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**Title**

African Political Actors in post-U.D.I. Rhodesia: Resistance or Accommodation

**Permalink**

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**Journal**

Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 4(2)

**ISSN**

0041-5715

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**Publication Date**

1973

**DOI**

10.5070/F742016446

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## RESISTANCE OR ACCOMMODATION

### AFRICAN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND AFRICAN POLITICAL ACTORS IN POST-U.D.I. RHODESIA

by

VINCENT B. KHAPOYA

Since the self-governing British colony of Rhodesia<sup>1</sup> unilaterally declared its independence from Britain in November, 1965, there has sprouted a vast amount of literature on it: books and articles dealing, naturally, with the reasons behind the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.), the analysis of the European society, whose political, economic and social fortunes the rebel Prime Minister, Ian Smith, sought to safeguard, and the analysis of the reactions to U.D.I. of Africans on the continent and of other countries in the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

Among the more relevant literature have been publications dealing with the consolidation of power by the white minority government since the illegal seizure of independence.<sup>3</sup> This consolidation, in process since 1965, has been executed by passing laws, writing a new constitution, ordering a new registration of voters, which resulted, by design, in many Africans being disenfranchised, declaring a republic thus severing all links with Britain, whose responsibility Rhodesia is supposed to be, and by calling for new elections to solidify the white electorate behind the rebel Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front. These events, of course, are extremely important because they give those committed to self-determination for Africans in that country an idea of the enormity of the struggle that will and must be undertaken to restore dignity and freedom to the Africans. Equally significant in this connection have been publications on the liberation movements in Southern Africa, of which Rhodesia is a part.<sup>4</sup>

Until the so-called Anglo-Rhodesian agreement was announced in November, 1971, and a commission appointed to go into Rhodesia to test the acceptability of the terms of the agreement to Rhodesians of all races, not much had been written about the role the Rhodesian Africans were playing in the post-U.D.I. politics, if they were playing any role at all. The few studies available on Rhodesian Africans have tended to be either (1) descriptive or (2) polemical in terms, for instance, of glossing over the problems of inter- and intra-ethnic conflict

which not only have persisted for a long time but have also been accentuated by some of the recent legislation in Rhodesia.<sup>5</sup> The commission that was appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Pearce - the Pearce Commission - enabled many people in Africa and the world to get a glimpse of what the vast disenfranchised Africans really felt about U.D.I. and about minority white rule in Rhodesia. The Ian Smith government had never consulted them; and Ian Smith himself had frequently stated that the Africans in Rhodesia were the happiest Africans on the continent and that they definitely supported his government and his policies.

At the present time no studies are available of black Rhodesians who are politically active on Ian Smith's terms within the Rhodesian political system. These politically active Africans include the sixteen members of Parliament in the 66-seat National Assembly, the Rhodesian Farmers Union, the Chiefs, and the officials of the registered political parties such as the Rhodesian African Party (RAP), the National People's Union (NPU), and the All-African People's Party (AAPP), as well as many other groups. This paper, therefore, represents a modest attempt to examine the role of the African legislators and other African actors in the context of Rhodesian politics since U.D.I. It is hoped that ideas and interpretations presented will stimulate discussion among scholars interested in Rhodesia, and contribute to better understanding of Rhodesian politics and greater appreciation of the liberation struggle, the height of which may still lie ahead.

First of all, some background is provided on the nature of African political participation formally permitted by the Ian Smith regime. Secondly, the platforms of the active political parties, particularly during the April, 1970 general elections, are examined to determine the role they played and the goals they pursued, thereby enhancing our understanding of the dynamics of intra-African politics. Then, on the basis of the elections of 1970, we shall try to explain why the diminutive African electorate (8,326 voters) voted the way they did and what implications one can see for the liberation struggle in Rhodesia. The general election of April, 1970, is important because African political parties were allowed to contest eight of the sixteen seats reserved for Africans in the Rhodesian Parliament - the remaining eight being filled by nominees of local chiefs and councillors and headmen. And finally, assuming the Africans had the opportunity to express precisely and freely what was on their minds, an analysis of the Pearce Commission findings will be attempted to see if certain conclusions drawn earlier in the paper can be confirmed.

Under the 1961 Constitution, Africans were allotted 15 seats out of 65 in the Rhodesian legislature. In addition, there were some entrenched clauses pertaining to the franchise, the Declaration of Human Rights, and the Tribal Trust Land, which could not be abolished without the approval of a two-thirds majority in Parliament and the approval, with a simple majority, through a referendum, of Rhodesians of all the four racial groups (African, Asian, Colored and European). The U.D.I. constitution of 1965 removed this referendum requirement. It meant, in effect, that Africans from this point on could not block any piece of legislation that was detrimental to their rights and interests. Since Ian Smith controlled 50 seats in the legislature, it was fairly easy to muster a two-thirds majority of Parliament to pass any kind of legislation he wanted. As it turned out, this is exactly what happened, and the Smith government passed one law after another taking away the few rights the Africans still had. This first process was sealed in the 1969 Constitution.<sup>6</sup>

Under this Constitution, one provision stipulated that parliamentary representatives had to be elected by their own racial group. The provision did not apply to the Asians and Coloreds who were classified as Europeans for voting purposes. This meant, therefore, that Africans who owned property in the cities could not vote for those Europeans they thought would listen to their grievances. By the same token, Europeans who resided in African areas and who might be tempted to run for seats in African councils were deterred. Another crucial provision increased African representation to sixteen (16) members and literally institutionalized tribalism by dividing the seats equally between the Mashona people who comprise roughly 69% of Rhodesian Africans and the Matabeles who comprise the remaining 31%. In a further bold and deliberate move of "divide and rule", the seats allotted to each group were broken down into four elective positions called electoral seats to be filled by the enfranchized Africans and the other four called rural seats to be filled by nominees of the Chiefs, Headmen and Councilors sitting as rural electoral colleges. The schematic diagram of the rural and electoral constituent seats is as follows:<sup>7</sup>

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY</u>	
	<u>RURAL</u>	<u>ELECTORAL</u>
Mashona	Zambezi Highveld Manica Lowveld	Nemakonde Mabvazura Kunyasi Harari

(continued)	<u>TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY</u>	
<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>RURAL</u>	<u>ELECTORAL</u>
Matabele	Kariba Pagati Pioneer Tuli	Mpopoma Ntshonaland Matojeni Insukamini

Incidentally, the chiefs and headmen are government employees, paid regular salaries, and therefore, expected to carry out government policy no matter how much they may happen to disagree with it. Not surprisingly, they have found very little to disagree with the government on. Chief Tangwena, who has been feuding with the government recently over tribal land which the government had declared European land, is probably an exception. Even though the Senate does not have any real power in the legislative and governing process of the country, but acts merely as a consultative body, the division scheme is repeated there also, with the ten (10) African chiefs equally divided between the two main ethnic groups, ten (10) European members elected by the European members of the legislature (Lower House) sitting as an electoral college, and three additional seats filled by appointees of the President of the Republic, or prior to the declaration of the Republic in March, 1970, by the Officer Administering the Government.

#### African Political Actors and U.D.I.

It is rather interesting that even though the main reason for U.D.I. was clearly to keep all power in the hands of the white minority indefinitely, there was still a handful of African political actors that believed or had hopes that they could, through constitutional means, effect changes in the Rhodesian political system favorable to the Africans. At the time of U.D.I., the opposition in the Rhodesian Parliament consisted of 16 members. Thirteen of these belonged to the United People's Party (UPP), two were Asians, and one was a European, (Dr. Palley). UPP, under the leadership of Chad M. Chipunza, strongly opposed U.D.I. and the Emergency Legislation that followed. But this opposition was based on different reasons from those articulated by the banned political parties, now in exile, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). UPP regarded U.D.I. as a constitutional conflict, which required a constitutional solution rather than the "extreme" actions advocated by the exile parties. In other words, Chipunza envisaged the possibility of using his parliamentary platform to reverse the unilateral seizure of power by white Rhodesians or at least to force compromises which would take into account the interests of the African majority.

When Parliament convened for the first time in June, 1966, Mr. Chipunza walked out in protest against Mr. Dupont, then chosen by Ian Smith as Officer Administering the Government to replace the Queen's Governor-General, Sir Humphrey Gibbs. Mr. Chipunza felt that Mr. Dupont did not have the legal right to act in the name of Her Majesty, the Queen. Eight UPP members refused to join the boycott. Two months later, seven UPP members rebelled and ousted Chipunza replacing him with J.M. Gondo, who then became the Leader of the Opposition. Gondo, like his predecessor, declared his opposition to U.D.I., decried the infringement of black people's civil and political rights by whites and not surprisingly, insisted that in Rhodesia there was still room to change things through constitutional means.<sup>9</sup> At a party caucus in January, 1967, Gondo was defeated for the Presidency of UPP by Percy H. M'kudu.

In June, 1969, the UPP decided to merge with another all-African party which did not have representation in Parliament, the Democratic Party (DP) to form the National People's Union (NPU). Gordon Chavunduka, a sociology lecturer at the then University College of Rhodesia, was chosen as the President of NPU, and Percy M'kudu accepted the position of Vice-President while continuing in his role as the official leader of the parliamentary opposition.<sup>10</sup> NPU declared its support for majority rule, embraced non-violence and non-racialism in its approach to Rhodesian problems, and promised to be pragmatic and to work within the new Rhodesian Constitution then being drafted.<sup>11</sup> Two months later in August, 1969, Chad Chipunza was elected the Leader of Opposition over Mr. M'kudu, and J.M. Gondo was chosen the deputy leader. M'kudu then promptly resigned saying that he simply could not accept Chipunza's leadership. A day after his resignation, in a move that prompted the *Rhodesia Herald* to headline its front page column "African Politics Puzzling", M'kudu stated that he had not resigned from NPU or from the vice-presidency of the party but rather had only "refused" to be a member of the NPU parliamentary caucus under the leadership of Chad Chipunza.<sup>12</sup>

Three months later, in November, 1969, in a continuing African political scenario, a new political party was born. A Mr. W. H. Kona, President of the African Farmers' National Union (AFNU), announced the formation of another political party, the United National Progressive Party (UNPP), whose purpose, he declared, was to improve the economic and educational lot of the African people instead of waiting until majority rule was achieved.<sup>13</sup>

In February, 1970, two independent members of Parliament, one (R.C. Makaya) of whom had left UPP after losing his bid for the leadership of that party, announced the formation of yet

another African party, the Rhodesia African Party (RAP) and pledged to field candidates for all the eight African seats in Parliament in the April, 1970 elections.<sup>14</sup>

On March 12, 1970, Mr. M. D. Matimba, speaking as the Secretary General of the All-African People's Party (AAPP), whose exact date of formation I could not establish from my limited sources, but assume to have been around the same time, announced that he would run for one of the African seats (for the Harari Constituency). He also said that the AAPP was going to field candidates for all the eight seats, and that it was going to issue its manifesto shortly. He asserted that the AAPP represented the true interests of the African people.<sup>15</sup>

Several conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing account:

1. U.D.I. was not able to drive the incumbent African members of parliament into the waiting arms of the nationalist parties whose commitment to African rule in Rhodesia was unequivocal.

2. U.D.I. did not unify these members of Parliament into a strong political front dedicated, for instance, to effecting change, if that was possible, by means of the platform provided by Parliament.

3. Even though one can argue that these members of Parliament used the parliamentary forum to voice their opposition to U.D.I. and to specific oppressive legislation, their effectiveness was almost totally lacking as evidenced by their small numbers and the amount of legislation that was passed by the Ian Smith government. There are cases where, perhaps in order to maintain their precarious freedom, African members of Parliament voiced their support for the law and order measures of the Smith government saying that progress could be achieved in Rhodesia only in "peace and harmony."<sup>16</sup>

4. U.D.I. was followed by an increase in fragmentation among African parties. There were resignations, for instance, from the UPP when it merged with the DP to form NPU, at a time when unity was imperative. Secondly, the frequent resignations that occurred from the new NPU seem to have been based not on differences over party policy but on individual drives for power and leadership within the party. The approaching general elections of April, 1970, may have accelerated this process, as will be clear later on.



April, 1970, Elections and the Parties

As the general election approached, the first election since the declaration on March 2, 1970, of the republican status by the white minority leaders, African political actors were markedly atomized. There were four African political parties, all pledged to fielding candidates for the eight African-roll (electoral) parliamentary seats. In addition, there was one party, a multi-racial party called the Centre Party which planned to contest all the eight seats plus some seats in the white constituencies. Furthermore, there were only 8,326 African voters registered to cast their votes on April 10, 1970, obviously a very tiny minority compared to the 87,020 white voters.<sup>17</sup> The African voters represented not only less than 10% of the white voters but also less than two-tenths of 1% of all the black Rhodesians (or 0.16% to be exact). In addition to the candidates running under the banner of these five political parties, there were 11 candidates running as independents. Many of these independents, as many as five, had failed to win nomination in their parties and had, in protest, resigned from those parties.

TABLE 1. Distribution of African Candidates According to Party and African-roll Constituency.

Party	<u>CONSTITUENCY</u>	
	MASHONA	MATABELE
CP	4	4
UNPP	1	2
AAPP	1	-
RAP	3	3
NPU	4	2
INDEP	7	4
TOTAL	20	15

[Source: Compiled from *Rhodesia Herald*, March, 1970

Under the electoral scheme already discussed, the remaining eight African seats were to be filled by tribal electoral colleges. These eight seats were broken down into Mashona and Matabele. Contesting these tribal seats were 34 candidates. The numerical breakdown according to the rural constituencies is as follows:



TABLE 2. Distribution of African Candidates in Rural Constituencies.

Mashona Constituencies

Zambezi	4
Highveld	5
Manica	8
Lowveld	3

Matabele Constituencies

Kariba	3
Pagati	4
Pioneer	4
Tuli	3
Total	34

[Source: Compiled from *Rhodesia Herald*, March 1970.]

Of the five political parties that fielded candidates for the eight seats, the multi-racial Centre Party, listed the most, eight. The Centre Party also happens to be the oldest --having been formed in 1968 following a stalemate between the British Government and the Rhodesian Government over the Tiger Proposals that had been worked out between Ian Smith and the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. (Those proposals were later rejected by Smith's Cabinet.) It arose from the Centre Group, a political association whose central purpose was to demand "equal rights for civilized men and...that a person of any race qualifying under a single franchise should be allowed full civil rights, including the right to buy land, occupy property anywhere and to have his children attend schools in any area."<sup>18</sup>

When the Centre Party was formed in August, 1968, the seven principles for which it stood included a commitment to the creation of a united independent Rhodesian nation, having one Parliament for all Rhodesians; advancement based on merit alone; increased education opportunities for all Rhodesians; and economic development with an emphasis on rural areas. Condemnation of racial discrimination was qualified by three provisos: (1) no forced integration in residential areas would be attempted, (2) individual rights, including the right of private association, would be honored, and (3) the Tribal Trust Land would be preserved.<sup>19</sup> In any case, the Centre Party strongly supported U.D.I., declaring that the independence of Rhodesia was not subject to negotiation but felt that Ian Smith of the Rhodesian Front had not done everything possible to win international recognition of the regime. During the campaign for the general elections, the Centre Party issued a statement which

clarified its position on many issues. Besides supporting U.D.I., it supported a qualified franchise such as the one already in existence, the republican constitution under which elections were being held, both segregated and non-segregated schools, European immigration, the role of the police, and judicial independence. It rejected majority rule arguing that the concept smacked of racialism, rejected separate development for the same reason, opposed the Land Tenure Act, a provision of which governs Tribal Trust Land, citing the inherent tendency of the Act to impede economic development of the Africans and to exacerbate racial animosity and rejected the extensive use of emergency powers.<sup>20</sup> W.H. Kona of UNPP thought that too much significance was being placed on the republican status. He felt change could be effected from within. He pledged that his party was going to work toward the economic improvement of the Africans in preparation for true independence for the Africans. In a hazy mixture of politics and economics, he asserted, in a statement that perhaps best explains the UNPP's position, that "There could never be true security for the minorities and political affluence for the majority race until a constitution is brought about which recognizes the African as the dominant political and economic ingredient of the Rhodesian population."<sup>21</sup>

In a TV broadcast, an NPU candidate stated that NPU was committed to "principles of unadulterated democracy", was opposed to the 1969 Constitution, and to the Rhodesian Front education policy which proved to be disastrous for the Africans since it was totally inadequate and did not provide skills to the Africans.<sup>22</sup> NPU was further opposed to the continued state of emergency, the gas rationing, night police raids into African homes, and opposed, in general, to the conditions which had brought about "war in the Zambezi Valley"<sup>23</sup> a clear reference to the guerrilla actions mounted by the exiled nationalists. NPU, it was further stated, was committed to the basic freedoms of movement, speech, press, religion, to universal adult suffrage, and to equal opportunity for all races.

R.D. Makaya of the Rhodesia African Party appealed for help for his party saying that it was the only honest and integrated party in Rhodesia dedicated to bringing about majority rule in the future. He indicated that the party planned to work with the chiefs to promote prosperity and well-being in rural areas.<sup>24</sup>

The AAPP ended up fielding only one candidate and published no manifesto. Of the 11 independent candidates, seven had earlier resigned from the National People's Union either

because they failed to win nomination of the party, because they decided NPU was too fragmented to win the trust of African voters, or because they did not like the merger of UPP and DP into NPU in 1969. Of the two additional resignations from NPU, one had rejoined the party and the other had joined the RAP (Rhodesian African Party).

All in all, the campaign was short and vigorous, and, in those cases where the smaller parties had not issued their party manifestoes, it provided a forum whereby positions at least of the candidates, if not of the parties, could be enunciated. It seems that in spite of the Centre Party's position, which really is not that radically different from that of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front in being wedded to the status quo of the Africans, most African candidates consistently supported the party's position. Some of the African candidates likened the NPU to R.F. in their respective appeals to African majority rule and white rule.<sup>25</sup>

Of the five political parties that fielded African candidates the Centre Party won seven seats. It did not, of course, win any seats in white constituencies. NPU's Gondo won, but his victory was probably due more to his personal following than to the appeal of his party. The election results from the two African electoral constituencies published in the *Rhodesia Herald* showed an African voter turnout of 60.27% (of 1,505 registered voters) in Harari constituency and 75.51% (of 539 voters) in Mpopoma constituency.<sup>26</sup>

It bears repeating that this analysis applies to 8,326 African voters, without question a very tiny portion of Africans who might otherwise be voting if it were not for the racially restrictive franchise system. A little over 60% of these voted. Given the platforms of the parties, evidence seems to be compellingly in favor of the view that most enfranchised Africans decided to throw their lot in with the Centre Party because of its advocacy of partnership between the two main racial groups. The lesson was not lost on them of the boycott of the 1962 elections which led to the downfall of the moderate Whitehead Government. (Whitehead had promised the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act if elected with black voters' help).

Secondly, they may have realized the impotence of African opposition as evidenced by their fragmentation following U.D.I. in the face of consistent apartheid measures of the Rhodesian Front government. It is disturbing that not a single one of the independent candidates, quite a few of whom were very capable and experienced parliamentarians, was elected. All

independent candidates opposed U.D.I. (Centre Party candidates did not); almost all deplored the record of the Rhodesian Front; all were for eventual majority rule. All major parties had access to television to address their voters. All planned meetings. The independent candidates did not have television time. However, many of them were familiar names in Rhodesian politics who might have been expected to reach voters through meetings. It is interesting to note that only one candidate who had served in the previous Parliament won, again very possibly confirming the African voters' interest in the Centre Party rather than in the candidates themselves as providing the best guarantee for African rights. Five former members of Parliament had run for election, two of them under the banner of NPU and the other three as independents.

What implications do the April, 1970 elections pose not only for the domestic politics in Rhodesia but also for the future of the Africans in general? The following are suggested:

1. Because of the high education and property requirements which the Africans must meet in order to qualify for the franchise, the African vote showed that African voters were moderate and that they still subscribed to that outmoded concept, at least as understood and applied in British imperial history, known as multi-racialism.<sup>27</sup> As the experience of the now defunct Central African Federation and that of Kenya shows, multi-racialism was a ploy used by the settlers to exercise far more power and control in the governing of the areas where they were than their numerical presence warranted. The African voters may also have responded to the call of the Centre Party for a viable opposition in Parliament, which the African parties seemed incapable of providing. They may also have perceived that only a white party such as the Centre Party would not cause the white electorate to panic and unite with the Rhodesian Front thereby emboldening the government to continue its consolidation of power into "civilized hands" and to continue to erode the civil rights of the Africans including the already limited right to vote. It also seems clear that the African parties misunderstood the mood of these few enfranchised Africans.<sup>28</sup>

2. It seems true that under ordinary circumstances local political parties such as those permitted in Rhodesia do not prove worthy allies in the liberation struggle. This is the case for two reasons: (a) many of the actors have a stake or at least think they do, in the existing social system; and (b) many of them operate under conditions that make it

impossible for them to take certain strong positions. In any case, in the 1970 elections, all of the African parties, while opposing U.D.I. and many of the restrictive laws, believed that change was possible within the Rhodesian political system. Those which advocated majority rule and declared that they were going to work toward it did not dare indicate just how majority rule would be achieved. A number of the candidates, when asked whether, if elected, they would swear allegiance to a government they considered illegal, evaded the question completely. None of the parties had tried to enlarge their following to involve those Africans denied the right to vote. While one can argue that these parties were trying to be pragmatic, they certainly did not pose or even appear to be posing any threat to the regime.

3. At least until some formal international recognition is extended to the Ian Smith regime, parties such as the NPU, AAPP, UNPP, RAP, and others that may be formed later, will be allowed to organize within Rhodesia so long as they do not appear to be nationalist and so long as they play the game according to prescribed rules. They will spend their energy, mostly carping at each other, while the Rhodesian Front goes about its business of leading Rhodesia toward an apartheid state, a possibility many observers of Rhodesia regard as inevitable and indeed a foregone conclusion.<sup>29</sup> The recent legislation in Rhodesia confirms this, and a survey of racial attitudes of white Rhodesians carried out before U.D.I.<sup>30</sup> seems to show that most white Rhodesians are willing to grant a mandate to Ian Smith to do precisely that. The right wing groups want an immediate apartheid state, the "silent majority" that so overwhelmingly gave all the parliamentary seats to Ian Smith's party seem to prefer the pace at which Ian Smith is implementing the policies set forth by the Rhodesian Front. What makes the role of the small African parties even more inconsequential is the fact that they have no forum outside Rhodesia to make their demands or their grievances known. Several times in the past, African members of Parliament have been refused permission to attend the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meetings and the meetings of the OAU Liberation Committee.<sup>31</sup>

### The Pearce Commission

As I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the Pearce Commission presented a rare opportunity for all Rhodesians to express themselves on the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals, even considering that the Africans were not consulted when the proposals were drawn up. So the findings of this commission are really perhaps the best gauge ever of

just how Black Rhodesians especially feel about continued white minority rule. Secondly, they should enable us to determine if the African voters that voted for the Centre Party candidates in April, 1970 would have voted differently given the same conditions as those obtaining during the Pearce Commission hearings.

Commission hearings were held all over the country and opinions were heard not only from individuals but also from some of the political groups already discussed in this paper.<sup>33</sup> The new African group which arose primarily from the African people's opposition to the proposals was the African National Council (ANC) led by Bishop Muzorewa. There is no indication that the African political parties had any part in forming this group. In fact, it seems as if the All-African People's Party (AAPP), the Rhodesian African Party (RAP) and the United National Progressive Party (UNPP) had become inactive after their failure to secure any seats in the April, 1970 elections. The National People's Union (NPU) continued to function, and in fact had one seat held by Mr. Gondo in Parliament. There was also another new party, the Rhodesia Electoral Union (REU) which was formed shortly after the 1970 elections by R.C. Makaya of RAP, bringing together all the eight representatives elected by the Chiefs in the tribal areas. The African Farmers Union whose President, Mr. W. H. Kona, founded the UNPP during the 1970 elections, the ANC, the Centre Party, the Council of Chiefs, the NPU, and the Rhodesian Electoral Union, all made their presentations to the Commission.<sup>34</sup> The ANC, of course, spearheaded the campaign against the proposals. The African Farmers Union rejected the proposals even before the Pearce Commission set foot in Rhodesia,<sup>35</sup> but the Centre Party supported the proposals. The Council of Chiefs at first unanimously endorsed the settlement terms before the Commission arrived and when it met the Commission later.<sup>36</sup> When interviewed later in their own areas, 13 of these Chiefs accepted the proposals, 8 rejected them, 4 abstained and one absented himself. Two of the Chiefs that had rejected the proposals later on told the Commissioners in private that they personally supported them.<sup>37</sup> On the whole, 184 Chiefs out of a possible maximum of 254 were seen by the Commission. The breakdown of the response was as follows: 44 "yes", 87 "no" and 53 "abstentions" or "don't know". This breakdown would seem to further support the ANC allegation that the first unanimous endorsement may have been obtained because of government pressure.<sup>38</sup> The NPU rejected the proposals, even though their sole member of Parliament, Mr. Gondo, accepted the proposals, and was immediately ousted from the leadership of the party.<sup>39</sup> The REU was more unified in its rejection of the proposals.



An analysis of African oral opinion by the Commission shows that of the 114,534 Africans who were seen by the Commission, 2,934 said "yes" to the proposals, 107,309 said "no", and 4,291 abstained or were undecided.<sup>40</sup> Written evidence, however, shows a trifle different story --it narrows the rejection margin slightly. Of the 54,102 Rhodesian Africans that submitted written evidence, 9,030 accepted the proposals, 43,608 rejected them, 1,464 didn't know.<sup>41</sup>

TABLE 3 Response of Rhodesian Africans to the Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement Proposals.

Acceptability	RESPONSE SUBMITTED			
	Inside Rhodesia		Outside Rhodesia	
	Oral %	Written %	Oral %	Written %
Yes	2,934 (2.6)	9,030 (16.7)	--	2 (0.1)
No	107,309 (93.7)	43,608 (80.6)	--	2,703 (99.9)
Don't Know	4,291 (3.7)	1,464 (2.7)	--	---
Total -	114,534 (100)	54,102 (100)	--	2,705 (100)
		* * * *		

[Source: Compiled from *Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion Under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce*. Miscellaneous No. 19 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1972), pp. 58-59, 187-88.]

In essence, what these figures tell us is that, unquestionably, the preponderant majority of the Rhodesian Africans rejected the proposals. However, recalling that during the 1970 elections only 8,326 Africans were registered to vote, and that a little over 60% of these did actually vote, and noting also that the numbers that accepted the proposals did exceed registered voters, it is difficult to discount the possibility that the African registered voters knew what they were doing when they elected seven Centre Party candidates and when they did not elect the independent candidates and other candidates whose views on African interests and aspirations would have been expected to be agreeable to the African voter. If this is so, then accommodationist attitudes can be seen among those who voted in 1970 and who may also have registered a "yes" vote during the Pearce hearings. Another significant point to note is that only one African Centre Party MP actually resigned from the party because he felt that he could not go against the wishes of his constituents who opposed the proposals.



Finally, the response of the Africans demonstrated very saliently once again the tremendous reservoir of the Africans' commitment to self-determination. The white minority government cannot ignore this strong desire for dignity and freedom, so powerfully and cogently expressed. Similarly, the nationalist parties now waging the struggle mostly from outside the country know or ought to realize that one of the most important things they really need to do is mobilize these masses. The eventual victory of the cause of African freedom will depend on how thoroughly the liberation parties understand the crucial role played by the masses. Perhaps the twelve thousand Africans that supported settlement proposals and the seven African organizations that campaigned for acceptance out of the 124 which submitted written evidence<sup>42</sup> need to be convinced not only that the cause for which the nationalist parties are fighting is just and right, and has the moral backing of most countries in the world, but also that the present white regime has no plans to ever share power on an equal basis with the African people.

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#### Footnotes

1. The African name for Rhodesia is Zimbabwe.
2. Examples include the following: B. Vulindela Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1967); Theodore Bull, *Rhodesia: Crisis of Color* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967); R.C. Pratt, "African Reactions to the Rhodesian Crisis," *International Journal*, XXII (Summer, 1968) 649-99; and Anirudha Gupta, "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Organization of African Unity," *International Studies*, IX, 1 (July, 1967), 55-64.
3. See: Claire Pelley, "Law and Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia Under the Front from 1963-1969," *Race*, XII (July, 1970), 15-47; and *Race*, XII (October, 1970), 139-67.
4. Philoment T. Makonese, "ZAPU and the Liberation of Zimbabwe," *Africa Quarterly*, X (April-June, 1970), 40-51; and Richard Gibson, "African Liberation Crisis," *Race Today*, II (February, 1970), 35-39.

5. See, for instance, Davis M'gabe, "Rhodesia's African Majority," *Africa Report*, XII (February, 1967), 14-20; and Herbert Chitepo, "The Passing of Tribal Man - A Rhodesian View," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, V (January and April, 1970), 10-15.
6. For a detailed account of post-U.D.I. legislation in Rhodesia, see Claire Palley's excellent article, *op. cit.*; and Reg Austin, "The Character and Legislation of the Rhodesian Front since U.D.I.," (London: African Bureau, 1968).
7. *Rhodesia Herald*, March 7, 1970, p.3; and March 21, 1970.
8. *Africa Research Bulletin* (hereinafter referred to as *ARB*), III (1966), 516. James Barber regards U.D.I. as a constitutional issue and looks at it in terms of power; see his "Rhodesia: The Constitutional Conflict," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, IV (December, 1966), 457-69.
9. *ARB*, III (1966), 618; and IV (1967), 705.
10. *ibid.*, VI (1969), 1450.
11. *ibid.*
12. *Rhodesia Herald*, August 30, 1969, p.1.
13. *ibid.*, March 6, 1970, p.3; *ARB*, VI (1969), 1450.
14. *Rhodesia Herald*, February, 1970, p.15; and February 17, 1970, p.3.
15. *ibid.*, March 12, 1970, p.2.
16. See, for example, the debate on the Police Vote in Parliament; *Rhodesia Herald*, August 2, 1968, p.5.
17. *ibid.*, March 10, 1970, p.2; and April 3, 1970, p.7.
18. *ibid.*, August 20, 1968, p.7.
19. *ibid.*, August 30, 1968, p.1.
20. *ibid.*, March 5, 1970, p.11.
21. *ibid.*, March 6, 1970, p.3.

22. The educational policy of the Rhodesian Front is succinctly covered in Eshmael Mlambo, *Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright* (New York: Humanities Press, 1972), 91-105.
23. *Rhodesia Herald*, April 2, 1970, p.3.
24. *ibid.*, April 4, 1970, p.3; and February 17, 1970, p.3.
25. *ibid.*, April 4, 1970, p.2.
26. *ibid.*, April 11, 1970, p.2.
27. Eshmael Mlambo also suggests that in the early sixties, the educated salaried Africans only paid lip service to African nationalism, and suggests that their material comfort may have been responsible for their reluctance to ally themselves with African nationalists. See his book, *op. cit.*, 140-41, 144-45.
28. Note, for example, a remark made by an NPU candidate: "It has not happened anywhere that a nationalist party has participated in an election and lost." (*Rhodesia Herald*, April 9, 1970, p.4.) A Centre Party African candidate who later won the election countered by saying: "I cannot believe a voter voting for the NPU which talks about majority rule which is not in sight... It is also no use talking about one man one vote before you have built the foundations to achieve it." *Rhodesia Herald*, April 19, 1970, p.4.)
29. For instance, Alan H. Jeeves, "The Problem of South Africa," *International Journal*, XXVI, 2 (Spring 1971), 432.
30. Stephen E.C. Hintz, "The Political Transformation of Rhodesia, 1958-1965," *African Studies Review*, IV, 2 (September, 1972), 177-83.
31. In November, 1966 two African Rhodesian MP's, Percy M'kudu and Joel Behave, were refused permission to enter Ethiopia and attend an OAU summit meeting as observers because they carried Rhodesian passports issued after U.D.I.; see *Keessing's Contemporary Archives* (Nov. 26 - Dec.3, 1966), p. 21740. In 1969, M'kudu would not be allowed to attend the 14th session of the OAU Liberation Committee because he "represented forces opposed to OAU ... and stood for no genuine liberation movement;" *ARB*, VI (1969), 1317.

32. See *ARB*, VI (1969), p. 1460.
33. *Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesia Opinion Under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce*, May 1972, Cmnd. 4969. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972. (Hereinafter referred to simply as the *Pearce Commission Report*.)
34. *ibid.*, p. 157.
35. *ibid.*, p. 27; and *Rhodesia Herald*, January 21, 1972, p.2.
36. *Pearce Commission Report*, pp. 26, 90; *Rhodesia Herald*, January 6, 1972, p. 1.
37. *Pearce Commission Report*, p. 26.
38. The ANC argued that the presence of the Minister of Internal Affairs at that meeting of January 4, 1972, constituted pressure on the members of the Council of Chiefs to endorse the settlement proposals. See: *Rhodesia Herald*, January 7, 1972, p. 2.
39. *Pearce Commission Report*, p. 23.
40. *ibid.*, pp. 58-59.
41. *ibid.*, p. 187.
42. *ibid.*, p. 73.

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