

UCLA

UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Politics of Sight/Site: Hypervisibility/Invisibility of Kahuku Training Area and the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Relation to Tourist Destinations

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8144f8cx>

ISBN

9798190929270

Author

Yuen, Paige Jessica

Publication Date

2026-09-11

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Politics of Sight/Site: Hypervisibility/Invisibility of Kahuku Training Area and the Pacific
Missile Range Facility in Relation to Tourist Destinations

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Asian American Studies

by

Paige Jessica Yuen

2026

© Copyright by

Paige Jessica Yuen

2026

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Politics of Sight/Site: Hypervisibility/Invisibility of Kahuku Training Area and the Pacific
Missile Range Facility in Relation to Tourist Destinations

by

Paige Jessica Yuen

Master of Arts in Asian American Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2026

Professor Keith L. Camacho, Co-Chair

Professor Nour Joudah, Co-Chair

Abstract: This thesis examines Kahuku Training Area on O‘ahu and Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kaua‘i and the ways in which they are rendered invisible or hypervisible by the tourist destinations in close proximity to or within the bases. Utilizing archival research, mapping technologies like Google and Apple Maps, and YouTube videos, this thesis exposes the messy and hidden entanglements between the U.S. military, state government, and private actors that maintain the settler occupation in Hawai‘i and imperialist efforts in the Pacific. Grounded by the scholarship of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi scholars, this thesis highlights the ongoing resistance towards

U.S. military occupation and suggests other methods of opposition through the operationalization of the glitch.

The thesis of Paige Jessica Yuen is approved.

Lisa Uperesa

Keith L. Camacho, Committee Co-Chair

Nour Joudah, Committee Co-Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2026

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	viii
Introduction	1
Chapter I: Origins of Kahuku Training Area, Ritz-Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort, and the Secret Relationships that Render the U.S. Military Invisible.....	24
Chapter II: Kahuku Training Area, Ritz-Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort, and the Glitch	43
Chapter III: Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Ni‘ihau, and Barking Sands Beach Cottages – Hypervisibility, the Propaganda of National Security, and the “Clean War” Aesthetic	64
References	103

List of Figures

Figure 1. "The O‘ahu Island Target UXO Awareness” sign posted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (Photograph by the author, July 19, 2025, Mālaekahana Bay)	1
Figure 2. Aerial photo of Ritz Carlton O‘ahu, Turtle Bay Resorts from Forbes	45
Figure 3. Aerial photo of Ritz Carlton O‘ahu, Turtle Bay from wedding videography site	45
Figure 4. Edited picture by author of Figure 2 to show location of three spheres	46
Figure 5. Screenshot of radar site on Apple Maps.	47
Figure 6. Screenshot of Google Maps displaying Turtle Bay Resort and Kahuku Training Area.	48
Figure 7. Screenshot of Apple Maps taken by author of Kahuku Training Area	52
Figure 8. Edited picture of Apple Maps screenshot to show glitches in clouds.	53
Figure 9. Screenshot of military vehicles exiting Charlie Road on Google Maps	55
Figure 10. Screenshot of military vehicles exiting Charlie Road on Google Maps	56
[From Top Left to Bottom Right] Figure 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4. Screenshot of military vehicles exiting Charlie Road on Google Maps	57
Figure 12. Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Barking Sands Recreation Map from U.S. Navy Website Commander Navy Installations Command	84
Figure 13. Barking Sands Area Map from University of North Texas Digital Library	85
Figure 14. Stills from the YouTube video "DV Cottage, PMRF, Barking Sands, Kaua‘i, 7-12-21"	88
Figure 15. Stills from the YouTube video "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha Kaua‘i”	93

List of Tables

Table 1: "Military land Holdings in the State of Hawai‘i"	15
---	----

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been completed without the wisdom and support of people from Hawai‘i to Turtle Island. This thesis is not merely my work, but it is the collective effort and knowledge of those both inside and outside the academy, and those here and those past. Though I cannot name and thank everyone individually in this acknowledgements, know that I am grateful and appreciative of you all.

First, mahalo to my committee for your advice, insight, and patience with me as I went through this process. To my advisor and co-chair Nour Joudah, mahalo for your constant support and mentorship throughout my two years in this program. I am gratefully appreciative of the ways in which you cared for both my scholarship and me as a person outside of academia. To my co-chair Keith Camacho, mahalo for your wisdom and the time you took out of your busy schedule to guide me. I am thankful for not only your expertise in the field, but also your enthusiasm to help me integrate into the community at UCLA when I was often homesick. To my committee member Lisa Uperesa, mahalo for your support and constant encouragement, while pushing me to become a better researcher and writer. I am so appreciative of your reassurance and kindness when I doubted that I could continue in academia.

Additionally, mahalo to all my mentors and advisors from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. To Cameron Grimm, mahalo for encouraging me to pursue graduate school and connecting me with Dean. I would truly not be on this path if it was not for your mentorship. To Dean Saranillio, mahalo for your teaching and guidance that helped me write my first thesis and now this masters thesis. Mahalo for urging me to apply to this program and for giving me the tools to complete a masters degree.

Mahalo to all the archivists and workers at the Hawai‘i State Archives, the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa’s Hawai‘i and Pacific Collections, and the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa’s Hawai‘i Congressional Papers Collection. An especially huge mahalo to Aunty Diane of the Hawai‘i State Archives, who would locate all the maps and archival pieces I had requested the entire summer. I appreciate each and everyone of you for your work and dedication to research. This thesis would not have existed without you all.

Lastly, mahalo to my communities in Los Angeles and Hawai‘i. To my LA community, mahalo for welcoming and embracing me. I have learned so much from you all, and I am so grateful for the long-lasting relationships I have built despite the relatively short period I was there. To my friends and family in Hawai‘i, mahalo for supporting me and my schooling 2,000+ miles away. I have missed you all so much. Mahalo for letting me explore a new opportunity and for always sending me love (and snacks) while I was in the midst of papers and research. Finally, to Grandma Linda and Roy, mahalo for waiting for me to come home so I could say goodbye. I love you both so much.

Introduction

I have fond memories of Mālaekahana. As a child, the bay was a place where I camped with my family, caught crabs with my red City Mill net late at night, and paddled out with friends on plastic kayaks and boogie boards to Mokua‘auia. It was a space where local families enjoyed their three-day weekends, turtles rested on the shore, and birds nested during their winter migration.



Figure 1. "The O‘ahu Island Target UXO Awareness” sign posted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (Photograph by the author, July 19, 2025, Mālaekahana Bay)

Over a summer break, I drove up to Mālaekahana with a friend, braving the traffic clogged with tourists on Kamehameha Highway. As we hopped out of my car and began our dissent to the beach, a rusted sign titled “The O‘ahu Island Target UXO Awareness” caught my attention (Figure 1). Posted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the sign cautioned of unexploded ordnances littered in the ocean and urged individuals to contact emergency services if one was encountered. Reading and rereading the warning stunned, I had no recollection of ever noticing this sign, despite its worn appearance that suggested it had been posted there for a while.

As I snapped a picture of it, I turned back to see a family of tourists throwing a football around, oblivious to my shock and to the grim caution looming over the bay.

The concept of an unexploded ordinance zone tucked in an idyllic tourist destination and animal sanctuary struck me as absurd and abnormal. However, these juxtaposing features depict precisely the everyday spatial entanglement of militarism, tourism, and settler colonialism in Hawai‘i. This thesis will examine militarized spaces partially leased by the State of Hawai‘i which are in close proximity to or surrounding popular tourist destinations, the Ritz Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort and Barking Sands Beach Cottages. The two spaces examined in this thesis are Kahuku Training Area on the North Shore of O‘ahu and the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on Kaua‘i. I chose these specific militarized spaces as (1) both areas are in proximity to or possess a “secluded” tourist destinations that are visible to the public online; (2) considerable literature on leased land to the U.S. military predominately focus on Mākua Valley and Pōhakuloa Training Area; and (3) leased portions of the sites are currently in negotiation as the leases expire in 2029. While narrowing the scope of my research, I also observed that while Kahuku Training Area is invisible to the public, the PMRF is exceedingly visible and establishes its presence within the community in Kaua‘i. Additionally, through a critical interrogation of these militarized and touristic zones, this thesis argues that the U.S. military renders itself either hypervisible or invisible in order to maintain, normalize, and necessitate its presence in the Pacific with the assistance of the tourist industry. Despite publicized contention between federal government, state government, and private corporations, these public and private actors quietly collude to augment their own profits through land acquisition and development, further

dispossessing Kanaka ‘Ōiwi from their genealogical land.¹ I also consider the following questions: (1) how does land ownership transfer overtime in these spaces, and how does the history of that land become erased as military and tourist presence expand in Hawai‘i?; (2) how do White and Asian settlers exploit their positions in government to benefit their own business ventures and further create a reliance on militarized and tourist economies?; (3) how do tourist destinations either conceal or highlight the U.S. military?; and (4) how can the digital space be sites or tools of resistance against military occupation in Hawai‘i?

Theoretical Frameworks

This thesis is grounded in theoretical frameworks, namely settler colonialism, Indigeneity, the politics of site, multiculturalist White supremacy, and the glitch. Prominent settler colonial scholar Patrick Wolfe’s definition of settler colonialism as a “structure not an event” illustrates the “logic of elimination” that underpins settler invasion and the dispossession of Indigenous communities.² With aims to “destroy to replace,” settler colonialism at times, Wolfe contends, requires both the erasure of native people and the appropriation and adoption of Indigenous culture to set them apart from the settler state.³ Similar to the Australian state government and their occupation of Aboriginal people, the U.S. government and military share the justification that they would make better use of the land than Kanaka ‘Ōiwi.⁴ In her examination of Wolfe’s theory, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi anthropologist J. Kēhaulani Kauanui notes that

¹ Throughout this paper, I will refer to Native Hawaiians as Kanaka, Kanaka Maoli, or Kanaka ‘Ōiwi. I will also not italicize words in ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i or Hawaiian language. All English translations are from *Nā Puke Wehewehe ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i*.

² Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 388.

³ Wolfe, 389.

⁴ Wolfe, 389.

settler colonialism is a “land-centered project” and that the logic of elimination that Wolfe describes is the “elimination of the native as native.”⁵ Thus, settler colonialism, Kauanui asserts, should also involve the question of indigeneity as a vital counterpart analytic.

Considering Kauanui’s argument of indigeneity as an analytic of settler colonial studies, this thesis spotlights Kanaka ‘Ōiwi scholars and theoretical frameworks that exemplify Indigenous resistance toward U.S. empire and provide alternative futures for Hawai‘i. In one of her works regarding political struggle and land back in Hawai‘i, Kanaka scholar and activist Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua refers to ea as political independence and sovereignty.⁶ Ea, which is directly translated into “life” or “breath,” reimagines sovereignty as a reciprocal and interdependent relationship with land itself.⁷ The appropriated state motto “ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono” is often mistranslated to “the life of the land is perpetuated in righteousness.” However, this proclamation declared by Kamehameha III or Kūikeyouli is more closely translated to “the sovereignty of the land continues through justice and proper acts,” which foregrounds the genalogical relationship between Kanaka ‘Ōiwi and their familial land.⁸ Seminal scholar and activist Haunani-Kay Trask also prompts the question of sovereignty in her work regarding Indigenous self-determination against U.S. imperialism, the tourist industry and the prostitution of Kanaka culture, and institutional racism at the University of Hawai‘i against Kanaka students and faculty. Tracing the familial relationship between Kanaka ‘Ōiwi and their

⁵ J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “A Structure, Not an Event’: Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity,” *Emergent Critical Analytics of Alternative Humanities*, no. 5 (2016).

⁶ Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, “Introduction” in *A Nation Rising: Hawaiian Movements for Life, Land and Sovereignty*, ed. Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, Ikaika Hussey, and Erin Kahunawaika‘ala Wright (Duke University Press, 2014), 3.

⁷ Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, 4.

⁸ Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, 4.

land, Trask contends that to mālama ‘āina or to care for or protect the land is to attain land back from U.S. empire.⁹ Bringing attention to both the tourist industry and U.S. military industrial complex, she maintains that their homelands are in need of protection from the “two engines of haole (white) American culture” who have “increased their rapacious consumption of [Native Hawaiian] physical and cultural heritage.”¹⁰ Hence, the U.S. military and their operations, along with the tourist destinations within or in close proximity to these occupied spaces, are in direct opposition to Kanaka ‘Ōiwi traditions and values.

Furthermore, this thesis examines the people who permit and sanction U.S. military operations and tourist development in Hawai‘i despite the two industries’ exploitative operations. To understand the actors involved in these profit generators, I turn to the work of scholars like Candace Fujikane and Haunani-Kay Trask who critically examine White and East Asian settlers in Hawai‘i. In addition to the White settlers who were major landowners, Asian settlers in the context of Hawai‘i utilized their high socio-economic statuses and top positions in the state or federal government to further their profit and dispossess Kanaka Maoli from their land.¹¹ Though ethnic demographic data is limited from the Hawai‘i Territorial Period and early statehood, twenty-one of fifty-one state representatives and ten of twenty-four state senators were Japanese settlers in 1985.^{12,13} Coincidentally, U.S. Senators Daniel Inouye and Spark Matsunaga were also

⁹ Haunani-Kay Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i* (University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999), 59.

¹⁰ Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i*, 4.

¹¹ Candace Fujikane, “Introduction: Asian Settler Colonialism in the U.S. Colony of Hawai‘i,” in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 8.

¹² Roland Kotani, *The Japanese in Hawai‘i: A Century of Struggle* (Hawai‘i Hochi Ltd., 1985), 157.

¹³ Other representatives and senators’ ethnicities were not cited and could not be found.

Japanese settlers, and the governor, George Ariyoshi, was the first governor of Asian descent.¹⁴ By 1985, Japanese settlers were in charge of eight of seventeen state departments, including Chairman Susumu Ono of the Department of Land and Natural Resources and Director Russell Nagata of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs.¹⁵ However, to create a distinction between themselves—the descendants of poor, plantation workers—and haole, Asian settlers habitually labelled themselves as “local” rather than as “settler,” while benefiting from the marginalization of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi and assuaging themselves of their settler guilt.¹⁶ This hegemonic identity rids Asian settlers of engaging in accountability and reinforces the narrative of Hawai‘i as a racial paradise.¹⁷ As a sixth generation Chinese, fifth generation Japanese, and Irish mixed settler of Hawai‘i, I found it important to touch on both White and Asian settler colonialism in this thesis as a way to acknowledge my own family’s complicity in the

¹⁴ Kotani, 157.

¹⁵ Kotani, 157-158.

¹⁶ Haunani-Kay Trask, “Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant Hegemony:’ ‘Locals’ in Hawai‘i,” in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008) 46-47.

¹⁷ There is much contention surrounding studies of Asian settler colonialism and even the framework itself that Dean Saranillio addresses and contends within his article “Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters: A Thought Piece on Critiques, Debates, and Indigenous Difference.” After the release of the *Amerasia Journal*’s “Whose Vision? Asian Settler Colonialism in Hawai‘i” and later the anthology *Asian Settler Colonialism*, Saranillio explains that reactions towards the application of settler colonialism to Asians in Hawai‘i were divisive and criticisms quickly emerged after the release of the anthology. Saranillio specifically highlights three main criticisms of Asian settler colonialism as an analytic: (1) Asian settler colonialism as a theory is neo-racist and advocates for the expulsion of Asian settlers as the solution to land back, (2) Asians as settler colonialists is ahistorical, and (3) Kanaka ‘Ōiwi nationalism promotes division and hostility between Kanaka and Asian settlers. However, as Saranillio notes, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi scholars and activists have instead asked Asian settlers to examine their positionality and take accountability for the ways in which conversations and practices may dismiss, exclude, or erase Kanaka ‘Ōiwi genealogies. He also chronicles a short history of Asian settlers in Hawai‘i that utilized their privileged socioeconomic statuses to gain positions in politics, which would be later coined the “Democratic Revolution.” For further contextualization of this hegemonic Asian political ascendancy, the brief historical overview in this introduction further delves into this account.

Dean Itsuji Saranillio, “Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters: A Thought Piece on Critiques, Debates, and Indigenous Difference,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 3 (2013), 282-286.

dispossession of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi land and to be transparent of my identity as a non-Kanaka scholar who does land-based research in Hawai‘i.

Additionally, considering the liberal progressive state that characterizes Hawai‘i’s predominately Democrat controlled state government, this thesis raises Ethnic Studies scholar Dylan Rodriguez’s conception of multiculturalist White supremacy to further distinguish Hawai‘i ethnic and racial relations from other power structures on Turtle Island or indigenous North America. In thinking of the contemporary issues in the United States through terms of warfare “post” Civil Rights era, Rodriguez employs the term multiculturalist White supremacy wherein White supremacist structures are enabled, maintained, and furthered while simultaneously promoting progressive principles like diversity and inclusion.¹⁸ Rather than racism ceasing to exist after segregation was made illegal, racism is transformed and mutated into the liberal state it currently operates. This sanitized racism seeps into the techniques, propaganda, and community in the Pacific. Though he centers his scholarship on the police, Rodriguez does argue that the U.S. military’s operations of counterinsurgency and domestic warfare are iterations of liberal strategies to diversify the institution.¹⁹ Considering U.S. military operations in Hawai‘i for this thesis, multiculturalist White supremacy manifests in two different ways: (1) the U.S. military delineates itself as a benevolent neighbor and sacrificial savior from malevolent, foreign entities and (2) the U.S. proudly boasts of their diverse servicemen and women and their adoption of ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i and other Kanaka ‘Ōiwi traditions to demonstrate their commitment of fostering inclusion and community-oriented relationships.

¹⁸ Dylan Rodriguez, *White Reconstruction: Domestic Warfare and the Logics of Genocide* (Fordham University Press, 2020), 56.

¹⁹ Rodriguez, 46.

In scrutinizing U.S. military operations in Hawai‘i, political scientist Timothy Pachirat’s concept of the politics of site and German sociologist Norbert Elias’s work on the modern state are key aids in understanding logics of invisibility/visibility/hypervisibility. Though Pachirat’s research concentrates on the industrialized slaughterhouse, his scholarship nevertheless illustrates the ways in which institutions purposefully conceal and distance their daily functions from society.²⁰ Employing Zygmunt Bauman’s idea of the “zone of confinement,” Pachirat asserts that what is “hidden in plain sight” exposes the power dynamics that allow societal abhorrent activities to continue to generate profit.²¹ Exposing the collusion of surveillance and concealment, he defines “politics of sight” as deliberate efforts to breach zones of confinement in order to make the invisible visible for systemic change to occur.²² Furthermore, he also gestures to Norbert Elias’s scholarship on the modern Western state, in which Elias argues that the state intentionally removes the morally repugnant from public sight, including everything from nose-blowing to sexual relations to torture and war.²³ In his chapter “On Changes in Aggressiveness,” Elias demarcates a time where war was no longer pleasurable and personal:

But even these temporal and spatial enclaves within civilized society in which belligerence is allowed freer play—above all, wars between nations—have become more impersonal, and lead less and less to an affective discharge having the immediacy and intensity of the medieval phase. The necessary restraint and transformation of aggression in everyday life of civilized society cannot be simply reversed, even in these enclaves...Even in war in the civilized world, the individual can no longer give free rein to his pleasure, spurred on by the sight of the enemy, but must fight, no matter how he may feel, according to the commands of invisible or only indirectly visible leaders, against a frequently invisible or only indirectly visible enemy. And immense social upheaval and urgency, heightened by carefully concerted propaganda, are needed to be

²⁰ Timothy Pachirat, *Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight* (Yale University Press, 2011), 4.

²¹ Pachirat, 9.

²² Pachirat, 15.

²³ Pachirat, 10.

reawaken and legitimize in large masses of people the socially outlawed instincts, the joy in killing and destruction that have been repressed from everyday civilized life.²⁴

According to Elias, aggression was restricted and administered by the modern state, directing attention to an invisible, uncivilized force that is suitable for destruction. Yet, these state sanctioned acts of aggression are far from humane as demonstrated by the operations conducted by the U.S. military.

Furthermore, political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott and French philosopher Michel Foucault's scholarship on power and surveillance are also worthwhile in considering the ways in which the U.S. military renders itself either hypervisible or invisible. In what Scott describes as "high modernism" for example, he chronicles state development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which the state carried out sweeping reforms of civil society to improve the conditions of its inhabitants and those subjected to its colonial rule.²⁵ Indigenous communities under such governance faced widespread social "experiments," whereupon their lifestyles were disturbed and altered.²⁶ Additionally, Scott argues that any state-led intervention necessitates some sort of manipulation or rearrangement of "units" whether those units be citizens, nature, or infrastructure.²⁷ This management and forceful maneuvering gives greater access to the state to monitor or surveil its inhabitants. Similarly, Foucault engages with the topic of surveillance, offering the panopticon as an example of state power and policing. Designated as a "laboratory of power," the panopticon, according to Foucault, not only is utilized to monitor

²⁴ Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners* (Urizen Books, 1978), 202.

²⁵ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998), 89.

²⁶ Scott, 97.

²⁷ Scott, 183.

human behavior while being relatively invisible to the public, but it can modify it as well.²⁸ This panoptic mechanism allows the state to discipline its subjects and eliminates the ability to conceal so that “in the peripheral ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen.”²⁹ Thus, in thinking of Foucault’s ideas of surveillance, this thesis categorizes the U.S. military as a sort of panoptic authority due to its ability to conduct their operations on the islands, while simultaneously being rather invisible to the public eye and nearby tourist destinations. This thesis also contends that the U.S. military’s locations of their bases in Hawai‘i are strategic and serves as a panoptic entity in the broader Pacific region.

Lastly, this thesis pulls from digital humanities scholars, such as Ruha Benjamin, Omar Zahzah, and Laila Shereen Sakr, to conceptualize the glitch as an uncovering of technological bias and method of resistance towards settler colonial states. In contrast to the colloquial usage of the glitch as an unintentional or accidental malfunction in technological systems, Benjamin argues that computer programmers input their own racial biases into the computer mainframe that result in glitches that are racist or racially unbiased.³⁰ These glitches are not merely mistakes, but rather are products and signals of database designs with present, hegemonic social dynamics built in the mainframe.³¹ Theorizing digital settler colonialism via questions of media censorship, Omar Zahzah also conceptualizes the glitch as an intentional act of silencing from

²⁸ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of a Prison* (Vintage Books, 1977), 204.

²⁹ Foucault, 202.

³⁰ Ruha Benjamin, *Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code* (Polity, 2019), 54.

³¹ Benjamin, 57.

settler hegemonic power and an articulation of the biased infrastructure that controls media.³²

Zahzah contends that the glitch is also an important illustration of an alternative future and that despite repression from social media platforms, Palestinian activists' posts have "glitched" and gone viral to further the resistance. Similarly, Laila Shereen Sakr's scholarship understands the glitch as a challenge towards institutions and governments that attempt to subvert resistance. Sakr argues that the glitch makes visible the technological infrastructures and that even the "aesthetic, grainy, low resolution, and compressed appearance unearths the unequal power relations within authoritarian regimes."³³ In conceptualizing the glitch as both intentional design for repression and opposition towards settler controlled media, I show how glitches on Apple Maps and Google Maps demonstrate both facets of the glitch as a possible collaborator with the U.S. military and a glimpse of the fraught mainframe through the examination of Kahuku Training Area.

Brief Historical Overview of Hawai'i

Before Western influence on and intervention in Native Hawaiian leadership, Hawai'i was divided into ahupua'a, pieces of land stretching from the mountains to the oceans.³⁴ The ahupua'a was cultivated and sustained by the families who resided there, and the economic system was based on exchange rather than profit. However, when the English explorer Captain James Cook and subsequent Western missionaries and businessmen invaded the islands, they brought with them disease and Western economies, religion, and government.³⁵ Under the

³² Omar Zahzah, *Terms of Servitude: Zionism, Silicon Valley, and Digital/Settler Colonialism in the Palestinian Liberation Struggle* (Seven Stories Press, 2025), 25.

³³ Leila Shereen Sakr, *Arabic Glitch: Technoculture, Data Bodies, and Archives* (Stanford University Press, 2023), 6.

³⁴ Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i*, 4.

³⁵ Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i*, 6.

pressure of Western businessmen, King Kamehameha III approved a haole commission to divide and privatize Kanaka ʻŌiwi land to sale, a process known as the Māhele.³⁶ In July of 1850, the legislature permitted aliens or non-Kanaka Maoli that were not naturalized citizens to purchase, own, and sell land, further disposessing Kanaka Maoli from their genealogical lands.³⁷

As U.S. imperialist efforts escalated in the Pacific, the desire for annexation also popularized amongst White settlers in the Hawaiian Kingdom. On July 6, 1887, a committee of haole leaders forced King Kālakaua to sign the Bayonet Constitution, which gave further power to the haole elite in the legislature without the requirement of allegiance to the Crown.³⁸ The constitution essentially revoked the authority of the monarch, furthered haole representation in the legislature, and allowed the legislature to determine the qualifications for citizenship in the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi.³⁹ After Kālakaua's death in 1891, Queen Lydia Liliʻuokalani succeeded her brother to the throne, and in 1893, she attempted to institute a new constitution that would abolish elitist property requirements and bar foreigners the right to vote.⁴⁰ However, before successfully implementing her more equitable constitution, the Committee of Safety, a group of haole businessmen who acquired much political power, betrayed and illegally overthrew Liliʻuokalani on January 17, 1893, placing the queen on house arrest. On February 1, 1893, United States Minister to Hawaiʻi John L. Stevens announced that the Hawaiian Kingdom was

³⁶ Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaiʻi*, 6.

³⁷ Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa, *Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea Lā E Pono Ai? How Shall We Live in Harmony?* (Bishop Museum Press, 1992), 209.

³⁸ Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwoʻole Osorio, *Disremembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2002), 197.

³⁹ Osorio, 240.

⁴⁰ Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaiʻi*, 12.

now a protectorate of the U.S., and on July 7, 1898, Hawai‘i was annexed by the U.S. under William McKinley.⁴¹

During the Hawai‘i Territorial Period, a noticeable shift occurred in the economy and the demographics of political leadership.⁴² In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the sugar industry and military industrial complex expanded as 1.8 million acres of Crown lands were abstracted and sold by the new government.⁴³ Majority of these plantations were controlled and owned by what was known as the “Big Five” corporations: Alexander and Baldwin, Castle and Cooke, Charles Brewer and Company, Heinrich Hackfield and Company, and Theophilus H. Davis and Company.⁴⁴ However, during the Great Depression, World War I, and World War II, the Big Five became inconvenienced by the termination of profitable tariffs and the unionization of their workers, sparking a desire for statehood and thus representation in Congress.⁴⁵ Yet, Congress seemed divided over their enthusiasm for Hawai‘i as the fiftieth state and their prime military outpost and their racism towards the majority non-White population that inhabited the islands. However, after World War II, attitudes towards specifically the Japanese American community

⁴¹ Trask, *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i*, 15.

⁴² To give a more extensive historical overview of Asian settlers in Hawai‘i, in 1852, the first wave of Chinese settlers arrived as contract laborers for sugar plantations, the growing economy at the time. As anti-Chinese sentiments increased and Chinese immigration was banned through the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, haole plantation owners turned to the Japanese laborers, who arrived in 1885 via government sponsorship. Japanese settler population in Hawai‘i continued to expand, and haole plantation owners as well as Hawai‘i Territorial politicians were concerned over the Japanese growing numbers and their prominent union organizing. Thus, Koreans, who were under colonial invasion from the Japanese imperial government and subsequent famine, caught the attention of plantation owners and arrived in Hawai‘i in 1903.

Fujikane, 17-18.

⁴³ Dean Itsuji Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai‘i Statehood* (Duke University Press, 2018), 68.

⁴⁴ Saranillio, 69.

⁴⁵ Saranillio 97.

altered from perceiving Japanese Americans as the enemy to heroes due to their involvement in U.S. military service namely in the 442nd, eventually utilizing their GI Bill to earn professional degrees.⁴⁶ Japanese settlers in Hawai‘i, along with other East Asian settlers who were children or grandchildren of plantation workers, gained high paying careers and aimed for positions in territorial politics to defeat the White elite. In the late 1940s, local elections saw a noticeable uptick of Democratic candidates of Asian descent beat majority-White Republican candidates who represented the interests of the Big Five. Ultimately, this transformation of electoral politics, as well as momentous wins for the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), crumbled the Big Five’s dominance in Hawai‘i, leading to the racial and ethnic hierarchies seen in the contemporary.

As the plantation economy shifted to the tourism industry, Asian political candidates utilized the issue of land reform as their foremost campaign initiative. Protecting the interests of wealthy landowners, Hawai‘i Territorial Republicans placed a ceiling on how much the county could receive from property taxes.⁴⁷ In a pivotal 1954 election, five years before statehood, Hawai‘i Democrats advocated for a more equitable property tax system, winning them the popular vote. However, their landslide victory did not ensure a fairer system for small landowners or working class families; rather, middle and upper middle class Asian politicians were able to forge close relationships and partnerships with real estate developers and attorneys. Moreover, Hawai‘i Democrats campaigned fiercely for statehood in office, further dispossessing Kanaka ‘Ōiwi from their land. As the U.S. engaged in the Cold War and the Civil Rights

⁴⁶ George Cooper and Gavan Daws, *Land and Power in Hawai‘i: The Democratic Years* (University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990), 4.

⁴⁷ Cooper and Daws, 35.

movement escalated and gained international attention, the Soviet Union, to counter anti-Communist propoganda, rightfully criticized the U.S. for its treatment and segregation of Black Americans and argued that the question of Hawai‘i statehood was an extension of U.S. imperialism in the Pacific.⁴⁸ In response, advocates for statehood insisted that Hawai‘i statehood would prove that the U.S. was diverse and anti-racist due to the inclusion of Hawai‘i’s majority non-White population. Thus, the addition of Hawai‘i as a state signaled a new geopolitical strategy, in which liberal multiculturalism and militarism worked together to further U.S. settler interests.

According to the latest Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan, the U.S. military currently occupies 221,981 acres of land in Hawai‘i with the army holding the most land at 174,544 acres.⁴⁹ The land holdings are split into four cateogries: fee, ceded, leased, and other.

Table 1: "Military land Holdings in the State of Hawai‘i"

SERVICE	FEE	CEDED	LEASED	OTHERS*	TOTAL
Army	36,744	102,969	29,349	5,482	174,544
Navy	16,793	7,446	9,546	7,830	41,615
Air Force	409	0	474	235	1,118
Marine Corps	2,968	1,727	0	9	4,704
TOTAL ACRES	56,914	112,142	39,369	13,556	221,981

*OTHERS includes easements, government/private agreements, and other interests in real property
Source: Service Components updates in Mar 2021

Source: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan (HMLUMP). April 2021.

Here, “Fee” refers to land that is owned by the U.S. military, while “Ceded” refers to land of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i that allegedly has no “traceable” title. Simply put, ceded lands are Crown lands that were illegally stolen by the U.S. government. The column and category of “Others”

⁴⁸ Saranillio, 133.

⁴⁹ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, *Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan* (Camp H.M. Smith, 2021), 13.

pertain to land from easements, public and private agreements, and real property, and leased land is land leased to the U.S. military from the Hawai‘i state government or other private land owners, such as the Bishop Estates.

Leased lands are highly contested and up for negotiation soon as most of them are set to expire in the next couple years.⁵⁰ In reference to the areas engaged within this thesis, the Kahuku Training Area and the majority of the Pacific Missile Range Facility leases are set to expire in 2029. The Pacific Missile Range Facility on Ni‘ihau is set to expire in 2028. The largest military maneuver space on O‘ahu, Kahuku Training Area is utilized for “infantry tactical maneuvers” and helicopter exercises.⁵¹ The largest “instrumented, multi-environment range” globally, the Pacific Missile Range Facility is utilized as a training area for the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) operations, conducts research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) for defense and radar systems, and acts as a support base for air operations.⁵²

Contemporary Literature on U.S. Militarism in the Pacific

Though there is a lack of scholarship regarding the land leases utilized by the U.S. military in Hawai‘i, there is much literature on the intersection of militarism and tourism in the Pacific. A collection of articles from Indigenous and feminist scholars, *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific* critiques American and Japanese colonialism and frames militarism as a “constitutive institution and ideology of empire.”⁵³ The

⁵⁰ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 9.

⁵¹ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 81.

⁵² U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 28.

⁵³ Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, “Introduction: Militarized Currents, Decolonizing Futures,” in *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho (University of Minnesota, 2010), xxvii.

authors argue that colonialism has not ceased to exist, rather it has mutated into the global military campaigns we witness in the contemporary. Particularly poignant is I-Kiribati and African-American poet Teresia K. Teaiwa's essay, in which Teaiwa conceives the bikini as a reverberation and veil of the dark legacy of U.S. nuclear testing in the Pacific.⁵⁴ Because of the bikini's hypervisibility in tourist spaces, the nuclear testing in the Bikini Islands is rendered invisible, and the bikini becomes a site of exoticism and fetishism.⁵⁵ The bikini and the bomb, Teaiwa contends, are thus "colonial military and neocolonial tourist technologies respectively" that have "a profound impact on s/Pacific bodies."⁵⁶ Additionally, ethnic studies scholar Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez's chapter on U.S. militourism sites in Corregidor and Bataan exhibit the normalization of U.S. military relations within the Philippines and reveals the narratives of heroic liberation, as opposed to U.S. military violence and occupation in Southeast Asia.⁵⁷ In addition to the sites' hypermasculine and sexist tropes, these militourist projects embody notions of national security and the need for U.S. intervention for protection.⁵⁸ Gonzalez thus argues that contemporary militarization is entangled in the travel industry as globalization both sanitizes and necessitates U.S. military imperialism.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Teresia K. Teaiwa, "Bikinis and Other S/pacific N/oceans," in *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho (University of Minnesota, 2010), 15.

⁵⁵ Teaiwa, 21.

⁵⁶ Teaiwa, 22.

⁵⁷ Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, "Touring Military Masculinities: U.S.-Philippines Circuits of Sacrifice and Gratitude in Corregidor and Bataan," in *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho (University of Minnesota, 2010), 63.

⁵⁸ Gonzalez, "Touring Military Masculinities: U.S.-Philippines Circuits of Sacrifice and Gratitude in Corregidor and Bataan," 67.

⁵⁹ Gonzalez, "Touring Military Masculinities: U.S.-Philippines Circuits of Sacrifice and Gratitude in Corregidor and Bataan," 70.

Further expanding on her chapter in *Militarized Currents*, Gonzalez's *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai'i and the Philippines* examines the military and tourist industries' partnership in the Pacific that normalizes U.S. occupation. In thinking of the intersection between masculinity and mobility, Gonzalez critiques the Interstate H-3 on O'ahu and conceptualizes the H-3 as a "visual technological prosthesis."⁶⁰ As part of Dwight Eisenhower's Interstate and Defense Highway System of 1960, the H-3, which costed \$1.3 million to construct, is a hypervisible crossroads of militarism and tourism that carries motifs of the "Old Hawai'i" without the reminder of settler colonial violence:

Finally disciplined by the completion of the interstate, the narrative continues, the natural surroundings of the tropics are showcased as a picturesque landscape, to be equally experienced and seen by everyone, uncluttered by the trivialities of historical occupation, overthrow, and colonialism. The languages and "techno-logics" of tourism, military efficiency, and modern engineering are instrumental to the H-3's production as a site where tourists and residents can access an experience that exceeds and transcends the particularity of Native Hawaiians. This discourse of the technological sublime is politically indispensable to the state because it abstracts the material conditions of the H-3's production, making land once again alienable from indigenous life.⁶¹

Thus, Gonzalez illustrates how the military and tourism industries work together to maintain their presence in Hawai'i by displaying their advanced infrastructure, while simultaneously masking the violence caused by the construction of the highway.

Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull's *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai'i* is also a foundational text to this thesis. Reflecting on the visibility and invisibility of the U.S. military in Hawai'i through grammar and rhetoric, Ferguson and Turnbull argue four overarching points: (1) military order is not necessarily order, and the order that

⁶⁰ Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai'i and the Philippines* (Duke University Press, 2013), 68.

⁶¹ Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise*, 78.

Kanaka ‘Ōiwi practice daily is scrutinized as inefficient or messy by Western conventions; (2) military order stains Hawai‘i physically through occupation, infrastructure, change of place names, and more; (3) the military is normalized in everyday life due in part to the aforementioned arguments; and (4) the military paints a narrative of reassurance, linking their presence with the promise of economic and political safety.⁶² The authors demonstrate this interconnection between tourism and the U.S. military through their critical examination of Fort DeRussy on O‘ahu. Situated on Waikīkī Beach, Fort DeRussy narrates U.S. military history through a hyper-masculine and imperial gaze, continuously framed as a space of rest and relaxation for brave service men heading to war to protect “our” safety and security. Ferguson and Turnbull’s commentary on the Army museum is important in contextualizing the language and propaganda employed by the U.S. military to fear monger tourists and residents of an external, villainous force and thus necessitate its presence on the islands.⁶³

Lastly, *Detours: A Decolonial Guide to Hawai‘i* edited by Kanaka ‘Ōiwi scholar Hōkūlani K. Aikau and Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez disrupts tourist fantasies of Hawai‘i and showcases the community initiatives dedicated to decolonization and towards ea. The collection of essays retells stories of specific places in Hawai‘i that have been intentionally obfuscated by colonial powers historically and in the contemporary. Though these DeTours reveal the pervasiveness of the military on the islands, the text most importantly spotlights the ongoing resistance led by Kanaka ‘Ōiwi against U.S. empire. In a collaborative chapter by ethnic studies scholar Kyle Kajihiro and Kanaka ‘Ōiwi activist Terrilee Keko‘olani, the authors detail their

⁶² Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i* (University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xiii-xv.

⁶³ Ferguson and Turnbull, 44.

DeTour project, an educational tour created by community partners that exposes U.S. military activities on O‘ahu.⁶⁴ The tour starts at the Kamehameha I statue and ‘Iolani Palace in Downtown Honolulu to tell the story of the illegal overthrow and ends with Hanakehau Farms, showing participants historic maps of a once abundant lo‘i kalo (taro patch) and loko i‘a (fishpond). Employing Kanka ‘Ōiwi activist and scholar Kaleikoa Kao’s conception of the U.S. military as a monstrous he‘e or octopus, Kajihiro and Keko‘olani demonstrate how much land the U.S. military controls in Hawai‘i and how the U.S. military utilizes Hawai‘i as the heart for its imperialist strategies in Asia and the Pacific.⁶⁵ Like the DeTours Project, this thesis presents the reader with the stories of land before Western imperialism, the history of subsequent haole takeover, the current military operations within that land, and the ongoing resistance for land back.

Methodology and Chapter Overview

This thesis relies on physical archive research from primarily the Hawai‘i State Archives and the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa’s Hawai‘i Congressional Papers Collection located at the Hamilton Library. This thesis also makes use of the Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan from 2021 compiled by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. From the digital sphere, I employ Google Maps, Apple Maps, and YouTube to investigate the ways in which tourists view or interact with these military occupied spaces. As I was not able to enter these bases, these tools allowed me to view the area from a first person perspective. Google and Apple Maps were also utilized to analyze glitches found in the digital mainframe that I discovered while on an

⁶⁴ Kyle Kajihiro and Terrilee Keko‘olani, “The Hawai‘i DeTour Project: Demilitarizing Sites and Sights on O‘ahu,” in *DeTours: A Decolonial Guide to Hawai‘i*, ed. Hōkulani K. Aikau and Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez (Duke University Press, 2019), 249.

⁶⁵ Kajihiro and Keko‘olani, 254.

internship with After Oceanic Built Environments Lab, a collaborative practice dedicated to supporting and uplifting Native-led voices and futures.⁶⁶ Under the directorship of 2025 NYU Artist in Residence Sean Connelly, I had the privilege of working on his Hawai‘i Military Atlas Research, a counter-atlas of all militarized spaces, including those in airspace and underwater, in Hawai‘i.^{67,68} While collecting the coordinates and descriptions of all militarized spaces in Hawai‘i utilizing the aforementioned mapping technologies, I stumbled upon the glitches that appear within these systems when attempting to plot the coordinates for Kahuku Training Area. At first, I did not have the vocabulary or the theoretical knowledge to understand and articulate what these glitches were or represented; however, after enrolling in Nour Joudah’s DHM221: Data and Society course, I was introduced to digital humanities scholars who conceptualize the glitch, and I was able to utilize the glitch as an analytic to examine Kahuku Training Area. My final for this course ultimately was the groundwork for Chapter II.

Chapter I focuses on Kahuku Training Area and provide a background and stories of the land. Examining the 50th Statehood Act, a Department of Defense report, political correspondences, and a press conference, I show how Kahuku Training Area was able to be leased for \$1 a year and highlight the ways in which federal representatives render the overthrow

⁶⁶ “After OcEAnic,” *After OcEAnic*, accessed July 17, 2026, <https://afteroceanic.com>.

⁶⁷ Artist Sean Connelly is the founding director of After Oceanic Built Environments Lab and Hawai‘i Linear. A non-profit. In 2025, Connelly was the NYU Artist-in-Residence at the Asian/Pacific/American Institute.

“Sean Connelly,” *A/P/A*, accessed July 17, 2026, <https://apa.nyu.edu/affiliate/sean-connelly-2025/>.

⁶⁸ The Hawai‘i Military Atlas Research is still an ongoing project. A preliminary project of Connelly’s is the O‘ahu Military Atlas, a 3-D map produced between 2014 and 2020 during his time at Harvard University, Nanyang Technological University, and University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. The map was created in collaboration with student research assistants, who compiled archival and historical cartographic pieces. More information can be found on Connelly’s community presentation as cited below.

Sean Connelly, “O‘ahu Military Atlas (A Community Presentation),” *Vimeo*, February 15, 2022, video, 21:41, <https://vimeo.com/678040439>.

and unlawful U.S. military operations invisible. I also critically examine James Campbell Estate and their role in constructing Turtle Bay Resort, while concealing the Kahuku Training Area. Through the examination of these letters exchanged by federal, state, and private actors, I expose the relationship and multiple positions each of these actors had in multiple sectors. Continuing my inspection of Kahuku Training Area and Turtle Bay Resort, I analyze the Ritz-Carlton's Turtle Bay Resort's website and marketing strategies and argue that their projection of a secluded paradise strategically hides the militarized space in Chapter II. Additionally, I pull pictures of the resort from multiple websites to demonstrate Kahuku Training Area's ability to remain "hidden in plain sight." Employing digital humanities scholars' interpretation of a "glitch" as a window into the computer mainframe's Western biases and a potential site of resistance, I utilize Google Maps and Apple Maps to reveal these "glitches" in the digital space that can inspire new methods of countermapping and countersurveillance.

In Chapter III, I shift my attention to the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on Kaua'i and Barking Sands Beach Cottages and show the legacy of Western colonization and settler colonialism that has surrounded the area. Chronicling how land has been altered and transferred to different foreign hands overtime, I reveal how the Robinson Family and the U.S. Navy have maintained control of the space without frequent public scrutiny. Additionally, I examine propaganda utilized to build support for a missile defense system and, as a result of that propaganda, the creation and establishment of Senate Resolution 6, a piece of legislation that would support a missile defense system in Hawai'i. By uplifting narratives of the U.S. military as a defender of freedom, the PMRF becomes exceedingly hypervisible to the public, while sanitizing and eventually making invisible the violent training and testing they perform and allowing the U.S. to maintain its control and surveillance in the Pacific. In thinking of the

PMRF's hypervisibility yet invisibility, I also scrutinize the Navy Getaway's Barking Sand Beach Cottages that are nestled within the missile defense base. To understand the ways in which guests experience the PMRF and view the U.S. military, I analyze YouTube videos created and uploaded by guests who vacationed there. Through my dissection of these videos, I argue that the hypervisibility of being within the PMRF renders the violent operations of the U.S. military invisible to both the guests and the viewers watching the video. I also argue that, even though these YouTube videos are not made by an official account of the U.S. military or the Department of Defense, they still serve as propaganda for the U.S. military as it portrays the PMRF as some sort of tropical getaway. I conclude with a summary of the case studies and offer a comparison of the two, as well as plans for research inquiries.

Chapter I: Origins of Kahuku Training Area, Ritz-Carlton's Turtle Bay Resort, and the Secret Relationships that Render the U.S. Military Invisible

On June 27, 2025, the Board of Land and Natural Resources of Hawai'i held a public meeting regarding the possible passage of the U.S. Army Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the leased lands of Kahuku, Kawaihoa-Poamoho, and Mākua Valley. Waiting to testify in opposition to the final EIS, I, along with others, listened to supporting statements of U.S. Army Garrison Commander Colonel Rachel Sullivan and program manager of the Army Training Land Retentions Alice Robets. Highlighting the relatively minimal retention of these training areas and collaboration with community members, Sullivan contended that that these U.S. military spaces “must be balanced with stewardship and respecting cultural values” and that it was the “enduring commitment” of the military to uphold these principles.⁶⁹

Sullivan's remarks at the meeting are illustrations of the construction of the U.S. military as a benevolent neighbor, the hidden operations of the military, and the purposeful formation of the training area as a zone of confinement. Her repeated commitment to cooperation with the community paints the U.S. military as a friend and an entity willing to generously negotiate these leases as if they had not illegally seized the land at the outset. Her particular employment of the term “stewardship” also articulates a dedication to environmental protection despite the ongoing desecration of Indigenous land in Hawai'i and other Pasifika nations. Moreover, Sullivan emphasizes that the U.S. Army only seeks to retain 450 acres of land from Kahuku Training Area in comparison to the over 5000 acres of land given back to the State of Hawai'i from all

⁶⁹ Board of Land and Natural Resources DLNR, “06.27.2025 Board of Land and Natural Resources Meeting,” *YouTube*, June 27, 2025, 0:36:30-0:36:39, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3dG0TuuwJvE&list=PLDh6ZXzdUvQkHtqVoauOkfa26NfNLh2pK&index=11>.

three training areas.⁷⁰ These numbers, as Sullivan attempts to demonstrate, reflect the benevolence of the U.S. military as it seems that the State of Hawai‘i receives the better bargain out of these negotiations. However, 450 acres is still roughly equivalent to 340 football fields, and the U.S. Army would still occupy 8,316 acres of Kahuku Training Area. The presentation of these numbers effectively minimizes the landholdings of the U.S. military, rendering their presence invisible.

Illustrated by Sullivan’s testimony, the U.S. military conceals their operations in Kahuku Training Area, while obscuring the size and extent of the total occupied space. In thinking of these camouflaging strategies, this chapter examines the history of Kahuku Training Area and demonstrates the logics of concealment that have been practiced since statehood. Analyzing letters and government documents, this chapter also reveals the hidden negotiations between federal, state, and corporate actors that increase their profit and further dispossess Kanaka ‘Ōiwi from their land.

Background of Ko‘olaupoko

Before delving into the archival records, I will provide a brief background of Kahuku and its neighboring areas that comprise the training area. Kahuku Training Area primarily covers the moku (district) of Ko‘olaupoko, encompassing the ahupua‘a (land division) of Kaipapa‘u, Lā‘iemalo‘o, Lā‘iewai, Mālaekahana, Keana, Kahuku, Punalau, Ulupehupehu, ‘Ō‘io, Hanakaoe, Kawela, ‘Ōpana, Pahipahu‘ālua, Wai‘alaie, Kaunala, Paumalū, Pūpūkea, and Waimea.^{71,72}

⁷⁰ Board of Land and Natural Resources DLNR, “06.27.2025 Board of Land and Natural Resources Meeting,” 0:35:47-0:35:58.

⁷¹ Lilia Merrin et al, *Ko‘olaupoko ‘Āina Inventory: Moku ‘O Ko‘olaupoko and Ko‘olaupoko* (Nohopapa Hawai‘i, 2023), 249-310.

⁷² U.S. Army Garrison-Hawai‘i Cultural Resources Program, *Military Heritage Resources: Kahuku Training Area* (U.S. Army Garrison-Hawai‘i).

Translated as the long windward, Ko‘olauloa is known for its lower mountains and was once abundant with lo‘i kalo and coastal fishing.⁷³ In the upper ahupua‘a of Ko‘olauloa, there is an abundance of streams spanning from mountain to ocean, including Lamaloa, Kea‘aulu, ‘Ōhia‘a‘ai, Kī, Ho‘olapa, ‘Ō‘io, Kawela, Kaleleiki, Kālunawaika‘ala, Elehaha, and Kamananui.⁷⁴

Meaning the projection, Kahuku is the northern most ahupua‘a on the island of O‘ahu.⁷⁵ Abundant with pūnāwai (springs) and pandanus groves, Kahuku is home to several wahi pana (storied or famous place names), including Punamanō, Punaho‘olapa, Kalaeokahipa, and Waiūolewa.^{76,77} In Mary Kawena Pukui’s *‘Ōlelo No‘eau: Hawaiian Proverbs and Poetical Sayings*, famous Kahuku no‘eau “Kahuku ‘āina lewa” means “Kahuku, an unstable land.”⁷⁸ This no‘eau draws from the mo‘olelo (story, history, tradition) that Kahuku was once the bridge between two islands that merged together to form the island of O‘ahu. Another famous mo‘olelo associated with Kahuku is the song of the kapa log. After beating her kapa, a woman from Kahuku placed her log near a spring.⁷⁹ However, when returning to the log’s hiding space, the woman realized that the log was swept away by a stream. In search for her beloved log, she traversed up the stream in Kahuku, following the song of the kapa beaters. The woman

⁷³ Merrin et al, 10.

⁷⁴ Merrin et al, 281, 310.

⁷⁵ John R.K. Clark, *North Shore Place Names: Kahuku to Ka‘ena* (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2014), 91.

⁷⁶ Clark, 91.

⁷⁷ Merrin et al, 283.

⁷⁸ Mary Kawena Pukui, *‘Ōlelo No‘eau: Hawaiian Proverbs and Poetical Sayings* (Bishop Museum Press, 1983), 144.

⁷⁹ Caroline Curtis, *The Water of Kāne and Other Legends of the Hawaiian Islands*, ed. Mary Kawena Pukui (Kamehameha Publishing, 1994), 179.

eventually finds her kapa log in Waipahu, overjoyed that she had found her “grandchild.”⁸⁰ As Hawaiian and Pacific studies scholar Kali Fermantez and Sāmoan scholar Lisa Uperesa gesture in their article “An Emergent Genealogy of Kahuku’s Contested Red Raider Mascot,” one of the two most recognized mo‘olelo of Kahuku point to themes of connection and disconnection and lost and found, which can serve as reminders to the ways in which land has been separated from Kanaka ‘Ōiwi by settler colonial forces.⁸¹

Furthermore, ‘Ō‘io and Hanakaoe are significant ahupua‘a in relation to the training area and to Turtle Bay Resort. Translated as bonefish, ‘Ō‘io is characterized by its length and narrowness, containing both mountains and coastal plains.^{82,83} ‘Ō‘io also has two streams after its namesake that flow from the mountain through the ahupua‘a of both ‘Ō‘io and Hanakaoe. Similar to Kawela, Hanakaoe is a smaller ahupua‘a that touches what is commonly known as Turtle Bay. Though there is little information on Hanakaoe in the widely referenced book *Place Names of Hawai‘i*, it is mentioned in the Bernice P. Bishop Museum’s *Sites of O‘ahu*, in which the authors describe the wahi pana Waikāne, or large stone.⁸⁴ According to the mo‘olelo of Waikāne, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi who lived by the coasts once had to travel up the valley to gather fresh, drinking water. However, after fishing and spending time with the kama‘āina (native born), the

⁸⁰ Curtis, 183.

⁸¹ Kali Fermantez and Lisa Uperesa, “An Emergent Genealogy of Kahuku’s Contested Red Raider Mascot,” *Pacific Studies* 46, no. 2 (2023): 127.

⁸² Mary Kawena Pukui, Samuel H. Elbert, and Esther T. Mookini, *Place Names of Hawai‘i: Revised and Expanded Edition* (University of Hawai‘i Press, 1976), 169.

⁸³ Merrin et al, 283.

⁸⁴ Esther P. Sterling and Catherine C. Summers, *Sites of O‘ahu* (Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1978), 148.

god Kāne struck the rock, bursting forth a spring that spouted water in the once dry area.^{85,86} In the contemporary, much of the Turtle Bay Resort's golf course is ironically situated in the ahupua'a of Hanakaoe and 'Ō'io, utilizing the water to maintain the grass that tourists play on daily across the Kahuku Training Area.

50th Statehood Act, Surplus Lands, and Land Reform

As mentioned in the introduction, the quest for Hawai'i statehood was led by the rising Democrats in the Hawai'i Territorial Legislature who campaigned on land reform to diminish the power of the Big Five.⁸⁷ Instead of redistributing land and passing legislation that would lessen socioeconomic gaps, these Democrats, who were primarily Asian settlers, sought development opportunities to generate greater revenue.^{88,89} Thus, to further secure land for development, they advocated for statehood as most crown lands or "ceded" lands were controlled by the federal government when Hawai'i was a territory.⁹⁰ With Hawai'i's admission as a state, ceded lands then transferred over to the management of state officials, which totaled 39% of the islands.⁹¹ The reconsolidation of lands was laid out in section 5 of the admissions act:

⁸⁵ E.S. Craighill Handy, Elizabeth Green Handy, and Mary Kawena Pukui, *Native Planters in Old Hawai'i: Their Life, Lore, and Environment* (Bishop Museum Press, 1972), 296.

⁸⁶ Merrin et al, 290.

⁸⁷ George Cooper and Gavan Daws, *Land and Power in Hawai'i: the Democratic Years* (University of Hawai'i Press, 1990), 5-6.

⁸⁸ Cooper and Daws, 7.

⁸⁹ Though there is no information I can find on ethnic demographic data on these politicians, most scholarship acknowledge that much of these top Democratic politicians in Hawai'i were of East Asian descent, particularly of Japanese ancestry. Based on voting statistics in 1978, Japanese settlers had a significant influence in election outcome due to their high voter turnout. 90.9% of Japanese settlers were registered to vote on O'ahu in comparison to 83.3% Polynesian voters and 75% White voters.

Roland Kotani, *The Japanese in Hawai'i: A Century of Struggle* (Hawai'i Hochi Ltd., 1985), 158.

⁹⁰ Cooper and Daws, 8.

⁹¹ Cooper and Daws, 8.

5. (a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the State of Hawai‘i and its political subdivisions, as the case may be, shall succeed to the title of the Territory of Hawai‘i and its subdivisions in those lands and other properties in which the Territory and its subdivision now hold title.⁹²

However, because of state representatives’ desire to control and later develop as much land as they could, tensions between state and federal representatives arose, particularly in regards to section 5 (d) of the act:

Any public lands or other public property that is conveyed to the State of Hawai‘i by subsection (b)⁹³ of this section but that, immediately prior to the admission of said State in the Union, is controlled by the United States pursuant to permit, license, or permission, written or verbal, from the Territory of Hawai‘i or any department thereof may, at any time during the five years following the admission of Hawai‘i into the Union, be set aside by Act of Congress or by executive order of the President, made pursuant to law, for the use of the United States, and the lands of property to set aside shall, subject only to valid rights then existing, be the property of the United States.⁹⁴

This section indicates that specifically military occupied lands would still be under the control of the federal government and would not be transferred to the state as, at the time of admission, these lands were under special lease, license, or permit. Much of the land managed and utilized by the U.S. military were training areas, including Kahuku. In a 1960 Department of Defense report regarding military real property in Hawai‘i, the document outlined the contentions between the federal and state governments over military land holdings as land, according to both federal and state entities, should be utilized to its maximum potential to avoid excess costs and to generate the most profit.⁹⁵ Though the author of the report does argue that excess or surplus

⁹² *An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawai‘i*, Public Law 86-3, U.S. Statutes at Large 4 (1959).

⁹³ Subsection c states that any land set aside for the U.S. under (1) Act of Congress, (3) Executive order, (3) proclamation of the President, or (4) proclamation of the Governor of Hawai‘i shall continue to be property of the federal government.

⁹⁴ *An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawai‘i*.

⁹⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Study of Military Real Property* (1960), 1.

lands should be given back to the state in order to eliminate maintenance costs for the federal government, they emphasized the importance of the training areas as the lands, much of it in forests, lava fields, and secluded mountains, have “little revenue potential” for development.⁹⁶ The author also noted that the training areas “do not conflict with non-military use,” so its management by the U.S. military would not pose a problem with the state government.⁹⁷

As arguments over surplus land continued and the five year deadline to negotiate the managed of the lands approached in 1963, further discussions arose regarding the training areas amongst Congressional representatives and the Department of Defense. In a drafted letter to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara from November 14, 1963, Senator Daniel Inouye, who would obtain a position on the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee and later be co-chair of the Defense Appropriations Committee, and House of Representatives Thomas Gill and Spark Matsunaga urged the secretary to wait on a decision regarding lands that would be leased to the federal government, specifically Mākua and Maili Beach, Pōhakuloa Training Area, and the “Northern end of the Ko‘olau Range.”^{98,99,100,101} Their concern over a sixty-five year lease for the maneuver areas stemmed from both the length

⁹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Study of Military Real Property* (1960), 5.

⁹⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Study of Military Real Property* (1960), 5.

⁹⁸ Ian Lind, “Ring of Steel: Notes on the Militarization of Hawai‘i,” *Social Process in Hawai‘i* 31 (1984): 38.

⁹⁹ Kyle Kajihiro, “The Militarizing of Hawai‘i: Occupation, Accommodation, and Resistance,” in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 190.

¹⁰⁰ The “Northern end of the Ko‘olau Range on O‘ahu” is most likely referring to the Kahuku Training Area.

¹⁰¹ Inouye, Gill, and Matsunaga to Robert S. McNamara, November 14, 1963, Hiram L. Fong Collection, University of Hawai‘i Hamilton Library, Box 96.

of the lease and the fact that the grounds would not be used year round.¹⁰² In addition to the areas' usage by the public for recreational purposes, the land, the authors argued, should be utilized to "accommodate a number of different uses" due to the islands' small size.^{103,104,105} Thus, similar to sentiments expressed by the Department of Defense report, maximum productivity of land remained the utmost important of these federal actors.

Though the sixty-five year leases of the training area were established, the Senate passed Public Law 88-233 or Senate Bill 2275 as a sort of compromise.¹⁰⁶ Under Public Law 88-233, public lands or stolen crown lands determined by the Administrator of General Services as surplus property would be given to the State of Hawai'i after August 21, 1964.¹⁰⁷ Public lands under consideration for review are highlighted under Public Law 86-3 sections 5(c), 5(d), and 5(g).¹⁰⁸ If land is returned to the State of Hawai'i, the federal government would not require monetary compensation from the state government. After the passage of Public Law 88-233 in December 1963, Congressman Spark Matsunaga, one of the authors of the letter to Robert

¹⁰² Inouye, Gill, and Matsunaga to Robert S. McNamara.

¹⁰³ Inouye, Gill, and Matsunaga to Robert S. McNamara.

¹⁰⁴ The same letter was sent to John F. Kennedy by Daniel Inouye on November 18, 1963.

¹⁰⁵ The acting Assistant Secretary of Defense of 1963 Glenn V. Gibson replied to the letter, sending a response to Thomas Gill. Dated December 6, 1963, Gibson said that mutual agreement was reached during a conference with Inouye, Matsunaga, and Gill himself. He also mentioned Senate Bill 2275.

¹⁰⁶ *An act to revise the procedures established by the Hawai'i Statehood Act, Public Law 86-3, for the conveyance of certain lands to the State of Hawai'i, and for other purposes*, Public Law 88-233, Statute at Large 77 (1963).

¹⁰⁷ Public Law 86-3.

¹⁰⁸ 5(c) of Public Law 86-3 states that any land that was utilized by the U.S. under (1) an Act of Congress, (2) Executive Order, (3) Presidential proclamation, or (4) gubernatorial proclamation will remain the property of the federal government. 5(d) states that land managed by the federal government through permit, license, or permission from the Territory of Hawai'i during the five years post-Hawai'i statehood will continue to be property of the U.S. 5(g) of Public Law 86-3 defines "public lands and other public property" as lands and property "ceded" to the U.S. after the joint resolution of annexation.

McNamara, issued a press release regarding the decision. In his statement, the congressman praised the bill and the Democrat delegation:

The passage by the Senate of S. 2275, the Hawai‘i land bill, is a milestone towards the recovery of the lands which are Hawai‘i’s birthright.

Passage is in my opinion due to the excellent teamwork of Hawai‘i’s Democratic delegation and to the work of Governor Burns and his staff. We are also indebted to Mr. Harold Seidman and Mr. Howard Schnoor of the Bureau of the Budget for their strong statements on behalf of Hawai‘i’s rights to this legislation.

House action is anticipated soon. No difficulty is presently expected.¹⁰⁹

The bill eventually was approved by the House of Representatives on December 23, 1963, and the land leases were instituted the summer of 1964.¹¹⁰

The 50th Statehood Act, Department of Defense report, letter to Robert McNamara, and Spark Matsunaga’s press release reveal not only the origins of the leases that include Kahuku Training Area, but they also highlight the ways in which the federal representatives and other federal actors render the overthrow and imperial actions of the U.S. military invisible and erase Kanaka ‘Ōiwi sovereignty. In the 50th Statehood Act, the definition of public lands and other public property as lands “ceded to the United States by the Republic of Hawai‘i under the joint resolution of annexation” or land “acquired in exchange for lands or properties so ceded” effectively frame the illegal overthrow and subsequent annexation as lawful and legitimate.¹¹¹ The employment of the term “ceded” to describe crown lands of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i also erases Kanaka ‘Ōiwi claim to their ancestral lands. Moreover, Spark Matsunaga’s choice of

¹⁰⁹ Spark M. Matsunaga, “Statement,” press release, December 4, 1963.

¹¹⁰ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, *Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan* (Honolulu, HI: Camp H.M. Smith, 2021), 13.

¹¹¹ Public Law 86-3.

labelling the bill as a milestone to “the recovery of the lands which are Hawai‘i’s birthright” further lays claim to Kanaka ‘Ōiwi land and solidifies the settler state as the rightful owners of land once controlled by the federal government.¹¹² Intentionally marking a visible distinction between the federal and state governments suggests that the two are vastly different in their leadership and vision for Hawai‘i. Rather, the state government is merely a product of the federal government’s imperial endeavors in the Pacific, and the co-constitutive nature between the U.S. military and tourist and real estate development is the result of the two institutions’ goals.

Furthermore, in direct contention with Kanaka ‘Ōiwi familial relationship to land, the Department of Defense report and letter to Robert McNamara demonstrate their perception of land as a commodity to be exploited for profit. In the Department of Defense report, the author emphasized that the U.S. military training areas should not be an issue as the areas are in “low revenue” spaces.¹¹³ Similarly, the authors of the letter to Robert McNamara were primarily concerned that the training areas would not be utilized year round.¹¹⁴ Apprehension to military training areas did not factor the environmental degradation of the area or the public health effects on families living nearby; rather, land usage and the decision as to who manages the land were based on productivity.

James Campbell Estate and Turtle Bay Resort

In addition to federal and state representatives, private actors such as James Campbell Estate played a substantial role in the dispossession of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi land and the relative invisibility of Kahuku Training Area. A haole from Ireland, James Campbell co-established the

¹¹² Spark M. Matsunaga, “Statement.”

¹¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Study of Military Real Property*, 5.

¹¹⁴ Inouye, Gill, and Matsunaga to Robert S. McNamara.

Pioneer Mill Company in 1860 that would eventually jumpstart his fortune in Hawai‘i.¹¹⁵ After selling his part of the Pioneer Mill Company, Campbell branched his interests to real estate development. In 1876, Campbell bought 15,000 acres of land in Kahuku from H.A. Widemann and Julius L. Richardson, 41,000 acres in Honouliuli from John Coney, and smaller properties in Downtown Honolulu, Maui, and Hawai‘i Island (Big Island).¹¹⁶ He later leased his Honouliuli and Kahuku properties to Benjamin Dillingham in 1889. Upon his death in 1900, Campbell left the management of his properties to three trustees of the Estate of James Campbell.¹¹⁷

Before the establishment of Turtle Bay Resort in 1972, a letter from the Estate of James Campbell was sent to Governor John A. Burns on May 24, 1966.¹¹⁸ The letter titled “Re: Army Training Area – Kahuku, O‘ahu” involved the drainage problems in Kahuku due to soil erosion disturbing Kawela Bay caused by ground maneuvers of troops. The trustees of the estate raised these concerns as Kawela Bay was “a key site in a potential major destination-resort on O‘ahu” that would cover “10,000 units when full development is realized.”¹¹⁹ Though the authors of the letter acknowledge the importance of continued army training in Kahuku Training Area, they were primarily concerned with the unattractiveness of the ocean and the surrounding areas due to soil erosion that would impact the economy. Emphasizing continued cooperation with the U.S. military, the trustees noted their communication and work with major General Carl A. Darnell, Jr. to resolve the issue. As a suggestion, the trustees proposed an engineering study be conducted

¹¹⁵ *James Campbell, Esq* (Estate of James Campbell, 1978), 1-4.

¹¹⁶ *James Campbell, Esq*, 14.

¹¹⁷ *James Campbell, Esq*, 25.

¹¹⁸ The Estate of James Campbell to John A. Burns, May 24, 1966, Hawai‘i State Archives.

¹¹⁹ The Estate of James Campbell to John A. Burns, May 24, 1966, Hawai‘i State Archives.

to “determine the best method of accomplishing the purposes stated.”¹²⁰ Some of the proposed plans to reduced the soil and vegetaion deamage included stilling ponds, check dams, and stream diversion. The governor, who also bcc’d Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) chairman and member Jim P. Ferry, replied to the trustees of the Estate of James Campbell, highlighting the state’s coordination to conduct an engineering study for a drainage area.¹²¹ Also emphasizing the importance of the training area for the military, Burns assured the Trustees that the DLNR would “collaborate with personnel from the Soil Conservation Service, the District Corps of Engineers, Gen. Darnell’s command, and Campbell Estate.”¹²²

Despite their conciseness, the two letters reveal the invisible collaboration between federal, state, and private actors and how much the aforementioned actors maintain their relationships with one another and even held positions in multiple sectors. Both letters include all three parties: the U.S. military and General Carl Darnell, Governor John Burns and the Department of Land and Natural Resources, and the trustees of the Estate of James Campbell. Though there was public tension between particularly the federal and state governments over the ownership of surplus lands, the letters demonstrate the willingness and readiness to collaborate with one another in order to reap the most benefit. The U.S. military benefitted from the engineering study and proposed alteration of the land for soil erosion as they were able to continue their utilization of the area for training maneuvers. The Hawai‘i state government was able to profit from both the U.S. military and the Estate of James Campbell as both the military

¹²⁰ The Estate of James Campbell to John A. Burns, May 24, 1966, Hawai‘i State Archives.

¹²¹ Draft of John A. Burns to the Trustees under the Will and of the Estate of James Campbell, June 2, 1966, Hawai‘i State Archives.

¹²² Draft of John A. Burns to the Trustees under the Will and of the Estate of James Campbell, June 2, 1966, Hawai‘i State Archives.

and tourism industry generate revenue for the local economy. According to the 2021 Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan, the U.S. military was the second largest economic generator in Hawai‘i, trailing the tourism industry as number one.^{123,124} By maintaining the soil and coasts, the proposed tourist development in Kawela Bay would also generate revenue for the state as an influx of tourists would travel to the destination. Likewise, the Estate of James Campbell would further their assets through the eventual development of the Turtle Bay Resort and the concealment of U.S. military ground maneuvers and its consequential environmental ramifications.

Moreover, the letters demonstrated an extensive, invisible network that intertwined all three sectors and revealed the multiple roles that some of these actors had in their time in office. Though John Burns had no formal position in the Estate, his son James S. Burns was an appointed guardian for Campbell Estate minors in 1968 and eventually became an appointed guardian for Campbell Estate masters in 1976.¹²⁵ Other Democrat politicians and governor appointed workers within the state government also held positions in the Campbell Estate in the 1960s, including Assistant State Attorney General Arthur Fong, Honolulu City Council Chairman Walter Heen, State Finance Director Hiram Kamaka, State Senator and Honolulu Supervisor Mitsuyuki Kido, State Representative Robert Oshiro, and leading governor advisor

¹²³ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, *Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan* (Honolulu, HI: Camp H.M. Smith, 2021), 2.

¹²⁴ According to the 2021 Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan, military expenditures totalled 7.7% of the state GDP in 2018, estimating \$7.2 billion. Military personnel and their families help generate much of this revenue for the state.

¹²⁵ George Cooper and Gavan Daws, *Land and Power in Hawai‘i: The Democratic Years* (University of Hawai‘i Press, 1990), 18.

and Honolulu City Councilman Matsuo Takabuki.^{126,127} Appointed by the court and the Attorney General, private attorneys who reviewed the estate's affairs also held positions in the Estate of James Campbell.^{128,129} Moreover, state politicians actively aided the development of Kuilima Resort Hotel and Country Club, now known as Turtle Bay Resort. In 1969, the Del Webb Corporation and Prudential Insurance Company, which created Inskon Development Corporation as a joint venture of the two companies, started construction on the 500-room hotel in October 1969.¹³⁰ Part of the \$20,000,000 tourist development was on 1,000 acres of land leased from the Estate of James Campbell. In order to fully develop the area into the vision set out by Del Webb Corporation and Prudential, Inskon Development Corporation had to receive various permissions from the State of Hawai'i Land Use Commission. In a meeting date May 23, 1969, the Land Use Commission held a hearing on A69-211 that would transform 220 acres of land from agriculture to urban purposes.¹³¹ Donald Walbrink of Walbrink and Associates, an office coordinating for

¹²⁶ Arthur Fong was a master in 1969. Walter Heen was also a minors guardian in 1966 and Hiram Kamaka was a minors guardian in 1965. Mitsuyuki Kido was a director of Leeward Development Corporation which developed an estate part of Campbell Estate leasehold subdivision. Finally, Robert Oshiro was a master in 1963, and Matsuo Takabuki was a minors guardian in 1962 and master in 1964. Takabuki also was appointed by Governor John Burns as a Bishop Estate trustee for Kamehameha Schools.

Dean Itsuji Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai'i Statehood* (Duke University Press, 2018), 169.

¹²⁷ Cooper and Daws, 54-55.

¹²⁸ Cooper and Daws, 62.

¹²⁹ These attorneys include Sidney Ayabe, James Burns, Clesson Cikasuye, C.F. Damon, Masato Doi, Arthur Fong, Robert Fukuda, Donald Gelber, Walter Heen, Ben Kaito, Hiram Kamaka, George Kimura, Samuel King, Edward Lebb, Leslie Lum, Samuel Lyons, Masaji Marumoto, Jon Miho, Wayne Minami, Jack Mizuha, Hideki Nakamura, Arthur Reinwald, Frederick Rohlfing, Barry Rubin, Hiroshi Sakai, Melvin Shinn, Arthur Spitzer, Keith Steiner, Taro Suyenga, Matsuo Takabuki, Sakae Takahashi, Carrol Taylor, Frederick Titcomb, Ted Tsukiyama, John Uehara, James Ventura, Gordon Wong, Ernest Yamane, and Nadao Yoshinaga.

¹³⁰ "Del Webb, Prudential's \$20-Mil Hawaii Resort," *Variety*, July 30, 1969, ProQuest.

¹³¹ State of Hawai'i Land Use Commission, Transcript of 3:00 PM Meeting, May 23, 1969, 10.

Inscon Development Corporation, highlighted the importance of the resort to expand tourist development outside of Waikīkī and petitioned the commission to convert the land use to urban for the first hotel and golf course, so that the two could be constructed simultaneously.¹³² After some deliberation and edits to the original petition, another commission meeting took place on July 8, 1969 with A69-211 as an agenda point.¹³³ Executive Vice President of Webb Corporations Fred Kuentz advocated for the petition and compromised with the commission regarding a minor disagreement over a conservation strip. It was no surprise that the commissioners unanimously agreed to pass A69-211 as all of the commissioners during the meeting had ties to land or tourist development. C.E.S. “Frank” Burns, Jr., the chairman of the commission, was a manager and executive of Amfac plantation, a major landowner and developer in Hawai‘i.^{134,135} Wilbert Choi was major landscaper for developments and was a director of Capital Investment Group in 1969, which was known as one of the most prolific development companies in Hawai‘i.¹³⁶ Goro Inaba was a manager of a hotel and was related to major investors, and Shiro “Sally” Nishimura was actively involved in Kukuioolono Associates, Opaika‘a Associates, and Hui o Kaua‘i.¹³⁷ Likewise, Alexander Napier, Jr. attempted to construct a resort on property he managed while actively serving as a commissioner, and Leslie Wung, a rancher, obtained her real estate license during her time on the commission.¹³⁸ Thus, the

¹³² State of Hawai‘i Land Use Commission, Transcript of 3:00 PM Meeting, May 23, 1969, 12.

¹³³ State of Hawai‘i Land Use Commission, Transcript of 10:00 AM meeting, July 8, 1969, 21.

¹³⁴ Cooper and Daws, 111.

¹³⁵ C.E.S. Burns, Jr. has no familial relation to former Governor John Burns or James Burns.

¹³⁶ Cooper and Daws, 111.

¹³⁷ Cooper and Daws, 110.

¹³⁸ Cooper and Daws, 111.

ventures outside of these state workers' government responsibilities demonstrated the invisible and extensive networks these officials had that only further their own profit and their control of land in Hawai'i.

Invisible Networks, Asian Settler Colonialism, and the Formation of the Turtle Bay Resort

The documents in this chapter revealed the invisible collaboration between federal, state, and corporate actors, the concealment of state networks and ventures, and the erasure of Ko'olauloa and its genealogical relationship with Kanaka 'Ōiwi. The 50th Statehood Act and its amendments made in Public Law 88-233 made a clear distinction between federal and state governments, even though the state is a major part of the settler colonial project in the Pacific. The definitions of ceded lands and Spark Matsunaga's choice to label the recovery of surplus land as "Hawai'i's birthright" further erase the history of the Kingdom of Hawai'i and postures the settler as the rightful owners of land instead of Kanaka 'Ōiwi. Moreover, the letters exchanged by the trustees Estate of James Campbell and Governor John Burns showed the benevolent cooperation between the U.S. military, the state government, and the Estate. The newly established Democratic elite in Hawai'i significantly benefited from its association with the "militarized economy" as local contractors received tremendous profit from the military and union workers were able to receive stable civilian defense jobs.¹³⁹ It also revealed the hidden conflicts of interest many of these state leaders had as they aided in the development of Kuilima or the Turtle Bay Resort as many worked as both state workers and employees of the Estate of James Campbell or other land development corporations.

Furthermore, these documents are clear examples of Asian settler colonialism in Hawai'i and Dylan Rodriguez's notion of multiculturalist White supremacy. In reviewing the

¹³⁹ Lind, 38.

demographics of both federal and state leaders, the majority of these Democrats are East Asian, particularly of Chinese or Japanese descent. Many of these politically elite East Asians utilized their education and higher socioeconomic statuses to pursue both government positions and land development opportunities.¹⁴⁰ Thus, in examining at their economic ventures outside politics, it is evident that these East Asian politicians leveraged their public servant role to further their own profits and power over land management. Additionally, by advocating for the reclamation of surplus lands and distinguishing themselves from the Big Five companies and the wealthy, White Republicans that supported the Five, East Asian politicians from Hawai‘i postured themselves as progressive leaders who want to recover as much land for Hawai‘i residents to provide them housing and economic opprotunites through the tourism industry. In his memoir, Matsuo Takabuki himself bragged of his financial ventures and criticized Cooper and Daws’ *Land and Power in Hawai‘i* of “paint[ing] of the collusion between political power and land use that was allegedly tied in with personal gain.”¹⁴¹ Instead, Takabuki suggests that instead of an abuse of power, these Asian politicians engaged in such opportunities to the benefit of everyone:

There will always be a natural relationship between political power and private-sector benefits. When an individual is engaged in both activities simultaneously, the true ethical issue should focus on that particular person’s alleged misuse of government funds or breach of rules for personal gain. It appears that the criticism against the politicians/entrepreneurs of our generation is that we totally altered the political and economic landscape and rapidly expanded and opened the economy for everyone—everyone benefited from those changes. The implication that the political process was abused for personal gain is based on certain out-of-context facts and statistical data. These data are easily used for criticism—especially by academics or media reporters, who try to wear a halo on their heads but are themselves rarely involved actively in any risk-taking process in either the private or public sector. These same critics have little

¹⁴⁰ Candace Fujikane, “Introduction: Asian Settler Colonialism in the U.S. Colony of Hawai‘i,” in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 8.

¹⁴¹ Matsuo Takabuki, *An Unlikely Revolutionary: Matsuo Takabuki and the Making of Modern Hawai‘i* (University of Hawai‘i Press, 1998), 93.

understanding of the socioeconomic stranglehold that an entire generation of islanders suffered under when "land and politics" were truly in the hand of only the few.¹⁴²

Similarly, when it was discovered that Mitsuyuki Kido advised his relatives to invest in a residential development project whose construction requirements were waived by the O‘ahu County Board of Supervisors that he was a supervisor of, Kido maintained that “there was no conflict of interest.”¹⁴³ Governor John Burns even defended Kido, praising Kido for having “‘the guts, the ability and the industry’ to become a rich man.”¹⁴⁴ Thus, criticism of Japanese domination in Hawai‘i politics and economy were framed as racist anti-Japanese sentiment, especially critique from Kanaka ‘Ōiwi. In his book about Japanese struggle in Hawai‘i, Democrat Hawai‘i State of Representatives Roland Kotani even wrote that Kanaka ‘Ōiwi “expressed resentment” against Japanese politicians and glossed over the Japanese politicians who were the main decision makers of the eviction of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi “squatters” on public lands like Sand Island and Mākua Beach.¹⁴⁵ These politicians are evidence and perpetrators of multiculturalist White supremacy and its ability to enable structures of racism in Hawai‘i that benefit White and East Asian residents, while simultaneously dispossessing land from Kanaka ‘Ōiwi.¹⁴⁶ These East Asians leaders, particularly those of Japanese descent, created this illusion that there must be minimal or no racial socioeconomic disparities in Hawai‘i as they were gaining success in their political careers and their hidden economic ventures.

¹⁴² Takabuki, 94.

¹⁴³ Kotani, 161.

¹⁴⁴ Kotani, 161.

¹⁴⁵ Kotani, 158-159.

¹⁴⁶ Dylan Rodriguez, *White Reconstruction: Domestic Warfare and the Logics of Genocide* (Fordham University Press, 2020), 56.

As these East Asian leaders continued to exploit their networks, the resort was eventually built and opened in 1972.¹⁴⁷ Multiple changes of ownership occurred throughout the years and eventually the resort was acquired by the Ritz-Carlton in 2024. While the resort experienced various ownerships and expanded its luxury services to tourists, the Kahuku Training Area continued its violent training operations on the other side of the highway. The U.S. military also purchased 8,000 acres of land from the Estate of James Campbell for permanent utilization of the area.¹⁴⁸ Thus, while tourism expanded and solidified its presence on the edge of O‘ahu’s North Shore, so did the operations of the U.S. military.

¹⁴⁷ About Turtle Bay,” *The Ritz-Carlton*, accessed April 20, 2026, <https://www.turtlebayexperiences.com/about>.

¹⁴⁸ Alexander Kufel, “HED Helps Army Buy Kahuku Training Area,” *The Pacific Connection* 33, no. 2 (1999).

Chapter II: Kahuku Training Area, Ritz-Carlton's Turtle Bay Resort, and the Glitch

Regardless of their close proximity, Kahuku Training Area still remains largely invisible to both tourists vacationing at the Ritz-Carlton O'ahu, Turtle Bay Resort and the general public. Despite efforts by federal, state, and corporate actors to conceal this militarized space, there remain a handful of incidents in which the Kahuku Training Area and the military activities conducted in the space become unexpectedly visible, revealing the U.S. military's vulnerability. This chapter utilizes Turtle Bay Resort's website, Google Maps, and Apple Maps to further demonstrate Ferguson and Turnbull's concept of "hidden in plain sight." Specifically, I examine the ways in which private actors intentionally conceal the military's presence from tourists by branding Ritz-Carlton's Turtle Bay Resort as a secluded hideaway. Additionally, I explore the glitches in the system that reveal the U.S. military occupation on the North Shore of O'ahu, not only uncovering the weaknesses of the supposed strongest military in the world but also countering the resort's claim that the area is unoccupied and unused.

Hidden in Plain Sight

Ferguson and Turnbull point to naturalization and reassurance as methods of and primary factors for the U.S. military's ubiquitous yet invisible presence.¹⁴⁹ Naturalization occurs when the military embeds itself in daily life, becoming a normalized institution on the islands.¹⁵⁰ Along with altered place names, participation in local events, and air shows free to the public, the violent and destructive activities conducted by the U.S. military also become ordinary occurrences. Reassurance operates when the U.S. military is recognized as good, necessary, and beneficial to Hawai'i, the economy, and our defense. The federal and state governments instill a

¹⁴⁹ Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai'i* (University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xv.

¹⁵⁰ Ferguson and Turnbull, xiii.

feeling of vulnerability towards financial and national security that delegitimize efforts of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi sovereignty.¹⁵¹ Hawai‘i is thus routinely positioned as an exposed and precarious state in dependence on the U.S. military. Simultaneously, these conditions remain quite invisible to tourists as, to them, Hawai‘i is a paradise meant to transport themselves outside their reality.

When browsing the Ritz-Carlton O‘ahu, Turtle Bay Resort website, the viewer and potential customer are automatically greeted with large text declaring: “On our O‘ahu Resort in Hawai‘i, all you have to do is be.”¹⁵² Painted as O‘ahu’s hideaway destination, the luxury hotel that is largely inaccessible to the average family boasts of the nature and seclusion that tourists would not expect if they stayed at a popular vacation spot like Waikīkī. The slogan, paired with its promise of scenic views and wellness services, invites tourists to an almost spiritual experience largely due to its perceived isolation and appropriation of Hawaiian traditions. The website homepage even boasts of the resort’s unique hideaway location that allows tourists to “deepen connection with the land and culture, [and] spark wonder within.”¹⁵³ In addition to the Ritz-Carlton’s website, aerial pictures of the resort on various travel and wedding planning sites similarly portray the resort as a secluded retreat with lush greenery and cascading mountains (Figure 2 and 3).

¹⁵¹ Ferguson and Turnbull, xv.

¹⁵² “The Ritz-Carlton O‘ahu, Turtle Bay,” The Ritz-Carlton, accessed March 17, 2026, <https://www.ritzcarlton.com/en/hotels/hnlkz-the-ritz-carlton-oahu-turtle-bay/overview/>.

¹⁵³ “The Ritz-Carlton O‘ahu, Turtle Bay.”



Figure 2. Aerial photo of Ritz Carlton O'ahu, Turtle Bay Resorts from *Forbes*.¹⁵⁴



Figure 3. Aerial photo of Ritz Carlton O'ahu, Turtle Bay from wedding videography site.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Photograph by Turtle Bay, “Turtle Bay: Hawai‘i’s Home for the Best Golf on Oahu’s North Shore,” *Forbes*, July 7, 2026, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikmatuszewski/2016/07/07/turtle-bay-hawaiiis-home-for-the-best-golf-on-oahus-north-shore-and-so-much-more/>.

¹⁵⁵ “Turtle Bay Weddings | Luxury Experience on Oahu’s North Shore,” *Bishop Media*, <https://bishopmediaproductions.com/turtle-bay-wedding-venue/>.

At first glance, these aerial photos of the resort create an illusion of a vast and empty land, prime for tourist exploration. However, much of the perceived untouched backdrop is occupied by the U.S. military and part of the 9,466 acres of the vast Kahuku Training Area.

Closely examining Figure 2, one may notice three small dots on top of the mountain range, ironically resembling golf balls (Figure 4). Within the Kahuku Training Area, these three spheres are part of a telecommunication station managed by the Navy, adjacent to the Opana Radar site that was the first wartime radar site utilized by the U.S. military during World War II.^{156,157} In looking at Apple Maps, the telecommunication station has no identification, but is labelled as ‘Ōpana 2,” which is an ahupua‘a or subdivision of the land (Figure 5). In contrast, Google Maps has the site labelled as the U.S. Naval research Laboratory.



Figure 4. Edited picture by author of Figure 2 to show location of three spheres.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Army Garrison-Hawai‘i Cultural Resources Program, Military Heritage Resources: Kahuku Training Area, https://home.army.mil/hawaii/5115/8379/7209/C_Kahuku_Military_Heritage.pdf.

¹⁵⁷ Though there is little information about the radar spheres in Kahuku Training Area, there are several similar structures on O‘ahu, including the Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX-1), a ballistic missile radar in Pearl Harbor.

“Go Inside the Pearl Harbor ‘Golfball,’” *Hawai‘i Public Radio*, accessed March 17, 2026, <https://www.hawaiipublicradio.org/local-news/2019-08-14/go-inside-the-pearl-harbor-golfball>.



Figure 5. Screenshot of radar site on Apple Maps.¹⁵⁸

Similarly, in Figure 3, the resort has a stunning backdrop of a section of the Ko‘olau Range and Kaumala Ridge. Though it may appear to be vacant and unused, the majority of the backdrop is part of Kahuku Training Area, further countering the idea of the Ritz-Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort as secluded and remote. A screenshot from Google Maps, Figure 6 illustrates the resort’s exceptionally close proximity to the training area and demonstrates that the mountains exhibited in Figure 3 are the same mountains occupied by the U.S. military.

¹⁵⁸ Screenshot by author on Apple Maps, March 17, 2026.



Figure 6. Screenshot of Google Maps displaying Turtle Bay Resort and Kahuku Training Area.¹⁵⁹

Thus, in looking at these figures as well as the Ritz-Carlton's website, the Kahuku Training Area remains hidden in plain sight for tourists vacationing at Turtle Bay Resort despite the visible markers of U.S. military presence. Through deliberate advertising of Turtle Bay Resort as a remote, secluded tourist destination, the training area is remade into an untouched and picturesque mountain range where tourists can pay copious amounts of money to experience a pseudo-spiritual connection the land itself. In an article examining the Ritz-Carlton's luxury branding, the authors explain that the success of the hotel chain relies on "incorporating a 'sense of place' design, an aesthetic that incorporates the geography, local culture, and indigenous architecture of the property."¹⁶⁰ In reframing luxury as experience rather than solely material possessions, the hotel chain relies on scenography, the "sense-of-place" arrangement, to fully immerse and transport guests into the property, obligating staff members to be both service

¹⁵⁹ Screenshotted on Google Maps and edited by author, March 17, 2026.

¹⁶⁰ Natalie W. Nixon and Alison Rieple, "Luxury Redesigned: How the Ritz-Carlton Uses Experiential Service Design to Position Abundance in Times of Scarcity," *Design Management Journal* 5, no. 1 (2010): 45.

workers and actors.¹⁶¹ Thus, the Ritz-Carlton's structural layout that creates a sense of isolation and appropriates Kanaka 'Ōiwi culture differentiates the resort and reinforces the impression of luxury as "rare and special."¹⁶²

The same mechanisms utilized to market the resort as a hideaway on the North Shore are also what enable the U.S. military to continue violent and destructive operations without extreme public backlash. As per Pachirat's scholarship on power and sight, the training area becomes a zone of confinement that permits the morally repugnant to remain invisible, allowing both the military and the Ritz-Carlton to generate revenue.¹⁶³ Mutually benefitting federal and corporate actors, these processes also allow for the further dispossession of Kanaka 'Ōiwi lands. For the Ritz-Carlton, Native Hawaiian sovereignty and repatriation are detrimental to their business and future expansions on the islands. For the U.S. military, land back loosens the control the military has on Hawai'i and the broader Pacific and necessitates recognition that what the U.S. empire has inflicted and continues to inflict upon Pasifika communities is immoral. Therefore, invisibility protects the U.S. military and maintains its imperial power.

Big Tech, the U.S Military, and the Glitch

In addition to the Ritz-Carlton, other corporate actors like Apple and Google share symbiotic relationships with the U.S. military that enables both entities to accumulate and grow their profit despite occasional public contentions. Obfuscating the boundaries between the federal government and private corporations, Big Tech companies have been eager to assist the surveillance state with their latest artificial intelligence and communications technologies as the

¹⁶¹ Nixon and Rieple, 46.

¹⁶² Nixon and Rieple, 44.

¹⁶³ Timothy Pachirat, *Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight* (Yale University Press, 2011), 4.

profitability of international wars and domestic policing skyrockets.¹⁶⁴ In exchange for their products, the federal government places less restrictions and regulations on tech companies, so that these companies have greater capacity to expand their investments, generate maximum profit, and collect data without overbearing privacy laws.¹⁶⁵ In 2025, Google updated their artificial intelligence principles that removed their 2018 pledge not to utilize the technology for weapons or surveillance purposes, while simultaneously procuring contracts with the Pentagon for artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud usage.^{166,167} In July of 2025, Google Public Sector obtained a \$200 million contract from the Department of Defense's Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) to further the military's AI capabilities for "national defense" purposes.¹⁶⁸ While Google's relationship with the U.S. military is more apparent, Apple seems to be less involved with the Department of Defense than their "Big Five" tech counterparts.^{169,170} Though explicit contracts have not been made, Apple continues to foster their relationship with

¹⁶⁴ Andrea Coveri, Claudio Cozza, and Dario Guarascio, "Big Tech and the U.S. Digital-Military-Industrial Complex," *Intereconomics* 60, no. 2 (2025).

¹⁶⁵ Coveri, Cozza, and Guarascio.

¹⁶⁶ Hugh Langley and Chales Rollet, "Hundreds of Googlers Ask Their CEO to Block Classified AI Work with the Pentagon," *Business Insider*, April 27, 2026, <https://www.businessinsider.com/google-employees-ceo-block-classified-military-ai-projects-2026-4>.

¹⁶⁷ In response to the updated AI pledge and new contracts made with the Pentagon, 600 employees of Google signed a letter to CEO Sundar Pichai in April of 2026. The letter explained their frustrations with Google's relationship with the Department of Defense and implored Pichai to prohibit the DoD from utilizing their AI technologies.

¹⁶⁸ "Google Public Sector Awarded \$200 Million Contract to Accelerate AI and Cloud Capabilities Across Department of Defense's Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO)," *Google Cloud*, July 14, 2025, <https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/public-sector/google-public-sector-awarded-200-million-contract-to-accelerate-ai-and-cloud-capabilities-across-department-of-defenses-chief-digital-and-artificial-intelligence-office-cdao>.

¹⁶⁹ The Big Five tech companies include Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, and Google.

¹⁷⁰ J Paul Dunne and Elisabeth Skön, "New Technology and the U.S. Military Industrial Complex," *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal* 16, no.2 (2021): 14.

the federal government through Apple CEO Tim Cook, who has personally donated to Donald Trump's inauguration fund, committed Apple's investments to U.S.-based manufacturing, and accompanied Trump to China with other business executives in May of 2026.^{171,172} Apple also partnered with OpenAI, which recently procured a contract with the Department of Defense in March of 2026, to incorporate ChatGPT into iOS, iPadOS, and macOS.^{173,174} Thus, though these corporations are seemingly open about their collaboration with the U.S. military on specifically AI technologies, the extent of their partnerships are more complex than what may appear as demonstrated by the glitches that appear in these mapping systems.

As mentioned in the introduction, the glitch can be conceptualized as both a window into the digital mainframe and a method of resistance towards the settler colonial state, disrupting the notion of the glitch as an impartial and unintentional mistake. In framing the glitch along these lines, I examine glitches visible on Apple and Google Maps.

Glitches as Clouds on Apple Maps

While examining parts of Kahuku Training Area on Apple Maps, it is oftentimes difficult to distinguish the structures within the training area as there are clouds blocking visibility (Figure 7). At first glance, the clouds seem to be there by accident – an incidental barrier to the viewer.

¹⁷¹ Will Weissert, "These are the 37 Donors Helping Pay for Trump's \$300 Million White House Ballroom," *AP News*, November 12, 2025, <https://apnews.com/article/donors-to-trump-white-house-ballroom-d4dd174eeb30ac244354a5a25551a86b>.

¹⁷² Tyler Pager, "Chief Executives to Accompany Trump to China," *The New York Times*, last modified May 12, 2026, <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/11/us/politics/trump-china-musk-cook.html>.

¹⁷³ "Our Agreement with the Department of War," *OpenAI*, February 28, 2026, <https://openai.com/index/our-agreement-with-the-department-of-war/>.

¹⁷⁴ "OpenAI and Apple Announce Partnership to Integrate ChatGPT into Apple Experiences," *OpenAI*, June 10, 2024, <https://openai.com/index/openai-and-apple-announce-partnership/>.



Figure 7. Screenshot of Apple Maps taken by author of Kahuku Training Area¹⁷⁵

However, upon closer inspection of the map, there are clouds that are oddly cut off from the frame or arranged together, signalling to the viewer that the map was put together by satellite images taken at different times (Figure 8). In one of the frames, the clouds have poor resolution, blurring together.

¹⁷⁵ Screenshot by author on Apple Maps, March 19, 2026.




Figure 8. Edited picture of Apple Maps screenshot to show glitches in clouds.¹⁷⁶

Thus, in examining these two screenshots, it is reasonable to infer that Apple Maps intentionally spliced these images to create a map that is indiscernible of certain structures in the Kahuku Training Area to the viewer, utilizing the clouds as a sort of barrier or cloak. In thinking of Ruha Benjamin and Omar Zahzah’s scholarship, the clouds and their choppy placements signal that their placement was due to deliberate database design rather than a “mistake.” Whether it is to render the U.S. military invisible or to protect their own interests and profits, Apple Maps’ visual manipulations and aesthetic choices demonstrate that data, data design, and mapping are never neutral; programmers are purposefully orienting the map in a certain manner. Simultaneously, the uneven and blurry clouds also gesture to a vulnerability of the corporation’s technological abilities and concealment of U.S. military occupation in Hawai‘i. The sloppy cut-offs of the clouds and low resolution are very apparent in closer examination. It thus signals to the viewer that there is something being deliberately hidden to the general public by powerful institutions and global corporate leaders.

Glitches in Street View on Apple and Google Maps

¹⁷⁶ Edited picture created by author, March 19, 2026.

In exploring the street views of both Apple and Google Maps, further glitches appear when viewing Kamehameha Highway, an east to west, two-lane highway and the main road that separates the Ritz-Carlton's Turtle Bay Resort and Kahuku Training Area. Street view allows the user to view an area through the perspective of the Google car that captures panoramic images of its route on the street-level. Despite its proximity to Turtle Bay Resort, the entrance to Kahuku Training Area is accessible to long side roads, specifically Charlie Road. However, users utilizing both Google and Apple maps cannot access Charlie Road via the street view function, even though it is a drivable and open road. Once again, the viewer notices the obstacles to the visibility in this area, whether it be due to clouds or lack of access. Charlie Road is one of the few roads that takes a driver straight to the main entrance of the training area and is purposefully left out of street view for both Apple and Google mapping services. Repeatedly, we experience as users that mapping and digital design are never neutral processes; rather, they seem to benefit and protect the settler colonial state.

Moreover, in thinking of the glitch as a glimpse into the vulnerability of settler structures, military presence and activities are noticeable in utilizing the street view function on Google Maps. While the Google street view car was capturing footage of Kamehameha Highway in October 2024, a group of military trucks or vehicles can be spotted along the highway as well as the exit or entrance of Charlie Road. When looking at the exit of Charlie Road, a green truck labelled C-110 and a smaller camouflage vehicle labeled A-217 can be spotted with military personnel inside (Figure 9 and 10). The larger truck is seen with beige cases strapped down in the bed trunk. As the viewer goes west on Kamehameha Highway, another smaller vehicle labelled TP 42 with blurred faces of military personnel are seen with camouflage backpacks in the trunk and an attachment to the vehicle (Figure 11.1). Continuing west, there are four more

military vehicles spotted, pulled off the side of the highway. The first camouflage car has an attachment covered with a tarp and a black case in the trunk. The military personnel in the vehicle are fully dressed in their uniforms and helmets (Figure 11.2). The next vehicle is very similar to the previous one with an attachment and black case in the trunk (Figure 11.3). A different style of the previous ones, the following vehicle is an armored military car with a camouflage tarped attachment in the back (Figure 11.4). The windows are tinted and difficult to identify how many personnel are inside. The last vehicle is similar to the style and built of Figure 11.4, though it has three long antennas sticking out in between the trunk and attachment (Figure 11.5).




Figure 9. Screenshot of military vehicles exiting Charlie Road on Google Maps



Figure 10. Screenshot of military vehicles exiting Charlie Road on Google Maps¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Screenshots by author, March 19, 2026.



[From Top Left to Bottom Right] **Figure 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4.** Screenshot of military vehicles exiting Charlie Road on Google Maps¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Screenshot by author, March 19, 2026.

Google Street View has been the center of controversy since its conception in 2007 due to privacy and safety concerns, including its ability to photograph and publish pictures of individuals' cars, license plates, and the inside of people's homes through their windows.¹⁷⁹ The company was also taken to court and fined in multiple countries in 2013 after German privacy regulators discovered that the Street View cars collected data containing usernames, passwords, emails, and other sensitive information from wi-fi networks.¹⁸⁰ Concurrently, the Google Street View and the glitches within the feature can be operationalized as a tool of resistance as conceptualized by digital humanities scholars like Zahzah and Sakr. While these mapping services further the surveillance state, the employment of corporate mapping technologies can also help monitor or counter-surveil U.S. military activities in Kahuku Training Area. By "watch[ing] the watchers," these images of military vehicles can bring visibility and awareness to U.S. military occupation in Kahuku and other militarized spaces in Hawai'i and the broader Pacific.¹⁸¹

Additionally, these glitches can be conceptualized through counter-mapping. As mentioned in the introduction, I discovered these glitches while developing a spreadsheet of descriptions and coordinates of militarized spaces in Hawai'i that would later be inputted into GIS to form a three dimensional counter-map. Like the computer mainframe, the map, both physical and digital, is an unneutral tool, and cartography, the study and production of maps, is

¹⁷⁹ Jana McGowen, "Your Boring Life, Now Available Online: Analyzing Google Street View and the Right to Privacy," *Texas Wesleyan Law Review* 16, no.3 (2010): 479.

¹⁸⁰ "Google Faces Streetview Wi-fi Snooping Action," *BBC News*, September 11, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-24047235>.

¹⁸¹ The concept of "watch the watchers" originated by the STOP LAPD Spying Coalition when they created a practice called "Copwatch," in which police abuses were documented and recorded "Watch the watchers" developed this practice and centered their focus on LAPD's surveillance technologies.

the exertion of power by the state.¹⁸² Drawing from Foucault and Joseph Rouse's *Knowledge and Power*, geography and cartography scholar John B. Harley argues that cartographers "manufacture power" and thus "create a spatial panopticon."¹⁸³ Harley further contends that the map is an application of Foucault's concept of "juridical power," in which the map "becomes a 'juridical territory' ... [that] facilitates surveillance and control."¹⁸⁴ This exercise of power and management is further exacerbated through mapping technologies as seen through Apple and Google. A tool to further digital settler colonialism, digital maps maintain the relationship between BigTech corporations and the U.S. government, normalizes settler occupation, and aids settler control.¹⁸⁵ In response, counter-mapping is an intentional effort to challenge and undermine powerful hegemonic institutions and their cartographic practices.^{186,187} It is also a way

¹⁸² John B. Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," *Cartographica* 26, no. 2 (1989): 11.

¹⁸³ Harley, 12.

¹⁸⁴ Harley, 12.

¹⁸⁵ In her paper "The Logics of Digitisation: Race, Cyberspace, and Digital Settler Colonialism," Kawsar Ali defines digital settler colonialism as "the production, maintenance and use of the Internet to extend settler colonialism and reiterate the power of the white sovereign online ... [that] becomes a tool used to eliminate Indigenous subjects and to exterminate the Other." Ali contends that digital settler colonialism simulates the settler violence on the digital sphere, thus embedding the unequal power relations within the Internet's mainframe. Omar Zahzah adds to this definition of digital settler colonialism to demonstrate the convergence between U.S. BigTech corporations and the Israeli settler state.

Kawsar Ali, "The Logics of Digitisation: Race, Cyberspace, and Digital Settler Colonialism," *Journal of Global Indigeneity* 5, no.2 (2021), 5-6.

Omar Zahzah, *Terms of Servitude: Zionism, Silicon Valley, and Digital/Settler-Colonialism in the Palestinian Liberation Struggle* (Seven Stories, 2025).

¹⁸⁶ Leila M. Harris and Helen D. Hazen, "Power of Maps: (Counter) Mapping for Conservation," *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies* 4, no.1 (2005), 115.

¹⁸⁷ Sociologist Nancy Lee Peluso is widely credited to have coined the term "counter-mapping" in her article "Whose Woods Are These? Counter-Mapping Forest Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia," in which she defines counter-maps as alternative maps or boundary-making that Indigenous or local people can control their representation and resources through cartographic practices.

Nancy Lee Peluso, "Whose Woods Are These? Counter-Mapping Forest Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia," *Antipode* 27, no.4 (1995), 387.

for Indigenous communities to illustrate their relationships they have with their land, reclaim their resources, and resist development.¹⁸⁸ Thus, the counter-map is an intentional amalgamation of glitches; it is knowledge production and a method of resistance that challenges the unneutral map-making produced by the settler state. Counter-maps like Sean Connelly's Hawai'i Military Atlas demonstrate the ways in which the glitch is not only operationalized, but also exposes the collusion between corporate actors and the U.S. military.

Moreover, the glitch can be employed by artists as a form of cultural resistance towards empire. Exposing the biased and hegemonic digital mainframe, many artists have utilized and stitched glitches into their artwork to create murals, mosiacs, and collages.¹⁸⁹ For instance, after the suppression of protests in Tahrir Square and Mohammed Mahmoud Street in Egypt in November 2011 in response to the Maspero Massacre, VJ Um Amel, a cyborg created by Sakr, compiled images from these protests that circulated through glitched channels to create a mosiac of bottle of spray paint, representing the graffiti of activists and protestors.¹⁹⁰ Another example of artists operationalizing the glitch in their designs is Emilio Vavarella's "THE GOOGLE TRILOGY," a counter-mapping and art project.¹⁹¹ In the first part of his trilogy, "Report the Problem," Vavarella reworked one hundred glitched photos from Google Street View that exposed the limitations and failures of Google.¹⁹² Vavarella also utilizes glitches in the last part

¹⁸⁸ Peluso, 387.

¹⁸⁹ Laila Shereen Sakr, *Arabic Glitch: Technoculture, Data Bodies, and Archives* (Stanford University Press, 2023), 23-26.

¹⁹⁰ Sakr, 23-24.

¹⁹¹ Emilio Vavarella, "On Counter-Mapping and Media-Flânerie: Artistic Strategies in the Age of Google Earth, Google Maps, and Google Street View," in *Error, Ambiguity, and Creativity: A Multidisciplinary Reader*, ed. Sita Popat and Sarah Whatley (Palgrave Macmillan Cham, 2020), 155,

¹⁹² Vavarella, 155.

of his trilogy “The Driver and the Cameras,” in which he gathers portraits of the drivers of the Google Car.¹⁹³ His collection of portraits uncover and reveal the invisible labor and operations that allow this sort of mapping and surveillance technology to occur. Thus, the glitch is often a reflection of the settler state; yet these artists reimagine the glitch as an expression of resistance and opposition towards the settler state, BigTech, and surveillance. In thinking of the glitches found near Kahuku Training Area, artists can engage with the glitch aesthetic and generate art that can make the U.S. military and their operations, as well as the collusion between the federal government and BigTech companies, visible to broader audiences.

Collusion, Glitches, and Resistance

Along with their problematic appropriation of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi culture and traditions, the Ritz-Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort renders Kahuku Training Area invisible for its guests to paint an idyllic fantasy for tourists to immerse themselves in secluded beaches and nature. The aerial pictures shown in this chapter and taken and posted by the resort, travel companies, and photography businesses further reinforce the idea of the training area as vacant and unoccupied land that bridges the physical and pseudo-spiritual worlds. However, in critically examining these pictures and orienting these images to a map, there are traces of military presence and structures, such as the spherical white radars on Kawela Camp Road. Collaborating for their individual interests, the Ritz-Carlton and the U.S. military both need Kahuku Training Area to remain largely invisible to the public eye in order to keep their control of O‘ahu’s North Shore.

In addition to the Ritz-Carlton, BigTech companies like Apple and Google enable the Kahuku Training Area to maintain its concealment through its online mapping services. In this chapter, we see that both corporations benefit from supporting the interests of the federal

¹⁹³ Vavarella, 156.

government to avoid restrictions and regulations that would diminish their profit.¹⁹⁴ Utilizing conceptualizations of the glitch as revelation and subversion, we can recognize the consequence of biased and oppressive database design in these mapping technologies. More importantly, the glitch beyond revelation is how viewers and communities can reequip it as a tool for resistance against the settler state and ongoing occupation. In analyzing the Apple Maps aerially, the clouds that partially block Kahuku Training Area are not merely obstacles that so happened to be utilized for the map, but perhaps intentional barriers that were pieced together by programmers. This can be inferred due to the choppy and missing parts of clouds, low resolution, and odd blurred section. A signal to the viewer that there is something being deliberately hidden underneath, the clouds represent a larger vulnerability hidden by both corporations and the U.S. military.

Lastly, the Google Maps street view function is another example of a glitch that further unravels the zone of confinement that the U.S. military tries to construct surrounding the Kahuku Training Area. Footage of multiple military vehicles exiting Charlie Road and lined up on Kamehameha Highway may seem out of place and unordinary next to the Ritz-Carlton's resort and the James Campbell National Wild Refuge to a tourist and even an average local. However, as we examined at various maps throughout this chapter, military activity in the North Shore is unfortunately a normal occurrence in much of the area. The footage caught by the Google car also demonstrates the U.S. military is vulnerable to its own surveillance technologies. Along with the pictures taken by the Ritz-Carlton, both Apple and Google Maps services can be utilized by activists, researchers, artists, and others alike to resist ongoing military occupation in Hawai'i, especially as negotiations continue regarding the leased land in Kahuku set to expire in 2029.

¹⁹⁴ Coveri, Cozza, and Guarascio.

Reequipping these surveillant technologies can help us “watch the watchers” and emerge new ways of countersurveillance and expose the operations of the U.S. military to a larger audience.¹⁹⁵ Consequently, these strategies can aid in the land back movement for Kanaka ‘Ōiwi sovereignty and to further hold the U.S. military accountable for its desecration of the Kahuku and Kawaihoa areas.

¹⁹⁵ “Watch the Watchers.”

Chapter III: Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Ni‘ihau, and Barking Sands Beach Cottages – Hypervisibility, the Propaganda of National Security, and the “Clean War” Aesthetic

Every July 3rd, the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on the island of Kaua‘i hosts the annual America’s Most West Freedom Fest for military families and the general public. Celebrating the birth of the United States, the event features a fireworks display, booths for food and drinks, and crafts for keiki or children. It also showcases live music from popular Hawaiian and other Pasifika artists with past performances from Sammy Johnson, Common Kings, Iam Tongi, and High Watah.^{196,197,198,199} Reflecting on the 2023 festival, event coordinator Genevieve Silva praised the success of the celebration and exclaimed, “The word Aloha embodies a spirit that acknowledges everyone’s responsibility and goodwill toward each other...Our commitment to bringing the community together as one Ohana to celebrate our freedom with Aloha was what contributed to its success.”²⁰⁰

Celebrating the birthday of a nation on stolen Kanaka ‘Ōiwi land that is actively dispossessed and desecrated is quite contemptible. The very well advertised event reveals the hypervisibility of the PMRF and demonstrates the ways in which the U.S. military engages with

¹⁹⁶ “America’s Most West Freedom Fest,” *Navy MWR*, Accessed May 1, 2026, <https://pmrf.greatlifehawaii.com/events/4de0770e-c9d9-4501-a264-0fba9f8444a9>.

¹⁹⁷ “PMRF to Host America’s Most West Freedom Fest Featuring Fireworks, Family Fun and Music Headliner Common Kings,” *Kaua‘i Now*, June 26, 2023, Accessed May 1, 2026, <https://kauainownews.com/2023/06/26/pmrf-to-host-americas-most-west-freedom-fest-featuring-fireworks-family-fun-and-music-headliner-common-kings/>.

¹⁹⁸ “America’s Most West Freedom Fest!” *Kaua‘i Now*, Accessed May 1, 2026, <https://kauainownews.com/community-calendar/event/h6o7r2d4a1g6a/>.

¹⁹⁹ “America’s Most West Freedom Fest,” *Kaua‘i Now*, Accessed May 1, 2026, <https://kauainownews.com/community-calendar/event/h2w4v6t3y5b7n/>.

²⁰⁰ Bodie Estep, “PMRF Celebrates Freedom with Aloha during America’s Most West Freedom Fest,” *U.S. Navy*, July 14, 2023, accessed May 1, 2026, <https://cnreurafcent.cnmc.navy.mil/news/news-detail/article/3472168/pmrf-celebrates-freedom-with-aloha-during-americas-most-west-freedom-fest/>.

the public to necessitate and normalize its presence on the garden isle. By opening the festival to the public and marketing it as a family friendly event, the U.S. military effectively portrays itself as a benevolent neighbor despite its violent operation that take place within the facility. Creating an illusion of community, the fireworks show also embodies the celebration of freedom on a beach that is largely restricted or inaccessible to the public year round unless they are able to acquire a Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) guest card.^{201,202}

Moreover, the platforming of Pasifika artists and the co-optation of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi culture and language further postures the U.S. military as a valued community member. By utilizing popular Pasifika artists and even hula hālau²⁰³ as live entertainment, the U.S military demonstrates its ability to be progressive and anti-racist despite its historical and continuous violence perpetuated in the Pacific. An example of Dylan Rodriguez’s concept of multiculturalist white supremacy, their decision to spotlight these performers displays, in their own way, their commitment to respecting and highlighting Kanaka culture. In actuality, these gestures normalize their presence in Hawai‘i and conceal their imperial operations on Kaua‘i and Ni‘ihau. Similarly, Genevieve Silva’s inappropriate categorization of aloha as a “spirit that acknowledges everyone’s responsibility and goodwill towards each other” appropriates and misconstrues the meaning of aloha, while maintaining that the U.S. military has the best interest for the community.

²⁰¹ “Beach Access,” *U.S. Navy Website*, Accessed May 4, 2026, <https://cnrh.cnmc.navy.mil/Installations/PMRF-Barking-Sands/Operations-and-Management/Beach-Access/>.

²⁰² Even with the MWR guest card, civilians are still limited to designated beach areas, especially due to designated danger and safety zones. The MWR guest card access includes Waiapua‘a Bay Beach Park, Waiokapua Bay Trail, Shenanigans Bar and Restaurant, Mana Car Wash and Outdoor Movie Theater, and Kini Kini Ditch (limited to weekends and federal holidays).

²⁰³ Hula school.

The America's Most West Freedom Fest is just one example of the strategies the U.S. military utilizes to make the PMRF hypervisible to the public, while simultaneously excluding the public from accessing these spaces on a daily basis. In this chapter, I identify the origins of the PMRF on Kaua'i and Ni'ihau and demonstrate how land ownership has shifted overtime. Analyzing archival pieces, I also illustrate why the U.S. military purposefully displays the facility in such a conspicuous matter and how its hypervisibility is an example of defense propaganda. I end the chapter with an examination of YouTube videos of guests who documented their time in the Barking Sands beach cottages, vacation rentals within the base for active duty, military retirees, reservists, NAF employees, Department of Defense civilians, and their sponsored guests. I also highlight how the PMRF remains both hypervisible yet invisible to the tourist eye. I inquire the following questions: (1) how does the U.S. military's hypervisibility contribute to its operations' invisibility?; (2) how does YouTube contribute to the sanitization and normalization of the U.S. military in Kaua'i?; and (3) how do these YouTube videos also contribute to U.S. propaganda of national security and Roger Stahl's concept of a "clean war"?²⁰⁴

Background of Mānā and Ni'ihau

The Pacific Missile Range Facility encompasses multiple islands of Hawai'i, including Kaua'i, Ni'ihau, and Ka'ula, a protected bird sanctuary southwest of Ni'ihau.²⁰⁵ On Kaua'i, the oldest major island of Hawai'i, the land has underwent a long history of colonialism from the accidental arrival of Captain James Cook to the environmental degradation of the sugar

²⁰⁴ Susan Jackson, "Marketing Militarism in the Digital Age: Arms Production, YouTube, and Selling 'National Security,'" in *Understanding Popular Culture and World Politics in the Digital Age*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd and Caitlin Hamilton (London: Routledge, 2016), 69.

²⁰⁵ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, *Hawai'i Military Land Use Master Plan* (Honolulu, HI: Camp H.M. Smith, 2021), 30-31.

plantations to the current occupation of the U.S. military. The PMRF occupies the moku of Kona in the ahupua‘a of Waimea.²⁰⁶ The name of multiple districts throughout the island chain, Kona is literally translated as leeward.²⁰⁷ The moku of Kona contains eleven different ahupua‘a within its district, including Waimea, Makaweli, Hanapēpē, ‘Ēle‘ele, Wahiawa, Kalāheo, Lāwai, Kōloa, Weliweli, Pā‘a, and Māhā‘ulepū.^{208,209} The largest ahupua‘a of Kona, Waimea means reddish water in reference to the erosion of red soil, and it possesses rivers, cascading red cliffs, dense forests, and swamp lands.^{210,211} Waimea also contains the Mānā Plain, which lies on the far west coast on Kaua‘i. The fresh water marshes of Mānā were once abundant with loko i‘a or fishponds and lo‘i kalo, and residents had memories of “rafts” that kalo stalks grew on and drifted on the fresh waters.²¹² A famous ‘ōlelo no‘eau regarding the region of Mānā is “Mānā, i ka pu‘e kalo ho‘one‘ene‘e a ka wai,” meaning “Mānā, where the mounded taro moves in the water.”²¹³

²⁰⁶ U.S. Navy, *Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF): Cultural Landscape Report Final* (Hawai‘i: U.S. Navy, 2011).

²⁰⁷ Mary Kawena Pukui, Samuel H. Elbert, and Esther T. Mookini, *Place Names of Hawai‘i: Revised and Expanded Edition* (University of Hawai‘i Press, 1976), 117.

²⁰⁸ *Ahupua‘a of Kaua‘i*, Department of Land and Natural Resources Hawai‘i, accessed May 4, 2026, https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/shpd/files/2015/06/Ahupuaa_Kauai.pdf.

²⁰⁹ Order of ahupua‘a is arranged from north to south.

²¹⁰ Pukui, Elbert, and Mookini, 226.

²¹¹ E.S. Craighill Handy, Elizabeth Green Handy, and Mary Kawena Pukui, *Native Planters in Old Hawai‘i: Their Life, Lore, and Environment* (Bishop Museum Press, 1972), 256.

²¹² Handy, Handy, and Pukui, 266.

²¹³ Mary Kawena Pukui, *‘Ōlelo No‘eau: Hawaiian Proverbs and Poetical Sayings* (Bishop Museum Press, 1983), 233.

However, despite its once abundant lo‘i and marshy lands, Mānā was drastically transformed by the Kekaha Sugar Company.²¹⁴ Arriving in Kaua‘i in 1856, Norwegian Valdemar Knudsen secured a thirty year lease of crown lands for sugar production.²¹⁵ In 1878, Knudsen along with his business partner Han L’Orange drained Kawai‘ele Pond with ditches and pumps to the ocean and transformed fifty acres of natural marshland into sugar plantations.²¹⁶ Nearby, Anton Faye began to grow sugarcane in Mānā and W. Meier in Kekaha, diverting the Waimea River to water their plantations as the area lacked the necessary rainfall to keep pace with the sugar demand.²¹⁷ Combining the three companies, the Kekaha Sugar Company under the management of Otto Isenberg was formed in 1898. By the end of 1931, the Kekaha Sugar Company altered around 3000 acres of marshland for sugar production, disturbing the natural waterways and habitats of native animals.²¹⁸

Off the coast of Kaua‘i, Ni‘ihau is nicknamed the Forbidden Island due to the isolationist policy placed by the Robinson family, restricting visitors from entering unless given permission from the private landowners.²¹⁹ The eighteen mile long and six mile wide island has an area of around seventy-three square miles and is technically part of Kaua‘i county.²²⁰ There are several ‘ōlelo no‘eau associated with the island, including Ni‘ihau a Kahelelani (Ni‘ihau, land of

²¹⁴ Mike T. Carson, “Kona District,” *Na Mea Kahiko o Kaua‘i: Archaeological Studies in Kaua‘i*, no. 2 (2005), 44.

²¹⁵ “Kekaha Sugar Company History,” *Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association: Plantation Archives*, accessed May 15, 2026, https://www2.hawaii.edu/~speccoll/p_kekaha.html.

²¹⁶ Carson, 44.

²¹⁷ “Kekaha Sugar Company History.”

²¹⁸ Carson, 44.

²¹⁹ John R.K. Clark and Keao NeSmith, *Ni‘ihau Place Names* (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2023), xv.

²²⁰ Pukui, Elbert, and Mookini, 165.

Kahelelani), Ni‘ihau i ka uhi pahe‘e (Ni‘ihau of the slippery yam), and Ni‘ihau i ke kīkū (Ni‘ihau leans back firmly).^{221,222} Similarly, epithets, poetic sayings that distinguish a place or person, regarding Ni‘ihau were often scattered through nūpepa ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i or the Hawaiian language newspapers. Popular epithets include Ni‘ihau ka mokupuni kā‘ili lā (Ni‘ihau, the island that snatches the sun), Ni‘ihau i ka moena pāwehe (Ni‘ihau of the makaloa mat), and Ni‘ihau nei i mokupuni hana‘i‘o o na ka haole (Ni‘ihau, the island where foreigners truly work).^{223,224} Ni‘ihau has three moku named Puna, Kona, and Ko‘olau, and part of the PMRF is located in the ahupua‘a of ‘Ōku.^{225,226,227} Meaning to protrude, ‘Ōku is on the northeast of Ni‘ihau; however, not much is known about the ahupua‘a, and it is not a prominent name in the nūpepa.^{228,229}

Much of Ni‘ihau is described as arid and barren with little fresh water and an abundance of makaloa sedge that were weaved to create the aforementioned mats.²³⁰ These mats along with decorative gourds were utilized for trade with Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Kaua‘i, presumably in exchange

²²¹ Pukui, 252.

²²² Ni‘ihau a Kahelelani refers to the first ruler of Ni‘ihau. Ni‘ihau i ka uhi pahe‘e is in reference to the yams that Ni‘ihau was historically known for and written about in James Cook’s journals. Ni‘ihau i ke kīkū is about the independence of the Ni‘ihau people.

²²³ Clark and NeSmith, 60.

²²⁴ Ni‘ihau ka mokupuni kā‘ili lā means the island where the sun sets.

²²⁵ “Moku Maps,” *Department of Land and Natural Resources: Hawai‘i State Aha Moku*, accessed May 13, 2026, <https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/ahamoku/maps/>.

²²⁶ Pukui, Elbert, and Mookini, 169.

²²⁷ The map found on the Department of Land and Natural Resources labels the northern ahupua‘a as Okii, while Pukui, Elbert, and Mookini’s *Place Names of Hawai‘i* refer to the area as ‘Ōkū. For this paper, I will stick with the name utilized by Pukui, Elbert, and Mookini as I have been utilizing the book for all of the backgrounds of the examined areas.

²²⁸ Pukui, Elbert, and Mookini, 169.

²²⁹ Clark and NeSmith, 1.

²³⁰ Handy, Handy, and Pukui, 279.

for poi.²³¹ When Western imperialists started to frequent the shores of Ni‘ihau and Kaua‘i, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau would also trade their yams and sweet potatoes to the haole.

Before his death in 1863, Kamehameha IV sold Ni‘ihau to haole private landowners, named the Sinclairs, for \$10,000 in gold.^{232,233} His successor Kamehameha V unfortunately finalized the sale of Ni‘ihau to the Sinclairs on January 23, 1864 with the advisement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Crichton Wyllie; however, because Kamehameha IV’s funeral service was on February 3, the sale of the island was not highly publicized in Hawaiian or English newspapers until news regarding the deal circulated around late May and early June.^{234,235} Many Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau were shocked and rightfully upset about the sale by the royal family, prompting Kamehameha V to visit Ni‘ihau and speak to residents on June 2, 1864. The Sinclair family then began their construction of a sheep ranch on the island, forcefully evicting Kanaka ‘Ōiwi off their land. In a letter sent to Ka Nūpepa Kuokoa in 1865, a Kanaka resident of Ni‘ihau named E.K. Wahinealoha described the dispossession of their land by the Sinclairs:

What’s more is that foreigners truly work here on Ni‘ihau. In the month of September the foreigners behaved aggressively toward the people of Ki‘i, Lehua, Keawanui, Halulu, Waima‘e, and Kaununu and evicted them. [They told them] to move to Kaua‘i, so they don’t continue living on the land of the foreigners. When the people did not go, the foreigners appealed to the District Judge of Waimea and Ni‘ihau, J. Kaua‘i, and they were tried. In the right thinking of the judge, he issued his decision that in one month they should go and take all of their belongings: horses, pigs, chickens, canoes, and so forth; But they did not go, owing to the love they had for the island. They are not outsiders, but rather locals of the land. This is their birth place, their patch of parched earth, their patch of shrubbery, and since they loved their land, they obeyed, but pleaded

²³¹ Handy, Handy, and Pukui, 279.

²³² Kamehameha IV also goes by Alexander Liholiho.

²³³ Clark and NeSmith, 69-70.

²³⁴ Kamehameha V also goes by Lot Kapuāiwa.

²³⁵ Clark and NeSmith, 70.

to the foreigners that they would show kindness. But they did not listen to them at all.^{236,237,238}

Thus, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau were treated as foreigners and forced to leave their own familial lands by the Sinclair’s. A prime example of settler colonialism, the Sinclair family along with the Hawaiian Kingdom which, at this point, was controlled by haole businessmen ignored the concerns of Kanaka. Valdemar Knudsen, the Norwegian settler who led the creation of the Kekaha Sugar Company also eagerly aided the Sinclair’s with their settler colonial project, acting as an ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i interpreter.^{239,240,241}

Additionally, sea island cotton was introduced and produced by the Sinclair’s on the land they newly acquired from the evictions described by Wahinealoha.²⁴² Planted by the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau that were not forcefully expelled from their land, the cotton was sold by the Sinclair’s in Honolulu, and profits were split between the Kanaka who planted and harvested the

²³⁶ E.K. Wahinealoha to the editors of Nupepa Kuokoa, February 2 1865, in *Ni‘ihau Place Names* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2023), 77.

²³⁷ The letter was translated from ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i to English by Keao NeSmith.

²³⁸ The article in which this letter is found has the ‘ōlelo no‘eau “Hana‘i‘o ka haole” repeated five times throughout it. “Hana‘i‘o ka haole” means “the white man does it in earnest,” in reference to the haole who had Kanaka ‘Ōiwi arrested for trespassing on their ancestral lands. Additionally, Wahinealoha wrote “Eia hou no kiea [sic. keia] hanaio o ka haole ia Ni‘ihau nei, [keia] hanaio o ka haole ia Ni‘ihau nei” translated to “what’s more is that foreigners truly work here on Ni‘ihau. As mentioned in this section regarding popular epithets in the nūpepa, this phrase, at first glance, seems to carry a positive connotation of haole work ethics. However, in the context of Wahinealoha’s letter, the phrase is utilized to describe the haole aggressive behavior shown towards the people of Ni‘ihau. In October of 1865, the Sinclairs appealed to a judge to try a group of Kanaka from Ni‘ihau who refused to leave their land, some earning fines from \$0.25 to \$0.75. As explained further in the letter, around 260 Kanaka who were living in those areas specified by Wahinealoha were evicted and forced to leave to Kaua‘i.

²³⁹ Ruth M. Tabrah, *Ni‘ihau: The Last Hawaiian Island* (Kailua: Press Pacifica, 1987), 101-102.

²⁴⁰ Valdemar Knudson eventually marries within the Sinclair family to Anne Sinclair, the youngest of Elizabeth Sinclair who purchased Ni‘ihau.

²⁴¹ I do not subscribe to the beliefs or perspectives of Tabrah, and I tried hard not to utilize her as a citation. However, she does have some history of the sale of Ni‘ihau that I cannot find elsewhere, so I am citing her for that purpose.

²⁴² Clark and NeSmith, 85.

cotton and the haole family. One resident named Philip Holi-o-Hana of Halawela, Ni‘ihau described the production as “good work,” but shared his sadness of the lack of his own people on the islands and the future of Ni‘ihau:

Most of the land is for the sheep of the foreigners, which will not likely flourish in the coming years. Ni‘ihau is desolate, and there are no people. Sheep and cattle are the people of Ni‘ihau. Poor Ni‘ihau.²⁴³

Hali-o-Hana’s letter to the nūpepa demonstrated not only the aftermath of the evictions, but it also illustrated the complicated relationship many Kanaka ‘Ōiwi had and continue to have with the Sinclair’s or Robinson’s. While the haole family displaced Kanaka ‘Ōiwi from their land, they also provided economic opportunities for Kanaka that created a relationship of dependence that was akin to the relationship between the people of Hawai‘i and the military and tourism industries.²⁴⁴ As the landowners established themselves on the island, Aubrey Robinson, the grandson of Elizabeth Sinclair, eventually closed all visitors of Ni‘ihau in 1915 and required special permission from the family to visit, gaining the popular nickname “the forbidden island.”²⁴⁵

History of the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF)

²⁴³ Philip R. Holi-o-Hana to the editors of Nupepa Kuokoa, April 20, 1865 in *Ni‘ihau Place Names* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2023), 85.

²⁴⁴ The Robinsons eventually abandoned their sheep and cattle industry in 1999, so many Kanaka of Ni‘ihau were laid off. Many Kanaka Maoli moved to west Kaua‘i, namely Kekaha, to find greater economic opportunity.

Christine Hitt, “Keepers of the Flame: How Cultural Practitioners Are Preserving Ni‘ihau’s Unique Traditions,” *Hawai‘i Magazine*, May 12, 2016, <https://www.hawaiimagazine.com/keepers-of-the-flame-how-cultural-practitioners-are-preserving-niihaus-unique-traditions/>.

²⁴⁵ Treena Shapiro, “‘Forbidden Island’ Kept in Family,” *Star-Bulletin*, October 29, 1999, accessed May 15, 2026, <https://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/10/29/news/story9.html>.

Part of the expansive PMRF, Barking Sands was first obtained by the Kekaha Sugar Company from the Knudsen family in 1921 to be utilized as a runway.²⁴⁶ The runway, which would later be known as Mānā Airport and then Barking Sands Air Base, was purchased by the U.S. Army in 1940, along with 549 acres of land.²⁴⁷ In June of 1941, the U.S. Army then obtained an additional 1509 acres in the area that would be heavily utilized during World War II.

During the height of the Cold War, the PMRF and its function drastically expanded, and its importance to national security and defense became clear. In 1964, the U.S. military signed multiple sixty-five year leases.²⁴⁸ The leases included 391.65 acres in the PMRF main base, 7680 acres offshore, 88.83 acres in Kamokala Ridge, .29 acres for a water well, 203.1 acres in Mākaha Ridge, .015 acres in Mil‘oli‘i Ridge, and 1,167 acres in the Test Vehicle Land Recovery Site in Ni‘ihau.^{249,250} In 1966, the U.S. Army transferred the entirety of the base to the U.S. Navy, officially renamed the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands.²⁵¹ As the Navy took full control of the PMRF, the base upgraded its facilities and capabilities. These efforts included the addition of radar in Mākaha Ridge and a field of hydrophones in the ocean between Kaua‘i and

²⁴⁶ “Mana Airport/Barking Sands Airport,” *Hawai‘i Aviation: An Archive of Historic Photos and Facts*, accessed May 15, 2026, <https://aviation.hawaii.gov/airfields-airports/kauai/mana-airportbarking-sands-airport/>.

²⁴⁷ “Mana Airport/Barking Sands Airport.”

²⁴⁸ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, *Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan* (Honolulu: Camp H.M. Smith, 2021), 9.

²⁴⁹ The 7680-acre offshore lease of the PMRF is called the Ocean Right of Way lease.

²⁵⁰ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 9.

²⁵¹ “Mana Airport/Barking Sands Airport.”

Ni‘ihau.^{252,253,254} The Navy also utilized the ocean as a training area for war game operations and other testings. During the 1980s, the construction and upgrading of drone launch sites were a frequent occurrence at the expansive base.

Ni‘ihau and National Defense in the Late 1990s

Around the late 1990s, conversations surrounding the utilization of Ni‘ihau as an expansion to the PMRF for missile tests occur frequently between the U.S. Navy and the Robinson family, giving the family full veto power over the extension instead of the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi residents of Ni‘ihau due to their ownership. The U.S. Navy was already leasing land for a \$1 a year on Ni‘ihau for their unmanned radar site site.^{255,256} Due to the very limited economic opportunities on the forbidden island beside the sheep and cattle ranch, military programs comprised the largest portion of the revenue in Ni‘ihau.²⁵⁷ Despite the Robinson family’s reluctance for visitors in general, they were rather willing and collaborative with the U.S. Navy and often framed their reluctance to military presence due to the complaints of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of

²⁵² The construction of underwater hydrophones was part of the development of the Barking Sands Tactical Underwater Range (BASTUR). The 42 hydrophones cover an expansive 100-square-mile underwater area.

²⁵³ New constructed facilities at Mākaha Ridge were operational by 1969. The first facilities part of this series of construction included a missile assembly building, a cable terminal building, a meteorological launch pad, and two other launch pads for drones.

²⁵⁴ The U.S. Department of the Navy, *Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Cultural Landscape Report Final* (The U.S. Department of the Navy, 2011), https://cnrh.cnrc.navy.mil/Portals/79/PMRF_Barking_Sands/Documents/CLR%20Barking%20Sands%20Late%20Cold%20War%20Period-10.pdf?ver=AR6LwQS8-1gEMSnbqLMgbg%3d%3d.

²⁵⁵ Gregg K. Kakesako, “Ni‘ihau Is an Important Part of Navy’s Plans,” *Star-Bulletin*, June 13, 1997, <https://georgehbalazs.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/1997-Niihau-Navy-Missile-Testing-Newspaper-Articles..pdf>.

²⁵⁶ The lease was created in 1964 along with the other land leases obtained by the U.S. military from the State of Hawai‘i.

²⁵⁷ Jan TenBruggencate, “Navy May Expand at Ni‘ihau,” *The Honolulu Advertiser*, June 13, 1997, <https://georgehbalazs.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/1997-Niihau-Navy-Missile-Testing-Newspaper-Articles.pdf>.

Ni‘ihau. In a 1997 newspaper article, Bruce Robinson, one of the landowners, said that his family has learned from past experiences to “consult [the] Island elders” due to past criticisms by Kanaka residents on the island.^{258,259}

Though an agreement was reached between the U.S. Navy, State of Hawai‘i, and the U.S. President’s Advisory Council on Historic Preservation for the utilization of Ni‘ihau as a PMRF testing site, Keith Robinson, the brother of Bruce and co-landowner of the island, rejected the use of Ni‘ihau; however, the family was not concerned over the potential environmental impacts, but rather the state’s archaeological survey that was implemented to protect “culturally significant sites.”²⁶⁰ When the archaeological inspection was mentioned in conversation between the parties, Keith Robinson adamantly argued, “We’ve said all along if they go ahead with this agreement, we’re out” and that they were fearful of “ethnographic studies” that would “find their way into the hands of militant native Hawaiians who then will claim a right to move to Ni‘ihau.”²⁶¹ Another newspaper article demonstrated the stark contrast between the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) and the Robinson family’s reasoning to stop the proposed missile testing on Ni‘ihau. The OHA asserted that the President’s Advisory Council on Historic Preservation did not properly consider the environmental and cultural importance that Ni‘ihau

²⁵⁸ TenBruggencate.

²⁵⁹ To further complicate the relationship between the Robinson’s and the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi in Ni‘ihau, Bruce Robinson is married to a Native Hawaiian woman from Ni‘ihau. Bruce Robinson has repeatedly spoken about his commitment and preservation of the community and culture on the island as mentioned in the interviews he has done. Due to his positionality as a settler and landowner as well as the ways he has managed the island with his brother Keith, Ni‘ihau and land back in the context of the forbidden island are extremely complex and nuanced.

Carla Herreria, “A Glimpse Inside Hawaii’s ‘Forbidden Island,’” *Honolulu Civil Beat*, July 22, 2015, <https://www.civilbeat.org/2015/07/a-glimpse-inside-hawaiis-forbidden-island/>.

²⁶⁰ Anthony Sommer, “Robinsons Reject Use of Ni‘ihau for Missile Tests,” *Star-Bulletin*, March 19, 1999.

²⁶¹ Sommer, “Robinsons Reject Use of Ni‘ihau for Missile Tests.”

carries for Kanaka ‘Ōiwi living in Ni‘ihau and off island.²⁶² In contrast, Keith Robinson again commented on his fear “that, if any artifacts are found, militant native Hawaiian groups [would] claim a right to come to Ni‘ihau and camp on their private property without permission.”

While these conversations between the three parties occurred, concerns escalated over military defense capabilities and ballistic missile systems of foreign enemies. In particular, on August 16, 1998, North Korea, under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, launched a satellite called Taepodong-1 that displayed the country’s long-range missile capabilities to the world.²⁶³ Because of heightened relations and the U.S. propoganda machine, ballistic missile defense became an imperative for lawmakers, prompting the creation of the National Missile Defense of 1999. Sponsored by House Representative Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, the bill H.R. 4 enacted and appropriated funds for a national defense system.²⁶⁴ The act reads:

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as possible an effective National Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authroization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.²⁶⁵

One of the supporters of the bill and member of the House Armed Services Committee was U.S. House of Representative Neil Abercrombie, a haole settler from New York.²⁶⁶ In a response

²⁶² Anthony Sommer, “OHA Has a Problem with Navy Using Ni‘ihau as Launch Site,” *Star-Bulletin*, February 5, 1999, <https://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/02/05/news/story12.html>.

²⁶³ Selig S. Harrison, “The Missiles of North Korea: How Real a Threat?” *World Policy Journal* 17, no. 3 (2000): 19.

²⁶⁴ *An act to declare it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense*, Public Law 106-38, U.S. Statute at Large 113 (1999).

²⁶⁵ Public Law 106-38.

²⁶⁶ Neil Abercrombie moved to Hawai‘i to obtain his masters in sociology and doctorate in American Studies. In 1974, he began his career in politics as a Hawai‘i State House of Representative. He currently serves in the Office of the Board of Regents at the University of Hawai‘i.

letter back to a concerned constituent dated April 23, 1999, Abercrombie defended his support for H.R. 4 and reiterated the looming missile capabilities of enemies of the U.S..²⁶⁷ Furthermore, he maintained that the expansion of the PMRF, specifically an extension missile defense in Ni‘ihau, would situate the U.S. as the leader in theater missile defense.

Thus, the proposed plans for Ni‘ihau, the conversations surrounding the proposal, the differing attitudes towards the agreement, and H.R. 4 are examples of the U.S. imperial project, surveillance and hypervisibility, settler colonialism, and the attack on Kanaka ‘Ōiwi sovereignty by multiple actors. First, conversations surrounding the proposal for missile testing in Ni‘ihau in 1997 to early 1999 occurred solely between the U.S. military and the Robinson family. Though the Robinson family claimed that they heeded advice from the Kanaka elders of Ni‘ihau, and though the Navy held public hearings regarding the ballistic defense program in Kaua‘i, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi were largely left out and were not at the center of these negotiations.²⁶⁸ Instead, the family were given sole priority and veto power over the proposal. Moreover, the recommended extension of missile testing in Ni‘ihau revealed the ways in which federal, state, and private actors collude to mutually benefit each other. Despite the strict visitation rules enforced by the Robinson’s, the family was readily cooperative and willing to allow the U.S. military to have further access to the island. Even the state government excluding the OHA, advocated for the military expansion in Ni‘ihau as the U.S. military presented job opportunities for civilians.

“Neil Abercrombie,” *University of Hawai‘i*, accessed July 16, 2026, <https://hawaii.edu/about/neil-abercrombie>.

²⁶⁷ Neil Abercrombie to Michael Jones, April 23, 1999, University of Hawai‘i Hamilton Library.

²⁶⁸ Star-Bulletin Staff, “Four Hearings on Kaua‘i, O‘ahu,” *Star-Bulletin*, <https://georgehbalazs.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/1997-Niihau-Navy-Missile-Testing-Newspaper-Articles..pdf>

Hawai‘i Governor Ben Cayetano also publicized his support for the extension, arguing that other revenues like tourism would not benefit the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau.²⁶⁹

Additionally, the Robinson’s reaction to the archaeological survey exposes the ways in which settler colonialists aim to replace the Indigenous population whose land they invade. In interviews with local newspapers, Keith Robinson repeatedly divulged his fears of “militant” Native Hawaiians who would “invade” their island to claim as their own, acting as if the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi were foreigners to the land they have ancestral relations to.²⁷⁰ The ironic and specific word of militant to characterize Kanaka ‘Ōiwi who advocate for sovereignty paint them as a violent and aggressive group of individuals who are unreasonable in their desire for land back. The Robinson family also repeatedly frame themselves as sole “protectors” of Ni‘ihau and its inhabitants, even when they were willing to lend a portion of the island to the military for missile testing. As supposed guardians of the island, the family also compelled Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau to be dependent on either them or the U.S. military as the sole employers and means for a salary. Thus, the forceful reliance on these entities further necessitates the foreign presence on the island.

Lastly, it is clear that the U.S. government and military were utilizing North Korea’s Taepodong-1 as means to justify increased national defense measure in the Pacific. Despite U.S. intelligence reports that North Korean nuclear missiles post-Taepodong-1 would be incapable of reaching a U.S. territory, the House of Representatives, including House of Representative Neil Abercrombie, concluded on a bipartisan level that the threat was lofty enough to expand the

²⁶⁹ Star Bulletin Staff.

²⁷⁰ Sommer, “OHA Has a Problem with Navy Using Ni‘ihau as Launch Site.”

PMRF.²⁷¹ One could also argue that posturing as the leader in missile defense would lead to a greater target on the U.S. and specifically the islands of Kaua‘i and Ni‘ihau. Moreover, the extension of the PMRF would not only further the dispossession of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi land, but it would also further bolster the surveillance of the U.S. military in the Pacific and beyond.

Senate Resolution 6

Entering into a new century, the overall desire for increased defense remained at the forefront of the country’s agenda. In a 2000 *Washington Post* op-ed titled “Making Defense a Non-Issue,” the author highlighted Bill Clinton’s decision to increase defense spending by \$12 billion in 2000 and an additional \$110 billion over the next six years.²⁷² Bridging parties together on the issue, the author claimed that Clinton’s willingness to increase the defense budget demonstrated “that fortuitous circumstances permit us to seek out a realistic middle course that countenances more spending but with eyes open and not with a foot to the floor.”²⁷³ A couple months after Clinton’s State of the Union address, the Senate of the Twentieth Legislature of the State of Hawai‘i introduced and eventually passed Senate Resolution No. 6 titled “Supporting a Missile Defense System for Hawai‘i.”²⁷⁴ In heeding the warning from the U.S. Congressional Ballistic Missile Threat Commission that the U.S. could face a serious missile attack in the next five years, the resolution called for the establishment of an effective defense system as “the

²⁷¹ Harrison, 19.

²⁷² Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “Making Defense a Non-Issue,” *The Washington Post*, 2000.

²⁷³ Rosenfield.

²⁷⁴ Hawai‘i State Legislature, Senate, *Supporting a Missile Defense System for Hawai‘i*, 20th Legislature, S.R. 6.

central Pacific location of Hawai‘i is made more vulnerable with increasing technology and range of missiles from potentially aggressive governments.”²⁷⁵

For the fiscal 2001 federal budget, \$55 million was allotted to the PMRF’s Operations and Support alone.²⁷⁶ From 1997 to 2001, the PMRF received an excess of \$500 million. Because of the federal government’s financial attention to the PMRF, the Hawai‘i State Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism even cited the PMRF as a source that aided Hawai‘i’s move into a “technology-driven, New Economy” in a report.²⁷⁷ Directed by Dr. Seiji Naya, a Japanese settler who moved to Hawai‘i in the 1950s from Japan, the Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism prioritized federal funding in Hawai‘i via the U.S. military in 2001.²⁷⁸ Within the report, the director’s message briefly mentioned the concerns over environmental harm caused by the U.S. military; however, Naya emphasized the supposed advantages of U.S. military presence and spending in Hawai‘i, explaining that “the military has been a good neighbor in Hawai‘i, giving generously of its time and resources to help charities, community activities and even in providing emergency medical evacuations on a day-to-day basis.”²⁷⁹ The report also highlighted private corporations also involved in the technology upgrade and advancement of the PMRF including ITT, Sandia Labs, MIT-Lincoln Labs, Boeing, DSR, Strategic Technology Institute Inc. (STI), Science

²⁷⁵ S.R. 6.

²⁷⁶ Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism, “Federal Activity and Hawaii’s New Economy,” July 2001, https://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/economic/data_reports/federal/fr07-01r.pdf.

²⁷⁷ Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism.

²⁷⁸ “Family Placed Obituary: Dr. Seiji Naya,” *Star Advertiser*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://obits.staradvertiser.com/2016/09/18/dr-seiji-naya/>.

²⁷⁹ Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism.

Applications International Corporation (SAIC), Textron Systems, TREX Enterprises, Oceanit Labs, Solipsys Corporation, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin.²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ ITT Inc. is a manufacturing company that specializes in reconnaissance and surveillance systems, including the ALR-95(V) maritime Patrol ESM System, ES-5080 Wideband Digital Receiver Based ELINT/ESM System, ES-3601 Tactical Radar ESM and Surveillance System, and ES-3701 Precision Radar ESM/ELINT System. They also claim to be a leader in defense surveillance radars. Sandia National Laboratories aim to discover technology solutions that bolster U.S. national security. Sandia is also in charge of the U.S. defense's nuclear arsenal, ensuring the capabilities of the current nuclear stockpile. MIT-Lincoln Labs develop technologies to ensure and aid national security. Lincoln Labs operate multiple radars called the Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex for surveillance purposes, including Millstone Hill Radar, Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR), and Haystack Auxiliary Radar (HAX). Boeing is extremely involved with the U.S. military as weapons, fighters, and bombers manufacturers. They also develop aircrafts specialized in reconnaissance and surveillance. Strategic Technology Institute Inc. (STI) is a "minority owned small disadvantaged business" whose clients include the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Battlespace, Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Naval Surface Warfare Center, NASA, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) specialize in IT and cyber defense, and Textron Systems is a defense development and manufacturing company. TREX Enterprises produce imaging and communications technology, and Oceanit Labs is a lab and engineering firm that often partner with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Part of Collins Aerospace, Solipsys which was later acquired by Raytheon operate a battlespace command and control center that has a Mutli-Source Correlator Tracker (MSCT) and MCST Display. Northrop Grumman is an aerospace defense company that supplies the U.S. military with aeronautics, satellites, and weapons. Lastly, Lockheed Martin is a weapons and aerospace manufacturer for the U.S. military and its allies.

"About Us," *Naval Technology*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.naval-technology.com/contractors/sonar/itt/>.

"Stockpile Stewardship," *Sandia National Laboratories*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.sandia.gov/missions/nuclear-weapons/>.

"Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex," *Lincoln Laboratory*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.ll.mit.edu/about/facilities/lincoln-space-surveillance-complex>.

"Defense," *Boeing*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.boeing.com/defense>.

"Clients," *Strategic Technology Institute Inc.*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.sti-inc.com/clients/>.

"Defense," *SAIC*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.saic.com/who-we-serve/defense>.

"About Textron Systems," *Textron Systems*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.textronsystems.com/our-company/about-textron-systems>.

"About," *TREX Enterprises Corporations*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.trexenterprises.com/about/>.

"Oceanit," *Oceanit*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://oceanit.com>.

"Battle Management: Solipsys Battlespace Command and Control Center (BC3)," *Collins Aerospace*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.rtx.com/collinsaerospace/what-we-do/industries/military-and-defense/battle-management/solipsys-battlespace-command-and-control-center-bc3>.

"The Facts," *Northrop Grumman*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.northropgrumman.com/who-we-are/the-facts>.

This report, particularly the director's message, demonstrates the collusion between the federal government, state department, and defense corporations. Naya, who is a Japanese settler, emphasizes the benefits of military presence in Hawai'i due to its economic and job opportunities. An example of how Asian settlers aid U.S. empire and also perpetuate settler colonialism, Naya not only advocates for further military occupation, but also gives credit to Senator Daniel Inouye, another infamous Japanese settler, who helped orchestrate federal initiatives and funding in Hawai'i. Additionally, the private corporations that gained access to Hawai'i because of their defense technologies furthers the surveillance state in the Pacific. Positioning Hawai'i as a panoptic arm of the U.S. military, these corporations, who specialize in weapons of mass destruction and surveillance technologies, strengthen their own profits and aid the U.S. military in its occupation in Hawai'i and its Indo-Pacific Command.

Navy Getaways and Barking Sands Beach Cottages

In addition to the PMRF's operations as a missile defense base, the area also offers private beach cottages as vacation rentals for active duty, military retirees, reservists, NAF employees, Department of Defense civilians, and their sponsored guests.^{281,282} Marketed as a "relaxing getaway" and "family vacation" the Barking Sands Beach Cottages are incidentally right below the main administrative and operations area for the facility.²⁸³

"Accelerating Transformation," *Lockheed Martin*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/accelerating-transformation.html>.

²⁸¹ "Navy Getaways - RV Parks, Campgrounds and Vacation Rentals FAQ," *Department of Defense Lodging*, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://get.dodlodging.net/Faq.aspx>.

²⁸² NAF employees stand for nonappropriated fund employees. It is federal civil service occupations that are not funded by appropriations made by Congress, but rather are self-generated. For instance, employees of on-base bowl centers and golf courses are considered NAF employees.

"About Us," *USAF NAF Jobs*, accessed July 16, 2026, <https://www.nafjobs.org/about.aspx>.

²⁸³ *Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaiian Area, Barking Sands, Kekaha, HI*, University of North Texas Libraries, accessed May 16, 2025, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc27779/m1/422/>.

Offering RV parks, campgrounds, and vacation rentals, Navy Getaways provides competitive lodging rates for over fifty-three locations around the world, including international stays in Japan and Italy.²⁸⁴ Navy Getaways is part of the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) program, which provides military servicemen and their families recreational and leisure activities.²⁸⁵ In fact, informal MWR programs existed from the American Revolutionary War; however, the MWR was not formally created until July 1940 by the Adjunct General's Office and named the Morale Division.²⁸⁶ Post-World War II saw the establishment of recreation programs, and in 1953, the War Department implemented funding for MWR activities.^{287,288} Besides the brief history of the MWR programs, little is known about the origins of Navy Getaways and its beach cottages.

The PMRF has eleven two-bedroom, one-bath ocean front cottages, twelve two-bedroom, one-bath ocean view cottages, and one three-bedroom, two-bath duplex north of their main recreation area and south of the administrative and operations area and launch pads (Figure 12 and 13).²⁸⁹ The cottages offer a clear view of Ni'ihau and Waiapua'a Bay or Majors Bay, a rather

²⁸⁴ "Navy Getaways - RV Parks, Campgrounds and Vacation Rentals," *Official U.S. Navy Website*, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://ffr.cnrc.navy.mil/Fleet-Readiness/Lodging/Navy-Getaways-RV-Parks-Campgrounds-Vacation-Rentals/>.

²⁸⁵ "About Morale, Welfare and Recreation: Supporting the Military Community," *Military One Source*, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://www.militaryonesource.mil/military-basics/extended-family-friend/about-mwr-morale-welfare-and-recreation/>.

²⁸⁶ Joanne Marshall-Mies, David Westhuis, and Richard Fafara, "U.S. Army Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Programmes: Links to Readiness and Retention," *Res Militaris* 1, no. 3 (2011): 1-2.

²⁸⁷ Marshall-Mies, Westhuis, and Fafara, 2.

²⁸⁸ "History of Military Recreation Programs," *Military One Source*, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://www.militaryonesource.mil/leaders-service-providers/morale-welfare-and-recreation/history-of-military-recreation-programs/>.

²⁸⁹ "Navy Getaways Barking Sands," *Department of Defense Lodging*, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://get.dodlodging.net/property/Navy-Getaways-Barking-Sands>.

dangerous beach due to its strong current and high surf.^{290,291} The MWR Travel Connections markets the cottages as a paradise and escape from the buzz of O‘ahu.²⁹² Other recreational activities offered by the facility include a navy exchange, fitness center, softball field, tennis court, racquetball court, outdoor movie theater, and Shenanigans restaurant and bar.



Figure 12. Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Barking Sands Recreation Map from U.S. Navy Website Commander Navy Installations Command²⁹³

²⁹⁰ “Sailor Dies After Rescuing His Child Struggling in High Surf,” *Hawai‘i News Now*, November 4, 2025, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2025/11/25/sailor-dies-after-rescuing-children-struggling-high-surf/>.

²⁹¹ Despite the strong current and related death to the beach, the PMRF website still markets the beaches in Kaua‘i as “pristine” and “heavenly.”

²⁹² “Beach Cottages at PMRF,” *U.S. Navy Website Commander, Navy Installations Command*, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://pmrf.greatlifeohawaii.com/navy-getaways/beach-cottages-at-pmrf>.

²⁹³ *Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Barking Sands Recreation Map*, 2004, Harrington Publishing, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://pmrf.greatlifeohawaii.com/navy-getaways/beach-cottages-at-pmrf>.




Figure - 3: Barking Sands Area Map

Figure 13. Barking Sands Area Map from University of North Texas Digital Library²⁹⁴

YouTube Tours, Hypervisibility/Invisibility, and the “Old Hawai‘i”

In reference to Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull’s scholarship on the semiotics of the military, U.S. military presence and operations, they argue, are exceptionally normalized and thus become naturalized on the islands.²⁹⁵ This process of naturalization involves “narratives of reassurance,” in which Hawai‘i can only survive with the economic opportunities and national

²⁹⁴ *Barking Sands Area Map*, in *Data Calls - Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaiian Area, Barking Sands, Kekaha, HI*, University of North Texas Libraries, accessed May 16, 2025, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc27779/m1/422/>.

²⁹⁵ Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i* (University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xiv-xv.

defense provided by the military.²⁹⁶ As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the PMRF, plans for its extension in Kaua‘i and Ni‘ihau, and the increased federal funding the facility received in the late 1990s were justified by propaganda of a potential foreign missile attack on the U.S. and the dependency on the U.S. military for income. National security discourse, as Ferguson and Turnbull explain, embrace the narratives of defense as stable, predictable, and reasonable.²⁹⁷ Thus, despite its violent operations, the PMRF is perceived as a benevolent neighbor, caring employer, and protector of Hawai‘i rather than an imperial and settler colonial institution.

Additionally, part of the PMRF’s public perception and overall favorable image in comparison to other militarized spaces in Hawai‘i is due to the military’s social media presence via its own account or the accounts of influencers, vloggers, and guests documenting their stay at the Barking Sands Beach Cottages. On Instagram, the U.S. military has a dedicated page for their MWR programs at the facility called *@pmrfmwr* that announces their activities for military families, special events opened to the public, and updates on Shenanigans restaurant and bar that can be accessed by anyone who obtains a MWR guest pass.^{298,299} Though the PMRF does not have its own YouTube channel, other accounts have provided glimpses of the base and cottages from a first-person perspective that both reinforces the normalization of the PMRF and vacation rentals within the base and demonstrates the base’s hypervisibility that also renders its morally repugnant operations invisible at first glance.

²⁹⁶ Ferguson and Turnbull, xv.

²⁹⁷ Ferguson and Turnbull, 79.

²⁹⁸ PMRF MWR (*@pmrfmwr*), Instagram, <https://www.instagram.com/pmrfmwr/>.

²⁹⁹ “MWR Guest Pass Program,” *U.S. Navy Website*, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://cnrh.cnrc.navy.mil/Installations/PMRF-Barking-Sands/Resources/MWR-Guest-Pass-Program/>.

In a YouTube video titled “DV Cottage, PMRF, Barking Sands, Kauai, 7-12-21,” the user @chipfields, a veteran who often films and posts travel content, gave a tour of one of the cottages named Hale Ali‘i.³⁰⁰ During the quick four minute and forty-three second video, Fields drives down the road to the cottage, films the the interior and exterior of the vacation rental, and gives a glimpse of Waiapua‘a Bay with a clear view of Ni‘ihau in the background. The cottage itself is decorated with wooden furniture, tropical duvets and paintings, and rugs with colorful monsteras (Figure 14). Facing the ocean, the open-air lanai or deck leads the guests right to the secluded beach and crystal blue waters that creates an illusion of isolation that most tourists would otherwise not experience on vacation in O‘ahu (Figure 14). Though there is no narration of the tour, someone in the background of the video can be heard saying in disbelief, “This is like...” and jokes, “I’m gonna stay an extra week after you guys leave [laughs]” to Fields.³⁰¹ The video ends with Fields walking out towards the beach again and filming the scenery. In the last seconds of the video, a lone woman can be seen with her blue beach umbrella, tanning in the sun with nobody around (Figure 14).³⁰²

³⁰⁰ Fields, “DV Cottage, PMRF, Barking Sands, Kaua‘i, 7-12-21,” YouTube, July 27, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_e28dz02d8&t=5s.

³⁰¹ Fields, “DV Cottage, PMRF, Barking Sands, Kaua‘i, 7-12-21,” 2:18 - 2:36.

³⁰² ields, “DV Cottage, PMRF, Barking Sands, Kaua‘i, 7-12-21,” 4:14 - 4:43.



Figure 14. Stills from the YouTube video "DV Cottage, PMRF, Barking Sands, Kaua'i, 7-12-21"³⁰³

With 7.5k views, the short video exhibits the perceived isolation the PMRF offers and reinforces the idea of the cottages as a tropical getaway for guests. While watching the tour, a viewer without knowledge of the PMRF would presumably be unaware that the cottages are located within the “world’s largest instrumented, multi-environment range, capable of simultaneously supporting surface, subsurface, air, and space operations.”³⁰⁴ Even guests who have some sort of relationship with the U.S. military would overlook that, to the right of their cottages, lies a 1,1000 square mile instrumented underwater range that has underwater tracking and communications capabilities up to 900 nautical miles and 6,000 to 15,000 feet deep.^{305,306} Additionally, with the tropical decorations and private beaches, guests are transported from the missile defense base to paradise vacation, normalizing the military’s presence and the obscure location of these cottages. Similar to Vernadette Gonzalez’s framing of the Interstate H-3 as an intersection of the U.S. military and tourism industry, the Barking Sands Beach Cottages also bare motifs of the “old Hawai‘i” that allows tourist to “experience” Hawai‘i before the mass development of places like Waikīkī.³⁰⁷ Simultaneously, while tourists vacation in a hypervisible militarized space that differs from the typical corporate hotel chains, the formation of this “old Hawai‘i” aesthetic erases the Kanaka Maoli that were present before settler invasion. The long history of violent settler colonialism and dispossession of Indigenous land from Captain James

³⁰³ Fields, “DV Cottage, PMRF, Barking Sands, Kaua‘i, 7-12-21.”

³⁰⁴ U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, *Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan* (Honolulu, HI: Camp H.M. Smith, 2021), 28.

³⁰⁵ “Installation Guide,” *Commander, Navy Region Hawai‘i*, accessed May 17, 2026, <https://cnrh.cnmc.navy.mil/Installations/PMRF-Barking-Sands/About/Installation-Guide/>.

³⁰⁶ “Underwater Training Range Refurbishment Complete,” *Naval Air Systems Command*, January 21, 2011, accessed May 18, 2026, <https://www.navair.navy.mil/node/16671>.

³⁰⁷ Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai‘i and the Philippines* (Duke University Press, 2013), 78.

Cook to the military is erased, and the land is transformed into a guest's fond memory of their exclusive trip to Kaua'i. Indeed, Ni'ihau is observed as a scenic landscape rather than island currently occupied by a haole rancher family and the U.S. Navy.

YouTube Video Reviews, Marketing Militarism, and Multiculturalist White Supremacy

Garnering 7,844 views, another popular video regarding the cottages by the travel and real estate content creator @realstaceyjohnson further illustrates the unsettling location of the vacation rentals and the hypervisibility and yet invisibility of the PMRF. Titled "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kauai," the video explores the "pros and cons of this Kaua'i getaway."³⁰⁸ Johnson starts the video with a gif of a white woman in a sombrero on a beach and gives a big "aloha" to her fellow wanderers," displaying short clips of Waiapua'a Bay and Ni'ihau.³⁰⁹ Before delving into the benefits and drawbacks of the cottages, she explains and films the different types of amenities the base has to offer from Shenanigans restaurant and bar to the beach supply rentals, quite aware and vocal of the fact that the vacation rental is in the middle of a large military base.³¹⁰ She also highlights the amenities provided within the cottages, giving the viewers a quick tour of the interior that closely resembles the tropical decor and wooden furniture of the cottage filmed by Chip Fields.

³⁰⁸ Stacey Johnson, "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua'i," YouTube, December 26, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3RUjGtGPNVs>.

³⁰⁹ Johnson, "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua'i," 0:00-0:23.

³¹⁰ Johnson, "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua'i," 1:12-2:50.

In her review of the stay, Johnson list three cons: the birds, the far location from nearby towns in Kaua‘i, and the heat.^{311,312} In addition to the PMRF’s distant location from the nearest town in Kaua‘i and the obvious heat at the beach, the base is also home to numerous birds, including the endemic nēnē and the endangered ‘u‘au and a‘o.^{313,314,315,316} Johnson’s frustration was due to the amount of birds there were and the noise they would make during the night and early mornings. However, Johnson’s overall perspective of her vacation was overwhelmingly positive, citing the beach front review, Shenanigans and its daily activities on base, naval exchange and fitness center, rental features, and general affordability as the advantages that made this rental distinctive to other resorts in Kaua‘i.³¹⁷ For a two-bed, one-bath beach front cottage, their total stay was around \$130 a night for two nights and three days.³¹⁸ Overall, Johnson argues that her stay was worth it as the cottages provided her and her partner an “escape from the hustle bustle and the regular grind” of everyday life.³¹⁹ Once again emphasizing the

³¹¹ Johnson mistakenly says that parts of the PMRF are a bird sanctuary. The PMRF rather coordinates with the U.S. Department of Agriculture Wildlife Services as birds like the albatross utilized the area for nesting and breeding.

“Preserving the Unique Ecosystem of Kaua‘i: Pacific Missile Range Facility, Partners Again Relocate Laysan Albatross,” *Kaua‘i Now*, April 2, 2026, accessed May 21, 2026, <https://kauainownews.com/2026/04/02/preserving-the-unique-ecosystem-of-kauai-pacific-missile-range-facility-partners-again-relocate-laysan-albatross/>.

³¹² Johnson, “Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua‘i,” 3:37-6:07.

³¹³ The nēnē is a goose, and it is the state bird of Hawai‘i.

³¹⁴ Hawaiian petrol.

³¹⁵ Newell’s shearwater.

³¹⁶ “Protecting Wildlife at PMRF,” *PMRF News*, accessed May 21, 2026, <https://pmrfkauai.com/Protecting-Wildlife-at-PMRF>.

³¹⁷ Johnson, “Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua‘i,” 6:12-7:24.

³¹⁸ Johnson also mentioned that price points vary depending on your occupation or relationship to the military and an individual’s rank if they are currently an officer.

³¹⁹ Johnson, “Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua‘i,” 9:24.

seclusion and privacy that the PMRF has to offer, she highlights the vacation's getaway feeling with "no service" and "no one bothering them" and recommends anyone who has a connection to the U.S. military to book a quick vacation at the Barking Sands Beach Cottages.³²⁰

³²⁰ Johnson, "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua'i," 9:42.




Figure 15. Stills from the YouTube video "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha Kaua'i"³²¹

³²¹ Johnson, "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua'i."

Similar to Field's video, Johnson's review of the Barking Sands Beach Cottages maintains the image of the location as some sort of remote or hidden getaway. Johnson herself even explains that the cottages offered her and her partner an "escape" from everyday life, labelling it as a "hidden gem."³²² Repeatedly acknowledging her awareness of the cottages within the PMRF, Johnson's video adds to a dissonance between the cottages as a vacation and the imperialist operations that take place within the PMRF.

Lastly, Johnson's video further demonstrates the hypervisibility of the PMRF that also renders their occupation in Kaua'i and the rest of the Pacific invisible to the viewer. Many of the clips shown in Johnson's video shows the military's occupation of Kaua'i from the vast amount of amenities provided by the base to the ocean view with Ni'ihau in the backdrop. Similar to Teresia Teaiwa's argument that the bikini's hypervisibility conceals nuclear testing in the Bikini Islands, I contend that the Barking Sands Beach Cottages act as a veil from the imperial operations that take place on Kaua'i, Ni'ihau, and the Pacific Ocean. These practice operations not only contribute to the violent imperialist efforts by the U.S., but they also are utilized to benefit other settler states like Israel and Japan.³²³ Thus, despite its perceived non-hostile and tropical getaway characterization, the PMRF is an epicenter for destructive and violent settler states to improve their abilities of occupying and murdering Indigenous peoples around the world that is largely invisible to the viewers of these YouTube videos.

PMRF and Barking Sands – Missiles in Paradise

³²² Johnson, "Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua'i." 9:24.

³²³ Aegis warships that practice off the shore of the PMRF are sent to Israel and Japan, as well as Guam and parts of Europe, for "defense purposes."

"Aegis Warships: The Golden Standard." *Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance*, March 6, 2025, accessed May 25, 2026, <https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alerts/aegis-warships-the-golden-standard/>.

Both Kaua‘i and Ni‘ihau have been sites of intense settler colonialism by the federal government and private actors like the Robinson family. During the late 1990s, there was a significant increase of interest in national security and defense, placing Kaua‘i as a shield of the continental U.S. and panoptic entity in the Pacific. In addition to the expansion of funding for missile defense in Hawai‘i, federal officials desired to further military occupation in Ni‘ihau, leading to conversations that excluded Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau. Though the proposed expansion was denied, these discussions exposed the complicated relationship that Kanaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau have with the Robinson family and demonstrated the ways in which settler colonialists aim to replace the Indigenous populations of whose land they occupy.

Moreover, the Barking Sands Beach Cottages are an additional layer of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i and further normalize U.S. military occupation in Kaua‘i. As demonstrated by the YouTube videos, the cottages generate a fantasy for tourists with ties to the military. Like the Ritz-Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort, the cottages transport the tourist into a perceived secluded paradise that is an escape from everyday life. However, unlike visitors at Turtle Bay Resort, tourists vacationing at the cottages are very aware of the getaway’s location and relationship to the base. Its looming presence and hypervisibility in the videos simultaneously render the base’s violent operations and even its purpose invisible to both the viewer of the YouTube video and the visitors themselves. Marketing a clean war aesthetic, these interactions with the base normalizes the U.S. military and their presence in the Pacific.

Conclusion

Though operationalized differently, the case studies of Kahuku Training Area and Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) share similar reflections in the convergence of militarism and tourism in Hawai‘i, as well as the collusion of private actors, state government, and the federal government. At first glance, the PMRF is seemingly hypervisible in comparison to Kahuku Training Area; however, upon closer examination, the PMRF’s hypervisibility lends to its and its operations invisibility. Throughout this thesis, the following questions were addressed: (1) how does land ownership transfer overtime, and how does the history of that land become erased as military and tourist presence expand in Hawai‘i?; (2) how do Asian settlers exploit their position in government to benefit their own business ventures and further create a reliance on militarized and tourist economies?; (3) how do tourist destinations either conceal or highlight the U.S. military?; and (4) how can the digital space be sites or tools of resistance against military occupation in Hawai‘i?

First, in Chapter I, I explained how the 50th Statehood Act transferred “ceded” lands, which were stolen crown lands, from the federal to state government. Sixty-five year leases made by the State of Hawai‘i for the U.S. military led to the leased areas in Pōhakuloa, the PMRF, Mākua Valley, Kawaihoa-Poamoho, and Kahuku. In addition to the occupation of Kahuku by the U.S. military, James Campbell Estate led to the establishment of the Ritz-Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort. Before his death, Campbell purchased 15,000 acres in Kahuku from H.A. Widemann and Julius L. Richardson. After the creation of the estate, his trustees leased a portion of Kahuku to Del Webb Corporation and Prudential for the development of Kuilima Resort Hotel and Country Club, now known as Turtle Bay Resort. Thus, through my inquiry of land transfer, I demonstrate how much of the history and significant cultural sites of Kahuku is erased through occupation.

Because of Kahuku Training Area's invisibility and the strategic marketing of Turtle Bay Resort, parts of Kahuku become empty land and generate a fantasy of a secluded playground for tourists to immerse themselves in a pseudo-spiritual world. Additionally, the resort's golf course that is situated on the ahupua'a of Hanakaoe and 'O'io erases the mo'olelo of Waikāne, utilizing the water to maintain the grass that tourists play on. In Chapter III, I explicated the long history of settler colonialism in Kaua'i from Captain Cook to the Kekaha Sugar Company to the current military occupation. The dredging and alteration of the once abundant wetlands of Mānā completely altered the land and its characteristics that are associated with mo'olelo and 'ōlelo no'eau. Additionally, I also explained how Ni'ihau was purchased by the Sinclair, later the Robinson family, by Kamehameha IV for \$10,000. The Robinson's occupation of Ni'ihau and the conversations the family had with the U.S. military rendered the claims to Ni'ihau that Kanaka 'Ōiwi have invisible.

In scrutinizing Asian settler colonialism in Hawai'i, I illustrated how Asian settlers created a further reliance on the U.S. military and tourism for the economy to largely benefit their own economic ventures. In Chapter I, I showed how Asian politicians from Hawai'i were instrumental in the push for Hawai'i statehood and the transfer of "ceded" lands to the state government. I also listed the Asian Democrat politicians that held positions in James Campbell Estate, which was instrumental in real estate and hotel development. In a 1969 Land Use Commission meeting, A69-211, which would transform 220 acres of land from agriculture to urban purposes, was passed unsurprisingly due to the fact that many of these commissioners were actively engaging in development ventures outside of their political responsibilities. Moreover, in Chapter III, I showed how Asian settlers, like Dr. Seiji Naya of the Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism and Senator Daniel Inouye, were pivotal in orchestrating

the increase of federal defense funding to militarized spaces, including the Pacific Missile Range Facility. The increase of funding was part of an initiative to push Hawai‘i into a “technology-driven, New Economy.”

Additionally, I illustrated how tourist destinations like Ritz-Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort and Barking Sands Beach Cottages render the U.S. military invisible, hypervisible, or both. In Chapter II, I showed how Turtle Bay is marketed as secluded and isolated to reinforce the Ritz-Carlton’s luxury status. Instead of a militarized space, Kahuku Training Area is transformed by the Ritz-Carlton into untouched land. In contrast, due to the cottages’ location within the base and the types of guests that vacation there, visitors are very aware of the U.S. military’s presence as seen in Chapter III. Through the YouTube videos provided as examples, I demonstrated how guests normalize the U.S. military presence in Kaua‘i and frame the base as a paradise. However, while the PMRF is hypervisible to those who vacation at the cottages, these sort of videos also conceal the imperial and violent actions that take place because of the PMRF’s location in the Pacific.

Lastly, in addressing how the digital sphere can be a tool of resistance, I turn to Chapter II, in which I described the glitch as a window into the biased, hegemonic digital mainframe and a tool for activists against the settler state. Examining the various glitches spotted on Google and Apple maps, I argued that these glitches can help make visible the U.S. occupation in Hawai‘i. Giving an example of the work I was privileged to do under Sean Connelly, I also showed how glitches can be involved in the creation of counter-maps that can expose the U.S. military and show the collusion between BigTech and the federal government. I also provided examples of artists who utilized the glitch aesthetic in their artwork, including Emilio Vavarella’s “The

Driver and the Cameras,” in which Vavarella makes visible the employees and laborers that maintain and further surveillance technologies.

Limitations of Research

There were several limitations I encountered while conducting my research and writing this thesis, including limited time and accessibility to militarized spaces. Because of the short two-year program, I had very little time to collect archival pieces on O‘ahu as I mostly resided in Los Angeles. My research time was confined to my summer break or the short holidays I took to visit family, and consequently, I could not spend a longer duration in the archives or visit the Ritz-Carlton’s Turtle Bay Resort. Additionally, I did not have the capacity to submit a formal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, so that I could retrieve official documents from the U.S. military regarding the bases and Barking Sands Beach Cottages.^{324,325} According to Homeland Security, FOIA necessitates an agency to respond to a request in twenty business days; however, the actual release of the documents requested have no conclusive timeline.³²⁶ Currently, the federal government is also exceedingly backlogged in these requests, having as many as 340,000 overdue inquiries as of September 2025 and average wait time of 240 days.³²⁷ Thus, documents requested through FOIA were not feasible to attain for the limited time I had in this program.

³²⁴ The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a law that requires the federal government to release information to individuals requesting documents from any agency with the exception of information pertaining to national defense, internal practices of an agency, trade secrets, medical files, law enforcement, and geological data concerning wells.

³²⁵ “What is FOIA?” *FOIA.gov*, accessed July 31, 2026, <https://www.foia.gov/about.html>.

³²⁶ “FOIA Processing,” *Homeland Security*, accessed August 1, 2026, <https://www.dhs.gov/foia-processing>.

³²⁷ Minh Kim, “Public Records Requests Are Surging. The Government Is Falling Behind,” *The New York Times*, accessed August 1, 2026, <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/us/politics/foia-public-document-requests.html>.

Moreover, because I am a civilian with no immediate connections to the U.S. military, I was unable to visit the PMRF, particularly the Barking Sands Beach Cottages. I also do not live on the island of Kaua‘i, so I was also unable to attend the America’s Most West Freedom Fest that does not require some sort of military affiliation.

Future Research

I hope to continue my examination of Kahuku Training Area and the PMRF in my doctoral studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Particularly, I would be interested in attending the America’s Most West Freedom Fest or other on-based events hosted by the U.S. Navy. Additionally, it would be important to interview community members living next to Kahuku Training Area and the PMRF to understand the ways in which they interact with the U.S. military and nearby tourist destinations. I also would like to interview community members and activists who are already resisting and defying the U.S. military in Hawai‘i. I hope this thesis along with my future research can be useful for grassroots organizations challenging the U.S. military.

Current Events and Acts of Resistance Against the U.S. Military

From Kaho‘olawe to Red Hill, there is a rich history of resistance against the U.S. military in Hawai‘i from Kanaka ‘Ōiwi, Asian, and haole activists, academics, artists, and photographers. To close this thesis, I would like to highlight the organizations led by Kanaka ‘Ōiwi that are defying empire, advocating for land back, and practicing mālama ‘āina daily.

Directed by Kanaka ‘Ōiwi educator and activist Lynette Hi‘ilani Cruz and Wai‘anae Moku Kupuna Council member Sparky Rodrigues, Mālama Mākua aims to return Mākua Valley, one of the leased spaces desecrated by the military, back to Kanaka and protect its endangered

species and 120 documented cultural sites.³²⁸ Founded in 1996, the organization has held community conversations regarding the sacred area, taken legal action against the U.S. Army, and recently released a documentary about Mākua directed by Mikey Inouye in December of 2025.^{329,330} As the U.S. military plans to return Mākua Valley back to the State of Hawai‘i in 2029, the organization has been consulting the community, state officials, and U.S. Army representatives to begin planning the recovery and restoration of the area as the U.S. military utilized the space as a bombing site. With Hui Mālama o Mākua and other community organizations, Mālama Mākua members hope to gain a land trust through a congressional approval, receive the appropriate funding for cleanup efforts, and compel the U.S. military to give any and all cultural artifacts back to Kanaka ‘Ōiwi.³³¹

Ka ‘Ahahui Hawai‘i Aloha ‘Āina (KAHAA), or the Hawaiian Patriotic League, has also been at the forefront of land back and resistance towards the renewal of the land leases utilized by the U.S. military. Inspired by the original Hui Aloha ‘Āina of 1893, the grassroots organization is committed to the preservation of land and Kanaka culture and has branches in O‘ahu, Maui, and Hawai‘i Island led by ‘Ilima Long, Sarah Niau Wakana, and Corey Asano.³³² Along with other community organizations, the hui has hosted education workshops and talk

³²⁸ “About Us,” *Mālama Mākua*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.malamamakua.org/about-mlama-mkua>.

³²⁹ “About Us,” *Mālama Mākua*.

³³⁰ Catherine Cruz, “New Documentary Captures Decades-Long Fight to Take Back Mākua Valley,” *Hawai‘i Public Radio*, December 4, 2025, <https://www.hawaiipublicradio.org/the-conversation/2025-12-04/new-documentary-captures-decades-long-fight-to-take-back-makua-valley>.

³³¹ “Community Consultation,” *Mālama Mākua*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.malamamakua.org/consultation>.

³³² “Ka ‘Ahahui Hawai‘i Aloha ‘Āina (KAHAA),” *Ka ‘Ahahui Hawai‘i Aloha ‘Āina Hawaiian Patriotic League*, accessed August 2, 2026, <http://www.kahaa.org/about.html>.

stories regarding the leases at community colleges, ‘Iolani Palace, and the Bishop Museum, participated and testified in state and OHA meetings, and led protests of the lease renewals as well as RIMPAC.³³³

Though Mālama Mākua and Ka ‘Ahahui Hawai‘i Aloha ‘Āina are perhaps the most well-known groups resisting the U.S. military and its occupation, there are many other organizations involved in these efforts including Ho‘opae Pono Peace Project, Sierra Club of Hawai‘i, Hawai‘i Alliance for Progressive Action (HAPA), and Hawai‘i Peace and Justice (HPJ).³³⁴ Many of the organizations listed and those unlisted often collaborate and co-host events, demonstrating the tenacious solidarity and vocal efforts to reclaim Kanaka ‘Ōiwi land and reimagine an alternative future for the lāhui.

³³³ Hui Aloha Aina o Honolulu (@haahonolulu), *Instagram*, accessed August 2, 2026, <https://www.instagram.com/haahonolulu/?hl=en>.

³³⁴ For more information on these organizations, please visit their websites at <https://www.eapono.org>, <https://sierraclubhawaii.org>, <https://www.hapahi.org>, and <https://hawaiipeaceandjustice.org>.

References

- “About Morale, Welfare and Recreation: Supporting the Military Community.” *Military One Source*. Accessed May 17, 2026. <https://www.militaryonesource.mil/military-basics/extended-family-friend/about-mwr-morale-welfare-and-recreation/>.
- “About Textron Systems.” *Textron Systems*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.textronsystems.com/our-company/about-textron-systems>.
- “About.” *TREX Enterprises Corporations*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.trexenterprises.com/about/>.
- “About Turtle Bay.” The Ritz-Carlton. Accessed April 20, 2026. <https://www.turtlebayexperiences.com/about>.
- “About Us.” *Mālama Mākua*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.malamamakua.org/about-mlama-mkua>.
- “About Us.” *Naval Technology*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.naval-technology.com/contractors/sonar/itt/>.
- “About Us.” *USAF NAF Jobs*. Accessed July 16, 2026. <https://www.nafjobs.org/about.aspx>.
- “Accelerating Transformation.” *Lockheed Martin*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/accelerating-transformation.html>.
- “Aegis Warships: The Golden Standard.” *Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance*. March 6, 2025. Accessed May 25, 2026. <https://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org/alerts/aegis-warships-the-golden-standard/>.
- “After OcEAnic.” *After OcEAnic*. Accessed July 17, 2026. <https://afteroceanic.com>.
- Ahupua‘a of Kaua‘i*. Department of Land and Natural Resources Hawai‘i. Accessed May 4, 2026. https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/shpd/files/2015/06/Ahupuaa_Kauai.pdf.

Ali, Kawsar. "The Logics of Digitisation: Race, Cyberspace, and Digital Settler Colonialism."

Journal of Global Indigeneity 5, no. 2 (2021): 1-22.

"America's Most West Freedom Fest!" *Kaua 'i Now*. Accessed May 1, 2026.

<https://kauainownews.com/community-calendar/event/h6o7r2d4a1g6a/>.

"America's Most West Freedom Fest." *Kaua 'i Now*, Accessed May 1, 2026.

<https://kauainownews.com/community-calendar/event/h2w4v6t3y5b7n/>.

"America's Most West Freedom Fest." Accessed May 1, 2026.

<https://pmrf.greatlifehawaii.com/events/4de0770e-c9d9-4501-a264-0fba9f8444a9>.

An Act to Declare It to be the Policy of the United States to Deploy a National Missile Defense.

Public Law 106-38. U.S. Statute at Large 113 (1999).

An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawai'i. Public Law 86-3. U.S. Statutes at

Large 4 (1959).

An Act to Revise the Procedures Established by the Hawai'i Statehood Act, Public Law 86-3, for

the Conveyance of Certain Lands to the State of Hawai'i, and for Other Purposes. Public

Law 88-233. Statute at Large 77 (1963).

Barking Sands Area Map. In *Data Calls - Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaiian Area,*

Barking Sands, Kekaha, HI. University of North Texas Libraries. Accessed May 16,

2025. <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc27779/m1/422/>.

"Battle Management: Solipsys Battlespace Command and Control Center (BC3)." *Collins*

Aerospace. Accessed August 2, 2026. [https://www.rtx.com/collinsaerospace/what-we-](https://www.rtx.com/collinsaerospace/what-we-do/industries/military-and-defense/battle-management/solipsys-battlespace-command-and-control-center-bc3)

[do/industries/military-and-defense/battle-management/solipsys-battlespace-command-](https://www.rtx.com/collinsaerospace/what-we-do/industries/military-and-defense/battle-management/solipsys-battlespace-command-and-control-center-bc3)

[and-control-center-bc3](https://www.rtx.com/collinsaerospace/what-we-do/industries/military-and-defense/battle-management/solipsys-battlespace-command-and-control-center-bc3).

“Beach Access.” *U.S. Navy Website*. Accessed May 4, 2026.

<https://cnrh.cnmc.navy.mil/Installations/PMRF-Barking-Sands/Operations-and-Management/Beach-Access/>.

“Beach Cottages at PMRF.” *U.S. Navy Website Commander, Navy Installations Command*.

Accessed May 17, 2026. <https://pmrf.greatlifehawaii.com/navy-getaways/beach-cottages-at-pmrf>.

Benjamin, Ruha. *Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code*. Cambridge: Polity, 2019.

Board of Land and Natural Resources DLNR. “06.27.2025 Board of Land and Natural Resources Meeting.” *YouTube*. June 27, 2025. 6:48:20.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3dG0TuuwJvE&list=PLDh6ZXzdUvQkHtqVoauOkfa26NfNLh2pK&index=11>.

Carson, Mike T. “Kona District.” *Na Mea Kahiko o Kaua‘i: Archaeological Studies in Kaua‘i*, no. 2 (2005).

Clark, John R.K., and Keao NeSmith. *Ni‘ihau Places Names*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2023.

Clark, John R.K. *North Shore Place Names: Kahuku to Ka‘ena*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2014.

“Clients.” *Strategic Technology Institute Inc.*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.sti-inc.com/clients/>.

“Community Consultation.” *Mālama Mākua*. Accessed August 2, 2026.

<https://www.malamamakua.org/consultation>.

- Connelly, Sean. "O'ahu Military Atlas (A Community Presentation)." Vimeo. February 15, 2022. Video. 21:41. <https://vimeo.com/678040439>.
- Cooper, George, and Gavan Daws. *Land and Power in Hawai'i: The Democratic Years*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1990.
- Coveri, Andrea, Claudio Cozza, and Dario Guarascio. "Big Tech and the U.S. Digital-Military Industrial Complex." *Intereconomics* 60, no. 2 (2025): 81-87.
- Cruz, Catherine. "New Documentary Captures Decades-Long Fight to Take Back Mākua Valley." *Hawai'i Public Radio*. December 4, 2025. <https://www.hawaiipublicradio.org/the-conversation/2025-12-04/new-documentary-captures-decades-long-fight-to-take-back-makua-valley>.
- Curtis, Caroline. *The Water of Kāne and Other Legends of the Hawaiian Islands*, ed. Mary Kawena Pukui. Honolulu: Kamehameha Publishing, 1994.
- "Defense." *Boeing*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.boeing.com/defense>.
- "Defense." *SAIC*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.saic.com/who-we-serve/defense>.
- "Del Webb, Prudential's \$20-Mil Hawaii Resort." *Variety*. July 30, 1969. ProQuest.
- Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism. "Federal Activity and Hawaii's New Economy." July 2001. https://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/economic/data_reports/federal/fr07-01r.pdf.
- "Department of Defense Tests Hypersonic Glide Body." *U.S. Department of War*. March 20, 2020. Accessed May 25, 2026. <https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2119458/department-of-defense-tests-hypersonic-glide-body/>.

- Draft of John A. Burns to the Trustees under the Will and of the Estate of James Campbell. June 2, 1966. Hawai‘i State Archives.
- Dune, J. Paul and Elisabeth Skön. “New Technology and the U.S. Military Industrial Complex.” *The Economics of Power and Security Journal* 16, no.2 (2021): 5-17.
- E.K. Wahinealoha to the editors of Nupepa Kuokoa. February 2, 1865. In *Ni ‘ihau Places Names*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2023.
- Elias, Norbert. *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners*. New York: Urizen Books, 1978.
- Estep, Bodie. “PMRF Celebrates Freedom with Aloha during America’s Most West Freedom Fest.” *U.S. Navy*. July 14, 2023. Accessed May 1, 2026.
<https://cnreurafcen.cnic.navy.mil/news/news-detail/article/3472168/pmrf-celebrates-freedom-with-aloha-during-americas-most-west-freedom-fest/>.
- “Family Placed Obituary: Dr. Seiji Naya.” *Star Advertiser*. Accessed August 2, 2026.
<https://obits.staradvertiser.com/2016/09/18/dr-seiji-naya/>.
- Ferguson, Kathy E., and Phyllis Turnbull. *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- Fermantez, Kali, and Lisa Uperesa. “An Emergent Genealogy of Kahuku’s Contested Red Raider Mascot.” *Pacific Studies* 46, no.2 (2023).
- Fields, Chip. “DV Cottage, PMRF, Barking Sands, Kaua‘i, 7-12-21.” YouTube. July 27, 2021.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V_e28dz02d8&t=5s.
- “FOIA Processing.” *Homeland Security*. Accessed August 1, 2026. <https://www.dhs.gov/foia-processing>.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of a Prison*. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.

Fujikane, Candace. "Introduction: Asian Settler Colonialism in the U.S. Colony of Hawai'i." In *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, 1-42. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008.

"Go Inside the Pearl Harbor 'Golfball.'" *Hawai'i Public Radio*. Accessed March 17, 2026.

<https://www.hawaiipublicradio.org/local-news/2019-08-14/go-inside-the-pearl-harbor-golfball>.

Gonzalez, Vernadette Vicuña. *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai'i and the Philippines*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Gonzalez, Vernadette Vicuña. "Touring Military Masculinities: U.S.-Philippines Circuits of Sacrifice and Gratitude in Corregidor and Bataan." In *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, 63-88. Honolulu: University of Press, 2008.

Goodyear-Ka'ōpua, Noelani. "Introduction." In *A Nation Rising: Hawaiian Movements for Life, Land, and Sovereignty*, ed. Noelani Goodyear Ka'ōpua, Ikaika Hussey, and Erin Kahunawaika'ala Wright, 1-33. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014.

"Google Faces Streetview Wi-Fi Snooping Action." *BBC News*. September 11, 2013.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-24047235>.

"Google Public Sector Awarded \$200 Million Contract to Accelerate AI and Cloud Capabilities Across Department of Defense's Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO)." *Google Cloud*. July 14, 2025. <https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/public-sector/google-public-sector-awarded-200-million-contract-to-accelerate-ai-and-cloud->

capabilities-across-department-of-defenses-chief-digital-and-artificial-intelligence-office-cdao.

Handy, E.S. Craighill, Elizabeth Green Handy, and Mary Kawena Pukui. *Native Planters in Old Hawai'i: Their Life, Lore, and Environment*. Bishop Museum Press, 1972.

Harley, John B. "Deconstructing the Map." *Cartographica* 26, no.2 (1989): 1-20.

Harris, Leila M., and Helen D. Hazen. "Power of Maps: (Counter) Mapping for Conservation." *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies* 4, no.1 (2005): 99-130.

Harrison, Selig S. "The Missiles of North Korea: How Real a Threat?" *World Policy Journal* 17, no.3 (2000): 13-24.

Hawai'i State Legislature. Senate. *Supporting a Missile Defense System for Hawai'i*. 20th Legislature. S.R. 6.

Herreria, Carla. "A Glimpse Inside Hawaii's 'Forbidden Island.'" *Honolulu Civil Beat*. July 22, 2015. <https://www.civilbeat.org/2015/07/a-glimpse-inside-hawaiis-forbidden-island/>.

"History of Military Recreation Programs." *Military One Source*. Accessed May 17, 2026. <https://www.militaryonesource.mil/leaders-service-providers/morale-welfare-and-recreation/history-of-military-recreation-programs/>.

Hitt, Christine. "Keepers of the Flame: How Cultural Practitioners Are Preserving Niihau's Unique Traditions." *Hawai'i Magazine*. May 12, 2016. <https://www.hawaiimagazine.com/keepers-of-the-flame-how-cultural-practitioners-are-preserving-niihaus-unique-traditions/>.

Hui Aloha Aina o Honolulu (@haahonolulu). *Instagram*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://www.instagram.com/haahonolulu/?hl=en>.

- Inouye, Gill, and Matsunaga to Robert S. McNamara. November 14, 1963. Hiram L. Fong Collection. University of Hawai‘i Hamilton Library, Box 96.
- “Installation Guide.” *Commander, Navy Region Hawai‘i*. Accessed May 17, 2026.
<https://cnrh.cnmc.navy.mil/Installations/PMRF-Barking-Sands/About/Installation-Guide/>.
- James Campbell, Esq.* Estate of James Campbell, 1978.
- Jackson, Susan. “Marketing Militarism in the Digital Age: Arms Production, YouTube, and Selling ‘National Security.’” In *Understanding Popular Culture and World Politics in the Digital Age*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd and Caitlin Hamilton. London: Routledge, 2016. 68-82.
- Johnson, Stacey. “Barking Sands Beach Cottages: A Regret or a Hidden Gem? Kekaha, Kaua‘i.” YouTube. December 26, 2023. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3RUjGtGPNVs>.
- “Ka ‘Ahahui Hawai‘i Aloha ‘Āina (KAHAA).” *Ka ‘Ahahui Hawai‘i Aloha ‘Āina Hawaiian Patriotic League*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <http://www.kahaa.org/about.html>.
- Kajihiro, Kyle, and Terrilee Keko‘olani. “The Hawai‘i DeTour Project: Demilitarizing Sites and Sights on O‘ahu.” In *DeTours: A Decolonial Guide to Hawai‘i*, ed. Hōkulani K. Aikau and Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez. Durham: Duke University Press, 2019.
- Kakesako, Gregg K. “Ni‘ihau Is an Important Part of Navy’s Plan.” *Star-Bulletin*. June 13, 1997.
<https://georgehbalazs.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/1997-Niihau-Navy-Missile-Testing-Newspaper-Articles..pdf>.
- Kame‘eleihiwa, Lilikalā. *Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea Lā E Pono Ai? How Shall We Live in Harmony?* Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992.
- Kauanui, J. Kēhaulani, “‘A Structure, Not an Event’: Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity.” *Emergent Critical Analytics of Alternative Humanities*, no. 5 (2016).

“Kekaha Sugar Company History.” *Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association: Plantation Archives*.

Accessed May 15, 2026. https://www2.hawaii.edu/~speccoll/p_kekaha.html.

Kim, Minho. “Public Records Requests Are Surging. The Government Is Falling Behind.” *The New York Times*. Accessed August 1, 2026.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/us/politics/foia-public-document-requests.html>.

Kotani, Roland. *The Japanese in Hawai‘i: A Century of Struggle*. Hawai‘i Hochi Ltd., 1985.

Kufel, Alexander. “HED Helps Army Buy Kahuku Training Area.” *The Pacific Connection* 33, no. 2 (1999).

Langley, Hugh and Charles Rollet. “Hundreds of Googlers Ask Their CEO to Block Classified AI Work with the Pentagon.” *Business Insider*. April 27, 2026.

<https://www.businessinsider.com/google-employees-ceo-block-classified-military-ai-projects-2026-4>.

“Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex.” *Lincoln Laboratory*. Accessed August 2, 2026.

<https://www.ll.mit.edu/about/facilities/lincoln-space-surveillance-complex>.

Lind, Ian. “Ring of Steel: Notes on the Militarization of Hawai‘i.” *Social Process in Hawai‘i* 31 (1984): 25-48.

“Mana Airport/Barking Sands Airport.” Hawai‘i Aviation: An Archive of Historic Photos and Facts. Accessed May 15, 2026. <https://aviation.hawaii.gov/airfields-airports/kauai/mana-airportbarking-sands-airport/>.

Marshall-Mies, Joanne, David Westhuis, and Richard Fafara. “U.S. Army Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) Programmes: Links to Readiness and Retention.” *Res Militaris* 1, no. 3 (2011).

Matsunaga, Spark M. “Statement.” Press Release. December 4, 1963.

Matuszewski, Erik. "Turtle Bay: Hawaii's Home for the Best Golf on Oahu's North Shore."

Forbes. July 7, 2016. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikmatuszewski/2016/07/07/turtle-bay-hawaiiis-home-for-the-best-golf-on-oahus-north-shore-and-so-much-more/>.

McGowen, Jana. "Your Boring Life, Now Available Online: Analyzing Google Street View and the Right to Privacy." *Texas Wesleyan Law Review* 16, no.3 (2010): 477-494.

Merrin, Lilia, Rachel Hoerman, Pua Pinto, Dominique Cordy, Kelley L. Uyeoka, and Kekuewa Kikiloi. *Ko 'olau 'Āina Inventory: Moku 'O Ko 'olaupoko and Ko 'olauloa*. Nohopapa Hawai'i, 2023.

"MWR Guest Pass Program." *U.S. Navy Website*. Accessed May 17, 2026.

<https://cnrh.cnmc.navy.mil/Installations/PMRF-Barking-Sands/Resources/MWR-Guest-Pass-Program/>.

"Moku Maps." *Department of Land and Natural Resources: Hawai'i State Aha Moku*. Accessed May 13, 2026. <https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/ahamoku/maps/>.

"Navy Getaways Barking Sands." *Department of Defense Lodging*. Accessed May 17, 2026.

<https://get.dodlodging.net/property/Navy-Getaways-Barking-Sands>.

"Navy Getaways - RV Parks, Campgrounds and Vacation Rentals FAQ." *Department of Defense Lodging*. Accessed May 17, 2026. <https://get.dodlodging.net/Faq.aspx>.

"Navy Getaways - RV Parks, Campgrounds, and Vacation Rentals." Official U.S. Navy Website.

Accessed May 17, 2026. <https://ffr.cnmc.navy.mil/Fleet-Readiness/Lodging/Navy-Getaways-RV-Parks-Campgrounds-Vacation-Rentals/>.

Neil Abercrombie to Michael Jones. April 23, 1999. University of Hawai'i Hamilton Library.

Nixon, Natalie W., and Alison Rieple. "Luxury Redesigned: How the Ritz-Carlton Uses Experimental Service Design to Position Abundance in Times of Scarcity." *Design Management Journal* 5, no. 1 (2010).

"Oceanit." *Oceanit*. Accessed August 2, 2026. <https://oceanit.com>.

"OpenAI and Apple Announce Partnership to Integrate ChatGPT into Apple Experiences." *OpenAI*. June 10, 2024. <https://openai.com/index/openai-and-apple-announce-partnership/>.

Osorio, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo'ole. *Disremembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002.

"Our Agreement with the Department of War." *OpenAI*. February 28, 2026. <https://openai.com/index/our-agreement-with-the-department-of-war/>.

Pachirat, Timothy. *Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.

Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Barking Sands Recreation Map. 2004. Harrington Publishing. Accessed May 17, 2026. <https://pmrf.greatlifehawaii.com/navy-getaways/beach-cottages-at-pmrf>.

Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaiian Area, Barking Sands, Kekaha, HI. University of North Texas Libraries. Accessed May 16, 2025. <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc27779/m1/422/>.

Pager, Tyler. "Chief Executives to Accompany Trump to China." *The New York Times*. Last modified May 12, 2026. <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/11/us/politics/trump-china-musk-cook.html>.

- Peluso, Nancy Lee. “Whose Woods Are These? Counter-Mapping Forest Territories in Kalimantan Indonesia.” *Antipode* 27, no.4 (1995): 383-406.
- Philip R. Holi-o-Hana to the editors of Nupepa Kuokoa. April 20, 1865 in *Ni ‘ihau Places Names*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2023.
- Photograph by Turtle Bay. “Turtle Bay: Hawai‘i’s Home for the Best Golf on O‘ahu’s North Shore.” *Forbes*. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikmatuszewski/2016/07/07/turtle-bay-hawaiiis-home-for-the-best-golf-on-oahus-north-shore-and-so-much-more/>.
- PMRF MWR (@pmrfmwr). Instagram. <https://www.instagram.com/pmrfmwr/>.
- “PMRF to Host America’s Most West Freedom Fest Featuring Fireworks, Family Fun and Music Headliner Common Kings.” *Kaua ‘i Now*. June 26, 2023. Accessed May 1, 2026. <https://kauainownews.com/2023/06/26/pmrf-to-host-americas-most-west-freedom-fest-featuring-fireworks-family-fun-and-music-headliner-common-kings/>.
- “Preserving the Unique Ecosystem of Kaua‘i: Pacific Missile Range Facility, Partners Again Relocate Laysan Albatross.” *Kaua ‘i Now*. April 2, 2026. Accessed May 21, 2026. <https://kauainownews.com/2026/04/02/preserving-the-unique-ecosystem-of-kauai-pacific-missile-range-facility-partners-again-relocate-laysan-albatross/>.
- “Protecting Wildlife at PMRF.” *PMRF News*. Accessed May 21, 2026. <https://pmrfkauai.com/Protecting-Wildlife-at-PMRF>.
- Pukui, Mary Kawena. *‘Ōlelo No ‘eau: Hawaiian Proverbs and Poetical Sayings*. Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1983.
- Pukui, Mary Kawena, Samuel H. Elbert, and Esther T. Mookini. *Place Names of Hawai‘i: Revised and Expanded Edition*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1976.

- Rodriguez, Dylan. *White Reconstruction: Domestic Warfare and the Logics of Genocide*.
Manhattan: Fordham University Press, 2020.
- Rosenfield, Stephen S. "Making Defense a Non-Issue." *The Washington Post*, 2000.
- "Sailor Dies After Rescuing His Child Struggling in High Surf." *Hawai'i News Now*. November 4, 2025. Accessed May 17, 2026. <https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2025/11/25/sailor-dies-after-rescuing-children-struggling-high-surf/>.
- Sakr, Laila Shereen. *Arabic Glitch: Technoculture, Data Bodies, and Archives*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2023.
- Saranillio, Dean Itsuji. *Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai'i Statehood*.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2018.
- Saranillio, Dean Itsuji. "Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters: A Thought Piece on Critiques, Debates, and Indigenous Difference." *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no.3 (2013): 280-294.
- Scott, James C. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Durham: Yale University Press, 1998.
- "Sean Connelly." *A/P/A*. Accessed July 17, 2026. <https://apa.nyu.edu/affiliate/sean-connelly-2025/>.
- Shapiro, Treena. "'Forbidden Island' Kept in Family." *Star-Bulletin*. October 29, 1999. Accessed May 15, 2026. <https://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/10/29/news/story9.html>.
- Sommer, "Governor Now Favors Navy Use of Ni'ihau." *Star-Bulletin*. May 8, 1999.
- Sommer, Anthony. "OHA Has a Problem with Navy Using Ni'ihau as Launch Site." *Star-Bulletin*. February 5, 1999.
- Sommer, Anthony. "Robinsons Reject Use of Ni'ihau for Missile Tests." *Star-Bulletin*. March 19, 1999. <https://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/02/05/news/story12.html>.

Shigematsu, Setsu, and Keith L. Camacho. "Introduction: Militarized Currents, Decolonizing Futures." In *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, xv-xlviii. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.

Star-Bulletin Staff. "Four Hearings on Kaua'i, O'ahu." *Star-Bulletin*.

<https://georgehbalazs.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/1997-Niihau-Navy-Missile-Testing-Newspaper-Articles..pdf>

State of Hawai'i Land Use Commission. Transcript of 3:00 PM Meeting. May 23, 1969

State of Hawai'i Land Use Commission. Transcript of 10:00 AM Meeting. July 8, 1969.

Sterling, Esther P. and Catherine C. Summers. *Sites of O'ahu*. Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1978.

"Stockpile Stewardship." *Sandia National Laboratories*. Accessed August 2, 2026.

<https://www.sandia.gov/missions/nuclear-weapons/>.

Tabrah, Ruth M. *Ni'ihau: The Last Hawaiian Island*. Kailua, Press Pacifica, 1987.

Takabuki, Matsuo. *An Unlikely Revolutionary: Matsuo Takabuki and the Making of Modern Hawai'i*. University of Hawai'i Press, 1998.

Teaiwa, Teresia K. "Bikinis and Other S/pacific N/oceans." In *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, 77-88. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.

TenBrugencate, Jan. "Navy May Expand at Ni'ihau." *The Honolulu Advertiser*. June 13, 1997.

<https://georgehbalazs.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/1997-Niihau-Navy-Missile-Testing-Newspaper-Articles.pdf>.

The Estate of James Campbell to John A. Burns. May 24, 1966. Hawai'i State Archives.

“The Facts.” *Northrop Grumman*. Accessed August 2, 2026.

<https://www.northropgrumman.com/who-we-are/the-facts>.

“The Ritz-Carlton O‘ahu, Turtle Bay.” *The Ritz-Carlton*. Accessed March 17, 2026.

<https://www.ritzcarlton.com/en/hotels/hnlkz-the-ritz-carlton-oahu-turtle-bay/overview/>.

The U.S. Department of the Navy. *Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) Cultural Landscape Report Final*. The U.S. Department of the Navy. 2011.

https://cnrh.cnrc.navy.mil/Portals/79/PMRF_Barking_Sands/Documents/CLR%20Barking%20Sands%20Late%20Cold%20War%20Period-10.pdf?ver=AR6LwQS8-1gEMSnqbLMgbg%3d%3d.

Trask, Haunani-Kay. *From A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i*.

Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999.

Trask, Haunani-Kay. “Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant Hegemony’: ‘Locals’ in Hawai‘i.” In *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, 45-65. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008.

“Turtle Bay Weddings | Luxury Experience on Oahu’s North Shore.” *Bishop Media*.

<https://bishopmediaproductions.com/turtle-bay-wedding-venue/>.

“Underwater Training Range Refurbishment Complete.” *Naval Air Systems Command*. January 21, 2011. Accessed May 18, 2026. <https://www.navair.navy.mil/node/16671>.

U.S. Army Garrison-Hawai‘i Cultural Resources Program. *Military Heritage Resources: Kahuku Training Area*. U.S. Army Garrison-Hawai‘i.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Report on Study of Military Real Property* (1960).

- U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. *Hawai‘i Military Land Use Master Plan*. Honolulu: Camp H.M. Smith, 2021.
- U.S. Navy. *Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF): Cultural Landscape Report Final*. Hawai‘i: U.S. Navy, 2011.
- Vavarella, Emilio. “On Counter-Mapping and Media-Flânerie: Artistic Strategies in the Age of Google Earth, Google Maps, and Google Street View.” *In Error, Ambiguity and Creativity: A Multidisciplinary Reader*. Ed. Sita Popat and Sarah Whatley, 137-166. London: Palgrave Macmillan Cham, 2020.
- “Watch the Watchers.” *Stop LAPD Spying Coalition*. Accessed March 20, 2026. <https://watchthewatchers.net/about#:~:text=This%20website%20is%20maintained%20by%20the%20Stop,Skid%20Row%20neighborhood%20of%20downtown%20Los%20Angeles.>
- Weissert, Will. “These Are the 37 Donors Helping Pay for Trump’s \$300 Million White House Ballroom.” *AP News*. November 12, 2025. <https://apnews.com/article/donors-to-trump-white-house-ballroom-d4dd174eeb30ac244354a5a25551a86b>.
- “What is FOIA?” *FOIA.gov*. Accessed July 31, 2026. <https://www.foia.gov/about.html>.
- Wolfe, Patrick. “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387-409.
- Zahzah, Omar. *Terms of Servitude: Zionism, Silicon Valley, and Digital/Settler Colonialism in the Palestinian Liberation Struggle*. New York City: Seven Stories Press, 2025.