

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

**Effects of Neighborhood Diversity on  
Civic Engagement and Social Trust**

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements  
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

by

William Estuardo Rosales

2017

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Effects of Neighborhood Diversity on  
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by

William Estuardo Rosales

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

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Professor Roger Waldinger, Co-Chair

Professor Robert Denis Mare, Co-Chair

How democratic nation-states deal with racial and nativity diversity is critical in understanding membership in a world where immigration is salient and populations are becoming more heterogeneous. Although the extant literature provides some evidence that diversity is linked to decreased civic engagement and social trust, far less research investigates the effects of ethnoracial and nativity diversity simultaneously and within a multi-racial and multi-ethnic context. Data from the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey are used in this study to examine the simultaneous effects of ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity in Los Angeles, California. The analyses examine the effects of neighborhood diversity on civic engagement and trust, and further unpacks the individual-and neighborhood-level factors that are associated with social cohesion. The results offer some support that within contexts such as Los

Angeles, nativity diversity, and not racial diversity, is important to examine and should be taken seriously in future research. Results here also provide further evidence that neighborhood economic disadvantage, as well as individual-level residential mobility and friendship social ties, are critically important factors in predicting civic engagement and trust.

The dissertation of William Estuardo Rosales is approved.

Jennie Elizabeth Brand

Jamie Goodwin-White

Roger Waldinger, Committee Co-Chair

Robert Denis Mare, Committee Co-Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2017

For my mother, Gloria De La Paz Tijerina  
Dedicatoria para mi madre, Gloria De La Paz Tijerina  
*Sus sacrificios no fueron en vano*  
*Gracias mommy*

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## Vita

### *Education*

Ph.D. in Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, *Expected* 2017

C. Phil. in Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, 2014

M.A. in Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, 2010

J.D. University of Wisconsin, 2005

M.S. in Public Policy, University of Rochester, 1998

B.A. in Political Science, University of Rochester, 1997

### *Academic Appointments*

Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology  
California State University, Los Angeles, 2016-Present

Adjunct Lecturer, Department of Sociology  
California State University, Los Angeles, 2014-2016

Clinical Faculty, University of Wisconsin Law School, 2008-2010

### *Publications*

Dethroning Economic Kings: The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 and its Modern Awakening, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1497, reprinted at JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & FOOD INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: VOL. 3: NO. 2, ARTICLE 4. (NOTE: American Bar Association Student Writing Competition Winner)

Sentence Adjustment Petitions: An Update, THE WISCONSIN DEFENDER, Winter/Spring 2007, available at <http://cdm16119.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p267601coll4/id/2430> (last visited June 2015).

### *Conference Presentations*

“Civic Fitness: The Effects of Legal Status in Shaping Neighborhood Civic Outcomes and Trust Among Neighbors” 2017 International Meeting on Law and Society in Mexico City, MX, Paper Presentation

Citizenship's Silences: The Violence and Racialized Denial by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services" 2017 International Meeting on Law and Society in Mexico City, MX, Paper Presentation w/ co-author Dr. Katie Dingeman-Cerda

"Re-Examining Social Cohesion in a Multiracial and Multiethnic Context" 2017 LGBTQ Scholars of Color National Conference in New York City, NY, Paper Presentation

"The Strength of Neighborhood Social Ties on Civic Engagement" 2016 Population of Association of America Annual Conference, Washington, DC, Poster Presentation

"*Unequal Diversity?*: Neighborhood Ethnoracial and Nativity Diversity and their Effects on Civic Engagement and Social Trust" 2016 Pacific Sociological Association Annual Conference, Oakland, CA, Presenter

"Immigration-Induced Racial/Ethnic, Nativity, and Nationality Diversity And its Effects on Civil Society" 2015 Pacific Sociology Association Annual Conference, Long Beach, CA, April 2015, Presenter

"Federal Immigration Enforcement, Immigration-induced Diversity, and Civil Society" 2014 Law and Society Annual Conference, Minneapolis, MN, May 2014, Presenter

"Timing and Correlates of Sexual Identity and Sexual Behavior Disclosure" 2012 Population Association of America Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, May 2012, Poster Presenter

"Neighborhood Norms and the Social Integration of Mexican and Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles" 2012 Population Association of America Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, May 2012, Tentative Poster Presenter

"The Civic Engagement of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles: Findings from the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave I," 2011 Population Association of America Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, March 31-April 3, 2011, Presenter

"Negotiating Legal Boundaries," University of California-Santa Barbara, May 14-16, 2009, Presenter

"Engaging in What?: Examining Variations in Levels of Immigrant Civic Engagement in Los Angeles," University of California-Irvine, May 9, 2009, Presenter

## **Introduction**

The growing immigrant-driven racial and ethnic diversity of industrialized developed nations is not without challenges. Global cities like Los Angeles, California represent the future of metropolitan areas with a heterogeneous population by race/ethnicity, legal status, nationality, language, and culture. Some observers are optimistic in the ability of the United States to integrate its diverse population. For example, Schlesinger (1991) argues that the genius of America lies in its historic ability to fold immigrants from distant parts of the globe into its community. Historically, according to Schlesinger, United States' trajectory is a movement from exclusion to inclusion, building a stronger, more diverse nation via the incorporation of immigrants (Schlesinger 1991).

The recent empirical literature on the effects of immigration-induced diversity finds that civil society is challenged by diversity. A consistent finding in the literature is that increasing population diversity by race/ethnicity, nativity, nationality, and socioeconomic status decreases various outcomes of social importance to a democratic nation-state—mainly the social bonds and cohesion existing in the population. The findings regarding the negative effects of diversity range from decreased public good expenditures inversely related to an area's ethnic fragmentation (Alesina et al. 1999; Harris et al. 2001; Vigdor 2001), low rates of group participation in areas characterized by ethnic, racial and income fragmentation (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003), and low levels of trust in areas with racial and nationality fragmentation (Glaeser et al. 2000). In fact, empirical findings from both the United States and Europe have led some researchers to label this finding regarding the—negative effects of heterogeneity—as an “empirical regularity” (Costa and Kahn 2003).

The research on the effects of population diversity is limited in a number of specific ways. First, although the research on diversity is largely examined at large aggregate geographic areas (e.g., countries, states, counties), more studies need to examine the effects of diversity at the neighborhood level, which captures the lived social interaction reality of individuals (for exceptions see Lancee and Dronkers 2011; Stoll et al. 2008). Neighborhoods, as a unit of contextual analysis, are arguably critical in understanding the effects of diversity because they capture the “racial and socio-economic realities that individuals face on a day-to-day basis” (Stolle et al. 2008). Second, although studies consistently document the effects of diversity on social cohesion and social bonds, less is known about the *types* of environments that respond to population diversity. Third, the existing research provides evidence of the association between diversity and various social outcomes, but does not fully explore the multiple mechanisms that might explain these associations.

This dissertation addresses some of the limitations of the existing literature and specifically examines the structural and individual factors that account for patterns in civic engagement and trust. Specifically, I examine the effects of ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity on civic engagement and social trust. I focus on neighborhood diversity by race/ethnicity and nativity because they represent two salient dimensions of potential social distance caused by immigration. Civic engagement conceptually captures the involvement by individuals in communal activities that have some purpose or benefit beyond a single individual or family's self-interest (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). Neighborhood trust conceptually captures faith in others and is measured in this study by the trust individuals have for their neighbors. Trust and civic engagement capture the values and behaviors that are necessary for a

healthy democracy and community (Putnam 2000, 2007; Verba and Nie 1987; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

This dissertation project contributes to the study of civic engagement, social trust, and immigrant incorporation. The simultaneous examination of diversity within a multi-racial and multi-ethnic context is a contribution to the literature because it demonstrates that ethnoracial heterogeneity is unlikely to predict civic engagement and trust in all contexts and that nativity diversity is a key factor to examine. This study uniquely contributes to the growing literature that examines the effects of diversity at the neighborhood level. Lastly, this work contributes to the immigrant incorporation literature by examining how diverse social contexts affect civic integration and social trust by nativity status.

**CHAPTER 1: THE EFFECTS OF NEIGHBORHOOD DIVERSITY ON CIVIC  
ENGAGEMENT: A MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND  
INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN A MULTIRACIAL AND  
MULTIETHNIC CONTEXT**

## Introduction

Civic engagement and the effects of neighborhood diversity on civil society have important implications for understanding ethnoracial relations, the incorporation of immigrants, and the state of democracy in the United States. The election of Donald Trump, a candidate who openly espoused anti-immigrant and anti-black views, and the post-election wave of protests and hate crimes raise concern as to the persistence of ethnoracial conflict (Frej and Murdock 2016; Yan, Sgueglia, and Walker 2016). The impact of the election of 2016 will be discussed and researched for years to come, though some mainstream sources have argued that immigration—in rhetoric and demographics—played a central role. Specifically, commentators have argued that areas with increasing racial and immigrant diversity were more likely to support Donald Trump (Adamy and Overberg 2016). Previous work in this area suggests at least some connection between racial and ethnic population and political and policy outcomes on immigration. (Huntington 2008; *but see* Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2013; Rodriguez 2008).

Beyond the political sphere, *understanding* the possible effects of diversity in the civic sphere is vital to understanding the state of ethnoracial relations and immigrant integration. In this study, engagement in the civic sphere covers a range of behavior from broad-based activism to organizational membership. Specifically, civic engagement here is differentiated between *socially-oriented participation*, such as volunteering in a neighborhood organization and attending a parent-teacher association meeting, and participation in more *professionally-oriented activities*, such as attending a business group meeting or a state political organizational meeting. In this sense, civic engagement is distinct from other forms of activities and institutional participation that encompass activities with state, family and market actors (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). Civic engagement is vital to the functioning of modern nation-states as



activities such as organizational participation develop society members' capacity for the collective action in civic and political settings that is necessary for democratic societies (Fung 2003; Putnam 2000; Tocqueville ([1835] 2003; Verba and Nie 1987; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Two central developments further contextualize the need to examine engagement in the civic sphere. One, engagement in civil society, has been decreasing, which is a concern for the vitality and health of democracy of the United States (Putnam 2000, 2007; *but see* Sampson et al. 2005). Second, contemporary migration streams introduced “a new diversity,” whereas, unlike previous waves of migration flows from Europe, migration flows since the 1960s have been predominantly from Latin American and Asian countries (Kessler and Bloemraad 2010). As a consequence, American society is increasingly diverse, and this diversity is not homogeneously varied across the country, with urban areas being more diverse than rural areas (Stepler and Lopez 2016; Uslaner 2012).

Related to these two developments are substantial, yet mixed, empirical correlational findings demonstrating that population diversity by race, ethnicity and nativity is associated with decreasing levels of social cohesion as measured by civic engagement activity and attitudes on social trust (Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Glaeser et al. 2000; Kessler and Bloemraad 2010; Putnam 2007; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006; Vigdor 2001). Whether immigration undermines social cohesion is not just relevant to the United States; all immigrant-receiving societies confront a similar phenomenon. The negative association between population diversity and social cohesion has been demonstrated in the Netherlands (Lancee and Drokers 2010), Australia (Leigh 2006), and the United Kingdom (Letki 2008). These critical developments in the United

States and globally highlight the need to examine the effects of ethnoracial and nativity diversity on civil society.

The United States is more racially and ethnically diverse now than it has ever been due, in large part, to diversity induced by immigration (Cohn 2015; Pew Research Center 2015). The immigrant population in the United States has grown tremendously from approximately 24 million people in 1995 to 37 million a decade later (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). For some ethnic groups, the increase in terms of population growth has been particularly significant. Due in part to immigration, and in part to high birthrates, Latina/os accounted for 40 percent of the country's population growth from 1980 to 2000, while the number of Asian Americans grew to approximately 20 million by 2000 (Stoll and Wong 2007). These demographic changes and increases in the foreign-born population are not evenly distributed across the United States. In some regions, such as the West and Southwest, immigration has profoundly altered the racial and ethnic make-up (Logan and Zhang 2010; Stepler and Lopez 2016; Stoll and Wong 2007).

The changing demographic make-up and the *perception* of the impact of those changes challenges ethnoracial relations between dominant and marginalized racial and nativity groups. Immigration and the perceived threat to the identity of the nation state (Soysal 1994), as well as the consequences immigrants have on economic competition and on the cultural identity of the nation state, further elevate the importance of ethnoracial relations (Huntington 2004; Zolberg and Woon 1999). Drawing from immigration and birth rate data, Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, in 2004, argued that Latina/os, especially Mexican and Mexican-Americans, were the biggest threat to the identity of America (Huntington 2004). Recently, during the 2016 presidential campaign, President Donald Trump advanced nativist and racist rhetoric against immigrants and Muslims that garnered enough support to catapult him to the White House. After

being elected, Donald Trump advanced and signed a string of executive orders such as a policy to build a wall along the southern border and a ban on people from seven majority-Muslim countries coming into the United States, fulfilling his campaign promises to “make America great again” (Exec. Order No. 13,767; Exec. Order No. 13,769).

The state of ethnoracial relations is important to monitor as it is related to the adoption of public policies that affect the relative standings of racial and native groups (Omi and Winant 2014). Public debates in how to deal with “immigrants” have centered on varied policy proposals deploying xenophobic and exclusionary tactics. Policy measures have varied from “anti-Latino” ballot measures in California to “[c]harges of police brutality in the Latino community, English-only workplace policies, school segregation, [and] the roundup of undocumented immigrants” (Barreto 2007:427). The debates and policy decisions undertaken by some state and local governments have been met by massive protest, such as the high turnout for protests in Dallas, Texas, where immigrants and their allies carried banners such as “Latinos unidos jamas seran vencidos,<sup>1</sup>” (Zlolniski 2008:352-353) to recent youth activism led by immigrant youth known as Dreamers (Gonzalez 2008). These events highlight the social conflict between dominant and marginalized ethnoracial and immigrant groups and challenge the notion that the history of the United States is one of incorporating racially and culturally distinct groups (Schlesinger 1991).

Given the extant literature finding that greater diversity is correlated with decreased social cohesion, more work needs to analytically examine the individual-level factors, such as racial and ethnic background and legal status as well as neighborhood structural circumstances, to truly advance claims regarding the effects of diversity. For example, Abascal and Baldassari (2015) replicated Putnam’s (2007) influential study and found that racial diversity *per se* does

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<sup>1</sup> Translation: Latinos united will never be defeated.

not negatively affect social cohesion. Rather, factors such as residential stability, race and ethnic composition, and economic inequality produce that effect. Additionally, the authors argue that racial and ethnic differences exist, finding that it is *Whites* who are negatively affected by racial diversity. Abascal and Baldassari's (2015) work is limited to the extent that the authors examine only social trust. Further, *racial diversity* captures the *racialization* of immigrants and how this might create group differences, but neglects diversity that captures more precisely the differences that might be created due to immigration: cultural. *Nativity diversity*, however, captures *cultural differences* that might arise between native and foreign-born groups.

The reasons ethnoracial diversity might lead to diminished social cohesion should be considered apart and in combination from nativity diversity. Ethnoracial diversity might lead to less cohesion given the history of race relations in the United States and the persistence of racial discrimination (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2013; Omi and Winant 2014). Nativity diversity implicates a distinct set of mechanisms that potentially affects engagement in civil society. Cultural similarity or lack thereof serves as an alternative rationale as to why nativity diversity is associated with engagement in civil society. Additionally, engagement in civil society is also based on the logic of participation as members: born and raised with an understanding of what it means to be a member and participate in America's political, civic, and social life. This assumption, however, ignores the social logic of participating in American civil society for immigrants and, importantly, neglects the consequences and implications of living with a tenuous or non-existent legal status (Alexander 2001).

Lastly, the structural circumstances of individuals' lived realities and time must be accounted for. Neighborhood structural conditions, such as racial composition and poverty, as well as individual-level neighborhood social ties, should be accounted for in the study of

diversity and civic engagement. Although some studies explore in-group friendship ties as moderating the effects of diversity (Phan 2008), few have looked at whether having social ties *within* the same neighborhood social context matters. Further, most studies on the effects of diversity focus only on one time period. As Putnam argued without supporting evidence, the effects of immigration-related diversity might be a short-term phenomenon (Putnam 2009). This study is able to uniquely address the question of whether diversity matters over time by examining two time periods in the same social context.

Civic engagement and the neighborhood mechanisms that drive the rate of engagement despite, or in light of, diversity must be fully explored. This study has three main research goals. First, I ask whether civic engagement is associated with ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity. Given the multi-racial/multi-ethnic social context of Los Angeles, will a positive association persist between engagement in civil society and population diversity once individual- and neighborhood-level demographic traits are accounted for? Second, the vast literature on social trust suggests racial and ethnic group differences in civic engagement. Once individual-level demographic and economic traits as well as neighborhood-level structural factors are accounted for, will racial/ethnic differences persist? Third, I ask broadly how social ties—friendship and kin social ties—are associated with engagement in civil society.

## **Background**

The empirical literature on the effects of immigration-induced diversity presumably demonstrates that civil society is challenged by diversity. Methodologically, most of the studies make use of the Herfindahl index<sup>2</sup>, which reflects the probability that two randomly selected

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<sup>2</sup> The literature also refers to Herfindahl index as fragmentation, fractionalization, or diversity index. All of these measures are all conceptually equivalent.

individuals from the population belong to different groups (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Putnam 2007). The findings regarding the negative effects of diversity range from decreased public good expenditures being inversely related to an area's ethnic fragmentation (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Harris, Evan, and Schwab 2001; Vigdor 2001), low rates of group participation in areas characterized by ethnic, racial and income fragmentation (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003), and low levels of trust in areas with racial and nationality fragmentation (Glaeser et al. 2000). In fact, empirical findings from both the United States and Europe have led some researchers to label this finding regarding—the negative effects of heterogeneity—as an “empirical regularity” (Costa and Kahn 2003: 108).

In the context of the United States, scholars have demonstrated that diversity, or heterogeneous community, as measured by race, nationality, and income have negative effects on social cohesion. For example, Costa and Kahn examined four major data sets, the General Social Survey (GSS), the Current Population Survey (CPS), the DDB Lifestyle Survey (DDB), and the American National Election Survey (ANES) between 1974 and 1998. Multivariate analyses of the effects of community heterogeneity show that diversity is associated with declines in the propensity to engage in civil society. Specifically, community heterogeneity—measured in terms of race/ethnicity, birthplace/nationality, and income—affects and depresses engagement in society as measured by volunteerism, membership, and social trust (Costa and Kahn 2003).

The findings from the above-cited works are correlational at best and lack a strong theoretical foundation as to why this relationship exists. Implicit in these studies is that diversity of any kind is the source of the declines in social cohesion and do not specify the distinct pathways *different* types of diversity take in affecting social cohesion. Ethnoracial diversity

might lead to less cohesion given the history of race relations in the United States and the persistence of racial discrimination (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2013; Omi and Winant 2014). The pathway as to why ethnoracial diversity might lead to diminished social cohesion should be considered apart and in combination from nativity diversity.

Some scholars have argued that nativity diversity induced by persistent immigration in the United States leads to fragmented communities due either to economic competition and or cultural differences between native and foreign-born individuals (Huntington 2004). Others argue that immigration-induced nativity diversity does not necessarily lead to diminished civic engagement. Kessler and Bloemraad (2010) argue that, although nativity diversity had a slight negative effect only in some advanced countries, there was “nothing inevitable about decline collective-mindedness in the face of increasing diversity...[demonstrating]...that countries with an institutional or policy context promoting economic equality and recognition and accommodation of immigrant minorities experience less dramatic or no declines in collective-mindedness” (320). In effect, depending on institutional or policy context, the effects of diversity are not a given.

Given the racial and nativity diversity that characterizes the demography of Los Angeles, this chapter examines both the *independent* and *simultaneous* effect of ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity on civic engagement. Although the research on diversity is largely examined in large aggregate geographic areas (e.g., countries, states, counties), neighborhoods are arguably more critical in understanding the effects of diversity because they capture the racial realities that individuals face on a daily basis (Lancee and Dronkers 2011; Stolle, Soroko, and Johnston 2008).

*Theories of Group Relations and Dynamics*

There are competing hypotheses that predict how groups from different racial and cultural backgrounds interact within society when facing increasing population heterogeneity. The two most prominent hypotheses are the contact and conflict hypotheses. Alternatively, Putnam (2007) advanced the constrictive or “hunkering down” hypothesis to explain the association between diversity and civil society. The contact hypothesis suggests that contact with out-group members, such as someone of a race different from one’s own, leads to tolerance, trust, and engagement in civil society (Allport 1954). For contact hypothesis advocates, it is exposure to out-group members that leads to increased social trust and engagement in civil society. In contrast, the conflict/competition hypothesis suggests that increasing ethnic and racial heterogeneity is negatively associated with social trust and engagement in civil society because groups compete for the consumption of limited resources (Hooghe et al. 2008). However, the perceived threat or competition from groups does not necessarily have to result from competition over scarce resources. The resulting competition between two groups might be “status struggles between minority and majority groups” (Hooghe et al. 2008: 201; Paxton and Mughan 2006). Additionally, as Hooghe et al. argue, “[t]hreats arising from immigration are also often based on cultural identity and the perceived cultural distance between immigration groups and majority cultures” (Hooghe et al. 2008: 201; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Group competition and/or group threat resulting from increasing heterogeneity is assumed to lead to less social trust and engagement in civil society.

The constrictive or “hunkering down” hypothesis, alternatively, claims that increasing racial and ethnic heterogeneity leads people to look inward (“hunker down”) and further isolate themselves from their own communities (Putnam 2007; Portes and Vickstrom 2011). According to this hypothesis, community heterogeneity leads individuals to retreat from all forms of civic



and social activities as well as share a distrustful and pessimistic view of their neighbors and communities. In part, engaging and interacting with people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds imposes costs (Costa and Kahn 2003). These costs are due to the tendency of individuals to have strong preferences to interact and engage with individuals who are similar to them in terms of race, ethnic and or socioeconomic background (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Campbell 2006; Costa and Kahn 2003; Lin 2001). This social preference tendency (also referred to as the homophily preference or “like-me” preference) implies that individuals in diverse communities will be less likely to interact or have some shared understanding or sense of obligation that would encourage them to civically engage. Although not fully explored in the extant literature, there is some evidence that “hunkering down” behavior does not apply to all racial and ethnic groups (Abascal and Baldassari 2015).

The contact and conflict hypotheses seem to rely on interaction-driven social contact or exposure, and/or perceived social distance to explain the effect of diversity on civic engagement and social trust. Although the hunkering down hypothesis seems to suggest that all racial and ethnic groups “pull-in” like turtles when confronted by diversity, at least some research suggests this is applicable only to Whites (Abascal and Baldassari 2015). As argued above in moving beyond the White-Non-White context, it is critical that we examine the effects of diversity in varied context to attest to the salience of the competing theories advanced above.

### *Social Ties*

Although the contact and conflict hypotheses capture social interactions, social ties are deeper and more meaningful in the lives of individuals. Kin and friendship ties within neighborhoods might be a source of social support for residents. Additionally, neighborhood contexts might affect social ties. Specifically, Mario Smalls (2007) finds that neighborhood

poverty is significantly associated with residents having social ties. With regard to neighborhood diversity and the role that social ties potentially play, Phan (2008) finds that having more in-group (racially) friendship ties moderates the effects of city-level racial diversity. In effect, individuals who have friends of similar race moderate the negative effects of living in a racially diversity city. Unclear in Phan's examination is whether those friendship ties reside within the respondent's neighborhood. This might or might not matter. Social ties within neighborhoods, however, have been shown to lessen the negative impact of diversity. Specifically, Stolle and his co-authors find that respondents with social ties in their neighborhood are less affected by their neighborhood's racial and ethnic fragmentation (Stolle et al. 2008).<sup>3</sup> This chapter looks at whether kin and friendship ties are important in understanding the relationship between diversity and civic engagement. Unique in this examination is that social ties here exist within the respondent's neighborhood, and, therefore, these ties are structurally confined to the neighborhood.

### *Neighborhood Context and Civic Engagement*

This study is uniquely situated to examine the effects of diversity in an ethnoracial and immigrant context. Los Angeles is ripe for examining how diversity affects civic engagement, as it is a vast urban setting diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, nativity, and legal status. Unlike other studies situated in settings that demographically involve a majority-White racial context, as evidenced in Figure 1-3, Los Angeles and its long history of migration pushes us to think about racial dynamics in a majority-minority city (Cohn 2015; Stepler and Lopez 2016). Figure 1-3 compares two different racial contexts. On the one hand, the average heterogeneous census

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<sup>3</sup> Phan (2008) and Stolle et al (2008) provide conflicting results as to the effect of neighborhood racial and ethnic diversity. Phan (2008) find no effect of racial diversity at the city, nor at the neighborhood level for social trust, while Stolle et al. (2008) find an effect of neighborhood

track<sup>4</sup> in the United States as evidenced by Abascal and Baldasarri's study (2015) is 58% White. On the other hand, the average heterogeneous census tract in Los Angeles is only 31% White, compared to 38% Latino. Where nationally the average homogenous tract is 84% White, in Los Angeles, the average homogeneous tract is 71% Latino/a. In effect, this study examines the effect of diversity in a majority-minority ethnoracial context; reflecting the future of metropolitan areas with a heterogeneous population (Stepler and Lopez 2016). Los Angeles is also 40% foreign-born, adding yet another form of diversity that complicates the nature and dynamism of ethnoracial relations (Cohn 2015).

INSERT FIGURE 1-3 HERE

Other than the multi-ethnic and multi-racial context of Los Angeles, structural circumstances are considered to further examine the factors that predict engagement. Neighborhood inequality, residential segregation, and residential turnover have been demonstrated to affect individuals' civic engagement (Huckfeldt 1979, 1980, 1983; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987).<sup>5</sup> Oliver demonstrates that net of individual-level characteristics, city median household income, is significantly and positively related to civic activities such as attending community board meeting or organizational meetings (Oliver 2001). Oliver also finds racial segregation affects civic participation such that living among one's co-ethnics is positively associated with certain civic activities, such as involvement in local organizations and voting

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<sup>4</sup> In Abascal and Baldasarri (2005), the median value to determine what qualifies as a homogeneous or heterogeneous neighborhood is 28% of the racial heterogeneity index. If the census tract is over 28%, then it's classified as a heterogeneous tract, below that value, a homogenous census tract. In this study, the median value for the ethnoracial heterogeneity index is 43.5% and the value is 47.8% for the nativity heterogeneity index.

<sup>5</sup> For example, Huckfeldt demonstrates that the socioeconomic status of the context, as measured by high levels of education in a neighborhood encourages participation for some and not others, specifically for higher status individuals. For Huckfeldt, the social status of a neighborhood was operationalized by levels of educations (over 12 years) and with individuals over 25 years old. For a higher social status neighborhood was one where individuals in the neighborhood were over 25 and had a high level of education. Giles and Dantico<sup>4</sup> (1982) also demonstrate using the 1972 American Election study also find that socioeconomic status of the neighborhood is significantly related to civic participation.

(Oliver 2001).<sup>6</sup> Residential stability might also positively affect civic participation because higher residential stability of a neighborhood makes it more likely that local ties and opportunities for social networking occur for that neighborhood's residents (Sampson and Graif 2009).<sup>7</sup> Regardless of individual length of residence in neighborhoods, Sampson finds that inhabitants of residentially stable neighborhoods are more likely to form friendships and civically engage when compared to individuals who live in neighborhoods with frequent residential turnover (Sampson 1988).

Neighborhood residential stability and racial and ethnic composition might be particularly salient for immigrants. Immigrants, to a large extent, live in states and metropolitan areas with higher concentrations of co-ethnics (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Ramakrishnan 2005). Additionally, neighborhood inequality affects the organizational opportunities for individuals to participate in civil society. Immigrants' participation in civic organizations might be hampered if they are concentrated in less affluent, resource-deprived neighborhoods. Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008), for example, have found that Mexicans, "who despite constituting the largest immigrant group, had a disproportionately lower number of organizations and [as a consequence] enjoyed considerably less political presence than their Vietnamese, Korean, Armenian, Indian, Chinese, and Filipino" (45).

#### *Individual-Level Factors and Civic Engagement*

Individual-level characteristics are also important factors for civic engagement. For example, research has repeatedly demonstrated that education is positively associated with

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<sup>6</sup> Using the Current Population Survey, Ramakrishnan's research at the county and metropolitan level, suggest that living in areas with high proportions of coethnics does lead to greater participation among first-generation immigrants (Ramakrishnan 2006).

<sup>7</sup> Sampson's study of 238 British localities demonstrates that residential stability is positively related to various outcomes such as the rates of visits to friends and relative in the community and participation in sporting events (Sampson 1988: 773). Further, Sampson finds that "long-term community stability engenders collective use of local facilities—despite SES, urbanization and auto use" (Sampson 1988: 773).

higher rates of civic and political participation (Ramakrishnan 2005; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Income also predicts civic participation, but to a modest extent compared to education (Ramakrishnan 2005; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). With regard to ethnic differences, some scholars have found a civic engagement gap between Latinos/as and other racial and ethnic groups, even after controlling for individual-level education and socioeconomic status (Lien 1994; Ramakrishnan 2005). For example, researchers have found that Latinos/as have a lower likelihood of civic skills, civic engagement, and recruitment into civic activities (DeSipio 1996; Geron and Michelson 2008; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Some have also argued that legal status explains some of the difference observed among Latinos/as. Specifically, DeSipio found that naturalized Latinos/as were less likely to register and vote than were U.S.-born Latino citizens (DeSipio 1996; Geron and Michelson 2008). Several scholars have also argued that age and life course factors are relevant in explaining associational participation (Putnam 1992; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006).

### **Research Questions**

This chapter address three main questions in light of the mixed evidence that the extant literature demonstrates on the effect of diversity on civic engagement. First, does ethnoracial neighborhood diversity affect individual-level civic engagement? Does this effect remain once neighborhood and individual level factors are accounted for and consistent over time? Second, does nativity diversity affect individual-level civic engagement? Does this affect remain once neighborhood and individual level factors are accounted and consistent over time? Third, do kin and friendship ties moderate the relationship between diversity and civic engagement? Related to these three main questions, I ask whether the effects of ethnoracial and nativity diversity differ

by the type of civic engagement. Specifically, I examined and operationalize two types of organizations respondents might engage in: socially oriented civic organizations (SOCO) and professionally oriented civic organizations (POCO).

### **Data and Methods**

The present study uses data from Wave One and Wave Two of the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (L.A. FANS) and models the mechanisms through which neighborhood diversity by ethnoracial and nativity correspond to patterns of civic engagement. I account for individual-level demographic characteristics—age, income, and education—and contextual factors—such as neighborhood inequality and residential stability—that explain and potentially mediate the association between neighborhood diversity and civic engagement. Neighborhoods in this study are operationalized by census tracts, which contain a population of approximately 4,000 individuals. Census tracts represent small geographic units, allowing one an opportunity to examine how individuals respond to diversity and more fully capture the social interactional context that people experience on a daily basis.

Wave One of the Los Angeles Neighborhood Family and Neighborhood Survey (L.A. FANS) is a longitudinal probability sample of individuals, families and neighborhoods in Los Angeles County. Wave 1 of the survey was fielded between April 2000 and January 2002. I primarily focus on the adult respondents and combine contextual data from the 1990 and 2000 census tract level data. A total of 65 census tracts were sampled and between 40 and 50 households were sampled within each census tract. L.A. FANS was designed to capture detailed information at the individual, family, and neighborhood level (Pebly and Sastry n.d.; Peterson 2003). These original 65 census tracts serve as the sampling units for L.A. FANS as defined by the 1990 census tract boundaries. L.A. FANS uses census tracts to define neighborhoods and

uses a multi-stage, clustered stratified sample where the 1,652 census tracts of Los Angeles were divided into very poor, poor, and non-poor strata based on 1990 census poverty rates (Peterson et al. 2003). An advantage of L.A. FANS is that it over-samples poor neighborhoods, making it useful for studying immigrants and their integration processes.

For Wave 1, within each household, L.A. FANS randomly sampled one adult for an interview, with a total of 2,623 adults in the sample, which is also known as the “Adult Sample” (Peterson et al. 2003). This study constructed a sample from the Adult Sample and excludes adult respondents not asked the civic engagement questions and excludes respondents who were missing on the civic engagement, weight, and legal status variables for a total of 202 respondents excluded. The total final sample for Wave 1 consists of 2,421 adult respondents.

For Wave 2 of the survey was fielded between August 2006 and December 2009. I primarily focus on the adult respondents and combine interpolated contextual data from 2008 census tract level data. For Wave 2, L.A. FANS's sample design consist of three main groups: 1) respondents who were interviewed during Wave 1 and still reside in Los Angeles County; 2) individuals who were interviewed during Wave 2, but reside outside Los Angeles County; and 3) new respondents (“new entrants”) who live within the 65 original sampled census tracts but did not live in them during the time that Wave 1 was fielded (Peterson et al. 2001). To maximize sample size, the Wave 2 analytical sample is a cross sectional sample that includes all eligible adult respondents residing in Los Angeles County at Wave 2, which includes respondents residing in the original 65 L.A. FANS tracts, plus respondents who are in Los Angeles County, but outside the original 65 L.A. FANS tracts at Wave 2.

The Wave 2 sample was constructed from the Adult Sample and excludes adult respondents not asked the civic engagement battery of questions along with those for whom the

civic engagement variable, L.A. weight variable, and legal status were missing, for a total of 473 respondents excluded. The total final sample for Wave 2 consists of 1,399 adult respondents living in 391 census tracts.

### **Analytical Approach**

I use Wave 1 and Wave 2 of L.A. FANS to examine the changes in the association of neighborhood diversity and civic engagement. The analyses proceed in three steps in assessing the relationships displayed in Figures 1-1 and 1-2. I first examine descriptively the association between ethnoracial diversity and civic engagement and nativity diversity and civic engagement, establishing that type of diversity, whether in race or nativity, matters for assessing the level of civic engagement in neighborhoods (Figures 1-1 and 1-2). Second, I build nested multi-level varying intercept statistical models that assesses the impact of both neighborhood-level and individual-level factors on overall civic engagement (Tables 1-7 and 1-11). Third, I build nested multi-level varying intercept statistical models that assess the impact of both neighborhood-level and individual-level factors on SOCO and POCO civic engagement, respectively (Tables 1-8 to 1-9, Tables 1-12 to 1-13). Fourth, I introduce kin and friendship social ties in an additional nested model to assess the moderating impact of social ties on the relationship between diversity and civic engagement (Tables 1-10 and 1-14).

INSERT FIGURE 1-1 HERE

INSERT FIGURE 1-2 HERE

### **Dependent Variables**

In this study, I operationalize a dichotomous dependent variable that captures whether respondents participated in any civic organizations (CE). I also differentiated between two



different types of organizations in which residents participate: socially orientated civic organizations (SOCO) and professionally orientated civic organizations (POCO). These measures of civic engagement are all behavioral measures variables drawn from a battery of questions asked in both waves of L.A. FANS. For Wave 1, L.A. FANS asked respondents whether, within the previous 12 months, they participated in various activities: neighborhood/block organization meetings, business/civic groups, nationality/ethnic pride clubs, local/state political organizations, volunteering with a local organization, veterans group, labor union, literary, art, discussion group, fraternity, sorority or alumni group. For Wave 2, L.A. FANS included additional questions, specifically whether respondents participated in a group seeking to change something in their community or in their neighborhoods. Further, a grab-all question asked whether respondents identified another type of local group organization. These specific responses were re-coded to be integrated in overall civic engagement if they met the conceptual construct of civic engagement. Specifically, the civic engagement variable included respondents who indicated participation in the following groups/organizations: sport, hobby, school, charity, and miscellaneous. I excluded responses that indicated church and alcohol-related group participation.

For Wave 1 and Wave 2, the variable civic engagement (CE) is coded as a dummy variable with 1 representing “participated in civic organization/group” and 0 representing “did not participate in civic organization/group.” Operationalizing civic engagement as dichotomous variable not only accounts for all the varied activities that individual might engage in, but it is parsimonious. Additionally, having civic engagement as a dichotomous variable comports with a multitude of studies that do the same, and, therefore, the results of this study could be compared with past work. For example, studies such as Costa and Kahn (2003), using the Current

Population Survey and DDB Lifestyle Survey, operationalize civic engagement as a dummy variable pertaining to whether individuals engaged in volunteer work in the previous 12 months and, using the General Social Survey and the American National Survey, operationalize associational membership as a dummy variable.

A critical assumption made when operationalizing civic engagement as a dichotomous variable is that it assumes that individual and contextual-factors equating attending a neighborhood block meeting with joining a business association. Common sense dictates that there are distinct pathways of associational participation. Specifically, civic organizations are not monolithic social organizations; rather, they have distinct organizational missions and values (Ramakrishnan 2005). Individuals also have varied motivations and incentives to engage in a particular form of organizational participation (Knack and Keefer 1997; Putnam 2000; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006).

I account for the different pathways to engage in civil society by operationalizing two types of potential respondent engagement: socially oriented civic organizations (SOCO) and professionally oriented civic organizations (POCO). Advancing these two measures not only allows me to account for the limitations of using a dichotomous civic engagement measure, but also recognizes that civic organizations serve varied purposes for individuals. Other scholars have recognized that organizations might provide different values and norms and ,therefore, individuals might be motivated for different reasons to join and participate (Knack and Keefer 1997; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006). For Wave 1, I classify respondents in SOCO engagement if the respondent indicated that they participated in one of the following activities and organizations: 1) neighborhood/block organization; 2) nationality/ethnic pride club; 3) volunteering with a local organization; 4) literary, art, or discussion groups; and 5) fraternity,

sorority or alumni group. For Wave 2, I classify respondents in SOCO engagement if the respondent indicated that they participated in one of the following activities and organizations: 1) neighborhood/block organization; 2) nationality/ethnic pride club; 3) volunteering with a local organization; 4) literary, art, or discussion groups; 5) fraternity, sorority or alumni group; 6) group involved in bringing change in the community/neighborhood; 7) sports-related groups; 8) hobby-related groups; 9) other civic groups (charity, school, miscellaneous). For Wave 1, I classify respondents in POCO engagement if they indicated participation in one of the following organizations: 1) business/civic group; 2) local/state political organization; 3) veterans group; and 4) labor union. For Wave 2, I classify respondents in POCO engagement if they indicated they participated in one of the following organizations: 1) business/civic group; 2) local/state political organization; 3) veterans group; and 4) labor union.

## **Independent Variables**

### *Ethnoracial and Nativity Diversity*

Neighborhood diversity, also known as neighborhood heterogeneity, is widely measured by a fragmentation measure, computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of racial/ethnic/native group share and reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population belong to different groups. This measure varies from 1, with values closer to 1 representing an increase in diversity (heterogeneity) and a decrease in diversity when values inch towards zero. In the case of two equally represented groups, 50% White and 50% Latino/as, the ethnoracial diversity will be at its maximum (Abascal and Baldassari 2015; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). A value of 0 under the diversity indices represents complete homogeneity. I operationalize two diversity indices to examine the effects of diversity on civic engagement:

ethnoracial diversity and nativity diversity.<sup>8</sup> As previously mentioned, higher values on each of these indices represent more diversity within the neighborhood. The two diversity indices are operationalized as follows:

*Ethnoracial Diversity Index*

$$f_i = 1 - \sum_k S_{ki}^2$$

Where  $S_{ki}$  is the share of racial and ethnic group  $k$  (Whites, Blacks, Latino/a, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Other) in census tract  $i$ .

*Nativity Diversity Index*

$$f_i = 1 - \sum_k S_{ki}^2$$

Where  $S_{ki}$  is the share of foreign-born group  $k$  (foreign born and native born) in census tract  $i$ .

For Wave 1, I differentiated between ethnoracially diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods by taking the median value of the ethnoracial diversity index for the sample of 65 neighborhoods (median value=0.4357) and classified neighborhoods at that value and above as ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods (heterogeneous) and neighborhoods below that value as non-ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods (homogenous). Similarly, to differentiate between immigrant diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods, I took the median value of the nativity diversity index for the sample of 65 neighborhoods (median value=0.4685) and classified neighborhoods at that value or above as immigrant diverse neighborhoods and neighborhoods below that value as non-immigrant diverse neighborhoods.

For Wave 2, I constructed neighborhood level estimates of percent White, percent Black, percent Latino/a, percent Asian/Pacific Islander, and percent Other by using linear interpolation to estimate these characteristics in Los Angeles County census tracts using census data for 2000

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<sup>8</sup> I also examined nationality fragmentation but the nationality and nativity fragmentation indices are highly correctly (0.75) and for simplicity, I chose to utilize the nativity fragmentation index.

and 2010. Since Wave 2 was field between August 2006 and December 2008, I used estimates for the racial/ethnic make-up for the 391 census tracts that correspond to the Wave 2 cross sectional analytical sample

Further, for Wave 2, I followed a similar procedure, but accounted for the 391 census tracts encompassed within the Wave 2 sample. I took the median value of the ethnoracial diversity index for the sample of 391 neighborhoods (median value=0.474) and classified neighborhoods at that value and above as ethnoracially diverse (heterogeneous) and neighborhoods below that value as non-ethnoracially diverse (homogenous). Similarly, I took the median value of the nativity diversity index for the sample of 391 neighborhoods (median value=0.4617) and classified neighborhoods at that value or above as immigrant diverse and neighborhoods below that value as non-immigrant diverse.

### *Social Ties*

For social ties, I draw upon two questions from both waves of L.A. FANS that ascertain whether relatives and friends live in the respondent's neighborhood, but not in the respondent's home.<sup>9</sup> The responses were categorized under the following: a) none; b) a few; c) many; and d) most or all. For social ties, I operationalize kin social ties and friendship social ties collapse the responses to these questions into three categories: a) none; b) few social connections; and c) many and most or all.

### *Individual-Level Factors*

For Waves 1 and 2, I control the following individual level characteristics: ethnoracial status, nativity, gender, age, education, marital status, employment, household income, residential stability, and legal status. Ethnoracial status is coded in the following mutually

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<sup>9</sup> The two specific questions are: a) How many of your relatives or in-laws live in your neighborhood?; b) How many of your friends live in your neighborhood?

exclusive groups: White, Black, Latino/as, Asian and Pacific Islander, Native American and Other. Nativity is coded as a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was born in the United States or abroad. Education is coded in the following manner: less than high school (0-11), high school graduate (12 years), some college (12-15 years), college degree plus (16 years or more of education). Employment is a dichotomous variable capturing employed and not employed. I log household income and include a dummy variable regarding whether the respondent has moved within the last 2 years.

### *Neighborhood-Level Factors*

For Waves 1 and 2, I control for three neighborhood characteristics: economic disadvantage, residential stability, and racial/ethnic composition. For Wave 1, I used the measure of neighborhood economic disadvantage as the percentage of households receiving public assistance from the 2000 Census. For Wave 1, neighborhood residential stability,<sup>10</sup> also taken from the 2000 Census, is measured by the percentage of the population in the neighborhood that occupies the same dwelling in both 1995 and 2000 (non-movers).<sup>11</sup> I use the percent of African-Americans in the census tract to measure the ethnoracial composition of neighborhoods taken from the 2000 Census.

For Wave 2, I constructed neighborhood-level estimates of disadvantage, residential composition, and racial composition. Using census data for 2000 and 2010, I used linear interpolation to estimate the characteristics annually and used estimates for 2008 for use of Wave 2 cross-sectional analytical sample. For Wave 2, I used the percentage of the population living in

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<sup>10</sup> I also considered other measures such as percent of the population that lives in residences that owner-occupied from the 2000 Census. This measure though was highly correlated with both non-move and neighborhood median household income.

<sup>11</sup> The measure for residential stability was kept as a continuous variable when used in estimating the multilevel models. Additionally, an inspection of scatter plots for the association between residential stability, as measured by non-mover, and participation showed that the relationship does not reveal any thresholds or non-linearities.

poverty to measure neighborhood disadvantage. Neighborhood residential stability is measured by the percentage of the estimated population that occupies the same dwelling. I use the percentage of African-Americans in the census tract to measure ethnoracial composition.

## **Results**

### *Descriptive Profile*

Table 1-1 provides the weighted individual characteristics for my analysis sample for Wave 1. Approximately 37% of my respondents self-identify as Latino/a and 38% identify as White. Over 40% of the respondents are foreign-born, and approximately a quarter of them have tenuous legal status, such as permanent resident, temporary visa holder, and or undocumented. Roughly a third of the sample changed residence within the last two years. The average household income of the entire sample is \$26,628.

Table 1-2 provides the weighted individual characteristics for my analysis sample for Wave 2. Approximately 40% of my sample respondents self-identify as Latino/a and 35% identify as White. Over 46% of the respondents are foreign-born, and approximately a quarter of them have tenuous legal status, such as permanent resident, temporary visa holder, or undocumented. Roughly 38% of the sample changed residence within the last two years, and the average household income of this sample is \$31,922.

INSERT TABLE 1-1 HERE

INSERT TABLE 1-2 HERE

Descriptively for Waves 1 and 2, there is higher average civic engagement in *ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods*, whereas the reverse is true in immigrant diverse

neighborhoods, with higher average engagement in organizations in *non-diverse neighborhoods by nativity*. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 indicate the average organizational participation in LA neighborhoods by ethnoracial diversity and nativity diversity. As indicated earlier, the median value for the ethnoracial heterogeneity index in Wave 1 is 0.4357 and 0.474 in Wave 2. The median value for Wave 1 nativity heterogeneity is 0.4685 and 0.4617 for Wave 2. Depending on the heterogeneity index—whether ethnoracial or nativity—neighborhoods above these median values are classified as heterogeneous, and those below this value are deemed homogenous. Specifically, the average level of engagement in ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods found in Wave 1 is 37.54% compared to 25.24% in ethnoracially homogenous neighborhoods. In contrast, the average level of civic engagement in immigrant diverse neighborhoods is 22.05%, compared to 40.83% in homogenous neighborhoods (Figure 1-1).<sup>12</sup> For Wave 2, a similar pattern occurs in that the average level of engagement in ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods is 36.68% compared to 32.50% in ethnoracially homogenous neighborhoods. In contrast, the average level of civic engagement in immigrant diverse neighborhoods is 40.57%, compared to 28.62% in homogenous neighborhoods (Figure 1-2).

This descriptive analysis suggests greater differences in the observed civic engagement patterns by ethnoracial and nativity diversity in Wave 1 than in Wave 2. In fact, differences in average civic engagement between diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods declined between Waves 1 and 2. There is almost no difference in average civic engagement in ethnoracially diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods in Wave 2. Similarly, for immigrant diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods, the difference in average engagement in Wave 1 is approximately

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<sup>12</sup> Additional analyses not shown here demonstrate substantial variation in civic engagement across neighborhoods. Frequency histogram analysis demonstrate variation in the distribution of the proportion of individuals civically engaged by the number of census tracts, displays this variation.



18.78%, whereas that difference is 11.95% in Wave 2. Further, whereas most of the empirical literature suggests a negative association with ethnoracial diversity, descriptive results here suggest otherwise.

Descriptively, there is variation in overall civic engagement, as well as SOCO and POCO engagement, by ethnoracial and nativity status. Tables 1-3 and 1-4 display the level of civic engagement by ethnoracial and nativity status groups for Waves 1 and 2. Of the respondents in the Wave 1 sample, 37.17% participated in a civic organization during the past 12 months. Whites have the highest level of civic engagement (49.72%), followed by Asian-Americans (41.89%), African-Americans (39.84%), those who identify their race as Other (39.73%), and Latino/as (20.70%). With regard to nativity, 75.47% of native-born respondents indicate that they participated in a civic organization within the past 12 months, whereas 24.53% of foreign-born respondents indicate so. More respondents indicate participating in SOCO versus POCO organizations, with 32.80% participating in SOCO and 16.16% in POCO organizations. For Wave 2, approximately 41.97% of respondents participated in civic groups during the past 12 months. The racial hierarchy of engagement changed during Wave 2. Although Whites have the highest level of engagement (57.92%), they are followed by African-Americans (47.04%), Asian-Americans (43.23), Latino/as (27.40%), and those who identify their race as Other (17.32). Native-born respondents civically engaged at 70.16% compared to 29.84% of foreign-born respondents. Similar to Wave 1, there is a higher level of engagement in SOCO (37.60%) versus POCO (23.00%).

INSERT TABLE 1-3 HERE

INSERT TABLE 1-4 HERE

With regard to social ties, Tables 1-5 and 1-6 demonstrate neighborhood kin and friendship social ties by ethnoracial and nativity status for Waves 1 and 2. When comparing between kin and friendship ties, on average, respondents in Waves 1 and 2 indicate having more friendship ties than kin ties in their neighborhoods. Specifically, in Wave 1, 15.64% of respondents indicate having “many or most of all” their friendship ties in their neighborhoods compared to only 4.83% indicating the same for kin ties. This same pattern is observed when comparing friendship and kin ties among the foreign-born. Specifically, 15.5% of foreign-born respondents indicate having “many or most of all” their friendship ties in their neighborhood versus only 5.92% of foreign-born indicating the same with regard to kin ties. Similarly, in Wave 2, 14.17% of respondents indicate having “many or most of all” their friendship ties in their neighborhoods compared to 4.94% indicating the same for kin ties.

There also seems to be some variation between ethnoracial groups in the extent of social ties within their neighborhoods. Specifically, in Wave 1, approximately 40.59% of Latino/a respondents report having “a few” and “many or most of all” kin ties in their neighborhoods versus 20.67% of Whites indicating so. With regard to friendship ties, the differences between Latino/as and White respondents are smaller. Approximately 73% of Latino/a respondents report having “a few” and “many or most of all” friendship ties in their neighborhood compared to approximately 70% of Whites indicating so. For Wave 2, we see a similar pattern between Whites and Latinos with the biggest difference in social ties existing with kin ties versus friendship ties. When comparing Waves 1 and 2, we observe a marginal decrease in the number of friendship ties in respondents’ neighborhoods over time, and a marginal increase in kin ties in respondents’ neighborhoods over time.

INSERT TABLE 1-5 HERE

INSERT TABLE 1-6 HERE

### *Multivariate Findings*

For this section, I first discuss the statistical findings in Wave 1 and then proceed to discuss the findings for Wave 2.

#### *Multivariate Findings--Wave 1*

Multi-level logistic regression results for Wave 1 for overall civic engagement are presented in Table 1-7. Table 1-7 presents a series of estimated models (Models 1-5) in which ethnoracial and nativity diversity are used to predict individual-level civic engagement. I estimate varying-intercept logistic regression models in which respondents are nested within 65 neighborhoods. Model 1 provides the baseline model where, contrary to previous studies (Costa and Kahn 2003; Putnam 2007), I find that greater ethnoracial diversity predicts greater level of civic engagement. Model 2 models ethnoracial and nativity diversity and was used to predict civic engagement. Model 3 examines the main effects and three main neighborhood factors that the extant theoretical and empirical literature have shown to affect civic engagement. Model 4 presents the main effects and includes individual-level factors known to be associated with civic engagement. Model 5 presents the fully saturated model from the multilevel logistic regression predicting any civic engagement.

To select the model that best fits the underlying sample data, I examined three model fit statistics, included at the bottom of Table 1-7. To obtain the Deviance statistic, I used the formula  $-2 \times \log \text{likelihood}$ . Across these three fit statistics, AIC, BIC, and Deviance, the smaller the value of the respective statistic, the better the fit of the model. The AIC and BIC fit statistics both suggest that Model 4 is the preferred model with the largest difference between models 4 and 5 of 22.096 in the BIC fit statistic. Contrary to both the BIC and AIC fit statistics, the

Deviance statistic suggests that model 5 is the preferred model, although the difference in the Deviance statistic between models 4 and 5 is only 1.28. Given the theoretical importance of neighborhood factors in shaping civic outcomes, the result of the Deviance statistic, and the small difference in the AIC statistic between models 4 and 5, I prefer Model 5 and interpret the result of said model.

INSERT TABLE 1-7 HERE

Table 1-7 provides the fully saturated model and the demonstrated coefficients are the log odds of organizational participation. Specifically, under Model 5, we can observe that a unit increase in the nativity diversity index is associated with a -2.139 decrease in the expected log odds of civic engagement. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01 statistical significance level. Noteworthy is that ethnoracial diversity is not significant at conventional statistical levels. This result, however, must be taken with caution because the nativity diversity effect could be an immigrant neighborhood composition effect. Nativity diversity and neighborhood immigrant composition are highly correlated ( $>0.70$ ). Given my existing measures and research design, it is very difficult to decipher which effect--nativity diversity vs. immigrant composition--is driving the negative association with neighborhood trust.

Individual-level factors such as ethnoracial group membership, nativity, education, household income, residential stability, and undocumented legal status are statistically significant. With regard to the effect of education, having more than 16 years of education increases the log odds of being civically engaged (versus having less than a high school degree) by 1.275. The t-test for education suggests we reject the null hypothesis that having 16 years of education is zero. Included in the model estimation is the strength of racial and ethnic group differences in civic participation. For example, being a Latino/a versus being White reduces the

log odds of being civically engaged by 0.333. This result, however, is only statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level.<sup>13</sup> Interestingly, Model 5 captures the differences in engaging in civic participation by legal status. Specifically, being undocumented, versus being a U.S. citizen, reduces the log odds of being civically engaged by 0.459. This result is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, net of other covariates.

Individual-level residential mobility and household income also play a role in explaining the variation in organizational participation. Moving between homes decreases the log odds of civically engaging by .303 net of other factors. This result is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. A unit increased in logged household income increases the log odds of organizational participation by 0.049, a result also statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Three neighborhood factors were controlled for in Model 5 given the theoretical importance and prior evidence on the role that social context plays in predicting civic engagement. Noteworthy is that none of the neighborhood factors—residential stability, ethnoracial composition, and economic disadvantage—are statistically significant given the cross-sectional sample used to test these factors.

To further understand the different pathways to organization participation and the effects of diversity, two different types of organizational participation were examined: socially oriented (SOCO) versus professional oriented (POCO) participation. Multi-level logistic regression results for engagement in SOCO and POCO activities are presented in Tables 1-8 and 1-9, respectively. With regard to Table 1-8 and given the above reasons for which we cannot simply compare across nested models, I used fit statistics demonstrated below in Table 1-8 to choose the

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<sup>13</sup> Additionally, analyses were performed to examine the interactions between nativity diversity and ethnoracial group membership. None of these interactions were statistically meaningful.

best model given the data sample. In line with the reasoning above, I prefer Model 5 as it accounts for neighborhood factors and the marginal difference between Model 4 and 5 given the Deviance fit statistic.

Similar to results presented in Table 1-7, a unit increase in the nativity diversity index decreases the log odds of participation in socially-oriented organizations by 1.731. This result is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Similarly, this result must be taken with caution because the nativity diversity effect could be an immigrant neighborhood composition effect. The main effect of ethnoracial diversity fails to rise to the level of statistical significance. Additionally, neighborhood factors do not seem to play a significant role as suggested by the t-tests of the coefficients for the variables of residential stability, ethnoracial composition, and economic disadvantage. Given the t-tests for these neighborhood factors, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the effects are zero.

Individual level factors, such as ethnoracial group membership, education, household income, and residential mobility, affect the log odds of participation in socially-oriented organizations. Specifically, being Latino/a versus being White decreases the log odds of socially oriented civic engagement by 0.421, a result that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Similar to the results of Table 3, household income and residential stability play a role in explaining the variation in SOCO participation. The log odds of socially-oriented organizational participation were reduced by 0.325, net of other factors, when a respondent indicated that they had moved, a result that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. There are no apparent effects of legal status on the log odds of engaging in socially oriented organizations. Lastly, neighborhood factors accounted under Model 5 in Table 1-8 do not contribute to understanding the observed variation in engaging in socially oriented civic organization.

INSERT TABLE 1-8 HERE

Table 1-9 presents the multi-level logistic regression results for engagement in professionally-oriented civic organizations (POCO). I prefer Model 5 given the Deviance fit statistic and the theoretical importance of including neighborhood factors. The main effect of nativity diversity, net of other factors, is negatively associated with engaging in POCO activities. The effect size as captured by the coefficient (-2.803) under Model 5 demonstrates that, net of other factors, nativity diversity depresses engagement in professionally-oriented activities. Similar to analyses presented above, neighborhood factors do not contribute to understanding the observed variation in engaging in professional oriented civic organizations. Nativity, age, education, employment, and residential stability contribute to understanding the variation in engaging in professionally oriented activities. Specifically, being employed versus not being employed increases the log odds of engaging in POCO activities by 0.901, a result that is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Being foreign-born versus native born reduces the log odds of engaging in professional-oriented activities by 0.930, a result that is significant at the 0.001 statistically significant level.

INSERT TABLE 1-9 HERE

In further attempts to understand the factors that explain the variation in organizational participation, Table 1-10 presents additional analyses to examine the effects of social ties. Table 1-10 consists of 3 panels: panel A predicts any civic engagement; panel B predicts any SOCO engagement; and panel C predicts any SOCO engagement. I have included Model 5 from Tables 1-7, 1-8, and 1-9 from the previous analyses to be included side-by-side by Model 6 under each panel that includes the social ties factors. At the bottom of each panel, the Deviance, AIC, and BIC fit statistics are included. Consistent across the three panels, all three fit statistics suggest

that Model 6 is preferred. Specifically, under Panel A, Model 6, a unit increase in friendship social ties increases the log odds of organizational participation by 0.395. This result is statistically significant at the 0.001 significance level. Kin ties, however, do not contribute to our understanding in the observed variation in civic engagement since according to the t-tests we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the effect of kin social ties is zero. Similar to the results in Panel A, under Panel B a unit increase in friendship ties increases the log odds of engaging in socially-oriented activities by 0.432; a result that is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

INSERT TABLE 1-10 HERE

### *Multivariate Findings--Wave 2*

Multi-level logistic regression results for Wave 2 for overall civic engagement are presented in Table 1-11. Table 1-11 presents a series of estimated models (Models 1-5) in which ethnoracial and nativity diversity are used to predict individual-level civic engagement. I estimate varying-intercept logistic regression models in which respondents are nested within 391 neighborhoods. Similar to my analysis in Wave 1, I assessed and determined the best model given the deviance statistic, AIC, and BIC, demonstrated below in Table 1-11. The AIC and BIC fit statistics both suggest that Model 4 is the preferred model with the largest difference between models 4 and 5 of 16.412 in the BIC fit statistic. Contrary to both the BIC and AIC fit statistics, the Deviance statistic suggests that model 5 is the preferred model, although the difference in the Deviance statistic between models 4 and 5 is only 5.3. Given the theoretical importance of including neighborhood factors and the mixed evidence regarding which model fits best, I conclude that Model 5 is the preferred model and will interpret the results of said model.

Model 5 in Table 1-11 provides the fully saturated model and the demonstrated coefficients are the log odds of organizational participation. As we can observe from Model 5,



there are no statistically significant main effects of ethnoracial diversity or nativity diversity. This result in Wave 2 contrasts with the result obtained in Wave 1 where we observed a negative association between nativity diversity and civic engagement.

Education and residential model are the only individual-level factors that contribute to explaining the association in civic engagement in Wave 2. Specifically, having more than 16 years of education increases the log odds of being civically engaged (versus having less than a high school degree) by 1508. The t-test for education suggests we reject the null hypothesis that having 16 years of education is zero. Individual-level residential mobility also plays a role in explaining the variation in organizational participation in that it decreases the log odds of civically engaging by -0.444, net of other factors. This result is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Noteworthy is that none of the immigrant-related variables, such as nativity status and legal status, explain the variation in civic engagement. This contrasts with the results for Wave 1.

Neighborhood disadvantage, as measured by the percentage of the population living in poverty in the neighborhood, is the only factor that is statistically significant at a conventional significance level. A unit increase in neighborhood disadvantage decreases the log odds of civic engagement by -1.763. Given the prior evidence indicating the role that residential stability and racial composition of neighborhood play, I have included them in the model estimation, but these two factors do not explain the variation in civic engagement.

INSERT TABLE 1-11 HERE

Tables 1-12 and 1-13 present the multi-level logistic regression results for any engagement in socially-oriented civic organization/group (Table 1-12) and any engagement in professional-oriented civic organization/group (Table 1-13). In terms of Table 1-12, I prefer Model 5 given that both the deviance and AIC fit statistics indicate that model 5 best fits the

underlying data. Unlike in Wave 1, there is no effect of nativity diversity on civic engagement. The result is the same for ethnoracial diversity. Education, residential stability and ethnoracial status are the individual-level factors associated with civic engagement. Specifically, being Latino, versus being White, depresses the log odds of SOCO engagement by 0.383, a result statistically significant at the 0.05 statistical significance level. At the neighborhood level, a unit increase in neighborhood disadvantage depresses the log odds of SOCO engagement by 2.154, significant at the 0.05 statistical significance level.

INSERT TABLE 1-12 HERE

Similar to Table 1-12, we observe in Table 1-13 that there are no main effects of ethnoracial and nativity diversity in predicting engagement in POCO groups. I prefer Model 5 given the deviance fit statistic, theoretical importance of including neighborhood factors and the small difference in the AIC in the fit statistic. Age, education, and employment are the only individual-level factors that are associated with engagement in POCO groups. Specifically, being employed, versus not being employed, increases the log odds of engaging in POCO groups by 0.594, a result significant at the 0.01 level. Further, an increase in age by one year increases the log odds of engaging in POCO groups by 0.031, a result significant at the 0.001 level.

INSERT TABLE 1-13 HERE

The data Table 1-14 pertain to the role of social ties in explaining the variation in engaging in any civic organization/group (Panel A), SOCO engagement (Panel B) and POCO engagement (Panel C). Given the fit statistic evidence with both deviance and AIC measures preferring the fully saturated models that includes social ties, I will interpret Model 6 in Panel A, B, and C. Under Panel A, Model 6, we can observe that social ties, specifically friendship social ties in the respondent's neighborhoods, are positively associated with civic engagement.

Specifically, increasing friendship ties from a few to many and or most within respondents' neighborhoods increases the log odds of any civic engagement by 0.266. This result is significant at the 0.05 level. Similarly, under Panel B, Model 6, we observe that increasing friendship social ties in respondents' neighborhoods is positively associated with greater SOCO engagement, a result significant at the 0.05 level. Under Panel C, Model 6, we can observe that friendship ties are positively associated with engagement in POCO groups. Specifically, increasing friendship ties from none to a few in respondents' neighborhood increases the log odds of engagement in POCO groups by 0.247, a result significant at the 0.05 level.

INSERT TABLE 1-14 HERE

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

This study examines the effects of ethnoracial and nativity diversity on civic engagement in a multi-racial and multi-racial context. Multivariate analyses examine the effects of statistically accounting for the simultaneous effects of ethnoracial and nativity diversity. Findings here demonstrate that, in contrast with extant literature, ethnoracial diversity does not play in role in in Wave 1 or Wave 2 in accounting for the observed variation in civic engagement. This result is consistent with the main finding by Abascal and Baldassari (2015) that racial diversity is not undermining social cohesion.

Unique in this study is the examination of diversity at two time periods in the same social context. By examining the effects of diversity at two cross-sectional time periods, this study examines whether the effect of diversity is observed at different time point. By using Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS, this study observes that the effects of diversity are inconsistent over time. In Wave 1, analyses here demonstrate that nativity diversity undermines engagement in civic engagement, *net of* neighborhood disadvantage and various individual-level factors, such as

education and legal status. This effect, however, is non-existent in Wave 2. This result in Wave 1 is limited to the extent that the observed nativity diversity effect could be an immigrant neighborhood composition effect. Given my existing measures and research design, it is very difficult to decipher which effect--nativity diversity vs. immigrant composition--is driving the negative association with neighborhood trust.

The simultaneous examination of diversity within a multi-racial and multi-ethnic context is a contribution to the literature because it demonstrates that ethnoracial heterogeneity is unlikely to predict civic engagement in all contexts and that nativity diversity is more likely to matter in places like Los Angeles. The effects of nativity diversity in Wave 1 analyses of L.A. FANS persist even after controlling for individual-level and neighborhood-level factors. This effect, however, is not present during Wave 2. In effect, immigration may lead to “hunkering” down in the short term. Although Putnam argued that the effects of immigration-related diversity matter for the short term, his empirical evidence provides no basis to support such a claim considering he only analyzed one-cross sectional time period (Putnam 2007). This study provides evidence to suggest that diversity, such as nativity diversity, may matter for only a period of time. Similar to Kessler and Bloemraad (2010), immigration-related diversity does not necessarily need to affect social cohesion as they find that nation-state policies regarding integration ameliorate any negative consequences that nativity diversity might introduce.

The lived-realities of individuals need to be more fully accounted for in the study of diversity and social cohesion. Results here demonstrate that neighborhood friendship ties are positively associated with greater civic engagement, despite the negative effects of nativity diversity. These findings suggest that civic organization should be further invested in examining and recruiting the friendship networks of their members to increase participation. Unique to this

study is the examination of social ties within the respondents' actual neighborhoods. Further research needs to situate social ties within the lived social contexts of study respondents, and findings here demonstrate that they matter.

Individual-level factors significantly account for the observed variation in civic engagement. Education, residential stability and household income affect the log odds of civically engaging in Wave 1, while education and residential stability account for the variation in Wave 2. Further, Wave 1 analyses of L.A. FANS data finds that individual factors have an impact on the log odds of engaging civically in the same direction as the literature on civic engagement has repeatedly demonstrated. As demonstrated by the findings, legal status, residential stability, nativity, and ethnoracial status matters more so for predicting engagement in socially-oriented civic organization (SOCO), while household income and employment status figures predominantly in predicting engagement in professionally-oriented civic organizations (POCO). These findings are important in considering policy interventions to increase engagement in civil society; reversing recent trends of less engagement in the United States (Putnam 2000). For Wave 2, education and residential stability play a significant role in predicting civic engagement. We can observe over these two cross-sectional periods that education and residential stability at the individual-level exert a persistent and significant effect on predicting civic engagement.

This study also finds that the type of civic engagement matters and future work needs to account for the specific types of individuals' behaviors. Specifically, in Wave 1, nativity diversity seems to depress engagement in POCO activities, as well as in SOCO activities. These effects are not present in Wave 2.

Future research needs to account for varied social contexts in terms of race and for geographic unit of analysis that better integrates the lived-reality of individuals in diverse and non-diverse contexts. Longitudinal analyses are also necessary to make a strong case for a causal relationship between population heterogeneity and civic and social engagement.

**Table 1-1: Wave 1 Weighted Descriptives of Analytic Sample****Individual-Level Variables (N=2,421)**

Independent Variables	
Ethnoracial Groups (%)	
White	36.36
Latino/as	35.44
Black	10.76
Asian	15.57
Other	2.4
Nativity (% Foreign-born)	41.24
Gender (% Female)	46.38
Age (mean)	39.75
Education	
Less than HS	22.43
HS Graduate (12 years)	21.95
Some College (12-15 years)	30.52
College Degree+ (16+ years)	25.10
Married (% married)	46.97
Employed (% employed)	66.64
Household Income (median)	\$22,310
Residential Stability (% moved within last 2 years)	28.45
Legal Status (%)	
US Citizen	74.84
Permanent Resident (LPR)	12.74
Temp Visa/Asylum	3.48
Undocumented	9.41

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

**Table 1-2: Wave 2 Weighted Descriptives of Analytic Sample**

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<b>Individual-Level Variables (N=1,399)</b>	
Independent Variables	
Ethnoracial Groups (%)	
White	35.21
Latino/as	40.14
Black	8.17
Asian	14.95
Other	1.52
Nativity (% Foreign-born)	46.01
Gender (% Female)	43.69
Age (mean)	39.12
Education	
Less than HS	23.05
HS Graduate (12 years)	18.93
Some College (12-15 years)	26.12
College Degree+ (16+ years)	31.90
Married (% married)	52.97
Employed (% employed)	67.19
Household Income (mean)	\$31,922
Residential Stability (% moved within last 2 years)	38.05
Legal Status (%)	
US Citizen	77.28
Permanent Resident (LPR)	11.93
Temp Visa/Asylum	1.95
Undocumented	9.32

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Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2



**Table 1-3: Wave 1 Civic Engagement, SOCO, and POCO Engagement by Ethnoracial and Nativity Status (N=2,421) (Weighted)**

	Civically Engaged (percent)	SOCO Engaged (percent)	POCO Engaged (percent)
Whites	49.72	44.90	22.95
Blacks	39.84	38.11	18.53
Latino/as	20.70	17.11	8.17
Asian	41.89	35.18	16.52
Other Race	39.73	34.95	14.91
<hr/>			
Native Born	75.47	79.19	92.17
Foreign Born	24.53	20.81	7.83
<b>Total</b>	<b>37.17</b>	<b>32.80</b>	<b>16.16</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

**Table 1-4: Wave 2 Civic Engagement, SOCO, and POCO Engagement by Ethnoracial and Nativity Status (N=1,399) (Weighted)**

	Civically Engaged (percent)	SOCO Engaged (percent)	POCO Engaged (percent)
Whites	57.92	51.99	33.63
Blacks	47.04	45.84	23.77
Latino/as	27.40	23.00	12.12
Asian	43.23	40.53	15.39
Other Race	17.32	16.48	16.68
<hr/>			
Native Born	70.16	72.86	88.00
Foreign Born	29.84	27.14	12.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>41.97</b>	<b>37.60</b>	<b>23.00</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2


<b>Table 1-5: Wave 1 Neighborhood Kin and Friendship Social Ties by Ethnoracial and Nativity Status (Weighted) (N=2,421)</b>			
	<b>Kin Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Whites	79.33	17.23	3.44
Blacks	75.49	20.19	4.32
Latino/as	59.4	34.03	6.56
Asian	74.46	20.49	5.05
Other Race	85.68	14.32	0.00
<b>Foreign Born</b>			
Foreign Born	64.46	29.62	5.92
<b>Total</b>	<b>71.17</b>	<b>24.01</b>	<b>4.83</b>
	<b>Friendship Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Whites	30.45	52.83	16.72
Blacks	38.91	48.8	12.3
Latino/as	27.15	55.98	16.86
Asian	29.35	57.58	13.07
Other Race	28.04	62.33	9.63
<b>Foreign Born</b>			
Foreign Born	29.9	54.95	15.15
<b>Total</b>	<b>29.85</b>	<b>54.51</b>	<b>15.64</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1


<b>Table 1-6: Wave 2 Neighborhood Kin and Friendship Social Ties by Ethnoracial and Nativity Status (Weighted) (N=1,399)</b>			
	<b>Kin Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Whites	77.76	17.45	4.78
Blacks	71.16	27.91	0.92
Latino/as	59.6	32.87	7.53
Asian	77.54	21.48	0.98
Other Race	41.38	57.95	0.67
<b>Foreign Born</b>			
Foreign Born	66.44	27.83	5.73
<b>Total</b>	<b>69.35</b>	<b>25.72</b>	<b>4.94</b>
	<b>Friendship Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Whites	32.26	51.27	16.47
Blacks	37.72	57.91	4.37
Latino/as	29.86	53.82	16.32
Asian	53.00	37.27	9.73
Other Race	23.1	76.23	0.67
<b>Foreign Born</b>			
Foreign Born	35.59	50.07	14.34
<b>Total</b>	<b>34.71</b>	<b>51.12</b>	<b>14.17</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2


**Figure 1-1: Wave 1 Average Neighborhood Civic Engagement by Ethnoracial and Nativity Neighborhood Diversity**



**Figure 1-2: Wave 2 Average Neighborhood Civic Engagement by Ethnoracial and Nativity Neighborhood Diversity**




**Figure 1-3: National and Los Angeles Ethnoracial Diversity**



Source: Abascal and Baldassarri (2015)

**Los Angeles Context: Brown versus Non-Brown**



Source: 2000 Census

**Table 1-7: Wave 1 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic Engagement (N=2,421)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>					
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.543** (0.545)	0.695 (0.435)	0.512 (0.424)	0.021 (0.317)	0.005 (0.354)
Nativity Diversity		-6.588*** (0.990)	-4.825*** (0.921)	-2.372** (0.736)	-2.139** (0.762)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>					
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			0.589 (0.724)		0.189 (0.594)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			0.052 (0.893)		0.016 (0.762)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.046** (0.013)		-0.009 (0.011)
<b>Individual Factors</b>					
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)					
Latino/as				-0.342* (0.152)	-0.333* (0.153)
Black				-0.296 (0.179)	-0.245 (0.193)
Asian-American				-0.174 (0.195)	-0.177 (0.195)
Other				-0.119 (0.370)	-0.101 (0.371)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)				-0.387* (0.150)	-0.376* (0.151)
Gender (1=Female)				0.050 (0.102)	0.049 (0.103)
Age				0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Education (reference=less than HS)					
HS Graduate				0.068 (0.162)	0.062 (0.162)
Some College				0.708*** (0.156)	0.689*** (0.158)
College or More				1.305*** (0.174)	1.275*** (0.177)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.075 (0.104)	-0.087 (0.105)
Employed (1=employed)				0.079 (0.114)	0.071 (0.115)
Household Income (logged)				0.049** (0.015)	0.049** (0.015)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.307*** (0.117)	-0.303** (0.117)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)					
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.203 (0.181)	-0.196 (0.181)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.157 (0.272)	-0.147 (0.274)
Undocumented				-0.528* (0.216)	-0.511* (0.217)
Constant	-1.562*** (0.269)	1.687** (0.524)	1.127 (0.640)	-0.379 (0.468)	-0.459 (0.598)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.2
Log likelihood	-1421.944	-1404.845	-1395.795	-1293.367	-1292.727
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>					
Deviance	2843.888	2809.690	2791.590	2586.734	2585.454
AIC	2849.888	2817.69	2805.590	2628.734	2633.455
BIC	2867.264	2840.857	2846.133	2750.365	2772.461

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 1-8: Wave 1 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any SOCO Civic Engagement (N=2,421)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>					
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.667** (0.561)	0.863 (0.469)	0.677 (0.469)	0.162 (0.337)	0.174 (0.374)
Nativity Diversity		-6.275*** (1.059)	-4.578*** (1.014)	-1.983* (0.777)	-1.731* (0.800)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>					
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			0.423 (0.800)		-0.164 (0.626)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-0.049 (0.986)		-0.230 (0.814)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.045** (0.015)		-0.010 (0.012)
<b>Individual Factors</b>					
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)					
Latino/as				-0.433** (0.157)	-0.421** (0.158)
Black				-0.224 (0.183)	-0.149 (0.197)
Asian-American				-0.2687 (0.199)	-0.271 (0.199)
Other				-0.030 (0.373)	-0.004 (0.375)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)				-0.332* (0.156)	-0.322* (0.156)
Gender (1=Female)				0.144 (0.106)	0.142 (0.106)
Age				0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Education (reference=less than HS)					
HS Graduate				0.099 (0.172)	0.091 (0.173)
Some College				0.790*** (0.164)	0.765*** (0.166)
College or More				1.411*** (0.182)	1.374*** (0.184)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.074 (0.108)	-0.087 (0.109)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.064 (0.118)	-0.073 (0.118)
Household Income (logged)				0.049** (0.015)	0.048** (0.015)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.328** (0.121)	-0.325** (0.121)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)					
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.156 (0.190)	-0.149 (0.191)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.067 (0.284)	0.057 (0.285)
Undocumented				-0.399 (0.226)	-0.379 (0.227)
Constant	-1.810*** (0.277)	1.279* (0.560)	0.829 (0.705)	0.684 (0.489)	-0.744 (0.627)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.2
Log likelihood	-1349.648	-1335.437	-1328.364	-1234.167	-1233.343
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>					
Deviance	2699.296	2670.874	2656.728	2468.334	2466.686
AIC	2705.292	2678.874	2670.727	2510.335	2514.687
BIC	2722.671	2702.041	2711.271	2631.965	2653.693

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p&lt;0.05 \*\*p&lt;0.01 \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

**Table 1-9: Wave 1 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any POCO Civic Engagement (N=2,421)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>					
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.346** (0.632)	0.438 (0.492)	0.022 (0.461)	-0.357 (0.442)	-0.449 (0.492)
Nativity Diversity		-6.891*** (1.015)	-4.635*** (0.882)	-3.236** (0.934)	-2.803** (0.951)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>					
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			1.545* (0.750)		0.983 (0.782)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			1.747 (1.006)		1.295 (1.074)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.068*** (0.016)		-0.017 (0.017)
<b>Individual Factors</b>					
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)					
Latino/as				0.177 (0.205)	0.179 (0.206)
Black				0.296 (0.233)	0.247 (0.254)
Asian-American				0.425 (0.259)	0.407 (0.259)
Other				0.028 (0.484)	0.008 (0.484)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)				-0.957*** (0.218)	-0.930*** (0.218)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.258 (0.137)	-0.247 (0.137)
Age				0.023*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)
Education (reference=less than HS)					
HS Graduate				-0.176 (0.269)	-0.189 (0.270)
Some College				0.600* (0.248)	0.583* (0.250)
College or More				1.034*** (0.260)	1.010*** (0.266)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.125 (0.146)	0.106 (0.147)
Employed (1=employed)				0.912*** (0.184)	0.901*** (0.184)
Household Income (logged)				0.048* (0.021)	0.049* (0.021)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.213 (0.170)	-0.197 (0.170)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)					
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.219 (0.298)	-0.127 (0.299)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				0.165 (0.442)	0.213 (0.443)
Undocumented				-0.614 (0.399)	-0.578 (0.401)
Constant	-2.776*** (0.319)	0.648 (0.534)	-0.456 (0.629)	-2.540*** (0.642)	-3.133*** (0.807)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.2
Log likelihood	-878.492	-861.454	-849.214	-764.899	-763.067
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>					
Deviance	1756.984	1722.908	1698.428	1529.798	1526.134
AIC	1762.984	1730.908	1712.429	1571.798	1574.134
BIC	1780.359	1754.076	1752.972	1693.429	1713.14

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p&lt;0.05 \*\*p&lt;0.01 \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

**Table 1-10: Wave 1 Social Ties Analysis—Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic, SOCO, and POCO Engagement (N=2,421)**

	Panel A: Any Civic Engagement (N=2,421)		Panel B: Any SOCO Engagement (N=2,421)		Panel C: Any POCO Engagement (N=2,421)	
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 5	Model 6	Model 5	Model 6
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.005 (0.354)	0.049 (0.342)	0.174 (0.374)	0.229 (0.358)	-0.449 (0.492)	-0.322 (0.488)
Nativity Diversity	-2.139** (0.762)	-2.105** (0.735)	-1.731* (0.800)	-1.653* (0.761)	-2.803** (0.951)	-2.855** (0.944)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties		-0.111 (0.085)		-0.103 (0.088)		0.095 (0.119)
Friends Social Ties		0.395*** (0.076)		0.432*** (0.079)		0.326** (0.105)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)	0.189 (0.594)	0.164 (0.574)	-0.164 (0.626)	0.139 (0.597)	0.983 (0.782)	1.038 (0.776)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)	0.016 (0.762)	0.115 (0.741)	-0.230 (0.814)	-0.135 (0.784)	1.295 (1.074)	1.272 (1.066)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.017)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as	-0.333* (0.153)	-0.337* (0.153)	-0.421** (0.158)	-0.434** (0.157)	0.179 (0.206)	0.162 (0.206)
Black	-0.245 (0.193)	-0.222 (0.194)	-0.149 (0.197)	-0.121 (0.198)	0.247 (0.254)	0.279 (0.256)
Asian-American	-0.177 (0.195)	-0.146 (0.195)	-0.271 (0.199)	-0.243 (0.199)	0.407 (0.259)	0.445 (0.260)
Other	-0.101 (0.371)	-0.101 (0.372)	-0.004 (0.375)	-0.008 (0.377)	0.008 (0.484)	0.031 (0.485)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)	-0.376* (0.151)	-0.359* (0.151)	-0.322* (0.156)	-0.306** (0.157)	0.930*** (0.218)	-0.940*** (0.219)
Gender (1=Female)	0.049 (0.103)	0.041 (0.103)	0.142 (0.106)	0.135 (0.106)	-0.247 (0.137)	-0.260 (0.137)
Age	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate	0.062 (0.162)	0.067 (0.162)	0.091 (0.173)	0.097 (0.173)	-0.189 (0.270)	-0.193 (0.270)
Some College	0.689*** (0.158)	0.684*** (0.158)	0.765*** (0.166)	0.761*** (0.166)	0.583* (0.250)	0.572* (0.250)
College or More	1.275*** (0.177)	1.287*** (0.177)	1.374*** (0.184)	1.398*** (0.184)	1.010*** (0.266)	1.012*** (0.267)
Married (1=married) (%)	-0.087 (0.105)	-0.096 (0.105)	-0.087 (0.109)	-0.101 (0.109)	0.106 (0.147)	0.089 (0.147)
Employed (1=employed)	0.071 (0.115)	0.101 (0.115)	-0.073 (0.118)	-0.043 (0.118)	0.901*** (0.184)	0.948*** (0.185)
Household Income (logged)	0.049** (0.015)	0.046** (0.015)	0.048** (0.015)	0.045** (0.015)	0.049* (0.021)	0.048** (0.021)
Residential Stability (1=moved)	-0.303** (0.117)	-0.251* (0.117)	-0.325** (0.121)	-0.267* (0.122)	-0.197 (0.170)	-0.154 (0.170)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)						
Permanent Resident (LRP)	-0.196 (0.181)	-0.184 (0.181)	-0.149 (0.191)	-0.129 (0.192)	-0.127 (0.299)	-0.097 (0.300)
Temp. Visa/Asylum	-0.147 (0.274)	-0.195 (0.275)	0.057 (0.285)	-0.105 (0.286)	0.213 (0.443)	0.180 (0.445)
Undocumented	-0.511* (0.217)	-0.516* (0.217)	-0.379 (0.227)	-0.379 (0.228)	-0.578 (0.401)	-0.545 (0.402)
Constant	-0.459 (0.598)	-0.829 (0.591)	-0.744 (0.627)	-1.177* (0.613)	-3.133*** (0.807)	-3.617*** (0.818)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Log likelihood	-1292.727	-1279.147	-1233.343	-1218.173	-763.067	-756.932
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	2585.454	2558.294	2466.686	2436.346	1526.134	1513.864
AIC	2633.455	2610.293	2514.687	2488.345	1574.134	1565.865
BIC	2772.461	2760.884	2653.693	2638.936	1713.14	1716.456

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001



**Table 1-11: Wave 2 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic Engagement (N=1,399)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>					
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.903*	0.324	-0.219	0.088	-0.204
	(0.441)	(0.433)	(0.494)	(0.374)	(0.453)
Nativity Diversity		-4.865***	-3.464***	-1.957*	-1.589
		(0.995)	(0.989)	(0.868)	(0.892)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>					
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-0.748		-0.732
			(0.934)		(0.817)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-0.481		-0.267
			(0.843)		(0.818)
Econ. Disadvantage (% in Poverty)			-3.544**		-1.763*
			(1.033)		(0.928)
<b>Individual Factors</b>					
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)					
Latino/as				-0.245	-0.212
				(0.201)	(0.201)
Black				-0.121	0.039
				(0.234)	(0.256)
Asian-American				-0.388	-0.404
				(0.265)	(0.265)
Other				-0.495	-0.412
				(0.679)	(0.677)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)				-0.309	-0.297
				(0.185)	(0.184)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.199	-0.193
				(0.132)	(0.132)
Age				0.004	0.003
				(0.005)	(0.005)
Education (reference=less than HS)					
HS Graduate				0.339	0.318
				(0.198)	(0.198)
Some College				0.714***	0.661**
				(0.196)	(0.197)
College or More				1.615***	1.508***
				(0.218)	(0.222)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.070	0.056
				(0.129)	(0.129)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.066	-0.073
				(0.145)	(0.145)
Household Income (logged)				0.009	0.008
				(0.013)	(0.013)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.428**	-0.444**
				(0.135)	(0.134)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)					
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.077	-0.076
				(0.213)	(0.213)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				0.055	-0.091
				(0.376)	(0.375)
Undocumented				0.098	-0.51
				(0.588)	(0.246)
Constant	-1.034***	1.316*	2.179*	0.063	0.915
	(0.204)	(0.515)	(0.899)	(0.588)	(0.892)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.2
Log likelihood	-888.351	-877.002	-866.655	-809.948	-807.289
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>					
Deviance	1776.702	1754.004	1733.310	1619.896	1614.578
AIC	1782.701	1762.003	1747.310	1661.897	1662.578
BIC	1798.431	1782.977	1784.015	1772.011	1788.423

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 1-12: Wave 2 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any SOCO Civic Engagement (N=1,399)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>					
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.756 (0.448)	0.216 (0.447)	-0.362 (0.504)	0.136 (0.361)	-0.306 (0.441)
Nativity Diversity		-4.670*** (1.005)	-3.237** (0.995)	-1.452 (0.836)	-1.116 (0.878)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>					
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-1.397 (0.945)		-1.264 (0.803)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-0.587 (0.871)		-0.110 (0.833)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-3.809*** (1.059)		-2.154* (0.929)
<b>Individual Factors</b>					
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)					
Latino/as				-0.415* (0.200)	-0.383* (0.201)
Black				-0.276 (0.232)	-0.114 (0.256)
Asian-American				-0.447 (0.263)	-0.464 (0.264)
Other				-0.824 (0.714)	-0.715 (0.716)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)				-0.136 (0.186)	-0.122 (0.187)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.021 (0.134)	-0.017 (0.134)
Age				0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
Education (reference=less than HS)					
HS Graduate				0.387 (0.206)	0.370 (0.207)
Some College				0.784*** (0.202)	0.733*** (0.204)
College or More				1.697*** (0.219)	1.579*** (0.225)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.029 (0.130)	0.024 (0.132)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.119 (0.146)	-0.123 (0.147)
Household Income (logged)				0.003 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.465** (0.135)	-0.486*** (0.121)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)					
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.141 (0.222)	-0.152 (0.223)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				0.177 (0.378)	0.214 (0.378)
Undocumented				0.167 (0.249)	0.214 (0.251)
Constant	-1.164*** (0.206)	1.084* (0.519)	2.427** (0.908)	-0.167 (0.577)	1.156 (0.885)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-860.718	-850.296	-837.772	-783.887	-779.294
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>					
Deviance	1721.436	1700.592	1675.544	1567.774	1558.588
AIC	1727.436	1708.593	1693.544	1607.774	1606.589
BIC	1743.166	1729.567	1730.249	1717.887	1732.434

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 1-13: Wave 2 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any POCO Civic Engagement (N=1,399)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>					
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.955 (0.565)	0.231 (0.541)	-0.033 (0.612)	-0.199 (0.502)	-0.193 (0.594)
Nativity Diversity		-5.743*** (1.104)	-4.482*** (1.114)	-2.817** (1.050)	-2.788 (1.099)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>					
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-0.098 (1.146)		-0.549 (1.080)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-1.223 (1.146)		-1.112 (1.189)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-2.718* (1.312)		-0.681 (1.276)
<b>Individual Factors</b>					
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)					
Latino/as				-0.002 (0.251)	0.024 (0.250)
Black				-0.201 (0.296)	-0.018 (0.324)
Asian-American				-0.380 (0.357)	-0.383 (0.357)
Other				0.491 (0.755)	0.594 (0.759)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)				-0.613* (0.248)	-0.609* (0.248)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.434* (0.169)	-0.436* (0.169)
Age				0.031*** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.007)
Education (reference=less than HS)					
HS Graduate				0.799** (0.299)	0.786** (0.301)
Some College				0.973** (0.298)	0.939** (0.166)
College or More				1.347*** (0.309)	1.272*** (0.317)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.008 (0.172)	0.002 (0.174)
Employed (1=employed)				0.598** (0.213)	0.594** (0.213)
Household Income (logged)				0.022 (0.017)	0.022 (0.017)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.242 (0.181)	-0.244 (0.182)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)					
Permanent Resident (LRP)				0.003 (0.329)	0.023 (0.329)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.244 (0.649)	-0.224 (0.649)
Undocumented				0.313 (0.386)	0.367 (0.390)
Constant	-2.422*** (0.277)	0.398 (0.573)	0.711 (1.068)	-2.679** (0.769)	-2.124 (1.169)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3
Log likelihood	-584.057	-572.070	-565.971	-520.942	-519.948
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>					
Deviance	1168.114	1144.140	1131.942	1041.884	1039.896
AIC	1174.114	1152.140	1145.941	1083.885	1087.896
BIC	1189.845	1173.114	1182.646	1193.998	1213.740

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 1-14: Wave 2 Social Ties Analysis—Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic, SOCO, and POCO Engagement (N=1,399)**

	Panel A: Any Civic Engagement (N=1,399)		Panel B: Any SOCO Engagement (N=1,399)		Panel C: Any POCO Engagement (N=1,399)	
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 5	Model 6	Model 5	Model 6
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	-0.204 (0.453)	-0.110 (0.452)	-0.306 (0.441)	-0.200 (0.444)	-0.193 (0.594)	-0.083 (0.601)
Nativity Diversity	-1.589 (0.892)	-1.706 (0.893)	-1.116 (0.878)	-1.246 (0.886)	-2.788 (1.099)	-2.892 (1.115)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties		0.015 (0.108)		0.002 (0.110)		0.096 (0.145)
Friends Social Ties		0.266** (0.095)		0.334** (0.097)		0.247* (0.126)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)	-0.732 (0.817)	-0.743 (0.814)	-1.264 (0.803)	-1.288 (0.807)	-0.549 (1.080)	-0.568 (1.088)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)	-0.267 (0.818)	-0.245 (0.815)	-0.110 (0.833)	-0.062 (0.834)	-1.112 (1.189)	-1.075 (1.195)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)	-1.763* (0.928)	-1.701 (0.926)	-2.154* (0.929)	-2.079* (0.934)	-0.681 (1.276)	-0.629 (1.289)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as	-0.212 (0.201)	-0.220 (0.202)	-0.383* (0.201)	-0.389* (0.204)	-0.002 (0.251)	0.006 (0.254)
Black	0.039 (0.256)	0.079 (0.256)	-0.114 (0.256)	-0.062 (0.834)	-0.201 (0.296)	0.017 (0.327)
Asian-American	-0.404 (0.265)	-0.356 (0.265)	-0.464 (0.264)	-0.406 (0.266)	-0.380 (0.357)	-0.323 (0.359)
Other	-0.412 (0.677)	-0.404 (0.679)	-0.715 (0.716)	-0.695 (0.719)	0.491 (0.755)	0.585 (0.763)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)	-0.297 (0.184)	-0.291 (0.184)	-0.122 (0.187)	-0.113 (0.187)	-0.613* (0.248)	-0.616* (0.249)
Gender (1=Female)	-0.193 (0.132)	-0.182 (0.132)	-0.017 (0.134)	-0.004 (0.135)	-0.434* (0.169)	-0.433* (0.170)
Age	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate	0.318 (0.198)	0.318 (0.199)	0.370 (0.207)	0.375 (0.208)	0.786** (0.301)	0.787** (0.302)
Some College	0.661** (0.197)	0.653** (0.198)	0.733*** (0.204)	0.729*** (0.205)	0.939** (0.166)	0.931** (0.302)
College or More	1.508*** (0.222)	1.508*** (0.223)	1.579*** (0.225)	1.588*** (0.226)	1.272*** (0.317)	1.279*** (0.319)
Married (1=married) (%)	0.056 (0.129)	0.049 (0.129)	0.024 (0.132)	0.014 (0.133)	0.002 (0.174)	-0.020 (0.175)
Employed (1=employed)	-0.073 (0.145)	-0.044 (0.145)	-0.123 (0.147)	-0.087 (0.148)	0.594** (0.213)	0.635** (0.215)
Household Income (logged)	0.008 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	0.022 (0.017)	0.021 (0.018)
Residential Stability (1=moved)	-0.444** (0.134)	-0.426** (0.134)	-0.486*** (0.121)	-0.465** (0.137)	-0.244 (0.182)	-0.223 (0.183)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)						
Permanent Resident (LRP)	-0.076 (0.213)	-0.072 (0.214)	-0.152 (0.223)	-0.149 (0.224)	0.023 (0.329)	0.052 (0.331)
Temp. Visa/Asylum	-0.091 (0.375)	0.079 (0.376)	0.214 (0.378)	0.202 (0.378)	-0.224 (0.649)	-0.244 (0.652)
Undocumented	-0.51 (0.246)	0.113 (0.246)	0.214 (0.251)	0.165 (0.252)	0.367 (0.390)	0.347 (0.392)
Constant	0.915 (0.892)	0.662 (0.895)	1.156 (0.885)	0.847 (0.895)	-2.124 (1.169)	-2.441* (1.184)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3
Log likelihood	-807.289	-802.989	-779.294	-772.977	-519.948	-517.305
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1614.578	1605.978	1558.588	1545.954	1039.896	1034.610
AIC	1662.578	1657.979	1606.589	1597.953	1087.896	1086.610
BIC	1788.423	1794.310	1732.434	1734.284	1213.740	1222.942

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

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**CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECTS OF NEIGHBORHOOD DIVERSITY ON SOCIAL TRUST:  
A MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL TRUST  
AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN A MULTIRACIAL AND  
MULTIETHNIC CONTEXT**

## **Introduction**

Renewed interest in the study of social trust is due to concern with demographic changes in Western nation-states driven by immigration from developing economies. Understood as an attitude and/or a belief in the integrity and faith individuals have for each other (Ross et al. 2001), social trust is linked to social outcomes such as community vitality (Putnam 2000), economic development (Putnam 1993; Tabellini 2010), civic engagement and political activity (Brehm and Rhan 1997; Zmerli 2010), volunteerism (Ulsaner 2002), and as argued by some, is a central ingredient to modern societies' social functioning (Jamal and Nooruddin 2010).

Relatedly, the Third Demographic Transition posits that countries like the United States are undergoing social transformation from a low-fertility, native-born population to a high-fertility, racial and ethnic immigrant population (Lichter 2013). This transformation will have lasting consequences pertaining to modern nation-states' identities and structures. Variation in social trust serves as an attitudinal barometer to assess how societies deal with the influx of ethnically and economically diverse migrants. Prominent scholars argued that, at least in the short-term, population diversity induced by immigration has a negative effect on social trust (Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Putnam 2007). Consequently, these studies uncritically and indirectly comment on the perils of too much immigration.

In the case of the United States, the link between population diversity and social trust must be historically contextualized. Research from various national surveys suggests that social trust is at a historic low, while, at the same time, the country is the most diverse (Desmond and Emirbayer 2016; Pew Research Center 2014: 7). The General Social Survey and the National Election Survey both document a downward trend in social trust from a high of approximately

69% of Americans who believed people are fair in 1964 to only 49% indicating the same in 2002 (Paxton 2005). Coinciding with this evidence are declines in social trust by generations. Specifically, when Millennials (between the ages of 18 and 33 in 2014) were asked if "most people can be trusted or that you can be careful in dealing with people," only 19% indicated that people can be trusted, in contrast to 31% of Gen Xers (ages 34 to 49 in 2014), 40% of Boomers (ages 50 to 68 in 2014), and 27% of Silents (ages 69 to 89 in 2014) (Pew Research Center 2014: 7). Coincidentally, Millennials are also the most diverse generation compared to other generations, as approximately 43% of them are non-White. In sum, social trust is at a historic low when the country is most diverse, and the most racially and ethnically diverse generation, Millennials, exhibits the lowest level of social trust.

Underlying the generational differences in social trust is that trust is not evenly distributed among racial and ethnic groups. Some studies indicate that whites are the most trusting and Hispanics the least trusting of others (Taylor et al. 2007). Additionally, some scholars argued that racial group membership is one the most important determinants of trust (Smith 2010, Uslaner 2002), affecting several outcomes such as employment (Smith 2010) and child care (Sampson et al. 1999).

Given the historical context and recent assessment of the effects of diversity on social trust, renewed attention on this phenomenon must focus on the structural circumstances of the social context as well on individual-level factors that drive social trust. More studies need to be conducted in varied social contexts to examine when, where and why population diversity matters for social trust. For some scholars, it is economic inequality and segregation that drives declines in social trust (Abascal and Baldassari 2015; Uslaner 2012). Given disagreement in the

extant literature and the potential implications to immigration rhetoric and policy, it is timely to examine the tension between population diversity and social trust.

This paper examines neighborhood diversity and its association with neighborhood trust during two time periods in multi-ethnic/multi-racial Los Angeles, California. Most studies examine the effects of trust and population diversity during one time period and are, therefore, unable to comment on change in the association over time. Social trust is examined and defined as trust among neighbors. This chapter argues that social trust cannot be understood solely as an individual phenomenon. Neighborhood context serves as a determinant of neighborhood trust in three distinct ways. First, neighborhoods serve as important social spaces where individuals interact with one another; therefore, population diversity in neighborhoods might affect interactions given individual preferences to trust in-group racial/ethnic members versus out-group members. A plethora of recent research articles advance empirical analyses demonstrating that locales with high levels of population diversity are also places where people trust less (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Putnam 2007). Second, neighborhoods are differentiated by the structural circumstances (employment, education, and housing) that might either advantage or disadvantage their residents. These structural circumstances, such as residential turnover, affect individuals' faith in their neighbors (Ross et al. 2001; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson 1999; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999, 2004; Smith 2010). Third, neighborhood contexts are not only spaces where individuals might form new connections with neighbors, but they are also where social ties come together. Friendship and kin social ties within an individual's neighborhood social context may mediate the relationship between neighborhood structural circumstances and social trust (Phan 2008; Stolle et al. 2008).

This study has three main research goals. First, I ask whether neighborhood trust is associated with ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity. The extant empirical research suggests that population diversity is negatively associated with social trust and, stated in another way, positively associated with neighborhood trust. Given the multi-ethnic/multi-racial social context of Los Angeles, will a positive association persist between trust and population diversity once one accounts for individual- and neighborhood-level demographic traits? Second, the vast literature on social trust suggests racial and ethnic group differences in social trust. Once individual-level demographic and economic traits as well as neighborhood-level structural factors are accounted for, will racial/ethnic differences persist? Third, I ask broadly how social ties—friendship and kin social ties—are associated with neighborhood trust.

## **Background**

### *Social Trust and Population Diversity*

The concept of trust is amorphous and applied in various contexts ranging from business transactions, politics, and among people. In general, trust has been understood as the faith one has in strangers. This type of trust is referred to as generalized trust and is distinguishable from a specific type of faith that one has for individuals in one's in-group, also known as particularized trust (Uslaner 2012, 2002). Trust in neighbors, the main outcome examined in this chapter, demonstrates properties of both generalized and particularized trust. Specifically, Uslaner (2002) in *The Moral Foundations of Trust* uses factor score analysis on various trust measures from the 1996 Pew Philadelphia Study and finds that "trust in neighbors" exhibited a high factor loading on both generalized trust (e.g., trust in strangers) and particularized trust (trust for in-group members). Uslaner reasons that this finding makes sense since we know some neighbors well and some neighbors not so well (Uslaner 2002).

Immigration-induced population diversity has been linked to declines in social trust in Western nation-states that received a good share of new immigrants. Specifically, scholars have argued that immigration from developing economies to Western democracies challenges the native populations' sense of community and social cohesion (Phan 2008; Putnam 2000). In effect, trust in others is undermined by increasing heterogeneous population. Utilizing the General Social Survey, Costa and Kahn (2003) examine general trust as measured by whether most people can be trusted and find that, especially among 25- to 54-year-olds, trust is lower in heterogeneous communities.

Putnam (2007), using data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, finds that ethnic heterogeneity is correlated with lower levels of trust, echoing similar findings by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002). Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002) argue that individuals trust those who are not part of their racial/ethnic or economic in-group, finding that, in the United States, the most economically or ethnically fragmented localities are the most distrustful.

Although some studies demonstrate a salient negative association between diversity and social trust, other factors are also correlated with social trust. For example, social and income inequality, some argue, is the underlying cause for the association between trust and social diversity (Uslaner 2012). According to Uslaner, there is a causal chain of events stemming from segregation which lead to the negative association between social trust and diversity. In summary, scholars argue that racial and ethnic differences in social trust are not due to diversity per se. Rather, they are driven by heightened levels of inequality and residential segregation (Hooghe et al. 2009; Portes and Vickstrom 2011; Uslaner 2006; Uslaner 2012). Putnam, however, argues that, in the case of economic segregation and inequality, diversity exerts an

independent effect: when comparing two equally poor or two equally rich neighborhoods, greater ethnic diversity is associated with less trust (Putnam 2007).

### *Racial and Ethnic Differences in Social Trust*

As mentioned earlier, significant variation exists between racial and ethnic groups in terms of social trust. Taylor et al. (2007) divided respondents into groups of those with high, moderate, and low levels of social trust after they answered three questions designed to measure their level of social trust. The authors find that 40% of whites reported high levels of trust, as compared to 20% of blacks and 12% of Hispanics who reported similar levels (Taylor et al. 2007). Some scholars have argued that racial group membership is one the most important determinants of trust (Smith 2010, Ulsaner 2002) and a consequence of structural opportunities and the rendering of services such as child care (Sampson et al. 1999; Smith 2010). The extant literature points to the role of discrimination and persistent racial inequality driving the observed racial gap in social trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Patterson 1999; Tylor and Huo 2002). Individual-level factors such as education and income, however, have been demonstrated to decrease the gap in social trust between racial and ethnic groups and to independently exert an influence on trust (Smith 2010).

With regard to population diversity, racial and ethnic groups might vary in terms of social trust depending on their neighborhood diversity. Abascal and Baldassari (2015) replicated Putnam's (2007) influential study and found that it is whites who are negatively affected by racial diversity. Other than Abascal and Baldassarri (2015), few scholars have examined that racial and ethnic group difference varies with population diversity. Additionally, it is unclear whether racial and ethnic group difference will surface in a multi-racial and multi-ethnic context since most studies have examined this question in a white versus non-white racial context.



## *Social Ties and Diversity*

Scholars have argued that faith in others is related to social connectedness between individuals. In general, an individual's level of trust toward friend and kin networks will be greater than that toward complete strangers. In fact, most studies on social trust examine faith in strangers and/or neighbors. However, the effects that friend and kin social ties have on neighborhood trust in diverse or non-diverse neighborhoods are unclear. Few studies have examined the lived neighborhood realities of individuals in the face of population diversity. Two studies have argued that social ties have the effect of mediating the association between population diversity and trust. Specifically, Stolle and his co-authors find that respondents with social ties in their neighborhood are less affected by their neighborhood's racial and ethnic fragmentation (Stolle et al. 2008). The location of the friend and kin ties might not matter, as Phan's study (2008) suggests that just having friends and social connections regardless of where these ties are in relation to respondents might be sufficient in moderating the negative effects of neighborhood diversity.

### **Research Questions**

This paper addresses three main questions in light of the mixed evidence in the extant literature on the role of population diversity on social trust. First, do ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity affect individual-level attitudes of neighborhood trust? Do these effects remain once neighborhood and individual level factors are accounted for? Second, are there racial and ethnic group differences in neighborhood trust? Third, are kin and friendship social ties within the respondent's neighborhood associated with neighborhood trust?

### **Data**

The present study uses data from Wave One and Wave Two of the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (L.A. FANS) and models the mechanisms through which neighborhood diversity by ethnoracial and nativity correspond to neighborhood trust. Wave One of the Los Angeles Neighborhood Family and Neighborhood Survey (L.A. FANS) is a longitudinal probability sample of individuals, families and neighborhoods in Los Angeles (Pebly and Sastry n.d.; Peterson 2003). Wave One of the survey was fielded between April 2000 and January 2002. I primarily focus on the adult respondents and combine contextual data from the 1990 and 2000 census tract level data. A total of 65 census tracts were sampled, and between 40 and 50 households were sampled within each census tract. I account for individual-level demographic characteristics—age, income, and education—and contextual factors—such as neighborhood inequality and residential stability—that explain and potentially mediate the association between neighborhood diversity and trust. Neighborhoods in this study are operationalized by census tracts, which contain a population of approximately 4,000 individuals (Peterson et al. 2003). Census tracts represent small geographic units, allowing one an opportunity to examine how individuals respond to diversity and more fully capture the social interactional context that people experience on a daily basis.

For Wave 1 of L.A. FANS randomly sampled one adult within each household for an interview. This “Adult Sample” consisted of 2,623 adults (Peterson et al. 2003). This study constructed a sample from the Adult Sample and excludes adult respondents not asked the trust question and were missing on the weight, and legal status variables, for a total of 206 respondents missing. The total final sample for Wave 1 consists of 2,417 adult respondents.

Wave 2 was fielded between August 2006 and December 2009. I primarily focus on the adult respondents and combine interpolated contextual data from 2008 census tract level data.

For Wave 2, L.A. FANS's sample design consist of three main groups: (1) respondents who were interviewed during Wave 1 and still reside in Los Angeles County; (2) individuals who were interviewed during Wave 2, but reside outside Los Angeles County; and (3) new respondents ("new entrants") who live within the 65 original sampled census tracts but did not live in those census tracts during the time that Wave 1 was fielded (Peterson et al. 2001). To maximize sample size, the Wave 2 analytical sample is cross-sectional and includes all eligible adult respondents residing in Los Angeles County at Wave 1, which includes respondents residing in the original 65 L.A. FANS tracts plus respondents who are in Los Angeles County but outside the original 65 L.A. FANS tracts at Wave 2.

The Wave 2 sample was constructed from the Adult Sample and excludes adult respondents not asked the trust question and/or who were missing on the neighborhood trust variable, the L.A. County weight variable, and on legal status, for a total of 473 respondents missing. The total final sample for Wave 2 consists of 1,399 adult respondents living in 391 census tracts in Los Angeles County.

### **Methods and Analytical Approach**

I use Wave 1 and Wave 2 of L.A. FANS to examine the changes in the association of neighborhood diversity and neighborhood trust. The analyses proceed in three steps in assessing the relationships displayed in Figures 2-1 and 2-2. I first examine descriptively the association between ethnoracial diversity and trust and nativity diversity and neighborhood trust (Figure 2-1 and 2-2; Tables 2-3 to 2-10). Second, I build nested multi-level varying intercept statistical models that assess the impact of both neighborhood-level and individual-level factors on neighborhood trust. Additionally, I introduce kin and friendship social ties in additional nested

models to assess the impact of social ties on moderating the relationship between diversity and neighborhood trust (Tables 2-11 to 2-12).

### **Dependent Variables**

I operationalize the main dependent variable from a question asked in exactly the same fashion in Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS. Specifically, adult respondents were to choose from one of five choices when asked, “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.” The choices were (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) unsure, (4) disagree, and (5) strongly disagree. Although the descriptive analyses make full use of the data provided by the respondents’ answers, the statistical analyses consolidate these responses to model neighborhood trust. Similar to other studies, neighborhood trust is coded as a dummy variable with 1 representing “neighbors can be trusted,” and 0 representing “neighbors can’t be trusted.” In effect, this study models the probability of neighborhood trust. Respondents who indicated “strongly agree,” or “agree,” on the original item received a value of 1 and individuals who indicated “disagree,” “strongly disagree,” or “unsure,” received a value of 0.<sup>14</sup>

### **Independent Variables**

#### *Ethnoracial and Nativity Diversity*

Neighborhood diversity, or neighborhood heterogeneity, is widely measured by a fragmentation measure, computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of racial/ethnic/native group share and reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population belong to different groups. This measure varies from 1, with values closer to 1 representing an increase in diversity (heterogeneity) and a decrease in diversity when values inch towards zero. In the case of two equally represented groups, 50% white and 50% Latino/as, the

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<sup>14</sup> General criticism regarding survey trust questions is that survey responses vary according to the manner in which questions are phrased, and who is asking them (Glaeser et al. 2000).

ethnoracial diversity will be at its maximum (Abascal and Baldassari 2015; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). A value of 0 under the diversity indices represents complete homogeneity. I operationalize two diversity indices to examine the effects of diversity on civic engagement: ethnoracial diversity and nativity diversity.<sup>15</sup> As previously mentioned, higher values on each of these indices represent more diversity within the neighborhood. The two diversity indices are operationalized as follows:

*Ethnoracial Diversity Index*

$$f_i = 1 - \sum_k S_{ki}^2$$

Where  $S_{ki}$  is the share of racial and ethnic group  $k$  (Whites, Blacks, Latino/a, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Other) in census tract  $i$ .

*Nativity Diversity Index*

$$f_i = 1 - \sum_k S_{ki}^2$$

Where  $S_{ki}$  is the share of foreign-born group  $k$  (foreign born and native born) in census tract  $i$ .

In order to differentiate between ethnoracially diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods in Wave 1, I took the median value of the ethnoracial diversity index for the sample of 65 neighborhoods (median value=0.4357) and classified neighborhoods at that value and above as ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods (heterogeneous) and neighborhoods below that value as non-ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods (homogenous). Similarly, to differentiate between immigrant diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods, I took the median value of the nativity diversity index for the sample of 65 neighborhoods (median value=0.4685) and classified neighborhoods at that value or above as immigrant diverse neighborhoods and neighborhoods below that value as non-immigrant diverse neighborhoods.

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<sup>15</sup> I also examined nationality fragmentation but the nationality and nativity fragmentation indices are highly correctly (0.75) and for simplicity, I chose to utilize the nativity fragmentation index.

For Wave 2, I followed a similar procedure to differentiate between ethnoracial and immigrant diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods. I first, though, needed to construct neighborhood-level estimates of percentages of whites, Blacks, Latino/as, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and those of other ethnicities by using linear interpolation to estimate these characteristics in census tracts of Los Angeles County using census data for 2000 and 2010. Since Wave 2 was field between August 2006 and December 2008, I used 2008 estimates for the racial/ethnic make-up for the 391 census tracts that correspond to the Wave 2 cross sectional analytical sample

To differentiate between ethnoracial and immigrant diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods, I accounted for the 391 census tracts encompassed within the Wave 2 sample. I took the median value of the ethnoracial diversity index for the sample of 391 neighborhoods (median value=0.474) and classified neighborhoods at that value and above as ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods (heterogeneous) and neighborhoods below that value as non-ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods (homogenous). Similarly, I took the median value of the nativity diversity index for the sample of 391 neighborhoods (median value=0.4617) and classified neighborhoods at that value or above as immigrant diverse neighborhoods and neighborhoods below that value as non-immigrant diverse neighborhoods.

#### *Individual-Level Factors*

I control the following individual level characteristics for Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS: ethnoracial status, nativity, gender, age, education, marital status, employment, household income, residential stability, and legal status. Ethnoracial status is coded in the following mutually exclusive groups: white, Black, Latino/as, Asian and Pacific Islander, Native American and Other. Nativity is coded as a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was born in

the United States or abroad. Education is coded as less than high school (0-11), high school graduate (12 years), some college (12-15 years), and college degree plus (16 years or more of education). Employment is a dichotomous variable capturing employment and not employed. I log household income and include a dummy variable of whether the respondent has moved within the last 2 years. I also coded four legal statuses drawn from a battery of questions asked in both waves of L.A. FANS meant to ascertain individuals' legal status. The four legal statuses operationalized are US citizen, permanent resident, temporary visa/asylum, and undocumented. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 provide the weighted descriptives for the analytic samples for Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS.

### *Neighborhood-Level Factors*

For Waves 1 and 2, I control for three neighborhood characteristics: neighborhood economic disadvantage, neighborhood residential stability, and racial/ethnic composition. For Wave 1, the measure of neighborhood economic disadvantage used is the percentage of households in poverty from the 2000 Census. Neighborhood residential stability,<sup>16</sup> also taken from the 2000 census, is measured by the percentage of the population in the neighborhood that occupies the same dwelling in 2000 as in 1995 (non-movers).<sup>17</sup> I use the percent Black in the census tract to measure the ethnoracial composition of neighborhoods.

For Wave 2, I constructed neighborhood-level estimates of neighborhood disadvantage, neighborhood residential stability, and racial composition of neighborhoods. Using census data for 2000 and 2010, I used linear interpolation to estimate the characteristics annually and used

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<sup>16</sup> I also considered other measures such as percent of the population that lives in residences that owner-occupied from the 2000 Census. This measure though was highly correlated with both non-move and neighborhood median household income.

<sup>17</sup> The measure for residential stability is a continuous variable when used in estimating the multilevel models. Additionally, an inspection of scatter plots for the association between residential stability, as measured by non-mover, and participation showed that the relationship does not reveal any thresholds or non-linearities.

estimates for 2008 for use of Wave 2 cross sectional analytical sample. For Wave 2, I used the percentage in poverty to measure neighborhood disadvantage. Neighborhood residential stability is measured by the percentage of the estimated population in the neighborhood that occupies the same dwelling. I use the percent Black in the census tract to control for the ethnoracial composition of neighborhoods.

### *Analytic Sample*

Table 2-1 provides the weighted individual characteristics for my analysis sample For Wave 1. The final analytic sample consisted of 2,417 adult respondents. As observed from Table 2-1, approximately, 35% of my respondents self-identify as Latino/a and 36% identify as white. Over 40% of the respondents are foreign-born, with approximately a quarter of them with tenuous legal status, such as permanent resident, temporary visa, and or undocumented. Roughly one-third of the sample has residentially moved within the last two years, and the average household income of for the entire sample is \$22,400.

Table 2-2 provides the weighted individual characteristics for my analysis sample for Wave 2. The final analytical sample was made up of 1,399 adult respondents. Approximately 40% of my respondents self-identify as Latino/a and 35% identify as white. Over 46% of the respondents are foreign-born, with approximately 23% of them having a tenuous legal status, such as permanent resident, temporary visa, and or undocumented. Roughly 38% of the sample has residentially moved within the last two years, and the average household income of for the entire sample is \$31,922.

INSERT TABLE 2-1 HERE

INSERT TABLE 2-2 HERE



## Results

### *Descriptive Profile*

Descriptively for Waves 1 and 2, there is greater variation in neighborhood trust and neighborhood diversity in Wave 1 than Wave 2 (Figures 2-1 and 2-2). Figures 2-1 and 2-2 demonstrate the average level of neighborhood trust in LA neighborhoods by ethnoracial diversity and nativity diversity. For Wave 1, there is higher average level of neighborhood trust in ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods, whereas the reverse is true in immigrant diverse neighborhoods with lower average neighborhood trust in diverse neighborhoods by nativity. As indicated earlier, the median value for the ethnoracial heterogeneity index in Wave 1 is 0.4357 and 0.474 in Wave 2. The median value for Wave 1 nativity heterogeneity is 0.4685 and 0.4617 for Wave 2. Depending on the heterogeneity index—whether ethnoracial or nativity—neighborhoods above these median values are classified as heterogeneous neighborhoods, and those below this value are deemed homogenous. What is clear from comparing Waves 1 and 2 is that there is less variation in neighborhood trust in Wave 2 than in Wave 1. Second, for Wave 2, there are overall lower levels of neighborhood trust in both diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods when compared to Wave 1. Finally, unlike Wave 1, neighborhood trust is higher in homogenous neighborhoods by ethnoracial and nativity diversity.

INSERT FIGURE 2-1 HERE

INSERT FIGURE 2-2 HERE

Tables 2-3 and 2-4 illustrate descriptively racial and ethnic differences in neighborhood trust. Overall, between Waves 1 and 2, there is a decrease in respondents who disagreed with the statement, “people in this neighborhood can be trusted,” from 17.05% percent in Wave 1 to 7.49% indicating the same in Wave 2. Latino/as a group disagreed with the statement, “people in

this neighborhood can be trusted” more in Wave 1 (23.68%) than in Wave 2 (12.07%), a 14.61% decrease. Whites have the highest level of neighborhood trust (79.7%) indicating “Agree” or “Strongly Agree,” followed by Asian Americans (74.12%), Other Race (69.59%), African Americans (65.24%), and Latino/as (64.96%). With regard to nativity, 72.79% of natives indicated they “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement “people in this neighborhood can be trusted,” whereas 70.52% of foreign-born respondents indicate the same. For Wave 2, approximately 61.97% of respondents indicated they “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.” In other words, neighborhood trust declined from 68.87% in Wave 1 to 61.97% in Wave 2. Although the levels of mistrust, as captured by responses of “strongly disagree,” and “disagree,” decreased between Waves 1 and 2, the level of trust also decreased in part because a greater percentage of respondents chose “unsure,” in Wave 2. Specifically, 27.90% of respondents responded “unsure,” when asked if “people in the neighborhood can be trust,” in contrast to only 8% of respondents indicating so in Wave 1.

The racial hierarchy of engagement changed during Wave 2 where Asian Americans expressed the highest level of neighborhood trust (69.59%), followed by whites (66.44%), Latino/as (58.54%), and African Americans (51.86%). With regard to nativity in Wave 2, 62.18% of natives indicated they “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement “people in this neighborhood can be trusted,” whereas 61.70% of foreign-born respondents indicated so.

INSERT TABLE 2-3 HERE

INSERT TABLE 2-4 HERE

As mentioned in the review above, education is a determinant of social trust. Tables 2-5 and 2-6 illustrate neighborhood trust by educational level for Waves 1 and 2. Respondents with

less than a high school degree or with a high school degree were more likely to “strongly disagree” or “disagree” with the statement “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.” Conversely, highly educated respondents were more likely to “agree” or “strongly agree” with that statement in both Waves 1 and 2. Specifically, 84.18% of respondents with some college or a college degree either “agree” or “strongly agree” with that statement. This contrasts with 61.81% of respondents with less than a high school degree who indicated so in Wave 1. The gap in neighborhood trust between respondents with high and low levels of education decreases between Waves 1 and 2. Specifically in Wave 2, 68.65% of respondents with some college or a college degree either “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement versus 58.97% of respondents with less than a high school degree who indicated the same. This result is in part explained by the fact that a greater percentage of respondents in Wave 2 decided to choose "unsure," when asked that statement, "people in this neighborhood can be trust."

INSERT TABLE 2-5 HERE

INSERT TABLE 2-6 HERE

Tables 2-7 and 2-8 demonstrate neighborhood trust by legal status. In general, there is a gradient observed between trust and legal status. The more secure you are in your legal status, the less likely you are to indicate lower levels of trust. For example, Table 2-7 illustrates that in Wave 1, 18.2% of citizens, 21.8% of respondents who are legal permanent residents, 28% of respondents with temporary protected status, and 32.22% of individuals without legal status responded that they either “strongly disagree” or “disagree” with the statement “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.” The same pattern is repeated for Wave 2 as illustrated in Table 2-8 with the exception of individuals with no legal status. Specifically, 8.85% of citizens, 14.41% of respondents who are legal permanent residents, and 29.94% of respondents with temporary

protected status responded that they either “strongly disagree” or “disagree” with the statement “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.”

INSERT TABLE 2-7 HERE

INSERT TABLE 2-8 HERE

With regard to social ties, Tables 2-9 and 2-10 demonstrate neighborhood kin and friendship social ties by neighborhood trust for Waves 1 and 2. Overall, both tables illustrate that the more social ties you have in your neighborhood, the more likely a respondent is to “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement, “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.” This is more so the case with friendship ties than kin ties. Specifically, for Wave 1, 81.31% of respondents with “many or most of their friendship” ties in their neighborhoods responded that they “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement versus only 63.35% of respondents with no friendship ties in their neighborhoods. We observe a similar pattern for Wave 2 with 72.47% of respondents with “many or most of their friendship” ties in their neighborhoods responding that they “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement versus only 54.66% of respondents with no friendship ties in their neighborhoods who indicated the same.

INSERT TABLE 2-9 HERE

INSERT TABLE 2-10 HERE

### *Multivariate Findings*

Multi-level logistic regression models predicting neighborhood trust for Wave 1 and Wave 2 are presented in Tables 2-11 and 2-12. By examining two waves of data, we can ascertain the strength of association between population diversity and neighborhood trust over two periods. Tables 2-11 and 2-12 presents a series of estimated models (Models 1-6) in which ethnoracial and nativity diversity are used to predict individual-level neighborhood trust. For

Wave 1, I estimate varying-intercept logistic regression models in which respondents are nested within 65 neighborhoods. For Wave 2, I follow the same analytical strategy, but respondents are nested within 391 neighborhoods. Model 1 for both Wave 1 and 2 provides the baseline model where, contrary to various studies (Costa and Kahn 2003; Putnam 2007), I do not find that greater ethnoraical diversity is associated with neighborhood trust in either wave. In Tables 2-11 and 2-12, Model 2 models ethnoraical and nativity diversity and was used to predict any neighborhood trust. Model 3 examines the main effects and three main neighborhood factors that the extant theoretical and empirical literature has shown to affect trust. Model 4 presents the main effects and includes individual-level factors known to be associated with trust. Model 5 presents the fully saturated model from the multilevel logistic regression predicting neighborhood trust. Lastly, Model 6 introduces kin and social ties in the multilevel logistic regression predicting neighborhood trust.

INSERT TABLE 2-11 HERE

INSERT TABLE 2-12 HERE

To assess and determine the best model, I examined three model fit statistics, included at the bottom of Tables 2-11 and 2-12. In order to obtain the Deviance statistic, I used the formula  $-2 \times \log \text{likelihood}$ . Across these three fit statistics, AIC, BIC, and Deviance, the smaller the value of the respective statistic, the better the fit of the model. For Wave 1 in Table 2-11, it is clear from all three of the fit statistics that Model 6 is the preferred model. Therefore, I will use this model to address the three main research questions. For Wave 2 in Table 2-12, the Deviance statistic as well as the AIC suggest that I should prefer Model 6. The BIC statistic for Model 6 is marginally different from that of Model 5 and, given the conceptual importance of including

social ties as well as the Deviance and AIC fit statistic, I will choose Model 6 as my preferred model to address the main research questions for Wave 2.

*Research Question 1: Do ethnoraical and nativity neighborhood diversity affect individual-level attitudes of neighborhood trust? Do these effects remain once neighborhood and individual level factors are accounted for?*

When comparing Waves 1 and 2, it is clear that the association between population diversity and neighborhood trust has weakened over time. Specifically, in Table 2-11, we can observe that a unit increase in the nativity diversity index is associated with a 3.535 decrease in the expected log odds of neighborhood trust. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01 statistical significance level. Noteworthy is that ethnoraical diversity is not significant at conventional statistical levels, contrary to the extant literature suggesting that racial diversity is associated with trust. Model 6 in Table 2-11 demonstrates that the effect of nativity diversity persists even when accounting for neighborhood- and individual-level factors. Nativity neighborhood diversity exerts an independent effect of neighborhood trust, but ethnoraical diversity does not. This result, however, must be taken with caution because the nativity diversity effect could be an immigrant neighborhood composition effect. Nativity diversity and neighborhood immigrant composition are highly correlated ( $>0.70$ ). Given my existing measures and research design, it is very difficult to decipher which effect--nativity diversity vs. immigrant composition--is driving the negative association with neighborhood trust.

Notably, neighborhood structural factors exert an independent effect on trust. Specifically, neighborhood disadvantage is negatively associated with neighborhood trust. A unit increase in household on public assistance is associated with a 0.058 decrease in the expected log odds of neighborhood trust. Further, residential stability is positively associated with trust. A unit

increase in neighborhood residential stability is associated with a 1.932 increase in the expected log odds of neighborhood trust. This result is significant at the 0.05 statistical significance level.

With regard to individual-level factors, very few factors are associated with neighborhood trust in Wave 1. Gender and age both exert an independent effect on neighborhood trust. Being female versus being male is associated with a 0.229 decrease in the log odds of trusting your neighbor. This result is significant at the 0.05 statistical significance level.

In Wave 2, we can observe that neither ethnoracial diversity or nativity diversity is associated with neighborhood trust. Once you account for individual- and neighborhood-level factors, there are no main effects of neighborhood diversity on neighborhood trust. Similar to the Wave 1 analysis, neighborhood economic disadvantage is associated with neighborhood trust. Specifically, a unit increase in the percentage of households in poverty is associated with a 3.215 decrease in neighborhood trust, a result statistically significant at the 0.001 level. With regard to individual-level factors, age and residential instability are associated with neighborhood trust. Specifically, respondents who indicated that they have moved versus respondents who indicated otherwise is associated with a 0.410 decrease in the expected log odds of trusting your neighbor. This result is significant at the 0.01 statistical significant level.

*Research Question 2: Are there racial and ethnic group differences in neighborhood trust?*

The extant literature is replete with evidence suggesting racial and ethnic group differences in social trust. Certainly, the descriptive analyses encompassed in Tables 2-3 and 2-4 suggest racial and ethnic group differences in neighborhood trust. The statistical analyses across both waves demonstrated in Tables 2-11 and 2-12 provide little evidence suggesting racial and ethnic group differences in neighborhood trust. The exception is for Wave 2 where belonging to

other racial/ethnic group versus being white is associated with a 1.897 unit decrease in neighborhood trust, a result marginally significant at the 0.05 statistically level. I would caution against putting much weight on this finding considering the low number of cases in the other racial/ethnic group.

*Research Question 3: Are kin and friendship social ties within the respondent's neighborhood associated with neighborhood trust?*

For Waves 1 and 2, friendship social ties within respondents' neighborhood is positively associated with neighborhood trust. Specifically, in Wave 1, having "many or most of their friendship" ties versus "few" friendship" ties is associated with a 0.498 unit increase in the log odds of neighborhood trust, a result statistically significant at the 0.001 conventional level. Similarly, in Wave 2, having "many or most of their friendship" ties versus "few" friendship" ties is associated with a 0.424 unit increase in the log odds of neighborhood trust, a result statistically significant at the 0.001 conventional level. Noteworthy, kin ties in both waves do not exert an independent effect on neighborhood trust.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

Findings from this paper have important implications for understanding the relationship between neighborhood diversity and social trust. By examining two separate cross-sectional samples within the same social context, we can observe the changing association, and/or strength thereof, between population diversity and trust. In fact, this paper provides evidence for the suggestion by some scholars that immigration-induced diversity might only exert a short-term effect on trust (Putnam 2007).

Does population diversity negatively affect trust? It depends. Not all diversity is the same and, in fact, the analyses here indicate no evidence that ethnoracial diversity exerts an



independent effect on trust in either time period. More research needs to explore the dynamic between the existing racial and ethnic make-up context and the persistent (or lack) of population diversity in said context. Given the longevity of racial and ethnic diversity in Los Angeles, racial neighborhood diversity might not matter in predicting and influencing social outcomes of interest such as trust and civic engagement.

Nativity diversity exerted an independent influence on trust, controlling for individual- and-neighborhood-level factors. This effect, however, was only present during Wave 1 as the Wave 2 analyses demonstrate that, once you account for individual- and neighborhood-level factors, no effect remains. Caution is warranted with this finding as the research design and the measures used are limited to the extent that they cannot definitely decipher whether this effect is due to nativity diversity or neighborhood immigrant composition. Further research needs to explore more closely the relationship between neighborhood immigrant composition and the probability of out-group contact within neighborhoods. Regardless, this finding of negative diversity exerting a strong effect on trust in Wave 1 and not Wave 2 further pushes scholars to think about macro- and or micro-level processes that occurred during the two time periods that might have affected the attitudes on trust in the presence of nativity diversity.

Neighborhood structural circumstances weigh heavily on individual-level attitudes on trust. In both waves, it is clear that neighborhood economic disadvantage exerts a significant influence on neighborhood trust. The findings here further strengthen the argument advanced by scholars such as Abascal and Baldassari (2015) that it is, in fact, economic inequality that drives attitudes on social trust. In both waves of the analyses above, poverty is negatively associated with neighborhood trust. Additionally, Wave 1 analysis also demonstrates that residential stability at the neighborhood level exerts a positive influence on neighborhood trust. Further

research needs to examine the point at which neighborhood economic disadvantage starts to exert an influence on trust. In other words, is there a tipping point where too much poverty has unintended consequences on social trust?

The findings in this paper also point to the need to further integrate the individuals' social networks to understand the effects on population changes to various social outcomes such as social trust and civic engagement. For both waves of the analyses, friendship ties independently exert an influence on neighborhood trust. Having more friends within one's neighborhood is good for neighborhood trust. It is not only important to examine the in-group/out-group connections individuals have or opportunities that some social contexts might provide them, but existing friendship connections also potentially exert an influence on the trust/mistrust individuals have toward others.

**Table 2-1: Wave 1 Weighted Descriptives of Analytic Sample**

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<b>Individual-Level Variables (N=2,417)</b>	
Independent Variables	
Ethnoracial Groups (%)	
White	36.32
Latino/as	35.58
Black	10.29
Asian	15.4
Other	2.41
Nativity (% Foreign-born)	40.98
Gender (% Female)	46.16
Age (mean)	39.75
Education	
Less than HS	22.27
HS Graduate (12 years)	22.05
Some College (12-15 years)	30.66
College Degree+ (16+ years)	25.02
Married (% married)	46.96
Employed (% employed)	66.93
Household Income (median)	\$22,400
Residential Stability (% moved within last 2	28.37
Legal Status (%)	
US Citizen	75.52
Permanent Resident (LPR)	12.36
Temp Visa/Asylum	3.49
Undocumented	8.62

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Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

**Table 2-2: Wave 2 Weighted Descriptives of Analytic Sample**

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<b>Individual-Level Variables (N=1,399)</b>	
Independent Variables	
Ethnoracial Groups (%)	
White	35.21
Latino/as	40.14
Black	8.17
Asian	14.95
Other	1.52
Nativity (% Foreign-born)	46.01
Gender (% Female)	43.69
Age (mean)	39.12
Education	
Less than HS	23.05
HS Graduate (12 years)	18.93
Some College (12-15 years)	26.12
College Degree+ (16+ years)	31.90
Married (% married)	52.97
Employed (% employed)	67.19
Household Income (mean)	\$31,922
Residential Stability (% moved withi	38.05
Legal Status (%)	
US Citizen	77.28
Permanent Resident (LPR)	11.93
Temp Visa/Asylum	1.95
Undocumented	9.32

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Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

<b>Table 2-3: Wave 1 Neighborhood Trust by Ethnoracial and Nativity Status (N=2,417)</b>					
	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Whites	2.45	11.41	6.44	70.95	8.75
Blacks	5.48	19.34	9.94	59.8	5.44
Latino/as	3.11	23.68	8.25	60.79	4.17
Asian	1.95	14.22	9.72	66.89	7.23
Other Race	9.49	12.31	8.61	58.41	11.18
Native Born	4.26	15.52	7.42	64.24	8.55
Foreign Born	1.40	19.25	8.84	66.72	3.80
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.09</b>	<b>17.05</b>	<b>8.00</b>	<b>65.26</b>	<b>6.61</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

<b>Table 2-4: Wave 2 Neighborhood Trust by Ethnoracial and Nativity Status (N=1,399)</b>					
	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Whites	3.65	2.20	27.71	55.45	10.99
Blacks	2.4	16.39	29.35	43.46	8.4
Latino/as	1.8	12.07	26.59	53.02	6.52
Asian	2.81	3.49	24.1	64.1	5.49
Other Race	1.30	0.00	96.74	1.96	0.00
Native Born	2.26	6.65	28.91	52.87	9.31
Foreign Born	3.09	8.46	26.72	55.28	6.45
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>7.49</b>	<b>27.90</b>	<b>53.97</b>	<b>8.00</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2



Note: The percentages for "Other race" seems odds, but it's because there are only 10 cases in that group.

<b>Table 2-5: Wave 1 Neighborhood Trust by Education (N=2,417)</b>					
	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Less than High School	2.98	25.33	9.88	57.82	3.99
High School	6.46	21.68	6.19	59.03	6.64
Some College	2.29	15.16	8.98	67.75	5.82
College	1.2	7.9	6.72	74.32	9.86
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.09</b>	<b>17.05</b>	<b>8.00</b>	<b>65.26</b>	<b>6.61</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

<b>Table 2-6: Wave 2 Neighborhood Trust by Education (N=1,399)</b>					
	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Less than High School	3.26	11.76	26.00	53.02	5.95
High School	1.38	11.71	28.63	54.19	4.08
Some College	2.66	7.27	30.95	49.96	9.16
College	2.93	2.06	26.35	57.82	10.83
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>7.49</b>	<b>26.35</b>	<b>57.82</b>	<b>8.00</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2



<b>Table 2-7: Wave 1 Neighborhood Trust by Legal Status (N=2,417)</b>					
	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Citizen	3.50	14.62	8.08	65.78	8.02
LPR	1.93	19.87	7.24	67.92	3.05
Temporary	0.89	27.11	5.05	64.50	2.45
Undocumented	2.06	30.16	9.61	57.17	1.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.09</b>	<b>17.05</b>	<b>8.00</b>	<b>65.26</b>	<b>6.61</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

<b>Table 2-8: Wave 2 Neighborhood Trust by Legal Status (N=1,399)</b>					
	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Citizen	2.58	6.27	27.80	54.97	8.38
LPR	3.00	11.41	27.77	53.19	4.63
Temporary	2.63	27.31	22.33	20.52	27.2
Undocumented	2.58	8.16	29.54	51.8	7.91
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>7.49</b>	<b>27.90</b>	<b>53.97</b>	<b>8.00</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2



<b>Table 2-9: Wave 1 Neighborhood Trust by Social Ties (N=2,417)</b>					
<b>Kin Ties</b>	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
None (%)	2.32	16.53	8.09	66.01	7.05
A few (%)	5.50	19.03	7.79	62.19	5.49
Many or Most of all of them (%)	2.31	14.83	7.79	69.42	5.65
<b>Friendship Ties</b>	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
None (%)	3.47	21.1	12.08	61.11	2.24
A few (%)	2.83	16.35	7.09	66.97	6.76
Many or Most of all of them (%)	3.28	11.8	3.43	67.18	14.31
<b>Total</b>	3.09	17.05	8.00	65.26	6.61

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

<b>Table 2-10: Wave 2 Neighborhood Trust by Social Ties (N=1,399)</b>					
<b>Kin Ties</b>	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
None (%)	3.52	6.48	26.05	57.31	6.63
A few (%)	0.69	9.64	34.5	43.43	11.74
Many or Most of all of them (%)	0.41	10.37	19.53	62.02	7.66
<b>Friendship Ties</b>	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
None (%)	2.54	7.92	34.87	48.51	6.15
A few (%)	3.33	7.55	25.10	57.10	6.91
Many or Most of all of them (%)	0.42	6.16	20.93	56.07	16.42
<b>Total</b>	2.64	7.49	27.90	53.97	8.00

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

**Table 2-11: Wave 1 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Neighborhood Trust (N=2,417)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.490 (0.685)	0.524 (0.629)	0.680 (0.542)	0.737 (0.594)	0.862 (0.537)	0.884 (0.529)
Nativity Diversity		-6.933*** (1.535)	-3.845** (1.283)	-6.328*** (1.512)	-3.651** (1.304)	-3.535** (1.284)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						0.001 (0.082)
Friends Social Ties						0.498*** (0.076)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			2.017* (0.935)		1.947* (0.924)	1.932* (0.908)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-1.498 (1.069)		-1.176 (1.065)	-1.043 (1.048)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.062*** (0.016)		-0.058*** (0.016)	-0.058*** (0.016)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				-0.005 (0.185)	-0.037 (0.184)	-0.107 (0.185)
Black				-0.236 (0.214)	-0.129 (0.214)	-0.136 (0.216)
Asian-American				-0.321 (0.238)	-0.356 (0.235)	-0.359 (0.237)
Other				-0.638 (0.403)	-0.636 (0.403)	-0.675 (0.410)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)				0.101 (0.168)	0.133 (0.167)	0.181 (0.169)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.231* (0.102)	-0.231* (0.102)	-0.229* (0.103)
Age				0.022*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.004)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				-0.085 (0.138)	-0.094 (0.138)	-0.094 (0.139)
Some College				0.171 (0.149)	0.138 (0.149)	0.145 (0.151)
College or More				0.288 (0.192)	0.259 (0.190)	0.298 (0.192)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.085 (0.102)	0.068 (0.102)	0.056 (0.103)
Employed (1=employed)				0.169 (0.109)	0.158 (0.109)	0.183 (0.110)
Household Income (logged)				0.019 (0.015)	0.016 (0.015)	0.013 (0.015)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.216* (0.108)	-0.214* (0.108)	-0.143 (0.109)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				0.132 (0.173)	0.146 (0.172)	0.160 (0.175)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				0.326 (0.244)	0.334 (0.243)	0.289 (0.247)
Undocumented				0.321 (0.191)	0.351 (0.190)	0.348 (0.193)
Constant	0.071 (0.685)	3.519*** (0.819)	1.776* (0.861)	2.006* (0.832)	0.507 (0.898)	-0.009 (0.889)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.5
Log likelihood	-1433.661	-1424.405	-1406.665	-1386.552	-1370.948	-1348.153
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	2867.322	2848.810	2813.330	2773.104	2741.896	2696.306
AIC	2873.323	2856.810	2827.330	2815.104	2789.897	2748.306
BIC	2890.694	2879.971	2867.862	2936.700	2928.864	2898.853

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 2-12: Wave 2 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Neighborhood Trust (N=1,399)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	-0.365 (0.459)	-0.739 (0.467)	-0.993 (0.537)	0.365 (0.434)	-0.670 (0.521)	-0.571 (0.573)
Nativity Diversity		-3.176** (1.109)	-1.702 (1.095)	-2.932** (1.068)	-1.835 (1.081)	-2.060 (1.099)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.116 (0.106)
Friends Social Ties						0.424*** (0.097)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			0.287 (1.033)		0.352 (0.989)	0.397 (1.004)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-1.604 (0.865)		-0.752 (0.885)	-0.731 (0.894)
Econ. Disadvantage (% in Poverty)			-3.577** (1.087)		-3.337** (1.073)	-3.215** (1.086)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				0.022 (0.218)	0.105 (0.216)	0.114 (0.219)
Black				-0.838** (0.254)	-0.539* (0.265)	-0.492 (0.268)
Asian-American				0.018 (0.286)	-0.023 (0.283)	0.035 (0.285)
Other				-2.131* (0.861)	-1.955* (0.851)	-1.897* (0.856)
Nativity (1=Foreign-born)				0.028 (0.192)	0.044 (0.189)	0.0611 (0.191)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.199 (0.132)	-0.185 (0.131)	-0.155 (0.132)
Age				0.019*** (0.005)	0.017** (0.005)	0.016** (0.005)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				-0.089 (0.186)	-0.129 (0.185)	-0.134 (0.187)
Some College				0.085 (0.191)	0.145 (0.227)	0.139 (0.193)
College or More				0.308 (0.227)	0.145 (0.227)	-0.012 (0.193)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.285* (0.126)	0.225 (0.126)	0.225 (0.127)
Employed (1=employed)				0.052 (0.142)	0.030 (0.141)	0.072 (0.142)
Household Income (logged)				0.004 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.391** (0.139)	-0.439** (0.136)	-0.410** (0.138)
Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.105 (0.196)	-0.079 (0.195)	-0.091 (0.197)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.371 (0.353)	-0.288 (0.351)	-0.329 (0.355)
Undocumented				0.227 (0.224)	0.318 (0.223)	0.256 (0.225)
Constant	0.303 (0.210)	1.829** (0.575)	1.987* (0.993)	0.925 (0.672)	1.208 (1.037)	0.881 (1.055)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Log likelihood	-923.801	-919.784	-901.421	-883.663	-871.888	-533.010
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1847.602	1839.568	1802.842	1767.326	1743.776	1066.020
AIC	1853.601	1847.567	1816.841	1809.326	1791.777	1776.043
BIC	1869.332	1986.541	1853.546	1919.44	1917.621	1912.374

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

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**CHAPTER 3: CIVIC "FITNESS": THE EFFECTS OF NATIVITY IN SHAPING  
NEIGHBORHOOD CIVIC OUTCOMES AND TRUST**

## **Introduction**

The growing immigrant-driven racial and ethnic diversity of industrialized developed nations is not without challenges, as can be observed in the public arena of politics, sports, and entertainment (Putnam 2007). In Italy, Cecile Kyenge, the government's first black cabinet member, attempted to advance legislation to ease the path for second-generation immigrant children to gain automatic citizenship when born in Italy, but faced racial and xenophobic insults. An Italian parliament member likened Cecile Kyenge to an orangutan, and some anti-immigrant groups accused her of introducing "tribal" traditions in Italy (Paggoli 2013; SangBender 2013). Black Italian soccer player, Mario Balotelli, also known as Super Mario, has been greeted with monkey imitations and faced soccer fans chanting to him, "[t]here's no such thing as a black Italian" (Poggioli 2012). During the 2013 Major League Baseball's All-Star Game, Marc Anthony, a singer born and raised in New York, faced attacks on social media after he sang "God Bless America" during the opening ceremony (Moreno 2013). Some of the published twitter attacks by baseball fans included statements such as, "Why is a Mexican, Marc Anthony, singing God Bless America? Doesn't he know this is AMERICA's song?" and "Marc Anthony singing God Bless America on the MLB Allstar Game.....am I the only person that finds that unAmerican" (Moreno 2013).

What these three public incidents demonstrate is racism on the one hand and, on the other hand, a nativist expression of exclusion. Kyenge not only faced racial insults likening her to an orangutan, but the fact that she was accused of introducing "tribalism" speaks to her perceived cultural difference from Italians. Likewise, Mario Balotelli faced chants that his blackness is antithetical to being "native" of Italy. In the United States, Marc Anthony, legally a U.S. native

since he was born in the New York City, is perceived as a non-native vis-a-vis his non-whiteness.

These three examples drawn from Italy and the United States highlight the ways that immigrant-receiving democracies are challenged as to what it be “native” and look “American” as in the case of Marc Anthony. These examples demonstrate that identity and who belongs within nation-states, “still express particularity and are conceived of as being territorially bounded” (Soysal 1994: 159). These public incidents also raise questions as to how democratic nation-states are to deal with the increasing racial and ethnic diversity induced by past and current immigration. Specifically, immigration since the 1960s in the United States brought migrants from Latin America and Asia differentiated by race/ethnicity, nationality, and culture (Putnam 2007; Schmidley 2003).

Many scholars focused on the effects of population diversity on social cohesion and, in doing so, focused primarily on the main effects of racial/ethnic diversity on a host of outcome measures that capture social cohesion (Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Glaeser et al. 2000; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Putnam 2007; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006; Vigdor 2001). Additionally, some scholars focused on ethnoracial group differences and merely controlled for citizenship. Specifically, Abascal and Baldassarri find that racial diversity triggers out-group division among whites only: “living among nonwhites—not in diverse communities per se—negatively predicts trust among whites. No other ethno-racial group exhibits a similar association between out-group contact and trust” (2015: 724). Putnam, however, finds that racial diversity triggers social isolation of people living in diverse neighborhoods, regardless of race/ethnicity: “Rather,

inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighborhoods, regardless of the colour of their skin” (2007: 150-151).

Although both Abascal and Baldasarri (2015) and Putnam (2007) consider racial and ethnic between-group differences, they fail to account for immigration-related factors and altogether ignore that diversity might further aggravate out-group divisions based on nativity status. Controlling for citizenship status is insufficient in accounting for the complexity involved in public incidents where nativity is perceived and used a basis of exclusion and/or out-group division. This paper examines a neglected area in the diversity extant literature to provide a within-group analysis of nativity to further unpack how the effects diversity might be different for both groups.

Additionally, the population heterogeneity literature assumes that the manner in which one comes to engage in civil society or one comes to have faith in strangers is based on an equal social footing: the notion of being born and raised with an understanding of what it means to be a member of and to participate in America’s political, civic, and social life. This assumption, however, ignores the social logic of participating in American’s civil society for immigrants and, importantly, neglects the consequences and implications of living with a tenuous or non-existent legal status (Alexander 2001). Specifically, immigrant characteristics such as legal status are salient given the civil and political context. If one thing differentiates the first wave of immigration from the second wave (post-1965), it is that so many immigrants today faced and continue to face little to no venue to formal citizenship. As noted by various studies, legal immigrants make up a small proportion of immigrants to the United States, where approximately 11 million residents are undocumented immigrants (Jasso et al. 2000). In light of the inability of some immigrants to adjust their status, immigrant characteristics make for an important

dimension in determining who is a member. These characteristics, in effect, are mechanisms to exclude/include, determining who “belongs” and rather, who is “fit” to be a member.

This study has three main research goals. First, I ask whether civic engagement and neighborhood trust are associated with ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity for both native and foreign-born groups. Given the multi-ethnic/multi-racial social context of Los Angeles, will diversity association persist once one accounts for individual-and-neighborhood-level demographic traits? Second, are there national origin and legal status differences in civic engagement and social trust for foreign-born respondents? Once individual-level demographic and economic traits and neighborhood-level structural factors are accounted for, will these differences persist? Third, I ask broadly how social ties—friendship and kin social ties—are associated with civic engagement and neighborhood trust for native and foreign-born groups.

## **Background**

### *Racial/Ethnic and Nativity Diversity*

The empirical literature on the effects of immigration-induced diversity demonstrates that civil society is challenged by diversity. Methodologically, most of the studies make use of the Herfindahl index<sup>18</sup>, which reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population belong to different groups (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Putnam 2007). The findings regarding the negative effects of diversity range from decreased public good expenditures being inversely related to an area’s ethnic fragmentation (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Harris, Evan, and Schwab 2001; Vigdor 2001), low rates of group participation in areas characterized by ethnic, racial and income fragmentation (Alesina and La Ferrera 2000;

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<sup>18</sup> The literature also refers to Herfindal index as fragmentation, fractionalization, or diversity index. All of these measures are all conceptually equivalent.

Costa and Kahn 2003), and levels of trust in areas with racial and nationality fragmentation (Glaeser et al. 2000).

It is still an open and contested question as to whether the effects of diversity are per se real or whether these effects are driven by structural and individual-level characteristics. Although there is a plethora of empirical research providing evidence that diversity diminished social cohesion, other studies, such as Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) find that racial diversity per se does not negatively affect social cohesion. Rather, factors such as residential stability, race and ethnic composition, and economic inequality produce that effect. Ethnoracial diversity might lead to less cohesion given the history of race relations and the persistence of racial discrimination in the United States (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2013; Omi and Winant 2014). Further, the reasons ethnoracial diversity might lead to diminished social cohesion should be considered apart and in combination with nativity diversity. Some scholars argued that nativity diversity induced by persistent immigration in the United States leads to fragmented communities due to economic competition and/or to cultural differences between native and foreign-born individuals (Huntington 2004). Others argue that immigration-induced nativity diversity does not necessarily lead to diminished civic engagement. Kessler and Bloemraad (2010) argue that, although nativity diversity had a slight negative effect only in some advanced countries, there was “nothing inevitable about decline collective-mindedness in the face of increasing diversity...[demonstrating]...that countries with an institutional or policy context promoting economic equality and recognition and accommodation of immigrant minorities experience less dramatic or no declines in collective-mindedness” (320). In effect, depending on institutional or policy context, the effects of diversity are not a given.

*Nativity Differences and Immigrant-Related Factors*

Immigrants to the United States are not homogenous. Immigrants from different national origins are embedded in varying neighborhood contexts and vary in their immigrant-related demographic characteristics like legal status (Stoll and Wong (2007). Nationality and legal status are understudied in the extant literature examining the effects of diversity on social cohesion. The role of legal status is, in fact, not explicitly examined as a mediating variable or used as a control variable. Citizenship status—whether respondent is a citizen or not—is a control variable in Putnam’s analysis that examines the determinants of trust among neighbors (Putnam 2007). Putnam’s results indicate that citizenship status marginally affects the probability of trusting neighbors, holding individual and contextual variables constant. There is no discussion as to the role of citizenship status or whether it affects the relationship between diversity and other outcomes besides trust, such as civic engagement. What is clear from the literature examining the effects of diversity is that legal status is ignored in all but one study where citizenship is accounted for as a control variable.

### **Research Questions**

This paper addresses three main questions in light of the neglect in the extant literature of how native and foreign-born groups might be differently affected by ethnoracial and nativity diversity. I first ask whether ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity affect individual-level civic engagement behavior and attitudes of neighborhood trust for native and foreign-born individuals and whether these effects remain once neighborhood and individual-level factors are accounted for. Second, are there nationality and legal status group difference in civic engagement and neighborhood trust for foreign-born respondents? Third, are kin and friendship social ties within the respondent’s neighborhood associated with civic engagement and neighborhood trust for foreign-born and native-born individuals?



## **Data**

Using data from Wave 1 and Wave 2 of the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (L.A. FANS), this chapter models the mechanisms through which neighborhood diversity by ethnoracial and nativity correspond to patterns of civic engagement and neighborhood trust for native and foreign-born groups. I account for the individual-level demographic characteristics of age, income, and education as well as for contextual factors, such as neighborhood inequality and residential stability, that explain and potentially mediate the association between neighborhood diversity and social cohesion. Neighborhoods in this study are operationalized by census tracts, which contain a population of approximately 4,000 individuals.

Wave 1 of the Los Angeles Neighborhood Family and Neighborhood Survey (L.A. FANS) is a longitudinal probability sample of individuals, families and neighborhoods in Los Angeles County. Wave 1 of the survey was fielded between April 2000 and January 2002. I primarily focus on the adult respondents and combine contextual data from the 1990 and 2000 census tract level data. A total of 65 census tracts were sampled and between 40 and 50 households were sampled within each census tract. L.A. FANS was designed to capture detailed information at the individual, family, and neighborhood levels (Pebly and Sastry n.d.; Peterson 2003). These original 65 census tracts serve as the sampling units for L.A. FANS as defined by the 1990 census tract boundaries. L.A. FANS uses census tracts to define neighborhoods and uses a multi-stage, clustered stratified sample where the 1,652 census tracts of Los Angeles were divided into very poor, poor, and non-poor strata based on 1990 census poverty rates (Peterson et al. 2003). An advantage of L.A. FANS is that it over-samples poor neighborhoods, making it useful for studying immigrants and their integration processes.

For Wave 1, within each household, L.A. FANS randomly sampled one adult for an interview, with a total of 2,623 adults in the sample, which is also known as the Adult Sample (Peterson et al. 2003). This study constructed two samples—native and foreign-born—from the Adult Sample and excludes adult respondents not asked the civic engagement battery of questions along with those for whom the civic engagement variable, neighborhood trust L.A. weight variable, and legal status were missing. In all 202 respondents were excluded. The total final sample for Wave 1 consists of 1,286 foreign-born and 1,135 native-born adult respondents.

Wave 2 of the survey was fielded between August 2006 and December 2009. I primarily focus on the adult respondents and combine interpolated contextual data from 2008 census tract level data. For Wave 2, L.A. FANS's sample design consists of three main groups: (1) respondents who were interviewed during Wave One and still reside in Los Angeles County; (2) individuals who were interviewed during Wave Two, but reside outside Los Angeles County; and (3) new respondents (new entrants) who live within the 65 original sampled census tracts but did not live in them during the time that Wave One was fielded (Peterson et al. 2001). To maximize sample size, the Wave 2 analytical sample is a cross-sectional sample that includes all eligible adult respondents residing in Los Angeles County at Wave 2, which includes respondents residing in the original 65 L.A. FANS tracts plus respondents who are in Los Angeles County, but outside the original 65 L.A. FANS tracts at Wave 2.

The Wave 2 sample was constructed from the Adult Sample and excludes adult respondents not asked the civic engagement battery of questions along with those for whom the civic engagement variable, neighborhood trust, L.A. weight variable, and legal status were missing, for a total of 473 respondents excluded. The total final sample for Wave 2 consists of 742 foreign-born and 657 native-born adult respondents living in 391 census tracts.

## **Methods and Analytic Approach**

Although the analyses in the previous two chapters control for nativity status, this chapter splits the analytic samples for Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS and examines the effects of ethnoracial diversity and nativity separately for native and foreign-born individuals. Table 3-1 demonstrates the weighted descriptives of the foreign-born sample for Wave 1, while Table 3-2 does the same for the native-born group. Tables 3-3 and 3-4 demonstrate the foreign-born and native-born sample characteristics for Wave 2.

INSERT TABLE 3-1 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-2 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-3 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-4 HERE

With both the foreign-and-native-born samples, I use Wave 1 of L.A. FANS to examine changes in the association of neighborhood diversity, civic engagement, and neighborhood trust. Second, I build nested multi-level varying-intercept statistical models that assess the impact of both neighborhood-level and individual-level factors on overall civic engagement as well as participation in socially oriented civic organizations and professionally oriented civic organizations for both samples over two waves of data (Tables 3-17 and 3-18). Third, I build nested multi-level varying-intercept statistical models that assess the impact of both neighborhood-level and individual-level factors on neighborhood trust for both samples over two waves of data (Table 3-19).

## **Dependent Variables**

In this study, I operationalize a dichotomous dependent variable that captures whether respondents participated in any civic organizations (CE) and their level of neighborhood trust. I

also differentiated between two different types of organizations in which residents participate: socially oriented civic organizations (SOCO) and professionally oriented civic organizations (POCO). These measures of civic engagement are all behavioral measures variables drawn from a battery of questions asked in both waves of L.A. FANS. For Wave 1, L.A. FANS asked respondents whether, within the previous 12 months, they participated in various activities: neighborhood/block organization meetings, business/civic groups, nationality/ethnic pride clubs, local/state political organizations, volunteering with a local organization, veterans group, labor union, literary, art, discussion group, fraternity, sorority or alumni group. For Wave 2, L.A. FANS included additional questions, specifically whether respondents participated in a group seeking to change something in their community or in their neighborhoods. Further, a grab-all question asked whether respondents identified another type of local group or organization. These specific responses were re-coded to be integrated in overall civic engagement if they met the conceptual construct of civic engagement. Specifically, the civic engagement variable included respondents who indicated participation in the following groups/organizations: sport, hobby, school, charity, and miscellaneous. I excluded responses that indicated church and alcohol-related group participation.

For Wave 1 and Wave 2, the variable civic engagement (CE) is coded as a dummy variable with 1 representing “participated in civic organization/group” and 0 representing “did not participate in civic organization/group.” Operationalizing civic engagement as a dichotomous variable not only accounts for all the varied activities individuals might engage in, but it is also parsimonious. Civic organizations, however, are not monolithic; rather, they have distinct organizational missions and values (Ramakrishnan 2005). Individuals also have varied motivations and incentives to engage in a particular form of organizational participation (Knack

and Keefer 1997; Putnam 2000; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006). Therefore, I also account for the different pathways to engage in civil society by operationalizing two types of potential respondent engagement: socially oriented civic organizations (SOCO) and professionally oriented civic organizations (POCO). Other scholars have recognized that organizations might provide different values and norms and, therefore, individuals might be motivated to join and participate by different reasons (Knack and Keefer 1997; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006). For Wave 1, I classify respondents in SOCO engagement if they indicated participating in one of the following activities and/or organizations: (1) neighborhood/block organization; (2) nationality/ethnic pride club; (3) volunteering with a local organization; (4) literary, art, or discussion groups; and (5) fraternity, sorority or alumni group. For Wave 2, I classify respondents in SOCO engagement if they indicated participating in one of the following activities and/or organizations: (1) neighborhood/block organization; (2) nationality/ethnic pride club; (3) volunteering with a local organization; (4) literary, art, or discussion groups; (5) fraternity, sorority or alumni group; (6) group involved in bringing change in the community/neighborhood; (7) sports-related groups; (8) hobby-related groups; (9) other civic groups (charity, school, miscellaneous). For Wave 1, I classify respondents in POCO engagement if they indicated participation in one of the following organizations: (1) business/civic group; (2) local/state political organization; (3) veterans group; and (4) labor union. For Wave 2, I classify respondents in POCO engagement if they indicated they participated in one of the following organizations: (1) business/civic group; (2) local/state political organization; (3) veterans group; and (4) labor union.

Additionally, I operationalize the trust dependent variable from a question asked in exactly the same fashion in Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS. Specifically, adult respondents were

to choose from one of five given choices when asked, “people in this neighborhood can be trusted.” The choices were (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) unsure, (4) disagree, and (5) strongly disagree. Although the descriptive analyses make full use of the data provided by the respondents’ answers, the statistical analyses consolidate these responses to model neighborhood trust where the variable is coded as a dummy variable with 1 representing “neighbors can be trusted” and 0 representing “neighbors can’t be trusted.” In effect, this study models the probability of neighborhood trust. Respondents who indicated “strongly agree” or “agree” on the original item received a value of 1 and individuals who indicated “unsure,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” received a value of 0.

## **Independent Variables**

### *Ethnoracial and Nativity Diversity*

Neighborhood diversity, or heterogeneity, is widely measured by a fragmentation measure computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of racial/ethnic/native-group share and reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population belong to different groups. This measure varies from 1, with values closer to 1 representing an increase in diversity and a decrease in diversity when values inch towards zero. In the case of two equally represented groups, 50% white and 50% Latino/as, the ethnoracial diversity will be at its maximum (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). A value of 0 under the diversity indices represents complete homogeneity. I operationalize two diversity indices to examine the effects of diversity on civic engagement: ethnoracial diversity and nativity diversity.<sup>19</sup> As previously mentioned, higher values on each of these indices represent more diversity within the neighborhood. The two diversity indices are operationalized as follows:

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<sup>19</sup> I also examined nationality fragmentation but the nationality and nativity fragmentation indices are highly correctly (0.75) and for simplicity, I chose to utilize the nativity fragmentation index.

*Ethnoracial Diversity Index*

$$f_i = 1 - \sum_k S_{ki}^2$$

Where  $S_{ki}$  is the share of racial and ethnic group  $k$  (whites, blacks, Latino/a, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Other) in census tract  $i$ .

*Nativity Diversity Index*

$$f_i = 1 - \sum_k S_{ki}^2$$

Where  $S_{ki}$  is the share of foreign-born group  $k$  (foreign-born and native-born) in census tract  $i$ .

To differentiate between ethnoracially diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods in Wave 1, I took the median value of the ethnoracial diversity index for the sample of 65 neighborhoods for both the foreign-born and native-born samples and classified neighborhoods at that value and above as ethnoracially diverse and those below that value as non-ethnoracially diverse. Similarly, to differentiate between immigrant diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods, I took the median value of the nativity diversity index for the sample of 65 neighborhoods and classified neighborhoods at that value or above as immigrant diverse and those below that value as non-immigrant diverse. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 demonstrate the median values for the racial and nativity heterogeneity indices for the foreign-born and native-born samples.

For Wave 2, I followed a similar procedure to differentiate between ethnoracial and immigrant diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods. I first, though, needed to construct neighborhood-level estimates of percentages of whites, blacks, Latino/as, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and those who identify as Other ethnicities/race by using linear interpolation to estimate these characteristics in Los Angeles County census tracts using census data for 2000 and 2010. Since Wave 2 was field between August 2006 and December 2008, I used 2008 estimates for the racial/ethnic make-up for the 391 census tracts that corresponds to Wave 2 cross-sectional analytical sample.

To differentiate between ethnoracial and immigrant diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods, I accounted for the 391 census tracts encompassed within the Wave Two sample. I took the median value of the ethnoracial diversity index for both the native-born and foreign-born samples and classified neighborhoods at that value and above as ethnoracially diverse and those below that value as non-ethnoracially diverse. Similarly, I took the median value of the nativity diversity index for the native-born and foreign-born samples and classified neighborhoods at that value or above as immigrant diverse and those below that value as non-immigrant diverse. Tables 3-4 and 3-5 demonstrate the median values for the racial and nativity heterogeneity indices for the foreign-born and native-born samples for Wave 2.

#### *Individual-Level Immigrant Factors*

For the foreign-born sample, I account for nationality and legal status individual-level characteristics for Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS. Specifically, I differentiated among the following national origin groups: Mexican, Central American, East and South Asian, and all other nationalities. Similar to Chapters 1 and 2, I observe the following legal statuses: citizen, permanent resident, temporary visa or asylum recipient, and undocumented.

#### *Individual-Level Factors*

I control the following individual-level characteristics for the native-group sample for Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS: ethnoracial status, gender, age, education, marital status, employment, household income, and residential stability. Ethnoracial status is coded in the following mutually exclusive groups: white, black, Latino/a, Asian and Pacific Islander, Native American and Other. Education is coded in the following manner: less than high school (0 to 11), high school graduate (12 years), some college (12 to 15 years), college degree plus (16 years or more of education). Employment is a dichotomous variable capturing employment and not



employed. I log household income and include a dummy variable of whether a respondent has moved within the last 2 years. Tables 1B and 1D provide the weighted descriptives for the analytic samples for the native-born group for Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS.

I control the following individual-level characteristics for the foreign-born group sample for Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS: gender, age, education, marital status, employment, household income, and residential stability. Education is coded in the following manner: less than high school (0-11), high school graduate (12 years), some college (12-15 years), college degree plus (16 years or more of education). Employment is a dichotomous variable capturing: employment and not employed. I log household income and include a dummy variable whether respondent has moved within the last 2 years. Tables 3-1 and 3-3 provide the weighted descriptives for the analytic samples for the foreign-born group for Waves 1 and 2 of L.A. FANS, respectively.

#### *Neighborhood-Level Factors*

For Waves 1 and 2, I control for three neighborhood characteristics: economic disadvantage, residential stability, and racial/ethnic composition. For Wave 1, the measure of neighborhood economic disadvantage used is the percentage of households in poverty as presented in data from the 2000 census. Neighborhood residential stability,<sup>20</sup> also taken from the 2000 census, is measured by the percentage of the population in the neighborhood who occupy the same dwelling in 2000 as in 1995 (non-movers).<sup>21</sup> I use the percentage of African Americans in the census tract to measure neighborhoods' ethnoracial composition.

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<sup>20</sup> I also considered other measures such as percentage of the population who live in residences that were owner-occupied from the 2000 Census. This measure though was highly correlated with both non-move and neighborhood median household income.

<sup>21</sup> The measure for residential stability is a continuous variable when used in estimating the multilevel models. Additionally, an inspection of scatter plots for the association between residential stability, as measured by non-mover, and participation showed that the relationship does not reveal any thresholds or non-linearities.

For Wave 2, I constructed neighborhood-level estimates of neighborhood disadvantage, residential stability, and racial composition. Using Census data for 2000 and 2010, I used linear interpolation to estimate the characteristics annually and used estimates for 2008 for the Wave 2 cross-sectional analytical sample. For Wave 2, I used the percentage in poverty to measure neighborhood disadvantage. Residential stability is measured by the percentage of the estimated population in the neighborhood who occupy the same dwelling. I use the percentage of African Americans in the census tract to measure ethnoracial composition.

### *Analytic Samples*

Table 3-1 provides the weighted demographic characteristics for my foreign-born sample for Wave One. The final analytic sample consisted of 1,286 adult respondents. As observed from Table 3-1, approximately, 45% of respondents are Mexican nationals, 13% are Central American, and 25% are from East and South Asia. Approximately 40% of respondents are citizens, and the rest of the foreign-born sample indicated tenuous legal status, such as permanent residence, temporary visa, or undocumented. Roughly one-third of the sample has residentially moved within the previous two years. The average household income of the entire sample is \$17,000. Additionally, foreign-born respondents predominantly live in Latino and immigrant neighborhoods. Table 1C provides the weighted demographic characteristics for my foreign-born sample for Wave Two. The final analytic sample consists of 742 adult respondents. As observed from Table 3-3, approximately, 50% of respondents are Mexican national, 15% are Central American and 21% are from East and South Asia. Approximately 51% of respondents are citizens, and the rest of the foreign-born sample indicated tenuous legal status, such as permanent resident, temporary visa, or undocumented. Roughly 40% of the sample has residentially moved within the previous two years. The average household income of the entire sample is \$23,500.

Additionally, foreign-born respondents predominantly live in Latino and immigrant neighborhoods.

Table 3-2 provides the weighted individual characteristics for the native-born sample for Wave One. The final analytical sample consists of 1,286 adult respondents. Approximately, 18% of respondents identify as Latino/a and 55% identify as white. Roughly 26% of the sample residentially moved within the previous two years. The average household income of the entire sample is \$29,300. Native-born respondents live in predominantly white and Latino neighborhoods. Table 3-4 provides the weighted individual characteristics for the native-born sample for Wave Two. The final analytical sample consists of 657 adult respondents. Approximately, 16% of respondents self-identify as Latino/a and 59% identify as white. Roughly 36% of the sample has residentially moved within the previous two years. The average household income of the entire sample is \$39,000. Native-born respondents live in predominantly white and Latino neighborhoods.

In summary, over the two waves of data, we can observe that foreign-born and native-born respondents live in dramatically different neighborhood contexts. Native-born individuals are more likely to live in affluent neighborhoods with less residential turnover. Additionally, the foreign-born sample is less educated and has a tenuous legal presence in the United States.

## **Results**

### *Descriptive Profile*

Table 3-6 illustrates descriptively racial and ethnic differences in civic engagement for the native-born respondents while Table 3-5 demonstrates the national origin and legal status differences in civic engagement for the foreign-born respondents. Tables 3-7 and 3-8 similarly display these differences for Wave Two. For both foreign-born and native-born, there is an

increase in overall engagement between Waves 1 and 2. Mexicans and Central Americans tend to have lower levels of engagement compared to respondents of other national origin groups. Whites and Asians tend to have higher levels of engagement in the native-born group. With regard to legal status, in Wave One, temporary status and undocumented respondents indicated the lowest level of engagement when compared to citizens and permanent residents. Specifically, 36.15% of foreign-born citizens indicated that they civically engaged in the previous year compared to 10.37% of undocumented foreign-born respondents. In Wave Two, the major differences in engagement is between citizen foreign-born respondents and everyone else. Specifically, 37.87% of citizen foreign-born respondents indicated they engaged civically, compared to 21.70% of permanent residents, 20.97% of temporary residents, and 22.50% of undocumented foreign-born respondents. Across all respondents in both waves, there is higher level of engagement in SOCO activities than in POCO activities.

INSERT TABLE 3-5 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-6 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-7 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-8 HERE

Tables 3-9 through 3-11 demonstrate differences in neighborhood trust by national origin and legal status for the foreign-born respondents (Tables 3-9 and 3-11) and by race and ethnicity for the native-born respondents (Tables 3-10 and 3-12) for both waves of data. For Wave 1, Central Americans tend to indicate the lowest levels of neighborhood trust when compared to other national origin groups; similarly, undocumented foreign-born respondents indicated the lowest level of trust. As indicated in Table 3-10, whites tend to report the highest level of

neighborhood trust in the native-born group. For Wave 2, approximately 11.5% of foreign-born respondents indicated they “strongly disagree” or “disagree” with the statement, “people in this neighborhood can be trusted,” compared to 8.88% of native-born respondents who indicated the same. In Wave 2, native-born Asian Americans (68.5%) and whites (68.2%) expressed the highest level of neighborhood trust. With regard to legal status, temporary status respondents reported the lowest level of neighborhood trust (33.3% indicating they “strongly agree” or “agree”) compared to citizen foreign-born respondents who indicated the highest level of trust (66.08% indicating they “strongly agree” or “agree”).

INSERT TABLE 3-9 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-10 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-11 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-12 HERE

With regard to social ties and for both waves of data, Tables 3-13 and 3-15 demonstrate neighborhood kin and friendship social ties by national origins for foreign-born respondents and Tables 3-14 and 3-16 by race/ethnicity for native-born respondents, respectively. In general, across both samples and across both waves of data, respondents tend to report more friendship ties and kin ties in their neighborhoods. Central Americans and Mexicans report higher levels of kin and friendship ties in both waves of data compared to foreign-born respondents from South and East Asia. Latino/as tend to also report higher levels of kin and friendship ties in their neighborhoods in both waves of data when compared to white and black native-born respondents.

INSERT TABLE 3-13 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-14 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-15 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-16 HERE

*Multivariate Findings*

Multi-level logistic regression models predicting any civic, SOCO, and POCO engagement for Wave 1 are presented in Table 3-17. The left-hand panel presents the results for the foreign-born sample while the right-hand panel presents the results for the native-born sample. Table 3-19 presents the results for Wave 2. By examining two waves of data, we can ascertain the strength of association between population diversity and social cohesion over two periods. Table 3-17 and 3-18 present, for each wave, a summary table of the main findings. The Appendix Tables 3-1 to 3-6 present the detailed statistical analyses for Wave 1 and Appendix Tables 3-7 to 3-12 are the complete series of estimated models for Wave 2. For each wave of analysis and for each sample—foreign-born and native-born—I estimate varying-intercept logistic regression models in which respondents are nested within neighborhoods. As an analytical strategy, I started with a baseline model looking only at ethnoracial diversity and built from that baseline model by first adding nativity diversity followed by neighborhood factors, and then only adding individual-level control. Finally, Model 6 is the fully saturated model that includes kin and friendship ties. I follow the same strategy for both waves and for both foreign-born and native-born samples.

INSERT TABLE 3-17 HERE

INSERT TABLE 3-18 HERE

Multi-level logistic regression models predicting neighborhood trust for Wave 1 and Wave 2 are presented in Table 3-19. The left-hand panel presents the results for Wave 1. The left sub-panel demonstrates the results for the foreign-born sample, and the right sub-panel presents

the results for the native-born sample. The right-hand panel presents the results of Wave 2, the left sub-panel presents the foreign-born sample results, and the right sub-panel presents the native-born sample results. Appendix Tables 3-13 to 3-16 provide the full results obtained by following the analytical strategy mentioned above.

INSERT TABLE 3-19 HERE

I determined which model best fits the underlying sample data given the fit statistics (Allison 1999; Karlson et al, 2012). To assess and determine the best model, I examined three model fit statistics, included at the bottom of the respective tables. To obtain the Deviance statistic, I used the formula  $-2 \cdot \log \text{likelihood}$ . Across these three fit statistics, AIC, BIC, and Deviance, the smaller the value of the respective statistic, the better the fit of the model. Across all the models for Waves 1 and 2, Model 6 is the preferred model and, therefore, I use Model 6 from each of the individual complete analyses to address the three main research questions.

*Research Question 1: Do ethnoracial and nativity neighborhood diversity differentially affect individual-level civic engagement behavior and attitudes of neighborhood trust for native and foreign-born individuals? Do these effects remain once neighborhood and individual-level factors are accounted for?*

*Civic Engagement Analysis:* As mentioned in the literature review, most studies focus on ethnoracial group differences and not on nativity differences when examining the effects of diversity on social cohesion. The results from Wave 1 analysis suggests that native-born respondents are negatively affected by nativity diversity, not racial diversity. Specifically, a unit increase in nativity diversity is associated with an expected decrease in the log odds of any civic engagement by 1.755 for the native-born sample, a result significant at the 0.05 significant

level.<sup>22</sup> When we examine different types of engagement, nativity diversity seems to affect only engagement in POCO activities. Specifically, a unit increase in nativity diversity is associated with an expected decrease in the log odds of engagement in POCO activities by 3.178. This result is statistically significant by 0.001 level. Interestingly, ethnoracial diversity tends to depress engagement in POCO activities for foreign-born respondents. Specifically, a unit increase in ethnoracial diversity is associated with an expected decrease in the expected log odds engagement in POCO activities by 1.805, a result significant at the 0.05 significance level.

For Wave 2 as demonstrated in Table 3-18, nativity diversity differentially affects foreign-born and native-respondents. Unlike the analysis in Wave 1, nativity diversity is associated with depressing engagement for foreign-born respondents. Specifically, a unit increase in nativity diversity is associated with a decrease in the log odds of any civic engagement by 4.016 for the foreign-born sample. Unlike the foreign-born sample, nativity diversity is not associated with any type of civic engagement for the native-born sample.

*Neighborhood Trust Analysis:* As demonstrated in Table 3-19, the results from Wave 1 analysis suggests that native-born respondents are negatively affected by nativity diversity, not racial diversity. Specifically, a unit increase in nativity diversity is associated with an expected decrease in the log odds of neighborhood trust by 4.156 for the native-born sample, a result significant at the 0.05 significant level and controlling for individual- and neighborhood-level factors. Ethnoracial and nativity diversity are not associated with neighborhood trust for Wave 2. Across both waves and across both foreign-born and native-born samples, neighborhood disadvantage is significantly associated with neighborhood trust. Specifically for Wave 2, a unit

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<sup>22</sup> This result, however, must be taken with caution because the nativity diversity effect could be an immigrant neighborhood composition effect. Nativity diversity and neighborhood immigrant composition are highly correlated (>0.70). Given my existing measures and research design, it is very difficult to decipher which effect--nativity diversity vs. immigrant composition--is driving the negative association with neighborhood trust.



increase in neighborhood economic disadvantage is associated with an expected decrease in the log odds of neighborhood trust by 5.068 for native-born respondents and is associated with an expected decrease in the log odds of neighborhood trust by 3.605 for foreign-born respondents.

*Research Question 2: Are nationality and legal status group difference in civic engagement and neighborhood trust for foreign-born group?*

Immigrant-related factors such as nationality differences and legal status are associated with civic engagement and neighborhood trust. As Wave 1 analysis demonstrates, being a Mexican national, versus being a national of Central America or Asia, is associated with an expected decrease in the log odds of civic engagement by 0.600, a result significant at the 0.05 level (Table 3-17). Similarly, being undocumented, versus a U.S. citizen foreign-born respondent, is associated with a decrease in the expected log odds of engagement by 0.651, a result significant at the 0.05 level.

Additionally, Wave 2 analysis for neighborhood trust demonstrates that being a Mexican national, versus being a national of Central America or Asia, is associated with an expected increase in the log odds of trust by 0.986, a result significant at the 0.05 level (Table 3-19). Similarly, having a temporary legal status versus a U.S. citizen foreign-born respondent is associated with a decrease in the expected log odds of trusting your neighbors by 1.140, a result significant at the 0.05 level.

*Research Question 3: Are kin and friendship social ties within the respondent's neighborhood associated with civic engagement and neighborhood trust for foreign-born and native-born individuals?*

For Waves 1 and 2, friendship social ties within respondent's neighborhood is consistently and positively associated with civic engagement and neighborhood trust for native-

born respondents and at times associated with neighborhood trust and civic engagement for foreign-born respondents. Specifically, in Wave 1 for native-born respondents, having “many or most of their friendship” ties versus “few” friendship” ties is associated with a 0.307 unit increase in the log odds of civic engagement, a result statistically significant at the 0.01 conventional level (Table 3-17). Similarly, in Wave 2 for native-born respondents, having “many or most of their friendship” ties versus “few” friendship” ties is associated with a 0.302 unit increase in the log odds of civic engagement; a result statistically significant at the 0.05 conventional level. For Wave 2 and for the foreign-born sample, friendship ties are not associated with predicating any civic, POCO, or SOCO engagement (Table 3-18). For both waves and across both samples, friendship social ties are positively associated with neighborhood trust. Noteworthy, kin ties in both waves and across both samples do not exert an independent effect on civic engagement or neighborhood trust (Table 3-19).

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

This study examines the effects of ethnoracial and nativity diversity on civic engagement and neighborhood trust in a multi-ethnic and multi-racial context separately for foreign-born and native-born groups. Multivariate analyses examine the differential effects ethnoracial and nativity diversity have on social cohesion for foreign-born and native-born respondents. Unlike the extant literature, this study is one of the first of its kind to separately examine nativity-related within-group differences. Findings here demonstrate that native and foreign-born groups experience diversity differently.

Nativity diversity matters for different groups at difference times. For examples, nativity diversity is not associated with any type of civic engagement for foreign-born respondents in Wave One, but does matter for native-born respondents. In Wave Two, nativity diversity matters

for foreign-born respondents, but is not associated with any type of civic engagement for native-born respondents. These results demonstrate that the effects of diversity vary over time. While native-born groups are associated with avoiding civic life during Wave One, the same seems to be occurring for foreign-born respondents during Wave Two. The reasons motivating withdrawals from civic life in the context of nativity diversity should be further examined. Specifically, scholars should take note of the out-group divisions that might occur given immigrant diverse contexts by nativity group membership. With the exception of racial diversity depressing engagement in POCO activities for foreign-born respondents during Wave One, there is minimal evidence here to suggest that racial diversity operates in a manner to negatively affect social cohesion in the context of Los Angeles. This finding is an important contribution to the extant literature suggesting that racial diversity is negatively associated with social cohesion. Racial diversity in multi-racial and multi-ethnic contexts such as Los Angeles matter less where nativity diversity seems to exert a significant, yet limited, influence on social cohesion. The results here provide evidence to suggest that nativity diversity may matter for only a period of time. Similar to Kessler and Bloemraad (2010), immigration-related diversity does not necessarily need to affect social cohesion, as they find that nation-state policies regarding integration ameliorate any negative consequences that nativity diversity might introduce.

Further, findings here demonstrate that diversity does not affect social cohesion outcomes per se. Specifically, findings here demonstrate that, across time and samples, structural conditions such as neighborhood disadvantage exert a powerful and consistent effect on social cohesion. This result is consistent with the main finding by Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) that structural factors undermine social cohesion.



**Table 3-2: Wave 1 Weighted Descriptives of Native-Born Analytic Sample**

<b>Individual-Level Variables (N=1,135)</b>	
Ethnoracial Groups (%)	
White	55.53
Latino/as	17.78
Black	16.23
Asian	7.03
Other	3.44
Gender (% Female)	47.06
Age (mean)	39.78
Education	
Less than HS	9.38
HS Graduate (12 years)	25.03
Some College (12-15 years)	37.22
College Degree+ (16+ years)	28.36
Married (% married)	44.72
Employed (% employed)	65.86
Household Income (median)	\$29,300
Residential Stability (% moved within last 2 years)	25.9
<b>Neighborhood Characteristics of Foreign-Born Sample</b>	
Neighborhood Turnover (% occupying same dwelling as in 1995 in tract) (median)	53.40
Neighborhood Disadvantage (% of HH receiving public asst) (mean)	7.28
Neighborhood Ethnoracial Composition (% Black) (mean)	8.91
(% Latino/a) (mean)	43.52
(% White) (mean)	33.40
(% API) (mean)	11.04
Immigrant Composition (% foreign-born in tract) (mean)	32.88
Racial Heterogeneity Index (median)	0.51
Nativity Heterogeneity Index (median)	0.45

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1





<b>Table 3-5: Wave 1 Foreign-Born Civic Engagement, SOCO, and POCO Engagement by Nationality and Legal Status (N=1,286)</b>			
	Civically Engaged (percent)	SOCO Engaged (percent)	POCO Engaged (percent)
	19.36	18.34	2.43
Mexican	13.63	10.90	4.69
East and South Asian	35.67	28.42	13.37
All Other FB	40.58	37.33	12.02
Citizen	36.15	30.37	12.08
LPR	21.51	17.55	6.08
Temp	15.70	13.81	5.50
Undocumented	10.37	10.20	3.23
<b>Total</b>	<b>24.54</b>	<b>20.82</b>	<b>7.83</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

<b>Table 3-6: Wave 1 Native-Born Civic Engagement, SOCO, and POCO Engagement by Ethnoracial Status (N=1,135)</b>			
	Civically Engaged (percent)	SOCO Engaged (percent)	POCO Engaged (percent)
Whites	51.25	45.94	24.72
Blacks	41.72	39.9	18.58
Latino/as	32.19	27.3	15.89
Asian	53.76	46.43	26.48
Other Race	38.11	32.42	17.05
<b>Total</b>	<b>46.04</b>	<b>32.80</b>	<b>22.01</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1



**Table 3-7: Wave 2 Foreign-Born Civic Engagement, SOCO, and POCO Engagement by Nationality and Legal Status (N=742)**

	Civically Engaged (percent)	SOCO Engaged (percent)	POCO Engaged (percent)
Mexican	26.25	22.22	12.14
Central American	15.72	14.62	2.50
East and South Asian	39.10	38.96	10.08
All Other FB	45.15	41.61	25.42
Citizen	37.87	36.43	13.94
LPR	21.70	18.87	7.46
Temp	20.97	20.97	9.71
Undocumented	22.50	16.42	13.75
<b>Total</b>	<b>29.84</b>	<b>27.14</b>	<b>12.00</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

**Table 3-8: Wave 2 Native-Born Civic Engagement, SOCO, and POCO Engagement by Ethnoracial Status (N=657)**

	Civically Engaged (percent)	SOCO Engaged (percent)	POCO Engaged (percent)
Whites	57.37	51.12	38.08
Blacks	46.74	45.67	24.07
Latino/as	39.48	32.25	18.93
Asian	54.62	45.79	32.99
Other Race	33	31.41	31.79
<b>Total</b>	<b>52.30</b>	<b>46.51</b>	<b>32.37</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

<b>Table 3-9: Wave 1 Foreign-Born Neighborhood Trust by Nationality and Legal Status (N=1,286)</b>	
	Neighborhood Trust (percent)
Central American	62.44
Mexican	65.58
East and South Asian	76.67
All Other FB	76.17
Citizen	77.38
LPR	68.57
Temp	66.95
Undocumented	58.15
<b>Total</b>	<b>69.77</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

<b>Table 3-10: Wave 1 Native-Born Neighborhood Trust by Ethnoracial Status (N=1,135)</b>	
	Neighborhood Trust (percent)
Whites	79.39
Blacks	63.69
Latino/as	63.43
Asian	68.86
Other Race	65.87
<b>Total</b>	<b>72.8</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

<b>Table 3-11: Wave 2 Foreign-Born Neighborhood Trust by Nationality and Legal Status (N=742)</b>					
	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Central American	1.61	12.58	21.24	56.01	8.55
Mexican	2.39	8.19	28.27	54.49	6.65
East and South Asian	4.38	4.34	22.54	61.21	7.53
All Other FB	5.41	11.11	34.05	47.65	1.77
Citizen	3.31	5.36	25.25	59.84	6.24
LPR	3	11.41	27.77	53.19	4.63
Temp	4.91	47.86	18.9	25.54	2.78
Undocumented	2.58	8.16	29.54	51.8	7.91
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.09</b>	<b>8.46</b>	<b>26.72</b>	<b>55.28</b>	<b>6.45</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

<b>Table 3-12: Wave 2 Native-Born Neighborhood Trust by Ethnoracial Status (N=657)</b>					
	Strongly Disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Unsure (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly Agree (%)
Whites	2.99	1.84	27.05	56.06	12.06
Blacks	2.44	16.66	29.49	43.79	7.61
Latino/as	0.61	18.41	28.41	47.08	5.48
Asian	0.00	1.32	30.41	66.31	2.14
Other Race	2.48	0.00	93.79	3.73	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.26</b>	<b>6.65</b>	<b>28.91</b>	<b>52.87</b>	<b>9.31</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

**Table 3-13: Wave 1 Foreign-Born Neighborhood Kin and Friendship Social Ties by Nationality/Region of Birth (Weighted) (N=1,286)**

	<b>Kin Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Central American	63.57	32.57	3.86
Mexican	56.56	36.47	6.97
South and East Asian	76.02	18.86	5.12
Other FB Born	69.01	25.13	5.86
<b>Total</b>	<b>64.46</b>	<b>29.62</b>	<b>5.92</b>
	<b>Friendship Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Central American	29.91	57.85	16.25
Mexican	29.87	56.27	13.86
South and East Asian	31.46	53.14	15.4
Other FB Born	30.72	51.97	17.31
<b>Total</b>	<b>29.85</b>	<b>54.51</b>	<b>15.64</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

**Table 3-14: Wave 1 Native-Born Neighborhood Kin and Friendship Social Ties by Ethnoracial Status (Weighted) (N=1,135)**

	<b>Kin Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Whites	80.84	16.39	2.77
Blacks	73.61	21.52	4.87
Latino/as	61.51	30.62	7.87
Asian	74.42	20.86	4.72
Other Race	83.64	16.36	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>75.87</b>	<b>20.07</b>	<b>4.06</b>
	<b>Friendship Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Whites	30.93	53.29	15.78
Blacks	38.6	47.62	13.78
Latino/as	21.21	56.04	22.75
Asian	21.06	71.06	8.87
Other Race	32.58	55.99	11.44
<b>Total</b>	<b>29.81</b>	<b>54.2</b>	<b>15.99</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

**Table 3-15: Wave 2 Foreign-Born Neighborhood Kin and Friendship Social Ties by Nationality/Region of Birth (Weighted) (N=742)**

	<b>Kin Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Central American	64.8	25.24	9.96
Mexican	58.34	34.73	6.93
South and East Asian	77.86	19.22	3.09
Other FB Born	81.6	17.74	0.66
<b>Total</b>	<b>66.44</b>	<b>27.82</b>	<b>6.93</b>
	<b>Friendship Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Central American	24.11	53.39	22.5
Mexican	31.64	55.73	12.63
South and East Asian	52.98	31.41	15.61
Other FB Born	36.31	53.88	9.81
<b>Total</b>	<b>35.59</b>	<b>50.07</b>	<b>14.34</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

**Table 3-16: Wave 2 Native-Born Neighborhood Kin and Friendship Social Ties by Ethnoracial Status (Weighted) (N=657)**

	<b>Kin Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Whites	77.43	17.94	4.63
Blacks	70.76	28.3	0.94
Latino/as	56.14	35.61	8.25
Asian	71.77	27.86	0.37
Other Race	31.19	67.53	1.28
<b>Total</b>	<b>71.82</b>	<b>23.92</b>	<b>4.26</b>
	<b>Friendship Ties</b>		
	None (%)	A few (%)	Many or Most of All (%)
Whites	32.34	51.61	16.06
Blacks	37.23	58.37	4.40
Latino/as	28.95	47.95	23.10
Asian	47.21	51.11	1.68
Other Race	44.03	54.69	1.28
<b>Total</b>	<b>33.95</b>	<b>52.02</b>	<b>14.03</b>

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

**Table 3-17: Wave 1 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic, SOCO, and POCO Engagement by Foreign-born and Native-born Samples**

	FOREIGN-BORN SAMPLE (N=1,286)			NATIVE-BORN SAMPLE (N=1,135)		
	Panel A: Any Civic Engagement	Panel B: Any SOCO Engagement	Panel C: Any POCO Engagement	Panel A: Any Civic Engagement	Panel B: Any SOCO Engagement	Panel C: Any POCO Engagement
	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	-0.707 (0.574)	0.009 (0.603)	-1.805* (0.875)	0.524 (0.443)	0.265 (0.451)	0.402 (0.542)
Nativity Diversity	-2.444 (1.487)	-1.915 (1.552)	1.458 (2.088)	-1.755* (0.809)	-1.279 (0.815)	-3.178*** (0.944)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties	-0.075 (0.126)	-0.045 (0.132)	0.112 (0.214)	-0.162 (0.119)	-0.191 (0.123)	0.187 (0.144)
Friends Social Ties	0.583*** (0.123)	0.628*** (0.129)	0.580*** (0.205)	0.307** (0.099)	0.335** (0.102)	0.275* (0.123)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)	0.267 (0.944)	0.201 (1.047)	2.993 (1.562)	0.408 (0.695)	0.396 (0.695)	0.600 (0.800)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)	0.264 (1.198)	-0.579 (1.130)	3.438* (1.731)	0.115 (0.995)	0.424 (1.024)	0.218 (0.279)
Econ. Disadvantage	0.264 (1.198)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.020)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican	-0.600* (0.282)	-0.629* (0.310)	-0.390 (0.468)			
Central American	-0.456 (0.303)	-0.355 (0.310)	-0.870 (0.596)			
South and East Asian	-0.248 (0.270)	-0.401 (0.279)	0.214 (0.392)			
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)	-0.239 (0.196)	-0.185 (0.207)	-0.131 (0.331)			
Temp. Visa/Asylum	-0.385 (0.305)	-0.039 (0.319)	0.222 (0.507)			
Undocumented	-0.651* (0.264)	-0.516 (0.279)	-0.648 (0.502)			
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				-0.447* (0.183)	-0.533** (0.189)	0.150 (0.226)
Black				-0.183 (0.222)	-0.069 (0.226)	0.233 (0.279)
Asian-American				0.031 (0.328)	-0.057 (0.327)	0.472 (0.373)
Other				-0.079 (0.424)	-0.008 (0.430)	0.101 (0.534)
Gender (1=Female)	-0.092 (0.168)	-0.039 (0.178)	-0.570* (0.276)	0.081 (0.135)	0.17 (0.137)	-0.137 (0.161)
Age	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.021 (0.012)	0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.023*** (0.006)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate	0.162 (0.235)	0.361 (0.245)	-0.598 (0.519)	-0.076 (0.249)	-0.132 (0.265)	-0.109 (0.370)
Some College	0.768*** (0.238)	0.752*** (0.253)	0.716 (0.412)	0.509* (0.240)	0.633* (0.252)	0.524 (0.349)
College or More	1.252*** (0.274)	1.430 (0.287)	0.949* (0.448)	1.201*** (0.270)	1.294*** (0.279)	1.003*** (0.371)
Married (1=married) (%)	-0.147 (0.163)	-0.178 (0.172)	-0.113 (0.283)	-0.065 (0.143)	-0.045 (0.143)	0.156 (0.172)
Employed (1=employed)	-0.107 (0.179)	-0.346 (0.187)	0.945* (0.283)	0.239 (0.157)	0.141 (0.159)	0.910*** (0.215)
Household Income (logged)	0.056* (0.024)	0.077*** (0.026)	0.079* (0.041)	0.039* (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.040 (0.024)
Residential Stability (1=moved)	-0.139 (0.181)	-0.208 (0.192)	0.316 (0.315)	-0.344* (0.157)	-0.322* (0.161)	-0.296 (0.202)
Constant	-0.526 (1.080)	-1.298 (1.135)	-5.266*** (1.687)	-1.166 (0.721)	-1.153 (0.728)	-3.546*** (0.896)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-575.509	-529.578	-236.421	-692.543	-675.106	-511.211
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1151.018	1059.156	472.842	1385.086	1350.212	1022.422
AIC	1199.018	1107.155	520.841	1429.087	1394.212	1066.421
BIC	1322.841	1230.978	644.664	1539.843	1504.969	1177.178

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 3-18: Wave 2 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic, SOCO, and POCO Engagement by Foreign-born and Native-born Samples**

	FOREIGN-BORN SAMPLE (N=742)			NATIVE-BORN SAMPLE (N=657)		
	Panel A: Any Civic Engagement	Panel B: Any SOCO Engagement	Panel C: Any POCO Engagement	Panel A: Any Civic Engagement	Panel B: Any SOCO Engagement	Panel C: Any POCO Engagement
	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	-0.947 (0.623)	-0.789 (0.645)	-1.492 (1.000)	0.629 (0.652)	0.231 (0.649)	0.809 (0.788)
Nativity Diversity	-4.016* (1.618)	-4.403** (1.658)	-6.895** (2.228)	-0.777 (1.069)	-0.026 (1.067)	-2.065 (1.271)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties	0.076 (0.152)	0.031 (0.158)	0.357 (0.246)	-0.048 (0.155)	-0.030 (0.157)	0.002 (0.187)
Friends Social Ties	0.249 (0.137)	0.369 (0.143)	0.014 (0.222)	0.302* (0.137)	0.299* (0.137)	0.423** (0.161)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)	-1.782 (1.186)	-1.987 (1.232)	-0.644 (1.984)	-0.131 (1.098)	-0.847 (1.092)	-0.590 (1.308)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)	0.527 (1.157)	-0.203 (1.243)	1.136 (1.819)	-1.026 (1.167)	-0.255 (1.180)	-2.768 (1.684)
Econ. Disadvantage	-1.457 (1.277)	-0.203 (1.332)	0.374 (2.075)	-1.654 (1.335)	-2.212 (1.354)	-0.311 (1.702)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican	-0.273 (0.343)	-0.218 (0.353)	-0.269 (0.510)			
Central American	-0.308 (0.372)	-0.226 (0.383)	-0.771 (0.593)			
South and East Asian	-0.315 (0.371)	-0.258 (0.378)	-0.380 (0.542)			
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)	-0.199 (0.220)	-0.271 (0.231)	0.069 (0.359)			
Temp. Visa/Asylum	-0.503 (0.498)	-0.356 (0.505)	-0.844 (1.114)			
Undocumented	-0.184 (0.270)	-0.091 (0.280)	0.206 (0.447)			
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)</b>						
Latino/as				-0.165 (0.245)	-0.444 (0.247)	0.054 (0.293)
Black				0.297 (0.298)	0.056 (0.296)	0.266 (0.358)
Asian-American				-0.124 (0.403)	-0.391 (0.407)	0.185 (0.467)
Other				0.143 (0.751)	-0.290 (0.765)	1.300 (0.534)
Gender (1=Female)	-0.097 (0.193)	-0.021 (0.200)	-0.398 (0.301)	-0.251 (0.186)	0.026 (0.187)	-0.441* (0.213)
Age	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.032* (0.013)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.034*** (0.008)
<b>Education (reference=less than HS)</b>						
HS Graduate	0.514* (0.246)	0.496* (0.258)	1.461*** (0.404)	0.069 (0.368)	0.309 (0.406)	-0.293 (0.463)
Some College	0.355 (0.286)	0.382 (0.298)	1.487** (0.461)	0.697* (0.339)	0.948* (0.376)	-0.044 (0.424)
College or More	1.471*** (0.331)	1.601*** (0.339)	1.487** (0.538)	1.518*** (0.371)	1.729*** (0.401)	0.488 (0.445)
Married (1=married) (%)	-0.107 (0.185)	-0.205 (0.192)	-0.088 (0.302)	0.202 (0.187)	0.243 (0.188)	0.045 (0.222)
Employed (1=employed)	0.064 (0.206)	0.016 (0.214)	0.744* (0.386)	-0.198 (0.218)	-0.262 (0.219)	0.609* (0.271)
Household Income (logged)	0.012 (0.019)	0.010 (0.020)	0.061 (0.032)	0.008 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.019)	0.008 (0.022)
Residential Stability (1=moved)	-0.241 (0.194)	-0.276 (0.202)	0.073 (0.324)	-0.547** (0.190)	-0.587** (0.192)	-0.333 (0.231)
Constant	2.616 (1.384)	2.788 (1.429)	-1.560 (2.087)	-0.514 (1.225)	-0.173 (1.238)	-2.415 (1.498)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.3
Log likelihood	-395.818	-379.584	-186.401	-396.397	-392.164	-316.135
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	791.636	759.168	372.802	792.794	784.328	632.270
AIC	839.636	791.168	420.8	836.794	828.323	676.267
BIC	950.261	901.792	531.425	935.523	927.057	774.999

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Table 3-19: Waves 1 and 2 Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Neighborhood Trust by Foreign-born and Native-born Samples**

	WAVE 1		WAVE 2	
	Foreign-born Sample (N=1,286)	Native-born Sample (N=1,135)	Foreign-born Sample (N=742)	Native-born Sample (N=657)
	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6	Model 6
<b>Main Effects</b>				
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.678 (0.497)	0.746 (0.744)	-0.352 (0.884)	0.295 (0.953)
Nativity Diversity	-1.657 (1.463)	-4.156* (1.603)	-5.315 (2.936)	-1.384 (1.753)
<b>Social Ties</b>				
Kin Social Ties	0.050 (0.105)	-0.045 (0.135)	-0.047 (0.189)	-0.117 (0.212)
Friends Social Ties	0.623*** (0.102)	0.403*** (0.119)	0.358* (0.171)	0.578** (0.203)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>				
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)	1.568 (0.861)	2.179 (1.214)	1.817 (1.538)	1.219 (1.590)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)	-0.392 (0.958)	-1.624 (1.474)	-2.081 (1.433)	-1.497 (1.317)
Econ. Disadvantage	-0.392*** (0.014)	-0.071*** (0.023)	-3.604* (1.612)	-5.068** (1.736)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>				
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>				
Mexican	0.169 (0.268)		0.986* (0.457)	
Central American	-0.170 (0.284)		0.860 (0.477)	
South and East Asian	0.259 (0.286)		0.503 (0.565)	
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>				
Permanent Resident (LRP)	-0.113 (0.175)		-0.103 (0.273)	
Temp. Visa/Asylum	0.027 (0.255)		-1.140* (0.456)	
Undocumented	-0.119 (0.209)		0.139 (0.322)	
<b>Individual Factors</b>				
<b>Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)</b>				
Latino/as		-0.232 (0.226)		0.0871 (0.374)
Black		0.008 (0.264)		-0.067 (0.402)
Asian-American		-0.261 (0.405)		0.509 (0.715)
Other		-0.798 (0.484)		-0.972 (0.907)
Gender (1=Female)	-0.119 (0.209)	-0.225 (0.162)	0.002 (0.239)	0.000 (0.277)
Age	0.015* (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.016 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)
<b>Education (reference=less than HS)</b>				
HS Graduate	-0.145 (0.178)	0.324 (0.251)	-0.135 (0.294)	0.769* (0.389)
Some College	-0.081 (0.208)	0.600* (0.254)	0.018 (0.351)	0.978** (0.367)
College or More	-0.103 (0.259)	0.962*** (0.319)	0.729 (0.504)	1.504** (0.469)
Married (1=married) (%)	0.062 (0.129)	-0.071 (0.174)	0.243 (0.220)	0.338 (0.279)
Employed (1=employed)	0.115 (0.144)	0.259 (0.182)	0.049 (0.244)	-0.061 (0.306)
Household Income (logged)	-0.013 (0.019)	0.034 (0.024)	-0.057* (0.025)	-0.036 (0.029)
Residential Stability (1=moved)	-0.074 (0.319)	-0.239 (0.179)	0.018 (0.239)	-0.478 (0.272)
Constant	-0.193 (0.984)	-0.204 (1.180)	2.683 (2.091)	0.908 (1.797)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.0
Log likelihood	-789.491	-549.984	-301.955	-221.260
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>				
Deviance	1578.982	1099.968	603.91	442.520
AIC	1626.981	1143.967	651.911	486.52
BIC	1750.804	1254.724	762.535	585.249

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Waves 1 and 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001



**Appendix Table 3-1: Wave 1 Foreign-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic Engagement (N=1,286)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.11 (0.619)	0.244 (0.573)	0.388 (0.599)	-0.622 (0.531)	-0.547 (0.588)	-0.707 (0.574)
Nativity Diversity		-6.685*** (1.505)	-4.466*** (1.523)	-2.422 (1.421)	-2.457 (1.520)	-2.444 (1.487)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.075 (0.126)
Friends Social Ties						0.583*** (0.123)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			0.735 (1.067)		0.299 (1.021)	0.267 (0.944)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-1.409 (1.311)		-0.230 (1.229)	0.264 (1.198)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.024 (0.018)		0.004 (0.017)	0.264 (1.198)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican				-0.619* (0.274)	-0.626* (0.280)	-0.600* (0.282)
Central American				-0.500 (0.286)	-0.504 (0.302)	-0.456 (0.303)
South and East Asian				-0.298 (0.268)	-0.302 (0.270)	-0.248 (0.270)
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.241 (0.193)	-0.237 (0.194)	-0.239 (0.196)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.271 (0.297)	-0.265 (0.301)	-0.385 (0.305)
Undocumented				-0.588* (0.259)	-0.582* (0.260)	-0.651* (0.264)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Gender (1=Female)				-0.071 (0.164)	-0.069 (0.166)	-0.092 (0.168)
Age				0.008 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)
<b>Education (reference=less than HS)</b>						
HS Graduate				0.161 (0.233)	0.162 (0.234)	0.162 (0.235)
Some College				0.751*** (0.236)	0.754*** (0.237)	0.768*** (0.238)
College or More				1.223*** (0.271)	1.223*** (0.272)	1.252*** (0.274)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.121 (0.160)	-0.121 (0.160)	-0.147 (0.163)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.122 (0.178)	-0.120 (0.178)	-0.107 (0.179)
Household Income (logged)				0.055* (0.024)	0.055* (0.024)	0.056* (0.024)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.225 (0.179)	-0.221 (0.179)	-0.139 (0.181)
Constant	-1.852*** (0.299)	1.518 (0.792)	0.888 (1.008)	0.0202 (0.881)	-0.166 (1.087)	-0.526 (1.080)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3
Log likelihood	-637.323	-628.252	-624.850	-587.271	-587.215	-575.509
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1274.646	1256.504	1249.700	1174.542	1174.43	1151.018
AIC	1280.648	1264.506	1263.700	1212.542	1218.43	1199.018
BIC	1296.125	1285.143	1299.815	1310.568	1331.934	1322.841

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-2: Wave 1 Foreign-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any SOCO Engagement (N=1,286)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.550*	0.796	1.032	-0.039	0.164	0.009
	(0.680)	(0.648)	(0.678)	(0.565)	(0.619)	(0.603)
Nativity Diversity		-5.966***	-4.933***	-1.814	-1.976	-1.915
		(1.662)	(1.695)	(1.534)	(1.585)	(1.552)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.045
						(0.132)
Friends Social Ties						0.628***
						(0.129)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			0.522		0.220	0.201
			(1.198)		(1.077)	(1.047)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-2.277		-1.121	-0.579
			(1.511)		(1.334)	(1.130)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.018		0.008	0.005
			(0.020)		(0.018)	(0.017)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican				-0.655*	-0.640*	-0.629*
				(0.284)	(0.289)	(0.310)
Central American				-0.399	-0.391	-0.355
				(0.307)	(0.310)	(0.310)
South and East Asian				-0.446	-0.449	-0.401
				(0.277)	(0.277)	(0.279)
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.204	-0.195	-0.185
				(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.207)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.251	-0.239	-0.039
				(0.311)	(0.314)	(0.319)
Undocumented				-0.460	-0.452	-0.516
				(0.274)	(0.276)	(0.279)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Gender (1=Female)				-0.015	-0.019	-0.039
				(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.178)
Age				-0.001	-0.001	-0.003
				(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				0.356	0.357	0.361
				(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.245)
Some College				0.731***	0.735***	0.752***
				(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.253)
College or More				1.390***	1.3890***	1.430
				(0.283)	(0.284)	(0.287)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.147	-0.144	-0.178
				(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.172)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.358*	0.358*	-0.346
				(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.187)
Household Income (logged)				0.076***	0.076***	0.077***
				(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.297	-0.292	-0.208
				(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.192)
Constant	-2.252***	0.748	0.282	-0.727	-0.858	-1.298
	(0.332)	(0.876)	(1.122)	(0.925)	(1.143)	(1.135)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4
Log likelihood	-585.912	-579.988	-576.792	-542.459	-542.101	-529.578
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1171.824	1159.976	1153.584	1084.918	1084.202	1059.156
AIC	1177.823	1167.975	1167.585	1122.918	1128.203	1107.155
BIC	1193.301	1188.613	1203.700	1220.945	1241.707	1230.978

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-3: Wave 1 Foreign-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any POCO Engagement (N=1,286)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.548 (0.838)	-0.410 (0.732)	-0.658 (0.757)	-1.469 (0.787)	-1.768* (0.866)	-1.805* (0.875)
Nativity Diversity		-6.973*** (1.858)	-3.880* (1.790)	-2.859 (1.974)	-1.333 (2.053)	1.458 (2.088)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						0.112 (0.214)
Friends Social Ties						0.580*** (0.205)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			3.348* (1.413)		2.873 (1.538)	2.993 (1.562)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			1.913 (1.646)		2.976 (1.711)	3.438* (1.731)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.067* (0.028)		-0.027 (0.028)	-0.028 (0.027)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican				-0.340 (0.464)	-0.460 (0.464)	-0.390 (0.468)
Central American				-0.975 (0.592)	-0.974 (0.596)	-0.870 (0.596)
South and East Asian				0.125 (0.384)	0.126 (0.384)	0.214 (0.392)
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.114 (0.324)	-0.108 (0.327)	-0.131 (0.331)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				0.248 (0.496)	-0.336 (0.499)	0.222 (0.507)
Undocumented				-0.709 (0.489)	-0.582 (0.496)	-0.648 (0.502)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Gender (1=Female)				-0.608* (0.272)	-0.596* (0.518)	-0.570* (0.276)
Age				0.023* (0.011)	0.023* (0.011)	0.021 (0.012)
<b>Education (reference=less than HS)</b>						
HS Graduate				-0.552 (0.517)	-0.596 (0.518)	-0.598 (0.519)
Some College				0.701 (0.410)	0.698 (0.409)	0.716 (0.412)
College or More				0.964* (0.442)	0.932* (0.443)	0.949* (0.448)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.033 (0.279)	-0.108 (0.280)	-0.113 (0.283)
Employed (1=employed)				0.905* (0.370)	0.883* (0.443)	0.945* (0.283)
Household Income (logged)				0.078 (0.042)	0.081* (0.041)	0.079* (0.041)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				0.184 (0.310)	0.241 (0.312)	0.316 (0.315)
Constant	-3.154*** (0.414)	0.422 (0.665)	-2.024 (1.238)	-3.815* (1.288)	-4.747*** (1.629)	-5.266*** (1.687)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.7	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-283.422	-277.416	-269.237	-244.503	-240.504	-236.421
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	566.844	554.832	538.474	489.006	481.008	472.842
AIC	572.844	562.831	552.474	527.006	525.009	520.841
BIC	-588.322	583.469	588.589	625.032	638.513	644.664

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-4: Wave 1 Native-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic Engagement (N=1,135)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.207*	0.625	0.107	0.480	0.390	0.524
	(0.545)	(0.480)	(0.462)	(0.376)	(0.430)	(0.443)
Nativity Diversity		-4.837***	-2.879**	-2.147**	-1.794*	-1.755*
		(0.989)	(0.875)	(0.766)	(0.803)	(0.809)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.162
						(0.119)
Friends Social Ties						0.307**
						(0.099)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-0.307		0.409	0.408
			(0.736)		(0.691)	(0.695)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			0.535		0.297	0.115
			(0.986)		(0.987)	(0.995)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.061***		-0.018	-0.013
			(0.016)		(0.015)	(0.015)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				-0.452*	-0.440*	-0.447*
				(0.179)	(0.181)	(0.183)
Black				-0.287	-0.207	-0.183
				(0.189)	(0.221)	(0.222)
Asian-American				-0.029	-0.022	0.031
				(0.326)	(0.326)	(0.328)
Other				-0.132	-0.089	-0.079
				(0.414)	(0.420)	(0.424)
Gender (1=Female)				0.08	0.08	0.081
				(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.135)
Age				0.006	0.006	0.006
				(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				-0.07	-0.087	-0.076
				(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.249)
Some College				0.556*	0.512*	0.509*
				(0.236)	(0.239)	(0.240)
College or More				1.254***	1.183***	1.201***
				(0.260)	(0.268)	(0.270)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.028	-0.052	-0.065
				(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.143)
Employed (1=employed)				0.227	0.210	0.239
				(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.157)
Household Income (logged)				0.044*	0.044*	0.039*
				(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.387*	-0.379*	-0.344*
				(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.157)
Constant	-0.947**	1.382**	1.413*	-0.699	-0.845	-1.166
	(0.283)	(0.518)	(0.625)	(0.539)	(0.704)	(0.721)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-758.348	-747.707	-738.788	-698.695	-697.542	-692.543
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1516.696	1495.414	1477.576	1397.390	1395.084	1385.086
AIC	1522.696	1503.413	1491.577	1431.391	1435.085	1429.087
BIC	1537.800	1523.551	1526.818	1516.976	1535.772	1539.843

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-5: Wave 1 Native-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any SOCO Engagement (N=1,135)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.057 (0.563)	0.486 (0.507)	-0.186 (0.492)	0.300 (0.392)	0.124 (0.446)	0.265 (0.451)
Nativity Diversity		-4.712*** (0.547)	-2.566** (0.931)	-1.868* (0.803)	-1.343 (0.807)	-1.279 (0.815)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.191 (0.123)
Friends Social Ties						0.335** (0.102)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-0.39 (0.776)		0.394 (0.691)	0.396 (0.695)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			1.121 (1.053)		0.614 (1.015)	0.424 (1.024)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.069*** (0.017)		-0.027 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.016)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				-0.549** (0.186)	-0.528** (0.186)	-0.533** (0.189)
Black				-0.192 (0.194)	-0.094 (0.224)	-0.069 (0.226)
Asian-American				-0.122 (0.326)	-0.0113 (0.325)	-0.057 (0.327)
Other				-0.083 (0.421)	-0.019 (0.426)	-0.008 (0.430)
Gender (1=Female)				0.171 (0.137)	0.169 (0.137)	0.17 (0.137)
Age				0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				-0.123 (0.264)	-0.144 (0.264)	-0.132 (0.265)
Some College				0.689** (0.249)	0.633* (0.251)	0.633* (0.252)
College or More				1.369*** (0.271)	1.272*** (0.278)	1.294*** (0.279)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.002 (0.143)	-0.032 (0.144)	-0.045 (0.143)
Employed (1=employed)				0.0139 (0.158)	0.114 (0.158)	0.141 (0.159)
Household Income (logged)				0.027 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.369* (0.159)	-0.358* (0.159)	-0.322* (0.161)
Constant	-1.078*** (0.292)	1.187* (0.547)	1.272* (0.657)	-0.706 (0.559)	-0.812 (0.711)	-1.153 (0.728)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-741.293	-732.007	-723.378	-682.871	-680.892	-675
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1482.586	1464.014	1446.756	1365.742	1361.784	1350.212
AIC	1488.586	1472.014	1460.756	1399.742	1401.784	1394.212
BIC	1503.689	1492.152	1495.996	1485.326	1502.472	1504.969

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-6: Wave 1 Native-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any POCO Engagement (N=1,135)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.683 (0.556)	0.216 (0.474)	-0.107 (0.496)	0.170 (0.456)	0.195 (0.535)	0.402 (0.542)
Nativity Diversity		-4.556*** (0.877)	-3.211*** (0.862)	-3.181*** (0.888)	-3.061*** (0.938)	-3.178*** (0.944)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						0.187 (0.144)
Friends Social Ties						0.275* (0.123)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			0.361 (0.767)		0.551 (0.799)	0.600 (0.800)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			0.475 (1.152)		0.379 (1.270)	0.218 (0.279)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.049*** (0.018)		-0.004 (0.019)	-0.000 (0.020)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				0.198 (0.221)	0.192 (0.223)	0.150 (0.226)
Black				0.227 (0.241)	0.205 (0.277)	0.233 (0.279)
Asian-American				0.411 (0.370)	0.406 (0.371)	0.472 (0.373)
Other				0.111 (0.453)	0.094 (0.534)	0.101 (0.534)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.137 (0.160)	-0.133 (0.160)	-0.137 (0.161)
Age				0.022 (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.006)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				-0.112 (0.369)	-0.118 (0.370)	-0.109 (0.370)
Some College				0.533 (0.346)	0.527 (0.349)	0.524 (0.349)
College or More				0.969*** (0.359)	0.973*** (0.369)	1.003*** (0.371)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.194 (0.169)	0.182 (0.171)	0.156 (0.172)
Employed (1=employed)				0.863*** (0.213)	0.859*** (0.213)	0.910*** (0.215)
Household Income (logged)				0.040 (0.024)	0.040 (0.024)	0.040 (0.024)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.341 (0.201)	-0.334 (0.201)	-0.296 (0.202)
Constant	-1.824*** (0.298)	0.306 (0.448)	-0.006 (0.626)	-2.656*** (0.685)	-2.997*** (0.869)	-3.546*** (0.896)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-568.677	-557.373	-552.002	-515.744	-515.446	-511.211
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1137.354	1114.746	1104.004	1031.488	1030.892	1022.422
AIC	1143.353	1122.745	1118.003	1065.488	1070.892	1066.421
BIC	1158.456	1142.882	1153.244	1151.072	1171.580	1177.178

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-7: Wave 2 Foreign-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic Engagement (N=742)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.404 (0.456)	-0.217 (0.474)	-0.54 (0.587)	-0.523 (0.507)	-0.953 (0.622)	-0.947 (0.623)
Nativity Diversity		-6.025*** (1.458)	-5.183** (1.539)	-4.166** (1.539)	-3.898* (1.611)	-4.016* (1.618)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						0.076 (0.152)
Friends Social Ties						0.249 (0.137)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-0.935 (1.158)		-1.705 (1.180)	-1.782 (1.186)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-0.812 (1.124)		0.406 (1.154)	0.527 (1.157)
Econ. Disadvantage (% of Pop in Pov.)			-2.251 (1.251)		-1.507 (1.273)	-1.457 (1.277)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican				-0.243 (0.337)	-0.221 (0.341)	-0.273 (0.343)
Central American				-0.284 (0.336)	-0.267 (0.369)	-0.308 (0.372)
South and East Asian				-0.354 (0.372)	-0.337 (0.370)	-0.315 (0.371)
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.191 (0.218)	-0.212 (0.219)	-0.199 (0.220)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.519 (0.498)	-0.522 (0.497)	-0.503 (0.498)
Undocumented				-0.149 (0.267)	-0.154 (0.269)	-0.184 (0.270)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Gender (1=Female)				-0.119 (0.192)	-0.117 (0.192)	-0.097 (0.193)
Age				-0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)
<b>Education (reference=less than HS)</b>						
HS Graduate				0.530* (0.247)	0.525* (0.245)	0.514* (0.246)
Some College				0.351 (0.290)	0.326 (0.286)	0.355 (0.286)
College or More				1.492*** (0.334)	1.480*** (0.331)	1.471*** (0.331)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.127 (0.183)	-0.109 (0.184)	-0.107 (0.185)
Employed (1=employed)				0.030 (0.205)	0.036 (0.205)	0.064 (0.206)
Household Income (logged)				0.011 (0.019)	0.009 (0.019)	0.012 (0.019)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.242 (0.194)	-0.257 (0.194)	-0.241 (0.194)
Constant	-1.174*** (0.195)	1.794* (0.738)	2.695* (1.195)	1.389 (0.998)	2.802 (1.376)	2.616 (1.384)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-431.293	-422.651	-418.887	-399.056	-397.878	-395.818
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	862.586	845.302	837.774	798.112	795.756	791.636
AIC	868.588	853.301	851.774	836.113	839.756	839.636
BIC	882.416	871.739	884.039	923.691	941.162	950.261

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-8: Wave 2 Foreign-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any SOCO Engagement (N=742)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.494 (0.484)	-0.126 (0.496)	-0.356 (0.597)	-0.460 (0.532)	-0.784 (0.643)	-0.787 (0.645)
Nativity Diversity		-6.163*** (1.478)	-4.391*** (1.543)	-4.367** (1.573)	-4.197* (1.644)	-4.403** (1.658)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						0.031 (0.158)
Friends Social Ties						0.369 (0.143)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-1.187 (1.180)		-1.870 (1.224)	-1.987 (1.232)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-1.599 (1.193)		-0.350 (1.239)	-0.203 (1.243)
Econ. Disadvantage (% Pop. In Pov.)			-2.311 (1.281)		-1.663 (1.326)	-0.203 (1.332)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican				-0.226 (0.348)	-0.156 (0.351)	-0.218 (0.353)
Central American				-0.234 (0.378)	-0.179 (0.381)	-0.226 (0.383)
South and East Asian				-0.313 (0.381)	-0.292 (0.376)	-0.258 (0.378)
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.269 (0.230)	-0.284 (0.230)	-0.271 (0.231)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.388 (0.503)	-0.386 (0.503)	-0.356 (0.505)
Undocumented				-0.067 (0.276)	-0.048 (0.277)	-0.091 (0.280)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Gender (1=Female)				-0.050 (0.199)	-0.048 (0.199)	-0.021 (0.200)
Age				-0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.08)	-0.006 (0.008)
<b>Education (reference=less than HS)</b>						
HS Graduate				0.531* (0.258)	0.512* (0.256)	0.496* (0.258)
Some College				0.39 (0.305)	0.342 (0.297)	0.382 (0.298)
College or More				1.643*** (0.345)	1.603*** (0.338)	1.601*** (0.339)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.229 (0.191)	-0.211 (0.191)	-0.205 (0.192)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.029 (0.213)	-0.024 (0.213)	0.016 (0.214)
Household Income (logged)				0.009 (0.019)	0.007 (0.019)	0.010 (0.020)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.279 (0.203)	-0.293 (0.202)	-0.276 (0.202)
Constant	-1.347*** (0.208)	1.684* (0.749)	2.822* (1.211)	1.396 (1.025)	2.986* (1.416)	2.788 (1.429)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-411.637	-403.041	-397.703	-376.962	-375.240	-379.584
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	823.274	806.082	795.406	753.924	750.48	759.168
AIC	829.234	814.082	809.405	791.923	794.481	791.168
BIC	843.101	832.519	841.671	879.503	895.886	901.792

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001



**Appendix Table 3-9: Wave 2 Foreign-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any POCO Engagement (N=742)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.187 (0.723)	-0.772 (0.751)	-0.962 (0.920)	-1.319 (0.815)	-1.545 (0.997)	-1.492 (1.000)
Nativity Diversity		-8.291*** (1.850)	-7.369*** (2.032)	-6.653** (2.050)	-6.791** (2.222)	-6.895** (2.228)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						0.357 (0.246)
Friends Social Ties						0.014 (0.222)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			0.226 (1.846)		-0.559 (1.975)	-0.644 (1.984)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			0.079 (1.667)		1.043 (1.806)	1.136 (1.819)
Econ. Disadvantage (% Pop. In Pov.)			-1.551 (1.948)		0.299 (2.064)	0.374 (2.075)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican				-0.132 (0.496)	-0.191 (0.505)	-0.269 (0.510)
Central American				-0.584 (0.576)	-0.667 (0.588)	-0.771 (0.593)
South and East Asian				-0.385 (0.535)	-0.354 (0.537)	-0.380 (0.542)
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				0.0492 (0.356)	0.020 (0.358)	0.069 (0.359)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-0.736 (1.094)	-0.791 (1.103)	-0.844 (1.114)
Undocumented				0.279 (0.441)	0.209 (0.447)	0.206 (0.447)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Gender (1=Female)				-0.381 (0.299)	-0.388 (0.299)	-0.398 (0.301)
Age				0.029* (0.013)	0.029* (0.013)	0.032* (0.013)
<b>Education (reference=less than HS)</b>						
HS Graduate				1.421*** (0.400)	1.448*** (0.402)	1.461*** (0.404)
Some College				1.434** (0.456)	1.465** (0.458)	1.487** (0.461)
College or More				1.426** (0.527)	1.478** (0.533)	1.487** (0.538)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.095 (0.298)	-0.078 (0.302)	-0.088 (0.302)
Employed (1=employed)				0.746* (0.384)	0.748* (0.384)	0.744* (0.386)
Household Income (logged)				0.054 (0.032)	0.056 (0.032)	0.061 (0.032)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				0.041 (0.318)	0.034 (0.321)	0.073 (0.324)
Constant	-2.547*** (0.331)	1.544 (0.928)	1.392 (1.747)	-1.683 (1.436)	-1.324 (2.067)	-1.560 (2.087)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Log likelihood	-217.399	-208.145	-207.487	-187.843	-187.502	-186.401
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	434.798	416.290	414.974	375.686	375.004	372.802
AIC	440.797	424.289	428.977	413.685	419.005	420.800
BIC	454.626	442.726	461.242	501.263	520.411	531.425

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-10 Wave 2 Native-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Civic Engagement (N=657)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.938 (0.629)	0.651 (0.632)	0.028 (0.697)	0.771 (0.538)	0.451 (0.674)	0.629 (0.652)
Nativity Diversity		-2.520* (1.259)	-1.018 (1.227)	-1.025 (1.033)	-0.674 (1.048)	-0.777 (1.069)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.048 (0.155)
Friends Social Ties						0.302* (0.137)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-0.737 (1.241)		-0.179 (1.088)	-0.131 (1.098)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-0.671 (1.117)		-1.060 (1.163)	-1.026 (1.167)
Econ. Disadvantage (% on Poverty)			-3.967** (1.464)		-1.716 (1.321)	-1.654 (1.335)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				-0.191 (0.242)	-0.179 (0.239)	-0.165 (0.245)
Black				-0.032 (0.256)	0.243 (0.296)	0.297 (0.298)
Asian-American				-0.189 (0.405)	-0.197 (0.399)	-0.124 (0.403)
Other				-0.014 (0.751)	0.076 (0.745)	0.143 (0.751)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.273 (0.185)	-0.258 (0.185)	-0.251 (0.186)
Age				0.009 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				0.076 (0.365)	0.061 (0.366)	0.069 (0.368)
Some College				0.788* (0.336)	0.726* (0.337)	0.697* (0.339)
College or More				1.673*** (0.361)	1.519*** (0.368)	1.518*** (0.371)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.268 (0.184)	0.227 (0.185)	0.202 (0.187)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.207 (0.215)	-0.237 (0.215)	-0.198 (0.218)
Household Income (logged)				0.011 (0.019)	0.010 (0.019)	0.008 (0.019)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.561** (0.189)	-0.571** (0.188)	-0.547** (0.190)
Constant	-0.625* (0.306)	0.546 (0.653)	1.476 (1.166)	-0.777 (0.787)	-0.183 (1.203)	-0.514 (1.225)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.1
Log likelihood	-439.862	-437.909	-430.922	-401.246	-398.899	-396.397
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	879.724	875.818	861.844	802.492	797.798	792.794
AIC	885.724	883.819	875.845	836.493	837.798	836.794
BIC	899.187	901.769	907.258	912.784	927.551	935.523

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-11: Native-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any SOCO Engagement (N=657)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.740 (0.633)	0.453 (0.644)	-0.343 (0.717)	0.527 (0.529)	0.052 (0.641)	0.231 (0.649)
Nativity Diversity		-2.593* (1.272)	-0.944 (1.255)	-0.318 (1.010)	0.058 (1.059)	-0.026 (1.067)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.030 (0.157)
Friends Social Ties						0.299* (0.137)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-1.654 (1.272)		-0.895 (1.088)	-0.847 (1.092)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-0.279 (1.148)		-0.297 (1.183)	-0.255 (1.180)
Econ. Disadvantage (% of Pop. In Pov.)			-4.445** (1.516)		-2.283 (1.348)	-2.212 (1.354)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				-0.467* (0.242)	-0.452 (0.242)	-0.444 (0.247)
Black				-0.194 (0.251)	0.008 (0.294)	0.056 (0.296)
Asian-American				-0.448 (0.405)	-0.474 (0.407)	-0.391 (0.407)
Other				-0.448 (0.760)	-0.346 (0.763)	-0.290 (0.765)
Gender (1=Female)				0.010 (0.185)	0.018 (0.186)	0.026 (0.187)
Age				0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				0.317 (0.402)	0.297 (0.404)	0.309 (0.406)
Some College				1.037** (0.371)	0.974** (0.374)	0.948* (0.376)
College or More				1.893*** (0.389)	1.725*** (0.398)	1.729*** (0.401)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.298 (0.184)	0.271 (0.187)	0.243 (0.188)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.287 (0.215)	-0.304 (0.217)	-0.262 (0.219)
Household Income (logged)				0.000 (0.018)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.019)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.594** (0.189)	-0.612** (0.191)	-0.587** (0.192)
Constant	-0.785* (0.309)	0.412 (0.656)	1.995 (1.191)	-0.988 (0.790)	0.184 (1.222)	-0.173 (1.238)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-436.774	-434.688	-428.358	-396.631	-394.636	-392.164
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	873.548	869.376	856.716	793.262	789.272	784.328
AIC	879.548	877.376	870.717	827.262	829.272	828.323
BIC	893.011	895.327	902.131	903.553	919.026	927.057

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-12: Wave 2 Native-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any POCO Engagement (N=657)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.545 (0.673)	0.222 (0.658)	0.161 (0.730)	0.350 (0.646)	0.532 (0.763)	0.809 (0.788)
Nativity Diversity		-3.011* (1.214)	-2.090 (1.179)	-1.828 (1.209)	-1.954 (1.280)	-2.065 (1.271)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						0.002 (0.187)
Friends Social Ties						0.423** (0.161)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			-0.384 (1.266)		-0.666 (1.281)	-0.590 (1.308)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-2.771 (1.536)		-2.889 (1.674)	-2.768 (1.684)
Econ. Disadvantage (% of Pop. In Pov.)			-2.366 (1.179)		-0.432 (1.666)	-0.311 (1.702)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				0.025 (0.286)	0.034 (0.285)	0.054 (0.293)
Black				-0.167 (0.311)	0.196 (0.352)	0.266 (0.358)
Asian-American				0.037 (0.464)	0.059 (0.462)	0.185 (0.467)
Other				1.031 (0.819)	1.199 (0.837)	1.300 (0.534)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.440* (0.210)	-0.441* (0.211)	-0.441* (0.213)
Age				0.033*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.009)	0.034*** (0.008)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				-0.315 (0.454)	-0.315 (0.457)	-0.293 (0.463)
Some College				0.025 (0.413)	-0.012 (0.417)	-0.044 (0.424)
College or More				0.566 (0.425)	0.451 (0.439)	0.488 (0.445)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.099 (0.215)	0.087 (0.219)	0.045 (0.222)
Employed (1=employed)				0.555* (0.268)	0.539* (0.268)	0.609* (0.271)
Household Income (logged)				0.013 (0.022)	0.012 (0.022)	0.008 (0.022)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.373 (0.228)	-0.368 (0.228)	-0.333 (0.231)
Constant	-1.672*** (0.347)	-0.257 (0.635)	0.329 (1.179)	-2.515** (0.960)	-1.802 (1.456)	-2.415 (1.498)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3
Log likelihood	-352.747	-349.927	-343.197	-322.198	-319.935	-316.135
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	705.494	699.854	686.394	644.396	639.870	632.270
AIC	711.493	707.855	700.395	678.396	679.869	676.267
BIC	725.956	725.805	731.809	754.687	769.623	774.999

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-13: Wave 1 Foreign-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Neighborhood Trust (N=1,286)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.195*	0.720	0.854	0.612	0.782	0.678
	(0.517)	(0.525)	(0.488)	(0.494)	(0.490)	(0.497)
Nativity Diversity		-3.811*	-1.540	-3.292*	-1.706	-1.657
		(1.527)	(1.416)	(1.529)	(1.445)	(1.463)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						0.050
						(0.105)
Friends Social Ties						0.623***
						(0.102)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			2.148*		1.559	1.568
			(0.865)		(0.847)	(0.861)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-0.856		-0.758	-0.392
			(0.968)		(0.938)	(0.958)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.041**		-0.038**	-0.392***
			(0.884)		(0.013)	(0.014)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican				0.084	0.127	0.169
				(0.269)	(0.266)	(0.268)
Central American				-0.251	-0.221	-0.170
				(0.286)	(0.281)	(0.284)
South and East Asian				-0.139	0.158	0.259
				(0.286)	(0.282)	(0.286)
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.139	-0.111	-0.113
				(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.175)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				0.086	0.118	0.027
				(0.251)	(0.250)	(0.255)
Undocumented				-0.114	-0.072	-0.119
				(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.209)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Gender (1=Female)				-0.198	-0.195	-0.119
				(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.209)
Age				0.016***	0.014*	0.015*
				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				-0.109	-0.137	-0.145
				(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.178)
Some College				-0.063	-0.089	-0.081
				(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.208)
College or More				-0.067	-0.114	-0.103
				(0.255)	(0.254)	(0.259)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.128	0.086	0.062
				(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.129)
Employed (1=employed)				0.108	0.104	0.115
				(0.152)	(0.142)	(0.144)
Household Income (logged)				-0.005	-0.009	-0.013
				(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.176	-0.175	-0.074
				(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.319)
Constant	0.077	1.993*	0.315	1.332	0.302	-0.193
	(0.240)	(0.802)	(0.884)	(0.871)	(0.968)	(0.984)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3
Log likelihood	-839.162	-836.035	-823.372	-831.008	-810.659	-789.491
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1678.324	1672.070	1646.744	1662.016	1621.318	1578.982
AIC	1684.325	1680.070	1660.744	1680.017	1665.318	1626.981
BIC	1699.803	1700.707	1696.859	1778.043	1778.822	1750.804

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-14: Wave 1 Native-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Neighborhood Trust (N=1,135)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	2.199*	0.749	0.606	0.585	0.539	0.746
	(1.002)	(0.904)	(0.821)	(0.784)	(0.752)	(0.744)
Nativity Diversity		-9.873***	-5.624***	-7.346***	-4.202*	-4.156*
		(2.132)	(1.774)	(1.900)	(1.625)	(1.603)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.045
						(0.135)
Friends Social Ties						0.403***
						(0.119)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			2.387		2.195	2.179
			(1.354)		(1.231)	(1.214)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-1.081		-1.336	-1.624
			(1.582)		(1.490)	(1.474)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-0.093***		-0.077***	-0.071***
			(1.216)		(0.024)	(0.023)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				-0.133	-0.162	-0.232
				(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.226)
Black				-0.301	-0.002	0.008
				(0.254)	(0.263)	(0.264)
Asian-American				-0.328	-0.312	-0.261
				(0.415)	(0.404)	(0.405)
Other				-0.899	-0.780	-0.798
				(0.475)	(0.472)	(0.484)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.221	-0.225	-0.225
				(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.162)
Age				0.025***	0.024***	0.025***
				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				0.308	0.309	0.324
				(0.251)	(0.250)	(0.251)
Some College				0.647*	0.588*	0.600*
				(0.254)	(0.252)	(0.254)
College or More				0.982***	0.914***	0.962***
				(0.232)	(0.318)	(0.319)
Married (1=married) (%)				-0.034	-0.065	-0.071
				(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.174)
Employed (1=employed)				0.272	0.223	0.259
				(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.182)
Household Income (logged)				0.046	0.039	0.034
				(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.280	-0.286	-0.239
				(0.179)	(0.177)	(0.179)
Constant	-0.355	4.577***	2.503*	1.854	0.302	-0.204
	(0.492)	(1.143)	(1.216)	(1.087)	(1.185)	(1.180)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	1.3	1.1	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.6
Log likelihood	-605.9862	-597.072	-581.765	-568.603	-555.918	-549.984
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	1211.972	1194.144	1163.530	1137.206	1111.836	1099.968
AIC	1217.973	1200.152	1177.529	1171.206	1151.835	1143.967
BIC	1233.076	1220.29	1212.770	1256.791	1252.523	1254.724

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 1

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-15: Wave 2 Foreign-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Neighborhood Trust (N=742)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	0.24 (0.596)	-0.325 (0.616)	-0.650 (0.808)	-0.355 (0.657)	-0.340 (0.877)	-0.352 (0.884)
Nativity Diversity		-5.683* (2.501)	-4.376 (2.771)	-5.377* (2.585)	-4.952 (2.905)	-5.315 (2.936)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.047 (0.189)
Friends Social Ties						0.358* (0.171)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			1.784 (1.433)		1.703 (1.531)	1.817 (1.538)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-1.523 (-1.316)		-2.162 (1.421)	-2.081 (1.433)
Econ. Disadvantage (% Pop.in Pov.)			-3.497* (1.522)		-3.727* (1.604)	-3.604* (1.612)
<b>Immigrant Individual Factors</b>						
<b>Nationality Differences (ref=All other FB)</b>						
Mexican				0.612 (0.434)	0.972* (0.453)	0.986* (0.457)
Central American				0.453 (0.461)	0.850 (0.475)	0.860 (0.477)
South and East Asian				0.497 (0.555)	0.435 (0.475)	0.503 (0.565)
<b>Legal Status (reference=U.S. Citizen)</b>						
Permanent Resident (LRP)				-0.156 (0.270)	-0.106 (0.271)	-0.103 (0.273)
Temp. Visa/Asylum				-1.252** (0.454)	-1.130* (0.454)	-1.140* (0.456)
Undocumented				0.023 (0.317)	0.204 (0.317)	0.139 (0.322)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Gender (1=Female)				-0.061 (0.235)	-0.045 (0.237)	0.002 (0.239)
Age				0.021* (0.010)	0.018 (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)
<b>Education (reference=less than HS)</b>						
HS Graduate				-0.072 (0.289)	-0.143 (0.293)	-0.135 (0.294)
Some College				0.068 (0.345)	-0.036 (0.347)	0.018 (0.351)
College or More				0.829 (0.494)	0.693 (0.501)	0.729 (0.504)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.310 (0.216)	0.232 (0.219)	0.243 (0.220)
Employed (1=employed)				0.048 (0.242)	0.008 (0.242)	0.049 (0.244)
Household Income (logged)				-0.048* (0.024)	-0.057* (0.025)	-0.057* (0.025)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				0.029 (0.234)	-0.017 (0.237)	0.018 (0.239)
Constant	1.662*** (0.256)	4.456*** (1.265)	3.828* (1.799)	3.085* (1.521)	2.904 (2.071)	2.683 (2.091)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4
Log likelihood	-332.749	-329.743	-317.587	-315.473	-304.197	-301.955
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	665.498	659.486	635.174	630.946	608.394	603.91
AIC	671.499	667.485	649.174	668.946	652.394	651.911
BIC	685.327	685.923	681.439	756.524	753.800	762.535

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

**Appendix Table 3-16: Wave 2 Native-Born Sample Parameters from Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Any Neighborhood Trust (N=657)**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<b>Main Effects</b>						
Ethnoracial Diversity	1.201 (0.167)	0.532 (0.857)	-0.111 (0.875)	0.706 (0.707)	-0.032 (0.945)	0.295 (0.953)
Nativity Diversity		-5.085* (1.992)	-1.968 (1.678)	-2.635 (1.569)	-1.138 (1.728)	-1.384 (1.753)
<b>Social Ties</b>						
Kin Social Ties						-0.117 (0.212)
Friends Social Ties						0.578** (0.203)
<b>Neighborhood Factors</b>						
Residential Stability (% Non-moving)			0.896 (1.478)		1.101 (1.567)	1.219 (1.590)
Ethnoracial Composition (% Black)			-1.822 (1.136)		-1.307 (1.291)	-1.497 (1.317)
Econ. Disadvantage (% HH on Public Asst.)			-6.615*** (1.637)		-5.093** (1.706)	-5.068** (1.736)
<b>Individual Factors</b>						
Ethnoracial Groups (Whites=reference)						
Latino/as				0.075 (0.357)	0.096 (0.367)	0.0871 (0.374)
Black				-0.810* (0.335)	-0.158 (0.398)	-0.067 (0.402)
Asian-American				0.611 (0.689)	0.481 (0.707)	0.509 (0.715)
Other				-1.086 (0.900)	-1.033 (0.900)	-0.972 (0.907)
Gender (1=Female)				-0.131 (0.266)	-0.047 (0.273)	0.000 (0.277)
Age				0.024* (0.024)	0.018 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)
Education (reference=less than HS)						
HS Graduate				0.841* (0.372)	0.776* (0.385)	0.769* (0.389)
Some College				1.205** (0.351)	1.040** (0.362)	0.978** (0.367)
College or More				1.916*** (0.447)	1.556** (0.466)	1.504** (0.469)
Married (1=married) (%)				0.550* (0.266)	0.398 (0.275)	0.338 (0.279)
Employed (1=employed)				-0.025 (0.294)	-0.112 (0.300)	-0.061 (0.306)
Household Income (logged)				-0.024 (0.028)	-0.032 (0.028)	-0.036 (0.029)
Residential Stability (1=moved)				-0.464 (0.260)	-0.523* (0.268)	-0.478 (0.272)
Constant	1.404** (0.424)	3.775*** (1.042)	3.509* (1.547)	0.817 (1.108)	1.365 (1.752)	0.908 (1.797)
$\sigma_{(1)}$	1.2	1.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Log likelihood	-285.524	-265.177	-242.072	-236.902	-225.596	-221.260
<b>Model Fit Statistics</b>						
Deviance	571.048	530.354	484.144	473.804	451.192	442.520
AIC	543.049	538.355	498.156	507.803	491.193	486.52
BIC	556.513	556.305	529.570	584.094	580.946	585.249

Source: Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, Wave 2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001



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