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Bargaining Under Liquidity Constraints: Experimental Evidence*

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forthcoming in *Journal of Economic Theory*

Abstract

Bargaining is widely used in monetary, labor and finance models to determine terms of trade. The chosen bargaining solution can matter for welfare analysis, for example when agents are liquidity constrained. Here we report on an experiment in which buyers and sellers engage in semi-structured bargaining to determine the terms of trade with the aim of evaluating the empirical relevance of two bargaining solutions, the generalized Nash bargaining solution and Kalai's proportional bargaining solution. These bargaining solutions predict different outcomes when buyers are constrained in their money holdings. We first use the case when the buyer is not liquidity constrained to estimate the bargaining power parameter, which we find to be equal to $1/2$. Then, imposing liquidity constraints on buyers, we find strong evidence in support of the Kalai proportional solution. Our findings have policy implications, e.g., for the welfare cost of inflation in search-theoretic models of money.

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1 Introduction

Decentralized markets are a key feature of many workhorse models in monetary and labor economics and finance (e.g., [Aruoba et al. \(2007\)](#), [Duffie et al. \(2005\)](#), [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#), [Lagos and Zhang \(2020\)](#), and [Weill \(2020\)](#)). These settings typically involve bilateral meetings where determination of the terms of trade (quantity and payment) is not obvious. One common approach is to suppose that traders bargain over the terms of trade. Importantly, the properties of the bargaining solution matter both qualitatively and quantitatively, particularly when agents face constraints. In this paper we focus on liquidity constraints but our approach would also apply to other constraints such as on production capacity or hours worked. If agents are liquidity constrained, then the solution that characterizes bargaining outcomes matters for welfare analyses in New Monetarist models ([Craig and Rocheteau \(2008\)](#)). Two main solutions are considered in this literature, the generalized Nash solution ([Nash \(1950\)](#), [Nash \(1953\)](#)) and Kalai’s proportional bargaining solution ([Kalai \(1977\)](#)). In this paper, we seek to understand which bargaining solution is more empirically relevant in such models. We address this question by placing subjects in the typical bargaining setting faced in the New Monetarist models and observing the allocations that they agree upon. We find strong support for the Kalai bargaining solution and we further explore the implications of this finding for the welfare cost of inflation.

The Nash bargaining solution follows uniquely from several axioms: solutions are assumed to be individually rational, Pareto efficient, independent of irrelevant alternatives and invariant to scale changes in utility representations. By contrast, Kalai’s approach replaces the last axiom, invariance to scale transformations of utility, with a strong monotonicity axiom, which implies that the resulting solution exhibits *proportionality*; if there are higher gains from trade, then both parties must gain from that expansion proportionally. A third solution possibility, due to [Kalai and Smorodinsky \(1975\)](#) replaces the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom of Nash with a weaker version of Kalai’s monotonicity axiom. As the applied literature mainly uses the Nash or Kalai solutions and since the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution responds similarly to the Nash solution as liquidity constraints are varied, we chose to focus our attention on a comparison between the Nash and Kalai solutions only.¹

¹[Feng et al. \(2022\)](#) highlight that the Nash solution can lead to undesirable predictions in the context of

Relative to the existing experimental bargaining literature (for surveys, see, e.g., [Roth \(1995\)](#), [Camerer \(2003\)](#) and [Güth and Kocher \(2014\)](#)) we consider an environment that differs in two important aspects. First, the payoff functions of the buyer and seller are nonlinear, and there are two dimensions to the bargaining problem, over quantities and money. Second, we consider the case where buyers may be liquidity constrained.

We show that in the case where buyers are not liquidity constrained, the Nash and Kalai approaches yield the same solution. However, in the case where buyers are liquidity constrained and the payoff functions are nonlinear, we show that the Nash solution will generally differ from the Kalai solution, enabling a direct test as to which bargaining solution best characterizes the experimental data.

An alternative approach to the one we pursue here would be to directly test the axioms that Nash and Kalai rely upon to determine the bargaining solution. However, as we can directly observe trading behavior in our experiment, it seems less interesting to evaluate more general axioms, e.g., Pareto optimality, than to consider the relevance of different bargaining solutions for predicting exchange outcomes. Further, to test the axioms that underlie the two different bargaining solutions would require testing of *different sets* of axioms for each solution that need not overlap. Such an exercise has been attempted already by [Nydegger and Owen \(1974\)](#) who find support for some (but not all) of the axioms found in [Nash \(1950\)](#) and for some (but not all) of the different axioms found in [Kalai and Smorodinsky \(1975\)](#). More recently, [Navarro and Veszteg \(2020\)](#) confirm that one axiom assumed in the [Nash \(1950\)](#) and [Kalai and Smorodinsky \(1975\)](#) solutions – scale invariance – finds little support in their experimental unstructured bargaining experiments.

Our experiment consists of three main treatments.² In the first treatment, buyers and sellers are unconstrained in their ability to achieve the first best allocation. In the other two treatments, buyers are constrained by their money endowments from implementing the first best allocation. The first, unconstrained treatment, enables us to estimate the distribution of supply chain negotiations, where there are typically multiple negotiations (e.g., one supplier with multiple retailers, or one retailer with multiple suppliers) that can hinge on each other through contingency contracts. Outcomes from the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution can then be more aligned with what one would expect. This is not the case in our context with liquidity constraints, where both Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky predict a non-monotone surplus for the buyer as her liquidity constraints are relaxed, counter to expectations.

²Section 6 reports on two additional robustness treatments.

bargaining power between the buyer and the seller. Given these bargaining weights, the two bargaining solutions predict different allocations in the two constrained treatments.

To preview our results, in the unconstrained case we estimate that the bargaining weight is equal to $1/2$. Using that bargaining weight we compare the predictions of the Nash and Kalai bargaining solutions in the constrained case and we find strong evidence favoring the Kalai proportional solution over the generalized Nash solution. We further discuss the implications of our findings for applied work. Specifically, we show that our estimates have important quantitative implications for the welfare costs of inflation in search-theoretic models of money.

2 Related Literature

Our paper adds to the literature in three ways: 1) We consider a two-dimensional bargaining game where players endogenously and simultaneously determine both the size of the pie, i.e., the quantity to be produced, and how to divide that pie, i.e., the amount of money the buyer offers the seller. 2) We further consider the role of liquidity constraints where one party, the buyer, comes to the bargaining table with constraints on the amount of money that s/he can offer; these constraints enable us to differentiate between two axiomatic bargaining solutions due to Nash and Kalai. 3) We provide evidence on the appropriate bargaining solution and weights in such a setting that will be useful to researchers working with such models; specifically, we provide an application to the welfare cost of inflation in money-search models.³

We start by discussing how our paper contributes to monetary economics. New monetarist economists emphasize the importance of micro-foundations. Given that bargaining solutions and weights matter both qualitatively and quantitatively, and that theory is silent on the bargaining solution/weight selection, empirical investigations are crucial to shed light on these issues. There is a relevant applied theoretical literature employing different price formation mechanisms—including generalized Nash and Kalai bargaining—in monetary economics, and studying their implications for monetary equilibria and the transmission of monetary policy,

³In a similar spirit, [Durante et al. \(2014\)](#) use lab experiments to measure preferences for redistributive policies with the aim of improving the modeling and analysis of such policies in macroeconomic and public finance models.

e.g., [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#), [Molico \(2006\)](#), [Aruoba et al. \(2007\)](#), [Craig and Rocheteau \(2008\)](#), [Rocheteau and Wright \(2005\)](#). These studies show that the efficiency of the monetary equilibrium, the welfare costs of inflation, and the impact of monetary policy depend on the trading protocol and the bargaining weights. A common approach in this literature is to impose a bargaining solution (e.g., Nash or Kalai), fix the bargaining parameter (e.g., 1 or 0.5), or calibrate it to target retail markups (the ratio of price to marginal cost) observed in the data in the United States. Using the latter method in a model where the bargaining setup is virtually similar to the one built into our experiment, and imposing the Nash bargaining solution, [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#) estimate the consumer’s bargaining power to range between 0.315 and 0.404. In a closely related but slightly different model, [Aruoba et al. \(2011\)](#) obtain a consumer bargaining weight of 0.92, also using Nash bargaining. Using Kalai bargaining, [Bethune et al. \(2019\)](#) obtain an estimate of 0.72, while [Venkateswaran and Wright \(2013\)](#) and [Davoodalhosseini \(2021\)](#) estimate the consumer’s bargaining power to range, respectively, between 0.68 and 0.86 and between 0.75 and 0.87. The range of estimates is due to variation in the targeted markup value as well as preference parameters and specifics of the model. In our study, we leverage experimental methods to provide an alternative approach. We find that the experimental evidence supports the use of the Kalai solution, and provides an additional data point for estimates of consumers’ bargaining power, suggesting that the assumption of symmetric bargaining powers is appropriate in settings close to [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#).

Our paper also contributes to the experimental literature on bargaining. As [Karagözoğlu \(2019\)](#) notes, prior to 1982, the experimental literature on bargaining generally employed unstructured designs. For example, [Nydegger and Owen \(1974\)](#) study two-player unstructured, face-to-face bargaining over chips where they vary the utility of value of chips between players and introduce irrelevant constraints to test the axioms of Nash and Kalai and Smorodinsky. See also [Roth and Malouf \(1979\)](#), [Roth and Murnighan \(1982\)](#), [Hoffman and Spitzer \(1982\)](#) and [Hoffman and Spitzer \(1985\)](#).

Since 1982 with Rubinstein’s alternating offers bargaining model ([Rubinstein \(1982\)](#)) and Güth et al.’s ultimatum game experiments ([Güth et al. \(1982\)](#)), much research has been conducted using more structured models of bargaining albeit mainly in the one-dimensional, divide a pie framework. For instance, [Binmore et al. \(1989\)](#), [Binmore et al. \(1998\)](#) looked at the role played by outside options and compared a “split the surplus” solution with a

“deal-me-out” solution. In the former solution, both players get their outside option and split equally the remaining pie net of those outside option values. In deal-me-out, the players agree to split the pie in half unless one player is worse off than under her outside option, in which case she gets her outside option and the other player gets the remainder of the pie. The evidence here seems to favor the deal-me-out solution. Our game, described in Section 3, does not allow us to distinguish between deal-me-out, split the surplus or the Kalai solution with symmetric weights.⁴

More recently there has been a revival of interest in *unstructured* bargaining experiments. For instance, [Feltovich and Swierzbinski \(2011\)](#), [Anbarci and Feltovich \(2013\)](#) and [Anbarci and Feltovich \(2018\)](#) study the role of outside options and disagreement values in one dimensional, unstructured bargaining games as well as in structured games, such as the Nash demand game ([Nash \(1953\)](#)). While outside options have to be forgone if parties enter into bargaining, disagreement values are payoffs earned in the event that a bargain is not reached. They too find that disagreement values do not matter as much as theory would predict, with subjects often dividing the pie down the middle regardless of the disagreement values. [Bolton and Karagözoğlu \(2016\)](#) study the role of hard leverage (ultimatum game proposal rights) versus soft leverage (appeal to a focal precedent) for outcomes in an unstructured bargaining game and find that focal precedents play an important role in bargaining outcomes. [Dufwenberg et al. \(2017\)](#) consider unstructured pre-play negotiation in a “lost wallet game” and vary whether agreed-upon bargaining outcomes are binding or informal (reneging is allowed). They find that regardless of whether negotiated outcomes are binding or informal, equal splits are the most commonly agreed upon outcome. [Camerer et al. \(2019\)](#) study unstructured bargaining with one-sided private information. They find that the incidence of bargaining failures is decreasing in the pie size. They use a machine learning approach to show that features of the bargaining process play an important role in the determination of agreements. [Korenock and Munro \(2021\)](#) study unstructured wage bargaining between firms and workers in a dynamic

⁴Both deal-me-out and split-the-surplus coincide because the disagreement values are normalized to zero. In this setup, both of these solutions, when Pareto efficient, also coincide with the Kalai proportional solution in the special case where the bargaining weights are symmetric, so that focusing on Kalai bargaining is without loss of generality in our context. The addition of non-zero disagreement values would only shift the paths of the Nash and Kalai solutions but not alter the characteristics we test for in our experiment.

labor-search model under the assumption that the exogenously determined match surplus is split equally. They find no effects on wages from changes in the unemployment rate and an under-reaction of wages to changes in unemployment benefits.

Like us, [Galeotti et al. \(2019\)](#) use an unstructured bargaining setting to explore equity-efficiency trade-offs. However, in their study the bargaining process is over two or three *pre-defined allocations* where an equal split allocation may or may not be efficient and bargaining only involves online chat between the two parties as to which pre-defined allocation they will agree upon. Using this design, they find evidence inconsistent with both the [Nash \(1950\)](#) and [Kalai and Smorodinsky \(1975\)](#) solutions, but they do not address the [Kalai \(1977\)](#) proportional solution as we do in this paper. Further, they show that focality on equal earnings outcomes is not universal. Indeed, in decision settings where, unlike in fixed-pie settings, there are trade-offs between equality and efficiency, a substantial proportion of subjects choose an unequal and total welfare maximizing allocation over equal and Pareto efficient ones.

As noted earlier, [Navarro and Veszteg \(2020\)](#) construct unstructured bargaining situations with the goal of testing the axioms of several bargaining solutions. They provide evidence against the scale invariance axiom, and show that the Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are poor predictors of bargaining outcomes.

In sum, in all of these unstructured bargaining studies, there is typically only a time limit to bargaining and bargaining typically takes place in a single dimension, e.g., how to divide a pie. By contrast, we study unstructured bargaining in a two-dimensional setting where subjects simultaneously decide on both the size of the pie and how to divide it.

There is a related experimental literature on “joint production” where non-cooperative bargaining occurs among players who have jointly produced the pie, often via some real effort task. After production has occurred, subjects subsequently bargain over how to divide that pie. For references see the survey by [Karagözoğlu \(2012\)](#). Research questions in that literature concern whether and how heterogeneities in efforts/abilities to produce the pie, in interaction with equality, equity and other fairness norms, matter for the subsequent bargaining and division of the pie. While our bargaining task is related to this “joint production” literature, there are important differences between our set-up and joint production bargaining experiments. First, as noted earlier, subjects in our experiment decide on the size of the pie and the division of that pie *simultaneously*, that is, there is no sequential structure to the game

that our subjects play.⁵ Second, we introduce liquidity constraints allowing us to differentiate between the Kalai and Nash solutions. In bargaining experiments with multiple variables, the production function depends on the sum of the efforts (e.g., it is either linear or a step function), and liquidity constraints are absent. Thus, under the parametrizations used in the literature (e.g., [Gantner et al. \(2001\)](#) or [Karagözoğlu and Riedl \(2015\)](#)), the axiom of Pareto optimality implies maximum effort to achieve maximum output. As a result, the bargaining problem reduces to one with a fixed-size pie, similar to our unconstrained bargaining problem, where we cannot differentiate between the Kalai and Nash solutions. Third, subjects in our setup have distinct roles as buyer/consumers or seller/producers. If a bargaining agreement is reached, then it is only the seller who actually produces the good (the buyer supplies money in exchange for this production). Thus, production is *not joint* and in such settings it would be unnatural for the seller to produce first, before there was any agreement on the terms of trade. Finally, the second stage bargaining game in the joint-production literature is typically a structured bargaining game, taking the form of an ultimatum game or the Nash demand game; by contrast we consider a less structured bargaining game. Still, we see our approach as complementary to the literature on joint production.

3 Theoretical Framework

We focus on a bargaining problem where a buyer and a seller need to determine the terms of trade in their match. The bargaining problem is inspired by the “bargaining stage” of the monetary model proposed by [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#) and captures many interesting bargaining situations where the outcome of the bargaining problem includes the size of the surplus, in addition to the surplus division between the two parties. Examples of such bargaining problems with endogenous surplus determination include labor-management negotiations, political parties during coalition-building processes following elections and family negotiations.

There are two agents: a buyer (consumer) and a seller (producer). The buyer gets utility $u(q)$ from consuming quantity, q , but he cannot produce for himself. The buyer is endowed

⁵Taking seriously the sequential structure of joint production bargaining games, once the size of the pie is determined, the costs are sunk and so it should not matter for bargaining outcomes whether and how the pie was produced by the bargainers or not. The experimental literature, however, shows otherwise.

with m tokens, which can be interpreted as money. He can offer $y \leq m$ tokens in exchange for some amount q , produced by the seller. The seller incurs a cost $c(q)$ from producing quantity q of the good. Production is thus made to order (it does *not* occur in advance) and is conditional on the two parties reaching an agreement.

If an exchange of y tokens for an amount q of the consumption good is agreed to, then the buyer's payoff is $\mathcal{S}^b = u(q) - y$ and the producer's payoff is $\mathcal{S}^s = y - c(q)$, such that the total surplus is equal to $\mathcal{S} = u(q) - c(q)$. If no agreement is reached, then the buyer and the seller get a payoff of zero. Note that the choice of q determines the joint gains from trade (size of the pie or total surplus), while y determines how these gains are split between the buyer and the seller. Units of the good and tokens are perfectly divisible.⁶ Information about utility and cost functions is complete. Tokens have a redemption value in terms of points only in the event that an exchange is agreed to, and then only in the amount of tokens actually exchanged; otherwise, tokens are worthless. This is equivalent to normalizing the buyer's threat point to 0.⁷ Note that in Appendix B, we show that the predictions that we test in our experiment remain unchanged when allowing for non-zero disagreement values.

The utility and cost functions satisfy the following assumptions: $u' > 0, u'' < 0, c' > 0, c'' > 0, u(0) = c(0) = 0$. There exists q^* such that $u'(q^*) = c'(q^*)$. That is, q^* is the amount that maximizes the joint surplus in a pair.

Figure 1 shows the utility function of the buyer against the cost function of the seller using the parameterization of our experiment (see also Section 4). The bargaining problem is to choose $q \in [0, \bar{q}]$, where $\bar{q} > 0$ s.t. $u(\bar{q}) = c(\bar{q})$ and to choose $y \leq m$. A proposal is a (q, y) pair offered by either the buyer or the seller. The first best solution is given by q^* ($q^* = 4$ in the experiment).

Consistent with Lagos and Wright (2005) we interpret tokens as money. While we abstract from dynamic money-holdings considerations, these considerations are incorporated within our framework. Indeed, our model is derived from the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework and the payoffs for the buyer and seller implicitly contain the continuation value of holding money

⁶While the theory assumes perfect divisibility, in the experiment we limited units of q and y to increments of size 0.01.

⁷If we allowed tokens to have a redemption value, then, in the event of no exchange, the threat point of the buyer would be m . In that case, the surplus of the buyer would remain the same $(u(q) + m - y) - m = u(q) - y$.




Figure 1: Seller’s production cost and buyer’s consumption utility as parametrized in the experiment. Gains from trade are maximized for $q = 4$.

(see derivations of equation (6) in [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#)). Our approach was designed to capture the core features of the bargaining problem as it relates to monetary economics in the simplest possible way. Despite our simplified framework, money still serves as a medium of exchange as it allows the two players to trade and realize gains from trade that would not be possible otherwise. Relative to good q , tokens/money are not just another commodity since they cannot be produced; rather, subjects are endowed with money and need to decide how much to spend. Money/tokens affect the utility of both players symmetrically, and this is not true of the commodity produced and traded for money.

3.1 Solutions to the Bargaining Problem

In this section, we apply the axiomatic approach to characterize the solution to the bargaining problem. We focus on the generalized Nash bargaining and the Kalai proportional solutions. According to the axiomatic approach, “One states as axioms several properties that it would seem natural for the solution to have and then one discovers that the axioms actually determine the solution uniquely” ([Nash \(1953\)](#)). The main difference between the generalized Nash bargaining and Kalai proportional solutions hinges upon one of the axioms. Specifically Kalai’s solution satisfies strong monotonicity (i.e., as the bargaining set expands, each player gets a




Figure 2: Surplus predictions (left panel) and terms of trade predictions (right panel) under Nash and Kalai bargaining for $\theta = 1/2$. The circle and triangle markers depict outcomes when $m \in \{30, 60, 315\}$, from left to right.

higher surplus), while the Nash solution does not. This difference generates distinct bargaining outcomes when the buyer is liquidity-constrained. Recall that an agreement consists of a pair (q, y) where q is the amount produced by the seller, and $y \leq m$ is the amount of tokens the buyer transfers to the seller. If the buyer and seller strike an agreement, the buyer's surplus is given by $\mathcal{S}^b = u(q) - y$ and the seller's surplus is given by $\mathcal{S}^s = -c(q) + y$, such that the total surplus is equal to $\mathcal{S} = u(q) - c(q)$. In case of no agreement, both parties' payoff equals 0, i.e., the disagreement point is $(0, 0)$. The set of feasible utility levels for this bargaining problem is given by

$$S(m) = \{(u(q) - y, -c(q) + y) : 0 \leq y \leq m \text{ and } q \geq 0\}.$$

The left panel of Figure 2 depicts the bargaining set for three values of m (30, 60 and 171) associated with the parameterization of our experiment, restricting our attention to the region where both players' surpluses are positive (i.e., their participation constraint is satisfied). Note that as m increases, the bargaining set expands, which implies that as the buyer's money holdings m increase, more outcomes can be attained. The Pareto frontier of the bargaining set is linear when the buyer is not liquidity constrained, and it is concave when the liquidity constraints bind (see also [Aruoba et al. \(2007\)](#) for details). Next, we describe what bargaining outcome is selected under the generalized Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai bargaining solution.

3.1.1 Generalized Nash Bargaining

The [Nash \(1950\)](#) bargaining solution satisfies the axioms of symmetry, Pareto optimality, scale invariance, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The generalized Nash bargaining solution that we study in this paper drops the symmetry axiom. The axiom of Pareto optimality implies that the solution is such that there is no attainable outcome that makes one player better off without making the other player worse off. Scale invariance implies that the solution is invariant to affine transformations of the buyer or seller's surplus. Independence of irrelevant alternatives means that, if some outcomes are removed from the bargaining set and the solution is not among them, then the solution must remain the same. The generalized Nash solution is given by the following optimization problem:

$$\max_{q,y} [u(q) - y]^{\theta_N} [y - c(q)]^{1-\theta_N}$$

subject to

$$0 \leq y \leq m,$$

where $\theta_N \in [0, 1]$ denotes the buyer's bargaining power (which in the generalized version can differ from the seller). Let $m_N^* = (1 - \theta_N)u(q^*) + \theta_N c(q^*)$. Then, the solution is given by:

If $m \geq m_N^*$,

$$q = q^*, \tag{1}$$

$$y = m_N^* = (1 - \theta_N)u(q^*) + \theta_N c(q^*). \tag{2}$$

If $m < m_N^*$, the consumer is money constrained, so $y = m$ and q is the implicit solution to:

$$m = \frac{(1 - \theta_N)c'(q)u(q) + \theta_N u'(q)c(q)}{\theta_N u'(q) + (1 - \theta_N)c'(q)}. \tag{3}$$

3.1.2 Kalai or Proportional bargaining

The [Kalai \(1977\)](#) solution satisfies the axioms of Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and strong monotonicity. Strong monotonicity implies that players cannot be made worse off as the bargaining set expands and greater surplus levels become attainable.

The Kalai solution does not satisfy the axiom of scale invariance. It is given by:

$$\max_{q,y} [u(q) - y]$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned} u(q) - y &= \frac{\theta_K}{1 - \theta_K} [y - c(q)] \\ y &\leq m, \end{aligned}$$

where $\theta_K \in [0, 1]$ denotes the buyer's bargaining power. This can be rewritten as:

$$\max_q \theta_K [u(q) - c(q)]$$

subject to:

$$(1 - \theta_K)u(q) + \theta_K c(q) \leq m.$$

Let $m_K^* = (1 - \theta_K)u(q^*) + \theta_K c(q^*)$. If $m \geq m_K^*$, the Kalai solution has the same functional form as in the Nash solution:

$$q = q^*, \tag{4}$$

$$y = m_K^* = (1 - \theta_K)u(q^*) + \theta_K c(q^*). \tag{5}$$

If $m < m_K^*$, the buyer is money constrained, so $y = m$ and q is the implicit solution to:

$$m = (1 - \theta_K)u(q) + \theta_K c(q). \tag{6}$$

3.2 Comparison of Nash and Kalai

When the buyer is not liquidity constrained, the bargaining parameters θ_K and θ_N have the same interpretation: they pin down the fraction of the total surplus assigned to the buyer. The two solutions are observationally equivalent in the unconstrained case. Therefore, in what follows, we set $\theta_K = \theta_N = \theta$.⁸ Both the Nash and Kalai solutions are the same when m is large enough, in the unconstrained case. That is, $q = q^*$, and $y = m^* = (1 - \theta)u(q^*) + \theta c(q^*)$, i.e., the first best is achieved and θ determines how the total surplus $u(q^*) - c(q^*)$ is distributed

⁸Following the applied literature from which our game is derived, we take θ as a primitive of the model and assume that it is exogenously fixed. We discuss in Section 6 the possibility of allowing θ to vary as a function of liquidity constraints.

between the buyer and seller. However, when the buyer is liquidity constrained, the two solutions differ.

Under Nash bargaining, the buyer spends all her/his money, i.e., $y = m$ and so q is pinned down by:

$$m = [1 - \Theta(q)]u(q) + \Theta(q)c(q), \text{ where } \Theta(q) = \frac{\theta u'(q)}{\theta u'(q) + (1 - \theta)c'(q)}.$$

Under Kalai bargaining, we also have $y = m$, but q is determined by

$$m = (1 - \theta)u(q) + \theta c(q).$$

The two solutions differ so long as $q < q^*$. Importantly, $\Theta(q)$ depends on q while θ is a constant.

This implies that, under Kalai, the buyer's surplus is $\mathcal{S}^b \equiv u(q) - y = \theta[u(q) - c(q)]$, that is, the buyer's surplus share, $\mathcal{S}^b/\mathcal{S}$, stays constant and is equal to θ . Further, the buyer's surplus increases in q up to q^* , since $[u(q) - c(q)]$ is increasing for $q \leq q^*$. Under Nash, on the other hand, the buyer's surplus is given by $\mathcal{S}^b \equiv u(q) - y = \Theta(q)[u(q) - c(q)]$, and the buyer's surplus share, $\Theta(q)$, depends on q . While $[u(q) - c(q)]$ is increasing for $q \leq q^*$, it is easy to show that $\Theta(q)$ is decreasing in q . We can show that the buyer's surplus is non-monotonic in q , first increasing as q increases but then decreasing as q gets closer to q^* . Also, note that $\Theta(q) \geq \theta$ for $q \leq q^*$. This implies that the buyer obtains a higher share of the surplus under Nash as long as the liquidity constraint is binding. The seller's surplus is increasing under both solutions.⁹

We illustrate the differences between the two solutions in the case where the bargaining weight is $\theta = 1/2$. The Nash solution is given by the tangency points of the Nash product level curves with the bargaining set, while the Kalai solution is given by the intersection of the 45 degree line with the bargaining set. The left panel of Figure 2 compares the buyers' and sellers'

⁹Note that here, we compare the Nash and Kalai outcomes for a given bargaining weight, θ . However, another way to compare the two solutions would be to start from a given allocation $(\mathcal{S}^b, \mathcal{S}^s)$ on the Pareto frontier (or equivalently, a given quantity and payment pair generating such an allocation) and compute the bargaining weights implied by both solutions. Under Kalai, the implied bargaining weight would be $\theta_K = \mathcal{S}^b/(\mathcal{S}^b + \mathcal{S}^s)$, i.e., simply the buyer's share of the total surplus. One can show that the bargaining weight implied by the Nash solution, θ_N , would necessarily be lower, $\theta_N < \theta_K$, as long as $q < q^*$. Also, the difference with θ_K increases as liquidity constraints are tightened (i.e., θ_N decreases).

surplus allocations as the buyers’ endowment of tokens, m , increases. The figure shows the bargaining sets for the three cases we study in the experiment, labeled $m = 30$, $m = 60$ and $m = 315$. Notice first that liquidity constraints (here, when $m < 171$) produce asymmetries in the bargaining set that the two players face; the maximum buyer’s surplus (vertical intercept) is always greater than the maximum seller’s surplus (horizontal intercept). Notice further that under the Nash solution, the buyer’s surplus increases and then decreases as m increases, and the buyer’s surplus is always greater than or equal to the seller’s surplus. By contrast, under the Kalai solution, the buyer’s and seller’s surpluses are always monotonically increasing, and they are equal when $\theta = 1/2$. These differences between the two bargaining solutions are the main focus of our experiment.¹⁰

4 Experimental Design and Hypotheses

We employ a 3×1 experimental design, where the treatment variable is the buyer’s endowment of money (or “tokens”), m . We adopt a between-subjects design, i.e., each subject participated in only one environment, either $m = 30$, $m = 60$ or $m = 315$. Our main outcome variables are the quantities q and amounts of tokens (money) y that buyers and sellers bargain over.

4.1 Model Parameterization

In parameterizing the model, we had several objectives. First, we did not want to make the first best choice too focal, so we chose to make q^* off-center between 0 and $\bar{q}$. Second, we made q^* and $u(q^*) - c(q^*)$ integer values and we sought to have a significant slope on both sides of $u(q^*) - c(q^*)$ so that the first best was sufficiently salient. Third, we wanted there to be large, significant differences between the Nash and Kalai solutions so that we would have some chance of detecting those solutions in our data.

With these considerations in mind, we chose:

$$u(q) = 74.1752q^{0.6}$$

¹⁰These differences remain if we allow for a non-zero, and possibly asymmetric, disagreement point. See Appendix B for details. The right panel of Figure 2 can also be used to compare the bargaining path under Kalai and Nash in the (q, y) space instead of the surplus space. For $m = 30$ and $m = 60$, the Nash solution predicts a higher quantity traded.

$$c(q) = 8.23249q^{1.51678}.$$

It follows that:

$$\bar{q} = 11, q^* = 4, u(q^*) = 170.41, c(q^*) = 67.41, u(q^*) - c(q^*) = 103.$$

4.2 Treatments

The maximum m needed to achieve the first best satisfies $\hat{m} - u(q^*) = 0$, i.e., it corresponds to the transfer of tokens required to compensate the seller assuming he/she has all of the bargaining power, in which case the buyer’s gains from trade are equal to 0. Given our model parameterization, $\hat{m} = 170.41$, so for our “unconstrained” treatment we set m to be much higher than $\hat{m}$ and equal to $m = 315$. For our two “constrained” treatments, we set $m < 170.41 \equiv \hat{m}$. Specifically, we chose $m = 60$ and $m = 30$. Both of these values are less than $c(q^*) = 67.41$ to ensure that liquidity constraints were binding regardless of the bargaining weight θ . Further, these two values for the constrained treatment nicely capture the non-monotonicity in the buyer’s surplus as m is varied as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2.

In all other respects, the environment was held constant. Each session consisted of 10 subjects who participated in 30 rounds of bargaining as either a buyer or a seller. At the beginning of the session, subjects were randomly assigned a role as a buyer or seller (5 of each) and they maintained the same role in all 30 rounds.¹¹

In each round, buyers and sellers were randomly and anonymously paired and were tasked with bargaining over q and y within $T = 2$ minutes without communication. In all treatments, $0 \leq q \leq 11$, while y was restricted by $m = 30, 60$ or 315 , depending on the treatment. Aside from the time limit and the requirement that proposals consist of (q, y) pairs, bargaining was largely unstructured and tacit. Still, because of the time limit and the restriction on proposals, we refer to our experimental design as involving semi-structured bargaining.¹²

Figures 3 and 4 show screenshots of the top and bottom parts, respectively, of the bargaining interface for a *buyer* in the unconstrained treatment where $m = 315$ (the seller’s interface

¹¹We chose this design to enable subjects to gain experience with a particular role.

¹²See also Camerer et al. (2019).




Figure 3: Top part of decision screen for a buyer, unconstrained treatment

is similar).¹³ On the top part of this screen (Figure 3), subjects had two slider bars, one for quantity, q , and one for tokens, y . By moving the position of one or the other of the two slider bars to different values for q or y , subjects were informed of the payoff to themselves and to the other player if the implied proposal of (q, y) was accepted. Thus, the sliders also worked as *calculators* for the subjects, avoiding the need for them to directly calculate payoffs. The buyer's payoff was calculated as $S^b = u(q) - y$ and the seller's payoff was calculated as $S^s = y - c(q)$, where $u(q)$ and $c(q)$ were parameterized as discussed above and illustrated on the decision screen. The calculators showed both the buyer's and the seller's payoff from any given proposal. All payoffs were denoted in "points" and subjects understood that their monetary payoffs were increasing in their points earned. Note that tokens, y , only had value in points to sellers or a cost in points to buyers if those tokens were part of an agreed upon trade. If an agreement was not reached, the buyer's token endowment was declared worthless.

¹³The constrained case is also similar, with the only difference being that the slider for tokens was restricted to $[0, 60]$ or $[0, 30]$.

Proposal submitted!

Choose your proposed quantity between 0 and 11:

9.04

Choose your proposed number of tokens between 0 and 315:

245.41

The total value of this many units to you is: 277.95

The total cost of this many units to the seller is: 232.18

Your payoff would be: 32.54

The seller's payoff would be: 13.23

Submit

Current proposals

Buyer Proposals	Seller Proposals
9.04 units for 245.41; buyer gets 32.54, seller gets 13.23 you	3.67 units for 150.31; buyer gets 11.52, seller gets 91.15 Accept

Figure 4: Bottom part of decision screen for a buyer, unconstrained treatment

If an agreement was reached, tokens in excess of the agreed upon exchange amount, y , were also declared worthless. In this manner, we capture the fiat money nature of the token object; the tokens only have value/cost if they are used as part of an agreed upon exchange.¹⁴

Once a subject found a proposal she would like to make, she clicked on a Submit button to make that proposal “live.” We restricted subjects from making proposals that would result in negative payoffs to themselves or to the other player.

Once a proposal was made live, it could *not* be withdrawn and the other player in the match could accept it any time by clicking on the Accept button next to that proposal (see illustration in Figure 4).¹⁵ Additional proposals made by either player within the 2 minute

¹⁴This is one interpretation. Other interpretations are that tokens are commodity money or that liquidity constraints are technological constraints on transfers. This has also the advantage that the buyer’s disagreement value is normalized to zero and equal to the seller’s disagreement value. Theoretically, this is without loss of generality, see footnote 7.

¹⁵This design choice was made for two reasons. First, we wanted to ensure that players think seriously about the proposals they make. Second, we wanted to prevent players using “fake” proposals to take advantage of

round were *added* to the existing set of proposals and did not replace any prior proposal.

Buyers and sellers could see each others' submitted proposals at all times under columns for buyer and seller proposals. If there were many proposals made in a round, then a scrollbar appeared allowing subjects to review all live proposals. Proposals were live only for the duration of each 2 minute round; the set of proposals was cleared out at the start of each new round.

A round ended when either a proposal was agreed to or the 2 minute time limit had expired, whichever came first. Importantly, our experiment was implemented in two distinct phases. In the first phase, we explored the unconstrained treatment (where $m = 315$) in order to estimate the bargaining weight, θ . As noted earlier, we picked $m = 315$, as it was well above $u(q^*)$. In experimental sessions using the unconstrained treatment, we found strong evidence that $\theta = 1/2$, as shown in Section 5.2.

With that knowledge, we designed the second phase of the experiment. In that phase we used a different sample of subjects, albeit from the same subject pool, and we studied environments where the buyer's money holdings were sufficiently low, so the first best could not be achieved. Specifically, in these constrained treatments, $m = 60$ and $m = 30$.¹⁶

As Figure 2 shows in these constrained cases, the buyer's surplus under the Nash solution is first increasing and then decreasing, whereas under the Kalai solution, the buyer's surplus is strictly increasing and is equal to the seller's surplus in all three treatments. Note that in the unconstrained case, the Nash and Kalai solutions coincide.

Summarizing, our three treatments involve three different values for m :

1. Unconstrained: $m = 315 \geq u(q^*)$
2. Constrained-High: $m = 60 < c(q^*)$
3. Constrained-Low: $m = 30 < c(q^*)$.

the 2-minute time limit (for example, withdrawing with only a few seconds lefts to constrain the other player to agree to less favorable terms of trade).

¹⁶While we conducted our experiment in two stages, we employed a between subjects design. This means that any individual subject participated in only a single treatment, either $m = 315$, $m = 60$ or $m = 30$.

4.3 Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework proposed in Section 3, we consider the following hypotheses. All are independent of θ .¹⁷

Hypothesis 1. In the unconstrained case, subjects achieve the first best.

This hypothesis checks whether there are any inefficiencies in the unconstrained case.

Hypothesis 2. As m increases, the agreed upon q , the amount of tokens spent y , the total surplus $\mathcal{S}$, and the seller's surplus $\mathcal{S}^s$ all increase.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are valid under both bargaining solutions. However, the buyer's surplus, $\mathcal{S}^b$, may increase or decrease in m depending on the bargaining solution.

Hypothesis 3a (Nash) As m increases, the buyer's surplus, $\mathcal{S}^b$, is increasing and then decreasing as q increases toward q^* .

Hypothesis 3b (Kalai) As m increases, the buyer's surplus, $\mathcal{S}^b$, is monotonically increasing as q increases toward q^* .

Hypothesis 3a is the prediction of the Nash bargaining solution, while hypothesis 3b is the prediction of the Kalai bargaining solution.

5 Results

In this section we first report on the number of sessions, then present results relevant to the question of the appropriate bargaining weight and solution.

5.1 Sessions, Subjects and Payments

The experiment was programmed in oTree (Chen et al. (2016)) and was conducted over networked computers in the Experimental Social Science Laboratory at UC Irvine. We conducted five sessions for each of the three treatments. As noted in Section 4.2, each session consisted of 10 subjects playing 30 bargaining rounds, resulting in 50 subjects and 750 rounds per

¹⁷Table 2 provides quantitative theoretical predictions for q , y , the per unit price y/q , the seller and buyer's surpluses, $\mathcal{S}^s$ and $\mathcal{S}^b$, the total surplus, $\mathcal{S}$, and the ratio of the buyer's surplus to the total surplus, $\mathcal{S}^b/\mathcal{S}$, under the Nash and Kalai bargaining solutions in the $\theta = 1/2$ case for all three treatments, since this is the empirical estimate for θ that emerges in the unconstrained case, as we show below in Section 5.2.

treatment. A software glitch caused data to be misrecorded in a small number of bargaining rounds.¹⁸ We discarded the corresponding rounds, leaving respectively 745, 741 and 740 rounds for the $m = 315$, $m = 60$ and $m = 30$ treatments. Overall, our sample consists of 2226 rounds of bilateral bargaining across the three treatments.¹⁹

Subjects were undergraduate students from a variety of different majors and had no prior experience with our study.²⁰ They were recruited using Sona Systems software. At the start of each 90 minute session, subjects were given written instructions which were read out loud. All participants had to successfully complete comprehension test questions before proceeding to the bargaining task. Sample instructions and comprehension test questions are found in Appendix A.

Following the instructions and test which took about 30 minutes, the remaining hour was devoted to the 30 bargaining rounds (maximum of 2 minutes each).

As noted earlier, subjects earned points in each round depending on bargaining outcomes. At the end of the session two rounds were randomly chosen. The sum of subjects' point totals from those two rounds were multiplied by 0.25 to determine subjects' monetary earnings from the bargaining task. In addition, subjects earned a \$7 show up payment. Subjects' average total earnings varied by treatment: \$31.08 for the $m = 315$ treatment, \$26.61 for the $m = 60$ treatment and \$19.03 for the $m = 30$ treatment.

Overall, 91% of negotiations ended with an agreement. Further, the lower the restriction on tokens, the higher the agreement rate: 89% for $m = 30$, 91% for $m = 60$ and 94% for $m = 315$. Table D1 in Appendix D reports agreement rates for the first 15 and the last 15 rounds, by session.

¹⁸Specifically, in those instances, the recorded agreed-upon outcome differed between the buyer and the seller in a given pair.

¹⁹The discarded rounds represent around 1% of our initial sample.

²⁰While we use a convenience sample of student subjects, we do not think that our results would change if we used a more representative sample drawn from the population at large. That is because the bargaining game under examination is a rather abstract version of real-world buyer-seller interactions and it is unlikely that there are more experienced or professional subjects who might be more adept at solving that problem. Consequently, there is little reason to anticipate significant variations in behavior among individuals with diverse life experiences. Still, it would be of interest to verify this claim using a more representative sample, an exercise that we leave for future research.




Figure 5: Probability distribution (left) and cumulative probability distribution (right) of the buyer's share in accepted offers when $m = 315$. In the left panel, the bin width is equal to 0.01. There are 698 observations.

5.2 Estimation of the Bargaining Weight

Our first result concerns the buyer's share of the total surplus. We examine the buyer's share in the unconstrained treatment where $m = 315$ because under both the Nash and Kalai solutions, the buyer's share gives us an estimate of the bargaining weight θ . We focus on accepted offers.

Figure 5 shows the probability distribution and the cumulative distribution of the buyer's share across all agreements when $m = 315$, indicating it is narrowly centered around 0.5. To obtain a more precise estimate of the bargaining weight, we regress the buyer's surplus $\mathcal{S}_i^b$ on the total surplus achieved by each pair, $\mathcal{S}_i$ in the unconstrained treatment. Specifically, we run the regression

$$\mathcal{S}_i^b = \theta \mathcal{S}_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (7)$$

using a random effects regression estimator where i indexes an individual buyer.²¹ We consider

²¹Regression results obtained when random effects are indexed at the individual seller level are reported in Table D3 in Appendix D.

Table 1: Random-effects estimation of the buyer’s share of the surplus among accepted offers in the unconstrained treatment.

	Buyer’s surplus			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total surplus, $\mathcal{S}$	0.5012	0.4994	0.4987	0.4989
	(0.0032)	(0.0018)	(0.0019)	(0.0019)
Observations	698	574	412	348

Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses

several specifications that vary in terms of how close the quantity is to the first best prediction of $q^* = 4$. Specifically, the sample we use consists of *accepted* offers in the *unconstrained* treatment for four different neighborhoods of $q^* = 4$:

- (1) all (2) s.t. $|q - 4| < 0.5$
(3) s.t. $|q - 4| < 0.1$ (4) s.t. $|q - 4| < 0.05$.

Sample (1) consists of 698 pairwise agreements (47 of the 745 bargaining rounds recorded did not lead to an agreement). Samples (2), (3) and (4) contain 574, 412, and 348 agreements, respectively. The results are reported in Table 1. Regardless of any restrictions placed on traded quantities q , the estimate $\hat{\theta}$ is not statistically different from 0.5.

Finding 1. *The buyer’s share of the surplus in the unconstrained case is equal to 0.5.*

Finding 1 suggests that we can use $\theta = 1/2$ to evaluate our theoretical predictions in the constrained treatments where bargaining outcomes differ between the two solutions. The predictions for the case where $\theta = 1/2$ are reported in Table 2.

5.3 Which solution?

Figure 6 shows the distribution of traded quantities and tokens over all five sessions of each of the three treatments. Mean values are reported in Table 2.²² Figure 6 and Table 2 indicate

²²Means by session and for each first/last 15 rounds are provided in Appendix D in Table D2.

Table 2: Theoretical Predictions vs. Average Outcomes by Treatment for Accepted Offers.

$m = 315$	q	y	$\frac{y}{q}$	$\mathcal{S}^s$	$\mathcal{S}^b$	$\mathcal{S}$	$\frac{\mathcal{S}^b}{\mathcal{S}}$
Nash	4	118.91	29.73	51.5	51.5	103	.50
Kalai	4	118.91	29.73	51.5	51.5	103	.50
Data	4.03	119.67	29.82	50.99	51.09	102.08	.50
$m = 60$	q	y	$\frac{y}{q}$	$\mathcal{S}^s$	$\mathcal{S}^b$	$\mathcal{S}$	$\frac{\mathcal{S}^b}{\mathcal{S}}$
Nash	2.17	60	27.65	33.27	58.19	91.46	.64
Kalai	1.69	60	35.5	41.71	41.71	83.42	.50
Data	1.69	59.05	35.88	40.65	42.14	82.79	.50
$m = 30$	q	y	$\frac{y}{q}$	$\mathcal{S}^s$	$\mathcal{S}^b$	$\mathcal{S}$	$\frac{\mathcal{S}^b}{\mathcal{S}}$
Nash	1.24	30	24.19	19.59	54.4	73.99	.74
Kalai	0.625	30	48	25.96	25.96	51.92	.50
Data	0.67	29.70	47.19	25.09	28.11	53.21	.52

that there is overall support for aspects of the theoretical predictions captured in Hypotheses 1 and 2, and more support for the Kalai solution, as formalized in Hypotheses 3b. We provide a more rigorous analysis of the data next.

We focus first on the unconstrained case, where we see that in case of agreement, the mean traded quantity is 4.03 and the mean traded tokens are 119.69. Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test on session-level averages for agreed upon trades, we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that in the unconstrained treatment, $q = 4$ and $y = 118.91$, i.e., the first best is achieved (p -values=.626 and .437, respectively).

Finding 2. *Consistent with Hypothesis 1, in the unconstrained case, we cannot reject the null that subjects achieve the first best.*

We next consider traded quantities and tokens across all three treatments. In addition to




Figure 6: Probability distributions of traded quantities and tokens by treatment. The bin width is 0.1 units of good in the top panel and 5 tokens in the bottom panel. There are 698 observations when $m = 315$, 674 when $m = 60$ and 657 when $m = 30$.

the averages displayed in Table 2, histograms show the distributions of traded quantities and tokens in Figure 6. The empirical cumulative distributions are plotted in Figure 7.

Finding 3. *Consistent with Hypothesis 2, as m increases, the traded quantity q , the amount of tokens spent y , the total surplus $\mathcal{S}$ and the seller's surplus $\mathcal{S}^s$ all increase.*

Support for Finding 3 can be found in Figures 6-9. More precise support is found in Table 3, where we report results from non-parametric Jonckheere tests for ordered alternatives using session-level data over all periods, and the first and second halves of each session (periods 1-15 and 16-30). Specifically, we test the null hypothesis that the medians of the outcome variables, $\tilde{x} = q, y$, and $\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{S}^s$ are the same across the three different values for m , i.e., $H_0: \tilde{x}_{30} = \tilde{x}_{60} = \tilde{x}_{315}$, against the ordered alternative hypothesis predicted by theory: $H_A: \tilde{x}_{30} \leq \tilde{x}_{60} \leq \tilde{x}_{315}$, with at least one strict inequality. We find that we can easily reject the null in favor of the alternative in all cases.




Figure 7: Cumulative distributions of traded quantities (left) and tokens (right) by treatment. There are 698 observations when $m = 315$, 674 when $m = 60$ and 657 when $m = 30$.

Further support for Finding 3 comes from pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests of distributional differences using data such as is illustrated in Figures 7 and 9. Specifically, we test the null of no distributional differences for the five outcome variables q , y , S^s , S , and S^b between the $m = 315$ and $m = 60$ treatments and also between the $m = 60$ and $m = 30$. The pairwise KS test results confirm that we can reject the null in favor of the alternative, theoretical predictions as reported in Finding 3, with $p < .01$ for all 10 pairwise tests.²³

We next focus on the impact of varying the liquidity constraint, m , on the buyer's surplus, so as to discriminate between Hypotheses 3a and 3b.

²³We have also explored whether the distributions of these outcome variables exhibit first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) in line with theoretical predictions using a test developed by [Barrett and Donald \(2003\)](#). This “BD” test reveals whether one distribution consistently provides a higher expected value than another for *any* possible outcome, and is a more stringent test than the KS test (which is based on the maximum distance between two cumulative distribution functions). We use the BD test as implemented in the PySDTest Python/Stata package ([Lee and Whang, 2023](#)) to test for first-order stochastic dominance in both directions. We find that for each of the five outcome variables examined between treatments, i.e., in comparisons of these variables between $m = 315$ vs. $m = 60$ and between $m = 60$ vs $m = 30$, we can reject FOSD in the direction *not* predicted by theory, and with a single exception (the distributions of buyer surplus between $m = 315$ and $m = 60$), there *is* first order stochastic dominance in the direction predicted by theory.

Table 3: Results and p-values from Jonckheere tests of ordered alternatives for the variables, q , y , $\mathcal{S}$, $\mathcal{S}^s$ and $\mathcal{S}^b$, all periods, first half (periods 1-15) and second half (periods 16-30), using session-level average data.

Row No., Variable	Hypotheses: H_0 vs. H_A	All periods	First Half Periods 1-15	Second Half Periods 16-30
1 q	$H_0 : q_{30} = q_{60} = q_{315}$ $H_A : q_{30} \leq q_{60} \leq q_{315}$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$
2 y	$H_0 : y_{30} = y_{60} = y_{315}$ $H_A : y_{30} \leq y_{60} \leq y_{315}$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$
3 $\mathcal{S}$	$H_0 : \mathcal{S}_{30} = \mathcal{S}_{60} = \mathcal{S}_{315}$ $H_A : \mathcal{S}_{30} \leq \mathcal{S}_{60} \leq \mathcal{S}_{315}$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$
4 $\mathcal{S}^s$	$H_0 : \mathcal{S}_{30}^s = \mathcal{S}_{60}^s = \mathcal{S}_{315}^s$ $H_A : \mathcal{S}_{30}^s \leq \mathcal{S}_{60}^s \leq \mathcal{S}_{315}^s$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$
5 $\mathcal{S}^b$	$H_0 : \mathcal{S}_{30}^b = \mathcal{S}_{60}^b = \mathcal{S}_{315}^b$ $H_A : \mathcal{S}_{30}^b \leq \mathcal{S}_{60}^b \leq \mathcal{S}_{315}^b$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$	Reject H_0 $p = .0000$

Finding 4. *Consistent with Hypothesis 3b (Kalai) but counter to Hypothesis 3a (Nash) the buyer's surplus is monotonically increasing as m increases.*

Support for this finding is found in Figures 8 and 9 and row 5 of Table 3, where we test the null of no difference in the buyer's surplus across the three treatments against the ordered alternative predicted by the Kalai (but not by the Nash) solution, using session-level data. We find that we can reject the null of no difference in favor of the alternative that the buyer's surplus $\mathcal{S}^b$, increases as m increases from 30 to 60 to 315, which is consistent with the Kalai solution.²⁴

²⁴We also tested the null hypothesis that the buyer's surplus was equal in *pairwise comparisons* between the three treatments using non-parametric Mann Whitney tests on session-level average data, i.e., $\mathcal{S}_{30}^b$ vs. $\mathcal{S}_{60}^b$; $\mathcal{S}_{60}^b$ vs. $\mathcal{S}_{315}^b$; $\mathcal{S}_{30}^b$ vs. $\mathcal{S}_{315}^b$; We are always able to reject the null of no difference in favor of the alternative that the buyer's surplus is *higher* when m is higher ($p = .0079$ for all three two-sided tests), which again favors the Kalai solution and runs counter to the non-monotonic prediction for the buyer's surplus under the Nash solution. It




Figure 8: Experimental bargaining agreements in the surplus space (left panel) and in the (quantity, payment) space (right panel). Each colored circled corresponds to an agreement between a buyer and a seller. Treatments are color-coded as follows: $m = 30$ in red, $m = 60$ in orange, $m = 315$ in green. Note that a region becomes darker as more data points overlap within it.




Figure 9: Left panel: Mean buyer's surplus and 95% confidence intervals across the three treatments along with Nash and Kalai predictions. Right panel: Cumulative distributions of buyer's surplus across the three treatments. There are 698 observations when $m = 315$, 674 when $m = 60$ and 657 when $m = 30$.

To quantify these effects, we also run the regression

$$\mathcal{S}_i^b = \beta_1 \mathbb{1}_{\{m=30\}} + \beta_2 \mathbb{1}_{\{m=315\}} + \varepsilon_i, \quad (8)$$

also runs counter to the Kalai-Smorodinsky prediction of a non-monotonic buyer surplus.

Table 4: Random-effects estimation of the impact of varying the liquidity constraint, m , on the buyer’s surplus.

	Buyer’s surplus	
	(1)	(2)
$m = 30$	-13.9488 (1.0885)	-14.2499 (1.1902)
$m = 315$	8.9191 (0.8067)	9.0271 (0.8106)
Constant ($m = 60$)	42.1993 (0.7856)	42.3712 (0.7943)
Observations	2028	1801

Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses

using a random effects regression estimator where i indexes an individual buyer. We focus on accepted offers, and report results for two different specifications:

(1) all accepted offers

(2) accepted offers s.t. $|q - 4| < 0.5$ when $m = 315$, $y - 60 < 0.5$ when $m = 60$, and $y - 30 < 0.5$ when $m = 30$.²⁵

The results are reported in Table 4.²⁶ For both specifications, consistent with Kalai’s predictions, the buyer’s surplus significantly decreases when m is reduced from 60 to 30, and significantly rises when m is increased from 60 to 315. Thus overall, we find strong support for the Kalai solution rather than Nash, given our estimate of θ at 0.5.

²⁵These conditions ensure that offers are close to the Pareto frontier, i.e., players are close to behaving rationally by proposing a Pareto-efficient joint production.

²⁶Regression results obtained when random effects are indexed at the individual seller level are reported in Table D4 in Appendix D.

6 Discussion

Given the estimated bargaining weight of $\theta = 0.5$ in the unconstrained treatment, the Kalai solution coincides with the “efficient equal split” outcome, or the case where the buyer and seller surpluses are maximized subject to the constraint that both surpluses are equal. Efficient equal split is *not* a general property of the Kalai solution. For values of θ different from 0.5, one can show that: 1) buyer and seller’s surpluses will *not* be equal under the Kalai solution (specifically, the buyer will receive a share θ of the total surplus); 2) in the presence of liquidity constraints, total earnings efficiency remains lower under the Kalai solution as compared with the Nash solution.

We emphasize that we study the standard, symmetric version of the model without imposing any particular structure or market power in the bargaining process. We estimated θ using data for the case where buyers are *not* liquidity constrained, and we treat that estimate of θ as a model primitive. We have no reason to think that θ should change as liquidity constraints become binding, as the existing theory is silent on this issue.

Nevertheless, in this section, we discuss the robustness of our finding that the data are more consistent with the Kalai solution than with the Nash solution, in light of the fact that Kalai coincides with the equal split outcome when $\theta = 0.5$ and so that solution may have been chosen based on fairness considerations alone. To address this concern, we present three persuasive arguments to demonstrate that the preference for the Kalai solution in our findings is not merely a reflection of fairness principles, but rather of the structure of the bargaining problem we consider.

As a first exercise, we reverse our approach to analyzing the data: instead of assuming that bargaining powers are a constant primitive of the experiment and checking which solution fits the data best, we instead impose a bargaining solution and solve for the bargaining power implied by the allocations we observe. First, suppose we fixed the buyer’s share to its empirical average, $\mathcal{S}^b/\mathcal{S} = 0.5$. We know that this is theoretically consistent with the Kalai solution for all treatments when $\theta_K = 0.5$ and for the Nash solution with $\theta_N = 0.5$ in the unconstrained treatment ($m = 315$). We can then ask how the bargaining weight would have to change as the liquidity constraint becomes binding so as to make the allocation consistent with the Nash solution. This is equivalent to solving for θ_N such that $\Theta(q) = 0.5$. Using the definition of




Figure 10: Empirical distribution of bargaining weights assuming that agreements follow the Kalai bargaining rule (in orange) v.s. the Nash bargaining rule (in white with dashed outline)

$\Theta(q)$ in section 3.2, we obtain:

$$\theta_N = \frac{c'(q)}{u'(q) + c'(q)}. \quad (9)$$

Plugging in the values for q predicted by the Kalai solution for $m \in \{30, 60, 315\}$ into (9), we obtain, respectively, $\theta_N = 0.15$, $\theta_N = 0.31$, and $\theta_N = 0.5$. That is, large changes in θ_N across environments would be needed in order for the Nash solution to fit the data and implement equal split allocations for all treatments.²⁷ In Figure 10, we go further and plot the empirical distributions of bargaining weights implied by all agreements, assuming that these agreements implement the Kalai solution (in orange) or the Nash solution (in white with dashed outline). That is, for each agreement in the data, we compute θ_K and θ_N . The distribution under Kalai bargaining is unimodal, centered around 0.5, while the distribution under Nash is trimodal, reflecting the three treatments. The figure confirms that in order to be consistent with Nash bargaining, the data we observe would require significant shifts in the bargaining weights of players across treatments, which is not plausible.

As a second exercise, we report on new experimental results using a modified version of

²⁷More specifically, the buyer's bargaining power would have to decrease significantly when her liquidity constraint tightens for our data to match the theoretical Nash predictions.

the unconstrained treatment. In this version, subjects were instructed that buyer proposals, accepted by the seller, are always implemented. However, seller proposals, accepted by the buyer, are implemented only with some probability $p < 1$; with probability $1 - p$, a seller proposal accepted by a buyer is not implemented and both players in such a match earn zero. If the proposal was implemented, then a pair earned payoffs from that proposal as in the standard design. The modified part of the instructions given to subjects in these new $p < 1$ treatments is reproduced in Appendix A.2. The aim of this modified, unconstrained treatment was to determine whether a simple change that introduces asymmetry presumably in favor of buyers but without changing too much the fundamental structure of the model—still involving two players and unstructured bargaining—would move outcomes away from efficient equal split and toward outcomes favoring the buyer. If this is the case, it would lend support to the idea that participants are not merely defaulting to equal splits, but are actively and strategically considering the relative power of each party in the bargaining process.

We conducted six sessions of this modified unconstrained treatment, three with $p = 0.5$ and three with $p = 0.25$. All six sessions involved 10 new subjects (with no prior experience in our study) and were conducted in the same manner as was done for the original unconstrained treatment.²⁸ These additional sessions resulted in 900 new pairwise negotiations. The agreement rates were 90% in the sessions with $p = 0.25$ and 81% in the sessions with $p = 0.5$, resulting in 403 and 364 agreements, respectively.

Table 5 reports findings for these two new treatments, similar to what was reported earlier in Tables 1-2. For comparison purposes, we repeat measures from those tables for the original unconstrained treatment, where $p = 1$. Note that we report data resulting from all agreed-upon offers, regardless of whether or not those offers were implemented.

We first note that while the new treatment added more complexity, players nevertheless responded predictably to the changed environment. Specifically, buyers rarely accepted sellers' offers, avoiding the stochastic implementation of such agreements. Indeed, only 10% (13%) of all agreed-upon offers were made by a seller and accepted by a buyer in the treatments with $p = 0.25$ ($p = 0.5$), resulting in only 8% (6%) of agreements not implemented.

²⁸We thus have data from an additional 60 subjects. Average earnings were \$28.96 for the $p = 0.25$ treatment and \$29.43 for the $p = 0.5$ treatment, which are comparable to the original $m = 315$ treatment (where $p = 1$ and average earnings were \$31.08).

Table 5: Average outcomes by treatment for accepted offers in the unconstrained treatment when $p = .25$, $p = 0.5$ and $p = 1.0$.

$m = 315$	q	y	$\frac{y}{q}$	$\mathcal{S}^s$	$\mathcal{S}^b$	$\mathcal{S}$	$\frac{\mathcal{S}^b}{\mathcal{S}}$
$p = 0.25$	4.17	119.76	28.94	46.40	53.64	100.04	0.54
$p = 0.5$	4.22	118.20	28.05	44.05	57.18	101.23	0.57
$p = 1$	4.03	119.67	29.70	50.99	51.09	102.08	0.50

Second, Table 5 shows that for both $p = 0.25$ and $p = 0.5$, the empirical buyer's share in all agreed-upon offers now exceeds 0.5, indicating a departure from the equal split outcome. Additional support for this shift is evident in Figure 11, which compares the cumulative distribution of the buyer's share in trades when $p = 0.25$ or $p = 0.5$ to those where $p = 1$. Using the new data, we run a regression exercise similar to that in Section 5.2 to provide a more precise estimate of the buyer's share. We run the regression in equation (7) on the sample of accepted offers for each of our two new treatments, again using a random effects regression estimator at the buyer level. In specification (1), we consider the sample of all accepted offers. In specification (2), we restrict the sample to accepted offers in the neighborhood of $q^* = 4$ such that $|q - 4| < 0.5$. The results are shown in Table 6.

We again observe that in both cases where $p < 1$, the buyer's surplus is significantly greater than 0.5, suggesting that subjects do not come to the bargaining game with a strong pre-disposition to play according to the equal split outcome. Rather, they are responsive to our induced change in the buyer's bargaining position. While the increase in the buyer's share above 0.5 may appear to be non-monotonic in p , the difference between the $p = 0.25$ and $p = 0.5$ treatments is not significantly different. The more important finding, is that the buyer's share is significantly greater when $p < 1$. We also note that while subjects strategically adjust their behavior in the modified bargaining game, sellers retain significant bargaining power. There is evidence that this is the case because of the unstructured nature of the bargaining process. Specifically, responses to an exit survey question indicate that sellers used their offers to signal the type of offers they were willing to accept and often delayed




Figure 11: Probability distributions (left) and cumulative probability distributions (right) of the buyer's share in accepted offers as a function of the implementation probability, when $m = 315$. In the left panel, the bin width is equal to 0.015, and bins are offset for visibility. There are 698 observations when $p = 1$, 365 when $p = 0.5$ and 403 when $p = 0.25$.

Table 6: Random-effects estimation of the buyer's share of the surplus, $\mathcal{S}^b/\mathcal{S}$, among accepted offers with probabilistic versus certain implementation ($m = 315$).

	Buyer's surplus, $\mathcal{S}^b$					
	$p = 0.25$		$p = 0.5$		$p = 1$	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Total surplus, $\mathcal{S}$	0.5378	0.5265	0.5688	0.5737	0.5012	0.4994
	(0.0088)	(0.0138)	(0.0123)	(0.0108)	(0.0032)	(0.0018)
Observations	403	221	365	254	698	574

Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses




Figure 12: Buyers' share of the surplus in their own offers, by rank of the offer relative to the accepted offer and by treatment. Colored circles represent all offers. Median offers are represented with a black square, and mean offers are represented by a black cross.

acceptance until the last moment, which led buyers to improve their offers.

In a final exercise, we consider the process by which buyers and sellers reached a trade agreement in each two minute round for the original treatments. Our aim here is to show that buyers and sellers do not immediately jump to the equal split outcome, but instead approach that outcome only gradually over the course of each two minute bargaining round.

Figure 12 shows the share of the surplus that buyers assign to themselves as part of their offers, as the negotiation unfolds. The three panels correspond to the three treatments. The sample is restricted to negotiations that ended with an agreement during sessions 1 to 6.²⁹ In each panel, offers are ranked by their order relative to the last offer made. For example, in the left panel, the yellow dots represent all the fourth-to-last offers made by buyers (i.e., the third subsequent offer was the agreed-upon offer). The black square represents the median offer in this sample, and the black cross the average. We can see that buyers tend to make

²⁹The sample here is restricted to the first six sessions because timestamps tracking the order in which proposals were made were not recorded for subsequent sessions.

Table 7: Random-effects estimation of the buyer’s share of the surplus, $\mathcal{S}^b/\mathcal{S}$, among buyers and sellers first proposals of a round.

Estimated buyer’s share, $\mathcal{S}^b/\mathcal{S}$				
		Buyer’s first offer	Seller’s first offer	Agreed-upon offer
$p = 1$	$m = 315$	0.54	0.47	0.50
		(.51 .57)	(.45 .48)	(.50 .51)
		$n = 747$	$n = 749$	$n = 698$
	$m = 60$	0.59	0.47	0.51
		(.55 .63)	(.46 .48)	(.49 .52)
		$n = 748$	$n = 748$	$n = 674$
	$m = 30$	0.62	0.44	0.52
		(.58 .68)	(.41 .46)	(.50 .54)
		$n = 749$	$n = 749$	$n = 656$
$p = 0.5$	$m = 315$	0.67	0.44	0.57
		(.66 .69)	(.36 .52)	(.54 .59)
		$n = 441$	$n = 389$	$n = 365$
$p = 0.25$	$m = 315$	0.64	0.43	0.54
		(.61 .67)	(.41 .46)	(.52 .56)
		$n = 446$	$n = 417$	$n = 403$

95% CIs in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered at the session level

proposals that significantly favor themselves (above the 0.5 equal split line), but they adjust these proposals downward as the negotiation proceeds. This is in line with the results reported in the upper panel of Table 7 where the buyer’s initial offer is associated with a surplus share significantly higher than 0.5. The bargaining process is similar for sellers, who also start out making proposals that favor themselves before agreeing to approximately equal splits as the bargaining time limit approaches (see Figure E1 in Appendix E and Table 7).

This process data analysis reveals that subjects do not immediately jump to the final outcome where the total surplus is split equally as reported in Section 5. That is, the equal split final outcome is not be due to an inherent desire for fairness on the part of players. Rather, it seems that subjects initially try to extract more surplus for themselves and only converge to an equal split as a result of the back-and-forth bargaining process.

To obtain an estimate of the compromises made by players as the negotiation unfolds, we study a new variable,

$$\Delta \text{ player's share} = \text{player's share in round's first offer} - \text{agreed-upon player's share}.$$

We then regress this new variable on a dummy variable indicating whether the player or her negotiation partner made the first offer. Observations include all rounds that ended with an agreement in sessions 1 to 6. Since each recorded offer corresponds to two observations (one recorded for the buyer and one recorded for the seller), we run two separate regressions, splitting the sample by roles. Results for the sample restricted to buyers are presented in Table 8 while results for the sample restricted to sellers are available in Appendix D in Table D5.

When the player makes the first offer, she initially proposes to allocate to herself a share of the total surplus that is, on average, 8.51 percentage points higher than is eventually agreed-upon. On the other hand, if her trade partner made the first offer, the player eventually obtains a share of the total surplus that is, on average, 4.87 percentage points higher than was originally proposed. Finding 5 summarizes this analysis. Similar conclusions can be made when the sample is restricted to sellers.

Finding 5. *If more than one proposal is made, the initial proposal is more favorable to the player making the proposal than is the final agreed upon proposal.*

Table 8: Random-effect estimation of the change in a player’s share of surplus between the first offer and the accepted offer, dependent on having made the first offer. Random effects are indexed at the individual player level. The sample includes only buyers.

	Δ Player’s share
Player made the first offer	-0.1338 (0.0216)
Constant	0.0487 (0.0093)
Observations	835

Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses

This finding shows that proposals do not inherently imply a weight of 0.5. In fact, subjects initially propose terms that favor themselves and only converge to a proposal implying an equal split after several rounds of unstructured bargaining.

Note that the bargaining process delineated above, with both players starting by proposing higher shares of surplus to themselves before converging towards a potential agreement, generates delays. Table 9 shows the average number of proposals made by a pair of players during one round (over the entire sample), broken down across treatments, rounds, and whether bargaining ended with an agreement. On average, players made 7.21 proposals per round. This number is markedly higher for rounds that did not end up with an agreement. While we do not have timed evidence, this finding suggests that players who agreed on a trade were typically not constrained by the time limit, since they typically made fewer offers than their counterparts who did not agree. It is also interesting to note that the more stringent the liquidity constraint, the greater the number of offers made on average by the players (and thus the larger the delays): it took fewer than 5 proposals, on average, for players in the unconstrained treatment to agree, compared to more than 10 proposals for players in the most constrained treatment. Indeed, as Table 2 reveals, the difference in the total surplus between the Nash and Kalai solutions is increasing with the tightness of the liquidity constraint. This

Table 9: Average number of proposals made by a pair of players during one round.

		Type of negotiation		
		All	Agreement	No agreement
All treatments	All rounds	7.21	6.60	14.24
	1-15	6.65	6.01	12.61
	16-30	7.78	7.17	16.68
m = 30	All rounds	11.36	10.18	21.51
	1-15	9.98	8.77	18.63
	16-30	12.74	10.18	25.66
m = 60	All rounds	5.43	5.22	7.85
	1-15	5.04	4.82	7.26
	16-30	5.83	5.61	8.57
m = 315	All	4.84	4.54	10.00
	1-15	4.93	4.56	9.31
	16-30	4.76	4.53	11.67

suggests that players face a trade-off between efficiency and equality, delaying the convergence process, rather than simply aiming for equal division.

7 Welfare Cost of Inflation

The results we reported on in the previous section provide support for the Kalai bargaining solution over the Nash solution and for equal bargaining weights for buyers and sellers. In this section we show how our findings on bargaining weights and bargaining solution have important implications for the estimation of the welfare costs of inflation.³⁰

The original method developed to estimate the welfare cost of inflation is due to [Bailey](#)

³⁰We recognize that this section may not appeal to all readers, but the question of the appropriate bargaining solution to use in search-money models and the implications for the welfare cost of inflation did serve as an impetus for this project, and so we feel we would be remiss not to include this discussion here. Readers who are not interested in this topic can skip to the concluding section [8](#).

(1956) and was later expanded upon by Lucas (2000). It involves estimating the money demand curve and calculating the area beneath it between relevant nominal interest rates, associated with inflation rates via the Fisher equation (see also Appendix C). Craig and Rocheteau (2006, 2008) highlight that the Bailey-Lucas approach, also dubbed “welfare triangle” approach, is accurate only if the private benefits of real money balances to money holders are equal to their social benefits because the money demand curve only captures the benefits of money to its holders, not more broadly to society. Since any transaction is two-sided, conditional on sellers extracting some surplus from transactions, the welfare triangle approach underestimates the benefits of real money balances (and thus underestimates the cost of inflation). Obtaining a correct estimate of the welfare cost of inflation therefore requires accounting for the surplus obtained by the two parties in any transaction. This can be achieved by estimating a structural model of monetary trade where exchange between buyers and sellers is explicitly formalized. Craig and Rocheteau (2006, 2008) do so using the Lagos and Wright (2005) model, where bilateral trade is formulated in line with the theoretical setup we presented in Section 3. Of course, results hinge on the structural assumptions used in the estimation. Importantly, assumptions regarding the determination of the terms of trade, such as the bargaining solution and bargaining weights, are critical.

We contribute to this literature by adopting a similar approach to Craig and Rocheteau (2006, 2008) and estimating the money demand curve and the cost of inflation using the functional forms and parameters from our experiment, varying both the distribution of bargaining powers and the bargaining protocol.³¹ Following the literature, we focus on estimating the cost of a 10% inflation regime compared to a no-inflation regime. Given a discount rate of 3%, this is equivalent to comparing an economy with an $i = 13\%$ nominal interest rate to an economy with an $i = 3\%$ nominal rate. Note that a nominal interest rate of 0% (thus an inflation rate of -3%) corresponds to the Friedman rule.

Table 10 shows our results. Considering both the Kalai and Nash bargaining solutions, the table reports the quantity traded in bilateral meetings as well as the cost of 10% inflation as a function of the buyer’s bargaining weight.

First notice that the higher the inflation rate, the higher the nominal interest rate, and the lower the quantity that is traded, q . Indeed, the higher the inflation rate, the more costly it is

³¹See Appendix C for details about the model and the estimation.

Table 10: Estimates of the quantities traded bilaterally and of the welfare cost of 10% inflation relative to 0% inflation. Outcomes corresponding to our experimental results are in bold.

	Buyer's bargaining power, θ	Quantity traded, q			Welfare cost (% of GDP)
		Friedman rule	0% inflation	10% inflation	
Kalai	0.33	4.00	2.84	0.32	5.70
	0.50	4.00	2.70	0.43	3.35
	0.66	4.00	2.70	0.74	2.13
	1.00	4.00	3.06	1.68	1.20
Nash	0.33	1.54	1.04	0.51	3.67
	0.50	2.17	1.53	0.76	2.86
	0.66	2.74	1.98	1.02	2.26
	1.00	4.00	3.06	1.68	1.20

to hold real money balances from one period to the next (in other words, the nominal interest rate is the opportunity cost of holding real money balances). As this cost increases, buyers economize by carrying fewer real balances, and thus they cannot purchase as many units of the consumption good from sellers. This phenomenon is partially due to a hold up problem: as long as $\theta < 1$, buyers do not extract all of the surplus generated by carrying real balances, which leads them to “underinvest” in real balances. This disappears when $\theta = 1$, in which case the first-best quantity of goods is traded both under the Nash and Kalai bargaining solutions, $q = q^* = 4$. Note that under the Nash solution, even when the Friedman rule is in place, so that carrying real money balances is costless ($i = 0$), buyers may not carry the optimal amount of real balances, leading to suboptimal trade sizes. This is due to the non-monotonicity of the Nash solution, as depicted in Figure 2. At some point, carrying additional real balances worsens the buyer’s bargaining position under the Nash solution as it reduces the amount of the surplus that she can extract. Even if real money balances are costless, this is another reason for buyers to limit their money holdings.³²

Estimates obtained under the specification in line with our experimental results are dis-

³²An interesting result is that while in partial equilibrium, for a given amount of money holdings, the Nash bargaining leads to a higher total surplus shared between a buyer and a seller, in general equilibrium, Nash bargaining leads to lower real money balances holdings and therefore lower surpluses.

played in bold (the corresponding estimated money demand curve is represented in Figure C1 in Appendix C). We summarize the key insights from the estimation below.

Finding 6. *Under Kalai bargaining and with a buyer’s bargaining power of 0.5, the cost of a 10% inflation amounts to 3.35% of GDP. Assuming instead that buyers have all the bargaining power ($\theta = 1$) leads to underestimating the welfare cost of inflation by a factor of 2.79 (for a cost of 1.20% of GDP). Setting the bargaining power equal to $\theta = 0.5$ but using the Nash bargaining solution instead of Kalai leads to underestimating the cost of inflation by a factor of 1.17 (for a cost of 2.86% of GDP).*

8 Conclusion

We have studied a bargaining setting where players simultaneously determine both the size of the gains from trade and the division of those gains. We have further considered the case where one party, the buyer, is constrained in terms of the amount of money that they can bring to the bargaining table. Such liquidity constraints are a common phenomenon and make the bargaining set asymmetric between the two players. Under the Nash bargaining solution, the presence of liquidity constraints gives rise to a larger surplus going to the buyer relative to the seller and larger total gains from trade than under the Kalai solution, where the surpluses are predicted to be equal (given the bargaining weight of $1/2$) regardless of liquidity constraints. These two different solutions are used in the money search literature to understand such questions as the welfare cost of inflation. For example, to evaluate the welfare costs of inflation, researchers typically assume that a bargaining solution—either Kalai or Nash—and conduct quantitative assessments of the model. They often rely on field data on mark-ups to estimate the buyer’s bargaining power. In contrast, we leverage experimental methods to provide an estimate for θ in a controlled setting that more closely resembles the model. We do not claim that our approach is superior, or the last word on the subject, but we believe it provides a useful alternative method for estimating θ .

The evidence from our experiment supports a bargaining power of $1/2$ and favors the Kalai bargaining solution over the Nash solution. Still, this is just a first step in understanding how liquidity constrained players approach the bargaining problem.

It is interesting to note that by favoring a solution close to the proportional Kalai bar-

gaining solution rather than Nash bargaining, players effectively agree to share a smaller pie, decreasing total welfare, in order to achieve more equality. The Nash solution would allow for a larger joint production, albeit at the expense of the seller. Theory predicts that this welfare result would be overturned were the liquidity constraints endogenized through a costly ex-ante choice of real balances by buyers (see, e.g., [Lebeau \(2020\)](#), [Rocheteau et al. \(2021\)](#)). In that case, playing according to the Nash solution rather than the Kalai solution would lead the buyer to carry fewer real balances, making the negotiation more liquidity-constrained, eventually resulting in lower trade volumes and total welfare. In that case, it would also be to the advantage of the buyer to implement Kalai bargaining. This suggests that our findings would be strengthened were liquidity constraints endogenized rather than imposed upon subjects.

A promising avenue to test this hypothesis in the lab would be to consider the following two stage game. First buyers decide how much to borrow in terms of money. Then, in the second stage, bargaining takes place. Finally, in the payoff stage, buyers have to repay their borrowings with interest and realize their payoffs. Higher interest rates would also capture higher inflation rates, allowing us to explore the welfare costs of inflation more directly. Other promising investigations include the implementation of bargaining settings that provide non-cooperative foundations to Kalai’s solution (see, e.g., [Dutta \(2012, 2021\)](#), [Hu and Rocheteau \(2020\)](#)) as well as the incorporation of unstructured bargaining in fully dynamic settings (e.g., [Duffy and Puzzello \(2022\)](#), [Jiang et al. \(2023\)](#), [Ding and Puzzello \(2020\)](#), [Duffy and Puzzello \(2014\)](#)). We leave these extensions to future research.

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Appendix For Online Publication Only

A Experimental Instructions

A.1 The following instructions were used in the constrained $m = 60$ treatment with $p = 1$. The instructions for the $m=315$ and $m=30$ treatment are similar.

Welcome to this experiment in the economics of decision-making. Please read these instructions carefully as the cash payment you earn at the end of today's session may depend on how well you understand these instructions. If you have a question at any time, please feel free to ask the experimenter. There is no talking for the duration of this 2-hour session. Please turn off your cell phone and any other electronic devices.

Your Role and Matching

There are 10 participants in today's session. You will participate in 30 rounds of decision-making using the networked computer workstations of the laboratory. Prior to the first round, one-half of participants will be randomly assigned the role of Buyer and the other half the role of Seller. You will remain in the *same* role in all 30 rounds.

In each and every round, the computer program randomly and anonymously matches Buyers and Sellers in *pairs*. All possible pairings of one Buyer with one Seller are equally likely in each round. Thus, while the player you are paired with will always be of the opposite type, they are likely to change from round to round. You will not know the identity of any of the players you are paired with, nor will they know your identity, even after the experiment is over.

Your Decision in Each Round

In each round, Sellers can produce a good that is valuable to Buyers only. In each round Buyers have an endowment of 60 tokens that can be used to purchase units of the good that Sellers produce. A round involves bargaining between the Buyer and Seller over the quantity of the good the Seller will produce, q , and the number of tokens, τ , the Buyer will give the Seller in exchange.

A **proposal** thus consists of a pair, (q, τ) . Quantities, q , can range from 0 to 11, inclusive,

in increments of up to 2 decimal places. The number of tokens, τ , can range from 0 to 60, inclusive, in increments of up to 2 decimal places. Proposals can be made by *either* the Buyer or the Seller at *any time* during each 2-minute bargaining round. Any number of proposals can be made by either player and in any order over the duration of the bargaining round. Once a proposal is made, it is shown on both the Buyer and the Seller’s decision screens and is considered “live”. If the player not making the proposal chooses to accept that proposal, the bargaining round is declared over and the proposed exchange of q units of the good for τ tokens is implemented. The payoffs from such an agreed upon exchange are explained below. Proposals submitted by one player can be accepted by the other player at *any time* during each 2-minute round. If no proposal is made or there is no agreement on any proposal by players within each 2-minute bargaining round, then the round is declared over and no exchange takes place.

Payoffs From Exchange Outcomes

1. If a proposal is accepted within the 2-minute bargaining round, then an exchange takes place. In that case:

- The Buyer’s payoff is given by:

$$\text{Buyer's payoff in points} = u(q) - \tau. \tag{A1}$$

Here $u(q)$ is an increasing function of the quantity q representing the buyer’s value from consuming q units of the good. This function is illustrated on your decision screen, and Table A1 provides the actual function for $u(q)$ along with a non-exhaustive list of possible values for $u(q)$. Note that while $u(q)$ is increasing in q , these increases are lower with higher values for q . Notice also that each token a Buyer gives to the Seller reduces the Buyer’s payoff by one point. Importantly, tokens that are not offered as part of an agreed upon proposal have *no payoff* in points to the Buyer. That is, if an agreed upon proposal involves an exchange of τ tokens, then the Buyer loses τ points. Any remaining tokens held by the buyer, $60 - \tau$, have 0 value.

- The Seller’s payoff is given by:

$$\text{Seller's payoff in points} = \tau - c(q) \quad (\text{A2})$$

Each token a Seller receives from a Buyer increases the Seller’s payoff by one point. Recall that tokens only have value to the Seller in terms of points (and a cost to the Buyer in terms of points) if a proposal is accepted. Notice also that the Seller’s payoff is decreased by $c(q)$, which represents the Seller’s cost of producing q units. This cost function, $c(q)$, is illustrated on your decision screen. Table A1 provides the actual function for $c(q)$ along with a non-exhaustive list of possible values for $c(q)$. Note that while $c(q)$ is increasing in q these increases are higher with higher values for q .

2. If no proposal is made or is accepted within a 2-minute bargaining round then no exchange takes place. In that case:
 - Both the Buyer and the Seller payoffs are 0 for that round.

The Decision Screen

The decision screen you face is illustrated in Figures 1-2. The top part of this screen, as shown in Figure 1, illustrates the functions $u(q)$ for Buyers and $c(q)$ for Sellers. Below this illustration are two slider bars, one for the quantity, q , and the other for tokens, τ , which are repeated in Figure 2, which illustrates the bottom part of the decision screen from the Buyer’s perspective (the Seller’s perspective is similar). By moving the slider bars for q and τ you will see, to the right of these slider bars, how the Buyer’s value, $u(q)$, and the Seller’s cost, $c(q)$, will be affected by the choice of q as well as the payoff to you and the other player from your proposal of (q, τ) . You can move both slider bars as often as you wish to experiment with various proposals. When you find a proposal that you would like to submit to the other player, press the blue Submit button, which makes your proposal ‘live’. This means that the other player can accept your proposal at any time during the two-minute round. Once submitted, proposals *cannot* be withdrawn. Note that proposals that would result in *negative* payoffs to either you or the other player are *not allowed*. The computer program will check whether




Figure A1: Top Part of Decision Screen (Buyer View)

your proposal would result in negative payoffs to you or the other player. If you try to submit such a proposal you will receive an error message and that proposal will not be made live.

The proposals, in the form, q units for τ tokens, submitted by the Buyer or by the Seller are shown at the bottom of your decision screen under the headings “Buyer proposals” and “Seller proposals”. Next to each proposal is the number of points the Buyer would earn and the number of points the Seller would earn if the proposal were accepted. A scroll bar will appear if the number of proposals is large so that you can review all proposals made in the current round.

To accept a proposal, simply click on the Accept button next to a proposal at the bottom of your decision screen. Note: you cannot accept your *own* submitted proposal; it is assumed that you agree to abide by any proposal that you submit. The bargaining round ends if one player chooses to accept a proposal made by the other player *or* the 2-minute time limit to the round has been reached, whichever comes first.

Payoffs

If you complete this experiment, you are guaranteed a \$7 participation payment. In addition, at the end of the experiment, the computer program will randomly choose 2 rounds from all

Proposal submitted!

Choose your proposed quantity between 0 and 11:

Choose your proposed number of tokens between 0 and 60:

The total value of this many units to you is: 152.66
The total cost of this many units to the seller is: 51.05
Your payoff would be: 94.73
The seller's payoff would be: 6.88

Current proposals

Buyer Proposals	Seller Proposals
3.33 units for 57.93; buyer gets 94.73, seller gets 6.88 you	1.14 units for 51.02; buyer gets 29.22, seller gets 40.98 Accept

Figure A2: Bottom Part of Decision Screen (Buyer View)

30 rounds played. Your payoff in points from those 2 rounds will be converted into dollars at the rate of 1 point = \$0.25. Your dollar payoff from the chosen rounds will be added to your participation payment. Your total payment will be made to you in cash and in private.

Summary of the Experiment

1. Prior to the first round, you will be randomly assigned a role as a Buyer or a Seller. You will remain in the *same* role in all 30 rounds of the experiment.
2. In each round, Buyers and Sellers are randomly paired and have 2 minutes to bargain over an amount, q , of the good the Seller will produce for the Buyer and the amount of tokens, τ , the Buyer will give the Seller in exchange.
3. Bargaining consists of making proposal pairs of (q, τ) . Proposals can be made by either player, in any order. Proposals that would result in negative payoffs to either player are not allowed.
4. Once submitted, proposals are considered *live* and can be accepted at any time.
5. If a proposal, (q, τ) , is accepted by the other player, the bargaining round is over. In that case, the Buyer's payoff in points for the round is $u(q) - \tau$. The Seller's payoff in

points is $\tau - c(q)$.

6. The Buyer's tokens have no value or cost (i.e., they are worthless) *unless* a proposal is accepted. In that case, the τ tokens offered yield τ points to the Seller and cost the Buyer τ points. Any excess tokens held by the Buyer, $60 - \tau$, have 0 value or cost.
7. If no proposal is made or is accepted within the 2-minute bargaining round, then both players earn 0 points.
8. At the end of the experiment, 2 rounds, from all 30 rounds, will be randomly chosen for payment. Your points from those 2 rounds will be converted into dollars at the rate of 1 point = \$0.25 cents.

Questions?

Now is the time for questions. If you have a question, please raise your hand and your question will be answered in private.

Quiz

To check your understanding of the instructions, we ask you to complete the following quiz before we move on to the experiment. The numbers in these quiz questions are for illustration purposes only. The actual numbers in the experiment may be quite different. When you have completed the quiz, please raise your hand. An experimenter will check your answers. If there are any wrong answers we will go over the relevant part of the instructions again.

1. My role as a Buyer or as a Seller will (circle choice):
 - a. change every round.
 - b. remain the same in all rounds.
2. Suppose a player makes a proposal of $q = 3.25$ and $\tau = 50$, and this proposal is accepted by the other player. What is the payoff in points to the Buyer from this proposal? (Use Equation (A1) and Table A1). _____ What is the payoff in points to the Seller from this proposal? (Use Equation (A2) and Table A1). _____

3. Suppose a player makes a proposal of $q = 1$ and $\tau = 60$, and this proposal is accepted by the other player. What is the payoff in points to the Buyer from this proposal? (Use Equation (A1) and Table A1). _____ What is the payoff in points to the Seller from this proposal? (Use Equation (A2) and Table A1). _____
4. If several proposals are made but none are accepted by the end of a 2-minute trading round, then (circle choice):
 - a. the last proposal made will be implemented.
 - b. both players will earn 0 for the round.
5. True or false: If I make a proposal in a round, I can later withdraw it and make a proposal that is better for me. Circle one: True False
6. True or false: At the end of the experiment my payoff in points from two randomly chosen rounds will be converted into dollars at the rate of 1 point = \$0.25. Circle one: True False

A.2 Changes to instructions made for the $m = 315$, $p < 1$ treatments. In the case where $p < 1$, the main modification was to the section of the instructions titled Payoffs from Exchange Outcomes. This section was changed as follows, for the case where $p = 0.5$ ($p = 0.25$ is similar).

Payoffs From Exchange Outcomes

1. If a proposal is accepted within the 2-minute bargaining round, then an exchange *may* take place. If the proposal was made by the Buyer and accepted by the Seller, then an exchange *always* takes place. However, if the proposal was made by the Seller and accepted by the Buyer, then an exchange takes place with probability .50 and does not take place with probability .50. In the case that an exchange takes place:
 - The Buyer's payoff is given by:

$$\text{Buyer's payoff in points} = u(q) - \tau. \quad (\text{A3})$$

Here $u(q)$ is an increasing function of the quantity q representing the buyer's value in terms of points from consuming q units of the good. This function is illustrated

on your decision screen shown in Figure 1 and Table A1 provides the actual function for $u(q)$ along with a non-exhaustive list of possible values for $u(q)$ in points. Note that while $u(q)$ is increasing in q , these increases are lower with higher values for q . Notice also that each token a Buyer gives to the Seller reduces the Buyer's payoff by one point. Importantly, tokens that are not offered as part of an agreed upon proposal have *no payoff* in points to the Buyer. That is, if an agreed upon proposal involves an exchange of τ tokens, then the Buyer loses τ points. Any remaining tokens held by the buyer, $315 - \tau$, have 0 value.

- The Seller's payoff is given by:

$$\text{Seller's payoff in points} = \tau - c(q). \quad (\text{A4})$$

Each token a Seller receives from a Buyer increases the Seller's payoff by one point. Recall that tokens only have value to the Seller in terms of points and represent a cost to the Buyer in terms of points if a proposal is accepted. Notice also that the Seller's payoff is decreased by $c(q)$ points, which represents the Seller's cost of producing q units. This cost function, $c(q)$, is illustrated on your decision screen shown in Figure 1. Table A1 provides the actual function for $c(q)$ along with a non-exhaustive list of possible values for $c(q)$. Note that while $c(q)$ is increasing in q these increases are higher with higher values for q .

2. If no proposal is made or is accepted within a 2-minute bargaining round then no exchange takes place. Further, if an accepted proposal was made by a Seller, then no exchange takes place with probability 0.5. In those two cases:

- Both the Buyer and the Seller's payoffs are 0 for that round.

B Non-zero disagreement values

In our experiment, the disagreement point was normalized to $(0, 0)$. This section shows that the theoretical predictions that we test for in Hypotheses 1 to 3 remain identical if the disagreement point is different from zero.

Assume that if the two players do not agree on a trade, the buyer obtains $d_b > 0$ and the




Figure B1: Pareto frontiers and predicted allocations under Nash and Kalai solutions with a (10,5) disagreement point compared to allocations with a (0,0) disagreement point.

seller obtains $d_s > 0$. The Nash bargaining problem is

$$\max_{q,y} [u(q) - y - d_b]^\theta [y - c(q) - d_s]^{1-\theta} \text{ s.t. } y \leq m, \quad (\text{B1})$$

while the Kalai bargaining problem is

$$\max_{q,y} u(q) - y - d_b \text{ s.t. } u(q) - y - d_b = \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} [y - c(q) - d_s] \text{ and } y \leq m. \quad (\text{B2})$$

After redefining $\mathcal{S}^b \equiv u(q) - y - d_b$, $\mathcal{S}^s \equiv y - c(q) - d_s$, and $\mathcal{S} \equiv u(q) - c(q) - d_b - d_s$, it is easy to show that we still obtain $\mathcal{S}^b = \theta \mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{S}^s = (1 - \theta) \mathcal{S}$ under Kalai. Under Nash, we also still have $\mathcal{S}^b = \Theta(q) \mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{S}^s = [1 - \Theta(q)] \mathcal{S}$, where q is given by

$$\min \left[q^*, q : \frac{\theta u'(q)[c(q) + d_s] + (1 - \theta)c'(q)[u(q) - d_b]}{\theta u'(q) + (1 - \theta)c'(q)} \right]. \quad (\text{B3})$$

Because the Nash and the Kalai solution predict how the net pie (i.e., net of disagreement payoffs) is split, changing disagreement values only has an impact on the size of what can be shared, not on how it is shared between the two players. More precisely, the buyer still earns a share θ of the net pie according to the Kalai solution, and a share $\Theta(q)$ according to the Nash solution. In addition, the buyer's surplus under Nash is still non-monotone, first increasing then decreasing as the liquidity constraint is relaxed.

Figure B1 provides a graphical illustration using the same parameters as those used in the laboratory and imposing $\theta = 0.5$, comparing the paths and allocations as m increases

when $(d_s, d_b) = (0, 0)$ and when $(d_s, d_b) = (10, 5)$. Going from the former to the latter disagreement point, the origin translates to $(10, 5)$, with the new axes now represented in blue. The bargaining path predicted by Kalai is then represented by the blue dashed line, while the blue dotted line is the new path under Nash. Blue squares represent the newly predicted allocations for $m = 30$, $m = 60$ and $m = 315$. Surpluses can be obtained by taking the difference between the axis value corresponding to the new allocations and the new origin, $(10, 5)$. Shares of the total surplus remain identical conditional on the quantity traded, but gross payoffs generically differ.

C Welfare cost of inflation

In this section, we outline the method used to estimate the welfare costs of inflation, drawing on the parameterization and findings from our experiment. The original method developed to estimate the welfare cost of inflation is due to [Bailey \(1956\)](#) and was later expanded upon by [Lucas \(2000\)](#). It consists in first estimating the demand curve and then measuring the area under the curve between the relevant nominal interest rates, where the latter are mapped into inflation rates (Π) using the Fisher equation, $i = r + \Pi$. The empirical money demand curve is represented by the circles in [Figure C1](#) for the years 1900-2000, where each observation corresponds to a year. Money demand corresponds to the aggregate balance of M1 divided by nominal GDP, while the nominal interest rate corresponds to the rate on short-term commercial paper.

[Craig and Rocheteau \(2006, 2008\)](#) highlight that the Bailey-Lucas approach is only accurate if the private benefits of real money balances to money holders are equal to their social benefits, because the money demand curve only takes into account benefits to its money holders. Using a typical search-theoretical model of money where competitive markets alternate with decentralized markets with bilateral trades that make money essential, [Craig and Rocheteau \(2006, 2008\)](#) estimate the welfare cost of inflation taking into account social benefits for four different trading protocols (fixed markup, Nash bargaining, Kalai bargaining, and take-it-or-leave-it offers) and a variety of distributions of bargaining powers.³³ They calibrate

³³The alternation of competitive and decentralized markets is also designed to capture that, in field settings, some trades take place in frictionless markets, while other trading activities take place in markets with frictions, e.g., where it may be more difficult to find counterparties. See also [Lagos et al. \(2017\)](#).




Figure C1: Money demand curve in the US, 1900-2000. Empirical observations in black circles (source: [Craig and Rocheteau, 2006](#)). Non-linear least square curve fit for $\theta = 0.5$ under the Kalai bargaining solution in orange solid curve.

their model to the US economy between 1900 and 2000. Their findings demonstrate that neglecting the seller's surplus leads to an underestimation of the benefits of real money balances and a distorted assessment of the welfare costs of inflation. We build on their approach to evaluate the welfare costs of inflation using our experimental setup.

Model. We embed the model of bilateral trade used in our experiment into a general search-theoretic model of monetary exchange. The resulting model is equivalent to the one by [Lagos and Wright \(2005\)](#) and can be described as follows.

The economy is populated by a continuum of agents of measure one. Time is discrete and infinite. In each period, there are two subperiods. In the first subperiod, agents may meet bilaterally in a decentralized market. An agent meets with another player who likes the good they can produce with probability σ . In this case, he becomes a buyer in the bilateral meeting. He may instead meet another player whose good they would like to consume, also with probability σ . In that case, he becomes a seller. We assume that there are no

meetings where both agents like each other's products (no double-coincidence of wants), such that with probability $1 - 2\sigma$, an agent does not get the opportunity to trade in the first subperiod. In that decentralized market, the production of q units of good costs $c(q)$, while their consumption provides $u(q)$ utils. In addition, payments require money, available in supply M in the economy. In the second subperiod, there is a centralized and frictionless competitive market where all costs and utilities are linear.

In the decentralized market, when an agent gets the opportunity to buy from another agent, he can purchase a quantity q of output against a payment $z(q)$, for a payoff $u(q) - z(q)$. Choosing money holdings is thus equivalent to choosing a trade quantity q . Thus agents pick q to maximize their expected trade surplus net of the cost of holding the real balances required to purchase that amount of goods:

$$q = \arg \max \{ -iz(q) + \sigma[u(q) - z(q)] \}. \quad (\text{C1})$$

Solving for this program determines the quantity of goods purchased in bilateral meetings, $q(i)$, as a function of the nominal interest rate, i . In addition, we can solve for a payment function $z(q)$, which depends on the specifics of the bargaining solution. With Kalai bargaining, $z(q) = (1 - \theta)u(q) + \theta c(q)$. With Nash bargaining, $z(q) = u(q) - \Theta(q)[u(q) - c(q)]$. We can then obtain individual money demand as a function of real balances,

$$\tilde{z}(i) = z \circ q(i). \quad (\text{C2})$$

Aggregate money demand is equal to $M/(\sigma M + pA)$, where A is the real output and p is the price in the centralized market. Using $z = M/p$, we can rewrite aggregate money demand as

$$L(i) = \frac{\tilde{z}(i)}{\sigma \tilde{z}(i) + A}. \quad (\text{C3})$$

Calibration and money demand curve estimation. Consistent with the calibration used in our experiment, we assume $u(q) = 74.1752q^{0.6}$ and $c(q) = 8.23249q^{1.51678}$. Regarding the determination of the terms of trade, we vary both the bargaining protocol (Nash and Kalai bargaining), and the distribution of bargaining powers ($\theta \in \{0.33, 0.50, 0.66, 1\}$), leading to 8 different specifications. For each specification, we estimate A and σ by fitting (C3) to our empirical money demand curve by non-linear least squares.

Welfare cost estimations. To estimate the welfare cost of a 13% nominal interest rate (10% inflation) compared to a 3% nominal interest rate (0% inflation), we start from the no-inflation steady state and compute the drop in consumption that would make a planner indifferent with a 10% inflation steady state. Mathematically, the cost Δ must satisfy

$$\sigma \{u[q(0.03)(1 - \Delta)] - c[q(0.03)]\} - A\Delta = \sigma \{u[q(0.13)] - c[q(0.13)]\}. \quad (\text{C4})$$

Table 10 reports 100Δ for the 8 specifications we consider.

D Additional Tables

In this section we provide additional tables for the main three treatments.

Table A1: Buyer values $u(q) = (74.1752)q^{0.6}$ and Seller costs $c(q) = (8.23249)q^{1.51678}$ in *points*.

q	$u(q)$ in points	$c(q)$ in points	Difference $u(q) - c(q)$ pts.
0	0.00	0.00	0.00
0.25	32.29	1.01	31.28
0.5	48.94	2.88	46.06
0.75	62.42	5.32	57.09
1	74.18	8.23	65.94
1.25	84.80	11.55	73.25
1.5	94.60	15.23	79.38
1.75	103.77	19.24	84.53
2	112.43	23.56	88.87
2.25	120.66	28.17	92.50
2.5	128.54	33.05	95.49
2.75	136.10	38.19	97.91
3	143.39	43.57	99.82
3.25	150.45	49.20	101.25
3.5	157.29	55.05	102.24
3.75	163.94	61.12	102.81
4	170.41	67.41	103.00
4.25	176.72	73.90	102.82
4.5	182.89	80.60	102.29
4.75	188.92	87.48	101.44
5	194.82	94.56	100.26
5.25	200.61	101.83	98.79
5.5	206.29	109.27	97.02
5.75	211.87	116.89	94.97
6	217.34	124.69	92.66
6.25	222.73	132.65	90.08
6.5	228.04	140.78	87.26
6.75	233.26	149.07	84.19
7	238.41	157.53	80.88
7.25	243.48	166.14	77.34
7.5	248.48	174.91	73.58
7.75	253.42	183.83	69.59
8	258.29	192.89	65.40
8.25	263.11	202.11	61.00
8.5	267.86	211.47	56.39
8.75	272.56	220.98	51.58
9	277.21	230.63	46.58
9.25	281.80	240.41	41.39
9.5	286.35	250.34	36.01
9.75	290.84	260.40	30.45
10	295.30	270.59	24.71
10.25	299.70	280.92	18.79
10.5	304.07	291.37	12.70
10.75	308.39	301.96	6.43
11	312.68	312.68	0.00

Table D1: Agreement rates for all treatments and sessions.

Session	Round	m = 30			m = 60			m = 315		
		1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30	All
	1	0.91	0.90	0.90	0.93	0.89	0.91	0.89	0.92	0.91
	2	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.93	0.97	0.95	0.99	0.99	0.99
	3	0.84	0.93	0.89	0.87	0.93	0.90	0.8	0.92	0.86
	4	0.85	0.91	0.88	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.97	1.00	0.99
	5	0.84	0.87	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.92	0.97	0.95
	All	0.87	0.90	0.89	0.90	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.96	0.94

Table D2: Mean outcomes for accepted offers, for all treatments and all sessions.

Treatment $m = 30$												
Session \ Round	Mean Quantity			Mean Tokens			Mean Buyer Surplus			Mean Total Surplus		
	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30
1	0.66	0.66	0.66	29.82	29.70	29.93	27.30	27.27	27.32	52.47	52.34	52.61
2	0.63	0.63	0.63	29.41	29.03	29.80	26.64	27.10	26.17	51.94	51.97	51.91
3	0.72	0.73	0.71	29.83	29.64	30.00	30.59	31.26	29.99	55.30	55.61	55.02
4	0.65	0.66	0.64	29.80	29.68	29.92	26.62	27.52	25.73	51.98	52.74	51.23
5	0.69	0.69	0.69	29.65	29.50	29.80	29.42	29.42	29.41	54.34	54.18	54.50
All	0.67	0.67	0.67	29.70	29.51	29.89	28.11	28.47	27.75	53.20	53.33	53.08

Treatment $m = 60$												
Session \ Round	Mean Quantity			Mean Tokens			Mean Buyer Surplus			Mean Total Surplus		
	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30
1	1.78	1.78	1.78	59.28	58.67	59.95	45.09	45.80	44.32	84.22	84.38	84.04
2	1.64	1.61	1.66	58.93	57.88	59.93	40.39	40.17	40.59	81.79	80.86	82.68
3	1.66	1.63	1.69	58.43	57.81	59.01	41.90	41.27	42.50	82.41	81.58	83.19
4	1.68	1.68	1.68	59.66	59.35	59.96	41.43	41.78	41.08	83.01	83.00	83.02
5	1.68	1.64	1.72	58.93	58.01	59.84	41.99	41.56	42.42	82.57	81.85	83.27
All	1.69	1.67	1.70	59.05	58.35	59.74	42.14	42.15	42.13	82.79	82.36	83.22

Treatment $m = 315$												
Session \ Round	Mean Quantity			Mean Tokens			Mean Buyer Surplus			Mean Total Surplus		
	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30	All	1-15	16-30
1	3.99	4.11	3.87	119.14	122.23	116.10	50.58	50.40	50.76	102.19	101.82	102.55
2	4.08	4.19	3.97	121.27	124.12	118.41	51.06	50.80	51.32	102.52	102.08	102.96
3	4.06	4.11	4.02	119.65	120.52	118.87	51.69	51.55	51.81	101.45	100.36	102.42
4	3.83	3.74	3.92	114.51	112.07	116.93	51.21	50.93	51.49	102.10	101.27	102.93
5	4.19	4.35	4.03	123.87	128.22	119.70	50.93	50.39	51.46	102.06	101.19	102.90
All	4.03	4.10	3.96	119.67	121.38	118.01	51.09	50.80	51.37	102.08	101.38	102.76

Table D3: Random-effect estimation of the buyer's share of surplus in accepted offers. Random effects are indexed at the individual seller level. The sample in column (1) includes all accepted offers in the unconstrained treatment. Column (2) includes the subsample s.t. $|q - 4| < 0.5$. Column (3) includes the subsample s.t. $|q - 4| < 0.1$. Column (4) includes the subsample s.t. $|q - 4| < 0.05$.

	Buyer's surplus			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total surplus, $\mathcal{S}$	0.5006	0.4997	0.5000	0.5005
	(0.0027)	(0.0014)	(0.0017)	(0.0019)
Observations	698	574	412	348

Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses

Table D4: Random-effect estimation of the impact of varying the liquidity constraint, m , on the buyer's surplus. Random effects are indexed at the individual seller level. The sample in column (1) includes all accepted offers, and the sample in column (2) includes accepted offers s.t. $|q - 4| < 0.5$ when $m = 315$, $y - 60 < 0.5$ when $m = 60$, and $y - 30 < 0.5$ when $m = 30$.

	Buyer's surplus	
	(1)	(2)
$m = 30$	-14.0669	-14.3074
	(1.0303)	(1.1053)
$m = 315$	8.9472	9.1411
	(0.7480)	(0.7373)
Constant ($m = 60$)	42.1275	42.2828
	(0.7304)	(0.7264)
Observations	2028	1801

Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses

Table D5: Random-effect estimation of the change in a player's share of surplus between the first offer and the accepted offer, depending on having made the first offer. Random effects are indexed at the individual player level. The sample is restricted to sellers.

	Δ Player's share
Player made the first offer	-0.1338 (0.0216)
Constant	0.0851 (0.0184)
Observations	835

Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses

E Additional Figures




Figure E1: Seller' share of the surplus in their own offers, by rank of the offer relative to the accepted offer and by treatment. Colored circles represent all offers. Median offers are represented with a black square, and mean offers are represented by a black cross.