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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
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An Introduction to Party Brand: Lessons from Business-Marketing as Applied to the
United States' Major Political Parties, 1976-2012

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Justine Gail Margarethe Ross

December 2018

Dissertation Committee

Dr. John Cioffi, Co-Chairperson

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2018

The Dissertation of Justine Gail Margarethe Ross is approved:

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Committee Co-Chairperson

University of California, Riverside

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WKH ODWWHU RI ZKRP WDXJKW μFDQ¶W QHYHU GLG QF
KDYH VXUHO\ μGRQH QRWKLQJ¶ ZLWKRXW

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My path to graduate school began when a particularly opinionated undergraduate SURIHVVRU YHU\ LQ success and happiness, challenged me to explore a career outside of law. Work for an elected official, volunteer for an advocacy campaign, intern with a think tank, KH GLGQ¶W FDUH SURYLGHG , FRQVLGHU school. Within one month, I was on a political campaign. Within six months I was completely besot with voter targeting, mobilization, and elite messaging and decided forgo my decadepluslong interest in law for political science.

So, thank you to Mark Petracca for encouraging me to expand my horizons and planting the seed for my graduate career.

Thank you to my dissertation committee John Cioffi, Kevin Esterling, Karthick Ramakrishnan, whose combined expertise provided me diverse feedback for which my project is all the better.

Thank you to my parents Christopher and Carrie and to my sister, Olivia, who were very supportive throughout this process, patiently read drafts of conference papers and chapters, and who are nearly as happy as I am submitthis dissertation.

Finally, this is a project on the power of branding, written in Corporate America, on a campus surrounded by historic orange groves, would be remiss if I did not thank Sunkist Growers, Inc. whose diet orange soda (unknowingly) fueled this dissertation. The late nights, coding marathons, and frustrating rewrites would have been possible without the caffeine provided by (literally) thousands of cans of Diet Sunkist. On a slightly

more serious note, Sunkist Growers, Inc. included as an illustration of a concept central to this project on page 47.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

An Introduction to Party Brand: Lessons from Business Marketing as Applied to the

8 Q L W H G 6 W D W H V ¶ 0 D M F 2 0 1 2 3 R O L W L F D O 3 D U W L

by

Justine Gail Margarethe Ross

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science

University of California, Riverside December 2018

Dr. John Cioffi, Co-Chairperson

Dr. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Co-Chairperson

3 R O L W L F D O V F L H Q W L V W V I U H T X a s C h a i r p e r s o n t o L Q Y R N H W K H

partisanship, party breakdown and heuristic voting, but scant attention is dedicated

brand as a meaningful construct in and of itself. Of the more recent studies that do

expressly incorporate party brand, most treat the concept as manifestly inherent or

employ it as a means to an end.

This project joins business marketing with the extant body of research on political

parties and conceptualizes party brand as a standard line of inquiry that provides novel

insight into long and short-term processes behind strategic party decisions, while still

allowing for analysis of the ultimate action. Party brand is a powerful explanatory

concept, which links elite and mass stories and begets theoretical insight as to how and

Z K \ S D U W L H V G H Y H O R S R Y H U W L P H D Q G Z K L A S K D F W R U V

well, party brand complements existing narratives by systematically joining the study of

parties as organizations, parties in government and parties in electorate.

Chapter 2 reviews relevant business marketing literature before introducing the party brand framework. It is argued each party subgroup actor contributes to the means and to various effects. Specifically, the national party committee operates as the central governing body and while the state party committees elaborate the framework with an emphasis on the relationship between the national committee, its elected officials, and the voting age population.

Chapters 3 and 4 use machine learning to analyze party texts for the period of 1976-2012. Using various methods of computational text analysis a descriptive picture of identities across time and between actors are traced, and patterns emerge as to which actors are most influential. Chapter 5 elaborates on the findings.

Chapter 5 adds a layer of description through elite interviews, which allows for further analysis of the role of party leadership as the driver of brand identity with respect to its franchise extensions (members) in Congress.

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CHAPTER 1 Getting to Party Brand

1.1 The Rise & Fall of a Party Brand

With the nation still mourning the loss of their young, charismatic leader and

Johnson was elected president in an office he had already held for a year. The election of 1964 was an opportunity for personal atonement and public legitimization no longer was /% - WKH 3 DFFLGHQW DGL \$ PHULFDQ SXEOLF 3 RQH R B BXU Q 3 RQH H states carried by the Democratic incumbent at the White House was decidedly President - RKQVRQ 1 V

7KH HOHFWLRQ ZDV WR EH SXEOLFDOO\ UHPHPEHUH presidency and policies prior FDVW DV WKH PDUW\UHG DEWDOLJDWL as one of the greatest political landslides in United States history. Just as it was alleged /% - FRPPDQG HG D SROLWLFDO PDQGDWH 5HSXEOLF DQ at the ballot box suggested WKH \$ PHULFDQ SXEOLF 1 V RXWU LJKW UHM conservatism in favor, minimally, of moderation, if not progressivism. As time would UHYHDO ± SYRUWHLLFX 1 D UO\ 5HSXEOLF DQ YDWRUWHV 1 V extremism on November 3 ZDV VKRUW OLYHG /% - QWU W ULXPSK PD\ KDYH EHHQ WKH VWRU\ RI WKH GD\ EXW WKH 5HSX EHJLQQLQJ ZLWK * RQ 3 DWHUWHV 1 V RQ 3 DWHUWHV 1 V of politics.

7KRXXJK HOHFWRU DOO\ DQWLFOLP DWHUWH 1 V DUU\ * RQ EHJLQQLQJ RI WKH 5HSXEOLF DQ 3DUW\ 1 V SXUSR VHIXOO motivated, fervently ideological, white conservative (Asstrup 2015; Miller and Schofield

2003; Schreiber 1971, etc.) Arguably, Goldwater could not predict the enduring effects of the Grand Old Party; however, he, the Draft Goldwater Committee, and the Republican National Committee chaired by William Miller who, were codifiers of the non-integrationist agenda and without sufficient temporal memory of the Civil War to steadfastly reject the Republican Party as the Party of Lincoln (Black and Black 2002; Schreiber 1971; Wildavsky 1965)

What began under Goldwater as a coalition of southern whites, united by thinly veiled laissez-faire stance across economic and racial issues during the tenure of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and fiscal conservatives and racially motivated voters joined, President Reagan expanded on this agenda with the Reagan Revolution. By the mid-1980s, Southerners self-identified as Republicans than Democrats, reversing nearly one hundred years of Democratic dominance (Miller 1991). In the twenty years after Reagan left

office, two Republican presidents and one candidate relied on support of this new, socially conservative coalition united by federal deference to the states and minimal government involvement in the economy and society.

The Southern Strategy is a powerful example of the process of branding. A brand is the collection of tangible assets (here, candidates and policies) and intangible mystique (here, symbols, affect, emotion, etc.) cultivated by an organization as a method of connecting with key constituencies. Markets have latent demands (here, Southern whites' desire to have racial hostilities reflected in national office and policy) and corporations (K H U H W K H * 2 3 D Q G * R) create and seize opportunities to identify and deliver on these demands through rebranding. To this end party (re)branding as demonstrated by the Southern Strategy is a top-down exercise to modify W K H S D U W \ ¶ V brand E D V H G R Q W K H 3 D U W \ ¶ V X Q G H U V W D Q G L Q J R I W K H Q potential constituents. The Republican Party capitalized on preexisting racial cleavages during the 1964 presidential contest, which opened the door for the organization to strategically rebrand and reorient its position on the electoral market. In turn, the GOP was able to appeal to new constituencies, on new issues over the course of the next three decades.

The Southern Strategy also demonstrates I O D Q N L Q J ' 0 L O O H U D Q G 6 F K D Q G W K H F U H D W L R Q R I 3 I O D Q N H U E U D Q G V ' % D H N H W D (2020). Political scientists Miller and Schofield (2003) use the term flanking to describe a S D U W \ R U F D Q G L G D W H ¶ V D S S H D O W R G L V D I I H F W H G Y R W without the cost of enthusiasm from traditional, core supporters. This approach is well

documented over the course of the Southern Strategy and similarly employed by corporations wishing to expand their market reach while insulating their core brand identity from attack.

\$ V G L V F X V V H G L Q & K D S W H U 3 I O D Q N H U E U D Q G V ' D
consumers without jeopardizing their core identity to the same extent they would if the central brand adopted new characteristics or brought different products to market. Flanking and flanker brands are typically employed when it is perceived the new appeal (to voters or consumers) might isolate existing supporters. Applied here, the Southern
6 W U D W H J \ I R V W H U H G L Q F U H P H Q W D O F K D Q J H D Q G D O O R
W K H Z D W H U V ' E \ S X U V X L Q J G L V D I I H F W H G Y R W H U V Z L W
Republican Party would have been able to add failed components of the Southern Strategy without irreparably damaging its core brand and isolating its traditional base prior to the strategy being fully realized.

With the Southern Strategy realized by the mid 1970s the Republican Party relied on the support of their base with minimal maintenance for the next decade (Aistrup 2015) 3 & R X Q W U \ & O X E ' 5 H S X E O L F D Q V W \ S L F D O O \ U H V L G L
pro-business platform was most important, and hence social conservatives, more often than not in the South, were able to live in relative harmony as politics and campaign became increasingly nationalized. Once every four years each wing of the Republican
3 D U W \ F R D O H V F H G W R I R U P S a k e H o r n i s o f U s a g e D e m e n t s R Q V W L W X
like when the presidential candidate Bob Dole resisted a strongly worded letter of
W K H S D U W \ S O D W I R U P E X W W K H 3 D U W \ F R J Q L J D Q W R I

the Republican Party faced little internal strife during this period and enjoyed great electoral success on the back of its base.

However, this period of relative harmony was short lived as the 2008 Presidential Election exposed a deep cleavage within the Republican Party. The Tea Party emerged in 2008 as an anti-government, anti-Obama, well-organized and well-funded wing of the GOP, catalyzed by the election of the first African American president (Parker and Barreto 2014; Williamson et al. 2011, et al.). Two years later, Tea Party candidates helped Republicans achieve success in Congress. The Tea Party seemed to last until the 2016 presidential contest where grassroots organizations mobilized to support their candidate Donald Trump (Skocpol and Williamson 2016). At the time of publication, mainstream Republicans and Tea Party members remain in the uncomfortable position of disagreeing on fundamental issues, like trade, but having to work together as wings of the governing party. As discussed in Chapter 2, this sort of in-party disagreement has disastrous effects on party brand and, as is supported based on brand theory, is likely a driver of the

1.2 Why Brand?

The study of party brand holds great promise and is particularly timely for three primary reasons: 1) historically high levels of party favorability (the measure of party support), 2) historically low levels of party favorability (the measure of party support), and 3) the incorporation and application of marketing principles.

First, brand, both as a concept and theory, holds great explanatory power in a manner that complements existing literatures while pushing toward a more rounded understanding of parties and the interplay between various elite actor groups and voters. Traditionally, party scholars either study a segment of the party apparatus (e.g. the national committee, congressional leadership, state parties, etc.) or study particular electorates. While these studies hold value, they have limited ability to explain parties as dynamic institutions with the capacity to actively shape and respond to national political discourse, issue saliency, and policy preferences.

Second, the current political climate (e.g. Growth and Opportunity Project 2012, etc.) and its extensive intraparty disagreements provides a compelling backdrop for the study of political parties as branded organizations and the relationship between party and voters. Favorability is the most generally employed measure of the strength of a brand. In a 2012 survey, 51% of consumers (voters) favorably perceive the brand the company (party) is currently proffering? Independents, moderate Republicans, and strong Republicans all view the Party less favorably today than at any other time the last seventeen years (SSRS 2017; Gallup 2017). The Democratic Party is also struggling in the eyes of the electorate, with favorability lower than the historical average (Gallup 2017).

Figure 1.1 plots the average difference between favorable and unfavorable evaluations of both parties for each of forty PEW public opinion polls administered between 1992 and 2012. The mass public is a volatile perception of both parties and

favorability has generally decreased during the twenty year span, highlighting the increasingly negative brand image of both parties.




Figure 1.1 Democratic and Republican Party Favorability Less Favorability, 1992-2012

Both parties are currently failing to positively connect with their likely voters, UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH VWUHQJWK RI WKH YRWHUUV SDUW are in crisis. The need to immediately address concerns as to Democratic and Republican party brand equity, integrity, and image promises a wealth of discussion and opportunities for research in the coming years.

Third, party leaders on both sides of the aisle and outside of the United States often discuss the primacy of developing and maintain a strong brand and positively held brand image. After an upsetting electoral performance, the Republican Party conducted DQ LQWHUQDO DXGLW ZKLFK DWWHPSWHG WR XQSDFN presidential election. The report, entitled The Growth and Opportunity Project developed a common refrain LQVWHDG RI GULYLQJ DURXQG LQ FLU de-sac, we need a Party whose brand of conservatism invites and inspires new people

YLVLW XV ´ * URZWK DQG 2SS\$RHUJXSLUWRUURRIBWVLGHG
election, the Democratic Leadership Council voiced similar concerns regarding their need
to revitalize their image ±³\$PHULFD GRHVQ¶W QHHG «WZR HVWDEOLY
SDUWLHV IURP :DVZKLLQ\$DHAHQFVSto discard the orthodoxies of
WKH SDVW ´ &OHYHODQG 3URFODPDWLRQ)L[DWLR
extends past domestic borders, with party leaders in other democratic systems
voicing similar concerns as to the value and image their brand identity conveys.

Former Opposition Leader, Edward Milliband reflected on the impact of former Prime
OLQLVWHU 7RQ\ %ODLU¶V WHQXUHbrand WLQJ ³KH WUDVK

There is intrinsic value to studying a unit of inquiry on its own terms. The party
UHIRUPV RI DVGH , rise¶W candidate centered campaigns, and proliferation
of mass media democratized American politics in that the party relationship
became more reflexive and the parties competed more intensely for votes. In this new
space, parties adopted many of the strategies used to promote businesses so far as
to hire the same consulting firms large corporations used to expand their consumer base
and revamp their image. Today, political parties rely heavily on the same tactics and
strategies employed by businesses to compete with one another and to curry favor with
WKHLU WDUJHW ³FRQVXPHU´ PD(e.g. Neuhart 2016; SRWLQJ DJH
DQG)UHQFK 2¶&DV The Process of Creating a strong,
recognizable brand that inspires relevant associations and favorable views in the eye of
the beholder is of critical importance in cultivating a successful business and, as relevant
to this project, a winning party (French and Smith 2010)

This dissertation leverages conceptual and theoretical insights from business
P D U N H W L Q J D J D L Q V W W K H G L V F L S O L Q H ¶ V X Q G H U V W D Q C
parties as brand manufacturers, which allows for the interpretation of multiple actor
groups to be studied with consideration of institutional constraints intrinsic to the
organization. As the first study to develop a comprehensive theoretical model of the party
brand relationship, three questions centrally motivate the project;

- 1) What is a party brand? (i.e. What does a party brand look like, both substantively and affectively?)
- 2) How is a party brand created/ and maintained?
- 3) : K L F K D F W R U V D F W R U J U R X S V L Q L W L D W H F K D Q J H

The remaining portion of this chapter introduces foundationally relevant party
politics literature, building to the minimal research that has been conducted on party
brand image to date, while subsequent chapters address the questions outlined above and
introduce and test a theory of party brand.

1.3.1 Getting to Brand: A Review of the Extant Literature

American parties are by no means an understudied unit of inquiry; however, party
politics is frequently analyzed in a truncated fashion (e.g. if studying the party office,
the organization and voters are often neglected, if considered as relevant) and
G L V F L S O L Q H ¶ V X Q G H U V W D Q C
behavioral divide has expanded the scholastic divide. In working
toward a theory of brand, this dissertation builds upon a broad swath of the extant
literature and, wherever possible, strives to find commonality to unify prior studies with
the current project. Each of the subsections below serve to join prior works and establish
key assumptions, supported by research, which underpin the theory of party brand
to be explained in the next chapter.

1.3.2 Getting to Brand: Party Motivations

The discipline widely accepts parties are electorally motivated either as a mean of policy-making (e.g. Sundquist 1988), power-grabbing (Budge and Lauer 1986), or as an end in-and-of-itself (e.g. Downs 1957). While this project is compatible with this premise, it is argued parties are ultimately concerned with self-perpetuation, which largely comes through the winning of office.

If it is supposed political parties are motivated by self-perpetuation via electoral gain (Olson 1986), logically it should evolve with the population whose support they require. Parties are cognizant their reputation and identity matter with respect to their electoral prospects and voting (e.g. Schaffner and Streb 2002; Green et al. 2004). Parties rely on their brand name and brand extensions to link party and individual in a way that allows new coalitions to be built and existing connections to be strengthened. Analysis of the American party system provides support for this claim (e.g. Sunstein, 1983; Aldrich, 1995; Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998; etc.); however, the extant literature leaves party branding exercises and the effect of an evolving brand on individual perception of party (i.e. the brand image) unexplored.

1.3.3 Getting to Brand: Parties as Organizations

There is no clear means, objectives, or

and actors, is sufficiently broad to adapt to the changing role of parties across time, and is largely uncontested by scholars of party politics.

Moreover, political parties are organizations that represent coalitions of interests (Cyert and March 1963; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and are comprised of actors with the shared motivation of gaining power through the winning of elections, voluntarily unite to overcome issues of collective action and achieve goals including; fielding competitive candidates, electing candidates, shaping governmental S R O L F \ D Q G V X V W D L Q L Q J W K H R U J D Q L J D W L R Q / D Z V R Q F R D O L W L R Q L V P R W L Y D W H G E \ H D F K D F W R V E (e.g. an Q W H U H V ideological challenge to existing parties, etc.), but as the party is institutionalized and the primary objective becomes self H U S H W X D W L R Q W K U R X J K W K H Z L Q Q L individual aims diversify at times to incompatible ends (e.g. the 2018 Republican Party is attempting to self-perpetuate by mediating the competing individual interests of its actors, some of whom are pursuing populist, Triump objectives while others are pursuing traditionally establishment aims).

Ultimately, the individuals who comprise this national level organization are decisionmakers; however, their actions are conditioned on institutional norms (e.g. Berman 2001), the incentive structure (e.g. Weingast 2002; Shepsle 1989), constrained by the decisions of those actors who came before them (e.g. Hay and Wincott 1998; Skocpol 1992; King 1995) and those who are currently acting within the same space. In W K L V Y H L Q S R O L W L F D O S D U W L H V U H I O H F W 3 O R R V H F R attenuated links and discontinuity (March and Olsen 1976) individual decision making

does not become formulaic, devoid of any behavioral stamp as individuals could make conflicting decisions even if at the same position within the organization; however, it does emphasize political parties, as organizations, have tremendous influence over the opportunities afforded to the actors which they contain and thus reflexively shape the trajectory of the organization as a brand conduit.

Complicating this decisionmaking structure, intra-party power is not hierarchical. The leader is identifiable, their decisions and actions are so constrained and contingent on negotiation it is difficult to determine their pure intent. Relying on new institutionalism does not answer this question directly, it does provide a framework that allows for an understanding beyond individual level, elite behavior and subsequent analyses in Chapter

While political parties are taken to subsume party officials, public officeholders, supporters in the electorate (Sorau and Beck 1988), and have been identified by some scholars as having no fewer than twenty sets of actors (Lawson 1994), the actor and actor groups of primary interest to this project are the national committees, congressional leadership, presidents and presidential candidates, and the voting age population.

¹ 7KH VHOHFWLRQ RI WKHVH ILYH EURDG VHWV RI DFWRUV LV MXVW of political parties. Having identified twenty three distinct groups of party actors, Schwartz isolated cohesion and reciprocal relations between different party components and identified the five actors above as comprising the central, national organization.

specializations and core competencies of each of these groups, as materially relevant to the theory of party brand, is explained in detail in Chapter 2.

1.3.4 Getting to Brand: The Party Systems Literature

As has been reiterated, the driving assumption underlying this project is that the bulk of party politics literature is that political parties are electorally concerned. Debate abounds as to whether political parties are vote-seeking, office-seeking, or policy-seeking; however, each of these theories is unified by a common denominator: elections are the mean through which parties accomplish their objective (Schattschneider 1942, 1960; Key 1966; Strom 1990). Ultimately, the distinction between various theories of party motivation is not of crucial importance to this project. However, understanding the party-individual link and the ability of parties to develop a brand to their electoral benefit, is inextricably linked with much of the party politics literature that is divided into the study of various party systems.

Political parties in the United States have long been recognized as fragmented entities; a supposedly loose alliance between three groups of parties as organization (PO), party-electorate (PIE), and party-government (PIG) (Key 1964). This conceptualization provides for the tidy analysis of American party politics within different spheres of activity; however, scant research explores the relationship between these spheres. Specifically, this project examines the relationship between party organization, party-government, and party-electorate as distinct actors with overlapping objectives. Given the trajectory of American politics and the (relatively) recent transition to the era of candidate-centered campaigns, it is crucial to understand

W K L V L Q W H U S O D \ D V P D Q \ R I W K H G L V F L S O L Q H \ V S U H Y

party organization in relation to elections are minimally, incomplete if not incorrect.

Historically, POs at the national, state, and local levels cooperated during elections out of strategic necessity (Ostrogorski 1964; Schattschneider 1942). Ballot structures linked parties at each tier of government and electing partisans at each level allowed parties to maximize patronage and preferments. Additionally, the national organization controlled the necessary resources (i.e. financial and administrative) to coordinate an effective nationwide campaign (Bruce 1927; Kent 1923), while local parties delivered locals to the polls through grassroots, marketing (Sorauf 1990; Merriam 1923). The national party provided benefits through economies of scale, but could not serve as an instrument at the citizen level (Arterton 1982). During this period POs wielded tremendous authority as they served as the definitive link between government and citizens.

In the mid 19th century, the emergence of the direct primary, civil service regulation (Key 1958; Roseboom 1970), the shift in demographic characteristics (e.g. increased social mobility, declining immigration, etc.) and birth of a national identity redirected

S R Z H U D Z D \ I U R P ^ S D U W \ E R V V H V ^ D Q G X Q G H U P L Q H G W

(Raney 1975; Kayden and Mahe 1985; McWilliams 1981). Furthermore, the advent of modern mass communication allowed the national party apparatus and their candidates to communicate directly with citizens, removing the reliance on local party infrastructure (Agranoff 1972; Sabato 1981). Cumulatively, these factors are (partially)

responsible for W K H G H F U H D V H L Q S D U W \ L G H Q W L I L F D W L R Q V L

Renten, and Stimson 1984; Beck 1984), a decrease in reliance on partisan referents and decisionmaking cues by citizens (Burnham 1970; Lad and Hadley 1975; Nieba, and Petrocik 1979; Wattenberg 1984), and a decrease in party unity among elected officials (Deckard 1976; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980).

While the process by which POs reorganized in the wake of their shifting relationship to voters certainly related to brand construction, this project is more concerned with how parties have overcome these changes to the party system and developed new methods of communicating directly with citizens through national campaigns. The erosion in the local party-individual link made it ever more important for both parties to develop strong core identities as their brands became the primary method of communicating with the mass public on a national scale, while balancing various constituencies that had previously coexisted with minimal awareness of the other.

: L W K W K L V L Q P L Q G W K L V G L V V H U W D W L R Q U H V W V
politics literature (including Schattschneider and Key) in providing a baseline explanation of the link between POs and PIE. At its core, a political party is differentiated from alternative pressure groups by their desire to make a bid for power which requires majority popular support, not just policy. During this initial bid and in attempting to maintain power;

³ 7 K H S D U n e r f o r K o W
The reference to business with a great variety of people. The consistency and symmetry of programs must be bent, amended, and amputated to fit the cruel necessities of compromise on a multitude of fronts. To refuse to make concessions and to refuse to develop
V L G H G S U R J U D P L V V L P S O \ W R U H I X V H W R P D N H D E
(Schattschneider 1942, 62).

To this end, political parties are an intrinsically democratic exercise (Epstein 1983) and
SDUW\ R U J D Q L J D W L R Q V O L Q N ³ L J Q R e l d e O 9 6 0, 6 3 7 1 R S O H D Q G
W R G D \ ¶ V P D e s s p e r s o n a l z i d W e t o p p o r t u n i t i e s j o i n p a r t y a n d i n d i v i d u a l, t h e
central contribution of POs to democracy is their simplification of alternatives in
coordinated attempts to win elections (Key 1950, 1964, Sartorius 1942; 1960).

New theories of the party system (e.g. party broker (Herrson 1986), party
campaign (Frantzich 1986), party PAC (Arterton 1982)) critique traditional party
theory by emphasizing the growing divide between elite and mass parties, but do little
to explore this connection. Admittedly, PO and PIE are not joined in the way they were
previously; whereas parties were once the lone connection between government and
citizen there are now a multitude of linkages. However, analyzing parties—and more
specifically, their brand—as a conduit between elite and mass levels comports with
the general themes of traditional party theory, while providing an update as to the
modern-day mechanism.

1.3.5 Getting to Brand: Analyzing Party Across Time

Additionally, this dissertation builds upon the broad body of party realignment,
dealignment, and decomposition literature. At the most general level of abstraction, party
image is studied by analyzing trends in individual favorability toward the major parties
and attempting to isolate what prompts shifts and deviations. While this dissertation is not
primarily concerned with refining the definition of party realignment, the correlation
between shifting brand, brand image and individual party identification are of material
relevance to the introduced motivating questions.

Party realignment has been studied at length, but similarly to party image, is plagued by conceptual inconsistencies. The primary body of literature can be divided into two competing frameworks: one of which argues realignments are hallmarked by a reversal in party fortunes among the masses (e.g. Campbell, et al., 1960; Burnham 1970), the other which posits new issue cleavages redefine party systems. (e.g. Key, 1955; Schattschneider 1960; Sundquist 1983). While this distinction appears corrupt with endogeneity, one could easily assume changes along issue lines drive party fortunes and vice versa, each of the aforementioned authors have provided historical evidence for their position as independent from their causal explanations. To this end, there is evidence that evolving issue cleavages lead party success and that shifting party favorability drives issue visibility/importance (Carmines and Stimson 1989).

1.3.6 Getting to Brand: Parties in an Era of Dealignment Partisanship

A rational calculus of party affiliation and vote choice highlights the judicious individual should recognize the futility of participating in the political process (Downs 1957); given the near importance, the overall focus among political scientists has shifted from explaining why people do not participate to why people do.

Historically, there was tremendous incentive for citizens to align themselves with a major party given the tangible benefits these organizations offered (DiGaetano 1988;

² In addition to this conceptual divide there is also a series of literature, which draws more nuanced distinctions in describing realignments (Sundquist 1983), sub-alignments, adjustments (Burnham 1970), critical elections (1959) and shifts. While some of these concepts are presented as at odds with one another in the literature, (e.g.

³ FULWLFDO HOHFWLRQV´ VXJJHVV UDSLG FKDQJHG PDUNHG E\ SXQ slowly, over several elections) each serves only to clarify a different process or path that party systems take.

Campbell 2006; Sundquist 1973). At a minimum, parties proved to be the primary intermediary between citizens and their representatives, transmitting policy preferences, designating candidates, and educating voters; in major cities where deeply entrenched machines like Tammany Hall or Pendergast reigned supreme, partisan identification translated to employment, rent covered, medical bills paid, extralegal services provided, and a political advocate in government. Prior to the candidate-centered era, parties as organizations provided a set of tangible services unique to the party, which could not be procured through another outlet and embodied certain attributes that encouraged even the most electorally rational citizens to become members.

That is not to say political parties and, more specifically, party affiliation is without utilitarian benefit today. Partisan identification remains the strongest predictor of vote choice (e.g. Campbell, et al. 1960) and helps to simplify the electoral landscape (Downs 1957; Rahn 1993; Popkin 1994). Subsequently party leadership strives to develop this signaling mechanism to the mutual benefit of citizens and elected officials (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005; Aldridge 1995; Kiewit and McCubbins 1991). In more recent years, the intangible assets of party affiliation including self-expressive value, identity, and loyalty are emphasized as explaining partisan attachment despite the decline in party centrality (Green et al. 2004, Goren, et al. 2009, Huddy 2001). It is of note that these intangible assets to partisans parallel that of the intangible assets of branded products to consumers as will be highlighted in the next chapter.

The rise of the candidate-centered era has minimized the centrality of political

SDUWLHV WR YRWHUV | FLYLF H [S r h d l i n e Q u e s t i o n V e . Q Q G D G Y R F

Wattenberg 1986) argue electoral disaggregation is the result of a myriad of factors, including the rise of the parties as a primary broker between the government and the governed, fifty six percent of voting age Americans self-identify as Democratic or Republican (Gallup 2014) and partisan identification remains the single most accurate predictor of political participation and choice (Bartels 2000; Miller 1991).

Contrary to much of the dealignment and candidate-centered literatures, this project argues that record rates of independents and loose partisanship should encourage the study of parties. Despite the attenuation of partisanship for many Americans, parties persist and remain central to the American political experience. In reassessing the role of parties, this project argues that parties are sufficiently flexible to allow for changes in party across time without diminishing our ability to explain intraorganizational, electoral-party, and party-citizen dynamics.

1.3.7 Getting to Brand Party Brand To-Date

Party brand is frequently used synonymously with the term party label to designate the partisanship of a candidate or the legislative positioning of an elected official. To this end, theories of party brand as a simplifying mechanism (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Snyder and Ting 2002) refute early political theory, which maintained voters with imperfect information were not capable of maintaining a strong electoral connection (e.g. Miller and Stokes (1962)).

Political parties are the producers of their own brand names and these labels provide the voter with information shortcuts or signals, which allow them to estimate the

policy positions of candidates and their representatives without being provided any

L Q I R U P D W L R Q R Q W K H S R O L W L F L D Q ¶ V D F W X D O S R O L F \

Sniderman 1985; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In the most general sense, party brands are developed as a signaling mechanism to bridge the gap between party and

Y R W H U : K L O H Y R W H U V V E D Y O Q U L W H I Y L R P H W K S L O V G U L R F V K W

parties have a strong incentive to develop recognizable, trustable brands their candidates can use to their electoral advantage (Cox and McCubbins, 2005: 11). Despite the relative agreement that brands act as simplifying labels, there has been little systematic investigation as to how brands are constructed, what information they convey, and how they are manipulated.

One of the few attempts to formalize labels and brand names was undertaken by Snyder and Ting (2001) who developed a game theoretic model of party behavior and signaling in an attempt to formalize party labels and brand names. At the heart of their argument, Snyder and Ting maintain that party labels convey meaning because the party restricts their membership to candidates who fit their ideology and constrains the behavior of their elected members. It is the party that defines the candidate, the reverse, as parties are long-lived organizations, primarily concerned with assisting short lived politicians implement party-menable policies (Alesina and Spear, 1988; Harrington 1992). The strength of party brand over candidate label/brand is demonstrated through the analysis of ANES data, which highlights voters can distinguish a political party and their representative as conservative or liberal, but are not able to distinguish the

position of politicians within a single party. This variation in perception and identification are driven by interparty differences (Snyder and Ting 2001).

Under this idea framework, parties manage their brand as it relates to members and making current policy positions salient and distinct from previous platforms (Snyder and Ting 2002). In this vein, brands can be a successful conduit between parties and citizens when; (1) individual beliefs about parties are sensitive to party unity levels (i.e. citizens can determine whether the party has the ability to regulate member behavior) and (2) when individuals are able to take party behavior into account to assess the credibility of commitments to current policy positions and platforms. Without meeting these requisite factors, party brand becomes an ineffective signal to voters.

Snyder and Ting provide a compelling intellectual exercise and theoretically appealing model; however, given the understanding of the American voter it is unreasonable to assume the average citizen possesses the cognitive recall, much less an understanding of party unity, as is allegedly necessary to discern the trustworthiness of a respective brand.

Additionally, one of the few studies that tackles the origins of party brands is by Woon and Pope (2008), who argue party leaders in Congress are pivotal to the development of a strong and recognizable party brand, and thus have an incentive to shape their brand through congressional activity. Playing into the stereotype,

WKH\ IXUWKHU ³SDUW\ EUDQGV DUH QRW LPPXWDEOH V
RULJLQV ´ :RRQ DQG 3RSH 7KLV PRGHO LV RYI

recognize the significance of parties and party behavior in other facets of politics and similarly to Snyder and Tingit assumes individuals operate at a higher level of political understanding than research indicates. For an individual to recognize a party brand that has purely congressional origins, it would follow the individual also have knowledge of recent legislative activity and how each party voted, which seems highly unlikely given many Americans cannot correctly answer basic political knowledge questions (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1993).

Using these studies as a theoretical baseline, this dissertation pushes party brand from an underspecified and idealized concept into the real world of politics, in which parties are not homogenous entities and voters are not perfectly informed citizens.

1.3.8 Getting to Brand: Party Image To Date

Party image has been studied somewhat sporadically since the twentieth century. The earliest studies on party image were conducted by Richard L. Fox in 1963, Richard L. Fox and Tasha Philpot in 1967, and Tasha Philpot in 2007. Fox (1963) studied party image in the context of the 1960 U.S. presidential election, while Fox and Philpot (1967) and Philpot (2007) studied party image in the context of the 1996 U.S. presidential election.

Although each scholar acknowledges the work of their forbearers, the extant literature is not unified in definition, theory, or explanation as to the significance of party image.

Until recently party image has not been studied as a meaningful concept in and of itself, which may explain the disjointed explanations presented in the extant literature.

When party image was incorporated, it was generally to aid in the explanation of another political phenomenon. For example, Fox (1963) studied party image as an extension of party identification and a component of vote choice

& DPSEHOO HW DO 6 HOOHUV ¶ V TKUHQG KR XW W

indicating a decrease in the perception of party image were used to support the broader argument of partisan realignment and decomposition (Burnham, 1970; Trilling, 1975;

perceptions isolates party image as a standing concept, which stands alone.

Despite a lack of unified academic study, a common understanding motivates each account of party image and how it is altered is unclear. At the most general level, party image is said to be a collection of symbols an individual identifies with a political party (Philpot 2007; Rahn 1993). The symbols developed or acquired vary and range from socialization (Rahn 1993) to environmental factors (Fiske and Taylor 1984).

Organizes prior information and experience around a central value or idea, and guides the interpretation of new information and expectations (Kramer, 1985; Duckitt and Wagner, 2002). To this end, party image allows us to respond to party-related stimuli and efficiently interpret new material within our expectations (Philpot 2007; Fiske and Taylor 1984; Rahn 1993). If party image stereotypes are simplifying mechanisms that allow boundedly rational individuals to navigate the complex political terrain (i.e. party image schema as similar to a satisficing strategy (Koeble, 1995; Krosnick, 1991), it follows that party image that is nuanced or specific is

RIWHQ³ RYHUULGGHQ' WR QHDWO\ ILW ZLWKLQ WKH JHC
framework³ (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). That is, when an image is incongruous with an
LQGLYLGXDQV H[LVWLQJ³ Pte of W D C S L F W X J U C h a n g e W L V R
the party or is made salient through messaging efforts (Philpot, 2007).

This project challenges this subsection of the literature, which maintains party
image is merely a simplifying schematic mechanism. While party image certainly guides
the use of party labels in elections (e.g. a voter with a negative image of the Republican
Party will likely have a negative perception of a Republican candidate when no further
information is available), it is overly reductive to argue party image serves only a
heuristic function.

Although current party images constitute the baseline from which future
evaluations are formed (Rapoport 1997), an individual is more likely to accept
confirming information and disregard partisan stimuli which challenges their existing

VFKHPD /RGJH DQG +DPLOO 7DEHU DQG /RGJH
DQFKRULQJ HIIHFW' 3KLOS R W R Q KRZ LQGLYLGXD
IROORZV WKDW WKRVH Z are more susceptible to changes in party P DJH

³ Within psychology individual tendency to disregard or discount competing information that challenges
pre-H[LVWLQJ H[SHFWDQFLHV LV UHMHUULG' W\$RODSRLHQFLQJ BRIWREUD
1985; Weber and Crocker, 1983). The motivation behind this behavior is twofold; (1) because stereotypes
justify social orders, provide a sense of self, and often justify individual behavior, individuals are reluctant
to reform a cognitive framework, which could have far-reaching implications and (2) atypical group
members are less likely to trigger the stereotype for the group they are associated with. Without recalling
the stereotype it is unlikely the individual will amend their belief system (Kunda and Olson, 1995; 1997).

⁴ Just as there are strong and weak
LPDJH :KLOH VRFLDOLJDWLRQ DFFRXQWV IRU D VXEVWDQWLDO SR
individuals with less information or who have made party image assessments under less salient
information are more susceptible to changes in party brand.

brand. In many ways, party image operates similarly to party identification in that while it
LV SRVVLEOH IRU DQ LQGLYLGXDO WR ³XSGDWH´ WKHLU
political factors, their perceptions are EWWDQWLDOO\ LQIOXHQFHG E\ \HV
platforms, messaging, and visibility (Fiorina, 1981).

One of the few studies, which attempts to analyze if, how, and when an individual
will modify their partisan stereotypes, evaluates whether experimental participants
incorporate the policy stance of a candidate into their electoral consideration if the
UHVSHFWLYH SRVLWLRQ LV LQFRQJUXRXV ZLWK WKDW P
findings support the large cognitive dissonance body of research, which maintains
LQGLYLGXDOV DUH UHODWLYHO\ IL[HG LQ WKHLU SDUW
information in reaching evaluation; they use the label rather than policy attributes in
reaching evaluation; and they are perceptually less responsive consistent
LQIRUPDWLRQ´ 5DKQ

Similarly, voters are largely resistant to incorporating temporary, cosmetic
FKDQJHV H J FDPSDLJQ PHVVDJLQJ ³FRPSDVVLRQDWH
SHUFHSWLRQ RI D SDUW\ TV Edges as a response to party
³UHSDFNDJLQJ´ DQ\ HIIHFW WHQGV WR EH UHODWLYHO\
WR EUDQG PD\ LQIOXHQFH SDUW\ LPDJH EXW GR QRW E
partisan schemata (Philpot, 2003; 2007).

A second common acknowledgement among authors is that party image is distinct
from party identification; however, these concepts are correlated and often discussed in
the same breath. As with early party studies, which characterize partisanship as an

individual psychological attachment (Campbell, et al., 1960), party image is an

LQGLYLGXDO¶V SV\FKRORJLFDO SHUFHSWLRQ RI D SROD
: DWWHQEHUJ ([WHQGLQJ WKLW FRPSDULVRQ

enduring and g@ HUDOO\ VWDEOH DFURVV DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V C

In their seminal study of voting and partisanship in the Civil Rights South,

Matthews and Prothro [SODLQ ³ZKLOH SDUW\ LPDJH LV QRW VR

party identification, it is likely to be less ephemeral than voter attitudes toward the issues

DQG FDQGLGDWHV RI VSHFLILF FDPSDLJQV ´ 0DWWKHZ

party image is most dramatically altered during periods of political upheaval when parties

polarize around critical issues and the electorate realigns; however, more moderate

changes can occur as the result of marginal adaptations in party platforms, the

introduction of new candidates, and through altered party messaging (Burnham, 1970;

Sellers, 1965; Trilling 1976; Wattenberg 1984; Philpot 2004; 2007). The extent to which

scholars emphasize dramatic versus incremental changes in party image is largely

contingent on whether they conceptualize party image as the result of long cognitive

processes or short term recall; another sub question that has been understudied.

The extant research indicates relative stability in party image across an

LQGLYL GineDacknowledges the difficulties parties face in influencing how

they are perceived at the micro level. To this end, there is minimal exploration as to how

political parties and external forces are successful in manipulating their image, both in

termV RI LQGLYLGXDO VXEMHFWLYH SHUFHSWLRQV DQG

VHJPHQWV' \$ FRQFHSWXDO WKHRUHWLFD O IUDPHZRUN

and individual is requisite to our understanding of this area.

1.3.9 Getting to Brand: Bridging Brand and Image, TDate

Rampant conceptual inconsistencies and uspecifications make it difficult to clearly link brand to image in the extant literature, however there have been few efforts to build a bridge between the two.

)LJXUH UHSUHVHQWV 7ULOOLQJ DQG %XUKDP

image literature. Apart from being the first two authors who attempted to systematically trace the relationship between party and individual, their model is unique in that it distinguishes between long and short term considerations of party image. In line with their respective theories, long term factors (i.e. political philosophy and economic policy) contribute to stability in perceptions while issues and candidates drive fluctuations.

\$OWKR XJK 3WLG \ LQ W-Komponents of Party Image vs. W-Kind of Party

two, easily distinguishable categories this model is problematic for two primary reasons.

First, it is assumed party image can be manipulated only at the margins and is otherwise constant, with general philosophy and economic policy being malleable only during periods of major realignment. This claim is challenged by the large number of scholars who argue on behalf of degrees of realignment, in which they can alter its position on a fundamental issue or philosophical principle without a complete overhaul of the current party system (Sundquist 1983; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, 1980; Campbell and Trilling 1980, 55).




Figure 1.2 Combined Model of Party Image, Trilling (1973) and Burnham (1970)

Second, both Trilling and Burnham study party image trends from the early

defining each party. It is plausible that, after the breakdown of the New Deal Coalition, fiscal policy proved to be less deterministic with regard to party image and that the mid-20th-century shift in party image (e.g. civil rights, etc.) resulted in making noneconomic policies salient and critical to image. Chapter 3 lends support for this argument, showing that party image, have trended toward and away from economic concerns at different points in history.

The second and most compelling model of party image to date is

model of party image in which all symbols, current and prior candidates, platforms,

DVVRFLDWHG JURXSV DQG KLVWRULFDO HYHQWV DUH P
 7KLV LPDJH LV PRGHUDWHG E\ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V SUH

image of the alternate party, and the media.




Figure 1.3 Model of Party Image, Philpot (2007)

\$OWKR XJK 3KLOS RW¶V PRGHO LV LQGLV SXWDEO\ PR

Burnham, it falls short in explaining the party-individual interaction as it inherently deprives political parties of agency as pragmatic actors. While historical events and groups associated with a political party do impact the image surrounding the party, these

DUH QRW FRPSRQH QWV SDUWLHV DFWLYHO\ ³SURMHFW´
 ³SURMHFW´ D VSHFLILF LPDJH 7KH SDUW¶ EUDQG IUDPH
 GLVHQWDQJOHV PFK RI ZKDW 3KLOS RW ODEHOV DV ³SU

EUDQG LGHQWLW\ WKH SDUW\¶V EUDQG SRVLWLRQ DQ
LPSDFW RI WKH SDUW\¶V DFWLYHO\ SUR and image EUDQG
7KHUH LV QRWKLQJ LQKHUHQW Party Image a ZLWK 3KLO
SURGXFW RI D P\ULDG RI IDFWRUV ERW to zu Mak LQ DQG

her model does not provide political scientists any additional leverage in explaining how parties influence citizen perceptions and begs refinement.

The rhetoric used to describe party image and brand are very similar and most of the authors discussed use the concepts interchangeably. However, the few authors who have disconnected the macro from the micro have laid the foundation for the exploration of another dimension of party politics. Developing the link between brand and image will allow for a greater understanding of how parties can manipulate their brand or label to influence their image, and subsequent electoral prospects, an area of both academic and applied interest.

1.4 A (re)Introduction to Party Brand

Whether because the discipline shifted toward the cognitive behavioral paradigm or because party reforms upended a WEX U\¶V ZRUWK RI LQVWLWXWLRQD transferring power toward the people and away from the parties, scholars of American Politics have neglected the continued centrality of parties to the American political experience for the last three decades. KLOH WKH YLVLELQW\ RI SDUWLHV lives has diminished, the power and role of parties behind the curtain has persisted.

Perhaps most impressive is that in the midst of their own chaos, parties are able to organize and simplify their layered complexity and deliver their message to potential voters. This process, by which the chaos becomes simple and the abstract becomes

tangible, is the singular most important function of parties as it allows them to bridge the elite-individual divide. It is through this mediation that parties translate their leadership, internal debates, priorities, and objectives into publicly claimed policies, platforms, symbols, and candidates, which can be peddled to citizens as consumers and exchanged for votes on the electoral market (Aldrich 1997).

The study of party brand is a natural extension of treating candidates, policies, and platforms as products and voters as consumers. It provides unique leverage in understanding how political parties, extra-legal non-governmental political organizations, are shaped by the society, government, and politics in which they reside and vice versa. Similarly, it is vital to understand the relationship between various sub-group actors and how these relationships promote and constrain party behavior and decisionmaking.

The conceptualization, theorizing, and analysis of party brand offers the unique opportunity to engage multiple facets of party, to understand how these various components interact, and ultimately constrain or promote each other (and, at times, WKHPVHOYHV LQ WKH GHYHORS PHQW RI YLWDO SROLW named focus of this project is the development, maintenance, and power of party brand, there is a concurrent sub-focus guided by the new institutionalism, which provides insight as to how parties, as institutions, operate, exist, and are perpetuated.

The next five chapters integrate behavioral and institutional literatures through the lens of business marketing literature and, in doing so, will reconnect PIE, PO, and PIG

H[SODQDWLRQV RI SDUW\ E\ DQDO\]LQJ WKH FHQWUDOL

the electorate, in government, and an organization. The next chapter briefly
V X P P D U L J H V W K L V S A B S U M P T I O N S F O R F O R E W O R D I N T E G R A T I O N
marketing literature, highlight the relevance of brand (as a concept) to political parties,
and present the framework and theory of party brand. Chapters 3 and 4 use computational
text analysis to provide D G H V F U L S W L Y H S L F W X U H R I W K H ' H P R F U D
brand positions between 1976 and 2012, providing insight as to what each respective
brand³ O R V R D A N D S systematically isolate changes between party brand positions from
election cycle to cycle while determining which actor group initiated these changes.
Chapter 5 summarizes key insights from interviews conducted with former party
chairmen, presidential candidates, congressional party leadership, and their staffers, with
respect to the analyses and findings of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 6 provides concluding
thoughts and acknowledges limitations in research design, in turn highlighting
opportunities for future research

CHAPTER 2 A (re)Introduction to Party Brand

2.1 Brand Power An Introduction

Luxottica Group is involved either by design, manufacture, distribution, or retail with approximately eighty percent of eyewear brands on the market today and no fewer than five hundred million people. The average pair of glasses costs an average of three dollars for Luxottica to manufacture, yet the retail price ranges from eighty dollars to upwards of five hundred. What drives a customer to purchase sunglasses at five times the price of a pair nearly equivalent in functionality, utility, and very often design?

Companies and their products carry intangible attributes such as their brand which drive consumer decision making and loyalty (Aaker 1996). Brands are laden with expressive value; by committing money to a product a customer is signaling they agree with or quite literally agree with. When a consumer opts to purchase a four hundred dollar pair of Armani, Chanel, or Bvlgari frames over a one hundred dollar pair of Ray-Ban, they are spending three hundred dollars to signal their identity, connect with, or experience their desired brand. Brands are powerful constructs, a combination of attributes (e.g. a concrete product, etc.)

¹ The consumer may personally connect to the brand, use the brand to signal their own individual identity or cultural symbol, or experience the affective and sensory components of the brand (Schmitt 2012). The brand identity, self-identity, self-presentation to others, and ultimately is an artifact of the brand.

and intangible mystique (e.g. symbols, ~~credibility~~, etc.), which direct consumer decision making in highly competitive marketplaces.

Political parties also develop their own brands, as argued here, they do so through much the same process and to similar effect of corporate branding. Political science widely acknowledges party brand as a concept relevant to the study of American politics, but until recently few have sought to engage brand as a meaningful construct in and of itself. Recent studies that do incorporate the concept as a central part of their inquiry tend to treat party brand as manifestly inherent or employ the concept as a means to an end. There is little discussion of what party brand is or how it comes to be; rather, the G L V F L ~~social brand~~ as related to partisanship and party breakdown (e.g. Lupu 2011), messaging valence (e.g. Butler and Powell 2014), the branding of elected officials (e.g. Speed, et al. 2015), and political communication in the age of social media (e.g. Tumasjan et al. 2010; Enil and Skogerbo 2010). Political and business marketing literatures more directly engage with the concept (e.g. Smith and French 2010, 2009; Schneider 2004; White and Chernatony 2002; Schweiger and Adami 1999, etc.), but trend toward the consumer/voter perspective and do not bridge the theory with the extant understanding of political parties.

Assuming political parties are concerned with self-petuation and amassing power by winning elections, there is an incentive to cultivate brand identity and position ~~as~~ a set of tangible and intangible benefits to attract supporters much the same as companies consciously develop their products and surrounding brand to interest voters. The beauty of party brand both theoretically and as a unit of observation is that it

provides insight into long- and short-term processes behind party decisions, while still allowing for analysis of the ultimate action. As well, party brand complements existing narratives by systematically joining the study of parties organizations, parties elected officials, and parties in-electorate.

This chapter begins by highlighting the motivating assumptions of this dissertation, paying specific attention to the gaps and blind spots left by behavioral narratives, and then moves to introduce and conceptualize party based on the synthesis of business marketing and party politics literatures in a manner consistent with WKH GLVFLSOLQH V FXUUHQW XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI SDU narratives. In doing so a powerful explanatory concept emerges which links elite and mass parties and gets theoretical insight as to how and why parties develop overtime

DQG ZKLFK DFWRUV OHDG FKDQJHV WR WKH SDUW V E

Section 2.2 emphasizes central assumptions that underpin this project, the importance of understanding parties as organizations, and traditional models of party organization before moving to introduce key party stakeholders. Section 2.3 summarizes key components of brand theory, then introduces the party brand framework theory of political branding.

2.2.1 A (re)Turn to Parties as Institutions Assumptions, Actors & Models

This project is predicated on the assumption that parties are endogenous, immeasurably complicated, entrenched in American society a product of the electoral system in which they are nested. It is impossible to divorce party from society, from history, from politics or party from any one of its group actors as all of these parts are inextricably braided and, in many instances, mutually constitutive. Each phase

of this project is conceived of with conscious attention paid to the blind spots and ambiguities inherent in party research. Moreover, electing to study the national strata of the American two-party system is a conscious decision to (temporarily) put aside state and county arms in favor of a more complete audit of the national parties.

These gaps—some mindful, some accidental—are intrinsic to the exercise and, while imperfect, this project argues it is better to study a portion of the totality of the parties than to study the totality of a portion as de rigueur in some scholarship. It is preferable to recognize the limitations in studying complex organizations and analyze units of inquiry as close to on their own merits as possible, rather than to impose arbitrary cut points (e.g. PIE, PO, PIG) to facilitate neat analysis.

Despite the early treatment of political parties as organizations (e.g. Weber, Duverger, Selznick, etc), more recent party studies have trended toward behavioral models, which neglect the organization as the primary unit of inquiry in favor of individuals or partisans within the electorate. While this transition is largely an artifact of W K H G L V Fitts and other behavioralists en masse, it is also partially driven by the practical restraints in studying parties with focus on their organizational structure. These studies that have focused on parties at the elite level typically focus on the role of parties with respect to elected officials and neglect to incorporate the party organization as an integral player in the broader partisan landscape (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Apart from their inherent complexity, parties as organizations are loathe to grant researchers the breadth and depth of access required to sufficiently research and understand their internal dynamics. Thus, most accounts treat party behavior as the

aggregator of preferences with the primary goal of maintaining power. Insofar as this literature discusses internal strife, often assumed disagreements are a function of different members having different (policy) interests. Incorporating behavioral and organizational literatures in this sense facilitates a more holistic picture of party behavior as organizations with layered objectives and bounded ability to actualize their goals.

To understand the role of the party and their dynamics, especially during a period of record polarization and strife, it is critical to understand the process by which parties are led to action. It is insufficient to treat parties as monoliths and draw blanket conclusions about what the party (or its partisans) represent solely on the ultimate action of the party in a given area. For example, the observable outcomes as intent would make the observable outcome of the 2016 election evidence of the Republican Party, which would ignore the half century long process that paved the way for the Trump presidency and the major infighting within the Party regarding the 2016 election and governance. Such myopic views in which the decision demonstrates the intent, belies the complexity of the party and obscures the process, which is often more revealing than the outcome.

2.2.2A (re) Turn to Parties as Institutions Models of Party Systems

As elaborated in the subsequent discussion of actors throughout this project, parties are best described in the extant literature through a natural systems model in which the organization responds to the needs and demands of relevant actors through balancing of a range of desires both intrinsic and extrinsic to the organization and by

primarily adapting to ~~as opposed to~~ strictly dominating ~~the~~ the environment in which the party is embedded (Panbianco 1983). The natural systems framework is much less hierarchical than the rational model, which assumes each actor group works within a singular, clearly defined space to actualize a single objective. Such preoccupation with action lends itself to excessive focus on decisions at the cost of unobservable actions and intent. Whereas leaders in the rational model are charged with continually adjusting moderators who broker expectations of various actors, internal and external to the system.

Arguably, the rational and natural systems models are not incompatible. From their inception, political parties ~~as~~ coalitions of individuals ~~are~~ developed to accomplish specific ideological objectives, but as this coalition evolves overtime it is institutionalized, and the organization trends toward self-perpetuation through the winning of office. This transition is consistent with the theory of substitution of ends (Michels 1927), whereby a party tends to drift away from their initial goal in favor of the survival of the organization through the careful management of ~~often competing~~ individual aims. This collaborative model is expounded in the next section and chapter, which discuss the cooperative relationship of various subgroup actors and the importance of managing competing objectives of subgroup actors.

2.2.3A (re) Turn to Parties as Institutions: Subgroups within the Parties

The primacy of political parties as organizations is not meant to marginalize the role of individuals there within. However, given the immense size of parties and their diverse competencies, the role of individual actors is best understood when the ~~unit~~ sub of inquiry are those coalitions internal to the party as opposed to the individual itself.

Even in those instances when a clear leader can be identified (e.g. the chairman of the national organization, etc.) these individuals operate within formally and informally defined limits and reach decisions only after repeated, reciprocal interactions with other internal and external actors. That is not to say leaders and group actors are deprived of freedom of action, it is to highlight the decision options available to a party actor at any given point in time are constrained by prior decisions made by/within the institution, concern for divergent internal interests, and made with ~~but~~ knowledge of external but relevant ~~±~~ D F W R U V ¶ S R V L W L R Q V

With this in mind, institutions act upon, distort, and transform actor preferences and thus the process by which a decision is made often tells us more about the party than the ultimate decision. Given the cumulative nature of decision making, it is imperative we remain aware that what the party reveals through action is only a sliver of ~~exists~~ Sub-group actors within parties enjoy a degree of choice, but their ultimate decisions and, in tu U Q R E V H U Y D E O H D F W L R Q V D U H Q R W D S X U H U H I O H F

Political parties are comprised of four categories of group actors, including; office holders, resource holders, benefit seekers, and ~~Five~~ ~~Each~~ category encompasses a coalition of individuals that has their own distinct core competencies and specializations with respect to one another. Each will be discussed in turn, with specific emphasis paid to the competencies of ~~each~~ coalition in relation to their role in the branding process. Table 2. (below) summarizes this information.

Office holders (somewhat obviously) are all individuals who either hold office or are actively pursuing elected office (Schlesinger 1975). At the national level, this

category is comprised of party sub-group actors including; congress, the president, and all candidates actively seeking those offices. As such, office holders are the most outward facing category of sub-group actors. Their core competencies as relate to party brand include; policy development and

Table 2.1 Contributors to/Subgroup Actors of the Political Party Branding Process

	Definition	Sub-group Actors	Core Competencies	Brand Relation
Office Holders	Those who seek and those who hold elected office (Schlesinger 1975)	Congress, President, Candidates	Policy development, Party publicity	Producer
Resource Holders	Those who centrally control critical resources, financial and informational	Party Organization	Fundraising, Data aggregation, Preference organization, Moderators, Strategic development, Policy influence	Producer
Benefit Seekers	Those who seek to influence politics and success to achieve the goal	Activists, Political Action Committees, Editorialists, etc.	Policy influence, Financial support, Information dissemination	Consumer/Quasi-Producer
Voters	Likely voters	Committed supporters, passively loyal, and ticket switchers and splitters	Validation/Support	Consumer

In the American context, resource holders are those sub-group actors who control critical resources—financial and informational—requisite for the pursuit of elected office and who act as a central clearinghouse for the aggregation and dissemination of these resources. In line with this definition, the national party committees are thus the resource

holders and are responsible for fundraising, keeping a finger on the pulse of core partisans and likely supporters, organizing the preferences of its supporters and elected officials, moderating internal strife as necessary, and identifying opportunities for strategic development of the party. These responsibilities are often taken on by resource holders and conveyed to their office holders, these responsibilities influence policy development.

Though less visible to the public, resource holders have a greater role in the party's operations. They are more enduring in that they do not risk defeat during (re)election, are central to the overall process, and are somewhat insulated from the ephemeral nature of public opinion and electoral cycles, which produce time horizon disparities. Resource holders make it singularly prepared to foresee changes to or in the electorate, which changes to the party brand to remain viable and self-perpetuate. For these reasons, resource holders are the core of the party brand.

Benefit seekers, including activists, political action committees, and editorialists are those who seek to influence politics and require the support of office and/or resource holders to do so. Though the core competencies of benefit seekers (e.g. fundraising, policy influence) overlap with resource holders, they fundamentally differ from the latter in that resource holders stand to benefit from the action or favor of resource and office holders. The degree and kind of benefits sought vary dramatically within this actor class. Because of this, benefit seekers are able to apply

external pressure greater than that of the average citizen without having determinative influence but they are predominantly consumers because of the benefits they seek to receive.²

Voters, somewhat obviously, are comprised of committed supporters, the passively loyal, ticket switchers, and ticket splitters. They are those voting age citizens with the greatest likelihood of supporting the party and thus are the focus of the candidates through voting and off decisions by participating in surveys and focus groups. As will be subsequently discussed, a citizen voting for a respective candidate is akin to a consumer purchasing a specific product, and thus voters are the core consumers whom the parties attempt to woo in the electoral marketplace.

The next section details the conceptual and theoretical model of party brand, which is inspired by business marketing literatures but is rooted in the party politics literatures discussed to this point.

2.3.1 A (re)Introduction to Party Brand Identity, Extensions, Position & Image

7 KH SDUW \ EUDQG IUDPHZ R99N Enkhal Wok/wkcs RQ \$ DNHU
outlines the relationship between corporation, product, and consumer and is heavily informed by related literatures on franchisor/franchisee branding, brand extensions, and

² It is of note that by using this definition it could be argued that office and resource holders are also consumers, because they are beneficiaries of a strong party brand in that a strong brand allows for self-petuation. However, in this context consumers stand to gain something (e.g. favorable policy, etc.) outside of the benefits of a strong brand.

marN H W L Q J V W U D W H J L H V , W K D V E H H Q P R G L I L H G W R U H

party politics, candidate politics, congressional politics, issue ownership, realignment/dealignment, political psychology, and media influence. To this end, the framework presented is minimally specified to allow for generalized, flexible application across time. Additional brand attributes particularly as related to the core identity and variables the relationship between brand position and image could be incorporated depending on the election cycle analyzed without undermining the explanatory power of the model.

The dissertation posits the relationship between the national party committee (brand producer), its elected officials (brand producer), and the voting age population (consumers) is best understood as the relationship between a corporation/franchisor, franchisees, and consumers. The relationship between franchisor and franchisee (elaborated in Section 2.3.3) is particularly important to this project, as it allows for analysis of the simultaneously hierarchical and reciprocal dynamic between national party organizations and their elected officials. Below, each actor group introduced in the previous section is designated as having a role in the brand system (e.g. national committee as franchisor, etc.) and the relationship between actor groups as consumers and producers of party brand is defined.

The party brand framework (Figure 2.1) is oriented around three primary brand dimensions that cumulatively comprise a system that allows the brand producer (i.e. office holders and resource holders) to develop useful relationships with potential consumers (voters and, to a lesser degree, benefit seekers). Identity is the origin and

repository of brand meaning, which functions as a value proposition or promise between the party and the citizen. This promise is conveyed to the citizen through brand position the activated, and broadcasted portion of brand identity by the party the message, distorted through the lens of the recipient and a series of mediating variables, is the brand image. Each of these brand components is analyzed in turn.

2.3.2 A (re)Introduction to Party Brand Components of the Core Brand Identity

The national organization operates as the governing, central apparatus of the party

D Q G L Q P D Q \ Z D \ V E U L Q J V W K H L U F D Q G L G D W H W R ³ P D

company introduces a new product under their brand name. However, for the national

R U J D Q L J D W L R Q \ V r y a l G e r s u b s t a n t i a l R i v e r Q W a f f e R i v e r F i n e party must

K D Y H D V W U R Q J F R U H L G H Q W L W \ 7 K H Q D W a y e R e D O R U J D

conglomeration of various symbols, issues, ideologies, platforms, and personality

characteristics over which the party the party has ownership.

Brand as issues, brand as platforms, and brand as ideology are rather self explanatory and are a nod to the vital importance of issue ownership (Petrocik 1996), defined platforms, and a recognizable ideology in defining a strong, stable core identity. Issue ownership, which theorizes candidates and parties will emphasize those issues on which they are viewed more favorably than their opposition, complements theories of party brand as ownership is a brand component. Through repeated claiming of

D S R O L F \ G R P D L Q D S D U W \ F R P H V W R ³ R Z Q ' D Q L V V X H

³ (D F K R I W K H V H E U D Q G F R P S R Q \ S Q W L Q D W K H U E I X N U Q H G V W R D D M H V U Q Q are referred to as such here for consistency.

competent in a given arena (e.g. Republicans and national security, etc.), which allows the party to incorporate that specific, publicly recognized expertise into their core brand.

In the corporate realm, brand symbol is most commonly associated with logos and the associations such visuals conjure; however, the brand symbol encompasses all marks, which represent or cue information about a party without explicitly referencing said information. Thus, brand symbol is inclusive of all visuals, slogans, and historical referents that represent the broader party (or corporation) and call upon relevant associations, without explicitly saying so. As the use of symbols in politics is becoming increasingly popular, the importance of symbolism increases in kind as it allows for the quick, cue-like transfers of information. Just as the flash of a donkey silhouette on the television screen conjures images of the Democratic Party, the phrase "Free Emancipator."

Brand as person (sometimes referred to as brand personality) allows for the incorporation of key leadership figures and the ascription of personality characteristics, such as the use of the term "Maverick" to describe Texas Governor Rick Warren. Corporations with respect to the power of this brand attribute as their leadership presidential candidates, congressional leadership, and committee leaders such more visible in the former than the latter. That is not to say that brand as person is inclusive of all highly visible current and former leadership, rather the party harnesses the charisma and/or legacy of key leaders who are positively associated with the organization by

incorporating their name into the core identity. Additionally, brand person is inclusive of anthropomorphic descriptors associated with the parties.

2.3.3 A (re)Introduction to Party Brand: Franchise Extensions and Core Brand Identity

The relationship between the national organization, as a franchisor, and their candidates/elected officials as franchisees and products of the party, is more involved than the brand components discussed to this point. Candidates and elected officials occupy a liminal space in that they represent the party party endorses them, thus presenting them to the market of voters as products but also have some flexibility with respect to how they portray themselves as a candidate. This relationship in which the party brings a candidate to market as a sort of product, and then party and candidate must develop a synergy to beget a strong party brand is rather complex, but can be unpacked using franchise extension and branding schemes literatures.

Corporations make strategic decisions as to what new products are developed and how closely these products should be brought to market, the corporation assesses what business they are in by considering who they are in competition with (Levitt 1986; 1960) and the type of product their company can reasonably and safely lend their name to (Taubert 1981). Once a new product is identified, the corporation must assess whether the product is entirely new to an alternative, subbrand name. As Table 2.1 demonstrates product is new, but the brand name is preexisting the relationship between the company and offering is considered a franchise extension. It is the leveraging of an established brand to a new

product, which will carry its own unique attributes in addition to those inherently being lent by the parent company.




Figure 2.1 Party Brand Framework

For example, Sunkist Growers incorporated an established citrus grower and distribution corporation that attempted to spur growth by introducing new products, from orange flavored fruit chews to diet orange soda. These successful franchise extensions

in that each new product is true to the core brand identity, natural citrus flavors, from a trusted, known entity, while adding a new brand dimension or layer.

Table 2.2 Types of Brand Extensions

Product Category			Brand Name
NEW	EXISTING		
New Product	Flanker Brand	NEW	Brand Name
Franchise Extension*	Line Extension	EXISTING	

Franchise extensions allow companies to capitalize on their existing brand equity (discussed below), creating immediate consumer awareness and impressions about the product. Additionally, market entry costs for the new product are minimized as there is an existing distribution or promotional infrastructure. Moreover, a successful franchise extension can increase brand recognition, visibility, and credibility, provide a platform for advertising for the company, and inspire growth.

When the new product in question is a person, as a candidate is for the party, all of the above hold. Before a party recruits and endorses a candidate, they consider their opposition for a given race.

⁴ It is of note that Sunkist Growers has since transitioned from a franchise extension to a licensing model, so the company now only lends its name to companies for other product categories (e.g. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group produces and distributes Sunkist sodas) under registered trademarks.

⁵ A Democrat endorsed during a Senate race in California will vary from a Democrat endorsed during a Senate race in Alabama, in large part due to the type of candidate the opposition will likely endorse.

perspectives and backgrounds (Har V XIILFLHQWO\ DOLJQHG ZLWK WKDW ensure the endorsement is believable and sincere (Norris 1996; Schlesinger 1985). The ODWWHU LV RI JUHDW LPSRUWDQFH DV GLVFRQWLQXLW that of their product is known to result in consumer (voter) dissatisfaction with both the franchisor (party) and the franchisee (candidate) (Anisimova 2010).

Once a decision to endorse has been reached, the two independent parties and candidate, franchisor and franchisee, establish an agreement, whereby the franchisor DJUHHV WR 3OHDVH' WKHLU QDPH OLNHQHVV DVVRFLD franchisee in exchange for WKH IUDQFKLVHH¶V SXUVXLW RI RIILFH D image of the franchisor. In addition to the increased recognizability favorability, advertising, and growth through election, this arrangement decreases the need for the FDQGLGDWH WR KDYH ODUJH FDSLWDO RXWOD\V DW WK endorsement comes (endor lists and fundraisers) and, in many cases, the party provides the supplies and/or labor necessary to run a campaign (e.g. proprietary marketing lists, local party employees and volunteers, etc.). (Miles Zachary et al. 2011; Tauber 1981; Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1969). This dynamic is also consistent with those studies that find more experienced, high-ranking politicians are less likely to tow the party line overtime, the franchisee becomes less reliant on the benefits the franchisor provides and is able to risk additional leniencies (e.g. Ware 1996, etc.).

⁶ The GOP would (likely) not be able to reasonably endorse choice, pre-LGBTQ FDQGLGDWH DV WKHLU FRUH EUDQG LV WRR PXFK DW RGGV ZLWK V of the endorsement and potentially weakening the strength of the core brand.

Central to this relationship is the expectation there is agreement between the party and its candidates as to the terms and conditions of their relationship. Traditional franchisor/franchisee relationships are established with formal contracts, which specifically enumerate the behaviors and commitment expected from both parties and are dissolvable under certain conditions (e.g. one party fails to comply with the terms, etc.). Here political parties (franchisors) come to an agreement with their supported candidates and elected officials as to the terms and conditions of their relationship. This relationship grants the party control and ability to terminate the franchise arrangement. When a candidate or elected official strays from the original terms or takes liberties that are inconsistent with the terms, the party may allow the franchisee to continue with no consequence.

With an understanding of the relationship between the party organization (franchisor) and a single elected official (franchisee) established, it is important to consider how the party governs its relationship with all of their candidates and elected officials. In a system with strict party discipline, wherein elected officials are bound by the party's rules, the party may extend the franchise arrangement to all elected officials. The current American party system embodies the House of Brands framework;

⁷ e.g. Apple has multiple unique product offerings, but there is a complete emphasis on the corporation as the unifying, distinguishing point of reference; the characteristics of each individual product are not

³ PLQLPDOLVWLF', brand rules that extend to every product.

parties publicly endorse candidates with whom they share ideology, values, or policy positions, but elected officials are afforded to a degree of freestanding brand identity. Figure 2.2 provides an overview of both branding schemes.

House of Brands are typically considered more difficult to manage because there are more moving parts; each franchise extension carries the brand of the party, which is then complemented by their own brand identities. This scheme is even more complicated to manage in the political realm as parties do not have perfect control over the behavior and positions of their candidates and, if a candidate is off, the party is not able to immediately remove the candidate, as a company is might remove a product from shelves due to backlash resulting from brand discontinuity. While there are mechanisms (e.g. promises of information, contributions, endorsements, etc.) through which parties heighten their influence and incentivize certain behavior from their candidates, the link is not quite as tight as it is in business. These exceptions do not undermine the use of the brandimage framework, but provide an opportunity to explore deviations from expected behavior that may provide greater insight as to when branding efforts are more or less successful.

⁸ Under the House of Brands scheme, there are varying degrees of distance between core brand identity and product identity. The corporation also act as a shadow firm, as Proctor & Gamble does with its offerings provide concrete benefits to the product, while allowing its products to develop wholly independent brand identities. As with Unilever, each product has a distinct brand identity (e.g. Dove, Ponds, Suave, etc.), but is consistent with the core brand identity and both brand names are prominently featured and known. This last model is most similar to the relationship between parties and candidates/elected officials.

It is of note that elected officials, as franchise extensions managed in a house of
 EUDQGV VFKHPH KDYH WKH FDSDFLW\ WR VKDSH WKH S
 introduction and/or highly visible acts, including presidential bids and media tours. While
 few elected officials rise to DQG VXVWDLQ WKH SURPLQHGFH QHFHV
 identity, there are instances of this sort of feedback relationship in which the franchisee
 LQIOXHGFHV WKH IUDQFKLVRU\ V EUDQG WKLV G\QDPLF
 consideration of which actors lead changes to party brand.




Figure 2.2 Branded House versus House of Brands Models

2.3.4 A (re)Introduction to Party Brand Brand Position

%UDQG SRVLWLRQ LV WKH VXE VHW RI D SDUW\ V E
 broadcast at a given point in time for strategic purposes; it is the part of their identity
 deemed most relevant in the eyes of citizens or within the context of an electoral cycle
 and, for these reasons, must be actively communicated with the populous. To this end, the
 elements that comprise brand position are a selection of those that comprise brand
 identity, but there is no difference that makes position a substantively unique brand
 element.

2.3.5 A (re)Introduction to Party Brand Brand Image

Brand image is the mental snapshot the individual has of a political party at a
JLYHQ SRLQW LQ WLPH , PDJH LV LQ VWDVLV ZLWK EUD
SDUW\¶V EUDQG LGHQWLW\ DOLJQV SHUIHFWO\ ZLWK W
relationship between brand and image is never one-to-one or exactly mirrored. As the
individual receives stimuli via the brand position, the information is mediated by a
myriad of variables including; their political predispositions, brand image, their
information source, and competing party brands (Philpot 2008) Furthermore, image is
incredibly difficult to change as individuals typically disregard information that does not
comport with their existing brand image and will only update their perception when
presented with a brand position or identity they view as substantially different.
(Philpot 2008; Zaller 1992, etc.)

Apart from identifying various brand components and the layered relationship
between brand producers (national committee/franchisor and elected
officials/franchisees) and consumers (voters and benefit seekers), the party brand
framework highlights branding is a multifaceted, coordinated effort at the national level.
The extant literature and this project highlight the importance of party labels as a
heuristic and the party brand framework outlines the multifaceted, coordinated process by
which a brand identity is cultivated, projected to the mass public to be used as a heuristic.
However, while a powerful heuristic is a central benefit of developing a strong brand
there are other assets to the party and the voter which encourage producers to
participate in this process. The next section discusses these secondary benefits under the
umbrella of brand equity.

2.4.1 : KDW ¶V LQ D 1DPH (TXLW\ \$ZDUHQHV V 6XEVDQFH
6WURQJ EUDQGV \LHOG KLJK OHYHOV RI EUDQG HTX

linked to a brand, its name and symbol, that add to or subtract from the value provided by
a product or service. The value of a brand is the nonmonetary capital return brought to the company by creating a brand and the value
a brand brings to the target market. Equity is the return (i.e. support) the party enjoys and the intangible benefits (e.g.
collective identity value, coordination benefits, etc.) brought to potential supporters.

As with brand, equity is an abstract concept and does not lend itself to easy
measurement. Within the corporate world, equity does not square with those assets that
include raw materials, existing product stockpiles, distribution networks, and
billions of dollars, the industry widely accepted Ford paid above and beyond the tangible
value of Jaguar (e.g. materials, manufacturing plants, etc.), but did so because they were
prospective, equity is measured in terms of favorability or likeability toward a given
brand.

: KLOH D SDUW ¶V EUDQG HTX LW\ FDQQRW EH PHDVX
material stockpiles, there are similar observable characteristics that allow for an
equity measurement. The value of a brand is the nonmonetary capital return brought to the company by creating a brand and the value
a brand brings to the target market. Equity is the return (i.e. support) the party enjoys and the intangible benefits (e.g.
collective identity value, coordination benefits, etc.) brought to potential supporters.

fundraising in a given period of time. Furthermore, nationally representative political surveys frequently include measures of favorability toward a party; these measures are often used by the extant literature as a proxy of general support for the party and map neatly onto those used in business marketing literature to measure brand image. These and other factors will be elaborated and analyzed as a demonstration of a

Brand equity is created and sustained through branding efforts and is measured along four primary dimensions; (1) name awareness, (2) brand loyalty, (3) brand substance, and (4) brand associations (Aaker 2009). The relationship between these four components, the political party, and the individual, is visually summarized in Figure

2.4.2 : Brand awareness in the corporate world

Brand awareness is the manner in which consumers are exposed to brands and their product offerings; as this box is filled through exposure to advertisements, direct marketing, and inadvertent contact, those brands with greater recognition — more consumers who have heard of the brand name — recall — more consumers who understand what the brand stands for — higher within the box and are more likely to be retrieved by the consumer.




Figure 2.3 Brand Equity and Party/Voter Assets

Brand strategists and political scientists note the importance of recognition in
 HVWDEOLVKLQJ IDPLOLDULW\ ZKLFK LV WLHG WR μOLN
 King 1990; Cover 1977); however, recall is the primary determinant of decision making
 and thus it behooves organizations to develop a brand strategy that does more than just
 provide name exposure. Ideally, brands which strive to appeal to a wide base of
 consumers or citizens will enjoy high levels of recognition and recall. If both are
 achieved, the brand will have a high level of brand equity. (Aaker 1991, p. 10)

in which recognition is high, recall is low, and consumers are not receptive to messaging as they assume they already know what the brand represents. This partially accounts for the lag between changes in party brand identity and brand image.

2.4.3 : K D W \ ¶ V L Q D 1 D P H " 3 R O L W L F D O 3 D U W L H V D Q G % U D C

The accessibility and use of micro-level data has skyrocketed in recent political campaigns, with many on both sides of the aisle using voter-driven electoral strategy (Nielsen 2012; Semiatin 2012). While micro-targeting only just attracted national attention during the 2012 presidential election, political parties have long maintained extensive databases of their members, their turnout history, and demographic information. Cataloguing this type of data allows parties to divide the electoral market along their historic loyalties, as demonstrated in Figure 2. This compartmentalization along party loyalty lines permits strategic mobilization and targeting (Sprague 1992). Parties have demonstrated the fantastic amount of resources dedicated to wooing and mobilizing ticket splitters and party switchers through direct mail campaigns, face-to-face contact, phone banking, and party sponsored events. Given our understanding of electoral capture and the relative stability of partisan identification across the individual, the first major decision on the part of the party is whether to target

However, a brand is only as valuable as the sum of its loyal followers and its potential to generate new customer interest; forgoing the former group in the constant chase to tie down the latter, parties overlook the associative and channel benefits their most loyal constituents can provide (Chauduri and Holbrook 2001; Jacoby and Kyner

1973). Those who are loyal may not need to be targeted to assure their support should be targeted to energize their interest regarding the election; those supporters who DUH μDFWLYDWHG ¶ DUH PRUH OLNHO\ WR WXUQRXW DQ peers. It is foolish for parties to overlook their most loyal citizens' success of peer persuasion when compared to party citizen outreach efforts (Green and Gerber 2008).

LEAST ←———— LOYALTY —————→ MOST			
<u>NON-SUPPORTERS</u> Citizens loyal to another party or not member of electoral market	<u>SWITCHERS & SPLITTERS</u> Citizens committed to more than one party; typically swayed by issue or ideology	<u>PASSIVELY LOYAL</u> Citizens supportive out of habit; likely to have high level of recognition and low level of recall	<u>COMMITTED SUPPORTERS</u> Citizens consistently loyal to party

Figure 2.4 Party Brand Loyalty Segmentation

2.4.4 : KDW ¶ V LQ D 1DPH" 3DUW\ %UDQG 6XEVWDQFH
 Perceived brand quality individual perception of brand features is the only

asset category that independently drives market performance in the consumer world and has a spillover effect, which is typically is correlated with improvements in other asset associations and brand image (Janiszke and Van Osselaer 2000). The parallel in the political realm is the set of policy positions, values, endorsements, and ideologies a party embodies, which this project labels brand substance.

Brand substance is a relatively straightforward concept compared with other asset categories; however, perceived and actual brand substance are often incongruous. Individuals cling to long held perceptions or stereotypes of party positions and reject disconfirming information that would update their mental image of the party to correctly

reflect reality (Zaller 1991; Aaker 1991). Correcting discordant brand substance is difficult, as the party must redefine or highlight their misunderstood quality on a dimension citizens will recognize and in a way that persuades them to accept the message, regardless of whether it undermines their existing brand image.

Arguably, brand substance is the most important asset category to actively manage as it implicates the three primary brand categories: identity, position, and image and is most likely to drive turnout and vote decision. Chapter Four will explore the difficulties the Republican and Democratic parties have encountered in their attempts to decrease asymmetry between perceived and actual substance since 1976.

2.4.4 : K D W ¶ V L Q D 1 D P H " 3 D U W \ % U D Q G \$ V V R F L D W L R Q V Political brand associations and political brand substance overlap substantially

conceptually and with regard to the benefits provided to the party and citizens. As opposed to brand substance, which is (ideally) rooted in the tangible components of party, brand associations are the feelings, people, causes, and symbols the individual affiliates with the brand. As individuals increasingly rely on cues to recall information and make vote decisions, it becomes progressively more important for parties to actively manage their associations to indirectly target potential supporters. Although parties lack control over what citizens think, they have considerable influence over how they think; actively governing brand identity to impel desirable party connections is one way of preserving this control.

2.4.5 : K D W ¶ V L Q D 1 D P H " 7 K H % H Q H I L W V R I % U D Q G (T X L W Taken cumulatively, political party brand awareness, loyalty, substance, and

associations provide negative or positive equity to both the party and citizens. Assuming

each asset class is favorable meaning each component in Figure 2 produces the benefits outlined. Brand equity provides value to both the party and the citizen. Political parties with high levels of brand equity enjoy efficient and effective position signaling and marketing efforts (on behalf of a party elite or the organization), voter loyalty with the possibility of spillover effects to less loyal or non-loyal citizens, and valuable associations; collective opposition. Party supporters garner brand equity benefits through eased information processing (i.e. the function of a traditional heuristic), satisfaction in membership, and affirmation of their vote choice or partisan identification.

Given political parties are inherently endogenous institutions (Aldrich 1995) it follows that the relationship between value to party and value to supporter are two points on a self-reinforcing feedback loop; value conferred to citizens and vice versa. While resource and energy intensive, it befits parties to define, cultivate, and evolve their brand because of the potential very likely return on investment. In an era during which parties are defined by the intangible, it is more important than ever for the organization and elected leadership to take an active, sustained interest in their brand as a mean of attracting citizen interest, providing meaningful service to their supporters, and perpetuating their own power and sustainability.

To this point, emphasis has been placed on merging political science and business marketing literatures to develop a model of party branding and to underscore the benefits of a strong brand to producers and consumers. However, given the layered nature of t

party brand framework and the degree of coordination and resource devotion required to meet the ideal typical model, the next section will accentuate the institutional hurdles to successful party brand development before introducing the hypotheses to be tested in subsequent chapters.

2.5.1 Constraints and Hurdles to Party Branding

Both political scientists and party elites, (organizational leadership, party leadership, and elected officials) have made the case that branding is an important H[HUFLVH VR SHUKDSV WKH PRUH UHYHDOLQJ ZD\ WR D partiescare? Are there certain conditions under which branding should be, or is neglected?

The emphasis to this point has been placed on the role brands play in fostering relationships between producer and consumer, party and citizen; however, brand building is primarily a topdown exercise, which is often thwarted by organizational dynamics and constraints before any branding efforts take hold and reliant on information flow from the bottom up. Such hurdles are not uncommon and are intrinsic to the nature of organizations.

From an external vantage, the benefits of creating a strong, appealing brand appear glaring and indisputable; if parties are to remain viable and are no longer able to rely on functional benefits to attract supporters, it logically follows they must invest in developing a new set of assets. Yet organizations, from corporations to political parties, are typically resistant to advancing their brand for three primary reasons.

First, organizations and the actors whom they encompass are path dependent. In HYROYLQJ SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV DUH FRQVWUDLQHG E

SUHYLRXV DOOLDQFHV FRDOLWLRQV DPRQJ RWKHU IDFV

H[HUW D FRQWLQLQJ LQIOXHQH X 1994 Merit, KDSH RI

preference for perpetuating the status quo permeates all aspects of organizational decisionmaking and change is often necessitated by a strong catalyst, which highlights declining performance and leaves the organization little choice to deviate from the norm. For instance, the Republican Party experienced a subtle decline in overall membership and favorability measures between 1996 and 2008, but the national organization did not call for a conscious rebranding effort until two presidential elections were lost and there was a sharp decline in favorability among all Americans, party members included (Pew Research 2014).

Second, brand is an incredibly abstract concept, particularly when compared with typical offerings (e.g. products or policies, etc.) A corporation is often more comfortable developing new products and a party is more comfortable recruiting candidates, providing campaign support, and developing a policy agenda because there is a clear UH WXUQ RQ WKH R Un (Aaker 1998; 2000; 2009) and a branding effort is outlined and executed by an organization the full benefit is typically not realized until years after the campaign has completed, the return is rarely tangible and when it is it is difficult to assign concrete value to the results.

In this same vein, the third and final reason active brand maintenance and rebranding efforts are met with resistance is that political parties are preoccupied with short-term gains and strategies. Frequent national elections encourage parties to operate in two- and four-year cycles, which subsequently places emphasis on short-term

the expense of creating and implementing long-term solutions. Corporations struggle with a similar situation given their fixation with the quarterly profit framework. Branding efforts that take years to develop, years to implement, and years to yield results do not square with the timetable parties operate within.

Parties continually strive to maintain and, when necessary, develop their brand despite the ample hurdles faced in doing so. Organizational action in the face of obstacles underscores the importance of party brand as a mechanism of perpetuation. A strong brand connects party and citizen, and, if viewed favorably, translates to votes won

2.5.2 Constraints and Hurdles to Party Branding: Periods of Intraparty Disagreement, the Trump Presidency

Apart from the constraints internal to the organization, periods of intraparty disagreement—particularly instances involving highly visibility agents—make it increasingly difficult for the party to coordinate their message and cultivate a strong, unified brand. Chapter 1 highlights the trajectory of the Republican Party through a period of major rebranding (i.e. the Southern Strategy) and describes the rise of the Tea Party and 'R Q D O G 7 U X P S ¶ V H O H F W L R Q D V E H J L Q Q L Q J D S H U disagreement. For reasons outlined below, this project analyzes only the period from 1972 to 2012; however, it is possible to provide speculative insight as to the effect ' R Q D O G 7 U X P S ¶ V H O H F W L R Q D Q G S U H V L G H Q F \ Z L O O K D . Moreover, informally considering the period from 2018 underscores the adaptability of party brand as a theoretical construct to explain phenomena during periods of harmony and tumult.

As extensively discussed in chapters three and four, the bulk of this project uses computational text analysis and machine learning to present a descriptive picture of the relationship between the United States and the world. Critical change in party brand, and determine which actors most commonly instigate changes to party brand across time. Because this analysis uses text as data and is interested in party brand change over time, it is critical to compare like sources for the period of interest. Chapter 3 fully elaborates the data selection criteria, but it is important to state here that there was no feasible way to include the 2012-2018 period as part of this research.

Apart from more obvious limitations (e.g. data archived at presidential libraries not available after 2008, etc.), increasing reliance on web platforms, including social media, transformed the political communications landscape. Websites, and particularly social media platforms, revolutionized how parties and their candidates communicate with likely voters. Campaigns made the first earnest effort to integrate social media during the 2006 midterm elections, but it was not until the 2014 midterms that use of the medium came to its own and was used to disseminate content distinct from that of other, more traditional channels (Dimitrova et al. 2014; Williams and Gulati 2003). At this end, it would be remiss to exclude social media from any analysis of the 2002 election cycle, but it would be impossible to incorporate social media and treat it as other texts for the 1972-2012 period.

As well as the Republican Party. However, the tension between mainstream and hardline conservative
5 HSXEOLFDQV SUHGDWHV 7UXPS TV HOHFWLRQ DQG WKH

disagreement between these wings beginning in 2000 and accelerating for the period of

WR 7 KLV WZHOYH \ HDU SHU ~~explains party~~ VWV SDUW \ E
dynamics during periods of intraparty conflict and offers preliminary support for the
continued relevance of party brand, as a concept and ~~era~~, for the 2012-2018
period.

Without being able to systematically evaluate the Republican ~~UP \ ¶ V EUDQG IR~~
2012 LW LV SRVVLEOH WR V ~~selection of the longer term~~ KRZ 7 UX
trend of growing intraparty brand disagreement within the Republican Party

Most obviously, Trump ~~did not enjoy widespread~~ endorsement from high ~~profile~~
Republicans. Both living Republican former presidents refused to endorse Trump, with
George H.W. Bush going so far as to publicly admit his personal support for Hillary
Clinton and five of the Republican candidates for president including, Jeb Bush, Carly
Fiorina, Lindsey Graham, John Kasich, and George Pataki ~~rescinded~~ their pledge to
support the * 2 3 ~~nominee~~ once Trump was nominated. Ultimately, nearly 200 high
profile Republicans not only refused to endorse Trump, but went so far as to ~~oppose~~
candidacy (Yourish et al 2016).

' LVDJUHHPHQW EHWZHHQ WKH SDUW \ HVWDEOLVKPH
after the 2016 Republican National Convention. The debate surrounding party platform
negotiations rarely receive media coverage as disagreements are hammered out behind
closed doors. However, 7 UXPS ¶ V SUR [LHV ¶ LQVLVWHQFH WKH * 2 3 C
ODQJXDJH ZLWK UHJDUG W ~~crisis~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~party~~ ~~platform~~ ~~negotiations~~ WLRQ RI
(Rogin 2016 Meyer 2017 etc), likely because it was ~~not~~ another instance of disagreement

between the mainstream GOP and Trump and because it fits into the broader Trump / Russia narrative.

0 R U H R Y H U 7 U X P S ¶ V O H J L V O - D d d L w i t h C o n g r e s s C o a d L V I U H T
Republicans ¶ Going into the 2016 ¶ H F W L R Q W K H 7 U X P S F D P S D L J Q ¶ V S
security (save the program without cuts), abortion (pro
life, but inconsistent statements regarding Planned Parenthood ¶ is adamantly
opposed to funding), financial regulations (reinstate Glass Steagall Act; GOP has long
R S S R V H G W K H 8 Q L W H G 6 a l s o p u s h e s ¶ t o p l e a s e t h e J o c o s S d i t s V H Q F H
military support for European allies; military support as a mechanism of ensuring
American security is a long ¶ held cornerstone of GOP foreign policy), and trade (anti
globalist; GOP prides itself on being the party of free trade ¶ (man 2016) were
L Q F R Q V L V W H Q W Z L W S i n c e ¶ i n s t a u r a t i o n , T r u m p h a s r e c e i v e d t h e
most blowback from the Republican Party on the issue of trade ¶ a w i t h a j o r i t y o f
congressional Republicans fundamentally opposing the ¶ globalist approach t h e f e a r
could spark a trade war ¶ a s t r a s t r o u s ¶ I H F W V R Q W K H Q - D W a n n 2 0 1 8 ; H F R Q R P
Werner 2018; Tankersley 2018) Notably, even with opposition from congressional
Republicans, the Party ¶ is careful in criticizing Trump; as is frequently reiterated by
7 U X P S ¶ V R S S R V L W L R Q t o ¶ D o s p o l i c i e s c o u l d d e q u i r e ¶ G s w i t h ¶ F e r X Q
which is unlikely (e.g. Stolberg 2018)

There is ample evidence of disagreement between ¶ Republican actors during
7 U X P S ¶ V S U H V L G H Q F \ E X W W K H U H L V Q R U H D V R Q W R V
the R U H W L F D O F R Q V W U X F W \$ V F K D S W H U V W K U H H D Q G I R

SRVLWLRQ KDV EHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ ³QRLV\ VLQFH exacerbated this division and made the chasm very public, there is no reason to suspect the trends observed for the 2008-2012 period would not continue for 2018.

7UXPS LV DFWLQJ DV D IUDQFKLVH H[WHQVLRQ RI W LGHQWLW\ DQG ZLWKRXW D PHFKDQLVP RI WRWDO FRQGLVWDQFH LWVHOI IURP 7UXPS LV VHYHUHO\ FRQVWUDLQ Republican Party brand resonates with a large segment of the American public and, LQVRIDU DV EUDQG LQJ LV LQIRUPHG E\ DQ XQGHUVWDQ needs, there is reason for the party to listen to their likely voters and adapt brand identity to grow their electoral market share. The dynamics of each actor group and the role of various franchise extensions in modifying the overall brand are discussed in Chapter 4, but brand theory and trends from the 1972 period suggest that changes to WKH 5HSXEOLFDQ 3DUW\ V RYHUDOO EUDQG ZLOO EH L officials with greater flexibility in representing newer interests), but anchored by the corporate identity (e.g. the national committee). Specifically, WKH 5HSXEOLFDQ 3DUW RYHUDOO EUDQG LGHQWLW\ ZLOO VKLIW GXULQJ 7UXPS Congress having the greatest impact on the overall brand, but not at a rate significantly accelerated when compared to the 2008-2012 period. 7UXPS V EUDQGLVW F he is revolutionizing the Party; however, Trump does not represent a watershed change in brand, but a public representation of a two-decade shift in the SDUW position.

2.6 Looking Forward

Political party brand names provide specific benefit to the party and potential supporters through the creation of brand equity. Positive brand equity is the intangible result of coordinated branding efforts, which are initiated and sustained by different actors along varying brand dimensions. A well-managed House of Brands framework allows for the creation of a responsive identity system, in which office holders play an active role in adding completeness and texture to the core identity as a branch

H[WHQVLRQV , Q D YDFXXP SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV¶ EUD
HTXLOLEULXP ZLWK WKH VXSSRUWHUV¶ EUDQG LPDJH I

shifted their position on immigration reform and activated the change as a part of brand position, we would expect all citizens to immediately realize and update their perception of the party. However, this mirrored relationship will remain but a dream of party politics scholars who yearn for the tidy analysis of a topic that is not so tidy.

In the subsequent chapters the strength of party brand as a concept that provides us greater leverage in understanding how party organizations evolve over time will be tested and the hypotheses in the prior section will be tested. This also argues that, like companies, a party is most likely to modify their brand after a shock to the marketplace or in the face of mounting discontent from their consumers. Moreover, it is argued the national organization (akin to the corporation) maintains a central role in

JRYHUQLQJ WKH SDUW¶¶V EUDQG E\ PRGHUDWLQJ LQWH
EUDQG DQG XVLQJ WKHLU ZHDOWK RI UHFRSUDJHV WR L

behaviors.

CHAPTER 3
: K D W ¶ V L Q D 1 D P H "

Political parties are central to the American political system, but are proverbial icebergs in that voters are only aware of a sliver of their activities. Day-to-day operations, interactions between party leaders and decisions as to issue stances and strategic positioning are largely obscured from public view. While those decisions made behind closed doors are important to the holistic study of party brand, a great deal of information about parties can be gleaned from what the party actively reveals to the public about its organization, candidates, issue positions, and ideology. They S D U W \ ¶ V brand position ± W K H ³ D F W L Y D W H G - component of the total brand. The brand reflects internal dynamics, strife, and path dependencies as only select party leaders entrusted as gatekeepers W K H S D U W ¶ V can be seen as witness to the infighting between party leaders or the S D U D P H W H U V S O D F H. But they do serve the fruits of these interactions as broadcast by key leadership charged with bringing the message to market.

7 K L V F K D S W H U L G H Q W L I L H V D Q G V X P P D U L] H V W K H positions. To this end, it is descriptive in nature, allowing for the identification of and shifts in patterns over time, across actors, and between parties.

3.1 Why Brand Position?

The party brand system has three distinct components: the brand identity, position, and image. The identity is the totality of all substantive and affective attributes of the party (central governing organization) and its elected officials (franchise extensions), strategically cultivated over time. The brand position is the subset of the

SDUW\ Identity that is activated or broadcast by key party actors at a given point
in time to strategic end) L Q D O O \ W K H S D U W \ V L P D J H L V W K H L Q G
SDUW\ D V L Q I R U P H G E \ W K H S U R M H F W L R Q a R s t W K H S D U W
Y D U L D E O H V L Q F O X G L Q J S U L R U p o s i t i o n L H I V D Q G W K H R S S F

The central unit of inquiry throughout this project is party brand position.
The decision to limit analysis to a single brand element is justified both practically and
conceptually.

Access to data that allows for the analysis of brand position is, by nature,
available as the brand position is broadcast to the public. This makes the study of
the brand position more appealing as a starting point than the study of the brand identity,
which is inherently private to the party (though, there is some discussion of identity in
Chapter 5). Data that can be used to unpack brand position is not readily available or
prepackaged, but it can be reliably accessed for the period of interest to this project.
That being said, data availability was not of determinative importance in selecting which brand
component to study as there is ample level survey data on perceptions of party
(brand image). However, the discipline has already extensively grappled with image in
behavioral literatures and, while there is room for improvement, brand position is less
chartered territory.

Second, brand position is the link between party and individual and, as discussed
at length in Chapters 1 and 2, the discipline has only explored the dynamic between
competing and complementary party actors (i.e. the national committee, candidates, and

electoral officials and the mass public. Moreover, brand position connects party brand identity with party brand image, and thus is the bridge of the party brand framework.

With an established focus on brand position, the scope of inquiry is limited to the national party system. There is a legitimate argument to be made regarding the role of state party committees. In the United States, state party committees and state resources flow from the national party to the states and then to the counties, so it is intuitive to begin with the repository. Furthermore, the extension of party brand position from the national level to the state level exposed the national and position of both parties. In turn, this project provides insight into the population from 1976 to 2012.

Because brand position is actively communicated by national party leadership to voters, it logically follows that the dataset be comprised of information publicly broadcast by the national party, including but not limited to, campaign commercials, editorials, and platforms. Because parties predominantly rely on the written and spoken word in communicating their brand position, computational text analysis is used to descriptive and empirical ends. This is the most appropriate method to answer this question for this project and provides an overview of the methods used to analyze the collected data in this chapter.

¹ State parties operate as line extensions of the national party in that they are a variation of an existing product category (the national party), often under the same brand name.

3.2.1 Data: Establishing the Universe & Collection

Sound computational text analysis requires systematic data selection and clearly defined methodological parameters, consistent with researcher expectations yet capable of flexibly testing the theory at hand. The party brand framework and extant literature on political parties guided the creation of a list of possible data sources in the universe of texts. Table 3.1 summarizes the methods national parties were likely to have used to communicate their brand position between 1976 and 2012. The universe of texts is divided by actor group and texts with an asterisk indicate a data source included in the ultimate analysis.

From this universe, the first selection criterion is availability. If a text is not available through archival research, internet research, or as part of a digital archive is only available for less than half the period of interest, it is excluded from all analyses. For example, direct mailers from the national committee are excluded from analysis because there is no way to procure all the materials the party sent to likely voters for the specified period. As well, direct party mailers are often disseminated by the state parties, but contain information supplied by the national party, which further complicates the possibility of data retrieval. Furthermore, websites are a critical source of information today, no actor group actively populated their website prior to 1992 (the halfway point of analysis) thus data scraped from websites are excluded.

The second selection criterion is reliability of availability. It is important to only include data from sources reliably archived between 1976 and 2012. Sure data across years is comparable. For instance, transcripts from television interviews with major news networks are reliably archived beginning in 2000, but most interviews are haphazardly

transcribed between 1976 and 1999. It is unclear why certain television interviews conducted prior to 2000 are available online while others are not, so this source is excluded as its inclusion has the potential to systematically bias the results of text analysis².

Table 3.1 Universe of Available Texts

NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP	PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES	CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP
Newspapers* (editorials, invited columns, etc.)	Newspapers* (editorials, invited columns, etc.)	Newspapers* (editorials, invited columns, etc.)
Magazines / Monthlies*	Magazines / Monthlies*	Magazines / Monthlies*
Television† (interviews, etc.)	Television† (interviews, etc.)	Television† (interviews, etc.)
Direct Mailers	Television* Campaign Commercials	Television Campaign Commercials
Party Platforms*	Television* Election Debates	Television Election Debates
Speeches* Party Conventions	Speeches* Party Conventions	Speeches* Party Conventions
Speeches Radio Addresses	Speeches Radio Addresses	Speeches Radio Addresses
Direct Emails	Direct Emails	Direct Emails
Websites	Websites	Websites
	Candidate Platforms*	

The final selection criteria is based on the speaker/author and the audience: is the party leader disseminating information in their capacity as an actor of the party? A party chairman delivering an address in public is clearly speaking in his capacity as party chairman; however, the line is not as clear for other actors. If the Senate Majority leader participates in an election debate in their home state, they are most likely speaking in

² Meet the Press, which has its own transcription archive for every airing since the first episode in 1959, is an exception among television interviews with respect to reliability and, for that reason, interviews with Meet the Press are included.

their capacity as a Senator representing their constituents, not as a leader of the party. For this reason, a text is only included if the audience is reasonably assumed to be national, thus indicating the actor in question is communicating to more than just their constituents. (e.g. An op-ed by Harry Reid published in the New York Times can be included as it is authored by a member of Senate leadership, but an op-ed published in the Reno Gazette-Journal would be excluded as it is authored by Harry Reid as it represents his personal interests.)

3.2.2 Data: Collection

With the universe defined, documents are searched for by speaker and/or writer and include the following party leadership positions between 1976 and 2012: (1) party chairman, (2) the Speaker of the House (when of the party), (3) House Majority Leader, (4) House Majority Whip, (5) House Minority Leader, (6) House Minority Whip, (7) Senate Majority Leader, (8) Assistant Senate Majority Leader (Whip), (9) Senate Minority Leader, (10) Assistant Senate Minority Leader (Whip), (11) presidential candidate

ProQuest Newspapers, LexisNexis Academic, Access World News, Meet the Press, and CQ Weekly yielded data in the form of: (1) newspaper articles, (2) magazine articles, (3) convention transcripts, (4) primary and general election debate transcripts, (5) presidential campaign commercial

³ Consistent with the expectation that the national party will attempt to broadcast its party brand to the entire nation, over 99% of newspaper articles were collected from large newspapers with national readership including, but not limited to: the New York Times, the Washington Post, USA Today, and the Los Angeles Times.

transcripts and (6) television interviews. A general internet search yielded (6) party platforms and (7) presidential candidate platforms. Together, these searches generated a corpus of over 10,000 individual party documents. A breakdown of the number of documents per party, per decade is included in Table 3.2.

3.2 Number of Party Documents per Party per Decade

NUMBER OF PARTY DOCUMENTS PER DECADE					
	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Democratic	84	340	1,644	2,393	501
Republican	59	400	1,918	2,862	466

The dramatic increase in the number of documents available from the 1950s through the 1990s (more likely to be electronically accessible) and transcription of party conventions. Transcripts are available for every speaker during the party conference beginning with the 1992 convention; prior to the 1992 convention, the only transcripts are for major speakers. Subsequent content analysis is conducted with the data also weighted by year, actor type, and communication mode to correct for the biasing effects of data availability due to technological advances.

3.3.1 Methods: An Overview of Computational Text Analysis

Within the humanities and social sciences, content analysis is traditionally used to tabulate responses to survey questions, identify common concepts across interview responses, and core themes of large bodies of text. However, business and market researchers have long used content analysis to assess patterns of organizational activity, and to describe the substantive and affective meaning of communication.

(Neuendorf 2016; Bo and Lee 2008; Nasukawa and Yi 2003; Kasstan 1977) In many ways, the social sciences have treated content analysis as a mean to a given research end (e.g. the tidy aggregation of responses to coded survey questions allows for said responses to be coded and later integrated into statistical models) as opposed to a research end in itself, but there is great value in using computational text analysis to isolate the central meaning and themes of a group of texts, while allowing for the identification of patterns and differences across time and between groups.

This chapter provides a description of the Democratic and Republican party brands between 1976 and 2012. Emphasis is placed on isolating recurring concepts, identifying common phrases, and determining affect frame. Chapter 4 employs more sophisticated modeling to determine the relative distances (similarity) between different corpuses, while isolating which actors are most active in the projection of brand position and which actors are most likely to initiate changes to the brand position.

3.3.2 Methods: Preparing the Text

A document classification system developed to group like texts together, into a single corpus.⁴ To this end, party texts are first divided by party, then by election cycle (e.g. Day After Election of Year x to Election Day of Year x+4), then by speaker (e.g. House minority whip or House majority whip, depending on which party power, etc.), then by media type (e.g. newspaper editorial versus television interview, etc.). A

³ SDUW \ [H Θ H B W H B Q P M G L D ´ F R U S o f a n a l y s i s . W r k e x a m p l e , D O O H V W
 the Republican x 1976-1980 x Party Chairman x Newspaper corpus contains only two

⁴ Typically, a corpus is a collection of written texts; however, in the context of this dissertation a corpus is a grouping of one or more written or transcribed texts.

unique party texts, but the Republican x 1976-80 corpus contains twenty-eight texts, and the Republican corpus contains 5,705 texts. Subsequent analyses specifically identify the corpus prior to the presentation of findings.

The data is also pre-processed using the cleaning and stemming features of the Text Mining package (tm) (Feldman and Sanger 2007; Meyer et al. 2008). Cleaning deletes non-content bearing language components (e.g. white space, punctuation, English stop words, etc.) and stemming strips words to their related morpheme (Haddi, Liu, and Shi 2013; Stolcke et al. 2000). Together, these modifications do not substantively distort the meaning of text and are consistent with the existing standard for substantive data alterations (Popping 2000).

3.3.3 Methods: Raw Counts and Thematic Clusters

As implied by the name, raw counts describe the text document (corpus) by tallying the number of times a specific root word appears in each corpus. Raw counts are an important step in processing text and provide a baseline understanding of key words for each party and election cycle, but the output does not provide tremendous insight in and of itself. More involved methods of text analysis like clustering must be applied after this initial treatment to unpack meaningful patterns and themes.

Clustering is the grouping together of like data points (words, also referred to as tokens) by established criteria through an iterative algorithm. Most commonly, tokens are grouped based on their similarity to the average/centroid of a predetermined number of

⁵ Stemming facilitates efficient analysis by consolidating words that would otherwise be counted as distinct despite having shared meaning; for example, when `stem(RFHVVHG)` `^3SUHVLGHQWLDO'EHFRP`
`^3UHVSQRQVLELOLWLHV'` `^3UHVSQRQVLELOLWLHV'` `^3UHVSQRQVLELOLWLHV'` `^3UHVSQRQVLELOLWLHV'`

clusters or based on their similarity in relation to the probability they belong to a given corpus. While both methods create clusters of similar tokens/words, they require different assumptions to be made about the corpus to determine how the tokens/words should be grouped.

Connectivity clustering also groups tokens based on their similarity, but does so based on their spatial proximity to one another in a document of a given corpus. As opposed to just being a raw count of a single word, clustering allows for the extraction of frequently repeated general phrases and/or words that are repeated closely, but not necessarily next to, each other. Because a given topic is rarely discussed verbatim, clustering allows for pairs to be extracted in a manner consistent with those variations inherent in speech/writing on a single topic. This is especially important with respect to political texts, which tend to be heavily framed. For example, as party leaders communicate strategically not straightforwardly

For example, in more recent election cycles Republican Party script often

L Q F O X G H V P H Q W L R Q V R e f e r e n c e t o n a k a n d v a g e w a k e n p a s s i v e L R Q ¶ V

the importance of immigrants learning English upon their arrival. However, between

November 2nd, 2004 and November 4th 2008, key party leaders never said or wrote

³ L P P L J U D Q W V ´ D Q G ³ (Q J O L V K ´ L Q V X F F H V V L R Q Z K L F K

³ L P P L J U D Q W V (Q J O L V K ´ L V a s o d i d n o t m a k e f o r d e r , b u t s t i d d e y H U V

V W D W H P H Q W V O L N H ³ L P P L J U D Q W V P X V W O H D U Q (Q J O L V

G H O L F D W H O \ I U D P H G D Q G ³ L P P L J U D Q W ´ D Q G ³ (Q J O L V K ´

complete sentences.

For example, the Republican Party Platform 2008 states: "English is the official language of the United States and the territories, including Alaska and Hawaii. Immigrants should be encouraged to learn English. English is the accepted language of business, commerce, and legal proceedings, and it is essential as a unifying cultural force." (Republican Party Platform 2008, 4)

In our multi-ethnic nation, everyone—immigrants and native-born alike—must embrace our core values of liberty, equality, meritocracy, and respect for human dignity and the rights of women. One sign of our unity is the English language. For newcomers, it has always been the fastest route to prosperity in America. English empowers. We support English as the official language in our nation, while welcoming the ethnic diversity in the United States and the territories, including Alaska and Hawaii. Immigrants should be encouraged to learn English. English is the accepted language of business, commerce, and legal proceedings, and it is essential as a unifying cultural force. (Republican Party Platform 2008, 4)

If clusters were created based on the frequency of word pairings or consecutive short sequences of words, such as "SKUDVHV" or "LPPLJUDQWV (QJOLVK' ZRXOG QRW HPHUJH", of the top ten most frequent themes of 2008. Connectivity clustering allows more latent or heavily framed concepts to be drawn from a greater body of text than traditional raw counts of words and phrases.

To identify key concepts using connectivity clustering, each document within a corpus is treated as a vector and the Euclidean distance between each individual word is measured, in turn allowing for frequently grouped concepts to be identified and extracted. The number of words and these bounds are shifted with each subsequent iteration of the model (e.g. Vector₁₀₀ to Vector₁₀₁, etc.). The process of shifting the bounds of analysis until the entire document has been processed is referred to as fuzzy clustering. As opposed to hard clustering, fuzzy clustering does not impose a single preset boundary and only analyzes data within that frame (e.g. Vector₁₀₀ to Vector₁₀₁).

Vector₁₀₁ to Vector₂₀₀, etc.). Fuzzy clustering is more flexible and better suited to

analyzing the W \ S H R I G D W D F H Q W U A D A Y S I S W R W K L V G L V V H U W D W L

For example, the text excerpt from the 2008 Republican Party Platform (above)

begins at the 2,157 word and ends at the 2,260 word (103 words total). If hard

clustering were employed, one subset of connectivity analysis would begin at Vector

end at Vector₂₂₀₀ and the next would begin at Vector₂₂₀₁ and end at Vector₂₃₀₀, which

would effectively truncate the passage just after its middle point in the third

V H Q W H Q F H E H W Z H H. The first and second half of the passage would not

E H D Q D O \ J H G W R J H W K H U L Q W X U Q R E V F X U L Q J W K H S D U

D Q G ³ (Q J O L V K '

Connectivity clustering is a crucial tool in establishing recurring substantive

W K H P H V R I O D U J H E R G L H V R I W H [D W S T E R 7 A N A L Y S I S A T E G L Q J V I U R P

presented in subsequent sections.

3.3.4 Methods: Ideological and Sentiment Analysis

Political Science has embraced the analytical benefit of computational text

analysis to the extent of other disciplines but did not lead the charge in developing a reliable

method of sentiment scaling (also referred to as affective, valence, and tonal scaling)

opposed to raw counts and clustering, which center on tangible (or explicitly readable)

content; sentiment scaling measures implied or latent meaning and tone. The most

common form of affective measurement is ideological scaling (Laver, Benoit, and Garry

2003), which estimates the ideological position of a given text along a priori

dimension. For this model to accurately perform, the ideological position of the reference

text (which provides the a priori dimension as a point of comparison), must be well

defined, known, or uncontroversial (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003, 313). With the a priori dimension established, the virgin text is then compared to the reference text and, through word scores and related manipulations, the ideological position of the virgin text is identified. Several variations of this method wherein words are treated as data have been developed (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2008, Beauchamp 2012, Slapin and Proksch 2008, etc) to marginally different ends; however, the method, especially the reliance on a reference text, remains largely unchanged.

Ideological scaling via computational text analysis is tremendously helpful and quite reliable if the a priori dimension is clearly established. However, the nature of this project, particularly the exploration of S D U W and H V as evolving over time and the integration of different document sources, does not allow for a single text to be designated as a reference. R P S D U L Q J W K H ' H P R F U D W L F 3 D U W \ ¶ V ' H P R F U D W S ¶ V H V L G H Q W L D O F D Q G L G D W H ¶ V L Q W H U Y L H Z R C comparing apples to oranges; neither text would be an appropriate reference for the other with respect to determining ideological position. Moreover, various literatures have extensively documented the relative ideological positions of both parties Congress over the years and, even if ideological scaling were a possibility here, there would be

Accounting for this limitation, pursue other forms of sentiment analysis that allow each corpus to be scaled with respect to affect (positive / negative), leadership, temporal O I R F X V D P R Q J R W K H U t n (D e t M D i e g) Q u a n t i t a t i v e L Q J 5 ¶ V L I W C a l i k e p a c k a g e s D Q G W K H / L Q J X L V W L F , Q T X L U \ D Q G : R U G & R X

SURSULHW DQG³ FORNWL⁶ Add from measuring sentiment, not ideology, the analytical process underlying these packages is similar that of ideological scaling; however, here the a priori dimension is / , : & ¶ 2007 dictionary⁷, which includes upwards of 4,500 words.⁸ Most of these words are scored for various affects much the way individual words in an ideological reference text are scored for policy position. Together, Quanteda and LIWC alike facilitate tabular reports of raw counts, clusters, and percentages, which allows for more complex text processes, including sentiment analysis. Findings from these manipulations are presented in section 3.4

3.4.1 Raw Counts and Clusters Brand Position and Issue Ownership

Raw counts tally the number of times stemmed words appear in each corpus, which allows frequencies and ranks to be assigned to each word. Frequencies are helpful in establishing recurring single word concepts and providing a quick snapshot of what the parties (and their actors) were broadcasting at a given point in time

For H [D P S O H W K H ' H s P B A d o p u s / o f F e x t s O n l i n e] of all party documents from November 5th 1980-November 6th, P H Q W L R Q V 3 5 H D J D Q ' 3 Z R U O G W L P H V D Q G 3 F K L O G U H Q ' c o n t r e i n f o r m a t i o n W V L G H R

⁶ Various text processing functions in Quanteda and LIWC are similar to those offered by LIWC software; however, R allows for much greater flexibility with respect to manipulating the text (establishing FXW SRLQWV HWF VR WKL only twice MMR VP KD VXD/G & FORNWLZIDFDH because there is no comparable method of analysis offered by R packages.

⁷ / , : & ¶ V GLFWLRQDULHV DUH WKH JROG VWDQGDUG LQ VHQWLPHQW charged word is done so based on scientific research, typically by psycholinguists. M W V D Q G O L Q J X L V W V / , dictionaries are proprietary and their 2015 dictionary is not disseminated; however, the 2007 dictionary is included if a license for their software is purchased. LIWC compared both dictionaries, using their own software, for 100,000 files inclusive of upwards of 200 million words and the difference in output was VWDWLVLWLFDOO\ QHJOLJLEOH , Q WKL V YHLQ WKL V GLVVHUWDLWLF validity given the introduction of the 2015 dictionary

⁸ Over 85% of the words in each corpus were also in the 2007 LIWC dictionary, which is consistent with / , : & ¶ V DVVHVVP HQW RI WKH GLFWLRQDU\ ¶ V FRYHUDJH DFURVV

particularly elucidating in and of themselves as the words are without context. To this end, this project conducted raw court to establish a rudimentary baseline understanding of tKH SDUW\TV EUDQG SRVLWLRQ EHIRUH PRYLQJ WR P

Table 3.3 Ten Most Common Connectivity Clusters, Democratic and Republican Overall C 1976-2012

Rank	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
1	administration nixon	oil trade	foreign governments	soviet leaders	forgotten middle*	health insurance*	global threats	alqaeda target	crisis fiscal	typical family*
2	elderly incomes*	arms control*	middle class*	peace process*	failed healthcare*	income middle*	retirement security*	mass destruction	education gap	homes afford
3	agriculture expand*	defense soviet*	income tax	welfare bill*	policy foreign	medicare medicat*	cutting poverty*	defense homeland	climate change*	independent energy
4	equal school*	credit tax	military cost	nuclear testing	read lips	reduce nuclear	pay college*	middle class*	fuel efficiency	terrorist alliances
5	protection land*	disabled elderly*	decent education*	inclusion politics*	labor policy*	credit college*	P R U D O F H@Mtdhne*	stop war*	stop war*	closing loopholes
6	poverty living*	minimum wage*	hungry homeless*	social security*	poverty millions*	tax cut	strengthen medicare*	seniors medicare*	security seniors*	start head*
7	pricing gas	teacher training*	rainbow coalition*	city students*	responsibilities racial	refugees fugitives	schools results*	prevent korea	alqaeda iraq	low income*
8	health care*	social security*	blacks women	union choice*	decent schools*	defense missile*	safety gun	diversity competition*	alternative tax	college students*
9	discrimination sex*	achieving students*	moral values	equal access*	drug treatment	crime rate	supreme court	soldier reservists	students kids*	natural gas
10	barriers trade	miserly index	steel workers	sound environmental*	head start*	finance reform	gays lesbians	crime violence	reform immigration	live poverty*
1	war veterans*	defense national*	cut taxes*	tax cuts*	persian gulf*	health care	emerging threats*	9/11 attack*	east middle*	partisan judge
2	national defense*	soviet union*	departm dence*	proposal tax*	eastern europe*	create jobs*	low taxation*	mass destruction*	common sense	borders homeland*
3	budget balanced	hostages iran*	regonomics cut*	security national*	military superpower*	middle class	middle class	terror operations*	world arab*	faith discrimination
4	home taxes*	cut tax*	arms nuclear*	unemployment lines	politically correct	border agents*	violent crimes*	counterterrorisr policy*	judicial nominee	freedom religious
5	illegal crime*	families dignity*	east middle*	military aid*	soviet union*	criminal aliens*	medical savings	saddam hussain*	fiscal accountability	marriage traditional
6	preventing drugs*	natural gas	secure peace	soviet's chance*	upper middle	social security	teacher training	medicaine taxes	limited taxes*	medicaid medicare
7	farm exports	stimulate jobs	abortion question	drug dealers*	personal dependency	juvenile violence*	drug illegal*	borders prevent*	immigrants english	english immigrants
8	health insurance	earned taxpayer*	moral values*	traditions family*	wrong taxes*	responsibility personal	promote marriage	law enforcement*	illegal immigration	society entitlement
9	industry oil	conservation desirable	local busing	social religious*	family values*	reclaim neighborhoods	faith charitable	uninsured patient	savings health	charter school
10	israel threatened*	moral white*	god constitution	urban housing	school choice	public housing	rural underserved	north korea*	religious liberty	illegal aliens

Connectivity clustering excels in those areas raw counts are weak and provides great leverage in assessing the most common themes for both parties in each election cycle. Table 3.3 presents the top ten most frequent clusters for both parties, during each

eO HFWLRQ F\FOH ,W LV QRWDEOH-universally HDFK SDUW\TV communicates more information on those issues they are perceived as owning than those the opposition is perceived as owning. This is consistent both with business marketing and political science literatures as it is expected a party in control of its brand position would choose to draw attention to those areas and trade upon those issues for which it is favorably perceived and uniquely associated with.

For the purposes of this dissertation, issue ownership is measured as commonly is in the extant literature (e.g. Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen 2003; Van der Brug 2004; Damore 2004; etc.). A party is viewed as having ownership over a given issue if the population views the respective party as being better equipped to handle the issue. Because there are fluctuations in issue ownership over time, ANES time series data

ZDV XVHG WR GHWHUPLQH RZQHUVKLS %HWZHHQ D party do you think can better handle issues such as taxes, the middle class, agriculture, foreign affairs, the military, crime, and social equality. (ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 2010)¹⁰ a question was not

¹⁰ Issue ownership is also an artifact of recognizability, a dimension some scholars emphasize more than others in their treatment of the concept. This dissertation affirms the centrality of recognizability both in establishing ownership over an issue and in strategic branding more generally. Using data collected from ANES responses, it is reasonable to assume respondents are providing answers based on their recognition of which party is more competent in handling issues related to [X] as opposed to answering without recognition. RI HLWKHU SDUW\TV SHUIRUPDQFH VROHO\ EHFDXVH WKH\ D

included in a presidential election year, the next closest survey date that included the question/issue was used to proxy issue ownership during the election year. If a party was viewed as 10% more competent than their competition on a given issue, they were flagged as having ownership during that election cycle. Democrats are consistently viewed as owning the issues of equality, peace keeping, healthcare, and education. Republicans are routinely viewed as better equipped to handle foreign affairs, issues related to the military, crime, and taxes¹¹.

Cells colored yellow and denoted with an asterisk indicate the cluster is a topic over which the party is perceived as having ownership, whereas a green cell with a dagger indicates the party is referencing a topic over which the opposite party has ownership. Cells with no color fill indicate a topic over which neither party has ownership.

2 Y H U D O O W K H ' H P R F U D W L F 3 D U W \ ¶ V P R V W I U H T X H C
 1972 and 2012 include fifty-seven issues over which they are viewed as having ownership, twenty-three issues over which the Republican Party has ownership, and twenty issues that are not perceived as owned by either party. Democrats average 5.7 owned issues, 2.3 opposition-owned issues, and 2 neutral issues per cycle, with the most party- R Z Q H G L V V X H V E H L Q J L Q ¶ V F \ F O H H L J K W L V V X H
 and the most neutral in 2012 (four issues). Of the 100 clusters for Republicans, fifty

¹¹ Agriculture was the major aberration from what are largely steadfast patterns as Democrats were viewed as having ownership over agriculture until the mid ¶ V Z K H Q F L W L J H Q S H U F H S W L R Q E H J small margins between the two parties. Thus, agriculture is only coded as an issue owned by Democrats prior to 1996.

were of issues over which they are perceived as having ownership, ten are for
W K R V H ' H P R F U D W ¶ V R Y H U Z K L F r i n e k a d Y e u t r a R e p u b l i c a n s L S D Q C
averaged 5.4 owned, 1.7 opposition owned, and 2.9 neutral issues per election cycle, with
the most party-owned issues tied in 1988 and 2004 (eight owned issues), the least in 2012
(one issue), and the most neutral also in 2012 (seven issues).

The only notable exceptions occur in Z K H Q ' H P R F U D W V ¶ W R S F O X
included six opposition R Z Q H G L V V X H V D Q G D Q G Z K H Q 5 H
clusters included four and two opposition-owned issues. Thus, in 85% of elections, the
S D U W L H V ¶ E U D Q G S R V L W L R Q V S U R P R W H G W K R V H L V V X H
more than those issues on which the party was not.

However, the exceptions to this overall trend are interesting and worth discussing
- albeit somewhat anecdotally in greater detail. In 1996, Republicans ran Senator Bob
Dole as their presidential candidate and, as is documented and affirmed in an
interview with Senator Dole conducted as part of this dissertation project, there was some
disagreement as to where the party organization and candidate stood on social issues,
most notably abortion. The 1996 Republican Party encouraged and ultimately assured the
adoption of a strongly worded, pro S U R Y L V L R Q W R W K H S D U W \ S O D W I F
F D P S D L J Q U H V L V W H G L Q I D Y R U R I D P R U H Q H X W U D O S R
rights. To this end, perhaps the 1996 Republican Party lacked unity across relevant actor
groups, which segmented the message H D Q G U H V X O W H G L Q W K H S D U W \ ¶ V
of its brand position.

In the wake of 9/11 the Democratic Party was in the unenviable position of being forced to run on those issues they are not viewed as exceptionally competent on: national security, defense, and the military. Of the six opposition-owned clusters to comprise the

'HPRFUDWLF EUDQG SRVLWLRQ LQ ILYH ZHUH GLUH
KHLJKWHQH G LQWHUQDWLRQDO SUHVHQFH ne J ³DOTDH
KRPHODQG´ ³SUHYHQW NRUHD´ DQG ³VROGLHU UHVHU

for the Republican Party, in which six of the eight party-owned issue clusters seem to be

WKH SURGXFW RI IDOORXW IURP H dor ³ DWWDFN´
RSHUDWLRQV´ ³FRXQWHUWHUURULVP SROLF\´ ³VDGGDI

7KH 5HSXEOLFDQ 3DUW\ In the Fall Disruptive Party SRVLWLRQ LV

weak showing with respect to issues it owns H J ³ERUGHUV KRPHODQG´ DQ

the oSSRVLWLRQ RZQV H J ³PHGLFDLG PHGLFDUH´ DQG ³

offensively focusing on those issues over which the Republican Party is viewed favorably

or defensively responding to those issues Democrats focused on, the Republican brand

position is a jumble of issues over which neither party is traditionally viewed as having

ownership. The Republican brand position appears to fully embody issues previously

DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK LWV 7HD 3DUW\ FDQGLGDWHV DQG K
MXGJHV´ ³IDLWK GLVFULPLQDWLRQ´ ³IUHHGRP UHOLJL
LPPLJUDQWV´ ³VRFLHW\ HQWLTW\ Share Price Wn off the DQG ³LOOHJD

traditional messaging of either party is not entirely unexpected; in 2008 the br

SRVLWLRQ LQFOXGHG QHXWUDO ³LPPLJUDQWV (QJOLVK
OLEHUW\´ LQ ³SURPRWH PDUULDJH´ DQG ³IDLWK FK

LQ DQG HXSKHPLVPV WKDW PDVNRUUDJHFDV' KR VWI
3 SHUVRQDO G HSHQG HGF \ ' 3 UHVS RQVLELOLW \ SHUVRQD
WKHLU KHDGV 7KH 5HSXEOLFDQ 3DUW \ ¶ V EUDQG SRVLV

issues is traced in the next chapter.

Apart from these deviations, the rank order of the clusters for each election cycle shed help to assess how issue ownership contributes to party brand as the frequency of discussion is an area over which party leaders have greater control. While forces exogenous to the system have the capacity (RI GLFDWLQJ ZKDW LV WDON SUHVLGHQWLDO HOHFWLRQ ZDV FOHDUO \ VNHZHG E \ aftermath), the parties have much more control over how frequently they engage the issues of the day. Typically, those issues over which the party is perceived as having ownership are topped in the rankings, meaning the party more frequently raises the issue as a point of discussion. This is especially true for the Republican Party, where forty-one of their total fifty-four issue owned clusters have a ranked frequency between one and five. The Democratic brand position demonstrates a similar, though slightly weaker, pattern with thirty-five of its fifty-seven issue owned clusters ranking in their top five.

This pattern minimally highlights a correlation between those issues the party is favorably associated with and the frequency with which party leadership discusses said issues. Pressed further, this correlation suggests party leadership makes a strategic decision to frequently engage with those issues over which they have ownership, while shirking those issues over which the opposition has ownership when possible. Taken

together the content and ranked order of the connectivity clusters for both parties highlights a persistent correlation between issues owned by the party and their prominent

LQFRUSRUDWLRQ LQWR WKH SDUW\¶V EUDQG SRVLWLRQ

It is also notable that, of the ten election cycles analyzed, seven of the presidential contests were won by the party that had an advantage with respect to brand position and

LVVXH RZQHUVKLS HJ WKH 'HPRFUDWLF SDUW\¶V EUDQ LQ FRPSDUHG WR WKH *23¶V RQH RZQHG LVVXH 7.

were tied with respect to ownership, one of which was won by the Republican candidate and one of which was won by the Democratic candidate. The only instance in which a

SDUW\¶V EUDQG SRVLWLRQ KDG DQ RZQHUVKLS DGYDQV 'HPRFUDW¶V KDGHIVYFRPSDUHG WR 5HSXEOLFDQV¶ IRX

VSHFLDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV VXUURXQGLQJ 9LFH 3UHVLGH

this election as true evidence of the party with a more favorably held brand position (with respect to issue ownership) losing an election. To this end, the data indicate a strong

correlation between electoral success at the presidential level and the extent to which the SDUW\¶V EUDQG SRVLWLRQ HIIHFWLYHO\ LQFRUSRUDWH

they have ownership.

This relationship is logical as issue ownership is closely linked to citizen SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH SDUW\ DQG IDYRUDELOLW\ 5HFDO

measure of party image (e.g. Philpot 2008; Trilling 1976; Karpowitz 2013; etc.).

7KH H[WDQW OLWHUDWXUHV FRQVLVWHQWO\ ILQG 3IDYR

electoral support and, as is relevant to business marketing, consumer choice (Schnittka,

Sattler, and Zenker 2012; Wang and Yang 2010; Brown and Da 1997; Pitta and Prevel
Katsanis 1995; Keller 1993, so it reasonably follows a party brand position focused on
issues salient in the eyes of the public and on which the party is viewed favorably will
likely be correlated with electoral success. Moreover, parties do not operate in a vacuum

V H H ' H P R F U D W ¶ V E U D Q G S R V L W L R Q L Q D Q G D V L
imposed by the system in which they are nested and, at times exogenous forces. To this
end, it would be unreasonable to propose a party would speak only to those issues on
which they are viewed favorably. Instead, parties must respond to a broad agenda

L Q F O X V L Y H R I L V V X H V R I W K H G D \ D Q G W K H L U R S S R V L V
institutional factors (i.e. path dependency, rule-based behaviors, etc.). However, it is
U H D V R Q D E O H W R S R V L W W K D W G H V S L W H W K H V H E D U U L
electoral prospects and the extent to which they can stay on message.¹²

3.5.1 Sentiment Analysis An Introduction

As the methods section of this chapter explains, sentiment analysis is conducted
by comparing the similarity between a reference document and the corpus of interest
along key affective dimensions. The LIWC 2007 dictionary provides the anchoring

¹² There is potential for a self-reinforcing feedback loop based on the dynamic described here. It is feasible
that external pressures, including the electoral system in which party organizations are nested, the
S R O L W L F D O O D Q G V F D S H D Q G F R Q V W U D L G e n d a , a n d P u b / t h e F a v o r e d Y L R U V L Q
party to capitalize on their strengths while the opposition is left in a defensive position, in turn biasing the
electoral agenda in favor of the offensive party in subsequent years. While the presence of such feedback
loop is I L N H O \ L W G R H V Q R W I X O O \ V X E Y H U W H D F K S D U W \ ¶ V D E L O L W \
what frequency. Moreover, it is not necessarily important to this project who sets the national agenda
though there is certainly rich discussion of who I O X H Q F H V W K H S D U W \ ¶ V E U D Q G S R V L W
but how they respond. If the connectivity clusters for Democrats and Republicans mirrored one another, it
would be reasonable to assume the agenda is either preset or created based on both parties W U L E X W L R Q V
however, the clusters do not and it is rare for both parties to have the same issues/themes as the focal point
of their brand position (2004 being the aberration when both parties focused on 9/11), which suggests party
organizations/actors are not merely responding to the system in which they are embedded, but also shape
the system through their strategic decision to engage a given issue

content is affectively framed? By engaging institutional and business marketing literatures this section grapples with how individual agency is transformed and actualized within an institutionalized organization and broader structural environment

As outlined in Chapter 2, parties are comprised of four primary actor groups. Each actor group is listed as having a set of specializations (e.g. the national committee is a resource holder, uniquely equipped to keep a finger on the pulse of the people and able to provide this information to the candidates whom the party supports, etc.), which contribute to the perpetuation of the greater party system.

2 I I L F H K R O G H U V ¶ F R U H F R P S H W H Q F L H V L Q F O X G H S
as they are, quite literally, the face of the organization; however, within this category there are more specific responsibilities and participatory expectations assigned to key leadership by the national party apparatus. This division of labor is particularly observable when comparing the role of congressional whips to their congressional leader. F R X Q W H U S D U W V er v i c e l i s t o v i s i t o r P D U W K H S D U p o s i t i o n s , S R O L F L H
and ideals—first among their partisans in Congress, but also among their partisans in the electorate¹⁴. This is in stark contrast to congressional party leaders (e.g. Senate Majority/Minority Leader, etc.), who function as figureheads of the party. While congressional leaders certainly have the capacity to build support for the party, it is secondary benefit to their leadership responsibilities.

¹⁴ Congressional whips in both chambers and on both sides of the aisle are as likely to engage in brand position promotion as their counterparts were traditionally thought to be more visible (e.g. Minority Leader of the House, etc.); however, the content of their communications are distinct in that they are nearly always tied to a specific policy or party position, whereas other leaders often engage general discussions and party promotion.

Assuming the official aim of both parties is self-perpetuation (through the winning of office), there is variation with respect to the secondary aims of actors within the party. With respect to the party brand framework, whips are franchise extensions that DUH PRUH FORVHO \ KHONGIDENRY THAKHIN SONGWESSONALFEADERS E U and presidents, as their party assigned role is inherently more partisan. When a franchise extension is afforded leniencies, they are still required to adhere to the brand but may exhibit a degree of individuality. Regardless of how closely held an elected official (franchise extension) is, there is a script which dictates the appropriateness of behaviors for specific party positions and thus there should be an observable difference between tightly- and loosely-held franchise extensions.

Organizational context inherently favors certain strategies and actions. Through the process of strategic learning, actors are familiarized with the norms and rules, which govern the behavior of those internal to the organization. Actors learn and revise their understanding of what is expected of them in their party assigned role and what is feasible, desirable, and legitimate as individual actors within the party through repeated interactions, institutional memory, and interdependency. Taken together, these factors establish rules for behavior, a series of normative and cognitive considerations, which allows each actor to identify acceptable behavior given their role

Rules, like the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 2004), justify and prescribe certain behaviors for a given role, within a given organization, within a greater institutional context. This development of a script that actors can adhere to fosters predictability, both with respect to the behavior of actors in their party assigned role and

in their role as individual agents. There are rules that apply to actors equally and rules specific to each actor category. For example, while all elected officials operate as franchise extensions of the party, some extensions like congressional whips are governed by rules that ensure they more closely align with the core identity because their role inherently serves the party by reinforcing said identity.

Building on the QRWLRQ R I D S S U R S U M M A R I Z E D B Y R U L E S O F F I D E L I T Y internal to the organization, there should be less flexibility and room for interpretation in the prescribed action of congressional whips than for presidential candidates and congressional leaders. These differences should be observable both in the way different actor groups affectively communicate and the extent to which there is variance between whips, presidential candidates, and congressional leaders from year to year.

Table 3.4 summarizes the results from the sentiment analysis as applied to all GRFXPHQWV LQ HDFK SUHVLGHQWLDO FDQGLGDWHV FR figures with that of more restrained (e.g. whips) party actors, it is of note that Democratic candidates are, on average, marginally both more positive and negative than Republican candidates (3.52 and 2.79 compared to 3.10 and 2.51), though Republican candidates do average higher in their use of language that stokes anxiety and fear (1.53 to 1.03). Though this is a marginal difference, it is likely that DWLIDFW RI 5HSXEOLF DQ V VFRULQJ KLJKHU RQ /, : & ¶ V ³ DQDO\WLFDO´ PHDVXUH ZK makes a linear argument or incorporates anecdotes; arguments that include anecdotes for demonstrative effect are more likely to include positively and negatively affected language as part of the frame.

Table 3.4 Sentiment Analysis Results, Republican and Democratic Presidential Candidates 1976-2012

	Year	%Past	%Present	%Future	%Positive	%Negative	%Anxiety	%I	%We	%Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
Carter	1976	4.46	12.12	0.80	3.20	1.07	0.26	3.20	2.86	1.80	83.62	59.56
Carter	1980	1.93	8.67	0.61	3.59	1.75	1.23	2.89	1.23	0.26	63.03	84.85
Dukakis	1984	2.03	8.12	1.43	2.77	2.17	0.92	2.31	2.21	0.74	76.69	81.80
Mondale	1988	2.03	8.12	1.43	2.77	2.17	0.92	2.31	2.21	0.74	76.69	81.80
Clinton	1992	3.80	11.07	1.60	2.87	3.14	0.47	2.20	3.00	0.60	77.64	74.69
Clinton	1996	1.01	6.00	2.73	2.49	4.99	1.71	0.55	1.95	0.00	87.56	76.42
Gore	2000	2.76	6.80	0.86	3.70	2.67	1.63	0.69	1.81	0.52	83.91	73.44
Kerry	2004	3.84	9.70	1.35	4.01	3.84	2.24	3.33	2.15	0.59	82.34	67.42
Obama	2008	2.77	9.00	1.55	5.56	3.98	0.66	2.34	3.46	0.46	86.11	75.48
Obama	2012	1.21	10.31	2.03	4.20	2.09	0.26	3.08	3.87	0.27	89.70	78.62
Avg.		2.58	8.99	1.44	3.52	2.79	1.03	2.29	2.48	0.60	80.73	75.41
Ford	1976	3.43	12.66	1.19	2.69	2.81	1.04	4.83	2.10	0.35	68.52	70.21
Reagan	1980	3.02	10.73	1.77	2.99	2.42	0.42	1.77	1.98	0.94	69.89	69.22
Reagan	1984	3.76	10.34	1.57	3.22	1.25	1.07	0.52	2.82	1.04	85.92	74.97
Bush (41)	1988	3.06	8.40	1.42	3.87	2.50	0.72	1.64	1.85	0.14	76.62	84.30
Bush (41)	1992	2.34	9.60	1.61	2.52	1.69	1.63	1.86	0.48	0.48	78.32	84.63
Dole	1996	3.17	7.45	1.54	3.32	2.11	0.74	1.11	1.88	0.68	87.96	78.76
Bush (43)	2000	0.83	6.71	2.76	3.51	2.21	2.53	1.65	1.38	0.28	66.06	86.93
Bush (43)	2004	2.86	6.49	0.84	3.04	3.45	2.02	2.75	1.25	0.59	66.34	76.77
McCain	2008	2.66	8.28	1.54	2.87	3.77	3.12	2.60	2.44	0.80	75.51	70.51
Romney	2012	2.07	8.77	0.79	3.01	2.90	2.01	2.75	1.04	1.87	78.38	82.69
Avg.		2.72	8.94	1.50	3.10	2.51	1.53	2.15	1.72	0.72	75.35	77.90

Figure 3.2 visually represents leadership scores for Senate Democratic and Republican leadership between 1976 and 2012. The Assistant Majority/Minority Leaders Majority/Minority leaders tend to use language that cues leadership and hierarchy in their communications and are much less likely to speak in the first person. Moreover, both Democratic and Republican whips score higher in analytical assessments of their speech pattern (i.e. preference for making straightforward, linear appeals) when compared with their Senate Leader counterpart.




Figure 3.2 Democratic and Republican Senate Leadership Scores 1978-2012




Figure 3.3 Collective versus Othering Speech, Democratic and Republican Senate Leadership 1978-2012

Whips also have a demonstrated pattern of using collective phrasing (e.g. “We” etc.) as opposed to framing an idea as being spoken on their own behalf, which cultivates a unique institutionalized role they occupy and their reliance on a script, which cultivates




Figure 3.4 Analytical Speech, Democratic and Republican Senate Leadership, 1976-2012

Whips on both sides of the aisle are also typically more analytical in their speech and writing pattern than congressional leadership. Figure 3.4 demonstrates that whips are nearly always more straightforward and less likely to make abstract appeals, filled with anecdotes and opinions, than their senate leader. This difference is particularly pronounced within the Democratic Party, which is generally less analytical than Republicans; for the period of 1976 to 2012, Democratic and Republican Senate whips demonstrated nearly identical levels of analytical speech (averaging 93.03 and 91.63 across all whips) irrespective of whether their party was in power, whereas there is great variation for senate leaders, both within and between the parties.

Particularly interesting language and frames since 1992 especially when compared with the Democratic Party. This buttresses the discipline identity cleavages to mobilize their base (Rosino and Hughey 2016; Hughey and Parks 2014; Barretto et al. 2011; etc.)

These affective differences in framing are particularly well demonstrated by comparing two newspaper articles written during a period of Democratic majority (10¹st and 10²nd Congresses) by Democratic Senate Leader George Mitchell and the Democratic Assistant Senate Leader (whip) Alan Cranston. Both senators published on the topic of U.S. relations with Asia, with specific emphasis on U.S. relations with China.

agenda and move to discuss a variety of related topics, including trade policy, human rights, the relationship between China and Cambodia, and American interests. Substantive areas of overlap are each highlighted (once per topic) and numbered in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. Similarities and differences are discussed in turn, below.

Both Senators begin by introducing their piece in relation to President George + : % X V K ... SRVLWLRQ 7RSLF RQ 8 6 \$VLD &KLQD UH * HRUJH 0LWFKHOO VWDWLQJ LQ Q RY, XQFronjy WDLQ WHUPV GLVDJUHH>V@ ' ZLWK WKH 3UHVLGHQW K D Q G O L Q J R I primacy of American interests (Topic 2). There is fleeting discussion of nuclear deterrence (Topic 3) in both pieces and a more protracted discussion of trade issues

7RSLF ZLWK VSHFLILF HPSKDVLV SODFHG RQ \$PHULI
 DQG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI UHFLSURFLW\ LQ WUDGH DJU
 H[WHQVLYHO\ LQGLFWV &KLQD ¶VctkdQuca lights, whEG DOOHJ
 Senator Cranston acknowledges the issue in passing (Topic 9). Both pieces propose a
 FRQFUHHW SROLF\ HQG 7RSLF EXW 6HQDWRU 0LWFK
 vague with respect to details, whereas Senator Cranston ~~only~~ outlines a three
 pronged initiative.

Dawn of Pacific Century Finds U.S. Sitting on Its Status
 Cranston, Alan
Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File): Feb 15, 1989;
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Los Angeles Times (1881-1990)
 pg. A7

Dawn of Pacific Century Finds U.S. Sitting on Its Status

By ALAN CRANSTON

1 When President Bush leaves next week on his journey to Asia, he will be establishing important priorities for American diplomacy in the years ahead. By responding imaginatively to the economic and security challenges confronting American interests in Asia, Washington policy-makers can do much to advance our interests in the coming Pacific Century.

The challenge for the generation ahead seems clear. As progress is made on stabilizing U.S.-Soviet nuclear deterrence at lower levels of force, the relative economic strength of nations will emerge as a fundamental determinant of national power. Yet we are stumbling in our efforts to keep up with our friends and former adversaries in the Pacific. We are falling behind at the dawn of an era in which trade issues and military deployments are likely to prove even more divisive. To avoid such pitfalls and to realize our extraordinary opportunities on the Pacific Rim, we need new initiatives.

The region is undergoing a radical transformation. Soviet diplomacy is aggressively pursuing new openings—not just in Beijing, where the first Sino-Soviet summit in a generation will be held this May—but throughout East Asia. A new generation of Korean leaders is questioning the lessons of history and expanding economic relations with former enemies. China is struggling forward with economic change that promises to double its gross national product in less than one decade. Japan is awash in capital, working hard to assume new security and diplomatic responsibilities while trying to remain sensitive to neighbors' concerns about its expanding military prowess. Virtually throughout East Asia an unparalleled economic boom is bringing prosperity unimaginable a generation ago.

But this is also straining relations with the United States as many of our businesses and workers suffer from the enormous trade deficit.

2 A set of priorities needs to be established for our Pacific agenda:

3 Diplomatic initiatives. The United States should take the lead in establishing a Pacific Basin Forum to pursue cooperation on regional economic and security concerns. This proposal should include the establishment of annual summit-level meetings styled after those currently held by key presidents and prime ministers within the Atlantic alliance. The forum should also make a deliberate effort to reach out to the Soviets and their allies, Vietnam and North Korea, to encourage participation in a dialogue about such common concerns as free trade, economic development and security confidence-building.

4 Trade and investment policy. While rejecting sweeping protectionist measures, we need to ensure that we're not unilaterally disarming in trade competition. We should commit to taking swift and certain retaliation when foreign trading partners refuse to provide reciprocal treatment for U.S. agricultural products, manufactured goods and financial services.

5 To create new export opportunities, we also need a major new commitment to educating our work force about foreign markets and foreign languages. George Bush pledged to be "the education President." He can fulfill that commitment by joining Congress in a war on ignorance—shaping new efforts to improve American training in mathematics, geography, science and foreign languages.

6 To enhance trade competitiveness, we also need new initiatives to curb defense spending and cut capital-gains taxes (the U.S. rate is 33%, compared with 5% in Japan). That's how we can free up public and private resources

for investment in the production of commercial goods.

7 Security policy. There are five clear imperatives for the shapers of American military policy in the Pacific:

8 —Pursue negotiations with Manila for at least a 10-year renewal of the lease on our vital facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. Failure could result in a \$10-billion relocation cost and a sharp setback for Philippine-U.S. ties.

9 —Press the Japanese to pay more of the on-the-ground costs for the American forces in Japan that enhance regional security. But discourage Japan from assuming ever broader military missions. Japan has already "re-armed," and is now making substantial contributions to regional security and economic development.

10 —Continue to provide selected defensive arms to both China and the authorities on Taiwan, sales that can help to reduce the possibility of a rash military confrontation.

11 —Oppose pressures for premature U.S. troop withdrawals from South Korea, an action that must await progress in direct north-south talks.

12 —Continue in all our diplomatic and military efforts to champion human rights and the rule of the law. Experience clearly demonstrates that this is not simply a moral obligation but a strategic imperative as well. Democratic allies are more stable, more prosperous and more reliable than dictatorships.

13 The successful implementation of each of these initiatives could enhance American interests in the Pacific for generations to come. But if we fail, if we sit back and become a status quo power ignoring the sweeping changes taking place throughout the region, we will have only ourselves to blame.

Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Asia subcommittee.

Figure 3.5 Newspaper Article, Assistant Senate Majority Whip Alan Cranston

Though the articles are substantively similar, the style in which they are presented varies greatly and highlights the differences in the stylized scripts various party leaders

IROORZ DV GHPRQVWUDWHG LQ WKH DQDO\VHV DERYH
 LV IUDPHG DV DQ LQGLFWPHQW RI &KLQD DQG 3UHVVLGH
 China from his perspective. Senator U D Q V W R Q ¶ V SLHFH LV YHU\ P X F K P

FROOHFWLYH ZLWK ILEHDTVX+GQ VWSISHV X V Q V RWIR R Z H U 6 H Q
 article is incredibly linear; he introduces the problem and then advocates on behalf of a
 series of actions to ameliorate. K H L V V X H 6 H Q D W R U 0 L W F K H O O ¶ V Z U L V
 linear as he works toward a policy end; however, his article is much more affectively
 charged and bounces from abstract discussions of American ideals, to criticizing China
 for Tiananmen Square, to pro O H P D W L] L Q J 3 U H V L G H Q W % X V K ¶ V U H V S
 DIWHUPDWK RI 7LDQDQPHQ 6TXDUH WR GLVFXVVLQJ & K
 related human rights abuse, and to a discussion of trade relations with the United States
 before repeating this cycle a fidally introducing a policy solution.

No. China Hasn't Earned It
 Mitchell, George J
The Washington Post (1974-Current file); Jun 4, 1991;
 ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post
 pg. A23
George J. Mitchell

No. China Hasn't Earned It.

Two years ago, the Communist tyrants who control China directed the massacre at
 ① Tiananmen Square. Today President Bush
 ② wants to extend to China, without conditions, most favored nation trade status. I
 ③ respectfully but strongly disagree. . . .
 On Memorial Day, the President said
 ④ American foreign policy is "more than simply an extension of American interests. It's
 ⑤ an extension of American ideals." Our foreign
 ⑥ policy should be an extension of American
 ⑦ ideals. But the president's proposal is not an extension of American ideals. It's a
 ⑧ contradiction of those ideals.
 If American ideals are not violated by the
 ⑨ massacre in Tiananmen Square, by the imprisonment and execution of persons for
 ⑩ peaceful dissent, by the forced political indoctrination of students and the arbitrary
 ⑪ refusal of emigration rights, then how are those ideals defined?
 On Memorial Day, the president also said,
 ⑫ "the Chinese play a central role in working to resolve the conflict in Cambodia." They
 ⑬ do. The problem is what they're doing is wrong. They're arming the Khmer Rouge,
 ⑭ the party responsible for the deaths within the past 15 years of a quarter of the
 ⑮ Cambodian population. That is not the way
 ⑯ to resolve the conflict in that tortured country.
 By no reasonable standard does the Chinese government's treatment of its own
 ⑰ people or the people of Tibet reflect even the most minimal respect for basic human
 ⑱ rights. . . .
 The Chinese government has not honored
 ⑲ commitments it made to act responsibly in controlling the proliferation of biological,
 ⑳ chemical and nuclear weapons technologies. China has not become a better, fairer or
 ㉑ more open trading partner. American interests, as well as American ideals, are served
 ㉒ by a peaceful world with open trade. But even in this respect, the actions of the
 ㉓ Chinese government have not earned favored trade treatment.
 The government of China gives no protection
 ㉔ to U.S. intellectual property rights, a failure that leads to the proliferation of
 ㉕ bootlegged software and other properties inside China and exported from China.
 American exporters don't get the same
 ㉖ unrestricted and fair access to Chinese markets that President Bush proposes to give to
 ㉗ Chinese exports in our market.
 Last year, President Bush urged renewal
 ㉘ of China's MFN trade status because of the
 ㉙ economic importance of the relationship. Yet a year later, China's exports to this
 ㉚ country rose almost 30 percent to \$15 billion; our exports to China fell by almost
 ㉛ 20 percent to \$4.8 billion. It's an economically important trade relationship all right,
 ㉜ but it's obviously more important and advantageous to China than to the United States.
 Our best opportunity to influence the
 ㉝ Chinese regime's calculations is to make clear that there's a price to be paid for
 ㉞ following a policy of repression instead of a policy of democratic tolerance.
 That is precisely what President Bush has
 ㉟ not done. The Chinese government has paid no price whatever for its brutal massacre of
 ㊱ peaceful dissidents in Tiananmen Square. It has paid no price for its continued disregard
 ㊲ of world arms control efforts. It has paid no price for its repression in Tibet.
 Continued pressure from Congress was
 ㊳ needed to force the president to give proper asylum to the Chinese students seeking
 ㊴ safety on our shores in the year of the Tiananmen Massacre. The president's ill-
 ㊵ advised action, less than six months after the massacre, in authorizing a high-level
 ㊶ delegation to visit that country while claim-
 ㊷ ing the opposite policy, was the wrong response at the wrong time.
 It's time to acknowledge that the president's
 ㊸ policy hasn't worked. Repression inside China and in Tibet continues. Arms
 ㊹ sales proliferate. Arms technology exports continue unabated. And the only response to
 ㊺ U.S. protests is contemptuous Chinese dismissal and spurious indignation.
 The president's policy has been given a
 ㊻ fair chance to succeed. It has failed. It's time to change that policy.
 That's what I propose in legislation
 ㊼ to condition MFN status on improvements in the Chinese government's conduct at home
 ㊽ and abroad. That's a policy change that may get the attention of the Chinese leadership
 ㊾ in a way that the president's policy has failed to do. That's a policy change consistent with
 ㊿ American ideals and American interests.
 And it's a policy change that has at least a
 ㊽ chance of serving as a building block for a genuine new world order, based on respect
 ㊾ for human rights, without which our world will not achieve stability and lasting peace.
 The writer, a Democratic senator from
 ㊿ Maine, is Senate majority leader.

Figure 3.6 Newspaper Article, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell

Sentiment analysis of each article is consistent with the patterns discussed above.

6 H Q D W R U 0 L W F K H O O ¶ V D U W L F W K B Q N S E W I n g u a g e J U H D W H U
 (D Q G F R P S D U H G Z L W K 6 H Q D W R U & U D Q V W R Q ¶ V

relies much more heavily on linear argument

(78.79 to 6014).

These correlational findings hold across other elite actors for each party, actor group, and year can be found in the appendix. Overwhelming, those actors who are assigned leadership role by the party (e.g. Senate leaders, House leaders, Speaker of the House, presidential candidates, etc.) are more likely to use language that demonstrates leadership and to speak in the first person as their own agent, in addition to being an agent of the party. Those actors whose party prescribed roles are inherently analytical and are more likely to make analytical arguments.

Most relevant to the party brand framework, there is considerably less variation in each of these measures between and within the parties for whips and Chairmen, who are the aisle appears much more rigid than the script of appropriate behavior for other leaders, whose affect, leadership, and analytical styles vary substantially from year to year. As discussed in Chapter 4, those party leaders whose party assigned role inherently affords greater leniency to their own style of communication, than whips and chairmen.

3.6. Looking Toward Party Brand Position Evolution

Political parties, as branded organizations, are cognizant of their brand position and (more often than not) trade upon those issues and policies for which they are viewed favorably. This finding is consistent with the extant understanding of parties and their

actors as strategic entities which avoid or downplay issues on which they are perceived negatively. For all the similarities between the parties, an artifact of their occupying the same electoral system, there is consistent variation between party and franchise extensions who occupy different roles. All analyses to this point suggest franchise extensions that are more closely held by the party are restrained with respect to their communication of the brand position. To this end, there is much less variability within and between the parties with respect to the messaging of party whips and chairmen. Conversely, congressional leadership (excluding the whips) and presidential candidates demonstrate greater variability from election cycle to election cycle and suggest the party organization affords them greater leniencies in the stylistic expression of the party message, the pursuit of their secondary, individualistic aims, or otherwise.

: L W K D E D V H O L Q H G H V F U L S W L Y H S L F W X U H R I E R W K

understanding that party actors are based and governed by the party and electoral system in which they are nested, Chapter 4 moves to isolate which party actors instigate changes to party brand and the extent to which the party brand position varies in content from year to year.

CHAPTER 4 Who Leads Whom?

4.1 Party Brand Evolution

1 HDUO\ DOO RI a We know that party brands have been developed on the heuristic value of a brand name in communicating information to the mass public (Aldrich 1995; Neiheisel and Niebler 2013; Butler and McDowell 2014; etc.). Much less attention has been paid to how party brands are developed, maintained, and the focus of this chapter is to evolve over time. Of those studies that do focus on brand development most have argued brands originate either in Congress (e.g. Wood and Pope 2008, etc.) or transform through the efforts of a particularly charismatic candidate who captures the attention of the voting public (Neiheisel and Schuman 2005).

This project's contribution is distinct in that it does not just take use of the SKUDVH 3SDUW\ EUDQG´ EXW ORRNV WR WKHRULHV RI to American politics.7 KLV DUJXPHQW FRQWU-Da emphasis on the role of Congress (JUHVV RU SUHVLGHQWLDO FDQGLGDWHM) and notably, this dissertation diverges from prior accounts by arguing the national committee is the repository of D SDUW\ V EUDQG DQG WKDW FDQGLGDWHV D extensions of the anchored identity.

Party brands are entities unto themselves, they are enduring, and perennial outliving the political ambitions of any single actor. A presidential candidate or highly visible congressional leader can certainly XH QFH WKH SDUW\ V RYHUDOO ephemeral nature of political offices, especially the presidency, diminishes the

OLNHOLKRRG RI DQ\ RQH LQ SDWKH XID D\ S DUXW V D LEUDQG G

by the national committee through indirect (endorsements of candidates, etc.) and direct

SURPRWLRQ RI WKH SDUW\ ¶ Van DICE G Influence by L R Q H W F
Congress and the president, in that order.

It is rare for a franchise extension products or elected officials of a greater
EUDQG WR KDYH D VXVWDLQHG LHS parent company & H EUDQG
national committee.7 DNH IRU H [DP SORHVED & D G L O O D F ¶ Cimarron
in WKH HDUO\ GH O ¶ VKHU DO GH G DV * HQHU DO G as a WRU ¶ V Q D C
franchise extension. ¶ DV Z L O G O \ L Q F R Q V L V W H Q W Z L W K & D G L O O D F
four-cylinder engine with a manual transmission which Cadillac had not produced
over seventy and thirty years respectively. It was comparatively inexpensive and
UHVHP E O H G - ¶ O ¶ V O I D, B I Z E H B, Chevrolet. It was poorly engineered and
suffered frequent mechanical failures. Taken together, the Cimarron was wholly
inconV L V W H Q W Z L W K & D G L O O D F ¶ V I n D e p e n d e n t y H a v i n g L W \ D Q G L
& D G L O O D F ¶ V V K D U H P i t t a a n d W F k e l K a s a n B D 9 5, A a k e 1 9 8 0
Cimarron is the textbook example of the deleterious effects of a company embracing an
off-brand extension), H W & D G L O O D F ¶ V a n d h a s o n e o f t h e s a m e H o r d e G
identity attributes today H J O D U J H H Q J L Q H V \$ P a t i d i F i n 1 9 8 0, O X [X U \ F
before the Cimarron was introduced.

All of this is to say, even in a worst cases scenario, a brutally off-brand franchise
extension/product does not typically have the capacity to reverse or permanently undo

¹ & D G L O O D F ¶ V 8 6 P D U N H W V K D U H L V O R Z H U W R G D \ W K D Q L W Z D V
however, this is due to other factors (e.g. increased preference for foreign makes/models, transition away
from large, fuel inefficient engines, etc.).

years of branding and a strong core identity. Unfortunately, this also means a well established core identity is somewhat impervious to the positive effects of its franchise to be absorbed by the core identity.

For these reasons and consistent with the theory of party brand change articulated in Chapter 2, this chapter uses a conditional maximum likelihood model to estimate the effects of different party actors on the overall party brand position.

4.2.1 Methods Explaining Change Through Computational Text Analysis

Spatial analysis of manifestos has allowed for the examination of budgetary politics (Franzese 2002), labor politics (Wallerstein 1999), and has been used as an instrument to predict the duration of coalitional governments (e.g. Druckman and Thies 2002; Strom 1984, etc.) and policy change (e.g. Tsebelis 2002, etc.). However, the discipline lacks a unified method of estimating the position of political parties and existing methodologies include, but are not limited to, branding (e.g. Budge, et al. 2001), extensive surveys (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006, Huber and Inglehart 1995, etc.), and computational coding (e.g. Laver, Benoit, and Golder 2008, Slapin and Proksch 2008 etc.).

Computer based content analysis offers notable benefits when compared to its predecessors. Most notably, it reduces propensity for human error during coding and inescapable subjectivity, but, as was extensively discussed in Chapter 3, the most common methods of partisan scaling are not appropriate for this project as there is no established reference text against which subsequent analyses could be anchored.

Theoretically, data from the Party Manifesto Project could have been used to identify the most and least liberal/conservative platforms in the dataset, but because the estimations are derived from the party platform, they would have produced biased scores for texts, and time.

One of the problems with word-based text analysis is Laver, Benoit, and Dugas' *Words as Data*, which is more or less the open source embodiment of the scales used in *Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data* (2003); however, without at least two reliable anchor texts representing the extremes on both ends of the spectrum, subsequent ideological scaling using this method is an impossibility within the scope of this project. Nevertheless, scaling is a critical method that informs the discipline. A dissertation that purports to gauge party change (via brand position) to neglect scaling all together, is important to consider all possibilities of computational text analysis, which allow for similarity scaling of some kind. To this end, this project explored the use of Jaccard and Levenshtein string similarity, hierarchical clustering, and factor analysis before pursuing a conditional maximum likelihood model using *Wish*.

² Apart from being unsure as to the reliable identification of reference texts for this project, the discipline has noted that *Wordscore* constitutes an extreme position for a respective policy time and space (Slapin and Proksch 2008). There are also criticisms of *Wordscore* ad hoc rescaling of virgin texts so that those words that occur frequently, but convey little political information (i.e. stop words, etc.) do not bias the text toward the middle; while it is important the text is not biased due to meaningless verbiage, the rescaled scores differ from the original

Wordfish, developed by Slapin and Proksch (2008) and later integrated into the R package *Wordfish* (Benoit and Nulty 2016) is strong in those areas where *Wordscores* is weak (with respect to this project). Like *Wordscores*, *Wordfish* estimates positions based on relative word usage, produces time-series estimates without a reference text, and uses all of the words in a document to estimate the importance of each word upon prior quantitative text analysis by assuming word frequencies are generated by a Poisson process, which supposes the probability a given word is used is independent of the proximity of other words in the text. That is, individual words are distributed at random (708). While language and the decision to use a specific word in a given context is highly complex and not at all random, there has been great success in using probabilistic models that specify independence of word choice in political science and in linguistic studies more generally. For all intents and purposes, *Wordfish* is a Poisson naïve Bayes model and the reliability of naïve Bayes models in predicting the distribution of texts is well documented (e.g. McCallum and Nigam 1998; Tan et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2009, etc).

The model also does not assign any predictive weights to a word's position at T_x . All party estimations are predicted simultaneously, so a party has a similar position at T_x as they do at T_{x+1} it is because they are using like words to frame and discuss topics of importance to them. The flip side of this independent modeling is that any movement over time can reasonably be assumed to be true change in the relative benefit over other

methods of time series analyses. Moreover, *wordfish* is unidimensional and each text is assumed to map on (in some way) to the left political dimension though the estimated position scores are not biological. This assumption is verified by Slapin and

3 U R N V F K ¶ V F R P S D U L V R Q R I W K H L U I L Q G L Q J V Z L W K

including multidimensional scaling, that also scale along the left-right continuum.

7 D N H Q W R J H W K H U W K H P R G H O ¶ V I X Q F W L R Q D O I R U

$$y_{ijt} \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_j)$$

$$\mu_j = \exp(\beta_j + \gamma_j + \delta_j)$$

³ Z K H Y U is the count of word j in party i ¶ V P D Q L I H V, W L R A B C W of W L P H fixed effects [to account for some words being used much more than others by all parties], β_j is an estimate of a word specific weight capturing the importance of word j in discriminating between party positions [i.e. how relevant is a given word in meaningfully differentiating Party A from Party B], γ_j is the estimate R I S D U W \ r l i f e s i o n y e a r w o r d e r i n g a s o r t o f c o n t r o l f o r w h e n a p p y W H [W L V S D U W L F X O D U O \ O H Q J W K \ L Q F R P S D U L V R Q Proksch 2008, 709).

In regressing the model, an expectation maximization algorithm is iteratively used to calculate maximum likelihood estimates for latent variables. This involves the following steps; a) calculation of starting values, including word and party fixed effects (and L), b) estimation of party parameters (and L), c) estimation of word parameters (and E), and d) calculation of the likelihood. Steps b, c, and d are repeated with the re-estimation of word parameters until convergence is met. Then, using a parametric bootstrap, 95% confidence intervals are calculated based on 500 simulations using the same data and process outlined above. This method of calculation is particularly reliable with respect to this project as the intervals shrink dramatically with large datasets in which each word is treated as a data point, which this project has many.

No method of text analysis would be without assumption, so subsequent findings will be presented with few caveats in mind. First and most importantly given the longitudinal nature of this study *Wordfish* assumes that words have the same meaning across time. While this is not necessarily ideal, the alternative would be weighting certain words during certain periods of time, which would inject subjectivity into what is otherwise objective analysis. Additionally, *Wordfish* does not purport to assign ideological scores to each text, though the model inherently incorporates ideology as spoken and/or written. It is easy to misunderstand the estimated scores when viewing the graphs below as the measure of similarity is laid out on a right scale, so it is important to remember the measurement only estimates the spatial proximity and similarity between Texts A and B. While this distance often maps ideological dimensions, it cannot be assumed to measure ideological similarity.

Prior to applying the model above, the texts were cleaned and stemmed as they were in the last chapter. Once cleaned, a series of corpora were created. Each corpus contains the party texts to be included for similarity/difference measures. For example, the Republican Party / Presidential candidate corpus yields total documents: one

```
IRU WKH 5HSXEOLFDQ 3DUW\TV HQWLUH EUDAG SRVLWL
FRQJUHVVLRQDO FKDLUPDQ DQG SUHVLGHQWLDO WH[V
DQG RQH IRU HDFK SUHVLGHQWLDO FDQGLGDWH LQFOX
```

commercial, campaign speeches, Meet the Press interviews, etc.) cleaned. The model is applied and yields *theta* estimates indicating scaled position, standard errors at

a 95% confidence interval, and θ and ψ measures for each individual word in the entire corpus.

4.3.1 Findings: Elite Polarization as Reflected Through Brand Position

There is a robust literature on party polarization and though the focus of this

SURMHFW LV QRW HOLWH SRODULJDWLRQ FRPSDULQJ E
year seemed a natural starting point and yields great insight into how distanced each
SDUW\|V EUD On the other hand, opposition further. Moreover, there is no reason to doubt
WKH DFFXUDF\ RI WKH PRGHO\|V HVWLPDWLRQV EXW DV
the model to be tested and externally verified. The literature well documents increased
elite polarization between 1976 and 2012, with accelerated polarization in the mid-1990s
(e.g. Aldrich 1995; Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 2001; Brewer, Mariani and Stonecash
2001; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Stonecash 2018, etc.) so the estimated distance
between Democratic and Republican texts at t should be greater than the distance
between Democratic and Republican texts at t' if the model accurately performs.

Figure 4.1 presents the estimated positions and standard errors for each party
brand position between 1976 and 2012. ULRU WR WKH HOHFWLRQ RI
positions were relatively similar. Between 1976 and 1992 both parties have an estimated
position of between 1.1773 and 0.2338 (a spread of .9435), whereas all party scores
afterward fall between 0.1365 and 1.6911 (a spread of 1.5546). Moreover, the
Democratic brand positions for 1976, 1980, and 1984 and spatially and statistically

³ Recall, the theta estimates are merely spatial proximities. The 2012 overall brand position having the highest estimated theta is not evidence of the position being the
PRVW OLEHUDO RU FRQVHUYDWLYH EXW WKH PRVW GLIIHUHQW IURP
the lowest theta estimate.

indistinguishable from the Republican brand positions for 1976 and 1980. Beginning in

WKH GLVWDQFH EHWZHHQ WKH SDUWLHV¶ EUDQG SF
 electoral cycle, with the greatest jump for both parties being in 1996 and the greatest
 distance between the parties LHV EHLQJ LQ 'HPRFUDW¶V HVWLPDW
 5HSXEOLFDQ¶V DW D GLIIHUHQFH RI




Figure 4.1 Spatial Comparison of Democratic and Republican Brand Positions, 1976-2012




Figure 4.2 Polarizations of Democratic and Republican Brand Positions, 1976-2012

Figure 4.2 visually presents the increase in polarization over time. While estimated theta is not a measure of ideology, it does detect ideology as communicated through speech or written text, so the distance between the parties provides evidence of ideological separation (though not on the political scale), and the parties focus on different issues, discussed using different affective frames.

Figure 4.3 plots the fixed effects and weights assigned to each word in the analysis of all party documents. The plot does not necessarily enhance the argument for polarization, but provides some insight into the model that clarifies how position estimates are determined. In a party system, it is expected the parties will use many of the same words (e.g. there are only so many ways to talk about immigration without XVLQJ WKH ZRUG³ LPPLJUDWLRQ´ DQG VR FRPPRQO\ XV used by a single party.

Word Weights v. Word Fixed Effects for Democratic and Republican Parties, 1976-2012




Figure 4.3 Weights versus Fixed Effects for Democratic and Republican Brand Positions, 1976-2012

When the fixed effects and weights of each word plotted, they resemble an Eiffel Tower of sorts, indicating there is much commonality (or convergence) between what the two parties say. The higher the cluster on each leg, the more consistent the party is within their messaging. This is particularly true for words that are used by different party leaders

Here, words such as 'HPRFUDWV' and 'DUH JLYHQ PRUH ZHLJKW WKDQ ZRUGV OLNPHL FVHDURDQ BHSXEOLFDQV DQG 3PLOO' which are frequently used by both parties and thus, do not provide reliably specific information. Words with negative weights (words on the left, the Democratic Party)

4.3.2 Findings: Institutional Change and Party Brand Position

Chapter 2, brands should be typically slow to move unless there is a change to the greater institutional system and/or environment in which the organization is nested. Only one reasonable to focus solely on the behavior and actions of party leaders; however, because

both brands shifted during the same cycle it seems more likely there was a change in the system, which required both parties adapt as a form of preservation.

Figure 4.4 disaggregates the parties from one another and shows brand position in relation to itself, across time. Both parties showed a significant change in 1996 by 1.0395 (Democratic Party) and 1.3381 (Republican Party) scaled, points indicating a shift in those topics incorporated and framed as part of the brand position. The movement between 1992 and 1996 accounts for nearly 47% of all change in brand position between 1976 and 2012. Interestingly, after this schism, both parties return to normal rates of change from cycle-to-cycle, which also suggests an interference in the system and not change that can be credited to any single actor.

The midterm elections of 1994 mark the first time Republicans won majorities in both chambers since 1954 and the Party made significant inroads at the state level, but the Democratic Party's Christian Coalition is thought to have been solidified. The apogee of Republican efforts to secure a reliable base was made possible as the defining issue cleavage in American politics switched from being economic to social. The defining cleavage in American politics became social, and voters resorted into the parties along the new line (Schofield, Miller, and Maritn 2003).




Figure 4.4: Cycle-to-Cycle Change in Democratic and Republican Party Brand Positions, 1976-2012

:LWK WKL V LQ PLQG WKH OHDS LQ ERWK SDUWLHV

broader system undergoes rapid change, the parties must adapt to the new environment to ensure self-perpetuation, which in this case required reorienting the brand position in relation to the new cleavage.

4.3.3 Findings: Actor Groups and Change to Democratic and Republican Party Brand Positions

Apart from change initiated by structural upheaval, party brand positions should also evolve due to the efforts of the national organization, congressional leadership, and presidential candidates. There is a degree of coordination between these actor groups will be discussed in the next chapter. So it is not entirely fair to suppose a single actor or group is the architect of all change. Rather, the relative specializations of each group coupled with their party attributed responsibilities dictates the extent to which a single group has influence over the brand position.

Here, influence over brand position is measured as the similarity between all brand positions texts of a given actor group and the overall corpus of party texts for a given election cycle (e.g. the estimated difference between all Democratic congressional leadership texts and the total Democratic corpus for the 1976 election cycle). To ensure a particularly verbose party leader did not bias the results, all texts were weighted prior to

application of the model sW KDW HDFK DFWRU JURXS V VHW RI WH [WR DOO RWKHU JURXS V




Figure 4.5 Weights versus Fixed Effects for the Democratic Party's Brand Positions, 1976-2012

Figure 4.5 depicts the weights versus fixed effects assigned to each word in the total corpus. Similar to the word cluster above in Figure 4.3 (above), had the party system remained constant—that is, if there were no shift in brand position substance in the mid-1970s

the word plot would be more triangular in shape there would not be a distinct point of departure between brand positions. However, because of this substantial schism and significant change in the Democratic party brand, each is comprised of words commonly used pre-1996 and post-1996. Those words that are negatively weighted are D V V R F L D W H G Z L W P L W K H I N S A N D F O C U S M U C H R O W N I S S U E S A T T E R N E D T O T H E S O C I A L (M O R A L A N D R A C I A L) C L E A V A G E T H A T E S T A B L I S H E D T H E M O D E R N P A R T Y C O A L I T I O N S (3 & K U L V W L D Q ' 3 H [W U H P L V W V ' 3 R X W V R X U F L Q J ' 3 L P P L J U W R W K H P L G S R L Q W Z K H U H D V H F R Q R F L H F I D Q R I P V F V Q D O O T O T H E R I G H T .)

The same plot of word weights versus fixed effects for the Republican Party tells a similar story of brand position, with a caveat. The legs of Figure 4.6 are fairly short and tightly grouped, indicating convergence between each party actor. While the Republican plot also has two (albeit less S L V F H U Q D E I O I D A T I N G O N E B R A N D P O S I T I O N S H I F T E D M O D E S T L Y P R E A N D P O S T P L G ± 1 1 6 / l e f t l e g , r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e b r a n d p o s i t i o n p o s t

1 1 6 much longer and less densely populated than the right. This indicates there is greater disagreement between party actors beginning with the 1996 election and is an H V S H F L D O O \ L P S R U W D Q W S R L Q W R D I S A G R E E M E N T W R D V W K A L L O W S F O R A M O R E R I G O R O U S A N A L Y S I S O F W H I C H A C T O R / G R O U P S A R E D R I V I N G T H E B U L K O F T H E S D U W \ 1 1 V E U D Q G S R V L W L R Q G X U L Q J D S H U L R G R I L Q W H U




Figure 4.6 Weights versus Fixed Effects for Republican Party Brand Positions, 1976-2012

Figure 4.7 graphs the brand position of the overall party, congressional leadership, the presidential candidate for each cycle, and the national committee chairman. Each estimated brand position is statistically distinct from the others, save for the overall chairman positions from 2012, for which the estimates were so close the confidence intervals overlapped. The table of estimated positions and the corresponding standard errors are presented in the appendix.




Figure 4.7 Change in Democratic Party Brand Position by Actor Group, 1976-2012

& RQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH DQDO\VHV DERYH WKH JUI
 was from 1992 to 1996; however, with respect to the similarity between actors and the
 RYHUDOO SDUW\ WKH QDWLRQDO SDCSIFRPHUWUWHUHQW EUD
 of the overall party, though the congressional brand position is a close second.

Interestingly, presidential candidates do not appear to have any substantial or lasting

brand To the extent D SUHVLGHQWLDO FDQGLGDWH GRHV KDYH L

brand position, it appears influence is reserved only for those candidates who win office

and have similar positions Q V WR WKDW RI WKHLU SDUW\ V OHDGHUV

HIIHFWV RI WKH SUHVLGHQW RQ WKH SDUW\ V RYHUDO

Congress, possibly via agenda setting.

Though still significantly distanced, there is greater correlation between the

overall and candidate brand positions when the candidate is an incumbent.

% HWZHHQ DQG 'HPRFUDWLF FDQGLGDWHV V EUD

the overall, chairman, and congressional positions, but from 1990 to 2012 DFK DFWRU V

brand position follows a similar trend. KH 'HPRFUDW V SDUW\ EUDQG SRV

similar to and anchored by the national committee, and is typically positioned between

WKH SUHVLGHQW DQG FRPPLWWHH

correlation between the overall and congressional positions than the overall and candidate

positions.

positions.

Figure 4.8 represents the estimated brand positions of the overall Republican

Party, the party chairman, congressional leaders, and presidential candidates. Similar to

WKH 'HPRFUDW DQG FRPPLWWHH V WKH QDWLRQDO FRPPLWWHH

position is consistently most similar to the overall party brand position with respect to

scaled distance and overall trend. Congressional leaders have the second greatest impact

on brand position, with a greater spatial distance than party chairman, but a mirrored trend.




Figure 4.8 Change in Republican Party Brand Position by Actor Group, 1976-2012

7DNHQ WRJHWKHU Wskhd5bssioE dLunDq8 DUW\|V
 compared toWKH 'HPRFUDWLF 3DUW\|V DV WKH RYHUDOO EUD
 LGHQWLFDO SDWK RI WKH FRPPLWWHH FKDLUPDQ DQG F
 though the overall party brand appears consistently toward or biased by the
 FKDLUPDQ\|V SRVLWLRQ \$OVR GLVWLQFW IURP WKH 'HP
 presidential candidates are significantly distanced from the overall and chairman
 positions and do not follow the same pattern as the other groups. The (seemingly)

stochastic relationship between presidential candidates and overall party position holds even for those periods when the party holds the presidency.

4.4 The Role of Leadership with Respect to Changes in Party Brand Position

For both the Democratic and Republican parties, the national committee

FKDLUPDQ ¶ V SRVLWLRQ LV PRVW VLPLODU WR WKDW RI
the changes in the overall brand position across time. This finding is consistent with theory of party brand, which argues the central organizations the keeper of the brand and is best govern the brand position. Moreover, this correlation affirms the centrality of the national committee in coordinating the resources and messages of its actors.

Congressional leadership also has a consistent impact on the overall brand identity, inclusive of measures of spatial proximity and general trends. Speculatively, the constant presence of party leadership in Congress and the ability to pursue concrete policies and publicize related issues cultivates increased impact on the overall brand position. Both policies and issues are critical brand components that contribute to the SDUW ¶ V FRUH LGHQWLW DQG KHLJKWHQ WKH LPSRUWD
cultivating and evolving a highly recognizable brand.

Presidents and presidential candidates appear to have a much looser relationship ZLWK WKH SDUW ¶ V RYHUDOO EUDQG HVSLWH EHLQJ D
presidents, particularly in an age of candidate centered campaigns, are granted greater leniencies in pursuing their own political ambitions than other party actors. Here it is VXJJHVWHG WKDW DQ LQIOXHGFH WKH SUHVLGHQW RU
brand is largely GLUHFWHG WKURXJK & RQJUHVV YLD DJHQGD V
brand position may not closely align with or trail the overall party brand, but the extent

WR ZKLFK & RQJUHVV SXUVXHW WKHS SDXVLEGOHQ WTKH DSUHC
influence is slightly underestimated in these models as they cannot account for indirect
impact on brand position.

Significant progress has been made in developing and refining methods for
scaling text documents and treating words as data. Using a conditional maximum
likelihood model, *Wordfish*, this chapter was able to test the extent to which party

EUDQGV KDYH FKDQJHG RYHU WLPH WKH VLPLODULWLH
DQG WKH UROH RI VWUXFWXUDO FKDQJH DQG OHDGHUV

The next chapter clarifies the findings presented in this and the last chapter
through a series of elite interviews conducted with key party leadership and their staffers,
which ultimately lend credence to the hypotheses tested in this dissertation and the theory
of party brand as framed within institutional and party politics literatures.

CHAPTER 5

Party Branding in Practice

In developing and applying a new theoretical construct, it is critical to affirm the validity of the party brand framework and theory of party brand with respect to the extant literature and the reality of party dynamics. Chapters 3 and 4 square the theory of party brand with expectations from the extant literature; by and large, the findings and theory complement our understanding of party politics, individual agency within institutions, realignments, and the rise of candidate-centered campaigns.

With validity within the discipline established, it is also important to assess the extent to which this empirically-rooted explanation aligns with the reality of the phenomena sought to be explained. This chapter focuses on squaring the analyses to this point with elite interviews in an attempt to add a layer of understanding to the party brand dynamic – particularly with respect to whether key party actors realize they are engaging in branding activities and the extent to which franchise extensions feel constrained by the core brand – while providing some external validation of the theory.

5.1 Methodology: Selection Process & Interview Guide

At this dissertation's inception, the intent was to conduct interviews to assess whether the theory of party brand and related findings were externally valid in the eyes of party leadership. However, after digging into the project and linking it to institutional theories of organizations and actor-agency it became clear the missing piece (that would also provide external validity) was how party brands are managed on a day-to-day basis. It is widely understood that actors' behaviors are constrained – by opportunities and by rules – but what does this look like in practice? Party brand position is relatively

consistent from actor group to actor group (save for Republican presidential candidates, who seem to operate on their own plane), but what ensures this consistency in a system in which party discipline is (comparatively) weak?

Interviewing congressional staffers provides insight into the day-to-day operations of party activities in Congress, the role of party leadership in driving consistency among their members, in turn a greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying the creation of a uniform party brand. Seven interviews with congressional staffers and one interview with former Congressman, former Senate Minority Leader, former Senate Majority Leader, former Republican National Committee Chairman, and 1996 Republican Presidential Candidate Bob Dole were conducted. Taken together, the staffer interviews provide an on-the-ground perspective that has been little explored to this point. Senator Dole's interview corroborates the findings presented in this chapter and in Chapters 3 and 4 by providing a firsthand account of the role of different party actors; Senator Dole's interview is included in the Appendix.

Using purposive sampling, the interviews include congressional staffers on both sides of the aisle, who represent legislative and office operations, who work in the Senate and House of Representatives, who worked in Congress during the period of analysis (1976-2012), and (ideally) those who have worked under both majority and minority leaders. Additionally, a range of staffers representing a range of constituencies and who work for members of varying self-professed ideologies (e.g. conservative, libertarian, democratic socialist, etc.) were included to ensure some diversity within the sample. (e.g. socialism, libertarianism, etc.).

Using these criteria, offices of sixteen members of Congress were contacted. The initial contact was based solely on the diversity of the districts the members represent and the partisanship of the member, with consideration for whether these offices were representative of the “norm” for the party. After making contact via phone or email, requests were made to interview a staffer in the Washington, D.C. office, with a preference for Chiefs of Staff and legislative staffers. Despite having initial interest from fourteen of the sixteen offices contacted and scheduling ten interviews from that fourteen, six staffers were ultimately interviewed, including; two chiefs of staff (one for a Democratic Congressman, one for a Republican Senator), one scheduler turned legislative assistant (for a Democratic Congressman), one legislative director (for a Republican Senator), and two legislative assistants (one for a Republican and one for a Democratic Congressman). The interviewees represent varying levels of experience (with most having worked in more than one position) and work in offices for districts in the Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, South, and on the West Coast. Furthermore, two of the offices represent swing districts, while the other four represent solidly Democratic or Republican districts. Five of the interviewees work for members who are par for the course for their respective party and one works for a member who is widely recognized as ideologically distinct from their party.

Identifier	CS	JW	TV	SL	LE	FM
Informed Consent	x	x	x	x	x	x
(current) Member	4-term, Democratic Congressman	2-term Republican Senator	2-term, Republican Congressman	1-term, Republican Senator	3-term, Democratic Congressman	1-term, Democratic Congressman
Job Title	Chief of Staff	Legislative Director	Legislative Assistant	Chief of Staff	Scheduler/ Legislative Assistant	Legislative Assistant
Years Experience	18	11	7	23	2	9
Still at Position?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No; left 2012	No; left in 2008
Describe your office's constituency	Urban, solidly Democratic district in Northeast	Predominantly rural, solidly Republican state in the Southeast	Rural, solidly Republican district on the West coast	Rural/urban, solidly Republican state in the South	Urban/rural, swing district in Midwest	Urban, swing district in the Midwest

Figure 5.2 Staffer Profiles and Unique Identifiers

Figure 5.2 summarizes general demographics for each interviewee. Interviews were conducted over the phone and in-person between March 2015 and January 2016 at the convenience of the interviewee. Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and an hour and ten minutes.

Prior to the interviews, all but one staffer indicated serious concern for anonymity – both for themselves and their member – so a condition of the interviews was using the interviewee’s initials in lieu of their name, not identifying the specific office in which the staff worked, and not presenting the interview in-full, which would increase the propensity the interviewee could be identified. For example, “CS” is currently Chief of Staff for a 4-term Democratic Congressman who represents a solidly Democratic district, in the urban Northeast. Moreover, the members are referred to as “they” or “them” or “Congressman [initials of interviewee]” to ensure gender is not revealed, which could lead to easy identification. Redacting this identifying information does not in any way

obscure the content of the interviews. Finally, non-content based edits were made to ensure the excerpts were understandable; these edits are denoted by ellipses, in the case a portion of text joining two statements was removed, and brackets, in the case a pronoun was modified, the name of the member redacted, or a word added to ensure readability.

Apart from four questions which gauge the frequency with which staffers interacted directly with their representative, with staffers in other offices and the frequency with which staffers' opinions were solicited by their member, all questions are open-ended. Interviews with staffers focused on five primary substantive areas designed to unpack the relationship between party leadership and their members and the creation of a unified party brand including; a) interaction with party leadership, b) party-building and party loyalty, c) party branding activities, and d) interaction with staffers in other offices. The complete interview guide is included in the Appendix.

5.2.1 Findings: Leadership and Staff Pressures, Party Constraints

The focus to this point has very much been on the role of party leadership in crafting a strong party brand that can be traded upon, so the role of party leadership in Congress – particularly with respect to inducing certain behaviors among members – was of primary interest. Somewhat surprisingly, all interviewees indicated the preferences of party leadership are consistently apparent in day-to-day operations, though the level of interaction with party leadership varies from member to member, as does who delivers the message from the “top”.

LE's worked as a scheduler (one and a half years) and a legislative assistant (one year) for a Democratic Congressman who represents a swing district in the Midwest during their second and third terms. As a scheduler, LE was uniquely positioned as they

reported directly to their member and, due to the nature of their work, were kept abreast of legislative and campaign related activities. Despite being from a swing district, LE's member was not particularly moderate and the member's position often aligned with that of the Democratic Party, which LE believes is the driving reason their office had less aggressive interaction with party leadership. In describing the relationship between Congressman LE and Democratic leaders, LE said:

“[They were] a little bit of a party darling. Everybody thought [they were] going to run for [senator's name redacted]'s seat when he left, so [they] kind of [were] given national fundraising opportunities that House members don't have...*[They were given that position on [the Democratic Congressional Caucus' policy and steering [committee] even though [they were] a fairly new member at the time. I don't really remember being pressured all that much because [they were] in those positions, but [they] probably got those positions coming in because there was a high degree of alignment between [they and the party],”* (LE personal communication, January 2016).

However, even though Congressman LE was favorably aligned with party leadership, LE remembers the member was not without party oversight.

“I do know that we got whipped a few times when I was scheduler because I would have to talk about ***our standard answer anytime the Whip's office called, which was that we didn't know, even if we did.*** Sometimes [Congressman LE] was going to vote the way they wanted us to anyway, but I was still just told to tell them, ***“we don't know,”***. I don't know what the rationale was for that...” (LE personal communication, January 2016).

This method of shirking or avoiding party leadership is a recurring theme for every member, regardless of their partisanship, experience, or alignment with the party and will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

While Congressman LE is a “party darling”, Senator JW is far from it. Despite being a nationally recognizable Senator, Senator JW does not seem to be granted the

leniencies or given the prestigious appointments afforded to Congressman LE. JW began their career on the Hill as one of their member's Legislative Assistants, but was promoted to Legislative Director six months prior to our speaking. JW indicated that even though their member nearly always votes as the party wants, they are viewed as a nonconformist – a reputation the member relishes, but JW finds, “difficult to manage,” because, “the office dedicates a lot of time and resources to reassuring leadership,” that they are, “on the same team,” (JW personal communication, April 2015). JW elaborated:

“I think we're *watched more closely because [Senator JW] isn't your traditional Republican*. On big votes they actually tow the party line almost as much as like, for instance [Senator Mike] Enzi and [Senator Tom] Coburn¹, but that's not [Senator JW]'s reputation. And I know for a fact *the party doesn't hassle Enzi and Coburn as much as they do us*. I definitely have fielded my fair share of calls where we're whipped. If the call makes it to me I'll explain our rationale. But they know what they're getting. It's not a surprise [that Senator JW is going to vote in the way they do], so they usually just say, “okay, we'll check back in”. But sure, there have been *three times things escalate and I got a call from the Leader's staff or the Leader will call [Senator JW] directly about a vote. That's when it's serious.*” (JW personal communication, INSERT DATE)

Though JW implied such heavy party oversight was needless, I was curious if the frequent calls and visits paid off. JW furthered:

“I can *count the number of times leadership has actually convinced the member [to vote with the party when conscience would dictate otherwise] on one hand, but I guess when they have it's been on critical votes for the party. National newsworthy votes.*” (JW personal communication, April 2015)

JW's emphasis on party leadership's persistence and success, particularly with respect to high profile issues, is consistent with the broader theory of party brand. A party cannot

¹ Senator JW voted with the party roughly 85% of the time in 2012, while Senators Enzi and Coburn voted with the party roughly 90% of the time.

actively maintain all brand components simultaneously, so they focus their energy on a brand position comprised of their identity as it relates to salient, timely issues. Thus, it is within reason the party would apply greater pressure when the legislation is highly visible to the public as it is part of their activated identity, which is communicated to the public.

The other interviewees voiced similar routine office interactions with the Whip's office, with no real decipherable difference in activity between when the party is in or out of power. Furthermore, each interviewee indicated, based on their own experience and the experience of staffers with whom they are friendly in other offices, that a member is much more likely to be whipped if the party is unsure of their position. This is a logical, though FM furthered that if the Whip has been advised the member is voting with the party they may still provide oversight if they, "don't really trust [the member]...[either] because they are new, so they're an unknown or because they burned the party in the past," (FM personal communication, March 2015).

Outside of direct interaction with the Whip's office, I asked four interviewees about the role of the Leader in their chamber; all agreed the leader is, "more of a figurehead for the caucus to look to and someone for committee leaders to work with [on] important issues," (TV personal communication, July 2015) and that the leader and their office are much less likely to interact with the member and their office than the whip. The Speaker, when of the same party as the member, is perceived as even less likely to contact individual members as they are more of a, "figurehead for the public," (TV personal communication, July 2015). While all interviewees reported an interaction between their member and their party's leader in some way, these seem to take place

behind closed doors at party gatherings and more private meetings (typically without mid- to low-level staff) at the request of the leader.

The only interviewee who volunteered knowledge of a specific interaction between their member and their party's leader was SL, a twenty-three year veteran of the Hill and, at the time of the interview, Chief of Staff to a Republican Senator from the South in their first term.

“Senator SL told me about [their] *first interaction with party leadership...[they] won in a special election and the leaders want[ed] to welcome [them]*, so a meeting was set up...[They] thought it was just going to be a polite “glad to have you” conversation and it was, until ***leadership told Senator SL that [they were] expected to earn [their] seat through daily fundraising***. If [they] wanted the party's support in the next election [they] needed to schedule time to call donors everyday and needed to meet their quota. ***As a party[member] that is [their] job***. It caught [them] off guard but [they do] it. I don't know if [they] were singled out because of the special election, but I've heard [about] other closed door meetings like this.” (SL personal communication, November 2015)

With their many years of experience working for Senators and vast institutional knowledge, SL did not seem particularly surprised by the focus of this meeting and seemed almost amused Senator SL did not anticipate such request. While the fundraising responsibilities of congressmen have increased significantly after Citizens United (Grim & Siddiqui 2013; Ferguson 2013; Levitt 2010), SL stressed, “fundraising has been a big part of the game the entire time I've been here...it's how the party sustains itself, it's just a reality,” (SL personal communication, November 2015).

While I argue brand cultivation is top-down, it does not necessarily have to come as an edict from a party's leader or whip. After talking to the interviewees, it seems most of the day-to-day party operations are at the behest of committee staff. Whereas oversight

by the leader or whip is stochastic, party messaging and communications by leaders of the committees appears to be constant. TV, a legislative assistant to a Republican congressman from the West coast, echoed his colleagues when he said:

“Well committee leaders have their [committee] staff put on like, info sessions about things that were coming up. Big bills that were being debated or marked up. Congressman TV doesn’t go to those meetings, but [the staffers] try to make the meetings relevant to our legislative area... Working on the legislative side, this is the most important service the party provides... They offer to write opening statements if the member wants them to, they send over briefing materials, so that we have a baseline, and it helps because we’ll use that to put together a briefing packet for Congressman TV. We all work off the same foundation... We know the party’s stance and we put the member’s spin on it from there.” (TV personal communication, July 2015.)

This project has devoted much time – particularly in chapters 2 and 3 – to discussing institutionally prescribed scripts, derived from rules that govern behavior, but TV (and the other interviewees) confirmed there are *literal* scripts distributed by party leadership to its members surrounding active legislation. While the members are not bound to use the information the committee provides, all interviewees indicated their office nearly always use the information they are given, both because its high quality (e.g. well-researched, which frees up member staff to focus on other tasks) and is generally, “pretty consistent with what we’d come up with,” (TV personal communication, July 2015). When they do alter the original information, it is usually by adding information relevant to constituents or the members’ general interests. Congressional staffers essentially frame these scripts to suit their district/state, while maintaining the core information proffered by party leadership.

Congressional leadership is centrally important in the development, perpetuation, and evolution of a party's brand and these interviews provide insight as to three different pathways the party is able to encourage brand unity: 1) oversight of the member from the whip/their office, 2) leadership as a figurehead (and likely in smaller meetings), and 3) the development of appropriate and shared scripts by party leadership in committees (with likely pressure from the chamber's leader via the committee's leader).

5.2.2 Findings: Staff Pressures

The decision to interview staffers was motivated by a desire to learn from those who have a ringside seat to the routine, internal machinations of parties' in Congress, but what was particularly surprising is that each staff member with whom I spoke described some way in which they constrain member actions, usually in line with party expectations. For most of the interviewees, their acting on the member and encouraging them to follow leadership seems secondary. For example, each interviewee indicated that when their member wanted to make a statement the office staff would, "give [them] talking points...really just bullet points from briefings and our research on the position [they] should take and reasons why...[They] would fill out the rest of the talking points...mak[ing] sure what [they] wrote aligned with what we gave as sort of a baseline," (LE personal communication, January 2016). In this sort of case, the staffers' primary objective is providing their member the information necessary for them to write a strong statement, but it has the secondary effect of reinforcing the party's influence as they include information from the committee's briefings, which – as discussed above – are facilitated by party leadership. However, there were three powerful examples of staff

carrying out their job function in a way that strategically attempted to persuade and constrain the member in line with normative expectations.

I asked each interviewee about the conditions under which their member reaches out to or responds to the media as a way of gaining some insight as to how non-leadership members publicize the party's brand. In doing so, JW (Legislative Director to a nationally visible, 2-term Republican Senator from the Southeast) underscored the extent to which their office works together as gatekeepers, largely attempting to restrict access to Senator JW out of respect for the Senator's time and out of concern the Senator may say or do something that will create more work for them. Because Senator JW is well-known, they are often requested to appear on political talk shows. Knowing the staff acts as gatekeepers, I asked if the office or designated press staff ever refrain from notifying the Senator about such requests, to which he indicated Senator JW is not told about, "them all because there are too many to count and [they] wouldn't think most are worth his time," (JW personal communication, April 2105). I pressed further and asked if the staff ever refrains from passing along media requests the Senator would find worthwhile, to which JW demurred.

Additionally, JW explained more routine media requests (e.g. smaller outlets, requests for comment, requests for rebuttal, etc.) are often brought by the press staffer² to the relevant legislative staffer, who may offer comment on behalf of the Senator. JW furthered:

² Five of the six interviewees were asked whether their office has a media plan in place. All indicated they did, but there was variation with respect to who fields the initial request as some, larger offices have a dedicated press staff, whereas the job falls to the scheduler, legislative director, or chief of staff in other offices.

“We get requests for comment...sometimes they came to my desk [when I was a Legislative Assistant] because they [would] implicate one of, you know, my issue areas. **Working for a Republican on healthcare, working for a Republican who is vocal about healthcare is tough.** I was swamped with requests for comment during the ACA lead up. **Unless it’s a rebuttal we need to make or an outlet with a lot of viewership, I just ignored requests or referred them to committee. If Senator JW had [their] way, [they] probably would talk every time, so we try to reign [them] in.** [They’ve] got a fire to do good by their conscience and I respect that. And **sometimes you have to give [them] a chance to comment, but I am always very clear what the stakes are.** This is what we’ve said before. This is what committee [leadership] gave us. This is what you should say. This is what your supporters want to hear. It’s tense sometimes. But you know, [they] **know it’s better not to comment unless [they] are sure [they’ll] come out looking good.** I mean media was not even really my job, but [Senator JW] knows we’re a team, trying to get it done.” – (JW personal communication, April 2015)

I asked JW what the concern was if Senator JW was given cart blanche to speak on every healthcare media request, to which they said:

“[Senator JW] voted against the ACA, but [they] saw value in some of the provisions and would say so...**when [they] did offer comment we [the office] almost always got contacted by leadership,** usually the Whip, and then *had to reaffirm we were not in favor...they’d push the talking points, we’d say we understood...*It put us [the office] in a weird spot [because] **we couldn’t say, “we’ve told [Senator JW] that, [they] just jettisoned it during the interview, but he’s still a nay,”**....I don’t remember if it was [then-Senate Minority Leader Mitch] McConnell or [then-Assistant Senate Minority Leader Jon] Kyl who called out [Senator JW] by name on [a Sunday morning news program], but one of them basically said don’t listen to or, or worry about [them]. That was hard, because *we were really trying and knew [Senator JW] wouldn’t vote for [the ACA], but he’s passionate and we can’t keep that quiet always,*” (JW personal communication, April 2015).

LE (a scheduler-turned-legislative-assistant to a Democratic congressman in [their] second term from the Midwest) had a similar story of staff influence, but in their case it was staff from other offices trying to persuade their member to vote against party lines. LE explained:

*“If the NRA wanted us to vote for something we always voted against it. Like, we were very proud of our “F” rating. **I know other Democrats in [state] were not so happy with us because they were much more scared of the NRA**, so they would be willing to get like, a “C” rating. They **didn’t think it looked good [to the party] when we were willing to vote against it and they weren’t**. In those sorts of instances, **we would get pressure from their [legislative director] asking us not to vote against them**... It wasn’t anything top down from a party leader. It was like, *our state delegation [was] trying to be more neutral and patrol because they were worried about the wrath,*” (LE personal communication, January 2016).*

LE’s story fits with the broader narrative that party leadership is more willing to make allowances for deviations from the party line when they see it as necessary for the member to satisfy their constituents.³ Here, Democrats from the same state were looking to Representative LE to validate their position on gun control legislation in the eyes of the party; if all Democrats from the state opposed a bill and cited it their constituencies as the reason, it would be much more believable to party leadership than if there was one member who broke from their state delegation and towed the party line.

FM worked on the Hill for 9 years – beginning as an Administrative Assistant and ending as a Legislative Assistant – before leaving in 2008. I was put in contact with them by the office of the last congressman – a Democrat from a swing district in the Midwest – for whom they worked. FM also detailed the power of staff pressures to reign in their member to the favor of the party. Specifically, they remembered:

“There were some times [Congressman FM] missed a vote. [They] didn’t vote yes or no, but [they] just missed a vote that was very important to our chief of staff...something to do with beer distributors. And [the chief of staff] was really mad

³ Senator Bob Dole spoke at length about this dynamic during our interview, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

about that and I think [Congressman FM] claimed [they] didn't miss it intentionally, but I think [they] did because [they] had expressed they were conflicted. They were like, "you want me to vote on this because of fundraising, but I don't really know how I feel about it," and so [they] purposefully skipped it. [Congressman FM] was weighing a Senate run and the chief was always very focused on the long-term impact of today's decisions...And it happens with frequency with members." (FM personal communication, April 2015).

It became clear in talking to FM that the Congressman's chief of staff was acutely aware of making sure the party and fundraisers were satisfied, so the Congressman would be well-positioned for a future campaign. As will be discussed in the next section, this sort of shirking is incredibly common among members looking to avoid the pressures of party.

Somewhat unexpectedly, congressional staff – at all levels – plays a major role in encouraging their member adhere to normative expectations, which are unique to the institution and, in many ways, designed to ensure the perpetuation of party and party interests. Though the reason staff encourage adherence to rule-prescribed varies – for JW, it meant decreased workload for the office and for FM it meant ensuring future electoral success – staff are crucial in reproducing institutional norms and influencing their members' behavior.

5.2.3 Findings: Senator/Representative Behavior and Party Constraints

When discussing constraints on member behavior – specifically the hurdles party leadership place in the way of a member pursuing their own party-inconsistent ideas – each interviewee brought up examples of their member shirking responsibility, either to

avoid having to follow a party decree with which they strongly disagreed or avoid retribution by the party.

SL (Chief of Staff to a Republican Senator from the South) shared a story they learned early in their career, which helps facilitate these avoidance techniques. SL advised:

“Their *calendar should always be full*. Not because they’re going to make [every] appointment, but *because they need a reasonable explanation why they aren’t meeting with people who want to meet with them*... When I was a scheduler we kept a duplicate calendar in the front office [in case we] needed to find [them]. About a week after I started, *a staffer from the assistant leader’s office came by, saw that our Senator was in a committee meeting that was ending soon, and that [they] didn’t have another meeting afterward. Next thing, the Assistant Leader walks in. Apparently, the Senator had been dodging [their] calls for a month.*” (SL personal communication, November 2015)

LE’s (a scheduler-turned-legislative-assistant to a Democratic congressman in [their] second term from the Midwest) recollection mirrored SL’s. LE described how their member would avoid fundraising call time:

“When he was in D.C. there was *call time scheduled every day*. Now sometimes [they] didn’t show up to it. Like, *[they] would go rogue, not answer [their] Blackberry, not answer [their] cell phone, and not be in the office or in the call center when it was scheduled.*” (LE personal communication, January 2016).

As SL discussed as part of their interview (relevant excerpt included above), daily call time is a non-negotiable commitment to the party and here Congressman LE is eschewing this party requirement through avoidance. I asked LE if there was any sort of retaliation by the party against the Congressman and they said there was not, though the Congressman did not routinely miss call time and was a “party darling”, which may be part of how they were able to get away with shirking this responsibility.

CS (Chief of Staff to a four-term Democratic Congressman from the Northeast) also discussed the lengths members will go to in an effort to dodge their party's oversight. During their eighteen years on the Hill, CS explained:

*“When I started we hadn't gone digital yet, so votes were logged by someone for the Democrats on one side of the chamber and someone else for Republicans on the other. The **Majority and Minority leaders usually stood next to the person tallying to, you know, keep watch and make sure their members were voting the way they should.** But **sometimes Republicans would go on the Democratic side, and vice versa, and vote and then immediately leave so their party wouldn't know they deserted until after voting ended.** I remember both parties were very excited when we switched to computers because they thought it would stop this. But **congressmen who really, really want to break from their party will still go to the other side, register their vote, and then run.** None of my members ever have done this, but I've seen it and it happened to a friend of mine. *Her member voted on the Republican side, left, and didn't go back to the office because he didn't want to be found. **If they [party leadership] finds you, they will corner you and bring you back to re-register your vote.***” (CS personal communication, May 2015)*

Every staffer interviewed indicated their member engaged in some form of shirking, despite my not asking the question directly. Understanding avoidance as a generally appropriate strategy for neglecting party directives is important as shirking is a rule-based behavior unto itself. As opposed to the rules discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, which facilitate party discipline, shirking provides an “out” for members whose day-to-day activities are conducted under the watchful eye of the party.

5.3 Preliminary External Validation

These staffer interviews provide external validation of key components of the theory of party brand and, more specifically, the extent to which party leadership is able to influence and direct their brand with the aim of self-perpetuation.

Most notably, party leadership on both sides of the aisle is omnipresent; whether it be through routine calls from the whip's office to confirm (and in some cases, re-confirm) the member's position stance, through the leaders' direction by setting the party's position on a given bill, through collective leadership's requirements of daily fundraising, or through committee leadership's dissemination of the party's position on active legislation via issue statements and briefing materials. Moreover, the staff plays a surprisingly central role in reinforcing the party leadership's directives, often unknowingly or as a secondary effect of some other action.

When confronted by party leadership's umbrella of influence, discordant members engage in shirking to temporarily ignore the party's requirements of them. This appears to be normatively acceptable behavior and layers upon previous chapters' emphasis on the importance of rule based behavior in ensuring the perpetuation of a party's brand. Just as institutionalized rules govern the way party whips discuss the overall brand position (e.g. Chapter 3) and govern the argument strategies of congressional leaders and presidential candidates, institutionalized rules allow congressmen to desert the party without reprisal, which begets flexibility intrinsic to franchise extensions.

CHAPTER 6 Conclusion

6.1.1 In Summary

Party brand is more than a political buzzword of the day and recent scholarship that has made use of the business marketing model has made terrific inroads in advancing the study of party politics. Within this comparatively new literature, most scholarship egpygtu"qp"vj g'tgrv kpuj kr "dgy ggp"xqygtu"cpf "c"r ctv{ø brand. These analyses typically consider j qy "cp"lpf kxf wcrur gtegr vqp"qt"ko r tguukpp"qh"c"r ctv{ "ko r ceu"r ctvcp" identification (Baker et al. 2016; Lupu 2013; Busby and Cronshaw 2015, etc.), strength of partisanship (Marder et al. 2016, etc.), and/or vote choice (Nielsen and Larsen 2014; Veer et al. 2010, etc.). A smaller subset of the literature considers the relationship between brands-in-crisis and partisan dealignment (Lupu 2014, 2013), and a smaller still subset integrates expressly leverages insights and constructs from business-marketing to explain elite party (in)action (Butler and Powell 2014; French and Smith 2010, etc.) and party brands (Rutter et al. 2018) .

This project contributes to this last group by explicitly incorporating business- o ctngvpi ø"dtcpf -image framework and various dimensions of branding theory (e.g. franchise theory, house of brands versus branded house models, etc.) to further the f kxkr nppgø"wpf gtucpf lpi "qh"r qkxkccnr ctv{gu"cu"utcvgi k"qti cpl vqp"lp"vj g"Co gtlcep" political landscape. As well, this project buttresses the broader party brand literature by providing conceptual clarification (i.e. party brand is defined inconsistently within the f kxkr nppgø"uwf { "qh"dtcpf lpi "cevkkxgu"and speaks directly to the American party politics literature.

C'r ctv{au'dtcpf 'ku'vj g'eqmgevqp"qh'eqpetgvg"cwkdwgu"gd 0r qre { 'r rlvhto u." õqy pgf ö"kuwgu."chhkcvgf "rgcf gtu"cpf "intangible mystique (e.g. symbols, ideology, personality) developed over time. At a given point in time the party will project or cevxvcg"e'r qt vqp"qh'ku'qxgtcm'dtcpf "kf gpv{ =vj ku'ku'vj g'r ctv{au'dtcpf 'r qukkqp0Vj g" brand position is communicated to the populace and this message is mediated by the r ctv{au'rgxkqu'dtcpf 'r qukkqp. "vj g'qr r qukkqp'r ctv{au'dtcpf 'r qukkqp."pgy u'uqwtegu."cpf " vj g'lpf kxf wcu'r tkt "eqpegr vqp"qh'vj g'r ctv{0Vj g'dtcpf 'r qukkqp"cu'f kuqtvf "d { 'vj gug" hcevtu"ku'vj g'r ctv{au'dtcpf 'ko ci g. 'vj g'lpf kxf wcu'r lewtg"qh'y j cv'vj g'r ctv{ 'ku'r tqlgex0

Within this general framework, this project argues the national committee hwpvqp"cu"e"eqtr qtcvqp"lp'vj cv'k'ku'vj g'tgr qukqt { "qh'vj g'r ctv{au'dtcpf 'kf gpv{0Vj g" national committee is uniquely equipped to serve in this central capacity as it controls critical financial and informational resources, routinely surveys likely voters to keep cdtgcuv"qh'vj gk"eqpukwgpwø'r tghgtpegulo ctngvf go cpf u."cpf 'ku'uqo gy j cv'kpuwrcvgf " from the ephemeral nature of politics as the committee persists regardless of election outcomes.

C'r ctv{au'ecpf kf cvgu"cpf 'ku'grgevgf "qh'ekcu"cev'cu'htcpej kug"gz vgpukpu"qh'vj g" core brand identity. When a party endorses a candidate or official, they enter into an informal contract wherein they provide critical resources (e.g. donor networks, proprietary data, etc.) and expertise in exchange for cooperation on issues critical to the r ctv{0Hcpej kug"gz vgpukpu"ctg'r gto kwgf "v"vcng"egt vcp"ndgt vku'y ky "vj g'r ctv{au'eqtg" identity and add a layer to the core brand that facilitates appeal among targeted constituents. This project contends only highly visible franchise extensions at the national

level, including congressional leadership and presidential candidates, play a crucial role in the study of American politics. Additionally, this conceptual model actively joins the study of party-organization (PO), party-in-government (PIG), and provides a framework for incorporating the study of party-in-the-electorate (PIE). This is a notable divergence from previous work on responsible party government which focuses on one component of the party to the neglect of the others. (e.g. Cox and Ordeshook's seminal work on responsible party government wonderfully illustrates the importance of party materiality inform and/or impact congressional activities.) In addition to putting forth party brand, this project emphasizes the importance of the holistic study of parties in an effort not to over- or understate the role of any one actor arm. Furthermore, this dissertation strongly advocates on behalf of reincorporating institutional theories, particularly as they pertain to the study of parties at the elite level.

The next sections summarize central findings as presented in chapters three, four, and five, before moving to suggest future areas of research.

6.1.2 In Summary: Issue Ownership

Chapter 3 joins theories of issue ownership with the theory of party brand and argues that party-brand position will strategically choose to highlight those issues

over which they are viewed as having ownership, and are thus viewed favorably on, as opposed to focusing on issues owned by the opposition party and/or neutral issues.

Connectivity clustering of party texts from 1972-2012 finds correlational support for seventeen of the included twenty election cycles, both parties were more likely to emphasize issues they owned than issues they did not and did so with greater frequency.




Figure 6.1 The National Brand Identity Framework (subset of the party brand framework)

6.1.3 In Summary: Elite Specialization

Furthermore, it is argued candidates and elected officials, as franchise extensions, are granted varying degrees of autonomy in pursuing their own political ambition based on their party-assigned role. For the party organization to self-perpetuate, there is a division of labor among relevant actors and their behavioral decisions are guided by their specialization and the rules tied to their position. To this end, Chapter 3 presents correlational findings, which indicate that party actors on both sides of the aisle present

and engag'g'y kj 'y gk'r ctv{a'dtcpf 'u{ ugo c'kcm{.'wukpi 'f k'kpev'htco gu0Rctv{ 'y j kr u'cpf "

party chairmen are much more likely than presidential candidates and Senate/House

ngcf gtu'q'wug'rcpi wci g'yj cv'otcmkgu'yj g'tqqr uö.'r qukkqpu'yj g'r ctv{ 'ci ckpu'c'hqkn'cpf "

provide linear argument, among other differences. These affective differences in framing

and valence are meaningful in that they indicate different party actors, even within the

same actor group (e.g. senatorial whips and leaders, etc.), are prescribed distinct ways of

k'vgtcevkpi 'y kj 'cpf 'r wdrkk kpi 'y gk'r ctv{a'dtcpf 'r qukkqpu'

6.1.4 In Summary: Behavioral Similarities Induced by Institutional Environment

Moreover, the effects of the electoral and party systems, in which both

qti cpk'ckqpu'ctg'pgugf.'er r gctu'q'uj cr g'dqyj 'r ctv{gu'chgevkxg'gpi ci go gpv'y kj 'y gk'"

respective brands and the behavioral patterns of their subgroup actors. For all

dissimilarities in party brand content, the similarities in the way the parties conduct

business points to a force that acts upon both organizations. To this end, I interview both

Democrats and Republicans in an effort to understand whether the similarities between

the parties as presented in the data are aberrant or an artifact of both parties occupying

space in the same system.

6.1.4 In Summary: Polarization and Realignment

Chapter 4 uses computational text analysis to analyze collected party texts and

assess changes to the party brand system and determine which subgroup actors have the

i tgcgvu'lo r cev'qp'yj g'r ctv{a'dtcpf 'r qukkqpu'Wukpi 'c"eqpf k'kqpcr'lo czko wo 'r'k'g'kj qqf "

model to compare the overall Democratic and Republican corpuses, it becomes clear

yj gtg'y cu"c"o clqt'uj k'v'p'yj g'twduwcp'kxg'eqp'gpv'qh'dqyj 'r ctv{a'dtcpf u between 1992

and 1996. It is argued that this jump in scaled position, which is clearly a departure from

the pattern pre- and post-1996, is evidence of a realignment, which supports the
 realignment (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Campbell 2006; Brooks and Manza
 1997, etc.). Specifically, this dissertation posits the defining cleavage in American
 politics was predominantly economic until the mid-3; ; 20. 'y j gp'v'j g'I QRa'hqtv' "{gctu"
 of strategic coalition building and cultivation of the Southern Strategy and Christian
 Coalition redefined the cleavage along social (and moral) lines. Thus, both parties
 adjusted and rebranded with respect to the new cleavage in an attempt to woo voters.

6.1.5 In Summary: The Role of Actor Groups in Producing Party Brand

Chapter 4 also tests the strength of the relationship between the overall party
 brand position and the branding activities of the chairmen, congressional, and presidential
 franchise extensions. As highlighted by the party brand framework, the national
 qti cpk cvqp'ku'y g'qtki kp'qh'y g'r ctv' au'dtcpf "cpf . "v'v'j cv'gpf . "v'j g'ej ckt o gpau'r qukkqpu"
 most closely align with and drive the overall brand. In a candidate-centered era,
 presidential candidates ó who are less reliant on the party organization for resources than
 congressional leadership ó should contribute to the overall brand position, but to a lesser
 extent than congressional leaders. Here, the observed findings are consistent with the
 theoretical expectations set forth in Chapter 2.

6.1.6 In Summary: Insights from Congressional Staffers and the Constraints of Institutional Norms

Chapter 5 summarizes interviews with congressional staffers and provides broad
 support for the findings and trends uncovered through computational text analysis.

Ur gekhecm{ . 'r ctv' 'rgcf gtuj kr 'r n {u'c'f ckn' 'tqng'lp'v'j gk "gngv'gf "qheknv' 'tqwkpg'v'j tqwi j "
 committee activkku. "tghphqtego gpv'qh'y g'r ctv' au'r qukkqpu"qp'c'i kxgp'dkn'qt "vqr le. "cpf "

fundraising requests. Somewhat surprisingly, congressional staffers play a role in
 tglphqtekpī "r ctv{ "rgcf gtuj kr ø"f k gevxgu0Y j krq"vj g"uchhgtu"lpf kecvgf "r ctv{ "rgcf gtuj kr "ku."
 more often than not, helpful (e.g. providing key information resources, etc.) they also
 indicated that when their member was at odds with the party they would engage in
 shirking as a way of circumventing party directives. In these scenarios, staffers
 emphasized shirking on non-critical issues, with minimal frequency was viewed as
 acceptable and allowed members some flexibility when their beliefs were at odds with
 vj g"r ctv{ ø"r tghgtgpegu0'

6.2 Future Research

Vj ku'r tqlgewu"eqptkdwkqp"ku'rcti gn{ "eqpegr wcn'and the analyses provide a
 foundational understanding of party brand dynamics at the national level of American
 politics. Three directions for future research are clearly supported by the conceptual
 development and findings presented here, including a conceptual extension of party brand
 to state and county parties, research that bridges party brand position and party brand
 image, and more rigorous empirical analysis of party brand during periods of intraparty
 brand disagreement.

The decision to exclude stavg"cpf "eqwpv{ "r ctvku'y cu"pgeguuct { "hqt"vj ku'r tqlgewu"
 completion due to scope constraints. However, business-marketing literature ó
 specifically licensing and other extension sub-literatures ó holds much promise in
 expanding the party brand framework to questions relevant to the federal party system.

Additionally, there is a wealth of research conducted in the behavioral tradition
 that either explicitly unpacks or is highly relevant to individual party image. With PO and
 FIG accounts joined, a critical next step is to incorporate PIE literature. This research

would provide critical insight into how elite branding and marketing efforts impact voter perceptions of party and how mass preferences inform these elite efforts. The latter is very much consistent with traditional market research, though both complement the study presented here.

Finally, this project provides speculative insight as to how branding is impacted during periods of intraparty disagreement and offers a wealth of opportunities for further research in this area. While party brand remains a powerful explanatory concept during periods of harmony and unrest, it is particularly important to understand how party brands are managed during periods of electoral uncertainty and in emerging contexts.

Dgi kppkpi "k"vj g"3; : 2a."c"i tqy kpi "pwo dgt"qh'r qrkkecn'uekspvku"flueqwpvgf "vj g" centrality of political parties to American politics and argued on behalf of a candidate-centric system. While candidates have been pushed to the forefront and new media has increased the opportunities candidates have to communicate directly with the people, parties persist as the central feature of American politics. Moreover, this research highlights parties do more than serve minimal heuristic function and aggregate electoral resources, as vj g"r ctv{ "qti cpl c"qp"eqpvkwgu"vq"cepj qt "ku'rgcf gtuj k' au'o guuci kpi "y kj " r tgukf gpvkc'n'ecpf kf cvgu'j cxkpi "vj g'rgcuv'ko r cev'qp"vj gk'r ctv{ au'dtcpf "kf gpvkw{0"

With an increasing number of registered independents, increasing party polarization, and the introduction of new media (as illustrated so powerfully through Fqpcrf "Vtwo r au'wug"qh"Vy kwgt"vq"eqppgev'y kj "j ku'uw r qtvtu+it is ever more critical to understand how parties maintain relevance and support in a new electoral landscape. In spite of these hurdles, parties persist and party branding helps explain how.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: (Chapter 3) Supplemental Descriptive Text Analyses

Table A.1 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses of Total Democratic and Republican Texts, 1976-2012

	Year	%Past	%Present	%Future	%Positive	%Negative	%Anxiety	%I	%We	%Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
DEMOCRATICS	1976	1.64	7.05	1.00	4.65	1.99	0.80	0.45	2.68	0.57	76.55	91.94
	1980	2.10	6.79	1.11	4.42	1.76	0.78	0.74	2.32	0.56	72.69	93.35
	1984	2.37	7.64	1.52	4.36	2.41	1.30	0.93	2.68	0.80	75.25	88.68
	1988	2.28	8.63	1.23	4.82	2.06	1.02	1.20	3.29	0.99	83.14	86.71
	1992	2.36	7.84	1.25	5.49	2.04	1.05	1.00	2.66	0.77	76.98	82.71
	1996	2.00	9.09	1.25	4.50	1.96	0.99	1.05	3.60	0.81	87.53	83.78
	2000	2.28	8.65	1.19	4.60	2.66	0.86	1.17	3.04	0.74	83.72	85.76
	2004	1.79	7.55	1.78	5.44	2.45	1.45	0.28	3.93	0.98	85.45	88.74
	2008	2.13	8.94	1.74	5.02	2.34	1.12	1.05	3.31	0.87	82.35	83.48
	2012	1.46	8.13	1.84	5.41	2.32	0.86	1.30	4.72	0.10	89.08	82.70
Avg.	2.04	8.03	1.39	4.87	2.20	1.02	0.92	3.22	0.72	81.27	86.79	
REPUBLICANS	1976	1.60	7.80	1.25	4.40	1.67	0.72	0.65	2.91	0.85	79.37	90.67
	1980	1.69	7.03	1.32	4.03	2.21	1.00	0.41	2.43	0.88	76.87	92.52
	1984	2.20	6.71	1.16	4.16	1.96	0.89	0.48	2.56	1.22	76.66	91.98
	1988	2.13	7.59	1.55	4.32	1.90	0.87	1.00	2.76	1.39	79.30	90.42
	1992	2.15	7.42	1.27	3.74	1.93	0.88	0.87	2.69	0.98	80.19	89.99
	1996	2.40	7.42	1.26	4.13	1.92	0.89	1.22	2.35	0.91	81.63	87.63
	2000	1.40	6.70	1.36	4.55	2.24	1.21	0.11	2.13	0.94	75.29	94.12
	2004	1.60	6.65	0.98	5.34	1.91	1.51	0.19	2.03	0.95	78.69	94.73
	2008	1.51	6.89	1.22	4.42	2.14	1.52	0.41	2.51	1.01	77.21	92.15
	2012	1.77	10.01	0.90	3.02	2.45	1.98	0.09	2.05	1.49	75.29	93.08
Avg.	1.85	7.42	1.23	4.21	2.03	1.15	0.54	2.44	1.06	78.05	91.73	

Table A.2 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses of Democratic and Republican Presidential Candidate Texts, 1976-2012

	Year	% Past	% Present	% Future	% Positive	% Negative	% Anxiety	% I	% We	% Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
Carter	1976	4.46	12.12	0.80	3.20	1.07	0.26	3.20	2.86	1.80	83.62	59.56
Carter	1980	1.93	8.67	0.61	3.59	1.75	1.23	2.89	1.23	0.26	63.03	84.85
Dukakis	1984	2.03	8.12	1.43	2.77	2.17	0.92	2.31	2.21	0.74	76.69	81.80
Mondale	1988	2.03	8.12	1.43	2.77	2.17	0.92	2.31	2.21	0.74	76.69	81.80
Clinton	1992	3.80	11.07	1.60	2.87	3.14	0.47	2.20	3.00	0.60	77.64	74.69
Clinton	1996	1.01	6.00	2.73	2.49	4.99	1.71	0.55	1.95	0.00	87.56	76.42
Gore	2000	2.76	6.80	0.86	3.70	2.67	1.63	0.69	1.81	0.52	83.91	73.44
Kerry	2004	3.84	9.70	1.35	4.01	3.84	2.24	3.33	2.15	0.59	82.34	67.42
Obama	2008	2.77	9.00	1.55	5.56	3.98	0.66	2.34	3.46	0.46	86.11	75.48
Obama	2012	1.21	10.31	2.03	4.20	2.09	0.26	3.08	3.87	0.27	89.70	78.62
	Avg.	2.58	8.99	1.44	3.52	2.79	1.03	2.29	2.48	0.60	80.73	75.41
Ford	1976	3.43	12.66	1.19	2.69	2.81	1.04	4.83	2.10	0.35	68.52	70.21
Reagan	1980	3.02	10.73	1.77	2.99	2.42	0.42	1.77	1.98	0.94	69.89	69.22
Reagan	1984	3.76	10.34	1.57	3.22	1.25	1.07	0.52	2.82	1.04	85.92	74.97
Bush (41)	1988	3.06	8.40	1.42	3.87	2.50	0.72	1.64	1.85	0.14	76.62	84.30
Bush (41)	1992	2.34	9.60	1.61	2.52	1.69	1.63	1.86	0.48	0.48	78.32	84.63
Dole	1996	3.17	7.45	1.54	3.32	2.11	0.74	1.11	1.88	0.68	87.96	78.76
Bush (43)	2000	0.83	6.71	2.76	3.51	2.21	2.53	1.65	1.38	0.28	66.06	86.93
Bush (43)	2004	2.86	6.49	0.84	3.04	3.45	2.02	2.75	1.25	0.59	66.34	76.77
McCain	2008	2.66	8.28	1.54	2.87	3.77	3.12	2.60	2.44	0.80	75.51	70.51
Romney	2012	2.07	8.77	0.79	3.01	2.90	2.01	2.75	1.04	1.87	78.38	82.69
	Avg.	2.72	8.94	1.50	3.10	2.51	1.53	2.15	1.72	0.72	75.35	77.90

Table A.3 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses of Democratic and Republican National Committee Texts, 1976-2012

	Year	% Past	% Present	% Future	% Positive	% Negative	% Anxiety	% I	% We	% Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
D E M O C R A T I C	1976	1.38	6.45	1.01	4.70	2.02	0.80	0.19	2.38	0.52	74.56	93.94
	1980	1.67	6.23	0.96	4.86	1.68	0.61	0.12	2.68	0.55	78.32	95.41
	1984	1.37	6.31	1.48	4.20	2.31	1.13	0.08	2.25	0.64	75.21	94.66
	1988	0.62	5.65	0.64	5.90	2.14	1.27	0.00	3.64	0.76	86.48	94.10
	1992	1.63	6.84	1.18	4.62	2.55	1.45	0.38	3.04	1.00	82.81	92.42
	1996	1.72	8.26	0.81	5.44	2.25	1.26	0.02	3.53	1.04	89.00	92.59
	2000	1.60	8.35	0.85	4.71	1.86	1.01	0.03	3.28	1.37	84.79	89.91
	2004	1.26	7.55	2.05	6.04	2.51	1.49	0.08	4.60	1.00	88.06	87.88
	2008	1.58	7.22	1.68	5.30	2.12	1.19	0.16	3.68	0.95	86.19	89.54
	2012	1.76	7.29	1.18	6.37	2.85	1.08	0.25	3.15	0.92	83.42	91.17
Avg.	1.46	7.02	1.18	5.21	2.23	1.13	0.13	3.22	0.88	82.88	92.16	
R E P U B L I C A N	1976	1.12	7.25	1.21	4.80	1.75	0.79	0.05	3.57	0.59	83.45	92.37
	1980	1.20	6.04	1.32	4.43	2.31	1.04	0.04	2.46	0.77	76.91	95.13
	1984	1.90	6.24	1.16	4.34	2.13	0.96	0.25	2.62	0.91	77.82	93.32
	1988	1.60	6.37	1.39	4.68	2.07	0.93	0.16	2.94	0.74	80.94	95.16
	1992	1.78	6.60	1.08	4.70	1.92	0.78	0.40	2.57	1.13	80.61	93.25
	1996	1.41	6.04	1.25	4.38	2.25	1.06	0.07	2.81	1.56	81.76	94.62
	2000	1.50	6.77	1.29	4.52	2.13	1.20	0.10	2.25	1.00	76.30	93.92
	2004	1.35	6.53	1.34	4.73	2.19	1.26	0.04	2.21	0.96	76.56	94.55
	2008	1.51	6.47	1.28	4.59	2.24	1.38	0.03	2.07	1.28	75.49	94.55
	2012	1.10	5.71	0.99	4.29	2.08	1.52	0.19	2.52	1.36	77.84	95.02
Avg.	1.45	6.40	1.23	4.55	2.11	1.09	0.13	2.60	1.03	78.77	94.19	

Table A.4 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses of Democratic and Republican National Committee Chairman Texts, 1976-2012

	Year	%Past	%Present	%Future	%Positive	%Negative	%Anxiety	%I	%We	%Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
D E M O C R A T I C	1976	2.69	7.67	0.90	4.48	2.45	0.60	1.21	2.11	1.00	76.55	85.49
	1980	2.69	7.67	0.90	4.48	2.45	0.60	1.21	2.11	1.00	72.69	85.49
	1984	2.36	6.23	0.85	3.11	1.43	0.50	0.45	1.00	0.45	75.25	93.71
	1988	2.44	7.01	0.83	3.00	1.09	0.44	0.70	2.49	0.55	76.17	87.98
	1992	2.81	7.33	0.90	3.03	2.86	1.56	1.20	2.53	0.74	83.14	88.88
	1996	1.22	5.18	0.30	2.74	2.44	0.91	0.30	1.83	0.91	76.98	88.54
	2000	1.64	8.43	0.81	4.61	1.78	0.90	0.06	3.06	1.41	87.53	89.73
	2004	1.49	7.70	1.99	5.67	2.52	1.46	0.13	4.26	1.02	83.72	88.09
	2008	1.35	7.14	2.29	5.20	2.23	1.34	0.04	4.33	0.98	85.45	87.25
	2012	1.22	7.32	2.68	5.82	1.98	0.98	0.05	4.12	0.87	81.66	86.90
	Avg.	1.99	7.17	1.25	4.21	2.12	0.93	0.54	2.78	0.89	79.91	91.32
R E P U B L I C A N	1976	2.59	10.26	1.78	3.13	2.75	0.59	1.30	4.60	0.11	89.08	86.74
	1980	1.88	8.31	2.83	4.48	3.07	0.59	1.30	4.60	0.52	81.27	86.44
	1984	2.40	7.55	1.05	2.61	2.05	0.73	0.84	0.55	0.65	79.37	90.22
	1988	2.63	7.30	1.01	2.79	2.00	0.98	0.84	0.80	0.74	76.87	90.41
	1992	3.02	6.14	0.81	3.44	1.87	0.72	1.61	0.89	0.85	76.66	92.44
	1996	1.60	6.07	1.20	4.32	2.08	0.93	0.15	2.56	1.14	79.30	94.41
	2000	2.35	7.81	0.94	3.54	1.67	1.05	0.46	2.59	1.19	80.19	89.70
	2004	1.81	6.21	0.97	4.91	1.53	1.02	0.23	2.60	0.97	81.63	93.98
	2008	2.46	6.09	0.85	3.91	2.30	1.93	0.06	1.48	1.44	77.21	94.39
	2012	2.33	8.10	0.89	3.87	1.60	2.23	0.10	1.03	1.63	82.01	94.44
	Avg.	2.31	7.38	1.23	3.70	2.09	1.08	0.75	2.17	0.92	80.36	90.97

Table A.5 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses ó Speaker of the House Texts, 1976-2012

	% Past	% Present	% Future	% Positive	% Negative	% Anxiety	% I	% We	% Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
Albert (1972-77)	2.01	8.59	1.68	1.97	1.11	0.86	1.80	1.02	0.89	79.98	82.11
O'Neil (1977-87)	2.22	10.56	2.99	4.99	1.08	1.20	2.34	2.13	1.01	94.72	87.79
Wright (1987-89)	1.16	6.45	1.05	4.45	1.61	0.89	1.22	1.39	0.55	72.72	88.52
Foley (1989-95)	1.89	9.61	1.22	2.89	0.99	1.15	1.68	2.10	0.77	82.09	80.15
Gingrich (1995-99)	2.38	7.96	3.89	7.78	5.19	3.41	3.44	4.63	3.93	91.86	94.68
Hastert (2000-07)	2.22	9.23	2.58	4.57	1.92	1.94	2.98	1.64	2.73	85.63	88.46
Pelosi (2007-11)	2.28	8.88	1.59	2.88	1.90	1.75	1.23	3.87	1.52	81.59	82.60
Boehner (2011-12)	2.04	7.75	1.22	4.20	3.62	2.51	2.23	2.96	2.23	89.47	93.07
Avg.	2.02	8.63	2.03	4.22	2.18	1.71	2.12	2.47	1.70	84.76	87.17

Table A.6 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses ó Democratic House Leadership, 1976-2012

	Year	% Past	% Present	% Future	% Positive	% Negative	% Anxiety	% I	% We	% Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
HOUSE LEADERSHIP	1976	2.97	8.55	0.88	1.85	1.21	0.29	0.89	0.33	0.48	76.14	89.42
	1980	3.16	9.12	0.69	2.94	1.08	0.35	1.73	0.26	0.65	72.69	93.35
	1984	5.37	2.74	0.42	1.26	1.74	0.21	1.00	0.34	0.22	75.25	88.68
	1988	1.70	7.77	0.95	2.81	2.31	0.85	0.80	1.80	0.60	83.14	86.71
	1992	1.80	6.94	1.07	3.64	1.85	0.98	0.53	2.03	0.73	76.98	82.71
	1996	2.38	6.55	1.34	3.13	2.20	0.67	1.27	1.15	0.97	87.53	83.78
	2000	2.10	6.60	0.62	3.81	2.67	0.43	0.11	1.05	1.38	83.72	85.76
	2004	2.56	7.09	1.09	4.70	2.17	1.37	0.53	3.51	0.42	85.45	88.74
	2008	2.15	7.31	1.20	3.71	1.93	1.30	0.26	2.30	0.97	82.35	83.48
	2012	2.26	8.06	1.35	3.88	2.02	1.22	0.44	0.99	0.84	81.80	82.10
Avg.	2.65	7.07	0.96	3.17	1.92	0.77	0.76	1.38	0.73	80.51	86.47	
HOUSE LEADERSHIP	1976	1.88	3.55	0.66	1.44	1.09	0.43	0.44	2.08	0.94	75.88	92.43
	1980	2.37	2.47	0.53	1.29	1.00	0.41	0.89	2.31	1.01	76.87	92.52
	1984	1.54	5.97	0.85	3.58	1.79	1.36	0.68	1.19	0.85	76.66	91.98
	1988	1.71	7.21	0.84	2.72	1.88	0.83	0.49	2.02	0.91	79.30	90.42
	1992	2.68	7.89	0.63	2.37	1.34	0.71	0.47	1.89	1.10	80.19	89.99
	1996	2.18	9.42	1.25	3.12	1.95	0.93	0.39	2.57	1.09	81.63	87.63
	2000	2.35	8.92	0.76	2.72	1.84	0.93	0.34	2.35	1.13	75.29	94.12
	2004	3.52	7.03	1.02	2.50	4.08	2.83	0.40	1.76	0.96	78.69	94.73
	2008	3.10	5.50	0.87	3.77	1.80	0.85	0.33	1.84	0.85	77.21	92.15
	2012	3.22	4.88	0.99	3.11	1.76	0.90	0.34	1.92	0.95	76.63	94.01
Avg.	2.46	6.28	0.84	2.66	1.85	1.02	0.48	1.99	0.98	77.84	92.00	

Table A.7 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses of Republican House Leadership, 1976-2012

	Year	%Past	%Present	%Future	%Positive	%Negative	%Anxiety	%I	%We	%Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
H O U S E L E A D E R	1976	2.85	7.75	1.32	2.22	1.62	0.60	0.87	0.72	0.72	59.33	90.85
	1980	2.51	7.72	1.03	1.93	1.35	0.49	1.35	0.99	0.58	68.12	94.92
	1984	3.12	8.68	0.88	2.34	1.71	0.63	0.88	1.45	1.25	65.17	85.20
	1988	2.88	6.82	1.01	2.88	1.75	0.66	1.03	0.97	0.88	69.33	87.60
	1992	2.39	5.96	1.19	3.98	2.03	0.40	0.94	0.80	2.19	73.77	93.03
	1996	1.96	5.09	1.17	3.13	1.43	0.32	0.74	1.01	0.64	66.63	94.63
	2000	1.69	8.75	1.53	3.84	2.44	0.46	0.25	1.45	2.19	72.11	89.83
	2004	2.25	9.15	1.67	4.31	3.15	1.94	0.42	1.90	1.02	74.84	89.57
	2008	2.59	6.44	1.44	4.19	2.33	0.79	1.00	2.73	0.71	75.98	92.49
	2012	2.44	7.10	1.55	4.00	2.68	1.02	1.44	2.03	1.55	78.44	90.24
Avg.	2.47	7.35	1.28	3.28	2.05	0.73	0.89	1.41	1.17	70.37	90.84	
H O U S E W H I P	1976	1.19	8.66	0.97	1.94	1.57	0.44	0.52	0.75	1.49	64.75	95.16
	1980	2.58	6.96	0.86	2.18	2.48	1.04	0.46	0.86	0.49	60.06	90.64
	1984	1.06	6.74	1.18	0.95	0.71	0.24	0.24	1.65	0.35	67.96	94.87
	1988	1.10	7.28	1.36	1.03	1.05	0.33	0.30	1.42	0.59	69.22	93.86
	1992	1.43	7.89	1.21	1.78	1.88	0.89	1.01	1.86	0.72	68.99	93.45
	1996	2.91	7.35	1.17	2.73	2.01	1.09	0.66	2.25	0.45	71.95	91.03
	2000	1.72	6.63	1.19	3.66	2.60	1.33	0.06	2.01	0.69	73.79	91.30
	2004	1.55	7.97	1.43	3.79	2.42	3.67	0.45	2.95	0.97	63.88	91.39
	2008	2.88	6.23	1.23	3.26	1.82	1.21	0.40	1.76	0.96	64.69	91.87
	2012	3.21	6.28	1.18	3.12	2.77	2.62	0.55	1.88	1.16	68.42	93.34
Avg.	1.96	7.20	1.18	2.44	1.93	1.29	0.47	1.74	0.79	67.37	92.69	

Table A.8 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses of Democratic Senate Leadership, 1976-2012

	Year	%Past	%Present	%Future	%Positive	%Negative	%Anxiety	%I	%We	%Them	Leadership*	Analytical*
SENATE LEADERSHIP	1976	1.95	6.77	1.52	2.88	1.77	0.57	1.07	1.22	0.30	64.35	90.76
	1980	1.90	6.85	1.62	3.70	1.54	0.60	1.15	1.48	0.22	52.85	91.93
	1984	2.63	6.85	1.11	2.50	2.69	1.74	0.74	2.40	0.21	68.50	93.28
	1988	1.51	7.92	1.40	3.26	2.33	1.17	0.12	0.81	0.88	61.02	93.80
	1992	2.56	7.13	1.04	3.93	1.47	0.70	0.76	0.74	0.49	53.39	85.69
	1996	4.24	6.45	0.68	2.53	1.93	0.33	3.22	0.51	0.39	59.04	88.32
	2000	4.88	6.60	1.11	2.34	1.25	0.58	2.44	0.98	0.75	62.94	86.29
	2004	4.67	6.59	1.09	2.60	2.19	1.65	1.30	1.03	1.15	67.01	93.81
	2008	2.32	7.88	1.26	3.22	2.08	1.27	1.70	2.23	1.12	77.37	89.85
	2012	3.42	6.89	1.34	2.78	1.92	0.99	1.03	1.33	1.00	79.64	90.60
	Avg.	3.01	6.99	1.22	2.97	1.92	0.96	1.35	1.27	0.65	64.61	90.43
SENATE WHIP	1976	1.90	7.88	0.89	2.69	2.77	1.41	0.80	1.02	0.82	53.89	93.41
	1980	1.85	7.83	1.09	3.50	2.59	1.39	1.46	0.74	0.84	53.17	90.13
	1984	2.30	6.03	0.78	2.62	2.79	1.72	0.71	1.45	0.58	60.30	93.40
	1988	2.34	6.41	0.88	3.15	2.11	1.78	0.26	1.63	0.75	65.11	95.36
	1992	2.78	5.36	0.88	2.20	2.18	1.04	1.34	1.00	0.38	57.38	94.13
	1996	2.55	6.89	1.03	2.30	2.43	1.48	0.97	1.44	0.56	58.09	92.33
	2000	2.46	6.73	0.98	2.45	2.05	1.30	0.72	1.51	0.89	60.22	92.75
	2004	1.73	6.62	0.92	2.65	2.29	1.98	0.52	1.38	1.15	64.59	94.18
	2008	2.89	7.34	1.35	3.18	2.01	1.26	0.54	1.31	0.90	70.11	91.06
	2012	2.33	7.03	1.20	2.28	2.44	1.23	0.68	1.42	0.84	64.26	93.59
	Avg.	2.31	6.81	1.00	2.70	2.37	1.46	0.80	1.29	0.77	60.71	93.03

Table A.9 Sentiment, Leadership, and Analytical Analyses of Republican Senate Leadership, 1976-2012

	Year	%Past	%Present	%Future	%Positive	%Negative	%Anxiety	%I	%We	%Them	Leadership*	Analytical*	
SENATE	1976	2.13	6.39	1.14	3.12	1.14	0.85	1.77	1.28	0.71	57.33	91.52	
	1980	2.01	7.99	1.01	3.13	1.04	0.87	1.45	1.87	0.65	65.56	88.27	
	1984	2.09	7.65	0.88	2.45	0.97	0.30	1.63	2.93	0.67	72.01	90.16	
	1988	1.82	7.53	1.82	3.24	1.97	1.06	1.89	2.38	1.12	71.23	87.99	
	1992	2.05	8.18	1.17	3.41	1.89	0.89	1.91	2.12	0.73	72.05	94.13	
	1996	2.2	7.02	0.99	2.85	2.73	1.26	1.94	1.14	0.67	61.98	91.46	
	LEADER	2000	1.94	7.35	1.52	2.26	1.42	0.52	1.16	1.76	0.47	53.15	94.82
		2004	1.83	9.52	1.67	1.95	3.41	2.12	1.29	1.91	0.87	68.65	87.7
		2008	1.99	8.1	2.02	3.76	2.14	1.06	1.65	1.77	0.95	68.06	90.12
		2012	2.19	6.88	1.89	3.54	2.11	1.02	1.71	1.59	0.77	73.45	89.89
Avg.		2.03	7.66	1.41	2.97	1.88	1.00	1.64	1.88	0.76	66.35	90.61	
SENATE	1976	2.56	6.98	0.87	2.77	1.12	0.91	0.45	1.49	0.78	55.89	90.38	
	1980	2.97	6.75	1.02	2.64	1.88	1.03	0.66	2.02	1.04	60.20	92.25	
	1984	3.27	6.06	0.73	1.64	1.73	0.82	0.91	1.7	1.55	61.45	91.84	
	1988	2.51	7.14	1.35	3.18	1.35	0.91	1.01	1.48	1.35	74.57	89.96	
	1992	2.44	7.22	1.01	2.62	1.62	0.85	0.83	1.53	1.07	65.97	91.88	
	1996	2.81	7.22	1.04	2.83	1.69	0.80	0.7	2.35	1.71	65.82	90.44	
	WHIP	2000	1.71	6.61	1.19	2.63	1.58	1.32	0.66	2.24	1.45	68.78	92.44
		2004	2.33	7.18	1.21	2.64	2.50	1.92	0.7	2.21	1.81	60.38	93.52
		2008	2.87	6.79	0.75	2.87	2.77	2.47	0.65	2.11	1.7	57.2	90.35
		2012	2.67	7.01	1.04	1.88	2.94	2.66	0.72	2.88	1.89	56.43	93.26
Avg.		2.61	6.90	1.02	2.57	1.92	1.37	0.73	2.00	1.44	62.67	91.63	

Appendix B:
(Chapter 5) Interview Guide & Interview Summary

INFORMED CONSENT

By stating your name, you are consenting to be interviewed as part of a dissertation research project. As per our conversation, your name [will/will not] be included in connection with any of your answers. You are not obligated to answer any of the questions I ask and may terminate the interview at any time. At the end of our conversation, I will debrief you and am happy to answer any questions you may have regarding my larger research project and your contribution at that time. If you agree to these terms and do not have any questions, please state your name as a form of verbal consent.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Did you work for a member of the House of Representatives or the Senate?

Which member(s) did you work for?

When did you begin working for []? Do you still work for []?

IF no: When did you stop working for []?

What was/is your job title(s)?

Can you briefly explain what your primary job responsibilities included?

Can you briefly describe the district [] represents?

WORKPLACE INTERACTIONS

Would you characterize your interaction with [] as very frequent, somewhat frequent, somewhat infrequent, or very infrequent?

Using the same scale, how would you characterize your professional interaction with other congressional staffers?

Using the same scale, how often would [] solicit your opinion?

Thinking of those times you did offer an opinion, do you feel [] took your opinion very seriously, seriously, somewhat seriously, or not at all seriously?

INTERACTIONS WITH PARTY LEADERSHIP

Was your office ever contacted by the [Speaker/Leader/Whip::Leader/Assistant Leader]?
(Speaker, Leader, or Whip)

IF yes: Can you tell me a little about why they were calling?

Was it common for leadership to call on []?

Can you recall a time when [] gkj gt"y cu"pqv'kngn("q"uwr r qt v'j g'r ct v' (a'r qukkqp?

IF yes: Did party leadership get involved?

IF yes OR no: Can you tell me a little bit about that?

Is there a time you can recall your office being contacted by the national committee?

IF yes: Can you please describe the nature of that interaction?

From your perspective, is party leadership omnipresent in day-to-day interactions?

Can you give me an example of a time party leadership explicitly attempted to influence []
_a'r qukkqp"qp"cxqvg."f cy-to-day operations, etc.?

Do you recall a time [] ignored the advice of party leadership?

IF yes: Can you tell me a little bit about the circumstances surrounding their
ignoring the party line and if there was any backlash?

IF interviewee has worked for the minority and majority: Is there a difference in
leadership presence depending on whether the party has control of the chamber?

PARTY BUILDING, PARTISANSHIP, AND PARTY LOYALTY

What types of party building activities did [] participate in?

Did [] participate in fundraising for the party?

IF yes: Could you explain a little about the different types of fundraising activities
[] participated in?

Did you get the impression that party loyalty was particularly important to []?

IF yes OR no: What gave you that impression?

Was bipartisanship [in legislation/in Washington] important to []?

How important was party loyalty in your job performance? Please describe.

PARTY BRAND POSITION

Did [] frequently contribute to newspapers, magazines, or other forms of media?

IF yes: Was [] typically contacted by the media source for comment? Did []/the office take it upon themselves to request coverage? Did party leadership even direct media inquiries to your office?

Y j cv'y cu"]{qwt l'j g'qhhegou_tqrg'kp'r tgr ctkpi "]"_"hqt"cp"wpuetkr vgf "o gf kc"cr r gctcpegA'

Y j cv'y cu"]{qwt l'j g'qhhegou_tqrg'kp'r tgr ctkpi "]"_"hqt"c"uetkr vgf "o gf kc"cr r gctcpegA

Did your office have a media plan?

In recent coverage qh'r qrk'leu.'r ct v'ewrctn' 'r ct v'ucp'r qrk'leu.'y j g'v'gto "ör ct v' "d'c'p'f ö"j' cu" dggp'kpeqtr qtcv'gf "k'p'q'p'gy u'c'pej qtuø'p'qo gper'w'wt'g'0'

Y kj "{qwt'gzr gt'k'peg.'y j cv'f qgu'ör ct v' "d'c'p'f ö"o gcp"v'q"{'q'w'A

If you had to describe the [Democratic/Republican] party brand, how would you?

K'p'q'f'c't'cu"{'q'w'y'k'p'm'l'y'gt'g'k'u'c'ör ct v' "d'c'p'f ö."f'q"{'q'w'y'k'p'm'l']_"c'p'f'k'q't"{'q'w't'q'h'h'eg"

contributed to the development of the brand?

IF yes: Could you elaborate a bit as to how?

INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER STAFFERS

J qy 'y qwf "{qwf guet'kd'g"]" _u'q'h'h'eg"operations with respect to those of other congressmen and party leadership?

Did you share information on active legislation, mail, or other day-to-day operations with other staffers?

IF yes: Can you tell me a little about the type of information you would share and how information shared with you was incorporated into your position?

CATCH-ALL

Is there any story, vote, or otherwise relevant event that implicated your office and party leadership that you think I would be interested in hearing about?

CLOSE

Thank you for taking the time to reflect upon and share your experiences with me today. Your insight will be incorporated into my dissertation project, which argues political parties develop brands that are maintained and developed by various actors, including congressional leadership and congressmen. I am especially interested in how party

leadership is able to induce favorable behaviors from their agents and how congressional staff contribute to the maintenance of party brand. As a reminder, I [will/will not] tie your name to your responses. Additionally, you are free to rescind your answers at any time prior to the filing of this dissertation. I so appreciate your time and welcome any questions you have.

Table A.9 Interview Summary by Unique Identifier

Identifier	CS	JW	TV	SL	LE	FM
Informed Consent	x	x	x	x	x	x
(current) Congressman	4-term, Democratic Congressman	2-term Republican Senator	2-term, Republican Congressman	1-term, Republican Senator	3-term, Democratic Congressman	1-term, Democratic Congressman
Job Title	Chief of Staff	Legislative Director	Legislative Aid	Chief of Staff	Scheduler/ Assistant	Legislative Aid
Years Experience	18	11	7	23	2	9
Still at Position?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No; left 2012	No; left in 2008
Describe your office's constituency	Urban, solidly Democratic district in Northeast	Predominantly rural, solidly Republican state in the Southeast	Rural, solidly Republican district on the West coast	Rural/urban, solidly Republican state in the South	Urban/rural, swing district in Midwest	Urban, swing district in the Midwest
Frequency of interactions w/[]	x	x	x	x	x	x
Contacted by Party Leadership	x	x	x	x	x	x
Example of Time [] Disagreed w/Party Line	x	x	x	x	x	x
Day-to-Day Role of Party Leadership	x	x	x	x	x	x
Difference Between Majority & Minority	x			x		x
Party Building Activities	x	x	x	x	x	x
Fundraising Activities	x	x	x	x	x	x
Importance of Party Loyalty	x	x	x	x	x	x
Importance of Bipartisanship	x	x		x	x	x
Frequency of Media Appearances	x	x	x	x		x
Role in Preparing for Media Appearances	x	x	x	x		x
Media Plan	x	x	x	x		x
Party Brand Contribution		x	x		x	x
Sharing Resources w/Other Offices	x	x	x	x	x	x

**Appendix C:
Transcript of Interview with Bob Dole, January 28th 2016**

Justine Ross (interviewer):	00:04	Okay. Thank you again for taking the time to talk to me.
Senator Bob Dole (interviewee):	00:06	[qwatg'xgt { 'y greqo g0*wpkvgnki kdr+í j cr r { "vq" talk to the next generation doing good work.
Ross:	00:10	Y gm "{qwátg'xgt { 'nkp 0Kf qpø'y cpv'vq'y cuw'cp { 'qh' {qwt'ko g.'wo . 'uq'Kmí gv'utcki j v'vq'k0Vj g'rqewu'qh' my dissertation and my research is political parties and party branding, which is very much linked to r ctv { 'rgcf gtuj kr 'f { pco leu0Cpf "Kyj kpm { qwátg'vj g" kf gcn'r gtupq'ht 'o g'vq'ur gcnly kj "dgecwug" { qwátg' held virtually every national party leadership r qukkqp'vj gtg'ku0Ki'køu'crt ki j v'y kj "{qw'kf 'rknq'vq" begin with a couple of questions about your time as Republican Party Chairman and then move to your leadership in the Senate and then your time as the r ctv {ø'r tgukf gpvkn'pgo kpgg0Does that sound okay with you?
Dole:	00:35	Yes. Absolutely.
Ross:	00:38	Thank {qw0Uq.'køu'hckn { 'y kf gn { 'f qewo gpv'f 'vj cv' you were loyal to President Nixon and, um, you were a vocal proponent of many of his policies on the Senate floor. But did you anticipate Nixon would tap you and [that you would be] nominated as chairman?
Dole:	0:53	Kf kf pø'gzr gev'vq'dg'ej ckt o cp'qh'vj g'Tgr wdrkcp" P cvkqpcnEqo o kwgg0F kf pø'ugg'k'eqo kpi 0Ki qv' some opposition from a couple of senators (unintelligible) Saxby, including the leading senator Ueqw.'y j q'y cu'c'Tgr wdrkcp'rgcf gt0]J g_'f kf pø' want me over there [at the national committee] or as vj g'ej ckt o cp00 c { dg'Km'uc { 'uqo gj kpi "qt 'f q" uqo gj kpi í '*tcku'qht-

Ross: 1:14 And you were fairly new at that point, correct? You had only been in the Senate for two years. Do you think your being a newcomer, um, threatened Uggpcvt"Ueqw'qt'j ku'ngcf gtuj k AKi wguu"ko "cunkpi ." where do you think the opposition to your nomination was coming from?

Dole: 01:49 I think Senator Scott or Senator Saxby from Ohio were the most upset with it. But we, uh, I remember meeting at night with a fellow named Bryce Harlow, which you may have run across in your research. He was very close to Nixon and I remember meeting with him. [He was] saying, you nppqy . "h'ko g'dggp'pgo kpcvfi "K'ij g'pgo kpcvqp" in trouble because I know there were a couple of guys trying to shoot it down.

Ross: 02:49 Did he give you any direction or advice?

Dole: 02:52 Y gm'y g'y qtngrf 'ugxgtcnj qwtu'y kj 'Crf gto cpi ""

Ross: 02:56 Okay.

Dole: 02:56 Finally it resolved everything. And I became the chairman.

Ross: 02:59 What was there to resolve?

Dole: 03:03 Well. I was relatively unknown. I think they just needed to, an assurance.

Ross: 03:10 You mentioned Senator Scott and Saxby by name. Were they accepting of you as party chair moving forward?

Dole: 03:14 [gcj . "Kj kpm]Ueqw_y cu'c'i tgcvi w{ "cpf "Kf qpø' yj kpm'ij gtgø'cp{ "o cnkqwu'kpgpv'qp'j ku'r ct'ØDw" ko "pqv'wut g'Keqwf "uc{ "y g'uco g'cdqw"Ucd{Ø' Senator Scott and I, we worked, we worked very emugn{ . "uq'k'y cupø'cp{ "eqo r gvkqp"qt'y j qø"going to be in the newspaper. Things like that.

and there was a little office right off his office. Y gøf "o ggvcpf "o quw{ 'r leasantries. I remember uc{ kpi "qpg"fc{ "vj cv'køf "j gctf "vj kpi u"qp"vj g'tqcf " about Watergate. Dead silence in the room. So I npgy "Ky cupø'i qkpi "vq'tckug'vj cv'ci ckp0'

- Speaker 3: 05:50 I can imagine. So these leadership meetings y gtgpø."wo . 'kputwe vkpcnA"Vj gy were more or less, like status updates so all leaders were kept abreast?
- Dole: 05:58 Yeah, most of the time.
- Ross: 06:01 So getting back to the Black Republican Council. Removing the doors from the RNC headquarter is symbolically, um, quite powerful. Trying to reach out to African American voters, that seems somewhat contrary to what popular belief is regarding Nixon and the southern strategy. Can you speak to that, specifically during your time as chairman?
- Dole: 06:29 We f kf pø'y cpv"q"lj cxg "Tgr wdkecp"v{r gu0[qw" npqy . "hqt"vj g"o quv'r ct0Y g" f kf pø'y cpv'cp{ "hkf "qh" a closed door party, we really want to be the party of inclusion, not exclusion. Because you know, you ecpø'y k"y kj qw'c"o clqtkv{ . "uq"vj cv'y cu'uqt'v'qh'qw" pitch that we had and that we gave when we went around. We had, I thought, a good time when I was chairman. Of course, as you know, I was succeeded by President George H.W. Bush.
- Ross: 07:25 I read somewhere that you were under the impression you thought yowøf "j cxg"vj g'r qukkqp"c" bit longer. It sounds like you enjoyed the work you were doing and that you, um, were passionate about promoting the GOP. How did you feel about the transition? How was it handled? Did you like, have any input in the succession plan?
- Dole: 07:52 Eqwrf øg"dggp"c"hwg"mpj gt0k" hcev."vj . "Kvxcxgrf " up to Camp David on the chopper to visit with President Nixon. I remember he gave me a jacket thanking me for uh, it had the mileage that I [traveled] as chairman and, uh, so that I had done a

great job and you, had done all the right things. But I kind of left knowing that I was probably not going to be chairman very much longer. [They] had to find a place for Bush. He was coming back from China.

- Ross: 08:40 UN ambassador at the point, right?
- Dole: 08:44 Yeah. And he did a good job there. I just, uh, Bush had been in the congress where I knew him slightly. I never at that point knew him well and he succeeded me and did a good job. He had to deal with all the Watergate stuff. I remember one reporter came to me, his name was Joe Alaska, from [unclear] got to ask you a question because the Democrats are pushing. He said, are the burglary tools hiding in your apartment? I said, no Joe. I had nothing to do with the break in.
- Ross: 09:59 Did you ever find out who was behind that story?
- Dole: 10:07 No and it shows how rough and tough politics can be, but they were insisting I be asked that question. I had a lot of Democratic friends, but when it comes to elections (inaudible) is, uh, fair to say they called CREEP, committee to reelect the president, and I do think they were a little involved [with the Watergate break in]. But the RNC? That was a different story.
- Ross: 10:57 Absolutely. Very lucky. And that raises another question, was he insulated from other leaders and not really the best party builder. Sort of like with Nixon and other Republican presidents. Do you see him as a great party builder? Or was he more insulated and um, focused on his presidency?
- Dole: 11:46 He was a brilliant man and had a lot of progressive ideas for the Republican Party. Family assistance

plan, FAP, was one of his ideas and the welfare reform and affirmative action in federal

go r nq { o gpv. 'vj kpi u'vj cv'j cf pø'dggp'eqpukf gt gf 0'
 Now some wonder why would we ever create FAP?
 But at the time, he did try to get the party behind
 j kò 00 c { dg'k'y cupø'vj g'tki j v'ko g'qt "o c { dg"
 r gqr ng "f kf pø'vcng "vq "k'cpf "j g'eqwrf øg'f qpg"
 something different. But he was always very
 friendly to me, you know, he would always reach
 out and shake my left j cpf "jdgecwug_ 'Kecpø'wug'o {"
 right. He left in disgrace I waited a couple of years
 and then I contacted him. Went up to New Jersey to
 visit with him and took some senators with me. I
 invited him to address the Republican senators,
 which he did, and then Robery Byrd, the leading
 Democrat, Democratic senator, he took him on a
 trip around the world. You know, it was so good on
 foreign policy. Some of the Democrats who went
 y qpf gtgf "y gtg'vj gk "lqdu'qr gp0'Keqwf pø'dgng'g"
 Nixon had this grasp on foreign policy. But anyway,
 it was sort of for Nixon and his rehabilitation.

Ross: 13:32 K'uqwpf u'ikng'k'y qwrf øg'o gcpv'c'i tgcvf gcn'vq"
 Nixon.

Dole: 13:35 Then I spoke at his funeral in California. Yeah, I
 vj kpm'P kzqp. "{qw'npqy . 'køu'wphqt wpcvg"qdxkqwun{"
 sort of how he left and then his ideas fell away.
 Even the ones that had support. A lot of people
 today are surprised to, uh, hear Nixon signed an
 order of affirmative action. When he came to visit
 the capitol there was a line up all the way down to
 the Senate or the House of Representatives, which
 is a pretty long walk. Just to get a picture with him
 and just to shake his hand. I think that had to be
 i qqf "o gf kelpg'ht "P kzqp'dgecwug"j gøf "dggp'i qpg"
 quite a bit.

Ross: 14:54 Vj cvø'u'qt v'qh'c"pleg"gpfi kpi "vq'y j cv'equld have been
 a long rest of his life. Your perspective on Nixon is
 so interesting. I want to skip back to something
 regarding your efforts to make the Republican Party
 the party of inclusion. When you were going around
 the nation and helping to recruit candidates, how

did that, that sort of idea of inclusion factor into the people you recruited?

Dole: 15:48 Y j gp"Kī q'kpq'ūcvgr' ctv' 'rgcf gtu'cpf 'kōū'pqv'c" state where we already have Republicans in the House and Senate, I would visit them about potential candidates to run against X, Y, or Z on the Democratic side. So I bring that information to them and then take it back with me. It was just not cp"qr r qtwpkv' "{qwf 'y cpv'q'r cuu'w' O'

Ross: 16:33 How would you describe the coordination between the RNC and state parties while you were chairman?

Dole: 16:48 We had a good relationship. I was sort of an outreach person anyway. I made friends with most of those state chairmen and of course we had meetings where there would be all the party leaders. Kf "j cxg"cp"opportunity to speak with all of them and, so we had a good relationship.

Ross: 17:21 Flash forward 40 years, do you think the RNC struggles with coordinating with the state parties? The RNC has made a point to be more inclusive in their language, but we f qpø'cny c {u.'wo . 'ugg'vj cv' reflected at the state level. Do you think this is just an issue of coordination or of leadership?

Dole: 17:49 Yeah, I think we have a good national committee chairman (Reince Priebus) and he is very active and aggressive in making contacts and trying to keep the parties happy in each state. No Republicans in the state will ever say they have enough contact with vj g'pcv'kpncleqo o kvgg.'dw'j gā'f qpg'c"i qqf 'lqd.'uq" Kf qpø'vj kpn'kōū'c'rgcf gtuj kr 'kuuwgOJ gā'c"{'qwpī " o cpOJ gā'ldg ctqwpf 'hqt'c'y j kgOKf qpø'hpqy "qh' cp{'qpg'y j qā'etkēkē kpi 'y j cv'j gā'f qkpi O' c {dg" uqo g'qh'vj g'ht'tki j v'r gqr rgO'Vj gtgā'o quw' 'c'rgxgr' qh'tgur gev'ht'y j cv'j gā'f qpg'ht'vj g'r ctv' O'Ncuv' election cycle he really, uh, had a plan and did his best to execute. We did well. We have new Republican senators, nine of them and then three

y j q'tgr mæg f "kpcwf kdr+tgwtkpi "Ucwtf c{0Vj cwu" c"
big group.

- Ross: 19:44 Tki j 0Vj ku'ku'uwdlgevkg."dw'f{qwog."wo . 'uqtv'qh'
uniquely equipped to assess this. Do you think the
party is moving in the right direction?
- Dole: 20:00 Kæ'i qlpi "v'dg"vwi j gt'kp'38"dgecwug'y g'j cxg"
*kpcwf kdr+cpf "vj g{ "qpn{ "j cxg'33"cpf "y gæ'g'i qv'7"
who are probably in danger. And the only
Democrat we might be able to flip is Harry Reid.
We picked the wrong candidate last time and Harry
o c{ 'tgwtkg0Kf qpø'hpqy 0Kø "c'hkpf'qh'j ku."dw'K'
think there are just a couple of seats out of 11 and
that might be one. Colorado and Nevada and that
the rest. Democrats are pretty safe right now. We
need to get a Repwdreep'r tgukf gp0Vj cwm'dg"vj g"
challenge.
- Ross: 21:14 The party has struggled with its image, well, for a
f gecf g'qt'uq."dw'kæ'i qwgp"o wej 'y qtug'tgegpw{0'
Do you think a Republican president could repair
vj g'r ctv{æ'ko ci gA
- Dole: 21:40 Well, it depends. Not by itself, but either Bush or
Rubio would be my choices. There are some other
good candidates out there, but some are so
gz'tgo gn{ "eqpugtxcvkg0Kf qpø'vj kpm'vj g{ "y qwf "
speak for traditional Republican, conservatives and
we need that more than far right people. The far
tki j v'kupø'i qlpi "v'y kp'hqt'wu'lp'vj g'hqpi "twp"cpf "
vj . "Kf qpø'vj kpm"Kf qpø'dgnkxg"]c'hct'tki j v'
candidate will] be nominated.
- Ross: 22:46 Well, it seems like far right candidates get a lot
more attention and air time than traditional
Tgr wdreepu."y j lej "f qgupø'j gr "vj g'r ctv{æ'r wuj "
toward, um, conventional conservatism.
- Dole: 23:18 [gcj 0Y gm'vj g'o gf k'kupø'i qlpi "v'j gr "
Tgr wdreepu0Vj cwu"uqo gj kpi "gnug"vj cv'j cu'vq'dg"
sorted out.

Ross: 23:34 P q.'y gm0Kuw r qug'y gm'see. I want to make sure I get to your time as a leader in the Senate and as a presidential nominee, so just a couple of questions here. In preparing for this interview, compromise is often included as a sort of hallmark of your service. From a branding perspective, unified messaging or, wo .r qukukqp'ku'xgt {'j ki j n'xcnwgf.'uq'ko "ewlkqu'kh" you found compromise in the Senate diluted the Republican position?

Dole: 24:13 I had a lot of Democratic friends and you used to be cdng"q'i gv'c'F go qetck'e'xqv'qt "y q'qt"vj tgg0Y gof " sometimes lose someone like Arlen Specter, Olympia Snow. They were more liberal in their attitudes, but we had a good group to work with, which makes it easier for the leader. We had good people who might have had a little different views qh'vj g'rgi kurckqp."dw'y gof "y qtmk'qw'lp"qwt " Republican conference and then go to the Democrats and try to bring a few of them aboard if y g'pggf gf "q0Kf qpø'vj kpnthe compromise we had to do was bad for the party, it was just doing dwukpguu0Vj cw'r tqdcn' "dgecwug'y g'j cf "uwaj "c" good group though, we could compromise without damaging our relationships or the party. And it was sort of understood the, uh, Democrats would sometimes work with us. When they did or when Tgr wdrkcpu'y qtngf "y kj "vj go "k'y cupø'cdqw'vj g" party, it was about them protecting their own kpvgtguu0Y g'lwu'f kf pø'xkgy "k'cu'j wtkpi "vj g'r ctv{0 Dw'ku'f khtgpv'pqy . 'f khtgpv'i tqwr 0

Ross: 25:56 Interesting. While you were leader, did you consider the party as a whole while conducting business and, like, negotiating these compromises?

Dole: 26:14 Yes. We wanted good legislation for America and the party. It worked out pretty well. I was proud to dg'vj g'rgcf gt."y g'j cf "c'i tgcv'ko g0Y gøt'g'i qlpi "q" have a reunion of our old guys in April. They all come back. The former senators come back to DC and have lunch and have a little memorial service for the 12 who passed away. And then we just sit around and visit.

Ross: 26:41 You talk about relationships a lot as leader and as RNC chair. Do you think having good relationships with your party members is key to having a strong party brand or image?

Dole: 26:58 [gcj 0Kau'tgrv kpuj kr u'qp'dqj 'ukf guUtqpi " working relationships make it possible for us to, uh, i gv'y j cv'y g'pggf "v'i gv'f qpg0K" {qw'f qpø'j cxg" good relationships, it makes it easier for people to walk away.

Ross: 27:21 F q" {qw'v'j kpn'v'j cv'v'y j cv'v'y g'Tgr vdrkcp'r ctv' {ø" problem is today? Leaders dopø'j cxg'utqpi " enough relationships with all other Republicans?

Dole: 27:40 Ky kpn'kø'r quidng0Ngcf gtuj kr 'f qgu'vt { 'cpf 'v'j g {ø'g" doing a good job, but the far right and traditional conservatives have some differences.

Ross: 27:56 As party leader of the Senate you were incredibly visible and a Sunday morning show favorite. Did your prominence ever affect your position on certain issues? Were you cognizant of pressure from the Republican Party and feel like you had to represent the party instead of just maybe your constituents or your conscience on (inaudible).

Dole: 28:18 I have my own philosophy, but on most of these talk shows they have these gotcha questions to get {qw'v'q'uc { 'uqo gv'j kpi " {qw'r tqdcdn { 'uj qwr'f pø'uc {0 So I try to avoid that. I finally got in trouble a few times with the party but nobody [complained] too loudly.

Ross: 28:47 Before we move to your presidential nomination, can you just tell me a little about party building during your time as Senate leader? Was it at the forefront of your mind?

Dole: 29:02 Qj " {gcj 0Y gø'g'cn'y c {u'vt {kpi "v'q'dwkrf "v'j g'r ctv' {kø" v'j g'Ugpcvg0Y gø'g'hqnkpi "hqt "i qqf "ecpf kf cv'gu'cpf " trying to help some who are not so strong. You cn'y c {u'vt { 'v'q'dwkrf " {qwt'dcug'cpf "y g'f kf pø'j cxg'v'qq"

o wej "hæntly kj "vj g"dræm'leqo o wpk{0Vj g{æg"dggp"
democrats for a long time, but we were able to
make some headway with women and some other
communities that are not tending to be more about
Democrats. We tried to find candidates and support
candidate who would help build that base because a
community would support them.

Ross: 30:48 Y gæt'wppkpi "uj qt v'qp"ko g'cpf "Knpqy "{qw} cxg"ç"
meeting right after this, so

Dole: 31:00 Yeah, I have a senator waiting for me in the other
room, but I have time for one more.

Ross: 31:09 Perfect. My last question has to do with your GOP
nomination for the presidency. In interviews, Hayler
Barbour has given the impression that you were sort
of pushed by the party during your campaign to be
o wej "o qtg'uqekcm{ "eqpugtxcvæxg"vj gp"{qwæf "y cpv"q"
be. Do you recall this pressure and, if so, how you
were pressured?

Dole: 31:20 Not really, but I think maybe some of the senators
vj qwi j v'Kf kf pæj cxg"ç"eqpugtxcvæxg'tgeqrd. I was
qpg"qh'Tgci cpæu'qr "uwr r qt vgtu. "qpg"qh} ku'vj kf "qt"
hqwtvj . "uq"Kf kf pæ'hægn'knæ"Kj çf "q"cr qmji k g0Dw"
uh, you know, some of the (inaudible) said that
çhgty çtf u"Ky cupæ"eqpugtxcvæxg0F qrg"y cu"ç"
o qf gtp"çpf "cm'vj çv'uwh0Dw"ko "uwn'eqpugt vative.
I had a very popular (inaudible) and maybe some
uck "Ky cupæ"eqpugtxcvæxg"gpqwi j "dw."{qw'hpqy ."
Enk'qp"y cu'xgt {"i qqf 0Y gæt.g. "y gæt'g'hægp u'pqy "
and, uh, the economy was good and I remember
getting a letter from Nixon saying all these good
things, but the last thing he said was, if the economy
ku'i qqf "{qw'æcpæ'dgcv'Enk'qp0J g'y cu'tki j æ'

Ross: 32:40 Yes, he was. Okay. Well, thank you so much for
agreeing to talk to me. I really, I really appreciate it.

Dole: 32:48 [qwæt'g'y græqo g0Kf ghpkgn{ "y ant to help others get
out there (inaudible) and I like hearing about the
i qqf "y qtm{qwæt'g'f kpi 0Dg'k"qwej "ci çk"kh}{qw'
need anything. Nice to talk to you.

Ross:

33:33

You, too. Thank you so much, Senator.

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