Title

Exploring the Role of Disaggregated Incoherent Regime Components on Intrastate Violence and Religious Identity and Out-group Animosity

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Exploring the Role of Disaggregated Coherent Regime Components on Intrastate Violence and Religious Identity and Out-group Animosity

By

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DISSERTATION

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Abstract

In this dissertation I explore the factors driving of intrastate violence on an institutional and individual level. The first two papers are based off the same theoretical backing – that when intra-regime components do not support one another it creates an environment with both opportunity and grievances reduce coordination costs increasing the likelihood of intra-state violence. In the first chapter I examine how our current limited categorizing of regime type has stymied our understanding of institutional influences on civil war. When regimes are disaggregated into smaller regime components, we are able to examine how components interact with one another. Using Multidimensional scaling I create four components of democracy encapsulating elections, and three aspects of civil liberties. I then examine how each civil liberty component (Rule of Law, Freedom of Religion, and Expressions) affect the likelihood of civil war onset. Interestingly each component affects civil war onset differently; for example, as Rule of Law increases the probability of civil war onset reduces, but as Expressions/Freedom of Religion increase likelihood of onset increases. I then interact each components finding the highest likelihood of civil war onset is when Expressions is extremely high, and Rule of Law is really low. When these components are incoherent and working at against one another, any given regime will have both a higher opportunity to coordinate violence and higher grievances to motivate rebellion. In the second dissertation paper I expand this new theoretical framework to protests. Specifically, I focus on Expressions and Rule of Law's interplay finding that when Expressions is higher than Rule of Law, there is an increased likelihood of protest and this increases as Expressions rises compared to Rule of Law.

In the third paper of this dissertation, we argue organizational factors and leader messaging are key characteristics of religious organizations that induce aspects of social identity theory and reduce coordination costs making organizing of out-group violence against other religious groups easier. We do this by running a novel survey in India, a state with significant levels of religious intergroup violence, in an attempt to isolate what mechanisms within religion can make religious based outgroup affect reduce and violence more likely. In India we find that when respondents report their religious organizations to be more hierarchical, they tend to view outgroups more favorably. However, the more a respondent agrees local religious leader, the more likely they are to higher outgroup animosity. When we separate the sample into those whose leaders have called for or support violence against other religious groups, then we find that respondents tend to approve of their leaders the more hierarchical they perceive the group to be. Yet respondents whose leaders have called for violence are also more likely to agree with their leaders as there is a higher religious organizational density, but the level of how religious the respondent is does not affect their level of agreement with leaders who call for violence. Those whose leaders who did not call for violence have no effect from religious organizational density, but we find that respondents tend to agree more with their local religious leader when they are more religious.

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Dissertation paper 1- Civil War and Intra-Regime Coherence

Introduction

Within the study of civil war onset, it is evident there is a relationship between regime type and civil war onset. Many authors assert harsh authoritarian states and institutionalized democracies experience fewer civil wars than hybrid regimes (also known as anocracies) (De Nardo, 1985; Fransisco, 1995; Muller and Weede 1990; Ellingsen and Gleditsch 1997; Hegre, 2002; Regan and Bell 2010). Precisely, scholars argue there are characteristics specific to anocracies that increases the risk of civil war in a society (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Evidence suggests that the relationship between regime type and civil war onset follows an inverted U-shaped relationship, where anocracies are most likely to experience civil war while democracies and autocracies are least likely (Muller and Weede 1990; Ellingsen and Gleditsch 1997, Hegre, 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Regan and Bell 2010), yet the cause of this parabolic relationship is not fully explained (Vreeland, 2008). Democracies are well defined by regime characteristics consistently encouraging freedoms – media freedom, civil rights, competitive elections; and autocratic regime characteristics consistently demonstrate repression - censored media, few legal guarantees of civil rights, and non-competitive or the absence of elections. Anocracies possess both democratic and autocratic characteristics, but each anocracy varies on which elements of the regime reflect democracies or autocracies more (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). Thus, democracies, autocracies, and anocracies differ according to variation in both civil liberties and competitiveness of elections, or what is commonly referred to as the 'components' of regime type (Levitsky and Way 2002; Karl, 1995; Muller and Weed 1990). Many studies examine regime type and susceptiblity to civil war, but there is scarce information regarding the effects of components within regimes and civil war. When examining civil war onset and regime type the traditional three

groups - democracy, autocracy, and anocracy - are not adequate because, civil war onset is affected by the variation of components within each category.

The key regime components focused on in this article are *civil liberties* and *leadership selection*. *Civil liberties* are defined based on measures from the Variety of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset including measures of freedom of religion, access to justice, and freedoms of media and civil society. *Leadership selection* is also defined based on V-Dem measures of holding elections, amount of legal competition, and opposition. The alternate levels and combinations of these components within *civil liberties* constitute the current gap in the literature intersecting civil war and democracy. Each of these components can vary significantly within regime types, but the range of components within anocratic regimes are most diverse (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). In this study, I examine the variation within all regimes by measuring the levels and interactions of regime components and their effect on civil war onset.

In democracies and autocracies, the components of a government generally work to stabilize the regime by reinforcing one another. As Gates et al. (2006) describes, consistent regimes exist when "the same motivation regarding the maximization of the current and future power and authority serves to maintain stability" (Gates et al., 2006, 895). Democracies are self-enforcing when political actors gain more by preserving democratic institutions than undermining them. Similarly, autocratic governments are consistent when there is no access to channels or institutional bases that can challenge the autocrat (Gates et al., 2006). Gates et al. then argue anocratic regimes hold inconsistent institutional incentives that work at cross purposes leading to destabilization because there are insufficient incentives to maintain the current government (Gates et al., 2006; Muller and Weed, 1990; Hegre et al, 2001). Hegre et al (2001) claim anocracies "lack the degree of concentration of power and authority that provides stability" present in autocracies,

while also arguing anocracies lack institutions that "in the long run [reinforce democracy] by preserving power-diffusion democratic institutions" (Gates, 2006, 895). These middling regimes combine elements from both democracies and autocracies creating a system that does not have individual or systemic incentives to maintain a stable government (Gates, 2006, 895; Przeworski, 1991).

I employ the theoretical framework of Gates et al. to study inconsistency within regime types by exploring variation of components. I argue, that when components do not support one another, meaning they are inconsistent, regimes are highly vulnerable to civil war onset. In this article, I develop a new approach to understand the relationship between the regime types and civil war by splitting the manner of leadership selection from governmentally granted civil liberties and analyze their impacts separately. As far as I know, no other study has examined civil war onset by disaggregating both *civil liberties* and *leadership selection* within regime types.

In this study, I argue, that within regimes, *civil liberties* are distinct from *leadership selection* and regime component coherence is notable because it can increase probability of a state's vulnerability to civil war onset. The remainder of the article is as follows: first, regime type and civil war onset are reviewed identifying a key gap in the literature, followed by presentation of the theoretical argument and creation of new variables to test it – *civil liberties* and *leadership selection*. Thirdly, the presented hypotheses are tested using generalized linear regression and interactions models using both UCDP and COW datasets of civil war onset. Lastly, I discuss my findings: (1) not all elements within *civil liberties* have the same effect on civil war onset and with the increase of ability to express and communicate the probability of civil war onset rises, while strengthening the rule of law reduces a state's vulnerability to civil war. (2) When examining leadership selection separately from civil liberties, elections are found to either not affect or

increase the likelihood of civil war. (3) The interactions of components illuminate how non-reinforcing components can increase a state's vulnerability to civil war. (4) UCDP and COW datasets of civil war onsets may be capturing different types of civil war and should not be used interchangeably.

Civil War and Regime Type

Within the study of civil war onset there are three major theoretical lines of inquiry: greed, grievance, and regime type. Literature on the role of greed emphasizes the opportunity and willingness of citizens to partake in rebellion and looting (Collier and Hoffler 2004), while grievance-based models highlight the motivations of citizen rebellion, such as discrimination, poverty, or perceived injustices (Gurr, 1970). Unlike literature highlighting the role of greed and grievance, I emphasize the importance of regime type and studying it disaggregated into components illuminates unexplored variation. Unpacking the constituent components of regime type will illuminate the hitherto unexplored effects of regime components on civil war. In much of civil war literature, the role of regime type is often used as a control, not as an explanatory variable. Nonetheless, some scholars dating back to Immanuel Kant believed that democratic regimes were associated with diminished state violence (Kant, 1949). Scholars consistently find institutionalized democracies rarely experience civil war; in addition, consolidated authoritarian regimes experience fewer civil wars than anocracies (Muller and Weede 1990; Ellingsen and Gleditsch 1997, Hegre, 2001, Regan and Bell 2010 etc.).

Focusing on regime type, Gurr (1968, 1970) and Lichbach (1987) originally theorized that in semi-democracies (anocracies) when the costs to mobilize are relatively low and peaceful opposition to government yields little, rebellion is a favored approach to ensure grievances are addressed. Muller and Weede (1990) found empirical evidence of this; specifically, anocracies have a higher risk of civil war onset than democracies or autocracies. They posited anocracies are

most vulnerable to civil war onset because "rebellion is likely to be the preferred strategy of opposition for many dissident groups in the context of a semi-repressive political system in which resource mobilization is possible and peaceful opposition typically is ineffective" (Muller and Weede, 1990: 624). Similarly, Huntington (1972) argued that as states open, citizens demand more from the state, but the state can only respond as quickly as the state's capacity allows. The combination of increasing demands and a state with lack of governing capacity increases the vulnerability to civil war. He argued that states that experience civil violence often have regimes that are not reinforcing and therefore not stable, the mobilization of society to pressure the state outpaced institutional capacity (Huntington 1972). Gates et al (2006) claim civil conflict occurs when there is a lack of sufficient ability to check internal conflict (with either repression or integration) because of the state's inherent inconsistency of non-reenforcing governmental organization.

Hegre et al. (2001) stressed regimes are more prone towards civil war when they are innately incoherent. Hegre et al. hypothesized, "semi-democracies are partly open, yet some-what repressive, a combination that invited protest, rebellion, and other forms of civil violence. Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to act and openness allows for them to organize" (Hegre et al., 2001: 33). While Hegre et al., Huntington, and Gurr all claimed incoherent regimes are prone to civil war onset, they do not directly test this theory. If partial public participation is allowed with some repressive practices, then a state is not self-reinforcing. The lack of self-reinforcement creates incoherence within a regime that many argue is the base of anocratic instability (Gurr, 1974; Muller and Weede 1990; Sanhueza, 1999). For example, following the collapse of communism from Yeltsin through Putin's second term, Russia was widely considered an anocracy (Lucan and Way, 2002; Colton and Hale, 2014). During this time Russia experienced

drastic rise in *civil liberties* (as seen in Figure 5 and 8). Russia experienced an unprecedented opening of the media allowing critiques the government and an extreme limitation in its ability to repress citizens. The rest of the current article discusses this argument by empirically testing what components or combinations of components within regimes increase the chance of civil war onset.

Why are current measures insufficient?

To understand the extent of variation within specific regime types, we must understand the spectrum of constituent parts for each regime type. Examining how we measure democracy within anocracies clarifies the shortcomings of our most common indices. For example, with Polity, states between -5 and 5 are considered anocracies, however within this range any single score can represent a variety of heterogenous governmental arrangements (Gates, 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 1997; Treier and Jackman 2008). Because the Polity scale is created by aggregating numerous indicators, there are "quite [a] diverse combination of characteristics [placing] countries in the middle range" (Goldstone, 2010, 195). There are multiple combinations for states to receive the same score; states with different institutional or regime components can receive the same score (Gleditsch and Ward, 1997). Coppedge (2002) noted that measuring democracy accurately is best done when each dimension is measured with an individual indicator. To fully capture the diverse nature of democracy, scholars need a comprehensive set of states and years covering a vast range of disaggregated indicators (Coppedge, 2016).

Additionally, Boix et al. (2013) comment on the benefits of unpacking regime components like civil liberties allowing researchers to disaggregate regime components to empirically analyze them separately (Teorell, 2016; Bollen, 1980; Schumpeter, 1942). Comparably, Przeworski et al (2000) claim excluding elements like suffrage from their measure of democracy is preferential because it allows scholars to test the effects of limited participation of democratic performance or

durability (Teorell, 2016). The disaggregation of how we measure regimes is not a new concept; however, databases like V-Dem that accurately and transparently measure components of regimes across large time spans is new.

The balance of this article is based on two main elements that vary within traditional regime categories: *civil liberties* and *leadership selection*. I draw on Dahl's (1971) original basic concepts of democracy contestation and participation and Schumpeter's limited definition of democracy (Schumpeter, 1942). One of the ways Dahl conceived of elections was by separating the ability of citizens to partake in an election from freely competitive elections into separate concepts. Dahl noted that systems with limited contestation and participation are not democracies (Dahl, 1971). I also begin by disaggregating democracy by separating the holding of multiparty elections (*leadership selection)* from all other forms of liberalization. In this, *leadership selection* by itself does not indicate democracy, but it is a crucial component of democracy. *Civil liberties* capture non-electoral elements of regimes such as freedom to communicate, protection against torture, freedom of religion, and right to free trial. *Leadership selection* focuses exclusively on how government leaders are selected, namely the presence of election and if there are multiple parties and competition. These are all crucial components within regimes, however *civil liberties* and *leadership selection* vary across and within the three traditional regime types, democracy, autocracy, and anocracy.

Civil War, Opportunity, and Grievance

Components of *civil liberties* affect civil war onset specifically because they work through or activate the opportunity and grievance model. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) promoted the opportunity model (Collier, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) by focusing on the reduction of

collective action problems. Alternatively, political scientists theorized that grievances are a primary contributor to civil war onset. The grievance model argued that comparative depravation provoked by inequality instigated a willingness for citizens to participate in civil violence (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970).

In this manuscript I apply the theoretical frame of opportunity and grievance to understand the regime components and civil war onset. Some levels of greed and grievance are present in all countries, yet greed and grievance alone cannot explain why any given regime type is more or less likely to experience civil war onset. I have asserted interplay between regime components significantly influences the levels of grievance and the opportunity for rebellion. There are three potential ways regime components can interact with one another: components are coherent and work together towards freedom and integration, components are coherent and work together towards repression and separation, or components work against one another where some work towards repression and others towards freedom.

If regime components like *civil liberties* are reinforcing towards freedoms, then they are less likely to create a state in which large swaths of the population hold grievances. For example, as the government applies laws equally across all citizens there is a smaller probability of citizens experiencing grievances at the hands of the government. As the interactions between government and citizens becomes increasingly transparent and citizens' freedoms are legally protected, then civil war onset will be less probable. Similarly, when regime components are reinforcing towards repression, then citizens are more likely to hold grievances, but the regime's highly restricted media reduces opportunity to create shared grievance. Without a sense of shared grievance there is little motivation for the organization of group opposition, greatly increasing opportunity costs for aggrieved citizens. Most citizen will not act on these grievances, but the components affect

everyone in the state including those who may choose to organize and act. Everyone is affected by the availability of information and the cost of organization. This theory does not imply that all those affected by grievances will take up arms, but that these components shape the environment in which they choose to, or not.

However, if regime components are incoherent or not reinforcing, then grievances may or may not either not be repressed or addressed by the state, leading to reduction in opportunity costs for citizens. Together, these cross-cutting components increase the probability of civil war onset. For example, if repression from the state or lawlessness is common and yet citizens are freely able to express their discontent, then both grievances and opportunity are present and raise the probability of civil violence. When the components are not reinforcing, then grievance and opportunity for rebellion are high making civil war onset more likely. As such, if *civil liberties* like the freedom to communicate or organize is not infringed or infringed in a limited way and laws are not equally enforced or political prisoners are common, then information of these grievances has a higher chance of dissemination and knowledge of the shared grievance amongst people reduce collective action issues. Essentially, the interaction of regime components influences the levels of grievance and opportunity potentially translating into intrastate violence.

Figure 1: Component Coherence



I theorize that the current examination of regime types and civil war is incomplete and ascertains that we need to examine how components within regimes either work together to reinforce one another or at cross purposes create an incoherent regime. When two or more components are coherent or working together, I expect the likelihood of civil war onset to be reduced. If both are relatively low, then the components are coherent in a repressive direction; if both are relatively high, then they are coherent in a free direction. When *civil liberty* components are incoherent, then it is more likely that grievances will be created, and the knowledge of the shared grievance will be communicated reducing collective action issues. I expect to find that when one component is low (repressive) and another is high (freeing), civil war will be most likely to happen.

Introduction of Independent Variables

By utilizing deconstructed elements of democracy from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database with the *civil liberties* and *leadership selection* framework outlined above, the author has demonstrated that incongruence between regime components creates vulnerability to civil war (Coppedge et al, 2020).[1] However, as far as I know, very few studies have examined the *civil liberties* components disaggregated and the levels of coherence between them. Considering the relatively new and expansive data from V-Dem, this disaggregation is now possible. I therefore put forth a new framework of understanding regimes based on the consistency of governmental components. My work calls into question any strict classification of regime type because of our new ability to quantify the within-element variation. I found that within regime elements of each country, no matter what their general regime type is (democracy, anocracy, autocracy), there exists variation of *civil liberty* components.[2]

To create the main explanatory variable, *civil liberties*, I first draws on Schumpeter's limited definition of democracy to justify examining civil liberties separately from leadership competition (Schumpeter, 1942). Schumpeter argues for a minimalist definition of democracy excluding what we now call civil liberties from leadership competition. Much later, Schneider and Schmitter (2004) were among the first to create separate indices for liberalization and

[1] While V-Dem creates premade indices with clear aggregation rules and equations, I choose not to use these for three main reasons. First, using a highly aggregated index will not allow us for an examination of the relationship between individual components and civil war. Second, most of the pre-made indices blend the two categories of regime components of *civil liberties* and *leadership selection.* Those that do not include measures greatly influenced by cultural preferences which are not party of my theory and must be kept distinct from my key independent variables concerning governing arrangements. Considering the aim of this paper was to examine governmental, not societal, effects on civil war, it was inappropriate to use the pre-made indices which contain measures influenced by societal norms. Third, most aggregations use a weighted equation to aggregate the elements; however, we do not have a theoretical justification for concluding that one or more variables were more important than any other and therefore do not weight index elements.

[2] This is displayed Figure 5.

democratization. Creating their own indices using multi-dimensional measures[3] of democratizing states from 1974 to 2000, Schneider and Schmitter argued that liberalization and democratization are not necessarily linearly related (Carothers, 2002; Guillermo, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986). In their study Schneider and Schmitter created a measure of political liberalism, defined as "'the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties'" or more broadly, the movement towards respecting the rule of law like habeas corpus, privacy, protection against torture, right to free trial, or freedom of speech, petition, religion, and movement (Schneider and Schmitter 2004, 60). Their operationalization of this was composed of six main indicators: Human Right Concessions; Few Political Prisoners; Tolerance of Dissidence; Professional Associations outside of Government; Electoral Competition; and Independence of Media or Press.

Similarly, Wigell (2008) theorized a less strict conceptualizations of middling regimes; instead promoting a theoretical disaggregation of regimes into two main parts: electoralism and constitutionalism (constitutional liberalism). He then operationalized the minimal conditions for constitutional liberalism by the degree to which states respect and guarantee: freedom of organization, expression, access to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (Wigell, 2008). Based on these and other operationalizations, Wigell then aggregated the operationalized electoralism and constitutional liberalism variables creating a clunky typology. I argue these categorization or typologies are insufficient because these individual components within these categories have different influences on political instability like civil war.

[3] Confirmed by Cronbach alpha. Cronbach Alpha is a measured used to determine the internal consistency of a group of variables. Variables grouped or aggregated should have a Cronbach alpha of at least .7 to be considered reliably similar.

Following both Schneider and Schmitter (2004) and Wigell (2008), I disaggregate democracy by first splitting leadership selection from political/constitutionalist liberalism variables using ten V-Dem variables to create the latter, what I call civil liberties: *Access to Justice; Freedom from Torture; Freedom from Political Killings; Freedom of Academic and Cultural Expression*[4]*; Freedom of Religion; Government Censorship; Harassment of Journal; Media Bias; Repression of Civil Society; and Transparent Law* (Coppedge, 2020).

[4] Heretofore called *Freedom of Expression.*

V-Dem Variable Introduction

Access to Justice: Citizens have the "effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal" (Coppedge et al 2020, 165).

Freedom from Torture: Freedom from the state using torture (physical or psychological) as a means of extracting information or intimidating victims of those incarcerated (Coppedge et al 2020).

Freedom from Political Killings: Freedom from deliberate killing by the state without due process for the purpose of eliminating political opponents (Coppedge et al 2020).

Freedom of Expression: Freedom from severely restricted or government controlled "academic activities and cultural expressions" (Coppedge et al 2019, 160).

*Freedom of Religion: "*Individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully" (Coppedge et al 2019, 169).

Government Censorship: Censorship (directly or indirectly) of political topics such as "politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery" (Coppedge et al 2020, 187).

Harassment of Journalist: Journalists "threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities" (Coppedge et al 2020, 189).

Media Bias: "Bias in media against opposition parties or candidates" (Coppedge et al 2020, 190).

Civil Society Control: The extent to which "the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life" (Coppedge et al 2022, 195).

Transparent Law: The "laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner" (Coppedge et al 2020, 164).

Variable Construction

In an effort to quantify electoral components separately from non-electoral components, I created my own indices. Most measures of democracy including elections have freedom of speech or media as a component of the index, but because I examine these concepts separately, like Schumpeter, I needed measures of electoral and non-electoral components that did not overlap. To accomplish this, I used Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS)[5]. While acknowledging individual elements of democracy are important to test, I also understand there is often conflation and significant correlation between many individual variables measuring democracy. By using Non-parametric Multi-dimensional Scaling to develop components I ensure minimal correlation between the variables (Munck and Verkuien 2002).

Figure 2: *MDS Civil Liberties*



[5] MDS is a tool used to determine the similarities or dissimilarity of the variables compared to each other. It determines the pairwise dissimilarity between objects. The charts based on MDS are interpreted based on groupings. Those located close together are closely related and may be considered a sub-population within the data, while those farther apart are less similar

Civil Liberties

In Figure 2, each of the ten *civil liberty* variables are graphed using MDS, this means they were graphed according to how closely each variable is related to one another. When mapping out *civil liberties* with MDS there are three clear separate clusters. Each grouping represents a sub-group or population within the data, indicating variables may be measuring the same or extremely similar underlying concepts. The first grouping in the lower-left quadrant contains: *Access to Justice; Freedom from Torture; Freedom from Political Killings; and Transparent Law*. I aggregated each group of variables by adding each together without weighting and then standardizing the variable between 0 and 1.[6] When aggregated I called this component *Rule of Law*.[7] Once aggregated, *Rule of Law* operationalizes a government's ability and willingness to apply laws equally to citizens perceived grievances. Lack of torture and political killings, clear laws, and access to bring cases before the courts together indicate to what level the government is willing or able to enforce equal access and just treatment before the law.

The second main grouping in the mid right quadrant encompasses: *Freedom of Expression; Government Censorship; Harassment of Journalists; Media Bias; and Repression of Civil Society*; I aggregated these into a single component named *Expressions*.[8] The component *Expressions* measures the ability of citizens to clearly express their grievances to government and to each other, and the government's willingness to allow grievances to be aired publicly. The last subpopulation

[6] I do not weight variable because I have no theoretical reason that one may be more important or affective than another. Additionally, I use and additive measure rather than a multiplicative model because it "permits the assessment of the marginal contribution of each variable separately" (Joint Research Centre-European Commission 2008). Similarly, when introducing the V-Dem indices, Coppedge et al's (2016) note they use an additive term with equal weights.

[7] A Cronbach Alpha Score for Expressions is .96. Meaning these four variables are internally consistent and are capturing similar underlying concepts. .The very generalized minimum acceptable score for aggregation of a group of variables is .7.

[8] With a Cronbach Alpha of 0.95, I aggregated these five variables by adding and then normalizing these into a single component.

within *civil liberties* is *Freedom of Religion;* it is not near any other variables and therefore cannot be aggregated but is still an important component. *Rule of Law, Expressions,* and *Freedom of Religion* together constitute the element: *civil liberties*.

Leadership Selection

To measure *leadership selection* without capturing *civil liberties* I choose specific individual variables from V-Dem rather than using the pre-created measures ensuring a separation. Many measures, including V-Dems, frequently subsume variables into both element groups. I argue, methods of selecting leaders can vary indistinct of the various levels of components within *civil liberties*. To capture the most basic changes in leadership I used four V-Dem variables: barriers to party formation, multi-party competition in practice; opposition parties are autonomous;

Figure 3: MDS Civil Liberties and Leadership Selection



and regularly held elections. Note, none of these directly measures the exchanging of information, focusing specifically on presence of opposition and competition, thus they are separate from measures capturing the element of civil liberties. When aggregated *Party Barriers*, *Multiparty Elections*, *Autonomous Opposition Parties*, and *Regularly Held Elections* is called the *elect aggregate.*[9]

In Figure 3, I showed that *civil liberties* and *leadership selection* do not capture the same underlying concepts. The clear separation between the two categories along the second dimension demonstrates these are separate subpopulations within democracy and the need to analyze these mechanisms separately.

Figure 4: Regime Disaggregation



[9] The *elect aggregate* had a raw Chronbach alpha of 0.87, again indicating sufficient internal consistency to aggregate.

Figure 4 illustrates the divide between the element's *leadership selection* and *civil liberties* after *civil liberties* components are aggregated. The variables with a red box are those included in my models.

What do these Components Tell Us?

Each component is present in all regimes and they fluctuate signifcantly over time. There are clear patterns of components in each traditional regime category, but as demonstrated in Figure 5, the is variation within each general group. Standard autocratic countries like China, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan have consistantly relatively low levels of all components, yet each component still differ significantly. We tend to analyze these regimes as a single category. For example,

Figure 5: Regime Components by Country Overtime



Sudan's *Elect Aggregate* is extremely volatile, while over the past twenty years *Expressions, Freedom of Religion,* and *Rule of Law* remain close together. Interestingly in 2020, *Expressions, Freedom of Religion,* and *Rule of Law* jumped significantly, while the *Elect Aggregate* cratered. Then there is China, where from the 1980's until 2015, *Rule of Law* stood steady near the midway point, with the *Elect Aggregate* at one of the lowest levels within this traditional regime category. But in the last 5 years, the *Expressions* and *Freedom of Religion* dropped. In more acute contrast, Saudi Arabia has never held elections therefore they have no *Elect Aggregate*; and, their *Rule of Law* and *Expressions* have not altered significantly since World War II.

Even what we often call liberal or institutionalized democracies have variaiton in components. Japan has a consistently lower rate of *Expressions* than any other regime component and very recently the *Elect Aggregate* dropped precipitously. While the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) show a different story with more variation across time and between components. In general the US has the widest distribution of components within the three institutionalized democracies. *Freedom of Religion* remains one of the highest components since 1945, whereas *Rule of Law* increased in the late 1960s, but remains consistently the US's lowest component. The US has experienced a reduction in all *civil liberty's* components since 2015. Post 1960's in the US, *Expressions* are steadily higher than in the UK's. Overall, the UK has less standard deviation between *civil liberty's* components, with a syncronized dip in both *Freedom of Religion* and *Rule of Law* since 2010.

While there are some distinctions between components within ideal regime types, the regimes with the most variety are anocracies. They not only seem to have the widest deviations between each component, but also some of the more volatile component movement over time. Brazil, Russia, Mexico, South Africa, and Philippines at one point in the time series were

considered these anocratic regimes. For all of these countries during their times of anocracy, the range between each component is far larger than most autocracies or democracies. For example, in Brazil since the 1990s until the mid 2010s, *Freedom of Religion* and *Elect Aggregate* remained stable and high, but *Expressions* and *Rule of Law* were both considerably lower, with *Rule of Law* being the lowest. Similarly, Russia in the 1990's to 2010's was an anocracy and shows some similar trends. However their *Elect Aggregate* and *Freedom of Religion* never breached the 0.75 threshold that all other anocractic regimes have crossed in this sample. And again with Russia, *Expressions* and *Rule of Law* were both lower than the others, but from 2000s on *Expressions* has been curbed significantly and dropped faster than *Rule of Law*.

These types of differences and changes in regimes are lost when categorizing regimes with a single measure. Disaggregating regimes by the components of *leadership selection* and *civil liberty* allows us to understand the relationship between all regimes and rebellion at a much deeper level. While other scholars have worked on disaggregation within typical regime categories (Geddes, 2003;Weeks, 2012; Linz, 1994; Shugart and Carey 1999), my new framework elucidates the important role of component and is applicable across all regime types.

Postulating Effects on Conflict

When regime components are cross cutting, then they are likely to create conditions under which the greed and grievance mechanisms function most effectively. Regime components can either enable or restrict the opportunity of intrastate violence by raising or lowering the cost of collective action (Muller and Weede 1990). In this section I explore the relations of directional and nondirectional *civil liberties* on civil war onset.

Directional Hypotheses

H1a: Ceteris Paribus, *leadership selection* will have no significant effect on civil war onset when including *civil liberties* in the model.

Ceteris Paribus, each *civil liberty* component will have a different effect -

H1b: *Rule of Law:* As *Rule of Law* increases the likelihood of civil war onset will **decrease**.
H1c: *Expressions:* As *Expressions* increases the likelihood of civil war onset will **increase**.
H1d: *Freedom of Religion:* As *Freedom of Religion* increases the likelihood of civil war onset will **decrease**.

Non-directional Hypotheses

When *civil liberty* components are fully aligned and self-reinforcing, they will either be more permissive, often by distributing power across people and institutions to reduce potential grievances and keeping a regime stable (democracies). Or regimes are non-permissive and therefore repressive to the point that grievances cannot be acted upon also keeping a regime stable (autocracies). However, when *civil liberties* are mismatched or cross cutting – where one component works in the opposite direction of another - then there is greater opportunity for intrastate violence because neither grievance nor opportunity are sufficiently constrained. Generally, I expect –

H2a: If one *civil liberty* component is high (free) and another is low (repressive), the likelihood of civil war onset will **increase**.

Given the three components within *civil liberties* I tested each combination of high and low components to determine which, if any were significant. Theoretically I expect when there are cross cutting components civil war onset will be more likely. More specifically, I argue when *Rule of Law* is low, and *Expressions* is high civil war onset is highly probable. Low levels of *Rule of Law* encompass two sperate situations: (1) where the government is extremely repressive and consistently infringing on written laws or norms and killing citizens without just cause, or (2) they are unable or unwilling to punish those doing violating laws and norms. Either of these scenarios

create a state with a low level of *Rule of Law*. When *Rule of Law* is low, it often produces widespread grievances. I further argue, low levels of *Rule of Law* are most dangerous when *Expressions* are high allowing the populace to widely communicate their grievances raising the likelihood that shared grievance to be known.

H2b: If Rule of Law is low (repressive) and Expressions is high (free), the likelihood of civil war onset will increase.

Similarly, if *Expressions* is high and *Freedom of Religion* is low, I also expect civil war to be more likely. In this case, if levels of *Expressions* are high and levels of *Freedom of Religion* are low, then lack of *Freedom of Religion* creates a potential grievance for people to rebel against. Whenever *Expressions* is high, then the populace can communicate their shared grievances. Rebellions against governments cannot occur if people do not know if others share their grievances. High levels of *Expressions* are key to any successful rebellion because when communication is low between people it significantly increases the costs to acting collectively against the regime.

H2c: If Expressions is high (free) and Freedom of Religion is low (repressed), the likelihood of civil war onset will increase.

Lastly, the *Freedom of Religion* can also reduce collective action issues and increase the opportunity for rebellion. When *Freedom of Religion* is at high levels (relatively free/independent), but *Rule of Law* is low, then again, components are working against each other. When *Freedom of Religion* is high, populations can congregate and worship in relative safety. If religion is freely practiced, then there is likely a pre-made organization in place able to reduce opportunity costs of collective actions. If there is a known shared grievance in place religious organizations can be the mechanism reducing collective action allowing action against the state. When *Rule of Law* is low

the state is either actively very repressive or very weak and unable to protect civilians from other forms of repression often causing grievances. A state with low levels of *Rule of Law* and high levels of *Freedom of Religion* creates an opportunity for grievances and lowers collective action issues increasing the probability for civil war onset.

H2d: If Rule of Law is low (repressive) and Freedom of Religion is high (free), the likelihood of civil war onset will increase.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable is the onset of civil war as defined by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1 and Correlates of War Intra State (COW) version 5.1 (Peterson and Eck 2018; Gleditsch, 2002; Sarkees and Wayman 2010). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset measures conflict on a yearly basis, defining armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year" (Peterson and Eck 2018; Gleditsch, 2002, 1). COW dataset defines civil war with at least 1,000 deaths within a year of sustained combat and effective resistance (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). For both measures of civil war onset was coded as "1" the year it starts, "0" otherwise. Ongoing civil wars were treated as a "0" and are not dropped. The data ranges from 1946 to 2014 with 162 countries. While many past papers use one dataset or the other, I found that each dataset results in different outcomes. As such I encourage future scholars to implement each dataset cognizant of the potentiality for different results.

Control Variables

This paper aims to control for the standard civil war control variables. From the Maddison Project Database (MPD) 2018 and V-Dem, I used the natural log *GDP Per capita* and *GDP per Capita growth*. A state's wealth and rate of growth have been linked to conflict (Przeworski, 2000;

Hegre and Sambanis 2006). According to Ross (2013) *oil income* is positively related to conflict. Using Haber and Menaldo's (2011) dataset we control for *oil income per capita*. Next, I control for years of peace (years since there was last conflict), or *peace years*, from COW (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). States with recent conflict are more likely to experience conflict again. Additionally, to control for inequality the *Gini Coefficient* was used (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). High levels of inequality can increase grievances and so influence civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). As one of the most in-depth datasets on ethnic fractionalization, I also used Ethnic Power Relations Data set from Cederman et al (2010). Specifically, I control for *max discrimination* using ratio of the largest ethnic group that is discriminated against and *ethnic fractionalization* of the state (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Fearon and Laitin (2003) started the trend of examining ethnic fractionalization as a factor of civil war and did not find any significant relation. However, scholars using different measures found a positive statistical significance (ie. Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2017; Sambanis, 2001). I control for military capacity, urban population, iron and steel production, and energy consumption using Composite Index of National Capability (Singer, 1987; Bartusevicˇius and Skaaning 2018). The natural log of *population* was also required as a control variable; there was a notable relationship observed between population and civil war violence (Raleigh and Hegre 2009; Singer, 1987). As Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued, cultural and historic trends vary around the world therefore regional effects are a valid control. If the regional dummy variables are not significant, then variations were captured by the other measures in the model. Lastly, a dummy variable was used to capture the variations before and after the Cold War. Some scholars argue there are significant differences international system variations influencing civil war and these two time periods (Kalyvas, 2001).

Empirical Analysis of Direct Effects

Impact of Governmental Components on Civil War

Table 1 - Civil Liberties and Leadership Selection

	UCDP VDEM	COW VDEM
Predictors	*Log-Odds*	*Log-Odds*
V-Dem Elect Aggregate	0.34 (-0.04 – 0.72)	0.02 (-0.41 – 0.46)
Rule of Law	-1.78 *** (-2.48 – -1.09)	-3.51 *** (-4.40 – -2.64)
Expression	0.82 * (0.15 – 1.50)	2.08 *** (1.24 – 2.92)
Freedom of Religion	-0.51 * (-0.99 – -0.02)	-0.10 (-0.69 – 0.50)
Observations	6169	6201
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.180	0.217
AIC	1850.373	1152.344

** p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001*

In testing the first hypotheses directly, I examine the effects of *civil liberties* and *leadership selection* components have on civil war onset. Using a general linearized model with all the control variables mentioned above, I found that regardless of the civil war onset dataset used, high *Rule of Law* significantly reduced civil war onset and low *Expressions* significantly increased civil war onset. However, the impact of *Elect Aggregate* had no affect and *Freedom of Religion* vary depending on which civil war dataset is used. For example, *Freedom of Religion* did not significantly affect civil war onset when using COW dataset, but it significantly reduced civil war onset when in the UCDP dataset.

As illustrated in Figure 5 using the UCDP Data, declining *Rule of Law* is associated with higher likelihood of civil war onset. All else held equal, at an extreme lack of *Rule of Law* (0), there is between 6% and 26% chance of civil war onset. Similarly, when *Expressions* are at their most free, (1) the chance of civil war is predicted to be between 23% to 10%. When the *Elect Aggregate* is at its greatest, most free, (1) the predicted chance of civil war onset is at its greatest between 3% and 7%. When *Freedom of Religion* is at its lowest, most repressed (0), civil war onset is predicted to be between 3% to 10%. Lastly, the *Elect Aggregate* when most competitive,

demonstrates the civil war onset is predicted to be 2% and 4%. In summary, the components of the *civil liberties* elements have separate effects on civil war onset.

Figure 6: Civil War and Components



When implementing the same generalized regression model using the COW civil war dataset, the results are similar, but not exact. Also see Figure 5 for predicted plots. When *Rule of Law* is at its lowest, most repressive (0), the probability of civil war is predicted to be between 20% and 55%. When *Expressions* is at its highest and most free (1), the predicted probability of civil war onset is between 4% and 18%. *Freedom of Religion* has no significant impact, and even at its lowest, most repressive, the probability of civil war onset is between 0% and 2%. The COW results are similar to the UCDP results, with the clear exception: *Freedom of Religion* that does

not significantly influence civil war onset when using COW data. In measuring the individual effects of regime components on civil war onset, this manuscript demonstrates how different components affect stability in different ways. *Expressions* can increase civil war onset while *Rule of Law* often reduces it.

Analysis of UCDP Civil War Onset and Cross Cutting Components

In the second set of hypotheses, I test if each *civil liberty* component's effect civil war likelihood is dependent on the other *civil liberty* components. In order to test this potential dependency, I interact each *civil liberty* component to determine if cross cutting components create regime incoherence leading to destabilization. In Table 2 I test each dual interaction possible within *civil liberties* using the UCDP dataset of civil war onset. Two of the three interactions proved to be significant: *Rule of Law*Freedom of Religion* and *Freedom of Religion*Expression*;

Figure 7: UCDP Predicted Probability of Interaction Terms



providing mixed support for hypothesis 2a, failing to reject the null hypothesis 2b, and providing support for hypothesis 2c and 2d.

To better understand the interactions, each model is plotted in Figure 6 with predicted probability. In the case of *Rule of Law*Freedom of Religion* the probability of civil war onset is between 10% and 45% when *Freedom of Religion* is high (1), but *Rule of Law* is extremely low (0). For example, in a country where religion is not regulated, but citizens are unable to petition the government of their grievances or the government is intentionally repressing the population, then we are more likely to see a civil war occur. One example of this is Guatemala from the 1950s to the late 1990s. Guatemala maintained a relatively high *Freedom of Religion* (mean of 0.56) and a relatively low *Rule of* Law (mean of 0.30). During this time, there were multiple examples, of lack *Rule of Law* within the country – namely the genocide of the indigenous Mayans, multiple turn overs of power, and repression of government opposition. Yet religion was not actively repressed.

When *Rule of Law* is held at 1 and *Freedom of Religion* moves from 0 to 1, the probability of civil war decreases by 13% and when *Rule of Law* is held at 0 and *Freedom of Religion* moves from 0 to 1, the probability of civil war increases by 15%. In other words, civil war is most likely when there are large disparities between components. The effect of cross cutting components are more stark when examining *Expressions*. In a given country when *Expression* is high (1), and *Freedom of Religion* is nonexistent (0) the probability of civil war onset ranges from 18% to 79%. When *Expression* is at 1, as we move from *Freedom of Religion* at 0 to 1 there is a 45% decrease in the probability of civil war onset, meaning when *Expressions* is high, the level *Freedom of Religion* can drastically affect the likelihood of civil war onset. When *Expressions* is high, and *Freedom of Religion* is low, I find civil war significant more likely to occur. Lastly, when *Expressions* is high (1) and *Rule of Law* is low (0) the probability of civil war onset is at 28%. When *Expressions* and *Rule of Law* are both high, meaning civilians are able to express their

opinions freely and laws are transparently and equally enforced, then civil war is improbable at only 4%. In all cases presented above, when there is incoherence between the components the probability of civil war onset increases.

Table 2 - UCDP Data: Interaction Models

	Interaction Model 1	**Interaction Model 2**	**Interaction Model 3**
Predictors	*Log-Odds*	*Log-Odds*	*Log-Odds*
Intercept	-1.86 ** (-3.01 – -0.73)	-2.49 *** (-3.76 – -1.26)	-2.30 *** (-3.48 – -1.15)
V-Dem Elect Aggregate	0.31 (-0.07 – 0.69)	0.29 (-0.09 – 0.67)	0.28 (-0.09 – 0.66)
Rule of Law	-1.04 (-2.16 – 0.09)	0.49 (-1.10 – 2.14)	-1.49 *** (-2.21 – -0.78)
Expression	1.33 * (0.29 – 2.38)	0.82 * (0.14 – 1.50)	2.64 *** (1.39 – 3.91)
Freedom of Religion	-0.50 * (-0.98 – -0.01)	0.90 (-0.15 – 1.99)	0.77 (-0.09 – 1.66)
Rule_of_Law:Expressions	-1.25 (-3.01 – 0.45)		
Rule_of_Law:Free_Reli		-3.35 ** (-5.67 – -1.15)	
Expressions:Free_Reli			-3.18 *** (-5.01 – -1.41)
Observations	6169	6169	6169
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.185	0.189	0.191
AIC	1845.483	1838.359	1834.831

** p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001*

Using the UCDP dataset, there is support for all hypothesis 2s are support except hypothesis 2b indicating when *Rule of Law* and *Expressions* are not reinforcing, there is not a significant effect on the likelihood of civil war onset. This may be because the UCDP dataset contains many small conflicts that last less than a year and start again later creating duplicate dyads. This method of measuring civil war onsets increases the size of the n, by adding lower-level conflicts. It seems, my theoretical argument is not as robust in these smaller scaled intrastate violence onsets likely because they include localized and very regional intrastate violence.

Analysis of COW Civil War Onset and Cross Cutting Components

As seen in table 3, To ensure quality of the results presented in this manuscript, I analyzed the same interaction models using the COW dataset. When substituting the COW measure of civil war for the UCDP intrastate conflict variable, I found different results. **All** hypotheses were supported, specifically the interaction of *Rule of Law*Expression* was significant. COW's measure of intrastate conflict is not as sensitive to lower intensity conflicts.

Figure 8: COW Predicted Probability of Interaction Terms



One of the most striking results were seen in the Interaction Model 1 and the first graph in Figure 8 testing hypothesis 2b. When *Expression* is high (1) and *Rule of Law* is low (0), then the probability of civil war onset was between 81% and 100%. However, if the components are not cross cutting, but reinforcing one another towards repression, the probability of civil war onset ranges only from 0-4%. When *Rule of Law* was at 0 and *Expressions* moves from 0 to 1 the probability of civil war onset increased by 98%. When using COW civil war onset data, hypothesis 2 was upheld.

Similarly, we found hypothesis 2c was supported; the interaction *Expressions* Freedom of Religion* significantly reduced the likelihood of civil war. Specifically, when *Expressions* was high (1), and *Freedom of Religion* is low (0) civil war was much more likely ranging between a 10-82% chance. Yet when both are confirming repressive behaviors (low) civil war was nearly non-existent (0%) and when both *Expressions* and *Freedom of Religion* were high (free) the probability of civil war is predicted at 9%.

Hypothesis 2d was also upheld when using COW data. The *Rule of Law*Freedom of Religion* significantly reduced the risk of civil war onset. For example, when *Freedom of Religion* was high (1), and *Rule of Law* was low (0) the risk of civil war onset ranged between 30% and 83%. Yet when *Rule of Law* and *Freedom of Religion* were both low (repressive) the chance of civil war onset was significantly lower predicted to be at 11% and when both were high (more free) civil war was even more unlikely predicted at 0% risk.

I suggest the different results between COW and UCDP datasets may be attributed to the size and breadth of conflict. Considering COW's threshold of civil war onset requires 40 times more deaths per year the UCDP, COW only captures large more nationalized conflicts where national level data like governmental components are most significant. Whereas smaller more localized conflicts may be less directly affected by more nationalized government components. the author does not argue that the civil war components are not significant in even smaller localized civil wars, however that the variation between intrastate conflict datasets is potentially picking up on slightly different types of conflicts. In this study, we found the effects of cross cutting

components were most robust when examining larger scaled intrastate violence using the COW dataset.

Table 3 - COW Data: Interaction Models

	Interaction Model 1	Interaction Model 2	Interaction Model 3
Predictors	*Log-Odds*	*Log-Odds*	*Log-Odds*
Intercept	-1.49 * (-2.98 – -0.04)	-1.25 (-2.77 – 0.23)	-0.94 (-2.35 – 0.45)
V-Dem Elect Aggregate	0.03 (-0.40 – 0.47)	0.02 (-0.41 – 0.45)	0.01 (-0.42 – 0.44)
Rule of Law	-0.81 (-2.40 – 0.84)	-0.96 (-3.04 – 1.24)	-3.33 *** (-4.24 – -2.44)
Expression	4.45 *** (2.96 – 6.03)	2.16 *** (1.32 – 3.02)	3.83 *** (2.23 – 5.50)
Freedom of Religion	-0.13 (-0.73 – 0.47)	1.38 * (0.11 – 2.76)	1.06 (-0.01 – 2.17)
Rule_of_Law:Expressions	-5.81 *** (-9.08 – -2.87)		
Rule_of_Law:Free_Reli		-4.07 * (-7.44 – -0.99)	
Expressions:Free_Reli			-3.02 * (-5.45 – -0.73)
Observations	6201	6201	6201
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.231	0.223	0.223
AIC	1138.415	1148.285	1148.444

** p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001*

These interaction effects help us understand that civil war is not just affected by individual parts of *civil liberties*, but how the likelihood of conflict is also dependent on the level of other *civil liberties*. Alone each *civil liberty* component can affect the likelihood of civil war, but the interaction terms illuminate how dependent those findings are on the coherence of the other components. This may help explain why some scholars find anocracies to be less stable than other regime types. While a low level of *Rule of Law* increases the probability of rebellion, when *Rule of Law* is low, and *Expressions* are high then civil war is far more likely to erupt.

Case Study: Russo-Chechen Civil War

In the 1990s Russia was an anocracy and its components were not reinforcing one another. In 1994 the first Russo-Chechen civil war broke out. During the 1990s, Russia was granting citizens more civil liberties. Between 1991 and 1995 Russia no longer maintained a tight grasp on media and citizen's ability to express their grievances to the state (Zassoursky, 2002). However, Russia was unable to implement rule of law effectively: There was an absence of law and order with a rise in local militias and organized crime (Matveeva, 1999). More specifically before the first Chechen war, according to Kulikov the ex-Interior minister of Russia, the Northern Caucasus experienced 1 out of every 9 of murders and 2/3rd of the terrorist activity in the entirety of Russia all of which went virtually unpunished (Matveeva, 1999). Rule of law in Russia and the North Caucasus around 1994 was limited at best and nonexistent in many cases, yet other civil liberties

Figure 9: Russia – Regime Components



like freedom of religion and ability to express discontent were unrestricted. In Chechnya, there was a grievance present in the people and the media was unrestricted allowing for the

dissemination of the discontent and reducing the cost of rebellion. The Russo-Chechen civil war displays that the interaction of regime components: high levels of media and civil society freedoms with low levels of rule of law exemplifies how a state without reinforcing components create a state more vulnerable to civil conflict.

Conclusion

As the frequency of civil war rises, it becomes more important to isolate how and why we find this empirical regularity. In this paper I report that when separating democracy into multiple measures and testing *civil liberty* components, *leadership selection* does not affect likelihood of civil war onset. Ceteris paribus, *Expressions* increase the likelihood of civil war, while *Rule of Law* reduces civil war onset and *Freedom of Religion's* significance changes depending on the data used. Given the different effects of these government components on rebellion, I test if the interaction between *civil liberty* components arguing civil wars are most likely when government components are incoherent or working in opposing directions. Namely, when *civil liberty* components are incoherent, then grievances are more likely, and knowledge of the shared grievance will reduce opportunity costs overall increasing the probability of rebellion. I found that cross cutting components within countries significantly increase a state's vulnerability to civil war onset. Lastly and unexpectedly, this study advocates that when using the UCDP and COW datasets on civil war indicating they may be capturing different types of conflicts. In future research, I therefore recommend scholars should acknowledge the difference and make a theoretically back decision when choosing the dataset used. Overall, in this paper I demonstrate the complexity within measuring democracy, how components within democracy have differing effects, and incoherent civil liberties greatly increase any given country's vulnerability to rebellions.

Dissertation paper 2 - Protests and Incoherent Components

Introduction

Due to recent advancements in political science, we are now able to measure regimes' constituent components, such as levels of media freedom, freedom of religion, or citizens access to justice across long periods of time and at level of confidence unseen before. The information now available to researchers is only beginning to be explored thoroughly. In this paper, I build off Yacuta (2022) conceptualizing a new framework that allows for a more fine-grained understanding of the components of regimes. Using a multidimensional scaling of fourteen disaggregated variables from Variety of Democracy (V-Dem) I assert that specific components like *Rule of Law, Freedom of Religion,* and *Expressions* have varying and significant effects on the frequency of protest. When these components are incoherent, they significantly increase the likelihood of protests because they create an atmosphere of both high motivation and low opportunity costs to mobilization. Furthermore, as the distance between components expand - are more incoherent - it increases the probability of protests. In this paper, I emphasize how important it is to further our understanding of the interplay between different components of regimes and the potentiality for increased protest when these components are not coherent.[10]

Protest and its Causes

For decades protests causes and outcomes have been extensively researched however, there is a substantial gap in the literature, namely the interplay of regime characteristics on protest frequency. Though sociologists originally dominated the research of protests, political science has more recently begun to also examine this area, though our research is relatively nascent by comparison (Barrie, 2021). For example, political science also often adopts a narrow

[10] My study has limitations that should be noted. First, I assume that civil liberties and elections are separate of one another and should be measured as such. Second, I do not test the drivers of regime components and their direct effects on protest frequency. Third, this study focuses on cross-national data and does not make generative claims.

lens when examining protests outcomes looking mainly at the psychological or case study level (Tilly, 1978; Reznik, 2016) on topics including how protests affect regime change (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Kadivar, 2018), public opinion (Boehmke et al 2023); or public agenda setting (Barberá et al., 2019; Walgrave and Vliegenthart, 2012). Though these more micro-level analyses are extremely valuable in understanding more psychological and behavioral aspects of protests, the focus on this type of research has eclipsed more broad examinations of institutional influences. Generally speaking, there is a dearth of research investigating how governments on an institutional level can influence the frequency or likelihood of protest.

There is extensive research in some specific areas. For example, there are a range of studies examining how the motivation of individuals to join protests are shaped by social and economic inequalities (Solt 2015; Gattinara, Froio, and Pirro, 2022). Other studies have emphasized the grievances created from inequalities in policies entrenching discrimination even further (Jetten and Selvanathan, 2020; Kurer, Häusermann, Wüest, and Enggist, 2019) and is even more meaningful when authors like Cederman et al (2010) and Fox and Bell (2016) account for polarization and fractionalization of ethnic groups or when Ostby (2008) argues that horizontal inequalities align with social or ethnic grievances.

While many authors focus mainly on these micro-features of protests, some authors like Hendrix and Haggard (2015) examine economic factors like global food prices in the context of different regime types. They find that regime type or economic grievances alone do not significantly affect protests, rather economic grievance, agricultural policies, and regimes type together offer us a fuller picture of protest causes. Others find states with more repressive behaviors with selective enforcement of laws are far more likely to see protests because citizens feel their rights are unjustly restricted. Tilly (2004) emphasizes the importance of opportunities

for protest, stressing that repressive laws can trigger protests. In previous work Tilly (1995) also underscored how a range of factors like economic shifts and the opening of political institutions created a long-term normalization of protests around politics in Britain. Similarly, Robertson (2011) explores the role of "organizational ecology" and elite unity on protest in the hybrid Russian regime. However, while Robertson's analysis provides valuable insights on state-society relations, it does not extensively delve into the intricate interplay of regime components.

There is still a lack of consensus in the literature as to the relationship between regime type and protests. While Tilly (2004) contends that democratic regimes present more opportunities for protests through protection of civil liberties, other scholars like Chenoweth and Stepan (2011) assert that autocratic regimes suppress protest activities reducing protest occurrence. Empirical analysis of these hypotheses seems to support the argument that democracies are more likely to see protests than autocracies. Other scholars find evidence of a quadratic relationship between repression and protests meaning that both low levels of repression as found in a democracies and high levels of repression as seen in autocracies are associated with higher levels of protests Yet middling or hybrid regimes experience mid-levels of repression are therefore less likely than either democracy or autocracy to experience protests (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). However, these studies do not cover why there is still variation within regime types. Past studies have not accounted for the complex interplay between governmental regime components and how those can then influence grievance and opportunity.

Scholars have found that institutions, such as political or electoral systems and policies exert a profound influence on groups' actions like protests (Arslanalp and Erkman, 2019). For example, institutions that restrict political participation or create barriers to democratic processes can generate grievances that motivate protests movements especially in authoritarian contexts

(Shirah, 2016). Studies have also examined the impact of electoral systems on protest mobilization arguing that majoritarian electoral systems can lead to exclusion of minorities from the policy making process (Powell & Powell, 2000) which may heighten protest activity as those left without or with little representation seek alternative routes of political influence (Van Dusky-Allen, 2017). In another instance, studies examined how the government formation in of single party majority governments in parliamentary systems increase the likelihood of protests over a coalition government (Van Dusky-Allen, 2017). While still others find the electoral system can influence the method voters use to hold their representatives accountable. As Lockwood and Kronke (2021) argue, in African countries, citizens in majoritarian electoral systems are much more likely to directly contact elected officials while those in proportional representation (PR) systems citizen are much more likely to protest. They argue this is out of uncertainty as to whom is to be held accountable in the more complex and murky coalition making that takes place at the federal level. While these studies highlight how individual aspects of governmental characteristics can influence the causes of protests, they fail to examine this at a higher-level governmental perspective of how the cross pressures between governmental components can contribute to the emergence of protests.

Existing studies of examining the causes of protests often neglect to scrutinize the coherence of regime characteristics at a cross-national level, focusing instead on a single country or regime characteristic (like regime type, income, or development levels, etc.), specific case study (Sullivan, 2019; Sa'di, 2015; Reznik, 2016), or individual-level factors (Barrie, 2021; Tilly, 1978). The traditional categorization of regimes as autocracies, democracies, or hybrid regimes fails to capture the nuanced influence of political institutions on protest causes (Sa'di, 2015). For instance, the intentional distribution of rights and resources to different identity

groups by the state is not adequately accounted for in conventional regime typologies. To gain a comprehensive understanding of protest causes, it is imperative to delve into the variation of regime components across different types of regimes, ranging from highly repressive autocracies to liberal democracies. By examining the distinct characteristics of governmental institutions, configurations, and interactions, we can elucidate factors that make protests more or less likely to occur. While acknowledging the valuable findings of previous literature, this paper aims to specifically investigate the influence of governmental characteristics on protest dynamics. Such research endeavors are crucial for enhancing our understanding of social and political unrest and its manifestations across diverse contexts.

I assert that the literature lacks a comprehensive examination of how the cross pressures of institutional characteristics modify protest frequency. These institutional characteristics or components of government, in the context of this paper, refer to the distinct features within civil liberties such as equitable application of laws and transparency in the judicial system or freedom of speech and assembly. These components may experience "cross-pressure" when they manifest conflicting characteristics or goals within a political system. I argue this phenomenon arises when different components of a regime, such as civil liberties and rule of law, exhibit divergent effects, leading to complex and sometimes contradictory dynamics. For instance, in more democratic systems, expressive freedoms may coexist with weakened rule of law, potentially motivating citizens to engage in protests due to perceived grievances. Conversely, in more autocratic regimes, limited civil liberties may be balanced by strong rule of law, discouraging protests despite discontent. In the remained of this paper I aim to illustrate how the interplay of civil liberties cross pressuring one another can increase the probability of protest frequency.

Postulating Effects on Protest

Hypotheses – Cross Cutting Components

Theoretically, I posit the likelihood of protest is amplified if *civil liberties* exhibit cross-cutting tendencies. When *civil liberty* components are fully aligned and self-reinforcing, two things may occur. First, they may be more permissive, often by distributing power across people and institutions to reduce potential grievances keeping the regime stable (democracies). Second, they may be non-permissive and therefore repressive to the point that grievances cannot be acted upon also keeping the regime stable (autocracies). However, when *civil liberties* are mismatched or cross cutting – where one component works in the opposite direction of another - then there is greater opportunity for protest because there is both high motivation and low coordination costs.

In this paper, within *civil liberties* I focus on the interplay of *Rule of Law* and *Expressions* specifically. For example, as *Rule of Law* decreases there is more motivation in the country to protest because the government is either repressing citizens causing grievances, or the government is unable/unwilling to address other concerns. When this is the situation, citizen motivation for protest is high. When *Expressions* is high, the citizenry are able to express any potential discontent and learn if this is shared amongst the populace; this actively reduces the costs of coordination between citizens. See Table 4 for an illustration.

Table 4 – Component Mechanisms		
	High Expressions	**Low Expressions**
High Rule of Law	Low Motivation Low Coordination Costs	Low Motivation High Coordination Costs
Low Rule of Law	High Motivation Low Coordination Costs	High Motivation High Coordination Costs

I test the idea of component interplay in two ways. First, I create a dichotomous measure for when one component is higher than another.[11]

> Hypothesis 1 (H1: Cross Cutting) – When *Expressions* is higher (freer) than *Rule of Law*, the likelihood of protests will **increase**.

Second, I measure the distance between each component. I assert because each component affects regime stability independently their affects should compound when we consider their relative position to one another. H2 aims to explore the relationship between the degree of divergence between *Expressions* and the *Rule of Law* and its impact on the occurrence of protests. Specifically, in the hypothesis I posit that as the distance between *Expressions* and the *Rule of Law* increases, there is a corresponding increase in the likelihood of protests. This implies that as the distance between expressive freedoms and the level of rule of law grows, it leads to an even greater capacity for communication between citizens resulting in lower coordination costs and heightened motivation caused by a lower *Rule of Law*.

[11] It is important to acknowledge that I assume these scales of the components are comparable. While I adopted this approach for analytical convenience, it is essential to highlight the potential variability in scales across the components. I recommend future research endeavors to validate and assess the comparability of scales for a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between institutional components and protest dynamics.

> Hypothesis 2 (H2: Relative) – Given *Expressions* is higher than *Rule of Law*, as the distance between them **increases**, protests are more likely.

For example, when *Rule of Law* is lower than *Expressions* then not only is there high motivation due to grievances, but the populace is able to widely communicate their grievances amongst themselves reducing opportunity costs of collective actions. I argue that the higher *Expressions* is over *Rule of Law* the further reduction of opportunity costs to making participation in protests even more attenable.

Disaggregating Regime Type

In pursuit of a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of democracy, scholars have recognized the necessity for an extensive dataset encompassing a diverse array of disaggregated indicators, spanning across different states and years (Coppedge, 2016). Boix et al. (2013) comment on the benefits of unpacking regime components like civil liberties allowing researchers to disaggregate these components to empirically analyze each component separately (Teorell, 2016; Bollen, 1980; Schumpeter, 1942). With the advent of databases like V-Dem, which provide a more transparent assessment of variables within regimes the exploration of institutional characteristics' impact on protest frequency is now better facilitated across substantial time frames (Coppedge et al., 2020; Little and Meng, 2023). Within this context, I emphasize the need to disentangle and analyze discrete democracy components to discern their distinct roles in shaping protest dynamics (Teorell, 2016; Bollen, 1980; Schumpeter, 1942). Furthermore, I advocate for employing procedural democracy measures that isolate specific attributes, such as rule of law and expressions, while avoiding outcome-based metrics like suffrage (Przeworski et al., 2000; Coppedge, 2002). This is in an attempt to comprehend how discrete institutional aspects contribute

to protest frequency, while refraining from conflating the analysis with broader democratic outcomes.

As Muller and Weede (1990) proposed - "attributes of the state, or political process variables" can either hinder or facilitate violent protests by influencing the costs associated with collective action. Specifically, they argue that when attributes of regimes are semi-repressive or exhibits cross cutting tendencies, they effectively reduce barriers for individuals engaging in collective action, because "violence is neither effectively deterred by the inability of dissidents to mobilize for collective action nor rendered superfluous by the availability of effective peaceful forms of collective political action" (Muller and Weede 1990: 630). The alignment and mutual reinforcement of civil liberty components, for example, tend to create a permissive environment. Democracies generally distribute power among individuals and institutions to minimize potential grievances and maintain regime stability. In contrast, autocracies are largely non-permissive and repressive, which hinders the effective resolution of grievances and helps sustain regime stability. However, when civil liberties display cross-cutting tendencies or lack mutual reinforcement, there is an increased likelihood of civil unrest, as neither the grievance nor the opportunity for protest is adequately addressed. While some scholars like Muller and Weede (1990) or Gates et al (2006) assert that governmental inconsistencies will likely create more conflict within a country none have directly tested this hypothesis with cross national data or highly disaggregated data assessing regime components separately.

In this paper, I aim to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on the institutional determinants of protests. Specifically, I posit that the likelihood of protest is amplified when the components of *civil liberties* exhibit incoherence. When *civil liberty* components are mutually reinforcing, they create a more permissive environment, as seen in democracies that distribute

power to minimize grievances and maintain regime stability. Conversely, autocracies are non-permissive and repressive, stifling grievances and sustaining regime stability. However, when civil liberties exhibit mismatched or cross-cutting characteristics, it provides an opportunity for protest due to the combination of high motivation and low coordination costs (Muller and Weede 1990).

Furthermore, a decline in the *Rule of Law* component heightens the motivation for protest, as it signifies either government repression that incites citizen grievances or an incapacity or unwillingness of the government to address pressing concerns. Under such circumstances, citizens are more inclined to be motivated towards protest actions. Moreover, when the *Expressions* component is elevated, the citizenry gains the ability to freely express their discontent and gauge the level of shared grievances among the broader population. This increased freedom of expression actively diminishes the costs associated with coordinating protest actions among citizens, thus fostering a more conducive environment for collective action. These affects only accentuate as *Rule of Law* falls further below *Expressions;* for instance, the lower *Rule of Law* is compared to *Expressions,* the more motivation due to grievances caused by the government and the more freely each citizen is able to express their own discontent with the government.

By delving into the intricacies of *civil liberties*, particularly the dimensions of *Rule of Law* and *Expressions*, I shed light on the nuanced factors that contribute to the likelihood of protests. To achieve a comprehensive understanding of the causes of protests, I argue it is imperative to move beyond the traditional regime typologies and consider the variation and dynamics within different regime types (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). By disentangling regime components and their individual consequences on protest dynamics, we can enhance our

understanding of the complex interplay between regime characteristics, leading to a more nuanced comprehension of the factors driving protests.

Introduction to Regime Components

Utilizing the V-Dem database I deconstruct elements of democracy and assess their relationship with protest likelihood. Drawing on the civil liberties and leadership selection framework from Yacuta (2022), I argue that incongruence between regime components can create vulnerability (Coppedge et al., 2020). Additionally, this work casts doubt on any rigid categorization of regime types due to our newfound ability to quantify variations within each particular country regime. Within the regime elements of every country, regardless of their overarching regime type — be it democracy, anocracy, or autocracy — variations in civil liberty components persist.

To establish the principal explanatory variables, within civil liberties, I initially draw upon Dahl's (1971) original basic concepts of regimes levels of contestation and participation and Schumpeter's limited definition of what is required for a democracy (Schumpeter, 1942). One of the ways Dahl conceived of elections was by separating them into two distinct concepts: the ability of citizens to partake in an election and freely competitive elections. Dahl noted that systems with needed both contestation and participation to be considered democracies (Dahl, 1971). I follow this divide by disaggregating democracy into election components from non-election components, namely civil liberties. *Civil liberties* capture non-electoral elements of regimes such as freedom to communicate, protection against torture, freedom of religion, and right to free trial. These are all

crucial attributes within regimes and while they are related, *civil liberties* vary across and within the three traditional regime types, democracy, autocracy, and anocracy[12].

Schumpeter (1942) similarly argues in favor of a minimalist definition of democracy that excludes what we now refer to as civil liberties from the realm of leadership competition. Subsequently, Schneider and Schmitter (2004) were among the first scholars to devise distinct disaggregated indices for both liberalization and democratization. By constructing their own indices, employing multidimensional measures for states undergoing democratization between 1974 and 2000, Schneider and Schmitter contended that liberalization and democratization were not necessarily linearly correlated (Carothers, 2002; Guillermo, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986). In their study, Schneider and Schmitter operationalized political liberalism, which they defined as "the process of ensuring certain rights that safeguard both individuals and social groups against arbitrary or illegal acts perpetrated by the state or third parties" (Schneider and Schmitter, 2004, p. 60). The measure essentially captured the progress of a regime towards upholding the rule of law, the right to a fair trial, protect privacy, protection from torture, freedom of speech, petition, religion, and movement. They then operationalized political liberalism with six key indicators: Human Right Concessions, Few Political Prisoners, Tolerance of Dissidence, Professional Associations outside of Government, Electoral Competition, and Independence of Media or Press.

Similarly, Wigell (2008) advanced less stringent conceptualizations of hybrid regimes, advocating instead for the theoretical disaggregation of regimes based on two primary ideas: electoralism and constitutionalism (constitutional liberalism). He subsequently operationalized the minimal conditions for constitutional liberalism based on the extent to which states respect and guarantee freedom of organization, expression, access to alternative information, and freedom

[12] See Figures 5 through 7 for further discussion.

from discrimination (Wigell, 2008). Building upon these and other operationalizations, Wigell then theoretically re-aggregates them and into a two-dimensional regime typology using electoralism and constitutional liberalism as the two axes. Wigell's typology resulted in a cumbersome four-part typology while identifying the extreme ideal types within each category.

Following in the footsteps of Schneider and Schmitter (2004) and Wigell (2008), I undertake the deconstruction of democracy by initially separating leadership selection from political or constitutionalist liberalism variables, utilizing ten V-Dem variables to construct the latter, which I refer to as civil liberties: Access to Justice, Freedom from Torture, Freedom from Political Killings, Freedom of Academic and Cultural Expression, Government Censorship, Harassment of Journalists, Media Bias, Transparent Law, Freedom of Religion, Civil Society Control[13].

Variable Construction

Continuing in the path of Gates et al (2006) and Yacuta (2022), I acknowledge the importance of testing individual elements of democracy but recognize the tendency for conflation and significant correlation among these variables. Therefore, I used non-parametric Multi-dimensional Scaling (MDS) to develop orthogonal components (Munck and Verkuien, 2002). Using MDS, I graph V-Dem's ten civil liberty variables (Figure 10); the distance between each variable represents the closeness of the relationships. Three distinct clusters emerge, indicating that variables within each cluster likely measure the same or highly similar underlying concept. The first cluster, located in the upper right quadrant, comprises *Access to Justice, Freedom from Torture, Freedom from Political Killings,* and *Transparent Law*. These variables were aggregated

[13] See appendix for further discussion of these variables.

without weighting, standardized between 0 and 1, and referred to as the component "Rule of Law". *Rule of Law* operationalizes a government's capacity and willingness to apply laws equally and to address citizen grievances.

The second main cluster, situated in the lower-left quadrant, encompasses *Freedom of Expression*, *Government Censorship*, *Harassment of Journalists*, *Media Bias*, and *Civil Society Control*. These variables were aggregated into the component called "Expressions." *Expressions* measures citizens' ability to express grievances directly to the government and to each other, as well as the government's willingness to allow for public airing of grievances. The third subpopulation within civil liberties is Freedom of Religion, which is not closely associated with any other civil liberties variable and therefore cannot be aggregated. Together, *Rule of Law*, *Expressions*, and *Freedom of Religion* constitute the components of civil liberties.[14]

Figure 10: MDS *Civil Liberties*



[14] Due to time and space constraints, moving forward only *Rule of Law* and *Expressions* are tested and analyzed.

What do these Components Tell Us?

Each of the three components (*Expressions, Rule of Law,* and *Freedom of Religion)* is present in all regimes and they fluctuate signifcantly over time. There are clear patterns of components in each traditional regime category, but as demonstrated in Figures 11-13, there is variation within each general regime type.

Autocracies

Overall, standard autocratic countries have relatively low levels of civil liberties components (below .5) meaning the government has low capacity or willingness to apply laws equally, to address citizen grievances, or allow for communal sharing or public airing of grievances (see Figure 11). While we tend to analyze autocratic countries as belonging to a single regime type, I argue the variation in and incoherence (relative distance) between components are a significant influence in explaining regime instibility. For example, since 1945, Iran's components frequently fluctuate, but remain consistently at or below .5. The dip in all components in 1979 reflects the Iranian revolution and installation of the new theocratic government. Between 1982 and 2000 each of Iran's components slowly increased. In contrast, Saudi Arabia's *Rule of Law* and *Expressions* have moved slightly towards one another since 1980. Interestingly, in 2012 *Freedom of Religion* started on an upward trajectory apexing in 2018-2019 and then dropping slighlty. While each of these traditionally autocratic regimes diplay comparable component levels, the relationship between the components within each regime vary. This within regime type variation is what I argue political science has overlooked. The implication of the relative placement and relationship of regime components has yet to be assessed nor have the implications for domestic conflict, specifically for protests.

Figure 11: Autocracies and Regime Components Over Time



Democracies

Even liberal or institutionalized democracies experience variaiton in components, though again all components tend to fall within a specifc range (above .75) (see Figure 12). In Japan there has been very little variation between components since the mid 1970s. Post 1980s Japan has had a consistently lower rate of *Expressions* than many other democratic regimes. *Rule of Law* and *Freedom of Religion* are consistantly high. In general the United States (US) has a wider distribution of components than other institutionalized democracies.[15]

[15] For example, France maintains more stable components ranging from .75 to 1. and Sweden does not have a component below .8 since the 1980s. Additionally, since 1950 all of the civil liberty components in Canada have remained within .05 of eachother, with the most divergence of components between 2000 and 2018.

Freedom of Religion is unfailingly the highest component since 1945. *Rule of Law* rose drastically in the early 1970s mirroring the civil rights movement that swept the nation increasing rights to discriminatized minorities. Since 2016 the US has experienced a reduction in all components likely a result of the flagrant and frequent disregarding of democratic governing norms. Unlike the other typical democracies, *Rule of Law* is consistently lower than *Expressions*.

Figure 12: Democracies and Regime Components Overtime

Anocracies

While there are distinctions between components within autocratic and democratic regime types, the regimes with the most variation are anocracies. They not only have the widest deviations between each component, but also show volatile movement across time. Brazil, Russia, and Philippines at one point in the time series were considered anocratic regimes (see Figure 13). For all of these countries during their times of anocracy, the range between each component is far larger than in most autocracies or democracies. For example, in Brazil since the 1990s until the mid 2010s, *Freedom of Religion* remained stable and high, but *Expressions* and *Rule of Law* were

both considerably lower, with *Rule of Law* being the lowest. There is a large distance between each component in Brazil. Similarly, Russia in the 1990's to 2010's was an anocracy and it shows some similar trends. The largest distance between components in Russia was from 1992 to 1999. Since the year 2000, *Expressions* declined significantly and dropped faster than *Rule of Law*; the two ultimately converged frist in 2000 and again 2014 after which *Expressions* fell faster than *Rule of Law.*

Figure 13: Anocracies and Regime Components Overtime



These types of differences and changes in regimes are lost when categorizing regimes into traditional categories like democracy and autocracy. Disaggregating regimes by the components of *civil liberty* allows us to more comprehensively understand the relationship between all regimes and intrastate violence . While other scholars have worked on disaggregation within typical regime categories (Geddes 2003; Weeks 2012; Linz 1994; Shugart and Carey 1999), my new framework elucidates the important role of components and is applicable across all regime types.

Dependent Variables

To measure protests, I use Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED collects data on "a range of violent and non-violent actions by political agents, including governments, rebels, militias, identity groups, political parties, external actors, rioters, protesters and civilians" (ACLED 2019; Raleigh et al 2010). ACLED collects data on a very broad range of types of protests in a given year however it is limited in years and countries covered. It covers from 1989 to present day. In this study I use the number of protests per year by country of all available data ACLED between 1999 to 2021. [16]

Limitations

One potential problem with using ACLED in panel data is that when aggregated it does not account for the size or intensity of each protest, but only the count of protests per year. Another is the regional variation; ACLED began collected data in Africa as far back as 1989, but most other regions do not have data until the late 2010s. This means the analysis in this paper has an over representation of African countries; however, this is accounted for in later analysis with regional dummy variables.

Control Variables

The primary objective of this section is to describe and account for the potential factors that are associated with protest frequency. To this end, the natural log of GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, population logged, and unemployment, all from the World Bank, were utilized. Prior studies have linked a state's wealth and rate of growth to conflict (Przeworski et al, 2000; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Barakat and Fakih 2021). Additionally, I control for oil income per capita, which Ross (2013) has associated with an increased likelihood of conflict and the natural log of population which generally proliferates unrest as the population increases (Raleigh and

[16] See appendix for both robustness checks using multiple protest databases (Mass mobilization and SCAD) and table of protests by region.

Hegre 2009; Gattinara, Froio, and Pirro 2022). In other words, countries with larger populations tend to have more unrest.

Scholars using different measures found both null results and positive statistical significance for ethnic fractionalization and protest or political instability (Tilly 1978; Fox and Bell, 2016; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). To control for this, I use the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset from Cederman et al. (2010) capturing marginalized ethnic groups as a percent of population (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Given that cultural and historical trends vary globally, regional effects are also added as a control.

Finally, I account for the presence of multiparty elections using a measure called Elect Aggregate[17] created by Yacuta (2022). This measure is optimal because it separates the act of holding elections from the role of freedom of the press or speech and other effects the presence (or lack thereof) of civil liberties has on elections. The Elect Aggregate is not meant to be a measure of democracy, but to account for the presence of elections which can allow the opportunity for civil liberties to be implemented or extended.

Empirical Analysis of Direct Effects

Test of Theory - Impact of Individual Components on Protest

In assessing the validity of the theory behind the hypotheses, I first test the direct relationship between *civil liberties* effects on ACLED protest frequency from 1999 to 2021. I use a negative

[17] In creating this measure Yacuta choose specific individual variables from V-Dem rather than using the pre-created measures ensuring a separation of concepts. Many current measures, including V-Dems, when trying to operationalize elections subsume civil liberties. To capture the most basic changes in leadership Yacuta used four V-Dem variables: barriers to party formation (Party Barriers), multi-party competition in practice (Multiparty Elections); opposition parties are autonomous (Autonomous Opposition Parties); and regularly held elections (Regularly Held Elections). Together these variables have a raw Chronbach alpha of 0.87, indicating sufficient internal consistency for aggregation; Yacuta then aggregated these four variables by adding and then normalizing them into a single component.

binomial regression to compensate for the overdispersion of the count dependent variable and add all the control variables mentioned above. In Table 5, I present the results of how each component independently affects the likelihood of protest. In the analysis I find a significant relationship between *Rule of Law* and protests. Specifically, that when *Rule of Law* is high protests are less probable. I argue this is the case because when *Rule of Law* is low there is a high level of motivation for the citizens to protest as the government is either using repressive tactics to create grievances or is unable/unwilling to intervene when there is a perceived injustice. Interestingly, I find *Expressions* has a significant relationship in the opposite direction. In this case, when *Expressions* is high, the probability of protests incidence is higher. [18]

[18] See appendix table for lagged models, interaction models, and models using v-dem premade indices.

Table 5 - Individual Components and ACLED Protest Frequency	
Predictors	**ACLED** *Log-Mean*
Intercept	-6.73 *** (-7.82 – -5.64)
Rule of Law	-6.99 *** (-7.86 – -6.12)
Expression	5.10 *** (4.22 – 6.00)
Freedom of Religion	-0.73 ** (-1.31 – -0.16)
V-Dem Elect (LY)	-0.53 (-1.18 – 0.11)
Oil Rent	-0.03 *** (-0.03 – -0.02)
Total Population	0.79 *** (0.73 – 0.85)
Marginalized groups as a percent of population	0.29 (-0.10 – 0.68)
Unemployment	0.03 *** (0.01 – 0.04)
GDP Per Capita	0.00 *** (0.00 – 0.00)
Population growth	-0.16 *** (-0.23 – -0.08)
GDP per capita growth	-0.03 *** (-0.05 – -0.02)
Regional control	T
Observations	1326
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.872
AIC	16524.778
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001	

As illustrated in Figure 14 using ACLED, declining *Rule of Law* is associated with more protests. All else held equal, at an extreme lack of *Rule of Law* (0), 8337.23 protests are predicted in a year. This is likely due to either the inability or unwillingness of the government to act when faced with a widespread grievance creating motivation for protests. When *Rule of Law* is low there

are lower costs to participation for any given citizen to protest as the government is either creating grievances or not addressing current grievances held. Contrastively, when *Expressions* are at their most free, (1) 2591.40 protests are predicted in a year. As *Expressions* increases, protests become more frequent because as citizens are able to communicate their own grievances, it becomes easier to learn others' grievances, reducing the cost of coordination of protests. In summary, the components of the *civil liberties* elements have differing effects on protests.

Figure 14: ACLED Predictive Plots



Analysis of Hypotheses: Cross Cutting Components and Protest[19]

Understanding individual components of civil liberties each have independent effects on protests, I then continue to test my two hypotheses. I find that both hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported.

Table 6 presents the results of the component effects and their association with protests. The first model, labeled "Cross Cutting," indicates whether *Expressions* is higher than *Rule of Law*, represented by a dummy variable where 1 indicates that Expressions is higher than *Rule of Law*,

[19] Additional analysis in appendix includes - testing with premade V-Dem indices, lagged variables, and interaction terms.

and 0 the opposite. As hypothesized in H1, irrespective of other components, when *Rule of Law* is lower than *Expressions*, protests are more likely to occur. The findings reveal that when the *Expressions* is greater than *Rule of Law*, there is a significant positive effect on protests. This suggests that a higher level of expressive freedoms compared to rule of law contributes to an increased likelihood of protest frequency. The second model, titled "Relative Difference," quantifies the magnitude of the relative difference between these two components. In this model, when *Expressions* is higher than *Rule of Law*, the relative difference between *Expressions* and *Rule of Law* also demonstrates a strong positive association with protests, indicating that a greater disparity between the *Expressions* and *Rule of Law* components amplifies the effect on protest activities.[20]

[20] See appendix for robustness check with Mass Mobilization and SCAD dataset.

Table 6 - Component Relational Effects and Protests		
	Cross Cutting	**Relative Difference**
Predictors	*Log-Mean*	*Log-Mean*
Cross-cutting Expressions over RoL	0.96 *** (0.78 – 1.15)	
Difference between Expressions and RoL		6.11 *** (5.30 – 6.93)
V-Dem Elect (LY)	-1.49 *** (-2.03 – -0.97)	-1.57 *** (-2.10 – -1.05)
Freedom of Religion	-1.60 *** (-2.19 – -1.02)	-1.04 *** (-1.63 – -0.46)
Oil Rent	-0.02 *** (-0.03 – -0.02)	-0.03 *** (-0.03 – -0.02)
Total Population	0.79 *** (0.73 – 0.85)	0.79 *** (0.73 – 0.84)
Marginalized groups as a percent of population	0.23 (-0.16 – 0.63)	0.29 (-0.10 – 0.68)
Unemployment	0.01 (-0.00 – 0.02)	0.02 * (0.00 – 0.03)
GDP Per Capita	0.00 *** (0.00 – 0.00)	0.00 *** (0.00 – 0.00)
Population growth	-0.19 *** (-0.27 – -0.12)	-0.18 *** (-0.25 – -0.10)
GDP per capita growth	-0.03 *** (-0.04 – -0.02)	-0.04 *** (-0.05 – -0.02)
Regional control	T	T
Observations	1326	1326
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.824	0.866
AIC	16699.17	16547.823
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001		

Demonstrated in Figure 15, the 'Relative Difference' model illustrates how as the distance between *Expressions* and *Rule of Law* increases (becomes more positive) the more likely protests are to occur. For instance, if the level of *Rule of Law* is lower than that of *Expressions*, it indicates a situation where there are significant grievances motivating the citizenry and there is also an ability to disseminate these grievances among the population,

thereby reducing the opportunity costs associated with collective actions. To summarize I posit that as the level of *Expressions* surpasses that of *Rule of Law*, then the larger the reduction in opportunity costs facilitating the feasibility of collective action like protests.[21]

Figure 15: Distance between Expressions and Rule of Law



The y-axis represents the number of protests per year; the larger the value, the more protests occur in a given year. The larger the numerical value on the x-axis represents the greater distance between *Expression* and *Rule of Law*, with *Rule of Law* below *Expressions.* The smaller the numerical value the higher *Rule of Law* is over *Expressions.* At 0.0 *Rule of Law* and *Expressions* are at the same level. The trend line created using the "relative difference" model

[21] See appendix for same figure for both Mass Mobilization and SCAD dataset.

indicates that as the higher *Expressions* is compared to *Rule of Law*, the more frequently protests will occur per capita. This aligns with my expectations that when *Rule of Law* is lower than *Expressions* two mechanisms influence the likelihood of protest: motivation and opportunity costs. Specifically, when *Rule of Law* is lower than *Expressions* there is a higher probability that the government either created grievances through repressive tactics or is unable/unwilling to address other grievances in the population. Simultaneously because *Expression* is relatively high citizens are able to express and discuss their own perceived injustices or grievances and learn if their opinions are widely held. If citizen find a perceived grievance or motivation is widespread in the country, it represents a significant reduction in the cost of organizing a movement. The lower *Rule of Law* is below *Expressions* there is a significant probability there is a high level of motivation and low opportunity costs to collective actions creating a situation pregnant with the possibility of protest.

Case Discussion: Lebanon

In order to give more context to the finding above, I apply them to recent events in Lebanon. For example, Lebanon has seen an increasing gap between 2016 to 2019 the components *Expression* and *Rule of Law* remained closely aligned with a difference of no more than .03 between one another. Consequently, protest frequency was relatively low. In 2019, *Expressions* increasing slightly, but has been on a gradual decent since 2020. Starting in 2018 *Rule of Law* exhibited a more noticeable decrease (Figure 16). As the gap between the two components widened, the number of protests per capita in the Lebanon rose extraordinarily (Figure 17).

A clear illustration of the erosion of *Rule of Law* was evident in the explosion at the Beruit port, one of the largest non-nuclear blasts on record. It damaged nearly half of the city, wounding over 7,000 people (World Report 2022). This incident highlighted government ineptitude and subsequent restriction of access to justice. For instance, even though "government officials were aware of the fatal disaster that the ammonium nitrate's presence in the port" no action was taken (World Report 2022). In the reverberations since then the government has blocked any attempts at investigations using courts to block investigations, political interference of the case, and violation of due process. Additionally, the government used the "defamation laws as a tool for retaliation and repression rather than as a mechanism for redress where genuine injury has occurred" and generally applied laws selectively sometimes acting without a judicial order like looking through a defendant's phone without a court order (Majzoub 2019).

Figure 16: Lebanon Regime Components 2016-2022



Those in the media and in civil society organizations also felt the reduction in *Expression* from 2020 to present as demonstrated by the case of Mariam Seif Eddine, a prominent journalist and regime critic. Seif Eddine and her family experienced death threats, harassment, and physical injuries. When she attempted to raise the issue with the police, she was instead written up on defamation chargers brought against her by the attackers (Majzoub 2021). This situation is not unique to Seif Eddine but is experienced across many journalists and activists in Lebanon who decries the regime. Reportedly between 2019 and 2021 at least 106 people who work in the

Figure 17: Lebanon ACLED Protests and difference in component scores 2016-2022



media were assaulted by non-state actors and at least 80 that were assaulted directly by government actors (Majzoub 2019).

While both *Expression* and *Rule of Law* have been declining, *Rule of Law* has experienced a more significant deterioration, resulting in a widening gap between the two components. As this

gap continues to grow, there has been a substantial increase in protest frequency per capita. I assertion that as the government fails to uphold the *Rule of Law* as it once did, and the media still disseminates critical information regarding the regime's policies, the conditions for protest become more favorable. Specifically, with events like the explosion at the Beruit port the government's incompetency is highlighted and their attempts to block investigations, while the media is still able to broadcast the perceived ineptitude contribute to a conducive environment for protests. The combination of the government's unwillingness to hold those responsible for the explosion accountable and the media's persistence in exposing perceived ineptitude create a situation where the motivation to protest is high and the coordination costs are relatively low, leading to an increase in protest frequency.

Conclusion

How political science conceptualizes regimes greatly influences how we as a field conduct research and make hypotheses. In this paper I further our understanding of how cross cutting components greatly influence the likelihood of civil unrest like protests. The analysis presented in this discussion highlights the crucial role that regime components, particularly *Expression* and *Rule of Law*, play in shaping protest frequency in countries like Lebanon. The alignment or mismatch between these components appears to have a significant impact on the likelihood of protests occurring. These findings underscore the importance of regime components in influencing political stability and citizen mobilization. And when these components are aligned and mutually reinforcing, as often observed in democracies, the permissive environment discourages mass mobilization.

Scholars, policymakers, and activists must recognize the intricate relationship between regime components and protest dynamics. Moreover, the availability of comprehensive and

transparent databases like V-Dem enables more rigorous empirical analyses of these relationships across different time spans and contexts. In conclusion, the interplay between regime components and how they can influence protest frequency is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that merits further research and attention.

Dissertation paper 3 - Characteristics of Religious Identity and Outgroup Conflict

Introduction

Religion is a feature of all human societies, yet religious violence against outgroups is common in some countries and absent in others. India in particular remains an outlier with widespread religious violence still tragically common (Kumar, 2023; Salazar, 2021). Today, faith-based violence is widespread in India as evident by the Hindutva movement and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spread of hate for the nation's Muslim minority. India's political leaders regularly use intergroup conflict as an organizing tool and often treat it as an end in itself (Basu, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2017). However, the role and influence of religious leaders in India's persistent faith-based violence is understudied (Basedau and Koos, 2015). In this paper we address the role faith leaders' pro or anti-violence messages play in influencing outgroup affect and public approval for violence against Muslims. We utilize an original survey to determine what characteristics of religious identities can be used to increase or decrease animosity and under what circumstances religious identity is most likely to be associated with approval for violence.

We develop a theory to explain how religious identities can be used to decrease outgroup affect or mobilize people towards or against violence. To incite or assist any event there must be some form of organization. Organization is costly. Time, effort, and resources are required to achieve collective action. Identities provide a mechanism for lowering the costs of such collective actions. In this study we examine the role of religious identities. We argue religious identities are used to mobilize animosity and violence towards outgroups though two main paths: religious organizational density and religious leaders support for violence towards outgroups. And find that the level of religiosity is not a main predictor of increased outgroup animosity.

In order to better understand the role of religious identity in outgroup affect and violence at the level of individual psychology, a survey and analysis of individual level data are required. Specifically, we utilize a large survey sample to better understand the mechanisms linking religious identity to intrastate conflict. We argue that religious identities link to the organizational capabilities provided by religious institutions makes them particularly effective at solving collective action problems associated with intrastate conflict even when accounting for religiosity of the respondents. We find that when the organizational capacity of religious institutions is high and religious leaders are supportive of violence, individuals have decreased affect towards religious outgroups and are more likely to approve of violence against outgroups even when accounting for respondent's religiosity.

Religious Organizations

In this article, we consider religion a cultural system comprising established symbols, beliefs, rituals, and values tied to sanctity, and it is organized around the premise of the supernatural and sacred essence. Religion links individual human life to a broader, transcendent reality, shaping both personal identities and communal life (Pals 2006). In the remainder of the

section, we will review literature on religion, ingroup and outgroups, religious identity, religious hierarchy, and the role of violence in leader messaging.

Religions have been historically considered a key societal pillar. With a clear authoritative moral framework, religious organizations have the capacity to steer collective ideals (Williams and O'Leary, 2019). Religions have supplied society with informal social control, reinforcing societal norms and regulating individual behavior (Snow 2001; Chaves and Gorski, 2001). Religious systems can often provide explanations for help create order out of chaos, offer emotional comfort, and establish a code of conduct within a group. A community of shared faith serves as a platform for increase social capital by promoting bonding between members of same religion and potential ties in interfaith relationships (Putnam and Campbell, 2010). These ties can also serve as a foundation for generated collective action, particularly when there are shared perceptions of threats or perceived injustices.

Religious collective action aligns itself with in/out-group dynamics, moral absolutism, and transcendent afterlife rewards. This collective action is facilitated by shared religious symbols and rituals distinguishing them from wider society (Snow 2001; Smidt, 2003). Homogenous groups with a shared identity provide opportunities for collective mobilization (Hunt and Benford 2004; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Collective actions can foster cohesion, or they increase clashes, depending on religions' influence on social norms, identity, political systems, and conflict resolution mechanisms (Olzak 1989; Haynes, 2013). The association between religious institutions and beliefs and potential violence has received particular academic scrutiny. Furthermore, the potential for religions to foster exclusive faith, promoting an 'us vs.

them' mentality, and possessing apocalyptic beliefs can directly contribute to violence (Ginges et al., 2011). Additional priming of characteristics and more dogmatic features of religion through reading of specific texts can enforce religious doctrines. When these doctrines are more aggressive toward outgroups, they are correlated with a higher propensity toward violent actions (Blogowska and Saroglou, 2013). This further supports the idea that certain facets of religious organizations, particularly those promoting exclusion and infallibility, can pave the way for violent actions against outgroups.

Religious Identity

Religious identity can also play a significant role when considering acts of violence. For instance, it may lead to a desire to defend or promote a particular religious perspective. The perception of existential threats against a religious community can fuel violence attributed to the struggle over sacred values (Atran and Ginges, 2012). Furthermore, Hall, Matz, and Wood (2010) argue that religious conviction can animate people into action more easily than political motives because the stakes are perceived to transcend earthly desires. The dualistic worldview inherent in many religious identities, namely, the differentiation between the absolute good of one's own religion and the absolute evil of others, can increase the propensity for violence (Juergensmeyer, 2013). Likewise, the theory of divine rewards, a commonly adopted belief within religious doctrines, contributes to the inclination towards violence, as actions are perceived to be vindicated in the afterlife (Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan, 2009).

As religion is a powerful identity it can create a higher potential for collective violence. Religious identity is a key component to understanding any intergroup dynamics like conflict or violent actions (Pew Research Center, 2014). Thus, when examining how religious identity impacts the propensity to endorse violent messages from religious leaders, especially during

intense interfaith conflict, two key factors are highlighted: religious leaders' influence and the political context surrounding the religious group identity (Toft 2013). Religious leaders have an essential role in helping to form the mindsets and behaviors of their adherents. These leaders possess considerable sway over group-based actions like violence generated by their positions on conflict and violence (Juergensmeyer, 2003). By validating or endorsing violence, leaders can fuel the likelihood of their followers participating in hostile behavior (Hassner, 2011). The messages conveyed by these critical figures serve as a potent mechanism for gratifying or defusing potential conflict (Neuberg et al., 2014).

Similarly, the political conditions within which religious identity functions can mold group-based violence. Circumstances such as political grievances or the politicization of religious identity for strategic purposes can escalate between-group conflict (Fox and Sandler, 2004; Basedau, Pfeiffer, and Vüllers, 2016). It consequently showcases the reciprocal relationship between political dynamics and religious identity in inciting or mitigating violent actions amongst groups.

Religiosity maintains a deep connection with a given religion’s hierarchy, because of the influence religious leaders exert on their followers (Stark and Glock, 1968). Higher levels of religiosity might correlate with a stronger attachment to religious authority figures, which in turn influences the reception and interpretation of teachings from religious leaders (Cadge and Konieczny, 2014). As a result, highly religious individuals may be more strongly influenced by their religious leaders and adhere more intently to a hierarchical religious infrastructure (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006).

Religious Messaging

The linkage between religiosity and outgroup violence in many religions can be paradoxical. While many faiths champion love and peace, under certain circumstances, elevated levels of religiosity have been associated with increased support for hostility or violence towards outgroups (Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan, 2009). This paradox may arise from the potent influence of religious leaders who possess the ability to manipulate religious narratives, particularly in times of conflict (De Juan et al, 2015). Religious adherents with high levels of religiosity may perceive any supposed threat to their beliefs as a significant existential menace, resulting in an intensification of hostilities toward others not sharing their convictions (Juergensmeyer, 2005).

The communication of non-violence messaging across religious communities is crucial in affirming universal peace, understanding, and harmony (Appleby, 2000). Religious teachings and doctrines almost universally emphasize the importance of peace, love, respect, and tolerance. Such non-violence messaging can exert a profound influence on congregants' attitudes and actions, given their approval and endorsement (Wolterstorff, 2019). The transmission of non-violence messages is often intertwined with a religion's hierarchy. Religious leaders, owing to their trusted and influential roles, can significantly shape congregants' understandings and interpretations of their beliefs (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011). Leaders who prioritize and promote non-violence messaging can positively influence the behavior and attitudes of their followers, stimulating actions of tolerance, peace, and understanding (Silberman, 2005).

In consideration of religiosity, highly religious individuals may exhibit a higher degree of respect and adherence to religious authority figures, which translates into acceptance of the communicated non-violence messages (Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan, 2009). High levels of

religiosity can foster a sense of moral obligation to uphold the principles of non-violence, thereby dissuading actions that contradict these peace-promoting teachings (Wellman and Tokuno, 2004). Moreover, individuals with a high level of religiosity might assume the role of ambassadors of religious tolerance and peace in their communities. They can positively influence others towards acceptance and respect for differing faith perspectives and encourage dialogue over conflict (Abu-Nimer, 2001).

Theory

We argue that the literature has inadequately explored the individual characteristics of religion that can generate outgroup animosity and affect the propensity for outgroup violence. We assert these include the role of religious organizational structures and leaders' influence. Specifically, that organizations built around religion can reduce opportunity costs for coordination and mobilization thereby facilitating collective action. When collective action is easily achieved it increases the potential that a group can be mobilized towards violence, especially if there are clear hierarchal orders in the organization.

While religion has long been studied by psychologists at the individual level across a variety of topics (Ellison and Sherkat, 1993; Schieman, Nguyen, and Elliott, 2003; Sim and Loh, 2003), the traits and characteristics of religion have been largely overlooked by the field of political science. There is also a gap in the literature around the role of these religious characteristics in conflicts (Grzymala-Busse, 2012). In an attempt to address this two-fold gap, we argue that religions have a distinct advantage in their ability to contribute to group-based violence because of their organizational capacity and hierarchical tendencies. These two characteristics of religion can increase collective action opportunities by increasing the ability for group organization among followers. Due to this, we believe if there are high levels of animosity

toward outgroups, then religious adherents are more able to translate their feelings into organized, potentially violent actions.

Religious organizations are built around the worship or deifying of esteemed individuals or God(s). Every religious organization is built with some level of established hierarchy where a given leader can exert their influence over their followers (Delehanty et al. 2015). These levels of hierarchy can vary between inter and intra-religious groups. The nature of a hierarchical structure enables groups to mobilize more effectively as leaders can serve to further reduce collective action problems and mobilize group actions (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2014). Religious organizational infrastructure can include physical places like temples, sanctuaries, places of worship, or religious schools; they may also include general community, sermons, and communal networks. Both of these can be used to disseminate information and coordinate activities (Toft 2007). These religious hubs for social and communal interaction can serve as places or mechanisms to increase organization, recruiting, coordination of community volunteers, welfare support (Bano, 2012), or more violent activities.

For instance, De Juan et al (2015) show statistical evidence using geospatial data that the denser these religious organization institutions are the more effectively leaders were able to reduce mass communal violence. However, if these religious organizations are used to promote a religious interpretation or narrative that promotes out-group animosity by depicting outgroup members as evil or morally inferior, then adherents have both a moral justification for violent action (Borum, 2011). For example, in Hinduism, cows are considered a sacred animal and are often associated with the predominant deities (Stewart, 2017). These religious beliefs have led to some efforts to actively preserve cows and protect them from slaughter. However, these groups also partake in violence against outgroups, namely religious minorities like Muslims. For

example, in a report written by Human Rights Watch, there have been many recorded acts of violence between May 2015 and December 2018 where at least 44 people, including 36 Muslims, were lynched in cow-related protection attacks (Human Rights Watch 2019). A Muslim dairy farmer named Pehlu Kahn was murdered by a religious mob of self-proclaimed cow vigilantes. Kahn and his sons were legally transporting cows when they were beaten and lynched by the mob. Kahn died two days later while his sons sustained serious injuries (Dosanjh, 2017). The perception of cows as holy has arguably created a sense of superiority and a need for protection which increases outgroup hatred of those who do not share the same beliefs. These incidents demonstrate how religious teachings can influence and even legitimize outgroup violence in India.

Within a religious community, there is often a strong bond between individuals within the group, which creates a collective identity that is tied to their religious beliefs (Lim and Putnam, 2010). During times of perceived conflict towards their religious group, threatened adherents may be more inclined to engage in violence to protect their communities. We argue in combination with hierarchical organizational structures inherent in most groups and the reduction in collective action due to religious organization make religious groups particularly effective in being active in group-based violence. Our proposed mechanism is grounded in social identity theory, which posits that affiliations with group identities, including religious identifications, inherently produce outgroup animosity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This effect is hypothesized to be particularly pronounced for religious identity, as religious organizations reduce coordination costs and enhance the potential for collective responses (Basedau et al., 2016; De Juan, 2008; Stewart, 2017). Scholars contend that religious institutions play a pivotal role in organizing collective action, thereby augment religious identity's capacity to contribute to

violence. We hypothesize that the organizational capacity of religious institutions and the stance of religious leaders regarding violent actions serve as key mechanisms (Basedau et al., 2016). To investigate the causal role of organizational capacity and elite influence, we employ a randomized control experiment. The primary objective of this study is to establish the validity of the proposed mechanisms and discern the impact of religious identities on outgroup violence within states. Specifically, we explore whether the effects of religious identity primes on willingness to engage in violence exhibit variations contingent upon religious organization and the influence exerted by religious leaders.

In this research endeavor, we embrace an empirical approach by systematically examining religious identity and gauging attitudes and behaviors associated with outgroup affect and violence. By scrutinizing the causal relationship between religious identities and group-based violence, we aim to enhance the existing understanding of the multifaceted dynamics underlying religious factors in conflicts. Moreover, by examining the interplay between religious organizational capacity, religious leaders' influence, and the propensity for violence, we aspire to achieve a more nuanced comprehension of the intricate mechanisms at work. This research bears paramount importance in elucidating the complexities surrounding religious factors in conflicts, thereby fostering the development of effective strategies to address and mitigate violence motivated by religious considerations.

Hypotheses

Outgroup Animosity

In the following section, we posit hypotheses on the effects of micro-religious features on outgroup affect and then specifically on approval of local religious leader’s messaging on outgroup violence.

Hypothesis 1: Outgroup affect will decrease as approval of religious leader's messaging against religious outgroups increases.

In this hypothesis, we posit that individuals who endorse the messaging of local religious leaders regarding other religious outgroups, then the individual will experience an overall reduction in their affect towards outgroups. In other words, as individuals agree more with their local religious leaders, they are more negatively emotionally inclined towards different religious groups. We base this hypothesis on social identity theory, where individuals derive part of their self-concept and social identity from group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this case, we assert that when individuals internalize attitudes espoused by their religious ingroup's leader's messaging this often leads to reduced outgroup affect.

Hypothesis 2: Outgroup affect will decrease as religious institutions become more hierarchical.

In hypothesis 2 we posit the micro-religious feature of hierarchy within religious institutions can influence individuals' affective responses towards outgroups. Specifically, as religious institutions become more hierarchical, with centralized authority and organized structures, the individuals' emotional attachment or sentiment towards outgroups is expected to decline. This hypothesis suggests that higher levels of religious hierarchy might contribute to a sense of exclusivity and reduced affinity towards other religious groups. In hierarchical religious institutions, leaders can emphasize the importance of group cohesion, potentially creating or reinforcing an "us versus them" mentality. The more hierarchical a religious institution we posit the more willing its members are to follow the will of the religious leaders. Given that positive interactions with outgroup members can lead to reduced prejudice and increased positive affect if a hierarchical religious organization discourages interactions with outgroups, it may limit

opportunities for positive intergroup experiences and chances at decreased affect towards outgroups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Hypothesis 3: Outgroup affect will decrease as religiosity increases.

In hypothesis 3 we argue that as an individual becomes more attached to their religion, they will view religious outgroups less favorably. In other words, we assert that those with higher levels of attendance and adherence to religious practices will have higher ingroup attachment. As these indications rise, an individual's attachment to out-groups will then decline. In these circumstances, individuals may prioritize the welfare of their own religious ingroup above outgroups (Ruffle and Sosis, 2003).

Hypothesis 4: Outgroup affect will decrease when religious leaders call for violence against outgroups.

Here we prose that when leaders use violent messaging against outgroup individual's affective attitudes towards outgroups will reduce. We suggest that approval of violent messaging might lead to reduced positive affective attitudes towards the given outgroups. We argue that when individuals see leaders endorsing violence against a religious outgroup, it can increase overall negative feelings or associations toward those groups. For example, if a religious leader regularly calls for or supports violent actions against a religious outgroup adherents may experience an increase in animosity and a reduction in empathy towards them.

Approval of Violent Messaging by Local Leaders

In the next section, we separate the survey sample into two groups: those who reported their local religious leaders as having called for violence and those who did not. By separating the two groups we aim to get a better understanding of how the microfeature of religion can affect

adherent's approval of this messaging. We examine how religiosity, hierarchy, and institutional density affect the respondent's approval of violent messaging by their local religious leaders against religious outgroups.

> *Hypothesis 5: Conditional on local religious leaders having called for violence, approval of violent messaging against religious outgroups will increase with religiosity.*

In hypothesis 5 we contend that individuals who exhibit higher levels of religiosity are more likely to have an increased approval of violent messaging by their local religious leaders. We posit that religiosity can contribute to a more hostile stance towards religious outgroups because those who are more committed to their religious identity may perceive outgroups as a higher threat to their religious ingroup. We suggest that religiosity can intensify ingroup-outgroup distinctions and increase animosity towards religious outgroups.

> *Hypothesis 6: Conditional on local religious leaders having called for violence, approval of violent messaging against religious outgroups will increase as religious institutions become more hierarchical.*

In this hypothesis we propose the level of hierarchy within religious institutions influences the approval of violent messaging targeting religious outgroups. We assert that religious organizations with more hierarchical structures, where power and authority are concentrated, are more likely to foster or tolerate violent messaging as a way of addressing conflicts with outgroups. The presence of a strong hierarchical structure may facilitate the dissemination and endorsement of violent messaging by religious leaders, influencing the attitudes of their followers. Hierarchical religious institutions may play a role in shaping the approval of violent messaging against religious outgroups because religious leaders hold substantial influence over their followers (Pew Research Center, 2014), and their stance on violence can significantly

impact the attitudes and behaviors of their adherents. Factors such as the interpretation of religious teachings and the values promoted by religious leaders within hierarchical structures can influence whether violent messaging is supported or discouraged.

> *Hypothesis 7: Conditional on local religious leaders having called for violence, approval of violent messaging against religious outgroups will increase as religious institutions become denser.*

In this hypothesis, we suggest that as religious institutions become denser, meaning they have a higher number of places of worship within a community, there will be an increase in the approval of violent messaging targeting religious outgroups. We believe that more local religious institutions may create a sense of cohesion, reinforcing ingroup-outgroup boundaries and creating heightened animosity towards outgroups. A heightened group identification may nurture an increased acceptance of violent messaging against religious outgroups.

Approval of Messaging without Violence by Local Leaders

> *Hypothesis 8: Conditional on local religious leaders having **not** called for violence, approval of messaging that is not violent against religious outgroups will be unaffected by religiosity.*

In hypothesis eight we contend that the level of religiosity among individuals will have no significant impact on their approval of messaging without violence directed at religious outgroups.[22] We posit that regardless of an individual's level of religious involvement, their attitudes towards messaging without violence targeted at religious outgroups will remain relatively stable. Religiosity, in this context, is expected to primarily influence attitudes towards violence rather than approaches without violence to conflict resolution. In this hypothesis, we

[22] See Figure 18-20 for explicit wording of survey question used.

acknowledge religiosity may not necessarily be linked to approval or disapproval of messaging without violence against religious outgroups. Individuals may perceive messaging without violence as local leaders attempt to promote understanding or peace, irrespective of their level of religiosity.

> *Hypothesis 9: Conditional on local religious leaders having **not** called for violence, approval of messaging that is not violent against religious outgroups will be unaffected as religious institutions become more hierarchical.*

Penultimately, we posit the level of hierarchy within religious institutions has no significant influence on the approval of messaging without violence against religious outgroups. Suggesting that the hierarchical structure of religious institutions does not impact individuals' attitudes towards approaches without violence when dealing with conflicts involving religious outgroups. Therefore, regardless of the level of hierarchy within religious institutions, individuals' support for messaging without violence targeting religious outgroups should remain unchanged. In this hypothesis, we contend that the hierarchical nature of religious institutions may not necessarily influence attitudes towards messaging without violence. Rather, we assert that individuals' support for approaches without violence is not dependent on the hierarchical structure of their religious organization. Factors such as personal beliefs, moral values, and exposure to inclusive religious teachings or interfaith initiatives may play a more significant role in shaping attitudes towards messaging without violence, regardless of the hierarchical nature of the religious institution.

> *Hypothesis 10: Given local religious leaders have **not** called for violence, approval of messaging that is not violent against religious outgroups will be unaffected as religious institutions become denser.*

Lastly, we propose that the approval of messaging without violence directed at religious outgroups remains unaffected as religious institutions become denser. We suggest that the

density of religious institutions does not impact attitudes towards messaging without violence because individuals' attitudes towards these approaches to addressing conflicts involving religious outgroups do not undergo significant changes in higher organizational dense environments.

Methods

We fielded a novel survey experiment, through Cint's survey platform, in the world's most religiously polarized nation, India.[23] We fielded our survey between January and June 2023. We target three regions within India (Haryana, Kerala, and Nagaland)[24] ensuring regional variations based on religious composition. We collected data on 965 high-quality respondents.[25] The median survey time was 13 minutes.

The study was approved by an institutional review board (IRB) and all subjects provided written and informed consent. India's high levels of existing violence allow us to utilize existent levels of outgroup animosity without introducing novel stimuli or reintroducing past traumatizing stimuli and thus satisfy IRB requirements. Furthermore, we carefully constructed all of our measures and interventions so as to never prime or in any way encourage violence or outgroup animosity. Our measures and questions were specifically designed to abide by the highest ethical standards. We avoided providing any negative stereotypical information, did not

[23] Because of concerns over Cint's (Lucid's) respondent pool we include multiple attention check questions (Aronow et al. 2020). We include a cut question that filters out respondents who fail the attention check question. We use attention check questions from (Aronow et al. 2020). In addition, we eliminate speeders from our sample.
[24] Regions were selected based on religious demographics from the most recent publicly available Indian census. See appendix for 1 table of the demographics.
[25] High quality respondents are those who passed three attention checks, completed the survey in less than 4 minutes, provided complete answers, and completed the survey in more than 40 minutes.

ask directly about participation in or approval of violence.[26] Rather, we indirectly measured our dependent variable through respondents' self-reports of their religious leadership's messaging.

Figure 18: Religious Hierarchy



How hierarchical is the religious institution you attend? How centralized is authority over religious matters in your faith?

(1) Extremely Centralized
(2) Moderately Centralized
(3) Slightly Centralized
(4) Slightly Decentralized
(5) Moderately Decentralized
(6) Extremely Decentralized

Our initial analysis examines how outgroup affect is influenced by religious hierarchy, religious institutional density, religiosity, and religious leaders' messaging towards outgroups. Our dependent variable, outgroup affects, is operationalized using thermometer ratings for religious outgroups. Respondents provided ratings for all major religious groups in India. We

[26] A consequence of our attention to ethical issues was that a religious identity prime we intended to function as a treatment yielded no significant effects. We primed respondents by having them confirm their religious identity before answering questions about their faith, thus increasing the salience of religious identity. Unfortunately, this minimal treatment did not yielded any reportable effects.

coded all groups each respondent did not report belonging to as an outgroup and treated each rating as an observation, yielding an N of 1924 for our thermometer model.

We operationalize religious hierarchy through a self-reported measure shown in Figure 18 (distribution shown in Figure 19). Respondent's subjective assessments of organizational hierarchy are ideal given that our theory depends on subjective perceptions of authority. We operationalize organizational density through the number of institutions respondents report in their local area, shown in Figure 20. Religiosity is operationalized through the standard three-question battery, worship attendance, and importance of faith shown in Figure 21 (distribution shown in Figure 22). We also control for respondent gender.

Figure 19: Religious Institutional Density



How many houses of worship of your faith are there in your local area?

(1) More than 5
(2) 5
(3) 4
(4) 3
(5) 2
(6) 1

Figure 20: Religiosity Battery



Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? (1) Never (2) Seldom (3) A few times a month (4) Once a week (5) A few times a week (6) Once a day	How important is religion in your life? (1) Extremely important (2) Very important (3) Moderately important (4) Slightly important (5) Not at all important	Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray? (1) Never (2) Seldom (3) A few times a month (4) Once a week (5) A few times a week (6) Once a day (7) Several times a day

Note: Questions are scaled for modeling, Alpha > .8

In the second part of our analysis, our key dependent variable is a respondent's self-reported approval or disapproval of pro or anti-violence messaging from their religious leaders. Figure 21 shows the questions used to construct our measures. We first ask respondents whether their religious leaders call for violence against outgroups. Then, we ask for their level of approval for their leader's messaging. This two-question construction is intended to avoid priming violence against outgroups among any respondents not reporting calls for violence from

their leaders while still giving us the ability to measure said calls. Finally, we subset our sample into those who report their local religious leaders calling for violence and those who do not. The subset allows us to examine those whose religious leaders have called for violence separately from those who have not.

Figure 21: Key Dependent Variables



Part 1: Have your Local religious leaders called for violence against other religious groups?

(1) Yes
(0) No



Part 2: Do you agree with your Local religious leaders overall messaging about other religious groups?

(1) Strongly disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Somewhat disagree
(4) Somewhat agree
(5) Agree
(6) Strongly agree

Measures of religious leaders' attitudes and the subset are necessary because our theory only holds if the organizational structures of religious identity are being used to encourage rather than discourage violence. Subjective perceptions of a religious leader's attitude are an excellent measure of how religious institutions are affecting intergroup relations. With measures of violent messaging approval, religious organization density, hierarchical structure, and religious leaders' stances on the use of violence, we employ linear probability models to show that religious organizational density and the opinions of religious leaders are associated with outgroup willingness to endorse violence.

Results

Out-group animosity

In Table 7 we analysis of the factors influencing individuals' attitudes towards various social or religious groups, as indicated by their thermometer ratings of outgroups. First, we examine hypothesis one examining how respondents who endorse the messaging put forth by their local religious leaders regarding other religious outgroups will experience a reduction in their affective responses towards those outgroups. We find that local religious leaders' messaging demonstrates a statistically significant negative relationship with thermometer outgroup ratings. With a one-unit increase in agreement with local religious leaders, the predicted thermometer rating of outgroups decreases by 0.98 points. This suggests that individuals who align more closely with the messaging of their local religious leaders might exhibit less favorable attitudes towards various out-groups and, that certain leaders might promote exclusivity or intolerance in their messaging.

Next, we test the second hypothesis finding that perceived leader hierarchy exhibits a statistically significant positive association with thermometer outgroup ratings. For every one-unit increase in perceived leader hierarchy, the predicted thermometer rating increases by 1.25

points. This indicates that religious adherents who perceive their religious organizations as being more hierarchical tend to exhibit more favorable attitudes toward outgroups. This finding aligns with social identity theory if the local leaders are promoting messaging without violence. For instance, leaders who emphasize unity and tolerance among different religious groups could lead to followers having more positive attitudes towards outgroups.

Subsequently, we examine hypothesis three and find no significant relationship. Interestingly we find that the religiosity aggregate does not exhibit a statistically significant association with thermometer outgroup ratings. This implies that individuals' overall religiosity seems not to strongly influence their attitudes towards different religious outgroups. Simply put, as someone becomes more religious it does not necessarily result in increased hatred of other perceived outgroups.

Lastly, when examining hypothesis four, agreement with local religious leaders' messaging demonstrates a statistically significant negative relationship with thermometer outgroup ratings. For every one-unit increase in agreement, the predicted thermometer rating decreases by 0.98 points. This suggests that individuals who align more closely with the messaging put forth by their local religious leaders exhibit less favorable affect towards outgroups. This counterintuitive finding is likely an indication of certain leaders who might promote intolerance in their messaging influencing the full sample. We explore this possibility in the next section examining the same hypotheses on leaders who have called for violence and those who did not separately.

Religious institutional density on the other hand does not show a statistically significant association with thermometer outgroup ratings. This suggests that the density of religious

institutions reported by individuals in their local area might not have a strong impact on their attitudes toward different groups. The reported number of intuitions is likely to be an imperfect measure for trying to understand how much organizational capacity a religious group has in a given area. We also discern that gender plays a significant role in affecting how individuals feel about outgroups. The negative coefficient of -3.83 indicates that males tend to have lower thermometer ratings of outgroups than females. In otherwards, we find that women exhibit more favorable attitudes towards outgroups. This may be due to the socialization processes women are subjected to, where they may be encouraged to develop more empathetic and inclusive perspectives towards different groups. Overall, Table 1 offers nuanced insights into the factors influencing individuals' attitudes toward religious outgroups. Perceived leader hierarchy and gender emerge as significant factors, while other variables, such as religiosity aggregate and agreement with local religious leaders do not.

Table 7: Outgroup Thermometer

	Model 1: ***Outgroup Thermometer***
Predictors	*Estimates*
(Intercept)	66.14 *** (60.90 – 71.39)
Levels of Perceived Leader Hierarchy	1.25 ** (0.40 – 2.11)
Religious Institutional Density	0.14 (-0.79 – 1.06)
Gender (Male)	-3.83 ** (-6.25 – -1.41)
Religiosity Aggregate	-1.46 (-3.24 – 0.31)
Agreement with Local Religious Leaders	-0.98 * (-1.79 – -0.16)
Local Leaders Call for Violence	-2.42 (-5.32 – 0.48)
Observations	1924
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.013 / 0.010

AIC	18010.66
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001	

Figure 22: Out Group Thermometer Marginal Effects Plot on Key Variables



For Violence Approval

First, test hypothesis one by examining the effect respondent religiosity has on an individual's propensity to agree with pro-violent messaging from their religious leaders. Our results, shown in Table 8, are inconsistent with hypothesis five. We find that overall religiosity does **not** have a systematic effect on individuals' agreement with their local religious leaders' messaging about other religious groups. It is possible that our findings indicate that the overall degree of religious attendance, beliefs, and practices may not systematically affect individuals' likelihood of agreement with pro-violence messaging. However, our model is close to significance so it is possible that with a larger N, our findings may differ. Further study is

required to test hypothesis five more conclusively. The model outputs are shown in Table 8 and Figure 23.

Table 8: Leader Message and Calls for Violence

	Model 2: ***Calls for Violence***	**Model 3:** ***No Calls for Violence***
Predictors	*Estimates*	*Estimates*
(Intercept)	2.32 *** (1.45 – 3.19)	2.43 *** (2.00 – 2.86)
Levels of Perceived Leader Hierarchy	0.43 *** (0.34 – 0.53)	0.15 *** (0.06 – 0.23)
Religious Institutional Density	0.21 * (0.04 – 0.39)	0.05 (-0.02 – 0.13)
Gender (Male)	-0.84 *** (-1.27 – -0.41)	0.34 ** (0.13 – 0.54)
Religiosity Aggregate	0.23 (-0.08 – 0.53)	0.28 *** (0.13 – 0.44)
Observations	238	727
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.309 / 0.297	0.056 / 0.050
AIC	871.731	2524.208
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001		

Second, we test hypothesis six by examining whether the institutional hierarchy of religious organizations predicts higher levels of approval for violent messaging. We find consistent with our expectations that the reported hierarchical structure of the religious institution attended by respondents plays a significant role. When adherents report their religious institutions are hierarchical these individuals are more likely to agree with the messaging put forth by their local religious leaders regarding other religious groups. This suggests that the perceived level of hierarchy within religious institutions influences the extent to which individuals align with the perspectives communicated by their leaders.

Third, we test hypothesis seven by examining whether the density of religious institutions predicts higher levels of approval for violent messaging. Unlike in model 1, we find that the number of houses of worship of individuals' faith in their local area also impacts their agreement

with their local religious leaders' messaging given that the leader has called for violence. Model output is shown in Table 8. This suggests that as the presence of religious spaces in the community increases it likely contributes to a sense of unity and may reinforce religious beliefs.

Furthermore, gender emerges as a differentiating factor in individuals' agreement, model output shown in Table 8. The analysis reveals that males, on average, show lower agreement with their local religious leaders' messaging on pro-violence about other religious groups compared to females. The gender difference suggests there may be variations in how individuals of different genders perceive and align with the messaging provided by their religious leaders. For example, women tend to be more compliant with leaders who espouse a proviolence message than men.

When separating our sample between those whose local religious leaders have called for violence and those whose have not, the regression analysis provides valuable insights into the factors that influence individuals' agreement with their local religious leaders' messaging about other religious groups. Specifically, this separation underscores the significance of the hierarchical structure of religious institutions, the density of religious spaces in the local area, and gender in shaping individuals' perspectives and alignment with their leaders' messaging.

Figure 23: Agreement with Religious Leader who Called for Violence and Religious Leader who did NOT call for Violence



For Approval of Messaging Without Violence

Next, we test the sample of respondents whose local religious leaders did not call for violence. In model three, we first test hypothesis eight by examining the effect respondent religiosity has on an individual's propensity to agree with messaging without violence from their religious leaders. Our results are again inconsistent with expectations. Albeit in the opposite direction. We find that overall religiosity does have a systematic effect on individuals' agreement with their local religious leaders' messaging without violence about other religious groups. We believe this may be because commitment to religious practices and belief can enhance endorsement of messaging without violence from local faith leaders.

Second, we test hypothesis nine by examining whether the institutional hierarchy of religious organizations predicts higher levels of approval for messaging without violence. We find inconsistent with our expectations that approval of nonviolent messaging will be unaffected. The level of hierarchy of a religious institution individuals attend is significant in approval for non-violence. When a religious institution is more hierarchical, with greater centralized authority over religious matters, individuals show a higher level of agreement with their local religious leaders' messaging about other religious groups. These findings highlight the important role that local religious leaders can play in more hierarchical religious settings.

Third, we test hypothesis ten by examining whether the density of religious institutions predicts higher levels of approval for messaging without violence. This time, we find results consistent with our expectations: that approval of nonviolent messaging will be unaffected. The number of houses of worship of individuals' faith in their local area does not have a statistically significant impact on individuals' agreement with their local religious leaders' messaging. This means that the presence of more or fewer houses of worship in the community does not strongly influence individuals' alignment with their religious leaders' messaging about other religious groups.

In conclusion, our results highlight the importance of examining the internal dynamics of religious institutions (specifically hierarchy) and individual religiosity when trying to better understand an individual's approval for messaging without violence.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our findings contribute to the understanding of how the details of religious organizations shape individual attitudes towards outgroups and their propensity towards violence. We present three main findings. First, the hierarchical structure of religious institutions is a significant factor influencing both outgroup animosity and approval of outgroup violence. More hierarchical

institutions produce more outgroup animosity and increase the likelihood of respondents agreeing with messages promoting outgroup violence. This finding suggests that religious institutions play a key role in promoting or defusing outgroup violence.

Second, the role of the density of religious institutions was only a significant predictor when examining agreement with violent messaging from one's religious leader. Signifying that the organizational capacity of religious institutions functions towards violent goals only when its leaders are calling for such. However, our measure of organizational capacity is limited at best. We rely on a self-report of the number of institutions near a respondent. It is possible that an objective measure of institutional density will show significant effects. We believe further research is needed to explore factors, like size and type of the house of worship, that may moderate the relationship between density and agreement with leader messaging.

Third, and perhaps the most interesting of our findings, are the effects of religiosity on outgroup animosity and approval of leader messaging. We find that religiosity is not a significant predictor of out-group religious animosity when considering religious hierarchy and density. Nor is it a significant predictor of agreement with leaders when they do promote violent messaging. However, religiosity is a significant predictor of agreement with leaders when they do not promote violence. Therefore, our findings have a very clear implication: violence is promoted by religious institutions, not highly religious individuals and such individuals are only susceptible to increased violence in so far as they are attached to religious institutions.

Taken together, the implication of our research is clear: characteristics of religious organizations like hierarchy and religious density matter, not the level of religious commitment. Our findings indicate that the organization and the leader's messaging matter a great deal when considering how religious adherents view outgroups. In India, our data suggests that when

religious leaders preach or support violence, they are contributing to the country's high levels of local violence. However, it is also clear that most of our respondents reported that their religious leaders did not preach pro-violence messaging and that these religious leaders may be reducing incidents of violence. Overall, religious organizations and their leaders need to recognize the mantle of responsibility they hold as they can shape affect towards outgroups. In extreme cases, this can result in violence towards these outgroups. Knowing this, we believe religious leaders should try to promote more peace and inclusive messaging towards outgroups in hopes of reducing conflict.

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