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### **Title**

Five: The Politics of Aging in a Diverse California

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## THE POLITICS OF AGING IN A DIVERSE CALIFORNIA

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The purpose of this paper is to examine and highlight the demographic significance of aging and diversity in California with a specific focus on the emerging politics of aging in the Latino community. This approach allows us to assess implications for electoral politics and the possibility of an age/race stratification of policy choices. Our chapter seeks to inform California policy makers about the dual challenge of a rapidly aging state where Hispanics will be the new majority and the emergence of old-age concerns among the Latino community.

The political influence of older persons and the impact of a growing Latino population attract much attention from the media and the public at large. Yet, much less concern is given to the question: What happens when Latinos live longer, become a politically influential group and adopt senior-citizen issues as part of their political agenda? And what might that portend for decision making and electoral politics in California? The answers to these questions involve several elements: assessing the demographic phenomena, understanding the politics of aging, overlaying Latino population trends in California with aging and politics, and creating a nexus that includes aging, diversity and politics.

As it ages and Latinizes, California is becoming a prototype of this country's demographic future. The U.S. Census Bureau, for example, projects that, by the year 2050 the United States will be 50 percent more populous than it was in 1995 (Newsweek, 1997). The largest growth will be among Hispanics and the elderly, each of which will represent 20 percent of the country's population. The focus of policy makers and elected officials has been on those two parallel trends: how to respond to the needs and demands of senior citizens and how to respond to the growth and political influence of Hispanics. This focus, however, has not included the overlapping implications of a third trend: the aging of the Latino population and the political implications of a large, Hispanic elderly population in the next century. Understanding this overlapping dimension involves a demographic overview of several related factors.

### **The Demographic Context**

Aging comprises two important variables: life expectancy and growth of the elderly population. Figure 5 shows the increase in life expectancy from 1900 to 1990--a dramatic increase for both men and women. While a gender differential exists among all racial and ethnic groups, with women outliving men, all have enjoyed a long life expectancy, with a growing number of people living into their 80s, 90s and even beyond 100. Longevity is reflected in the growth of the elderly population. By 2000, 13 percent of the population will be 65 and older; and by 2040, that proportion will increase to 21 percent (See Figures 7 and 8). An even greater increase in the elderly population will occur among those 85 years of age and older, four times as many as there are today.

At the same time that the United States as a whole ages, Hispanics will be the fastest growing minority population. The number of Hispanics grew nearly two-fold, from 14 million to 26.5 million, between 1980 and 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993). Given high fertility and immigration rates among this population, the total number of Hispanics is expected to double again, reaching 53 million by 2025 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996).

While that rate of growth is dramatic, projections show that Hispanics are also aging rapidly. The number of elderly Hispanics will quadruple between 1990 and 2020, from 1.1 million to 4.7 million, and will nearly triple, reaching 12.5 million, in another 30 years. Between 1990 and 2030, the non-Hispanic white elderly population (those age 65 and older) is expected to increase 93 percent, while the older minority population is expected to increase by 328 percent. Among them, the number of African American elders will triple, and the number of Asian, Hispanic and native American elders will increase by 693 percent, 555 percent, and 231 percent, respectively (American Association of Retired Persons, 1994; Angel and Hogan, 1994). Currently, Hispanics compose six percent of the U.S. elderly population. By 2050, they will represent 15.5 percent, compared with Asians at 7 percent, African Americans at 10.4 percent and non-Hispanic whites at 67 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996).

Although variations exist within the elderly Hispanic population, (e.g., Cubans have the highest proportion of elderly among Hispanic subgroups) Hispanics in general are relatively young, compared with other population groups (Delgado, 1982). The median age for Hispanics is 26, while the median age for non-Hispanic whites is 33.5. However, this picture will change dramatically by the early twenty-first century. The major contributing factor will be the increase in life expectancy, which will result in Hispanics living longer than ever. Currently, life expectancy for Hispanics is equivalent to that of non-Hispanic whites and considerably higher than that of African-Americans (Markides and Rudkin, 1995). Projections for the twenty-first century indicate that life expectancy will increase for Hispanics, with men age 65 in 2030 reaching 86.2 years and women reaching 89.2 years (Day, 1993). Indeed, according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1996), the number of Hispanics age 85 and over--also known as the "oldest-old" population--will increase from 100,000 to 2.6 million between 1990 and 2050. This is a 26-fold increase. Comparatively, the number of "oldest-old" African Americans will increase seven-fold from 200,000 to 1.4 million during the same period.

The Hispanic population is a diverse group that varies by culture and region. Among them, 63 percent are Mexican-American, 14 percent are Central and South American, 11 percent are Puerto Rican, five percent are Cuban, and eight percent are other Hispanics (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993). Subgroups settle in different regions, given their distinct migration histories. For example, Mexicans and Central and South Americans tend to reside in southwestern states, while Cubans and Puerto Ricans are more likely to live in Florida and New York, respectively (Lacayo, 1993). Despite their regional differences, more than half of Hispanics live in three states--California, Texas and New York (Chapa and Valencia, 1993)--and more than two-thirds are concentrated in 16 specific metropolitan areas. Within these regions, Hispanics will become the largest minority group, outgrowing African-Americans by 2030 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996).

## California: Aging and Latinization

California will be a bellwether state for the growth of both the elderly population and the Hispanic population. California is aging and becoming more diverse. California's elderly population is expected to double from 3.3 million residents age 65 and older in 1993 to 6.6 million by 2020 (San Francisco Examiner, 1996). Although other states, such as Florida, have a higher proportion of persons who are 65 years of age and older, California numerically has the largest elderly population in terms of sheer numbers. The 85-and-older population in this state will nearly triple by 2020.

Along with increasing numbers of elderly Californians, there will also be a shift to a more ethnically diverse older population (Archstone Foundation, 1997). While the proportion of white, older Californians declines among the 65 and older population, from approximately 78 percent in 1990 to 45 percent in 2040, the percentage of Latinos 65 and older will increase from approximately 10 percent in 1990 to 33 percent by 2040 (See Figures 9 and 10).

At the same time that the older population doubles in California, we will see a doubling of the State's overall population by 2040 (Ellis and Riccardi, 1998). Latinos, which will account for 48 percent of the population by that time, will be the largest ethnic group in California. In Los Angeles County, Latinos are expected to be a majority by 2010 and possibly 64 percent of the county's population by 2040. By contrast, whites and African Americans are expected to decline as a proportion of the state population. Higher birth rates and continued foreign immigration will fuel Latino population increases and contribute to its relative youthfulness, compared with whites and African-Americans, for the foreseeable future. By 2030, however, the aging and longevity of this young population will increase the proportion that will be old.

What emerge from these demographic trends, nationally and in California, are the twin developments of aging and Latinization, both on a parallel course. Yet, at some point in the early part of the next century will come a convergence, where increasing numbers of Latinos become older, and their proportion of the elderly population becomes substantial. That convergence is seen in the following diagram. Figure 1 outlines nexuses of three factors: aging, diversity (among Hispanics) and politics. Figure 2 reflects the convergence of aging and Latinization toward a critical mass of older Latinos. When that convergence occurs, we can expect to see the full implications of a politics of aging in the Hispanic community. The youth and middle-aged Latinos of today will age and have sufficient numbers to be visible as a Latino older population. However, we are uncertain about the implications of that trend.

Will Latinos, as they age, become a politically influential force of elders, as we see with older persons in general? Will Latino elders in the next century view their concerns from a Latino or an elderly perspective, as opposed to an old-age focus? Or will Latinos, as they age, become assimilated in the political and policy process as individuals, concerned with their particular immediate needs (e.g., income, family, recreation)?

The answers to these questions are not only important, but necessary. As a population, Latinos already exercise considerable political influence, as seen in increased voting, election of Latinos to political office and high profile positions (e.g., Assembly Speakership, Lt. Governor).

The conventional wisdom has both political parties competing for the Hispanic vote, and pundits predict that the Latino population will be a dominant voice in electoral politics in the next century. What has not been addressed, however, is this: To what extent will Latino older persons be viewed by political leaders and the public at large as an identifiable and visible interest group with a defined agenda reflecting their role as Latino older persons? If older persons in general are politically influential, given their very high rate of registration and voting, can we expect that Latino elders will have similarly high rates of registration and voting? If so, how might they exercise their electoral capabilities? Examining historical developments in the politics of aging lend clues as to what might occur with Latinos as they age.

### **The Politics of Aging**

The politics of aging represent the coming of age of older persons as a political force and the rise of social policies predicated on age as a primary criterion. This was not always so. Life expectancy at birth was about 35 years when the nation was founded and increased to about 42 years by the mid-1800s (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996b). Thus, it comes as no surprise that there were few very old people in those eras. Coupled with the agrarian nature of those societies, the emphasis on youth and physical abilities, and the absence of modern democratic societies, old age was not a prerequisite for political leadership. Gerontocracies, rule by old men, existed from time to time. But organizing by older persons on behalf of older persons and for the purpose of enacting laws benefiting older persons was unknown.

The advent of a politics of aging, where old age is a basis for collective organizing and political actions, is a phenomenon unique to the United States in this century. While the United States moved from its agrarian roots toward cities and westward expansion, older persons, especially the poor, frail and those unable to compete, relied on the willingness and vagaries of their children, neighbors and local charities. Poverty among elderly persons without those safety nets was widespread, and by the 1930s, old age was synonymous with poverty. There were a few exceptions. Civil War veterans and widows received pensions, and some industries, such as railroads, provided retirement benefits. But generally, retirees and the elderly were dependent on others.

The Great Depression was a paradigm shift from historical ambivalence toward elders to the rise of social policies for older persons. The elderly were most vulnerable to the vagaries of economic dislocation and forced migration and found themselves cast adrift. Older persons and middle-class families lost their homes, life savings and a sense of stability. The radicalization of older folks and the subsequent advent of social policies for the elderly took place in the depths of the Great Depression. As early as the 1920s, a group called the Fraternal Order of the Eagles campaigned on behalf of old-age pensions. By the 1930s, others followed that example, especially in areas with a high proportion of retirees (Day, 1990). California was a prominent fixture for both individuals and organizations to use the economic problems of older Americans for political organizing. Upton Sinclair's campaign for Governor in 1933 with his "end poverty in California" agenda rallied retirees with a promise to provide a \$50-per-month pension. The Townsend movement in the early 1930s, based in Long Beach, California, gained national notoriety with Dr. Francis Townsend's plan to give persons age 65 and older \$200 a month, on condition that it be spent within 30 days (Williamson, et. al, 1983). Those and other efforts highlighted the isolation and

social vulnerability of the elderly and gave impetus to President Franklin Roosevelt's proposal for a national social insurance plan--the Social Security Act of 1935.

Today, a plethora of organized interest groups purport to represent older persons. The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the National Association of Retired Federal Employees (NARFE), the National Council on Aging (NCOA), the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare (NCPSSM), the Gray Panthers, the Alzheimer Association, the American Society on Aging, and representatives of providers and service groups such as National Association of Area Agencies on Aging (NAAA) are but a few of the many groups that advocate and lobby on behalf of older persons. The proliferation of interest groups does not always mean that they or the elderly are guaranteed legislative or policy success, and political scientists debate whether the elderly have real or perceived political clout (Binstock, 1987, Hecllo, 1988; Torres-Gil, 1989). What is clear, however, is that elected and public officials take the political demands of older persons and their organizations seriously.

One major reason for the political influence of older persons is their rates of registration and voting. As political participants, older persons are seen as more active than other age groups in electoral politics, with higher voter registration and voting rates (Hudson and Strate, 1984). For example, between the 1964 and the 1988 presidential elections, the percentage of those 65 and older who voted increased from 66 percent to 69 percent, while the proportion of persons age 18 to 24 who voted dropped from 51 percent to 36 percent. Those age 25 to 44 who voted also decreased, from 69 percent to 54 percent. This imbalance also holds for Congressional elections from 1974 to 1986 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1989c). In the 1992 and 1996 presidential election years, 78 percent and 77 percent, respectively, of the persons 65 years and older voted, compared with 69.2 percent and 66.5 percent, respectively, for voters 35 to 44 years old and 48.3 percent and 45.6 percent, respectively, for voters 21 to 24 years old (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997). Given the growing proportion of persons age 65 and older, one can safely assume that older persons will continue to increase their collective electoral muscle.

This electoral muscle is evident in California, as well. In the 1996 elections, 75 percent of those 60 and older--about 3.25 million people--were registered to vote, which was the highest rate among all age groups. Ninety percent (2.9 million) of those registered actually voted (Brinkerhoff, 1997). The political clout of California based old-age organizations may not be as visible as the role that senior citizen advocacy groups play in Washington, D.C. Brinkerhoff (1997) characterizes seniors as having a modest level of real influence in Sacramento, compared with their influence with the U.S. Congress.

The politics of aging in California in the last several decades has been characterized by competing and fragmented organizing on the part of the main California-based organizations: AARP (with 3 million state members), the Congress of California Seniors (and its coalition of 500,000 people), the California Commission on Aging, the 33 Area Agencies on Aging, and the state chapters of the National Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC). These groups have not taken a major role in the major public policy debates around health care, taxation and services to older persons. The California Senior Legislature (CSL), which meets each year in a mock state legislative session, has been successful in promoting a large proportion of its recommended bills, but those tend to be incremental and modest policy proposals. Notwithstanding questions about the relative

impact of political lobbying by older persons in California, this will intensify with the doubling of the state's elderly population. We can expect that, with the high level of registration and voting among California senior citizens, and with high profile issues such as nursing home abuses, reform of health maintenance organizations and the demands for long-term care programs, California's older population will see its political clout grow.

But what about Latino elders? Who represents them? What roles do California's Hispanic senior citizens play in lobbying and advocacy for Hispanic elders?

### **Political Participation Among California's Latino Elders**

Research on the political behavior and participation of older Latinos is sparse. With few exceptions (Torres-Gil, 1982; Torres-Gil and Kuo, 1998), political and policy scientists and Hispanic scholars have not looked at the political role of Latinos as they age. Little is known about what factors might influence their political agendas when they become older and account for a more significant part of the elderly population. What is known, however, gives credence to the possible emergence of a politics of aging in the Latino community, although there will also be issues related to culture, language, immigration, generational cohort and leadership.

What we do know about Hispanics and Hispanic elders is that their voting rates are increasing. As is well known, the Hispanic population is becoming an increasingly important part of the political landscape. As Table 1 shows, they accounted for 8.8 percent of the U.S. population in 1992 and represented a diverse set of Latino sub-populations. In the overall voting population, 3.7 percent were Hispanics, showing that, they are in fact a relatively small part of the electorate. There are various reasons for this, including the fact that they are a relatively young population with lower levels of education and higher levels of poverty; they do not have a long history of civic involvement in the United States (with important exceptions); and a sizable portion are persons who do not speak English and are undocumented (Desipio, 1996a).

Nevertheless, the Hispanic vote is becoming increasingly important in certain states. As Table 2 demonstrates, in 1992, Hispanics accounted for 25.5 percent of the vote in New Mexico, 13.6 percent in Texas, 9.6 percent in California and 9.0 percent in Arizona. Given the projected increase in the Hispanic population over the next 20 to 30 years, we can expect that the percentages will increase. More germane to this discussion are the voting rates of the Hispanic population by age. Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the voting patterns in the 1990 and 1992 elections between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites.

Older Hispanics are more likely to vote than their younger cohorts. For example, in the 1990 election, 44 percent of older Hispanics ages 65 to 74 voted, compared with only 10 percent of those 18 to 20 years old (Figure 3). In addition, two other age groups—those 75 years and older and those 55 to 64 years of age—had the second and third highest voting rates of 33 percent and 34 percent, respectively. Combining the three highest voting age groups—persons age 55 and older, 2.2 million persons were represented, or 16.5 percent of the Hispanic voting-age population in 1990.

In 1992, a similar pattern held among older Hispanics, where 42 percent of those age 65 to 74 voted, compared with only 16 percent of those age 18 to 20 (Figure 4). Persons age 55 to 64 and

those who were 75 years and older had the next highest voting rates, at 45 percent and 36 percent, respectively. And together, the three oldest age groups--those age 55 and older--accounted for approximately 2.4 million individuals, or about 16.7 percent of the voting-age population among Hispanics.

However, the voting rates among Hispanics in general were lower than those of non-Hispanic whites. Despite the difference, voting patterns were consistently the same regardless of race--the older the age group, the higher the voting percentage. One exception was that Hispanics age 75 and older showed a lower voting rate than Hispanics age 65 to 74. This is not unusual; it happens with non-Hispanic whites as well. The lower rate reflects the frailties of old age. Even then, this age group was more likely to vote in 1990 than persons younger than 55. In summary, Hispanics age 55 and older are more likely to vote within their ethnic group and thus may be in a position to play a significant role in the electoral power of the Hispanic community.

### **Implications and Speculation**

If older Hispanics vote in greater proportions than younger Hispanics, what are the implications for a potential politics of aging? What factors may influence or intrude on the development of political agendas among Hispanic older persons, today and in the future?

These data demonstrate that, of the Hispanic population that participates in electoral politics, it is the older segment that is voting. The extent to which this is recognized by Hispanic elected officials is unclear. A literature review does not turn up studies or surveys on this subject. From anecdotal evidence, however, we can surmise that Hispanic city council members, state legislators and Congressional elected officials are well aware that Hispanic senior citizens are a potent segment of their constituencies. One has only to visit senior citizen centers during election time to know that elected officials--Hispanics and non-Hispanics--take this vote seriously.

The larger issue, however, is whether established advocacy groups concerned about social issues and social welfare recognize Hispanic elders as a constituency that engages in political activities. To what extent are Hispanic older voters sought out as potential partners? The answer is: probably not much. In part, Hispanic elders are not organized in the same way as other seniors. There are no major Hispanic old-age groups similar to the AARP. Hispanic senior citizen groups do exist in most communities with large Hispanic populations, but they are usually not actively engaged in organized electoral activities. The two national organizations purporting to represent Hispanic elders--the National Hispanic Council on Aging and the Asociacion Nacional Por Personas Mayores--are non-profit groups that provide social services and policy advocacy. Established organizations like the AARP, National Council on Aging, and National Council of Senior Citizens, do not have an identifiable agenda of Latino issues, although their large memberships undoubtedly include some Hispanics.

Thus, what we know about a politics of aging in the Hispanic community is that: 1) the Latino population is growing; 2) Latinos are living longer; and 3) as they age, they have higher voting rates. Beyond these three facts, not much more is known about their proclivity to organize as senior citizens and the political agendas and electoral behavior they are likely to have as they become a large core of older Latino voters. More research and policy analysis, including focus



groups, surveys and longitudinal studies that assess voting behavior as well as older Latinos involvement in mainstream aging advocacy organizations is clearly needed. Moreover, further investigation of the extent to which aging advocacy groups represent the interests of older Latinos is in order. In doing these investigations, several issues come into play that will shed light on the potential development of a politics of aging.

### **Factors Affecting a Politics of Aging**

- **Naturalization Rates:** For many decades, naturalization rates among Hispanics, especially Mexican-Americans, were quite low. That has changed in recent years. According to estimates by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the number of naturalized persons has increased from 270,000 in 1990 to approximately 1.1 million in 1996. This will add to the pool of registered Latino voters. The proportion of Latino elders naturalizing in their old age is difficult to gauge, but observation shows that significant numbers of Hispanic elderly are becoming citizens. Torres-Gil and Kuo (1998) estimate that approximately 20 percent of naturalized persons age 55 years and older (about 400,000 elderly Hispanics) will become citizens. Thus, a combination of younger naturalized persons who will age, and Hispanic elders now becoming citizens will add to the pool of future Latino elder voters.
- **Policy Backlash:** The fears and insecurity engendered by welfare reform and threats to public benefits and services (Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, emergency health services and food stamps) and public controversies over immigrants and undocumented persons, has had an unsettling effect on Latinos, both citizens and non-citizens. In part, this development has propelled more to become naturalized and to register with the Democratic Party. However, what this tendency means over the long term as they become older is uncertain. But one clue is that today's non-Hispanic elderly are staunch supporters of public entitlements because of their experiences with the Great Depression and World War II.
- **Assimilation and Cultural Changes:** Latinos do change as they age and do become more assimilated by the second and third generations. Greater heterogeneity within the Latino population will mean greater numbers that are first-generation--Spanish--speaking large families, adhering to traditions from their countries of origin--as well as those that are more likely to speak English, have smaller families, are better educated, and are more geographically dispersed. This heterogeneity may work against a common political agenda. Not all Latino elders will be concerned with immigration and relations with Mexico and Latin America, and not all will see their priority identity as Hispanics. More may become "Americanized" and focus on the concerns of their states and the United States.
- **Longevity and Old-Age Concerns:** Evidence indicates that, as individuals become older, especially as they move into the "old-old" category (75 years and older), they acquire a common concern about long-term care, affordable medical care, retirement security, pension solvency and age discrimination. This leveling effect may influence

Latinos, as they age, to adopt senior citizen concerns, irrespective of ethnicity and assimilation, and reinforce a politics of aging.


- **Cohort Effects:** Each generation of older persons has different views about government and their communities based on the historical experiences they shared with members of their own generations. Thus, today's elders--the New Dealers--support Social Security and Medicare, are relatively conservative and believe that government can do good. Baby boomers, the large, post-World War II generation born from 1946 to 1964, are more suspicious of big government (and big labor and big business) and less willing to support public interventions. Generation X and the Baby boomlet, two younger cohorts, may have different views. Latinos are part of each of these cohorts, and they too may have political attitudes and public views that represent their particular cohorts, not just their ethnic group.
- **Age/Race Stratification:** For the next twenty years, notwithstanding the aging of the Latino population, most older persons will be white and English-speaking, and most Latinos will be younger. This has prompted some social scientists and pundits to proclaim a generational and racial conflict between older white retirees and younger Latino workers and taxpayers. Whether or not this leads to age and race stratification among voters in California is speculation, but there may be some tensions between the needs of older voters (largely non-minority) who are concerned with taxation, pension solvency and quality of life and the needs of younger voters, increasingly minorities, concerned about employment, educational opportunities and taxation. In time, however, all Latinos and minorities will age, and they, too, will embrace old-age issues.

### **Closing Comments**

There is still a window of opportunity to examine the demographic, social and political trends affecting older persons and Latinos. The aging and Latinization of California and much of the nation are twin developments that will make for a dynamic and fluid environment over the next twenty to thirty years. The growth of a Latino elder constituency and the political agendas that emanate from this third development raise intriguing questions that should be explored during this intervening period. What is clear is that the consequences of these trends will reshape California public policy and political processes.

## The Nexus of Aging, Diversity and Politics


Figure 1



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
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Figure 2




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**Figure 3. The 1990 Election: Percent Voting by Age Groups**



Source: Torres-Gil, F. and Kuo, T. (1999). Social Policy and the Politics of Hispanic Aging. *Journal of Gerontological Social Work*, vol. 30, no. 1/2, p. 151


**Figure 4. The 1992 Election: Percent Voting by Age Groups**



Source: Torres-Gil, F. and Kuo, T. (1998). Social Policy and the Politics of Hispanic Aging. *Journal of Gerontological Social Work*, vol. 30, no. 1/2, p. 152

## Americans are Living Longer

**Figure 5. Life Expectancy at Birth by Gender, 1900-1990**



Reproduced: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. (1996, August). *Chronic Care in America: 21st Century Challenge*. San Francisco: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, p. 16


**Figure 6. Increases in Life Expectancy**



Reproduced: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. (1996, August). *Chronic Care in America: 21st Century Challenge*. San Francisco: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, p. 16


## Distribution of Elderly Population, by Age Groups, 1990-2040

Figure 7. Percentage of population  
65-84 years of age



Reproduced: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. (1996 August). *Chronic Care in America: A 21st Century Challenge*. San Francisco: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, p. 17.


Figure 8. Percentage of Population  
Over 84 years of age



Reproduced: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. (1996 August). *Chronic Care in America: A 21st Century Challenge*. San Francisco: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, p. 17.


## Diversity is Increasing Among California's Older Population

**Figure 9. The Proportion of White Older Californians Is Declining Among the 65 and Over Population**



Reproduced: Archstone Foundation. (1997). *The Future of Growing Older in California: Understanding the Current Context 1997-2000*. p. 19. Work In Progress.

**Figure 10. Percent African-American and Latino of the California Population 65 Years and Over**



Reproduced: Archstone Foundation. (1997). *The Future of Growing Older In California: Understanding the Current Context*. p. 19. Work In Progress.

**Table 1. National Overview on Hispanic Population and Voting Rate  
In the United States--1992**

Population	251,447,000
Hispanic Population	22,096,000
% Hispanic in the total population	8.8
% Mexican Americans in the Hispanic Populatio	63.6
% Puerto Ricans in the Hispanic Population	10.6
% Cuban Americans in the Hispanic Population	4.7
% Other Hispanics in the Hispanic Population	21.2
Voting Population	113,866,000
Hispanic Voters	4,238,000
% Hispanic in the voting population	3.7
Hispanic adult non-citizens	5,910,000
Electoral votes	538

Source: Torres-Gil, F. and Kuo, T. (1998). Social Policy and the Politics of Hispanic Aging. *Journal of Gerontological Social Work*, vol. 30, no. 1/2, p. 149

**Table 2. Latino Share of the 1992 Statewide Vote in Selected States**

State	Total Vote	Latino Vote	% Latino of statewide vote
Arizona	1,728,000	156,000	9.0
California	11,789,000	1,135,000	9.6
Colorado	1,688,000	136,000	8.1
Florida	5,772,000	411,000	7.1
Illinois	5,650,000	171,000	3.0
New Jersey	3,572,000	173,000	4.8
New Mexico	675,000	172,000	25.5
New York	7,613,000	382,000	5.0
Texas	6,817,000	927,000	13.6

Source: Torres-Gil, F. and Kuo, T. (1998). Social Policy and the Politics of Hispanic Aging. *Journal of Gerontological Social Work*, vol. 30, no. 1/2, p. 150



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