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# Intergenerational Mobility among Immigrants and their Descendents

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**Abstract:** This chapter provides an overview of the intergenerational progress of several major immigrant groups in the United States. Drawing on the most recent issues of the CPS, we provide estimates of poverty rates, educational attainment, and occupational attainment among the native born children of immigrants and compare these outcomes to similar estimates of the foreign born with the 1980 Census, allowing for a comparison across generations. We find improvement from the first to second generation for nearly every origin group. To more directly explore the transmission of socioeconomic status among immigrants, we directly link the parental and child outcomes of immigrants in Los Angeles, estimating the relationship between parents' and children's educational and occupational outcomes. We find considerable variation in the relationship between parent and child outcomes by origin group, although all immigrants show higher rates of intergenerational mobility than the children of the native born. Traditional assimilation models, as well as the alternative working class and selectivity hypotheses we pose here, do not fully explain these inter-ethnic differences.

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## Introduction

Immigration has long been a major source of economic and demographic growth in the United States. It has also long been a source of inequality. The last great wave of migration at the turn of the previous century brought large numbers of relatively lower skilled immigrants to the United States, diversifying the labor market, increasing rates of poverty, and creating an ethnically defined stratification system that endured for several generations (Lieberson and Waters 1988). The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which eliminated nationality-based quotas, has once again opened the United States to a new wave of immigration from Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Bringing increased diversity in formal schooling and ethnic origin, a central source of concern is the impact of this immigration on inequality in the United States.

On one hand, the United States has offered most of these new arrivals a chance to improve their earnings (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2008) and better their material conditions relative to their sending countries. On the other hand, the foreign born in the United States are more likely to be poorly educated and poorly paid relative to the receiving country, with higher poverty rates than the native population. In the long run, however, the fate of immigrants may not be the central issue when assessing the impact of migration on inequality. Rather, it is the direction and degree of *intergenerational* mobility - the links between immigrant parents and their children – which will define the impact of immigration on the future of ethnic stratification in the United States.

The question of intergenerational mobility has placed the children of immigrants, also known as the second generation, in the research spotlight. Two central questions guide much of this research. The first is a matter of direction: which children of immigrants will improve upon,

reproduce, or “decline” from the socioeconomic status of their immigrant parents? Second, what can explain the variation in mobility patterns observed between the children of immigrants of different origins and the children of native born Americans?

In this chapter, we address these questions by examining the transmission of poverty and educational and labor market outcomes from immigrants to their children. Drawing on recent debates surrounding immigrant assimilation in the US, we formulate a series of competing hypotheses about the direction of intergenerational mobility as well as the degree of transmission by origin group. We then test these hypotheses, first comparing nationally representative age-adjusted poverty rates, educational attainment, and labor market outcomes of immigrants and their descendents to the children of native born whites, blacks, and Hispanics. We examine these trends more closely with metropolitan level data from the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA). This data allows the measurement of intergenerational educational and occupational mobility by including individual level measures of parental outcomes during the adult respondent’s childhood. We conclude by framing these findings within the assimilation debate on the US second generation that has burgeoned in the past two decades.

## Theoretical Perspectives

### *Assimilation Reformulated*

Two competing reformulations of traditional assimilation theory frame the majority of current research on the second generation. Neo-assimilation theory modifies and updates the traditional assimilation perspective, arguing that in their desire to improve their material conditions, immigrants and their descendents will adopt the linguistic, educational, and residential characteristics that make them more like the native born (Alba and Nee 2003). In so doing, the educational and occupational distributions of the native born descendents of

immigrants should come to resemble those of the native population. Although not all immigrants will advance at the same rate, the decline in individual and institutional discrimination, combined with an increase in opportunity as the baby-boomer generation retires, should provide ample opportunity for intergenerational mobility into an increasingly multi-ethnic "mainstream" (Alba 2008).

In contrast, segmented assimilation theory predicts variation within the second generation, both in the direction of intergenerational mobility and its degree. Its central contribution is the identification of three discrete paths for the children of immigrants: the traditional straight line assimilation pattern of parallel acculturation and socioeconomic mobility towards the middle class; "ethnic mobility" of delayed acculturation combined with socioeconomic mobility; and the more novel prediction, "downward mobility" as the fate of the more disadvantaged immigrant groups (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001a). Only the children of middle class immigrants can expect both streamlined acculturation and upward mobility into the middle class mainstream. Those immigrants with less human and financial capital must rely instead on ethnic capital: in their contribution to this volume, Lee and Zhou reveal how resources specific to the Chinese and Vietnamese communities in Los Angeles, such as extracurricular tutoring in ethnic neighbourhoods and the "Asian yellow pages" which provide information and rankings of local schools, enable even those Vietnamese with very low levels of schooling to help their children to become high academic achievers. In contrast, the children of less fortunate immigrant groups – those both poor in ethnic and traditional forms of capital - are seen as twice disadvantaged compared to their historical predecessors, by their appearance as visible minorities as well as by a restructured hourglass economy which offers fewer footholds in the climb from lower to middle class. Without the protection of a strong and diverse ethnic community, the children of these

immigrant groups are expected to be *immobile,* stagnating in the low socioeconomic position of their immigrant parents, and reproducing their higher levels of poverty.

*Working Class Hypothesis: Receiving Country Starting Points*

The emergence of these two theories has generated much empirical research as well as some further refinements. Through a series of empirical papers, many focusing on the experiences of Mexican immigrants and their descendents, we and our colleagues have argued for a middle ground between the neo- and segmented assimilation models (Luthra and Waldinger 2010; Luthra Forthcoming; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997; Waldinger 2007; Waldinger and Feliciano 2004). The core argument in much of this work is that the children of disadvantaged immigrant groups such as Mexican Americans will not experience downward mobility, as forecasted by segmented assimilation theory, nor the convergence with the mainstream expected by neo-assimilation, but rather a "pluralist" or "working class" mobility characterized by slow progress that varies across different dimensions of life. For instance, labor market research with the Current Population Survey reveals near convergence in the wages of similarly skilled Mexican Americans and native whites but continued variance in employment arrangements, in particular in terms of fringe benefits (Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007) and employment sector (Luthra and Waldinger 2010). Recent work by Susan Brown and Frank Bean have found similar evidence of "delayed" incorporation in terms of spatial mobility (Brown 2007) as well as in education (Bean et al. 2011). Similar to assimilation theory, these authors expect, and indeed have shown, that downward intergenerational mobility or even stagnation are unlikely outcomes for the children of Mexican immigrants, if only because their starting position is so low (Bean and Stevens 2003; Blau and Kahn 2007 ; Kasinitz 2008). Yet in contrast to neo-assimilation theory, the working class hypothesis predicts that the interaction of a low socioeconomic starting point, combined with a higher proportion of foreign born with undocumented status (Bean, Brown,

and Rumbaut 2006; Bean et al. 2011), will delay the convergence of native whites and Central American immigrants and their descendents.

Like segmented assimilation theory, the working class hypothesis emphasizes the high political and socioeconomic hurdles to upward mobility faced by immigrants at the individual level, and it also shares with this perspective a focus on the aggregate effects of national group membership. In addition to the individual handicap of low parental education or undocumented status, the lack of socioeconomic diversity among Mexican immigrants further affects mobility beyond the individual level, exerting an independent impact via the "ethnic capital" available to the group as a whole (Borjas 1992). Specifically, the average traits of the Mexican immigrant population – its low levels of education; the prevalence of undocumented status; concentration in unskilled work -- is likely to impede the upward mobility of the second generation, depriving them of connections, information, and role models that would facilitate advancement. Gonzales's contribution to this volume, for instance, reveals the dampening effect of undocumented status on upward mobility among the 1.5 generation, leaving even US college graduates without any possibility for higher skilled jobs.

*Selection: Sending Country Starting Points*

While the working class hypothesis takes the relative position of the foreign born in the *receiving* country as its point of departure, a parallel strand of research looks to the relative position of the immigrants in the *sending country* as an important determinant of the outcomes of the second generation (Feliciano 2005a). The argument here is that the higher the socioeconomic standing of immigrants relative to their sending country, the better their children will perform, even controlling for their starting point in the US. Although immigrant selection receives considerable attention in the economics of migration, it receives far less

notice in most of the sociological literature. However, recent work on second generation performance in the US (Feliciano 2005a; Feliciano 2006) as well as in Europe (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008; Levels, Dronkers, and Kraaykamp 2008; Luthra 2010) have brought the selectivity of the first generation to bear on the outcomes of the second generation. This research argues that insofar as most immigrants arrive with higher than average levels of schooling (Chiquiar and Hanson 2005; Feliciano 2005b), health (Akresh and Frank 2008), or generally unobserved characteristics such as ambition (Chiswick 1999) than the average resident of their native country, assuming equal distributions of the relative mobility characteristics across countries, we should expect higher mobility among the children of immigrants than among the children of the native born. In this way, the sending country selection hypothesis dovetails with both neo-assimilation theory and the working class hypothesis: all expect upward mobility among most groups.

However, the selection hypothesis also straightforwardly yields implications regarding the *degree* of mobility to be expected. Whereas neo-assimilation theory is relatively quiet on the mechanisms behind differential mobility patterns across groups, and the working class hypothesis focuses on the slower achievement of the poorest groups, the selection hypothesis expects variation in mobility patterns to follow the degree of selection from the home country. It is very likely that immigrants who have higher than average education levels or health than non-migrants in their home countries will pass along these advantages to their children, even if they are relatively disadvantaged in the receiving country. The result will be higher rates of upward mobility among more positively selected groups.

### *Measuring Mobility and Hypotheses*

In this paper, following previous work on intergenerational mobility (Borjas 1992; Card, DiNardo, and Estes 2000; Solon 1999), we measure the strength of the connection between

the educational or occupational status of the immigrant parents and the outcomes of their children using the following model:

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where  is the level of education or occupational status of child (adjusted for age) and $x$ is the level of education or occupational status of his or her parent during his childhood. The larger the size of coefficient $\beta_1$, the higher the degree of intergenerational transmission, and the closer the outcomes of the child reproduce the outcomes of the parent. Smaller coefficients $\beta_1$ denote greater mobility and regression to the mean level of education or occupational prestige of the child's generation.

The purpose of this paper is to describe and account for variation in intergenerational transmission, $\beta_1$. National origin differences in intergenerational mobility can therefore be indicated by a model that allows the relationship between parent and child to differ across groups, such as:

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where  is a categorical variable for group membership and  is an interaction term for parental education or occupation and group membership. National origin groups with larger $\beta_3$ have less intergenerational mobility. Group level differences in the size of coefficient  impact the intercept and can be interpreted as the *main effect* of group membership. Higher intercepts indicate better educational or occupational outcomes for the second generation *net of* differences in parental educational or occupational outcomes. Differences in intercepts can be attributed to a range of unmeasured group level effects, ranging from the average financial resources of the origin group to its general cultural or religious practices and beliefs.

Overall ethnic differences in second generation outcomes are therefore a combination of the strength of the parent to child transmission as well as the main effect of ethnic origin (rather than the effect of ethnic origin on intergenerational transmission). It is important to discuss both. For instance, one second generation group may obtain only high prestige, professional jobs, regardless of their parental background, thanks to a high degree of ethnic capital. Another group may be clustered uniformly in low prestige labouring occupations, regardless of parental background, due to a lack of legal status. Both of these groups would have the same , but the key to their very different social position would be found in the main effect , which would be high in the case of the former and low in the case of the latter.

To account for these two components of intergenerational change, slope and intercept, we draw from the literature review above the hypotheses outlined below. These hypotheses are also represented graphically in graphic 1:

[GRAPHIC ONE HERE]

1. Segmented Assimilation

Intercepts: Advantaged groups will maintain their advantage, and disadvantaged groups without a positive context of reception will maintain their disadvantage. Intercepts for these groups will reflect the starting place of first generation, without much movement up or down. Only those disadvantaged groups with a positive context of reception (such as Cubans or Vietnamese) will have intercepts that are higher than the starting points for their parents.

Slopes: slopes will approach 1 for negatively received groups and for advantaged groups, who are expected to reproduce their class position. Slopes will approach 0 for disadvantaged groups with a positive context of reception, who will improve upon their parents' position.

### Neo-Assimilation

Intercepts: Neo-assimilation theory predicts convergence towards the receiving country mean. Intercepts will reflect the starting place of parents, but be much more compressed around the receiving country mean. This means that disadvantaged migrant groups such as Mexicans will have intercepts that are higher than their parents' outcomes, whereas the children of advantaged migrants will have intercepts that are lower than the starting position of their parents.

Slopes: Slopes will be moderate for the children of immigrants, and the rate of intergenerational transmission will be similar across groups.

### Working Class

Intercepts: legal difficulties and very low SES will result in lower intercepts for the children of working class immigrants as compared to advantaged immigrants and native whites but still higher than the outcomes of their parents.

Slopes: Slopes will be moderate for the children of immigrants, but due to negative main effects for undocumented and low SES immigrants this will still result in working class incorporation.

### Immigrant Selection Perspective

Intercepts: The immigrant selection perspective predicts very high intercepts for the children of positively selected groups, with lower intercepts for less positively and negatively selected groups.

Slopes: Positively and negatively selected immigrants will have fairly shallow slopes, because due to unobserved heterogeneity (selection) parental educational and occupational

outcomes are less efficient indicators for the relevant unobserved characteristics in predicting performance in children. Groups that are not strongly negatively or positively selected will have steeper slopes that are more similar to the native population.

**Data**

This paper relies on three data sources. To obtain measures of the current adult children of immigrants, we rely on the 2006, 2008, and 2010 March Current Population Survey (CPS) (King et al. 2010), a large nationally representative survey. By combining several survey years together, these surveys allow the identification of sufficient numbers of 1.5 and second generation origin groups and provide detailed education and occupational information as well as poverty indicators. The next survey is the IPUMS 1% Metropolitan Sample of the 1980 Census (Ruggles et al. 2010), which we use to examine the characteristics of the foreign born most likely to be parents of the current 1.5 and 2nd generation adult population. This data allows us to make intergenerational comparisons between the outcomes of today's second generation (in 2006-2010) and their foreign born parents during their childhood (in 1980). The final survey, the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles survey (IIMMLA), is a metropolitan level data set designed for the study of second generation mobility (Rumbaut et al. 2008), and thus is uniquely suited for the aims of this paper.

*The Current Population Survey*

The CPS is a nationally representative sample of approximately 50,000 households, excluding persons in the armed forces and institutionalized living quarters. The survey is conducted monthly, and the March files contain the most extensive information on a variety of poverty indicators: individual and household earnings, employment information, and educational background. Although the survey size is much smaller than the US Census,

unlike the Census, the CPS inquires after the place of birth of the respondent's parents, allowing the identification of the adult second generation who have left their parents' households. Moreover, although the data lacks the variables necessary to directly measure intergenerational mobility, as in the IMMLA data set, it does provide a nationally representative overview of each of the immigrant origin groups under consideration here. This data will be used to provide national context and a broader age range to compare to the IIMMLA findings.

*IPUMS 1% Metropolitan Sample 1980 Census*

The IPUMS sample is a 1 in 100 random sample of the US population, and thus contains sufficiently large sample sizes of the foreign born to differentiate many national origins. Unfortunately this data cannot be used to identify the native born children of immigrants (see above). We use this data to estimate the characteristics of foreign born adults most likely to be the parents of the second generation in 2006-2010; however we note that these estimates are only approximations and include many foreign born adults who are not parents, whose children remained in the country of origin, or who may have returned to their country of origin and brought their children with them.

*IIMMLA*

The IIMMLA is a telephone survey of young adults (ages 20-39) consisting of 4655 interviews in the Los Angeles Metropolitan area – comprising Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside and San Bernardino counties. The sample has quotas for second and 1.5 generation groups (Mexicans, Vietnamese, Filipinos, Koreans, Chinese, and Central Americans from Guatemala and El Salvador) and includes three native-parentage comparison groups comprised of third and later generation Mexican-Americans, Non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks. IIMMLA is designed to study the second generation and contains multiple measures

of parental background and socioeconomic outcomes in young adulthood, as well as current and former legal status.

IIMMLA is a cross-sectional survey, containing numerous retrospective questions that allow us to reconstruct parental characteristics from when the respondents were children. We therefore expect some recall error in IIMMLA. IIMMLA also involved targeted random sampling, via the telephone, of selected populations within a pre-defined geographical region. Due to the well-noted income and age bias arising from telephone surveys, as well as selection by omitting second generation youth who dispersed from immigrant enclaves away from Los Angeles, we note that the IIMMLA may not be fully representative of all second generation youth born and raised in Los Angeles[1]. Furthermore, as the second generation is still a young population, IIMMLA sampled young adults ages 20-39, excluding the older second generation. We further limit our sample to adults ages 23 and above, to reduce the number of respondents still in school while still maintaining adequate sample size. To correct for missing data in parental occupational and educational status, we use multiple imputation with chained equations (M=30) using the Stata ice command and mi estimation procedures (Royston 2009).

**Analysis**

To provide a first glance of the relationship between immigration and economic disadvantage, we compare poverty rates, educational attainment, and occupational attainment for a nationally representative sample of first, second and 1.5 generation members, acknowledging that this cross-sectional snapshot does not allow us to directly link parents to children.

1 In a similar survey, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey (CILS), approximately 20% of second generation youth surveyed in early adolescence had moved out of their childhood city of residence by their mid-twenties. These respondents had higher educational attainment than those who remained.

*Descriptive Statistics with the CPS and Census*

In tables 1-3 below, we report the poverty rates, educational attainment, and occupational status of nine immigrant origin groups (1st, 1.5, and 2nd generation) as well as third generation whites, blacks, and Hispanics. Individuals who migrated to the United States at age 13 or older are recorded as first generation, those who migrated before age 13 are recorded as 1.5 generation, and the children of at least one foreign born parent are defined as second generation. The first and 1.5 generation are assigned their country of birth as their national origin. For the second generation, their origins are assigned according to the country of birth of the foreign born parent; where a child has two foreign born parents of different origins, the mother's origin is used. All statistics reported are restricted to adults aged 25 and above, and adjusted for the different age distributions of these populations. The results reported are the weighted average of the single age year specific rates with the overall second generation (in 2006-2010) as the standard population.

a. Starting Points: Sending and Receiving Country

Before examining the intergenerational comparisons on which these papers focus, we review aspects of the socio-economic standing of different foreign born groups in the United States, both relative to the third generation native population as well as to the average resident of the sending country. Table 1 displays the age-adjusted poverty rates, educational attainment, and average occupational status scores for the children of native born non-Hispanic whites, Blacks, and Hispanic Americans, and the foreign born of eight different origin groups. For comparison, we include the characteristics of the current adult foreign born as well as the adult foreign born in 1980, whom are more likely to be the parents of today's 1.5 and second generation adults.

In addition, we also include the Net Difference Index score for the foreign born groups. This measure utilizes UNESCO and Census data to calculate a summary measure of the level of educational selectivity of immigrants to the United States relative to non-migrants in the sending country of similar age. For example, an index of .35 indicates that an immigrant's educational attainment will exceed that of a nonmigrant from the same country 35 percent more often than a nonmigrant's education will exceed that of an immigrant from that country ((Lieberson 1980) quoted from Feliciano 2005:849). If the number of immigrants exceeding nonmigrants in educational attainment equals the number of nonmigrants exceeding immigrants in education, the value of N D will be zero. Thus, the higher the N D, the more educated the immigrants are relative to the nonmigrant population in their home country. If immigrants are more often less educated than nonmigrants (that is, there is negative selection), the value of N D will be negative[2].

Table 1 shows great variation in both receiving and sending country starting points. The greatest number of immigrants hail from Mexico: approximately 25% of the US foreign-born population. Of the 9 nationalities highlighted in the table, Mexicans are also the least educated, the most concentrated in jobs of low quality, and the most likely to be in poverty: about a quarter of the Mexican first generation were in poverty in both 1980 and currently, as compared to only 8% of third generation whites in 2006-2010. Salvadoran immigrants share similarly low educational and occupational attainment, although their poverty rates are lower, due in part to their smaller family size. Persons born in Puerto Rico and living on the mainland displayed even higher poverty rates than the Mexican foreign born in 1980, although their position has improved slightly in more recent years, and they enjoy average

2 Feliciano (2005), following Lieberson (1980), calculated the net difference index along all points of the education distribution, as the measure of selectivity. The net difference index is calculated based on the percentage of immigrants with the same level of attainment as nonmigrants, the percentage of immigrants with more education than non-migrants, and the percentage of immigrants with less education than non-migrants.

educational and occupational attainments that are higher than those of the Mexican immigrants and also possess birthright U.S. citizenship.

For the most part, nationalities falling at the higher end of the spectrum originate in the eastern Hemisphere. The Filipinos appear to be the most advantaged, with higher rates of high school and college completion and lower rates of poverty than all other groups, native whites included, and mean occupational scores outdistanced only by the Chinese. While on average the latter are employed in jobs of high quality, their poverty rates and educational indicators point to significant within group variation, a pattern that holds for the other Asian groups. Thus, although displaying birfurcated educational attainment and twice the poverty rates of native whites, the Chinese stand out with the highest occupational status in both 1980 and today. Koreans have high levels of educational attainment, exceeding the white average, and yet higher levels of poverty and occupational scores below those of whites and immigrants from Cuba, who typically arrive with lower levels of schooling. Their position has also worsened relatively across time, and they currently have higher poverty rates and lower occupational prestige scores in 2006-2010 than they did in 1980, despite an improved educational profile. By contrast, the Vietnamese foreign born have a much more positive socioeconomic profile today than in 1980, with poverty rates in 2006-2010 at only a third of a high rate of 31% in 1980. Although their educational attainment levels continue to fall well behind that of the other Asian nationalities in 2006-2010, their poverty rates are relatively low and job quality relatively high, perhaps reflecting the advantages associated with their initial status as refugees and the benefits associated with that status. For both the Chinese and Vietnamese, within group variation is probably related to internal ethnic differences and a diversity of points of origin, as the Sino-Vietnamese may enjoy advantages not possessed by ethnic Vietnamese, and the stream of highly educated migrants from China is accompanied by a significant number of workers and former peasants, many arriving without legal status.

Despite these complications, an eastern-western hemisphere cleavage emerges, as does a rough hierarchy on each side of the divide. The fairly uniformly advantaged Filipinos stand at the top, followed by the more heterogeneous Chinese and Vietnamese. Although the Vietnamese start off as the most disadvantaged Asian origin group, their position changes significantly by 2006-2010. Finally Koreans appear disadvantaged in the labor market, and their relative position worsens between 1980 and more recent years. Among immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, Caribbean and Cuban immigrants are the most advantaged, though worse off than most of the Asian groups more recently, followed by Puerto Ricans and Salvadorans, with Mexican immigrants very last. According to the expectations of the working class hypothesis, we should expect to see the lowest second generation outcomes among the Latin American origin groups, as they are the most disadvantaged in terms of educational and occupational attainment, and are also the most likely to arrive with undocumented status.

A look at the Net Difference Index scores yields a roughly similar picture. The Western/Eastern hemisphere distinction again appears, with higher levels of educational selectivity observed among immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere. With the exception of Caribbean immigrants, all the Asian groups are much more positively selected than the Western immigrants, with index scores twice as high. Despite their somewhat average educational and occupational characteristics relative to other origin immigrants in the US, Puerto Ricans stand out as the only negatively selected group. The expectations of the selectivity hypothesis therefore generally align with those of the working class hypothesis, in that slower upward mobility is expected among the Latin American groups; however, the selectivity hypothesis suggests that we should expect greater than average upward mobility among the Caribbean and Chinese origin immigrants.

As a first evaluation of how well the sending and receiving starting points correspond to the mobility we observe, we turn to descriptions of poverty, educational, and occupational attainment among the 1.5 and second generation descendents of these foreign born groups.

b. Poverty

In table 2, we examine the changes in poverty rates from the first generation in 1980 to 1.5 and second generation in 2006-2010. This table shows that the children of immigrants of all nationalities, both the U.S.-raised and even more so, the U.S.-born, are far less likely to experience poverty than those who are born abroad. Thus Mexican immigrants who arrived in the United States as children, prior to the age of enrolment in secondary school (the 1.5 generation) are 32% less likely to be in poverty than those who migrate later in life; for this population, poverty rates are similar to the overall Hispanic third generation and 5 percentage points *lower* than the poverty rates of third generation blacks. Despite the fact that a large percentage of the US born children of Mexican immigrants grew up in poverty, sharing the poverty status of their foreign born parents, as adults aged 25 and older they are less than half as likely as the first generation to be in poverty, with lower rates of poverty than both blacks and Hispanics of the third generation and beyond.

This pattern of intergenerational improvement in rates of poverty is found for essentially every immigrant group observed: all display a steep decline in poverty from the first to the second generation. Moreover, in contrast to Mexican Americans, the native born children of all Eastern Hemisphere origin groups report poverty rates that are lower than or indistinguishable from third generation whites. This cross-sectional data does not directly link parents with children and may be affected by return migration and differential fertility bias among the foreign born in 1980. Still, little evidence of downward mobility appears. Rather than joining a disadvantaged minority class, these data show that within the space of

one generation, every group approaches or converges with the native white norm. Moreover, the variation of poverty rates across immigrant origin groups drops by more than half from the first to the second generation (from .08 to 037), pointing toward the type of convergent outcomes expected by neo-assimilation theory. The fact that many of these second generation adults grew up in poor households, among which heads were often lacking legal status for some significant period of time, makes this shift across generations still more remarkable.

c. Educational Attainment

Table 3 displays the percentage of each group at the lowest and highest ends of the educational spectrum. Observing rates of high school noncompletion, on one hand, and college completion on the other, we see that in most cases the second generation outperforms the first generation. While comparing the foreign- to the U.S born demonstrates that rates of high school completion increase in every case, the contrast in college completion among the foreign and US born is less consistent. Moreover, the pattern of change from one generation to the next varies, both across groups and depending on the benchmark.

Not surprisingly, offspring in the least skilled groups show the largest gains relative to the immigrant parents. For example, the percent of those with less than a high school degree drops by more than two thirds, and the level of college completion rises by more than four times, for the Mexican second generation as compared to their foreign born parents. The gains for Salvadorans take a similar form; among the Vietnamese, the most disadvantaged of the Asian origin groups, the U.S.-born are two and a half times more likely to have completed college than those born abroad. For comparison, although native high school completion also increased dramatically from 1980 to 2006-2010, the native born college completion rates increases pale in comparison to the large gains made by the children of Western Hemisphere and Vietnamese migrants.

The other Eastern hemisphere migrants display a somewhat more modest success story: the Chinese and Korean inter-generational comparisons show gains more in line with native whites; among the Filipinos, college completion rates are indistinguishable between the first generation and the second. This kind of convergence towards the receiving country mean, with disadvantaged immigrant groups improving and advantaged groups maintaining or falling in their relative educational position, is largely in line with traditional assimilation theory.

Despite this convergence, large differences between the second generation and native whites remain, underscoring the enduring legacy of a low receiving country starting point at the time of arrival. Thus, significant improvement from first to second generation still leaves Mexican immigrant offspring well below the levels for the white native-born: while the greatest gap involves college completion, rates of high school completion show that Mexicans are well short of catch-up on this count as well.

On the other hand, one also notices the importance of sending country selectivity, particularly in college completion rates. Despite a first generation educational and occupational profile that is nearly as disadvantaged as the Mexicans' and Puerto Ricans', the children of more positively selected Salvadoran immigrants attain higher levels of education than do their counterparts. The influence of source country selectivity is also consistent with the pattern among the Caribbean and Chinese second generation who make greater strides in college education (relative to the first generation) than Filipinos and Koreans, among whom there is evidence of maintenance or even regression towards the mean from the very high educational position of their immigrant parents. The findings of nearly universal improvement from first to second generation align well with neo-assimilation theory, as does the decreasing variation in college noncompletion rates among the immigrant origin groups with each generation. Yet the continued lower college and high school completion rates of the

Latin American groups support the working class hypothesis, while levels of variation in upward mobility between the Asian and Latin American origin groups attest to the importance of sending country selectivity.

d. Occupational Attainment

Further evidence of catch-up appears when the focus turns to occupational attainment in table 4. In the first generation, only the Chinese and Filipinos have SEI scores at or above the white mean. In the second generation, by contrast, only Salvadorans, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans have scores *below* the white mean. Moreover, every group experiences improvement in occupational status from one generation to the next.

We also note that there is considerable variation in occupational assimilation trajectories. As would be expected from their educational attainment profiles, the Mexican and Salvadoran second generation make large gains relative to the first generation. The change in SEI scores from first to second generations is roughly equivalent to a shift from a semi-skilled factory worker to a factory supervisor, making the intergenerational contrast quite similar to the earlier experience of Poles or Italians (Perlmann 2005). Though occupational upgrading of this sort represents a significant improvement, the occupational status of these second generation groups continues to lag behind the status of third generation whites.

As noted, *all* of the other second generation groups enjoy ISEI scores that match or exceed the native white benchmark. Every group, with the exception of Puerto Ricans, experiences at least a 9 point increase in their average score. As the Korean second generation does not quite achieve the educational attainment of the first generation, their higher ISEI scores suggest that they are largely free of the problems – most notably, lack of US-appropriate skills and credentials – that stand in the way of the Korean foreign-born.

While these patterns of change in occupational status again provide no evidence of the stagnation or decline expected by segmented assimilation, the intergenerational changes among Salvadorans and Mexicans seem to bear out the working class incorporation hypothesis. Moreover, differences in the degree of upward mobility in this indicator is generally low, with each group making large, and similar gains from first to second generation such that the ethnic inequality declines between all the immigrant origin groups and native whites but the differences between different immigrant nationalities persists across generations.

In sum, our review of these three indicators points towards nearly universal upward mobility, as expected by assimilation theories, albeit at different rates for different groups, as suggested both by the working class and selectivity hypotheses. Because the CPS does not allow us to directly compare children to parents, these indicators are impressionistic; still, there is little evidence of any substantial downward mobility. The low educational and occupational attainment of the children of Mexican and Salvadoran immigrants does give pause, however, before we can discard a related concern of substantial second generation disadvantage. Although Salvadorans and Mexicans avoid the higher rates of poverty experienced by older native minority groups, their higher than average rates of high school noncompletion and lower occupational attainment may indicate significant hardship, roughly comparable to that experienced by third generation blacks and Hispanics.

*Intergenerational Mobility with IIMMLA*

To more directly assess whether a significant minority of the second generation are experiencing downward mobility and the mechanisms behind the variation in outcomes observed above, we now turn to the IIMMLA data, focusing on the relationship between parents and child's educational and occupational attainment.

Educational attainment is measured as the respondent's years of education at the time of survey. Respondents reported both the number of years they and their parents attended any school (grades in grammar and high school and years of study at post-secondary institutions), which were straightforwardly translated into years of education. Both mother's and father's education are used in all analyses.

Occupational attainment of father and respondent is measured as the primary occupation, recoded from Census codes into Treimain's occupational prestige scores. We use father's occupation because approximately a third of our respondents reported that their mothers did not work. Parental occupational attainment is only gathered for the second generation; this analysis therefore omits the native comparison samples. Second generation respondents who have never worked, or who reported that their father did not work or who could not answer questions about their father (N=215, or 6% of the second generation sample) were not imputed for these variables and are omitted. We emphasize again that nearly half of our sample is still enrolled in school, as well as beginning their careers, and so these estimates are likely lower than what the respondent's *eventual* occupational attainment will be[3].

Generation: We measure generation status similarly as in the CPS: first generation are those who arrived at ages 13 and older, 1.5 generation those who arrived before the age of 13, second generation are those born in the United States to two foreign born parents, and the 2.5 generation are those who have one US born parent.

Legal Status: Legal status is a central explanatory variable in the working class hypothesis and an important part of the context of reception within segmented assimilation theory. IIMMLA contains a host of questions surrounding the present legal status and status on arrival of immigrant parents as well as the 1.5 generation respondents in the sample. Through

3 Restricting the sample to ages 25 and older does not substantively alter the results.

the process of elimination the answers to these questions can be combined to create a four category indicator of legal status: 1) children of immigrants who have had citizenship since birth, 2) naturalized citizens, 3) those respondents who currently have a green card and/or are applying for US citizenship, and 4) is a residual category of other statuses. This small residual group contains first and 1.5 generation youth who arrived under a variety of original statuses (student, refugee, temporary worker) as well as young adults who are undocumented.

Origins: Origins are again assigned as the country of birth for foreign born respondents; for the second generation, we report the nativity of the foreign born parent, where these disagree, the mother's country of origin is used. Due to differences in the data available in IIMMLA and CPS we substitute third generation Hispanics with third generation Mexicans in the Los Angeles region as a comparison group, and restrict analysis to a smaller subset of national origins: Mexican, Salvadoran, Chinese, Filipino, Vietnamese, and Korean origins.

Controls: All analyses are conducted for men and women separately. Age is also included as a control in all analyses.

Analysis: Respondent's years of education and occupational prestige are regressed on mother and father's education and father's occupational prestige. The MI suite in Stata 11 is used to analyze the 30 multiply imputed IIMMLA datasets.

*Descriptive Statistics*

Descriptive statistics for the IMMLA dataset is found in table 5. The educational and occupational characteristics in this sample are roughly similar to those observed in the nationally representative CPS data. All of the Eastern hemisphere second generation groups in IIMMLA have higher years of education than the native comparison groups, and the variation in educational attainment among second generation respondents is lower than the

variation observed for their immigrant parents. Mexican and Salvadoran second generation respondents have similar educational attainment as third generation Mexican Americans, and nearly two years less education on average than native whites. Information on parental occupational prestige is available only for the children of immigrants, however the ranking is consistent with education, with the Mexican and Salvadoran immigrant parents displaying occupations that are nearly 10 points lower than Chinese, Filipino and Korean immigrant parents, two-thirds of a standard deviation lower on the occupational prestige scale. Occupational inequality among the second generation, though compressed, still remains with Eastern hemisphere respondents reporting higher prestige jobs than Western Hemisphere respondents.

There are also compositional differences in generational and legal status between the national origin groups. Time of arrival is important: for instance, whereas 80% of Vietnamese respondents were born abroad, less than half of Mexican respondents were born outside of the US. Mexican origin respondents are also more likely than other groups to have a US born parent, likely attributable to the longer duration of Mexican migration to the United States and thus enhanced prospects for within-ethnic marriages to the native born. Mexican and Salvadoran origin respondents stand out as the only groups with a non-negligible proportion who are not citizens or green card holders. All other groups are much more likely to be naturalized citizens.

*Educational Mobility*

Table 6 reports coefficients regressing father and mothers' educational attainment on the educational attainment of the respondent. Men and women are modelled separately. Immediately apparent is that the relationship between parental education and respondent education is more consistent and stronger for the native born than for any immigrant group.

Each additional year of mother's education is associated with approximately a 0.2-0.3 increase in respondent's education for native black men and women, whereas mother's education has essentially no relationship with respondent's education for Korean, Chinese, and Vietnamese second generation men and women, as well as Salvadoran men. Where there is a relationship, it is much weaker, only passing .2 for Filipino and Salvadoran women. Father's education is less consistently statistically significant, however it does exert an independent effect for third generation and second generation Mexican, Filipino, and Korean origin men, as well as native white and second generation Chinese and Mexican women. In general, there is a high amount of variation in the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment, with higher mobility for *all* immigrant origin groups as compared to native whites, and to a lesser extent native blacks and Mexicans as well.

The intercepts display a similar level of variation: Western hemisphere origin respondents, along with Filipinos and the native born, have much lower intercepts than the children of Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese immigrant parents. The relationship between average parental education and respondent's education for each group are plotted in Figure 2, which provides a clearer picture of each group's respective intercepts and slopes. As expected by neo-assimilation theory, and already observed in the CPS, every immigrant origin group (except Filipinos) displays convergence in their intercepts: the second generation intercepts are closer to the mean years of education of 14 years than the mean outcomes among the foreign born. Three different integration pathways are clearly visible. Chinese, Vietnamese, and Korean origin respondents form one pattern – these groups share very high intercepts, and very flat slopes. As expected by the segmented assimilation and selectivity perspectives, these highly selected groups perform well regardless of parental educational background.

The next identifiable pattern includes Mexican and Salvadoran origin respondents, and is what we would expect from the working class hypothesis: they do not reproduce the

low levels of education of their parents, as evidenced by their higher intercepts than native born groups as well as their parents, yet they share with Eastern hemisphere origin respondents a flatter slope than native groups. This combination of flat slope and lower intercept, however, means that their attainment is lower than other groups when we compare the children of higher educated parents. The end story is consistent with the working class hypothesis: strong improvement over parents, but continued disadvantage relative to other groups.

Finally, Filipinos share with native origin groups a steep slope and high class reproduction, yet are disadvantaged relative to native whites in terms of their intercepts. Filipino men in particular have much lower intercepts than native white men, though their steeper slopes mean that they outperform whites with higher parental educational levels. Filipinos display an integration path that is distinct from other Eastern hemisphere immigrants, though generally advantaged over Western hemisphere immigrants.

In sum, all groups are converging across generations, as evidenced by the lower variability in educational outcomes among the second generation than among the first. Koreans, Chinese and Vietnamese respondents display intergenerational mobility patterns consistent with the selectivity hypothesis, Salvadorans and Mexicans consistent with the working class hypothesis, and Filipinos appear to most closely mirror the "middle class" mobility process expected by segmented assimilation. No group shows stagnation – every group has intercepts on par with or above the *mean* education levels of the most disadvantaged foreign born groups, Salvadorans and Mexicans.

We now turn to two of the central explanatory variables in the segmented assimilation and working class hypothesis: legal status and parental occupation. Table 7 shows the relationship between these variables and years education, restricting analysis to the children

of immigrants and including controls for immigrant origins and parental education. Mexican origin second generation is now the omitted category. The first columns for men and women also control for generational status, the second includes occupational prestige of the father, and the third controls for legal status and father's occupational prestige, but generation is omitted as it is perfectly correlated with legal status.

Generational status collectively is only significant for women, and the 1.5 and 2nd generation report higher educational attainment than foreign born women who arrived after the age of 13. This advantage for the US born is only significant for the children of two foreign born parents, however; the 2.5 generation does not report higher educational attainment than those who were foreign born, net of parental education.

As expected by the working class hypothesis, immigrant men in working class occupations have lower achieving children, even net of their educational attainment and legal status. The effect is modest, a standard deviation increase (15 points) in father's occupational status is associated with a 0.17 increase in years of education, and this effect is significant for male respondents only. The effect of legal status is much more pronounced: men with only a green card report three quarters of a year less schooling than those who are birthright citizens, and women with a green card have over a year less schooling, net of parental education and father's occupational prestige. Respondents with other legal statuses, including those who are undocumented, report .8 years less schooling for men and over 2 years fewer schooling for women.

Our estimates for the effect of legal status may be overestimated because of unmeasured characteristics that both preclude naturalization and affect educational attainment. Unfortunately we cannot estimate the degree of bias here, but there does appear to be a strong difference between those with and without citizenship that is independent of two major

confounders, namely parental education and occupational status. In contrast, there is no difference between naturalized and birthright citizens, and the difference between those with a green card and those with temporary status is also insignificant for both men and women at the .05 level. It is important to remember from the descriptive statistics that the majority of noncitizen respondents in this sample are of Mexican origin; however, the negative association between noncitizen status and educational attainment remains strong and significant even if Mexican origin respondents are omitted from the analysis.

As expected by both segmented assimilation and the working class perspectives, a lack of citizenship and working class employment in the first generation delays the academic performance of the second generation. The majority of noncitizens are Mexican and Salvadoran, and so legal disadvantage has the most substantive application to these groups. However, controlling for compositional differences in legal status and parental occupational prestige does little to account for the difference in educational attainment between respondents of Eastern and Western hemisphere origins. The main effect (not shown) of Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese origins on educational attainment, relative to Mexican origins, remains large and generally unaltered as we include father's occupational prestige and legal status into the model. Even after controlling for these differences, these Eastern hemisphere groups continue to have approximately 3 years more education than the children of Mexican immigrants.

*Occupational Status*

Intergenerational transmission processes among the children of immigrants has been shown to differ across socioeconomic indicators (Waldinger and Feliciano 2004). Next, we turn to the relationship between father and respondent's occupational prestige. Because IIMMLA did not gather occupational information for the native comparison groups, this

analysis is restricted to the children of immigrants. The slopes and intercepts for the relationship between national origins, father's prestige, and respondent's prestige are found in table 8.

We first see that the relationship between father and respondents' occupation is essentially nonexistent, especially for women. Only Korean women, and Vietnamese and Filipino men, display a significant relationship between father and respondent's occupational status. The strongest relationship observed, for Vietnamese origin men, is that one standard deviation in father's occupational prestige score (15 points) is associated with slightly more than one quarter of a standard deviation in respondent's occupational prestige (3.6 points). Origin differences in intergenerational transmission differ by gender – among women, the strongest intergenerational transmission is among Koreans, whereas for men, the strongest relationships between father and son are reported for Vietnamese and Filipino men. Because of the young age of this sample, the relationships observed with this data are tentative at best; it is well known that intergenerational occupational and income relationships observed among recent labor market entrants is lower than for older men (Solon 2002). Still, despite the young age of the sample, we can already observe large differences in the main effects of national origins, as reflected in the intercepts. Most notably, we see that Chinese and Korean men, and all Eastern hemisphere women, have higher intercepts than the other origin groups.

Plotted expected values provide a useful overview of these relationships. Figure 3 plots the relationship between father and respondent's occupational prestige. Looking first at men, we see again three transmission patterns, though the origin group constellations differ slightly from those we observed with educational transmission. At the top, we see the children of positively selected Korean and Chinese immigrants have very flat slopes and high intercepts. Mexican and Salvadoran men show working class mobility at the bottom, with fairly modest slopes and low intercepts. In the middle, displaying mainstream or middle class

mobility patterns, are Filipino and Vietnamese origin men, with low intercepts but sharper slopes that allow them to overtake men from other origins at higher ends of the distribution of father's prestige. Patterns among women are similar, though not identical. Again, as anticipated by the selectivity hypothesis, Korean and Chinese women have high intercepts and shallow slopes (though steeper than men). Mexican and Salvadoran women have shallow or flat slopes, and low intercepts. Vietnamese women display flatter slopes, with higher intercepts than Vietnamese men, breaking away from the Filipino pattern.

In sum, intergenerational transmission in occupational prestige is similar to educational transmission: intercepts for all groups are higher than the *average* occupational prestige scores of the most disadvantaged foreign born groups, Mexican and Salvadorans. They are also somewhat less varied, than the average occupational prestige scores of their immigrant parents. Korean, Chinese, and to a lesser extent Vietnamese origin respondents display a highly advantaged, "select" or "ethnic mobility" pattern of high intercepts and flat slopes. Salvadoran and Mexican origin respondents display flat slopes and low intercepts, a "working class" or "less selective" transmission pattern. Finally, Filipinos display a more "mainstream" or "middle class" incorporation pattern of stronger intergenerational transmission, at least for men.

We next turn to the effect of generation, parental education, and legal status on second generation occupational prestige. The results of these models are found in table 9. Generational status is collectively insignificant at the .05 level for women. For men, those 1.5 generation respondents who arrived before the age of 13 or were born in the US have higher occupational prestige than first generation respondents, but this association is primarily accounted for by the higher educational attainment of the parents of the 1.5 and second generation. Father's education is significantly associated with occupational attainment for both men and women, but only very modestly: each year of father's education is associated

with only between one fifth and one third of one point on the occupational prestige scale. Ignoring possible issues of endogeneity mentioned above, legal status appears to be the most important variable in predicting occupational prestige: those most likely to be undocumented ("other" status) are in occupations that are 7 and 8 points lower on the occupational prestige scale than birthright citizen men and women, respectively, net of parental occupational and educational background. Because Mexican and Salvadoran origin respondents comprise the majority of those without citizenship, legal status accounts for some of their occupational disadvantage.

**Conclusion**

The contemporary second generation is beginning to transform the United States, as the offspring of the "new immigrants" from elsewhere in the Americas and from Asia move through schools and enter the labor market. As this population has grown, the related research has burgeoned. The questions of whether these immigrant offspring will move ahead and why some groups might progress at differing rates have sparked considerable debate.

Debate over this issue began on a note of inflected pessimism, as scholars have underscored the ways in which the circumstances of contemporary migration, combined with the low skills of many migrants, are likely to throw up obstacles to second generation progress. Many immigrants are converging on low skilled, poorly paid, stigmatized jobs and encountering a negative reception context, of which the most salient feature has been unauthorized status. The low-skilled foreign born in particular are adversely affected by labor market trends – most notably the shift from a manufacturing to service based economy, increasing the earnings premium placed on higher education (Goldin and Katz 2007). Given these hurdles, researchers have wondered whether the U.S.-born descendents of today's immigrants can surmount the difficult conditions that they encounter (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001b). Hypothesizing "segmented" assimilation, these scholars forecast

a future of lasting inequality, in which the immigrant offspring of working-class, racialized migrants – Mexicans, Central Americans, Caribbeans and others -- will stagnate or possibly even fall below the positions occupied by their working class parents (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2008).

Confronting this challenge head-on, Alba and Nee's recent effort to update assimilation theory for the 21st century -- *Remaking the American Mainstream* (2003) – contends that the forces propelling advancement for immigrants of all skill levels remain strong. On the one hand, there are significant similarities in the characteristics and labor market placement of immigrants in the current and past eras of mass migration. Whether past or present, whether from Italy or Mexico, peasant migrants and their descendents are expected to follow a similar path of upward mobility in the labor market. On the other hand, conditions affecting *all* immigrants, whether highly or lowly skilled, have changed in one crucial respect: unlike the *last* era of mass migration, labor markets are now structured in such a way as to diminish discrimination. This shift facilitates movement into the economic "mainstream," "that part of society within which ethnic and racial origins have at most minor impacts on life chances (Alba and Nee 2003: 12)" and where good jobs – of the same quality as those accessed by Italian, Polish and other children of the last mass migration – can still be found.

If the predictions of the segmented assimilation model are accurate, we would expect the high poverty rates and disadvantaged educational and occupational profiles of the foreign born to prevail among their US born children and grandchildren; Alba and Nee's revised assimilation model suggests the opposite. As we have shown in this paper, building on prior research, neither perspective provides an adequate account of today's reality. On the one hand, there is little evidence that the offspring of the least skilled immigrants are prevented from moving ahead, let alone falling behind their parents. At the aggregate level, all

indicators point to second generation progress, whether the focus is trained on poverty, education, or occupational status. Analysis of intergenerational changes at the individual level underscores those conclusions: whether occupational or educational, intergenerational transmission is lower among the children of immigrants than the children of the native born, a generalization that holds for all groups. Even among the most disadvantaged groups among whom a parental experience of undocumented status is common, upward mobility for the offspring of low-skilled immigrants prevails.

On the other hand, comparisons across groups show variations in mobility trajectories not anticipated by either of the two most influential approaches. Thus, while the children of unskilled Mexican or Salvadoran immigrants are not stagnating at the bottom, contrary to the expectations of segmented assimilation, among more advantaged Mexican or Salvadoran parents the successful transmission of their resources seems problematic, contrary to the expectations of the standard assimilation approach. This pattern of low intergenerational transmission combined with low intercepts, a pattern of upward movement from the bottom with impediments from the middle on is instead more compatible with our hypothesis of working-class incorporation. Underscoring the ways in which the circumstances of migration are likely to slow advancement for the children of working-class immigrants, the working class hypothesis is borne out by the analysis of intergenerational mobility, where we see that acquisition of U.S. citizenship and higher parental occupational status, exercise positive effects on second generation mobility.

However, our own approach only goes so far, failing to illuminate the full range of variation among the increasingly diverse population of immigrant offspring, a problem shared by the standard assimilation approach, which forecasts upward movement, without generating expectations regarding differences in rates or patterns. As we have noted, disparities in attainment and mobility often fall along an Eastern/Western Hemisphere divide, with eastern

hemisphere immigrants entering with more advantages and then experiencing greater success in transmitting those resources from parents to children. Yet that generalization also requires further complication, as there are significant differences within both the eastern and the western hemisphere streams. Furthermore, some of the seemingly more advantaged groups, most notably the Filipinos, do not seem to enjoy the uniformly high performance of the other groups of the eastern hemisphere, displaying intergenerational transmission patterns that more closely mirror the native born – a middle class or mainstream, rather than a selective or ethnic mobility integration pattern. As we suggest, these intergroup disparities may reflect differences in at-origin selectivity. Thus, the most successful group of immigrant offspring – enjoying the most consistently high educational and occupational attainment – are the Chinese, who also comprise a highly selective migration stream.

In the end, explaining the full range of inter-ethnic variation may exceed the capacity of any of the prevailing approaches: the number of groups is small; each is affected, at least to some degree, by unique historical experiences; and each is also characterized by a certain degree of at-origin heterogeneity, although that too is highly variable. Perhaps the greatest value added is to be gained through further close analysis of the children of Mexican immigrants, at once the overwhelmingly largest group of immigrant offspring, the one among whom undocumented status is most prevalent, and therefore the one most likely to be affected by the increasingly adverse conditions to which undocumented immigrants are exposed. It is the experience of this population that will largely determine the future of the new second generation and the degree to which today's immigrant offspring capture the American dream to which their parents have surely aspired.

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Table 1. Sending and Receiving Starting Points:
Age Adjusted Poverty Rates, Educational Attainment, and Occupational Attainment by National Origin

US Population 25 and Older 2006-2010

| *Ethnic Group* | Percentage in Poverty | Less than HS | College or More | Mean Occupational Status Score | Net Difference Index: Educational Selectivity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Whites 3+ Generation | .077 | .073 | .336 | 49.1 | |
| Blacks 3+ Generation | .207 | .159 | .185 | 44.4 | |
| Hispanics 3+ Generation | .143 | .202 | .159 | 45.5 | |
| | | *Foreign Born* | | | |
| *Western Hemisphere* | | | | | |
| Caribbean | .179 | .230 | .202 | 41.2 | .650 |
| Cuban | .189 | .214 | .191 | 42.5 | .399 |
| Mexico | .256 | .637 | .053 | 35.7 | .208 |
| Puerto Rican | .236 | .304 | .172 | 43.5 | -.064 |
| Salvadoran | .157 | .563 | .076 | 36.2 | .350 |
| *Asia* | | | | | |
| Chinese | .149 | .133 | .580 | 55.4 | .671 |
| Filipino | .055 | .059 | .532 | 49.8 | .597 |
| Korean | .174 | .053 | .578 | 40.6 | .525 |
| Vietnamese | .102 | .237 | .247 | 48.1 | .595 |

Foreign Born US Population 25 and Older 1980

| *Ethnic Group* | Percentage in Poverty | Less than HS | College or More | Mean Occupational Status Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Western Hemisphere* | | | | |
| Caribbean | .182 | .437 | .101 | 39.5 |
| Cuban | .136 | .367 | .175 | 44.3 |
| Mexico | .235 | .782 | .034 | 36.5 |
| Puerto Rican | .299 | .655 | .045 | 39.1 |
| Salvadoran | .196 | .557 | .078 | 36.9 |
| *Asia* | | | | |
| Chinese | .127 | .310 | .372 | 46.9 |
| Filipino | .080 | .227 | .431 | 46.5 |
| Korean | .123 | .269 | .313 | 43.4 |
| Vietnamese | .307 | .409 | .122 | 41.0 |

Note: Weighted percentages from the 1980 US 1% Census and the 2006, 2008, and 2010 March Current Population Surveys. Age adjusted with composite second generation (2006-2010) as standard population. 1.5 Generation defined as foreign born who immigrated before secondary school (younger than 13). 2nd generation are children born in the United States to at least one foreign born parent. Where national origins of the mother and father differ, the national origin of the father is used. Poverty is defined as the official poverty status of the individual's household according to the definition of poverty originally developed by the Social Security Administration in 1964, later modified by federal interagency committees in 1969 and 1980. High school completion includes GED. College completion includes a bachelors degree or higher. Occupational status scores

are created from ISCO-88 occupation codes into the International Socio-Economic Index Scores (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Net Difference Score from Feliciano (2005).

Table 2. Age-Adjusted Poverty Rates, by National Origin and Generational Status, US Population 25 and older

| *Ethnic Group* | 1980 | 2006-2010 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whites 3+ Generation | .084 | .077 | |
| Blacks 3+ Generation | .252 | .207 | |
| Hispanics 3+ Generation | .170 | .143 | |
| | 1980 | 2006-2010 | |
| | | Generation | |
| *Western Hemisphere* | 1st | 1.5 | 2nd |
| Caribbean | .182 | .071 | .133 |
| Cuban | .136 | .055 | .069 |
| Mexico | .235 | .159 | .116 |
| Puerto Rican | .299 | .202 | .154 |
| Salvadoran | .196 | .081 | .122 |
| *Asia* | | | |
| Chinese | .127 | .041 | .065 |
| Filipino | .080 | .037 | .067 |
| Korean | .123 | .075 | .081 |
| Vietnamese | .307 | .067 | .048 |
| Std. Dev | .080 | .056 | .037 |

Note: Weighted percentages from the 1980 US 1% Census and the 2006, 2008, and 2010 March Current Population Surveys. Age adjusted with composite second generation (2006-2010) as standard population. 1.5 Generation defined as foreign born who immigrated before secondary school (younger than 13). 2nd generation are children born in the United States to at least one foreign born parent. Where national origins of the mother and father differ, the national origin of the father is used. Poverty is defined as the official poverty status of the individual's household according to the definition of poverty originally developed by the Social Security Administration in 1964, later modified by federal interagency committees in 1969 and 1980.

Table 3. Age-Adjusted Rates of High School and College Completion, by National Origin and Generational Status, US Population 25 and older

| *Ethnic Group* | 1980 | | 2006-2010 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Less than HS | College or More | Less than HS | College or More |
| Whites 3+ Generation | .240 | .200 | .073 | .336 |
| Blacks 3+ Generation | .441 | .089 | .159 | .185 |
| Hispanics 3+ Generation | .475 | .080 | .202 | .159 |

| | 1980 | | 2006-2010 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Generation | | | | | |
| | 1st | | 1.5 | | 2nd | |
| *Western Hemisphere* | Less than HS | College or More | Less than HS | College or More | Less than HS | College or More |
| Caribbean | .437 | .101 | .217 | .328 | .069 | .395 |
| Cuban | .367 | .175 | .210 | .269 | .132 | .384 |
| Mexico | .782 | .034 | .406 | .093 | .239 | .156 |
| Puerto Rican | .655 | .045 | .274 | .108 | .165 | .169 |
| Salvadoran | .557 | .078 | .478 | .164 | .172 | .264 |
| *Asia* | | | | | | |
| Chinese | .310 | .372 | .192 | .552 | .043 | .669 |
| Filipino | .227 | .431 | .142 | .389 | .048 | .426 |
| Korean | .269 | .313 | .178 | .481 | .114 | .508 |
| Vietnamese | .409 | .122 | .281 | .363 | .186 | .426 |
| Std. Dev | .185 | .149 | .111 | .161 | .067 | .163 |

Note: Weighted percentages from the 1980 US 1% Census and the 2006, 2008, and 2010 March Current Population Surveys. Age adjusted with composite second generation (2006-2010) as standard population. 1.5 Generation defined as foreign born who immigrated before secondary school (younger than 13). 2nd generation are children born in the United States to at least one foreign born parent. Where national origins of the mother and father differ, the national origin of the father is used. High school completion includes GED. College completion includes a bachelors degree or higher.

Table 4. Age-Adjusted Mean Occupational Status Scores, by national origin and generational status, US Population 25 and Older 2008-2010

| *Native Group* | 1980 | 2006-2010 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| White | 45.9 | 49.1 | |
| Black | 40.3 | 44.4 | |
| Hispanic | 41.8 | 45.5 | |
| | | Generation | |
| | 1980 | 2006-2010 | |
| *Western Hemisphere* | 1st | 1.5 | 2nd |
| Caribbean | 39.5 | 50.1 | 51.1 |
| Cuban | 44.3 | 50.6 | 53.8 |
| Mexico | 36.5 | 42.1 | 45.0 |
| Puerto Rican | 39.1 | 44.2 | 46.4 |
| Salvadoran | 36.9 | 44.0 | 47.5 |
| *Asia* | | | |
| Chinese | 46.9 | 52.4 | 56.6 |
| Filipino | 46.5 | 53.3 | 55.1 |
| Korean | 43.4 | 47.4 | 54.1 |
| Vietnamese | 41.0 | 51.1 | 52.1 |
| Std. Dev | 3.900 | 4.063 | 4.126 |

Note: Weighted means from the 1980 US 1% Census and the 2006, 2008, and 2010 March Current Population Surveys. Age adjusted with composite second generation (2006-2010) as standard population. 1.5 Generation defined as foreign born who immigrated before secondary school (younger than 13). 2nd generation are children born in the United States to at least one foreign born parent. Where national origins of the mother and father differ, the national origin of the father is used. Occupational status scores are created from ISCO-88 occupation codes into the International Socio-Economic Index Scores (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Net Difference Score from Feliciano (2005).

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics, Men and Women 22-39, Los Angeles 2004

| | Whites 3+ | Blacks 3+ | Mex 3+ | Mex | S |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent's Years Education | 14.8 | 13.7 | 13.4 | 13.1 | 1 |
| Father's Years Education | 14.4 | 13.0 | 12.3 | 8.1 | 1 |
| Mother's Years Education | 13.9 | 13.3 | 12.0 | 8.1 | |
| Respondent's Occupational Prestige | | | | 43.2 | 4 |
| Father's Occupational Prestige | | | | 36.5 | 3 |
| *Generation Status* | | | | | |
| 1st: Arrived age 13+ | | | | .093 | . |
| 1.5: Arrived before 13 | | | | .307 | . |
| 2nd: Born in US | | | | .457 | . |
| 2.5: One US born parent | | | | .187 | . |
| *Legal Status* | | | | | |
| Birthright Citizen | | | | .644 | . |
| Naturalized Citizen | | | | .176 | . |
| Permanent Resident | | | | .112 | . |
| Other | | | | .067 | . |

Note: IIMMLA Multiple Imputed Data (M=30), mean and proportion estimates using Stata mi estimation commands. 1st Generation defined as foreign born who immigrated at age 13 or older, 1.5 Generation defined as foreign born who immigrated before secondary school (younger than 13). 2nd generation are children born in the United States to two foreign born parents, 2.5 generation defined as those with one foreign born, one native born parent. Where foreign national origins of the mother and father differ, the national origin of the father is used. Occupational status scores are created from ISCO-88 occupation codes into the International Socio-Economic Index Scores (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996).

Table 6. Marginal Effect and Standard Error of Years Parental Education on Years Completed Schooling, Men and Wo

| | Years Completed Schooling: Men | | | Years Co |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Father's Education | Mother's Education | In | Father's Education |
| Whites 3+ Generation | .039 | .320 | 7 | .146 |
| Std. Error | .062 | .074 | · | .067 |
| Blacks 3+ Generation | .101 | .206 | 7 | .095 |
| | .063 | .084 | · | .059 |
| Mexican 3+ Generation | .212 | .160 | 6 | .137 |
| | .079 | .073 | · | .081 |
| Mexico | .092 | .089 | 9 | .080 |
| | .033 | .035 | · | .031 |
| Salvadoran | .022 | .045 | 1 | .045 |
| | .059 | .066 | 1 | .082 |
| Chinese | .076 | .053 | 1 | .135 |
| | .067 | .066 | 2 | .059 |
| Filipino | .160 | .197 | 8 | .113 |
| | .079 | .093 | · | .083 |
| Korean | .124 | .009 | 1 | .074 |
| | .068 | .081 | 2 | .074 |
| Vietnamese | .019 | .083 | 1 | .069 |
| | .068 | .061 | 2 | .075 |

Note: IIMMLA Multiple Imputed Data (M=30), effects and standard errors computed using Stata mi estimation commands. Dependent variable is respondent's years of schooling. Models include controls for respondent's age.

Table 7. Marginal Effects and Standard Errors of Generation, Father's Occupational Prestige, and Citizenship status on Year
Men and Women 22-39, Los Angeles 2006

| | Years Completed Schooling: Men | | | Yea |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Generation (1st Generation Omitted)* | | | | |
| 1.5 Generation | .402 | .455 | | .699 |
| Std. Error | -.241 | -.241 | | -.239 |
| 2nd Generation | .472 | .508 | | 1.104 |
| | -.250 | -.250 | | -.248 |
| 2.5 Generation | .496 | .540 | | .499 |
| | -.295 | -.295 | | -.287 |
| Father's Occupational Prestige | | .013 | .011 | |
| | | -.005 | | |
| *Legal Status (Birth Citizens Omitted)* | | | | |
| Naturalized Citizens | | | | |
| Green Card / Applying for Citizenship | | | -.746 | |
| Other Status | | | | |
| Parental education, country of origin fixed effects, and interactions | X | X | | X |

Note: IIMMLA Multiple Imputed Data (M=30), marginal effects and standard errors computed using Stata mi estimation commands. Dependent variable is respondent's years of schooling. Models include controls for respondent's age, country of origin, mother's education, father's education, and interaction terms between parental education and country of origin.

Table 8. Marginal Effect and Standard Error of Father's Occupational Prestige on Respondent's Occupa
Men and Women with at least one foreign born parent ages 22-39, Los Angeles 2004

| | Occupational Prestige: Men | | Occupa |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Father's Occupational Prestige | Intercept | Father's O<br>Pre |
| Mexico | .104 | 37.7 | .0 |
| Std. Error | .068 | | .0 |
| Salvadoran | .116 | 37.9 | .0 |
| | .112 | | .1 |
| Chinese | .041 | 51.0 | .0 |
| | .074 | | .0 |
| Filipino | .195 | 38.0 | .0 |
| | .087 | | .0 |
| Korean | .011 | 50.2 | .1 |
| | .082 | | .0 |
| Vietnamese | .241 | 39.4 | .0 |
| | .103 | | .0 |

Note: IIMMLA Multiple Imputed Data (M=30), marginal effects and standard errors computed using Stata mi estimation commands. Dependent variable is the occupational prestige of respondent's primary occupation, father's occupational prestige derived from respondent's report of father's occupation during respondent's childhood. Models include controls for respondent's age.

Table 9. Marginal Effects and Standard Errors of Generation, Parental Education, and Citizenship status on Respond
Men and Women with at least one foreign born parent ages 22-39, Los Angeles 2004

| | Men | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Generation 1st Generation Omitted* | | | |
| 1.5 Generation | 4.015 | 3.450 | |
| | -1.580 | -1.572 | |
| 2nd Generation | 3.206 | 1.897 | |
| | -1.604 | -1.615 | |
| 2.5 Generation | 3.908 | 2.106 | |
| | -1.890 | -1.892 | |
| Mother's Education | | .235 | .223 |
| | | -.133 | |
| Father's Education | | .377 | .355 |
| | | -.135 | |
| *Legal Status Birth Citizens Omitted* | | | |
| Naturalized Citizens | | | 2.925 |
| Green Card / Applying for Citizenship | | | -2.630 |
| Other Status | | | -6.664 |
| Father's occupational prestige, country of origin fixed effects, and interactions | X | X | |

Note: IIMMLA Multiple Imputed Data (M=30), marginal effects and standard errors computed using Stata mi estimation commands. Dependent variable is occupational prestige of respondent's primary occupation. Models include controls for respondent's age, country of origin, father's occupational prestige, and interaction terms between parental education and country of origin.

Figure 1


Figure 2




Source: IIMMLA




Source: IIMMLA

Figure 3




Source: IIMMLA




Source: IIMMLA