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Mistranslations and Misinformation: Diplomacy on the Maine Frontier, 1725 to 1755

DAVID L. GHERE

The texts of treaties and the journals of treaty negotiations are major sources both for historians and for attorneys engaged in present-day litigation of American Indian rights and land claims. These sources are available in a field largely devoid of documentary evidence on the thoughts and motivations of American Indians. Yet, as Francis Jennings has shown, these documents must be evaluated very critically because white men's ". . . pens could be as forked as [their] tongues." Since few Indians could actually read a treaty, Jennings argues that the question to ask is not what a treaty text said but what the white interpreter told the Indians it said. In addition, white treaty commissioners frequently used misleading rhetoric or ignored issues entirely in order to postpone confrontations until such time as their governments chose to enforce a treaty. Diplomatic relations between the English and the Abenaki Indians on the Maine frontier prior to the Seven Years War (French and Indian War) offer a fascinating illustration of these deceptive practices and their effects on Indian-white relations.¹

The foundation of Anglo-Abenaki diplomacy during this period was Dummer's Treaty, negotiated at three conferences from 1725 to 1727. This agreement was renewed at every subsequent conference during the next three decades and was consis-

David L. Ghere researched and wrote this article while he was a fellow at the D'Arcy McNickle Center for the History of the American Indian within The Newberry Library in Chicago.

tently cited and praised by both the Abenakis and the English as the basis of their relationship. The Abenakis' favorable, even reverent, attitude toward the treaty contrasts with their repeated refusal to honor their promises as recorded in its text. Their failure to meet its terms contributed to the image of "Barbarous and Perfidious" Indians that was widespread among colonial leaders and was adopted later by historians.²

This article focuses on the treaty provisions concerning English land ownership, sovereignty and an Anglo-Abenaki alliance that provided much of the basis for this negative image. It documents the deliberate and systematic use of mistranslations and misinformation by Massachusetts government officials to deceive the Abenakis. While initially facilitating the Abenakis' acceptance of Dummer's Treaty, by midcentury the resulting misunderstandings thwarted Anglo-Abenaki efforts to maintain peaceful relations.

The Abenaki Indians during these thirty years can be divided into the Maine Abenakis and the Canadian Abenakis. The Maine Abenakis, who consisted primarily of 700-800 Penobscots and 210-240 Kennebecs, generally sought neutrality in Anglo-French conflicts and attempted to exploit the diplomatic rivalry for their own benefit. This independence was prompted by disappointing French alliances in the early colonial wars, French refusal of all but covert involvement in Dummer's War (1722-1727), and a series of Abenaki defeats in that Anglo-Abenaki conflict. Conversely, the Canadian Abenakis were staunch allies of the French in both warfare and diplomacy. The 700-800 St. Francis and 300-350 Becancour Indians had fled from the wars in New England to the safety of the two mission villages in Canada. Other smaller Abenaki bands existed in northern New England but had no impact on the diplomacy of the period.³

In the best of circumstances, misunderstandings were prevalent in Anglo-Abenaki relations. Structural and grammatical differences between the Abenaki and English languages made concise literal translations very difficult. Official communication between the parties, whether it be treaty text, conference dialogue or written correspondence, was translated either by English militia officers or by French missionaries. The perceptions, prejudices and motivations of these men affected the content and tone of the translations. Accuracy was not enhanced by the nature of conference negotiations where speeches were often quite

lengthy and Abenaki responses were frequently delayed by their need to confer among themselves.

Other cultural differences created confusion as well. The English considered written documents such as treaties and land deeds to be absolute legal proof of Anglo-Abenaki rights and obligations. The Abenaki based their diplomatic relations primarily on the reality of the existing frontier situation, both in terms of English actions and land possession. At conferences, Abenaki complaints or objections were usually met by adamant English demands for strict adherence to the written agreements. Facing such intransigence, Abenaki leaders would shift the discussion to other issues. This was normal practice in the consensus politics of Abenaki society, but the English perceived it as conceding to their views.

One of the disputes before Dummer's War concerned the issue of sovereignty. Despite the reality of Abenaki military and political independence, the English perceived sovereignty as the inherent right of European monarchs. Since the Abenakis had to be considered as either French or British subjects, every Anglo-Abenaki treaty after 1693 required their submission to the British Crown. Any subsequent hostilities by the Abenakis therefore constituted treason in the eyes of the English and was treated accordingly. The Abenaki repeatedly rejected this concept in their speeches at conferences (1701, 1713, 1717 and twice in 1720) and by their alliance with the French during the War of the League of Augsburg (King William's War, 1688-1699) and the War of the Spanish Succession (Queen Anne's War, 1703-1713). Yet, when confronted by English intransigence on the issue, the Abenakis secured peace by reluctantly ratifying the documents.⁴

The dispute that contributed most directly to the outbreak of Dummer's War concerned land. The Abenakis consistently claimed that the English owned no lands east of Pemaquid or north of Arrowsic Island, and they demanded the removal of Forts Richmond and St. Georges established outside these limits. Additionally they requested that definite boundaries be marked to show the extent of English territory. The English, however, ignored the boundary issue and repeatedly assured the Abenakis that no settlers would be allowed to encroach upon their lands. At the 1717 treaty conference Governor Shute of Massachusetts presented a deed documenting English ownership of land along the Kennebec River up to Fort Richmond and rejected Abenaki

claims that the area had been obtained fraudulently. During the next five years the English remained adamant on their right to settle this land, despite repeated Abenaki objections. The animosity and mistrust generated by the dispute prompted the English to seize a group of Penobscots as hostages and to raid the Kennebec village in an attempt to capture the French missionary there. These incidents and Abenaki reprisals precipitated Dummer's War.⁵

Hostilities were terminated by Dummer's Treaty without any compromise by the English on the issues of land or sovereignty. The treaty stated the English would be allowed to peacefully reoccupy, ". . . improve and for ever enjoy all . . . their Rights of Land and former Settlements." The Abenakis were required to submit to the sovereignty of the Crown and to be governed by English laws. In addition, they pledged to furnish warriors to accompany the militia in action against any tribe that broke the treaty. The treaty also required the Abenakis to admit full responsibility for starting the war.⁶

Dummer's Treaty, while primarily a reflection of the English concept of sovereignty, was also designed to enhance English diplomatic efforts to undermine Abenaki loyalty to the French. English policy was to promote discord among the Abenaki tribes and to attract disaffected Indians as allies. Massachusetts pursued these goals through government operation of the fur trade, subsidization of frontier missionaries and the dispensing of large amounts of diplomatic gifts. The treaty provisions concerning admission of guilt, submission to the king and an Anglo-Abenaki alliance against hostile Indians formally documented the tribes' obligation of future loyalty to the English. The Anglo-Abenaki alliance requirement, never included in previous treaties, was designed to force the Abenaki tribes to oppose each other in war.⁷

Considering the consistent Abenaki objections concerning the issues of land and sovereignty in previous negotiations, it is curious that they acquiesced so easily to Dummer's Treaty. The conference journals do not record the usual Indian objections to the submission to English sovereignty or any response to the new requirement of an Anglo-Abenaki alliance against Indians who remained hostile. Moreover, while the Penobscots repeatedly disputed English ownership of the lands at Forts St. Georges and Richmond during the first two conferences, there is no indication of any Abenaki reaction when at the 1726 conference a legislative committee presented deeds documenting English land

claims fifty-five miles above Fort Richmond. Abenaki spokesmen assured the English that they completely understood and accepted the treaty without ever making any reference to these provisions. Either the Abenakis totally capitulated on these issues or they were deceived about the nature of the treaty provisions.⁸

Determining the Abenakis' true understanding of Dummer's Treaty poses some difficulties. There were no copies of the document written in French or Abenaki, only English. At the three conferences the treaty text and all dialogue were translated orally by three men, John Gyles, Joseph Bean and Samuel Jordan. These men had begun their careers as interpreters a decade earlier when inaccurate translations were rendered ". . . by the Governor's express order."⁹ If this policy was continued during the negotiations of Dummer's Treaty, any discrepancies could have been perpetuated by the exclusive use of Gyles or Bean at every subsequent conference from 1727 to 1752. Thus statements attributed by the English to the Abenaki must be examined critically and compared with information from a variety of other sources. More important, the consistency of Abenaki actions over the thirty year period provides the most accurate indication of their understanding of the treaty.

Negotiations concerning the land issue dominated the first conference in November 1725 between Massachusetts and four representatives of the Penobscots. When that treaty article was translated, the Penobscots questioned the meaning of ". . . the Words former Settlements, [and asked] whether the English design to build Houses further than there are any Houses now built or Settlements made." The Massachusetts commissioners evaded the question by promising that the English would ". . . neither build or settle any where but within [their] own Bounds so settled . . ." without the Penobscots consent.¹⁰

The Penobscots, citing previous broken treaties, urged the establishment of a new foundation for peaceful relations. They claimed that all the Abenaki tribes would quickly join in the peace if Massachusetts would dismantle Forts Richmond and St. Georges. The commissioners rejected this demand and presented deeds to document their ownership of the two locations. After further discussion the boundary issue was postponed to the next conference.¹¹

At the 1726 conference the Penobscots reiterated three times their ". . . desire that no Houses or Settlement . . . be made to the Eastward of Pemaquid, or above Arrowsic." The abandon-

ment of the two forts, they argued, would eliminate all problems with the absent tribes. Rejecting these proposals, Lt. Governor Dummer countered by having the legislative committee present all deeds documenting English ownership. Finally realizing that Dummer would never dismantle the forts, the Penobscots resolved to relinquish the disputed land ". . . to effect a good understanding . . ." but twice demanded that ". . . no other Houses be built there or thereabouts." Dummer failed to make any response.¹²

The journal of the meeting between the land claims committee and the Penobscots lists twenty-nine deeds documenting the full extent of English land ownership. A careful reading of the text indicates, however, that the Penobscots examined only the deeds pertaining to the sites of the two forts and the disputed land between them. "As to the Deeds for the Lands on Kennebeck River, . . ." the Penobscots urged that ". . . they should be shewn to the Kennebeck Indians." Subsequent discussions concerning land at the 1726 conference focused exclusively on the two forts. The Penobscots' limited knowledge is also substantiated by an early reference to the "small Tract of Land" in dispute and by their final demand, already quoted, that no additional settlements be made.¹⁴

The issue of land was not raised at the final conference in July 1727, at which all the Abenakis were represented. No boundary between English and Indian land ownership was ever established, and English claims along the Kennebec River above Fort Richmond were never revealed. The Penobscots had convinced the other Abenakis of the necessity of conceding the land around Forts Richmond and St. Georges to secure peace. The Indians believed that these two forts, located near the head of the tide waters, marked the limit of English land.¹⁵

Anglo-Abenaki misunderstandings concerning the sovereignty and alliance provisions of Dummer's Treaty resulted from a different set of circumstances. The first indication of a problem occurred when the four Penobscot representatives to the 1725 conference returned to their village with a copy of the treaty. Father Etienne Lauverjat, a Jesuit, rendered a translation of the document (hereafter referred to as the French version) that was markedly different from that of the English interpreters (hereafter referred to as the English version). When the Penobscots confronted Joseph Bean with this information, he reiterated the English version and charged the priest with misleading them.

Lauverjat's version of the treaty was communicated to the Canadian Abenakis, who rejected it and continued to attack English settlements.¹⁶

The 1726 conference provided two further indications that something was amiss. First, the Penobscots asked Samuel Jordan to translate the treaty, claiming they understood him better than they did the others. His version proved identical, however, to the one previously rendered by Gyles and Bean. Then the Penobscot spokesman, Loron, stated his suspicion ". . . that the Articles of Peace . . . delivered to him . . . were not of the same Purport with those . . . Deposited and left in the Hands of the Government." He requested that the two copies be exchanged and inspected to insure they were the same. Father Lauverjat later examined the new copy of the treaty and reiterated his own earlier translation.¹⁷

This confusion prompted a letter from Loron protesting the mistranslations. He claimed to have made no ". . . submission . . . to King George" or ". . . acknowledged your king for my king." He further disavowed any pledge of alliance against hostile Indians or any admission of being the first to have broken the peace. He requested that future correspondence be written in French, which many Indians understood, so that ". . . the Interpreter may not be tax'd with Interpreting in an other sense."¹⁸

The following June, representatives of the Penobscot and St. Francis Indians, accompanied by Lauverjat, confronted John Gyles on the differing translations. Their stated purpose was to resolve the differences between the Penobscots' understanding of the treaty derived from the English interpreters and that of the other tribes derived from the priest. After refusing to allow Lauverjat to record his words in the Abenaki language, Gyles rendered the English version of the document. When asked whether the Abenakis understood the articles, Loron replied "Yes" but indicated Gyles did ". . . not Reed them, as ye Jesuitt Red em." Loron then stated that the Indians believed Gyles's translation was an accurate one.¹⁹

All the Abenaki tribes endorsed Dummer's Treaty at the conference in July 1727, and the Abenaki dialogue, as translated, gave little evidence of any misunderstandings. Yet Abenaki suspicions are indicated by their demand for accurate translations as the meeting commenced and by their later request that the English not hide anything from them. Toward the end of the conference Auyaummowett, head of the St. Francis delegation,

voiced pleasure that "Everything that lay in the way as a Stumbling Block . . . [had been] cleared away before [they] came from Canada." The "stumbling blocks" were the articles concerning sovereignty and an Anglo-Abenaki alliance, as translated by Father Laverjat, which had caused the Canadian Abenakis to reject the treaty during the preceding two years. These had been "cleared away" when the St. Francis representatives heard Gyles's translation of the treaty the previous month. The text had not changed.²⁰

These hints of mistranslations recorded in the 1727 conference journal are confirmed by two documents sent to French officials after the conference. The first, from Loron, reviewed the negotiations and specifically repudiated any admission of guilt, submission to the king or pledge of alliance against other Indians. Protesting "the diversity and contrariety of the interpretations," Loron urged, that "if . . . any one should produce any writing that makes me speak otherwise, pay no attention to it."²¹ The second document was signed by a number of Penobscot tribal leaders as well as by Laverjat and an Acadian named Alexandre le Borgne de Belisle who had accompanied the Indians to the conference. They repeated Loron's denials and claimed that the English interpreters had eliminated certain clauses from their translation of the treaty text and conference dialogue.²²

These two documents provide the best insight into the Indians' understanding of the treaty. The Abenakis considered themselves independent equals of the French and English and subject to neither. Loron declared that "God hath willed that I have no King, and that I be master of my lands in common." According to the English version of the treaty, the Indians merely saluted the English governor and agreed to make peace with him. The governor then reciprocated by saluting the Abenaki leaders and agreeing to make peace with them. Thus both the treaty provisions, as translated, and the ceremonial procedures at the conferences indicated a negotiation between equals rather than a submission of one to the other.²³

The pledge of alliance against recalcitrant Indians had also been mistranslated. The Abenakis thought they were renewing a promise from previous treaties to inform the governor of impending hostilities. In addition, they pledged all their efforts to ". . . endeavor to pacify [hostile Indians] by fair words." When frontier raids by the Canadian Abenakis continued before the

1727 conference, Penobscot actions had been limited to warning English settlements and dissuading some war parties from attacking them.²⁴

It may seem puzzling that the Abenaki tribes endorsed Dummer's Treaty when they were well aware of the differences between the English and French versions. Their motivation to end the conflict resulted from devastating losses in the war and from the desire of many Abenakis to return to their homelands in Maine. Furthermore, the Indians were uncertain how to respond when the English steadfastly avowed that their translations were accurate. Loron's letter was an effort to record the Abenaki Indians' understanding of Dummer's Treaty and communicate it "all over the earth."²⁵

Dummer's Treaty was followed by seventeen years of frontier peace during which both sides consistently revered this agreement. Such incidents as did occur involved damage to property or livestock and were settled amicably at the annual conferences. There is no record of Indian objections to the treaty provisions; it should be noted, however, that John Gyles and Joseph Bean were the only translators used throughout the entire period. More important, the sovereignty and alliance issues were moot points in peacetime. Massachusetts did not need to exercise the king's sovereignty by conducting military operations, erecting forts or demanding warrior support. The colony never attempted to impose English law upon the tribes. The only requirement of the Abenaki's "submission" was the exchange of salutes with the governor's representative at the annual conferences.²⁶

A survey of the Abenakis' actions and statements during the period indicates their continued rejection of the provisions concerning sovereignty and alliance. When Micmacs attacked English settlements in Nova Scotia in late 1727, the Penobscots' response was limited to successfully convincing the Micmacs to cease their hostilities; a considerable accomplishment. In 1732 the Maine Abenakis arrived at a conference flying two French flags in their canoes, prompting the governor to refuse to meet with them.²⁷ At the 1740 conference Loron claimed that the Abenakis would remain neutral in any Anglo-French conflict, as they were "a free People." However, he confirmed the Indians' obligation to warn the English whenever attacks were imminent. This determination to remain neutral in colonial disputes was reiterated four years later by other Penobscot leaders who asserted that any

outbreak of hostilities would be the fault of the English, not themselves.²⁸

There were serious disputes concerning the land issue during the 1730s. When Governor Belcher proposed in 1732 to build a settlement at Cushnoc Falls above Fort Richmond, Wiwurna, the Kennebec chief, replied that he could not sell that land "without the Consent of the other Owners" in his tribe. Belcher failed to respond to this declaration of ownership but dropped his plan.²⁹ A few years later the Penobscots protested settlement growth beyond the tidewater of the St. Georges River, and in 1736 a tribal delegation was sent to the Massachusetts legislature to argue that these encroachments were violations of Dummer's Treaty. The legislature ultimately agreed, and a boundary was established at the head of tide on the St. Georges.³⁰

Abenaki speeches at two later conferences provide concise statements of their understanding of the extent of English ownership. At the 1740 conference the St. Francis Indians stated that the ". . . English were to Settle on the Sea Coasts, and the Indians were to hold the back lands."³¹ Two years later, at a conference attended by all the tribes, Loron claimed, "It was said in the Time of Governour Dummer's Treaty, the English desir'd to go no further than the salt-water relished. The English then told us, they would not step a Foot over that Line."³² Governor William Shirley later assured the Indians that the English would not ". . . settle any other Lands than what [they had] agreed to."³³

The relatively harmonious relations following Dummer's Treaty ended with the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (King George's War) in 1744. Uncertain about the reaction of the Penobscots to the murder of one of their tribe and false reports of their involvement in raids in Nova Scotia, Massachusetts demanded warrior support against the Micmacs and Maliseets. Although the Penobscots refused, both they and the Kennebecs informed Massachusetts about hostile Indian activities in adjacent areas and sought to dissuade other Indians from attacking the New England frontier. While the effectiveness of these efforts is difficult to gauge, no hostilities occurred in New England until sixteen months after the Anglo-French conflict had commenced. When Pemaquid and Fort St. Georges were attacked in July 1745, Massachusetts sought to divide the Abenakis by invoking their treaty commitments. Governor Shirley demanded that the two Maine tribes either furnish thirty war-

rriors as scouts or offer hostages to insure the tribes' neutrality. When the Indians failed to comply, Massachusetts declared war on them on August 23.³⁴

The Treaty of Falmouth in 1749 terminated this conflict with a simple restatement of Dummer's Treaty. Although there is no recorded evidence of mistranslations, the conference dialogue revealed the Indians' continued rejection of the English concept of sovereignty. Kennebec and Penobscot spokesmen declared that they were ready to make peace because their French allies had already done so. Furthermore, they indicated their willingness to renew hostilities if the Anglo-French conflict resumed. The British angrily denounced their attitude and threatened to suspend the conference. Fearing a continuation of the war, the Maine Abenakis promised to observe the peace regardless of future Anglo-French relations.³⁵

Unfortunately, this treaty was followed by two years of strife and tension on the frontier. On December 2, 1749, near Wiscasset, six White men attacked a party of Kennebec and St. Francis Indians returning from the Falmouth conference, killing one. Eventually, after numerous delays, the murderers were acquitted or released from custody.³⁶ Exasperated, a force of over a hundred Abenakis attacked Fort Richmond and the surrounding settlements in September 1750. The English avoided disaster because the Kennebecs, acting on their understanding of Dummer's Treaty, had warned the fort two days before the attack. When the Canadian Abenakis renewed their raids the following summer, Penobscots and Kennebecs continued to warn the English settlements of imminent assaults.³⁷

These two tribes sought to mediate an end to the warfare in August 1751. Serving as representatives for the Canadian Abenakis, they negotiated a cessation of hostilities with the English and protested a recent expansion of settlement north of Fort Richmond. The English treaty commissioners ignored this complaint, Lieutenant Governor Phipps having instructed them to avoid ". . . all Controversies respecting any land claimed . . ." by the English.³⁸

The following year all the Abenaki tribes reconfirmed Dummer's Treaty with no objection to any of its provisions. However, the negotiations revealed their true understanding of the treaty. Rejecting British sovereignty, the Indian spokesman stated that God ". . . decreed this land to us, therefore neither shall the

French or English possess it, but we will. This is agreeable both to King George and to the French King." The latter statement is very puzzling if one assumes that the translations of Dummer's Treaty over the previous twenty-seven years were accurate. The commissioners failed to respond to this assertion or to the Indians' advocacy of ". . . proceeding upon Dummer's Treaty, by which it was concluded, that the English should inhabit the lands as far as the salt water flowed, and no further." Later, the Kennebecs renewed their protests concerning Frankfort, the new settlement north of Fort Richmond, and the Penobscots complained about hunters trespassing on their territory. The treaty commissioners avoided these concerns by promising that the government would examine the problems.³⁹

These issues developed into a diplomatic crisis the following year. During the spring of 1753, the Kennebecs dispatched four successive protests to Governor Shirley threatening violence if Frankfort was not abandoned. Likewise, a Penobscot letter renewed the protest concerning trespassers on their land. In April a legislative committee confirmed the validity of English claims along the Kennebec River but directed militia captains "to keep the Indians quiet" until the government was ready to announce the decision. Upon receipt of the Penobscot complaint the legislature determined to satisfy that tribe in an effort to undermine their support for the Kennebecs concerning Frankfort. The militia escorted the offending hunters back to the English settlements, but they returned in a few weeks. This prompted the legislature to issue warrants for their arrest and they were taken as prisoners to Boston. Then the Massachusetts commissioners to the 1753 conference took the unusual step of meeting separately with the two Maine tribes. At the conference at Fort St. Georges, the Penobscots indicated their appreciation for the persistence of Massachusetts efforts to remove the hunters but the claims along the Kennebec River were not mentioned.⁴¹

At the second meeting the commissioners informed the Kennebecs of the legislature's confirmation of the settlers' right to the land at Frankfort. Furthermore, presenting the original deeds, they revealed for the first time that English ownership extended fifty-five miles above Fort Richmond. Strongly objecting to this assertion, the Kennebecs held that Dummer's Treaty had promised no settlements north of Fort Richmond and challenged the validity of the deeds. Who sold the land? Why had their ancestors not told them? Were they intoxicated at the time? What

was the price paid for the land? Why was the cost not specified in the deed? Faced with English intransigence, the Kennebecs sought compromise by agreeing to accept the existing settlement if no others were located farther up the river. Four times they repeated their unwillingness to allow any cabins above Frankfort, but the commissioners failed to respond.⁴²

The conference of 1753 provided a startling revelation to the Abenakis. Previously the Massachusetts government had never informed the Indians of the full extent of its land claims. None of the deeds revealed at the conferences in 1717, 1725 or 1726 concerned the land north of Fort Richmond. Questions about claims and boundaries had always been either ignored or answered so ambiguously that the Indians felt their position had been accepted. In the twenty-eight years since Dummer's Treaty had first been negotiated, the English had never voiced disagreement with the view the Abenakis repeatedly expressed.

Frontier tension escalated in the months following the conference. Kennebecs visiting Frankfort or Fort Richmond issued numerous threats against the settlers. Large numbers of Canadian Abenakis pledged resistance to the English settlements, and French Governor Duquesne promised to provide forts and troops to protect the Kennebecs if desired. However, when the Penobscots learned of the English land claims, their reaction was limited to a letter of protest to Governor Shirley. Otherwise, they continued their friendly attitude toward the English.⁴³

At this crucial moment in Anglo-Abenaki relations, English decisions on the Maine frontier were dictated by the dispute with France. French construction of a series of frontier forts from 1749 to 1754 promoted English fears of being encircled. Early in 1754 the Massachusetts government received three separate reports of a new French fortress and settlement at the head of the Kennebec River. This news prompted Governor Shirley to propose a military expedition to eliminate French installations on the Kennebec and to construct an English fort at Taconic Falls, thirty-seven miles above Fort Richmond. Shirley was completely aware of the probable Indian reaction, but he already expected hostilities because of the recent murder of four St. Francis Indians in New Hampshire and Maine. He again scheduled separate conferences with the Maine tribes as the first activities of the expedition. His intent was to intimidate the tribes with a large militia force and then launch the expedition before the Abenakis and the French could unite to oppose it.⁴⁴

Meeting first with the Kennebecs in late June, Shirley detailed the threat to them posed by the French fort and revealed his plans for the expedition. He had the treaty provisions concerning sovereignty, Anglo-Abenaki alliance and English rights to land translated and the pertinent deeds presented. In a lengthy discourse Shirley utilized a variety of arguments to justify the expedition and threatened the tribe's total destruction if they resisted these plans. Later Shirley detailed a series of raids conducted by the St. Francis Indians just prior to the conference and demanded that the Kennebecs provide warriors to join the English in attacking them.⁴⁵

The Kennebecs were shocked by the tone and content of this speech. Shirley had informed them that the conference's purpose would be to satisfy their concerns about their land. Instead, Massachusetts stood ready to wrench their land from them. Claiming there was no French fort, they contended that the English had promised in Dummer's Treaty to build no forts above Fort Richmond and that all would be well if both sides adhered to that agreement. The Indians twice avoided the demand for warrior support by stating they would do everything in their power to prevent future incidents. The following morning the English intentions were reiterated and the Kennebecs were threatened with utter destruction if they refused to confirm Dummer's Treaty. Faced by the 800 militiamen, the twenty-seven Kennebec (probably their total warrior strength) reluctantly signed the treaty without giving any verbal affirmation of its provisions.⁴⁶

When the Penobscots arrived at the conference on July 5th, the expedition was already ascending the Kennebec River. After being informed of Shirley's plans, the Penobscots also denied the existence of a French fort and vowed never to allow either a French or a British fortification on their river. However, Penobscot land was not in dispute and Massachusetts had responded to the tribe's complaints concerning settlers at St. Georges in the 1730s and trespassing hunters in 1753. Moreover, the English were intransigent and the Penobscots realized their protest would have no effect except to generate English suspicions of them. They ignored the topic and simply acquiesced by ratifying the treaty.⁴⁷

Governor Shirley again emphasized the treaty commitment pledging warrior support to subdue any tribe which broke the agreement. After detailing the recent activities of the St. Francis

Indians, the Penobscots were pressed three times to provide warrior assistance “. . . in reducing these Indians to Reason.” They responded with a promise to warn the English of impending attacks and to use their “. . . utmost Endeavours to prevent these Indians from doing any more Mischief.” The conference concluded with a warning that if those efforts proved ineffective, the English would insist upon their warriors’ support.⁴⁸

As the Abenakis had claimed, there was no French fort on the Kennebec River. Indian reaction to the military expedition was restrained until the militia departed in mid-October. Then, a large war party of Canadian Abenakis and Kennebecs approached the newly constructed English fort at Taconic, designated Fort Halifax, hoping to surprise and overpower the garrison. On October 30, they encountered a six man logging detachment, killing or capturing all but one member who succeeded in warning the fort. The subsequent attack was unsuccessful and the Kennebecs, fearing reprisals, either emigrated to the Canadian missions or joined the Penobscots.⁴⁹

The English were uncertain about the Penobscots’ response to the fighting, but three letters from Penobscot leaders asserting a strong desire for peace relieved their anxieties. This correspondence specifically stated the tribe’s understanding of its treaty commitments: to warn of Indian raids and, whenever possible, dissuade them. The Penobscot Indians revealed their efforts to prevent the recent attacks and pledged to adhere to this promise in the future. While Massachusetts never officially accepted the Penobscots’ interpretation of the treaty, they tacitly conceded by dropping all other demands and praising the tribe’s adherence to its commitments. The absence of Indian raids during the winter contributed to this friendly attitude and no demands for warrior support were made for six months.⁵⁰

The Canadian Abenakis resumed hostilities in late April 1755, prompting Massachusetts to declare war and establish scalp bounties on all the Abenakis, except the Penobscots. In early June the frontier raids, which had previously been confined to areas further west, reached the St. Georges River area. Although there was no indication of Penobscot involvement in these attacks, many settlers and colonial leaders assumed the tribe was responsible. This prompted a renewal of Massachusetts’ demand for an alliance with the tribe. On June 14, 1755 Governor Shirley dispatched a letter to the tribe requesting that their warriors join the

English to attack the hostile Indians. He also expressed appreciation for the Penobscot Indians' efforts to maintain peace.⁵¹

His letter was communicated to the Penobscots in late June by Captain Jabez Bradbury, Fort St. Georges commander. After the meeting the chiefs prepared to depart to consult with their tribe, camped nearby at Owls Head. Captain Thomas Fletcher, a local militia officer, informed the Penobscot Indians they would not be allowed to leave until they agreed to the governor's demands. He was supported by most of the fort's garrison who ignored Bradbury's efforts to reassert his authority. Faced with this threat to their lives, the tribal leaders agreed to join the English in attacks against the Canadian Abenakis and pledged to become English allies if an Anglo-French war ensued. As proof of their sincerity, they volunteered to provide three hostages.⁵²

Five days later this potential Anglo-Penobscot alliance was shattered by a tragic frontier incident. A band of scalp hunters encountered the Penobscot camp at Owls Head, killing fourteen. Lieutenant Governor Phipps sought to soothe the American Indians' anger by quickly releasing the hostages and dispatching two letters which expressed his condolences and offered compensatory presents to the tribe. (Shirley was commanding an expedition in New York.) His correspondence also withdrew the demand for warrior support and promised justice through the Massachusetts court system. The Penobscots' brief reply expressed their profound grief and ignored or rejected all of Phipps's proposals.⁵³

This curt, cold response prompted a new policy, after considerable legislative debate, which Phipps communicated to the tribe in mid-August. It insisted the Penobscots camp near Fort St. Georges but did not require their warriors to join the British. Phipps repeated his promises of compensatory presents and justice against the murderers and concluded by arguing that failure to relocate might result in more tragic incidents in the future. However, Owls Head had confirmed Penobscot fears of proximity to the English. The tribe responded with a generally conciliatory letter which expressed their disappointment in the relocation demand.⁵⁴

On September 24th, a Canadian Indian war party interrupted this diplomacy by attacking near St. Georges. Most settlers and government leaders assumed this raid had been conducted by

the Penobscots but Phipps demanded confirmation from Captain Bradbury. He also sent a letter to the tribe which repeated all the promises and proposals of mid-August.⁵⁵ However, fearing reprisals, the Penobscots had fled from the area and no Indian visited Fort St. Georges to receive the message. By late October Bradbury also assumed the tribe's involvement in the recent incident and Massachusetts promptly declared war against the Penobscots. Thus ended three decades of diplomacy based on Dummer's Treaty.⁵⁶


It is clear from this survey of Abenaki statements and actions as well as colonial documents that the Massachusetts government conducted a policy of deception concerning the land issue. During the negotiation of Dummer's Treaty, the Abenakis had argued that English ownership did not extend to the areas around Forts Richmond and St. Georges and had requested the establishment of a definitive boundary. When the Indians finally conceded to the forts, they were deceived by misleading rhetoric into believing these forts marked the limit of English land claims. At numerous conferences during the next three decades, the Indians voiced their understanding of this boundary without ever encountering an objection. Massachusetts never revealed the deeds documenting their ownership to land above Fort Richmond and at the 1751 and 1752 conferences the commissioners were specifically instructed to avoid discussing the land issue.

Likewise, Abenaki statements and actions concerning English sovereignty and an Anglo-Abenaki alliance contrast sharply with the pledges attributed to them during the negotiation of Dummer's Treaty. These provisions are repudiated in both of Loron's letters as well as the statement signed by Louverjat and various Penobscot leaders. Their rejection of English sovereignty was revealed in Indian speeches or actions at the 1732, 1740, 1744, 1749, 1752, 1753 and 1754 conferences. Their disavowal of the pledge of military support was substantiated by the acts and correspondence of the Maine Abenakis during the four periods of warfare (1725-8, 1744-5, 1750-1 and 1754-5) in which they sought to remain neutral. In each case they refused to send warriors against the hostile tribes but were quite diligent in warning the English of Indian raids and in dissuading the attackers.

Underlying these deceptions were the ethnocentric attitudes which permeated all English relations with the Abenakis. While

the Indians consistently sought communication and negotiation concerning troublesome issues, English interpreters and governmental officials ignored and postponed disputes until they could militarily enforce Abenaki compliance with the "correct" understanding of Dummer's Treaty. Confident of their cultural superiority, they considered only the effects of Indian resistance, not the validity of Indian arguments. Considering treaty documents and deeds as irrefutable evidence, Massachusetts leaders and frontier settlers dismissed Abenaki protests as confirmation of the untrustworthy nature of the "savages."

Throughout the three decades between Dummer's War and the Seven Years War, the Maine Abenakis had sought neutrality in Anglo-French disputes. The two differing interpretations of Dummer's Treaty were preserved for two decades by frontier peace and limited English settlement. During the third decade, however, expanding English settlements, exercise of sovereignty and insistence on warrior support ultimately thwarted Anglo-Abenaki peace efforts, resulting in Massachusetts' declarations of war in the last two colonial wars. The seeds for this clash had been sown in the mistranslations and misleading rhetoric which had originally prompted the Abenakis to accept Dummer's Treaty.



Sources: Gerald E. Morris, Ed., *The Maine Bicentennial Atlas: An Historical Survey*. (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1976), plates 11-13; "Plymouth's Patent of Territory on the Kennebec," Maine Historical Society, Misc. collection.

NOTES

1. Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), pp. vii, 123-24. Quote from p. vii.

2. Quote from the title of Benjamin Coleman, "Some Memoirs for the Continuation of the History of the Troubles of the New English Colonies, From the Barbarous and Perfidious Indians, . . . Began November 3, 1726," *Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections*, 1st. Series, Volume C (1799): 108-18. For a sample of historians, see Jeremy Belknap, *The History of New Hampshire*, 3 volumes. (Philadelphia: Robert Aitken, 1784), 1:124-25; William D. Williamson, *The History of the State of Maine*, 2 volumes. (Hallowell, Me.: Glazier, Masters, 1832), 2:218, 234-45, 388-89, 302; Samuel G. Drake, *A Particular History of the Five Years French and Indian War* (Boston: Samuel G. Drake, 1870), pp. 32-34; Francis Parkman, *A Half-Century of Conflict*, 2 volumes. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1892), 2:246-47. More recent historians have either ignored the period or the issue in their works.

3. There are various interpretations of Abenaki tribal organization as well as numerous names and spellings of each tribe. I have followed William C. Sturtevant, General Editor, *Handbook of North American Indians*, 20 volumes. (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978-), volume 15: *Northeast*, Bruce G. Trigger, Ed., pp. 137-59. Sources used for these population estimates include Sturtevant, *Handbook*, p. 145; "John Gyles' Statement on the Number of Indians," *Maine Historical Society, Collections* 3(1853):357-58; [Maray de la Chauvinerie] "Denombre des Nations sauvages qui ont rapport au gouvernement de Canada," *Bulletin des Recherches Historiques* 34:541-51; Wendell, "An Estimate of the Inhabitants, English and Indian in the North American Colonies, . . . 1726," *New England Historical and Genealogical Register* 20(1866): 7-9; P. Andre Sevigny, *Les Abenakis: habitat et migrations* (Montreal: Cahiers d'Histoire des Jesuites, 1976); Gordon M. Day, *The Identity of the Saint Francis Indians* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1981), pp. 35-45.

4. These comments are based on a survey of American Indian conferences from 1694 to 1720 in James P. Baxter, Ed., *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, 24 volumes (Portland, Me.: Tower, 1916), 23:11, 23, 31-57, 64-87, 94-108; and Maine Historical Society, *Collections* 3:361-75.

5. "Conference . . . with Eastern Indians, 1717," Maine Historical Society, *Collections*, series 1, 3(1853):352, 367, 369; Two Indian Conferences during 1720, *Massachusetts Archives, 1622-1799* (Stoughton, Mass.: Graphic Microfilm), 29:57-74. For an overview of this period, see Kenneth Myron Morrison's dissertation "People of the Dawn: The Abenaki and their relations with New England and New France, 1600-1727" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maine, 1975) or his new book *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

6. "Conference with the Eastern Indians at the further Ratification of the Peace, held in Falmouth in Casco-Bay, in July 1727," Maine Historical Society, *Collections*, 3(1853): pp. 416-20. Quote from p. 417.

7. For a more comprehensive assessment of the various influences on Anglo-Abenaki diplomacy, see David L. Ghere, "The Twilight of Abenaki Independen-

dence: The Maine Abenaki During the 1750's" (M.A. Thesis, University of Maine, 1980).

8. "Conference . . . 1727," pp. 407-47; "Conference with the Eastern Indians, at the Ratification of the Peace, Held at Falmouth in Casco-Bay, in July and August, 1726," *Maine Historical Society, Collections*, 3:377-405; Conference with the Delegates of the Eastern Indians, November 11-December 1, 1725, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:186-202.

9. Bannister to Council of Trade, June 6 to December, Edward T. Harrington, *History of the Archdiocese of Boston* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944), 1:3. See Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*, pp. 170-71 for the full quotation and supporting argument. I am indebted to Mr. Morrison for alerting me to this material.

10. Conference with the Delegates of the Eastern Indians, November 11-December 1, 1725, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:195.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-99; Monsieur de Vaudreuil au Ministre, November 18, 1725, *Collection de documents relatifs a l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France* (Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada, 1970), 3:114; Memoire du Roi aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnois et Dupey, May 14, 1726, *Ibid.*, p. 128.

12. "Conference . . . 1726," pp. 383-92. Quotes from pp. 388 and 392.

13. *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:203-8. Quote from p. 208. The deeds on this list which were not revealed to the Indians included #11 Chogoandoe to Lake and Spencer; #12 Wassamack to Lake and Spencer, June 25, 1653; #13 Agebedosett and Kennebas to Lawson, Spencer and Lake, May 4, 1653; #14 Agebedosett and Kennebas to Lawson, October 10, 1649; #15 Robin Hood to John Richards, April 20, 1649; and #28 Agadoagmagor and Sknumbee to Lake and Spencer.

14. "Conference . . . 1726," pp. 390-93. Quote from p. 390. See also Memoire du Roi aux Sieurs Marquis de Beauharnois et Dupey, April 29, 1727, *Collection de documents*, 3:130-31.

15. "Conference . . . 1727," pp. 407-47.

16. Rapport de MM. Longueil et Begon au Ministre, October 31, 1725, *Collection de documents* 3:125; Note du Ministre sur les Depeches de L'annee Derriere, May 2, 1725, *Ibid.*, p. 126; Edmund Mountfort to Lt. Governor Dummer, February 18, 1726, *Documentary History of Maine*, 10:239-40.

17. "Conference . . . 1726," pp. 382, 394. Quote from p. 394.

18. Indian letter, January 28, 1726, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:209-10.

19. Memorial of a Conference at St. Georges River, June 26-27, 1727, *Ibid.*, pp. 213-17. Quote from p. 215.

20. "Conference . . . July, 1727," pp. 414, 421, 425. Quote from p. 425.

21. Indian Explanation of the Treaty at Casco Bay, 1727, E.B. O'Callaghan, Ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, 15 volumes (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1855-61), 9:966-67.

22. Most prominent among the leaders were J.S.H. Dibavis de St. Castin and Barenos [Joseph Abbadie] St. Castin, the sons of the famous Baron St. Castin and his Abenaki wife Pidianske. Alexandre le Borgne de Belisle was married to a daughter of this union. Traite de Paix Entre les Anglois et les Abenakis, August, 1727, *Collection de documents*, 3:134-35.

23. Quote from Indian Explanation of the Treaty, p. 967; *Traite de Paix*, pp. 134–35; R.P. Lauerjat à Monsieur le Marquis de Vaudreuil, *Collection de documents*, p. 136.

24. Quote from Indian Explanation of the Treaty, *Ibid.*; Assorted letters to Governor Dummer from October 1726 to May 1727, *Documentary History of Maine*, 10:359–61, 365–68, 391–92.

25. Quote from Indian Explanation of the Treaty, pp. 966–67; Lettre du Ministre à Monsieur le Marquis de Beauharnois, May 13, 1726, *Collection de documents*, 3:132.

26. Various Indian conferences, 1727 to 1744, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:217–71, 276–80, 290–91; Massachusetts Bay Colony, *A Conference at Falmouth in Casco-Bay* [July 1732], (Boston: B. Green, 1732); Massachusetts Bay Colony, *A Conference Held at St. Georges* [August 1742], (Boston: Draper, 1742).

27. Conference with Indians, December 9, 1727, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:217–21; Indian letter to Governor Dummer, July 3, 1728, *Ibid.*, pp. 231–32; *Conference at Falmouth* [1732], p. 3.

28. Indian Conference [1740], *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:265–68, quote from p. 267; Jabez Bradbury to Governor, June 18, 1744, *ibid.*, pp. 290–91.

29. *Conference at Falmouth* [1732], p. 12.

30. *Journal of the House of Representatives*, June 25, July 2, 3, 1736; *Records of the Council*, June 25, July 2, 1736; Indian Conference at Boston, June 25, 1736, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:236–38; Conference with Penobscot and Norridgewalk Indians, July 1738, *Ibid.*, pp. 247–52.

31. Indian Conference [1740], p. 263.

32. *Conference at St. Georges* [1742], p. 7.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

34. Declaration of War, October 19, 1744, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:296–97; Shirley to Captain Bradbury, January 25, 1745, *Ibid.*, pp. 298–99; Shirley to the Lords of Trade, August 10, 1744, *Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731–1760*, Ed. Charles Henry Lincoln, 2 Volumes (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 1:138–39; *Journal of the House*, August 23, 1745.

35. Massachusetts Bay Province, *A Journal of the Proceedings to the Commissioners . . . of the Peace . . . at Falmouth*, (Boston: Draper, [1749]).

36. *Records of the Council*, December 13, 28, 29 and 30, 1749; Indians to Massachusetts, April 17 and June 9, 1750, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:328–29.

37. Governor Lajonquiere to the French Foreign Minister, October 18, 1750 and October 13, 1751, *Collection de documents*, 3:493–94, 505–6; Penobscots to Phipps, August 3, 13, and September 12, 1751, *Massachusetts Archives*, 32:177, 182, 199–200; Bradbury to Phipps, April 22, 1751, *Ibid.*, p. 130; Lithgow to Phipps, May 15 and July 9, 1751, *Ibid.*, pp. 136–38, 155.

38. Quote from Instructions to commissioners on how to treat with the Eastern Indians, August 15, 1751, *Ibid.*, p. 189; Proclamation concerning the Eastern Indians, September 3, 1751, *Ibid.*, pp. 197–98; Report on Conference, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:412–23.

39. "Treaty with the Eastern Indians, 1752," Maine Historical Society, *Collections*, series 1, 4(1857):174–78. Quotes from p. 174. The settlement along the Kennebec River that concerned the Abenakis was part of the Plymouth Patent, first granted in 1629. Additional purchases from the Indians in 1648 and 1653

had extended the Plymouth Company's lands far up the Kennebec River. The proprietors, interested in the fur trade, had located trading posts at Cushnoc and Taconic Falls, but no settlements were ever established. After the posts were destroyed in King Phillip's War, the Plymouth Company's claims lay dormant for three-quarters of a century. At the conclusion of King George's War the descendants of the Plymouth proprietors renewed the claims and established a township at Frankfort. Robert Gardiner, "History of the Kennebec Purchase," *Maine Historical Society, Collections, Series 1*, 2(1846):274-81; Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607-1763" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1933), pp. 421, 427-29, 434-35.

40. Lithgow to Shirley, March 26, 1753, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:445; Penobscot letter, April 25, 1753, *Ibid.*, p. 448; Lithgow to Shirley, April 7 and May 13, 1753, *Massachusetts Archives*, 32:341-42, 359; Kennebecs to Shirley, June 10, 1753, *Ibid.*, p. 363; Quote from Report of Committee on Indiana Complaints, April 11, 1753, *Ibid.*, p. 344.

41. Report of legislative committee, June 12, 1753, *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:448; Phipps to Bradbury, June 13, 1753, *Ibid.*, pp. 449; Warrant against Ebenezer Hall, *Ibid.*, p. 451; Shirley to Legislature, September 13, 1753, *Ibid.*, 12:224; Massachusetts Bay Province, *A Conference Held at St. Georges [1753]* (Boston: Kneeland, 1753), pp. 3-11.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-21.

43. Massachusetts Bay Province, *A Journal of the Proceedings at Two Conferences [1754]* (Boston: Draper, 1754), p. 15; Shirley to Penobscots, [March 1754], *Documentary History of Maine*, 23:452-55; Shirley's speech, March 28, 1754, *Ibid.*, 12:247; Governor Duquesne to the French Foreign Minister, October 10, 1754, *Collection de documents*, 3:515.

44. *Records of the Council*, February 8, 1754; Shirley to the General Court, March 28, 1754, *Correspondence of William Shirley*, 2:36-37; Shirley to the Lords Commissioners, May 23, 1754, *Ibid.*, p. 69; Shirley to Sir Thomas Robinson, August 19, 1754, *Ibid.*, pp. 74-5, 82. For background on Anglo-French rivalry see Edward P. Hamilton, *French and Indian Wars* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 62-64, 69-70, 152-50; or Douglas E. Leach, *Arms for Empire* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 313-16, 323-25, 332.

45. *Journal of Two Conferences [1754]*, pp. 8-22. Quote from p. 11. Shirley's arguments are interesting. At first, the fort was to protect the Kennebecs from French attacks and facilitate trade. Next, he contended that as the sovereign's representative he had the right to build the new fort. Then he claimed the land had been owned by the English for almost a century and referred to the trading post ruins at Taconic as confirmation of this fact. Finally, he maintained that the English had won all Kennebec land by right of conquest in Dummer's War. This last claim was based on two brief English raids on the village of Noridge-wock while ignoring the Abenaki "conquest" of the area during King Philip's War and the subsequent absence of Englishmen for three-quarters of a century.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-22; Shirley to Eastern Tribes, March 1, 1754, *Massachusetts Archives*, 32:467-69; Shirley to Legislature, October 18, 1754, *Ibid.*, 108:635.

47. *Journal of two Conferences [1754]*, pp. 23-26.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

49. Account of the expedition, *Boston Gazette*, September 8, 1754; Governor Duquesne to the Foreign Minister, October 10, 1754, *Collection de documents*,

3:515; *Records of the Council*, November 7, 1754; *Journal of the House*, November 6, 1754.

50. Kehoorit's letter, November 11, 1754, *Documentary History of Maine*, 24:21; Penobscots to Shirley, December 9, 1754 and January 8, 1755, *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25; Shirley to Council, February 17, 1755, *Ibid.*, p. 25; Legislative committee report, February 25, 1755, *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

51. Declaration of War, June 9, 1755, *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32; Shirley to Penobscots, June 17, 1755, *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34; Benjamin Burton to Shirley, June 6, 1755, *Massachusetts Archives*, 54:453; Thomas Killpatrick to Shirley, June 14, 1755, *Ibid.*, p. 465.

52. Bradbury to Shirley, June 27, 1755, *Ibid.*, 32:648; Penobscots to Shirley, June 27, 1755, *Ibid.*, p. 647.

53. James Cargill's Journal, [July 1-4, 1755], *Ibid.*, 38:167; Bradbury to Shirley, July 3, 1755, *Ibid.*, 77:382; Phipps to Penobscots, July 10 and 12, 1755, *Ibid.*, 32:650-52; Penobscots to Phipps, July 25, 1755, *Ibid.*, p. 661; Bradbury to Phipps, July 25, 1755, *Ibid.*, pp. 660.

54. Legislative proposals, August 8-15, 1755, *Ibid.*, pp. 662-65; Phipps to Penobscots, July 18, 1755, *Ibid.*, pp. 670-71; Penobscots to Phipps, September 6, 1755, *Ibid.*, p. 674.

55. Legislative proposals, September 27-October 2, 1755, *Ibid.*, pp. 681-86; Phipps to Penobscots, October 3, 1755, *Documentary History of Maine*, 24:60-61; Phipps to Bradbury, October 3, 1755, *Ibid.*, p. 59.

56. Bradbury to Phipps, October 24, 1755, *Ibid.*, p. 61; Declaration of war and scalp bounties, November 1-3, 1755, *Massachusetts Archives*, 32:689-91.