JEN'NAN GHAZAL READ *University of California—Irvine*

Family, Religion, and Work Among Arab American Women

Using data from a national survey of 501 Arab American women, this study examines the extent to which family behavior mediates the influence of religion on women's labor force activity. Prior research on families has largely overlooked the role of religion in influencing women's labor force decisions, particularly at different stages of the life cycle. The analysis begins to address this gap by examining whether religious affiliation and religiosity have direct relationships to women's work behaviors, or whether they primarily operate through family behaviors at different phases of the life course. The results show that religiosity exerts a negative influence on women's labor force participation, but only when children are present in the home. Among women with no children, religiosity has no effect on employment.

Religious influences on family and women's and men's roles are at the center of numerous debates about the role of religion in contemporary American life (Bartkowski, 2001; Gallagher, 2003; Sherkat, 2000). The accepted wisdom is that the tenets of major religious traditions restrict women's achievements in the public sphere by prioritizing their obligations to home and family (for a review, see Lehrer, 1995). Recent studies on Judeo-Christian groups are beginning to challenge this view, finding that the relationships between family, religion, and women's economic activity are more complicated than previously believed (Gallagher; Heaton & Cornwall, 1989; Lehrer, 1995, 1999; Sherkat). To a lesser but growing extent, research is also contesting homogeneous images of Muslim women that depict them as universally oppressed by a patriarchal religious culture (Read, 2002; Read & Bartkowski, 2000).

This article contributes to this line of inquiry by examining the effects of religious affiliation, religiosity, and family on women's employment, using Arab Americans as a case study. Arab Americans are of interest because this group comprises both Christians and Muslims, which offers a unique opportunity to examine interreligious, intraethnic differences in women's behaviors. The analysis uses survey data from a national sample of 501 Arab American women to examine the extent to which religion inhibits women's labor force participation, and degree to which family commitments mediate the relationships between religion and work.

DETERMINANTS OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

Studies that examine religious influences on women's labor force participation have raised interesting questions about the mediating effects of family obligations on women's economic achievements (Hartman & Hartman, 1996; Heaton & Cornwall, 1989; Lehrer, 1995; Sherkat, 2000). In particular, these studies find that religious constraints on women's employment operate through their family roles. All major monotheistic religious traditions

Department of Sociology, 4201 Social Science Plaza B, University of California, Irvine, CA (jennan@uci.edu).

Key Words: Arab American, employment, family, religion, women, work.

(Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) promote women's familial duties over their public sphere activity, and women who are married (Hertel, 1988) or who have young children present in the home (Hartman & Hartman) are less likely to work than those without these family ties. This is true for both Christian and Jewish denominations, although there are certainly denominational differences in how strictly these doctrines are interpreted.

Arab Americans present an interesting theoretical case for examining the relationships between family, religion, and women's labor force participation for two reasons. First, they are an ethnic group comprising both Muslims and Christians, which offers a rare opportunity to examine intraethnic, interreligious differences in women's behaviors. As defined by the Census Bureau, Arab Americans trace their ancestry to 17 Arabic-speaking countries in North Africa and western Asia. They emigrated in two distinct waves from the Middle East over the past century, the first being predominantly Christians from Greater Syria, which includes modern-day Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Israel, and the latter comprising mainly Muslims (Naff, 1994). Second, families are a central institution in Arab culture, yet few studies examine systematically their influence on Arab American assimilation (Read, 2004; Read, in press).

A robust qualitative literature on Arab and other Middle Eastern (e.g., Iranian) communities in the United States provides a basis for theorizing about the effects of family on Arab American women's employment (Aswad, 1994; Bilge & Aswad, 1996; Dallalfar, 1996). These studies emphasize the significant role that families play in determining the position of women of Middle Eastern descent in American society. Middle Eastern countries do not have a monolithic culture, but they do share in common a patrilineal family structure and the belief that families are the foundation of the community (Aswad). Women are primarily responsible for family stability, and their public sphere participation is discouraged in favor of their domestic responsibilities.

Although gender differentiation is the norm in many parts of the Middle East, family and gender dynamics vary considerably among people of Arab descent in the United States (Esposito, 1998; Haddad & Smith, 1996). Some Arab Americans feel that female domesticity is fundamental for preserving their ethnicity and reproducing Arab culture in the new world (Cainkar, 1996). Others maintain pride in their Arab heritage but discard patriarchal customs perceived as inhibiting their integration and achievement in U.S. society (Haddad & Smith). These attitudes vary by social class and generational status, with stronger attachments to traditional values found among the lesser educated and foreign born (Aswad; Read, 2002, 2003). The foreign-born segment of the Arab American population is predominantly Muslim, resulting in a conflation of religion and ethnic identity in studies of Arab communities in the United States. Muslims, however, make up only one third of the estimated three million Arabs in America, with Christians comprising the rest of the population (Naff, 1994).

Within these broad categories of Muslim and Christian affiliation, there is considerable diversity in Arab American women's employment patterns. As with other groups of U.S. women, Arab American women's participation in the public sphere varies by ethnic identity, religiosity, family structure, and social class (Cainkar, 1996). Women living in families with stronger ties to ethnic values and customs are less likely to be employed, and have less power in major family decisions than women living in families with weaker attachments to cultural traditions (Aswad, 1994). In general, cultural bonds are strongest among the most recent Arab immigrant arrivals, many of whom live in ethnic enclaves because of network ties (Cainkar).

The influences of religiosity and education on Arab American women's employment operate in the expected direction. Women with stronger connections to religion usually have lower employment and higher fertility rates than women with weaker religious ties (cf., Hartman & Hartman, 1996; Lehrer, 1995), and women with higher levels of education have higher work rates and earnings, and are more likely to share in major family decisions (Haddad & Smith, 1996; Read, 2004). Family structure also has expected consequences. The presence of young children at home dampens women's employment opportunities, and the presence of nonspouse adult family members has mixed effects. Nonspouse adult family members can improve women's work opportunities by assisting them with their domestic responsibilities; conversely, they can add to women's household obligations and reduce their ability to work (Read). Age, nativity, and labor market region

can potentially mediate the influences of family structure on women's labor supply (Stier & Tienda, 1992).

Although there has been no systematic examination of the relationships between family, religion, and Arab American women's labor force activity to date, following from this literature review, I expect that (a) degree of religiosity (i.e., strength of religious beliefs) will have a significant negative effect on women's labor force participation; (b) degree of religiosity will be more significant than religious affiliation (Muslim or Christian) for women's labor force participation; and (c) family characteristics (i.e., children) will mediate the effect of religiosity on women's employment.

METHOD

Data

To test these hypotheses, I use data from a mail survey administered in spring 2000 to a national sample of women in the United States with Arab surnames. Other national data sets classify Arab Americans with non-Hispanic Whites, which contributes largely to the dearth of statistical data on this group and to the reliance on studies of localized Arab American communities (for exceptions, see El-Badry, 1994; Zogby, 1990). Although Arab ethnicity can be derived from the birth and ancestry questions on the long form of the U.S. Census, this resource is insufficient for this project because it contains no information on religious affiliation or religiosity.

The sampling frame for the survey questionnaire came from the only two national lists of Arab Americans available: the membership roster of the Arab American Institute and a list of female registered voters assembled by Zogby International. The questionnaire was administered to a systematic random sample of women drawn from these two frames, and a filter question was used to exclude non-Arab women. The question identifies the birthplace of the respondent, the respondent's mother and father, and the respondent's maternal and paternal grandparents.

Because the majority of Arab American women are U.S. citizens, and 92% are proficient in the English language (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990), the questionnaire was administered in English. The combined responses from the two sampling frames equal 501, composed of 77 women from the first frame and 424 women from the second. A comparison of the two groups of respondents reveals minimal differences in their demographic characteristics (Read, 2004). The median age of the overall sample is 45, and the geographic distribution is similar to that found in the 1990 census: 32.4% are clustered in the East and Northeast (mainly in the New York and Washington, DC areas), 35.3% are located in the Midwest (mainly in and around Detroit and Chicago), 25.6% live in the West (mainly in Los Angeles), and a minority (6.7%) live in the South (mainly Texas). Full details on the sample and sampling procedures can be found in Read (2004).

Given the sampling frame characteristics, women sampled are probably older, more highly educated, and more politically involved than the Arab American population as a whole. The most recent immigrants are likely to be underrepresented in the sample, as are the most assimilated women, those who have outmarried, or those whose surnames have been Anglicized over time. At the same time, the sample is more nationally representative than previous studies of this population and is more heterogeneous by religious affiliation (i.e., contains both Christians and Muslims), allowing for a more thorough examination of religious influences on women's labor force activity.

Variables

The primary dependent variable for this study is labor force participation (1 = *currently employed*). The analysis also examines married women's labor force decisions at two different stages in the life cycle: (a) after marriage and before children, and (b) when young children are present in the home. The independent variables include several measures of religion, family characteristics, and background factors known to influence women's employment. Three variables capture religious influences on women's employment: religious affiliation (1 = *Muslim*, 0 = *other*), religiosity over the life cycle (1 = *high in childhood and adulthood*, 0 = *other*), and belief in scriptural inerrancy (1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*). The analysis assesses the effect of Muslim affiliation on women's employment because it is often considered more restrictive of women's achievements than Judeo-Christian affiliations

(Read, 2002). Ancillary analysis also shows these to be unique predictors of religion (i.e., correlation matrices).

To address both Muslim and Christian respondents, I altered slightly the standard question on biblical inerrancy to read, "Do you agree or disagree that the holy book of your religion is the literal word of God?" I also created a religiosity index with the following five items: respondent's subjective religiosity (1 = *not very religious* to 4 = *very religious*), family's religiosity during the respondent's youth (1 = *not very religious* to 4 = *very religious*), frequency of attending religious services (1 = *never* to 7 = *nearly every day*), frequency of reading religious materials (1 = *never* to 7 = *nearly every day*), and belief in scriptural inerrancy. The index ranges from 5 to 27 ($\alpha = .765$). I recoded the index into three categories: low, medium, and high. The low category includes respondents who gave only low responses (*not very religious*, *never attend services*, and so on), the high category includes respondents who gave only high responses (*very religious*, *attend nearly every day*, and so on), and the medium category contains those who fall between the low and high categories.

Four variables measure family structure: a dummy variable for marital status (1 = *married*), a continuous measure for number of children in the household, a dummy variable for any children under the age of 5 years, and a dummy variable for presence of nonspouse adult family in the household. Financial need is measured with two dummy variables that identify women with low household incomes (less than $20,000 a year) and those with high household incomes (more than $50,000 a year). The reference category is those women with moderate household incomes, $20,000 to $50,000 a year. The analysis also controls for educational attainment (1 = *bachelor's degree or higher*), age (in years and a quadratic term), nativity (1 = *foreign born*), and labor market region (*South* = omitted category).

Results

The analysis begins by examining variations in Arab American women's religious, family, and background characteristics. Because this study is concerned with women's employment rates, the analysis focuses only on women who are between the ages of 24 and 65 and who are not currently in school ($n = 416$). As seen in Table 1, one half (50.0%) of respondents report being Christian, 44.0% report being Muslim, 1.0% report other religious affiliations, and 5.0% report no religious affiliation. These findings run counter to popular perceptions of this ethnic group, which tend to conflate Muslim affiliation with Arab ethnicity. Table 1 also demonstrates that the sample's religious identity is strong, with two thirds (67.5%) of women reporting high levels of religiosity over the life cycle, and more than half (56.8%) believing that the Bible or Kor'an is the literal word of God. These high levels are also evident in their scores on the religiosity index: 40.8% of women sampled have moderate levels of religiosity, and another 30.4% have high levels, with 27.8% having low religiosity levels.

Two thirds (67.1%) of respondents are married, and over half (52.2%) have children in the home. A relatively small proportion of the sample has children under the age of 5 years in the home (13.0%), a finding that reflects their median age of 45 years. Turning to their labor force characteristics, women sampled have high labor force participation rates, with nearly one half (47.5%) employed full time, one third (31.5%)

TABLE 1. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS ($N = 416$)

Variables	%
Religious affiliation	
Christian	50.0
Muslim	44.0
Other or none	6.0
Religiosity over the life cycle	
Low in childhood and adulthood	10.1
Increased or decreased since childhood	21.9
High in childhood and adulthood	67.5
Belief in scriptural inerrancy	56.8
Religiosity index	
Low	27.8
Moderate	40.8
High	31.4
Married	67.1
Presence of children in household	52.2
Presence of children less than 5 years old	13.0
Presence of nonspouse adult in household	15.9
Labor force participation	
Not employed	21.0
Employed part time	31.6
Employed full time	47.4

employed part time, and 21.0% out of the paid labor force. Of the respondents who are married with children in the home, 22.5% have remained out of the labor force both before and after children were born, 7.8% entered the labor force after children were born, 31.0% exited the labor force after children were born, and 38.8% remained in the labor force in both stages of the life cycle.

The central question of this study is whether religiosity has a direct relationship to women's work behaviors, or if it primarily affects family behaviors that are related to labor force participation. Table 2 considers this question by examining the relationship between religiosity and labor force activity, controlling for presence of children in the home. The religiosity index is recoded into three categories representing women with lower levels of religiosity (27.8% of the sample), those with more moderate levels of religiosity (40.8%), and women with higher levels of religiosity (31.4%).

The first section of Table 2 examines respondents with children present in the home, and finds a negative relationship between women's religiosity levels and degree of labor force commitment. Among women with children, highly religious respondents are more than three times as likely to remain in the home, compared with those with the lowest levels of religiosity (44.4% compared with 13.5%). Similarly, women with the highest levels of religiosity are considerably less likely to work full time (27.8% compared with 51.9% of women with the lowest religiosity levels). In contrast, for those respondents who have no children in the home, religiosity is relatively unimportant for their degree of labor force commitment. For example, looking only at those respondents without children, roughly half of those with low and high levels of religiosity are employed full time (57.0% and 49.1%, respectively).

Table 2 also finds a relationship between presence of children and women's degree of labor force commitment, controlling for their religiosity levels. This relationship is strongest among respondents with high religiosity levels, where children significantly dampen women's labor activity. Nearly one half (44.4%) of women with children present in the home are out of the labor force, compared with 16.4% of women without children. Less than one third (27.8%) of women with children work full time, compared with 49.1% of women without childcare responsibilities.

An important finding in Table 2 is that there is no relationship between women's religiosity levels and presence of children. Looking at the absolute numbers in the marginals, nearly one half (46.0%) of women with low religiosity levels have children present in the home, compared with 55.4% of those with moderate levels, and 56.7% of those with high levels of religiosity. In other words, women with low levels of religiosity are just as likely as those with high levels to have children in the home. Overall, the findings in Table 2 suggest that the presence of children in the home mediates the influence of religiosity on women's employment, which lends initial support to hypothesis c.

Table 3 considers whether these relationships hold in the multivariate context, net of controls for other factors. The table presents a series of logistic regression models that examine the effects of women's religious and family ties on their current labor force participation,

TABLE 2. ARAB AMERICAN WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION (%) BY RELIGIOSITY AND PRESENCE OF CHILDREN

	Children in Home			No Children in Home		
Religiosity Index	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High
Employment						
Not employed	13.5	25.0	44.4	9.8	12.2	16.4
Employed part time	34.6	31.5	27.8	32.1	29.7	34.5
Employed full time	51.9	43.5	27.8	57.0	58.1	49.1
$n=$	52	92	72	61	74	55
		$\gamma = -.263^{**}$			$\gamma = -.128$	

$^{**}p < .01$.

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR VARIABLES PREDICTING ARAB AMERICAN WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION ($N = 416$)

	Model 1			Model 2		
Predictor	B	SE B	eB	B	SE B	eB
Religious identity						
Muslim affiliation	−.311	.356	.733	−.244	.360	.784
High religiosity over the life cycle	−.640*	.347	.528	.326	.513	1.385
Belief in scriptural inerrancy	−.285†	.244	.752	−.380	.383	.684
Family characteristics						
Married	−.991†	.593	.371	−1.007†	.592	.365
Number of children	−.045	.130	.956	.422	.246	1.525
Any children less than 5 years old	−1.121**	.422	.326	−1.138**	.433	.320
Nonspouse adult in household	.762	.649	2.143	.863	.642	2.371
Additional family income						
Less than $20,000	1.184*	.560	3.266	1.323*	.570	3.755
$20,000–$50,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
More than $50,000	−1.426**	.312	.240	−1.395**	.316	.248
Number of children* high religiosity	—	—	—	−.588*	.252	.555
Constant	−2.040			−3.105		
χ^2	116.48**			122.29**		
df	16			17		
% in labor force	79					

Note: Controls are education, nativity, labor market region, and age (omitted from table). e^b = exponentiated B.
†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

controlling for nativity, educational attainment, labor market region, family income, and age. Model 1 examines the effects of religious and family ties, controlling for other factors, and Model 2 considers an interaction effect between women's religiosity levels and the presence of children.

In support of hypothesis a, Table 3 finds that high religiosity over the life cycle and belief in scriptural inerrancy are related to a lower likelihood of employment among these women, as are marriage and the presence of young children in the home (Model 1). Respondents who believe or strongly believe in scriptural literalism have a 24.8% lower odds of employment compared with other women, and respondents reared in highly religious families who remain very religious in adulthood have a 47.2% lower odds of labor force participation, compared with women who have increased or decreased in religiosity since childhood, and those with low religiosity in childhood and adulthood. The cumulative effect of conservative religious socialization in childhood and continued religious commitment in adulthood is more significant for women's behaviors than is their degree of religiosity in any one phase of the life cycle (analysis not shown). Table 3 also provides support for hypothesis b, finding that Muslim affiliation has negligible effects on women's labor force participation (26.7% lower odds of employment and not significant), relative to women in the sample who affiliate with Christianity or other/no affiliation. This result runs contrary to popular stereotypes that portray the Islamic religion as particularly oppressive of women's public sphere activity (Haddad & Smith, 1996; Read, 2002). In analysis not shown here, I enter each of the three religion variables in separate models and find the same results (i.e., Muslim affiliation is not synonymous with high religiosity).

Model 2 tests the primary research question by including an interaction term for number of children and high religiosity over the life cycle. The findings reveal that high levels of religiosity are most restrictive for women with children in the home, controlling for having young children (< 5 years) in the home. Similar to the results in Table 2, these findings indicate that

children mediate the influences of religiosity on women's employment, supporting hypothesis c. It is also worth noting that marriage has a restrictive effect on women's employment in both models, which follows known patterns among other groups of U.S. women (married women have a 63.0% lower odds of employment compared with other women). The background variables included as controls also operate in the expected direction: Educational attainment and economic necessity increase the likelihood of employment, and additional family income and foreign birth decrease it.

Although the data for this study are cross-sectional and cannot measure changes over the life course, they do contain retrospective questions that allow us to compare the labor force history of married women with high and low levels of religiosity at two stages in the life cycle: (a) after marriage and before children, and (b) after children are present in the home. Compared with women with low levels of religiosity, women with high levels are less likely to be in the labor force in either stage of the life cycle (26.7% compared with 21.3%). Conversely, women with low levels of religiosity are significantly more likely to be employed in both stages of the life course (47.0% compared with 18.6%). Consistent with family role explanations, highly religious women are more likely to exit the labor force once children are present in the home (40.0% compared with 26.8% of women with low levels of religiosity). Highly religious women are also more likely to enter the labor force after children are present in the home (14.7% compared with 4.9%). This may reflect the low number of highly religious women in the labor force in the first place (i.e., there were more women available to enter the labor force because more stayed out of the labor force before having children). It may also reflect unmeasured factors such as economic necessity.

Conclusion

This study investigates the relationships between religion, family, and work among an underresearched population of Arab American women. The primary question is whether religion has a direct relationship with women's work behaviors, or whether it primarily operates through family behaviors that affect women's labor force decisions. Several noteworthy findings emerge from this research that provide further clarification of religious influences on contemporary gendered family roles. First, religious affiliation (Muslim or Christian) is less important than degree of religiosity for determining women's labor force participation. Similar to research on other U.S. ethnoreligious groups, belonging to a community of believers serves to reinforce lifestyles prescribed by that particular community (Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000). Because Islam and Christianity teach similar roles for women, this finding is not completely surprising, but it does run contrary to popular perceptions of Muslim women.

Although religiosity appears to be inversely related to women's labor force participation, the relationship only holds for women with children present in the home. Among women with no children, religiosity is unrelated to employment. Moreover, religiosity is not just operating through increased fertility; women with low and high levels of religiosity were equally likely to have children present in the home. In sum, the influence of religion on women's labor force decisions is most salient at specific phases of the life cycle (i.e., when children are present in the home).

This study is not without limitations, most notably those related to the sample and data. Even though the sample is more geographically diverse than in previous studies on Arab American women, the ability to generalize findings remains limited, which is a common and often unavoidable problem in research on unidentified populations, such as Arab Americans. Given that the sample was drawn from voter registration and membership lists, the most recent immigrants are likely to be underrepresented in the sample, as are the lesser educated women, the most assimilated women, and those who have outmarried or whose surnames have been Anglicized over time. The questionnaire was administered in English because the overwhelming majority (92%) of Arab American women are proficient in the language; however, this strategy likely eliminates some of the foreign-born population. The small sample size also limits the analysis to comparisons between the foreign and native born, rather than across generations.

Because the data are cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, we can only examine women at different stages in the life cycle rather than follow them across their life course. The sample size further limits the examination to two phases

of the life course: after marriage and before children, and after children are present in the home. The findings would be enhanced if we knew whether highly religious women reenter the labor force after their children are grown. Results from prior research suggest that this is indeed the case among conservative Christian women (Sherkat, 2000). Despite their limitations, these data represent the most comprehensive and nationally representative information on Arab American women, and have been used to examine a range of sociological issues such as identity politics (Marshall & Read, 2003), cultural determinants of female employment (Read, 2004; Read, in press), and religious influences on gender ideology (Read, 2003).

In general, the results of this study provide a nuanced understanding of the mechanisms (i.e., family behaviors) by which religion restricts women's labor force participation, but they do not necessarily challenge feminist critiques of religion as a patriarchal institution that legitimizes gender inequality through the maintenance of traditional gendered family roles (Sherkat, 2000). The primary goal of this study, however, was to broaden unidimensional conceptualizations of religion to examine its varying effect on women's behaviors at different phases in the life course. The results suggest that future research on female labor force participation should pay further attention to the interaction between family roles and religious belief systems. Religion may be restrictive of women's public sphere participation, but its effect may not be as universal as previously conceived.

NOTE

I would like to thank Philip Cohen, Michael Emerson, Joy Pixley, and Darren Sherkat for comments on earlier versions of this article. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers at the *Journal of Marriage and Family* for their insightful comments and feedback. All interpretations presented here are my own.

REFERENCES

Aswad, B. (1994). Attitudes of immigrant women and men in the Dearborn area toward women's employment and welfare. In Y. Y. Haddad & J. I. Smith (Eds.), *Muslim communities in North America* (pp. 501–519). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Bartkowski, J. P. (2001). *Remaking the godly marriage: Gender negotiation in evangelical families*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Bilge, B., & Aswad, B. C. (1996). Introduction. In B. C. Aswad & B. Bilge (Eds.), *Family and gender among American Muslims: Issues facing Middle Eastern immigrants and their descendants* (pp. 1–16). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Cainkar, L. (1996). Immigrant Palestinian women evaluate their lives. In B. C. Aswad & B. Bilge (Eds.), *Family and gender among American Muslims: Issues facing Middle Eastern immigrants and their descendants* (pp. 41–58). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Dallalfar, A. (1996). The Iranian ethnic economy in Los Angeles: Gender and entrepreneurship. In B. C. Aswad & B. Bilge (Eds.), *Family and gender among American Muslims: Issues facing Middle Eastern immigrants and their descendants* (pp. 107–128). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Ebaugh, H. R., & Chafetz, J. S. (2000). *Religion and the new immigrants: Continuities and adaptations in immigrant congregations*. New York: Altamira Press.

El-Badry, S. (1994). The Arab-American market. *American Demographics*, *16*, 22–31.

Esposito, J. L. (1998). Women in Islam and Muslim societies. In Y. Y. Haddad & J. L. Esposito (Eds.), *Islam, gender, and social change* (pp. ix–xii). New York: Oxford University Press.

Gallagher, S. K. (2003). *Evangelical identity and gendered family life*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Haddad, Y. Y., & Smith, J. I. (1996). Islamic values among American Muslims. In B. C. Aswad & B. Bilge (Eds.), *Family and gender among American Muslims: Issues facing Middle Eastern immigrants and their descendants* (pp. 19–40). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Hartman, H., & Hartman, M. (1996). More Jewish, less Jewish: Implications for education and labor force characteristics. *Sociology of Religion*, *57*, 175–193.

Heaton, T., & Cornwall, M. C. (1989). Religious group variation in the socioeconomic status and family behavior of women. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *28*, 283–299.

Hertel, B. R. (1988). Gender, religious identity and work force participation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *27*, 574–592.

Lehrer, E. L. (1995). The effects of religion on the labor supply of married women. *Social Science Research*, *24*, 281–301.

Lehrer, E. L. (1999). Married women's labor supply behavior in the 1990s: Differences by life-cycle stage. *Social Science Quarterly*, *80*, 574–590.

Marshall, S. E., & Read, J. G. (2003). Identity politics among Arab-American women. *Social Science Quarterly*, *84*, 875–891.

Naff, A. (1994). The early Arab immigrant experience. In E. McCarus (Ed.), *The development of Arab-American identity* (pp. 23–35). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Read, J. G. (2002). Challenging myths of Muslim women: The influence of Islam on Arab-American women's labor force participation. *Muslim World*, *96*, 18–39.

Read, J. G. (2003). The sources of gender role attitudes among Christian and Muslim Arab-American women. *Sociology of Religion*, *64*, 207–222.

Read, J. G. (2004). *Culture, class, and work among Arab-American women*. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing.

Read, J. G. (in press). Cultural influences on immigrant women's labor force participation: The case of Arab Americans. *International Migration Review*.

Read, J. G., & Bartkowski, J. P. (2000). To veil or not to veil? A case study of identity negotiation among Muslim women living in Austin, Texas. *Gender & Society*, *14*, 395–417.

Sherkat, D. E. (2000). "That they be keepers of the home": The effect of conservative religion on early and late transitions into housewifery. *Review of Religious Research*, *41*, 344–358.

Stier, H., & Tienda, M. (1992). Family, work, and women: The labor supply of Hispanic immigrant wives. *International Migration Review*, *26*, 1291–1313.

U.S. Census Bureau. (1990). *Census of population and housing* (Public-use microdata samples). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Zogby, J. (1990). *Arab America today: A demographic profile of Arab Americans*. Washington, DC: Arab American Institute Foundation.