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### Publication Date

2011

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

**Growing Out of a Postsocialist World:  
Teenagers Reconstructing Identities in Western Ukraine**

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

Anthropology

by

Elizabeth A. Peacock

Committee in charge:

Professor Kathryn A. Woolard, chair  
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Professor Akos Rona-Tas

2011

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2011

## Table of Contents

Signature Page.....	iii
Table of Contents .....	iv
Transliteration Key.....	ix
Transcription Key.....	x
List of Excerpts.....	xi
List of Figures.....	xii
List of Tables.....	xiii
List of Vignettes.....	xiv
Acknowledgments.....	xv
Vita.....	xvi
Abstract of the Dissertation .....	xvii
Chapter 1. Introduction: The Construction of Identity in Times and Places of Social Transformation.....	1
The Chronotope: Narratives Of and In the World.....	4
Memory and Nostalgia.....	12
Why Study Postsocialist Ukraine? .....	15
Economic Transformations.....	17
The Global Linguistic Marketplace .....	19
Why Young People?.....	22
Socialization to Ideologies.....	22
Social Identities.....	25

Youth and Social Transformation.....	27
Methodology .....	28
Organization of the Dissertation.....	30
Chapter 2. Living in the Borderlands: A Minority Nation between Two World	
Superpowers.....	37
Historical Ties .....	39
Unification of Ukrainian lands .....	45
Nation-building.....	48
Revising History .....	52
Citizenship .....	60
Language policies .....	63
Ukraine in the Global Mindset .....	67
Discussion .....	69
Conclusion.....	72
Chapter 3. The Local Context.....	74
The Reproduction of Social Differences.....	74
L'viv: a.k.a. L'vov, L'wow, Lemburg, Leopoldis .....	80
Schooling in L'viv.....	84
The Working Class School: Taras Shevchenko.....	89
The Middle Class School: Ivan Franko Secondary School .....	93
Making Identity with Style.....	97
Alina's New Haircut .....	98

The Uniform Debate.....	100
Conclusion.....	106
Chapter 4. The Authentic Village and the Modern City: Local Sites of Meaning	
Making.....	108
Place and Identity .....	111
Rural-Urban Dichotomy in Western Ukraine.....	113
Rural Life.....	115
Media Images of the Rural .....	118
The Rural at School.....	120
Family Experiences of the Rural.....	129
The Wisdom of the Rural.....	133
The 19 <sup>th</sup> Century Village in a 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Ukraine.....	138
The Modern and Immoral City.....	142
Nostalgia as a Response to the Present.....	146
Discussion .....	149
Conclusion.....	152
Chapter 5. “It Wouldn't be Ukraine Without Ukrainian”: Socioeconomic Class and	
Ideologies of Speaking .....	154
Ideologies about Language Use .....	155
Ukrainian and Russian.....	161
National Ideologies .....	166
Regionalism and Linguistic Purism .....	168

Local Experts' View of “Correct” Speech .....	170
“Attention! Cultured Speech!” on Public Transportation .....	170
“Correct” Speech at School .....	177
Teenagers' Ideologies of Speaking Ukrainian .....	184
Self-Reported Speech .....	185
Rural and Urban Varieties .....	187
Slang and Vulgar Speech.....	194
Teenagers' Ideologies of Speaking other Languages.....	204
Multilingualism in Ukraine .....	205
Multilingualism Abroad .....	214
The Global Linguistic Marketplace .....	219
Discussion: Youth Identities at School.....	221
Conclusion.....	225
Chapter 6. Stance-Taking in a Social Minefield: Discourses of Emigration.....	228
From Ukraine to Europe .....	231
Comparing Life Abroad with that in Ukraine .....	235
Soviet and Western Normalities .....	238
Achieving Normality at Home by Moving Abroad?.....	242
Public Discourses at School .....	245
Fancy Footwork on Uneven Ground .....	250
Friction between Identities: Example 1 .....	252
Friction between Identities: Example 2.....	259



Discussion .....	264
Conclusion.....	268
Chapter 7. Conclusion: Locating Who We are in Space and Time .....	271
Boundary-Making.....	271
Implications and Further Research.....	275
Chronotopes of Identity .....	278
Appendix I: Language at Ivan Franko (Sept 2007).....	282
Appendix II: “Cool” speech at Ivan Franko (Sept 2007) .....	290
Appendix III: The Village at Taras Shevchenko (Sept 2007) .....	302
Appendix IV: Migration at Taras Shevchenko (May 2007).....	310
Appendix V: Migration at Ivan Franko (Apr 2007).....	317
References.....	325

## Transliteration Key

Ukrainian	Transliteration	Ukrainian	Transliteration
А а	A a	О о	O o
Б б	B b	П п	P p
В в	V v	Р р	R r
Г г	H h	С с	S s
Ґ ґ	G g	Т т	T t
Д д	D d	У у	U u
Е е	E e	Ф ф	F f
Є є	Je je	Х х	Kh kh
Ж ж	Zh zh	Ц ц	Ts ts
З з	Z z	Ч ч	Ch ch
И и	Y y	Ш ш	Sh sh
І і	I i	Щ щ	Shch shch
Ї ї	Ji ji	Ю ю	Ju ju
Й й	J j	Я я	Ja ja
К к	K k	ь	'
Л л	L l	Ё ё (Rus.)	Jo jo
М м	M m	'	"
Н н	N n		

## Transcription Key

The following conventions are used in the transcripts, both in-text and in the extended versions that appear in Appendices.

=latching

stressed speech

[overlapping speech

rising intonation!

falling intonation?

((transcriber's note))

XX ((inaudible speech))

(unclear speech)

°quieter speech°

e:longated vowel

*nonstandard form*

FST ((female student))

MST ((male student))

STs ((multiple students))

## **List of Excerpts**

Excerpt 4.1: “I’m really sorry I wasn’t born in the village” .....	131
Excerpt 4.2: “More cultured” people .....	135
Excerpt 4.3: “Everything’s there in the village” .....	137
Excerpt 4.4: “Ukrainian is becoming fashionable” .....	148
Excerpt 5.1: Playing with “Potatoes” .....	188
Excerpt 5.2: Proper speech can only be learned .....	190
Excerpt 5.3: Slang as typical youth speech .....	201
Excerpt 5.4: “Boys don’t understand...how girls have to be” .....	203
Excerpt 5.5: “Different people speak differently” in Ukraine .....	208
Excerpt 5.6: “It wouldn't be Ukraine without Ukrainian” .....	210
Excerpt 5.6: “English is an international language” .....	217
Excerpt 6.1: Gender divisions at Taras Shevchenko.....	253
Excerpt 6.2: Class divisions at Ivan Franko .....	261

## **List of Figures**

Figure 3.1: “Our School Family.” Main entry at Taras Shevchenko .....	91
Figure 4.1: Mural in hallway at Taras Shevchenko. ....	121
Figure 4.2: Segment of mural in main hallway at Taras Shevchenko.....	123
Figure 4.3: Ukrainian Declarations of Independence in main hallway at Ivan Franko .....	128
Figure 5.1: “Attention! Cultured Speech! Respectable Passengers!” Bus Poster.....	171
Figure 5.2: “We Speak Correctly and Beautifully!”Bus Poster.....	172

## List of Tables

Table 2.1: Development of the Ukrainian language (Bilaniuk 2005) .....	43
Table 2.2: Language events in Ukraine (Bilaniuk 2005; Janmaat 2000) .....	64
Table 3.1: Historical Timeline of L'viv .....	82
Table 3.2: Excerpted from The Standard Plan for General Education for Students in Levels II-III (distribution of teaching time between educational branches) .....	85
Table 5.1: Ukrainian Consonants .....	163
Table 5.2: Russian Consonants .....	163
Table 5.3: Ukrainian and Russian Vowels .....	164
Table 5.4: Orthographic Differences (Timberlake 1993:832 and Shevelov 1993:953) .....	165
Table 5.5: Ukrainian lexicon with Russian syntax .....	173
Table 5.6: Russian lexicon with Ukrainian phonology .....	174
Table 5.7: Example of “More Ukrainian” forms on Bus Posters. ....	176
Table 5.6: Self-Reported Language Practices.....	186
Table 5.7: “To be successful in Ukraine, a person needs to speak:” .....	206
Table 5.8: “To be successful elsewhere, a Ukrainian needs to speak:” .....	215

## **List of Vignettes**

Vignette 4.1: Being “Patriotic”, May 24, 2007.....	125
Vignette 5.1: Being “Funny” in Ukrainian, October 23, 2006 .....	160
Vignette 5.3: Graffiti at Taras Shevchenko, December 14, 2006.....	197
Vignette 5.4: Sunday lunch with Solja's family, September 9, 2007.....	207
Vignette 5.5: Tourism Day at Taras Shevchenko, October 2, 2007. ....	222

## Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my committee members for the years of guidance and support they have given me. My years of working with Kit Woolard have helped me develop as a scholar and gave me a strong model of the kind of professor I hope to become. I thank all of my committee members for their open and constructive feedback, which I think helped me much more than any of us realize.

I would also like to thank the UCSD Linguistic Anthropology Lab, our exchange lab at the University of Arizona, and all the faculty and graduate students who have helped me think through my research. Specifically, I'd like to thank Nicole Barger, Jon Bialecki, Jen Carroll, Eric Hoenes, Viktor Krevs, Melanie McComsey, Nicole Peterson, Brendan Thornton, Allen Tran, and Nataliya Tsisar. I especially thank Nataliya for her expertise and insight into local language practices. I also thank all of the faculty and students at “Taras Shevchenko” and “Ivan Franko” secondary schools who gave their time to help make this research possible, as well as to all of the families who welcomed me into their homes.

Funding for this research was provided by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad grant (2006-2007), the UCSD Department of Anthropology F. G. Bailey Fellowship (2006), Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowships through the Harvard Ukrainian Institute (2002, 2004) and the University of Kansas (2003), and Title VIII grants from the U.S. Department of Education through American Councils for International Education (2004) and the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (2005).



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- 2011 Book note. *Youngspeak in a Multilingual Perspective*, Anna-Brita Stenström and Annette Myre Jørgensen, eds. *Language in Society* 40(3):387-388.
- 2011 “Evangelical Christianity and the Transformation of Postsocialist Society.” Book review. *Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism*, Catherine Wanner. *H-Net Reviews*. [www.h-net.org](http://www.h-net.org). March.
2010. Book review. *Women’s Social Activism in the New Ukraine: Development and the Politics of Differentiation*, Sarah D Phillips. *Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Europe* 10 (2): 42-43.

## Fields of Study

Youth, identity, and globalization

Sociolinguistics

Postsocialist societies

Social structure and individual agency

## **Abstract of the Dissertation**

Growing Out of a Postsocialist World:  
Teenagers Reconstructing Identities in Western Ukraine

by

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Doctor of Philosophy

University of California, San Diego

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Postsocialist Eastern Europe is one region where economic restructurings coincide with state-building processes, both of which lead to a reordering of national values and a redefining of national identity. The former USSR continues to be a reference point for adults in western Ukraine as they make sense of ongoing uncertainties. The generation born after socialism and Ukraine's independence in 1991, however, has learned what life was like before it was “transformed” only through the accounts of others. As a result, the way these young

people relate to the cultural, political, and economic elements associated with socialism and postsocialism are not the same as what the older generation expects of them.

Drawing upon ethnographic and linguistic data collected over sixteen months at two public schools in western Ukraine, this research examines how space and time work in concert to allow young people in contemporary Ukraine to make sense of the world they live in. Specifically, I apply Bakhtin's notion of the chronotope, a space-time association that underlies people's experiences and conceptions of personhood, to contend that teenagers draw upon multiple linkages between space and time in order to position themselves among their peers, within their local communities, and towards the wider global community.

My analysis suggests that teenagers position themselves in relation to different social identities by constructing multiple chronotopes of tradition and modernity. Specifically, I examine how these space-time associations underlie teenagers' attitudes towards emigration, language use, and linguistic variability. These chronotopes play an important role in how Ukrainian teenagers perceive the differences between the older and younger generations, between rural and urban residents, and between Ukrainians and the rest of the world. Socioeconomic class and differing ideologies of language influence how space and time are valued within these dichotomous relationships.

An investigation such as this suggests that everyday encounters with change are only one way in which social transformation is experienced. People also draw

upon space and time in order to contextualize change and understand its effect on their lives, an integral facet of experience that extends beyond any particular historical event or rupture.

## **Chapter 1.**

### **Introduction: The Construction of Identity in Times and Places of Social Transformation**

Solja says she would like to go abroad for schooling someday. Though her father works as a bank security guard and her mother is a nurse, the family saves money to be able to go to France every few years to visit some of her father's relatives. Unlike many of her classmates, Solja has mixed feelings about Europe. Though she would like to study at a European university, she fears that she may never return to her hometown in western Ukraine if she does. While others at her school question whether a Ukrainian could still be considered Ukrainian if they lived and worked in another country, Solja has visited family members who provide a model for her of this possibility. As her father explains, “they are Ukrainian; they just happen to live in France. They still speak the language, eat Ukrainian food.” The idea that these family members might no longer be Ukrainian is inconceivable. Rather, they welcome their L'vivian brethren, continuing to uphold familial ties and fulfilling their familial responsibilities, which, for Solja and her family, attest to their Ukrainianness. Their financial situation, however, makes it unlikely that Solja or her brother Tolik will be able to study abroad, so she is left with her memories of visits to France and her extended family's model of being Ukrainian while living in another country.

In meeting Solja and her peers, and in seeing how they defined and described their worlds, I recognized a deeper generational difference I had seen back in 2004, while I was studying in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. At that time, it seemed

as if every generation in western Ukraine was attending organized rallies in the city center, waving flags of support, and watching the events religiously on the nightly news. Even my then six-year-old host sister drew a picture in support for the western leaning candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, which her mother taped to the second-story living room window that faced the street. I wondered, however, if this Revolution meant the same thing to all: undoubtedly, the school-aged children saw this event much differently than their college-aged siblings, their middle-aged parents educated under the Soviets, and their grandmothers who had lived under pre-Soviet Polish rule. Seeing other school children similarly waving flags and marching in support of political ideologies they could not begin to understand, I wondered how this generation which had only known an independent Ukraine might view the world much differently from previous generations. How might postsocialist debates look through the eyes of this first generation of postsocialist Ukraine? How do young people in a newly-independent, postsocialist country understand the nation and national identity? What constitutes their social identities, and how do these identities interact with larger public discourses of belonging? How do schools, teachers, and parents shape, constrain, and otherwise influence teenagers' understandings of themselves and their society? More broadly, how do people layer space and time to conceptualize, understand, and make meaning of who they are?

Migration and social transformation have led to a reframing of what it means to be a citizen and a member of the nation in many countries. For the youth who are growing up, is it even more difficult to discover and define where they belong within

these transitional societies. Though older generations have direct experience of earlier models of social life and ideologies of social norms, this generation's understanding of these earlier models is second-hand. For them, the transformation from socialism is life; instability and uncertainty are the norm. Somehow they are able to create a stable, coherent social life of their own, not based on the same reference points as previous generations. Rather, they draw upon local discourses from their peers, and communities, upon national discourses evident in their textbooks and the political sphere, and upon the global discourses that unite them to other young people living around the world. To a much larger extent than young people elsewhere, the first generation of postsocialism lives in a time and space different from their parents.

As these young people went about their lives, going to class, chatting with friends during and after school, and participating in my research activities, I discovered that, in many ways, they made sense of who they were as teenagers and as Ukrainians through comparisons with other peoples and other places. Though this isn't surprising—communities throughout the world define and distinguish themselves in relation to others—what I noticed was that place was often imbued with a sense of temporality. In fact, much of the postsocialist and post-Soviet literature consists of actors who live between two worlds, separated by both space and time: a socialist past located within the USSR and a postsocialist present or future that occupies the same geographic area but is situated in a much different, transformed, independent nation-state.

Nostalgia has been an often used concept in postsocialist research, as a way to examine people's responses to the social, political, and economic changes that came with the end of the Soviet Union. However, this longing for a past time and place cannot fully encompass the multitude of other ways in which people envision space-time. Some of the teenagers in this study have nostalgia for a rural life that still exists, or for the ease of travel to Poland that existed before the expansion of the European Union.

Finally, the ways in which the first generation of postsocialism comes to understand who they are and what are their possibilities in life, are shaped by other actors, such as teachers, parents, and the state. Among these ideologies of socialism and postsocialism, of tradition and modernity, is that of language use and its role in social identities. Not all of the boundary-making of these young people included indexes of space-time; at other times, they used differences in language use to frame the borders of their worlds. In the next few sections, I delve into these issues of space-time, nostalgia, and identity in more detail. Then, I present the methodology of the research project upon which this dissertation is based, and provide an overview of the subsequent chapters.

### **The Chronotope: Narratives Of and In the World**

In his examination of genre in classic Western literature, Mikhail Bakhtin, a Russian literary theorist, showed how relationships between space and time were often used as plot devices. Appropriating physics' Theory of Relativity, Bakhtin defines the



chronotope as the “articulation” of persons within time and space, and “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships” within literature (1981:84). He suggested that the different ways in which time and space are linked within literature work to help delineate different literary genres, each with its own flow of time and varying ways of depicting places, which, together, create a specific narrative structure. In literature, “[t]ime, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history” (84).

Through framings of space and time, certain events happen and particular characters are affected (or not) depending on the genre of the narrative. The Greek romance, or “adventure novel of ordeal,” for example, “requires large spaces” (99), as “the nature of a given place does not figure as a component in the event; the place figures solely as a naked, abstract expanse of space” (100). In this genre, the story revolves around lovers who find themselves separated by obstacles in foreign lands, who, at the end of the story are reunited. In essence, there is no temporal gap between the lovers and only a vague notion of space, which is filled with events that exist only to prolong the lovers' separation. Furthermore, neither the passage of time nor the experiences they face in these foreign lands change them. Rather, the events become “a test of the heroes' integrity” (106); “the hammer of events shatters nothing and forges nothing—it merely tries the durability of an already finished product” (107). In other words, the trials and tribulations faced by the hero function only to confirm his status as a hero. When he is finally reunited with his lover, he remains the same man

she first set eyes upon; just as his love for her has not changed, neither has his character, despite all of his adventures.

In this way, Bakhtin showed how the nexus of space, time, and character qualities create distinct literary genres, from adventure novels to romances to biographical novels. The articulation of space and time within the narrative creates the possibility for different types of characters and approaches to character development; different chronotopic frames give rise to specific characters, such as the unchanging, ageless adventure hero, or the autobiographer who is the sum of his life choices and experiences, as well as the product of the larger world in which he lived. Authors use different genres, and the events and characters congruent with each genre's chronotopes, in an aim to represent a world to which readers may be drawn. These recognizable genres facilitate reader alignment to their constructed worlds and the events that occur within them; once a reader recognizes genre, then the dis-beliefs, of certain flows of time and space and the nature of the narrative's characters, are dispelled.

Though Bakhtin limited himself to the examination of literature, and did not seek to "deal with the chronotope in other areas of culture" (1981:84), scholars have recently made similar claims about non-literary narratives. Just as a reader must be able to understand the genre in use in order to interpret the significance of a particular event within a text, a listener must be able to understand the broader social interaction in order to interpret the meaning of a speaker's utterance. These investigations focus on other forms of narrative and speech practices, such as oral histories (Perrino 2007,

Schiffrin 2009) and formalized speech registers (Lempert 2007, Wirtz 2007). When people narrate a story, for example, they can “move through” time, drawing past events, people, or values into the current context. Other scholars have examining the moral systems implicit in the personhoods that are made possible within cultural chronotopes, the “depictions of place-time-and-personhood to which social interactants orient when they engage each other through discursive signs” (Agha 2007:320).

The chronotope has also been analyzed by anthropologists such as Asif Agha (2007a, 2007b), and philosophers like Walter Benjamin, from two different perspectives.<sup>1</sup> The space/time perspective treats the chronotope as socially defined, ephemeral, and abstract. In contrast, a place-historicity perspective focuses on the pre-bounded spatial and temporal qualities that are located within particular physical sites and events. These perspectives frame place as “a particular physical environment and its associated socio-cultural qualities” while space is viewed as “a grounded metaphor” (Creed and Ching 1997:7). Richard Parmentier makes a similar distinction with his “signs of history” and “signs in history”:

‘signs of history’ can be anything in any medium that represents the past (e.g., a monument, a history book, a name, a specific spatial arrangement of objects, an historical painting); and ‘signs in history’ are those signs of history that, additionally, become tokens players in the dynamics of social life because of the first representational function (2007:173)

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<sup>1</sup> Walter Benjamin (1968) also makes a distinction between different temporal frames—that of a historical, empty, and homogenous time and messianic time that allows for the past to be brought into the present. Benedict Anderson (1991) reinterpreted Benjamin in his examination of the formation of the nation-state. However, as Kathryn Woolard points out, Anderson shifted the focus “from a way of experiencing time to a way of experiencing community...historicism became ahistorical and synchronic” (2004:61).

The primary purpose of “signs of history” is the indexing of historical events and places<sup>2</sup>, whereas “signs in history” only indirectly index these events and places as they have acquired additional meaning. In a way, chronotopes of place/historicity create “signs of history,” which can then be transformed into “signs in history” that have space/time chronotopic significance.

Both chronotopic lenses, that of space/time and place/historicity, can be used to examine postsocialist phenomena in which the past becomes relevant for understanding present phenomena. For example, take the Taras Shevchenko monument in the center of L'viv. In terms of a place-historicity framework, it is a memorial to the Holodomor, or Great Famine, of 1932-1933. During this time an estimated 1-6 million Ukrainians died due to a combination of a widespread drought that resulted in a poor harvest and Stalin's strict harvest quotas. The two-part monument depicts dozens of people, faces wrenched in agony, who are protected by an angel. The Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, stands off to one side, hand raised in a lecturing style reminiscent of Orthodox icons of religious figures who preached to the people. Annually, on the Day of Remembrance, people gather here and place lit candles and flowers, visiting as they would a cemetery grave on All Saints' Day. On other national holidays, veteran's groups, religious leaders, or political organizations gather here to celebrate the Ukrainian people. In these ways, the monument is sign *of* history, a site of historical memory of a tragic event for the Ukrainian nation. It

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<sup>2</sup> Keith Basso's description of the significance of Apache place-names (Basso 1996; also cf. Feld and Basso 1996) could also be seen as a way in which places that are “signs of history”, both documented and mythological history, can become culturally important and embued with morality

becomes a place to remember past atrocities and to celebrate the resilience of the Ukrainian people.

But through a space/time framework, the monument becomes something else on other days of the year. As one of the largest, most central, and most well-known monuments in the city, it is a space where people arrange to meet their friends on their way to a cafe or the movie theater. The monument as a sign of history, has also become a sign *in* history due to its significance as a monument, It is a space where alternative teens socialize, smoke, and drink beer from plastic bottles in brown paper bags, and where young women roller skate, waving flags and passing out free knickknacks to advertise the opening of a new technology store or mobile phone company. It is also one of many local sites where wedding couples get their pictures taken for their weddings albums and videos the day before the church ceremony. At this level then, the Taras Shevchenko monument is a gathering place for all kinds of people. It is a space to mark special occasions or to begin a night of festivities, a space that everyone can occupy and make use of throughout the year.

Apart from examining specific objects or places linked to the past, the chronotopic lens of analysis can also reveal the multiple space/time and place-historicity understandings present within interpersonal interactions. Simultaneous chronotopes of the Cold War, such as the American and the Russian, for example, differ due to the experience of historical events and their national, political, and social significance for each country (Lemon 2009:843).

The strands that post-Soviets knit together from the meaningful past differ from those that most raised in *kapstrany* (capitalist countries) might pluck out, prone to look for reddish patches of socialism as we assume it had been – to miss altogether

continuities not colored by obvious nostalgia or difference. Signs read locally as continuity are easily misread as signs of change because – to *kapstran* eyes – they seem to clash against socialist fabric. (Lemon 2009:842)

In other words, the American and Russian chronotopes of the Cold war shape each region's views of this period of time and its influence on the present. An American historical perspective on postsocialist life, for example, might see it as much more jarring and unexpected than those living in these postsocialist countries. Differing chronotopic perspectives shape our understandings of past events and actions, and how the past is relevant to present concerns and future trajectories.

Merely viewing postsocialism as some form of anti-socialism, or socialism as anti-capitalism obscures the varying perspectives on these time periods and the political and economic systems associated with them. This kind of simplification also homogenizes the events and actors within these periods, which may be perceived differently by those in the West and those residing in postsocialist regions. Alexei Yurchak (2006) critiques analyses of socialism based in dichotomies of Western, non-socialist forms and Soviet socialism. Explicitly or not, these frameworks rely on “the use of binary categories to describe Soviet reality such as oppression and resistance, repression and freedom, the state and the people, official economy and second economy, official culture and counterculture, totalitarian language and counterlanguage, public self and private self, truth and lie, reality and dissimulation, morality and corruption, and so on” (5).

As Yurchak attempts to explain how the end of socialism was experienced as both “unimaginable and yet unsurprising,” he argues for an interpretation of people's actions that is based on an underlying logic, seemingly contradictory through western

eyes, yet in line with socialist ideals. “In a seemingly paradoxical twist, the immutable and predictable aspects of state socialism, and its creative and unpredictable possibilities, became mutually constitutive” (29). The Soviet state sought an ideology of socialism based on collective compliance, but also one that was linked to modernist goals of individual commitment, creativity, and scientific advancement. Compliance itself became a meaningful act, separate from any interpretation of intent. When the system finally fell apart, the expectation that people display a complying public face also fell away. People's motivations and desires, however, had already been cultivated in their private lives.

The lines constructed between what was socialism and what is postsocialism do not adequately explain either experience. We may conceive of the end of the Soviet Union as a kind of rupture, from a socialist existence to a postsocialist one. However, this rupture can also be framed as simply the social transformation most recent in memory. For many people, under socialism was not necessarily distinct from pre-socialist life or the current realities of postsocialism. To present the complexity of history, lived experience, and shifting ideological frameworks that occurred in this part of the world as a complete and totalizing move from one kind of life to another, simplifies people's experiences during these decades. Interpreting the past as one known history shared by all does not leave room for alternatives that can have lasting meaning.

## Memory and Nostalgia

Research on the former Soviet Union often deals with issues of time and historicity, whether they are about the balancing of past and present experiences or the imagining of the future. Space/time connections of postsocialism, however, are tinged with unique meaning in this part of the world. In contrast to common uses of the term, Svetlana Boym (2001) defines nostalgia as

a longing for a place, but actually it is a yearning for a different time – the time of our childhood, the slower rhythms of our dreams. In a broader sense, nostalgia is rebellion against the modern idea of time, the time of history and progress. The nostalgic desires to obliterate history and turn it into private or collective mythology, to revisit time like space, refusing to surrender to the irreversibility of time that plagues the human condition. (2001: xv)

Within this notion of nostalgia, Boym shows how people long for a multitude of memories that are anchored in a particular time, not just to a particular place or event. She also argues for an understanding of nostalgia that resists the pacing and progress of modern life. Furthermore, Boym claims that “[n]ostalgia is not always about the past; it can be retrospective but also prospective. Fantasies of the past determined by needs of the present have a direct impact on realities of the future” (xvi). Boym's view of nostalgia, which is a present that both looks back at a past and looks forward to a future affected by the past, conveys a chronotopic frame. Nostalgia for rural life, for example, is a yearning for rural places as well as times where rural ways of life were common. This nostalgia can comment on the follies of modern life and its future trajectory by emphasizing the disparity between what is longed for in the past and what is reality in the present. Nostalgia which is “retrospective but also prospective” wants for a past time, and in this wanting, helps shape the future.



Boym's perspective on nostalgia adds an often missing element in the analysis of the chronotope in postsocialist narratives. In Deanna Davidson's work on East Germans and their use of the deictics "here" and "now" (2007) she reveals a chronotope that separates space into an East German "here" and a West German "there," at the same time as it separates time into a Western "now" and an Eastern "back then." Through the use of ambiguity in voicing, East Germans can both appear to support Germany's view that the East is in need of reform, while also validating the socialist ideals that are widely rejected in the West. This works to maintain a separation between a valued Eastern personhood and the broader Germany: "The textual structuring of a postsocialist chronotope provides one example of ways in which, despite the dissolution of the socialist state, East German postsocialist subjectivity continues to exist and even arguably to thrive" (225). By contrasting unified Germany and the former East Germany, these East Germans can acknowledge the value of past socialist norms and challenge the ideologies of the unified German state.

While Davidson seems to be looking at how the socialist Germany is viewed as a past but not one whose logic worlds are always "behind" or "backwards" in comparison to the present unified Germany, Alaina Lemon's take (2009) is slightly different. She shows how the new postsocialist generation in Russia reproduces images of socialism and the Soviet person, which places the past in a negative light. As they have never experienced the "seemingly paradoxical twists" of socialism (cf. Yurchak 2006), this generation must be taught to view the past in a more fluid way if

they are to come to understand older generations and how socialism has shaped them. Instructors at a theater school in Moscow try to teach their students the importance of taking into account and drawing upon the multiple pasts—the imagined past experiences and tragedies that shaped these people's characters at different points in their lives—which created the present person. In order to fully understand the person upon which a student's character is based, one has to understand all of the pasts that are simultaneously a part of that person. In this drawing together of different temporalities, the student actor comes to understand, and empathize with, the Soviet person by gathering these pasts and pulling them into the present.

Both Davidson and Lemon examine, in a way, socialist and postsocialist chronotopes in interaction. However, underlying their discussions of space-time associations is a nostalgia that motivates their informants' perspectives. Davidson's East Germans value socialist ideals, in contrast to the ideologies of a unified Germany, seem to be nostalgic for an earlier time when their way of life was not subject to the ridicule they currently face. Through their nostalgia, these East Germans can challenge current reforms that will move Germany even further away from the past that they long for. The empathy for socialism that Lemon's acting instructors seek to instill in their students, also suggests a kind of nostalgia that is important to these teachers, a nostalgia they hope to impart upon their students. They insist that their students model their characters on actual people in order to understand the past at a deep, personal level that goes beyond broad stereotypes. Though their students may not feel nostalgia for the past, the process of creating these characters makes nostalgia a possibility.

The use of a chronotopic lens of analysis allows for a broader examination of how space and time frame people's worlds which nostalgia cannot fully take into account. Conversely, investigating space-time associations without addressing the nostalgic sentiments that impart and motivate people's beliefs and values about these times and places is like buying a postcard instead of taking a photograph. Though the pre-made postcard may be of the same sight as the photograph, it lacks the personal connection that gives the photograph its significance as a memento. The photograph says "I was here, at that time" much more loudly and deeply than a postcard, which can be purchased far from the location it represents, and at a time far removed from a person's first-hand experience of the place.

### **Why Study Postsocialist Ukraine?**

Postsocialist nation-building in Ukraine involves nostalgia within multiple chronotopic frames. Under socialism, collective memories focused on socialist historiographies, geography, a pan-*ethnie*, and the primacy of the state's version of cultural identification (Kuzio 2002: 246). Individuals' memories based on direct experience of an event—such as Ukrainians' collaborations with and fighting against both the Germans and the Russians during World War II—were often erased by official accounts or forgotten due to globalization and "accelerated" history, and so people sought to retain these experiences through the construction of "sites of memory" (Ten Dyke 2000: 140).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> These "sites of memory," for example, can be apartment "museums," personal collections, or diaspora art exhibits that are dedicated to warehousing and displaying artifacts (or kitsch) that were

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, however, states have been able to create their own official accounts of the past. However, they are often ambiguous about which memories should be protected against forgetting, or which ones should be “already forgotten” (Anderson 1991 [1983]: 201). For many of the newly independent states, it is unclear how the recent past should be interpreted. As varying logic worlds exist within post-Soviet regions, each have responded differently to the “flashpoint” of the end of socialism (cf. Rickedahl 2007). This has resulted in differing regional experiences of space/time and place/historicity.

In Ukraine, for example, the government is undecided on how the Ukrainian nation and “Ukrainian-ness” should be defined (Birch 1996; Goshulak 2001; Hrytsenko 2001; Pirie 1996; Wilson 2002), and what role the state should play in defining each. Its history, territory, language, and national culture are all closely linked with that of Russia. Because there is no clear sense of how the nation should be seen as an actor in Soviet historiography, the Ukrainian state has remained silent on the issue in order to avoid conflicts with groups who might challenge it.<sup>4</sup> As a result, nation-building in Ukraine is balanced between constructing a unique national identity based on a separate national language, culture, and history and carving out space for

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common during the socialist period (see Boym 1999; Sabonis-Chafee 1999; Ten Dyke 2000).

<sup>4</sup> The actions of different groups during World War II has led to some of these ambiguities; some openly sided with Nazi Germany and actively participated in the exterminations; others formed part of resistance groups against both the Russians and the Germans (Magocsi 1996: 622-37). In addition, many Ukrainians are now reevaluating independence as the economy worsens, and are supporting continued ties with the Russian Federation (Pirie 1996: 1098-99). While the state and many in western regions of the country seem to think that becoming more Western will improve the country, instead of remaining tied to the East and Russia (Wolczuk 2000: 683-6), those in the eastern and southern areas seem hesitant to believe that Ukraine will ever be accepted as part of Europe.

the largest ethnic minorities, Russians, in order to maintain its economic ties with Russia.

### ***Economic Transformations***

The social transformations that occurred after 1991 in Ukraine also resulted in economic changes, most significantly in terms of the adoption of western capitalism. Though the economic definitions of capitalism and socialism have not changed, the ways in which people view and define these systems for themselves are shaped by their experiences with each. Katherine Verdery (1996) argues that Eastern Europe and Eurasia provide unique views of transnationalism and globalization. In examining new formations of citizenship and property ownership in this region, she shows how these issues are linked to both national and transnational processes. Rather than weakening the influence of the nation-state, the past socialist nationalizing policies have upheld the legitimation of the nation-state system. At the same time, global pressures lead towards other transnational formations linked to the global economy.

For example, nostalgia for socialist ideologies persist despite pressures to replace everything connected to the old system, leading to more hybrid systems where socialist and capitalist practices are utilized simultaneously. This includes positive attitudes towards collective property rights under processes of privatization (Lampland 2002), the utilization of socialist networks in navigating the market system (Creed 1998), a continuing reliance on third economies (Humphrey 2002), and the valuing of

socialist identities that focus more on group cohesion and success rather than on individual achievement (Ashwin 1999; Berdahl 1999; Dunn 1999).

Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery's edited volume highlights the role of the past in framing how western versions of capitalism are adopted and transformed in postsocialist societies. For example, the social networks that were vital in the "economy of scarcity" that existed under socialism have reappeared in new ways under capitalism (Humphrey 1999; Woodruff 1999). A model which functions in one locale, however, cannot simply be transported somewhere else and function in the same way, as has been shown in the adoption of capitalist business practices (Ashwin 1999; Dunn 1999), and western democratic welfare reforms (Haney 1999).

Other researchers of the former Soviet Union have investigated how people in this region have learned to navigate the global consumer market in their everyday lives (cf. Stryker and Patico 2001). These studies include examining how global media is linked to the commodification of linguistic knowledge (Jacquemet 2001); how western cinematic discourses are combined with local themes to reflect both old nationalist gender relations and new global feminist perspectives (Popescu 2001); and how evaluations of new consumer products can result in two different, albeit not necessarily opposing, scales of value (Patico 2001, 2005).

Globalized processes such as these create tension between the existing economic systems and social institutions in postsocialist countries, and those of western societies, which are held up to be the ideal models for these countries to join the global marketplace. It is important to continue investigating the difficulties in

mediating between nation-building processes aimed at internal development, which are often contentious, and the external transnational flows that are linked to, entwined with, and rub against these nation-building processes.

In addition to redefining the relationship between the state and citizenry, Ukraine has also dealt with growing socioeconomic class differences and decreasing state support. Previous Soviet social programs focused on people's roles in society, such as providing financial support to mothers of multiple children regardless of their families' actual level of need. The objective definitions of economic need promoted by current reforms, however, have forced people to find other means of support. The poor and disabled in Ukraine have turned towards foreign nongovernmental organizations; only those who can reframe their need to reflect the goals and objectives of these western NGOs end up benefiting (Petryna 2002; Phillips 2008). Others seek to fill their economic needs through emigration (Dickinson 1999; Montefusco 2008; Tolstokorova 2010), which may both help foster development in Ukraine and solidify the image of Ukraine as belonging to the Third World of illegal immigrant laborers (Düvell 2007; Solari 2010).

### ***The Global Linguistic Marketplace***

In multiple ways, postsocialist Eastern Europe is a region where economic restructurings coincide with state-building processes, both of which lead to a reordering of national values and a redefining of national identity. Ideologies of language are central to national and ethnic identities (cf. Heller 1999; Irvine and Gal

2000; Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998; Urciuoli 1995), as they affect a group's notion of both its place within a society, as well as in the larger global arena. Macrosocial processes, however, often interact with language ideologies and shift the values upon which national identity is based (Gal 1979; Kulick 1992; Gal and Woolard 2001).

Many researchers have studied how economic and political changes have influenced the identities of minority language speakers and their uses of language. People can shift their uses of language, for example, in order to change their positions within the larger society (Dickinson 1999; Gal 1978, 1987; Hill 1985). Susan Gal (1978), for example, shows how young Hungarian women adopt German in order to secure comfortable desk jobs and marry German workers, both of which allow them to give up a harsh farm life. In other words, people can be strategic in their constructions of identity, presenting particular identities in order to achieve a desired social status. When economic or political shifts occur, they can lead to a reordering of values within a society, which changes the relationship between minority and majority languages, and through them, the identities of the speakers of these languages.

As the global consumer marketplace competes with state institutions, people's understandings of national identity may similarly shift away from the state's visions of the nation, reflecting orientations based upon global economic concerns, rather than ethnic or national ones. Scholars have examined how states link language to national identity; for example, through policies aimed at preserving and expanding the use of minority languages with official standing (Heller and Martin-Jones 2001; Jaffe 1999),



something that Ukraine has used to promote Ukrainian (Wanner 1995, 1998). Begoña Echeverría (2003) has studied how the language of instruction is correlated with ethnic identity among Basque- and Spanish-schooled students. In contrast, Kathryn Woolard (1997, 2003) has shown how policies aimed at promoting Catalan affect ethnic identity in unexpected ways (1997) and class differentiations are increasingly replacing ethnic distinctions (2003). Monica Heller similarly argues that the social meaning of French in Ontario is becoming commodified and heterogeneous due to a growing international French-speaking community which challenges the value of local French-Canadian speech (Budach, Roy, and Heller 2003).

Finally, processes of globalization may not simply erode national ties, but may transform the relationships between nation-states, their citizens, and international actors, shifting the bases for national identity. Sociologists and political scientists dealing with postsocialism have focused on top-down debates over the importance of language in people's social, ethnic, and political identities (Arel 1995; Janmaat 1999; Marshall 2002; Pirie 1996; Shulman 2001), while anthropologists have focused on the everyday effects of new economic and political changes on the postsocialist identity (Berdahl 1999; Galbraith 1996; Hann 2002; Humphrey 2002; Lampland 1995; Pesmen 2000; Verdery 1996, 1998). These discourses, however, are situated within a larger global field. Although scholars have studied processes of globalization, especially in terms of immigration and citizenship (Appadurai 1996, 2003; Benhabib 2001; Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson 1995; Ong 1999; Sassen 1997; Soysal 1994; Tsing 2005), and others have shown the effects of globalization within postsocialist cultures

(Stryker and Patino 2001), few have investigated how the postsocialist transformation has had an effect beyond the former Soviet Union itself (cf. Buck-Morss 2000). This project will attempt to bridge this gap, utilizing analyses of language ideologies to reframe local and national notions of identity and belonging within the global postsocialist arena.

### **Why Young People?**

Though the younger generation never experienced socialist times, they may still experience nostalgia for the “fantasies of the past,” which can have an effect on both their understanding of Ukraine and Ukrainians and what they do with this understanding in the future. In examining conceptualizations and constructions of identity through a chronotopic lens, an investigation of this youngest generation can provide alternate understandings of national identity in a globalized world. This may show us a “glimpse into the future” as youth bring change and influence the future paths of their country.

### ***Socialization to Ideologies***

Studies of young people often begin by looking at socialization practices. Through socialization, the processes by which we learn the beliefs, values, and practices that are deemed natural and normal in our societies, children learn how to become culturally competent members of their societies. They also learn how these facets of their community differ from those outside of their group. Language is a

central part of socialization, as children are both socialized *to* language and *through* language (Hymes 1972; Ochs and Schieffelin 1994). Not only do they learn how to speak, but they also learn what it means to speak in particular ways, at particular times, and to particular people. In acquiring a language, children learn what it means to be a speaker in a social world. This includes being socialized into the ideologies of language that underpin their communities' speech practices.

Ideologies of language are “representations, explicit or implicit, that construe the intersection of language and human beings in a social world” (Woolard 1998). Like other kinds of ideologies, ideologies of language can affect people's chances in society. The ideologies that lead to the greatest success are those ideologies of the socially dominant group; when the dominant group changes, the ideologies that lead to success shifts, reflecting the conditions of the new ordering of society. Elinor Ochs and Bambi Schieffelin (1994) show how language acquisition is deeply embedded in ideologies about language use. Different societies socialize their children in different ways, such as prioritizing dyadic or multiparty communicative interactions, or viewing pre-linguistic children as appropriate or inappropriate conversation partners for adults. These various socialization practices reveal different underlying ideologies, such as whether a hearer must infer a speaker's intentions from their spoken words, or whether speakers always “say what they mean” and “mean what they say.”

Not only do societies socialize their members to different ideologies about language, different social groups within the same society can also differ in their practices and underlying ideologies. Shirley Brice Heath (1982) shows how

differences in bedtime reading practices contribute to different outcomes in children's educational success in the United States. The bedtime reading practices of middle class white parents are reinforced by the ideologies of school and the broader dominant ideologies of the dominant middle class society. The working class and minority groups similarly socialize their children into their own group's ideologies of literacy and learning, but the skills their children learn are not always recognized by educators.

Adults are not the only actors in socialization practices; young people can also socialize each other. Marjorie Goodwin (2006) shows how girls construct and communicate differences of class and gender during their play activities. Through play, children create their own social worlds, filled with their own hierarchical systems, rules, and norms of behavior. These worlds are not completely distinct from the communities into which these children are socialized by adults. In developing their own social organizations, children draw upon wider class, race, and gender distinctions, at times reinforcing, challenging, or ignoring them. Interactions between peers, therefore, can also be seen as sites of socialization processes through which young people develop and communicate their own age-graded ideologies about the world. This includes youth communicative practices and the identities that young people claim through their uses of language.

## *Social Identities*

Following on Vered Amit-Talai and Helena Wulff's edited collection on youth cultures (1995), Mary Bucholtz (2002) makes an argument for a change in the anthropological perspective of youth, from seeing adolescence as a fixed stage and young people as merely learners of culture, to seeing youth as active agents with their own cultures. Rather than treating youth merely as agents of resistance towards adult-centered and adult-defined institutions, Bucholtz shows how the anthropology of youth can deconstruct this dichotomous relationship and view youth in a more heterogeneous way. Instead of viewing children as potential adults who will eventually become just like other adults in a society, or as inhabiting an oppositional stance (which likewise will be left behind when they mature and become part of the system they currently resist), young people have practices of their own, which they create and maintain, apart from adults.

One way in which young people construct, present, and maintain identities within their peer groups is through style. Many forms of identification can carry meaning, among them language, clothing, hairstyle, and musical preferences. Linguistic anthropologists have examined how people use language in a variety of ways to mark themselves as members of social groups through their uses of different languages, linguistic registers, and their attitudes towards others' uses of language.

Robert Le Page and André Tabouret-Keller (1985) describe how uses of language can be viewed as "acts of identity," as performances of identities the speaker is presenting to other participants within interactions. Jan-Petter Blom and John J.

Gumperz (1972), show how people change their uses of language depending upon contextual factors. A switch in language, for example, can reflect a change in an individual's perspective or orientation within an interaction. The use of particular linguistic forms can also emphasize certain kinds of identities. Masculine "cool solidarity" can be created through the use of "dude" among southern fraternity members (Kiesling 2004) or "güey" among Mexican immigrants (Bucholtz 2009). Certain word endings can index an identity of "soft" femininity (Ochs 1992) as well as draw upon historical constructions of gender (Inoue 2002, 2004). The use of language that usually marks a racial identity can also be used by a speaker to "cross" the line between his identity and this racial identity, an act which solidifies the division between the speaker's identity and the identity associated with the speech form, and which can be used to create and index peer relationships between youth of different speech communities (Rampton 2000, 2008).

Non-linguistic style choices can also function as "acts of identity." Mary Bucholtz (2001) shows how white nerds distinguish themselves from other groups primarily because they reject the current style choices that their peers covet as markers of prestige, flipping the presumed goal of popularity on its head. Others have looked at how young people make seemingly meaningless practices meaningful amongst them as markers of peer group membership, such as in the application of eyeliner (Mendoza-Denton 2008) or the width of one's jeans (Eckert 1989). The ways in which young people construct and present social identities in independent Ukraine involve

both linguistic and nonlinguistic styles, which gain meaning through their spatial and temporal contexts.

### ***Youth and Social Transformation***

Related to the construction of identities, researchers have also examined how the social identities of young people are often constructed in response to larger social phenomena. The Birmingham school examined the rise of a distinct period of youth in Western societies during the mid-twentieth century and its relation to the social upheavals during that time. Showing how British youth cultures in the 1950s-70s arose within particular historical moments, Dick Hebdige (1979) analyzed how these subcultures provided avenues for young people to challenge the racial, social, and economic barriers they faced through their styles of dress, appearance, musical tastes, and behaviors. Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson's 1976 edited volume also looked at how youth can use these subcultures to reflect the broader social order or to resist the social position in which they find themselves.

Focusing on the more recent transition from a socialist to a postsocialist state system, Hilary Pilkington et al. (2002) similarly look at how Russian youth appropriate and transform global subculture styles, utilizing them as “strategies...for negotiating the present and a means of envisaging the future” (130). Fran Markowitz (2000) also discusses how young people in Russia experience the social changes that came about after the end of the Soviet system. Although some might assume that these teenagers would view their worlds in terms of a disjuncture or rupture between the

former and current times, Markowitz shows, rather, how they use past-times, hobbies, media, and other cultural forms to give their lives a sense of normality, leading them to envision life as residing on a continuous, almost unchanging, time line.

Young people in other regions of the former Soviet Union have also been faced with shifting conceptions of national identity during times of social change. Marysia Galbraith (1996) studied young people in technology schools in Poland, and has recently argued that, for Polish young people, Poland is envisioned as “between” the East and the West. Scholars such as Pilkington, Markowitz, and Galbraith have focused on teenagers’ experiences both during and after the Soviet era. But how do the teenagers who have only lived in an independent, postsocialist state understand their nation? How do they orient towards the socialist past that remains a significant point of reference for the older generations? What types of identities do they present, and through what cultural forms do they construct these identities? These are the questions taken up in this study.

## **Methodology**

This dissertation is based on a total of twenty-one months of research conducted in 2003, 2004, and 2006-2007 in L'viv, an urban city in western Ukraine. During my preliminary fieldwork, I made contacts through Ivan Franko National University and became acquainted with teachers at a school that would later become one of my field sites. I sought the help of personal contacts to locate and select the



schools, which were chosen to represent different socioeconomic neighborhoods within the city.

The main research period in 2006-2007 included 60 students, aged 12-15 years old, in their eighth and ninth grade years, and 10 teachers at two public secondary schools. During the project, I conducted participant-observation with students and teachers, observing over 300 lessons in Ukrainian language, Ukrainian literature, Ukrainian history, world history, chemistry, and a handful of other lessons such as English, civics, physical education, arts and crafts, and geography. These lessons were chosen in order to compare how students might be socialized into the Ukrainian nation and as Ukrainian speakers to different degrees based on subject matter. In addition to extensive note-taking, and the acquisition of classroom textbooks and other materials, some of these lessons were also audio-recorded in order to gather more accurate data on typical classroom exchanges and activities.

I also interviewed teachers, individual and groups of students, and conducted student discussions, and interviews with some parents. Interviews with teachers focused on a variety of topics, from personal histories and their views of Ukrainian schooling to issues of students' home and school lives. These interviews were primarily one-on-one, with the teacher given a list of topics and related questions on which they spoke for as long as they wished. Students were, for the most part, interviewed in small groups with their peers. Interview topics included questions about the students' school, aspirations, travel experiences, and views on Ukrainian politics, language, media image, and migration. Classroom discussions asked students about

similar issues, as were interviews with parents. Over 40 hours of lessons, interviews, and discussions were audio recorded for transcribing and analysis.

The analysis of audio data includes analysis of interactions between students; group interviews with students, and individual interviews with teachers, parents, and students; and data from a survey on students' speech practices and language attitudes. The results of these analyses are presented in more detail in subsequent chapters. As the project progressed, I came to realize that notions of space and time could help reveal the ways in which these young people conceptualize and frame their attitudes towards current, locally-relevant social issues. Though students may not have spoken explicitly on these issues without my prompting, an examination of what they say about these issues can reveal the underlying ideologies they learned about the Ukrainian nation, their place within it, and its place within the global community.

### **Organization of the Dissertation**

My goal in this dissertation is to explore how social identities are defined through the creation of boundaries, and how these identities come to the forefront and engage with larger notions of difference, such as differences grounded in space-time associations or uses of language. As Stanton Wortham argued in his introduction to the panel, “Beyond Macro and Micro in the Linguistic Anthropology of Education,” at the American Anthropological Association meetings in 2009, a breaking down of the local/global construct can help us better see the multiple levels made relevant—the historical, political, and economic, as well as the everyday, personal, and semantic—

within interpersonal interactions. In addition, these levels are not merely in contrast, but may also be entwined to various degrees. Following Wortham, I suggest that temporal levels must also be considered, as well as the interactions between these various levels. The chronotope is a useful analytic tool, though it has its limits, to understand the ways in which the first generation of postsocialism makes sense of who they are and the world in which they live.

I begin with a socio-historical contextualization of Ukraine in Chapter 2, focusing primarily on the twentieth century. By examining Ukraine's relations with its neighbors, which is rooted in its geographical location, national narratives, and historical events, I show how nation-building in the country continues to be framed in spatiotemporal terms, referencing different Russias and Europes based in pre-socialist, socialist, and postsocialism times. As the territories of Ukraine were differently divided and often shifting between Russian and European powers, regionalism remains a key factor in nation-building projects. Western Ukraine, the location of this study, in particular is a site of nationalist sentiments, where language is a central component of national identity. This region of the country now shares a border with the European Union, but one that was more porous in earlier times. These complex relations result in a hierarchy of place that is envisioned as grounded in particular times.

I present the city of L'viv and the schools in which my research took place in Chapter 3 in order to demonstrate the local context within which this project's participants are situated. L'viv has historically been the center of Ukrainian

nationalism, which presents the nation as united across the social hierarchy through the shared use of Ukrainian. The growing socioeconomic differences in this part of the country, as evidenced at each school, have led to a re-evaluation of existing social norms and values. Though school administrators reproduce class identities, the meaning and value of the working class lifestyle is becoming increasingly de-valued as that of the worldly, capitalist emerging middle class becomes the standard against which Ukrainians compare themselves.

In Chapter 4, I show how views of the rural and the urban are linked to different spatiotemporal frameworks for working and middle class teenagers. Similar to the rural-urban dichotomies imagined elsewhere, western Ukrainian teenagers' views of rural and urban spaces are linked to their ideas of modernity, the value of these spaces and people in their lives, and their future life goals. Using a chronotopic lens to examine urbanities' attitudes and perceptions of the rural can uncover underlying social values and expectations. All participants agree that village areas do not have all of the opportunities and resources of the city, and are, in many ways, both simpler and less modern than urban areas. While teachers show some form of nostalgia for rural places, their students tend to interpret these places in terms of their personal experiences. Those of the working class, many of whom have retained ties to a familial village, describe rural areas as sites of core national morals, speaking of villages as supportive, caring communities, whereas the urban middle class views rural areas as akin to Third World countries or nineteenth century Europe.

In Chapter 5, I investigate the ideologies of language use that are promoted in L'viv and within the schools, both of which contribute to these teenagers' attitudes towards standardization and multilingualism. Local and national ideologies focus on framing standard Ukrainian as the ideal way to speak, and encourage the populace to become multilingual. Teenagers of different socioeconomic classes, however, draw together these ideologies, along with those transmitted at school, and approach these notions differently. The working class acknowledges the authenticity and legitimacy of Ukrainian dialects, and finds the informal acquisition of language varieties to be just as acceptable as formal training in standard languages. Additionally, while they agree with their middle class peers that Ukrainians need to know English or "the language of the country" when they go abroad, they also emphasize the need to retain "one's native language," seeing people's use of Ukrainian threatened by their residency within another linguistic community. For the middle class, only formally acquired, literary standardized languages are legitimate ways of speaking. Though they admit that young people, including themselves, speak slang and vulgarities, these nonstandard speech forms can have a negative effect on how a speaker is evaluated by others. For them, language must be monitored for a person to create and maintain a good social reputation. Along these same lines, these middle class teenagers view multilingualism, also acquired through formal language study, as the most important resource for future success.

Interestingly, neither group directly includes Russian in these discussions. The middle class teenagers acknowledge the importance of speaking Russian in other

regions of the country, but, at the same time, they frame Russian as a language that is “foreign” to Ukraine, despite the fact that a large proportion of ethnic Ukrainians are Russian speakers. Those of the working class, however, find the line between Ukrainian and Russian to be quite permeable. Their parents might describe them as non-Russian speakers, but for this group of young people, Russian can easily be learned through their native Ukrainian, passively and informally through their exposure to the Russian language media found all over their city.

People's perceptions of rural and urban spaces in Ukraine, and of nonstandard and standard languages, mirror their attitudes towards Ukraine and Europe, and can reveal widespread ambivalence over the current status and future trajectory of these relationships. Chapter 6 examines how attitudes about Ukrainian emigration are linked to conceptions of places (multiple Europes and Ukraines), spaces (both urban and rural), and the social value of each. Multiple chronotopes are present in discourses of emigration, such as a Ukraine that is “backwards, rural, and socialist” in contrast to a “modern, urban, and democratic” Europe, or “moral, caring” Ukrainians who must contend with “self-interested, uncivilized” Europeans. The attitudes voiced in these discourses illustrate an individual's positioning towards these geopolitical issues, but also her positioning towards other interlocutors in the interaction.

Working class teens in western Ukraine are wary of the changes that are occurring, echoing their parents' and teachers' fears of how economic and social changes will affect the future of their country. For many of them, Europe is not a viable model for Ukraine, as it represents a place of uncertainty, risk, and gain at the

needless expense of others. They have heard stories of people leaving the country for higher wages, albeit in jobs of low status, who rarely, if ever, return home. Though many who work abroad make efforts to return in the summer months, the sense among these teens is that leaving the country means abandoning their friends and families, and, at a deeper level, destroying the future of their nation.

In contrast, middle class students want Ukraine to become “normal” and “equal” to the countries in western Europe. Rather than viewing it as a threatening unknown, Europe is a place of culture, educational and occupational opportunities; in short, Europe is the hoped for future of Ukraine. Working abroad is seen as a viable, temporary choice that people make in order to help their families back home. Emigrants are not abandoning their families for their own selfish reasons. On the contrary, they are sacrificing themselves for a time so that their children can attend university and their families' lives might improve in Ukraine. Either that or they will succeed in their host country and their children will be able to join them there. Middle class teenagers see emigrants as not abandoning Ukraine, but as helping Ukraine join the wider European community.

I bring these levels of spatial organization together again in the Conclusion, showing how a chronotopic lens can lead to a more complete understanding of the influences on and motivations behind identity-making. Social identity and belonging is not merely a matter of the local, or the local versus the non-local. The local is always connected to the global, and vice versa, each shaping and responding to the other. There is not merely one local or one global, not merely one set of conceptual borders

and boundaries that delineate a person's world. Rather, there are multiple lines that mark the limits and possibilities available to people, depending upon where one stands in time and space. An examination of multiple spatiotemporal levels can lead to a more complete picture of where a person understands herself to be located in the present, and where she envisions herself to become in the future.



## **Chapter 2.**

### **Living in the Borderlands: A Minority Nation between Two World Superpowers**

Since 1989, many former Soviet republics have had to figure out how to become independent states, examining what kind of society they are and envisioning what kind of society they would like to become. For many of these states, the legacies of the Soviet era have conflicted with their pre-Soviet images of nationhood. The postsocialist borders between these states were based on those of the former Soviet republics, themselves delineated by the settlements of a few, recognized titular nations. The Soviet system reinforced the idea of a territorial based nation. When the regime collapsed, these Soviet republics were transformed into independent nation-states. However, not all nations were able to secure their own state. Rather, the difficulties in establishing these new Eastern European states has led to ethnic violence and separatist movements, such as in the former Yugoslavia, Moldova, South Ossetia, and Chechnya. While much of the former Soviet Union has avoided such violence, it is important to recognize the role that history plays in the construction of national identity.

All of these states can potentially draw upon earlier events and ideologies in order to legitimate their political aspirations. Ukraine in particular must manage its multiple pasts in order to create a future filled with more stability and less ambiguity than currently exists within the country. Ukraine's history has long been intertwined with those of more powerful political entities, namely that of earlier Austrian, Polish,

German, and Russian states (Wolczuk 2000). Ukraine's periods of independence prior to 1991 were limited to less than two years after World War II, and questionably the earlier Cossack and Kyvian Rus' polities that are included in the histories of several Slavic nations. Decades of Russian rule in eastern regions presented Ukrainians as “Little Russians” who lacked unique linguistic, cultural, and historical roots separate from their neighbors. The additional absence of an earlier, irrefutable, Ukrainian state made it difficult for Ukrainian elites in western regions to envision how a Ukrainian state might differ from the European ones they had lived under. In the history of the Ukrainian nation, foreign occupation and rule has been the norm. In a way, independent Ukraine can be seen as a “postcolonial” state, both as a “colony” of Russia and of Europe.

Ukraine's problems in managing itself as an independent state can be understood more fully by taking a postcolonial perspective (Korek 2007), though not in the traditional sense. Rather, Ukraine's experience of the postsocialist, postcolonialism that began in 1991 is one filled with ambiguities over who was the colonizer and the colonized, as well as the cultural, linguistic, and economic means of colonization. In other words, the current Ukrainian state must juggle the variety of histories found within its borders in order to create a coherent national past with which to unite its citizenry.

In this chapter, I argue that Ukraine's historical positioning between the political and economic forces of Europe and Russia continues to affect current identity-making within the country, from language and citizenship reforms at the

national level to what it means to be Ukrainian in everyday life. As Philipp Ther has argued, “territorial entities and groups that perceived themselves as backward had a particularly strong tendency to look across the border and import and adapt cultural goods from abroad. Comparing oneself has been a driving force in East Central Europe and Ukrainian history since the Age of Enlightenment” (2008:93).

Geographically located between European and Eurasian polities for centuries, Ukraine defines itself in relation to its stronger, more globally influential neighbors. The history of Ukraine's relations with these regions, both long past and more recent, show how Europe and Russia continue to be salient points of reference for Ukrainians, revealing the extent to which these places factor into current conceptions of national, and even local, identities. In other words, national and global understandings of Ukraine and its place in the world influence western Ukrainian teenagers' ideas about Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, which these teenagers then respond to in creating their own social identities.

## **Historical Ties**

Long lasting colonial-like relations<sup>5</sup> have linked Ukraine to Poland, Hungary, Germany, and Russia in different ways throughout the country, leading to an independent Ukraine where region has become as important to identity as ethnicity, culture, and language. Different regions of the country have had very different

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<sup>5</sup> It has been argued that these colonial-like relations have also helped foster a sense of Ukrainian inferiority towards both Europeans and Russians (Riabchuk 2007), supporting the folk notion that “Ukrainians have an inferiority complex” that they must overcome if they are to stand alone as an autonomous state.

experiences; western regions were not subject to restrictions on language and culture, or the assimilation practices experienced by those in eastern regions. In fact, the territories of the current Ukrainian state have only been united since the end of World War II; managing the regional differences while creating a coherent view of the nation has been one goal of the Ukrainian government.

Unlike the Polish, Hungarian, and Lithuanian peoples, Ukrainians were traditionally agricultural and had no historical monarchy of their own. Rather, “there was neither an uninterrupted tradition of statehood nor an established high culture with a standardized language” within the territory of Ukraine (Ther 2009:81). The elites that did exist often sought the prestige that came with the ruling elite, be they Russian or European, creating identities that were more based in urban and rural residency than in shared national belonging.

The early Ukrainian elites in the eastern regions of the country, for example, gained many benefits from assimilating into the Russian imperial class, including political power. As a result, “by the mid-nineteenth century all that was left of a potential multilayered nation was a Russified nobility and an impoverished peasant mass. ‘Ukrainian’ meant the countryside, with a residual folk tradition, but no high culture” (Wilson 2002:78). The vast differences between peasants and elites were based more in their rural and urban lifestyles, which were more similar to their counterparts in other territories than they were to each other. Because of this, there was no identity that could bridge the rural and urban divide. Furthermore, Kenneth Farmer has argued that Ukrainian culture in eastern regions has been centrally rural

because "there has been no distinctly Ukrainian urban culture. The Ukraine was colonized, industrialized and modernized by Russians, and social mobilization and urbanization has meant Russification for those Ukrainians who have become mobilized" (Farmer 1980:12).

Though contemporary Ukrainian national culture throughout the country retains a pastoral ideal, the varied experiences and histories in this territory have led to a high level of regional differentiation, both in national character—defined along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines—and in geopolitical perspectives. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Ukrainians under Russian rule were often viewed as being no different from their rulers. Russian authors, composers, and artists of this time, for example, “used Ukrainian elements with no acknowledgment whatsoever (or no acknowledgment of the need for acknowledgment), reflecting how automatic the assumption that ‘Ukraine’ was just ‘Russia’ had become” (Wilson 2002:83). Sentiments such as these led to the notion that Ukrainians were merely “little Russians,” poor and uneducated Russians who spoke Russian badly rather than a language of their own.

A nineteenth century revival led by intellectuals reinterpreted the Ukrainian national history and position within the Russian empire, promoting national separatism (Magocsi 1996:360-364). During this time, however, there were competing conceptions of nationhood, with some favoring a nation that recognized multiple, overlapping loyalties and others supporting one mutually exclusive identity (Magocsi 1996:355). In addition, the Russian regime placed many restrictions on its minorities

in an attempt to weaken people's identifications with minority cultures, such as Ukrainian and Belorussian, and transform them into the “Russians” they really were.

In terms of ideologies of language, for example, the eastern regions became linguistically russified under Soviet rule as Russian became the dominant language of the USSR. With an aim towards creating a population of literary Russian-speakers, the Soviet elite “campaign[ed] to promote linguistic purism and conservative values and tastes among the masses in order to elevate them” (Bilaniuk 2005:16). In their attempts use Russian, Ukrainian-speaking peasants and other non-Russian speakers often mixed linguistic elements from Russian and their native dialects, resulting in speech that was “marginalized, reviled, and derided, for they were considered emblematic of backwardness and limited education” (17). In addition, the Ukrainian language was revised in the 1920s and 1930s to appear to be closer to Russian, which included changes in the “grammatical, morphological, and orthographic rules” of the language, and the prioritization of Russian-like synonyms, and the elimination of the variety of synonyms in official dictionaries (87-88).

**Table 2.1: Development of the Ukrainian language (Bilaniuk 2005)**

1600s	Suppression of early Ukrainian under Russian rule
1700s	Vernacular-based form appears in publication
1798	First work written in vernacular, <i>Aeneid</i>
1818	First grammar published
1830s	Taras Shevchenko writes in Modern Ukrainian
1860s	Unofficial language textbooks
1904	Regulation and standardization begins
1920s	Language standardized and instituted
1930s	Language is russified under Soviets
1970s	Translation and russification of articles in Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' journals
1994	National Committee of Linguistic Standards is formed to revise codification
1999	New committee proposes revision that reverses Soviet influences, to intense debate
2003	Reconstituted National Committee proposes revision, reversing some 1994 standards and leading to further debate

While the Ukrainians living in the eastern territories were being transformed into Soviet Russians, those living in the European-controlled western regions were allowed to retain their native culture and language to varying degrees, depending upon the European ruling regime. Though there were periods of cultural and linguistic repression, the various German, Polish, and Austro-Hungarian regimes allowed their minorities to be educated in their native languages, develop print media and cultural organizations, and establish their own communities. Ukrainian intelligentsia in the mid-1800s “rejected the Polish claims to Ukraine as a land that was to become part of a restored Poland one day, just as it refuted the similar Russian claims; however, it was receptive to Polish—that is, Western or 'European'—ideas” (Szporluk 2009:264).

For example, the Ukrainians living in the Polish-ruled region of Galicia were able to develop a strong sense of European nationalism. “Instead of assimilating the Galician Ukrainians to the Polish language and culture, the Polish regime... unintentionally, only radicalized Ukrainian national sentiment” (Janmaat 2000:57). The freedoms that both urban and rural Ukrainians experienced in the west helped foster a unique national identity that was not shared by their kin living in the east. By 1914,

...it was evident that a Ukrainian subject of the Austrian monarchy enjoyed more personal and political freedom than a Ukrainian, as well as his Russian counterpart, did in Russia. The Ukrainian national idea and the political ideas of Ukrainophiles were compatible with the legal and political system and values of 'Europe' as exemplified by Austria: what the Ukrainians wanted was more of 'Europe'--further democratic reforms, greater national rights, especially the grant of autonomy to the Ukrainian part of Galicia.... the more the Galicians advanced in their own region, the more they wanted to reciprocate by helping their compatriots within the Russian Empire. (Szporluk 2009:268-269)

After having experienced how both western and eastern states treated their minorities, the nationalist movements in the western regions looked towards Europe as a model for the creation of a Ukrainian nation-state.

These movements resulted in the establishment of a Ukrainian National Republic (1918-1920) which was recognized as a sovereign state under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Magocsi 1996). However, they remained primarily projects of the urban elite and lacked the support of the rural peasantry. Though it would take time to garner the support of the peasantry, the nationalist movements in the western regions continued to frame their struggle for independence in terms of European nationalism. As Oleh Ilnytzkyj writes:

The imagining of Ukraine in a European framework—and the corresponding rejection of the all-Russian/imperial context—was a profound paradigm shift that allowed



Ukrainian culture to view itself not as a subsystem or a complement, but as a complete world in its own right, equivalent (if not is fact, at least potentially) to all other self-contained European national cultural systems. By embracing Europe as a point of reference, Ukraine symbolically transformed itself from a dependent provincial culture in an empire to an independent national culture within a European framework. (Riabchuk 2007:163-164)

The attitude that the Ukrainian people—their language, culture, and traditions—were as legitimate as the Polish, German, Hungarian, and Romanian peoples who also lived under the regime helped foster nationalist sentiments in the western regions of Ukraine. While the Soviets required minorities to learn the Russian language and culture in order to succeed within the ruling party—fearing that minority nationalisms would weaken Soviet loyalty—the freedoms minorities possessed further west allowed these nationalisms to develop and thrive.

### **Unification of Ukrainian lands**

Under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 between Nazis Germany and Soviet Russia, Poland was divided between the two powers. Eastern Galicia and other parts of western Ukraine, which had been part of Poland, came under the control of the Soviet troops. The Soviets quickly began to deport Polish residents and other enemies of the state, destroying many Polish, as well as Ukrainian, organizations and institutions in the process (Magocsi 1996:616-20). Although the goal was de-polonization, many Ukrainians were also deported for being anti-Soviet, and the elimination of all cultural organizations affected all nationalities, not just the Polish population. For the Ukrainians living in Nazi-occupied regions of Poland, much of their cultural life continued unrestricted, and lead to the reestablishment of organizations and churches prohibited under Polish rule (Magocsi 1996:620).

As a result, many Ukrainian nationalists, as well as members of the peasantry, saw Nazi Germany as the lesser of two evils.<sup>6</sup> The Germans went on to defeat the Soviet army, occupying most of Soviet Ukraine from June 1941- October 1944. In the first few months of the occupation, the Nazi permitted Ukrainian officials to institute a variety of ukrainization programs. “All these developments during the summer and fall of 1941 led many Ukrainians to believe that the Germans had come as true liberators who would help them reestablish a non-Soviet national life” (Magocsi 1996:629). It was not long, however, until the Nazis quickly began to implement their racial hierarchy. The Germans who had escaped the deportations of the Soviets in 1939 became those privileged under Nazi rule, and new hatred grew between the Ukrainians and their German neighbors. Ukrainian schools were closed, as well as political and cultural organizations, in an effort highlight the “inferiority” of the Slavic peoples (Magocsi 1996:630- 34). By the end of the war, Ukraine came back under the control of Soviet Russia, and, for the first time, all of the Ukrainian-speaking territories are united within the republic of Soviet Ukraine.

The “amalgamation” of Western Ukrainian and Eastern Ukrainian lands into one, unified state, became the goal of Soviet regime (Subtelny 2000:487). This affected those living in the western regions the most. Their incorporation into the USSR “expos[ed] them to an entirely different world” which “separated [them] from the political and cultural values of Europe” and led to the loss of the religious and

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<sup>6</sup> Although many Ukrainians helped the Nazis in their extermination efforts, they were no more likely to than any of the other nationalities under the Nazis; some Ukrainians were exterminators, others were part of the resistance movements, and many more were passive on-lookers just like those in Nazi-occupied Europe.

militia networks “that for generations had been [the region's] main defense against foreign rule and the most clear-cut expression of Ukrainian nationhood” (Subtelny 2000:495). Under this newly united, yet Soviet, Ukrainian SSR, western Ukrainians were faced with the historical erasure of their nation's past accomplishments, something those in the eastern regions had long accepted. “Ukrainians were expected to accept the proposition that the past achievements in their country's development were in large measure due to Ukraine's relationship with Russia” (Magocsi 1996:647).

As result of these shifting political borders throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the regions of Ukraine had vastly different experiences with and of foreign rule. Those in eastern regions had long been part of the Russian empire and had become accustomed to their position within the empire, accepting Soviet regulations as a stable norm. Over time, their use of Russian, Russian Orthodox Christian beliefs, and cultural traditions made them more similar to Russians than those living on the other side of Ukraine. Though a push to protect Ukrainian interests would have been possible, it was difficult to imagine a simultaneous massive rejection of Russian and the adoption of Ukrainian in the region.

The swiftly changing levels of cultural and linguistic freedom in the western regions, however, allowed people to see the vacillating restrictive and permissive policies towards Ukrainian and other minorities as transient and short-lived. Though the Soviets outlawed Catholicism and native pagan traditions, and restricted the use of Ukrainian in schools and public life, this was not the case in earlier times of foreign rule and it may not be the case in the future. The frequently shifting regimes were

evidence that those in power could not be relied on to protect and secure the rights of Ukrainians and their language; it was the people themselves that became responsible for the continuation of their language and cultural traditions.

## **Nation-building**

On the heels of similar political upheavals throughout Central and Eastern Europe, an overwhelming majority of the population in the Ukrainian SSR voted in favor of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, which was quickly acknowledged by Poland. Since then, the Ukrainian government has struggled to define a coherent narrative around which to gel its diverse population. Soviet identities and support for the Communist party have waned along with the oldest generation and among those in eastern and southern areas of the country. Instead, regional and national identifications are increasing.

In the 2001 Census, people were asked to identify one nationality and one language (their “native” language or “mother tongue”).<sup>7</sup> The correlation between nationality<sup>8</sup> and linguistic identity, however, differs greatly by region. Out of a total population of 48.5 million, 78% are Ukrainian, 17% are Russian, and the remaining 5% come from one of 130 minority groups. In terms of native language, only 68% claim Ukrainian; 30% name Russian and 2% claim another minority language.

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<sup>7</sup> The lack of a dual or multiple option, however, fails to recognize those who would be better described as multiethnic or multilingual.

<sup>8</sup> As of this time, “nationality” and “ethnicity” are used interchangeably within the literature on Ukrainian national identity. Many political scientists use the former to investigate political identification. Some anthropologists, such as Laada Bilaniuk (cf. Bilaniuk and Melnyk 2008), interpret this to be more of an ethnic label rather than a political one.

Regionally, these statistics suggest vastly differing orientations towards the confluence of nationality and language. In the western L'viv region<sup>9</sup>, nationality and language are highly correlated, where 99.6% of ethnic Ukrainians are Ukrainian-speakers and 88% of Russians are Russian-speaking. In contrast, only 41% of the Ukrainians living in the eastern region of Donetsk are Ukrainian-speaking while 99% of Russians are Russian-speaking.<sup>10</sup> These figures show a Ukrainian-speaking, Ukrainian majority west and a Russian-speaking, Russian and Ukrainian east. The diversity within Ukraine is complicated further once the southern regions are included. In the Autonomous Region of Crimea, of the 2 million residents 24.3% are Ukrainian, 58.3% are Russian, and 17.4% are of minority nationalities, and the majority speak Russian as a common language of communication.<sup>11</sup>

In both the 2004 and 2010 Presidential elections, the leading candidates garnered votes that were divided more along regional lines than those of nationality or language.<sup>12</sup> In addition to religion, however, the factors of nationality and language

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<sup>9</sup> The population of the L'viv region is 2.6 million, with 2.47 million Ukrainians (95%) and 90,000 Russians (3.6%). There are 2,46 million Ukrainians claiming Ukrainian as their native language, and 81,000 Russians claiming Russian.

<sup>10</sup> The population of the Donetsk region is 4.8 million. There are 2.7 million Ukrainians with 1.1 million claiming Ukrainian and 1.6 million claiming Russian. Of the 1.84 million Russians, 1.82 claim Russian as their native language.

<sup>11</sup> The population of the Autonomous Region of Crimea is 2.0 million. There are 490,000 Ukrainians, 1.2 million Russians, and 243,000 Crimean Tatars. Unfortunately, the nationality and native language results from Crimea were not available on the Census website as of April 21, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> The 2004 election was marred by extensive fraud that resulted in the Orange Revolution and a re-election. The eventual winner, Viktor Yushchenko, emphasized during the Revolution that his supporters were both Ukrainian and Russian speakers, while his rival, Viktor Yanukovich, unsuccessfully pledged to make Russian a second state language. Both of the top 2010 candidates, Yanukovich and Yulia Tymoshchenko, were known as native Russian speaker who made attempts to learn Ukrainian and use it official speeches. Both elections included discourses about language, but the geographic voting patterns showed strict regionalism. This is not to say that language does not matter. Linguistic practices are clearly tied to each region's unique histories and demographics,

have been frequently studied in Ukraine, especially in light of the presumed mismatch between linguistic and national identities found there, much more so than the regionalism underlying both identifications.

Despite the diversity found there, Ukraine is often framed as the site of a dichotomy between the Russian and Ukrainian languages, ethnicities, and nations, a framing which continues to be powerful for many. Within this framework, eastern and southern regions are depicted as Russian-speaking, of Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox belief, equally Russian and Ukrainian in ethnicity, of weak national consciousness, and populated by industrial workers and miners. In contrast, the western and central areas are presented as a mirror image: they are ethnically and linguistically Ukrainian, with strong national sentiments, of Catholic belief, whose populace is comprised of peasant farmers or educated workers in the technological or service sectors.

Though these depictions highlight only the ends of a spectrum of practices, the “Imagined or/and real images of polarization and/or differences remain instruments for shaping the minds of millions in the country. They both contain an ideational matrix of the Ukrainian future” (Pavlyuk 2007:180). The Ukrainophile, ethnic Ukrainian, Ukrainian-speakers in the western regions most closely resemble European models of nationalism. However, it is more difficult to categorize and account for those living in the rest of the country,<sup>13</sup> which include Ukrainian identified, ethnic

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resulting in the overlapping of several gradations from west to east that includes both language and political leaning.

<sup>13</sup> “[T]he outcome of differentiation has an asymmetrical contour—with a hermetic state border and clear-cut cultural frontier in the West and a transparent state border (absence of any physical signs)

Ukrainian, Russian-speakers; Russian identified, ethnic Ukrainian, Russian-speakers; and Ukrainian identified, ethnic Russian, Russian-speakers; among other minority ethnic and linguistic groups. The competing models of Ukrainian nationhood—one centered on Ukrainian and Russian ethnonationalism, and the other on creating a civic, multicultural Ukraine—both project visions of what the country should and will transform into.

Ukraine's nation-building processes since 1991 have primarily focused on reinterpreting national history, promoting the Ukrainian language, and making reforms in the mass media (cf. B. Anderson 1991), rather than establishing the social and economic reforms that many see as more central, and more pressing, for building a democratic Ukrainian state (cf. Phillips 2008). This reflects an orientation aimed at adhering to a traditional model of the homogenous nation-state. This vision of the nation, however, requires an agreed upon definition of the national community and leaves national minorities in a precarious position. The initial aim was to legitimate an autonomous Ukrainian state, which continues to be seen as threatened by Russia. However, it has since shifted towards establishing more of a civically-minded state with an ethnonational flavor, establishing more minority rights as it constructs a Ukrainian-centric historiography and protects Ukrainian as the sole state language.<sup>14</sup>

This move toward minority rights, however, is limited as many Ukrainians fear that an extension of minority rights will also result in a loss of political autonomy

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and a broad area of assimilative processes and diffuse identities in the East” (Pavlyuk 2007:178).  
<sup>14</sup> In his critique of models that frame European nation-state as “civic” as opposed to the ethnically-based nation-states of eastern countries, Stephen Shulman (2002) argues that these models simplify complex processes in both regions that vacillate between, and meld together, elements of civic and ethnic nationalism.

to the Russian Federation. Too much freedom for ethnic Russians and the Russian language, they fear, might transform them into a second Belarus, a cultural and linguistic appendage of Russia. Some reforms of business and land ownership might help bring in foreign investment, but they may also make it easier for Russians to “buy” Ukraine, effectively re-colonizing Ukraine economically. As a result, many in the western regions aspire to become like Poland, where no outside force is believed to threaten the Polish language or the country's economic and political progress.

Within its reforms focused on history, language, and media, the Ukrainian government must navigate its various pasts, the ambiguities that these pasts have created, and the possible futures it seeks both for the state and the nation.

### ***Revising History***

Ukrainian academics have faced difficulties in their attempts to revise the nation's past due to conflicting beliefs over how this history will represent the nation to the next generation (Popson 2001), as well as the ramifications of the denial and neglect of Ukrainian history by the Soviets and western scholarship (von Hagen 1995). Under European and Russian rule, Ukrainian territories were often the front lines during warfare and the political buffer zones in times of peace. The history of Ukraine has been written by those ruling over it, whose perspectives have shaped Western ideas about Eastern and Central European states. As Mark von Hagen states, “Not only the legacies of the German and Russian historical communities, but also the postwar political order have reinforced the marginalization of eastern and central Europe in



North American academic politics” (1995:661). Only more recently has this marginalization become modified; the newly independent states have been divided into those with “good” nationalisms based on the “civic” model, and those with “bad” nationalisms, such as Ukraine, which are based on ethnicity or “blood” (von Hagen 1995:662). Ukrainian historians are, therefore, left to piece together a past that is, on one hand, linked to the Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empires in western and southern Ukraine, and on the other hand, more recently tied to the Russian Empire and USSR in the northern and eastern oblasts.

This fragmented history brings uncertainties in what the nation is, and who belongs to this nation, opening up multiple fields of interpretation. For example, some elites in Ukraine are attempting to uphold myths of national struggle while downplaying Ukraine’s cultural differences in order to become more like the West (Wolczuk 2000). The precarious position that filtering and revising history can create also leaves much doubt over which symbols can, and should, be used as representations of the nation, as well as which interpretations of history will be accepted in the official discourses of the public sphere. Because of the ambiguous nature of the state’s conception of the nation’s history, many Ukrainians are as skeptical of the postsocialist interpretations of history as they were of the earlier Soviet representations.

At the beginning of perestroika, for example, secondary school history textbooks in the USSR were being reevaluated (Husband 1991). Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms allowed for a more open discussion of the government and its policies, which

invariably led to the questioning of Soviet history. “Reconciling society’s collective memory with an official version of the past...became not only morally imperative, but critical to the credibility of the regime and its programs as well” (Husband 1991:459). Schoolteachers, historians, and academics began to challenge the portrayal of Soviet history that was being taught in secondary schools. Even though they represented the state as transmitters of the state’s vision of national history, these intellectuals were placed in a position where they could choose to oppose the regime. As glasnost allowed the open criticism of the system, many people began to question the validity of the state’s depiction of history. Teachers felt they were being unfairly blamed for supporting discredited histories, as they had been forced to do in times that were more repressive.

Though many felt that a variety of opinions and historical materials was needed to reinterpret Soviet history, in order to create some legitimacy for the history taught to the students, the lack of consensus left little real change in both the curriculum and the content of the classroom (Husband 1991:479). Even the revised versions did little to reverse the disjuncture between what different teachers taught, what they knew to be true, and what the students were learning from their increasing contact with Western versions of history.

The difficulty in revising the official state history to coincide with Ukrainian national histories is evident in the problems currently faced in the educational system. As Nancy Popson argues, “Ukraine seems to have adopted the ‘cultural pillar’ strategy—it has attempted to define its national identity as inclusive and citizenship

based, but resting on Ukrainian mythology and symbols” (Popson 2001:326). The state has focused its efforts on a form of civic nation building, but in order to achieve cohesiveness, it has based this civic nation on the history of one particular ethnic nation. Ukrainian educational institutions highlight Ukrainian national narratives while ignoring the multinational past of the state.

The difficulties in creating a coherent Ukrainian national history echo those of other postsocialist states. As “teachers [are] a critical link in fully understanding the role of history education in nation building, citizenship, and national identity” (E. Anderson 2005: 54), states like Moldova (Solonari 2002) and Estonia have also focused nation-building through the teaching of national history. Moldovan teachers, for example, vary in their perspectives from those who look “back” at the history of Moldova as the story of the Romani nation, to those who look “forward” towards the creation of a new civic Republic of Moldova, to those who seek to instill both a sense of Romanian ethnonational identity and a civic Moldovan identity (E. Anderson 2005). In Estonia, the teaching of history also attempts to balance between competing identities. Though regional minority activists often attempt to strengthen regional and local identities, despite their efforts these local identities become marginalized under larger educational goals that focus on developing broader Estonian and European identities (Brown 2005).

Though teachers in Ukraine have some control over what they teach and how they teach it, their methods are limited by nationally and locally prescribed curricula. Many of the new textbooks, for example, present an ethnically and historically

homogenous nation. In these texts, history of Ukrainian is presented as the long and continuous struggle of the Ukrainian nation for political autonomy (Popson 2001; Janmaat 2005; Korostelina 2010). Positive emphasis is placed on the Cossacks, the Rus' Empire, and other early states that resided within the current boundaries of Ukraine, presenting them to be contiguous, uniquely Ukrainian, states. Though both Russian and Ukrainians can legitimately claim the Kyivian Rus' as their earliest polity, "Rus was simply that which existed before the modern Ukrainian and Russian nations developed" (Wilson 2002:19). Despite this, Russians view Kyiv as the birthplace of their nation, and "many Ukrainians feel that Russia's claims [to Rus' roots] are efforts to 'steal' Ukraine's history and thus undermine its nationhood" (Bilaniuk 2005:72).

Instead of viewing these early states as the political structures of early Slavs, to which all Slavs can trace their roots, the revised historical accounts emphasize a national consciousness underlying these entities, one which developed into the Ukrainian nation (Popson 2001:330).<sup>15</sup> In addition, figures that were once demonized are transformed into nationalized "heroes" such as Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who had been cursed in church services for 300 years for joining the Swedes in an unsuccessful attempt to defeat Peter the Great (Wilson 2002:65-66, 76); and Symon Petlura and Stepan Bandera, who were notable revolutionaries that unsuccessfully opposed the Bolsheviks. Ukraine's history becomes a logical story of successes and failures in achieving a nation-state, where the former always outshine and replace any instances

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<sup>15</sup> After independence even more unfounded nationalist claims were popularized, including the claim that all Indo-European peoples originated in Ukraine, and that Ukrainians are mentioned in the Bible as the Magog, who were to said to fight against the "dark forces" of the East (Wilson 2002:22-3).

of the latter. The stains of the past are ignored, bleached out, or cut out if they cannot be revised and situated into the present version of the historical record.

Through these textbooks the state has somewhat successfully focused its interpretation of Ukrainian history on pre-Soviet narratives. When it comes to more recent past, however, representations are more ambiguous. “[T]he [ruling] elite has focused on the more distant past, leaving to one side an explicit re-evaluation of the Soviet period...[as it] is by far the most problematic and politically sensitive” (Wolczuk 2000:681). The state has attempted to legitimate itself by utilizing commonly supported pre-Soviet national histories that transform the state into the long-awaited political expression of the nation. However, it has failed to clarify its place in more recent events. This has led many people to question whether the state is that much removed from its Soviet predecessor. “Even the revised history textbooks...still make use of ‘Soviet language’ and concepts. Although revised, the new textbooks fail to make a break with received interpretations of Ukrainian history” (Wanner 1998:94).<sup>16</sup> The historiography of the Ukrainian state is still somewhat reliant on previous Soviet narratives as its authors continue to use Soviet era understandings for most, although not all, accounts of recent history.

The two major shifts in Ukrainian historiography, as illustrated in the new history books, concern the state’s revised interpretations of the Famine of 1932-33 and

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<sup>16</sup> Under the Soviet system, for example, the Russian nation and its history were promoted as more valid than non-Russian national histories. The Ukrainian state, therefore, is replicating this social hierarchy to some extent. The Ukrainian nation and its history are presented as the “true” history of the state, while non-Ukrainian histories are almost completely absent from official narratives. In addition, the Ukrainian state is claiming that nationhood is unimportant in the new civic order. This claim echoes that under socialism, which stated that all citizens were Soviets first, and nationals second.

the Chernobyl accident of 1986 (Popson 2001; Korostelina 2010). While the Famine has been both acknowledged and commemorated in official discourse,<sup>17</sup> the significance of Chernobyl remains unexplored. According to Katherine Wanner (1998:94-100), the Famine has been elaborated within new Ukrainian textbooks. Chernobyl, on the other hand, while it was harshly condemned in the Soviet texts, is seldom more than mentioned in passing in the new Ukrainian books.<sup>18</sup>

In this instance, much like its predecessor, the new government uses its silence to erase inconvenient episodes of history. The ‘living memories’ of Chernobyl...are not only fresh but widespread throughout the population. By ignoring them and constructing a narrative that bypasses consideration of an event of such importance, (new) state-sponsored historiography remains discredited. The authors’ interpretation of history and a popular counter discourse disparaging the state foster the temptation for students to approach the new texts with the same cynicism and dismissal with which they read the old. (Wanner 1998:100)

Even though Chernobyl played an important part in many independence movements in the late 1980s, not only in Ukraine but also throughout Eastern Europe, only a few years later the state had all but erased it from official discourse. As it mirrors many of the socialist policies of silence and denial, the drastic change in the interpretation of Chernobyl by the state, therefore, has led to more distrust of state-sponsored narratives, not less.

The historical symbols that have been used to support the Ukrainian state’s historiography have also been perceived to be ambiguous by many individuals. It has attempted to utilize some nation building tactics to construct a cohesive national

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<sup>17</sup> The Famine has still not become a pivotal event in Ukrainian history, however, despite nationalist claims that it was a genocide committed by Stalin against the Ukrainian people. “[E]ven after 1991, despite official commemorations of the sixtieth anniversary in 1993, the Great Famine has not moved to center-stage in official or even nationalist rhetoric in the manner that might have been expected” (Wilson 2002:145).

<sup>18</sup> These historical revisions highlight the state’s attempt to explain the Famine in terms of the actions of a single ruler, while de-emphasizing the effects of Chernobyl in order to justify the continued reliance on the nuclear reactor.

history, such as official commemorations (Connerton 1989; Hobsbawm 1983, 1990), and dedicating certain places to important figures in history through naming streets and erecting statues and monuments (B. Anderson 1991 [1983], Verdery 1999). However, these representations of history fail to support one particular vision of history, much like the textbooks that vaguely deal with the Soviet era. In a similar way, statues are also means through which the state can legitimize an interpretation of history (Verdery 1999). But the use of these statues appears to be only a rejection of Soviet symbols, and not the creation of a new set of imagery that promotes the state and the nation as unique. “If they take him [Lenin] down, who will be the next guy on the pedestal? In some parts of Ukraine they were in a hurry. They didn’t have anyone else so they put up Shevchenko. That’s not good. But the worst thing of all would be to do nothing” (Wanner 1998:181). From this perspective, it is the state’s responsibility to construct new representations of history for its people. However, the state is constrained by a Soviet past. It has no coherent historical narrative from which to build a cohesive national history.

Scholars charged with developing new interpretations of Ukrainian history attempt to frame Ukraine as a civic nation, where all nationalities are to be included and ethnicity and nationhood is less important than citizenship. At the same time, however, they prioritize distinctively Ukrainian perspectives and events central to the Ukrainian national narrative, to the exclusion or alienation of national minorities. In its goal to be both an inclusive civic state like much of western Europe, and continue to

be linked to a particular nation, citizenship has also been an important site for government reform.

### *Citizenship*

Due to a high level of regionalism, Ukrainians list a variety of factors as being central to national identity, such as ethnicity, language, or residence (Kuzio 1996). Some scholars have predicted that, eventually, citizenship in Ukraine will be less dependent upon ethnicity, and will “more likely evolve in the direction of a Ukrainian civic identity...based on Ukrainian language, history and traditions” (Kuzio 1996:604).

Ukraine's citizenship policies are similar to those of its former Soviet neighbors. The preambles and/or constitutions of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Serbia each reference one specific nation, either claiming it to be the final realization of a historical state of the people while also claiming equality for all nations (Croatia, Macedonia), or by instituting more openly discriminating policies such as ranking one's privileges according to one's nationality (Slovenia) (Hayden 1992, 1996).

In a similar way, the Ukrainian constitution prioritizes the Ukrainian nation, and confers citizenship based on four main categorizations: 1) permanent residency prior to 1991; 2) acquisition through parental citizenship; 3) acquisition through registration (limited to adoptees and stateless persons); and 4) acquisition through naturalization (with requirements of residency, functional use of Ukrainian, and knowledge of the Constitution). Though the residency category includes the largest



group of potential non-nationals, it leaves no room for future non-nationals to gain citizenship solely through residency. The third category is a small proportion of the population; the primary way of gaining Ukrainian citizenship, then, is based on lineage, as naturalization remains a rare occurrence.<sup>19</sup>

Citizenship policies in many Eastern European countries, including Ukraine, have been more lenient towards members of their diaspora communities living elsewhere, including those whom have never visited the country, than towards the immigrant communities residing within their borders. The prevailing fear of universal dual citizenship in western regions of Ukraine is that those seeking Russian-Ukrainian dual citizenship do so in order to help Russia overtake Ukraine politically and financially through their voting practices, ownership of land, and control of business. Underlying this fear is the idea that these dual citizens would really be Russians in disguise, with no loyalty or commitment to Ukraine beyond a passport. Though some of this anxiety may be grounded in Russia's recent and on-going interference in Ukrainian politics, it also rejects the idea that Russian ethnics and Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in the country might be loyal Ukrainian citizens, or hold dual loyalties to both countries. Interestingly, these fears of a Russian “invasion from

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<sup>19</sup> Unlike Estonia, Ukrainian citizenship, however, is not dependent upon passing a linguistic competency test in Ukrainian. Higher emphasis is placed on residency than language. Dual citizenship is officially not recognized, legally stating that they are citizens of Ukraine when in Ukraine. However, one way to renounce Ukrainian citizenship is to acquire a foreign citizenship. This suggests that, dual citizenship where Ukrainian is the second citizenship acquired is allowed, but not if Ukrainian is the first citizenship held. This seems to favor members of Ukrainian diaspora communities, but not Ukrainian emigrants, who, ironically, may have stronger ties and interests in the development of the country.

abroad” are not extended to non-Ukrainian minorities living in the country<sup>20</sup> or to members of the Ukrainian diaspora living abroad.

Citizenship as an idea beyond political membership is also being re-evaluated. The 2004 Orange Revolution laid clear the prevailing differences that “patriotism” and “nationalism” have for many Ukrainians. For many, patriotism expresses loyalty, love, and respect for one's country; nationalism, on the other hand, is divorced from national culture and emphasizes a hatred for other nations (Fournier 2007). These differing conceptions of citizens' behavior shape Ukrainian expectations of what it means to be a member of a nation and the citizen of a nation-state. The Orange Revolution, it has been argued, did not result in the development of western democratic citizenship. Rather, “both the content and the style of citizenship education in schools promote a domesticated Ukrainian patriotism associated with the concepts of order, obedience and spectatorship. This focus discourages national self-assertiveness, initiative, and active participation” (Fournier 2007:108). Though sporadic but monumental political events, such as the Orange Revolution, can potentially lead to the transformation of Ukrainian society—such as the bases for national membership and citizenship—people's everyday interactions with various state institutions re-enforce existing ideologies of the nation-state.

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<sup>20</sup> Fears of immigrants are growing; however, they are centered more on how African and Southeast Asian immigrants might change Ukrainian culture, rather than a perceived threat that these groups will politically or economically dominate.

### *Language policies*

The Ukrainian government also continues to link language to national identity. As in other regions where a minority language has official status, nation-building policies in Ukraine have prioritized the preservation and expansion of the Ukrainian language over other languages, such as Russian. Following the lead of language movements promoting Estonian (Schulze 2010), Catalan (Petherbridge-Hernandez and Latiner Raby 1993; Woolard 1997, 2003), Corsican (Jaffe 1999), Basque (Echeverria 2003), and minority languages elsewhere (Heller and Martin-Jones 2001), the Ukrainian government has promoted the language through laws mandating Ukrainian in schools, and others aimed at increasing the presence of Ukrainian in the mass media (Wanner 1995, 1998; Bilaniuk 2005), such as requiring animated films to be dubbed and imported television shows to be subtitled.<sup>21</sup> However, these language policies fail to resolve the ambivalent position of the Russian language and the rights of Russian speakers.

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<sup>21</sup> More recently, the Taiwan-China situation has been examined as a minority-majority language situation (Dreyer 2003) comparable to that of Ukraine-Russia in terms of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural similarities as well as colonial-like rule, where the minority group lacked political and economic power (Bilaniuk and Melnyk 2008:343).

**Table 2.2: Language events in Ukraine (Bilaniuk 2005; Janmaat 2000)**

1989	Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR. Ukrainian as sole official language.
1990	Russian declared as sole official language of USSR.
1991	Ukrainian independence
1991	The State Program on the Development of the Ukrainian Language. Revised freedom of parental choice to protecting right to have children learn their “native” language (= national language). Cleared up some of the ambiguities of the 1989 Law, and worked to improve the position of Ukrainian (in business, higher education)
1991-1992	Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities and the Law on National Minorities. Protects minority language rights, support for minority language education, and allows for self-identification of national minorities.
1993	Law of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting, Art. 9. Stipulates all broadcasting is to be in Ukrainian, except when sent to regions with high minority populations.
1993	Revised language of instruction requirements, to increase use of Ukrainian. Russian Literature incorporated into World Literature in schools. Schools allowed to end Russian language classes entirely.
1996	Ukrainian Constitution ratified. Re-affirms Ukrainian as sole official language, but also guarantees “the free development, use and protection” of Russian and other minority languages (Art. 10), such as in the schooling system (Art. 53)
2006	Councils in eastern and southern regions question sole authority of Ukrainian

Under socialism, speaking Ukrainian was a central aspect of Ukrainian national identity in western regions of the country as it distinguished a person from the Russian-speaking Soviet leadership. Since independence, the Russian language in Ukraine is no longer a representation of Soviet domination; however, Russian continues to permeate much of Ukrainian society as an economically powerful language, dominating popular media and business. This has created a tension between visions of Ukraine tied to and dependent upon Russian and Russia, and those where Ukraine is integrated into a larger global economy, where Russia is only one of many economic partners. The competing discourses over the economic and political future

of Ukraine within the EU, therefore, are invariably intertwined with those dealing with its past and present relations with Russia.

One central aspect of these discourses concerns the role of language in Ukrainian national identity, as language is seen to be representative of geopolitical orientations either towards the West (official Ukrainian monolingualism with non-Russian multilingual schooling) or towards Russia (official Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism). For example, both the 2004 Presidential election and the recent 2010 Parliamentary elections brought to the forefront competing geopolitical orientations, revealing how differing ideologies of language are divided along regional lines, and possibly increasingly along socioeconomic lines.

Nonreciprocal bilingualism<sup>22</sup> and the use of English as a neutral third language are increasing, mitigating the politicization of language choice (Bilaniuk 2005:22-23); however, ideologies of language purity survive. In western regions, the stigma of mixing Ukrainian and Russian in speech is so strong that many people would prefer to hear a Russian speaker speak Russian rather than speak Ukrainian poorly. When asked about Ukrainian language learners, Russian-speakers are believed to “think they're speaking Ukrainian” but are really “just speaking Russian.” This discourages many Russian speakers from learning Ukrainian for fear of ridicule

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<sup>22</sup> “Nonreciprocal bilingualism entailed each interlocutor speaking his or her preferred language and not accommodating to others, sometimes resulting in conversations being carried on in two languages” (Bilaniuk 2005:22). The practice of nonreciprocal bilingualism was most evident in youth-dominated media, such as the Ukrainian MTV channel, where the majority of shows featured two VJs (video-jockeys), one speaking Ukraine and the other Russian. I also observed this practice at the birthday party of a graduate student friend. The host openly accommodated to all guests, alternately speaking Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, or English, depending on which was the available and preferred shared language. However, between native Russian and Ukrainian speakers, nonreciprocal bilingualism was the norm, with both parties comprehending both languages but only speaking their preferred language.

and the disavowal of their progress in the Ukrainian-dominant west. In the eastern regions, Russian speakers have little incentive to learn Ukrainian as much of public life is conducted in Russian and Ukrainian continues to be a “peasant” language in the eyes of many.<sup>23</sup> Efforts to promote Ukrainian have led to an increase in its use, especially among the younger generation; however, the persistence of Russian in many regions and the strict attitudes of linguistic purity towards Ukrainian make it difficult to merely replace one language for the other.

For example, the first Rock Sich festival in the capital of Kyiv in May 2006 explicitly sought to promote Ukrainian rock music in order to combat the continuing popularity of Russian pop music in the country. At a transnational level, it included diaspora groups and gained the attention of others in Europe and North America. However, the concert used nationalist Cossack imagery, required all music to be sung in Ukrainian only, and had the slogan “Live sound! No to pop! Yes to the Ukrainian language!” These restrictions ignored the role of Russian and English within regional popular music, much of which adopts elements of American hip hop and rap music. The requirements of the music festival, though it aimed to promote Ukrainian artists, was not as effective in gaining an audience as wider-reaching, and less “Ukrainian”, international music video channels. In the same month as the Rock Sich festival, the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the cities of Kharkiv and Sevastopol granted

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<sup>23</sup> For example, one of the major newspapers in L'viv gave an extensive interest story about a Russian-speaking man in an eastern region who sought to learn Ukrainian (*Vysokyj Zamok*, Oct 2006). Though the aim of the story was most likely to show its western readership that there were people in the east who desired to learn Ukrainian, it also revealed the extent of hardships they face, which included being ridiculed by acquaintances, threatened at work, being unable to use Ukrainian in his daily life, and the difficulty in finding language learning materials.

Russian special status under a minority language clause of the Ukrainian Constitution, which spurred debates questioning Russian's legitimacy as a protected minority language. The granting of a special minority status to Russian and the ethnic Russian community, however they are defined, questions national conceptions based on the primacy of Ukrainian, as the sole language of the nation, at the same time as it attempts to conform to broader transnational notions of minority language rights.<sup>24</sup>

### **Ukraine in the Global Mindset**

Under Soviet rule, Russians continued to hold the power to define Ukrainians, “folding” them into the larger Russian nation at the global level. The coupling of Ukrainian with a devalued “peasantry” and Russian with prestigious “nobility” continues to persist in Russian popular culture, where Ukrainian characters are used for comic relief, the “hick” at the butt of Russian jokes.<sup>25</sup> Though most young people in western Ukraine openly challenge the assumption of Russian superiority,<sup>26</sup> claiming

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<sup>24</sup> Ukrainians' use of Russian may not be undermining language policies, but redefining the relationship between nation and language. Attitudes in support of Ukrainian are important in and of themselves, even if the one voicing the support does not speaking it himself (Polese 2010:54). “Often people will designate as ‘native’ the language that corresponds to their ethnic heritage, even if they know it poorly, in the belief that this is how things should be” (Bilaniuk and Melnyk 2008:346).

<sup>25</sup> One teenager in this study commented on how, even though many Ukrainians enjoy watching Russian sitcoms, including her, she didn't like they way Ukrainians were portrayed in them. Though they were funny characters, for her, they also perpetuated Russian misconceptions of Ukrainians as “ignorant farmers”. Although these characters may not be directly defined as Ukrainian, the particularities of their speech, behavior, and views are often grounded in Russian stereotypes of Ukrainian-speakers. In interactions I had with two Russian college students visiting from St. Petersburg, the students described Ukrainian speech as “funny” and “bad Russian,” often giggling at the Ukrainian they heard on television, including neutral programming like the nightly news report.

<sup>26</sup> During a break at school one day, a group of girls was browsing the Russian-language version of a direct-to-seller cosmetics catalog. At one point, one of the girls began reading aloud from it, overly dramatizing the flowery descriptions of the products and exaggerating the differences between

that the Ukrainian language and culture is equal to and different from Russian, the “lesser-ness” of Ukrainian is not always contested. Despite openly voiced opinions in favor of the national language, many of these young people view Russian as the norm in global media and communication, as popular movies, music, fiction, and online communities are easier to acquire and participate in through Russian rather than English. Though many schools have exchanged Russian as a subject for English, current nation-building reforms have not been aimed at promoting English as an alternative path to global integration, unlike nearby Poland, Hungary, and Romania.

Western and Eastern historians of nationalism have long ignored Ukraine, treating it as an extension of Russia (Hrytsak 2009), and making it difficult to reinterpret and revise Ukrainian historiography on a large scale. Ukrainian scholars have a need to reinterpret Ukraine's relation with Russia (Riabchuk 2007), and educational reforms have focused on recategorizing Russian language and literature as “foreign” subjects of study, and emphasizing prominent authors of Ukrainian nationality, including those who wrote in Russian.<sup>27</sup>

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Russian and Ukrainian to the laughter of her peers. In her performance, both the text of the catalog and the Russian voice it uses, were subverted and transformed into objects of ridicule.

<sup>27</sup> The study of Russian-speaking Ukrainian authors in contemporary Ukrainian literature classes, however, can complicate the ideas of national identity being promoted in schools in the western regions which see language as an essential part of Ukrainian identity. At one school in this study, for example, the teacher would require the class to read these authors in the original Russian text, despite that few, if any, of the students had any formal training in Russian. Reading the text aloud as a class, the teacher would select a few students who could read well in Russian—those who understood the differences in vowel pronunciation and could approximate the sounds without garnering the laughter of their peers. In contrast to the Ukrainian language texts, the teacher would stop the student to translate words she felt the students might not or could not understand. This task relied heavily on students' own passive knowledge of Russian, and emphasized an ideology of mutual comprehensibility.



Though it has been not been easy to re-write the history books taught in Ukraine, it is much more difficult to challenge the decades-long dominance of the Russian perspective that has shaped how the history of this region of the world is presented in textbooks used around the globe. As Lindelöf has claimed, “In the 'West'...Eastern Europeans are commonly treated as somewhat old-fashioned, backward and not modern, as 'not yet' people.... After the fall of Communism, Eastern European countries should 'catch up' with the West...'they' should join the European Union and NATO and become normal people—in other words, like 'us'” (Korek 2007:12). This view from the West, though, is often also echoed by those living in the “East”. Parents and students often speak of their desire for Ukraine to have a “normal” government, for “normal” wages, and for a “normal” standard of living, this “normality” being equated to what they envision to be the standard in western countries. The economic, political, and social problems in the country are seen as preventing Ukrainians from becoming “normal” people.

## **Discussion**

The historiographies of Ukraine, I argue, have framed this region of the world as caught between modern, western societies and those of Russia in the east. It is no wonder that the West/Europe and the East/Russia have become common points of comparison for Ukrainians. These focal points, however, have different meanings for the younger generation than they do for previous generations. Ukraine is not seen to be a part of the West/Europe—though it might “become Europe again”—nor is it still

part of the East that is Russia. Up until this point, I have been using the term “Europe” to encompass elements of modernity and westernization, in addition to the specific places my informants spoke of in terms of “normality”: England, Germany, France, and the United States. For these young people, then, “Russia” indexes the country, but also a time and a place they are moving away from.

In her examination of Polish youth, Marysia Galbraith (2004) focuses on discourses of “betweenness” which similarly frame Poland as residing in a space between the East and the West. My informants, however, do not describe themselves in terms of being “between” these places; many of the views they voice in this dissertation suggest dynamic transformation, a process of “becoming” something rather than merely located within a space. In other words, the Europe/Russia framework I present here is shorthand for a number of things—such as ideologies of language, social norms, and values of tradition and modernity, to name a few—that are associated with each space.

Echoing the “betweenness” of these young Poles (Galbraith 2004), and Russian teachers' evaluation of goods based on the global status of their country of origin (Patino 2005), western Ukrainians view their world as a continuum. They see themselves as residing somewhere in the middle of a spatial and temporal global hierarchy, with the ability both to “move up” or “ahead of” and to “fall down” or “behind” other places. At the top of this hierarchy, residing in spots “higher” and “ahead” of Ukraine, lays Europe, the United States, and a few select countries in Asia,

such as Japan. Occupying spots “lower” and “behind” Ukraine is all of Africa and the majority of Southeast Asian countries.<sup>28</sup>

In western Ukraine, students and teachers seem to view themselves as being equal to Russians, with some claiming Ukraine to be more superior—possibly due to the perceived lack of democracy, freedom of speech and economic choice, and the rampant corruption there—and a few steps below their neighbor and new EU member-state, Poland. On more than one occasion, I heard the desire, both hopefully and yet ironically, for Ukraine to “be like Poland is now,” albeit 20 years from now. This perspective seems to comment both on the relative “backwardness” of Ukraine—being behind its neighbor by a full generation, if not more so—and the ability to improve their situation over time (albeit with the implied financial help of the EU, membership within NATO, or through co-hosting the UEFA European Football Championship with Poland in 2012).

With the younger generation growing up under an independent Ukraine, however, Russia and Russians have not held such a strong place as the repressors of the Ukrainian language, culture, or religion. Even in the nationalist western regions of the country, where derogatory terms for Russians can be found silk-screened on T-shirts sold openly in outdoor markets (and are popular among diasporic tourists from the U.S. and Canada) or freely spoken by some teens in front of their parents, the younger generation is just as likely to experience Russia through popular culture as

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<sup>28</sup> Though there are Ukrainian communities in places like Brazil, it is unclear where Latin America would fit in this system, as those living in Ukraine have had few real experience or knowledge of the region apart from imported daytime dramas, which may not even register as coming from this part of the world.

through their world or Ukrainian history lessons. With the movement of the EU borders, the rise of the internet and other globalization processes, young people's conceptions of Ukraine and Ukrainians' relative positioning within the global hierarchy of nations have similarly shifted.

## **Conclusion**

It is not surprising that Ukrainians continue to frame their experiences and define their sense of nationhood and national identity through using Russia and Europe as reference points. Throughout much of its history, this territory and its inhabitants have been subject to the regimes of both, especially during the twentieth century. The challenges Ukraine now faces are, in large part, the result of decades of occupation and colonial-like rule. Under European rule, the western regions were able to shape and maintain a coherent national identity, centered on a shared Ukrainian language that was backed by a community of intellectual elites. Eastern regions, conversely, spent much of their time under Russian regimes, assimilating and identifying with the Russian language and its culture over the course of decades. As a result, nation-building policies aim at creating a national narrative that both regions can accept. The primary areas of reform include revising historical accounts, creating a system of citizenship that recognizes the rights of all permanent citizens, and creating an inclusive language policy at the same time as it promotes Ukrainian as the sole official state language.

This balancing act attempts to establish Ukraine as a modern nation-state concerned with minority rights, similar to its European neighbors. At the same time, however, the primacy of the Ukrainian language and nation remains a goal. As I discuss in Chapter 6, not all Ukrainians want to adopt the European model wholeheartedly. As the Soviet regime attempted to create a united citizenry through the use of Russian language and centralized rule which pointed toward Moscow, the current Ukrainian government seeks to unite its people under a shared history, culture, and, to some extent, language. Just like its pasts, Ukrainians' future will be shaped with eyes looking both West and East.

## **Chapter 3.**

### **The Local Context**

My project is based in L'viv, a regional administrative center in western Ukraine. This city of 700,000 residents is known as the heartland of Ukrainian nationalism, and recently celebrated its 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary as a city in the fall of 2006. The two schools in which I conducted research are located in different areas of L'viv, and lie within two different school districts. In this chapter, I present L'viv, these schools, and the students whose words and views appear throughout the dissertation. In addition, I aim to show how social class differentiations are growing within this postsocialist country, playing a role in the reshaping of existing social norms and values, as well as people's understandings of identity.

### **The Reproduction of Social Differences**

Institutionalized schooling is usually seen as the site where middle class ideologies, values, and tastes—which underlie the institutions of power in many places—are reproduced (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). Education can also be a source of class difference and inequality in society, as an extension of the division of labor within the family (Bowles 1972; Bowles and Gintis 1976). Schools then become “sites of cultural production and reproduction” as the class distinctions and local stratification of the society are reproduced in schooling practices (Willis 1977). This reproduction of class distinctions occurs both within the overt curriculum and in the “hidden curriculum” that occurs “simply by their living in and coping with the

institutional expectations and routines of schools day in and day out for a number of years” (Apple & Weis 1983:18).

At the local level, however, actors can effectively reproduce their own social order through schooling, even if their values and ideologies are not widely held outside of the community. Both extending and challenging Bourdieu, Deborah Reed-Danahay shows how the farming peasantry, not only the middle classes, can manipulate the educational system to ensure the reproduction of their norms as they “work to reinforce local identity ... [and] resist aspects of national culture and state power” (1996:3). Reed-Danahay explains how schooling is rejected and resisted by the peasant children in a French rural farming town because to be a “good” student of a middle class education is seen as a rejection of the local laborer identity. In a less overt yet still significant way, Charlie Walker (2009) shows how working class youth in Russia continue to attend the same technical schools that led their relatives and neighbors into steady, well-paid careers. This choice, however, negatively impacts the employment opportunities of these young people, as they eventually master increasingly obsolete trades instead of preparing themselves to work in the growing service sectors by attending colleges with broader curricula.

Research on language socialization and education has often focused on examining how diversity—in language, ethnicity, gender, and class—results in social inequality. The consistently poor educational performance of minority and working class students has been explained, for example, as stemming from a “deficiency” in their home environments (Bereiter and Englemann 1966; Payne 1996), or from a

“discontinuity” or difference between their home and school cultures (Brice-Heath 1982). Scholars have critiqued both of these perspectives, claiming that viewing differences in educational attainment as either the result of the actions of individuals or the educational system simplifies the complex relations between numerous factors (cf. Mehan 1979, 1992). James Collins, for example, asserts that “it is necessary to conceptualize and study multiple social levels to understand mechanisms that might produce such large-scale structural inequality” (2009:43), and that these levels need to be examined over the course of time. Stanton Wortham also emphasizes the importance of multiple timescales in the making of classroom identities (2006).

In his review of the research on class differences in educational achievement, Collins locates urbanization and industrialization as key events in the development of class-based communities that unknowingly play a role in the perpetuation of social inequality:

The development of distinct communities along class and ethnic lines follows upon urbanization and industrialization. Complex divisions of labor create social and economic segregation. Segregation, in turn, serves as a spur to the development of networks of social relations—of work, kinship, friendship, religious observation, and political mobilization. Such networks are imbedded in institutions that are themselves shaped by class antagonisms. (1988:308)

This movement of people into urban centers in order to work in industrial factories explains much of the ethnic and class segregation the United States and other western countries. Many scholars have examined how the linguistic variations of youth are often linked to ethnic and/or class-based communities, such as those that result from residential segregation (Hewitt 1986; Willis 1977) and immigrant settlement patterns (Mendoza-Denton 2008; Shankar 2008).



Although socialism influenced educational systems differently than western capitalism, many comparisons can be made between the educational systems under both systems. As the postsocialist states in Eastern Europe seek to transform into capitalist economies, many of the ideological and value norms associated with education were not drastically different from those in the West, especially in those territories that were part of western Empires during the development of formalized education. The highly centralized educational system under the Soviet regime also sought to instill and reproduce the ideologies of the state. During the Soviet era, the educational system was one tool for promoting socialist ideals among the populace. One goal of schooling was to create the Soviet person; the Soviet person was to be highly educated and creative, and yet also loyal to the Party:

Children learning obedience, duties and discipline as a part of the school's 'hidden curriculum' were essential, it was thought in Soviet pedagogy, for the process of interiorisation of communist values and norms, for raising the awareness (and, implicitly, loyalty) of the future Soviet citizen. But the real side effect of this practice appeared to be increasing social apathy, passivity and conformism. (Stepanenko 1999:64)

Schooling emphasized form and appearance over content and substance; seeming to comply was more important in many respects than actual compliance (Yurchak 2006).

The separation of working and middle class in the former Soviet Union, however, did not develop the same way as in western societies. In eastern Ukraine urbanization and industrialization came in the 1920s with the Bolshevik Revolution, a movement focused on rebuilding society along working class values and not those of the middle class. In western Ukraine, urbanization and industrialization came even later, in the 1950s, and, in many parts of the region, never really took hold. With the

end of socialism, the emerging class structure, therefore, is not directly comparable to those in western societies.

The emergence of a middle class in places like Ukraine is relatively recent. It has been argued that this class looks towards western, primarily American, images of middle class life—such as home ownership, the two-car household, and ownership of the latest array of technological gadgets—as something to achieve and emulate (Patino 2008). These basics of the American middle class, however, are far from easy to attain and are more representative of the wealthy in Russia and neighboring countries. In western Ukraine, few families own cars, and their apartments and houses are often the result of inheritance as housing is difficult and expensive to acquire. Government restrictions on the importation of used cars from Europe and elsewhere have resulted in a narrow and limited automobile market. The dearth of cheap used cars makes, for example, the idea of a middle class teenager's first car a near impossibility; though television shows imported from the United States often depict middle class, car-owning teenagers, the young Ukrainians who watch these shows can hardly hope to reproduce this form of middle class consumption.

This emerging middle class identity, based on those in western societies, further complicates postsocialist schooling, which has been focused on shedding other socialist ideologies, creating tension between the earlier Soviet and current western models of education. In order to affirm their claims to autonomy and distance themselves from the former regime, Ukraine and many of its neighbors have implemented reforms to their schooling systems, such as rewriting textbooks (Popson

2001; Solonari 2002; E. Anderson 2005), reinterpreting history and its past atrocities (Husband 1991; Stevick 2009; Korostelina 2010) and revising the relations between local and national languages (Janmaat 2000, 2005; Brown 2005; Polese 2010). These efforts at nation-building in Ukraine are not clear-cut, and their implementation is dependent upon local actors. The state may regulate the national curriculum but how these policies are enacted is locally determined (Janmaat 2000; Polese 2010). Seemingly small changes, such as in how students are evaluated—like in the shifting from a 12-point grading system to a 5-point one— or the incorporation of Russian literature within the subject of “foreign literature,” complicate even everyday classroom practices.

In urban western Ukraine, postsocialist reforms attempt to create a schooling system based on western-styled educational systems which also intersect with more local and national notions of Ukrainian identity. This intertwining of the local, national, and supranational is not all that new or surprising, however, given the history of L'viv. Its location along trade routes between the East—Kyiv and Moscow—and European cities in the West—such as Krakow, Vienna, and Budapest—have made L'viv a cultural, intellectual, and administrative center for centuries. Its international and multiethnic beginnings, coupled with later nationalist movements, have resulted in a multisided L'vivian identity that is both cosmopolitan and local, genuinely European and Ukrainian.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> People's desire that Ukraine become “more European again” seems to be in reaction to the changes that came with Soviet socialism. The ardent nationalism in L'viv was in reaction to repressive regimes, such as the Nazis who decimated the local Jewish population and the post-World War II Soviets who deported much of the Polish. In a way, people imply that the Soviets made them less

### **L'viv: a.k.a. L'vov, L'wow, Lemburg, Leopoldis**

The Ukrainian government's nation-building policies, though implemented to varying degrees throughout the country, are upheld most by those living in the western regions where Ukrainian nationalism has existed the longest. Arguably it is both the most European and the most Ukrainian region, where both the intelligentsia and rural peasantry spoke Ukrainian since the nineteenth century. Though it does not have the same diglossic relationship with Russian (cf. Fishman 1967) as in the eastern regions where Russian continues to be a language of prestige and power, linguistic issues in this western region, nonetheless, involve the use of standard Russian, as well as the use of a variety of standard and nonstandard dialects of Ukrainian. Ideologies of language in western Ukraine do not only include ethnolinguistic claims of national identity, but also attitudes towards linguistic purity.

Though L'viv is often held up to be the most traditionally and homogeneously Ukrainian, in the city, for centuries "cultures intersected, melded, and contended with each other before any of their carriers became self-consciously 'national' or 'ethnic'" (Czaplicka 2005a:14). Contrary to other models, which claim that national identities were formed from self-interested governments seeking legitimacy for their political rule over a territory, Yaroslav Hrytsak (2005, 2009) argues that urban centers such as L'viv were more influential in creating national sentiments than the actions of any particular early polity. Hrytsak refers to John Armstrong's theory of nation-building (cf. Armstrong 1982), arguing that "only gradually, under the centrifugal influence of

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European and less cosmopolitan, problems that they seek to remedy now.

large cultural centers, such as Kyiv, L'viv, and Vilnius, did distinctive national identities emerge” (2009:235). Rather than nations born from the incorporation of small communities of people who share local religious, cultural, and linguistic practices, this perspective finds nations emerging from otherwise disparate groups of people living together. As people from different regions of a territory interacted within these early cities for purposes of trade, they found common ground which united them, developing a wider sense of the community in which they were a part. From this viewpoint, the idea of the nation is intimately tied to localized contact between otherwise extralocal practices and beliefs.

Benedict Anderson (1991 [1983]) and Eric Hobsbawm (1983) speak of similar national formations—linking the creation of national sentiments to activities that are most prevalent in urban centers—such as printing and availability of mass media, and the celebrations and performances of national importance. However, the role of the city in these phenomena is only as a locale in which these events take place, rather than as a motivation spurring such events. Mass media and displays of the nation do not merely occur in cities because more people reside there; the concentration of a city's populace also gives rise for a need to create mass media and depict a coherent national image.

Rather than viewing L'viv as the site of a Ukrainian national identity, untainted by foreign, especially Russian, influence, scholars of Ukraine have recently shown how the city, like its contemporaries in Central and Eastern Europe, was built because of, and due to, its cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity (Czaplicka 2005b;

Kasianov and Ther 2009). In addition to Ukrainian and Russian, the city has Ruthenian, Polish, Armenian, German, and Jewish roots which span Polish Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, and German Protestantism (see Wanner 2007).

**Table 3.1: Historical Timeline of L'viv**

5 <sup>th</sup> century AD	Early settlement by Lendians
late 900s	Region under Kyivan Rus' rule
1256-1349	City built by Ruthenians. Population is primarily Ruthenian, Polish, Armenian.
1349-1772	Under rule of Polish Kingdom. Germans and Jews become significant major ethnic groups.
1772-1918	Under Austrian Empire. Ruthenians adopt Ukrainian ethnic identity.
1918-1939	Second Polish Republic. Main city languages are Polish, Yiddish, Ukrainian and Ruthenian.
1939-1941	Annexed to Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR)
1941-1944	German occupation. Local Jewish population decimated.
1944-1991	Returned to Ukrainian SSR. Polish population forced to emigrate to Poland. Rural Ukrainians migrate into city, shifting demographics to Ukrainian majority (88%).
1991-present	Part of Independent Ukraine.

Its role as a major center of administration and commerce only added to its influence. “L'viv has been a major cultural center since early modern times... [its] cultural influences radiated throughout Eastern and Central Europe. In the nineteenth century, under the auspices of the Hapsburg regime, three local ethnic groups ...managed to develop a dense network of cultural, academic, and educational institutions” (Hrystak 2009:235-236).

L'viv's roots, therefore, are religiously, linguistically, ethnically, and culturally diverse, becoming homogenized only under the rule of its twentieth century political

regimes. While the government's nation-building processes tend to emphasize a homogeneous Ukrainian nation, one whose only significant minority group is Russian, some argue that the historical diversity in L'viv's past, as well as that of the rest of the country, opens up the possibility for envisioning the Ukrainian nation as a vibrant mosaic:

The 'rediscovery,' recovery, and, indeed, reconstruction of history taking place in L'viv configures a historical alterity populated by Armenians, Germans, Jews, Poles, *and* Ukrainians. This history of cultural difference challenges the current populace of a city that is largely homogenous in its culture to consider *their* own heritage as one characterized by cultural diversity. What the local history and heritage of the city could suggest are the possibilities for a more culturally integrative and cosmopolitan formation of Ukrainian identity itself. (Czaplicka 2005a:31)

The recent reinterpretation of L'viv as a multicultural city allows for a new way for L'vivians to define themselves. Rather than viewing L'viv as solely an ethnic and linguistically Ukrainian city, this more nuanced perspective of its population as multiethnic and multicultural can ease the L'vivians' path back to Europe. It can also be seen as a model for rewriting the history of Ukraine along similar lines and build support for a more civic-minded Ukrainian citizenship. A focus on all of the peoples within the territory—emphasizing its social complexity in a number of ways—makes it possible to free Ukrainian historiography from earlier models, which present Ukraine as the culmination of a centuries-long struggle by the Ukrainian nation, and allow for alternate ways of defining what it means to be Ukrainian. Though the demographics of L'viv are homogeneously Ukrainian in language and ethnic identity, a shift in perspective that acknowledges and addresses a diversity of ways of “being Ukrainian” is also possible in other areas of social life, such as in the schooling system.

## **Schooling in L'viv**

The vast majority of schools in L'viv are Ukrainian-language, composed of Ukrainian-speaking students who come from predominately Ukrainian-speaking families. These schools are also relatively small, having thirty to eighty students per grade, and are populated by students who live in the surrounding neighborhood. Although all of a school's student body may not be of the same socioeconomic class, it is largely representative of the neighborhood's demographics.

The public school curriculum is set at the national level, and includes which textbooks are approved for classroom use, which subjects students at each grade level are to be taught and for how many hours per week, and how students' performances are evaluated, such as through the nationwide comprehensive exam that occurs at the end of the ninth grade. These guidelines are set by the Department of Primary and Secondary Education, a branch of the national Ministry of Education and Science. Lists of suggested textbooks for each subject and grade level vary from a single textbook to one of ten or more; the reason for such a wide range is not clearly evident.



**Table 3.2: Excerpted from The Standard Plan for General Education for Students in Levels II-III (distribution of teaching time between educational branches)<sup>30</sup>**

Educational branches	General number of hours per week		
	Level II (grades 5-9)	Level III (grades 10-12)	Levels II & III (grades 5-12)
<i>Required Courses</i>			
Language and literature	42	19	61
Social science	12	10	22
Aesthetic culture	8	2	10
Math	20	8	28
Natural history	26	13	39
Technology	8	6	14
Health & physical education	17.5	9	26.5
<b>Total number of hours for required courses per week</b>	<b>133.5</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>200.5</b>
<i>Elective Courses</i>			
For subjects of choice, concentrated study, optional, individual study, and consultations	21.5	33	54.5
<b>Total number of school hours required per week</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>220</b>
<b>Total possible number of school hours per week</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>255</b>

Table 3.2 shows the distribution and type of classes are required and available for inclusion at each schooling level. Students in 5<sup>th</sup> through 9<sup>th</sup> grades cumulatively are required to spend 42 hours in lessons on Ukrainian language and literature. This might be achieved by having 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, and 7<sup>th</sup> graders each have five lessons and 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> graders take six lessons a week in either of the two subjects. The requirements laid out are far from clear: the number of hours of required courses (133.5 hours) for schools with only grades 5<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> exceeds the required number of school hours in a

<sup>30</sup> Translated from the Ukrainian Ministry of Education website, section on “Information Materials,” under the link “The state standard for basic and secondary education.” 14 January 2004. (<http://www.mon.gov.ua/education/average>)

week (130 hours), for example; the only way to meet the national requirement is for these schools to extend the school week by 3.5 hours. Though they do allow for increasing flexibility in the course loads of older students, the majority of instruction is heavily geared towards the required courses. Lower secondary school students (Level II) have little flexibility whereas Level III upper students have at minimum 23 flexible hours per week (the number of required school hours minus the number of hours devoted to required courses), divided between the three grades. The schools in this study house both Levels II and III, and, therefore, have 19.5 flexible hours divided between their seven grades, which results in an average of just over 2.5 hours or approximately three lessons a week of electives for each grade. Schools may choose to extend the school day, in order to allow for more classroom hours; when they do they tend to add lessons in required courses rather than in electives. At the local city and district level, administrators may also prescribe specific additional courses and limit which of the approved textbooks will be used in local schools. As the language of instruction is based on local demographics of nationality, the enforcement of minority schooling rights also occurs at a sub-national level of administration.

If there are any additional free instructional hours, schools have some flexibility in what subjects their students are required to learn. For example, both of the schools in this study had courses in Christian Ethics, a thinly-veiled theology class primarily taught in the lower grades. However, only one of the eight grade cohorts at one school was required to take the class because the administration deemed the students to be overly undisciplined, and so, in much more need of the class. Others

courses which were not required at both schools included the History of L'viv, German, Information Technology, Arts and Crafts, and Wood shop. The courses schools offer are limited by their facilities—such as having a computer lab or shop equipment—as well as how many school hours were available for these elective courses. Lastly, some schools choose to use their elective hours for additional lessons in required courses, such as Ukrainian language or mathematics, in order to better prepare their students for end-of-the-year exams.

Beyond this high level of national and local administrative control over school curricula, the cohort system also works to standardize the general education experience. In Ukraine all students in a cohort take classes together from the fifth grade until they graduate, drop out, or transfer to a specialized or vocational school after passing their ninth grade exams.<sup>31</sup> Though primary schools are fairly similar, there are multiple kinds of secondary schooling available. Both of the schools in this study are general public schools which have a separate primary school building nearby, and a secondary school building that houses both the “lower” (grades 5-9) and “upper (10-11) grade levels. If students pass the ninth grade exit exam, they receive a Certificate of Completion from the lower secondary school, and may continue on at that school, or transfer to a specialized (*lyceija* or *hymnazija*) or vocational (*technika*)

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upper secondary school. Students who complete and pass exams at all types of upper secondary schools receive a Matriculation School Certificate, and those at vocational schools also earn a Professional Diploma at the level of Junior Specialist. Since this research followed students through their eighth and ninth grades, the students had not yet decided the type of upper secondary education they would seek. Observing the difference in the number of ninth graders in comparison to those in the tenth and eleventh grades, working class students appear to leave the general public school at twice the rate of middle class students. The middle class students stated they would, of course, continue at the school after ninth grade, in the hopes of achieving high scores that would help them get into a university. In contrast, many working class teenagers were uncertain of their plans after ninth grade; some assumed they would continue at the school while others voiced desires to attend technical schools that would lead directly to employment after graduation.

The composition of each cohort is fairly consistent from fifth through ninth, with some students having been in the same class together since primary school. At the beginning of fifth grade, students are placed in a cohort and are assigned a homeroom teacher. This teacher remains with the same cohort throughout secondary school, and is responsible for the students under her charge. The homeroom teacher informs parents and students of school activities, keeps a journal of all of the students' grades in every class, their daily attendance, and their parents' contact information. Though other teachers and even students have access to this journal—other teachers keep their scores for the class in this same journal, making class journals widely

circulated after major exams—it is the homeroom teacher's responsibility that the cohort's journal is up-to-date and in good order. Under the belief that teachers are more competent when instructing their own children, and that other students will work harder in order to keep up with the teacher's child, school administrators will often transfer a teacher to another class, or even another school in the district, in order to have a parent take on the role as the homeroom teacher for her child's class.

The centrality of the class cohort is evident in the organization of school duties. Cohorts are responsible for own classroom space—either the classroom in which they have the majority of their lessons or the room in which their homeroom teacher uses—including the condition and repair of desks, chairs, and other furniture, the decorating of the room during holidays, and the general cleanliness of the space, as school janitors are often not responsible for cleaning individual classrooms. Students are also organized by class for inter-class sports and academic competitions, for school-wide assemblies and health check-ups, and for assigning rotating hall and yard monitors and other responsibilities deemed suitable for the student body. Though these basic elements categorize the majority of public schools in L'viv, particular schools differ from each other in a number of ways depending on their location within the city and the socioeconomic demographics of their student bodies.

### ***The Working Class School: Taras Shevchenko***

Taras Shevchenko Secondary School is a public secondary school located in a predominately working class area on the edge of L'viv. Near the school are a major

avenue and an expansive city market, where residents throughout the city go to shop in at the Western-style supermarket and electronic store, or to buy lower quality items sold in the open air bazaar nearby. Most of its roughly 500 students in grades five through eleven live in 1950s Soviet-era, cement block housing. A few students live in the detached homes along a dirt path that retains vestiges of its former village status, or in relatively newer apartment buildings. Many of their parents are in factory or construction jobs, or work as salespeople, nurses, or teachers. Few are working in the areas for which they were educated or trained, and some are periodically unemployed or underemployed.

At this school, the principal, Mrs. Ivanenko, explicitly presents the school as extension of the family, highlighting a triadic relationship between the school, parents, and students. The integration of school and home life is encouraged through events such as monthly evening seminars for parents on topics like childrearing and becoming a better parent. Homeroom teachers are expected to have open communication with parents, which includes calling home if a student is misbehaving or doing poorly on his schoolwork. Many of the homeroom teachers upheld this view, publicly reviewing the cohort's grading book—where every teacher recorded individual student's grades on tests and daily attendance and participation—from time to time, and openly speculating on parents' reactions to student scores. The homeroom teacher of the focal class at Taras Shevchenko, Mrs. Stadnyk, for example, both threatened to inform students' parents of their behaviors at school, and, on more than one occasion, told me of her strong relationships with many of her students' families.



**Figure 3.1: “Our School Family.” Main entry at Taras Shevchenko.**

The desire of school officials to create close relationships with parents gives the school an air of order and restraint, where students are expected to display regimented self-control as well as their mastery of the curricula. This includes students addressing their teachers with *Pan* or *Pani* (Mr. or Ms.) and their family name, keeping their elbows on their desks when raising their hands, and standing to give their answers, remaining so until their teacher has instructed them to sit again. Public reprimands also involved students standing at attention, even when the entire class was involved.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Of course, not every student displayed this behavior all of the time, nor were teachers always consistent in enforcing this behavior. However, when students were expected to be on their “best” behavior—such as during the first few weeks of this foreign researcher’s observations—or for lessons taught by the school principal, they displayed these behaviors much more often.

Another underlying goal at Taras Shevchenko is to present and maintain a sense of equality. Trendy or flashy clothing is rarely worn by either gender, as it might draw negative attention from teachers and other students alike; clothes that were too different might make a student seem snobbish or as if she were trying to be superior to her peers.<sup>33</sup>

The girls seem to have their own unofficial “uniforms”: jeans, flats or sneakers, and long-sleeved sweaters in pastel colors, imports from China and other Southeast Asian countries that are sold in abundance in the outdoor bazaars throughout the city. Their hair is long and straight, pulled back into a ponytail with a thick, decorated hair band or pulled back with a large barrette at the base of the neck. Their only jewelry consists of small gold earrings; only a few wear thin gold necklaces or rings. These teenage girls also wear little to no makeup, having the occasional pale lip gloss on, something their homeroom teacher is unlikely to notice or comment upon. Their fingernails are bare, or painted with clear or light pastel nail polish. They carry small backpacks or shoulder bags, all made of sporty fabric in bright colors, in which they hold their school pen cases and notebooks, if the bags are large enough to hold any of them. The boys at Taras Shevchenko wear sneakers and neutral-colored clothing in shades of blue, black, or tan. Two boys, whose mothers both work in Italy, are the only ones who regularly wear colors, including red and green striped sweaters.

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<sup>33</sup> Conversely, those students with fewer financial resources were pitied, but their appearances were not openly critiqued or ridiculed. One girl, for example, had only one outfit she appeared to wear the entire school year. When the new school year started, her homeroom teacher pointed out, to me and some nearby students during a break in lessons, how the girl's mother had purchased her a new outfit. The teacher saw this as an improvement, asking students to confirm her positive assessment of the girl's new clothes, telling me she hoped that the new clothes would encourage the other students to interact with the girl more.



They mostly wear white or black sneakers. Between classes, both girls and boys chat, finish homework or study for the next lesson, mildly tease one another, wander the hallways, or go to the school's cafeteria for jam-filled rolls. Some of them find other things to do in order to skip the upcoming class.

The students that appear throughout this and the next two chapters are primarily of the working class. The parents of Katja, Larysa, Alina, Valja, and Solja all have a secondary school education, and are employed in semi-skilled jobs—pipelayer, machinist, truck driver, building engineer, nursing—or in the service sector—salesperson, cook, security guard. Yevhen and Stanislav are an exception; both of their parents attended college and Yevhen's father is a local policeman. The majority of these teenagers' parents have traveled to other countries at some point in their lives, but, apart from Solja's family trips to France every few years, these trips are rare and mostly limited to the countries of the former Soviet Union and nearby Poland.

### ***The Middle Class School: Ivan Franko Secondary School***

In contrast, Ivan Franko Secondary School is a much smaller secondary school, located in a region of the city historically associated with the city's intellectual elite, within walking distance of the city center. It is located along a major trolley line, and is across the street from a former Soviet-era stadium, which has fallen into disrepair. Its student body of roughly 250 fifth through eleventh graders is primarily middle class, either the children of professionals like doctors and dentists, or of the emerging

class of businessmen and salesmen. Though unemployment and underemployment affect these families too, more of them are financially secure enough to vacation abroad, sometimes accompanied by their children.

At this school, teachers see their job as merely to try and educate their students; they do not hold any deeply held belief that they should be an extension of parents or that parents should be extensively involved in school activities. Though many teachers claim a desire for parents to be aware of what is going on at school, since it is such a big part of their child's life, teachers do not see it as their responsibility to give parents unsolicited information about their children's school lives.

Though the teachers and students recognize that traditional school behavior requires the forms of address and classroom bodily practices that are held as the norm at Taras Shevchenko, at this school they do not patrol these practices. On the contrary, the norms at Ivan Franko include students addressing teachers by their first name and patronymic, raising their hands high and answering from their seats, with no assumption that they remain in the "hot" seat past the question they sought to answer. While the most conservative students may raise their hands with their elbows on their desks, or stand to answer, they are not received or encouraged in this behavior. Oftentimes, their raised hands go unnoticed as they are raised much lower than others'. When they do answer, their commitment to traditional classroom behaviors is seen as a nuisance, as it requires more attention and effort on the part of the teacher, who must wait for the student to stand and remember to tell the student to sit afterwards. These

formal behaviors are wholly unsuited to the quick barrage of questioning typical for many of the teachers at Ivan Franko.

In contrast to those at Taras Shevchenko, the girls at Ivan Franko appear to dress much more distinctively, showing a wider range of clothing styles, hairstyles, school bags, and uses of makeup. These girls have highlighted, layered, or curled hair; some have hair cut above their shoulders. They wear mascara, brighter colored lip gloss, and eye shadow on occasion. Many of them wear a variety of accessories, including dangling earrings, various rings and necklaces, decorated hair clips, fashionable belts, and even neon-colored shoelaces. Some carry large backpacks similar to the boys', while others bring small purses, mini-backpacks, tote bags, and highly-embellished purses that would not seem out of place on the arms of women twice their age. They wear cotton T-shirts, jeans, and heavy boots or sneakers. During breaks, they pour over the latest Oriflame catalogue,<sup>34</sup> or leave the school grounds to buy snacks at the market down the street. Some stay on campus and buy instant cappuccino drinks and potato chips in the school lunchroom. The ninth grade girls at Ivan Franko are often described by their teachers as being outspoken, determined, and more academically and politically aggressive than the boys.

The boys at Ivan Franko are dressed similar to their peers at Taras Shevchenko, wearing clothing in the same muted blues, browns, and grays. Many also wear sneakers, though some wear the brown or black leather shoes commonly worn by men. While the boys in one ninth grade cohort prefer to play short soccer games in the

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<sup>34</sup> Oriflame is a Swedish direct-seller cosmetics company similar to Avon, which also has an office in the city.

school's small yard, the other group remains closer to their classroom, interacting with the girls or playing ping pong on a couple of the classroom desks. The teenage boys and girls in both ninth grade cohorts often flirt and tease, chasing each other around the classroom and the adjoining hallway, restricting each other's movement into the classroom by barring the door, and otherwise exercising their dominance over each other from time to time.

The parents of the students that appear here are mostly college-educated, with some only having a secondary school education. For the most part, these parents are also employed in their field of study, both those with and without a college education. The parents of Ljuba, Ksenja, Maryna, Vika H, and Lada D work in more white collar careers than those at Taras Shevchenko, including as a veterinarian, economist, work safety engineer, businessman, and small business owner. In addition, these parents have traveled beyond the former Soviet Union, with many of them having been to western or central Europe on several different occasions, and a few have traveled as far away as Japan and Egypt.

The socioeconomic class differences between the students at Taras Shevchenko and those at Ivan Franko reflect broader shifts throughout Ukrainian society. As the gap between the working and middle classes increases—the differences between their wages, economic and educational opportunities growing more disparate—it has the potential to disrupt and redefine existing social networks, as well as the values that underlie these social networks. As the following example will illustrate, relatively minor changes in a person's appearance or behavior may be

interpreted by others as rejecting prior social relationships or shunning norms of equality.

### **Making Identity with Style**

People use both linguistic and non-linguistic elements of style, such as their tastes in music, clothing choices, and hairstyles, to construct, present, and maintain social identities (Irvine 2001). Style can mark an individual as belonging to a particular social group or community, or it can be used to comment on wider social issues, by reinforcing or challenging prevailing social norms (Hall and Jefferson 1976, Hebdige 1979). Our styles are not merely consumptive choices; they may also be interpreted as “acts of identity” (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985) that communicate with a broader social world, especially for adolescents.<sup>35</sup>

The school environment is one important place where students' social identities are constructed through their engagement with their friendship groups, other peer groups, and social categories such as class (Willis 1977; Eckert 1989), gender (Bettie 2003), ethnicity and race (Wortham 2006, Mendoza-Denton 2008). Youth who belong to the same friendship group can also begin to adopt similar linguistic styles, such as when non-minority teenagers use the ethnically-marked speech styles of their ethnic

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<sup>35</sup> “Clothing and other forms of adornment, ways of speaking, territory, and even substance use and school performance all have symbolic value in the adolescent context. However subconsciously, they all stand for deeper cultural differences that may themselves not be accessible to all who participate in the symbolic system. Differences in symbolic behavior are commonly taken as the only differences between the categories—and such things as clothing differences are regarded as if they had social value in themselves rather than simply in association with an evaluation of the people who wear them. Category symbols attain their value from association with clear differences in both form and content, developing around salient social differences between the categories and maximizing distinctness in visible form” (Eckert 1989: 49-50).

minority friends (Rampton 2000, 2008). The styles of young people also draw upon wider sociohistorical contexts, such as rampant unemployment (Hebdige 1979) or the institutions that solidify their social class position (Hall and Jefferson 1976; Willis 1977). These larger social realities are reflected in the social relations they seek out at school and within their communities (Eckert 1989). In other words, the concrete ways in which individuals and their social groups construct and present their identities to others, through their uses of speech, clothing, and other style elements, often reflect and respond to their relative positions in the social environment.

The following two examples will illustrate some of the tensions created when young people present identities that highlight class differences. Oftentimes, the styles that young people adopt are interpreted much differently by the adults in their lives. In a way, these generations live in different worlds, where what is deemed normal and expected by one generation comes to mean something very different for the other.

### *Alina's New Haircut*

One spring day at Taras Shevchenko, Alina, a quiet girl well-liked by many, came to school with a new haircut. In contrast to her previous hairstyle, when she had bangs with the rest of her hair being all one length, this new style was layered and highlighted. Her friends quickly admired the new style, asking Alina questions about it and generally giving the girl more attention than usual. During one break early in the school day, however, Alina's teacher, Mrs. Stadnyk, scolded her in front of her classmates (who were also Alina's close friends). The teacher asked her how much

money her mother had spent on such an elaborate haircut, and said that the money should have been used for a more practical, and less frivolous, reason.

Alina's new hairstyle was more modern and western than the hairstyles of her peers. Although few could afford, or convince their parents to pay for such an expensive style, their admiration of it showed how valuable it was within Alina's peer group. However, the teacher's reaction towards the hairstyle questioned not just Alina's and her mother's fiscal sensibilities, but also her authority to hold this style. Among peers, knowledge and access to particular styles are essential to claims of authentic identities. However, group belonging "[is] not just a question of having the correct commodities, but of establishing a right to wear them" (Croghan et al 2006:471). While Alina's peers reinforced her right to have the hairstyle, their teacher challenged this right on the basis of an assumed superior focus, that of spending money frugally, on "things that matter" in the eyes of Mrs. Stadnyk. For Alina, however, style was a "thing that matters," as it raised her social prestige and may help raise the prestige of her peer group in the eyes of other students.

Though one might argue that an event such as this is a typical exchange at school in many ways, with an older adult seeing the decisions of teenagers as "frivolous" and lacking in common sense, the situation also involves underlying issues of economic difference and self-interest. In questioning Alina's haircut, Mrs. Stadnyk indirectly voices socialist concerns of economic scarcity and communal ties. First, Mrs. Stadnyk interprets the haircut as a "waste"; the money spent on Alina's hair could have, and morally should have been used on something more useful for her family.

She frames the decision for the haircut as a family decision, one that was made with the support and encouragement of Alina's mother. In doing so, Mrs. Stadnyk questions the fiscal sense and responsibility not only of the 14-year-old Alina, but also her middle-aged mother who lived through the the tough economic times both prior to and immediately after the end of the Soviet Union. For many people during the Soviet era, such a haircut would have been a luxury which few could afford, but under present conditions this may not be the case. In a way, Mrs. Stadnyk is framing the present as a time of potential future scarcity, where the money spent might be needed for something more essential in the near future. For Alina, and presumably her parents, it is just a new haircut, it will not, so to speak, "break the bank."

More evidently, the distinct hairstyle may also be working to highlight the present differences in socioeconomic class. Mrs. Stadnyk's view of economic resources as strained does not coincide with that of Alina's family. In a way, the haircut can be seen as flaunting the economic opportunities available to Alina that may not be available to her classmates, or even her teacher. By publicly questioning the decision behind Alina's new haircut, Mrs. Stadnyk critiques the current, growing economic inequalities that garner some people financial security while others, such as Mrs. Stadnyk and her family, continue to struggle as they did under socialism.

### ***The Uniform Debate***

Across town at Ivan Franko, the beginning of the school year for the ninth graders brought with it a new school principal. Having previously worked at a local



specialized secondary school (hymnazija), and having knowledge of the schooling systems in the United States and Europe, Mr. Zvavych's main goal was to improve the prestige of this general public school.<sup>36</sup> His first act was to require every student to wear a school uniform, composed of a white dress shirt, dark blue blazer, dark blue trousers or skirt, and a dark blue tie. Mr. Zvavych described the uniform policy as a way to associate the school with elite private schools in the city, which are thought to be modeled after schools in England and elsewhere in Europe. These schools have their own school crest, which is displayed on students' uniform blazers. The blazers, slacks, and ties are of a distinct color, such as burgundy. Teenagers who wear these uniforms are easily identifiable as private school attendees by the lay person, even if the particular school is not known. The resources of these local private schools – the wide variety of courses, fully modern computer labs and other technology, for example – are believed to ensure admission into a university, as well as the social contacts that lead to a successful career. According one student, those attending private schools are even exempt from taking the usual college entrance exams, bypassing the rigorous multi-day testing required by all other students seeking admission at a Ukrainian university. Though the tuition at these schools is much more than even the emerging middle class can afford (Zhiliaev 2005) their school uniforms,

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<sup>36</sup> During his first social studies lesson with the ninth graders, he discussed the importance of knowing the rights and duties they had as Ukrainian citizens. He also openly critiqued the school, saying that the cappuccino and coffee the students could currently purchase in the lunchroom were bad for their health, and that the casual, joking relationships they had with many teachers were okay once in a while, but they contributed to disciplinary problems. In effect, he critiqued the school's current learning environment, as well as the faculty, and implicitly the former administration. It is no surprise that many students quickly disliked him, though his experience with their age group put him on solid grounding to be respected in the future.

for some, have come to index an elite social class well-versed in western norms and expectations.

Uniforms for many people, however, remain linked to the Soviet system and are viewed as a revival of socialist practices. The uniform pieces, especially for primary school students, are not stylistically any different from those worn during socialist times. Students claim that the uniforms reflect a concern over creating an “eliteness” which is merely focused on the school's “unattractive public face,” rather than improving “the essentials” and “the basics” of students' education. From this perspective, the re-implementation of uniforms can be equated with the Soviet practice of over-emphasizing surface-level changes without making any substantial policy reforms.

Some teachers see the return to uniforms as an attempt to make the students more “equal” again and less concerned about their appearances, like they were before independence.<sup>37</sup> They assert that students will spend less time worrying about their clothing since “everyone will be dressed the same,” and they will take their studies more seriously if they are required to wear “serious” clothing. Although a uniform was more expensive than a typical outfit, a student only really needed a jacket, a white shirt, and pants, rather than the wider variety of clothing they were used to wearing at school. Teachers complained that girls' current clothing was inappropriate, that they dressed “like they were going to a discotheque, not school” and that boys were

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<sup>37</sup> Wearing the uniform can be just wearing the right colors on the right days (ie. white shirt with navy pants or just a navy jacket, when they have civics with the school principal), not only wearing the full uniform. At the time that I left, not wearing the uniform did not lead to any disciplinary action apart from teacher warnings, such as “don't let the principal see you.”

distracted by the girls' too short, too tight, clothing. They also believed that students would take their studies more seriously if they were required to wear “serious” clothing. One teacher at Ivan Franko compared the school uniform to that of a man's work suit: “Just as a father puts on a suit and tie to go to work, it makes sense for students to similarly have a uniform. School is their work.” The link being made through these comments is that uniforms can prepare students for a future white-collar career,<sup>38</sup> and that the act of wearing a uniform changes one's demeanor to prepare students for this career trajectory. In general, most teachers felt that academic and behavioral problems would lessen with the uniform policy.

The debate over a new uniform policy at Ivan Franko illustrates how something as mundane as whether students should wear a uniform to school can also become a site for reflecting back upon socialist educational practices or for envisioning a western-styled future for the school. Discussions over teenagers' clothing at school are fairly common in many industrialized countries. In postsocialist countries, however, these same debates are not merely echoing those of their western counterparts, but may also be drawing upon socialist and postsocialist ideals of personal expression and community membership. School uniforms played an integral part in creating the Soviet citizen, and although many public primary schools continue

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<sup>38</sup> Craik describes how school uniforms for boys are linked to their future occupations, where they would be expected to be restrained in their behavior, and which would require them to wear suits and ties, adult versions of their school clothing. However, as Craik aptly points out, this ease in the transition from schoolboy to working man through the use of uniforms is not applicable to the uniforms worn by girls. Instead of mimicking their future adult lives, Craik claims that the behaviors and demeanor instilled in girls are in direct contrast to those needed to be a successful adult woman in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (67-68). Rather than carrying with them the restraint they learned in school, girls are encouraged to discard all associated behaviors upon finishing their schooling, in order for them to adopt the social norms required for them to be courted, get married, and raise children.

to require uniforms on a regular, though not daily, basis, public secondary schools ended the uniform policy shortly after the 1991 state independence.

With the end of socialism throughout the former Soviet Union came a variety of educational and social reforms, including an end to school uniforms, which gave youth “their first tangible opportunity to think for themselves, experiment publicly with style and ornamentation, and forge an identity through clothing, hairstyles, and jewelry” (Markowitz 2000:68). Whether this abandonment of the school uniform was a positive or negative change—whether the ability for self-expression outweighed the now-visible economic and class disparities evident in the menagerie of clothing now worn by students—is debatable.<sup>39</sup> Though more public schools in western societies are adopting uniform policies for disciplinary and economic reasons, the abandonment of uniforms in postsocialist states like Ukraine is linked to a shedding of a Soviet past.

Bringing back a policy that was in place during the Soviet era may not simply be addressing issues of teenage rebellion and school discipline. Rather, policies such as this one become potential sites of engagement with temporally-situated understandings of social transformation which involve ambiguous, dual indexicalities of socialism and a non-socialist modernity. Institutionalized dress may be interpreted alternatively as a regression or progression of societal goals, as the denouncement of individual identities or the reflection of a valued form of quality and prestige. In one

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<sup>39</sup> “Under the Soviet system, all students wore uniforms, suit-like jackets and pants for boys and short black or brown dresses topped with a white or black apron for girls. Makeup, jewelry, and fancy hairstyles were not encouraged. With such rules lifted, most students, boys and girls alike, now try to make a fashion statement by the way they dress. The fetishization of material goods flourishes as each item of clothing or accessory indicates the type of connections one's parents have, whether they have access to hard currency, and the ability to travel abroad” (Wanner 1998:91-92).

way, uniforms are associated with a socialist past characterized by order, respect, and a focus on appearances rather than fundamentals; the school and its students are pushed “back” into a socialist time of earlier generations. In another way, uniforms can also index a more advanced “future” schooling system. Rather than indexing a socialist past, uniforms are representative of efficiency and work to control the styles and speech practices of teenagers, and the uses of technology that can be both a wellspring of information and of distraction. As an index of the prestige shared by local private schools and imagined European schools alike, school uniforms can also symbolize a potential future for the students at Ivan Franko, a time in which their school is “equal” to these other prestigious schools, not only in dress but also in the quality of education it provides.

The various comparisons people make in discussing the reasons for the uniforms reveal multiple understandings of tradition and modernity when examined through a chronotopic lens, often divided along generational and class lines. Uniforms can be viewed as traditional, linked to a socialist past that is characterized by order and respect; this standardized dress will lead to more disciplined students and will solve the school's current problems situated in the “here and now.” These uniforms can also be part of an implied more advanced “future” schooling system for others, where the elements of global culture that link students to a wider, global youth culture are both utilized and controlled by the local school administration. Uniforms can also be interpreted within the context of the more prestigious gymnasiums in the city and at imagined European schools, where they can be used to construct a potential future for

these students, and by extension Ukraine. This view layers multiple space-time associations: it includes a “here and now” that encompasses both Ivan Franko and the local elite private schools; a “there and now” that is linked to European and other places with similar elite schools; and a “here in the future” that projects the use of uniforms into some future time, when Ivan Franko is transformed into a school equivalent to those in Europe. Implicit in this latter chronotope is that these elite schools elsewhere are believed to already belong to this transformed “future” time: they are located in the present, but also in the hoped-for “future” of these western Ukrainians.

## **Conclusion**

For centuries, the city of L'viv and its residents were part of Europe, a past that can still be seen in the architecture of the city, and its appeal to those who seek to experience this former medieval Leopoldis, Polish L'wow, and German Lemberg. It has always been a place where balancing local, national, and supranational identities and concerns are balanced against each other. This on-going balancing of multiple and potentially competing identities is revealed in the reforms and practices of the local school system. The balancing of multiple visions of place are also evident through the expression of class identities and the tensions they create, both of which are different from those of past generations. For the older generations, certain kinds of identities can be viewed as inappropriately trumping other identities. Among them are

glocalized class or gender identities that may becoming more transformative than traditional identities tied to family and nation.

Since Ukraine's independence, those living in L'viv and similar urban areas in western regions of the country, strive to be “European again.” The improvements spurred by the upcoming 2012 Euro Cup soccer championships, which will be co-hosted by Ukraine and Poland, promise to make huge strides towards this goal. Social class differences, however, are seen by many as becoming more visible and more problematic than they were under socialism, or even in pre-socialist times. These concerns over economic differences and their influences on notions of rural spaces, language use, and Ukraine's relations to other countries will be explored in the next few chapters.

## **Chapter 4.**

### **The Authentic Village and the Modern City: Local Sites of Meaning Making**

For many people who see themselves as members of a nation, the idea of a homeland is more than just about political boundaries. Narratives of the homeland include comparisons of different physical places, but also of imagined places and the temporal locations of these places. In Ukraine, the idea of the homeland is intimately rooted in the rural: it is where the Ukrainian nation began, where the language and culture is most authentic. However, Ukrainians are also striving to become equal members in the urban-centric global community. The relationship between rural and urban spaces complicates notions of Ukrainian identity, both how young people view themselves and who they wish to become.

Divides between rural and urban spaces are increasing as city-dwellers find they often have more in common with each other than those living in more geographically close rural villages. Differences between these spaces are also increasing with migration, such as the recent mass movements of rural villagers into the major cities in Vietnam, China, and India. Though the narratives of many nations are situated in a distant past, located in agricultural areas and rural landscapes, urban centers, with their employment and educational opportunities, are where contemporary life resides for many. The interrelations between the rural and the urban complicate territorial bases of the nation-state, questioning the roots of a rural-based nation in conceptions of the future of that nation.



Perceptions of the differences between rural and urban places include notions of temporality that are associated with each kind of space and the inhabitants of each space. Take, for example, the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign. Then Governor of Alaska and Republican vice presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, often voiced the paradigm of “two Americas.” One was framed as the “real” America, a place inhabited by those Americans who were primary rural, religious, and conservative. Palin presented herself as a resident of this “real” America by describing her love of hunting, her life in rural Alaska, and through her use of rural idioms such as “you betcha.” The unspoken but ever-present opposition to Palin and other “real” Americans were the “fake” Americans, primarily deemed to be those living in the urban centers of the more liberal, coastal states. Palin's framework defined rural places as strongholds of the American values of independence and self-reliance, where urban cities were seen as filled with the immoralities of corporate greed, atheism, and liberal excessive tolerance of difference. Though comedians like Jon Stewart joked about her categorization of a “real” and a “fake” America, in doing so, they re-affirmed an urban-rural divide. Rather than challenging Palin's “two Americas”, they transformed her idealized country towns into places of ignorance, in-breeding, and irrational thought, and re-defined the coastal cities in which they lived and identified as filled with a diversity of open-minded, rational, and educated people.

Through a chronotopic lens, these paradigms of rural and urban America lie upon different temporal timelines, each of which is connected to a different understanding of American identity and history. On one hand, Palin's “real” America

is temporally layered: her valued rural America is located in both the “past” and the “present.” What makes these rural places and the people who inhabit them “real” and “true” Americans is their reproduction of (imagined) traditions of the Pioneer West. These “real” Americans are modern—they watch cable television, use the internet, etc.--but their identities are based in traditional forms of community, centered on shared beliefs and practices. The “real” America described by Stewart, however, is grounded in a notion of cosmopolitanism where people from all different beliefs and backgrounds can live alongside each other peacefully despite their differences.

Furthermore, this urban-valued America is valued in contrast to a past that is better left behind and forgotten, rather than one that is viewed as “the good old days.” While Palin's rural-valued America sees the history of the American nation as a narrative of freedom and independence filled with patriotic heroes and wartime victories, the urban-valued America instead focuses on the changing national culture—from accepting slavery to promoting equal rights, from sacred to secular rule. In other words, Palin's “two Americas” envisions the “true” American as upholding long-held traditions while “fake” Americans reject these core beliefs. Those who critique Palin's model view it as based in the traditions of a small minority, traditions which exclude and marginalize the large swathes of the population who are just as legitimately “American”.

This chapter will show how current debates over the role of “the village” in discourses of the Ukrainian nation can be better understood by examining how these debates reflect underlying notions of temporal and spatial meaning that help shape

how young people come to define who they are and who they hope to become. I propose that the incorporation of the rural as a site for creating and sustaining a Ukrainian identity differs among urban teenagers in western Ukraine due to socioeconomic class. Through an examination of these differing orientations towards the rural, we can discover how these competing views complicate notions of what it means to be “Ukrainian.” How do these differing conceptions of the rural and the linguistic, cultural, and ultimately moral values associated with it map onto broader relations that may have significant impact on out-migration, as well as the incorporation of new immigrants? In addition to media depictions of the Ukrainian village, I draw upon interviews and discussions with students and teachers in which I elicited talk about rural spaces, language use, and ways of speaking. While both working and middle class teenagers view the Ukrainian nation as borne of a rural pastoral, they construct different chronotopic frames of the rural and its relationship to the urban spaces in which they live.

### **Place and Identity**

Nations are often defined in relation to the geographic territories they inhabit or are believed to have a right to inhabit; territory is a central characteristic in the imagining of the nation (B. Anderson 1991 [1983]; Armstrong 1982; Barth 1969; Gellner 1983) and one's membership within it. Globalization, however, challenges the territoriality of the nation-state as migration, the internet, and other transnational movements allow communities to span across physical spaces. Post-national studies

often focus on reinterpretations of place as a basis for state authority (Appadurai 1996, Benhabib 2001). Recent movements towards increasing state regulation—such as restricting the flow of information in China, French policies that result in high unemployment among Afro-French youth, Germany's denial of citizenship to Turkish Muslims, and ongoing territorial conflicts between ethnic groups—challenge the primacy of territorialization (Soysal 1994, Ong 1999). Though membership within a nation can be more global and virtual due to various forms of communication, the idea of the homeland remains important for both diaspora groups and those living in the home country.

Narratives of difference between places shape and define identities. People's conceptualizations of places are linked to their identity-making in multiple ways. For example, scholars have shown how people from the former East Germany define their identities through their current relations with the unified German state (Davidson 2007); how Uzbeks view their level of empowerment in the economic system as linked to their physical location in urban or rural areas (Liu 2005); and how teenagers in the U.S. construct identities in terms of their “urban-” and “rural-ness” in comparison to other local and national places, often valuing urban spaces over rural ones. “Young people’s narratives of identity often reflect public narratives which construct hierarchies of places, with people, activities, and things coded ‘urban’ often (although not always) represented as superior to those coded ‘rural’” (Vanderbeck and Dunkley 2003:242). In other words, people use place in identity-making as much as other characteristics, situating themselves in relation to others by drawing upon

notions of place at different levels of meaning (cf. Dimitriadis 2001; Ferguson 1999; Low 2003; Rodman 2003). I show how tropes of the urban and the rural in Ukraine are mapped onto temporal frameworks that are used to mark a variety of differences in identification, even by members of the same peer group. The competing identities linked to these notions of space-time are due to the increasingly different experiences afforded by socioeconomic class.

### ***Rural-Urban Dichotomy in Western Ukraine***

Much of the literature on the relations between places describes a “socially valued” modern urban and the stigmatized historic “rustic,” where cities are spaces of the future and villages are places of the past. In studies of place and identity, “the urban-identified can confidently assume the cultural value of their situation while the rural-identified must struggle to gain recognition” (Creed and Ching 1997:4) although “almost any inhabited place can be experienced as either rural or urban” (13). The link between the urban and social progress often leads rural areas to be seen as “backward” and, therefore, unimportant. Gerald Creed and Barbara Ching make a claim for the persistence of rural identifications as a form of resistance to social and economic inequalities, though, at the same time they argue, these rural identifications also work to reaffirm the rustic's lower position in society. Valuing the rural to cope with the increasing gap between socioeconomic classes may also be occurring among the working class in western Ukraine, as well as other parts of the postsocialist world.

The Ukrainian nation is viewed as essentially pastoral. Though it has its own government, Ukrainians believe that the soul of the nation and its people reside within the hospitality and industriousness represented in images of traditional rural life. Since independence, the government has worked to define itself within this framework of the nation-state while simultaneously making inclusive reforms in order to become accepted by the multiethnic states in the west. Like other former socialist regions (Galbraith 2004; Verdery 1996) the Ukrainian government attempts to walk the line between promoting the Ukrainian nation and its language and protecting the rights of minority nations within its territory.<sup>40</sup> The aim is to become authentically Ukrainian—basing authority in the Ukrainian language and culture—without becoming the oppressors of other minorities who suffered along with Ukrainians under foreign rule.

The issue of ethnic minorities—both co-nationals and more recent foreign nationals—in Ukraine is a complicated matter in and of itself and will not be delved into here. But if the state is to be built upon one nation, which Ukrainian nation do they mean? The contested forms of “being Ukrainian”, within local arenas as well as the national and global, are shifting.

Though the majority of the population is ethnic Ukrainian, just what it means to have this identity is regionally defined. Language is an often debated requirement (Arel 1995, Bilaniuk 2005, Shulman 2001). In both the villages and cities in western regions of the country, it is believed that any ethnic Ukrainian should be able to speak Ukrainian regardless of education, social class, or residence. However, in eastern

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<sup>40</sup> However, the classification of Russian ethnics has been continually under contention as many disagree that they need the same protection as other state minorities.

regions, especially in those cities where Russian is the norm, few ethnic Ukrainians speak the language and those who do are often from the poorer, surrounding rural villages. Though Ukrainians in the eastern regions admit that it would be nice to speak their “mother tongue” (*ridna mova*),<sup>41</sup> the language's association with an uneducated, provincial rustic does little to motivate them to actually do so.<sup>42</sup> Even within western regions of Ukraine where speaking Ukrainian is an essential part of holding the ethnic identity, what is in contention is whether, and to what extent, “the village” is relevant to the imagining of the modern Ukrainian nation.

Though “the village” as the idyllic birthplace of the nation remains a valued image in public discourse, whether rural spaces continue to be where “the soul of the nation” resides is debatable. I propose that the current ambiguity over how to “be Ukrainian” involves competing notions of authenticity and anonymity (Woolard 2008) that map onto chronotopes of “the village.”

### ***Rural Life***

When Ukrainian teenagers talk about rural places, they either speak of places in the countryside where the wealthy have summer homes (*dachy*) or, much more frequently, the remote places where year-round residents live (*khaty*), raise chickens,

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<sup>41</sup> One's *ridna mova*, or “native language,” is often interpreted in Ukraine as the language of one's ethnic group, or their “mother tongue,” rather than as one's first or primary language.

<sup>42</sup> One of the major city's newspapers, *L'vivska Hazeta*, presented an interest article on a Russian-speaking Ukrainian in an eastern part of the country. The article's primary goal seemed to be to show western Ukrainians that there are co-ethnics in the east who are actively learning Ukrainian as a symbol of their commitment to the nation. However, the numerous obstacles the man faced also showed how difficult it is to for those like him to successfully learn and use the language in such a Russian-dominant environment, due to its persisting stigmatization.

plant and harvest crops, and sometimes sell their excess milk, eggs, and produce at local markets.

A drive on any highway spanning the countryside that lies between cities can reveal the typical Ukrainian village. Among the vast underdeveloped fields elderly women tend plants, slicing through weeds with a hand scythe. To passersby, they will sell fresh milk, unpasteurized and still warm from the cow, in reused two-liter bottles. At times, cows graze along the roadside and a local farmer steers his horse-driven cart down the road, its original wooden wheels having been replaced with car tires. The number of buildings in the village is few, and it is often difficult to determine which are still being used due to a general aura of agelessness. Though there is transportation out of the village, usually by train or bus, only local residents know their schedules.

The ebb and flow of life in rural areas is dependent upon long-scaled events, such as the rising and setting of the sun and the seasonal farming chores, rather than on any specific time defined by the hands of a watch or the date on a calendar. Life is quiet, simple, and generally predictable. Few people live year-round in villages, especially in those rural communities composed primarily of summer vacation homes. Those whose sole residence is the village come to resemble the village itself: together they grow weathered along with the village's roads and buildings. Their clothing may be store-bought, but much of their life is tied to their homesteads: they raise chickens for eggs and meat, cows for milk and cheese; they grow potatoes, dill, carrots, buckwheat, apples and other staples, primarily for consumption but also as a source of income when cash is needed.



Similar to those in rural Hungary (Lampland 1995), village homes in Ukraine have a distinct style that display both a local village identity and the economic resources of their owners. Their gingerbread house trim, which drips from rooftop eaves, door jams, and window frames, along with the tole painted designs on both the interior and exterior walls, are more reminiscent of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century buildings in Ukraine's outdoor folklore museums than their contemporaries on the outskirts of cities. No matter how small the community, every village has at least one public building, usually a white-washed, metal-domed church situated on the highest hill so that it can be seen from anywhere in the village.

Despite its natural beauty, rural areas in Ukraine are home to a number of social problems, just like rural areas elsewhere. Fueled by rampant unemployment and limited educational opportunities, alcoholism, poverty, and domestic violence abound. As the population of many rural communities dwindles, these problems worsen, leading local schools to close and consolidate with neighboring communities as there are fewer and fewer children to attend them. Teachers described village students as better behaved and more dedicated than their urban peers. However, these children have fewer opportunities for bettering their lives through schooling. They are restricted by the few resources available at their schools as well as by seasonal farming obligations. When they reach adulthood, those who can leave, do.

For those villagers who move to the city, like the majority of the parents of students at Taras Shevchenko, the village retains a prominent place in their lives. They return to the village to celebrate family events—births, deaths, weddings, and

occasionally for the birthdays of village relatives—and those holidays, religious or national, that are traditionally spent with one's family, such as Christmas and Mid-Summer's eve (Ivan Kupalo). These events usually last more than a day, and include dancing, singing, food, and drink. In addition, many children are sent back to the village during the summer where they spend their time exploring the countryside and attending village dance clubs—town halls transformed by disco lights and pop music, and are the sole form of entertainment outside of summer festivals.

These trips work to maintain connections between urban and rural kin, and for urbanites to fulfill familial obligations in-mass since they are unable to do so on a daily basis. Villagers provide housing, food, and entertainment while their urban relatives contribute their labor (helping with the planting and harvesting), with their finances (paying for some celebration expenses), and give gifts that are expensive and/or difficult for their rural kin to acquire. However, after urban relatives have lived in the city for a few decades and rural relatives pass away, these connections and obligations lessen. Urbanites' relationship to rural areas changes once contact between them has been broken, transforming the rural from a place of family connections to one of summer *dachy* and an alternative to vacationing along the Black Sea.

### ***Media Images of the Rural***

Rural Ukrainian life is depicted in both Ukrainian and, more often, in Russian mass media. The Ukrainian villager ubiquitous in the Russian comedy is a drunkard, uneducated, and coarse; as the jester character, he vacillates between the role as the

unsuccessful and unseemly schemer, and that of the dim-witted yet sympathetic oaf. In both roles, his speech is a marked vernacular which contributes to his hilarity. The traits of village characters exaggerate the perceived differences between rural and urban spaces, framing rural people and the places they inhabit as inferior and deficient and, therefore, the appropriate butt of jokes.

The village is presented as deficient in the news as well. As newscasts are often centered on sensational events, the village is often the site of a lack of jobs, a lack of education, and a lack of modern conveniences and sensibilities. It is a place where men are alcoholics, young women are single mothers or marry in their teens, and people are so poor and politically naive that they sell their votes to put food on their tables. When more positive stories are shown from rural places, they include an element of the strange such as the birth of a two-headed calf, a living giant who has trouble finding shoes that fit his enormous feet, or a fluff piece on the home village of a Ukrainian-American astronaut or other famous figure. On the other hand, there exists an idyllic pastoral from which the Ukrainian nation is said to have arisen.

Many films of Soviet and post-Soviet Ukrainian cinema idealize rural life such as *Zemlja* ("Earth," 1930) and *Ivan* (1932) by Oleksandr Dovzhenko; *Tini zabutykh predkiv* ("Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors," 1965) by Sergei Parajanov; *Annychka* (1968) and *Propala hramota* ("The Lost Letter," 1972) by Borys Ivchenko; *Neskorenyj* ("The Undefeated," 2000) by Oles Yanchuk; and *Mamay* (2003) by Oles Sanin. The villages in these films are filled with radiant, hardworking, and honest people often threatened by industrialization, warfare, or the abuse of power held by

petty bureaucrats. Though there are conflicts between villagers and villagers suffer despair and death, their innate faith in God, the land, and their community helps them endure these hardships. Repeated viewings of these films reinforces the perception that Ukrainians are, at heart, rural people who have learned to survive invasion and oppression because of the tenacity passed down to them from earlier, village-based generations.

### ***The Rural at School***

Rural images are also prevalent at school, even at public schools in a large urban city such as L'viv. However, the ways in which village life is presented to students is related to how these young people perceive the value and role of the rural in their daily lives.

At the working class secondary school, Taras Shevchenko, the village is both the glorified birthplace of the Ukrainian nation and the place where Ukrainian values and traditions are reproduced from generation to generation. In both explicit and implicit ways, the students at Taras Shevchenko are shown a rural that is located in a distant, timeless past as well as in the living present.

In Mrs. Stadnyk's classroom at Taras Shevchenko, there are four paintings, one for each season of the year, which depict the typical activities that occur in villages, including mid-winter celebrations and the sowing and reaping of wheat. The stylized villagers are shown wearing traditional Ukrainian shirts, white with red and black cross-stitching, tall black boots, with thin-mustached men and women with flowers in

their braided hair. In the hallway outside of her classroom, the school has a mini-museum to the “Shakespeare” of Ukrainian literature, Taras Shevchenko, a former serf who became an artist and poet with the help of a benefactor.




**Figure 4.1: Mural in hallway at Taras Shevchenko.**

This wing of the school has framed copies of Shevchenko's drawings hanging on the walls, and two long, enclosed cases holding copies of his poetry and other writings, a photograph of students from the school standing beside Shevchenko's tombstone, and a small container holding dirt gathered from his resting place. Covering the entire wall at the end of the hallway is a mural, which was painted by a local artist at the request of the school. Sitting on a hillside overlooking wide green pastures and a slow-moving river is Shevchenko. He holds open a book, presumably reading aloud or teaching the

group of villagers that surround him, each dressed in traditional Ukrainian clothing. Rather than depicting Shevchenko in the typical dress of a 19<sup>th</sup> century educated urbanite, he is shown wearing long white robes with a mandarin collar which make him seem modern (in cut of clothing) as well as rural (in simplicity and color of clothing).

There are many other images that hark to an idealized rural past at Mrs. Stadnyk's school. In the main hallway that leads from the school's entrance to the two wings where the classrooms are located, another hand-painted mural spans the length of the corridor. This monumental mural depicts the national hymn, a description of the Ukrainian flag, the quotations surrounded by a variety of symbols of Ukrainian culture. Among them are elaborately decorated eggs that also form rolling hills, and a border designed to resemble traditional cross-stitching.



**Figure 4.2: Segment of mural in main hallway at Taras Shevchenko.**

On holidays and other important days, students are asked to wear their cross-stitched shirts to school to mark the importance of the occasion. This happens at several times throughout the year, such as on the first day of school, when Mrs. Stadnyk's students presented their Ukrainian literature and history reports to the other classes in their grade, and when they participated in a school-wide assembly on the dangers of drugs and the benefits of a healthy lifestyle.

In a tour during my first day at Taras Shevchenko, the school's principal pointed out these images and symbols of traditional Ukrainian culture and claimed that their presence was aimed at instilling in students a sense of pride for their nation and

country. Though they may not notice these images, the principal asserted, the daily exposure to them—of walking by them, standing in the hallways near them during breaks or while waiting for classes to begin—gave students the opportunity, however brief, to stop and look at them, and to ponder their meaning within the school environment.

Taras Shevchenko also has a special club, the Traditional Ukrainian Cooking Club, whose members are allowed to miss lessons for special occasions. On one fall day, the girls in this club were asked to demonstrate the preparation of *verenyky*, traditional Ukrainian dumplings stuffed with savory or sweet fillings, to a group of visiting foreign educators. This event was framed as one way in which the school was actively working to prevent the loss of traditional, rural-based Ukrainian culture.

The girls all wore matching head scarves and aprons, both printed with cross-stitched patterns but in non-traditional colors of pink and purple. A supervising teacher demonstrated, to the room full of visitors and the other students who were allowed to attend the event, how *verenyky* should be shaped—emphasizing how past generations were able to do this in their hands and without the rolling pins and tables the girls were using—, what kinds of fillings were appropriate and for which course of a meal, and which sauces should be served along with each type of filled *verenyky*. As the girls shaped the dumplings, the teacher explained how mothers were no longer making *verenyky* by hand. She explained that they did not have the time for such a labor-intensive meal, so, unfortunately, they were serving their families inferior frozen ones, if they served them at all. The teacher asserted that these girls, through the Cooking



Club, were learning how to prepare traditional Ukrainian dishes that their mothers did not know to, or did not have the time to, teach them on their own. By learning how to cook *verenyky*, *pilmeny*<sup>43</sup>, *hlybsti*<sup>44</sup>, and other dishes, these girls would be preserving an essential part of their Ukrainian identity.

In Vignette 4.1 a competition on Ukrainian geography at Taras Shevchenko becomes a site for promoting Ukrainian “patriotism” among the eighth graders participating in the competition as well as those in the audience.

**Vignette 4.1: Being “Patriotic”, May 24, 2007.**

...Things went a little different with the eighth graders' head-to-head Ukrainian geography competition. Only two classes competed, with six members on each team. Mrs. Stadnyk's class had a team of all girls who named their team after water nymphs, with each member wearing a blue T-shirt and being “named” for one of the rivers in Ukraine. The other team wore red shirts and called themselves the Edelweiss's... When all of the different sections of the geography competition were over, the scores were added up and Mrs. Stadnyk's class declared the winner.

The principal called out what each team had scored on each part of the competition, adding her comments on their performance. This was where it got interesting. First, she said she didn't like how Mrs. Stadnyk's students had mentioned Greek mythology in their choice of a team name; she liked how they had named themselves after Ukrainian rivers but didn't see what Greek nymphs had to do with a competition on Ukrainian geography. Commenting on their skit, she called it “banal, even crude”. She didn't know what it had to do with geography or Ukraine, what with them hitting people on the head with a newspaper. As she finished her comments, she said that she had wished the students had been more patriotic—this was *Ukrainian* geography after all—and they should have kept closer to the theme of the contest. Afterwards, Mrs. Stadnyk pointed out the girls' blue shirts, saying that *they* were patriotic—they were “only missing the yellow”—and they named themselves after Ukrainian rivers. And “what about the song they wrote and sang as part of the “homework” section, didn't that count too?” The other class didn't have any song at all, or name their individual members after anything in particular.

This contest over which eighth grade team gave the most correct answers to the geography questions is turned into a discussion over the subjective requirements of the

<sup>43</sup> *Pilmeny* is a pasta dish in which the dough is stuffed with a small meatball and shaped similar to tortellini. It is served with a butter sauce and salt, or white vinegar.

<sup>44</sup> Literally, “little pigeons,” these are cabbage leaves stuffed with a rice and meat mixture, then steamed or baked. They are served with a tomato cream sauce. Another variation has the same filling and sauce, but replaces hollowed-out mild yellow bell peppers for the cabbage leaves.

competition: the team's name, its geography skit, and how well a team interpreted the theme of the competition. Interestingly, the school principal does not comment on the other team's red shirts or German team name. Mrs. Stadnyk's students' attempt to link Ukraine's rivers to a broader classical tradition—they were not Greek nymphs, they were *Ukrainian* nymphs—is seen as showing a lack of “patriotism.” Though this vignette does not directly reflect rurality, it does suggest a concern over how these young people represent Ukraine as a place, both in the present and linked to an earlier place and time—that of ancient Greece—and not just over what they know about the geographical features of Ukraine.

In these ways, rural places come to be associated with a kind of purity that spans different temporalities. For the working class teenagers at Taras Shevchenko, the historic village is the origin of the nation and its language; contemporary rural spaces retain this quality, their villagers being “truer” Ukrainians because of their upholding traditional practices and values; they have not forgotten how to make *verenyky* and their lives are intimately tied to the land. By placing a past rural alongside more contemporary milieu, the school creates an expectation that the traditions and values of rural life should be remembered, upheld, and incorporated into its students' lives, and, ideally, become a part of their identities. Valuing the village, however, may also work to help the working class school community to cope with growing socioeconomic class disparities between their class and that of the emerging middle class.

In contrast, extending images and symbols of traditional Ukrainian life into students' daily lives does not occur at Ivan Franko, a middle class secondary school. Rural places are only linked to the founding of the nation and have little bearing on students' lives on any regular basis. Though the school is over 150 years old, much older than Taras Shevchenko, the building and school curriculum have adapted over time, currently highlighting the political independence of the nation-state over the beginnings of the nation itself. First, the artwork adorning the walls at Ivan Franko suggests a Soviet aesthetic. One three-dimensional piece, its colors faded from time, depicts the process of evolution and includes images of stars, dinosaurs, and various flora and fauna. On the outside of the building, by the main doors, is a large glass mosaic that forms a column of abstract flowers. In the central hallway, the Declarations of Independence of 1918 and 1991 are painted on the wall in a Soviet artistic style. Other decorations throughout the school are student-made, such as the class art projects having in the main hallway, and the school-sanctioned graffiti wall, dedicated to the city's 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary, which shows various depictions of L'viv, drawings of the city's famous lions, and the skyline of the city center as viewed from its scenic viewpoint atop the hill at High Castle.



Figure 4.3: Ukrainian Declarations of Independence in main hallway at Ivan Franko

The rural is most evident on two occasions, both of which are ritually important at most schools in L'viv. On the first day of school, held on September 1<sup>st</sup> every year, regardless of whether the day falls on a weekday or on the weekend, entering fifth graders are marched from their former primary school to Ivan Franko, their new school. All of the fifth graders are expected to wear either uniforms or a cross-stitched shirt and dark pants and skirts; those older students who are selected to make speeches, lead the fifth graders, or otherwise play a part in the ceremony also wear cross-stitched shirts to mark the event as a celebration of the Ukrainian nation. The second annual event is the Christmas pageant, when every class performs their

variation of the same play, in costume and at times with singing. The play explains the conversion of the Slavs to Christianity, and involves a foreign king with his knights, the local ruling Cossack tribes, and local (yet exotic and untrustworthy) gypsy and Jewish characters.

Unsurprisingly, teenagers of both the working and middle classes perceive of the rural as connected to a distant past where the Ukrainian nation emerged. However, only working class teenagers see rural spaces as also alive and contemporary, due in part by their continued interdependence with village relatives, which provides these young people with a multitude of direct experiences with villagers and village life. For their middle class peers, the village is the past, a past that should only be drawn upon when celebrating the creation of the nation, but not in envisioning its future. Members of different socioeconomic classes, therefore, hold different perceptions of rural spaces and the temporalities in which rural spaces are located.

### ***Family Experiences of the Rural***

The emphasis on the Ukrainian nation's rural character is also linked to the familial connections and practices that teenagers of different socioeconomic classes learn from and experience with their families. Many Ukrainians of both the working and middle class continue to visit rural areas even after having moved to the city, visiting familial villages a few times a year for religious and national holidays (Wanner 1998), such as Christmas, Easter, and Mid-Summer's eve. However, they have very different reasons for returning to the village. While the working class

returns for a variety of benefits, for the middle class, the journey back to the village is often seen as an unwanted, and therefore sporadic, obligation.

For the working class, the rural is seen as a simpler, safer and peaceful community, similar to the British imagining of the countryside as a rural idyll (Valentine 1997). These families regularly spend time in the village helping their relatives with the farm work, sending children to live in the village with their grandparents during the summer. For example, Mrs. Stadnyk and her family travel to their familial village every couple of weeks, and Larysa and her family spend almost every weekend in the village. Their visits vary by season and are dependent upon the weather and the chores that need to be done; they make fewer visits in the winter and more frequent ones in the spring and summer during the peak planting and harvesting months.

The majority of working class parents in Mrs. Stadnyk's class were born in a village and moved to the city as young adults for schooling or work, getting married and starting their own families there. In the following excerpt,<sup>45</sup> some working class girls explain how their families' migration to the city was the result of the poor conditions of village life under the Soviet system.

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<sup>45</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix III.

**Excerpt 4.1: “I’m really sorry I wasn’t born in the village”**

254	<b>EAP</b>	tak, tak, chomu vony ne zhyty zaraz v seli?	yeah, yeah, why don't they live in the village now?
255	<b>Katja</b>	prosto todi ne bulo takykh dobrykhdobrykh	it just that wasn't that good then
256	<b>Larysa</b>	umov	the conditions
257	<b>Katja</b>	mozhlyvostej tam zhyty v seli zaraz vzhe pochalys' taki, mozhlyvosti, todi po-pershe shkola bula tuta krashche vchytysja, bulo v shkoli, nu, i potim jak vony pochaly pratsjuvaty	It's possible to live there in the village now, now they're starting some kinds, it's possible, first off the school here was better to learn then, it was at school, well, and later on, like they started working
258	<b>Olha</b>	mozhna bulo v misti zarobyty	maybe there was work in the city
259	<b>Larysa</b>	tak	yeah
260	<b>Olha</b>	a v seli ne bulo	but there wasn't any in the village
261	<b>Katja</b>	tak	yeah
262	<b>Alina</b>	i robotu majut' v seli, a tut u L'vovi je bahato	they have work in the village, but there's a lot here in L'viv
263	<b>Katja</b>	tak	yeah
264	<b>Larysa</b>	a prozhyvaty treba	and you need to live
265	<b>Alina</b>	tak	yeah
266	<b>Katja</b>	ta, ta, i tym bil'she prosto todi vydavaly kvartyry, derzhava vydavala kvartyry	yeah, yeah and there was just more, they gave out housing then, the government gave out housing
267	<b>Larysa</b>	stojaly v cherzi	they stood in line
268	<b>Katja</b>	ta, to nam vydaly kvartyru tut, i mama vzhe jak mala narodytysja, to mama vzhe pryjikhala sjuda, i, nu, ja zh narodylasja u L'vovi	yeah, then they gave us housing here, and already like Mom had to be born, then Mom came here, and, well, I was born in L'viv
269	<b>Larysa</b>	ja tezh	me too
270	<b>Alina</b>	i ja tak samo tozhe, sho selo to selo	and I'm the same too, the village is a village
271	<b>Katja</b>	tak	yeah
272	<b>Alina</b>	tam zovsim inakshe	it's completely different there
273	<b>Katja</b>	ja duzhe zhaliju sho ja v seli ne narodylasja to strashenno	I'm really sorry that I wasn't born in the village, it's a shame

These girls describe rural areas as no longer deprived, yet they once were at one point in the past (Line 258). They situation a lack of opportunity in village areas (Lines 259-261) within a particular period in time (Line 267), when their parents were young and before the girls themselves had been born. Their parents had “need[ed] to live” (Line 265) and, as “the government gave out housing” (Lines 267 and 269) in the city, in an effort to spur urban resettlement and industrialization, it was logical that they would leave the village. In the intervening years, however, life in the village has improved, so much so that girls like Katja feel a sense of nostalgia for a village childhood they did not have (Line 274). Katja holds some regret that her parents had to move for better opportunities; though it was the right choice for them and their future families (Line 265), Katja and her friends see the city as lacking in something inherent in the village.

Working class teens like Katja also tend to visit familial villages more often than their middle-class peers and, as a consequence, have more exposure to, and positive experiences of, village life. Many of their families are expected to contribute their time and labor to their village relatives who are often the teens' grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. This dependence, however, goes both ways. Due to the continuing economic instabilities, working class families are also dependent upon the village plots they help sow and reap. By helping their poorer rural relatives, they are also entitled to the fruits, vegetables, eggs, and dairy products produced on the family farm. Rather than spend money on these goods in the city market, they harvest their “free food” when the crops are ready.



Though these working class urban teenagers, the children of rural-raised parents, do not fully embrace a rural identification, they seem to challenge the urban-rural hierarchy. By presenting certain characteristics of rural spaces as superior to urban spaces—such as its clean air, fresh produce, and friendly and caring people—these teenagers construct a culturally valued rustic that is difficult to imagine (cf. Creed and Ching 1997). These teenagers value a past that has persisted into the present; the traditions of village life have adapted over time, yet at their cores they have remain unchanged. These young people construct identities that are at once contemporary and traditional, and are lived within both rural and urban spaces. Villages are places where one learns how to be authentically Ukrainian, as they are spaces that are imbued with cultural knowledge and traditional values.

### **The Wisdom of the Rural**

Keith Basso (1996) examines how specific places can become concrete sites of cultural knowledge. Among the Western Apache, the act of hearing a place's name conjures up an image of the physical place, the narrative associated with that particular place, and the lesson to be learned from the actions of the protagonist in the narrative. By speaking its name, a place is transformed into a site of an historical event and a permanent reminder of the event on the landscape for those who know its story. For the Apache, places can convey social lessons and link the past, present, and future.

Though few perceive place in the same way as the Apache, when dealing with national identity, places can become sites of cultural knowledge. While rural areas are

widely-known to be places with high rates of unemployment, alcoholism, and poverty, western Ukrainian teenagers also see them as spaces of authentic Ukrainian values free from the insecurities and facelessness of the city. Katja, the only child of a village-born, working class family, explains one of the reasons she likes her familial village.

**Katja:** You can dress in normal clothes, for example, clothing with some little stain or that went out of style. If you go to the vegetable garden or the forest, then it doesn't make a difference how you're dressed, everyone looks at your character, *like* if a person has a good character, she'll have a lot of friends...

For Katja, rural people are not focused on judging people based on superficial details, such as the cleanliness or style of a person's clothing, details that city people over-emphasize. Instead these villagers seek to know a person's "character," which Katja claims can be determined, for instance, by the number of friends a person has. Gill Valentine's (1997) interviews with village parents in the English countryside make similar claims about the values and practices of villagers. These English parents claim that the rural way of living can teach children to be less concerned with fashion and other markers of social class, which consume the lives of many urban youth.

Katja and her friends, whose village-born parents moved to L'viv as young adults in search of an education and/or employment, also enjoy the relative freedom they experience when they are visiting their familial villages.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> An extended version of this excerpt is in Appendix III.

**Excerpt 4.2: “More cultured” people**

23	<b>Larysa</b>	meni spodobalosja sho ja mozhu huljaty tsilyj den' maizhe	I like that I can hang out all day long, maybe
24	<b>Alina</b>	z samoho ranku ta vyjshov	in the morning, you can go on your own
25	<b>Larysa</b>	i do samoho vechora	and be on your own until dinner
26	<b>Alina</b>	tam druzi je, vykhovanishi, nabahato vykhovanishi ljudy, a tu[ta	friends are there, more well- mannered ones, people a lot more well-mannered, but he[re
27	<b>Katja</b>	[tak, bahato vykhovanishi ljudy=	[yeah, a lot of more well-mannered people=
28	<b>Alina</b>	=kul'turnishi	=more cultured
29	<b>Katja</b>	tam bil'she ljudy, znajete, pryvitnishi jak v kohos' bida stalasja to vony zrazu dopomozhut'	there are more people, you know, friendlier ones, like if a misfortune comes to someone, every time they help out
30	<b>Alina</b>	tut je, ale	they're here, but
31	<b>Katja</b>	malo tutu, tozhe je bahato khoroshykh ljudej, ale ne chasto znaidesh takykh jak tam, vsi v seli, kozhnoho znajut' v ljubyj chas tobi mozhut' pomohty tam po-pershe harno vidpochyvaty	there are few here, there' also a lot of good people, but you don't often find those like there, everyone on the village, everyone knows that in good time, they can help you, first off it's good to relax there

Larysa, Alina, and Katja see the village as a place of freedom and autonomy (Lines 23-25) that does not exist in the city. In the village, they can “hang out all day and all night” (Appendix III: Line 34), “do want [they] want,” (Appendix Lines 57-58); it is “so much easier” (Appendix III: Lines 63-65) to experience this kind of freedom in the village. While parents restrict their movements when they are in L'viv, requiring details about where, when, and with whom they spend their free time, in the village these restrictions are temporarily lifted. The village is a safe community filled with known people (Line 26) who are friendly and helpful (Lines 29 and 31), things one cannot find in the uncaring, anonymous city.

In her description of villagers, Katja includes a certain understanding of community associated with these rural places. People there are “good” because they look after one another, help out others in need (Lines 29 and 31), and are friendlier than those who live in the city. People are known to each other and so they are accountable to others. In her father's familial village Solja, their classmate, says she is known as “Ivan's daughter;” while all of the villagers may not know her name, they all recognize her face. The anonymity of the city does not exist in the village.

In the village, a person can be seen as a unique individual who is known by others and has a place in the local community. Another benefit of rural life is the ability to live off of the land, and not need to rely on a steady cash flow.<sup>47</sup> In the following excerpt, Katja and her friends discuss how the village has “everything”, especially for those who are financially strapped. Katja claims that money is a necessity of life in the city (Line 220), but “everything's there in the village” since people can grow a variety of foods in their rural fields without the need for hard currency (Lines 218-221).

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<sup>47</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix III.

**Excerpt 4.3: “Everything’s there in the village”**

213	<b>Katja</b>	...dyvit'sja, tuta treba ity na bazar kupljaty jajtsi	...Look, here you have to go to the outdoor market to buy eggs
214	<b>Larysa</b>	moloko tut treba kupljaty	you have to buy milk here
215	<b>Alina</b>	a tam, znajete, svizhe, teple	but there, you know, it's fresh, warm
216		((various repeats of <i>svizhe</i> , “fresh”))	
217	<b>Alina</b>	duzhe dobre maty	it's really good to have
218	<b>Katja</b>	svoje tym bil'she, litom duzhe <i>faino</i> , ne treba ity na bazar kupljaty <i>klubni ku</i> , khto maje <i>klubni ku</i> , pishov na horod sobi, narvav, z'jiv=	more on your own, it's really <i>great</i> in the summer, you don't need to go to the market to buy <i>klubni ku</i> , whoever has <i>klubni ku</i> , they go to the garden on their own, pick it and eat it=
219	<b>Alina</b>	=chy vyshni abo jabluka	=or cherries or apples
220	<b>Katja</b>	jabluka, hrushi, vse tam je v seli, a tut treba kupljaty, khto ne maje hroshej, to tut ne prozhyve, a v seli prozhyve	apples, buckwheat, everything's there in the village, but here you need to buy it, whoever doesn't have money can't live here, but they can live in the village
221	<b>Alina</b>	znajete, <i>kartozhe</i> je	you know, there's <i>potatoes</i>
222	<b>Katja</b>	kartoplja	potatoes
223	<b>Larysa</b>	<i>bul'ba</i> =	<i>potatoes</i> =
224	<b>Alina</b>	=kartoplja=	=potatoes=
225	<b>Larysa</b>	= <i>bul'ba</i>	= <i>potatoes</i>
226		((laughter))	
227	<b>Katja</b>	<i>karoche</i> , v seli <i>faino</i> zhyty	<i>in short</i> , it's <i>great</i> to live in the village
228	<b>Larysa</b>	tozh	for me too
229	<b>Alina</b>	tozh	for me too
230	<b>Katja</b>	tam vyhidnishe zhyty tam...	it's more beneficial to live there...

Katja and her friends describe the village as a place where all of the kinds of food people need can be grown or raised on one's own land, without the use of money. For them, this consists of “everything” that a person needs to live. However, there is no mention of the other necessities of life which cannot simply be grown; products that

require processing or manufacturing, such as fabric for clothing or shoes, are absent. In a way, the world of the village is presented in contrast to the city along lines of bare subsistence level living. The “great”ness of the village is most significant to those people who struggle to feed themselves and the modern necessities of the city are luxuries when one can barely stave-off daily hunger.

The underlying image here is of desperation, a level of poverty that is satiated by the food grown in rural fields, which would be difficult to reproduce in the city. These working class teenagers continue to insist that rural areas are “great,” not only because these places can provide for people faced with such poverty. Rather, in their view, a person has more freedom and control over her fate than those living in urban places. In the village, people are “more on their own,” able to work as much or as little as they want, and reap the products of their labor rather than be reliant on external factors such as store prices. This kind of “freedom to do” as one wishes, however, is not seen as a “freedom from” local obligations. In other words, for the working class, rural spaces give people freedoms that go beyond those found in urban spaces—such as the ability to grow one's own food and set one's own work day—without eroding people's responsibilities towards other people, like helping those in need.

### **The 19<sup>th</sup> Century Village in a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Ukraine**

In contrast to those of the working class, middle class families in L'viv are more likely to have resided in the city for multiple generations.<sup>48</sup> They are not

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<sup>48</sup> In a demographic survey, some of these high school students wrote-in that they were born in the city of L'viv, rather than merely in the L'viv oblast. Two hundred first-year university students in a

dependent on the goods grown on familial farmlands to make ends meet. Instead, their financial resources make it easier for them to buy their groceries at the farmers' markets around the city, or at one of the European supermarkets. If they spend time in rural areas, it is mostly in a non-familial “vacation village” filled with summer homes and few yearlong residents.

Unlike Katja and her working class friends, middle class teenagers do not view rural spaces and people as having a superior character to those living in cities. For them, the village is an important part of their identity, albeit in name more than in practice. Though a Ukrainian should be, if not needs to be, linked to a rural place, this does not mean that a person needs to ever visit this place, let alone retain village connections. At Ivan Franko, a teacher in her early 30s lamented the fact that she did not have a village to travel to since her family had lived in the city for several generations. Echoing her teacher, Ljuba made a point to emphasize her link to a village.

**Ljuba:** In general, I have a village but, in general, I don't remember where it is or when I was there the last time. I had a grandmother—she's not alive now—in Volyns'ka oblast<sup>49</sup>, in the city of XX. It's not really a village but it's not in the center of town. Mostly, I spent very little time there, three weeks, sometimes two.

For Ljuba, it is important to trace herself back to a village, or as close to a village as she can, even though she has no other connection to the place and she has never visited it in recent memory. Middle class teens say that they would not go to a village unless they had to—their parents often share this sentiment—because the city in which

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variety of majors were given a similar survey, and several made the same distinction, writing “in the city of L'viv” as their answer to “in which oblast were you born?”

<sup>49</sup> An “oblast” is an administrative division in Ukraine, similar to states in the US, but the size of a US county. Ukraine is composed of twenty-four oblasts, and one autonomous republic, Krimea. Though “oblast” is sometimes translated as “region,” I leave it untranslated and use “region” is a broader geographical description.

they live provides them with all of the things the village might provide. As Ljuba elaborates,

**Ljuba:** You go there to the supermarket on your own, and buy yourself the same kind of potatoes, tomatoes, cucumbers. But in the village there are (full miles) of vegetable gardens there they dig up (*sadiat'cho, odiat', chy nuit'*). And in the village, they work so much more, but in L'viv, XXXX ready-made.

The “same potatoes, tomatoes, cucumbers” can be found in the supermarkets and farmers' markets throughout the city; there is no need to “work so much more” in a field when everything can be bought at the local market. For Ljuba and those like her, it does not make sense to live in a village unless a person had no other choice.

While it is important for these middle class teenagers to trace their ancestral lineage to a particular rural place, this connection to the rural goes little further and does not influence their everyday lives. Furthermore, the village has no place in modern life; it is both a place that links people to the past and a place that *is* the past. For Ljuba and her friends, the passage of time in the village lags behind that of the city. In contrast to the working class, this slower flow of time is not something to be embraced. Rather, it is indicative of a lack of modernity.

**Natalija:** I was in the village but *everything's* so sad, so boring, *everything's* like every year. ...well, that's it and it's just boring, well, there's old women, old men, it's just not interesting, there's no one that I don't know in the village, that's why it's boring.

Natalija's description evokes an image of the rural as moving so slowly through time that a casual observer would not notice any movement at all. The village never progresses, but remains the same from year to year. Along with this imperceptible movement of time come feelings of sadness and boredom which Natalija sees as



inherent to village life. In a similar way, her classmate Ljuba describes rural spaces as located two centuries behind the city in which she lives.

**Ljuba:** Look, it's like the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But in the village, the quality is, I don't know, 19<sup>th</sup> century. In the village, for example, there are families with no water lines. There are, well, no gas hook-ups, sometimes it's like this, well, there's no electricity. In general, there are a lot of villages like this, if there's no real electricity, and in the village people know only this.

For Ljuba, the village does not lead to more freedoms. Rather, it lacks basic day-to-day conveniences such as water and electricity, or the ability to go grocery shopping rather than needing to tend fields. In this way, Ljuba explicitly places rural spaces in another world from her own, removed in space and time, and which requires a whole other set of daily practices. Those who live in such places “know only” how to live without running water and electricity. According to her, the normality of these basic necessities is as foreign to these villagers as the absence of them would be for Ljuba and other city dwellers.

The middle class teenagers frame the contrasts between rural and urban life more in terms of a temporal difference rather than within the traditional and moral framework drawn by their working class peers. The village is not just a different place; it is also a different time. The nostalgia associated with rural places, then, can only be experienced in short bursts, as a type of modern urban “quaintness” that even permeates some of Katja's depictions of the rural. For urbanites, to remain in the village when one can leave becomes a nonsensical decision. Furthermore, the desire to move back to the village, which Katja claims is her ultimate goal, is inconceivable for middle class teenagers like Ljuba and Natalija.

## The Modern and Immoral City

In addition to having first-hand experiences of village life, which gives them a more nuanced perspective of rurality, working class teenagers also find notions of the rural made relevant to their urban lives. By drawing upon traditions and moral values that are associated with rural spaces, the middle class can critique the norms and practices of the city, and create a space in which the village and their identifications with the village reign supreme.

In the following section, Katja and her friends tell a story about a girl in their neighborhood who was the victim of a hit-and-run during the summer break. A young man, under the influence of alcohol, drove on the wrong side of the street and hit a group of three teenagers, killing one of the girls.

**Katja:** They told me he was totally driving on the wrong side of the road, like he saw that they were walking in the road, he didn't come back to this side, and he killed her... he's free now, and these policemen work but don't do anything. *Yeah*, his dear parents didn't say where he was, he must not be at home, and he didn't tell *anyone and all*. They found his car in the courtyard by my place, *well, well*, right by me, in another courtyard near me they found this car. He bought a new car and *wanted* to test it out, but they said, *like*, that, *yeah*, he *wanted* to celebrate, that he bought a new car. *Like*, he drove it drunk, and he hit people.

They find problems with the city police: “these policemen work but don't do anything” even though “they already know who it was” who hit the group of teenagers when they were walking. Katja and her friends also find fault with urban motorists in general, and with the lack of road safety measures in L'viv more broadly: “There are a lot of accidents now. If a policeman stood on every corner, they ((drivers)) would be afraid to drive through red lights at people”.

Granted, villages have fewer motorists, poorer roads, and small police forces, if they have any at all. However, Katja claims that rural places are safer for pedestrians.

**Katja:** The street is so wide there ((on the main street by her home in L'viv)). Cars get up to full speed right there, and they sprint out on their own, and there's a lot of traffic there. It's so dangerous to cross the street... People who go somewhere in the village or whatever, for example, how I walk in the village, I go across at this stop sign, and there you probably can't just cross. You have to wait until it's your turn. It's safe to cross the street with the stoplight. But there's no stoplight here ((near her home in L'viv)) although everyone knows that there's a lot of people ((wanting to cross the street)), but the stoplights don't work.

According to Katja, pedestrians can easily obey the rules of the road in the village, waiting for their turn at stop signs and crossing the road with the flow of traffic. The complexity of the city—its multi-lane streets and cross-streets, its stoplights, stop signs, and traffic cops—makes it a more, rather than a less, dangerous place to live.

In her discussion of city traffic and urban drivers, Katja also claims that urbanites have a lack of “normal” values, which include respect for the elderly.

**Katja:** Normal values have to give regard to older people. Now, there are the kind of youth that, *like*.. No one has any respect for older people, for their own language. Even when you go on the mini-bus and sit somewhere, young people. For example, a man rides and an older woman with a cane hardly ever sits. A lot of people, even he doesn't stand up, he turns towards the window, and looks out, unconcerned with other people. And he thinks, let others stand up for her. She painfully stands, maybe bent over to one side; she has problems with her legs that's why she walks with a cane. Well, it's hard for her to stand. None of us young people, we don't get up, and some stand, but some, *like*, look at her, *like*, out of the corner of our eyes, and we don't care. But, *like*, I stand up, and there are others different from me. There are those who are raised with manners and those who weren't taught manners, we don't care, they don't stand, then she keeps standing...and there's *nothing* like it anymore.

On the public transportation in the city, young people and others similarly do not give their elders the respect they deserve. Katja describes a common occurrence: an old woman rides a city bus but there are no available seats; instead of someone giving up their seat to her, she is forced to stand despite the obvious difficulty it poses for her.

The few people who were “raised with manners”, like Katja, are the only ones who give up their places, while the majority of the rest avoid eye contact and otherwise display a lack of concern for the old woman. In this way, Katja implies that basic manners requires people to have concern for others; if more passengers had been “taught manners,” if they could empathize with the elderly, then perhaps they would also be willing to stand instead of “turning towards the window, looking out, unconcerned with other people.”

Though she does not explicitly frame the acquisition of manners as connected to either a city or a village life, her view that villagers are “friendly” and “more cultured” than urbanites (Excerpt 4.2) seems to be echoed here in her evaluation of public transport riders. As rural people are concerned with the welfare of others, so should city people. There is also a temporal aspect in her words. So few people show respect for the elderly that “there's nothing like it anymore” except for the few people who are like Katja. The depiction of city life shown in these accounts of traffic problems and the behaviors of people on public transportation suggest a form of nostalgia for a simpler life, where people cared for each other: pedestrians could place their faith in motorists and old women could expect to find a seat on the city bus.

The village itself is seen by these girls as a cohesive organism; through the act of living in a village community, people learn how to work together to solve problems and learn how to depend upon others. The problems Katja and her friends associate with the urban landscape—like the lack of concern for others evident in their narratives of the car accident and the typical treatment of the elderly on public

transportation—are viewed by these girls as inevitabilities. The expanse and anonymity provided by urban spaces allows people, both the drunk driver and the passengers on the bus, to shirk their responsibilities to other people.

In another vein, Katja's views can also be seen as critiquing the problems that stem from increasing class inequalities. In the village, there are few cars as most people equally cannot afford them. For those villagers who can afford to purchase a car, they are often called upon to use this luxury to help others, such as in driving a sick neighbor to the hospital or offering to transport goods to a city market. In a way, a villager's car is both a personal possession and a public good. A village motorist who refuses to help his neighbors risks damaging the other social relationships he relies upon. As Katja's comments imply, however, urbanites with cars do not risk such community censure in cities, and so they are able to act immorally towards other people. They see their ability to afford expensive cars as justifying their sense of superiority over others and their attitude that both they and their cars are more valuable than the lives of pedestrians. In Katja's opinion, policemen are accomplices to motorists' disobedience towards the rules of the road, as they do not patrol the streets or investigate road crimes to the extent that they should. For working class teenagers like Katja, valuing the village is both a way of re-affirming their rural experiences and coping with their resentment over growing economic disparities.

## **Nostalgia as a Response to the Present**

The need for every Ukrainian to “have” a village to call their own allows people to feel a sense of nostalgia for the pastoral, both for the middle class who vacation in a rented village cabin and for the working class who travel back to the village of their childhood. Svetlana Boym (2001) sees the past as another place, not just another time. The yearning for a place linked to the past, however, is not only about recreating the past, but also recreating the stability associated with this past. The teenagers born in the city to both village- and city-born parents learn to feel nostalgia for a time they never experienced, yet do so in different ways.

For working class teens like Katja, the village represents a simpler lifestyle but not necessarily one “stuck” in the past. Time there does not need to move as fast as in the city. Rural places have roads, youth clubs, and many events, just like urban areas, only on a smaller scale. Some villages might lack a general store but every village is unique. In describing what they do in the village, Katja and her friends speak of wandering the village all day, going to the local dance club, spending time outdoors, attending summer weddings, and going to village gatherings for youth to get together such as the midsummer's Ivan Kupalo celebration.

Katja presents the village as a place very much situated at the same point in time as the city, shifting only in the events marked along this timeline. Urbanites mark a variety of events on a daily basis that lead them to hurry and concentrate too much on their own business, such as getting to work or school on time, making time to go shopping, or paying the bills. Villagers, on the other hand, mark events over a longer

period. Their lives are defined by week-long religious celebrations based on seasonal changes, agricultural seasons for planting and reaping, and everyday chores completed when they need to be done regardless of the hour. Working class teenagers hold nostalgia for this simpler “past” rural life at the same time as they balance the village and city aspects of their identities.

Their middle class peers, on the other hand, look towards a time in the future when Ukraine can join the rest of the modern world rather than idealizing a centuries removed rural. As one graduate student friend said, “Ukraine is like Poland 15, 20 years ago. We hope we can become like Poland. Maybe not like the rest of Europe, but I think we can become like Poland.” There is a view that Ukraine's progress is being halted by the past, and those who wish to go back to the Soviet times; this usually attributed to the oldest generation and the more rural areas in the eastern parts of the country. Drawing from her own experience as a tourist, Ksenja claims that Ukrainians are becoming equal to other nations, as evidenced in the increasing numbers of non-ethnic Ukrainian language learners.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix I.

**Excerpt 4.4: “Ukrainian is becoming fashionable”**

35	<b>Vika H</b>	Teper vzhe molod' <u>bil'she</u> zavzhdy starajet'sja hovoryty po-ukrajins'ky	Already young people now always try to speak more in Ukrainian
36	<b>Ksenja</b>	Ukrajins'ka mova bil'sh, nu, v Ukrajini, ukrajins'ka mova staje modnoju	Ukrainian is more, well, in Ukraine, Ukrainian is becoming fashionable
37	<b>Vika H</b>	I she, koly ot jidesh za <u>kordon</u> , to bude tam rosijs'koju movoju, ne povazhajut'. Vony pohano stavljat'sja do ljudej	and what else, when you go <u>abroad</u> Russian will be there, they don't respect. They treat people badly
38	<b>FST</b>	rosijany	Russians
39	<b>Vika H</b>	iaki pryjkhaly z Rosiji, cherez to sho otaki ljudy duzhe <u>nahli</u> v smysli, ts'oho slova, nu, vony sebe duzhe ne harno povodjat' a <u>ukrajintsiv</u> tam povazhajut' sho v Yehypti sho Turkey	those who come from Russia, though some people are really <u>nice</u> and friendly, in a word, well, they don't behave very well among themselves, but they respect <u>Ukrainians</u> there in Egypt, Turkey
40	<b>Ksenja</b>	tak, tam je=	yeah, there there is=
41	<b>Vika H</b>	=tam je skovav	=there is restraint
42	<b>Ksenja</b>	ta ot Yehypet, Turtsija, ta tam duzhe ljubljat' ukrajins'ku movu, nu, vot, z kym ja spilkuvalasja ja jizdyla v Yehypet, to vony vsi khochut' vyvchyty ukrajins'ku movu, dozhe bahato ljudej tam dejaki slova, <u>znajut'</u> , mozhut' i skazaty shos'	and in Egypt, in Turkey, they really like Ukrainian there, well, those I spoke with when I visited Egypt, they all want to learn Ukrainian, a lot of people there <u>know</u> some words, they can say something

According to these teenage girls, as those who work in the tourist industry begin to interact with Ukrainians they are seeing how friendly Ukrainians are in comparison to other nationalities (Line 39). The evidence that Ukrainian as a language is “becoming fashionable” (Line 36) is that other nationalities want to learn it (Line 42). It is possible, of course, that Ksenja spoke with other Ukrainians, such as those working in the tourist industries of Egypt and Turkey, rather than non-Ukrainian locals. However, her perspective that Ukrainian is being valued outside of the country shows Ksenja to



see this as a positive sign for middle-class urbanites like herself. Just as the tourist industry learned Russian to interact with its Russian visitors, so it is becoming the same with Ukrainian. By placing Ukrainian on par with Russian, a global language, Ksenja is also equating the resources and standard of living of Ukrainian tourists with their Russian counterparts.

In addition, these middle class teenagers present a generational contrast. Ukrainians are becoming “fashionable” along with their language because the younger generation is actively working to speak it (Line 35). Vika H does not separate this group of young people; rather, their generation as a whole is spurring a change in the international perspective on Ukrainians. The village may be the “past” of the city, but beyond the borders of Ukraine, these two locales merge. According to these teenage girls, the tourist industry and young people are pulling Ukraine out of Russia's past and into its present, if not future.

## **Discussion**

Chronotopes of the village illuminate the different ways in which these teenagers make sense of local community values and their own relationships to these values. Both the working and middle classes view the village as “the past in the present,” where rural spaces move slower, following a different flow of time. Middle class teenagers see this as a problem, blaming rural people for their lack of modern ideas and as one reason that Ukraine has not developed at the same pace as its European neighbors. On the other hand, the working class teenagers see this as an

essential value of rural living, a slower pace that instills in people a sense of reflection and concern for others that all but disappears in a crowded, hurried urban life.

The multiple meanings of the village suggest that engagements with space/time create particular kinds of people. Villagers are “good people” in the eyes of the working class because of the slow pace, gradual changes, and consistent environment of village life. Helping out others, who are usually well-known neighbors, becomes natural. The slow pace encourages deeper relations between people, in contrast to the “uncaring” city people who hurry about dealing with the complexities of their own lives with little concern for those around them.

But through the middle class perspective, this slow pace breeds laziness. The unstructured village time makes alcoholism and unemployment the norm. For them, villagers must rely on each other in order to survive; they have no choice but to do so. Kindness is not authentic, but a matter of survival.

**Solja:** Well, of course, if there's a lot to do. He ((her father)) takes Mom with him. They bring food for the workers if a lot of people come and, in other words, for us it's necessary ((to go to the village)). If it ((the family's farmland)) just lies there, it'll be 'oh-ho-ho' too.

As Solja's statement shows, not all rural people are as selfless and eager to help as her classmates like Katja might think. For her family, working the familial lands is a way of preventing their village relatives from being shamed or gossiped about; visiting is a way to fulfill their familial obligations. If an urban family still has close ties with village relatives, and decides to not maintain them, they will be viewed poorly in the eyes of those still living in the familial village. If the land does not get sowed or reaped at the appropriate time, there will be talk throughout the rural community about

the problems and tensions between the rural and urban relatives in the family. For Solja, the familial village is not always better than the city.

Working class teenagers view their futures as tied to L'viv, which might explain their lack of interest in foreign languages, their belief that Russian can be learned through experience rather than formalized schooling, and their rejection of rural dialects (see Chapter 5). As they will likely live and work in this dominant Ukrainian language environment their whole lives, they know from their parents' experiences that communication with Russian speakers can be successful without fluency, and foreign languages are only required if one is forced to emigrate. They will have more interaction with speakers of rural dialects or variations of "mixed" Ukrainian and Russian speech than they will with non-Ukrainian, non-Russian speaking foreigners. In a way, valuing the rural is a way for these young people to cope with their lack of educational and employment opportunities, and decreasing social position in comparison to their middle class peers.

These views also extend to their perceptions of urban places in Ukraine, and to other countries in contrast to Ukraine. As the working class teenagers are bound to the city in which they were born, they are also tied to their familial villages through their frequent visits. Middle class teenagers, on the other hand, look towards the cosmopolitanism and modernity of urban spaces. In other words, there are two orientations at play here, one which looks at Ukrainian identity as belonging and thriving in smaller, exclusive, authentic communities, and the other that seeks a wider, more inclusive yet anonymous understanding of the nation.

These orientations have the potential to affect future relations both between rural and urban spaces within the country and between “rural” and “urban” countries more globally. Just as middle class students value the city over the village, finding the former a site of opportunity and the latter a place far removed in both space and time from their current position, they also seem to find Europe as a place of opportunity in contrast with a “backwards” Ukraine, held back from modern development due to its economic, political, and social “impoverishment. And as the working class continues to find value in rural places, they also seek to continue to value Ukraine despite its perceived lack when compared to the U.S. and other western countries. While their middle class counterparts turn towards the “urban,” be it cities in Ukraine or the “city of Europe,” working class teenagers prefer to spend part of their time in the rural spaces of Ukraine and in the “village of Ukraine.”

## **Conclusion**

Nation-building processes that are grounded in a rural identity have their limits. As this chapter has shown, western Ukrainian teenagers learn that the public sphere values the pastoral, but rural places themselves have variable meanings for these young people due to their socioeconomic position, family obligations to rural relatives, and these teenagers' first-hand experiences with villagers and village life.

The idea of the Ukrainian nation as born from a pristine rustic seems to be persisting at least in the more nationalistic western regions. However, the temporal placement of the village in the distant past discourages middle class teenagers from

incorporating this pastoral image into their goals of becoming European. For them, the rural—its places, practices, and people—have no place in urban life or the cosmopolitan future they seek. The working classes, however, question whether becoming “European” is the best goal for Ukraine. Just as city life means giving up the close community bonds found in the village, becoming more like Europe may also involve transforming all of Ukraine into one “city,” potentially becoming devoid of compassion and personal accountability to others.

Young people of different socioeconomic classes view the village and the city, and the relationship between these places, in different ways. For those of the working class, viewing rural spaces as holding more cultural knowledge and moral values is a way for them to deal with the increasing economic disparities and inequalities they experience in their daily urban lives. For their middle class peers, however, the village is only important in that it is central to being a part of the past and present Ukrainian nation—having a village of one's own solidifies one's claim of a Ukrainian identity as its most basic, as proof of Ukrainian ancestry—but rural spaces are not where the future of the Ukrainian nation lies.

## Chapter 5.

### **“It Wouldn't be Ukraine Without Ukrainian”: Socioeconomic Class and Ideologies of Speaking**

A chronotopic lens can show how people live in different logic worlds, which shape and influence how people view themselves, what they can do, who they can become, and the various possibilities open to them in the world. However, this analytic tool has its limits. When it comes to examining how people delineate their world along linguistic lines, they often do not use space-time terms to draw these boundaries. Rather than utilizing a chronotopic analysis, this chapter will investigate how ideologies of language result in kinds of boundary-making that echo those that result from space-time framing.

The prevailing national ideology of speaking in Ukraine favors linguistic standardization. In western Ukraine, this standardization occurs along with an avoidance of Russian and the promotion of Ukrainian. The interplay between these two languages works to valorize nonstandard Ukrainian over standard Russian in this part of the country. The ways in which local schools present the relationship between standard Ukrainian and Russian further complicates the issue, as they attempt to meet state goals of creating a citizenry and their own local aims of maintaining a sense of regional identity based on the authenticity and exclusivity of language. The ideologies of speaking that young people learn are often contradictory and dependent upon other factors beyond speech, such as a particular speaker's perceived personal character, social position, and potential life trajectories.

In this chapter, I propose that Ukrainian teenagers draw upon these national and local ideologies of speaking in order to draw boundaries and establish their own social positions. Through the use of transcripts and survey data, I show how teenagers from different social classes orient towards standardization in different ways. The majority of these teenagers claim that speaking Ukrainian is an essential part of Ukrainian identity. However, working class teenagers see multiple forms of Ukrainian, both standard and nonstandard rural dialects, as valid ways of speaking Ukrainian. In contrast, their middle class peers favor the use of standard Ukrainian only, as well as being able to speak other standard languages. By examining what ideologies of language use these teenagers hold, I suggest that socioeconomic class experiences play a role in shaping these teenagers' views of language and its relationship to social identities. Along with class, the ideologies of each school and the particularities of their teachers may also influence how these teenagers view language, playing a role in how they incorporate linguistic and non-linguistic styles into their identities as young people.

### **Ideologies about Language Use**

Languages are not necessarily “by nature” distinct from each other or free of inconsistencies, but are often believed to be distinct and cohesive through the construction of linguistic difference or sameness. Judith Irvine and Susan Gal (2000) examine the ways in which communities use language to express deeper ideological notions of difference. Through particular languages and ways of speaking, a

community can identify itself as including others who speak “in our way,” and as excluding those who speak “in another way.” According to Irvine and Gal, the delineation of “us” from “them” occurs through multiple processes. Particular linguistic features become associated with one group or another (iconization), which then become mapped onto other perceived, non-linguistic differences between the groups (fractal recursivity). Finally, some linguistic features, speakers, or practices that do not fit the boundaries set by iconization and recursivity are ignored (erasure). These processes work together to link some linguistic phenomena to particular social groups, project a contrasting relationship of localized origin onto a wider region, or ignore linguistic variation within a group to emphasize its linguistic homogeneity. In addition, these processes are both born of ideologies about language—such as the idea that language is a key marker of group identity—and help create ideologies of language, like the preference for a group to be linguistically homogeneous.

Ideologies about language and the appropriate use of language become additional markers of group membership and identity, on top of shared beliefs, practices, and customs. Speakers of minority languages, for example, come to construct their identities through their language choices, such as upholding community norms of linguistic heterogeneity (Jaffe 1996). Their linguistic choices are also responses to broader structural forces that affect their linguistic communities, such as the encroachment of a majority language (Hill 1995), multilingual migration experiences (Koven 2004), or the tensions between communities that spur people to



emphasis their “insider” status as valued speakers (Urciuoli 1991), or their status as “outside” of a stigmatized linguistic group (Hill 1998).

At its heart, an ideology of language defines the linguistic practices that a speech community, in its own eyes, should uphold. This idealized, ideological viewpoint underlies evaluations of speakers within and outside of the community, and extends to both spoken language and written language. One widespread ideology is that of standardization. Much of the westernized world views standard languages—those languages that have been formalized, with their own dictionaries, rules of grammar, and institutes of study—as more legitimate for use in government and the public sphere than languages have not been standardized. By solidifying speech into the written word, standardization works to limit the dynamism of a language, and allows it to be studied in a regular, predictable fashion. A language that is standardized also limits the ways in which language is used, making certain forms “correct” and a vast array of others “incorrect.” Speech and writing are, therefore, intertwined as the written form is first developed from the speech it represents, and the standard written form can later influence speech practices.

Language as a marker of identity does not always share aims with the development of a standard language for broader, political or social ends. In her study of Corsican speakers, Alexandra Jaffe (1996, 2001) shows how local ideologies of linguistic authenticity can problematize efforts at national standardization. In order to promote the minority language, the organizers of a Corsican spelling contest attempted to present “unified, authoritative written Corsican” (1996:817). By doing this,

however, they were seen by Corsican linguists and layperson speakers to be rejecting the local construction of authentic Corsican that relies upon heterogeneity. “Most Corsican speakers do not view ‘homogenized’ Corsican as ‘authentic.’ ‘Authentic’ speech is local speech...Because of popular (and academic) ideologies about the nature of language, however, the symbolic representation of differences undermined people’s confidence to Corsican’s claim to status as a language: they interpreted linguistic unity as homogeneity” (1996: 828). To speak Corsican is to speak in the Corsican way, a way of everyday life that is removed from the organizers’ emphasis on literacy-based standardization. The contest organizers failed to recognize that Corsican authenticity comes from linguistic variation. In their attempts to encourage participants to write a standardized form of Corsican, they were seen as promoting an inauthentic, French-defined Corsicanness. Both groups sought to promote the language, organizers through standard literacy and participants through their inclusion in the event. The disjuncture between the views of the expert and of the layperson, however, highlights the multiple ideologies that underlie any process of standardization.

While experts work to present Corsican speakers as a distinct minority linguistic group, other minority language speakers live in close contact with larger, standardized languages which challenge these speakers' linguistic identities. Jane Hill (1985, 1995) examines how Spanish is utilized by Mexicano speakers in the Malinche region in central Mexico. As the peasant life of the Malinche is no longer a viable option for many, Spanish is becoming more important. The Malinche Mexicano

ideology of purity, however, is at odds with this shift towards Spanish. The Malinche see their language as important, but only in its pure state; they often said that “there was no point in studying Malinche Mexicano because it was so broken down and hispanicized” (1985:735). Malinche identity, therefore, is created through interactions that support an ideology of “pure” Mexicano, but this emphasis on purity highlights the increasing inability of Malinche Mexicano speakers to conform to the ideology. As larger social transformations shift the community closer towards Spanish, they also shift Malinche away from Mexicano and weaken all Malinche claims to a Malinche Mexicano identity.

Though Ukrainian is not Corsican and western Ukraine is not central Mexico, regional ideologies of language in L'viv are subject to some of the same pressures and expectations. National policies promote standard Ukrainian at the expense of the rural dialects that continue to be valued by many, and though Ukrainian increasingly lives alongside Russian as an equally legitimate language of power in many parts of the country, Russian is often viewed as a threat to local identity in western regions of the country. The closeness of Russian and Ukrainian, together with concerted efforts to “russify” Ukrainian under the Soviets and to “de-russify” it decades later, opens up the possibility for a given person’s speech to be evaluated as “Ukrainian,” “Russian,” or a mixture of the two, based on different criteria by different people. As the following vignette shows, the use of objectively standard Ukrainian in an unfamiliar context might be interpreted by some as humorously odd and, therefore, inappropriate in some contexts.

**Vignette 5.1: Being “Funny” in Ukrainian, October 23, 2006**

When Nadija, my Ukrainian tutor, and a friend of hers were buying tickets to see *Pirates of the Caribbean 2*, she said that some kids in front of her asked “is it in Russian or Ukrainian?” And when they heard it was in Ukrainian, they said, “let’s see it; it’ll be funny.” She said it would be funny because Ukrainian “doesn’t have slang” and all those other words. “You know, it’s *Pirates of the Caribbean*,” implying that the film isn’t one that is supposed to be of high quality. Hearing really famous Ukrainian actors dubbing over the comedic vernacular of Johnny Depp’s characters and the other pirates would sound a little funny.

Both Nadija and the movie-goers frame the use of standard Ukrainian in such a popular film as *Pirates of the Caribbean* as something unusual and potentially “funny” on its own, apart from any particular dialogue or action in the film.<sup>51</sup> The assumption here is that standard Ukrainian is more suited to literature and polite speech, but not so much to the myriad of nonstandard linguistic forms typical of Hollywood blockbusters. In a way, standard Ukrainian is “too good” for this kind of low-brow entertainment. The idea that Ukrainian “doesn’t have slang,” which is held by many Ukrainians, especially those concerned with linguistic purity, also opens up a number of potential dubbing concerns: how will they translate Captain Sparrow’s pirate speech? How will the creative and innovative uses of English within the film be captured in the Ukrainian dubbing, if at all? Will the voices of well-known Ukrainian actors, known for their command of standard Ukrainian, make the film seem more serious than originally intended, even to the point of absurdity? How should the commitment to promoting standard Ukrainian be balanced against popular culture’s

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<sup>51</sup> During my time in Ukraine, dubbing policies tended to use standard Ukrainian, even when nonstandard forms might be more appropriate. In my experience, this often had unintentional effects, making dramatic scenes in *Hulk* (2003) seem silly, and completely eliminating the colorful, Valley-girl speech, key to the show’s popularity in the United States, used by the main characters on *Buff*y the Vampire Slayer (1997-2003).

need for nonstandard varieties? Issues such as these highlight the complex ways in which language, both standard and nonstandard forms, can be evaluated in Ukraine.

### ***Ukrainian and Russian***

The deeply entwined and politically-charged interactions between East Slavic speakers, stretching back to the 9<sup>th</sup> century Kyivan Rus' through the end of the Soviet regime in the 1990s, have made it difficult for experts and laymen to define the line between the Ukrainian and Russian languages. Laada Bilaniuk, linguist, anthropologist, and native speaker of Ukrainian, for example, claims that “there is no way to characterize the degree of mutual intelligibility of Ukrainian and Russian” (2004:203). She finds that lexical items are “the greatest barrier to understanding” between speakers, and that most of the differences between the two languages lie in phonology, making it so that “written language may be easier to understand than speech” due to the differences in orthographic rules (203).

Formal linguists categorize Ukrainian and Russian as East Slavic languages, occupying the ends of a spectrum with Belorussian placed between them. Major differences between Ukrainian and Russian include phonological, orthographic, and the use of the vocative case. For both languages, the literary form is the standard against which all other forms are compared, such as dialects and colloquialisms (Timberlake 1993; Bilaniuk 2004; Friedman 2006). Both have six grammatical cases (nominative, accusative, genitive, locative, dative, and instrumental). In Russian, a seventh case, the vocative, is functionally absent as its use is currently limited to

expletives like “oh God” (*Bozhe*) and “oh Lord” (*Gospodi*) (Timberlake 1993:836). In Ukrainian, however, this vocative case is used more widely, both for expletives and for more neutral purposes such as calling out to someone.<sup>52</sup>

There are differences in the phonological and phonetical patterns of Russian and Ukrainian as well. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the consonants of each language in IPA, according to place and manner of articulation. Though both Ukrainian and Russian share many of the same consonants, Ukrainian has the palatalized affricatives [ts] and [dz], the approximant [w], and a glottal [h] which are absent in Russian. Ukrainian also has dentalized consonants ([n], [t], and [d]). While Russian articulates [l] as an approximant include [l], in Ukrainian it is a lateral. Both languages also have palatalized consonants, though Russian also has more of them ([k], [g], [f], and [v]) than Ukrainian. Another phonological difference is [w], which is absent from Russian. In Ukrainian, [v] is sometimes transformed into [w], such as with when it comes at the end of a word and is preceded by [i]. While the locative L'vov is [-ov], its nominative form L'viv is [-iw] not [-iv].

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<sup>52</sup> In my experience, however, the teenagers in this study rarely used the vocative when it could have been used. Though I went by the easily declinable “Eliza” (or “Elisa”), teenagers would simply call out “Eliza” to me, rather than use the vocative, “Elizu” (“Elisu”).

Table 5.1: Ukrainian Consonants

	Bi-labial	Labio-Dental	Dental & Alveolar	Palatalized Alveolar	Post-Alveolar	Palatal	Velar	Glottal
Nasal	m		$\underset{\sim}{n}$			$n^j$		
Plosive	p b		$\underset{\sim}{t}$ $\underset{\sim}{d}$			$t^j$ $d^j$	k g	
Affricative			$\widehat{ts}$ $\widehat{dz}$	$\widehat{ts}^j$ $\widehat{dz}^j$	$\widehat{tʃ}$ $\widehat{dʒ}$			
Fricative		f	s z	$s^j$ $z^j$	ʃ ʒ		x	ɦ
Approximant	w					j		
Lateral			l			$l^j$		
Trill			r	$r^j$				

Table 5.2: Russian Consonants

	Bi-labial	Labio-Dental	Dental & Alveolar	Palatalized Alveolar	Post-Alveolar	Palatal	Velar	Glottal
Nasal	m $m^j$		n	$n^j$				
Plosive	p b $p^j$ $b^j$		t d	$t^j$ $d^j$			k g $k^j$ $g^j$	
Affricative			$\widehat{ts}$		$\widehat{tʃ}$			
Fricative		f v $f^j$ $v^j$	s z	$s^j$ $z^j$	ʃ ʒ	ç: ʒ:	x $x^j$	
Approximant			l	$l^j$		j		
Lateral								
Trill			r	$r^j$				

One difference between Russian and Ukrainian that has been the focus of politically-motivated linguistic manipulation is the sounds [g], [x], and [ɦ]. During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Soviet linguists attempted to make changes in the orthography of Ukrainian, in order to de-emphasize the differences between it and Russian. The russification of Ukrainian was much easier than in other Slavic languages as Ukrainian had always been written in Cyrillic rather than in Roman script, unlike Polish or Czech. This active manipulation of Ukrainian resulted in the elimination of r (Ukr [g])

from the alphabet for much of the Soviet era, leaving only *г* (Ukr [ɦ], Rus [g]) and *х* (Ukr [x], Rus [x]). This was to delegitimize the Ukrainian pronunciation of *г* as [ɦ] and further construct the language as a dialect of Russian. Presumably, it would spur a phonetic change: by emphasizing the shared use of *г* in both written languages, Ukrainian speakers might shift away from using [ɦ] and began to adopt the more prestigious Russian pronunciation, [g]. Later Ukrainian linguists reinstated *г* back into the language; at present, it rarely occurs in native lexicon and is mostly used in borrowed words.

Ukrainian and Russian also differ in their vowels, as shown in Table 5.3. Ukrainian vowels are primarily front or back whereas Russian includes several central vowels. The only vowels they have in common are the close front unrounded [i] and the close back rounded [u]. The majority of vowels in both languages are unrounded, with the only rounded vowels being back vowels ([u] and [ɔ] in Ukrainian, [u] and [o] in Russian).

**Table 5.3: Ukrainian and Russian Vowels**

	Ukrainian			Russian		
	Front	Central	Back	Front	Central	Back
<b>Close</b>	i		u	i	ɨ	u
<b>Near-close</b>	ɪ					
<b>Close-mid</b>						o
<b>Mid</b>				e	ə	
<b>Open-mid</b>	ɛ		ɔ			
<b>Open</b>			ɑ	a		

In general, the orthographic system in Ukrainian is closer to its phonology than that in Russian, where phonological changes can occur based on stress in vowels and



palatalization of consonants (Timberlake 1993:828). One example is the noun for “malt”, *solod* (солод), which is written the same in both languages but reflects different pronunciations: [solod] in Ukrainian but [sòlət] in Russian (Cubberley 1993:48). Transliteration reveals both differences in the orthography between the languages, and in the relationship between orthography and phonology.

**Table 5.4: Orthographic Differences (Timberlake 1993:832 and Shevelov 1993:953)**

Ukrainian	Russian	Transliteration
г [ɦ]	–	h
г [g]	г [g]	g
а [a]	а [a] or [ə]	a
е [ɛ]	е [e]	e
є [jɛ] <sup>53</sup>	–	je
и [ɪ]	ы [ɨ]	y
–	ё [jo]	ë
і [i]	и [i]	i
ї [ji]	–	ji
–	ъ	"
–	э [je]	è
о [ɔ]	о [o] or [ə]	o
я [ja]	я [jə]	ja

Table 5.4 shows some of the differences in orthography between the two languages which results in some sounds being written differently in Ukrainian than in Russian, and, more often, the same written form being pronounced much differently. The similarities in the written forms of Ukrainian and Russian, for example, can be utilized

<sup>53</sup> The [j] in the orthographic chart represents the palatalization of the preceding consonant. Though the palatalization occurs with the consonant, these vowels are always written as if the palatalization was a part of the vowel itself, especially because palatalization often occurs without a preceding consonant, such as in “I” (я [ja]), and “hers” (ї [jji]).

by Ukrainian youth in their claims of being able to comprehend written Russian, without having had any formal instruction, but not speak it. Similarly, Russian speakers who claim that Ukrainian is incomprehensible base their inability to understand it on phonological, but not orthographical, differences between Russian and Ukrainian.

The linguistic differences described by formal linguists, however, are often less important than how people are perceived as speaking Ukrainian, Russian, or a mixture of both. As agents of a national educational policy focused on creating a civic form of citizenship—establishing standard Ukrainian as the language of society, rather than that of a specific ethnic group—educators in western Ukraine must temper national ideologies of speaking with those based in regional identities.

### ***National Ideologies***

The central national ideology is that Ukrainian is a standardized language, one which all Ukrainians should eventually know, either due to their ethnic identity or as a citizen of Ukraine. This ideology is based on a notion of linguistic purity that links standardization and aesthetics. In her dissertation on language socialization in Ukraine, Debra Friedman (2006) frames national building as based in the idea that the nation is a linguistic community: “The Ukrainian *speech* community is one in which Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, code switching, and code mixing are the norm. The Ukrainian *linguistic* community, however, valorizes a single language variety—standard literary Ukrainian—as the sole legitimate representation of the Ukrainian

nation” (2006:8). In her study, Friedman examines the Initiation-Response-Evaluation strategy (cf. Mehan 1979) used by Ukrainian language and literature teachers with two fifth grade classes in Vinnycja, Ukraine. She concludes that competency in Ukrainian is assessed based on a speakers' use of “correct” language and on the aesthetics of their use of “beautiful” language (Friedman 2006:10).

Broadly speaking, language mixing—which includes the mixing otherwise standard Ukrainian and Russian as well as mixing nonstandard and standard forms of both languages—neither conforms to the requirement of “correct” speech, nor is it seen as aesthetically “beautiful.” Though standard Ukrainian is increasingly becoming a language of prestige alongside standard Russian, combining the two languages in speech continues to be avoided. Even now, nonstandard forms “tend to be shunned, ridiculed, or treated as taboo since they violate the definition of 'Ukrainian' and 'Russian' identities as unmixable” (Bilaniuk 1997:93), and do not conform to the ideology of linguistic purity. “Mixed” speech, known as *surzhyk*, is stigmatized: its “incorrectness” and “ugliness” indexes a speaker who lacks education, was poorly raised, and has questionable morals.

While standardization is key, social relations play a significant role in whether a person's speech is evaluated as “Ukrainian” and to what degree it is seen to be standardized. A person can be seen as speaking a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, called *surzhyk*, meaning “impure, mixed language” (Bilaniuk 2004:409), in a variety of ways. Bilaniuk describes the multifaceted nature of language mixing in Ukraine:

Since independence the term *surzhyk* has been used by different people to refer to very disparate phenomena, depending on their background and linguistic ideology. Those with some knowledge of dialectology may define *surzhyk* as the incorrect

mixing of forms that belong to different linguistic systems, as distinct from dialects. People without knowledge of documented dialect varieties may evaluate dialect speech as surzhyk, simply because it is not what they know to be the standard. Still others may evaluate their own close-to-standard speech as surzhyk because of insecurity in their own linguistic knowledge (Bilaniuk 2004:423).

*Surzhyk* is not merely the use of standard Ukrainian and Russian in the same utterance; it is also dependent upon the expertise and evaluation of the hearer. Surzhyk may be anything from a nonstandard variety of Ukrainian, alone or mixed with standard or nonstandard Russian to standard Ukrainian with a Russian accent, or standard Russian with a Ukrainian accent.

Furthermore, social relations play a factor in the evaluation of a person's speech (Bilaniuk 2005). A Russian speaker who is well-liked and supportive of Ukrainian, for example, might be “heard” as speaking more standardized Ukrainian than they in fact are. Conversely, if a speaker of mostly standard Ukrainian fails to uphold social norms in other ways, such as displaying rude behavior on public transportation, their speech is more likely to be viewed by others as surzhyk.

### ***Regionalism and Linguistic Purism***

Perceptions of people's speech also differ regionally in Ukraine. While Russian is commonly used in eastern and southern regions, and does not necessarily connote a claim to a Russian identity, in western Ukraine language is seen to be a central part of a person's identity. For a native L'vivian to speak Ukrainian or Russian means to claim a Ukrainian or Russian identity. The use of Russian is associated with a speaker's ethnonational identity and it carries no more prestige than standard Ukrainian. Among groups of friends that include speakers of both languages, it is not unusual to hear one

person speaking Ukrainian while another speaks Russian; the speakers understand both languages, with each merely speaking his “own language.” At a birthday party for a graduate student, the host spent the evening switching between Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and English. Most of this codeswitching occurred when he was speaking with native Polish and English-speaking guests who were not fluent in Russian or Ukrainian. He spoke Russian at times with one Pole who had studied Russian but not Ukrainian; this guest switched between Russian, Polish, and English. The host spoke primarily Ukrainian with me as I preferred to speak it with native Ukrainian speakers. With the other local guests, however, the host spoke in his native Ukrainian whether the guest spoke Ukrainian or Russian. In this way, the host accommodated his speech for interlocutors who were not seen as being able to comprehend the languages at play. With his local friends, however, he spoke his native Ukrainian as it was assumed that everyone would understand both languages. When I asked about these interactions, which Bilaniuk coins a “nonreciprocal bilingualism” (2005:22), all involved agreed that having each speak his or her own language was the best way to communicate. Since everyone understood both Ukrainian and Russian, there was no need to accommodate and use the other's language. Of course, this reasoning assumes that Ukrainian and Russian speakers in L'viv actually do fully understand both languages, a form of bilingualism that perhaps is not being reproduced in the youngest generation.

In other parts of the country language is not so closely tied to identity. Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine, for instance, claim a Ukrainian national

identity based on citizenship or ethnic ties, but not based on the language they speak. There are many people who are nationally Ukrainian—and hold the belief that their “mother tongue”, the language of their heritage, is Ukrainian—but speak Russian. Though people hold a variety of views about how language and identity are related, both Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers place a high value on speaking a standardized language, without the use of words or grammar from other languages. However, Ukrainian linguists and laymen alike do not agree on what is “standard.”

### **Local Experts' View of “Correct” Speech**

As a long-standing place of nationalism that is linked to the use of Ukrainian, L'viv is a city where there is active promotion and pride in the language. Following in the footsteps of the 19<sup>th</sup> century linguists, writers, and other intellectuals who codified, developed, and promoted Ukrainian in the L'viv region, L'vivians are often seen to be the most fervent supporters of Ukrainian being the sole state language. While other regions work to conform to national language policies, L'viv is often the place where these language policies are first proposed and implemented.

### ***“Attention! Cultured Speech!” on Public Transportation***

One clear effort at promoting standard Ukrainian came in the form of “correct speech” posters that I saw on new city mini-buses in 2006 and 2007 (See Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The posters are directed at passengers. Titled, “Attention! Cultured Speech! Respectable Passengers!” and “Attention! Respectable Passengers! We speak correctly

and beautifully!” these posters give “incorrect” and “correct” forms of hypothetical statements which are applicable to public transportation riders. The linguists behind these Bus Posters<sup>54</sup> label a variety of levels of mixing Ukrainian and Russian as “incorrect speech,” all of which they indirectly mark as surzhyk, but which lay people may not recognize as “mixed” to the same degree.



Figure 5.1: “Attention! Cultured Speech! Respectable Passengers!” Bus Poster

<sup>54</sup> These bus posters are sponsored by the political party, VO “Svoboda” (All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom”) and the L'viv City Council Department of Transportation.



Figure 5.2: “We Speak Correctly and Beautifully!” Bus Poster

Both of these posters were visible on one of the mini-buses I rode regularly around the center of L’viv. The poster in Figure 5.1 presents “incorrect” Ukrainian in black italics at the top, and is in black, italicized, and underlined in the bottom section. The “correct” versions of these forms are then presented in red at the top and in red and underlined at the bottom. These conventions, however, are reversed in the poster in Figure 5.2. On this poster, “incorrect” Ukrainian is shown in red, with the “correct” versions presented on the right in black. Table 5.5 depicts a typical example of surzhyk, where linguistic features from both Ukrainian and Russian are used and is



often viewed as being neither one nor the other language. This example is presented on the poster in Figure 5.1 as “incorrect” Ukrainian.

**Table 5.5: Ukrainian lexicon with Russian syntax**<sup>55</sup>

Ukr	O kotrij At which-LOC	hodynj hour-LOC	ostannja last-F-NOM	marshrutka? mini.bus-F-NOM
Rus	V kakoe At which-GEN	vremja hour-GEN	poslednij last-M-NOM	avtobus? bus-M-NOM
Sur	<i>V jakij</i> V jak-ij At which-GEN	<b>hodynj</b> hodyn-i hour-GEN	<i>poslidnja</i> poslidn-ja last-F-NOM	<b>marshrutka?</b> marshrutk-a mini.bus-F-NOM

What time is the last mini-bus?

In this example, standard Ukrainian only appears in the nouns of the sentence: the word for “hour” (*hodyna*) and the mini-bus form of transport (*marshrutka*) that is widespread in the city. The use of *v jakij*, however, is markedly perceived as a form of surzhyk: rather than using the locative to indicate time, as is standard in Ukrainian, the hypothetical passenger follows Russian syntax and uses the genitive instead. The use of *v jakij* rather than *o kotrij* in telling time is a fairly common mistake for Russian speakers learning Ukrainian, or for non-Russians who learn Ukrainian after having first learned Russian. Finally, the Russian word for “last” (*poslednij*) is presented with standard Ukrainian phonology, showing another instance of the hypothetical speaker's

<sup>55</sup> The lines labeled Ukrainian (Ukr) and surzhyk (Sur) are indicated on the posters as “correct” and “incorrect” Ukrainian, respectively. The lines labeled as Russian (Rus) are mine and are included here for analysis. The posters themselves do not mention Russian, nor do they specifically name that any particular “incorrect” form as being Russian or surzhyk. The elements that are marked as “correct” and “incorrect” become more understandable when compared to the Russian.

use of surzhyk. In this example, “incorrect” Ukrainian is presented as primarily using Ukrainian lexicon but Russian syntax.

Another speech practice that is considered a form of surzhyk, which the local linguists have marked as “incorrect” on these bus posters (see Figure 5.1 again) is the adoption of Russian lexical items while maintaining typical Ukrainian phonology. For those who recognize this practice and view it as surzhyk, it is viewed as “speaking Russian” but with a Ukrainian accent. However, the absence of labeling these forms as “Russian” suggests that the local experts aim for people to adopt different words without having to acknowledge their Russian origins.

**Table 5.6: Russian lexicon with Ukrainian phonology**

	purse	next (adj.)	last (adj.)	furniture (adj.)
Ukr	hamanets'	nastupnij	ostannijj	meblevohij
Rus <sup>56</sup>	koshelek	sledujushchij	posledhij	mebel'n'ij
Sur	koshel'ka	slidujuchij	poslidnij	mebel'nij

The underlining in Table 5.6 indicates differences between the standard Russian word and the words marked as “incorrect” Ukrainian (Sur). These words are written, seemingly, according to Ukrainian pronunciation conventions. These examples suggest that the experts behind the bus posters acknowledge a tendency for local Ukrainian speakers to use Russian words in their speech. Rather than emphasizing the correct pronunciation as it would appear in Russian—which would then mark the

<sup>56</sup> Nowhere on these posters is Russian mentioned or indicated. However, the standard Russian forms presented in Table 5.6 suggest that the “incorrect” forms on the poster reflect how a Ukrainian speaker would potentially pronounce these Russian words using Ukrainian phonology.

word as a borrowed term and undeniably Russian, rather than merely “incorrect” Ukrainian—the linguists “correct” the use by presenting an alternate word (Ukr). The imagined surzhyk speaker's *koshel'ka* gets replaced by the standard Ukrainian equivalent, *hamanets'*. With the example of “furniture”—the adjectival form rarely used as short-hand for any store or location where furniture is sold, or to indicate a nearby bench—the experts highlight a minor morphological difference. The adjectival endings in both languages are identical (*-ij*), and the difference in their roots (*mebl-* vs. *mebel-*) is one that may be difficult to catch in L'vivians' usual fast-paced speech patterns. The correction in this instance appears to instruct a wider audience in which terms are ideally “correct” Ukrainian without highlighting the Russian origin of these “incorrect” words.

The local linguists also find the use of particular forms of standard Ukrainian to be problematic when they have close cognates in Russian. While some people might view the “incorrect” statement as “Russian,” linguistically this is not the case. Again, the experts behind these bus posters prescribe one “correct” form, which has the effect of ignoring the linguistic variations available within standard Ukrainian, all of which are correct. In the following example in Table 5.7 (also from Figure 5.1), both of the Ukrainian versions are possible, but only one version is labeled as “correct” (Ukr) while the “incorrect” one (Sur) is indirectly presented as nonstandard in the eyes of these experts.

**Table 5.7: Example of “More Ukrainian” forms on Bus Posters.**

Ukr	Vidchynit'	zadni	dveri.
	Vid-chyn-it'	zadn-i	dver-i.
	IPFV -open-3PL	back-F.PL.ACC	door-F.PL.ACC
	Open the back doors.		
Rus <sup>57</sup>	Otkrojte	chern'ij	khod.
	Ot-kro-jte	chern'-ij	khod.
	IPFV-open-3PL	back-M.S.ACC	door/exit-M.S.ACC
	Open the back door/exit.		
“Sur”	Vidkrijte	zadnij	prokhid.
	Vid-kri-jte	zadn-ij	prokhid
	IPFV-open-3PL	back-M.S.ACC	door/exit-M.S.ACC

Both the “correct” and “incorrect” statements are allowed in standard Ukrainian.

However, the “incorrect” version is very similar to its equivalent in Russian. The verb used, *vidkryty*, is closer to the Russian *otkrojt'* than it is to the Ukrainian variant (*vidchynyty*) the linguists prefer. The same is true of the word “door.” Again, the “incorrect” version (*prokhid*) is more similar to the Russian (*khod*) than it is to the “correct” version (*dveri*), though both *vidkryty* and *prokhid* are standard Ukrainian.<sup>58</sup>

The use of *zadnij prokhid* actually seems to be slightly more accurate than *dveri*.

Though both mean “door,” *prokhid* implies that the passageway is passed through in

<sup>57</sup> I present this version in Russian in order to show the possible source of the marked “incorrect” version. The same command can also be written as “Otkrojte zadnjaja dver’,” which is very close to the “correct” version presented on the poster. This suggests that the poster’s creators found only particular utterances to be problematic, such as the one presented, but not others.

<sup>58</sup> In my experience, I heard “vidkrijte dveri, bud’ laska” (“Open the doors, please”) much more often on public transportation than either the “incorrect” or the “correct” versions presented on these bus posters. There was often no need to indicate which doors needed to be opened; the front doors were next to the driver, so there would be little need to call out to him if you needed to exit from the front doors (usually only allowed if the bus was full, the passenger requesting it was elderly or with a small child, or was carrying several packages and would find it difficult to traverse the bus to reach the back doors).

only one direction; public transportation etiquette requires passengers to enter at the front and exit from door in the back, creating an efficient flow of people onto and off of the transport, if possible. In contrast, *dveri* is used for doors that are used equally for coming into and going out of, such as classroom doors or front doors of homes.

### ***“Correct” Speech at School***

These bus posters are just one example of local language planning that young people in L'viv encounter on a regular basis, in addition to the nationalized language curriculum that they are taught in school. Teachers also play a part in the reproduction of local and national ideologies about speaking. The goal of Mrs. Stadnyk and Mr. Petrenko, Ukrainian language and literature teachers at Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, respectively, is for their students to master standard Ukrainian. While both teachers teach the same material, often using identical textbooks, the different strategies they use in their classrooms help shape their students' ideologies about language<sup>59</sup>

The “hidden curriculum” (Apple & Weis 1983) displayed by Mrs. Stadnyk and Mr. Petrenko address issues of linguistic purity and language learning. Mrs. Stadnyk looks towards the best students to present the most eloquent, purest work without participation from other classmates. Mr. Petrenko, however, focuses on strengthening the weakest students' skills through active audience inclusion in the learning process.

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<sup>59</sup> Mrs. Stadnyk worked hard initially to show me her ideal face, whereas Mr. Petrenko did not as the administration at Ivan Franko had more experience with visitors, especially students from the nearby teaching college. Though each might be performing for the researcher as much (if not more so) as for the students, this still reveals each teachers' attitudes towards language learning.

Mrs. Stadnyk's classroom shows expertise in Ukrainian as something that only a few can master, but in Mr. Petrenko's class linguistic expertise is a goal everyone should aim for, and can achieve with diligent work. These contrasting methods influence their students perspectives on how language should be used, contributing to the differences in these teenagers' attitudes about language use, which are divided along socioeconomic class lines.

At the working class Taras Shevchenko secondary school, Mrs. Stadnyk chooses top students to complete exercises at the front blackboard rather than weaker students.<sup>60</sup> A typical exchange entails Mrs. Stadnyk dictating a literary sentence for a known top student to diagram. While the student is diagramming the sentence at the blackboard, the rest of the group is expected to do the same in their notebooks at their desks. In reality, many of them write out the sentence and wait to diagram it until the student at the board has done it first. Mrs. Stadnyk expects students' notebooks to be neat, tidy, and with only “correct” work. As a result, students often do not risk making mistakes on their own. Instead, they wait until the top student has done the work, which all assume will be “correct.” Either as the student writes or after she has finished, the student at the board quickly tells the class what she work she did to complete the exercise.

If the student makes a mistake at the board, Mrs. Stadnyk offers the correct answer, or indicates the location of mistake in the sentence, expecting the student to be

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<sup>60</sup> The class was divided into two groups for Ukrainian language at both schools; while this seemed to result in two evenly skilled groups at Ivan Franko, the groups appeared ranked at Taras Shevchenko. Mrs. Stadnyk preferred I attend lessons with the group of top students and quiet, passive students, rather than the one comprised of mostly boys, with a few girls who were viewed as trouble-makers, or what Eckert might deem as future “burnouts” (1989).

able to identify the problem and correct it on her own. Rarely does the class help, or need to help, the student at the board. The result is that exercises during Mrs. Stadnyk's lessons are completed quickly, as if they are simple and easy tasks to do, which leaves little room for other students to ask questions about the exercise or why a particular answer is correct.

Though Mrs. Stadnyk sometimes asks other students to explain the work on the board, it is generally assumed that all of her questions are primarily aimed at the student working in the front of the class. However, she also expects the rest of the class to appear to be following the work at the front, rather than working on other exercises or classwork. Mrs. Stadnyk uses board work as a way for students to publicly demonstrate their knowledge and expertise of the material, acting as models for weaker students to emulate.

In contrast, Mr. Petrenko at the middle class Ivan Franko secondary school focuses on getting the weaker students to participate and improve their linguistic skills. Oftentimes, stronger students raise their hands to be asked to go to the blackboard and Mr. Petrenko refuses them, saying "I know that you know how to do this," implying that working at the blackboard is how students work through their problems; once a student has proven that she knows how to work through the exercises, she no longer needs to do board work. Mr. Petrenko asks the student at the board questions about each step of the sentence to be diagrammed. If a student is having trouble, other students raise their hands to help him or simply call out the

correct answer. The student at the front might not know all of the answers, but he is expected to do all of the written work at the blackboard.

For Mr. Petrenko, students learn how to do the exercises correctly through their time at the blackboard, and with the help of other students. In other words, board time is used to learn how to work through difficulties in a cooperative way, and to prove that a student is capable of solving these problems their own once they leave the blackboard. Unlike Mrs. Stadnyk, he does not expect students to effortlessly complete the exercises; if they have mastered the material, there is no longer a need for them to be at the blackboard. In a way, working at the board teaches Mr. Petrenko's students that mastering Ukrainian is not a simple process or an innate skill. Rather, language learning is a process which develops over time and through practice and dedicated work.

The differences between these teaching practices suggest differing interpretations of language learning. Though each teacher may have been performing as much (or more so) for me, the researcher, than for their students, their classroom practices represent their views on the relation between teachers and students in the process of learning. Mrs. Stadnyk's lessons emphasize the demonstration of multiple skills correctly, quickly, simultaneously, and without help. Little time is spent correcting mistakes or explaining the nuances of correct answers, implying that learning and using standard Ukrainian is easy and simple; mastery of Ukrainian, therefore, should also be easy and simple to achieve. Since the majority of work is done by a few high-achieving students, few are ever shown as mastering the language



to this degree. Other students are rarely called to the blackboard, and help from other students is often unneeded and interpreted as a form of classroom disruption. As a result, those who fail to be linguistically fluent and standard in their writing of Ukrainian are “erased” from the interaction. In contrast, Mr. Petrenko's students are expected to learn from their mistakes and from each other. The implication here is that a good command of standard written Ukrainian does not come naturally but requires practice and involves mistakes; with time, everyone can improve and master the language.

These perspectives on language learning—that of exclusive, complex, and error-free use shown at Taras Shevchenko, and that of inclusive, practical, mistakes to be corrected at Ivan Franko—are also reflected in the teaching of foreign languages and students' orientations towards learning other languages. The classroom is a site of exclusive linguistic purity at Taras Shevchenko; at Ivan Franko, languages are practical skills that anyone can acquire.

The teachers at both Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko view that being able to speak a second language is an important skill for students to acquire. Teachers often quoted a common pro-multilingualism adage: “the more languages one speaks, the more of a person one becomes.” A few students even recited this quote during interviews, echoing the sentiment that multilingualism was a valuable goal for them, and that learning other languages did not diminish their loyalty or competence in their native language. The extent to which this ideology was evident in the everyday practices of teachers and students varied, though, suggesting contrasting stances

towards the ideology in favor of multilingualism. Both schools required students to have lessons in at least one foreign language, English. The students, however, were differently expected to be able to speak the language.

Rarely did the working class students at Taras Shevchenko try to practice their English with me, with the exception of one out-going eleventh grade boy and the occasional words of greeting, departing, and the rarely shouted vulgarity.<sup>61</sup> Lessons in eighth and ninth grade include rote memorization tasks, with some teachers seeming to know little more than their students. I was only ever asked by students to attend their lessons, never by teachers; though I would only stay if the teacher gave me her permission and I attempted to be as little of a distraction as possible, the teacher was visibly unnerved by my presence. I also know of no students in the Taras Shevchenko cohort who had tutoring in English outside of school. This may be due to the cost and availability of private English lessons, but neither did students voice a desire to improve their foreign language skills through private lessons if they were given the chance.

In addition to their twice a week English lessons, these teenagers also have a German lesson once every other week. When the principal sought to eliminate the course, their homeroom teacher, Mrs. Stadnyk, instructed them to write letters to the principal explaining how much they liked the subject. She told them that it was

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<sup>61</sup> In a mixed gender group interview on slang, a boy at Taras Shevchenko said two vulgar phrases in English, voicing the untranslated curses heard on imported American action films. In contrast, the group interviews at Ivan Franko were primarily girls, sometimes with a few boys overhearing. English was mainly used by these girls in greeting exchanges with the researcher, or as brief displays of their knowledge of the language. Though the girls said they knew vulgarities in English, they did not use them in these interactions.

necessary for the German teacher to keep her position at the school. Many of Mrs. Stadnyk's students quickly wrote letters, but did so only to appease Mrs. Stadnyk.

For the most part, the students detest the German lesson and see little value in having the subject so infrequently. Rather, they find German useful only as tool for comedic effect, speaking German phrases in harsh, parodied voices from time to time, similar to the *Deutsch* of London students (Rampton 2008). When the students were coming from a German lesson one day, several of them repeated the phrase “good morning” in German. One of the boys then played a parodied “German authority” role, spouting out memorized phrases in a nonsensical order and in a highly-exaggerated way, which elicited laughter from his classmates.

The middle class students and teachers at Ivan Franko seem much more comfortable demonstrating their knowledge of English. Several of the English teachers tutor their students outside of class, and a few of the eighth and ninth grade students, including Ljuba and Vika H, pay for outside tutoring, either with English teachers at the school, or with local university students. I was invited to attend English lessons by both students and teachers. Teachers asked me to speak in their English classes; while only some were confident enough to ask questions, many of the students wanted to understand what I was saying, even if that meant asking the student next to them for a translation. During lessons where I was present but not incorporated into the lesson itself, teachers would ask me for clarification of a translation at times, and some students appeared to be more actively involved in the lesson for my benefit.

In summary, the different methods of teaching Ukrainian used in the classroom, and the different ways in which teachers oriented towards foreign languages have an influence on the attitudes students at these two schools hold towards uses of language. In the following sections, I present and analyze data on teenager's views on language use, collected from a demographic, language use, and language attitudes survey<sup>62</sup> conducted at both schools in 2007.

### **Teenagers' Ideologies of Speaking Ukrainian**

Ideologies that favor standardization at both national and local levels play a role in teenagers' attitudes towards speaking. For the majority of young people in L'viv, language is a reflection of a person's heritage and identity (ethnic), a view which echoes the local ideology. Most of them have neither learned standard Russian in school, nor are they aware of any intentional Russification of their speech. Differences exist, though, in what counts as legitimate Ukrainian, and the relationship Ukrainian-speakers have with Russian. Teenagers of both the working and middle class uphold the local and national view that the ideal way to speak is to speak a standard language. However, the standard is not only legitimate way to speak Ukrainian for working

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<sup>62</sup> The contexts in which the students took the survey at both schools were not ideal. At Taras Shevchenko, Mrs. Stadnyk insisted in seeing the survey before I gave it to the students, claiming that she needed the information in order to adequately inform them about the assignment. Then, when I conducted the survey, she remained in the classroom. The consistency across students on some answers suggests that she may have prompted them on what answers they should put down. In contrast, the students at Ivan Franko completed the surveys at several different times and in different contexts. While the majority completed them at one of two different times—once with each cohort class—with their teacher present but not helping students answer, several other students took them home and completed them in their own time. This perhaps explains the wider variety of responses given at Ivan Franko. To what extent students at either school were influenced by their teachers, parents, or peers is debatable. However, responses in later interviews and group discussions seem to confirm their attitudes on these two open-ended questions.

class. And, though middle class supports multilingualism in multiple standard languages, the status of Russian remains a potential threat to the survival of Ukrainian, which is a long-standing local/regional concern.

Additionally, while their regional ideology ties language choice to identity, this ideology is not nationally nor globally reinforced. These young people can use Russian in many ways outside of their locally communities without making claims to a Russian identity. The availability of Russian-language media, for example, allows these young people to tap into a broader, youth culture that speaks Russian as well as English. Though earlier generations had access to similar forms of Russian media, which were always more numerous than those available in Ukrainian, there has been an increase in the proliferation and variety of youth-g geared media. The ability to use Russian to different degrees—from using Russian slang, reading youth magazines, or listening to popular music, to communicating with other players during online gaming—has taken on a different meaning than under previous generations, revealing alternative notions of language use. In sum, these young people attempt to mediate between the contrasting local and national ideologies, while still keeping open their ability to maneuver among them in presenting themselves as modern youth in a globalized world.

### ***Self-Reported Speech***

On questions over their uses of language, the vast majority of both working and middle class teenagers claim to speak only Ukrainian at school, at home, and with

friends. These answers reflect the local view of “being Ukrainian means speaking Ukrainian,” where one's use of Ukrainian both creates and reinforces one's identity as Ukrainian.

**Table 5.6: Self-Reported Language Practices<sup>63</sup>**

	Taras Shevchenko (n=26)		Ivan Franko (n=21)	
<b>Spoken at home</b>	<b>#respon</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>#respon</b>	<b>%</b>
Ukrainian	21	81%	20	95%
Russian	0	0%	0	0%
Surzhyk	3	12%	0	0%
sometimes Ukr, smts Rus	2	8%	1	5%
<b>Spoken at School</b>				
Ukrainian	26	100%	21	100%
Russian	0	0	0	0
Suzhyk	0	0	0	0
sometimes Ukr, smts Rus	0	0	0	0
<b>Spoken with Friends</b>				
Ukrainian	22	85%	19	91%
Russian	0	0%	0	0%
Surzhyk	3	12%	1	5%
sometimes Ukr, smts Rus	1	4%	2	10%

As expected, the little variation in use that exists comes outside of the school environment, and is limited to mostly their close friends.<sup>64</sup> Though they have the opportunity to select “sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian,” some of these teenagers claim to use surzhyk. This could be their attempt at a farcical answer, but

<sup>63</sup> The survey also gave the option of “Other” with room to explain. No student selected this option. One student, however, marked both “Russian” and “Ukrainian” and so is included in the “sometimes Ukrainian, sometimes Russian” category. Another student marked both “Ukrainian” and “Surzhyk”, and so is counted twice in these results.

<sup>64</sup> The term for “friend” (*druh*) is not as widely used as its American English equivalent. Ukrainians are more likely to use “acquaintance” (*znajomyj*) for all except their closest friends, who have earned the *druh* designation over time and through strong social ties.

more likely reveals a lack of knowledge or experience with surzhyk as a stigmatized form. It could also indicate avoidance in claiming to use Russian, or claiming to be fluent enough in Russian to be able to speak it. Marking surzhyk allows a person to acknowledge a wider range of language use without directly naming Russian in this range of use.

These data reflect the local valuing of Ukrainian as “our” language, in contrast to Russian. They may also reflect notions of standardization. These young people have never formally learned standard Russian; they are most familiar with the Russian they passively learn through their interactions with Russian-language popular music, movies, television, and print media.

### ***Rural and Urban Varieties***

Because of the few, but unexpected claims of surzhyk use among these teenagers, I inquired further about language in group interviews and discussions. While the national policy and the local schooling system do not promote rural dialects, the western Ukrainian regional identity does recognize and value local voices. On more than one occasion, L'vivians asserted that the way they spoke Ukrainian was recognizable outside of the region; they spoke Ukrainian, but they spoke in a way that differed from how Ukrainian was spoken in other parts of the country. This way of speaking was described in several different ways: they were thought to speak quickly, their consonants were more “soft,” or they used more “old Ukrainian” words. All of these regional differences, though, were framed as if they were legitimate variations of

standard Ukrainian, with differences primarily in word choice, preference, and pronunciation. The younger generation recognizes their local variety of the standard. However, while the middle class rejects rural dialects as “archaic,” the working class recognizes these same dialects as variations that are just as legitimately Ukrainian as the standard form. For them, dialects are authentic speech, not evidence of surzhyk.

In Chapter 4, Alina uses a dialectal form of “potatoes,” *kartozhke*, which elicits a playful exchange between her and her friends, and reaffirms the standard form at the same time as it validates the rural variants the girls use.

**Excerpt 5.1: Playing with “Potatoes”**

221	<b>Alina</b>	znajete, <i>kartozhe</i> je	you know, there's <i>potatoes</i>
222	<b>Katja</b>	kartoplja	potatoes
223	<b>Larysa</b>	<i>bul'ba</i> =	<i>potatoes</i> =
224	<b>Alina</b>	=kartoplja=	=potatoes=
225	<b>Larysa</b>	= <i>bul'ba</i>	= <i>potatoes</i>
226		((laughter))	
227	<b>Katja</b>	<i>karoche</i> , v seli <i>faino</i> zhyty	<i>in short</i> , it's <i>great</i> to live in the village
228	<b>Larysa</b>	tozh	for me too
229	<b>Alina</b>	tozh	for me too
230	<b>Katja</b>	<i>karoche</i> , v seli <i>faino</i> zhyty	<i>in short</i> , it's <i>great</i> to live in the village

Similar to how Katja and her friends find village people to be “good people,” they also find village speech to be something endearing, though also potentially humorous. The girls' playfulness with the rural dialect terms legitimizes these forms in light of the standard they are taught at school. Though Alina uses the standard form, *kartoplja*, after being corrected by Katja (Lines 221-222), the succeeding turns in which Larysa



uses another dialect variation, *bul'ba* (Lines 223 and 225), work to mitigate the repair. The standard is still upheld as the preferred term, most likely for the benefit of the foreign researcher. However, the dialect variants are not simply condoned; the light collective laughter (Line 226) may present dialects as “funny,” but the number of turns they take in this playful display result in a group consensus that “it’s great to live in the village.” For these girls, there is value in knowing and using authentic, locatable Ukrainian dialects.

Not everyone agrees with Katja and her friends, however. The middle class students at Ivan Franko acknowledge the legitimacy of Ukrainian rural dialects, but in practice deem these dialect variants to be incorrect speech. One girl, Natalija, links the way people speak to the type of person they are: “Even in the village, there are old women there who can say some kinds of words; maybe it's among their families. It's like some other kinds of Polish letters; to some degree it's Polish. A soul ((*dusha*))<sup>65</sup> that's like half Polish, half Ukrainian.” The “mixed up” language of villagers shows them to also be “mixed up” people, who are neither Ukrainian nor Polish.

Natalija's other classmates agree, viewing the standard language learned at school as the preferred way to speak. While they describe rural speech as examples of genuine dialects of Ukrainian (Appendix II: Lines 178-181), when Maryna offers up

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<sup>65</sup> Dale Pesmen (2000) describes how “soul” (*dusha*) talk is widespread in Slavic, especially Russian, cultures. In essence, to speak of one's *dusha* is to speak about a person's moral center in the context of social relationships. A person, who is seen to be failing in their social obligations as many New Russians (Humphrey 1999, 2002) are accused of, has “lost” their soul, for example. When someone is described as having a “divided soul,” they are seen to be torn between two moral and social centers, completely belonging to neither.

rural speech as a type of slang, their response suggests that both slang and rural speech forms are to be avoided.<sup>66</sup>

**Excerpt 5.2: Proper speech can only be learned**

126	<b>EAP</b>	nu, jak ljudy mozhe hovoryty naikrashche?	Well, how can people speak the best?
127	<b>Ksenja</b>	ne znaju, ja <i>rakhuju</i> <sup>67</sup> sho bez slenhu, ale	I don't know, I <i>think</i> , without slang, but
128	<b>Maryna</b>	nu, ale v ukrajins'kij movi <i>tozhe</i> <sup>68</sup> je dejaki slova	well, but in Ukrainian, there are <i>also</i> some words
129	<b>Ksenja</b>	nu, davai skazhy	well, go on tell us
130	<b>Maryna</b>	<i>mizhpoverkhovyj trot otjah</i> tse je lift	<i>mizhpoverkhovyj trot otjah</i> that's an elevator
131		((laughter))	
132	<b>Ksenja</b>	shch-shch-shch-shcho?	what?
133	<b>Maryna</b>	ta <i>porokhotjah</i> , nje, jak skazaty? <i>porokhotjah-pylosos</i>	and <i>porokhotjah</i> no, like, how do you say it? <i>porokhotjah-pylosos</i>
134	<b>Sofija</b>	pravyl'no	correct
135	<b>Ksenja</b>	tse ne je slenh	that's not slang
136	<b>Sofija</b>	tse pravyl'na=	it's correct=
137	<b>Maryna</b>	=pravyl'na=	=correct=
138	<b>Sofija</b>	=ukrajins'ka mova	=Ukrainian
139	<b>FST</b>	tykho	quiet
140	<b>Vika M</b>	naykrashche hovoryty takuju movoju jakuju tebe navchyly bez vsjakykh dialektiv	it's best to speak, the kind of language that you were taught without any dialects
141	<b>Sofi</b>	O-o-o	oohh
142	<b>MST</b>	a khto nas navchyv	but who taught us
143	<b>Vika H</b>	ty sam navchyvsja	you taught yourself
144	<b>Darija</b>	nu, pravyl'no, ty zh	well, that's right, you did

<sup>66</sup> An extended version of this excerpt is in Appendix II.

<sup>67</sup> This is an example of *surzhyk*, a stigmatized form that is a “mixture” of Ukrainian and Russian. (cf. Bilaniuk 2005).

<sup>68</sup> This is a Russianism. The standard Ukrainian form would be *tezh* or *takozh*.

Though Maryna claims to be giving examples of legitimate Ukrainian slang (Lines 128-133), middle class Ksenja (Line 135) and Vika H disagree (Line 140).<sup>69</sup> Sofija, on the other hand, agrees with Maryna's assessment, asserting that her example is “correct Ukrainian” (Lines 134-138)

At times, these girls acknowledge that Ukrainian has different dialects; even L'vivians have a way of speaking that can be recognized when they travel to other regions of the country. However, the majority of their discussion of dialects is focused on rural speech practices. Earlier in the interaction Vika H names the rural region of Zakarpathia as having a dialect (Appendix II: Lines 97-99). Later on, Ksenja reiterates this point, explaining how “in villages they pronounce them ((words)) a little bit differently” (Appendix II: Line 178), adding the Karpathian mountains as another place people speak a dialect of Ukrainian (Appendix II: Line 180).

Though L'viv is included in these middle class girls' examples of dialect speech, throughout the discussion they describe dialects more often as forms of rural nonstandard speech that is “not pretty” and “not cool” (Appendix II: Lines 186, 187, and 191) for young people to speak. After Ksenja claims that “only villages speak it ((use dialect words)), both Vika H and Maryna use nonstandard forms of “fourteen” and “fifteen” (Appendix II: Lines 189 and 190). Sofija then proceeds to utter “the village” in such a way that it elicits laughter from the group (Appendix II: Lines 192-193). In claiming that the best way to speak is “without any dialects,” and associating nonstandard speech with villagers, these middle class teenagers reaffirm the

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<sup>69</sup> According to my native L'vivian and linguist friend, the example that Maryna presents is a stigmatized form of speech associated with rural peasants in this part of Ukraine.

superiority of standard Ukrainian and implicitly include their peer group and the wider urban L'viv community as speakers of this standard.

When I ask about their views on a popular Ukrainian band, Vopli Vidoplyasova (VV), who is well-known for their use of rural speech forms, Vika H and Ksenja frame VV's use of the language temporally. Rather than considering it to be a dialect of Ukrainian, they label it “old Ukrainian” (Appendix II: Lines 197 and 198). They claim that this way of speaking can be “nice” and “cool” because you can only hear this style of speech “from them;” “we don't use them ((these words)).” For these girls, the use of nonstandard speech by musicians is allowable and can be a trait indicative of a particular band's sound. These teenagers interpret the VV's use of nonstandard forms as an appropriation of historical Ukrainian, rather than as utilizing current, rural forms of Ukrainian. While it is acceptable for these musicians to use these nonstandard variants, “it's not really the same” (Appendix II: Line 202) when regular people speak them in their daily life; dialect speech does not carry the same cache when it is not used as an artistic performance of Ukrainian identity.

In contrast to their classmates Vika H and Ksenja at Ivan Franko, Maryna and Sofia view rural dialects as legitimate forms of speaking Ukrainian. In Excerpt 5.3, Maryna performs a “village” voice that she is familiar with (Lines 130, 133; Appendix II: Line 190). Although her change in loudness easily marks this voice as that of a rural Other, her subsequent defense of the phrase positions her in alignment with Sofia and against her other classmates. The rural term for “elevator” might sound archaic

and strange to the ears of urban teenagers, but for Maryna that does not negate its linguistic legitimacy and social value.<sup>70</sup>

Though national ideologies that these young people learn at school emphasize the importance of learning and speaking only the standard form of Ukrainian, other varieties of speaking are acknowledged at the local level, though they are not equally valued. Local experts work to combat residents' mixing Ukrainian and Russian, and the local urban identity valorizes its unique, L'vivian variations at the same time as it devalues similar variations linked to rural spaces. These teenagers learn to view their urban-based regional variety of Ukrainian as a legitimate standard, but to not extend this legitimacy to rural varieties. For the working class, this further denigrates their rural connections; in addition to their education and upbringing, their rural-born parents and rural kin are also deficient in their speech. By recognizing rural dialects and arguing that they are as Ukrainian as the standard form promoted nationally, these working class teenagers can be seen as attempting to reclaim value for them on the basis of cultural authenticity. In doing so, these young people can also create value for themselves and their rural-tinged urban identities.

During our discussions of rural and urban speech, rural varieties were linked surzhyk, and both rural dialects and surzhyk were, in general, conceptually lumped together with slang and vulgar speech.

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<sup>70</sup> Later in the discussion (Appendix II: Lines 186-192), however, Maryna is the first person to state that dialect speak "it's pretty" and that those people who use it "think it's cool, but it's totally not cool." This act seems to re-align her to her peers and their predominate ideology of speaking, in affirming that nonstandard forms are rural, and should remain in rural areas. Her performance of "village slang" or "village dialect", however one might interpret it, suggests that at that earlier moment, Maryna was voicing an alternative ideology held in villages.

### *Slang and Vulgar Speech*

Working and middle class teenagers in western Ukraine also have different attitudes towards slang and vulgar speech, and their acceptability in everyday life. I use “slang” to connote nonliterary speech which is associated with young people and youth culture, often used in popular media. In Ukraine, slang is usually viewed as coming from outside of the speech community, being borrowed from Russian and English-language youth-centered media. By “vulgarisms,” I refer to speech that is taboo and deemed inappropriate for all speakers in the community, and is unacceptable in most social contexts. Again, most Ukrainians views these words as coming from Russian and English; I often heard the claim, by young and older people alike, that “Ukrainian has no slang,” and “Ukrainian has no vulgarities.”

Both slang and vulgarities are central to speaking “cool” among western Ukrainian teenagers, despite these teenagers’ claims in favor of linguistic purity and the value of standard Ukrainian. The everyday “mixed” speech of these teenagers is self-described as “impure,” filled with slang and vulgarities from Russian, as well as English and a few tokens of other Europeans languages like Italian and Spanish. Granted, youth speech is not quite the same as language mixing; though both are viewed as “improper”, further study is needed to understand the distinctions between Ukrainian “youth speech” and the merely peppering otherwise standard speech with an

occasional “cool word.”<sup>71</sup> I do not undertake an investigation of actual youth speech practices here, but rather I examine teenagers’ views of their own speech.

The teenagers of both socioeconomic classes assert that they “always” or “mostly” use nonstandard forms, especially when they are with friends or around other young people, such as at school. Students’ explicitly express attitudes in favor of language purity in describing their use of slang and vulgarisms; the degree of these attitudes differ along class lines. The middle class students at Ivan Franko emphasize a high value on the linguistic standard, and claim to avoid vulgar language, whether in Ukrainian or another language, which is of less concern for their working class counterparts at Taras Shevchenko.

In a group discussion on language at Taras Shevchenko, facilitated by me in the school cafeteria during one of their lessons, Mrs. Stadnyk’s students agree that they learn much of their nonstandard forms from their peers at school, and only secondly from the television shows and action films imported from the United States. As one boy says, “When I came to school I didn’t know any” but he quickly learned these words from his classmates.

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<sup>71</sup> Nonstandard African American English, standard African American English, and the youth speech adopted by the global hip hop community are also viewed as “incorrect” and stigmatized forms of English more widely. An evaluation of a person’s speech using these variants highly depends upon the context and the other interlocutors. As H. Samy Alim (2004) has shown, African American hip hoppers use more nonstandard variants with other hip hoppers, emphasizing the solidarity aspect, and possibly a level of prestige, of the language. However, the further the social distance between the hip hopper and another speaker—such as gender, race, hip hop identification, age, and class—the more standard the hip hopper speaks. Rather than using nonstandard speech to create solidarity, standard forms are used in order to lessen the effects of a lack of prestige for nonstandard speech within the wider community. Though teenagers like Ksenja portray themselves as upholding norms of language purity and “proper” speech (Excerpts 5.1 and 5.3) they may also be using nonstandard speech forms for prestige purposes among their close peers (Excerpt 5.2).

Though some claim to speak slang “all the time,” others limit their uses: “Not at home, not on the street; ((only)) at school.” As students outnumber teachers at the working class school, and are often together during breaks between lessons, using such language holds little risk of punishment, and provides students with a form of privacy. As Solja explains, “they [teachers] don't understand this private youth language; we need to say something to satisfy ourselves.” For what I observed, this slang was Ukrainian, but filled with a multitude of nonstandard forms, so much so, that I could not comprehend their speech during school breaks.<sup>72</sup> For these typical teenagers, youth slang is used as a way of creating cohesion among schoolmates and to create a space at school separate from adults.

Vulgurities also play a role in youth speech, though to a lesser degree than non-vulgar slang. Graffiti, for example, is expected on St. Andrij's Day, a religious feast day similar in many ways to Halloween. Traditionally, girls fortune-tell to discover the names or occupations of their future husbands; boys play pranks and otherwise run amok. Tricks and pranks are expected, such as graffiti and other public nuisances and, for the most part, these activities are excused due to the carnivalesque atmosphere. As in Vignette 5.4, when an older boy at Taras Shevchenko paints graffiti on the school building on St. Andrij's, however, there are different interpretations of his behavior, and his use of vulgar language at this site of learning.

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<sup>72</sup> At Ivan Franko, the students spoke standard Ukrainian much more often during school breaks; in my impression, the way they spoke during class was fairly similar to the way they spoke among themselves during breaks. In addition, the students at Ivan Franko used more foreign words in their speech, such as “Okay”, “hello”, and “bye” (English) and “caio” (Italian).



**Vignette 5.3: Graffiti at Taras Shevchenko, December 14, 2006.**

St. Andrij's was last night. When I arrived at Taras Shevchenko, there was orange spray-painted graffiti across the front of the school building. The message was scrawled across the wall and both main doors. The principal was furious, yelling at a group of older boys to clean it up, and then at me for watching them. I asked the students in Mrs. Stadnyk's class about it. They said that an older boy at the school wrote it and was arrested. The girls didn't seem too upset, saying that next time "it'll be in another color", and that "they'll just have to scrap it off again." The graffiti was about one of the older girls at the school, naming her specifically. It said "50 cent", something about the girl's father, and *suka* ("bitch").

Mrs. Stadnyk said that it was a St. Andrij's Day joke. She said that "boys play pranks like that all the time in villages" on this feast day, but they use something that's "easier to clean up," and "don't write things with such a cruel and vulgar tone." She said they do it in the villages, but "there's no similar place" to do it in the city. Villages usually have old, abandoned buildings covered in graffiti; no one minds if these buildings are further defaced. But "it's not the same in the city." By the end of the day, all of the graffiti was gone, having been scraped off or painted over.

The students in Mrs. Stadnyk's class treat the graffiti of the older boys as something that is a normal St. Andrij's Day activity and something to be expected from this particular boy. In contrast, one boy, Stanislav, was concerned that the graffiti might be used by this foreign researcher to misrepresent his school. When he learned that I had seen the graffiti, and had my camera on me, he asked to see if I had taken any photos of it and demanded that I erase them if I did.<sup>73</sup> For the majority of his classmates, the graffiti was more of an interesting topic to discuss during breaks—like the stupidity of the boy in painting the graffiti on the school he still attends—than something to be seriously concerned about.

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<sup>73</sup> Misinterpreting the extent of his ability to censure my collection and use of data, as described on his consent form, Stanislav invoked his "right" to not allow me to write about things that happened at his school, which he did not agree with. While he was confronting me, his teacher Mrs. Stadnyk joined us, also seemingly anxious about my knowledge of the graffiti. She quickly explained the circumstances behind it, presumably so that I would not think this was a normal occurrence at the school. Throughout this exchange, the rest of the students in the class seemed more excited that something interesting had happened at the school, rather than anxious over how it might reflect on their school.

Mrs. Stadnyk also frames the graffiti as a regular occurrence on St. Andrii's, but she asserts that St. Andrii's pranks in the city have become more "cruel," "vulgar," and permanent than their rural varieties. Mrs. Stadnyk's characterization may be focused on this particular occurrence: the singling out of one girl, the words the boy wrote, and/or the placement of the graffiti across the school's main entrance. However, her general explanation locates the St. Andrii's graffiti more broadly as a village activity, one that has somehow become warped in an urban setting.

Young people do not have a monopoly on vulgar language, though. Working class teenagers claim that both adults and young people use vulgarities even though they know that they should not. These teenagers say they choose not speak vulgarities at home "because as long as my parents are supporting me I try to respect them." Though "My dad does [curse]. But he thinks I can't hear him." In other words, even those adults whose speech is supposed to be a model for these teenagers do not always speak the most standard speech. They expect their children to do so, however, as a sign of respect, which these teenagers both acknowledge and seem to resent to some extent.

The views of these working class teenagers imply that both young people and adults should use standard Ukrainian and avoid vulgar language; when they recognize that they are not using the speech appropriate to the situation and audience, such as using vulgarities around their children, they apologize for their behavior. These parents might unintentionally use vulgarities at home or in front of their children, but they frame their use of these words as a mistake: "if they're around me, then they

apologize, of course.” Apologizing for one’s use of vulgarities around those people whose status, or the speaker’s relationship, commands a certain level of respect—such as to one’s parent or around one’s child—is an act that works to maintain the ideology that standard speech is the ideal way for a Ukrainian to speak.

These working class teenagers seem to question this process of “sin, then repent;” as Solja remarks, “you know, parents think, *like*,<sup>74</sup> when they speak, it's fine, but when we do it's all bad.” However, these teenagers' attitudes towards the uses of slang and vulgarities suggest that these linguistic practices are fairly common among their social class. In a group activity that I facilitated, which centered on creating word lists of slang and other “cool” words, these teenagers seemed eager to use nonstandard forms in the school's cafeteria. A lunch lady was within earshot, showing her disapproval of their language by reminding them that they were at school, and that teachers or even the principal might hear them. Despite this, they used vulgarisms, asked questions about English words they had heard, and otherwise presented their speech as “how we usually talk.”<sup>75</sup>

Though they uphold the idea of linguistic purity and claim that slang and vulgar speech should be avoided, for these working class teenagers, these nonstandard forms of speech are also a fact of life. They do not take their use of nonstandard

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<sup>74</sup> The use of italics indicates a nonstandard form.

<sup>75</sup> This transcript is potentially very useful for further examination of youth speech. During this activity, they seemed most at ease, talking quickly to both myself and each other as they conferred over their lists. Mostly, this was due to the casual way responses of one focal student and her friend, both of whom the class knew had spent time with me outside of school. Another indicator of these students' possibly frequent uses of nonstandard varieties was the initial hesitation of my Ukrainian assistant to transcribe their speech. She began by only transcribing their standard speech, omitting vulgarisms, or by “standardizing” their utterances by correcting their nonstandard forms.

speech as a character flaw, neither viewing it as a liability for future job opportunities nor romantic relationships.

In contrast, the middle class students at Ivan Franko claim that teenagers “speak cool,” using both Russian slang and vulgarisms, but that these practices are “bad” and “ugly.” For them, using Russian slang is “a habit” that is “unnecessary” (Appendix II: Line 116). According to these teenagers, Ukrainian may have some of its own slang (Appendix II: Lines 94-102), but slang and vulgar speech forms “aren't needed” (Appendix II: Lines 106-107). For the middle class, people should speak only the standard; these teenagers’ uses of Russian slang and vulgarities can be seen as their compromise with larger ideologies of purism. For them to be both a “cool” young person and a Ukrainian speaker who is committed to upholding ideologies of linguistic purity, they choose to borrow slang and vulgarisms from foreign languages.

In her speech, Ksenja uses some instances of surzhyk, as well as singular Russianisms (see Excerpt 5.1). While she agrees with Vika H's assessment that standard Ukrainian is the best way to speak (Appendix II: Line 140), she openly admits that teenagers like her use slang and borrowed words, “dirtying” their own language. The association of teens' use of slang and villagers' use of nonstandard dialects, often interpreted as the stigmatized surzhyk, equates two very different groups of speakers and ways of speaking in the discourse of purity that Vika H. takes up and makes her own. Though surzhyk is thought to be a problem of rural people, especially when they go to the city, slang is a generational issue.<sup>76</sup> In the following

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<sup>76</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix II.

excerpt, Ksenja frames youth speech as distinct from that of older generations. She asserts that the way she and her classmates are speaking during the discussion as typical, both for this group and for youth in western Ukraine more generally.

**Excerpt 5.3: Slang as typical youth speech**

171	<b>Ksenja</b>	my tak rozmovljajemo pervazhno	we talk like this, mostly
172	<b>Vika M</b>	de molod', de starshi ljudy ni	where there's teenagers, where older people aren't
173	<b>Maryna</b>	vzahali, <i>matjuky</i> tse ne dobre	in general, <i>vulgarisms</i> are bad
174	<b>Ksenja</b>	ta, ta, i v nas slenhom hovoryt' til'ky, til'ky, molod' hovoryt' slenhom	yeah, yeah, and we speak slang, only, only teens speak slang
175	<b>FST</b>	tak, tak	yeah, yeah
176	<b>Ksenja</b>	starshi ljudy ne hovojat'	older people don't speak it

In Excerpt 5.3, the middle class girls at Ivan Franko claim that the use of slang is limited to the younger generation (Lines 172 and 174) and to places where there are not a lot of older people (Line 172). In their eyes, it is both possible and desired, at least for adults, to speak standard Ukrainian which does not include these speech forms. Maryna's claim that “vulgarisms are bad” (Line 173) within this talk of slang is affirmed by others (Lines 174 and 175), though it is unclear what the relation is between these “bad vulgarisms” and the “slang” that Ksenja mentions in Line 174.

Unlike their working class peers at Taras Shevchenko, who do not distinguish between the various forms of slang and vulgarities they use, these middle class teenagers focus on their use of Russian slang. They claim that slang in Russian possesses a semantic meaning unavailable in Ukrainian. As Vika M and Ksenja agree, these Russian words “don't resonate in Ukrainian”, and “in Ukrainian you can't... they

don't make sense" (Appendix II: Lines 35-36, 40). Though these teenagers claim that Ukrainian "has no slang" or "very, very, few" slang words (Appendix II: Lines 94-96), their description of how young people use Russian words suggests otherwise. Ukrainian cognates of many of these Russian words have "normal" meanings in Ukrainian, but "in Russian it's like slang" (Appendix II: Lines 61-63).

**Ksenja:** Yeah, it's cool if it's in Russian. If it's in Ukrainian, well, it's not the same. It, well, it's not the same. It's not like that ((those in Russian)).

Ksenja and her classmates agree that young people use slang, but they also view it as something people "don't need" to speak. The legitimacy of Ukrainian dialects is also at question in the discussion (Appendix II). Though Ukrainian has few of its own slang and vulgar words, it does have regional dialects. While these variants exist, they are no more "pretty" (Appendix II: Lines 186 and 191) than slang and vulgarisms.

For the middle class teenagers at Ivan Franko, the use of slang and vulgarities may be necessary for some young people, but the use of these forms can reflect poorly on a person's character. Though they use slang and other nonstandard forms of speech, these teenage girls specifically try not to speak this way around strangers, their parents and teachers, and others who might judge them harshly.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix II.

**Excerpt 5.4: “Boys don’t understand...how girls have to be”**

145	<b>Vika M</b>	sered divchat, ot my v svojiy hrupi, mozheмо tak hovoryty, ale pry khloptsevi, vony ot tak podyvljat'sja, jaksho my budem hovoryty	among girls, in our own groups, we can talk like that, but around boys, they notice, like, if we're going to speak like that
146	((overlapping speech))		
147	<b>Vika M</b>	ale jaksho pry komus' chuzhomu	but if you're around some stranger
148	<b>Ksenja</b>	tak	yeah
149	<b>Vika M</b>	khloptsi, tse ne spryjmajut' ne	boys don't understand this, they don't
150	<b>Darija</b>	divchat jak nalezhyt'	how girls have to be
151	<b>ST</b>	a divchata	but girls
152	<b>Lana M</b>	nu, ne vsi, ne <i>nada</i>	well, not all, not <i>anything</i> <sup>78</sup> ((“nothing” in Spanish?))

These girls assert that they use slang and vulgarities only around people they know well (Line 145) like their friends and other classmates (Appendix II: Lines 156-158). However, they claim to explicitly avoid using nonstandard speech forms in front of strangers (Line 146) or boys who might be potential romantic partners (Line 145; Appendix II: Line 154). The girls’ claim that they, as females, have to monitor their speech more than others (Lines 149 and 150) points towards a gendered expectation of young people.

These girls’ views imply that, unlike teenage boys, a girl's linguistic practices are often interpreted by others as a reflection of the type of person she is in other ways. This seems to echo reasons why people avoid being labeled a surzhyk speaker or rural dialect speaker. Reflect ideology that people should speak “correctly” and “beautifully.” For them to avoid being viewed in a bad light—an “easy” girl,

<sup>78</sup> It is possible that Lana M is using a token Spanish word, *nada*, in her statement for added emphasis.

unmarriageable, an uneducated party girl, all types of young women people would expect to abandon their families and their country by emigrating—they must speak “correctly” and “beautifully” in public. This leads them to claim to limit their use of slang and vulgarities to only situations around their close friends, and to not acknowledge that they use surzhyk or rural forms at all.

### **Teenagers' Ideologies of Speaking other Languages**

I also asked these teenagers about speaking other languages. Their positions towards slang and vulgarities include the use of foreign languages, and reflect local attitudes in favor of multilingualism, albeit a multilingualism that may or may not include Russian. Despite the large proportion of the national population who speaks Russian, Ukraine remains the sole state language; however, this may change in the near future. When asked about the wider linguistic world in which they, as Ukrainian speakers, live, working and middle class teenagers held different ideologies about multilingualism. The working class recognizes multiple kinds of authentic, legitimate Ukrainian, but interprets the benefit of knowing foreign languages, including Russian, from a pragmatic view. In contrast, middle class teenagers emphasize formal study of standard languages as they also fear the future of the Ukrainian language if Russian is established as an official second state language. These attitudes suggest that the value of knowing and being able to speak Ukrainian, Russian, and other languages is dependent upon each socioeconomic group's perspective on the kinds of relations that exist between these languages and their speakers.



The data in this section comes from a survey of language attitudes, as well as recorded follow-up group discussions and interviews with several students at each school. On the survey, I ask students two related open-ended questions which require them to think about language from two different perspectives: one of an immigrant living in Ukraine (Table 5.7), and the other of a Ukrainian emigrant living in another country (Table 5.8).

### *Multilingualism in Ukraine*

On the first question, students are asked to answer the following question: “In your view, if a person wanted to become successful in Ukraine, she<sup>79</sup> would need to speak which language (which languages)?”<sup>80</sup> The students are then able to give any answer they wish; the majority of them named “Ukrainian” specifically, with some giving more general answers such as “Ukrainian and other languages” (see Table 5.2). The majority of students at both schools named “Ukrainian” as a necessary language, but only one specifically named “Russian” in their answer.

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<sup>79</sup> I used *ljudyňa* (“a person”) in the first question and the masculine *ukrajinetŝ* (“a male Ukrainian”) in the second question. Within this context, I do not think that the use of gender in the question influenced their answers. *Ljudyna*, though a feminine noun, is not gendered in meaning. While *ukrajinetŝ* has gender encoded within it (both grammatically and lexically), the majority of students taking the survey are girls, and most talk about Ukrainians in other countries is centered on women, not men.

<sup>80</sup> “Na tvoju dumku, jakby ljudyna khotila dosjahnuty uspiĥu v **Ukrajini**, jiji treba rozmovljaty jakoju movoju (jakymy movamy)?” (bold in original)

**Table 5.7: “To be successful in Ukraine, a person needs to speak:”**

<b>Languages mentioned</b>	<b>Taras Shevchenko (n=26)</b>		<b>Ivan Franko (n=21)</b>	
	# respon	%	# respon	%
Ukrainian	22	85%	13	62%
Russian	0	0%	1	5%
English	3	12%	4	19%
Other	1	4%	7	33%
<b>More than one language given in answer</b>	4	15%	10	48%

Interestingly, a significant percentage of students give answers that favor multilingualism, naming or indicating two or more languages in their answer (15% and 48%). However, there is some avoidance of naming Russian specifically as the language one needs to know apart from Ukrainian. Several students answered “Ukrainian and English” (12% and 14%) or “Ukrainian and another language” (19% at Ivan Franko). The students at Taras Shevchenko overwhelmingly present an orientation that favors monolingual Ukrainian (73%), while those at Ivan Franko are split between monolingual Ukrainian (29%) and multilingualism of Ukrainian and other languages (48%).

These results suggest that students at the working class school may be less aware of the benefits of multilingualism in Ukraine, or they are influenced, in part, by the pro-Ukrainian orientation of their school. Their teacher, Mrs. Stadnyk said in an interview that she wishes the students were learning Russian as their foreign language, rather than English, because “Russian is also a global language and it's easier for them to learn since it's closer to Ukrainian.” This surprised me because she projects a strong preference for Ukrainian in the classroom, one that is usually associated with an anti-

Russian sentiment in L'viv. Solja's parents also agree that the younger generation is not fully learning Russian; without requiring students to learn Russian in school, they are not as competent as older generations.

**Vignette 5.4: Sunday lunch with Solja's family, September 9, 2007.**

When I asked about their knowledge and use of languages, Solja said she knew Russian, which she had learned it from watching TV and from reading books in Russian (“there aren't as many books in Ukrainian”). Dad then said, “she can't really write in Russian properly, though”, seeming to scoff at his daughter's claim of “knowing” Russian. Mom agreed, saying that “kids don't know Russian grammar at all.” I then asked what languages the parents knew and used. Dad said only Russian and Ukrainian; he had learned German in school, but he didn't really know it now. Mom said it was the same with her; she had learned English in school, but had only had one lesson a week, whereas she had had Russian four or five lessons a week, since “Russian was 'our big brother'.” Both parents said that they only use Ukrainian at home at at work. Mom joked that Dad spoke “literary” Ukrainian at work, but dialect/slang at home. They both thought that it would be better for them if they knew English; people who know English can get better jobs. Mom said she wished that she already knew English.

Solja's parents frame her knowledge of Russian as incomplete; though their daughter may understand the language to some extent through her exposure to Russian-language books and other media, she “can't really write” in it and she and other young people “don't know Russian grammar at all.” Although her parents only use Ukrainian in their daily lives, they have the ability to use Russian if they need to. Those like Solja's parents and Mrs. Stadnyk acknowledge that the youngest generation is not bilingual like previous generations. While these young people assert that they “know” Russian, due to their exposure to the language in their everyday life, they lack the formal schooling that the older generation sees as essential for being able to “know” and use Russian as a bilingual. Teenagers like Solja acknowledge that writing and speaking Russian is difficult for them, but they claim that they can “get by” in Russian if they need to. This suggests that Ukrainian and Russian are nearly equivalent; to

know one language makes it relatively easy to “know” the other. Working class youth, in other words, frame Ukraine as a place where Russian is a fact of life. For them, a person can be successful as a Ukrainian-only speaker without needing to formally learn Russian; it can be acquired passively through a person's native Ukrainian and her engagement with Russian-language media.

The views of the middle class students at Ivan Franko, on the other hand, show a wider cognizance of multilingualism through formal education and its benefits outside of the western regions of Ukraine. In a follow-up interview, they describe the need to be bilingual in Ukraine as the result of regional linguistic practices.<sup>81</sup>

**Excerpt 5.5: “Different people speak differently” in Ukraine**

2	<b>Ksenja</b>	Jaksho vona khoche dosjahnuty uspihku v Ukrajinu, nu, napryklad, tuta na zakhodi u L'vovi, jaksho vona khoche dosjahnuty uspihku to jij treba rozmovljaty po-ukrajins'ky, napryklad, jaksho vona pojide v Kyjiv jij treba znaty ukrajins'ku i rosiis'ku, tomu shcho v Kyjevi polovyna ljudej rozmovljajut' vse-taky na rosijs'kij, i tomu tam treba znaty i ukrajins'ku i rosiis'ku, tomu sho rizni ljudy i po-risnomu rozmovljajut', i je vazhali jaki ne rozumijut' ukrajins'koji ot i tomu treba znaty dvi movy	If she wants to be successful in Ukraine, well, for example, here in the west, in L'viv, if she wants to be successful, then she needs to speak Ukrainian, for example, if she goes to Kyiv, she needs to know Ukrainian and Russian because in Kyiv half of the people nevertheless speak Russian and that's why you need to know it, both Ukrainian and Russian because different people speak differently, and in general there are some that don't understand Ukrainian, and that's why you need to know two languages
3	<b>Maryna</b>	ta bil'sha polovyna skhidnoji Ukrajinu ne rozumije ukrajins'koji, ne rozumije	and more than half in eastern Ukraine don't understand Ukrainian, they don't understand it
4	<b>Ksenja</b>	ta, napryklad, v Krymu tam ljudy maizhe ne rozumijut' ukrajins'koji movy	and, for example, there in Crimea, people pretty much don't understand Ukrainian

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<sup>81</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix I.

For these teenage girls, people speak different languages in different parts of the country; a “successful” person would learn to use whichever language is spoken by people in that region. Ksenja and Maryna are neutral in their position towards Russian speakers in Ukraine, simply agreeing that they “don’t know Ukrainian” (Lines 3 and 4). At other times, though, these girls describe Russian speakers as “not wanting” to learn to speak Ukrainian (Appendix I: Line 51); this lack of desire is attributed especially to the older generation living in eastern regions of the country (Appendix I: Line 52). For these teenagers, Ukrainian speakers have to tolerate Russian speakers (Appendix I: Line 30), although this situation is changing (Appendix I: Lines 30 and 36), especially among the youngest generation (Appendix I: Lines 35 and 58) who are finding Ukrainian to be essential for academic success (Appendix I: Line 49).

The absence of directly naming Russian in their survey answers, which occurs among students at both schools, however, is significant. In a later discussion, the teenage girls at Ivan Franko admit that people really do need to know both Russian and Ukrainian, especially if they are traveling to different parts of the country. But when the issue of making Russian a second, official state language is raised, it leads to concerns over the future of the Ukrainian language.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix I.

## Excerpt 5.6: “It wouldn't be Ukraine without Ukrainian”

62	<b>Darija</b>	jaksho hovoryty pro zakhid, to zakhid katehorychno z tsym, ne pohodzhujet'sja, katehorychno, a bil'shist' tam na skhodi=	If you speak about the west, then as a whole the west doesn't support it, but the majority there in the east=
63	<b>Ksenja</b>	=ta=	=yeah=
64	<b>Darija</b>	=[khochut' druhu rosij's'ku movu katehorychno	=[they want Russian as the second language, as a whole
65	<b>Ksenja</b>	=[u L'vovi z tsym katehorychno ne pohodzhujut'sja=	=[as a whole they don't support it in Lviv=
66	<b>Darija</b>	=i navit' taki pytannja, jaksho by tam Yanukovyh by vybraly vin stav ministrom prem'jerom	=and on this question, if he were, if Yanukovyh was elected, if he became Prime Minister
67	<b>Sofija</b>	ta, Viku	yeah, Vika
68	<b>Darija</b>	to kazav nash mer mista, sho vin vse odno ukrajins'ku movu, u L'vovi ne zaboronyt' v nas, u vsikh shkolakh budut' vchytysja til'ky po-ukrajins'komu, rosij's'koji movy v nas ne bude	our mayor said that's it, the one Ukrainian language, for us in L'viv it's intolerable ((to have Russian)), in all schools they will only teach in Ukrainian, we will not have Russian
69		((overlapping speech))	
70	<b>Darija</b>	jaksho Rosija pryime druhu derzhavnu movu ukrajins'ku, to todi proshu, dushe haj v nas pryumajut' [druhu rosij's'ku	if Russia is adopted as the second state language in Ukraine, then, please, really, let ours be adopted as [the second one in Russia
71	<b>Vika H</b>	[ta, ale tse prosto [je	[yeah, but it's just that [there's
72	<b>Vika M</b>	[ale til'ky pislja toho, jak vonu pryimut' druhu derzhavnu movu	[but <u>only</u> after that, like, they can become the second state language
73	<b>Maryna</b>	navit' jaksho by vonu z povahoju stavylsja, po-pershe, do nashoji movy, tomu sho	even if they had regarded our language with respect from the beginning because
74	<b>Vika M</b>	choho tse v Ukrajinu majut' hovoryty rosij's'koju movoju?	why do they have to speak Russian in Ukraine?
75	<b>Vika H</b>	ta	yeah

**Excerpt 5.6: “It wouldn't be Ukraine without Ukrainian” (cont.)**

76	<b>Vika M</b>	navit' jaksho vonu zaprovadjat' druhu derzhavnu ukrajins'ku, vse odno, my ne musymo povtorjaty za nymy	even if they instituted Ukrainian as the second state language, it doesn't make a difference, we don't have to split it with them
77	<b>FST</b>	ta	yeah
78	<b>Vika H</b>	jaksho kozhna chastyna Ukrajiny maje pryimaty movu susidn'oji derzhavy, jaksho todi pryimaje, nu, bere sobi druhu natsional'nu rosij's'ku, to my sho majem sobi, sho v nas maje she pol'ska zaprovadzhuvatys', bo my blyzhche do Pol'shchi	If every part of Ukraine has to adopt the language of its neighbors as an official language, if it takes them then, well, takes Russian as a second official one, then we have to have others, we'd have to institute Polish because we're closer to Poland
79	<b>Sofija</b>	ta	yeah
80	<b>Lada D</b>	Bilorus'ka	Belorussian
81	<b>Vika H</b>	ta	yeah
82	<b>Ksenja</b>	Koroche, kazhuchy my proty ts'oho [shob	In short, while I'm saying we're against this [that would
83	<b>Vika H</b>	[tomu sho derzhava, tse je derzhava odna, i jakos' ne mozhe buty v nij dvi movy	[because the state, this is one state and all, you can't have it in two languages
84	<b>Ksenja</b>	ta..tomu sho Ukrajina bez ukrajins'koji movy, ne je	yeah..because it wouldn't be Ukraine without the Ukrainian language
85	<b>EAP</b>	jaksho rosij's'ki a staly druhi, sho stalosja b?	If Russian was made the second, what would happen?
86	<b>Vika M</b>	sho, sho?	what?
87	<b>Ksenja</b>	jaksho b rosij's'ka bula druha mova	If Russian was the second language
88	<b>Vika M</b>	nu, ne znaju, vonu neju, b ne rozmovljalu	well, I don't know, they wouldn't speak it
89	<b>Vika H</b>	a jakby v nas bula rosij's'ka mova	and if we had Russian
90	<b>Ksenja</b>	nu, todi vsi zakhidna Ukrajina zalyshylysja b na ukrajins'kij movi, a vsi reshty, vsja reshta Ukrajina	well, then all of western Ukraine would remain in Ukrainian, but all the rest, all the rest of Ukraine
91	<b>Maryna</b>	i pivnich, i tsentr	and the north, and the center
92	<b>Ksenja</b>	nu, ta	well, yeah

**Excerpt 5.6: “It wouldn't be Ukraine without Ukrainian” (cont.)**

93	<b>Vika H</b>	a pivnich, i skhid, tse rosijs'komovni oblasti	but the north and the east, those are Russian-speaking oblasts
94	<b>Vika M</b>	ta	yeah
95	<b>Ksenja</b>	Meni zdajet'sja, sho Ukrajina todi b rozdilylasja na dvi chastyny, na ukrajins'komovnu i na rosijs'komovnu	It seems to me that, then, Ukraine would be divided into two parts, a Ukrainian-speaking one and a Russian-speaking one

When asked what they think might happen if Russian becomes the second official language in Ukraine, these teenagers frame their answers in terms of local preferences, regional differences, and broader international concerns, suggesting that their understanding of the relations between the Russian and Ukrainian languages are entwined at multiple spatial levels.

At the local and regional level, these teenage girls describe a difference between an anti-Russian west, of which L'viv is a part, and an anti-Ukrainian east. Ksenja asserts that people would be against it in L'viv (Line 65), and Darija claims that “we will not have Russian” in their city (Line 68). They present the western regions of the country as not supporting Russian as an official second language (Line 62). If Russian gained official status, only the western regions would continue speaking Ukrainian (Line 90); the north and eastern regions of the country “wouldn't speak” the language at all (Lines 88 and 91-93).

An international spatial level is also discussed, where the uses of Ukrainian and Russian are explained in reference to other, non-linguistic relations between Ukraine and Russia. When Vika H states “if every part of Ukraine has to adopt the language of its neighbors as an official language...” (Line 78), she indirectly indexes a popular justification for giving Russian official status, which based in the proximity of



Russia to Ukraine and the extent of their shared borders. With Sofija and Lada D agreeing with her, Vika H challenges this idea by applying its underlying logic to other parts of Ukraine: “we'd have to institute Polish because we're closer to Poland.” For Vika H, geographic proximity is a weak argument for giving Russian official status; just as it is absurd for L'viv to be a Ukrainian-Polish bilingual city, so would it be for Ukraine to be a Ukrainian-Russian bilingual country.

There is also a concern about the political motivations to give Russian official status. Darija asserts that there should be mutual adoption of a second language in both Russia and Ukraine (Excerpt 5.3: Line 70), suggesting a type of shared equality between the speakers of each language within each country. For Vika M, mutual adoption is not enough. Rather, she wants a particular ordering of this mutual adoption: Ukraine should adopt Russian “only after” Russia adopts Ukrainian (Line 72). After Maryna mentions the lack of respect Russians have always had for Ukrainian (Line 73), Vika M amends her view and rejects the idea of mutual adoption completely: “we don't have to split it with them” (Line 76). This idea of “splitting”—together with Ksenja's view that “Ukraine would be divided into two parts” (Line 95) in Russian gained official status, and Maryna's claim that the politician favoring the adoption of Russian “wants to join Russia” (Appendix I: Lines 96 and 98)—suggests a future division of speakers and a concern that this division will result in a change in political borders.

According to these middle class teenagers, if Russian was given official status, Russian-speakers would lose any incentive to speak Ukrainian and, at the most

extreme, Ukraine would be at risk of coming under the political rule of Russia again. Vika H and Ksenja present the heart of the issue, echoing the ideology of “one nation, one language” (Excerpt 5.3: Line 83), asserting that the language is central to the idea of a Ukrainian state, as “it wouldn't be Ukraine without the Ukrainian language” (Line 84). These teens, in effect, “erase” the half of the country that is Ukrainian by nation but Russian by linguistic practice; they question the idea that someone could be a member of the Ukrainian nation and yet not speak Ukrainian. They frame the issue of official language adoption as concerning only Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians. This leaves no room to recognize the substantial part of the population who are Russian-speakers *and* members of the Ukrainian nation.

### ***Multilingualism Abroad***

The working class students at Taras Shevchenko and the middle class students at Ivan Franko also gave different answers on a question concerning the language use of Ukrainians in foreign countries. On this question, they were asked: “In your view, if a Ukrainian wanted to become successful in other countries, he would need to speak which language (which languages)?”<sup>83</sup> The working class students emphasized the need for Ukrainians abroad to know Ukrainian (42%); their middle class peers rarely mentioned Ukrainian (10%). Students of both socioeconomic classes viewed it as essential for Ukrainian emigrants to be bilingual or multilingual (50% and 29%),

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<sup>83</sup> “Na tvoju dumku, jakshcho b ukrajinets' khotiv dosjahnuty uspiokhu **v inshykh krajinakh**, jomu treba rozmovljaty jakoju movoju (jakymy movamy)?” (bold in original)

emphasizing the need for Ukrainian in other countries to know English (54% and 29%) and the “language of the country” (31% and 57%).

**Table 5.8: “To be successful elsewhere, a Ukrainian needs to speak:”**

Languages mentioned	Taras Shevchenko (n=26)		Ivan Franko (n=21)	
	#respon	%	#respon	%
Ukrainian	11	42%	2	10%
English	14	54%	6	29%
Lang of the country	8	31%	12	57%
Other	2	8%	1	5%
<b>More than one language given</b>	13	50%	6	29%
<b>Ukrainian<sup>84</sup> given</b>	13	50%	3	14%

The primacy of English in the answers of both groups reveals an orientation towards those places more favorable to English-speakers, but not towards places where Russian might be useful, such as in the other former Soviet states or even neighboring Belarus. Their views present a world where Ukrainian emigrants predominantly travel to European or English-speaking countries, rather than Russian-speaking ones further east.

There are some differences between these two groups, however. Half of the teenagers at Taras Shevchenko specifically mention Ukrainian as a language necessary for Ukrainians in other countries. This could be a result of earlier instructions given to them from their teacher, or due to a pro-Ukrainian environment at their school. It may

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<sup>84</sup> This category includes answers with “Ukrainian” and “own native language”. Although it leaves room for a Ukrainian to have a native language that is not Ukrainian, it is more likely that this answer is used as a way to be politically correct, since it is rare for Ukrainians who live in L'viv to have a native language other than Ukrainian.

also reveal a fear of “language loss,” one that is different from that shown at Ivan Franko in terms of the status of Russian in Ukraine. Rather than viewing the widespread use of a particular language in Ukraine as threatening Ukrainian, these working class teenagers' insistence on retaining Ukrainian implies that the language, culture, and experience of living in another country might lead Ukrainians to lose their own language. By explicitly stating that Ukrainian is a necessity, even while in foreign countries, these young people imply that Ukrainian speakers might forget the language which is, for them, as essential part of the Ukrainian identity.

The majority at Ivan Franko, in contrast, does not include Ukrainian in their answers; perhaps they do not fear language loss due to emigration. This might suggest that, for these middle class teenagers, knowing Ukrainian does not provide one with much linguistic capital in other countries; this may also suggest that “forgetting” Ukrainian is not something one should worry about. In the same follow-up interview, the girls at Ivan Franko elaborate, framing their answers in terms of European political and economic pragmatism.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix I.

**Excerpt 5.6: “English is an international language”**

8	<b>EAP</b>	nu, i je v vas taki, jaksho by ukrainets' khotiv dosjahnuty uspikhu v inshij krajini, jomu treba rozmovljaty jakuju movoju?	well, and is there, do you have such, if a Ukrainian wanted to be successful in other countries, what language would he need to speak?
9	<b>Ksenja</b>	Anhlijs'koju	English
10	<b>EAP</b>	Chomu?	Why?
11	<b>Maryna</b>	Tomu sh[o anhlijs'ka	becau[se English
12	<b>Ksenja</b>	[anhlijs'ka—tse mizhnarodna mova=	[English is an international language=
13	<b>Maryna</b>	=nu, ta=	=well, yeah=
14	<b>Ksenja</b>	=i anhlijs'ku znajut' vchat' u vsikh krajinakh ta	=and they know and learn English in every country
15	<b>Maryna</b>	abo ispans'ku	or Spanish
16	<b>Vika H</b>	inshe nimets'ku=	or German=
17	<b>Maryna</b>	=ja by [ispans'ku vyvchyla	=I would [study Spanish
18	<b>Vika H</b>	[Teper hovorjat' sho nimets'ku bil'she, tomu sho teper Jevrosojuz	[now they say that German is more widespread because now it's the European Union
19		((loud crash))	
20	<b>Vika H</b>	i Nimechchyna, jakby holovuje v Jevropejs'komu, to jiji jakby jiji movu treba vchyty, tomu sho bil'sh-mensh jiji vzhvajut' u vsikh jevropejs'kykh krajinakh	and if Germany leads in the European Union, then its language would be the one to learn because more or less they use it in every European country
21	<b>Ksenja</b>	ta, to take nimets'ka, anhlijs'ka	yeah, like German, English
22	<b>Maryna</b>	ale anhlijs'ka naiposhyrenisha mova	but English is the widest spoken language
23	<b>Darija</b>	jasno, sho bo anhlijs'ka vvazhajt'sja mizhnarodnoju movoju	clearly, that's because English is used as an international language
24	<b>Ksenja</b>	anhliis'ka i nimets'ka	English and German

These teenagers focus on the linguistic capital of global languages in “other countries” specifically located in Europe and the European Union. They focus on the use of English within the European Union, asserting that it useful throughout the region due

to the culture of English language education and the resulting widespread knowledge of the language: “They know and learn English in every country” (Line 14), because “English is the widest spoken language” (Line 22). This group of girls also describes the usefulness of English as stemming from its role as an “international language” (Excerpt 5.4: Lines 12 and 23); German is also implicitly included within this category (Lines 21 and 24).

These middle class teenagers, in other words, orient towards Europe and European languages and away from Russia, not mentioning the country or including its language in their discussion of international languages. Their valuing of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism is limited to those regions of Ukraine where Russian is spoken, suggesting that Russian will eventually disappear once the people living in these regions learn to speak and value Ukrainian.

The pro-multilingual position among middle class students may be influenced by their parents' and teachers' personal experiences and knowledge of European languages. Several of the English teachers at Ivan Franko claimed that they were learning other languages, such as German, Italian, and Greek, on their own time and at their own expense. Many of the students' parents have traveled abroad, for work or on vacation, with some taking their children along with them. While the majority have been to near-by Russia and Poland, others have traveled to England, France, the United States, and even Egypt and Japan. Teenagers' first hand experiences of these countries, or just having a parent who has experienced these countries, may also contribute to the pro-multilingualism of teenagers at Ivan Franko.

## **The Global Linguistic Marketplace**

The national and local level ideologies of language, as reflected in these teenagers' views of language use, are linked to wider, global values of multilingualism and the value of specific global languages, primarily Russian and English. While teachers at both Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko assert that multilingualism is essential to their students' futures, the national and local curriculum does not fully support this in practice. Though students are taught foreign languages as early as first grade in the public schooling system, people rarely claim fluency without additional, private language study. The anxiety that Ukrainian will disappear in Ukraine without concerted effort at its promotion and protection is most vocally expressed among the middle class teenagers. This anxiety reflects a perspective that global Russian competes with, and will eventually destroy, minority languages like Ukrainian. Working class teenagers, on the other hand, do not seem to share this anxiety. For them, Russian is similar enough to Ukrainian that it can easily be acquired without formal study. The threat to the Ukrainian language does not come from the Russian speaking community in Ukraine, but rather from those Ukrainians living in other countries who stop speaking the language and fail to transmit it to the next generation.

The alternative perspectives of language learning, though both linked to mastering the standard language through a formalized institutional setting, reflect different notions of language use and identity as speakers of Ukrainian. The exclusivity of the working class school's approach, in emphasizing the rarity of full command of the standard at the same time as it attempts to present it as simple and

easy to do, gives weaker students a reason for their lack of skills. This both reaffirms the social hierarchy of language – in which only the elite and privileged can properly speak the standard, and the lower classes and those living in villages are left with their nonstandard dialects and “mixed” surzhyk speech. Paradoxically, if becoming competent in the standard requires no use of other varieties of Ukrainian—such as dialects, colloquialisms, slang, and vulgarities—and is simple and easy for only a select few, then the nonstandard speech of the masses remains legitimate in its own way. As language plays a central role in Ukrainian identity, any language that does not come naturally cannot be a true reflection of the speaker.

This same idea of language as linked to a person's core identity is also present in the approach to language learning at Ivan Franko, however, in a much different way. The acknowledgment of students' weaknesses is not equated to an inability to master the standard. Rather, every speaker has linguistic weaknesses that can be overcome. Though this perspective makes room for nonstandard use throughout the learning process, in the end it reaffirms the standard as the most legitimate way to speak Ukrainian. Through this lens, the standard should be the goal of all Ukrainian speakers because it *is* their true, native language. Nonstandard dialects, then, are all interpreted as “mixed” surzhyk and the result of centuries of foreign rule.

Ideologies about language, the role of institutions, and appropriate behavior are linked to ideas of tradition and modernity. The Taras Shevchenko administration values working class norms. Students know that they will probably remain in L'viv and have little difficulty with speaking only their native language, or informally



learning Russian or Polish. If they are “forced” to find employment abroad, it is more practical to learn the language in-country as one does not know where she may end up. These teens also hold the expectation that institutions are and should be an important support system in their lives, just as it is for their pensioner grandparents or as it should be the in eyes of their periodically unemployed parents. It is only expected, then, that the school would play an integral part in their lives.

The administration and school communities of Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko share many values between them. But rather than focusing on more traditional views of language, institutions, and behavior, those at Ivan Franko place more value in progressive, modern ideals. Having more positive experiences with the emerging western capitalist system, practicing multilingualism is not seen to be a threat to their use of Ukrainian. Rather, it is viewed as an additional source of social capital that will significantly improve their future educational and employment prospects. These students do not rely on the school for anything beyond an education (and with the use of tutoring, not even fully on this either), and some view the school administration as overstepping its role if it attempts to regulate students' behaviors beyond the boundaries of the school environment.

### **Discussion: Youth Identities at School**

As young people spend a significant amount of time at school, their teachers and the wider school environment affect the differing ideologies of language use among these working and middle classes teenagers. In the following vignette, the

working class students in Mrs. Stadnyk's class maneuver around the teachers' rules for using the bus driver's microphone to play songs from their cell phones during a field trip. The teachers agree to let the students use the microphone on two conditions: the music must be “good” and it must be “in Ukrainian.” These rules, however, are quickly broken. Once a Ukrainian-language hip hop song is played and appears to “pass” the teachers' requirements for the use of the microphone, it opens the door for other hip hop songs to be played, first in Russian and then in English.

**Vignette 5.5: Tourism Day at Taras Shevchenko, October 2, 2007.**

Several classes went by bus to an Ivan Franko museum, which included an outdoor replica of the village homestead where Franko spent his childhood. On the bus, the students asked to use the bus' radio. At first, the teachers suggested they have a sing-a-long instead, asking a couple of girls who “sang well” to use the bus driver's microphone and lead the group in singing some traditional Ukrainian songs. The girls sang but few of the other students joined in. After the sing-a-long, some of the students asked if they could play songs from their cell phones, putting their phones up to the microphone. The teachers agreed, as long as the songs were “good,” and “in Ukrainian.” After a few Ukrainian-language “classics” and contemporary rock songs were played, Nina asked if she could play one of her songs. Mrs. Stadnyk asked “is it good?” Nina responded, “It's in Ukrainian.” It was a popular hip hop song, performed in Ukraine, but unlikely one that the teachers would have considered “good.” Receiving no ill response from the supervising teachers, a few Russian-language songs of a similar type are played, and then an English-language hip-hop/rap song. In the middle of the song, the teachers said “that's enough,” telling the students to turn it off and repeating that they wanted something “good”. So, the kids played songs, mostly in Russian, mostly pop songs or Russian hip-hop. Later on, the teachers complained of the loud volume the songs were being played at, and they ended the “cell phone jukebox.” The teachers tried for another sing-a-long, but fewer participated than the first sing-a-long. The bus radio was finally turned on to a Russian-language radio station playing older Russian songs.

Mrs. Stadnyk and the other teachers allow the hip hop in Ukrainian to be played, and the Russian-language one after it. It is only after the English-language song is played that the teachers stop the music and return to their initial suggestion of having a sing-a-long. Failing to gain student participation, they resort to a “middle ground” of Russian songs, albeit older ones. It is unclear whether the teachers rejected the

particular language being used, or the style in which it was used; most likely it was a combination of the two. Both Ukrainian and Russian hip hop is understandable to the teachers and their students, but the use of English might put teachers at a disadvantage. By allowing them to hear hip hop in English, the teachers may inadvertently be permitting students to listen to, and learn, inappropriate words and other vulgarities in English. For the students, each shift in music style and language can be seen as an attempt to transform the bus into a “youth” space, filled with their preferred soundtrack.

As working and middle class teenagers hold different ideas about how language should be used, it is likely that they also differ in their own uses of language, to some degree. A site for future research would include an investigation of the actual linguistic practices of these two groups of teenagers. For example, in a rough examination of participants' speech, there appear to be some youth-indexed discourse markers—*vzahali* (“in general,” Ukr), *vopshe* (“in general,” Rus), *niby* (“like,” Ukr), and *tipa/typa* (“like,” Rus)—as well as both regional and age-linked slang such as *nicho* (for *nichoho*, “nothing,” Ukr) and *khtiv* (for *khotiv*, “he wanted,” west Ukr dialectism). The prevalence of these nonstandard forms suggests that western Ukrainian teenagers may have a particular way of indexing a “youth” identity with possible variations in style that signal gender, class, urbanness, and/or geographic region, through their uses of language.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> I do not attempt such an examination of western Ukrainian youth speech practices here, though I hope to conduct such a study with the collaboration of my transcriber, Dr. Natalija Tsisar, a linguist and native L'vivian, in the near future.

Differing ideologies of learning, which are manifested in classroom activities, highlight variations in broader attitudes towards the uses of language. The ways in which teachers interact with students, both during lessons and outside of the classroom during school-sponsored activities like field trips, lead to students holding differing attitudes about how language should be used and by whom.

The working class teenagers at Taras Shevchenko embrace a wider variety of authentic ways of speaking Ukrainian, and do not see the incorporation of other languages into their speech practices as a threat to their Ukrainian. Since mastery of standard Ukrainian is only within the reach of a few, the acceptance of linguistic variety legitimates the speech of nonstandard and rural dialect speakers. Extending this idea of exclusive linguistic mastery, these middle class teenagers are equally accepting of their own informal acquisition, and nonstandard uses, of Russian and other languages.

At Ivan Franko, on the other hand, middle class teenagers learn that standard Ukrainian can be achieved by anyone with hard work and dedication, resulting in their devaluation of nonstandard speech and non-urban dialects, which are linked to uneducated speakers. This emphasis on inclusive linguistic mastery, however, influences their views of learning foreign languages. For this group, to really “know” a language, they must be formally taught the literary standard. The Russian language’s threat to Ukrainian lies not only in people’s use of the language on the street or in the media, but in the systematic, formalized instruction of Russian, which would come about if the language was given the status as a state language.

## Conclusion

All of these issues of language use—from what are considered legitimate standard forms of Ukrainian and how young people are expected to use language, especially young women, to the sites where Ukrainian is in contact with other, more globally powerful, languages—are linked to notions of identity. Though other chapters showed how a chronotopic lens is useful in examining the boundaries young people draw in their identity-making and social positioning, space-time associations are not as actively used in these discussions about language. Space is apparent in the middle class teenagers' opinions about Russian speakers in Ukraine, and those of the working class mark a potential difference between language and identity among Ukrainians who live outside of Ukraine. However, there is only a weak link made between these spatial differences and any temporal association: Russian speakers are often older people, whose ideas and practices are those of an earlier era; speakers of rural dialects live in the past, but language is just one expression of their spatiotemporal difference. Instead of framing difference in terms of space-time associations, this chapter shows how difference based on language is more frequently described in terms of how people use language, and what these uses of language can tell others about speaker and the identities a speaker sees to create, maintain, and express.

Working and middle class teenagers in western Ukraine both see Ukrainian as an essential language for those claiming a Ukrainian identity. They both acknowledge that English is a valuable language to know, and that Ukrainians abroad should be bilingual or multilingual in English and “the language of the country.” Youth of

different socioeconomic classes, however, hold different ideas about the value and necessity of multilingualism and nonstandard speech in other ways, such as in the use of multiple languages in Ukraine and the use of slang and vulgarities more broadly.

For those of the working class, Ukraine is a monolingual, Ukrainian-speaking place, where a person does not need to learn Russian formally but can acquire it passively through Russian-language media. This suggests a perspective where Russian is almost equivalent to Ukrainian; if a person knows Ukrainian, she also “knows” Russian. The use of Russian at home does not threaten Ukrainian; rather, Ukrainian is at risk when Ukrainian-speakers are in foreign countries. According to these teenagers, Ukrainians need to know other languages if they go abroad. It is imperative, however, that Ukrainian migrants not forget their native language, Ukrainian, during their time in these other countries.

What it means to “speak Ukrainian,” for the working class, however, is not homogenous. Both young people and older generations can and usually do use nonstandard speech forms, such as slang and vulgarities; although these uses are not ideal, they are also neither surprising nor reflective of a person's character.

Middle class teenagers, on the other hand, describe Ukraine as a Russian-Ukrainian bilingual world. This bilingualism, however, is the result of regional differences based in ethnicity and national differences. Rather than acknowledging the significant part of the population that identifies as Ukrainian while speaking Russian, teenagers of this economic class frame the language environment in their country as

consisting only of Ukrainian Ukrainian-speakers and Russian Russian-speakers. In effect, they “erase” a large proportion of the Ukrainian populace.

In regards to the use of slang and vulgarities, middle class teenagers differentiate between the varieties they use—focusing mainly on the use of Russian words—at the same time as they assert that these varieties are “unnecessary” for people. Though young people use slang and vulgarities, adults are not presented as using these nonstandard forms. For the middle class, it is both possible and desirable for people to use only standard Ukrainian, since a person's speech can be seen as a reflection of her character.

These class differences in attitudes towards uses of language may be connected to identity-making in other ways through the use of nonlinguistic styles, as well as the wider school environments in which these youth inhabit. These attitudes may also reflect young people's understandings of language as a form of capital, both in Ukraine and abroad.

## Chapter 6.

### **Stance-Taking in a Social Minefield: Discourses of Emigration**

With the spread of global capitalism, transnational migration has become an important item on many governments' agendas. Such high levels of migration across political borders have the potential to disrupt definitions of civic citizenship and ethnonational membership that form the bases of western polities. The expanding borders of the European Union have problematized multinational economic and social practices, such as those practices which tightly entwine states' economies on the global market or prescribe similar levels of tolerance towards ethnic and religious minorities residing within the member states. In the countries neighboring the EU, mass migration out of and through their borders can be rapidly reconfigured as a blessing or a curse.

In places like Ukraine, migration redefines the borders of the Ukrainian nation, not just for those who choose to emigrate, but also for those who remain in Ukraine. Stories of the emigrant experience circulate at home, giving potential emigrants a picture of what it might look like to work abroad. These narratives include both images of the foreign lands to which Ukrainians move, and a perspective on how Ukrainians differ from those native to these lands. How people imagine a particular place, apart from their actual experience with such places, can reflect their own understandings of national membership.<sup>87</sup> Some theorists argue that globalization has

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<sup>87</sup> Though research on space usually focuses on people's experiences of particular places in the lived



usurped the authority of the nation-state (Appadurai 1996, Bauman 1998), challenging its territorial-based notion of citizenship (Benhabib 2001). However, more integrated approaches seek to examine the interplay between the nation-state and global processes (Robertson 1995), by focusing on how states can and do regulate everyday flows of goods and people (Sassen 1998), and how local and global connections are integrated into everyday life (Ong 1999, Tsing 2005).

While such scholarship on globalization and immigration examines these issues at the level of the nation-state and from the perspective of immigrants themselves, researchers have not always investigated how migration affects those who remain back home. As people move across national boundaries, their mere presence questions the identities of national belonging, not just within their host country but also in their home country. As Stephen Castles points out, “migration is not a single event (i.e. the crossing of a border) but a life-long process which affects all aspects of the migrant's existence, as well as the lives of non-migrants and communities in both sending and receiving countries” (qtd. in King 2002:91-92). The data presented here seeks to provide a glimpse of how emigration as a phenomenon has an influence on the lives of Ukrainian teenagers, even those who have no direct connection to an emigrant. Rather, these young people use public discourses of emigration to take

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environment, these experiences of places can also be viewed as sites of identity-making. For example, gated communities can become sites of security and safety for their residents (Low 2003), at the same time as they reflect their residents' perceptions of a wider community filled with violence and crime. Similarly, certain neighborhoods can become viewed as sites of immorality, a characteristic of the place which can then become attached to the people who reside there through their geographical association (McDonogh 2003). As a result of the wide circulation of perceptions of certain spaces, people who have never experienced a space first-hand may draw upon these discourses about space in their constructions of identity.

moral stances which reveal friction between their gender, class, and friendship group identities.

The utilization of public discourses within everyday speech can have a deeper meaning and significance apart from aligning a person with a widely circulating social opinion or value. Within interpersonal interactions, people present both their evaluations of the issue at hand—their attitudes and opinions on the social issue and its larger meaning in their lives—and their alignment towards other participants in the interaction, responding to existing social relations, relevant in-the-moment context, and their current positioning in the locally-constructed social order.

This chapter examines the ways in which western Ukrainian teenagers use public discourses to establish and maintain their social positioning during group discussions focused on emigration. Through multivocality (Bakhtin 1981) and the use of face work strategies, these young people express stances towards global and local spaces, the links between Ukrainians and these places, and their understandings of the current social order. In the process of stance-taking, however, differences based on class unexpectedly come to the forefront. Despite the inter-class composition of their friendship groups, teenagers of similar classes find themselves aligning with non-friends and disaligning from their friends of different classes. They work to manage their conflicting evaluations of Ukrainian emigrants as they simultaneously mitigate or highlight their (dis)alignments with their peers. The unintended alignments between non-friends highlight the underlying logic worlds of each socioeconomic class, which have their own understandings of Ukraine and Europe. In other words, friends of

different social classes may, in fact, live in different worlds from each other; the Ukraine of one may look very different from that of another.

After discussing the current debates over emigration in Ukraine, I present John DuBois' Stance Triangle to show how it can be useful for analyzing stance within interpersonal interactions. I then analyze two student discussions held at public secondary schools in L'viv, a major city in western Ukraine. In the final section, I discuss how stance-taking can have an effect on the interpersonal relations that extend beyond the particular interaction at hand. Perceptions of global economic difference may also frame the discourses about emigration in Ukraine, delineating the kinds of futures young people identify with and hope to achieve. At a broader level, an examination of the circulation of public discourses and the role they play in interpersonal interactions can further illuminate the impact of emigration both at home and abroad.

## **From Ukraine to Europe**

In part due to its geographical location and political history, Ukraine has a negative population growth: globally, it has the thirteenth highest death rate, and the thirty-first lowest birth rate (*World Factbook*). In addition to the inability to maintain its population levels, many Ukrainians are choosing to leave the country in search of work, further potentially decreasing the size of the population remaining in the country. On another front, Ukraine has become a pathway to Europe for illegal immigrants from Asia and Africa, unintentionally finding itself both the largest

supplier and the largest receiver of immigrant workers (Düvell 2007). Immigration from the south and east, as well as out-migration of native Ukrainians, are changing the playing field of debates over citizenship and ethnonational belonging. Though there is a burgeoning anti-immigration movement, much of the discourse about emigration in western regions of the country focuses on the perception that Ukrainians who emigrate threaten the future of the nation, through their intended or unintended rejection of their obligations to their kinsmen and nation.<sup>88</sup>

The high rate of migration among citizens of Ukraine and other ethnonational states, therefore, leads to a redefining of civic citizenship and ethnic belonging in the public sphere. The discourses about emigration include imaginings of foreign lands and the connection or disconnection people have to these lands. Much of the discourse about emigration in western regions of the country focuses on the perception that Ukrainians who emigrate threaten the future of the nation through their intended or unintended rejection of their obligations to their kinsmen and to Ukraine. For many Ukrainians, emigration is the result of larger economic troubles within the country, from low wages, high unemployment, and underemployment to below subsistence-level pensions and a general lack of state support for public services. There is a fear that this out-migration will further destabilize the nation. The movement away from the home country is seen by many as a draining away of the nation, with parents separated from their children and fewer young adults remaining to build their own

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<sup>88</sup> This is not to claim that other foreign nationals are not a concern in Ukraine. Some do fear that these foreigners will replace native Ukrainians, and the most visible immigrants from Africa and Southeast Asia, though they are still a small minority, are increasingly the targets of racist, anti-immigration violence.

families. Ukrainians who leave to work abroad are often seen as less committed to the nation as they may never return, instead linguistically and culturally assimilating to their host countries of northern and western Europe, Canada, and the United States. Those who remain are left to solve the country's problems on their own, or emigrate themselves. The host countries, therefore, act as points of reference not just for emigrants, but also for those still living in Ukraine.

As the Ukrainian government continues its post-independence nation-building project, it must deal with the effects of a significant proportion of its population living outside of the country. As Europeans age, employment in domestic work and elder care is easy to find. Cinzia Solari (2010) shows how the older Ukrainian women who emigrate to Italy are part of a new transnational migration pattern.

[T]his particular articulation of Ukrainian nationhood (a Ukraine that is European not “Soviet” or “Russian”) and the migration pattern to Italy (the temporary labor migration of “grandmothers”) are inextricably linked. In fact post-Soviet Ukraine... is being constituted transnationally. The migration pattern to Italy and the production of the “new” Ukraine are mutually constitutive and so the homeland effects of this migration pattern are best understood not as resource drain but as 'constitutive circularity. ... [G]ender forms the basis of the migration pattern on the one hand and Ukraine’s nation building project on the other. The emergence of both of these migration patterns is rooted in Ukraine’s postsocialist transformation. (218)

Within this environment many are forced to re-evaluate their notions of hard work, familial obligations, and, ultimately, the Ukrainian identity. For example, the majority of Ukrainian emigrants are women who leave to work in traditionally female caretaker roles, such as elder care and domestic work (Solari 2010).<sup>89</sup> Their emigration can be

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<sup>89</sup> Solari (2010) focuses on older, more educated women who temporarily work in Italy in order to provide economic resources to their adult children and grandchildren. Cristina Montefusco distinguishes two types of women migrating, Solari's “grandmothers,” and younger, poorer, and less educated women (2008:345). It may be assumed that these “grandmothers” who were forced into early retirement in Ukraine are urbanites – former teachers, accountants, and engineers (Solari 2010:218), while the younger women constitute a new way of migration out of rural villages. Rather

viewed positively as their remittances are a viable, yet still invisible, source of revenue for the state. Successful emigrants can eventually return home with the knowledge and resources to help make their home country “European again.”

Emigration, however, has its downsides. Back home, stories abound of the dangers associated with living and working in host countries. Emigrants may find themselves exploited by former co-nationals or locals due to their immigration status, lack of a social support system, and their inability to speak the local language. Younger women, especially, are at risk of becoming victims of human-traffickers in their host countries, and those back home often believe that all young women who emigrate become sexworkers regardless of the actual employment they find abroad.

This emigration puts Ukraine in a bind as it reflects traditional Third world migration patterns: “Ironically, the very migration pattern that allows for the constitution of the social and economic structures within Ukraine that permits the state to make claims to Europe and the 'First World' also makes Ukraine look like it may belong to the 'Third World' instead” (Solari 2010:228). The perception that Ukrainian emigrants might come more from a Third World country than a First World one is evident in some of the shared risks involved in migrating.

The desire of many Ukrainians to be viewed as European, though without having to emigrate to an already recognized European country, creates tension in debates over emigration. As a result, there is no clearly articulated public opinion with which people may support or challenge. Rather, multiple, often contradictory or

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than moving to nearby urban centers as they have in the past, these villagers “hop over” Ukraine's cities and land directly in the urban centers of Europe. (cf. Keough 2006 for issues concerning broader phenomenon of women migrating to Europe.)

ambiguous views exist. This makes it difficult for people, including teenagers, to appropriate and use these discourses to position themselves within interpersonal debates.

### **Comparing Life Abroad with that in Ukraine**

Scholars have recently examined how political borders are experienced by those living near them. Though much research focuses on the United States-Mexico border, and the economic, linguistic, and citizenship issues present in this region, Europeanists have similarly investigated how the changes in political borders that came with the end of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the European Union have influenced conceptions of national identity and belonging. These pivotal re-alignments have led to disruptions and diversions in the flows of goods, information, and people across these borders. Under the Soviets, it was comparatively simple for a Ukrainian to travel to any other Soviet republic or socialist country, such as Poland, East Germany, or Cuba. Since independence, the border with Russia remains fairly open, though with added border guards, patrols, and regulations. However, travel to the western, former socialist countries, now EU member states, has become much more difficult (cf. Çağlar and Gereöffy 2008; Iglicka and Weinar 2008; Triandafyllidou 2009). Not only do Ukrainians need a visa to visit Poland, which are limited annually and can take months to get, they also need a foreign travel passport, the equivalent of 100 USD in cash on their person as they cross the border, a process itself that might double or triple one's travel time to the nearby Polish cities of Krakow or Warsaw.

Though changes in border regulations and boundaries can affect people's behaviors on either side, knowledge of the “near abroad” can also affect people's perceptions of their own way of life. Tatiana Zhurzhenko (2010) explains why villagers living on the Ukrainian side of the Ukrainian-Russian border compare themselves to the Russian villages on the other side. “Those who live at the border have more intensive contacts with relatives and friends in Russia, they travel there more often and have more opportunities to compare changes in both countries...The proximity of the border alone does not make Udy inhabitants Russian, but allows them to imagine other scenarios and leaves some options open” (303). Those living in borderland areas often involve comparisons with “others” across the border. For example, villagers living on both sides of the Ukrainian-Russian border compare themselves to those living on the other side, framing their narratives within Soviet and post-Soviet times. Those living on the Russian side see life as an extension of Soviet times, one that is more prosperous and more stable than in Ukraine. Villagers on the Ukrainian side agree that their standard of living is worse than it was under the Soviets (Zhurzhenko 2010:237-280).

Though these villagers live in close proximity to the Ukrainian-Russian border, being within walking distance if not also visible proximity to the other country, similar comparisons exist in the narratives of those living farther from the border who have indirectly relied on border crossings. L'viv, though not located at the Polish-Ukrainian border, is the major city between the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv and Krakow in Poland, making it a hub of east-west travel. The city is also a market center, where cheap



Ukrainian products, such as vodka and cigarettes, are bought to sell in Polish markets, and Polish chocolate, clothing and other higher quality goods are sold to the rising Ukrainian middle class. Without ever crossing the borders themselves, Polish and Ukrainian consumers can come to rely on the crossings of others in their daily lives. In addition, those with cable television can easily watch Polish, German, and English programming without ever leaving their homes. Radios may also pick up signals from Polish stations, making it easy to be informed of Polish news and weather reports.<sup>90</sup> In other words, the mere fact of living within a day's travel of a border, irrelevant of whether a person ever personally crosses that border, makes the border a focal point.

For those living in L'viv, stories of emigration, therefore, hold a stronger place in their conceptions of national identity, as the border is more concrete to them than those living metaphorically “further” from others' experiences on the other side of the border. The views of those remaining in Ukraine towards life across the border reflects a notion of “normality” that is Euro-centric. This idea of “normality” is described in terms of a basic standard of living which is centered on one's wages, living expenses, and the attention one needs to devote to spending. Similar to how those living along the Ukrainian-Russian border viewed life in Russia as better than that in Ukraine, those in L'viv see the relationship between themselves and those living in comparable cities further west as one shaped by economic inequalities.

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<sup>90</sup> During my stay in 2004, my host family assured me that, because the foreign nightly news weather report did not include L'viv, it was better to pay attention to the weather report for Krakow than Kyiv. In their view, the weather in southeastern Poland was more similar to L'viv than that of central Ukraine.

### *Soviet and Western Normalities*

Olha attends a working class school, but her family looks more like members of the emerging middle class than the typical working class family. Her father works in real estate and construction, building modern apartment complexes like the one in which the family lives. Olha's mother is a seller in one of the small shops at the nearby mall, and her older brother attends one of the local universities. She also has an aunt who lives in Chicago, who periodically mails the family videos of their cousins' life in the United States, and her mother has other relatives in Germany. Though Olha spent one recent summer in the family village, in general, her family does not visit the village more than once every few years.

In interviews, parents of some of her classmates implied that Olha's parents worked in morally suspect jobs. Rather than working in traditionally honorable sectors, such as teaching or as a factory worker, these parents framed the new business sectors as paying higher wages, but at the loss of personal integrity. One mother claimed that she could easily make more money working in one of these new stores, but implied that there was a stigma in working at these places. These jobs enticed people to spend their money on frivolous, but poor quality clothing and trinkets, both those who sold and those who bought these goods. It would not benefit anyone, trying to sell things that people do not need. This attitude towards Olha's family and other New Ukrainians echoes those towards New Russians (Humphrey 2002; Mandel and Humphrey 2002). Members of this emerging middle class have succeeded under

capitalism, but are viewed as having done so at the expense of others and through the rejection of traditional practices of frugality and a commitment to the public good.<sup>91</sup>

Despite the economic differences between their family and the majority of the working class families at her daughter's school, Olha's mother frames her family as equally struggling financially. She quotes an adage of “haves” and “have nots” in order to align herself with other families in Ukraine and in contrast to other countries in the western world.

**Olha's Mom:** But I say it's not everyone, and that's why they say 'half the world dances'—the elite have everything—'and half the world cries,'—those that can't ever let themselves go on vacation, eat, well, do anything at all, you know. This is how it is for us in Ukraine, you see, but in the Second World, for you in America, there in Germany, in Austria, in Poland, a person going to the supermarket doesn't have to keep track of their money.

She uses the saying, “half the world dances and half the world cries” to illustrate her view of Ukraine's location in the global community. Framing her view of global inequality in terms of consumption and the abilities of people to purchase both what they need and what they want, Olha's mother finds her standard of living as inadequate. This perspective echoes that of many east Germans, for whom “consumption became a realm in which and through which many of the dynamics between East and West were experienced, expressed, negotiated, and contested” (Berdahl 2010:34), and where “learning how to consume became a central initiation rite into the new society” (39).

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<sup>91</sup>I am not attempting to strictly apply a dichotomized model of the capitalism and traditional cultural morality. Instead, I seek to follow Jennifer Patico, who proposes viewing this dichotomy as it is used by social actors, which will allow us to see “the ‘market versus morality’ divide [as] not a matter of opposed forces so much as a means of making sense of (and arguments about) experience” (Patico 2009: 220).

Although Olha's mother places her family and all other Ukrainians as being part of the “have-nots”, in local terms the family belongs to the “haves.” In her have-have not paradigm, the “haves” which she would like to belong to can spend their money freely and without thought, can take vacations to places like Egypt and Switzerland. Among others in her working class community, however, these are luxuries that only few can acquire, not necessities for a middle class lifestyle. For Olha's mother, her lifestyle is “behind” where it should be; the “haves” of the world live in “normal time” while everyone else always remains a few decades behind. Life might improve for the “have nots,” but they will always be where the “haves” were at some point, but are no longer.

In voicing her desire to consume as those in western countries do, Olha's mother sees herself, and all Ukrainians as having earned the right to be one of the “haves” in this world through independence. Ukraine remains among those states that are the have-nots that “cry” while the United States and EU countries – including Ukraine's neighbor, Poland, which recently joined the EU – “dance” instead. For her, the main reason why Ukraine is part of the “half that cries,” is not due to the failings of the people, but due to the failings of the Ukrainian government. In “normal” countries, the government supports schools and libraries, and through these institutions the public and its intellectual development.

**Olha's Mom:** Everyone in school collects eight hryven, now three, then five, now nine, then four, and you know. All are public ((schools)), all are public. If a school is safe, with textbooks, with books, you get it, and with children, they would give everything, there wouldn't be a need to buy anything. But you can't get a book in the library, and they don't give them to every library, there are no books because the state doesn't provide them with books, and all books in the stores, all of them are twenty-five or thirty hryven. There aren't any in the library, none. They give you them for

free, but you have to pay at the store. But people don't have money, you see. Like, where it's normal, well, in some countries they wouldn't give out books in school. Well, they don't understand this there. For them they don't invest in minds, you see, but for us, everything's everywhere, just not in school.

**Olha:** With you, if you study at school, they give you all the books, right?

Olha's mother focuses heavily on what the local schools and libraries lack, holding the government responsible for the low quality of these public institutions. She defines the issue based on socialist ideals of the government as the caretaker of the people.

In her experience living in both the Soviet Union and independent Ukraine, Olha's mother indirectly compares these time periods in her assessment of her current living conditions. If the Soviet regime was a failure and unjust to Ukrainians, at least it was able to provide children with free textbooks, fill public libraries with books, and supported the educational system. Since the country is now independent, she seems to be asking, why can it not at least guarantee its people these basic necessities? In a way, Olha's mother seeks to mesh the paternal government of the past with the western-style consumption currently achievable by those in the U.S. and Europe. By critiquing the current government, she is able to continue to support the former Soviet system of social support and, at the same time, seek a western lifestyle. By combining these two space-time frames—of socialism and postsocialism—Olha's mother can present herself as a moral capitalist: she not only seeks a western, middle-class lifestyle but she seeks this lifestyle for all Ukrainians, not just those who have prospered since independence. Her position suggests that the normality of a western lifestyle is a basic right which every Ukrainian should be able to attain.

Her daughter, on the other hand, looks at the situation from the perspective on public institutions in the United States and Europe. Olha finds the Ukrainian government, the only one she has known, as not living up to the standards of western society, rather than eroding the structures set up by the previous socialist system. Her life does not measure up to that of her cousins in Chicago, who have their own house with a yard and a family car. Olha's life also does not resemble those of the middle class she sees on the television shows she watches on cable after school. Instead of combining space-times, her view appears to present a Ukraine that is progressing but still fully behind the West. While her mother sees a future where it is possible to combine the Soviet social system and western-style capitalism, Olha's views frame Ukraine as abnormal in comparison to Europe and the U.S.

### ***Achieving Normality at Home by Moving Abroad?***

The dual framing of current social problems—as stemming from Ukraine's socialist past and its relationship to a non-socialist West present—is evident in the views of other adults, but not to the same degree in the youngest generation. Mr. Petrenko, a Ukrainian language and literature teacher, shows support for Ukraine becoming a more European country. In his view, the government has created reforms that are aimed at improving the country; however, they are more likely to fail than not.

**Mr. Petrenko:** We want to move a little bit more towards Europe again, but we don't have the same conditions, there wouldn't be, we wouldn't really be the same, but we have quality reforms to help do it, but the quality comes out worse and worse.

One reason Mr. Petrenko gives for the failure of educational reforms is the arbitrary nature of the changes and difficulty in acclimating teachers and students to these

changes. Such changes, like that from a 4-point to a 12-point grading scale and the automatic promotion of students to the next grade regardless of their scores, do more harm than good in his eyes. They may make the educational system appear more European, but they confuse the students and the teachers, who see the reforms as unexpected and without clear reasoning behind them. Despite student efforts to study and improve their scores on the standardized exams, Mr. Petrenko sees students' scores dropping. The combination of unnecessary western-style reforms, coupled with parents who work abroad and no longer seem to care, makes failure inevitable.

While Mr. Petrenko and Olha's mother focus their attention on the failures of the government and its reforms, another mother compares her current wages as a nurse to her counterparts in European countries, similarly finding them lacking.

**Solja's mom:** For us, we work all day. For example, okay, I work for like eight hours every day. And for all this I have nothing because compared to any other professional and what they earn, a doctor or a nurse or a medical assistant. For example, a nurse came over here, I worked with her, this nurse from Italy, and people work there too. They have nurses there, what I earn in a year here, she has in one month. And people think "why?" Well, "why is it this way?" And you can work here even harder than they do there. Though we do have people that no one would fire. Anyone who wants to work can, even those that don't want to. And we even work for pennies, but we have to work because we can't not work. In general, there's nothing. The first question then is the unemployment. ...There are factories that would bring work, and maybe stay here because the money is more. Well, but you don't stay because it's not a state job. There's no kind of job security. Today you work but tomorrow, it's his business, he closed up or took off or went bankrupt or something else happened to him, and you're just a bum on the street, and then for you, well, there's nothing, nothing at all.... well, today you worked, well, but tomorrow, no. Well, there are a lot of nuances.

Solja's mother presents the differences between Ukraine and Italy as inherent within the current Ukrainian system, and as a fact of life. Though Italians get paid more for working less, the Ukrainian system gives everyone a job who wants one. On the other hand, non-governmental jobs lack job security. The safest solution for many, therefore, is to accept the guaranteed job, even if its wages are low or go unpaid, rather

than to seek a job that is dependent upon the actions of a new businessman in a new and unstable market system. The ambivalent attitude Solja's mother holds towards the emerging market sector jobs also works to support her decision to not seek work abroad. Being a nurse in Italy might pay more than her current job, but it would not outweigh the benefits she finds in being able to see her children every day.

These ideas of Europe look different through the eyes of emigration issues. Though emulating Europe, to some extent, is desired, the situation becomes more complex when it comes to people moving to Europe to live and work. The result is a double-edged sword: “moving towards Europe” opens up the possibilities for improvements in education, employment, and government reforms, but it also brings with it the potential for failure, victimization, and the disintegration of the Ukrainian family on which the nation is based.<sup>92</sup> Becoming European comes about through more drastic economic reforms, but at the risk of moral traditions. There are tensions between wanting to live a European lifestyle and the potential negative effects this lifestyle might have on existing practices. For many of the older generations, Europe is a place of economic development and social degradation; Ukraine, that of economic stagnation and social cohesion. These are some of the attitudes that the youngest generation draws upon in envisioning the Ukraine in which they live and its connection to the Western world.

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<sup>92</sup> Alissa Tolstokorova quotes her earlier work (2007:4), where she finds that, for Ukrainians, the family is “the material and spiritual foundation of the nations’ existence, the guardian of the ethnic memory, mentality and identity” (2010: 186).



## Public Discourses at School

Similar visions of Europe and Ukraine appear at school, where stories of emigration circulate and students are exposed to the views of their teachers and their peers. Though few openly speak about those who have left, their absence is used to account for a variety of problems at school. Teachers at both Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko spoke of the typical discipline problems at school, such as truancy and lack of student motivation. However, they linked many of these problems to a lack of parental supervision due to emigration.

Mrs. Stadnyk, a homeroom teacher at Taras Shevchenko, describes the parents of her students as engaged and concerned about their children. They want to know what goes on in their child's school life, and are eager to help reinforce school values at home. According to Mrs. Stadnyk, some parents need to search for work abroad, never forgetting about the families they are working to support.

**Mrs. Stadnyk:** You know, people abroad, you know, are in my class too. Some parents work abroad, but it's a temporary thing. They come back, they visit their kids. They have vacation time, it's not really long. They won't come for a year, and then they come at a break. Grandma, Grandpa are raising the kids, or Mom if someone else left, you know. There are problems but parents are interested in raising their kids, and of course, parents need to work for a lot of money if they want their kids to go to university. But every year we have higher fees for educational institutions, it's not bad where children can get whatever they want on their own, and parents come back to be with their kids and work.

Mrs. Stadnyk presents emigrants as workers who temporarily reside elsewhere. Her description of them focuses on showing how emigrant parents are just like any other parents: they have vacation time, they are able to see their children, and they care about their children and their children's education. Parents who emigrate are viewed as working in another country for a few years in order to more adequately provide for

their families. This perspective does not acknowledge the extent of the effects of out-migration on families, though deeper issues are hinted at in Mrs. Stadnyk's repetition that these parents do "come back."

Mrs. Stadnyk's insistence on the return of emigrant parents can be seen as a way of supporting those students whose parents have been abroad for several years. The morality of emigrants is often framed in terms of their return home. As long as there is a possibility that the emigrant will come back to her family, she can be seen as morally virtuous; the absence of a return, however, is proof that her choice to emigrate was solely self-interested and not for the benefit of those left behind. Teacher's attitudes towards parents who live abroad, however, are often more complex and contradictory than this. While Mrs. Stadnyk wants the emigrant parents of her students to return home after a few short years abroad, in reality, they do not. Instead, she attempts to balance the view that these parents are moral—sacrificing themselves for their children—at the same time as she disapproves of their migration choices.

Two boys in Mrs. Stadnyk's class have mothers who work in Italy. Though their behavior is similar to other boys' in the class, they are the default troublemakers: if students are scolded for not completing homework or for being disruptive, one of these boys will be the one singled out as the worst offender. When she threatens to call home about their offense, even Mrs. Stadnyk herself is not convinced of its effectiveness as she thinks the grandmothers taking care of them are much less capable of controlling the boys' behaviors than their mothers would. Due to Mrs. Stadnyk's disapproval of their mothers' emigration, these boys are marked as slightly Other

within the classroom and among their peers. This indirect critique of their mothers' decisions to work abroad both limits them in the views of other teachers as “bad” students, and elevates their status among their peers as “bad boys”.

The opportunities that their mothers' jobs give these boys are framed by Mrs. Stadnyk and other parents as unwarranted and unearned. This includes periodical trips to Italy, which required one boy to miss two full weeks of school. The other boy told me of his strong desire to become an actor—and live in Italy, elsewhere in Europe, or even the United States—which is an occupation that depends more upon having connections abroad than a Ukrainian college degree.

Though money earned abroad is often essential to pay for supplies and repairs that government funding can no longer pay for, and parents who work abroad have more financial resources and are better able to fill the needs of the school, many teachers see emigrant parents' absence from the home as contributing to student's academic and behavioral problems at school. When emigrants are seen as successfully navigating life abroad not all of their efforts are presented as beneficial for their families and communities back home. Solari (2010), for example, describes how Ukrainian women working in Italy see themselves as “good mothers” for sending money back home to their families, but, ironically, they frame the remittances of other emigrants as the source of the disciplinary, consumptive, and drug abuse problems of young people back in Ukraine (222). The view is that parents are so focused on improving their own families' financial welfare that they forget that this welfare is also dependent upon other factors beyond the financial. Though Mr. Petrenko, a homeroom

teacher at Ivan Franko, sympathizes with the financial difficulties of many of his students' families, he believes that many parents do not recognize that their physical presence is also essential to their children's welfare, a necessity that the school, teachers, and grandparents cannot fully compensate for.

**Mr. Petrenko:** Well, and there's another problem, that parents travel abroad to work, but they leave the kids with Grandpa, with Grandma, or with Dad, or with Mom, mainly with Dad because it's easier for women to go abroad to find work than men. That is, the problems and the kid stay behind. Through adolescence the child is alone with Grandma, she doesn't really want to listen that much, Grandpa and Aunt too are at work. And then, then, the parents send money, for clothing, to buy expensive things, cell phones, everything fancy, but Mom isn't here, Dad isn't here, she doesn't know that she needs looking after. She wears nice clothing and every gold thing, but then Mom isn't here. And then, the kids begin to get out of hand, and Grandma, Grandpa are old, they don't always know what else will happen, they stay in the neighborhood, but what else will happen. Then there are big problems. There's no work here, and they have to go. Parents have to go. But why do they go? For an expensive apartment, they need to buy an apartment or to build a house, or to work for the kid's education, you see, and everyone goes for the kid's happiness. But then later on, yeah, they return, it happens, and the families set out and the kids get out of hand. They don't want to learn. There are money problems, but there isn't this or that, the family wouldn't be much if the father or mother. . I have friends like this. If they work for six years in America, in Toronto, in Canada, for six years they work, for five or six years, some families work illegally there, later on they come back but for 6 years he hasn't seen his sons, his daughters, then it's tough, and the children get out. You left when the kid was ten years old, and came back when your kid had finished school, graduated from high school, but he came back with money, worked somewhere over there for our education. It's unfortunate; there are neighborhoods where parents would be in this position.

According to Mr. Petrenko, in the past parents paid more attention to their children; now that they have sought employment in other countries, they expect others to fill this role and be responsible for raising their children. As the family is central to national identity, as it is in other Slavic cultures, the idea that a parent could not really know their own child is shameful and almost unthinkable for many Ukrainians.

These facets of emigration are ultimately tied to economic issues connected to underlying perceptions of Europe. Western Ukrainians see self-sacrifice as resulting from leaving the safety and familiarity of Ukraine in order to enter a Europe filled

with unknown danger, deceit, and lack of social support. On one hand, the opportunities of Europe can lead to improving an emigrant's standard of living, education, and worldview. Emigration abroad can help both those emigrants living in the host country and their families in Ukraine. The decision to emigrate, on the other hand, can also be the source of additional unintended problems, from infidelity, involvement in illegal activities, and the increased behavioral problems of the children left behind. Finally, the benefits and risks of migrating to a foreign country may not be all that different from those that exist in one's home country. Europe is a place filled with countries that are just like Ukraine, with rewards and hardships alike. It is a place to live, a place to work, and a place to raise a family, and not necessarily one where an emigrant must choose between their home country and host country.

These economic issues underlie the discourses of Ukrainian emigration that young people draw upon in making their own evaluations of emigration and its role in their present and future lives. As will be shown in the following section, class-based stances towards emigration suggest the presence of multiple conceptions of Ukraine and Europe. These various Ukraines and Europes reflect a shared commitment to the traditional Ukrainian value of family, but interpret the relationship between these spaces and people's attempts to fulfill their familial responsibilities through migration. These different notions of space-time can have a real effect on interpersonal interactions, both shaping the stances participants take and revealing the socioeconomic class differences underlying the stances made.

## **Fancy Footwork on Uneven Ground**

The youngest generation in western Ukraine learns about Ukrainian-European emigration from the mass media, and their parents, teachers, and peers. These teenagers draw upon wider discourses in developing their own position towards out-migration and the role it has in who they are and who they want to be, whether it be as an “abandoned” child of an emigrant or as a future emigrant.

In order to fully understand how people communicate who they are to others, one has to investigate identity in relation to the wider social context. Sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists have various definitions of the concept of stance, at times folding it into notions of indexicality (Ochs 1992), limiting it to positionality (Blommaert 2005) or eliminating the interactional component (Kockelman 2004). Alexandra Jaffe's 2009 edited collection highlights the continuing difficulties in developing a coherent, and aptly narrow, use of the term, one which allows for various types of linguistic analysis as well as cross-disciplinary discussion.

John DuBois' definition of stance focuses on the processes of evaluation and alignment which are inherently social. “Stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field” (DuBois 2007:163). The Stance Triangle emphasizes the shifting relationships between the 1) interlocutors' evaluations, 2) interlocutors' subjectivity or positioning, and 3) alignments of interlocutors, which imply the social relations between these

interlocutors. This allows for the examination of discrete elements within an interaction. In other words, participants' stances result from what positions they hold themselves and, more importantly, from the active, within interaction, re-alignments they make in response to the alignments of others.

These stances people take can be viewed as “acts of identity” and “identities-in-interaction” (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985; Antaki and Widdicombe 1998; Auer 2007); what teenagers say about emigration can tell their peers something about who they are and what they hope to become. These identities are constructed in singular acts that last a moment, such as an off-hand comment, or encompass multiple events that occur over longer periods of time, spanning months or years (Wortham 2006). However, identities are not constructed within a vacuum, but are always under re-evaluation according to the shifting contexts in which a person finds herself.

Widely circulating discourses may also affect the evaluations and positionings of participants and the stances they take. Recent work on reinterpreting the past and its significance for the present has shown how discourses of the past are often multiple and competing (cf. Cavanaugh 2004; Eisenlohr 2004, 2006; Davidson 2007; Lemon 2009). In her investigation at a Russian theater school, Alaina Lemon (2009) shows the complex relations between Soviet experiences and post-Soviet understandings of the Soviet past. Theater students, according to their teachers, must work hard to envision Soviet life—and how individuals' identities changed at different points in their lives, both during this time period and after—if they are to embody post-Soviet

characters. Though the students themselves often oppose the values and norms of Soviet life, in their performances their goal is to align with the characters they portray.

Stance-taking on a controversial topic, like that of emigration in Ukraine, is potentially highly threatening to one's public social face (Goffman 1959), as these views may directly and openly challenge the face of other participants, and deep-seated social values. As a result, conversations that center on highly debatable issues are generally avoided, or occur between participants who are deemed “like-minded” and most likely to engage in mutual face-saving techniques. The existing social distance between interlocutors has the potential to shape the ways in which each participant (dis)aligns to others. While DuBois limits his investigation to the stances made within one particular interaction, prior and foreseen future interactions can also be relevant to in-the-moment stance-making.

### ***Friction between Identities: Example 1***

In a group discussion on emigration at Taras Shevchenko, the different statuses each participant usually holds in the classroom allow for the most vocal students to disagree with each other with little risk to their existing social relationships. In the following excerpt<sup>93</sup>, best friends, Stanislav and Yevhen, work to highlight their general alignment, and de-emphasize evaluations they have that are potential sites for disalignment. Solja and Valja, on the other hand, while they find themselves aligned with the boys at times, present their utterances as non-evaluations or as based on

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<sup>93</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix IV.



different social values. The distance they create between themselves and the boys works to maintain their existing social distance without attacking the boys' positions.<sup>94</sup>

Though the discussion of emigration allows all four teenagers to maintain their existing friendship group and social class identities, the issue draws out other concerns that are gender-dependent. When Stanislav starts to shift the focus away from emigration and towards a locally-produced program on the history of L'viv (Line 130), Solja and Valja take a more active role in order to expand upon the emigration topic. This time, they indirectly bring up the danger of human trafficking (Lines 131-134), a fear held by many young women like themselves. Though the boys realign to this shift towards discussing the potential for young Ukrainian women becoming foreign prostitutes (Lines 135-136), the girls seem to hold a sense of empathy (Line 137) towards these victims that the boys cannot fully understand.

**Excerpt 6.1: Gender divisions at Taras Shevchenko**

70	<b>EAP</b>	What do you think about Ukrainians that go to other countries for an education?
71	<b>Stanislav</b>	it's <i>stupid</i>
72	<b>Solja</b>	it's <u>good</u> for transformations
73	<b>Stanislav</b>	it's <i>stupid</i>
74	<b>Solja</b>	<i>like</i> , it's a little hard
75	<b>Yevhen</b>	there, for example, at Harvard
76	<b>Valja</b>	Harvard's different
77		((overlapping speech))
78	<b>Solja</b>	the teachers might be a little better, they can compare you
79	<b>Valja</b>	it's a better education

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<sup>94</sup> Though there are other students present, in this exchange they take audience roles.

**Excerpt 6.1: Gender divisions at Taras Shevchenko (cont.)**

- 80 **Yevhen** well, there, it's *like*, even when you come from to here with some science degree, there they'll ask you, where did you study=
- 81 **Stanislav** =oy=
- 82 **Yevhen** =you say abroad, that it'd be more of a worse, *like*, well, [education
- 83 **Stanislav** [but that's it
- 84 **Solja** after you study abroad, maybe there'll be a broader perspective here
- 85 **Yevhen** you leave from there, you'll be an authority
- 86 **Stanislav** °you say in America°
- 87 **EAP** there's more good things or bad things?
- 88 **Solja** Good
- 89 **Stanislav** good, *yeah, yeah, for sure*
- 90 **EAP** and what about Ukrainians that work abroad=
- 91 **Stanislav** =no, that's here
- 92 **Yevhen** no, [good
- 93 **Stanislav** [but in general, it's good, *yeah*=
- 94 **Yevhen** =not for Ukrainians, they leave to earn money, they keep
- 95 ((overlapping speech))
- 96 **Stanislav** over there
- 97 **Yevhen** and here, they need to earn this kind of money there
- 98 **Stanislav** it's good, *yeah*
- 99 **EAP** why do Ukrainians go abroad?
- 100 **Stanislav** to earn [money
- 101 **Solja** [to earn money for us, to earn money for kids
- 102 **Stanislav** to earn money for their kids, to provide for their kids' education
- 103 **ST** for studies
- 104 **Stanislav** for studies, what else
- 105 **Valja** it's hard what they do
- 106 **Stanislav** later on, they'll come back here and live their lives
- 107 **Solja** I-, on-, they're only there to work and send money so their kids can learn, and they can already, or they can there
- 108 **Stanislav** or work for their kids' XX

**Excerpt 6.1: Gender divisions at Taras Shevchenko (cont.)**

- 109 **Solja** well, yeah, to learn XX and/or to take
- 110 **Stanislav** well, some stay
- 111 **Solja** we can't XX there
- 112 **Yevhen** this is here, though
- 113 **EAP** is it good that Ukrainians live in other countries?
- 114 **Yevhen** aahh [in general
- 115 **Stanislav** [no, no
- 116 ((overlapping speech))
- 117 **Valja** °no°
- 118 **Stanislav** no, no, it's really not good, not for the country, it's a betrayal to your country
- 119 **Yevhen** *you* don't work for the country, °and that's it°
- 120 **EAP** and why?
- 121 **Solja** what?
- 122 **Stanislav** it's no-, it's not necessary, not your own people, in that, well
- 123 **Yevhen** in the language
- 124 **Stanislav** their own native language, own native home, where they were born, they're changing it
- 125 **Solja** what XXX?
- 126 ((laughter))
- 127 **Yevhen** no, it's not that. they don't need to change their religion, culture, or, *like*, their own XX into another
- 128 ((whispering))
- 129 **EAP** What have you seen about Ukraine and Ukrainians on the TV, in films, in TV shows?
- 130 **Stanislav** ij. the broadcast of the Legends of Old L'viv
- 131 **Solja** wait, we'll say it
- 132 **Valja** I watched on television about, well, young girls there who can't leave
- 133 **Solja** they're locked up there so they can work
- 134 **Valja** because they stole their passports, and later on they can't come back
- 135 **Stanislav** first they steal them, and later they use them
- 136 **Yevhen** and sometimes they use them, like they'll be prostitutes, and they'll start to work
- 137 **Valja** it's really bad. well, because it's bad, they're treated poorly until they leave

While all four students agree that Ukrainians emigrate for economic reasons, they do not always share the same opinion over whether this is beneficial in the long run. Stanislav works to maintain his social distance from Solja, at the same time as seeks to lessen his disalignments from Yevhen. At the onset, Stanislav and Solja directly set themselves as holding opposing views on the value of out-migration and the morality of emigrants (Lines 71-74), a disalignment they maintain throughout the excerpt. Stanislav rejects Solja's positive evaluation of study abroad (Line 72). In response to Stanislav's utterances that study abroad is "stupid" (Lines 71 and 73), Solja distances herself from his view (Lines 72 and 74), and later avoids taking a position towards Stanislav and Yevhen's perspective that emigrants "trade their culture" for that of their host countries, as evidenced by her confusion in Lines 121 and 125. Though he potentially aligns with her in Lines 88-93, it is unclear Stanislav and Solja are each referring to as "good." Solja's "good" (Line 88) seems to evaluate study abroad whereas Stanislav's (Lines 89, 93, 98) seem to refer to the "goodness" of foreign wages; though Solja could have aligned more openly to Stanislav at this later point, she merely elaborates on his reason for emigration, a response he then echoes (Lines 100-102). Within this dyad, Stanislav and Solja are able to display opposing positions. Since they are not close friends, they are able to take different stances on emigration without disrupting the existing social order within their peer group.

The stance-taking between Stanislav and Yevhen requires more negotiation, however. In lines 71-83, Yevhen directly positions himself against his friend, Stanislav. Instead, he aligns with Solja and Valja (Lines 75-85), agreeing that study

abroad is more prestigious and can be more beneficial than attending college in Ukraine. Though they agree that emigrants work abroad to earn money for their families, Yevhen's evaluation of this as not being a good thing (Line 93) is justified only later, when Stanislav frames emigrants as traitors (Lines 118-119). At this point, Yevhen and Stanislav re-align to one another, echoing each other's view that emigrants betray their country by assimilating to their host country (Lines 118-127).

Stanislav and Yevhen's maneuvering of footing is more understandable given their social relationship. As best friends and boys who hold high social standing in their class, they can often voice their opinions with little threat to face, or challenge to their positions. However, the topic of emigration is one that places them in a bind in terms of their co-alignment. With no pre-established, shared view, the boys find themselves unexpectedly disaligned, which has the potential to spark a deeper conflict. Their difference may stem from their slightly different class identities. As the son of a policeman and housewife, Yevhen may see education abroad as a possibility for him; his older brother already attends a local university. Stanislav, however, frames his future as strictly tied to the local community and wants to someday own his own auto body shop, a career he sees dependent upon a technical secondary school diploma rather than a university degree. Rather than pursue their differences, however, both Stanislav and Yevhen opt to avoid full alignment, either by focusing on their disalignment with Solja and Valja, or by keeping their participation to a minimum until they are able to find common ground with which to align to each other.

When the discussion shifts to human trafficking, Yevhen and Stanislav are the ones to withhold their evaluations, giving factual statements about what happens to these girls, taking the stance of objectivity: “they steal them,” “they use them,” “they’ll be prostitutes.” In contrast, Valja becomes the one to align with the victims, evaluating these actions as “really bad.” The issue of human trafficking itself allows the girls to bring their gender to the forefront—as they are more threatened by this danger—but prevents the boys from emphasizing the maleness they share with the imagined traffickers.

The fear of human trafficking appears at other times among working class teenage girls. When Katja and Alina talk about the dangers of city life, they mention their own fear of being kidnapped and exported to a foreign country. At one point, Katja recounts a time when a man tried to convince her to get into his car. She describes how scared she was, not of being kidnapped and ransomed, but of being kidnapped and forced into prostitution. Though she was fearful at the time, Katja narrates the event as something that all young women like her must be prepared for; this kind of thing happens to girls, so they must all be aware of potential dangers that their male classmates rarely have to fear.

The Ukraines and Europes that these working class teenagers describe contrast both economically and morally. For Yevhen and Stanislav, Ukraine and Ukrainians are moral, but are easily corrupted by the advances of Europe: Ukrainians emigrate for good reasons, but they end up rejecting their homeland due to their greed for higher wages. This view suggests a traditionally moral Ukraine and a degraded Europe that

threatens it; if all of Ukraine was to become like this Europe, it would no longer be Ukraine. Solja and Valja's positions, however, seem to frame Ukraine and Europe as equal but different: Europe has better schooling and can help improve Ukraine, but it is also plays a role in the trafficking of Ukrainian women.

### ***Friction between Identities: Example 2***

Students also draw upon discourses about the Ukrainian emigrant to position themselves towards each other in primarily same-gendered interactions. Though a few boys are present, the girls are the dominant interlocutors in this next example from Ivan Franko. In contrast to Excerpt 6.1, the stance-making and stance-taking in this interaction threatens the existing social order in a much more divisive way, ending only after repeated attempts from several girls to move onto the next topic (Appendix V: Lines 117, 129-131, and 136), attempts to bring more order to the group (Appendix V: Lines 77-78 and 119), and after one girl openly interprets the lack of alignment as a “fight” (Appendix V: Line 132).

The topic of discussion results in some unusual alignments within the peer community. Though Ksenja and Sofija usually occupy different social positions and identify with contrasting friendship groups, in this case, they find themselves in a similar position but for different reasons. In opposition to Vika M, Ksenja finds the experience of living in another country as extremely valuable in terms of earning substantially more money for those struggling back in Ukraine, which also allows the emigrant or her children to get a better college education. Ksenja herself seeks to get a

professional degree at a European university (“I’d like to study abroad, but not to live there. I’d come back afterward.”), but she would also return to Ukraine, and not contribute to the country’s growing “brain drain” problem.

Sofija also favors living in a foreign country, but more due to the more comfortable lifestyle and a higher standard of living she could gain there (“I want to live in London... I want to live in an apartment too, but in London.”). While Sofija aligns to Ksenja’s positive assessment of living abroad, Ksenja attempts to create distance from Sofija’s position, and by extension maintain a stance of social distance from Sofija, by stating her desire to only live abroad long enough to get a degree.

Rather than highlighting the similarity of the girls’ positions, the rest of the group focuses on displaying their disalignment from Sofija—finding Sofija’s evaluations as evident of an identity they disapprove of—not because of her positive position towards living abroad, but on the underlying bases of that position. Vika H questions Sofija’s knowledge and experience of England, placing Sofija’s major reason to live in England (“I like it there”) as something lacking in social value. These attitudes towards Ksenja’s and Sofija’s views create a group norm against permanent settlement outside Ukraine. Though Ksenja agrees with Sofija that not everything is bad about living abroad, she places more emphasis on her desire to return to Ukraine, framing her desire to emigrate as a particular, demarcated stage in her life, not as the lifetime goal that Sofija holds. In this way, Ksenja is able to present an identity of a future moral Ukrainian emigrant, one who uses emigration for life improvements and



then returns home. Sofija, on the other hand, is framed by others as the typical immoral emigrant who trades the homeland in order to live “the good life.”

Later on in the discussion<sup>95</sup>, Vika M describes the complex position of Ukrainian emigrants through a narrative about a friend of her grandmother, who found herself in prison in Italy due to forged work documents. Up until this point, Vika M has struggled to find a comfortable position in which to stand, finally telling the narrative in an attempt to create some common ground for her views. The group listens to Vika M's story, but they have difficulty in interpreting her position, seeking out the women's motivations for emigration and the details key to her victimization.<sup>96</sup>

**Excerpt 6.2: Class divisions at Ivan Franko**

- 108 **Vika H** Unemployed, how many of our people are in this position, and how many of them are there?
- 109 **Vika M** And it's the same in Italy, my grandmother's friend went, and what do you think? They made her illegal documents, she sat in prison, yeah only, only, yeah for half a year because she had illegal documents with her there, not here, illegal ones made for her there, and- and, yeah, people have to do it
- 110 **Lana D** people might, so what of it?
- 111 **FST** where does she work
- 112 **Vika M** and what, so what? People just have to go to jail?
- 113 **Vika M** because her bosses made illegal documents for her
- 114 **FST** they make all kinds of documents
- 115 **Vika M** and how did she know they were illegal, but people have to
- 116 **FST** where do you appeal, if you're not a resident?
- 117 **Ksenja** good, Vika. give us [the next one
- 118 **FST** [and
- 119 ((open palm hit on tabletop))

<sup>95</sup> An extended version of this segment of the interaction is presented in Appendix V.

<sup>96</sup> An extended version of this excerpt appears in Appendix V.

**Excerpt 6.2: Class divisions at Ivan Franko (cont.)**

- 120 **Vika H** you have to go to some kind of embassy, to get your own documents, not have the boss there go and do them for you?
- 121 **Vika M** yeah, all visas are like that, but if she has documents [that she can look over there
- 122 **Sofija** [but she can verify them=
- 123 **Vika H** =Vika, she can verify them, someone knows Ukrainian, someone works there, and verify the documents
- 124 **Ksenja** tell me, how much does our nurse get? five, six hundred hryven, not more. a month. how much does this nurse from Ukraine probably get there on her own? I think that=
- 125 **Maryna** =°a thousand dollars°=
- 126 **FST** =((doubtful whine))=
- 127 **Ksenja** =a thousand dollars, she gets around that, peop- Vika, it's a higher standard of living, you know?
- 128 **Sofija** maybe there's worse information there, but it's an ideal the standard of living, °I- I only say°
- 129 **Vika M** good. and that's all.
- 130 **Ksenja** [give us another one=
- 131 **FST** [give us another one
- 132 **Ksenja** =because now we're fighting
- 133 **Sofija** mmm and I'm with Ksenja, against it, but they
- 134 ((laughter))
- 135 **Marta** I don't want that again
- 136 **FST** enough=

Earlier in the discussion, the group aligned themselves in terms of employment and wages (Appendix V: Lines 6-16 and 21-28), and then, in terms of family (Appendix V: Lines 57-59 and 83-90). At the point of Excerpt 6.2, however, Vika M's narrative shifts the discussion away from merely differences in wages and towards issues of immigrant labor rights (Line 116). Rather than openly disagreeing over whether or not wages in Ukraine are comparable to those abroad, and whether Ukraine has employment problems, the group is now faced with exploring the deeper ramifications

of emigration. Namely, is life in Ukraine so bad that emigration is the only solution (Lines 124-128), and can Ukrainians only work in Europe as illegal immigrants, as Vika M suggests (Lines 109 and 112-115)? The crux of the girls' opposing views lies in this question: most agree that emigration will solve many Ukrainians' economic hardships, but the group is torn over the reality that those of different socioeconomic classes may have very different emigration opportunities. Some Ukrainians are only able to emigrate if they do so illegally; others have more options available to them.

Though the girls and boys in Excerpt 6.1 manage their interaction while maintaining the existing peer group boundaries, the girls in Excerpt 6.2 find themselves crossing these boundaries in voicing their perspectives on emigration. Though Vika M and Ksenja are part of the same friendship group, their differing positions highlight a lack of consensus within the group. Vika H, a friend closer to both Ksenja and Vika M than they are to each other, is in the most precarious position. Rather than openly agreeing or disagreeing with their personal statements, Vika H instead poses questions to Vika M (Lines 120 and 123), and makes general, impersonal statements about the social conditions in Ukraine and among Ukrainian emigrants at other times in the interaction.

Socioeconomic class is also a factor in this interaction, as both Ksenja and Sofija are a part of the newly mobile middle class, having fathers who earn middle or upper middle class wages as a businessman or as part of the Ukrainian emigrant community, respectively. Vika M. and Vika H., in contrast, are part of the older intellectual class that has lived in the city center for generations. This older middle

class sees it as its duty to preserve and protect Ukrainian culture and language, as they have more time and resources to do so, unlike the poorer working classes. Marta and Maryna, who are more vocal in other parts of the interaction, are from working class families. Similar to how Ksenja finds herself in agreement with Sofija due to their common social class and despite their different positions within their cohort, Vika M. finds herself in agreement with the working class girls in her desire to remain living in Ukraine. Though Maryna and Marta see living in Ukraine as their best option, rather than to be “forced” to seek work abroad, Vika M's commitment to live in Ukraine is based on her emotional ties to the country. She might make more money, receive a better education, and live a higher standard of living in Europe, but she is willing to forgo these benefits because she “loves Ukraine.”

Furthermore, the experience of her grandmother's friend has had an impact on Vika M's position towards emigration. If someone like her grandmother could only emigrate illegally, and pay the consequences of this status, then others like her might be faced with similar problems. For Vika M, illegal migration is not only the fate of the poor or uneducated, but could happen even to educated middle class people like herself.

## **Discussion**

These teenagers' attitudes towards migration are connected to their perceptions of Ukraine, and Ukrainians, at the multiple levels. For example, their positions contrast Ukrainians who decide to emigrate and those who do not, between Ukrainian

emigrants and those living in their host countries, and between the typical life in Ukraine and in these host countries. This idea of “normality” is focused on in both Excerpt 6.2 (Lines 124-128) and in Olha's mother's view that the world is divided between the “haves” and “have-nots. The majority of the teenagers in both Excerpt 6.1 and 6.2 seem to agree with Olha's mother: western Ukrainians have found themselves on the losing side of the “have-nots” which makes it more difficult for them to become European again.

The emerging middle class, like Olha's mother and Ksenja, defines itself as struggling with the gap between their European identities and the financial realities of living in Ukraine which hinder their ability to maintain this European identity. For them, Ukraine is neither “good enough” for the people they are nor for the people they want to become: Ukrainian jobs do not have the wages, security, or prestige to support a normal European middle class lifestyle. At the local level, the emerging middle class seems to feel this sense of inadequacy more so than their working class counterparts. While those like Marta believe that “there is work in Ukraine” (Appendix V: Lines 2-12) that can adequately support a family, this working class lifestyle is no longer “good enough” for the middle class.

Ukraine is also framed in these interactions as a place that is becoming divided, where people are no longer as “equal” as they were in the past. Socioeconomic class differences are becoming more visible at the local level, threatening existing cross-class networks. Interpersonal interactions, which formerly would have united people on the basis of their shared lack of resources and the

interdependence that was required to meet their needs, are now also sites for highlighting people's increasingly different accesses to financial capital at the same time as they indirectly emphasize the waning importance of social capital in making ends meet.

The friendship groups among the girls in Excerpt 6.2 are not divided along class lines, and individuals in the new middle class can be friends with both the older intellectual class and the working class. However, when faced with an important, value-laden topic linked to class experiences and opportunities like migration, alignment along class lines becomes more apparent and potentially threatens the existing school social order. In other words, the discourse theme of emigration and the stances these young people make towards it interact with the existing social relationships. In turn, these social relationships affect the stances individuals take.

While social contacts had once been essential for navigating social life—from obtaining fresh vegetables or clothing, to helping children get into college through extensive networks of barter, exchange, and personal favors (Ledeneva 1998)—they are now less important, especially for those with the financial means to obtain and achieve these things on their own. For this relatively self-sufficient group, maintaining cross-class relations is less of a necessity than for the lower class branches of their social networks. Though newly middle class Ksenja works to maintain her relationships with her older middle class friends, Vika M and Vika H, Sofija does not always do the same for her working class friend, Maryna. This may be more due to their differing social positions within the classroom—Ksenja is part of the socially

prestigious friendship group while Sofija occupies a rebellious, fringe role—than their need to rely on these social networks outside of the school environment.

The differing views of migration reflect contrasting notions of Ukraine and Europe and, by extension, of Ukrainians and Europeans. For working class teenagers, Ukraine appears as a place of security and comfort—with well-paid jobs and familial support—in contrast to Europe which is filled with corruption, unknown dangers, and wealth gained at the expense of others. The stories they hear of emigrants support this view: lacking the financial resources to emigrate legally to work or study, members of this class often end up as part of the European underclass of illegal workers. As a result, these working class teenagers reject emigration and deem emigrants to be either immoral or helpless victims; who else would willingly choose this fate? In terms of temporality, Ukraine might be “behind” Europe, but if it is, Europe is a future that these Ukrainians do not wish to achieve. And if Ukraine and Europe are contemporaries, they reside along different temporal trajectories—in different logic worlds governed by incompatible moral systems.

The middle class, however, lives in a Ukraine that cannot live up to their expectations. Progress and development is absent, or comes too slowly for them to ever be able to live the lives they seek. Europe, then, becomes the solution to their sense of being excluded from the rest of the western world. For them, Europe is a place of opportunity: for a better education, higher wages, and the chance to live a middle class lifestyle, not by Ukrainian standards but on a global scale set by European standards. Ukraine is stuck in the past and remains there because of some

Ukrainians' resistance, such as that of the older generations and poor classes, against the European “normality” that the middle class has earned. In this view, Europe is both the present and the future: it represents where the middle class believes it should be and where it hopes the rest of Ukraine will be eventually.

There is friction between these multiple Ukraines and Europes, however, as people do not hold merely identities of socioeconomic class. The tensions that Solja and Vika M face are grounded in the disjuncture between their class and gender identities, as well as in the possibilities and expectations they hold for their futures. Both girls recognize and understand their peers' positions on emigration, but their personal experiences with migrants—the American student Solja's family hosted and their relatives in France, and Vika M's grandmother's friend in Italy—provide them with alternative perspectives and potential outcomes of emigration. These teenagers' stance-making and stance-taking reveal the different Ukraines and Europes within which these young people live.

## **Conclusion**

In their stance-taking, young people draw upon public discourses to position themselves both towards the content of these discourses, and to align themselves towards other participants. When discourses are situated within different logic worlds, however, stance-taking can become a complex process of multiple participants working together to manage (dis)alignments and maintain the pre-existing social order. Socioeconomic class is also an important factor in how Ukrainian teenagers



position themselves towards emigration and align themselves with their peers. Social class can affect which discourses these youth are most familiar with, as well as which outcomes of emigration they are most likely to experience in years to come.

Emigration can be viewed positively for its financial benefits and, at the same time, be the source of social problems. Emigrants appear as both the source of needed income and the source of child neglect which emphasizes the contradictions that underlie the Ukrainian value of familial obligation. The precarious ways in which these views of emigrants conflict, support, and otherwise interact with each other complicate the positions people hold and the stances they make towards others. The ways in which emigrants are perceived as retaining or rejecting their Ukrainian identity are also in contention, leading some to view emigration as the rejection of a Ukrainian identity while others see it as the potential creation of a hyphenated, dual identity.

Discussions can involve multiple, contrasting social identities which threaten participants' existing social relations. This can lead to a complex stance-taking by multiple participants as they work to alleviate these tensions. Participants, however, often inhabit multiple space-time frameworks which shape their stance. In these discussions, multiple Ukraines and Europes underlie these teenagers' stances on migration and emigrants. The working class lives in a Ukraine that is more morally upright than Europe, and evaluates emigrants in light of this. In contrast, the middle class lives in a Ukraine that has not yet caught up to the modern world, and its moral system is not always applicable to the reality of this world. Furthermore, the different

logic worlds in which these young people live can also influence their potential as future emigrants: the kinds of emigration experiences they will have, and their stances towards these experiences.

## **Chapter 7.**

### **Conclusion: Locating Who We are in Space and Time**

This dissertation has shown the complexities and intricacies of identity-making for the young people growing up in postsocialist Ukraine. Though they have experienced life only after Soviet rule, the “logic worlds” of socialism continue to affect their daily lives. The parents and teachers who nurture, guide, and educate these young people experienced socialist life first-hand. Unsurprisingly, these adults continue to utilize the ideologies and conceptual frames of language, youth, gender, and national membership to some degree in their understandings of postsocialist economic and political problems. As a result, teenagers in places like western Ukraine indirectly appropriate some of these same frameworks, though for different reasons. Their perspectives on Ukraine and its place within the global environment only partly resemble those of earlier generations.

### **Boundary-Making**

The preceding chapters have focused on how young people in western Ukrainian teenagers draw and utilize the boundaries based in space-time and language use, and how they use these boundaries in thinking through and managing their identities as young people, as members of different socioeconomic classes, and as Ukrainian speakers. Specifically, these chapters have shown how space-time associations and frameworks based on language use are used to establish, maintain,

and question the boundaries that delineate the possibilities and limitations of what these young people can do and who they can become.

In all societies, youth and adults alike are limited by the worlds in which they live. In postsocialist societies such as Ukraine, the bases of these restrictions have been drastically transformed along with the political, economic, and social changes that have occurred since the late 1980s and continue to shape the present. The social norms that older generations lived under are no longer the same as those of their children and grandchildren. But not all of these changes are thought to be necessary; many, including the youngest generation who never lived in socialist Ukraine, continue to be nostalgic for this previous existence.

While young people strive to define who they are and who they wish to become, they are also navigating through multiple chronotopes that link space and time, each with its own sets of norms and expectations: an imagined pre-socialist Ukraine in which language is directly linked to ethnic and cultural identity, a socialist Ukraine where the state promotes social equality across classes (even if more in name than in practice), and a postsocialist Ukraine where everyone seeks to become “normal” again, but no one really knows how to go about doing this without losing that which makes them Ukrainian. As young people navigate through and between these various Ukraines, they do so under the gaze of a European Other and a Russian Other, against whose norms they evaluate themselves and other people. This complex milieu influences and shapes the issues discussed in the previous chapters.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I presented the recent history of Ukraine and its historical,

political, and cultural relations with Europe and Russia in order to show how Ukraine's past relations with Russia and Europe influence current understandings of Ukrainian identity and the role of Ukraine more globally. Though these relations stem back centuries, I emphasized the events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century because this is the time in which the Ukrainian language was standardized, and most strongly become a symbol of nationalism and anti-Soviet sentiment in western regions of Ukraine. While much of this part of the country had been a part of earlier European polities, under the Soviets, this past was overlooked and forgotten in the wider global picture of the region. I extended the view of a multi-perspective history in framing the city of L'viv and the school sites in order to show how teenagers in L'viv learn of multiple forms of local identity. L'viv was once the "capital" of Ukrainian nationalism, but for much longer than that than it was a multicultural, administrative, and educational urban center.

I also discussed the tensions between multiple generations of urban L'vivians and rural newcomers, who migrated to the city post-World War II. The first generation of postsocialism may be urban-born, but they are still influenced by earlier generations' interactions between, and attitudes towards, rural and urban lives. Middle class teenagers, whose families have lived in the city for multiple generations, define their urban lives against the rural spaces they views as impoverished and "stuck in the past." Their working class peers, however, continue to hold onto aspects of their rural heritages, finding them as contemporary as urban spaces. In order to come to terms with the financial difficulties their families continue to face in the city, these teenagers link their identities to the morally superior village hospitality and traditional values

they find lacking in the urban environment in which they live.

I suggested that a chronotopic lens of analysis was useful in understanding boundary-making in terms of socialism and postsocialism, socioeconomic difference (Chapters 3 and 6), rural and urban identities (Chapter 4), and in terms of gender and emigration (Chapter 6). I argued that social positioning influences the stances that young people take and, the stances they take have an effect on their social positions open to them. Through the examples I presented in Chapter 6, I showed how social class is the basis for teenagers' different views on Ukrainian emigration, and how class limits teenagers' future emigration experiences in different ways. I proposed that the different worlds in which the working and middle class lives become more apparent through the use of a chronotopic lens.

Not all boundary-making, however, arises through space-time associations. In Chapter 5, I showed how lines are also drawn on the basis of language: how it is used, and, more importantly, how it is perceived by others. Though national and local ideologies encourage multilingualism in standard Ukrainian and Russian, to some degree, the experiences young people have—as students, as members of their respective socioeconomic classes, and as consumers of global popular media—influence how they come to define Ukrainian speakers, identify themselves as speakers of Ukrainian, and see other languages as a viable resource for their future life trajectories.

## **Implications and Further Research**

This research suggests two important areas for further study. First, the issues raised in here show a need to examine how young people actually use language in territorially and temporally unbounded spaces, such as in virtual realms and through global forms of communication, or even in local spaces. Secondly, debates over competing ideologies about language and national belonging highlight how global migration upsets notions of achieved citizenship, such as residency or linguistic competence, and those based on ascribed characteristics of ancestry and birthplace.

Future research is needed on the components of style used by young people, not just within English-speaking communities—the majority of research on style has been conducted in the UK, the US, and Canada, albeit within both monolingual and bilingual communities of practice—but also within other societies that are linked to these regions through global youth practices, such as the hip hop and online gaming communities, or through other consumptive practices of global youth culture.

In addition, as I suggested in Chapters 4 and 5, the slang and other nonstandard forms of speech of youth living in places such as Ukraine—where Russian formerly dominated and repressed Ukrainian, and remains a powerful language within the country—has been under studied in this region of the world. I examine only teenagers' attitudes towards different uses of language in this dissertation, but I hope to analyze their actual speech practices in the near future. Research on youth speech has primarily focused on monolingual English speakers, or bilingual speakers in Spanish-speaking Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula. An investigation is

needed, however, of youth speech in other places where colonial relations between the dominant and minority languages persist or have only recently been severed, such as in Taiwan, India, Ukraine, and the other former Soviet republics. Additional research on these types of language contact can lead to better understandings of multilingual practices and language politics and a global level.

An investigation of youth linguistic practices which go beyond face-to-face interactions, and which occur beyond the boundaries of a particular location and at multiple timescales, opens up new avenues for examining language and identity. Do young people in different countries share a common “global” youth identity? To what extent do global forms of communication—such as Skype, YouTube, and social networking websites—help facilitate the construction and expression of youth identities? To what extent does the form of communication shape language use? How might conventions that favor particular languages and writing systems affect young people's ideas about and uses of their native languages? How might conventions for the virtual world be adopted or transformed by events in the physical world?

This dissertation also leads to new avenues in the study of migration and its effects on citizenship and national belonging. Recent scholars of Ukraine have focused on the need to move away from ethnonationalism and towards the acknowledgment of the religious, cultural, ethnic diversity in Ukraine's past, as well as its growing diversity in the future. Just like many other countries, Ukraine is faced with a new influx of immigrants from Africa and Southeast Asia, both unskilled and undocumented laborers and those seeking a university education, whose ultimate



destination is Europe. In addition, many Ukrainians are emigrating in the hopes of a better life elsewhere. A rapid change in demographics has resulted from the movements of non-Ukrainian immigrants and Ukrainian emigrants, and raises many important questions. To what extent are existing requirements for citizenship still relevant?

As I suggested in Chapter 6, those who continue to live in the home country may question whether their co-nationals living elsewhere are, in fact, legitimate citizens. Conversely, immigrants often find it difficult to become full-fledged members of their host countries. For these migrants, their emigration is viewed by those at home as a rejection of their nationality and citizenship rights; at the same time, their host countries are hesitant to fold them into its society. As a result, migrants face becoming nation- and state-less in the eyes of others, losing rights in their home countries without regaining them in their host countries.

The migrants who find their home and host countries to be more accepting of their mobility can be seen as testing the bases and boundaries of the nation-state. To what extent do politically active emigrants foster or hinder change in their home countries? How are they viewed by their co-nationals who reside there? How might the incorporation of migrants be beneficial to both their host and home countries? To what extent might these migrants help solve host countries' problems of labor shortage and an aging population, at the same time as they solve home countries' economic crises and global political standing? How might these same migrants be able to

mitigate host and home countries' growing fears of religious, racial, and cultural diversity?

These are just some sites for further research that would be illuminated if examined through a chronotopic lens. For many people living in postsocialist countries like Ukraine, chronotopic lenses of socialism and postsocialism shape how they view the world in which they live. For the first generation of postsocialism, however, these chronotopic lenses are focused differently from that of previous generations, shedding light on their alternative understandings of the past, attitudes towards the present, and aspirations for the future.

### **Chronotopes of Identity**

In this dissertation, I have worked to show how varying notions of local, national, and global “Ukraine” are evident within conflicts over language use, migration, gender and generational identities, and identities of place and class, as well as within the interpersonal interactions in which these conflicts are exposed. The competing perspectives on language and social identity highlight the growing economic disparities that were unheard of, or were at least less visible, during previous eras. In other words, both generational and socioeconomic class differences lead to different interpretations of the relations between socialism and postsocialism, between Ukraine and its European and Russian neighbors, and between the people who identify with these places.

For many teenagers in western Ukraine, language comes to represent particular rural and urban perspectives towards the development of Ukraine and its relations with

Europe. Although a rural pastoral continues to take a central place in images of the Ukrainian nation, growing economic differences have transformed urbanites' relations to rural spaces. Working class teenagers, whose families depend on maintaining their ties to familial villages, continue to value village life and undeveloped rural spaces. For them, these spaces are sites of pristine nature, of freedom from the troubles and constraints of urban living, and of important community values. The middle class similarly validates the village as “the birthplace” of the Ukrainian nation. However, these same rural spaces are irrelevant to modern, urban Ukraine. While a rural perspective is embraced by the working class, the rising middle class sees it as a hindrance to a future “European” Ukraine.

The debate over whether Ukraine is and should be a monolingual (Ukrainian-speaking only) or a bilingual state (speaking both Ukrainian and Russian), is also not so much about language as it is about what language represents. For the middle-class teenagers in L'viv, speaking Ukrainian is the result of having a standardized education. As a result, every citizen of Ukraine, irrelevant of ethnicity, should eventually learn to speak Ukrainian if the educational system functions in the same way as those in Europe. Their focus on mastering a linguistic standard is not so much based on the pre-socialist view—that ethnic Ukrainians are obligated to speak the language if the nation is to survive—that their working class peers orient towards, as it is on the fear of the future political and economic domination that might come with the widespread use of Russian, which these teenagers claim will happen if Russian gains the status as a second official language.

Finally, conflicts over teenagers' identities can only partially be explained in terms of adolescent rebellion or the seeming “degradation” of social values. Adult perspectives of young people, drawn from their understandings of socialist norms and the transformations of postsocialist Ukraine, inadequately describe these teenagers' experiences as part of local, national, and global youth communities. Unlike older generations, these young people work to balance local expectations of language use at the same time as they seek to identify with national and global identities as Ukrainian teenagers and urban youth. In addition, though socioeconomic class differences threaten their existing social relations, the students work to mitigate tension across class lines within their friendship groups, mostly rejecting socioeconomic class identities when these identities threaten their existing social order.

I do not claim that people are aware of their uses of space/time frameworks of socialist life or life beyond postsocialism. However, it seems as if the chronotopes of socialism that older generations demarcate from other space/time frameworks, have become folded into the youngest generation's perspective, their temporal elements becoming erased. Rather than directly indexing chronotopes of socialism, the youngest generation instead uses symbols of the socialist period to indirectly index these chronotopes. Their use of an English word no longer represents an anti-Russian or anti-Soviet attitude, but rather one's inclusion, or future inclusion, in a multi-sited (though Euro-centric) global marketplace. I suggest then, that these frameworks are present within and have a significant effect on the attitudes people hold about these issues. The embedded nature of space/time frameworks, irrelevant of a person's

awareness or intent, makes them that much more significant. A chronotopic lens can reveal how some conflicts are not primarily based in the particular opinions participants hold but, rather, stem from participants' differing understandings of the values underlying these conflicts.

## Appendix I: Language at Ivan Franko (Sept 2007)

- |   |               |   |  |
|---|---------------|---|--|
| 1 | <b>EAP</b>    | Na vashu dumku, jakby ljudyna khotila zdobuty uspikhu v Ukraini, jii treba rozmovljaty jakuju movoju?   | in your opinion if a person wanted to be successful in Ukraine, what language would she have to speak?   |
| 2 | <b>Ksenja</b> | jaksho vona khoche dosjahnuty uspikhu v Ukraini, nu, napryklad, tuta na zakhodi u L'vovi, jaksho vona khoche dosjahnuty uspikhu to jii treba rozmovljaty po-ukrajins'ky, napryklad, jaksho vona pojide v Kyjiv jii treba znaty ukrajins'ku i rosiis'ku, tomu shcho v Kyjevi polovyna ljudej rozmovljajut' vse-taky na rosijs'kij, i tomu tam treba znaty i ukrajins'ku i rosiis'ku, tomu sho rizni ljudy i po-risnomu rozmovljajut', i je vazhali jaki ne rozumijut' ukrajins'koji ot i tomu treba znaty dvi movy | If she wants to be successful in Ukraine, well, for example, here in the west, in L'viv, if she wants to be successful, then she needs to speak Ukrainian, for example, if she goes to Kyiv, she needs to know Ukrainian and Russian because in Kyiv half of the people nevertheless speak Russian and that's why you need to know it, both Ukrainian and Russian because different people speak differently, and in general there are some that don't understand Ukrainian, and that's why you need to know two languages |
| 3 | <b>Maryna</b> | ta bil'sha polovyna skhidnoji Ukrainy ne rozymije ukrajins'koji, ne rozymije  | and more than half in eastern Ukraine don't understand Ukrainian, they don't understand it   |
| 4 | <b>Ksenja</b> | ta, napryklad, v Krymu tam ljudy maizhe ne rozumijut' ukrajins'koji movy  | and, for example, there in Krimea, people pretty much don't understand Ukrainian   |
| 5 |               | ((boy excuses himself and slams the door as he's leaving))  |  |
| 6 | <b>Vika H</b> | by:znez   | bu:siness  |
| 7 |               | ((laughter))  |  |
| 8 | <b>EAP</b>    | nu, i je v vas taki, jaksho by ukrajinet's' khotiv dosjahnuty uspikhu v inshij krajini, jomu treba rozmovljaty jakuju movoju?   | well, and is there, do you have such, if a Ukrainian wanted to be successful in other countries, what language would he need to speak?   |
| 9 | <b>Ksenja</b> | Anhlijs'koju  | English  |

- 10 **EAP** Chomu? Why?
- 11 **Maryna** Tomu sh[o anhlijs'ka becau[se English
- 12 **Ksenja** [anhlijs'ka—tse [English is an international  
mizhnarodna mova= language=
- 13 **Maryna** =nu, ta= =well, yeah=
- 14 **Ksenja** =i =and they  
anhlijs'ku znajut' vchat' u vsikh know and learn English in every  
krajnakh ta country
- 15 **Maryna** abo ispans'ku or Spanish
- 16 **Vika H** inshe nimets'ku= or German=
- 17 **Maryna** =ja by [ispans'ku =I would [study  
vyvchyla Spanish
- 18 **Vika H** [Teper hovorjat' sho nimets'ku [now they  
bil'she, tomu sho teper say that German is more  
Jevrosojuz widespread because now it's the  
European Union
- 19 ((loud crash))
- 20 **Vika H** i Nimechchyna, jakby holovuje v and if Germany leads in the  
Jevropejs'komu, to jiji jakby jiji European Union, then its  
movu treba vchyty, tomu sho language would be the one to  
bil'sh-mensh jiji vzhvajut' u learn because more or less they  
vsikh jevropejs'kykh krajnakh use it in every European country
- 21 **Ksenja** ta, to take nimets'ka, anhlijs'ka yeah, like German, English
- 22 **Maryna** ale anhlijs'ka naiposhyrenisha but English is the widest spoken  
mova language
- 23 **Darija** jasno, sho bo anhlijs'ka clearly, that's because English is  
vvazhajet'sja mizhnarodnoju used as an international language  
movoju
- 24 **Ksenja** anhliis'ka i nimets'ka English and German
- 25 ((overlapping speech))
- 26 **EAP** nu, vy spodobaly, nu, vy ljublyte well, does it please you, well, do  
shcho ne vsi ukrajintsi hovoryty you like that not all Ukrainians  
po-ukrajins'ky? speak Ukrainian?
- 27 **MST** sho? what?

- 28 **EAP** Vy ljublyte shcho ne vsi ukrainjntsi hovoryty po-ukrajins'ky? Do you like that not all Ukrainians speak Ukrainian?
- 29 **Vika H** nje, nam ne podobajet'sja to sho dekhto hovoryt'= no, we don't like that some speak=
- 30 **Ksenja** =nam tse ne podobajet'sja, ale my z tsym zmyrylysja znevazhaty ljudynu, cherez te sho vona hovoryt' v Ukraini rosijns'koju movoju, tse ne du:zhe harno, i tomu my z tym zmyrylysja, ale bil'she vse-taky ljubym koly v Ukraini hovorjat' po-ukrajins'ky, nam tse bil'she podobajet'sja =we don't like it, but we're resigned to despise a person for this, after she speaks Russian in Ukraine, it's not ve:ry pretty, and that's why we're resigned to it, but still, more people speak Ukrainian when they're in Ukraine, we like that more
- 31 **Darija** Ukrajina *forever* Ukraine *forever*
- 32 **Ksenja** tak, *the best, of the best* yeah, *the best, of the best*
- 33 **EAP** Vy dumaty, nu, bude shchos' zminytysja, nu, a majbutni? Do you think, well, something will change, well, in the future?
- 34 **Vika M** jak zminyt'sja? change how?
- 35 **Vika H** Teper vzhe molod' bil'she zavzhdy starajet'sja hovoryty po-ukrajins'ky Already young people now always try to speak more in Ukrainian
- 36 **Ksenja** Ukrajins'ka mova bil'sh, nu, v Ukraini, ukrajins'ka mova staje modnoju Ukrainian is more, well, in Ukraine, Ukrainian is becoming fashionable
- 37 **Vika H** I she, koly ot jidesh za kordon, to bude tam rosijns'koju movoju, ne povazhajut'. Vony pohano stavljat'sja do ljudej and what else, when you go abroad Russian will be there, they don't respect. They treat people badly
- 38 **FST** rosijany Russians
- 39 **Vika H** iaki pryjkhaly z Rosiji, cherez to sho otaki ljudy duzhe nahli v smysli, ts'oho slova, nu, vony sebe duzhe ne harno povodjat' a ukrajintsiv tam povazhajut' sho v Yehypti sho Turkey those who come from Russia, though some people are really nice and friendly, in a word, well, they don't behave very well among themselves, but they respect Ukrainians there in Egypt, Turkey
- 40 **Ksenja** tak, tam je= yeah, there there is=



- 41 **Vika H** =tam je skovav =there is  
restraint
- 42 **Ksenja** ta ot Yehypet, Turtsija, ta tam and in Egypt, in Turkey, they  
duzhe ljubljat' ukrajins'ku movu, really like Ukrainian there, well,  
nu, vot, z kym ja spilkuvalasja ja those I spoke with when I visited  
jizdyla v Yehypet, to vony vsi Egypt, they all want to learn  
khochut' vyvchyty ukrajins'ku Ukrainian, a lot of people there  
movu, dozhe bahato ljudej tam know some words, they can say  
dejaki slova, znajut', mozhut' i something  
skazaty shos'
- 43 **Maryna** °tam bil'she° °there's more there°
- 44 **Ksenja** ta same proste, vony znajut' and it's just the same, they know  
it
- 45 **EAP** i shcho vy dumajete pro, ja and what do you think about, I  
znaju kudy v Krym ranishe, nu, know where, earlier in Krimea  
moxhlyvo misjats' tomu, molodi well, maybe a month ago, young  
khloptsi, jaki khoche po-rosijs'ky men who want Russian
- 46 **Vika M** pro Krym? about Krimea?
- 47 **Ksenja** sho my dumajemo? what do we think?
- 48 **EAP** Так, так yeah, yeah
- 49 **Vika M** Vony majut' zminytysja, meni They want to change it, it seems  
zdajet'sja, tomu sho teper navit' to me, because now, they are  
prestyzhnishi zaklady dlja more prestigious institutions, for  
osvity, dlja navchannja, je na college, for an education, there  
ukrajins'ki movi, i tam jak, ty are those in Ukrainian and, like,  
hovorysh po-rosiis'ky z if you speak Russian there with  
vchytalem, napryklad, z teachers, for example, with  
ukrajins'koji movy, z Ukrainian language, with  
ukrajins'koji literatury, to ty Ukrainian literature, you won't  
dobrykh otsinok ne budesh maty, get a good grade then because  
bo ty majesh spilkuvatysja na you have to have interactions in  
urokakh, na ekzamenakh, til'ky class, on tests, only in Ukrainian  
ukrajins'koju movoju
- 50 **Ksenja** ta, tam, vazhali, vsi tak and, actually, everyone speaks  
rozmovljajut' i, v pryntsyphi, tse like that there, and it's the choice  
vybir kozhnoji ljudyny, of every person, really, we don't  
osudzhuvaty jikh my ne majem have the right to condemn them  
prava, tomu sho tse jikhni vybir because it's their choice

- 51 **Darija** ale v Odesi, napryklad, tam starshi, 70 navit' protsentiv rozmovljajut' po-ukrajins'ky, prosto ti sho tam za rosijs'ku, vonu ne khochut' vyvchaty ukrajins'ku, vonu rozmovljajut' po-rosiis'ky but in Odesa, for example, there are older people, even 70% speak Ukrainian, Russian is only there, they don't want to learn Ukrainian, they speak Russian
- 52 **Vika H** a vazhali, to navit', a vazhali rosiis'koju movoju vzhe, perevazhno, rozmovljajut' bil'sh starshe pokolinnja but really, even, Russian is actually already, for the most part, the older generation speaks it more
- 53 **Ksenja** ta yeah
- 54 **Darija** v Krymu, tomu sho in Krimea because
- 55 **Vika H** nu, ta well, yeah
- 56 **Ksenja** tomu sho, zaraz, v shkolakh, vchat', v usikh sholakh Ukrajinu vchat' ukrajins'ku movu, i tomu molod' suchasna zna:je ukrajins'ku movu, ale tak jak Kyjiv, rozmovljajut' rosijs'koju tomu vony rozmovljajut' rosijs'koju, i z tym nicho ne zpobysh, tse vse ide vid sim'ji, vid bat'kiv, vid tam babusi, didusja, a ne:: vid otochennja because now in schools, they teach, in all Ukrainian schools they teach Ukrainian, and that's why modern youth know Ukrainian, but like those in Kyiv they speak Russian because they speak Russian, and you can't do anything about that, everything comes from the family, from the parents, from the grandmothers, grandfathers there, and not from the environment
- 57 **EAP** I shcho vy dumajete pro, nu, ja znaju je reklama Yanukovyh, Yanukovyh, vin khotiv rosijs'ki ljudy zrobyty derzhavnu and what do you think about, well, I know there is a commercial Yanukovich, Yanukovich, he wanted Russian people to make the state
- 58 **MST** ja vam skazhu I'll tell you
- 59 **Vika H** a but
- 60 **Ksenja** nje, tse vazhali no, really, it's
- 61 **Vika H** my proty we're against it
- 62 **Darija** jaksho hovoryty pro zakhid, to zakhid katehorychno z tsym, ne pohodzhujet'sja, katehorychno, a bil'shist' tam na skhodi= If you speak about the west, then as a whole the west doesn't support it, but the majority there in the east=

- 63 **Ksenja** =ta= =yeah=
- 64 **Darija** =[khochut' druhu rosij's'ku movu katehorychno] = [they want Russian as the second language, as a whole]
- 65 **Ksenja** =[u L'vovi z tsym katehorychno ne pohodzhujut'sja=] =[as a whole they don't support it in Lviv=]
- 66 **Darija** =i navit' taki =and  
pytannja, jaksho by tam Yanukovyč by vybraly vin stav ministrom prem'jerom on this question, if he were, if Yanukovyč was elected, if he became Prime Minister
- 67 **Sofija** ta, Viku yeah, Vika
- 68 **Darija** to kazav nash mer mista, sho vin vse odno ukrajins'ku movu, u L'vovi ne zaboronyt' v nas, u vsikh shkolakh budut' vchytysja til'ky po-ukrajins'komu, rosij's'koji movy v nas ne bude our mayor said that's it, the one Ukrainian language, for us in L'viv it's intolerable, in all schools they will only teach in Ukrainian, we will not have Russian
- 69 ((overlapping speech))
- 70 **Darija** jaksho Rosija pryime druhu derzhavnu movu ukrajins'ku, to todi proshu, dushe haj v nas pryumajut' [druhu rosij's'ku] if Russia is adopted as the second state language in Ukraine, then, please, really, let ours be adopted as [the second one in Russia]
- 71 **Vika H** [ta, ale tse prosto [je] [yeah, but it's just that [there's
- 72 **Vika M** [ale [but only til'ky pislja toho, jak vonu pryimut' druhu derzhavnu movu] after that, like, they can become the second state language
- 73 **Maryna** navit' jaksho by vonu z povahoju stavylsja, po-pershe, do nashoji movy, tomu sho even if they had regarded our language with respect from the beginning because
- 74 **Vika M** choho tse v Ukrajinu majut' hovoryty rosij's'koju movoju? why do they have to speak Russian in Ukraine?
- 75 **Vika H** ta yeah
- 76 **Vika M** navit' jaksho vonu zaprovadjat' druhu derzhavnu ukrajins'ku, vse odno, my ne musymo povtorjaty za nymy even if they instituted Ukrainian as the second state language, it doesn't make a difference, we don't have to split it with them
- 77 **FST** ta yeah

- 78 **Vika H** jaksho kozhna chastyna  
Ukrajiny maje pryimaty movu  
susidn'oji derzhavy, jaksho todi  
prymaje, nu, bere sobi druhu  
natsional'nu rosijs'ku, to my sho  
majem sobi, sho v nas maje she  
pol'ska zaprovadzhuvatys', bo  
my blyzhche do Pol'shchi
- If every part of Ukraine has to  
adopt the language of its  
neighbors as an official language,  
if it takes them then, well, takes  
Russian as a second official one,  
then we have to have others, we'd  
have to institute Polish because  
we're closer to Poland
- 79 **Sofija** ta
- yeah
- 80 **Lada D** Bilorus'ka
- Belorussian
- 81 **Vika H** ta
- yeah
- 82 **Ksenja** Koroche, kazhuchy my proty  
ts'oho [shob
- Koroche, while I'm saying we're  
against this [that would
- 83 **Vika H** [tomu sho derzhava, tse je  
derzhava odna, i jakos' ne mozhe  
buty v nij dvi movy
- [because the state,  
this is one state and all, you can't  
have it in two languages
- 84 **Ksenja** ta..tomu sho Ukrajina bez  
ukrajins'koji movy, ne je
- yeah..because it wouldn't be  
Ukraine without the Ukrainian  
language
- 85 **EAP** jaksho rosijs'ki a staly druhi, sho  
stalosja b?
- If Russian was made the second,  
what would happen?
- 86 **Vika M** sho, sho?
- what?
- 87 **Ksenja** jaksho b rosijs'ka bula druha  
mova
- If Russian was the second  
language
- 88 **Vika M** nu, ne znaju, vonu neju, b ne  
rozmovljalu
- well, I don't know, they wouldn't  
speak it
- 89 **Vika H** a jakby v nas bula rosijs'ka mova
- and if we had Russian
- 90 **Ksenja** nu, todi vsi zakhidna Ukrajina  
zalyshylsja b na ukrajins'kij  
movi, a vsi reshty, vsja reshta  
Ukrajina
- well, then all of western Ukraine  
would remain in Ukrainian, but  
all the rest, all the rest of Ukraine
- 91 **Maryna** i pivnich, i tsentr
- and the north, and the center
- 92 **Ksenja** nu, ta
- well, yeah
- 93 **Vika H** a pivnich, i skhid, tse  
rosijs'komovni oblasti
- but the north and the east, those  
are Russian-speaking oblasts
- 94 **Vika M** ta
- yeah

- 95 **Ksenja** Meni zdajet'sja, sho Ukrajina  
todi b rozdilylasja na dvi  
chastyny, na ukrajins'komovnu i  
na rosijs'komovnu It seems to me that, then, Ukraine  
would be divided into two parts,  
a Ukrainian-speaking one and a  
Russian-speaking one
- 96 **Maryna** ...Vin duzhe, v svojikh  
reklamakh, hovoryt' sho khoche  
ob'jednaty Ukrajinu, bo vona  
podilena na zakhidnu j skhidnu,a  
potim, khoche pryjednaty Rosiju ...in his commercials he says that  
he really wants to unite Ukraine  
because it's divided into the  
western and the eastern, but later  
he wants to join Russian
- 97 ((overlapping speech))
- 98 **Maryna** Ale, tak samo, sho vin khoche  
zrobyty Rosijs'ku druhoju  
derzhavnoju movoju, vin nas  
tym rozdiljaje navpaky, tomu  
sho skhidna ((ne zrozumilo)) But, similarly, what he wants is  
to make Russian the second state  
language, he'll divide us in half  
because the eastern ((unclear  
speech))

## Appendix II: “Cool” speech at Ivan Franko (Sept 2007)

1	<b>EAP</b>	U mene je pytannja pro tsej <i>kruti slova</i> , nu, de vy vchyly, nu, zvidky vy znajete?	I have a question about <i>cool</i> words, well, where do you learn them, well, where do you know them from?
2	<b>ST</b>	Shcho taki slova=	What kinds of words=
3	<b>ST</b>	=z shkoly, z vulytsi=	=from school, from the street=
4	<b>ST</b>	=sami pryдумaly	=we thought up on our own
5	<b>EAP</b>	Nu, jak tsej sliv, nu narodylysja	Well, how did these words, well, get made
6	<b>Ksenja</b>	Nu, ne znaju, khtos' ot tak prydumuje jakes' tam slovo jakes' take <i>prykol'ne</i> i [vsi za nym povtorjujut'	Well, I don't know, someone thought it up some kind, some kinds of words that are <i>cool</i> and [everyone uses them
7	<b>STs</b>	(((unclear speech)))	(((unclear speech)))
8	<b>EAP</b>	Nu, a z kym vy rozmovljajete?	Well, and who do you speak it with?
9	<b>Ksenja</b>	z druzjamy=	with friends=
10	<b>FST</b>	=odnoklasnykamy	=with classmates
11	<b>Ksenja</b>	odnoklasnykamy, tobto, tse do [vchyteliv, do	with classmates, that is, to [teachers it's
12	<b>Marta</b>	[starshykh ljudej=	[older people=
13	<b>Ksenja</b>	=ne mozhna	=you can't
14	<b>Lana D</b>	til'ky do odnolitkiv	only to your peers
15	<b>Ksenja</b>	nu, do druziv	well, to friends
16	<b>EAP</b>	nu, ie chas koly vy korystujetesja cherez bat'kiv?	well, are there times when you use them around parents?
17	<b>Ksenja</b>	nje=	no=
18	<b>FST</b>	=nje	=no
19	<b>FST</b>	=nje::=	=no::=
20	<b>FST</b>	=nema	=there aren't any

21	<b>Ksenja</b>	=ni takoho nema	=no, there aren't any
22	<b>EAP</b>	Chomu?	why?
23	<b>Ksenja</b>	dejaki- dejaki slova, tak, ale	some- some words, yeah, but
24	<b>Darija</b>	tam <i>prikol'no</i>	<i>cool</i> ones there
25	<b>Ksenja</b>	slenhy mozna vzhlyvaty i pry bat'kakh ale taki normal'ni slenhy [a	you can use slang around parents but the kind of normal slang, [but
26	<b>MST</b>	(((unclear speech)))=	(((unclear speech)))=
27	<b>Ksenja</b>	=ot tak <i>matjuky</i> , pohani slova, ne vzhlyvajut' pry bat'kakh	=yeah, like <i>vulgarisms</i> , bad words, we can't use them around parents
28	<b>EAP</b>	Vy znajete, jaksho b tse sliv po-ukrajins'ky, chy blyzhchij jak dialekt ukrajins'kyj jak v sely, znajesh? nu, napryklad, ja znaju je slova jaki z inshi movy?	Do you know if these words are in Ukrainian, or closer to Ukrainian dialect like in villages, do you know, well, for example I know there are words from other languages?
29	<b>ST</b>	zdajet'sja, je	it seems like there are
30	<b>Ksenja</b>	v pryntsyypi, tsi vsi slenhy bil'she rosijs'ka mova a nizh ukrajins'ka	in general, all this slang is more Russian, and not Ukrainian
31	<b>Maryna</b>	rosijs'ka, ta	Russian, yeah
32	<b>Ksenja</b>	nu, i anhlijs'ka, rosijs'ka, anhlijs'ka mova, ot ukrajins'kykh takykh sle[nhiv	well, and in English, in Russian, in the English language, some kinds of Ukrainian sla[ng
33	<b>Vika M</b>	[slenhiv nemaje=	[there's no slang=
34	<b>Ksenja</b>	=nemaje ((говорить неупевнено)) tobtu, tse bil'she rosijs'ka mova, tomu shcho ljudyna	=there isn't any ((constant talking in background)), that is, it's more in Russian because a person
35	<b>Vika M</b>	тому sho v ukrajins'kij movi vony ne zvuchat'	because they don't resonate in Ukrainian
36	<b>Ksenja</b>	ta, vony ne vzhlyvajut'sja i ne zvuchat' po-ukrajins'ky	yeah, they aren't used and don't resonate in Ukrainian
37	<b>MST</b>	tak	yeah
38	<b>EAP</b>	a chomu?	but why?

- 39 **Vika M** tomu sho hovoryty ti slova= because to say these words=
- 40 **Ksenja** =po- =in Ukrainian you  
ukrajins'ky ne mozhna... can't...they don't make sense=  
nezrozumilo=
- 41 **Vika M** =ale po-rosijs'ke =but in Russian you  
mozhna can
- 42 **EAP** a chomu? but why?
- 43 **Vika M** tomu sho jak pereklasty na because, like to translate them  
ukrajins'ku movu, vony vsi into Ukrainian, they all have  
oznachajut' jakyjs' predmet some kind of meaning
- 44 ((overlapping speech, listing off examples of slang words))
- 45 **Darija** tuta zaperechne pytannja *klasno*, here it's an objectionable *classic*  
a v nas *prykol'no* sentence, but for us it's *cool*
- 46 **MST** *super* *super*
- 47 **Darija** *super*, tak, po-nashomu to *super*, yeah, for us it's normal  
normal'no
- 48 **Ksenja** ale *klasno*, tse po-nashomu a but it's *cool* for us and *cool*,  
*kl'ovo*, tse po-rosijs'ky that's in Russian
- 49 **Maryna** nu, tak vse odno, majut' well, they're the same, really
- 50 **FST** pereklady translated
- 51 **Vika M** my ne hovorym pro ynonimy= we're not talking about  
synonyms=
- 52 **Ksenja** =ta:= =yea:h=
- 53 **Vika M** =a hovorym pro detal'nyj =but speech,  
prereklad slova about the details of translating  
words
- 54 **Darija** ta davaite, *karochje* yeah, give them, *in short*
- 55 **Maryna** *kapjets – kapets* *kapjets – kapets* (“get it”??)
- 56 **Ksenja** abo, abo *karochje – koroche* or, or *in short – in short*
- 57 **Darija** *torba – torba* *torba – torba* (“turbo”?)
- 58 **EAP** tsi zvuky rizni po-ukrajins'ky? do they sound different in  
Ukrainian?
- 59 **ST** ta yeah
- 60 **Vika M** Vono zvuchyt' po-riznomu It sounds different



- 61 **Ksenja** vono vzhyvajet'sja, jak slenhy, it's used like slang, but in Ukrainian, like the meanings, a po-ukrajins'ky jak predmety jak zvychaini predmety tam, napryklad= the meanings are like normal there, for example=
- 62 **Vika M** =°suka°= =°female dog°(("bitch"))=
- 63 **Ksenja** =°tapochky°, a =°slippers°, and po-rosijs'ky tse jak slenhy, napryklad, chy tapochky chy she shos' ot take in Russian it's like slang, for example, *slippers* or something else like it
- 64 **EAP** Tse bil'she *krutyj*, jaksho b tse po-rosijs'ky? It's more *cool* if it's in Russian?
- 65 **Ksenja** ta, tse *kruto*, jaksho tse po-rosijs'ky, jaksho po-ukrajins'ky tse, nu::, ne tak, nu. vono, nu, ne tak vono ne ne je yeah, it's *cool* if it's in Russian, if it's in Ukrainian, we:ll, it's not the same, well, it, well, it's not the same, it's not like that
- 66 **Darija** ne tak spryjmajut' they don't perceive it so
- 67 **Ksenja** chitko, ljudy ta clearly, people don't, yeah
- 68 **EAP** jaki inshi movy majut'? do they use other languages?
- 69 **Ksenja** nu, v pryntsypi, rosijs'ka tse bil'she os-osno= well, in general, it's more Russian, bas-basic=
- 70 **Vika M** =osnovna= =basically=
- 71 **Ksenja** =ta v =yeah, slenhu osnovna rosijs'ka mova, a bil'she anhlijs'ka, v pryntsypi, nu and slang in basic Russian and more English, in general, well
- 72 ((unclear speech, followed by group laughter))
- 73 **Ksenja** ta:k yeah
- 74 ((overlapping speech))
- 75 **Ksenja** je, nu, napryklad, v anhlijs'kij, tse normal'ni slova, v nas vvzhajut'sja slenhom, tak samo jak c rosijs'kij tse slenhy, a v nas tse normal'ni slova there's, well, for example in English they're normal words, they're considered to be slang for us, the same as in Russian it's slang but they're normal words for us
- 76 ((overlapping speech))

77	<b>EAP</b>	pro shcho sliv jaki vy pysaly?	which words did you write about?
78	<b>Vika M</b>	tykhi:she!	quie:ter!
79	<b>Vika H</b>	shcho take	what's that
80	<b>EAP</b>	pro shcho tsej sliv vy pysaly?	What did you write about these words?
81	<b>Ksenja</b>	tse slenhovi	they're slang
82	<b>EAP</b>	tak, tak, ale jaki slenh? prosto tse <i>kruti</i> , chy maje rizni, nu, normal'ni znachennja	yeah, yeah, but what kind of slang? just that they're <i>cool</i> or have different, well, normal meanings
83	<b>ST</b>	nje	no
84		((overlapping speech, but quieter. consulting each other on how to answer?))	
85	<b>Vika M</b>	°majut' normal'ni znachennja?°	°do they have normal meanings?°
86	<b>Ksenja</b>	((to another student)) nu, ale zh my ne vzhывajemo v literaturnyj movi, znajesh?	((to another student)) well, but we don't use literary language, you know?
87	<b>Ksenja</b>	((to the recorder)) ni, tse slenhy, <i>kruto</i> tam, ot take ale ne je tam, tobto, my ne vzhывajemo ioho pry pysanni, abo pry rozmovi z vchytelem	((to the recorder)) not, it's slang, <i>cool</i> there, but not like there, that is, we don't use it around recordings or in conversations with teachers
88	<b>Lana D</b>	ta	yeah
89	<b>EAP</b>	vy dumajete shcho ukrajins'ky treba svojikh slenhom?	do you think that Ukrainians need to have their slang?
90	<b>Vika H</b>	pry shcho, pry vchytelju?	near what, around teachers?
91	<b>EAP</b>	ni, vy khotily shob v ukrajins'ki movi maje svij slenh?	no, do you want Ukrainian to have its own slang?
92	<b>Lana M</b>	chy ukrajins'ka mova maje svij slenh?	does Ukrainian have its own slang?
93	<b>STS</b>	tak, tak	yeah, yeah
94	<b>Maryna</b>	°zvychaino maje°	°of course it has°
95	<b>Vika M</b>	du:zhe ridko	it's rea:lly rare,
96	<b>Ksenja</b>	tak, i du:zhe, jikh du:zhe malo	yeah, there are ve:ry, ve:ry few of them

- 97 **Vika H** v nas, perevazhno, ne slenhy, v nas, v pevnykh, mistsevostjakh je dialekty for us, it's predominately not slang, for us it's for sure regional, there are dialects
- 98 **Ksenja** tobto that is
- 99 **Vika H** dialekty Zakarpattja Zakarpathian dialects
- 100 **Ksenja** odni i ti sami slova, vony zvuchat' prosto po-riznomu i tomu dialekty one in the same word, they sound just different and that's dialect
- 101 **Vika H** dialekty a slenhy takykh slenhiv v ukrajins'kij, jak *karochoje*, *tipa*, v ukrajins'kij movi nema dialects but slang, like slang in Ukrainian, like, *in short*, *like*, there isn't any in Ukrainian
- 102 **Ksenja** tak, sho ukrajins'ka mova nemaje, v pryntsyphi, svojikh slenhiv yeah, Ukrainian, in general, doesn't have its own slang
- 103 **EAP** Ukrajins'kij, ja khochu hovoryty, ukrajins'kij treba svoji slenh'?= Ukrainian, I want to say, does Ukrainian need its own slang?=  
=njea= =no=
- 104 **Ksenja** =njea= =no=
- 105 **EAP** =vy dumajete? =what do you think?
- 106 **Vika H** njea, dumaju, [sho ne no, I think [it doesn't
- 107 **Ksenja** [dumaju, sho ne [I think it doesn't  
treba, ne treba, tomu sho todi need it, it's not needed because  
mova bude zabrudnena then the language would  
become polluted
- 108 **Vika H** ((unclear speech)) ((unclear speech))
- 109 **Darija** nasha mova duzhe harmonijna, Our language is really  
vona chysta harmonious, it's pure
- 110 **Ksenja** ni, real'no, ukrajins'ka mova no, in reality Ukrainian is still  
vkhodyt' v desjatku samykh one of the ten, pretty languages  
harnykh mov svitu, i jaksho of the world, and if brings in  
pryvnesty she slenhy, tse je some slang, it's there
- 111 **EAP** jak ty vid, a jak vy dumajete, nu, do you, and do you think, well,  
vsi ljudej hovoryty slenh, nu, i everyone speaks slang, well, and  
pohani rechi, ja khochu znaty bad things, I want to know what  
sho vy dumajete, nu, na moji you think, well, in my opinion  
dumky, vsikh ljudej bud-jaki everyone speaks, at some time,  
chas', hovoryty pohani slova chy bad words or slang or  
slenh chy shchos', jak vy something, what do you think,

- dumajete ukrajintsi shchob treba korystujut'sja inshi slova zrobyty tse, tomu shcho nema po-ukrajins'ke svoji slenh, svoji, rozymijete? Ukrainians need to use other words to do this because there aren't any in Ukrainian, its own slang, it's own, do you understand?
- 112 **Ksenja** ne duzhe not really
- 113 **Vika M** jak vy stavytesja do, toho sho ukrajins'ka mova bere z inshykh mov slenh chy jak if you consider besides that Ukrainian takes slang from other languages or what
- 114 **EAP** tak, tak, chy ukrajintsi v treba jaksho b nema slehn po-ukrajins'ky yeah, yeah or Ukrainians need it if there's no slang in Ukrainian
- 115 **Darija** ne treba jikh braty prosto you don't need to borrow them, only
- 116 **Ksenja** prosto tse vviyshlo v zvyчку tse vzhe zvyчка, a ne prosto neobkhidnist' to ne treba robyty prosto tak vsi zvykly only, it's already become a habit, it's a habit, but not only is it not necessary, it's just not needed to do everything you're used to
- 117 ((boy making animal sounds in background; girls laughing))
- 118 **EAP** nu, jaki ljudy, nu, vy dumajete, jaki ljudy hovorut' *naikrutishe*? Well, what kind of people, well, what kind of people do you think speak the *coolest*?
- 119 **Darija** jaki ljudy hovorjat' *naikrutishe*? what kind of people speak the *coolest*?
- 120 **Maryna** jaki ljudy, nu, napevno, my molodi what kind, well, we youth for sure
- 121 **Ksenja** tak yeah
- 122 **Vika M** navit', vony, jaksho chuty slenh, tobto, tse ne duzhe harno, v ukrajins'kij movi nema takoho brudu, vazhali, jaksho ot hovorjat' pro slenhy, to v nas nemaje vse rivno a jaksho vzhe hovoryty, to tse jak rahulizm, a ne.. even if they hear slang, that is, it's not very pretty, there aren't such dirty words in Ukrainian, in general, if they say something about slang, we don't have any equivalent, and if to speak, it's like a habit, and not..
- 123 **Ksenja** tak, tse ne dobre jaksho hovoryty mizh ljud'my v tramvaji v transporti yeah, it's not good if it's spoken between people on the streetcar, on public transportation

- 124 ((talking in background))
- 125 **Ksenja** my vykorystovujemo taki slova tam slenh to *vs'o* nashe otochennja druzi shkola ale ni v jakomu razi, ne, ne v ts'omu, ne v transporti abo we use these kinds of words there is slang in *all* our circle of friends at school, but not at any time, no, no, not anytime on public transportation or
- 126 **EAP** nu, jak ljudy mozhe hovoryty naikrashche? Well, how can people speak the best?
- 127 **Ksenja** ne znaju, ja *rakhuju* sho bez slenhu, ale I don't know, I *think*, without slang, but
- 128 **Maryna** nu, ale v ukrajins'kij movi tozhe je dejaki slova well, but in Ukrainian, there are also some words
- 129 **Ksenja** nu, davai skazhy well, go on tell us
- 130 **Maryna** *mizhpoverkhovyy trot otjah* tse je lift *mizhpoverkhovyy trot otjah* that's an elevator
- 131 ((laughter))
- 132 **Ksenja** shch-shch-shch-shcho? what?
- 133 **Maryna** ta *porokhotjah*, nje, jak skazaty? *porokhotjah-pylosos* and *porokhotjah* no, like, how do you say it? *porokhotjah-pylosos*
- 134 **Sofija** pravyl'no correct
- 135 **Ksenja** tse ne je slenh that's not slang
- 136 **Sofija** tse pravyl'na= it's correct=
- 137 **Maryna** =pravyl'na= =correct=
- 138 **Sofija** krajins'ka =Ukrainian  
mova
- 139 **FST** tykho quiet
- 140 **Vika M** naykrashche hovoryty takuju movoju jakuju tebe navchyly bez vsjakykh dialektiv it's best to speak, the kind of language that you were taught without any dialects
- 141 **Sofi** O-o-o oohh
- 142 **MST** a khto nas navchyv but who taught us
- 143 **Vika H** ty sam navchyvsja you taught yourself
- 144 **Darija** nu, pravyl'no, ty zh well, that's right

- 145 **Vika M** sered divchat, ot my v svojij hrupi, mozhemo tak hovoryty, ale pry khloptsevi, vony ot tak podyvljat'sja, jaksho my budem hovoryty among girls, in our own groups, we can talk like that, but around boys, they notice, like, if we're going to speak like that
- 146 ((overlapping speech))
- 147 **Vika M** ale jaksho pry komus' chuzhomu but if you're around some stranger
- 148 **Ksenja** tak yeah
- 149 **Vika M** khloptsi, tse ne spryjmajut' ne boys don't understand this, they don't
- 150 **Darija** divchat jak nalezhyt' how girls have to be
- 151 **ST** a divchata but girls
- 152 **Lana M** nu, ne vsi, ne *nada* well, not all, not *anything* ((“nothing” in Spanish?))
- 153 **EAP** khloptsi ne ljubljat' shos' boys don't like something
- 154 **Ksenja** ne ljubljat' koly divchata hovorjat' slenhamy abo she they don't like it when girls speak slang and all
- 155 **EAP** je khloptsi there are boys here
- 156 **Ksenja** nu, tse odnoklasnyky, odnoklasnyky well, those are classmates, classmates
- 157 **Lana D** pry nykh mozhna vse around all of them you can
- 158 **Lana M** pry nykh mozhna, ta around them you can, yeah
- 159 **Natalija** XXX chy maje khloptsi XXX or have boys
- 160 ((overlapping speech))
- 161 **EAP** nu, ljudyny treba rozumity, nu, treba rozumity inshi movy, dlja toho shob rozumity tsej sliv, nu, napryklad, jaksho vy korystujetesja *kruti* slova po-rosijs'ky treba znaty, nu, povnyj znachennja po-rosijs'ky? well, do people need to understand, well, need to understand other languages to understand these words, well, for example, if you use *cool* words in Russian, do you need to know, well, the meaning in Russian?
- 162 **Ksenja** nje, nje, nje no, no, no

- 163 **Vika H** to prosto dejaki vynjatkovi rosijs'ki slova ot, vzhali, to slenhy, prosto ot *matjujy*, a *matjuky* perevazhno ne vykorystovujut'sja It's just some are exclusively Russian words, really, they're just slang here, *vulgar speech* there, but mostly they aren't used like *vulgar speech*
- 164 **Maryna** a *matjuky* ne *kruto* but *vulgarisms* aren't *cool*
- 165 **Ksenja** ta, v ukrajins'kij movi *matjukiv* takykh nema yeah, there's no *vulgarisms* like that in Ukrainian
- 166 **Vika H** perevazhno maje rosijs'ka mova i neju hovoryty ne potribno, ti *matjuky* vony vzhe jakby zakripleni slenhy sliv vony vzhe zakripleni Mostly it's in Russian, and you don't need to speak it, these *vulgarisms* if they're already stronger slang words, they're already stronger
- 167 **Ksenja** ta v ukrajins'kij movi i maizhe vsi jikh rozumijut', nu, ukrajintsi vsi rozumijut' and in Ukrainian, maybe all understand them, well, all Ukrainians understand
- 168 **Darija** prosto pry dokumentakh, tak, jak just from documents, yeah, like
- 169 **Vika H** khtos' skazhe, nu, *karochje* someone says, well, *in short*
- 170 **Vika M** takoho ne skazhe tam v dokumentakh no one says anything like it in documents
- 171 **Ksenja** my tak rozmovljajemo perevazhno we talk like this, mostly
- 172 **Vika M** de molod', de starshi ljudy ni where there's teenagers, where older people aren't
- 173 **Maryna** vzhali, *matjuky* tse ne dobre in general, *vulgarisms* are bad
- 174 **Ksenja** ta, ta, i v nas slenhom hovoryt' til'ky, til'ky, molod' hovoryt' slenhom yeah, yeah, and we speak slang, only, only teens speak slang
- 175 **FST** tak, tak yeah, yeah
- 176 **Ksenja** starshi ljudy ne hovojat' older people don't speak it
- 177 **EAP** prosto, ja khotila znaty pro taki slenhy po-rosijs'ky, jaki ja chula, ty hovoryty, tse dialekt chy prosto it's just that I want to know about this Russian slang, the kind I've heard, you say, it's dialect or it just is

- 178 **Ksenja** ni, ni dialekt, tse prosto, to jakby nashi ukrajins'ki slova tse tak je, nu, ot pevni ukrajins'ki slova jaki majut' vymovljatysja, tak, ale v dejakykh ot, napryklad, selakh jikh vymovljajut' troshky po-inshomu, i tse nazyvajet'sja dialektom no, no it's not dialect, it just is, if it's our Ukrainian words, there are, well full Ukrainian words, those that have like an accent, but some, for example in villages they pronounce them a little bit differently and this is called a dialect
- 179 **Vika H** vot, dopustym Ukrajina velyka derzhava, i dopustym odni slova jaki vzhyvajut' na zakhodi hovorjat', tak, a na skhodi mozhut' po-inshomu hovoryty, nu, i je etnichni zemli, vsjaki jakis' tam Slovozhanschyna zakhidna Ukrajina, i tse mozhut' buty duzhe rizni slova, ale maty te same znachennja *like, we let, Ukraine's a large country, and we let one word that they use in the western regions, they speak so, and in the eastern regions they can speak differently, well, and there are ethnic lands, all kinds, there's the western Ukrainian Slovozhanschyna, and it can have really different words but have the same meanings*
- 180 **Ksenja** ot, napryklad, jak my u L'vovi hovorymo, nu, odne slovo tak, to ot v Zakarpatti abo v Karpatakh hovoajat' zovsim inakshe, te same slovo, tse dialekt for example, we in Lviv say, well, a word in one way, but in the Zakarpathia or the Carpathians they say something completely different, it's the same word, that's a dialect
- 181 **Vika H** tak yeah
- 182 **EAP** vy ne dumaty slehn chy you don't think it's slang or
- 183 **Ksenja** tse ne slenh that's not slang
- 184 **EAP** chy vy dumaty koly ljudy korystujut'sja, nu, jaki dialektni slova? what do you think when people use, well, dialect words?
- 185 **Maryna** tse:: i::t's
- 186 **Ksenja** tse zalezhyt', ne znaju, tse ne krasyyvo it depends, I don't know, it's not pretty
- 187 **Maryna** ta, tse ne otakvo, dekhoto dumaje to kruto, ale zovsim ne kruto yeah, it's not *the same*, some think it's *cool* but it's totally not *cool*
- 188 **Ksenja** tak, hovorjat' til'ky ljudy z sela yeah, only people from villages speak it



- 189 **Vika H** *shtyrnaitsi* *fourteen*
- 190 **Maryna** *pjatnaitsi* *fifteen*
- 191 **Ksenja** tak, rakhyjet'sja ne duzhe harno, yeah, it's not considered it to be,  
tak, v nas duzhe bahato ljudej, v very pretty, yeah, really, to a lot  
pryntsypi of people, actually
- 192 **Sofija** selo the village
- 193 ((laughter))
- 194 **Ksenja** v nas, duzhe bahato ljudej for us, really a lot of people  
skhyljajut'sja, do toho sho disapprove, in order for  
ukrajins'ka mova maje buty bez Ukrainian to have to be without  
dialekt, vona maje buty prosto a dialect, it has to be only  
ukrajins'ka, a ne dialektom Ukrainian, and not a dialect
- 195 **EAP** shcho vy dumaty pro, nu, what do you think about, well,  
napryklad, muzykanty jaki for example, musicians that use  
korystujut'sja dialektom? dialect?
- 196 **Ksenja** a jak VV, a vony *prykol'ni* like V.V, they're *cool*
- 197 **Vika H** ta tse dekoly navit' pryjemo koly and sometimes it's even nice  
tse prosto jakby davnja when, it's only that, if it's just  
ukrajins'ka mova old Ukrainian
- 198 **Ksenja** tak, tse davnja ukrajins'ka mova yeah, it's old Ukrainian
- 199 **EAP** chomu tse, tse why is it, is it
- 200 **Ksenja** chomu prykol'no? nu, tomu sho why is it cool? well, because in  
v budennomu zhytti, ty takoho everyday life, you don't hear  
ne pochujesh such things
- 201 **FST** tak yeah
- 202 **Ksenja** koly ty hovorysh tak z when you speak like that with  
druzjamy, to takoho ne friends, you don't hear it, you  
pochujesh, ty mozhesh can only hear it from them and  
pochujesh til'ky vid nymy °i that's all, because it's great,  
vse°, tomu sho tse klasni, though these words are in songs,  
khocha my ot tykh sliv v we don't use them, when we say  
pisnjakh, ne vzhывajemo them, maybe hear them, *like*, it's  
*nazhod*, jikh koly my hovorym not really the same  
jikh, mozhna poslukhaty ale  
hovoryty *takvo*, tse ne duzhe

### Appendix III: The Village at Taras Shevchenko (Sept 2007)

1	<b>EAP</b>	chomu vy khodyly v seli?	why do you go to the village?
2	<b>Larysa</b>	a chomu my jizymo v seli?	why do we go to the village?
3	<b>EAP</b>	tak	yeah
4	<b>Larysa</b>	nam tam duzhe podobajet'sja ta	we really like it there, yeah
5		((laughter))	
6	<b>Larysa</b>	pershe meni tam duzhe podobajet'sja, ja duzhe khotila teper, ja vzhe bil'she u L'vovi bukval'no budu	First off, I really like it there, I really wanted to go, I've been in L'viv more, literally, I'll do it
7	<b>Alina</b>	Na seli, perevazhno, svizhe povitrja, menshe jizdjat' mashyny, rizni, hazy tam, a tam v seli chyste povitrja	Mostly, in the village there's fresh air, fewer cars going around, it's different, there's gas, and in the village there's clean air
8	<b>Larysa</b>	tak	yeah
9	<b>Alina</b>	tam harno	it's pretty there
10	<b>Larysa</b>	tak	yeah
11	<b>Katja</b>	v seli	in the village
12	<b>Larysa</b>	vyjshov rano, i zrazu na vulytsi ne to sho tuta	you go out in the morning, and in the street, it's never like it is here
13	<b>Katja</b>	ja tozhe tak samo bula v seli meni bil'she podobajet'sja	Me too, I'm the same, I was in the village, I like it more
14	<b>Alina</b>	sho selo, to selo	a village is a village
15	<b>Katja</b>	tam duzhe klasno	it's really cool there
16	<b>EAP</b>	tak?	yeah?
17	<b>Katja</b>	tomu ja vyrishyla tuda jikhaty, vidpochyvaty, ja mala mozhlyvist' jikhaty na more ale ja vidmovylas'	because I decided to go there, to relax, I could have gone to the sea but I didn't want to
18	<b>EAP</b>	tak	yeah

- 19 **Katja** i skazala shcho ja khochu na druhyj rik na more, a toho roku khochu buty na seli and I said that I want to go to the sea next year, but this year I want to be in the village
- 20 **EAP** tak yeah
- 21 **Katja** tomu sho na druhyj rik v nas ekzameny, i ja vzhe ne zmozhu pojikhaty tak dobho v selo, a vzhe na more ja zmozhu pojikhaty because next year we'll have the state exams, and I won't be able to go to the village for very long, but I'll still be able to go to the sea
- 22 **EAP** sho duzhe podobajet'sja pro selo, nu, napryklad, rozkazhi what do you really like about the village, well, for example, explain
- 23 **Larysa** meni spodobalosja sho ja mozhu huljaty tsilyj den' maizhe I like that I can hang out all day long, maybe
- 24 **Alina** z samoho ranku ta vyjshov in the morning, you can go on your own
- 25 **Larysa** i do samoho vechora and be on your own until dinner
- 26 **Alina** tam druzi je, vykhovanishi, nabahato vykhovanishi ljudy, a tu[ta friends are there, more well-mannered ones, people a lot more well-mannered, but he[re
- 27 **Katja** [tak, bahato vykhovanishi ljudy= [yeah, a lot of more well-mannered people=
- 28 **Alina** =kul'turnishi =more cultured
- 29 **Katja** tam bil'she ljudy, znajete, pryvitnishi jak v kohos' bida stalasja to vony zrazu dopomozhut' there are more people, you know, friendlier ones, like if a misfortune comes to someone, every time they help out
- 30 **Alina** tut je, ale they're here, but
- 31 **Katja** malo tutu, tozhe je bahato khoroshykh ljudej, ale ne chasto znaidesh takykh jak tam, vsi v seli, kozhnoho znajut' v ljubyj chas tobi mozhut' pomohty tam po-pershe harno vidpochyvaty there are few here, there' also a lot of good people, but you don't often find those like there, everyone on the village, everyone knows that in good time, they can help you, first off it's good to relax there
- 32 **Larysa** mozhna zaharjaty maybe get a tan
- 33 **Olha** na richku khodyty go to the river

- 34 **Katja** huljaty tsilyj den', vvecheri hang out all day, hang out in the  
tozhe huljaty evening too
- 35 **Alina** dyskoteky je there are discotheques
- 36 **Katja** do 11 vechora until 11pm
- 37 **EAP** nu, a vy dumajete shcho bat'kiv well, do you think that your  
khodyty a jizdyty sami [chy parents go for the same [or do  
treba dopomohty v seli? they need to help in the village?
- 38 **Katja** [tak [yeah
- 39 **Alina** nu. treba dopomohty, tam well, they need to help, there's  
byrjaky beets
- 40 ((laughter))
- 41 **Alina** perevazhno v seli zavzhdy most of the time, they always  
znaidet'sja robota find work in the village
- 42 **Larysa** tak yeah
- 43 **Katja** ta v seli ne te sho tut siv nohy and in the village it's not like  
zader, i dyvyshsja a tam, nje, here, sowing legs zader, and you  
bat'ky ljubljat' jizdyty, can see, but not there, parents  
napryklad, moji bat'ky ljubljat' love to go, for example, my  
buty v seli parents love to be in the village
- 44 **Alina** tak yeah
- 45 **Katja** vony navit' kazhut' shcho khtily even they say that they would  
zhyty v seli, po-pershe tam *want* to live in the village, first  
vyhidnishe zhyty, po-druhe tam of all it's more advantageous to  
svizhe povitrja, nu, vony tam live there, secondly there's fresh  
vsikh znajut' narodylysja tam, air, well, everyone knows, they  
moji bat'ky narodylysja v seli ta were born there, my parents  
were born in the village, yeah
- 46 **EAP** tak yeah
- 47 **Katja** tak yeah
- 48 **EAP** jaka riznytsja zhyty u L'vovi i v how is it different to live in  
seli? L'viv and in a village?
- 49 ((overlapping speech))
- 50 **Katja** dyvit'sja u L'vovi, nu look, in L'viv, well
- 51 **Larysa** jaku dovzhe it's so long

- 52 **Katja** dyvit'sja, u L'vovi, nu, jak vam skazaty, u L'vovi nema takoho svizhoiho povitrja, jak Alina kazala, tut ne mozhna vidpochyty, tut ne vyjdes zranku v pizhami na vulytsju look, in L'viv, well, like you said, in L'viv there's not this fresh air, like Alina said, you can't relax here, you can't go out in the morning, in your pajamas, in the street here
- 53 ((laughter starts))
- 54 **Katja** a tam mozhna vyjty but you can go out there
- 55 ((laughter dies))
- 56 **Katja** tam majesh svoje podvir'ja, sad, horod there, you have your own air, land, a vegetable garden
- 57 **Larysa** robysh sho khochesh you do what you want
- 58 **Katja** tak, pryjshov yeah, go
- 59 **Larysa** mozhesh (sobi) chy ty ne hovorysh? you can (yourself), or you won't say it?
- 60 **Katja** svij budynochok majesh, nikhto ne krychyt', ne stukaje po batareji tam, *niby* skrutit' televizor abo she shos' you have your own house, no one shouts, knocks for a flashlight there, *like* (tie up) the television or something else
- 61 **Alina** mozhesh slukhaty muzyku you can listen to music
- 62 **Larysa** *bljakha* vdjahajsja sho khochesh, tobi *hicho* nikhto ne skazhe, chy dobre chy pohano you wear *around* whatever you want, no one ever says *anything* to you, good or bad
- 63 **Katja** a tuta vyjdes v chomus' takomu prostishomu but here you go out for some reason so much easier
- 64 **Olha** i vsi and all
- 65 **Katja** i vsi zrazu o *niby* jak ty mohla vyjty my vsi taki harni, a vona taka pohana tam vykhodysh v chomu-nebud', nje and every time, *like*, how you could go out, we are all so good, but a person who's not so good, you go with whoever there, no
- 66 **Alina** (vkljuchennja abo nema) (included or not there)

- 67 **Katja** v normal'nomu odjazi mozhna vdjahty, napryklad, odjah z jakojus' pljamkoju abo sho z mody vyjshlo jaksho ty idesh na horod chy v lis, to nikomu nema riznytsi jak ty vdjahnuta, vsi dyvljat'sja za kharakterom, jaksho niby ljudyna *khorosha* za kharakterom, to v neji bude bahato druživ, napryklad, v mene tam bahato druživ, ja to pershyj rik pojikhala v to selo na tsile lito, i ja tam poznakhodyla tam bahato druživ, i teper vsi znajut' mene, i pryjemno spilkuvatysja z nymy
- you can dress in normal clothes, for example, clothing with some little stain or that went out of style if you go to the vegetable garden or the forest, then it doesn't make a difference, like how you're dressed, everyone looks at your character, *like* if a person has a *good* character, she'll have a lot of friends, for example, I have a lot of friends there, the first year I went to the village, for the whole summer, and there, I met a lot of friends there, and now everyone knows me, and it's nice to spend time with them
- 207 **EAP** jaka riznytsja mizh problemuju v seli i L'vovi
- what is the difference between problems in the village and in L'viv?
- 208 **Alina** je v seli husy, kury, korovy, to taka problema
- in the village there are geese, chickens, cows, that kind of problems
- 209 **Larysa** zh tam [problema?
- that's a [problem?
- 210 **Katja** [problema?
- [a problem?
- 211 ((laughter))
- 212 **Alina** nu, ne znaju
- well, I don't know
- 213 **Katja** dyvit'sja, ja (bula ne prosyla) ty, ty (ne skazhesh) shchos' chy ja, dyvit'sja, tuta treba ity na bazar kupljaty jajtsi
- look, I (wasn't grown yet), you, you (aren't saying) anything or me. Look, here you have to go to the outdoor market to buy eggs
- 214 **Larysa** moloko tut treba kupljaty
- you have to buy milk here
- 215 **Alina** a tam, znajete, svizhe, teple
- but there, you know, it's fresh, warm

- 216 ((various repeats of *svizhe*, “fresh”))
- 217 **Alina** duzhe dobre maty it's really good to have
- 218 **Katja** svoje tym bil'she, litom duzhe more on your own, it's really *fine*  
*faino*, ne treba ity na bazar in the summer, you don't need to  
kupljaty *klubni ku*, khto maje go to the market to buy *klubni ku*,  
*klubni ku*, pishov na horod whoever has *klubni ku*, they go to  
sobi, narvav, z'jiv= the garden on their own, pick it  
and eat it=
- 219 **Alina** =chy vyshni =or cherries or apples  
abo jabluka
- 220 **Katja** jabluka, hrushi, vse tam je v apples, buckwheat, everything's  
seli, a tut treba kupljaty, khto there in the village, but here you  
ne maje hroshej, to tut ne need to buy it, whoever doesn't  
prozhyve, a v seli prozhyve have money can't live here, but  
they can live in the village
- 221 **Alina** znajete, *kartozhe* je you know, there's *potatoes*
- 222 **Katja** kartoplja potatoes
- 223 **Larysa** *bul'ba*= *potatoes*=
- 224 **Alina** =kartoplja= =potatoes=
- 225 **Larysa** =*bul'ba* =*potatoes*
- 226 ((laughter))
- 227 **Katja** *karoche*, v seli *faino* zhyty *in short*, it's *fine* to live in the  
village
- 228 **Larysa** tozh me too
- 229 **Alina** tozh me too
- 230 **Katja** tam vyhidnishe zhyty tam, it's more beneficial to live there,  
rakhuite svoje opalennja je you record your own heating,  
sobi pidkljuchysh ne platysh when you add it up yourself, you  
bahato, vodu svoju majesh v don't pay so much, you have your  
krynytsi ne platysh tak bahato. own well, you don't pay so much,  
tam chystisha voda tuta z the water is cleaner there, here,  
khlorkoju it's got chlorine in it
- 231 ((overlapping speech))

250	<b>EAP</b>	vy znajete chomu vashi bat'ky	do you know why your parents
251	<b>FST</b>	jizdyty v misto?	moved to the city?
252	<b>Katja</b>	tomu shcho	because
253	<b>Larysa</b>	chomu vony pojikhaly pislja narodzhennja	why did they leave after they were born?
254	<b>EAP</b>	tak, tak, chomu vony ne zhyty zaraz v seli?	yeah, yeah, why don't they live in the village now?
255	<b>Katja</b>	prосто todi ne bulo takykh dobrykhdobrykh	it just that wasn't that good then
256	<b>Larysa</b>	umov	the conditions
257	<b>Katja</b>	mozhlyvostej tam zhyty v seli zaraz vzhe pochalys' taki, mozhlyvosti, todi po-pershe shkola bula tuta krashche vchytysja, bulo v shkoli, nu, i potim jak vony pochaly pratsjuvaty	It's possible to live there in the village now, now they're starting some kinds, it's possible, first off the school here was better to learn then, it was at school, well, and later on, like they started working
258	<b>Olha</b>	mozhna bulo v misti zarobyty	maybe there was work in the city
259	<b>Larysa</b>	tak	yeah
260	<b>Olha</b>	a v seli ne bulo	but there wasn't any in the village
261	<b>Katja</b>	tak	yeah
262	<b>Alina</b>	i robotu majut' v seli, a tut u L'vovi je bahato	they have work in the village, but there's a lot here in L'viv
263	<b>Katja</b>	tak	yeah
264	<b>Larysa</b>	a prozhyvaty treba	and you need to live
265	<b>Alina</b>	tak	yeah
266	<b>Katja</b>	ta, ta, i tym bil'she prosto todi vydavaly kvartyry, derzhava vydavala kvartyry	yeah, yeah and there was just more, they gave out housing then, the government gave out housing
267	<b>Larysa</b>	stojaly v cherzi	they stood in line
268	<b>Katja</b>	ta, to nam vydaly kvartyru tut, i mama vzhe jak mala narodytysja, to mama vzhe pryjikhala sjuda, i, nu, ja zh narodylasja u L'vovi	yeah, then they gave us housing here, and already like Mom had to be born, then Mom came here, and, well, I was born in L'viv
269	<b>Larysa</b>	ja tezh	me too



- 270 **Alina** i ja tak samo tozhe, sho selo to and I'm the same too, the village  
selo is a village
- 271 **Katja** tak yeah
- 272 **Alina** tam zovsim inakshe it's completely different there
- 273 **Katja** ja duzhe zhaliju sho ja v seli ne I'm really sorry that I wasn't born  
narodylasja to strashenno in the village, it's awful

## Appendix IV: Migration at Taras Shevchenko (May 2007)

1	<b>EAP</b>	a chomu vy by ne khotily zhyty v inshikh krajinykh?	why don't you want to live there, in other countries?
2	<b>Yevhen</b>	nu, tam, <i>tipa</i> , jak novyj narod, inaksha mova, znajomykh nema, daleko ridnykh, i treba tam poznajomytysja, pryvyknuty	well, there's, <i>like</i> , new people there, another language, you don't know anyone, you're far from family, and you have to get used to (throw away?)
3	<b>Stanislav</b>	treba prosto minjaty svoje vs'o zhyttja jak pryjidesh	you just need to change your whole life when you get there
4	<b>Yevhen</b>	ne znajesh de zhyty	you don't know where to live
5	<b>EAP</b>	chy dejaki krajiny krashchi nizh inshi?	or, which countries are better than others?
6	<b>Stanislav</b>	nie	no
7	<b>Yevhen</b>	she raz	one more time
8	<b>Yehven</b>	chy dejaki krajiny krashchi nizk Ukrajinu?	which countries are better than Ukraine?
9	<b>EAP</b>	ni, inshi	no, others
10	<b>Yevhen</b>	aa, jasno, sho krashchi	oh, I get it, what's better
11	<b>EAP</b>	jaki, jaki	which, which ones
12	<b>Stanislav</b>	nu, Italija, Ameryka	well, Italy, America
13	<b>MS</b>	Frantsija	France
14	<b>Yevhen</b>	nu, she krashcha otsja Bolharija, tam bankiv bahatom vona krashscha	well, Bulgaria's better, they have a lot of banks there, it's better
15	<b>Solja</b>	Velykobrytanija	Great Britain
16	<b>Yevhen</b>	nu, tam vsjaka <i>fihnja</i>	well, there's all this <i>crap</i>
17	<b>MS</b>	tam vsjaka <i>fihnja</i>	all this <i>crap</i> there
18	<b>EAP</b>	chomu ti krajiny krashchi nizh inshi?	why are these countries better than others?
19	<b>Stanislav</b>	nu, kozhna krajina chymos' vidriznjajet'sja	well, every country is known for something
20	<b>Yehven</b>	maje svij prapor, svoje znachennja	it has it's own flag, it's own significance

21	<b>Stanislav</b>	svoju movu	it's own language
22	<b>Yevhen</b>	svoji zvychaji, istoriji	it's own customs, histories
23	<b>Valja</b>	kozhna krajina po-svojemu <i>fajna</i> , nu	every country is <i>fine</i> in its own way, well
24	<b>EAP</b>	v jakykh krajinakh dobre zhyty?	which countries is it good to live in?
25	<b>Yevhen</b>	v Ukrajinu, ny, nashij krajini	in Ukraine, well, in our country
26	<b>Stanislav</b>	v Ukrajinu	in Ukraine
27	<b>Yevhen</b>	v Amerytsi, v pryntsypi, ne pohano zhyty	in America, it really wouldn't be bad to live there
28	<b>Stanislav</b>	v Amerytsi, <i>da</i>	in America, <i>yeah</i>
29	<b>FS</b>	v Frantsiji	in France
30	<b>MS</b>	ta vsjudy	yeah, everywhere
31	<b>Yevhen</b>	vsjudy, ta	everywhere, yeah
32	<b>Stanislav</b>	vsjudy dobre	everywhere is good
33	<b>Yevhen</b>	nu, krim tykh Iraku	well, except for Iraq
34	<b>Solja</b>	vsjudy dobre, zvidky tebe ne vyzhenut'	everywhere is good, if you haven't been throw out
35	<b>EAP</b>	i jaki krajiny pohani zhyty?	and which countries are bad to live in?
36	<b>Stanislav</b>	jaki pohani? ja b ne zhyv v Iraku	which are bad? I wouldn't live in Iraq
37	<b>Solja</b>	pystyni	in a desert
38	<b>Stanislav</b>	v pustyni, <i>da</i>	in a desert, <i>yeah</i>
39	<b>Yevhen</b>	v Kytaji by ne zhyv	I wouldn't live in China
40	<b>Solja</b>	v Tadzhykystani	in Tajikistan
41	<b>Solja</b>	<i>cho?</i> v Kytaji dobre	<i>why?</i> it's good in China
42	<b>Yevhen</b>	chomu bo v Kytaji vsikh dushe bahato	why, because there's a lot in China
43	<b>Solja</b>	v Kytaji bahato ljudej	there's a lot of people in China
44	<b>Solja</b>	a tam ti vony zh vjujut'	but they fight over there
45	<b>Stanislav</b>	vony psiv jidjat'	they eat dogs
46	<b>Yevhen</b>	kotiv, psiv vony jidjat'	they eat cats, dogs

47	<b>EAP</b>	ja ne znaju, ja ne bula	I don't know, I've never been there
48	<b>Stanislav</b>	zhabiv	frogs
49	<b>Yevhen</b>	ja jiv zhaby, do rechi, duzhe smachni zhaby	I've eaten frog, by the way, frogs are really tasty
50	<b>ST</b>	<i>fu</i>	<i>eww</i>
51	<b>Yevhen</b>	jak ryba	it's like fish
52	<b>Yevhen</b>	ale shos' ne duzhe taki	but nothing's really like it
53	<b>EAP</b>	chomu tsi krajiny pohani nizh inshi?	why are these countries worse than others?
54	<b>Stanislav</b>	nu, v zahal'nomu tam, napryklad, v Iraku tam ne je, prosto pohano, bo tam ljudy v pryntsypi taki jakis' bidni vyhljadajut', <i>khot'</i> , majut' hroshi no vony jakis' bidni	well, there, in general, for example, in Iraq there's nothing there, it's just bad, because people there, generally, are like, kind of poor, they look out <i>they want</i> to have money, they're kind of poor
55	<b>Yevhen</b>	tam zavzhdy vijny vsjaki	there's always some kind of war there
56	<b>Stanislav</b>	vijny, ta	wars, yeah
57	<b>Stanislav</b>	ljudej vbyvajut'	they kill people
58	<b>Yevhen</b>	bombljat' <i>vs'o</i>	they bomb <i>everything</i>
59	<b>Stanislav</b>	ta	yeah
60	<b>Yevhen</b>	v zalozhnyky berut'	they bring criminals
61	<b>EAP</b>	a shcho vy chuly pro ukrajintsiv jaki pratsjujut' za kordonom?	what have you heard about Ukrainians that work abroad?
62	<b>Yevhen</b>	sho vuny robotjashchi	that they're industrious
63	<b>Stanislav</b>	zarobljajut' bahato hroshej	they earn a lot of money
64	<b>Yevhen</b>	navit' ti sho pojikhaly <i>niby</i> z Ukrajinu tuda to vony zavzhdy sobi znajdut' mistse bo vony robotjashchi tam, i jikh vsikh berut' na robotu, bo vony vsi robotjashchi, dijsno tam <i>vs'o</i> robljat'	even those that, <i>like</i> left Ukraine, to go there, they always find a place for themselves there because they're industrious, and everyone gives them work because they're all industrious, <i>everyone</i> really works there

- 65 **Solja** praktychno, vony ne vertajut'sja in practice, they don't come back
- 66 **Stanislav** ale praktychno, *da*, ne vertajut'sja but, in practice, *yeah*, they don't come back
- 67 **Yevhen** jim tam podobajet'sja, ale dejaki vertajut'sja we like it there, but some come back
- 68 **Solja** koly vony vzhe stari, i jikh ne budut' braty na robotu, *khibba* sho vony zakhochut' konkretno zhyty when they're really old and no one will give them work, *like* unless they want to live (concretely?)
- 69 **Stanislav** v jakis' sim'ji zabatsajut' in some families they (???)
- 70 **EAP** shcho vy dumate pro ukrainciv jaki khodyty jizdyty do inzhnykh kraïny dlja navchannja? What do you think about Ukrainians that go to other countries for an education?
- 71 **Stanislav** to *tupo* it's *stupid*
- 72 **Solja** to dobre na oborot it's good for transformations
- 73 **Stanislav** to *tupo* it's *stupid*
- 74 **Solja** *niby*, trokhy tjazhko *like*, it's a little hard
- 75 **Yevhen** tam, napryklad, Harvard there, for example, at Harvard
- 76 **Valja** Harvard inakshe Harvard's different
- 77 ((overlapping speech))
- 78 **Solja** vchyteli mozhe trokhy krashche, mozhut' tebe porivnjaty the teachers might be a little better, they can compare you
- 79 **Valja** vyshcha osvita it's a better education
- 80 **Yevhen** nu, tam, *tipa*, navits koly ty pryjidesh zvitam z toji nauky sjuda tam budut' tebe pytaty de ty vchysja= well, there, it's *like*, even when you come from to here with some science degree, there they'll ask you, where did you study=
- 81 **Stanislav** =oi= =oy=
- 82 **Yevhen** =ty skazhesh za kordonom, to bude povazhnishe bil'she, *tipa*, nu, [bil'sha osvita =you say abroad, that it'd be more of a worse, *like*, well, [education

83	<b>Stanislav</b>	[a te toi	[but that's it
84	<b>Solja</b>	potim, pislja toho navchannja tuta bil'she perspektyvne	after you study abroad, maybe there'll be a broader perspective here
85	<b>Yevhen</b>	vyjidesh zvitam to tam budesh avtorom to bude afihjet'	you leave from there, you'll be an authority
86	<b>Stanislav</b>	°skazhesh v Amerytsi°	°you say in America°
87	<b>EAP</b>	tse bil'shist' dobri rechi chy pohani rechi?	there's more good things or bad things?
88	<b>Solja</b>	dobre	good
89	<b>Stanislav</b>	dobre, <i>da, da, vernjak</i>	good, <i>yeah, yeah, for sure</i>
90	<b>EAP</b>	i pro ukrajintsiv jaki pratsjujut' za kordon=	and what about Ukrainians that work abroad=
91	<b>Stanislav</b>	=nje, to je tuta	=no, that's here
92	<b>Yevhen</b>	nje, [dobre	no, [good
93	<b>Stanislav</b>	[ale v pryntsypi dobre, <i>da</i> =	[but in general, it's good, <i>yeah</i> =
94	<b>Yevhen</b>	=ne ukrajintsi pryjizhdzhajut' tuda i zarobljajet' hroshi	=not for Ukrainians, they leave to earn money, they keep
95		((overlapping speech))	
96	<b>Stanislav</b>	toi je	over there
97	<b>Yevhen</b>	i tuta sobi robljat' to sho jim treba za ti hroshi jaki, vony tam zarobyly	and here, they need to earn this kind of money there
98	<b>Stanislav</b>	to je dobra, <i>da</i>	it's good, <i>yeah</i>
99	<b>EAP</b>	chomu ukrajintsi jizdjat' za kordon?	why do Ukrainians go abroad?
100	<b>Stanislav</b>	zarobyty [hroshi	to earn [money
101	<b>Solja</b>	ta shob hroshi zarobyty	[to earn money for us, to earn money for kids
102	<b>Stanislav</b>	zarobyty dlja svoji ditej, prystrojity svoji ditej na navchannja	to earn money for their kids, to provide for their kids' education
103	<b>ST</b>	navchannja	for studies
104	<b>Stanislav</b>	dlja navchannja, shche shos'	for studies, what else

105	<b>Valja</b>	tjazhko zarobyty tut	it's hard what they do
106	<b>Stanislav</b>	potim pryjidut' sjuda i budut' sobi zhyty	later on, they'll come back here and live their lives
107	<b>Solja</b>	nje to prosto tam pratsjujut', i hroshi peresylyjut', i tak ves' chas, tomu sho poky dity vyvchut'sja, a todi vzhe mozhe vernut'sja mozhe	I-, on-, they're only there to work and send money so their kids can learn, and they can already, or they can there
108	<b>Stanislav</b>	abo zaberut' ditej spyzdjat' i vs'o?	or work for their kids' XX
109	<b>Solja</b>	nu, tak, butut' vchytys' jaksho zabere	well, yeah, to learn XX and/or to take
110	<b>Stanislav</b>	nu, ta dekhto zabyraje	well, some stay
111	<b>Solja</b>	tam, ne mozna XX	we can't XX there
112	<b>Yevhen</b>	sharakhajut'sja	this is here, though
113	<b>EAP</b>	chy dobre shcho ukrajyntsi zhyvut' v inshykh krajin?	is it good that Ukrainians live in other countries?
114	<b>Yevhen</b>	aahh v [prytsypi	aahh [in general
115	<b>Stanislav</b>	[njea, njea	[no, no
116		((overlapping speech))	
117	<b>Valja</b>	°nje°	°no°
118	<b>Stanislav</b>	nje, nje, prosto ne dob-, ne derzhave, von prosto zrazy svoju derzhavoju	no, no, it's really not good, not for the country, it's a betrayal to your country
119	<b>Yevhen</b>	von prosto robljat' ni derzhavoju °i vse°	you don't work for the country, °and that's it°
120	<b>EAP</b>	i chomu?	and why?
121	<b>Solja</b>	shcho?	what?
122	<b>Stanislav</b>	ne-, neobkhidnyj, ne svoji natsiou, na shcho shchu	it's no-, it's not necessary, not your own people, in that, well
123	<b>Yevhen</b>	movoju	in the language
124	<b>Stanislav</b>	svoji ridna movo, svoji ridni dim', de vony narodyls', zminajut'	their own native language, own native home, where they were born, they're changing it
125	<b>Solja</b>	shcho XXX?	what XXX?

- 126 ((laughter))
- 127 **Yevhen** no, ne tse. ne teba zminajut'sja relihiju, kul'turu chy *typo*, vsoji svij z XX inakshe no, it's not that. they don't need to change their religion, culture, or, *like*, their own XX into another
- 128 ((whispering))
- 129 **EAP** shcho vy dyvylys' pro Ukrajinu i ukrajintsiv po televizoru, u fil'makh, u prohrami? What have you seen about Ukraine and Ukrainians on the TV, in films, in TV shows?
- 130 **Stanislav** ij. Lehendy staroho L'vova peredacha ij. the broadcast of the Legends of Old L'viv
- 131 **Solja** chekaj, my skazhemo wait, we'll say it
- 132 **Valja** ja dyvylasja po televizori sho, nu, tam molodym divchatam I watched on television about, well, young girls there who can't leave
- 133 **Solja** z nykh tam shljukh mozhut' zrobyty they're locked up there so they can work
- 134 **Valja** tomu sho pasport kradut' jikhnij i vony potim ne mozhut' vernutysja because they stole their passports, and later on they can't come back
- 135 **Stanislav** pershe kradut' jikh, a potim vykorystovujut' first they steal them, and later they use them
- 136 **Yevhen** i dekoly vykorystovujut' jikh jak povij vony buvajut' i zarobljajut' and sometimes they use them, like they'll be prostitutes, and they'll start to work
- 137 **Valja** tse duzhe pohano. nu, tomu pohano stavljat'sja troshko do vyjizdiv it's really bad. well, because it's bad, they're treated poorly until they leave



## Appendix V: Migration at Ivan Franko (Apr 2007)

- 1 **EAP** ni, ni, ni, shcho vy slukhaly pro- no no no what have you heard  
a, pro ukrajintsiv jaki pratsjuje about about Ukrainians who work  
za kordon? tse dobre rechi? tse abroad? are they good things? not  
ne dobre rechi? good things?
- 2 **Marta** nu, ja- ja vvazhaju i moja sim'ja well I- I hope and my family hopes  
vvazhaje, sho v Ukraini zaraz, that, in Ukraine now, that in these  
toi jak desjat' rokiv tomu, zaraz ten years there is work [in Ukraine  
Ukraini [je robota
- 3 **Lana M** [polityka, polityka= [politics,  
politics=  
=je, je =there's, there's [work  
[robota
- 5 **Vika M** [Martu[sja! [Martu[sja!
- 6 **Marta** [zaraz v Ukraini mozhna [now  
znajty robotu, napryklad, tam in Ukraine you can find work, for  
khai= example over there=  
7 **Vika M** =mozhna= =maybe=  
8 **Marta** =mozhna sto  
dolariv, a tam zarobljajut' stil'ky =maybeit's 100 dollars, but there  
to a v Ukraini, stil'ky til'ky na they work for how much in  
to robysh, jaksho ty bydesh Ukraine, how much can you get if  
maty, sho zaraz ljudy duzhe you work, people do an awful lot  
velyku robotu robljat', to tu of work now, then a job, for this  
robotu za ti hroshi mozhna money, you can find yourself a job  
znajty sobi tuta v Ukraini= here in Ukraine=  
9 **FST** =Darija!= =Darija!=  
10 **Marta** =to tu robotu za ti hroshi =then a job, for this  
mozhna znajty sobi robotu tut v money, you can find yourself a job  
Ukraini= here in Ukraine=  
11 **FST** =shshsh!= =shshsh!=  
12 **Marta** =sobi robotu tut =yourself  
v Ukraini work here in Ukraine  
13 **Lana D** Nu, ale v prytsypi, meni Well, but, in general, it seems to  
zdajet'sja, sho krashche me that it's better to work abroad=  
pratsjuvaty za kordonom=  
14 **Vika M** =nje =no

15	<b>FST</b>	ale	but
16	<b>Vika H</b>	Vazhche pratsjuvaty=	It's harder to work=
17	<b>Ksenja</b>	=meni- [meni duzhe shkoda tsykh ljudej, tomu shcho=	=I'm- [I'm really sorry for these people because=
18	<b>Sofija</b>	[vashe ale	[for you but
19	<b>Ksenja</b>	=vony ne mohly znajty=	=they can't find=
20	<b>FST</b>	=ne [rukhaj	=don't [grab
21	<b>Ksenja</b>	[te, shcho jim pidkhodyt' ne mohly tuta, zarobyty hroshi vidpovidno, jakshcho vony khochut' jidut' <u>tuda</u> , znachyt', tam shchos' <u>krashche</u> , znachyt', tam shchos' bil'she platjat'	[because for us, you can't go out here, to work for adequate money if you want it, here they go out to look <u>there</u> for something <u>better</u> , you know, to find something there, you know, with higher wages
22	<b>Sofija</b>	nu, i ja toj hovoryla=	well, and I said that=
23	<b>FST</b>	= a ja vvazhaju	=but I hope they
24	<b>Natalija</b>	tam bil'she platjat', a v Ukraini [navpaky	there's higher wages there, but in Ukraine [it's the other way around
25	<b>Vika H</b>	[ale tozhe treba	[but it's also necessary
26	<b>FST</b>	(vamy u shcho)	(you have what)
27	<b>Ksenja</b>	XXX	XXX
28	<b>Natalija</b>	jakby, napryklad, tebe nikhto ne viz'me na robotu bez hroshej=	if, for example, no one takes a job that doesn't pay you money=
29	<b>Vika H</b>	=Natalija, ale ty by, ty toj tam tozh, ne prosto robota tam, po- persha, jej svoji ljudy to pershe viz'mut'=	=Natalija, but if you , if you were there too, it's not just work there first of all, there's your own people they take first=
30	<b>Natalija</b>	=ale [tse bachyla, skil'ky ljudej nasha, Darija=	=but [I saw this, some of our people, Darija=
31	<b>Vika H</b>	[nu, ale yrozhaj ne toj v Ukraini nizh pryjizhdzhykh	[well, but production in Ukraine isn't like that for migrants
32	<b>Sofija</b>	=ale skil'ky	=but how many of us

		nashykh jide, skil'ky tam pratsjujut', bil'shist'?	go, how many work there, the majority?
33	<b>Vika H</b>	nu, ale=	well, but=
34	<b>Vika M</b>	=ale, Sofija	=but, Sofija
35	<b>Vika H</b>	ale pratsjujut'	but they're working
36	<b>FST</b>	ne v shykarhykh ymovakh, ale vse odno pratsjujut'	it's not in ideal conditions, but it doesn't matter, they're working
37	<b>Marta</b>	ale v Ukrajinu lihshi umoby	but it's ideal conditions in Ukraine
38	<b>Ksenja</b>	ale v polovyny=	but in the middle=
39	<b>Vika H</b>	= na najhirshykh robotakh=	=in the worst work=
40	<b>Ksenja</b>	=ne znajdesh sobi robotu, jakshcho v tebe ne maje, napryklad, vyshchoji osvity, bez vyshchoji osvity nikuda ne berut', rozumijut'	=you can't find work for yourself, if you don't have, for example, a higher education, without a higher education you can't go anywhere, you know
41	<b>Marta</b>	<u>Mozhna!</u> [mozhna znajty	<u>You can!</u> [you can find
42	<b>FST</b>	[mozhna znaity, Ksenja	[you can find, Ksenja
43	<b>FST</b>	robotu shchob	work that
44	<b>FST</b>	ja b pojid-	I would go-
45	<b>Marta</b>	Ksenja, v Ukrajinu zara povno roboty, to ne, to shcho p"jat' rokiv tomu, prosto ljudi vvyjizhdzhajut' tuda z [Ukrajinu	Ksenja, now in Ukraine there's full- time work, it's not like five years ago, people only migrate there from [Ukraine
46	<b>Ksenja</b>	[ljudy vvyjizhajut', tomu shcho vony khochut' krashchoho [zhyttja	[people go because they want a better [life
47	<b>Vika M</b>	[du:maju	[I thi:nk
48		((overlapping speech))	
49	<b>Lana D</b>	majesh faine vzuttja, a v Ukrajinu ne zhyvut'	you have cool shoes but they don't exist in Ukraine
50	<b>FST</b>	na vse odno, vin kolys' v Rosiji [pratsjuvav	it doesn't matter, in Russia when [one worked
51	<b>Vika M</b>	[ale vse odno	[but it's all the same
52	<b>FST</b>	vin	he

- 53 **Vika M** Ksenja, jakshcho vony bez vyshchoji osvity toi jikhni problemy, bo vony kolys' ne vchylsja, i v nykh nema vyshchoji osvity Ksenja, if they don't have a higher education it's their problem, because they didn't study so they don't have a higher education
- 54 **Ksenja** ale, buvaje, take shcho dejaki ljudi ne mozhut' maty vyshchoji osvity, tomu shcho vony ne maly hroshej todi, tomu shcho treba byly zarobljaty bat'kam do[pomahaty but, hello, that, like some people aren't able to get a higher education because they didn't have money then, because they had to work to help their [parents
- 55 **FST** [toj [this
- 56 **Lana D** Vony pojikhaly tuda They went there
- 57 **Ksenja** a tut- a potim, vony koly vyrosly, vony zh majut' svoju sim'ju, vony khochut' dlja svojikh ditej krashche zhyttja, vony jidut' tuda, tomu shcho tuta but here- but later, when they grow up, and they have their own family, they want a better life for their children, they go there because here
- 58 ((overlapping speech))
- 59 **Maryna** A potim tu sim'ju lyshajut', duzhe mudro and later they abandon the family, that's really smart
- 60 **Sofija** tak yeah
- 61 **FST** ale vse odno, [starshi but it doesn't matter, [older
- 62 **Vika H** [ale lihshe, nekha] [but it's ideal, tse let it go
- 63 **FST** ale, dyvit'sja, skil'ky ljudej pomyraje z holodu but look, how many people are dying from starvation
- 64 **Marta** pocyrajut' duzhe dovho they exaggerate a lot
- 65 **Sofija** ale, dijsno, znajte, dobre, jakshcho vony tam pohano, zrobljajut' za kordonom, to choho vony zrazu nepryjizhdzhajut', nu, tam dva roky chy [try roky but it's clear, you know, good, if there it's bad, they work abroad and they don't come back again, well, there for two years or [three years
- 66 **Lana D** [vony tam pohano, zrobljat' kopijky [it's bad there, they work for pennies
- 67 ((overlapping speech))

- 68 **FST** ale, Vika, hovoryt' sho ne taki, prystyzhni nizh tykh pratsjujut' but, Vika, they say it's not like that, it's more prestigious than where they work
- 69 **Vika H** ale ty khochesh [skazaty= but you want [to say=
- 70 **FST** [sho [that
- 71 **Vika H** =Sho =that they  
vony pratsjujut' chy tam work or they're some kind of  
menedzheramy jaky mos' i vony manager and they [something there  
[tam shos'
- 72 **Ksenja** [vony prybyral'nykamy [they're janitors
- 73 **FST** pravyl'no right
- 74 **FST** ale vse [odno but it doesn't [matter
- 75 **FST** [vony pratsjujut' z [they work for some  
jako jus' khvoruju ljudynuju i kinds of sickly people and they  
sho jim podobajet'sja help them
- 76 ((overlapping speech))
- 77 ((fist banging on table))
- 78 **FST** Ne hovorit' vsi na raz! Don't everyone talk at once!
- 79 **Ksenja** Shob tut zarobyty taki hroshi, if you work here for that kind of  
jak zarobljaje, zarobljaje such money, like you work, you  
menedzhr treba, Vika, maty need to be a manager, Vika, to  
vyshchu osvity, a tam vony have a higher education, but they  
jidut' bez vyshchoji osvity, vony go there without a higher  
tam zarobljajut' taki cami education, there they work for the  
[hroshi same [money
- 80 **Vika M** [ne menedzhremy [they aren't managers
- 81 **FST** Vika, vse odno, vony tam lihshe Vika, it doesn't matter, there, they  
zhyvut' live ideally
- 82 ((overlapping speech))
- 83 **Natalija** Vony tam hroshi bil'she They earn more money there, but it  
zarobljajut', ale vse odno, vony doesn't matter, they are there, later  
tam potim svojikh ditej lyshajut' on they abandon their kids
- 84 **Marta** lyshajut'= they abandon=
- 85 **Vika M** =[lyshajut'= =[they abandon=
- 86 **FST** =[lyshajut'= =[they abandon=
- 87 **Marta** =tak =yeah

		[lyshajut'	[they abandon
88	<b>Natalija</b>	[potim, koly bat'ky pryjidunt' [nazad	[later on, when the parents come [back
89	<b>Marta</b>	[polovyna=	[half of them=
90	<b>FST</b>	=bil'shist'	=the majority
91	<b>FST</b>	nu, ale	well, but
92		((overlapping))	((overlapping))
93	<b>Ivan</b>	kuda tuda tam vzhe bil'she	to there, from here, it's already more there
94	<b>Marta</b>	oj, i <u>cholovika</u> vse odno lyshajut'	oh, and <u>men</u> are the same, they abandon
95	<b>Marta</b>	Napryklad, pojikhala zhinka, cholovika zabypaje	For example, a wife left, took her husband
96	<b>Ivan</b>	Zhinka pojikhala, shist' roktiv bula tam, potim pojikhala cholovik, dity buly tuta, i ditej zabrala toho roku, i vs'o	A wife left, she was there for six years, later on her husband left, the kids were here, and she took the kids this year, and that's it
97	<b>Marta</b>	to odna taka sim'ja [bula	then one such family [was
98	<b>FST</b>	[polovyna lyshaje	[half are abandoned
99	<b>FST</b>	ale polovyna zalyshaje	but half of them are abandoned
100		((overlapping speech))	
101	<b>Sofija</b>	de krashche pratsuvaty? za kordonom	where is it better to work? abroad
102	<b>Marta</b>	v Ukrajinu, mozhna za ti sami hroshi znajty robotu=	in Ukraine, you can find work with this kind of money=
103	<b>Lana D</b>	=nu, tak, [ale	=well, yeah, [but
104	<b>FST</b>	[dyvit'sja=	[look=
105	<b>FST</b>	=umovy budut'=	=they'll be in conditions=
106	<b>Vika H</b>	=ty porivnjaj, davaj nashykh bezrobitnykh	=you compare, take our unemployed
107		((overlapping speech))	

- 108 **Vika H** Bezrobitnykh, skil'ky nashykh ljudej je, a skil'ky tykh? Unemployed, how many of our people are in this position, and how many of them are there?
- 109 **Vika M** I taka sama Italija, pojikhala mojeji babtsi podruzka, i sho ty dumajesh? jij zrobyly nepravyl'ni dokumenty, vona v tjurmi cydila prosto tak, prosto tak, piv rokiv bo jiji zrobyla tam nepravyl'ni dokumenty, ne tut, jiji zrobyla nepravyl'ni a tam, i tak povyna ljudej And it's the same in Italy, my grandmother's friend went, and what do you think? They made her illegal documents, she sat in prison, yeah only, only, yeah for half a year because she had illegal documents with her there, not here, illegal ones made for her there, and- and, yeah, people have to do it
- 110 **Lana D** mozhna ljudy, nu i sho? people might, so what of it?
- 111 **FST** de pratsjuje where does she work
- 112 **Vika M** a sho, nu i sho? Ljudyna prosto tak v tjurmi sydila? and what, so what? People just have to go to jail?
- 113 **Vika M** tomu shcho jiji hospodari zrobyly jij nepravyl'ni dokumenty because her bosses made illegal documents for her
- 114 **FST** Vsjaki robljat' dokumenty they make all kinds of documents
- 115 **Vika M** a zvidky vona znala sho nepravyl'ni, a tak pobynni ljudej and how did she know they were illegal, but people have to
- 116 **FST** kuda ty zverneshsja, jaksho ty ne mistseva? where do you appeal, if you're not a resident?
- 117 **Ksenja** dobre, Vika. da[vaj good, Vika. give us [the next one
- 118 **FST** [i [and
- 119 ((open palm hit on tabletop))
- 120 **Vika H** ty musysh ity v jakes' posol'stvo, zrobyjaty svoji dokumenty, tobi zh ne hospodari tuda idut' vyrobljaty jikh? you have to go to some kind of embassy, to get your own documents, not have the boss there go and do them for you?
- 121 **Vika M** tak, vizu to vsjo tak, ale shob vona maje dokumenty [sho vona tam mozhe perebuvaty yeah, all visas are like that, but if she has documents [that she can look over there
- 122 **Sofija** [ale vona mozhe pereviryty= [but she can verify them=

- 123 **Vika H** =Vika, vona mozhna =Vika, she can verify  
 pereviryty, khto znaje them, someone knows Ukrainian,  
 ukrajins'ku movu, khto someone works there, and verify  
 pratsjuje, i pereviryty the documents  
 documenty
- 124 **Ksenja** davajte tak, skil'ky poluchaje tell me, how much does our nurse  
 nasha sidjelka? hryven p"jat sot, get? five, six hundred hryven, not  
 shist sot, ne bil'she. v misjats' more. a month. how much does this  
 skil'ky polochaje tam zhe sama nurse from Ukraine probably get  
 sidjelka z Ukrajiny? ja dumaju there on her own? I think that=  
 shcho=
- 125 **Maryna** =°tysjachu dolariv°= =°a  
 thousand dollars°=
- 126 **FST** =((doubtful whine))= =((doubtful  
 whine))=
- 127 **Ksenja** =tysjachu dolariv, =a thousand dollars, she  
 vona des' tak i poluchaje- ljudy- gets around that, peop- Vika, it's a  
 Vika, tam vshchyj riven' higher standard of living, you  
 zhyttja, rozumijesh? know?
- 128 **Sofija** tam mozhe hirshe znannja, ale maybe there's worse information  
 lipshyj riven' zhyttja, °ja- ja there, but it's an ideal the standard  
 prosto hovorju° of living, °I- I only say°
- 129 **Vika M** dobre. vsjo. good. and that's all.
- 130 **Ksenja** [davajte dal'she= [give us another one=
- 131 **FST** [davajte dal'she= [give us another one
- 132 **Ksenja** =bo zaraz =because now  
 posvarymsja we're fighting
- 133 **Sofija** mmm ta my Ksenoju, za to a mmm and I'm with Ksenja, against  
 vony it, but they
- 134 ((laughter))
- 135 **Marta** ja vvazhaju sho nje tozhe I don't want that again
- 136 **FST** vsjo= enough=
- 137 **Vika H** =ja ne protiv =I'm not against it
- 138 **Sofija** a ja vvazhaju sho but I want to
- 139 **Vika M** Sofi, vsjo! sama [hovorysh Sofi, enough! you speak [alone
- 140 **Ksenja** [dobre, davajte [good,  
 dal'she give us the next one



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