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Inversion and Interpellation:

On the Modern Theory of Colonization and Indonesian Interventions

in the Critique of Political Economy

By

Dylan Fagan

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor in Philosophy

in

Anthropology

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Xin Liu, Chair
Professor Sylvia Tiwon
Professor Lawrence Cohen

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Abstract

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More than one decade after his infamous interventions of *Pour Marx* and *Lire "Le Capital,"* writing in a Preface to an uncelebrated book written by Gérard Duménil entitled *Le Concept de loi économique dans "Le Capital,"* Louis Althusser delivers a disarmingly devastating and simple question: "how does Marx think in *Capital*?" This question, Althusser writes, "refers us…to the rudiments…in Marx himself." Motivated by his longstanding dissatisfaction with the doxa that Marx's materialism inverts Hegel's idealism, Althusser goes on to argue not only that the discursive orders and concepts of *Capital* do not bear such an inversion of Hegel's method and system, but moreover that *Capital* discloses a mode of thinking that interdicts recourse to discursive constructions which bind an appropriation (*Aneignung*) and exposition (*Darstellung*) of material (*Stoff*) in a "*purely theoretical*" manner. In doing so, Louis Althusser, this dissertation argues, fundamentally rethinks the field and function of inversion in the critique of political economy.

In detecting the consequences of this reconsideration, the dissertation identifies how the original and sustained limit of *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (1867), that is the chapter "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" ("The Modern Theory of Colonization"), brings forth such a critical inversion in *Capital*. Part One of the dissertation demonstrates both why "The Modern Theory of Colonization" has historically presented epistemological obstacles for its readers as well as the conceptual effects which are generated by grasping its notion of inversion. Foremost amongst these effects is the identification of the limit of the critique of political economy as a process, not a space, of modern colonization. Part One concludes that the critique identified by "The Modern Theory of Colonization" avails a place of thinking and speaking in modern colonization just beyond the limit of "pure theoretical" discourse in the activity that this dissertation calls, following as well as critically reconsidering Althusser, interpellation.

Oriented by these considerations, Part Two of the dissertation exposits an ethnography of a discourse of interpellation in a set of Indonesian interventions in this critique of modern colonization. The analysis focuses on three discursive and practical localities. The first is the novel written by the pseudonymous Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, Or the Coffee Auctions of a Dutch Trading Company* (1860) and its subsequent formal and aesthetic transformations through the 20th and 21st centuries, including its contemporary settings in the sculptures of *Multatuli* (2017, 2019) made by Dolorosa Sinaga (b. 1952) with her *Somalaing* studio in Jakarta. The second is the investigations and disputes regarding ontology and the social formation in the contemporary Indonesian Renaissance in philosophy, centering on the writings of Martin Suryajaya (b. 1989) and Muhammad Al-Fayyadl (b. 1986). The third is a practice and discourse of parrhesia in the artwork of Dolorosa Sinaga and the world of the verandah beside her *Somalaing* studio, where ethnographic research for this dissertation was based from June 2016 to March 2020. Part Two of the dissertation identifies how these interventions as interpellations are marked by a critical, rather than a "purely theoretical," mode of inversion and effectivity.

The dissertation concludes that the exposition of "The Modern Theory of Colonization" orients the limit of *Capital* as a critique of the process whereby a colonizing state acts *indirectly* on the forceful conjuncture of capital and labour on the behalf of capital. The dissertation shows how this process is both identified and critiqued by Indonesian interventions within the conjuncture of modern colonization. These works both enrich and develop practices for interrupting the actuality, rather than the pure theoretical possibility, of the mistake (*Verwechslung*) of political economy. In lieu of reconstituting *a priori* theoretical impasses generated by the production processes of capital, the dissertation shows that these interventions initiate inversions in political, physical, and metaphysical modes of existence by obstructing the processes of modern colonization that mute domination and compulsion.

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The *oikos,* we are taught, is an abode, a dwelling, a family. I grew first in the home of my parents, Mark Fagan and Sheila Cooley, with my two sisters, Katie and Charlotte Fagan. My home now is-with Jenny Zhang and Augie Fagan, my two closest and most cherished companions in life. Let this dissertation be a thoughtful remembrance, a *pusaka*, for these families, who have given me more than everything.

D.M.F.

But more basically, I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their "thus saith the Lord" far beyond the boundaries of their hometowns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco-Roman world, so am I compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond my hometown. Like Paul, I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call for aid.

Martin Luther King Jr., *Letter from Birmingham Jail*

But there remains this difference between what can be touched and what can be seen or can sound; in the latter two cases we perceive because the medium produces a certain effect upon us, whereas in the perception of objects of touch we are affected not *by* but *along with* the medium; it is as if a man were struck through his shield, where the shock is not first given to the shield and passed on to the man, but the concussion of both is simultaneous.

Aristotle, *De Anima* (Trans. J. A. Smith)

To strike light means: to make light, to let become bright, to lighten, to endow light.

Martin Heidegger, *Heraclitus* (Trans. J. G. Assaiante and S. M. Ewegen)

Hukum adalah lembah hitam
Tak mencerminkan keadilan
Pengacara juri hakim jaksa
Masih ternilai dengan angka
(uang)

Hukum telah dikuasai
Oleh orang orang beruang
Hukum adalah permainan
Tak menjaga kekuasaan

Maling-maling kecil dihakimi
Maling-maling besar dilindungi
Maling-maling kecil dihakimi
Maling-maling besar dilindungi

Hukum adalah komoditas
Barangnya para tersangka…
Ada uang kau kan dimenangkan
Tak ada uang you say good-bye…

Marjinal, "Hukum Rimba"

Law is a darkened valley
Not reflecting justice
Lawyer jury judge and prosecutor
Still evaluate with the numbers
(money)

Law has been mastered
By the moneyed people
Law is a game
Not guarding rules

Small thieves are judged
Big thieves are protected
Small thieves are judged
Big thieves are protected

Law is a commodity
Its things are the suspected
There is money, you won
There is no money, *you say good-bye*…

Preliminary Appraisal

Opening

Two small stories will help introduce this dissertation.

The first is to recall that still early during this period of ethnographic fieldwork research, someone with whom I became quite fond of during this time characterized the place where we were – Garuda, *BRG* – with a differentiation and universalism that provides an orientation for this dissertation. He said, at night, people *berkarya* (make works) here. He said, of course, elsewhere there are people who go to bed at night and sleep. But here instead, he said, people come together in the night. This memory has persisted, I think, because it was not the *fact* of sleep or waking in the night on which he was remarking. Instead, the remark disclosed a concept of temporality as that which is *not* prevailing in the social formation. This memory has become attached to another one, when, in this same place that is a verandah, someone else with whom I became quite fond of during this period described a particular attribute of this place as inverted time. He said that here, the time has been turned upside down (*jamnya terbalik*). 3am here is like 3pm out there, he said.

The second is to recall that this ethnographic dissertation research began with the questioning of a *Mitsein* of the micro-movie theater in the metropolitan city of Jakarta as a place where people come together, particularly in the evening, in an auditorium environment or architecture, to be-together temporarily. During the course of this dissertation research, the Covid pandemic lockdown has brought about an interdiction in this particular pastime or custom. This coming together at night with others, most of whom are strangers, was interrupted and continues to be so, although now with an attenuating intensity.

Both of these stories recognize how *Mitsein* is neither a permanent nor physical but rather instead a political and metaphysical attribute for the anthropos. This dissertation seeks to demonstrate that the human world is a difference not only between categories such as the day and the night, but also and instead between the night and the night.

Chapter 1: On *'How* Marx *Thinks'*

In the Preface to a book written by Gérard Duménil, *Le Concept de loi économique dans "Le Capital"* published in 1978, Louis Althusser delivers a disarmingly devastating and simple question: "how does Marx think in *Capital*?"[1] This question, Althusser writes, "refers us…to the rudiments…in Marx himself."[2]

Why does Althusser ask this question and what is the significance of such an answer ('to the rudiments')? This chapter outlines the conceptual causes and effects of this particular questioning and shows how it allows Althusser to identify a *differentia specifica* of Marx's interpretation of unity and being. This specific difference, we argue, is a mode of action as overturning and inversion.

In this 1978 *Preface*, Althusser identifies this specific overturning action in *Capital* by considering and reconsidering four particular concepts – *Forschung*, *Darstellung*, *Denkprozess*, and *Methode*. His reading differentiates the discourse of *Capital* from both Hegel's discourse as well as what Althusser calls *a priori* construction. This dissertation chapter shows why the elucidation of this overturning mode of action by Althusser prescribes or pre-predicates a critical reconsideration of the limit-in-exposition of *Capital* that Marx names "Die Moderne Kolonisationstheorie" ("The Modern Theory of Colonization").[3] This critical reconsideration constitutes the practical activity of Part I of this dissertation.

I. *Forschung* and *Darstellung*

To situate this 1978 *Preface* to *Le Concept de loi économique dans "Le Capital,"* it is not impertinent to note that it was written more than ten years after the seminal and now historical contributions of *Pour Marx* (1965) and *Lire "Le Capital"* (1965). The 1978 *Preface* thus can be understood as a reconsideration and return to Althusser's own inceptual reading of *Capital*. We present the *Preface*'s first crucial passage at length, as its concepts bear on the dissertation as a whole. Althusser writes,

> "One does not read *Capital,*" Duménil affirms, "one studies it." We shall take that to mean: one has to study it to be able to read it. Let us make no mistake about the objective of this "study." It is not to make a close study of *Capital* in order to find in the text – clear, confused, or unfinished – answers to "economic" questions such as the theory of prices or production, of (cyclical or general) crises, and so on. Nor does Duménil study *Capital* in order to learn what Marx thought about this or that problem. He "studies" it to learn *how* Marx *thinks*: the rest comes as a by-product of this effort. At the limit, Duménil would say that we cannot produce a fully informed reading of *Capital* – that is, determine what it

[1] Louis Althusser, "Preface to *Le concept de loi économique dans 'Le Capital,'* by Gérard Duménil," *Rethinking Marxism* 30, no. 1 (2018): 6. Cited hereafter as "Preface."

[2] Ibid.

[3] In the 1867 edition of *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Oekonomie,* "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" constitutes the third and final part of the sixth and final chapter, "Der Accumulationsprozess des Kapitals." See Karl Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1867), 745. In subsequent re-organizations of *Das Kapital*, "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" has come to constitute the self-standing, final chapter of the work. This is Chapter 25 in the 1962 *Marx-Engels Werke* and Chapter 33 in the 1976 edition published by New Left Review & Vintage. On the turns in the *Capital* project organization, see Michael Heinrich, "Crisis Theory, the Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall, and Marx's Studies of the 1870s," *Monthly Review* 11, no. 64 (2013): 15-31.

> contains, what falls "by rights" within its purview and what escapes it and is excluded from it – unless we know how Marx thinks, unless we are familiar with the logic defining his object and governing his demonstration.[4]

Althusser's text breaks off here. A careful reading shows that in characterizing Duménil's practice of 'study,' Althusser identifies here the possibility of a learning that is not of a theory, but instead of a first knowledge, a logic. A logic that is moreover not a schoolmen's doctrine because it is obtained not within the study, but outside it, in an intuitive or existential mode of existence. This is not a reading of *Capital*'s own finite forms of appearance, including the contents of its own theoretical laws. This instead identifies a learning of '*how* Marx *thinks*' that we hasten to note takes place in Althusser's text in the place of another reader, that is, Duménil.

This idea – "'studying' *Capital* to learn *how* Marx *thinks*" – is one which sees or reads *Capital* not triumphantly, but rather from Marx's own attempt to re-introduce *Capital* in an emendatory or reparative manner to readers in the 1873 *Nachwort* to the Second German edition of *Das Kapital*. Althusser focuses his attention on the belated and retroactive nature of this discourse. We present Althusser's next decisive passage again at length, for its concepts again bear on the dissertation as a whole. Answering to his own question of a learning of *how* Marx *thinks* in *Capital*, Althusser writes,

> the simplest and most "obvious" answer consists in identifying the logic of Marx's thinking (a supposedly unified logic) with "the order of the reasoning in *Capital*" – that is, with the book's order of exposition or, to repeat Marx's terms, its "method of exposition" or "mode of exposition" [*Darstellungsmethode, Darstellungswiese*]. This answer is not just dictated by the impressive conceptual unity of the "order of reasoning" in *Capital*; Marx also explicitly states it in his afterword to the second German edition, when, in 1873, six years after the appearance of *Capital,* Volume I, he takes stock of his readers' and critics' reactions. Yet while the order of exposition in *Capital* is compelling simply by virtue of its presence, in the absence of all presuppositions, a second order also appears in the afterword. *This second order is in fact the first*: the order of research. Thus, Marx declares that one must distinguish between method or mode of research [*Forschungsmethode* or *Forschungsweise*], spelling out that it falls to the former "to appropriate [*sich aneignen*] the material [*Stoff*] in detail, to analyze its different forms of development, and to bring out their inner connection." The conceptual exposition comes second: "Only after this work is finished can the actual movement be adequately described [*entsprechend dargestellt*]." *Thus, the order of exposition presupposes the order of research*. To appropriate the material in its movement, one must first conduct research; the exposition comes only thereafter, "reproducing" the "real movement" in the movement of the concepts.[5]

The English translator, G.M. Goshgarian, notes that the interpolations of Marx's German here are in Althusser's text. In this passage, Althusser identifies a relation of exposition (*Darstellung*) and research (*Forschung*) in *Capital* as *itself* presenting a critique of the concepts of research and exposition as *practiced* by and in *a priori* constructions.

In a fundamental formulation, Althusser writes that Marx articulates how '*the order of exposition presupposes the order of research*.' *Forschung* and *Darstellung* participate in each other

[4] Althusser, "Preface," 5-6; emphasis in Althusser.
[5] Ibid, 6-7; emphases added.

completely and essentially, not simply within a delimited domain of analysis. Moreover, Althusser's final epochal quotation marking in the prior passage's final moments around *both* "reproducing" and "real movement" articulates, we suggest, an idea of an action of inversion in *Capital* that for Althusser distinguishes the theoretical practice of *Capital* from that of *a priori* constructions. For the practice of *a priori* constructions, Althusser argues, *itself* indicates that exposition *returns* to research eventually. In foregrounding the question of reproduction and its realm of movement in *Capital*, Althusser marks a *turning* action *within Capital*'s own conceptual and practical activity that is not simply so-called production.

Although Althusser does not quote Marx's own German without interruption at length, we do so here, for its discourse brings forth several concepts that are fundamental for this dissertation. In the decisive passage for Althusser's 1978 *Preface* reading, Marx writes,

> Allerdings muß sich die Darstellungsweise formell von der Forschungsweise unterscheiden. Die Forschung hat den Stoff sic him Detail anzueignen, seine verscheiden Entwicklungsformen zu analysieren und deren innres Band aufzuspüren. Erst nachdem diese Arbeit Vollbracht, kann die wirkliche Bewegung entsprechend dargestellt werden. Gelingt dies und spiegelt sich nun das Leben des Stoffs ideell wider, so mag es aussehn, als habe man es mit einer Konstruktion a priori zu tun.[6]

Ben Fowkes here reads,

> Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development to track down their inner connections. Only after this work has been done can the real movement be appropriately presented. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is now reflected back in the ideas, then it may appear as if we have before us an *a priori* construction.[7]

Rereading this passage in his 1978 *Preface*, Althusser identifies here in Marx *how* exposition *itself* actualizes an *order* of research. This idea does not, however, eventuate in an understanding of an absolute power of exposition over research. On the contrary, the 1978 *Preface* shows that Marx teaches with this passage that the *particular conceptual relation* of research (*Forschung*) and exposition (*Darstellung*) in *a priori* construction is *not* the *universal conceptual relation* of research and exposition as such. Marx sees here that a *conceptual relation* of research and exposition intervenes in and on a process that *a priori* constructions and genetic evolutionisms instead project into an extant duality as 'the ideal' and 'the material.'[8] Althusser identifies here in Marx's passage how an appearance *can* produce a deception, or a pseudonymity, with regards to itself.

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[6] Karl Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, in *Marx-Engels Werke Band 23* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962), 27. Cited hereafter as "*MEW 23*."

[7] Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy,* trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1976), 102. Cited hereafter as "*Capital*."

[8] Althusser argues that *a priori* construction and genetic evolutionism project 'the ideal' and 'the material' as symmetrical imputations of the self-same concept. Their schemas imagine (project) that *Forschung* and *Darstellung* are ontologically the self-same. In his own earlier writings, particularly in the text called "On the Young Marx" first published in 1960, Althusser identified this theoretical practice as Ludwig Feuerbach's and one which this dissertation calls a spurious mode of inversion. Like in "On the Young Marx," Althusser in the 1978 *Preface* argues that this notion of a symmetrical, spurious inversion of 'the material' and 'the ideal' is *not* the *specifica differentia* of *Capital*. For even the so-called cell form of *Capital* – the commodity form – *bars* such a symmetrization as its synoptic

In divining the cause of this attribute, Althusser states that there is in *Capital* "*another method*…behind the order of exposition" such that its own exposition *"turns on the appropriation of the 'material."*[9] The orthographic quotation marking around "material" is again decisive in Althusser's writing, for it indicates a questioning, rather than a positive verification, of this turning action. Althusser then outlines particular consequences of his proposition. *Capital* is not the factical exposition of a research in an *a priori* manner or mode. Rather, presupposing an order of research in exposition, *Capital* grasps the conjuncture of its own discourse in such a way that attempts to bring about effects that its own exposition seeks but does not exposit directly within itself. This is not exposition of an object with an extant orientation, Althusser posits. And yet, Althusser notes, Marx himself does 'fall' into the theoretical practice of *a priori* constructions in *Capital,* and at times "engenders the speculative illusion that the real movement is produced by (is constructed 'a priori' from) the method of exposition."[10] Althusser writes,

> we are faced with a paradox. It is the *success* of the reproduction – the fact that the method of exposition, the movement or dialectic of the concepts, results in the adequate materialist reproduction of the real movement – that thus engenders the speculative illusion that the real movement is produced by (is constructed "a priori from") the method of exposition, the movement or dialectic of the concepts.[11]

In order to make, or to allow, exposition to produce conceptual effects *other* than those stemming from *a priori* construction, Althusser suggests that Marx develops a return to the notion of method in the 1873 *Nachwort*. Althusser, introducing this place and concept with a semantics of Freudian psychoanalysis, writes "throughout his explanation, Marx repeatedly lets slip a little word that may be just a word but may also have far-reaching implications: 'method.'"[12] Althusser focuses on the relation of this notion of method to what Althusser conserves in Marx's German as *Denkprozess.* Their relation becomes and is fundamental for Althusser's reconsideration of *how* Marx *thinks* in *Capital*.

To do this, Althusser first acknowledges a doxa. This is the notion that Marx's thinking and method inverts, or is an inversion of, Hegel's thinking and method. It originates in a reading of the statement "*Man muß sie umstülpen*" in the 1873 *Nachwort* to which we turn below. Althusser here advances a characterization and critique of this notion and concept of inversion in '*how* Marx *thinks*' as follows:

> Whereas the Hegelian *Denkprozess* is "the demiurge of the real," which is merely its phenomenon; whereas we can say, hardly forcing the word "demiurge," that the Hegelian *Denkprozess*, the movement of the Idea, produces the real, the *Denkprozess* in Marx contents itself with "reproducing," in the movement of its concepts, the movement of the material [*la matière*] itself. Furthermore, just as, in Hegel, the real is merely the phenomenon [*Erscheinung*] of the Idea, which is posited as independent, so, but "the other

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rendering as M – C – M' makes clear. *Capital,* Althusser argues, bears a theoretical and practical rejection of such a spurious symmetrization.

[9] Althusser, "Preface," 7; emphasis added.

[10] Ibid, 8.

[11] Ibid; emphasis in Althusser.

[12] Ibid.

> way around" [*umgekehrt*], the ideal (the *Denkprozess*) is merely the "reflection" of the "material."[13]

Althusser here postulates that *Capital*'s *Denkprozess* '*contents itself*' with '*"reproducing"*' a 'movement of the material itself.' In so doing, Althusser posits an action '*in* the movement of [*Capital*'s] concepts.'[14] With this particular notion, Althusser identifies, we suggest, an attribute of pseudonymity, artifice, fraudulence, or ventriloquism in *Capital*'s exposition as being itself a presupposition of an order of research. Althusser thus is both boldly and coyly imputing a decisive action of turning and overturning in *Capital in its concepts*. Unlike an *a priori* construction, this *Denkprozess* is not simply specular. This thinking-process instead, Althusser writes, is "a *constitution* or *production* bearing, this time, on the real itself."[15]

II. *Denkprozess* and Method

For *Denkprozess* is not *simply* a first cause in *Capital*, according to Althusser. This *Denkprozess,* Althusser writes, is "defined, precisely, as a function of the *method.*"[16]

As such, thinking-process is not absolutely foreclosed, according to Althusser, even within the capitalist mode of production. Instead, Marx, Althusser suggests, critically displaces what Jean-Joseph Goux calls the "anthropocentering" which dominates the modern metaphysical tradition from Descartes to Kant and Nietzsche.[17] With *Capital*, Althusser writes, "it is now no longer just a question of a '*Konstruction a priori.*'"[18] Thinking-process is not *simply* saturated by the particular conceptual relation of *Forschung* and *Darstellung* in *a priori* construction.[19] Althusser questions here the specific mode of thinking-process for *Capital* which is not made available by the aforementioned doxa of inversion.

Althusser's intervention advances a rethinking of the notion of inversion as it has been understood and appropriated by readings of the 1873 *Nachwort.* Althusser restates how "this famous passage delineates a term-by-term opposition and an inversion between the *modality* of Hegel's method or *Denkprozess* and the *modality* of Marx's method or *Denkprozess*."[20] By placing orthographic emphases on modality, Althusser here draws a line of demarcation between those practices which use the 1873 *Nachwort* to symmetrize 'the material' and 'the ideal,' or the names Hegel and Marx, and those readings which ask, or 'study,' how Marx thinks *in* his concepts such as method and *Denkprozess.* Althusser argues that there is in this 1873 *Nachwort another* notion of inversion brought forth by Marx which is *not* the doxa which Althusser often represents and criticizes in the name Feuerbach or the attribute of speculation.[21]

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[13] Ibid, 9; interpolations in Althusser.

[14] To anticipate our reading of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we can say that Althusser identifies here that the speculative inversion of Hegelian idealism and genetic evolutionism cannot identity, see, or look-to the modes of action in *Capital* such as those where Marx imputes an anxiety, zeal, and unction to the capitalist.

[15] Althusser, "Preface," 9; emphases in Althusser.

[16] Ibid; emphasis in Althusser.

[17] See Jean-Joseph Goux, *Oedipus, Philosopher* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993), 119 ff.

[18] Althusser, "Preface," 9.

[19] This formulation moreover suggests that what this dissertation suggests calling the *politeia* is not absolutely appropriated by *either* scientific discourse *or* capitalist dominations.

[20] Althusser, "Preface," 9.

[21] In his 1967 manuscript entitled "On Feuerbach," Althusser articulates his position on Feuerbach pithily: "here are the themes of Feuerbach's philosophy that I propose to discuss in very schematic fashion: 1. The theory of the

This question of inversion, Althusser writes, "grasps the stakes of a definition of 'the' logic of Marx's thinking."[22] The epochal quotation marking in this passage places its decisive questioning on the question and concept of unity in *Capital*. This passage in the 1873 *Nachwort*, Althusser writes,

> brings into play two philosophical categories standing at opposite poles, between which the inversion supposedly takes place: the real or matter or the material on the one hand and, on the other, the idea or the ideal. The fundamental philosophical position – the materialist or the idealist thesis – turns on the primacy of one or other of these two diametrically opposed categories. But, in addition to these two diametrically opposed categories, two more terms come into play: the *Denkprozess* and the *method*.[23]

This schema of diametric opposition is one which, Althusser suggests, may need to be rejected, for it participates in a specular or spurious projection that symmetrizes by the names of 'the material' and 'the ideal.' Rather than reproduce this dogmatic doxa of the 'inversion' of 'materialist' and 'idealist' philosophical practices, Althusser says instead that

> it is all too clear that we must call this *Denkprozess* itself into question – that is, the very idea that there exists a unique, common, and thus exemplary *Denkprozess,* one that offers the advantage, according to Marx, of sustaining both the speculative illusion of a conceptual exposition that truly "reproduces" the subject-matter [*matière*], as well as the aberration of a speculative discourse that claims to "produce" it.[24]

In doing so, Althusser raises up the question of a unity in *Capital* which *both* sustains *and* deviates from speculative discourse. For Althusser, this is the meaning of the materialism of *Capital.*

This materialist practice is attributed by Althusser to the action and relation of *Denkprozess* and 'method' in *Capital.* While both of these terms seem to "come down to one, and are both to be arranged under the idea or the ideal," they instead, Althusser writes, comprise "something like the pivot or unvarying substratum for the inversions of modality that bring about the shifts from one primacy to the other (of material and the idea)."[25] This compact of the *Denkprozess* and method is "unquestioned and uncriticized in Marx," but, Althusser states, it "authorizes the

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absolute horizon, or the theory of the object as the essence of the subject; 2. The theory of alienation as the inversion of sense and abstraction; 3. The theory of the species as the ground of the Revolution of Modern Times and the realization of the human essence; 4. The materialist inversion of speculative philosophy and the unity of humanism, of naturalism and humanism." Althusser, "On Feuerbach," in *The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings* (London: Verso, 2003), 90.

[22] Althusser, "Preface," 9.

[23] Ibid, 10. Althusser elucidates the error of this 'dualist' inversion by taking recourse to the concept of "the real." For Althusser, Marx introduces a new possibility in the relationship of discourse and the real, for in *Capital*, *Denkprozess* and method do not *necessarily* bring exposition and research into a determined relation, such as in *a priori* or genetic constructions. See also note 78 below.

[24] Althusser, "Preface," 10. These re-considerations of the concepts of 'thinking' and 'turning' can be understood in relation to Althusser's late reading of Heidegger. In a 1987 letter, he writes, "I am tired of Nietzsche and I'm scared of Heidegger." Althusser, "Correspondence about 'Philosophy and Marxism,'" in *Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978-1987* (London: Verso, 2006), 248.

[25] Althusser, "Preface," 10.

'inversion,' without, however, going beyond the limits of the philosophical presuppositions commanding this operation."[26]

This authorization is crucial for *Capital* and the critique of political economy. For Althusser asks, "if everything turns on the inversion of the modality of the *Denkprozess,* is it enough, by the logic of the critique of speculative philosophy – that is, by the logic of Feuerbach's conception of speculation as the truth of every idealism – to invert the modality of the 'speculative *Denkprozess* in order to arrive at a 'scientific-materialist' *Denkprozess?*"[27] His answer is no. The inversion of speculation does *not itself* identify the 'scientific-materialist' thinking-process. The existence of the relation of method and *Denkprozess* is *not* resolved by *a priori* demonstration or specular inversion. As Althusser critically asks, "on what grounds and at what price can one presume to endow oneself with '*a method,*' a truly unified method, and truly a *method*?"[28] For when Marx "affirms that the difference between 'Hegel's dialectical method' and 'his own' dialectical method stems from the latter's (no longer speculative but materialist) modality," Althusser writes that Marx "stakes his materialist position on the existing idea of method – that is, in making his position turn on that idea – (and) risks losing control of his thesis."[29] Althusser here raises the question of what *kind* of unity bears *both* this deviation *and* sustaining conservation at once.

Althusser will confess that what is "in question here [in Marx's 1873 *Nachwort*] are just a few words, hastily written at that," but since they "have been treated as his last word on the subject by those who have read and religiously glossed them, we have to take them seriously."[30] They are significant, that is, not only because Marx himself took them seriously, but because they show *a turn* from "fifteen years earlier" in the text known as the *Grundrisse.*[31] In the *Grundrisse,* Althusser argues, Marx remains beholden to the idea that there is a "unique, common, and thus exemplary" relation of method and the *Denkprozess* characterizing the critique of political economy.[32] Althusser argues here that the 1873 *Nachwort* tests, or emends, that principle of unity.

As such, Althusser's discourse of 1978 can be understood as an emendation, or an intervention, in theoretical practice and its notion of inversion. Althusser writes,

> more than one commentator, misled by Marx's admission that he had 'flirted' with Hegelian 'modes of expression' in the first section of *Capital,* Volume I, has very naturally fallen into the trap represented by 'a priori constructions' of the commodity as a 'unity of opposites' (it remains a mystery how 'use value' which Marx calls a 'bearer' – *Träger* – of 'value', may be said to contradict the value that it 'bears'), or of deducing money as the in-itself-for-itself of the in-itself (the commodity) and for-itself (exchange) – to say nothing of the deduction of capital from the commodity, and the like.[33]

These readers imagine that *Capital* exhibits an '*a priori* construction' whereby the commodity forms a 'unity of opposites.'[34] Althusser notes that even Marx's own statements in January 1873

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[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid, 11.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Althusser identifies that these readings cannot elucidate why or how 'use value' contradicts the 'value' that it bears. These are political Hegelians, and many are Marxists.

set up this 'fall.' This is a paradox *within* the forms of appearance of *Forschung* and *Darstellung* for Althusser.

To advance a maneuver against this doxa in this 1978 *Preface,* Althusser argues that the relationship of *Denkprozess* and method in *Capital* causes or creates a breaks with *a priori* constructions and the idea that *Capital* exposits a theoretical form – the commodity form – as a 'unity of opposites.' The 1978 *Preface* argues that there is *another*, exemplary, although intermittent, form of categorial action in *Capital*. This is specifically, Althusser writes, a turn in or of the primacy of "the real or matter or the material" on the one hand and "the idea or the ideal" on the other.[35] This turning action is within the movement of *Capital*'s categories.

And yet Althusser recognizes that it is not only Marx who has fallen into the 'trap' of thinking of a unity of opposites in thinking an '*a priori*' distinction of research (*Forschung*) and exposition (*Darstellung*), or even 'the material' and 'the ideal.' In a gesture if not also an act of self-criticism, Althusser writes that Vladimir Lenin also fell into this 'trap' reading *Capital*. In his so-called *Philosophical Notebooks,* Althusser recollects that Lenin writes that in "the exchange of commodities...this very simple [...] phenomenon [...] reveals *all* the contradictions (or germs of *all* the contradictions) of modern society."[36] Althusser calls this Lenin's "if not…Hegelian madness, then at least…a Hegelian vertigo."[37] This is the idea that "to begin with what is the simplest...in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a...cell the germs of all the elements of dialectics."[38] Althusser states that here Lenin's "'audacity'…is obviously out of his control."[39] Reporting on this situation, Althusser notes, as a clinician might, "no vertigo without a void."[40]

This mode of reading of *Capital,* Althusser writes, "bob(s) endlessly back and forth," between the priority of science and method.[41] It imputes that there is a science that advances the truth by its own laws, and yet there is also a method that "will be, in advance, science's sure path…that, in a word, precedes itself, this… 'scientific method.'" Althusser states that the notion of method and *Denkprozess* in *a priori* demonstrations "want to know in advance what path they are going to take in order to strike it down…(they) want to assure themselves in advance of the truth that they are going to discover before setting out in quest of it."[42]

This notion of method is one which Althusser's 1978 *Preface* identifies as a principal foe for Marx in his 1873 *Nachwort*. Marx, in 1873, according to Althusser in 1978, outlines how *Denkprozess* for *Capital* is not only a passive effect of an *a priori* application of the concepts of method, exposition, and research. Thinking-process and method instead intervene on the very reflective and reflected schema binding *Forschung* and *Darstellung* itself.

Althusser does not however exactly identify Hegel as the guilty party in Lenin's reading. Althusser writes instead that Hegel "vehemently criticizes" this 'endless bobbing back and forth'

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[35] Although Althusser argues that *Capital* does not bear a so-called mechanical or physical inversion of Hegel's dialectic, he also suggests in a hint if not act of self-criticism the importance of Hegel and the figure of inversion for reading *Capital.*

[36] Vladimir Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks,* in *Collected Works: Volume 38* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), 358-9, quoted in Althusser, "Preface," 11.

[37] Althusser, "Preface," 11.

[38] Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, 359-60, quoted in Althusser, "Preface," 11. It should be recognized that Althusser is here criticizing Lenin's notion of a 'cell form' in and of *Capital.*

[39] Althusser, "Preface," 11. See Warren Montag's discussion of Althusser's philosophical practice and strategy of 'lieu-tenancy' in his "Althusser's Lenin," *diacritics* 43, no. 2 (2015): 51.

[40] Althusser, "Preface," 11.

[41] Ibid, 12.

[42] Althusser, "Preface," 12.

of method and science.[43] But with Hegel, Althusser writes, this problem "resurfaces in the form of '*absolute*' method, as a guarantee of the advent in every result in its becoming, an a priori guarantee, of the teleological meaning and orientation [*sens*] of every process."[44] In Althusser's reflection, Lenin's reading of *Capital* could be characterized as losing sight of the subtitle of *Capital*, that is "*Kritik der politischen Oekonomie.*" Without the name and concept of critique, reading *Capital* becomes instead a contribution to the thinking and method of the *physical* science of political economy (classical, modern, ancient, or otherwise).[45]

Although he acknowledges that Marx indeed had also thought in this evolutionary and *a priori* manner through the *Capital* project, Althusser also argues that Marx developed another mode which disturbs an *a priori* 'guarantee' binding method and thinking-process after 1844 and before 1861. For in the 1857 *Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx states that Hegel succumbs to the "*illusion* that the real [*das Reale*] *was the result of thought*, synthesizing itself within itself, delving into itself by itself, and moving by virtue of its inner motivation."[46] *Capital,* Althusser argues, is not organized by this logic of *pure* speculation, which eventuates in an aporia of science and method. Lenin, Althusser identifies, falls back from Marx's own specific understandings to a pre-Hegelian, symmetrizing notion in 'the ideal' and 'the material.' Althusser identifies this spurious notion as follows: "either you postulate that the *Denkprozess* produces the real by its own movements, or else you postulate that it is simply one mode of appropriation of the real."[47] Althusser argues in the 1978 *Preface* instead that *Denkprozess* in *Capital* is a mode, attribute, and substance of a process that interrelates method, research, and exposition.

And yet Marx's *own* discourse itself has *reproduced* the idea that "inverting the modality is thus enough to bring about a shift from speculation to true theory."[48] Althusser gives this particular activity a discursive bearer as follows: "it is quite as if there existed a *Denkprozess* as such, which one can accent so as to produce speculation, or invert to produce science."[49] This dissertation calls this Althusser's identification of a spurious inversion. In opposition or contradiction to this notion, Althusser argues that Marx poses, or posits, but does not presuppose, the critical question of a true *Denkprozess* in *Capital*. "In defiance of every variety of empiricism," Althusser writes, Marx instead shows that "in the true *Denkprozess*, the concrete comes not at the beginning but at the end; that one does not 'start' with the concrete in order to reach the truth as abstraction, but, rather, that one starts with *abstraction* in order gradually to produce the concrete, 'the concrete totality' as a 'concrete-in-thought' and that this totality is 'the thinking mind'."[50] With this, he writes, "we can even say that, formally, this *Denkprozess* of 'concretization' mimes,

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] The problem is particularly associated with the thought of Friedrich Engels and his idea of the universal laws of nature. With reference to this question, Althusser repeats Gottfried Leibniz's impersonation and criticism of the originary modern methodologist René Descartes: "to arrive at the result you want, you need only proceed as you must in order to obtain it." Althusser, "Preface," 13.

[46] Althusser, "Preface," 13; emphasis in Althusser.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid, 14.

[50] Karl Marx, "Introduction to *Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58,"* in *Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 28* (London: Lawrence and Wishart 2010), 38, quoted in Althusser, "Preface," 14. Note the Hegelian and Aristotelian concepts in Althusser's language here. Note also that Althusser locates this break in the 1857-8 *Introduction* which is a text typically thought of as a Hegelian mode of exposition or thinking by Marx. In so doing, Althusser aims, we suggest, to draw a line of demarcation *within* his own notion of an epistemological break itself.

from afar, the process of Hegel's *Logic.*"[51] Althusser thus states here that Marx's critique of political economy in 1857 'mimes,' rather than 'inverts,' Hegel's notion of the concept as exposited in *Science of Logic.* For in both *Capital* and *Science of Logic*, the thinking mind is realized not at the beginning of exposition in an *a priori* manner, but instead through its whole interiority and therefore uniquely at the end of the exposition. Althusser concludes that *Capital*'s materialist *Denkprozess* specifically differs from evolutionary and *a priori* modes of exhibition in the way that its relation of interiority and exteriority is an activity of individuation, rather than an identification of at-hand states or entities.

III. Interiority and Exteriority in *Capital*

For as we have seen, simply drawing a line of demarcation between an idealist and materialist *Denkprozess* is not *itself* adequate to Althusser's question of '*how* Marx *thinks*' in *Capital*. Althusser emphasizes, "*we cannot affirm that the movement from the abstract to the concrete settles, by itself, the question of Marx's thinking.*"[52] Crediting Gérard Duménil with "defending powerful theses" to distinguish *Denkprozess* for Marx and Hegel, Althusser writes:

> Marx's thought, far from proceeding by the *self-production* of concepts, proceeds rather by *positing* a concept that initiates the exploration (analysis) of the theoretical space opened up and closed off by this positing...until theoretical fields of great structural complexity have been constituted.[53]

This action takes place, Althusser writes, in "the *interiority* of 'laws'" in *Capital.*[54] This means that its "determinations are attributable only to the interiority of a concept or theoretical field… interiority does not designate essence opposed to appearances but the fact that determinations are attributable only to *the interiority of a concept or theoretical field.*"[55] Duménil recalls Marx's statement in *Capital, Volume 3* that laws are "the inner and necessary connection between two apparently contradictory things."[56] As such, the *limit* of interiority thus *informs* the action of law and its concepts in *Capital*. Exteriority in *Capital*, Duménil writes in a crucial formulation, is "a *different* logical totality."[57]

With this reflection on the action of the limit of *Capital* in mind, this dissertation now preliminarily recalls that the end and limit of the interiority of *Capital* is a largely unremarked upon discursive place that Marx calls the "The Modern Theory of Colonization" ("Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"*). "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"* is thus not only within the interiority of *Capital* but constitutes its very limit-in-exposition as such. Accordingly, we can now

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[51] Althusser here notes that even Lenin misses the crucial point that "the *Logic* does not start with '*the simplest determination*' (the simplicity that so enchanted Lenin, as appears in his note)....[T]he *Logic* starts with the in-determinate, Being...with the greatest of abstractions; and of course its whole movement carries it too from the abstract to the concrete." Althusser, "Preface," 14.

[52] Althusser, "Preface," 14; emphasis in Althusser.

[53] Ibid, 14-15; emphasis in Althusser.

[54] Ibid, 15; emphasis in Althusser.

[55] Ibid; emphasis in Althusser.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Gérard Duménil, *Le concept de loi économique dans "Le Capital"* (Paris: Maspero, 1978), 38, quoted in Althusser, "Preface," 15; emphasis in Duménil and Althusser. We can suggest here that Althusser's conservation of Duménil's emphasized notion of a *different* logical totality as identified by the relation of interiority and exteriority in *Capital* both invokes and critiques a Hegelian *Denkprozess.*

suggest that Althusser's reading of Duménil *theoretically* indicates that this particular discursive place constitutes the point where the laws of *Capital* and 'a *different* logical totality,' form as a threshold.

This bears important conceptual and political effects for reading *Capital*. For Althusser writes that "each time a concept is posited... an exterior is simultaneously *excluded*, with the result that the field is also *closed off*."[58] Moreover, *Capital,* Althusser writes,

> *exclude(s)* all appearance of self-production of the concept...and *require(s)* us to think the positing, the intervention at a given point in the exposition...To talk about the positing of concepts is to rule out thinking their appearance in 'the order of the reasoning' as a self-production of concepts.[59]

"The Modern Theory of Colonization," as the limit of the interiority of *Capital,* thus elicits the question of *how* Marx *thinks* about the limit of the capitalist process *and* 'a *different* logical totality.' This is not a self-deduction of the concept. For as Althusser recalls with the passage in the 1857-1858 writings known as the *Grundrisse*, Marx writes, "*surplus value can never…spring from the equivalent*…it must spring from the process of production of capital itself."[60] The concepts of *Capital*, Althusser writes, are "*guided from behind the scenes* by the major realities brought to light *by the silent 'research method'* he evokes, just as his initial abstraction, value, is underpinned by the 'abstraction *in actu'* of 'the movement of industrial capital.'"[61] As such, the limit of *Capital* – "The Modern Theory of Colonization" – constitutes such a discrepancy between the laws and interiority of *Capital* and that which it faces as the exteriority of the process of capitalist production. It bears a mode of action, we argue, that is not the evolution but instead the extinction of *Capital*.

IV. '**The unity of the exposition is not what it makes itself out to be'**

These reflections on '*how* Marx *thinks* in *Capital*' leads Althusser to a statement of alarming clarity and importance. Althusser writes, "*Capital* does not possess only, or exactly, the unity it confers upon itself."[62] With this hypothesis, Althusser returns to the idea that Marx "takes pains to cast his exposition in as unified and homogenous a form as possible…[and the notion that] consequently, within this field, research and exposition, can, at the limit coincide."[63] In a long footnote appended to this statement, Althusser writes that the thinking-process of *Capital* is

> haunted and shaped – not just in its form but, beyond it, in the theoretical effects that this form requires – by a theory of knowledge which, in the guise of the (analytical or dialectical) 'method' assumes the task of guaranteeing the unity that it supposedly realizes…We now have reason to believe, after so many attempts, experiences, and trials,

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[58] Althusser, "Preface," 15; emphasis added.
[59] Ibid; emphasis in Althusser and added.
[60] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Outlines of the critique of political economy (rough draft of 1857-8)*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 28* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2010), 250, quoted in Althusser, "Preface," 16; emphasis in Althusser.
[61] Althusser, "Preface," 17; emphasis added.
[62] Ibid, 18. Sigmund Freud's notion of negation and disavowal are germane to Althusser's re-reading of *Capital* here. Freud writes in 1925, "negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed." Freud, "Negation," *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 6 (1925): 368.
[63] Althusser, "Preface," 18.

> that the unity of *Capital's Denkprozess*, the unity of its order of exposition, is *uneven and disparate* – that this order of exposition is in reality invested with a unity and homogeneity that are in large measure *fictitious*. We have to consider the possibility that *Capital* contains not a unified, homogenous order of exposition, but several heterogenous, intersecting orders of exposition, *which come together only in colliding with and exceeding one another*…This hypothesis would enable us to avoid…com(ing) up against the limits of the 'theoretical' in Marx's text; against the difficulties of the theoretical distinction between interior and exterior (when this 'exterior' goes by the name of productivity of labor, or 'class struggle' and so on); against the attribution of this 'exterior' to historical materialism, conceived of, at this point, in its programmatic isolation and poverty as the 'theory of the succession of modes of production,' as radically autonomous and outside an interiority specific to the field of 'the economy'; or against the teleology of the 'realization' of laws, which is the correlative to the adequation of the object to its concept, and so on.[64]

The *mode* of the *unity* of the exposition of *Capital*, Althusser states, *is* a 'colliding and exceeding' of itself. This unity is *not* unity as a relation of homeostatic, extant entities, such as 'the material' and 'the ideal.' It is a *mode* of unity as *Denkprozess* and method. As Althusser writes,

> that [Marx] married this 'method' to a certain idea of the 'thought process' (*Denkprozess*), that is, to a certain standard for thought indispensable to thinking the true, and that, accordingly, he cultivated a certain idea of 'the theory of knowledge,' as Duménil understands it – this is...fairly certain. That this idea of the *Denkprozess* may well have served as guarantee of the unity of the exposition of *Capital* is possible and even probable.[65]

Althusser identifies the decisive conceptual effects that stem from this thesis as follows: "*the unity* of *Capital*'s *Denkprozess,* the unity of its order of exposition, *is not what it makes itself out to be*… [It is] remarkably uneven and disparate. I say 'remarkably' because this unevenness means something, and something important."[66] Althusser's identification here of the activity of negation develops the aforementioned thesis regarding the artificial and fraudulent attribute of *Capital's* exposition. For Althusser notes here how the exposition *denies* the apparent unity that it gives itself. This 'remarkable' unevenness indicates the intention of *another order* of method and *Denkprozess* in *Capital* whose effects can be understood as *Capital*'s intervention in, rather than *a priori* constructions of, the capitalist mode of production.

Althusser argues that Marx introduces and advances the activity of this other order by means of the *mode* of the combination of the two primary orders of exposition within *Capital* as follows. Althusser writes:

> There plainly is in *Capital* a major order of exposition, visible, impressive, unified and homogenous (unified and homogenous on condition that unity is understood as Duménil understands it - that is, as constituted by the posing and posing-together [*position et composition*] of concepts): from value to capital and capitalist production all the way to the 'concrete' categories of Volume 3. *Conjointly, however, and obliquely, there are also other 'orders of*

[64] Ibid, 19; emphasis in Althusser and added.
[65] Ibid, 18-19.
[66] Ibid, 19; emphasis added.

> *exposition' that repeatedly interrupt and cut across the first: intermittent, interminable chapters, of the highest importance*, in which a *completely different* 'analysis' comes into play.[67]

In order to distinguish these two 'orders', it has, "for convenience" Althusser writes, "been called the 'concrete' and 'historical', in contrast to the genuinely 'theoretical' analysis of the major order of exposition."[68] Althusser identifies the categorial problem imputed by this 'convenience,' for the 'theoretical' chapters bear 'historical content', and the 'historical' chapters likewise bear 'theoretical import,' but he chooses to maintain the terminology for the sake of clarity.

For it is not their names but rather the *mode* of their "unity…(which) is problematic," Althusser writes.[69] He states that the mode of this unity exists in *Capital* "paradoxically, yet insistently."[70] This very strangeness *itself* discloses, Althusser argues, a form of action in *Capital* that breaks from the 'Hegelian' form of action and what Althusser calls the 'demiurge of the Idea.'

Althusser recalls that *Capital* begins and is dominated as a whole by the 'pure theoretical,' not 'concrete historical,' order of exposition. And yet it is the 'concrete historical' that interrupts and overturns the 'theoretical' order and not the reverse. Althusser writes that

> the analyses of the 'working day', or the chapter which he 'sweated blood and tears' in order to discuss manufacture and the role of machinery, or the astounding chapters in [part] 8 about primitive accumulation… [are] the chapters and passages in which what is called 'concrete history' *breaks into the analysis.*[71]

Althusser identifies here the *mode* by which this 'minor' order enters the 'primary' order of *Capital*. This is a mode of breaking in, interruption, interjection, disruption, and distortion. This collision of orders, rather than the 'historical order' itself, 'overturns' the attributes bestowed by the pure theoretical order in *Capital*.[72] This situates a particular mode of activity that is not inscribed in either the pure theoretical order or the concrete historical order but instead *as* their conjuncture *and* collision.

Althusser thereby reasons that there is something presented in *Capital* that is not presented. And yet this presentation is also *not* 'outside' of *Capital.*[73] This activity is, however 'strangely' and 'paradoxically,' *within* the field of *Capital.* Althusser, in a statement of striking clarity, writes that "this 'exterior' communicates in a singular fashion with the interior."[74] What is this 'singular fashion' of communication of the exterior on the interior? How does this 'strange,' 'singular' communication of orders allow us to "see…an effect of exteriority produced by the

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[67] Ibid, 20; emphasis in Althusser and added. Interpolations of Althusser's French appear in Goshgarian's translation.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid; emphasis added.
[72] Jacques Lacan and his followers call this general form of action a symptom. It is an answer without a question, a genus without species. See his so-called Rome Discourse, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," in *Écrits* (New York: Norton, 2006), 197-268.
[73] Althusser writes, "that this exterior is also in *Capital*, as that which cuts across and interrupts its order so as to sustain it, tells us as much about that order as about its closure: about its contingency, and therefore also about its significance." Althusser, "Preface," 20.
[74] Althusser, "Preface," 20.

order of exposition"?[75] He says that the overturning of the 'pure theoretical' order by the 'concrete historical' one – the working day, the machinery and manufacture chapters, and Part VIII on primitive accumulation – "alerts" us to the "strange theoretical 'node'" that is "*in the interior* of the analysis itself."[76] Thus, this action of inversion in *Capital*, according to Althusser in this 1978 *Preface*, exists as an intimation, not a finite facticity.

Althusser writes that this 'strangeness' is "at once reduced and irreducible to the concepts of Section I…the 'theory' of labour power and its reproduction."[77] He says, "this point… is crucial (for the whole theory of capitalist exploitation depends on the way it is *interpreted*)."[78] For, Althusser writes, in the 'pure theoretical' order of *Capital*, "the commodity… produces value and therefore surplus value, a commodity that is paid for at its value."[79] But, as he continues to say, "if we were to leave it at that…that Marx has nothing more in mind than what he writes here, we risk *taking the exposition (which would necessarily be arithmetic) of surplus value for a complete theory of exploitation.*"[80] And Althusser hastens to note that Marx's discourse is *not* a faithful testimonial to that domination, but instead an attempt to introduce a disjunction *in* 'the interior' of real 'concrete history.' *Capital* does *not* parrot capitalist exploitation and domination. Althusser's question therefore returns to how Marx introduces this displacement and inversion *within* the unity of exposition. Althusser's argument is that the strange unity and overtaking of the 'pure theoretical' order of exposition allows us to study, or to interpret, '*how* Marx *thinks.*'

V. Overtaking and Inversion

As we saw in his critique of Lenin's reading of *Capital,* Althusser in the 1978 *Preface* aims to obstruct any readings of *Capital* which posits that *all* of the understandings and reason of *Capital* can be found in the form of a germ, cell, or seed in Part I. That mode of reading, Althusser writes, "risk(s) reducing exploitation to the mere calculation of surplus (value)."[81] This arithmetic method of thinking excises, he thinks, the specifically political ideas of *Capital*'s discourse as an order of research and exposition. Althusser elucidates the discursive strategy that combats this reading of *Capital* as follows:

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[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid, 21; emphasis in original. For an illuminating commentary on Althusser's formulation, see Fabio Bruschi, "Splitting Science: The Althusserian Interpretation of *Capital*'s Multiple Orders of Exposition," *Rethinking Marxism* 30, no. 1 (2018): 25-43. Bruschi states that this 'node' where the exterior affects the inside in *Capital* is "at once reduced and irreducible to the concepts of section I" and that it "*generates its meaning from what its major orders of exposition excludes*, from what it allows one to see only indirectly, from its own point of view, depending on the effect that this reality produces on what it sees, for without this reality the very positing of the concept of surplus value would not occur." Bruschi, "Splitting Science," 36; emphasis added.

[77] Althusser, "Preface," 20. Bruschi identifies the source of this irreducibility: "it can function as a commodity in the process of the valorization of capital only *because it is mobilized as something different from a commodity that simply 'transfers' its value to other commodities.*" Bruschi, "Splitting Science," 37; emphasis added.

[78] Ibid, 21. In his critical interpretation, Bruschi writes, "*it is because the real – class struggle – is more than what is 'made visible' by the dominant ideology that the heterogeneity of the orders of exposition allows us to understand it.*" Bruschi, "Splitting Science," 38; emphasis added. This is *realized* by Marx not in the major orders and concepts of exposition but by the interruptions that criticize and transform it. This does not make the 'pure theoretical' order 'otherwise,' but rather what it is itself.

[79] Althusser, "Preface," 21.

[80] Ibid; emphasis in Althusser.

[81] Ibid.

> In the guise of the chapters that cut across and exceed the order of exposition, the "exterior" intervenes as a theoretical element indispensable to the project of a "critique of political economy"; thus it bears witness to the meaning of the "reduction" carried out by an order of exposition whose theoretical constraints Marx accepts, while attesting [to] the real significance of the analysis conducted within the rigorous space of this "reduction" and *therefore exceeding its necessary "limits."*[82]

Althusser here says that these so-called 'exteriors' – what Althusser calls-out elsewhere as the working conditions and the conditions of the reproduction of labour power – are not only not 'outside' of the theoretical orders of exposition, they are also not 'within' the 'inside' itself of the 'pure theoretical' order of exposition. They instead *exist as intervention*, not even constancy or presence. They bear not only on the real reductions of the theoretical order, but also on a *meaning* of the 'real significance of the analysis' that itself 'exceeds' the 'pure theoretical' order of *Capital*. This all takes place by means of a 'guise,' Althusser says, in an action of pseudonymity and verisimilitude. The critique of political economy therefore can be understood to at once exceed the 'limits' of the order of its exposition and yet participate in these limits at the same time.

Althusser states that Marx himself does not 'theorize' this relationship of the orders of exposition in *Capital.* Marx does not explain the *theoretical* reason for the separations into the regions of Parts I and II and Parts IV, VI, and VIII, or the 'pure theoretical' and the 'concrete historical' orders. That is to say, Marx does not *theoretically* introduce this unevenness *within* the unity of the exposition of *Capital* as a methodological or theoretical characteristic of *Capital.* Instead, this special unity can be called an attribute of its particular relation of method and thinking-process. This attribute traverses *Capital* but is nowhere contained within it alone as a finite part. The expositions on the working day (Chapter 10), machinery and large scale machinery (Chapter 15), wages (Part VI) and primitive accumulation (Part VIII) all *interrupt* the 'pure theoretical' orders, but they do not *absolutely overtake* or *excise* the place and action of the 'pure theoretical' order. Rather, Althusser argues, the theoretical practice of *Capital* brings forth an action that is a distortion of and into 'pure theoretical' discourse.

This elucidation bears therefore not simply on *Capital* but more generally on what has been called ontology or metaphysics, particularly after Aristotle. For as Althusser writes,

> what then comes into question is precisely the unity of the major order of exposition itself, as it presents itself and seeks to impose itself in *Capital*: as an order in the strong sense, an order grounded in the self-evidence of its *beginning*, and a beginning supposed to have the indubitable self-evidence of 'the *simplest* determination': the commodity or value.[83]

Capital, Althusser posits here, introduces an overturning of the idea of the simple as containing all posterior existence within its own logic or discourse. This particular notion is developed, Althusser recollects, by Marx's own drive to elucidate the 'simplicity' of the beginning which does *not* 'reproduce' the order and connection of things as in the Hegelian manner.[84]

With this problematic of the 'simple' and the beginning of exposition, Althusser here identifies a decisive problem in *Capital.* Althusser recognizes that Duménil writes that Marx

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[82] Ibid; emphasis added.
[83] Ibid, 21-2; emphasis in Althusser.
[84] In Part I of *Capital*, Marx unveils the form of movement of the commodity as an ellipse, not a circle. Marx writes, "Die Ellipse ist eine der Bewegungsformen, worin dieser Widerspruch sich ebensosehr verwirklicht als löst." Marx, *MEW 23*, 119.

"consciously" struggled with it.[85] This epistemological obstacle of the simple, Althusser writes, allowed, or forced, Marx to "displace the difficulty…by generalizing it ('every beginning is difficult, holds in all science')."[86] This obstacle drove him, Althusser suggests, in 1873 to "invoke, in a sort of aside, the philosophical guarantee of an exemplary *Denkprozess* and a 'method' suited to founding this undertaking."[87] This is a shoddy 'guarantee' he says, but it recollects "the real difficulties that it is charged with compensating for [*suppléer*] and covering up."[88] These 'difficulties' are "precisely Marx's self-evident truths: the self-evident truth of the 'simplest determination' and the self-evident truth that one has to begin with this self-evident truth."[89] This self-evidence is not *simply* an epistemological question of veracity or facticity. This dissertation argues that it is instead an ontological and metaphysical one that can be called a political idea. This is the problem of how to introduce a true statement into conditions in which the condition of its own truth is struck out ahead of time. Part One of this dissertation demonstrates why this question constitutes a limit of the critique of political economy and thus drives its development to a critique of the pseudonymity of truth in the capitalist social formation. By doing this, Althusser writes, Marx introduces a way for science to exist as an intervention on its discursive conjuncture. Unlike '*a priori* construction,' *Capital*'s discourse, as Althusser said of Machiavelli's, is an effort (*conatus*) for a new beginning.[90]

Marx repetitively worked on the beginning of *Capital* so that it could hold a "definitive character it *was supposed to have*."[91] That these attempts never satisfied him points, for Althusser, to the very existence of Marx's own true idea: the simple beginning itself *cannot* hold all of its own posteriority. For exteriority individuates interiority in a mode of collision and conjuncture. Althusser sees that *Capital* identifies the impossibility of pre-conceptual identifications of 'pure theoretical' or 'concrete historical' orders and existence as such. Given this discussion of the importance of the beginning of *Capital*, this dissertation suggests here that the final chapter of *Das Kapital,* "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," thereby constitutes the verso of the problem of the beginning of the exposition of *Capital* for Marx. On the other side, "The Modern Theory of Colonization" thereby bears the problem of expositing the end of a process which instead exceeds the limit of its own exposition as such.

VI. Plurality and Unity in *Capital*

Althusser asks, why does Marx return to the *problem* of the 'need' to begin with this 'self-evidence' of the 'simple and homogenous' in order to reintroduce *Das Kapital* in 1873? It indicates, Althusser thinks, Marx's specific, 'ontological' thesis regarding the one and the many. Althusser recalls that Marx, in 1880, in the writing known as *Notes on Wagner,* repeated *Capital*'s idea that "the exchange of commodities…only exists where *commodity* occurs *in the plural.*"[92] Althusser writes that Marx's notion of plurality and unity here

[85] Althusser here is referring to Duménil's imputation that this unity is undertaken "consciously" by Marx.
[86] Althusser, "Preface," 22.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid. Interpolation of Althusser's French appears in Goshgarian's translation.
[89] Ibid.
[90] See Louis Althusser, "Machiavelli's Solitude," in *Machiavelli and Us* (New York: Verso, 1999), 137.
[91] Althusser, "Preface," 22; emphasis in Althusser.
[92] Althusser, "Preface," 22; emphasis in Althusser.

> suggests another way, or other ways, of "approaching" [*prendre*] things, and thus of rectifying [*reprendre*] the analysis; which suggest the idea that it might well be productive to begin not "with the simple" but with complexity – an idea that cannot fail to affect in return the idea on which it depends, that of the beginning as well as the concept embodying the homogeneity of the simple: value.[93]

Althusser texts breaks off here before resuming again after a discursive partition. Althusser sets the course here for "identifying and confronting, by way of their theoretical presuppositions, the difficulties inscribed in the unity and unevenness of *Capital*'s order of exposition."[94] Althusser argues that this notion of unity and plurality in *Capital* is *not* the self-same as Hegel's and that this can be identified with one word and concept: value (*Wert*). This relation of unity and plurality in *Capital* is therefore *not* a 'Hegelian' ladder of forms for Althusser here. By invoking a plurality of 'other way*s* of "approaching" [*prendere*] thing*s* and thus of rectifying [*reprendere*] the analysis,' Althusser is here developing a practice of reading *Capital* as an emendation of the intellect or mind.

For Althusser posits that the problem of plurality and unity is *not* adequately addressed by the doxa of the specular inversion of Hegel by Marx as a *Denkprozess*. Althusser states that the question of the beginning of *Capital* and of the 'simple and homogenous space' of the value form (*die Wertform*) forms an obstacle that blocks out, rather than facilitates, an interpretation of '*how* Marx *thinks*' in *Capital.* The 1978 *Preface* thus *re*thinks the notion and action of inversion, particularly in and with this idea of the one and the many in *Capital.* For the action in the movement of the concepts of unity and plurality is not even its own 'pure' conceptual and social forms, but rather a distortion in and from these forms.[95]

Althusser makes a decisive contribution to Marxist theory and philosophy here by identifying this mode of discursive action in *Capital* as a re-thinking, rectification, and self-criticism. Its mode of negation differs essentially from *a priori* or genetic analysis. *Capital* does not exposit the *possibility* of another pure theoretical or concrete-historical order. Critique in *Capital* does not, Althusser argues, reverse-into-speculation the order or primacy of classical political economy. Instead, as we all know, *Capital* discloses a presentation whose effects at once act on and exceed these other modes of 'sociological' construction. This is because, the 1978 *Preface* argues, *Capital* appropriates and exposits unity and plurality in an ultimately political, rather than physical, process.

While the 'pure theoretical' order of *Capital* appears and presents itself as that which exists without essential interference from the so-called concrete historical order, the fundamental ontological thesis of *Capital* is that so-called pure theoretical categories emerge through interventions by so-called concrete historical 'exteriorities' *on interiority*. Althusser calls this mode of interaction a 'colliding and exceeding.' This dissertation suggests calling this turning and overturning the concept of inversion. It *is* a change in the primacy by which modes, attributes, and substances encounter and overtake each other.

VII. The Modern Theory of Colonization and the End of the Exposition of *Capital*

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[93] Ibid, 22-3; interpolations in Althusser.

[94] Ibid, 23; translation modified.

[95] Bruschi writes that *Capital's* "mode of exposition requires the intervention of certain realities that cannot be reduced to what they are under the dominant ideology… [*Capital*'s exposition] rel(ies) on a thought that already exists in reality and that removes itself from the dominant ideology." Bruschi, "Splitting Science," 39.

With these notions of intervention and distortion in mind, if we now recall Duménil's idea that *Capital* exposits laws regarding the necessity of an internal contradiction through propositions within its own interiority, the 'end' or limit of *Capital*, "The Modern Theory of Colonization," takes on an intensified conceptual and categorical significance.

"Die Moderne Kolonisationstheorie" forms the final part of the final chapter of the 1867 *Das Kapital* and the final, self-standing chapter of *Das Kapital* from the 1873 second German edition onwards. "The Modern Theory of Colonization" is therefore both the original and conserved 'end' or limit of the exposition of the process of production of capital (*Der Prokuktionsprozess des Kapitals*) by the hand of Marx in *Capital.*[96] In several decisive moments in his writing, Althusser states that the final *part* of *Capital,* "Die Sogenannte ursprüngliche Accumulation," is one particular place where the 'pure theoretical' order of *Capital* is interrupted, disrupted, and overturned by the so-called 'concrete historical' order.[97] Accordingly, it bears, he states, an over-value (*Mehrwert*) and thus requires more attention for the reader.

Despite this theoretical pre-predication, the overwhelming majority of commentators, including Althusser himself, have given their attention within this *part* of *Capital* to the particular *chapter* which in German is a single, longer chapter *of the same name*, "Die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation" ("So-called Primitive Accumulation").[98] The subsequent *chapter* within this *part* is "The Modern Theory of Colonization," and it has not received the careful commentarial attention that its more famous and preceding discursive neighbor has. The chapter "The Modern Theory of Colonization" ("Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie") therefore bears for this dissertation the duplicated significance of having both been positively prescribed as bearing conceptual import while simultaneously bearing that activity as a historical and practical lack of care, activity, and attention. This dissertation aims thus to practically remedy that situation through a conceptual and ethnographic reading of this final chapter of *Capital.* In doing so, this dissertation suggests that Marx exposits in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," not a 'pure theoretical' order of ideas, but instead an exposition of what this dissertation calls an inversion in a minimal political anthropology of the capitalist mode of production.[99]

Many extant commentaries have refused any great 'theoretical,' much less 'philosophical' or 'anthropological' importance to this final chapter of *Capital*.[100] The chapter has been regarded instead as illustrative of Marx's supposedly regrettable utopianism, if not ignorance, about either the process of colonization or the existence of colonies as such.[101] While the argument for ignorance has been thoroughly debunked by the recent work of Kevin Anderson, amongst others, the question of its utopian dimension remains significant and of outstanding interest for Part Two of this dissertation. In one of the first writings that brought David Harvey into a wide academic audience, entitled "The Spatial Fix: Hegel, Von Thunen, and Marx," Harvey confessed that he found this last chapter of *Capital* "more than a little strange."[102] Part One of this

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[96] See note 3.

[97] See Louis Althusser, "Preface to *Capital* Volume One," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).

[98] In the 1976 English language edition of *Capital*, this longer chapter is divided into the several shorter chapters from 26 to 32.

[99] The title of the final chapter is "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." Its category is an action of "colonization" and specifically "the modern theory of colonization." It is not a spatial representation of the concept as is "the colony" ("*die Kolonie*").

[100] Kevin Anderson cited Maximilien Rubel's remark that Chapter 33 is "anodyne" and was inserted by Marx merely there to ward off the censors. Personal communication, July 2021.

[101] David Harvey, "The Spatial Fix – Hegel, von Thunen, and Marx," *Antipode* 13, no. 3 (1981): 1.

[102] See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a commentary on Harvey's interpretation.

dissertation examines this 'strangeness' that Harvey felt at the end of *Capital* and argues that it can be understood as an attribute of the critique of political economy – its homelessness in philosophizing – whereby it differs from evolutionary and '*a priori*' construction. *Capital* is a critique. It thereby exposits a critical negation of even its own 'lawful' interiority.[103]

The 1978 *Preface* shows that *Capital* bears this overturning action in a mode of hinting or suggestion, rather than as a part of its own extant finitude. As such, the dissertation argues that the "The Modern Theory of Colonization," as the limit in exposition of *Capital*, bears a decisive place for 'studying' '*how* Marx *thinks,*' and specifically for listening to the 'singular communication' of an 'exterior' or 'outside' on the 'inside' of *Capital*.

VIII. Mode of Inversion in *Capital*

To conclude this preliminary appraisal, we recall again that in the 1978 *Preface* to Gérard Duménil's *Le Concept de loi économique dans "Le Capital,"* Louis Althusser describes a strange and peculiar unity of the discourse of *Capital*. This unity is such that the opposition of 'reality or matter or material' and 'the ideal or the idea' unite in such a way that denies the unity as conferred by the 'pure theoretical' order of *Capital* itself. This chapter has identified that this particular form and mode of action is crucial for Althusser's rethinking '*how* Marx *thinks*' in *Capital* in 1978.

Althusser shows that in the 1873 *Nachwort* to *Capital*, Marx says that when one is faced with the theoretical practice that symmetrizes 'the material or matter' and 'the ideal or idea,' as in the Hegelian dialectic and fashion, "it must be inverted."[104] In German, Marx writes, "*Man muß sie umstülpen*."[105] Althusser identifies how this statement gave birth to a doxa of inversion whereby Marx is imputed to have thought of 'the material' and 'the ideal' as simply the self-same and his own thinking merely a reflection of Hegel's. But it also, we have shown, births another idea that is instead a turn and another way of approaching (*prendre*).

This chapter identified Althusser's argument in his 1978 *Preface* that there are *apparently* two orders of exposition in *Capital* and that their unity introduces significant theoretical and political effects into reading *Capital*. This theoretical practice, Althusser argues, forecloses *a priori* derivations of its own 'pure concepts.' The discourse of *Capital* and the critique of political economy thus, Althusser argues, introduce the concepts of 'the material' and 'the ideal,' not as in the manner of an *a priori* construction, but instead as bearers or categories that are determined and redetermined according to an interaction of *Forschung, Darstellung, Denkprozess,* and *Methode.* This conceptual unity is guided by a rearguard, rather than exposited, mode of action.

Althusser's 1978 *Preface* thus identifies that while the 'pure theoretical' order *is* the primary order of exposition in *Capital*, it *is* the 'concrete historical' order that overtakes the 'pure theoretical' laws in forging the real destiny of capital. And yet, as Althusser shows, this 'overturning' never eventuates in the submergence for *either* orders of exposition. Instead, in

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[103] Bruschi argues that Althusser understands this attribute as coming from the conflictual 'nature' of the capitalist mode of production itself. Bruschi writes that "other modes of production… *are no longer first thought in theory in order to be introduced into politics but instead start to be thought in the course of the political struggles of the proletariat*…It is first of all in the real itself (class struggle) that the communist mode of production (the object of strategy) thinks itself, and it is to this thought that already exists in reality that theory connects itself." Bruschi, "Splitting Science," 40; emphasis added. Bruschi here articulates why *Capital* does *not* understand the concepts of method and thinking-process in the manner of *a priori* demonstration.

[104] Marx, *Capital*, 103.

[105] Marx, *MEW 23*, 27.

particular places in *Capital,* such as in the chapters on the working day and the part on primitive accumulation, the concrete historical order grips a primacy in the encounter *within* its conjuncture with the pure theoretical order so that the forms of appearances within the discourse of political economy are modified in a real way.

This chapter has demonstrated that the unification of thinking-process and method in *Capital* organizes a negation, or a self-criticism, in its notions of 'the material' and 'the ideal.' This does not mean that *Capital* 'bobs' between the primacy of the pure theoretical and the concrete historical, or the material and the ideal. Rather, Althusser argues, as a unity, *Capital* exposits a mode of thinking that no longer reproduces a symmetrical opposition with the capitalist mode of production, but instead one which overturns it. This is a true inversion.

PART I

Chapter 2: On Inversion

Introduction:
The Priority and Persistence of Inversion in the Critique of Political Economy

This chapter examines the status and vicissitudes of the concept of inversion in the critique of political economy. It outlines its originary formulation from Karl Marx's hands in 1873, and its decisive reconsideration by Louis Althusser in 1963 and Jacques Rancière in 1965. The chapter elucidates how its originary consideration by Marx as a relation to the dialectic of Hegel has come to stand in for a practice bearing on the very orientation of thinking and action itself. As such, the chapter articulates why inversion is not a particular theory or worldview. Instead, it identifies Marx's notion of critique in *Capital* and his answer to the question of Immanuel Kant from 1786 – *was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?,* what does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? – with this concept and action of inversion.

1. Inversion in the 1873 *Nachwort*

To begin, we recall that Marx's identification of the action of inversion does not begin to emerge in *Capital* nor in the 1873 *Nachwort*. In his so-called early writings, particularly in his critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* of 1843, Marx identifies and criticizes the particular mode of action in Hegel's texts which he characterizes as a kind of inversion. Marx writes there, "the crux of the matter is that Hegel everywhere makes the Idea into the subject, while the genuine, real subject, such as 'political sentiment,' is turned into the predicate."[106]

But Marx does not simply discard or disregard Hegel because of this particular theoretical practice.[107] In his 1978 writing entitled "Marx in his Limits," Althusser reminds us that Marx returned to Hegel's *Greater Logic* in 1858. Althusser tells us that Marx reread the work in a physical book which was bequeathed to him by Bakunin "thanks to a chance encounter."[108] This 1858 reading, Althusser notes, is different than the way that Marx "forgot or combated" Hegel in his youth.[109] In underscoring that Marx *re*-encountered Hegel in a way that *re*-impacted his thinking and writing of *Capital,* Althusser reintroduces the question of inversion or the relation of Hegel and Marx not as a simple, but instead as an overdetermined and complex contradiction.

The concept of inversion is itself of course not the exclusive domain of the critique of political economy. It is a concept which is appropriated and exposited by the so-called physical sciences. As a physical notion, it constitutes an identity of an orientation in the attributes of a system, or parts in a phenomenon or appearance, as 'upside down.' This form of action and attribute is fundamental to the physical sciences and its scientists. We briefly indicate this here now.

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[106] Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State," in *Early Writings* (New York: Vintage, 1975), 65.
[107] As Engels writes, "Hegel was not simply put aside." *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), 38.
[108] Louis Althusser, "Marx in his Limits," in *Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978-1987* (London: Verso 2006), 42.
[109] Ibid.

During the period of this dissertation research, I spoke with and listened to two university professors of physical sciences talk about the concept of inversion in their respective fields of nuclear physics and ocean physics. The nuclear physicist told me that any research which exposited the true action of inversion – what he called the dissymmetry of matter and anti-matter of the electric dipole moment – would be awarded an immediate Nobel prize. The physical oceanographer explained to me that inversion is understood and used primarily in two ways in his field. On the one hand, inversion is an *a priori* analytic that advances analysis, such as in geometrical or differential equations analysis. But it is also, on the other hand, more commonly understood and used as a posterior analytic. In this mode, he said, inversion is that which identifies a natural physical process "backwards" by the action of its sorting of elements in a physical process. This mode of action presents itself as a reversal of the normal sorting motion of a physical process.

Inversive action thus is not restricted to Marx's critique of political economy. Marx himself understands and uses both *a priori* and *a posteriori* analytics of physical inversion in *Capital*. And yet he also identifies a mode of movement of inversion or overturning that is not identical to the analysis of the physical sciences.[110] Inversion in the critique of political economy, we suggest, is not a physical process, but a metaphysical or political process that *is* an action of orientation.[111]

We now move to look carefully at the imputation of the concept of this inversion in Marx's thinking. It emerges in the aforementioned 1873 *Nachwort* to the Second German edition of *Das Kapital*. Marx writes:

> of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction.[112]

Marx recognizes here that discourse can produce (and reproduce) the appearance that it has been constructed by means which in fact are not the true ones. Marx here points to the success of this illusion that relates exposition and research, while also suggesting that there is another mode of existence and discourse that is not this illusory one. This idea can be glimpsed when rereading Marx's German carefully. Marx writes:

> Meine dialektische Methode ist der Grundlage nach von der Hegelschen nicht nur verschieden, sondern ihr direktes Gegenteil. Für Hegel ist der Denkprozess, den er sogar unter dem Namen Idee in ein selbstständiges Subjekt verwandelt, der Demiurg des

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[110] If the first appearance of an inversion in *Capital* bears the form of homeostatic exchange as C – M – C, the second inversion as M –C – M' forms instead a trinity of asymmetrical difference such that its own inner elements – C and M – can*not* bear a self-standing self-identity.

[111] For a discussion of the notion of metaphysics that is not tantamount to a physical or 'natural' mode of being, see Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*: *World, Finitude, Solitude* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

[112] Karl Marx, "Afterword to the second German edition of *Capital*," trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 35* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2010), 19. Cited hereafter "*MECW 35*."

> Wirklichen, das nur seine äußere Erscheinung bildet. Bei mir ist umgekehrt das Ideelle nichts andres als das im Menschenkopf umgesetzte und übersetzte Materielle.[113]

We present here two slightly different English translations, from 1887 and 1976. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling first read:

> My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.[114]

Ben Fowkes later reads:

> My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into an independent subject, under the name of 'the Idea,' is the creator of the real world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought.[115]

Many readers have found in this passage the idea of the inversion of Hegel in Marx, such as when a physical posteriority conserves a prior action through an imputation of continuity and opposition. A closer look at the statement can see an action here that is not of a physical body. This can be sighted clearly in Marx's formulation, 'Für Hegel ist der Denkprozess, den er sogar unter dem Namen Idee in ein selbstständiges Subjekt verwandelt, der Demiurg des Wirklichen, das nur seine äußere Erscheinung bildet.' Departing from both Fowkes and Aveling and Moore, we translate Marx here as stating, 'for Hegel the *Denkprozess*, which he transforms into a self-standing subject under the name of the Idea, is the demiurge of the real, which forms only an outer appearance.' The 1873 *Nachwort* thus invokes a thinking, not physical, form and mode of action here. In doing so, Marx characterizes Hegel's dialectic as "Wesen nach kritisch und revolutionär ist."[116] Moore and Aveling read, "in its essence critical and revolutionary" and Fowkes "revolutionary in its very essence."[117] The meaning and mode of this turning action for the critique of political economy is social, not planetary.

In making such a statement, Marx indeed places himself into a 'direct opposition' (*direktes Gegenteil*) with Hegel here. We ask, is this not precisely the solecism that Althusser characterizes as the notion of the spurious inversion for Feuerbach or the so-called Young Marx? This chapter suggests that it is not because Marx here does not set up this 'direct opposition' as a true infinity. Instead, we argue, the inversion constitutes a new foundation that is to be displaced by the critique of political economy. *Capital*'s discourse, Althusser argues, is a critique of its own ideological determinations. Thus, this exposition of 'direct opposition' is not imputed by Marx as

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[113] Marx, *MEW 23*, 27.
[114] Marx, *MECW 35,* 19.
[115] Marx, *Capital*, 102.
[116] Marx, *MEW 23*, 28.
[117] Marx, *MECW 35*, 20; Marx, *Capital*, 103.

a final cause but instead as one that is advanced to facilitate a dissipation of that which founds its own speculary oppositions.[118]

The origination of the doxa of Marx's so-called inversion of Hegel continues from the prior passage into the following passage. Marx there writes:

> Die mystifizierende Seite der Hegelischen Dialektik habe ich vor beinah 30 Jahren, zu einer Zeit kritisiert, wo sie noch Tagesmode war. Aber grade als ich den ersten Band des „Kapital" ausarbeitete, gefiel sich das verdrießliche, anmaßliche und mittelmäßige Epigonentum, welches jetzt im gebildeten Deutschland das große Wort führt, darin, Hegel zu behandeln, wie der brave Moses Mendelssohn zu Lessings Zeit den Spinoza behandelt hat, nämlich als „toten Hund". Ich bekannte mich daher offen als Schüler jenes großen Denkers und kokettierte sogar hier und da im Kapitel über die Werttheorie mit der ihm eigentümlichen Ausdrucksweise. Die Mystifikation, welche die Dialektik in Hegels Händen erleidet, verhindert in keiner Weise, daß er ihre allgemeinen Bewegungsformen zuerst in umfassender und bewußter Weise dargestellt hat. Sie steht bei ihm auf dem Kopf. Man muß sie umstülpen, um den rationellen Kern in der mystischen Hülle zu entdecken.[119]

Fowkes translates this as follows:

> I criticized the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just when I was working at the first volume of Capital, the ill humoured, arrogant and mediocre epigones who now talk large in educated German circles began to take pleasure in treating Hegel in the same way as the good Moses Mendelssohn treated Spinoza in Lessing's time, namely as a 'dead dog'. I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.[120]

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[118] As we noted in Chapter One of the dissertation, Althusser frequently identifies the sections in *Capital* on the working day, machinery and large-scale industry, and primitive accumulation as places where this notion and mode of a collision or overturning emerges. This is an 'uneven' form, mode, and attribute of discourse. Whereas in the systems of Hegel, the 'concrete historical' is subsumed *within* the pure theoretical orders such that all of the internal parts share a logical order, in *Capital* there is instead a collision and exceeding of elements and complexity in such a mode such that the 'pure theoretical' and the 'concrete historical' can*not* both be considered as discrete modes of extant facticity. This is because in *Capital*, the 'historical concrete' is not a microcosmic exemplar of the 'pure theoretical' inner logic of capital. In Hegel's *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* [1830], on the other hand, the end of the system *is* "*Der absolute Geist*." It is Art, Revealed Religion and finally Philosophy. They are *all* absolute *Geist* for Hegel, and yet the notion of their unity is that which is founded *within* the same passage of their differentiation. Thus, whereas Hegel endows all conceptual power to the inner side (*seite*) of the limit of the System or Encyclopedia, Althusser's re-reading of *Capital* argues that Marx places this Absolute on the other side of this limit of exposition, which is not within the exposition of the system. *Capital* is thereby *not* a Hegelian system because it *is* a critique. It exposits that its parts are *not* absolutely subsumed in exposition.

[119] Marx, *MEW 23*, 27.

[120] Marx, *Capital*, 102-3.

There are several important aspects of this passage to recollect. Marx here identifies how *Capital* delivers itself as an intervention, that is to say, as an attempt to disturb the conditions of its own conjuncture. Marx also here identifies that the particular balance of forces in his own conjuncture midst sophists and sophistry lead him back to Hegel. Marx states forthrightly that his turn to Hegel was a strategic maneuver aimed to combat the ideological mystification of the conjuncture at-hand. In 1873, Hegel is a great and mighty thinker that can be made useful for Marx, even against those that profess to be the former's lawful late custodians.

But perhaps the most decisive aspect of the passage is that Marx characterizes a mode of action in *re*-encountering mystification with '*Man muß sie umstülpen.*' The first English language translation of *Capital* by Samuel Aveling and Edward Moore reads 'it must be turned right side up.' Ben Fowkes reads 'it must be inverted.' It could also be read as 'it must be turned inside out.' Marx therefore indeed does write that the Hegelian dialectic must be inverted. This imperative of overturning is how Marx characterizes, in this both belated and prefatory remark of 1873, *how* to discover rational kernels in mystical shells.

We note here that this phrase and word *umstülpen* does not appear anywhere else like this in *Das Kapital*. There is however a rich lexicon of inversion developed by Marx in *Capital*. This is particularly in the word *kehren* and its many derivatives. The most common usage is the verb *verkehren* (reverse), and its noun derivative *verkehrung* (reversal, inversion). Marx also uses *umkehren* (turn back) and *umkehrung* (reversal, inversion). These categories and forms of action are crucial in *Capital,* particularly in the exposition of its 'pure theoretical' order. The nominal action *Umschlag* (a sudden or shocking reversal) appears in several important passages in *Capital*. With *Verkehrung, Umkehrung, Kehrseite, Umschlag* and *umstülpen, Capital*'s discourse is, we note, crucially animated by modes of inversion.

Dr. Trevor Murphy, a Professor of Classics at UC Berkeley, provides us with a lexical basis for the Latinate 'inversion'. Murphy wrote the following:

> With reflexes in proto-Italic languages and the PIE family, the particle *in* is certainly older than written Latin. As a Latin preposition, its usage is specific and predictable: governing the accusative, it means *into / against* (implying movement), and with the ablative, *in* or *on* (location). But when the same particle is used as a verbal prefix, it ramifies until a consistent meaning is hard to grasp. In some words it suggests a relation of moving-toward or location, but elsewhere the connotation is intensive or contrastive.
>
> In the case of *in* + *vertere*, the added relationship is a kind of emphatic change, which I might explain as contrastive with a previous state. But these after-the-fact justifications aren't worth much. The truth is particles experience indiscriminate redefinition in their use as adverbial modifiers. Compare the *under* in the English *to understand*.
> On the other hand, the *re* in *revertere* is very simple (again, back).
>
> To your point about orientation, one major use of *invertere* does imply a vertical axis, as in turning upside-down, but as to whether the orientation of the axis is thought of as consistent is more than I can say. It may be significant that even without the prefix, simple *vertere* can mean "turn upside down, throw into confusion."[121]

[121] Personal Communication, March 2021.

Murphy says two things that when thought together are very important for our understanding of the problematic of inversion in *Capital*. Firstly, he says that this prefix "in" likely 'ramifies [the stem] until a consistent meaning is hard to grasp.' The imputed action of 'turning' here thus is 'hard to grasp,' Murphy says. Secondly, he notes that 'even without the prefix, simple *vertere* can mean "turn upside down, throw into confusion."' 'Inversion' thus *is a turning not simply of elements with respect to a stable system but instead of the very form of orientation itself*.

Murphy's statement moreover helps identify a minimal conceptual difference between the German *kehren* and the Latinate *vertere.* For *kehren* brings forth modes of action as turning that do not immediately invoke the notion of the vertical turning as does the stem of *vertere*. And yet the inversion of 1873 *Nachwort* is not based in a semantics of *kehren* or *vertere.* The mode of the thinking-process of *Man muß sie umstülpen* is not a physical, but instead a metaphysical, political, and social inversion. It bears no semantic appearance of a 'direct opposition' (*direktes Gegenteil*). It is instead an imputation of a self-causing act of overturning. Marx's imperative could read as 'it must be overturned.' This inversion is thus a mode of action and not a settled doctrine.[122]

2. On the Spurious Inversion for Louis Althusser in *For Marx* (1965)

This clarification of the notion of inversion from Marx's own hands helps orient our reading of Althusser's return to and rereading of this mode of action in 1978. For in the writings published in *Pour Marx,* particularly "On the Young Marx: Theoretical Questions" [1960] and "On the Materialist Dialectic: On the Unevenness of Origins" [1963] Althusser very strongly criticizes, if not also mocks, the idea that Marx 'inverts' Hegel. We here identify the basis of this reading. We argue that the notion of a spurious inversion was for Althusser a 'practical concept' that allowed him to advance in opposition against particular theoretical and political effects which he saw as reproduced by this doxa of Marx inverting Hegel.[123] This itself was, we suggest, a strategic maneuver which we can call an intervention, for it allowed Althusser to reject and reorient particular theoretical practices, such as those which were ratified by the 22nd Congress in 1961 and its abandoning of the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[124]

For this reason, we suggest, Althusser's spirited attacks in *Pour Marx* are not oriented strictly by a 'purely' theoretical problematic of 'inversion,' but instead and primarily by a political problematic. Althusser's return to this question in the 1978 *Preface*, more than fifteen years after these seminal contributions in *Pour Marx,* strongly suggests that the problem of inversion remains fundamental to his reading of *Capital* as a political and theoretical practice. His repeated returns to this idea of inversion suggests a kind of dissatisfaction with his own earlier, we might say romantic criticisms, which sought valiantly to 'absolutely' excise this idea or question of specular inversion and Hegel's philosophy from Marx's thinking. If therefore *Pour Marx* is a theoretical exposition of the political paralogisms in the political practice of 1950s and 1960s European

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[122] This understanding sheds light on the frequently imputed characteristic of the political actions of some of Marx's followers, such as Lenin and Mao, for their intention to overturn their own political conjunctures. Lenin's last words in *What is to be Done?* are, "liquidate the third period [the now]." *What is to be Done?* (London: Panther Modern Society, 1970), 222. This imperative mode of inversion also clarifies why the end of *Capital* presents few indications about the capitalist future. *Capital* cuts off with the idea that the prostitution markets in London and Australia will come to resemble each other internally, even though they are spatially discrete. For Marx, the capitalist mode of production is essentially an anthropologically revolutionary, not conservative, process.

[123] On the notion of 'practical concept,' see Étienne Balibar, "On the Basic Concepts of Historical Materialism," in *Reading Capital: The Complete Edition* (New York: Verso, 2015).

[124] See Martin Suryajaya, *Alain Badiou dan Masa Depan Marxisme* (Jakarta: Resist Books, 2012), esp. Chapter 1 "*Zaman Badiou*" ["The Age of Badiou"].

communist movement, we would like to suggest that the 1978 *Preface* on the other hand is an effort to reconsider this action of inversion of which *Capital* founds its inceptual point.

This dissertation chapter reconstructs the notion of inversion that Louis Althusser and Jacques Rancière advance in their writings published in *Pour Marx* (1965) and *Lire "Le Capital"* (1965). We identify that this idea of inversion forms a fundamental mode of action for both of their readings of *Capital.* We show that the problem which Althusser identifies in the doxa of inversion is rearticulated by Rancière, but that Rancière begins to articulate another mode of inversion in *Capital* that is not strictly identical to the physical or spurious ones which Althusser critiques in 1963. This will allow us to begin to suggest why and how the final general name and part of the exposition of *Capital*, "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," exposits what this dissertation calls a political and metaphysical mode of inversion of *Capital.* This will also allow us to understand why Marx brings forth the concepts of soul (*Seele*) and world (*Welt*) in the limit of *Capital*, for *Capital* discloses a turn not only in its own concepts, but in what Martin Heidegger and his French follower Jean-Paul Sartre called *Dasein* (Being-there, there-being) that is the human being.

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The writings published under the titles *Pour Marx* (1965) and *Lire "Le Capital"* (1965) develop a hypothesis, amongst others, that the historical thesis of Marx inverting Hegelian philosophy is a mistake.[125] This chapter outlines this thesis and lesson in Althusser's writing entitled, "On the Materialist Dialectic: On the Unevenness of Origins," which was written in 1963 and published in *Pour Marx* (1965). In this essay, Althusser advances the now well-known thesis of a turn or inner division within Marx's thinking and writing. Althusser calls this an 'epistemological break' with the 'theoretical humanism' still active in the writings of Marx in and before 1845. Althusser argues that the writings of and after this so-called break are not tethered to the ideology of 'theoretical humanism' or the particular idea of 'inverting' Hegel's philosophy. This theoretical intervention is also a political intervention, we think, for it aims at its limit to introduce a rereading and therefore relearning of the ideas of *Capital*.

It is important to recollect here that when Althusser uses the name Hegel in this particular exposition, this name presents a particular concatenation of not only theoretical but also political concepts and practices. This is important because Althusser does not identify the problem of the Marxist error in Hegel himself, but rather in the effects that his name makes possible and introduces. Althusser writes, "Hegel's basic flaw is *not* just a matter of the 'speculative' illusion."[126] These attributes of speculation and illusion in Hegel's system, as Althusser notes, were "already denounced by Feuerbach and it consists in the identification of thought and being…[it is] the sin of abstraction which inverts the order of things and puts the process of the auto-genesis of the concept (the abstract) in the place of the process of the auto-genesis of the concrete (the real)."[127] This can be remembered as Althusser's lesson of the mistake (*verwechslung*) of the 'auto-genesis of the concept.' Althusser's critical intervention here is to identify that the formation of a or the concept is *not* tantamount or adequate to the formation of the so-called 'concrete.' The notion of the symmetrical inversion by Feuerbach (and many of his

[125] See discussion of *verwechseln* (mistake) in *Capital* in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
[126] Louis Althusser, "On the Materialist Dialectic: On the Unevenness of Origins," in *For Marx* (New York: Vintage, 1970), 189; emphasis added.
[127] Ibid, 189-90.

unwitting late followers) here inscribes a 'bad faith' promise, according to Althusser, to have found the concrete in the concept, or the true in the error.

And yet this Hegelian speculation is *not* at the heart of the matter for the problem of the doxa of Marx's inversion of Hegel according to Althusser. Althusser argues instead that this problem of Feuerbach and his many late followers of theoretical humanism is to think that they have absolutely inhabited the place of identifying this error in the activity of speculation without themselves being exposed to any remainder of error or speculative illusion. Feuerbach or Feuerbachians thinks, Althusser argues, that man can replace (*wechseln*) its extant notion of God with a new one that is Man without mistaking (*verwechseln*) either.[128] Althusser recognizes that this schematic projection thinks it can guarantee the separation of the "bad use of abstraction (the speculative and idealist use)" and a "good use of abstraction (the materialist use)."[129] This identification by Althusser of the illusion or imagination of replacing without mistaking is precisely what this dissertation calls the spurious notion of inversion. We argue that it completely elides the *question* and problem of ontological difference and truth. In the schema brought forth in Chapter One of this dissertation, this spurious inversion presupposes that *Forschung* and *Darstellung* are *essentially* identical and ontologically adequate to one another.[130] Althusser identifies that this spurious inversion only reduplicates its own starting point. It therefore does not turn. Without *kehren* or *vertere,* it is not therefore adequate to the name of its own concept as inversion. Althusser formulates the theoretical presupposition of spurious inversion as follows: "we prepare to put things straight, that is, to put abstraction in its right place by a liberating 'inversion.'"[131]

In "On the Materialist Dialectic: On the Unevenness of Origins" [1963], Feuerbach, not Hegel, is the named lieutenant who holds up the thinking that the real is composed by the transparency and immediacy of 'the ideal' and 'the material' at once, without obstructions or occlusions. Feuerbach names the world-view that there is simply a correct conceptualization of God and Man and that erroneous understandings can be at once identified and ameliorated by Man's handling. This is the illusion that old errors are absolutely eradicated by the new truths. Althusser argues that this Feuerbachian inversion presupposes a model of action that unifies and controls matter and thought *all at once* in its apprehension of God and Man, or theology and anthropology.[132] This leads to the idea that theology is nothing but a speculary mystification of something that instead is clear and unobscured, which is Man. This projects an underlying and latent single unity of philosophy, anthropology, and theology, *within* the very same schema that

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[128] This mode of inversion proclaims that whereas there has been theology, now this must be subsequently transformed into anthropology and that *this itself will be* the essence of a harmonious social formation. In doing so, this ventriloquized Feuerbachian completely denies the efficacy of the problem of the semi-autonomy of the economic base and the so-called superstructure as has been identified in myriad Marxist discourses.

[129] Althusser, "On the Materialist Dialectic," 190.

[130] Alain Badiou, following in Althusser's thinking here, has in recent times called this linguistic anthropology the fundamental ideology of democratic materialism. See his *Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II* (London: Continuum, 2009), esp. "Introduction."

[131] Althusser, "On the Materialist Dialectic," 190.

[132] See Chapter 6 of this dissertation. Muhammad Al-Fayyadl makes a similar argument when he identifies the onto-theological presupposition which thinks God is known in the mode of extant-ness that characterizes physical sciences. Instead, he explicitly states that God is for Man inconsistent and furthermore something that is *not* present in the mode of everydayness. This does not, however, result in a fatalism or nihilism. Rather, he identifies a minimal anthropology whereby Man *can* change because its being is an act and acts. In this schema, he notes, while Man *does* change in facing God, God *does not* change facing Man. With this we can see a rejection of the Feuerbachian mode of inversion.

projects their differentiation. Althusser argues that the discourse of *Capital* does *not* undertake such a theoretical practice.

This dissertation suggests calling this Althusser's critique of a maximal anthropology. Althusser's intervention here can be thought of as oriented by the principles of a minimal anthropology that he reads as introduced in *Capital*.[133] To understand this demarcation, we first recall that *Capital* has historically been criticized for its 'theoretical antihumanism,' *avant la lettre* to boot. For in *Capital,* as we all know, the capitalist and the wage worker are *bearers* or *character-masks* of the capitalist and commodity *relations*. This schema inherently rejects the notion of a maximal anthropology by which we mean an imputation of a 'theoretical humanist' human being who is the subject *and* bearer of its own causes and relations. The schema of bearers and character-masks in *Capital* shows a truly 'theoretical antihumanist' formulation, for it is the bearer and the mask, rather than a heroic individual, that bears personification.

The modes of action of the capitalist and the wage labourer in *Capital* are therefore essentially unlike those of the maximal or Feuerbachian anthropology, where God and Man are entirely recuperated in their polar oppositions. Capital, as can be synoptically seen in the schema of its cellular formation as M-C-M' does *not* 'invert' itself with *any* inner relation or mode of physical symmetry. The unity of capital thus necessitates another idea of cause than the symmetrical inversions governing a Feuerbachian, maximal anthropology.

Althusser's intervention in "On the Materialist Dialectic: On the Unevenness of Origins" therefore aims not at Hegel's system in-itself as much as the effects that the Feuerbachian readings of it introduce. As Althusser says in the 1978 *Preface*, this is the problem of the guarantee of method that thinks that one can arrive at the solution simply by setting out for it.[134] This lesson, we note, is not one which only exists as a remote past. In Chapter Six of this dissertation, we will see that Muhammad Al-Fayyadl, writing in Indonesia in the 21st century, brings forth a critique of this 'theoretical humanism' to his contemporaries. Fayyadl recounts the story of a pious and poor peasant couple who committed suicide to escape their debt collectors. Fayyadl reminds us that their piety didn't protect them from the debt collectors.[135]

Althusser argues that the theoretical practice of the Feuerbachian inversion that takes and never mistakes cannot grasp the 'uneven and disparate' mode of unity of *Capital.* For already in Part I of *Capital,* Marx states that the form of action of the commodity is an ellipse, that is, a turning mode of action whereby the action of two bodies realizes and resolves in contradiction.[136] This is essentially unlike the Feuerbachian practice of replacing God with Man without mistaking either.[137]

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[133] Michael Heinrich suggests that *Capital* bears a 'minimal anthropology.' Personal Correspondence, May 2021.
[134] This maximal anthropology imputes an adequate givenness of God to Man. This 'simple' conversion of theology into anthropology thereby conceals both the forms and categories of God and Man.
[135] See Muhammad Al-Fayyadl, "*Membangun Keberislaman yang Materialis: Arah Perjuangan Ekonomi-Politik Islam Progresif*," *Islam Bergerak*, October 7, 2016, https://islambergerak.com/2016/10/membangun-keberislaman-yang-materialis-arah-perjuangan-ekonomi-politik-islam-progresif/.
[136] Marx, *Capital*, 198.
[137] Althusser's intervention thus is not simply aimed at a theoretical content of *Capital,* but instead at the political orientation of its reading. We have said that in 1873 in the *Nachwort* to the second German Edition of *Das Kapital*, inversion appears in the mode of an imperative. Using Martin Heidegger's rearticulation of Heraclitus' discourse, we can say that the mode of turn articulated in '*Man muß sie umstülpen'* is not that of a linguistic or grammatical imperative, but instead a mode of turning that is a favoring. This turn therefore is less the heeding to the hail of the imputation of a theoretical or grammatical duty, but rather a fundamental orientation *as* turning *as* '*how* Marx *thinks'* in *Capital*. This turn and inversion is a self-causing action of favor, tendency, or effort (*conatus*) that cannot be grasped

In 1963, Althusser writes that this spurious inversion is "the act of abstraction whereby the pure essence is extracted from concrete individuals [and it] *is an ideological myth.*"[138] But this does not mean that there is no true idea of inversions as such. On the contrary, Althusser writes, "behind the still ideological semblance of the 'inversion' of abstract speculation…is the decisive point in which the fate of Hegelian ideology and Marxist theory is decided."[139] Inversion thus is an absolutely crucial concept for Althusser's inceptual re-reading of *Capital*. A true notion of inversion and the spurious inversion, Althusser writes, are "qualitatively different…[and a] denial of this difference… is the very basis of the Hegelian idealism that Marx rejected."[140] But a true idea does not necessarily enter into the form of appearance through the demonstration of an untrue idea. The existence of scientific discourses does not eradicate the primacy of the imagination and ideology. While Althusser vociferously points to the import of a true notion of inversion, he himself does not illuminate it in his 1963 critique. For this reason, this writing brings forth a primarily 'negative' identification of the problem of inversion in *Capital*.[141]

In this 'negative' identification, Althusser severely underlines the fundamental importance of the position of inversion in Marx's thought in an important passage that we quote at length:

> To maintain that the concept of 'inversion' is a *knowledge* is to endorse the ideology that underlies it, that is, to endorse a conception that denies even the reality of theoretical practice. The 'settlement' pointed out to us by the concept of 'inversion' cannot then consist merely on an inversion of the theory, which conceives the auto-genesis of the concept as 'the genesis of the (real) concrete' itself, to give the opposite theory, the theory which conceives the auto-genesis of the real as the genesis of the concept (it is this opposition that, if it really had any basis, would authorize the term 'inversion'): this settlement consists (and this is the decisive point) of the rejection of an ideological theory foreign to the reality of scientific practice, to substitute for it a qualitatively different theory which, for its part, recognizes the essence of scientific practice, distinguishes it from the ideology that some have wanted to impose on it, takes seriously its particular characteristics, thinks them, expresses them, and thinks and expresses the practical conditions even of this recognition. On reaching this point, we can see that in the last resort there can be no question of an 'inversion'. For a science is not obtained by inverting an ideology. A science is obtained on condition that the domain in which ideology believes that it is dealing with the real is abandoned, that is, by abandoning its ideological problematic (the organic presuppositions of its basic concepts, and with this system, the majority of these concepts as well) and going on to establish the activity of the new theory 'in another element', in the field of a new, scientific problematic. I use these terms quite seriously, and, as a simple test, I defy anyone ever to produce an example of a

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by a physical or genetic mode of action as in the Feuerbachian schema. See Martin Heidegger, *Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking; Logic: Heraclitus' Doctrine of the 'Logos'* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 98 ff.

[138] Althusser, "On the Materialist Dialectic," 191; emphasis in Althusser.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid; translation modified.

[141] In "The Modern Theory of Colonization," Marx brings forth another mode of inversion. This is when the wage worker *loses* the relation and feeling of dependency on the abstemious capitalist at once. In this action, there is a change in the ratio of exploitation of the wage worker. This loss articulates a political and metaphysical inversion in *Capital*. This inversion disrupts the exploitation that takes place *as* the exchange of the special commodity of labour power in its purchase. This turning is an act that is undertaken as individual producers and a class of wage workers at once. See Marx, *MEW 23,* 797. On the concept of ratio, see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Science of Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Bk. 1, Sec. II, Ch. 3.

> true science which was constituted by inverting the problematic of an ideology, that is, on the basis of the very problematic of ideology. I only set one condition for the challenge: all words must be used in their strict sense, not metaphorically.[142]

We see here the strongest formulation of the spurious inversion by Althusser in his writings which were published in *Pour Marx* (1965). And yet a true idea of inversion in *Capital* is not recollected here by Althusser.[143] Perhaps driven by an intuition of this inadequacy, the question of inversion was not simply dropped by Althusser or his associates. Many could recognize the persistence and deviation in the notion of inversion in Marx's writings, from the 1843 *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* through the 1873 *Nachwort*. The question is how this idea changed.

To understand this continuity and discontinuity, we now turn to Jacques Rancière's contribution to *Lire "Le Capital"* (1965). In it, he demarcates a specular action of inversion from another action of inversion in *Capital*. The latter is not, we argue, a knowledge but rather a 'mode of action' that can also be called an act. Its mode of existence therefore is not of an extant physical body. On the contrary, it is a meta-physical inversion whose polarity and orientation is not exactly bound to mechanical or physical forms or relations.

3. On the Dual Character of Inversion for Jacques Rancière in *Reading Capital* (1965)

In order to gain access to the orienting questions of this dissertation – *how* does Marx *think* in *Capital*? and why does this question facilitate a rereading of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie"? – we turn to the elucidation of inversion in Marx's discourse from Jacques Rancière, who at the time of writing was a close student and associate of Louis Althusser.[144]

Rancière's contribution to *Lire "Le Capital"* (1965), "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy: From the *1844 Manuscripts* to *Capital*," situates the concept of inversion at the center of its reflection.[145] Rancière first presents an identification of the notion of inversion in the *1844 Manuscripts*, and then identifies why this notion of inversion is itself not adequate to the notion of inversion in *Capital*. In doing so, he identifies the significance of the concept of process and its attribute of development to *Capital*'s discourse. Following the consequences of this elucidation, we conclude that the question and concept of inversion bear decisively on "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," being the utmost 'development' of the

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[142] Althusser, "On the Materialist Dialectic," 192-3.

[143] For as he himself argues in "Contradiction and Overdetermination: Notes for an Investigation," the true and the false are essentially ontologically discrete. Against this dualistic schema which he reads in Feuerbach, Althusser proposes instead a trinitarian schema comprising three levels of Generality. Generality 1 is the realm of ideological activity. Generality 3 is the realm of true knowledge. The passage between the two, Generality 2, is the realm of science, with its truth making characteristics and theoretical activity. In this schema, Generality 1 and 3 do not combine. Generality 3 is the realm of true knowledge. Generality 2 is the realm where discourse is transformed into truth. Its propositional form and content are qualitatively discrete from Generality 1 which is instead the realm of immediacy in ideology. The importance of this formulation is that it does not collect itself into the kind of process such as Hegel does to the concept and *Geist* in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* [1830]. See his "Contradiction and Overdetermination: Notes for an Investigation," in *For Marx* (New York: Vintage, 1970 [1965]).

[144] Their personal relationship has been the object of considerable consideration and concern elsewhere. See Jacques Rancière, *Althusser's Lesson* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011).

[145] For the importance of inversion to Hegel's philosophy, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, "*Die Verkehrte Welt,*" *Hegel Studien* 3 (1964), 135-154.

concept and exposition of *Capital*. In order to detect these effects, we patiently follow Rancière's practice of reading Marx in *Lire "Le Capital*."

α) *1844 Manuscripts*

To situate his lesson, Rancière first draws a line of demarcation *within* Marx's practice and notion of critique. He posits that for Marx in the early 1840s, critique means "*erklaren."* This notion of *erklaren* thinks that "behind…contradictions (there is) a more fundamental contradiction, that which is expressed by the concept of alienation."[146] This identifies man's essence with that which he 'alienates.' Man's essence is thereby a contradiction, both 'within' and 'without' him. Rancière writes that "the contradiction is the separation [and] this is the important point to bear in mind in order to follow the whole logic of the critical discourse."[147] With this schema, each contradiction is a *particular* separation; contradiction thereby 'guarantees' its own existence. This is what Althusser criticizes as the aforementioned auto-genesis of the concept.

Within this circularity, critique for Marx, Rancière writes, is then as follows: "to give to a contradiction its general form is to give it its human meaning."[148] Marx calls this "*Vermenschlichung* (literally 'humanization')."[149] This is important for Rancière because it identifies that Marx understands *this* particular subsumption of the specific in the general *as* 'humanization.'

Rancière then delineates the effects of this schema, which he sees as obfuscating, rather than clarifying, a notion of contradiction. For Marx here, Rancière glosses, "this human meaning, of which the particular contradiction is the *manifestation*, is discovered by the critique by releasing the general form of the contradiction: the relation between the two terms whose separation is posed in the contradiction."[150] This formulation posits that with critique, 'man' can determine the relation between two things according to this particular mode of separation and contradiction. Rancière's critique here, we note, hews closely to Althusser's aforementioned critique of Feuerbach's maximal anthropology.

Rancière writes that Marx himself practices this notion of critique in his reading of Bruno Bauer's *The Jewish Question.* In *On the Jewish Question* (1844), Rancière writes, critique *identifies* that there has been a mistaking of a *particular* form of a state for a *general* form. With this act of *erklaren,* the Christian state is seen as not adequate to the notion of state as such. In so doing, Marx thereby develops the notion that "the essence of man exists outside man in the state."[151] With this, Marx aims to 'reverse' the untrue into the true. Critique thereby *guarantees* "the explanation of the fundamental meaning of the contradiction" and "the rediscovery of its original unity," Rancière writes.[152] This 'unity,' as man and his essence, "defines the concept of *truth* in Feuerbach's critique," Rancière writes.[153] Like Althusser's theoretical practice of 1963, Rancière here can be understood as aiming to combat or neutralize a set of theoretical effects stemming from this theoretical humanism.

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[146] Jacques Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy: From the *1844 Manuscripts* to *Capital*," in *Reading Capital: The Complete Edition* (New York: Verso, 2015), 78.
[147] Ibid, 79.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid, 80
[153] Ibid.

This notion of 'humanization' in Marx does not fundamentally differ from the thought of Feuerbach and it remains inadequate, according to Rancière. The concept of the abstract and abstraction are, Rancière writes, "the basis of a fundamental misunderstanding…*Abstract is in fact taken here in the sense of separated*."[154] As Rancière says, this notion of separation is in fact not tantamount to separation as such. Rancière writes that this is where the predicate "pose(s) as the true subject."[155] This "disqualifies abstraction as an instrument of thought."[156] All abstraction here "is accused of maintaining the separation of the abstract moments from the human experience."[157] Rancière thus identifies a confusion (*verwechslung*) here, for this schema is incapable of distinguishing "the process of thought and the real process."[158]

To situate this turn or break within Marx's thinking, Rancière then hypothesizes that Marx discovers the "*place* of political economy" between 1844 and the *Capital* manuscripts and that this discovery constitutes the specific difference that differentiates the latter from the former.[159] For Rancière, the notion of critique in the latter identifies effects that not only exceed but also are not simply identical to its own discourse. It is not a poetic exaggeration to say that this '*place'* is armed with weapons.

Without a notion of this *place,* Rancière writes, the *1844 Manuscripts* think that

> political economy appears as the mirror in which the economic facts are reflected…Political Economy…plays the role of mirror…Political Economy grasps the laws which show the movement of private property. It does not *comprehend* these laws in their internal connections…It is this comprehension which is the proper task of the critique.[160]

In this conceptualization, the discursive 'place' of political economy in the *1844 Manuscripts* recognizes itself without any irreducible opacity with respect to political economy as such. This notion of critique thus thinks that it begins with "'an actual economic fact,'" such as the impoverishment of people.[161] This finitude thereby is supposed to 'spontaneously' manifest the essence of the process of political economy.

Rancière argues that this 'spontaneity' re-introduces the spurious notion of 'alienation,' for it thinks that it grasps the human essence as the form of activity characterized by the 'production' of 'things.' Rancière calls this a religious schema, by which we should emend to read as the *revealed* religious schema. This schema is one where the notion of God creating man is the basis for the notion that man produces things. This syllogism thinks of the production of the object as the essence of the man.

Rancière here, like Althusser in 1963, identifies the physical and metaphysical illusions which stem from this notion. Rancière recapitulates this thinking as follows: "the object produced by the worker appears as a Feuerbachian object, as the objectification of man's own essence."[162] The human essence is thereby known from the production of the thing. We note the immense

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[154] Ibid; emphasis added.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid; translation modified.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid, 81.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid, 83-4.
[161] Ibid, 84
[162] Ibid, 86.

realm of human activity that is repressed by this 'producerist' onto-theo-anthropology. This conflates the ontological essence of the human soul with the capitalist soul.

Rancière identifies the activity and effects of this 'reflective' schema in *On the Jewish Question* as follows. For Marx there, Rancière writes, "political life, which represents the generic life of man, [is] simply a means of preserving the selfish interests of the members of bourgeois society."[163] Rancière writes that this schema is as follows: "manifestation of generic life = means of maintaining individual existence."[164] Rancière argues that this does not essentially break with the theoretical practice of classical political economists. This idea advances a "means/end reversal."[165] It presupposes that it can move from the spontaneous ideology of classical political economy ('private interests') to the activity of its critique (*Erklaren*). Critique, so understood, "consists of a solution by substitution of the terms of the equations in which the contradiction is posed…human essence = alienated being."[166]

With this reading, Rancière identifies how this particular notion of inversion and critique has not come to understand the *place* of political economy, that is, the real effects of its own discursivity. For if the essence of the human being is determined by the release of the predicate as alienated being, this is only "the loss of man in his object."[167] Although it begins by rejecting 'abstraction,' this theoretical practice nonetheless "condemns its discourse to be only reduplication."[168]

ß) *Capital Project*

With the second section of his contribution, "Critique and Science in *Capital*," Rancière then introduces the idea of a break with the notion of critique and inversion which he characterizes in Marx's *1844 Manuscripts*. For with *Capital*, Rancière argues, the concept of critique for Marx is no longer the attempt "to read into a discourse an implicit sub-discourse."[169] Instead, as Marx articulates in his 1858 letter to Ferdinand Lassalle, the critique of political economy is "a critical exposé of the system of bourgeois economy. *It is at once an exposé and by the same token, a critique of the system.*"[170] This is an important statement, for Rancière stated that critique in the *1844 Manuscripts* is an action of *reflection*. This critique of political economy, on the other hand, exposits the system of bourgeois economy under the same species of eternity that it critiques. This critique of political economy does not therefore project the bourgeois economy as an act of alienation. Critique in this critique of political economy instead inhabits and works on the bourgeois economy itself.

To demonstrate the effectivity of this difference, Rancière recalls the action of inversion in 1843, when Marx wrote that Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right* "turned the autonomized predicate into the true subject."[171] Rancière writes:

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[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid, 87.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Ibid, 89.
[167] Ibid, 93.
[168] Ibid, 96.
[169] Ibid, 100.
[170] Karl Marx, ""Letter to Ferdinand Lassalle 22 February 1858," in *Collected Works, Volume 40: Letters 1856-59* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), 270, quoted in Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy: From the *1844 Manuscripts* to *Capital*"; emphasis added.
[171] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 101.

> in alienation, this predicate, this spirit of the subjects of the state is separated from its subject. It appears as the essence of the state. This separate existence of the subject and the predicate enables Hegel to make the speculative operation: by a new separation he separates sovereignty from the real state, he makes it into an idea, an *autonomous* being. This autonomous being has to have a support. This support is provided by the Hegelian Idea, what Marx calls the Mystical Idea. Sovereignty becomes a determination of this mystical idea.[172]

From this abstraction, Rancière writes,

> Hegel has to make the inverse movement and redescend towards the concrete. The link between the abstract idea and the concrete empirical reality can only be made in a mystical way, by an *incarnation*. The incarnation allows the abstract determination to exist in the concrete. The Mystical Idea is incarnated in a particular individual, the monarch. The latter then appears for Hegel as the *immediate* existence of sovereignty.[173]

Rancière calls this movement "*hypostatization.*"[174] Rancière describes this as the process of "an inversion of the empirical into speculation (abstraction and autonomization) and of speculation into the empirical (incarnation)."[175] This is the action of spurious inversion for Althusser in 1963.

In *Capital,* Rancière argues, although there is a persistence of this spurious inversion, there is also the emergence of another mode of inversion. In order to identify the basis of this demarcation, Rancière recalls that Marx said that the problem with classical political economists can be found in their "'scientific starting-points.'"[176] In an important statement, Rancière recalls that Marx wrote that these starting points of classical political economy "dissolve (*auflösen*)" the necessary transformation between the inner basis of value and the "multiplicity of its outward forms."[177] Their 'starting points' therefore forbid the very concept of value, for value exists in such a way that it cannot be recapitulated simply by its appearance as it is instead always and essentially forms differentially, not homeostatically or symmetrically. For Ricardo, the dissolution and unification of the basis and appearance of value is *entirely resolved* by the concept of labor. Rancière elucidates, "for Ricardo, value is labour. It does not matter in what form this substance appears. For Marx, labour is *represented* in value, it *takes on the form* of the value of commodities."[178] Where the Form of value A = Natural form of B, Rancière writes, "B lends its body, its natural form, for the expression of the value of A."[179]

Rancière states that Marx in *Capital* thus demonstrates that value exists in the realm of appearance that is itself 'conceptless-ness' ('*begrifflosigkeit*'). *Capital,* Rancière reasons, is thus an analysis of the actions of taking-on the form and body of this conceptless-ness. *Capital* makes the

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[172] Ibid, 101-2; emphasis in Rancière.
[173] Ibid, 102; emphasis added.
[174] Ibid; emphasis in Rancière. Rancière also recalls that there is a historical reading of Marx which states that this notion of inversion *is* the method whereby Marx 'critiques' classical Political Economy. For Rancière in 1965, Galvano Della Volpe personifies this tendency. In this understanding, Marx identifies the real determinate historical abstractions of the indeterminate hypostases that populate the spontaneous ideology of political economy.
[175] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 102.
[176] Ibid, 103.
[177] Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value,* in *Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 32* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2010), 499, quoted in Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 104.
[178] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 105.
[179] Ibid.

generic action of 'resolving' at once 'dissolving.' Rancière specifically identifies this in Marx's exposition of the equals sign ("="), for this sign, he tells us, "relates together two terms which are presented in absolutely heterogenous forms."[180] Thus,

> value has its mode of existence…in the natural form of the equivalent commodity. *The paradox is that value is unable either to appear or to exist*. In so far as it appears in the natural form of a commodity, it disappears in it as value, and takes the form of a thing. Value thus has its form of manifestation in the exchange relation only in so far as it is not manifested there.[181]

This mode of impossibility helps Rancière identify why *Capital* does not *simply* exhibit the 'reflective,' 'spurious inversion' as in the *1844 Manuscripts*. Rancière writes:

> in the *Manuscripts* the equations which expressed the contradictions (e.g., the erection of the world of things into values = the depreciation of the world of men; or value of labour = value of means of subsistence) all referred to the equation: essence of man = essence foreign to man, i.e., they referred as their cause to the split between the human subject and its essence. The solution of the equation lay in one of its parts. The essence of man separated from the human subject provided the cause of the contradiction and the solution to the equation. *The cause was referred to the act of subjectivity separating from itself.*[182]

But in the capitalist mode of equalization, the cause of equality is elsewhere than the exposited equation of equality. Rancière explains the effects of this as follows:

> *Here*, in the equation, or, what amounts to the same thing, the contradiction: x commodity A = y commodity B, *the cause is not in the equation*. The latter presents a relation between things, a connection between effects determined by the absence of the cause. This cause lies in the identity of useful labour, creative of use-values, and labour creative of exchange-values, of concrete labour and abstract labour.[183]

The essential difference Rancière brings forth here is the following. Whereas in the form of action as alienation in the *1844 Manuscripts*, there is no absence within this action as separation, in the generalized conditions of the concept-bereft relations of equality as in the capitalist money form of general equivalence, even true particular causes in the capitalist mode of production are 'covered' by this concept-less appearance of equality. *Capital* therefore does not, he argues, exposit simply a reflective action of economy as in the *1844 Manuscripts*. Instead, in *Capital*, the *form* of value can*not* be represented in either the act of labor itself or the commodity in which it is represented.[184]

This necessary and impossible union as the value form in *Capital* is, Rancière writes, "the result of a *social* process. The absent cause to which we are referred is the *social relations of production.*"[185] The *form* of this social causality, according to Rancière, can*not* therefore be

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[180] Ibid, 106.
[181] Ibid, 107; emphasis added.
[182] Ibid, 107; emphasis added.
[183] Ibid; emphasis added.
[184] In his 1978 *Preface*, Althusser characterized the exposition of *Capital* as largely "*fictitious.*" Althusser, "Preface," 19.
[185] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 108.

ascertained with the 'religious' demiurge of alienation. In *Capital*, Rancière says, causality is neither subject nor substance as in Hegel's systems but instead a "metonymic" effect.[186] It comprises a "mode of manifestation of a certain structure within a space which is not homogeneous with it."[187] The 'starting point' and the real object are not homogenous and cannot be identified in a formal or simple duality.

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To deepen the meaning of this difference, Rancière develops the following schema. He says that objectivity in the *1844 Manuscripts* means sensual. In *Capital*, on the other hand he states, the sensual means sensuous-supersensuous. In *Capital,* the sensual is "the manifestation of a characteristic of the structure…(for) what takes the form of a thing is not labour as the activity of a subject but the social character of labour."[188] Objectivity is thus a "metonymic manifestation of the structure."[189] Rancière thereby places a break between objectivity as the sensuous and the sensuous-supersensuous. In the thinking-process of the *1844 Manuscripts*, sensuous objects refer to alienated human essence. In *Capital*, there is instead a realm and form of objectivity that *is contradiction* in the very mode of its appearance. This is sensuous-supersensuous, not simply sensual.

To sharpen this contrast, Rancière elaborates the effective difference between these two modes of objectivity. The coat is famously a 'bearer' of value in *Capital*. In the 1843 *Critique of Hegel's Staatsrecht,* Marx states that the 'monarch' is the 'bearer' of sovereignty.[190] The monarch is the incarnation and the speculative translation of the concept of state and sovereignty. In drawing our attention here, Rancière demonstrates that the concept of 'bearing' has transformed within Marx's discourse. For in *Capital*, the coat bears "the phenomenal form of value itself, and not its speculative translation."[191] Unlike the process of separation and investiture of sovereignty in the monarch, the sewing of the coat appears "[in] the space *in which* the determinations of the structure manifest themselves."[192] This notion of objectivity and process cannot be identified according to a mode of action of demiurge or alienation. This is because *Capital*, Rancière writes, "theorizes the structure which founds the thing-form adopted by the social characteristics of labour."[193]

This discussion, Rancière notes, pertains to Immanuel Kant's notion of transcendental dialectic. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant, Rancière recalls, schematizes the form of objectivity into a division of the object (*Gegenstand*), the sensuous (*sinnlich*), and the appearance (*Erscheinung*) on the one side, and supersensuousness (*ubersinnlich*), seemingness, appearance, and illusion (*Schein*) on the other side. Rancière's recapitulation is not an unfamiliar schematization of the notion of objectivity.

Against this, Rancière writes, the schema of objectivity in *Capital* is of "a quite different structure."[194] Rancière represents this re-determination as follows:

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[186] Ibid. He notes that this is a term he borrows from Jacques-Alain Miller.
[187] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 108.
[188] Ibid, 109.
[189] Ibid, 110.
[190] Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State," 99 ff.
[191] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 111.
[192] Ibid, 112; emphasis added.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Ibid, 113.

Gegenstand = *Erscheinungsform*
(form of appearance)

sinnlich-übersinnlich "*gesellschäftlich*" ["socially"]

Schein (appearance or illusion) [195]

In Rancière's reading of *Capital,* 'objectivity' is no longer characterized by the irreducible antinomies of Kant's schema. In *Capital*, Rancière writes, "the object *is* a sensuous-supersensuous object in so far as its properties are only the form of manifestation of social relations. It *is* the misrecognition of its character as a manifestation of labour in a determinate social structure, which founds the appearance."[196] Misrecognition thus is not error; it is instead that which is constitutive for and of appearance as such. The thing *appears* as a sensuous thing in *Capital*, but, Rancière writes, "appearance (*Schein*) is determined by the gap between the conditions of constitution of the objects and the conditions of their perception."[197]

This notion of a gap cannot be found in the reflective schema of inversion in the *1844 Manuscripts*. There, contradiction lay in a mode of alienation and guaranteed incorporation or subsumption. In *Capital*, instead, there is another, internal mode of equality forged whereby a third term – 'the social relations' – traverses the unity and contradiction of sensuous-supersensuousness. This lays the foundation for Rancière for distinguishing a notion of a spurious inversion and another mode of inversion in *Capital*.

Rancière states that in *Capital*, the "resolution of the contradiction is achieved in what Marx calls its *forms of movement.*"[198] These forms of movement (*Bewegungsformen*) are where "contradiction is both realized and resolved."[199] They "enable us to bring to light the constitutive structure of the relations of production and its mode of action at the level of *wirklichkeit.*"[200] Rancière quotes Marx's own schematism as follows:

> in the expression 'value of labour,' the concept of value is not only completely extinguished, but inverted, so that it becomes its contrary [*Im Ausdruck: „Wert der Arbeit" ist der Wertbegriff nicht nur völlig ausgelöscht, sondern in sein Gegenteil verkehrt*]. It is an expression as imaginary as the value of the earth. These imaginary expressions arise, nevertheless, from the relations of production themselves. They are categories for the forms of appearance of essential relations (*Sie sind Kategorien für Erscheingsformen wesentlicher Verhältnisse*).[201]

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[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid; emphases added.
[197] Ibid, 114
[198] Ibid, 116; emphasis added.
[199] Marx, *Capital*, 198.
[200] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 117.
[201] Marx, *Capital*, 677, quoted in Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 120. Interpolation of Marx's German added here in square brackets.

This is a crucial statement. It anticipates in many ways Althusser's notion of ideology.[202] Marx here identifies that inversions are 'categories for the forms of appearance of essential relations.' Rancière glosses Marx here as follows:

> the expression 'value of labour' presupposes a change of form; the value of labour-power appears, manifests itself in a form of manifestation which is the value of labour. As a form of manifestation of labour-power, the value of labour is a form of manifestation of that relation of production essential to the capitalist mode of production – wage-labour. The mechanism of transformation of the forms is thus determined by the relations of production, which manifest themselves in the form of manifestation/appearance by concealing themselves.[203]

Inversions, Rancière writes, identify an appearance that "conceals the truly determinate relation."[204] They are necessary to the critique of political economy. In contrast to the presentation of the notion of critique in the *1844 Manuscripts,* Rancière reasons here that inversions are not simply extinguished by the concept of critique in *Capital.*

To understand their significance, Rancière identifies how process is a central category in *Capital* and not in the *1844 Manuscripts.* Rancière writes that "process… expresses a development considered in the totality of its real conditions."[205] A process does not present to the eye diametrical opposition as in a physical inversion. Rancière says that the mode of action of process is instead one that constantly reproduces a starting point where "the elements in it are defined not by their *nature* but by the place they occupy, the function they fulfill."[206]

In *Capital,* Rancière writes, *both* commodity and capitalist relations evince an internal development of form that advance the appearance of concealment.[207] Marx uses the word 'inversion' (*Verkehrung*) to indicate this mode of action. To demonstrate such an action in *Capital*, Rancière refers to Part VI on Wages, and particularly its chapter, "The Transformation of the Value (and Respectively the Price) of Labour-Power into Wages" ("*Verwandlung von Wert resp. Preis der Arbeitskraft in Arbeitslohn*").[208] Rancière writes that by

> studying the change in form which converts the value of labour-power into value of labour, Marx declares: '[this] form of appearance…makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed presents to the eye the precise opposite of that relation' (Vol. 1, p. 680) [*dieser Erscheinungsform…die das wirkliche Verhältnis unsichtbar mach und grade sein Gegenteil zeigt*].[209]

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[202] It anticipates in many ways Althusser's notion of ideology. Althusser writes that "ideology is a 'representation' of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence." *On the Reproduction of Capitalism* (London: Verso, 2014), 256.
[203] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 120-1.
[204] Ibid, 120.
[205] Marx, *Capital,* 685, quoted in Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 121; translation modified by French edition.
[206] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 121. This section is entitled "Structure of the Process and Perception of the Process" in the part "The Development of Forms and the Inversion" of the Appendix entitled "Commodity Relations and Capitalist Relations."
[207] This concealment is the concealment of the capitalist process itself.
[208] Althusser repeatedly said that this particular place – Part VI on Wages – is a crucial region of *Capital.* See his "Preface to *Capital* Volume One."
[209] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 126; Marx, *MEW 23,* 559, 562.

In this passage, we see value as a processual, illusory inversion that conceals an actual social relation. These 'extinguishings' and 'direct contraries' are a trail of non-appearances of the social formation. Rancière writes:

> what *appears* in the form of wages is in fact that the worker is paid for the whole of his working day without distinction, whereas in reality the wages correspond to the value of the labour-power, and therefore to the part of the working day during which the worker reproduces the value of his own labour power. *In the form of wages, the basis for the understanding of surplus-value (the division of the working day) is thus reversed*.[210]

Rancière emphasizes that

> the inversion of the inner structural determinations, which bear witness to the constitutive character of the relations of production, in their forms of manifestation, thus appears as a fundamental characteristic of the process. It is this law which determines the development of its forms.[211]

These inversions in *Capital* therefore are not simply a mode of action as reflection or alienation. Instead, *Capital* demonstrates a form of action as inversion that is a development of a process. Rancière gives an example, writing:

> money is in fact a form of existence of the value of commodities and monetary circulation a form of motion for the contradictions in commodities. But an examination of the movement of circulation as it is given in ordinary experience reveals a different presentation.[212]

This asymmetry is itself disclosed in the realm of appearance itself. Marx writes, "that this one-sided form of motion of money arises out of the two-sided form of motion of the commodity is a circumstance which is hidden from view. The very nature of circulation itself produces a semblance of the opposite…."[213] The ellipse is in Rancière's text. He then comments,

> [Money as a means of circulation] circulates commodities, which in and for themselves lack the power of movement, and transfers them from hands in which they are non-use-values into hands in which they are use-values and this process always takes the opposite direction to the path of the commodities themselves. Money constantly removes commodities from the sphere of circulation, by constantly stepping into their place in circulation, and in this way continually moving away from its own starting-point. Hence, although the movement of the money is merely the expression of circulation of

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[210] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 126.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid. Rancière is reading Chapter 3 "Money, or the Circulation of Commodities," section 2, "The Means of Circulation," subsection B, "The Circulation of Money" in Part I of *Capital*. One sees in this concatenation that the concept for Marx is an internal re-organization of the forms of the circular, circulation, and the circle, which requires multiple reunifications of generality and specificity.
[213] Marx, *Capital,* 211-2, quoted in Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 127.

> commodities, *the situation appears to be the reverse of this,* namely the circulation of commodities seems to be the result of the movement of the money.[214]

The process of the production of capital thus generates spurious inversions as well as the possibility to unconceal the true process. The 'study' of the inversions generated by the capitalist process facilitates this unconcealment. Rancière writes,

> This relation of inversion…is the development of 'these concrete forms which grow out of the process of capital's movement considered as a whole' (Vol. 3, p. 117)…This development ends with the forms which are manifest at the surface of capitalist production, those in which different capitals confront one another in competition, and which are perceived in their daily experience by the economic subjects to whom Marx gives the name of *agents of production.* [215]

The action of inversion eventuates in perceptible forms of appearances of the real movement of capitalist and commodity relations. Rancière writes:

> the development of the forms of the process is thus governed by the law of inversion; the forms in which the process of capitalist production presents itself or appears are rigorously inverted with respect to its inner determination. They present a *connection of things* which is the inverse of the inner connection, an *apparent motion* which is the inverse of the *real motion* of the capitalist production. It is this form of the apparent motion or the connection of things which is given to the perception of the agents of production.[216]

Rancière credits his understanding here to Jacques Alain Miller's "*Fonction de la formation théorique*" ("Function of the Theoretical Formation"), which he quotes as follows:

> In the structural system in which the production is articulated in a specific mode, the zone of the displacement of the subject – in so far as it maintains itself at the level of the current (*actuel*), i.e., in so far as the structure concedes it the perception of its state (of its apparent motion) while stealing that of its system – is defined as *illusion*. The latter, in so far as the subject reflects it, signifies it, in a word reduplicates it, perpetuates itself in the form of *ideology*. Illusion and ideology, if they are thought in the continuity from a 'seeing' to a 'telling', form the element natural to a subject rigorously qualified by its insertion into the structure of a social formation. Precisely because the economy is in *the last instance,* to be situated as the referent of all manifestations of social practice, its action is radically foreign to the dimension of the current (*actuel*), it offers itself by its effects. The absence of cause is enough to achieve the inversion of the structural determinations at the level of the individual consciousness. As perception, the inversion is illusion. As discourse, ideology.[217]

This passage indicates why the action of inversion is never excluded from the critique of political economy. But Rancière here also recognizes that the forms of appearance as inversion bear an

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
[214] Ibid; emphasis added.
[215] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 127; emphasis in Rancière.
[216] Ibid, 127-8; emphasis added.
[217] Ibid, 128.

'eccentric' identity with their cause and development. The appearance of inversion is thus not the inversion of capital itself.

To demonstrate the reason for this, Rancière recalls Marx's formulation of the value of commodities as c + v + s (constant capital + variable capital + surplus value). In this formula, Marx teaches, surplus value is a ratio. This ratio, Rancière notes, is a "*conceptual connection.*"[218] Profit, on the other hand, *is* a specular form. Profit thus reveals and conceals surplus value. Profit bears, Rancière writes, a "concept-less (*begrifflose*) connection with capital as a whole."[219] Its appearance is that "in which the differences between the component elements *disappear*."[220] Appearance thus actively obfuscates the origin of itself, that is, the *ratio* of paid to unpaid labour. This very appearance of contradiction *is* the realization, rather than the overtaking, of the laws of capitalist value, he writes.[221] Rancière quotes Marx writing,

> all these phenomena seem to contradict both the determination of value by labour-time and the nature of surplus-value as consisting of unpaid surplus labour. In competition, therefore everything appears upside down. The finished configuration (*fertige Gestalt*) of economic relations, as these are visible on the surface, in their actual existence, and therefore also in the notions with which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is very much different from the configuration of their inner core (*Kerngestalt*), which is essential but concealed, and the concept (*Begriff*) corresponding to this.[222]

Rancière creates a schematic presentation of this statement that we present again here now.[223]



A vertical line labeled *Verkehrung* (inversion) divides and unites the schema. Inversion here thus bears the accessibility of the concept (*Begriff*) as such. Rancière argues that this action of inversion

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[218] Ibid, 129; emphasis in Rancière.
[219] Ibid; translation modified. Brewster reads "a-conceptual" for "*begriffslose*."
[220] Ibid; emphasis added.
[221] Recalling the figure of the ellipse from Part I, Rancière underlines clearly how "the law of value is…realized in the *form* of its opposite." Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 130; emphasis added.
[222] Marx *Capital, Volume 3*, 311, quoted in Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 131. Emphasis and German interpolations are in Rancière.
[223] Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 131.

is what allows one to understand the "development of form" in *Capital*.[224] With this action, the concept (*Begriff*) and the inner form *necessarily* dissipate into the 'representations' available for the 'bearers' of the *fertige Gestalt*. This is thus not a dirge mourning the loss of an inner essence by Marx. On the contrary, this schema identifies a process that is the "reduction of the visible movement to the invisible movement."[225] With *Capital*, Rancière writes, "the presentation of the real motion… is a matter of grasping the movement by which the inner determination of the process manifests itself."[226] This notion of inversion therefore brings out a discrepancy or difference, not a symmetry or reflection of extant entities. Inversion here is akin to a test or a try to interpret the eccentricity of social relations in a *fertige Gestalt*, rather than the positive identification of *der absolute Geist* of a *Kerngestalt.*

In the *1844 Manuscripts*, Rancière argues, the 'developed expressions', i.e., 'outer forms', emerge from the activity of alienated labour. In the *1844 Manuscripts*, the schema dyadically situates the "action of the subject on the object; inversion of the subject/object relation; recognition of the subject in the object."[227] On the other hand, Rancière writes, "in *Capital,* it is the position of eccentricity of the relations of production which determines the place of the subject and the object."[228] This is a very important formulation, for it underlines that these determinations are not realized by the 'will' or 'drive' of a capitalist or wage worker, but instead by an 'immanent' eccentricity of the social relations of production.

In 1844, Rancière argues, the substantial subject (*hypokeimenon*) and the Idea meet in direct opposition for Marx. In 1867, 'subject' and 'object' "coincide with the [notion of] *bearer.*"[229] In 1844, the essential content of the subject is in "being-mystified."[230] In 1867, the agent "tr(ies) to explain to itself the economic relations it perceives."[231] This is *personified* as the agent appropriating and expositing the "phenomena of apparent motion through which is realized the law of the real motion."[232] This means that "there is a *perception* of the apparent motion and a confirmation of the inversion which is constitutive of it."[233] The 1844 schema does not bear a notion for this 'a-conceptual-ness' of appearance or the effects of its being-perceived.

For while profit is not a physical 'inversion' of surplus value, the latter is a constitutive form of the former's real 'inner' essence. Profit, Rancière writes, "translate(s) the distribution of the mass of profit constituted by the total exploited surplus labour in all spheres."[234] The apparent motion makes profit appear as if this distribution is constitutive of surplus-value. But profit distributes, rather than constitutes, surplus value. Likewise, while the apparent motion constitutes the ground for the appropriation and perception of the movement of capitals and capitalists, the capitalist agent's activity does not necessarily produce a real movement in surplus-value.

Rancière thereby underscores a fundamental concept of the critique of political economy. In *Capital*, Rancière writes in an important statement, "appearance (is) a dislocation between the

[224] Ibid, 132.
[225] Ibid.
[226] Ibid, 132-3.
[227] Ibid, 134.
[228] Ibid.
[229] Ibid.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Ibid, 135.
[232] Ibid, 136.
[233] Ibid, 137; emphasis added.
[234] Ibid, 136.

constitution of forms and their perception."[235] In *The German Ideology*, Rancière writes, "inversion appeared as a mere function of subjectivity."[236] Inversion merely meant that bourgeois society presents itself upside down. With such a schema, the 'real reality' is merely upside down but still essentially present and at-hand. In *Capital,* on the other hand, Rancière writes, "*the inversion is founded in the structure of the process itself*."[237]

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Rancière concludes his reflection by underlining the demarcation within the concept of inversion in '*how* Marx *thinks*.' Rancière writes that inversion (*Verkehrung*), "as a function determined by the development of forms, by the transition from the *kerngestalt* to the *fertige gestalt*…(can) receiv(e) rigorous conceptual determination."[238] It is a fundamental form of action for the critique of political economy. The spurious inversion that Rancière calls 'reversal' ('*renversement*'), on the hand, "is one surrounded by a whole anthropological halo" and results in the "bewitched, distorted and upside-down world."[239]

Rancière writes that Marx himself at times 'confuses' these two notions of inversions. *Renversement* produces a space of illusion, and it is an ineradicable form and attribute of capitalist discourse. *Verkehrung*, on the contrary, *is* the terrain of critique for Marx, according to Rancière. This notion of an inversion thus bears on social relations and it can be understood as the mode of action such as articulated in the Chinese Cultural Revolution as "it is right to rebel against the reactionaries."[240]

Recapitulation: Inversion and Critique of Political Economy

This chapter has identified how Marx in 1873, Althusser in 1963, and Rancière in 1965 each identify inversion as a fundamental theoretical and practical concept for the critique of political economy. The chapter showed that while Althusser in 1963 delivers a primarily 'theoretical' or 'theoreticist' intervention into this problematic, Rancière, on the other hand, brings forth examples in *Capital* of another movement of inversion that is not simply the direct opposite of the spurious one. We suggested that this emerged because of Rancière's identification of the concept of process (*prozess*) in *Capital*, and specifically the importance of its notion of development.

Drawing on the theoretical effects of this sequence, this dissertation hypothesizes that the "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" constitutes, as the limit of the exposition of *Capital,* an utmost development of the concept of process and contradiction in *Capital*. In "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," Marx rings the death knell of so-called European social relations where primitive accumulation has dissolved from the surface, and he identifies the necessity of new combinations and tendencies for association in a process he calls modern colonization.[241] As

[235] Ibid, 138.
[236] Ibid, 139.
[237] Ibid, 139; emphasis added.
[238] Ibid, 159.
[239] Marx, *Capital, Volume 3*, 969, quoted in Rancière, "The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political Economy," 159.
[240] For a thick description of the Maoist notion of struggle, see Xin Liu, *The Mirage of China: Anti-Humanism, Narcissism, and Corporeality of the Contemporary World* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), esp. pt. III.
[241] Although this dissertation retains Marx's language of 'systematic colonization' and 'modern colonization,' the contemporary usage of 'neoliberalism' or 'neoliberal capitalism' is germane here.

Rancière argues, in *Capital,* the developed form is *not* spontaneously apparent in the origin or surface. As such, the development of *Capital* that is its limit-in-exposition ("Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie") bears decisive conceptual significance to *Capital* as a whole.

Before we undertake a careful study of this final chapter of *Capital*, this dissertation demonstrates how the critical dimensions of '*how* Marx *thinks*' in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" have tended to be blocked out or obfuscated in the long 20th century by the concept of imperialism in the discourse of the critique of political economy.

Chapter 3: On Imperialism

Introduction: On the Conceptual and Categorical Difference of Imperialism and The Modern Theory of Colonization

In Chapter 2, we outlined the primacy of the concept of inversion in the Althusserian reconstruction of Marx's discourse. In doing so, we demonstrated how Althusser and Rancière each identify how the concept of inversion advances both spurious and true ideas of an 'overturning' action of the capitalist process. The chapter proposed that this fundamental concept can be critically reconsidered with a careful re-reading of the limit of the exposition of *Capital,* that is, "The Modern Theory of Colonization" ("Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie").

This chapter prepares this reading by suggesting a certain historical occlusion of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" by the particular concept, notion, and discourse of imperialism in the critique of political economy in the long 20th century. This chapter identifies why and how the concept of imperialism has tended, with its spatialization of the concept, to conceal the emancipatory tendencies which Marx, however incompletely and cautiously, exposited in the limit of *Capital* and its concept of the modern theory of colonization.[242]

To do this, the chapter first recollects how two particularly significant critical rereadings of *Capital* in the 1960s in France and Germany both inscribe the *conceptual* and *theoretical* importance of this final chapter while leaving the *actual* or *practical* rereading of this limit of *Capital* unaccomplished. The chapter then develops a genealogy of the concept of imperialism with the aim of laying a groundwork for identifying a categorical and conceptual difference between imperialism and "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." The chapter argues that this difference is between an action of process and a state of space and that it is fundamental to the critique of political economy and 'how Marx thinks' in *Capital*.

1. 20th Century Returns to the Critique of Political Economy: *Neue Marx Lektüre* and Louis Althusser

In order to orient this exposition of the concepts of imperialism and the modern theory of colonization, we first recall that both Louis Althusser and the school known as the *Neue Marx Lektüre* pointed out that the final part of *Capital*, "Die sogenannte ursprungliche Akkumulation" ("So-called Primitive Accumulation") is a crucial passage of exposition in *Capital,* but for different reasons.

As this *Neue Marx Lektüre* is a perhaps unfamiliar name for some readers, we acknowledge this as a name that has been given to a collective identity of the authors Hans-Georg Backhaus, Alfred Schmidt, Helmut Reichelt, Michael Heinrich, and their allies.[243] First students of Theodor Adorno, they have developed their energies to critically reread *Capital* in Germany beginning in the 1960s. This *Neue Marx Lektüre* is understood today as inceptual for their interpretation of *Capital* in its primary relation to Hegel's philosophy.[244] Their work identifies that the concepts and categories of *Capital* – form, logic, appearance – have a primary relation to Hegel's

[242] Michael Heinrich has said that Marx's idea in "*Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*" is incomplete. Personal Communication, 2020-2021.
[243] See Riccardo Bellofiore and Tommaso Redolfi Riva, "The Neue Marx-Lektüre: Putting the critique of political economy back into the critique of society," *Radical Philosophy* 189 (2015), 24-35.
[244] Ibid.

philosophy and that one therefore cannot really come to grips with Marx's discoveries without a basis in Hegel's categories.[245]

With this in mind, we note here that Hegel's many systems give a decisive *conceptual* determination to the 'place' of the end in exposition and thinking. This end of exposition and thought unites not only with its origins, but also makes the existence of forms and their contents intelligible as such. Although this lesson has already become itself a philological doxa, we repeat here that in Hegel's philosophy, this 'place' of the end of exposition and thinking is the Absolute. This Absolute however is a form, not a finite, historical entity. The Absolute is that which makes known. It therefore unites with origination, but it is not the origin-in-itself. For the Absolute still *only* (that is the necessary stress here) appears at the end of the system and thinking for Hegel.

Given this consideration, we see that the *Neue Marx Lektüre* reading strongly *theoretically* pre-predicates that "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"* might be an absolute form and not an insignificant finite entity for Marx. The *Neue Marx Lektüre* authors themselves however have tended to focus their attention on Parts I and II of *Capital* and its notion of the value form (*die Wertform*).[246] As such, their reading practice thereby appears to 'directly' contradict the 'wild' instructions that Althusser gave in 1969 to explore the limits of *Capital,* to even put Part I aside and begin reading *Capital* with Part II.[247]

In a relatively coincidental moment to the origination of the *Neue Marx Lektüre*, Louis Althusser also positively pre-predicated the *theoretical* importance of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," but for a different reason. In several places, Althusser suggests that these 'outer' localities of *Capital,* such as Part VIII of which "The Modern Theory of Colonization" constitutes its own final part, bear an important *political* significance for understanding '*how* Marx *thinks*' in *Capital.* Both Althusser and the *Neue Marx Lektüre* therefore articulate reasons for carefully re-reading *Capital*'s limit in exposition of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"* is therefore both *theoretically* prescribed and *practically* uninscribed by these two re-readings of *Capital* in Europe after World War II.

They are not alone in this practical lack of attention. "The Modern Theory of Colonization" has tended to be identified as superfluous and even expendable to the so-called true core of *Capital*.[248] What happened to the concepts of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"*? Why has it not received intensive attention? What accounts for its indigestibility?

This chapter argues that in the beginning of the 20th century, the concepts that Marx identified in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" were replaced and overtaken, particularly with

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[245] Their work does not argue for a 'simple,' uncontradictory synthesis of Hegel and Marx. Their reading can be said to reveal a specific difference by which Marx's discourse can*not* be subsumed within Hegel's. This reading has urged that Marx's critique of political economy be understood as the critique of immediacy of the categories of political economy. They emphasize that this critique does not generate a 'mirrored' reflection of the spontaneous categories of political economy, but instead a breaking away from these categories. See Bellofiore and Riva, "The Neue Marx-Lekture."

[246] See, for example, Hans-Georg Backhaus, "Zur Dialektik der Wertform," in *Beiträge zur Marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie*, ed. A. Schmidt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969).

[247] See Althusser, "Preface to *Capital* Volume One." His intervention can be understood, we suggest, as an attempt to displace the ideological practice of reading *Capital* where *Capital* was no longer capable of living or thinking because it had instead become doxa. In the 1969 *Preface,* Althusser developed the notion that not all parts of *Capital* can be found in Part I, and that there are particular, salutary political effects generated by reading away from Part I and into the *upstream* inlets and coves within *Capital.* There, Althusser writes, it is not Hegel's logic that we find but instead one that is *Capital*'s own.

[248] In downplaying the chapter's significance, Kevin Anderson referred to Maximilien Rubel's comment that the chapter was simply placed there to ward off the censors. Personal Communication, 2020-2021.

the concept of imperialism and its many subsequent derivatives. The chapter now presents a genealogy of the emergence of this notion of imperialism through its foundational statements in the discourses of Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Lenin, as well as a line of their late commentators. The chapter identifies how this notion of imperialism conceptually breaks from Marx's own notions of systematic or modern colonization as exposited in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." In particular, we demonstrate that this notion of imperialism advances a spatial or spatialized concept that loses touch with the notion of process as Marx exposits in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." The modern theory of colonization and imperialism therefore do not point out the same process.[249] "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," we suggest, has been occluded and concealed. It has been and is forgotten or lost.

2. 20th Century Genealogies of Imperialism

α) Rosa Luxemburg

In considering the 'place' of imperialism in the discourse of the critique of political economy, it is important to note first that the notion of imperialism is not in any way alien to *Capital*. Marx analyzes economic and political formations traversing ancient and modern imperial formations throughout *Capital*. Rosa Luxemburg's 1913 *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals* (*The Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to the Economic Theory of Imperialism*) is therefore not the 'first' analysis of modern imperialism in the critique of political economy.

Luxemburg opens *The Accumulation of Capital* by stating that Marx's "enduring contribution" is his "*posing the problem* of the reproduction of social capital."[250] She writes that only Francois Quesnay also posed this question, but, Luxemburg notes, neither Quesnay nor Marx could "solve it."[251] Luxemburg explains that while Marx's own economic theory identifies *why* the reproduction of social capital can*not* take place according to the model of simple reproduction, she shows that Marx himself falls back to schematize the reproduction of capital in the same mode as he does for simple reproduction.[252] Marx decisively demonstrates that the originary circuit of capital – 'simple production' – necessitates an expansion of the composition of capital, and yet, Marx's 'theory,' Luxemburg posits, assumes that the composition of capital remains constant in reproduction as in production.

Luxemburg states in counterpoint: "in reality, the actual conditions for the accumulation of total social capital are completely different to those that govern the accumulation of individual capitals and simple reproduction."[253] Marx's account, she writes, "merely illustrate(s) the genesis of capital, the moment that it comes into the world…(But) as soon as Marx begins his theoretical analysis of the process of capital (of production as well as circulation) he constantly returns to his presupposition of the universal and exclusive dominance of capitalist production."[254]

This *asymmetrical simultaneity* of 'simple reproduction' and 'expanded social reproduction' is the problem Luxemburg seeks to 'solve' with her notion of imperialism. This asymmetrical simultaneity, she writes, testifies to a "transaction occur(ing) – behind the back, so to speak – each

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[249] This is what Michel Foucault in *The Order of Things* [1966] identifies in the discontinuities born across the *epistemes*.
[250] Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to the Economic Theory of Imperialism*, in *The Complete Works of Rosa Luxemburg, Volume II* (London: Verso, 2016), 7.
[251] Ibid.
[252] See Riccardo Bellofiore, *Rosa Luxemburg and the Critique of Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 2009).
[253] Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, 251.
[254] Ibid, 262.

time after the circulation of capital between capital and labor has been completed."[255] Luxemburg gives this 'behind the back' action a discursive and theoretical bearer as the 'colonies' and 'semi-colonies.' These colonies are thus a rearguard space for Luxemburg. In these 'colonies,' Luxemburg writes,

> pre-capitalist forms of production…spurs capital to strive to bring these countries and societies under its dominion; indeed, in so doing, the primitive relations facilitate such extraordinary rapid and violent surges in accumulation that would be unthinkable under purely capitalist relations.[256]

She states that capitalism "requires an environment of non-capitalist social formations."[257] Luxemburg here makes explicit what Marx had also indicated in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" regarding the *necessary* existence of the colonies in the world formation that is the generalization of the capitalist money form. Simple reproduction does not seemingly account for the conflictual situation that characterizes the character-masks of 'colonies,' 'semi-colonies,' and 'original accumulation.'

For Luxemburg, imperialism constitutes an adequate schema for this antagonistic world formation. She calls this a "period of catastrophes."[258] It is one where "militarism carries out a very determinate function in the history of capital."[259] This process, she sees, facilitates the production *and* reproduction of martial armaments. This imperialism is, she writes, "dreadful in its implications."[260] Luxemburg is here not naïve in her thinking.

The historical significance of Luxemburg's analysis of imperialism to 20th century Marxist discourses is unquestionable. Imperialism became and has continued to form a fundamental schema orienting Marxist discourses. And yet one of the effects of Luxemburg's analysis is, we suggest here, the overtaking of the *mode* of thinking in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" as critique with a spatial conceptualization of *Capital*. This spatialization, we suggest, minimally displaces the specific notion of process in the limit of *Capital*. This spatial notion of imperialism therefore minimally occludes the activity that Marx deposits in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," such as the effort (*conatus*) of wage labourers to exit, *en masse,* from the capitalist market of labour in the general conditions of 'systematic colonization.' In place of this *activity*, the notion of imperialism, however minimally, tends to identify the concept and limit of *Capital* spatially as such.

β) Vladimir Lenin

Writing in exile in Geneva, Vladimir Lenin solidified the place and importance of the concept of imperialism in Marxist discourse with his *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline* [1916]. Like Luxemburg, Lenin inscribed imperialism into the title of his work. With Lenin, however, imperialism is identified as a *stage* and specifically the high*est* stage of capitalism.

This turn to the notion of stage is crucial for understanding the effects of the concept of imperialism on 20th century Marxist discourses. For in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie,"

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[255] Ibid, 333.
[256] Ibid, 263.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Ibid, 325.
[259] Ibid, 331.
[260] Ibid, 445.

Marx exposits how the state acts *indirectly* on the contradiction of labour and capital in its efforts to bring about the perseverance of its home capitals. Lenin's analysis of imperialism, on the other hand, exposits a state in an immediate *unity* with the elements and processes of capital. Whereas Marx sees in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" new conditions *from which* capitalist and emancipatory futures commence, Lenin sees a state in imperialism that brings about the end of the capitalist formation *as well as* the one which succeeds it. In doing so, we suggest, he thereby transforms Marx's idea of future as exposited in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie."

It is important to recall that Lenin opens his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* by stating that this 'popular outline' is written in "that accursed Aesopian language… with an eye to Tsarist censorship."[261] It is marked therefore not only by its effort to intervene in, rather than merely describe, the extant State, but also its aim to elude it.

To begin here, we first acknowledge that Lenin's 'method' in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* bears many important 'practical' similarities with Marx's "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." For in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," Marx carefully listens to the discourse of political economists in order to understand 'the modern theory of colonization.' Marx's primary informants there are 19th century colonists and political economists, such as Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Herman Merivale, Gustave de Molinari, and William Howitt, amongst others. In listening carefully to their discourse, Marx develops a critique of their idea of modern colonization. Lenin likewise carefully reads his informants' discourses on imperialism, such as John Atkinson Hobson, Hans Gideon Heymann, and Rudolf Hilferding, amongst others. He reads them in order to understand imperialism before developing a critique of their notion of imperialism. Lenin, in a blunter manner than Marx, explicitly notes that while he does not agree with the political ideas of his bourgeois informants, they must be read in order to understand the reality of imperialism. It is likewise for Marx and modern colonization.

But there are also, we suggest, decisive differences between Marx's and Lenin's expositions. This first appears at a level of facticity. For whereas Lenin writes that the "small proprietor" is a "distant *past* of capitalism," Marx sees the individual as the future of capitalism in America.[262]

Perhaps more importantly, they diverge with respect to their notions of *Denkprozess* and 'method.' For the notion of imperialism as the high*est* stage of capitalism and identifying this high*est* moment as *the* end of a process is a theoretical practice sometimes thought to characterize Hegel's notion of system.[263] This is an identification of a telos as that which allows there to be both the ability to identify, as well as strengthen, tendencies that bring about this end. Lenin's notion of imperialism as the high*est* stage is strikingly marked by this quasi-Hegelian temporality. As a particular example, Lenin writes in the second Preface to his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, "imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat."[264] This belief that one *is* precisely *in* the eve of the coming event adequately articulates this particular temporality and its anticipatory political practice. It is, we note here, in some contrast with Marx's "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" which does not participate such confident forecasting or divination in the same manner. In order to identify the difference in Lenin and Marx's accounts of system and temporality, we here briefly recollect the basic theses of Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* before turning to Marx afterwards.

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[261] Vladimir Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline,* in *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977 [1968]), 169.
[262] Lenin, *Imperialism*, 172.
[263] See Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* (London: Continuum, 2006 [1988]), 161-9.
[264] Lenin, *Imperialism*, 172.

Lenin begins *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* by stating that "the economic and also the political literature of the two hemispheres has more and more often adopted the term 'imperialism' in order to describe the present era."[265] This is a crucial formulation. Imperialism is a concept of presence. Moreover, imperialism constitutes only *two* hemispheres forming a unity under *one* state. This particular spatialization of hemispheres with a bilateral numerology, we argue, forecloses the existence of a remainder exterior to this subsumption, that is, a *third* world.

Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism sets out, Lenin writes still in the Preface, the "principle economic features of imperialism" and states that he will "*not* be able to deal with the non-economic aspects of the question, however much they deserve to be dealt with."[266] Our reading reflects this particular statement by Lenin here, for Marx in "Die moderne Kolonsationstheorie" states that so-called non-economic aspects are fundamental to so-called economic aspects in the capitalist mode of production. "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" argues that 'methodologically' occluding 'non-economic aspects,' such as Lenin does here, results in the misapprehension that there is no exteriority within the interiority of the 'pure theoretical' order of the capitalist process as such.

Lenin's 'popular outline' identifies ten principles of imperialism. The first is the economic characteristic of the concentration of production into monopolies. This is not, we note, theoretically contradictory to the analysis of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" where Marx also identifies these tendencies as participating the process of systematic colonization. Marx, however, stresses that there is not only a concentration, but also a necessary dispersal of capital in the conditions of modern colonization. In doing so, Marx thereby recognizes that this concentration and dispersal constitute an obstacle for capital. In one of his many acts of dialectical wit and political pith, Marx writes "this is the secret both of the prosperity of the colonies and their cancerous affliction – their resistance to the establishment of capital."[267]

In this first point, Lenin describes the internal and necessary tendency of the capitalist system in production towards concentration. In this description, Lenin depicts this domination by monopolies as a new condition. We note here that the domination of the monopoly form of capital is not new to the early 20th century. The Dutch East Indies Company, the "ideal type of 17th century capitalist nation" (Marx), advanced itself with the political and commercial form of a monopoly.[268]

Lenin's second principle of imperialism is that banking takes on a new role. In describing this moment, he notes that banking is only now a particularly profitable form of financial transaction. In contrast to the division of banking and production in a pre-imperialist stage of capitalism, this is the moment instead of the "'universal bookkeeping' of the *whole* capitalist class."[269] The so-called empirical validity of such claims notwithstanding, we note that Lenin thinks here in an evolutionary schema of the mode of production when he states that the "old capitalism has had it day."[270]

Lenin's third principle is of finance capital and the financial oligarchy. Lenin comes to understand this principle by reading the German bourgeois economists, who themselves identify that the "*balance sheet jugglery*" of the "joint-stock companies…put us in the mind of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from which the visible inscription had first to be erased in order to discover

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[265] Lenin, *Imperialism*, 176.
[266] Ibid; emphasis added.
[267] Marx, *Capital*, 934.
[268] Ibid, 916.
[269] Lenin, *Imperialism*, 193.
[270] Ibid, 200.

beneath it another inscription giving the real meaning of the document."[271] In this moment, Lenin writes, "all the conditions of economic life are being profoundly modified by this transformation of capitalism."[272] In these conditions, the "supremacy of finance capital over all the other forms of capital means the predominance of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy."[273]

Lenin's fourth principle is the export of capital. Enumerating a sequence of finite stages again, Lenin writes that whereas goods were exported in the old capitalism, capital is exported in imperialism. Capital exporting countries, seeking profitable opportunities, "spreads its net over all countries of the world."[274]

The fifth principle is the division of the world amongst capitalist associations. Lenin's principal thesis here is that this process is such that the so-called great powers, particularly British, German, and American trusts of electricity and oil firms, *divide 'the world'* between themselves. They cut it. This is a struggle *between* trusts to seize 'rights' to either source or delivery. The capitalists do this because "the degree of concentration (of capital) which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits."[275] And yet this process, Lenin writes, "does not preclude *redivision.*"[276]

The sixth principle is the division of the world among the great state powers. Lenin writes, "for the first time the world is completely divided up."[277] Lenin finds in Cecil Rhodes the paradigmatic imperialist logic of imperialism: "if you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialist."[278] Colonial policy intensifies in this stage. Imperial logic is defended as an inner sovereign good.[279] We note one rather remarkable aspect of Lenin's description here is a near absolute excision of the Dutch from his account of imperialism.[280] For while Lenin identifies and comparatively characterizes the 'great power' colonialisms of the British, French, Belgium, and even German states, Dutch colonialism has been forgotten. This was not the case for Marx. On the contrary, he found in J.W. Money's *Java: or, How to Manage a Colony, Showing a Practical Solution of the Questions Affecting British India* (1861) that Dutch colonialism in Java was the ideal type of managing a colony for this 19th century British ideologue of colonization.

The seventh principle identifies imperialism as a special, 'modern' stage of capitalism. This is specifically the dominance of monopolies and finance capital. For while ancient Rome had colonies, they were not organized in a capitalist form constituted by monopolies of finance capital. The eighth principle is the parasitism and decay of capitalism. With this, Lenin charts the decline of capitalism. Monopoly engenders stagnation and decay.

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[271] L. Eschwege, "Tochtergesellschaften," in *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, 545, quoted in Lenin, "Imperialism," 203; emphasis in Lenin.
[272] Lenin, *Imperialism*, 206.
[273] Ibid, 210.
[274] Ibid, 215.
[275] Ibid, 222.
[276] Ibid, 218; emphasis in original.
[277] Ibid, 223.
[278] Ibid, 225.
[279] Lenin tends, in this theoreticism, to depict a general tendency in ways that are at times illusory to a fault, such as when he writes, "colonial possession alone gives the monopolies *complete guarantee* against *all contingency* in the struggle against competitors." Lenin, *Imperialism*, 228; emphasis added. While this may or may not be true in a 'pure theoretical' order, syndicates indeed encounter 'concrete historical' resistance from wage workers, perhaps even more so than those in other so-called stages or moments of capitalist concentration.
[280] He does mention the Shell and Samuel trusts in their competition with the Rockefeller trust.

The ninth principle indicates the material existence of the ideology of imperialism. Lenin indicates here the importance of attitudes and general ideology of the different classes towards imperialist policy. With this, Lenin indicates the importance of ideology to which we turn in Chapter 5 of the dissertation.

Principle ten is the place of imperialism in history. Its essence is monopoly capitalism. Lenin describes it as "moribund."[281] It cannot advance beyond this point. He thereby proclaims the identification of the end of this process. This particular philosophy of history would come to be criticized by many different partisans of the 20th century.

Our reading here notes two strong 'direct oppositions' between the notion of imperialism for Lenin and a process of systematic colonization in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" for Marx. Firstly, Marx does not so strongly or confidently identify the 'end' of the capitalist production process in the limit of exposition of *Capital* with "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." Marx instead introduces the problem of emancipation when there is no single, social form that encompasses all of the desubjugated social relations engendered by the process of systematic colonization. Secondly, with this concept of imperialism, Lenin brings together into a synchronic compact and stage something that in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" remains internally ununified. Imperialism as a concept presupposes to unify 'the world'; with the modern theory of colonization, Marx, on the other hand, sees that every colony will undergo a different actual process of modern colonization.[282]

This notion of imperialism fundamentally reorients Marx's notion of the process of modern colonization. Whereas Lenin's intervention aims to foment rebellion, Marx is instead attempting to detect tendencies that are still largely 'underground' in the limits of *Capital*. The limit for Marx therefore does not generate enthusiasm as it does for Lenin. Whereas Lenin speaks of the unity of thousands of millions of colonized people, Marx talks about the Australian labour market having *as* strong a drive for prostitution *as* in Haymarket, England. Imperialism, we suggest, tends to block out the dialectical or contradictory formulations of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" in order to give confidence that the future can be grasped here and now.

γ) Kevin Anderson

From this introduction to a semantic of imperialism, we now identify its effect in what this dissertation calls the spatialization of the concept of the critique of political economy. This marks, we argue, a discontinuity with the conceptual centrality of process in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" and *Capital* more broadly.

Kevin Anderson, in his *Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity and Non-Western Societies* (2010), states that his work aims to "shift the Marx canon" away from the major works and towards Marx's writings on what he calls "non-Western societies."[283] This is animated by his idea that Marx is a "multilinear theorist of history and society…immersed in the study of the concrete social reality of Asian societies."[284] In order to provide evidence for his claim, Anderson calls attention to Marx's unpublished notebooks pertaining to the Dutch East Indies. The first is the 1853 notebook that Marx took from his reading of Thomas Raffles' *History of Java* (1817). The

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[281] Lenin, *Imperialism*, 260.
[282] This is because of the singularity of the price of money. Marx in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" idenstifies this in the singularity of the relation of land price to the cities' wage labour markets.
[283] Kevin Anderson, *Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity and Non-Western Societies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 6.
[284] Ibid.

second is the 1880 notebook on the aforementioned J. W. B. Money's *Java; or, How to Manage a Colony, Showing a Practical Solution of the Questions Affecting British India* (1861). Both are planned for public publishing in the so-called *MEGA 2* editorial project underway.[285]

Anderson identifies that Marx's reading of Raffles focuses on the essential differences in land tenure between the social formations of Java and Bali. In so doing, Anderson defends Marx against the charge to which he has often been accused, that is, of being an evolutionary and Eurocentric thinker of 'non-western' social formations. For by showing that Marx instead identified the essential differences, rather than a single latent identity as 'place' (i.e., 'the orient') between Java and Bali, Anderson can and does persuasively argue that Marx instead took the greatest care in identifying difference, rather than a genetic or generic continuity, within social formations in 'non-western societies.'

These considerations regarding Java and Bali are fundamental for Marx, Anderson argues, because they are the place where Marx is grappling with something that is beyond the 'pure theoretical' laws of *Capital*. Anderson recalls a comment from Raya Dunayevskaya that these notebooks "let us hear Marx think."[286] Anderson also remembers that Dunayevskaya stated that the American Civil War had an immense impact on Marx that was "decisive, not only for the creation of ["Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie"], but also for the reorganization of the text of *Capital.*"[287]

Anderson moreover argues that the *Capital* project forms "a single whole" with these writings on "non-western societies."[288] With this in mind, Anderson writes that "the context [of 'non-western societies'] is not the past but the future" for Marx.[289] He describes Marx "inton(ing)" when he quotes Raffles saying that the Dutch colonial administration is "one of the most extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness."[290] Anderson hears that Marx is raising his voice in this particular moment, but he passes over the passage without commenting on the conceptual significance of this mode of discourse to *Capital* as such. We will return to this question in our discussion of the critical (meaning conceptual and decisive) place of humor in *Capital* in chapter 4 below.

In Marx's 1880 notebook on *Java: or, How to Manage a Colony, Showing a Practical Solution of the Questions Affecting British India* (1861), Anderson notes that Marx "makes no directly critical comments on the vantage point of this rather superficial chronicler of life in Java", that is, the author whose patronymic is Money.[291] Rather than simply morally condemn Mr. Money, Marx "instead concentrated on Money's data."[292] This allowed Marx to study the way that Money thinks, rather than simply consider whether he is morally virtuous or reprehensible.

For this reason, Anderson notes that Marx studies the intra-imperial differences between the British and Dutch Indies, rather than posit a simple uncomplicated identity of 'European Colonialism.' Anderson writes that Marx figured out how "in Java, the Dutch had retained more of the precolonial system than had the British in India" and that they therefore "extracted a

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[285] *MEGA 2* stands for *Marx Engels Gesamtausgabe 2*.
[286] Raya Dunayevskaya, *The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx,* ed. Peter Hudis and Kevin Anderson (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 294, quoted in Anderson, *Marx at the Margins,* 198.
[287] Anderson, *Marx at the Margins,* 194.
[288] Ibid, 163.
[289] Ibid, 189.
[290] Marx, *Capital*, 916, quoted in Anderson, *Marx at the Margins,* 189.
[291] Anderson, *Marx at the Margins,* 219.
[292] Ibid. Anderson even identifies that the Dutch rule is an "example of a conservative 'state socialism.'" *Marx at the Margins,* 219.

surplus while allowing many aspects of traditional land tenure patterns, political organization and communal village culture to persist."[293] The question for Marx here is not sociological; it instead pertains to a differential within the social formations emerging in 'modern colonization.'

Anderson argues that these particular readings are fundamental for Marx's discovery of the capitalist mode of production. They cannot therefore be considered as ancillary to his thought. Anderson quotes Nikolai Mikhailovksy's review of *Capital* who said of the section on "So-called Primitive Accumulation" that it "gives us something much bigger, a whole philosophical-historical theory."[294] In following this work, Anderson's interventions aim to demonstrate the central importance of 'non-western societies' in Marx's so-called mature discourse of *Capital*. While endorsing the spirit of these findings, this dissertation suggests that this notion of 'non-western societies' introduces a conceptual or categorical catachresis into reading *Capital*. For although Marx indeed reads those who think in these spatial terms, the concept-forms of *Capital* act to overturn, not advance, such spatialized concepts as 'non-western societies.' Anderson importantly recognizes the centrality of Raffles and Money to Marx's thinking, but the concept of 'non-western societies' reinscribes a spatialization of the concept of *Capital* where Marx's critique of political economy instead bears as its specific difference the identification of a *process*. For this reason, this dissertation here draws a line of demarcation between the category and concept of 'Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie' and spatialized representations of social formations, such as 'non-western societies.' *Capital* is a (theory of a) theory of a process and not an imputation of a spatially objective objectivity.

δ) **Rosalind Morris**

We can now turn to a recent contribution by Rosalind Morris in her essay "*Ursprüngliche Akkumulation*: The Secret of an Originary Mistranslation" (2016) which argues for a critical rereading of the place of the concept of *ursprüngliche Akkumulation* in the critique of political economy.[295] In doing so, Morris posits the conceptual centrality of Part VIII of *Capital* to *Capital* as such. Her reading thereby returns to the notion of imperialism in Luxemburg in order to theorize how accumulation takes form now.

Morris begins her contribution by recalling Jenny Marx recalling her own "pathos" in reading the sections on "'primitive accumulation' ('*ursprüngliche Akkumulation*') and the 'modern theory of colonization'" in a letter to Friedrich Engels.[296] Jenny wrote there that in her reading, "history became clear as daylight."[297] Morris criticizes Jenny's reading as taking an "empiricist solace in the apparently developmentalist dimensions of these sections of *Das Kapital*."[298] Against this, Morris writes that *Capital* does not temporalize this evolutionary mode of time because it instead brings forth a concept of a displacement of time. This can be seen in the discourse itself, where Marx deposits into the *rear* of the exhibition of *Capital,* not the originary, which would deliver into exposition an appearance of a 'direct opposition,' but instead, with the so-called

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[293] Anderson, *Marx at the Margins,* 219.
[294] Ibid, 225.
[295] Rosalind Morris, "*Ursprüngliche Akkumulation*: The Secret of an Originary Mistranslation," *boundary 2* 43, no. 3 (2016): 29. Morris argues that *ursprüngliche* should be translated as 'originary,' although Michael Heinrich has said that it should be 'original.'
[296] Friedrich Engels, "From a Letter by Jenny Marx to Johann Philipp Becker," in *Marx and Engels Collected Works* 20 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2010), 440, quoted in Morris, "*Ursprüngliche Akkumulation,*" 29.
[297] Ibid.
[298] Morris, "*Ursprüngliche Akkumulation,*" 30.

originary, a denial of a spurious inversion and its concomitant notion of a genetic, evolutionary temporality.

With this overdetermination animating the concept of so-called originary accumulation, Morris argues that Marx thereby rejects a naïve notion of origin and has instead introduced what Morris calls a "recursive" temporality that wards off 'representationalist' accounts of capital or *Capital*.[299] Before turning to Morris' exposition, we first suggest that this 'clarity' and 'pathos' that Jenny's reading uncovers perhaps should not be castigated as naïve or erroneous since the critique of political economy works on a unity of the mind and the body such that the tears of its readers are a primary, not ancillary, concern as such.

In order to demonstrate the difference between a 'recursivity' in *Capital* and an evolutionary ek-stasis, Morris returns to Rosa Luxemburg's theory of imperialism. She recalls that Luxemburg shows that the capitalist mode of production is *essentially* a militarism whose form of appearance is the historical necessity of European colonialism. Morris recollects that this militarism is exposited in an "ambivalently territorialized idiom, (of) a 'zone of accumulation' ('*Gebeit der Akkumulation*')."[300] With this idea, we note, militarism and space are imperialism's fundamental conceptual and categorical orientations.

Morris shows that for Luxemburg, this militarism cannot be understood simply through "*Staatsmacht* under capitalism."[301] For this militarism is not strictly the spaces of the imperial and inter-imperial battles. Luxemburg therefore identifies that the capitalist mode of production is a militarism that precedes the category of space.

Morris then identifies that the house, meaning the dwelling point of a family or ken, is where the "mode of production becomes material in the minds of the subjects who operate it."[302] The home thereby orients capitalist subjectivation. In households, there inheres, in forms of kinship, debts that forge forms of futurity. The household is thus, Morris writes, an "ideological apparatus" that affects capital and services debts in formations that are, temporally, reproductive.[303] We note that in doing so, the analysis partitions the particular ideological state apparatus of the household from the more generic and necessarily pluralized formulation that Althusser gave of ideological state apparatus*es* that are of the school, family, church, law, political system, media, and culture. [304]

This is the raising up (*sich erheben*) of the mode of production in ideological apparatuses and the secretion of temporalities that are not only those which reproduce the domination and exploitation of the wage-worker. Morris thus sees the home as fundamental to the form of the 'expanded reproduction' question in Luxemburg. Morris points to credit card debt in the USA and household debt in Thailand to show both how this zone of militarism and the social formation of imperialism persist into contemporary capitalist modes of production as well as why ideological state apparatuses, such as kinship formations, apparently avail other modes of social reproduction that are not necessarily those of capitalist domination.

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[299] On the concept of representationalist thinking, see Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008 [1927]), esp. §6 - 7. Morris writes "originary" for "*ursprüngliche*" in order to stress the processual mode of this category for Marx.

[300] Rosa Luxemburg, "*Akkumulation des Kapitals*," in *Gesammelte Werke 5* (East Berlin, 1975), 398, quoted in Morris, "*Ursprüngliche Akkumulation,*" 49.

[301] Morris, "*Ursprüngliche Akkumulation,*" 76.

[302] Ibid, 63.

[303] Ibid, 71.

[304] See Louis Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, 171-272.

While we suggest that Morris' intervention dramatically succeeds in underlining Marx's rejection of an evolutionary temporality in *Capital*, we also restate that while Morris entitles a section of her essay "Returning to Beginnings at the End of *Das Kapital,*" her intervention focuses on the penultimate, rather than the ultimate, end of *Capital.*[305] Like Althusser and most commentators, Morris uses the *chapter* entitled "Die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation*"* to stand in for the whole *part* which bears the same titular name, thereby excising the true end of *Capital* in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." For in the letter from Jenny Marx with which Morris begins, Jenny explicitly refers to "The Modern Theory of Colonization." This dissertation therefore builds upon Morris' contribution by turning to "The Modern Theory of Colonization" in *Capital* and addressing the true end of *Capital*.

ε) David Harvey

As we have stated, "The Modern Theory of Colonization" has not received the commentarial attention that its immediately preceding chapters have. Our exposition has thus identified the *theoretical* pre-predication of the importance and the *practical* absence of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"* in 20th century Marxist discourse.

This final chapter of *Capital* has not however completely eluded late 20th century academic regard. David Harvey, in his early career article, "The Spatial Fix – Hegel, Von Thünen, and Marx" (1981), candidly confesses that "the position of such chapter, at first sight, appears more than a little odd."[306] In his popular book, *The Limits to Capital* (1982), he recalibrates his original enthusiasm, writing, "at first sight, its placement is somewhat odd."[307] He notes that *Capital* "appeared to reach its natural culmination in the preceding chapter," after the "grand rhetorical flourish, the death-knell of capitalist private property."[308] This 'strangeness' of the chapter suggests to him that "Marx had something broader in mind" than an unremarkable perishing to a most remarkable "symphony."[309]

Harvey hypothesizes that this chapter is Marx's response to the foundational problem of 'modern society' as laid out in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* [1821]. Harvey draws on Johann H. Von Thünen's *Der Isolierte Staat* [*The Isolated State*] (1826) to suggest that the "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"* evinces Marx's thinking about imperialism and whether there is what Harvey calls a 'spatial fix' which could relieve the aporias of modern society which Hegel identified in his *Philosophy of Right*.

We first note that Harvey's hypothesis that *Capital* understands the capitalist mode of production in a consonant way with the presuppositions of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is not an idea shared by all.[310] The same could be said with regards to his idea of Marx's reading of Von Thünen's concept of the frontier. This difference can be most succinctly recalled by acknowledging that although Marx *reads* classical political economy, he *ventriloquizes* it from a communist viewpoint. Notwithstanding these caveats, Harvey's reading is important for drawing

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[305] As we have repeated in this dissertation, "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"* is the final section of the final chapter, "Der Akkumulationprozess des Kapitals," of the originary 1867 *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*. We have emphasized that this section remains the final section through all of *Capital's* significant internal transformations in organization.
[306] David Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 1.
[307] David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital* (London: Verso, 2006[1982]), 413.
[308] Ibid.
[309] Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, 414; Anderson, *Marx in the Margins*, 172.
[310] See Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*.

a line of demarcation between Marx's notion of the modern theory of colonization and a discourse of imperialism.

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In order to treat his own discomfort in reading the chapter, Harvey states that "a clue to Marx's intent lies, perhaps, in a curious parallel between his presentation and a problematic identified in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right.*"[311] This is Hegel's identification of an "'inner dialectic' which produces an increasing accumulation of wealth at one pole and an increasing accumulation and misery at the other."[312] Harvey's 'starting-point' here is thus a spatialized notion of the concept. We argue that this 'spatialization' will help us understand why Harvey and his contemporaries do not recognize Marx's notion of politics that emerges in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie."

Harvey writes that Hegel's decisive contribution in his *Philosophy of Right* is understanding that the family and civil society *appear* to form a contradiction. With this contradiction, the family *appears* as the site of ethical life and altruism and civil society *appears* instead as the place of 'universal egoism.' Harvey recounts that this dialectical relation constitutes a bad infinity, doomed to an eternity of irreconcilable contradiction for Hegel, and that it is only the Rational State that can "transcend the dualities of private and public life."[313] Harvey writes that this allows Hegel to understand that *this* bad infinity generates "a rabble of paupers" that, for Hegel, blocks the path to the Rational State.[314]

Hegel thereby considers two possible solutions. One is to increasingly tax the wealthy in order for the State to obtain financial resources that it would use to exterminate the conditions causing the necessary production of 'the paupers.' Hegel thinks that this creates even more problems because of what could now be called a depression of liquidity in production. This does not resolve the 'inner dialectic' which generates 'the paupers.'

The second possibility Hegel considers is for the state "to push beyond its own limits and seek markets…in other lands that are either deficient in the goods it has overproduced or else generally backward in industry."[315] Since the 'internal' transformation of taxing the rich can*not* overcome the problem of the poverty of the paupers, Hegel, according to Harvey, thinks that "civil society is forced to seek an *outer* transformation through geographical expansion."[316] Harvey writes that Hegel "suddenly drops" the problem of colonization and instead turns to the idea that the state must be transformed into the "actuality of the ethical Idea."[317] This 'sudden dropping' does not "leav(e) us in the dark," Harvey writes.[318] Hegel thereby recognizes that the only resolution to this contradiction is the actualization of the ethical Idea. Harvey here, nearly

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311 Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 1.
312 Ibid.
313 Ibid. Hegel has been roundly criticized, both for bearing such a republican and utopian idealism, as well as for misunderstanding that the very elements of his contradiction are themselves the realization of a particular ideology of a 19th century Prussian state and social formation, and not characteristic of all social formations as such. Hegel's statements about African social formations are not only repugnant, but significant because they remain so-called common sense in the 21st century American social formation, as even spoken-out by a recent American president.
314 Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 2.
315 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 151[§246], quoted in Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 2.
316 Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 2
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.

unwittingly, recollects that for Hegel, there can be no spatial or 'outer' fix to this 'inner' contradiction of the 19th century state.

On the one hand, we can see that this is not far from the idea brought forth by Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* [1848]. There, Marx and Engels also see that there is no 'outer' fix to this inner contradiction of bourgeois society. In the terms of Harvey, there is no spatial fix to the antinomies of bourgeois society. In this way, it seems that Marx rediscovers the logical conclusion that Hegel did. And yet Hegel's idea of the 'actuality of the ethical Idea' and Marx's 'dictatorship of the proletariat' are *not* raised up from the same categorical ground. *Capital* does *not* exposit an ethical antinomy of the family and civil society as the *elements* expressing the 'true' contradiction of a concept called the state. Instead, the primary contradiction for Marx is rather the conjuncture of labour power and the ownership of the means of production. For Hegel, the state generates a new synthesis *from* within itself. In "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," this transformation does not emerge through a self-standing 'surpassing' *from* within itself. The transformation takes place through the loss (*verliert*) of an inner antinomy whose presentation is domination. This does not appear in Harvey's account.[319]

Harvey states that Marx too learns that the inner contradictions of capital are *not* overcome by a 'spatial fix.' The 'sending' of European 'poors' to the 'frontier' is not an overcoming of the fundamental contradiction. Harvey writes: "there is, in short, no 'spatial fix' that can contain the contradictions of capitalism in the long run."[320] Harvey therefore identifies the question of the actuality of the ethical idea in Hegel and its relation to the processes that Marx identifies in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" only to retreat from these advances in Hegel back to the classical political economy of Johann Heinrich Von Thünen.

For Harvey writes that Marx overcomes the impasse of Hegel's antimony of civil society with a reading of Von Thünen's *The Isolated State* [1826]. For Von Thünen, the 'frontier' is essentially different or detached from 'pure' economic laws. Whereas Hegel did not question the necessity of the production of paupers by 19th century society, Harvey shows that Von Thünen, on the other hand, wants to 'cure' this cancer by the way that it 'treats' its 'frontier.'

In order to do this, Von Thünen first asks whether the wage that the poor receives is "a *natural* one or is it caused by exploitation which the labourer cannot avoid."[321] This allows von Thünen to understand something which, according to Harvey, Hegel does not: "the 'source of evil'…lies 'in the divorce of the worker from his produce.'"[322] Von Thünen, like Marx, saw that the "two factors of production – capital and labor – which must cooperate to produce anything, exist in an antagonistic relation to each other."[323] They "perpetually oppose each other."[324]

With this, Harvey's analysis of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" turns towards Von Thünen identification of capital's spatial appearances – 'the frontier' – and away from the question of Marx's relation to Hegel's idea of the transformation necessary in order to realize the

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[319] Furthermore, Hegel's notion of the sublation of the ethical idea and the aim (*telos*) of the system is not an 'external' category. Hegel of course does write that bourgeois society will 'push beyond its own limits,' but this is not exactly a spatial phenomenon. Rather, the overcoming of the inner contradictions of bourgeois society stems from an inner problem and thus necessitates action, rather than an external extension.

[320] Harvey, *Limits of Capital*, 442.

[321] Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 3.

[322] Ibid. One could argue that Hegel does indeed centralize this separation already in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the antinomy of the Lord and the Bondsman (*Der Herr und der Necht*).

[323] Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 3.

[324] Ibid. Because of this, Von Thünen and Harvey see that technology it not created to improve the lot of the generic laborer of capitalism, but instead as a machine for holding up the reproduction of surplus value.

'actuality of the ethical Idea.' For Von Thünen, the question becomes instead a technical one of rendering "the natural, just share of labor in the produce that labor creates."[325]

Rather than a 'space' possessing the capacity to *absorb* the precipitate engendered by the 'inner dialectic' of bourgeois society, the 'frontier' is, in this technician's discourse, instead an experimental site – a laboratory – whereby von Thünen aims to determine the 'just wage.' This takes place in the titular isolated state, where "free land is to be had in unlimited quantities" and "neither the arbitrariness of the capitalists nor the competition of the workers nor the magnitude of the necessary means of subsistence determined the amount of wages, but the produce of the labour is itself the yardstick for the wages."[326] While we can see that the statement is populated with empirical fallacy and ideological chicanery, we want to follow its logic in order to see how Marx's logic comports and diverges with it.[327]

Von Thünen thinks of this 'natural wage' by a formula he created and with which he was so smitten that he requested it be engraved on his tombstone. It is $\sqrt{ap}$, "where a is the essential subsistence needs of the worker and p the product of his labour."[328] Harvey glosses this simply: "this is the equilibrium wage at which total output, the accumulation of capital, and the wage rate are simultaneously maximized."[329] Workers and capitalists thereby "have a mutual interest in increasing production."[330] With such a mode of action, class struggle dissipates in the laboratory conditions of thought.

How does von Thünen account for the subordination of the poor to capital? Why does capital *need* to rediscover this 'paradise' at the 'frontier'? Like all classical political economists, he does not have an answer because his discourse conceals the very effectivity of surplus value and labour power on the realm in which they act. Von Thünen instead focuses on the therapeutic nature of 'the frontier' which "enable(s) the more talented, thrifty, and energetic [workers] to become capitalists."[331] For Von Thünen, the "differentiation between capital and labor simply depended upon the frugality and efficiency of some laborers relative to others."[332] Some workers "embody capital in themselves and in their children" more than others.[333] In the condition of the 'frontier,' workers can "lift themselves to freedom and mastery over suffering."[334] Von Thünen triumphantly saw that freedom and wealth flourish in America "provided, that is, human beings acquire the universalistic consciousness of marginalist economics."[335] Von Thünen asked the right question – how does the labourer pass from being the master of capital to its slave? – but his theory of human capital that supposes that relative surplus value can stabilize capitalism's cancers from within, is, in Marx's assessment, a "simply childish" answer.[336] With this mode of technical thinking, the 'transformation' problem that is the actuality of the ethical idea for Hegel is entirely occluded from this understanding of how Marx thinks in *Capital*.

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[325] Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 3.
[326] Ibid.
[327] Von Thünen separates wages and the produce of labour as different economic species or substances in a way that entirely contradicts Marx's notion of the capitalist labour market as something in which *die Wertform* is 'represented.' See Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 3.
[328] Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 3.
[329] Ibid.
[330] Ibid.
[331] Ibid, 4.
[332] Ibid.
[333] Ibid, 5.
[334] Ibid.
[335] Ibid.
[336] Marx, *Capital*, 772.

Harvey imputes that Marx reconciles Hegel's fundamental problem with a negative imputation drawn from von Thünen ('there is no spatial fix'). Hegel understood that the colony is a necessary moment in the internal contradictions of bourgeois society. For Von Thünen, on the other hand, the 'frontier' is a space to be experimented upon and where the perfect realization for the correct wage could be appropriated. Generating the 'just wage' is, in this line of thought, at once the aim and solution. Before one even objects to the way that this kind of 'marginalization' situates force and consent in such a way that colonized people lose any recourse to 'ontological self-determination,' one sees in this thought how this 19th century European thinking aims to 'improve' relations of domination and servitude in the colony. The inner social contradiction in Hegel vanishes in Harvey's mode of reading *Capital*. It erases a fundamental and essential difference between Marx's critique of political economy and Von Thünen's political economy. For whereas the notion of the frontier is a space to readjust capital for the latter, the colony in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" is a fundamental and essential expression of an inner contradiction of the capitalist process as such. The question of 'the spatial fix' is not adequate to *how* Marx *thinks* of new modes of social association that emerge in the ontological transformation of modern colonization.

But Harvey, because he 'spatializes' the concept, sees the 'frontier' as separated from a 'true' inner substance of capital. Marx, on the other hand, *because he is not a classical political economist but instead a thinker of social formations and their modes of production,* does not situate a 'spatialization' of the concept at the limit of its exposition. This is because there is no simple spatial origin or telos of the capitalist mode of production. By making 'the frontier' something posterior that can be experimentally 'cured,' rather than constitutive of capital's own so-called originariness, Harvey introduces a kind of representationalist time and space that Marx is precisely refuting by naming the final part of *Capital* the peculiar negation of genetic origins in his concept of "so-called original accumulation." Recall that the final discursive part of *Capital* – "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" – contains no 'spatial' stem. This is a question for Marx of process, not space.

In relaying the action of this process, Marx writes in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" how the attempt of the American government to assure the oversupply of labourers in the East Coast American cities by keeping interior continental land prices artificially high while eliciting the flow of migrants to work in factories and valorize capital *did not* in itself ensure an oversupply of labor forced into a conjuncture with capital.[337] This is part of the great secret of "systematic colonization."[338] Marx thus demonstrates that the 'spatial fix' *fails,* and this is not accountable to the vicissitudes of the morality of wager workers, capitalists, and bureaucrats. For while labour and the means of production are necessarily separated from one another in the capitalist mode of production, the 'expansion' of capital in modern colonization can never undo that absolute and necessary separation. Neither the government nor the individual capitals themselves can 'fix' this relation into an auto-advancement of capital. Marx writes thus that there is an opening in modern colonization for the failure of the reproduction of the capitalist circuit. That is to say, "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" attests to the impossibility of any 'simple' realization of the

[337] For Harvey, the problem is the relation of capital in-itself and space in-itself. Accordingly, he sees overaccumulation and devaluation of capital as the two primary consequences stemming from the inner contradiction of capital. He says that the 'export' of capital for production to the 'frontier' and the 'expansion' of the proletariat through primitive accumulation do not *transform* this 'inner dialectic.' One can criticize this as 'Eurocentric' and imperialist and also note that it is the anthropology which the movement of the concepts of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" rejects.

[338] Marx, *Capital*, 939.

ethical idea in the bourgeois state without a new discrepancy in the relation of the 'inner' and the 'outer.' This necessary discontinuity, we suggest, is not identified by Harvey and his contemporaries.

We can see this particularly acutely when Harvey comments on "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" by saying that "new forms of class struggle necessarily reassert themselves at the frontier."[339] For while Harvey refers to the "innumerable populists and radical movements [that] spawned amongst settlers in frontier regions," this 'history' is not the one Marx points out or sees in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie."[340] The conceptual and categorical difference is most acute in Harvey's usage of 'reassert.' For Marx, on the contrary, indicates the possibility of a *break* with and from the 'old' modes of 'populist resistance' in the colony in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." This breaking with the origin furthermore identifies why the notion of system in *Capital* is not identical to a Hegelian system. Marx does not locate an 1848-style 'populist and radical' organization in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." Instead, the 'modern theory of colonization' thinks about emancipation given the social conditions that are now called 'neoliberalism.'

In order to indicate how this notion of imperialism epistemologically blocks out 'the modern theory of colonization', we now begin to turn to Marx's own formulations in *Capital.* This will allow us to develop a conceptual difference between the notion of process in systematic colonization and of space, state, or stage in imperialism.

3. Process and Space: On the Categories of '*Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*' and Imperialism

In many ways, the theoretical and practical differences between the discourses of *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* and "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" are not slight. While Lenin was anticipating the Russian Revolution, Marx is indicating the minimal possibility of the impossibility of the capitalist process itself.[341] Whereas Lenin appears sure of the success of the proletarian revolution, Marx instead recognizes how the colonizing government and home capitals work to ward off their own extinction. "The Modern Theory of Colonization" does not, as we saw with Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,* identify itself as in the eve of its own transformative revolution. This caution of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" has made the chapter notoriously antithetical to 20th century Marxist digestion. Marx leaves no clear ladder of forms to guide a program for emancipation from capitalist domination here.

These differences are conceptually crucial. "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" identifies the possibility for emancipation of the wage worker in a mode of action as a loss. This mode of loss is fundamentally unlike both the botanical mode of growth that characterizes Lenin's concept of imperialism and Harvey's notion of the repetition of the 'European' mode of political association emerging in the margin of an empire. "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" instead posits the existence of a *new* minimal anthropology in the process of systematic colonization. This comprises a social formation *on the other side* of a massive exit from the labour market by wage labourers. Marx therefore identifies in this discontinuity the necessity of a new viewpoint *within* the capitalist conjuncture of labour and capital. The mode or manner of thinking in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" thus is not a repetition of a European priority. On the contrary,

[339] Harvey, "The Spatial Fix," 9.
[340] Ibid.
[341] Marx, *Capital*, 933.

the limit of *Capital* is not *in* but *out of* the aim of this process. It exposits the notion of a concrete universality of wage workers in the conditions of modern colonization as they are *not* convened by the forms of association of the 'old' European lords and bondsmen.

Unlike the mode of a global subsumption of sovereignty which we saw in Lenin's notion of imperialism, "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"* shows that the state and capital's mode of activity is failure, not a success without remainder. Rather than bringing about the positive optimization of the wage at the frontier as von Thünen imagined, the colonizing American state, Marx sees, does *not* carefully allow a steady drip of the urban proletariat to leave their toil by buying land priced by a 'rational' state. This is because, Marx writes, the American government debt was so immense after its Civil War such that the 'pure theoretical' policy of 'systematic colonization' was abandoned and replaced by another practical strategy.[342] Marx recounts the sales of immense land holdings to highly concentrated capitalized mining and railroad firms in acts of so-called primitive accumulation as such.

This overturning of the 'pure theoretical' order ratifies Althusser's aforementioned hypothesis regarding the 'peculiar' unity in *Capital* of 'pure theoretical' and 'concrete historical' orders of presentation which we saw in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. For the 'concrete historical' order *enters into* the presentation of *Capital* as "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*"* in order to distort, rather than repeat, the 'pure theoretical' order of *Capital* and "Die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation." Harvey's mode of thinking remains of the order of classical political economy as Marx identified, for instance, whereby appearance is sufficient to understand essence.


In "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," Marx instead testifies that the supply of labour in the form of immigration into America can*not* be controlled by the American government as they had calculated in drawing up their plans. This is because supply in the priority of M – C – M' is *not* controlled from the internal, 'pure theoretical' conditions of 'M' as is thought in classical political economy. The 'pure theoretical' order is, Althusser argues, itself determined by a 'historical' and 'concrete' order that displaces the 'pure theoretical' orders that orient systematic colonization. For this reason, "The Modern Theory of Colonization" is for Marx, we suggest, not a 'pure theoretical' concept or category. Instead, at the very limit of the exposition of *Capital*, Marx presents, we argue, the very action that Althusser describes as the peculiar unity of *Capital* as 'uneven and disparate' in 1978. In "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," Marx shows that the control over the at-handed-ness of labour power for the home capitals could *not* and can*not* be absolutely controlled. Marx's lesson in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" is that even 'systematic colonization' is redetermined according to something that it did not calculate *within* its own calculated predictions. Accordingly, the wage worker is not *absolutely* subjected in these conditions of systematic colonization. Neither wage workers nor the state or individual capitals *absolutely* control the form of activity of their conjuncture. All are at once uncontrollable and controlling.

Unlike Lenin's confidence in the unity of the parts in the whole, Marx writes instead in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" that "*the great republic has ceased* to be the promised land for emigrating workers."[343] The categories of land or space here do *not* resolve the inner contradiction of the capitalist mode of production for Marx. Marx exposits an extinction, not simply a genesis, as Luxemburg states, in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* impresses that imperialism *already bears* the passage to the dithering away

[342] Marx, *Capital*, 940
[343] Ibid; emphasis added.

of the capitalist mode of production. "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," on the other hand, exposits the need for a new practice that is not hereditarily imperialist.[344] 'Modern colonization' and 'the modern theory of colonization' are for Marx, we argue, such new categories. They aim to bear the new anthropological beginnings in the capitalist mode of production. They do *not* emerge as a genetic extension of the past.

David Harvey, on the other hand, interprets "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" to state that there is a theoretically humanist resistance to the capitalist mode of production according to the notion of a space as margin. But Marx does not use the semantics of theoretically humanist resistance as Harvey suggests. "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" identifies the minimal possibility of transformation of the capitalist – wage worker character masks in the aftermath of the American Civil War according to an emancipatory rather than exploitative manner. We distinguish this schema from the dual character formation of the concept in Part I of *Capital* as follows:



Here we note that Marx identifies, already in the 1860s, how an American colonizing government acts on behalf of its 'home capitals' with and against the emancipation of wage workers in *wirklichen* colonies. This schema is brought forth to help refocus the long-lasting event of 1965 in Indonesia in Part Two of this dissertation. For in Indonesia in the 20th century, those that opposed the domination and exploitation of modern colonization were murdered, camped, exiled, and subjected to myriad other technical forms of warfare.[345] The Indonesian long 20th century thus bears a practical knowledge of this practice of modern colonization. This American Civil War exposited in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" is not a distant 19th century past in Indonesia, but instead an ongoing situation and condition of Indonesian human and political worlds.

Recapitulation: On Imperialism and Modern Colonization

[344] Fredric Jameson has steadfastly argued that utopia is an expression of concrete contradictions. The concept does not thereby mean a play space for the unreal. See, for example, his *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).
[345] See Rudolf Mrazek, *The Complete Lives of Camp People, Colonialism, Fascism, Concentrated Modernity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020) and Part II of this dissertation.

This chapter identified the conceptual significance of imperialism to the critique of political economy. The chapter demonstrated that the emergence of the concept of imperialism in the beginning of the 20th century introduced a spatialization of the concept to the critique of political economy. The chapter argued that the fundamental concept of "The Modern Theory of Colonization" is the process, not space or stage, of modern colonization. As such, the chapter suggested that this critical concept of *Capital* has been conceptually and practically concealed by the notion of imperialism.

By returning to the category of the process of modern colonization in *Capital*, we seek in part to reapproach the discourse of 'postcolonialism.' For with the concept of 'postcolonialism,' colonialism appears as a superseded moment. During fieldwork research for this dissertation in Indonesia in 2019-2020, I saw and heard several Indonesians speak-out to say that a notion of postcolonialism introduces the impression that colonization has happened and is over with now. Given the militarized and militarizing conflict in the West Papua region of Indonesia, 'postcolonialism' appears in this viewpoint as a categorical mistake or deception. At the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, Lenin himself already articulated why such a notion as 'postcolonialism' is not adequate to the capitalist conjuncture. For he identified there a division *between* Soviet and Social Democrats *within* colonized nations. He showed that the nationalist problematic does *not* resolve the fundamental problem of the capitalist mode of production.[346]

Marx is, in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," however incompletely, identifying a process that is the intervention of a new character mask in the social formations of the colonies. Marx of course is not the first or only person to have thought as much. Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a person born on the island of Java as the Dutch East Indies in 1925 and dying on the island of Java as the Republic of Indonesia in 2006, articulated this overturning extraordinarily adequately in his *Tetralogi Buru* (Buru Tetralogy) of novels.[347] Minke, one of the tetralogy's central protagonists who bears and temporalizes an Indonesian national awakening, is asked by his own Javanese mother, "Oh Gus, why do you compose in a language that your mother cannot understand?"[348]

This question, we suggest, articulates a mode of generic universality that Marx recognizes as the limit of *Capital* in "The Modern Theory of Colonization." The character masks of the colonies are *not* a summation of imperial capital, bureaucrats, paupers, and an expanding civil war upon indigenous people everywhere at its limits. This cauldron forges *new* minimal anthropologies for us all. With this new synthesis of systematic colonization, Marx sees that the capitalist world already absolutely inverts itself. The mask of wage labourers returns to confront their former masters, now both as capitalists, in the competition of individual capitals. In the limit of *Capital*, Marx identifies this moment when the formerly subjugated confront and *can* overtake their old masters.

But this mode of action is aleatory more than it is dogmatic in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." For Marx recounts how the American government *attempted* to pre-regulate the market of labour power of its home capitals through immigration initiatives that

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[346] Vladimir Lenin, "Report on the Commission of the National and the Colonial Questions, July 26, 1920," in *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977[1968]), 596 ff.
[347] Pramoedya Ananta Toer's "Buru Quartet" comprises *Bumi Manusia* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1980), translated as *This Earth of Mankind* (New York: Penguin, 1990), *Anak Semua Bangsa* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1981), translated as *Child of all Nations* (New York: Penguin, 1990), *Jejak Langkah* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1985), translated as *Footsteps* (New York: Penguin, 1990), and *Rumah Kaca* (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1988), translated as *House of Glass* (New York: Penguin, 1992).
[348] Toer, *This Earth of Mankind,* 296.

advantage its urban, home capitals and yet still could not auto-authorize enslavement. Thus, despite the accessibility of the 'pure theoretical' order to its object, Marx shows that the American government cannot finally control this object. The state and individual capitals thus act in such a way that while they act in tandem, they are not unified. The activity of the concept of 'the modern theory of colonization,' we argue, cannot be exposited as a finite spatial being because it instead is the conditioning of an ongoing and always incompletely determined conjuncture of capitals and wage labourers.

"Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" is thus not a 'pure theoretical' order of exposition as the end of the metamorphosis of capital. Instead, it indicates that this capitalist process does *not* itself succeed at 'going on its own.'[349] Whereas the end (Absolute Mind) and the origin (Being) form a circle for Hegel's systems, the end ('Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie') and the origin (the commodity) of *Capital* constitute a separation (*Scheidung*) that *is* the return of the end to the beginning for *Capital*.[350] Whereas for Hegel, Absolute Spirit comes to be known in the process of the exposition of his System, the separation of the worker and the means of production, which Marx places in the last sentence of *Capital*, does not only illuminate the truth of its opening form of the commodity, but moreover initiates a new question of world. This is the social formation of the future capitalist world. This is a new, absolute form of the problem of the actuality of the ethical Idea. It is not resolved by such spatializations as in the names England, America, or Australia. It thus does not advance the notion of system in Hegelian philosophy that forms a foundation of Lenin's notion of imperialism.

This chapter has identified that Harvey states that 'new forms of class struggle necessarily reassert themselves at the frontier.' Against this understanding, this dissertation argues that "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" unveils a process of forming new dependencies and subjections through association in the capitalist mode of production. By dramatically presenting the British capitalist in Australia, *Herr Peel*, who has brought the means of production and labourers to the colony and *still* cannot auto-authorize the 'old' forms of association and therefore domination to take hold, "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" demonstrates that the end of *Capital* is not simply composed by what is always already present in the beginning of exposition and appropriation. The limit of *Capital* instead anachronizes the process of capital and injects the possibility of a break with the temporalities and modes of domination that characterize the aporias of imperialism.

The very concept of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" is not even itself an 'object' in the everyday sense. The concept forming the limit of *Capital* is the *theory* of a process, not even a process in and for itself. Marx thus crosses out the noumenal object of 'the colonies' in the limit of *Capital*. Whereas the problematic of imperialism identifies a limit of the capitalist process in a spatial concept or category, "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" identifies a minimal possibility for a future emancipation. We can now turn to the text of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" to better understand '*how* Marx *thinks*' this in the limit of *Capital.*

[349] See Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism,* 171-273. Althusser writes that ideology *appears* to go on its own; its mode of temporality *is* a species of eternity.
[350] On the 'divorce process' of *Capital,* see Nathan Brown, *Rationalist Empiricism: A Theory of Speculative Critique* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2021), 228 ff.

Chapter 4. On "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie"

Introduction

Let us now proceed to carefully and patiently reread how Marx writes in the final chapter of *Capital,* "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" ("The Modern Theory of Colonization"). Our aim is to present a 'thick description' of this last chapter of *Capital* to lay a foundation for understanding Marx's idea of 'the modern theory of colonization.'[351] In doing so, the chapter demonstrates that the limit of the critique of political economy is a process and its activity of emancipation exists in a mode that Part One of this dissertation has identified as inversion.

1. *Verwechseln* and Political Economy

Marx begins this last chapter with the following statement: "Die politische Ökonomie verwechselt prinzipiell zwei sehr verschiedne Sorten Privateigentum, wovon das eine auf eigner Arbeit des Produzenten beruht, das andre auf der Ausbeutung fremder Arbeit."[352] Ben Fowkes gives, "Political economy confuses, on principle, two different kinds of private property, one of which rests on the labour of the producer himself, and the other on the exploitation of the labour of others."[353] This is a crucial statement so we will repeat it. Political economy, Marx writes, confuses on principle private property which is based on or due to the labour of the producer with that which is based on or due to the exploitation of '*fremder Arbeit*.' Ben Fowkes translates Marx's '*fremder Arbeit'* here as 'the labour of others.' *Fremder* is indeed 'of others,' but it is moreover 'of foreign others,' 'of unfamiliar others,' 'of outside others,' or 'of stranger others.'

The *confusion* of political economy is thus not only *between* two extant finitudes as other people's labours and the labour of the private producer. The confusion here instead *is* the very unity of individuals and unfamiliar others in the capitalist mode of production. The capitalist world formation *is* this confusion or mistake. The capitalist world *is* both generated and obfuscated by this 'confusion.' Confusion thus is not simply a realm of knowledge in the capitalist social formation for Marx. It *is* the ideological effect of the capitalist mode of production and its social formation. The labour of an individual producer and the labour of a 'foreigner' or 'stranger' *is mistaken* by this political economy.[354] The discourse of political economy thus participates this confusion.

This 'confusing' form of action can be strongly contrasted with the first mode of action in the first sentence of Chapter 1 in *Capital* where "wealth…appears." ("Der Reichtum… erscheint")[355] Here, in the first sentence of the final chapter of *Capital*, Marx writes, 'political economy confuses' ('Die politische Ökonomie verwechselt'). 'Confusion' here is now a primary quality. Fowkes reads 'confuses' for '*verwechselt*.' *Verwechseln* is 'confuse' in a strong sense. This could also read as 'confound' or 'mistake.' The root, *wechseln*, means 'to change' or 'to vary.' *Ver-*

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[351] Our understanding of this concept and practice derives from Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture," in *The Interpretation of Culture* (New York: Basic Books, 1973). The dissertation uses double quotation marks to refer to the chapter ("*Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie"*) and single quotation marks to refer to the concept ('*Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie*').

[352] Marx, *MEW 23,* 792.

[353] Marx, *Capital*, 931. "*Auf…beruht"* could also be translated as "is based on."

[354] See the discussion in Chapter 2 of this dissertation regarding Rancière's notion of the a-conceptual-ness (*Begrifflosskeit*) of appearance in *Capital.*

[355] Marx, *Capital,* 125.

brings repetitive intensification to the stem -*wechseln*. Marx thus indicates here how exchange (*wechseln*) in capitalist exchange forces a mistaking (*verwechseln*).[356]

Of this political economy and its confusion, Marx then writes with the second sentence of the chapter, "Sie vergißt, daß das letztre nicht nur den direkten Gegensatz des erstren bildet, sondern auch bloß auf seinem Grab wächst."[357] Fowkes reads, "it forgets that the latter [private property based on the exploitation of *fremder Arbeit*] is not only the direct antithesis of the former [private property based on the individual producer's labour], but grows on the former's tomb and nowhere else."[358] We again repeat Marx's formulation. This confusion by political economy not only forgets the physical mode of inversion whereby the *Arbeit* of the individual and the stranger are direct opposites (*den direkten Gegensatz*), but moreover forgets that the labour of unfamiliar others grows on the grave of the individual producer and nowhere else.[359] With this notion, the individual's grave forms a foundation for the growth of the exploitation of the labour of unfamiliar others.[360] This idea thereby presents a relation between individuals and unfamiliar others as a political, not physical, mode of unity.

2. Overdetermination and Distortion of the Modern Theory of Colonization

To situate "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" within *Capital,* we recall that Louis Althusser in the 1978 *Preface* hypothesized that there are particular nodes in *Capital* which bear a conceptual transformation of the general laws and tendencies established by *Capital*'s so-called 'pure theoretical' exposition.[361] These dislocatory passages often bear remarkable rhetorical panache whereby Marx's own discourse forms itself into novel configurations.[362]

The chapter title of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" itself bears such an interruption, disruption, and transformation. For Marx appends a footnote to the chapter title itself. This footnote appears in the original 1867 *Das Kapital* and all of the many subsequent editions and translations of *Capital* that Marx oversaw. This is the only chapter title in *Capital* to have such a footnote. It is perhaps both germane and unnecessary to remark that footnoting a chapter title is itself a highly unusual semantic practice. In chapter 1 of this dissertation, we argued that the discursive practice of *Capital* presents a mode of distortion that the work represents within itself. *Capital*, we argued, shows, *with the letter itself*, how the forms of capital, value, and the commodity can*not* be exposited in a 'pure theoretical' way without their essential and inherent modes of and

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[356] Marx indicates how this 'confusing' unity of the labour based on *fremder Arbeit* and on the individual producer still bears a capacity of ἀπόφασις, that is, of pointing out truth and falsity in this world. On ἀπόφασις, see Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude,* § 72.

[357] Marx, *MEW 23, 792.*

[358] Marx, *Capital,* 931.

[359] Note that the physical inversion, the 'direct antithesis,' is not present to this threshold of the labour of the individual and the others that is the individual grave.

[360] For a metaphysical remembrance of the grave, see Al-Ghazali, *The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife* (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2015).

[361] In the well-known passage in Part I of *Capital*, Marx writes, "Dies beweist nur, daß er innerhalb des Wertverhältnisses zur Leinwand mehr bedeutet als außerhalb desselben, wie so mancher Mensch innerhalb eines galorierten Rockes mehr bedeutet als außerhalb desselben." *MEW 23*, 68. Fowkes reads, "this proves only that, within its value-relation to the linen, *the coat signifies more than it does outside it*, just as some men count for more when inside a gold-braided uniform than they do otherwise." *Capital*, 143; emphasis added. With this formulation, Marx indicates how the capitalist value relation (*die Wertverhältnis*) re-conditions and distorts the very possibility of equivalence, or equivocity, in appearance.

[362] *Capital* often bears foreign languages, particularly French and English, in its own 'German' exposition.

as distortion itself. *Capital* brings forth with its letters seemingly 'strange' discursive forms, which themselves bear conceptual, rather than simply stylistic, import.

This titular footnote therefore preemptively reclarifies this concept and neologism of 'Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie.' In the footnote, Marx writes,

> Es handelt sich hier von wirklichen Kolonien, jungfräulichem Boden, der durch freie Einwanderer kolonisiert wird. Die Vereinigten Staaten sind, ökonomisch gesprochen, immer noch Kolonialland Europas. Übrigens gehören auch solche alten Pflanzungen hierher, wo die Aufhebung der Sklaverei die Verhältnisse gänzlich umgewälzt hat.[363]

Fowkes reads here,

> We are dealing here with true colonies, i.e., virgin soil colonized by free immigrants. The United States is, economically speaking, still a colony of Europe. Apart from this, such old plantations where the abolition of slavery has completely revolutionized earlier relationships also belongs here.[364]

With these sentences, the exposition demarcates '*wirklichen Kolonien,*' for which Fowkes reads 'true colonies,' and *'immer noch Kolonialland Europas,*' for which Fowkes reads 'still a colony of Europe.' Marx writes here of the former that there is a 'sublation of slavery' ('*die Aufhebung der Sklaverei*') which is identified by its attribute of 'completely revolutionized earlier relationships.' This attribute does *not* pertain to the modes of production within European imperial provenance. *Wirklichen* colonies bear a new mode of *Verhältnisse*.

But this demarcation is dialectical, not dualist, for Marx. For he writes that the United States is, economically speaking, still a European colony. And yet this chapter, named "The Modern Theory of Colonization" comprises in large part a historical materialist analysis of the United States. Why does Marx then use such an example of colonization that is related to but *not adequate* to the titular concept? This is because, we suggest, the modern theory of colonization is for Marx neither a 'concrete historical' nor a 'pure theoretical' category. Its mode of existence *is* a mode of distortion. It is not simply the end of an organic or mechanical sequence.

Many readers will quickly note that Marx's notion of '*wirklichen Kolonien*' ('true colonies' in Fowkes) with the example of 'jungfräulichem Boden, der durch freie Einwanderer kolonisiert wird' ('virgin soil colonized by free immigrants') not only appears to exclude the real existence and worlds of indigenous peoples who exist in the conjuncture of the colonies, but also appears to occlude the very existence of imperial wars against those indigenous peoples which is constitutive of the very modern theory of colonization which Marx aims to conceptualize in this chapter.[365] It therefore has born charges of being apologetic to and naïve of European imperialism and colonization itself.[366]

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[363] Marx, *MEW 23, 792*.

[364] Marx, *Capital*, 931.

[365] This concept, with its notion of 'virgin land' ('*jungfräulichem Boden*'), appears to inscribe a sexing of the colony as an ideological attribute of colonialism and capitalism. The Dutch East Indies, the archipelago of islands now comprising the Republic of Indonesia, was depicted in the 19th century as a forming a beautiful chain of emeralds, as an erotic ornament. With it, a Dutch form of sexual phantasy is inlaid with an orientalist and colonizing mentality. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see chapter 5 of this dissertation.

[366] See discussion of Rosa Luxemburg in Chapter 3 of this dissertation and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

While these criticisms are important, we want to suggest here that Marx is identifying a political, not a 'pure theoretical' or 'concrete historical' (meaning temporally zoological) process with the chapter title "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie."[367] This concept can instead be thought of as attempting to effectuate a rethinking of the mistaking (*verwechselnd*) of the two kinds of private property by political economy which Marx exposits in the first two sentences of this chapter. "The Modern Theory of Colonization" is an attempt to intervene with the aim of remedying such a process of confusion. In chapter 1 of this dissertation, we recalled that in the 1978 *Preface*, Althusser noted a 'peculiar' unity of exposition in *Capital*. The mode of existence of the titular footnote likewise identifies this mode of discrepancy. "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" is thus a contradiction to, not a factical summary of, the capitalist mode of production.

3. Modern Colonization and Spatial Orientation

"The Modern Theory of Colonization" thereby unfolds its intervention through the exposition of the 'mistaking' and 'forgetting' of political economy.

To do this, Marx first gives an orientation by a spatial contrast. The second, short paragraph begins, "Im Westen von Europa…" ("In the west of Europe…") and the third paragraph recollects and reorients this spatial orientation with "Anders in den Kolonien" ("Otherwise in the colonies").[368]

We first note that Marx here brings forth colonie*s*, and not a single, ideal type of colony. Like the plurality of commodities to the form of the commodity itself, the modern theory of colonization necessarily presupposes a plurality of colonies. But this spatial orientation is not sustained by Marx. Instead, as we will see below, 'the colonies' are that which cause the appearance of the truth of capitalist political economy which is repressed and concealed in 'Western Europe.'

But this truth does not emerge spontaneously in either Western Europe or the colonies. For this spatial orientation itself is sustained by an exploitation of the colonies by the social formation of Western Europe. Marx's extraordinary sentence that concludes the second paragraph of the chapter is as follows, "Auf diese fertige Welt des Kapitals wendet der politische Ökonom mit desto ängstlicherem Eifer und desto größerer Salbung die Rechts- und Eigentumvorstellungen der vorkapitalischen Welt an, je lauter die Tatsachen seniner Ideologie ins Gesicht schreien."[369] Fowkes gives, "To this ready-made world of capital [i.e., Western Europe], the political economist applies the notions of law and of property inherited from a pre-capitalist world, with all the more anxious zeal and all the greater unction, the more loudly the facts cry out in the face of his ideology."[370] Marx here exuberantly, one might say joyfully, personifies the ideology of the political economists. He makes this ideology (*seniner Ideologie*) not only speak but employ (*anwendet*) gestures of 'unction' and 'anxiety.' But Marx does not *simply* lampoon the political economist to ridicule a *theoretical* error. On the contrary, this action of *anwenden* in the gestures of unction and anxiety give this critique of political economy a minimal anthropological bearer (*Träger*).

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[367] Marx indeed does not develop a critique of settler colonialism here, which he had already done repeatedly in *Capital*, particularly in the immediately preceding chapter, "Die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation."
[368] Marx, *MEW 23,* 792; Marx, *Capital*, 931.
[369] Marx, *MEW 23,* 792.
[370] Marx, *Capital,* 931.

We do first suggest two problems with Fowkes' translation here. Firstly, in giving 'apply' for '*anwenden,*' he excises the action of 'returning' as well as 'exerting' and 'exploitation' that are within Marx's semantics of '*anwenden*.' 'Apply to' would improve his 'apply.' Secondly, his semantics of 'notions…inherited' are not warranted. Marx's sentence instead identifies a mode of activity of political economists whereby an intensification of a screaming in appearance (*schreien…ins Gesicht*) that contradicts their ideology causes an intensification of an exploitation of the right and *Eigentumvorstellungen* of pre-capitalist socialist formations. Fowkes' unwarranted reading of 'inherited' discards the exploitative actions of political economists critiqued in Marx's statement.

This spatial presentation of Western Europe is sent into a reversed direction by the concentrated utterance of the next sentence that begins the third paragraph. This is, "Anders in den Kolonien."[371] This short sentence has the effect of syncopating or distorting the temporality secreted by the text. It generates a dramatic reversal, a turning inside out of its own exposition. Fowkes reads here, "it is otherwise in the colonies."[372] Another possible translation is "not so in the colonies," or even more literally and abruptly "different in the colonies."[373]

At any rate, Marx avers that the colony *is not* the 'ready-made world of capital,' where primitive accumulation has already recessed out of everydayness and forgotten its own presence.[374] And yet this opposition *is not* a spatial opposition, as in the forms of reflection-determinations that mechanically differentiate divisions within mirrored and mirroring reflection. For whereas the 'ready-made world of capital' conceals the truth of the capitalist process, Marx writes that the colonies unconceal a truth.[375]

It is important to stress however that this truth does not *spontaneously* emerge or 're-educate' the ready-made capitalist world. The capitalist formation instead undergoes a confession in the process of colonization. This takes place because of the condition of the encounter of the capitalist with its outside in the colonies. Marx writes, "Das kapitalistische Regiment stößt dort überall auf das Hindernis des Produzenten, welcher als Besitzer seiner eignen Arbeitsbedingungen sich selbst durch seine Arbeit bereichert statt den Kapitalisten."[376] Fowkes reads, "the capitalist regime constantly comes up against the obstacle presented by the producer, who, as owner of his conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself instead of the capitalist."[377] This anthropological 'obstacle' in the colonies thus at once impedes and facilitates the capitalist process.

Marx writes that the mode of existence of this opposition is practical and political. Marx writes in the third sentence of the third paragraph, "Der Widerspruch dieser zwei diametral entgegengesetzen ökonomischem Systeme betätigt sich hier praktisch in ihrem Kampf."[378] Fowkes reads here, "The contradiction between these two diametrically opposed economic systems has its practical manifestation here in the struggle between them."[379] With this statement,

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[371] Marx, *MEW 23,* 792.
[372] Marx, *Capital*, 931.
[373] Marx does not express in German the 'it is' that Fowkes reads here.
[374] On the question of forgetting presence, see Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1977).
[375] This is not precisely the relation of the lord and bondsman as in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, because the colony and Western Europe do not encounter one another 'directly.' Instead, they intercourse through the body of the commodity.
[376] Marx, *MEW 23,* 792.
[377] Marx, *Capital*, 931.
[378] Marx, *MEW 23*, 792.
[379] Marx, *Capital*, 931.

Marx identifies that this opposition is not 'purely theoretical,' specular, or spatial, but instead practical.

Moreover, with this confrontation, Marx identifies the activity of state apparatuses in this process. But the state is not *simply* present in this confrontation for Marx. He writes, "Wo der Kapitalist die Macht des Mutterlandes im Rücken hat, sucht er die auf eigner Arbeit beruhende Produktions- und Aneignungsweise gewaltsam aus dem Weg zu räumen."[380] Fowkes gives, "Where the capitalist has behind him the power of the mother country, he tries to use force to clear out of the way the modes of production and appropriation which rest on the personal labour of the independent producer."[381] This formulation, like Freud's 'Wo Es war, soll Ich werden,' identifies a mode of activity as supervenience. For Marx, this mode of presence is one that facilitates a capitalist war strategy, and it articulates why the capitalist and the independent producer can*not* be conceived according to a symmetrizing schema.

4. Critique of Political Economy against Spatialization of the Concept

Marx thereby identifies that the appearance of 'direct opposition' such as in a spatialization of 'Western Europe' and 'the colonies' is in fact a specular polarity. It is not one that characterizes the real form of opposition in the capitalist social relation. Marx writes here:

> Dasselbe Interesse, welches den Sykophanten des Kapitals, den politischen Ökonomen, im Mutterland bestimmt, die kapitalistische Produktionsweise theoretisch für ihr eignes Gegenteil zu erklären, dasselbe Interesse treibt ihn hier „to make a clean breast of it" und den Gegensatz beider Produktionsweisen laut zu proklamieren.[382]

We note that "to make a clean breast of it" appears within Marx's originary German text both in English and quotation marks. The phrase means to confess or to disclose. Fowkes here reads:

> the same interest, which in the mother country, compels the sycophant of capital, the political economist, to declare that the capitalist mode of production is theoretically its own opposite, this same interest, in the colonies, drives him 'to make a clean breast of it,' and to proclaim aloud the antagonism between the two modes of production.[383]

With this statement, Marx re-identifies the notion of equality and inequality at once. For in the capitalist mode of production, that which appears as a symmetrical opposition, such as 'in the west of Europe' and 'the colonies,' is in fact an ideological rather than an ontological mode of identity.

In the wake of this specularly mode, Marx deposits his hypothesis: the truth of the capitalist process emerges in the colonies and not in the West of Europe. For in the genitive of the mother country (*Mutterlandes*), political economy buries its own truth in specular inversions that impute that which is '*theoretically* its own opposite.' This can be called a critique of theoreticism by Marx here. Against spurious 'theoretical opposition,' Marx thinks of opposition as an antagonism between modes of production. This bears some spatial orientation, but it is, in

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[380] Marx, *MEW 23,* 792-3.
[381] Marx, *Capital,* 931.
[382] Marx, *MEW 23*, 793
[383] Marx, *Capital*, 931-2.

the end, a crossing out of 'the colonies' and a commencement of a new social formation from within this antagonism.

Colonies for Marx here are thus not simply the 'concrete historical' colonies. They are instead a threshold of a new mode of human association in capitalism. They characterize the limit of the production of capital, which knows no spatiality between the names London, Australia, New York and further beyond yet.

5. 'like rotten touchwood'; or, Ideology has a Material Existence

The repression of the truth of political economy, Marx identifies, *does not* appear spontaneously in the at-hand world of capital. Marx thereby recognizes an *absolute asymmetry* which results from the ur-repression of capital's own constitutive geneses, for it is only with the colonies that there can be the realization of the truth of capitalism.

This truth is therefore not a spatial concept for Marx. On the contrary, it is explicitly an ideological problematic for Marx. To lead us there, Marx explicates the conditions of the colony for the capitalists with characteristically dramatic pathos, writing

> …die Entwicklung der gesellschaftlichen Produktivkraft der Arbeit, Kooperation, Arbeitsteilung…unmöglich sind ohne die Expropriation der Arbeiter und die entsprechende Verwandlung ihrer Produktionsmittel in Kapital. Im Interesse des sog. Nationalrechtums sucht er nach Kunstmitteln zur Herstellung der Volksarmut. Sein apologetischer Panzer zerbröckelt hier Stück für Stück wie mürber Zunder.[384]

Fowkes reads

> …the social productivity of labour, co-operation, division of labour, [and] application of machinery on a large scale…are impossible without the expropriation of the workers and the corresponding transformation of their means of production into capital. In the interest of the so-called wealth of the nation, he seeks by artificial means to ensure the poverty of the people. Here his apologetic armor crumbles off, piece by piece, like rotten touchwood.[385]

Marx here first notes that the necessary, so-called natural conditions for capitalist production must be artificially generated. The natural is the artificial and the wealth of a nation is the poverty of the people. The process of modern colonization thereby forces a confession by the sycophants of capital, the political economists. But rather than expositing these acts in a realm of morality, Marx identifies them as materially ideology. The form of movement of these acts moreover are of loss or subtraction, not synthesis. In modern colonization, Marx writes, the ideology of the political economist, like pieces of armour (*Panzer*), falls off their body, 'like rotten touchwood' (*'wie mürber Zunder'*).[386]

Marx here deposits an outline of the human being coated in an armour of ideology and shedding its rotten pieces in the process of modern colonization. It is a remarkable formulation.

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[384] Marx, *MEW 23,* 793.
[385] Marx, *Capital*, 932.
[386] *Zunder* is readily flammable woody matter. Marx's phrase could also be translated as, 'like brittle tinder' or 'like tender tinder.'

With this falling of the armor of the ideologists of political economy, Marx inscribes a form of action of ideology which experiences an expropriation of itself in the process of modern colonization. As such, the form of movement of the armour *is* an inversion of the capitalist process.

6. On Truth and the Capitalist Soul

In order to facilitate the falling of this rotten ideological armour, Marx undertakes a critique of the ideologists of modern colonization itself. His primary so-called native informant is Edward Gibbon Wakefield and his work *England and America* (1833). Wakefield was a 19th century British colonist.

Bringing Wakefield into his theater, Marx writes "Est ist das große Verdienst E.G. Wakefields, nicht irgend etwas Neues über die Kolonien, aber in den Kolonien die Wahrheit über die kapitalistischen Verhältnisse des Mutterlands entdeckt zu haben."[387] Fowkes reads, "it is Wakefield's great merit to have discovered, not anything new *about* the colonies, but, *in* the colonies, the truth about capitalist relations in the motherland."[388] This truth emerges, he writes, from an original objective which is to "manufacture wage labourers in the colony" ("die Fabrikation Lohnarbeitern in den Kolonien").[389] Marx recounts that it is Wakefield who calls this process 'systematic colonization.' Marx gives Wakefield's English in his text and inserts in translation, "(*systematische Kolonisation*)."[390]

Just as he described the critique of political economy in his February 1858 letter to Ferdinand Lassalle as exposé and critique at once, Marx here both demonstrates and critiques Wakefield's 'theoretical' identification of 'systematic colonization.' In doing so, Marx shows that Wakefield and the ideologists of political economy *do* accurately identify a fundamental ontological relation of capitalist worlds. This is the process of the separation of the individual producer and wage labourers from the ownership of the means of production. But bearing this dual activity of exposition and critique, Marx's discourse introduces Wakefield here not simply as a 'concrete historical' or 'pure theoretical' personage. Instead, Marx reads Wakefield in order to facilitate a maneuver in a practical struggle.

To do this, Marx recalls Wakefield's exposition of Mr. Peel (*Herr Peel*), a capitalist who brings his ownership of the means of production as well as 3000 workers to the Swan River Valley of Australia but who cannot force the workers to sell their labour to valorize his stock of capital. In doing so, Marx thereby exposes a failure of capital to circuit itself in the conditions of colonization. Marx exhibits this situation not as rote facticity but instead with humor. Giving words and voices to this scenario, Marx writes, "Unglücklicher Herr Peel, der alles vorsah, nur nicht den Export der englischen Produktionsverhältnisse nach dem Swan River!"[391] Fowkes reads, "Unhappy Mr. Peel, who provided for everything except the export of English relations of production to Swan River!"[392] Marx thereby at once demonstrates and mocks the misfortune of the capitalist personage in learning that his own ownership of the means of production is not *in-itself* tantamount to the existence of capital or surplus value.

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[387] Marx, *MEW 23*, 793.
[388] Marx, *Capital*, 932.
[389] Marx, *Capital*, 932; Marx, *MEW 23*, 793.
[390] Marx, *MEW 23*, 793.
[391] Marx, *MEW 23*, 794.
[392] Marx, *Capital*, 933.

For in the process of modern colonization, the ideologists of capital and political economy learn the truth that capital is *only* a specific combinatory of fixed and variable forms of capital.[393] Marx writes, "Sie werden Kapital nur unter Bedingungen, worin sie zugleich als Exploitations- und Beherrschungsmittel des Arbeiters dienen."[394] Fowkes reads, "[the means of production and subsistence] become capital only under circumstances in which they serve at the same time as means of exploitation and domination over the worker."[395] Capital is thus not the things. Capital is instead the conjoining of exploitation and domination *into the same time*. It is a process of 'serving' (*'worin…dienen*'). Marx does not call this a thing or a process. He writes that this is "the capitalist soul" ("Diese ihre kapitalistische Seele").[396]

Marx recognizes here that the confusion of political economy obstructs identifying the very cause of the activity of this capitalist soul. For the activity of this capitalist soul causes the appearance *as* something that *is* occluded. Marx exposes the difficulty acutely in the combination of these two sentences: "Diese ihre kapitalistische Seele ist aber im Kopfe des politischen Ökonomen so innig mit ihrer stofflichen Substanz vermählt, daß sie unter allen Umständen Kapital tauft, auch wo sie das grade Gegenteil sind. So bei Wakefield."[397] Fowkes reads, "but this, their capitalist soul, is so intimately wedded, in the mind of the political economist, to their material substance, that he christens them capital under all circumstances, even where they are its exact opposite. Thus it is with Wakefield."[398] Marx writes here that the '*Kopfe,'* for which Fowkes reads 'mind,' of the political economist, *cannot* distinguish between the material substance and the acts of the soul. Marx here identifies a conflation by political economy of discrete ontological essences in the spontaneous adequation of the concept of capital to its material integument. This action is what Part I of this dissertation has called a spurious inversion. For this conflation of material substance and the capitalist soul *is* the confusion of capital.

In stating that this soul acts on both mind (*Kopfe*) and material integument (*stofflichen Substanz*), Marx is both positively identifying a field of action of the capitalist soul while also indicating that this soul harbors other unities of the mind and the body than those that are born in capitalist practices. Marx thereby inhabits his foe's discourse in order to elucidate its ideological and practical effects, but also in order to indicate that other modes of unity of mind and body are made available in the process of modern colonization.

It is important to note that in Marx's exhibition, the position from which Wakefield speaks already grasps the lesson that the capitalist soul and the material bearer of the capital relation are not the self-same. But Marx's lesson is not simply the critique of the bad faith of Wakefield. In relaying the destiny of Mr. Peel, we see instead Wakefield understanding that the possession of the means of production (money), the carrying of the labor power to the site of its valorization, and the exploitative buying of labor power in the form and price of money is *not* conceptually tantamount or adequate to capital itself. Capital's existence is neither of the mind *or* the body but instead *only* their uniting. Thus the 'mistaking' by the political economists with

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[393] This generates a well-known thesis: "capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons which is mediated through things." *Capital*, 932. The footnote attached to this statement refers to Marx's 1849 writing "Wage Labour and Capital" in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* where Marx writes: "a negro is a negro. In certain relations he becomes a slave….Capital is a social relation of production. It is a historical relation of production." *Capital,* 932. This thesis from Marx fundamentally rejects any recourse to biological or evolutionary explanations regarding the existence of slavery.

[394] Marx, *MEW 23*, 794.

[395] Marx, *Capital*, 933.

[396] Marx, *Capital*, 933; Marx, *MEW 23,* 794.

[397] Marx, *MEW 23*, 794

[398] Marx, *Capital*, 933.

which "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" began is not *simply* ridiculed. Marx instead allows this mistaking to come out and prevail in the limit of *Capital.* In doing so, he inscribes an energy or principle to change (*wechseln*) a mistake (*verwechslung*).

7. Modern Colonization and the Possibility of the Impossibility of Capital

To do this, *Capital* rereads Wakefield's text. In doing so, Marx hears Wakefield describing that in America "all the members of society are supposed to possess equal portions of capital."[399] Marx syllogizes from there. He writes, "solange er Eigentümer seiner Produktionsmittel bleibt, ist die kapitalistische Akkumulation und die kapitalistische Produktionsweise unmöglich."[400] Fowkes reads, "so long as the capitalist worker can accumulate for himself – and this he can do so long as he remains in possession of his means of production – capitalist accumulation and mode of production are impossible."[401] Marx thereby locates where the capitalist mode of production, by means of itself, is impossible (*unmöglich*). Whereas Wakefield has identified this obstacle in order to develop a removal strategy for it, Marx instead seeks to allow this interdiction of the process to prevail within the very process itself.

Wakefield's discourse allows Marx to identify characteristics of this blockage that take place within the circuit of capitalist production. In this situation, Marx writes, "die dazu unentbehrliche Klasse der Lohnarbeiter fehlt."[402] This can be translated as "the indispensable class of wage-labourers is missing." Marx is not of course mourning this loss. He is instead indicating it as the possibility of impossibility within the capitalist process and specifically in the process of modern colonization. "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" thus is not the 'direct opposite' of Wakefield's exposition of 'systematic colonization.' It is its inversion or overturning.

8. Indirection and Modern Colonization

The direct opposition of 'Western Europe' and 'the colonies' is thus both set up and critiqued by Marx in the limit of *Capital*.

Marx writes here that the essential concealment of the true relation of capital and wage labourers in 'Western Europe' is "brought about…by a social contract, of a quite original kind" ("hergestellt…Durch einem *contrat social* ganz origineller Art").[403] This 'social contract' is a determinate fiction which Marx makes Wakefield himself describe. Marx translates Wakefield into German as saying, "Die menschheit…adoptierte eine einfache Methode zue Förderung der Akkumulation des Kapitals…sie teilte sich in Eigner von Kapital und Eigner von Arbeit…diese Teilung war das Resultat freiwilliger Verständigung und Kombination."[404] Fowkes reads here, "mankind…adopted a contrivance for promoting the accumulation of capital… (and) divided themselves into owners of capital and owners of labour."[405] This is, we suggest, the fundamental ontotheology and anthropology of classical political economy.

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[399] Marx, *Capital,* 933.
[400] Marx, *MEW 23*, 794.
[401] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, *England and America*, Vol. 2, (London: R. Bentley, 1833), 33, quoted in Marx, *Capital*, 933 and Marx, *MEW 23*, 794.
[402] Marx, *MEW 23*, 794
[403] Marx, *Capital*, 933; Marx, *MEW 23*, 794. Marx writes '*social contrat*' in French in both the 1867 and 1873 *Das Kapital* editions. The 1962 *Marx Engels Werke* gives here in footnote "*Gesellschaftsvertrag.*"
[404] Marx, *MEW 23*, 795; ellipses in Marx.
[405] Marx, *Capital*, 934; ellipses in Marx.

For Wakefield finds here that the ideologists of political economy identify the *particular* division of capitalists and wage-labourers as a *natural* constancy. Marx allows Wakefield, the ideologist of political economy himself, to lampoon this idea of the auto-expropriation of humanity that 'divided themselves into owners of capital and owners of labour.' Marx interpolates and 'historicizes' Wakefield's discourse as stretching "since the time of Adam" ("*seit Adams Zeiten"*).[406] Marx thereby develops a critique of this 'philosophy of history' whereby this 'social contract' is simply nature or constancy rather than artificial and anthropogenic.

The tale of the self-expropriation of labourers is even too foolish and naïve for Wakefield. He instead recognizes that "slavery…is the sole natural basis of colonial wealth" ("Sklaverei…die einzige naturwuchsige Grundlage des Kolonialreichtums ist").[407] 'Systematic colonization' is thus, Marx writes, "*ein bloßes pis aller."*[408] Although not present in the original 1867 *Das Kapital,* later editions footnoted this idiom to clarify that it means "*ein Notbehelf."*[409] 'Systematic colonization' is thus a 'stopgap.' It is 'makeshift' and 'artificial.' It indicates an ongoing process rather than something in an organic state of completion without furtherance. This compromise formation emerges, Marx writes, because "[the capitalist in colonization] has free men, not slaves, to deal with."[410] 'Systematic colonization' therefore is not an 'end of history.' It is instead a temporary stopgap for reproducing the conditions necessary for capitalist production, which is the expropriation of the individual producer from the means of production.

In these conditions when individual capitals cannot access their sole 'natural' basis that is slavery, there is a tendency for capitals to perish. This is thus a crisis from the capitalist point of view. Marx recounts Wakefield himself recounting this condition: "Dies fand wirklich statt in der letzten von den Engländern gegründeten Kolonie, wo ein großes Kapital in Samen, Vieh und Instrumenten unterging am Mangel von Lohnarbeiterern und wo kein Ansiedler viel mehr Kapital besitzt, als er mit seinen eignen Händen anwenden kann."[411] Fowkes reads, "This really took place in the last colony founded by Englishmen – the Swan River Settlement – where a great mass of capital, of seeds, implements, and cattle has perished for want of labourers to use it, and where no settler possessed much more capital than he could employ with his own hands."[412]

But Marx rediscovers these conditions of impossibility differently than Wakefield does. For Marx uses them to teach that even the political economists do not control the destiny of the seeds and instruments of capital. Even the ideologists of political economy identify that capitalist accumulation does not come 'directly' from the individual capitals or capitalists themselves. Instead, it comes about through an insertion in the conjuncture where the colonial state and its 'home' capitals encounter the relative surplus or scarcity of wage labourers. This insertion point is one which the colonizing state and the capitalists attempt to stabilize in 'friendly' conditions for the viewpoint of the 'home' capitals. This mode of action does not proceed 'directly' from the state or capitalists. Instead, these elements combine 'indirectly' in 'systematic colonization.'[413]

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[406] Marx, *Capital*, 933; Marx, *MEW 23*, 795.
[407] Marx, *Capital*, 934; Marx, *MEW 23*, 795.
[408] Marx, *MEW 23,* 795.
[409] Ibid.
[410] Marx, *Capital*, 934.
[411] Marx, *MEW 23*, 795.
[412] Marx, *Capital*, 934; translation modified.
[413] Wakefield himself identifies his understanding of 'systematic colonization' from his reading of a pamphlet published in 1830, entitled *A Statement of the Principles and Objects of a proposed National Society for the care and prevention of pauperism by means of Systematic Colonization.* See Wakefield, *England and America, Vol. II*, 162.

The 'pure theoretical' colonizing state policy thus cannot in-itself remove the obstacle which it finds and faces. For by means of the purchase of land, the wage labourer can possibly exit from this repetitive sale of one's labour power. The 'pure theory' of systemic colonization therefore is the attempt to control the entry and exit points to the labour market. The state and capitalists aim to facilitate the availability of that which the capitalist process lacks, even in these conditions of colonization, which is the absolute capture of labour power, i.e., slavery. The elucidation of 'the modern theory of colonization' by the critique of political economy thus displaces the mirage projected by the tale of the auto-expropriation of individual producers.[414]

9. The Minimal Anthropological Inversion of Modern Colonization: 'The Loss of Relation and Feeling of Dependency at Once'

In the colonies, Marx posits, the separation (*die Scheidung*) of the individual producer from the land and soil "does not yet exist, or only sporadically, or on too limited a scale."[415] Agriculture and industry are not yet separated. How, then, Marx asks, can capital find a home within and between material substances, minds, and capitalist souls? How is there "a home market [*innere Markt*] for capital"?[416]

Wakefield's recognition of labouring Americans strikes a light on a new capitalist social formation for Marx. Marx recalls Wakefield's description of Americans, who

> cultivate the soil [and] follow many other occupations…they frequently build their own houses, and carry to market, at whatever distance, the produce of their own industry. They are spinners and weavers, they make soap and candles, as well as, in many cases, shoes and clothes for their own use.[417]

This differentiation differs essentially with the dual characteristic of labor in capitalism that Marx qualified in Part I of *Capital* as abstract and concrete labor. Marx's reading of America here is not however a moral championing of *another* anthropos who makes candles *as well as* carries them to market, thereby evincing a kind of human flourishing that has withdrawn from presence in 'Western Europe.' Marx here instead brings forth into exposition the possibility and actuality of *other minimal character masks* and with it the lesson that the historically specific capitalist and wage labourer 'of Western Europe' are not the last two character masks of the human being.

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[414] This mode of action moreover is not simply a repetition or extension of the mode of action elucidated in the prior chapter, "Die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation," in the expropriation of people from the soil. For in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," Marx identifies a *new* mode of association and action in colonization. He writes, "daß die Masse des Bodens nock Volkseigentum ist und jeder Ansiedler daher einen Teil davon in sein Privateigentum und individuelles Produktionsmittel verwandeln kann, ohne den spätren Ansiedler an derselben Operation zu verhindern." *MEW 23*, 795-6. Fowkes reads, "every settler… can therefore turn part of [the colony] into his private property and his individual means of production without preventing later settlers from performing the same operation." *Capital*, 934. This notion can be criticized as being or perpetuating a phantasy of taking from a 'common virgin source' and thereby completely eradicating the being and existence of indigenous peoples everywhere. While this critique is an important one, the mode of Marx's thought here is not a 'pure theoretical' or 'concrete historical' discourse. It instead thinks here of the *possibility* for a transformation in the capitalist mode of production and its spurious notion of equality. This is an identification of a necessity within the capitalist mode of production for a new, artificial social formation that is not simply a genesis 'of western Europe.'

[415] Marx, *Capital*, 935.

[416] Marx, *Capital*, 935; Marx, *MEW 23*, 796.

[417] Marx, *Capital*, 935.

For the process of modern colonization, Marx sees, disrupts the mirage of the automatic subjectivation of capital. Marx writes, "Aber in den Kolonien reißt der schöne Wahn entzwei"; Fowkes reads, "but in the colony, this beautiful illusion is torn aside."[418] '*Wahn'* is not only 'illusion' but also 'delusion.'

This action takes place because of a disturbance in the stability of the labour market for the capitalist.[419] In fact, Marx writes, in the colony, "the law of the supply and demand of labour collapses completely."[420] Marx writes that "this constant transformation of wage-labourers into independent producers, who work for themselves instead of capital, and enrich themselves instead of the capitalist gentlemen, reacts in its turn very adversely on the conditions of the labour-market."[421] And yet Marx is not providing promises here about an edifying end or effect of this process. He instead identifies these conditions as limits within the capitalist process as such.

This situation is however explicitly identified by Marx as bearing an emancipatory tendency. He calls this a loss. This event is inscribed by Marx as the unity of two subtractions that constitutes in turn a new essential relation. This event occurs when the wage-labourer loses *both* a relation and a feeling of dependence *at once*. He writes, "Der letztre verliert obendrein mit dem Abhängigkeitsverhältnis auch das Abhängigkeitsgefühl vom entsagenden Kapitalisten" and Fowkes reads "the wage labourer also loses, along with the relation of dependence, the feeling of dependence on the abstemious capitalist."[422] Marx jokes that this is for Wakefield a "*Mißstände,*" for which Fowkes reads "inconvenience," but where "bad state of affairs," "grievance," and even "illness" is warranted.[423] This event eventuates in a new relation and feeling of dependence that differs from the particular '*social contrat'* of Western Europe. We suggest calling this event the minimal anthropological inversion of modern colonization.

10. Instability and Inversion of Ideology

With this, Marx recognizes that Wakefield himself recognizes and moreover *complains* about this uncertainty in the labour market in the conditions of systematic colonization. This anxiety emerges because this situation *decreases* the capitalists' absolute power for acting and *increases* the power to act for the wage-labourer. This disturbance in the predictability of the labour market is grasped even by the ideologists of classical political economy, such as Wakefield and "that mild, free-trading, vulgar economist Molinari."[424] Although this impossibility of valorizing capital is an immanent tendency within the whole process of the production of capital, it 'takes over' the end of *Capital* in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie."

To tell this story, Marx winds up Wakefield. He makes Wakefield speak differently than Wakefield himself writes and thinks. Marx makes the political economist pant and lose his breath while he delivers his report. We can see this well in the following passage. Marx here quotes Wakefield as having written the following: "'Sie hören bald auf, Lohnarbeiter zu sein, sie

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[418] Marx, *Capital*, 935; Marx, *MEW 23*, 797.
[419] Marx writes, "[capitalist production] not only reproduces the wage labourer as wage labourer, but also always produces a relative surplus population of wage labourers in proportion to the accumulation of capital." *Capital,* 935. This reproduction is undertaken through a production process, but it is still withheld from production-in-itself. The capitalist mode of production thus necessitates a population whose mode of inclusion *is* exclusion.
[420] Marx, *Capital*, 936.
[421] Marx, *Capital*, 936.
[422] Marx, *Capital*, 936; Marx, *MEW 23*, 797. Marx calls the capitalist "*entsagenden*," which Fowkes reads as "abstemious." The German could also allow "renouncing" or "no-saying."
[423] Marx, *Capital*, 936; Marx, *MEW 23*, 797.
[424] Marx, *Capital,* 937.

verwandeln sich bald in unabhängige Bauern oder gar in Konkurrenten ihrer alten Meister auf dem Lohnarbeitsmarkt selbst.'"[425] Fowkes reads, "They [the wage labourers in the colony] soon cease…to be labourers for hire; they…become independent landowners, if not competitors with their former masters in the labour market."[426] Marx thereby identifies a perceived uncertainty for the capitalists with regards to the labour market, but it is not only a voice of panic for the ideologists of political economy that he hears. Marx's discourse temporalizes this event so that wage labourers *return* to confront their former masters (*alten Meister*). This is a capitalist future. This is not simply a 'romantic' yearning for 'another' mode of production in America for Marx. Instead, these are general and dialectical conditions of 'systematic colonization.'

After making Wakefield's discourse itself discover a natural and constant expropriation of expropriators, Marx brings into this clearing a series of pithy, semantic inversions that refuse any absolute separation within science and critique. Marx writes, "Man begreife den Greuel!"[427] Fowkes reads "Horror of horrors!"[428] This could also be translated as "Understand the horror!" or "Grasp the horror!"[429] We note that the German *Greuel* includes a homophony with the English 'cruel' that Fowkes' 'horror' occludes. 'Horror of horrors!' moreover lacks any lexeme of a grammatical verb. Marx's German, on the other hand, introduces the very verbal form and action of "understand" or "grasp." This is crucial. For as this chapter has identified, there is in *Capital* a mode of a humorous discourse which facilitates a conceptual intervention *within* the action of 'comprehensive' discourse.

This statement by Marx thus takes on the form of appearance of an inversion for the following reasons. There is here a facetious imperative given to the reader that is grammatically absolutely signified by the exclamation mark. For this 'Understand the horror!' also means its contrary or contradictory, '*do not* understand the horror!' The panic of the capitalist ideologist in recognizing the possibility of the impossibility of the valorization of capital is here introduced *at the same time as* Marx's overturning of this anxiety. *Capital*'s discourse thus exposits Wakefield's ideology of political economy, but also 'overturns' and 'inverts' it *as its own exposition*. Like 'Anders in den Kolonien,' this statement, 'Man begreife den Greuel!', bears its conceptual intervention in an inversion that is its own discursivity becoming itself.

Marx's discourse does this, we suggest, by sewing into the inner belly of the statement another form of inversion and overturning than the spurious one of classical political economy. For in the imperative to understand (*begreife*), Marx facilitates a *turn in the notion of understanding* that travels back from the horror for Wakefield and the viewpoint of the ideologists of political economy to the discourse itself. This horror becomes in Marx's hands a so-called horror. This semantic, rather than grammatical, inversion introduces an overturning of the viewpoint occupied by the ideologists of political economy without renouncing the pseudonymity advanced by such discourse. For the lesson prevailing in this utterance is that the real horror does indeed exist in this very self-same place that Marx sees in Wakefield's discourse, and yet the real horror is *not* in the immediacy of the statement that it first gathers. Instead, the true exists in a new form that is an overturning of itself.[430]

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[425] Marx, *MEW 23*, 797.
[426] Marx, *Capital*, 936.
[427] Marx, *MEW 23*, 798.
[428] Marx, *Capital*, 936.
[429] Many thanks to Anna Strauss and Alexander Locasio for their generosity in discussing Marx's German here and throughout.
[430] Spinoza writes, "*veritas norma sui et falsi est.*" *The Ethics*, in *Collected Works of Spinoza Volume I,* ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 479/II P43S.

This inversive theoretical practice does not stop there. The very next sentence is "Da hört denn doch alles auf!"[431] Fowkes reads "The end of the world has come!"[432] While this is idiomatically apt, Marx's German contains no stem of "*Welt*." It could read in everyday discourse as "Everything stops there!" or "That's where everything stops!" In any case, the statement articulates that everything does *not* stop there.

These statements indicate that Marx is thinking about an artificial, not organic, mode of finitude and infinity. Marx here re-writes the words of Wakefield's disciple, Herman Merivale, who anxiously sees that in the colonies the dependence of relation and feeling of the wage worker to the capitalist "must be created by artificial means."[433] This is a crucial statement. It indicates, we suggest, that Marx is thinking here both about how these modes of dependence are perpetuated as well as how they cease in modern colonization.

11. The Limit of Ventriloquism

Elucidating this 'artificiality' in a rich footnote, Marx quotes at length the so-called vulgar economist, Gustave de Molinari (b. 1819-1912), who wrote "in the colonies…there has occurred the opposite of what happens every day before our eyes" ("sah man das Gegenteil von dem sich abspielen was sich taglich von unseren Augen zutragt").[434] This chapter has identified how this particular notion that the colonies are the direct opposite of Europe blocks out the true relations of capital.

But Marx does not bring forth Molinari to simply mock his idea of the inversion of the European world and the colony. Marx instead exposits this spurious inversion in order to identify a true inversion in its stead. Marx states that in these conditions of modern colonization, "Man sah die einfachen Arbeiter ihrerseits die industriellen Internehmer ausbeuten" and Fowkes reads, "simple workers have been seen to exploit in their turn the industrial *entrepreneurs.*"[435] In doing so, Marx here fathoms the expropriation of expropriators.[436]

This 'troubling' situation thereby leads to the intervention of the state and particularly the action of the repressive state apparatuses. These interventions aim to safeguard 'home' capitals against expropriation or extinction. Not forgoing rhetorical panache, Marx inquires,

> M. Molinari! M. Molinari! What then becomes of the ten commandments, of Moses and the Prophets, of the law of supply and demand, if in Europe the 'entrepreneur' can cut down the worker's 'legitimate share' -and in the West Indies the workers can cut down the entrepreneur's? And what, if you please, is this 'legitimate share', which, according to your own admission, the capitalist in Europe daily neglects to pay? Over yonder, in the colonies, where the workers are so 'simple' as to 'exploit' the capitalist, M. Molinari feels a

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[431] Marx, *MEW 23*, 798.
[432] Marx, *Capital*, 936.
[433] Marx, *Capital*, 937.
[434] Marx, *Capital*, 937; Marx, *MEW 23*, 798.
[435] Marx, *MEW 23*, 798; Marx, *Capital*, 937. The emphasis is given in *Capital* not in *MEW 23.*
[436] When Molinari writes, "it is doubtless better that these accumulations of capital should be destroyed than that generations of men should perish," Marx responds with his inimitable caustic and sarcastic wit: "*wie generös von dem Herrn Molinari!*" ("how generous of M. Molinari!") *Capital*, 937; *MEW 23,* 798. For the so-called generosity of Molinari is *not* the so-called generosity of Molinari. Marx is showing here that the capitalist viewpoint is instead one which dances on the life and death of the wage labourer's life. This joke and inversion for Marx here is a discursive weapon that seeks to facilitate the falling away of the rotten ideological armour born by political economists.

> powerful itch to use police methods to set on the right road that law of supply and demand which works automatically everywhere else.[437]

Marx thereby exposits and overturns the notion of inversion as thought by Molinari. For while Marx recognizes that Molinari is pejoratively calling the colonial workers 'simple,' Marx overturns and reinscribes the self-same notion of the 'simple.'[438] For Marx, there *is* a 'simple,' and it *is not* the one that Molinari imputes to the 'simple.' The *simplicity* of these wage-labourers is their own acts to overturn their own exploitation. This true simplicity, Marx sees, disturbs those holy European ideologies, that is, the Ten Commandments and the so-called laws of supply and demand. And yet even such committed ideologues of systematic colonization as Molinari still anxiously confess that capitalist relations require in colonization "police methods to set the right road."[439]

Marx's reading of Molinari finds a necessary fragmentation of capital and capitals in the conditions of modern colonization. He writes, "every lengthy undertaking…is prevented from being carried out."[440] This entails the "fragmentation of the means of production."[441] This analysis therefore already identifies the tendencies within capitalism that have now been identified as 'neoliberalism.' This entails the recomposition of capital whereby capitalists aim to shift the proportion of their total capital from constant capital and into variable modes of capital. This, we note, *technically* increases the ratio of exploitation of the wage worker.[442]

This also recognizes that in its limit, the capitalist process does *not* go on its own.[443] To explain the consequences, Marx allows Wakefield to retell his own experience of "talking with some capitalists of Canada and the state of New York."[444] This "exceedingly painful anecdote" ("eine äußerst schmerzensreiche Anekdote") allows Marx to deliver his critical exposition.[445] For Wakefield explains that while the individual capitalist possesses the means of production required to initiate their own action to operate or valorize their stock of fixed capital (i.e., ownership of the means of production), the capitalists told Wakefield that *they could not begin acting* on that potentiality, given the understanding, being itself a mixture of ideological and scientific determinations, that the labor market (i.e., conditions of the purchase of variable capital) did *not* appear to them as 'friendly.'

With this statement, Marx sets forth the possibility of the self-cause of a disappearance or extinction of this capitalist character mask. With "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," the capitalist process itself can cause itself to cease because of a perception of the instability of the at-handedness of labour to the capitalist. With this understanding, Fowkes recounts Marx quoting

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[437] Marx, *Capital*, 937.
[438] Marx, *MEW 23,* 798.
[439] Marx, *Capital*, 937.
[440] Marx, *Capital*, 937. Alexis de Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* [1835] writes, "democracy breaks the chain and severs every link of it." This is the epigraph to Louis Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus: An Essay on the Caste System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
[441] Marx, *Capital*, 937.
[442] This mode of purchase and sale breaks with the mode of production that characterizes the European factories, such as the watch factories that are exposited in Section 3 "The Two Fundamental Forms of Manufacture – Heterogenous and Organic" of Chapter 14 "The Division of Labour and Manufacture."
[443] Althusser identified the attribute whereby ideology *appears* to go on its own. See his *On the Reproduction of Capitalism,* 171-207.
[444] Marx, *Capital*, 937.
[445] Marx, *Capital*, 937; Marx, *MEW 23,* 799.

Wakefield as writing, "we [the capitalists] could not begin such operations with labor."[446] The capitalists needed to be "sure of a fresh supply [of labour] *whenever we might need it*" ("waren wir einer frischen Zufuhr je nach unsrem Bedürfnis sicher gewesen").[447]

Marx here predicates (*pre-dicates*) an immanent cessation of the capitalist process. With such an ethnographic recollection, Marx sees that the thinking-process of the capitalists is not posteriorly expressive of another, so-called prior concrete economic instance.[448] Rather, Marx returns to the moment when the capitalists' thinking-process can*not* be assured of this unspecific access to the exploitation of the supply of labour power. For in this situation, even a 'historical' stock of fixed capital cannot secure its future. Marx is showing here thereby the conditions of the extinction of the capitalist circuit within modern colonization.

12. The Failure of Healing; or, *Causa Sui* and Emancipation.

But possibility is not simply actuality. Marx's discourse thus asks how this "anti-capitalist cancer of the colonies [can] be healed (*heilen*)."[449]

Marx characterizes this theoretical practice with the following configuration. Fowkes reads, "the trick is to kill two birds with one stone," where Marx has written, "Die Kunst ist, zwei Fliegen mit einer Klappe zu schlagen."[450] Marx therefore calls this capitalist political practice an art (*Kunst*).

Marx identifies it as follows: "Man gebe von Regierungs wegen der jungfräulichen Erde einen vom Gesetz der Nachfrage und Zufuhr unabhängigen, einen künstlichen Preis, welcher den Einwandrer zwingt, längere Zeit zu lohnarbeiten, bis er genug Geld verdienen kann, um Grund und Boden zu kaufen und sich in einen unabhängigen Bauern zu verwandeln" and Fowkes reads, "let the government set an artificial price on the virgin soil, a price independent of supply and demand, a price that compels the immigrant to work a long time for wages before he can earn enough money to buy land and turn himself into an independent farmer."[451] Marx recapitulates this ideology by saying, "Unter diesen Umständen tout sera pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possible. Dies ist das große Geheimnis der 'systematischen Kolonisations'", and Fowkes reads, "under these circumstances, 'everything will be for the best in the best of all possible worlds.' This is the great secret of 'systematic colonization.'"[452] The conceptual importance of the 'secret' in *Capital* is often recalled by remembering that the section entitled "The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret" concludes the first chapter of *Capital*. Here, we see that the notion of secret (*Geheimnis*) returns in one of the final passages of *Das Kapital*, but now as a great (*große*) secret that is "'systematic colonization.'"[453]

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[446] Marx, *Capital*, 938. Fowkes' translation transforms what is an interrogative question in Marx's quotation of Wakefield's discourse into a constative statement in English.

[447] Marx, *Capital*, 938; emphasis added; Marx, *MEW 23*, 799. Fowkes' translation again changes a significant grammar in Marx's statement. In Fowkes, 'need' appears as a form of action in the phrase 'need it'; in Marx, '*Bedürfnis*' is instead a substantive form in '*nach unsrem Bedürfnis,*' thereby warranting in English 'according to our need.'

[448] This is because the capitalist soul seeks to rule this need *whenever*.

[449] Marx, *Capital*, 938; Marx, *MEW 23*, 799.

[450] Marx, *Capital*, 938; Marx, *MEW 23*, 800.

[451] Ibid.

[452] Marx, *MEW 23*, 800; Marx, *Capital*, 938. As in the aforementioned passage regarding the Adamic *social contrat,* Marx retains the French "*des mondes possible"* within his 'German' exposition.

[453] Marx is here making himself a puppeteer of Wakefield's discourse. Marx imputes that Wakefield "*unwittingly* shows us the obverse of the medal" ("*entschlüpft ihm auch die Kehrseite der Medaille"*). *Capital*, 938; emphasis added; *MEW*

Marx identifies this systematic colonization as follows. The activity of the state here seeks to 'stabilize' the supply of labour for 'home,' individual capitals by facilitating the oversupply of labourers to the urban labour market and controlling their exit by means of the price of so-called virgin land. Marx writes, "the land price laid down by the state must of course be 'sufficient', i.e., it must be high enough 'to prevent the labourers from becoming independent landowners until others had followed to take their place'."[454] This generates the 'pure theoretical' appearance of an absolute capture of the wage labourer by the colonizing state in the conditions of modern colonization. As Marx writes, the high price on land is "nothing but a euphemistic circumlocution for the ransom which the worker must pay to the capitalist in return for permission to retire from the wage labour market to the land."[455] This *theoretically* presents a closed loop of the absolute domination of the wage worker in the conjuncture of systematic colonization.

But the lesson from Marx's hand here is that this *theoretical* plan of individual capitals and the colonizing state to absolutely capture labor power *fails*. Marx instead shows that the 'pure theoretical' order – 'systematic colonization' – is redirected by a movement in the 'concrete historical' order that itself cannot be included within the pure theoretical exposition of the order of capital. Systematic colonization thereby exists in a mode of being thwarted. In demonstrating this, Marx deposits a conceptual lesson that *a priori* demonstrations do not grasp the real relationship of the 'pure theoretical' order and the 'concrete historical' order, as well a practical lesson about the incomplete projection of the future formed in the conjuncture of the State and world-market.[456]

Instead of the realization of a 'pure theoretical' plan, "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" unconceals a minimal anthropological self-actualization. It is an overturning that is uncommanded by the 'pure theoretical' order of 'systematic colonization.'[457] This is a physical and metaphysical notion at once. Human activity is thus exposited as not exclusively controlled by the plan of the state apparatuses. In *Capital*'s limit, there is an inconstant and self-caused movement. It is a subversion of the 'pure theoretical' order.[458] But this subversion of the 'pure theoretical' order in systematic colonization also takes place, Marx shows, by means and causes of the colonizing state itself. For the event of the Civil War in America indeed causes a subversion of the 'pure theoretical' aim of the state to control the land-price and the urban labor market at once.

23, 799. This '*Kehrseite der Medaille'* that Fowkes gives as "obverse of the medal" is colloquially "the other side of the coin." This unwitting slip shows for Marx that these American people are "independent, enterprising and comparatively cultured." Marx, *Capital*, 938. With this *Kehrseite* of the medallion, Marx exhibits a positivity that is at once introduced by but also *escapes* from the discourse of Wakefield and political economists. With it, Marx shows that classical political economy cannot entirely exterminate the possibility, if not actuality, of its own overturning. The '*Kehrseite der Medaille*' is a figure for that which remains unseen in that which remains seen. This other-side of the coin bears as a form of appearance a mode of activity that is both presupposed and denied by the ideologists of political economy.

[454] Marx, *Capital*, 939.

[455] Ibid.

[456] Michael Heinrich has averred the incomplete characteristic of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," by which he means that Marx's concepts, such as the world market and the state, are not adequately addressed here by Marx. We suggest instead that this 'incompletion' is not an accident but instead a practical and political principle for Marx. It thereby marks a true inversion or overturning of Hegel's notion of System as exposited by the ends of *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Science of Logic,* or *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

[457] On self-cause (*causa sui*), see discussion of Vittorio Morfino and Martin Suryajaya in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

[458] On the activity of subversion, see Jacques Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious," in *Écrits* (New York: Norton, 2006), 671-702.

This Civil War, Marx writes, accrues a "colossal national debt" which the American state and situation gives to itself.[459] Rather than carefully calibrate the release of urban wage labourers from their *de facto* captivity, Marx writes that the government instead "grant(ed) immense tracts of public land to speculative companies for the exploitation of railways, mines, etc. In short, it has brought a very rapid centralization of capital. The great republic has therefore ceased to be the promised land for emigrants."[460] Marx thus exposits a temporality of extinction, not an evolutionary genesis, in modern colonization.

13. The Ends of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie"

This passage allows us to return to the orienting question of Part I of this dissertation. This is Althusser's question of '*how* Marx *thinks*' in *Capital*. One answer to this question is a form of action which we have called inversion. In "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," inversion is the overturning of the spurious spatialized orientation in the absolute opposition of 'Western Europe' and 'the colonies.' For Marx shows here that the 'pure theoretical' plan of 'systematic colonization' cannot itself control the conjuncture of 'home' individual capitals *and* the relative surplus and scarcity of its labour market. This is because there is a self-cause that cannot be completely subsumed by the 'theoretical order' of 'systematic colonization,' such as it is developed by the ideologists of political economy.

There is thus an irreducible asymmetry in the final breaching of the process of production of capital. Marx indicates in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," however quickly and incompletely, that there are emancipatory tendencies accessible to individual producers in these generalizing conditions of the capitalist future. We identified how Marx calls this a double loss of dependency in relation and feeling at once.

This end of *Capital* does not thereby ratify its own origin in the schematic projection of 'Western Europe' and 'the colonies.' This end instead introduces a cessation of a promised land. This is not contrary, Marx writes, to the facticity that "capitalist production advances [in America] with gigantic strides."[461] "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" instead names a minimal anthropological realm in which partisans re-encounter each other. This is neither the absolute domination of wage labourers by the capitalists and state, nor the unimpeded emancipatory paths of those wage labourers. Instead, this is a moment of mutual antagonism and contestation.

Marx does not flinch here. He describes this as an unruly social formation of modern colonization. Regarding Australia, Marx writes, and Fowkes reads, that

> schamlose Verschleuderung des unbebauten Kolonialbodens an Aristokraten und Kapitalisten seitens der englischen Regierung hat namentlich in Australien, zusammen mit dem Menschenstrom, den die Golddiggings hinziehn…ein hinreichende "relative Arbieterübervölkerung" erzeugt, so daß fast jedes Postdampfschiff die Hiobspost einer Uberfüllung des australischen Arbeitsmarkets – „glut of the Australian labour-market" – bringt.

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[459] Marx, *Capital*, 940. Spinoza writes, "a Commonwealth is always put at greater risk on account of its citizens than on account of its enemies." *Political Treatise* in *Collected Works of Spinoza Volume II,* ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 534.
[460] Marx, *Capital*, 940.
[461] Marx, *Capital*, 940.

> The shameless squandering of uncultivated colonial land on aristocrats and capitalists by the English government…has especially in Australia, in conjunction with the stream of men attracted by gold-digging, and the competition from imported English commodities which affects everyone down to the smallest artisan, produced an ample 'relative surplus population of worker'…so that almost every mail-boat brings ill tidings of a 'glut of the Australian labour-market.'[462]

Note that Marx does not even demonstrate this final, seemingly 'pure' economic fact without also bringing forth the ideological state apparatus by which it is made known in the social formation. For Marx indicates that this message of the surplus population of labourers arrives on 'almost every mail-boat.' Marx's own discourse thus can be understood here as an attempt to listen to the letters arriving which are testifying to the practical activity of modern colonization.

Marx's critical, scientific, and political notion of inversion can be understood here as a rethinking of the notion of equality or equalization. This can be grasped in one of *Capital*'s last sentences where Marx writes that "prostitution flourishes [in Australia] in some places *as exuberantly as* in the Haymarket in London" ("so üppig gedeiht wie auf dem Haymarket von London").[463] In writing this, Marx does not thereby exclude the passions of labourers from the problematic of 'the modern theory of colonization.' Marx moreover does not morally adjudicate this process. He instead notes a *relative* equalization of a libidinal subject, a capitalist soul, a capitalist world that traverses America, Australia, England and beyond. There is here thus a unification of an equivalence and identification that takes place by a worker in a 'stream of men.' This is an action of equalization within individuation.[464] This relative equalization neither exclusively dominates nor emancipates the labourer. But this action of equality overturns the idea of an absolute expression of equality. This is an important lesson which Marx places at the end, rather than the beginning of *Capital,* when spurious appearances remain dominant.

For in the limit of *Capital*, it is not the combination of finite measures of labor that determine the actions of colonization. The conjuncture of capital and labour is caused instead by the relative surplus of the at-handedness of labourers, or the relative lack of at-handedness of a "'relative surplus population of workers.'"[465] The final cause for *Capital* is not a finitude as price; it is rather an infinitude born by an individuating unity of its elements.

'Modern colonization' thus interrupts the at-handed-ness of capital for the capitalist; Marx writes that in the colonies the "dependence of the wage-labourer (on the capitalist) has by no means yet proceeded so far as to reach the normal European level."[466] This formulation may appear as one which indicates that Marx sees the colony as *simply* proceeding towards a pre-existent and stable European form. He would thereby here perpetuate an evolutionary (and representationalist) historicism, a Victorian Anthropology.[467]

And yet this is not the ideological viewpoint that Marx's discourse advances here. By differentiating between the ratio of exploitation in Europe and the colonies, Marx argues that the

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[462] Marx, *MEW 23,* 801-2; Marx, *Capital*, 940. The utterances "gold-digging" and "glut of the Australian labor market" appear in Marx's German in English.
[463] Marx, *Capital*, 940; emphasis added; Marx, *MEW 23*, 802.
[464] Within the capitalist process, there is a manufacturing of semblance and genericity that Marx identifies, dialectically, in the name of the final part of the first chapter of *Capital*, "the Fetishism of Commodities and Its Secret."
[465] Marx, *Capital*, 940.
[466] Marx, *Capital*, 937.
[467] See George Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology* (New York: Free Press, 1987).

mode of dependence in Western Europe does *not* exist in this same way (*weise*) in all social formations and worlds in 'the colonies.' *Das Kapital* thus already in 1867 understands the idea of the plurality of worlds and ontologies.

As such, systematic colonization is a fundamental or generic, rather than particular or peripheral, attribute of the process of capitalist production. Marx does not place a Western European form as *the* maximal anthropology towards which all social formations tend. Instead, he indicates that 'systematic colonization' is a situation whereby new relations and feelings of dependence can and do emerge. Marx's argument is that there *are* new forms of association and dependency, and they are neither pre-capitalist forms nor exilic emancipations from Western European forms.

With the last paragraph of *Capital*, Marx returns to the primary concern of "Die moderne Kolonisationtheorie" that the revelation of the truth of political economy appears in the colonies. Marx writes:

> Jedoch beschäftigt uns hier nicht der Zustand der Kolonien. Was uns allein interessiert, ist das in der neuen Welt von der politischen Ökonomie der alten Welt entdeckte und laut proklamierte Geheimnis: kapitalistische Produktions- und Akkumulationsweise, also auch kapitalistisches Privateigentum, bedingen die Vernichtung des auf eigner Arbeit beruhenden Privateigentums, d. h. die Expropriation des Arbeiters.[468]

Fowkes reads:

> However, we are not concerned here with the condition of the colonies. The only thing that interests us is the secret discovered in the New World by the political economy of the Old World, and loudly proclaimed by it: that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property as well, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of that private property which rests on the labour of the individual himself; in other words, the expropriation of the worker.[469]

This conclusive exposition negates the notion of the direct opposition of the New World and the Old World. "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" thus ends by striking out its own 'pure theoretical' origin in an act of self-criticism.

Recapitulation: On "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie"

With this conclusive exposition, Marx develops, we suggest here, a critique of the concept of Hegel's System. For here in the limit of *Capital*, there *is no* exposition of Absolute Mind or Absolute Idea. *Capital* instead concludes its 'melodramatic' crisis with a ventriloquism of political economy personified by the words of Wakefield, Merivale, and Molinari. This end of *Capital* does not exposit that the end of its exposition includes all of its own anteriority in a 'pure theoretical' unity. Instead, the end of *Capital* exposits an absolute separation born within itself. This passage and limit of exposition should thereby deny recourse to any facile or schematic homology of Marx and Hegel's dialectical thinking.

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[468] Marx, *MEW 23*, 802.
[469] Marx, *Capital*, 940.

This can be seen with the following. In these last breaths taken by *Capital*, Marx writes that this exposition entitled "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" is itself *not* concerned with the condition or state (*der Zustand*) of the colonies. While this statement has been read to characterize Marx as an ordinary, Eurocentric European not concerned with *wirklichen* colonies, the statement shows instead, we suggest, that Marx identifies that knowledge is an intratheoretical effect, and that truth therefore bears a priority over the chronicles of facticity.[470] The 'great secret of political economy' cannot thus be reported in the mode of a zoological treatise regarding 'the colonies.'

This 'great secret' returns us to the first sentence of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" and its imputation of the mistake (*verwechseln)* of classical political economy. This mistaking, Marx thereby shows, is not an accidental moment in the capitalist process. It is instead a necessary one that facilitates the intervention of capital on the inner lining of the capitalist soul. Thus, the true secret of the capitalist mode of production for Marx is not only the exploitation of the realm (*Gebeid*) of the colony in colonialization. It instead is a process that enters workers' souls from the means of production.

As many readers of *Capital* note, Marx's own notion of future remains largely uninscribed in the exposition of *Das Kapital*. Given our reading of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," one could argue that the capitalist future can*not* be understood from *within* the social formation he characterizes as of Western Europe. For the truth of the capitalist mode of production is discovered in the process of modern colonization.

This is not to say that capitalist ideology does not grow in the colonies. On the contrary, Pramoedya Ananta Toer (b. 1925-2006), in his novels set in the late colonial period and written while himself a political prisoner of an 'independent' Indonesia, personifies the essential agon for the colonized people of the Dutch East Indies, not as a so-called 'pure' European, but instead in a personage who was born as a so-called native and who becomes in his life an official in the Dutch Colonial state bureaucracy. This is Pangemenann, a police investigator that investigates and interdicts so-called native political activity for the Dutch state apparatus. In opposition to this agon is the protagonicity of the emancipating colony. This is Minke, who says at the end of novels comprising the *Buru Quartet*, "a Javanese who was not a Javanist was a revolutionary in these times in which I lived" ("seorang Jawa yang bukan Javanis tidak lain daripada seorang revolusioner pada masa hidupku sekarang ini").[471] This statement articulates extraordinarily adequately the idea of a minimal anthropological inversion that Marx recognizes in the limit of *Capital.*

In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we recounted that David Harvey interpreted "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" as identifying how 'new forms of class struggle necessarily reassert themselves at the frontier.' Our reading here in Chapter 4 has identified why this way of thinking presupposes that the colony is always already of the same essential nature as the Western European metropole. We have argued that this is precisely what Marx exposes as untrue in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." Marx instead identifies the colonies as a 'capitalist cancer' where the conjuncture of the sale of labour power is not absolutely pre-predicated or reproduced by the alliance of the state and its home capitals. While this idea has been used to develop the notion that America is a kind of fantasy for Marx, it is important to understand that this utopia also bears for Marx an idea of a process of inversion or overturning within the capitalist mode of production itself. We have argued that this process of modern colonization is not therefore an evolutionary anthropological sequence for Marx. Instead, it is the place in the capitalist process

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[470] See Althusser, "On the Materialist Dialectic," in *For Marx,* 185 ff.
[471] Toer, *House of Glass*, 306; Toer, *Rumah Kaca,* 306.

where there is another possibility for kinds of relations and feelings of exploitation and domination.

Before concluding this chapter, we want to recall that Marx never once uses the titular collocation "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" in the chapter bearing this name. This concept can therefore be said to exist exclusively through its dislocating and emendatory effects.

Part I of this dissertation has presented an outline of the concept of inversion in the critique of political economy. In doing so, we saw that Louis Althusser identified how *Capital* situates its decisive mode of thinking just beyond the limit of its own exposition. Following this mode of reading *Capital,* Part II of this dissertation turns from the limit of *Capital* and its still theoretical notion of 'The Modern Theory of Colonization' to present an interpretation of interventions in the critique of political economy in the modern social formation of Indonesia. These interventions, we argue, interrupt the process of modern colonization and facilitate the 'falling, like rotten touchwood' of the ideological armour of political economy in its limit that is the late conditions of systematic colonization. They indicate how a theoreticist notion of inversion can be overtaken by a practical strategy of speaking-out that is interpellation.

PART II

Chapter 5: Inversion and Ideology in *Max Havelaar, or The Coffee Auction of a Dutch Trading Company* (1860)

Introduction

1. Regarding our Sins in Common (*Dosa Kolektif*)[472]

Like many ethnographic researches, the aims and trajectories of this dissertation project were displaced by unanticipated movements generated from within the field of research itself. Shortly after arriving in Jakarta in 2019, there occurred a sequence of events that turned into the largest mass mobilizations on the streets of Jakarta by Indonesian citizen-subject peoples since the deposition of General Suharto from the presidency in May 1998.

One of the primary causes of this mass movement can be understood as follows. In August 2019, Indonesian people, 'ethnically' or 'hereditarily' from the West Papua region of Indonesia, were gathering in a student dormitory residence (*asrama*) in the city of Surabaya on the island of Java.[473] At that time, the Indonesian police surrounded the building with the intent to disband this gathering, which they saw as suspicious. In this direct confrontation, a police officer shouted and called those convened "monkey" ("*monyet*").[474] In this act, while wearing their state apparatus uniforms, the bearer of the state apparatus of Indonesia called-out a zoological-metaphysical racist epithet to particular Indonesian citizen-subjects. This particular shouting utterance significantly contributed to setting off a series of martial engagements between the Indonesian state apparatus and West Papuan Indonesian people. This has not stopped, more than two years later now.[475]

This epithet *monyet* (monkey) bears within the national situation of Indonesia a specific and significant symbolic historicality. For this same slur forms one of the first and strongest concentrated navels of narrative in Pramoedya Ananta Toer's novel *Bumi Manusia* (*Earth of Mankind*), which is perhaps the most widely recognized Indonesian novel writ large.[476] There, the calling out of the slur *monyet* constitutes the very distortion that bears the origination of the name of the novel's protagonist. This is the name Minke. Many readers have thought that Minke personifies the idea of the emergence of an Indonesian people and nation for Pram.[477]

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[472] '*Dosa*' can be translated as 'sin,' 'transgression,' or 'guilt.'

[473] Surabaya, located in the region of East Java, is thus outside of the region of West Papua. On the question of race and sovereignty of West Papuans in Indonesia, see Maryani Palupy Rasidjan, "Population Anxiety in Black Papua: The Politics of Reproduction and Racialization in Peripheral Indonesia" (PhD diss., University of California San Francisco, 2019).

[474] See Alfian Putra Abdi, "Kisah Penangkapan 42 Orang di Asrama Papua Surabaya Versi Mahasiswa," *Tirto.id,* August 17, 2019, https://tirto.id/kisah-penangkapan-42-orang-di-asrama-papua-surabaya-versi-mahasiswa-eguq.

[475] One day while working on this dissertation in November 2021, I read that Mama Agustina had been killed in the Mamba village in the Intan Jaya region of West Papua.

[476] *Bumi Manusia* (1980) is a novel composed, first orally, by Pramoedya as a political prisoner before he was allowed access to a typewriter which was sent to him by Jean-Paul Sartre.

[477] See Hilmar Farid, "Rewriting the Nation: Pramoedya and the Politics of Decolonization" (PhD diss., National University of Singapore, 2014). Minke is a literary representation of Tirto Adhi Soerdjo (c.1880 – 1918). This dissertation regularly refers to Pramoedya Ananta Toer as 'Pram' as was done by all those with whom this researcher spoke during the period of research.

Bumi Manusia, as all readers of its first page find, opens with the protagonist and narrator introducing himself by saying "orang memanggil aku: Minke" ("people call me Minke").[478] This formulation, we note, is essentially unlike René Descartes' well-known "cogito ergo sum" ("I think therefore I am"), for this protagonist of *Bumi Manusia* identifies himself as being called by others, not himself. This 'I' asks the reader, who am I? and answers, "mystery!" ("*Misteri!*").[479] With such an opening, the meaning of the name of the person and the reason for its emergence enters as a refusal, deferral, and concealment.

The novel itself discloses the reason for this mysterious name and naming. The reason for this 'mystery' not only points out but also critiques what Althusserians call ideological and repressive state apparatuses.[480] For Minke's 'strange' or 'mysterious' name is explained by the story of how the bearer of the state apparatus interpellates subjects with ideological, not physical, names and anthropologies. The disclosure of the naming of Minke thus sheds light on the practices of state apparatuses within the process of modern colonization as well as Indonesian interventions which disrupt their ideological reproduction.

The novel commences with Minke as a young Javanese boy attending the Dutch colonial school as a colonial subject of the Dutch East Indies in 1899. As a so-called 'native' ('*pribumi*') in Dutch colonial schools, he is, amongst his schoolmates, classified as beneath the so-called 'pure Europeans' or so-called '*Indo*,' meaning approximately 'mixed.' This appearance of a hierarchical set of relations is such that Minke is, as a 'native,' in the 'lowest' rank *within* the state apparatus of the school while being at once in a 'high' rank *within* the so-called natives in the colony writ large. This is because only the 'highest' so-called natives even enter the ideological state apparatus of the colonial schools. Minke's very existence in school – what Althusser called the ideological state apparatus *par excellence* – presents a mode of inversion of the racial apartheid advanced by state apparatuses in modern colonization.[481]

The mystery of the name of Minke is unconcealed in an utterance of hateful speech by the bearer of the state apparatus as personified by the schoolteacher. This Dutch teacher, Mr. Rooseboom, frustrated with the so-called native Javanese boy in the imperial Dutch school, calls-out to him, "Quiet you monke…*Minke!*" ("Diam kau, monk…Minke!")[482]

The teacher was on the way to calling him a monkey, but rather than saying monkey, his own act of speech distorted his own speaking and its resulting discourse itself thereby. The telling of the utterance evinces an attempt to stop itself in its own speaking *after* Rooseboom had already acted to call out with a zoological-political-metaphysical racist epithet. The result, *Minke,* is the appearance of the *failed* canceling out of what was intended to be an insult, *monyet*. The name materially evinces the racist ideology of the capitalist state in the conditions of modern colonization. The name Minke thus holds up and remembers an action with which the imperial state apparatus calls out in a denigrating slurring.

In the text often known as *De Anima,* Aristotle describes the action of touch, as distinguished from sight and sound, as when one's body is not affected *by* but *along with* the medium. Aristotle's example of this touch is not a lover's embrace, but as when the body is struck from the outside by a sword that penetrates through the shield that protects the outside of the

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[478] Toer, *Bumi Manusia*, 1; Toer, *This Earth of Mankind,* 15.
[479] Toer, *This Earth of Mankind*, 15; *Bumi Manusia*, 1.
[480] For an originary formulation regarding state apparatuses, see Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism,* 232-72.
[481] Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism,* 142 ff.
[482] Toer, *This Earth of Mankind,* 39; Toer, *Bumi Manusia*, 28.

human body.[483] Rooseboom's utterance identifies how the bearer of the ideological state apparatus in modern colonization calls-out in this martial manner and crashes through the soul's shield.

Pram tells moreover how the students naturally knew exactly what was intended by the interpellation, and thereby began to use it as the denigrating appellation for the narrator. Pram writes, "Sejak itu, seluruh klas yang baru mengenal aku, memanggil aku Minke, satu-satunya Pribumi."[484] This can be translated, "Since then, the whole class just meeting me called me Minke, the only native person." The name emerges thus not only from Rooseboom's mouth, but also in its transmission by the school-children of modern colonization who grow in these conditions. This telling thus can be understood as a critique of the reproduction, rather than simply the production, of the capitalist mode of production by Pram. The naming of *Minke* is not only about the so-called past of colonial racial apartheid systems and their discourses, but also the present and presence of the human being itself.

In 2019, the policeman in Surabaya, wearing the uniform of the Indonesian state apparatus and calling out to another Indonesian citizen-subject people as 'monkey' (*monyet*) returns to and repeats the 'political' practices that western European state apparatuses perpetuated throughout the human world in the process of modern colonization. There is however an important difference between this literary exposition and the one which took place in the city itself. In 2019 in Surabaya, the slur and interpellation is without a 'literary' formulation as a failed repression and transformation into a 'spoken dialect' as in Pram's imagination. For in 2019, the zoological-metaphysical epithet was instead spoken 'plainly' by the bearer of the repressive state apparatus. A hate unconcealed and unadorned.

This repetition and difference of calling-out *monyet* ought to unseat recourse to evolutionary or historiographical periodizations that aim to absolutely separate between colonialism as a superseded past and postcolonialism as its future. For this event testifies to the ongoingness of the zoological, political, and linguistic technique whereby the state in late capitalist modes of production – what Marx calls 'systematic colonization' in the limit of *Capital* – hails an anthropological apartheid. The state apparatus of modern colonization thus finds not barbarians but animals ('others') as its strangers within.

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During the charged political moments which followed the widespread making known of this epithet and dormitory attack in Surabaya, Eka Kurniawan, a novelist of significant national regard and who wrote his Master's thesis on the works of Pram, published a small opinion piece in the *Jawa Pos* newspaper entitled "*Max Havelaar dan Dosa Kolektif*." We can preliminarily translate this title as "*Max Havelaar* and Collective Sin."

In order to make sense of this hailing epithet in Surabaya, Kurniawan turns to *Max Havelaar,* a novel published in 1860, and which Pram is often recalled for having called "the novel

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[483] Aristotle writes, "But there remains this difference between what can be touched and what can be seen or can sound; in the latter two cases we perceive because the medium produces a certain effect upon us, whereas in the perception of objects of touch we are affected not *by* but *along with* the medium; it is as if a man were struck through his shield, where the shock is not first given to the shield and passed on to the man, but the concussion of both is simultaneous [423b12]," quoted in Joan Copjec, "The Imaginal World and Modern Oblivion: Kiarostami's Zig-Zag" *Filozofski Vestnik* 37, no. 2 (2016): 56.

[484] Toer, *Bumi Manusia*, 28.

that killed colonialism."[485] In the essay, Kurniawan elucidates how *Max Havelaar* not only exposits collective sin or collective guilt in its own discourse, but more specifically how *reading* the novel can activate a healing of a collective sin or guilt.

Kurniawan first underscores the fundamental importance if not popularity of *Max Havelaar* in both the Netherlands *and* Indonesia for more than one century. The novel thus bears a division at the level of a national conscience. On this matter Kurniawan recounts a conversation he had with an elderly Dutchman. That man said to him that the novel "opened our [ed: Dutch, not Indonesian] consciousness that we had made wrong in the colonial land."[486] Kurniawan characterizes the mode of this man's description as follows. The book mechanically opens consciousness like a water tap; the resulting body does not become massive all at once, but the longer it stays open, the more water pools there and thus the greater is its bodily weight.

After introducing this figure, Kurniawan counters that this mechanical image is not right. He then presents a figure that is of the human body and mind at once. He writes that the book "opened boiling sores growing on one's own body" ("*membuka borok diri*").[487] *Borok* are ulcers, boils, sores. *Diri* indicates that these are ulcers on one's own body. The novel, Kurniawan identifies, makes known the existence of collective sores. Reading the work is a process by which the human being can heal these self-sores. Kurniawan writes that with *Max Havelaar,* one is directly confronted with a "self-reflection that for injustice and oppression, one of the perpetrators is ourselves."[488] Of course this awakening does not happen for all of its Dutch readers, but its number is not too few either, he notes.

Kurniawan writes that he had an experience with his *borok diri* when reading *Saksi Mata* ("Eyewitness"), written by Seno Gumira Ajidarma in the 1990s during the period of Suharto's rule. *Saksi Mata*, written neither exclusively in the genre of literature or journalism but both at once, recounts the Indonesian state apparatus' occupation of East Timor and particularly the event that is named the Santa Cruz massacre of November 1991.[489] Reading the book touched on a communally held guilt for Kurniawan. This was not because there were stories of torture as such, but instead, he said, because he could see his own face in the people who were doing the torture. Reading the book made us nervous (*daya gugah*), he said.[490] Nervousness makes known something to which we are involved even if we are not directly involved.[491] Reading *Saksi Mata* facilitated the activity of the superego for Kurniawan.

From this literary exposition, Kurniawan then brings us into the presence of the uprisings against the Indonesian state apparatus that moved between the 2019 Surabaya dormitory storming to the mass movement of protest against the "*Omnibus Bill*." This surge resulted in the direct martial confrontation of the state apparatuses and the people on the streets of Indonesian cities throughout the country. Kurniawan states that reading is not ancillary to this 'political' process. The confrontation with collective sin or guilt (*dosa kolektif*) harbors the possibility to transform the identification of the superego (and, therefore, the 'ego'). Nervousness, anxiety, and shame facilitate this process. Kurniawan writes:

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[485] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "The Book that Killed Colonialism," *New York Times,* April 18, 1999.
[486] Eka Kurniawan, "*Max Havelaar dan Dosa Kolektif," Jawa Pos*, December 10, 2018. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Indonesian into English in this dissertation are my own.
[487] Eka Kurniawan, "*Max Havelaar dan Dosa Kolektif*."
[488] Ibid.
[489] See Seno Gumira Ajidarma, *Saksi Mata* (Yogyakarta: Bentang Budaya, 1994).
[490] Kurniawan, "*Max Havelaar dan Dosa Kolektif*."
[491] See Lacan, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," 208 ff.

> Political elites are often the last to have shame for their sins. However, a group of ordinary citizens can move first and force them. Start reading about Reformation, Munir, and Papua right now. It will embarrass us indeed as the Dutch feel embarrassed reading *Max Havelaar*. But we have to get through it.[492]

This reading by Kurniawan helps situate a central hypothesis of this chapter. This is that the novel *Max Havelaar; or, the Coffee Auctions of a Dutch Trading Company* (1860) 'develops' the discourse of the critique of political economy specifically in its limit that is "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." The novel, we argue, not only points out but facilitates a transformation in the modes of subjection and domination which are advanced in modern colonization. The novel, we suggest, thus bears therapeutic properties for modern colonization and this is not meant in a spiritualist manner. The form of activity that generates this effectivity and healing is the action of reading.[493] In order to understand the significance of this intervention, we will have to enter deep into the text to be able to grasp the notion of its self-ulcers and the understandings which are introduced while healing these boils.

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We begin with a brief note on names. Max Havelaar is the name of one of the primary protagonists of the novel. The novel's complete name is *Max Havelaar, Or the Coffee Auctions of a Dutch Trading Company*. The novel was authored, published, and circulated under a pseudonym, "Multatuli." This pseudonym was chosen by the living author, Eduard Douwes Dekker (b. 1820 – 1887).

For the most part, this chapter forgoes recapitulating the novel's entire title after the name Max Havelaar that is "Or, the Coffee Auctions of a Dutch Trading Company." This is not to minimize the importance of the form of the title. On the contrary, the title shows *how* the character masks in the limit of the capitalist mode of production, i.e., systematic colonization, are not only 'exchanged' but 'changed.' For the title, *Max Havelaar, Or the Coffee Auctions of a Dutch Trading Company* (1860), with its conjugation of an 'or,' shows that an anthropological name *is* an equivalence with a commodity auction of a national society, association, and trading company. This titular form of the exchange of a person and a posterior predication or attribution is not the personal invention of Dekker. In the 17th century, Aphra Behn entitled her novel *Oroonoko, or the Royal Slave* (1688), and in the 18th century Samuel Richardson wrote, *Clarissa, or the History of a Lady* (1748). And yet these earlier titles use the 'or' in such a manner that provides a description or definition of a person (e.g., 'royal slave', 'a lady'). With *Max Havelaar*, on the other hand, the titular exchange via the 'or' can no longer be thought through a 'theoretical humanist' enframement. For this man is instead exchanged with the stock market exchanges of a commodity trading company. The title thus exposits an anthropology of *verwechseln.* This is a change *in* equivalence. The title thus brings forth, unlike in the titles of Richardson or Behn, a minimal 'theoretical antihumanism.' This will bear important effects for understanding the

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[492] Kurniawan, "*Max Havelaar dan Dosa Kolektif*."

[493] This is not a novel notion or phenomenon. A manuscript of *Hikayat Andaken Penurat,* a 'classical' Javanese tale, relays in its own beginning that the hearing of the telling of its story heals the body in pain. Its poet writes, "maka hilanglah pertjintaannya, sebab mendengar hikayat inilah jang meliputi dendam dan berahi sekalian, astamewa jang ada menaruh rindu dendam akan kekasihnya," for which the translator Robson gives "his grief will vanish because hearing this *hikayat,* which can soothe all feelings of yearning and desire, especially in those who may be longing for a loved one." *Hikayat Andaken Penurat,* ed. Stuart Robson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 21, 65.

particular way that the critique of political economy allows one to grasp the relation of temporality and truth.

The particular recapitulation of the name of the novel in this chapter is done for two reasons. Firstly, during the period of dissertation research, those with whom this researcher spoke referred to the novel exclusively as *Max Havelaar*. Secondly, the historical commentary of the work has tended to refer to it as *Max Havelaar,* and we seek entry into this world's conventions. Thus, we refer to the novel primarily with the name preceding its second clause coupled with its Roman calendrical numeration, in order to distinguish it clearly from other works bearing the same name, as "*Max Havelaar* (1860)."

We also note that the engagement with *Max Havelaar* (1860) in this dissertation is not guided by a philological but instead an ethnographic method of research and exposition. The *Somalaing* sculpture studio in Jakarta, in which this ethnographic research was based from 2016 – 2020, received a request and in turn accepted the commission to create sculptures and a sculpture garden for the inaugural opening of the Multatuli Museum in Rangkasbitung, Banten Province in 2018. The principal work of this sculpture garden is a megalithic sculpture which is referred to in this dissertation as *Multatuli* (2017). It is the primary work of the museum's sculpture garden. The name, Multatuli, thus formed a primary name throughout the period of ethnographic dissertation research.

Multatuli (2017) was the largest sculpture, as measured by its weight, that the *Somalaing* studio had ever produced. It weighs 400 kilograms and is made of bronze and nickel. A second *Multatuli* (2019), made with a much lighter fiberglass material, was fabricated with the same mould and was set into the ground to stand on a corner of a square on the University of Indonesia campus in Depok, West Java province in 2019. Under the second *Multatuli* (2019), there appears an exscript in the sculpture's pediment from the novel. It reads, "Karena aku tidak bermaksud untuk menulis dengan baik. Aku ingin menulis agar didengar." This can be translated as, "Because I didn't aim to write well. I want to write to be heard."[494]
This dissertation chapter aims to identify the concept exscribed there. In doing so, we suggest that this exscribing is an act of inversion that *Max Havelaar* (1860) advances into the foundation of the critique of political economy in Indonesia. The chapter argues that this mode of inversion does not simply repeat the mode of the analysis of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," but instead 'develops' this thinking into an act of interpellation. This mode of action can be preliminarily sighted by Michel Foucault's reading of the concept of παρρησία in Greek philosophy, ethics, or thinking.[495] We argue that this parrhesia is an overturning of itself; it aims to overthrow its own ideological formation in which its own action is itself at home. This can therefore be called ideological struggle.

2. The Critique of Political Economy and Ideological State Apparatuses

To take a step back again, we first want to note that it has often been said that those who are looking for a theory of the state or politics in Marx's writings will not find it in *Capital*.[496] Part

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[494] Dekker's Dutch is, "Want het was me niet te doen om *goed* te schryven…ik wilde zóó schryven dat het gehoord werd." Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of, de Koffiveilingen der Nederlandsche Maatschappij* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1896), 255. Cited hereafter as "*Max Havelaar, of, de Koffiveilingen der Nederlandsche Maatschappij*." This is the ninth edition which is based on the seventh edition that was, the title page notes, revised by his widow (*weduwe*). Whereas the whole Dutch passage is in a past tense, the second Indonesian sentence can be read as either a past or present tense of action.
[495] See Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech* (Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e), 2001).
[496] See Fredric Jameson, *Representing Capital* (New York: Verso, 2011), 2.

One of this dissertation, on the other hand, identified in Louis Althusser's 1978 rereading of *Capital* a theory and practice of politics in the way that its so-called 'concrete historical' order of discourse interrupts and overturns its 'pure theoretical' order in its own limits. In doing so, we identified the importance of "The Modern Theory of Colonization" to the project of the critique of political economy writ large. Our analysis indicated that *Capital* identifies the fundamental importance of that which is just beyond the limit of *Capital*'s exposition that is the mode of production which emerges in the New Worlds.

As such, '*how* Marx *thinks*' in the limit of *Capital* is crucial for understanding how this limit can be overtaken. As we saw in Part One of this dissertation, two significant postwar rereadings of *Capital* have *theoretically* pre-predicated the importance of "The Modern Theory of Colonization" to the project of the critique of political economy.[497] We saw that the relation of the origin and limit is crucial for both Marx and Hegel. In Hegel's systems, this difference governs the appearance of the truth of the concept. In *Capital*, as both Althusser and the *Neue Marx Lektüre* school argue, the 'structure' of its exposition indicates the impossibility of the appearance of the truth of the concept. For the *concept* does *not* reveal *itself* in *Capital*. Whereas Hegel sees the unity of the end and origin as a circle, *Capital* sees the form of motion of the commodity as an ellipse.

But even such physical forms of unity are not adequate to the analysis that Marx brings forth in the end of *Capital* in the chapters on "So-called Primitive Accumulation" and "The Modern Theory of Colonization." For "The Modern Theory of Colonization" demonstrates that the 'process of divorce' at the heart of the capitalist mode of production is not auto-poetically generated by capital itself. The limit of *Capital* instead is a contestation between the tendency towards the equalization of individual capitals, which Marx calls an 'anti-capitalist cancer,' and the disruption of this process by 'original' accumulation. In Part One of the dissertation, we argued that this notion of modern colonization is not, pace David Harvey, a spatial concept for Marx. 'Modern colonization' instead is for Marx a moment in the capitalist process when the state aims to surreptitiously facilitate the expropriation of the individual producer. We therefore hypothesize that a theory of politics is in no way 'missing' from the 'limit' of *Capital.* As Marx identifies in "The Modern Theory of Colonization," the colonizing state cannot itself absolutely control the conjuncture of its 'home' capitals and wage labourers.

In this dissertation chapter, we argue that *Max Havelaar* (1860) contributes to this critique of political economy by interrupting the ideological reproduction of state apparatuses in its limit, that is, the process of modern colonization. The chapter demonstrates that *Max Havelaar* (1860) does this by identifying that the process of modern colonization does not 'reproduce' a binary schema of capitalists and wage labourers. It is instead rather comprised by an indirect force and relation binding colonial bureaucrats, European stockbrokers, and the expropriated. They are interrelated elements in a process of the production of capital and commodity relations by an 'exchange' that is a 'mistaking' of the process of purchasing and selling labour-power. Like *Capital,* the discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860), we argue, inhabits the action of this 'mistaking' in order to make possible a mode of thinking that does not simply reproduce the mode of domination from which it draws its own *Forschung.*

In Part I of this dissertation, we saw that Kevin Anderson, in his *Marx at the Margins* (2010), attempts to exculpate Marx from the historical judgment as a 'Eurocentrist.' Anderson argues that Marx was not only well aware of 'non-western' social formations, but he moreover increasingly sought to understand them in the years after publishing *Capital* and before his death.

[497] See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

The effort of this dissertation can be said to bear an inverted orientation. Rather than suggesting that Marx harbors an underappreciated interest in and knowledge of 'non-western' societies, we suggest here that the very concept of 'The Modern Theory of Colonization' dissipates such a spatialized concept as the 'non-western.' This chapter argues that *Max Havelaar* (1860) does not present a *theoretical* treatise regarding modern colonization; instead, like the limits of *Capital* which Althusser identifies in 1978, its discourse aims to overturn rather than simply recapitulate the 'pure theoretical' concepts of the capitalist mode of production. As such, the concept in *Max Havelaar* (1860) therefore bears down on the ideology, rather than the space, of the limit of the capitalist mode of production that is modern colonization.

3. Protagonicity and Pseudonymity of *Max Havelaar* (1860)

It is important at this outset to identify that *Max Havelaar* (1860) has historically been appropriated for myriad and even 'directly opposite' ideological camps. Seemingly every possible interpretative stance has been adopted by readers of the work. For some, the novel is the summit of 19th century, if not all, Dutch literature. For others, it is ramblings of a misanthropic madman.[498] As noted above, Pram entitled a short essay on the novel, "The Book that Killed Colonialism."

We recall as well that Dekker wrote *Max Havelaar* (1860) in Brussels in 1859. The novel was first published in the Netherlands in 1860. Marx wrote the *Capital* manuscripts primarily from 1861 to 1863 in London. *Das Kapital* was first published in Hamburg in 1867. It seems that Marx did not read or comment on *Max Havelaar* (1860).[499] We also recollect that *Max Havelaar* (1860) was significant for the first Indonesian nationalist generation, as the work presents manifest content of a rebellion against Dutch imperialism and colonialism.[500]

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To orient our reading of *Max Havelaar* (1860), we will examine the remarks of the late Benedict Anderson on the novel, published in 2006, 35 years after his first book, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946* (1971). Given the impact of his work on the field of Indonesian studies and more broadly, we use his reflection on *Max Havelaar* (1860) to situate our reflection. Before attending to Anderson's exposition, we first bring forth an academic treatment of the novel by a non-Indonesian specialist, Anne-Marie Feenberg, in her writing, "'Max Havelaar'*:* An Anti-Imperialist Novel" published in the *Modern Language Notes* journal in 1997. This late 20th century interpretation provides us with an orientation point for reading Anderson's reflection.

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[498] But of all the Manichean distinctions lobbed at and drawn from the novel, the one that perhaps defines it more than any other is: fact or fiction, true or false. The depth and durability of this questioning can be understood as an effect of the attribute of the discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860) which, like *Capital*, aims to introduce a truth into conditions of discourse which are characterized by the necessary non-appearance of that truth. To do this, *Capital* and *Max Havelaar* (1860) forge a 'fiction.' Fiction however is not something fanciful. Fiction instead is the form for something which is made. This 'fictional' unity of *Max Havelaar* (1860), like *Capital*, identifies that the unconcealment of truth in the conditions of its necessary occlusion involves the 'deconstruction' of its own ideological appearance.
[499] Dekker knew the work of Heinrich Heine (b. 1797- 1856). Heine was a frequent contact of Marx while he was in Paris in 1844. See Stathis Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx* (New York: Verso, 2018 [2003]).
[500] Martin Aleida identifies this in his "Joshua: Multatuli Jilid Dua," which is examined in chapter 7 of this dissertation.

Feenberg recalls Edward Said's comment that *Max Havelaar* (1860) is a very unusual, perhaps entirely anomalous, novel in 19th century European novels.[501] She recounts that Said said that unlike so many other 19th century European novels, *Max Havelaar* is *not* a novel informed by and informing the imperialist vision and imaginary.[502] She calls this an anti-imperialist vision. Like nearly every commentator of this novel, Feenberg explicitly remarks on the 'chaotic' structure of the novel. Pram said, "Dekker's style is far from *halus*."[503] *Halus* means subtle, delicate, refined. Our argument here first follows Feenberg and then diverges from this dominant line of thinking. We argue that the form or structure of *Max Havelaar* (1860) instead bears a unity akin to the one Althusser finds in *Capital*, which is an internal dislocation of its own 'pure theoretical' mode of discourse by its 'concrete historical' order. This facilitates, we suggest, the ideological struggle of the text.

This so-called chaotic structure of the novel can be preliminary introduced as follows. The novel presents itself as a 'strange' relation of two narrators. One is the eponymic hero, Max Havelaar. The other is a 'rational miser' coffee broker, Batavus Droogstoppel. And yet an unpaid intern in Droogstoppel's coffee trading firm, Ludwig Stern, composes the novel under terms of a contract which themselves appear within the novel. But this is not all. At the very end of the work, this dually masked protagonicity is overturned so that the 'real' author can appear who is neither Havelaar nor Droogstoppel. And yet this 'true' narrator, Multatuli, is itself a pseudonym. This is thus a complex but not, we suggest, 'chaotic' formation of protagonicity. These 'protagonistic' bearers and relations instead *unite in and as a commodity form* that is the book *Max Havelaar* (1860). Rather than chaos, the structure discloses that the novel's own discourse *is* a commodity form itself. Pseudonymity is thereby not disingenuously excised from the novel's exposition. On the contrary, the novel articulates a determinate rejection of the concept of an unriven anthropological bearer in the conditions of systematic colonization.

With this in mind, we can return to Edward Said's characterization of the peculiarity of *Max Havelaar* (1860) in lacking an imperialist world-view. For in the Indonesian national context, this novel has been criticized, both for its critical (meaning here assuming the position of an adverse partisan) portrayal of the colonial system, with its revelation that the Dutch *and* Javanese aristocracy together worked towards ensuring the suffering of poor Javanese peasants, *as well as* for its purportedly 'Eurocentric' viewpoint and epistemology, which "imposes a Western notion of justice on an Asian feudal system."[504] It has been thus criticized for being *at once* 'for' *and* 'against' the peculiar European *social contrat*.[505] These parallel lines of criticism suggest that the novel bears *neither* a 'European' *nor* a 'native' standpoint. This is because, we suggest, *Max Havelaar* (1860) instead brings about the unconcealment of the truth of classical political economy predicated by Marx in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" through its critique of the *process* of modern colonization. Said's imputation of the novel's repudiation of the 'imperialist vision'

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[501] Anne-Marie Feenberg, "'Max Havelaar': An Anti-Imperialist Novel," *MLN* 112, no. 5 (1997): 819. We want to suggest here that it is a mistake to classify *Max Havelaar* (1860) as a *European* novel. If one needs to spatially categorize, it could be called a 'global,' 'colonial,' or proleptically 'Indonesian' novel. At the same time, it is important to note that it not written 'from the native's point of view' (Malinowski). The novel instead situates an internally contradictory viewpoint. This tension generates the dramatic presentation of its object.

[502] Feenberg, "'Max Havelaar': An Anti-Imperialist Novel," 820.

[503] Toer, "The Book that Killed Colonialism," in Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, or, the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2019), xii.

[504] Feenberg, "'Max Havelaar': An Anti-Imperialist Novel," 821. See the final section of this chapter for a discussion of this question in Robert Nieuwenhuys' *Mirror of the Indies* [1972].

[505] The basis of these criticisms is an epistemology which inscribes the Indies *as* 'Asian' or 'feudal' in mutually exclusive contradiction to a 'Western' or 'European' notion of justice.

grasps this fundamental attribute. For the novel undermines, we suggest, recourse to the symmetrization and spatialization under the concept of 'the world' as comprised by a duality named 'Europe' and 'the colonies.'

The novel's intervention in and on the ideology of classical political economy can be preliminarily glimpsed by looking to the form of the pseudonym Multatuli. For while the novel's title and 'body' is in Dutch, its pseudonymous author bears a Latin or Latinate name. This displacement thus introduces a minimal intervention into the novel's own contemporary region of discourse that is its Dutch language. Many commentators, including Benedict Anderson, have recollected the 'origination' of this pseudonym with reference to the names and writings of Horace and Paul of Tarsus, to whom we turn below. Authorial pseudonyms, we also recall, flourished particularly in the conditions of modern colonization of the 19th and 20th centuries in the so-called Dutch East Indies. For pseudonyms and their concomitant artificial and fraudulent form of appearance allowed authors to write and bear witness in ways that warded off the hailing intrusion of the colonial state apparatus.[506] This preliminary elucidation suggests that *Max Havelaar* (1860), like *Capital*, foregrounds the practical question of unconcealing truth in the process of modern colonization.

Part I. Thick Description of *Max Havelaar* (1860)

1. On *Verwechseln*

We now bring forth a thick description of the novel.[507]

The first epigraph of the novel is a dedication to the wife of the author, "Everdine Huberte, Baroness van Wijnbergen, Faithful wife, Loving Mother, Noble Woman."[508] It is written in French in the original Dutch edition. It begins, "I have often heard the wives of poets pitied."[509] They must have the "rarest collection of excellences."[510] The poet lays laurels at the feet of his wife, "in the lap of the Antigone who acts as guide to the blind wanderer through this world."[511] We read,

> For...make no mistake: nearly all Homer's grandsons are more or less blind, in their way. They see what we do not see; their gaze pierces higher and deeper than ours; but they cannot see the homely highroad which is straight in front of them, and they might stumble and come to grief over the merest pebble if they had no support in plodding through these valleys of prose in which the lines of human life are laid.[512]

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[506] Throughout his "Buru Quartet," Pramoedya shows that anonymous pamphlets distributed a kind of forbidden knowledge in the colony and allowed a kind of thinking to exist that could not be thought without the imputation of pseudonyms. The novels thus formalize the problem that the true report necessarily bears itself as pseudonym.
[507] See Geertz, "Thick Description."
[508] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, Or, the Coffee Auctions of a Dutch Trading Company* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1987), 17. Cited hereafter as "*Max Havelaar.*"
[509] Ibid.
[510] Ibid.
[511] Ibid.
[512] Ibid.

This opening port of the text articulates both that writing transforms the sight of the seer, but also that this is impossible without the worldly support who here is the writer's wife. This fragment is, we note, attributed to another pseudonym of Dekker, Henry De Pène.

There is a second epigraph preceding the text of the novel which is of utmost importance. One of the most well-known episodes in the entire novel, it articulates a critique of the concept and practice of the juridical state apparatus. We argued in Part I of this dissertation that the critique of political economy introduces, in part, its critical effects by the way that its discourse generates 'humorous' affects that disturb the relation of the mind and body of the reader.[513] This scene can be understood likewise with this guideline.

The scene is a dialogue in a courtroom from an 'unpublished play.' A court officer brings the accused, Lothario, before the judge. The court officer tells the judge, this is the man who killed Babbie, he must hang. Lothario pleads his innocence. I have a witness, he says. The judge repeats, "you must hang!"[514] The witness is Babbie herself. Babbie enters; "I am Babbie" ("*Ik ben Barbertje*").[515] Lothario hasn't killed me, she pleads. On the contrary. "he is a noble man!" ("*hy is 'n edel mensch!*")[516] Lothario protests, "she says I am good man" ("*zo zegt dat ik 'n goed mensch ben*").[517] But the judge will not interrupt his practice or thinking. The judge repeats, he must hang. The judge says, he is guilty (*schuldig*) of "*eigenwaan*."[518] Roy Edwards translates "*eigenwaan*" as "conceit." *Waan* is delusion; thus, 'self-delusion' is also warranted here. The final line from the judge is "Recorder, cite in the preamble the judgement of *Lessing's* Patriarch."[519] The reference is to Gotthold Lessing's play, *Nathan the Wise* (1779), where the Patriarch of Jerusalem refuses all mercy for Nathan, saying "no matter, the Jew shall burn!"[520]

With this 'humorous' opening, the novel articulates a critique of the reproduction of ideology born by the activity of the juridical and judicial state apparatus. For this opening epigraphic passage exposits the irrational obduracy of injustice with a paradox. The judge convicts Lothario against the manifest facts of reason. With this epigraph, Dekker foregrounds that judicial verdicts are not epi-phenomenal but rather the heart of the matter for this social formation. The scene teaches that the cause of the verdict rendered in the courtroom comes from elsewhere than the facts that can be presented there. The work thus begins by pointing to 'justice' *as* injustice itself.

After these tempestuous epigraphs, the first sentence of the novel is: "I am a coffee broker and I live at No. 37 Lauriergracht, Amsterdam."[521] This first line forms a parapet for the individualism that is both examined and ruthlessly critiqued throughout the novel. This first-person narration continues: "I am not in the habit of writing novels of that sort… I don't even like reading such things, because I'm a businessman. For years I've been asking myself what is the use of them, and I am amazed at the impudence with which a poet or a story-teller dares to palm

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[513] Humorous here meaning of and related to the humors.
[514] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 18.
[515] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 18; Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of, de Koffiveilingen der Nederlandsche Maatschappij,* 1.
[516] Ibid.
[517] Ibid.
[518] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of, de Koffiveilingen der Nederlandsche Maatschappij,* 1.
[519] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 18.
[520] Ibid, 327. This is identified by Roy Edwards in a Translator Note. This scene becomes a common Dutch expression as "*Barbertje moet hangen*" ("Babbie must hang"). It is a parapraxis and inversion whereby the victim of the deed becomes the victim of justice. This is the activity of scapegoating.
[521] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 19. René Descartes' famous "cogito ergo sum" was also published originally in Amsterdam.

off on you something that never happened, and usually never *could* happen."[522] The story thus opens by identifying that it is itself forbidden and moreover could not happen.[523] The broker continues:

> If I, in *my* line - I am a coffee broker, and I live at 37 Lauriergracht - gave a statement to a principal - a principal's someone who sells coffee - which contained only a small portion of the untruths that form the greater part of all poems and novels, he would transfer his business to Bussellinck & Waterman at once. They are coffee brokers too, but you don't need to know their address.[524]

This broker posits that he *is* his profession. This notion is repeated throughout the work.[525] He moreover complains that novels are filled with untruths. If you pedaled such untruths in the work of coffee exchange, you would lose your business. This statement introduces a separation between the world of commercial exchange supposedly composed by truth or facts and novels as supposedly composed of untruths. This demarcation is critically critiqued by the novel. For the discursive practice of the broker is shown to be caused not by truth but instead by the drive for profit and thereby the activity of warding off the profit of one's competitors.

This broker locates the demarcation of the true and the false by this action on '*de beurs*.' Edwards translates this as "'Change," as in a slang expression that means 'the exchange,' but excising the 'ex-' prefix particle.[526] It is 'the market,' but also the name of 'the fairground.' It is the place of the fair and market exchange, animated by desire, display, and deception.

The coffee broker *states* that if one presents 'untrue' statements on the market, you "go down."[527] This happens, he states, because one took the "wrong course" in one's "youth."[528] This is a Calvinist understanding of destiny: you give yourself your fate through your own actions. Against such 'wrong' practices, he proclaims: "*truth* and *common sense* - that's what I say and I'm sticking to it."[529] And yet the 'going downs' of the market in the novel are *not* caused by straying from moral rectitude. The novel thus exposits this 'theoretical humanist' determinate fiction in order to unmask its conceit that the stock market is the place of truth and novels are composed by untruth.[530]

This opening passage identifies a fundamental attribute that the novel shares with *Capital*. For while the novel and *Capital* deliver a critique of bourgeois ideology, neither situate the bourgeoise exclusively in the place of the 'other.' Rather, this narrator, Batavus Droogstoppel, a 'typical' Dutchman, elucidates the Dutch bourgeois ideology by means of his own self

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[522] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 19; emphasis in Multatuli.
[523] Alain Badiou has argued in many places that *the event is ontologically forbidden*. See his *Being and Event*, 372-386.
[524] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 19; emphasis in Multatuli.
[525] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari called this mode of discursive repetition, particularly in 'minor' literature, a refrain or ritornello. It facilitates the return of the subject to itself. See their *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987[1980]). The ritornello in *Max Havelaar* (1860), 'I am a Coffee Broker,' exhibits that this man is not thought as in Descartes' 'cogito ergo sum.' As 'Ik ben makelaar in koffie,' man does not exist because he thinks; man exists because of his work.
[526] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 19.
[527] Ibid.
[528] Ibid.
[529] Ibid; emphasis in original.
[530] Ibid, 20. He refers to the popular children's stories of Van Alphen. In these stories, an old man says that he adores children. The story states that one's father is one's best friend, but Droogstoppel states that he was fonder of his neighbor, leading to his eruption of "nothing but lies! And that's how education goes on." *Max Havelaar,* 20.

presentation, from the syntactical viewpoint of an 'I am.' The novel thereby brings forth contradictions as 'immanent' to the discourse of bourgeois ideology itself. Like the way that Marx ventriloquizes the political economist by allowing them to speak themselves, Dekker likewise allows the ideology of the capitalist to bear its own burdens.

This protagonist and narrator's name, Batavus Droogstoppel, moreover bears rich nominal signification. Batavus is a personified ethnonym of the people who lived in what is now the Netherlands during ancient Roman times, the Batavi. Roy Edwards, the English language translator of the Penguin World Classics edition of the novel, gives a gloss implied by such a name: "ancient virtues, sturdy John Bull-like common sense, parochialism, crass materialism, block-headed stupidity, a 'backwoodsman's' attitude to life's problems."[531] Droogstoppel means literally 'Dry Stubble' as in 'dry as dust.' Taken together, Ben Anderson writes that this personal name personifies a "hypocritical, gasping, pompous, puritanical, and utterly provincial" person.[532] In his opening monologue, this character mask bellows: "Holland has remained *Holland* because our old folk attended to their business and because they had the true faith. That's all there is to it!"[533] The name Batavus Droogstoppel draws on these archetypal anthropologies while also being situated as a historically specific buyer and seller of commodities at market exchange in a trading company (*handelmaatschappij*).

This mentality proclaims that it reduces everything to a practical calculus. If, Droogstoppel opines, he falls into a canal in Amsterdam, he will pay a couple of stivers to a passerby to help him out, but not much more, stating "those not satisfied with less may leave me where I am."[534] He then reasons, "only on Sunday I'd be prepared to give a little more, though, because then I wear my braided gold watch chain and a different coat."[535] The sentence lucidly evinces how vestments generate (and vary) the perception of one's worth.[536]

Writing novels and poetry appears to be antithetical to this mentality. He states, "if you want words to form fours, it's all right with me! But don't say anything that isn't true. 'The air is raw, the clock strikes four.' I'll let that pass, if it really *is* raw, and if it really *is* four o'clock …[T]he worst thing about such shows on the stage is that the public gets so accustomed to all these untruths that they admire them and applaud them."[537] The theater shows a torsion, rather than a directly mirrored opposition, with reality. A man doesn't marry an indigent woman 'in real life' he protests. "Virtue rewarded? If it was, wouldn't that make virtue an article of commerce? Things just aren't *like* that in the world, and it's a good thing they're not. For what merit would there be in virtue if it was rewarded?"[538] Droogstoppel gives the example of Luke, who is a worker in the warehouse. He is virtuous. He goes to Church and doesn't drink. But now that the warehouse needs young people, Luke cannot work. Droogstoppel explains that he cannot reward him for his virtue, because if everyone virtuous was rewarded, this would thwart God's intention to only mete reward for the good in the afterlife. And yet, "on the stage they twist

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[531] Ibid, 328.
[532] Benedict Anderson, "Max Havelaar" in *The Novel, Volume 2: Forms and Themes,* ed. Franco Moretti (Princeton: Princeton University, 2006), 453.
[533] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 20.
[534] Ibid, 21.
[535] Ibid, 22.
[536] In Part I of *Capital*, Marx identifies that in the capitalist mode of production, a man appears as 'more' when he appears in a coat with gold braids than when he is not in vestments adorned with gold braids.
[537] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 21.
[538] Ibid, 23; emphasis in Multatuli.

that around...all lies, abominable lies!"[539] It is this activity of fictional 'inversion' that so animates Droogstoppel's animosity.

Droogstoppel states that unlike in the expositions one finds in the theater, he only receives rewards from his own virtue in business. He writes,

> And, the fact that I *am* virtuous can be seen from my love of truth…And I should like you to be convinced of this, reader, because it is my excuse for writing this book…A second trait of mine...is my passion for my profession...well then reader it is my unimpeachable love of truth and my enthusiasm for business that you have to thank for these pages.[540]

The novel indeed is driven by the relation of truth and the coffee auctions of the Dutch trading company. And yet the novel delivers an overturning of the ideology which the broker espouses here, that is, that 'fiction' is fanciful, and the agents of the commodity markets are instead the speakers of truth. The novel thus splits its own discourse from within. It turns this 'love of truth' so that it brings about the falling of the ideological armor of Droogstoppel and the capitalist character mask, piece by piece, like rotten touchwood.

To conclude this first chapter's opening monologue, Droogstoppel then presents to the reader his name card. Put this in your pocket, he instructs. It bears the name of his firm, "Last & Co.". "Last" is his father-in-law and he is the "co." itself, he explains. His own given name does not appear; he appears only in the abbreviation of the word company in the name of a commodity trading firm. Thus, the first chapter opens with "Ik ben makelaar in koffie" ("I am a broker in coffee") and concludes with "Die Co. ben ik" ("That Co. is me").[541] We learn here both that his own profession as a broker came through his own marriage, but also that this 'I' character mask is a contraction and concentration of a 'company.'[542]

The exposition of this name card forms, we suggest, a primal scene in the work's contribution to the critique of political economy. This name-card presentation indicates a transformation in the form of discourse itself, for it presents another mode and material of discourse in and as the trading firm name card. This new mode of discourse is both separated and attached to the discourse which precedes it. Its presentation sheds light on the way that language and capital are, in this social formation and mode of production, so absolutely intertwined that the very place of the presentation of the 'I am' is disrupted, gives way, and *becomes* the typescript of commercial advertisement in the name card as "Last and Co.". With this presentation, the 'I am' becomes not even 'the company' but only 'Co.'. The individual is the 'Co.' in the action of advancing one's own name card.

This discourse is thus absolutely inhabited by capital and commodity relations. Capital and discourse have entered here into an internal relation. The form of value inhabits the words 'I am' and the family names themselves. This exchange or mis-taking *is* the appearance of discourse itself. With this discourse, language does not simply mete propositional content, but rather turns the commercial and human world.

Droogstoppel states that verse and the theater tell lies and avers that he instead loves the truth. He says that he will write this book because of his love for truth and that he is virtuous

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[539] Ibid, 24.
[540] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.
[541] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of de Koffiveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatchappij,* 6. '*Last*' in Dutch is also 'burden,' 'load,' 'charge,' 'bother,' or 'trouble.'
[542] Regarding kinship formations in the Dutch imperial colony of Batavia, see Jean Gelman Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and Eurasians in Colonial Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009[1981]).

because he loves the truth. His virtue can be seen from the rewards he receives from his business of coffee trading. Two important questions are foregrounded in this set up. The first, from Plato and Nietzsche as questioned again by Heidegger, is: does art tell lies? The second is: do rewards by the market evince virtue? This dissertation chapter articulates the novel's responses to both of these questions.

We begin to get a sense of these as Droogstoppel informs the reader about his rival coffee firm, Busselinck & Waterman. He says that they tried to undercut him by offering a slimmer percentage to his client, Ludwig Stern in Hamburg. Droogstoppel explains how he warded off his competition. He wrote to Stern and suggested that he give his son, Ernest Stern, a position at Last & Co. in Amsterdam so that his son can learn the coffee trade business.[543] Droogstoppel announces to Stern that his house serves the Lord, knowing that the Sterns are Lutherans. With this, Dekker brings forth a crucial lesson regarding the mode of kinship in the capitalist mode of production.[544] Droogstoppel seeks to gain the perpetuity of the exchange relationship with his client by offering to take the client's son as an apprentice. With this plan for a commercialized kinship relation, Droogstoppel is aiming to obstruct his client Stern from defecting to his competitor. The fraudulence of the market therefore inhabits not only 'self-perception' but also relations between people.

The next crucial turn in the novel occurs in the place of selling coffee at market. Droogstoppel brings himself into this market to inspect the coffee to see if he might be able to profit by its purchase.[545] Being dragged there by his desire to accumulate surplus value, he confesses, "I caught sight of a gentleman, who was standing in front of the bookshop next door and whom I thought I knew. He seemed to recognize me too, for our eyes kept meeting."[546] Droogstoppel was so taken with inspecting the coffee that he didn't realize then how 'shabbily' the man was dressed, leading him to call him Scarfman (*Sjaalman*). Had he grasped the man's poverty, he repeatedly insists, he would have left the man there. Droogstoppel quickly regrets opening himself to this man. For he states, he doesn't like poor people, because they must have done something to deserve it and because the Lord doesn't "forsake anyone who served Him faithfully."[547] While imagining the possibility of profiting from this encounter, "suddenly the idea occurred to me that [Scarfman] might be a traveler for a German firm."[548] Droogstoppel saw this other man as the means to gain. Thinking of him as a potential client, he gave him his company name card.

As their encounter continues to last, Droogstoppel realizes that they were indeed childhood acquaintances. In searching for this memory, Droogstoppel recollects the smell of perfume. Droogstoppel remembers and realizes that this stranger had rescued him. As a child, he went to the fair with his friends, where there was a beautiful girl whose father sold perfume. "Her father was Greek, too – at any rate, he looked like a Greek."[549] The children asked one another, who would speak to this beautiful girl? Droogstoppel was chosen by the others. The girl spoke

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[543] The commercial connection with Stern was made, Droogstoppel recounts, through Napoleon's Continental system. With this, Multatuli identifies this mode of deceit as a specifically Napoleonic mode of kinship.
[544] From this early moment of the novel, Droogstoppel constantly invokes his relationship with his son Frits. He repeatedly interpolates his speech with what Frits would say with his superior grasp of Dutch and English grammar.
[545] They are described as "middling, fine yellow Cirebon-type, a little broken, with sweepings, which greatly interested me." Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 27.
[546] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 27.
[547] Ibid, 28.
[548] Ibid.
[549] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 29.

first: "*plaît-il*?" ("what do you want?") He responded to her question with the first lines of the *Iliad* and Herodotus' *Histories*. Another boy shoved Droogstoppel into her. He was then grabbed by the neck by her father. Droogstoppel then remembers that this 'Scarfman' saved him from her father and a bludgeoning.

Havelaar remembers his action. He did nothing to help his rescuer from the father, recounting, "later on, I heard that the Greek had given him a drubbing, but because it's a firm principle of mine never to meddle with things that don't concern me, I ran away immediately."[550] This statement articulates the fundamental 'bad faith' of Droogstoppel and the ideologists of political economy. He *does* meddle in other's affairs, but he uses the reference to his 'principles' to shield himself from aiding those who aid him. Returning from his recollection, he sees that this other man is 'Scarfman.' He does not wear a watch. He appears in shabby clothing. Scarfman tells Droogstoppel that he has been in the East Indies and he wants something from Droogstoppel now. Droogstoppel escapes from him, running away before fielding the request.

But Scarfman finds Droogstoppel later because the latter had given the former his own name card when the latter imagined that the former might be a means to financial profit. Droogstoppel receives a big parcel from Scarfman. In it, he explains that he is a writer, and he is in need. In the Indies, Scarfman tells,

> I wrote down every day what went on in my soul. I feel sure that among all these writings there are some articles of value, and I am looking for a publisher for them. But that is just the difficulty. The public does not know me, and publishers, in judging work, go more by the established name of its author than by its content.[551]

Dekker indicates here how the form of the capitalist exchange bears this impossibility of spontaneous *and* primitive accumulation, for the origin of the stock cannot emerge from within the realm of circulation on which its own existence depends. The value of stock presupposes this prior concentration as constant capital. Droogstoppel clarifies this to himself: "just as we judge coffee by the repute of its brand. And what's wrong with that?"[552]

Scarfman's problem is thus as follows. The merit of the work will only be proved after the publishing of the publication, but the publishers ask for an advance payment for the printing. He thus requests that this childhood acquaintance, who he rescued from the 'Greek,' pay this small cost of its first printing. "In the accompanying parcel you will find many manuscripts, and from them you will see that I have thought, worked and witnessed much."[553] This last phrase is the first of several enunciations which semantically bear the work's pseudonym, Multatuli.

2. The Encyclopedia Entry of Benedict Anderson

α. On Political Conditions and Contexts

Now that we have preliminarily opened the novel itself, we can now return to the elaborations provided by Anne-Marie Feenberg and Benedict Anderson to deepen our reflection and description. Feenberg writes that the novel emerges into a void, a place where there is no

[550] Ibid, 30.
[551] Ibid, 34.
[552] Ibid.
[553] Ibid.

literature, where "everything is as dead as possible" because of the "sleepiness of the Dutch."[554] The novel, in this rendering, shook awake a people slumbering in their own exploitation of another human world in the East Indies.

Benedict Anderson, in his writing published in the *Encyclopedia of the Novel* (2006) begins to determine a reading of *Max Havelaar* (1860) that differs from the historicist rendering of Feenberg and which can instead, we suggest, be called a political reading. For Anderson, the novel does not generate the immense effect that it does because of the sleepy audience it found. Instead, he finds that reading *Max Havelaar* is extraordinary in the strict sense because it does not confer historical *information*. Anderson sees instead that it disturbs the ideological discourse into which it intervenes.

Anderson recalls that the first translation into English was done by William Siebenhaar, and it was, in Anderson's estimation, "abysmal."[555] Anderson explains that Siebenhaar attached himself to D. H. Lawrence when the esteemed writer was visiting Australia in 1922. Siebenhaar showed him an essay he had written on the novel, praising it as "a queer work - real genius."[556] Lawrence's publisher, Knopf, agreed to publish the translation under the condition that Lawrence would write an introduction and that Lawrence's name would be printed on the cover and appear like a brand name for the book. With D. H Lawrence's name on the cover and sufficiently advertised, Knopf published the book. We note here that Anderson does not remark that this mode of action is the very one of *Max Havelaar* (1860) we just recounted, that is, of how an unknown writer gloms onto someone with recognition and capital in order to get a book printed. Siebenhaar's translation that Lawrence read has been replaced by Roy Edwards's when Penguin published the work in its World Classics series. This translation was first published by the University of Massachusetts Amherst Press in 1982 before being acquired by Penguin Books.

Feenberg explains that the 'historical context' of the novel is the Dutch colonial *Cultuurstelsel*. This is routinely translated as 'cultivation system,' although its semantics also show that it is a 'culture system.' It is known in Indonesian not by these Germanic semantics but instead generically as '*tanam paksa*' ('forced planting'). It names the 'systematic colonization' of Java in the early 19th century which forced Javanese peasants to plant and 'exchange' the harvested yield with the Dutch East Indies Company. This was a mode of domination that enriched the Dutch and, if not enslaving the Javanese, it indeed 'cultivated' or 'encultured' the planting and selling unfree labor.

Anderson fills in this historical context by recalling that when Dekker gets to the Dutch Indies in 1839, it is at once a familiar *and* unknown place of a Dutch world. He remembers that the Netherlands at that moment had recently been trampled by Napoleon's army. The Netherlands was thereby the recipient of a foreign emperor. The United East Indies Company (VOC), on the other hand, "was the largest and most transnational corporation in the world" of the 17th and 18th centuries of Dutch worlds.[557] After its Napoleonic defeats, resulting in the 'dispossession' and 'loss' of the so-called sovereignty of the Indies in its transfer to the British, the Indies of 1839 was, for Dekker, in Anderson's apt phrase, "a shrunken inheritor of the past."[558]

Dekker spent 18 years in the Indies from 1839 to 1857. He returned, armed with copious documentation of the abuse, that is, the "illegal corvee labor, expropriation of land, theft of property, torture and murder practiced by the local native aristocrats with the connivance of the

[554] Feenberg, "'Max Havelaar': An Anti-Imperialist Novel," 821.
[555] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 451.
[556] Ibid.
[557] Ibid.
[558] Ibid.

colonial bureaucracy to which he belonged."[559] It would not be unfit to invoke the contemporary names and ethos of Julian Assange and Wikileaks in reference to the novel. Dekker lived and died in exile after this work. Anderson notes that historians have argued that his choice of pseudonym was done to preserve the possibility to be reinstated to the colonial bureaucracy. Anderson is less inclined towards this explanation, preferring the idea that Dekker wanted to bury himself in the event that the novel was an immense failure. With this idea of the provenance of the authorial pseudonym, Anderson's explanation, we suggest, excises the pathos of the pain in the name *Multatuli* (I have suffered much).[560]

β. On Pauline Discourse

The name and notion of Multatuli – 'I have suffered greatly' and 'I have witnessed much' – is not simply a historical artifact of the 19th century of the Dutch East Indies. In and with her sculptures, Dolorosa Sinaga, the founder and principal sculptor of *Somalaing* studio in Jakarta, grapples with the great pain of suffering and witnessing.

The bronze statuette which appears on the cover of her *catalogue raissoné – Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Matter* (2019) – is entitled *I, the Witness II* (2002). When she showed me a photograph of the work in 2019, she said, pointing at the figure, look (*lihat*), there is a constriction (*sesak*) of the body's throat (*leher*). She then told me the story of her making this work. She said she had met with family members who had witnessed and remembered their daughters, sisters, mothers, and other notions of feminine kinship relations, be violently attacked from May 12th to 15th, 1998 in Jakarta. She made two works, *I, the Witness I* and *I, the Witness II* thereafter. The necks of the figures are turned. Their faces are turned slightly backwards and upwards. There are no eyes there on the surfaces of the faces. There is no organ of vision pointed out in the works entitled *I, the Witness I & II* (2002). The constriction in their throats points out the pain of trying to speak-out after witnessing much.

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In his encyclopedia entry on the novel, Anderson recalls that G. Koops-Van Bruggen, in his article "Nomen est Omen," identifies the source of the name Multatuli in a line in Horace's *Ars Poetica*: "multa tulit fecitque puer, sudavit et alsit, abstinuit Venere et vino."[561] Anderson freely translates this as "As a youth he endured much, and much achieved, he sweated and shivered, and abstained from sex and wine."[562] Dekker did read Horace.[563] But Anderson notes that "the popular interpretation" of the meaning of the name Multatuli is "I have suffered much."[564] Anderson notes that the meaning of Horace's statement is strongly contrasted with the notion of

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[559] Ibid, 452.

[560] Martin Heidegger, in his reconstruction of Aristotle's notion of λόγος ἀποφαντικός places great emphasis on the way that for Aristotle, discourse both reveals and conceals. Λόγος is both ἀληθεδειν and ψεδδεσθαι. Such an account avers that there is no revealing, no manifestation, without concealing. We recall this here in order to ward off the idea that the pseudonymity advanced by Dekker is somehow antithetical to truth and revelation. Heidegger argued that Aristotle understood precisely the contrary. See Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude,* esp. pt. 2, ch. 6.

[561] See G. Koops-van Bruggen, "Nomen est Omen," *Over Mulatuli* 24 (1990): 63-70, cited in Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 452.

[562] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 452.

[563] See, for instance, Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 236.

[564] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 452.

"I have suffered much" in Paul of Tarsus' Second Letter to the Corinthians. In the fifth verse in its first chapter, The King James Bible gives "For as the sufferings of Christ abound in us, so our consolation also aboundeth by Christ."[565] This origin, Anderson suggests, is more popular than in the name of Horace. Anderson also recollects that Dekker was indeed "a free thinker if not an atheist."[566] At any rate, the novel makes multiple explicit parallels between Max Havelaar and Christ. Anderson writes rather jocularly that with the name Multatuli, "it may have amused [Dekker] to melt Horace into Jesus."[567]

We suggest here that Anderson may be guiding us a bit astray with the notion of Dekker's 'amusement.' For Paul's writing here does not only recollect the suffering of Christ. Paul imputes here that in the event of the sharing in the suffering of Christ, there is in this same event a sharing in consolation by the disciples. Dekker indeed deeply understands this meaning in Paul, for the guiding schema of *Max Havelaar* (1860) is, we suggest, one whereby the reading of suffering of Max Havelaar in *Max Havelaar* (1860) is that which brings about the consolation, or healing, of the disciples of Multatuli.

Paul's fidelity to Christ's suffering has at times been identified by his many modern opponents, famously Friedrich Nietzsche, as the source of his hatred. Nietzsche, in his *The Anti-Christ*, wrote of Paul, "he is the genius in hatred, in the standpoint of hatred, and in the relentless logic of hatred."[568] Although Multatuli should not necessarily be submitted to Nietzsche's tribunal, *Max Havelaar* (1860), like Paul's Second Letter to the Corinthians, bears, we suggest, a knowing hatred of the extant law that is itself injustice. This is important because the interpretation of the origin of the name Multatuli for Dekker in Paul fundamentally differs from Horace's idea of a suffering that is an abstention from worldly sex and wines. This is not Paul's meaning of a collective consolation in a specific suffering that is remembered faithfully.

There are, we note, important similarities between Paul's letters and *Max Havelaar* (1860). Dekker writes many times in the novel that this writing aims to generate a true conversion in and of the reader. The novel is thus not a Neo-Kantian description which keeps facts and values separated. It seeks instead to shape and guide the reader into a different path. In the Second Letter to the Corinthians, Chapter 1, verse 5, Paul of Tarsus also wrote or thought this way. These discourses do not deliver technical or epistemological assistance. Paul and Dekker instead write to excoriate waywardness. Paul and Dekker moreover both affirm that a truth comes into existence by the writing of the letter to one's own flock that upsets the flock with its news of a new truth. This can be called a self-criticism. For this reason, one can say that Dekker and Paul are both militants committed to the dispensation of the truth which is the overturning of an extant worldly 'law.' Both articulate the notion that it is right to rebel against the sophists.

While Anderson's entry into this *Encyclopedia of the Novel* (2006) is immensely rich in its hermeneutic discoveries, we need to suggest here that Anderson may be too quickly discarding the *place* of 'prophetic discourse' in *Max Havelaar* (1860) and the critique of political economy

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[565] Anderson cites the passage erroneously as verse 5, rather than Chapter 1, verse 5. The Norton Critical Edition gives, "For just as we share abundantly in the sufferings of Christ, so also our comfort abounds through Christ." *The Writings of St. Paul* Ed. Meeks and Fitzgerald (New York: Norton Critical, 2007), 47. In Greek, the line is "ουτως δια του Χριστου περισσευει και η παρακλησις ημων."

[566] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 452.

[567] Ibid.

[568] Nietzsche, *The Antichrist,* §42, quoted in *The Writings of St. Paul*, 413.

more broadly. For the novel, we suggest here, does not 'amusedly melt' Horace into Jesus. If there is a 'fusion' here, it is a 'tragic' more than 'comedic' one for Dekker.[569]

γ. Critique of Political Economy contra Orientalist Discourse

Anderson notes that the "chapter devoted to the melodramatic and sentimental story of two poor village sweethearts, Saidjah and Adinda" is the only part of the story known in contemporary Indonesia.[570] This notion of a lack of understanding of the novel in Indonesia is a longstanding trope in orientalist discourse. This episode is indeed one of the narrative climaxes of the novel. We will recall it below at length. But Anderson's identification here does not relay how this particular narrative sequence bears a coda within itself which articulates perhaps the conceptual or metaphysical heart of the matter for *Max Havelaar* (1860). For after the exposition of this particular love story, Dekker returns to it to absolutely overturn the facticity imputed by the just prior narrative exhibition.

At that point, the narrator states that what was just brought forth in the novel as true was actually not true. The text reads, "Yes a confession, reader!"[571] The confession is: "I do *not* know all this. But I know *more* than this" ("Dit alles weet ik niet. Maar ik weet *meer* dan dat alles").[572] Dekker here articulates, we suggest, a fundamental concept of the critique of political economy. This is that truth is not characterized by such a finitude or facticity. Instead, it is identified in a class of actions whose essence is 'not-one.' Dekker writes that what he knows is not the finite cattle theft but the class of cattle thefts. Dekker then unambiguously states the condition of this truth. He writes, "*what is fiction in particular becomes truth in general*" ("*wat verdichtsel is in 't bysonder, waarheid wordt in 't algemeen*").[573] We will examine this statement at length below. For now, we note that this fundamental concept of *Max Havelaar* (1860) is not commemorated in Anderson's encyclopedia entry.

δ. The Translation and Discursive Movements of *Max Havelaar* (1860)

After recalling the polyphonic protagonicity of *Max Havelaar* (1860), Anderson recalls that this plurality is finally withdrawn at the very end of the novel with the taking over of the pen by Multatuli. The text thereby shouts, I stand up and I will translate my own book into Malay, Javanese, Sundanese, Alfurese, Buginese, Batak, and "I should hurl *klewang*-wielding warsongs into the heart of martyrs to whom I have promised help, I Multatuli."[574] This is, Anderson suggests, a reasonable rebellion: "this (novel) is a call, not for an antifeudal insurrection of natives against their abusive chiefs, but rather for the overthrow of colonialism itself, aided long-distance

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[569] Although Anderson does not name him, there is another significant 'local' predecessor for this philosophical and political discursive practice of Dekker. This is Baruch Spinoza (b. 1632-1677), who lived and dispensed his metaphysical propositions into the world of Holland. For these writings, Spinoza was exiled from his Jewish congregation. Dekker, we note, was exiled from the petit bourgeois social formation in Holland after *Max Havelaar* (1860) was published, dying poor and destitute in exile in 1887 in the German Empire. We turn to the importance of Spinoza's thought for understanding the thought of *Max Havelaar* (1860) below.

[570] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 456.

[571] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 278.

[572] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 278; Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of de Koffiveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij,* 220; emphases in originals.

[573] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 278; Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of de Koffiveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij,* 220; emphasis in Multatuli.

[574] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 457.

by a former colonial ruler."[575] *Max Havelaar* (1860) thus is unlike writings *about* the colonies, such as George Orwell's writings on Burma. "*Max Havelaar* strikes one today as very remote from its untricky coevals," Anderson states in adoration.[576]

Anderson writes that the novel draws on and ventriloquizes myriad extant discourses such as "colonial bureaucratese, Calvinist sermons, sentimental romances, bad poetry, antibourgeois boutades, policymaker puffery, romantic self-aggrandizement and self-abasement, gothic intrigues, dilettante-journalistic social criticism, and so on."[577] *Max Havelaar* (1860), unlike these other modes, aims to destroy its own present. Anderson quotes Lawrence's introduction to the work: "the book is a pill rather than a comfit. The jam of pity was put on to get the pill down. Our fathers and grandfathers licked the jam off. We can still go on taking the pill, for the social constipation is as bad as ever."[578] Lawrence and Anderson are telling us that *Max Havelaar* concerns the present and the future, not strictly the past. Droogstoppel thus is a character mask, rather than a finite historical personage. It concerns the anthropology which thinks in the wins and losses according to the market value. Anderson wryly comments on how Dekker has been lionized and nationalized in the 20th century: "in an ironic move that Douwes Dekker would have appreciated, the Dutch government bought up a thousand copies to be distributed through its embassies in South America."[579] Anderson is in on Dekker's jokes.

In this world market of the commodity form, Anderson writes that Amsterdam and Batavia are close to each other because of "something boundless and transcontinental."[580] Anderson notes that *Max Havelaar* (1860) was translated in one generation into English, French and German. The German and French readings did not proliferate: "the German version, however, excising half the original and full of errors, sank without a trace. The clumsy French version was briefly and mostly favorably noticed but also seems to have had little impact."[581] The English did only slightly more; "against Douwes Dekker's hopes, it led to no political movement of solidarity, despite the Great Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the liquidation of the English version of the United East India Company. Probably, the contemporary hegemon was too certain that it always did things better, including colonialism, than the people across the Channel."[582] With this, Anderson here recognizes that 'minor literatures' are often not seen from hegemonic viewpoints.

Anderson recalls that the novel did make an immense impact on the Filipino nationalist leader and hero Jose Rizal.[583] Rizal wrote to his friend that the novel was of a much higher quality than his own, but he also said that the work "only exposes *one* aspect of Dutch life on Java."[584] Here lies another lineage of the novel's antagonists, which argues that it does not present life 'from the native's point of view' (Malinowski). Rizal recognizes that there is another social formation and mode of production beside the one that imperialism-colonialism faces in the colony.

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[575] Ibid.
[576] Ibid. Anderson says "perhaps one has to wait till Genet's play *Les paravents*" to re-discover this lineage of 'anti-colonial' exposition. *Les Paravents* (The Screens) (1961) is Genet's play about the Algerian 'situation.' "Max Havelaar," 457.
[577] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 457.
[578] Ibid.
[579] Ibid, 460.
[580] Ibid, 458.
[581] Ibid.
[582] Ibid.
[583] Jose Rizal, in turn, had an immense impact on the Indonesian Tan Malaka. For a discussion of the latter, see Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
[584] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 458; emphasis added.

The reading of *Max Havelaar* (1860), Anderson notes, grew after the death of Douwes Dekker. It was a German language re-translation in 1900 that was used as the source text for further re-translations into Swedish, Danish, Polish, and Russian. This success is undoubtedly related, Anderson suggests, to its existence in German language which is the "core language of Marxist thinking" as well as to "a wider intra-European critique of imperialism and colonialism" at the time.[585] The interest of the novel faded in the interwar period. But Anderson traces its further reception and translation in the Stalinist period into Polish, Hungarian, Slovak, Armenian, and Slovenian, noting that "Douwes Dekker had become a martyr to imperialism and a stalwart friend of the colonized."[586] Anderson suggests that the novel is not as simple as this reading gives, but also that the novel is better grasped 'in translation' as Douwes Dekker's aforementioned conclusion prognosticated.

In 1987, Penguin Books published the work in its Classics Series, and the novel re-entered the market of markets, the English language of the late 20th century. Anderson does not waste the opportunity to recount, with both pathos and irony, that the first translation into Indonesian language was 112 years after its "original's incendiary publication," in 1972, "just nosing out Estonia."[587] Anderson notes, H.B. Jassin translated the novel into Indonesian in 1972. As a rightist, he was an appropriate person to produce a translation that "only a handful of young people would actually read," Anderson suggests.[588]

Anderson recalls that the Dutch Indies government themselves banned the text, though it was not difficult to obtain a copy. Dekker was considered, Anderson suggests, a "good Dutchmen" who spoke out, four decades before "Indonesians" could.[589] The martial hostility and suffering of 1945-1949, followed by the Indonesian nationalization of Dutch enterprises, brought this tale out of early national period 'relevance.' Anderson clearly marks the moment that changed this: "only with the installation of the brutal right-wing dictatorship of General Suharto in 1966 did the stance change."[590] Its critique of the colonial state bureaucracy working on behalf of individual capitals against the exploited was not a hard sell.

ε. Withdrawal Symptoms: On *Max Havelaar* (1976)

Anderson's exposition underscores that *Max Havelaar* (1860) articulates the obduracy and eternity, not the finite instance, of injustice. In D.H. Lawrence's words, the book 'is a pill not a comfit.' This can be strongly understood by recalling the acts and events of the production and subsequent banning of the 20th century production of the film *Max Havelaar* (1976).[591]

The film was made by a Dutch filmmaker, Fons Rademakers (b. 1920-2007), in 1976. Anderson, like many other critics, complains about this film. He writes that all of Dekker's "ironical multiple framing(s)" are absent in the film.[592] The film is, according to Anderson, an impoverishing of the written novel. Anderson explains that the film was an Indonesia-Dutch collaboration. Anderson writes that the Suharto's New Order government used the excuse that the Indonesian public did not "like the idea of a rare Cannes-candidate film about Indonesia in

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[585] Ibid, 459.
[586] Ibid, 460.
[587] Ibid, 461.
[588] Ibid.
[589] Ibid.
[590] Ibid.
[591] Fons Rademakers, dir., *Max Havelaar,* (The Netherlands: Mondial Motion Picture, 1976).
[592] Anderson, "Max Havelaar," 462.

which the hero was a Dutchman" as the reason for banning the film.[593] Anderson relays that this official explanation for its banning is false. The true reason for its ban in Indonesia, he explains, is that the film's portrayal of villainous 'native chiefs' would be understood by the Indonesian viewers as the very situation in Suharto's Indonesia. Anderson wryly and in conclusion notes that Marcos banned *The Godfather* (1972) in the Philippines at roughly the same time. With this sequence, we can suggest that the film that Rademakers made is minimally discrete from the one that the Indonesian government's film censorship bureau (*BSF*) perceived.

The film itself moreover is more than minimally 'unfaithful' to the novel. We elucidate this here in order to understand the effects that can be and are introduced by a translation of its form. The opening of the film fundamentally differs from the opening of the novel which we have elucidated above. In *Max Havelaar* (1976), the encounter of Scarfman and Droogstoppel is not, as in the novel, a knot of forestalled remembrances and repressed recollections. In the novel, Havelaar waits in the shadows of the Amsterdam night to jump out on Droogstoppel with his immense parcel of letters in hand and to solicit his beneficence. In the novel, as we have said, their meeting is an encounter in the market where Droogstoppel is being dragged by his desire to win a profit. In the novel, the name-card first emerges in free indirect discourse, and then reappears in the scene of the first encounter of Droogstoppel and Scarfman. In the film, this act is not a repeated exposition, but appears instead only once. The effect is that the dramatic presentation of this writing that bears the 'unction and anxiety' of Droogstoppel are absent from the film.[594]

Carmel Budiarjo (b. 1925 – 2021), an important 20th century commentator on the Indonesian New Order, explained that the film was set to be entitled *Adinda and Saijah* for Indonesian release, but it was not released when *Max Havelaar* (1976) was released in Europe. The film was banned April 1, 1977, by the Indonesian censorship board (*BSF*, *Badan Sensor Film*). Budiarjo writes, "the film gives a stark portrayal of corruption and brutality in the provinces, and the similarities with present-day Indonesia, where the military officers occupy so many local posts, are too glaring to be missed by anyone familiar with life in rural areas."[595] In their decision, the censorship board said that the film is harmful because it suggests that in colonialism, the local people are exploited by the Javanese gentry and not the Dutch imperialists. But, as Budiarjo notes, *Max Havelaar* (1860) is anti-feudal *and* anti-colonial story. The ban attempts to cover over the story's two-front battle.

Budiarjo quotes Rademakers saying that he wanted to make the film because he wanted "to show injustice (and) to portray the cries of protest which are still heard everywhere today."[596] Thus, even if the film sullied the novel's conceptual genius, the film still elicited the anxiety of a

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[593] Ibid.

[594] The differences do not stop here. The sermon in the Dutch church 'explaining' the poverty of the Javanese is at the very beginning of the film but is preached much later in the novel. Likewise, the killing of Slymering, Havelaar's predecessor in Banten, which emerges early in the film, is not ever 'presented' 'on-stage' of the novel. Havelaar only comes to understand it belatedly in the novel. Likewise, Slymering's confronting of the Javanese Bupati is never 'on-stage' of the novel. In the film, on the other hand, the Dutch assistant resident righteously scolds the Bupati to stop his exploitation of the natives. After the altercation, the Bupati presents the assistant resident with female dancers. They take him away, as if for sex. The Bupati says to Slymering, "they want to perform specially for you. Do you want to meet just as two (*berduaan*) after the performance?" Slymering declines. The plan changes. The servers of the meal poison him with his served food. For the importance of Javanese dance on the New Order state formation, see Rachmi Diyah Larasati, *The Dance That Makes You Vanish: Cultural Reconstruction in Post-Genocide Indonesia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2013).

[595] Carmel Budiardjo, "Dutch Film Banned," *Index on Censorship* 7, no. 2 (1978): 52.

[596] Ibid.

ruthless sovereign.[597] With this in mind, we suggest that the film is not simply an aesthetic catastrophe or spiritual loss, as in the characterization by Anderson and many others. We suggest here instead that the censorship by the New Order Indonesian government underlines that the story of *Max Havelaar* (1860) carries an actually existing declaration of the reason of rebellion, even if this is not the reading available to a 'European' percipient.

The film does not open with the epigraphs of Lothario's judgment and its teaching of the obduracy and mistaken identity of the state's judiciary. The film opens instead with the appearance of words in penmanship that in the 1976 film appears as archaic rather than contemporary writing. The words are attributed to Willem III (b. 1817-1890), the King of Netherlands. The film gives intra-diegetic English subtitles as follows:

> When we scrutinize, with gratitude, the highly satisfactory condition, of the country's finances, and We recognize that Our present wealth derives from the fruits yielded up by Our property in the East Indies, We do not hold lightly Our calling to further the well-being of these our Colonial possessions. The sacrifices needed of Us to maintain Our authority over them, we will not make grudgingly.

The attribution of the statement is given in the film as "Address from the Throne by Willem III, King of the Netherlands." This statement, a 'throne address' ('*Troonrede*'), is nowhere exposited in the novel *Max Havelaar* (1860). In the film, this opening 'royal' address is given in diegetic darkness amidst the sounds of birds chirping. This diegetic written King's throne address gives way to the sun rising slowly and the Indies appearing as illuminated palm and coconut trees. These are telltale orientalist signatures of the 'beautiful' 'nature' 'of the colony.'[598] While these tropical trees become more illuminated, the 'natural' sounds are interrupted and thereafter commingled with the unmistakable bugle call of a 'Napoleonic' state's colonizing marching army.

In the light of the daybreak, the film presents an intradiegetic title of "Java-Lebak 1850." This situates the conditions of its diegesis as a fictional history. Nothing could be further from the modes of distortion with which Dekker opens *Max Havelaar* (1860), for the opening epigraph articulates that even injustice is obdurate and refuses to listen to or heed to the speech of the witness. Dekker begins with the notion and practical activity of distortion. Rademakers, on the other hand, begins with a neo-classical, 'ethnographic discourse' that presupposes the accessibility of another finite discrete time.

The film's first depicted human beings appear standing together floating in a long shallow canoe boat. They are a patrolling army. The troop is commanded by a Dutch soldier. The infantry is shown in profile. Some are white skinned, and others are brown and black skinned.[599] The boat is pushed with a long pole by colonial subjects, brown-skinned human beings who wear

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[597] The memories of the film from two Indonesian and Dutch people help clarify this. I asked them both what they remember of seeing the film. The Indonesian from Java, born in approximately 1965, said that it was banned in Indonesia. She said, Suharto didn't want people to see the story of the corrupt government. They didn't want to show their own likeness to the Dutch Order. She first saw the film many years later, abroad, studying in America. The Dutch person, born in approximately 1980, said that she remembered the film more than the novel in her childhood. She said that the film was important because this was how she and others learned about "the terrible things that were happening there." She said, it was the same with the novel. People didn't know before. There was no Wikipedia at that time, she said.

[598] These are typical genre conventions of "*mooi Indie*" ("Beautiful Indies"). On these conventions, see Susan Protschky, *Images of the Tropics: Environment and Visual Culture in Colonial Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

[599] This colonial army is put together not from "countrymen" but from the "riff raff" of Europe and other colonies.

no uniform. The bird calls are loud. The river is ringed with fertile green lands and a pyramidal volcano appears in the absolute background.

The Dutch commander is visually distinguished from the infantry not simply as being white skinned, as there are white skinned infantry, but because he wears white pants and not blue ones like the infantrymen. A clumsy infantry man drops his rifle into the mud, eliciting a disapproving stare from the Dutch officer and a swear in German. The scene builds the diegetic affect that the army is ill at ease. There is a cut in the film's montage, and a young, 'native' boy is then shown caring for a buffalo. He brings it to the river to wash it. He is followed there by a young girl. She is affectionate to the boy who is caring for his buffalo. She made a jasmine chain that she puts on his buffalo as a kind of offering.

Passing the military march in the opposite direction are a group of 'natives.' Their vestments contrast with the army's. The 'natives' are without shirts. They wear unadorned brown sarongs and headcloths. The two groups cross each other momentarily in the same frame. The 'natives' are carrying coffee. They are followed and patrolled by a Dutchman on a horse. "A small fortune [*geluk*]" he says to the army's officer.[600] An older 'native' man says to a younger 'native' man, are you afraid of the soldiers? "*Jangan*" (Don't be).[601] Look, your brother is not afraid.

Other 'native' 'villagers' are shown working on the wet paddy field. The young boy is with his buffalo. A tiger then appears coming out of the forest and into the paddy. Everyone flees. The tiger attacks the boy's buffalo. A short and quickly cross-cut action scene ensues. Blood and red organs momentarily appear.[602] But the buffalo, with his horns, kills the tiger. The villagers appear in rejoice.

Another 'brown' skinned Javanese (i.e., not 'black' skinned) military officer approaches and scolds a group of villager Javanese, who are the *Bupati*'s men. The Javanese person who is the Dutch imperial emissary is exhibited in a high angle shot. He wears a blue military jacket with gold sequined collar but a *batik* sarong on the bottom.[603] The *Bupati* is not happy with you, he says. Do you want to embarrass your regent, with your pitiful tributes? They then steal the buffalo from the villagers, leaving them unable to plow their own fields and produce a tribute for the *Bupati* that the officer is demanding. Someone resists this theft. How will we plow the fields? We will not be able to! He runs after the thieving horseman, and then is shot and killed there by the troops.

The montage cuts and the film resurfaces no longer in Java but now in a church in Holland. A preacher is preaching. He preaches to the congregants that we must lead the Javanese to the word of God, and they need their donations in order to do so. The film shows the collection basket being passed and filled. The scene has a macabre, eerie timbre. This is particularly given by the contrast of the ascending high angle shot exhibiting the preacher and the descending low angle shot exhibiting the parishioners. The church is lit with sparse candlelight. The preacher stands at a baroquely carved wooden lectern.

The montage cuts and the congregants are dispersing form the church and entering the Amsterdam night. This is the moment for the first encounter of 'Scarfman' and Droogstoppel. As we said, it differs from the novel in an essential way. For 'Scarfman' alias Max Havelaar is

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600 Rademakers, *Max Havelaar.*

601 Ibid.

602 Intestines spewing from an open stomach is a common trope in Javanese and Indonesian literature.

603 In *Bumi Manusia,* an Italian designer of Javanese court apparel tells Minke that the Javanese only wore blankets (*selimut*) before Europeans arrived. This speech, Minke says, "really hurt" ("*Sungguh menyakitkan*"). Toer, *Bumi Manusia*, 128.

carrying his epistolary cargo in their first encounter. In the film, Scarfman is waiting for Droogstoppel outside of church and follows him. The very essence of the surprise of their encounter is eradicated in the film. This lurking in the shadows, we suggest, evinces a paranoia of the post-Taylorist, 'European' capitalist social formation, which is anxious about desubjugated colonized people confronting their former masters.

Although most of these gestures that open the film appear, in some way, in the novel, they do not appear in the way or place that they do in the film. The theft of the buffalo indeed takes place in the novel, but this is near its conclusion not its beginning. Furthermore, the theft in the novel is not a singular event in the novel; the theft of the buffalo repeats. Moreover, the monotony and repetition of these buffalo thefts is absolutely emphasized by the novel. The refrain of this climactic scene in the novel is: "I told you my story is monotonous."

The King's throne speech (*Troonrede),* as we have said, is nowhere in the novel. Its diegetic activity, we suggest, articulates a fundamentally different notion of sovereignty than the novel exposits. Whereas the film begins with a representation and acknowledgement of injustice, the novel begins with the epigraph of the judiciary apparatus as acting to make injustice insensible. The film *begins* with a 'speech *from* the throne.' The novel on the other hand *ends* by retrospectively indicating that the whole utterance of the novel has been a speech *to* the throne. The film therefore gives the seer the scene as though it were a crime scene that has already concluded. The novel gives instead a report on an ongoing investigation and problem for the future.

What motivates such a difference? Rademakers said that he wanted the film to "*portray* the cries of injustice."[604] This formulation should be kept in mind, for Dekker instead, we suggest, thinks that his work *is* the cry of injustice. It is not a representation or a portrayal of the cries of injustice. The film *re*presents injustice. The distortion and conflict of justice and injustice that structures the novel is thus absent in the film. As film, it is a historical drama, a period piece.

These inversions are extremely important. In our description of the opening of the film, we saw that the racialized distinctions were new to the film. Released in 1976, the film visually separates the characters into the colonial and imperial apartheid. This shows that not only 'white' people but also, 'native' 'brown skinned' people subjugated the Javanese. The film draws these lines of racial and ethnic distinctions as its opening presupposition. As we will see below, this is not the schema that orients the novel. Thus, rather than suggesting that *Max Havelaar* (1976) is simply an impoverished 'translation' of *Max Havelaar* (1860) as in the thinking of Anderson, we would like to suggest instead that this opening presentation of a 'racial schema' in *Max Havelaar* (1976) indicates a racial anxiety that is not simply present in *Max Havelaar* (1860). The film, released shortly after the so-called Oil Crisis of 1973, is an expression of a European anxiety of lacking a ready-made world of capital. The opening of the film bears this imperial anxiety and its withdrawal symptoms more than its effort to heal imperial injustice as such. As such, it repeats, we suggest, rather than de-constructs, orientalist discursive practices.

3. On Ideology and Intervention

As we said, the Indonesian Film Censorship Board (*BSF*) banned *Max Havelaar* (1976). In order to understand how the film could elicit this anxiety, we turn to Pierre Macherey's *Pour une Théorie de la Production Littéraire* (1966) to understand how literary discourse intervenes on practices and the reproduction of ideological practices. Macherey argues that literary language can undertake a

[604] See Budiarjo, "Dutch Film Banned"; emphasis added.

critique of ideology, not by becoming 'ideology critique,' but by subjecting its own ideological discourse to a self-criticism. This will help us to understand why *Max Havelaar* (1976) elicited the strong concern of the Indonesian New Order state apparatus.

As we have argued in this chapter, *Max Havelaar* (1860) does not fit easily into typical classifications of 19th century novels. Its so-called chaotic structure is essentially unlike the 19th century writings of Flaubert, Dickens, or Balzac. In his *Pour une Théorie de la Production Littéraire*, Macherey develops a theory of discourses that will help make sense of Dekker's work. Macherey bases his idea in Baruch Spinoza's notion of three kinds of knowledge as exposited in his *Ethics.* They are imagination (spontaneous), *ratio* (adequate), and intuitive (true).[605] With this in mind, Macherey argues that literature is of the second order. Literature, he writes, works on the first order of imagination or ideology. As fiction, literature is not the third form, but nor is it simply imagination or ideology. Rather, literature has the possibility to transform first level generalities into the third order.[606] This conceptualization enriches the aforementioned crucial and climactic statement in *Max Havelaar* (1860): 'what is fiction in particular becomes truth in general.'

Macherey's idea of literature as a second kind of knowledge furthermore helps clarify the 'strange' form of *Max Havelaar* (1860). For the structure of a literary discourse, Macherey argues, is itself something that interrupts the first order of knowledge, that is, the imagination and its spontaneous ideologies. This is formulated explicitly against the idea that literary language is either independent of everyday ideology and imagination, as well as the notion that literature 'explains' those everyday illusions. Macherey argues instead that we are never outside of ideology. Literature however interrupts the reproduction of ideology. He writes,

> the text is not a tissue of illusions which has merely to be unraveled if we wish to understand its power. An illusion that has been set to work becomes more than just an illusion, more than a mere deception. *It is an illusion interrupted, realized, completely transformed.* To ignore this transformation is to confuse the non-literary use of language from which the text is made, and the labour of elaboration which produces the text from this initial state of language; it implies the belief that it is enough to dream in order to write.[607]

Macherey recognizes here that the discursive order of literature and everyday discourse work together, not in a relation of mutual exclusion or separation, but rather with an effect so that 'illusions,' which are our determinate fictions and thoughts, *are at once realized and modified.* Literature thus is not an '*a priori*' demonstration of discourse. The novel and everyday imaginary are *both* illusions; when they relate to one another, a truth is ascertained. That truth is not the content of the novel. Instead,

> *the language of illusion, the writer's raw material, is the vehicle and source of everyday ideology* – that thing we bear within us which turns us into things as we are carried along on the endless stream of this formless discourse in which one image is substituted for another, though the excluded middle term which might verify the argument is never to be found.[608]

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[605] See Spinoza, *The Ethics*, 477-8/IIP40Sch2.
[606] Pierre Macherey, [*For*] *a Theory of Literary Production* (London: Routledge Classics, 2006[1966]). The English translation scandalously excises the "*pour*" ("for") from Macherey's title.
[607] Macherey, [*For*] *a Theory of Literary Production,* 71-2. Emphasis added.
[608] Ibid, 72; emphasis added.

Macherey, writing in the warmth of June 1966 in Paris, advances here a theory of discourse which we suggest is sanguine or even triumphalist regarding the possibility or capacity of literary language as such.[609] Macherey writes,

> existence comes to the individual in the form of a very primitive illusion, a true dream, which sets up a certain number of necessary images: man, liberty, the will of God. It is spontaneously defined by a spontaneous use of language which turns it into a shapeless gaping text—a text that slides vigorously over itself, doing its utmost to say nothing, since it is not designed actually to say anything.[610]

Macherey here thinks the possibility if not actuality of a literary language that effectuates an act whereby true knowledge and imagination join as one. Neither are allowed to exit the stage in the other's presence. Literature thus concerns the question of how to interrupt an illusion. This is essentially a political practice and question for Macherey. He writes:

> There is a profound difference between the vague language of the imagination and that of the text; within the limits of the text this language is in several senses deposited (fallen, forsaken and gathered). The literary work interrupts and solidifies the apparent motion of the former—in which words are moved to no purpose; in this space where language confronts itself, is constructed that true distance which is the condition of any real progression—the discourse of the book. Determinate reverie: a true and necessary fiction, making its way to a specific destination. This is why, once again, there is little point in denouncing the myth which would endow the book with a semblance of life. Since it is built from the formless language of illusion, the book revolves around this myth; but in the process of its formation the book takes a stand regarding this myth, exposing it. This does not mean that the book is able to become its own criticism: it gives an implicit critique of its ideological content, if only because it resists being incorporated into the flow of ideology in order to give a determinate representation of it. Fiction, not to be confused with illusion, is the substitute for, if not the equivalent of, knowledge. A theory of literary production must show us what the text 'knows', how it 'knows.'[611]

These questions return to the ones with which we began in Althusser's rereading of *Capital* in 1978. For Macherey writes here, books are not merely a critique of an extrinsic ideology. They instead present a critique of their *own* ideological content. Macherey moreover writes, 'fiction, not to be confused with illusion, is the substitute for, if not the equivalent of, knowledge.' *Max Havelaar* (1860), we suggest, aims to disturb the conditions which encompass the determinate illusions of 1860 in Amsterdam. Macherey here helps us to make the step from seeing *Max Havelaar* (1860) as a critique of colonialism as an extrinsic ideology to what this dissertation calls the intervention of Pauline discourse which is generically a self-criticism.

For *Max Havelaar* (1860) articulates that its discourse exposits the truth and yet it takes the form of a 'fiction.' This is for a necessary reason. This is because, as Macherey notes, fiction interacts with and transforms the everyday ideology of discourse *in which it participates*. This is not

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[609] See Joan Copjec, "May '68, the emotional month," in *Lacan: The Silent Partners,* ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso 2006), 90-114.
[610] Macherey, [*For*] *a Theory of Literary Production,* 72.
[611] Ibid, 73.

to say that the novel cannot contain factual errors. But literary production can 'give an implicit critique of its ideological content.' *Max Havelaar* (1860), we suggest, does this; Dekker allows the Dutch or capitalist ideology to speak and to shed its own rotten ideological armour. Macherey articulates this process as follows:

> Thus the book substitutes the clear—though not simple— outlines of a fiction for the meanderings of illusion. Fiction is determinate illusion, and the essence of the literary text is to establish these determinations. Thus the power of language, settled in the more or less fixed edges of the work, is displaced. To know what a literary text is we must ask: From what new centre is the work of fiction carried out? It is not a question of a real centre, for the book does not replace ideologically decentred illusion with a permanent centre around which the system of language is to be ordered; the book does not endow this system with a subject. Fiction is not truer than illusion; indeed, it cannot usurp the place of knowledge. *But it can set illusion in motion by penetrating its insufficiency, by transforming our relationship to ideology*. (By its nature, ideology is always elsewhere, it can never be located; consequently, it cannot be totally subdued, diminished or dispelled.) Fiction deceives us in so far as it is feigned; but this is not a primary act of deception, because it is aimed at one even more profound, exposing it, helping to release us from it. The text begins from where 'life' reaches its formless conclusions; the two terms, then, form a distinct contract; but they are also inseparable, not because they are simply different forms of the same content, but because they constitute an endless dialectical opposition.[612]

Fiction thus is not truth-in-itself. Determinate fictions however generate effects, some of which are true knowledge. Macherey here underlines that fiction is not however simply equivalent to ideology. This is Macherey's perhaps romantic plea for literary discourse: to 'resist being reduced' because it is instead that which is reducing the reducible. While this may seem like a utopian, 'May 1968' thought, it also wonderfully articulates that revolutionary political practices necessitate the transformation in the ways, modes, and manner by which language determines its illusions. Macherey and Dekker, we suggest, both aver that there are certain discursive practices, such as literature, that 'work on' transformations within ideology itself.

This is important because it redresses the notion that 'literature' is ornamental or epiphenomenal and is unrelated to everyday language and ideology. Macherey writes: "The critical question would then be: *in what relation to that which is other than itself is the work produced*?"[613] For Macherey, "the real critical question is not: What is literature? (What does one do when one writes, or reads?) The question is: What kind of necessity determines the work?"[614] This necessity is the fundamental problem animating *Max Havelaar* (1860). While there is an important criticism of this 'triumphant' notion of literature, we recall again that *Max Havelaar* (1860) was called by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who was born in the Dutch East Indies and died in the Republic of Indonesia, 'the novel that killed colonialism.' While there may be an element of a 'Javanese' understanding of the power of text and words in Pram's statement, the statement suggests that the novel's discourse bears an inner and essential relation to the material existence of colonialism. In the final paragraphs of the novel, Dekker says that he wrote the book for two reasons. Neither of them is killing colonialism. First, he said he wanted to write something so that his children

[612] Ibid, 73-4; emphasis added.
[613] Ibid, 173; emphasis in Macherey.
[614] Ibid.

would have 'a sacred heirloom,' a *pusaka*, for his children. His second reason is: "*I want to be read*!" ("*Ik wil gelesen worden!*")[615] This evinces the aim to disturb the ideological practices in which its discourse intervenes.

But how is it possible that a novel can be thought to 'kill colonialism'? Macherey here helps when he states that fiction 'sets an illusion in motion.' He extends this in a passage that we quote here at length:

> the literary work is also doubly articulated: at the initial level of sequences (the fable) and themes (the forms) which establish an illusory order; this is the level of organicist aesthetic theories. At another level, the work is articulated in relation to the reality from the ground of which it emerges: *not a 'natural' empirical reality, but that intricate reality in which men—both writers and readers—live, that reality which is their ideology*. The work is made on the ground of this ideology, that tacit and original language: not to speak, reveal, translate or make explicit this language, but to make possible that absence of words without which there would be nothing to say. We should question the work as to what it does not and cannot say, in those silences for which it has been made. The concealed order of the work is thus less significant than its real determinate disorder (its disarray). The order which it professes is merely an imagined order, projected on to disorder, the fictive resolution of ideological conflicts, a resolution so precarious that it is obvious in the very letter of the text where incoherence and incompleteness burst forth. It is no longer a question of defects but of indispensable informers. This distance which separates the work from the ideology which it transforms is rediscovered in the very letter of the work: it is fissured, unmade even in its making. A new kind of necessity can be defined: by an absence, by a lack. The disorder that permeates the work is related to the disorder of ideology (which cannot be organized as a system). The work derives its form from this incompleteness which enables us to identify the active presence of a conflict at its borders. In the defect of the work is articulated a new truth: for those who seek to know this truth it establishes an original relation to the real, it establishes the revealing form of a knowledge.[616]

Max Havelaar (1860) is renowned for its 'disarray.' With Macherey's statements here, we can now call this a *determinate disorder*. The novel introduces a determinate disarray into the very field in which it intersects, that is, the everyday ideology of 1860 Amsterdam, or in the case of the film, 1976 Netherlands or Indonesia. For this reason, all poesis is dangerous for despots. The discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860) interrupts the illusion that all is calm and peaceful in the 'hidden abode' of production.

4. On the Opacity of Letters Arriving from the Colony

a. The Unconscious of Modern Colonization

We can now return to our thick description of *Max Havelaar* (1860). After receiving the cargo of writings from Scarfman, Droogstoppel puts the idea of this possible book aside and goes to a dinner party at the Rosemeyers who "are in sugar."[617] Droogstoppel's son, Frits, plays with the

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[615] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of de Koffiveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij,* 255; emphasis in Multatuli.
[616] Macherey, [*For*] *a Theory of Literary Production,* 173-4. Emphasis added.
[617] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 35.

Rosemeyer daughter, Louise. A cry comes from the room in which the children play. Droogstoppel fears: had his son pinched the girl? No. His son had recited poetry. Frits had opened Scarfman's package and extracted a verse.

Droogstoppel ridicules the ordinariness of the verse his son read: "a young man was writing to his mother that he had been in love, and that the girl had married someone else - and very right too, in my opinion - but that he, notwithstanding, had always loved his mother."[618] When Droogstoppel explained the provenance of the parcel to the other party guests, he represses the part of the story of his being rescued by Scarfman as a child, because, as he said, his son was present. Besides the verses, there are other things in the parcel, he promises, "of a more solid nature," that are included in this very book.[619] They are connected to the coffee auctions, and, he adds, "my profession's my life to me."[620]

Droogstoppel states that the publisher asked that he include the verse Frits read at the party, and that he obliges, against his own inclinations, because it is "lies and tomfoolery, from beginning to end!"[621] This demand of the publisher on the author to include verses taken from the Indies situates another intrusion of the hidden abode of production into the novel itself. The verse is from 1843 from Padang. It begins "mother, far, oh far from me...."[622] He tells her of his love. It is a heat of blazing fire. There is something in the seeking of this love that must be satisfied.[623]

The parcel comprises a staggering array of documents. It is the 'pre-historical' cargo out of which the novel is formed. It presents an appearance of the discursive outside of the novel inside the novel. Its contents are quantitatively immense. 147 titles are presented. Its qualitative heterogeneity and quantitative immensity introduce a marked interruption into the novel. The list comprises more than five pages of the novel. The following small selection brings forth both the specificity, the breath, and dimensions of its contents. Their discursive appearance evinces, we suggest, both an orientation to an encyclopedic colonializing mode of discourse as well as a critical inversion of such discourse. The list begins with 'scientific' treatises such as the following:

> On Sanskrit as the mother of the Germanic Languages.
> On the penalties for infanticide.
> On the origin of the aristocracy.
> On the difference between the concepts of 'infinite time' and 'eternity'
> On the theory of probabilities.
> On the book of Job (I found something else about Job, but that was in verse)[624]

Many of the entries are treatises on topics of theology, linguistics, geography, and ethnology. But there are also practical and theoretical treatises on topics of governing and manufacturing. Their appearance in an 'ironic' encyclopedia suggests that these knowledges are not discarded but

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[618] Ibid, 36.
[619] Ibid, 37.
[620] Ibid.
[621] Ibid.
[622] Ibid.
[623] The poem and the subsequent discussion produced a 'displeasure' for Droogstoppel. It spoke of a son suckling his mother's breast. Without disputing the unlikely possibility of a Malay *sjair* depicting such a scene, we note that this is present in the Bible and re-presented by Caravaggio in his *Seven Works of Mercy* (1606).
[624] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 45. Alexander Kojève states, "Spinoza's concept-being is eternity, whereas Hegel's concept-being is Time." *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (New York: Basic Books 1969), 117-118.

instead repurposed in the novel. The list moreover indicates the existence of writings that point to the 'unrest' in the colonies such as the following:

> On the unpopularity of rice mills in Java...On the power of error...On the *Jus Primi occupantis*...On the crimes of the Europeans outside Europe…On epidemic corruption in national economies… On the right of rebellion against oppression (This was in the Javanese language. I only found out the title afterwards) ...On the right of a people to demand that the taxes they pay shall be applied for their benefit (This again was in Javanese).[625]

These treatises indicate an important discursive aspect of opacity in modern colonization. The interpolated descriptions of the texts indicate that some are written in Javanese. They indicate that there is 'unrest' in Java because the people are oppressed, and yet these writings are written in Javanese language and not the Dutch in which *Max Havelaar* (1860) is written. The novel thus at once presents the material existence of this 'reasonable rebellion' for a reader in Europe, while also presenting them as that which Europeans, who do not understand Javanese language, can*not know*. The mode of the existence of these titles thereby brings forth a non-knowledge of 'the right of rebellion against oppression in the colony.'[626] They exposit a non-knowledge of colonial subjects' political strategy and tactics. This means that the question of the martial colonial encounter is not simply an unknown. Instead, it articulates that even the capture of this epistolary cargo does not render legible all of its contents. This can also be understood as a critique of the 'spurious inversion' of 'theoretical humanism' analyzed in Part I of this dissertation. The exhibition of these titles brings forth a place of contradiction within modern colonization without presupposing to dissolve the foundation of these contradictions.

β. On Contract and Fiction

Encountering these treatises, Droogstoppel does not think of their intrinsic merits. He thinks instead about how to employ these epistolary stocks for his financial benefit. But how could he make a book from these sundry treatises? He avers, "every broker knows how important it is to grade the various lots of coffee properly."[627] The information contained in the parcel shows that the entire coffee market is under threat. He realizes this, he notes, *while* writing; "it *is* strange how things will occur to one, while one's writing," he opines.[628] He surmises that the information concerns "everyone…millers...clergy...distillers and tiler makers…and the king as well...yes, the King above all! My book *must* go out into the world."[629]

Droogstoppel devises a solution to which we have alluded. He creates a contract that defines the terms of the production for this book. It will be worked by the young Stern. The contract details how quickly Stern will produce the chapters, and includes the provisions that Droogstoppel can include chapters when he'd like, that immorality should be avoided, and that "Stern should be authorized to publish German, French and English translations of my book,

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[625] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 47-48.
[626] Alain Badiou writes that Marxism can be reduced entirely to one statement: it is right to rebel against the reactionaries. For a discussion, see Dylan Fagan, "Reading Culture in Revolution: Badiou and Macciocchi on Ideology and Hegemony in the Cultural Revolution," *Décalages: an Althusser Studies Journal* 4, no. 2 (2022).
[627] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 53.
[628] Ibid, 54.
[629] Ibid.

because - so he maintained - such works are better understood in foreign countries than in ours."[630] After laying forth the contract, Droogstoppel writes "and here, reader, is the answer to the question how a coffee broker - *Last & Co., 37 Lauriergracht* - comes to be writing a book that looks like a novel."[631] He thereby comes to refer to his book as a firm.

The mode of existence of this contract generates a discursive 'inversion' in *Max Havelaar* (1860), for the contract itself unconceals the generic mode of discourse in the capitalist mode of production. The contract absolutely formalizes that its own discourse emerges from a conditioning by capitalist forms of exchange and relations through contract and that these are *not* the forms and conditions of which Droogstoppel complains in his opening screeds about the 'lies' of theatrical arts. For the contract shows instead that the novel is not due to the fanciful imaginations of a dimwitted poet, but instead a commercial contract that formalizes the exploitation of its worker.

γ. On the Quantum and Secret of the Factory and Colonies

With the package pierced, Droogstoppel begins to read. He finds out that the bundle contains reports that impact his own work as a coffee trader. With these purloined letters, Dekker advances a critique of the ideology of the immediacy of forms bearing on the conjunctures of capitalist exchanges. Like in *Capital, Max Havelaar* (1860) does this by beginning with the appearance of the market (*de beurs*) in order to overturn this place and form of appearance with what Marx calls a 'hidden abode of production.'

Capital indeed indicates that modern colonies are a 'hidden abode of production' in the capitalist mode of production. In Part VIII of *Capital*, Marx reads and recollects Thomas Raffles writing that the Dutch East Indies advanced "one of the most extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre and meanness."[632] Raffles wrote that in the East Java region of Banyuwangi, the number of human beings alive fell from 80,000 in 1750 to 18,000 in 1811. Marx hurls his critical joke here. He writes, "Dat ist der doux commerce!"[633] The French is inlaid here by Marx. In English, this reads "That is peaceful commerce!" With it, Marx states that this is *not* peaceful commerce.

But *Max Havelaar* (1860) also 'develops' an understanding for why the colony is not the same essence as the 'hidden abode' of the factories. For the modern colony, *Max Havelaar* (1860) shows, brings forth a 'development' of the contradiction of the capitalist social formation into such a complexity that can*not* be exposited without the intervention of the 'concrete historical' on the 'pure theoretical' order of capital. *Max Havelaar* (1860) thus shows that modern colonization is a qualitative development of the so-called cellular commodity form. This 'history' of capital is not *simply* a reflection of its seed. We will see this in what follows when the narrative turns away from Europe.

5. On Inversion and the Critique of the Modern Theory of Colonization

Dekker leaves the parlor room party in Holland and begins to describe the world of Java with a comparative morphology. He begins with the road. He writes that "'highroad' is perhaps a slight

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[630] Ibid, 56. This also indicates why the novel is not conceived of as limited to Dutch readers.
[631] Ibid.
[632] Marx, *Capital*, 916.
[633] The footnote in the *MEW 23* translates the French "*doux commerce"* as "*sanfte Handel.*"

exaggeration when applied to the wide footpath which...is called 'the road.'"[634] In Java, "the driver cracks his whip, the runners (in Europe, I suppose, you would call them footmen - but no, there is nothing in Europe like them."[635] This road, "which Marshal Daendels caused to be built, with considerable sacrifice of life...dared to defy the unwillingness of the population and the discontent of the native chiefs."[636] This road crosses "high mountain ridges, skirting abysses which make you shudder", where you think "we are going down into the abyss...there is no road...there is only precipice", but where those "traveling thus for the first time writes to tell his people in Europe that he has been in danger of his life. But the old hands in Java laugh at him."[637] In such a description, the accessibility of understanding the road is both unveiled and denied to European readers.

Dekker's discourse departs from regular 'ethnographic' description, for he directly addresses the reader to tell them that his work concerns ideas, not facts. He writes that he will only fling the heroine from a balcony four floors up when he has secured the reader's interest.[638] This throw, he writes, 'takes place' in writing, in the idea, in thinking. The place of this throw is the mind, for as Dekker writes, "there are no such things as towers. 'Tower' is an idea, a dream, an ideal, a fiction."[639] That it is an idea makes it no less real or true, nor bereft of 'body.' Dekker writes, "no money will buy the lost yet admiral sentiment that saw in a building a poem, a poem in granite that spoke loudly to the people, a poem in marble that stood there as an immovable eternal prayer...."[640] We recall that recent anthropologists have argued that the road is the paradigm of colonial infrastructure and ideology.[641] Dekker's opening description of the road, as an idea from which the author indicates that he will throw the reader, thus indicates that this ethnographic discourse is employed for metaphysical reasons.

Max Havelaar is the newly arriving colonial administrator, traveling on this road to his new post in Lebak. Dekker writes, "custom, which has the force of law in the Dutch Indies more than it has anywhere else, dictates that an officer charged with government of a division shall be given a festive reception."[642] This can be considered an archetypical expression of 19th century idealist anthropological ideology. In it, the 'natives' give, by so-called custom, an excessive display of celebration for the colonial official. The important point is that the so-called natives *give* it by their custom. With this notion, it is 'natural' for them to celebrate the colonial official.

After the description of the colonial sovereign arriving on the road, Dekker next brings forth the 'local' architecture. Hegel, in his *Lectures on Fine Art,* argues that architecture is the absolutely original spiritual formation of a people.[643] In a kindred mode of thinking, Dekker here first brings forth the Javanese *pendopo*: "next to a broad-brimmed hat, an umbrella or a hollow tree, (it) is undoubtedly the simplest representation there is of the concept 'roof'. Imagine four or six bamboo posts, driven into the ground and connected at the top by further bamboos, on which

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[634] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 62.
[635] Ibid.
[636] Ibid, 63. The novel acknowledges the deaths that were caused by the construction of this road but passes by this event. For a deep reflection on this road, see Pramoedya Ananta Toer, *Jalan Raya Pos, Jalan Daendels* (Jakarta: Lentera Dipantara, 2006).
[637] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 63.
[638] Ibid, 64.
[639] Ibid.
[640] Ibid, 65.
[641] See Brian Larkin, *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure and Urban Culture in Nigeria* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).
[642] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 65.
[643] See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 635.

a cover has been fixed made of the long leaves of the nipa palm, called *atap* in those parts; and then you have a picture of such a *pendopo.*"[644] Dekker thus begins the description of the place with the so-called most simple spiritual formation.

Dekker moves from this 'primitive' architectural principle into a description of the political dimensions that animate this situation. He does this through a structural-functionalist account of the political relations between this highest Dutch official in the region, the Assistant Resident, and the highest 'native' in the region, *Bupati*.[645] Misunderstanding their fundamental difference produces an erroneous understanding of the political economy situation, he avers. Dekker writes that he therefore "shall have to make a digression here regarding the machinery of government in these regions" to explain their relation.[646] He tells the European reader that in the Indies, there are two different kinds of relations with the Netherlands for 'native' peoples. There are the people in the Indies who are relatively independent of the Netherlands. On the other hand, there are Javanese people, who, Dekker writes, are "immediately subject to the Netherlands. There is no question of tribute, or levy, or alliance. The Javanese is a Dutch subject. The King of the Netherlands is his king...The criminal is convicted and sentenced under a law made in the Hague. The taxes the Javanese pays flow into the exchequer of the Netherlands."[647] Dekker adds that it is only with this relation that "these pages will mainly deal."[648] Like the exhibition of the treatises on the right of rebellion written in Javanese in the novel, this schema indicates an outside within itself that is absolutely unrepresentable and yet a threat to colonial authority.

Dekker then gives an outline of how this ecumene of the Dutch East Indies combines a relation between the Assistant Resident and the *Bupati* in a way that produces surplus value for the Dutch burghers and stockbrokers.[649] Dekker explains that colonial authority theoretically depersonalizes authority so that domination and exploitation cannot be identified or personified by a single individual.[650] Dekker explains the mode and method of this dual character of authority as follows:

> The name resident dates back to the time when the Netherlands still ruled the population only indirectly, as overlord, and was represented by Residents at the courts of the then still reigning princes…It is these Residents who actually represent Dutch authority in the eyes of the Javanese population. The people know neither the governor-general, nor the council of the Indies, not the departmental directors in Batavia. They only know the Resident, and the minor officials who rule them under his direction…Each residency...consists of three, four, or five Divisions or Regencies, at the head of which are placed the Assistant Residents. Under them again the administration is carried out by Controleurs, Inspectors and a number of other officers necessary for collection of taxes, supervision of agriculture, public works, the police, and administration of justice.[651]

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[644] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 66.
[645] "*Bupati*" is often translated as "Regent."
[646] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 66.
[647] Ibid.
[648] Ibid, 67.
[649] Ibid.
[650] Dekker writes, "the governor-general is assisted by a council, which, however, has no decisive voice in his decisions. In Batavia, the various branches of government are divided into departments, headed by directors, who form the link between the supreme authority of the governor-general and the residents in the provinces. However, in cases of a political nature, Residents communicate with the governor-general directly." *Max Havelaar,* 67.
[651] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 67.

Parallel to the colonial state hierarchy is the 'native' political-economic body, imagined as symmetrical by the colonial state ideology, headed by the *Bupati*. Dekker explains:

> in each of these Divisions the Assistant Resident is helped by a native chief of high rank with the title of Regent (*Bupati*). Such a Regent, although his relation to the Government and his function are entirely those of a paid official, is always of the highest nobility of the land, and often comes from the family of the princes who in the past ruled independently over that region or the neighboring regions. Very shrewd political use is thus made of their ancient feudal influence - which, in Asia, is generally of great importance, and is regarded by most of the peoples as part of their religion: because, by appointing these chiefs as officers of the Crown, a hierarchy is created, at the summit of which stands Dutch authority.[652]

Dekker identifies this relation with what this dissertation has called a spurious inversion, writing, "just as in the Roman Empire, a Count is chosen from the Barons, but a count is an office, whereas a baron 'considered himself a baron 'by the grace of god.' The counts represented the emperor, and as such carried his banner, i.e., the standard of the Empire. A Baron raised men under his own colours, as a *banneret.*"[653] A baronial family "was always noble because it was noble – autochthonous"; counts and dukes, on the other hand, sought their rank.[654] The problem, according to Dekker, is that officials "sought...from the emperor the assurance that their sons...would succeed them in their office. And that in fact usually happened...this form of hereditary privilege started as favour, soon became a custom...but it never became a law."[655] With this we can identify that whereas Marx identifies the historical specificity of *modern* colonization, Dekker does not distinguish the essence of Ancient Rome from 19th century Java. For Dekker, the Ancient Roman practice is the same as the one in Java.[656]

Dekker here highlights that it is the Dutch authority that invests the Javanese Regent's son with his position, and that this is done by custom, rather than law. As such, he notes, this relation "is of a very delicate nature."[657] Dekker depicts this as an inversion. While the Dutch appear to be the superlative highest authority in Java, it is the Javanese *Bupati*, who is the autochthonous noble, that maintains myriad forms of customary control over the population and "is in a much higher position."[658] There are thus two modes of domination and subjugation that are relatively coextensive. They exist in a hierarchical mode, and yet they are not of the same order and connection because law and custom are essentially and ontologically discrete.

Dekker also indicates here that the Dutch government does not dominate and subjugate absolutely, for they need the Javanese *Bupati* in order to complete the action of economic production. For this reason, the Dutch aimed to never elicit the discontent of the *Bupati.* The

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[652] Ibid, 67-8.
[653] Ibid, 69.
[654] Ibid.
[655] Ibid. This condition is of such massive social awareness in Indonesia that it exists as a discursive concentration in an abbreviation (*singkatan*) as *KKN* (*kolusi, korupsi, nepotisme;* collusion, corruption, nepotism).
[656] In *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), Johannes Fabian argues that anthropology constructs its object by placing a social formation into an earlier time and thus denying contemporaneity to the people whom they study.
[657] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 70.
[658] Ibid.

Assistant Resident on the other hand is a necessary 'obstacle' for those functionaries who ascend from this low tip of empire. Dekker describes the character of this situation as an inversion. He writes, "this, then, results in a strange situation whereby the inferior really commands the superior."[659] The Assistant Resident forces the *Bupati* to collect taxes, to present laborers for building roads, and to provide receptions for the Residents. This 'peculiar relationship' renders "extremely courteous forms."[660] Dekker uses a kinship schematic here: if the Assistant Resident treats the *Bupati* like a younger brother, the parents (the Government) fear the younger brother; but if the younger brother misbehaves, it is the older brother who is at fault.

Dekker's inversion posits a 'direct opposition' of two character-masks. He writes that the *Bupati* is a wealthy prince and the Assistant Resident is a middle-aged, married bureaucrat, living on his income. The *Bupati* has many wives; the assistant resident, one. The *Bupati* "has to live in the manner which the people are accustomed to see among their aristocracy."[661] "But all this has to be paid for" by the Dutch government.[662] They must pay the *Bupati* in order to receive the command over the people that the Dutch so need. The *Bupati* is paid by the Dutch a monthly salary, compensation for rights transferred to the Dutch government, a bonus in proportion for the yield of coffee, sugar, indigo, cinnamon, etc., as well as the "the arbitrary use of the labour and property of his subjects."[663]

Dekker then presents an Adamic origin story of this domination. He writes:

> strangers came from the West, who made themselves lords of his land. They wished to benefit from the fertility of the soil, and commanded its occupant to devote part of his labour and time to growing other products which would yield greater profit in the markets of Europe. To make the common man do this, a very simple policy sufficed. He obeys his Chiefs; so it was necessary to win over those chiefs by promising them part of the proceeds...And the scheme succeeded completely.[664]

With this, Dekker explains the mode of production where the Dutch and the *Bupati* together interrelate in a way that dominates and subjugates the Javanese peasants. Dekker brings out that the 'hidden abode' is underwritten by this domination. He writes:

> if anyone should ask whether the man who grows the products receives a reward proportionate to the yields, the answer must be in the negative. The Government compels him to grow on *his* land what pleases *it*; it punished him when he sells the crop so produced to anyone else but *it*; and *it* fixes the price it pays him...since, after all, the entire business must yield a profit, this profit can be made in no other way than by paying the Javanese just *enough* to keep him from starving, which would decrease the producing power of the nation.[665]

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[659] Ibid. This sides with Alexander Kojève and not Gillian Rose's interpretation of Hegel's Lord and Bondsman in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* [1807]. Rose writes that in modernity, there are no more masters and slaves but instead only persons. See her *Hegel Contra Sociology* (London: Verso, 2009 [1981]), ch. 1.
[660] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 70.
[661] Ibid.
[662] Ibid, 72.
[663] Ibid.
[664] Ibid, 73.
[665] Ibid.

The Javanese peasant is thus subject to a 'dual authority.' This has made Holland rich, and the Javanese impoverished. Undertaking to dialogue with the reader, Dekker writes, "Famine? In rich, fertile, blessed Java - famine? Yes reader, only a few years ago, whole districts died of starvation. Mothers offered their children for sale to obtain food. Mothers ate their children…I see I have become bitter. But what would you think of someone who could write such things *without* bitterness?"[666]

Regarding the "arbitrary disposal of the persons and property of [the *Bupati*'s] subjects", Multatuli states that "over almost all Asia the subject, with all he possesses, belongs to the Prince."[667] Nothing is more routine than hundreds of people being summoned by the Prince for unpaid work. "The Javanese is generous, especially when it is a matter of proving his attachment to his Chief, to the descendent of those his forefathers obeyed…But in this way the existence of a *charming custom* makes it difficult to abolish an *abuse.*"[668] Dekker identifies that this process of modern colonization makes it impossible to *finitely* determine "where use has ceased and made room for abuse."[669] With this, Dekker avers that the appearance of 'direct opposition' conceals another opposition – justice and injustice – that can*not* be located with a spurious mode of inversion or opposition.

6. The Critique of Modern Colonization and Apartheid

After Dekker opens the setting with this structural-functional analysis, he then moves to personify the situation. Verbrugge, an underling of the Assistant Resident, and the *Bupati* wait for Havelaar and the Resident to arrive in Lebak. Verbrugge comments to the *Bupati* that the road is not bad in the neighboring district, implying that the road in this district is less excellent. Dekker uses this speech activity as a way to indicate that the mode of communication between the Dutch and Javanese is both veiled and populated with suspicion. Duclari, a colonial lieutenant, enters the scene on a horse from a hunting trip. He begins to tell stories about Havelaar. Duclari calls him a fool. He recounts the story of when Havelaar jumped into the ocean to save a dog; he "has a good heart, with a warm corner in it for justice."[670] Duclari relays that Havelaar annoyed his superior General in Sumatra and stole his turkey.

Returning to the infrastructure of colonization, Dekker then describes the relation between the imperial rider and imperial carriage like a Möbius strip: "eventually one no longer knows precisely where the leather cushion of the carriage ends and where the ego begins."[671] This statement literalizes the unity of colonial infrastructure and ideology. He then asks whether or not errors and "obliquities which we mistake for rectitude, might possibly result from the fact that we have been sitting with the same company in the same coach for too long."[672] The next utterance – "I think it is a good thing to change carriages, seat, or fellow-passengers, from time to time" – carries therefore political rather than simply divertive content.[673]

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[666] Ibid,74
[667] Ibid. Multatuli here is, much more than Marx in *Capital*, developing a notion of an "Asiatic Mode of Production."
[668] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 75; emphasis in Multatuli.
[669] Ibid.
[670] Ibid, 83.
[671] Ibid, 85.
[672] Ibid.
[673] Ibid.

Slymering, the Resident, appears in the carriage. His name is the personification of 'slimy.'[674] Upon arriving at the scene, the first thing Dekker notes is that Mrs. Havelaar "is not beautiful, but that her way of looking and speaking had something very sweet about it… She had not of the stiffness and unpleasingness of middle-class gentility...hence she attached but little importance to the outward forms which seem to have value for some other women."[675] Havelaar, with "nothing remarkable in his appearance except his short and mobile upper lip" had eyes which "shot fire when a great idea took possession of him."[676] Dekker writes, "He was a 'vessel of contradictions'… Full of love for truth and justice, he frequently neglected his nearest, most obvious duty, in order to redress a wrong that lay higher, further, or deeper...He was chivalrous and brave, but, like that other Don Quixote, often wasted his valour on windmills."[677] Moreover, "no science was wholly foreign to him…All that was great and sublime attracted him… (He) greatly deviated from the everyday norm…He grasped the ludicrous and the serious side of things with equal rapidity and simultaneity."[678]

But these characterizations give way to the heart of the matter. This can be called an ontological difference between thought and experience. Dekker writes, "to boast of experience has become a ridiculous commonplace."[679] There are people who "undergo a whole series of emotions without outward circumstances appearing to give occasion for them."[680] Socrates was called a "corrupter of youth and denier of the gods."[681] Jesus Christ lamented that Jerusalem would not take heed. From this Dekker delivers his fundamental metaphysical concept, writing: "it is *there* that suffering has been, great suffering...*there* is true *experience.*"[682] This passage, we note, is not referred to by Anderson in his discussion of the provenance of the pseudonym Multatuli. It is crucial for understanding that there is a Pauline dimension of this discourse that is not strictly accessed by the so-called scientific and secular dimensions such as one finds in 19th century colonial functionaries.

With the appearance of the Resident, the novel repeats the spatial path of imperial ideology and infrastructure. For the novel started from and left the Amsterdam market, to arrive at the colonial road, populated by the bodies of the highest officials, followed by their subordinates, to then finally depict the 'marginal' poor place of Lebak. This path retraces the very schematic positions as distributed by capital in modern colonization.

But after Havelaar arrives to his new region, and is given the requisite, 'customary' arrival display from the local inhabitants, he gives an invocatory speech that interrupts this repetitive spatialized schema. In this 'customary' speech, he praises the poverty of the region. We learn here that Havelaar's predecessor, Slotering, had died 2 months before his arrival and that Mrs.

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[674] Dekker writes, "He spoke as though there was a full stop after each word, or even a prolonged rest; and I can think of nothing better with which to compare the space between his words than the silence following the 'Amen' after a long prayer in church." *Max Havelaar*, 87.
[675] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 87. He continues in his philosophical-aesthetic treatise, "I have said she was not beautiful, and yet I should not like you to think she was the opposite...Let me say, then, that she had a beautiful soul and that one would have had to be blind not only to see beauty also in the face in which that soul was to be read." *Max Havelaar*, 88.
[676] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 88.
[677] Ibid, 89.
[678] Ibid, 90-1.
[679] Ibid.
[680] Ibid, 92.
[681] Ibid.
[682] Ibid, 93; emphasis in Multatuli.

Slotering is still living on the grounds of the Assistant Resident's compound.[683] She is a 'native woman,' but the novel explains that it would be wrong if one were to think that this is a 'full blooded Javanese."[684] He presents again a structural-functionalist account in explanation:

> European society in the Dutch East Indies is rather sharply divided into two parts: the real Europeans, and those who - although they legally enjoy the same rights - were not born in Europe, and have more or less 'native' blood in their veins. I hasten to add here that however sharp the line which is drawn in social life between the two classes of individuals who for the genuine natives both equally bear the name Hollander, this distinction has nothing of the barbarous character which prevails in the American status differentiation. I cannot deny that, even so, there is still much in this mutual relationship which is unjust and repellent, and that the name liplap (half caste) has often grated on my ear as proof of the distance which separates many a non half-caste, a white person, from real civilization. It is true that only in exceptional cases is the half caste admitted into European society, and that generally, if I may use a very slangy expression, he is not regarded as 'one hundred per cent'. But few people would present or defend such exclusion or disparagement as a just principle. Everyone is, of course, at liberty to choose his own environment and company, and one cannot blame the full European for preferring to mix with his own kind rather than with persons who - irrespective of their greater or lesser moral or intellectual value - do not share his impressions or ideas or - and this, in a presumed difference in civilization, is perhaps very often the main thing - whose prejudices have taken a different direction than his.[685]

Dekker's position here is not one which gives its care and attention to those who are hurt by racial segregations. He identifies instead the prejudice and injustice *intrinsically* perpetuated by this racial chauvinism. The problem he identifies is how any Dutchmen presumes themselves to be the 'real' bearers of 'European civilization' in their act of symmetrically comparing themselves against a 'non-European.' In doing so, they have conflated their physical position with a metaphysical notion of Europe. He writes: "a *liplap* - if I wanted to use the official, more polite term, I should have to say a 'so-called native child'-...may have many good qualities. The European may also have many good qualities. Both have many that are bad, and in this too they resemble each other. But the good and the bad qualities inherent in both are too divergent for commerce between them to be, as a rule, mutually satisfactory."[686] Dekker identifies how this schema identifies ontological difference between, rather than within, these worlds or concepts. For Dekker is dealing with the problem of when one individual uses a collective identification to exert force over another individual as construed in another collective identification. He writes, "the liplap is often ill educated."[687] But this, he writes, is no different than with Normans and Saxons; "Normans appealed to the superiority of Normans *in general,* in order to assert himself *in particular*, where he would have been the inferior *without* the influence of his countrymen as the dominant party… Such a state of affairs naturally gives rise to a certain awkwardness in social

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[683] In Pramoedya's *Rumah Kaca* (1988), the predecessor of Pangemenann, a protagonist and so-called native informant for the Dutch empire, died 3 days before he began working for the colonial government as an investigator of 'native' political activity.
[684] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 100.
[685] Ibid, 100-1.
[686] Ibid, 101.
[687] Ibid.

intercourse, which nothing could remove except philosophical, broad-minded views and measures on the part of the Government."[688] Obviously "the European...feels perfectly comfortable in his artificial ascendency."[689] But it is "ludicrous" when the nincompoop European "sneers" at a "liplap" who makes minor grammatical mistakes speaking Dutch.[690] This racist is the imbecilic European who, Dekker notes, "made his fortune 'in' indigo."[691]

Dekker is not however extending sympathy to those who are 'sneered at' here. He is instead attacking those who sneer for at once invoking an 'artificial ascendency' while themselves not being even faintly aware of any of the metaphysical concepts or 'European ideals' that are drawn upon in order to presuppose such an elevated position. His position therefore is not that of the late liberal notion of multiculturalism or the multinaturalism articulated by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro.[692] This is instead an attack against a categorial catachresis of the 19th century European notion of the 'I that is we and the we that is I' (Hegel). Dekker thus criticizes the character masks of Droogstoppels that exist in the worlds in which *Max Havelaar* (1860) is read.

7. Pauline Discourse and the Critique of Political Economy

At his oath ceremony, Havelaar swore to be "loyal and faithful to His Majesty the King of the Netherlands...that he will strictly observe and cause to be observed the laws and regulations made or to be made....so help me God Almighty" and to "protect the native population against oppression, ill-treatment and extortion."[693] While the Resident Slymering was a beacon of "stateliness and solemnity," Havelaar showed "something in his face, voice and bearing that seemed to intimate: 'This goes without saying: I should do this even *without God Almighty.*'"[694] His action is not tethered to extant notions or laws.

Havelaar can thus be called a militant. But his crusade is not one that 'succeeds' by immediately demonstrating the domination and subjugation he seeks to undermine. Instead, like in *Capital,* the discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860) brings forth *how* the 'pure theoretical' order is 'distorted' and overtaken by the 'concrete historical' order itself. The novel thus does not elaborate a reformed government policy within itself. The novel instead aims to incite the incineration of the imperial citizen-subjectivation from within. It deposits the lesson that this capitalist mode of production contains a mode of abolition within itself. It sets a course for a justice that contravenes worldly jurors and jurists.

This transformation can only take place at the level of the word and hearing the word. Words for Havelaar "really were to him instruments for making his meaning exactly clear to his audience, and not, as is so often the case, the irksome appendages that encumber the periods of orators without helping to illuminate the matter they profess to be explaining."[695] The problem is those who use language and do "not draw it from the poesy of the soul" but "merely copied his commonplace image from some book or other - perhaps the Bible."[696] Havelaar was instead "a

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[688] Ibid.
[689] Ibid.
[690] Ibid.
[691] Ibid, 102.
[692] For the latter, see Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, "Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 4, no. 3 (1998): 469-488.
[693] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 102.
[694] Ibid, 105.
[695] Ibid, 119.
[696] Ibid.

true poet."[697] He made the tree ask where the children have gone; "he invented nothing: he *heard* the tree speak, and considered he was only repeating what he had so clearly heard in his poetic inspiration…His language recalled that of the Old Testament prophets…in moments of exaltation he really became more or less a seer."[698] But how can words introduce a just intervention? Havelaar cries out:

> listen to me, and I will tell you how justice would then be done. There comes a time when our women and children will weep as they prepare our shroud, and the passer-by will say: 'someone has died in that house!' Then whoever arrives in the village will bring tidings of death of the one that is no more, and whosoever harbours him will ask: 'who was the man that died?' And it will be said: 'He was good and righteous. He administered justice, and drove not the injured from him door. He listened patiently to those that came to him, and restored to them what had been taken from them. And if a man could not drive the plough through the soil because his buffalo had been stolen from the stall, he helped him find the buffalo. And where the daughter had been taken from the house of the mother, he found the thief and brought back the daughter. And where the labourer had laboured he withheld not his wage from him, and he took not the fruit from him who had planted the tree. And he clothed himself not with the garment that should have covered another, nor did he feed himself with food that belonged to the poor.[699]

Dekker here identifies the point of death and the unconcealment of justice. At this point, "in the villages," they will say "Allah has taken him unto Himself. He will be done...a good man has died'…A man has died who vowed to be just… What will be said in the villages where we had power? And what by the passer-bys who look on at our burials?"[700] Death is as such a reflection point of justice. Havelaar's sermon locates this death and justice as a choice for the living.

After the oration, the *Bupati* asks Verbrugge if he can be paid, but Verbrugge demurs. Havelaar knows that there has been "a scandalous abuse of authority in Lebak," for the *Bupati*, the day after Slotering died, "called up people to work on his *sawah*...without payment!"[701] Moreover, "three times as many people had been summoned to work for the Regent as the regulations allow."[702] Havelaar is telling this to Verbrugge, who has been serving in this region, and asks if he knows this. Verbrugge remains silent. Dekker knows that this *Bupati* is from a noble family, but he is poorer than a humble minister from Preanger, where coffee is cultivated. And yet that minister of Preanger would "have to hold the stirrup when our Regent's cousins mount their horses."[703] This is why Havelaar wants to lend money to the Regent before the accounts clear. Havelaar doesn't want the 'cultural' hierarchy to be disturbed for practical economic reason. But it is known that the Regent's son in law, the Dhemang of Parang Kujang, "extorts money and goods from the poor wretches" for the Bupati.[704]

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[697] Ibid.
[698] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.
[699] Ibid, 122-3.
[700] Ibid, 123.
[701] Ibid, 126.
[702] Ibid, 127.
[703] Ibid.
[704] Ibid.

Havelaar shouts that there are colonial officials who "love injustice because they live by it."[705] They "say that there was no injustice so as to have the pleasure of calling you and me Don Quixote and at the same time keeping their windmills turning."[706] His predecessor Slotering knew this as well. Havelaar had his notes "on rice cultivation, on the houses of the village chiefs, on the collection of the land taxes" that he wanted to discuss with the Resident.[707] He knew that "far more money is paid in land tax than ever finds its way into the Treasury."[708] It is clear that there is a missing volume of tax money; the amount that is harvested is not equal to the amount that is entered into the coffer.

We are told then that Slotering brought this to Slymering, but he had to produce witnesses. And yet the oppressed themselves would not testify against the Regent. For while being an Assistant Resident was a temporary status, the *Bupati*'s position of authority is, in Dekker's own words, "eternal."[709] And while the colonial government itself generates the regulations and the apparatuses to police its own regulations, exploitation is not punished, much less eradicated. The first site of conflict here is that the colonial functionary Verbrugge knows this and does not tell Havelaar. Verbrugge acknowledges that Slotering did meet the Resident with these charges, but that "the Regent usually denied everything. Then witnesses had to come... (and) no one dared to bear witness against the Regent."[710] This is not an exposition of mute compulsion in itself, but instead the activity of muting compulsion.[711]

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"It was my soul that you have milled over....it was my heart that you have just swallowed."[712] With these words, the novel introduces an absolutely sudden overturning of the place of its discursive existence; the novel at once returns from Java to the burghers' party at the Rosemeyers' in Amsterdam. This absolutely sudden change indicates, we suggest, that the relation of the places of the colony and the metropole bears an interruptive, rather than evolutionary, mode of relation.

At the party, Droogstoppel thinks and complains to himself, "how little satisfied I am with Stern's work. I had hoped for coffee, and he has given us...Heaven knows what!"[713] With this, the book returns to telling the story of how it came into existence. Dekker writes that "that parcel of Scarfman is a Trojan Horse."[714] Droogstoppel tells that he has "signed an agreement with *Gaafzuiger* for the publication of a book on the *coffee auctions.*"[715] This strikes in strong opposition to the story in Java of the exploitation by dual authority system of the baronial *Bupati* and the colonial Dutch empire, which harvest profit from the Javanese peasants' so-called service. Stern

[705] Ibid.
[706] Ibid.
[707] Ibid, 129.
[708] Ibid, 129-30.
[709] Ibid, 130.
[710] Ibid.
[711] Regarding the former, see Søren Mau, *Mute Compulsion* (London: Verso, 2022).
[712] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 134.
[713] Ibid, 135.
[714] Ibid.
[715] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.

reassures him: "all roads lead to Rome."[716] Everything will come back to coffee. Furthermore, as Droogstoppel clearly sees, "it's clear, I can't push Stern out of the 'firm' of my book."[717]

With this, Dekker allows the hypocritical stockbroker to tell his own lies. Droogstoppel speaks: "you must know reader that I am strict in carrying out my duties as a father and that the moral training of my children is a thing very near to my heart."[718] This is a critique by the exposition of sophistry and the impersonation of its practicality. For Droogstoppel lectures his son: "I am not satisfied with you! I have always shown you the right path, and yet you will stray off it...Immorality leads to perdition my lad. Read the Scriptures...Do pay attention in church...the church is His sanctuary."[719] Meanwhile, Droogstoppel also thinks and says aloud "ask [Stern] – quite spontaneously you know! – whether he thinks his father is likely to go to Busselinck & Waterman, and tell him they're tricksters."[720] Dekker is listening to but also impersonating in critique the discourse of Droogstoppel.

Stern tells Droogstoppel that coffee can't be grown in Banten because the soil is unsuitable there. But Droogstoppel insists that this is only negligence by the Government; they must only change the soil. He recalls the sermon of the preacher *Dominee Wavelaar* which Roy Edwards translates into the English name, "Parson Blatherer."[721] He remembers, "it is from Blatherer's sermon that I have drawn my conclusion about the wrongfulness of abandoning coffee cultivation in Lebak."[722] Here Dekker satirizes, rather than 'scientifically' presents, the connection of Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism. The sermon regarding the conversion of Heathens (from I Sam XV: 33) is spoken from the priest's position to the congregants; Dekker's discourse knows and hates, we suggest, this priestly discourse. Droogstoppel states:

> [The] extermination of the inhabitants of Canaan...is also the mission of Holland!... Out there live lost ones… It is even possible that the Supreme Being has made the soil there unsuitable for coffee growing for no other purpose than that the population of those parts shall be made fit for Heaven through the labour that will be necessary to transport different soil to them… I can't help hoping my book will come to the eye of the King and that soon bigger auctions will testify how closely the knowledge of God is connected with the proper interests of all respectable citizens…Yes, labour, labour, that's my watchword! Labour for the Javanese, that's my principle! And my principles are sacred to me… It would be selfishness, abominable selfishness if we didn't make every effort to preserve those poor lost sheep from the terrible future Parson Blatherer so eloquently described…A lady fainted when he spoke of that black child...perhaps she had a little boy with a rather dark complexion.[723]

The discourse identifies and rejects the ideological alliance of Blatherer and Droogstoppel, of the preacher and stockbroker. For Droogstoppel says he is acting out of selflessness, so that the Javanese can be saved, and yet his so-called selfless act is instead motivated by personal gain. In

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[716] Ibid.
[717] Ibid, 136.
[718] Ibid, 136-7.
[719] Ibid, 137.
[720] Ibid, 138.
[721] The pseudonym here in the surname "*Wawelaar*" rhymes with the name "*Havelaar.*" Their difference and identity is brought forth by their near homophony. A *wavelaar* (*wowelaar*) is a 'prattler,' 'babbler,' or 'driveller.'
[722] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 139.
[723] Ibid, 143.

professing to serve the Lord, he serves himself on this earth. The discourse of the novel therefore can and does present the hypocrisy, rather than the mute facticity, of the Dutch Calvinist ideology born by its preachers and brokers.

8. On Dekker's Concept of Experience

Chapter 11 opens by candidly confessing that this specific chapter is essential for understanding the story. It states that this chapter identifies the central idea of the novel. We suggest calling this Dekker's idea of the irreducible difference between experience and representativity.

Dekker immediately proceeds to the heart of the matter, stating "there's nothing, I think, that brings before you so clearly beauty in the abstract, the visible image of *truth*, of *immaterial purity*, as a beautiful woman."[724] This identification facilitates Havelaar's exaltation of the ideal in the primacy of human existence. He states that he has no interest in waterfalls; "buildings speak rather more loudly, especially when they are pages of history."[725] For even in catching a glimpse of buildings, "the shades of days gone by pass in review."[726] Information about buildings, which tell of when and by whom they were built, is simply sophistry because

> a building doesn't move. I think this also applies to sculpture and painting. Nature is movement. Growth, hunger, thinking, feeling are movement…immobility is death! Without movement – no pain, no pleasure, no emotion!... Since our thirst for beauty is not slaked by one single glance at a beautiful thing, but requires a series of successive glances at the movement of the beautiful, we suffer from a sense of incompleteness, dissatisfaction, on contemplating that class of works of art; and for this reason I maintain that a beautiful woman...comes nearest to the ideal of the divine. You can see, to a certain extent, how great is the need for movement I mean when a dancer, though she be an Elssler or a Taglioni, stands on her left leg after a dance, and grins at the public.[727]

Havelaar says that this form of action is the "'point' of the epigram."[728] He repeats, "immobility is death."[729] Waterfalls, though not immobile, "tell no story...they make a sound, but they don't speak."[730]

Duclari asks Havelaar, can't a painting express something powerful? Havelaar responds, "undoubtedly, but only for a moment."[731] In order to elucidate his lesson, Havelaar says, imagine it is February 1587 and you are locked in Fotheringhay Castle. You have climbed up on a chair to look out and you see a women in a black dress beside a man holding a sword. You fall, shouting 'Oh God'. Why did you fall? Havelaar answers his own question:

> Because you saw a woman dressed in black, kneeling before a block. And she bowed her head, and bright as silver was the neck that shone against the black velvet. And there stood a man with a great sword, and he held it high, and his eye gazed on that white

[724] Ibid, 152.
[725] Ibid.
[726] Ibid.
[727] Ibid, 152-3.
[728] Ibid, 153.
[729] Ibid.
[730] Ibid.
[731] Ibid, 154.

> neck, and he mentally measured the arc his sword must describe so that there…there, between those vertebrae, it would be driven through with precision and force…and then you fell Duclari! You fell because you saw all that and *that* was why you cried "Oh God!" Decidedly not because there were only three legs on your chair. And long after…you still dream waking dreams about that woman, and in your sleep even you start up, and fall heavily down on your couch again, because you are trying to seize the executioner's arm.[732]

Contrast this, Havelaar instructs, with a "*painting* of the beheading of the Mary Queen of Scots."[733] You may be struck by the painting, you may even "throw out your arm to ward off the blow."[734] Duclari asks, isn't that the same as seeing the real thing in the Fotheringhay Castle? It is not, Havelaar avers. You are *not* standing on a chair looking through a hole in the museum. In the museum you do *not* see the moment before the execution of the Queen. You do *not* fall down so that you do not see it in the museum. For in the museum, you may sit down in your chair and watch this painting for an eternity and never fall down, adding "strange though it seems, we do enjoy the sight of horrible things."[735] You will even start to feel "fellow suffering and fellow feeling" for the executioner and the woman, who are "kept waiting for so long" in the painting.[736] You might even say of the execution: "get it over… isn't this business finished yet?"[737] You get impatient with its immobility.

Dekker is bringing forth the irreducible antinomy of what Althusser in our first chapter identified as exposition (*Darstellung*) and appropriation (*Forschung*). For Dekker instates here, however allegorically, that he himself was looking through the peep hole and grasped the preparations being undertaken for the beheading. Rather than the Queen, it is the Javanese peasants and the colonial system itself which he saw being prepared for execution. He, however allegorically, 'fell' and shouted, 'oh God!' The novel that the reader reads is this shout. This passage articulates the idea that his own experience and the experience of the reader are irreducible to each other. The novel is therefore a representation of this voice which emerges in the experience of 'falling.'

He then returns to the opening question of beauty and the statement that a beautiful woman is an 'immaterial purity.' The women in Arles, Havelaar opines, are the pure form of beauty; "they *enact* a whole history in their features."[738] It is not a single woman that is beautiful; they are all beautiful, he avers. It was as if, like Caligula or Tiberius said, that the whole human race had only one head.[739] He does not, however, bring forth these beautiful women as those from whom he seeks a corporeal kiss, but instead as those "to gaze at, to dream about, and...*to be good for*!"[740] He explains that "because the features were so noble I felt something like shame at being only a human being, and not a spark...a ray – no, those would still be matter! - a thought!"[741] These noses should not be blown, he cried. At that moment, his wife, Tina, sneezed.

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[732] Ibid, 154-5; emphasis in Multatuli.
[733] Ibid, 155; emphasis in Multatuli.
[734] Ibid.
[735] Ibid, 156.
[736] Ibid.
[737] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.
[738] Ibid.
[739] Ibid, 157.
[740] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.
[741] Ibid

The interruption of this sneeze into the paean to the ideal nose contradicts its 'pure theory' of immaterial purity and that "she ought not to have a body at all."[742] Havelaar's discourse therefore exalts the ideal in femininity while lampooning its own forbidding her a material instantiation in action or gesture.

This aporetic nexus of representation and experience is further advanced by Havelaar in a story from his experience as an assistant resident in Sumatra before his time in Lebak. He recalls that he was sailing on the boat with the daughter of a *Datuk*.[743] He tells the young girl the story of the Japanese stone cutter which he had just read in a magazine. He wanted to tell it to her "out of pure kindness...but she, the child, cured me...better than my story."[744] The story is told as follows: there was a man that cut stones from rock, and his wages were very little. He exclaims, oh that I were rich, I would rest on a '*baleh baleh*' (bamboo furniture). Then an angel arrived and brought about his wish; he became rich. Then he saw a king, with a golden umbrella and he said I want to be a king. And the angel returned, and thus he became a king. But he still burned from the sun, and he wished he were the sun. And the angel made him the sun. Then he burned the earth. A cloud obstructed his beams and he became angry, so he wished to be the cloud. And then he rained rain to the earth, and destroyed the fields with floods. But the rocks would not yield the water, and he wished to be a rock, and he became the rock. "And then came a man with the pickaxe and chisel and...hewed stone from the rock…He cried... I wish I were this man!"[745] And he became the stone cutter, working hard for little money "and he was content."[746] After telling the girl the story, Havelaar asks the girl, what would you wish from the angel who came to give you a wish? She replied: to be "take(n) back to Heaven with him."[747]

Dekker argues here that experience is not adequate to the idea. Experience is *essentially* different than representation. This introduces an important aporia, for *Max Havelaar* (1860) indeed comes out of the experience of the author of almost two decades living in the Indies. The novel therefore sets forth this contradiction as follows. Though experience bears the capacity to 'fall,' representation, rather than experience, bears the form of the 'shout.' Dekker thereby situates the problem of truth as shuttling between experience and representation and their essentially discrete notions of participation. For the collapse of the seer in order to avoid witnessing the Queen's execution forms a 'direct opposition' with the seer of the museum painting who begs for the executioner to get it over with. There are two different ethical trajectories set forth here by Dekker. One acts to tell others of the pain of this experience of seeing the preparation for an execution. The other shouts out to hasten an execution for one's own imagination. In the latter, the representation of the execution is the basis of experience. In the former, the execution forms that on which experience is experienced. Writing, Dekker therefore argues, is thus without any *relation* to the ideal because it instead *forms the ideal itself*.

9. On Research and Exposition of So-Called Primitive Accumulation

Havelaar then explains why he was suspended from his post in Natal. Officially, it is because his accounts were short, but it actually entails the story of a stolen turkey.

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[742] Ibid, 158.
[743] This is a Malay honorific.
[744] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 165.
[745] Ibid, 167.
[746] Ibid.
[747] Ibid.

There was a rumor that a woman had given birth to a child that disappeared. At the same time, the Assistant Resident of the region was sent to another division where a Controleur had been dismissed, supposedly to report on the condition there. But it was then made known that this reason was a ruse to get the Assistant General out of the way and "to prevent his intended inquiry into the disappearance of Miss X's baby."[748]

When Havelaar submitted a report favorably for the sacked Controleur, the story gained "a tinge of injustice," and he was suspended for "dishonesty" by General Vandamme.[749] Havelaar, pinched by this injustice, left a poem on the General's breakfast table:

> Walking Suspension-writ, who rules us by suspension
> That werewolf of our days, Governor Suspend-all Jack
> Would e'en have given his conscience suspensory attention
> Had it not long ago been firmly given the sack[750]

For this delivered letter, the General cut Havelaar's pay off completely for 9 months so much that he starved. But the governor did not prosecute him, thus depriving him even of "the very least vestige of a martyr's crown."[751] Dekker uses this story to illustrate that the official reason for the sacking of Havelaar for "errors in his accounts" conceals the true cause.[752] Havelaar's accounts were indeed short. This is because the Dutch had

> to fight...against the discontent of the population and their persistent attempt at rebellion…Surely no one knew better than he did that in such cases there never could be question of anything else but *force majeure*…I was far from the cash box or anything like it…I could only have been guilty of a carelessness which had nothing to do with 'dishonesty'!...Especially in those days, there were numerous cases in which the authorities had fully recognized the difficult position of officials in Sumatra in this respect; and it seemed to be an accepted principle that some allowance should be made. The Government contented itself with requiring the official concerned to make good the deficit, and the evidence had to be *very* strong before anyone uttered the word 'dishonesty', or even thought it.[753]

Havelaar even told his superior that he feared an audit of his accounts, to which the governor shrugged and responded, "Oh...those money matters!"[754] Indeed his account was thousands of

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[748] Ibid, 172. With this sequence, we can see vividly why Sigmund Freud was attracted to Dekker. For Dekker, like Freud, identifies the psychic activity of disavowal. Dekker writes, "there's so much bad in the best of us…we praise the other chap's good quality to the skies, in order to make a particular bad quality show up more without our appearing hostile." As an example, Dekker writes, one says that I *would* applaud him, but he beats his wife. Then, "we gladly use the women's bruises as an excuse for keeping our hats on, and in the end we're even quite pleased that he clouts the poor creature, although that's otherwise a very nasty thing to do…*We love pulling down even those statues whose pedestal we shall never be able to ascend ourselves.*" As a further exhibition, regarding General Vandamme, Havelaar explains, people say that he has bravery so that they can say "but...his morals!" *Max Havelaar,* 174-5; emphasis added.

[749] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 175.

[750] Ibid, 176.

[751] Ibid, 178.

[752] Ibid, 179.

[753] Ibid, 180-1.

[754] Ibid, 181.

guilders short, "but those thousands were short because of my successful efforts to prevent a rebellion which threatened to set the whole district of Mandheling ablaze and bring the Achinese back to the places from which we had only just expelled them at the cost of much money an many lives!"[755] With this, Dekker relays not only that all is not quiet and calm in the colony, but also that this war strategy is not paid for entirely in the official budget. It is true, therefore, that the accounts were imbalanced, but the reason is to "preserve infinitely greater interests."[756] Havelaar was content to repay, for if he did not, "too wide a door would be opened to peculation."[757]

But he was summarily suspended. Defending himself required inspecting documents, but his requests to see the documents were refused. He asked himself why the empire was contravening "accepted custom and equity" of allowing account deficits? [758] The reason was because Havelaar had crossed the feelings of the General with his poem. This articulates a critical point made by *Max Havelaar* (1860) that so-called political economy is shot through by human passions.

The narration then returns to Banten of 1856 and the appearance of Mrs. Slymering on the verandah. Suspicious of her, Havelaar calls to the policeman. He thinks that she hasn't gotten used to her 'dethronement,' after her husband's death, and he condescendingly remarks of "how fond these native ladies are of exercising authority."[759]

From here, he opens a "digression about digression," which he says is necessary because of the difficulty in "describ(ing) conditions in spheres that are quite unknown to the reader."[760] Havelaar has to explain that while he has said that Mrs. Slymering is staying with his family, that does not mean under the same roof, as it would in Europe. This requires an architectural explanation of the 'compound.' In so doing, Havelaar defends the author of *Waverley* (1814) for his prolix description of place, and states that the reader cannot know 'before the catastrophe' whether some narrated detail is yet necessary or not. He asks the reader, "do you think Amy Rosbart's death would have moved you so much if you had been a stranger in Kenilworth's halls?"[761] Havelaar contrasts this with the novels that have come in its wake, where

> the sorrow of the king is translated on paper into the wailing of the people...*his* wrath offers the author an opportunity of killing thousands on the field of battle...all this gives scope for coarse brushwork!...You shed no tears for that mother vainly seeking her child?...very well then, I'll show you another mother watching her child being quartered!...In this way artistic horrors turn to silliness. Yet this is what we should get if we were too hasty in commending a writer for trying gradually to prepare us for his denouement without resorting to such screaming colours.[762]

One must instead make the readers meander, showing them flowers or plants

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[755] Ibid. We maintain Edwards' spellings of "Achinese" and "ACHIN," although the province is now written in Indonesian language as "Aceh."
[756] Ibid.
[757] Ibid.
[758] Ibid, 182.
[759] Ibid, 184.
[760] Ibid, 185.
[761] Ibid, 186.
[762] Ibid, 187.

> which had hitherto escaped my notice… For when at last we shall have got so far, I shall know how our road has meandered through the mountains, what it is that has caused the sun, which was over yonder only just now, to have come round to the left of us, and why that hill, whose top we saw in front only a short while ago, is now behind us...look, then your digression will have made it easy for me to understand my walk, and to understand is to enjoy…In my story, reader, I have often left you on the high road when I was sorely tempted to take you off into the undergrowth...But because, this time, I believe it will eventually give you satisfaction to have seen the path we shall be following presently, I now feel I must tell you something about Havelaar's house… You would be mistaken if you thought of a house in Java in European terms.[763]

He then presents a schematic contrast in 'direct opposition' of the architectural principles of Java and Holland. Houses in Java have only one story.[764] Havelaar presents it with a geometrical figure of a rectangle. It comprises 21 squares, three squares wide and seven long. Squares 1-3 at the front of the house are the verandah. 19-21 are the back verandah. Those between are rooms and corridors. Of this space, he writes:

> a compound is neither garden, nor park, nor field, nor wood, but either something of each, or all these things together, or nothing of any of them. It is all the land which belongs to the house but is not covered by the house, so that the expression 'garden and compound' would be considered a pleonasm in the Indies.[765]

Behind the house is a river. Of this enveloping space, he writes

> The vegetation which grows rapidly enough everywhere in the Indies, was especially rank there owing to the constant accretion of ooze from the river…Apart from the insects...numerous snakes and other vermin lurked in the undergrowth, and did not confine themselves to the ravine but were also found, over and over again, in the garden beside the house.[766]

From this 'digression about digression,' he returns to the war front in Sumatra of the 1840s. He explains that

> our possessions on the west coast of Sumatra border on a number of independent states in the north of the island, the most important of which is ACHIN. There is said to be a secret article in the Treaty of 1824 which imposes on us the obligation towards the British not to cross the River Singkel. General Vandamme, our pinchbeck Napoleon,…met with an insuperable obstacle in that direction. I am forced to believe the article exists, because otherwise it would be too odd that the Rajahs of Trumon and Analabu, whose territories are important to the pepper trade, shouldn't have become vassals of the Netherlands long

[763] Ibid, 188.
[764] Yet it is the European house that is 'strange,' he says, for it is the lack of space in Holland that forces the house upwards.
[765] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 190.
[766] Ibid, 191.

> ago. You know how easy it is to find a pretext for making war on such little states and annexing them. Stealing a country will always be easier than stealing a mill.[767]

The translator's footnote notes that the reference here is to the story of Frederick the Great and the miller of *Sans Souci*. Frederick wanted his land, and his agents threatened the miller. The miller replies, "haven't we the law court in Berlin?" and the agent gave up.[768] In 1838, Dekker translated a poem by Andrieux on the subject which ends, "See: a province is stolen/And a mill is spared."[769]

The 'pinchbeck Napoleon' Vandamme couldn't march north so he instead went east, through the region of Mandheling. A governor's commission condemned it, but Vandamme said that the garrisons were paid by money that had already been approved for the troops. He thus expanded the territory without costing the Kingdom any more money. Vandamme got the approval of the commission by assuring the personal support of Yang di Pertuan, "the principal chief of the Battak lands."[770] In this region, the Controleur, the son in law of the assistant resident, was on very bad terms with Yang di Pertuan. He was instead friendly with a Sutam Salim, a Natal chief who was the enemy of Yang di Pertuan. A rejection of marriage offers birthed the animosity; it made "Natal and Mandheling at odds with each other."[771] The rumor that Mandheling would rise up and kill all Europeans came out of Natal. The conspiracy "*if* it ever existed, which I don't know" supposed that Yang di Pertuan "collected many Battak chiefs around him in a sacred wood where they had sworn they would never rest until the rule of the 'dogs of Christians' had been wiped out in Mandheling."[772] Dekker opines that Yang di Pertuan had a 'divine inspiration' which is "never absent in such cases."[773] Havelaar read the witness statements, but these cannot be completely relied upon. Yang di Pertuan was a 'fanatical Moslem' and "had been converted to the true faith by the Padris only a short time before, and new converts are usually fanatics."[774] Yang di Pertuan was arrested and sent to Natal. He was transported on ship, by another prisoner. When he arrived in Padang, he was freed. He was received by the General and sent back to Natal, free and with great distinction.

With this story, Dekker demonstrates why the supposed enemy of the empire is in fact an ally in a region which is concealed from the 'metropolitan' realm of appearance. If the General had sent Yang di Pertuan to Batavia to face charges, the central government there would learn about what is actually happening in his region. The Controller has a court sentence a Si Pamaga to "flogging and branding and - I think - twenty years of hard labour for attempting to murder the Tuanku of Natal."[775]

The General formed an "ad hoc tribunal" to investigate "the way in which my predecessor had conducted the trial of Si Pamaga."[776] The General presided in the court, but he understood no Malay. It was clear that Si Pamaga never intended to murder anyone. He had

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[767] Ibid, 194.
[768] Ibid, 334.
[769] Ibid.
[770] Ibid, 195.
[771] Ibid.
[772] Ibid.
[773] Ibid. For two different moments identifying the divine principle of the social formation, see James Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (New York: Macmillan, 1922) and Dipesh Chakrabarty *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
[774] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 195.
[775] Ibid, 198.
[776] Ibid.

never met Sutan Adam or Yang di Pertuan. But the conduct of the court was like "the game of whist played by a certain Emperor of Morocco, who said to his partner: 'play hearts or I'll cut your throat!'"[777] This scene echoes the opening epigraph of the novel, of the unjust courtroom sentence. But because the General had "lower(ed) himself to be the tool of Mandheling," Havelaar acted in a "plucky" manner from time to time.[778] Havelaar knew this was a show trial. He therefore refused to sign its documents, which angered the General.

Marx identifies in *Capital* that there is an action that conceals the true origin of capitalist accumulation. With the exposition of Havelaar's experience in Natal, the novel instantiates the necessity of this condition. Dekker depicts this also in metaphor. Snakes, he writes, would "creep into houses and conceal themselves for warmth in the bedrooms."[779] Moreover, "the nature of snakes makes them prefer darkness and seclusion to the light of open spaces."[780] This mode of existence is not spontaneously accessible in the urban centers and its market exchanges.

This does not only take place on the war front. Havelaar tells the reader that the Residents keep up their residences with a "chain gang."[781] When a chain gang is not available, they use "statute labour."[782] A resident summons a *Bupati* who summons the labour. And the *Bupati* does this because "it will be difficult for the official who so abuses his authority to punish a native chief for doing likewise. And thus the offence of the one becomes the license of the other."[783] Dekker deftly articulates the consequences of this situation: "*once the limit of what is strictly legal has been exceeded, it becomes difficult to fix a point where such excess becomes exploitation*."[784] Herein lies a fundamental point about the capitalist mode of production which produces surplus value: one can*not* locate a finite point to stop its abuse of the rule, for the very finite localization of the infraction is foreclosed by this mode of production. Dekker asks, "what then induces so many people contrary to sworn oath and duty, to allow such abuses to persist without notifying the Government of them?"[785] Havelaar will "endeavor to unfold the reasons for this."[786]

10. On the Inversion of Artificial Optimism

Carrying out evil tidings is unpleasant and "something of the unfavourable impression they make sticks to the man whose depressing duty it is to convey them."[787] How much worse to be the "*cause* of the adverse situation," Dekker avers.[788] The government in the Indies tells the Motherland everything is going well. The Residents say the same to the Government. The Assistant Residents say this to the Residents and the Controleurs say this to the Assistant Residents. This "gives birth to an artificial optimism," Dekker writes.[789]

Dekker unconceals this artificial existence by explaining how the Residents' accounting reports flourishing trade in their regions. They state that no one is smuggling, and everything is

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[777] Ibid, 201.
[778] Ibid, 200.
[779] Ibid, 206.
[780] Ibid.
[781] Ibid, 207.
[782] Ibid.
[783] Ibid.
[784] Ibid; emphasis added.
[785] Ibid, 210.
[786] Ibid.
[787] Ibid, 211.
[788] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.
[789] Ibid.

peaceful. Rebellion is only from a few bad seeds and the population has not increased because the past years censuses were inaccurate, they state. Famine is because of bad weather, not bad government. But Havelaar relays that his predecessor, Mr. Slotering, in an "*un*official note," states that there are "outrageous abuses" in the region.[790] Havelaar writes, "in short, the official report...which the Government sends to the Motherland, are mostly and for the most important part *untrue.*"[791] Furthermore, Havelaar states, "I can prove my charge."[792] Where regions were praised, there was famine; where there was peace reported, there was revolt. He will provide one example of this "absurd optimism."[793] Rice trade in Java is reported by two metrics: trade with the outside world and trade within regencies in Java. He writes that the latter figure ought to be identical across all of the regencies of Java but it is not because regencies falsify their reports.

But Dekker refrains from simply moralizing here. Instead, he wants to identify "the *object* of this deceit."[794] Because "export from a residency meant prosperity, import into it means want," this leads to "the absurd thesis that *there is more rice in Java than there is*. That's prosperity, if you like!"[795] He writes that this sending of artificial and absurd good news to the motherland

> would be comic if the results were not so tragic… What may be expected from a population which...sees one Resident after another retire on furlough or pension, or be called away to another post, without the slightest thing being done to redress the grievances under which it suffers? Must not the bent spring eventually recoil? Must not the long-suppressed discontent - suppressed so that the Government can continue to deny its existence! - finally turn to rage, desperation, madness? Is there not a *Jacquerie* at the end of this road?[796]

On the one hand, Dekker is prognosticating that these iniquities will spring into their direct opposites for both the subjugated and dominators. This is the thinking that identifies a future justice by means of a past injustice. But justice is not simply something that takes place at the level of the mechanical or physical rationality of the force of a loaded spring. For as we know, Dekker gives himself the pseudonym Multatuli. This name identifies an immense (*multa*) suffering (*tuli*). Havelaar "could not see sorrow without suffering personally… his tenderheartedness was either denied or pronounced ridiculous."[797] He wept. Dekker exhorts the reader, "I summon you to bear witness to his heart."[798] The novel itself is a bearing witness; following Paul of Tarsus, it thinks that participating this suffering facilitates a metaphysical inversion for its disciples.

11. On the Dissymmetry of Official and Unofficial Discourse

Dekker thereby introduces a strong contradiction between official and unofficial discourse in modern colonization as it bears on the putative truth of capitalist political economy. This is not

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[790] Ibid, 212; emphasis in Multatuli.
[791] Ibid, 212-3; emphasis in Multatuli.
[792] Ibid, 213.
[793] Ibid.
[794] Ibid, 214; emphasis in Multatuli.
[795] Ibid; emphasis in original. This line strongly resonates with Marx's "Dat is der doux commerce!" *MEW 23,* 780.
[796] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 214.
[797] Ibid, 216.
[798] Ibid, 217. Anderson does not mention this passage in his genealogy of the pseudonym Multatuli.

the identification of a good or evil, but instead an elucidation of the effects which this contradiction introduces. Dekker explains the state of this situation in the following way.

Havelaar is not, of course, the first to have understood the 'treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness' of modern colonization. His predecessor, Slotering, whose death forms the pre-conditions and discursive mystery of the novel, also knew this well. Dekker notes that Slotering however did not persevere in making this known, for "the man had many children and no money behind him."[799]

Havelaar himself began on the *customary* path to bring forth grievances to the colonial state apparatus itself, for he first *spoke* to the Resident, rather than

> name them openly in an official report. He knew that a Resident does not like to receive a written statement, which remains in his files and can be produced later as evidence...whereas an oral communication brings no such risk upon him but leaves him the choice between dealing with a complaint or ignoring it. These oral communications usually resulted in an interview with the Regent....then the Resident summoned the people who had had the temerity to complain; and crawling at the feet of the Adhipatti, they prayed for a pardon. 'No, the buffalo had not been taken from them for nothing; they felt sure that double the price would be paid for it.' 'No, they had not been called away from their fields to labour in the *sawahs* of the Regent without payment -...' They must have been mad, and they begged to be duly punished for such gross disrespect![800]

Dekker here again brings forth the artificial and absurd optimism given by this order and connection of things. Furthermore, he identifies an important relation between speaking and writing. In these conditions, those who testify were given *rattan* canings, while the Resident returns "with the pleasant consciousness of having 'fixed' things."[801] Those who spoke up have fled. That is why there are so many Bantammers wandering in other districts, joining the rebels in the Lampung mountains. These exiles of modern colonization "prefer the shade of alien woods" to their autochthonous home.[802] This is not a romantic idea for Dekker; he retorts, "but not everyone *could* flee."[803] Many were found and killed.

These seemingly 'literary' episodes in fact prepare a critique of the actuality and existence of modern colonization. For as Dekker writes, "if my reader should complain that I am wasting his time with correspondence about the prices of timberwork...I beg him to consider that the real point at issue is...the condition of the East Indian Government economy."[804] Havelaar commands Verbrugge to "renounce altogether this unmanly shrinking from telling the plain truth about a case" and to explain the *cause* of the difference in prices between now [1856] and 1854.[805] Verbrugge will not. As a result, the novel shows that one can*not* find the truth in 'official' discourse.

12. On Inversion and Truth

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[799] Ibid, 223.
[800] Ibid.
[801] Ibid.
[802] Ibid.
[803] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.
[804] Ibid, 228.
[805] Ibid, 230; emphasis in Multatuli.

How can the truth appear within the conditions of its officialized concealment? We suggest that like *Capital*, *Max Havelaar* (1860) demonstrates how grasping truth necessitates a minimal inversion from the worldly facticity of capitalist ideology.

The clearest example of this is in what Benedict Anderson rightly calls the most famous story of the novel. This story itself constitutes a named couplet in the personal names Saijah and Adinda. Their names are akin in form to Romeo and Juliet. Their love is a fateful love, but their beloved connection is, as Dekker writes, "a story of extortion and robbery."[806] Their love is the story of the theft of the buffalo from Saijah's father by the *Bupati*'s kin and his lieutenants.

But before disclosing their story, Dekker begins to explain this inversive relationship between the appearance of the true and its discursive environment which is determinately fictional. We suggest that Dekker advances here a critical notion regarding the immanence of truth. He writes,

> if anyone wishes to regard [the tale of Saijah and Adinda]...as fictitious, I can supply the names of thirty-two persons in the District of Parang-Kujang alone from whom, in one month, thirty six buffaloes were forcibly taken on behalf of the Regent… to be more precise, I can name thirty two persons from that District who, in one month, *had the courage to complain,* and whose complaints were *investigated and found justified* by Havelaar.[807]

With this, Dekker states that the action in question is of a 'class,' rather than a finite, phenomena. He impresses the importance of the repetition of this class of action. He is bringing forth an aeon of Adindas and Saijahs. The discourse then states that this class of action implicates its readers in Holland, who cannot spare thinking of these souls far away, for they are too busy choosing the next representative of Parliament between "Nonentity A and Nobody B."[808] Dekker imputes that their individual concern will only be aroused if the stock exchange was "slack" with "oversupply threatening the coffee market."[809] Dekker seeks an intervention in this class of actions through the reading of this novel.

At this moment, Droogstoppel immediately takes over the point of narration from Havelaar. Droogstoppel complains that Stern's father hasn't ordered coffee yet. He complains that this parcel has made Stern and his son Frits 'mad.' Who cares about whether people go in the front or back of Havelaar's house, or hide in the ravine in the back? Why does it matter that these people want buffaloes? I, Droogstoppel, have no need for a buffalo. But Droogstoppel begins to detect the possibility of profit when he notices that Mrs. Rosemeyer likes this story; he recognizes the possibility of profit in a fictional story. And yet Droogstoppel complains about Stern going on about these 'discontented people.' There are always miserable people, he counters. He condemns Stern too, for he, as a foreigner in the Kingdom of Netherlands, is benefiting from its government. He is making noise when he should be only thankful, Droogstoppel argues.

Droogstoppel then recalls Parson Blatherer's sermon in admiration. Droogstoppel is "amazed at Blatherer's business acumen."[810] Blatherer said that the Javanese are poor because they are heathens. Dekker's exhibition lampoons this ideological armour: "isn't that why we're told to 'work and pray' meaning that *we* should pray and have the work done by that black scum

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[806] Ibid, 239.
[807] Ibid, 239-40; emphasis in Multatuli.
[808] Ibid.
[809] Ibid.
[810] Ibid, 251.

which doesn't know its 'Our Father'?"[811] Dekker uproariously presents their imbecilic logic: "how light is the burden made for all that believe!"[812] This is a sardonic satire of Calvinist predestination, for Dekker does not 'analytically' criticize his opponents. He instead allows this discourse to prevail in order for its own ideological armour to fall to the ground, like rotten touchwood. This action is essentially unlike that of sawing off branches of a tree.

With this setting, the love story of Saijah and Adinda finally appears. It is as follows:

> Saijah's father had a buffalo with which he worked in his field. When this buffalo was taken from him by the District Chief of Parang-Kujang, he was very sad and said not a word for many days. For ploughing-time was drawing near and it was to be feared that, if the *sawah* was not prepared soon enough, sowing-time would also pass by, and in the end there would be no paddy to cut and to store in the barn…Saijah's father feared that his wife would lack rice, and also Saijah, who was still a child, and the little brother and sisters of Saijah. Moreover, the District Chief would report him to the Assistant Resident if he was behind-hand in paying his land tax. For that is punishable by law.[813]

What did he do? Saijah's father took a "*kris* which was a *pusaka* left to him by *his* father…He sold this *kris* to a Chinaman who lived in the Divisional capital, and came home with twenty-four guilders, which is about two pounds in English money, for which sum he bought another buffalo."[814] Dekker shows here that the circuit of money into which Saijah's father is forced is caused by the theft of the means of production by the representatives of the state apparatus itself.

But this discourse does not only advance by a 'pure theoretical' exposition of so-called political economy. For this is a love story. Dekker writes:

> Saijah, who was then about seven years old, soon struck up a friendship with the buffalo. Not inadvisedly do I use the word 'friendship'; for it is indeed touching to see how attached the Javanese buffalo becomes to the little boy who minds and takes care of him. Presently I shall give an example of this attachment. The great strong animal meekly bends his heavy head to the right or left or downward, in response to the pressure of the finger of the child whom he knows, whom he understands, with whom he has grown up.[815]

Saijah's voice "gave even greater power to the powerful shoulders of the animal."[816] This land is beside the land of Adinda, "the child who will marry Saijah."[817] This buffalo was stolen when Saijah was nine and Adinda six. Saijah's father again goes and sells to the 'Chinaman' "two silver *klambu* hooks - *pusaka* from the parents of his wife" to buy another buffalo.[818]

The situation for the exploited *and* dominated Javanese peasant is the following: his buffalo is stolen by the district chief. The buffalo is the means of production. Yoked, it plows fields where the crop grows to be harvested and transformed into tax value. Saijah, the boy,

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[811] Ibid.
[812] Ibid.
[813] Ibid, 255.
[814] Ibid.
[815] Ibid.
[816] Ibid, 256.
[817] Ibid.
[818] Ibid. *Pusaka* are inherited possessions, heirlooms, relics, inheritances.

"feared that his buffalo has been slaughtered, like the other buffaloes which the District Chief took from people."[819] But he soon loved the new buffalo, "for, alas, the impressions made on the wax of our hearts are so easily smoothed out to make room for other writing."[820] The next buffalo was not as strong and did not pull as straight as the last. Saijah frustrated started to yell 'ASU,' but Multatuli writes "A-S" and stops short, noting "anyone who has been in the Indies will know what I mean, and those who do not know what I mean can only benefit by my sparing them the explanation of a coarse expression."[821]

But the reason why the Buffalo wouldn't move was then disclosed to Saijah from the shouts of Adinda's brothers. There is a tiger approaching; "all unyoked their buffaloes, swung themselves on to the animals' broad backs and galloped away over sawahs."[822] But Saijah and his buffalo were not with the others. Saijah had been thrown and faced danger. But his buffalo went back, killing the tiger and saving Saijah. Multatuli writes, "when this buffalo was taken from Saijah's father and slaughtered...I told you, reader, that my story is monotonous."[823] Dekker articulates here that the temporality of so-called primitive accumulation is 'monotonous' and repetitive.

But Dekker's aim here is not sociological but instead political. For the story continues:

> Eventually Saijah's father fled the country. For he was much afraid of being punished for not paying his land tax, and he had no more *pusaka* with which to buy a new buffalo…He went to look for work in the Buitenzorg region. He was flogged with *rattan* for leaving Lebak without a pass, and brought back to Badur by the police. There he was thrown into jail, because they took him to be mad...and because they were afraid that, in a fit of insanity, he might run *amok* or commit some other offence. But he was not a prisoner for long, as he died soon afterwards.[824]

Saijah thereafter too leaves Banten for Batavia, today's Jakarta. He heard he could work there as a "*bendie* boy."[825] He went there to work to save money and to come back and buy buffaloes to give for the dowry to wed his beloved Adinda. He told Adinda, I will come back, I will buy buffaloes. Saijah asks her, what if I come back and you have married someone else. She testifies, "I shall marry no one else. My father promised me to your father."[826] He beseeches her, "wait for me near the *jati* wood, under the *ketapan* tree, where you gave me the *melati* flower."[827] She asks, "how shall I know when I must go and wait for you at the *ketapan*?", and he says "*count the moons*. I shall be away thrice twelve moons...not counting this one. Look, Adinda, cut a notch in your rice block at the coming of every new moon. When you shall have cut thrice twelve notches, I shall arrive under the *ketapan* on the following day."[828] He ripped a piece of his blue turban and gave it to her as a pledge.

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[819] Ibid.
[820] Ibid, 257.
[821] Ibid. *Asu* means dog and is a strong curse word in Javanese. This speech act is akin (and differs) from the one Pramoedya brings forth in the eruption of the slur from *Monke* to *Minke* with which we began this chapter.
[822] Ibid, 258.
[823] Ibid.
[824] Ibid, 259
[825] Ibid. *Bendie* was a name for a horse drawn chariot.
[826] Ibid, 260.
[827] Ibid.
[828] Ibid; emphasis added.

Then, "he walked for many days."[829] He wanted to turn around, but what would Adinda have thought of that? What if he does not make good on his promise to her? Will he be remembered as an evil man? When Saijah arrived in Batavia, no one understood his Sundanese language. This was to his advantage in this city and its conditions of buying and selling labour. Dekker writes, "people like to have servants who have not yet learned Malay and consequently are not yet so corrupted as others who have been longer in contact with European civilization."[830] After three years, he returns. He "counted his treasures...thirty Spanish dollars, enough to buy three buffaloes."[831] He did not seek the emancipation that Marx sees for Americans whose diversity of concrete labour proliferates in leaving the city and the capitalist labour market. He has traveled to the city in order to return to the place he left.[832]

Having brought together his counting of moons and money, he went to the *ketapan* tree as he promised Adinda. He sat there, "and his childhood came back to him, and his mother, and how that buffalo had saved him from the tiger."[833] Waiting, "all that his senses perceived bore the name Adinda."[834] But she was not there waiting. He went to go look for her. But her house isn't there where he remembered. He is told that her father also fled, fearing the land tax. He crossed the Sunda strait to follow their trail to the Lampung mountains. There, he finds her father's corpse, her brothers' corpse, and then her's, "naked, horribly abused."[835] He rises up, runs against Dutch soldiers, "with open arms, he ran on to the broad sword-bayonets."[836] Dekker recalls how these Dutch 'victories' in Lampung were celebrated in Batavia. They were relayed to the Motherland to tell that peace had been restored in the colony.

With this *récit* seemingly concluded, Dekker writes that he wants to give a confession which is an emendation. The confession is as follows:

> I do not know whether Saijah loved Adinda. Nor whether he went to Batavia. Nor whether he was murdered in the Lampong districts by Dutch bayonets. I do not know whether his father succumbed as a result of the *rattan* flogging he received for leaving Badur without a pass. I do not know whether Adinda counted the moons by notched on her rice block. I do not know all this. But I know *more*, I know, *and I can prove*, that there were *many* Adindas and many Saijahs, and that *what is fiction in particular is truth in general*…It is not my purpose in this work to make statements such as would be required by a tribunal sitting to pronounce judgement on the manner in which Dutch authority is exercised in the East Indies - statements which would only have power to convince those who had the patience to read through them with an attention and interest not to be expected from a public that reads for pleasure. Hence, instead of bare names of persons and places with dates - instead of a copy of *the list of thefts and extortions which lies before me* - instead of these, I have tried to give a sketch of what *may* go on in the hearts of poor people robbed of their means of subsistence, or more precisely: I have only *suggested* what

[829] Ibid, 261.
[830] Ibid, 264.
[831] Ibid, 265.
[832] Ibid. Dekker does not exclude the 'Victorian' erotic appearance; he tells that Saijah is also carrying "a women's girdle of broad silver links with a gold *ikat-pendieng* or clasp. To be sure, the girdle was short, but then she was so slender...Adinda!" *Max Havelaar,* 265.
[833] Ibid, 267.
[834] Ibid, 270.
[835] Ibid, 276.
[836] Ibid, 277.

> may go on in their hearts, fearing that I might be too wide of the mark if I firmly delineated emotions which I never felt myself…
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> But...as regards the *underlying truth*? O that I were summoned to substantiate what I have written!...Is the parable of the Good Samaritan a lie because perhaps no despoiled traveler was ever received into a Samaritan house? Is the parable of the sower a lie because - as everyone realizes - no husbandman would ever cast his seed on stony ground? Or - to come down to a level nearer to that of my book - may one deny the truth which underlies *Uncle Tom's Cabin* because Little Eva never existed? Shall it be said to the authoress of that immortal plea - immortal not on account of art or talent but because of its *purpose* and the *impression* it makes - shall it be said to her: 'You have lied, the slaves are not ill-treated, for...not all of your book is true: it's a novel!'?...Is it her fault - or mine - that the truth, in order to find an entrance, so often has to borrow the guise of a lie?[837]

We interrupt this climactic passage to note that it strikingly resembles what Alain Badiou says in his book *Saint Paul: Foundation of Universalism* (2003 [1997]) to which we turn below. Badiou writes there that truth comports with an inexistence, not a finite fact. Like *Capital,* the discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860) is not the exposition of an *a priori* demonstration of parts. It instead aims to grasp *and* modify the unity of the body and mind of the reader at once. Dekker reminds: "for it is a fact that very few Europeans think it worth their trouble to stoop and observe the emotions of those coffee- and sugar-producing machines we call 'natives.'"[838] The story of Adinda and Saijah is addressed to the heart of its readers.

For if they say to Dekker "'the evil you combat does not exist, or is not so very bad, *because* the native is not like your Saijah...the ill-treatment of the Javanese is not so great an evil as it would be if you had drawn your Saijah more accurately,'" he retorts,

> No, Minister for the Colonies... No Governors-General (retired)...*that* is not what you have to prove! You have to prove that the people are not ill-treated, irrespective of whether there are sentimental Saijahs among them or not. Or would you dare maintain that it is lawful to steal buffaloes from people who do not love, who sing no melancholy songs, who are not sentimental?... It is all the same to me whether I am considered an incompetent artist, provided that the admission be made that the ill-treatment of the native is: OUTRAGEOUS! For that was the word used in the note of Havelaar's predecessor, as shown to Controleur Verbrugge - *a note which I have before me*.[839]

Here we see how all of the previous overturnings are overturned in the relation of the true and the fictional, and the finite and the infinite. This passage articulates a relation of 'method' and *Denkprozess* with which we began in Chapter One of this dissertation. Adinda, a young woman who is raped, killed, and found by her beloved Saijah, who then runs himself into the bayonet of the Dutch army, is not for Dekker a 'fact' but instead a truth. As truth, this mode of existence is an inexistence, not a representation of facticity. This romantic narration thus prepares a political intervention. This narration is of a resurrection of deaths rather than deaths-in-themselves.

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[837] Ibid, 278-9; emphasis in Multatuli.
[838] Ibid, 279.
[839] Ibid, 279-80; emphasis in Multatuli.

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Dekker asks the reader: is it my fault "that the truth, in order to find an entrance, so often has to borrow the guise of a lie"?[840] We note that this is precisely the idea that Alain Badiou brings forth in his *Saint Paul: Foundations of Universalism* (2003 [1997]). For Badiou writes there, "for Paul, the event renders the prior markings obsolete…Although the event depends on its site *in its being*, *it must be independent of it in its truth effects.*"[841] Dekker echoes this precisely. For while the truth of the novel rests upon the facts of the exploitation of the people of Java, the truth is separated from the particular site and the facts as such. The truth of Adinda and Saijah is not 'in' the recollection of the past. The truth is instead free from the law completely. Truth necessitates a forcing separation from the extant law. Badiou writes,

> Paul's project is to show that a universal logic of salvation cannot be reconciled with any law. It is impossible that the starting point be the Whole, but just as impossible that it be an exception to the Whole. Neither totality nor sign will do. One must proceed from the event as such, which is a-cosmic and illegal.[842]

Paul's position, like Dekker's, stems from a double differentiation. Badiou states, "Greek and Jewish discourse are both discourses of the Father. That is why they bind communities in a form of obedience…For Paul, the emergence of the instance of the son is essentially tied to the conviction that 'Christian discourse' is absolutely new."[843] We have seen that the discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860) similarly presents itself as a break with both Dutch and Javanese discourses. Badiou argues why the mode of conferring facticity will never confer a truth. He writes, "the resurrection is not in Paul's eyes of the order of fact, falsifiable or demonstrable. It is pure event, opening of an epoch, transformation of the relations between the possible and the impossible."[844] Hence, we note, the constant invocation by Dekker of the need for him to invent a new form of writing and his foretelling the confusions that this mode of presentation causes for the reader. All of this comports with the self-reference and auto-authorization of the importance of chapter 11 where Dekker exposits the ontological difference of potentially witnessing the death of the queen and potentially viewing the painting of the Queen's beheading.

But the reason for this new discourse is not caprice. This new form is necessary in order for the truth itself to be brought forth. For Paul, Badiou writes, "its [the resurrection's] genuine meaning is that it testifies to the possible victory over death, a death that Paul envisages...not in terms of facticity, but in terms of subjective disposition."[845] Likewise, the discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860) cultivates a subjective disposition in the reader which is a realization of a new relation between the possible and the impossible. For Paul, "God has chosen the things that are not in order to bring to nought those that are [*ta onta*]."[846] This is an overturning of the extant worldly law, and it forms an important foundation for the place of the discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860).

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[840] Ibid, 279.
[841] Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 23; emphasis added.
[842] Ibid, 42.
[843] Ibid, 42-3.
[844] Ibid, 45.
[845] Ibid, 45.
[846] Ibid, 47. The Latinized Greek is in Badiou.

It is crucial to note that Badiou writes that there is *nothing* that exists between facts and the truth for Paul. Badiou notes, "with Paul there is a complete absence of the theme of mediation."[847] Only an act which *is* without being as *logos* generates this transformation. Badiou writes,

> for Paul…Christ is *a coming*; he is what interrupts the previous regime of discourses. Christ is, in himself and for himself, *what happens to us*. And what is it that happens to us thus? We are relieved of the law. But the idea of mediation remains legal; it enters into composition with wisdom, with philosophy. This question with Paul is decisive, because it is only by being relieved of the law that one truly becomes a son. And an event is falsified if it does not give rise to a universal becoming-son. Through the event, we enter into filial equality.[848]

As Badiou sees it, the only way to bring about this equality is in an emancipation from the law of the father. This truth is thereby entirely subtractive. Recall that in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," Marx writes that the emancipation of the wage worker is a double loss of a dependency as relation and dependency as feeling. Paul, Badiou writes, brings forth "the revelation that what constitutes the subject in its relation to this unheard-of-real is not its unity but its division."[849] This division generates "the upsurge of an *other* object."[850]

Badiou underscores that "the event that (Paul) takes to identify the real is not real (because the Resurrection is a fable)."[851] It is a fiction in the sense that it is made. This is not an ancillary but instead a necessary condition in order to understand the structure of the true. The truth only exists as the fidelity to this event. Thus, as Badiou writes, "for Paul the event is not death, it is resurrection."[852] The true is not a summary of existence. But this truth does not exterminate the worldly law. Badiou and Paul are very clear on this. Badiou writes in a crux, "the salvation of a subject cannot take the form of a reward or wage. The subjectivity of faith is unwaged (which in the final analysis entitles us to call it communist)."[853]

With Badiou's reflections, we can better grasp why *Max Havelaar* (1860) says that it aims for the heart of readers. In Badiou, we read:

> under the condition of faith…love names a nonliteral law, one that gives to the faithful subject his consistency… A subject turns the universal address of the truth whose procedure he maintains into a nonliteral law… Love underwrites the return of a law that although nonliteral, nonetheless functions as principle and consistency for the subjective energy initiated by the declaration of faith.[854]

With this, Badiou has provided an absolutely exemplary and adequate notion of a subjective disposition. He clarifies why a discourse intervenes in this process of subjectivation and how it

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[847] Ibid, 48.
[848] Ibid, 48-9.
[849] Ibid, 55.
[850] Ibid, 56.
[851] Ibid, 58.
[852] Ibid, 68.
[853] Ibid, 77.
[854] Ibid, 87-9.

bears the potentiality to bring about particular others as faithful upsurges. Badiou argues that with this schema of subjectivation,

> faith would be the opening to the true; love the universalizing effectiveness of its trajectory; hope, lastly, a maxim enjoining us to preserve in this trajectory…Hope then becomes an evental connection; it deploys from the subject in the interval between two events.[855]

From this passage, we can understand why there is a consistency and hope for justice inhering in the name Multatuli and *Max Havelaar* (1860), spanning from the 19th to 21st centuries, in the human worlds of Indonesia. For Badiou posits here that the truth has to be told, it is not simply an evolutionary reception received from the realm of facts.

13. 'The secrecy has a twofold object'

It is only at the end of the novel that the cause for Havelaar's arrival to Banten – the death of Havelaar's predecessor, Slotering – becomes evident. It comes moreover from Mrs. Slotering herself, someone who Havelaar had cast suspicion and aspersion upon throughout the narration.

She finally tells Havelaar that her husband had been poisoned and that is why he died. She tells him, "he wanted to be just, Mr. Havelaar."[856] Although the official letter from the doctor said he died of an abscess of the liver, "those about him considered he had been poisoned, and that they linked their suspicion with his desire to resist injustice."[857] Havelaar calls Verbrugge in and asks him: is it true people are oppressed and exploited in Lebak? Verbrugge would not answer. Havelaar then makes him write down that he wouldn't dare respond to the question.

Havelaar then decides to write a letter to the Resident Slymering to formally bring a charge against the *Bupati*. It is dated 24 February 1856 and classified as 'secret.' Therein, he explains that he has become aware that "the regent called up people on his own authority and for his own benefit in numbers greatly exceeding his legally permitted number."[858] He explained that he tried to stop the abuse without this formal injunction because he wanted to stop the "malpractices" *and* "avoid excessive severity" in dealing with the *Bupati*.[859] But the malpractice proceeds, and he thereby formally accuses the *Bupati* of Lebak for the "illegal use of the labour of his subjects."[860] He requests that the *Bupati* be summoned immediately to Serang, the capital city of the district where the Resident is located, so that he cannot unduly influence the testimonies that Havelaar will "have to obtain."[861]

The next day he receives a reply, not from the *Resident* of Batam but from Mr. Slymering "in his *private* capacity!"[862] Dekker avers, "this reply is a priceless contribution to knowledge of the way in which the business of government is carried out in the Dutch East Indies."[863] For

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[855] Ibid, 93-4.
[856] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar*, 281.
[857] Ibid, 283.
[858] Ibid, 285.
[859] Ibid.
[860] Ibid, 286.
[861] Ibid.
[862] Ibid, 287; emphasis in Multatuli.
[863] Ibid.

Slymering complains that Havelaar didn't "acquaint him orally with the matters dealt with in letter No. 88…[which would give] a better chance of '*fixing*' things."[864] Slymering complained of being disturbed at all to which Havelaar retorts, "the man was no doubt occupied with an annual report on peaceful peace!"[865]

In order to point out the place of this discourse, the narrative turns away from this drama in Lebak and enters the flat of 'Scarfman' in Holland. There on his shelves are books which are enumerated: "Byron, Horace, Bastiat, Beranger, and...a complete Bible."[866] The Bible, we read, "seemed to have been read, too, for I found a lot of notes relating to the Scriptures...he seemed to have made a special study of the Book of Job, for the Bible fell open easily at that place."[867] This is the appearance of the Bible within the book *Max Havelaar* (1860) whereby the Bible opens.

The narration then moves to Driebergen, a vacation district for wealthy Amsterdammers, where Droogstoppel is visiting his father-in-law Last. They visit a former Resident of the Indies. The Resident knew of Havelaar and disliked him, for he was "always finding fault with everything."[868] The former Governor recalled how his own compound in the interior of Java was kept up by over 100 people who "did it entirely gratis, purely for love!"[869] There was another rich man present, who made his fortune in Java with tea. He too was "very angry with all the malcontents who are everlastingly talking and writing against the Government."[870] They returned to Amsterdam in carriages, passing the "vagabond of a Scarfman", in his "threadbare jacket;" mud flung on him, "as Fate would have it."[871] With a mode of discourse akin to "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie," Dekker here ventriloquizes the discourse of the ideologists of political economy, for he allows their 'logic' to pour forth on its own. The statements are not brought forth here to be identified as factually inaccurate. They are brought forth, as jokes, in order to disturb their own ideological discourse and the practices which they bear.

The novel then returns to that which was previously disclosed by the secret epistolary discourse between Havelaar and Slymering, whereby the former's interruption of the customary repression of the truth from official imperial discourse is seen as an act of transgression by the latter. The Resident writes that he will come to Havelaar in Rangkasbitung to discuss the issue in person.

Havelaar writes a letter that is serially numbered and classified as Secret and Urgent. Havelaar explains that his investigation into the *Bupati* has been secret and "the secrecy has a twofold object."[872] Firstly, Havelaar explains that he hoped to change the *Bupati*'s course of action without formal legal proceedings, thus 'saving face' for the *Bupati*. Secondly, he said that he wanted to protect himself and his family, given the murder by poisoning of his predecessor. He explains that the content of the letter is true, "but it might *appear* untrue if the case were treated in a manner that could lead to my charge and my suspicion being revealed *before the Bupati has gone from here*."[873] When the Resident does arrive in Rangkasbitung, he meets the *Bupati* alone to ask what charges he can level at Havelaar, and moreover, if he needs any money.

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[864] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.
[865] Ibid.
[866] Ibid, 288.
[867] Ibid, 289.
[868] Ibid, 291.
[869] Ibid, 292.
[870] Ibid.
[871] Ibid, 293-4.
[872] Ibid, 296.
[873] Ibid, 297; emphasis in Multatuli.

The Resident requests that Havelaar rescind his request. Havelaar refuses. The resident "urged Havelaar to relinquish such mistaken principles."[874] The Resident finally gave a threat that was a triumph for Havelaar: "(the resident) *would now be compelled to bring the letters in question to the attention of the government*."[875] The resident thereby sends another secret letter. The government will not pursue the proposal of prosecution which Havelaar presented. Havelaar in response states that he has done his duty. If the Government wishes that he served differently, he will resign; "I shall ask society whether it will give me bread for wife and child, bread in exchange for my brains...bread in exchange, maybe, for labour with a wheelbarrow or spade."[876] Havelaar could not relinquish his principles. The author then addresses his son: "when they tell you I was a rascal who hadn't the courage to do justice...tell *them* what I suffered!"[877]

A letter arrives from the Governor-General to the *ex*-Assistant Resident Havelaar. It mentions the *Bupati* is a "servant of the State, kin to important neighboring families of *Bupati*s."[878] Havelaar's method of double secrecy is rejected. Havelaar is thereby ordered to be transferred to a position in Ngawi in central Java. He understands the move; "Ngawi is part of the Residency of Madiun and the Resident of Madiun is the *brother-in-law of the last Resident of Bantam*."[879] Rather than remain within the State government, Havelaar requests and is granted honorable discharge.

14. Interpellation in the Limit of the Exposition

Havelaar then writes a letter to Verbrugge. He calls himself "an *impotent* protector."[880] He charges Verbrugge with the administration of the District of Lebak. Havelaar travels to the Governor General, the highest official in the Indies, in Batavia but he is denied an audience there. He thus writes a letter:

> I *have done my* DUTY, MY WHOLE DUTY, AND NOTHING BUT MY DUTY, *with discretion, with restraint, with humanity, with gentleness and with courage*… Your Excellency has *sanctioned*: THE SYSTEM OF ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, OF ROBBERY AND MURDER, UNDER WHICH THE HUMBLE JAVANESE GROANS, and it is that that I complain about… Your Excellency, there is blood on the pieces of silver you have saved from the salary you have earned thus!... If Your Excellency can reconcile your conscience to leaving without hearing me, mine will be clear through the conviction that I have done everything possible to prevent the sad and bloody events which will soon result from the ignorance in which the Government chooses to be left concerning what is going on among the people…Another Excellency had retired to rest in the Motherland![881]

With this, the inner overturning of the protagonicity of the novel, as personified in the division of Droogstoppel, Havelaar and Stern, takes its final turn. In this limit at the end of the exposition, the true pseudonym erupts. Dekker writes,

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[874] Ibid, 300.
[875] Ibid; emphasis in Multatuli.
[876] Ibid, 302.
[877] Ibid, 307; emphasis in Multatuli.
[878] Ibid, 309.
[879] Ibid, 310; emphasis in Multatuli.
[880] Ibid, 313; emphasis in Multatuli.
[881] Ibid, 316-317; emphases in Multatuli.

> Enough my good Stern! I, Multatuli, take up the pen…Halt, wretched spawn of sordid moneygrubbing and blasphemous cant! I created you...you grew into a monster under my pen...I loathe my own handiwork: choke in coffee and disappear!...Yes, I, Multatuli, 'who have borne much', take up the pen. I make no apology for the form of my book. That form seemed suitable to me for the attainment of my object. That object is a dual one. In the first place, I wanted to body forth something that may be kept as a sacred heirloom, as *pusaka*, by little Max and his sister when their parents shall have perished from hunger. I wanted to give those children a patent of nobility from my own hand. And in the second place: *I want to be read!* Yes, I want to be read! I want to be read by politicians who are obliged to keep an eye on the signs of the times...by literati, who 'would just like to have a look, all the same' at the book everyone is running down...by merchants who have an interest in the coffee auctions...by ladies' maids who will borrow me for a few pence...by ex-Governor Generals in retirement...by Ministers in office...by the lackeys of those Excellencies...by praying preachers, who will say *more majorum* that I am attacking Almighty God whereas I am only rising against the petty idol *they* have made in their own image...by thousands and tens of thousands of specimens of the tribe of Droogstoppel, who - continuing to grind their own little axes in the well-known fashion - will be the loudest in joining in the chorus about the 'prettiness' of my writings...by the members of the House of Representatives, who ought to know what is going on in the great Empire beyond the seas which belongs to the Realm of the Netherlands.[882]

Dekker writes, "Want het was me niet te doen om *goed* te schryven…ik wilde zóó schryven dat het gehoord werd."[883] Edwards reads, "It was not my intention to write *well*...I wanted to write in such a way as to be heard."[884] These words form a conclusive and lasting inversion in the text. They appear in Indonesian in the basal pediment of the aforementioned second *Multatuli* (2019) sculpture, which was created by the *Somalaing* studio and set on the ground of the University of Indonesia campus in the city of Depok in 2019. In the *eidos* of this sculpture, Max Havelaar looks down into a huge open book laying in his lap. The visage on his face is calm. The exscribed statement articulates the idea: do not write well, but instead proclaim the truth to be heard. [885]

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[882] Ibid, 317-8; emphasis in Multatuli.

[883] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of de Koffiwielingen der Nederlansche Handelmaatschappij,* 255.

[884] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 318.

[885] The exscript in the pediment brings into the square of the campus and the scholastic vision of the university a look and face that does *not* praise university discourse and its notion of writing well. During the period of ethnographic field research, I saw this sculpture *Multatuli* (2017) on many different days on the campus of the University of Indonesia campus in Depok city, West Java Province. Many campus dwellers took their picture in front of and beside the sculpture at this place. Over this period of time, I came to understand some of the physical and metaphysical processes by which this sculpture was made. This will be primarily discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation. At the moment, we can say that a physical mould is first made which is eventually discarded during the production process. For the sculpture is made by excavating a physical body which infills this mould. This process consists of the following sequence of steps. First, a fibrous body is poured into the fabricated mould. Then it hardens. Later, the infilled material is excavated from the mould. The mould is discarded and the sculpture thereby stands. This process is a physical action of inversion. The process of the creation of sculpture turns around the relations of an inner and outer place. The process therefore is an overturning of the physical body by the handed work of the sculptors. That which we see as the standing surface of the sculpture, that is, the face or the 'exterior', takes this particular form through an inversion enabled by a mould. Moreover, this mould that is met by the soft material was made by the hardening of another soft body that is clay. Thus, the second, lasting inversion, repeats the path of a prior hardening process. The lasting hard sculpture repeats the priority of the production of the mould, and yet also makes that mould no longer necessary. A first hardening is necessary for the second hardness, which is the sculpture

Hegel, in many places in his writings, while praising art and philosophy, thinks of art as a kind of inferior form in comparison to philosophy. He is not alone in this thinking. In the text known as *The Republic,* Plato has Socrates ask, "must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach?"[886] Plato seems to state that poets introduce a common orientation of the polis that is a threat to the *politeia*.[887] *Max Havelaar* (1860) too identifies how poesis gathers an orientation in the *politeia*. But Dekker writes: I do not want to be good, I want instead to articulate the truth. In the foundation of *Multatuli* (2019), this exscript repeats that originary act of *Max Havelaar* (1860) of inscribing a truth that contravenes how the now recognizes the good. This is a power of art that seems to make Hegel and Plato anxious.

From Dekker's conclusive inversion to Dolo's re-presentation of that articulation, we can identify a crucial ethos of the Indonesian interventions in the critique of political economy. This is its mode, attribute, and substance that is a speaking that is a speaking out, a speaking up, a rising up. It is an act of interpellation. It *essentially* differs from the notion of the 'good' as it is understood in university discourses or the spontaneous philosophy of the sciences.

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This dissertation chapter has argued that the mode of discourse of *Max Havelaar* (1860) is essentially akin to the one which Louis Althusser in 1978 argues characterizes *Capital* in that it aims for an overcoming of its own 'pure theoretical' presuppositions. In this chapter, we recalled how Dekker brought forth a character mask looking through a peep hole, seeing the preparation for the execution of the Queen. Rather than catch a glimpse of the killing of the body, the seer shouts and falls at once. Dekker, in the limit of the exposition of *Max Havelaar* (1860), which is its twentieth and final chapter, defends the 'chaos' of this shout as follows: "(J)ust as someone who yells 'Stop thief!' troubles little about the style of his improvised address to the public, so am I quite indifferent to the judgements people will pass on the way in which I have yelled *my* 'Stop thief!'"[888]

Havelaar ventriloquizes this anticipated criticism as reported speech, writing "the book is chaotic...disjointed...striving for effect...the style is bad...the writer lacks skill...no talent...no method."[889] This prepares his own overturning response, which we quote at length so that it can be read slowly and repeatedly:

> Right, right...all right! But... THE JAVANESE IS MALTREATED! For: *the* SUBSTANCE *of my work is irrefutable*… Moreover, the more loudly my book is condemned the better I shall be pleased, for so much the greater will be my chance *of being heard*. And that is what I *want*!... You whom I disturb in your 'pressure of business' or

itself. The mould is necessary for there to be this form of sculpture, and yet it is necessarily separated away from that body. The schema of this concept and process is a zig-zag pattern of hardness and softness. In this particular mode of production, sculptures bear an inversion that makes a figure of the human body shine forth. This is very similar to the way that Lisabona Rahman described 16 and 35mm celluloid film production to me. The process of the film camera results in an original negative. From this negative, an original positive film can be made. From this duplicate positive a duplicate negative element can be made and this duplicate negative be used in order to make positive film prints. Accordingly, positivity does not necessarily preserve its own future positivity. Fieldnote, August 2017.

[886] Plato, *The Republic,* in *The Dialogues of Plato Volume II,* trans. B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), 857-8.

[887] See Plato, *The Republic,* bk. X.

[888] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 318; emphasis in Multatuli.

[889] Ibid.

> in your peaceful 'retirement'...If I were you I should not bank too much on my pen's lack of skill. It could practice, you know, and with a little effort it might even become proficient enough to make the people believe the truth! Then I should ask that People for a place in its Parliament, were it only for the purpose of protesting against the certificates of integrity which East Indian experts present to each other - perhaps to give the world the extraordinary idea that they themselves *value* that quality... And if that place in Parliament were refused me...if people persisted in not believing me... Then I should translate my book into the few languages I know, and into the many languages I can still learn, in order to ask from Europe what I have failed to find in the Netherlands. And in all the capital cities songs would be sung with refrains like this: *A pirate state lies on the sea, Between the Schedlt and Eastern Friesland!* And if this did not avail? Then I should translate my book into Malay, Javanese, Sundanese, Alfuro, Buginese, Battak… And I should hurl *klewang*-whetting war songs into the hearts of the poor martyrs to whom I have promised help, I, Multatuli…Deliverance and help, by legal means, if *possible*...by the *legitimate* means of force, if *necessary*. And *this would react most unfavourably on the* 'Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company!'. For I am no fly-rescuing poet, no half-baked dreamer, like the downtrodden Havelaar, who did his duty with the courage of a lion and now starves with the patience of a marmot in the winter. This book is only a beginning...I shall wax in power and keenness in weapons, in proportion as shall be necessary...God grant that it may not be necessary! No! It will *not* be necessary! For I dedicate my book to YOU, William the Third, King, Grand Duke, Prince...more than Prince, Grand Duke and King...EMPEROR of the glorious realm of INSULINDE, that coils yonder round the Equator like a girdle of emerald...YOU I dare ask with confidence whether it is Your Imperial will: that the *Havelaars* be spattered with the mud of *Slymerings* and *Droogstoppels*? and that yonder Your more than *thirty million* subjects be MALTREATED AND EXPLOITED IN YOUR NAME?[890]

This passage constitutes the end of the novel. With it, we see that this originary Indonesian intervention in the critique of political economy makes clear that the 'good' that his critic charges him with lacking is *not* the good in which his discourse is based. His work is *not* to be judged in the courtroom of university discourse. With the repetitive and monotonous *récit* of the theft of the Saijah's family's buffalo, *Max Havelaar* (1860) repeats *Capital*'s lesson that the basis of capitalist value is *not in* its own 'endogenous' realm of appearance, but instead *in* acts of violence that are *not* shown within the pious outcomes of 'hard work and perseverance' or its courtrooms.

Dekker develops the theoretical practice of the critique of political economy that does not analytically separate the appearance of the stock market exchange and the parliamentary state which governs this mode of exchange. [891] *Max Havelaar* (1860) shows that 'the government' and 'commercial exchange' in this mode of production – modern colonization – act together to subjugate and dominate, to "maltreat and exploit in your name" ("mishandeld en uitgezogen in uwen naam").[892] The limit of this exposition is thus a shouting-out that this dissertation calls an interpellation. It is an increase in the volume and the ferocity of the discourse.

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[890] Ibid, 319-320; emphases in Multatuli.
[891] Note that the development *precedes* the 'historical' origin!
[892] Multatuli, *Max Havelaar, of de Koffiwielingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij,* 257.

Dekker is more of a reformist than a revolutionary.[893] But he does see the problem that the rule of law in this social formation can*not* be 'respected.' In elucidating the systematicity of the conditions of exploitation, *Max Havelaar* (1860) indicates that this mode of production *is* a mishandling and exploitation (*mishandelen en uitgezogen*).[894] It thus elucidates *the reason* for the rebellion of the exploited and mistreated.

The novel, very much like *Capital,* delivers this critique with a ventriloquism, rather than a dispassionate analysis, of bourgeois ideology. Droogstoppel and Slymering deliver their own perfidy and hypocrisy. They are not presented in exposition in order to reflect their own *a priori* 'pure theoretical' theory. Instead, the limit of their discourses aims to introduce a distortion into the very social formation into which their discourse proceeds. Their very discursivity aims to eradicate their own origination and bring about a new political aeon.

Max Havelaar (1860) thus develops the thesis of "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie." This can be characterized as follows: 'systematic colonization' is characterized by a schema of domination by a colonizing government and its home capitals that is overturned by a 'reasonable rebellion.' In the so-called Dutch East Indies of the 19th century, this apparatus of domination and exploitation is personified in the dual character of the Dutch colonial state apparatus and the Javanese feudal social system or culture. Dekker therefore is not condemning the finite *Bupati* in contradistinction to the finite Dutch Resident who facilitates it. Instead, the novel identifies the avenues of their interrelation. As Dekker repeats throughout the work, this 'mishandling and exploitation' concerns *all* people, in Holland and the Indies, including and especially the King.

Part II. Speaking-after Multatuli

1. On the Existence of *Max Havelaar* in the Indonesian 21st Century

During the period of dissertation research, I repeatedly encountered the question of whether *Max Havelaar* (1860) is fact or fiction. One such encounter occurred in an online discussion, still in the first year of the Covid19 global pandemic in 2020. Bonnie Triyana moderated the discussion and said that this debate has always been boisterous (*ramai*). To give the present conversation context, he recalled how in the middle of the 20th century, Rob Nieuwenhuys, a doyen of Dutch literature, said that Dekker didn't understand local customs (*adat istiadat*) in Banten. Bonnie recalled how this ideologeme has sought to discredit Dekker by calling him a drunkard so that they do not have to consider the actual question – modern colonization – addressed by the novel itself.

This conversation was organized as a launch event for a documentary film *After Multatuli Left* (2020), directed by a Dutchman, Arjan Onderdenwijngaard. In his opening remark, the filmmaker explained that he traveled to Lebak in 1987. He said it looked poor to him. "The roads were bad" ("*Jalan rusak*") he said, repeating the colonial ideology of infrastructure that we recalled earlier in this chapter. He wondered what has changed since the time of Multatuli, he said. In his dialogue with the director and other conversation participants, Bonnie recalled how the film *Max Havelaar* (1976) was banned by the New Order Indonesian government. He explained that the work calls us to speak out against corruption, which contravened the New Order national ideology of a harmonious society.

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[893] See his 1875 Introduction in Multatuli, *Max Havelaar,* 321-7.
[894] This is *uitgezogen* (sucked out) not *uitgezorgen* (taken care of).

In her invited remark, Ayu Utami, a prominent Indonesian novelist, argued that the binary of fact or fiction, as in Nieuwenhuys' thought, completely misses the very essence of the novel. She said, we know, fiction produces facts. Fiction therefore has real effects (*dampak jadi kenyataan*). And yet, the 'fact' of Dekker's experience produced the 'fiction' of *Max Havelaar* (1860). Their relations – fact and fiction – are gray (*abu abu*), not either or, she said. But, she also said, there is something that novels can get at that the supposedly veridical discourse of history cannot. This is the essence of mankind (*inti manusia*), which, she said, you cannot find in the discipline of history. Ayu recalled that Seno Gumira Ajidarma said that at the end of the New Order, sovereign power forbade writing 'factual history' of its crimes and sins. So, you wrote works that wore a mask of fiction (*bertopeng fiksi*), she remembered.

Bonnie explained that *Max Havelaar* (1860) offended (*menyinggung*) the Dutch authority, but that this was unlike the experience of becoming acquainted with the name Multatuli as a child in Banten during the late New Order period. Bonnie explained that his elementary school was located on and called by Multatuli Street (*Sekolah Dasar Jalan Multatuli*). This was long before there was a Multatuli museum. At that time, he said, there was an idea that there was a ghost of a man that rode a horse on that street, and it was the ghost of Multatuli. His laughter interpolated his own storytelling.

The Multatuli Museum director also spoke at this online conversation. He explained that he had to answer to the criticism of why Indonesian government money is being used to build a museum in Indonesia for a Dutchmen in the 21st century. He relayed his defense. This man, alias Multatuli, resigned from his position as a colonial official rather than enjoy spoils from corruption, he said. He asked, isn't this man a good example for Indonesians to learn from?

Bonnie told a story about being at a discussion with Dutch academics who were discussing the novel. He said, it was really like how Edward Said said! They were Dutch people talking about the novel, as if it were simply an unreal fiction. They don't even know that there are Indonesian people *present* there. He laughed. He said, I thought to say, hey, look at me and think of me when you read these characters! They are me! They are my ancestors! He continued to scatter laughter through his decisive and incisive remarks.

Bonnie asked the Dutch filmmaker what effect the novel had on Dutch society. He said, it "opened a window to the colony." He said he thought it showed how Dutch and Javanese people lived in the colony. Bonnie then invoked a formulation which he attributed to Hilmar Farid: colonialism is exploitation of another people; feudalism is exploitation of your own people. Java had both, he reminded. The novel showed how these systems are interrelated. They are not discrete or successive historical periods or formations.

The museum director referred to a work on *Max Havelaar* (1860) by Subagio Sastrowardoyo, who said that the novel works through frames and the power of enframement.[895] He suggested that the novel's exposition is a self-reflexive acknowledgement that its own shifting frames makes it clear that enframement itself conditions the framed content. He recalled how Sastrowardoyo wrote that the shifting in frames of the novel is an expression of that kind of separation that the colonial mode of production brings about.

Continuing to respond to Bonnie's question, the filmmaker said that the novel completely shook Dutch society. He said that it was the first novel to begin the first sentence in the first person, *Ik ben makelaar in koffie*, I am a coffee broker. Novels did not use this mode of address of 'I am,' he said. It shook the Dutch social formation because this 'I am' itself confessed its communal sins.

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[895] He is the uncle of Dian Sastrowardoyo, the actress.

Bonnie returned to the work of Robert Nieuwenhuys and his so-called history of Dutch colonial literature in his *Mirror of the Indies* [1972].[896] This work begins by positing that "anyone setting out to explore the literature of the Dutch Indies enters into an entirely different world."[897] This fundamental orientation continues the centuries long line of orientalist thinking that binds a world into a unity by means of a division which situates the East Indies, symmetrically, on the other side of a spatial divisive action. In his chapter on Dekker, Nieuwenhuys proposes that Dekker's "greatness" is due less to the more oft-remarked "human concern" of the novel and is instead due to its "language."[898] Nieuwenhuys writes that the practices that *Max Havelaar* (1860) relays were already told by others, and more accurately to boot. But Nieuwenhuys struggles with his own evidence, noting that future generations of colonial officers could recite large tracts of the work and were fervent "Multatulians."[899]

To furnish his ad hominem attack, Nieuwenhuys cites a 'native informant,' an Indonesian who concurs that Dekker did not understand "Javanese patrimonial bureaucratic structure."[900] In so doing, Nieuwenhuys thereby presupposes that the novel concerns a 'local' finitude. He thereby forecloses the question of truth and justice and the novel's own statement that it concerns 'us all.' Nieuwenhuys proposes instead that the language, and not the truth, has caused its long-lasting existence. The same of course cannot be said for the Indonesian perspective brought forth by Pram when he stated that this book 'killed colonialism.'

To develop his criticism, Nieuwenhuys states that the Resident rejected the charge against the *Bupati* as relayed in *Max Havelaar* (1860) because the Resident and the government wanted to undertake the investigation 'properly.' When Dekker refused to provide more evidence, his petition was denied. Nieuwenhuys concludes, "and rightly so."[901] In doing so, he adequately expresses the ideology of classical political economy that all is fair in the appearance of the market which the parliamentary state supervenes.

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By any mode or measure, Dolorosa Sinaga can be understood as one of the most significant Indonesian artists of *seni rupa* (formal art, arts of form), living or otherwise. As one mode of identification, we note here that she has been a professor at the Art Institute of Jakarta for more than three decades. She is a longstanding member of the Jakarta Arts Council body of the Jakarta Province Government (*DKI*). She recently was chosen and served as the Director of the Jakarta Biennale 2021, whose organizing theme, Future (*Esok*), she chose.

From the first moment I met Dolo in 2016, the *catalogue raissoné* book project of her life work was already a central activity being undertaken by a team at the *Somalaing* studio. With over 1000 pages, thirty bi-lingual essays, 600 photographs of her sculptures, the book project was immense. Like many large works, it was almost finished for years past its first projected publication date. I contributed efforts as a translator and editor of the book for two years.

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[896] See Robert Nieuwenhuys, *Oost-Indische Spiegel* (Amsterdam: E. Querido, 1972), translated by E. M. Beekman as Robert Nieuwenhuys, *Mirror of the Indies: A History of Dutch Colonial Literature* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982).
[897] Nieuwenhuys, *Mirror of the Indies,* xxiv.
[898] Ibid.
[899] Ibid, 92.
[900] Ibid, 84.
[901] Ibid, 85.

The book launch event entailed several days of activities in both Jakarta and Yogyakarta. The event began at the National Gallery in Jakarta. A two-day seminar was preceded by a festive, celebratory evening.[902] Several hundred people attended. There were many speeches, from government ministers, friends, art workers, and others. In preparing for the night, a question emerged: would beer be allowed at the National Gallery evening? There was some, discreetly. Friends sat together in circles on chairs and on the ground in the courtyards, smoking, talking, and enjoying themselves.

The seminar was opened the next day with a remark from Lisabona Rahman. She said that her remark is meant to open the remarks and discussions which will follow. There were five speakers who were to talk about five of Dolo's works. The final remark was on *Multatuli* (2017), and it was delivered by Bonnie.

Lisabona said there that Dolo's sculptures consider "perihnya penciptaan yang benda antara tubuh dan pikiran." This can be preliminarily translated as "the pain of the creation which forms an entity between the body and thought." It is an extraordinarily adequate identification of Dolo's work. Many people have articulated the existence of a pain concerning Dolo's work. This is something that is both "objectively" represented in her work, and also "subjectively" experienced by the viewers of the artworks.[903] In Lisabona's statement, pain is neither exclusively "objective" or "subjective." Rather, it is a consequence between thoughts and the body. This has historically been called the place of the incorporeal, the imaginal, or the angelic. Dolo's angelic sculptural forms however bear a pain of and in creation. This is therefore not simply a "representation" of pain. It is not simply a depiction of the pain of the body or thinking. It instead *is* a pain that is a form between thinking and the body.

Lisabona also said that the five sculptures that will be discussed share a mode of action as "*dipinggirkan*" ("marginalized"). And yet the so-called referents of the sculptures are some of the most recognizable people that exist for this Indonesian world. They are the Dalai Lama, Wiji Thukul, Gus Dur, Soekarno, and Multatuli. How could these most recognized people appear under such a species of marginalization? Lisa's comments showed that Dolo is making portraits of defeated men.

In several places, Hegel wrote that Art, and even more specifically sculpture, founds the appearance of the concept.[904] The artist therefore does not merely "represent" our existence. With art and sculpture, the concept begins to be brought forth at all. The artwork and work of art therefore break from merely physical and natural modes of existence. Thus, the centrality of the existence of the real human beings of the Dalai Lama, Wiji Thukul, Gus Dur, Soekarno and Multatuli is not that which appears in the work of art but instead a marginalization or peripheralization of the concept itself. Lisa's pointed point here is that these forms deliver a dialecticity so that the concepts of centrality and marginalization are themselves overturned and reestablished in these works.

Lisa then deepened the point. Historically, she said, sculpture is not just a physical concept, but instead one that is a "*keberpihakan*." *Pihak* is a side. *Berpihak* is to side, to side with, to stand with, to take (in the strongest sense) sides, to make a common cause with a side. The prefix

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[902] This "*Aktivisme Seni*" ("Activism of Art" or "Art Activism") event took place January 18, 2020 at the *Galeri Nasional* (National Gallery).

[903] I once spoke with an Indonesian artist, living in Czech Republic, who remembered having his work critiqued by Dolo when he was much younger as an art student in Yogyakarta. He remembered that she didn't like his work because there was no political content. He said, just a pretty picture isn't good enough for her.

[904] See his *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volumes I & II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) and *Philosophy of Mind Being Part Three of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

ke- coupled with the suffix *-an* is a circumfix which makes the word into a noun. "*Keberpihakan*" thus is a "taking a side." Sculpture, as a dedication, gives orientation in the strongest sense. Sculpture orients the orientation of the concept and the seer in an action of transference.

The first speaker spoke about the Dalai Lama sculpture. He said that he would not speak as an artist or art critic but instead from the Buddhist community of Indonesia. He relayed his story of meeting the Dalai Lama. He recalled that the Dalai Lama said to him that the island of Sumatra, in 11th Century during the reign of the Buddhist kingdom of Sriwijaya, was an important center of Buddhist life, and that it is possible that the king of Cambodia comes from this kingdom. Departing from the prepared remarks and responding to Lisa's introduction, the speaker said that the Dalai Lama sculpture indeed evinces a marginalization and a taking sides. This can be seen with the "Indonesian" style of this Dalai Lama, he said, who looks tired, is falling asleep, exhausted from thinking about the problem of intercommunal violence in Indonesia.

The next speaker addressed one of Dolo's most famous works. It is a sculpture of the body of the Indonesian poet Wiji Thukul. Its title is one of his most famous lines of poetry: *Hanya ada satu kata: LAWAN!* which is commonly translated as 'There is only one word: Resist!'. Wiji Thukul is an extrajudicially 'disappeared' person. In this world, it is widely known that he was taken by the repressive state apparatus and that his body has never been returned nor acknowledged as deceased by the State. In this bronze sculpture, Wiji Thukul's visage stands. He is holding with one arm a sheet of paper and his other arm is raised overhead. His arms and chest form together a semi-circular opening. His body harbors this opening and clearing. His mouth is open. His mode of action is oration. This strong gesture of oration is conceptually held in conflict with the silence of his body's absence.[905] We will return to this work at the end of the final chapter of this dissertation.

One of Wiji Thukul's best friends came before the audience to speak about the work that day. He wore unkempt jeans and a cap with a red star. He choked up repeatedly as he spoke, both holding back and not holding back his tears. He said, it is so hard for him to look at this sculpture. He said, it splits his body from itself. Below the chest is ok, he said, but his throat and head hurt when he sees it. The feeling is *pedih* (painful, poignant, sore, acute). It is the same word that Lisa used in her introductory remark.[906]

He told a story about meeting a government official. He asked him, where is Thukul? That official denied any first-hand knowledge but said that he had heard that the military who do know said he was casted, mummified, and dropped into an ocean or wherever. Or possibly that he is in a mass grave somewhere in rural Java. Thukul's friend then told a joke that people in the village in Java tell. If someone dies on a particular night of the Javanese calendar, it is thought to be good to eat bones because it's good for your health. He then said, the communists have indeed come back to life, because we ate them![907] The audience chuckled mirthlessly.

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[905] Strong is one of the most commonly used words to describe Dolo's work. When I returned to Berkeley in 2021 after my fieldwork research, I met with Piero Mussi, a sculptor with whom Dolo had a brief internship in the 1985 in Berkeley, California. When we met, Piero had no idea what had happened to her, because he couldn't remember her name. He was so happy to learn of her success. I brought him the book, *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Matter* (2019) with the photographic archive of her lifework. Seeing the photographs, he said, the work is very strong.

[906] *Sakit* is the most common everyday word for pain.

[907] This is a reference to the oft-made, fanciful claim that communism is being resurrected in Indonesia and the repressive state apparatus needs to eradicate it.

He told another story about being in Australia with Thukul for a poetry reading. He reminded the audience, Thukul doesn't know English. There, they went into a restaurant. The friend asks Thukul, how are we going to order? No problem, Thukul says. When the waiter arrives at their table to take their order, Thukul shouts loudly, "I am very fine thank you!" From the most intense hearkened listening erupted the loudest laughter of the whole day from the teary-eyed audience.

Seno Gumira Ajidarma, a longtime colleague of Dolo, spoke next about the series of Soekarno sculptures that Dolo had recently done. Seno explained the indexical reference of the sculptures. This is the famed Soekarno pose captured in the photo taken by Henri Cartier Bresson in front of the painting *Kawan-kawan Revolusi* (Fellows of Revolution), painted by Sudjojono. This is a painting Soekarno would show to foreign dignitary guests. His hands, in fists, are pugilistic. Seno said that from his study of Dolo's sculptures of Soekarno, "I learned how ideology works in sculpture." He said, it comes from the hands. The hands are where you can find that this is a gesture of passion. There, he found that Dolo's sculpture is not an identical reflection of the Bresson photograph. In Dolo's sculpture, Soekarno's hands have been raised even higher. She has given him even more power. He said, Soekarno is always called the leader of the revolution, and the sculpture shows that he is the thinking leader.

But Seno also said that in preparing these remarks and thinking about sculpture, he finally learned what it means that sculpture is a three-dimensional medium. He said, I am only a writer and a photographer. But with sculpture, he said, "you can be behind a sculpture, facing it, or you can see one in your rear-view mirror on your motorcycle." It spatializes space in a way that two dimensional mediums cannot. We will return to these remarks in the conclusion of chapter 7 of this dissertation.

The next speaker was a close friend of Gus Dur, M. Sobary. Sobary shared stories of Gus Dur. He said that Gus Dur was a teacher of tolerance and compassion. He recalled one of Gus Dur's famous jokes. There are 3 important substances for humans that warm you which begin with "*al*": *al quran* (The Quran), *al kitab* (The Bible), and *alcohol* (Alcohol). They are all good when used in moderation, but too much of any of them will kill you. The audience laughed heartily. Sobary said that each represent (*mewakili*) a group (*kaum*) of Indonesians: Muslims for the Quran, Christians for the Bible, and indigenous people (*masyarakat adat*) for Alcohol. This characterization of indigenous people, at once stereotypical insult while also a backhanded compliment, met no vocal refutation from the audience. Sobary's story disseminated the idea that Gus Dur is a teacher of multiculturalism and tolerance. The sculpture, representing Gus Dur in the pose of the sleeping Buddha, and the smile of the Cheshire cat, carries this message. We will return to this artwork in the conclusion of chapter 7 of this dissertation.

Bonnie spoke last. He was, as often is the case, introduced as the editor of *historia.id*, a popular website which published articles on topics of Indonesian history. He is one of the most well-known public intellectual historians in Indonesia. He spoke today about the *Multatuli* (2017) sculpture. He says that he does not come from an art history background, so he will instead speak about the story of Multatuli and the museum where the *Multatuli* (2017) sculpture stands. He recalled the well-known critique, articulated by Rob Nieuwenhuys, that Dekker didn't understand the customs of Lebak, and that what he saw was not exploitation, but rather custom.

Rather than affirm or nullify this long-standing debate, Bonnie instead relayed a great historical irony that is irreducible to the fact or fiction dichotomy. Bonnie told the story of the opening of the Multatuli museum in Lebak in 2018. It was met with protest from local organized youth. They said, this is a Dutch person! We don't need museums about Dutch people, we need Indonesia for Indonesia. Bonnie asked them, do you know about the contents of the museum?

No, they said. He asked, do you know that it has one part on Multatuli and six other parts about colonialism in Indonesia? They did not, he said.

The irony he brought forth was not about their lack of awareness about the museum's contents. It is instead 'the fact' that their very act of protest is a continuation of the spirit of Multatuli who they profess to reject. By rejecting Multatuli, they regenerate Multatuli. Bonnie's point was that Dolo's sculpture and *Max Havelaar* (1860) take the side of even those who are protesting against them.

Chapter 6: 'There is No Good News in this Country': Overdetermination and the Contexts and Concepts of Marx and Monotheism

Introduction

1. On Eccentricity

A common way of greeting someone in Indonesia is to say to the other person, *apa kabar?* Idiomatically, it is "how are you?" or "how's it going?" With an archaic semantic, it could read as "what is the word?" or "what is the tiding?" It is an invitation and opening to the word of the other. Casual, everyday responses to the greeting are often "*baik (-baik)"* (well), "*kabar baik"* (well), "*sehat (-sehat)"* (healthy).

At times, it seems that one can orient one's speech according to with whom one speaks. This possibility seems to be harbored, however minimally, within the speaking being. A stranger, a kin, an esteemed friend, a foe, or otherwise can elicit different speech activity from a speaker. This is attested to routinely in everyday experience.

Over the period of dissertation research, I heard Ardjuna, who we will hear from at length in the following chapter, repeatedly take the opportunity when asked "*apa kabar?*" to exit this everyday mode of discoursing and return to it with a mode of discourse that bore an eccentricity to this everydayness. Midst one such instance, after either I or some other unsuspecting interlocutor said, "apa kabar Om?" he said, "tidak ada kabar baik di negeri ini."[908] We can preliminarily translate this as, "*there is no good news in this country.*"[909]

This dissertation chapter develops a groundwork for an interpretation of this remark. In order to do this, we first identify the conditions of this utterance as the ongoing "Renaissance of left thinking in Indonesia" ("*Renaissance pemikiran kiri di Indonesia"*).[910] This particular naming was introduced by one of the participants of this Renaissance.[911] In the introduction to his book, *Materialisme Dialektis: Sebuah Kajian Marxisme dan Filsafat Contemporer* [*Dialectical Materialism: A Study of Marxism and Contemporary Philosophy*] (2012), Martin Suryajaya thanked Coen Pontoh for, in their correspondence, "continually supporting the idea of a Renaissance of left thinking in Indonesia."[912] Grasping the nomination of this event will help identify the physical and metaphysical orientation availed in the statement 'there is no good news in this country.'

In order to do this, this chapter presents a reading of three related debates and interventions in this Renaissance. They are entitled, *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity* (2016 [2013]), *Behind Marx* (2015), and *"*PKS and Lenin*"* (2012). Our reading will identify a conceptual centrality of Marx and Monotheism in this Renaissance and outline how their particular

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[908] "*Om"* can be "uncle" or more generically a respectful term of reference to someone older than the speaker.
[909] "*Negeri*" can also be translated as "land." Commentators have spent half of a century interpreting Jacques Lacan's statement, "there is no sexual relation" ("*il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel*"). Rather than negating the existential qualifier of 'sexual relation,' Ardjuna here negates the existential qualification of 'good news in this country.'
[910] Martin Suryajaya, *Materialisme Dialektis: Kajian Tentang Marxisme dan Filsafat Kontemporer* (Yogyakarta: Resist Books, 2012), xiv. Cited hereafter as "*Dialectical Materialism*."
[911] Badiou argues that a named event is the nomination of that which itself constitutes an element within that world. A name thus brings about a minimum necessary for an element. See his *Logics of Worlds*, Bk. III, sec. 3.
[912] Suryajaya, *Dialectical Materialism,* xiv.

conceptual interrelation is fundamental to the question of politics and metaphysics both in Indonesia and more broadly construed for the long 20th century.[913]

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To situate the statement 'there is no good news *in this country*,' we begin here by orienting the concept of sovereignty and the state for the critique of political economy. The state has notoriously posed a problem for the critique of political economy. It has often been a source of shame and ridicule.[914] The practical presences of the Soviet Union and various Stalinisms throughout the globe have scarcely provided aid.

For *Capital* does not *appear* to disclose a critique of the republican state as one of its finite discursive elements in the way that it does for the capitalist and commodity forms and relations. And yet as its subtitle makes clear, the work is a critique of *political* economy, not simply economy. Be this as it may, the primary anthropological character-masks of *Capital* are the capitalist and wage worker. This leaves out the finite existences of seemingly myriad other minimal anthropological personages of the capitalist mode of production, such as the state and clergy. These so-called omissions have been used as ammunition, both from inside and outside Marxist traditions, to argue that *Capital,* and therefore the critique of political economy, lacks a true idea of the state in its own discourse.[915] According to this idea, the absence of a finite representation of the state and the clergy is tantamount to lacking the theoretical inscription of the effectivity of the state and clergy as such. Late Marxists, many following Althusser, on the other hand, have tried to argue instead that this very inexistence exerts a mode of torsion on the notions of the state and clergy which is not made available in *a priori* demonstrations of finite entities.[916]

This dissertation chapter suggests that the critique of political economy indeed exerts a torsion upon the destiny of the minimal anthropology of the state and clergy character-masks in such a way that both are redetermined at once. This can be understood as a consequence of *Capital*'s intervention on the reproduction of ideology in the capitalist mode of production. This chapter argues that this Indonesian Renaissance has rediscovered this originary problematic of ideology in the critique of political economy and in doing so advances a critical reconsideration of the notion of practice in the capitalist social formation.

2. An Indonesian Renaissance of the Critique of Political Economy

In order to begin to indicate the realm of these interventions, we bring forth four epigraphs from four significant books which have been and are being written in this Renaissance. Two are from Muhammad Al-Fayyadl and two are from Martin Suryajaya. They have called each other *sahabat* (best friend) in philosophy.

The first epigraph we point out here is from Fayyadl's *Filsafat Negasi* (*Philosophy of Negation*) (2016). It is a statement of Heraclitus. Fayyadl writes them in Indonesian as "matahari itu baharu

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913 Regarding the latter, see Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1994).
914 See Louis Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism,* 72 ff.
915 See Leslek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution, Volume 3* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
916 See Samo Tošič, *The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and Lacan* (New York: Verso, 2015).

setiap hari."[917] These words have been referred to in the Diels systematization as Fragment 6. They are often translated into English as "the sun is new everyday" or "a new sun every day." Fayyadl's own statement here is without a syntactical copula. This is, we note, common in Indonesian language activity. It thus reads translated into English as "that sun new every day." The lexeme here of "new" ("*baharu*") is in Fayyadl's 21st century Indonesian an archaically re-determined lexeme, for *"baru,"* which excises the infixed "*-ha-*," is the prevailing, everyday form now for "new."

As an epigraph, the words of Heraclitus introduce the metaphysical question of time and behind it the philosophical thought of Martin Heidegger. This includes the latter's statements regarding the end of philosophy and the end of metaphysics.[918] *Filsafat Negasi* however concludes with the notion of the regeneration of being and time, which Heidegger also found in Heraclitus' writings.[919] Fayyadl's epigraph and question of the return of a new sun again is, we suggest, a question that does not seek to sequester itself exclusively within the particular national situation of Indonesia.

The second epigraph we point to here is from the sequel to *Filsafat Negasi*, which is unfinished and entitled *Filsafat Aktualitas* (*Philosophy of Actuality*). This epigraph is the words of Aristotle that Fayyadl has written in Indonesian. They are acknowledged as those of *De Interpretatione,* 22b29. Fayyadl writes, "Barangkali, niscaya dan tidak niscaya adalah prinsip-prinsip pertama segala sesuatu, ditinjau dari ada atau tidak ada-nya."[920] We translate this here as, "Perhaps, certainly and not certainly are the first principles of all things, which is reviewed considering being or not being." Fayyadl is here repeating Aristotle's questioning of first principle.[921] As an epigraph, they again indicate an opening to a concern with metaphysics as a whole.

While these two epigraphic references may give off an appearance of a hermetic philosophical inquiry, Fayyadl has and continues to write constantly about 'worldly' situations, such as that of Indonesian peasants, whose means of production are constantly being not only threatened but stolen as such.[922] These treatises are not however a popularization of philosophy. Instead, they are, he described to me once, "very seminal and pioneering" ("*sangat seminil dan rintis sekali*"). His invocation of the names of Heraclitus and Aristotle help indicate that this Indonesian Renaissance is a thinking and rethinking of philosophy that does not absolutely separate between Indonesian and Greek authors.

The next two epigraphs we point to here are from two books by Martin Suryajaya. The first we present is from his aforementioned book *Materialisme Dialektis: Sebuah Kajian Marxisme dan Filsafat Contemporer* [*Dialectical Materialism: A Study of Marxism and Contemporary Philosophy*]. The book was first published in 2012, and it entered a second publication in 2014. This epigraph is attributed to William Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, Act III, Scene I and it is presented in Martin's book in this English:

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[917] Muhammad Al-Fayyadl, *Filsafat Negasi* (Yogyakarta: Cantrik Pustaka, 2016). The book entered a third printing in 2018 and a fourth in 2020.

[918] See Martin Heidegger, "Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being," in *Nietzsche, Volumes III & IV* (New York: Harper Row, 1991), 199-250.

[919] See Heidegger, *Heraclitus,* 254 ff.

[920] Muhammad Al-Fayyadl, *Filsafat Aktualitas,* in *Filsafat Negasi* (Yogyakarta: Cantrik Pustaka, 2020), 123.

[921] This work is not simply a review of Heidegger's reading of metaphysics. In *Filsafat Aktualitas,* Fayyadl returns to Henri Bergson, not only to the latter's notion of duration (*durée*), but also the ontological essence of future in that which he writes in both Indonesian and French as "*kemenjadian* (*le devenir*)." '*Kemenjadian*' means 'becoming.'

[922] See Muhammad Al-Fayyadl, "*Membangun Keberislaman yang Materialis: Arah perjuangan Ekonomi-Politik Islam Progresif.*"

O, Pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth,
That I am meek and gentle with these butchers!
Thou art the ruins of the noblest man
That Ever lived in the tide of times.
Woe to the hand that shed this costly blood!
Over thy wounds now do I prophesy,
(Which, like dumb mouths, do ope their ruby lips,
To beg the voice and utterance of my tongue),
A curse shall light upon the limbs of men;
Domestic fury, and fierce civil strife,
Shall cumber all the parts of Italy:
Blood and destruction shall be so in use,
And dreadful objects so familiar,
That mothers shall but smile, when they behold
Their infants quarter'd with the hands of war;
All pity chok'd with custom of fell deeds:
And Caesar's spirit,
Ranging for revenge,
With Até by his side, come hot from hell,
Shall in these confines, with a monarch's voice,
Cry 'Havoc!' and let slip the dogs of war.
That this foul deed shall smell above the earth
With carrion men, groaning for burial.[923]

Although English language of course cannot strictly be called a foreign language in any 21st century national language or situation, as it is a currency in a global money market of the US dollar, this epigraph's English bears in itself a turning action. For Shakespeare's English and the story of *Julius Caesar* here participate at once an Indonesian and not Indonesian world and existence. Like Fayyadl's epigraphs, the epigraph's invocation is not simply or exclusively of Indonesian provenance. But Martin's invocation of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* situates itself on a different terrain from Fayyadl's invocation of Aristotle or Heraclitus, for the words of *Julius Caesar* here bear an explicitly political questioning of the social formation as such.

For the actuality of the discourse of Martin's book is the Indonesian language.[924] Shakespeare's English and the story of *Julius Caesar* therefore turn themselves inside out in order to appear at home here. The English words here therefore, of "the hands of war," "ranging for revenge," "hot from hell," "groaning for burial," are an identification of a sense-power whose actuality is Indonesian. The epigraph thereby, we suggest, inverts an orientation in reading.

Although the book's subtitle indicates itself as scientific discourse (*kajian,* a study), it opens with the theatrical or fictional language of Shakespeare. Opening a 'scientific' tract on Marxism and Philosophy with this discourse of *Julius Caesar* defamiliarizes, we suggest, the discursive place of the state in the critique of political economy. In doing so, Martin retains the aforementioned question of the presence of the state and clergy but articulates its subjectivation as "groaning for

[923] Suryajaya, *Dialectical Materialism*, xvi.
[924] This actuality is "perception" for Spinoza in the *Ethics* and Heidegger in his reading of Kant. For the latter, see Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* 316 ff. For the former, see Spinoza, *Ethics,* esp. Part II.

burial." The state is thus not a finite element or fact as is sought in institutional analysis here. This is instead a minimal anthropology of life during late Roman warfare, with and through its pools of deaths and their afterlives.

This *Julius Caesar* epigraph is itself preceded by a dedication. This is not written in Shakespeare's English language but in Indonesian. We translate it here into English as "For the Left and National Emancipation combatants, who were massacred, physically and in thinking, since the beginning of the founding of the New Order, and which then became the body of a joke by those who today live passing over modernity."[925] This book is "for" ("*demi*") these combatants and their deaths. It is not dedicated to a philosopher. It is instead dedicated to an oceanic destiny and destinations of Left and National Emancipation combatants. The book gives itself to something that even this massive massacre has not completely erased.

The fourth and final epigraph here is from Martin's first book, whose title we translate here into English as *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism.*[926] This epigraph is an untitled poem by the Indonesian poet Agam Wispi. The poem is presented in Indonesian language in the book. We present an English translation here as well as the Indonesian original.

> That who was born in the pot of struggle
> now already big and become grown
> he who was brought up in battle
> thousands of falls, but millions lifted its banner
>
> hypocritical people and stunted ideas in vain seek the secret:
> why history takes the side of the youth?
> why communism is more even, tested and loved?
> and why the working people, the grey hair warriors of the proletariat remain
> youthful?
>
> afternoon exchanges night and night changes to morning
> thousands of years of mankind sets in the mud of slavery
> and in the darkness of those thoughts marx and engels sprinkle a fire
> and in every country there reverberates the song of resurrection and uprising.
>
> An Egom[927] died in the gallows
> An Aliarcham[928] killed in the wasteland
> a new generation arrives, learning about the bravery and wisdom
> one by one the enemy is defeated and one by one usurped
> the victory

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[925] Martin writes, "Demi para pejuang Kiri dan pembebasan nasional yang dibantai secara fisik dan pikiran sejak awal pendirian Orde Baru yang kemudian dijadikan bahan lelucon oleh mereka yang kini hidup melampaui modernitas." Suryajaya, *Dialectical Materialism,* xvi.

[926] Martin Suryajaya, *Alain Badiou dan Masa Depan Marxisme* (Yogyakarta: Resist Books, 2011). Cited hereafter as "*Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism*."

[927] Translator's Note: Egom. Apprehended by the Dutch Colonial Government for participation in the 1926 Uprising in Banten. Also Farmer's School of *Egom* (*Sekolah Tani Egom*), a cadre school in Cisarua, Bogor.

[928] Translator's Note: Aliarcham (1901-1933). Leader of Union of Islam (*Sarekat Islam*) and the Communist Party of Indonesia (*PKI*). Died in Digul camp. Also Aliarcham Academy, the cadre school of the PKI in Jakarta.

marxism-leninism sets up class struggle
and class struggle seeds marxism-leninism;
o, brilliant revolution, which is being prepared by the suppressed nations
in this century, we also make imperialism extinct

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ia jang lahir dalam kantjah perdjuangan
kini sudah besar dan mendjadi dewasa;
dia jang dibesarkan dalam dadung pertempuran
beribu-ribu gugur, namun berdjuta menangkat pandjinja

orang-orang munafik dan kerdil pikiran sia-sia mengintip rahasia
mengapa sedjarah berpihak kepada klas yang paling muda?
mengapa komunisme kian merata, terudji, dan ditjinta?
dan bagi rakyat pekerja, pedjuang proleriat ubanan tetap remadja?

siang bertukar malam dan malam berganti pagi
ribuan tahun manusia terbenam di lumpur perbudakan
dan di gelapan pikiran itu marx dan engels memerjikkan api
dan di tiap negeri berkumanganglah lagu kebangkitan.

seorang egom mati di tiang-gantungan
seorang aliarcham tewas di tanah-buangan;
generasi baru dating, beladjar tentang keberanian dan kearifan
satu demi satu musuh dikalahkan dan satu demi satu direbut kemenangan.

marxisme-leninisme menemap perdjuangan kelas
dan perdjuangan klas menjemai marxisme-leninisme;
o, repolusi tjemerlang, jang sedang disiapkan nasion-nasion tertindas
dalam abad ini djuga kita punahkan imperialisme.

In *To the Party: Collection of Poems* (Jakarta: *Yayasan Pembaruan* [Reclamation Foundation], 1965)[929]

The poem is written by Agam Wispi (b. 1930-2003). He was a member of *Lekra* (*Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat,* People's Cultural Institute). He was abroad in Beijing at the moment of September 30, 1965, having been invited to Vietnam to receive a prize for his poetry. Unable to

[929] Suryajaya, *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism,* xxi.

return to Indonesia thereafter, he lived in exile first in China and for many years in the Netherlands.

This epigraph is also preceded by a dedication. In Indonesian language, it reads "*Kepada Komunitas Marx.*" In English this is linguistically straightforward, "To the Marx Community." This *Komunitas Marx*, however, is not simply an unspecific, global qualification of a putative Marx community, like an internet. It is instead a particular community which gave this collective name to itself. As Martin tells it, it began as a reading circle. The circle emerged out of a split within a group of philosophy students at *Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara* (Driyarkara High School of Philosophy) who were reading contemporary philosophy together. The group broke into two new circles or communities, resulting in a *Komunitas Hegel* and *Komunitas Marx*.[930] This book is dedicated to the latter.

These epigraphs – from Heraclitus, Aristotle, Shakespeare's *Julius Cesar* and *Lekra* poet Agam Wispi – present an outline for this Indonesian Renaissance of Left thinking. With the Indonesian language bearing the statements of Heraclitus and Aristotle and the English language Shakespeare, we suggest that Fayyadl and Martin are considering the question of philosophy and metaphysics *as a whole*. With these names, we can preliminarily identify that their efforts are not dedicated to reciting philosophy as doxa but rather instead in attempting to animate a return to its founding questions. This is the question of the new sun every day and the necessity or lack of necessity of cause itself. And yet, with Martin's invocation of Shakespeare's utterances and the burning verses of the *Lekra* poet Agam Wispi in 21st century Indonesia in a commentary on Alain Badiou, we also see that this Renaissance is decidedly concerned at once with 'global' and 'local' instantiations of leadership and justice. Moreover, this mode of research and exposition does not follow the technical paths forged in modern political science. It therefore centralizes the problem of the essence of the republic, while also recognizing that the political cannot necessarily be grasped by regular republican modes of discourse. The epigraphs indeed articulate a particular field and activity of thinking politics, not as something representable "in" or "on" a horizon, but instead *as* that in which the human Dasein necessarily participates.

3. The Eccentricity of the State in Recent Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy

These epigraphs indicate the presence of the question of sovereignty and the state to this Renaissance. In order to situate the particularity of this identification, we first outline why the state has tended to present an epistemological obstacle to and for late Marxist thinking. We do this with a schematic contrast of the thinking of Giorgio Agamben and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. This will help understand the reason for the strength and intensity of Martin Suryajaya's reading of Alain Badiou when the circle of philosophy readers at the High School of Philosophy in Jakarta split into an opposition of Hegel and Marx.

In the latter part of the 20th century, both Agamben and Hardt and Negri sought to rediscover a critical notion of politics. In this pursuit, they have both been informed by the so-called crisis that the socialist and communist movements faced by the end of the 20th century. To orient their respective paths following this crisis, we can say that while Agamben argues that the political ban is the essential concept of the modern state and politics, Hardt and Negri on the other hand argue that the notion of labour power in *Capital* harbors the potentiality for a

[930] The origin story is relayed by Martin in his Introduction to *Dialectical Materialism.* See Suryajaya, *Dialectical Materialism,* xi-xii.

transformation in this conjuncture of politics and the state. Both of these readings are germane to this Indonesian Renaissance.

The concept of the state in *Capital* is foundational to the thinking of Hardt and Negri.[931] Their work identifies how the state is omnipresent throughout the *Capital* project.[932] As we identified in Part I of this dissertation, the writings in Part VIII of *Capital* report luridly on the participation of the state in the creation of capitalist and commodity forms in the colonies. Marx moreover identifies these historical practices in his reading of Thomas Raffles as "one of the most extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre and meanness."[933] Hardt and Negri identify that the state thus has to be understood as an 'immanent' mode of power relating to the financial economy, rather than as a discrete and finite anatomical entity.[934]

Agamben has received considerable attention from late professional Anthropologists.[935] Working explicitly with the aim of developing Michel Foucault's thinking, Agamben has proposed that the paradigm of 'Western' sovereignty is the generation of a prohibition against itself.[936] The concentration camps of the Holocaust in the European 20th century are for Agamben the absolute instantiation of this paradigm. The Nazi regime of sovereignty founded its own so-called political vocation in forbidding *particular* forms of human life. The Nazi sovereignty tasked itself with the decision to exclude that which it grasps. We note here that Agamben is explicitly interested in a 'Western' paradigm of power. He does not become interested in so-called non-Western paradigms nor their mysteries. His analyses are important here because they place the question of the ban or prohibition at the center of the problem of the question of politics and modern sovereignty.

With this contrast in mind, this dissertation chapter identifies how the mode of existence of the political ban in Indonesia facilitates a critical re-engagement with the aforementioned analyses. We argue that Agamben's notion of the state as a vestibule of prohibition conflates the state's 'pure theoretical' order with its 'concrete historical' existence. Against this, we show that the mode of existence of the political ban in Indonesia identifies an ontological difference, rather than a symmetry, with political acts as such. The latter is a *conatus* that cannot be absolutely captured by the sovereign. While seconding Hardt and Negri's argument regarding the immanent effects of the state on the capitalist social formation as such, this chapter suggests that their notion of the potentiality of labour power bypasses the fundamental mode of discrepancy and eccentricity with which ideology and politics bear a relation to productive economic activity. This chapter thereby shows *how* this Indonesian Renaissance interrupts the reproduction of capitalist ideology in its practices of politics. Rather than flattering the political ban itself, these practices of struggle, criticism, and transformation work on and within ideology itself.

4. On Polarity and Politics

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931 See Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Labor of Dionysus*: *A Critique of the State-Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

932 See Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

933 Marx, *Capital*, 916.

934 Although this notion of immanence is alternately celebrated and derided, it tends, we suggest, to occlude the absolute peculiarity or eccentricity of the so-called superstructure to its own problematic. Badiou, on the other hand, is in a line together with Lacan and Althusser, for whom there is no at-hand status of materiality without ideology.

935 The citations are nearly without end here. For two representative publications, see Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat "Sovereignty Revisited," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 35 (2006): 295-315 and Adam Smith "Archaeologies of Sovereignty," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40 (2011): 415-432.

936 See Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995).

These two significant and opposed paths – Agamben and Negri's Italian descents – converge, however obliquely, on the idea of politics. In order to understand their reconceptualizations, we begin by acknowledging Martin Heidegger's reintroduction of this idea in the 20th century with his interpretation of Plato's notion of πολιτεία (*politeia*). Heidegger presented this interpretation in his 1942-1943 lectures at the University of Freiburg, which have been published in English by Indiana University Press as *Parmenides*.[937]

To do so, Heidegger draws a line of demarcation between πολιτεία (*politeia*) and the Latin and Latinate words which have come to replace it in *res publica* and republic. His interpretation asks if the notion of politics is at all adequately identified by the notion of state (*Staat*) or the Latinate republic. In these lectures, Heidegger argues that Plato's notion of the *politeia* is *not* tantamount to the republican state as it is popularly thought of as an ideal or embodied in institutional living.[938] Instead, the ontological basis of the *politeia* for Plato is the physical and metaphysical semantics which we find now in the words of "pole" and "polarity."

According to this interpretation, politics is thus the very possibility for orientation as such. Politics here means the mode of the action of turning for human beings. Thinking politics means the possibility or actuality of there being such a turn. With this notion, politics is neither the state's effectivity in productivity nor the decision of the sovereign exception, but something that decisively individuates the human Dasein in a mode of existence that is being-with (*Mitsein*). Heidegger's reflection suggests that this politics, or the *politeia*, exists, however minimally, separated from the essence of the state or republic.

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Returning to the Indonesian Renaissance, we note that Martin Suryajaya, in his *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism* (2011), recalls that already in *Being and Event* [1988], Badiou *proved* the irreducible ontological excess of representation over presentation.[939] The realm of this irreducible excess of a situation can be called its politics. Politics means representing the presentation of representation, or the *turning* of being.

This dissertation chapter details how Communism and Marxism-Leninism form such a disruption and turning in the state and republic of Indonesia. Agamben, in his wide-ranging reflections on the prohibition as the modern paradigm of sovereignty, never considers the particular prohibition on the communist hypothesis. Indonesia, we note, is not alone in the juridical prohibition on the existence of Communism or Marxism-Leninism.[940] The inexistence of this Indonesian ban in Agamben's thought does not however indicate a *particular* or finite shortcoming in his thinking. Instead, we suggest, the particularity of forgetting the prohibition of Communism or Marxism-Leninism in Agamben bears on a more fundamental question regarding the *politeia* as the form whereby human beings live together an orientation.

The work of Alain Badiou seems to present itself as a direct opposite to the work of Agamben, for Badiou posits that the very existence of philosophy and the thinking human being necessitates the reconsideration of the destiny of the communist party and the communist hypothesis as a whole.[941] The Communist Party of Indonesia was, we note, one of the first

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[937] Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).
[938] Ibid, 95 ff.
[939] Suryajaya, *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism,* ch. 4.
[940] For a comparative approach, see Marla Stone and Giuliana Chamedes, "Naming the Enemy: Anti-communism in Transnational Perspective," *Journal of Contemporary History* 53, no. 1 (2018): 4-11.
[941] See Badiou, *The Communist Hypothesis.*

political organizations to use the name-in-sovereignty of Indonesia.[942] This particular act of naming thus advanced an intervention in its own contemporary that opposed the hegemonic paradigm, which at that time was the Dutch East Indies. It thus called-out to extinguish a collectively experienced exploitation. This act and name by the Communist Party of Indonesia is therefore germane not simply to the individuality of the communist party of Indonesia, but to the (non-)place of communism in the understanding of modern or 'Western' sovereignty in Agamben's genealogies.

The significance of this activity is moreover intensified by the history of its ongoing exilic existence in the republic of Indonesia. For this political formation was banned by the Dutch East Indies in 1927 and banned again by the revolutionary Indonesian state in 1948 after communist uprisings.[943] Beginning with the events of September 30, 1965, the party was inscribed into state prohibition by the Republic of Indonesia with the 'emergency' state decision on July 5, 1966, to which we turn below.

In the middle of the 20th century, Jean-Paul Sartre said, and was subsequently severely criticized for saying, "I consider Marxism to be the unsurpassable philosophy of our time."[944] This dissertation chapter suggests that this 21st century Indonesian Renaissance of left thinking testifies that Sartre's idea cannot be so simply discarded. Given the historiographicality and existence of the mass murder of so-called communist Indonesians, this chapter presents an ethnographic analysis of how this particular *politeia* is not only a past, but moreover an unsurpassable future of human beings living in the 21st century under the capitalist conditions of modern colonization with its sundry techniques of legislating the forceful conjuncture of class struggle.[945]

5. On Prohibition and Presence

As the question of the political prohibition on Communism and Marxism-Leninism is not bound to the period of fieldwork research, we first bring forth an articulation of this situation drawn from a research experience which precedes this dissertation research period. In 2009, before entering graduate school, I went to Bali on a Fulbright Research Fellowship. When I first arrived, I stayed in Denpasar with an acquaintance who is a visual artist. With other friends from the Art Institute of Denpasar (*ISI*), they formed an art collective. They wanted, he told me, to make art with a non- or anti-traditional practice of aesthetics and making art. He told me that their art was guided by street art principles as against fine art principles, and political content over aesthetic mastery. They often made street murals. In beautiful, comedic, and surreal genres, their murals

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[942] See Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912-1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[943] For a review, see Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).

[944] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method* (New York: Vintage, 1963), xxxiv. For a severe criticism of Sartre, see Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), chap. 9.

[945] On why the notion of history is fundamentally 'zoological,' see Martin Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, pt. 2. For important historiographical research of the events of 1965-66, see John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's coup d'etat in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), Geoffrey Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres 1965-1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), Wijaya Herlambang, *Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965: Bagaimana Orde Baru Melegitimasi Anti-komunisme Melalui Film dan Sastra* (Serpong, Tangerang Selatan: Marjin Kiri, 2004) and Roro Sawita, "The Connection Between Land Reform and the 1965-1966 Tragedy in Bali" in *The Indonesian Genocide of 1965: Causes, Dynamics and Legacies,* ed. K. Macgregor, J. Melvin and A. Pohlman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 89-113.

told stories about Bali, of its dystopic colonization by tourists and the efflorescence of the commodification of everything, particularly land (*tanah*). Funny, beautiful, and smart all at once, their public art works ridiculed paradisiacal notions of Bali as world pictures to be bought and sold to tourists in Bali. Mocking tourists coming to stare at Balinese "culture," he has made paintings of bare-breasted women in the rice fields wearing hazardous material gas masks over their faces while giving the middle finger with inlaid discursive statements reading, "Come and Buy My Culture."

At the moment when I stayed in his studio, he was working a large canvas with Chinese ink. "The ink is cheap," he told me. The primary large-scale figure on the canvas was clearly the famous, iconic portrait of Mao's face. The face did not however appear alone on the canvas as a simple transposition and repetition. Strewn in suspension throughout the canvas' face were smaller scaled, hyperrealist figures of Indonesian children wearing their school uniforms, twisting their torsos, and holding their fingers up to their mouths in the gesture when quieting someone: "shhh." He named the work, in English *Do Not Talk About the Communists*. The work extraordinarily adequately points out the simultaneous presence and prohibition of communism in late Indonesia.

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Almost a decade later, as a PhD student, I was strongly encouraged by an acquaintance to go to the home and sculpture studio of Dolorosa Sinaga – *Beranda Rakyat Garuda* (Verandah of the People of *Garuda*) and *Somalaing* – to do my field research in Jakarta if I was interested in art and politics in Indonesia. Upon entering the Verandah (*Beranda*) for the first time in 2016, I immediately caught a glance of the many artworks that both hang on the walls and stand on the ground there. The works seemed to speak in a discourse related to *Do Not Talk About the Communists* (2009). Of these many works, one in particular strongly held my attention in my initial moments there. It is a black ink drawing of a smiling skeleton wearing a military uniform, dark sunglasses, beret, black boots, carrying an AK 47 rifle over his shoulder while marching and smirking. The skeleton casts a shadow as the chain of islands that together comprise the mapped view of Indonesia.

My experience there however indicated how the realm of the *politeia* is not simply contained within artworks. This became particularly clear in the conversations I had at Garuda with Bilven. His habits were unlike many others there. He was not an artist (*seniman*). He did not smoke cigarettes. He is the editor and publisher of *Ultimus*. *Ultimus* is one of the most significant publishers of books participating in this ongoing Renaissance. One of *Ultimus'* most popular and remarkable works is a large-form tome entitled *Sejarah Gerakan Kiri Indonesia: Para Pemula* [*History of the Left Movement of Indonesia: For Beginners*] (2016).[946] Over 500 pages and worked on by over one hundred people, it is by all measures both an immense and collective work. The book tells, with short written entries and hundreds of graphic arts, the history of the Left movement in Indonesia, including its repression by another national and international movement.

Having already come to be attached in care and friendship with Bilven while bearing a knowledge of the aforementioned ban, I felt compelled at some point to ask him something that I had wanted to for some time but had resisted. I asked if he had concern or fear for his personal safety because of the aforementioned prohibition. Bilven smiled and said to me, "I don't think it is the most important problem." We continued in our usual conversation afterwards. From this

[946] Yayak Yatmaka, et al., *Sejarah Gerakan Kiri Indonesia: Untuk Pemula* (Bandung: Ultimus, 2016).

grew the lesson that the law and its imputation of a political prohibition was itself *not* tantamount to the cause of politics itself. Political acts are different than theoretical worldviews. Politics is participating in the *politeia.* Political thinking is not simply the potential and actual harm mete by the sovereign. In other words, the ban in the republic is not *itself* adequate to political action. And yet political acts do bear a relation to the political prohibition and the state. An anti-communist political tactic widely undertaken by the repressive state apparatuses of Indonesia has been the making-known of a so-called haunting resurrection of new communism in the republic. The Republican repressive state apparatus regularly claims that this is taking place as a danger in Indonesia, and that they must therefore protect the republican people from these state rebels.[947]

Martin Suryajaya analytically demonstrates this situation in *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism* (2011). He testifies to Badiou's identification of a pure discrepancy between ontological presentation and political representation. Accordingly, he sees that the Republics do not control all possibilities of polarity and the social formation. The Agamben-inspired theoreticism that thinks of politics as a ban cuts itself off from the question of *politeia* as being-with others as orientation.

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At an early moment of this dissertation research, I met Coen Pontoh, an Indonesian person living in the United States at the time, at UC Berkeley. He spoke to an audience in Wheeler Hall about the contemporary political situation in Indonesia. Although this would not be spontaneously apparent to everyone in the room, Coen was active in the workers movement in Indonesia during the late years of the New Order regime. This activity eventuated in his imprisonment. Subsequent to his release, he experienced continued threats and intimidation. Eventually he managed to leave Indonesia, and he lives now in New York City.

When he was asked to give a remark about the contemporary conditions in Indonesia, he gave his reflection a very clear and unambiguous understanding. His final projected slide was filled only with the number 1965. This was the largest font size used in the whole presentation. He explained why in no uncertain terms. This number allowed him to draw a contrast with the contemporary, of which he again delivered a very clear and precise remark. These recent days, he said, are characterized by an "NGO-ization" of political thinking and life in Indonesia. This attribute emerged from the social movements which opposed the New Order regime (1965-1998). But whereas these movements originally emerged *as* the grassroots, the subsequent transformation of this sphere engendered what Coen called an "NGO-ization." These NGOs are no longer the popular, which is to say, of the people. They have instead become a regular sector of capitalist society. They are minimally discrete from the radical transformative aspiration that characterized that moment when Indonesians organized against the oppressive practices of the New Order. This has resulted in a mode of organization that is not adequate to the challenges of the current situation, he stated. 1965, he said, thus introduces the conditions of the depoliticization of the Indonesian *politeia*.

In response to these remarks, an American person and professor suggested an antithesis. She claimed that 1965 is not the essential root of the contemporary political situation of Indonesia. Instead, it can be understood as a result of a series of *technical* 'political' and 'economic'

[947] See, for instance, Dewi Nurita, "Gatot Nurmantyo dan Lagu Lama Tentang Kebangkitan PKI," *Tempo.co*, September 28, 2021, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1511344/gatot-nurmantyo-dan-lagu-lama-tentang-kebangkitan-pki.

outcomes during the Reformation period, roughly from the year 2000 to the present. Coen, on the other hand, suggested that a new beginning is opened by the intervention of forbidding Marxist-Leninist teachings in Indonesia. For her, the roots of the present political and economic situation are the material outcome of the Reformation. She said communism is not relevant to the struggles of ordinary people. This articulates the hypothesis that ideology is not a necessary mode and condition of the material existence of human beings.

But is communism an irrelevant consideration to the masses of Indonesia? If that is the case, why is there such a constant and never submerging mark placed upon it by the repressive state apparatuses in Indonesia? Why do they continue to espouse an anti-communist ideology when all those who were in any way affiliated with the communist party are the most elderly and marginalized people in Indonesia? The repressive state apparatus often says that there is a "new communism" ("*PKI baru"*) that is barely latent and very dangerous to Indonesia.[948] The facticity of this imputation notwithstanding, what is clear is that the material existence of ideology is in play for both the state apparatuses and the people who seek a new prince's people. The ban of the critique of political economy creates an obstacle to such an emancipatory doctrine. This chapter presents an understanding of the effects of this obstacle.[949]

6. Book Raids [*Razia Buku*] and the Political Prohibition

In July 2019, two young men, who were participating in a "Vespa Literacy Library" and had brought and displayed books in the square (*alun alun*) in front of the district palace in Probolinggo (East Java), were detained by the police. The term used to relay this action in the mass media was often "*diamankan.*" The root of this word is *aman*, meaning safe or safety. "*Diamankan*" is a passive verb form that could be translated as "to be 'safe-d'" or "to be 'safety-ed.'" This is a term often used in situations when someone has been brought into the police station, but not necessarily charged and arrested.

The media reported that the books were seized (*disita*) and 'safety-ied' along with the literacy promoter-activists (*pegiat*).[950] The newspaper reported that the boys were apprehended by the police (*Kapolsek*) because they exhibited (*pajang*) books that are "considered to be banned" ("*dianggap terlarang*").[951] This language of safety, we note, explicitly invokes the pastoral powers of republican sovereignty. The report explained that it was the public-ness of the display of the book that caused the problem for the police. The police said they wanted to avoid any public noise (*kegaduhan*) regarding the *PKI* (The Communist Party of Indonesia).

In the regional press coverage, the boys' faces were mostly not shown. Instead, the coverage exhibited the books. This included a book by D. N. Aidit (b. 1923-1965), the deceased former General Secretary of the *PKI*, which is banned. This book includes a speech he gave in 1952 at the 32nd birthday of the *PKI*. Another displayed book was entitled *Sukarno, Marxism & Leninism*, published in 2017 by Peter Kasenda.

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[948] Nurita, "Gatot Nurmantyo dan Lagu Lama Tentang Kebangkitan PKI."

[949] This ethnographic research took place in Jakarta from 2016-2020, and ended promptly on March 15, 2020, the Ides of March, with the Covid19 pandemic global evacuation of Fulbright fellows.

[950] Abdul, "Dua Pegiat Literasi Diamankan Polisi," *Ranah Riau*, July 29, 2019, https://www.ranahriau.com/berita-11252-dua-pegiat-literasi-diamankan-polisi.html. This meaning of '*Sita'* derives from the *Ramayana* where Sita is seized and abducted by Ravana in the forest.

[951] Ibid.

A local news article gave a bit more background on the literacy activists.[952] It explained that one of the boys was a member of *Muhammadiyah*, one of the two largest Muslim mass organizations in Indonesia. He himself took the name Dipa Nusantara Aidit, the very same name of the former *PKI* General Secretary. The article noted that the Vespa Literacy Group was locally popular because it supported literacy for poor people. The article sympathetically recalled that the activists were detained while displaying books of "*bung Karno*," the first president of Indonesia.

A follow up report explained that the boys were later called in again to the Police station for a "mediation" with the highest Islamic organization of authority in Indonesia, *MUI* (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*).[953] At the mediation, the books were returned to the Vespa literacy activists by the police, who then handed the books over to *MUI* who would then "study their contents" ("mengkaji isi dari buku-buku").[954] The article displayed a photograph of the literacy activists, who were wearing civilian clothes, beside the police who were in uniform, and the *ulama* who were wearing white *peci* and black *songkok* caps that are popularly identified as Muslim.

Ariel Heryanto, a prominent Indonesian intellectual who has lived for several decades in Australia, wrote a comment about this event in Probolinggo on Twitter. He said that whereas there are three time zones in Indonesia, Probolinggo is not in any of the three. It is in 1966 in a red scare. It is still in the past. This posting received thousands of likes and retweets.

But it also received one incisive criticism from Mohammed Al-Fayyadl, one of the most prominent intellectuals in contemporary Indonesia, which he disseminated on his Facebook website. Yes, he said, we in Probolinggo are far behind other places, such as the cities of Yogyakarta, Malang, even Jember, in reading, literacy, and books. Books are for us, like ancient objects (*benda purbalaka*). But, Fayyadl retorts, commentators ought to draw attention to the literacy activists themselves rather than the police and state's red scare. The literacy activists are spreading goodness (*menyebar kebaikan*) by sharing, reading, and creating a studio (*sanggar*) for young people to learn together on the streets. These young people are just now growing (*baru tumbuh*). Fayyadl interdicts: do not burden them with the phobias of the past New Order, so that this flower that has just bloomed will wither and die. Pray, instead, that they will hold out and grow. He rejoins us to consider not always the repressivity of the state apparatus but instead a self-movement, the thinking, of the political acts of the readers themselves.

One week later, there was another case of books being seized and accused of communist sympathies. This time it was not the police but members of a civilian mass-organization, the *BMI* (*Brigade Muslim Indonesia*), who seized books in the large corporate bookstore, Gramedia, in the city of Makassar on the island of Sulawesi. The book raiders made a short video during their seizure that made national news. It exhibited a uniformed Gramedia worker, standing uncomfortably beside the four pugilistic but not completely unruly men. The speaker, Muhammad Zulkifli, said that the books are communists and that therefore they are obliged to seize them. One of the books he held up was *The Thought of Karl Marx* by Romo Magnis, a professor at the *Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat* (High School of Philosophy) and one of the most prominent elder intellectuals in Jakarta and Indonesia. He is also a teacher of Martin Suryajaya.

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[952] Yuli, "Polisi Probolinggo Tangkap Dua Pegiat Vespa Literasi Gara-gara Pajang buku DN Aidit dan Bung Karno," *Surya Malang,* July 28, 2019, https://suryamalang.tribunnews.com/2019/07/28/polisi-problonggo-tangkap-dua-pegiat-vespa-literasi-gara-gara-pajang-buku-dn-aidit-dan-bung-karno.

[953] Galih Pujo Asmoro, "Terkait Penyitaan Buku Aidit, MUI Probolinggo: Kami Menyayangkan Sikap Dik Najwa Shihab," *Tribun Jateng,* July 31, 2019, https://jateng.tribunnews.com/2019/07/31/terkait-penyitaan-buku-aidit-mui-probolinggo-kami-menyayangkan-sikap-dik-najwa-shihab?page=all.

[954] Ibid.

Romo ("Priest") Magnis, a prominent public theologian, published an opinion piece shortly thereafter reflecting on the seizure event. There he wrote, "our stupidity is without limits."[955] He said that while the brigade confiscated his book, his book does not even support Marxism-Leninism. It is a critique of this ideology, he said. Read the books, he prodded. Romo Magnis said that these anti-literacy activists are stupid (*bodoh*). They see a picture of Marx and Lenin and think it incites Marxism-Leninism without reading it.[956] The books they claimed to criticize still were sealed in plastic, he commented. The raiders admitted that they hadn't read the books. But, they said, the books smelled (*berbau*) communist.[957]

7. On the Forces of the Law

The practical basis of both seizure actions is the notion that these books violate the edict of the Republic of Indonesia known by its abbreviation, *TAP MPRS* 1966/XXV. This legal discourse prohibits Communism and Marxism-Leninism in Indonesia. Book banning, however, is not addressed by the *TAP MPRS* 1966/XXV emergency decree.

The National Commission of Human Rights of Indonesia (*Komnas HAM*), in their statement regarding this particular efflorescence of 'book seizures' did not even materially refer to *TAP MPRS* 1966/XXV. They instead argued that the book raid action in Makassar violated *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (*UUD 45*). *UUD 45* is the founding State Constitution of Indonesia. *Undang-Undang Dasar* is literally the Basic or Foundational Laws. It was written in 1945 at the end of the period of Japanese occupation and before the proclamation of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945.[958] *Komnas HAM* recalled that *UUD 45* secures the right of private property and states that this right cannot be taken away arbitrarily by anyone.[959] This errant book raid action is thus confiscating "right" and private property and this is in violation of Article 28H of *UUD 45*. Furthermore, *Komnas HAM* recollected that *UUD 45* states that everyone has the right to knowledge.[960] These raiders therefore cannot obstruct the right of those who seek to obtain knowledge by reading these books.

The ability to ban books was established, not by *TAP MPRS* 1966/XXV, but instead by Law no. 4/PNPS of 1963. The Supreme Court of Indonesia (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*, *MK*), however,

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[955] Danu Damarjati, "Franz Magnis: Buku Saya Soal Marxisme Tak Bertentangan Dengan TAP MPRS," *Detik News,* August 6, 2019, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4653649/franz-magnis-buku-saya-soal-marxisme-tak-bertentangan-dengan-tap-mprs?_ga=2.47537703.1052357839.1565145795-397729800.1565145795.

[956] On sympathetic magic, see James Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (New York: Macmillan, 1922), ch. 3.

[957] Romo Magnis said that the 'foolish' raiders cannot differentiate between talking critically about an idea and spreading the idea. Magnis says that communism is a problem of the 20th century and that no one is spreading it now because it is a theory that is *konyol* (ridiculous, absurd). Magnis' 'raiders', like 'natives' for Frazer, see the tendency of an image to propagate itself even after the image is removed. Magnis criticizes their inability to differentiate 'critical' from magical thinking. But he also notes that this book raid does however show that there is a communist phobia in Indonesia because of Suharto. He thinks that Indonesian people have a traumatic attachment to communism because of the propaganda that was developed and spread during the New Order. See Damarjati, "Franz Magnis."

[958] See Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), chap. 1.

[959] See "Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945," *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, accessed April 16, 2022, https://www.dpr.go.id/jdih/uu1945. Article 28H, paragraph 4 states, "Setiap orang berhak mempunyai hak milik pribadi dan hak milik tersebut tidak boleh diambil alih secara sewenang-wenang oleh siapa pun."

[960] Ibid. Article 28F states, "Setiap orang berhak untuk berkomunikasi dan memperoleh informasi untuk mengembangkan pribadi dan lingkungan sosialnya, serta berhak untuk mencari, memperoleh, memiliki, menyimpan, mengolah, dan menyampaikan informasi dengan menggunakan segala jenis saluran yang tersedia."

delivered an emendatory decision regarding this law in 2010. The new decision did not completely allow or forbid book banning, but instead established a procedure for what they called a material test of the ban.[961] The confiscation of a book, such as took place in the Gramedia in Makassar, did not undertake this legal and thus required test procedure to establish whether the "safeguarding" is warranted or not. The Makassar action is therefore contrary to the due process established by the law of the state of Indonesia.[962]

The Legal Aid Foundation (*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI*), an important civil society organization founded with the initiative of Adnan Buyung Nasution in 1970, also issued a statement. It stated that left books do not necessarily incite communism. These books instead present a history that is not discussed because of its sensitive nature.[963] They also noted that books can only be banned if they are tested and established to be in violation of law, such as in the situation of blasphemy or pornography. But this can only be undertaken by the decisive state apparatus which precedes the seizure. This did not take place in the book raiding in Makassar, which was instead a direct action of a mass organization (*ormas*). A national Indonesian government cadre, the Deputy of Political Communication and Information Dissemination for the President, Eko Sulistyo, said in a public statement at a press conference, book banning is the beginning of the destruction of a civilization.[964]

On a CNN television talk show program, JJ Rizal, a well-known public intellectual and publisher of a significant publishing house, *Komunitas Bambu*, explained the success of the 2010 Supreme Court challenge. At that time, he recalled, the list of banned books was growing. He and other concerned parties submitted a challenge to the 1963 law in the Supreme Court. They won. He gave a rousing pedagogic oration on the television screen. He said,

> The basis of Indonesia is in reading books. The majority of the leaders of this nation from that we can call the founders [*pendiri*] of our people [*bangsa*], they all read books. And the majority of them in the beginning of the 20th century read left books [*buku kiri*]. This left has to be understood as an ideology that opposed and struggled against colonialism. All groups that opposed colonialism – Islam, nationalists, and others [ed: communists are unnamed] – used a left ideology. The most simple example, Cokrominoto, the founder of Sarekat Islam [ed: the largest mass organization in Java in the early 20th century] wrote a book Islam and Socialism, because he said Islam had socialism within it. Another example, the high military commander [*panglima*] Sudirman was a joiner [*pengikut*] of Tan Malaka's group and that basis of that radical youth [*pemuda radikal*].
>
> This opposition to the left is a wholesale sin [*dosanya borongan*]. Not just a betrayal [*pengkhianat*] of the proclamation of the 2010 Supreme Court ruling, but rather it forgets a whole very long history, that Indonesia is formed in the basis of books. And the founders

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961 "MK Cabut Kewenangan Jaksa Larang Buku," *Tempo.co,* October 13, 2010, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/284502/mk-cabut-kewenangan-jaksa-larang-buku.

962 Lisye Sri Rahayu, "Komnas HAM: Razia Buku Marxisme Melanggar Hak memperoleh Informasi," *Detik News,* August 6, 2019, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4653698/komnas-ham-razia-buku-marxisme-melanggar-hak-memperoleh-informasi.

963 Teddy Ardianto H., "HRGW dan LBH Pers Sesalkan Usulan Jaksa Agung Razia Buku Kiri," *Berita Jatim,* January 25, 2019, https://beritajatim.com/peristiwa/hrwg-dan-lbh-pers-sesalkan-usulan-jaksa-agung-razia-buku-kiri/.

964 CNN Indonesia, "Gagal paham razia buku 'Kiri,'" ["The Failure of Understanding 'Left' Book Raidings"], Youtube, August 7, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ox14nZtn_sY.

> of this country and people didn't ever have a problem with various ideologies, including the left because these contributed in their thinking to a process of the becoming of Indonesia.[965]

His explanation identifies why this ideological struggle is a class struggle. For this forbidden existence is imputed, not even because it is or is not true (this is the position of Romo Magnis), but instead because this determinate fiction is that which makes the state apparatus 'go on its own' (Althusser). Ideology is therefore not idealistic. It exists materially, for it intervenes on the production and reproduction of social relations as such.

8. Law and Anti-communist Discourse

After the military maneuvers which led to the taking over of the state government by the Army, the New Order Government of Indonesia, under and through the invocation of emergency powers, prohibited Communism and Marxism-Leninism with the edict entitled *TAP MPRS* XXV/1966. *TAP* is an abbreviation for *Ketetapan,* meaning 'Decision.' *MPRS* is an abbreviation for *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara. Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* is the People's Consultative Assembly and the legislative branch of the Indonesian national government. *Sementara* means in this situation "temporary, interim, provisional, terminable," or even "exceptional." The *TAP MPRS* XXV/1966 opens as such:

> Ketetapan Tentang
> Pembubaran Partai Komunis Indonesia. Pernyataan Sebagai Organisasi Terlarang di Seluruh Wilayah Negara Republik Indonesia bagi Partai Komunis Indonesia dan Larangan Setiap Kegiatan untuk Menyebarkan atau Mengembangkan Faham atau Ajaran Komunis/ Marxisme-Leninisme.[966]
>
> Decision About
> The disbandment of the Indonesian Communist Party. Declaration as a Prohibited Organization in the Entire Territory of the Republic of Indonesia for the Indonesian Communist Party and Prohibition of Any Activities to Spread or Develop Communist/Marxism-Leninist Understanding or Teachings.

It presents a very brief argument. Its first point states that Communism/Marxism-Leninism, in its essence (*pada hakekatnya*), contradicts (*bertentangan*) Pancasila.[967] Pancasila is the name of the foundation of the State philosophy of Indonesia. It is introduced in the preamble of *UUD 45*. It is discussed at greater length in this chapter below. It consists of five principles, the first of which is *Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa*. Although this is colloquially known as "belief in (one) God," *ketuhanan* is "divinity" or "the divine," rather than "God," which is "*Tuhan*."

Its second thesis is that history has proved that those who encounter the understanding and teachings of Communism/Marxism-Leninism overthrow the power of the Republic of Indonesia. This refers to the events of 1926-7, 1948, and 1965. The third thesis, synthetizing the

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[965] Ibid.
[966] "Ketetapan MPRS XXV/1966," *Majelis Permusyarawatan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia,* accessed April 16, 2022, https://adminweb.radenfatah.ac.id/assets/tampung/hukum/20161123115009tap_mprs_no_25_1966_ttg_pembubaran-pki.pdf.
[967] Ibid.

first two theses, states that firm actions have to be taken against this group, their activities, and the spreading of their teachings (*ajaran*) and understandings (*faham*).[968]

This emergency decree thus establishes the following effective activity: "Larangan Setiap Kegiatan untuk Menyebarkan atau Mengembangkan Faham atau Ajaran Komunis/ Marxisme-Leninisme."[969] This states, "The prohibition of every activity for spreading or developing the understanding or teaching of Communism/Marxism-Leninism." It strongly supports Althusser's theses of the primacy of ideology, ideological struggle, and the ideological class struggle, for it articulates that the annihilation of the *material* existence of its predicate is undertaken by an absolutely *ideological* interdiction.

9. On *Reformasi*: Maintaining the Reproduction of Ideological State Apparatuses

In the events following the deposition of Soeharto from the presidency of Indonesia in 1998 and in the moment of republican reformation (*reformasi*), the emergency statues of prior state administrations were reviewed by the Indonesian national legislative body. The objective was to review the material and legal status of each emergency edict and to provide legal basis for their future legitimacy or illegitimacy.[970] *TAP MPRS* XXV/1966 was itself submitted to review as a part of this process.

The extant TAP decrees were grouped into 6 categories, according to the judgment of their material and legal status. These were the following: Category 1: Revoked and declared invalid, Category 2: Declared to remain valid with provisions, Category 3: Declared to remain valid until the establishment of the Government of the 2004 General Election Results, Category 4: Declared to remain valid until the enactment of Law, Category 5: Declared still valid until the enactment of a New Order Regulation by the MPR 2004 General Election Results, Category 6: Declared that no further legal action is required, either because it is *einmalig*, has been revoked, or has been completed.[971]

TAP MPRS XXV/1966 was placed into Category 2. This means that it remains valid with added provisions. The judgment pertaining to the act reads as follows:

> Decree of the Provisional People's War Council of the Republic of Indonesia Number XXV / MPRS / 1966 regarding the dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party, the Declaration as a Prohibited Organization throughout the Territories of the Republic of Indonesia for the Indonesian Communist Party and the Prohibition of Any Activities to Spread or Develop Communist / Marxism-Leninism ideology or teachings is declared to remain valid with the provisions of all provisions in the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly Decree of the Republic of Indonesia Number XXV / MPRS / 1966, in the future it will be enforced with justice and respect for law, democratic principles and human rights.[972]

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[968] Ibid.
[969] Ibid.
[970] "Ketetapan MPR Nomor I/MPR/2003." *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia,* Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2011.
[971] Ibid, xiii.
[972] Ibid. The text reads, "Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia Nomor XXV/MPRS/1966 tentang Pembubaran Partai Komunis Indonesia, Pernyataan Sebagai Organisasi Terlarang di Seluruh Wilayah Negara Republik Indonesia bagi Partai Komunis Indonesia dan Larangan Setiap Kegiatan untuk Menyebarkan atau Mengembangkan Faham atau Ajaran Komunis/Marxisme Leninisme dinyatakan tetap

I asked Bilven about the contemporary practical effectivity of the prohibition and how it affects the intercourse of understanding and teachings today in Indonesia. He said that the reform has made the prohibition rubber in its nature, so that it can be used whenever and wherever if the authority so desires. After the Probolinggo incident, I asked him again about whether he felt the balance of forces shifting. He said that these incidents were happening and that "this year *Ultimus* has not (or has not yet) been '*swept.*'"[973]

Of course, this political ban does not strictly operate in the relative accessibility of particular books. The injunction exists instead in its very dispersion. As one example, many at Garuda organized a Left Turn Festival (*Festival Belok Kiri*) to take place as a gathering in Jakarta. This festival organization articulated its aim as "Rejecting Propaganda of New Order" ("*Lawan Propaganda Orde Baru"*). It was at first permitted and then subsequently forbidden to take place at *Taman Ismail Marzuki* (*TIM*) in Jakarta. It then moved to the building of the Legal Aid Foundation (*YLBHI*), where it eventually did take place, exilically.

10. The Context of the Concept in an Indonesian Renaissance

As we will repeat throughout this dissertation, Dolo is a singular leader of *Somalaing* studio and *Beranda Rakyat Garuda*. She bought the land and organized the building of the studio, verandah, and her home there with her husband Ardjuna. They have lived there, along and together with many others, for just over 35 years. Dolo told me, and I witnessed many times, that Garuda is a place of refuge, where those who are in flight shelter, for both long and short periods.

This place is colloquially called Garuda. Its more formal and official expanded name is *Beranda Rakyat Garuda,* The Verandah of the People of Garuda. This very name puts "the people" (*rakyat*) into a generalized and restricted consideration. For generally speaking, '*rakyat*' considers 'the people' as 'common people.' Moreover, *Garuda* is *the* 'symbolic species' of Indonesia, being its mythic, aviary totem. This name, 'The Verandah of the People of Garuda,' therefore re-solves the aforementioned question of representation and presentation following the work of *Being and Event* by identifying *the* people *as* those who participate in the gathering.

One of the most constant forms of sociality there was communal discussions. "*Ada diskusi"* ("there is a discussion") could be heard in a mode of constancy in the Verandah. There were formal meetings, with agendas, microphones, public address systems, and presentations aided by visual projector screens, as well as everyday modes of discussions. These discussions routinely took place during the day but were commonly held late into the night. The amplified first call to prayer from the neighborhood mosque *azan* at *subuh* was very often the sound which ended the gathering and indicated the end of the night.

From the first moments at Garuda, I began to discuss philosophy with Dolo's husband, Ardjuna. He had read more philosophy than anyone else at Garuda and most elsewhere for that matter. We exchanged many books, particularly philosophy ones, over this five-year period of dissertation research. He had an immense personal library of books, but a perhaps even more astounding collection of DVDs and CDs. He kept them in their house, which is behind and attached to the Verandah, on the other side of a narrow *gang* (alley), where he and Dolo live.

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berlaku dengan ketentuan seluruh ketentuan dalam Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara Republik Indonesia Nomor XXV/MPRS/1966 ini, kedepan diberlakukan dengan berkeadilan dan menghormati hukum, prinsip demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia," 8-9.

[973] Personal communication, July 31, 2019.

Long ago, others told me, behind their house, there was an open field where now there stands a lot filled with trucks and other heavy machineries.

When I first met him, I thought he was in his 60s, although I was unsure of his exact age. His long hair of iron and steel colors fell over his shoulders down his back. His knowledge, particularly although not exclusively of film and music, was known and remarked upon constantly at Garuda. His piano playing is virtuosic. One night, early in my first stay at Garuda, laying in a bedroom near the Verandah, unable to sleep while the communal night living had not yet receded, I began to hear Philip Glass' *Glassworks* (1982) streaming through the walls, which Ardjuna was playing on the piano and which completely astounded me with its beauty. I learned, from him and others, that he was a music student at the Jakarta Institute of Art (*IKJ*) in the 1970s. He played cello amongst other instruments there. He once helped me understand what that meant by acknowledging that as a student, he played the Bach cello suites. He smiled when he told me that he even slept in the instrument closet at *IKJ* for a time. Our friendship grew through our discussion of reading books. He at times asked his own friends, often older men also involved in cultural, musical, and intellectual activity in Jakarta, if they knew that this person studied with Fredric Jameson, to which they mostly demurred. "Jameson, alone as a Marxist," he confirmed.

He reminded me once, it is not just philosophy books that he is constantly reading, but also science and physics books. He read extremely widely and into many popular genres that are held outside of regular, late academic purview. He very early on handed me a book entitled *Don't Drink Your Milk!* (1992) and told me to read it. It was a popular account identifying the horrible health effects of industrial farming and husbandry. We talked about Susan Sontag several times. He admired much of her work and often brought her books out into the Verandah to hand to me and others. One of them had an inscription on its inner cover, 'Dolorosa, Berkeley 1985.' He particularly cherished her work, *Illness as Metaphor* (1978). He said, raising his voice and speaking not with anger but instead a furious passion, her point is that illness is *not* a metaphor. There is a deception *within* the as.

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At one point he asked me, have you read the last two chapters in Badiou's book on Sarkozy? I thought and said, I have not. He went back to his home and returned to the Verandah with the book, *The Meaning of Sarkozy* (2008). I said, thank you. I read them both sitting on a bench in the Verandah. They hypothesize that philosophy, from the pre-Socratics to all those who still philosophize, is a consideration of what stands in the word common and its derivatives.[974]

With this formulation, Badiou, however unwittingly, makes the particular, anti-communist genocide in Indonesia something that *intervenes* on *all* of thinking and philosophy. In this line of thinking, this repetitively disavowed genocide of so-called communists is not simply a fact of world affairs or political science, but instead bears on the human Dasein and its accessibility as philosophy and politics as such.

This is not to say that Badiou himself identifies this. On the contrary, Badiou himself finds a 'positive' destiny of Marx in the lineage from the French Revolution to the Paris Commune,

[974] Badiou writes "Without the perspective of communism, without this Idea, nothing in the historical and political future is of such a kind as to interest the philosopher…In fact, what we are ascribed as a philosophical task, we could even say a duty, is to help a new modality of existence of the hypothesis to come into being." *The Meaning of Sarkozy* (New York: Verso, 2008), 115.

Lenin, and Mao.[975] He thus finds only two stages of this hypothesis: 1789-1871 and 1871-1971. Many participants in this Indonesian Renaissance see something else within this destiny or hypothesis. This is the human beings who were killed through the imputation of the communist in the conditions of late modern colonization. The Indonesian rereading of Badiou is therefore not an ironic or academic celebration of lost causes. It instead sights something that it holds but unwittingly, that is, a *Kehrseite*.

11. 'A pioneering and seminal philosophy'

To conclude this introduction, we can now return to and reintroduce two of this Renaissance's inceptual thinkers with whom we began, Martin Suryajaya and Muhammad Al-Fayyadl.

Like Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel, Martin and Fayyadl have been-together during their formative growths in philosophical thinking. Fayyadl said to me that Martin struck a light (*dipantik*) on a new possibility with his philosophy.[976] This is because, he said, Martin reintroduced the concept of emancipation in a new and significant way. And yet, Fayyadl said, Martin's philosophy was ultimately not satisfying for him. After an early monograph on Jacques Derrida in 2005, Fayyadl published the aforementioned *Filsafat Negasi* in 2016. The book began, he said, as a reflection on Edmund Husserl and that it is an attempt to provide new nuance to the problem of negation after Hegel and more distantly Ibn 'Arabi.

The unity and parts of the title of Martin's first monograph – *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism;* Alain Badiou, the Future, and Marxism – set forth, we suggest, an orientation or guideline for this Renaissance. The book was first published in August 2011 by *Resist Book* and it entered a second printing, also by *Resist Book,* in 2014.[977] Although there are myriad moments before and after *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism* (2011) that can be identified in the event of the Renaissance of left thinking in Indonesia today, this book is unquestionably foundational therein.[978]

The first chapter entitled "The Age of Badiou" argues that the philosophy of Alain Badiou, particularly its notion of a red Platonism combating sophistry, both renews and regenerates the conceptual question of Marxism for the 21st century. The lengthy second chapter "Louis Althusser and the Rediscovery [*Penemuan Kembali*] of Marxism which is Scientific," reconstructs the early work of Louis Althusser, particularly the writings published in *Pour Marx* (1965). The chapter moreover identifies the causes and effects of the *PCF* strategy that created a political firewall with rebellion. Martin shows that one crucial cause was the decision in the 22nd Congress of abandoning the dictatorship of the proletariat, which led to the embrace of parliamentarianism. The third and fourth chapters, "The Methodology of Alain Badiou" and "The Marxism of Alain Badiou" of approximately 150 pages present a comprehensive reconstruction of the work known in English as *Being and Event* [1988].[979]

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[975] See his *The Communist Hypothesis.*

[976] Personal Communication, 2021.

[977] *Resist Book* is a publisher in Yogyakarta. Martin wrote the book in Jakarta in the Rawasari neighborhood.

[978] This does not mean that the book is a king of a kingdom. The Renaissance does not exist strictly within the bounds of these written books by its most well-known authors.

[979] This title in Indonesian is *Ada dan Peristiwa*. Like all translations, these new words introduce something that is not present as either *Being and Event* or *L'Être et l'événement.* "*Ada*," unlike "Being" or "*L'Être,"* means not only "Being" but also "there is (a)" as in the French "*il y a"* and German "*es gibt*." "*Peristiwa"* is an entirely apt translation for "event." But *peristiwa* was appropriated by the New Order Indonesian governments and represented in its foundational 'event.' This is in Indonesia "*Peristiwa Gerakan 30 September PKI*" which in English is "Event of the September 30

In chapter 4, Martin states that the entire, extant Anglosphere commentaries on *Being and Event* bear a critical shortcoming. He recognizes that they do not actually examine the most important proofs in the work. These are meditations 33 and 34, where Badiou actually brings forth the proof of the indiscernibility of the situation, which is *the* fundamental idea on which the work depends. By repeating Badiou's technical demonstration, Martin verifies that Badiou indeed does complete the proof of demonstrating ontological indiscernibility.[980] In doing so, Martin sends his own reading back to *all* readings of *Being and Event* [1988].

The fifth and final chapter is entitled "Thinking to Return to the Idea of Communism" ("*Memikirkan Kembali Ide Komunisme*"). Martin there returns to his own opening reason for this study to confidently point to the Marxism of Alain Badiou as the future of Marxism. He writes in conclusion, "whereas Marx said a spectre is haunting [*bergentayangan*] Europe, what that means, according to Badiou, is that there is a communist hypothesis [*ada hipotesa komunisme*], we already built it [*kami telah membanggunnya*]. That too [*Itulah juga*] is our task now."[981] No one should mistake this statement as being undertaken with falsely beheld confidence.

And yet even with this immense accomplishment of this first book and his many more subsequent ones, Martin's philosophy and thought has been and is criticized, even and especially by those who affectionately call him *sahabat* (best friend) or *bung* (endonym for left wing participants). And yet his own thinking prepares and welcomes this situation. In the introduction to *Dialectical Materialism* (2012), Martin writes, "dialectical materialism is the response to the contradiction of immanence and transcendence in contemporary philosophy."[982] His thinking therefore provides an opening for, not the end of, a Renaissance of left thinking in Indonesia today.[983]

Martin was born in 1989 in the city of Semarang on the north coast of Java. Fayyadl was born in 1986 and raised in the Karanganyar dorp in the Paiton region of Probolinggo district in the province of East Java. Semarang is and has been a 'central' region of Java, for at least the past several hundred years. As we read in Fayyadl's response to Ariel Heryanto, Probolinggo constitutes an opposition to this 'centrality.' While Probolinggo is 'peripheral' according to logics of global and national capital, being itself a source of national and international migrants, it is, being situated on the island of Java, still absolutely 'central' within Indonesia, where multitudes live on other islands that are not Java and therefore exist in Indonesia in some 'marginal' relation to the 'centrality' of Semarang as well as Probolinggo.

But beyond these spatialized considerations, Fayyadl, as a male and as a Muslim, bears a kind of originary majoritarian identity in Indonesia that Martin does not. Martin is not Muslim. He is Chinese-Indonesian and therefore however minimally an exilic citizen-subject.[984] This does not mean outside of a true origin in another place, but rather being auto-effected by a kind of

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Movement *PKI* (Communist Party of Indonesia)." *Ada dan Peristiwa* invites a new 'local' consideration to Badiou's thinking.

[980] Martin writes, "Adakah mengherankan bahwa para komentar Badiou dalam dunia berbahasa Inggris tidak memeberikan penjelasan mendetail tentang meditatasi 33 dan 34 dari Being and Event, yakni bagian yang mengupas secara mendalam tentang formula ontologis dari yag tak-terpilah dan ekistensi dari yang-tak terpilah itu sendiri. Ini mengherankan karena pembuktian matematis/ontologis Badiou tentang eksistensi tang-tak terpilah sessungguhnya menjadi kunci bagi pemikiran tentang relasi antasa Ada dan Peristiwa, atau dengan kata lain, keseluhan bangunan teoretik dari Ada dan Peristiwa sendiri." Suryajaya, *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism,* 170-171.

[981] Suryajaya, *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism,* 264.

[982] Suryajaya, *Dialectical Materialism,* xiii.

[983] Ibid, xiv.

[984] See Mrazek, *The Complete Lives of Camp People.*

unhomeliness that is essentially unlike the majoritarian existence of being a Muslim man in Indonesia. The philosophies of Martin and Fayyadl thus cannot be compared by constructing an *a priori* comparison, as if they were both on some absolutely identical ground from which they emerge at once. Our reading instead seeks instead to bring out a world that is both generically philosophy but specifically this Indonesian Renaissance that can be read between and therefore *with* these authors and their contemporaries.[985]

I first encountered Martin Suryajaya's writing on the website *Indoprogress*. The site is a central forum of exchange for contemporary Indonesian philosophy as well as politics, and it will be discussed below at length. When I first mentioned to Ardjuna that I was interested in Martin's writings, he said Martin is a friend of Garuda. He is one of us here. Martin's nearly 1000-page tome, *History of Aesthetics* (2016), regularly stood on the table in a stack of books beside where Ardjuna and others often sat in the Verandah.[986] It is a kind of encyclopedia of aesthetics, beginning with Plato and Aristotle and moving through the Renaissance to contemporary understandings.

I had read in the mass media that Martin was criticized by contemporary Indonesian journalists for writing so much about so-called Western theories of Aesthetics and leaving only a few pages for 'local' Indonesian ideas about aesthetics. When I asked Ardjuna about this consideration, he said that he did not think that was the most important aspect of the work. There are already many other works that have done that in Indonesian language, he said. This work, he said, filled a major gap in Indonesian language, and should be cherished.

Ardjuna also then said to me that Martin would be giving a public address at *IKJ* (Art Institute of Jakarta) and that he would attend with others and that I should attend. I did and met Martin there. When Ardjuna introduced us, he told him that I had read his work. The meeting was immediately convivial and warm. As he was giving the public address and had many people to greet, we chatted only briefly. His address that day dealt with the question of the role of the artist in the late capitalist city of Jakarta today. Because the Indonesian city is undergoing an immense political-economic transformation, the artist today, he said, has the opportunity to tell this and bring forth the contradictions that populate everyday experience in Jakarta.

In our chat after his remark, I thanked him for his books. I told him that I had also energetically read Alain Badiou and thought that his commentary was exceptional. He said that he was very glad I was staying at Garuda with Dolo and Ardjuna and that he had spent a lot of time. At that moment, he was working for the Indonesian Government Ministry of Culture while also doing his PhD coursework at *STF* (High School and Seminary of Philosophy). As such, he said he could not come over to Garuda and spend the whole night talking as is customarily done there. The ascetic place of the scholar is not identical with either the studio or the verandah.

Martin's works have elucidated how Marxism constitutes a scientific intervention in the categories of bourgeois society. Although he does not completely excise all historicist or

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[985] Before moving on, I want to note that in discussions at Garuda, the forename Martin primarily referred to another Martin. This is Martin Aleida (b. 1943), nearly 80 years old, and a significant national figure of Indonesian literature. Because of his age, his life experience, his writings, and his being, his presence was a singularity in the Verandah. In communal discussions, he regularly inveighed against sophistry. He spoke strongly at Verandah meetings, at times taking recourse to shouting and even bringing about his own tears. He said many times that so many Indonesians were killed by being accused of being communist and the memorialization of their lives and deaths has been disavowed by the State.

[986] At the time of this dissertation research, Martin Suryajaya had already published several major works of philosophy and scholarship, as well as a novel, *Kiat Sukses Hancur Lebur* [*Tips for Success, Destroyed and Melted*] (Jakarta: Banana, 2016), which won a national literature prize in 2018.

representationalist understandings of communism, he is not elucidating the historical *past* of the communist hypothesis. His work instead reintroduces the fundamental questions in Marx's discourse regarding the relationship of science and truth, and its relation to the communist hypothesis. It is therefore significant both to the Indonesian Renaissance and the more general discourse of philosophy as such.

Part I: *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity* (2016)

Introduction

With this introduction in mind, we present here a translation and commentary of a work to which Martin and Fayyadl both contributed. This small book, akin to a pamphlet, was published by *Indoprogress* and entitled *Marxisme dan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (2016). The second titular phrase, "*ketuhanan yang maha esa,*" is the first principle of the state philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia, *Pancasila*. *Pancasila* is itself the two lexical elements from Sanskrit language. *Panca* means five and *sila* can be preliminarily translated as principles. '*Ketuhanan yang maha esa*' is habitually translated as 'belief in (one) God' although it bears no semantic of 'belief' (*'percaya*'). We will elucidate the question of this phrase at length below. Here we note that the title foregrounds the question of Marxism and the *politeia* of Indonesia.

The graphic on the book cover contains an image in a square under the title. Marx's face appears in the center of the square. He is encircled by a multitude of people. Above his head, coming from opposite corners of the square, are acrobats on trapeze. They are each holding books. One is inverted. In the center at the top of the square is a yellow star. The design is credited to Alit Ambara, who, I was told by Budi, is a former disciple of Ibu Dolo. Alit is a prominent Indonesian visual artist and is known particularly for his work which is 'critical' of the prevailing order of things. The frontispiece of the book is the same image as appears on the cover on paper only slightly thinner than the slightly thicker and glossier book cover. With streaks of ink breaking up and bleeding into itself, it reveals itself as a photocopy of the cover, rather than a direct print from a computer.

The pamphlet collects writings prepared for, responded to, and published on the *Indoprogress* website. Martin Suryajaya is the author of the original article, "Marxisme dan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa" ("Marxism and the One and Only Divinity") which the pamphlet reprints. The pamphlet also includes two other critical responses to Martin by Muhammad Ridha and Hizkia Yossie Polimpung, an introduction by Muhammad Al-Fayyadl newly published with this pamphlet, as well as a response to the responses from Martin.

This pamphlet, though of thin material body, is a deep contribution to contemporary Indonesian philosophy and its aforementioned Renaissance. It demonstrates both how the prohibition of Communism/Marxism-Leninism decisively animates the thinking of these young philosophizing Indonesians as well as the theoretical practices which these thinkers develop in order to intervene on their conjuncture. For while "*ketuhanan yang maha esa*" is the *absolutely originary discursivity* of the state-form of Indonesia, "*Marxisme*" constitutes a legal contradiction to and a banned form of life in that republic and *politeia*. This title thus presents the *politeia* as affected by its own contradiction. With the "and" in the title itself, Martin therefore already delivers a decisive conceptual intervention into this conjuncture.

We will turn to this first principle of *Pancasila* below the translation. Here we present a brief contextualization of the concept at the level of its letters. *Tuhan* means God.[987] The prefix *ke-* and suffix *-an* form in Indonesian a generic nominalization of an inner stem. Thus, "*Ketuhanan*" warrants "Deity," "Divinity," "the Divine," and "Godhead." In "*yang maha esa*," '*yang*' facilitates a determination in its own posteriority, much like "which" or "that is" in English. "*Maha*" means "almighty" and "*esa*" means "single," "one," and "unity." Thus, "*yang maha esa*" can be translated as "the one and only," or "the almighty One."

But Christians in Indonesian can and do say "*puji Tuhan*" ("praise (be to) God"). For Muslims in Indonesian, there is also the name of God *Allah*. Thus, this univocity and equivocity of *Tuhan, Ketuhanan,* and *Allah* means that the unary instantiation of '*ketuhanan yang maha esa*' ('the one and only divinity') bears an ineradicable and asymmetrical divisor within itself. By binding this irreducible dissymmetry to the name of Marxism – a forbidden corporeal and incorporeal presence in the Indonesian *politeia* – the title, we suggest, pre-predicates a politicality of the work.[988] As this contemporary Indonesian philosophy does not exist in English translations at the moment, we present a translation of Martin and Fayyadl's writings here now.

1. A Translation of "Marxisme dan Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa" ("Marxism and the One and Only Divinity") by Martin Suryajaya

This time, we will theologize. We will build a particular theological model which inherently characterizes Marxism. And what I mean is not a kind of reformulation of 'liberation theology' of the revolutionary priests of Latin America. We need to place respect to them, but too bad we will not discuss them here. Liberation theology, despite having emancipatory *usefulness* (useful, for instance, as a mean for the mobilization of Christian masses for the sake of revolutionary emancipatory goals), remains in the last analysis a form of theology and its mode of understanding is external to Marxism, specifically a prevalent theology which involves the afterlife, sin and all of the modes of biblical credos concerning the transcendent. What I want to do here, in opposition, is give birth to a theology which is born from within the womb [*rahim*] of Marxism itself - to be fertilized [*dibuahi*] by historical materialism, conceived [*dikandung*] by dialectical materialism.

People who are skeptical will now cut in: for what does the Marxist clan [*kaum*] theologize? Isn't religion opium according to Marx? How could historical materialism and dialectical materialism accommodate theology? All these skeptical questions about a Marxist theology can be sorted into two types: *first,* concerning its *consistency* concerning the thought of Marx which is 'atheistic' and scientific; *secondly*, regarding its usefulness for emancipatory praxis. We will peel these off starting with the first.

The reception of Marxism *does not* presuppose the complete rejection of religion. That is to say, Marxism does not necessitate us to adhere to atheism. What is rejected is a specific conception concerning God, that is the conception of a realism, *ante rem*, concerning God. *Ante rem* realism concerning God constitutes an acknowledgement of the *immaterial substance* of the existence (of God) which is separated or transcendent from the universe as a material substance. A view of this

[987] It is nearly homophonous with '*tuan*' meaning 'lord.'

[988] And yet this printed book is distributed without pseudonyms. On the place of pseudonyms in modern colonization, see Pramoedya Ananta Toer's *Buru Quartet*, especially his *Child of All Nations.*

mode demands of us that we adhere to a dualism of substance (professing the existence of material *and* immaterial substance) which is difficult to reconcile with the scientific spirit of Marxism. As a result, the modern scientific spirit, which became the basis of Marxism, holds on to the realist conception of *in re*, that is the understanding that everything which is immaterial only can be embodied [*terlembagakan*] as a property from material substance. Because of this, the understanding of *ante rem* (transcendent) regarding God, which is usually found in revealed religion, is not consistent with Marxism. Yet the understanding of this mode is not the only understanding which can be reconciled with the teaching of revealed religions. We can also adhere to revealed religions while becoming Marxist with the mode of having an attitude of *fictionalist* to the existence of God. Fictionalism in this meaning is the view that God, as immaterial substance, is *as far* as is stated in specific religious discourse, and is not outside of this. This means that God is a *cultural entity*, that is an object which is avowed its existence by particular social cultural conventions, or as a *mental entity*, as an *object of faith*. This is a mode of atheism which is soft: an atheistic attitude which is diplomatic.

Despite this problem, adhering to this mode of fictionalism means cutting off a large number of emancipatory religious characteristics which actually are useful for Marxism. *Ante rem* realism regarding the afterlife (heaven – hell), for instance, forms an indirect criticism of the actually existing world. When a person with exploitative characteristics during their life, or an oppressed person both do not have life after death - if neither can get a reward or retaliation [*balasan*] for their deeds in their life - then naturally all people will choose from the exploitative attitude. The theological distinction between heaven – hell, because of this, form a critique of the social division between oppressed and oppressors in the world of actuality. Accordingly, *ante rem* realism regarding God contains emancipatory aspirations which are valuable. This passion [*semangat*] is not replaceable if we embrace fictionalism. As a result, with a fictionalist attitude, the world of afterlife is only a religious fiction which is free to be believed or not according to our pragmatic interests of this world. This also means, seen from its usefulness for marxian emancipatory praxis, *ante rem* realism is more useful than fictionalism, because realism of this mode shows *that another world is possible* and that this actual world contains this contradiction.

The next question becomes: is it possible for us to assemble a model of God which is in harmony with the scientific spirit of Marxism, while also at once reserving [*menyimpan*] the emancipatory cargo [*muatan*]? I feel that the key to the response is in the effort to formulate a grey field [*bidang abu abu*] which is placed between *ante rem* realism and fictionalism. What we do not need from *ante rem* realism is the idea about immaterial substance which is transcendent, and what we do not need from fictionalism is the idea that another world which is possible is only a fiction which is believed according to a requirement. The solution is located in *in re* realism which becomes a basic characteristic of Marxism itself. There are two ultimate questions which must be answered by the aforementioned solutions:

1. Is it possible for us to devise a materialist theology?
2. Is this theology characterized by emancipation?

I will argue that these two questions can be answered affirmatively. The following explanation will answer the two questions.

Where is the place for God in Materialism, in a conception of reality where everything which is only is a material substance or as immaterial attributes [*sifat-sifat*] which forms the body of a material substance? In reality like this, everything is connected in a causal manner. The existence of humanity is caused by the chemical compositions of planet earth. The existence of planet earth is caused by the distribution of particles after the Big Bang. In a materialist conception, the physical universe is 'eternal': it started from a big explosion, terminating in a *Big Crunch* which triggers a new big explosion. What we call time is only a function from the characteristics of this physical universe. Time begins with the big explosion, ends with shrinking, and begins again with another big explosion. Space and time are only a function of the material distribution and its characteristics. This universe is not finite, in the meaning which resembles the succession of infinite numbers in the set theory of Georg Cantor. So where is the location of God in the presence of the infinity of this physical universe?

I contend that a materialist can believe in God as *the totality of the possibility and impossibility of the distribution of characteristics in the physical universe*. If Leibniz argues that God creates our universe as the best of all possible universes, I argue that God *is not otherwise than the whole of the possibility and impossibility of that universe itself*. God is the whole of the world which is possible and not possible. However, what is the meaning of *possible worlds* and *impossible worlds*? Possible worlds, are, for instance, a world in which the Industrial Revolution didn't take place, the planet Earth never existed, or elephants can fly. Impossible worlds are, for instance, where 2+2 = 15, or where A=B is true and at once false. If we imagined a set whose members are all of these worlds, then that set I call God.

Accordingly, for a materialist, the place of God is a *logical space*. This is a space which is accessed by logic. The apparatus of Logic *can* be expressed as all possible *and* impossible worlds (for instance through dialectical/dialetheist logic and plural values). It is true that the method of logical computation we use here (table method of truth or logical tree) still is very limited and is not capable of calculating true/false for *all* propositions regarding *all possible and impossible worlds*. This however is a technical problem concerning the development of technology and not an *a priori* mode to close the possibility for all of these logical computations. In this meaning, we can imagine God in a materialist way as a super-computer which is able to count *all* logical permutations from possible and impossible propositions.

Even though the totality of possibility and impossibility are not yet possible for us to list one by one, at the very least we can make a type of cartography regarding the *types* of this logical space. We can make the following taxonomy:

1. In its broadest form, there is God as a set of possibility and impossibility. This can be stated through dialectical/dialetheis logic and value-plurality. Consider this set as the world **T.**

2. As a part of **T**, there is a set of logical possibility: all sets which can be logically thought and do not contradict classical logic (with the principle of non-contradiction and an exception to value-center). Call this set as world **K**.


3. As a part of **K**, there is a set of physical possibility: all sets which can possibly occur in the physical universe and do not contradict the laws of its nature. Call this set as the world **F**.

4. As a part of **F**, there is the set of the world of actuality: this set of reality which constitutes the actual world which we live in today. Call this set the world **A**.

5. The four types of this world are arranged in a *hierarchical* mode. All members of **A** constitute members of **F**, all members of **F** are members of **K**, and all members of **K** are members of **T**. In the formulation of set theory, hierarchical relations between *type* of this worlds can be formulated through stratification of parts (*subsets*) such as the following:

A⊆F⊆K⊆T

A clearer illustration from this stratification can be depicted through the following diagram.



Through this diagram, it is seen that the world of actuality which we live in today, **A1**, is not the only world of actuality which is possible, if compared with actually existing other worlds, with other physical worlds, as well as other logical worlds. **A1** is our world at this moment when capitalism reigns and *seems* necessary. But it is not the only actual work which is possible based on the physical conditions of **F1** - let's say the physical conditions where there is planet earth and things which are needed for the existence of humanity. Consider the world of **A2**, for instance, where capitalism has fallen in the beginning of the 21st century and has been replaced by socialism. Because **A2** is possible, so that *capitalism is not certain* in **F1** - it *does not* appear natural, much less contingent. Consequently, the struggle against capitalism in the name of socialism and communism in **A1,** is not the struggle which is hopeless or will undoubtedly fail. In brief, through the diagram which demonstrates the stratified relations of parts, we know *in a logical mode* that *another world is possible*. We achieve this without postulating the existence of heaven/hell which is transcendental. What we need is only a conception of God as the totality of possibility and impossibility which can be organized in a taxonomical method through logic. By enabling an understanding regarding an alternative world, the model of God such as this clearly has emancipatory characteristics and because of this it is useful for Marxist emancipatory praxis.

At its peak, a materialist theology is possible as logic. Theology, in this meaning, is logic of possibility and impossibility (*modal logic*). But does this necessitate that we postulate a logical space as a supra-material realm? The discourse of materialism *per se* only permits speaking at the level of **A** and **F,** not to **K** and **T.** If it is like this, how can the model of God at hand, which clearly encompasses **K** and **T,** be called materialist? This is materialism because it postulates the realm of **K** and **T** *not* contradicting materialism. The basic claim of materialism says that all characteristics, including its institutionalization, must be bodied in the physical universe. There are two things it refuses: (1) that there is an immaterial substance; (2) there is an organization of qualities outside of the physical universe. Thus, materialism does not reject the existence of qualities which are not organized themselves. Qualities which are not organized can exist as an abstract entity whose existence is postulated through reconstructive logic (in abductive modes) regarding qualities which are organized. God is the point [*ujung*] for this reconstruction. Because of this, the acceptance of Marxism which is materialist does *not* necessitate the rejection of God. Only the conception of an *ante rem* realism regarding God has to be rejected, while safeguarding an *in re* realist conception which has now been explained.

Through a materialist teleology with this logic, there is the appearance of how a historical materialism can be anchored. The proposition that there is a material basis to condition the cultural superstructure can be justified based on the fact that the physical world which is possible and which is organized as our world is the world **F1**. In **F1**, there is the distribution of particles which in such a way, in such a mode of the realization of life that stands on a mode of material existence. Because **F1** is the context of our actual life, the world of **A1**, a historical materialism becomes true in **A1**. In other words, historical materialism is right because it forms the physical inevitability from world **F1**. Historical materialism is not true in **F4**, in a particular physical universe where planet earth does not exist. This does not become a problem because we know that we do not live in conditions which are realized by **F4.** What is required by Marxism is only that historical materialism is true in the conditions of the physical universe which are relevant.

We already answered our two preliminary questions. A materialist theology is possible as logic and this is useful for Marxist emancipatory praxis because it provides a logical justification for emancipation. People who are not satisfied with this reconciled solution of Marxism and God can ask: through where is there a place for faith in this materialist theology? Is there not a religious quality that is characterized by faith over everything which is not completely known through cognitive modes? Is this not the striking down of theology to logic, whereby we indeed discard a crucial aspect of religious attitude?

In short, in a materialist theology like this, faith is still possible. I will return to the Platonic understanding of knowledge: what is called knowledge is the confidence which is justified and true (justified true belief). From there it can be seen that faith or confidence is *a part* of knowledge. Having faith is a quality of people who do not know yet completely. If this is what is meant by having faith, then the most reliable logicians at this moment are devout. Consequently, as has been shown, although logic can map in big lines the taxonomy of God (the taxonomy of possibility and impossibility), a method of calculation of all propositions which prove those possibilities and impossibilities until today are still far from perfect. By using the table of the method of truth, for instance, we need 2^n lines for counting a right/wrong proposition with n variables. The modern computers can count one million lines per second. If n is 80, then we need n^80 microseconds for counting the table of truth completely which can test all the permutations

of each true/false change in each proposition. Unfortunately, 2^80 microseconds is equivalent to 38 billion years, that is more than 2 times the age of our physical universe today (around 15 billion years). The problem is known in the treasury of theoretical computing as the problem of 'P vs NP' (see Enderton, *A Mathematical Introduction to Logic,* p. 26). Because we cannot completely know the method of logical counting which is efficient and accurate, we have faith in the totality which is possible and not possible in logical space. Because faith is the beginning of knowledge, so that with searching we know more, and builds a more accurate science, we realize [*mewujudkan*] our faith in actions.

Then this is creed of materialist faith:

'I believe there will be God, the set of the world which is possible and impossible; which is found in a logical mode from the reconstruction of the qualities of the physical universe; which only can be worshipped with the mode of thinking and discovering; which realizes the real as physical laws and appears as the tendency of social historical movement which is called historical materialism: a politeness from mind to matter. Amen.'

16 December 2013. Martin Suryajaya
(Published 18 December 2013 on indoprogess.com)[989]

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We now present a translation of Muhammad Al-Fayyadl's introduction to *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity* (2016) here, which we follow with our commentary. The footnotes within the body of this text are from Fayyadl's text. Footnotes introduced newly by this translation are indicated by "Translator's Note."

2. A Translation of "*Kata Pengantar*" ("Foreword") to *Marxisme dan Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa* by Muhammad Al-Fayyadl

This debate which arose out of the articles in this book form a portrait of one of the contemporary developments in the discourse of divinity in contemporary materialism. In Indonesia, the questions of materialism mostly have come from the relatively exclusive fields of speculative science (theoretical physics and pure mathematics); the presentation of this anthology seeks to shift this discourse slightly towards the social sciences, even through the lens of metaphysics, from the point where the discourse is pulled to the base of its question which is ontological: the Idea of 'God' itself and how this idea contributes to social emancipation. In other words, a particular theology for social sciences

Even though it is called Marxism, the references used by this term do not necessarily refer to the historical tradition of thought that is Marxism. With Martin Suryajaya, 'Marxism' experiences a refraction which is systematic by coning [*mengerucut*] the ontological doctrine of materialism, from materialism coning it again to realism. In other words, in the state of this interpretation, Marxism becomes a nominalism: taken in name only, but for referring to something broader, going

[989] Martin Suryajaya, "Marxisme dan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa," in *Marxisme dan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (N.p.: Indoprogress, 2016), 15-22.

beyond Marxism which we recognize. Because of this, don't be shocked then if there are very few references to Marxism, because that which is presented here actually is no longer Marxism, but instead Marxism as its ontology *only*. Because of this, the title should be "Materialism and the Belief in the One and only God."

But before this, how is this discussion possible in Indonesia, where Marxism is more read as a tradition of thinking that is historical (inside its relation to the left movement) than a pure philosophy? This book gives the impression of wanting to break the myth that Marxism is atheistic and anti-religious, myths that as we know, the regime that is dominant today in post-New Order Indonesia wants to be believed *en masse*. However, this impression is mistaken. This book does not want to respond to that ideological problem - which in fact is much more important and urgent. Instead, through a philosophical argument, this book wants just for the sake of proving it that its materialism – Marxism – must not presuppose atheism. People can have a God, even while adhering to materialism.[990] It is as simple as that. The next issue is whether the mode [*cara*] of its having a God is different, or whether the 'God' which is meant is different than 'God' which is believed by most people. This is the ongoing issue. What is important is being able to prove that a person who is a materialist can believe. If they are not able to have faith or God (*faithless*), at the very least they can believe (*having a belief*).[991]

This discussion will definitely not correspond to your expectations of religious people [*yang beragama*], or those who will seek a solution regarding Marxism through religious belief (for example you are a Muslim person, how Marxism can strengthen your revolutionary praxis through the teachings of Islam; as well as if you are a Catholic, Buddhist or Hindu person). The simple reason is because the precondition and starting point of the problematic of this book is materialism. For joining the discussion of this book, therefore, you have to even more so become a materialist. This then raises the question, how many are there from us which first becomes materialist before religious?

The direction which this book brings us, therefore, is new, because you will have to make a position switch from assuming to shove off from the materialist position to then theologize from that position. From there the question arises: what are the consequences if we theologize from a materialist position?

The arising of this kind of question will sound strange [*ganjil*] unless we understand the historical and discursive background why that question can arise, in this country where Marxism is more treated as a kind of social theory, without fiddling with the theological-cosmological superstructure which becomes the level of confidence and reference value for society.

First, secular modernity which continues in the center of our society has created a shift where religion and the world [*agama dan dunia*] experience a radical separation. People can increasingly differentiate which person is religious and which is worldly. Religion is pinched and sequestered into private spaces, when in another side, the institutions of life increasingly control almost all aspects of life. As a result, religion, along with all its theological explanations, appear helpless to balance the movements of secular sciences which give the pattern [*pola*] for social life. This

[990] First article by Martin Suryajaya in this book.
[991] Slavoj Žižek, *On Belief* (London: Routledge, 2001).

secularization occurred in the phase of development of the New Order, where religion was reduced to only an 'ideology' of development. In this phase, against the 'idealism' of the state of the new Order, materialism necessarily arose as an antithesis for showing that ideas that exist, including theology and the teachings of religion, undoubtedly have a material quality. Through historical materialism, this thought is made possible. But critical thinking with historical materialism, named 'Marxism' was taboo. In this period, Marxism was present as a criticism of the *ideological function* of religion; therefore, it was the criticism of the establishment theology. In this phase, we recognize the meeting between theology and historical materialism through *liberation theology*. In the New Order, religious people who depart from liberation theology, from Catholic as well as Islamic realms, work to push theology to enter and infiltrate the political space which was neutralized of the influence of religion by the New Order.

Post New Order, we witnessed the reversal of this phenomenon, which can be called a 'religious feedback.' The infiltration of religion into political space was unstoppable, making the phenomenon where things which are worldly become religious-ized; the pattern of religious thinking entered all aspects of life. There arises the enthusiasm for religion on a massive and irrational scale. This new growth occurs in this phase of global capitalism which melts the limits of the movement of capital. Religion participates in becoming a part of the histrionics of capitalism and becomes capital which is ready to be converted by its adherents. This openness creates alternatives within religious practices; theism no longer becomes the only choice. The diversity of choices for becoming theist, atheist, agnostic or spiritualist are opened. However, this phase births a contradiction which sooner or later shows its tendencies: the current which makes religion as an unknowing aspect which participates in global capitalism itself, against the tendency (increasingly strong) for making religion as a motor for an antagonism and anti-capitalism and creating an alternative life. We can call these two tendencies and their opposition between a *conservative religious turn* and a *revolutionary religious turn*. For these tendencies, religion returns to itself to become an object of critique and reflection. The question arises: is it true that religion forever and undoubtedly is pro-establishment? If religion is not necessarily pro-establishment, from where can the revolutionary tendencies of religion be built and developed? From its theology? There arises the need for religion - and thinking about religion - in the manner of the 'left.' The meeting with Marxism was possible again.

However, this meeting itself splits between two tendencies. On the one hand there is the tendency which emphasizes historical materialism, with the emphasis returning to Marxism and its engagement with building a discourse which is critical towards religion, which all at once makes it possible for a social change through the path of religion. This issue will actualize *liberation theology* (which is not yet completed) in a form which can become more sophisticated. On the other hand there is the tendency, which goes along with dialectical materialism, and makes Marxism an alternative paradigm to religion, which, like religion, is regarded as a system of thinking which is complete, integral and systematic, all the way to the furthest dimensions of its ontology.

The articles in this book exist inside this space of seeking and contestation. We see the tug of Martin to one side, which assumes the starting point from dialectical materialism for giving the basis for historical materialism, and Muhammad Ridha and Hizkia Yosie Polumpung on the other side, which see the interconnection of both materialisms by explaining "revolutionary faith which historicizes" ["*iman revolutioner yang menyejarah*"]. We see the tug between viewpoint which

sees that Marxism has supplied its theology itself without the theology of religion, and the viewpoint which sees that Marxism adopts the theology of religion (which is historical) even while all at once sharpening the theology of religion through its dialectical materialism.

However different, the origin of the debate is *materialism*, something which is relatively new in our Marxist discourse. That which is new is the attitude towards this principle. Before, a religious person can become a Marxist while they praxis [*berpraksis*] in a Marxist mode, without having to verify if they are a '*kaffah*' or partial materialist. Now, that verification possibly can be made, with writing, if you feel the need.

The posture of this debate is indeed speculative. How could it not be speculative if what is sought is building a particular Marxist concept regarding 'God'? In other words, this debate has entered to the heart of theology and metaphysics. As its igniter, Martin Suryajaya wants to push Marxism to steps farther than just as the *critique of religion* and *critical thinking which contributes to the theology of religion*; he wants Marxism to become *theology* itself. Dialectical materialism must build its theology itself, teaches Martin. How can this urge arise?

This issue is not separated from its context. The writers in this anthology are the generation which lives in the consumptive-flow of contemporary (Western) theory, where philosophy, science and mathematics have experienced many surprises and revolutions of paradigms. The public of post-New Order Indonesia in general also lives in this climate and has witnessed an explosion in consumption of theoretical works in doses which are high enough. In this climate, explorations in the possibilities of alternative theologizing have arisen, from the model of "spirituality without God" of Andre Comte-Sponville[992] to "faith in god without religion" of Bertrand Russell.[993] The problem of *materialism* presents in the middle of this current, and from the beginning this is not from Marxism or from social sciences but from theoretical sciences (cosmology and physics). Through Armahedi Mahzar and other Indonesian physicists, from the 1980s, these physicists in Indonesia have been involved in a dialogue and confrontation with some materialist tendencies in science, in a debate between science and religion. The translation of Keith Ward, *God, Chance, Necessity*[994] and the popular books of Richard Dawkins exemplify the existence of this debate.

In this consumptive-stream, we grasp that the principle of this debate ranges to questions around the existence of God, the creation of the universe, evolution and the purpose of life, and the morality of life (if God exists or does not exist). In other words, this debate stretches from metaphysical-ontological problems to ethical-axiological ones – a debate which in its turns overflows out from the scope of pure science and involves religion, philosophy, and social sciences. *Materialism*, in other words, can have wide implications depending on where we pull it. This issue also brings up the question, if it is possible or necessary for materialism to be followed in full, by all scientific branches that exist? Until today, there is not yet a materialist person or scientist who integrally presents their materialism, from the side of ontology to the side of

[992] Andre Comte-Sponville, *Spiritualitas tanpa Tuhan* [Spirituality without God] (Jakarta: Alvabet, 2007).
[993] Bertrand Russell, *Bertuhan tanpa Agama* [Faith without Religion]. (Yogyakarta: Resist, 2008).
[994] Keith Ward, *Dan Tuhan Tidak Bermain Dadu: Argumen bagi Keterciptaan Alam Semesta* [And God Doesn't Play Dice: Argument for the Creation of the Universe] (Bandung: Mizan, 2002).

axiology. Also, there is not yet a materialist scientist who presents their materialism in a coherent way in all sciences that we recognize.

The debate in this book, thus, opens a glimpse into the domain of materialism, which concerns the intersection between theology and history. From the question, 'Is there a place for God in Materialism?', the debate in this book refolds this into 'How does the idea of God make the consciousness of those who have faith in God always move and endeavor to realize Him in practical reality?'[995] In other words, from theology to practice, from ontology to axiology.

If there is something new in this book, it is not the object of its material, but instead the mode of intervention and approach which is used. The novelty is in two realms at once: in the realm of materialism and the realm of theology. In the realm of materialism, what is new this time is the effort to show that materialism which is consistent can receive the idea of divinity which is oneness [*ketuhanan yang esa*], (despite that this effort, we will see, fails[996]) and the effort to show that materialism (which is inconsistent) can contribute to a particular theology and subject of religion that is revolutionary.[997] This mode of intervention, in the realm of materialism, is categorically new. Materialist scientists always show that materialism undoubtedly contradicts theism, the belief in God that is one.[998] Materialism (outside this book) teaches the absence of laws whatsoever which are supracosmic, precisely because there is no idea whatsoever about God which is established by those aforementioned rules; because of this for this materialism, the universe is a collection of material which emerges and works in a hazardous and arbitrary way, without order, harmony or causal relationality which undoubtedly is the same with one another. The most recent version of this materialism, as is made known by Quentin Meillassoux, uses the term 'contingency' for addressing the absence of absolute rules. But Martin Suryajaya has come up with the idea which is possibly strange for materialist scientists: that a materialist can become 'theist' and accept the hypothesis regarding One God, with the assumption that that order *exists*, and God is order and rules itself.

The method for this is making an odd [*ganjil*] combination (with repeated attempts) between the ontology of Leibniz, the mathematics of Cantor, and modal logic. From Leibniz, Martin takes the idea regarding the totality of the cosmos and the principle of sufficient reason (that there is some reason which is reasonable for all happenings [*ihwal*] which exist) yet he discards the idea of personal God which actually becomes the precondition from metaphysics and the principle of sufficient reason. From the mathematics of Cantor, he takes the theory of sets which encompass each other, which then leads to a particular supra set which is called 'God'. And from modal logic (particularly dialectical logic which accepts the possibility of contradiction and non-identity, A=A and at once non-A), he takes the impossibility which can still be thought and counted even though it cannot be proved. As an experimental result of its reconstruction, there is the appearance of the world which is tiered and hierarchical and which moves towards a level which is wider, where God presents as the peak of a logical evolution.

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[995] Muhammad Ridha's article "Tuhan Sebagai Eksepsi" in *Marxisme dan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Indoprogress, 2016).
[996] On Martin Suryajaya.
[997] On Muhammad Ridha and Hizkia Yosie Polimpung. It is called inconsistent because this position continues to presuppose God which is personal and transcendental (concerning materiality or subject).
[998] See Ward, especially Chapter 5, "The Metaphysics of Theism."

The model of this theological thinking, which is tiered, which covers each other, for then presupposing God as the hypothetical tip (Omega, destination [*ghayah*]) from this logical evolution, if we remember again, precisely forms the model which is taught by the theology of religions, which presents a distinction between the big universe (macrocosm) and the small universe (microcosm), with God as the sufficient reason why there is the universe. This means, when seen from this womb, Martin Suryajaya just copies (imitates) the structure of cosmology which is known by the theology of religion.

The idea about the universe as ordered, hierarchical, and united also is not prevalent for materialists. Martin presupposes some ontological *monism,* where there is only one universe, even though within it there are several worlds (which are possible and not possible). And this monism precisely forms the meaning from *idealistic* theology, which in its peak presents in the form of mysticism. (We can contrast this with the concept of Form [*Wujud*] of Ibn 'Arabi). Contemporary materialism indeed negates monism and affirms a radical plural ontology, that there is not one universe; that the universe in its foundation is chaotic, differently than the model of comprehensive principle order which is thought by Martin, and because of this, the universe in its foundation is not logical.

Accordingly, it is not too shocking if the idea regarding this universe on the contrary, contra materialism, becomes the proposition for the existence of God, of creation, and the finality of the universe. Long before Martin, Keith Ward, also using the illustration of set theory, writes:

"All the potential which has been recorded in physical reality since the beginning and formation of its essence, is manifested in a contingent manner or with freedom, through creative actions. This universe is only one from many possible universes, and the cosmic knowledge that chooses it for its manifestation and guarantees its act in accordance with a set of its laws...The theory above is a theory about creation. God, that cosmic knowledge, is the mode undoubtedly and covers all possibilities of law and the universe. God forms the actual reality of this place and can found all possibilities, and which without it there will not be possibility at all. The set from all those possibilities, already is certain, and includes the subsets of all possible values which there is in this and whichever universe. This forms the purpose of the existence of possibility, which is chosen by God to be realized."[999]

The only one possible novelty from the thought of Martin Suryajaya is, so that the idea is not seen as idealistic and not presupposing God which is transcendent from nature, that he disarms God from the attributes of His essence and merges them within the aforementioned *order*, so that 'God is the universe' or 'this universe is God.' Because of this, God is 'all the possibilities and impossibilities of this universe itself.'

Consequently, God is immanent *as* [*sebagai*] the universe, and not just *into* [*ke dalam*] the universe. This is confusing and also a kind of logical fallacy. If the universe, as the entirety of logical laws which are possible and not possible, is God, then the universe undoubtedly – through the combination of laws – is able to create itself and destroy itself simultaneously. This argument can easily be broken with the following reason. That is, there is a gap between the laws of logic and reality. When something materializes, it cannot only be thought, but can also be done. The

[999] Ward, *And God Doesn't Play Dice,* 92.

physics student knows that an atom cannot exist only in thought and hypothesis. It exists because it is created, or, there exists particular conditions which make possible its manifestation in reality. If the laws of logic can *alone* [*semata*] manifest everything that is, then those laws form a particular device of intelligence from a particular agency. And that is God, which does not form a part of the whole from all the laws which exist. The difference between intelligence and agency is what is melted down here and results in the principal confusion in this argument. The difference presupposes the validity of the concept of creation from a Creative Agent, which is not fully a part of the Universe, but participates in and inside [*di dalam*] the Universe.

This 'theism' of Martin Suryajaya, consequently, is not an authentic theism, with the result that it can be understood if this idea does not adopt the concept of God of religions. It forms a particular contemporary version from deism, which in a formal way forms a certain variation from pan-physicalism (the concept that everything has physical characteristics, or can be depicted [*dicandra*] by physical laws) and pan-logicalism (the concept that everything is logical).[1000] While giving the name "God" to this universe, the name "God" which is meant is only another version from the Absolute in classical physics, though now served in the form of logical mathematics. Like the critique of the metaphysician-biologist Raymond Ruyer said, 'the aforementioned form of atheism, which presents the world of classic physics as the Absolute, is none other than deism, and a bad one [*yang buruk*].'[1001]

Nevertheless, we can underline one important point, that there is a device of logical laws which are immanent and which work in this world and nature [*alam*] – with that device which is hypercomplex God works and participates in the creation of worlds. Nevertheless, these logical laws undoubtedly are not God Himself. The logical laws are intelligence which with God works, yet so that the logical laws operate and are able to realize something, they need intervention, particular ongoing acts of creation by God in material or potential material. Here we can possible repeat again what has already been brought forth by Al-Ghazali and Descartes: that causality, relation, and some logical laws are derived directly from the agency of God and constitute a creation which is legitimate from God and are not separable from the act of His creation.

Actually, Martin Suryajaya can draw out the benefit of Leibniz's metaphysics, provided that it can acknowledge consistently its existence of personal God, which for Leibniz is indeed central. He can derive pan-logicalism directly from the existence of all knowing God, like Leibniz, so that pan-logicalism can give the foundation for a personal conception of God which is also supported by the theology of religions. But different from Martin, Leibniz founds the knowledge of God on 'perfection' and the complexity of logical laws which give support for the existence of God to various levels of existence.[1002]

[1000] "*Deism*: belief in the existence of a God on the evidence of reason and nature only, with rejection of supernatural revelation (distinguished from theism)." *Webster's Unabridged Dictionary*.
[1001] Raymond Ruyer, *Neo-finalisme,* Presentation & Preface par Fabrice Colonna (Paris: PUF, 2012 [1952]), 282.
[1002] See Leibniz, *Discours de metaphysique* (Paris: Flammartion, 2008). Proposition XVI: "The extraordinary intervention of God is recorded within what is expressed by our essence. Accordingly, that expression goes beyond everything, but it overcomes the power of natural forces or our expressions which turn out to be clear and limited. From this expression maxims which are lower appear and follow." What is meant by Leibniz with 'our essence' is our essential reason as thinking creatures. This 'our essence' also can be understood here as the laws of nature which

The knot of this debate, metaphysically, is the struggle with the existence or non-existence of personal God, as is believed by the people of religion [*beragama*]. Materialists reject personal God and see the universe as self-sufficient material which is able to organize itself (through natural selection, DNA, *meme*, logical permutation and others). Martin Suryajaya arrives with a new view: reject personal God, because God is nothing else besides the Universe itself; while theists affirm personal God and see the universe as material which follows God's plan. More or less what is the problem of personal God for Materialism? And if the problem can be broken, can we think a possibility in which the concept of God which is personal gives support for materialism? If these questions can be answered, we will be able to find a theological and materialist formulation whose inherent mode synergizes with religious theology, not *indifferently* (like materialism deistic or pseudo-deistic like Martin Suryajaya), or even antagonistically (like more or less materialists who are atheists).

The problem with the concept of personal God for Materialism, shaped by the argument of Martin Suryajaya, is that it presupposes the position of God which is immaterial and transcendent to world and nature [*alam*]. Meanwhile, materialism which is consistent must presuppose everything is bodied in the material structure of the universe. In other words, it is not possible for a dualism between immanence and transcendence. There is no outside because everything is undoubtedly within. This argument immediately shows an internal weakness, because of its inconsistency.

First, the development of logical evolution which is hypothesized by Martin as possible to occur when at a certain future moment the most complete logical model is found, presupposes at its limit 'a particular realm of supra-material'. Because of the limitation of logical science which exists now, this 'realm' temporarily can now be hypothesized; God now presents as a 'postulate.' Terminologically, this presents as 'a realm of supra-material' that is not different than naming its existence [*adanya*] 'immaterial substance.' *Supra*-material: overcoming [*mengatasi*] that which is material; in other words, transcendent. Its inconsistency: this argument presupposes the existence of a particular 'realm' which overcomes materiality, yet the argument does not admit immateriality.

Second, the use of logical dialetheism situates God as 'the set of possibility and impossibility,' which overcomes the law of non-contradiction in classical Aristotelian logic. A simple question: if it is possible to postulate God as the set in which contradiction is not a problem and can be accepted, why is 'God' still situated in the opposition between inside/outside, material/immaterial, transcendent/immanent? Why not accept God has both at once? Why not just admit that God possesses characteristics of 'bodied-ness' [*terlembagakan*] in material modes (read: in the act of creation) but also immaterial ones (His essence and substance [*Dzat*])? Why still use a dualism between *ante rem* (overcoming material) and *in re* (material)? In other words, Martin uses logical dialetheism (logical contradiction) for accepting the possibility of the existence of God which overcomes contradiction (because contradiction has been 'covered' within Him), yet he rejects the possibility that that God is immaterial (even though His immateriality forms a contradiction which cannot be separated from His existence).

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attach to our biological bodies which work with relations of cause-effect, micro reflections from natural laws of God in a scale which is larger and more cosmic.

This argument, which rejects personal God, precisely gives a logical basis for personal God (which is transcendent, immaterial) to be accepted and to not contradict materialism. God which is transcendent over world and nature [*alam*] is not a problem for materialism, while that God is assumed to be related with nature and to structure the material of world and nature [*alam*] itself. In other words, while He is involved with creation and production [*creatio et generatio*], as the actualization of His material. This conception precisely forms the essence from the theology of religions; to the contrary, teachings regarding God which are entirely passive and detached from world and nature [*alam*] indeed form a deism which is foreign to the theology of religions. God, therefore, is not nature and a part of the essence of nature (*ante rem*), but the world *inside* nature and with *nature* (*in re*).[1003]

This concept can split within into two paths – idealism and materialism. This aforementioned conception is not yet materialist. The idealist path will situate God as a single actor who in an arbitrary manner moves materiality, without giving the smallest opportunity for a materialist to work with its rules which are material. In Islamic Scholastic Theology, this conception was submitted by *Jabbariyah* (theological overdeterminism).[1004] This is the idealist conception *par excellence* because it denies creation as a natural mode [*cara alam*] that is organized by God for working with its laws that are immanent. There is no creation here. Instead there is absolute coercion (*al-jabr*). This idealist conception forms a theology which is preferred by the oppressor class and is itself anti-materialist.

On the other side, we have the materialist path. The materialist path splits into two: soft materialism and radical materialism. Soft materialism will see God working in nature with a mode that is not direct and instead through material devices [*perangkat*] which are needed by nature for guaranteeing its perpetuity. These devices have various names: the laws of nature (the era of Newton), *sunnatullah* (Al Qur'an), evolution (biologists and Muslim physicists to the era of Darwin) and others. These devices themselves are forms of the mechanic program of the Enormous who with it God installs the operations of nature from a cosmic level to the molecular. Seen from 'above,' these devices are subordinate to the intelligence and will of God. Seen from 'below,' these devices are a virtual mode with autonomous characteristics and are as if separated from the power of God. This reduplication [*kegandaan*] which results in the soft materialist person sees the intervention of God as an invisible mode, even though there is the participation of God *within* (*di dalam*) this materiality, God never works separated entirely from materiality (even though God is able to do so).

The radical materialist rends this position. Different from the soft materialist, the radical materialist gives a large portion to the material capacity of work, *without* assuming its involvement with God behind it (even though in fact God continues to work). This materiality is pushed to its extreme capabilities for overcoming its problems, without the involvement of God. When this material power reaches the moment of its climax, and that materiality is not able to overcome the moment of this climax with its own power, then at that moment God 'is called,' is involved in intervening. God, thus, presents (even though in fact He is always present) in the moment that is

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[1003] Translator's Note: Fayyadl's sentence is: "Tuhan, dengan demikian, bukan alam dan bagian hakiki dari alam (*ante rem*), tetapi bekerja *di dalam* alam dan bersama *alam* (*in re*)."
[1004] Translator's Note: "theological overdeterminism" is in English in Fayyadl's text.

precarious [*genting*] and critical, and is, in fact, involved in the pulse of history, precisely when the materiality of history is not able to resolve the subject for itself. God presents as the possibility of a dialectical leap, when materiality must be overcome itself and raised up to a new stage. This is what is meant by *transcendence*.

This position is formulated by Muhammad Ridha with 'God as exception.' God presents as a singularity [*perkecualian*] at a precarious moment, in the moments of the outbreak of revolution. For that, this God, in normal situations, only can be assumed as a "void," as an object which is desired (object petit a), precisely because He only can be presented at a critical situation when "the void" must manifest in the world [*dunia*], in the movement of history. From another direction, but akin to this position, Hizkia Yosie shows the potential for the presencing of God already inside Materialism itself. God is not everywhere, not arriving from a supranatural world or outside history, but is already located in history, in the materiality of history itself. From the position of this radical materialism, God is called to enter at the moment that is the most concrete from materiality, even in the form of blood and flesh. God faces, bloods, and fleshes.[1005] Because of this, the reference of Hizkia Yosie is the figure of Jesus who is historical, and precisely in this moment the radical materialist position gives the philosophical foundation which is fresh to liberation theology.

The radical materialist position can reach meeting points which are not assured by the theology of religion, precisely because it accepts the postulate about a personal God which is able *in extremis* to take form in history. The radical materialist position affirms the agency of God in a direct mode as something which takes form with the agency of a historical subject (the oppressed class). This difficulty indeed is not able to be broken away satisfactorily by Martin Suryajaya because of his trap with the conception of God that is intellectual, logical, and sky high. The tension between the conception of God which is sky high and grounded will continue to be the terrain of debate that is not resolved for Marxism, as long as we Marxists want to continue to be involved in the dynamic contemporary developments of religious peoples [*umat beragama*].

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3. Commentary on *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity* (2016): Metaphysics and the Social Formation

We can now begin to present a commentary on these writings by returning again to the title of the pamphlet. '*Ketuhanan yang maha esa'* is, as we have said, the first principle of the state philosophy of Indonesia, *Pancasila*. It is often colloquially thought of as 'Belief in (one) God.' Although there is no semantic of belief (*percaya*) in the phrase, it identifies a fundamental attribute of a unity that is Deity or Divinity. But the difficulties that this concept raises for worldly sovereignty can be seen in the events of its very inceptual articulation in 1945.

[1005] Translator's Note: Fayyadl writes, "Tuhan mewajah, mendarah dan mendaging."
[1006] Muhammad Al-Fayyadl, "Kata Pengantar," in *Marxisme dan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (N.p.: Indoprogress, 2016), 1-14.

On June 1, 1945, more than two months prior to the Indonesian national proclamation of independence ("*Proklamasi"*), Soekarno delivered a speech which is now commemorated as the "Birth of Pancasila" ("*Lahirnya Pancasila*"). In it, Soekarno articulates what he calls a *philosofische grondslog* (philosophical foundation) of an independent Indonesia as *Pancasila*. Soekarno outlines these five principles as nationality (*kebangsaan*), Internationalism or humanism (*peri kemanusiaan*), Consensus (*Mufakat*) or Democracy, Social Welfare, and finally Divinity (*Ketuhanan*).[1007] One can see already here that the number five bears a symbolic, rather than a technical, attribute.

Perhaps sensing that his formulation had not resolved simply into five elements, Soekarno presents a re-reduction of this unity and philosophical foundation of the state. He states that if there are people who do not like these five principles, the state philosophy can instead be represented as a unity of three. He called this the *Trisila*. As three, he said, the foundation of the state can be articulated as Social-Nationalism, Social-Democracy, and Divinity (*Ketuhanan*). Sighting again those who still might remain dissatisfied with this unity as articulated in this three-part unity, Soekarno reduces the reduction and states that the state principle can be articulated entirely as one principle. This is the *Ekasila* (single principle). As one principle, Soekarno said, it is *gotong royong* (mutual cooperation).[1008] As *gotong royong* was not made present in either of the *Pancasila* or *Trisila* formulations, its belated emergence indicates that it lays in the basis of the *Pancasila* and *Trisila* formulations.

Soekarno's originary reduction and re-reduction of *Pancasila* suggests that the unity, rather than the finite parts themselves, bears the fundamental significance of *Pancasila*. The principle of *Ketuhanan* therefore is less a finite theological principle and more an onto-theological principle. With it, Soekarno does not suggest that any particular religion should be included or excluded from the Indonesian state. Rather, it brings forth the inclusion of divinity (and God) for *all* Indonesian citizen-subjects.

After this birth, *Pancasila* began to be drafted into the founding legal discourse of Indonesia, the aforementioned *Undang Undang Dasar 1945*. But in an early draft of the Pancasila Law, the *Trisila* appears slightly differently than how Soekarno articulated it in the inceptual speech. In the draft law, the *Trisila* is stated as social-nationalism, social-democracy and "*Ketuhanan yang Berkebudayaan*" ("Divinity which is cultured" or "Cultured Divinity"). Historians have demonstrated that some representatives, in and out of parliamentary debate from June to August 1945, argued against this draft law phrasing of *'ketuhanan yang berkebudayaan*' ('divinity which is cultured'). This articulation was particularly objected to by Islamic republican representatives.[1009] They disliked the notion of a divinity which is subjected to the notion and process of culture. But this transition from 'Divinity' to 'Divinity which is Cultured' also indicates that this principle was not originally strictly a monotheistic principle of sovereignty.

In his speech on June 1, 1945, Soekarno stated that "the principle of divinity" ("*prinsip Ketuhanan*") means that the diverse people of Indonesia can "pray to their God in their own and diverse ways" ("*menyembah Tuhannya dengan cara yang leluasa*"), and that this particular philosophical foundation of the state is one which forecloses "religious egotism" ("*egoisme-agama*").[1010] Soekarno does utter the phrase "*ketuhanan yang maha esa*" but it is introduced as a rearticulation of "*Ketuhanan*

[1007] Andri Setiawan, "Tentang Ketuhanan yang Berkebudayaan," *Historia.id,* June 28, 2020, https://historia.id/politik/articles/tentang-ketuhanan-yang-berkebudayaan-P9dy5.
[1008] John Bowen translates "*gotong royong*" as "mutual assistance" in his "On the Political Construction of Tradition: *Gotong Royong* in Indonesia," *Journal of Asian Studies* XLV, no. 3 (1986): 545-561.
[1009] Setiawan, "Tentang Ketuhanan yang Berkebudayaan."
[1010] Ibid.

yang Berkebudayaan" ("Divinity which is Cultured").[1011] In the actual Foundational Laws of Indonesia (*Undang Undang Dasar 1945, UUD 45*), the first principle of *Pancasila* is articulated as "*Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa.*" As we have mentioned, Soekarno was pressured, particularly by Islamic republican representatives, for this particular wording of the principle.[1012] In this originary moment, Islamic parliamentary interests overtook the "*ketuhanan yang berkebudayaan*" ("divinity which is cultured") formulation. The *UUD 45* formulation of "*ketuhanan yang maha esa"* thus inscribes a unary attribute much more emphatically than does Soekarno's original statement regarding "divinity which is cultured" and the importance for Indonesians to be able to pray to God in their own ways.[1013] This republican articulation of "*ketuhanan yang maha esa"* thus conceals within itself its own repression of "*ketuhanan yang berkebudayaan*" ("cultured divinity"). But it also thereby acknowledges a kind of latent plurality that is displaced, subjugated, and overtaken by an Islamic parliamentary representation in the republican state of Indonesia.

This instability within the originary foundation of *Pancasila* illustrates the nature, that is to say the constancy, of the question and problem of the unity of God and Divinity in the Indonesian state. *Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa* has been seen at once as too secular, too Islamic, too religious, as well as the negations of all of these positions. *Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa* is thus a compromise formation in every sense of the term. As such, it constitutes both a wish and a defense against that wish.

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The resistance to this wish is not only a historical phenomenon. The anthropologist Karen Strassler has written recently about the work of an Indonesian artist whose moniker is *Antitank.*[1014] He was a friend of many people with whom I spoke regularly during my dissertation research and his work was a topic of our ongoing conversation. Around the yearly statist commemoration of Soekarno's Birth of Pancasila speech, the artist posted a statement about *Pancasila* on his social media website. It was an image of the gigantic national Pancasila monument with a short accompanying writing entitled "Why I am not Pancasila." In writing below the pictorial figure, he outlined many ways that Pancasila has been used by the Indonesian state to muzzle dissent.

After seeing the work, I asked Codet one night at Garuda about it.[1015] He said, the thing with Pancasila is that it had a good intention in its beginning, but it has become poisoned by the New Order period. The origin and the end are not simply identical. He looked again at *Antitank*'s post on the phone and said, I want to make that into a t-shirt. Ari burst out in laughter and disbelief. "You idiot! You want to go to jail?!" But Codet wasn't disturbed by Ari's excitement. He kept looking at it intently while smoking his cigarette.

Guided by the ideology of *Pancasila* during the New Order Period, the state established the only five accepted religions in Indonesia as Islam, Christian, Catholic, Hindu, and Buddhist. As a consequence, the state formally forbid 'local' religions practiced throughout the vast

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[1011] Soekarno, "Lahirnya Panca sila*," Perpusatakaan Nasional*, Accessed April 16, 2022, https://kepustakaan-presiden.perpusnas.go.id/uploaded_files/pdf/speech/normal/soekarno10.pdf.
[1012] See "Asal Mula Sila Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa," *Kumparan News,* June 1, 2017, https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/asal-mula-sila-ketuhanan-yang-maha-esa/3.
[1013] "*Êsa"* is given as "one; unity" in Richard James Wilkinson, *A Malay-English Dictionary* (Singapore: Kelly and Walsh, 1901), 13.
[1014] Karen Strassler, *Demanding Images: Democracy, Mediation and the Image Event* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020).
[1015] The name Codet means Scarface. The name was given to him and is called out by his friends.

archipelago of Indonesia.[1016] *Ketuhanan yang maha esa* thereby facilitated the exclusion of the understandings and knowledges of divinity of myriad Indonesian people that do not accord harmoniously with this sanctioned unary principle.[1017] Thus, this unary principle facilitated the *extinguishing* of so-called indigenous Gods and Divinity with the very principle which Soekarno originally articulated in an effort to *safeguard* these very acts of prayer.

Ketuhanan yang maha esa thus can be understood to underline a problem, rather than a solution, of a unary principle in theological and worldly sovereignty in Indonesia. At any rate, our reconstruction shows that Soekarno's idea was not to forbid particular religious practices. He instead aimed to found a positive and plural sacralization of Indonesia, an allowing for the blossoming of divinity based in a single principle of mutual assistance (*gotong royong*). The poisoning described by Codet is an important context for situating the writings of *Marxisme dan Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa*.

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But Martin demonstrates in his essay that while this unary principle (*'yang…esa'*) has been appropriated as a technology to dominate marginal peoples in the name of warding off disunity within the Republic, it also unwittingly shelters within itself a conservation of an ontological foundation for Marxism. As Fayyadl says in the beginning of his "Foreword," Martin's Marxism is unlike Marxism with which many are more familiar as a mode of social critique.

Since we will focus here primarily on Martin and Fayyadl's contributions, we first want to recognize that there are two other essays in this pamphlet written by Muhammad Ridha and Hizkia Yossie Polimpung which respond to Martin. In his essay "God in Earth" ("*Tuhan di Bumi*"), Hizkia points out that there is an outside of this human world – the earth (*Bumi*) – that still worlds the world, and the *earth* that worlds the world is minimally discrete from the *world*. As such, Hizkia argues that by seeking to accommodate theology, logic, and Marxism *all at once*, Martin levels down an ontological difference born in the different names that are God and man. We will turn to Muhammad Ridha's essay below.

We also want to recognize that the pamphlet concludes with a retrospective piece of writing by Martin in which he responds to the critiques of Fayyadl, M. Ridha and Hizkia. In it, he returns to his original intention in writing the piece. He explains that he set out to show that Marxism and religion are not *actually* antithetical. Actually here for Martin means logically or onto-logically, for he reiterates that he set out to identify, as in an *a priori* construction, the non-contradictory relation of Marxism and *Pancasila*. As such, he avows that he does not engage with their everyday incarnations. In his "Foreword," Fayyadl suggests that by foreclosing an analytic of everydayness, Martin's paradigm of thought becomes a-political. We will turn to this below.

Martin's understanding of God indeed appears as 'out of touch' with the understanding of God of the other three authors. For Martin, the practice of seeking God and the practice of Marxist philosophy both aim to illuminate the cause of movement. Both are organized by the idea that this cause is itself a one-ness. With its understanding that *this* world immanently organizes polarity as heaven and hell, revealed religion, according to Martin, 'proves' that this world contains within itself knowledge of its own virtues and iniquities by means of something

[1016] See Abdul Mu'ti and Ahmad Najib Burhani, "The Limits of Religious Freedom in Indonesia: With Reference to the First Pillar Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa of Pancasila," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 9, no 1 (2019): 111-134.

[1017] See discussion of Adi's film on *Sunda Wiwitan* in chapter 7 below.

that is constitutively excluded from within it. Many have made a similar argument regarding Marx's analysis of capitalism as bearing its own tendency to perish. Martin therefore sees no *essential* contradiction between a theological understanding of totality and a Marxist one.

But this mode of thinking fundamentally mistakes the essence of God, Fayyadl writes. For Martin demonstrates that there is no *formal,* logical contradiction between the ontological essence of 'the One and Only Divinity' and 'Marxism.' Fayyadl argues that this 'relation' levels down the notion of God by making Him a state. Martin's critics press that God is not a name of that which is *present,* as in Martin's concluding image of a computation where all of the overlapping elements of truth, falsity, possibility, and impossibility immanently overlap. The other three authors all argue that this is not an adequate concept of God because God is not *ontotheological presence*.

This conceptual question is not exclusive to this particular conjuncture. In Heidegger's reconstruction of philosophy in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, he identifies an aspect of Meister Eckhart's thought that echoes Fayyadl's critique of Martin. Heidegger writes that Eckhart "transforms the idea of essence in general, which is an ontological determination of a being, the essential *entis*, into a being and makes the ontological ground of a being, its possibility, its essence, into what is properly actual."[1018] Heidegger recognizes here the danger of conflating the essence of God with a being and thereby forgetting ontological difference as such.

While Martin is criticized by the other authors for his so-called intellectualist and ontological rendering of the relation of Marxism and the first principle of the state philosophy of Indonesia, his thinking could instead be understood to have strongly understood Althusser when he quoted, as he did many times, Themistocles' speech to the Athenians exhorting them to "change elements – instead of fighting on land, fight at sea!"[1019] For Martin, we suggest, aims to change the place of the very question of the relation of Marxism and Pancasila. He thereby estranges the concepts of Marxism and Theology from themselves at once. His discourse begins from within the *kampfplatz* of the State, rather than within the intratheoretical discourses of Marxism or Theology. This can be called a materialist practice of politics.[1020]

In so doing, Martin demonstrates the solecism of the state judgment that Marxism is an infraction of the foundation of the state philosophy of '(belief in) the one and only Divinity.' Martin argues instead that Marxism itself necessitates (the belief) in the one and only Divinity. His aim is the defenestration of the 'logical' basis of *TAP MPRS* XXV/1966, not with historiographical methods, but with onto-logical exposition.

Martin's exposition, we note, does not however completely eschew historiographical thinking. He recalls that Nyoto, a leader of the Communist Party of Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s, also showed that Marxism actually is in harmony with the presuppositions of Pancasila, and that the propaganda regarding communism's so-called atheism is one that emerges from its political opponents, not its own teachings.[1021] In fact, as many have shown, the roots of communism in Java and Indonesia are in and with Islamic organization.[1022] Martin's aim is not however to defend Njoto historiographically. He wants instead to show that Marxism *necessarily* presupposes God, i.e., the one and only Divinity. But God, in Martin's discourse, is akin to the set of all sets. While the semantics of this language may be unfamiliar for so-called establishment

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[1018] Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* 90.
[1019] Althusser, "Marx in His Limits," 27.
[1020] On the notion of political materialism, see Fabio Bruschi, *Le Matérialisme politique de Louis Althusser* (Paris: Mimesis, 2020).
[1021] Martin writes Nyoto, rather than Njoto.
[1022] See Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion.*

theologians, Fayyadl argues that this notion is conceptually consonant with mainstream monotheistic discourse in contemporary Indonesia.

Martin, however, advances this notion of the set of all sets in order to show that God is not a personal concept. God is an ontological rather than a relative or epistemological category. Accordingly, Martin argues, Being is the sole and proper idea of both Marxism and Revealed Religion.[1023] But Fayyadl writes that this intellectual, 'high in the sky,' quasi-deist notion of God is not adequate to the Being or Form (*wujud*) of God. Fayyadl contrasts Martin's concept of God with the Being (*wujud*) of God as articulated by Ibn 'Arabi.[1024] *Wujud* is in everyday discourse akin to "shape" or "form," as in the shape or form into which something has been shaped or formed. R. J. Wilkinson's 1901 *Malay-English Dictionary* defines *wujud* as "existence, being, entity."[1025] It cannot be projected therefore with a schematic dualism in 'the ideal' and 'the material.'

In doing so, Fayyadl suggests that Martin's exposition is a materialism without material. And Martin does not entirely reject such a characterization. He himself writes that "a materialist theology is possible as logic" and "for a materialist, God is a logical space."[1026] We note here that this is precisely what Heidegger identifies as a kind of nihilism, where God is thought as an extant being that can thus be known like all other extant beings.[1027]

Fayyadl identifies this attribute in Martin's account and elucidates some of its causes and consequences. Firstly, Fayyadl argues, this notion of onto-theology bears a logical fallacy. For while it proclaims that this 'materialism' only admits material substances as that which comprises the universe, it must also necessarily admit a minimal immateriality as substance. Moreover, it denies that it denies this ur-repression. Secondly, and as a direct consequence, this 'materialism' forecloses an adequate notion of God. Fayyadl calls this the *mode* perfection. Accordingly, Fayyadl argues, because Martin's notion of God is inadequate, he cannot bring about his stated aim which is the reconciliation of Pancasila and Marxism. For if this idea of God is not adequate, then the reconciliation with Marxism stalls before it even can begin.

Martin defends himself by explaining that his attempt to 'make peace' between Marxism and *Pancasila*, is a logical, not anthropological, argument. Fayyadl's response is that Martin therefore "does not want to respond to the *ideological problem* – which is in fact much more important and urgent."[1028] This important and urgent situation is not simply the conceptual or

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[1023] In this way, Martin seems to return to Aristotle's understanding that theology is the first philosophy. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, bk. VI, 1026a19. We hasten to recall that in his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* Heidegger argues that the notion of God as a being is not Aristotle's idea. This is rather one that he says is introduced by Thomism. Heidegger singles out Francisco Suarez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (1597) as particularly determining this 'modern' understanding and trajectory. Heidegger writes, "Suarez is the first one – even if only timidly – who tries to show, in opposition to the usual Scholastic opinion, that the *ens rationis* is also an object of metaphysics. Although the investigation of being represents in general an essential task of metaphysics, nevertheless[…] God, as the first and principal being, is also the primary object of the whole of metaphysics, that is to say, of the whole of ontology, and the *primum significatum*, that which is signified first, that which constitutes the significance of all significance; the *primum analogatum*, that to which every assertion about beings and every understanding of being is traced back. The ancient conviction runs thus: since every being that is actual comes from God, the understanding of the being of beings must ultimately be traced back to God." *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 81. This passage adequately outlines why Fayyadl rejects the 'modern' notion of God as entity.

[1024] See Ibn 'Arabi, *Kitab al-ahadiyyah* [A Treatise on The One Alone], in *Divine Governance of the Human Kingdom* (Louisville KY: Fons Vitae, 1997).

[1025] Wilkinson, *A Malay-English Dictionary*, s.v. "*wujud,*" 678.

[1026] Suryajaya, "Marxisme dan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa," 18, 20.

[1027] See Martin Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in *Identity and Difference* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969).

[1028] Al-Fayyadl, "Kata Pengantar," 1.

epistemological foundation of the myth that Marxism is atheistic. It is instead the practices whereby this myth is lived and thought in everyday, post-New Order, contemporary Indonesia. There is thus an effort (*conatus*) exerted by state apparatuses to inculcate this idea in the people. Martin, on the other hand, demonstrates that this myth is not theoretically true. Fayyadl's response is that this theoretical practice disavows the very materiality of ideology as such. One could restate this by saying that according to Fayyadl, Martin seeks to circumvent the analytic of the everydayness of God and also of Marxism for that matter.

Fayyadl's critique thus locates the effects of this onto-theology. Martin's point of origin is that a materialist denies an *ante rem* notion of God. This can be thought of as denying the mind or intelligence of an outside. The notion of an immaterial substance in the universe contradicts the 'scientific spirit' of Marxism, says Martin. For Martin's materialist, God is the "totality of the possible and impossible distributions of qualities and attributes in the physical universe."[1029] God thereby is the laws of the universe *and* the existence of the universe. He is the attributes of God *and* the order of the universe are one substance. No immaterial substance is admitted here. God is the set of all possible and impossible worlds.

This is, Fayyadl writes, an "ontological monism."[1030] This is the notion that God is the sufficient reason of this universe. This idea of God is, for Fayyadl, ultimately a 'world view.' In Martin's schema, God is 'immanent *as* the universe.' With this notion, God is not transcendent and thereby He has no activity bearing '*into* the universe.' Martin's conception thus renounces both depth and a void. There is no outside of the world. The world is only inclusion. Many modern mechanistic and physicalist world-views also think this, Fayyadl recalls.

Fayyadl identifies the logical fallacy developed by this mechanistic world-view. Physicalism denies that a discrepancy can exist in the mode of eternity. For, as Fayyadl notes, there is an irreducible gap between the laws of logic and facts. They simply cannot be thought as absolutely immanent to one another.[1031] This indicates the existence of an irreducible and essential difference between the concept and existence, between being and beings. Martin argues that God is immanent as the Universe. But Fayyadl counters that if "the laws of logic can *alone* manifest everything that is, then those laws form a particular set (*perangkat*) of intelligence from a particular agency. That is God and this is not a *part* of the whole of the laws of the universe."[1032] With the irreducible difference of intelligence and agency, Fayyadl posits that the world is not a simple, homogeneous substance. Martin, on the other hand, melts the distinction between agency and intelligence with the notion that God is immanent as the Universe. According to Fayyadl, Martin's scientistic approach aims to simply bypass the ineluctable eternity of the immediacy of ideology, and therefore the problem of how, tactically, to bring about an intelligence from an agency which one cannot possess and yet in which one nonetheless still participates.

Martin's position is not strictly 'theist,' Fayyadl notes, for theists, in general, accept a personal God, which Martin does not. Theists think that the universe is material and yet follows the will of God. Martin rejects a personal God and sees that God is nothing but the material universe. This God is, as Fayyadl notes, the Absolute of classical physics. Martin identifies that there are two different ways that Marxists have tended to reconcile the problem of religion with its 'scientific spirit.' The first Martin calls the notion of a fictionalist God. This is the position that God is a mental and cultural entity, an object of belief. The second, which Martin characterizes

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[1029] Suryajaya, "Marxisme dan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa," 17-18.
[1030] Al-Fayyadl, "Kata Pengantar," 8.
[1031] This very identity is of course, we note, the very aim of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.
[1032] Al-Fayyadl, "Kata Pengantar," 9.

as *ante rem* realism, underscores the emancipatory nature of religion. With its distinction of heaven and hell, revealed religion presents a criticism of the domination of the oppressed class of people in *this* world. Religion thereby both acknowledges that 'another world is possible' *and* that *this* world itself presents this notion as contradiction within itself. With this, Martin sees that *this* world therefore contains the elements and possibility of real change.

But, as Fayyadl demonstrates, Martin's position still presupposes 'some' transcendence or immaterial substance within this Universe. Martin's computer model still presupposes, as its limit, something that is not strictly a part of this material that makes it possible to *know* the truth of the logical model. This is an immaterial substance, mode, and attribute. As Fayyadl writes, "in other words, transcendence."[1033]

Fayyadl presses on this contradiction. If Martin admits this dialetheism, that God is possibility and impossibility, why could God not be both material and immaterial? Fayyadl here recognizes that Martin's position is close to the theology of 'mainstream' religion, which often says that God is involved in creation but not history, or a 'deism' which says that God is entirely passive and detached from the world. Fayyadl's position, on the other hand, rejects both this 'establishment' theology and Martin's (pseudo-) deism. Fayyadl clarifies that God "is not nature and a part of the essence of nature (*ante rem*), but works *inside* nature and with *nature* (*in re*)."[1034] God thus cannot be an extant being because God is within *and* with beings. But even that with-and-within-ness *is not-one*, for extant beings can have a 'relation' with God whose activity changes the human being as such. God thus is not nature, but nor is He the exterior of nature, Fayyadl reasons.

Even this demarcation however does not settle the dispute. For the 'melting' of ontological difference is used within the 'establishment' religion that Fayyadl also critiques. Fayyadl notes that *Jabbariyah* jurists advance a homologous but inverted position to Martin's, for they give all authority to God and in doing so usurp the possibility of creation. This, Fayyadl writes, is a mode of idealism. But even the opposition of materialism and idealism does not settle the matter. For, as Fayyadl shows, the materialist position splits into 'soft' and 'radical' materialist positions. 'Soft materialists' see God working through 'devices' (*'perangkat'*) in the universe. This makes God's intervention in the world nearly invisible, while also presupposing that materiality can never be without God. This view in its limit repeats the conflation of the ontological essence of world and God.

Fayyadl writes that the 'radical materialist' position slices (*beririsan*) this 'soft materialist' position. For the 'radical materialist' foregrounds the place of work and activity in the universe, *without presupposing* that this is undertaken with or as the agency of God. This does not mean that God does not continue to work in the universe. On the contrary, it means instead that one cannot *a priori* impute the activity of God to every act or movement as such. A true act introduces an effect which is known to be true and is something that introduces something into this world that cannot be accounted for by an *a priori* demonstration of the everyday mode of presence. They can be understood by the particular moments of crisis or trial.[1035] In the trial or crisis, everyday understandings are not adequate. Another mode of action is required. In these moments, Fayyadl writes, God can be called and can present. In this way, God can enter what is thought of as secular history and time. But, Fayyadl writes, "God presents as the possibility of a

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[1033] Al-Fayyadl, "Kata Pengantar," 11.
[1034] Ibid, 12.
[1035] On the Islamic notion of trial and tribulation, see Basit Iqbal, *Tribulation and Repair: Islamic Humanitarianism after the Syrian War.* (Ph.D diss., University of California Berkeley, 2019).

dialectical leap, when materiality must be overcome itself and raised up to a new stage. This is what is meant by *transcendence.*"[1036] Accordingly, God is a mode of possibility of actuality, not actuality in itself.

Muhammad Ridha makes a related point in his contribution to the pamphlet. He writes that God is an exception or singularity (*perkecualian*). Using language familiar to readers of Jacques Lacan and Alain Badiou, he says that God is a void (*kekosongan*), an object desired (*object petit a*), because He is only present as that which cannot be present in the world. This notion absolutely negates the onto-theological idea which imputes that God is a being.

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Martin and Fayyadl were born and have grown up in Indonesia in coeval historical conditions. Martin graduated from the High School of Philosophy (*Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat, STF*) in Jakarta. Fayyadl was educated in Islamic schools. He attended *Madrasah Aliyah Keagamaan* (MAK) in Sumenep, Madura and he graduated from the State Islamic University (*UIN Sunan Kalijaga*) in Yogyakarta in 2009. Fayyadl's *skripsi* "Negative Theology of Ibn Arabi: A Critique of the Metaphysics of Divinity" was accepted from the Islamic State University of Yogyakarta, known as Sunan Kalijaga, in August, 2009. Martin's *skripsi* "Immanence and Emancipation: An Exposition Regarding the Ontological Foundation for Emancipation in the Thought of Alain Badiou" was accepted at *STF* in November 2009. Fayyadl was a Postgraduate Student in Philosophy at the University of Paris VIII (Vincent Saint-Denis) in 2012.

Their philosophizing has been undertaken in relation to each other. Despite the great theoretical differences of Martin and Fayyadl, they call each other friends (*teman*) and best friends (*sahabat*). They set out into two relatively discrete lineages of philosophy, if not modern philosophy. Philosophizing they disagree, but they are both philosophizing.

During this dissertation research, Martin was working at the Director General's Office of Culture Bureau, for Hilmad Farid, who is the Director General of Culture Bureau, while also working on his PhD at *STF* in Jakarta. Fayyadl is a teacher and rector in a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Probolinggo, as well as being the principal editor of an online media outlet, *Islam Bergerak*, (Islam Stirring, or Islam Afoot). Both wrote and published continuously during and now exceeding this research period.

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Fayyadl explicitly states that in "Marxism and the One and Only Divinity," Martin lacks a notion of activity. Fayyadl writes that this question of activity and God is one which Indonesian Marxists must continue to deal with "if they want to be involved with the dynamic of religious people in Indonesia."[1037] This is the final utterance in Fayyadl's "Foreword." It reiterates the fundamental political question that Mao Tse-Tung raised in 1942 in Yenan regarding art and literature. This is concentrated in his intransitive question: for whom?[1038] For Fayyadl underscores that the problem of God and materialism is important for contemporary Indonesian Marxists because *it is they who* need to understand the thoughtful activity of religious people in

[1036] Al-Fayyadl, "Kata Pengantar," 14.
[1037] Ibid, 14.
[1038] See Bonnie McDougall, *Mao Zedong Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art*: *A Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980).

Indonesia who constitute the majority. If Marxism is to be relevant, it needs to understand what God is to the people who think Him. Fayyadl unambiguously avers that God is not a computer function. God is instead a mode of singularity. He exists in the place of crisis. He is not a prevailing constancy of presence.

For Martin, the response to Mao's political test of 'for whom?' leads into a different direction. Martin is not primarily concerned with the dynamic of religious people in contemporary Indonesia. He is instead dealing with the 'pure theoretical' problem introduced by *Pancasila* and its first principle: 'the One and Only Divinity.' Martin is therefore not seeking to shelter so-called atheists or Marxists in Indonesia, whose Dasein is forbidden. He is also not seeking an eschatological coming of God; he is seeking a redetermination in the battle of positions on the terrain of the State. He is doing this by elaborating a peace treaty. It is important for emancipatory praxis because it provides a logical justification for emancipation.

Fayyadl's proleptic response to this mode of thinking is as follows: who amongst us becomes a materialist before becoming religious? Do Marxists need to believe in this logical God, or do religious people need to understand why God is not an entity that instructs you to obey rather than revolt? Both answer yes to both questions, but their emphasis is diametrically opposed. For Martin, religious people need to understand that their belief in heaven and hell is consonant with Marxist teachings. For Fayyadl, Marxists need to understand that the emancipatory notion of God does not make Him an ontotheological entity.

Martin concludes his contribution with a response to the question of the place of faith in his 'materialist theology.' Without naming Anselm of Canterbury or Augustine, Martin recalls that faith is necessary in order to know. This is a unity of logic for Martin that is engaged in order to know. Fayyadl writes instead that this faith can only be realized in action, which takes place in both mind and body. For Fayyadl, knowledge is engaged in order to transform 'the world.' This takes place not under the figure of a computer, but instead under a species of eternity that makes change possible as such. In other words, human beings.

Both Martin and Fayyadl are engaged in the work of differentiation and defamiliarization. Martin aims to make traditional Marxists uncomfortable by making Marxism a science of ontology, thus eschewing the more familiar historical categories of hegemony or class consciousness. But he is also aiming to make secularism uncomfortable by making Marxism – the *persona non grata* of Indonesian sovereignty according to the New Order and Post New Order Indonesian State – entirely consonant and *in fact identical with* Pancasila's imputation of the foundation of Indonesian sovereignty in 'the one and only divinity.' He therefore is logically defenestrating the state-sponsored and sanctioned forms of anti-communism. His discourse submits an emendation of the State intellect. It is an act of materialist politics. It lives to emend the *politeia*, not university discourse.

Fayyadl is engaged in a different strategy of double differentiation. On the one hand, he uses an alliance with Marxism against establishment theology so that the notion of God as perfection is one which works to eradicate injustice and oppression in *this* world, rather than engendering obedience to priestly and institutional powers. On the other hand, he seeks to bring about a differentiation within Marxism, with an understanding of God which rejects the notion that He is a logic of being personified by a super-computer defining possibility and impossibility. Fayyadl thereby seeks to rejoin God to the foundation of Marx's thought which is the activity of the expropriation of expropriators in the class struggle.

Fayyadl argues that Martin's ontotheology lacks a concept of acts. For if there are some acts, there is something that cannot be counted at any moment by the state of the situation. Acts introduce a new synthesis in time. Acts make known the ontological existence of ethics. God

therefore is not a notion that is identical to itself before and after an act. Acts instead rearrange the perception of unity. In this way, Fayyadl argues that there has to be a strong understanding of act, for without this, there could be no creation. And there is some creation. As Heidegger puts it, "in creation existence is added to the actual and can at any time be taken away from it."[1039]

This small pamphlet whose title we have translated as *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity* (2016) therefore intervenes in the very place where Heidegger situates the fundamental question of *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (1995). For according to Fayyadl, Martin's position absolutely expresses what Heidegger calls modern metaphysics, as it emerges from Thomism into René Descartes and beyond. In this lineage of 'modern metaphysics,' God is unambiguous. He is an absolute being. With this presupposition, it becomes necessary to become 'absolutely certain' in the science which knows Him. It is this absolute certainty that Fayyadl (and Heidegger) target as a fundamental problem and originary mistake. For God and beings are not necessarily known in the same way. Fayyadl, writing from, with, and against an Islamic tradition and practice, writes that God is an inconsistency. God cannot always be ready at hand. As Friedrich W.J. Schelling writes, "God is a life, not a mere being."[1040] This does not introduce a lack into His universality; rather, this universality is one where perfection is a mode of acts, not beings.

Fayyadl sees that this philosophical and theological thinking can transform our relationship to time that capitalism both generates and denies. The pamphlet makes apparent that while the so-called Global North incessantly repeats that history has dealt Marxism and communism its deserved deaths, the Indonesians philosophizing in this Renaissance instead work with its ideological, scientific, and critical resources.

Part II: *Behind Marx* (2015)

Introduction

We now ask why Alain Badiou's reading of communism could have so intensely animated Martin's thinking and the prevailing Renaissance of left thinking (*pemikiran kiri*) in Indonesia. In order to do this, we will recall again the existence of the epigraph of William Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* in Martin's second monograph, *Dialectical Materialism: A Study of Marxism and Contemporary Philosophy* (2012). This seemingly technical exegesis of the philosophies of Kant, Husserl, Lenin, and Marx begins with an invocation of the 'hands shedding blood in fierce civil strife,' 'foul deeds smelling,' and 'with carrion men, groaning for burial.' How do we understand the mode of existence of this epigraph?

To better understand this invocation of politics in ontology, we turn to a nearby book in this Renaissance. It is entitled *Di Balik Marx: Sosok dan Pemikiran Friedrich Engels* (2015) which we can translate into English as *Behind Marx: The Figure and Thinking of Friedrich Engels*. It is a volume which brings together contributions from eight authors. As in our reading of *Marxism and the One and Only God* (2016), we focus only on two of the contributions. The first is the preface to the work which is written by Sylvia Tiwon. This writing sheds light on the crucial context which animates the *Julius Caesar* epigraph by Martin. The second is Martin's contribution which is entitled "Historical Naturalism: An Analytical Reconstruction of the Philosophy of Nature of Friedrich Engels." We then contrast Martin's reading of Engels with that of Vittorio Morfino in his "*Causa*

[1039] Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 99.
[1040] F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 84.

Sui or *Wechselwirkung*: Engels between Hegel and Spinoza" (2014), published within one year of *Behind Marx* (2015) on Brill's Historical Materialism series.

We can preliminarily introduce Martin's theoretical aim and practice here as follows. Martin posits that *Capital* is a "truth maker" discourse because it identifies the real cause of movement in capitalist human societies. The scientific inquiry into human societies therefore is one that necessarily engages the hypotheses of *Capital*. Martin calls this realm of discourse 'historical naturalism.' In doing so, Martin brings forth a basis for a critique of the notion of naturalism as understood by the so-called ontological turn in late academic Anthropology.

Like the discursive strategy employed by "Marxism and the One and Only Divinity," Martin leaves the regular realm of Marxist discourse in his "Historical Naturalism." Here, he inhabits the discourse of analytical philosophy. This tactic of taking up another discursive realm in order to disturb the prevailing Marxist discourse bears, we note, an affinity with Badiou's reading of set theory.[1041] As in "Marxism and the One and Only Divinity," Martin's exit strategy is oriented here by an aim of bringing about a differentiation within Marxist discourse. In both expositions, Martin aims to make another regional discourse not only complementary but moreover necessarily adequate to Marxism as its own existence. In both expositions, the aim is to generate practical effects by means of a theoretical intervention. Because of the technical nature of his exposition, we have situated the bulk of the logical demonstrations into an appendix located at the end of this chapter.

In our exposition, we focus on the way that Martin's notion of 'historical naturalism' introduces two important interventions. First, it facilitates an identification of a solecism in the aforementioned understanding of 'naturalism' in the late so-called ontological turn in professional Anthropology. Second, it facilitates identifying a Marxist theoreticism which Morfino introduces with the imputation of the 'animism' of Engels. Martin's intervention, we argue, identifies why this theoreticism seeks to bypass the 'dialecticity' inhering in the concept of an anthropological bearer of revolt in the capitalist mode of production. Martin thereby recognizes an animism in Engels in the sense that the latter's thought aims to identify *and* effect an *anima* (soul) of the workers' movement. We conclude by identifying how Martin's warding off of a Marxist theoreticism and identifying its dominating and subjugating effects for colonized people bears a significant antecedent in Indonesian philosophy in the thought and work of Tan Malaka (b. 1897-1949). These elucidations will help situate the historical, philosophical, and political contexts that animates this Indonesian Renaissance.

1. On *Behind Marx* (2015)

One of the central gathering points for this Renaissance discourse has been and is the organization and publisher *Indoprogress*. Its website has published writings regularly and intensively since 2010.

Indoprogress is of course not alone in this gathering capacity. There are multitudes of other publishers of this work throughout Indonesia. But it is an important organ of this Renaissance. Its editors receive manuscripts constantly and without solicitation.[1042] *Indoprogress* participated in

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[1041] Alain Badiou has made it one of his philosophical signatures to reintroduce modal logic symbols into his philosophical treatises. Martin has followed Badiou in this practice.

[1042] In the city of Kupang, on the island of *Timor*, I was with a group of people who likewise are participants in this Renaissance. Many were ex-seminarians. While we were together, one in the group received news that his article about the accumulation of capital by dispossession of land in the Kupang urban area was accepted to be published in

publishing each of the three discursive fields that we address in this chapter.[1043] The 'centrality' of *Indoprogress* however appears in a 'direct opposition' to its 'marginalization' as dictated by the aforementioned *TAP MPRS* XXV/1966. *Indoprogress* is thus a 'center' of a discourse that is itself identified by the state as unhomely; it is thus a 'center' and the 'direct opposite' of the licit center.

Martin has explicitly remarked upon and called this overdetermined position of Indonesian philosophizing the '*liar*' [LEE-ar]. '*Liar*' can be translated as 'wild,' 'illicit,' 'unregulated,' and it often refers to a place which is unkempt and lacking institutionality. Martin has both celebrated and criticized this characteristic. On the one hand, this *liar* world of thinking and philosophy means that philosophizing and thinking are still possible in Indonesia, for this attribute indicates a world that has not been absolutely captured by the Taylorization of philosophizing and thinking. On the other hand, this realm can give rise to Indonesian philosophers, who tend to sloganize rather than philosophize.[1044] This *unkempt* field of thinking is not simply a spiritual, but also a material condition, according to Martin. This is particularly the case in this city of Jakarta where philosophers are human beings who can work different kinds of jobs and still take part in this wild world of philosophy.[1045] In this *liar* world of Indonesian philosophy, Martin avers, philosophy is being written. Philosophy is not, he posits, being written by the university philosophy professors. Philosophy, or politics and ontology, is being written and read instead in the writings such as those that appear in such venues as *Indoprogress*.

It is important to note that the word *liar* refers historically to an economy that took place outside of the colonial plantations. During the Dutch colonial period, *liar* referred to illicit plantings.[1046] These outside-of-regulation plantings, on the outside of the plantation, are '*liar*,' that is, 'in the wild.' *Liar* thus names a place that is outside of the *politeia* and yet is concerned with nothing else but the *politeia*. This characterization of Indonesian left thinking and philosophy as *liar* indicates that it forms a kind of 'counter-society' or 'anti-society.' This philosophizing thus inscribes the possibility of a turn of the *politeia* of Indonesia.

And yet, as we have said, *Indoprogress* forms itself a 'central' space in this discourse. Its condition thereby entails a displacement of the *liar*. Such are the conditions for this discourse in Indonesia today. Its mode of action is not simply antithetical to the sanctioned *politeia*; it is *essentially*, not accidentally, *not* an extant republican form or mode. Thus, this Renaissance of left thinking in Indonesia engages with the existence of a difference within the *politeia* itself.

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In her introduction to *Behind Marx*, Sylvia Tiwon draws attention to the animating problematic of the book: why is there a collective interest to go 'behind' Marx, to Engels, and therefore to someone who is regularly criticized by 'contemporary' thinking as a mechanistic determinist?

Indoprogress. His close friends joked, he has been published in *Indoprogress,* a star is born! He will leave us in this good for nothing city and become a famous professor in Java in no time! This was followed by the laughter of all present.

[1043] *Indoprogress* published the original website versions, as well as the subsequent pamphlet of *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity*. They co-published *Behind Marx* with another publisher, *Marjin Kiri* (Left Margin). And finally, they published a third set of writings based on an original thesis, "PKS and Lenin", which we discuss in this chapter's final part. Ted Sprague published his own response, "PKS bukan Lenin," first in another online forum, *Koran Militan.* He also published a quaternary response to Martin's tertiary response, "PKS masih bukan Lenin" ("PKS is still not Lenin") on another website, *Revolusioner*.

[1044] See Suryajaya, *Dialectical Materialism,* 345 ff.

[1045] See §13 in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

[1046] See Jan Breman, *Keuntangan Kolonial dari Kerja Paksa: Sistem Priangan dari Tanam Paksa Kopi di Jawa 1720-1870* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2014).

This reconsideration of Engels evinces a drive to examine the very foundation of Marxism. This activity thus recalls the statement with which this dissertation began when Althusser suggested returning to the rudiments in Marx. This temporality therefore is not orthodox in the sense of repeating an inherited obligation to an institutionalized canonical thought, but instead one that aims to return to a genesis. It thereby queries Marx's thought by means of its given-ness in its own posteriority. This is a way of looking at the γένος of Marx, from a descendent which the 'contemporary' theoretical scholars have predominately preferred to repress or excise.

Tiwon candidly acknowledges the stakes that characterizes this book and its realm of discourse in Indonesia today. She asks, "will the benefit that is obtained [by the book] be greater than the danger which is still attached to it due to the chain of bans and prohibitions against Marxism"?[1047] If the answer is yes, Tiwon continues, why approach Engels, who is so unpopular and bears "the 'stigma' of determinism *ala* the Soviet Union"?[1048] Why engage in this 'risk' for 'a lost cause'? We suggest here that given the existence of the annihilation undertaken by the Indonesian state apparatus according to an appropriation and exposition of the names of 'Marx' and 'communism', this 'theoretical practice' of elucidating the γένος of Marx's discourse is one that seeks to salve a transindividual wound and prepare the possibility for a healing in Indonesia.

This entails the elaboration of the true discourse of Marx, as well as the identification of its erroneous imputations and practices. In the introduction to *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism* (2011), Martin writes that there are 'public intellectuals' in Jakarta who harbor an enthusiasm for such 'Neo-Marxist' authors as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, whose idea of 'politics' is entirely consonant with parliamentary democracy. But Martin does not only identify a theoretical discrepancy. Instead, he names the names of his antagonists, out in the open, demonstrating their ideological imputations and errors. Martin writes that these 'public intellectuals' use the names of the concepts of Alain Badiou – for instance, 'fidelity' – in work that is "*absolutely antithetical*" to the ideas and notions advanced by Alain Badiou.[1049] Martin's criticism highlights their opportunism, but it also locates a substantive problem. This is that Neo-Marxism has completely lost touch with the real foundation of the critique of political economy. Martin's recourse in such conditions of generalized sophistry is to return to the originary questions of Marxist discourse.

By returning to Engels, the authors of *Behind Marx* interrupt a so-called progressive temporality, whereby recent 'Neo-Marxism' supersede their own putative past in Engels. Tiwon characterizes this act of intervention in the following way:

> [the book] constitutes an effort to shatter the charm of the genre of the critique of postmodernism which is shackled by its notion of dismantling discourse, with its understanding of the subject as an identity which is increasingly narrow, local, and itemized, such that it loses the big picture; the critical theory which already has become a scientific 'trend' and sags when facing the concept of agency because it cannot find again the basic consideration for generating an antagonism against the order which prevails.[1050]

The book's very mode of existence-in-the-world thus advances an actual act of antagonism to the prevailing state. The book, Tiwon writes, "challenges the blockage in the flow and tides of

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[1047] Sylvia Tiwon, "Pengantar," in *Di Balik Marx: Sosok dan Pemikiran Friedrich Engels,* ed. Dede Mulyanto (Serpong, Tanggerang Selatan: Marjin Kiri and Indoprogress, 2015), viii.
[1048] Ibid.
[1049] Martin Suryajaya, *Alain Badiou and the Future of Marxism,* 14; emphasis in original.
[1050] Tiwon, "Pengantar," ix.

knowledge as generated by *TAP MPRS* no. 1/MPR 2003 which is extraordinary in its regressivity."[1051] The book's discourse can thus be called an antagonistic synthesis. On the one hand, it returns to the most unpopular, 'vulgar' lineage from Marx in Engels. On the other hand, it tarries with a banned and prohibited *form* of thinking and activity. The book therefore cannot simply be reduced to the *theoretical* content of Engels' thought itself. Marxism in Indonesia is not simply ready-at-hand such as in the states where there is no such political ban on its existence, where the 'teachings and understandings' of Marxism are extant in lessons such as those brought forth in accounting textbooks or cookbooks. In the conditions of this ban, on the other hand, Marxism and communism bear a particular concatenation of time and the concept in the *politeia* that makes it discourse not simply epistemological, but ontological and moreover hermeneutic.[1052]

The work therefore does not disavow the *Nachträglichkeit* of its own problematic. Tiwon adumbrates the historical aftermath of *TAP MPRS* XXV/1966, writing, "after banning the reading of all 'Marxist-Leninist' materials in any form or mode, the realm of thinking came to be colored by psychologism, with existentialist philosophy and absurdism."[1053] Tiwon asks, what is the relation of anti-communism and this psychologism? "Did [psychologism] happen because these intellectuals were struck by the sense of nausea (cf. Sartre) mixed with absurdity when they became partly aware of how fierce and awful the shedding of blood was in the victory of the flattering individual of 'universal humanism'"?[1054]

In order to understand this 'victory,' it is important to recall that in Indonesia by 1965, a strong antagonism divided the 'cultural' organizations of *Lekra* (*Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat,* Institute for the People's Culture) and those who came together to write and sign the document known as *Manikebu* (*Manifesto Kebudajaan,* Cultural Manifesto). *Lekra* was affiliated with the Communist Party of Indonesia.[1055] The writers of *Manikebu*, on the other hand, were supported by forces on the Right, including the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF).[1056] One night at Garuda, Ardjuna handed me *Who Paid the Piper?* (1999) and asked, do you know that the CCF and the CIA supported abstract expressionism because it forsook the content of class struggle? I answered honestly, no. He shook his head. He opened the well-worn book and showed me the letters between a CCF representative and Goenawan Muhamad, a *Manikebu* signatory. After October 1,

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[1051] Ibid.

[1052] This 'displacement' is one where the existence of contradiction itself indicates the history of its own displacement. For a particularly illuminating account of this process, see Mary Steedly, *Hanging without a Rope: Narrative Experience in Colonial and Postcolonial Karoland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[1053] Tiwon, "Pengantar," xi. She notes that this phenomenon can be seen in the novel *Merahnya Merah* [The Redness of Red] (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1968) by Iwan Simatupang, the adaptation of *Waiting for Godot* staged by Rendra in 1969, and the academic treatment of existentialism by Dr. Faud Hasan in 1973.

[1054] Tiwon, "Pengantar," xii.

[1055] See Alex Supartono, *Lekra vs. Manikebu: Perdebatan Kebudayaan Indonesia 1950-1965* (Jakarta: Edi Cahyono's Experience, 2005) and Keith Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*: *the Indonesian "Institute of People's Culture" 1950-1965* (Clayton: Monash University, 1986). We note that *Lekra* articulated the idea that art should be for the eponymic people (*rakyat*), meaning peasants and common people. Artists should 'go down' (*'turun ke bawah', turba*) to the people, to learn about their experiences and make art that reflects the struggle of the poor. *Lekra* emphasized 'indigenous' arts and rejected the incorporation of foreign art forms; they were vocal in opposition to importing foreign film. *Manikebu,* on the other hand, argued that art espouses universal human values, and should not be a political device. We note that as Louis Althusser, amongst others, has demonstrated, the notion of a 'universal humanism' is itself a partisan ideology. This 'universal humanism' posits that there is a true, ultimate, eternal essence, not only *of* the human, but that it *is* precisely the 'universal' human. It denies that this 'universal' essence is formed by and in a *particular* conjuncture of historical forces. See Althusser, "Marxism and Humanism," in *For Marx.*

[1056] See Francis Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper*?: *The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 2000).

1965, *Lekra* members were killed and imprisoned. Some *Manikebu* participants became the highest 'cultural' officials in the New Order of Indonesia, such as H.B. Jassin, Goenawan Mohamad, and Taufiq Ismail. This dispute, which appears to be 'ideological' or 'cultural,' is instead a material one. The ideology of 'universal humanism,' espoused by *Manikebu,* 'covers' the material practices of anti-communism.[1057] 'Communist' cultural workers were killed and imprisoned without due process while 'rightists' became successful New Order Indonesian citizen-subjects.

Tiwon explains the ramifications of this situation with the following example. Goenawan Mohamad, a doyen of post-1965 Indonesian letters, wrote in 1971 in the literary magazine which he founded and edits, *Horison*, about the inner (*batin*) struggle of facing the violence of history. He uses Julius Caesar to develop an allegory which he says is not dissimilar to the 'treason' (*'pengkhianatan'*) of Indonesia. Goenawan states that "Brutus is 'forced' (*'terpaksa'*) to betray Julius Caesar and kill him because he already had become a dictator."[1058] As Tiwon notes, "For Goenawan, Brutus becomes 'an example of defeat in political struggle which is full of violence' – but he is the figure who is at once heroic and tragic 'inter alia because that violence is not enough in his heart.'"[1059] Goenawan's imputation, writes Tiwon, is that "Brutus failed because he wasn't cruel enough."[1060] Goenawan's discourse generates a puzzle, asking "who wrongs who?"[1061] In doing so, he creates the semblance of a foggy landscape, where history appears as that where it is unclear who is right and wrong. His allegory obliquely asks: is it the military who killed *en masse* the 'communists' (and those who profess to be the practitioners of 'universal humanism') who are right or wrong? Or did the communists, who in the narrative of the military-government itself attempted a coup d'état, have to be killed in order to conserve the Republic?

Goenawan uses the allegory of Julius Caesar to provide a scene of recognition whereby the Indonesian events appear as a repetition of an ancient and static tableau. Brutus is 'forgiven' by God. His death is therefore a glorious one. Isn't it the same, Goenawan suggests, for those in Indonesia who killed? Tiwon sees that in making this Indonesian history an aesthetic allegory, Goenawan makes a puzzle of something unpuzzling. For how can the mass murders of Indonesian so-called communists be made acceptable? Tiwon notes that Brutus' response is one familiar to *kita* (unrestricted us): Brutus says "let's carve him as a dish for the gods."[1062] Thus, "we shall be called purgers not murders."[1063] These are 'fictional' lines from Shakespeare's drama, but they outline a reality of Indonesia since 1965. The New Order used this sacralization of the murders to absolve, if not bless, their sins. Tiwon elucidates how this 'psychologism' brings about an obfuscation into the relationship between spirit and matter. Goenawan Muhamad quotes Brutus who says, "Let us be sacrificers, but not butchers Caius/ We all stand up against the Spirit of Caesar;/And in the spirit of men there is no blood."[1064] Tiwon emphasizes that this last line articulates that action is not restricted simply to the mind. There is a material substrate – synecdochally 'represented' by blood – of the murder. There is an actual red of blood that is not a *theoretical* 'redness of red.'

Tiwon shows that Engels and the authors of *Di Balik Marx* reject this mode of idealism which denies the material substrate of these murders. This is a problem that exists both on the

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[1057] See Martin Suryajaya, "Aesthetics and Politics in Indonesian Art," *Di'van,* no. 1 (2016), 98-109.
[1058] Tiwon, "Pengantar," xii.
[1059] Ibid.
[1060] Ibid.
[1061] Ibid.
[1062] Ibid, xiii.
[1063] Ibid.
[1064] Ibid.

right as well as the left, for as Martin indicates, 'Neo-Marxists' zealously proclaim the primacy of relationality and not materiality. And as Tiwon recalls, the material substrate is primary for Engels. She cites *The Holy Family*, authored by Marx and Engels in 1844, stating that "love…first really teaches man to believe in the objective world outside himself."[1065] Notwithstanding its apparent naivete, the statement articulates the "first step for beginning to transform the world."[1066] It furthermore marks a specific difference of Marxism in the history of human sciences with its demonstration that the *beginning* of these material transformations is not 'in the mind,' as understood in a classical duality of mind and body. The invocation of *Julius Caesar* (1599) identifies the primacy of materiality in politics and moreover a scene for a recognition of a turning action in the *politeia*.

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We can now turn to Martin's contribution to *Behind Marx* entitled "Historical Naturalism: An Analytical Reconstruction of the Philosophy of Nature of Engels." Like in "Marxism and the One and Only Divinity," Martin here returns to the *logical* foundation of Marxism. He recounts that Marx does not leave a completed work of philosophy that systematized the various aspects of his thinking. Engels himself thus is the generator of dialectical and historical materialism that Martin here calls synoptically '**MDH**' (***m****aterialisme* ***d****ialectical* ***h****istorical*).

Martin immediately notes that this act of systematization brought about by Engels has a negative connotation for many, including many Marxists. They accuse Engels of falling back into an idealism by making this system "integralistic regarding reality"; it "mak(es) man passive to the workings of nature" and thus remains "stuck in scientism which reduces all knowledge into a standard of natural knowledge."[1067] In this characterization, Engels "freezes dialectics into a formal category."[1068] Marxism thereby becomes "vulgar," Martin recounts.[1069]

But Martin argues that the contribution of the thought of Engels is not only to the worker's movement. It also bears on science itself, by which he means logic. Martin thereby brings Engels away from traditional Marxism and into the framework of formal logic and analytical philosophy. This is oriented by the political aim of attempting to introduce an intervention in the conjuncture where scientific and ideological practices collide. For his aim is to show that Engel's thought is a naturalism and what is known in analytical philosophy as 'historical naturalism.' He argues that this historical naturalism is the implicit presupposition of historical materialism and science writ large.[1070] These postulates are demonstrated in the appendix to this chapter.

Given the great attention that recent professional Anthropology has paid to this word 'naturalism,' we want to first underscore that Martin argues that Marxism's attribute of 'truth-making' is understood by demonstrating its 'naturalism.' By reading his explanation, this chapter

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[1065] Ibid, xiv. It also raises a question of the relation of love and hate. Recall Lacan in Seminar XX stating, "analysis reminds us that one knows nothing of love without hate." Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality,* 91

[1066] Tiwon, "Pengantar," xiv.

[1067] Martin Suryjaya, "Naturalisme Historis: Rekonstruksi Analitis atas Filsafat Alam Friedrich Engels," in *Di Balik Marx: Sosok dan Pemikiran Friedrich Engels,* ed. Dede Mulyanto (Serpong, Tanggerang Selatan: Marjin Kiri and Indoprogress, 2015), 31. Hereafter cited as "Historical Naturalism". Martin quotes Chris Arthur, a British philosopher, as articulating the 'vulgar' quality of Engels.

[1068] Ibid.

[1069] Ibid.

[1070] Ibid, 32.

submits a counterpoint to the 'ontological turn' of Anthropology by indicating not only the existence of a naturalism outside of the spatial boundaries of Europe, but moreover why Martin's elucidation of naturalism demonstrates a categorial catachresis in the concept of ontology as understood by many late professional anthropologists. In *Beyond Nature and Culture* (2005), Philippe Descola advances an idea of ontological difference which understands the names 'being and beings' in such a way that eventuates in a fourfold of 'ontologies.'[1071] They are naturalism, animism, totemism, and analogism. This fourfold emerges through the combination of two pairs of binary oppositions. They are interiority and exteriority and materiality and animacy. In this projection, 'the' ontology predicated as 'naturalism' is one characterized by "the continuity of the physicality of the entities of the world and the discontinuity of their respective interiorities."[1072] This 'ontology' has stood in for a historical and spatial tie of thinking *qua* 'West' or Western Europe.

Martin Suryajaya, born and living in the so-called postcolonial state of Indonesia – therefore not 'genetically' a 'Western European' – has turned away from the so-called ontologies that distribute 'being and beings' in the modes Descola calls animism, totemism, or analogism and *towards* naturalism. Martin in fact praises the naturalism of Engels' discourse. The meaning of Martin's maneuver, we suggest, interrupts Descola's fourfold projection. For Martin's appropriation and exposition of 'naturalism' shows that the discourses of human beings are not simply extant but are moreover that by which the human world is remade. *Contexts of concepts differ*. Martin's discourse proceeds through the historical destiny whereby those who have identified their own emancipation through Marxist discourses are denied access therein both by the written laws of the Republic of Indonesia and the practices of state apparatuses. Naturalism for Martin therefore is not a euthanasia of life and reason. It is rather a mode of discourse which harbors emancipatory tendencies in the conditions of reworlding effectuated by the social relations of the capitalist and commodity forms. That naturalism is identified by some North Atlantic scholars as the end of thinking *and* as their 'own' only strengthens Martin's Heidegger's thesis of the end of metaphysics and nihilism as the destiny of modern Europe.[1073]

Under the notion of naturalism, Martin argues that the rationality of historical materialism is coincident to the science of logic as such. Martin recalls that Engels' thought inscribes in discourse that the causal power of something is inscribed in some*thing*. '*MDH,*' he writes, elucidates the circuit of understanding this cause. We first want to recognize how Martin's thinking here could be construed as forgetting that the fundamental discovery of *Capital* is that surplus value and labour power do *not* exhibit this kind of 'expression' whereby their causal power is inscribed in some*thing*. For *Capital* shows that it is the unpaid labour that determines the relation of price and value in the exchange of buying and selling labour power. This unpaid part does not form an expressive totality in the paid parts. With such a 'physicalist' conceptualization, Martin therefore implicitly argues against the mode of unevenness as characterizing the unity of the mode of exposition of *Capital* that we identified in Part I of this dissertation. Furthermore, the class struggle, which Marx calls the motor of history, is not inscribed in any*thing*.[1074] Be this as it

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[1071] Philippe Descola, *Beyond Nature and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 121 ff.
[1072] Ibid, 173.
[1073] Regarding the former, see Pierre Charbonnier, Gildas Salmon and Peter Skafish eds., *Comparative Metaphysics: Ontology after Anthropology*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). Regarding the latter, see Martin Heidegger, "Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being."
[1074] With the thesis that historical materialism is the science of identifying the causal power of things, we can suggest that Martin here may lose sight of one of Althusser's (and before him Freud's) originary concepts of overdetermination (*Überdeterminierung, surdétermination*). With it, Althusser showed that the capitalist and commodity

may, these are not fatal flaws, for Martin's argument is rather guided by the aim to show that Engels' appropriation and exhibition of Marx's thought is one which 'repairs' the irrationality such that perhaps over one million Indonesians were killed in part for an imputation of believing or thinking some*thing* that is logically coincident to the everyday research practices of the modern physical sciences.

This is the context into which this intervention introduces itself. Martin's aim thus is to demonstrate that Marxism is a 'truth maker' of scientific discourse. On the one hand, he thus posits an antithesis to the 'Neo-Marxist' position which denies the existence of a 'truthmaker' as such. On the other hand, it advances a 'scientistic' thesis which is an antithesis to the 'myth' (meaning, determinate ideological fiction) that the Indonesian state has used to annihilate and shame Marxism in its imputation that Marxism is an atheist discourse that promotes a moral decay. Like in his "Marxism and the One and Only Divinity," Martin aims at the logical foundation of a question in order to discredit an opponent's perfidy. We saw Fayyadl cast doubt on this tactic earlier, for it vests its hope in 'science' and practically forecloses the very real, which is to say eternal, effectivity of the ideological formation and instance. In this particular situation, these are the practices of anti-communism in Indonesia.

Despite these theoretical caveats, Martin's schema still delivers an untimely and unsolicited letter to the professional Anthropologists who loathe 'their own' naturalism and seek to 'know' 'other' 'ontological' 'distributions of beings.' For Martin, born and living on the island of Java, seeks to ground historical materialism in a historical naturalism so that Marxism can engage with and ultimately overtake the reworlding practices of other sciences. His project is undertaken under the provision that it may help to transform the universe and worlds in which we live rather than merely see them as going on elsewhere. He thereby illustrates a specific problem in *Beyond Nature and Culture* (2005). For there, 'being' and 'ontologies' are schematically *present*. They are made to be *at hand.* The subject supposed by this fourfold is one that cannot fundamentally modify these distributions. Martin's schema thus can be *theoretically* criticized, but it evinces an important attribute of the Neo-Kantian discourse in which Descola and others dwell. For Martin, the 'distribution of human beings' is not a fourfold, but an ocean whose eddies and pools are filled with the real flesh and blood of so-called Indonesian communists and whose future is an absolutely capitalistic commodification of Indonesia. He aims therefore not to reproduce the extant cause and movement of capitalist material and ideas, but instead to interrupt and intervene in them so as to make them reproduce practices in a different mode than their habituated modes of injustices. This recourse to naturalism therefore is an attempt to make a justice possible in this world where something is going very wrong.[1075] Naturalism is thus not one particular mode of projecting being and beings. Naturalism for Martin facilitates a process of reworlding.

2. On Finding the Place of Engels' Discourse

forms are constituted in such a way that there is an internally repetitive temporalization transmitted repeatedly between the 'base' and the 'superstructure' such that even the 'posterior' superstructure 'works back' on the 'base' and 're-determines' it in such a way that rejects a totally 'physical' representation of their relation. The understanding of the causal power of a thing bears 'some' metaphysical instantiation, which is known as its ideological moment.

[1075] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, The Work of Mourning and the New International* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 78 ff.

Given the context of Marxism and communism in Indonesia into which this intervention proceeds, Martin's presentation of Engels as a 'natural scientist' of the capitalist mode of production should not be understood as an example of 'depoliticization.' For his explanation that Engels employs the epistemology of 'physical' sciences to understand the capitalist mode of production aims to disrupt the place in which the encounter of Marxism and *Pancasila* takes place. This is not a naïve tactic; it can be understood as a tactic in the struggle to dislodge the aforementioned 'blockage' by advancing against the theoretical practices of anti-communism.

The meaning of Engels for Martin therefore differs in a fundamental way from that imputed by contemporary academics who live in Europe and America where this Indonesian event – the anti-communist genocide – is simply inexistent. To demonstrate this, we read a reading of Engels by the great contemporary Italian philosopher Vittorio Morfino in the first chapter of his book, *Plural Temporality: Transindividuality and the Aleatory between Spinoza and Althusser* (2015). This will allow us to elucidate a fundamental difference inhering in the name of Engels.

In his chapter "*Causa Sui* or *Wechselwirkung*: Engels between Hegel and Spinoza," Morfino precisely demonstrates the importance of the way that Engels understands Spinoza's concept of *causa sui* (cause of itself). Morfino argues that Engels mutilates Spinoza's concept when he 'translates' it with his *Wechselwirkung* (reciprocal action). Morfino suggests that Engels not only 'misread' Spinoza, but that this misreading is crucial in order to understand that a Marxist understanding of *causa sui* might avoid some of the entailing errors falling from Engels' understanding of *Wechselwirkung*. Morfino here seeks a Marxist understanding of cause that is not Engels' nor his followers, but one that also does not separate itself from 'modern scientific discourse.'

Morfino begins with Jacques Monod's *Chance and Necessity: Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology* (1970) and its identification that the central problem of modern science concerns the relationship of invariance and teleonomy. For what Morfino calls 'modern science' and the 'scientific method,' invariance necessarily precedes teleonomy. Morfino writes that Monod identifies that the two modes that invert this 'scientific method' are 'vitalism' and 'animism.'

Morfino's principal objection to Engels is that by making contradiction the law of all movement and configuring its "systematization" into a "subjective interpretation of nature…[it] weaken(s)…the principle of objectivity."[1076] This generates an "anthropocentric illusion," Morfino writes.[1077] This is, according to Morfino, "Engels' *animist* projection."[1078] Martin, we recall, argued that Engels' thought is a *naturalist* projection.[1079]

Morfino first demonstrates how Engels and Spinoza are aligned in their understanding that movement is the "very mode of being of matter."[1080] With this, they are opposed to Descartes and Newton, both of whom, he writes, "point to an impulse external to matter" in order to understand movement.[1081] As a result, both Engels and Spinoza see that there are no isolated facts. The universe is an "interconnected totality."[1082] In this way, both Engels and Spinoza are opposed to the classical, 'rigid' metaphysical dualisms, particularly of identity and

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[1076] Vittorio Morfino, *Plural Temporality: Transindividual and the Aleatory between Spinoza and Althusser* (Brill: Leiden, 2015), 20.
[1077] Ibid.
[1078] Ibid, 21, emphasis added.
[1079] Descola, on the other hand, writes that "the epistemological problems faced by naturalism are the exact opposite of those facing animism." *Beyond Nature and Culture,* 290.
[1080] Morfino, *Plural Temporality*, 22.
[1081] Ibid.
[1082] Ibid, 23.

difference and cause and effect. Their discrepancy arises in their respective understandings of this 'interconnected totality.'

For according to Morfino, Engels' reading of Hegel's notion of *Wechselwirkung* is fundamentally contradictory to Spinoza's notion of *causa sui*. *Wechselwirkung* is the category of 'reciprocal action' or 'interaction.' For Engels, this is the category necessary to understand "matter in motion as a whole…we cannot go back further than to knowledge of this reciprocal action for the very reason that there is nothing behind [it] to know."[1083] This is the only way to understand the "real causal relation."[1084] The causal category of *Wechselwirkung* is "not as the reciprocal action of two substances but as the efficacy of the totality on its elements in as much as it is the interrelation between the action of these elements."[1085]

Morfino recollects that Engels himself celebrated Spinoza as the first radically anti-metaphysical thinker with his idea that "substance is *causa sui*."[1086] Spinoza's notion of 'immanent causality' means that there is *not* any "originary givenness of sense and of movement."[1087] Instead *causa sui*

> thinks the self-production of the infinite substance as a production of the totality of modes in order thereby to understand the immanent (infinite) causality of proposition XVIII [ed: God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things] and the transitive (finite) causality of proposition XXVIII [ed: Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another, which is also finite and has a determined existence, and so on, to infinity] not as two distinct activities, but as a single and contemporaneous process.[1088]

Thus, for Spinoza "every existence… is the infinite necessary relations that it maintains with all of the others."[1089]

Morfino argues that *Wechselwirkung* is *not* adequate to *causa sui*, perhaps because there are no adequate metaphysical translations. Morfino writes that *Wechselwirkung* is a category that Kant introduced in the third category of relations in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This 'reciprocal action' or 'interaction' emerges from the analysis of disjunctive judgments. *Wechselwirkung* is what Kant called the "co-existence…of the determinations of the one substance with those of the other."[1090] It is the "rule of all temporal relations which precede experience and render it possible for the first time."[1091] Kant said that this is why "all substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in a thorough going reciprocity [*Wechselwirkung*]."[1092] This conception, Morfino argues, diverges from Spinoza's notion that "every existence… is the infinite necessary

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[1083] Ibid, 27-8.
[1084] Ibid, 28.
[1085] Ibid.
[1086] Ibid.
[1087] Ibid, 29.
[1088] Ibid.
[1089] Ibid, 30.
[1090] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University 1998), 275/B 183-4.
[1091] Morfino, *Plural Temporality,* 32.
[1092] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 211, B 257, quoted in Morfino, *Plural Temporality,* 32.

relations that it maintains with all of the others" because for Kant this reciprocity occurs specifically in the realm of judgment.[1093]

Morfino argues that Engels' understanding of *Wechselwirkung* does not come from that understanding by Kant but instead from Hegel's "Doctrine of Essence" in the *Science of Logic* in the section "*Wirklichkeit.*" There, Hegel demonstrates that 'interaction' ('*Wechselwirkung*') is "a synthesis of substantiality and causality."[1094] This is, for Hegel, "an infinite totality."[1095] This is what allows Hegel, Morfino writes, to make the transition from the objective logic to the subjective logic and from substance to subject. For in the absolute relation, there is an "identity of thought as thinking and thought as that which is thought."[1096] This is a mode of duplicity that Morfino strongly contrasts with *causa sui* and Spinoza. For this *Wechselwirkung* of Hegel, he argues, binds as interiority a "temporality as the simultaneity of the totality" into one.[1097] We can recall that Martin Heidegger also criticized this conflation of System and the Science of the System in his reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[1098] *Causa sui* for Spinoza, Morfino stresses, is without this same kind of closure and totality-in-simultaneity.

Morfino recapitulates Jacques Monod's thesis that with modern science, invariance precedes teleonomy. He thereby argues that Engels, and Hegel, conflate invariance and teleonomy. For Engels (and Hegel), there is, he argues, a reconciliation of interiority and system. This is specifically "that in communist society, [the] auto-transparency of the natural and social totality must come to pass, (that is where natural and social matter is organized according to its nature), thus opening the kingdom of freedom."[1099] Without this "leap from necessity to liberty, from substance to subject", there is no communism in the thought of Engels.[1100] It is this Archimedean point that Morfino aims to strongly reject with Spinoza. Morfino argues that when dialectical materialism is guided by this *Wechselwirkung* and not *causa sui*, it remains a System being replaced by the Science of the System. Spinoza, on the other hand, Morfino argues "bars any conception of nature and of history as a *Bildungsroman* of a subject."[1101] The persevering of an existence, Morfino writes, "can never become destined."[1102]

For Engels, Morfino argues, there is still a totality that is present as simultaneity. For Spinoza, Morfino posits, totality is instead a modality of duration and freedom is a degree of power. For Morfino, Engels collapses what in Spinoza is an eternity in an irreducibility of thought and action. Engels does this, Morfino notes, to create a passage "from nature to history, from matter to thought, and from substance to subject."[1103] We suggest here that while Morfino is surely correct that Hegel and Engels do transform matter into thought in the very 'theoretical' way in which he imputes, we should perhaps ask what is this imputed 'animism'? If it is of an *anima*, this being the soul and what Aristotle called "the cause and principle of the living body," it perhaps should not be so confidently aimed at for extermination.[1104] This 'animism' of Engels is 'behind Marx' for Martin. Engels' name contributes therefore to generating the possibility to

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[1093] Morfino, *Plural Temporality,* 30.
[1094] Ibid, 35.
[1095] Ibid.
[1096] Ibid, 37.
[1097] Ibid, 37-8.
[1098] See Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
[1099] Morfino, *Plural Temporality,* 42.
[1100] Ibid, 43.
[1101] Ibid, 44.
[1102] Ibid.
[1103] Ibid.
[1104] Aristotle, "On the Soul," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 561/415b8.

change a political situation. Engels' name, however 'animist,' bears an inner relation to the workers movement *and* science. As a name, Engels thus *is* a generality capable of effectuating a 'transforming transformation,' which is different than the practices of theoretical sciences.

The concept that the late North American Spinozism cannot suffer – "to locate where Engels goes off the rails," Morfino writes – is an 'inversion' which combines anthropological projection and action at once.[1105] For if there is no 'reciprocal action,' then there can be no 'inversion.' Marx's notion of inversion in *Capital* necessitates an interrelation, a reciprocity, even with an unknown or outside. Inversion thus is not simply the doxa of the negation of the negation; inversion names a necessary difference in orientation. It puts its hopes in a new future to which it itself can find no direct path.

Martin calls Engels' thought a naturalism and Morfino calls it an animism. Descola has fundamentally opposed these so-called ontologies. To understand these oppositions, we suggest the following hypothesis. Engels' thought appears as an animism from a perspective where 'teleonomy' and 'invariance' are both at once present and at hand for the scientist, as is the case for the scientists of modern science. This realm of scientific discourse is not, we suggest, strictly coincident with a materialist philosopher and his, her, and their acts of politics. For the materialist's act of politics, we argue, the relation of 'teleonomy' and 'invariance' is not exclusively the realm of modern scientific discourse seeking to eradicate its errors. For Martin and his contemporaries, there is no forgetting of the truth that Engels' discourse introduces. The mode of appearance of the annihilated Communist Party of Indonesia and its ongoing political prohibition forecloses that absolute oblivion. Whereas Martin aims to repeat Engels' truth (its political materialism), Morfino seeks to excise Engels' errors (its theoreticism). Truth and error are not however ontologically identical.

3. On Tan Malaka and the Existence of Indonesian Materialist Philosophy

Martin is not the first Indonesian philosopher to defend Engels' thought against partisan criticism. Long before this 21st century Renaissance, Tan Malaka (b. 1897 – 1949) 'lifted up' Engels. In order to situate the overdetermined position of Engels in this late Indonesian Renaissance, we want to familiarize ourselves with his inceptual philosophical treatise of 'independent' Indonesia and its particular relation to Engels. This is *Madilog* [1951]. This title is an abbreviation (*singkatan)* and synthesis whose expanded elements are **Ma**terialism, **Di**alectics and **Log**ic.

A brief excursus on the life and work of Tan Malaka will help situate the appearance of a consistency in the consideration of Engels in this Indonesian world. Tan Malaka was one of the first leaders of the early communist party of Java.[1106] But he disagreed with the putsch actions of 1926 and 1927 in Banten and West Sumatra.[1107] He was thereby displaced from the 'center' of Indonesian communist power. He lived a nearly twenty-year period of exile away from the Dutch East Indies. *Madilog* begins with an exposition of his return from that exile into Jakarta's

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[1105] See Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), pt. 4. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that Engels formalized the doctrine of inversion in Marx's more scattered stipulations on the concept. See Norman Levine, "The Engelsian Inversion," *Studies in Soviet Thought* 25, no. 4 (1983): 307-321.

[1106] See Harry Poeze, *Verguisd en Vergeten: Tan Malaka, de Linkse beweging en de Indonesische Revolutie, 1945-1949* (Leiden: KILTV, 2007).

[1107] See Tan Malaka, *Massa Actie* (Djakarta: Poestaka Moerba, 1947).

harbor to which we turn below. The work was published for the first time in 1951, two years after Malaka's death in 1948. Indonesia became an independent republic in December 1949.

Malaka relays in the work's preface that he wrote *Madilog* while sheltering silently in Rawajati, a region of Jakarta which he identified as near the shoe factory in the area called Kalibata. *Kali* means river, particularly a smaller waterway than a larger river (*sungai*). *Bata* is rock or stone. At the time, this region was a 'periphery' of Djakarta in contrast to the 'centers' of Tanah Abang, Menteng, Kota, and the regions to the north and closer to the harbor. He tells that he rented a room of 15 square meters and wrote for 8 months, from July 1942 to March 1943. Out of the 'center' of the city, he avoided the notice of others.

After this time and space of orientation is first established, this philosophical treatise inscribes a schema of time that we suggest is fundamental for understanding a specific difference of this world of Indonesian philosophy. This is a schema adequate to Hegel's concept that time is the concept standing there, but Malaka's concept of temporality differs from that of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. For *Madilog* begins by identifying the immediacy of Malaka's time in three different calendars. The three calendars are Japanese, Dutch, and Islamic. The first day is the "official" ("*opisil*"), which is the Japanese calendar and the contemporary 'surface' of colonization and imperial order. The second is the counting of the "lord" (*"tuan*"), which is the Dutch. This Dutch time, he writes, "is currently falling from the throne governing Indonesia."[1108] The Dutch have already been overtaken by the Japanese as the foreign occupier, and yet their mode of meting time remains. The third is the one that "the pupils of the people of Indonesia who go to an Islamic school [*bersekolah Arab*] near to the place where I write this, write as Kamis day, the month of Rajab, the year 30-1362."[1109] This third time is the time of future. Together, this mode of temporality is a specifically colonial one; it knows an absolute inequality and irreducible discrepancy within its situation. The coincidence of the calendars refutes their coincidence. [1110]

But this clash of calendars is not one that lacks an emancipatory possibility for Malaka. On the contrary, Malaka writes, "Indonesia actually does not yet give the time of its own age to itself… true [*tulen*] Indonesia has not yet arisen, emerged, come up and out from its sinking and drowning [*tenggelamnya*] for these centuries [*berabad-abad itu*]."[1111] The aforementioned critique of Engels' so-called animism fails to grasp something that Malaka does grasp here. This is a temporality which has not yet finished but has already begun.

Malaka uses the dislocation of Japanese, Dutch, and Islamic calendricality to introduce another mode of opposition with his own personal experience. He writes, "11 July 1942 into the darkening evening, I arrived in Djakarta."[1112] Against the opening trinitarian temporality,

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[1108] Tan Malaka, *Madilog* (Jakarta: LPPM Tan Malaka, 2008 [1951]), 1.
[1109] Ibid.
[1110] This inner plurality of temporalizations as reflected by three calendars can also be understood by the multiplicity of naming paradigms practiced in Indonesia. According to physical and linguistic anthropologists, Indonesia is a 'super-diverse' nation, with over 400 discrete languages and ethnic groups. There is accordingly an irreducible diversity of personal naming conventions. It is commonly and truthfully reported that many people in Indonesia 'go by' a single name. But others have two or more names. Some have family names, and some do not. And yet the salient personal identifying name is not always the first or the last of these names. In many cases, both of the names of a person with two names are given (i.e., not family) names. This is further complicated by particular given names, such as Muhammad. When referring to a person named Muhammad, one does not refer to him by the single first name, as is the case for most others who have and go by a first given name. See Zane Goebel, *Language and Superdiversity*: *Indonesians Knowledging at Home and Abroad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
[1111] Malaka, *Madilog*, 1.
[1112] Ibid.

Malaka projects a direct opposition. This opposition is political and is posed with the figure of another single person. For Malaka, this agon is Soekarno.[1113]

Malaka demonstrates this difference with an exposition of a dramatic, parallel opposition. This mode of discourse bears great historical provenance in the Malay and Minangkabau worlds in which Malaka was born and grew in Sumatra.[1114] We suggest that this strong mode of opposition constitutes an important attribute of the discourse of what Martin called the Indonesian Renaissance in left thinking. This mode of critique raises its voice into a strong speech in order to identify or impute that true Indonesia has not yet arisen (*belum timbul*). This is the imputation that an agon leader is one that is still 'drowning' in the trinity of calendars that dominates and subjugates Indonesia.

Malaka begins his identification of this difference with two boats arriving at the Djakarta harbor. Malaka states that when he departed from the harbor of Betung aiming for Djakarta, Soekarno also departed from Palembang heading for Djakarta. Their departures form (*rupanya*) a likeness. "And yet there is a difference," he states.[1115] The ship that Malaka arrives on, he writes, is "just a sail boat, old and leaky [*tua dan bocor*]. Even though its name sounds sweet as 'Princess Renjet,' this boat completely became a toy of the wind. If the wind came from the back, it advanced. If from the front, it lay as at anchor."[1116] This image of arrival is contrasted with the physical boat and conditions of the arrival of Soekarno. Malaka writes, "the ship of Ir. Soekarno, it is said, was pulled by the ship powered by a Japanese motor. Because of this, even though we left at the same time of departure and I was two times closer than Ir. Soekarno, my travel time was two times as long as his."[1117] Malaka thus transforms a physical form and instantiation into a temporal and political meaning.

Malaka's lesson here is clear. Through arithmetic reduction, a non-arithmetic and political lesson is learned. There are many demonstrations like this in *Madilog*. Rather than flatter mathematics-in-itself, *Madilog* employs mathematical reason in order to bring forth a political lesson. Here, it metes an absolute difference between two leaders. Throughout the book, arithmetic exercises are employed in order to identify the exploitation and domination of Indonesia and the Indonesian proletariat. This thinking thereby brings forth the rationality of a rebellion within Indonesia, as well as itself being an effort to bring about that emancipation that Malaka names *Indonesia tulen*.

Malaka uses the opening arithmetic expression of the difference of the two boat journeys to transform that quantity again into a quality. The true difference between the arrival of Soekarno's and his boat is not simply quantitative but instead social and political. He writes,

> even though my exile was twice as long as Ir. Soekarno's 10 years, and I actually did not return formally, officially, ceremonially, standardly, but instead returned myself, I am not

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[1113] Classical Javanese thought identifies an opposition which, although appears externally, is also an inner agon. In the *Mahabharata*, the war of the world is between the Kurawa and Pandawa clans, but they are actually sibs. See Franz Magnis Suseno, "Renungan tentang Etika dalam Wayang: Pandawa dan Kurawa," *Kompas,* August 10, 1981.
[1114] On the parallel oppositions in the discursive tradition known as *pantun,* see Sylvia Tiwon, *Breaking the Spell: Colonialism and Literary Renaissance in Indonesia* (Leiden: Semaian, 1999), 55-68 and Erizal Gani, "Kajian terhadap landasan filosofi pantun Minangkabau," *Komposisi: Jurnal Pendidikan Bahasa, Sastra, dan Seni* 10, no. 1 (2012): 1-10. Malaka lived in exile in many localities throughout the world, including China, Soviet Union, Europe, and Southeast Asia.
[1115] Malaka, *Madilog,* 2.
[1116] Ibid.
[1117] Ibid. "Ir." is the honorific title indicating the person is an engineer.

> allowed to work openly. At the same time Soekarno already "has been given" ["*diberi*"] permission for making "propaganda."[1118]

Malaka quotes Soekarno's article entitled "*Di Baris Depan*" ("On the Front Line") in the publication *Sinar Matahari,* which was published by the Head of the Public Division of the propaganda line of Dai Nippon of Palembang. Dai Nippon is the name for the Japanese invading and occupation force of leadership in 'pre-Indonesia.' In the article, Soekarno "recommends" ("*menganjurkan*"), Malaka recounts, that the People of Indonesia (*Rakyat Indonesia*) should "work together with all its might with Dai Nippon. Because only with working with Dai Nippon will we achieve our aim, purpose and goal [*cita cita*] of a great Indonesia in the environment [*lingkungan*] of a great Asia."[1119] Tan Malaka reports here that he has searched in Soekarno and Hatta's writings for considerations regarding answers to the questions of "what is the order [*tata*] of the State of this Great Asia…what is the order of Independent Indonesia on its own [*Indonesia Merdeka sendiri*]" and that he has come up with "empty hands" ["*tangan hampa*"].[1120]

This coupling and contrastive discourse climaxes with a flourish. Malaka writes, "in summation: the two nationalist leaders already began to execute their aim, purpose and goal, yes that is under the tip of the Samurai sword."[1121] With this formulation, Malaka argues that this foundational Indonesian national leadership in the body and person of Soekarno remains a colonized compromise formation.

As if this critique were not enough, Malaka goes for more, adding "in the end there is a third difference."[1122] He writes,

> while these two previously mentioned leaders were welcomed with joy by the followers of the official ceremony like a "beaver" which is famous for staying in the hole which it is making under that water, I entered having to use all of the members of vigilance [*segala anggota keawasan*], which indeed already are well practiced by the flight and exile which has lasted more than 20 years.[1123]

With this, Martin's exposition of the *liar* (illicit) attribute of this Indonesian Left discourse finds a kin and relative, for Malaka writes from the outside, not the inside, of the party in *Madilog*. This is particularly important given Malaka's own articulation of the work of *Madliog* as "undang kaum proletar berpikir."[1124] This can be translated as "inviting the proletariat people to think." *Madilog* identifies a line of thinking tracing from Pythagoras to Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. *Madilog* cherishes Engels' demonstrations of the logic of science; Malaka identifies their salutary effects "for enlightening the people [*mencerdaskan rakyat*]."[1125] Like *Max Havelaar* (1860), *Madilog* thus does not address itself to satisfying the ideology of the capitalist mode of production. *Madilog* proclaims its own aim to bring about a new people (*bangsa*) that is pure and true (*tulen*) over and against this

[1118] Malaka, *Madilog,* 2.
[1119] Ibid.
[1120] Ibid.
[1121] Ibid, 2-3.
[1122] Ibid, 3.
[1123] Ibid.
[1124] Ibid, 4.
[1125] Ibid, xvii.

drowning that it undertakes by its towardness 'to machines' ('*ke mesin*').[1126] *Madilog* does not project the world of human beings in a fourfold schema of 'ontologies.'

We can understand this difference particularly in *Madilog*'s inscription of practice as such. When we earlier quoted Malaka quoting Soekarno encouraging Indonesian cooperation with Dai Nippon, Malaka's writing suddenly broke off from the 'regular' discourse in which he was engaged. In his 'digression,' he noted the date on which Soekarno and Hatta assumed the role as the nationalist leaders, 13 July. Malaka inserts into a parenthetical statement there: "do not be afraid of the number 13."[1127] Throughout *Madilog,* Malaka inveighs upon a mysticism of Indonesian people. This is not a criticism of 'scientific' inaccuracy. Instead, it is a critique of its practical effects, for 'mysticism,' Malaka argues, only advances the drowning in colonial calendars and temporalities for Indonesian people.[1128] Practicing mysticism, Malaka reasons, advances and reproduces the impossibility of overthrowing the *collective* subjugation of Indonesian people in global capitalism to foreign capital. Emancipation, Malaka argues, commences from the rejection of mysticism. Malaka does not call for a 'liquidation' of any Indonesia that is not yet true (*tulen*). Instead, *Madilog* brings forth a critique of Indonesian practices of thinking and leadership which he sees as reproducing the conditions of colonization.

Tan Malaka, we note, is a Muslim. *Madilog* is, we also note, not a discourse of 'establishment' theology as indicated by Fayyadl above. *Madilog* is neither a theologicalization of reason, nor a secular bureaucratic treatment of how quality results from a quantitative combination. *Madilog* instead explains and demonstrates that the powers of capital has made Indonesia a subjugated people. In order to break this numeration by the capitalist mode of production and domination, Pythagorean sciences, such as those practiced by Engels, must be learned by Indonesian people, he states.

Madilog's theoretical practice is thus instructive for identifying the contrasting readings of Engels by Vittorio Morfino and Martin Suryajaya. For Martin cherishes the naturalist systematicity of Engels and his understanding of science as something that makes something else true. Martin and Malaka identify the important practical and political effects stemming from this mode of thinking. Morfino, on the other hand, identifies and critiques the 'anthropocentric animism' of Engels.[1129] Martin and Malaka see instead that Engels' dialectic can be developed into materialist acts of politics. While their interventions may appear to be entirely scholastic, consisting of myriad logical and mathematical symbols, we suggest that this thinking understands that politics can simply mean putting a science and ideology to work.

Part III: "PKS and Lenin" (2012)

Introduction

[1126] Ibid, 500. After this named part, the final part of the work is named "*Ke Taman Manusia*" ("To the Garden of Mankind").

[1127] Ibid, 2.

[1128] *In the Shadows of Lenin,* Romo Franz Magnis writes that Tan Malaka was committed to the eradication of 'mystical' thinking from this new day of Indonesia. Magnis writes that Malaka's philosophy is similar in content to Auguste Comte. Both see man as going through a succession of a social formation that eventuates in positive, scientific understandings and progress. Both therefore possess a notion of the progress of a social formation which is realized by a system of interrelated forces that reorients the social formation as and in knowledge of the social formation. See Franz Magnis Suseno, *Dalam Bayang-Bayang Lenin* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2003), 216-217.

[1129] Engels' notion of *Wechselwirkung* presupposes that there is the presentation of a state of interiority in exteriority. This allows one to recognize a state where something else presents in interiority. Morfino calls this an 'animism.' But without this concept of *Wechselwirkung*, there would not be anything on which to inscribe teleonomy *or* invariance.

We now bring forth a third discursive cairn in this ongoing renaissance of the critique of political economy in Indonesia. We will follow the practice we established earlier in the discussion of *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity* by naming this realm, including its subsequent critiques, by its first thesis. Here, this is "PKS and Lenin." Like *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity*, the writings of "PKS and Lenin" were published originally on the *Indoprogress* website.[1130] Martin Suryajaya participates in both debates.

Whereas *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity* explicitly raises an 'ontological' question with the names of God and Marxism, "PKS and Lenin," on the other hand, raises the question of political thinking and political organization according to the names and concepts of "roads," "water," but also "veiling" ("*berkerudung*"). More than the prior two examples, "PKS and Lenin" is a 'warm' dialogue. This 'warmth' means an intensified force of care that is neither cool nor placid. This can be said to form an important attribute of this Renaissance. This 'warmth' is in no way restricted to the writings published on *Indoprogress*. I witnessed many fierce and strenuous debates in Jakarta during the period of research.[1131]

In his *The Religion of Java,* Clifford Geertz characterized Indonesian and specifically Javanese people as essentially bearing a restrained, polite manner, particularly as understood by their discursive practices and etiquettes.[1132] The particularly dissentious discursivity which we are bringing forth here aims to dislocate the facticity of that orientalist trope. "PKS and Lenin," and this Renaissance more broadly, instead projects a fierce contestation over the social formation itself. It is oriented by discursive intervention and a political action of turning as overturning. It questions the very meaning of *having* a political idea.

1. On *"PKS dan Lenin"* (2012)

Indoprogress published "PKS dan Lenin" ("PKS and Lenin") by Ragil Nugroho and its critical responses within a few days. "*PKS"* is the abbreviated name for the largest Islamic or Islamist political party in contemporary Indonesia, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*.[1133] In many conversations and situations I encountered during my dissertation fieldwork, the name *PKS* was often used as a shorthand expression to stand in for an idea of political Islam, Islamist politics, or Islam in Indonesian Politics. Thus, as a discursive conjunction, "PKS and Lenin" pre-predicates a confrontation of politics.

"PKS and Lenin" was published on May 13, 2012, and is dated as having been written May 9, 2012. This first thesis written by Ragil drew a very strong antithetical response from Ted Sprague entitled "PKS Bukan Lenin" ("PKS [is] Not Lenin").[1134] This was published May 29, 2012, on *Indoprogress* and before this in *The Militant Papers* (*Koran Militan*). Sprague's title sustains the nominals from Ragil's title but has replaced the originary connective conjunction "and" ("*dan*") with a syntactical form of negation "(is) not" ("*bukan"*). This strong second antithesis itself

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[1130] Progress Publishers, we recall, was founded in the Soviet Union in 1931.

[1131] Many of these took place at Garuda, particularly during night hours. We note again that the architectural form of the place of this speech activity is a verandah. A verandah is both an opening and a threshold of interior and exterior space.

[1132] See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), ch. 17.

[1133] Ragil Nugroho, "PKS dan Lenin," *Indoprogress*, May 13, 2012, https://indoprogress.com/2012/05/pks-dan-lenin/.

[1134] There is no grammatical copula present in the Indonesian syntax here.

drew a strong third thesis from Martin Suryajaya entitled "Lenin, PKS, dan Realisme" ("Lenin, PKS and Realism"). This was published May 30, 2012, on *Indoprogress*.

To situate this trinity of writings, we first note that Martin argues that Ragil's position touches on the political idea of 'realism' without calling it by name. In Martin's reading of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909), 'realism' names the thesis that the vanguard party is ahead of the masses, but by 'one step and one step only.'[1135] Martin argues that Ted's position ("PKS is not Lenin") articulates the idea that Lenin identifies and criticizes in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909) as the urge in science to bypass the real social conditions of its own existence. Martin thereby argues for a return to Ragil's thesis in order to clarify this political strategy and aim of 'realism.' We now turn to the contents of these interventions.

Ragil's text opens with great poetic and lyrical panache. For his first utterance proclaims that his question is simple. It is, "what perseveres [*bertahan*] and what falls down [*tersungkur*]?"[1136] This single sentence is set off as its own paragraph. In calling itself trivial (*persoalan yang sepele*), it sets up the questioning of whether what follows is indeed simple, uncomplicated, and therefore without legitimate rebuttal or not. The next utterance is not a sentence with a subject, copula and object, but rather a fragment: "Just a little bit of nostalgia" ("*sedikit nostalgia*").[1137] With this captivating opening, the piece then enters its 'regular,' propositional discursive statements.

Ragil answers to his 'simple' opening question by recalling the moment during and after 1998 in Indonesia. Replacing the reader of 2012 into 1999, he recounts that this was the first election after Soeharto's deposition and abdication of his control on the government of Indonesia. There were two parties of ideologically opposed orientations which grew in this moment. The *PRD, Partai Rakyat Demokrasi* (People's Democratic Party) of the Left and *PK, Partai Keadilan* (The Justice Party), which became *PKS*, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera,* (Prosperous Justice Party) with an Islamic or Islamist orientation. In this election, *PRD* earned 78,000 votes and was the 16th party in terms of votes. *PRD* fell even further into electoral oblivion shortly thereafter. *PK,* on the other hand, rose. *PKS* is now one of the largest political parties in contemporary Indonesia.

In order to make sense of this, Ragil then recollects that 1902 was a difficult time for Lenin. "The room for movement was stuffy [*sumpek*]", he writes.[1138] It was in that condition that he wrote *What is to be Done*? But Ragil says that this book has become 'dusty' on the bookshelves of the Indonesian Left. It is "stored neatly on a sacred shelf as a holy book."[1139] The lesson in this book is very clear, Ragil writes: "tight organization with discipline that is not amateurish so that it is difficult for the authorities to 'hit' the cells."[1140]

Ragil argues that *PKS* has learned this fundamental lesson from Lenin. This learning is indicated because they do not copy Lenin but instead adapt and develop his thought for their own conditions. Ragil reasons, "different soils, different water content" ("*lain tanah beda kadar airnya*").[1141] During the New Order, their 'seed' organization, *Tarbiyah*, went underground and "gathered the masses through *halaqah* (discussion groups) as well as clandestine movements."[1142]

[1135] The background to his usage of 'realism,' Martin notes in a footnote, is exposited at length in the first chapter of his book *Dialectical Materialism*, which was published shortly after "Lenin, PKS, dan Realism" in 2012.
[1136] Nugroho, "PKS dan Lenin."
[1137] Ibid.
[1138] Ibid.
[1139] Ibid.
[1140] Ibid.
[1141] This idea recalls Maria Machiocchi's notion that Mao's thought in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is how to be Leninist elsewhere. For a discussion, see Fagan, "Reading Culture in Revolution."
[1142] Nugroho, "PKS dan Lenin."

It is not *simple* therefore to follow the movements of this organization because they both infiltrated campus organizations and consolidated in mosques. They spoke not only of heaven and hell, but politics. Ragil draws a historical allegory to insult his foe in the Indonesian Left. He writes that *Tarbiyah* was not like Mensheviks who were afraid in 1905. In Indonesia, Ragil writes, "while the leftist movement is still drunk as if it was the only force to overthrow the New Order, PKS works in the real world."[1143]

Ragil states that *PKS*, not the Left, became the actual revolutionary mass movement in the post-counter-revolutionary Indonesia. i.e., the contemporary. For *PKS*, Ragil argues, is engaged in a revolutionary social and political practice. It therefore deserves not only passing regard from the so-called Left, but instead a positive identification as the vanguard who is 'one step and one step only' ahead of the masses. The 'self-perception' of the Indonesian Left as the upholders of the political tradition of Lenin, Ragil argues, is a "false consciousness."[1144] The masses are not wrong in their support of the *PKS*, Ragil surmises. It is the Left intellectuals who carry themselves and their discourse as apart from the masses who err.

Ragil's discourse is critical and at times sarcastic. Rather than always celebrating their own correct assessments of the objective world of capital and capitalism, he beckons, in smarm, for the Left to stop what they are doing. This is a condemnation of the Left wing. He portrays them as busy with their scholastic problems while the *PKS* activists "goes down to the masses."[1145] The *PKS* is therefore actually bringing about an intervention, while the Left's discourse remains ineffectual and ineffective. According to Ragil, the Indonesian Left has not understood the lesson of Lenin's "Left Wing Communism: A Childhood Disease" (1920). Ragil recounts that Lenin there explains that one is not always in a revolutionary situation, and that the party therefore has to work with other forces in society that are not exclusively 'revolutionary.'

To demonstrate his claim, Ragil takes a quotation from a *PKS* cadre. This is not from his own spontaneous experience but from his reading of a writing from an Australian political science professor Greg Fealy. The cadre's statement was heard and recorded as follows: "let's fix potholes and provide good sanitation before thinking about forcing women to wear veils."[1146] He contrasts this with the Left who is "wearing its red t-shirts and singing the Internationale" while *PKS* received over 11 million votes in the 2019 national legislative election.[1147]

This *PKS* practice of community service – blood and grocery donation – may not appear 'revolutionary,' but Ragil states that it builds their power in and with the people. The *PKS* has also understood, he writes, Lenin's short treatise "Where Do We Begin?" (1901), in which Lenin identifies the necessity of a newspaper. For Ragil simply states that this is exactly what *PKS does*. They produce this organ. It is a magazine called *Eyewitness* (*Saksi*) and it is read regularly and massively. It strengthens the base of their 'Islamic' ideology, but it also provides a guide for practical life, such as the best ways to wash clothes and preserve perishables. With a strong

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[1143] Ibid.

[1144] This does not mean, as it is often thought, to be the mistaking of an imaginary for a real relation. It is instead the specific occlusion of the reason that the masses make history.

[1145] This "going down below" ("*turun ke bawah," Turba)* was a *Lekra* practice. See Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts*.

[1146] Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy and Whit Mason, *Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey* (Double Bay: Longueville 2008), 69. Ragil writes that the interview is with a *kader* (cadre) though Fealy writes a "parliamentarian." *Zealous Democrats,* 135.

[1147] Nugroho, "PKS dan Lenin."

presentation of contradiction, Ragil identifies two possibilities for the Left. He writes, "wail at the wall of suffering," or take the *PKS* path, "follow Lenin."[1148]

Days later, *Indoprogress* published a response from Ted Sprague, "PKS is not Lenin." Ted's discourse opens with a partially unconcealed insult of Ragil:

> it is already too frequent that we meet those who poke around in [*mencolek*] Marxism and Leninism for patching up [*menambal*] the holes in their thinking, with the hope that Marxism-Leninism will make their shallow and boring thinking even more attractive, or even dazzle our eyes from the ugliness of their ideas.[1149]

After this poetic and political gathering, Ted raises a substantial question, aimed entirely at *the foundation* of Ragil's thought. Ted asks: is the originary issue *simply* who perseveres and who falls down, as Ragil presupposes? Ted's intervention aims to refute this presupposition. The question of "PKS and Lenin" *cannot* be reduced to a kind of physical existence of the vanguard which can be represented in a standing or sunken physical body, he argues. It cannot be identified as the social movement that is physically 'one step and one step only' ahead of the masses. It cannot be found with a thinking which results in a materialistic conceptualization of human society at all, according to Ted.

Ted finds Lenin teaching a different lesson in *What is to be Done?* (1902). For Ted recollects that Lenin refutes the ideas of economism and specifically the spontaneity of socialism. In "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disease," Ted remembers that Lenin does *not* argue that communists should 'cooperate' with other social forces. Whereas Ragil instructs that organizations should use existent organizations in order to practice for ruling in a future, Ted recalls Lenin teaching that communists should use organizations in order to teach the masses of the bankruptcy of these very institutions themselves. Soviets seek to destroy the bourgeois state's parliamentianism, Ted avers.

Ted concludes with the same idea as his foe Ragil: the only path for the Indonesian Left is the one back to Lenin. But this does not entail for Ted a detour through the *PKS*, as Ragil suggests, for the return to Lenin entails a return to Lenin's revolutionary movement or theory. This is because it advances the rejection of the capitalist mode of production and its ideology and is not an accommodation to it with plans for a future revolutionary tactic that never arrives in the general conditions of imperialism ('the highest stage of capitalism').

Martin's reflection on these two pieces, "Lenin, PKS and Realism" was published May 30, 2012.[1150] The first aspect of his writing that we note is that he has inverted the order of *PKS* and Lenin in his title. Whereas Ragil wrote "PKS and Lenin" and Ted, "PKS is not Lenin", Martin places Lenin into the first position, *PKS* into the second and adjoins a third member, "realism." Martin states that the *PKS* activities begin 'from the real world,' however non-revolutionary these situations may appear. This is a form of laudable political realism, he writes.

In order to defend his thesis, Martin here works with one of Lenin's less quoted works, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909). There, as Martin elucidates at length in his *Dialectical Materialism: A Study of Marxism and Contemporary Philosophy* (2012), Lenin criticizes Ernst Mach for his upholding the idea that there is no material reality outside of the subject's understanding of

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[1148] Ibid.

[1149] Ted Sprague, "PKS bukan Lenin," *Indoprogress,* May 29, 2012, https://indoprogress.com/2012/05/pks-bukan-lenin/.

[1150] Martin Suryajaya, "Lenin, PKS dan Realisme," *Indoprogress,* May 30, 2012. https://indoprogress.com/2012/05/lenin-pks-dan-realisme/. Martin's piece is subtitle "Critique of Ted Sprague's Critique of Ragil Nugroho."

that reality. Lenin saw that for Mach, matter is only a 'mental symbol.' Martin recollects that Lenin identified this in the thought of the social democrat Alexandre Bogdanov. The latter wrote enthusiastically that Marxism rejects the "objectivity of truth."[1151] As a consequence, Martin writes, truth is thereby rendered a relative, not an objective, condition.

Lenin and Martin strongly criticize this position as an idealist philosophical practice.[1152] Martin's position against this is that "epistemologically we embrace realism, namely the view that there is a reality that is external and independent of the subject of knowing."[1153] This is not discontinuous from Marx or Lenin. Martin writes:

> The "fundamental character of materialism," [Lenin] wrote, "is that it *departs from the* objectivity of science, from the recognition of the objective reality reflected by science, while idealism *requires* 'circular movements' to 'deduce' objectivity based on thought, consciousness, the 'psychic'"(Lenin 1962: 294). Lenin delved into a pile of scientific literature to build his argument: he even became involved in the philosophical debate of science about the status of the laws of physics (Lenin 1962: 293).[1154]

Martin's decisive intervention here is not merely that of a Neo-Kantian historian of science who identifies a discrepancy between the understandings of Lenin and Bogdanov. Rather, Martin's 're-learning' of Lenin instructs that Lenin concerned himself with such seemingly abstract questions of 'science' because he understood (i.e., saw) that knowledge has immediate (i.e., determinate character as) political consequences. In order to demonstrate this, Martin explains the specificity of the conjuncture in which Lenin composed this unfashionable work.

After the failure of the 1905 revolution, Martin recounts that the Tsar had allowed for a parliament to convene in 1906 and that the Left entered it in 1907. Alexandre Bogdanov rejected this parliamentary path. Lenin, on the other hand, saw a path within, as well as outside, parliamentary politics. Lenin identified Bogdanov's political ideology as the 'empirio-criticist' standpoint. This kind of heroism is opposed by the notion of strategy for Lenin and Martin. Lenin and Martin recognize that Marxism is precisely not a relativist epistemology because it instead departs from what Martin often describes as a reckoning with reality itself.

Starting from this 'realism,' Martin writes that "socialism is not built by *blaming the masses*…(who) don't like to read books, don't speak English, never associate with world activists, find solidarity with the struggles of the Eskimo people difficult and so on."[1155] This portrayal of the foe here is clear. While Ted and the Left is portrayed as more comfortable in cosmopolitan doctrinal disputes over Lenin's liturgy, Martin thinks that it is more important to go into the 'real' situation and build soviet power.

Citing "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," (1920) Martin recounts Lenin writing that 'inexperienced revolutionaries' think that the legal channels are for 'opportunists' and that this is a 'wrong' idea. It is more difficult and more important to be a revolutionary when the conditions for open revolutionary mass struggle do not exist. Martin thus ratifies the aforementioned judgment that to fix the potholes and water sanitation before thinking about

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[1151] Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, in *Collected Works, Volume 14* (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1962), 122-3, quoted in Suryajaya, "Lenin, PKS dan Realisme." See Suryajaya, *Dialectical Materialism,* ch. 1 "Lenin dan Realisme," esp. 51-56, 70-72.
[1152] Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, 81, quoted in Suryajaya, "Lenin, PKS dan Realisme."
[1153] Suryajaya, "Lenin, PKS dan Realism."
[1154] Ibid.
[1155] Ibid.

forcing women to wear headscarves is correct. In a section entitled 'Reading Marx Slowly,' Martin states that this 'realism' also characterizes the thought of Marx and Engels. Martin refers to Marx's criticism of Mikhail Bakunin who thinks of the will and not of the economic preconditions of the revolution.[1156] Martin recounts that Marx critiqued a voluntarism which thinks that revolution needs only its own faith.

Read slowly, Marx's discourse does not give many 'high flying' revolutionary slogans, he states. It instead locates what Martin calls the 'epistemological fault' in a moral understanding of 'material.' This is done, Martin writes, particularly in two texts published by Marx and Engels in the 1873 and 1874 Italian Socialist Almanac. They are "Political Indifferentism" by Marx and "On Authority" by Engels. Both were written to counter, he writes, the ultra-leftism in Italy which rejected cumbersome and authoritarian bureaucracy as well as worker battles for wage increase. Marx mocks both tendencies. With his inimitable political wits, Marx lampoons those advocating for the position that workers must not battle for their wages and that they must only instead continue to proclaim the emancipation of the working class.

In the following section entitled 'The Importance of a Left Epistemology,' Martin writes there that Ted has replaced Lenin's 'realism' with Lenin's 'phrases.' Ted's attack on Ragil, in the effort to defend Marxism, he writes, kills Marxism. Martin bellows: "*Marxism is a science that rests on implicit methods of analysis and philosophy, which are often not immediately apparent at the level of quotations, which presupposes the study of the history of thought and objective reality.*"[1157] Martin states that the "task" of the Indonesian Left is indeed to combat reformism, "middle-class prophets of culture," and "cultural priests" with their "secular sermons" who state that "there is no objective reality."[1158] This epistemological relativism only builds strength for liberal democracy "and their donors," he says.[1159] Martin's verdict is that Ted has fallen into this trap because he has forsaken objectivity for subjective qualities. This results in what he calls an anti-realist epistemology.

The only way to stop this "exhibitionist" Marxism is to become "methodological" Marxists, according to Martin.[1160] This means reading Marx slowly. It means distinguishing between objective and subjective categories. To absolutize this contrast and the difference between them, Martin writes that there are two portraits here: "Left Facebook activists and the *PKS* activists."[1161] We note here the resemblance with the strong opposition in leadership which we saw in *Madilog* by Tan Malaka.

To conclude this exposition of "PKS and Lenin," we recall that there is a concern with pedagogy expressed by all of the participants. Each contributor accuses in one way or another their foe of an improper reading. Each writer suggests that another has misinterpreted Lenin's thought. Moreover, Ragil, Ted, and Martin all write that *other* Indonesians have not read Marx and Lenin properly. They all diagnose the other with needing reeducation. Furthermore, all accuse others of mistaken inference with regards to interpreting the true meaning of Soviet Russia. Martin accuses Ted of a mechanical transposition, that is, reifying Soviet Russia into a model. Ted on the other hand accuses Ragil of not identifying its true specific difference of the Bolshevik revolution in the historicality of human beings.

Like in *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity*, revealed religion is a fundamental topos for the consideration of the name and concept of Marx in "PKS and Lenin." The inner relationship

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[1156] See Mikhail Bakunin, *Statism and Anarchy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[1157] Suryajaya, "Lenin, PKS dan Realisme," emphasis in original.
[1158] Ibid.
[1159] Ibid.
[1160] Ibid.
[1161] Ibid.

of religion, Marxism, and the Indonesian State again constitutes the central terms of this political consideration. While scholars have identified the 'arche-fossil' root of communism in Java as inextricably imbricated with Islam and its 'political incorporation' of *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Union), Islamic mass political organization in Indonesia, particularly in the 1965 revolutionary situation and event, engaged massively in murdering accused communists.[1162] Not all of this Left Renaissance therefore admires this massive political incorporation and organization of the masses by political Islam. Many people with whom I spoke at Garuda recalled the everyday practices of political Islam in Indonesia that are not emancipatory. Moreover, its parliamentarianism guided by an ideology of revealed religion contradicts the understandings of historical and dialectical materialism in its opposition to the representative parliamentary system. By forgetting this fundamental concept, Ted sees, one never can grasp the *differentia specifica* of the critique of political economy. These tactics and strategies of parliamentarism remain tethered to Feuerbachian inversions of the parliamentary system, he argues. The horizon for Ragil and Martin, according to Ted's analysis, is to make Islamic ideology an effect of the fundamental lumpenproletarianization of Indonesian people as undertaken and assured by the republican parliamentary mode of representation.[1163]

Martin, defending Ragil, sees that the *PKS* actually do serve the people. Ted sees that these people, however, are not a soviet people; their theoretical practice does not, he suggests, disrupt the reproduction of the ideology of an anthropological effectivity that is capital's valorization of itself. Good alms cannot adequately extinguish capital's inferno.

2. On Sexual Difference and Parliamentary Modes of Representation

These ideological differences do not, however, exhaust the political ideas generated through this debate. For there is a political ground of the debate. To understand this condition, we consider here how sexual difference exists in these interventions. This is not, to quote Martin, to bring the problems of the Eskimos to the Indonesian cadres. Instead, we note here how sexual difference is placed at once at the very heart of the political syllogism thought by all of the contributors and yet it nonetheless remains unaddressed by all. Our aim therefore is not to ascertain the 'psychological' motivations for this absent presence. All writers write from something that is fundamentally unseen by them.[1164] Our aim is rather to consider what practical and political considerations can be drawn from this mode of existence that is an inexistence.

To do this we first repeat the originary quotation from Greg Fealy's interview with a *PKS* activist which is used by all contributors in order to generate their positions in "PKS and Lenin." It is: "let's fix potholes and provide good sanitation before thinking about forcing women to wear veils" ("mari kita perbaiki jalanan berlubang dan sediakan sanitasi yang bagus sebelum berpikir memaksakan perempuan berkerundung").[1165] For Ragil and Martin, the statement articulates what Martin calls a political and epistemological 'realism.' They both agree that it is best for a political vanguard to begin with the problems as they actually present themselves to the masses,

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[1162] See Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion* for the former and Robinson, *The Killing Season* for the latter.

[1163] Behind Ted's argument that the contemporary Indonesian politically Islamic ideological revolution is *not* tantamount to the Bolshevik one is the idea that Marx's proletarian revolution is *not* tantamount to Hegel's republican one. If the Marxist revolution is adequate to the *PKS* revolution, there would be no specific differentiation of matter and ideas *qua* the capitalist mode of production as even the young Marx came to understand in his studies of Hegel and Hegelian dialectics.

[1164] See Althusser, "From *Capital* to Marx's Philosophy," in *Reading Capital*.

[1165] Nugroho, "PKS dan Lenin."

'materially,' rather than 'ideologically.' For both of them, 'ideological problems' are diametrically opposed to 'real material problems.' The former are posterior to the latter's priority. 'Real material problems' are instantiated here as water and roads, while 'ideological problems' are instantiated as religious or secular ideas and practices. Ragil and Martin thus posit that the 'ideological' cannot be the basis for the intervention of a vanguard political organization; Martin calls that standpoint subjectivist. Thus, for Martin and Ragil, 'forcing women to wear veils' is such an 'ideological' (read: not material) instance. And yet neither touch the 'ideological' aspect of the statement, that is, '*thinking* about forcing women to wear veils.'

In his antithesis, Ted does not suggest that 'forcing women to wear veils' is a 'material' consideration. He maintains the same duality of 'material' and 'ideal' as Ragil and Martin do. He instead 'simply' inverts their hierarchy while maintaining the logical foundation of their comparison. For Ted, 'material' considerations cannot be held up and over 'ideological' considerations because this leads to reformist positions that lose touch with the ideological content of Lenin's theses. His argument is that the syllogism of *PKS* as ratified by Ragil has not in any way realized the *specifica differentia* of Lenin and Marx's theses that break with parliamentary modes of representation and presentation. But just like Ragil and Martin, Ted does not question the form of syllogism. For all three authors, roads and water 'represent' the material base, and 'religious norms' 'represent' the ideological 'superstructure.' This division is in many ways unsurprising, for few Marxists have developed Althusser's thesis that ideology has a material existence.[1166] None of the authors therefore broach the ideological existence of water and roads, nor the material existence of women, veils, or women in or out of veils.

None of the authors address or even allude to 'woman' or 'women' as espoused in the political theory and tactic expressed by the *PKS* cadre. This syllogism introduces a future decision upon women and woman that is a recalibrating of how she will have to appear in order to exist 'correctly,' and yet none of the authors question the political virtue of this future. Woman here is therefore absolutely centralized. She is the reason for the existence of the syllogism at all. She is its own future. And yet she is *presented and disappeared* at the very same moment. She inexists. She is there and not there in the very crux of the originary syllogism, as well as all of its subsequent endorsements and rejections. We argue here that this mode of inexistence is one from which the new *politeia* is at once made possible but also crossed out by "PKS and Lenin."

These articulations of feminine inexistence, however unintentionally, positively endorse Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan's extremely unpopular and misunderstood theses that '*the* woman' does not exist.[1167] They also provide some important guidance for understanding the political conditions of sexual difference in this particular Indonesian Renaissance with which this chapter is primarily concerned. For the statements by Ragil, Martin, and Ted do not, we suggest, *aim* or *intend* to advance the ideological and material effects of patriarchies and misogynies. Instead, we suggest, this political syllogism that is shared by all doesn't see what it knows itself. This is the categorial question of why women wearing headscarves limits an ingress and egress of the *politeia* at all. "PKS and Lenin" therefore, we suggest, brings one to the very question of whether this revolutionary ideology does or does not constitute a worthy *politeia,* and yet, because none reckon with the foreclosing of the ideological materiality of women, the instance remains repressed.

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[1166] See Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism,* 184-187.
[1167] See Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality,* 7 ff.

Ragil takes up the original utterance spoken from the *PKS* cadre as heard by Professor Dr. Greg Fealy to articulate an understanding of the relationship of the economic base and the ideological superstructure as one where the material is politically primary and the ideological is instead a posterior phenomenon. With this thinking, the 'materiality' of water and roads ought to precede in a political movement the moment of book learning debates in the vanguard. This is how Ragil and Martin characterize the limp Left's mode of movement after its 'failure' in the Reformation.

From Ted's standpoint, if one advances this 'materialistic' analysis of society as that which is prior to its 'ideological' realization, one can never grasp the syllogism of 'no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory.' As such, according to Ted, these cadres will always remain parliamentarians and capitalist reformers. Ted argues that this framework blocks out any movement from the people themselves. This political position forecloses the people's mind in a reasonable rebellion.

All of the authors thus presuppose the existence of the syllogism's contents. This mode of logic is what Lacan calls the male formulae of sexuation. With the feminine formulae, on the other hand, Lacan shows that there is a logical mode of existence whose members are not constituted by the presupposition of existence.[1168] This mode of existence is the not-all (*pas-tout*) $(\neg\forall x\ \phi x)$. The instance of its negation $(\neg\exists x\ \neg\phi x)$ can*not* be understood by the formulae of male sexuation. Lacan calls this negation of the not-all feminine knowledge or feminine jouissance. He says that it is the domain of ethics. He argues that these acts do not simply exist in or act on the realm of the 'all.' These ethics therefore cannot be identified when one presumes that 'thinking' constitutes a simple identity with a 'material base' as roads and water. The writings of "PKS and Lenin" do not question the accessibility of the ethical good for the vanguard. None question the ability and capability of the vanguard to think the 'good.' The evidence of the good represented in materiality presents a guarantee for the evidence of the good of the idea. This schema thereby does not question the decision, or thinking, of this jural or political force itself.

This 'inexistence' emerges in the very temporality by which the syllogism proposes itself. In its postponed scene, some people, who are not those included in this restricted expression, '*think* about forcing women to wear veils.' The syllogism does not state that they necessarily *will* force women to wear veils, as in a mechanical schema where the preconditions of the base mechanically generate an effect in the superstructure, such in the action of loading and unloading a metallic spring. Instead, the presupposition of serving the people materialistically generates here the *possibility* for the party jurists *to think* about that collective *politeia* in such a way that reserves the possibility for the decision that *is* the forcing of women to wear veils. This temporalizes a last hour that never strikes. Its notion of a political intervention is one that reserves a force that 'allows' female existence. It is therefore an accumulation through the speculation on sexual difference and the *politeia*. The existence of woman is thus both necessary and foreclosed here.

3. Recapitulation of "PKS and Lenin"

"PKS and Lenin" opens a clearing for a thinking to decide upon that which it itself reserves. That which has been reserved is the administering of a force on the appearance of woman in the *politeia*. The syllogism is thus the production not of concealment-in-itself but instead a mode of

[1168] Ibid, 79 ff.

surplus concealment. And yet all of the writers of "PKS and Lenin" bypass the very existence of this inexistence. Feminine knowledge or ethics is not *beheld* by those who *identify* it. Our discussion here has identified a foreclosed repression of the appearance of women's bodies within and traversing a Left discourse in this Indonesian Renaissance.

The work of the sculptor, Heidegger said, is one which makes a body be seen originarily in the place that is an alcove in the temple where one worships and thinks.[1169] And because the human body is physically sexuated ('there are some sexual organs'), the mind is likewise also sexuated.[1170] In the next and final chapter of this dissertation, we turn to the sculpture practice of Dolorosa Sinaga and ask why her mode of sculpture artwork does not bypass the encounter of sexual difference and the *politeia*. We will show why Dolo's sculptures and its pedagogical universe 'raises up' this problem into a physical and metaphysical care and concern.

As a general orientation, one can say that Dolo and many of the people at Garuda with whom I spoke seek to *not* advance the same notion as advanced by the *PKS* activist's statement. It might seem that they instead advance the 'direct opposite' of the *PKS*'s statement. Many strongly oppose the worldly effectivity of the ideological state apparatuses that are represented in such a name, *PKS*. They thus do not take the same standpoint as the writers in debate who hypothesize about the possible good which could come out of this idea. The female human beings that Dolo and her studio bring forth in their sculptural artworks are, in Martin's meaning, 'realist,' however 'surrealist' the aesthetic form of appearance of their artworks may, at times, be. The writers in "PKS and Lenin" instead implicitly posit that water and roads are primary and headscarves and females are not primary. They all, however unwittingly, give positive testimony to the inexistence of the woman for man.

But this is not simply a 'pure theoretical' question. This denial of primacy facilitates the legal criminalization of women in Indonesia. This criminalization is widespread and entered high national attention during this dissertation research period with the legislation of the so-called *Omnibus Law* in 2019, to which we will turn in the next chapter of this dissertation. 'Women' are thus absolutely no less legally 'material' than the other 'material' that is legislated by Indonesia's parliamentary state. If we recall that Althusser in *Reading Capital* argued that labor power is the concept that the critique of political economy identifies as the one that classical political economy needs but cannot introduce, we suggest here that in this "PKS and Lenin" debate, what Lacan called feminine knowledge and ethics assumes a similar (non-)position in this particular moment of this Renaissance.[1171] Dolo's artwork and political practice intervenes in this very oblivion. Her sculptures, many of which bear female bodily forms, give form to this 'in-existence.' Her works do not simply speculate on this female inexistence in Indonesia. Instead, they see into and from the place of this witting and unwitting concealment of woman.

All three authors ask how this *PKS* movement can be appropriated by the Left. None ask about the 'immanent' effects of this political theory and tactic on Indonesian women. This elision of woman and its Leftist symptom – the experimental and hypothetical question of how the *PKS* model can be followed in order to achieve a different Left political program later – articulates what many feminists have long known. This is that political theories, even Leftist ones, are regularly anti-feminist. They routinely presuppose a natural occlusion of consent in lieu of force. And yet "PKS and Lenin" also, however unwittingly, positively identifies that feminine

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[1169] See Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Off the Beaten Track* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2 ff.

[1170] On the problem of sexual organs for the Romantic arts, see Joan Copjec, *The Fate of the Image in Church History and in the Modern State* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan Library, 2012).

[1171] See Althusser, *Reading Capital,* 225 ff.

knowledge and jouissance is that out of which a new political idea is possible. For all of the contributors, 'woman' is that which arrives in the structure dictated as 'you will wait and see.'[1172]

In "PKS and Lenin," woman and women are at once promised and completely denied in the place of thinking and political futurity. Woman is at once made necessary for and denied effectivity as temporalizing temporality. Her existence makes possible something other than the mechanical opposition of 'matter' and 'ideas,' and yet the debate does not actually consider what to do with this promise. In the next chapter, we suggest that the artwork and practices of Dolorosa Sinaga, Budi Santoso, and others at Garuda do not withdraw from this precipice but instead grasp a feminist and materialist political practice.

"PKS and Lenin" forecloses its own promise of politics and ethics. The political position which all of the authors of "PKS and Lenin" endorse instead entails reserving and accumulating the possibility of decision regarding the forcing of female bodies into an appearance in the *politeia*. This only postpones engaging with the actual problem of freedom or emancipation in capitalist servitude. This presented and vanished woman articulates the essential concealment of citizen-subjects as a place where materiality and ideology converge as temporality.[1173] In the next and final chapter of this dissertation, we will address how the participation at Garuda and *Somalaing* identify and grasp an idea that in deed turns the time of this *politeia*.

[1172] Jacques Derrida analyzed this idea at length in his last seminars. See his *The Beast and the Sovereign, Vols. I & II*.
[1173] Recall that the New Order propaganda represented the 'night' of the so-called coup d'etat attempt as one where Gerwani women danced around the kidnapped generals before undertaking the physical castration of the generals. See Herlambang, *Kekerasan Budaya Pasca 1965*.

Appendix

Ontological Naturalism and Historical Naturalism

Martin opens his chapter, "Historical Naturalism: An Analytical Reconstruction of the Philosophy of Nature of Friedrich Engels" with a brief elucidation of the "naturalization of philosophy" undertaken by Engels.[1174] Engels' orienting question is what is the connection of thinking and existence? He presents two possibilities: idealism, which admits the primacy of thinking and materialism, which admits the primacy of existence.[1175] Putting his faith in the latter, Engels justifies beginning with nature before proceeding to mankind. This is what Martin calls the "abdication of the autonomy of philosophy."[1176] Philosophy loses its autonomy when human reality is known by a detour through the science of existence.

With this, philosophy is now "in tune" ("*selaras*") with science.[1177] Philosophy cannot persist in thinking of intentionality as the unique 'hallmark of the mental universe' when scientific inquiry indicates that intentionality is instead the function of nerves. Martin places Engels with John Locke, who said that philosophy should be the "underlabourer of science."[1178] In this position, philosophy clarifies concepts and questions the presuppositions of science, but "it cannot bother the substance of science with a mode of proclaiming paradoxical advice or sermons which pretend to be sublime while neglecting scientific findings."[1179] While this recalls Heidegger's hypothesis of the forgetting of being, for Martin this is completely acceptable so long as it allows Marxism to set the course for a 'real change' that leaves behind 'sublime sermons.'

This priority of existence over thinking is what Martin calls the **t**hesis of **m**ethodological **n**aturalism (**TNM**). This thesis posits that "the method of natural sciences is the basis for the method of social-human sciences."[1180] Martin says that this TNM is 'implicit' in Marx and made 'explicit' in Engels. As a proof, he cites the passage from the first Preface of *Capital* where Marx says that the physicist

> either observes natural processes where they occur in their most significant form, and are least affected by disturbing influences, or wherever possible, he makes experiments under conditions which ensure that the process will occur in its pure state. What I have to examine in this work is the capitalist mode of production and the relations of production and forms of intercourse that correspond to it.[1181]

As we have said, this 'scientistic' stance is one of the more unpopular starting points for many late Marxists. Martin states that this is a 'naturalization of epistemology.' It was made explicit by the American philosopher Willard van Orman Quine. Quine thought of the "basing of the study of philosophy about knowledge in the scientific studies about cognitive and neuroscience:

[1174] Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 32.
[1175] For Spinoza, on the other hand, the body and the mind are the same substance, but grasped according to two different modes and attributes. See his *Ethics*, pts. II & III.
[1176] Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 33.
[1177] Ibid, 34.
[1178] Ibid.
[1179] Ibid.
[1180] Ibid.
[1181] Marx, *Capital*, 90, quoted in Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 34.

knowledge as an evolutionary function of brain nerves."[1182] This relating relation is fundamental for Martin's reconstruction of Marx. For because Marx describes the totality of the development of society *based* in its economic aspect as the precondition for the existence of mankind as a species, he likewise is undertaking a methodological naturalism. As Martin notes, this is a dominant approach in recent analytical philosophy.

For Martin, this methodological naturalism of Marx and Engels is actually an ontological naturalism that can be considered a 'physicalism.'[1183] Martin states this as the **t**hesis of **o**ntological **n**aturalism (**TNO**). It is as follows: "that which is, is not other than, or leans on (*atau bertopang*), the physical universe."[1184] In order to explain this, Martin again refers to the first preface of *Capital* where Marx says – "my standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them."[1185] This is, Martin writes, an "ontological naturalism, or physicalism" and adds that "physicalism is a new name for materialism in analytical philosophy."[1186] We note again that the attunement of physicalism and analytical philosophy with Marxism are very far from the 'regular' starting points of late Marxists, both within and outside Indonesia.

This is because Martin is here again attempting to build a peaceful bridge. Here it is between analytical philosophy and Marxism. As in his contribution to *Marxism and the One and Only Divinity* where he sought to demonstrate that Marxism is not contradictory with the foundation of the State Philosophy of Indonesia, (the belief) in a one and only God, here he writes that Marxism rests upon the 'same' foundations as the seemingly a-political, 'pure' scientific discipline of analytical philosophy. But what happens to the sides that are connected by means of these bridges? We noted above that Fayyadl suggests that God is no longer God when God is an ontotheological place or space. And here, we ask, can the problem that Marx and Engels identify as 'ideology' be inscribed by such a 'physicalism'?[1187]

In order to elucidate this 'applied ontology' of Engels, Martin explains what 'that which is' ('*ada*') is for Engels.[1188] In a decisive formulation in the *Anti-Dürhing*, Engels writes that "movement is the mode of existence of material."[1189] Movement is not the absolute foundation of material, but its mode of existence. Material is therewith movement and change. Martin writes that the Aristotelian distinction of substance and accident is no longer, as with Aristotle, the distinction between constancy and movement, but is instead now between substantial movement and accidental movement.[1190]

According to Martin, "substantial movement is movement which is needed for its existence as that thing, while accidental movement is movement which can be discarded without

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[1182] Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 34-5.
[1183] Ibid, 35.
[1184] Ibid.
[1185] Marx, *Capital,* 92, quoted in Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 35. Martin presents the passage in Indonesian in the body of the essay, but in the footnote, he provides the English and puts the phrase 'viewed as a process of natural history' in additional boldface emphasis.
[1186] Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 35.
[1187] Althusser posits that ideology is a 'representation' of the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of existence. See Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism,* 232-272.
[1188] '*Ada*' means 'there is' or 'there exists' and also 'is' and 'exists.'
[1189] Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Duhring: Herr Eigen Duhring's Revolution in Science* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), 464, quoted in Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 36.
[1190] Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 36.

losing something itself."[1191] Martin suggests that Engels' concept of movement facilitates an understanding of being or existence.[1192] For Engels, since there is no material without movement, movement thus constitutes the causal power which causes the existence of material.[1193] This provides the foundation for a 'pure ontology' for Engels. The **d**efinition of 'existence' (***a**da*) (**DA**) for Engels is: K =causal power , x - a thing.

DA: for every x, x is and only is if x possesses the quality K.

$$\forall x(x \text{ exists } \equiv Kx)$$[1194]

Accordingly, for Engels, existence is defined as bearing (*mengandung*) causal power. Martin attributes his understanding here to a fusion of Alexander's Dictum ['to be is to have causal powers'] and a discussion of it by Lynne Rudder Baker.[1195] He writes that this understanding of existence is the approach of sciences (*ilmu-ilmu*). To postulate something in science is to postulate that it can describe a causal relation that is not attributed to another entity.

But the **t**hesis of **O**ntological **N**aturalism (**TNO**) is more specific than the **d**efinition of existence (***a**da*) (**DA)**.[1196] TNO has to show first that existence is equal to the physical universe, or second, existence is equal to propping up the physical universe. This is first demonstrated by 'physical instantiation' and the second with 'supervenience.'[1197]

Physical instantiation can be proved in an everyday mode with 'embodiment.' "Something is only insofar as that something is a physical body, or becomes an element of the physical world (*df*)."[1198] Tied to DA, the specificity of causal power (K) is the physical-causal characteristic of *Kf*. But how does K become Kf? Martin defines 'physical instantiation' (DAp) as follows: DAp: for every x, x is and only is if there is a physical world in such a way so that x forms a member of this physical world and if x forms a member of the physical world then x possesses the physical causal power of Kf.

$$\forall x \{x \text{ exists } \equiv \exists df [x \in df] \wedge [(x \in df) \supset Kfx]\}$$[1199]

Put in other words, "with DAp, it is stated that it is impossible that there is something that is considered to exist if that thing is not an element of the physical world and because of that it does not possess physical-causal power."[1200]

For the second aspect, Martin writes that supervenience states that the characteristic of B supports the characteristic of A if and only if there is no difference of B without a difference to characteristic A. The definition of supervenience is thus: DAk: for every x, x is if and only if it is impossible for x to not possess the quality M and x to possess the quality F and, with other

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[1191] Ibid.
[1192] Ibid, 37.
[1193] Ibid.
[1194] Ibid.
[1195] L.R. Baker *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 98, quoted in Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 37.
[1196] Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 38.
[1197] Ibid.
[1198] Ibid, 38.
[1199] Ibid, 39.
[1200] Ibid.

conditions remaining the same, if x possesses the quality F then x possesses Kf, then if x possesses quality M then x possesses Km.

$$\forall x \{x \text{ exists } \equiv \sim \Diamond [\sim Mx \wedge Fx] \wedge \textit{ceteris paribus}[(Fx \supset Kfx) \supset (Mx \supset Kmx)]\}$$[1201]

Put in other words, "with this it can be stated that the mental universe (ideology, culture) exists precisely because it props up the physical universe such that the causal power of the physical universe conditions the causal power of the mental universe. This conditioning cannot be read as an absolute determinism (because of this, it is important to remember the clause *ceteris paribus* in the formulation."[1202]

Together, Martin posits that if there is relation, it is causality. Thus, if there is a relation between the physical and mental world, as Engels states in his letter to J. Bloch in 1890 and Marx in his *Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in 1859, there is a conditioning causality of the relation. From here, Martin introduces what he calls the complete (***l****engkap*) **d**efinition of existence (***a****da*) (**DLA**) based on the ontological naturalism of Engels: DLA: for every x, x is if and only if x contains K, such that x is if and only if there is df such that x is a member of df and if x is a member of df then k contains Kf or it is impossible that x does not contain M and x contains F and other conditions remaining the same if x contains F then x contains Kf then if x contains M then x contains Km.

$$\forall x < x \text{ exists } \equiv Kx| \; x \text{ exists} \equiv \{\exists df [x \in df] \wedge [(x \in df) \supset Kfx]\} \vee \{\sim \Diamond [\sim Mx \wedge Fx] \wedge \textit{ceteris paribus} [(Fx \supset Kfx) \supset (Mx \supset Kmx)]\} >$$[1203]

For Martin, "this is the complete definition of existence, or 'pure ontology' which is presupposed in an implicit manner in the materialism of Engels (and consequently, in the historical materialism of Marx). Thus, we find the presupposition which justifies the physicalist thesis as 'applied ontology' of Engels that 'what exists is not other than, or supports, the physical universe'".[1204] This means that "ontological naturalism as applied ontology is guaranteed by the complete definition of existence as pure ontology."[1205]

How can we say that the methods of natural science form the basis of human science? If whatever is means whatever carries causal power, then it makes sense that scientific explanations mean the making explicit of causal power through causal predicates. This is what Martin calls **AP** (the principle (***a****sas*) of explanation (***p****enjelasan*)). It is defined as: AP: For every x, there is a theory t, such that x is explained by theory t if and only if there is a one to one correspondence between the causal quality of K from x and the causal predicate of P regarding x and the theory t contains the causal predicate P about x.

$$\forall x \exists t [Jxt \equiv f(Kx, Px) \wedge Pxt]$$ [1206]

[1201] Ibid, 40.
[1202] Ibid. *Ceteris Paribus* means 'with other conditions remaining the same.'
[1203] Ibid.
[1204] Ibid.
[1205] Ibid, 41.
[1206] Ibid.

This means that "explaining is nothing else besides grasping the causal relation between entities through theory."[1207] But this still lacks a recognition of the difference between science and knowledge, for there can be and are causal relations which are not known as such.

The complete (***l****engkap*) principle (***a****sas*) of explanation (***p****enjelasan*) (**ALP**) is: the statement about an inner (*batin*) principle (b*) can be reduced to the statement about the material entity (m*) if and only if there is a one to one correspondence between the class of causal predicates Px and the class of causal predicates Py such that if m* contains Px then b* carries Py.

$$\forall b * \ \forall m * [b * Rm * \equiv f(Px, Py)(Pxm * \supset Pyb *)]$$ [1208]

In other words, "with ALP, it is admitted that there is a conditional reduction between sciences. Social human sciences can be reduced to a natural science *as far as there is a one to one correspondence between the class of mental causal predicates and the class of physical causal predicates*…therefore the physical sciences, with their study of physical facts constitute the foundation for the method of social-human science with their studies of mental facts."[1209]

This leads to the following integral square of Marxist Philosophy:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} TNO & \rightarrow & TNM \\ \uparrow & & \uparrow \\ DLA & \rightarrow & ALP \end{array}$$

TNO- Applied Ontology
TNM- Methodology
ALP- Epistemology
DLA- Pure Ontology[1210]

Martin writes that this fourfold is a non-reductive physicalism.[1211] But what has not been understood is the historical characteristic of historical naturalism which is loaded in the works of Engels.[1212] When Engels says movement is the mode of existence of material, he truly shows the historical quality which is embedded in the physical universe Martin sees.[1213] But the clarification of this historical characteristic necessitates "clarifying dialectics as a mode of basic motion which becomes the foundation for every history."[1214]

This is what Martin calls "Dialectical Calculus." This "takes responsibility for the Marxist dialectic" and is "the Marxist concept most prone to ridicule."[1215] The dialectics of Engels in the *Dialectics of Nature* were, according to Martin, "directly taken from Hegel."[1216] They are: the

[1207] Ibid.
[1208] Ibid, 42.
[1209] Ibid, 42-3.
[1210] Ibid, 43.
[1211] Ibid.
[1212] Ibid.
[1213] Ibid, 44.
[1214] Ibid.
[1215] Ibid.
[1216] Ibid.

change of quantity to quality and back; the negation of negation; the unity of opposites. These laws only become materialist when "*they can descend from* DLA [the complete definition of existence] as 'pure ontology' from TNO [the thesis of ontological naturalism]."[1217]

He continues, "DLA says something is if and only if that something contains/comprises causal power…This is *disposition*. Disposition is the power to actualize something although the process is possibly not actualized."[1218] To depict the first law of dialectics, water is heated and changes quantitative degrees at first, but then later changes qualitatively into steam. For quantitative changes, Martin provides the following definition: "for every x, suppose that x contains disposition D1 and x is subjected to stimulus S, so that x will obtain disposition D2."[1219] But there are changes that are not only connected with one disposition. Thus the model of quantitative change with n dispositions is: "for every x, assume that x contains disposition D1, D3,…Dn, so that x will obtain disposition D2."[1220]

How does qualitative change come from this? Martin writes: for every x, x which contains dispositions based in the class of dispositions a experiences transformations to become x which contains dispositions which are based in a class of dispositions b if and only if it is assumed that x contains dispositions based in a class of dispositions a, c,…, n, so that x contains dispositions based on the class of dispositions b. This generates the DLA from the first law of dialectics.

To depict the second law, Martin writes: everything is from negation (internal relation). This law stands at the origin of the problem Martin examines in his work *Dialectical Materialism: A Study of Marxism and Contemporary Philosophy* (2012). In the first chapter, "The French Ideology," he argues that the 'internal relation' is the original sin of French Ideology and mars the entire 20th century thought which cannot encounter reality because of this original presupposition. Here he has no trouble delineating its formal character: for every x, non-x constitutes a member of x if and only if disposition D1 to Dn constitute members of x and if x contains Dn, then x results in the effect En, and E1 if and only if non-E2, E2 if and only if non-E3, ad infinitum.[1221] This amounts to saying that water can become ice with the effect of cold.

But he hastens to add that this law cannot be used for hyperbolic metaphysical theses, whereby something "always already is with an internal relation with everything in the same mode."[1222] This is mistaken because there are instead a "particular number of essential forms which have particular forms of opposition between effects which are specific for each thing."[1223] The internal relation is a posterior, not prior, logical entailment.

Regarding the third law, the unity of opposites, Martin demonstrates this law in two steps. First: if it is possible that non-x is a member of x and the dispositions of x are at once also possible dispositions of non-x, then it is possible that x is at once non-x. Second: if non-x is a member of x and the dispositions of x are at once also dispositions of non-x, then if it is possible that x is at once non-x, then x is at once non-x.

Together, this is the **f**undamental **t**heory of **d**ialectics (**TFD**): everything which exists is dialectical (or establishes the three laws of dialectics).

[1217] Ibid, 45.
[1218] Ibid.
[1219] Ibid, 46.
[1220] Ibid, 47.
[1221] Ibid, 49.
[1222] Ibid.
[1223] Ibid.

$$\forall x \{[ceteris\ paribus\ (Dkax \supset Dkbx)] \wedge [\sim x \in x] \wedge [x \wedge \sim x]\}$$[1224]

The final section of the chapter is entitled "Historical Naturalism as the Mode of Historical Materialism". The outcome of the work up until now leads to the idea that "historical naturalism is the 'truthmaker' of historical materialism and forms the greatest legacy of Engels for Marxism as well as philosophy and science in general."[1225] Martin writes

> If TFD is used to see TNO, the result is a conception about the reality of the universe which in one side is conditioned by physical structure (thanks to DLA) but on the other side, it can be changed by a social intervention (thanks to TFD) based on the preconditions of the physical structure (as far as TFD continues to be descending from, and therefore being conditioned by, DLA). Thus it can be summarized that TNO forms the foundation which makes the thesis of Historical Materialism (TMH) true. The thesis of historical materialism says: 'the economic basis conditions the superstructure of culture'. In other words, the thesis of Historical Materialism wants to say 'the conditions of physical existence condition the conditions of mental existence'. Meanwhile the thesis of ontological naturalism (TNO) says 'what exists is not other than, or stands on, the physical universe'. Because of this, it can be said that TMH (thesis of historical materialism) constitutes a member of TNO, that TMH is a species from the genus of TNO. With this we can make explicit the model of base and superstructure.[1226]

He expresses this symbolically as: TMH ∈ TNO. To further depict this, a triangle is divided into an upper and lower story, with the upper story again divided into a lower and upper story. TNO appears in the lower story (the 'base' of the triangle). TMH appears in the upper story. Outside of the triangle, the base is indicated as the 'physical universe.' The base of the upper story is labeled the 'economic base' and the upper story of the upper story is the 'superstructure of culture.'[1227]

The inheritance of Engels is this assurance that the base guarantees or secures the superstructure. Recall the tactic and strategy being implemented here. Martin's aim becomes clear here:

> Engels thus advances a dilemma to anti-marxist philosophers of today: either you all reject the thesis of Historical Materialism and therefore make ontological naturalism faulty, or you accept ontological naturalism and therefore accept historical materialism. This dilemma has four horns:
>
> -either they reject TMH with rejecting TNO and therefore they must work with physicists and natural scientists generally
> -either they reject TMH without rejecting TNO and therefore make TNO faulty and any theory which is added for changing TMH will appear as an *ad hoc* step of postulation and which is not economistic in its theoretical mode

[1224] Ibid, 51.
[1225] Ibid, 52. Martin writes "pembenar (*truthmaker*)" in his text.
[1226] Ibid, 54-5.
[1227] Ibid, 54.

> -either they reject TNO without rejecting TMH and therefore make an explanation which is not complete so that TMH appears like an *ad hoc* postulate which is arbitrary and ahistorical
> -either they accept TNO and accept TMH and therefore their explanatory framework is complete and consistent.[1228]

The first choice is idealism, the second dualism, the third ahistorical, and the 4th is the heart of Marxism. This dilemma is the essence of Marxism for Martin.[1229]

Martin's tactic here could be understood as animated by a 'bloc within' strategy.[1230] He wants to go within another organization of society (here, analytical philosophy, as a synecdoche for science writ large) to make them Marxists. He does not do this through a sublime sermon nor an evangelical 'conversion,' but instead by showing that they are already 'ontologically' Marxists. Martin's demonstrations seek to bring about the insight that their own thinking already is founded on the thesis of historical materialism.

Thus, TNO is the truthmaker of TMH. The truthmaker is "something that makes some proposition about reality become true."[1231] His argument is that "there must be something in reality in virtue of which some statement can be considered true."[1232] Martin's argument is that the statement that the base conditions the superstructure is true only if the base conditions the superstructure. And we know it is true because this causality has been demonstrated by the discoveries of social science.

As an example, Martin takes Marx's statement regarding exploitation: "surplus value is obtained as the difference between the value of the product of work and the value of work."[1233] This is true in the sense that it is demonstrated by the empirical analysis in the volumes of *Capital*. And yet the causality of this relation is not strictly 'material.' As Martin writes,

> But the truth which necessitates its truth doesn't arise alone. This truth is also made necessary by the effectiveness of the specific conditions of reality. Reality that is the basis of economy which conditions the superstructure of the social-politic which necessitates the truth of TMH is, in turn, necessary by the reality that there is oxygen such that creatures can live and the society of mankind can appear. The reality of the truthmaker which necessitates TMH is necessitated by another reality, that is, that the existence of the mental universe stands on the existence of the physical universe - in other words, TNO. If so, then TNO constitutes the truthmaker in its meaning which is the most fundamental from the thesis of historical materialism.[1234]

In other words, Martin identifies 'naturalism' as necessary for 'historical materialism.'

[1228] Ibid, 55.
[1229] Ibid, 56.
[1230] On this concept, see McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism,* 76 ff.
[1231] Suryajaya, "Historical Naturalism," 56.
[1232] Ibid.
[1233] Ibid, 56-7.
[1234] Ibid, 57.

Chapter 7: Parrhesia in a People's Porch: An Ethnography of Political Life in the City of Jakarta

§1 *Form of Action in the City*

Before leaving that first night to return to Garuda, an old friend said to me, Jakarta is like Carnaval, but without the drinking. And then he added, well, mostly without the drinking. In the traffic, on the back of the motorcycle at night in Jakarta, I thought, there are so many people in this city, how could one propose a form of unity for this movement.

Opening the door of the gate and re-entering, I saw the telltale signs of a meeting already underway there in the Verandah. There stood a screen on which a luminary slide was being projected. I heard a voice speaking, amplified with the connection of a microphone and electrified public address sound system. It sounded to me like the voice of someone I recognized.

I did not join the meeting at first. I went and sat with Ari and a few others at the small porch at the studio office to watch Indonesian soccer on a small television given poor reception by an analog antenna. We watched the game and subsequent televised concert together, both commenting on how many mosquitoes there were there at that time. For some reason I asked Ari if his parents went on *umroh* (pilgrimage to Mecca not during the hajj season). He said no and that there is a stereotype of Lampung people that they are *kasar* (coarse). I asked whether he had watched *Sexy Killers* (2019), one of the most discussed films at that particular moment. He said, *cuma sedikit, karena panjang*, (only a little, because it is long) and he laughed.

While we were there below, I saw Martin Aleida again. I didn't approach him, as he was getting into a car to leave. A tall, hale, older man, he was still walking with a pronounced limp, but not more so than one year before when I had last seen him.

Ardjuna came down to us at the studio office, and I told him that I had brought what he had asked me to bring: a particular toothpaste and three Alain Badiou books. I showed him two other books that I had also chosen to bring as well: *The Century* [2005] and *Can Politics Be Thought?* [1985]. He pointed at the latter title and said, this is what we are talking about in the meeting, you can come up and join if you want. We are talking about whether there can be something like an alternative to state politics, he said.

This was the meeting of a committee which named itself *KOMITMEN*. This name is a concentration and abbreviation. As a long name, it is "***Komit****e Satu* ***Me****i untuk Kemerdekaa****n****, Kesetaraa****n*** *dan Kesejahteraa****n****"*. This name means "May 1 Committee for Emancipation, Equality and Prosperity" and it makes the concentrated sound of "commitment" ("*KOMITMEN*").

Ari and I eventually did quit the TV and walk up into the Verandah to take a seat and join at the table where several people were sitting and discussing. I saw many familiar faces, as well as many new ones there.

Harry Wibowo was speaking on the microphone and referring to the projected slides. The slides showed numerical data from the National Election Committee, *KPU*. He said that what the data shows is that the strategic activity of voting whereby ballots are cast and their effectivity is destroyed at once, that is, *golput* (*golongan putih*, "white-ing out"), received the 4th highest representation after PDI-P, Gerindra, and Golkar. *Golput* names the political practice that registers presence in representation as voting whilst prohibiting or destroying the validity of the same parliamentary ballot. *Golput* was an electoral event. Many felt that the film *Sexy Killers* (2019) contributed to the *golput* effort.

This does not mean, however, that this electoral event achieved a widespread formation. Many did not *golput*.[1235] But *golput* did advance a 'democratic' strategy and tactic. It is a kind of inversion of the parliamentary system that the parliamentary system gives to itself. He said no doubt that the question with *Golput* is how to transform it. For there is no ultimate, or real, political action to this "white-ing out" that inoperates the parliamentary system. The meeting of *KOMITMEN* was working precisely on this progression. His last slide showed all the fronts who oppose these politics: Neo-post-fordism, authoritarianism, fractured workers movement, militaristic culture, and impunity of human rights violations.

Other meeting participants also spoke up. One introduced himself with his experience organizing with Toyota factory workers nearby in Bekasi. He said with authority, there are challenges that these workers face that are at a remove from the discourse of political organizing underway at the moment. This seemed like a self-criticism of the meeting.

Later in the night, after the meeting had concluded and the beer bottles had been opened, I approached him and a few others and asked if I could introduce myself. One of them said that he had seen me here before, probably at a going away party at the end of a previous stay. He joked that usually when people hear the name Berkeley here, they think about the Berkeley Mafia. He laughed and said this is just an Indonesian joke. He asked me what I thought about Venezuela as an American, and I said I don't know about what is happening really in Venezuela. He said that he had just returned from there and that he had been on a trip to exchange ideas with organizers there. I asked him what he thought of Venezuela. He said, as a place, for him, it was beautiful.

I asked the other young man about his experience organizing in the Toyota factory. He said that he had been there for many years. He was involved with a particular case (*pengadilan*), and that they had won. He asked me how is it that I could be so capable in Indonesian language, and I told them that Ibu Sylvia Tiwon is my teacher in Berkeley, and he said that he had heard her name before.

Another invited me to come to visit what he called his poor (*miskin*) political party's dwelling in Depok, the city which is on the other side of Jakarta's southern border. He told me the name of the party, *Partai Pembebasan Rakyat*, (People's Liberation Party), *PPR*. He said our place is small, crowded, and dirty, please be forewarned. We are a poor leftist party, he said self-deprecatingly. Do you know *PRD* he asked me? I told him I did. Yes, he said. We are a splinter of them. *PRD,* he said, you know, are no longer a leftist political party.

Harry then explained to me the beginnings of *KOMITMEN*. Thin, bespectacled, smoking cigarettes often, of sharp intelligence and quick worded, he said *KOMITMEN* is a May Day alliance. It works for justice (*adilan*) and freedom (*pembebasan*) for *masyarakat* (society, community). He explained that each year, Jokowi invites several union representatives to the State Palace on May Day. They show up wearing yellow clothes, he explains.[1236] The president doesn't invite those who are wearing red.

The first group to organize in opposition to the yellow were *Gerakan Buruh untuk Rakyat* (Workers Movement for the People). *KOMITMEN*, he said, began as a splinter from them

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[1235] Codet said to me once that he doesn't want to talk about politics all the time. He said he wants to take care of his fish in the aquariums in the rear of the studio to make a nice environment (*lingkungan*). In other words, the activist position was not the only mode of activity in this place.

[1236] In the *Philosophie des Geistes,* in the part entitled "Sensibility," Hegel writes, "yellow is not merely the symbol of ordinary gaiety but also of jaundiced envy." *Philosophy of Mind Being Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, 81.

because of three issues of disagreement. They were, he said, anti-LGBT.[1237] Secondly, they did not foreground the Papua and 1965 issue. *KOMITMEN* thus formed by scission. I asked, are you in an alliance with them or opponents (*saingan*) and he said *saingan*.

We sat at the table where there were several stacks of books and newspapers. I caught a glimpse of one title, *Don't Drink Your Milk!* (1977), Later, I learned that it explains how hyper-industrialized agriculture and the production of milk as a commodity is bad, not good, for human health. Ardjuna asked me if I had seen the film about Jack Kevorkian, *You Don't Know Jack* (2010), with Al Pacino. No, I hadn't I said. He told others and me then about what Kevorkian did, how he put people to death, how he was imprisoned but had a reduced term. He told us all that assisted suicide is not legal in Japan, but in Scandinavia it is. He asked me, isn't the Church strong in Scandinavia? Does assisted suicide happen frequently in America? I recalled the story from a former Dutch language teacher, who often told the same story about suicide in the Netherlands. She told our class of the social gathering in Holland where a person invited their family and loved ones together only to then go upstairs and commit suicide. Ardjuna said, Japan has the highest suicide rate in the world. Someone else said no its Korea, and then, emending, said wryly, the South not North.

That first night back, I went home from Garuda after 2am, as usual.[1238] Ari hailed a Grab bike for me with his cellphone. When the picture of the driver appeared on his mobile phone, it showed a woman, as made-known by her *jilbab*. I looked at him surprised. He said "*tak mungkin, tak mungkin*" ("impossible"). When the driver came towards us at the *pangkalan ojek* (motorcycle taxi post), it indeed was not a woman. He was perhaps 18 years old. He said that this person in the photograph is a woman, but she isn't audacious (*tak berani*) to take passengers at night, so he came instead. They are in a driver cooperative (*koperasi*) together, he told us. He repeatedly asked Ari to cancel the order, as it would be clear to the app that the hailed driver would not be taking me, and this would prevent her from incurring any penalty. On the ride back, the driver repeatedly told me that the driver is a woman and that she isn't dauntless (*berani*) to take passengers at night. Towards the end, he asked me where I was from. I said America. When he let me off, after paying him for the ride in Indonesian Rupiah, he requested an American dollar for a souvenir.

§2 *Culture and Enframement*

During the year of dissertation research, I rented a room in a house in the Rawajati neighborhood of Jakarta, six kilometers from Garuda, which is in the Pinang Ranti neighborhood of East Jakarta. When I told Dolo who our landlord is, she said that she knew her well and that she had worked as a commissioner on the National Women's Committee, *Komnas Perempuan*. This is a high-ranking and prominent position of government.

Dolo had just returned from England. When I went to Garuda to see her, I first met Om Yayak again. His white hair was pulled up into a thin ponytail and his quick warm laugh opened his mouth to show his infrequent teeth as before. Other friends from the past several years at

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[1237] This was not the only instance of learning that 'LGBT' divided a contemporary Indonesian political situation. Someone else with whom I spoke talked about her involvement in a women's movement (*gerakan*). She said that in their meetings, they are mostly discussing the problem of religion and particularly political Islam. But the women's movement is breaking along the lines of those who support LGBT and those that don't, and those that are in solidarity with Papua, and those that are not. *Pecah* (shattered), she said, making her hand's fingers spread as far apart from each other as possible.

[1238] At this hour, the return trip takes 15 minutes as compared to the more than one hour it takes during the same day's evening rush hour.

Garuda were there as well. Ardjuna said that Dolo was inside unpacking and that she would come out hearing that I had arrived.

Entering the Verandah from its back door, she gave a shout of jubilation and shuffled over to give a warm embrace and hug. I inquired about her trip. She had been teaching at the St. Martin's Fine Arts Institute in London for 4 weeks. She had attended St. Martin's from 1980 to 1982. The director now was one of her classmates. Her trip was a bit of a *KKN* (collusion, corruption, nepotism) she said, in a gesture of self-criticism.

She had also visited Newcastle, to visit Alex Supartono, as well as Paris and Utrecht, where she visited a design academy. She then went to Venice for the Biennale. She was a jury member for the Indonesian exhibition. The trip had recharged her batteries, she said. I asked how the skill of the students in London and Utrecht are compared to here and she said, "*tak kalah*" ("Indonesia is not defeated"). She noted that the installation seemed to be the primary medium of the student work she saw. She said, it is clear that they are learning it from the teachers and the academy.

But her more incisive consideration was the following. She said that the students and artists there are very good at doing concept design. As an example, she said that in Utrecht the students wanted to make an aesthetic presentation of the idea of the Netherlands living on manmade land, as a way of accessing "who" populates this land, city, and society. But when it came to the aesthetic presentation, the artwork itself tended to become a "knowledge" rather than an artwork. There is thereby no artwork at all. This makes her, she said, worried about the future.

Sitting again at the same tables and on the same long benches as I had for the previous four years, I saw again a triptych painting that hangs on the wall outside the bedroom where I first stayed at Garuda.[1239] The title of the work is *Kereta Api Indonesia.* This can be translated simply as "The Train of Indonesia."[1240] In the panel farthest to the right for the viewer is the engine car of the train. In it stands the driving conductors. The middle panel is the executive class carriage. Men in suits sit comfortably there. In the panel to the left is the common people's class. It is a handsome painting.

I met the painter of *Kereta Api Indonesia*, Tanto, when he came to Garuda. He traveled that day from Tangerang, the city on the other side of the western border of Jakarta, when his friends from *Taring Padi* had traveled from Yogyakarta to Garuda as well.[1241] Om Yayak had also traveled to Garuda from Yogyakarta with the *Taring Padi* troupe that day. He was flying out to Germany the next day. His daughter was getting married there and he said, what a pity if her father wasn't at the wedding. Hearing the news of their wedding, he said that he told everyone, give me work! And then he bought the airplane ticket. The wedding was to be in Köln. He said after the wedding, they would travel through Switzerland. They would go to Bern, Geneva, and Zurich, where, he told me, there is an *ekstrim kiri* (extreme left).

When I first met Yayak years before at Garuda, I had known of him as having done an immense work of hundreds of drawings for the *Sejarah Gerakan Kiri Indonesia Para Pemula* [*History of the Indonesian Left Movement: For Beginner*s] (2016) book. He described that immensely productive work process as "good, bad, doesn't matter, the essence is that it's made!" Over time, I learned

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[1239] This is a guest room that is reserved for Dolo's own parents. Dolo usually called it her parents' room. She said that whenever they came to stay, it is their room, but it was also regularly inhabited by other guests, including myself.

[1240] This translation elides that "*kereta api*" is more literally "wagon of fire" or even "a blazing carriage."

[1241] Budi told me that he was one of the original founding members of *Taring Padi*. His appearance was unlike many other *Taring Padi* artists. He had no tattoos showing. He appeared fit for athletic competition.

that he, like many others, was forced into exile as an Indonesian citizen-subject during the New Order Period. He like others lived outside of Indonesia because his life was threatened by the New Order Indonesian state apparatus. Yayak had written and sung a song, "*Tanah untuk Rakyat"* ("Land (is) for the people") that teased, joked with, or bothered those officials who were interpellated by this song's story of state plunder. Yayak fled to Germany and stayed there until after Soeharto was deposed in 1998. I said, you must have learned to speak German. He said, just enough to live and then made a gesture with his hand towards his mouth as when eating.

That night of Dolo's return, I asked Yayak about how Bilven was doing. He said, he's alone in Bandung. The person who was with him went back to Padang because his parents were sick. He added, it's hard, taking care of the house and working alone. And I asked him about the book raid, about a year ago, on bookstores and left books throughout Indonesia. He said, yes, it happened to Bilven. No, they didn't take the books, but they came in against his wishes and terrorized him. He said, now Bilven has a lock and locks up.

Adi kept talking about the situation of the *Ahmadiyah* community in West Lombok who have been terrorized repeatedly. Adi's skin is significantly tattooed. "*Realis*" not "*ornamentalis,*" he explained to me once. He had some new ones on his fingers since I last saw him. Yes, they are the most recent (*terbaru*) ones, he said, and pronated his fingers to show me.

The year before, Adi showed me the working edit of his documentary about *Sunda Wiwitan*. The film is about the discrimination that this group of Indonesian citizen-subjects face. A confession of religion is demanded by the Indonesian state apparatus, but *Sunda Wiwitan* is not an available choice. *Sunda Wiwitan* is not admitted, and yet there are myriad practitioners, particularly in West Java. These people are therefore exiled from their own citizen-subjecthood that interpellates them as subjects. Adi's film shows how these particular citizen-subjects encounter myriad modes and instances of injustice in the republic because of this inclusion as exclusion.

His documentary's protagonist is an elementary school aged girl. She explains to the camera about how her teachers harass her for her religion. But it is not just or simply hateful speech activity. Her parents also explain to the camera that they cannot get an official marriage certificate because this requires a certificate which they cannot obtain for their marriage without choosing a different religion. Religion is thus clearly a material, not simply an 'epi-phenomenal,' condition and attribute of political life.

Adi explained that the *Ahmadiyah* in Lombok are being attacked by other communities. They have been forcibly dissipated (*digusur*). The community has lost its ground. He is searching for funders to pay him to go and film there. Adi, born and raised in Jakarta, has for a long time been active as a filmmaker, particularly as an ambassador of indigenous communities in Indonesia. That night, he had brought smoked boar (*celeng*) from the mountainous region of north and central Java, Ceremai, to Garuda. *Celeng* (Boar) is also the name of his film production outfit. Its logo is a boar with a celluloid film stock reel coming out the back of its bucking body. This smoked boar is coated in spices and dried coconut. Everyone marveled over its flavor. Adi said, it can be ordered. He can be the agent, he said and laughed. The land in the mountainous region of *Ceremai*, he said to me, it is still natural, still real (*masih natural, masih real*).

Ardjuna had two books on the table that Dolo had brought back from England. I read the titles, *Why Suicide?* (2010) and *When Bad Things Happen to Good People* (1981). He had another stack of books that he had recently bought at a book fair that just ended in Bandung. The largest in the whole world, he told me. And he showed me the coupon he had used to get 60-80% off.

We began to talk about one book in particular. It looked like a photography book. In fact, Ardjuna told me, it shows a collection of documentation gathered from famous people. The

photos are of miscellaneous curiosities. There was a photograph of a list of bizarre words that Ronald Dahl had written on a piece of paper. Ardjuna then used the book to explain something to me. He said, do you know what "*kurang kerjaan*" means? I said, only literally I suppose. It could mean "less work," as an action or a substantive. It can be either a comparative or a state, and I asked, does it mean something like 'lazy' or 'under productive'? He said, yes, in a way, it is used in that way.

But then he reframed this. He said, that which is said is that which is refuted so that we turn it over to make that meaning into a good meaning. This is not therefore "simple" opposition. Rather, its usage is such that that which *says* 'less work' *changes that meaning* of 'less work' into a different meaning of 'less work.' The book is not a masterpiece, he said. Its virtue is instead its critique of work and specifically an ideology which imputes the ideas of more or less work. It is a critique of a mode of attention that lacks even the awareness of its own mode of attention.[1242]

Wimbledon showed on the large TV in the Verandah. Serena Williams won her semifinal match. Ardjuna asked if I knew how many grand slams Serena has won. I did not and he told me, 23. He shook his head and snickered, in admiration for her greatness. Later, there was UFC and boxing on the TV. After that *Schindler's List* (1993), which we watched until the end. K. said afterwards, what a good film. Touching, he said. The man saving over a thousand people and being killed himself.

Ardjuna asked me after if I had read Susan Sontag, and I said I had a bit. We each said something that we learned from her. For me this was from her essay on photography. Photography is a technology that facilitates the consideration of time and yet time cannot be represented therein. He recalled that *Illness as Metaphor* (1978) teaches that illness is *not* simply a metaphor. He mentioned the book *Under the Sign of Saturn* (1980). He said that he had read it 30 years ago and that it brought him to tears. He said, I reread it recently and again it brought me to tears.[1243] He brought me out his copy of the book, which he marked and dated on the front page with his name and 1985. He said, read it, but don't read it now. There is an essay in it on Syberberg's film *Our Hitler* (1977), he said.

He then began explaining New German Cinema to all those who were listening. He said, Didier Huberman was the one who stood apart from the others and heavily criticized Werner Herzog and Wim Wenders for going into Hollywood film. Rainer Werner Fassbinder, he reminded us, defended their decision. Ardjuna said, Jean-Marie Straub was the genius of the generation. He told everyone how he lived in exile from both France and Germany. Herzog, he continued, is interested in the sublime of film. Ardjuna told the story about how Herzog got into a car crash with someone. When he met that person, he said, you must be in my films. This man did come to then be an actor in six of Herzog's films afterwards. He told everyone gathered there listening that Herzog walked from Germany to France for days after a famous film critic died.[1244]

[1242] On this surrealist practice, see André Breton, *Manifestoes of Surrealism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972).

[1243] Gus Dur is commemorated as having cried *the first time* he read Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in Morocco in 1979. See M. Haromain, "Ketika Gus Dur Menangis Lihat Kitab Etika Aristoteles," *Poles* 9 (September 2000), http://nu.or.id/fragmen/ketika-gus-dur-menangis-lihat-kitab-etika-aristoteles-FcwdL.

[1244] In relation to Surrealism and Herzog, I mentioned the work of Luis Buñuel. I said the title of his film as "Virdiana" [ver-DEE-an-yah] and Ardjuna corrected and said "Viridiana" [vir-ID-E-an-ah]. He also corrected me later in reference to Wim Wenders' film, *Lighting Over Water* (1984). I said, incorrectly, that the film was a portrait of the dying artist Man Ran. He corrected and said Nicholas Ray. Man Ray (b. 1890 – 1976) was a European surrealist and Nicholas Ray (b. 1911 – 1979) an American filmmaker.

Herzog was an enthusiastic supporter and producer of Joshua Oppenheimer's film *The Act of Killing* (2012). Herzog said upon seeing Joshua's footage that he "immediately knew that he had never seen anything like that, never seen anything as powerful, as frightening, and as surreal as what was on the screen, and I immediately said this is big, this is truly truly big."[1245] I asked Ardjuna if he'd seen Edwin's film, *Babi Buta Yang Ingin Terbang* (2008). He said he had not and didn't know of it. He said he had not seen Garin Nugroho's new film, *Kucumbu Indah Tubuhku* (2019), another "hot topic" film at that moment for some dedicated film goers in Jakarta either.

Later, Ardjuna was discoursing to several listening. I was half listening and half watching the boxing match; I was trying and failing to imagine going into a ring with an opponent in this way. Ardjuna said, Dylan we are talking about indigenous people and how they don't have a written sacred document. They worship the ancestors, their grandparents. They live without this transcendent notion of God.

He explained the name of Rene Magritte's painting, "*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*" ("This is not a pipe") to all listening. He said, this statement contradicts itself. Again, he said, *Illness as Metaphor* (1978) explains that illness is *not* a metaphor, or not *essentially* a metaphor. Both point out that discursivity is not *itself* tantamount to existence.

§3 *Conjuncture in the Politeia*

I awoke one weekend morning to the emergence of a large gathering of people in the small streets immediately outside the home in which I stayed in the Rawajati neighborhood of Jakarta. This mass of people, thousands at its peak, had come together because of a particular preaching and collective prayer event which took place throughout the day at the *Jami At-Taubah* mosque beside the *Makam al-Habib Munzir bin Fuad-al Musawa*. '*Makam'* is both 'grave' and 'shrine.' The gathering organization was the *Majelis Rasulullah.* Those who came were primarily youths, both male and female. Many females were wearing black *niqab* dress.

"*Tutup*," (closed), my housemate said. These youth, he said to me, are attracted to these charismatic preachers because they do not yet have *wawasan* (insight). Their black clothes are adorned with golden threads bearing the names of their own particular religious groups. Many bore Palestinian flags. Men went to the front and were closest to the mosque; the women sat, closely packed together, far out away from the mosque and into the narrow streets throughout the neighborhood. Their size grew throughout the day. They left a small footpath in the middle of the street to allow for entry and exit. Walking this path, Jenny and I exited the neighborhood to meet hailed motorcycle taxis. We traveled to another neighborhood in South Jakarta to the independent film theater, *Kinosaurus*.[1246]

Kinosaurus was not as crowded as it had been the night before. The night before, I had come to the theater but did not succeed in buying a ticket because the showing had sold out by

[1245] Drafhouse Films, "Werner Herzog on the Act of Killing," Youtube, July 18, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HyBhdFLTaU.

[1246] Before heading into the movie theater that day, Jenny and I went to an exhibition in the storefront beside the bookstore. The exhibition showed a singing duo, male and female, with photographs and documents beginning in the 1970s at the University of Indonesia Literature, French, and Anthropology departments and up to the present. There were two ladies sitting in the gallery, in front of a drum kit and guitar, a place from which a performance had already or would soon take place. After seeing all the photos, I realized that one of the ladies there was in all of the photographs that are shown on the walls of the gallery. When I came to recognize this in seeing her, I let my surprise be known, Oh wow, it is you! She smiled and laughed. There is presentation, not only representation.

the time I arrived. *Kinosaurus* is a small, single room movie theater. Although there is a maximum of 30 tickets, the room feels nearly full with 10 viewers.

The sold-out showing was for *Kucumbu Indah Tubuhku* (2019) the new Garin Nugroho film. The film was given an English title *Memories of My Body* although the Indonesian title could be more directly translated into English as "I Flatter My Beautiful Body," or "I Fondle My Beautiful Body." *Memories of My Body* does not conserve the beautiful palindromic aspect of *Kucumbu Indah Tubuhku,* for the same '*-ku*', short for '*aku'* (I, me, mine), both opens and closes the title. *Memories of my Body* moreover lacks the central word – beauty (*indah*) – of the title, and its imputed form of action of the 'I' that is doing the flattering or kissing of my body. Be this as it may, *Memories of my Body* conserves the overall concept of the film extraordinarily adequately.

Garin has been the most well-known or popularly recognized director of "independent" or Art film in Indonesia for more than the past two decades. Garin's name is akin to the place of the name Jean Luc Godard 'globally,' and his work has likewise been the subject and object of both praise and dissatisfaction.

The release of *Kucumbu Indah Tubuhku* generated a stormy stir in Indonesia. The film opened briefly in theaters and was subsequently banned from being exhibited. The film exhibits sexual relations, some of which are between men in exploitative and unfree modes. But *Kucumbu Indah Tubuhku* is not just an exhibition of sex and power. It is not pornography or pornographic. And yet the suppression of the public, commercial screenings of the film increased the public interest and attention towards the film. That night, we saw an early work by Garin, *Surat Untuk Bidadari* [*Letter for an Angel*] (1994). There were about 10 other viewers in the movie theater.

Letter for an Angel is a story set on the island of Sumba in eastern Indonesia. Although it is a narrative film, it bears many attributes of ethnographic film. The film repeatedly shows the people of Sumba in communal practices, such as weaving *ikat*, conducting elaborate funeral ceremonies, riding horses, dancing, and singing. The exhibition of these communal practices of village people in Sumba is, we note, addressed to a metropolitan Indonesian and moreover foreign audience, for the film originarily contains intradiegetic English subtitles.

As the title indicates, the film exhibits letters for an angel. The first meaning of these titular epistles comes from the hands of the central protagonist, a young boy, who writes letters asking an angel why he has had such a hard-trodden destiny. His angelic schoolteacher reads and writes letters in return to him. But this notion of an angelic epistle does not end there. The central antagonist of the film is a village villain, who kills men to steal women. When this villain is killed by the young boy, the boy is tried in an Indonesian court of law. The 'communal' people show up at the trial and shout out against the judge in the boy's defense. They speak out against and verbally attack the state apparatus' prosecutor. The 'communal' people defend the act which is the killing of the thief. Their fearless speech can also be understood as a 'letter for an angel.'

The film moreover develops a critique of the process of modern colonization in eastern Indonesia. This is particularly acute in a scene where Indonesian capitalists are producing a commercial advertisement with a photography shoot in a rural region of Sumba.[1247] The model is an Indonesian woman who is wearing 'traditional' eastern Indonesian indigenous regional clothing (*kain ikat)* while also wearing high heels. The clothing marks the particular identification of this cultural appropriation. Happening upon this scene, the young boy steals a polaroid camera from the shoot. In a cinematic gesture, his small theft appears as an expropriation amidst the exploitation of eastern Indonesia by Indonesian capitals. The film manages to skate by the

[1247] The national is not contrary to the 'global' identification here, for it is the transnational corporation name – Kodak – that appears in this 'peripheral' place of Garin's imaginary Sumba.

criticism here of repeating this Indonesian colonization of the East by making this camera the source and origin of the boy's action of self-determination.[1248]

This critique of modern colonization does not stop there. At school, the boy looks into his schoolbook and sees a picture, under which it is written in the national Indonesian language, "this is my mother" ("*Ini Ibu saya*"). The young boy says to the teacher, this is not my mother, for he is an orphan. At home after school, he takes his polaroid camera and takes a picture of the Madonna. He returns to the classroom and says this is my mother. He puts it in his book and reads, this is my mother. Faced with the same book's exhibition of a picture and inscription "this is my father" ("*Ini Bapak saya*"), again, the young boy refuses to accept. He then goes to the grave, digs up his father and drags him on a sled hauled by a horse. He takes a polaroid of his dead father, brings it back to class, and says, this is what my father looks like! The village has to have a ceremony to apologize to the spirits for disrespecting the dead because of this. This facilitates the depiction of sacrificing animals, chewing *sirih pinang* (betel nut), and uttering spells by a ritual specialist. With this, we can see how the film both participates in a hegemonic ethnology whereby eastern Indonesia is 'naturally' a place of 'wild being,' while it also brings forth the voice of a people of Sumba speaking out and rejecting the injustice of the colonizing state apparatus.[1249]

In the previous chapter of this dissertation, we recalled Martin Suryajaya asking whether or not Indonesians should be concerned with the struggles of Eskimo people. Although Garin's film indeed minimally reproduces the historical hegemonic domination of eastern Indonesia, the film teaches the lesson that the colonization of eastern Indonesia does not stop in the middle of the 20th century with so called national independence and decolonization. Moreover, it shows that 'communal,' 'non-modern' people speak out and against the judgment of the modern state apparatus.

This speaking-out takes place specifically in the courtroom. The judge does not side with the people's demands. The boy indeed goes to juvenile detention and is incarcerated for his act. At the film's end, he lays in bed. Two miniature palm frond angels hang over him at his bedside. His angel on earth brings him his belongings there and leaves. But his own statuette angel, the one made of palm fronds, hangs and twirls above him and his bed as the film ends. The film therefore shows that an angelic persona persists beside the one whose acts are just and who is incarcerated by the state apparatus.

§4. *The Attributes of Having-Been and Ek-static Existence*

I had brought *Persona* (dir. Ingmar Bergman, 1967) for Indra, as an *oleh-oleh* (small souvenir gift). I had been wanting to watch a film with him and Adi because we had been discussing film whenever we met at Garuda. Adi told me that he re-watched *Indonesia Calling* (dir. Joris Ivens,

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[1248] There is a longstanding idea in Javanese culture of the hand meeting the thing that is both tool and weapon at once. For a discussion, see Dylan Fagan, "The Excentric Film Project of Gotot Prakosa," *Bijdragen tot de taal, land, en volkenkunde* 177, no. 1 (2021): 94-123.

[1249] *Letter for an Angel* (1994), we note, does not absolutely lack the question of sexuation. In the film, the young boy takes a polaroid photograph of his teacher while she sleeps. She wakes and finds him there. Neither speak in an uncut, slow long shot. She takes his young head with her hand. They face each other directly. The camera takes its leave and is replaced by a morning landscape. There is an extradiegetic voice-over. She is speaking. She speaks in a local language. These words are translated into English in an intradiegetic subtitle. She asks him, "do you want to feel my breast?" and then, "I'll let you kiss it." The boy does not speak. She sings a lullaby in a local language whose English language translation is given, "Sleep, baby, sleep."

1947) and that he wanted to talk about it. But we had all been busy with other things and not found the time together.

That evening at Garuda, the central team working on publishing the book, *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Substance* (2019), were meeting at the big table in the studio office. At that time, the book had already been in working progress for several years, and it was planned to be finished within the next 10 days. During the meeting, Indra pulled up on one of the desktop computers an Adobe file of the book's photographic gallery to show me. It contained photographs of Dolo's entire *oeuvre*, over 500 sculptures. It was my first time seeing all of the works together in one place, and it took my breath away.

The earliest slide photographs are from her years as a student at *IKJ* (Jakarta Art Institute). These works were made in the 1970s and appear now as the genre of abstract formalism. They are studies in shape and form. The next moment evinces an absolute discontinuity with the first moment. These are the works Dolo made as a postgraduate at the St. Martin's School of Art in London from 1980-1982. The academy's aesthetic education at that time was such that sculptors made sculptures not only with classical modes and techniques, but also with entirely new and revolutionary forms and processes. This genre has been called "post-Caroist sculpture."[1250] The works from the next period, made upon her return to Jakarta and in the setting up of her *Somalaing* studio in 1987, evince an artist who is forging the strongest ideas with her sculptures.

We sat during the meeting with the Jack Daniel's bottle that Dolo brought back from her trip to Europe. Ari pressured Indra to drink. You are sick, it is good for you, he said. Indra assented. He began to tell us about his father, Bachtiar Siagian. He said, there is a question. Is there a leftist tradition of Indonesian film? It is supposed to be Bachtiar Siagian, a *Lekra* member and his own father. We are supposed to know this from his films, such as *Violetta* (1962), which I had recently seen at a screening in a micro-cinema in the back of a coffee shop in the Manggarai region of Jakarta. That film, he said, is more of a nationalist than a socialist realist film though. It could only obliquely be understood as a leftist film, he said.

He said that growing up in Medan, his father was exposed to and influenced by multitudes of visual, literary, and performing arts cultures. He enumerated these as Chinese, Indian, Javanese, Sunda, and Batak. He then mentioned the Asia-Africa Film Conference. He said that so-called leftist Indonesian films were sent to other socialist countries, such as in Africa. These Indonesian films have not been kept here; they instead exist in foreign film archives. He said that it is a dream of his to go to Cairo, or somewhere else, and do research on these Indonesian films. But, he said, as you know, you do one or the other, research or work (*berkerja*). He had told me before that he has been working in an advertising office on the computer with Adobe and other related software programs. I asked him, *apa kabar*? He laughed and said self-deprecatingly, I become a corporate slave (*jadi budak korporat*). He said that he is working on a film about his father, but that it would be more personal and not only about the cold war context of his father as a political and then ex-political prisoner.[1251]

Others had left the table and it was only Ari and I left listening intently. Ari was wearing a red t-shirt that is itself an artwork of *Taring Padi*. On its surface is a slogan and a pictorial image. The words say, "Old Sins Do Not Forget" ("*Dosa Lama Jangan Dilupakan*"). In its picture, a

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[1250] Alex Supartono and Sony Karsono, eds., *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Matter* (Jakarta: Somalaing Art Studio, Red & White Publishing, and Jakarta Art Institute Press, 2019), 476.

[1251] For a historiographical account of this cinema, see Krishna Sen, "What's 'oppositional' in Indonesian Cinema?," in *Rethinking Third Cinema,* ed. Anthony Guneratne and Wimal Dissanayake (New York: Routledge, 2004), 159-177.

minister or businessman wears a suit and smiles standing atop a field of human skulls. Indra wore a black t-shirt inlaid with the visage of a deer in yellow. Below is written "*Survive!*". *Survive!* is the name of an art gallery in Yogyakarta run by a member of *Taring Padi*.

Indra showed us an image he had in his phone from a Whatsapp chat. It is a 1958 magazine synopsis of his father's most well-known though lost film, *Turang* (1957).[1252] Indra's finding and bringing forth this inscription articulates a difference, we suggest, *within* the idea of space or placement. For Indra is showing that his father and his father's films are not 'misplaced' or 'lost' in the sense that their mode of being-in-the-world is simply not present to hand. Instead, his effort in retrieving shows that his father and father's work are not present to hand because they exist in a mode of annihilation, extermination, extinction, all of which his act overturns. He is rejecting this mode of inexistence that is not simply forgetting, for he is *remembering* him.

After 4 hours sitting around the studio office table and having been repeatedly asked to come up to the Verandah and to join the others, we three went up there together. There was a gathering of people there. They were sitting together on long benches, discussing. There were stacks of books on the large rectangular tables as usual. I sat and opened a short story collection entitled *Orang-Orang Pinggiran* [*Marginal Peoples*] (2019). The book had been personally inscribed to Dolo and Ardjuna by the author, Lea Pamungkas. I next opened a book by Seno Gumira Ajidarma, *Dilarang Nyanyi di Kamar Mandi* [*Don't Sing in the Bathroom*] (2019). Sony, an editor of the *Dolorosa Sinaga* book, and I began to talk about this author and his other works. I said I liked *Jazz, Perfume, and the Incident* (1996). Sony said he had read *Saksi Mata* (1994) before that one and preferred it. Both are 'masked' fictionalizations of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.[1253] I said that with *Jazz, Perfume, and the Incident,* Seno creates a triptych that makes the work operate as a kind of unity and dispersion at once. This works at the level of the genre itself, whereby the true identity of the titular incident, which is the violent torture of East Timorese people by the occupying Indonesian state apparatus, is only made apparent through its seemingly 'strange' identities as 'jazz' and 'perfume' back on the home front in the mid 1990s Jakarta metropolitan world. The book thus shows that these commodity masks of the city life work to conceal the eponymic 'incident' of violent colonization in so-called marginal spaces and places. The work thus exits melodramatic discourse and instead enters the discourse which this dissertation calls the critique of political economy. That is, it points out and critiques those social relations which are reproduced by the capitalist mode of production. Thus, the triptych itself denies any naïve attempt to classify the work as *either* fact or fiction. Is it even a novel, Sony asked? Do we call it a novel?

During our discussion, I saw, again, over Sony's shoulder, the painting *Kereta Api Indonesia* (*The Train of Indonesia*). I surprised myself. Sony, I said, look, a triptych. He said, oh wow, that is incredible, we were just talking about it and there it appears. When Dolo heard us talking about *Kereta Api Indonesia*, she asked if I liked the work. I said yes very much, not going into the explanation that I had been in a process of rediscovering it for the past few weeks. She said that she really likes it as well. I looked again at the panels. The right panel is the driver car. The left panel is the executive class and the middle panel is the economy class car. This is not how I had remembered it as we first recalled here when I had inverted the left and center panels. I saw the work again recreated thereby.

[1252] The publication was *Minggu Pagi*.

[1253] For an autobiographical account of these events, see Naldo Rei, *Resistance: A Childhood Fighting for East Timor* (St. Lucia, Qld.: University of Queensland, 2011).

Reading parts of *Don't Sing in the Shower* together to each other, Sony and I talked about how the text speaks in a voice that is a spoken dialect of the people (*rakyat*) of Jakarta. This could be seen in the cover of the book which is the film poster.[1254] There is a smiling woman in the center of the picture. She is flanked by the rest of the cast. Sony explained that it is a film about an urban village (*kampung)* in Jakarta. This film, Sony said, is from the male perspective. Upon seeing the cover, Ari said, if the film is going to be successful (*laku*), it has to have a pretty woman or handsome man. Other forms of Art can sell without this, but film must have this, Ari said. This is because, he said, a film must interest your heart (*menarik hati*). If a film doesn't have this, you will just look at it and think, why is there this film, he explained.

I had been carrying a Radiohead *Amnesiac* (2001) CD in my bag. I wanted to give it as an *oleh-oleh* to Ardjuna. But I held back because there were others present there, and I didn't have a gift for everyone at that moment. At that very moment, Ardjuna went over to the stereo and amplified for us all to hear, *Amnesiac* by Radiohead. We had brought the same CD to the same place at the same moment, making there exist two of the same CDs. When I brought out the CD into the open and explained this much, there grew a small wonder amongst us.[1255] Sony, Ari and I kept marveling at this co-incidence. The same CD? The same CD, I said.

Adi and I sat together, and he gave me his impressions of *Indonesia Calling* (1946). He said it is good. To explain this, he said, the film shows a strike of port workers in Australia. These dock workers refuse to load weapons onto a ship being sent to the Dutch army in Indonesia. The filmmaker, Joris Ivens, is 'hereditarially' a Dutchman. But the film turns against this imperial state to propagate a solidarity between the dock workers union in Australia and colonized people of the human world. The film propagates an anti-imperialist, internationalist alliance against the Dutch attempt to recolonize the so-called colonial possessions that they had lost to the Japanese four years before in 1942 and which already proclaimed (*proklamir*) national independence (*merdeka*) as Indonesia in 1945. The film's mode of existence thereby disrupts the very political conditions that its very own existence inhabits.

Adi's hair formed a single dreadlock that came out of the bottom of his t-shirt. The t-shirt was a political artwork which he had made that said simply: SAVE CIREMAI. People called his long dreadlock his tail (*ekor*). His body is, as we said, covered with indigenous tattoo motifs of indigenous peoples with whom he learned their tattoo techniques, motifs, and beliefs.

He said of *Indonesia Calling* that it is very good for showing the internationalism against the Dutch military aggression. But he also had his critique of the film. He said, who is that guy who is speaking at the end? Who is that Indonesian man who is giving the rousing speech at the end? The film never gives his name, he said, and it should. We need this data, he said.

Returning to look into the gallery walls of Garuda again, I found frames there that I had forgotten and now re-encountered. One brought together four portraits into one frame. I could recognize one of the figures as Om Yayak. From their winter jackets and hats, all of the figures appeared to be Indonesians in the Netherlands or Europe. From their gait, they appeared as exiles and not vacationers. I looked closer at Yayak's face. In the work, his face casts a shadow in the shape of lotus flower petals. His face thus falls from itself as petals do from plants.

[1254] The story was made into a film in 2019.

[1255] There is a Javanese idiom that expresses this situation extraordinarily adequately: *loro tunggal loro* ("two [but] single [but] two"). But it also, we note, that of the commodity form, for the commodity form endows the form of appearance with a specular singularity that *is* instead a material difference. For the former, see Petrus Joseph Zoetmoelder, *Pantheism and Monism in Javanese Suluk literature: Islamic and Indian mysticism in an Indonesian setting* (Leiden: Koninklyk Instituut Voor Taal, Land-, en Volkenkunde, 1995), 121.

By the end of this night, K. was a bit drunk. He said loudly and dramatically, we all know, everyone knows, the Arab spring was done by Nato. We are living in the world occupied by Nato. He mocked the Indonesian government speaking in imperial English: "come invest in my country!" This Washington Consensus is why, he explained, there is the *Golput* electoral strategy. Both presidential candidates, Jokowi and General Prabowo, are, he said, seeking the same 'neoliberal' foreign investment strategy to benefit the capitalist class of Indonesia. I remembered then a friend from Berkeley asking me, how does class struggle present there in Indonesia? I thought now, many Indonesian people know about the American government's participation in capital's war crimes and anti-communist genocides *not only* in Indonesia but also elsewhere, such as in Chile, Brazil, and elsewhere.

K. said that when Ardjuna met Franz Magnis Suseno after the latter wrote in *Kompas*, the Indonesian national newspaper of record, that Jokowi is the lesser of two evils and that one ought to choose the lesser of two evils, Ardjuna beat him up with his words (*hajar dia*). Ardjuna joined our conversation and responded to K.'s explanation. What kind of theologian tells you to *choose evil*? K. had spent some of his lifetime in parishes in East Java, including one which was bombed (*yang dibom*). He was under no democratic delusion that Indonesia is a harmonious *politeia* shared fairly and equally by all.

§5 *A Discourse on Art delivered by Martin Suryajaya*

Ardjuna said to me, let's go to Martin's speech tomorrow. It is at *TIM*. We can meet there.

TIM is the art center of Jakarta. There is the *Art Institute of Jakarta* (IKJ) as well as several auditoria, galleries, commercial movie theater (*Cinema 21*) and a non-commercial movie theater (*Kineforum*). At *TIM's* front gate on *Jalan Cikini Raya* (Central Cikini Street), there hangs a banner that reads: "*Komunisme HARAM di negeri ini*" ("Communism is *haram* in this country"). *Haram* means both prohibited, forbidden, but also sinful.

That day, I entered *TIM* from the back gate on *Jalan Kali Pasir* at the Art Institute of Jakarta (*IKJ*). Before entering the gate that day, I sat at a small roadside snack stall and chatted with a stranger there. He told me that he had been here on *Jalan Kali Pasir* in this same place since the beginning of *IKJ* in the 1970s. This was a long time ago, he said. Then, they accepted anyone. It wasn't like it is now. 'Elite,' he clarified.

I mentioned that I had done research on Gotot Prakosa and he told me that he remembered Gotot. He was extraordinary (*hebat*), he said. The man said that he himself did not graduate (*tidak lulus*) or receive a degree from *IKJ*, but because he has lived for this time at its gate, he worked on many films. He described this as working to do whatever (*apasaja*). He pointed across the street and said he lived right here. There were several buildings there, behind a large tree.

One time, he said, a Japanese director came to *IKJ* and needed snow for his shooting but was stymied by the tropical climate and his film idea. The director was puzzled. He didn't know what to do because he found himself in such a warm place as Jakarta. This man recalled that he himself resolved the problem. He made the snow on the set by mixing soap and water to make bubbles. Its aqueous bubbles gave the appearance of snow. The Japanese director said to him, you're crazy! He smiled and laughed. He said, many great artworks have been made here at *IKJ* and they are made with imagination. You begin with imagination, he said. We can't think anything without imagination. If there wasn't imagination, there wouldn't be Indonesia, he said.

From there, I went through the back gate of *TIM* and attended the 49th anniversary celebration of *IKJ*. This particular anniversary year was called "*Menuju Tahun Emas*" ("Toward

the Golden Year"), identifying itself as the eve of the 50th anniversary in the next year to come. In the auditorium, I sat with Ardjuna. He said he hadn't been here in 40 years. He knew many, seemingly all, of those present there that day and he introduced me to many of them. He left the auditorium for much of the invocatory addresses to go outside and smoke.[1256] I remained sitting and listening.

Seno Gumira Ajidarma, the rector of the Jakarta Art Institute (*IKJ*), and the author of the aforementioned *Don't Sing in the Bathroom* amongst others, was the first to speak. He emphasized art's vocation of critique. After he spoke, there was a musical performance. They played the Betawi music of *gambang kromong*, a local genre of this region of Jakarta and its 'autochthonous' people. The music consists of a *kendang* drum, a Chinese string instrument, and woodwind, flute and gamelan instruments. This music is a local music that grew in the urban life of Betawi and its people for the past hundreds of years. One of the musicians I knew from Garuda as Ardjuna's friend.

The central activity of this commemorative party was Martin Suryaja's *Seni Pidato* (A Discourse on Art). His particular talk was entitled, "The Destiny [*Nasib*] of the Artist in the Future City." The written text of his spoken address was given out to attendees in a small pamphlet booklet that day. Martin began by invoking how the World Economic Forum has described the future of human beings as planned by automation and algorithms. This is sometimes called a fourth capitalist revolution, he said. This raises questions about the existence of the artist and art critic as well as the speculation of their end, death, and replacement by the 'netizen' (*'netijen'*). Countering pessimism, Martin said that Art will not exactly die in these conditions and our future. This is because, he said, we cannot underestimate the boundlessness of our human stupidity. The audience laughed at his criticism and joke.

We know this boundlessness, he said, from the way that the majority can think itself as the minority. This received a second laughter but with a different more complicated sound than the first. There was a recognition of the joke being advanced there. This is a 'local' reference for the audience to the mass movement organized by a citizen-subject 'identity' as Muslim Indonesians, who have presented themselves as a persecuted citizen-subject minority people when they are instead, as a majority, often persecuting others, who are citizen-subject minorities. These include not only LGBT peoples and communities, but also many others who are simply not the Muslim majority. In metropolitan Jakarta and this particular environment at *IKJ*, this includes Chinese Indonesian citizen-subjects. Martin's critique and joke thus concerns an actual oppression. The vocation of the artist, he said, remains to identify this story of 'stupidity.' You must exist in touch with the people and their contradictions, he said. In doing so, Martin celebrated the artists and artistry of *IKJ*.

After the address ended, there was a reception gathering directly outside the auditorium for all to attend. I spoke there first with Martin Aleida. He told me that he had written something and wanted my help to translate it. He said, it is about *The Act of Killing* (2012). I did so at a later time. In his piece, Martin Aleida writes how *The Act of Killing* contributed to the actual 2016 verdict by the International People's Tribunal (IPT) in The Hague which states that the Government of Indonesia is guilty of crimes against humanity. He compared Joshua to Multatuli and *Max Havelaar* (1860). When we talked that day at *IKJ,* he wondered whether Anwar Congo, the film's protagonist and anti-hero, loved Joshua in some way.

[1256] Slamet Rahardjo said that the legends of Indonesian film came from *IKJ*. A city government minister of culture and tourism spoke and said that after some time when Jakarta turned its priorities to infrastructure, now it is focusing on culture, and this is shown by the ongoing 'renovation' of *TIM*, which, God willing, will be done in 2021.

In his essay, Martin Aleida responds to the criticism that the film is not ethical because it entraps Anwar Congo and those who are caught up in the filming because they did not understand or consent to this filmmaking process. Martin Aleida rejects this notion. He says, No! It is Anwar Congo who is not ethical, not Joshua! The film and its screening in the Netherlands acted to activate the IPT verdict. The film is a political intervention and for this, Martin Aleida writes, the film succeeds.

Standing at the reception, I saw a student carrying their cello case through the atrium on their back. I asked Ardjuna about his own playing of the cello. I had seen a portrait drawing of him on the wall at Garuda playing cello. He said, yes, he played cello, and added, all of the other instruments as well, although not the woodwinds. He joked that he even slept in the instrument closet at *IKJ* from time to time at that time. I asked him if he knew the kora instrument. He said no. I told him about it and that I would bring over a kora CD to Garuda later for us to listen to together.

In this gathering after the convocation exercise, I extended my thanks and appreciation to Martin Suryajaya for his remarks, which he courteously and gently prevented from going on for too long. I asked and he told me that he was writing his PhD on Logic at this time, but that he was also working at the Ministry with the Director General Hilmar Farid on an education program. I joked, so you're giving the students Hegel's *Logic* I hope, and he laughed.

§6 *Poetry Unburied: The Having-been and Ek-static Existence of the Politeia*

In the same screening series of Garin's films as *Surat Untuk Bidadari* (1994), I went to the screening of his film *Puisi Tak Terkuburkan* [*Unburied Poetry*] (2000). Released shortly after the deposition of Soeharto, the opening intertitles state that between 500,000 to 2,000,000 were killed and disappeared by the so-called "event" ("*peristiwa*") of 1965 in Indonesia. As in *Letter for an Angel* (1994)*, Unburied Poetry* (2000) brings forth an ethnographic film discourse within its encompassing narrative and melodramatic film genre. *Unburied Poetry* (2000) includes recordings of the music, dance, and oral poetic art traditions of an Indonesian 'ethnic minority' – here, Gayo – which Garin positions 'against' a diegetic majoritarian and hegemonic Indonesian republic.

Unburied Poetry uses the 'local' poetic mode of storytelling to relay a story of 1965. Like a one act play, the film stages the story of prisoners incarcerated during the 1965 event in a Gayo world. One of the film's strongest gestures is when one of the prisoners attempts to obstruct their own ears by shoving anything they could find at-hand in their prison cell into their ear canals in an effort to obstruct the sense power of their ears and prevent themselves from having to hear the torture of other inmates.

If Theodor Adorno asked the question of whether poetry is possible after Auschwitz, *Unburied Poetry,* we suggest, shows that one answer to this question is yes because Auschwitz is not a universal name for all 20th and 21st century human worlds. There are other worlds invoked by this question that are not found by the name Auschwitz. Garin identifies this here by representing the Indonesian event of 1965 as a local, not simply 'national,' phenomenon. Garin thereby tells a story of the inner-exile of modern sovereignty; there is not simply a national paradigm of power and sovereignty. Garin's films helps recognize that Adorno's question evinces the worst kind of Hegelian idea of an end in time, for it can think that *all* of the possibilities of the names of this kind of political exception are known or understood by a German or European one. The film recognizes that this modern paradigm of sovereignty – the emergency – is an archipelago of both secret and un-secret prisons. Garin is exhibiting the existence of a 'local' prison which dislocates the notion that all prisons have all already been brought to light.

This film screening, like many others at microcinemas throughout Jakarta in which I participated during the period of research, was witnessed by a small quantum of people.[1257] The apparatus of micro-cinema is composed principally by the availability of witnessing a film with others. These screens are venues of persuasion. Their telos is not an immense maximal quantum of viewers but rather the foundation of a minimum.

§7 *Pedagogy and the Politeia*

The International People's Tribunal (IPT) project undertaken by many at Garuda began with the goal of obtaining a verdict of crimes against humanity by the Government of Indonesia for the events of 1965 from the IPT court in the Netherlands. With an immense and sustained effort of many people across different national situations, they achieved their goal in 2016. The verdict has been delivered.[1258]

At the next meeting of *KOMITMEN* and IPT 1965 activists, the discussion continued of what is to be done. A brief dispute arose amongst meeting participants about whether the youth know about the *TAP MPRS* XXV/1966 and the ongoing legalization of the emergency status on which the Indonesian state apparatus exerts the bans that makes illegal the existence and dissemination of communism or Marxism-Leninism in Indonesia. Harry said that the youth *do* know about the *MPRS*, the everyday idea in Indonesia that communism has to be annihilated (*harus dibasmi*), and that any contrary notion is liable to charge of treason (*makar*). He therefore advocated for a campaign that explained the legal infrastructure of *MPRS* that holds this together.

But another meeting participant responded and said that we shouldn't go for the hardest thing first. Instead, they suggested, because the youth care so much about the 'greatness' of Indonesia, we should bring forth an agitation and socialization that Indonesia would be so much greater were it not for this anti-communist ideology that led to the killing off an entire generation of intellectuals. This could be done with focus group discussions (FGDs) on campuses and *pesantren*, they said.[1259] The dispute was not resolved. Later, the participants planned an action to mark the anniversary of the final report of the International People's Tribunal (IPT). There was a discussion regarding the possibility of making a center in the Netherlands which is dedicated for Indonesian trauma. Harry said that the idea seems a bit off the mark to him, a bit too narrow of a focus, and perhaps not right, but that there is this possibility.

I spoke after the meeting dispersed with Andreas, one my most constant and close companions at Garuda. We talked about his blog that he maintains about the 1965-66 Indonesian genocide. He said to me, smiling, that he is always updating it. He tries to let it go, but then he remembers something else, and he has to go back to it. He could almost always be found in the Verandah on his laptop. After I asked, he told me that he had grown up in Japan and Hong Kong. His father worked for the Indonesian national bank. This contradicted my expectations of the 'origin' of someone who now dedicates their life at this moment to making-known the memory of 1965 victims as his activism. After many times of postponing, I asked him why he has become such an active activist of the 1965 genocide. He said that he had family that

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[1257] There were generally between ten and fifteen people in the micro-cinema screenings which I attended in Jakarta.
[1258] See "Final Report of the IPT 1965," *International People's Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity Indonesia 1965*, Accessed 4-20-22, https://www.tribunal1965.org/en/final-report-of-the-ipt-1965/.
[1259] This plan hewed closely to the aforementioned identification of the NGO framing of knowledge and politics in contemporary Indonesia, for its solution to its political problems took the form of an NGO action that is a "FGD" ("focus group discussion").

was accused and that they suffered. But that this only came to him later in life. This was not the primary cause.

As an undergraduate, he joined the Economics department of the University of Indonesia in 1984. The neoliberal order, he reiterated. The department graduated many future barons who controlled, and were financially enriched immensely by, the New Order financial economy. After graduation, he did work for a few companies. But then, he said, that once he was touched by human rights (*hak asasi manusia, HAM*), he could never stop. He could never go back to working in corporations. He began to work for NGOs (*LSM, lembaga swadaya masyarakat*) and dedicated his life to this work. He began to paint as well. His painting exhibitions, thematizing the 1965 anti-communist genocide, have been attacked by militant anti-communist mass organizations (*ormas*) such as *PP* (*Pancasila Pemuda*) and *FPI* (*Front Pembela Islam*). This happened both in Semarang and Yogyakarta. His paintings bear a strong red and black color schema.

Like many others at Garuda, he had learned the histories of the exiled existence of Indonesian citizen-subjects by the state apparatus. Even before the Indonesian Government, the Dutch East Indies government also did this, he reminded. After the communist rebellions in West Sumatra and Banten in 1926 and 1927, seeking to overthrow the Dutch imperial state, the state massively encamped and incarcerated these so-called communist political prisoners into the most distant prison colony possibility, located in the Southeastern region of what is today the Papua province and region of Indonesia. The place is named *Digul; 'di'* is 'in' and '*gul'* is 'gaol.'

This camp strategy persisted during the Indonesian New Order when, after the 'emergency' of 1965, the government sent many so-called communist political prisoners to Buru, an island located in the so-called peripheral Ambon region of Indonesia. With both Buru and Digul before, 'cultural workers' ('poets' Plato called them) are *not cast out* of the *politeia*. They are *cast out within* the Republic. But their destiny does not conclude in this imprisonment. He reminded that in *Indonesia Calling* (1946), these Indonesians who are calling out and speaking freely on the waterfront in Australia are the descendants of those who were imprisoned in DiGul. As we noted above, the state also, he recalled, cultivated and maintained an archipelago of prisons that massively incarcerated Indonesians throughout the country under the auspice of the 'emergency decision' to eradicate communism. This was a massive process and thereby uneven in its existence.

I had brought the *kora* CD, *New Ancient Strings* (1999), to give to Ardjuna as a gift of thanks. I referred to our earlier conversation about it when giving it. I told him that it was a copy and that I couldn't give him the original because the one I was carrying was itself a gift from my parents. He opened it and began to play it. We listen to it together with others. That night, it played it for several hours. I estimated in my notebook that it was four hours, nearly continuously.

He listened extremely carefully. A younger musician who was often at Garuda and a kind of student or pupil (*murid*) of Ardjuna's was listening with us as well. A percussionist, he said that when he first heard this *kora*, it sounded to him like an Indian dialect of music, and also, but in a less strong way, a Chinese dialect. When I said it was from Mali in Africa, he said he was first surprised it was African. In Indonesia, he said, percussion music from Africa is popular, but rarely string music. *Kora* is a string instrument that can be called a harp. This *New Ancient Strings* (1999) was recorded on the 22nd of September 1997 on Mali's Independence Day in the city of Bamako. The recording indicates the following technical condition: "Recorded at 20-bit

resolution in a natural acoustic, without any artificial reverberations."[1260] The kora musicians are Toumani Diabate and Ballake Sissoko.

After listening, Ardjuna said with an intent harkening to those gathered and listening to him, think of the form of indigenous music, such as the *kora* and the myriad forms that indigenous peoples of Indonesia made. Contrast *what* western music is with *what* 'music' is in the cultures of the people comprising the people of Indonesia. *Musik* is, he said, a lexical, and therefore conceptual, loan or introduction. *Lagu* is now 'song,' but it is of course not 'music.' Archaically, it is more akin to 'tune' and not at all therefore identical ontologically with the essence of 'music.' There is no such existence as a concert in the way that the notion of 'music' understands the concept of music, performance, and audience by Mozart, Chopin, Bach, or Philip Glass. That music is written and performed. It is played by players and heard by audiences. The *kora* and *gamelan*, for instance, of course today are 'performed' by 'performers' or 'musicians' 'for' 'audiences.' And yet its very *mode* of existence is essentially unlike the writings of Bach or Mozart. The former is moulded in a mode of production, that is, a social formation, that is not the modern or capitalist ones. Ardjuna's point is to demonstrate that this 'music,' *New Ancient Strings*, participates, anthropologically, according to a communal, not a capitalist, mode of individuation. This is not the theoretical position that 'other worlds are possible.' It is instead a question of *how* to listen to an actuality of another world.

Both Dolo and Ardjuna recalled many times that even the so-called modern Indonesian arts and its creation of art were and are produced in a mode of habitation that is called *sanggar*, which means an art studio that is a collective dwelling together.[1261] In a discussion about *ARTJOG*, one of the so-called premier art exhibitions and market displays for Indonesian contemporary art works, Ari reminded me that it only invites individual artists to exhibit. No art collectives are allowed to commission and exhibit artworks there. This exclusion of art collective producers clearly identifies the particularity of this capitalist mode of market as composed of individual, not communal, producers. He recalled that *Taring Padi*, a collective in which he, Budi, and many others at Garuda participate, does not use art in such an individualistic way. They instead create art by opening a channel between itself, a vanguard party, and oppressed communities. In this connection and unity, art is made in a political mode of action. Together, in such actions, *Taring Padi* and exploited communities enter into a novel activity of making art and political demonstration at once.

Ari told me specifically about the time when *Taring Padi* artists traveled from Yogyakarta to the north coast of Java to the region of Batang. There, they met and stayed with the community which lives beside a then newly built coal electricity power plant whose existence adversely affected this community of human beings. Together, the artists and community made art that at once identified and criticized the construction of coal power plants, *PLTU* (*Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Uap*, electric steam power plant), which polluted and impoverished this environment and world. Together, they created immense banners which *Taring Padi* and the community carried in their arms together, raised up into the sky while marching. Seen from above, this speech activity reads, "STOP PLTU." Together, they raised their voice and arms to create the place where the heavens look down and read the surface of the earth as an immediate political imperative to stop.

[1260] Toumani Diabate and Ballake Sissoko, *New Ancient Strings* [*Nouvelles Cordes Anciennes*], Rykodisc, 1999, compact disc.

[1261] *Taring Padi* began as a communal squat of the vacated Yogyakarta Art Institute (*ISI*) campus buildings, and they continue to maintain a communal dwelling now in *Sembungan.*

Ardjuna read the *New Ancient Strings* CD booklet with a magnifying glass. He said to us all, this music is from Mali. Mali, Andreas said, that is the country that touches on all different sides different African cultures, isn't it? Arab, West African, Desert, all together. Yes, I confirmed. The beauty of the music was astounding.

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Returning to Martin's *Seni Pidato* (*Discourse on Art*) address spoken a few days before, Ardjuna said, as we know, there are two genres. Tragedy and comedy. This was comedy. He said, I said that to my friends after and they laughed. As if this is funny, the destiny of the artist and the city that is Jakarta. As if this is something to tell a funny story about, this world of algorithms. This is not funny, he said. This is a tragedy. He said, Martin was giving a birthday toast and did not deliver the tragic remark to ruin the spirit of the party about algorithms and capitalism. Martin instead laid out a place for Art in this future and its conditions. Martin said, artists must continue to "go down to the (experience of the) people" if they are going to be relevant in any way. Ardjuna's judgment here was critical. This is in no way in opposition to his friendship with Martin. In fact, it is its direct opposite.

Ari was going to an anti-plastic demonstration at *Bundaran HI* (Traffic Circle of Hotel Indonesia), in the center of the central district of Jakarta, and then to the new contemporary art museum of Jakarta, *MACAN* (Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art in *Nusantara*), nearby afterwards. There, he would help out at a *Taring Padi* workshop, teaching children and anyone else how to make screen-prints and zines. He laughed as he said, *MACAN* is elite and boring.

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As we have alluded to above, *Sexy Killers* (dir. Dandhy Laksono and Ucok Suparta, 2019) was both a popular and controversial film after its release in 2019. The film was seen over 10 million times in the first week it was released on Youtube. This was the week preceding the 2019 Indonesian presidential contest between Jokowi and Prabowo. The film has now been seen over 36 million times on Youtube. As we recalled, the film has been considered to have contributed to the action of *golput*, that is, the subversion of the parliamentary ballot through the use of the ballot itself. This is because *golput* participates in the parliamentary ballot whereby the participation itself renders the parliamentary process of voting inoperative. Even though it did not ultimately result in obstructing either of the two major parliamentary candidates from winning the election, it introduced a political position into the state – the 'now' – itself.

Because of this, *Sexy Killers* (2019) was contentious. One person prominent in the world of Indonesian cinema criticized it to me, saying that it was not balanced and that it didn't give equal film time to the voices of the coal industry and the politicians. For *Sexy Killers* indeed shows and criticizes the parliamentary system and its representatives for harming, in bodies and minds, Indonesians who live where the coal production process does not simply exist as an abstract form as money, but instead in physical bodies such as toxic pollutants.

This person explained that the director of *Sexy Killers* has a successful production house, *WATCH DOC,* and that NGOs produce their films with him because they are aligned in thinking. This revenue is what provides the money to be able to make what she called his "passion project" like *Sexy Killers*. Others with whom I spoke disagreed with this criticism. They said instead that the film and its practices are very good. They said, it is only a problem for those who think that the parliamentary system, rather than poor Indonesian people, are sacred.

Parasite (dir. Bong Joon-ho, 2019) was released and became a popular film in both popular and academic Jakarta film communities during the dissertation research period. In this film, proletarians and bourgeoisie confront one another, in terms that are extraordinary in their 'treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness' (Raffles). The relative orientation of higher and lower ground absolutely orients this scopic world. The physical lowness of the half basement home of the proletarians is exposited repeatedly in contrast to the high hill home in which they work. When it rains and Seoul floods, the proletarian dwelling is hit in ways that are not exclusively spatial or abstract.[1262]

But what *Parasite* reveals is that the spatial schema of higher and lower is *not* the absolute determinant of this world. For after the film's climactic bloody lawn party scene, after the 'downstairs' of the house overturns the 'upstairs,' the 'downstairs' of the bourgeoisie house is not vacated by the end of the film. On the contrary, the film ends with another secret dweller living in that basement without those living upstairs knowing of this basal existence. It is thus not the 'downstairs' of the urban lords' home that is the true motor of *Parasite.* It is rather that the ground exists as the unknown or unconscious of the 'upstairs' dwellers.

Sexy Killers (2019) opens with an exposition of the eponymic sexy killers living in a high, skyscraper dwelling. This 'fictional' *mise-en-scène* is then replaced with a 'veridical' documentary semantic. This is the diegetic appearance and speech of an Indonesian 'peasant' who lives in Kalimantan beside an open coal pit. He shows the camera that there is no clean water coming from his water source. It has been polluted by the neighboring coal mine. It is murky (*keruh*). He speaks out and raises his voice slightly.

Water is not therefore a mystical or cosmological element in the film. The diegetic water instead exposits that the very element which is necessary for human life has been taken away from this place and community. With water, both *Sexy Killers* and *Parasite* exposit that the 'nature' of capital and commodity relations are lethal. With their different genres, both films seek a pedagogical intervention in the ideological apparatuses of the *politeia*.

§8 *Enframement and Abstention*

On Budi's porch at his house, by the river in the forest of Sembungan (Yogyakarta), there are benches, a table, and several framed and hanging artworks. When I visited for the first time, there were four books as well as a small ashtray in the shape of a dove (*merpati*) that he had made on the table.[1263] Hanging from the rafter above the benches there was a red and yellow puppet in the shape of a horse with a saddle that was itself embossed with a star. *Jawa Tengah* (Central Java), he said, pointing to it. I then heard the faintest sound of music. Budi said, can you hear the gamelan? We both became silent and listened. We could hear it faintly but absolutely. *Sanggar* (studio), he said.

The first night I stayed there, Budi had a small party for his close friend, Aris (Manyul), who had been staying there in his home studio for several weeks. Manyul was going back to Australia where he now lives. He had been working on some artworks which were to be

[1262] Almost everyone with whom I spoke in Jakarta remarked upon the flood (*banjir*) scene in *Parasite* (2019).
[1263] The books were all from the same publisher, *Penerbit Sumbu*, all published in the early 2000s in Indonesian language. One, *Class and Class Struggle*, written by Antonina Yermakov and Valentin Ratnikov. The second was *Globalization: What is it?* Its jacket cover shows the street sign of the central tourist thoroughfare in Yogyakarta, Malioboro Street, superimposed by the iconic logo image of the McDonald's Arch. The third was *The Iranian Revolution*, whose jacket cover shows Ayatollah Khomeini with a cross hairs on his face's visage. And the fourth was *Cannery Row*, written by John Steinbeck and translated by Eka Kurniawan.

exhibited in a joint exhibition with Budi, planned to take place at the Edwin Gallery in Jakarta in 2020.[1264] Named *Lihat Di Sini* (Seeing Here), the exhibition was to be the continuation of their 2012 joint exhibition, *Lihat Di Sana* (Seeing There). Manyul was working on a wood carving sculpture. Budi teased him and said it was a '*piala*' ('cup', as in trophy), more than a '*patung*' ('sculpture'). Knowing that I didn't speak Javanese, Budi said to me, people speak in *Bahasa Jawa* (Javanese language) in Yogya. He said, the first lesson in Javanese is this. If someone laughs, join laughing, if someone cries, join crying.

At the gathering that night, I spoke at length with W.. We had spoken before at Garuda in Jakarta and thus continued from our prior conversation. I said to him that there was an academic conference going on at the moment at the nearby *UGM* (University of Gajah Mada) campus in Anthropology. He sighed and said that many people now sell Anthropology to the World Bank. This is a tragedy not a comedy. Others, he said, sell it to the Left itself. He explained that the government created a body to facilitate this 'smoothing out,' he said in English, of the image of the New Order to the outside world during the Reformation period.

W. then returned to an earlier conversation we had at Garuda about when Adi made a film about *Gerwani* (*Gerakan Wanita,* literally: Women's Movement). He said Adi was opposed by some activists in Yogya who didn't like him doing his film and telling this story of *Gerwani*. He explained, this is because they seek to possess this history *for themselves*. They don't like outsiders – Adi, as we said, grew up in Jakarta – coming in to tell that story, even in acts of solidarity such as his. I asked why he thinks this is the case. He said, this is a Javanese *kromo* (royal, aristocratic) thinking of the left and it is very bad. This is a feudal order and connection of things, he said, and it is the one which is reactionary and regressive.

Adi had shown me his *Gerwani* film in the first few weeks when I first stayed at Garuda in 2016. He showed me then the absolutely stirring footage when a *Gerwani* leader, an old frail lady laying down in a bed, popped up from her supine stature to begin singing a *Gerwani* song from fifty years prior. I asked him where he learned filmmaking, and he pointed his finger down at the table at which we stood and strongly exclaimed, "here with Om Ardjuna!"[1265]

A friend, who I first met while he was painting a panel in preparation for a mural to be completed at the Multatuli Museum, is Budi's neighbor in this Sembungan forest and he also came over to the farewell gathering party for Manyul. He explained to me again that he is in a land dispute with his wealthy neighbor, who is an Indonesian painter and was the first Indonesian painter to sell a painting for 1 billion rupiah in 1998. He has used his riches to buy all of the land around him. This friend is not the last holdout, but his own land has become an island.[1266] He is without direct access to land that is not his neighbor's own private land. And this rich neighbor has refused to allow a bridge over his so-called private land in order to provide access to his neighbor's now insular land. The reason he does not want a bridge is because, this

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[1264] Although down the street from *Kinosaurus*, the Edwin Gallery is not owned by Edwin the filmmaker.

[1265] Adi's other major teacher in film beside Ardjuna is Leonard Retel Helmrich (b. 1959). Leonard is a Dutch filmmaker who made a trilogy of documentary films with one family in Java over a decade, entitled *De Stand von de Zon* [*Eye of the Day*] (2001), *Vlucht uit de Hemel* [*Flight from Heaven*] (2003), and *Stand van de Maan* [*Shape of the Moon*] (2004). Adi joined Leonard's film workshops in Indonesia and was immensely inspired by Leonard Retel Helmrich. Adi explained to me repeatedly the brilliance of Leonard's single shot camera work. Leonard built a camera stand that he mounts directly onto his chest. This allows him to move with the recording camera and therefore enter into the world he is filming. Adi said excitedly of this film technique, that's real! That's time itself!

[1266] This friend reminded me that there are other neighbors who have also been 'blocked.' These neighbors have in the past been denied electricity cable access and thus electricity in their homes, situations which have only come to be changed with the mediation (*mediasi*) of the local government. The electricity eventually delivered did not come from the direction of the large landowner but instead from the opposite division.

friend related, he does not want to disturb the beauty of the landscape from which his artistic work supposedly draws. "The leftist artist," the friend reiterated with irony. Everyone laughed. W. reminded us that this neighbor wasn't even in *Lekra*, he was a *candidate* to be in *Lekra*.

W. knew about the *rombongan* (troupe travel) of Yogya artists to San Francisco and Berkeley last year. In that entourage, he said, there were members of the *Apotik Komik* collective and that they are trying to create artwork in public space. There were also members of *Taring Padi* there. He laughed and snickered as he brought out how he would complete the comparison and articulate the art practice of *Taring Padi*. He said that the work of *Taring Padi* is *luar kiri* and *kiri luar.* This lexical inversion can be translated by linking 'outer-left' and 'left-outer'. As a statement, it indicates that for him, *Taring Padi* are not simply inhabiting the margin (*pinggir*) of the Indonesian parliamentary system of discourse. They are something else that does not seek to reproduce the *conditions* of this *concept* of a 'public' and 'art' as both already essentially at-hand. Rather, they seek an intervention in these elements as well as their relation.

There were so many exhibitions in Yogya that night because *ARTJOG* was also taking place. *ARTJOG* is the largest yearly art fair in Yogyakarta.[1267] I asked W. if he was interested in the artwork at *ARTJOG* and he said no, it is just for the market. Budi and I went on Friday night to two art galleries. Budi kept saying, it is because of *ARTJOG* that there are other, simultaneous gallery exhibitions elsewhere in Yogyakarta. Ucup, a member of *Taring Padi*, had explained this in his comments at UC Berkeley in response to a Berkeley professor, who cynically suggested that *ARTJOG* is just like every other Biennale, such as those in Singapore, Hong Kong, or Shanghai. Ucup said, we don't just see one level or one market. He explained, without having to cite Lucretius, that there are several layers and markets. There are layers (*ada lapisan*), he explained.

We first went to *Survive!* art gallery. Two of Budi's works were being exhibiting there. Many others I knew from Garuda and *Taring Padi* also had works being exhibited. The walls of the gallery were completely full. Bayu, the primary owner of *Survive!*, had just come back from *ARTJOG*. He said that there are many mixed medium artworks there. He explained that one of the artworks strongly smelled in an unpleasant way and that this smell is its artistic installation of plastic and pollution. Budi and I went through the *ARTJOG* exhibition rather quickly. I later said to Peter that I looked at this horse hanging on Budi's porch constantly for days, while the installations, on the other hand, sometimes only after a few seconds, though at times of course longer, I felt the urge to leave it and did so. I remembered how Fredric Jameson identified the attribute of postmodernity as a reduction of temporality.[1268]

Peter said he wanted his sketches and paintings to be critiqued. There is something positive about critique he said that cannot be given in everyday discourse. When I asked someone to give a critique of my work and they say, oh it's nice 12 times, he said, I say, I mean, c'mon. The critique itself needs to find a viewpoint to make the artwork better.

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Part of the idea for the book *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Substance* (2019) emerged from the book, *Taring Padi: Seni Membongkar Tirani* [*Taring Padi:* Art Dismantles Tyranny] (2011). The latter brings together a visual archive of *Taring Padi*'s artworks, as well as a cache of critical writings which comment on their work. Its cover bears the image of a body of a human being. Both arms are

[1267] The founder of *ARTJOG*'s nickname is *Toko* ('Store'). Ari also reminded me that the original name of *ARTJOG* was *Jogja Art Fair*.
[1268] See Fredric Jameson, "The End of Temporality," *Critical Inquiry* 29, no. 4 (2003), 695-718.

raised. This human being is amidst myriad others. In the place of its face is not a human face but a red star. The star is internally shadowed, bearing different triangularly shaped shades of the color red.

Dolo has a contribution in *Taring Padi: Art Dismantles Tyranny* (2011). In it, she writes that the most important thing about *Taring Padi* is that they do their artwork collectively.[1269] She writes that the higher and lower skilled artists work together. The works are not created therefore by an artistic individual but instead always by a collective one. She also identifies the importance of its practice, which is not for the sake of fine arts discourse. Although works are sold, they are so collectively.

Martin Aleida also contributed to the book. His reflection provides an extremely deft articulation of this specific difference of being outside the discourse of fine arts. He writes, "*bagi Taring Padi, sebuah garis tidak layak hanya berdiri di ruang hampa.*"[1270] This can be translated as, "for Taring Padi, a line is not worthy to exist only for abstract space." These acts of lining are not for fine-arts discourse. Instead, they instead are undertaken for the political action of 'dismantling tyranny' with artworks.

In his contribution to the book, Yayak writes about the *Taring Padi* exhibition he helped organize in Germany. He recollected that a German curator there remarked upon how different the work of *Taring Padi* is from the socialist realism of East Germany, where this genre was mandated by the state.[1271] Another contributor, Erpan Faryadi, wrote about *Taring Padi*'s intervention in the problem of neoliberalism in Indonesia, particularly in the way that they have foregrounded land and agrarian issues.[1272] The name *Taring Padi* itself is the spiky first growth of the rice plant, sometimes called the rice's fang. It can also mean scarecrow. The name thus identifies itself in a second-nature form of the human body that is placed in the field in order to ward off pests. These intertwined agrarian and political issues are thus present in the very name of the organization.

Another contributor, Wulan Dirgantoro, criticized the representation of females in *Taring Padi's* work for wearing the traditional garment of the *kebaya,* thereby reproducing patriarchal or idealized normativity through their works.[1273] When I asked Budi about this criticism, he countered that *kebaya* is not the only vestments worn by women in *Taring Padi*'s work, and also that many of these works aim to give a political and iconographic virtue and dignity to peasant, rather than urban lord, figures.

In its beginning, *Taring Padi* was named *Lembaga Budaya Kerakyatan Taring Padi* (Institute of the Culture of the People *Taring Padi*). Later, this 'old fashioned,' formal language of the institute of cultural organization gave way to a shortened form, *Taring Padi*. This short form has been shortened again to just two letters, *TP* [tay-pay]. As we said, the name *Taring Padi* can be given a linguistic or pragmatic translation as "rice husk fang." It is a fine body on the outside of the rice

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[1269] Dolorosa Sinaga, "Taring Padi: Not For the Sake of Fine Arts Discourse," in *Taring Padi*: *Seni Membongkar Tirani* (Yogyakarta: Lumbung Press, 2011), 23-40.
[1270] Martin Aleida, "An Immortal Idea," in *Taring Padi*: *Seni Membongkar Tirani* (Yogyakarta: Lumbung Press, 2011), 78.
[1271] Yayak Yatmaka, "Workers United, Will Never be Defeated," in *Taring Padi*: *Seni Membongkar Tirani* (Yogyakarta: Lumbung Press, 2011), 150.
[1272] Erpan Faryadi, "Agrarian Movement as the Primary Demand of the Indonesian Farmers Movement," in *Taring Padi*: *Seni Membongkar Tirani* (Yogyakarta: Lumbung Press, 2011), 265.
[1273] Wulan Dirgantoro, "Ideology has a Gender: The Representation of Women in the Artworks of Taring Padi," in in *Taring Padi*: *Seni Membongkar Tirani* (Yogyakarta: Lumbung Press, 2011), 130.

husk. When it comes into contact with human skin, it causes itchiness and irritation. This name is thus rich in metaphysical significance.

The 'old fashioned' name of *Lembaga Budaya Kerakyatan Taring Padi* presented an inversion of the name of *Lekra. Lekra*'s formal name was *Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakyat. Lembaga Budaya Kerakyatan* thereby inverted the place of 'the people' and 'culture' as in *Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakyat.* Both *Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakyat* and *Lembaga Budaya Kerakyatan* could be translated as 'Institute of People's Culture.'[1274] But by bringing forth an inversion of the name of *Lekra*, *Taring Padi* ties itself not only to the historicality of the institute of *Lekra,* but also to the question of how an avant-garde institute can be for or of a people's culture.

§9 *On Local Spirit and Spirits*

At Garuda, Andreas had four books about Pramoedya on the table at which he was sitting in the Verandah. One was the dissertation of the then Director General of Culture for the Government of Indonesia, Hilmar Farid, who is called 'Hilfar' by those, like many at Garuda, who know him personally.[1275] He begins his dissertation by relaying the story of Pram recalling his own experience on December 28, 1949, at the transfer from Dutch to Indonesian sovereignty in Jakarta. Farid recollected that Pram recalled this moment as one of defeat and not victory of the Indonesian revolution. Pram was 24 years old at the time.[1276]

Farid delivers several important historical arguments of rejoinder in his dissertation. *Lekra,* he avers, was not a dictatorial or so-called 'Stalinist' organization. It was instead an attempt to bring about a change in the ideological superstructure and to bring about the hegemony of a people's culture. Farid moreover demonstrates that for Pram, literature is itself a rewriting and critique of 'history.'[1277] Adi, seeing that I was reading this, said, do you know that Hilfar is going to be a minister in the next cabinet for Jokowi, after they split culture and education into different ministries?

The *AO* [Ah-O] emerged and was poured into one glass and passed around for all to drink together. When the *AO* (*Anggur Orang Tua*, literally 'Old Person Wine') is bought, someone goes around and collects small amounts of money from those present. After the money is collected, one or two people go to the store where it can be bought. Alcohol can be bought in Jakarta, but not openly and everywhere easily. There are a few stores where *AO* can be bought nearby. It came back from the store not in a glass bottle but instead a plastic bag. Ari explained to me that you get the *AO* poured into a plastic bag so it doesn't make noise when you are traveling back, so that the people around you don't know that you are possibly carrying concealed alcohol.

Codet said *AO* is our Local Batavia Spirit. Everybody laughed. He then said, we should make it into a t-shirt. Ari said, you can't do that! Codet kept thinking. He reassessed and said

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[1274] In *Taring Padi: Seni Membongkar Tirani,* "*Lembaga Budaya Kerakyatan*" is translated as "Institute of People Oriented Culture." Alex Supartono, "Introduction," in *Taring Padi*: *Seni Membongkar Tirani* (Yogyakarta: Lumbung Press, 2011), 7.

[1275] This shortening and suturing of first and last name is common in this Indonesian world.

[1276] At the age of 74 in 1999, Pram joined the *PRD* (*Partai Rakyat Demokrasi,* Party of a Democratic People). See Farid, *Rewriting the Nation*.

[1277] In "Maaf atas Nama Pengalaman," Pram writes "literary reality contains a reorientation and evaluation of civilization and culture, which is not actually contained by historical reality. Thus, literary work is a thesis, a baby who begins his own development in the building up of the lives of his readers. It is equal to new discoveries in all fields, which takes society one step further." Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Maaf atas Nama Pengalaman," Accessed April 16, 2020, http://kebumenypkp65.blogspot.com/2014/09/essay-pramoedya-ananta-toer-maaf-atas.html.

OK, let's put Batavia Local Spirit on the back neck, and the Indonesian flag icon on the sleeve. That would ensure that it would seem patriotic, he said. It was still a joke, but it also brought out a true and critical idea.

But *FPI* is also a Local Batavia Spirit, someone else said. *FPI* is the Islamic Defenders Front. They reject *this* so-called 'other' Local Batavia Spirit. Codet joked, they might lose their spirit if they try our Local Batavia Spirit! Everyone laughed.

His joke refers to and teases the fetishization for the commodity of the so-called local. Batavia is the old, colonial period name of Jakarta. But this is foremost a joke that seizes and rearranges the valences held by the word and concept of spirit. For spirit is a generic name for an alcoholic drink, as well as the basis of so-called revealed religion. Codet's notion of spirit and the local spirit of Batavia as the most inexpensive alcohol that is bought and drank in Jakarta lampoons the use of the notion of 'local,' 'old,' archaic colonial era placenames in the commodity form. But it teases the religious right which opposes the indigenous, local spirit of alcohol, while also positively identifying the spirit of nocturnal and communal alcohol drinking.

Shortly after I first came to Garuda, Dolo and I had a conversation about the intolerance of religious pluralism in Indonesia. Someone listening to us explained their own efforts to disturb intolerance as follows. They said that they asked their Muslim friends: so if you have sacred sites, and there are other religions, wouldn't all religions have sacred sites and not only Islam? To which their friends called them a shithead (*bajingan*) for bringing this up in conversation in this way. Codet said, this is the ego of religion. Religion, he said, is actually something that intends to be good, but in going about achieving its intention, it becomes something that is the opposite of good.

Later Paul Kadarisman arrived. Alex had made me aware of Paul before I first arrived at Garuda. He said, Paul is a photographer and one of the best contemporary artists in Jakarta. That night, he sat with Codet, together scrolling through pictures of goldfish. "*Seni Rupa*" ("Fine Art"), he said to me, in jest. Later that night, we talked about Jeff Wall and Andreas Gursky. We looked at the Gursky photo, *99 Cent*, which shows the inside of the store that is overfilled with the colorful wrappers of commodities. The photograph shows both the intensification of consumption of late capitalism as well as a 'critical' analysis of its colour schema which shines from its packaging. Paul said of this Dusseldorf school of photography, they are fanatical.

I changed my position in the Verandah and sat down at a different table and on a bench beside Dolo and Ardjuna. A vintage Steven Segal film, *Above the Law* (1988), played on the TV. Dolo repeated that the contemporary artwork which is a knowledge product is increasingly becoming the primary problem in contemporary art. If you are a researcher, she said, you can just give the idea. But if you are an artist, she said, you have to give it a visual form.

§10 *On the Constancy of Nature and Health*

Budi came over to where I lived in Rawajati. We stood in the kitchen looking across the river into a small forest in the mega-metropolitan city of Jakarta. This small forest is a *tanah adat Betawi* (Betawi customary land). Its plantings are harvested and its land is kept by Betawi people. Betawi people can be considered as at once autochthonous and not autochthonous, for the land and people of Betawi presupposes the imperial and colonial force of encounter with the Dutch. This is essentially different than the indigenous names of peoples, such as the Dayak, Kemak, and Bunak amongst others, for whom the beginning of human time is not tantamount to the temporality of European imperial and colonial forces. This customary forest is in the city of

Jakarta and is spatially close to the postmodern capitalist infrastructure of malls, convenience stores, and residential enclaves for the wealthy.

Budi faced across the river in wonder. Rare to see this in Jakarta, he said. He pointed to one of the largest trees there. He said, that tree is called a *Rambu* tree. It is, he said, a sign for drought. When its seed pods drop, it will rain. The tree bore not only vertical stems and branches but also a lateral organic body, like hair, wrapping itself. Like a tree's tentacles. I asked Budi, what do you call this? He said he didn't know the name, but that he knew of it to be used as medicine. It was November and there had already been significant rain. We saw there in the river rafts which were made by sheafing together banana tree stalks. They were being used by children to play in the river.

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It is at once essential and impossible to relay adequately the constancy of the activity of smoking tobacco at Garuda. Most smokers there smoke an unusual tobacco for smokers in Indonesia. This tobacco is sold as and called *Divine*. It is usually sold as loose tobacco in red striped pouches. *Divine* tobacco is mostly rolled by the smokers themselves.[1278] In most cases, it is not bought from a so-called convenience store but instead from a clinic (*klinik*). *Klinik* is nearly homophonous with *klenik* which means occult.

Divine dispenses myriad so-called scientific explanations for its superiority to other forms of tobacco. The sellers and smokers of *Divine* explain that this tobacco is prepared in such a way that removes 400 toxic compounds from the tobacco. The company motto is "*rokok sehat.*" This can be translated as healthy smoking, smoking for health, healthy cigarettes, or cigarettes for health.

Not everyone smokes *Divine.* B. smokes a type of *Dji Sam Soe* where each cigarette is individually wrapped in gold foil. At night after dinner, he eats only single (*tunggal*) garlic cloves for snack. Not individual cloves of garlic, but a garlic that is a single bulb and without any partitioning into separate cloves. They fight sickness, he tells me. You can't have the ones which are divided into individual cloves, they are not the right ones.

§11 *On the Formation of Alliance and the Politeia*

AMAN (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara,* Alliance of the Indigenous Peoples of Nusantara) had their 20th Anniversary commemoration at *TIM*. It consisted of multiple days of art performances and workshops. There were exhibitions of traditional arts from traditional societies (*masyarakat adat*), such as weavings of grasses and linens, music, and dance. There are over 2,000 *masyarakat adat* in *AMAN* that advance together their political and cultural aims.

I joined the commemoration with several members of *Taring Padi* and *Somalaing*. They together set up a booth at the fair. *Taring Padi* artists would teach anyone who came to their booth how to make screen-print posters and t-shirts. They also sold t-shirts and artworks that they had already 'pressed' through the printing process. *Somalaing* had small sculptures and other items on display for sale. Fair walkers mostly bought tote bags, t-shirts, and posters. Codet's mom sold foods she had cooked beside the *Somalaing* and *Taring Padi* booth. *Taring Padi* unfurled and

[1278] *Divine* also sells pre-rolled tobacco cigarettes, but also in ways that separate it from others tobacco retail firms. One pack of *Divine* has 40, not the regular ~12-18, individual cigarettes. These *Divine* cigarettes are unfiltered, which is not unusual in Indonesian cigarettes.

placed into the horizon, a banner bearing their characteristic black and white genre that has been called 'socialist realism.' The words atop the banner read *Tolerasi Adalah Solusi*, Tolerance is the Solution.

Tanto, the artist who painted the train triptych *Kereta Api Indonesia,* attended and we had a chance to talk. I told him how I greatly admired his artwork. He said that he painted it when he would frequently go back and forth between Yogya and Jakarta around the year 2000. At that time, there were no bathrooms in economy class and it is a ten-hour ride. Riding the economy class gave him the idea to paint "The Train of Indonesia," where the executive class, the economy class, and their very difference is apprehended at once.

After this conversation, I went back again to the panels. I saw that he had painted a bathroom in the economy class car which I had not noticed before. The bathroom is cramped. There is both a person inside standing up and laying down. There is a bucket of water. The section is not dramatized more than others. And yet this is unlike the story of his experience he told me, where there is no bathroom in the economy class car. This lesson teaches, it seems, how the discourse of the painting is for itself and not for its factical or experiential origin.

At the *AMAN* celebration at *TIM*, I spoke at length with Ucup, a member of Taring Padi who I had met first when he came to Berkeley on the art residency exchange program in 2018. He explained the art practice of *Taring Padi* as follows. There is a democratic process to decide everything. This can make for very long deliberations and decisions. In its essence, he said in a not unjoyful self-criticism, "it is fair but not effective." He told me that *Taring Padi* has recently been invited to exhibit in Nanjing, China and that some people in China are now very interested in Indonesian art.

Portraits hang from the buildings lining *TIM.* They bear the iconic faces and the so-called legendary figures that Eros Djarot identified in his remark at the 49th *IKJ* anniversary. One is Raden Saleh, the 19th century painter who is commemorated as the 'first' Javanese painter to go to Europe to study painting in the 19th century. Another is H.B. Jassin, for whom there is at *TIM* the center for the study of Indonesian literature which bears his personal name. Someone said to me that he is known as a famous Indonesian anti-communist.

Budi told me for the first time about a solo exhibition he did in 2012 at *Grand Indonesia*, which is an iconic, 'fancy' mall of central Jakarta. The exhibition took place within its immense architectural interiority in a marginal place where occasionally there were art exhibitions. He said that the issue for the exhibition was women, women at night, and prostitute. He used the word *prostitut* not *pelacur. Pelacur,* as the formal name, can carry with it a majoritarian gaze of moral condemnation. *Prostitut,* on the other hand, with this foreign lexeme, names the *situation* of prostitution. 'Women at night' names a situation to be addressed by the artwork rather than the one of *pelacur,* which already exists on the terrain of those who moralize against these women. He told me he had painted the whole gallery black so that it was dark in the exhibition.[1279] He made tens of sculptures of women who appear standing and under lamps in this darkness. We will turn to this exhibition in detail at the end of this chapter below.

We returned from *TIM* to Garuda after dusk. I sat with Budi and Ucup on a long bench. We looked together at the Venice Biennale catalog that Dolo had brought back. It was mostly advertisements. When we opened the map indicating the locations of the exhibitions and saw that it takes place all over Venice, Ucup said, see, this is just like *ARTJOG.*

[1279] I mentioned an article by Rosalind Krauss "Sculpture in the Expanded Field," *October* 8 (1979). In it, she argues that modern sculpture is a negative synthesis of landscape and architecture, that is, it is a synthesis of 'not-landscape' and 'not-architecture.' Budi immediately grasped her point.

I then sat at one of the Verandah's many large tables and talked with Bilven about *Ultimus*. He said that the *Manuskrip Sejarah 45 Tahun PKI* [Manuscript of the 45 years of History of the Indonesian Communist Party] (2014) is often bought by anti-communist groups. The book has sold out and has not been reprinted yet. He said that the *Ultimus* book with the highest sales is the most expensive one. This is the *Sejarah Gerakan Kiri Indonesia Untuk Pemula* (History of the Indonesian Left Movement: For Beginners), a book which was collectively authored, illustrated, and edited by hundreds of participants.

Bilven reminded me that Romo Magnis had spoken and written publicly that the 2019 Presidential election is not about choosing the best candidate but about preventing the worst. We have turned this into a gag (*lelucon*), he said. The raids in the Makassar Gramedia bookstore removing Romo Magnis' books are not trying to choose the best books, he said. They are instead trying to prevent the worst books from entering circulation. Uproarious laughter erupted. Many *ormas* (mass organization) groups need the specter of communism to exist, he said. It sustains their specular ideological position. The masses are not interested in these so-called leftist books, he reminded. The notion of a new communism is a favored fantasy of *anti*-communist activists. And yet the state doesn't punish the perpetrators. He asked aloud, why is this? It is because, he followed, the state apparatus themselves are afraid of being accused of being called communist by the anti-communist mass organizations.

Later in the night, he met with 10 others at the middle table of the Verandah. He explained that they are coming together because they want to speed up (*mempercepatkan*) publishing works on and about 1965. He and Andreas were organizing a team who were working individually and together to massively increase the publishing of books which are the stories of these *korban* (victim, oblation). This is because, as he said, these people are old. The team is a collective of about 30 people. Many are working with handwritten manuscripts. These are stories from some of the oldest living human beings in Indonesia. B. heard him say this to me and said, they are all talking about human rights. I hate human rights. I like to punch! He made the gesture of taking someone into a head lock and landing a blow on their head while he smiled. Stop this conversation and come drink beer instead.

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The mass killing of communists in Indonesia is not simply a question of historical facticity. It is a conceptual, political, and theoretical question. Andreas would wonder aloud, how is it that most likely over a million people were killed from the killing of 6 generals and one of their daughters the night of September 30, 1965? How can we understand this improportionality? This is not a question at the level of empirical knowledge.

Ardjuna said to me, do you know the author that said, all writing is pigshit. I said no. He furrowed his brow. Really? There was not only a slight shock, but also some dismay and disappointment. He said, Artaud. And then he brought over again the portrait that Peter drew of Artaud that is framed and hangs on the gallery wall at Garuda. Ardjuna said, this is drawn from the photograph he had taken of himself two months before he died. Crazy guy, really actually crazy, he said.

Ardjuna played an album of music and began to talk about it. He said, this is rock minimalism, and it is as great of an accomplishment as Phillip Glass or Steven Reich. It was a Mike Oldfield album called *Incantations* (1978). He explained the melodic and harmonic forms to those listening. It is repetitions of change; it is a circle of fifths. After listening to several songs

together, I stood up and tried to excuse myself to go home. It was past 3am. He said, oh come on, stay, lets listen. Its only 10 more minutes, let's finish it.

§12 *On* The Look of Silence (2014) *and* Sexy Killers (2019)

In an intensive period from 2012 to 2014, Martin Suryajaya regularly published his writings in *Indoprogress.* These writings help outline the problematic of what this dissertation identifies as the renaissance, rediscovery, or relearning of left thinking in Indonesia.

In a writing entitled "That Which Vanishes in *Senyap*" ("*Yang Lenyap di Senyap*"), Martin Suryajaya begins by returning to Adorno's question of poetry and Auschwitz, and whether one can write lyric poetry after Auschwitz?[1280] As Martin recalls, Adorno asks us why one would *poetically* pose the human being now. Martin writes that the lesson one draws from *The Look of Silence* (2014), but also *The Act of Killing* (2012), is that speaking about morality after 1965 is "like playing a *turntable* at a funeral home."[1281] Morality has already been refused by 1965. The problem thus is not of the morality of the filmmaker nor the film.

The Act of Killing (2012) shows Anwar Congo explaining to the camera how he repeatedly used metal wire to wrap a person's neck to strangle and kill them. A perpetrator in *The Look of Silence* (2014) explained how he drank the blood of the people he killed. Incorporating the blood of the victim will provide strength and inner calm to continue the process, he said. He compares it to when the coconut harvester occasionally splits the coconut and sips its water while working. Martin writes that Anwar did not break the law, for this 'black operation' is not tethered to the laws regulating the everydayness of society. Anwar is not therefore an immoral figure, Martin argues. Anwar is outside the boundaries of morality, and this is precisely what makes the film so painful, Martin writes.[1282]

Martin acknowledges that the film has been called 'exploitative' and has resulted in an increase of panic for those who confront the 'butchers.' But Martin also says that we cannot criticize Joshua Oppenheimer as immoral because it is precisely the moral category itself which is being not only questioned by both films but rather shown to be itself inadequate to the actuality that the films address. This is the 'practico-inert' biopoliticality of 1965 in Indonesia that still ecstatically encompasses the second decade of the 21st century of the *politeia* of Indonesia.

Martin's answer to his essay's titular question is that Joshua's films teach us that *morality disappears in silence*.[1283] We are not only made sad by these films. They are instead an invitation to an anger that is not a form of morality. Martin quotes William Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* to make his point for him:

> Forgive me, O blood red earth,
> because I'm soft and polite with these butchers!
> You are the holiest ruins of man
> Who had lived on the tide of history.
> Crush this blood-shed hand!
> On your wound I swear [...]

[1280] See Martin Suryajaya, "*Yang lenyap di Senyap,*" *Indoprogress*, November 4, 2014, https://indoprogress.com/2014/11/yang-lenyap-dalam-senyap/. *Senyap* (2014) is the Indonesian title for the film whose English title is *The Look of Silence*. '*Senyap'* can mean 'silent,' but also 'quiet.'

[1281] Suryajaya, "*Yang lenyap di Senyap.*"

[1282] Ibid.

[1283] Ibid.

Curses will fall into the human stomach
Raging mobs and ferocious civil war
Will spill all over the earth;
Blood and destruction will be so everyday
And horrified will become best friends
So mothers will smile when hugging
The baby is torn to pieces by war;
Pity will be crushed by daily wickedness:
And communist ghosts, screeching madly,
With Death by his side, boiling from hell,
Will come down to earth with the voice of the king
Shout 'Calamity,' and release the fury of war;
Until that rotten deed is smelled throughout the earth
And the bodies were moaning asking to be buried.[1284]

These lines are presented in Indonesian language and Martin acknowledges that they are a free adaptation (*saduran*). Their semantics differ slightly with the previously quoted epigraph of *Dialectical Materialism: A Study of Marxism and Contemporary Philosophy* (2012), which he presented in English. With Shakespeare's words, Martin argues that the controversy around the morality of *The Look of Silence* (2014) and *The Act of Killing* (2012) is misplaced. The heart of the matter is instead what Shakespeare here calls the daily wickedness, the ferocious civil war, and the fury of war. These are political problems that cannot be adequately encompassed by the everyday understanding of so-called aesthetics.

A similar argument has been leveled at *Sexy Killers* (2019). The film was screened at community screenings throughout Indonesia. Some screenings were attacked on the accusation that the film "provokes citizens and contains expressions of hatred."[1285] Its opponents criticized the film's dissemination strategy; being released the week before the 2019 President election, the film was accused of being a propaganda for electoral abstention.

Sexy Killers (2019) is indeed a documentary that 'takes a side.' It chooses to side with those whose lives have been concealed by the mainstream media, government, and coal mining corporations. *Sexy Killers* (2019) shows the human beings whose lives are poisoned by this so-called production process of capital. *Sexy Killers* (2019) allows those people who live in these marginal spaces to tell their story. They speak-out to tell how their families have become ill because the toxic runoff from coal mining enters their water, soil, and human bodies.

This film does not pretend to present a balanced presentation of coal and the availability of energy in Indonesia. It instead defamiliarizes the standpoint with which the voice of the Indonesian *politeia* speaks of progress. This is not simply the replacement of the government and corporate ministers with the voice of the victims or the defeated. Instead, the film allows the so-called marginal standpoint to intervene in the national political domain and interrupt its ideological discourse. In so doing, it demonstrates a rudimentary and fundamental illness speaking through the mode of production assured by the parliamentary system. This schema of indirection that Marx calls modern colonization works to safeguard home capitals against

[1284] Ibid.

[1285] Agung Sandy Lemana, "Produser Film Sexy Killers: Kita Mau Publik Lebih Cerdas Memilih Pemimpin," *Suara.com,* April 15, 2019, https://www.suara.com/news/2019/04/15/162822/produser-film-sexy-killers-kita-mau-publik-lebih-cerdas-memilih-pemimpin?page=all.

individual producers. The critique of political economy, such as is undertaken in *Sexy Killers* (2019), both points out and criticizes this process.

§13 *A Rediscovery of Marx*

In his essay entitled "Marxism and Political Articulation," which was published in *Indoprogress* a few months before "*Yang Lenyap di Senyap,"* Martin advances the thesis that *Marxism is a political articulation.*[1286] Politics is an organizational aspect of economic reality, he writes. This is, Martin avers, fundamentally different from Hegel's notion of the state as he articulates it in the *Philosophy of Right.* There, Hegel interpreted the rationality of the State in its relation to civil society, as an embodiment or an incarnation (*perwujudan*) of private rationality based on self-interest.[1287] Marx identifies that this state is still a contradiction of the representatives and the represented, rather than an *a priori* state of elements composed by stockbrokers and the state.

Martin articulates the specific mode by which the Marxist notion of politics differs from this Hegelian one as follows. Formally, politics is a matter of truth regarding social life. What is to be achieved through every political practice is the discovery of the truth about how social life should be arranged. [1288] Behind this belief lies the assumption that the criterion that determines political correctness is the people. People determine the truth and mistakes of collective life. That is, it is the people who are the legislators as well as the real executors of political life. Martin acknowledges that Alain Badiou called this principle a metapolitic (*metapolitik*).[1289] It is a political approach that does not depart from moral postulates assumed to be universal (for example that 'monarchy is evil,' 'representative democracy is evil', etc.), but rather from what is rooted in the interests of the people themselves. The reason for this is clear: the political participation of the people is necessary for political emancipation. Martin's expression of this is as follows: Marxian emancipation = absolute political participation + abolition of class.[1290] With this, political correctness, in a different sense than its everyday meaning, is realized.

But before a political truth is realized, it must be first revealed. This revelation forms the agenda for Marxist politics, according to Martin.[1291] This is what Martin calls the articulation of politics. This leads to the modification of the prior formula: Marxist emancipation = absolute political participation + abolition of class + political articulation.[1292] Without political articulation, Marxist emancipation will remain only a noble ideal. This work of revelation means that the work is a rediscovery, not a discovery, of Marxism.

Martin's final writing as the editor of the Logic column of *Indoprogress,* published on December 31, 2014, is entitled "The Rediscovery of our Marxism."[1293] He first acknowledges that speaking about Marxism in Indonesia is difficult. The issue is not merely that there is a legal prohibition against the spread of Marxism. More important is that "talk of the theoretical aspects of Marxism are often regarded as being 'not down to earth' or not knowing 'grassroots.'"[1294] This

[1286] Martin Suryajaya, "Marxisme dan Artikulasi Politik," ["Marxism and Political Articulation"] *Indoprogress,* April 9, 2014, https://indoprogress.com/2014/04/marxisme-dan-artikulasi-politik.
[1287] Ibid.
[1288] Ibid.
[1289] Ibid.
[1290] Ibid.
[1291] Ibid.
[1292] Ibid.
[1293] Martin Suryajaya, "Penemuan Kembali Marxisme Kita," ["Rediscovery of Our Marxism"] *Indoprogress,* December 31, 2014, https://indoprogress.com/2014/12/penemuan-kembali-marxisme-kita.
[1294] Ibid.

criticism, he says, is based on the failure to identify the *modality of the statement*. That is, the context and in what way a statement is made. He writes, "what often makes matters rather complicated is that we cannot always demand clarification of a statement's modality from the start."[1295] This stems, he says, from an impoverished *Marxist knowledge* in Indonesia. Many are fond of *tweeting* about Marxism, but few are willing to seriously engage with Marxism; our Marxist thinking is fragmented and fragmentary, he writes.[1296]

Martin recollects that the Marxism that developed in Indonesia took place during the Cold War. Today Marxism in Indonesia is not only dealing with neoliberal capitalism, but also must formulate its relationship with a diversity of social and intellectual elements. Martin enumerates these as populism, postmodernism, religious fundamentalism, young people's pop culture, post *-avant-garde* art, findings of neuroscience, economics post-equilibrium, particle physics, plural-value logic and Haruki Murakami.[1297] Given the conditions of this conjuncture, Martin writes, today Marxism, in short, "*must be rediscovered*" ("*mesti ditemukan kembali*").[1298] He notes that this is what he wrote in the first edition of the Logic rubric column on *Indoprogress*, December 28, 2012, two years before. Now, he writes,

> The rediscovery of Marxism does not mean a revision of Marxism. Rediscovering Marxism, in my opinion, means formulating the conditions that make Marxism true — showing how the truth of Marxism is guaranteed by the structure of reality: made possible by the logical structure of the world, the ontological structure of the physical universe until finally confirmed by the socio-politico-cultural structure of reality. The destruction of the PKI – the burning down of the entire intellectual tradition of Indonesian Marxism – stopped the discovery of Marxism in Indonesia. Now it is the task of the post-1965 generation to continue the effort to *rediscover our Marxism*… Therefore, I see no other solution: the 'rediscovery of Marxism' project must begin immediately.[1299]

Martin locates the fundamental obstacle that has given rise to the necessity of this rediscovery. He says that the theoretical studies of Marxism that exist to this day are mostly built through the exegetical model. Against this, Martin writes, we must prove logically not only how Marxism is true about the structure of reality that it wants to explain, but also how Marxism *might be* true. That is, we must conceptually reconstruct the structure of reality, including areas of reality that have not been addressed by Marxism so far. In other words, a theoretical study of Marxism requires a philosophical reconstruction that reveals the logical, ontological, and epistemological structure of the totality of reality itself.

Contemporary philosophy, Martin writes, will not help. This is because of the disappearance of what was known as *the philosophical system* until the 19th century. The last figure who still philosophizes in the framework of the system is Marx, he writes. Marx is the last seeker of the "law of social movement" through a materialist ontological framework.[1300] Therefore, the reconstruction of Marxism requires the reconstruction of contemporary philosophy itself. But, Martin acknowledges, postmodernism taught us to be suspicious of system. This suspicion, he writes, has impoverished our philosophical capabilities, almost fatally. Indonesia, however, seems

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[1295] Ibid.
[1296] Ibid.
[1297] Ibid.
[1298] Ibid.
[1299] Ibid.
[1300] Ibid.

to be an exception. There is still the possibility to rediscover that which makes Marx's discourse true. The conjuncture of capital and labour power in the dominant modes of production in the Jakarta region is such that there is the possibility for a philosopher to live and to study while working other jobs temporarily.

In this description of the philosopher, Martin is elucidating his own path. In Indonesia, he writes, someone who wants to live as a philosopher be a temporary philosopher. Sometimes they will write about realism in mathematical philosophy, or literary or art criticism. Sometimes they will be a language interpreter for NGOs. Sometimes they will be a political commentator. Sometimes they will be contracted as a lecturer for creative writing courses. Sometimes they will make or sell food for Idul Fitri or Christmas. His description is not unlike the proliferation of concrete labours that Marx described as taking place when the wage labourer in America exits the labour market and thereby multiplies the modes by which one exchanges one's labour. But it is precisely from this standpoint that this temporary philosopher can gain insight into the interrelationships that forge the various aspects of reality. Martin mentions that Spinoza worked as an eyeglass lens grinder, not a professor of philosophy.

Martin asks, what is the system of Marxism? We know, he says, its classical problems of dialectics, materialism, and class struggle. But he restates these fundamental questions as follows: "*what kind of world is supposed to be such that Marxism is true?* - or - *If Marxism is true, what kind of world does this truth require?*"[1301] This necessitates a systematic approach that re-interrogates all categories of philosophy from metaphysics and logic to political philosophy and ethics. This is what Martin calls rediscovering (*penemuan kembali*) Marxism. Writing from the conditions of post-Reformation Indonesia, with its widespread 'common sense' idea of 'debottlenecking' capital, Martin sees that the scientific source of Marx is directly pertinent to the world of Indonesia.

§14 *On Pedagogy*

Sitting on a long bench together in the Verandah, Ucup showed me pictures of his beautiful woodcut (*cukil*) artworks on his Instagram page. They were not exclusively black and white but were instead infilled with purples, blues, and reds. The bodies of the human beings appear as females according to their vestments in *burqa* or *niqab*. One panel's utterance reads below her, "With this Water I want to Put Out the Fire of Hell so that People will no Longer Worship God for Fear of Torment." Another read, "With this Fire I want to Burn Heaven so that People will no Longer Worship God because They only Want to Enjoy his Paradise."

Taring Padi artists often make woodcut artworks.[1302] This is done in the following manner. First, a plane of wood is furrowed with a handed tool. Once the design is set, ink is poured into the wooden ravines, and a piece of paper is pressed to the surface of the wood. This ink is then transferred to the paper through the activity of dancing on the wood, paper, and ink connection. Many people become joyful in this activity. The space of this movement is confined to the small enclosure of the paper's surface. The dancer thus circles inside the small frame repeatedly. This is the movement which presses out underfoot such utterances in *Taring Padi*'s work as "everyone is sib" ("*semua bersaudara*"), "give love to fellow beings" ("*berikan cinta pada sesama"*) "unite within

[1301] Ibid. Martin writes, "Dunia macam apakah yang diandaikan demikian rupa sehingga Marxisme benar adanya? – atau – Seandainya Marxisme benar, maka dunia seperti apakah yang disyaratkan oleh kebenaran tersebut?" Suryajaya, "Rediscovery of Our Marxism."

[1302] This technical mode of production in woodcut was pioneered by *Lekra.* See Foulcher, *Social Commitment of Literature and the Arts*.

difference," ("*bersatu dalam perbedaan*") and "weapons do not finish problems" ("*senjata tak-selesaikan masalah*").[1303] The utterances are at once descriptive and imperative.

Once coming upon Ari making a woodcut in the *Somalaing* studio alone at night, I said to him that I had never seen this activity before. He said, yes, it is the way that *Taring Padi* has made artworks for a long time. It has a practical reason, he said. The wood, chisel, paper, and inks are all inexpensive and ready-at-hand. But there is also an aesthetic and political reason. If a machine is used to press the ravined wood, there will be only one plane and surface of pressure and contact between the carved wood, ink, and paper. But the woodcut has valleys (*ada lembah*), he said. It is not flat. The pressing of the woodcut by the feet and dancing motion instead presses the ink into the paper with so many different angles and planes in such a way that renders the depths of the carving. This dance is thus not a conceptually or practically shallow aesthetic process.

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In the Verandah, I. said to me that in 1963, *PKI* realized that there was a split in the communist movement. This is the so-called Sino-Soviet split. In a broad way, the Chinese one was thought of as the rural revolution and the Soviet one was the urban and industrial one. Up until then, he said, *PKI* had followed the Soviet line. It had therefore for this reason been considered 'ortho-practical' if not the very curse and slander that is 'Stalinist.' This division in the communist movement facilitated the identification that Indonesia is more similar to the Chinese path than it is to the Soviet path given the conjuncture of forces at that time. Of course, there are substantial physical and metaphysical differences between the Chinese and the Indonesian balance of forces in general as well as specifically at that moment in time. China was and is a vast physical space whereas the communist movement in Indonesia was small, he said. It is between two neighboring mountains, Merapi and Merbabu, in the central mountains of central Java. But this rural heartland more closely resembles, physically if not also metaphysically, the Chinese ones than it did the Soviet. Even though there was a significant industrial urban proletariat throughout Indonesia going back into the late colonial periods of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the rural strategy appeared as a conducive one. Although the peasant and the urban realms are not 'direct opposites,' they do represent an essential division in orientation of strategic movement.

He explained that he found this explanation reading books. One was by Olle Törnquist, who, he said, confessed to being a communist but lived his life as a *hedon*. Olle's book has been translated into Indonesian as *Kehancuran PKI* (The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party). It hypothesizes that the *PKI* failed because of problems which pertain to what the author calls ideology. As an example, Törnquist relays how the Indonesian Communist Party retreats from an earlier position and into a so-called reformist one in 1960 with its collaboration with President Soekarno. Törnquist suggests that this submerges class struggle below a nationalist ideology.[1304] This was also called class collaboration. This so-called reformism was one where, he writes, "class struggle and nationalism were thus seen…to pollinate one another."[1305] Törnquist imputes that this decision in the realm of ideology by the *PKI* was erroneous. This was one where the party developed a campaign to understand the subjugation of the Indonesian people that is

[1303] Taring Padi, *Taring Padi*: *Seni Membongkar Tirani* (Yogyakarta: Lumbung Press, 2011).
[1304] Olle Törnquist, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia* (London: Zed Books, 1984), 156.
[1305] Ibid.

generated and motored by the action of what they called bureaucratic capitalists. Törnquist suggests that this notion errs in thinking that the realm of political struggle is one which bears administrative character-masks, rather than the capitalist character-masks of the capitalist and the wage labourer. One can say that Törnquist sees that this mode of analysis posits the presupposition of the parliamentary mode of representation and has separated with the specific differences of Bolshevik or Soviet hypotheses.

I.'s point was that this new direction of the Indonesian communist movement in 1963 was never actually undertaken. It therefore remains suspended as a theoretical question. If there was a new *ideological* foundation against its own past and its historical relations to the Soviet communist movement, what does that future look like? He recollected that when President Soekarno first heard the news that night of the September 30th, 1965, and of the so-called coup d'état attempt, he thought that this action was not such a big deal and that he would find a political solution to it. Thus, we can say, the event named The September 30th Movement is not even present at that very so-called historical time of the event itself. Soekarno, of course, was not able to realize the political solution that he may have imagined that night. Suharto, I. recounted, blocked Soekarno from meeting the council of Generals who seized emergency control, and thus took away the possibility for Soekarno to regain control of the role of presidency in the political situation.

I. repeated that these killings were not small in number. This quantity is also a quality. What was and is the state of the situation that is susceptible to such a loss of so-called civilian leadership to military leadership (of the *politeia*)? What is the nature of this situation of the *politeia* such that it commences a principle and *raison d'etre* that auto-effects the *legitimacy* of an immense and massive killing of human beings according to an anthropology inscribed in the names of communism? Why has this been considered reasonable at all in the first place? He recalled that it is not true that the *PKI* did not militarily defend themselves. He mentioned that there were some victories and temporary refuge in a region on the island of Sulawesi.

§15 *On* Mohr und die Raben von London (1968) *in Jakarta*

Along with *Kinosaurus* and *Kineforum,* the Goethe Institute is a primary physical venue, as well as organizational body, of independent film screenings and culture in Jakarta. Indonesian, German, and other international films are regularly screened there. Its programming and venue are longstanding in this world of independent and alternative Jakarta film screening culture. Being affiliated with, but also detached from, the mission of the German embassy in Indonesia, the Goethe Institute has both a stately power as well as a degree of separation and protection from Indonesian mass organizations that have sought to oppose such film screenings. The screening of *Mohr und die Raben von London* [*Mohr and the Ravens of London*] (1968) can serve to indicate such semi-autonomy.

The film is the story of the eponymic Mohr, who is the diegetic character of Karl Marx. The eponymic Ravens of London are a gang of thugs. The speaker who introduced the film in the auditorium at the screening said they are *preman. Preman* is the Indonesian language word that shelters a displacement of hearing-back the English word "freeman." *Preman* has many valences, and its meaning depends on its context, but it has and can mean a military personnel who is out of uniform and acts with impunity.[1306] In more everyday terms, it can mean someone who extorts or steals through force, threat, and intimidation.

[1306] The term "*pakian preman*" ("*preman* dress") is still used to denote police and military out of uniform.

An opening intradiegetic subtitle indicates that this film of 1968 "takes place" in London, 1857. The film begins with two poor children, seemingly siblings, waiting for a carriage to pick them up and bring them to the factory where they work. The first carriage does not stop for them. Out of the field appear two men. They are Marx and Engels. The next carriage stops for them all. The children, who are factory workers, become the film's guides. They tell Mohr-alias-Marx how they are going to the factory where they work a night shift, and that this is the routine, not the exception. The boy goes to work, and Marx says he will accompany the girl back to her home. She says, you don't want to come to our home, it is a slum. He says, I know the alley, I will come. Children beg him for money there.

The film returns to the young boy in the factory. Because he missed his bus, he is late for work and the factory is locked. He has to climb over the walls in order to break into the factory which is his place of work itself. He sneaks through the warehouse and the foreman finds him on the stairs late and excoriates him. The boy says, it is diarrhea, I'm sorry.

The shot of the factory shows that the floor of the factory is reached by a descending spiral staircase. It is underground and in the bowels of the earth itself. In this sunken space, the film unfurls the looms which are worked in lines of workers and that thunder deafeningly in this process of production. Whereas Rembrandt's Philosopher in *Philosopher in Meditation* (1632) sits at the lit desk beside an *ascending* stairwell, here the worker is at the other side of a *descending* stairwell. In this sunken place, when the foreman sees the non-productive activity of the young boy talking to the girl, he physically whips her.

Hearing what the boy told him, Marx seeks out and insists that the factory inspector inspect the factory. The inspectors are sent to and arrive at the factory.[1307] This facilitates the central anagnorisis of the film. There, the factory's boss, Cross (*Kreuz*), with the inspector present, asks the workers to answer the question: this night shift is not normal, isn't that correct? The film shows the inspector seeing the wound on the girl's face from being struck by the foreman earlier. The inspector asks her how she got it. She says she fell. At first, no one will speak out. Marx had said to children, "remaining silent never changes anything. You must find the courage to speak. That'll be easier when you stick together."[1308]

It is the young boy who first speaks out. He says, this night shift is not abnormal, it is routine. This time of the working day as it has been represented to you by the capitalist is a false one. After he speaks up, other workers then also follow and give their testimony. Another boy says, we work so much we fall asleep at the machine. We eat out of these pails that are chained around our neck. The young girl brings out the whip. This is the whip I was whipped with.

Meanwhile, the foreman discovers that some lace was stolen from the warehouse. The young boy is scapegoated because another worker told the bosses that they saw him going through the warehouse that morning. The young boy insists that it wasn't him and that he didn't steal from the warehouse. It indeed was not him. It was instead stolen by his brother, a raven, who sold it to a sailor who wanted to give it to his bride. His brother does not work in the factory. He is not 'evil,' but he is an individualist who has not joined with others. His younger brother and mother are accused of his crime. When his brother tells him that he and his mother have suffered for his criminal deed, the gang of ravens contribute to pay back the wages that have been withheld from the younger brother.

[1307] The film delivers a joke there. Cross says to Mohr alias Marx, economics is a complicated science, you obviously have little understanding of it. To which Mohr alias Marx responds that his understanding of economics is instead, "more than you'd like."

[1308] *Mohr und die Raben von London*, directed by Helmut Dziuba, (GDR: DEFA, 1968).

Speaking down from the top of the stairs which stand over the factory, the controller informs the workers that the boy has been granted clemency by Cross and that he should thank him. The boy does not speak. Marx told him earlier, never sign a confession statement; it will admit your guilt.

Like in *Capital,* the film exposits another scene of subjection and exploitation in the capitalist process which is semi-autonomous from the so-called hidden abode of production. This is not the unspecific marketplace here but instead specifically a pawnshop. Needing money, the children had to pawn their pregnant mother's bed. Marx gives them the money to get it back. When they repay, the pawn shop owner tries to introduce a falsity into the arithmetic calculation. He attempts to add another unit of money to the price. When he is caught by them, he then retracts it as a mere 'slip.'[1309] The pawnshop owner escapes from the store, saying aloud, much in the way that the religiosity of Batavus Droogstoppel is presented in *Max Havelaar* (1860), that he must go to church. With this, the film recognizes that the capitalist discourse bears an ideological specularity and as such is liable to absolutely spurious and knavish lies.

The film belatedly reveals that the father of these young working siblings is out of work. He has himself been fired from the factory for organizing workers. Now that other lace factories are suffering from workers strikes, Cross has more orders than ever and needs to hire him back. When the current labor organizer comes to the house to ask for his support in the strike, he refuses. He has been out of work too long, he says. He needs money.

Meanwhile his son is now in friendship with Marx. When Marx's family members are sick, he cooks them soup. He teaches Marx how to peel potatoes and eke the last bit of oil out of a carafe. Marx advises the labor leadership of the factory through the boy. The workers eventually force Cross to sign their demands. With all the workers together out of the factory and on the square, Cross signs and the 8-hour workday is realized.

The film thus speaks-out politically and pedagogically at once. The film argues for the necessity of the intervention in the factory by the workers, and it aims to facilitate efforts to organize against the exploitative mode of ownership of the means of production in the capitalist mode of production.

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Before the film screening began, two speakers spoke on the auditorium's stage to introduce the film. This practice is common in this Jakarta world of independent cinema, and it practically demarcates these film screenings from commercial film screenings, which are preceded instead by 'previews' for other films or other modes of commercial advertisements. In the introduction to this film, one of the emcees said that we can learn about exile (*pengasingan*) from this film because Marx lived in exile in London. They also asked that spectators post on social media about the screening. There were approximately 100 people in the auditorium at the Goethe Institute that evening. That is one of the largest single viewings I saw in the duration of the entire fieldwork research period, 2016-2020. At the end of the film, many audience members clapped their hands thunderously.

In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, we identified the existence of the ban on the understandings and dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in Indonesia which was introduced

[1309] The young children are not the only ones at the pawnshop. The film shows a cello player who has pawned his cello and goes to the shop to be able to continue to play it. The cellist never speaks. When the pawn owner wants to cut him off, he pulls the cello by a string back up to the ceiling.

through emergency power in 1966 and re-affirmed in 2003. This screening does not directly contradict that thetic content. Instead, it evinces a strong collective movement in seeing a film which the mainstream history of cinema has mostly tended to forget. This is because, we suggest, the question of the meaning and destiny of the division of capitalism and communism has not been completely forgotten or submerged in this world. *Mohr und die Raben von London* (1968) is therefore a local film as much as it is a foreign one. Its primary lesson, spoken from Marx in the genre of a children's book, is a political analysis of the ownership of the means of production as well as the advocation for a courage to speak out without fear.[1310]

§16 *Agitation and Pedagogy of Film*

The environments of screening films thus bear a capacity to disturb the conjuncture into which they proceed. This condition animated the aforementioned reception of *Sexy Killers* (2019).

As we have said, *Sexy Killers* (2019) advances the thesis that the parliamentary system as represented in the appearance of the division between its two presidential candidates of Jokowi and Prabowo is one which conceals a true unity in a mode of production.[1311] *Sexy Killers* (2019) argues that both leaders see the parliamentary system as one which ought to aim to 'debottleneck' capital in Indonesia. Families of both leaders, the film discloses, are financially invested in or benefitting from the extraction of coal from the earth in Indonesia. The film exhibits the process whereby the creation and maintenance of coal mines introduces lethal toxicity to Indonesian people's lives. As Indonesian citizen-subjects, they live in the *politeia* founded by *Pancasila,* one of whose principles is "social justice for all of the people of Indonesia" ("*Keadilan social bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia*").[1312]

This political practice is often referred to generally as *Ekopol* (eco-politics). The success of this strategy can be seen from the immense magnitude of viewings of *Sexy Killers.* As we have said, the film was seen more than ten million times in its first week on Youtube. This political strategy is therefore of a massive political identification in Indonesia. It is not contained to the concerns of the so-called elite or left intellectuals.

The film opens with a seemingly fictionalized depiction of the encounter of two lovers of the urban bourgeoisie. The setting is a tower apartment residence. There is a pizza delivery box on the floor. The film shows, with a locking pair of feet under bed sheets, an attribute of this 'sexy' eponym. The film then turns to a classical, pedagogical documentary genre. The frame exhibits an electrified and illuminated desk lamp with an intertitle that reads "9 watts," a refrigerator with an intertitle reading "250 watts," a television of "150 watts," a laptop charger of "87 watt," a blow-dryer of "400 watts," and an air conditioner of "350 watts." This lesson continues to show throughout the apartment the quantified demand of electricity of each machine. After seeing and showing all of these machines and their quantified electrical demands, the authoritative voice-over reads, "what we often don't know is how electricity is generated and transmitted to this room."[1313] The meaning is made clear. The mode of existence of the urban bourgeoisie draws out, through metallic filaments, a hidden abode of the production of electricity. The dialectical montage effect of this opening scene is very strong.

[1310] The film is based on a so-called children's story, authored by Ilmos and Vilmos Korn.

[1311] The Indonesian political system, like that of the United States, bears a strong executive branch. The strength of the Parliament was eroded after 1959 when the Constitutional Assembly was dissolved and *UUD* 1945 was restored. See Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia.*

[1312] See Nasution, *The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia*, 443.

[1313] *Sexy Killers,* directed by Dandhy Dwi Laksono and Ucok Suparta (Jakarta: WatchDoc, 2019).

Exiting the misty realm of the 'sexy killers,' the film turns to a long shot recorded with an aerial drone flying over a coal mine in Samarinda, East Kalimantan. That voice-over says, "everything begins with an underground explosion."[1314] It tells us that coal, while it is called a rock (*batu bara*), is instead plants that have been trapped underground at high pressure for 200 to 300 million years. This temporalization is ended through the mining blast and the extraction of the remains. The massive quantum and scale of this coal process are not only found in the temporalities of physical natural processes. The film shows and the voice-over tells that shipping barges carry 8,000 tonnes of this material through rivers of Kalimantan where they meet even larger oceanic vessels which carry 50,000 tonnes of coal. Coal from East Kalimantan is both exported as well as burned in Indonesian power plants, *PLTU*. There, coal is burned to produce steam that generates electricity. The film therefore bears witness to and rediscovers this process.

After opening in the high-rise apartment, the film then denies the possibility for the truth of this production process to appear there. It thereby re-identifies that the initial form of urban appearance is a false one. This is not simply a real in contrast to a false appearance, but rather the critical thesis that truth emerges by a mode that *is* a distortion of their relation. This structure also characterizes *Capital,* where the transaction first appears to be the starting point of value and capital in order to be rejected by Marx, as well as *Max Havelaar* (1860), where the coffee being sold by a grocer in Amsterdam emerges in order to be exited from for Java. In *Sexy Killers,* the fictional high rise apartment tower of the urban lords is exited and gives way to a place that is *within the home* of the peasant who lives next to a coal mine. The man asks the camera to bear witness to his home water. Look and see, he exclaims. This is our water. It is murky (*keruh*).

But the film is not simply a critical exposition of a physical or environmental process. For the film exposits the relation of the 'sexy killers,' the parliamentary leadership of two final presidential candidates, and marginal people throughout Indonesia who are seen as obstacles to the process of 'debottlenecking' capital in Indonesia. The film's political idea is that the sexy killers participate in this process by their slumber and support for the parliamentary system's leaders. The film was strongly disliked by those who preferred either of the two candidates. The film was released in the days directly preceding the presidential election. Some supporters of Jokowi were insulted by the film, for it likely subtracted more votes from Jokowi than Prabowo. But Jokowi ended up winning the election. Over 158 million votes were cast. Jokowi and his vice president Ma'ruf Amin received over 85 million votes and Prabowo and his running mate Sandiaga Uno received over 68 million votes.

At the same time, the millions of viewers of *Sexy Killers* saw and heard its lesson of how the process of electricity makes 200 to 300 million years of containment extinct by powering refrigerators, hair dryers, lightbulbs, and computers. In doing so, the film strongly speaks out to say that the parliamentary system *as a whole*, represented in both of the final presidential candidates, does not *care* about these human beings who are the citizen-subjects of Indonesia living in domiciles beside coal pits that do not look anything like city skyscrapers.

§17 *An Emergence of New Indonesian Cinema, 1998-2008*

Riri Riza (b. 1970) spoke at an event commemorating the film *Kuldesak* (1998) at *Kinosaurus*. He directed *Kuldesak* together with Nan Achnas and Mira Lesmana as a directorial collective. He spoke about making that film that is now called and thought of by some as the historical origin of contemporary independent Indonesian film. His experience making the film, however, does not

[1314] Ibid.

resemble the film's contemporary glorification and adoration by some. He said, the film's historical significance would come as a huge surprise to his own younger self.

In speaking, he remembered meeting commercial executives in the film industry, both of production and movie theaters, to pitch the film. He recalled trying to explain to them what *Kuldesak* was and why it was worth their attention and resources, why this film was both interesting but also why it would be popular.

He recalled for many of those present in the audience who were not yet even born 20 years ago that the commercial film studio system of the 1990s did not make films like *Kuldesak*. He explained that at the time when he was at *IKJ,* from 1988 to 1993, the film *Cut Nyak Dhien* (1991), the story of a female Acehnese guerilla played by Christine Hakim and directed by Eros Djarot, came out and showed them that something different and new in Indonesia film was possible. The film made it seem possible to make films that he wanted to make. He stressed the difference in the movie theater at that time in contrast to the present. Indonesian films were 'B' films. The more popular movie theater film showings were Hollywood films. Indonesian film tickets were cheaper. He was, he said, *gelisah* (restless, uneasy, agitated), with the state of Indonesian film. There was a new wave of film happening at that time in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan. He had an older brother living in the US from whom he learned about America. Spike Lee was his idol at that time, he said.

The name of the film (*Kuldesak*) articulates its main idea. It is a story of the *fin de siecle* metropolitan city of Jakarta; the path of the story is a "cul de sac." He explained that *Kuldesak* is about the intersection of several stories in one night. It is the story of the disquiet (*kegelisahan*) of the young people, he said. It has a voice of anger (*kemarahan*), he remarked. Its central story of a musician suicide was inspired by Kurt Cobain. He said it draws from the film *Taxi Driver* (1976), particularly the idea of the relation of the nighttime and the daytime in the metropolitan city.

He said, they knew they did not want to join the studio system of filmmaking. They all complained about its feudalistic culture. At that time, he said, there was a monopoly on the movie theater for distribution and circulation. He recalled going to the corporate office of Cinema 21 and explaining the film and confronting skeptical industry executives but eventually gaining their compliance. One of the conditions was that the film had to have a film poster, the lure of the movie's own commodity form. The poster bore, he remembered, the logo of a cigarette company, who provided financial support for the film. The film itself, he remembered, begins with a diegetic advertisement of the cigarette company.

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Sitting on the balcony in Rawajati, Lisabona and I talked about the state of independent film in Jakarta today. She told me that several years ago Edwin and a few others together formed a *yayasan. Yayasan* means 'foundation', or 'institution.' Lisa worked there as a freelance programmer. She said, we needed to do this because we have many different ideas, but we need to be able to keep them together. The *yayasan* comprises a micro-theater (*Kinosaurus*), a film distribution unit (*Kolektif*) and an artist-run analog laboratory (*Lab Laba Laba*). The foundation also teaches filmmaking classes which assesses tuition and provides a financial inflow.[1315]

I asked her about Edwin's films. She said that *Babi Buta Yang Ingin Terbang* (2008) significantly contributed to the birth of the next generation of Indonesian film which is

[1315] Most courses cost about 1 million Rupiah (~80$) per participant. At this cost, these courses are only accessible to the so-called upper middle classes.

ongoing.[1316] This can be called, in reference to the German antecedent, New Indonesian Cinema. Between *Kuldesak* (1998) and *Babi Buta Yang Ingin Terbang* (2008), we suggest, a new way for film to be made in Indonesia was opened. These films speak-out in a disquiet. Given its inceptual significance, it is not ancillary to recall that *Babi Buta Yang Ingin Terbang* (2008) was not formally released within Indonesia, as it would not have passed the *BSF* (*Badan Sensor Film*) because of the graphic male-to-male sex depicted therein.

§18 *The Existence of Modern Colonization*

Ardjuna invited me to join with him and others at the opening of an exhibition at the National Journalism Gallery (*Antara*). He said there would be an art exhibition, live music, and possibly even some beer drank. It was also a birthday party for one of the *Antara* curators and a close friend of Garuda, Oscar. I took the train there into the middle of the city and met others who came on motorcycles and in cars from Garuda and elsewhere.

Heading into the middle of the city around 8pm, my train traveled directly against the dominant stream of passenger traffic. Trains leaving the city center were completely filled with passengers squeezed against each other; a remainder of passengers were denied entry at most stations. Trains heading into the 'center' of the city were nearly empty, with all passengers able to take a seat. I exited at the Juanda station beside the largest mosque in the country, *Mesjid Istiqlal*, a central region of Jakarta.

I spotted the building with the myriad benedictory flower boards (*papan bunga*) congratulating the exhibition lining the front of the gallery at the street. The building, Andreas reminded me later, was the first national news office and was constructed by the Japanese. When I arrived, the ceremonies had already begun. Ministers were sitting inside on chairs and invited one by one to speak to the audience. I stayed outside with Indra.

We had time. He smoked a cigarette. We talked about film. I asked Indra about *Kucumbu Indah Tubuhku*, Garin's newest film. He said that it wasn't popular (*tidak laris*) at first, but then after it got banned, its popularity grew. He had come from a *demo* (demonstration, protest) at the National Parliament (*DPR*). Two friends were arrested, even before anything started, and they were just released at 6pm. The demonstration was a protest against the new law of what was generically referred to as the *Omnibus Law*. It was, during this period of dissertation research, understood to be a significant intervention in the legal state apparatus of Indonesia. As the name indicates, it was not a single law but a set of laws. One of its many measures that elicited strong opposition is its labour law which facilitates the accessibility of so-called flexible labour for capitals.

The others from Garuda arrived at *Antara*. We went through the gallery for the first time. Ardjuna said a philosopher wrote a text called "On Models and Fashion." He asked me, who is it? I don't know, I said. Walter Benjamin, he said, and then he turned and said to several others at once, who was a Marxist.

There was a high spirit to the entire affair. The exhibition took place August 16, 2019, the eve of Indonesian national Independence Day. The exhibition consisted mostly of journalistic photographs from 1945-50, taken during the war of revolution and independence. There were also extraordinary drawings by Sudjojono, Henk Ngantung, and others that exhibited the inceptual national revolutionary political ideology of Indonesia. Dolo had a sculpture exhibited in the middle of the exhibition. It is a figure of a photographer taking a photograph. Appearing

[1316] *Babi Buta Yang Ingin Terbang*, directed by Edwin (Amsterdam: Tiger Releases, 2008).

within the National Journalism Gallery in an exhibition composed primarily of 'stately' photographs, the sculpture brings forth an absolutization of the form of the address of the exhibited artworks. This statuary photographer was facing an interior gallery wall where other exhibited artworks hung. It thus made into an absolutely static gesture this photographic 'shooting' and 'the look' of the camera.[1317] The sculpture however shows not only the mode of seeing that is undertaken by photography, but also the more general conceptual depiction of exhibition as such. The sculpture thereby endows the enframed works, which are all 'artifacts' of the Indonesian revolution, with something other than simply their 'past.' It shows that they are all also a mode of presentation that is the very activity of enframement.

The exhibited paintings thematize the people (*rakyat*), the guerillas, and the *pengungsi* (refugees, those in-flight). One of the strongest images and utterances were the drawings entitled "Guerilla Sketches" by HB Angin. They exhibited and instructed relationships between the guerillas and the people. The slogans read "the people mutually assist [*gotong royong*] the guerillas," "guerillas have to help guide the people," and "the people have to be obedient and respectful [*taat*] to the guerillas." Another was a caricature of a martial European male carrying a rifle. He is named "Johnny v. Mook". The inlaid statement in the graphic reads: "Born Aug. 4, 1947 Cease Fire Order. STILL DOING WRONG." The exhibition commemorated the birth of Indonesia where the people and the founding nationalist guerrillas are engaged in mutual cooperation. The exhibition demonstrates, amongst other theses, that the state is not essentially theatrical.

The bands played and were all excellent. The first played in a British Pop music genre, akin to the bands The Strokes or Franz Ferdinand. The second played in a folk music genre. The third was another rock pop band and the fourth was an excellent blues band. The fifth and final band was a new wave, punk band which thrilled the crowd and got people dancing.[1318] Almost everyone wore a black t-shirt. Ardjuna, however, as almost always, wore a plain white t-shirt. Drinking was done in both a concealed and unconcealed manner.

There is an immensity of human life and activity in the night of Jakarta. This does not come as a subtraction from daylight activities. There is instead in the night, however rarely, another kind of being that is not the time of the day. Hundreds of people attended. Many people, including women in headscarves, not only smoked cigarettes but drank beer. This is a night that is not the direct opposite of the day but rather its inversion.

§19 *On the Aesthetic Form of Reason and Rebellion*

Having taken place for ten consecutive years, *Arkipel* has established itself as one of the most important film festivals each year in Jakarta. As a screening and discussion forum, it is a crucial element of this New Indonesian Cinema. The festival is collectively organized by *Forum Lenteng*, a community of film activists which was founded by Hafiz Rancajale (b. 1971). The festival is centered around a theme each year. In 2016, the theme was "social/kapital." In 2019, the theme was "*Gelora Indonesia*." *Gelora* means "surge" and "enthusiasm." The film genre "*gelora Indonesia*"

[1317] In one TV interview, Dolo said that sculpture is the freezing of the body in a gesture. It is a closing that is simultaneously an opening. See *Kompas TV*, "Perempuan Pematung Pejuang HAM," Youtube, October 26, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ki-gcpiBBo0.

[1318] The painter of the work "*Do Not Talk About the Communists*" (2009) said to me once that when he came to America, he was shocked because everyone stood up together at parties. He said, it was so nice. You stood; you walked around. You talked, he said. Here, in Bali, he said, people sit down at parties. They sit in circles. You can't go up to anyone and have a brief conversation, he explained.

names films produced by the Indonesian government depicting and eliciting the enthusiasm of the new nation. This year, *Arkipel*'s opening exhibition was a critical examination and presentation of these *Gelora Indonesia* national television programs of the Indonesian national television station, *TVRI*. The exhibition aimed to call attention to this 'glorification' and enthusiasm for development that *TVRI* disseminated. Moreover, the exhibition drew attention to the way that Indonesian state ideology has been sutured into and propagated by the mass media infrastructure of Indonesia.

The opening exhibition took place in the National Museum located in the spatial center of Jakarta. To enter, one walks through the museum's own opening gallery, which exhibits huge maps of Indonesia, divided by colors indicating so-called 'ethno-linguistic' spaces. In these huge, color-coded maps, all groups of people are presented as equally the 'ethnic' peoples of Indonesia. The peoples are shown in portraits of their 'ethnic' dress. Papuans appear with nose plugs and Dayaks with feather plume headdresses, for example. The maps, like many New Order 'cultural' productions, explicitly advance the thetic content of the 'unity in diversity' postulate of Indonesian national ideology, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. The maps furthermore exhibit the uneradicated historical events of Indonesia's own military aggressions. For Timor island, still in 2019, is shown on the map as 'inside' Indonesia. The map has not been emended over the past 22 years since East Timor has become an independent and internationally recognized sovereign nation.

In the exhibition, the *Gelora Indonesia* films viewing stations were situated in a gallery as an installation. There were projectors stationed throughout the gallery space; some were in alcoves while others were projecting onto open gallery walls. Most had attached headphones where spectators could hear the film's audio on a loop. In the opening ceremony, ministers gave small remarks wearing batik to consecrate the opening of the festival. One official said that this exhibition will be, and then he took a long pause and said, informative (*informatif*).

The exhibition's curatorial statement appeared on a gallery wall. It stated that the curators see the films of *Gelora Indonesia* as one large work. During the Japanese occupation of what became Indonesia, film was used to disseminate (*menyebarluaskan*) military propaganda all the way to rural countryside. This film production organ then became the *BFI* (*Badan Film Indonesia,* the National Film Body of Indonesia) and later *PFN* (*Perusahan Film Negara*, National Film Company). *PFN* made *Gelora Indonesia* films until 1976 when the genre's official name was changed to *Gelora Pembangunan* (The Enthusiasm of and for Development). These films, they wrote, can be called propaganda films in that the voice (*suara*) of the voiceover instructs the viewers to see and think at once and together.

The curatorial statement argued that there is a fundamental difference within the concept of *gelora* (enthusiasm) that separates the Old Order films (pre-1965) and the New Order (1965-1998) ones. In the Old, enthusiasm itself is foregrounded. In the New, development is foregrounded. In the New, the 'news' exhibits ministers present to witness and glorify bridges, roads, and factories. The event itself is the presence of the military and government emissaries. In one, Suharto gives boats to governors in the marginal districts in Eastern Indonesia who are exhibited as being thankful to Suharto. The transmigrants are depicted as happy to move to other islands of Indonesia. Another segment shows that the government and military help assure the safety of the election ballot. In one of the films showing the pinning of stripes on the shoulder of a soldier, the voiceover says that the soldier (*prajurit*) works for the people and vice versa.[1319]

[1319] On this statist cinematic practice, See Fagan, "The Excentric Film Project of Gotot Prakosa."

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In addition to screening new international documentary and experimental films, *Arkipel* also convenes panels to discuss film. These panels pertain both to films being screened during the festival as well as on topics regarding film more broadly. Edwin (b. 1978), Garin Nugroho (b. 1961) and Manshur Zikri (b. 1991) appeared together on a panel at the Goethe Institute to discuss the concept of *bromocorah* in Indonesian film. Garin and Edwin are the two most influential living Indonesian filmmakers of the Reformation and Post-Reformation period. Manshur, as a member of *Forum Lenteng,* is an active film critic and activist. *Bromocorah*, as the convening remark to the panel explained, means a rebel.[1320] But as the different panelists suggested, it is impossible to simply translate the word, and yet this impossibility facilitated an illuminating inquiry into the existence of independent Indonesian cinema.

Edwin said that he would talk about the genre of *film pendek* (short film) because it will show how film is always looking for a form and medium because film is not itself a stable thing. He said that *film pendek*, in the history of film in Indonesia, always comes from a place of rebellion. *Film pendek* as a genre exists *against* the extant hegemonic forms at-hand for that filmmaker. *Film pendek are* all experiments to rebel. These films are not proper (*mapan*), he said. Edwin began by explaining that in the 1970s, Sardono W. Kusomo and Gotot Prakosa made *film pendek* by introducing elements of other aesthetic mediums into film in order to make films hold the *elements* of dance, music or theater within it. These films were often funny (*lucu*), he recalled. In this practice, there is a conceptual interaction between the act of making film and the resultant film itself, such that these films acted on social, rather than exclusively aesthetic, practices.

Edwin then moved to a subsequent slide projection which identified a change with the 1980s and early 1990s. At this time, he said, *film pendek* goes into a period of decline with the technicalization and industrialization of the next generation of filmmakers taught at *IKJ*. In his next slide, he said that *film pendek* was reborn in the 1990s, and it is oriented towards narrative expressions that are essentially different from the formal experiments of Gotot and Sardono from the 1970s and early 1980s. *Film pendek* in the 1990s is used for pedagogical or political ways of presenting a social issue, he said. Edwin's example of this moment is the film *Sonata Kampung Bata* [Sonata of a Brick Village] (1993). This is Riri Riza's *film pendek*. It is not a documentary, he said. It is a story of the social issues of a poor village but told with the narrative of a child who wishes to ride a merry go round.

Edwin marked the next shift into the 2000s by the shift from film to video. From this moment, films are a questioning of the false (*palsu*) histories of Indonesia after the deposition of Suharto. There is in this period, Edwin recalls, an explosion of independent film production and communities throughout Indonesia. In Jakarta, *Kineforum* opened in 2006, he noted. Film communities exploded in this period with the expansion of video playback due to computerization of film projection. This period, he said, is marked by an extreme variation in content and quality.

By the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, there is another essential shift in this medium. This is the shift from video to digital as the medium of production and distribution of film in Indonesia. Now formally completely severed from celluloid, film loses its sensuous and practical relation to the medium of painting. In content, many of these *film pendek*,

[1320] Echols and Shadily give "repeat offender" for "*bromocorah.*" *Kamus Indonesia Inggris,* 3rd ed. by John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1989), s.v. "*bromocorah.*"

he noted, oppose the increasingly conservative turn of Indonesian society.[1321] Edwin gave the film *Kado* [Gift] (2018) by Aditya Ahmad as one such example.[1322] *Kado* is the story of a young person who withholds their gender from others under the *hijab*. But the film is not simply a story of the social oppression of organized religion. It is about navigating the construction and deconstruction of 'subjectivity,' or the human being, given the forces of social normativity. The film, with grace and care, brings forth the fragile consistency of such a journey. The film has received significant international praise and acclaim. It won the Prize for the Best Short Film at the Venice Film Festival in 2018 and the *Prix du Reseau Cinema* at the International Film Festival of Fribourg Switzerland in 2019.

But Edwin also suggested that many young Indonesian filmmakers are not aware of this history of Indonesian film. This was a direct and oblique confrontation with many of those who were present and listening in this Goethe Institute auditorium. Edwin's lesson ended with the idea that this Indonesian film history of *film pendek* can intervene in ideological practices.

Garin spoke directly after Edwin. Garin began by saying that he is himself the concept under consideration by this panel, that is, the existence of *bromocorah* (rebelling rebels) in Indonesian independent film history. He said that he himself is this very paradox. Whereas Edwin gave a pedagogic address regarding the concept of *bromocorah*, Garin gave a personal biographic reflection of his idea of *bromocorah*. He said that he made his films under the monopoly conditions of Indonesian cinema, both in its distribution by *Cinema 21,* but also the commercial studio business, and yet his films were against those systems.

After Garin finished, the youngest panelist spoke. He was introduced as a member of *Forum Lenteng*. He gave a talk explaining that the concept of the rebel used to exist in the very medium of the film itself. Later, he said, this notion of rebel enters the narrative itself and becomes a diegetic character. He used many examples from global international cinema, such as Pedro Costa, to illustrate his points. But he also explained that this tension animates the film *Alam: Syuhada* (2005). The film was made by Hafiz, the founder of *Forum Lenteng*. *Alam* is regularly translated into English as 'nature,' but it also can mean 'world' or 'realm.' *Syuhada* is an Islamic martyr. A brief portrait of this film helps elucidate a foundation both of *Arkipel* and the world of Post-Reformation Indonesian independent cinema.

Alam: Syuhada opens with a man's voice spoken as a voice-over. The visual shot appears in a perpendicular orientation to the lateral movement of the camera.[1323] The shot exhibits the side of the street in the city of Jakarta in an ongoing lateral long take manner under the voiceover. The voice is telling his story. He says, "after I was born, my father left." A second voice, the interviewer, enters and phatically affirms to that voice that they are there and listening. The first voice continues to say that my mom left for work and that my grandparents took me until I was 12. Then I went to a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school). Then I was told to go to Jakarta, to go look for work.

The visual shot is taken from the viewpoint as if riding in an *angkot* (mini-bus). Its riders see the city in the perpendicular view to the direction of traffic. This viewpoint inscribes the place of the city's common, not wealthy, people. The image looks at the city from this standpoint, seeing mostly people driving motorcycles.

[1321] This notion of a conservative turn has recently been criticized as conceptually catachrestic. See Robert Heffner, "Islamism and the Struggle for Inclusive Citizenship in Democratic Indonesia" in *Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: Threats and Opportunities for Democracy*, ed. Chiara Formichi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021), 14-37.
[1322] *Kado,* directed by Aditya Ahmad (Jakarta: Miles Films, 2018).
[1323] This is a 90 degree turn from the 'direct' perspective of the road that Gotot Prakosa's *Jalur* (1977) exhibits. For a discussion of that film, see Fagan, "The Excentric Film Project of Gotot Prakosa."

The voice-over says to the interviewer, sometimes you feel good, sometimes bad. But now I have my own money, and I can use it to give to my family in the village. Or, he continues, and says, to drink with my friends. The first time I drank was 2000, he said, but I don't do other things. Yes, I buy lottery tickets. The first time I won was during Ramadan, he said. He bought VCDs with the winnings and was quickly broke again.

After four minutes of long shots of the voice over and the edge of the city street seen horizontally, the same orientation now captures a human being into whose body this voice can now be imputed. I've had girlfriends, the voiceover says. I would get so mad, going to her parents' house. They asked for so many things, like if we were married. If I get married, he says, I want a religious wife. I want to change my life, to pray, but my heart can't, he said. It's like it's just closed, he said. I never go to the mosque on Friday. In the *warung* (canteen), people tease me. If I say I want to go pray, they say, what are you doing if you just pray on Friday. Then the eponymic martyr (*syuhada*) arrives. I want to join the army, he says. Because if I joined the army, he says, I could die as a *syuhada*. Then I can defend the country (*negara*).

The closing credits indicate that this protagonist's name is *Alam*. His utterances are not satirized by the film. Instead, *Alam: Syuhada* (*Nature: Martyr*), hears the voice of the side of the street in Jakarta, heard while riding in the miniature bus in Jakarta. This notion of *alam* has very little to do with what is usually imputed to and by the concepts of nature as the environmental or ecological. *Alam* here is both an individual *and* the realm of a living human being who dreams of dying as a martyr for the nation. To become a martyr would change his place in this world.

In an interview, Hafiz said that the film is a method in profiling.[1324] It is a physical profile of the city's street as well as a metaphysical profile of one of its human beings.[1325] Given its invocation by Manshur in the context of the discussion of *bromocorah*, we suggest that *Alam: Syuhada* shows that the city is the 'nature' of this 'rebelling' human being.

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Arkipel is distinguished from other Jakarta film festivals for its explicit orientation towards international documentary and experimental films.

In 2019, one *Arkipel* screening session was called "Cinema Observing Cinema." Its first film was an Iranian film, *The Plato* (dir. Mohammad Ghanbari, 2019), which depicts the tale of a donkey that stops working. An *imam* explains the rules of when and how the donkey can be killed, but the shepherd cannot bring himself to do it. He is mocked by others. He refuses to kill it. He attacks his donkey, he is so upset it won't continue to work, even though it is old and has worked his whole life. The donkey's milk stops, but the owner refuses to line up and get the mechanized milk. He is even recorded running *amok* by neighboring villagers with their cellphones.

The shepherd seeks out the Islamic law jurist for counsel, but he is of no help. The jurist tells him what he must and mustn't do, but when the shepherd asks the *imam* to care for his donkey for one night when he wants to leave the village, the *imam* refuses. I have never taken care of a donkey, he says. The *imam* is shown at the mosque in his tidy office with his bookshelves lined with books. Eventually, the protagonist tempts suicide, but he is stopped by the other villagers. The film ends by him being arrested and taken away in the back of the police truck.

[1324] "Interview with Hafiz Rancajale," ASEAC Interviews, August 21, 2019, https://www.aseac-interviews.org/hafiz-rancajale.

[1325] For a deep reflection on the concept of profiling, and its relation to Hegel's philosophy as well as his remarks on sculpture in his *Aesthetics,* see Rebecca Comay, "Defaced Statues: Iconoclasm and Idealism in Hegel's Aesthetics," *October* 149 (2014): 123-142.

Arrested and detained, neither sacral nor secular legal jurists can resolve the problem that the donkey poses to the man.

The second film of the program was called *Distant Tropics* (2018). It begins with a visual image as seen through a periscope, with its telltale circular scopic enframement which leaves an umbra shadow on its visible surface, between the enlightened circled and a darkened squared border of the frame. In the encircled visibility, a white man washes up on the beach shores of Brazil. At first, the 'natives' there welcome the castaway. But later there is strife. The man attempts a romantic encounter with a woman and another man strikes him down with an oar.

In the discussion with the viewers after the films at the Goethe Institute, one viewer said that Indonesia is that 'distant tropic' for the imperialist gaze. Another said that the Iranian film is a parable for a journey of ethics in an Islamic world. But there were few comments. The audience in general was not enthusiastic in discussion. This mode of quietude is essentially unlike that one we have identified in the Verandah as parrhesia.

§20 *A Minimal Anthropology and a Healing of the Politeia*

Some of the artworks framed and hanging on the walls of Budi's porch appeared like woodcuts although they were not. These drawings are from a series entitled *Kampung Pulo*. Literally 'Island Village,' it is a particular region in Jakarta on the banks of the Ciliwung river. In the drawings, people are gathering on a bamboo float at the river's edge. A man is using a bucket to wash himself. Others are washing clothes and dishes.

I asked Budi about them, and he told me that the artist, a member of *Taring Padi,* drew them because this particular riverbank society was about to be evicted. The people there *were* evicted by the state, he said. The artworks are an action of commemoration.

In the furthest point in one of the drawing's horizons, there is the tip of one of the tallest and most iconic skyscraper buildings in central Jakarta, the *BNI* (National Bank of Indonesia) tower. Its highest point is the shape of the tip of a fountain pen. Inscribed here within the same frame as the city's riverside poor, the drawing gathers together into symbolization the dignity of ordinary people against the wealthy elite of Jakarta. With this inclusion and opposition, the work identifies and takes the side of ordinary people on the threshold of the dissipation of this particular human world.

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The possibility for a self-determination vote in West Papua remained present in the national mass media discourse through this period of research in Jakarta in 2019-2020.[1326] Some of these reports referred to the Referendum vote which was given by the Government of Indonesia and taken in the province of *Timor Timur* in 1999. That Referendum led not only to the independence of East Timor, but a violent conflict and humanitarian crisis for the people of East Timor in the aftermath of the Referendum vote. Someone critically and sarcastically remarked on the situation with West Papua. He said, if I am Jokowi, I will give a referendum to West Papua because I will win. I will win because the majority of the population in the province of West Papua are 'non-Papuan' because of the historical and ongoing colonization of the Papuan region by Indonesians from other regions of the country.

[1326] For the context of the situation, see chapter 5 of this dissertation.

Ardjuna had come from the weekly political action at the state palace that is known by the day of the week of its own convergence in political action. This is *Kamisan,* which could be translated in this context as 'to Thursday' or 'Thursday-ing.' *Kamisan* was initiated by a mother, Sumarsih, whose son, Wawan, was killed in Jakarta at the Semanggi I shooting, November 13th, 1998. *Kamisan* has now grown into a much broader alliance of protest, specifically centered around human rights (*HAM, hak asasi manusia*) and the Indonesian government. This action has gathered for over 500 consecutive Thursdays without interruption.

That particular Thursday, because of the ongoing military confrontation in West Papua, Papuan activists joined *Kamisan.* Ardjuna reported to all, this was so great. They played music, he said, that invited our bodies to move (*mengundang badan bergerak*). It was an entirely different action of protest than prior *Kamisans*, he testified. He said to Budi, think about this and think about making a sculpture with a study from this dance movement. It is something great and fierce (*dahsyat*), he said.

On the table, there was a booklet whose cover showed drawings of what appeared to be future buildings. They were for the next, new terminal at the Jakarta International airport, Terminal 4. Budi said that the terminal construction commissioned a work from Dolo which *Somalaing* would do, probably next year. The booklet was composed of computer presentation slides with images bearing such statements as "Business travelers usually dine in 30-40 minutes" and "they buy less souvenirs." It instructed that the airport therefore needs "food and beverage near the gates" and "must have recycled water."

I thought about how Alain Badiou often disputes and disparages so-called human rights. Badiou's position is one which was formed without living under the long duration of Suharto's Indonesia where even the inexistence of human rights did not exist. In this Indonesian world, human rights are not in any way adequate to the idealism of linguistic anthropology that Badiou imputes to them. Someone in the Verandah once explained to me that human rights developed as an activity to de-construct the spurious notion of the harmonious society of the New Order. Thus, in this world, human rights are not linguistic anthropologies, but are instead an actual political practice. There were scores of acts of solidarity with Papuans (and others) at Garuda during the years of this dissertation research. It was a place that sheltered Papuans at a time when many experienced myriad instantiations of formal and informal persecution.

Indra told me on several occasions that his father, Bachtiar, was imprisoned for his activities as a filmmaker and member of *Lekra*. His father was imprisoned for many years and lived his citizenship-hood afterwards as an ex-political prisoner (*ex-tahanan politik*). As his descendent, Indra said, I am a victim (*saya korban*). I asked him one time how he, of Batak and Sunda parents and now living in the metropolitan region of Jakarta, became so gripped by his solidarity with West Papuans in Indonesia. He said the following. He said that his solidarity with the people of West Papua, who are also a victim of the state apparatus of Indonesia like himself, is a kind of healing for him. Caring for other *korban* is therapeutic, he said. This action transforms what is a poison into a healing for two victims at once.

§21 *The Mode of Production of Artworks*

Sitting together on a long bench in the Verandah, Andreas said to me that *Indocement* and *Cement Indonesia* are two different corporate entities. *Indocement* is making cement from the demolition of karst rock formations in north Java, near Rembang and Pati.

We began to speak about this because he was wearing a t-shirt, like many others we have mentioned, that bore a political thesis which is held up pictorially and discursively at once. This

statement is: *Tolak Pabrik Semen*, *Lestari Gunung Kendeng* (Reject Cement Factory, Conserve *Kendeng* Mountain). Its iconic image is of a famous political protest action in 2018, when several elderly women, farmers from *Kendeng* mountain region, wearing bucket straw hats, went to the State palace (*istana*) and poured concrete cement into casts around their feet. This image was disseminated and propagated widely, through screen-prints, t-shirts, as well as digital mediums. His t-shirt is a *Taring Padi* artwork.

As we have recalled, *Taring Padi*'s mode of work is explicitly one where the producer is a collective and not an individual. They have used art to develop a discourse, actions, and artworks that interrupt horizontal social conflict in Indonesia. *Taring Padi* employs many motifs used by socialist realism because, as Ucup said to me, they can be received and accepted by all groups (*golongan*) of society. He said to me, they try to not create a confusion which leads away from the social issue. As an artist organization, they "dialecticize" (*"berdialektika"*) with the oppressed people, their spirit and energy. They create artworks and political action which is neither strictly 'fine arts discourse' nor regular parliamentary forms of social association.

On one of the tables at Garuda, there was a new, large coffee table book. It was called *Inside Studio with 25 Indonesian Artists*. It showed with large format glossy photographs the insides of these prominent artists' studios. One of the included artists was Dolo. The photo in the book showed the very place where we were sitting at the moment of looking at the book. She said, OK this is good, look, you can see the Munir and Marsinah posters on the wall, which we looked up and saw in front of us on the wall. Munir (b. 1965 – 2004) and Marsinah (b. 1969 – 1993) are both understood to have been killed by the state apparatus for their speaking-out. In an interview in the book, Dolo said, with our government officials and what they do, I don't know whether to laugh or cry. She said, with the continued impunity of murder, genocide, and human rights abuse, Indonesia will have a lot of struggle and change in the future.

§22 *On Interpellation*

During the period of dissertation research, I attended approximately one hundred screenings of independent cinema. This is said to indicate an essential plurality of this experience. Due to this quantity, many are not recollected again here in this dissertation. This absence of local representation does not however disturb its original presentation. Those that are recollected here are done so particularly for the way that they relate to categories present in this dissertation as a whole.

One night at *Kinosaurus*, I saw a screening consisting of 3 *film pendek* (short films). The first was a coming-of-age sexuality story. The second film opened with the voice-over saying that this is the place where they were raped. The soldiers did whatever they wanted to us, the voice-over voice said. This took place in East Timor. The third film showed an actor doing a voice-over alone in a sound studio. He is given direction through his headphones, to be more angry, more sadistic, and more violent. The film ended in an intertitle which silently stated that this was the way that the film *Penghianatan G 30S/PKI* (1984) was made, and that it was banned during the *Reformation* period, but is now emerging out of its ban.[1327] All of the films present tellings that are excluded from the mainstream oracles of mass society. They are all thereby instances of intervention.

[1327] For a formal and critical reflection on the film, see Hafiz Rancajale, "Mari Belajar Bahasa Filem dari *Penghianatan G 30S/PKI*," *Jurnal Footage*, January 10, 2020, https://jurnalfootage.net/v4/mari-belajar-bahasa-filem-dari-pengkhianatan-g-30spki/.

Another night, I saw another program of *film pendek* screenings also at *Kinosaurus*. One film was a story of two West Papuan brothers living in Yogyakarta. The film is about how Yogyakarta landlords who own boarding houses don't want to rent rooms to West Papuans. Because of this discrimination, the older brother stays in the Papua *asrama* (dormitory). The film shows the everydayness of the racism which West Papuans directly confront in Indonesia. The film, made years before the storming of the Surabaya dormitory by the repressive state apparatus, provided a *both fictional and true* 'pre-history' to the calling out of *monyet* into the dormitory where young Papuans were gathered together in Surabaya.

After *Kucumbu Tubuh Indahku* [*Memories of My Body*] (2019) came out of its *de facto* repression, it was screened at *Kinosaurus.* The film tickets were sold out more than one hour before the screening time. Many tried to come after and were turned away. It was a lively screening atmosphere.

As has been previously mentioned, the film's narrative is violent and sexually explicit, and this is therefore considered foretold here. In the film, a young boy is left by both parents to a neighbor who is a leader of *lengger* troupe of dancers. In *lengger* dance, some boys dress in a feminine mode. When one of the men in the troupe sleeps with a female in the troupe, the boss kills him, and says, her *leng* is mine. A troupe member explains the etymology of *lengger* to the young boy. '*Leng*-' is the hole of life and '*-ger*', is the brow of the cock. Eventually in the film, a village politician takes him as a young boy to be his erotic masseur. The politician tells him to put some powder on his penis, saying that he was told by a shaman this will make him win the election.

But the discourse of the film is not, as we argued, pornographic. One of the older troupe members explains to him what happened to the boy's parents when he was young. His father left this region because he saw his family in or after 1965 get massacred and dumped into the river here. The film diegetically places itself in the forest of Central Java and assiduously avoids the urban *mise-en-scène*. The film is a telling of the bearing and carrying of these memories and traumas.

After the film finished screening, the actor who plays the central boy character stood up from his seat in the small theater. He then turned and sat on a chair in the front of the theater with the head film programmer of *Kinosaurus* to talk about the film. He said he learned from drag queen friends in Yogyakarta about 'how to be feminine.' He said that he studied acting at *ISI Yogyakarta* and almost gave up thinking that he could make a career of it when he was contacted and cast for this role.

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The very first thing Ardjuna said to me upon arriving to Garuda one day is that Surya Anta has been arrested. I asked, is he alone? Who is he with? And he said that many have been arrested. He said they can hold him for questioning for 24 hours, and then he should be released. Someone said to tell Bilven to be careful in Bandung.

Meanwhile, there was a larger gathering of people there. Yayak was extremely animated. May, he said, is a month of important remembrance (*peringatan*). May 1 is *Hari Buruh* (Worker's Day), May 2, *Hari Pendidikan* (Education Day), May 13 is *Trisakti* (Semanggi II), and May 21, Suharto deposed. It should be used in order to disseminate a thoughtful idea, he said.

But the conversation also moved away from the grave circumstances at hand. I told Ari about how I was telling Dolo about how much I liked Taufan's sculpture, where a man with a dog's face and dog with a man's face are facing each other on a blue couch. Taufan was one of

Dolo's principal disciples who left *Somalaing* to work on his own before I arrived in 2016. I told Ari, she said to me, that one next to it is pretty good too, huh? That was one of her signature bronze sculptures from the series entitled *Dance Movement* (1994). She laughed and I laughed. I tried to backpedal and to praise hers too. When I said to Ari that I thought to praise the disciple is even better than to directly praise the master herself, Ari laughed and then said, maybe what she is saying is when you are looking at something there is something right next to it that you will not even notice.

§23 *The Pitch of Film*

On *Jalan Rasuna Said*, a central Jakarta road lined with tall skyscraper buildings, I went to an event called "Good Pitch" in which documentary film projects and film funders are brought together in order to raise money for these films. The event took place in an elegant ballroom at a hotel. I was invited by one of the event's organizers who knew I was doing research on film in Jakarta.

When I entered, there had just been such a 'pitch' from a filmmaking team who had made a documentary about ecological challenges facing communities in Palu, Indonesia after they experienced a tsunami. On the stage, an American, from an organization called Working Films, pledged money, and said in English that the film will resonate outside of Indonesia, as environmental disasters disproportionately hurt "black and brown folks." The roundtable VIPs spoke about the film, and pledged support from their respective organizations. There were two microphones in the audience at which attendees formed a line in order to say what they thought about the film and pledge their support of money, story consultation, editing consultation, advertising, and screening support. Huge organizations such as Ford Foundation, Skoll Foundation, Foreign Embassies, and wealthy individuals come together to finance these films.

The next film, *BARA* [*FLAME*] was about a *tokoh adat* (traditional leader) who is struggling to get a forest recognized as an *adat* (customary) forest. The film's first intertitle states that from 2009-13 over 3000 soccer fields' size of forest were burned in Kalimantan each day. This 'traditional leader' was in the ballroom that day. After the 'pitch,' the director acknowledged his presence. He stood up and faced the room, wearing traditional vestments. His hat had two feathers crossing in the back, forming a V. He wore a long necklace in the front. His name was Iber Djamal. He says in the film, I'm not afraid of being sued by the government. The most important thing is to be supported by your family. When he spoke, he choked up, and I felt my tears welling. This is a story about the endangerment of souls and spirit (*mengancam nyawa dan jiwa*), he said. He bowed to the crowd and received the largest and loudest standing ovation of the whole day.

Later, a Kenyan director from Good Pitch explained that he showed a film about the environment to some villagers. They were asked, do you see the truth? They say, yes we do. Film is extraordinary, the director said. It *convenes people*. It creates an arena for dialogue. It speaks the language of humanity. It facilitates practical solutions. It changes lives, he said.

Another pitching film project was entitled *Waste On My Plate*. In the trailer shown to the ballroom filled with foods and beverages, cows are shown eating plastic bags in an immense dump of human waste. This film is the story of commercial agriculture in Indonesia and it

explains the presence of plastic in the food supply. This plastic is very much a physical condition as well as a metaphysical one.[1328]

Beyond the immediate interest of the film projects, the event strongly pointed out the multipolarity of contemporary urban Indonesian society. Everyone introduced themselves as a member and affiliated with a *different* social organization and movement. This seemed to ratify Coen Pontoh's aforementioned notion of the efflorescence of civil society organizations which emerged after the deposition of Suharto.

Upon returning to Garuda from the event at the hotel ballroom, I learned that Surya, who had been detained for treason (*makar*) for unfurling the flag of West Papua at a political demonstration, had not been released. His detention continued. After that arrest, the police were moving to charge Veronica Koman, a prominent human rights lawyer, with violating the Information and Electronic Transmission Act (EIT; *Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronic, ITE*) for writing on her Twitter account that the police had shot 23 people at the Papua Dormitory and deployed tear gas.

§24 *Dialects of Harmonies and Melodies*

The musician with whom Ardjuna and I had listened to *New Ancient Strings* (1999) had returned from a 45-day trip to eastern Indonesia in Larantuka, Flores. He went with other musicians from the Jakarta metropolitan region to make, share, and learn music. It was a cultural exchange sponsored by the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Government of Indonesia. The essential principle was the exchange of the knowledge of Indonesian music*s* for the purpose of enriching Indonesian music and musicians.

Ardjuna had come back from a dance performance supported by the Goethe Institute called *Celestial Sorrows*. I asked him how it was, and he demurred. I asked him again, and he said, of course, while watching I can enjoy it, it is just that after, at which point he cut off speaking. He stood and talked to those sitting around him. The problem now is, he said and continued, the specialization of artists. Theater students need to watch film. Film students need to learn music and photography or painting, he said.

That night, I was speaking in conversation with an elderly man I had just met for the first time while sitting together at a table in the Verandah at Garuda. He said to me, you probably took private transport here. This class of transportation encompasses motorcycle and automobile taxis, accessible to some but not all. Although I rarely took the latter, I took the former in daily life. I said yes. He said, I take the public bus. He explained that he was living in the *Manggarai* district of Jakarta. I asked, as is common in such an introductory conversation, if he grew up as a child (*dibesarkan*) in Jakarta as well. Yes, he said. After that, he said, I was imprisoned in *Pulau Buru* for 10 years. He said, I almost died from sickness there. He was neither declaring a heroic biography nor withholding this actual event. It was shocking momentarily for me.

He identified himself with the name of the island – *Buru* – that held perhaps 10,000 political prisoners after 1965. Some, although not all, of those prisoners were members of the aforementioned *LEKRA*, "The Institute of a People's Culture." Its most well-known prisoner, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, wrote his most well-known historical novels as a prisoner there. This

[1328] Catherine Malabou writes that plasticity both gives form and receives form. While this is correct, this leaves out, as Aristotle would not, the physical body of plastic. The physical plastic is not bypassed for the metaphysical or conceptual 'plasticity' in this film. See Catherine Malabou, *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic* (London: Routledge, 2004), 115 ff.

particular man is one of the thousands of others that are not with Pram's literary fame. His name is Muhammad.

Later that night, Codet said to me, in Jakarta, everyone is trying to get money. If you join this stream of humanity (*arus manusia*) in Jakarta, you will get exhausted. After he said this, Yayak, somewhat coyly, showed me a photo of one of his paintings on his phone's screen. There is a sea of people (*laut manusia*), he said. Everything is blue, like we're all together in a sea, he said. Yayak said Bilven's name is on a military's list of people who are going to be targeted and that he needed to be careful.

*

Many regions in Jakarta flood after big rainfalls. After the floods, all kinds of things can be found by the river, Codet said. Even new plastic wrapped sofas. Where are these things from, he said, we really have to think. After the flood, I've taken things from the river, he said.

Codet lived far from Garuda, directly north towards the sea, in *Pulo Gadung,* a densely populated urban area of East Jakarta. He said, people look at me there when they see my tattoos and earrings. I know they are thinking that I don't know. But know what? he asked.

When I lived in Yogya, he said, I always took care of (*pelihara*) dogs. When I would look for a boarding house, I would listen to hear if there were dogs. If there were dogs in that area, I'd go there to start looking for a place to live. Taking care of dogs is *haram* for some but not all Muslim Indonesians.

He told me how in *Pulo Gadung,* he lives just across a cement block wall, less than the width of his arms, from a mosque's *azan.* An *azan* is an amplified speaker which calls out to Islamic prayers five times a day. He said, we're like this, and he made a silly, sarcastic gesture of a close, affectionate embrace that is not affectionate.

*

After he explained his *Ahmadiyah* film project in Lombok once again to me, Adi said both laughing and in sincerity at once, how do I get the money?

Ari said when he was a kid, in the 1980s and 1990s, a movie theater ticket was 300 rupiah in the city of Lampung. This is about 3,500 rupiah in 2021 and equivalent to 25 US cents. There were important differences between different movie theaters, he remembered. In the picture and the sound but especially the chairs. There were some with single wooden chairs, he said. But there were others that had soft sponge on the seat and those were the best. He also remembered seeing films at night in the night market; they could be seen out in the open (*layar tancep*) he said.

We were sitting on the small porch in front of the *Somalaing* office in Jakarta where we watched the Indonesian soccer match. We were under a huge mango tree. I asked Ari, does it fruit? Oh yeah, he said. I asked, a lot? Oh yeah, he said.

§25 *A Jakarta Uprising*

It is always hard to say within the moment of an uprising what specifically caused the uprising to begin. The notion of reasonable rebellion still posits the presupposition of right and reason. What, therefore, grounds this reason? Here, we can say that the 2019 uprising in Jakarta appeared as a unity of previously semi-autonomous realms of political struggle. These realms can be understood by three points as follows.

At this time, there were massive burning fires throughout Indonesia, particularly in Sumatra and Kalimantan. These burns were generated in order to incinerate organic matter to be able to plant oil palm tree plantations. The pictures of fires, smoke, and haze came to the digital computer screens and surprised many in cities who do not have a direct experience of this fire. The government was criticized by many of its people, not for setting the fires (which is instead undertaken in the domain of the individual capitals themselves), but instead for not putting them out, for not caring for its own earth and people, and instead caring for 'corporate profit.'

There was also the hailing utterance of *monyet* in the storming of the gathering of West Papuans in Surabaya. This led to an uprising in Papua and a securitized response from the Indonesian state apparatuses. This included the killing of tens of Papuans and Indonesian state soldiers, the detaining of protesters, and the making of the human rights lawyer and activist, Veronika Koman, a state agon, by charging her with breaking the EIT law and requesting that *Interpol* arrest her. Her Twitter account has been a primary locus for the dissemination of videos taken by Papuans to document and show that the Indonesian military apparatus is attacking them. The Monday of the week of uprising in Jakarta was the deadliest day in Papua in over 20 years at that time, with over 26 people killed in Wamena after protesters burned the office of the district head (*bupati*).

There was thirdly the *Omnibus Law*. University, college students, and technical high school students came together to protest this Law at the national legislative body (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR*). The primary Twitter hashtag in this movement was "*reformasidikorupsi*," "The Reformation is Corrupted." With these three elements, the movement grew to a greater sum than its parts.

The week before this uprising, students had begun to revolt against the perception of the government's incineration of a crucial piece of Reformation, the Corruption Eradication Commission (*KPK*). *KPK* was one of the major institutional consolidations of the Reformation movement. The name of the body is translated as the Commission for the Eradication of Corruption (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*). The word for eradication, *pemberantasan,* is one of the keywords that was used by the New Order; communism and the threat of communism in Indonesia had to be 'eradicated.' Thus, the name of the commission heralded a shift in the state's enemy, but it also evinces a continuity in the discourse of the Indonesian state apparatus.

The president had just permitted a legislative revision of the *KPK* to be introduced. Many commentators felt this was the death knell for the *KPK*. The revision would reduce what made the *KPK* effective, which is its independence from the national legislature. The revision would also take away its power to wiretap, which is the primary mode by which it has gathered evidence for its indictments. In tandem with this legislative revision, the *DPR* chose a police leader to be the new head of the *KPK*. The police and the legislature are the two primary state organs that the *KPK* investigates. This choice was widely perceived to weaken if not completely compromise the existence of the *KPK*.

At Garuda, A. asked A. earnestly, is this new leader good? A. chortled, he's *brengsek* (lousy)! In the evening, students began to occupy the *KPK* building. Upon seeing the occupation reported by live television news coverage, the action didn't seem to change the balance of forces regarding the *KPK* as outlined here. But the situation was not without foment. The street demonstrations were in the same places as 1998-1999, between Semanggi and the *DPR*, where armed forces shot and killed protesters in November 1998 and September 1999, in events known by the names Semanggi I and II.

Activists were being arrested. Dandhy Laksono, the director of *Sexy Killers*, was arrested for a tweet. Dandhy was charged with violating Article 28 and 29 of the *ITE* law. His tweets included photographs of Papuans shot which the tweet alleged was done by the Indonesian state apparatus. Articles 28 and 29 impute the illegality of spreading information to sew hatred based on ethnicity, religion, or race.[1329] Another friend of Garuda was arrested for collecting money for the protesters. They both were released within 24 hours. After the third day on the street, the Legal Aid Foundation (*LBH*) released a list of 50 students who still are unaccounted for. I was constantly receiving messages on Whatsapp with people's names and state identity cards, of those who had not been contacted since the protests began.

Protests took place all over Indonesia. Actions converged at regional legislative body houses (*DPRD*) in regional capital cities. Then news came that two students were shot and killed in a protest in a provincial capital city, Kendari, in the province of Southeast Sulawesi. Their names are Himawan Randi and Yusuf Qardhawi.

In Jakarta, the student movement leadership first rejected the offer to meet with the president Jokowi in the Palace. They demanded that the President must first agree to their Reformation Completion Declaration demand. The student movement developed 7 demands: revoke the Omnibus Law, revoke the *KPK* leader, revoke *dwi fungsi* (dual function) of the army and police, stop militarism in Papua, stop criminalizing activists, stop burning forests and uphold human rights. "Heal the rights of victims now!" they demanded. They *framed* the situation: "*KPK* weakened. The Forest is burned. Papua is oppressed. Land is for financiers. Farmers are evicted. Workers are squeezed. Privacy is in danger. Democracy is neutered. Move, People! [*Rakyat bergerak*]"[1330]

A friend showed me a document created by an NGO to explain the *Omnibus Law*. It stated that Article 470 states that rape victims who need an abortion can be imprisoned for 4 years; Article 432 states that women out at night can be fined 1 million Rupiah; Article 419 states that women who search for opposite gender roommate can be imprisoned 6 months; Article 432 states that a homeless person can be fined 1 million Rupiah; Article 218 states that one can be imprisoned 3.5 years for criticizing president; Article 416 states that parents who show contraception to kids can be fined 1 million Rupiah; Article 417 states that those committing *zina* (unlawful sex) can be imprisoned for 1 year. They clarified that the provenance of these social oppression articles that criminalize female citizen-subjecthood come from the Islamic party of *PKS*.

The Electronic and Information Transaction Act (*ITE)* was being used to attempt to arrest standpoints, such as those of Dandhy and Veronica, that unconceal what the repressive state apparatus is doing in West Papua. But the state apparatus is not merely discursive. Randi and Yusuf were shot and killed. Many others were bludgeoned in Jakarta. Politics and the *politeia* are not simply linguistic anthropologies.

§26 *The Interpretation of Sovereignty*

The egg seller in the market in Rawajati said to me, Anthropology? That is wonderful. I was surprised momentarily. Let me ask you, he said, is Indonesia capable of democracy? Is

[1329] The law is no. 11/2008 and is named *Undang-undang Informasi dan Transaksi Electronik*. It was modified by *Undang-undang* no. 19, 2016. For a review of its content and subsequent juridical revisions, see Baker McKenzie, "Indonesia: Joint Decree attempts to unify the interpretation of provisions on prohibited contents under the EIT law," *Lexology,* July 9, 2021, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=82f6e263-cdc4-444f-bd0e-6fbd7705be7c.
[1330] Fieldnote, October 2, 2019.

democracy an institution or a people? Or a culture? The government is mostly Javanese, he noted. And Javanese are not democratic, he said. They are feudal. Knowledge is good, he said. Knowledge is universal. I need to read more. I reserve (*simpan*) a book here and read when there aren't any customers, he said.

At Garuda, Andreas asked me if I knew that the first prisoners who went to *Buru* had to build their own prison colony themselves? He said, this wasn't done out of any particular joy in sadism, but rather so the bureaucrats could take the money that was allotted for the prison facilities construction.

After his release from *Buru*, Pram wrote a tract entitled "Apologies in the Name of Experience" ("*Maaf Atas Nama Pengalaman"*). Its thesis helps situate the historical world from which an Indonesian Renaissance of left thinking emerges.

Writing in 1991, Pram recalls that the *Mahabarata* climaxes in a "blood bath of your own brothers."[1331] And yet this is not only a literary or imaginary representation. Sutawijaya, the first Mataram king, took the throne by killing his adopted father. In the 17th century, Sultan Agung, the 3rd king of Mataram, destroyed the neighboring kingdom. Pram moreover notes that Javanese chronicles never mention *nurani* (conscience); it doesn't seem to exist in Javanese vocabulary, he writes.

With the imperial subjugation by Dutch and the loss of the ability to move on the seas, the Javanese retreated into the interior (*pedalaman*) and folded under the power of the knights (*ksatria*).[1332] Our poets kowtowed, he said. These poets said, for instance, that Nyai Roro Kidul was the lover of the Mataram kings. This telling neglects, Pram writes, that the first king went to Nyai Roro Kidul in an attempt to eliminate his shame of losing the power over the sea.

The military defeat to the Dutch contributed to an inward-facing, village (*kampung*) culture, Pram writes. Javanese were confined (*terkungkung*) into village culture and civilization. This village culture and mentality is reflected, Pram thinks, in the glorifying remembrance of the blood bath of your own brothers of 1965-66.

This *eidos* can be glimpsed, we note, in Indonesia's monumental statist architecture. On *Jalan Thamrin*, on the corner of the central state square in Jakarta, there stands in a state sculpture the climax of the *Mahabarata.* It is a glorification and sacralization of a sib killing. The statue is regularly called the *Arjuna Wijaya* [The Victory of Arjuna] (1987). In copper, Arjuna rides his chariot powered by scores of flaming horses. He stands, carrying his bow and arrow, with *Batara Krisna*, having successfully completed the task given to him to kill his brother, Karna. This is the depiction of the Pandawas riding the chariot in the open having defeated the others, the Kurawas. The Pandawas and Kurawas are sibs.

Pram here repeatedly apologizes for breaking out of the village culture which glorifies that brothering blood bath. He writes, literature turns upstream realities into literary realities. The best literary work contributes to a more advanced (*maju*), not acceptable (*mapan*), reality.[1333]

A basis of the Indonesian New Order can be seen, he suggests, in the legend of Gandring from 13th century Java. Gandring is a *keris* (dagger) master. Ken Arok, the first ruler of the *Singhasari,* orders a *keris* made. The made *keris* is lent to a Kebo Ijo who shows it off. Ken Arok steals the *keris* and kills the leader Tunggul Ametung to take his throne. Kebo Ijo is sentenced to death for the crime, as everyone had seen him display that he is the possessor of the *keris.* But this

[1331] Toer, "Maaf Atas Nama Pengalaman."
[1332] Ibid.
[1333] Ibid.

is not all. There is some utterance left behind. For Gandring says that this *keris* will kill 7 more generations of leaders of this kingdom.[1334]

A possible orientation out of this 'village' mentality, according to Pram, is *Verlichting* and *Aufklarung.*[1335] Pram, who was born in the conditions of actually-existing-modern-colonization and imprisoned by multiple Indonesian regimes as a political prisoner, sees a strategic aim in these Dutch and Germanic semantics if not concepts. His reflection suggests that in the conjuncture of modern colonization, concepts are best appraised according to their tactility, not their spatial provenance.

§27 *The Force of Politics*

At Garuda, I asked Andreas about the last week of uprisings. He said that the biggest actions were on the 23rd and 24th. He was with the women from *Kendeng* mountain region. The plan was to begin at the *Istana* (Palace) and long march (he always said in English) to the *DPR* (National Legislature). He explained that the university students (*mahasiswa*) had opened the street and the march followed. He went with the *Kendeng* activists to the *Indocement* headquarters. *Indocement* is excavating the karst mountains that damages the livelihoods of the peasants with whom he marched. But before they arrived at the *DPR*, there was chaos, he said.

On September 30, 2019, the demonstrations resumed in the streets of Jakarta and converged at the *DPR*. The response from the police was more forceful than the week before. This time, water cannons and tear gas were used. The nearby university campus of Atma Jaya University became a sanctuary, but the police still pursued demonstrators shooting tear gas.

Testimonials emerged from those confessing to have been paid to wear a student school uniform, go to the streets and cause destruction. This activity aimed to make the students appear to be acting anarchically, thus seeming to necessitate re-control by the parliamentary state apparatuses. Many videos showed police, clad in armour, beating demonstrators to the ground. Over 500 people were arrested that night.

The next day, I saw a picture of K. on Twitter. I had seen him three days before. We talked about yoga. He said he likes to practice yoga. He said, it is not Indian yoga that became popular in Indonesia. It was not through Hinduism as either a religious or scientific experience or practice. It is instead, he said, about western life, and then he laughed. In Bali, he said, there are so many you can't believe. Now Indonesians are getting into yoga as a kind of "health" practice, he said. This happens, he said, both in expensive studios, but also in the village (*kampung*) on courts (*lapangan*). He regularly did yoga at Garuda and got others to join him.

K. had been livestreaming this confrontation. He and his camera broadcast the riot police beating someone right in front of him. Then K.'s camera showed himself lose those conditions of representativity when he himself began to be beaten. His camera showed the police standing over him and begin to beat him when the video cuts. That was his last known whereabouts. I asked Andreas and Bilven, but there was still no news. Dolo had in the late afternoon gone to the Police (*Polda*) to try to find him. I told Jenny. She said, these cameras, these connections to Facebook, they simulate a feeling that it will save you because it can be seen by others. But that is a false security. No one is home in facebook. There is no one there. When I first saw him a few days

[1334] Ibid. Pram gives a 'stage-ist' account of this history as follows. In the 20th century of Indonesia, Soekarno is the thesis. Suharto is the antithesis. Synthesis is what we are still heading towards.
[1335] Ibid.

later, he had a bruise on his face and his eyebrow was blue and swollen where he had taken the impact.

§28 *Interpreting the Acts of Killings*

In his writing that he had asked me to translate, "Joshua: Multatuli Volume Two," Martin Aleida said that *The Act of Killing* (2012) made him think about a *primbon* that his father took with him everywhere. As a young person, Martin tells, he thought this *primbon* was where you looked up names to see if someone is sick because they have the wrong name, or when you should have a wedding or start a business. It is a book of forecast (*ramalan*), he writes. Books, he reminded, during Suharto's reign, were taken by people and even buried underground, outside, on the other side of the river if necessary, because possessing books could get you killed, particularly in 1965-1966. Books are not simply mute material facticity. He remembered that his older sibling buried that *primbon* during that period outside somewhere.

Martin Aleida said that he himself again looked into this *primbon* book when he began to write about Joshua. Because, Martin said, to write of Joshua in Indonesia is to engage with the way that he has been identified as treasonous. Martin says, Joshua has helped uncover one of greatest crimes since the holocaust in Germany. Joshua's 2012 film, jerks (*menyentakkan)* world consciousness (*kesadaran dunia*), he writes.

In 2016, the IPT wrote an indictment of the Government of Indonesia for several crimes. The process which eventuated in this verdict, Martin Aleida recalls, *began* with a screening of Joshua's film, known mostly internationally by its English title, *The Act of Killing*. This was in Den Haag in March 2013 at a "Films That Matter" film festival. As Martin relates, "a discussion began directly after the screening of the film."[1336] There were about 35 Indonesian exiles, activists, researchers, and Joshua there. Martin says the primary question after the film screening was: how can this impunity be ended? The participants there set the intention to bring the case to the International People's Tribunal (IPT).

Of course, Martin notes, Joshua's film is not 'breaking the silence' of these crimes against humanity. Martin writes that the Human Rights Ministry of the Indonesian government (*Komnas HAM*) reported in 2012 on this and the Attorney General did nothing to act on it. Joshua's film moreover is not a policy statement. It is a film that shows killers dancing the *cha-cha-cha* in the site where they and others killed others. The ethics of this film are not the most important problem for Martin Aleida. Anwar Congo asked Joshua to do this, Martin pleads. Anwar thought Joshua is a promising young American director and he saw a possible profit in telling him his story.

Martin recalls the strange situation of the films' screenings in Indonesia. *Senyap* [Silent], the sequel to *The Act of Killing,* showed at *TIM* and 800 people came to see it, he remembers. The plan was for only one showing, but they added another because of its popularity. A minister of the interior thanked the Jakarta Art's Council (*Dewan Kesenian Jakarta*), for showing the film to the youth of Indonesia. But shortly after this, public screenings of the film were banned. Students in Java were forbidden by the rectors to see it. Martin explained that this was because the military pressured and pressures them. And yet scores of Indonesians still watched the film.

Martin states that the film had an important impact on Indonesian journalism, citing how *Tempo* magazine published a major report on it afterwards. They followed Joshua's tactics and interviewed perpetrators, thereby changing the form of the representation of history. Joshua, Martin writes, follows in the footsteps of Multatuli, whose writings "dismantled the dilapidated

[1336] Martin Aleida, "Joshua: Multatuli Jilid Dua," Personal Collection, September 2019.

behaviour of the Dutch officials."[1337] Martin writes that Multatuli's work is monumental and an inspiration (*ilham*). Martin thereby identifies a continuity between *Max Havelaar* (1860) and *The Act of Killing* (2012).

At the end of this writing, Martin gives his biography as follows. He states that he was editor of *Zaman Baru*, the monthly magazine of *Lekra* and that he changed his name after being briefly incarcerated in 1965. In the latter part of the 20th century, he worked for 13 years at *Tempo,* one of whose founders is the aforementioned Goenawan Mohamad. It is the most prominent national periodical magazine.

§29 *On Semangat 98* ("98 Energy") and *Prison: A Short Introduction*

At different times, Andreas and Martin Aleida both said to me that Joshua is Jewish and suggested that this might contribute to his drive to expose the 1965 genocide in Indonesia. Both were said in a mode of speculation or hypothesis. Their questioning identifies a drive of the filmmaker that is not coincident to that which is exhibited in their films.

K. was working on his laptop and editing his footage with Adobe Premiere software for a period of several months at Garuda in 2019. He showed me footage from a 2008 demonstration at the gate at the state legislature body, the *DPR*. In his laptop, water cannons were blasting against those congregating in opposition at its gate. He said, for 21 years I've been making this film. The working title was *Semangat 98*. *Semangat* can be translated as energy or spirit. He explained to me that one of the working film's protagonists was then a demonstrator *outside* of the DPR and is now himself *inside* and a DPR representative. While watching together, K. turned and asked me frequently, is it boring? He kept saying, as in a self-defense, it is not yet edited.

Another young man was sitting beside K. and also editing footage on his laptop. After we introduced ourselves, he asked if I wanted to watch his film. I said yes. It is called *Prison: A Short Introduction.* It is about a documentary about a particular prison, *Tanjung Dusta*, in North Sumatra. The film's opening is an Indonesian television newscaster saying that this might be the worse prison in the whole world. The newscaster said, it is overcrowded. Cells built for 3-7 people have 15-30 prisoners in them.

The central action of the film is the story of the event when the prison lost electrical power which eventuated in a riot. The film tells the story of one prisoner who in this riot sheltered a prison guard from harm. The film recounts that this prisoner told the guard that he had to take off his uniform, otherwise he will be beaten up. With this, the film itself shows care and nurture which is not simply the 'structure' or 'information' of the overcrowding of the prisons. The film's story holds up something else besides the everyday modes of imprisoning. It is the prisoner who in the emergency acts ethically towards his own captor.

K. asked me, do I need more footage? I said no, you already have the ending. It is the footage of livestreaming on your facebook page when you were struck down by the police to the ground. You have the shot from the ground looking up to the battalion police directly over you, attacking. There's your ending. Yes, he laughed, now just show me in the wheelchair. Yes, he said, it's now a tragedy. *98 Energy* has to be a tragedy, he said.

§30 *Sighting Hollywood in Jakarta*

[1337] Ibid.

In line at a large grocery store, after I answered California to his question of where I was coming from, a grown man ahead of me said that he watched *Terminator* (1984) today. I asked him, was it good? No, he responded and gave a long, dramatic pause. He said, it is great! He threw his head back, opened his mouth and let out a deep laugh. What an incredible movie, he said. I don't know how they can make a movie so great as that.

Just a few days later, walking to the morning market in Rawajati from home, a man sitting on a tarp and selling clothing stood up and said to me: mister, I want to ask a question. King Kong, is it real or not? I thought and asked in response, in the film or in history? In the film, he said. Is it real? I really have a hobby to watch film, he said.

The very next day, he stood up again. I want to ask you a question, mister. In *Titanic* (1997), when the ship hits the glacier in the ocean, is it real? Did they film it in the ocean? I said no, they filmed it in a studio in Mexico. Both questions are reasonable. They ask, as many do, how did I see what I did see? He knows that what he saw is true, but he still wants to know how that truth appears as such.

§31 *Speaking-out in a Literary Meeting*

Book launch events regularly take place at Garuda. I attended many, including one to commemorate the publishing of the book *Buku Catatan Harian Keluarga Kiri* [*Diary of a Leftist Family*] (2016) written by Dhianita Kusuma Pertiwi.[1338] Its eponymic diary is a work of historical fiction. It takes the form of the diary of a child whose father was incarcerated in *Buru*. Dhian's grandfather, as she explains in the book's prologue, was imprisoned for ten years in *Buru*, leaving his wife (her grandmother) and three children (her mother and two uncles), in Malang, East Java.

She appeared on stage with three others, including Bilven. The audience numbered perhaps around 70 people. After the panelists first spoke about the book, Martin Aleida spoke first from the audience to the panel of authors and moderators. He did praise the work at first. He said, it is an extraordinary (*luar biasa*) work. But his main point was critical. He asked, do novels need editors? This is a work of great imagination, he said, but what is it? Is it a novel? What is the meaning of history in this literature (*sastra*)? Bilven, who was moderating the panel, responded that some manuscripts need editors because if they aren't edited, they can't be read.

Martin relented on this but continued to speak severely. He asked, can the last sentence of the work be explained to him?[1339] We already have the facts about 1965, he said. We already have the published facts. Andreas is here, his blog has collected all of them. They can be read. What we need is the spirit. Martin's point was not simply a challenge to Dhian's work but instead to all there. Another participant spoke after Martin and challenged. I don't agree with this dichotomy, she said. She asked, isn't that spirit exactly what your stories do? That is, they are literature but they do not separate out a so-called pure historical story.

After several more comments and discussions, Bilven asked if we could hear from a survivor and victim (*korban*) who was there. The discussion had begun during the sunlight hours of the afternoon, and it was now dark and evening. This elderly man stood to address the listening group. He told the story of the night that he was arrested in 1965. He was in a group with others. The rest of them except for him were shot and killed there. Something intervened,

[1338] Dhianita Kusuma Pertiwi, *Buku Catatan Harian Keluarga Kiri* (Malang: Sastra Pelangi, 2019 [2016]).
[1339] She writes, "if punishment can be mete by means of kinship, then also wounds can be felt by means of kinship. Including the struggle for opening the veil of falsity [*Termasuk perjuangan untuk membuka tabir kepalsuan*]." Pertiwi, *Buku Catatan*, 169.

he said. A lack of bullets, or a sudden change in orientation of the action. Something. He should have been killed there too, he told us. This was spoken as a matter of fact and not with an affected heroism.

He told us of how he became a political prisoner and then an ex-political prisoner *(eks tahanan politik*). It was hard for him to get work, he told everyone. Sometimes an employer wouldn't check or know this identity and he could get a job. Even good ones, he momentarily recalled with mirth.

He spoke for a long time. He had to change the microphone which he was using several times. When he did finish speaking, his accompanying companion stood up directly afterwards. He said, it is good that the descendants of victims, such as Dhian, are writing about this because the victims themselves cannot write it. Dolo also spoke and addressed everyone there. She praised this accomplishment of writing.

The work's prologue is named "one question, one beginning." It is important to recollect:

> How is the feeling of being accused as a leftist person? What is the feeling to become a part of a family which is stamped as leftist people? It seems that a question such as this these days is no longer popular, and it felt unnecessary to be asked. How is it so that the evil of the big leader is shuddered and made sacred by the government for tens of years, such that its name then is glorified as the heroes.[1340]

She continues and recounts that her grandfather was a *Soekarnois*, that is, a nationalist, who gathered with farmers and artists. He was imprisoned by an *imputation* of being affiliated with *PKI, not* the *facticity* of his own true existence. The state apparatus therefore violates even its own speculary formulations.

This book discussion took place in the Verandah at Garuda. Beside the Verandah is the open lawn. In this clearing, one of Budi's sculptures, *Mother and Child* (2006)*,* stood alone in the middle. This is less than 5 meters from where this elderly man spoke about his life while tens of people hearkened to his words for scores of tens of minutes without interruption. *Mother and Child* (2006) is a short marble sculpture artwork. It rises to knee-level. Made with chisel work, it never bore a material mould in the course of its production. With it, there appears the *eidos* shining forth of a mother holding a child within her arms while her face faces upwards, parallel to the sky. Her mouth forms a small but definite opening. It is such an incredibly strong gesture of care, love, and protection to never stop looking over this lawn in which it stands. As a sculpture, it not only exposits but stands up the *eidos* of a sheltering within that human beings can make or do in-embrace.

§32 *A German Invitation in Jakarta*

An international aspect of the contemporary fine art world was never absent from *Somalaing* and *Taring Padi* in this period of 2016-2020. Members of *Taring Padi* were consistently traveling for foreign exhibitions or residencies in the United States, Taiwan, People's Republic of China, and several European countries. Germany's position in this world can be considered as perhaps unique. This is in part due to the longstanding presence of the Goethe Institute in Jakarta. Its explicit internationalist strategy regarding the advancement, rather than only exposition, of arts, culture and science has had a significant impact on this Indonesian and Jakarta contemporary art

[1340] Ibid, 9.

world. The following ethnographic description is an attempt to express this quality both generically as well as specifically.

Supported by the Goethe Institute, Lisabona organized the visit of Ute Aurand, a German filmmaker and teacher, to Jakarta in 2019. The primary activities of the trip were the exhibition of some of Ute's films as well as films Lisabona had selected in relation to seeing Ute's work and a filmmaking workshop with Indonesian filmmakers. The workshop was with a group of filmmakers who work with celluloid, not digital, film stock. This group is named *Lab Laba-Laba*. This is "Spider Lab" in English, but this translation excises the poetic repetition in *Lab Laba-Laba*.

The screening of the films Lisabona selected took place at *Rubanah Underground Hub* art gallery. *Rubanah* is a basement building level art gallery in central Jakarta, run, and owned by people who regularly participate at Garuda in discussion and communal life. While we waited outside of the gallery for the screening program to begin, someone said of Ute, she isn't Left. They said that they thought she was from East Germany at first. When they found out that she is from West Germany, they said, that's even worse!

We went inside to watch a program of the films. Lisabona introduced Ute and the program. She said, women's films are hidden in the archive, and that women have different experiences from each other, and from men. Their reality is different, she said, and their films are different.

The films were projected on 16mm celluloid by a manual projectionist. The viewers sat on the gallery's floor. The films were diaristic, epistolary. One film, *A Portrait of Ga* (dir. Margaret Tait, 1952) showed a grandmother, smoking cigarettes and dancing, alone joyfully. Another, *O-de-ka-ke Diary* (dir. Utako Koguchi, 1988), showed the filmmaker herself in different localities throughout the city of Tokyo, often in the rain and submerged in bodies of water. In the discussion afterwards, the viewers did not fawn in praise. Some noted that they found the viewing experience difficult (*susah, sulit*). It is a lot of effort to watch, you have to really pay attention, one person said. They could be called silent films even if there were some small pieces of speech, someone else said. Acting as the interpreter for Ute as well as the discussion moderator, Lisabona said that she felt that the addressee of the films are loved ones. The films are not sent to a mass public. They are not about telling a narrative story like that. It is about the feeling of intimacy.

A filmmaker and director said, there is something very important about the way we watched these films. This is an 'unusual' screening situation. Think about it, he said. We are not in a movie theater. We are in an art gallery. We are all sitting down on the ground together. There are no seats. The film is being projected on a manually operated film projector in the same room, not in a separate projection booth, as the screen. All of this creates the feeling of intimacy. Not only as what is seen but how it is seen. This creates a different collective mode of action.

The projectionist himself was collectively acknowledged with gratitude. The audience gave him a special ovation. Lisabona said, we can't deny that this 'retro' celluloid projection screenings are becoming a trend (*tren*). People are going back to 16mm and 8mm, and she said that maybe we are partaking in some kind of nostalgia. The film projectionist said, yes maybe it is romantic, but who cares, what's wrong with that? Why do we want to get rid of that romanticism?

§33 *On Socratic Speech*

It was already late into the night at Garuda when Ardjuna, standing, began to bellow a questioning, "must a state have an ideology?" It was not threatening as much as hectoring speech. After a pause, T. said, no, it doesn't have to. Why does it have to have an ideology? It

shouldn't have an ideology. Ardjuna responded, but how is something true if there is no ideology? A state must have an ideology, he reasserted. It matters very much what that ideology is.

T. stood up to take a leave of this conversation. He said, as a joke, don't worry I'm not going to pray (*sholat*, Islamic prayer). Ardjuna said severely, this doesn't have anything to do with that. This is not about religion. T. had repeated what is often said in this question of religion in Indonesia: before (*dulu*), there was not a religion in Java, there were beliefs (*kepercayaan,* also 'trust,' 'confidence'), which is not a religion (*agama*) which is a system.[1341] It is possible therefore to live without the notion of religion and its mode of ideology as it is "secured" by *Pancasila*, T. stated. Ardjuna responded. *Pancasila* recognizes the respect for local customs and culture, he said. He asked, how else can we oppose what the coal firms do without *Pancasila*'s prior *ideological* principle of a "just and civilized humanity" ("*kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab"*) and "social justice for all the peoples of Indonesia" ("*keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia"*)?

Think of this, he said. Islam proclaims Judaism and Christianity as its antecedents. But in the Kabbalah, it says if you help one person, you help all people. But in the Quran, it says if you kill one person, you kill all persons. These are not simply of the same essence, he said. This idealization of killing makes possible a worldly and holy death. Ardjuna repeated again that myriad indigenous peoples in Indonesia do not even introduce a written transmission attributed to their God.[1342]

This conversation took place at Ardjuna's birthday party. It was the first time after five years of close contact that I learned of his age, 68 years. I gave him a book of *Aesthetic Theory* by Theodor Adorno for his birthday gift. He told the others in this circle on the lawn about how great this book is. He read and translated the first sentence into Indonesian: "the only thing that is self-evident about art now is that nothing is self-evident about art anymore."[1343]

Like at most all birthday parties at Garuda, there was a toast at midnight. Ibu Dolo poured small shot glasses of whiskey for all. Bilven joked, it's just a little, there's a monetary crisis! Dolo gave a birthday benediction. She said, Ardjuna has three words to reject for the coming year: age (*umur*), tiredness (*lelah*), and boredom (*bosan*).[1344] We all raised our glasses, sang happy birthday, and drank the glass.

Even later into the evening's morning, J. said to me, it is really different, it seems like you can enjoy the drink, whereas we just try to drink it as fast as we can. What you do is tempo and what I do is anti-tempo, he said and laughed. Because, he said, drinking isn't really something that is primarily about the inside for us. It is instead for that which is between us. Think about it, he said. Drinking is something that you try out as you grow up and figure out which ones create a bond with the people you want to be with. This is a shared body. It is not simply a blissfully co-inhabited place. It can be terrifying (*ngeri*) too, he said and laughed.

§34 *On Mental Revolution*

[1341] Heidegger writes that there is no such thing as "Greek Religion." See his *Heraclitus,* 13.

[1342] In a discussion about this ongoing problem of religious difference in Indonesia and sectarian citizen-subjectivity, G. asked me whether I thought it was possible that humanity could ever give up the church entirely. How, he asked, will we be able to glorify life if we don't have God? Fieldnote, August 2017.

[1343] Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

[1344] Catherine Malabou asks, isn't there a time of time? The time within time, she reasons, is such that the time that presents the 'given' time cannot be presented. Time is thus a qualitative transformation within and between the time of time. See her ""Idealism": A New Name for Metaphysics Hegel and Heidegger on a priori synthesis," *German Idealism Today* (2017): 189.

When I arrived at Garuda that day, there was a woman standing at the front gate, seemingly unaware of how to get in. She had just arrived in a taxi. I put my hand through the opening in the door next to the gate, slid the heavy metal bar to the side to open the door and let ourselves in. She had come for a meeting with Dolo and a few others. Budi told me that they were the 2020 Jakarta Biennale committee, and that Dolo has been chosen as its artistic director. This is an immense honor and responsibility.

I sat at a table with Andreas. He said that Bilven would come to Jakarta for the pre-trial for Surya. Surya was being held at *Brimob* (*Brigade Mobil*) in South Jakarta.[1345] He said, we are suing (*menggugat,* also 'contest' or 'accuse') the police for improper procedure. He said, they didn't provide the letter of evidence (*surat keterangan*) of what the 'material' for the charge is. He said, tomorrow the police would respond. Surya's team would then respond, and that the police would again respond. He said that on Monday, one week from today, there would be a decision. Surya's case was at this time in the national news.

Andreas had been reading the Indonesian translation of Geoffrey Robinson's book. In English it is *The Killing Season* (2018), and the Indonesian title is *Musim Jagal*. *Jagal* is 'butcher' or 'slaughterer' and is the Indonesian title of Joshua's film known in English as *The Act of Killing* (2018). Andreas said the book answers part of his question of how the military could have mobilized for such a 'disproportional' action in 1965 so quickly.[1346] He asked aloud, why was the action against the PKI so strong in Aceh? It is because, he answered, the army command structure was already mobilized there because of the recent confrontation with Malaysia. Why were the killings so immense in East and Central Java? He explained, the army of the Diponogoro faction in Central Java was pro-Suharto. North Sumatra was very different, he said. The governor there was pro-PKI. He was disappeared. In Bali, a nationalist, pro-PKI, governor, was imprisoned.

The Biennale meeting was taking place at a table beside the one where we were sitting. Andreas, at times, lowered his voice. He said, if there was more money, the state would have 'camped' those who they captured. But there wasn't, so they killed them instead. He stressed that there were *many* more camps and prisons than just the famous ones of *Buru*, *Nusa Kambangan,* and *Plantungan*. The last, in Central Java, is where *Gerwani* members were imprisoned, he said. But there were so many more. He asked, do you know that released political prisoners were still doing corvée labor for the state on the fields of the governor's grounds into 1998?!

Later, he asked me if I had read Mas Marcos' novel, *Green Student* [1918]. Not intensively, I said. But his *syair*, "*Sama Rata Sama Rasa"* ("*Same Level, Same Essence*"), I had read, I told him. He said, that was Semaun's *syair* no? I said, it was written by Mas Marcos, he wrote it while in prison in Jakarta. Oh yes, Andreas said, yes, I remember now. Semaun, considered the founder of *PKI*, was from the beginning thought of as harboring rightist tendencies, he said. What about Tan Malaka? I asked. In 1926, when *PKI* wanted to make its revolution, its October, Tan Malaka, with, as Andreas repeatedly said, a very rational reason, opposed (*menentang*) the putsch idea. Malaka thus forced a split with the *PKI*, and he founded another party, *Partai Rakyat Indonesia* (The People's Party of Indonesia), *PARI*. Andreas said that he didn't really know that much about this sequence, and that Martin Aleida really knows this history from his research with Sumarsono, who had participated in the so-called Madiun Affair of 1948. The communist

[1345] He was transferred later from *Mako Brimob* in Depok to *Salemba* in Jakarta.
[1346] See Robinson, *The Killing Season*.

movement in Indonesia, he explained, was never unified like in USSR or China. It was always already split within itself.

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B. explained that he did environmental engineering at *ITB* (Bandung Institute of Technology) in the 1970s. Engineering with the style of an artist, he joked. Engineering at that time, he said, split into wet and dry. This schema was supposed to mean roads and reservoirs. But wet became waste instead. Humanity is disgusting, he said. He became a consultant. If you work in the ministry, you work 8-5, he said. If you work contracts, you come home at 11am or 12pm, he said smiling.

Beginning in the 1990s, he worked in the financial management of waste project contracts. He explained, projects get a loan. The loans from the *BUMN* (Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises) are for thousands of trillions of Rupiah, he said. The creditors are Chinese banks and Jokowi's government. This is why Jokowi and China are so friendly, he said. The interest is very low, but the total loan is so big that each deal creates a new financial fortune. Some people he knows stole money and are now in jail. Their whole work was to learn how to steal the money, he said.

Budi brings over the figure he is working on. It is clay which he is molding into a model that will later be cast. It has been solicited by a curator for an exhibition on the theme of *"Revolusi Mental"* ("Mental Revolution"). "*Revolusi Mental"* was one of the political slogans used by Jokowi to describe the transformation of the Indonesian *politeia* that 'debottlenecks' capital. The sculptural figure appeared as a man whose outside is smooth but whose inside looks like gravel or debris. Because, Budi said, this is the kind of body that Jokowi's 'mental revolution' wants, and he laughed.

§35 *On Film Criticism*

During the period of dissertation research, I routinely attended panels and discussions on film throughout the Jakarta region. At one such panel on film criticism at *IKJ,* Hafiz spoke first. He said, the criticism of film is in the very root of Indonesian cinema. He said that Usmar Ismail, the 'first' lionized Indonesian filmmaker, wrote important film criticism.

The next speaker was a professional critic. He doubted the possibility for the youth to carry on this legacy. He listed many 'global' film auteur's names, such as Antonioni and Tarkovsky, and asked if they are known by the everyday film critic today. They are not, he said. Film is the most complicated art, he seemed to brag. It is light, camera, music, dialogue, acting. This cannot be understood by netizens, he said. We need peer-review and more professionalism, he argued.

Tommy Awuy, a professor of philosophy at the University of Indonesia spoke last. He said, artists are the geniuses of the modern world. They are like teenage mutant ninja turtles, he said. As a professor of philosophy, he was surprised to be asked to speak about film criticism at *IKJ* because for him *IKJ* creates those who *create* films. These students excel in imagination, he said. Now we can study film with any theory we like, he said, and listed semiotics, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, and gender.[1347] He took this to be a positive development. Hafiz responded and asked him, what about film theory itself. Tommy said he himself didn't know about this.

[1347] He mentioned Krisna Sen and Ariel Heryanto as having written on Indonesian cinema.

Audience members asked a few mostly deflected questions and the event ended without definitive conclusiveness.

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The night of the first preview of K.'s film at Garuda, he looked a bit nervous. The viewing began around midnight. It was during a normal Saturday night party. The lights were turned off. Several people gathered on the benches near the television, and some of the benches even further away were turned to face that direction as well. When it began, I saw that the title was no longer *Semangat 98* (*98 Energy*), as it had been in the earlier version he showed me on his laptop. The title as it appeared on the first intertitle screen now was *A Beautiful Mind*.

This working edit was about 40 minutes long. After the screening ended, the criticism from the viewers was rather harsh. It is kind of boring (*agak bosan*), someone said. What are we watching? You don't explain the context. It will only be watched by people like us who already know the story, someone else said. One of the producers of the film, defended it. He said it is extraordinary (*luar biasa*), but it needs to be rethought. Currently the story is too slow. Harry suggested that the film should be the story that 1998 fails. He said this is an important lesson.

In one of the film's many powerful scenes, one of the 1998 activists in 2009 said that what has happened since 1998 is clear. The military and the government made a *deal,* he said. *Deal* was said in interpolated English within his Indonesian language sentence. He then explained the deal. The military wouldn't really lose their position, but they would include these politicians in the spoils of the political economy. In another powerful scene, one of the film's featured activists, a young woman, says to her mom in their home that she can't close her eyes to this injustice. Her mom responded, "you don't have to do this." The producer said, this scene is so intimate. He asked everyone, how can we show this?

The film was a portrait of three activists, spanning a 20-year period of filming. It was not a historical documentary story which explains 1998 and the Reformation period as a historical event. Instead, it aimed for a metaphysical portrait of these activists over two decades. Peter, a great painter and portraitist said after watching the film, I don't see a portrait yet. A portrait should give you something that lets you see. It needs to open to a face. I don't see the faces yet, he said.

This felt true. The audio and visual were often of poor quality. I said it would help to have subtitles, to get the point across, as sometimes the audio is not good enough. He said that is right. K. said to me, well that didn't go great. I tried to defend the film to the filmmaker himself. I said to him, have confidence, even though I did not entirely. When I left Garuda that night, after more than two hours of discussion, Ari accompanied me to the gate. He said he really doesn't like this kind of interminable discussion.

The film was publicly released two years after this preview screening. The film is now titled *Mencari Keadilan: Kisah Gerakan Mahasiswa 98 Menolak Dwifungsi ABRI* [*In Search of Justice: Story of the 98 Student Movement to Reject the Dual Function of the Indonesian Army*] (2021). The film project which was entitled *Semangat 98* and then *A Beautiful Mind* had transformed in many fundamental ways to become *Mencari Keadilan* (*In Search of Justice*). The film is a very successful documentary. The producer's confidence prevailed. The finished film includes substantial new footage. With this new interview footage, the film is now, as Harry had suggested before, a documentary about the generation and corruption of the 1998 revolution and Reformation. It is a strong and striking work now. Although nowhere near the quantum of *Sexy Killers*' 35 million Youtube views, with

over 64,000 views in its first three months of release, this magnitude indicates a consequential significance for the film.

No longer a metaphysical, essayistic portrait, the film is now a stronger and more definitive explanation of the events whose name in the Indonesian *politeia* is "*Semanggi I.*" With new interview footage from human rights practitioners and activists, the film tells the story of the strong action of peaceful protest by the student movement which is met with violent and eventually lethal opposition by the repressive state apparatuses on November 13, 1998. The film brings forth not only the eponymic search for justice, but justice itself, perhaps even more so than *Sexy Killers*' powerful parliamentary electoral stratagem.

§36 *On Custom and Calendar*

In the midst of one of Garuda's many nights of communal gatherings around its tables and on its long benches, someone said to me, I recognize you, I have seen you at film screenings in Jakarta. She said she was a member of *Forum Lenteng*. I said I had been to *Arkipel* and thanked her for that organizing activity.

She told me that *Forum Lenteng* gathers to watch films together regularly. She named some of the great film director's names, including Fassbinder, Bresson, and Tarkovsky. I suggested that she talk with Ardjuna here. He introduced himself to this table of youngsters. My name is Ardjuna but I am a Batak and I refuse Javanese culture, he said.[1348] For Batak culture, he said, you must greet the household head. Understand (*Paham*)? Understand (*Paham*), the boy beside him responded. It was not angry but instead severe and direct speech.

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Along with the constancy of celebrating the birthday celebrations of its own people, the Christmas party at Garuda was one of the largest gatherings of the year at Garuda. With over one hundred people, it was more like a banquet or wedding.

Codet was wearing a white t-shirt that when I first caught a glimpse of it, I saw Soekarno and Che Guevera shaking hands. On his chest in the photograph, Sukarno's smile is beaming, and he looks directly at Che. Che is looking downwards. He is wearing his green militant clothes, with a beret on his head and scraggly facial hair on his face. He is not posing. Under the photograph is written, "Che Guevera with Soekarno, leader of the Non-Alligned Nations Movement." Codet saw my wonder and said, this shirt is an artwork (*karya*) by Budi.

There were shot glasses of whiskey poured out and shared for a midnight toast. Dolo, as often, spoke to this large gathering. She invited several people one by one to replace her and to say something to all who were there together. She said, now I want to introduce someone who has come from far away and is now one within us as well. I had anticipated being called upon by her, which indeed did happen. When I came out into the clearing in the Verandah, both in excitement and trepidation, W. teased by shouting "CIA," and eliciting more laughter and cheer. I said thank you to Dolo, Ardjuna, and everyone here for everything. I said that it is Christmas today, and that the impression and message (*kesan dan pesan*) of Christmas and Jesus is so much more complicated (*rumit*) than we usually think, and let us try in recollecting his birthday to hear his lesson to love as one (*mencintai sebagai satu*). I said thank you and merry Christmas to all and then returned to the gathering. Later, the musical disciple of Ardjuna who listened to the *kora*

[1348] Ardjuna is, we note, a Javanese name.

music at Garuda, in cheer, teased me, repeating the word *rumit* and Jesus. *Rumit* (complicated, complex, not uncomplicated) is perhaps not often the message of the establishment religion's notion of Christmas as the celebration of the birth of Jesus Christ.

Later at night, one person with whom I was speaking for the first time, said to me that he had done some formal work for a government project, and that he witnessed acts of corruption. He told his father, this is not right, and his father said, there is something else in our life than our work, by which his son took it to mean, do not create disturbance. He explained, they clean (*mencuci*) the stolen money with gambling accounts. He said that recently an official was caught depositing government money into his online gambling account. Meanwhile, this man's companion was playing online poker on his phone beside us the whole time.

§37 *Temporality and Exile of the Indonesian Communist Party*

This is the story of Syarkawi Manap. Manap wrote a memoir of his life which he lived as an exile in Sweden. *Ultimus* published this book prior to this period of fieldwork. It was read and discussed by many at Garuda.

Manap begins his own life-story by explaining how he was born in South Sumatra to his parents who were devout Muslims. He came to the Party in part because of its emphasis on education. Working there, he was chosen to depart for Cuba to study with the Cuban Party. When he prepared to depart for Cuba in 1965, he could never have known that he would not have returned to Indonesia for a period of over four decades. Before leaving for Cuba, he writes that he was already aware of the fracturing of the Communist movement. He knew that the Soviet Union and others strayed (*menyeleweng*) from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. He knew about Stalinism. Despite this, the *PKI*, he thought, aimed to continue to maintain good relations with all communist parties while those parties continued to struggle against imperialism.[1349]

He traveled to Cuba through a path of airports in the Soviet world. These were the cities of Columbo, Karachi, Kabul, and Moscow. In Prague, he remembers that he met an Indonesian person who was there in the International Union of Students. He came out to meet Manap on the tarmac and Manap gave them Indonesian spices (*bumbu*) for cooking. In Cuba, he recalls that he stayed in a dormitory with students from the African countries of Guinea, Angola, and Mali.

He recounts here in this autobiography two people who he worked with in the party and who became '*tukang tunjuk*' ('craftsmen of pointing-out') for the Indonesian Military after 1965. They 'pointed-out' others, including himself, with whom they worked in order to try to secure their own salvation. Manap relays, not without dramatic pathos, that they were themselves discarded by the regime after they had done this pointing-out.[1350] He used their initials to indicate them. They still live in Jakarta, he writes. He has not forgotten who they are.

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In the Verandah, Om Juna was playing the music of the band that Werner Herzog used for his first six films on the stereo. The name of the band, he told me, in Mayan language means the book of the people. Like the Torah for the Jewish people, he said. The band is Popul Vuh. One of their songs is named, he said to me, open your heart.

[1349] Syarkawi Manap, *Kisah Perjalanan* (Bandung: Ultimus Books, 2009).
[1350] Ibid, 6.

T.'s t-shirt said, "No Future/Future is Mystery." It bore an image of a human being dressed in the tell-tale black garments of a 17th century European. The face of the creature was not, however, the face of a human being. Instead, it bore a bear's head. I asked him what it meant, and he said, nothing.

§38 *Interventions in the Ideology of Space*

Before I knew its name, as either *Work in Progress* or *Painting a Wall* (1997, resin and acrylic paint), this particular sculpture was one of the first of the many sculptures at Garuda that constantly grabbed my attention and dragged my sight back to it.[1351] The figure is a human being standing. He is holding a paint bucket in one hand. His other arm is raised, and he holds a paintbrush in that hand. He is wearing a bucket hat. His face is hidden under there. His posture is as if in the motion of painting. It is a strong presentation of the concept as the human being standing named 'work in progress.'

The sculpture constantly brought forth an indecision for me that turned into a decision of whether there was a human being or a statue standing there. The work elicited the turning equivocation and assuredness of seeing and not seeing a human being. In part, this is caused by the 'perfect,' anatomical proportions of the work. And yet even when we return our look to the work, the face remains concealed, looking the other way. For his back is turned out. His back *is* the front of the work. The body stands therefore *as* its turning around. The sculpture shows this turning around. In doing so, the artwork shelters the face even in the subjection of the 'work in progress.'

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In the previous chapter of this dissertation, we recalled how the first *Multatuli* (2017, Bronze) sculpture made at *Somalaing* studio was set into the ground at the Multatuli Museum for its inauguration in 2018. The sculpture is an immense, 400-kilogram visage of Multatuli, sitting in a chair with an immense, open book in his lap. He looks down at its pages' immense smooth bronze faces. Beside him are smaller, free-standing sculptures of *Saijah, Adinda,* and a bronze desk, which is topped by four bookshelves full of bronze books. *Saijah* and *Adinda* are of an organic, rather than megalithic, measure. *Saijah* stands on watch with his arms behind his back. *Adinda* sits down on a bench. She is holding flowers and in a posture of waiting. Together, these works form a sculpture garden. Its bronze books, both megalithic as well as of organic measure, project an idea of a powerful written word in the name Multatuli.

We also recalled how after this first sculpture was created and set, a second *Multatuli* (2019, Fiberglass) sculpture was made by the *Somalaing* studio. The sculpture is of the same spatial dimensions as the first *Multatuli* but is of different material. It was set to stand on the side of a square on the campus of the University of Indonesia in the city of Depok. The sculpture standing on the square of the university campus bears a quotation from *Max Havelaar* (1860) in its plinth that the one in the space of the museum sculpture garden does not. This is written in Indonesian

[1351] In the gallery of *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Matter* (2019), the work is named *Painting the Wall,* but Budi once told me it was called *Work in Progress*. It is entitled *Buruh* (*Worker*) in the Indonesian Visual Art Archive of Dolorosa Sinaga. See Dolorosa Sinaga, "Indonesian Visual Art Archive of Dolorosa," http://archive.ivaa-online.org/pelakuseni/dolorosa-sinaga-1.

and we translate it into English as: "Because I didn't want to write well. I wanted my writing to be heard."

This statement and sculpture evince, we suggest, an attribute of sculpture that Hegel both identified and disparaged. This is the necessary enlacement of sculpture with the surroundings and place where it is set into standing. The statement in the plinth of *Multatuli* (2019) indicates that sculpture indeed directly calls out to its own environment. The university campus square environment is essentially unlike the museum sculpture garden. This discursive statement calls-out to the campus environment against writing 'well.' Something instead needs to be heard. This challenge thus takes place in an opening between the statue and the discursive statement. This is, we suggest, a practical rejection of praising the beatitude of the concept.

But it is not only by this exscript that the second *Multatuli* at the University of Indonesia differs from the first *Multatuli* at the Multatuli Museum. Although the megalithic *spatial* dimensions of this original sculpture of the museum are maintained in the second sculpture at the university, the *material* changes. The two identical spatial dimensions are therefore completely unalike in actuality or existence. The museum *Multatuli* is bronze. The campus *Multatuli* is fiberglass. Setting the 400-kilogram *Multatuli* was an immensely difficult challenge involving several people working together at once, whereas fiberglass is lighter and less expensive than bronze. Light gathers, pools, and eddies on the soft metal of bronze. The resin coated fiberglass, while chromatically akin to the color of bronze, tends to reflect, rather than shelter, light. The second *Multatuli* (2019), with its exscript, advances an urgency of itself in contrast to the original's peaceful repose.

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Seno Gumira Ajidarma, the rector of the Art Institute of Jakarta (*IKJ*) and one of the most well-established writers and artists in Indonesia, talked about Dolo's recent *Soekarno* (2017) sculpture series in his remarks at the book launch of *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Matter, Form* (2019).

He said, we repeat, that while thinking about what to say about these *Soekarno* sculptures, he finally felt that he learned about how ideology works in the sculpture medium. These *Soekarno* (2017) works taught him that it comes from the hands. The hands are where you can find that this is a pose of passion, he said. From these hands, he said, I learned how ideology orients space. He explained this as follows.

Seno recalled the famous photograph of Soekarno in front of the painting *Kawan-kawan Revolusi* [*Fellows of the Revolution*] (1947) which he hung on the wall of the national palace and which Henri Cartier-Bresson captured during the moment of Indonesian independence in December 1949. In the photo, Soekarno's hands form a gesture there that is now iconic, Seno said. With Dolo's *Soekarno,* he said, you see that she has altered the gesture. For, he said, the hands and arms of Dolo's *Soekarno* (2017) are developed. They have grown higher. They are no longer the same as in the 1949 photograph. They are now in a different gesture that is still one of passion. Understanding this, he said, we see that sculpture itself orients ideology with space. We see both the absolutely ideological existence of space itself, but also Dolo's participation in the realization of this passion.

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Two men from Semarang arrived in Garuda. I didn't know either of them before this night. They sat on the small front porch of the studio office with others, talking convivially. They both

wore unadorned red t-shirts of different hues. They had driven a truck together to Jakarta. I wasn't immediately sure for what reason. They talked about how it took them about 12 hours to drive to Jakarta. B. asked why they didn't take the toll road. They laughed; it was so obvious. To not pay the tolls.

They had brought several bags of different loose tobaccos which were all on the table. They were different shades of brown and yellow. Everyone was rolling cigarettes with the tobacco and trying all the different types. People talked about which ones they liked. B. said that Ardjuna rolls and smokes about 100 cigarettes a day. He said that he has even woken up from sleeping and he was rolling a cigarette. He was unsure if he went to sleep rolling one or started rolling one while he was still asleep.

Everyone's hands move differently. Ardjuna's cigarettes are consistently shaped. Budi's are more irregularly shaped. Ari smokes Divine pre-rolled cigarettes. He smokes them from the reverse side. When I asked him why, he said he does it on purpose, as the other side of the cigarette is looser and better to light.

§39 *Experience and Event of Corona Virus*

Everything moved very quickly. I received a first notice from Rizqi, who said that the Fulbrights are being evacuated, but he was not sure what would happen with the Fulbright-Hays. Then the next morning, I received the email with the notification for a voluntary withdrawal and hiatus status. The email was sent on Friday the 13th. The evacuation began on March 15th, the Ides of March.

That Friday, before thinking or knowing it was to be my last during this fieldwork research time, I had spent all day at the *Somalaing* studio with Codet. He was working, making a model for a sculpture. He worked most of that day with wetted clay and chisels in his hands. He was making a female figure. A goddess, he told me, who symbolizes feminine independence, for she rejected mainstream Buddhism in "pre-modern" Java. He had been working on it for the past several days. The form looked substantially different than the last time I had seen it. The face had been significantly reworked. More beautiful now, I said. I know, he said.

I asked him to explain to me once again the physical process by which a sculpture such as this one is made. He explained again. First, a model is made from wetted clay. This clay is itself made from the earth *(tanah*). Now wetted, it is shaped with one's own hands as well as with physical implements, such as picks (*cukit*). This point of the process can take from a very short time of hours and days to longer periods of weeks or months. For once this point in the process ends, this shaped body is sealed and coated, at first with a resin and secondly with a silicone. This recoating of the coating creates a new sealed bond and thus a new body. Once the resin and silicone have hardened and bonded to each other as mould, the model is no longer necessary. It is discarded.

To make a sculpture, a metallic or fibrous material is then poured into the mould. That material then hardens. The hardened body is the sculpture. This process of making sculpture results from the removal of the newly hardened body from the mould. Some moulds can be reused. Others are destroyed in their removal from the model, thus preventing any reuse. The sculpture is an excavated body, he said, "like *manggis*" ("*seperti manggis"*). *Manggis* is the mangosteen fruit. The fruit has a hard, purple colored outer shell, and a delicate globe of lobed sweet fleshy

fruit on its inside.[1352] The sculpture is, like the mangosteen fruit, made within and excavated out from a hard, outer armour.[1353]

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That Friday, Budi had just arrived from Yogyakarta. He said that he didn't even really know about the Corona Virus until arriving in Jakarta. He said, no one around them in Yogya knew anything about it. They were just going out each day to look for grass to feed the animals, most people don't know anything about this, he said.

He was wearing a t-shirt. It was the picture of a handsome landscape painting, bearing with its caption below, "THIS THING CALLED PROGRESS." This t-shirt artwork, like many others we have recounted, makes the body of the human being the stage or theater where such a political articulation is read.

That day, *Somalaing* was packing a new *Soekarno* sculpture into a custom-made wooden box to be sent at once to Algeria. This *Soekarno* (2020, Iron plate and iron rod) sculpture is completely different – spatially, materially, and discursively – from the *Soekarno* (2017) series on which Seno remarked at the book launch.

About 1 year before, Budi had said to me that Dolo and the studio would be making a sculpture of Soekarno that would be set to stand in Algeria in the city of Algiers.[1354] The sculpture would be set into the middle of a boulevard in Algiers, he told me. It would be surrounded by five short pillars to provide a small place for the people in the city to sit and catch a glimpse of Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia. The five pillars represent the five pillar principles of Indonesia, *Pancasila*. This *Soekarno* artwork is an explicit act of internationalism, specifically of 'Asia-Africa' solidarity. It was conceived by Ridwan Kamil, a graduate of Bandung Institute of Technology and University of California, Berkeley, while he was the Governor of Bandung in concert with Dolo. Budi explained that the statue was conceived by Ridwan and commissioned by the Ambassador of Indonesia to Algeria. He explained, Soekarno was the first leader in the world to support Algerian Independence from the French, and Soekarno is thus a hero in Algeria.

This *Soekarno* (2020) was a new aesthetic form developed by Budi, Dolo, and the studio. It can be preliminarily thought of as a sculpture based on a photographed leader. This form of sculpture bears an *eidos* of a silhouette of a photograph. It brings forth an appearance of bringing together the positive and the negative elements of a photograph at once. The physical form is made in the following manner. Workers welded together a lattice frame structure with iron rods. Then, they cut hundreds of small, iron plates of differing sizes, which are then painted with alternately silver and black color. The small plates are then welded to the lattice to together

[1352] My housemate once said to me, mangosteen (*manggis*) teaches us a philosophy of life for the Javanese. For just like the mangosteen, one can be ugly on the outside but sweet on the inside. Secondly, he said, there are as many points on the base of the fruit as there are lobes inside. This means, the outside is a true reflection of the inside, the outside reflects the inside that you can't see.

[1353] Sculptures (and fruit) are not forms of aesthetic concealment. Film, on the other hand, is. Film presents in the mode of playback, whereas sculpture bears itself entirely in a dimension and surface. A sculpture can be made without a mould, as with a chisel and marble. For film, on the other hand, the relationship of the negative and the positive is fundamental. Film temporalizes a 'playback' or indirection. Sculpture is instead a self-standing existence in the body of an exposited human being. These modes of temporality are fundamentally distinct.

[1354] In Indonesian language, the country is *Aljazair* and the city is *Aljir*.

compose the appearance of a person. This method was used for *William Soerjadjaja* (2018) and *Soekarno* (2020), the latter being the one packed on this day.[1355]

When I asked Budi if he was happy with the result, he said, yes, and then paused. He said, there is still always some small shortcoming. I asked what, and he said in the arm area. He said, because in the "real" gesture, Soekarno's arm is going more forward, that is to say, lower on the vertical axis. But in the sculpture, his arm is raised more vertically, up over head.

Dolo has said several times that her artworks are not made simply to replicate gestures. The sculpture's gesture indeed is *not* the historical gesture. Seno Ajidarma Gumira noticed this in his remarks on the earlier *Soekarno* (2017). She has explained the reason for this many times in different ways, and it relates to the prior discussion regarding the difference between knowledge and the artwork. She doesn't aim to repeat a gesture in her sculpture. She instead aims to bring into appearance a particular concept through the artwork. In *Soekarno* (2017), it is determination according to Seno. In *Soekarno* (2020), one could identify it as an international determination of Asia-Africa. This is not the so-called Washington consensus enforced upon so-called third world nations, including both Algeria and Indonesia. *Soekarno* (2020), placed in Algeria, does not bear the same position of a finger pointing as in the original photograph of 1949. The arm of 2020 is instead 'developed.' It is now more directly vertical and upwards. It has more passion and exclamation than even the height of the arm of 1949.

Budi and Dolo were planning on accompanying the statue to Algeria for the ceremony to dedicate its foundation in Algiers. This plan was thwarted by the Corona Virus lockdown event. The ceremonial inauguration and setting of *Soekarno* (2020) could not be postponed because the Ambassador who supported the project was finishing their appointment. The inauguration plan proceeded, but Budi and Dolo couldn't depart to accompany it. Budi and others made a guide so that Indonesian workers of the state enterprise *WIKA* (*Wijaya Karya*) could re-assemble and set it in the ground there in Algeria. He said, hope for the best.

§40 *Rediscovering Politeia*

The academic discipline of Anthropology has historically distinguished itself from others, in part, because it considers the human not as facticity but instead as being. To conclude this dissertation, we endeavor to contribute to this longstanding effort with a reflection on the artworks of Dolo and Budi as interventions and interpretations regarding the existence of human beings.

To do this, we will take a detour through two different, although related, relations to Aristotle's philosophy in the writings of Thomas Aquinas and Hegel. Aquinas' and Hegel's reflections will help us understand the importance of sense-power as well as the particularity of sculpture as a form to the anthropos. Their elucidations will prepare an understanding for our suggestion that Dolo and Budi's works are not anatomical or *a priori* representation of human beings, but rather ones that disclose the metaphysical struggles born in the tellings of witnesses.

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To enrich our familiarity with the capacity of sculpture as a form and its importance to the notion of Anthropology, we recall Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's treatise, Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν, known in Latin *De Sensu et Sensato*. Aquinas there recalls that Aristotle

[1355] *Somalaing*'s first created this form for the sculpture bearing the image of the Astra Corporation patriarch, William Soerjadjaya, for the opening of the Astra Gallery in the Astra Tower in Central Jakarta in 2018.

posits that the human being has some sense-power. Sense-power, Aquinas writes, is sensitivity that informs "reason, which is able to know universals."[1356] While sense-power acts on reason, the senses are "actualized *through external* media...namely *smell, hearing* and *sight.*"[1357]

But senses are not only for reason. Senses are for health, as they allow the human to avoid what is harmful. Sight, Aquinas recalls from Aristotle, is superior to hearing because sight is more able to know than hearing. But, Aquinas notes, "hearing surpasses sight inasmuch as it serves understanding, although this is by accident."[1358] He exposits a distinction between the accident of hearing and the superiority of sight as follows: "the power of sight announces....(T)he power of sight by its apprehension announces to us *many differences* among things *and* among various *kinds* of things."[1359] Sight thus is unique amongst the sense powers because it ascertains differences not only between things but also within things. This is, we note, germane to the notion of ontological difference as articulated by Martin Heidegger. Catherine Malabou has recapitulated this as follows: "for Heidegger...the general structure of appearing appears as non-appearing. Or it can be said to appear as difference; the difference between presence and withdrawal...(is a) difference, which opens manifestation, (and) is not reducible to any kind of presence, including a hidden one."[1360] Accordingly, sight at once bears on the thought of ontological difference, but it is not as a sense-power adequate to think this difference as such.

Aquinas pursues this physical understanding of sight and hearing to its metaphysical consequences. He writes "[sight's] object, which is the visible, is found in all bodies: for a thing becomes visible by the transparent being illuminated in actuality by a shining body."[1361] That which appears is a "common sensible."[1362] Sound, on the other hand, expresses difference. Voice, Aquinas recalls from Aristotle, is "imagin(ed) from an animal's mouth...(and) as such naturally indicates the animal's inner feeling (*passio*)."[1363] Recalling the teachings of Aristotle, Aquinas writes, "a sense-power is in potentiality to a sensible thing, and…(the sense-power) must be altered by the thing through the medium."[1364] Aquinas demonstrates this in the following way. A smooth body, "from a property of their nature" shines.[1365] It does not itself make a medium shine. The eye is a smooth and polished body, but why does it catch the shining from another smooth body?

Aristotle says this shining "appears to an eye that is moved because what happens through the movement of the eye *is that what is one becomes as though it were two.*"[1366] Seeing thus necessitates the sensible division of one into two. Aquinas clarifies, writing "for the shining and seeing pupil is one and the same in subject: but inasmuch as it shines, it projects its shine outward; and inasmuch as it sees, it apprehends the shining by, as it were, receiving it from without."[1367] Visibility is thus constituted by two inextricably bound realms traversing the two shining bodies. The pupil cannot see without the shine of another body. But the eye also shines.

[1356] Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed" and "On Memory and Recollection"* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 27.
[1357] Ibid.
[1358] Ibid, 28.
[1359] Ibid.
[1360] Malabou, "'Idealism'," 200
[1361] Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed,"* 28.
[1362] Ibid, 29.
[1363] Ibid.
[1364] Ibid, 34.
[1365] Ibid.
[1366] Ibid, 35; emphasis in original.
[1367] Ibid.

It thus also can be caught by another eye. To see thus necessitates the potentiality to be seen by another eye. To see is to apprehend or deproject the shining body.[1368] Thus, Aquinas writes, "*the pupil…receives its own brightness as if from without*, and so it seems *that what sees and what is seen are different*, although they are the same in subject."[1369] This elucidation allows us to understand that for Aquinas and Aristotle, the form of action of seeing engages a sensitivity informing thinking.

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Although artworks did regularly move around the spaces of Garuda, the sculpture *Wali Tertawa* (2010, Bronze) rarely did. It instead at once stood and laid down on a sill at the edge of the Verandah. Its iconic body is one of the most recognizable and recognized persons in Indonesia, known by his nickname Gus Dur. Gus signifies an Islamic honorific. Dur is a shortening of his own name Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940-2009). He is the 4th president of the Republic of Indonesia.

Dolo gave the sculpture the name *Laughing Sufi* in English and *Wali Tertawa* in Indonesian. *Wali* can mean saint or guardian in a religious or spiritual sense. The *Wali Songo* (Nine Saints), mythologically, if not also historically, are understood to have inceptively brought Islam to Java. *Tertawa* is a participle form of the verb 'to laugh.' The Indonesian title thus could also be translated into English as "The Laughing Saint." Not only a former president, Gus Dur is also a kind of folk saint of Indonesian democracy.[1370] He was a leader of *Forum Democracy*, a widely recognized and powerful institution which openly opposed General Suharto during the twilight of his reign.

Budi rarely talked about national politics with me. When he talked about so-called political situations, they were decidedly 'local,' such as about how a particular landlord treated his tenants poorly or well, or how a particular worker was being unfairly exploited. One night for some reason we were talking about tattoos. He said, do you know Gus Dur's joke about truck drivers? I said no. He said, Ok. The angels of heaven are receiving people. There is a tattooed truck driver, and he is a drunk (*pemabuk*). The angels let him through. The priests, the imams, and the ex-presidents, arrive to the gates of heaven, and they are denied entry by the angels. They ask, why do the tattooed truck drivers get through and we are denied? The angels answer, because truck drivers drive so fast and recklessly that they make people pray, whereas your boring sermons put people to sleep so that no one prays. We all cracked up in laughter together.

The Laughing Saint bears both the postures of the iconic recumbent Buddha as well as the smiling Cheshire cat. For in the work, Gus Dur is laying on his side; one arm is bent to hold his head, much like a sleeping Buddha. But his neck is thrown slightly back. He bears a smile of satisfaction if not happiness itself. He wears his telltale *songkok* hat and his large, iconic thin-framed glasses. This is not therefore the restrained facial expression of a sleeping Buddha. Gus Dur here has no inlaid jewels or ivory. His belly is plump and protruding. His top is unclothed, and his bottom half is draped with a sarong. But his entire body is bronzed and shining.[1371]

Laying down, his face turned upwards and askance parallel and perpendicular planes of view, the sculpture's *orientation* intervenes in the ideological dimensions of space. It is not standing

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[1368] On 'deprojection,' see Goux, *Oedipus, Philosopher,* 162-9.
[1369] Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed,"* 35; emphasis in original.
[1370] Gus Dur is a widely (though not absolutely) adored person in this particular world. For a critical perspective, see Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "*Saya Bukan Mendala,*" *Buku Progressif,* July 31, 2018, https://bukuprogresif.com/2018/07/31/goenawan-mohamad-vs-pram-saya-bukan-mandela/.
[1371] The work has been cast in both fiberglass and bronze. The fiberglass is resin coated and painted bronze color.

as the sculptures of European classical antiquity, and it is not laying down face up. His face is not completely facing the viewer. His left hand is not flush to his side. His wrist is craned up, as in a gesture of dance or sass. All of these reconditionings generate an *eidos* that is not captured simply by classical aesthetic or political forms.

With this Cheshire cat smile, this 'holy' golden body also turns into its own opposite. For what is the cause of this 'saintly' laughing? This gesture is uniquely 'at home' in the post-Reformation period of Indonesia. This is the time when the very promise that Gus Dur championed and for which he is often adored – a kind of multicultural, 'tolerant and moderate' Indonesian democracy that turns away from the authoritarian alliance of the state and military, i.e., Reformation – becomes a time-past.[1372] This laugh is therefore at once a critique of, as well as a hope for, this promise or *politeia*.

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With this context in mind, we can now return to Aquinas' reading of Aristotle regarding the metaphysics and physics of sight and thinking. In elucidating Aristotle's teaching, Aquinas writes,

> it seems that what sees and what is seen are different, although they are the same in subject...the pupil begins to see a shining that is, *as it were*, shining from elsewhere…The shining of *smooth* bodies...is seen in darkness. This also happens with other things that have a small amount of light, and for this reason are seen in darkness but not in light, for instance *certain heads of fish*, *and* the dark fluid of the fish called *the cuttlefish*. [Aristotle] adds that if *the eye is gently* - that is, slowly - *moved,* the above-mentioned appearance *does not happen* by *what sees and what is seen* seemingly *simultaneously to be one and two,* as was said. But *in the other case* - that is, when the eye is quickly moved - then *the eye sees itself*, **being as it were affected by itself in its other position**. This also happens *in "refraction*" - that is, reflection - for instance *when an eye sees itself in a mirror from which, as from without, the form of the eye returns to the eye itself by way of reflection*, just as, in the above-mentioned appearance the shining of the eye returns to the eye itself.[1373]

This is, we suggest, a decisive passage for understanding the Aristotelian idea. Aristotle and Aquinas teach here that the eye sees through a movement in a medium, and this is not, as had been thought, fire. Aristotle instead identifies a 'dual character' in sight that opens to an understanding of ontological difference. The eye can see shining smooth bodies, but if the eye moves too quickly, 'the eye sees itself.'

Aquinas recounts Aristotle's recapitulation and criticism of previous attempts to grasp the concept of sight. Plato in the *Timaeus* posits that light comes out of the eye which is then 'extinguished.' In this idea, light, which is hot, is extinguished by the cold.[1374] But, Aristotle notes,

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[1372] In chapter 5 of this dissertation, we recalled how at the book launch event for Dolo's book, M. Sobary, a close acquaintance of Gus Dur, retold a Gus Dur joke to the many people listening. He said, there are three very important things in this world begin with '*al*': *al quran* (the Quran), *al kitab* (the Bible) and *alkohol* (alcohol). Sobary said that Gus Dur said, all three bring enlightenment when used in moderation, and all three will kill you if you overdose on any of them. The listeners in the room laughed together. The implicit meaning developed by both Sobary and Gus Dur's statements is a 'political philosophy' of tolerance and moderation.

[1373] Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed,"* 35-6; boldface emphasis added.

[1374] Empedocles thinks of the conditions as follows: it is "like *when someone* thinking of *going out* along a road *on a winter night* - that is, when wind is blowing - *prepares a lamp. He kindles a light of burning fire*, and to *block the force of all winds* he

darkness is neither hot nor cold. Democritus, Aristotle recalls, thinks that seeing is not fire but elementally water because sight's affection "*is a reflection*; that is, it is caused by the reflection or rebound of the form from a polished body."[1375]

This is a naive materialism, according to Aristotle. Aquinas recapitulates this as follows: "Democritus held that soul is something bodily," but "according to the truth of the matter, [vision itself] is not a bodily affection: rather, *its principal cause is a power of soul.*"[1376] The activity of sight is of the soul of the human being and not of its physical sense-powers. Aquinas articulates the pedagogic effects of this as follows:

> *Vision is an act of soul* only through a bodily organ, and so it is no wonder that it has a cause from the point of view of a bodily affection, but in such a way that *the bodily affection is not the same thing as the vision*: rather, it is a cause of it with respect to the initial "impact," if I may so call it, of the visible form of the eye. The subsequent reflection contributes nothing to the eye's seeing of the thing seen through the form appearing in it, but rather contributes to the form's being able to appear to something else; *thus the eye that sees the thing by means of the form that appears in it does not see this form itself*.[1377]

These are decisive conceptual formulations from Aquinas and ultimately Aristotle. Aquinas writes here that while there is a bodily affection causing vision, this physical action is not the cause of vision itself. The physical organ determines the initial impact upon the eye. But what is seen does not act on that initial impact, for this is instead an activity of the soul. This is known because although the eye sees the visible according to myriad forms, the eye does not see that form itself in which it is participated.

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We note here that this 'dual characteristic' strongly resembles several important formulations in Marx's *Capital*. For while abstract labour determines the value of a concrete labour, abstract labour cannot be seen anywhere in appearances of value. There is almost no way in the form of appearance of commodities to demonstrate the elements that compose the cause of this form of appearance. As Kant learned, no one can show the thing-in-itself. Critique can instead represent presentation.

Aquinas' lessons here are moreover directly pertinent to understanding some of the attributes we brought forth in this chapter regarding the conditions of the micro-movie theater in Jakarta. For Aquinas writes that the eye and a shining body determine a scene of sight given in a medium of transparency. This is both a transmission as well as a "turn(ing) back, like a ball thrown at a wall and bounced back."[1378] For there to be the activity of the sense-power of sight, there must be a body that is smooth on its surface. If there is not, there cannot be the action of the return that is necessary for light to be turned back into the eye. The surface where there is the lighting of the darkness must be 'smooth,' Aquinas says. This flat surface provides a delimited

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puts the light kindled in a lantern, and by this means *he deflects* the blowing of breathing *winds* - that is, he prevents their blowing from reaching the light of the fire." Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed,"* 38; emphasis in Aquinas.

[1375] Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed,"* 40; emphasis in Aquinas.

[1376] Ibid, 41; emphasis added.

[1377] Ibid, 41; emphasis added.

[1378] Ibid, 40.

field from which to receive and return light. The blocking of the transparency that Aquinas invokes exists in the movie theater with regards to both sound and light. The movie theater obstructs sound and light with its cubical blackened fabrics and sound barriers. These containments provide an inner opening. This is a chamber of sound and visual reflection that allows vision. This is thus a venue for what Aquinas calls vision and the acts of the soul.

Aquinas recalls that Aristotle recalls that Democritus did understand that in order for there to be this seeing, there must be something that causes vision. Aquinas calls this "the power of sight."[1379] Although Aquinas follows Aristotle against Plato's idea that vision occurs by extromission, he also shows that for Aristotle "*it is impossible to see without light*. For because vision occurs through a medium that is transparent, vision requires light, which makes a body be transparent in actuality, as was said in the book *On the Soul.*"[1380] This 'dialectical' resolution rejects the extromission thesis while also maintaining its premise that there is some natural existence of light that vision requires.

Aquinas states, "*the movement* that occurs *through* this medium causes vision."[1381] Vision, he writes, is caused by this "'movement' according to alteration: the alteration is a movement towards a form that is a quality of the thing seen…The medium is an unbounded transparent....and what is unbounded is related to what is bounded as potentiality to actuality, for form is a boundary of matter."[1382] Aquinas indicates here how vision apprehends 'a form that is a quality.' To understand this, Aquinas repeats Aristotle's lessons regarding the peculiar existence of color. He writes,

> color is a quality of a bounded transparent…. Because of the different nature of the transparent in a transparent medium, the medium receives the form of a color in a mode that is different from the mode in which it exists in the colored body, where there is a bounded transparent, as will be said below; for actualities are in receivers according to an intentional being.[1383]

Thus, "color is in a colored body as a quality complete in its natural being, but *it is in the medium incompletely*, according to an intentional being."[1384] Color therefore is not entirely within the medium of sight, and yet it is seen by sight.

This identification of the threshold of interiority has important consequences. Aquinas writes "[Aristotle] says that because what causes vision is the alteration of a medium made bright by the body seen, *it is reasonable that what is inside* the pupil, which is the organ of sight, *be made of water*: *for water is* one of the *transparent* things."[1385] And yet, Aquinas recounts, Aristotle reasons that water in the pupil as a transparent thing is not a sufficient cause of the organ of sight, for

> the external medium is a transparent thing that has been illuminated, and nothing can be seen without this illumination: so the light must *also* be *inside* the eye…if the power of sight

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[1379] Ibid, 41.
[1380] Ibid, 46; emphasis in Aquinas. He notes furthermore that it is not possible for a whole body to be seen by anyone or one eye. Instead, only as much as can be taken in by the pupil can be seen. We note that pupil is said here in its 'anatomical' form, although the pupil is itself in relation to and that which registers the movement of the teacher.
[1381] Ibid, 46; emphasis in Aquinas.
[1382] Ibid.
[1383] Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed,"* 46-7.
[1384] Ibid, 47; emphasis added.
[1385] Ibid; emphasis in Aquinas.

> were on the outer surface of the eye, the light of the external transparent, through which the alteration by color reaches the outer surface of the pupil, would alone suffice for seeing. But *the soul,* or *the sensitive part of the soul, is not* on the outer surface *of the eye, but inside.*[1386]

The sensitive part of the soul thus bears this capability to see and this soul bears on the activity of thinking. From this demonstration, we understand that color is the end of the medium of transparency, but color is not itself the physical body on which its own surface appears. Aquinas writes,

> the interior does not in actuality have the power to move sight…. Color is on the limit of a body and…bodies participate in color with respect to the transparent…[thus] color is the limit of the transparency…the limit of the transparent [is what Aristotle] calls a quality of a body.[1387]

With color, Aristotle sees, there is an appearance of a body on the body. With this, Aristotle reasons, there is an aporetic conclusion of physical bodies that is never *physically* overcome or resolved. We note that this mode of aporia likewise characterizes the form of the commodity as outlined in *Capital,* for commodities cannot ever be reduced beyond their inner division of abstract labour and concrete labour. Prices of commodities therefore can be thought of as 'colors' of the capitalist mode of production. Prices, like colors, present an intensive measure. They are a 'form of the quality of the thing seen.'

The surface, such as that of the sculpture, bears qualities *into* sight and thinking. These qualities, Aquinas shows, bear on the activity of the soul of the human being.

§ 41 *Lihat Disana* (*Seeing There*)

We have recalled that there is a small lawn beside the Verandah. This opening of green grass is a rarity in this predominantly concrete world of Jakarta. It is approximately 19 meters long by 7 meters wide. The house dogs, *Cawil* and *Loba,* relieved themselves there.[1388] Larger gatherings in the Verandah would often spill out there as well.

Just beyond this clearing and opening, there rises a wall at the perimeter of the property. It is about two meters in height and made of grey cement blocks. Trees line its inner side. Two sculptures regularly stood there within the line of trees. On the lawn, there regularly stood two other sculptures. We will here discuss all four sculptures to give an orientation to the organization of this place and space.

To do so, we first underscore here one particular way that sculpture differs from the other aesthetic forms that Hegel called the Romantic arts. While a poem or a painting is regularly given authorial inscription *within* the form of its completion, whereby the work of *Paterson* (1946) is regularly read *as* written by William Carlos William, and *Guernica* (1937) is seen *as* painted by Pablo Picasso, a sculpture does not always spontaneously present its authorship within its realized, 'aesthetic' form itself. One can come across a sculpture and not know 'who' the creator

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[1386] Ibid; emphasis in Aquinas.
[1387] Ibid, 60.
[1388] *Loba* means "always wanting to get many things" and *Cawil* in Sundanese means approximately "poking around."

is. One can guess, but there are mistakes. This raises an important question not only about sculpture but also what Hegel called *Aesthetik* and its relation to the concept of Anthropology.

I thought for a long time that a particular sculpture that stood in another region of Garuda was one that was made by Dolo or *Somalaing*, not because I had been told so, but because of the way that it looked to me. I came to doubt this when I looked in the photo gallery of *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Matter* (2019) and did not see it there. I asked Dolo if it was an oversight, intentional or otherwise. She said it was intentional. She said she did not want to include it because the concept of the sculpture was developed by another artist, and she and *Somalaing* were only the executors of it. I asked Budi about the same one and he remembered it. He said, the figures in the work were a Japanese man and a Batak man and some others whose names and identities he had forgotten. He remembered that it had not been picked up after its material production. It was produced and paid for but was not retrieved. It therefore did not enter into the place of commercial exchange, but its physical body had already been created. It stood on the inside of a wall at *Garuda,* under the large mango tree, nearby where cars park. It is not in direct display but is beside the small porch outside of the studio where people regularly sat together. With this, we note that the imputation that stands with regards to the 'past' of a physical appearance bears both true and erroneous ideas.

This aspect of an unknown was not the case for the four works on and at the edge of the lawn. I had been told and read in confirmation that three were Budi's and one was Dolo's. I had seen pictures of Budi's works in a pamphlet book for an exhibition he did with Manyul (Aris) in 2012 called *Lihat Disana* (See There; Seeing There; Look There; Look Over There; Take a Look Over There) and had seen Dolo's work attributed in several places.

The *Lihat Disana* exhibition took place August 2-11, 2011, at the Gallery III in *Taman Ismail Marzuki* (*TIM*). The cover of the *Lihat Disana* exhibition pamphlet shows two small human being figures who are looking. Light casts over their backs. Within the shadow there emerges a realm that is the seen-there. The seen is a circular illumination within a darkness. Within the light are small, thumbnail sized images of the artworks that are depicted within the pamphlet and which were exhibited at the exhibition. All of the works within the exhibition appear in the light there all at once, as shining and colorful bodies.

Although we focus here on Budi's artworks exhibited in the exhibition *Lihat Disana*, we note first that *Lihat Disana* was a dual exhibition which also exhibited the artworks of Aris Prabawa (Manyul).[1389] Aris primarily works in the graphic mediums of art. Nearly all of his artworks in *Lihat Disana* are composed with paper and black ink. They are thus in a black and white schema and can be minimally distinguished from a polychromatic color schema. He created the first artwork which intensely drew my attention at Garuda that we mentioned in the previous chapter of this dissertation. This is of the smirking marching skeletal soldier who casts a shadow in the image of a map of Indonesia. Long after forming this passionate attachment, I learned its title is *Melangkahi Bangsa* (2010), which could be translated as "Stepping Over the People."[1390]

Manyul's work is particularly marked by the practice whereby nearly every human being figure that he draws is one where some part, usually the head and face, are what the 'European' sciences regularly call animals in the sense of an animal genus and species that is in contrast to a human animal and human being. The notion indicated by the artworks is not exactly hybridity,

[1389] The sequel to *Lihat Disana*, *Lihat Disini,* scheduled for 2020, has been indefinitely postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic.

[1390] *Bangsa* is nation and people; *melangkahi* could be translated as stepping over, overstepping, or even disregarding.

for the reason that the idea that the works point out are manifestly those of human beings, insofar as this is the animal of discourse and politics. Manyul points out a crossing over, rather than a hybrid *state*, of animality and humanity. These exposited creatures exist in the human world such that they carry such human tools as handguns and machine guns.

Aris was born in 1974 in Surakarta (Solo) and Budi was born in 1980 in Cilacap. They both grew in the New Order period, which was marked by the lethal dominance of the Army over the people. Manyul's artwork sees myriad manifestations of this militance of The New Order and the state apparatuses of Indonesia. Some of the most intense works are the ones that are not portraits of individuals but instead exhibit a social relation according to a physical body that is 'inter-individual,' that is, a *Mitsein*.

We can see this attribute with the following two works by Aris. One is a black and white drawing. It bears the body of an Indonesian Army man in a uniform and sunglasses, who is not entirely a human being because it instead *becomes* within the creature's body itself, a dog. Laying on its side, its many teats are being suckled by human beings who are crawling on their hands and knees. The sucklers are dressed as adult human beings. They suckle the body of the doggish military general who doesn't even look at them. The title is *Ketergantungan* [*Dependency*] (2011).

In another black and white drawing, there appears two beings standing in direct opposition to one another and facing each other, as in a duel. Each being holds a pistol gun in their hands and aims it at the other towards which it looks. Each holds, in their other hand, their military awarded medals of honor. Each, with their military boots, steps down onto the backs of two other human beings who are facedown. These people, underfoot, appear as a family, huddling together and holding a small baby in their arms while being kicked in the back by the two dueling opponents who hold their military medals and weapons in their hands. The dueling beings bear 'human' organs of arms, torso, and legs, but this 'humanity' gives way in the face. Their faces are instead the heads of the shrimp animal. Their bodily surface is hardened armor, and their mouth cavity egresses and ingresses with a doubly articulated tongue. The dueling opponents both wear army uniform vestments and don capes that add a kind of carnivalesque humor to upbraid and ridicule this bleak enclosure of being and beings. The work is titled *Pahlawan Oposan* (2011). *Pahlawan* is hero or patriot, depending on the situation. *Oposan* is opposition. The title can read as "The Heroes of Opposition," "The Patriots of Opposition," or "Oppositional Heroes." Its title identifies and lampoons the notion and existence of politics based on the 'direct opposition' of these shrimps.

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We now turn to Budi's sculptures which stood in and as the horizon of the Verandah in the line of trees at the perimeter wall.

One sculpture appears at first as the shape of a hoe (*pacul*). That is, the piece of equipment which brings together into unity a thin wooden handle and a turned metal tip. In this sculpture, the opposite end from the handle bears another metal casting. It is a human head and face. The human body and the technological implement are fused into a unity as the form of the organism, creature, or being of the work.

The face appears in a baroque mode and attribute. Its color is dark. This face bears myriad folds and pockets. Its rivulets cascade. The face thus is a presence of holes and voids of dark metal. It is not only its face which holds holes. The torso-length wooden piece ('the hoe's handle') has three holes in the chest region. The look of the face appears as struck with terror. The name of the work is *Kupacul kau* [*I hoe you*] (2010). Its synthesis and unity of tool and human

body express a force of domination, but there is also something else in the look of the face that still sees and is not entirely extinguished even by the cauldron in which this head and face are burned. The face bears a resemblance to the face of Wiji Thukul.

The other sculpture that regularly stood in front of the same cement block wall in the line of trees is of nearly identical physical dimensions to *Kupacul kau* (2010), about one meter tall. It also bore a human face atop a 'torso' body and 'represented' the concept of work. Rather than a hoe *(pacul*), its base is the figure of a factory. Its 'torso' is not a wooden handle, but a 'smokestack' of the factory. Thinly etched lines in its 'walls' give the appearance of cement blocks. Its roof comes together in a point that gives way to a tall smokestack or chimney.

The top of the silver-colored chimney gives way to the face of an older man that forms the peak of the work. His face is fundamentally different than the horror of the wrought iron face of *I hoe you* (2010) beside which it stands. This face is made of fiberglass. It is a 'realistic,' contemporary face. The realistic face color of light brown meets the silver color of the factory and chimney in a littoral shape; the silver comes up the left side of his face but falls below his chin and onto his neck across the right side. His face appears not exhausted but having been worked. The name of the artwork is *Potret Pekerja* [*Portrait of a Worker*] (2009).

Atop his head is a newsboy style cap. It would be repeating orientalist dogma to recall that the place of the forehead and the head, particularly in the central Javanese culture in which Budi was born and grew, has historically placed a great deal of emphasis on the forehead and head regions as a locus of a person's power. The newsboy cap rotates this and locates this worker outside of factory work time. The artwork does not exhibit the 'emancipation' of the worker or the absolute abolition of his subjection by the factory as such. Rather, it shows and recollects the portrait of the worker who is not on duty. Both works, we suggest, bring forth political, rather than 'purely aesthetic' ideas.

Out in the open on the lawn, there regularly stood two more sculptures. One is Budi's. It is entitled *Ibu dan Anak* [*Mother and Child*] (2006). It is 65 centimeters. It stands low to the ground. It is immediately distinguished from nearby sculptures because of its substance. It is the unmistakable interplay of grey and white that is marble, so celebrated by Hegel, amongst others. It was worked by chisel and hammer, not the 'modern' method of inlaying and excavating fabricated moulds. This is an ancient rather than modern technique of sculpting. There is no discarded mould created in this process. The embrace of *Mother and Child* (2006) bears some resemblance to Constantin Brâncuşi's *The Kïss* (1907).

Mother and Child (2006), in a block of marble, sees a mother wrap her arms and embraces the child into her bosom. Her hands are immense. The hands are of a massive measure within the work. They cover the whole back of the child who is being embraced. The small head of the child is turned. Their left cheek is flush to mother's breast just below her chin. The grasp of the child into the mother's bosom forms the visibility of care. The mother's face faces directly upwards towards the sky. Her miniature mouth forms a small open circle. This organ of speech of the sculpture emerges upwards into the heavens. This embrace of the child by the mother forms a seeing and look in a world which is inhospitable, rife with harm.

The other regularly standing sculpture at the center of the garden is one of, if not the single most, recognizable sculptures by Ibu Dolo. For many at Garuda and elsewhere in Indonesia who see this work, the likeness of the figure is immediately personally identified as Wiji Thukul. Wiji Thukul was a poet. We mentioned in chapter five that he was disappeared in 1998 and is widely thought to have been taken and killed in secret captivity by the New Order. His body has never been given to his family and friends.

This is the sculpture entitled "*Hanya ada satu kata: LAWAN!*" (2003). It is bronze and stands just over one meter. The name of the sculpture are the words of Wiji Thukul himself that we have preliminarily translated as, "Only is there one word: RESIST!" It is the last line of his 1986 poem, *Peringatan*. *Peringatan* can mean warning, but also commemoration, memorial, anniversary, caution, or reminder. The stem of the word *ingat* is remember or recall. The prefix *per-* and the suffix *-an* turn the stem into a substantive noun that repeats the action brought forth by the stem word. It carries with it thus the understanding that caution and warnings are also kinds of memorializations and anniversaries.

'*Hanya ada satu kata: LAWAN!*' has become a political password, both adorned and disparaged in the world of this left Renaissance addressed in this dissertation. For Dolo and many others at Garuda, it is a statement that must be recalled. The memory of the disappearance of Wiji Thukul is both the warning and reminder of what needs to be done. For others, particularly youth who were not alive or growing at the same time as Thukul in the New Order, this phrase can appear in the second decade of the 21st century as ossified doxa. Martin Suryajaya has suggested that it is used to fly a leftist flag by saying that the only possible tactic is a resistance.[1391] Accordingly, he suggests, this notion obstructs theoretical inquiry or the everyday practices of organizing in counter-revolutionary situations and organizations, which seem to *not* be explicitly inscribed by such a notion of "only is there one word: resist."

In the sculpture, Thukul stands and his mouth is open. One hand holds a sheet that is being read. His other arm is raised. Its hand forms a fist. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* [1807], Hegel writes, "after the organ of speech, it is by and large the hand by which a person brings himself to appearance and actualizes himself. It is the living artificer of his fortune [*Sie ist der beseelte Werkmeister seines Glücks*]."[1392] In this sculpture, the hand and the voice mean perhaps something slightly different than what Hegel has in mind there. For Thukul's body – this body, voice, and hands of Wiji Thukul in *Hanya ada satu kata: LAWAN!* (2003) – exist in a mode of having-been-taken-away. This opening of the mouth, raising of the arm, making of a fist, holding the written discourse to be read, returns *there* to the reason for his inexistence. And this is the place where the human being has been taken away by the sovereign State. Dolo's work therefore articulates not simply a slogan *about* 'resistance,' but rather the presence and ethos of this withdrawal of the voice and the hands from its own human beings. The work *is* a rejection of this injustice. Its own mode of existence, its own being-in-the-world *is* the standing up of this inexistence. This uncovering of disappearance and inexistence can be understood to characterize many of Dolo's works, including *I, the Witness II* (2002).

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By any measure, Dolo is one of the most significant artists working in the Republic of Indonesia, irrespective of medium, gender, or ethnic origination.[1393] Most Indonesian artists of its contemporary art world (*dunia art kontemporer*) are painters and most of those painters are men. Dolo is instead a sculptor. She is furthermore not a Javanese although she has lived and worked primarily in Jakarta for the past four decades. She is a Batak and was born in North Sumatra in 1952.

[1391] See Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

[1392] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 189/§315.

[1393] Dolo is regularly featured in national mass media and magazines. Indonesian Forbes Magazine named her one of 9 inspiring Indonesian women 'to watch' in 2020.

Her sculptures are oriented by a rejection of the ordinary understanding and vocation of fine arts. This ordinary understanding of fine art has tended to be replaced with what she often calls activism and art. While remaining formally and conceptually artworks, their mode of existence brings forth an activism, rather than a politically neutralized standpoint for the seer. Many people have said that they experience a kind of discomfort, even a physical cramp, when they see her work.

Dolo of course is not simply alone as a pioneer in this Indonesian contemporary art world. In order to outline an orientation of this world, we recall one of the most significant Indonesian contemporary artworks by a contemporary of Dolo, FX Harsono (b. 1949). Many people have commented on the way that this particular artwork presents a mode of existence which re-presents the forced inexistence of particular citizen-subjects of the Indonesian *politeia*.[1394] His work, like Dolo's, directly concerns the spontaneous appearance and concealment of justice and injustice in this Indonesian world.

I witnessed this famous artwork at the *MACAN* art museum in Jakarta. It is a 'performance' art piece, entitled *Writing in the Rain* (2011). Upon arriving in the gallery at the appointed time, we saw an unblemished, transparent glass plane standing on a stage. When the performance began, Harsono walked up to the glass on the stage and took a brush into his hand. He began to mark the transparency with black ink paint in what appears in this Indonesian world as Chinese characters or Chinese language. We watched him begin and continue to write these characters for a period of time on this glass transparency. After a short period of time, water began to fall on the surface of the glass plane, making these Chinese characters go from being-seen to rivers of black ink. Deformed, the ink eventually fell entirely from the surface itself. As the water continued to pour down the transparent glass, Harsono never stopped writing the letters on the glass plane, and yet the characters cannot hold out and remain on the surface.

I saw this performance in 2017. It was an event for the opening of this new art museum in Jakarta that sought to distinguish itself from the other extant museums by being an 'international-level' museum. Its interior looked more like modern art galleries in San Francisco and Chicago than they do the old, "local" museums run by the Indonesian government, such as the *National Gallery*. At the point of time when I saw the work and performance, *Writing in the Rain* was already a well-known artwork in this contemporary art world.[1395] This day it attracted many spectators who used their cellphones to take videos of the performance.

FX Harsono is a Chinese Indonesian person. *Writing in the Rain* has been called an aesthetic expression of the erasure of Chinese Indonesian people, in life and death, in the Indonesian polis.[1396] Chinese Indonesian people were historically forced to give up their own names and to adopt names that did not sound or look Chinese but instead sounded and looked 'Indonesian.' Thus, many Chinese Indonesians took names that originarily were Javanese names. 'Suryajaya,' 'Harsono,' and 'Budianta,' are now the patronyms of Chinese Indonesian people which were not the names that their own ancestors used to call themselves.

In the performance artwork, Harsono writes his Chinese name in Chinese characters. But his calligraphy is repeated, again and again in the same place, such that the characters cannot be read. The water washes out the glass plane of names of human beings and in doing so, the artwork directly confronts the question of the relation of temporality, existence, and writing. For the water that wipes the letters off the glass stands for something which is very painful. The

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[1394] See Suryajaya, "Aesthetics and Politics."
[1395] A video of it was projected in Times Square, New York City in 2018.
[1396] Ibid.

streaks of black ink that form winding black brooks down the glass give a form to a "downstream" figure of this particular history. The ink remains on the plane, but it has completely lost its originary shape or form. The persistence of the artist writing on the transparency during the event of rain is a gesture of persistence, hope, and fidelity. The artist doesn't stop painting even though the plane of writing will not keep the ink and character in the way that it is intended by the artist.

FX Harsono's piece seems to specifically consider this Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian world. But the washing away of Chinese characters is not the only concept achieved in the artwork. The artwork also brings forth the problem of its own inscription and how to give form to something, such as the historical destiny of Chinese and Chinese Indonesian people, that exceeds the possibilities given by the artwork. This very ineffability is momentarily reflected in this artwork. Like many of Dolo's artworks, *Writing in the Rain* draws on the techniques of fine art but leaves them for what this dissertation calls the discourse of the critique of political economy and what Dolo has called art and activism.

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Wiji Thukul was disappeared in 1998 at the end of the New Order. He was a member of the *Partai Rakyat Demokrasi* (*PRD*), one of the most significant parties and political movements opposing President Suharto.[1397] He was taken and his body has never been returned. Dolo's sculpture, *Hanya ada satu kata: LAWAN!*, thus brings forth an image of his body in the mode of the denial of its presence. In the sculpture, his legs are undifferentiated, as when wearing a sarong. Together, his arms form a semi-circle around his hollowed chest. Its form is a sheltered opening.

We recalled in Chapter Five how at Dolo's book launch, his good friend told stories about him and being in Australia for a poetry reading. They were in a restaurant. He said to Thukul, what are we going to do? We can't speak English. Thukul (as he was called by this friend in this story), said it will be fine. When the waiter came over and asked what they wanted to eat, Thukul loudly exclaimed in English "I AM VERY FINE THANK YOU." The whole room erupted in laughter. He wasn't afraid of a restaurant in Australia.

The friend said that day that he has asked so many officials, 'Where is Thukul? Where is he?' Someone in the government told him that it is possible that he was dumped into the sea. Others said that he was buried in an unmarked grave in central Java. This led to the telling of how villagers around these graves have strange experiences. He said, the communists have all gone into the ground and we have eaten them, which elicited a different sound of laughter from the audience.

Many of Dolo's sculptures bring forth, as their concept, justice for a people. One of its forms of aesthetic appearance is as a line or fence of people. All locking arms, the figures hold each other together. They are united and not-one. They do not bear individual bodies. They gain and project strength by binding together. In many of these works, such as the iconic *Solidarity II* (2000), only one arm is raised from this fence of people, its fist is held up to the sky.

§42 *Woman at Night*

Budi has been Dolo's principal disciple for more than a decade at *Somalaing*. Like his teacher, his art practice inhabits fine arts discourse in order to make it introduce effects that critically identify

[1397] See "PKS and Lenin" section of chapter 6 of this dissertation.

the social formation. We can catch a glimpse of this with his exhibition which he called "Story Night" in Jakarta in 2012. He told me that the name came from the idea to exhibit the story of the night coupled with the homophony it bears with Vincent van Gogh's painting *Starry Night* [*Sterrennacht*] (1889).

In our conversations, Budi regularly praised other artists and he never praised his own artwork. He sometimes asked me if I knew particular historical artists, such as the American sculptor Alexander Calder (b. 1898-1976), who he knew and admired. He rarely talked about his own art. He preferred to talk about the artistic and political activities of *Taring Padi* in which he participated with-others. He recounted how he had just entered the Art Institute of Yogyakarta (*ISI*) in 1998 when *Taring Padi* was inceptively forming as a political and art organization. He joined then in its very originary foundation. More than two decades later now, he has become one of its elders and was elected the second president several years ago. Toni, *Taring Padi*'s first president, died in 2018. After his death, Budi made a sculptural bust of Toni's face. He and other *Taring Padi* members set it at Toni's gravesite in 2021 on a rainy day, laying flowers (*menabur bunga*) there as well.

Budi told me that the idea for the "Story Night" exhibition was "woman in the night of the day" ("*peremptuan di malam hari*"). He explained the exhibition by means of teasing himself to me. It took place at *GI* [gay – E], he said. The name of this central Jakarta mall, Grand Indonesia (*GI*), invokes the place where villainous, vain, as well as other Jakartans gather amongst the most expensive stores in the country that are worked by the migrant workers of Jakarta. He said that in the basement of *GI,* there is a small gallery within this massive place where he had the exhibition.

He said that his idea for the exhibition was first that the gallery would be completely dark, like going into the night. This darkening introduced a disruption, in the relation of light and dark, with the commercial mall from which gallery visitors enter. Taking away the light and bringing forth 'the night' within the mall physically accentuated the contradiction with the mall outside. The manner in which he relayed this, by teasing himself, allowed him to articulate the commitment of the artwork and exhibition without boasting.

This presentation of the night unveils a new light by replacing 'natural' light and darkness with the 'artificial' night in the gallery. This was done by hanging black sheet cloth and painting the walls black before re-lighting the room with electric lamps. After taking away all of the outside light inside this darkened space, he explained while still laughing with self-deprecation every few moments in the description, there is the place for the presentation of his artworks.

The primary exhibited works were a series of sculptures, "women in the night of the day." They are fiberglass sculptures of women standing under lamps at night. The concept of "woman in the night of the day" was, he directly clarified, prostitution (*prostitut*). He continued to tease his own commitment to his idea as he continued to explain. There in this new darkness and light would be his sculptures. There, the female human beings stand under the streetlamps 'at night.' Some of these sculptures stood in the studio or Verandah during the period of dissertation research from 2016-2020 and I was strongly affected by them.

Part of what makes the artworks so powerful is that these figures are not at all exhibited in the form of appearance of prostitutes which aim to elicit a pity for the abjection suffered by the prostitute. These "women in the night of the day" are not presented in the moment of physical or sexual harm or denigration, such as how Multatuli exhibited Adinda's death.

In one of the works from the series, entitled *Amien* [*Amen*] (2012), there stands a woman under a lamp. She is wearing a red dress and is listening to her own headphones. Her arms are crossed on her breast, and she is looking away. *Her eyes are closed*. Her own gaze averts that of the

seer. Her eyes *cannot* be seen by the seer. In another work entitled, *Dalam Malam Ada Doa* [*In the Night There are Prayers*] (2012), a woman stands in a green dress under the streetlight. She holds a bouquet of flowers. Her neck is turned in profile. She is not looking at all at the place from which she is seen. Another work, entitled *Long night nih* [*It's a Long Night*] (2012), a woman stands again under the light in a dress. In a matte red dress, her neck is tilted upwards. She is yawning. One hand covers her mouth. Her face shines under the lamp with boredom. Time seems to be dragging.

But what we see is not pity for a prostitute. It should be noted however that there is nothing contradicting that standpoint. There is, instead, a surpassing of fine art discourse and a turn into a critique of the ordinary concept of 'prostitution.' For Budi's sculptures do not bring forth female human beings in order to be shown under the lamp with a biological-zoological-metaphysical form as abjection, subjection, or moral iniquity. The works instead reject that very mode of the objectification of human beings as such.

We can see this particularly acutely from the action of turning and withdrawal exhibited in the whole series of works. In *Amien* (2012), her eyes are closed. She refuses to be seen being seen. She is instead listening inwardly. And yet her eyelids are adorned with bright, almost coral blue, eyeshadow makeup. Her eyes are made attractive for the outside and yet her eyes are not opened to that attraction. The artwork brings forth a minimal anthropological bearer that cannot be *absolutely* captured simply through abjection and subjection.

She has not only closed her eyes. She is moreover listening with something that is specifically the modern technological machine which are called headphones (*headset* in Indonesian). She is listening, not to the scopic gaze of the conditions of her own representation under the lamp at night in a marketplace of sex and desire, but instead to something else that is *within* her. She is therefore in the opening of the marketplace and yet still elsewhere. Her eyes and ears are both already covered up, but they are covered in two completely different ways. The title of the work is *Amien* (*Amen*). With this title, she is praying, saying "Amen," but also is seen *as* prayer.

This is a night story of Jakarta. It is not a representation of morality with the human body of the prostitute at night. For with representation of morality and pity, the viewer sustains a kind of separation from the one suffering. With this artwork, on the other hand, there is not simply an absolute capture of women and her flesh. Instead, there are qualities here that are more than just her capture in subjection. There is a decision that is *hers*. It is the colors of her dresses (leopard print, green, or red), or the song played from her handphone.

The sculptures indeed bring forth and exhibit the practico-inert standpoint of paying for sex in the city. But the works articulate that there is still something more that is not appropriated in and by this exhibition. This can be seen in her gestures, such as her yawning. This gesture is not held in the same world as the one that enters the scopic drive of the seer. As such, these works disrupt the reproduction of the ideology which thinks that the day holds the night within it. They indicate instead that there is another story of the night than the ones which are told about it during the day.

§43 *On the Soul*

We now return to Aquinas' commentary for its lessons on Aristotle's notion of the human being and its soul. Recalling its expositions will enrich our understanding of the capacity of sculpture as well as Marx's usage of the 'capitalist soul' in "Die moderne Kolonisationstheorie" which we saw in Part One of this dissertation.

In Περὶ Ψυχῆς, known as *De Anima* in Latin, Aristotle writes that the soul is "the cause or source of the living body."[1398] This is a *unity* of the being in its relation to its multiple senses and sense-powers.[1399] The diversity of sense and sense-power are thus crucial for understanding this soul, but the decisive question remains the concept of unity. Aquinas writes in his commentary on Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν, "although all things are sensible by their nature, nevertheless an object *does not appear* in actuality *to be everything* that it is: *rather, sometimes it is indivisible, but one sees what is not indivisible.*"[1400] There is therefore a division within this unity of the soul and the diversity of sensitivity. The appearance of division is thus crucial to understanding this activity of the soul.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas finds that "every sensible object is visible from some determinate distance."[1401] Divisibility is necessary in order for something to be sensed, but the divisible itself is not adequate to the sensed itself. Aquinas thereby reasons that "what is indivisible cannot be seen from any distance."[1402] Aquinas writes in the passage that concludes this particular section of the commentary:

> Therefore an indivisible thing cannot be sensed – except, perhaps, inasmuch as it is the limit of a continuum, for other accidents of continua are also perceived in this way [*Si ergo indivisibile non potest sentiri, nisi forte secundum quod est terminus continui, sicut et alia accidentia continuorum sentiuntur*].[1403]

This is a decisive statement. Aquinas states here that there is thus something participating in sense and sense-power that is not divisible within it. He identifies the activity of the encounter with the limit of a continuum as a chance to perceive, not sense, the indivisible. Aquinas writes, "an indivisible body is sensible in itself, although the sense-power cannot see an indivisible object of this kind."[1404]

Aquinas states that indivisibility thus forms the limit of the continuum of divisibility. There can be, as by an accident of perception, an encounter *at* finite divided things that is not those finite divided things themselves. With this, Aquinas provides a groundwork for the concepts in *Capital* such as surplus-value, labour-power, and class struggle that are not sensed by the sense-powers such as in wages, prices, profit and all the other forms of finite appearance that populate the ideology of classical political economy. He moreover identifies that the indivisible can be perceived at limits such as the surface of finite forms, i.e., sculptures.

This line of thinking by Aquinas serves, we suggest, as a proleptic answer to Althusser's question of '*how* Marx *thinks*' in *Capital*, for it suggests that the decisive concepts – unity, the indivisible – are, as Althusser suggested, just beyond the finite and divisible parts. Marx's invocation of the capitalist soul in the limit of *Capital* suggests that he thinks that even the capitalist organ of activity can, as by accident, perceive that which is not simply within the limits of its own divisible forms. The sculptures of Dolo and Budi likewise can be understood as forms

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[1398] Aristotle, "On the Soul," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* trans. J. A. Smith (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 561/415b8. Foster and Humphries read "principle" for "ἀρχή." See Thomas Aquinas *Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima,* trans. Kevin Foster and Silvester Humphries (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1994), 99.
[1399] Aquinas writes, "it would seem that the soul cannot simultaneously sense sensible objects of one genus where they are contraries." Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed,"* 156.
[1400] Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On Sense and What is Sensed,"* 149; emphasis in Aquinas.
[1401] Ibid, 157-8.
[1402] Ibid, 158.
[1403] Ibid, 158.
[1404] Ibid, 149.

which facilitate the possibility for an encounter with the indivisibility that limits the outline of these artificial human bodies.

§44 '*Sculpture in general comprises the miracle of spirit's giving itself an image of itself in something purely material*'

From this elucidation of sense-power and soul in Aquinas, we can now turn to the fundamental importance given to sculpture by Hegel, both in his understanding of *Aesthetik* but also more generally in his concept of Philosophy as System.

We recall that Art (*Kunst*) comprises the first moment of Absolute *Geist*, which itself constitutes the final moment of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.* Absolute *Geist*, we hasten to remember, is the true infinite according to Hegel.[1405] Moreover, in his *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik,* Hegel posits that sculpture is the first form and moment of Art.[1406] Thus, to grasp the fundamental nature of the concept of sculpture for Hegel, we first recall his notion of the human body as *Geist* in *Die Philosophie des Geistes.*

Hegel begins the third and final part of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences – Die Philosophie des Geistes* – with the part "*Der subjektive Geist,*" which itself begins with the section "A. Anthropology. The Soul." Hegel there articulates a process whereby *Geist* begins to transforms a passive νοῦς which eventuates in *der objektive Geist* and finally *der absolute Geist.* This transformation takes place by fashioning a second nature that is habit (*die Gewohnheit*). Catherine Malabou has called this the 'plasticity' of the Hegelian soul.[1407] Plasticity names a particular ability of *Geist* to reform by repeatedly reencountering itself.

Malabou also remarks that many commentators pass over this part of the *Encyclopedia* because it seems naïve or mystical in its understanding of *Geist* and human beings.[1408] Hegel here chronicles national types and the impact of environment and climate on their nations. He exposits the moments of life stages as themselves necessary moments of *Geist.* Readers may assume that these passages are there to be surpassed, conceptually, by Hegel's own System itself, meaning here the concepts of *der freie Geist*, *die Sittlichkeit*, or *der absolute Geist*. We suggest here instead that the "Anthropology" of *Die Philosophie des Geistes* identifies why the *eidos* of the human being is of fundamental significance for Hegel's Systems of Philosophy and thereby why sculpture constitutes both a fundamental and uncomfortable aesthetic form for him.

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In the section "A. Anthropology. The Soul," Hegel articulates the idea that the form of the human being and even its physical organs do not lack the concept (*Begriff*). They are instead, he states, the work of *Geist*. This can be understood as follows. The first sentence of the section states, "*Geist came into* being as the truth of Nature."[1409] The human being for Hegel thus begins as this denaturing of Nature. Hegel describes this denaturalization as such: "it means that Mind presupposes itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is always self-externalized, but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. At such a

[1405] See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, 23.
[1406] See Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II,* 701 ff.
[1407] See Malabou, *The Future of Hegel,* ch. 1.
[1408] Ibid.
[1409] Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind,* 29. For "*Der Geist,*" Wallace gives "Spirit (Mind)" here.

stage it is not yet mind, but *soul*."[1410] This soul that is not yet Mind is not simply disparaged by Hegel. On the contrary, he states that "soul is the *substance* or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought."[1411] The soul is therefore crucial for understanding how Hegel understands ideality, materiality, and substance.

Hegel situates the transformation of soul into *Geist* in the action of feeling. He describes this process as follows:

> in this way we have two spheres of feeling. One, where what at first is a corporeal affection (e.g. of the eye or of any bodily part whatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward, memorized in the soul's self-centered part. Another, where affections originating in the mind and belonging to it, are in order to be felt, and to be as if found, invested with corporeity. Thus, the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in the soul.[1412]

With this, Hegel finds that the human being organizes and reorganizes the identity of corporeity and the affections of the mind. The *experience* of corporeity thus is fundamental to *Geist.* Hegel writes:

> As to the representative faculty the body is but *one* representation, and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the *simplicity* of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul, the corporeity, and all that outness of parts to parts which belong to it, is reduced to *ideality* (the *truth* of the natural multiplicity). The soul is virtually the totality of nature: as an individual soul it is a monad...and to that world it stands but as to itself.[1413]

The soul thus bears together that transformation of 'feeling…being driven inward' and 'affections…invested with corporeity' at once. This phenomenon metes temporality for the human being for Hegel. Hegel writes,

> this *process* of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul *appears as a repetition of them*, and the generation of habit as practice. For, *this being of the soul...is a reflexive universality*…In habit, the human being's mode of existence is 'natural' and for that reason not 'free'…The main point about Habit is that by its means *man gets emancipated from the feelings, even in being affected by them.*[1414]

From the sentient soul to habit, Hegel gives to the name Anthropology the possibility to know, but also to make and remake, human existence. The transformation of corporeity, as Hegel writes, intervenes on the very existence, rather than the ideality, of the soul itself. Hegel writes,

> the body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier…*to mould such an aim* in the organic body *is to bring out and express the 'ideality'* which is implicit in matter always, and

[1410] Ibid; emphasis in Hegel.
[1411] Ibid; emphasis in Hegel.
[1412] Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, 75-76.
[1413] Ibid, 93; emphasis in Hegel.
[1414] Ibid, 141; emphasis added.

> especially so in the specific bodily part, and thus to enable the soul, under its volitional and conceptual characters, to exist as substance in its corporeity.[1415]

The human body, Hegel states, is the "soul's work of art."[1416] It has a *"human* pathognomic and physiognomic expression."[1417] Hegel writes, "implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter….The actual soul…has implicitly realized the ideality of its qualities…and is infinite self-relation…it gains the position of thinker and subject."[1418] Hegel's identification of the transformation of the human body and human being here suggests that the practice of sculpture, being itself an art of fabricating the *eidos* of human beings, bears itself on and intervenes in this activity of the soul.

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Sculpture, as some readers may recall, bears an essential shortcoming according to Hegel. This is the necessity of sculpture's corporeality, for sculpture is always placed or set in a particular place. This finitude and inmixing of place or environment is dissatisfying for Hegel. For this condition prevents sculpture from the possibility of a 'pure' interiority of the concept, which Hegel identifies in the form of poetry. Hegel states in the *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik*,

> neither a statue nor a group, still less a relief, can be fashioned without considering the place where the work of art is to be put. A sculptor should not first complete his work and only afterwards look around to see whither it is to be taken: on the contrary, his very conception of the work must be connected with specific external surroundings and their spatial form and their locality. For this reason sculpture retains a permanent relation with spaces formed architecturally.[1419]

For Hegel, this spatialization obstructs sculpture from a true infinite. And yet this same 'material' characteristic, we suggest, can also be understood as what obstructs sculpture from entering into the banal antinomies and discourses of so-called representation. Sculpture is an unabashedly material instantiation of the form of Art.

But it is not only the spatialization of the sculpture form which Hegel criticizes. Its static, anti-progressive temporality is antithetical to the notion of the Concept for Hegel. This stasis of sculpture is anxiety begetting for Hegel. Hegel writes, "sculpture… provides only a specific moment with nothing to follow it, something motionless without the progress of living action."[1420] Sculpture is therefore *confined* to "one feature of externality, i.e., its material form."[1421] He writes, "the shape which is the subject of sculpture remains in fact only one abstract aspect of the concrete human body; its forms lack any variety of particular colours and movements."[1422] Sculpture "gets no further…than the first still universal mode of existence in nature, i.e., *pure*

[1415] Ibid, 142; emphasis added.
[1416] Ibid, 147.
[1417] Ibid, 147; emphasis in Hegel.
[1418] Ibid, 151.
[1419] Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II*, 702.
[1420] Ibid, 703.
[1421] Ibid, 704.
[1422] Ibid, 704. Rebecca Comay identifies Hegel's mistake, for Greek Antiquity and other social formations *did* paint colours on the surfaces of sculptures. See her "Defaced Statues," 134 ff.

visibility and what is in general illumined, without bringing into the presentation that bearing on darkness where the visible is inherently particularized and becomes colour."[1423] Sculpture for Hegel thus is both a development of the concept and a lack of its development.[1424]

But Hegel's formal criticism of sculpture – that it is only incompletely separated from its place and environment, that it lacks particularity, that it is only 'pure visibility' – can also be understood as sculpture's specific difference and conceptual achievement. We see this in an extremely significant passage for understanding the inner relation of sculpture and anthropology for Hegel. He writes,

> for while poetry can embrace the totality of appearance in one and the same element, i.e. in our ideas, visual art must accept the separation of this totality into its parts…Therefore on the one side we have *objectivity* which, not being the proper shape of the spirit, confronts it as inorganic nature…In this external object which is no longer the mere opposite of the inner life, spiritual individuality is to be presented, yet not as a living body, i.e. one continually referred back to the point of unity implied in the spiritual individual, but as a form envisaged and presented as external; into this mould the spirit is poured, yet without coming out of this externality to appear in its withdrawal into itself as something inward…Instead of taking for its expression in a symbolic way modes of appearance merely *indicative* of the spirit, sculpture lays hold of the human form as the *actual* existence of the spirit. Nevertheless, however, as the representation of unfeeling subjectivity and of emotion not yet particularized, sculpture is content with the *shape* as such in which the point of subjectivity is spread out. This is also the reason why sculpture does not present the spirit in action in a series of movements which have and accomplish a purpose or in understandings and deeds in which character is displayed.[1425]

Sculpture's movement is unmoving rather than developing. As such, its *Geist* is presented in externality and not inwardness, which, for Hegel, is the true home of spirit.[1426] But the underlined passage identifies why sculpture is *the* fundamental moment for *Geist* as *Kunst.* Sculpture uniquely brings forth the conceptual interpenetration of spirit and matter as the human form for Hegel. Sculpture does not merely point to spirit because it *is* spirit. Sculpture is "content with the *shape as such* in which the point of subjectivity is spread out."[1427] As Hegel states,

> sculpture...lacks the point where the person appears as a person, i.e. the concentrated expression of soul as soul, the flash of the eye... on the whole a sculpture is uniformly coloured, hewn from white marble and not from something variously coloured; it also has metals at command as material, this original matter, self-identical, undifferentiated, a so-to-say congealed light.[1428]

[1423] Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II*, 704-5.
[1424] Comay identifies how Hegel's thinking of sculpture as created without a mould can be understood as his disavowing the gaze of the other. See her "Defaced Statues," 135 ff.
[1425] Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II*, 705; underlining emphasis added.
[1426] While this draws Hegel's disapproval, it also can be understood as a virtue in our late conjuncture, for it formalizes a species of eternity that rejects transience.
[1427] Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II*, 705.
[1428] Ibid, 706.

It is this lack of the individuality of the *Geist* that disappoints Hegel. And yet this inherently unspecific, even indivisible, characteristic of the form can also be understood to be one of its virtues. Sculpture is a fundamental form; it is a threshold within the aporia of nature and *Geist.*

In her wonderful essay, "Defaced Statues: Idealism and Iconoclasm in Hegel's *Aesthetics,*" Rebecca Comay remembers that Hegel writes that sculpture is a form that transmits itself without any process of production visible as such in the resultant form.[1429] And yet Hegel also remarks upon the process of creating sculpture that "while sculpture is in and by itself a more abstract art, it does not always remain in this abstraction but brings with *it incidentally from its origin much that is traditional, hidebound, and localized*, but it is also adapted to the living needs of the people."[1430] Sculpture is therefore not as unmoving or without a remainder of process as Hegel wishes it to be.

These contradictory formulations indicate the strong conceptual transformation being undertaken by Hegel in his thinking of sculpture. Sculpture, partaking in both material and ideal attributes as well as their reconfiguration, articulates a form and practice whereby the anthropos 'gains the position of thinker and subject.' This activity that is the transformation of ideality and materiality constitutes the very foundation of Hegel's Anthropology.

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Mikke Susanto, an art historian at the Art Institute of Indonesia (*ISI*) Yogyakarta, writes in his contribution to *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Matter* (2019) that Dolo's work can be thought of in this long tradition whereby sculptors relate to the spiritual needs of a people through recreated material existence. Susanto writes,

> *Pandhe* [ed: the work of, or the profession related to, metal]…has often been understood much too simply, that is, as the study of technical skills. In fact…*empu* and *pandhe,* masters of craft, are those who actually have the ability to read the community's needs. Understandably, in traditional and spiritual societies, *pandhe* and *empu* were always governed by the fact that discourses on traditional beliefs were monopolized by the Brahmins (the case of the Hindu priests). They, the *pandhe* and *empu*, articulated their visualizations independently, while recognizing the imaginations outside of themselves, including the discourse of the Brahmins. Thus, cultural artifacts were created, either as useful objects or as objects of art. In brief, I see Dolorosa as a sculptor working with metal, a medium with rich cultural history. In our contemporary society, she is a '*pandhe*' who participates in people's activities. She contributes to the hustle and bustle of modern rituals.[1431]

Susanto sees an interaction between the work of sculptors and the thinking of the people themselves. Hegel, on the other hand, posits that "the fundamental type (the human body) is therefore *given* to sculpture, not devised by it."[1432] Susanto's reflection instead identifies how

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[1429] See Comay, "Defaced Statues," 127 ff.
[1430] Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II*, 707; emphasis added.
[1431] Mikke Susanto, "Three Notes for and about Dolorosa," in *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Matter,* eds. Alex Supartono and Sony Karsono (Jakarta: Somalaing Art Studio, Red & White Publishing, and Jakarta Art Institute Press, 2019), 376-7.
[1432] Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II*, 713.

Dolo's work intervenes in, rather than simply represents in an *a priori* manner, this 'fundamental type (the human body).'

This difference is crucial, for it divergently identifies the orientation in the origination of the ur-concept for Hegel that is *Geist*. Hegel himself dramatically underlines the immense importance of sculpture in the following pithy statement: "sculpture in general comprises the miracle of spirit's giving itself an image of itself in something purely material."[1433] With this statement, Hegel delivers a strong reason for why sculpture is fundamental to understanding the *Philosophie des Geistes*, broadly construed.

§45 *Sexual Difference and the Rediscovery of Political Existence*

In the previous chapter of this dissertation, we suggested that the "PKS and Lenin" debate exhibited an absolute centralization *and* occlusion of woman, women, and sexual difference in the *politeia*. With this in mind, we want to conclude by indicating the mode of the exhibition of the existence and inexistence female human beings in the sculpture work of Dolorosa Sinaga.

In the book launch events that commemorated the publishing of *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Form, Matter* (2019), many intellectuals and artists came together and delivered public addresses in Jakarta and Yogyakarta to celebrate the occasion. We recount three persistent themes which emerged in these discussions.

First, nearly everyone remarked that Dolo's sculptures explore the *existence* of the human body, or the body of the human being as such. The name she gave to her 2001 exhibition – *Have you seen a sculpture from the body?* – expresses this aim intensively. This unquestionably emerged because of her period of aesthetic education in the early 1980s at St. Martin's Art Institute in London, England. She frequently recounts the difficulty of the study period there. She recollects, the teachers gave the students cardboard and told them, make a sculpture of a human body. At first, she had no idea what to do. Eventually, she learned to work by folding and twisting the material to find shapes of the human body.[1434]

The second aspect that nearly everyone commented on is the way that Dolo's work exists in the conjuncture of fine art and political activism such that they enter into a new, disclosive relationship. Politics is not simply representational in her work. Fine art and political activism are both participated at once. Although there are no doubt diverse conditions and causes which animate this change, we here bring forth one story of a lesson Dolo learned and recounted regarding the human being and the body of the human being. This was when her close personal friend, Semsar Siahaan, an Indonesian painter, went to a demonstration to protest against the New Order and returned from there badly physically beaten. Seeing him, she said, she saw that his body had changed. His face bore blood and bruises. He was in pain. She said that this was an

[1433] Ibid, 710; emphasis added.

[1434] Dolo explains the physical and metaphysical question of sculpture through a description of the difference between her two "work attitudes, or methods," that is clay and wax. The two materials result in completely different kinds of works. Clay, as she explains, *begins* as an intrinsic volumetric mass. Your hands find themselves an initial formless heap of clay that becomes, through the working process, the shape of that which can become an *unchanging form*. This movement eventuates in the unchanging form, which is often in the likeness of a human being. With wax, on the other hand, you begin with a material whose volumetric mass is a thin flat sheet. Wax's shape has to be given entirely by the work of the artist. These two practices in creations are therefore fundamentally unalike and yet both can render a standing human body as a sculpture. The sculptor therefore works in a place that introduces a decision of an image giving itself an image. See Dolorosa Sinaga, "Artist Statement," in *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, Matter, Form* (Jakarta: Somalaing Art Studio, Red & White Publishing, and Jakarta Art Institute Press 2019), 232-3.

awakening for her that touched her politically and artistically. She came to grasp a fundamental relation of the body of the human being and the *politeia*.

The third aspect which we will pursue here is that nearly everyone remarked that Dolo's sculptures have thematized woman and women in an important way. Many also noted that this cannot exactly be called a feminism; she has often rejected any facile notion of implementing an already completed doctrine. She says that she wants her art to participate in something which she often predicates in the relative or comparative form as "better" ("*lebih baik*"). Many of her sculptures of females exhibit women locking arms together, such as in the *Solidarity* (2000) series. And yet this collective articulation is not axiomatic. In her *General, Have You Read the Book of Love?* (2006), there is a male and female bronze couple.[1435] The male is an Army General, carrying a rifle over his shoulder and wearing a helmet on his head. He tips his neck over and looks down at the eponymic book of love that the woman is holding open and showing him. There is a feminist attribute of this artwork at the level of the sexuation of the *politeia*.

The sculpture whose photographic image appears on the front of the book *Dolorosa Sinaga: Body, From, Matter* (2019) is, as identified by her chignon hair bun, a woman. The body is a bronze miniature. She is not in a chain of solidarity, but instead standing alone. Her torso is elongated. Her arms do not separate from the torso. Her neck is tilted to one side. She looks up. But she has no opened eyes. In fact, she doesn't have individuated eyes at all. This is a material body for which the appearance of eyes gives no service.

The bronze artwork is named *I, the Witness II* (2002). We have recalled it on multiple occasions in this dissertation. In it, the human body appears with a piece of furniture in relation to it. It is a tall, narrow table, as in a lectern. Its figure and proportions are raised up. It forms a high, empty tabletop, waiting at the upper chest level of the figure. This place for the testimony of the witness is raised up. This is a place for the testimony of the witness. This place is above where everyday letters are written and read. This woman is 'I, the witness.'[1436]

Dolo told me from where the idea of the sculpture came. It is the events of May 1998 in Jakarta, when groups of men attacked women, physically and sexually, particularly Chinese-Indonesian women. Dolo is in no way alone for having drawn on the events of May 1998 in the creation of an artistic work.[1437] But Dolo's work is not a commemoration of the event-in-itself. It is instead a commemoration of its recollection, of its being remembered, of its remembrance.[1438]

'I, the witness' is not the victim herself. It is a relative who witnessed her kin be violently attacked and subjugated. Dolo told me that she made the work after she met someone who witnessed, with her ears more than her eyes, her beloved kin be physically and sexually tortured. She herself was hiding within the house from the marauding invaders. She witnessed these acts and could not herself come out to stop them. This artwork brings forth the eponymic figure of 'I, the witness' as the one who *knows the past.* She knows what happened. She carries the pain within the gesture of her neck. She recollects something that cannot be made simply present in everydayness. The figure and gesture in the work is neither triumphant in its defiance nor absolutely defeated by their violence. The opening of the lectern at her chest suggests a place to place such a painful memory. It is raised up.

[1435] The work has also been titled, *General, have you ever read a book of poems?*

[1436] The title of the work is, we repeat, *I, the Witness II*. The 'II' indicates its placement in the series. *I, the Witness I* (2002) is slightly different. Its lectern is slightly lower and less substantial than in *I, the Witness II.*

[1437] See, for instance, Edwin, *Babi Buta Yang Ingin Terbang.*

[1438] Edwin's *Babi Buta Yang Ingin Terbang* can also be considered to reflect upon the remembrance of the event named May 1998.

The organ of the human body which is most intensely worked in the work is the throat. The organ for breathing and speaking is constricted. When I asked her about the work, Dolo talked about the very center of the body of the torso. She said, look at the line in the center of the body. See how it is wrapped up, she said. It's like a suffocation, it's like being suffocated, she said.[1439] It is neither an anatomical throat nor a backbone, but instead the line in the center of the human body. There is a coiling and tightening there. This is a kind of great pain for the soul in speaking-out. *I, the Witness II* (2002), we suggest, is an unsolicited mendicant given to post-Reformation Indonesia by Dolo. The sculpture unconceals a remembering of this pain. It shows that this form of the human being which remembers this and speaks-out does not see with its eyes. The table and the barely opened mouth are the horizons for this outline of sense-power.

Dolo's partner and husband, Ardjuna Hutagalung, is, as she will say, her greatest and fiercest critic. Om Juna can speak in a severe speech. I have seen it happen many times. He raises his voice. His words quicken. He stands up. He raises his hand, bends his elbow, and points his finger, as he argues against his opponents, both those in his midst as well as those whom we bring near with our own words. He does not, at times, allow for something to stand if he disagrees. It is not just identifying a difference; it is a strong intervention. He seizes on the moment in order to eradicate anything where there is not something else better that can replace it.

This aforementioned interventionary characteristic is directly opposed to the customs that Ardjuna and many others, including Pramoedya Ananta Toer as well as centuries of Europeans, say is a Javanese characteristic of seeking harmony by bringing about sameness. Ardjuna's speech is instead often refutational. He, at times, seeks a harmony in contradiction. The two are not exactly the same. Ardjuna, Dolo, and many others in Garuda, are committed to upbraiding a mute choral silence in the face of the injustice in the *politeia*. This activity, we suggest, is an act of interpellation. In its Latin, *inter-* means "between" and *-pellere* means "to drive." It is an inner drive. It is an interrupting by speaking-out.

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It is a recent custom in ethnographic research to let in a little light and explain the ethnographer's relationship and position to the research.

I met Alex Supartono when he came to a conference at UC Berkeley, in the first year of my PhD program in Anthropology. I had completed my MA in South and Southeast Asian Studies with Professor Sylvia Tiwon, who Alex had already known over decades, countries, continents, and generations. When we met, he strongly encouraged me to go to Garuda in Jakarta, where he lived during his university study at *Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara*. Alex sent me there to this place to be taken in. He repeatedly told me that Dolorosa and Ardjuna would take me into their world. He said if you are interested in art and politics in Indonesia and Jakarta today you must go there.

This began a direction into a new place. Alex sent letters to Dolo who sent letters to me welcoming me to stay at Garuda. In the very beginning, I persisted in methodological individualism, insisting that I would take myself on my own there, being well able to navigate Jakarta. She insisted that she would have someone pick me up from wherever I was staying in the city, and that it would be her pleasure. I yielded. I would be picked up from the hotel where I was staying in Cikini, across the street from the Jakarta Art Institute. I waited there and then

[1439] Stefania Pandolfo has recalled this image of 'soul choking.' See her *Knot of the Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 330 ff.

heard a hailing, 'Dylan?' It was Ari. Driven by Pak Musapik, I went to Garuda for the first time. At first, I thought that I would be an unwanted intruder. Alex let me know that he did check to see if they did indeed welcome my presence. I spent the summers of 2016, 2017, and 2018, periods of weeks and months from 2018 to 2019, and a continuous period from June 2019 to March 2020 there.

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To conclude this ethnographic reflection, we will recall once more Ardjuna's birthday party. Past midnight, midst a party enjoyed by many, he came up to a group of revelers and asked, do you know about the International People's Tribune (IPT)? Do you know they rendered a verdict on Indonesia in the Netherlands? The collective and individual attentions instantly changed. Some responded and gave mild assenting utterances. He left and returned to the group with stacks of pamphlet book copies of the verdict. He began handing them out to unoutstretched hands. The atmosphere was no longer simply mirth. He seized the moment and developed a pedagogical encounter.

He said, the international tribunal has delivered a verdict against the Government of Indonesia. Do you know this about "your" government, he asked? His act of speaking dislocated the conversation. It refused to allow it to return to reproduce its futurity without encountering this pedagogical obstacle. We were sitting together on the lawn amidst the aforementioned sculptures. Sculpture is, as Hegel complained, a physical form. Sculpture pours into material existence the appearance of spirit as a human being. This is its ecstatic appearance. The sculpture's visage introduces a displacement into the horizon. Here, *Mother and Child* (2006) and *Hanya ada satu kata: LAWAN!* (2003) stood less than 2 meters away beside us.

Our ethnography began by being confronted with the question of how one could present a theoretical exhibition of the meaning of the orientation of this city of Jakarta, which appeared, at the intersection of *PGC* (*Pusat Grocir Cililitan,* Grocery Center of Cililitan), as intersected by such an immense multiplicity and multipolarity of forms so as to resist formalization absolutely. We conclude by presenting a temporary emendation to this impossibility.

I left Garuda to go home almost always in the hours from 2 a.m. – 4 a.m. The path of the motorcycle was through *Kramat Jati* (literally: sacred teak) on *Jalan Raya Bogor*, one of the oldest modern pathways on the island of Java, dating from the 19th century. This path passed the market of *Kramat Jati,* where sellers sold and buyers bought perishables. The coolness of these late-night hours is a daily rarity and conducive for this buying and selling of perishable goods. The sides of the street are lined with tables, rearguarded by sellers and bearing sensuous commodities, including fruits, vegetables, meats, and fishes. In these late-night hours, lights hang over these tables to illuminate that which is being sold. 3 a.m. – 6 a.m. are the busiest hours of the market. It is filled with people employed in multitudes of discrete capacities of labour.

If the initial ethnographic questioning drew out the problem of exhibiting a schematic formalization of an immense and heterogenous city, our ethnographic research results in the following finding. Indeed, a *spatial* schematization cannot adequately provide a figure for the orientation of life and labour in the city. The concept of space itself lacks a concept of what Kant perhaps awkwardly calls absolute position and that Heidegger called being.[1440] In lieu of a spatial schematization, we can say instead that there is an existence in the conjuncture that is lit up and suspended over a table in the market in the general conditions of capitalist production that Marx

[1440] See Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 316 ff.

calls as without further recourse systematic colonization. The critique of political economy both points out that which exists and inexists in that illuminated conjuncture. Interpellating interventions seek to bring about a rearrangement of the forces that constitute this conjuncture of the speaking and political human being.

Closing

This dissertation aimed to reraise the question of an ontological turn in Anthropology, such as it can be identified in the publications of *Beyond Nature and Culture* (2005) and *Comparative Metaphysics: Ontology After Anthropology* (2017). These publications mark, we suggest, a belief that the old notions of professional Anthropology ought to be surpassed. Indeed, human beings now know their second nature as the burning combustion of fossil fuels and the absolute contraction of the absolute futurity of the anthropos itself.

The dissertation has aimed to articulate how this ontological anthropology necessitates an elucidation of an action not between but *within* concepts and categories. In our exposition of the concepts of inversion and interpellation, we have sought to identify an action whereby human beings not only create and inhabit but also change (*wechseln*) their ideological and material conditions. This activity demonstrates how human beings live according to modes and practices that are not adequate to the conditions or concepts that physical scientists observe and use in their experiments.

Beyond Nature and Culture means what it says. There is a realm of human existence which is not tethered to the physical categories. Many followers of Aristotle have called this metaphysics. Inversion and interpellation in particular name forms of actions within this realm whereby human beings aim to overturn a prevailing oblivion. The dissertation has argued that this event emerges as an interruption into and of the conditions that Karl Marx called modern and systematic colonization.

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