UC San Diego

UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Frontiers and borders : sources of transcendent credibility and the boundaries between political units

Permalink

https://escholarship.org/uc/item/84b1t6kz

Author

Williamson, Rosco

Publication Date

2007

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Frontiers and Borders:
Sources of Transcendent Credibility and the Boundaries between Political Units

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Rosco Williamson

Committee in charge:

Professor David Mares, Chair
Professor Alan Houston
Professor Richard Madsen
Professor Victor Magagna
Professor Michael Monteon

2007

Copyright

Rosco Williamson, 2007

All rights reserved

The dissertation of Rosco Williamson is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____
Chair

University of California, San Diego

2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signature Page.....iii

Table of Contents.....iv

List of Tables.....vi

Vita. vii

Abstract.....viii

Chapter 1: Theory.....1

Why Is This Question Worth Asking?.....3

Dependent Variable: Boundary Distinctiveness.....14

Proposed Explanation.....18

Changes in the Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility.....27

Chapter 2: Methodology.....51

Operationalization.....52

Methodology.....64

Implications of the Hypothesis.....67

Plan of the Dissertation.....69

Chapter 3: China: The Sui and T'ang Dynasties.....73

Unification of China under the Sui and T'ang Dynasties (589-700).....75

China and Tibet (620-800).....99

Chapter 4: Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century Central Asian Islamic Empires.....122

Fifteenth Century Central Asia.....124

Sixteenth Century Central Asia.....142

Chapter 5: Medieval Europe, 400-1000.....167

Christendom.....170

The Carolingian Empire and the Saxons.....182

The Vikings.....203

Chapter 6: The Protestant Reformation, 1517-1565.....223

Ideology: A Priesthood of All Believers.....224

The Establishment of Lutheranism.....238

The Establishment of Calvinism.....254

The Catholic Reaction.....264

Changing Distinctiveness of Boundaries.....269

Chapter 7: The Thirty Years' War: From God to Proto-Nationalism.....279

The Significance of the Addition of the Nation.....281

The Ideological Development of the Change.....302

Richelieu as Innovator of Proto-Nationalism.....311

Distinctive Boundaries: The Peace of Westphalia 1648.....323

Chapter 8: The "Westphalian" States System.....331

Ideological Foundations of Nationalism.....334

Impact on the Political Boundaries of Europe.....374

Chapter 9: Implications.....384

References.....417

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.....46

VITA

1992	Bachelor of Arts, Northwest Nazarene College (Chemistry, History)
1998	Master of Arts, San Diego State University (History)
2000-2003	Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego
2002	Master of Arts, University of California, San Diego (Political Science)
2003-2006	Adjunct Professor of History and Political Science Point Loma Nazarene University
2006-present	Assistant Professor of Political Science Point Loma Nazarene University
2007	Doctor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego (Political Science)

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science (International Relations and Political Theory)

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Frontiers and Borders:

Sources of Transcendent Credibility and the Boundaries between Political Units

by

Rosco Williamson

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2007

Professor David Mares, Chair

Rather than starting with physical form as "state"-centered theories do, a more useful theoretical model should begin with the content of political units. Specifically, this model should examine a crucial element of the content of a political unit, the "source of transcendent credibility," and analyze the effects this has on the physical form of political units in a given system.

Hence, this dissertation hypothesizes that the boundaries between political units in a given system will be relatively more distinctive as the number of sources of

transcendent credibility within that system increases. A source of transcendent credibility is an unseen (transcendent) force that a critical mass of the population in a territory believes to be acting on behalf of and in favor of the "faithful." To more efficiently and effectively generate compliance from the people, a ruler will link his own credibility to this inherently credible source. Competing sources of transcendent credibility within a system increase the perceived threat to the ruler's source of efficient compliance generation. The cost-effectiveness of this means of generating compliance creates large incentives for the investment of resources to protect the source's efficacy. One potential threat arises from the fact that an international rival can improve its' bargaining power vis-à-vis a ruler by undermining the ruler's source of transcendent credibility, provided the two rivals rely on different sources of transcendent credibility. Second-tier variables, geopolitics and military capabilities, can exacerbate the perceived threat from an international rival that depends on a different source of transcendent credibility.

The dissertation tests this hypothesis using case studies that vary in both time and space: the unification of northern and southern China under the Sui and T'ang, the eighth century rivalry between China and Tibet, the rise of the Shiite Safavid Empire alongside the Sunni Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, and the European continent from the medieval period to the present. The extended European case examines the dynamic of changing numbers of sources of transcendent credibility in a system and responses to these changes. The conclusion discusses the implications for the future global system and the discipline of Political Science.

CHAPTER 1: THEORY: THE NUMBER OF SOURCES OF TRANSCENDENT CREDIBILITY AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF BOUNDARIES

A. Introduction
B. Why Is This Question Worth Asking?
   1. The International Question
   2. The Political Unit Formation Question
C. Dependent Variable: Boundary Distinctiveness
D. Proposed Explanation
   1. Explanatory Variables
   2. Effects of Explanatory Variables on Boundary Distinctiveness
   3. Resulting Hypothesis
E. Changes in the Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility
   1. The Choices Available to Rulers
   2. The Impact of Ideas
   3. Ruler Responses to Declining Credibility
   4. Putting It All Together

Introduction

Is a "borderless world" an approaching fact or simply wishful thinking?[1] Borders are often the scene and the source of conflict. Some reason that, as experiments in regional integration and the inexorable forces of globalization blur these traditional lines in the sand, perhaps traditional conflicts will dissipate as well. And so, social scientists longing for a peaceful future rejoice in the malfunction and breakdown of the nation-state and its exclusionary boundaries.[2] What comes next is still the stuff of speculation.

Whether these predictions hold true or not, they do make clear that our social science theories are woefully limited. Political Science's obsession with the nation-

[1] See Kenichi Ohmae (1999), *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy*, revised ed. (New York: Collins); Oscar Schachter (1997), "The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 36: 7-23.

[2] Zygmunt Bauman (2002), *Society Under Siege* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers).

state as a fundamental unit of analysis is apparent from inter-*national* relations to *state* formation.[3] But the state is not the only form of political unit to have existed and, if predictions of borderlessness are even partly accurate, not the only type that ever will. It is but one of many institutional options.[4] This narrow analytic focus on the state hinders us from looking back through history, envisioning the future, and even asking the right questions of the present.[5] A theory is needed that can encompass and explain the existence of the nation-state, but that can also look beyond it and explain the existence of other forms of political units.

This dissertation develops a theory to explain the variety of physical forms political units assume. An important characteristic of a unit's physical form is the boundary that is the furthest extent of its authority. This boundary can be distinct, demarcated, ratified, or even patrolled in order to control the flow of goods, ideas, and people across it.[6] Such a defined boundary is needed to fulfill the requirements of the modern nation-state, for example. On the other hand, a boundary can be indistinct, a

---

[3] Jens Bartelson (2001), *The Critique of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[4] See for example, Hendrik Spruyt (1994), *The Sovereign States and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Joyce Marcus and Gary M Feinman (1998), "Introduction," in *Archaic States*, Marcus and Feinman, eds. (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press): 3-14; Guillermo Algaze (1993), *The Uruk World-System: The Dynamics of Expansion in Early Mesopotamian Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); TK Earle, ed. (1991), *Chiefdoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); John Gerard Ruggie (1993), "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47(1): 139-174.

[5] Richard Ashley (1996), "The Achievements of Poststructuralism," in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 240-53; Robert BJ Walker (1993), *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[6] James Sidaway (2002), "Signifying Boundaries: Detours Around the Portuguese-Spanish Borderlands," *Geopolitics* 7(1):139-164.

site where the authority of two (or more) political units overlaps to various degrees, such as is common in feudalism.[7]

This dissertation argues that the physical form of political units in a system depends on the ideological content of the units. Each unit relies on a "source of transcendent credibility" to generate compliance from the people. Transcendent credibility is the rarely questioned credibility that the people ascribe to an entity that exists beyond the material world, for example a god or a nation. Authority figures enhance their own credibility by linking their credibility to that of the transcendent source. Rulers are therefore very sensitive to potential threats to these compliance-generating ideologies and will act to reduce them. The proposition is that as the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system increases, the physical form of the political units will change and the distinctiveness of the boundaries between political units will increase.

Why Is This Question Worth Asking?

The International Question

My dissatisfaction with the existing international relations literature concerns scope. Neo-realism and neo-liberalism are limited to a states system.[8] Both of these theories begin with the assumption that the nation-state is the fundamental unit of

---

[7] Otto Hintze (1929), "The Nature of Feudalism," in Frederic L Cheyette, ed., *Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe*: 22-31; John Gerard Ruggie (1986), "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35(2): 261-86; Kathleen Thompson (2002), *Power and Border Lordship in Medieval France: The County of Perche, 1000-1226* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer).

[8] For example, see John Gerard Ruggie's review of Kenneth N Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* in "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35(2): 261-86.

analysis.[9] Thus, international systems for which this is not true are beyond the scope of their explanatory powers. Some systems contain nation-states co-existing with very un-state-like political units.[10] Other systems consist of no nation-states at all.[11] Further, since the nation-state is a modern intellectual construction, the assumption is not valid beyond the modern era.[12] This limits the existence of the states system to 1648 to present, at the most.[13] Some have construed this window more narrowly, arguing the states system only begins with the European nationalist movements of the late 1700s.[14] When we add place to these time limitations, we reduce the applicability

---

[9] The common state-centric assumptions of neo-realism and neo-liberalism are discussed in David Baldwin, ed. (1993), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press); Bartelson (2001), *The Critique of the State*. On neo-realism, see, for example: Kenneth N Waltz (1979), *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley): 94; Robert G. Gilpin (1986), "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert O Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press): 304-305; Robert Gilpin (1981), *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press): 15-39; Stephen Krasner (1985), *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press): 28; Joseph M Grieco (1997), "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, edited by Michael W Doyle and G John Ikenberry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press): 163-201. On neo-liberalism, see, for example: Robert O Keohane (1984), *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 63-67; Francis Fukuyama (1992), *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton); Richard Rosecrance (1986), *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books); John Gerard Ruggie, ed. (1993), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press).

[10] For example, the early modern European system: Hendrik Spruyt (1994), *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

[11] Political units in the Ancient world consisted of chiefdoms, "archaic states," and a variety of transitional forms in between: Gary M Feinman and Joyce Marcus, eds. (1998), *Archaic States* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press): 4-7. For the Middle Ages see Janet L Abu-Lughod (1989), *Before European Hegemony: The World System, AD 1250-1350* (New York: Oxford University Press).

[12] Anthony D Smith (1998), *Nationalism and Modernity* (London: Routledge).

[13] Hans Morgenthau (1978), *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed (New York, Alfred A Knopf): 280; Daniel Engster pushes this date to later in the 17th century, because he argues it took time for the ideas put forward at Westphalia to catch on and become practice, *Divine Sovereignty: The Origins of Modern State Power* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001).

[14] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

of the dominant theories to strictly Europe for all but the late twentieth century.[15] This excludes most of human history.

The discipline needs a theory capable of explanation *beyond* the states system. This does not mean the states system is irrelevant – far from it. The dominant theories prove relatively useful because they focus on the times in which they are practiced. However, unless the world has truly arrived at the "end of history," the states system will not endure forever. Further, current theories tell us very little about the interaction of political units prior to the invention of "states."[16]

A theory is needed that contains what came before, what may come after, and the states system of the present. A theory narrowly focused on the present sufficiently answers some questions. As a result, there has not been an overwhelming outcry against the paradigms with which we live. However, many questions beg for something more. In fact, the current paradigm of state-centrist theory *limits* the

---

[15] See, for example: Elie Kedourie (1960), *Nationalism* (London); Julia Adeney Thomas (2001), *Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Political Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

[16] This is not to say attempts have not been made. However, in order to use the tools of neo-realism or neo-liberalism, many authors must begin by assuming that the units they are examining are state-like. Such a connection is difficult to maintain in most cases. See, for example: Bruce Russett and William Antholis (1993), "The Imperfect Democratic Peace of Ancient Greece," in *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 43-71; Markus Fischer (1992), "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization* 46: 427-466. On criticism of Fischer's treatment of medieval French barons as state-like units, see: Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V Kratochwil (1993), "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization* 47: 479-500; John Gerard Ruggie (1993), "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47: 139-174.

In his model of medieval and early modern Europe, Hendrik Spruyt does not assume that the political units are state-like. In this, his work is superior to other pre-states-system analyses. However, because he looks at a given variety of institutional forms in a single historically-determined context, his model resists generalization to include other networks of institutional forms and contexts. Spruyt (1994), *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*.

questions that we think to ask.[17] For example, it is probable that the literature of "state failure" in Africa asks the wrong questions. This literature aims at improving the stability and survivability of African states. Yet, if conditions are such that something *other than* a state is called for, then an artificial superimposition of the state structure may *never* succeed. "State failure" exists because the ideological foundations required for a territorial nation-state are absent. If this is true then the literature should not be asking how states can succeed in Africa, but what type of political organization the conditions of Africa demand. This can only occur if our theories do not presuppose the state.

Another issue requiring a more fundamental theory is the future direction of the international system. The argument that has emerged pits those who believe the state is withering away against those who insist the state is durable, successfully weathering the current storms.[18] The withering/weathering debate is important because the future of international interaction is implicated in it. Unfortunately, neo-realism and neo-liberalism shed scant light on this dialogue. If the nation-state is a starting assumption, how can a theory envision anything beyond it? A more

---

[17] Thomas Kuhn (1962), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Bartelson (2001), *The Critique of the State*. "Postmodern" international relations scholar Richard Ashley self-consciously seeks to undermine the dominant theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism in order that "new ways of thinking and doing global politics might be opened up," "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," *Millennium* 17 (1988): 254.

[18] On withering: Susan Strange (1996), *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Michael Walzer (1992), "The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem," *Dissent* 39: 164-171; Michael Mann (1997), "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?," *Review of International Political Economy* 4: 472-97; Charles Tilly (1992), Futures of European States," *Social Research* 59. On weathering: Spruyt (1994), *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*: 183-194; Stephan Krasner (1999), *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Gregory Gause (1992), "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs* 45: 441-469; Jeffrey Herbst (1990), "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa," *World Development* 18: 949-58.

fundamental theory would embrace a variety of international systems and discuss the mechanisms and causes of system change. Such a theory would present the conditions necessary for change or stability, postulate the mechanisms of change, and envision likely outcomes of a future system transformation.

A more fundamental theory will also allow us to gain a clearer understanding of why current paradigms and theories are so applicable today. Such a theory will *not* contradict the basic tenets of current theories. Instead, it will be able to derive the premises and assumptions of current theory from more basic assumptions and premises. Thus, the current states system will be a subset of the total cases a fundamental theory would include.

Going beyond the *state as unit* demands a better understanding of what a unit is. This dissertation will argue that a unit consists of both *form* (geographical, physical being) and *content* (reason for being). Neither aspect of the political unit can be ignored. The two aspects are mutually constitutive as well.[19] Getting beyond the state requires a focus on this constitutive interaction between a unit's form and content. Every political unit must exist in physical space. This begs the question of what exactly it is that exists. To answer this, we must turn to the content of the unit – the reason of the unit's being. Martin Heidegger is well known for his elaboration of the distinction between two types of "being."[20] A rock *exists* – meaning it consumes physical space – but a rock does not exist in the same sense that person *exists* –

---

[19] Alexander Wendt (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid, eds. (2001), *Identities, Borders, and Orders: Rethinking International Relations Today* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

[20] Martin Heidegger (1996), *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press).

meaning the person also has a reason for being. A political unit also exists in both senses. This dissertation will look closely at what content means in terms of the political unit, and will then examine the effects that content has on the physical form a political unit assumes.

Realist and Neo-liberal models take the form of the unit as the starting point of analysis: specifically, the State. By contrast, I argue that the content of the unit, existing in a systemic matrix of other units with other contents, affects the physical form the unit will take. The form taken then feeds back and affects the content of the unit in a cyclical pattern. Form and content of a political unit must be seen as mutually constitutive. Beginning the process of analysis with the content rather than the form of political units enables international relations scholars to break out of the theoretical iron cage of the nation-state.

The Political Unit Formation Question

It is "state formation" that dominates Comparative Political Science literature. As discussed above, this means that a general process applicable over a wide range of historical and spatial contexts is lacking. For example, Western scholars suggest that the two key mechanisms of state formation in early modern Europe were the spread of citizenship and the formation of bureaucracies to pay for war. However, R Bin Wong argues that these variables were irrelevant in the case of China: European dominance of the discipline of Political Science has shackled the study of China's history to the

state-centered paradigm.[21] It is crucial that Political Science concern itself with the formation of *political units*, broadly speaking, rather than the formation of nation-states.

The process of a political unit's formation is crucially important to that unit's reason of being, in other words its' content. This is because once a particular method of obtaining compliance has been instituted during the process of formation, there are large costs associated with changing these institutions.[22] Political units sometimes have incentives to maintain very inefficient and costly institutions.[23] In short, the content of a political unit is a difficult thing to change once established.

Modern political philosophy often approaches the formation of political units through a discussion of how governments emerge from a State of Nature.[24] The central questions in this tradition involve how and why mankind moves from a condition of absolute individual freedom (the State of Nature) to a condition in which a government limits the individual's freedom (the present condition). This transformation can be treated as a bargain between two actors: the would-be ruler and the people considered as a whole. The State of Nature is conceived to be deficient in some way and, therefore, the two actors bargain over the creation of a new institution to remedy these deficiencies.

---

[21] R Bin Wong (1997), *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 93-101.

[22] On institutional lock-in, see Douglass C North (1991), *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[23] Douglass C North and Robert P Thomas (1973), *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Douglass C North (1981), *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: Norton); Margaret Levi (1997), *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 58-66.

[24] Richard Tuck (1999), *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); John Rawls (1971), *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press).

Bargaining theory recognizes that the outcome of the bargain will be heavily influenced by the relative bargaining powers of the actors. Thus, a crucial question in this scenario is which actor has the bargaining advantage. Both actors begin with definite bargaining disadvantages. The would-be ruler does not have coercive resources at his disposal, primarily because he is not yet a ruler who can command resource extraction. Likewise, the "people as a whole" are not a single actor until they are able to overcome their collective action problem – a highly unlikely possibility given the conditions of the State of Nature. Hence, neither actor obviously appears to have an advantage over the other in terms of bargaining.

On one side of the discussion, some theorists have argued that the people as a whole have the bargaining advantage: the would-be ruler's bargaining position is extremely weak until the people provide him with the resources to rule. Thomas Hobbes argued that the intense insecurity of each person in the State of Nature provided enough incentive to overcome any collective action problem they faced.[25] John Locke agreed with this perspective, though he emphasized that the primary motivator was the insecurity a lack of property rights caused.[26] In both cases, individuals recognized that the costs of not solving their collective action problem were so great that it was possible to at least create a focal point for compliance generation. Seventeenth-century political philosopher Samuel Pufendorf enhanced

[25] Thomas Hobbes (1991 [1651]), *Leviathan*, Richard Tuck ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[26] John Locke (1988 [1689]), *Two Treatises of Government*, Richard Ashcraft, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

this perspective by adding an intermediate step to Hobbes' mechanism.[27] Pufendorf argued that fear of the elements and wild animals compelled individuals to live in close association with each other for mutual protection. The greatest threat, according to Pufendorf, was Nature, not other humans. Thus, men developed "natural sociability" (*socialitas*). This trait enabled them to more effectively overcome their collective action problem.

A more recent (and radical) version of the perspective that the people as a whole dominated the bargain comes from the economist Yoram Barzel.[28] Not only were the people able to overcome the collective action problem and set up *their* government, Barzel argues that they also agreed on and institutionalized restrictions on the power of the soon-to-be ruler in order to prevent him from acting against their interests after the bargain was struck. Barzel's problem with Hobbes is that rational people would not agree to the unenforceable bargain of government creation as outlined in *Leviathan*. Neither would they assume the ruler would be naturally motivated to protect the property rights of the people, as Locke had believed. Hence, if the people could solve the collective action problem to form a government, it stands to reason that they also could and would place restrictions on the future activities of the newly formed government.

---

[27] Samuel Pufendorf (1934), *De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (The Law of Nature and Nations)*, Walter Simons, ed., CH and WA Oldfather, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press); see also Tuck (1999), *The Rights of War and Peace*: 140-65. A more thorough comparison of the State of Nature arguments of these theorists can be found in Robert Wokler (2001), *Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 44-60.

[28] Yoram Barzel (2002), *A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

The problem with this perspective is that there is little to suggest that such a large collective action problem could be overcome without some sort of leadership.[29] If this is true, then there is every reason to believe that these leaders would be the same as the would-be rulers of the bargain. In short, the very process of overcoming the collective action problem gave the bargaining advantage to the would-be rulers. This is the position taken by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.[30] He argued that the relatively wealthy in the State of Nature were able to coordinate the activities of other individuals, leading progressively to the establishment of government. A similar argument is made by the "organized violence" literature, initiated by the economic historian Frederic C Lane.[31] In this argument, rulers used coercion to continue to extract resources from the people. The people, for their part, accept the situation because they desired protection, even if it was protection from the ruler himself. A powerful individual institutionalized his rule in order to ensure a perpetual source of revenue. The situation has been said to resemble a "protection racket."

However, the organized violence perspective fails to discuss how these early rulers developed their coercive resources in the first place. In addition, while it may account for conquest, it does little to explain consolidation of rule. Another ingredient is required to understand the development of authority – coercion alone is insufficient. This is provided in the post-Marxist views of Antonio Gramsci and more recent Neo-

---

[29] Russell Hardin (1982), *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).

[30] Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1973 [1755]), "Discourse on the Origins of Inequality," in GDH Cole, ed., *The Social Contract and Discourses* (London: Everyman's Library).

[31] Frederic C Lane (1958), "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," *Journal of Economic History* 18: 401-17; Lane (1966), "The Economic Meaning of War and Protection," in *Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C Lane* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press); Margaret Levi (1983), "The Predatory Theory of Rule," in Michael Hechter, ed., *The Microfoundations of Macrosociology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press); Charles Tilly (1992), *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell).

Gramscian authors.[32] Gramsci argued that political authority has two objectives: setting up the means of coercion and securing the active consent of the governed. The latter objective can also be expressed in the negative: demobilizing the governed in order to prevent active dissent. In either case, this is accomplished through ideological practices that Gramsci labels "hegemony." Both hegemony and force are needed to consolidate rule.

The Gramscian view fits neatly between the two perspectives mentioned earlier: government as a solution to the collective action problem and government as a protection racket. The former perspective focuses on how the development of institutions creates a legitimacy that produces the active consent of the governed. The latter perspective concentrates on how would-be rulers institutionalize, and thereby legitimate, the means of coercion. Yet, neither perspective presents a complete picture of political unit formation. In both, one bargainer is seen as active while the other is perceived as passive. In order to develop a more complete theory of political unit formation, both bargainers must be able to act. Barzel begins to move in this direction as he forces the people as a whole to consider the future actions of the would-be ruler.[33] Yet Barzel does not provide an adequate reason why the people as a whole can so effectively overcome their collective action disadvantage. I argue that such a solution required a leadership core. That such a group or individual would exist forces

---

[32] Antonio Gramsci (1978), *Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926* (London: Lawrence and Wishart); Nicos Poulantzas (1973), *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books); Poulantzas (1978), *State, Power, and Socialism* (London: New Left Books); Chantal Mouffe (1979), "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* (London: Routledge); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1982), *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (London: New Left Books); Bob Jessop (1982), "Hegemony, Force, and State Power," in *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods* (New York: New York University Press): 142-210.

[33] Barzel (2002), *A Theory of the State*: 26-27, 113-54.

our theory to give more weight to the bargaining position of the would-be ruler vis-à-vis the people as a whole than Barzel allows.

Therefore, this dissertation begins with the premise that the would-be ruler must first obtain some means of generating voluntary compliance from the people. This requires the would-be ruler to overcome a credibility problem: why should the people believe the ruler will fulfill his end of the bargain after they comply? The would-be ruler solves this problem by appropriating already existing sources of credibility, what will be termed "transcendent credibility," and linking it to his own credibility. This will provide sufficient compliance to allow the ruler to gather some resources, which he will then turn around an invest in developing further means of coercion and hegemony. As his physical and ideological means of securing compliance increase, his authority will be consolidated. Further, once these paths are embarked on, the ruler will find it very costly to change directions. This means the ruler will invest in protecting the validity of both the source of transcendent credibility among the people and the means of linking that credibility to his own. From this argument, I hypothesize that a political unit's source of transcendent credibility and the ideological linkage to a ruler's credibility form the key components of that unit's content and that this has implications on the physical form the unit will take in relation to other units in the system.

Dependent Variable: Boundary Distinctiveness

Political scientists and sociologists are well aware that political units come in a variety of physical forms. In his 1994 book, Hendrik Spruyt presented a sampling:

territorial states, city-states, city leagues, and empires.[34] Scholars are also aware that the differences in the physical forms of these units have consequences on inter-polity interaction. For example, an empire's relationship with its peripheral territories is very different than a nation-state's interaction with its borderlands.[35] The dissertation will use the "distinctiveness of boundaries" as a means of analyzing the variation in the physical forms of political units. This section will outline why boundary distinctiveness is a useful proxy, the meaning of "distinctiveness," and the range of that variable.

All political units exist in physical space.[36] Put simply, a political unit consists of people and people exist in space. Political units are also composed of a combination of ruler-ruled relationships. In some cases, an individual only has one dominant ruler-ruled relationship, while in other cases a person may have many ruler-ruled relationships in varying degrees. An analogy can be made to gravity: one object may be drawn gravitationally toward many objects, but these attractions will probably not all carry equal weight.

There are many advantages for political units that organize their authority in terms of concentrated territory. First, a political authority often faces the difficulties of competition. In some instances, individuals can readily defect from one authority to another, thereby inducing a bidding war of sorts between the authorities.[37] Just as competition in a market drives prices down, competition between authorities decreases

---

[34] Spruyt (1994), *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*.

[35] Michael Doyle (1986), *Empires* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Mann (1989), *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[36] This is not the same as saying that all political units are territorially continuous.

[37] Albert O Hirschman (1970), *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Harvard: Harvard University Press): 21-29.

the value of having authority. Second, the sunk costs of government infrastructure make it more efficient to concentrate ruler-ruled relationships geographically. For example, it is generally much more cost effective for a ruler to place one judge in a discrete territory where the population is entirely under the ruler's authority, than to place two or more judges across a larger, less-defined area that is shared with other political authorities.

One of the basic assumptions of the nation-state is that a distinct, highly structured border surrounds the political unit. Within this geographical zone, a single political authority (the state) holds a monopoly of power. This is a reasonable assumption that provides useful theories with respect to current international relations. However, political units have not always been organized in such a way. Therefore, basing general theories of inter-polity relations on the nation-state assumption prevents us from achieving a fuller understanding of how political units interact with one another.

In order to analyze the variation in physical forms of political units, this dissertation will use the distinctiveness of the border of the political unit as a proxy. A *distinctive* border exists where the political authority holds a monopoly of power in the territory within that border. Consider the US-Mexico border: three feet to the north of the border an FBI agent has the full authority of the state, while three feet to the south of the border, the same agent lacks authority. Thus, distinctiveness describes a sharp drop-off in the legitimate power of the political authority—where one political unit's power ends, another's immediately begins. At the other extreme ("indistinctiveness"), two or more political units share power in a given territorial area. This represents a

power *overlap*. At the extreme, it is a parity of power. Along the continuum between these extremes (shared parity and sharp drop-off) are various levels of hegemonic, but overlapping power.

Thus, we can describe the range of the dependent variable for a given territory. In the case of two political units, one unit can hold a monopoly of power, various levels of hegemonic power, or it may hold a parity of power with another political unit. The boundary between these units can then be described as *distinct* in the case of a monopoly of power and it can be described as *overlapping* to varying degrees in the other cases. The more hegemonic one unit's power is in a given territory, the greater the distinctiveness of the boundary between units.

There is nothing too radical about these definitions. Max Weber was clear that a state, with its "monopoly of power," is only one of several kinds of political units.[38] Unlike Weber, I argue that the nation-state does not represent a more progressive method of political organization. If particular characteristics within political units and within the system were different, it is probable that the nation-state would pass away and another type of political unit would dominate the system. If those same characteristics should someday reappear, political units would reassume physical forms resembling nation-states.

This dissertation will necessarily operate in "ideal types."[39] Finding territories that represent pure forms of either extreme would be a fruitless search. Inter-polity

---

[38] Max Weber (1978), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

[39] Thomas Burger (1976), *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press): 94-114; Susan Hekman (1983), *Weber: The Ideal Type and Contemporary Social Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press): 153-60.

boundaries are both "structured spaces" and "liminal places."[40] It is structured in the sense that the boundary can be demarcated, mapped, ratified, and even patrolled. This is what is meant in this dissertation by "distinctiveness." However, although authority in such spaces sharply drops off, there will inevitably be some flow of goods, ideas, and people across the border. This is how James Sidaway uses the idea of "liminal places:" these areas are marginal, peripheral, and occasionally transgressed. This simply means that a polity cannot structure a boundary to such a degree that it has complete control of the flow across it. Thus, we will probably not come across the ideal extreme of "distinctiveness" of a boundary. For every border this dissertation labels "distinctive," there will be evidence of inability to control the flow across the boundary. For every boundary labeled "overlapping," there will be exceptional places and moments of intense control. Some simplifications must be made in order to grasp an underlying theory. The exceptions and anomalies should offer rich opportunities to test the hypothesis further.

Proposed Explanation

Explanatory Variables

The distinctiveness of boundaries between political units in an international system can best be described using three variables: the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system, the geopolitical arrangement of political units, and the military capabilities of each unit. First and foremost, border distinctiveness

[40] James Sidaway (2002), "Signifying Boundaries: Detours Around the Portuguese-Spanish Borderlands," *Geopolitics* 7(1): 139-64.

depends on the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the international system. As the number of sources of transcendent credibility increases in a system, so too does the potential threat to an individual ruler's ability to efficiently use ideology to generate compliance. This compels the ruler to do more to isolate his territory from these potentially undermining ideas.

Boundaries within a single system will consist of varying degrees of distinctiveness. A second tier of variables can help explain this intra-system variation. By "second-tier" I mean that they only have an effect on the distinctiveness of boundaries if there are multiple sources of transcendent credibility within the system. The second-tier variables serve as magnifiers, either increasing or decreasing the perceived threat of an alternative source. The impact of these variables will be greatly reduced or even eliminated when there is only one source of transcendent credibility in the system. The two second-tier variables are the geopolitical arrangement and military capabilities of the units.

The arrangement of the political units in geographic space is the first of the second-tier variables. Two adjacent political units that share a common source of transcendental credibility will require a less distinctive boundary than two adjacent political units that possess different sources. Natural barriers will also tend to mitigate a neighboring ideological threat, although not to the same degree as they can allay a neighboring military threat. Ideas will generally transcend barriers more easily than weapons and troops.

Second, military capabilities must also be considered a second-tier explanatory variable. "Military capabilities" as a variable will be much less relevant to the

distinctiveness of boundaries in systems with a single source of transcendent credibility. An alternate source of transcendent credibility backed with large military capabilities will be perceived as a far more threatening than an alternate source that lacks military capabilities. Thus, military capabilities should have a strong impact on boundary distinctiveness in systems of two or more sources of transcendent credibility, but should have little to no effect where there is only one source.

This highlights an important distinction between the theory in this dissertation and that of neo-Realism. Neo-realists consider "military capabilities" a relevant variable in its own right in modern-day international relations theory because these studies tend to concentrate on the era of nationalism. Nationalism has created an international system in which each state has a different source of transcendent credibility — it's nation. Thus, neo-Realist theories are correct in asserting the importance of military capabilities currently, but incorrect in arguing this is accurate for all times and places. Military capabilities will be increasingly irrelevant in a system that possesses only one source of transcendent credibility.

The theory being proposed in this dissertation will be able to embrace current approaches to international relations, while avoiding the temporal-spatial limitations imposed by their foundational assumptions. Geographic position and military capabilities will have strong effects in systems containing many sources of transcendent credibility—the nation-states system, for example. This theory will also provide a method of describing the interactions of political units before and after the current system, as well as the places in the contemporary world that are parts of the state-centric paradigm in name only.

Effects of Explanatory Variables on Boundary Distinctiveness

Political power is a derivative of compliance.[41] Compliance is generated through two uses of political power: physical and ideological.[42] As rational actors, rulers of political units, in general, desire political power as a means of maintaining their position. They will expend some of their political power on physical and ideological means of generating more compliance and, hence, more political power. This process with respect to physical power has been looked at extensively in international relations theory, while the ideological aspect has generally been noted and avoided.

In the bargain between ruler and ruled, the ruled will only comply if the ruler's promise to deliver benefits is credible.[43] Standing alone, these promises seem incredible. In order to generate compliance, the ruler must bridge this credibility gap. The threat of physical force does not improve the ruler's credibility, but it may balance out the costs of non-compliance with the costs of complying with a lying ruler's commands. Ideology may have a similar impact, but it may also be used to bridge the credibility gap. In her recent book, Heather Rae argues that political elites use

[41] Political power depends directly on subjects complying with taxation, thereby producing state revenue, and subjects complying with military conscription, thereby producing military capability. See sources in footnote 29.

[42] See Margaret Levi (1988), *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press): 1-70. For an empirical study, see Kristina Murphy (2004), "The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders," *Law and Human Behavior* 28(2): 187-210.

[43] "The first task of predatory rulers in their efforts to create or maintain quasi-voluntary compliance is to provide reassurance that they will deliver the promised goods and services," Levi (1988): 60.

religious and national traditions to forge cohesion and build a "state."[44] Thus, some ideological aspects of culture can significantly contribute to uniting a political unit. The question than is how elites are able to appropriate culture for their own ends, in particular, generating credibility?

Cultures possess a source of transcendent credibility: an unseen force (e.g., god(s), a nation, Nature, etc.) that is believed to favor the faithful. Members of the culture see this force as possessing transcendent powers that earthly beings cannot understand. Regardless of the outcome of any particular event, the people will often perceive that outcome as a part of an overall plan to achieve some crucial goal. Because this end is more important than the means to obtain that end and because the means are considered beyond the understanding of the ordinary follower, the faithful usually refrain from questioning the credibility of the force itself. This is exactly the kind of rarely questioned credibility the ruler craves his efforts to generate compliance. Thus, a ruler will bridge his own credibility gap by using ideology to appropriate and link this transcendent credibility to his own promises.[45]

That rulers use sacred beliefs to legitimate their power is not a new argument.[46] Neither is it particularly novel to argue that there is a direct parallel between the usage

---

[44] Heather Rae (2002), *State Identities and the Homogenization of Peoples* (New York: Cambridge University Press). See also Christian Sartorius (2002), "The Relevance of the Group for the Evolution of Social Norms and Values," *Constitutional Political Economy* 13(2): 149-72.

[45] HJM Claessen and JG Oosten, eds. (1996), *Ideology and the Formation of Early States*; P Gose (1996), "The Past is a Lower Moiety: Diarchy, History, and Divine Kingship in the Inka Empire," *History and Anthropology* 9(4): 383-84. Marcela Cristi points to 'civil religion' as the use of explicitly religious symbols, rituals, and beliefs to 'sacralize' a political regime: *From Civil to Political Religion: The Intersection of Culture, Religion, and Politics* (Waterloo, ON: Willfrid Laurier University Press, 2001).

[46] See, for example, Max Weber (1956 [1922]), *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press); Reinhard Bendix (1978), *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press); Daniel Engster (2001), *Divine Sovereignty: The Origins of Modern State Power* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press).

of transcendent ideas attached to a deity and the transcendent ideas attached to a more secular manifestation, such as a nation.[47] What is new here is the idea that the political appropriation of the sacred and transcendent is linked to issues of establishing the credibility of the ruler. The clarification of this link is necessary in order to understand the ramifications at the international level.

As a ruler (or potential ruler) seeks to unite a group under his authority, he enhances his own credibility by linking it with what he believes to be the most efficacious source of transcendent credibility for this particular group. When successful, this linkage increases the perceived costs of disobedience and increases the perceived benefits of compliance for those who believe in the source of transcendent credibility. This enables the potential ruler to generate just enough compliance to gradually increase other means of generating compliance: give priests a share in the system, create symbols of authority, hire persons to compel compliance, return benefits to the people, etc. The ruler begins by leaning on ideological means of generating compliance and, with this, intensifies the ideological link and creates physically coercive means of generating compliance.[48] It should not be assumed that

---

[47] See, for example, Emile Durkheim (1915), *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London: Allen and Unwin); Lucian Pye (1962), *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press); David Apter (1963), "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press); Manfred Halpern (1963), *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Leonard Binder (1964), *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York: John Wiley); Shmuel Eisenstadt, ed. (1968), *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization* (New York: Basic Books); Elie Kedourie, ed. (1971), *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson); Bruce Kapferer (1988), *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia* (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution).

[48] N Abercrombie, S Hill, and BS Turner (1980), *The Dominate Ideology Thesis*; Eric R Wolf (1999), *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press); EM Brumfiel (2001), "Aztec Hearts and Minds: Religion and State in the Aztec Empire," in Susan Alcock, et. al., eds., *Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History*: 283-310.

the potential ruler does this out of strictly instrumental intentions – he may be as much a believer in the source as any of the people. As Pierre Bourdieu argues, the dominant class does not necessarily dominate overtly.[49]

This ideological link is fairly sticky: once a link is established, a ruler faces high costs if he chooses to shift the basis of credibility to another source of transcendent credibility, *ceterus paribus*.[50] In addition, a ruler will avoid shifting all means of generating compliance to coercion because this is incredibly costly and cannot be sustained for a long period.[51] Although the ideological link is sticky, there will arise a variety of interpretations of how the link is made (i.e. a theological dispute, etc.).[52] Groups, individuals, and the ruler himself, will seek to affirm interpretations that benefit them and disparage interpretations that are perceived as counter to their interests.[53] Again, this does not require a purely materialistic actor: the actor may believe a particular interpretation is true, not because it is in his material interest, but

---

[49] Pierre Bourdieu (1990), "From Rules to Strategies," in *In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology*, trans. M Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press): 59-75.

[50] North (1990), *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*.

[51] Victor V Magagna (1991), *Communities of Grain: Rural Rebellion in Comparative Perspective* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 25-47; Mark Harrison (2002), "Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet Command Economy," *The Economic History Review* 55(3): 397-433.

[52] "We should not suppose that religion, even 'state religion' is a wholly conservative force; rather, religion is a framework of thought and social organization through which many aspects of life in traditional states may be filtered, including innovative forces and schismatic ones." Anthony Giddens (1987), *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press): 75. For a specific example see Michael Walzer (1965), *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

[53] Terry Eagleton (1991), *Ideology: An Introduction* (Verso: London): 58. On responses of the non-elites to these interpretations, see Magagna (1991), *Communities of Grain*; J Comaroff and JL Comaroff (1999), "Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony," *American Ethnologist* 26(2): 282-3; Eamon Duffy (2001), *The Voices of Morebath: Reformation and Rebellion in an English Village* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

in addition to it being in his interest.[54] Thus, governments will be concerned with how various interpretations of the linkage arise and which interpretations emerge dominant.[55] Rulers may also promote alternative interpretations that are more beneficial to their interests as domestic circumstances change.

To further complicate matters, this domestic game takes place in a strategic international environment. Other political units will exploit opportunities to undermine different sources of transcendent credibility and the different ideologies used to link this credibility to rulers. Successful undermining will reduce a rival's effectiveness in generating compliance and, hence, lead to a deterioration of his overall political power. Where the sources of transcendent credibility or the linking ideologies are similar, however, a rival will be much less willing to attack, since this undermining could boomerang and undermine his own ability to generate compliance efficiently.

---

[54] The parallel here is to the study in American politics led by Angus Campbell that concludes that voters tend to vote for candidates that promote the interests of the groups to which they belong, Campbell, et. al. (1960), *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley). Supporting candidates that advance a group's interests can benefit the individual by establishing a sense of group solidarity, Eric A Posner (2001), *Law, Cooperation, and Rational Choice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). The result is that groups, in general, "develop ideologies that advance a self-serving conception of the public interest, like the automobile worker who believes that 'what's good for General Motors is good for America,'" Robert D Cooter (2000), *The Strategic Constitution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 20.

[55] A recently published collection of essays stresses that, in the modern world, the closer a religious tradition comes to exercising state power, the more likely it is that theological differences will undermine the political unity of the movement, Ted Gerard Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, eds. (2002), *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, The Few, and the Many* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Once a group is in power, groups will rationally pursue strategies that prevent such discord. Alternatively, Anthony Gill argues that religious traditions with a monopoly or near monopoly status may become lazy providers of religious goods, *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Clearly, however, feasible alternatives must be available if religious switching is to occur. Systems that contain only one source of transcendent credibility would lack such alternatives, unless created wholesale.

The two second-tier variables, geographic position and military capabilities, can magnify the threat a differing source of transcendent credibility poses. In general, geographically closer sources will be perceived as greater threats than more distant ones (taking into account natural barriers and corridors). In addition, the more coercive capabilities a political unit with a differing source has at its disposal, the greater the perceived level of threat from that unit.

Borders are, in large part, a means of controlling the entry of unwanted ideas into a given territory.[56] The border's ability to accomplish this varies with the amount of resources a ruler invests to keep foreign ideas excluded. These costs are weighed against the potential costs that would result from an outside idea penetrating the territory in question and possibly undermining the ruler's source of transcendent credibility or the ideology that maintains this link.

Resulting Hypothesis

Thus, it stands to reason that as the perceived threat to a political unit's source of transcendent credibility or the ideology that links this credibility to the ruler increases, so too will the amount of resources a ruler will be willing to invest in making boundaries more impervious to outside ideas. Overlapping territory would be impermissible when the threat of the ideas from the other political unit is large. The result would be boundaries that are distinct and recognized. On the other hand, when the threat from another political unit is low the ruler has less incentive to invest his

[56] David Cherry (1998), *Frontier and Society in Roman North Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 33; Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid, eds. (2001), *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Today* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

scarce resources in maintaining such a barrier. Hence, we arrive at the hypothesis that is the focus of this dissertation: as the number of sources of transcendental credibility within the system increases, the boundaries of political units become more distinct.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine this hypothesis in two settings: seventh and eighth century China and fifteenth and sixteenth century Persia. Each case experienced a period in which a single source of transcendent credibility monopolized the system and a period in which there were two sources in the system. Political units in the period dominated by a single source had indistinct boundaries between them, while the political units in the period with more than one source invested heavily in creating relatively more distinct boundaries with political units that used different sources of transcendent credibility. The correlation of dependent and explanatory variables demonstrated in these cases suggests the plausibility of the hypothesis.

Changes in the Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility

Demonstrating a causal relationship between the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system and the relative distinctiveness of the boundaries between political units requires a diachronic analysis. It must be shown that rulers responded to a change in the number of sources created by investing more resources in the control of their boundaries. However, this also necessitates a closer examination of when and why the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system would change.

To a large extent, the hypothesis as stated above is limited to an exogenously-given independent variable. The statement 'the number of sources of transcendent

credibility increased" glosses over important processes that could make the hypothesis discussed above more useful to current political science research and policy making. For example, the hypothesis predicts that any shift away from a Westphalian-states system would first require a change in the number of sources of transcendent credibility internationally – in other words, a shift from national allegiances to allegiance to something like the idea of "humanity." This is best revealed though a fuller analysis of the incentives of rulers and how they respond to and shape their systemic environment.

The Choices Available to Rulers

Rulers are rational strategic actors. They seek to obtain compliance from people in their territory at a minimum cost of resources. Compliance can be obtained using coercive tactics and ideological tactics. All things being equal, once established, ideological tactics are less costly than coercive tactics. Because rulers require compliance to access resources, they will invest some of these resources in maintaining ideological bases for compliance and protecting these bases from ideas that threaten to reduce their effectiveness. In addition, there is an investment cost in resources for a ruler to switch his basis of legitimacy from one source of transcendent credibility to another. This means that once a ruler has established an effective source of transcendent credibility, he will tend to resist any alternatives that come along. To the extent that he perceives it to be cost effective, he will invest in controls to quash threats from within and without and will actively work to prevent alternative sources of transcendent credibility from emerging in the area around his territory. This

suggests that changes in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system will be rare occurrences.

Still, while "ideas do not float freely," they have the ability and tendency to change as they are passed around through time and space.[57] It is clear, for example, that the Christian source of transcendent credibility at the beginning of the middle ages was very different from that of the late middle ages. Rulers have an incentive to provide for some flexibility in the interpretation of a source of transcendent credibility in order to keep up with changing conditions and popular sentiments. Too little flexibility can be as damaging as too much. Therefore, we should expect some evolution in the interpretations of sources of transcendent credibility. In addition, where there is a shared source among political units, we should also expect to see some coordination between rulers to reduce their costs and to prevent the outbreak of costly battles over interpretations. Where this coordination occurs throughout a system (i.e. the Roman Catholic Church), the source of transcendent credibility can change without necessarily increasing or decreasing the total number of sources. However, this evolution, even when closely controlled, must still be seen as a potential source of systemic change.

This model is slanted heavily toward a "top-down" arrangement: changes in a source of transcendent credibility are discussed, made, and enforced by the elites, especially rulers. This demands an apologetic statement, since historical and social science research has been increasingly shifting toward "bottom-up" approaches in

[57] Thomas Risse-Kappen (1994), "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization* 48(2): 185-214.

which the causes of change are sought among the "people" rather than the elite.[58] There are several problems with a "bottom-up" approach, however. First, especially when dealing with ideas, it becomes very difficult to pinpoint what the "people" believed. A common understanding of any issue or idea is often absent among an agglomeration of individuals. Arguments about the "elite" also faces similar obstacles, but these are mitigated thanks to the smaller numbers and self-disciplining mechanisms within the group. This is not an excuse to ignore the non-elite, however. A top-down model must continuously recognize that the elite are adjusting to changing perceptions among the non-elite, not merely imposing their ideas on a passive populace. Second, historical data preserves much more about the elite than the non-elite. This makes the world of the elite more accessible to the twenty-first century scholar. Again, there is no excuse to completely leave out the non-elite as historical methodology has developed innovative ways to capture the thoughts and actions of the people. Third, it is much easier to capture intentions from the elite than from the people since they are more likely to leave written records. Finally, since the cause and effect under consideration are political policies—obtaining compliance and making political boundaries more or less distinctive—the viewpoints of the elite necessarily predominate.

The dynamic model used in this dissertation will not push the people aside, however. To gain compliance, political elites are compelled to keep their fingers on the pulse of the people and react to or even anticipate any deviations from the norm

[58] To give one example, the ever-expanding literature on social movements led by Ronald Inglehart, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, among others.

among the population. Any model that leaves out grassroots changes from below or political adjustments from above ignores a significant piece of the puzzle.

The Impact of Ideas

Demonstrating the impact of ideas on human action fits uneasily into scientific studies. Ideas leave very little evidence of their existence and almost no "hard numbers" that can be measured. It is no coincidence that many scientific hypotheses in the field of history involve economics—the flow of money and goods leaves a much clearer trail that can followed by later scholars. Economic records can be tested and verified against other sources. Ideas, on the other hand, are often questioned as to their authorship or whether the author really meant what he or she said or intended something completely different. Someone may *claim* that a particular idea was integral to his or her consequent action, yet there is often no way to verify that this assertion was sincere or if it were merely a Machiavellian justification to placate a particular audience. More cynically, the claimant may unwittingly be fooling himself. These and other complaints have made the use of ideas treacherous territory for the student who wishes to infuse them into a causal hypothesis.

On the other hand, the fact that people consistently implicate ideas as causes for their actions suggests that ideas have important impacts. Even if they are "fooling" themselves or others, it must be asked why a particular idea is perceived to be useful in accomplishing a purpose. More than this, people believe ideas make a difference in their actions and the actions of others and act according to this belief. Thus, even the

cynic can appreciate the study of the impact of ideas, even as he or she doubts the reasons why they have the impact they do.

The ideas that this dissertation are concerned with are those useful for generating credibility and, thereby, compliance with authority. This allows for several limitations in the ideas that are available for use. A minimal requirement that can be made for someone to use an idea is for that person to have possession of the idea. Reformation historian Heiko Oberman has pointed out that the specific historical conditions in which a person exists vastly limits the ideas that are available or even possible.[59] Thus, there is a finite pool of ideas from which any person may draw.

A second limitation is that the idea holds a certain level of efficacy among the society at large or, at least, among a crucial segment of the constituency of the population. In other words, if only one person holds the idea, it will be extremely unlikely that it will be an effective means of generating compliance. While there will be a very large number of possible ideas in existence, they will each have varying levels of efficacy. Since this is a dynamic theory, an idea's level of efficacy may increase or decrease over time as a result of bottom-up or top-down changes.

Thus, we need not concern ourselves with every possible idea. Rulers were presented with a very finite group of ideas from which to draw and an even smaller set that were seen to possess sufficient efficacy among the population that they could be used to generate compliance. Still, as time passed, this set of ideas could change as well as the level of efficacy of each potential source of transcendent credibility.

---

[59] Heiko A Oberman (1989), "*Die Gelehrten die Verkehrten:* Popular Response to Learned Culture in the Renaissance and Reformation," reprinted in *The Impact of the Reformation: Essays by Heiko A Oberman* (1994) (Grand Rapids, MI: William B Eerdmans Publishing Company): 202-204.

Why Does the Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility in a System Change?

Changes in the number of sources of transcendental credibility occur in two ways. An *external* change happens as a result of the successful entry of a new source into a system. An *internal* change occurs as a result of decisions of rulers within the system to adopt new sources or modify an old one. The most useful way to examine these changes is to do so from the perspective of an individual ruler within a system. From this vantage point it is possible to see why and how changes are successful.

External changes in the number of sources of transcendent credibility involve the entrance of a new source into a system of political units. This is the easier of the two types to conceptualize as it can be treated as an exogenous event. An agent outside the system consciously seeks to extend the territory of his source. There are several means of accomplishing this. A conquering country will often impose its source of transcendent credibility in the new territory through a "colonization of consciousness."[60] At the very least, conquest will bring the real or imagined threat of imposition. Another way a new source may enter the system is along with a migrating group. Many religions proselytize and export missionaries into distant lands to gain converts, with varying levels of success. Finally, new contacts through trade and pilgrimage can increase the possibility of interactions that may result in the introduction of new sources of transcendent credibility into regions. Of course, combinations of these may also occur, increasing the potential of a new source of

[60] Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff (1991), *Of Revelation and Revolution, Volume 1: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago).

transcendent credibility taking root. Because it will take some time before the new source of transcendent credibility can effectively generate compliance in the area, the eventual success of the introduction must also depend on the strength of the political unit supporting the expansion.

An internal change in the source of transcendent credibility occurs when a ruler significantly modifies an old source or adopts a new one. Because there are significant costs and risks in changing a source, such changes will be rare. The most likely moment for such a transformation will be when a ruler perceives that the old source is no longer an effective means of generating compliance. There are several reasons why a ruler or a ruling coalition would perceive an old source of transcendent credibility to be losing its effectiveness in generating compliance. If the source loses its legitimacy then it also loses its practical reason of existence. As it loses its legitimacy, the people will be more likely to withhold compliance from a ruler who has linked his own legitimacy to the source. Such declines in legitimacy will often result from the source's inability to adapt with changing circumstances. Faith movements frequently undergo a process of institutionalization that make it more and more difficult to adjust to conditions.[61] If the institutions surrounding a source become too calcified, the people will often begin to lose faith in the legitimacy of the source for pragmatic reasons. The source may also lose its effectiveness if the link between the ruler and source is broken or damaged. For example, the people may not obey a ruler who does not act "virtuously." If the link between ruler and source is

[61] William James (1999 [1902]), *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (Modern Library); Charles Taylor (2003), *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited* (Harvard University Press).

more indirect (e.g., god → priests → king), a weakened link at any point in the chain can damage the source's effectiveness. Thus, rampant corruption in the clergy may force a ruler to take some action to restore the credibility of the source.

Once the ruler perceives the old source is losing its effectiveness in generating compliance, the ruler faces a choice. He must measure the costs and benefits of each potential action. Two of his options, a reinvigoration of the old source or a switch to a new source, will each require a short-term investment of resources. A third option, doing nothing, will be relatively costless in the short-term, though there are many other long-term costs associated with it. Benefits will largely be measured in terms of the effectiveness of the source in generating compliance from the populace. Any cost-benefit analysis must include (1) the ruler's perceived costs in resources to pursue one option or another, (2) the ruler's perceived benefits in resources after pursuing one option or another, (3) the ruler's perceptions of the success and failure chances of pursuing one option or another, (4) key constituents' perceptions of their own costs and benefits, and (5) the relative weights of short-term and long-term costs and benefits. Since these are largely perceptions and, thus, difficult to measure, each of these three options will be discussed more thoroughly.

Option #1: Do Nothing

Historians who look back at the choices of rulers are quick to point out the dangers of the "do nothing" option. Hindsight allows scholars to separate significant events from the day-to-day events in which historical actors were immersed. However, for the ruler trapped in the moment, there will often be no perceived decline

in the effectiveness of the source and, thus, the do nothing option must be considered the overwhelming default. In addition, the ruler may make minor adjustments here and there, but they are rarely of the magnitude that constitutes the introduction of a "new" source.

The more striking question then is when a ruler, who actually perceives the declining effectiveness of a source, will choose to do nothing about it. This may be the case if the ruler is uncertain about his perception.[62] The more uncertainty or mixed messages, the more likely that a rational ruler will play it safe and wait for more information. Another possibility is that the ruler lacks the requisite resources necessary to either reinvigorate the old source or switch to a new one. Finally, since any change will create winners and losers, changes may be stymied by persons who would lose from such a switch.[63] Such persons may come from inside the society or from outside.

All of these scenarios point to two conditions that are more likely to culminate in the "do nothing" option: uncertainty or a weak ruler.[64] Irrationality and uncertainty may prevent the "best" decision from being made and, since the default choice is "do nothing," this will be the likely choice. But, in other cases, this option will be the result of a weak ruler facing a period of turmoil that, of itself, makes the government

---

[62] For example, he does not trust his sources or different advisors are providing conflicting information on the status of the source or the people's attitude.

[63] On the "stickiness" of institutions, see Douglass C North (1991), *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). That winners will have better access to political power and will use that position to protect the system that has made them winners, see Ronald Rogowski (1989), *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 3-20.

[64] A weak ruler is one who can not respond to a threat to the dominant source of credibility despite a reasonable level of certainty that it is under threat. This may be the case if the ruler is irrational (e.g., mentally deficient or insane) or if the ruler lacks sufficient resources and/or compliance from the elite and the people to be able to respond.

less effective. The ruler is forced to ride the waves of change and depend on fate or luck. Machiavelli suggested in *The Prince* that this was the situation facing the Medici's in Florence.[65] Foreign powers continued to invade Italy, creating new turmoil. Machiavelli advised that the Prince cease doing nothing and tap into the power of religion in generating compliance and obedience.

Thus, three conditions that are necessary for a ruler to do "something" when faced with a source of transcendent credibility that is losing its efficacy are (1) possession of the necessary resources to act, (2) sufficient political and personal strength to be able to act, and (3) a perception of the necessity to act. It is important to note that if a change in the source of transcendent credibility will occur as a result of a change in leadership (peaceful or violent), the new ruler will need to meet these same three conditions. Once these conditions are met, it is increasingly likely that a ruler will either use his resources to reinvigorate the declining source of transcendent credibility or use his resources to adopt a new source. The next question, then, is which of these options the ruler will choose.

Option #2: Use Resources to Reinvigorate the Old Source

Given the conditions listed above, a ruler may choose to invest his resources to rejuvenate the traditional source of transcendent credibility. This is not a surprising option since the old source is a known quantity that has shown that it can effectively generate compliance when vital. Thus, it is safest to assume that if the old source of

[65] Nicolo Machiavelli, "Chapter XXVI: Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians," *The Prince*.

transcendent credibility appears to be fixable to the ruler and that fix appears to be cost-effective, then the ruler will opt to reinvigorate the old source. To this necessary condition, we may also add two sufficient conditions under which this option will be chosen over replacing the source: the ruler is a "true believer" and/or there is a lack of viable alternatives to the old source.

If the ruler is a true believer in the old source of transcendent credibility he will choose reinvigorating the old source over instituting a new source. In fact, he will likely consider it his religious duty or even divine mission to breathe new life into the ideas and institutions surrounding the declining source of transcendent credibility. This does not present a problem to a rational-choice model since, for example, a nationalist leader may place priority on the vigor of the nation over his political career, yet he would also likely see the two as going hand in hand. Whether a ruler is a true believer is a difficult variable to test, however. Past actions may be instructive. Examples include crusades, investment in invigorating the source during periods when such investment was unnecessary, or inordinate tithes and gifts. Past statements may also be instructive, though it is difficult to distinguish true beliefs in statements from rhetoric aimed at manipulating an audience. However, where one finds a ruler who is a true believer, he will likely act to preserve the old source of transcendent credibility.

Another sufficient condition that would result in a reinvigoration of the old source is a lack of viable alternatives. Granted, there are always alternative sources of transcendent credibility, but very few at any time are viable. Competition from other sources can often accelerate an old source's decline, but there are also times when a source declines on its own merits. It is likely that such periods point towards a future

that people perceive as hopeless, full of uncertainty, or chaotic. An example may be the last years of the Roman Empire in the West – the idea of "Rome" was disintegrating and for a time there was no obvious alternative. At such times, a ruler who is able to reinvigorate the old source may receive the added benefit of being considered the "savior" from the pending chaos, thereby enhancing his credibility further. Still, we should not expect to see many periods where there are no alternative sources with significant efficacy vying for dominance.

Aside from these two sufficient conditions, the choice to reinvigorate the old source of transcendent credibility requires that the ruler perceives that the old source is fixable and that this fix is cost-effective, especially given the viable alternatives. Thus, the reason why the old source is declining is crucial. The fact that the old source of transcendent credibility is a "known quantity" means that time is a factor as well. In the short term, the ruler knows that the old source has worked, while the effectiveness of a new source remains unknown. This favors the old source. However, over a longer period of declining efficacy, the old source has demonstrated that it can be both effective and less effective. Since its' less effective period is the more recent, this tends to color the perception of the ruler, making the fact that the old source is a "known quantity" more a wash in terms of benefits and costs. In short, we should expect that a ruler will more likely attempt to reinvigorate a declining source of transcendent credibility in the earlier years of its' decline. Likewise, the longer the source demonstrates declining effectiveness, the less likely that the ruler will opt for reinvigoration.

Overall, the default for a ruler who decides to act in the face of a declining source of transcendent credibility is to use his resources to reinvigorate that source. There are several reasons for this. First, a ruler will tend to be a product of the culture he was raised in and will be, at least, a partial believer in the source. Second, newer potential sources of transcendent credibility tend to lack the demonstrated effectiveness that only time can provide. Third, old sources almost always appear fixable, although the costs and potential backfires may make this costly. Finally, there is some level of certainty for a ruler in calculating costs and benefits with respect to the old source, as it is a "known quantity." Therefore, the more difficult question is why a ruler would opt to invest resources in a new source of transcendent credibility.

Option #3: Use Resources to Establish a New Source

The concern of this chapter is to determine the conditions under which the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system will increase or decrease. It is only when a ruler chooses to adopt a new source that there is the potential for an internal change in the total number of sources in the system.[66] Adopting a new source of transcendent credibility is a traumatic event that sends shock waves throughout every level of society. Processes are often set in motion that quickly spin out of a ruler's ability to control the effects. Thus, we would expect that the choice of a ruler to use resources to adopt a new source would be a rare event and done only under

[66] This includes instances of coup d'etat. The new ruler who has grabbed power may *choose* to adopt a new source, possibly increasing the total number of sources in the system.

exceptional circumstances. The fundamental question to explain such a shift is to ask what makes a ruler perceive a new source as a viable, cost-effective alternative.

Several factors are crucial in determining how a ruler will establish a new source of transcendent credibility and what form that source will take. First, such a transition will require a large lump-sum investment. Old ideas and institutions must be replaced with new ones both physically and in the hearts and minds of the people. This will take time, during which compliance will be inefficiently generated, if at all. Some sources will be more costly to implement than others, depending on if they are brand new and/or radically different from the old. Besides costs, a second factor will be which group the ruler expects to pay for the transition period. A ruler may depend on an external basis of resources (i.e. another political unit footing some or all of the bill) or he may depend on an internal basis (i.e. a sufficient segment of the ruler's constituency).[67] A third factor is the perceived short-term benefits from the establishment of a new source. Finally, a fourth factor that must be considered is the perceived long-term benefits of the switch. Some rulers will be in a better position than others to ignore the time horizon considerations and take a longer view of the effects of the transformation. These factors will help distinguish between four methods of establishing a new source of transcendent credibility: imitation, conversion, adoption, and adaptation.

The first method of establishing a new source is *imitation*. Imitation consists of a ruler imitating another ruler who has already used the new source of transcendent

[67] That a ruler is concerned with maintaining the support of a sufficient segment of his population rather than all or even a majority, see Stephen D Krasner (1999), *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

credibility successfully. For this to be a viable option, the ruler must perceive both territories and cultures as similar enough that the new source could be transplanted to the new realm effectively. This option will also be attractive if a ruler seeks to enhance his relationship with the imitated ruler. For example, a ruler may imitate a source in order to avoid invasion and stay in power as a puppet ruler. A ruler may also recognize a changing power situation in the system and attempt to catch the "rising tide." The difficulty is that for imitation to be successful, the ruler needs the support of an active segment of the selectorate.[68]

There are real benefits for a ruler who chooses imitation. For the most part, a ruler that imitates the source of another ruler will seek resource assistance from the imitated political unit to ease the transition as his people adjust to the new source of transcendent credibility. Smaller and poorer political units are thereby not wholly left to wait out the tides of fortune. In addition, the new source is already a tried and true method of generating compliance. Well-known examples of imitation can be found in the spread of Christianity throughout Europe in the early middle ages and throughout the world during sixteenth and seventeenth century colonialism. Smaller political units recognized the benefits of imitating the European Christian source of transcendent credibility. Once accepted by the people, it often effectively generated compliance for the rulers and, strategically, it won the imitators important allies and protected a ruler's position.

---

[68] In the modern era, imitation requires acceptance by an active portion of "civil society," Wade Jacoby (2001), *Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 12. In other eras, if imitation is to be effective at generating compliance, a good portion of the population must adhere to the new source of transcendent credibility. In short, it is not just a question of elite acceptance.

A second method of establishing a new source of transcendent credibility is *conversion*. There is only a slight difference between this method and imitation. In imitation, a ruler imitates a new source for strategic reasons – if the strategic environment changes, then it is likely the ruler may shift again. In conversion, on the other hand, a ruler converts to the new source and makes the shift even if the outcome is inefficient generation of compliance. Granted, "true belief" and strategic necessity are almost impossible to differentiate. Still, we should not just ignore the distinction because it eludes measurement. According to his own proclamations, Asoka converted to Buddhism in a political environment that did not necessarily support such a "peaceful" ideology.[69] He transformed the Mauryan kingdom in third century BC India from an aggressively expansionist political unit into a relatively peaceful empire. Since conversion is less strategically motivated, we would also expect it to be less durable. This was certainly the case of the Mauryan kingdom, which fell apart soon after Asoka's death. This does not mean that others with a stake in the new source or later generations of rulers would not be able to effectively generate compliance with the new source, but it does mean that the conversion of the ruler must spread to a critical portion of the constituency for it to be useful in the longer term.

A third method of establishing a new source is *adoption*. In adoption, a ruler "plucks" one of the many potential sources of transcendent credibility out of the set of potential alternatives and adopts it. Adoption differs from imitation in that the ruler is going it alone, meaning no other rulers in the system are using this particular source of

---

[69] Romila Thapur (1997 [1961]), *Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); NA Nikam and Richard McKeon, eds. (1978 [1959]), *The Edicts of Asoka* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

transcendent credibility. Thus, many of the benefits offered by the method of imitation do not exist in adoption. Lacking this external source of assistance, adoption necessarily requires that a key portion of the constituency already find the new source an acceptable alternative to the old source. This likely means that the new source is not "radically different" from the old. For example, although Protestantism is different from Roman Catholicism as a source of transcendent credibility, it still retained many of the same features, institutions, and language (i.e. God, Bible, Heaven, etc.). More "radical" changes (i.e. from ancestor worship to Christianity) would require imitation or conversion, rather than adoption.

In adoption, a new source of transcendent credibility must be perceived as an efficient means of generating compliance *given the political position of the ruler*. This last clause is important because one would not imagine a ruler investing in a new source that did not support his position at the top of the political hierarchy. Thus, there is a definite strategic element to the choice of adopting a new source. So, for example, the German princes adopted Protestantism, in part, because it supported their position over that of the Emperor's, as Catholicism did.[70] This strategic consideration therefore further reduces the number of viable sources available to the ruler.

Adoption can offer a ruler long-term benefits if successfully applied. Because it must be paid for internally, this guarantees that there is a significant portion of the constituency who will have a vested interest in the source's durability. Further, since the ruler can choose the source from a menu of viable alternatives, he can select the

[70] Guy E Swanson (1967), *Religion and Regime: A Sociological Account of the Reformation* (University of Michigan Press).

source that is best fitted for his territory and people – best fitted meaning most effective at generating compliance. Imitators, on the other hand, choose their source based on external factors rather than the conditions within their constituencies. This means a successful adoption should prove more durable and more effective in the long-term than a successful imitation or conversion.

Finally, a fourth method of establishing a new source is *adaptation*. In adaptation, a ruler takes a source already in existence and consciously adapts it for his particular realm. The adaptation is radical enough that it is clear that the ruler is not merely imitating another ruler's source. In most cases, the adapted source will be sufficiently different from the original source to count as two sources – if not, this raises a number of questions about why a ruler would want to go to the trouble of adapting the original source at all. The benefit of adaptation is that a ruler can custom-fit a source for his territory, people, and desired political hierarchy. This manipulability allows a ruler to tailor the source to win the backing of a key portion of the constituency necessary to install the new source.

The flexibility of adaptation is also its' curse as it is obvious to the other elites and people that the ruler is manipulating the ideas and institutions surrounding the new source that is supposedly "transcendent" and beyond manipulation. This obstacle is not insurmountable, however. As mentioned earlier, the obviousness of the ruler's actions allows others, who would substantially benefit from the switch, to assist the ruler's efforts, taking some of the costs off of him. In addition, for a ruler who has the luxury of looking longer term, the investment of additional resources required to mask the manipulations may be perceived as worthwhile because the new source would be

tailored to generate compliance extremely effectively and efficiently. Perhaps the most obvious case of adaptation is King Henry VIII's sixteenth-century Anglican Reformation. Very few disputed the fact that England's divorce from the Catholic Church was triggered by Henry's desire for a divorce from his wife. However, despite such obviously self-serving motives, Henry was able to establish an adaptation of the Protestant Reformation that placed him as the head of the Anglican Church. The costs were higher, but once in place, the payoffs were also higher.

Table 1: Comparison of Different Methods of Establishing New Source of Transcendent Credibility

	Costs	Short-term Benefits	Long-term Benefits	Basis of Resources
Imitation	Low	Medium	Low	External
Conversion	Medium	Low	Very Low	External
Adoption	Medium	Low	Medium	Internal
Adaptation	High	Low	High	Internal

Each of the four methods of establishing a new source of transcendent credibility varies in terms of costs, short-term and long-term benefits, and the basis of support that would help provide resources for the transition (see Table 1). Imitation has relatively low costs, fairly good short-term benefits, poor long-terms benefits, and is funded primarily from external sources. Conversion ranks extremely low in almost every category, but then it is not a strategic choice. Adoption has high costs, low short-term benefits, good long-term benefits, and is funded internally. Adaptation has extremely high costs, horrible short-term benefits, but the best long-term benefits, and is also funded internally. The rational strategic ruler will take these conditions into account when deciding how to switch sources of transcendent credibility and these variables will also limit the potential sources he may choose from.

In sum, the following conditions are necessary for a ruler to use resources to adopt a new source of transcendent credibility:

1. The ruler possesses the necessary resources to act
2. The ruler possesses sufficient political and personal strength to act
3. The ruler perceives it is necessary to act
4. The ruler is not a "true believer" in the old source
5. There are viable alternatives from which to choose

For the most part, these are "internal" conditions. Thus, an increase in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system is either imposed from outside the system or generated from within one or more of the political units in the system.

What, then, is the role of the ruler who possesses a stable and effective source of transcendent credibility, but wishes to prevent an increase in the number of sources in the system and the subsequent costs that come along with that increase? A rational strategic ruler will invest resources toward ensuring the necessary conditions listed

above do not exist for himself or his neighbors. For example, a ruler may undermine his neighboring ruler's political strength or his neighbor's ability to generate resources to pay for such a transformation. A ruler may also provide assistance to his neighbor in order to reduce the perception that action is needed. There may even be system-wide efforts to transform rulers into "true believers," for example, through a crusade or an inquisition. At the same time, the ruler may be interested in accentuating the conditions listed above in an attempt to get the neighboring ruler to imitate his source. As has been mentioned earlier, this is a critical reason why rulers invest resources so heavily in controlling their boundaries when there are multiple sources of transcendent credibility in a system.

These observations are applied in Chapters 5 through 8 with an examination of the hypothesis in Europe from the medieval period to the present day. Europe provides a well-documented and much-discussed laboratory for a study of the effects of a changing number of sources of transcendent credibility on the distinctiveness of boundaries. The continent has seen several changes in the number of sources of transcendent credibility. Thus, a diachronic look at Europe provides additional cases for the dissertation's central hypothesis. Medieval Europe was a period in which there was primarily one source of transcendent credibility. The indistinctiveness of the boundaries between political units in this period is correctly predicted by the theory. Likewise, there are several exceptions in this period that add support to the overall argument. In the Early Modern period, post-Reformation Europe contained two sources of transcendent credibility, Protestantism and Catholicism. As the theory predicts, this period also saw the establishment of relatively more distinct boundaries,

particularly along frontiers that divided these competing sources of transcendent credibility. Finally, the Modern period experienced an explosion in the number of sources of transcendent credibility as each nation established its own source. As is well known, this is also the period of the Westphalian states system with its incredibly distinct borders between political units.

The analysis of Europe also demonstrates that the relationship between dependent and explanatory variables is valid chronologically: the change in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system *precedes* changes in the distinctiveness of boundaries. Rulers made their boundaries between each other more distinct *in reaction to* an increase in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system. This provides more evidence that the relationship between the variable is causal and not merely correlative.

A chronological examination of Europe also allows an examination of the processes that produced the above-mentioned changes in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system. Three changes in particular characterized Europe. The first was the split of "Christianity" into Protestant varieties and Catholicism during the Reformation. The second transformation occurred during the seventeenth century as rulers began to shift their source of transcendent credibility away from religious foundations and towards the concept of the "nation." Finally, during the long eighteenth century, nationalism produced many sources of transcendent credibility in Europe and later the world. These transformations altered the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the European system. This variation is tested in the subsequent chapters to validate the dissertation's central

hypothesis: as the number of sources of transcendental credibility within the system increases, the boundaries of political units become more distinct.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

A. Operationalization
   1. Measuring the Dependent Variable: Distinctiveness of Boundaries
   2. Measuring the Explanatory Variable: Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility
B. Methodology
C. Implications of the Hypothesis
D. Plan of the Dissertation

One of the first difficulties presented when testing this dissertation's central hypothesis is the challenge of measuring the dependent and explanatory variables. The explanatory variable, number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system, is new to the literature. In addition, while borders are a frequent topic among scholars, the dependent variable, relative distinctiveness of the boundary between political units, is rarely measured. Boundaries as a topic of study are so inter-meshed with the borders characteristic of nation-states that a measure that retains usefulness over a wide scope of times and places remains undeveloped. In addition, historical boundaries, let alone their distinctiveness, have left few records for later generations to study. Like borders today, political units disagreed over where their boundaries lay. To resolve this, I turn to five variables that will serve as proxies for boundary distinctiveness and I will argue they provide a reasonable substitution for a direct measure. This chapter then discusses some implications of the hypothesis in other areas of the Political Science discipline. It concludes with a summary of the cases used to test the hypothesis.

Operationalization

Measuring the Dependent Variable

Borders are human constructs.[71] Thus, the distinctiveness of a particular boundary is as much a perception as it is a measurable entity. Rather than measure this variable directly, this dissertation will turn to five proxy measures that, taken together, will provide inductive evidence for the contemporaneously perceived levels of boundary distinctiveness.

Hegemonic Membership/Citizenship versus Competing Membership/Citizenship

According to Weber's famous definition, the nation state claims a monopoly on legitimate authority in a given territory. This does not mean, however, that individuals do not have multiple loyalties.[72] Although a state's *claim* of loyalty may be monopolistic, an individual's reality falls on a continuum that ranges from competing memberships to a hegemonic membership. "Competing membership" is defined as an individual who does not use consistent criteria to negotiate action in the face of conflicting demands. In such cases, none of a person's competing memberships is more likely to win a face-off with the other loyalties of the individual. On the other hand, "hegemonic membership" ensures that one of the individual's

[71] Walter Pohl (2001), "Conclusion: The Transformation of Frontiers," in Walter Pohl, Ian Wood, and Helmut Reimitz, eds., *The Transformation of Frontiers: From Late Antiquity to the Carolingians (The Transformation of the Roman World 10)* (Leiden: Brill): 247-60.

[72] Charles Taylor (1989), *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

many loyalties, the hegemonic one, will dominate every critical internal conflict over means and ends.[73]

Illustrations may help highlight the difference between these two extremes. In the modern nation-state, no loyalty is permitted to have precedence over loyalty to the state. A conscientious objector, for example, may choose not to fight in the military, but this does not absolve him or her of service and paying taxes that fund the military. Although some religious organizations may possess their own "courts," these are ultimately subject to the judicial system of the state. In contrast, we can turn to Feudal Europe. When an individual's loyalty to the Church was pitted against his or her loyalty to the ruler or lord, there was not a clear solution. Knights could also be called to battle in the service of a Lord against a ruler to whom they had also sworn allegiance. In such conflicts, there was little to guide the knight's decision.

Where an authority figure successfully imposes hegemonic authority, this will constitute evidence that the territory is located within distinct boundaries. Such membership can be measured using a variety of means. To whom are regular taxes and tithes paid? To whom does an individual turn to secure legal justice? To whom does an individual pledge allegiance or citizenship? In most cases, individuals will not be shy about pointing out the authorities to whom they defer since there are

[73] There is a parallel here with Charles Taylor's notion of "strong evaluation," in which an individual will rank-order and build a hierarchy of her moral values and preferences according to a deeper layer of meta-values. This enables an individual to choose between competing values in a given situation. See Charles Taylor (1989), *Sources of the Self*; Taylor (1985), *Philosophical Papers I: Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). See also David Laitin (1986), *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yoruba* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 109-35.

material and psychological benefits in making sure authority figures know they can count on individuals or that the authority's claims are thin.

Imposed Standardization of Means of Exchange versus Conventional Standardization

Standardization of the means of exchange is an important way to improve the economic efficiency within a given area.[74] Societies designed coins, for example, as a standardization of value. As such, they simplified the exchange process, improved the efficiency of exchange and, thus, increased the level of trade. The production of coins also enhanced the prestige of the ruler.[75] In addition, rulers who standardized currency reaped the benefits to be gained from the mintage of coins. The standardization of weights and measures also simplified the exchange process and increased the level of trade.[76]

"Conventional" standardization is one means of arriving at such focal points.[77] Standardization is usually as beneficial for the people as it is for the rulers. Thus, standardization does not necessarily require a third party to set the focal point and impose it on a population.[78] The people of a given territory may have sufficient incentives to overcome their collective action problem in setting commonly accepted

---

[74] North (1990), *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*: 120-22.

[75] Georges Duby (1974), *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 66-67.

[76] Barzel (2002), *A Theory of the State*: 202-205.

[77] Groups are often able to overcome the free-rider problem and cooperate without the intervention of a more powerful third-party (like a state): Elinor Ostrom (1990), *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[78] The people may overcome their collective action problem through the creation of a third party who then facilitates the solution of the problem in the future. The classic article discussing such an outcome is Paul R Milgrom, Douglass C North, and Barry Weingast (1990), "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges and Champagne Fairs," *Economics and Politics* 2(1): 1-24.

standards.[79] Standardization may also be "imposed:" a third party imposes a focal point on the population in order to improve economic efficiency.[80] The third party must balance the costs of imposition with the potential benefits that may be achieved both in resources and enhanced centralization.

Where an authority figure successfully imposes standardization, this will constitute evidence that the territory is located within distinct boundaries. It is a reasonable hypothesis that a third party would not expend resources to impose a standardization if there were other parties in the territory that could free-ride, capturing portions of the newly created wealth without investing any costs of their own. Thus, it is expected that an authority figure that imposes standardization of the means of exchange either holds a monopoly of authority in the territory or at least has preponderant hegemony.

It should be noted that the antithesis of the above hypothesis is not valid. Distinct borders may very likely surround a territory with conventional standardization. If the third party finds that an already existing conventional standardization is to his advantage, or at least less costly than imposing another focal point of standardization, then he will accept the status quo.

Hierarchical Judicial System versus Competing Judicial Systems

As with standardization, judicial power requires a large investment of resources, but the returns on it can be substantial. Authorities that set up successful

[79] For a discussion of how enforcement of collective action mechanisms can be achieved in a society without the use of a third party that imposes its will, see Michael Taylor (1982), *Community, Anarchy, and Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[80] See Mancur Olson's discussion on "entrepreneurs."

judicial systems saw two main benefits: the order of the realm and the ability to convert the power of law into political power (i.e. to interpret law and rule in favor of oneself and one's political allies). Like imposed standardization, an authority figure sought the material benefits that could be gained from controlling the judicial system and the ideological benefits that accrued from the close connection between the legitimacy of the authority figure and order in the realm. The costs of setting up such a system were also both material and ideological (i.e. legitimacy of the courts and their outcomes).

When more than one authority figure set up judicial systems in a given territory, competition reduced the benefits that each authority could realize. In areas of overlapping jurisdiction, litigants could play one judicial system against the other in hopes of obtaining a more favorable settlement. This had the further effect of destabilizing social order as losing litigants sought protection and redress from the other judicial system. [81] For example, the competition between secular courts and ecclesiastical courts destabilized the social order throughout Medieval Europe.

There are two ways multiple judicial systems can co-exist: hierarchy and competition. The decisive variable is whether one judicial system recognizes the right and authority of the other to overrule its decisions. If so, there exists a hierarchical judicial system. Although the Constitution is somewhat contradictory on this point, American jurisprudence has evolved in such a way that the federal courts have a veto power over state courts should they choose to exercise that authority.[82] Where such a

---

[81] Hirschman (1970), *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*: 1-29.

[82] "The government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action," *McCulloch v Maryland* 4 Wheat. (17 US) 316 (1819).

hierarchical relationship does not exist, there are competing judicial systems. Each system asserts its authority in a particular jurisdiction. A judicial system's ruling can only be overturned if there is sufficient material and moral force to back a veto up.

Where an authority figure successfully sets up a hierarchical judicial system, this will constitute that the territory is located within distinct boundaries. It will require an input of resources, both material and ideological, to eliminate or subordinate competition. Although the people will receive the benefits of greater collective order from a judicial monopoly, each potential litigant has an incentive to keep competing judicial systems in order to take their case to the court that will provide the most favorable deal. The authority figure is the only actor with the resources and incentives to create a monopoly of justice.

Efficient Compliance Generation versus Compliance Waste

A market with two or more producers of the same good is subject to competition that forces the price of the good to calibrate with the laws of supply and demand. On the other hand, when there is a monopoly, the price can be largely determined by the producer.[83] This same principle is valid in the production of compliance within political units. Authority figures in political units are producers of a variety of public goods, such as security, property rights, judicial authority, and so on. An individual who has a choice of providers of these goods in a single territory will comply with the authority figure that provides the maximum goods for the

[83] James M Buchanan (1980), "Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking," in James M Buchanan, Robert D Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., *Toward a Theory of a Rent-Seeking Society* (College States: Texas A&M University Press): 3-15; Richard A Posner (1975), "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," *Journal of Political Economy* 83: 807-27.

minimum cost to the individual. This effectively drives authority figures in the same territory to compete for compliance, which reduces the profits each authority can gain from the provision of public goods. On the other hand, when there is only one authority figure within the given territory, an individual has no where else to turn for necessary public goods. The lone provider of public goods can determine, in large part, how much to charge and how much to provide. Authority figures that achieve a monopoly status in providing public goods in a territory can generate more profit and benefits than those who must compete with other authority figures.

When an authority figure is the sole provider of public goods in a territory, he is more likely to generate compliance efficiently – meaning he can achieve a high profit to investment-in-public-good ratio.[84] Where there is competition, individuals have the ability to transfer their compliance from one authority to another who is providing more goods or demanding less compliance.[85] But competition also creates the opportunity for individuals to withhold their compliance from *all* authority

[84] On the ruler as profit-maximizer, see Charles Tilly (1985), "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Lane (1958), "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence"; Margaret Levi and Douglass C North (1982), "Toward a Property Rights Theory of Exploitation," *Politics and Society* 11(3): 315-20.

A possible complaint about the statement above is that it does not necessarily follow that a monopoly provider of public goods can generate efficient compliance. A monopoly provider may attempt to extract more rents than the people are willing to give. If the provider demands too much, the people may opt to revolt or reduce their own production to limit the amount that can be given or seized. Gordon Tullock (1974), *The Social Dilemma* (Blacksburg, VA: University Publications): 17; Magagna (1991), *Communities of Grain*. Rational choice theory predicts that a ruler will make a demand that maximizes the amount of compliance that can possibly be generated if there is complete information. However, even in the absence of complete information, the ruler is strategic and will try to devise strategies to maximize compliance output, Robert H Bates and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1985), "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government," *Politics and Society* 14(1): 53-70.

[85] Hirschman (1970), *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*: 1-29.

figures.[86] This opportunity arises as individuals wait and see which authority figure presents the most competitive offer. During this "bidding" and "counter-bidding," the authority figures lose potential compliance that would otherwise have been generated in a monopolistic environment. This is "compliance waste:" compliance that could be generated in a monopoly, but is forfeited due to competition.

The authority figure in a competitive environment must make a trade-off. More efficient compliance (and thus higher profits) can be generated if the authority holds a monopoly of public goods provision. However, the elimination or eviction of rival providers costs resources as well, further reducing the authority figure's expected profits at least in the short term. Investment in resources designed to eliminate competing authority figures in a territory is another form of compliance waste. If the long-term benefits of monopolizing a territory are seen to outweigh the short-term costs of eliminating the competition, an authority figure is likely to make the attempt. Otherwise, an authority figure will not pursue unchallenged authority and will opt to settle for less-than-efficient compliance generation, not to mention the loss of compliance that is captured by the competition.

Where an authority figure generates compliance efficiently, this will constitute evidence that the territory is located within distinct borders. A monopoly of authority requires clear demarcations of where that authority begins and ends. The primary sources will present the struggles of generating efficient compliance, although where the author is sponsored by an authority figure in the midst of competition, it should

[86] This idea is derived from the discussion in Yoram Barzel (1997), *Economic Analysis of Property Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 16-32.

also be expected that the primary source will be more interested in propaganda than the recording of events. The amount of taxes collected and the efforts required for collection will also provide useful evidence regarding the level of competition and the identities of the rival authority figures for a given area.

Credible Commitment to Defend Borders

A threat to a territory is often more than military in nature. Ideas and persons can enter a territory and undermine a ruler's ability to generate compliance efficiently. Thus, "defense" means more than opposing force with force. Defending a border means to invest in the control of flows across a boundary. Many goods and ideas may cross a strongly controlled border. Control implies an active agency involved in regulating the goods and ideas that cross the border. For example, the borders of the modern day nation state are very tightly controlled, yet there is still a greater degree of flow across these borders than there ever has been. Control does not obstruct flow in general, but only regulates it in areas that can undermine the authority of the ruler.[87] A ruler will desire to control the border flow of troops from other political units. The presence of such troops represents a threat to the ruler's authority. At the same time, though much less conspicuously, the ruler will also be very wary about ideas that can cross the border and potentially undermine his ability to generate compliance.

[87] M Millett, when discussing the frontier of the Roman Empire, uses the term "information barrier," "Romanization: Historical Issues and Archaeological Interpretations," in TFC Blagg and M Millett, eds. (1990), *The Early Roman Empire in the West*: 38-39. The term "barrier," however, does not imply the sense of active regulation that borders (even very distinctive ones) use. A better analogy is found in cell biology. Proteins in cell walls allow only specific molecules into the cell and only in specific amounts. Everything else is excluded.

Such control requires the continuous investment of resources. If this control preserves the compliance-generating mechanisms of a ruler, then these are resources well spent. Investment in border defense is subject to diminishing returns: there comes a point at which additional investment no longer achieves any greater protection of compliance generation. A rational, profit-maximizing ruler will not "throw away" investments once he reaches the point of diminishing returns. The greater the threat (both physical and ideological) from outside the territory, the more a ruler will be willing to invest in border defense and mechanisms of the control of flow. The further the boundary is from the center of the political unit, the more costly such defense will be.

Where an authority figure credibly commits to defend a territory that is "distant" from the center, this will constitute evidence that the territory is located within distinct boundaries. The variable of "distance" is understandably vague because technology can change what is distant into what is near. Comparisons of distance will be made based on contemporary situations, not diachronically. Thus, what is "distant" for the Roman Empire will probably not be the same as what is distant for the nineteenth-century British. The phrase "credibly commits" is designed to remove from consideration rulers who bombastically claim the right to defend a territory, yet exert no effort short of lip service to control the flow of ideas and people into the area.

It must be stressed again that no single proxy hypothesis listed above is sufficient for determining the level of border distinctiveness. For example, the

absence of imposed standardization of the means of exchange does not mean distinct borders are not present — the authority figure may find the conventional standardization already in place very beneficial for his position. The level of border distinctiveness must be inductively measured.

Measuring the Explanatory Variable

The number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system can be measured by looking at the means through which rulers legitimized their authority ideologically. This variable depends very much on the perceptions of both the rulers who attempt to link their credibility to that of a transcendent source and the ruled who acquiesce or resist the ruler's attempts. Rulers are not shy about expressing their links beyond this world and so evidence of where they turn for legitimation is not difficult to pull out of the sources.

Since the explanatory variable is the *number* of sources of transcendent credibility, it is essential to be able to differentiate between different sources and/or different means of linking the source to the ruler's credibility. The sources themselves may be different, for example God and Allah or the French nation and the German nation. The difficulty comes when assessing whether two units that follow the same deity, but have different religious doctrines and practices, actually share a source of transcendent credibility. Here again, this dissertation will be dealing with "ideal types." Obviously, no two persons will understand one source in the same manner and the same must be expected of any two political units. The crucial distinction is *how* each unit uses the source to establish political credibility. This tends to be a question

of theology: the expectation is that, for the ruler to be associated with transcendent credibility, he will express his authority as an earthly mirror of divine authority. Thus, how the population perceives divine authority (again, theology) matters in how effectively and efficiently the ruler can generate compliance. For example, sixteenth-century Protestantism and Catholicism conceived of divine authority in very different ways, although they each looked to the same God as the source of transcendent credibility. The governments of Protestant and Catholic political units during this period mirrored these theological differences.[88] In other words, it is expected that the theological differences would play out in terms of the perceived threat to the ability to generate compliance and, ultimately, in terms of border distinctiveness. It should be added that, although the term "theology" is etymologically linked to a god or gods, I will also use it to describe the ideologies that link the transcendent credibility of the nation to a ruler's credibility.[89]

Thus, measuring the "number of sources of transcendental credibility" in a system requires: (1) the limits of the system in question, (2) a search for the different (and relevant) *sources* in the system, and (3) a search for different (and relevant) theologies of divine authority within each source. By relevant, I mean sources and theologies that rulers actually use, resist, or reject.

[88] Mann (1989), *Sources of Social Power II*: 463-72.
[89] This is along the lines of nationalism as a "civic religion;" see Chapter 1.

Methodology

The methodology used in this dissertation focuses on comparative case studies for reasons that emerge from the theory itself. The theory presented in this dissertation relies on a combination of rational choice theory and constructivism.[90] The actors make decisions after weighing the costs, benefits, and risks of their actions. Beliefs play a central role in this theory, affecting the perceived values of costs, benefits, and risks, and limiting the range of choices available to the actors. Utility for the actors is not strictly limited to benefits and costs that will accrue on earth. Sources of transcendent credibility are often followed because they are seen to reward and punish both here and in the hereafter. This adds a degree of complexity to a traditional rational choice model. For example, how might one make a rational choice between saving ten dollars and the divine favor that tithing ten dollars could create, especially if we account for time horizons. The model in this dissertation assumes that people can, and often do, care about the rewards and punishments they believe are dispensed by transcendent entities. However, most of these transcendental movements also promise rewards and punishments in the temporal sphere. These beliefs are usually derived from one's culture. This means that the values individuals assign costs, benefits, and risks will often depend on the cultural context. It is natural for such a theory to combine historical evidence with ahistorical generalizations.

[90] See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917.

The particularism of History need not be the antithesis of the generalism of the Social Sciences.[91] Thomas Kuhn argued that "history, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed."[92] Such an image "presents as absolute and timeless its foundations for knowledge." The ideal is a marriage of the two perspectives: the particularities of each historical context combined with the structural generalities of human existence. To that end, the perceptions of individuals in their particular historical context are examined separately, while the data from each are further analyzed for themes that are historically independent and generalizable.[93]

This dissertation approaches historical analysis from two different, but complementary perspectives: synchronic and diachronic. First, a variety of historical contexts are analyzed individually. Selection of cases depends on variation of the independent variable, but also covers a variety of times and spaces. In the diachronic approach, space is held constant. Europe will be analyzed from the fall of the Roman Empire to the present day. Taken together, the synchronic and diachronic cases demonstrate that the hypothesis's validity does not dependent on time or space.

A brief word also must be said regarding the now-derogatory label of "grand theory," given that the sheer scope of the hypothesis opens this dissertation to such a

---

[91] "[T]heory linked to data is more powerful than either data or theory alone," Robert H Bates, et al (1998), *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 3.

[92] Quoted in Margaret R Somers (1996), "Where Is Sociology After the Historic Turn? Knowledge, Cultures, Narativity, and Historical Epistemologies," in Terrance J McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press): 59.

[93] Melvin Richter (2002), "Montesquieu's Theory and Practice of the Comparative Method," *History of the Human Sciences* 15(2): 21-33.

charge. Grand theory is a necessary, but dangerous, tool of the scholar.[94] It is dangerous because it tries to explain a lot with a little and, thereby, vastly oversimplifies reality. It also threatens to eliminate individual free will. An individual (not to mention a society) is far too complex to be reduced to simple if-then statements and deterministic cause-effect relationships. To do so, as grand theory does, is to risk oversimplifying the subject and set up barriers from which neither the subject nor the scholar can escape. Paradigms, as Thomas Kuhn has pointed out, are necessary for human understanding, but also self-limiting.[95] Anyone who attempts grand theory must approach it humbly. However, with these caveats in mind, such theory remains a necessity in the advancement of knowledge.

Theory is always a mere shadow of reality. When the finiteness of the human mind encounters the vast complexity of the external world, a compromise must be reached.[96] How can that world be explained in a discrete package and how do we know that we have done an adequate job explaining it? First of all, the Social Sciences ought to aspire for "reasonableness" rather than "certainty."[97] The subjects of the Social Sciences (human beings) possess too many motivations to ever say anything about them with a measure of certainty.[98] Another criterion of the Social Sciences is parsimony. But, parsimony in and of itself does not necessarily reveal the

---

[94] Quentin Skinner, ed. (1985), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[95] Thomas Kuhn (1962), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

[96] Michel Foucault (1970), *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London).

[97] Stephen Toulmin (2001), *Return to Reason* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press); Peter Achinstein (2001), *The Book of Evidence* (New York: Oxford University Press).

[98] Charles Taylor (1964), *The Explanation of Behavior* (London: Routledge).

best explanation.[99] Simplicity matters only after many other important criteria of a theory's value have been judged. For example, Imre Lakatos argues that the comprehensiveness of the explanation and the contribution to theoretical progress are far more crucial than simplicity.[100] Theories that begin with the nation-state are certainly parsimonious, but they lack a comprehensiveness that covers the larger range of human interaction and they stifle our ability to see beyond a system dominated by the nation-state.

Implications of the Hypothesis

In sum, the content of political units is a crucial indicator of the form of these units and the international system in which they exist. Changes in the layout of sources of transcendent credibility in a system will frequently produce concomitant changes in the interaction of political units, their physical forms, and the nature of the international system itself. If the current international system and its Westphalian foundations are transforming, the place to look is changes in sources of transcendent credibility.

Nations, the predominant sources of transcendent credibility in the current international system, have divided the world up into many mutually incompatible ways of legitimating rule. This has tended to mask the effect that the number of

---

[99] Ironically, "Ockham's Razor" itself has been oversimplified. The "simplest explanation is best" *only after* the other criteria of validity are met. John Losee (1972), *A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 37-38; Sharon M Kaye and Robert M Martin (2001), *On Ockham* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning).

[100] Imre Lakatos (1970), "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and A Musgrove, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Lakatos (1978), *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 35.

sources of transcendental credibility has on the separateness of different political units. If the age of nationalism passes into an age of fewer sources of transcendent credibility, the age of the state as dominant political unit may also fade.

This masking also allows contemporary IR scholarship to use "military capabilities" as a proxy for threat and security. However, neo-realist and neo-liberal theories can only measure a subset of international systems—systems with multiple sources of transcendent credibility. Their success to date is predicated on the fact that the twentieth century (at least) also resides in that subset. This dissertation does not seek to question the usefulness of these theories in this particular subset, but it does argue that there is more happening than meets the twenty-first-century eye. A new theory allows IR scholarship to look beyond this subset.

The European Union presents an excellent test case for this theory. The goal of the EU is to replace the individual nations as sources of transcendent credibility with a single source: Europe. This theory would argue that, to the extent that it is successful at accomplishing this goal, the borders between the individual states would become less distinctive. On the other hand, it also argues that merely passing legislation to make the borders less distinctive will fail without the jettisoning of individual nationhoods. My own best guess is that rulers in these countries still attach their credibility to that of their nation and not Europe. Thus, the EU may attempt to superimpose another source for a while, but will probably fail without a real grassroots ideological shift.

The chaotic political conditions in Africa also represent good evidence of the theory's validity. Colonialism superimposed borders on African territory that did not

and do not correlate with the sources of transcendent credibility there in most cases. Credibility is still largely attached to the tribe and the ethnic group rather than a nation such as "Nigeria" or "Rwanda." "State failure" exists in this continent because the ideological foundations required for a territorial nation-state do not exist. In fact, the question of "state failure" in Africa is misplaced. It assumes that state success is a desired outcome, when the conditions of Africa necessitate instead a different paradigm of political units living together.

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation proceeds in two general parts. In the first part, the validity of the hypothesis is tested in two different cultures and time periods. Chapter 3 explores China during the Sui and T'ang dynasties. It examines how the Sui efforts to unify northern and southern China began with an intentional strategy to create a single source of transcendent credibility that covered the entirety of China. Only after this was achieved did the relatively distinct border between North and South begin to fade and eventually completely disappear. Next, the chapter examines the effect the rise of Tibet had on China's western flank in the early days of the T'ang. Tibet's emergence increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility from one to two. In response, China invested heavy resources in a much more distinct border with Tibet, including enormous military reforms to reflect this new strategy.

Chapter 4 continues examining the validity of the hypothesis in a non-Western environment by examining the appearance of a strong Shiite Empire among the two

dominant Sunni Empires of Central Asia in the sixteenth century. The boundaries between political units in sixteenth century Central Asia prior to the success of the Shiite Safavids were relatively indistinct. However, once the Safavids established their Empire in Persia, all three Islamic Empires invested heavily in the control of their mutual borders, thereby increasing the distinctiveness of their boundaries. Overall, chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate the efficacy of this dissertation's theory and hypothesis in places and cultures outside of Europe and in historical periods prior to the emergence of the nation-state.

The second part of the dissertation consists of a diachronic analysis of the European continent from the fall of the Roman Empire to the present day. Chapter 5 focuses on the medieval period, where the status quo during the period from 400 to 1500 was a single source of transcendent credibility: Roman Catholicism. As the hypothesis predicts, the boundaries between political units during this period were extremely indistinct. This chapter will then also examine two cases in the period in which there were two sources of transcendent credibility: the Frankish Empire's encounter with the Saxons in the eighth century and the interactions of several Christian kingdoms with colonizing "heathen" Vikings. In each case, where two political units with different sources of transcendent credibility came into contact, the Christian rulers invested their resources in relatively distinct borders. Similarly, the conversion of the Saxons and Vikings to Christianity subsequently saw the return to the Medieval status quo of relatively indistinct boundaries.

Chapter 6 advances chronologically to examine the significant changes that occurred in Europe as a result of the Protestant Reformation. Protestantism challenged

the Catholic doctrines of spiritual and secular authority and presented an alternate political theory based on the Lutheran doctrine of "a priesthood of all believers." Lutheranism and Calvinism offered theories of authority that were different from Catholicism and also from each other. Though all three religions linked their authority to God, they did so in ways that challenged the foundations of political authority in other political units. As predicted, the increase in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in Europe from one to three increased the distinctiveness of boundaries between political units, particularly in regions where political units of different sources were contiguous.

During the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), an important change occurred in how sources of transcendent credibility were linked to the credibility of the ruler. During this period, covered in Chapter 7, sources of transcendent credibility anchored in religious ideas became increasingly based on the transcendent concept of the "nation" or the "people." The Wars of Religion from the late sixteenth century through the Peace of Westphalia triggered the emergence of "proto-nationalism," a collection of new ideologies that linked the transcendent credibility of God to the ruler indirectly through the *nation*. Cardinal Richelieu played an especially important role in transforming these political ideas into practice through his foreign policy during the Thirty Years' War. The success of these policies prompted imitators throughout Europe to adopt similar policies. The policy makers of Europe ultimately codified this new linkage between God and ruler in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the transcendent source of credibility, God, was now linked to the ruler indirectly vis-à-vis the nation or the people. Chapter

8 describes how the transition continued to evolve, making God's role less important – the *nation* itself became the source of transcendent credibility. Philosophers such as Grotius, Spinoza, and Hobbes took God out of the equation while others, including Althusius, Lawson, and Locke, put the "people" in His place. The struggle against France and Spain in the Netherlands, the Glorious Revolution in England, and the French Revolution converted these ideas into actual political practice during the eighteenth century. Because each nation was different from every other nation in Europe, these political policies adjusted the number of sources of transcendent credibility from three to many, which created incentives that made the distinctiveness of borders between political units much more distinct. The outcome was the institution of the nation-state so familiar to the twentieth-century world. This chapter demonstrates that the *content* of political units implied by the many nationalisms produced the *form* of those units, states surrounded by incredibly distinctive borders.

The dissertation concludes in Chapter 9 with a summation of the findings of the case studies and a discussion of the implications of the hypothesis on issues relevant to the twenty-first century world. In particular, it examines the implications of the dissertation in four areas: (1) the durability and meaningfulness of current borders; (2) whether the European Union is changing the distinctiveness of boundaries in Europe and what effects this will have; (3) the likelihood of religious sources of transcendent credibility reemerging today; and (4) the potential of "cosmopolitanism" to replace nationalism with a common concept of "humanity" as the dominant, and only, source of transcendent credibility in the world.

CHAPTER 3: CHINA: THE SUI AND T'ANG DYNASTIES

A. Introduction
B. Case 1: Unification of China under the Sui and T'ang Dynasties (589-700)
    1. Background: China before the Sui Dynasty (589)
    2. Reducing the Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility from Two to One
    3. Reduction in the Distinctiveness of Boundaries between North and South
    4. Summary
C. Case 2: China and Tibet (620-800)
    1. Background: The Rise of Tibet
    2. Differences between the Two Sources of Transcendent Credibility
    3. Increase in the Distinctiveness of Boundaries between Tibet and China
D. Conclusion

Introduction

The Sui (589-618) and T'ang (618-907) dynasties of China provide the opportunity to examine the theory from two separate angles.[101] On the one hand, the T'ang, and the preceding Sui dynasty, re-unified the Chinese Empire using a hybridized form of Buddhism designed to win the support of the Chinese in the South. The success of this project enabled the Sui and T'ang to lower the physical and cultural barriers separating the North from the South. In effect, the Sui and the T'ang reduced the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the Eastern plain of China

[101] There are few English language sources on the Sui and T'ang Dynasties. The bulk of the historical narrative found in this chapter is drawn from Denis Twitchett and John K Fairbank, eds. (1979), *The Cambridge History of China: Volume III: Sui and T'ang China, 589-906, Part I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) [indicated in the footnotes as "CHC"] and Charles Benn (2002), *China's Golden Age: Everyday Life in the Tang Dynasty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 1-44. Other important English-language scholars on the Sui and the T'ang mostly predate the 1979 Cambridge History, and are thus included: Arthur F Wright, Woodbridge Bingham, Charles P Fitzgerald, Howard J Weschler, Antonio Forte, and Edwin G Pulley-Blank. The same is true for the history of Tibet during the seventh and eighth centuries. Modern English-language sources are concerned primarily with Tibet as it related to the Chinese dynasties or as it relates to the current drive for Tibetan independence. Unfortunately, therefore, the historical narrative on the Chinese-Tibetan rivalry necessarily is primarily from the Chinese point of view.

from at least two to one. This was a necessary step in unification, or to put it another way, in making the boundary between North and South less distinct.

On the other hand, the T'ang confronted other political units around the edges of their territory: the Eastern Turks in the North and the newly formed Tibetan state in the West. The Tibetan government depended on a form of Buddhism that had been borrowed from India and adapted to suit the conditions of Tibetan society. Chinese Buddhism was very different from Tibetan Buddhism in terms of how the ruler linked his (or her) credibility to a transcendent source. In addition, the T'ang, for their part, adapted their source of transcendent credibility to Taoism, albeit a Taoism that looked very similar to Chinese Buddhism. This shift occurred during the same period as the rise of prominence of Tibet. Once the Tibetans firmly acknowledged a source of transcendent credibility that was different from the T'ang source, boundaries between the two political units became more distinct.

These cases provide evidence that the distinctiveness of boundaries between political units depends on the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system. The first case will demonstrate that the Sui and T'ang reduced the number of sources of transcendent credibility in China to one, in order to eliminate the border between North and South China and create a single, unified Chinese Empire. The second case will demonstrate that the appearance of a militarily strong polity in the West that generated compliance using a different source of transcendent credibility from the Chinese resulted in a fairly distinct boundary between Tibet and China.

Case 1: Unification of China under the Sui and T'ang Dynasties (589-700)

In the sixth century, "China" was a distant idea. Since the fall of the Han dynasty in 220, the region had been divided into a conglomeration of separate political units. Although there arose a variety of ruling families and rival territories, the one consistent boundary throughout this period separated the North from the South. Roughly, this boundary, starting from the east, run along the Huai River into the Qianling Mountains, where the watershed of the Huang He belonged to the North and that of the Yangtze belonged to the South. The South was significantly wetter than the North, leading to differences in core agricultural crops. This geographic boundary paralleled a political and cultural boundary as well. Thus, when the leaders of the Sui dynasty sought to reunify China in 589, they had to devise a strategy to overcome and eliminate this gash through the middle of the region. Making such a boundary less distinctive required not just a military unification, but also a unification of the source of transcendent credibility between North and South.

Background: China before the Sui Dynasty (589)

There is no easy way to characterize the political situation in China from the decline of the Han Dynasty in 220 to the Empire's reunification in 589. This period is marked by a series of popular rebellions, a succession of local elites who gained power only to lose it to another upstart, and waves of invasions of non-Chinese peoples from the north. What was consistent throughout this period is the preservation, at least in form, of many of the institutions originally set up by the Han. In 440, the Toba Turks finally succeeded in creating a stable political unit, and despite being ethnic and

cultural outsiders, consolidated their position among the Chinese elite by adopting Chinese institutions. Yet, a powerful segment of these Turks who did not want to abandon their traditional ways formed a new political unit off in 534. The "traditionalists" dynasty later became known as the Northern Chou, while the "sinicized" political unit was transformed into the Northern Ch'i. In 577, the Northern Chou conquered the Northern Ch'i. Ironically, although it was the traditionalist portion of the Wei that eventually won, it was "sinicization" that was the real winner: the traditionalists became converted to the benefits of adopting Chinese institutions, elites, and culture. In short, while the northern parts of China were very strong militarily, they remained politically unstable until 577, due in large part to disagreements over the ideological bases of government.

The dynasties in the South, on the other hand, considered themselves to be the true heirs of the Han. Race and the continuity of institutions mattered. The peoples of the North were seen as impure and barbaric, with non-Chinese people continuously polluting those lands. While the North nominally kept the Han institutions, "barbarians" could not understand their proper operation. The South contained some of the best farmland in the region, which made these dynasties relatively secure economically compared with the North. The Ch'en controlled the South beginning in 557. However, its power was drastically reduced in 575 when the Northern Chou convinced the Ch'en emperor to attack the Northern Ch'i, a move that weakened the two rivals of the Northern Chou to such an extent that the Northern Ch'i were easily conquered in 577 and the Ch'en in 589. The Ch'en's military troubles got worse with the accession of an Emperor ranked among the least effective by Chinese historians.

Thus, despite political stability and economic prosperity, the Ch'en lacked the superior military strength and leadership of the North.

It was into this environment that the founder of the Sui Dynasty, Wen-ti, stepped. Wen-ti was a senior court official in Northern Chou who had intermarried into another important court family. The intrigue of other court officials provided an opportunity for Wen-ti to stage a coup, assume leadership of Northern Chou, and set up the Sui Dynasty. It would have been difficult to deduce that a new dynasty had taken over if one merely looked at the royal court in the Northern Chou capital Ch'ang-an. The same families were still in residence, providing the corps of advisers and officials. Yet, Wen-ti understood the importance of consolidating his authority in the North before attempting an invasion of the South. To this end, he immediately created a bureaucracy that brought together elites from Northern Chou and the now-defunct Northern Ch'i. He set this group to work in bringing the local regions under stronger central control. This group was also responsible for creating and implementing a new legal code. In addition, although Wen-ti knew he would need his troops for the upcoming invasion, he did not neglect his subjects in the far north, sending troops to the Great Wall to increase protection against invading Turks. Once these reforms were accomplished, Wen-ti's position was secure enough that he began his campaign against the Ch'en, conquering and annexing the South in 589.

Thus, in 589, prior to the Sui conquest of the South, China was clearly divided into two political units: the Sui in the North and the Ch'en in the South. Despite changes in leadership and changes in the military capabilities of both North and South, the boundary between the two units remained fairly distinct and unmoved. The North

and the South clearly saw their counterpart as an "Other." The unification of "China" was a geographic enterprise, not an ethnic or cultural one. The dominant military of the North could conquer the South, but it could do little to allow the Sui to "rule" the South and efficiently generate compliance. What was required, the Sui learned, was a single source of transcendent credibility that was palatable in both the North and the South.

Reducing the number of sources of transcendent credibility from two to one

The Sui unification of China is an interesting case study because it shows the Sui leadership recognizing that one single source of transcendent credibility was needed where there had been two. This was a conscious policy choice made by the Sui after other policies designed to eliminate the boundary between North and South had failed. Thus, it is important to demonstrate, first, that the sources of transcendent credibility in the North and the South differed significantly, second, the conscious policy choices made by the Sui leadership to reduce the number of sources of transcendent credibility to one, and third, the resultant source of transcendent credibility and its level of acceptance in both the North and South.

Buddhism in the North

Northern China adhered to a very different source of transcendent credibility than the South thanks to differences in historical development. Surrounded by oceans, dense jungles, and high mountains, the South was relatively isolated compared to the North. The North, on the other hand, was exposed to new influences thanks to the

numerous tribes of the steppes and their position as eastern terminus of the Silk Roads. Although the North resisted these changes, they also found it prudent to adapt in ways the South was not forced to do.

The influence of the peoples of the steppes continued because the Sui inherited the institutions of the Northern Chou. As has been noted earlier, the key Turk families and officials of the Northern Chou wished to retain many of the traditional religious beliefs that their ancestors had brought with them from the steppes. But, at the same time, they recognized the value of adopting Chinese institutions and religions to more effectively rule the predominately Chinese population. Thus, many of the traditional steppe practices had already been blended into existing Northern Chinese rites and institutions.

However, the three most important influences on Northern transcendent credibility came from Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. It must be recognized that these three systems had existed together in Northern China for roughly five hundred years. Whereas, in the beginning, these systems vied with one another for the hearts and minds of the populace, over time they began to blend together. In their extreme versions, each system could (and did) act as an alternative source of transcendent credibility and, thereby, a threat to the existing government. Yet, in their more moderate versions, each system could be shown as support for the other. In short, by the sixth century, Taoism in and of itself was not a threat to the government in power, but a Taoism that excluded, for example, the legitimacy of the Buddhist teachings could very well be a threat or an opportunity for the government in power.

This syncretic trend in Northern China is very important as the source of transcendent credibility for the Sui was a hybridized version of Buddhism and Confucianism.

Sui Emperor Wen-ti acknowledged the importance of Buddhism as a source of legitimacy for any government in Northern China. Buddhism had been in China for 500 years and was well integrated into every level of Chinese society. The Northern Chou were ready to adopt the more secular Confucian practices and institutions, but also wished to retained many of the religious beliefs they had brought with them from the steppes. In 574, the Northern Chou ruler instigated a severe program of repression of the Buddhist and Taoist clergy. Three years later, this policy was extended to the newly conquered area of Northern Ch'i, a region where Buddhism was much more firmly ensconced. Over the ensuing ten years, the rulers managed to enforce this incredibly unpopular policy, but failed to change the hearts and minds of the Northern Ch'i people and the elite. This costly policy combined with Wen-ti's assurances to Buddhists contributed heavily to his successful coup. It was well known that Wen-ti was raised among Buddhist monks and nuns and that he had married a very devout Buddhist woman. In the last years of the Northern Chou dynasty, Wen-ti watched as the ruler tried (unsuccessfully) to eradicate all non-Confucian religious practices. As Emperor, Wen-ti revived Buddhism.[102]

[102] China historian Arthur Wright has labeled this set of Buddhist practices used to directly support the Sui and T'ang dynasties as "Imperial Buddhism," Wright (1959), *Buddhism in Chinese History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

The transcendental source of Emperor Wen-ti's credibility was a hybridized version of Buddhism and Confucianism.[103] The Han Dynasty had based their governance on Confucian doctrines. While many scholars argue that Confucianism is not technically a "religion," it cannot be denied that an important facet of its doctrines is the "Mandate of Heaven" (*t'ien-ming*).[104] Confucius argued that good government requires recapturing the institutions and practices that worked in the "Golden Age" of China, especially in the Shang and early Zhou dynasties. These dynasties incorporated the idea that Heaven placed the current Emperor in his position and, as long as he continued to rule in harmony with the cosmic forces, society would flourish while he ruled.[105] Hence, Confucianism is at least "transcendent," pointing to the legitimacy of political leadership established by Heaven. It is this argument that Wen-ti's advisor, Li Te-lin, turned to in his "Discourse on the Heavenly Mandate:" compared with the Chou, the new Sui dynasty produced the *least* possible disruption to the cosmic order.[106]

Wen-ti was not especially intellectual or learned; thus, he lacked some key qualities Confucians valued. At the same time, he recognized the usefulness of Confucian doctrines for establishing legitimacy and of Confucian scholars for effective government. His Confucian advisor Su Wei convinced him that the moral

---

[103] "Buddhism had added an extra dimension to the Tang heritage from the Han [Confucianism]." John King Fairbank (1992), *China: A New History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press): 78.

[104] On the discussion of whether Confucianism is a religion, see Xinzhong Yao, *An Introduction to Confucianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[105] On the use of the "Mandate of Heaven" in the Shang and Zhou Dynasties, see KC Chang, *Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983): 33-35.

[106] CHC 72.

health of the people and government was crucial to a flourishing society.[107] To that end, Wen-ti pushed policies that focused on reinvigorating the people's filial piety (*xiao*). Against the advice of Li Te-lin, Wen-ti argued that reading only the Confucian *Classic of filial submission* was sufficient to establish one's character and to govern a state. This position stressed the importance of hierarchy in a family and the state (especially if you are the Emperor at the top of the hierarchy).[108] Early in his reign he provided a great deal of support to Confucian schools in the hopes of producing a strong group of advisors and bureaucrats. However, by 601 it was clear that these schools were either drawing mediocre students or not effective educational institutions. Fed up with the low quality of graduates, Wen-ti closed most of these schools. Not coincidentally, on the same day he shut down the Confucian schools, he distributed large numbers of holy Buddhist relics through the empire.

One of the most important innovations of Wen-ti was blending Confucianism and Buddhism together in such a way that the contradictions between the two were ironed out and both provided complementary sources of transcendent credibility for his rule. Confucianism said that Wen-ti ruled under the Mandate of Heaven, but Heaven (*t'ien*) had always been a vague term.[109] In the *Analects*, Confucius argued that questions about Heaven should wait until the questions about mankind and the

---

[107] CHC 74. One of the most important places where common ground was found between Buddhism and Confucianism was in their emphasis of moral behavior, Eric Zurcher (1959), *The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China* (Ledien: Brill).

[108] The following is indicative of what Wen-ti appreciated in the *Classic of Filial Piety*: "Filiality begins with service to parents, continues in service to the ruler, and ends with establishing oneself in the world," Wm Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds. (1999), *Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 1: From Earliest Times to 1600*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press): 326.

[109] Yao, 141-152.

world are first answered.[110] As a result, it was relatively easy to attach a conscious Being to the vague notion of Heaven. In Wen-ti's words, it is the Buddha who "takes true dharma and entrusts it to the princes of states. We, being honored among men, accept Buddha's trust."[111] Because it is the Buddha who has chosen the Emperor, and the Buddha is the paragon of compassion, the ruler is seen as ideal. The ruler is considered "a Cakravartin king," which means that he is the Buddhist political ideal of a ruler who brings peace and prosperity to his land.[112] The Cakravartin king is the secular counterpart of the Buddha. The word Cakra is Sanskrit for yantra, which is a physical form of a mantra, meaning that the king was something to look at to see how to be enlightened.[113] Thus, Wen-ti's duties as Emperor also included defender of the faith and generous donor. He established Buddhist temples in every region of the Empire, on the one hand fulfilling his role as donor, but on the other hand providing a visible sign to the people that Buddha's political counterpart was in charge. The monks and nuns were put to work immediately. They served as healers, leaders of religious rituals, and other crucial roles in the community. The local people could see on a daily basis that the Emperor and the unseen forces of Nature were working on the same side, for their benefit.

A third religious factor in Chinese history, Taoism, also found a place in the Sui dynasty, though its role was minimal. Taoism had transformed over the past 800 years from a brief explanation of the Tao found in Lao-Tzu's *Tao-Te-Ching*, to a

---

[110] Confucius, *Analects*, 11.11.
[111] CHC 76.
[112] De Bary, "Commentary on the Sutra for Humane Kings," 476-480.
[113] "Cakravartin" and "Sri Yantra," in *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions*, John Bowker, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

belief system that now deified the messenger, Lao-Tzu, and included many other Immortals.[114] During the Han dynasty, many of the more durable concepts of Taoism had been melded into official Confucianism in order to produce a fuller philosophical/theological system.[115] Thus, at the time of the Sui, Taoism was not perceived as an alternate source of transcendent credibility than Confucianism. Yet, to the extent that Taoist clergy were independent, they still represented a potential threat to the Sui's ideology. Emperor Wen-ti honored Lao-Tzu just enough to keep the Taoists happy. Because this came at the tail end of ten years of harsh repression under the Northern Chou, Taoists believed that they had a real champion in Wen-ti. The truth is that Wen-ti only accepted Taoism to the extent that it meshed with his hybridized version of Buddhism and Confucianism. For the most part, Taoist practices that did not conform were illegal. He may have stopped the oppression of both Buddhism and Taoism, but only Buddhism received his full support. At the end of his reign, the capital Ch'ang-an contained 120 Buddhist buildings, but only ten Taoist. In short, as long as the Taoist clergy were minimalized and its most durable concepts were already appropriated, Taoism was permitted to exist.

Relationship between Emperor and Sangha

Perhaps the most crucial distinction between Buddhism in the North and South involved how the clergy related to the rulers. In the fourth century, more than two

---

[114] De Bary, 77-111, 392-414.

[115] During the Han dynasty, official Confucianism adopted many Taoist concepts in *The Discourses in the White Tiger Hall* written by the historian Ban Gu (32-92 AD), which reportedly recorded discussions on Confucian ideas held at the court of the Han Emperor Zhang. De Bary, 344-347.

centuries before the Sui reunification of China, the Buddhist clerical leaders in the North and South made clear their different stances on how monks relate to emperors. The question was whether monks, and especially the head of the Buddhist clergy (the *Sangha*), should pay homage to the ruler.[116]

In the North, the relationship between the Buddha and the king was closely connected. As Buddhism gained popularity in the North, the ruler came to be seen as a bodhisattva well on his way to becoming a Buddha. At times, however, a ruler could assert that he was a living Buddha or even the Buddha reincarnated. The founder of the Wei dynasty (mid-fourth century) claimed such status and the Buddhist clergy backed him up. Thus, when the Sangha was asked to pay homage to the king, he could justifiably do so since he was not acknowledging the authority of mere temporal ruler, but spiritual authority already due a Buddha. According to one Sangha of the Wei dynasty, Faguo, the ruler was both the temporal and spiritual authority of every Buddhist monk.

In the South, however, there was a very different outcome to this question. The emperors in the South claimed to be persons in pursuit of buddhahood, but this was very different from actually being one. According to Huiyuan, a Sangha of the South who established the precedence that would be followed until reunification, the vocation of a Buddhist monk is to renounce the world. Nothing on earth should have any hold on a true monk. Thus, the Sangha should not bow before the ruler. If anything, the emperor should bow to the monk for the service he is provided

---

[116] Whalen Lai (2003), "Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey," in *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, Antonio S Lua, ed. (Routledge): 7-19 [9-10]; DeBary, 426-29.

humanity. For a variety of reasons, both political and spiritual, the leading families of the South supported Huiyuan's position. As a result, the Buddhist clergy in the South remained almost totally independent of the Southern emperors. Such a politico-religious hierarchy was perceived by the emperors of the North as a real and present threat to their ability to generate compliance among the peoples of the North.

This hierarchical distinction between North and South led to continued divergences between the two forms of Buddhism. Free from direct imperial supervision and feeding off of the support provided by many of the powerful families, Buddhists in the South were allowed to spend much of their time considering the philosophical ideas. Many schools sprung up as a result. Each monastery in effect had its own theology. In the North, on the other hand, such ideological experimentation was frowned on. The focus of Buddhists in the North was perfecting the practices and rites associated with attaining Nirvana. The North was more prone to invasion and war than the South, thus a focus on practices was more welcomed by the people of the North who sought stability and solace in the midst of chaos. Yet, philosophical matters remained largely undiscussed in the North, thereby protecting the theological status quo.

Buddhism in the South

The source of transcendent credibility in the South was a "purer" form of Buddhism, meaning one that was less "tainted" by foreign influences.[117]

[117] In particular, the constant invasion and occupations of Turkish peoples from the north and northwest that the northern portion of China had been exposed to for centuries.

Buddhism was incredibly strong in the Southern dynasties.[118] There is less evidence about religious practices of the rulers in the South, but this is understandable as the conquered society usually leaves less to posterity than the conqueror. There were few connections between the Buddhist clergy in the South and the clergy in the North. Thus, not only did central doctrines differ, the hierarchy personnel differed as well. North and South had distinct Sangha who saw their position vis-à-vis the emperor very differently. In other words, a respected monk in the South was not necessarily equally respected in the North.

The Buddhist clergy in the North under Wen-ti emerged from ten years of oppression under the last Northern Chou emperor. Their concern was with their own status, not with that of the South. Their modest goals included not giving Wen-ti an excuse to withdraw support and gradually increasing their influence in society. The clergy in the South, on the other hand, had always had a relatively privileged status. They had not faced state-sponsored oppression for centuries and had come to take their position in society for granted. In addition to this, they shared the Southern dynasties contempt for the "barbarous" peoples that now populated the Northern portions of the former Han Empire.

The lack of evidence and the short term of the Ch'en dynasty prevents an adequate understanding of how it related its legitimacy to a source of transcendent credibility. Clearly, rulers of all the Southern dynasties claimed legitimacy as heirs to the Han dynasty.[119] However, Confucianism was not as strong in the South as it had

---

[118] Kenneth KS Ch'en, *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[119] CHC 5.

been in the Han or was currently in the North. No adequate compromise had been reached between Buddhism and Confucianism – the success of one meant the decline of the other. Over the past century, Buddhism had clearly been in ascendance among both elite and masses. The theological innovation in the South largely concerned blending some of the ideas of Buddhism and Taoism, but this still fell short of peaceful co-existence of the two systems. As long as the form of Taoism that deified Lao-Tzu was insignificant, its existence could be tolerated.

Yang Kuang's efforts to win the support of the South

The military conquest of the South was a relatively easy affair. Wen-ti's efforts at consolidation of power in the North was the antithesis of the decline the Ch'en ruler experienced in the South. A year before Wen-ti launched his campaign against the South, he sent the Ch'en ruler a letter containing twenty crimes he had committed, suggesting that the Mandate of Heaven had been lifted. Wen-ti considered the elimination of the Ch'en ruler an obligation placed on him by Heaven, and said so in his letter. Wen-ti had 300,000 copies of a similar edict made and distributed in the South—an early form of psychological warfare. In short, Wen-ti wanted to make clear to the soon-to-be-conquered people in the South that he had the Mandate of Heaven while the Ch'en did not.[120] Resisting the Sui was resisting Heaven. The Ch'en were easily defeated.

Wen-ti found (as have many other conquerors throughout history) that conquest was simpler than governance. Wen-ti's first actions in reuniting the Empire

[120] CHC 110.

involved shifting the legitimacy of the Ch'en ruler to himself. Two policies were especially important in this. First, the Ch'en ruler and his family were kept alive and lived near Wen-ti's court in the capital Ch'ang-an. The Ch'en ruler was instrumental in encouraging rebels in the South to do as he had done and accept the new Emperor. The clemency shown to the Ch'en ruler was also intended to symbolize the leniency Wen-ti would show to the South once it embraced him. Second, Wen-ti had the Southern capital city, Chien-k'ang completely destroyed and turned into farmland. The people were not killed, but there was nothing left to show a city had once stood in that place. In short, Wen-ti intended his dynasty to be more than the best option—it would be the only option.

These early policies of Wen-ti failed to win him legitimacy in the South. Despite a common heritage and close proximity, these two cultures had been completely separated for the past three hundred and fifty years. A good example of this is that when the Ch'en ruler was brought to Wen-ti, neither could understand the other because they spoke different languages.[121] Each society had evolved differently. Yet, Wen-ti was determined to recreate the Chinese Empire of the Han, and this required finding ways to bridge these cultural differences.

In the South, it was not primarily the elites that had to be won over. This could be done (and was) by involving some of the leading families in Wen-ti's bureaucracy. As had been the case for centuries, the elite families would often associate themselves with whichever star they perceived was on the rise. Since all dynasties North and South, Chinese or other, used some Confucian principles of government, elite officials

[121] CHC 112.

were useful despite multiple changes of leadership. Instead, it was the larger population that needed to be won over. This, in large part, meant winning over the Southern Buddhist clergy who occupied prominent positions in every community.

Wen-ti tried another unsuccessful policy designed to encourage the North and the South to adhere to the same source of transcendent credibility. This policy of imposing Confucian principles on the general population backfired. Wen-ti's goal was to drive home the importance of filial piety throughout empire. To this end, everyone in the Empire was required to memorize the "Five Teachings" (*Wu chiao*), which basically emphasized the importance of the social hierarchy and fulfilling one's place in it. Whether the people in the South thought this doctrine to be wrong or believed that it was a first phase in replacing Buddhism with Confucianism is unclear. What is clear, however, is that the people of the South did not like the policy of mandatory memorization the Five Teachings. Many of Wen-ti's officials in the South were killed, and in some cases, eaten. Tradition says that as they ate the officials, the rebels said "This will make you more able to memorize the Five Teachings!"[122] These popular uprisings convinced Wen-ti that a new policy was needed.

The second policy was to convince the Southern Buddhists that Wen-ti was really a Cakravartin king who would not only protect Buddhism, but would enable it to thrive. Truth be told, it is unclear that this was Wen-ti's policy. It became his policy in the latter years of his reign, but his adoption of it probably came after his son, Yang Kuang, demonstrated how effective it was in uniting the North and South. Yang Kuang, the Prince of Chin, was sent by his father with troops to crush the *Five*

[122] CHC 113.

Teachings uprisings and maintain order in the South. He successfully stopped the rebellions, but recognized that the South would be won more easily with both a carrot and a stick. Part of the discontent in the South stemmed from the destruction of the capital city, which had also served as the center of Buddhism. Lacking the money from elites (who had moved to the North to serve Wen-ti), Southern clergy fretted that they would lose their place to Northern Buddhists. Yang Kuang, however, immediately began to pour money into their coffers, supported the building of new temples, and invited them to come to his new Southern home in Yang-chou to live and work. Of course, Yang Kuang purged the Southern Buddhist clergy of any who did not support the new Sui Dynasty, but once they passed the screening process, the clergy could expect to be treated very well.

The main Buddhist school in the South was the T'ien-t'ai, headed by the legendary Chih-i. Yang Kuang struck up a friendship with Chih-i and made it clear that Buddhism in the South would merge with Buddhism in the North, not be dominated by it. Chih-i also played an important symbolic role in the merging of Northern and Southern Buddhism, which could not have been missed by Yang Kuang. Chih-i was from an aristocratic Southern family, but studied under the famous Northern Buddhist teacher Huisi. One of the central doctrines of the Chih'i's teaching and the T'ien-t'ai School is that the philosophical aspects of Buddhism (heavily emphasized in the South) and the discipline and meditative aspects (heavily emphasized in the North) were "like the two wings of a bird."[123] Yang Kuang

[123] DeBary 444.

promoted these teachings of Buddhism, elevated the T'ien-t'ai School and its clergy, and doctrinally ironed over the differences between Northern and Southern Buddhism.

Yang Kuang also gathered sacred books from all over the Empire, had them copied, and sent these manuscripts to important temples in the South. Gradually, Yang-chou became the Southern political and cultural capital that Chien-k'ang had been. The Buddhist clergy became the biggest supporters of the Sui in the South, reducing the resistance to the new conquerors. In 604, Yang Kuang succeeded his father with the new Imperial title, Yang-ti. When he returned to Ch'ang-an he brought with him the best of the Southern clergy. The Buddhists from the South merged with their counterparts in the North and blended into one hierarchy.

Confucianism had lost favor with Wen-ti in the later years of his reign. Yang-ti revived Confucianism again, recreating the complementary blend with Buddhism discussed above. The Buddhist clergy held privileged places in the capital near Yang-ti's court. At the same time, Confucian rituals were brought back. In particular, the Emperor traveled to one of the holy mountains, Heng-shan, and performed a Confucian ritual dating from the Han dynasty that "dramatized supreme power."[124] When blended properly, the doctrines and rituals of Confucianism did not contradict those of Buddhism, and Yang-ti recognized that a hybrid could actually produce the best of both worlds in terms of generating compliance and authority.

[124] CHC 132-33. Before his ill-fated invasion of Korea, Yang-ti also performed three ancient Confucian sacrifices traditionally done by a ruler before beginning a military campaign. CHC 133.

The resultant single source of TC

In sum, China was divided both politically and religiously as late as 589. The North relied on a newly developed blend of Confucianism and Buddhism, while the South was Buddhist. The Sui Emperors conquered the South, consolidating their conquest by blending an important Southern School of Buddhism into its Confucian-Buddhist hybrid. Once this was done, the populace of the South was more willing to accept significant Confucian principles without coercion. Likewise, the people of the North were satisfied because the T'ien-t'ai School still emphasized and celebrated the Northern practices of Buddhism. At the same time, the Sui retained the Northern theological concept that the ruler stood in authority above the clergy. Finally, all of this was combined with Confucian institutions that had been the official state practices under the Han dynasty, which held a transcendent credibility all its own. Only after this hybridization was accomplished was the authority of the new Emperors secure.

Reduction in the Distinctiveness of Boundaries between North and South

The distinctiveness of the boundary between Northern and Southern China in 589 is a far cry from borders of the modern nation-state system. And yet, for the time period, the Huai River-Qianling Mountain divide formed a relatively distinct boundary between Northern and Southern political units. This border, however, disappeared between 589 and 618. A military victory was insufficient to eradicate this border as the division was more than just a political phenomenon. Once the Sui imposed a single source of transcendent credibility covering both the North and South, the boundary gradually disappeared both physically and conceptually.

A distinctive boundary prior to 589

Despite the obvious and consistent military threats from the Northern nomadic peoples, the Northern Chou also stationed troops along their southern border. This border closely followed the Huai River in the East and the Qianling Mountains further West. Because the North had a more powerful military, the South was particularly vulnerable to an invasion that crossed the Mountains and floated down the Yangtze to the population centers. A Northern invasion could either hug the coastline or proceed down the Yangtze River gorge. This made the geographic barrier a natural political and cultural boundary. Up river and on the northern side of the Yangtze, the Northern Chou built outposts that could guard any movement along the river. The Ch'en, and many of the dynasties that preceded them, had built similar fortifications downstream and on the Southern side. Thus, the River itself acted both as a highway for invasion and a heavily controlled border. In the East, the Huai River served as a similar barrier with fortifications on its North and South banks. Under such scrutiny, very little in terms of people and trade passed between North and South.

By the 580s, the military threat in the South was minimal. The Ch'en had once had a strong military power, but it was aimed primarily at the Northern Ch'i.[125] The failed invasion into Northern Ch'i in 575 reduced this power to a purely defensive force. Northern Chou troop postings were intended primarily to ensure that all flow of goods, people, and troops crossing the Qianling Mountains was checked. After Wen-ti

[125] The Ch'en boundary with the Northern Ch'i lay primarily along the Huai River, which was a relatively flat plain. Thus, this boundary was more susceptible to invasion than that of the Northern Chou, who would need to cross the Qianling Mountains and float an armada down the fortified Yangtze River.

took over in 589, he added a new objective to the generals in charge along the Southern frontier: prepare to invade.

The worst part of the fighting between the Sui and the Ch'en occurred in the naval battles on the Yangtze. Once the Sui controlled the River, the rest of the fighting was minimal. Interior defenses for the Ch'en were almost non-existent. The Ch'en invested their resources primarily in creating and controlling a distinctive border. Likewise, the Northern Chou and the Sui invested the bulk of their troops along the northern boundaries with the Eastern Turks and along the Yangtze River. Military in the interior of the Sui realm consisted of local militias, not centrally controlled and trained soldiers. In short, both the Sui and the Ch'en demonstrated a credible commitment to defend their borders. Distance from the center was not the issue nor was the extent of the military threat. Control of the borders militarily and non-militarily was the primary concern.

The northern shore of the Yangtze River[126] was also a distinctive boundary because authority of the political unit ended sharply at the water's edge. Persons living near the border could not appeal to both the Sui and the Ch'en's authority. Officials in a particular region or village were appointed by either the Sui ruler or the Ch'en ruler, depending on the side of the River. As the local official was the primary provider of justice, hierarchies of appeal and law existed, but did not cross the River. In general, persons on the North side of the River spoke a different language and came from a different culture than those on the South side. This separation was continually reinforced with new deployments of troops from the interior of each respective realm.

[126] The Qianling Mountain range.

Reduction of boundary distinctiveness after the Sui conquest

The reunification did not occur in an international vacuum. As the Sui and T'ang reduced the distinctiveness of the boundary between North and South, external enemies were growing stronger. Thus, some of the proxies that we would turn to here will be somewhat masked in the country as a whole. For example, the reduction of border defenses between North and South to nothing was mirrored by an increase in troops stationed on the edges of the Turkish and Tibetan realms. In addition, while the theory would predict a less hierarchically arranged judicial system where a border becomes less distinctive, in this case we see an *increase* in judicial hierarchy. However, this intensification throughout the Empire is in response to the growing threats on the frontiers. The hierarchy, however, now crossed the boundary and embraced both North and South. In other words, despite the confounding effects of China in an international system, it is still possible to see that the boundary between North and South China grew less distinctive.

Following the conquest of the Sui and the pacification of the brief uprisings in the South, troops were no longer stationed along the Yangtze River.[127] Controlling the flow of ideas was the last thing on the Sui ruler's mind. In fact, ideally, he sought to vastly increase the flow from North to South in terms of ideas. Likewise, he expected the flow of economic goods to increase along the Yangtze River. As was discussed earlier, thanks to the pacification strategy of Wen-ti's son in the South, all of these things occurred. The Yangtze was no longer a fortified border, but a highway of sorts

[127] Except to protect the flow of goods and people along it.

that saw an enormous increase in traffic. The Huai River experienced a similar transformation. The expansion of the canal system primarily under Wen-ti's heir, Yang-ti, improved the flow of traffic between what was formerly divided between Northern Chou, Northern Ch'i, and Ch'en. By 611, the Grand Canal directly linked the Huang He and Yangtze River systems. Troops that had been stationed on the River were first redeployed in the South for pacification, but within a decade, redeployed to face the nomadic tribes in the North and Northwest and to prepare for the doomed invasion of Korea.

Redeployment of troops was relatively easy, but it took some time for the cultural barriers to fall between North and South. In particular, the people in the South had always looked down on the Northern people as barbarians merely dressed up as Chinese. Such beliefs did not disappear overnight. Language barriers also took time to dissipate. However, the free flow of goods and people between North and South increased the rapidity of the assimilation. The Sui rulers and the later T'ang rulers appointed local officials in the South. Many of these officials, though not all, were transplants from the North. At the same time, however, many of the best people in the South were moved north to work in other parts of the bureaucracy. People from the North and South were forced to solve the assimilation problem in order to conduct daily affairs. By the time the T'ang took control in 618, there was little evidence that a boundary between North and South had existed.

Summary

All of these unification strategies depended on the Sui ability to create a shared source of transcendent credibility. After a number of brief uprisings in the South, rebellions no longer revolved around the idea of a North as separate from the South or vice versa. Relative internal peace reigned in the reunited China for roughly twenty years. When a new spate of rebellions surfaced, the locus had shifted to the northeast in the regions most heavily affected by the 611 Huang He flooding. Further, the rebellions were not about breaking away from the Empire, but replacing an Emperor who (in the eyes of the rebels) had so clearly lost the Mandate of Heaven. The Sui policies had solidified the idea that the Empire was eternal. Though it would go through periods of decline, the Empire would always be revived. A distinctive border tearing the Empire in half was a thing of the past.

Thus, in order to eliminate this boundary, the Sui Emperors developed and implemented a conscious strategy designed to generate compliance from the South with a minimal amount of coercion. The Sui reduction of the number of sources of transcendent credibility in China to one was instrumental in reducing the distinctiveness of the boundary between its Northern and Southern halves. To put it another way, the Sui goal of reunification depended on the Emperors' ability to base their legitimacy on a source of transcendent credibility shared in common throughout the Empire.

Case 2: China and Tibet (620-800)

Early in the seventh century, a new power was rising in the West. No one in China would have predicted that several disparate tribes of shepherds on the Tibetan Plateau would suddenly merge into a single political unit capable of extending its power all the way to the Chinese plains. And yet, the new T'ang dynasty, taking over in China after Yang-ti's disastrous invasion of Korea on the 610s, found that their source of transcendent credibility was no longer the only source in the system. This case will demonstrate that the introduction of an alternate source of transcendent credibility induced the Chinese and Tibetans each to invest heavily in their mutual border, creating an incredibly distinct and incredibly long border between their territories. The area where the distinct border emerged had formerly been sparsely-populated, mountainous, and distant from the Chinese and Tibetan centers of power. The frontier was just that, incredibly indistinct and patrolled by tribes that preferred to be left alone. However, the rise of Tibet and its alternate source of transcendent credibility meant that this region would be the most hotly contested and highly demarcated in Medieval Asia.

Background: The Rise of Tibet

When the T'ang came to power in 618, they faced a new enemy on their western flank with which the Sui had not had to contend. The Tibetans as a unified people were relatively new. The land that would become Tibet was surrounded on all sides by mountains. The area itself was a large plateau in the midst of the sharp peaks of the Himalayas. The silk roads skirted this region to the north and the south, but

travel across the plateau itself was avoided as a costly and fruitless venture. Thus, the many tribes that lived in Tibet were relatively isolated from external influence and, by consequence, were neither powerful nor rich. Monks from India had brought Buddhism to Tibet and neighboring Nepal in the third century, but the dominant religion was Bon, which required Shamans in order to speak to the various gods, demons, and spirits. In general, Bon resembled religions found among the small nomadic tribes of Siberia, Africa, and North America.

For reasons that are unknown, late in the sixth century a number of leaders of the various tribes on the plateau decided to make one of their number a king over them all. The lord of Yar-lung became the Spu-rgyal btsan-po. While rgyal means "king," spu refers to the sacred nature of the king as a divine manifestation. His authority was not strictly political, but spiritual as well. From 570 to 608, he consolidated the tribes and extended their power beyond the plateau. Though the Sui had not encountered any of his forces, rumors of the growing power of the Tibetans reached Ch'ang-an. It was said (and the Sui Emperors believed) that the Tibetan king commanded 100,000 warriors. This number is clearly an exaggeration, but its credibility can probably be ascribed to the rapidity at which the Tibetans went from backward yak-herders to military power.

It was the son of this first Tibetan king who gets the lion's share of the glory in Tibetan history. Songtsen Gompo (608-650) is known as the first chos-rgyal, or "religious king," a title given to him for his successful efforts to convert the Tibetans to Buddhism. According to the traditional Tibetan history, *Clear Mirror on Royal Genealogy*, written in 1364, the mother of Songsten Gompo and the mothers of his

two future wives, one a princess of Nepal and the other a princess in China, were all impregnated with a ray of light that emanated from the forehead of the Buddha Avolokitesvara. As rulers, they "brought the Dharma" to the land of Tibet. *The Clear Mirror*, a Tibetan history, describes the people of Tibet as being descended from the mating of a monkey and a rock-ogress.[128] Hence, the Tibetans were a depraved people before the dharma came and all of their neighbors knew this and despised them for it. However, when Songsten Gompo transformed dharma laws into royal law, he transformed the Tibetans into a blessed and happy race. In this way the traditional account describes Songsten Gompo as both political and spiritual savior of Tibet. In the end he does not die, but returns to the Buddha from whom he originally emanated. Songsten Gompo, and by relation his royal descendents, was no ordinary monarch, but was a dharma-king.[129]

While there is much in the traditional account that does not pass a modern believability test, it is verified in many places that Buddhism became the source of transcendent credibility in the reign of Songsten Gompo.[130] The traditional Bon religion was not so much eliminated as absorbed into Buddhism, creating a unique form that evolved in different ways than Buddhism in India or China or elsewhere for that matter. The Buddhism Tibet built on came straight from India, while Songsten Gompo also brought in various pieces of Chinese Buddhism to supplement and customize for the Tibetan culture. This was symbolized in Songsten Gompo's

---

[128] For more here, consult Part I, chapter 7, entitled, "The Descent of the Tibetan Race from a Monkey and a Rock-Ogress," Gyaltsen, *The Clear Mirror*: 75-79.

[129] Sakyapa Sonam Gyaltsen, *The Clear Mirror: A Traditional Account of Tibet's Golden Age*, McComas Taylor and Lama Choedak Yuthok, trans. (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1996).

[130] Hugh Richardson (1984), *Tibet and Its History*; Charles Bell (1968), *Tibet, Past and Present*.

marriages: his first and senior wife was from Nepal and his second wife was from China. Each brought something of their culture with them, but the pride of place belonged to the wife from the South. Songsten Gompo also imported writing from India, primarily to get Buddhist texts translated and disseminated for his people.

In terms of power, Tibet was growing, but still not a match for the reunited Chinese Empire. In the early years of his reign, Songsten Gompo requested that the daughter of the first T'ang Emperor be given to him as a wife. The first time he asked, he was refused. The Tibetan account suggests the Tibetan emissaries were laughed at. Tibet was considered an uncivilized land unworthy of a Chinese princess. However, after several successful Tibetan campaigns that extended their border up to the Western border of China, the T'ang Emperor relented and sent his daughter to Tibet. A temporary and wary peace settled between Tibet and China that was broken twenty years after Songsten Gompo's death. In 670, the two armies fought along their shared boundary and this fighting continued for the next 200 years.

Differences between the Two Sources of Transcendent Credibility

It is important to note that even as Tibet was becoming a strong Buddhist Empire, China was shifting from Buddhism to Taoism. However, to say "Buddhism" is to brush over the differences that existed between Chinese Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism. In brief, Chinese Buddhism had been heavily infused with Taoist principles, while Tibetan Buddhism was colored with the latest Indian Buddhist

evolutions and Tibetan Bon.[131] Both Buddhisms shared the underlying ideas of the Way and Enlightenment, yet they were very unlike each other.

Tibet's Source of Transcendent Credibility

The Tibetans held one particular Buddha, Avalokitesvara, in highest esteem. As the legend goes, when this Buddha attained full enlightenment, so great was his compassion to ease human suffering that he chose not to go to Nirvana, but to stay and give aid to those who need it.[132] In particular, Avalokitesvara looked north at the great plateau of Tibet and had compassion on the people there. He thus set in motion a series of events that culminated in his incarnation as Songsten Gompo, who brought the dharma to Tibet. Therefore, the heirs of Songsten Gompo were not merely men, but were also the descendents of the Buddha, and in some cases were seen as new incarnations of the Buddha. The modern world is more familiar with Avalokitesvara's more recent incarnations as the Dalai Lamas. Hence, the Tibetan king derived much of his credibility from being the Buddha or at least the progeny thereof. The Buddha of compassion cares so deeply for the people that the king's actions must be for their benefit.

Avalokitesvara also held the place of honor that any Buddha would have in China. Yet, he was only one of many Buddhas who favored the Chinese. Over time,

---

[131] "The culture [of Tibet] was one totally alien to the Chinese…. During the eighth century Tibet was culturally united by a native culture using a native script derived from an Indian model, and with cultural ties far stronger with Nepal and India than with the Chinese. It remained little influenced by China until our times." CHC 36.

[132] "Avalokitesvara," in *A Dictionary of World Mythology*, Edward Cotterell, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

the Chinese transformed Avalokitesvara into Guanyin, a female figure.[133] There is no indication that this was done deliberately to slander the Tibetans, yet the transformation occurs during the most competitive years between them. More likely, the development of her female characteristics reflects the Taoist influence of complementary properties (wu-hsiang). Still, this religious modification probably mirrored how the Chinese viewed the Tibetans – as the yin to the Chinese yang. Guanyin would be a very popular figure in China, specializing in compassion just as the male counterpart in Tibet. Yet, Guanyin remained but one of many Buddhas in Chinese lore.

The linkage between Buddhist credibility and the king's right to rule varied considerably between the two political units. While kings in Tibet were seen as the Buddha, Chinese Emperors were seen as surrogates of Heaven. Chinese rulers were not divine, but they had been chosen by the divine. This distinction stayed with the Chinese rulers whether Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism was ascendant. The idea of the Mandate of Heaven was displaced into both Buddhism and Taoism. As a representative chosen by the Buddha, the Immortals, or Heaven, respectively, the Emperor could be seen as credibly looking after the best interests of the people. Perhaps the one exception to this would be the T'ang claim that they were descendents of Lao-Tzu.

---

[133] "Guanyin," in *A Dictionary of Asian Mythology*, David Leeming, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

The Transformation of China's Source of Transcendent Credibility

From the days of the T'ang dynasty's first emperor, Kao-tsu, the T'ang rulers attempted to replace the hybridized Buddhism inherited from the Sui with a hybridized Taoism. As has been mentioned earlier, over centuries the doctrines of Taoism and Chinese Buddhism had begun to mirror each other.[134] Yet, there were two essential differences important to the T'ang rulers. First, the network of Buddhist temples was far larger than that of the Taoists. Buddhism was an economic drain on the Emperor. Buddhist temples controlled large tracts of land and the peasants that worked on them. Their clergy and workforce were exempt from corvee labor and public service in the bureaucracy. The economic situation of Kao-tsu resembled that of late Medieval European kings vis-à-vis the church and monasteries. In 624, Kao-tsu was encouraged by his advisors, especially the court astrologer Fu I, to rid China of Buddhism.[135] Torn between the obvious economic benefits and the unpopularity of such a move, Kao-tsu waited until 626 before issuing an edict that limited the number of Buddhist temples. In three months, Kao-tsu's son, Li Shih-min held a bloodless coup in which

---

[134] When Buddhism first arrived in China in the first century AD, translators used Taoist terms to describe Buddhist concepts. For example, the Buddha achieving enlightenment was said to have "obtained the Tao." The Buddhist saints were translated to Taoist chen-jen, or perfected immortals. In addition, Taoists were open to Buddhist ideas. Lao-tzu was said to have disappeared to the West and became the Buddha. Thus, to Taoists, Buddhism was just a lesser form of Taoism – it was said that Lao-tzu had to dumb down his teachings for the foreign audience in India. Thus, between the Han and T'ang dynasties, Buddhism in China "Taoicized" itself to be more compatible to local conditions and Taoism looked at Buddhism as more teachings of Lao-tzu, although inferior. The average person in China would not have been clear about doctrinal distinctions between the two by the time of Chinese reunification. The practices were different and the clergy were separate, but Buddhism and Taoism appeared to be two sides of the same coin. The most popular form of Buddhism in China from the 7th century on was Ch'an, a synthesis of Buddhist and Taoist ideas. Ch'an Buddhism, unlike Western Buddhism, pursued illumination in a single lifetime, rather than at the end of a series of reincarnations. This syncretism removed the largest doctrinal distinction between Buddhism and Taoism. "Taoism," in *Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia Knowledge in Depth*, Vol 28, Philip W Goetz, ed., 15th edition (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1989): 394-407; de Bary (1999), *Sources of Chinese Tradition*.

[135] CHC 180.

he killed his brothers, retired his father, and reinstated Buddhism. It is unclear if Li Shih-min's actions were motivated by personal piety, but clearly his move won him the affection and support of the Buddhist clergy and faithful throughout China. Li Shih-min, who became Emperor T'ai-tsung, would use his strong bargaining position with the Buddhist clergy to hybridize the Chinese version further.[136]

The second important difference between Buddhism and Taoism for the T'ang rulers was that Buddhism originated in India and was thus foreign, while Taoism was a Chinese product. Taoism had been gaining in popularity throughout China. T'ai-tsung continuously pointed out that Buddhism was a foreign religion, while Taoism was Chinese through and through. This shift was, at least in part, a response to the rising Buddhist power to the West, the Tibetans. By 646, as Tibet had extended its border to touch that of China, T'ai-tsung denounced Buddhism as a vulgar faith that misled Emperors and people. However, unlike his father, T'ai-tsung gradually and effectively shifted the basis for his legitimacy from Buddhism to Taoism. Taoist priests gained the access to the royal court that the Buddhist clergy had once had. Additionally, the royal historians claimed that the Li family direct descended from Lao-Tzu, father of Taoism.[137]

From this point on, the T'ang dynasty drew its legitimacy predominantly from a blend of Taoism and Confucianism.[138] Buddhism was not eradicated; however, its development had to conform with the central doctrines of Taoism and, as a result, it became uniquely "Chinese." Chinese Buddhist doctrines looked very different from

---

[136] CHC 217-219.

[137] Benn (2002), *China's Golden Age,* 60.

[138] Taoism had been adapting its core teachings to complement Confucianism since the latter's ascendancy during the Han Dynasty. See de Bary, "Learning of the Mysterious," 377-391.

those of India and Tibet. This change in Buddhism was not inordinately difficult as Buddhism in China had already begun to develop differently than in the West.[139] T'ai-tsung favored Taoism because it was a native religion and because it was less of an economic drain.[140] For the peasants, however, the difference was not too noticeable. Finally, the change happened so gradually that the Buddhist clergy, who may have been able to stop the switch early in T'ai-tsung's reign, were powerless to respond.

Because Confucianism and Buddhism resembled Taoism in terms of fundamental practices and vocabulary, the Emperors did not eschew these. These systems pointed back to Taoism, which in turn supported the legitimacy of the T'ang Dynasty. Arguably, the T'ang rulers went through brief periods of suppressing Buddhism, yet in every case there is evidence that the purpose of these more harsh measures was designed not to eradicate Buddhism, but to give the government more leverage over it. Often, harsh measures applied to Buddhist clergy were simultaneously applied to the more favored Taoist temples. Because Buddhism in China so closely resembled Taoism, the fear was not that it offered an alternate source of legitimacy, but that it, along with the Taoists, siphoned too many resources in terms of money and manpower away from the government. Even this was acceptable provided civil officials supervised.[141] For most of the history of the T'ang, Taoist *and* Buddhist clergy presided over important government ceremonies.

There was one exception to this. Under Empress Wu (684-705), the balance of power briefly shifted to Buddhism. There are several reasons for this. First, she was

---

[139] Ch'en, *Buddhism in China*, 1964.

[140] It was less of an economic drain primarily because there were more Buddhist monks and monasteries than Taoist monks and monasteries.

[141] Ch'en (1964), *Buddhism in China*, 214.

attempting to legitimize her authority after she had essentially usurped power from her husband and children. She was not descended from Lao-Tzu as the T'ang claimed, thus Taoism was a constant reminder that she was a usurper (and a female one at that). She found an answer for bolstering her legitimacy in *The Great Cloud Sutra* (Ta-yun-ching), chapters four and six.[142] In this Sutra, the Buddha informs a female divinity named Ching-kuang that, because of her conversation with him, she would be reincarnated as a universal monarch about 700 years after the Buddha achieved Nirvana. This text was copied and distributed throughout China by the Empress, with accompanying text implying that she was that reincarnated divinity. However, some scholars point out a second reason for her favoritism of Buddhism: her lover for the early part of her reign was a Buddhist monk.[143] These historians point out that when this monk fell out of favor and she had him killed, she immediately shifted to favoring Confucianism, again because her new lover was her Confucian physician. It is difficult to say whether these theories are valid or if they are the product of misogynistic history-writing; however, it is certain that she did not stick with Buddhism very long. Thus, during a brief ten years of her reign, most of which was spent consolidating her rule, her method of linking credibility to a transcendent source very much resembled that in Tibet. However, the experiment was short-lived (and unsuccessful). Her successors restored the balance between the two similar religions, with favor falling heavier on Taoism.

---

[142] There were many questions at the time whether the Great Cloud Sutra (known in India as the Mahamegha Sutra) was a real sutra "discovered" by Empress Wu's lover or whether he wrote it himself to legitimate the Empress, CHC 305; Antonio Forte (1977), *Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century*.

[143] Ch'en (1964), *Buddhism in China*: 220-222; CHC, 256-265.

At the Council of Lhasa, held in the famous Tibetan monastery of Samye in 742, the Tibetan king summoned representatives from India and from China to debate which form of Buddhism was superior.[144] The debate centered on whether enlightenment is instantaneous, the Chinese position, or gradual, the Indian view. In truth, the Indian side was also the Tibetan side. For a variety of reasons, Tibet had always allowed Indian views to have far more influence in their land than Chinese views. Hence, the outcome of the Council was decided before it started. However, as a result of this debate, the Tibetan ruler could justify a complete exclusion of Buddhist doctrines from the East. Rumor even spread that, after suffering such a humiliating defeat, the Chinese representative had the Indian representative assassinated. This provided the Tibetan king with further reasons to shut down the flow of ideas from China.

Comparison of Sources of Transcendent Credibility in Tibet and China

Thus, there were two very different sources of transcendent credibility in China and Tibet. First, the Buddhisms practiced in the two regions differed dramatically. While Tibet primarily focused on one Buddha, the Chinese followed a host of Buddhas relatively equally (The Buddha, Siddartha Guatama, being the exception, especially among those who believed he was actually Lao-Tzu). Further, Chinese Buddhism had been transformed from its Indian counterpart, fusing many aspects of its practice closer to Taoism and Confucianism. In Tibet, Buddhism

[144] "Council of Lhasa," in *A Dictionary of Buddhism*, Damien Keown, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

depended heavily on more recent manifestations of Indian Buddhism combined with the native practices of Bon. Second, on many occasions in their rivalry China did not rely on Buddhism, but a Taoism that was very similar to Chinese Buddhism. Third, the link between the source of transcendent credibility and the ruler differed in the two regions. In Tibet, the king was an incarnation of Avalokitesvara or his direct progeny. In China, the emperor's credibility depended on his role as an earthly representative of the transcendent source, whatever that source may be.

Increase in the Distinctiveness of Boundary between Tibet and China

Although strong military threats had existed along this Chinese frontier prior to the arrival of Tibet and its alternative source of transcendent credibility, a distinctive border did not exist. Once this new source of transcendent credibility arrived, so too did a very distinct border between the Chinese Empire and the area ruled by the Tibetans.[145] This border was well-demarcated, heavily defended, and fairly stable for long periods of time despite continuous skirmishes back and forth. In the 670s, the Tibetans expanded into areas dominated by Chinese allies and created the outlines of the border that was to exist for roughly ninety years.

This period of the T'ang-Tibet rivalry can be divided into two parts, with the dividing line being the An Lu-shan rebellion in China from 756 to 763. In the first

[145] "Until the seventh century, although Ch'iang tribesmen had created havoc during the Later Han, and later he T'u-yu-hun people living around Lake Kokonor had threatened what is now western [Gansu], the western frontier had never been of crucial strategic importance to the Chinese…. During the seventh century this situation was transformed. Tibet suddenly grew into a powerful united kingdom and embarked on a career of aggressive expansion…. From this time onwards the Tibetans constantly threatened the Chinese both in the [Gansu] corridor and in the region around Lan-chou, in which regions the T'ang was forced to maintain huge permanent armies." CHC 35-36.

part, from 670 to 756, it is roughly possible to say that Tibet controlled the highlands and China controlled the lowlands. China controlled the Chinese plain and the Tarim Basin, along with the narrow Gansu corridor that runs between the Gobi Desert to the North and the Qilan Mountains to the South. The Gansu Corridor was the route from the heart of China to the Tarim Basin and the trade routes that passed through these to the West. Tibet, for its part, controlled the mountainous territory south of the Tarim Basin and the Tibetan plateau itself. In the 670s, it captured the Kokonor region from the T'u-yu-hun, Chinese allies. This region contained the headwaters of the Huang He River and literally overlooked the Gansu corridor and the city of Lanchow. Lanchow may be thought of as the gateway to the Gansu corridor, and thus held immense strategic importance to China. Likewise, Lanchow was the last bastion of defense between Tibet and the Chinese capital city of Ch'ang-an. At huge costs, China was able to fortify a line of defense up into the mountains, but not penetrating very far. Hence, the border between the two political units was in the highlands, but just barely. In addition to the Kokonor region, Tibet also captured the Szechwan region. This is the mountainous area that, in effect, surrounds the Chongqing Basin and holds the upper stretches of the Yellow River. It overlooked Chinese trade routes to Southeast Asia (modern-day Myanmar). In short, Chinese authority was strongest along the trade routes and in the China plain. The border reflected this.

In 763, when the An Lu-shan rebellion ended, China had been forced to withdraw all of its troops from the Tarim Basin and the Tibetan border to finally quell the revolt. China and its army was incredibly weakened. Into this vacuum stepped the Tibetans who quickly swooped into the Tarim Basin and the Gansu corridor. The new

border with China was much more strategically efficient as it reduced the length of contiguous territory. Now Tibet occupied Lanchow, but recognized that holding these new territories was very different as the Chinese in this area did not appreciate the Tibetan claims to divine authority. Thus, military force was required to maintain these new prizes, which meant Tibet's ability to exploit China's internal weakness was limited. Thus, a new border was established between the two units that excluded Gansu from Chinese rule. A stalemate was reached with the Tibetans only after the T'ang Emperors invited the nomadic peoples of the North, especially the Uighurs, to come into China to help hold off the Tibetans. While they were fairly successful in this venture, the remedy proved worse than the disease as the Uighurs moved in and almost ended the T'ang Dynasty.

Chinese-Tibetan Borders from 600 to 712

That the Chinese were committed to defending their boundaries, even those thousands of miles from the center, is without question. The Tarim Basin is a good example of this. Since roughly 600, when the reunified Chinese Empire attempted to recapture the borders of the Han Dynasty, the Tarim Basin and the trade routes were high priorities. The Chinese established the An-hsi Protectorate over the peoples in this region and built the "Four Garrisons," manning these with 50,000 troops. Maintaining so many troops in such a far away place that, frankly, did not have the same plentiful resources as China proper, required the simultaneous establishment of military colonies to feed these troops. Thus, many Chinese headed West to build new settlements in the Tarim Basin. The more troops that were sent, the more auxiliary

citizens followed, forcing the government to provide even more commitments to protect these colonists.

Protecting the Tarim Basin also meant protecting the narrow Gansu corridor, a series of oases wedged between the heart of the Gobi Desert and the Himalayas. This corridor was vulnerable to horseback nomads from the North. The Han Dynasty had understood this and built most of the Western sections of the Great Wall as a barrier between the nomads and the Gansu corridor. However, the Gansu was also vulnerable to attacks from the mountains to the South. In 600, the inhabitants of the Kokonor region were a relatively weak nomadic people known as the T'u-yu-hun. Through diplomacy and the threat of military force, these people were cowed into an alliance with the Chinese, thereby allowing China to focus on the Northern raiders. However, in the 670s, the rapidly expanding Tibetans conquered the T'u-yu-hun and made the Gansu corridor vulnerable on all sides. Thus, to the high costs in money and manpower to protect the Tarim Basin was added the costs of defending a highly vulnerable strip of land from very mobile enemies to the North and South.

Finally, Tibetan expansion eliminated other allies, protectorates, and puppet states that China had along its Western boundary. The Tibetans and Chinese both formed huge armies and had various degrees of success or failure, but none substantially changed the boundary along the edge of the mountains and the China plains. After the Tibetans captured Szechwan, China made several attempts to recover it, all ending in failure. The mountainous terrain proved too much of a natural defense. Thus, recognizing its inability to push Tibet back, China opted for a defensive strategy along its Western border, building strong fortifications on the

Eastern edge of the mountains and sending troops to be permanently stationed along this border. As in the Tarim, these troops required more resources than the mountainous areas could provide, so military colonies were established near the border to grow food and provide other goods for the defenders. The presence of these colonies made the defense even more important as brief in-and-out raids could diminish food supplies and thereby jeopardize the entire border. Thus, China's defensive strategy not only created a distinctive border with Tibet, it also necessitated that the border would grow more and more distinct over time.

Whether the Tibetans could have overcome these defenses and, at least, pushed the Chinese border out of the mountains is difficult to say since court intrigues and a series of infant rulers stayed Tibet's expansion in the late 600s. When a new Tibetan king was able to rally the Tibetans around him and launch a new invasion in the Kokonor region to push China out of the mountains, it failed. China built stronger fortifications in the area, signaling the border that they were settling into. In 710 the Tibetans and Chinese signed a treaty that recognized the border between them. This treaty also gave the Tibetans the area in Kokonor known as the Nine Bends, which is the upper stretch of the Huang He River, an enormously important strategic area that basically opened Ch'ang-an up for invasion. However, this made the peace unstable and Tibet broke the treaty and launched an invasion, which was beaten back by the Chinese. The end result was that the original border was returned to in a stalemate and the Chinese Emperor lost all trust in the word of the Tibetans.

Chinese-Tibetan Borders from 712 to 756: The Reforms of Hsuan-tsung

It is at this time that the Chinese Emperor Hsuan-tsung (ruled from 712-756) reformed the military to reflect the permanent border.[146] Before the rise of Tibet, the neighbors that posed the largest threat to the Chinese were nomadic people. With only a few exceptions, they were smaller groups who split their time between sheep herding and minor raids into China. The Chinese strategy to counter this was to ally themselves with other nomadic peoples who would protect the frontier regions and serve as a buffer between raiders and the Chinese people. If the raid was larger than the allies could handle, they at least provided the time for the Chinese to raise an army from the center and march to the frontier. Such a strategy proved inadequate against the Tibetans, who easily crushed these nomadic allies. Likewise, in the North and Northwest in the 710s, a new qaghan of the Turks united many of the desert tribes and led them on raids into China. The new situation required tighter control of the boundaries. The Chinese replaced frontiers manned with non-Chinese allies with fortifications and permanent Chinese troop deployments.[147] Under the new arrangement, there was a clear line at which the authority of the Chinese ended and that of the Tibetans began. These spaces did not overlap, as was the case with nomadic buffers. A mutually recognized line existed, ratified in treaties and perpetuated through the reality on the ground.

---

[146] CHC 362-370.

[147] Prior to the rise of Tibet, the Chinese military depended on local militia, known as *fubing*, made up essentially of the farmers of a particular area. This method was a relatively cheap way to provide adequate frontier defense against nomadic peoples. This system was no longer sufficient by the eighth century, first and foremost because, although farmers may be able to muster and defend wide frontiers, they could not be permanently deployed along the more distinct boundaries the Tibetan threat demanded. Under Hsuan-tsung, "the *fubing* militia had been made gradually into a professional fighting force grouped in nine commands, mainly on the frontiers under generals with wide powers to repel attacks." Fairbank (1992), 82.

Hsuan-tsung created nine frontier areas along the Western and Northern boundaries of China. Besides the An-hsi Protectorate that has already been discussed in the Tarim Basin, three other zones abutted the Tibetans. In the Southwest, in Szechwan, the Chien-nan Zone protected the trade road from China into modern-day Myanmar. The mountainousness of the area and its relative inaccessibility for both sides meant that fewer troops were stationed here. Every accessible route from Tibet to China was fortified, but there were few such routes. The headwaters of the Yellow River lay in this region and, thus, much of the defense focused on this "roadway." The Kokonor Region was the site of the Lung-yu Zone. This zone was the home of many troops on both sides. Strategically, the collapse of this Zone for the Chinese would have meant the loss of Szechwan, the Gansu Corridor, and even the capital Ch'ang-an. Hence, it was extremely well fortified. The third important military frontier was the Ho-hsi Zone, located in the Gansu Corridor, protecting the sole road from China to the Tarim Basin. To the North, these troops had the benefit of the Great Wall of China, but to the South, the Chinese built new fortifications in the mountains, but on the edges. The other four zones were located along the Northern boundary of China. When the Tarim Basin is included in the calculations, as China adamantly did, the border that was permanently manned and fortified was extremely long.

The Emperor appointed a military commander for each zone. These commanders controlled everything from troop movements down to food production. Civil officials often filled this role along the Northern zones, but in the zones bordering Tibet, professional soldiers commanded. In the first two decades, this system worked extraordinarily well, largely because the early commanders were loyal

to the Emperor. However, the system became a liability as commanders became personally powerful militarily and economically. The Emperor responded by appointing royal princes as commanders of the zones. These princes lived in the capital with the Emperor and sent deputies to take care of their duties along the border. The surest route to becoming a top official under Hsuan-tsung was to win victories against the Tibetans along the border.

The costs of maintaining permanent troops in far-off places along an incredibly long border (perhaps the longest border ever) took a toll on the Chinese Empire. Flooding of the Huang He River in 726 and 727, followed ironically by severe droughts in the same region in 727 and 728, exacerbated the financial situation. Some of the Emperor's advisors suggested a new treaty with the Tibetans that would enable the Chinese to reduce their costs. However, the Emperor remembered when the Tibetans broke a treaty in 710. Instead, he argued that a strong offense is the best defense and staged a large-scale attack in the Kokonor Region. This came to nothing and a new treaty was signed in 730. The two sides erected a stele on the border demarcated by the treaty.

In 737, the Chinese attacked again, this time succeeding in changing the border through the reacquisition of the Szechwan region that had been under Tibetan control since 680. The people of this mountainous area, the Ch'iang tribes, had grown tired of the overtaxing of the Tibetans and aided the Chinese in breaking down the Tibetan defenses. However, despite back-and-forth fighting, the rest of the border stayed relatively firm. Gains on either side were made in unpopulated areas. In 755, the

Tibetan king died and a temporary peace was made. Chinese ambassadors visited Lhasa and all appeared to be calm once again.

Chinese-Tibetan Borders from 756 to 805

In 756, the An Lu-shan rebellion commenced in the Northeast of China. To quell it, the Emperor withdrew the troops stationed in the Tarim Basin. Tibet moved in from the South and the Turks and Uighurs moved in from the North. It would be 1,000 years before China would control the Tarim again. The Emperor required more troops, however, because the rebellion was only gaining strength. Thus, he was forced to pull his permanent troops off of the Tibetan border. By 763, the rebellion was done, a new Emperor sat on the Dragon Throne, but the border was incredibly changed. The Gansu Corridor was no longer Chinese, Tarim was gone, and the boundary between Tibet and China was no longer in the mountains, but in the Northwestern valleys, no more than 100 miles away from Ch'ang-an.

The new Emperor had very little control over the military. In 763, the Tibetans prepped for an invasion. The Tibetans were stretched extremely thin with their troops located thousands of miles from Lhasa. Whether they would have invaded given resistance is an unanswerable question. The Chinese Emperor called on his military governor in the area, P'u-ku Huai-en, to stop the invasion, but P'u-ku refused. The Tibetans marched untouched into Ch'ang-an in 763, easily capturing the capital and forcing the Emperor to flee the city for the second time in a decade. The Tibetans knew they were stretched out further than they could maintain and pulled back after only a couple weeks. The Emperor dismissed P'u-ku. P'u-ku was an Uighur who had

risen through the ranks of the Chinese military. After his dismissal, he fled to the Tibetans and led them in a new invasion the following year. In 765, he managed to create an alliance between the Tibetans and the Uighurs and invaded again, an invasion that failed only because P'u-ku got sick and died, causing the alliance to fall apart.

The Chinese did not man the new border with Tibet as well as it had in the early part of the 8th century, largely because it was still recovering from the rebellion and because it became widely understood that Tibet had reached its limits of expansion.[148] Yet, for the next fifteen years, Tibet raided at will into Chinese territory and heaped enormous costs both financially and psychologically on the T'ang Emperors.[149] In 783, a treaty was signed between the two, again recognizing a demarcated border between them. In this treaty, the Chinese formally recognized Tibetan rule in the lands that had been China's before the An Lu-shan rebellion. This border remained fairly stable until 805. Of course, this twenty-five year period was full of attack and counter-attack between the Tibetans and Chinese, but it was mostly the allies of the Chinese, especially the Uighurs, who suffered. In 800, however,

---

[148] During the An-Lushan Rebellion, "it was decided to withdraw the entire military establishment of permanent armies from the north-west [the Tarim Basin], leaving only such small garrisons as were needed to maintain order locally…. In the long term the removal of the huge garrisons around Ho-hsi and Lung-yu left the north-west and the Chinese dominions in central Asia at the mercy of the Tibetans and the Uighurs, and marked the end of Chinese control over the Tarim and Zungharia for almost a millennium." CHC 457. Tibet's inability to consolidate these latest expansions was evident from its inability to hold newly invaded territory for a substantial period of time. After capturing Chang-an with almost no opposition and little external duress from the Chinese forces, the Tibetans were forced to withdraw after only two weeks. They were "in no position either militarily and politically to hold the capital." CHC 491.

[149] During the 760s, "the Tibetans attacked the frontier every autumn," but the subsequently withdrew. These raids "severely hampered the [Chinese] government in its efforts to restore central control over various regional centers of authority in the interior of China." CHC 491. The Tibetan inability to permanently advance further into Chinese territory and the Chinese inability to defend against both the sporadic raids and enemies to the north-east produced a détente during the late 770s and a formal treaty in 783. CHC 501.

China teamed up with one of Tibet's former vassal states, Nan-chao, and struck hard into the heart of Tibet. The strong anti-Chinese Tibetan king had recently died and the new ruler lacked the ability to stop the invasion. By 805, the Tibetans were forced to pull back their troops from their extended positions and reach a truce with the Chinese.

Without question, there was a correlation between the rise of a new source of transcendent credibility in Tibet, backed with military power, and the transformation of the Western Chinese boundary from one of frontiers and buffer tribes to a sharply demarcated distinctive border. Military capability alone is not an adequate explanation, as similar measures were not taken against the Turks in the North in the late seventh century, who had adopted the Chinese source of transcendent credibility.[150] The Tibetans represented a qualitatively different threat, combining a new linkage between Buddhist beliefs and the legitimacy of the ruler to a large military capability. The perceived threat generated with the introduction of this alternate source of transcendent credibility compelled the T'ang rulers to respond with enormous investment of resources in creating a relatively distinct border along their western border with Tibet.

Conclusion

These two episodes from Sui and T'ang China, the reunification of Northern and Southern China and the relationship between China and Tibet in the seventh and eighth centuries, demonstrate that the hypothesis can transcend cultural, geographical, and temporal boundaries. In both cases, the number of sources of transcendent

[150] CHC 181-182, 219-35, 286-287.

credibility in the system determined the distinctiveness of the boundaries between political units. In the first case, the distinct border between Northern and Southern China was eliminated only after the Sui Emperors pursued policies specifically intended to reduce the number of sources of transcendent credibility in northern and southern China to one. In the second case presented, the East Asian regional system witnessed the appearance of an alternate source of transcendent credibility in Tibet, backed with sufficient military capability, which induced the T'ang rulers in China to invest heavily in the creation and perpetuation of a distinct border between the two political units.

CHAPTER 4: FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURY CENTRAL ASIAN ISLAMIC EMPIRES

A. Introduction
B. Fifteenth Century Central Asia: One Source of Transcendent Credibility
   1. The Monopoly of Sunni Islam in Fifteenth Century Asia
   2. Relatively Indistinct Boundaries between Political Units before 1500
C. Sixteenth Century Central Asia: Two Sources of Transcendent Credibility
   1. Safavid Shiism: A New Source of Transcendent Credibility in the System
   2. Increased Distinctiveness of Boundaries in the Sixteenth Century
      a. Increased Effort and Ability to Impose Hegemonic Authority on Frontier Peoples
      b. Compliance Generation in Frontier Areas Grew Increasingly Efficient
      c. Increase in Credible Commitment to Defend Frontier Territories
      d. Increased Efforts to Establish a Hierarchical Judicial System
      e. Increased Efforts to Impose Standardization of Currency
D. Conclusion

Introduction

In the fifteenth century, Central Asia contained many militarily strong and reasonably well-organized groups, but Sunni Islam was the only source of transcendent credibility. In 1501, however, Shah Ismail descended on northwest Persia with an army of Shiites and established an empire to rival the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Thus, in the sixteenth century, the number of sources of transcendent credibility in northwest Persia increased from one to two, a transformation that significantly increased the distinctiveness of boundaries between political units.

This chapter provides further evidence in support of the dissertation's central hypothesis: as the number of sources of transcendent credibility increases from one to two, the distinctiveness of the boundaries between political units in the system also

increases. This case, along with the case on T'ang China in the previous chapter, helps to demonstrate the versatility of the hypothesis over a wide range of time periods and cultures and shows that the scope of its application goes well Europe and the modern world.

This chapter examines the case of Central Asia in two parts: before the arrival of Shiite Safavid empire (1500) and after. Prior to 1500, Sunni Islam held a monopoly as the only source of transcendent credibility used by the major political units in northwest Persia (an area that incorporates modern northern Iran, Azerbaijan, and eastern Turkey). Despite the fact that these political units posed a military threat to each other, the boundaries between political units were relatively indistinct. This chapter examines the five proxy variables for measuring distinctiveness of boundaries between political units enumerated in Chapter 1 and confirms that, in fact, a single source of transcendent credibility led to relatively indistinct boundaries.

In the sixteenth century, a new source of transcendent credibility entered northwest Persia, the Shiite Safavids, breaking the monopoly of Sunni Islam. After showing that Shiism and Sunni Islam are two different sources of transcendent credibility, this chapter argues that the increase in the number of sources in the system led to an increase in the distinctiveness of boundaries between Sunni and Shiite political units. The incentives for governments to invest in more distinct boundaries only emerged *after* and *in response to* the Safavid state's development of Shiism as a second source of transcendent credibility in the region.

Fifteenth Century Central Asia: One Source of Transcendent Credibility

The Monopoly of Sunni Islam in Fifteenth Century Central Asia

Sunni Islam stood alone as the source of transcendent credibility in central Asia in the fifteenth century. During this century, the collapse of the Mongol government produced a political vacuum into which many political groups emerged. Five political units stand out in terms of military power and ability to establish a moderately stable government in Persia. Each of these units relied on Sunni Islam as their source of transcendent credibility. The only moderate challenge during this period, Sufism, although popular among many nomadic groups of northwestern and northeastern Iran, did not succeed in establishing itself in any stable political entity. Although Sufism posed a minor challenge and ultimately created fertile ground for the emergence of the Safavids, it did not affect the strategies of the major political units in a serious manner.

Sunni Islam served as the source of transcendent credibility among all five of the major political entities in Persia in the fifteenth century. The Ottoman Turks in the west were a growing power, expanding in all directions from their center in western Anatolia (modern Turkey), eventually capturing Constantinople in 1453. Ottoman interest in Persia was limited to keeping the peace among their more rebellious subjects in central and eastern Anatolia and maintaining overland trade routes with India and China. The more desirable objects of expansion lay to the south and the west of the Ottoman capital, not to the east.

In eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan, two Turkmen tribes faced off against one another: the Qara Qoyunlu (or Black Sheep) and the Aq Qoyunlu (or White Sheep).

Both of these rivals were Sunni. Many scholars had believed that the Black Sheep were Shia or at least possessed strong Shia tendencies.[151] The more recent consensus among Islamic historians is that this was not the case. There is very little evidence to support a Shia Black Sheep. What likely occurred was that later historians attempting to understand the rivalries and alliances among the many groups during this period saw the Black Sheep sandwiched between two Sunni powers, the Ottoman and the White Sheep, and assumed, based on scant evidence, that the Black Sheep must be Shia.[152] There is far more evidence suggesting the Black Sheep were Sunni, despite some Shia anomalies.

In the east and the south two groups dominated in succession. The Timurids largely consisted of the Sunni Persians who inherited the area from the collapsed Mongol empire.[153] The government of this Sunni group disintegrated due to internal struggles for power. Invaders from the northeast, the Ozbegs, took advantage of this opportunity and began to settle in eastern Persia. The Ozbegs were also Sunni, sharing the religious orientation of the region. By the time they reached southern

---

[151] A discussion on the religious attitudes of the Black Sheep may be found in Roemer, 166-168. A good discussion on the religious attitudes of the Black Sheep and their relationship with the later Safavid Empire can be found in Vladimir Minorsky (1992 [1957]), *Persia in AD 1478-1490* (London: Royal Asiatic Society).

[152] It is important to note at this point that the dependent variable of this dissertation is distinctiveness of boundaries between political units, not peaceful relations with neighbors. Thus, although the Black Sheep frequently warred with their Sunni neighbors, the hypothesis suggests that the boundaries between them were relatively indistinct, which was the case.

[153] There were several towns in the Timurid territory, including Ray, Qum, and Kashan, that had a large population of Shiites and the regions around the eastern side of the Caspian Sea also had a higher than usual number of Shiites. Still, these groups were small in number and mostly located in mountainous regions that were already geographically isolated from the rest of the Timurid realm. Beginning with the reign of Shah Rukh in 1409, there was a successful crackdown on these Shiite regions: Maria Eva Subtelny and Anas B Khalidov (1995), "The Curriculum of Islamic Higher Education in Timurid Iran in the Light of the Sunni Revival under Shah-Rukh," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 115(2): 210-12.

Persia, however, the Ozbegs were stretched thin and did not so much replace the Timurids as created a power vacuum that the Shia Safavids were later able to exploit.

Given the dominance of Sunni Islam, it is important to understand how a ruling group could use it as a source of transcendent credibility and a means of legitimating its authority. In particular, Sunni Islam possessed four important aspects that had implications on associated political theories.[154]

First, the Sunni believed that Allah communicates with man primarily, even exclusively, through the Scriptures and the prophets. Since Mohammed was the last and the greatest of the prophets, the Koran is the principal means man has to follow Allah. Thus, Allah interacts with man only indirectly. It is the magnificence of Allah that necessitates this distant relationship.[155] The Sunni believed that Allah occasionally communicated with man through prophets, but many human attempts to communicate with God revealed only the pride of man, the worst of the sins.

Second, interpretation of the Scripture could not be done by just anyone. Likewise, there was no *one* person who was uniquely qualified to interpret the Scripture. Instead, Koranic interpretation depended on an informal "consensus" of the scholarly community. Individual Muslims gravitated toward particular teachers (*ulama*), possibly even to the exclusion of other teachers, yet the community in

---

[154] Islamic political theory is incredibly complex and varied. The nature of this dissertation requires an oversimplification of centuries of political thought. The implications that are listed in the chapter were *commonly* held, particularly in the early modern period. For a fuller discussion on the historical development of Islamic political theories see Antony Black (2001), *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present* (London: Routledge); Ann Lambton (2002), *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (London: Routledge); Patricia Crone (2005), *God's Rule – Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press): 197-257.

[155] Even the title "Allah" connotes this meaning. It is derived from a combination of *El*, meaning "strong," and *ilah*, meaning "standing alone." Thus, Allah means "the far and distant God." Robert O Ballou, ed. (1972 [1944]), *The Portable World Bible* (New York: Penguin Press), 438-39.

general relied on the dialogue generated among the various teachers and schools of theology.[156] Still, this dialogue should not be confused with a "free" exchange of ideas. Interpretations must be founded on the Koranic texts. In addition, traditional interpretations of Islamic law carried more weight than novel or innovative interpretations.

Third, as alluded to above, individual Muslims had some freedom in choosing which of the ulama they would follow. While this is far from what the moderns would call tolerance, there was a certain degree of acceptance of alternative points of view provided they were aligned with the Koran, professed by a legitimate teacher, and not significantly different from traditional interpretations of Islamic Law (*Sharia*).

Fourth, Sunnis believed that the caliph did not necessarily need to be a descendent of Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of Mohammed, as opposed to the Shia who argued that the caliph's pedigree was essential. The caliph led the more traditionally political and military aspects of government: enforcing the law, defending Islam, managing the economy, and supervising the government. After the first century of Islam, the caliph had increasingly fewer specifically religious responsibilities, but continued to symbolize the unity of the entire Muslim community. There were several political theories in circulation as to why a particular caliph was the legitimate ruler. However, the method of selecting the caliph was less important to the Sunni-Shia divide than whether the caliph descended from Ali. This had very

[156] The Sunni jurist al-Shafi'i put it this way: "We accept the decision of the public because we have to obey their authority, and we know that wherever there are sunnas of the Prophet, the public cannot be ignorant of them although it is possible that some are, and we know that the public can neither agree on anything contrary to the sunna of the Prophet or on an error." Quoted in David Waines (1995), *An Introduction to Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 69.

important political implications, but only in contrast to the Shia political theories and so discussion of it will be postponed for a later section.

The most significant challenge to the Sunni monopoly as a source of transcendent credibility was Sufism, a movement that flowered in Persia during the period under consideration. The presence of Sufism complicated the rather simplified outline of Sunni Islam and its accompanying political theory described above. Sufism is a generic term for the many mystical movements within Islam that believed man could experience direct contact with Allah under certain conditions.[157] Only the most devout could truly attain contact with Allah, so clearly not *every* person was capable of achieving a direct link with Allah, even for a short period. Still, the belief that such contact was possible posed a powerful challenge to more traditional forms of Sunni Islam.

It is no coincidence that Sufism was very successful among the nomadic peoples who lived on the edges of larger empires.[158] First, because the schools and theorists of scholarly Islam were primarily centered in urban centers, they had a minimal impact on the rural, nomadic, and uneducated people that dominated northwest Persia. Second, the opposition of the nomads to Ottoman policies became conflated with opposition to the Empire's religious establishment, the Sunni schools and scholars. As the Empire extended its power into frontiers populated by nomads, it asked these wanderers to become sedentary. Sufi beliefs greatly coincided with feelings of rebellion against these new circumstances both in terms of religion and

---

[157] Waines, 133-154. Perhaps the most famous of the Sufi sects to the West is the whirling dervish.

[158] Lawrence G Potter (1994), "Sufis and Sultans in Post-Mongol Iran," *Iranian Studies* 27(1-4), 77-102.

politics. The Sufi who could achieve direct contact with Allah could not be contained by traditional religion any more than the imperial bureaucracies could contain the nomadic way of life.

For their part, Sunni governments repressed the Sufi movements for both religious and political reasons. Sufi ideas were particularly popular among other Ottoman rural populations who, not coincidentally, lived in areas beyond the everyday reach of the bureaucracy. Sufi teachers would periodically stir up the Turkish warriors to undertake holy wars on behalf of Allah. Some of the wandering Sufi dervishes openly opposed any contact with the governmental authorities.[159] In short, among the rural population in eastern Turkey, the Sufi teachers often held more authority than the Ottoman rulers.

The Ottoman experimented with various ways of gaining control over the Sufi portions of their population. In the fourteenth century, for example, several Sufi brotherhoods had achieved success among the Ottoman masses. In response, the Ottoman rulers "extended their patronage" to the Sufi elites.[160] This gave the Empire much greater control over the madrasa educational system in the region. In turn, state sponsorship and funding of the religious schools for the various sects gave the Ottoman a greater degree of control over the messages that were communicated to the masses and the next generation of ulamas.

---

[159] Ira M Lapidus (2002 [1988]), *A History of Islamic Societies*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 266.

[160] Ibid., 265.

Sufism was not merely a political maneuver. It appealed to the nomadic peoples for a number of reasons, not the least of which was a true belief in its tenets.[161] The Mongol invasions of the fourteenth century and the collapse of those empires in the fifteenth produced a large degree of uncertainty among the peoples in Persia. Sufi preachers stepped in to fill this void. Not only did these Sufi teachers perform miracles and even magic, they gave the people hope in a future in which a savior would come and establish a new order. They preached of the qutb, the central "pole" around which the interests of the world revolved and that was periodically manifest in a great saint or leader of the people.[162] The qutb would come and protect the oppressed peoples of the world. It was into this religious milieu that Shah Ismail, the leader of the Safavids, would later step.

Sufism thrived among the nomadic tribes in eastern Anatolia and among the White Sheep, once they had eliminated their Black Sheep competitors. Under their most powerful leader, Uzun Hasan, the White Sheep began to permit a great deal of Sufism to infiltrate their rather traditional forms of Sunni Islam.[163] It is likely that Uzun Hasan saw this as a way of differentiating the White Sheep from their former allies the Ottoman. It may also have been a strategic decision intended to attract the support of the nomadic tribes within the Ottoman eastern frontier. Whatever the reason, the introduction of Sufi elements into the White Sheep drew the wrath of the

---

[161] Ibid., 232.

[162] "Qutb," John Bowler, ed., (2000), *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[163] It is still a matter of debate exactly how much Sufism affected the White Sheep under Uzun Hasan. What is clear is that Uzun Hasan's successor spent most of his reign trying to eradicate whatever Sufism had seeped into the Turkmen society. HR Roemer (1986), "The Turkmen Dynasties," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 184-85.

Ottoman, who sent an army that soundly defeated Uzun Hasan at Bashkent in 1473.[164] Uzun Hasan's successors, recognizing that a continuation of Sufi toleration was a suicidal policy since Ottoman gunpowder could easily decimate White Sheep cavalry, attempted reforms to restore orthodox Sunni laws. But Sufi beliefs had already taken root in the region and the outcome was a civil war. It was into this very favorable situation that Shah Ismail and the Safavids entered the scene.

Thus, the short-lived Sufism of the White Sheep created fertile ground in the southern Caucasus region for the eventual success of the Shiite Safavids. In northwest Persia, the unique hybridized version of Sufism and Shiism that the Safavids introduced provided the Shia with a staging ground from which to proselytize the rest of Persia. However, besides Uzun Hasan's brief and relatively localized attempt to introduce a new source of transcendent credibility into fifteenth century Central Asia, Sunni Islam maintained its monopoly as the only source in the system. Thus, according to the hypothesis, prior to the arrival of the Shia Safavids, the boundaries between the political units in this region should have been either indistinct or non-existent.

---

[164] David Morgan (1988), *Medieval Persia: 1040-1797* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 105-107. The presence of an alternate source of transcendent credibility in the White Sheep increased the perceived threat to the Ottoman, whether this was because the Ottoman feared these new ideas seeping into the Empire and undermining their Sunni source or because the White Sheep used the source to stir up the nomads living in Azerbaijan and Eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman were *not* responding to the White Sheep as a *military* threat (they had always been a potential military rival but the Ottoman had not attacked), but to an *ideological* threat.

Relatively Indistinct Boundaries between Political Units Before 1500

It is difficult to locate reliable information on boundaries in fourteenth and fifteenth Central Asia. Much of the administration of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in its remote eastern regions, was not committed to written records.[165] The region of eastern Anatolia, northern Iran, and the Caucasus Mountains during this period was populated almost entirely by rural populations and nomadic peoples. Aside from a few towns, this region was bereft of urban populations. It is rather simple to draw borders around urban populations since cities rarely change territory. Nomads, on the other hand, present greater difficulties for anyone seeking to make an exclusive claim to a territory and receive compliance from its residents. The relative unimportance of Eastern Anatolia within the Empire coupled with the nomadic nature of much of this population suggested more practical forms of record-keeping. Unfortunately, these methods have generally left little information that is accessible to the modern scholar.

Increased attempts by the Ottoman Empire to settle the nomads in this area was actually a catalyst to religious, political, and ideological movements that eventually resulted in the success of the Safavids.[166] Thus, an examination of the boundaries of this period should begin by noting that even if there were efforts by local or imperial administrators to draw distinct political lines – and it is far from certain that this was

[165] Even the more developed and urbanized Ottoman Empire relied more on oral performance in its early-modern courts than on written documentation in its court proceedings. When this is coupled with the predominantly uneducated nomadic population in eastern Anatolia, it is no surprise that there is a significant lack of written records, including property deeds, contracts, and court decisions. Bogac A Ergene (2004), "Evidence in Ottoman Courts: Oral and Written Documentation in Early-Modern Courts of Islamic Law," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 124(3): 487.

[166] See pp. 7-10 above.

the case – these attempts proved largely unsuccessful in the face of the nomadic peoples of the region who resisted and revolted to prevent such demarcations.

The more central question to this case, however, is whether there were distinct boundaries between the Ottoman Empire and either of the region's two main political units: the Black Sheep or the White Sheep. An analysis of the proxy variables for distinctiveness of boundaries in this region reveals that, in fact, the boundaries between these political units were extremely indistinct, as the hypothesis predicts.

The Ottoman Empire and the Turkmen tribes were either uninterested in or unable to impose hegemonic authority on frontier peoples. Rural populations and nomadic peoples had a variety of authority figures with which they could comply. In addition to the Ottoman and the two Turkmen tribes, wandering Sufi teachers and other holy men asked for and received the support of the people of this region. These teachers encouraged the development of local folk culture, which in turn fed into the peoples' resistance to attempts by any larger political authority to make them subject.[167] They saw themselves as fighting holy wars (jihads) for broader Islam or battles to maintain their independence. The Sufi teachers told the people that their time and resources must go to preparing the world for the coming salvation, not to enrich far away rulers. Distance and the threat of resistance forced the Ottoman and Turkmen to take what they could get. The people of this region also had the

[167] Lapidus, 266.

opportunity – and used it – to ask for assistance from more than one authority figure.[168]

Perhaps even more importantly, they usually asked for no assistance at all. If the Ottoman pushed their authority too hard, there was a real danger that the people in the region would side with the Turkmen tribes, as happened in the reign of Uzun Hasan. Knowing this, the Ottoman rarely demanded compliance using force. As a result, the peoples of the region were often left to their own devices. They developed a folk culture replete with poetry, theater, and local heroes.[169] The culture developed around their role as holy warriors (*ghazi*) battling against the Georgians, Circassians, and Byzantines.[170] Another undertone of this folk culture was a separation between the rural people living on the edge of Islam and the urban elites, who the Sufi suggested had grown complacent in their practice of Islam.[171] The nomadic Turkish people of the eastern provinces saw themselves as acting on their own for the greater good of Islam.

Thus, it is no surprise that the Ottoman and Turkmen tribes were unable to generate compliance in these frontier areas. Historians have considered Ottoman taxation one of the fairest systems in the pre-modern world. One author describes the system as "in general simpler and less liable to abuse than earlier systems of feudal

---

[168] Potter (1994). Elites in the region also had the opportunity to choose between several authority figures, see Maria Eva Subtelny (1988), "Socioeconomic Bases of Cultural Patronage under the Later Timurids," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20(4): 479-505.

[169] Lapidus, 266.

[170] Morgan, 109.

[171] Lapidus, 266.

services."[172] However, the use of econometric analysis has more recently led economic historian Metin Cosgel to suggest that Ottoman tax policy was driven more by "simple pragmatism and concern with political stability" than by vague ideas of fairness or equity.[173] In some cases, Ottoman policies of the period consciously gave up economic efficiency in exchange for greater economic stability.[174]

The Ottoman faced many problems with collecting taxes in northwest Persia. Personal taxes in the Ottoman Empire came from two main sources: trade taxes brought to market for sale and production taxes on farming and manufacturing.[175] Both of these sources of revenue are largely absent in nomadic communities. However, even in the areas where there were settlements, the Ottoman pragmatically allowed landlords who had been there before the Ottoman conquest to continue to collect the taxes.[176] Thus, much of the ability to control taxation was out of the direct hands of the bureaucracy and large amounts of the taxes collected were not passed on to the central government.

Another source of inefficiency came from the Sufi teachings in the region. They preached that all resources belonged to Allah. In the Ottoman Empire, and most of the Islamic world, there were two types of taxes: taxes that fit within Islamic law

---

[172] H Inalcik (1973), *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London: Phoenix Press), 73.

[173] Metin M Cosgil (2004), "Taxes, Efficiency, and Redistribution: Discriminatory Taxation of Villages in Ottoman Palestine, Southern Syria, and Transjordan in the Sixteenth Century," Working Paper 2002-22, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, 23.

[174] Relli Shechter (2005), "Market Welfare in the Early-Modern Ottoman Economy – A Historiographic Overview with Many Questions," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 48(2), 253-76.

[175] Metin M Cosgil (2005), "Efficiency and Continuity in Public Finance: The Ottoman System of Taxation," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37(4), 571.

[176] Sevket Pamuk (2004), "Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35(2), 230.

(tithes and alms) and taxes that did not (tax to the government).[177] Where the line between these two types of taxes was drawn became a subject for interpretation. The Sufis instructed the people of the region to pay their teachers the former, but deny the Ottoman the latter. This money would be better spent on the jihad occurring there in northwestern Iran than back in Istanbul. The same was true for military service: the local jihad was more important than the Empire's distant battles. It was not until the mid-1500s, after the emergence of Shiism in the region, that the Ottoman bureaucrats and religious leaders offered a more formal interpretation of its tax system in which many of the personal taxes were to be included under Islamic law.[178]

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire did very little to reverse these inefficiencies just listed. The Ottoman possessed enough military strength to capture Byzantium, advance into the Balkans, and hold off most of its rivals in Asia Minor. However, despite this power, the Ottoman did not consolidate its authority in the eastern portion of its Empire sufficiently to silence the Sufis, to wrest power from the local landlords, or to settle the nomads. Such actions would, at a minimum, have required different military technology than the Ottoman possessed. However, the absence of another source of transcendent credibility in the region supported by a major political unit meant that the Ottoman lacked an incentive to change the status quo.

The relative indistinctiveness of the boundaries between political units in northwest Persia may also be inferred from the Ottoman Empire's lack of credible

[177] Cosgil (2005), 581.
[178] Ibid., 582.

commitment to defend these frontier territories from rivals in the East. There is little to no evidence that anything existed resembling distinctive lines of defense between political units in Persia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It can reasonably be argued that there were stretches of "no-man's land" separating political units. One indication was the dominant military technology of the region: the nomad on horseback. Such soldiers were incredibly ill-suited for defense. A second reason may be the lack of urban centers that could provide supplies for a defensive line. As long as there was only a single source of transcendent credibility in the region, the Ottoman and the Turkmen tribes lacked any incentive to develop new military technology or new urban centers to permit the construction of more distinctive lines of defense.

This was true despite the fact that the degree of military threats in the region was rather great. The White Sheep, for example, fought the Black Sheep, the Timurids, and the Ottoman. Historian David Morgan suggests that one of the reasons the White Sheep at their height were so successful was because they avoided over-extension after victories.[179] One strategy was to leave large stretches of unclaimed territory between the major political units. After the White Sheep victory over the Timurids in 1469, they left the vulnerable areas of northeastern Iran (Transoxania and Khurasan) open. The centers of these empires were far more important strategically than the frontier zones. Rival militaries that entered one's frontier could be dealt with, but otherwise there was no incentive to defend outlying regions.

The Ottoman used the same strategy on its eastern side. Diplomatic negotiations began in 1472 when an embassy from Venice met with the White Sheep

[179] Morgan, 105.

leader, Uzun Hasan. Within a few months, the Ottoman decisively defeated Uzun Hasan. However, the Ottoman did not follow up this victory with the capture of any significant territory. The focus of the Ottoman at this moment was on their European flank – a site of an alternate source of transcendent credibility. The goal in the East was to keep neighbors from stirring up revolts in the region. Although the true motives of the Ottoman still elude us, it is possible to argue that the Ottoman strategy was to prevent the region from drifting further into Sufism or alliance with the Christians. In other words, the Ottoman actively sought to preserve the status quo of one source of transcendent credibility in the region. Military defeat without subsequent territorial follow-up kept a Sunni power in place in northwestern Iran without the expense to the Ottoman of conquering this region.

The 1473 battle was one of the very few times prior to 1500 when the Ottoman sent a large force the eastern portion of their empire. Standing armies were not stationed in the eastern portion of the Ottoman Empire, except in the relatively few cities. The military goal was not to keep invaders out, but to keep a semblance of peace within. Sufism was the true enemy, not the White Sheep.

All of this is even more remarkable given the strategic and economic importance of the region. The Ottoman relied on the trade routes through northern Iran and through the Caucasus Mountains. These overland routes were significant to the Ottoman economy, especially given the growth of Venetian sea power in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Thus, it is noteworthy that the Ottoman did not take stronger measures in the eastern half of their empire. The Ottoman strategy in the east only changed once northwestern Iran fell into the hands of the Shiite Safavids.

Another piece of evidence that northwest Persia prior to 1500 held relatively indistinct or non-existent boundaries is that no political entity was able to establish a hierarchical judicial system in the area. The presence of an alternate source of transcendent credibility on the Ottoman western flank (Christianity) complicates the analysis of this proxy. On the one hand, the Ottoman had a very hierarchical judicial system and maintained strict control over appointments and rulings throughout the empire.[180] However, on the other hand, they were only partly successful in achieving the same degree of control over the judicial system in the eastern portion of their empire. The local people often called upon the wandering Sufi teachers, for example, to mediate disputes.[181] The Ottoman judicial system, while extensive, did not reach very far beyond the cities, plus this region held few cities that ulama, judges, and professors of law found suitable to their position. Thus, local people could choose to either have a Sufi holy man hear and mediate a dispute or take the case to the nearest town and have the thinly stretched Ottoman bureaucracy assist in settling the issue. These were two clearly different judicial structures, unlinked in any fashion.

Both parties made efforts to reduce the influence of the other within the region. The Sufis relied on persuasion, which proved insufficient to remove the authority of the Ottoman completely from the area. On the other hand, while the Ottoman possessed more force capabilities and tried on occasion to use these to reduce the influence of the Sufis, these efforts also came up short. Thus, a tenuous stalemate was

---

[180] For example, in the western portion of the Ottoman Empire, many ethnic communities were permitted to create their own court systems that used that group's religious laws. However, all of these court systems still remained ultimately subject to the Ottoman Shariah judicial system, Daniel Goffman (2002), *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 73.

[181] Lapidus, 266

tolerated in the region between all of the authority figures. No authority figure had the necessary incentives to start a full-scale assault on the influence of any of the others. The end result was that frontier individuals had the opportunity (and used it) to choose the most advantageous judicial venue.

Similarly, the Ottoman Empire also lacked sufficient incentives to impose standardization of currency and other economic measurements in the region. The sheer size of the Ottoman Empire meant that attempts to standardize money and measurements would be an enormous problem. The central Ottoman government had minted coins from the very early years of its existence, but this was no guarantee that the money would be used. Examinations of the *tahrir defters* (imperial tax registers) reveal that not only were regional units of measurement used, they were also often used in the imperial bureaucracy's record keeping.[182]

From its inception to the 1500s, the Ottoman Empire increased the standardization of its coinage within Anatolia and the Balkans.[183] Still, before 1500, the Ottoman also encouraged the use of other forms of currency within the Empire. For example, the Ottoman used the Venetian *ducat*, the gold coin of their Mediterranean rivals, as the standard for their own gold *sultani*.[184] On its peripheries, including eastern Anatolia, the use of non-Ottoman currencies was even more pronounced. In newly conquered territories, there was often a locally familiar

---

[182] Metin M Cosgil (2004), "Ottoman Tax Registers (*Tahrir Defterleri*)," *Historical Methods* 37(2), 90; H Inalcik and D Quataert (1994), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 987-93.

[183] Pamuk (2004), 238-39. These were the regions of the Empire that shared boundaries with political units relying on sources of transcendent credibility other than Sunni Islam.

[184] Sevket Pamuk (2000), *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

currency already in place. Obviously, to replace these currencies with the Ottoman currency would have had the effect of undermining the local economies and producing unrest. In addition, imposition of a new currency and mints would have been extremely costly to the central government. The Ottoman thus allowed the former currencies to continue to circulate in the peripheral areas, at least until the sixteenth century.

In sum, these proxy variables demonstrate that before the arrival of the Shia Safavid state in the early sixteenth century, the region of northwest Persia and eastern Anatolia lacked a distinctive boundary. The Sunni political units of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkmen dynasties lacked the incentives necessary to make such an investment in the region. The status of the boundaries in this region changed, however, with the arrival of new source of transcendent credibility in the region that possessed the necessary military capabilities to pose a threat to the Sunni political units also vying for control of the area.

As has been suggested in the discussion above, it is important to consider that some of these proxy variables do not hold if one examines the entire Ottoman Empire throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In particular, along the Ottoman-Christian boundary there is much more evidence that a distinctive boundary was in place. For instance, in this region and in the Balkans, once they were captured, the Ottoman used the *timar* tax system.[185] Here, the central government appointed *sipahis*, state employees who had proven themselves in war, to live in the rural areas and collect taxes and raise and train provincial troops. This is a significant contrast to

[185] Pamuk (2004), 230.

the system of local landlords the Ottoman used in eastern Anatolia to collect taxes. Thus, when modern historians talk about the centralizing efforts of Mehmet II (1451-81), the application of these measures tended to be in regions that bordered alternative sources of transcendent credibility, not in areas bordering other Sunni political units.[186] Thus, the locations of the exceptions in the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century provide more evidence in favor of the overarching hypothesis.

Sixteenth Century Central Asia: Two Sources of Transcendent Credibility

Safavid Shiism: A New Source of Transcendent Credibility in the System

At the start of the sixteenth century, a group known as the Safavids conquered northwestern Persia, breaking the monopoly Sunni Islam had enjoyed in the region. Shiism, the source of transcendent credibility in the Safavid state, posed theological and political threats to its Sunni neighbors, compelling the Ottoman in the west and, later, the Mughal in the east to adjust their frontier strategies and increase the distinctiveness of their boundaries with the Safavids.

From the very beginnings of Islam, Shiites saw themselves as something other than the more numerous Sunnis. Many of their beliefs were crucially different and their ecclesial structures also developed in very different forms. Sunni political leaders now faced Shiite ulema, backed by the forces of a political unit, declaring the bases of Sunni governments to be heretical.[187] Thus, the emergence of a Shiite state in Persia was considerably unwelcome to the Ottoman Empire.

---

[186] See for example, Oktay Ozel (1999), "Limits of the Almighty: Mehmed II's 'Land Reform' Revisited," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 42(2): 226-46.

[187] Waines, 170-72.

Shiism entered the region in force in 1501, when Shah Ismail led an army out of the Caucasus Mountains and into northern Iran, conquering the remnants of the Turkmen tribes that ruled there. His support came from the various tribes in the region that tended toward the Sufi teachings and a warrior lifestyle. Ismail claimed Safi al-Din (1252-1334), the famous Sufi leader, as his ancestor, thus his family name was Safavid. Ismail was able to consolidate his victory and expand his empire in all directions, eventually controlling an area spanning large sections of modern Iraq and Iran.

Exactly what system of belief Shah Ismail I brought with him when he and the Safavids captured northern Iran remains a subject of debate.[188] By the end of the 1500s, it the Safavid state was certainly a Shia state, but the initial Shiism of Ismail and his main supporters, the Qizilbash, was better described as a "melting-pot" of many Sunni, Sufi, and Shia beliefs.[189] However, at least from the perspective of the Safavid's neighbors, from the beginning the source of transcendent credibility was assuredly perceived as *not* Sunni. The Sufis who had roamed northern Iran stirring up occasional revolts had been worrisome, but lacked sufficient strength to cause long-term problems. The situation was dramatically different now. Many of the beliefs of the Sufis had been combined with the might of an army and the long-term stability of a government. The Ottoman government required a new strategy on its eastern boundary.

---

[188] Morgan 112-23; BS Amoretti (1986), "Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Periods," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 629-40; Kathryn Babayan (1994), "The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi'ism," *Iranian Studies* 27(1-2), 135-61.

[189] Amoretti, 629.

Shia Islam and Sunni Islam were clearly two different sources of transcendent credibility and were recognized as such by contemporaries. While the content of the Safavid's Shia source of transcendent credibility changed through the sixteenth century, the Sunni Ottoman reacted aggressively against it in all its manifestations. Since the later and more traditional form of Shiism, Twelver Shiism, is the one that eventually dominated Safavid interpretations, this is the one the following analysis will compare with Sunni Islam.

Twelver Shiism was not new with the emergence of the Safavids, though it had found its most effective champion in them. The split between Sunnis and Shiites dates back to first century of Islam. Twelver Shiites believe that there have been twelve infallible imams, all descended from Muhammed's son-in-law and cousin, Ali. A division almost immediately occurred between the Shiites, who believed only a descendent of Ali could become imam, and the Sunnis, who believed that the imam did not need to be a descendent of Ali. Each group named separate imams as the leaders of Islam. In 874, the Shiites' twelfth imam disappeared. Of course, he may have been abducted and killed by his enemies, but the Shiites believe he went into hiding, is still alive, and will return again to take power and spread the true religion. Those who share this messianic notion are called Twelver Shiites. Though a complex theology surrounding these beliefs has been developed for centuries, for the purposes of this discussion there are five main tenets that set Twelver Shiism apart from Sunni Islam.

First, in Safavid Shiite theology, Allah communicated to man indirectly through Scriptures *and directly through the imam*. Because the imam descended from

Ali, Allah made him infallible. Thus, when the imam interpreted Scripture or made a pronouncement on some topic, his word represented that of Allah. The Sunnis do not allow that any teacher has infallibility.

Second, the caliph *should be a direct descendent of Muhammad and Ali*. For the Shiites, Ali was both Allah's *hujja*, meaning he was Allah's proof or evidence, and he was Allah's *wali*, meaning he was Allah's close friend.[190] Thus, Ali, like Muhammad, stood in the gap between men and Allah, permitting some limited communication between the two realms. Likewise, the direct descendents fulfilled this same function. This was incredibly significant theologically and politically because it allowed the selection of any spiritual or temporal ruler to be made by Allah, not men. Only Allah could choose who descended from Muhammad and, therefore, only Allah could choose who was qualified to rule the people. An "election" of a spiritual leader was tantamount to humans attempting to interpose their will where only Allah's will should carry the day.

Third, Shiites emphasized *the imposition of doctrine by the imam*, rather than through the consensus of a scholarly community. While the Sunnis relied on the plurality of the ulama and the emergence of a consensus from among their teaching and writings, the Shiites depended on the infallibility of the imam. Even unanimity could be wrong, let alone a consensus. Infallibility, by definition, was always right. This, in turn, produced ecclesiastical structures that were far more hierarchical than Sunni counterparts.

---

[190] Michael Sells, ed. (1999), *Approaching the Qur'an: The Early Revelations* (Ashland, OR: White Cloud Press), 152-53.

Fourth, believers *could not* "choose" which of the ulama they followed. Again, if the imam was infallible, then there was no choice. Of course, practically speaking, there could be disagreements on minor matters among the Shiites that would be seen as beneath the imam to address and, therefore, different schools of thought could still emerge within Shiism. This, however, was a very different situation than that presented by Sunni Islam in which different sects strictly speaking had no overarching interpretative authority.

Fifth, the Hidden Imam (the *mahdi*) would return someday. This added an explicitly eschatological aspect to the practice of Islam that had a very important political dimension among the Safavid. The world must be prepared so that the mahdi could return. Because the mahdi would not return until the time was right, the duty of every believer was to transform the world. From a political standpoint, this likewise became the purpose of the government. Thus, Shiite military zeal was not focused entirely on the Sunni. The Safavid state was incredibly hostile toward non-Muslim minority populations.[191] However, practically speaking, this meant that *jihad*, or holy war, was no longer merely directed at Christians – the Sunni hindered the return of the mahdi as much or more than anyone else.

The early Shiism of Shah Ismail and the Qizilbash shared all of these aspects of Twelver Shiism, which made the later transition to more orthodox beliefs much smoother. But, Ismail went much further. Depending on which source one reads, Ismail can be seen referring to himself as a prophet, the mahdi, Ali, or even Allah. At

[191] The exception to this is the reign of Abbas I, Roger M Savory (2003), "Relations between the Safavid State and Its Non-Muslim Minorities," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 14(4): 435-58.

the very least, his followers saw him as someone who was in direct contact with Allah and who would usher in the next phase of the world, though there was disagreement over whether he was the mahdi or was the person who would prepare the way for the mahdi.

The Qizilbash devoted themselves to Ismail, giving him the military power necessary to take over northern Persia and consolidate his rule. A weakness in Ismail's radical formulation of Shiism as the source of transcendent credibility was revealed when he lost to the Ottoman at the battle of Chaldiran in 1514.[192] Ismail had never lost a battle before and this had added to the truth of his divine claims. After the battle, however, not only did he fall into fits of depression, the Qizilbash also began to question his true status. The Qizilbash continued to support Ismail, but material reasons were now combined with spiritual ones.

It is from this point that the native Persians began to gain more power in government and religious matters. Also, many more "orthodox" Shiite teachers throughout the Islamic world began to flock to the new Safavid territories and had the effect of moderating the more radical versions of Qizilbash belief.[193] The effect was a shift from the more radical version of Shiism originally professed by Ismail to a more orthodox Twelver Shiism.[194] This reinterpreted Shiite source of transcendent credibility effectively united the Turkish military class and the Persian bureaucratic

---

[192] Roger M Savory (1986), "The Safavid Administrative System," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 359.

[193] Colin Turner (2001), *Islam Without Allah? The Rise of Religious Externalism in Safavid Iran* (New York: Routledge), 72-87; Rula Jurdi Abisaab (2004), *Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire* (I R Taurus), 7-30.

[194] Some of the early beliefs about Ismail persisted, however. For example, even as late as 1629, the successive leaders of the Safavids were referred to by a title the Qizilbash gave to Ismail: *murshid-i kamil* (Perfect Guide), Savory, "The Safavid Administrative System," 360.

class, a union that would have been all but impossible without an effective overarching ideology.[195]

Not only were there theological differences between Shiism and Sunni Islam, these differences produced political outcomes that made the sudden appearance of Shiism in northern Iran a threat to the Ottoman source of transcendent credibility. Clearly, both the Sunni and the Shia share the same ultimate source of Allah. However, in a manner parallel to Protestant and Roman Catholic distinctions in Europe, each group has a very different means of linking the authority of Allah to the authority of the ruler. It is for this reason that Sunni Islam and Shiism may be considered different sources of transcendent credibility.

For the Sunnis, Allah has no direct connection to man (except the Koran). Believers are left with lots of freedom to choose between different ulamas and schools, which implied a meritocracy among the religious teachers. Politically, this meant that the legitimacy of the ruler was largely tied to his ability. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, legitimacy often required stability within the Empire and territorial expansion. Muslim rulers would also try to maintain their legitimacy through the patronage of notable religious scholars. They gave gifts, made endowments (*awqaf*), and created places within the government for the more popular teachers, who tended to produce fatwas that supported the government.[196] In these ways, a Sunni ruler could demonstrate that he ruled with the support of Allah, even though Allah did not communicate directly with men. This is not to suggest that

---

[195] Morgan, 128.

[196] Gregory C Kozlowski (1995), "Imperial Authority, Benefactions and Endowments (*Awqaf*) in Mughal India," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 38(3): 355-70.

subjects had the freedom to judge the ruler's effectiveness openly, nor that the people had a "right" to choose a more effective ruler. In ordinary circumstances, the fact that the ruler was the ruler was often enough in to verify that the ruler worked on behalf of Allah.[197]

It is important to note that the Sunni religious leaders did not call for the exclusion of Shiites from the community of Islam.[198] From the Sunni standpoint, Shiism is just one of the many possible schools of thought. However, due to Shiism's exclusionary nature, Sunni rulers were not willing to allow this particular school of thought to gain a stable political foothold. The Shiites, on the other hand, were not as inclusive as the Sunnis. They clearly defined the boundaries between their beliefs and those of the Sunni. For example, to the central Islamic tenet that "there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His prophet," the Shiites added the phrase "and Ali is the friend of Allah."[199] The Sunni rejected this phrase.

For the Shiites, Allah did have direct connection with man: the imam. If the imam was among the people, he was not just the best spiritual and temporal ruler – he was the only legitimate one. Legitimacy was not determined by outcomes, as it was for the Sunni. Legitimacy could only come via birth and heritage. Subjects had absolutely no say in who the ruler was or evaluating the job he was doing. Allah

---

[197] This political theory is reminiscent of the Mandate of Heaven in Confucian China or the use of Romans 13 in Christian Europe.

[198] Waines, 170. On the other hand, the more the Shia claimed to be the *only* orthodox version of Islam, the more Sunni religious and political leaders established policies that would prevent this exclusionist branch of Islam from dominating particular areas. A source of transcendent credibility that claims it is the only legitimate source must be considered a threat by all other sources of transcendent credibility. Hence, even "inclusive" sources of transcendent credibility (such as Sunni Islam) can become exclusivist when faced with an exclusivist source of transcendent credibility.

[199] Ibid., 171.

determined the ruler through birth. Thus, submitting to the ruler was the same as submitting to Allah.

Of course, one problem for the Shiites was that the rightful heir of Ali was still in hiding, raising the question of how government should operate in his absence. The solution was something akin to stewardship. The leader of a Shia government was granted the authority he needed on the condition that he prepared the world for the return of the mahdi.[200] The religious leaders had the ability to declare the ruler as delinquent in his responsibilities as steward and remove him, an event that occurred most recently in Iran in 1979 when the Ayatollah Khomeini removed the Shah. The spiritual realm thus trumped the temporal sphere in Shiism to an extent it did not and could not within Sunni Islam.

Practically speaking, contemporaries saw these two sources of transcendent credibility as different and threatening to each other.[201] Not only did the Shiite Safavid "self conscious sense of self-righteousness make cooperation with Sunnis difficult, but it led to extravagant claims and aggressive activities."[202] As was mentioned earlier, Ismail redefined the term jihad so that the Sunni Ottoman became the primary targets rather than Christians.[203] Over the next two centuries, Safavid rulers and Christian rulers would develop numerous alliances that were partly trade

---

[200] Waines, 167-69.
[201] Waines 170-72.
[202] Ronald Ferrier (1986), "Trade from the Mid-14th Century to the End of the Safavid Period," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 427.
[203] Amoretti, 635.

related and partly directed against the Sunni Ottoman Empire.[204] The Ottoman, for their part, recognized that the Shiism of the Safavids was especially attractive to persons living in central and eastern Anatolia. Almost immediately, people on the Ottoman eastern frontier, who thanks to centuries of Sufi influence shared many of the same beliefs as the newly emerged Shiite state, began to drift into the Safavid sphere of influence. Ismail sent envoys into eastern Anatolia who were instructed to stir up the population there and bring them into the Safavid sphere of influence.[205]

The Ottoman "could not fail to notice" that there was a flow of compliance eastward.[206] In fact, the growing instability in East helped precipitate the abdication of the Ottoman ruler Sultan Bayezid in favor of his son Selim the Grim, who immediately turned his attention eastward.[207] Selim understood the crisis in the east very well. He had been the governor of an eastern province during the early years of Shah Ismail and watched as Ismail transformed himself from a local religious leader into the fanatical leader of a massive army. Selim fully comprehended that this was no ordinary revolt or invading army – it was an army in possession of an alternate source of transcendent credibility that would have tremendous appeal among the subjects of eastern Anatolia.[208] Selim's every action in the east supported the hypothesis that the arrival of a new source of transcendent credibility necessitated a new strategy with respect to the boundaries of the two political units. This Sunni-

---

[204] Even though the Shiites and the Christians had different sources of transcendent credibility, neither bordered the other, although both bordered the Ottomans with their Sunni source of transcendent credibility.

[205] HR Roemer (1986), "The Safavid Period," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 218.

[206] Ibid., 219.

[207] Morgan, 116.

[208] Roemer (1986b), 222.

Shiite rivalry did not dissipate after the Ottoman victory at Chaldiran in 1514. On the contrary, it has shaped economic, social, religious, and political realities in eastern Anatolia and northern Iran up to the present day.

The Shiite Safavids faced a threat not only from the Sunni Ottoman Empire, but also from the emergence of the Sunni Mughal state in India. Forced out of the eastern edges of the Safavid empire by Shah Ismail's armies, a local leader known as Babur entered the political vacuum of northern India in the 1520s. With the help of gunpowder, his army had a relatively easy time taking control of vast stretches of India. The control of Babur's Mughal dynasty was still somewhat tenuous until Babur's grandson, Akbar (1556-1605), took the reigns of power and turned his realm into a full-fledged empire. The Mughal depended on a source of transcendent credibility relatively similar to the Sunni Islam of the Ottoman Empire.

Thus, central Asia in the sixteenth century contained three major political units and two sources of transcendent credibility. Being surrounded on both sides by a different source of transcendent credibility exacerbated the perceived threat the Safavids faced. When Shah Ismail I first conquered the eastern portion of his territory (modern Afghanistan and southeastern Iran) in the 1510s and early 1520s, there was no credible political unit threatening Shiism on the eastern flank. Within a decade, this situation changed dramatically. Therefore, if the hypothesis holds in the case of the Safavids, the distinctiveness of the borders along the eastern portion of the Safavid state should have increased by at least the 1530s.

This, in fact, was the case. Ismail had left local princes in control of the territory on the eastern edges of the Safavid state. These rulers were ostensibly loyal

to Ismail, but were not hierarchically connected to the central government. In 1536, however, Tahmasp I, the Safavid ruler who succeeded Ismail I, appointed a governor for the eastern region of Lahijan to replace the local prince Ismail had left as ruler.[209] This move was a direct response to the rise of the Sunni Mughal Empire. Throughout the mid-sixteenth century, the Safavids continued to replace local princes with governors appointed by the central government, turning what was a frontier region into portions of a unified state. The border that eventually emerged between Safavids and Mughal stayed largely intact for the next two hundred years. Several attempts were made by the Mughal to conquer the Qandahar region (in modern Afghanistan), but all of these ended with the Mughal being pushed back into India.[210] This border very closely matches the present-day border between Pakistan on the one hand, and Afghanistan and Iran on the other.

Increased Distinctiveness of Boundaries in the Sixteenth Century

As has just been demonstrated, the hypothesis successfully explains the case of the Safavid state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The emergence of the Shiite Safavid state introduced an alternative source of transcendent credibility into the system, raising the number of sources from one to two. According to the hypothesis, then, the distinctiveness of the boundaries between political units of differing sources of transcendent credibility should also have increased. This was the case. The

[209] Ibid., 244-45.
[210] Roemer (1986b), 299-300.

boundaries between the Shiite Safavid state and the Sunni Ottoman Empire, on one hand, and with the Sunni Mughal Empire on the other, became more distinct.

Increased Effort and Ability to Impose Hegemonic Authority on Frontier Peoples

The Ottoman Empire vigorously responded to the threat of the Shiite Safavid state. In 1502, a year after the appearance of Ismail and his Qizilbash army, the Ottoman sultan sent troops into eastern Anatolia to physically brand every person with known sympathies for the Safavids and emigrate those persons to the West.[211] This was a powerful demonstration that although distinctive boundaries are sometimes drawn on land, they can also be physically inscribed on people.

Most of the fighting between the Safavids and the Ottoman and their allies between 1502 and 1514 occurred in territories that had been frontier zones between the Ottoman and the White Sheep.[212] In each of these encounters the Safavids were victorious, encouraging the people of eastern Anatolia to rise up in open revolt against the Ottoman. This, in turn, created a crisis within the Ottoman government, which, as has already been mentioned, led to the replacement of the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II in 1512. The arrival of a new source of transcendent credibility in the region necessitated a new strategy in the east or the loss of large stretches of territory. Bayezid was either unwilling or unable to make the necessary adjustments – his son Selim the Grim was not.

---

[211] Ibid., 219.
[212] Ibid.

Selim's first actions involved getting the nomadic people of the east under firm central government control. The nomadic people, especially the Qizilbash in the Ottoman territories, were either registered, imprisoned, or executed. Troops were stationed in the area purposefully to prevent the flow of people from Ottoman territory into Safavid lands.[213] Significantly, the townspeople in the region were not persecuted at all. Once these groups were brought under control, Selim gathered a larger army complete with cannon and marched out to meet Ismail, ultimately defeating his army at Chaldiran in 1514.

After Chaldiran, the Ottoman army continued east to capture the Safavid capital of Tabriz. However, this portion of the world was considered a backwater by the Ottoman military. The real glories and riches were to be found in fighting in Europe or Egypt, not in the sparsely populated mountains of Iran. Faced with an impatient military, Selim and his army stayed in Tabriz only one week before heading back to the Ottoman capital.[214] However, over the next few years, the Ottoman carefully built up their territories that bordered Safavid occupied lands.

What had once been frontier provinces, either claimed by two or more political units or claimed by none, began to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of one of the dominant political units in the area. The circumstances on the Safavid-Mughal boundary have already been discussed. In the northwestern Safavid territories there are also several examples. In the sixteenth century, the province of Bitlis,[215] was transformed into an ordinary Ottoman district, rather than a frontier region governed

---

[213] Ibid., 219-220.

[214] Roemer (1986b), 225; Morgan, 117.

[215] Bitlis (or Bidlis) was a province located on western and southern shores of Lake Van, on what became part of the border between the Ottoman and Safavid territories.

by local princes that claimed loyalty to the Ottoman government.[216] Other formerly frontier provinces soon followed suit including Arzinjan and Diyarbakr, both on the newly established border with the Safavids.[217]

Before the arrival of the Safavids, the people of eastern Anatolia and northern Iran possessed significant latitude to appeal to the authority of the Ottoman administration, the Turkmen tribes, or various Sufi teachers. However, in the first two decades of the sixteenth century, these areas were captured militarily and administratively for either the Ottoman or the Safavids. Frontier territories and loosely allied princes became obsolete. Nomads were settled or at least controlled in the Ottoman territories. In Safavid territories, nomad chiefs received significant government and military positions.

In short, the appearance of a second source of transcendent credibility created the necessary incentive for the territory of eastern Anatolia and northern Iran to become a more settled territory. At least in the first two decades of the sixteenth century, the people of the area moved around largely according to their religious beliefs to place themselves under the exclusive authority of either the Ottoman or Safavids. Thus, on the one hand both political units exerted more efforts to impose hegemonic authority in the specific territories in the region. However, on the other hand, the sometimes voluntary and sometimes coerced emigration of the local population increased the ability of the political units to be successful in those efforts.

---

[216] Mehmet Oz (2003), "Ottoman Provincial Administration in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: The Case of Bidlis in the Sixteenth Century," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 9(1-2), 144-56.

[217] Roemer (1986b), 225.

Compliance Generation in Frontier Areas Grew Increasingly Efficient

In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire required more income than it did in the past. Military technology changed during this century and the central government required larger standing armies and navies.[218] As a result, the central government needed to change its tax collection system to increase the efficiency of taxation in the peripheral and rural regions. Thus, the landlord system in Eastern Anatolia was replaced with tax farming, a method that had long been used in urban areas.[219] By 1695, tax farming had been replaced by the *malikane* system, whereby taxes were farmed out on a lifetime basis, rather than on the basis of annual or five-year contracts.

Ideally, what we would like to know here is whether the Ottoman administration was able to raise more taxes relative to the wealth of the population after the organization of the eastern provinces in the early sixteenth century. I have not found any secondary material that makes such a comparison at all. However, it is plausible to argue that the new administrative realities in the eastern provinces allowed for a more efficient collection of taxes. With central government administrators now located in these provinces, the rural areas would have been more thoroughly registered and the local landlords would have been less able to conceal their share of the tax. Corruption of central government officials is a likely scenario, but, as has been mentioned before, officials would have sought a better position that one in what was seen as the backwater of the Empire. In addition, the more rebellious of the Sufi

[218] Charles Oman (1987 [1937]), *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Greenhill Books), 607-770.

[219] Cosgil (2005).

teachers who had encouraged the local population to eschew paying taxes to the central government had been eliminated or forced to emigrate thanks to the programs of Selim in the early 1500s. Finally, thanks to the Ottoman possession of provinces in Armenia and Georgia, more overland trade would have passed through this region and could be taxed. Thus, even if there is no evidence that taxation in this region was higher relative to the wealth of the population, at the very least it may be argued that tax collection methods would have increased the amount of revenue flowing into the central government's treasury.

Increase in credible commitment to defend frontier territories

A credible commitment by the Safavids to defend frontier territories grew only gradually over the sixteenth century. One of the biggest reasons for this is that the military technology Ismail initially relied on, the nomadic cavalry, was an excellent means of conquest, but ill-suited to defense. Thus, during the reign of Tahmasp I (1533-76), the core defensive strategy against Ottoman invasions was retreat coupled with scorched earth tactics. On three separate occasions the Ottoman army managed to capture large stretches of northwestern Iran, but after the army withdrew, these Shiite territories reverted right back to the Safavid state.[220] Thus, we are presented with Safavid borders that were frequently subject to attack and invasion, but which, over the long term, stayed relatively unchanged.

In gratitude for their loyalty, Ismail granted the Qizilbash leaders important positions within the government. On the positive side in terms of Safavid defense, this

[220] Morgan, 127-28.

meant that the various nomadic tribes had a larger stake in keeping the Ottoman out of their lands. However, on a more negative side, Qizilbash resistance to military reform meant that it took most of the sixteenth century to transform the military organization into one that concentrated on defending boundaries. In fact, it was not until the major reorganization of the military instituted by Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) that the Safavid state possessed the military strategy and technology to establish lines of defense that were more or less permanent. Still, this does not mean that the Safavids were unable to credibly commit to defending their frontier territories in different ways. Governors in Safavid provinces along strategically important boundaries were often given the title of *amir al-umara*, which highlighted their military role over their other administrative functions.[221] These governors were given some troops to supplement the provincial armies that they were asked to raise and train. Thus, no invading force would be permitted to march untouched into Safavid territory, though the force that met them may be small and under equipped.

In regions covered by deserts or mountains, a line of defense is rarely the best option to prevent the flow of persons across a boundary. In such places, there are only a few roads or passes that must be guarded in order to tightly control movement. For the Safavids, many of their frontiers fell into this category, which is a large reason why they were able to use a relatively small military strength to protect a vast border. It was also important to guard these passages since they were the main route of trade – and the best way to collect trade taxes. The Safavids, more than any of the preceding

[221] Savory, "The Safavid Administrative System," 370.

authority figures in Persia, dispatched guards, traders, and inspectors at key points along these routes and especially at the edges of their territory.[222]

The Ottoman also built up their defenses along their eastern boundary to a degree that would have been unheard of in the fifteenth century. There was little danger of an outright attack coming from Safavid territory into Ottoman lands because of the asymmetry in military strength between the two powers. Still, the population in northwestern Iran had proven to be susceptible to fanaticism and, thus, the more radical elements had to be kept out of eastern and central Anatolia. Maintaining peace and order in the eastern half of the empire required strict control of the flow of ideas and persons coming from Safavid territories.

Increased Efforts to Establish a Hierarchical Judicial System

In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman central government took greater steps to infuse hierarchy into its judiciary throughout the empire. Before this period, the central government was very interested in maintaining law and order throughout their territory, but the actual practice was decentralized, resting in the authority of local landlords or central government military officials located in the more remote areas. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Ottoman system began to redefine "justice" to mean the protection of rural and urban producers against abuses of the military elite.[223] In essence, this allowed the ruler to claim authority as sole protector of the weak in the peripheral areas. The population was encouraged to

[222] Ferrier, 415.

[223] BA Ergene (2001), "On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict (1600-1800)," *Islamic Law and Society* 8(1): 52-87.

appeal to the central government when it was believed that this justice had been denied. Obviously, it was still difficult for persons on the periphery to make such an appeal, but the central government adapted the system in order to more easily facilitate the process.

During the first years of the Safavids, there were many courts in the realm and many different administrators of these courts. This created a large degree of jurisdictional conflict and confusion. The solution the early Safavid rulers devised was the creation of a new position, the divan-begi. This position was given authority over other courts within the state, making it "the highest court of appeal."[224] Thus, in both the Safavid and Ottoman territories, judicial structures were rearranged so that there existed a regularized procedure of appeal over which the respective central governments held the ultimate authority.

As was alluded to earlier, the main judicial rival in northern Iran was not another political unit, but the Sufi teachers to which locals appealed. Because Sufi teachings mirrored the Shia beliefs to a much larger degree than the Sunni system of belief, Sufi teachers and organizations were permitted a wide degree of freedom in Safavid territory that they were not in Ottoman lands. The Ottoman solution was, in a sense, to "buy off" the Sufi teachers. Whether or not this exchange was a *quid pro quo*, the granting of these endowments had the effect of moderating the Sufi teachings.[225] Sufi teachers who resisted this influence were forced to emigrate.

---

[224] Savory, "The Safavid Administrative System," 355-56.
[225] Kozlowski (1995).

The Safavid solution was slightly different. Rather than buy off specific Sufis, the Sufi teachers were permitted to maintain their organizations, and it was these larger groups that the Safavids brought into the government. These "continued to exist as a system within a system," but over time their influence was minimized to the point where they were "devoid of any real function within the state."[226] Integrated into either the Ottoman or Safavid government, the Sufi teachers lost their ability to appeal independently to the population, plus they were forced to confine their activities to one side of the emerging border or the other. The end result was that the central governments absorbed the Sufi teachers into their respective judicial hierarchies.

Increased Efforts to Impose Standardization of Money and Measures

Any discussion about the currency in Central Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth century must begin with the strength of European currency and the presence of European trading posts. Florentine and Venetian gold coins continued to flow throughout Central Asia after the establishment of the Safavid state. Because gold was far more valuable than silver, it was the currency of international trade. Silver and copper, on the other hand, were the coin of local merchants. Thus, at least in the Safavid state and in Mughal India, European gold coins could continue to be exchanged without doing too much damage to the sovereignty of these political units. The average subject would deal in quantities too small for gold coins, but would have plenty of use for silver and copper.

---

[226] Savory, "The Safavid Administrative System," 356.

The Ottoman Empire, facing different challenges on the border of Europe, was an exception here. Starting in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman made its *sultani* the only gold coin to be used in its Empire. This gold coin, which the central government took pains to ensure its weight and fineness in order to compete with the Venetian *ducat*, helped to unify the Empire.[227] The Ottoman saw coins as a symbol of national sovereignty and circulated them on purpose to demonstrate the power of the central government.[228]

For their part, the Safavids focused on the standardization of silver coins, a less valuable, but therefore more frequently used type of currency. For a variety of reasons (the two most important being the instability in leadership following Tahmasp I and the control of the southwestern port of Hormuz by the Portuguese), mint consolidation was not undertaken systematically until the 1600s.[229] In the 1500s, the *mahmudi*, a silver coin that was minted in southwestern Iran, was the most widely circulated currency in the Persian Gulf region. It is likely that, at least in the sixteenth century, the Safavids did not see any great benefit in tampering with a currency that was already highly successful, nor with confronting the military might of the Portuguese who profited most from this coin. Still, it must be noted that the Safavids demanded, and the Portuguese usually acquiesced, that Portugal assist in the imposition of the Shia creed in Hormuz, Goa, and other Portuguese port towns in the region.[230] The demands of the Safavid rulers in the early 1600s were different, however, and the

---

[227] Pamuk (2004), 238-39.
[228] Pamuk (2000).
[229] Ruti Matthee (2001), "Mint Consolidation and the Worsening of the Late Safavid Coinage: The Mint of Huwayza," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 44(4), 505-39.
[230] Ferrier, 427.

central government began to consolidate the various mints around the state. The *mahmudi* gradually deteriorated in value and was replaced with coins from official Safavid-approved mints. Though this process took place later than the hypothesis would predict, it is not necessarily problematic. The Safavids lacked the incentives to intervene.

However, in the late sixteenth century, the Mughal Empire became the largest importer of metals outside Europe, excluding Ming China.[231] This greatly affected the value of silver in the Safavid state and required the central government to take more active role in the minting of all coins. Secondly, there had been a dramatic decline in Portuguese power and its ability to stay in direct control of Hormuz. In addition, questions of authority and sovereignty became more significant for Safavid rulers in the 1600s. As a result, the incentives to fully standardize currency emerged at that point.

In the early sixteenth century, the Safavids also sought to control the minting through the indirect method of taxing all mints in the territory. In addition to the fees the central government charged mints for the privilege of operation, up until 1565 mints were also charged a *tamgha* tax, which was the difference between the real and nominal value of every coin made.[232] In 1565, Tahmasp I cancelled this tax, though it continues to show up on royal treasury records well into the eighteenth century. The

[231] Najaf Haider (1996), "Precious Metal Flows and Currency Circulation in the Mughal Empire," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 39(3), 298-364.

[232] Bert Fragner (1986), "Social and Internal Economic Affairs," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 545.

large amount of revenue gathered through these taxes each year demonstrates that the central government had a fairly tight control over the workings of its mints.

In short, both the Ottoman and the Safavids increased their efforts to standardize their currencies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Admittedly, there were many external factors that interposed themselves, which brings into question the causal impact of the emergence of a second source of transcendent credibility. I would not argue that Shiism's appearance was the exclusive cause of increased standardization, though at least because of incentives tied to sovereignty issues it did play some role.

Conclusion

Taken together, these proxies suggest that, in the sixteenth century, Central Asian political units invested in more distinct boundaries with neighboring political units that did not share the same source of transcendent credibility. Something had clearly changed in the sixteenth century that produced incentives to invest in these boundaries to a degree that was unheard of or impossible in the previous century. The most significant change over that period was the arrival of a new source of transcendent credibility in the system, increasing the number of sources from one to two. Despite persistent military threats in the east in the fifteenth century, it is only after the arrival of a military threat *that was coupled with an alternative source of transcendent credibility* that the Ottoman changed their strategy in the eastern portion of their empire, investing resources to bring the nomadic peoples under control and establishing a more distinctive boundary with the Safavids. In short, this case

provides additional evidence in support of the relationship between number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system and the distinctiveness of the boundaries between political units.

CHAPTER 5: MEDIEVAL EUROPE, 400-1000

A. Introduction
B. Christendom: A Single Source of Transcendent Credibility in the Middle Ages
    1. A Single Source of Transcendent Credibility
    2. Indistinct Boundaries Between Political Units
C. The Carolingian Empire and the Saxons (751-820)
    1. Indistinctiveness of Boundaries Prior to Prolonged Contact with Saxony
    2. Contact with Pagan Saxony Increases the Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility
    3. Increase in the Distinctiveness of Boundaries between the Franks and Saxony
    4. Decrease in the Distinctiveness of Boundaries between the Franks and Saxony
    5. Conclusion
D. The Vikings (840-1000)
    1. The Vikings in France (840-911)
    2. The Vikings in Britain (840-925)
    3. The Conversion of the Vikings in Britain (925-1025)
    4. Conclusion
E. Conclusion

Introduction

For the most part, the European system of political units during the medieval period held one source of transcendent credibility: Christianity directed from Rome. In fact, according to Eric Voegelin, one can speak of the medieval period in Europe as a "search for Christendom."[233] This is not to neglect other potential sources of transcendent credibility that existed in Europe, however. The early centuries of the middle ages saw the Church pursuing missionary activities among the Germanic peoples who had moved into the former Roman Empire or who continued to live on its

[233] Eric Voegelin (1997), *History of Political Ideas: The Middle Ages to Aquinas (Collected Works of Eric Voegelin 20*) (University of Missouri Press).

fringes. New sources of transcendent credibility waxed and waned on the edges of Europe as well, including Islam and the successive waves of horsemen from the steppes. Inside Europe there was constant vigilance against the spread of heretical systems of belief. Thus, the idea of Christendom was not maintained without a struggle; however, it was a struggle that Catholic Europe consistently won for over one thousand years.[234]

On the other hand, in the rare instances when and where these alternate sources of transcendent credibility combined with military capabilities, they could rise to a degree of threat that compelled the Christian political units of Europe to respond. The following section will look at two of the most important anomalies and use these to demonstrate the robustness of the theory. The first exception occurred under Charlemagne. The expansionist policies of Charlemagne and his father Pippin narrowed the frontiers between Christianized Europe and some of the remaining pagan elements of the Germanic tribes, most notably the Saxons and later the Slavs and Avars. This expansion, in effect, enlarged the size of the system under consideration, increasing the number of sources of transcendent credibility from one to two. It will be shown that a relatively distinct border formed along the Frankish-Saxon boundary. Further, because such a strategy was extremely costly, Charlemagne opted to change his policy to actively convert the Saxons to Christianity in order to shift the resources he had invested in the border elsewhere.

---

[234] RI Moore (1994, [1986]), *The Origins of European Dissent (Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching 30)* (University of Toronto Press).

The second exception to be considered is found in the places on the continent and in the British Isles the Vikings colonized. The Christianized Angles and Saxons on the British Isles followed the general pattern of the European middle ages with respect to one another. Despite the fact that each kingdom represented a threat to the other, the boundaries between political units were relatively indistinct and frequently overlapped. It was only during the reign of Alfred the Great, the first Angle king to be faced with a permanent Viking presence, that the military was reformed and border fortifications reflected a more distinct boundary. As this Viking territory, the Danelaw, began to convert to Christianity, the boundary grew increasingly more indistinct despite the fact that the Danelaw still represented an enormous military threat.

These cases demonstrate that border distinctiveness was not related to constitutional systems or common practices of particular time periods, but to the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system and how they were situated geographically with respect one another. Where Christianity existed unchallenged, rulers invested very little in maintaining and controlling boundaries with other political units. However, where political units arose that held an alternative source of transcendent credibility, Christian rulers changed their strategies to create more distinctive borders. Once this was accomplished, in many cases they turned to a policy of Christianization of the neighboring political unit. The strategic advantage of this policy was that, once the neighbor had converted, the boundary required fewer resources and these could be redirected elsewhere. Thus, after successful conversion

of neighbors, boundaries between political units became more indistinct and tended to overlap, even when the neighbor still posed a serious military threat.

Christendom: A Single Source of Transcendent Credibility in the Middle Ages

A Single Source of Transcendent Credibility

Christianity's ascent in Western Europe plausibly began with the Edict of Milan in 313, when Emperor Constantine permitted people "the free and unrestricted practice of their religions."[235] The Edict, in particular, mentioned Christianity and the official seal of approval implicitly directed the Empire to embrace the teachings of this formerly Jewish sect. Confrontations with Paganism and heresy within the Empire and heathens without marked the history of the Church from the fourth to eighth centuries.[236] However, the period now known as Late Antiquity may succinctly be referred to as the success story of a religion. Christianity came to not only dominate the furthest reaches of the former Roman Empire, it also successfully extended into regions the powerful Roman legions were unable to penetrate. With only a few finite exceptions, Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Protestant Reformation was the home of only one source of transcendent credibility: Christianity as directed by the Roman curia.

The decline of Rome in Late Antiquity created an administrative vacuum throughout the Empire into which the Church stepped. The political decline produced

---

[235] "Edict of Milan" quoted in Henry Bettenson, ed. (1963), *Documents of the Christian Church* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 22.

[236] Ramsay MacMullen (1997), *Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

subsequent economic and cultural crises.[237] The Roman elite located throughout the Empire could no longer play the crucial role of providing local order. In many cases, these elite, finding themselves cut off from or ignored by Rome, turned to the Germanic tribes that continued to migrate into these areas from the North and East. The Germanic rulers adopted many of the institutions and values of the Romans in order to maximize compliance given the changing political situation.[238] The Church played a significant role in teaching the new rulers how to use this different source of transcendent credibility, enabling the Roman elite and Germanic elite to fuse into a single class, and convincing the general populace that they were all *Christian* rather than Roman or German. The Christian liturgy and ceremony possessed the only viable legitimacy across racial and class lines.[239] In addition, local bishops used displays of wealth as a symbol to demonstrate to Roman and German alike the validity of placing the Church at the center of the social system.[240] This allowed the Bishops to step into the gap between the waning Empire and the waxing tribal kingdoms. As a result, the clergy received political and social status concomitant with their role in this transition.

It was a precarious balancing act for the Church, however. Until roughly the eighth century, although the Church was nominally centrally connected to Bishop of Rome (the Pope), that person's power to affect the practices and doctrines of distant

---

[237] Chris Wickham (1984), "The Other Transition: From the Ancient World to Feudalism," *Past and Present* 103: 3-36.

[238] See Walter Pohl, ed. (1998), *Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300-800 (Transformation of the Roman World 2)* (Leiden: Brill).

[239] Berhard Jussen (2000), "Liturgy and Legitimation, or How the Gallo-Romans Ended the Roman Empire," in Berhard Jussen, ed., *Ordering Medieval Society: Perspectives on Intellectual and Practical Modes of Shaping Social Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press): 147-99.

[240] Dominic James (1998), *God and Gold in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

parts of Europe was extremely limited. Each Germanic tribe produced a unique blend of Roman and Christian institutions. Acknowledged heresies such as Arianism had taken root among powerful tribes, such as the Visigoths. Local gods and heroes still carried enormous levels of respect and credibility among the people and could not be eradicated by the Church. Thus, local clergy compromised, allowing these objects of worship to be converted into *saints* – otherworldly beings that were not God, but also something more than human possessing a transcendent credibility of their own.[241]

This patchwork of Christianity was stabilized by the growing centralization of the ecclesiastical bureaucracy and the practice of pilgrimage. Devout Christians sought the blessings of individual saints and of God by traveling great distances to visit Christian shrines and gaze upon relics.[242] The early form of cosmopolitanism allowed Christians from distant parts of Europe to begin to share and coordinate their practices. An extremely important destination of pilgrims was Rome, giving the ecclesia there greater opportunities to influence travelers who would take these ideas back to their home regions.[243]

Rome remained the symbolic center of Europe, even though its real status had declined greatly. This was especially true among the clergy who were "buoyed up by

---

[241] It was crucial, however, that even these otherworldly persons be subject to, and often marginalized by the authority of the Church, Peter Brown (1982), *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Isabel Moreira (2000), *Dreams, Visions, and Spiritual Authority in Merovingian Gaul* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 225-28; on other examples of compromises between Anglo-Saxon culture and Christianity, see Karen Louise Jolly (1996), *Popular Religion in Late Saxon England: Elf Charms in Context* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).

[242] Patrick Geary (1991 [1978]), *Furta Sacra: Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

[243] RW Southern (1953), *The Making of the Middle Ages* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press): 134-39.

immense corporate confidence in the absolute rightness of all things Roman."[244] Church histories and rituals often included the monuments from Ancient Rome's past in order to connect their current legitimacy with the continued credibility of the Empire.[245] The Bishop of Rome took pride of place over all Christian bishops – at least in the doctrines purported by the Church in Rome. Church tradition said that the Apostle Peter was the first Bishop of Rome and, as Christ had made Peter first among the disciples, his bishopric would also be first among the others. At least in Western Europe where no city rivaled that of Rome, bishops and other clergy would often bring disputed rulings to the Pope. The papacy thus became a focal point around which an ecclesiastical bureaucracy formed in the West. This centralization was so successful that "by the eighth century, all the Latin Christians were Trinitarians and were in communion with the bishop of Rome."[246]

Expansion of Christianity beyond the traditional edges of the Roman Empire was an early concern for the Church.[247] It sent missions to the many Germanic tribes throughout Europe, to all parts of the British Isles, and into the East. In some areas, the local rulers recognized the value of Christianity as a source of transcendent credibility and quickly adopted it along with many pieces of Roman culture. In other areas, the Christian missionaries faced rejection and execution. And yet, when Europe

---

[244] Peter Brown (1996), *The Rise of Western Christendom* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers): 68.

[245] Andrea Sommerlechner (2004), "Mirabilia, Munitiones, Fragmenta – Rome's Ancient Monuments in Medieval Historiography," in Frances Andrews, Christoph Egger, and Constance M Rousseau, eds., *Pope, Church and City: Essays in Honour of Brenda M Bolton* (Leiden: Brill).

[246] Feredrick B Artz (1980 [1953]), *The Mind of the Middle Ages: An Historical Survey, AD 200-1500* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 190.

[247] See RA Markus (1997), *Gregory the Great and His World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 163-88; Justo L Gonzalez (1984), *The Story of Christianity, Volume I: The Early Church to the Reformation* (San Francisco: Harper): 231-50

is considered in the longer term, these missions eventually accomplished their goals to the extent that, by the year 1000, there were very few secluded regions in Europe that had not made Christianity their source of transcendent credibility.

Another joint project of the Christian Church were the attempts to reclaim the Holy Land from the forces of Islam. Lords and kings who had been warring with each other only a few years before would be seen heading off together on crusade in the name of Christendom. A common enemy bolstered the common identity Christianity had fostered among the people of Europe. Christians were instructed by no less an authority than St. Bernard of Clairvaux that the Church required an active defense and that heretics and unbelievers should be killed before they are able to lead an innocent Christian astray.[248] Crusades could also be called by the Church against persons within Europe, for example, against the Albigensians in Southern France.[249] The outcome was a joint effort by both Church and rulers to defend this solitary source of transcendent credibility from threats both within and without.

Indistinct Boundaries between Political Units

Sociologist Michael Mann described Europe from roughly 1000 to 1500 AD as "a multiple acephalous federation. Europe had no head, no center, yet it was an entity composed of small, crosscutting interaction networks."[250] In this estimation, he is far from alone. The great medievalist Joseph Strayer argued that "the idea of a

---

[248] GR Evans (2000), *Bernard of Clairvaux* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 168-69.

[249] See, for example, WA Sibly and MD Sibly, eds. (2002), *The History of the Albigensian Crusade: Peter of Les Vaux-de-Cernay's '*Historia Albigensis' (Boydell Press).

[250] Michael Mann (1986), *Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 376.

Commonwealth of Christendom found its expression in the Church, and loyalty to the Church was stronger than loyalty to any lay organization."[251] This did not mean the Pope stood alone at the top of Europe. It was the *idea* of the Church that dominated Europe and both Pope and ruler claimed dominance over particular parts of that legacy. Networks of authority, albeit hierarchically organized, resulted. Within the Church itself, even at its height under Pope Innocent III, "The Pope was no dictator. He was more like a chairman of the board, who has to act with the approval of his fellow directors (the Cardinals), and find ways to accommodate or neutralize potential opposition."[252] The relationship between kings and nobles in the Middle Ages functioned very similarly in most cases. And, just as persons may sit on many different corporate boards, nobles and clergy participated in multiple networks of authority throughout Europe.

There is also a close connection between the feudal social structure and Christianity itself. According to the French historian Georges Duby, it was the clerical hierarchical ideas transferred to and imposed on European society in general that culminated in the system that we now recognize as feudalism. Hierarchy was more than natural – it was God-inspired. Everything in Creation was "arrayed 'in distinct orders' under the authority of a sovereign, who sits enthroned in the city on high."[253] In short, all was hierarchically organized under Christ. Since Christ was both the

---

[251] Joseph R Strayer (1955), *Western Europe in the Middle Ages* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc): 5.

[252] Anne J Duggan (2004), "Thomas Becket's Italian Network," in Frances Andrews, Christoph Egger, and Constance M Rousseau, eds., *Pope, Church and City: Essays in Honour of Brenda M Bolton* (Leiden: Brill): 185.

[253] Georges Duby (1980), *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 33.

source of all spiritual and temporal power, the arrangement of power among his lieutenants on earth should be organized in essentially the same manner. This illustrates two very important facts of the European Middle Ages. First, the organization of political authority should mirror the organization of spiritual authority, which was the Church. Second, secular rulers could not remain neutral in discussions about the proper organization and distribution of power within the Church hierarchy, since any such changes would have profound impacts on the structure of political (and hence his own) authority.[254]

The lack of distinctive boundaries is extraordinarily clear in the European Middle Ages. The *acephalous* nature of the system was not accidental. One of the key characteristics of the feudal system was that a vassal could have more than one lord.[255] If two of a single vassal's lords were to fight and summon the vassal to fulfill his military obligations, there were no set criteria that were systematically accepted to make the choice of which obligation dominated. In fact, a vassal may use such an opportunity to play one lord off the other to acquire more rights or he may declare his obligations null and void as a result of the situation. The boundaries between political units did not serve as a barrier preventing the establishment of an obligation between lord and vassal. A count may, for example, hold fiefs on behalf of the duke of

---

[254] Even the "divine order" was subject to interpretations. The divisions between the "three orders" of European Medieval society were very changeable, thus giving political rulers ample incentive to always be involved in discussions about the Church structure, Giles Constable (1995), *Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 249-359.

[255] Gianfranco Poggi (1978), *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press): 27-28; see also Carl Stephenson (1956), *Medieval Feudalism* (Cornell University Press); Marc Bloch (1961), *Feudal Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Kathleen Thompson (2002), *Power and Border Lordship in Medieval France: The County of Perche, 1000-1226* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer).

Normandy and also hold separate fiefs on behalf of the King of France. Likewise, due to complicated (but highly regulated) rules of inheritance and marriage, the duke of Normandy may hold fiefs on behalf of the King of France *and vice versa*. Thus, any attempt to clearly demarcate the boundaries between political units in Medieval Europe was a challenging pursuit.

To this must be added the relatively autonomous nature of cities and towns in Medieval Europe. The fact that a city lay within the territorial boundaries of a lord's domain did not imply that it in any way complied with that lord's authority. Ordinarily, as long as municipalities generated money from trade and commerce *and* the lord received his share of that income, cities were permitted the freedom to make more money. This was true even to the extent of undermining the feudal system itself. For example, cities and lords permitted a special (unspoken) dispensation for runaway peasants who sought refuge in a city. The refugee would participate in the city's economy and a blind eye would be turned toward his or her fugitive status. Thus, it is an oversimplification to say that municipalities were truly autonomous, but so long as they kept the political elite happy (and wealthy), they were permitted a large degree of freedom.

The relative lack of hegemonic authority within the territories of Medieval Europe was not the only indication of relatively indistinct boundaries between political units. Compliance generation could be extremely inefficient since a vassal could play the relationship with one of his lords off against the other, in essence forcing the lords to bid for the vassals' allegiance. For this same reason, there were very few efforts to

construct judicial hierarchies.[256] Vassals administered justice locally. Though appeal to the king or some other office always theoretically existed, there were few opportunities for appeal for the people in general. On the other hand, a vassal charged with a crime by a lord could frequently appeal to the intervention of one of his other lords. Thus, investments in more hierarchically organized judicial systems would have to wait for the social structure of feudalism to transform in some way.

Authority figures in Medieval Europe made only limited attempts at imposing standardization of coinage. Persons using money in Late Antiquity and the Early Medieval centuries primarily relied on the coins of the former Roman Empire.[257] The sixth-century Franks minted some coins that circulated alongside Roman and other coins. However, in the seventh century, as Frankish royal power declined, the right to mint coins was scattered and sold to many different entrepreneurs in the territory, in particular churches. Between the fall of the Roman Empire and the sixteenth century only Charlemagne made a concerted and somewhat successful effort to *impose* a standardized currency. Venice was the most important monetary center of Medieval Europe, and even it did not force a single standardized currency. Venetian merchants recognized that foreign coins lacked consistent quality and value. In response, Venice minted its own coins, though the city did not compel its internal commerce to only use these. Venetian coins became the standard by the late twelfth century, inside and

---

[256] See Harold J Berman (1984), *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Harvard: Harvard University Press): 307-10; there was variation in the degree of royal centralization of courts in Europe, but even in England, arguably the country with the highest degree of centralization, lord's courts dominated until at least the fourteenth century, John Hudson (1996), *The Formation of the English Common Law: Law and Society in England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta* (New York: Longman).

[257] Duby (1974): 64-65.

outside Venice, but this was largely due to Venice's reputation, not imposition by the Venetian government.[258] Venice refrained from depreciating its coins while many other European minters made short-term profits from reducing the quality of their currency. In short, the market in Medieval Europe determined the standardization of coinage. While strides were made throughout the Middle Ages to standardize money and measurements, these efforts tended to be the result of the self-imposed regulations of merchants rather than the imposition of any governmental authority.[259] This lack of imposed standardization of currency provides further evidence that there were relatively indistinct boundaries between political units.

The relatively indistinct boundaries between political units resulted from the uniformity of the source of transcendent credibility in the European system during this period. These cross-cutting networks of relationships were not legal in the modern sense of the term, but their durability and usefulness required some regulation. According to Michael Mann, "The major regulatory agency was Christendom."[260] But then, what exactly was "Christendom" and how could it exert sufficient sanctioning strength to compel persons to comply with their mutual obligations? It was the embodiment of the source of transcendent credibility that was accepted by all of the political units within Medieval Europe. It functioned in two principal manners. First, "It was *transcendent*, yet it reinforced the *immanent* morale of an existing social

---

[258] Alan M Stahl (2000), *Zecca: The Mint of Venice in the Middle Ages* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).

[259] Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast (1990), "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," *Economics and Politics* 2: 1-23; Roger B Myerson (2004), "Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 5(1): 91-108.

[260] Mann (1986), *Sources of Social Power*: 377.

group, a ruling class of lords."[261] In short, the people, vassals, and lords of Europe recognized it as capable of imposing sanctions both here on earth (through ostracism and excommunication) and in the afterlife (simply put, Hell). A non-Christian would not be motivated by such sanctions and, hence, could not be trusted (except under exceptional circumstances) to fulfill his end of any agreement. It was a social system that was designed by and benefited the elite of society and they used their real power to maintain and perpetuate this ideological power. The second manner in which *Christendom* functioned was by connecting the various local networks of power to a larger whole. The shared beliefs of Christianity generated a shared identity among the local networks, allowing these networks to interconnect to a degree that would not have been possible or desirable in the absence of a common identity. For persons in Europe, "The most powerful and extensive sense of social identity was Christian."[262] Race, class, occupation, and political divisions produced social divisions within Europe, yet these were all secondary to the dominant identity of Christian.

This common identity also allowed lords to be generally aloof from the governance of the cities and towns in their territories. Like the vassal-lord relationship, municipalities depended on religious values and rituals.[263] Similar to an emergence from a "state of nature," many of these towns and cities were *founded*, so that their very formation depended on a charter agreed on by the original residents and invariably were supported by religious oaths sworn by the founders. In addition, religious oaths formed the guarantee of economic transactions, the life-blood of the

---

[261] Ibid.
[262] Ibid., 381.
[263] Harold J Berman (1983), *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Harvard: Harvard University Press): 361-63.

city. Although urban laws differed in many ways from the feudal laws of the countryside, they were both solidly built around the same religious rituals and values. The autonomy lords permitted municipalities depended on this shared source of transcendent credibility.

In general, Western Europe from 400 to 1500 was the site of a single source of transcendent credibility and, as a result, rulers possessed little incentive to invest in controlling boundaries between political units. However, there are exceptions to this general rule. First, on the edges of Europe, where Christendom abutted territories possessing alternate sources of transcendent credibility, far greater care was taken to control the flow of ideas and persons across the border. These regions include the eastern edge of Eastern Europe, Spain, and the Mediterranean Sea itself. The eastern border of Hungary, for example, was known throughout the West as 'the gateway of Christendom."[264] Other exceptions could occur within Europe itself due to the expansion of Christendom and invasions from outside the system. The rest of this chapter will examine two of these exceptions: the Carolingian expansion into pagan Saxony and the invasion of the Vikings in Britain during the reign of Alfred the Great. The value of examining these exceptions to the medieval norm of Christianity only is that they show that increasing the number of sources of transcendent credibility, even for brief periods, resulted in more distinctive borders localized where the alternate source threatened the monopoly held by Christianity.

---

[264] Nora Berend (2001), *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and 'Pagans' in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000 – c. 1300 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 4th Series)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

The Carolingian Empire and the Saxons (751-820)

There were a few exceptions to the general state of indistinct boundaries between political units in Medieval Europe. One of these, the era of Charlemagne, is often depicted as a brief moment of continent-wide order in the otherwise chaotic "Dark Ages." Centuries after the fall of Rome, it appeared that a new Empire, based in part on the same principles that had made Rome great, had arisen. However, the disintegration of the Frankish Empire after Charlemagne's death and the subsequent invasions from three directions produced the impression that transformation had not really occurred. These perceptions are not surprising. There was a brief transformation in the system during the reign of Charlemagne caused by conditions that disappeared after his death.

Before and after Charlemagne, Western Europe as known to the Franks contained one significant source of transcendent credibility – Roman Christianity. However, the expansion of the Franks under Charlemagne and his father, Pippin III, put that Empire into contact with at least one other source of transcendent credibility: that of the Saxons. The following section examines the early years of the Carolingian Empire when there was just one source of transcendent credibility and discusses how the expansionist policies of the Franks brought them into contact with the Saxons and a new source of transcendent credibility. Lacking the resources to conquer Saxony, the Carolingians were forced to adopt a strategy of making their borders with Saxony more distinct to prevent the erosion of political authority. This had the effect of centralizing Imperial institutions to the extent that it seemed order was to be restored to the chaos that befell Europe after Rome fell. Possessing greater military might,

Charlemagne was able to conquer the Saxons and convert them to Christianity, thus removing the alternate source of transcendent credibility in the system and return the total number to one. With this reduction, the boundary between the Franks and the Saxons became relatively less distinct, to the point that it was eliminated administratively.

Indistinctiveness of Boundaries Prior to Prolonged Contact with Saxony

Frankish Gaul as established by Charles Martel (714-41), Pippin III (741-68), and Charlemagne (768-814) was a confederation of many political units of Franks, Germans and several other peoples. They all shared a belief in Christianity, as interpreted by the pope and the Roman curia. These different peoples submitted to the Carolingians' because of their overwhelming military power and, during the reign of Pippin III and after, because of the nod of the papacy.

In 751 Pippin III was consecrated by the pope. For several generations, the Carolingians had served as mayors to the Merovingian kings. Over time, the mayors came to perform most of the actual functions of government. By the time of Charles Martel, the Merovingian kings were that in name alone. The Carolingians were the strongest military power in central Europe and, thanks to threats from the Lombards, the papacy needed as much military aid as could be mustered. Likewise, the Carolingians based their legitimacy in part on efforts to reform the church.[265] Thus, Pippin III received the sanction of the pope, which amounted to a sanction from divine authority. This was an incredibly important support given the fact that the Carolingian

[265] Paul Fouracre (1995), "Frankish Gaul to 814," *The New Cambridge Medieval History II: c. 700 - c. 900*, Rosamond McKitterick, ed. (Cambridge University Press): 96 [*CMH II* hereafter].

right to kingship was dubious under traditional standards. Under the guidance of their bishops, the Franks chose to depose the Merovingian king, Childeric III and place Pippin directly on the throne. The anointing of Pippin as king by the bishops started a new practice that would continue in Europe for centuries.

It is also significant to note that contemporary Carolingian apologists argued that the transition from Merovingian to Carolingian rule was gradual and natural. For example, the noted biographer of Charlemagne, Einhard, stated that, although the pope did "order" the deposition of Childeric, the Merovingians "had long since lost all power" – the Carolingian Mayors of the Palace already possessed the wealth, power, and "entire sovereignty" of the realm.[266] Einhard dismissively described Childeric as someone who enjoyed all the pleasures of royal without any of the responsibilities, while Pippin and his father, Charles Martel, are described as active and vigorous in serving the realm. The *Royal Annals* of the year 749 note that Pope Zacharias said, in response to a question from the bishops about who should be king, "It would be better to call king the one who held the power rather than the one who remained without regal power."[267] The pope then "ordered by virtue of his apostolic authority" that Pippin should be king. Arguably, these apologists suggested that the Carolingians also

---

[266] Einhard (830 [1960]), *The Life of Charlemagne* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).

[267] "Royal Annals," quoted in Stewart C Easton and Helene Wieruszowski, eds. (1961), *The Era of Charlemagne* (Princeton: D Van Nostrand Company): 110. In her recent analysis of the *Annals*, historian Rosamund McKitterick persuasively argues that this story is fictional, invented by Frankish historians after the fact to legitimate the Carolingian dynasty. She goes on to conclude that, whether truth or fiction, the story was "a crucial element in the collective memory of the newly formed realm under Frankish and Carolingian rule." In short, the elites and the people *believed* it was true and thus the story was able to provide legitimacy where perhaps none was due. Rosamund McKitterick (2004), *History and Memory in the Carolingian World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 154.

had a hereditary right to the throne because they had acted kinglike for many generations, even though they did not technically hold the title.

The Church fully supported the legitimacy of the Carolingian rulers over the Frankish kingdom and over Western Christendom. Except for one brief period in the 770s when the papacy was held by persons who deferred to the Lombards, the popes perpetuated an overt arrangement with the Carolingians in which they traded the blessings of God for the protection of Frankish warriors. Charlemagne put it this way:

> Our part is by the help of our divine faith everywhere to defend with arms Christ's holy church from the attacks of the heathen and the devastation of the infidel without, and within to fortify her with the knowledge of faith. Your part, most holy Father, is, like Moses, to raise your hands to God to aid our militant service to the end that with your intercession, under the guidance and grace of God, Christian people may at all times and in all places be victorious over the enemies of His holy name and the name of our Lord Jesus Christ be made glorious throughout the world.[268]

Charlemagne also took the additional step of making his palace the center of learning, shifting it out from direct control of the Church.[269] This was a purposeful step. Medieval historian Rosamund McKitterick argues that there was "a concentrated effort on the part of a group of associated members of an elite to deploy history in the service of politics."[270] The major historiographical sources between 780 and 880 were connected to the Carolingian court and "articulate a clear ideology of political power and a very particular presentation of the past."[271] For such a venture, the historians had to be close at hand, not in distant Rome. Thus, not only did the Carolingians

---

[268] Quoted in MLW Laistner (1931), *Thought and Letters in Western Europe, AD 500 to 900* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 190-191.
[269] Ibid., 191.
[270] McKitterick (2004), *History and Memory in the Carolingian World*: 130.
[271] Ibid., 131.

obtain access to the most potent source of transcendent credibility in Western Europe, they held the upper hand in the relationship, allowing them to determine, in large part, the outcomes of theological debates that had the potential to destabilize their rule. The papacy lacked the leverage to resist this shift and, to a certain extent, welcomed it so long as the Franks fulfilled their end of the bargain. In short, the link between the Frankish government and the Roman Church effectively served the political needs of the Carolingian rulers.

The political structure of the Frankish kingdom also mirrored that of the Roman Church. On day-to-day matters in particular territories, the duke was the authority figure. Like local bishops and priests, the dukes and their lords managed the affairs of everyday life and were the front-line against the disintegration of order. Similarly, as the Pope held a final appeal (if one could successfully claim a valuable moment of time), so the Carolingian king held final appeal. While the Pope was responsible for the larger picture of orthodox belief and the eradication of heresy on a large scale, the Carolingian king took the lead in maintaining order and security for the Frankish kingdom. Under such an arrangement the boundaries between different political units within the overall kingdom were necessarily relatively indistinct.

Not all Christian territories in Europe were automatically willing to be a part of the Frankish kingdom. Aquitaine, for example, in southwestern France maintained its independence from the ever-expanding sphere of influence of the Franks.[272] However, by 716, the Muslims had conquered the Iberian Peninsula and Aquitaine recognized that only the Pyrenees separated them from a new and powerful source of transcendent

[272] Fouracre (1995), *CMH II*: 98-101.

credibility. The duke of Aquitaine perceived that his ability to hold his title was firmly linked to the continuation of Christianity in his territory and he turned to the Franks in an alliance that eventually subsumed Aquitaine in the larger kingdom. The point here is that although Aquitaine heavily fortified and protected its border with Islam, it left its boundary with the Franks indistinct, even merging with the larger Empire, despite the fact that both the Franks and Muslims presented a serious threat to the existence of Aquitaine and its ruling house. Subordination to the Muslims presented a greater threat to the duke than assimilation into the Christian Frankish empire.

The boundaries within the Frankish confederation and between the Franks and other Christian political units were indistinct. Authority of nobles could easily cross nominal borders. Fortifications and permanent military garrisons stationed along the boundaries between political units were almost completely non-existent, despite the fact that the threats of rebellion or invasion remained high in several areas. The underlying reason for this is that all of these political units shared the same source of transcendent credibility. Once the Church anointed Pippin III as the king of the Franks, the Carolingians could trade on this legitimacy to extend their dominance over other Christian political units in Europe (whose rulers had not received the same attentions from the papacy).

Contact with Saxony Increases the Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility

As the Carolingian Empire grew in strength and territory, the Franks increased the number and frequency of contacts with peoples who did not adhere to Christianity

as their source of transcendent credibility. Of these, it is the relationship between the Franks and the pagan Saxons on which we have the most sources today. Raids from Saxony (modern-day Germany) into the Carolingian Empire became more frequent in the later years of Pippin III's reign. Charlemagne spent twenty-seven years of his reign dealing with the Saxons. Because these people took so much of the ruler's attention, they similarly captured the attention of contemporary biographers and chroniclers. The Carolingians' concern stemmed from the combination of military might the Saxons could muster and the fact that they were pagans (non-Christian), an alternate source of transcendent credibility that potentially held some sway among persons in the eastern parts of the Empire.[273]

The expanding reach of power of the Carolingian Empire combined with a strengthening of the Saxon tribes produced an increase in the frequency of contacts between the two political units. As a result, in the eastern portion of the Empire, the number of sources of transcendent credibility increased from one to two. This is not to say that the Saxons were new to the area nor that they had abstained from conducting raids in Frankish territory prior to the reign of Pippin III. However, before Pippin's advances there was a relatively large and open frontier located between the two units separated in part by the Rhine River. This meant that raids were few and far between. But once the Carolingians were firmly in power, internal concerns were for

[273] The vague term "pagan" is used here because of the lack of written sources from pre-conquest Saxony. The essential fact for Christian chroniclers of the period is that all pagans were non-Christian, and as such they were frequently portrayed as members of a single religion. While this perspective cannot be supported today, it has also been demonstrated that the Saxons shared many religious beliefs and rituals in common. In addition, the Franks treated Saxony as if there were a single religion. Thus, we can talk about a single source of transcendent credibility among the Saxons. If there were multiple sources of transcendent credibility in Saxony, this would not effect the prediction that the Franks would invest heavily in making their borders with Saxony more distinct.

the most part eliminated and Pippin and Charlemagne possessed both the time and resources to focus on the fringes of their domain.

That the Franks considered the source of transcendent credibility to be different from their own is without question. The Saxons, like many of the pagan Germanic tribes, were polytheistic, worshipping a panoply of gods that were primarily attached to nature. The political structure of the Saxons reflected this theistic structure. There was no single overlord of the Saxons, just as there was no single god that dominated the others. The obedience of a warrior to a chief did not appear to be the result of any agreement or oath, but a matter of choice that largely depended on the glory and wealth that could be gained through the association. These political implications of the Saxon religion could not be tolerated inside the Carolingian Empire. The Carolingians demanded an overlord and binding agreements of service, all of which Roman Christianity amply provided.

Increase in the Distinctiveness of Boundaries between the Franks and Saxony

The Carolingians faced a choice about how to react to this new ideological threat. Doing nothing was a poor strategy given the increasing frequency of cross-boundary raids and the somewhat tenuous hold they had over the duchies on the eastern edge of the Empire. This left two possibilities: conquest and conversion or invest resources in the boundary to control the flow of people and ideas into the Empire. Pippin III lacked the strength to conquer Saxony. He spent much of his reign trying to consolidate his authority after the Church-endorsed coup d'etat. On top of this, Saxony was not an easy place to conquer. Politically, as we have seen, it lacked a

centralized leadership structure, making it difficult to conquer the whole territory. Geographically, the region was mountainous, criss-crossed by well-fortified rivers, swampy, and without Roman roads on which to move easily about. Rationally, Pippin would also have reasoned that, once conquest had occurred, the occupation would be incredibly difficult without a concentrated and costly effort to eradicate the well-rooted religious practices. Thus, during the final years of Pippin's reign and the early years of Charlemagne's, the Carolingian Empire increased the investment of resources in the border with Saxony in an effort to keep the pagans out in the most cost-effective manner possible.

Much evidence exists that the border between the Carolingian Empire and Saxony grew more distinct during this period (roughly 760-780). Most importantly, Pippin and Charlemagne demonstrated a credible commitment to defend this border that was a great distant from their center of power in Gaul. Perhaps the best example of this was the reorganization of the military in the early years of Charlemagne. Ideally, we would look for the permanent garrisoning of troops along the border, but such a strategy is designed for a defensive military arrangement. Pippin and Charlemagne pursued aggressive expansionist policies, which required a military designed for offense. Thus, the army was made more mobile and roads and canal projects made it possible for the army to get from one side of the Empire to the other in very little time. In 778, Charlemagne was fighting in Spain when news came of a Saxon invasion. He was able to take the main force of his army across his entire realm and stop the invasion before it had penetrated very far. A fast communications system

and a highly mobile army enabled Charlemagne to develop more distinctive borders (relative to other boundaries) without permanent garrisoning of troops.

It should be pointed out that Saxony was not the only external ideological threat the Carolingian Empire faced during this period. Along the farthest most boundary of Bavaria dwelt the Avars and Slavs, both of which were non-Christian and were perceived by contemporaries as even more backward than the Saxons. Some churchmen in this period suggested that there was no point in proselytizing among these people because they could not possibility grasp Christianity. In the southwest, Aquitaine had been absorbed into the Empire, bringing the Carolingian Empire into direct contact with Islam along the Pyrenees Mountains and the Mediterranean. Henri Pirenne famously argued that without Mohammed there would have been no Charlemagne, suggesting that the threat of Islam gave Charles the leverage he needed to consolidate his Empire and become "the Great."[274] While there are problems with the simplicity of this argument, it is essentially correct: Charlemagne's centralization of government and the support the nobles and people gave him for this project was a rational response to the ideological threats increasingly surrounding them. Thus, some of the other indications of more distinctive borders may not be wholly attributed to the Saxon threat, but they remain the result of external ideological threats from which the Carolingians sought to protect their realm.

Pippin III and Charlemagne effectively centralized political and military power, transforming the looser confederation of Frank territories into what amounted to a single political unit. Following the death of Charles Martel in 741, almost every

[274] Henri Pirenne (2001 [1939]), *Mohammed and Charlemagne* (Dover Publications).

duchy rebelled against the government of the Merovingian king. It took Pippin and his brother Carloman ten years to quell the rebellions and turn the focus of Frank energies outward. However, in 768, when Pippin III died, only one rebellion occurred that was quickly ended. Power was firmly in the hands of the Carolingians and supported by the Church at the highest and lowest levels. Much of the ordinary political affairs were left in the hands of local lords and bishops, but there is a remarkable increase in the number of charters, legislative texts, and government orders emanating from the center.[275] Even ecclesiastical authority passed through prominent clergy attached to the king, most significantly Boniface under Pippin III and Alcuin under Charlemagne. The Carolingians' increasingly efficient generation of compliance provided an increase in resources at their disposal, which were subsequently reinvested in expanding the Empire and consolidating their authority.

The novel administrative tool the Carolingians used to link the central government with local areas was the *missi dominici*. The entire realm was divided into *missatica* and each year two or three centrally-appointed missi were sent to each with "the powers to inspect, redress, and reform."[276] The missi had permission to make adjustments in almost every area of administration, including ecclesiastical and monastic. The missi tended to be nobles or high clergy who held power by social position already and, backed with royal power, could achieve significant results. Less formally, Charlemagne also had a group of men known as *vassi* (vassels), who could

[275] Fouracre (1995), *CMH II*: 101.

[276] "General Capitulary for the Missi, 802," quoted in Stewart C Easton and Helene Wieruszowski, eds. (1961), *The Era of Charlemagne* (Princeton: D Van Nostrand Company): 142-148.

function as agents of the king in his absence.[277] Together, the missi and vassi represent a larger and more potent central secular bureaucracy than Europe had seen since the fall of Rome.

The centralization of government was coupled with the establishment of hierarchical judicial system throughout the Empire. While it had always been the case that Imperial laws were superior to local laws, the Empire lacked accessible means of enforcing this. Charlemagne changed this situation, making one of the key roles of the missi to be available to those who claimed the King's care and support.[278] In other words, they represented a court of appeals. This allowed them, in special cases, to supercede local laws with empire-wide laws. Most importantly, a petitioner need not travel to the palace nor attempt to gain audience with a king that was more than likely elsewhere on military campaign. The King's justice could be appealed to with more frequency because it was far more accessible. The missis' effectiveness in this role grew gradually stronger throughout the reign of Charlemagne. The *scabini* was a second institution Charlemagne created to further increase the hierarchy of the judiciary.[279] These were experts in law the central government appointed to work with the "amateurs" in the local courts.

On several occasions, Charlemagne called and presided over Church Councils, a role that had not been assumed by a secular leader in Western Europe since the end of the Roman Empire. He was able to play a central role in the condemnation of

---

[277] Janet L Nelson (1995), "Kingship and Royal Government," *CMH II*: 413.

[278] "Let the missi themselves make a diligent investigation whenever any man claims that an injustice has been done to him by anyone.... They shall administer the law fully and justly in the case of the holy churches of God and of the poor, of wards and widows and of the whole people." "General Capitulary for the Missi," 143.

[279] Fouracre (1995), *CMH II*: 106.

Adoptionism as heresy. Adoptionism was a doctrine of increasing importance among Christian bishops and believers in Spain.[280] It argued that Christ was not the real Son of God, but was a human being whom God adopted as His Son. While there is no indication that Charlemagne recognized the political implications of such a doctrine, it is likely that Alcuin, who wrote numerous books against it and had the ear of the king, made it clear that one consequence would be the belief that the Church could exercise its divine sanction to anoint ("adopt") *anyone* as king.[281] Adoptionism died out soon after the death and recantations of its main proponents, thanks in large part to the efforts of Charlemagne. In short, not only did the Carolingians centralize economic, administrative, and judicial power, they also centralized (and arguably secularized) ecclesiastical power.

Pippin and Charlemagne also successfully imposed standardization of coinage in the realm's mints.[282] The Merovingians had produced coins, but the decentralization of the confederation allowed individual territories to deviate from a standard coin type and weight. The opportunities presented for devaluing coins drove down the value of Merovingian currency. As a result, the use of Frank coins throughout Europe declined in favor of Anglo-Saxon and northern Italian coins. A few years after being crowned king, Pippin III reformed the coinage of the realm, setting a standard weight for each coin. He also created a new coin, the halfpenny, whose smaller value made it a very popular unit of exchange among the peasants.

---

[280] John C Cavadini (1993), *The Last Christology of the West: Adoptionism in Spain and Gaul, 785-820* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press).

[281] Edward Peters, ed. (1980), "Alcuin: Against the Adoptionist Heresy of Felix," *Heresy and Authority in Medieval Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press): 50-56.

[282] Mark Blackburn (1995), "Money and Coinage," *CMH II*: 545-551.

Each coin minted in the Carolingian Empire had to identify both the name of the king and the mint where it was issued. Under Charlemagne, one side of the coin was standardized across the Empire, though the reverse side could be just about anything. In the 790s, Charlemagne again reformed the coinage system, reducing the number of mints. This enabled the central bureaucracy to more closely monitor the weight of the coins. The royal efforts were so successful that five thousand *denarii* coins issued by various mints and buried before 794 have all been determined to be of the same weight.[283]

Taken together, this provides evidence of a political unit that was increasingly concerned with and capable of making its borders more distinctive in order to control the flow of ideas and persons entering the territory. Not only did the Carolingian rulers act toward that end, the nobles and general population of the realm supported these actions significantly. Missi, vassi, scabrini, and other agents of the central government were generally treated with deference and, most importantly, acquiesced to. Pippin and Charlemagne did not have trouble fielding large armies or supplying them. Despite harsh measures imposed on conquered peoples, there is little evidence that coercion was a significant motivation within the core parts of the Empire. It was the Carolingians whom God had directly appointed and it was they who received the support of the people.

---

[283] Georges Duby (1974), *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 98.

Conversion of Saxony Reduces the Number of Sources of Transcendent Credibility

The decision to change strategies in Saxony from maintaining a distinctive border to conquering and converting it probably was made due to the increasing costs. In 772, Charlemagne sacked the Saxons' most important religious center, Irminsul, which provoked a retaliatory invasion while Charlemagne's army was in Italy. Although Charlemagne managed to quickly march his army back to Saxony and stop the invasion before it made any real progress, the Saxons had begun to adapt to Charlemagne's policy. They would wait until Charlemagne's army was in some distant area and then invade. While the Saxons were rarely successful to any significant degree, the costs to Charlemagne in terms of resources and stalled campaigns elsewhere revealed the flaws in his current strategy.

Conquering the Saxons was not Charlemagne's only option; however, the circumstances of Frankish society made his other options less desirable. For example, he could have invested in fortifications and permanent garrisons along the Rhine River. The problem with this was that military service was rewarded with land and soldiers stationed along an immovable border could not win new lands with which to be rewarded. Such a strategy would have required a large and very costly military reorganization. Another possibility was to divide the army into two or three different groups, so that there was always at least one army near the Saxons to throw back an invasion without disrupting other campaigns. The problem was the threat that whoever commanded those other armies would likely receive personal loyalty that rightly belonged to the king. Both Pippin III and Charlemagne led the entire army – there was no room for other commanders. Certainly other options existed as well, but

Charlemagne had far greater resources at his disposal than his father did. The conquest that seemed hopeless in the 750s now appeared possible.

There were other benefits of conquest and conversion. The capture of the lands of Saxony could be immediately converted into rewards for loyal followers and exceptional soldiers. Given the strength of the Islamic polities in Spain to the West, further expansion had to come in the East. It would have been strategically unwise to take on the Avars or Slavs without first eliminating the threat from the Saxons who dwelt in between. Another benefit was the spread of Christianity among the Saxons, a project that Boniface had called for since the 740s. As a close spiritual advisor of Pippin III, Boniface, an Anglo-Saxon priest, felt specially compelled to bring Christianity by whatever means to his pagan kindred.[284] The Church in Rome and in Gaul supported such an effort in the decades that followed.

Charlemagne had already demonstrated many times that the only way to convert the Saxons was by force. Each time Charlemagne would defeat the Saxons, they would agree to terms that permitted the entry of Christian missionaries into their lands and, at times, would accept conversion themselves. However, once Charlemagne's army was far away again, all of the Franks in Saxony, including the missionaries, would be massacred. This occurred several times, convincing Charlemagne and others that conversion was only possible after thorough conquest.

To all of these reasons for choosing conquest and conversion should be added the fact that Charlemagne would rid himself of a competing source of transcendent

---

[284] Ephraim Emerton, ed. (2000), *The Letters of St. Boniface* (New York: Columbia University Press): 52-53.

credibility by eradicating the pagan practices of the Saxons. This benefit must be taken with a grain of salt, however, because Charlemagne would have realized that he would be trading one alternative source of transcendent credibility for another as his Empire would now abut that of the Avars. Still, the Franks held racist ideas about the Avars and would likely have seen Avar ideas as less of a threat of catching on in the Empire than those of the Saxons, particularly since there were more descendents of the Saxons in the Empire than Avars.[285]

The conquest was not an easy one, but it was successful. In 785, the Saxon leader Widukind surrendered and was baptized, effectively ending outright war between the Franks and Saxons. The Saxons were forced to accept the *Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae*, which detailed the conversion process. Traditional pagan practices were punished with death or with a fine, depending on the seriousness of the offense. It did not order persons to convert in so many words, but everyone had to observe the practices of the Christian Church, including baptism and infant baptism. In addition, "all shall give a tithe of their property and labor to the churches and priests," which would be set up in newly-established parishes throughout the territory.[286] Conversion is a process that often begins with outward behavior changes that eventually leads to

[285] Falko Daim (1998), "Archeaology, Ethnicity and the Structures of Identification: The Example of the Avars, Carantanians, and Moravians in the Eighth Century," in Walter Pohl and Helmut Reimutz, eds., *Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300-800* (Leiden: Brill): 71-94.

[286] "*Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae*," quoted in Stewart C Easton and Helene Wieruszowski, eds. (1961), *The Era of Charlemagne* (Princeton: D Van Nostrand Company): 118-121.

an internalization of a moral code.[287] The *Capitulatio* was intended as a first step in this process.

The souls of the pagan Saxons were only one of Charlemagne's concerns, however. The religious practices and rituals of the Saxons were integral to the construction of their group identity. It has been argued, for example, that one of the reasons why the *Capitulatio* focuses so intensely on eradicating Saxon burial rites such as cremation was because this practice clearly differentiated the Saxons as a distinct group.[288] The dead were now to be buried in Christian fashion. There exist few details today regarding the ritual significance of cremation; however, there is ample evidence that the Frankish Empire would not tolerate the practice of cremation – under penalty of death. Among the other punishments visited on the Saxons were mass deportations into Frankish territory and forcing the sons of Saxon nobles to attend monastic schools near Charlemagne's capital.[289] The *Capitulatio* sought the conversion of pagans, but also the blurring of distinctions between the Saxons and other peoples.

Charlemagne's spiritual advisor, Alcuin, among others, criticized the harshness of the measures of the *Capitulatio*. The purpose of the conversion, he argued, was that the Saxons be saved by faith. "Little benefit will accrue to the body by the ablutions of sacred baptism unless the soul has first accepted the truth of the Catholic faith on

---

[287] Wolfert van Egmond (2000), "Converting Monks: Missionary Activity in Early Medieval Frisia and Saxony," in Guyda Armstrong and Ian N Wood, eds., *Christianizing Peoples and Converting Individuals (International Medieval Research 7)* (Turnhout: Brepols): 37-45.

[288] Bonnie Effros (1997), "*De partibus Saxoniae* and the Regulation of Mortuary Custom: A Carolingian Campaign of Christianization or the Suppression of Saxon Identity?" *Revue belge de philology et d'histoire* 75: 267-86.

[289] Heinrich Fichtenau (1957), *The Carolingian Empire: The Age of Charlemagne* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers): 22.

rational grounds."[290] Alcuin and others warned that rather than win converts, these measures could instigate reprisals against the Franks. When these reprisals materialized, Charlemagne responded with even harsher measures, including mass executions and mass deportations. The Church eventually stepped in and convinced Charlemagne that they could convert the Saxons using more peaceful means. When Charlemagne backed off and turned the Saxon conversion over to the Archbishop of Cologne, the Saxons gradually accepted the new faith.[291] This was a lengthy process, however. The *Capitulatio* was signed in 785, but it was not until 804 that fighting between the Saxons and Franks was over and Saxony was absorbed into the Frank political and ecclesiastical order. Sources of transcendent credibility are not easily or quickly traded out.

One thing the forced conversion of Saxony demonstrates is "how deeply the church had been drawn into government."[292] The conquest of Saxony occurred only after the Synod of Frankfurt, where the Carolingian regime "reaffirmed its orthodoxy and in effect restated its commitment to Christian government."[293] This was a true partnership of church and state.

Decrease in the Distinctiveness of Boundaries between the Franks and Saxony

After the Franks conquered and established effective control over Saxony, the Rhine no longer served as a significant boundary for the Empire. For example, the

---

[290] "Alcuin's Letter to King Charles, 796," quoted in Stewart C Easton and Helene Wieruszowski, eds. (1961), *The Era of Charlemagne* (Princeton: D Van Nostrand Company): 122.
[291] Easton and Wieruszowski (1961), *The Era of Charlemagne*: 36.
[292] Fouracre (1995), *CMH II*: 103-104.
[293] Ibid., 103.

Archbishop of Cologne, who assumed control of the ecclesiastical order in Saxony, held his see in the eastern duchy of the Empire called Austrasia. His see straddled the Rhine, combining portions of the older Empire with the new Saxon territory. The distinction between these two regions gradually blurred.

Saxon lands were granted to loyal Carolingians who, in return for the fief provided internal order for the territory. Although the Saxons periodically rebelled, Charlemagne now had loyal persons in the area that could quell most rebellions and slow the rest, enabling Charlemagne to continue unabated in military campaigns in the east against the Slavs and Avars. As the new Frank landlords established themselves and consolidated their holdings, rebellions became far scarcer. In addition, the Church did its part by converting the population slowly but surely. A monotheistic religion tends to have the advantage over polytheistic systems since conversion can occur in a three-step process: first, Christ is but one of the many gods; second, Christ is superior to all of the other gods; and finally, Christ is the only god. This process takes time, but the Franks were willing to treat Saxony as a "long-term investment." From 785 on, Saxon warriors were fighting as part of Charlemagne's army.

It is often difficult to locate evidence regarding the culture and beliefs of peoples who are absorbed into larger empires. Some examples of the artwork of the Saxons have reached modern scholars, who have examined it for clues regarding the success of Charlemagne's conversion program. The analysis of Karen Heilund Neilsen reveals that before conversion, the Saxons effectively "develop[ed] their own identity through material culture," largely by borrowing techniques and styles of their

neighbors and adapting them for their own.[294] However, in the ninth century, after conversion, the influence of Christianity dominated and overwhelmed the traditional Saxon forms of art. Thus, the adoption of Christianity blurred the cultural boundaries between the Frankish Empire and the conquered Saxons.

Perhaps the best evidence that the boundary between the Franks and Saxons was now indistinct was that a new distinctive border emerged farther to the east along the Elbe River. As was mentioned earlier, the Franks believed the Avars and Slavs to be too ignorant to be capable of accepting Christianity. Charlemagne's efforts east of the Elbe involved raiding. In 796 he captured the Avar "ring," a group of fortifications that held most of the Avars' treasures. However, permanent settlement and conversion were not included in Charlemagne's plans. Instead, he constructed fortifications along the western bank of the Elbe and created a relatively distinct border between his Empire and the pagan Avars and Slavs.[295]

Toward the end of his reign, Charlemagne's realm covered all of Western Europe with only a few exceptions. To call it a Frankish Empire is to mask the fact that a wide variety of races, customs, languages, and institutions paid taxes to the same king and served in the same army. There was only one commonality within the Empire: "All its inhabitants professed a common creed, and the all-embracing Church was also potentially, and under Charlemagne, actually, the common teacher of all."[296]

---

[294] Neilsen (2003), "Saxon Art between Interpretation and Imitation: The Influence of Roman, Scandinavian, Frankish, and Christian Art on the Material Culture of the Continental Saxons AD 400-1000," in DH Green and F Siegmund, eds., *The Continental Saxons from the Migration Period to the Tenth Century: An Ethnographic Perspective (Studies in Archaeoethnology 6)* (Woodbridge: Boydell): 193-246, quote from p. 228.

[295] Julia MH Smith (1995), "*Fines imperii*: The Marches," *CMH II*: 172-173.

[296] Laistner (1931): 191.

Charlemagne recognized that maintenance of the Empire required a common source of transcendent credibility even if every other societal structure remained varied.

Conclusion: The Carolingian Empire and Saxony

This case has demonstrated that relatively distinctive boundaries did exist in some circumstances in the middle ages. Increased contact with the pagan Saxons meant that the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the eastern portion of the Carolingian Empire increased from one to two. The initial strategy the Carolingian rulers pursued was to invest in more distinctive borders to control the flow of people and ideas out of Saxony. Over time, this policy became too costly, and Charlemagne adopted a new strategy of conquest and conversion, thereby returning the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the area to one. As a result, the distinctive border between the Empire and Saxony was transformed into an indistinct one, overlapping with the eastern duchy of Austrasia.

The Vikings (840-1000)

The Vikings in France (840-911)

Viking raids in Northern France had been perennial events. These consisted mostly of quick hit-and-run attacks on coastal communities, never penetrating very far inland at any point. The swiftness of these attacks made them virtually impossible to defend against or repel. This situation changed dramatically in 839, however. Lothar I, the grandson of Charlemagne, wanted to challenge the rule of his father, Louis the Pious, so Lothar invited some Viking leaders to raid in the northeast of the empire to

weaken his father. This strategy proved very successful and Lothar rewarded these Vikings with grants of land after his ascension in 840. As one historian puts it, they transformed themselves "from poachers to gamekeepers."[297] This backfired on Lothar, first because it encouraged other Vikings to raid the Frankish Empire and second because these land grants became a base of operations for Viking raiding on the continent. Lothar soon recognized that the Vikings had no intention of honoring their sworn allegiances to the Emperor. From 841 to 875 there was a significant increase in the number and size of Viking raids.[298] In addition, from their newly settled lands, the Vikings were able to raid further inland.

The permanent settlement of the Vikings in the northeastern regions of the Frankish empire increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility in Western Europe to two: Christianity and Norse polytheism. For the Vikings, there were many gods. Odin dominated the other gods, but this is not the same as saying he ruled over them like a king rules over nobles. Odin was the *primus inter pares* (first among equals) because he was the strongest of all the gods. The same was true politically among the Viking leaders. One Viking leader may rise to command the respect of all others, but only because he was the strongest. When he ceased to be the strongest, he ceased to command the respect of the other leaders. Within particular bands, the leader was the strongest. Another in the band could challenge the leader to a test of strength and, if successful, become the new leader. This presented obvious challenges to Christianity and European political thought. A monotheistic God had no

---

[297] Simon Coupland (1998), "From Poachers to Gamekeepers: Scandinavian Warlords and Carolingian Kings," *Early Medieval Europe* 7: 85-114.

[298] Simon Coupland (1995), "The Vikings in Francia and Anglo-Saxon England to 911," in *CHC II*: 190-91.

challengers. Likewise, a king was naturally the king, not because of strength, but because of God's will.

The Franks definitely saw Norse polytheism as an alternative source of transcendent credibility that could undermine their own. It has been suggested that a motivation for the increasing Viking raids from 790 on was a militant paganism.[299] Historian Simon Coupland argues on the other hand that this militant paganism was not real, but only imagined by Frank writers who were themselves motivated by a militant Christianity. Both positions highlight the importance the religious differences played in the overall confrontation between the Franks and the Vikings. Although they operated in several separate raiding groups, the Franks labeled them the "Great Heathen Army," as if it were a single unified force waging war on Christian beliefs. The *Annales Vedastini* put it succinctly: "All were filled with grief and torment as they saw the Christian populace being destroyed to the point of extinction."[300]

The introduction of an alternative source of transcendent credibility in northeastern France prompted the Franks to invest in a more distinctive border with the newly settled Vikings. Viking raids at this time were still mainly conducted from boats. The major difference after settlement was that the Vikings had access to rivers much further inland. Thus, fortified bridges were a major aspect of the Franks' strategy of controlling their border with the Vikings.[301] This strategy was pursued

---

[299] Roberta Frank (1984), "Viking Atrocity and Skaldic Verse: The Rite of the Blood Eagle," *English Historical Review* 99: 332-43; Hilda Ellis Davidson (1990 [1964]), *Gods and Myths of Northern Europe* (New York: Penguin Books): 54-56; Peter Sawyer (2001), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Vikings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 31.

[300] Coupland (1995), 200.

[301] Ibid., 198.

heavily during the 860s and 870s during the reign of Charles the Bald.[302] Significantly, it is also during this period that Vikings begin to actively colonize portions of France and England. The ideological threat was present and had begun to take root in certain areas on the continent. The rational response of Charles the Bald was dramatic increases in the fortification of borders along the most likely entry points: the rivers.

What is most significant is that the fortifications were constructed along the boundaries between Christian kingdoms and the Vikings. The significance of the military threat was important. If the Vikings did not pose a military threat to the Franks, it would be difficult to believe that the Empire would have invested so heavily in boundary fortifications. However, military threat alone is an insufficient explanation. The Vikings were most definitely a military threat, but they weren't the only one. The Franks did not respond to the military threats to the south and west with more distinctive borders and fortifications as they did against the Vikings. Further, the investments in fortifications along the rivers occurred during a period of intense internal political upheaval in the Empire. The fight to succeed Charles the Bald began long before he died. Thus, even as Charles dealt with the inevitable succession crisis, he still invested enormous resources in guarding against the inflow of Vikings and their gods.

---

[302] Brian Dearden (1989), "Charles the Bald's Fortified Bridge at Pitres (Seine): Recent Archaeological Investigations," *Anglo-Norman Studies* 11: 107-12; Carol Gillmor (1989), "The Logistics of Fortified Building on the Seine Under Charles the Bald," *Anglo-Norman Studies* 11: 87-106; Simon Coupland (1991), "The Fortified Bridges of Charles the Bald," *Journal of Medieval History* 17: 1-12; EJ Schoenfeld (1995), "Anglo-Saxon *Burhs* and Continental *Burgen*: Early Medieval Fortifications in Constitutional Perspective," *The Haskins Society Journal* 6: 49-66.

The other indicators of a relatively distinct border also begin to appear during the reign of Charles the Bald, despite the continued brewing of internal conflicts. Charles the Bald made the first significant attempt to standardize the currency since the death of Charlemagne in 814. At the Council of Pistes in 864, Charles reduced the number of mints in France from nine to three, the central mint being located within the palace itself.[303] The denarius was to be stamped on one side with Charles' name and on the other, the name of the state and an image of the cross were to be imprinted. Perhaps the most ironic evidence of more distinct borders is that Charles effectively and efficiently issued a royal tax on all parts of the Empire in order to pay an annual tribute to the Vikings.[304]

This tenuous standoff between Vikings and Franks was to continue for the next forty years. Internal conflicts within the Frankish Empire meant that resources were not available to go on the offense against the Vikings. The only viable strategy was maintaining the fortifications that kept the enemy out. A resolution to this situation occurred in 911, when after being baptized, Charles the Simple recognized Rollo as ruler in Normandy. These Christianized Vikings thus became the Normans, "and thereby, in the eyes of contemporaries, the barbarians joined civilization."[305] Thus, at least between the core of the Frankish Empire and Normandy, the number of sources of transcendent credibility was reduced from two to one and there was a concomitant reduction in the distinctiveness of the boundary between these two units. Rollo

---

[303] Charles the Bald, "The Edict of Pistes, 864," in Roy C Cave and Herbert H Coulson, eds., *A Source Book for Medieval Economic History* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1936; reprint ed., New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1965): 133-134.

[304] Janet L Nelson (1995), "The Frankish Kingdoms, 814-898: The West," *CHC II*: 129-30.

[305] Coupland (1995): 201.

recognized Charles as his suzerain. Their relationship was clearly different from the normal king and noble interaction, but it was also not open war. The raids stopped in this portion of the Empire. Commerce between the regions accelerated rapidly. Border lords often owed fealty to both the Frankish king and the Norman ruler. Once Christianity returned to its status as the sole source of transcendent credibility in France, the boundaries between Norman and Frank relaxed as well.

The Vikings in Britain (840-925)

Similar events were to transpire in England. Through the eighth and early ninth centuries, the island was the home to several separate Germanic groups. These groups, especially the Angles, Saxons, and Mercians saw themselves as politically and culturally distinct from one another, yet they shared a single source of transcendent credibility. By roughly 630, the Roman Catholic Church had converted the rulers of England south of the Humber. For two hundred years, these political units continued to war against one another, with one occasionally rising to dominate the others, only to recede a generation or two later.

Despite the continuous wars, the boundaries between these units were relatively indistinct, especially when compared with the borders between these Southern units and other political units on Britain that did not share an allegiance to the Roman Church. For example, during the reign of Offa of Mercia (757-796), Mercia greatly enhanced its ability to threaten its neighbors militarily. To the south and the east were Anglia, Kent, Wessex, and Sussex, all units that shared the Roman Catholic source of transcendent credibility. Offa kept these boundaries very indistinct,

encouraging commerce and traffic between these areas, even though they represented a significant military threat, both separately and working together. On the other hand, along the western boundary lay the Welsh, who had refused to convert from Celtic Christian practices to the Roman Catholic doctrines.[306] Along this boundary, Offa built and manned an earthen wall known as Offa's Dyke that can still be seen today in many places. It is no coincidence that the most significant coinage reforms between the Romans and Alfred the Great occurred under Offa. Most importantly, during Offa's reign, all foreign currency had to be exchanged for the Mercian coins before it could be used.[307] Thus, as Mercian power expanded, Offa chose to invest resources in a more distinct boundary with the Celtic Christians and actively encouraged a less distinct boundary with his fellow Roman Catholics.[308]

Further, we may ask why Wessex did not invest in a more distinctive border with Mercia as it grew increasingly threatening militarily. The answer is that such a strategy would have been very inefficient and ineffective. Distinct borders serve a military role, yet their primary purpose is to control the flow of ideas and persons across a boundary. Where there is a shared source of transcendent credibility, as there was between Mercia and Wessex, resources are more effectively spent on military

---

[306] The Celtic Christianity practiced by the Welsh and the Roman Catholic brand imported from the continent and practiced in the Angle and Saxon portions of Britain should be seen as different sources of transcendent credibility because they saw the essential relationship between a believer and God (and hence between a subject and a ruler) in very different ways. For the Welsh, "the way to forgiveness did not pass, by means of public penance, through their fellow-believers in their local church. It passed through an intense relationship with a single person. In that crucial sense, the Christianity of the Celtic World was closer to that of the east than to the strong collective piety of Continental Europe." Brown (1996), 158. The Saxons of Britain also saw the Welsh Christian practices as distinct from their own. They accepted Roman Christianity from the Continental Saxons as part of their larger practice of "gift-exchange," but "no glory was attached to receiving gifts from the 'Welsh,' the *wealh*, the despised and hostile 'foreigners' *par excellence*." Ibid., 207.

[307] Blackburn (1995), *CMH II*: 550.

[308] Simon Keynes (1995), "The British Isles: England, 700-900," *CMH II*: 31.

units than linear fortifications. Wessex only needed to repel an invading army, not an invading ideology. Thus, fewer sources of transcendent credibility does not produce peace, only a different manner in which war and peace are practiced.

England in the eighth and early ninth centuries, excluding the lands of the Welsh, Scots, and Picts, was entirely Roman Catholic and possessed relatively indistinct boundaries, despite the competition between the various political units in the area. This situation began to change in 865. The Vikings raided the British Isles for most of the century and the scope and size of these raids progressively worsened each year. However, in 865, a Viking army arrived that did not leave. It did not settle in any particular place, but rather than sailing back to Scandinavia or the continent, it set up fortified winter camps in Britain itself. By the early 870s, the Vikings had established a base of operations in East Anglia and Northumbria from which to raid the rest of the island during the warmer seasons. As long as the "Great Heathen Army" remained untethered to any particular land, there was no political unit with which the Roman Catholic units could invest in distinctive borders. Once settled, however, in a territory that became known as the Danelaw, Wessex, the most powerful of the Anglo-Saxon units, almost immediately created a relatively distinct border with this new political unit.

It was Alfred the Great who found himself the King of Wessex when the Viking army settled more permanently in East Anglia and Northumbria. Several indicators demonstrate that he boundary established with the Danelaw was very distinct. Standardization of currency coincided with the newly settled Danes in eastern Britain. Alfred extended his mint network, improved the quality of his coins,

and established a new standard for the penny.[309] This increased people's access to money and gave them more confidence in it as a form of exchange, which in turn improved the economy in his realm. He invested the enhanced revenue in fortifications along the Danelaw boundary.[310] These actions – standardization of coinage and border fortification – worked in tandem increasing the distinctiveness of the border with the Danelaw.

Alfred transformed his military with the express purpose of creating a distinctive border against the Danelaw.[311] First, he built thirty strong fortifications along the boundary at regular intervals (about a day's march).[312] These strong points along the border, known as *burhs*, were designed to be centers of defense, commerce, and royal power. Alfred invested much money and energy in rebuilding old Roman fortifications and hill-forts that had fallen into disrepair, though new burhs also rose out of seemingly nowhere at the proper interval.[313] Many of the burhs were located along old Roman roads, most importantly the northwest-to-southeast Watling Street, allowing the Saxons to better facilitate communication and defense between the separate burhs. When Alfred and the Danelaw king Guthrum agreed on a border separating their realms in 886, Watling Street and Alfred's burghal system naturally

---

[309] Mark Blackburn (1996), "Mints, Burhs, and the Grately Code ch. 14.2," in D Hill and AR Rumble, eds., *The Defense of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon Fortifications* (Manchester): 160-75.

[310] Mark Blackburn (2003), "Alfred's Coinage Reforms in Context," in *Alfred the Great*, Timothy Reuter, ed. (Burlington: Ashgate): 199-217.

[311] On the burghal system and the "Burghal Hidage," a early tenth-century document that sought to capture the intent of Alfred and enable his program to be further developed, see: D Hill and AR Rumble, eds. (1996), *The Defense of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon Fortifications* (Manchester); Richard Abels (1998), *Alfred the Great: War, Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England* (London: Longman): 194-218; Ryan Lavelle (2003), *Fortifications in Wessex, c. 800-1016: The Defenses of Alfred the Great Against the Vikings (Fortress 14)* (London: Osprey Publishing).

[312] Abels (1998): 203.

[313] HR Loyn (1967), *Alfred the Great* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 32-33.

offered itself as the line.[314] For this fortification system to work, Alfred also reformed the West Saxon *fyrd*, changing it from a levy called in time of need to a mounted standing army. The emphasis of the new *fyrd* was on mobilization and mobility. When the Vikings threatened to breach a point in the burghal line, the Saxons could quickly mobilize and get to the point of contention. Alfred built roads (*herepaths* or "army paths") from the center to the peripheries to facilitate this movement. Third, Alfred designed and constructed a new type of ship that could compete with the Vikings in the shallower waters surrounding England. They were faster and stronger, designed specifically to meet water-borne Viking parties before they could raid the coastlines and rivers. According to Anglo-Saxon sources (which are understandably one-sided), these boats gradually allowed the Anglo-Saxons to remove one of the Viking's greatest military strengths, prompting at the very least a stalemate. Finally, taking a page from Charles the Bald on the continent, Alfred had fortified bridges built along key waterways to protect inland areas from Viking ships. In short, these four reforms together produced a very credible commitment on the part of Alfred to defend parts of his realm that were distant from the center.

As the border with the Danelaw became more distinct, the boundaries with other Anglo-Saxon political units grew increasingly less distinct. The ruler of the Mercians, battered by Viking raids but unable to finance an enormous project like Alfred's burghal wall without assistance, submitted to the overarching authority of Alfred. The king of the Mercians thus became Alfred's ealdorman of the Mercians.

---

[314] Eleanor Shipley Duckett (1956), *Alfred the Great* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 84-86; RHC Davis (1982), "Alfred the Great and Guthrum's Frontier," *English Historical Review* 97: 803-10.

The Anglo-Saxons saw the Vikings as a common enemy sent by God "as an instrument of divine punishment for the people's sins, raising awareness of a collective Christian identity."[315] By 866, "all the English people that were not under subjection to the Danes submitted to" Alfred, not because they were conquered, but to combine their resources against the powerful paganism to the East.[316] From this point on, Alfred was no longer merely king of Wessex, but was recorded in documents as "King of the Anglo-Saxons."[317]

This British exception to the normal state of affairs in Medieval Europe can be explained in the following manner: a new source of transcendent credibility within close proximity increased the potential ideological threat to the stability of Alfred's rule, so he invested resources to make the border between the Anglo-Saxons and the Danelaw more distinctive, thereby better controlling the flow of ideas and people into Anglo-Saxon territory. Alfred and his apologists described the Vikings as the "Great Heathen Army," a moniker that connoted both physical and ideological threats.[318] He stated that his inspiration for military reform came the Bible, especially from the military strategies of King Solomon.[319] Alfred's response to the threat was only partly military. In the words of historian Christopher Dawson, Alfred "realized the vital importance of the spiritual issue and devoted no less energy to the recovery of the

---

[315] Keynes (1995), *CMH II*: 41.
[316] Ibid., 42.
[317] Simon Keynes (1999), "England, 900-1016," in Timothy Reuter, ed., *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Volume III: c. 900-1024* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 459.
[318] Richard Abels (2003), "Alfred the Great, the *micel haepen here* and the Viking Threat," in *Alfred the Great*, Timothy Reuter, ed. (Burlington: Ashgate): 265-79.
[319] Abels (1998): 197.

tradition of Christian culture than to the defense of national existence."[320] The reason for this was that Alfred did not distinguish between the two – the defense of the source of transcendent credibility was the defense of the realm in both form and content. His policy was to strengthen Christian culture in his realm through translations and education, a strategy previously adopted by Charlemagne.[321]

The strength of the connection between spiritual legitimacy and political legitimacy is clear in Alfred's translations. For example, one of the first translations that Alfred personally undertook was that of Pope Gregory's *Pastoral Care*.[322] As the title suggests, Gregory addressed this treatise to clergy to teach them how they should govern those that the Church has given them to shepherd. The parallels between ecclesiastical authority and secular authority are frequently made in Gregory's original version and had been discussed by secular and spiritual leaders alike for decades. Yet, the fact that Alfred began his vast translation project for the Anglo-Saxons with this particular text is significant, demonstrating that Alfred recognized the important connection between the strength of the religion and the authority of the state. Further, it is clear from *Pastoral Care* that even small modifications in the doctrines of the Church could have tremendous impacts on theories of spiritual and political authority. Christianity needed protection from both paganism *and* heresy. Given the strength

---

[320] Christopher Dawson (1950), *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company): 89.

[321] Alfred envied the success of the Carolingian dynasty and its' ability to project the image of ruling on behalf of God. Alfred consciously imitated the strategies of Charlemagne who had faced threats similar to those Alfred was experiencing, Janet L Nelson (2003), "Alfred's Carolingian Contemporaries," in Timothy Reuter, ed., *Alfred the Great* (Burlington: Ashgate): 293-303.

[322] "From the Translation of Gregory's *Pastoral Care*," in Simon Keynes and Michael Lapidge, eds. (1983), *Alfred the Great* (New York: Penguin Books): 124-30.

and proximity of the Vikings' polytheism, Alfred invested heavily in a heavily controlled and distinct border.

The Conversion of the Vikings in Britain (925-1025)

It is impossible to say when the Vikings in the Danelaw converted to Christianity. The historical record often shows a ruler converting to Christianity as his people acquiesce to this change, perhaps slowly, but surely. This turns out to be inaccurate among the Vikings, however.[323] In Denmark, Norway, and the Danelaw, there are several examples of rulers converting to Christianity, only to find themselves abandoned by other powerful warlords and the people. The process of conversion among the Vikings proved to be a long process, rather than a sudden epiphany.

Vikings, wherever they were found, fully "converted" to Roman Catholicism only through a series of steps over generations. First, the Vikings placed Christ and the Christian God within their larger pantheon of Norse gods. Intermarriage, the slave trade, and other commerce placed the Vikings in sufficient contact with Christians to see the business benefits of learning and practicing Christianity alongside their traditional beliefs. This can hardly be considered conversion: it was primarily located among the upper classes of the Vikings and remained polytheistic. Second, Christian beliefs filtered through Viking society to take root among the general populace, although still practiced alongside polytheism. Finally, whether for pragmatic reasons or for spiritual motives, the rest of the gods in the pantheon were evicted, leaving

[323] Birgit Sawyer and Peter H Sawyer (1993), *Medieval Scandinavia: From Conversion to Reformation, Circa 800-1500 (The Nordic 17)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press): 100-128.

Christian monotheism. As long as polytheism still dominated, Viking rulers could not easily adopt Christianity. Polytheism implied political authority based on strength, not divine right. Thus, Viking kings who attempted to mass convert their people to Christianity, such as Guthrum in the Danelaw and Harold Bluetooth in Denmark, ended up losing whatever political authority they had previously held. Perhaps the best that can be said is that sometime between the death of Alfred in 899 and the Norman invasion in 1066, Roman Catholicism regained its monopoly in England, excluding the Scots and the Welsh.

Likewise, it is not so simple to say that the boundary between the Anglo-Saxon units and the Viking political units were either distinct or indistinct. In truth, the boundary vacillated between distinctiveness on the level of Alfred's burghal wall and very indistinct boundaries, almost to the point of unification. Toward the end of Alfred's reign, the general belief among the Anglo-Saxons was that when Guthrum, king of the Danelaw, converted to Christianity following a military defeat the problem was solved. He would ensure that his people converted as well and the Heathen threat would be averted. Toward the middle of the reign of Alfred's son, Edward the Elder, it was increasingly clear that conversion had not occurred. Edward returned to his father's policy of investing in a distinct border. In some places he repaired his father's burhs and in other places, where the boundary had shifted, he built new fortified sites across central England from the Thames to the Wirral. Edward also encouraged a kind of economic missionary work: persons were to purchase land from the pagans in

order to return English influence into Viking held lands.[324] These two strategies were effective for Edward, "precipitating the submission of one region after another."[325]

In fact, these strategies were so successful that, according to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, Edward's son and successor, Aethelstan (924-39), "brought under his rule all the kings that were in this island."[326] Whether by military conquest or by consent, there was a general meeting in Eamont in 927 of all the kings on the island, including the Welsh and Scots, where the kings "renounced all idolatry and afterwards departed in peace."[327] From this point on, Aethelstan is titled either *rex Anglorum* (king of the English) or *rex totius Britanniae* (king of the whole of Britain). In this role, he appoints mostly nobles from the southern part of the island to posts in the distant, less Anglicized, portions of the realm, such as the Danelaw regions of Northumbria, York, and East Anglia.[328] In this way, Aethelstan sought to break down the isolation of the North and enhance his rule by further propagating English and Roman Catholic ideas. The English did not fully trust the loyalty of the Danes in these territories and a relatively crucial role of the southern appointees was to prevent the populace from rebelling.

---

[324] The Danelaw had a polytheistic source of transcendent credibility. This dissertation does not put forward a theory about the different effects on monotheism and polytheism on the distinctiveness of borders. However, I would infer that the effects would differ. A polytheistic source would not be threatened to the same degree as a monotheistic source by the entrance of an alternate source of transcendent credibility. The polytheistic source could absorb any rival with few effects religiously or politically, as was the case with the Vikings and Christianity. Thus, the Vikings saw no threat and large cash incentives in selling their lands to the English. However, we would expect that the English would not reciprocate, allowing Vikings to buy lands from Christians.

[325] Keynes (1999), *CMH III*: 465.

[326] Quoted in Keynes (1999), *CMH III*: 469.

[327] Quoted in Keynes (1999), *CMH III*: 469.

[328] Dorothy Whitelock (1959), "The Dealings of the Kings of England with Northumbria in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries," in Peter Clemoes, ed., *The Anglo-Saxons: Studies in Some Aspects of Their History and Culture Presented to Bruce Dickins* (London: Bowes and Bowes): 70-88.

In 937, the Vikings in Ireland allied with the Scots and invaded, attempting to reestablish a Danish kingdom of York. It is a measure of how successful Aethelstan's unification polices in that he was able to mobilize an army to defeat the invaders. Still, the English nobility expected (and were correct in that expectation) that the Danes living in York would assert their independence and support the invaders. This only increased the English policy of appointing non-native lords and clergy from the southern regions to offices in the former Danelaw. Watling Street, Alfred's border, continued to hold symbolic value well into the eleventh century as a dividing line between Christians and Viking converts to Christianity, who tended to combine their new beliefs with traditional Viking religious practices.[329] Even the Vikings recognized this boundary marker. In 1013, when the Danish king Swegn invaded England, he refrained from plundering until he crossed south of Watling Street, showing "how strong the distinction between the English and Danish areas was still felt to be."[330]

Conclusion: The Vikings

The Vikings represent a second exception to the monopolization of Christianity as the source of transcendent credibility in Medieval Europe. The Vikings practiced Norse polytheism, which presented significant challenges to both the monotheism of Christianity and the theories of political authority derived from it. At first, the Vikings were raiders who resided in distant Scandinavia. As such they

[329] Ibid., 87.
[330] Ibid.

presented a military threat, but not an ideological one. However, once they permanently settled, first on the continent in Frisia, and next in Britain in what became the Danelaw, the Christian kingdoms in these areas were faced with an alternate source of transcendent credibility within close proximity and supported with ample military capability. In response, the Frankish Empire and the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms both invested heavily in creating more distinct borders with the Vikings, even as they maintained relatively indistinct boundaries with their other Roman Catholic neighbors, some of which were equally threatening militarily. These borders remained distinct as long as the inhabitants in the Viking territories continued to embrace polytheism. The process of conversion on the continent and in Britain was a long one. However, half-steps toward conversion were responded to by allowing the borders to become much less distinct, although there remained a certain wariness that the Christianity in these formerly Viking lands was an unstable neighbor. Even in Britain, where the English managed to gain control of the Danelaw, the incomplete conversion resulted in an incomplete elimination of the boundary between the English and Danes.

Conclusion

Christianity as the sole source of transcendent credibility dominated the status quo in Medieval Europe. As the theory of this dissertation predicted, this resulted in relatively indistinct boundaries between political units during this time frame. Thus, feudalism as a political system is an understandable result of the dominance of the idea of a single Christendom that dominated the minds of Medieval Europeans. However, even the exceptions to Christianity's monopoly demonstrate the validity of

the thesis. In the two anomalies analyzed, the interaction with "pagan" Saxony in the eighth century and the emergence of the polytheistic Vikings in the ninth century, where an alternate source of transcendent credibility supported by sufficient military capabilities arrived in close proximity to a Christian political unit, the Christian ruler invested heavily in making that border more distinct, fortified, and controlled. In further support of the thesis, these same rulers did not invest in more distinct boundaries with their Christian neighbors who shared their source of transcendent credibility, even when these neighbors posed a military threat. In some cases, the Christian neighbors who were formerly rivals formed a united front against the common enemy that threatened their very foundations of political authority. Finally, as the Saxons and Vikings began to convert to Christianity, albeit slowly, the boundaries with their Christian neighbors began to grow increasingly indistinct, even where the military threat on both sides remained strong and imminent. Thus, Medieval Europe provides several admirable examples that support that thesis of this dissertation.

The stability and longevity of the status quo in Europe did not happen by accident. It required the concerted efforts of ecclesiastical and secular authorities to keep alternative sources of transcendent credibility out of Europe. Islam was barely held off with the military might of the secular authorities and the Crusades called by the Church. Even more than this, however, Muslims and Jews and others were heavily marginalized in all Medieval European societies. So long as they remained relatively powerless within society, these individuals were allowed to live among the Christians – after all, they fulfilled important functions in society that Christians could or would

not perform. However, the Church and the State both perpetuated ideologies that did not give these groups any opportunity to do more than live at the edge of accepted society. Despite the recent spate of books arguing that tolerance was more prevalent than traditional scholarship has expressed,[331] marginalization of non-Christians (perhaps to different degrees) still dominated.

Likewise, the Church and State actively pursued and suppressed heresy wherever it was found in Medieval society. These reactions to other religions and heresies were rational responses in a system that is dominated by only one source of transcendent credibility. Investment in distinct borders is a costly enterprise, but one that necessarily must be undertaken by a ruler who possesses sufficient resources and is faced with an alternate source of transcendent credibility. Thus, there are enormous incentives to prevent the emergence of any alternative source. Although each political unit in a single-source system has almost no incentives to invest in border control in their territory, the system as a whole possesses tremendous incentives to work together to keep the entire territory "pure," if a collective action solution can be successfully arrived at. The unified hierarchy of the Church and the family connections of the rulers in part provided the conditions in Medieval Europe that facilitated such collective action. However, no collective action solution is indestructible. This relatively stable situation in Medieval Europe began to break down when a new source

[331] John Christian Laursen and Cary J Nederman, eds. (1997), *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment* (University of Pennsylvania Press); Cary J Nederman (2000), *Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Toleration, c. 1100 – c. 1500* (Pennsylvania State University Press); Maria Rosa Menocal (2003), *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (Back Bay Books).

of transcendent credibility took hold in Europe that could not be successfully converted away: the Protestant Reformation.

CHAPTER 6: THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION, 1517-1565

A. Ideology: A Priesthood of All Believers
   1. Martin Luther: Christians Are Also Priests
   2. John Calvin: All of Us Who Are Christian
B. The Establishment of Lutheranism as a Source of Transcendent Credibility
   1. The Lutheran Reformation in Northern Germany
   2. The Schmalkaldic War
C. The Establishment of Calvinism as a Source of Transcendent Credibility
   1. Geneva, 1541-1565
   2. The Spread of Calvinism
   3. Why Two Sources (Calvinism and Lutheranism) and Not One (Protestantism)?
D. The Catholic Reaction to the New Sources of Transcendent Credibility
E. Changing Distinctiveness of Boundaries
F. Conclusion

One of the most significant results of the Protestant Reformation was that it increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility in Europe from one to three. Each of the sources began with God, but rival methods of linking the authority of the ruler to God's credibility emerged in the uproar against the Catholic Church. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the theoretical arguments that produced such a change, to explain how rulers and other political practitioners implemented these new theories, and to show the effects this had on the distinctiveness of the boundaries between political units. The Reformation's crucial change politically was the introduction of the doctrine that all Christians were priests and had direct access to God. This tenet drove three reformations (Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic), which produced three relatively successful competing sources of transcendent credibility. This, in turn, created the incentives for some rulers to invest in more distinctive

boundaries against political units that relied on a different source of transcendent credibility.

Ideology: A Priesthood of All Believers

Neither the Protestant nor the Catholic Reformers of the sixteenth century would have argued that the ideal outcome was the proliferation of new sources of transcendent credibility. "Reform" was seen as just that: purification of the existing structure, not schism. Since each party believed they represented the "True" Church, any recognition of another source's legitimacy produced charges of betrayal of Christ and heresy. The Holy Roman Emperor Charles V's tacit recognitions of Lutheran territories in the Religious Peace of Nuremberg in 1532 and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 drew just such criticisms from many of his fellow Catholics. Charles's attempts at compromise in the Interim of Augsburg in 1548 were met with derision from both Catholics and Protestants. What was so different between Protestantism and Catholicism that produced vigorous opposition in Early Modern Europe?

Put simply, the Protestant theorists envisioned an alternative theory of how man interacted with God. The structure of the Church and the personal salvation of the individual believer were the real targets of these reformers, but their resultant theories also had numerous implications on how rulers related to the ruled and how rulers appropriated credibility from God. In the Holy Roman Empire especially, the traditional role of the Emperor became exposed. Historian C. Scott Dixon argues that "the Reformation introduced a new understanding of princely sovereignty, and this shift of ideas in turn gave rise to a reach and intensity of rule without precedent in

German history."[332] The reformers had no intention (in the beginning) of dividing up Christendom, but adopting these new religious ideas also meant changing one's idea of how God interacted with political authority.

At the heart of the Protestant argument was I Peter 2:9: "You, however, are 'a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people He claims for His own to proclaim the glorious works' of the One who called you from darkness into His marvelous light."[333] The intent of the Reformers was to use this verse to demonstrate that the clergy, and therefore the Church, did not possess any special "powers" or have any better access to God than the ordinary believer. In Martin Luther's words: "All of us who are Christian are also priests."[334] This statement of belief held two ideas that directly affected political theory among Protestants. First, the notion that "Christians are also priests" in effect removed the middle man — the clergy — between man and God. Authority and accountability came directly from God, allowing the believer to shed the necessity of hierarchy: "When a bishop consecrates, he simply acts on behalf of the whole congregation, all of whom have the same authority."[335] This weakened the supports of hierarchy in the political sphere as well. Second, the phrase "all of us

---

[332] C Scott Dixon, *The Reformation in Germany* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002): 117.

[333] The verse itself quotes the words of God to Moses on Mt. Sinai from Exodus 19:6: "You shall be to me a kingdom of priests, a holy nation." Citing the I Peter verse, Christians claimed that this promise God made to the Israelites now applied to Christians.

[334] Luther, *Pagan Servitude of the Church* (1520) in John Dillenberger, ed., *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings* (New York: Anchor Books, 1962): 345. Luther returned to this idea frequently. In *An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nationality* (1520), he called the Roman clergy's exclusive claim as "the religious class" to be one of "three walls, which have protected them till now in such a way that no one could reform them." Instead, "all Christians whatsoever really and truly belong to the religious class, and there is no difference among them except in so far as they do different work . . . . The fact is that our baptism consecrates us all without exception, and makes us all priests" (Dillenberger 406-408). In his *Preface to Romans* (1522), he argued that Paul "shows that all Christians are priests" (Dillenberger 33).

[335] Martin Luther, *An Appeal to the Ruling Class* (1520) in Dillenberger (1962): 408.

who are Christian" placed new emphasis on the proper recipient of a believer's primary allegiance. As the elect of God, Christians were substantially different from those who had not received the grace of God. The first idea is explored in Martin Luther's writings, while John Calvin's texts are used to explore the second.[336]

Martin Luther: Christians Are Also Priests

Martin Luther's central theological argument was that Christians are justified by faith. He was reacting to several Church practices, especially the sale of indulgences, in which a believer could earn salvation through actions, or "works." His reading of Paul's Epistle to the Romans led him to believe there was *nothing* a person could do to gain salvation unless God first sent his grace to do the work. Once infused with this "prevenient" grace, the believer possessed faith and would, as a result, do good works. This reversed the basic position of the Church, in which doing good works (e.g., penance) produced salvation through the mediation of the Church. Virtually every other item of Lutheran reform stemmed from this one basic argument. For example, if works were unimportant as a means to salvation, then the Church and the clergy lost much of their centrality to the believer. Contrary to Catholic teaching, Luther argued that the clergy could not absolve the sinner, only the direct gift of God's grace could. The *only* difference between clergy and layman was a call to preach. Thus, Luther labeled five of the seven sacraments of the Church as "works" and

[336] It must be noted that both Luther and Calvin asserted each of these ideas, as each idea was seen as a logical conclusion of "justification by faith." The discussion is split between the two reformers as followers of Luther tended to emphasize the first idea and followers of Calvin placed greater emphasis on the second. These different emphases also have important ramifications in terms of whether Lutheranism and Calvinism are different sources of transcendent credibility and will be discussed more in depth below.

therefore not sacred at all, again minimizing the necessity of the Church — and potentially depriving it of much needed sources of income.

Most importantly for the argument under consideration, the Lutheranism largely removed the Church as mediator between God and man. For Luther, salvation came only through the direct interaction of God and the person. The Church could neither add to nor subtract from that basic relationship. The believer could and should read the Scriptures rather than allow the Church to be the sole interpreter of the words of God. This undermined the structure of the medieval Church – authority was not passed down through a hierarchy, but now passed directly from the top (God) to the individual at the bottom. Some of Luther's successors took this further and argued for a church structure in which each local congregation was an entity unto itself, accountable only to God rather than a General Council or higher authority.

The best statement of this position may be found in Luther's *An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nobility* (1520). Here he stated that *believers* chose their spiritual leaders. He wrote of a hypothetical scenario where a group of believers are taken prisoner. They could choose one of their number and "endow him with the office[s]" of a priest.[337] According to Luther, this person "would be as truly a priest as if he had been ordained by all the bishops and the popes." Since all who have received the grace of God are considered priests, there is nothing special in officially holding the title of priest. "In former days, Christians used to choose their bishops and priests from their own members," but now the institution of the Catholic Church had usurped that right. This right belonged to the community of believers, not an

[337] Quoted in Dillenberger 408.

institution: "Only by the consent and command of the community should any individual person claim for himself what belongs equally to all."[338]

Luther's intent was almost certainly not to transform the secular political hierarchy. The next passages in the *Appeal to the Ruling Class* depended on Romans 12, which was the basis of the traditional medieval Christian argument regarding the necessity of hierarchy in society.[339] According to this argument, all the parts of a body have different functions and each is necessary to the health of the whole. For Luther, every believer in society may be a priest, but each also had his or her social function – the shoemaker may be a priest, but his role in society was still the making of shoes. Likewise, the secular authorities' role in society was "to punish evil-doers and to protect the law-abiding." Since the Christian authority was also a priest, the command found in Romans 13 gained a new significance for Luther: "For this is what St. Paul says to all Christians, 'Let every soul (I hold that this includes the pope's) be subject to the higher powers.'"[340] Rather than attempting to undermine secular authority, Luther favored the subordination of ecclesiastical authorities to temporal ones in most areas.

In fact, Luther was very concerned about his doctrines being misinterpreted by political and social radicals. The printing press allowed Luther to get his ideas out to the public, but it also allowed many other authors to use those ideas in their own pamphlets.[341] The enormous proliferation of his writings in the later years of his life

---

[338] Ibid., 409.
[339] Ibid., 409-412.
[340] Ibid., 411.
[341] RW Scribner, *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Miriam Usher Chrisman (1996), *Conflicting*

has been attributed to a conscious effort to prevent what one historian has called "slippage" between his written words and his true intent.[342]

However, his vigilance could not prevent this slippage from occurring. In fact, allowing believers to interpret Scripture for themselves actually *encouraged* slippage. The "naturalness" of the secular "right order" of earlier centuries began to lose its foundational assumptions.[343] Political hierarchy in the Middle Ages mirrored the hierarchical structure of the Church, which in turn was seen as imitating that of Heaven.[344] Since Luther's theology changed the image of the hierarchical relationship of God and man and of the Church, it was inevitable that these ideas would likewise seep into the political arenas and, over time, overwhlem them.

Luther's ideas emerged in a political environment that proved particularly receptive. Erasmus had made Humanism fashionable among the intellectuals of northern Europe. Luther, an adherent of Humanist ideals himself, adopted many of these principles in his interpretation of Scriptural doctrine.[345] The German historian

---

Visions of Reform: German Lay Propaganda Pamphlets, 1519-1530 (Studies in German Histories) (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996); Elizabeth L Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, Vol. 1 and 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980): 303-452.

[342] Mark U Edwards, Jr., *Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

[343] Gerd Tellenbach, *Church, State, and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest (Studies in Medieval History)* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948).

[344] Arthur O Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964 [1936]).

[345] Humanism is a difficult term to define precisely. Historian Paul Kristeller suggested it should be seen as a research program rather than an ideology – a methodology that may be best described as anti-Scholasticism: *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961 [1955]): 3-23, 92-119. As a label, Humanism becomes tricky since what it meant constantly changed as did the ideas of those contemporaries considered the major Humanists. Thus, some of the "slippage" between what Luther meant and the political implications that resulted can be pinned on the slippage of Humanism and its chief adherents. On Humanism's slipperiness (though the author does not use this term): Timothy A Dost, *Renaissance Humanism in Support of the Gospel in Luther's Early Correspondence: Taking All Things Captive* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).

Peter Blickle provides another cause for Luther's success, insisting that the common people of northern Europe already saw themselves in terms of "community" prior to the introduction of Lutheranism.[346] Thus, Luther's ideas, falling on such fertile soil (and emerging from them), received "unparalleled support" from the population.[347] Luther's conception of the community of believers choosing their priest also already existed politically in the cities as the citizens chose those who sat on city councils. In such an environment, Luther's ideas did not seem far-fetched. To this must be added the traditional argument that the German territorial princes were receptive to an ideology that provided them greater freedom from the Holy Roman Emperor and the Roman ecclesia. The appeal of Lutheranism thereby cut across social and economic barriers.

However, this agglomeration of motives also meant that different groups would emphasize aspects of Luther's writings that mirrored their own interests. Thus, for example, the German peasants in 1525 attached a political meaning to "The Freedom of a Christian" that Luther never intended. The adaptability of Luther's doctrines, while a source of frustration to Luther, enabled them to survive and thrive among various classes of Northern German society. Historian Miriam Usher Chrisman has analyzed most of the available Lutheran pamphlets written during the 1520s and has found that the doctrinal emphases depended in large part on the social status of the author and the pamphlet's intended audience.[348] City secretaries, for example, who wrote Lutheran pamphlets played a crucial role in legitimating

---

[346] Peter Blickle, *From the Communal Reformation to the Revolution of the Common Man (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 65)* (Leiden: Brill, 1998).

[347] Ibid., 129.

[348] Chrisman, *Conflicting Visions of Reform* (1996).

Lutheranism among the elite of the cities. Following Luther's suggestion in *An Appeal to the Ruling Class*, they passed legislation enabling secular authorities to intervene in ecclesiastical affairs within the city. As a result, however, the city secretaries, not the reform clergy, became "the architects of the Reformation." Such an outcome seems inevitable given Luther's assertion that "all who are Christian are also priests." Luther did not begrudge the city leaders the new powers his doctrines bestowed on them, but he did find it much more difficult to prevent the slippage of his doctrines.

Intellectually, the political ramifications of Lutheran doctrine began to emerge. The first target was the idea that hierarchy was natural and, therefore, God-ordained. In 1533, the Lutheran preacher Johannes Eisermann wrote what may be considered "the first detailed social contract theory of the Christian commonwealth to emerge" from Germany.[349] Eisermann equated life in the Garden of Eden before the Fall as "the perfect state of nature." After the Fall, every person became sinful, though God allowed each to retain small "inborn sparks" of honesty, virtue, and community. What emerged from this Lutheran interpretation of the foundation of societies is the complete absence of natural hierarchy (excluding God), producing the conclusion that, as the legal historian John Witte, Jr. has summarized it, "there is no single person—far less a single dynasty—in a commonwealth that should naturally rule."[350] This was still a far cry from modern democracy, but it demonstrated that the doctrine the every

---

[349] The tract was first published as *On the Common Good* and, due to the conversation it generated, extended and republished as *On the Good Ordering of the Commonwealth*: John Witte, Jr., *Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 153.

[350] Ibid., 146.

believer was also a priest would fundamentally change the nature of political authority where it was the dominant confession.

John Calvin: All of Us Who Are Christian

In many ways, John Calvin's writings on political theory resembled those of Luther. He also began with "justification by faith," which, as has been demonstrated above, implies several conclusions relevant to the political life. He and Luther each relied on an Augustinian construction of two cities as well. In fact, the largest difference between Lutheran and Calvinist political theories lay in the directions their respective successors would take their ideas rather than in the writings of the founders themselves. However, there was at least one relevant matter in which the two differed: Calvin placed a much heavier emphasis on the "double doctrine of predestination" and this had important implications on his overall political theory.

Calvin began his *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1545) with the fundamental principle that man is accursed and degenerate. At the Fall in the Garden of Eden, original sin entered the human race and, thus, our "whole nature is, as it were, a seed-bed of sin, and therefore cannot but be odious and abominable to God."[351] Despite this, "there is some room for divine grace."[352] In his mercy, Calvin argued, God did not leave the whole human race in its deplorable condition, but gave his grace to some.[353] The *double* doctrine of predestination argued that God chose who would receive this grace and salvation *and* God also chose who would *not* receive His grace.

[351] *Institutes* II.1.
[352] *Institutes* II.3.
[353] *Institutes* III.21.

This doctrine took "justification by faith" to its logical conclusion: if man had the capacity to *choose* to accept or reject salvation, this would amount to works. Thus, the choice must belong to God, not man. To Calvin, only the double doctrine of predestination truly allowed God to be omnipotent. Thus, God divided everyone in the world into two groups: the *elect* who received grace and the *reprobate* who did not.

While this obviously had theological implications, it also had important political consequences. To best understand them, we must turn aside momentarily and examine the political theory of the Frenchman Guillaume Bude. Bude's Catholic credentials were impeccable, having served as the French ambassador to the Papal court of Leo X. As royal librarian to the humanist King Francis I, Bude has historically been given much of the credit in founding what would become the College de France in Paris and introducing the Renaissance-style study of the classics into French culture. In 1518, Bude published *The Institution of the Prince*, dedicating it to the young Francis I.

In this treatise, Bude argued that the prince's power was absolute, in part because it came directly from God. In addition to this, no less authorities than Plato and Aristotle had pointed out that there are some persons who are so superior to the rest of mankind that the only appropriate place for them in society is in full control over the rest. According to Bude, the kings of France, and especially the current incarnation of Francis, fit easily into this construction. "Kings are so perfect in prudence and nobility and equity that they have no need of rule or written form to constrain them by fear and by the necessity of obedience, as others do, except for the

divine law that takes its authority from God and not from men."[354] Because "the heart of the king moves by instinct and by impulsion of God," his every action will be for the good of his people.[355] For Bude, any constitutional restraints on the power of the king (or what the French minister Claude de Seyssel called "bridles") would either be harmful or superfluous. A wise king would also take advantage of philosophers who would instruct him in reason and provide advice; however, in the end, the king was a being that sat above society, not just by virtue of his office, but by the virtue God had instilled in him.

It would be hard to imagine that Calvin had not read or was at least familiar with Bude's *Institution*. John Calvin attended school in Paris throughout the 1520s obtaining a humanist education. He returned to Paris for further study in 1531, a year after Bude established the College de France. It was during this formative period in the humanist-infused atmosphere of Paris that, while writing a study on Seneca's *De clementia*, Calvin converted to Protestantism. Bude's effect on Calvin's later political theory can be clearly seen as he ultimately granted the same qualities and privileges to God's elect that Bude imparted to the king.

According to Calvin, if everyone were elect, then civil government would be "superfluous."[356] Just as Bude's king was "perfect in prudence and nobility and equity" and had no need for the laws, so Calvin claimed the elect were perfect and had no need of civil government. This idea gained further support from Colossians 2:20-23, which argued that the main effect of human laws and doctrines was "that they

---

[354] Nannerl O Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980): 60-61.

[355] Ibid., 61.

[356] *Institutes* IV.20.2.

indulge men's pride."[357] On the other hand, "if with Christ you have died," then the laws were useless. According to Calvin, everything civil laws were meant to do, the elect already did because they had received the grace of God.[358]

However, Calvin's double doctrine of predestination emphasized that not everyone was among the elect. As long as the reprobate lived among us, civil government remained necessary. The insolence of the reprobate "can scarcely be curbed by any severity of laws."[359] Still, without the civil government, the reprobates' behavior would cause society to collapse into anarchy and the elect would find it difficult to worship God. Calvin was not content to label civil government a "necessary evil," as Augustine had. Civil government could aid the elect in maintaining the external worship of God, defending sound doctrine, and defending the Church. With a proper civil government "a public form of religion may exist among Christian, and humanity among men. Let no one be surprised that I now attribute the task of constituting religion aright to human polity."[360] Like Bude, Calvin argued that the "best" in society should control everyone. For Calvin, however, the best were the community of the elect, meaning the Church. The Church was the "matrix" where the

---

[357] Calvin's perspective on this passage was likely inspired by Phillip Melantcthon's commentaries on Colossians. Timothy J Wengert, *Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon's Exegitical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Colossians 3:20-23 (NIV): "Since you died with Christ to the basic principles of this world, why, as though you still belonged to it, do you submit to its rules: 'Do not handle! Do not taste! Do not touch!'? These are all destined to perish with use, because they are based on human commands and teachings. Such regulations indeed have an appearance of wisdom, with their self-imposed worship, their false humility and their harsh treatment of the body, but they lack any value in restraining sensual indulgence."

[358] William Stevenson, Jr., *Sovereign Grace: The Place and Significance of Christian Freedom in John Calvin's Political Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[359] *Institutes* IV.20.2.

[360] *Institutes* IV.20.3.

divine-human relationship took place and, therefore, served as the crucial institution for every aspect of life.[361] In 1541, the city council of Geneva invited Calvin to implement this theocratic form of government.

For those who lacked this "city on a hill," the best form of government for a people was whatever form God chose for them. This paralleled the doctrine of predestination: God chose to elect some and not others and the reasons for his choices were so unfathomable to humans that to even question them amounted to sin. Likewise, God imparted some peoples with good governors and some received harsh ones, even tyrants. Romans 13 clearly stated that all rulers received their power from God. For Calvin, "An impious king is a mark of the Lord's anger."[362] God could choose to punish an evil ruler, but "let us not suppose that that vengeance is committed to us, to whom no command has been given but to obey and suffer."[363] Instead, "The first duty of subjects towards their rulers, is to entertain the most honorable views of their office . . . receiving and reverencing them as the ministers and ambassadors of God."[364] Still, Calvin left a two-sentence "loophole" that later generations seized on to justify resistance to a tyrant. He stated that "when popular magistrates have been appointed to curb the tyranny of kings," they must fulfill their roles since they also receive their positions "by the ordinance of God."[365] This addendum to Romans 13 depended on a country possessing specific institutions that could curb the power of the king. However, in no way did his language suggest that

---

[361] Philip Walker Butin, *Revelation, Redemption, and Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
[362] *Institutes* IV.20.25.
[363] *Institutes* IV.20.31.
[364] *Institutes* IV.20.22.
[365] *Institutes* IV.20.31.

these magistrates could remove or kill a tyrant, as later Huguenot theorists would argue.

Overall, Calvin's theory must be classed among other absolutist theories. This makes sense if we consider that he wrote the *Institutes* as a means of justifying and perpetuating the civil government structure he erected in Geneva. By 1545, it was still unclear whether Calvin's party would hold onto its power in the city's political structures or if other rival groups would reclaim dominance in the Council.[366] At the same time, Calvin's theory was oligarchic rather than monarchic. Calvin tweaked the absolutist theory of Bude and demonstrated that, if the best persons were in control, this would amount to an oligarchy of the elect. However, in all other government structures, the elect were not "subjects" in a true sense of the word. God's grace had freed them from a need for civil laws. They were still admonished to obey the rulers, but Calvin's new conception amounted to a loosening of the bond between ruler and ruled. Kings retained the *power* of God, but if they were not among the elect, they lacked the *authority* of God.

These two Protestant ideas, all believers are priests and only those who are believers are priests, immediately began to shake the traditional political foundations in Europe. The primary target of the Reformers was the Roman Church, yet the same cannot be said of others in Europe who saw the potential of using these new doctrines to subvert the medieval structures of political power. This is not to argue that the religious ideas were adopted only because they were useful in a practical sense. It is

---

[366] William G Naphy, *Calvin and the Consolidation of the Genevan Reformation* (Manchester: Machester University Press, 1994).

more than likely that the political practitioners of Protestantism were both true believers in the basic doctrines of Luther or Calvin *and* that they placed greater emphasis on those doctrines that also furthered their interests politically, socially, and economically. After all, if every believer was a priest, the religious ideas that had greater applicability in a person's everyday life carried greater weight in that person's ("priest's") overall theology. As these new theological doctrines took hold in sixteenth century Europe, the medieval monopoly of Catholicism as the only source of transcendent credibility came under attack.

The Establishment of Lutheranism as a Source of Transcendent Credibility

The Protestant Reformation increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility in sixteenth century Europe. In the period from 1520, when Luther wrote his most virulent pieces attacking the Church until 1555, when Lutheranism was tentatively recognized by the Holy Roman Emperor, political practitioners transferred the ideas of Luther and other Protestant reformers into workable methods of government. This was a gradual process and one that was hotly contested among the reformers themselves. However, events in Europe provided this movement just enough breathing space to solidify its position within a portion of the Empire and successfully resist attempts to eradicate it. As a result, by 1555 Europe began to invest in much more distinctive political borders, particularly between political units of different confessions.

Of course, it was not just one Reformation, but a series of several Reformations that shared numerous ideas, but also differed in a few as well.[367] Three are of particular importance for this discussion. The first Reformation was that of Luther occurring primarily in Northern Germany. With the return of John Calvin to Geneva in 1541, a second Reformation began. Finally, the closing of the Council of Trent in 1563 formalized a gradual Catholic Reformation in which the doctrines of the Church were reaffirmed. Where each of these movements took root, more distinctive borders emerged separating them.

The Lutheran Reformation in Northern Germany: "The World Upside Down"

Martin Luther was certainly not the first person to suggest a radical reform of Christian theology and Church structure. The advantage he had over earlier, less-successful reformers (such as John Wyclif and John Hus) was the patronage of Elector Frederick the Wise of Saxony, one of the Holy Roman Empire's more influential territorial princes. At least initially, Frederick neither embraced nor rejected the reforms suggested by Luther. Instead, Frederick's contribution was to prevent the arrest and execution of Luther unless the monk received a hearing. The Elector possessed enormous power within the traditional institutions of the Empire and the Emperor, Charles V, could not afford to disregard his wishes.

Luther's survival also depended on a distracted Emperor. Charles V succeeded his grandfather, Maximilian I, as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519, two years after

[367] On the variety of Reformations in this period, see James D Tracy, *Europe's Reformations, 1450-1650* (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999).

Luther posted his *Ninety-Five Theses Against Indulgences* on the door of the Wittenberg church. Up until this point, the issue had been an ecclesiastical matter that the Pope and the clergy were to handle. Charles therefore focused his attention on what he perceived to be much more important matters.[368] As both King of Spain and Emperor, Charles controlled more territory than any other European ruler had since the days of Charlemagne. The dream of Europe as a single "Christendom" looked to be on the cusp of fulfillment. Strategically and philosophically, this meant Charles had to keep Northern Italy out of the hands of the French. Further, it meant defending Christendom from the surging power of the Ottoman Turks. The new leader of the Turks, Suleyman I, had captured Belgrade in 1521 and would continue to threaten Habsburg lands in Eastern Europe for the rest of Charles' life. Charles saw these as his real threats, not a solitary preacher in a distant part of the Empire.

It must be remembered that no one at this point knew that the "Reformation" would be so epochal. If anything, in the first decade of Charles' reign, schism seemed a more remote possibility than the unification of Christendom politically. After all, Charles' childhood tutor, the famous humanist scholar Erasmus of Rotterdam, had made many of the same suggestions regarding reform of the Church as Luther had.[369] At least initially, Luther merely asked for *reform*, not separation from the Catholic Church. Charles, of course, had a stake in any reforms in the Church and would not

---

[368] The overarching goals of Charles regarding his Empire are disputed. Most traditional accounts argue that Charles' primary desire was the realization of a single Christendom under one ruler. Another argument that has gained currency is that Charles' goals were much less lofty in that he "never forgot that his primary obligation was always to the dynastic interests of his family." William Maltby, *The Reign of Charles V* (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 30. In either case, Charles' early focus remained on the larger threats rather than Martin Luther.

[369] Lisa Jardine, "Introduction," in *Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): x.

have sat idly by as key doctrines were undermined. On the other hand, Charles could not have foreseen that Lutheranism would survive with the vigor it did after his condemnation of it at the 1521 Diet of Worms.

Under the urging of Elector Frederick, Charles agreed to give Luther his day in court and summoned a Diet in the city of Worms. As Charles heard the testimony and defense of Luther, he could not help but be struck by Luther's insistence that "unless I am convicted by the testimony of Sacred Scripture or by evident reason . . . my conscience is captive to the Word of God."[370] The political implication was clear: if each individual conscience could contradict the Church, the same argument could soon be applied to the political authority. As a result of this hearing, Charles confessed he had waited too long to silence such talk and had Luther declared a heretic. Charles granted him safe passage back to Saxony, but then told him to leave the Empire. The Edict of Worms, issued in May of that year, condemned Luther, his teaching, and all of his followers. Two days later, as an added benefit for Charles' actions against Luther, the Pope broke off his support for the French and gave the blessing of the Church of Rome to Charles. This in turn allowed Charles to recapture Milan and force the French to withdraw from Northern Italy.

Of course, the label heretic did not diminish the support Luther received from all levels of society.[371] Many German nobles found the ideas of Luther and their political implications compelling. Frederick, for example, stood to gain much

---

[370] Quoted in John Dillenberger, "Introduction," in Dillenberger, ed., *Martin Luther* (1962): xxiii.

[371] Miriam Usher Chrisman studied Lutheran pamphlets published between 1519 and 1530 in order to investigate of how and why Lutheran ideas appealed to all classes of society in very different ways, *Conflicting Visions of Reform: German Lay Propaganda Pamphlets, 1519-1530 (Studies in German Histories)* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996).

politically by supporting this new movement. His political rival, Cardinal Albrecht von Hohenzollern, was the primary supporter of indulgences in Saxony. By eliminating indulgences, he could deal a strong financial blow to the Cardinal. Further, Saxony lacked religious shrines and each year pilgrims took money outside his territory primarily to Rome. Pilgrimages and shrines did not fit in a "justification by faith" theology. The traditional view is that the German princes pounced on the Reformation as an opportunity to continue to assert their independence vis-à-vis the Emperor. While there is some truth to this, it cannot be taken too far. Once the Emperor declared Lutheranism a heresy, overtly supporting him (and in the case of Frederick harboring and protecting Luther) would have been an extremely risky gamble. Certainly, Charles was distracted but there was no guarantee this would continue. A short lull in his other ventures would be all it took to punish heretical nobles who took independence a step too far.

German knights and peasants also saw glimpses of greater independence in accepting Lutheranism.[372] The Emperor was not the only person to recognize the political implications of Luther's theology. In 1522, a pamphlet entitled *The Great Lutheran Fool* warned of the growing likelihood of social revolution as Lutheranism would "turn the world upside down."[373] For several years, this was exactly what happened. In the Knights' War (1522-23), knights who were self-professed Lutherans unsuccessfully rose up against the Elector of Trier. Rebel knights claimed the same

---

[372] Hillay Zmora, *State and Nobility in Early Modern Germany: The Knightly Feud in Franconia, 1440-1567* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Peter Blickle, *The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants' War from a New Perspective* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

[373] Quoted in Richard Bonney (1991), *The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 20.

independence from the nobles that Protestant nobles claimed from the Emperor. Likewise, a group of peasants made the same argument in the so-called Peasants' War of 1524-26.[374] Catholic and Protestant princes alike put down the two rebellions. Still, these radical ideas spread throughout Germany. In his account of the Reformation in the province of Ansbach, C. Scott Dixon points out that in 1528 rural peasants demanded to directly hear the Word of God because the Margrave, Georg the Pious, said "it was their right as subjects."[375] It was becoming increasingly clear that there were severe and potentially revolutionary consequences of Lutheran theology in the political realm.

Luther's response was incredibly pragmatic. The survival of this reform movement depended on the safe harbor a handful of sympathetic princes provided. To encourage social disruptions in the lower strata of society would necessarily invoke the wrath of these nobles. Thus, Luther clarified the infamous words he had written in 1520: "A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none."[376] This phrase, taken out of the context it was presented, had become the rallying cry for the rebels. In response, Luther wrote extended treatises emphasizing the ignored context. *On*

---

[374] James M Stayer, "The German Peasants' War and the Rural Reformation," in Andrew Pettegree, ed., *The Reformation World* (London: Routledge, 2000): 127-145. These rebels were stirred to action through the preaching of Lutheran Thomas Muntzer, who preached to them that if those in authority did not fight against the godless, they should be removed from power violently and without mercy: "It is impossible so long as they rule you to speak to you of God. Attack, attack, while it is still day! God goes before you, follow, follow!" Quoted in Gary K Waite, *Heresy, Magic, and Witchcraft in Early Modern Society* (Houndsmill, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2003): 63. See also Thomas Muntzer, "Sermon Before the Princes," in George H Williams and Angel M Mergal, eds., *Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers* (Philadelphia, 1957): 47-70; Roland H Bainton, "Thomas Muntzer, Revolutionary Firebrand of the Reformation," *Sixteenth-Century Journal* 1982 13(2): 3-15.

[375] C Scott Dixon, *The Reformation and Rural Society: The Parishes of Brandenburg-Ansbach-Kulmbach, 1528-1603* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[376] Luther, *The Freedom of a Christian* in John Dillenberger, ed., *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings* (New York: Anchor Books, 1962): 53.

Secular Authority (1523), written in response to the Knights' War, and *Against the Murderous and Thieving Hordes of Peasants* (1525), made clear that although the conscience of a man is free, outward obedience always belonged to the secular authority. Luther did not intend his theological reform to also become a political reform, yet it was clear that the genie was out of the bottle and could not be put back.

The Anabaptists were another example of the political use made of Lutheran theology.[377] These groups carried Luther's doctrines to their extreme conclusions and combined them with a belief in an imminent apocalypse. Many of these groups believed that the return of Christ would not occur until a pure society had been set up.[378] Through an electoral strategy of immigration, the Anabaptists won control of the city of Munster and set up their "heavenly city" in 1534.[379] In response, local princes besieged and took the city in 1535. The event proved instructive for the rulers of Europe, both Catholic and Protestant: the ideas of Lutheranism, if not properly controlled, could have immense social and political implications. Lutheran authors scrambled to dissociate their movement from that of the Anabaptists.[380] In fact, the late 1530s and 1540s became a period of doctrinal dissension within the German Lutheran movement as it tried to more precisely define what Lutheranism was in order to avoid the "unnatural" social consequences it seemed to be able to encourage.

---

[377] See William R Estep, *The Anabaptist Story: An Introduction to Sixteenth-Century Anabaptism* (William B Eerdman's Publishing, 1996): 177-200.

[378] Waite, *Heresy, Magic, and Witchcraft*, 67-70.

[379] Non-believers were compelled to leave even as Anabaptists from all over Europe began to flock to the city. New laws abolishing private property and encouraging polygamy unnerved much of Europe.

[380] Iren L Snavely, Jr., "Huldyrch Zwingli and the Preaching Office in German Switzerland," *Fides et Historia* 1993 25(3): 33-45.

On the other hand, Lutheranism also began to spread beyond the edges of the Empire. In 1536 the Swedish Lutheran Church was established and in the following year, the Danish Lutheran Church was founded. Many of the leaders and churchmen in these two countries had received a humanist education at the University of Wittenberg. In terms of distance and shared culture, the draw of Wittenberg proved much more compelling than that of distant Rome. The conversions also enabled the rulers of Sweden and Denmark to formally institute a new church structure and gain much more control over ecclesial matters. Both countries requested and received Lutheran scholars from Germany to assist in the formulation of doctrine. Lutheran conversion also occurred in England at the same time, but there was greater hesitance on the part of the Germans to send assistance. Henry VIII requested the great theologian Philip Melanchthon himself be sent, but the German Lutherans refused.[381] However, the rulers of northern Europe now had a choice in their source of transcendent credibility. It had proved to be effective in a number of political ways in northern Germany and became a viable option for a ruler seeking greater independence from the Church in Rome.

The Schmalkaldic War

By the late 1520s, events began to demonstrate the potential threat of allowing Lutheranism to continue to exist in the Empire. At the Diet of Speyer in 1526, the Lutherans succeeded in getting those assembled to agree to a tacit recognition of the

[381] In fact, it can be argued that all Henry got from the German Lutheran establishment was a new wife, Anne of Cleves, who he singularly disliked, Rory McEntegart, *Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, and the English Reformation (Studies in History New Series)* (Bury St. Edmunds: St. Edmundsbury Press, 2002).

right for each principality to "so live, rule, and bear itself as it thought it could answer to God and the Emperor."[382] Thanks to distractions in Italy and Hungary, Charles and his brother Ferdinand were unable to resist this outcome. This, in turn, encouraged Protestant princes to increase efforts to assume authority over all matters, including the church, within their respective territories.[383] By 1529, however, Charles had reconciled with the Pope, retaken Milan, and could now focus on the increasingly worrisome situation in Northern Germany. Charles reconvened the Diet of Speyer and pushed through a repeal of the agreement made in that city in 1526. The Lutherans responded with a "Protest" in which they asserted they would continue to operate under the 1526 agreement—no matter what.[384]

Turk victories in Hungary made it impossible for Charles to accept a divided Empire. Thus, he sought reconciliation between the two positions and called a new Diet at Augsburg in 1530. Each side had their moderate and extreme factions. The extreme Catholics, led by Johann Eck, demanded that the Protestants be forced to abandon their heretical doctrines, while more moderate factions recognized the practical necessity of compromise in order to mount a sufficient force to beat back the advancing Turks. The Protestants were riddled with faction, which is understandable given that they doctrinally allowed for wider interpretations of Scripture. For example, on the crucial issue of the Eucharist, the extreme wing of the Protestants

---

[382] Quote is from the concluding Decree of the Diet of Speyer (1526), quoted in Will Durant, *The Reformation* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957): 442.

[383] An excellent example of this can be found in the erastian *Reformatio ecclesiarium Hassiae* of 1526 and the impact that it had on other Protestant princes over the next six years: William J Wright, "The Homberg-Synod and Philip of Hesse's Plan for a New Church-State Settlement," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 1973 4(2): 23-46.

[384] It was from the title of this document that Catholics began to describe the Lutherans as "Protestants," a term that became associated with both religious and political rebels in the Empire.

followed Zwingli's assertion that the bread and wine of communion was only that: bread and wine.[385] The moderates, led by Philip Melanchthon, sought a middle ground between Zwingli and the doctrine of transubstantiation of the Catholics.[386] Melanchthon submitted a very toned-down version of Lutheran doctrine, a document (the *invariata*) that would become the official creed for Lutherans. Eck responded with the *Confutation*, which rejected all parts of Lutheran doctrine.[387] Sensing the direction the winds were blowing, the Protestants at the Diet began to head home. Charles adopted the arguments of the *Confutation*, but generously gave the Protestant princes in the Empire a six-month grace period to return to Roman Catholic doctrines and practices.

Though Charles must have believed this general clemency would permit rebel princes return to the Catholic fold, he was greatly mistaken. In preparation for the end of the six-month grace period, several princes formed a Catholic League that would restore the faith. In response, Protestant princes and cities organized the Schmalkaldic League. The lines were drawn and Germany was poised for all-out civil war in April of 1531. However, Charles' international situation continued to worsen and so he suspended his ruling from Augsburg and requested the help of the Lutheran princes against the Turks. In the Peace of Nuremberg (1532), Lutheran and Catholic princes agreed to join against the common Ottoman menace in Hungary and to accept mutual

---

[385] Carter Lindberg, *The European Reformations* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996): 181-191.

[386] See Leif Grane, *The Augsburg Confession: A Commentary* (Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1987): 113-126; Timothy J Wengert, "Luther and Melancthon on Consecrated Communion Wine," *Lutheran Quarterly* 2001 15(1): 24-42.

[387] See Robert Kolb and James A Nestingen, eds., *Sources and Contexts of the Book of Concord* (Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 2001): 31-82, 105-139.

toleration until a general church council could be held.[388] The force that marched to war under the leadership of Ferdinand, Charles' brother whom he had placed in charge of his eastern territories, was so large that the Turks agreed to partition Hungary and withdraw its army without fighting a major engagement.

The Lutheran princes recognized that Ferdinand's victory would not have been possible without their assistance and used this new leverage to go on the offensive diplomatically. In 1534, Lutheran Philip of Hesse removed Ferdinand's governors from the duchy of Wurtemburg and returned that land to his friend, the formerly deposed Duke Ulrich. This territory not only became Lutheran, it also joined the Schmalkaldic League. Although this diplomatic maneuver amounted to an open declaration of war, both Ferdinand and Charles were so preoccupied that there was no response. This diplomatic success without subsequent punishment encouraged other Protestant princes and cities in the Empire to join the Schmalkaldic League, causing its leadership to become even bolder. Papal envoys expressed a desire to hold a general church council as called for in the 1532 Peace of Nuremburg, but the Protestants, relishing their strengthened bargaining position, sabotaged this effort by adding new conditions to such a meeting. In addition, some Lutheran princes declared the property of the Catholic Church in their lands forfeit and passed laws against Catholic forms of worship. These actions prompted a recreation of the Catholic League.

---

[388] Abe J Dueck, "Religion and Temporal Authority in the Reformation: The Controversy Among the Protestants Prior to the Peace of Nuremberg, 1532," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 1982 13(2): 55-74.

Throughout the 1530s, events continued to go the Protestants' way, while Charles and Ferdinand remained convinced that their most significant threat still lay outside the Empire rather than inside.[389] In 1539, the Elector of Brandenburg set up a Protestant Church in Berlin semi-independent of both Rome and Wittenberg.[390] In 1542, the duchy of Cleves, the bishopric of Naumburg, and the See of Halle all became Protestant as well. Even the Archbishop-Elector of Cologne converted his city to Lutheranism.[391] To these conversions were significant in the context of an international reformation that saw Sweden and Denmark set up national Lutheran churches.[392] Success bred confidence. Luther and Melanchthon abandoned their earlier willingness to meet the Catholics halfway and declared that peace would only exist when the Emperor and the clergy abandoned their heresy.

Although the 1530s found Charles still beset with multiple crises – renewed war in Italy over the Milanese succession, threats in the Mediterranean from the Turks, and a revolt in Ghent all vied for Charles' attention – by the end of the decade, he was emerging victorious in each of these spheres. Yet, he still wished for a peaceful resolution to the situation in Northern Germany. Charles' uncertainty in how to respond to the Lutherans seems somewhat reasonable considering the Catholic Church itself was unsure of how to respond. The leading clergy in Rome belonged to one of

---

[389] This was understandable since the Muslim Turks relied on a different source of transcendent credibility that had been in existence for a longer period of time. It was a clear alternative source, while in the 1530s Lutheranism merely had the potential to become one.

[390] James M Estes, "Johannes Brenz and the German Reformation," *Lutheran Quarterly* 2002 16(4): 373-414.

[391] John R Tyson, "A Protestant City Handbook from the Mid-Sixteenth Century," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 1993 24(1): 3-20.

[392] Ole Peter Grell, ed., *The Scandinavian Reformation: From Evangelical Movement to Institutionalisation of Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): especially Martin Schwarz Lausten, "The Early Reformation in Denmark and Norway 1520-1559," 12-41; and EI Kouri, "The Early Reformation in Sweden and Finland c. 1520-1560," 42-69.

two camps.[393] The indecision produced by this debate continued until 1542, when Cardinal Caraffa succeeded in getting the Church to reestablish the Roman Inquisition, with himself as Chief Inquisitor. Caraffa immediately used this newfound independence and authority to target supporters of compromise with the Protestants, who either recanted their heretical views or were executed. The debate was over, as was the Roman Church's indecision. The Pope had summoned a new Church Council (which would eventually become the famous Council of Trent), but following the Inquisitorial purging, it was clear to all what the outcome of this Council would be. Seeing the writing on the wall, the Protestant princes and clergy declared they would not attend. Though the Protestant Church had been a separate institution *de facto*, by the commencement of the Council of Trent in 1545, it was clear there would be no return to the pre-Luther status quo.

Charles changed his strategy and secretly attempted to make separate agreements with each of the Lutheran princes in the Schmalkaldic League. Approached princes refused to accept extremely generous terms if it meant abandoning what they considered the True Church.[394] The Schmalkaldic League

---

[393] The humanist *spirituali*, of whom Cardinal Reginald Pole is perhaps the most prominent member, believed that the Protestants were correct in that the Church needed severe reform. They argued that if the Church admitted this and took real steps to reform, the Protestant movement would dissipate and people would return to the Catholic Church. The other party was the rejectionists, led by Cardinal Gian Pietro Caraffa, who would eventually become Pope Paul IV. They rejected any compromise whatsoever and believed that any admission of fault on the part of the Church would only make a bad situation worse. This typological bifurcation of the Catholic clergy is the traditional description in the literature, though it is clearly an oversimplification: Paul V Murphy, "Between *Spirituali* and *Intransigenti*: Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga and Patrician Reform in Sixteenth-Century Italy," *Catholic Historical Review* 2002 88(3): 446-469. The point is the same, however: those who opposed reform systematically marginalized those willing to compromise with the Protestants.

[394] This perhaps more than any other evidence demonstrates that the success of the Reformation in Germany rested on more than mere material or political gain.

responded by capturing the last Catholic territory in the North.[395] As before, Charles and Ferdinand's armies were fighting elsewhere. However, in 1545, as Catholic representatives began to gather in Trent to reassert the Church's dominance in Europe, Charles signed truces with both France and the Turks. Looking to score a public relations victory at Trent, Charles finally turned his military might against the Schmalkaldic League.

Although the Schmalkaldic League gathered a larger force than the Emperor, they were much more disorganized.[396] The Imperial troops had one commander, while the Protestant troops had many. At the outbreak of the war, Protestant troops were brought to the increasingly militarized border between Lutheran and Catholic territories. Poised and ready to invade both Bavaria and Bohemia, the Schmalkaldic League suffered a setback as one of their members, Maurice of Misnia, betrayed them, invading and conquering Saxony as its Lutheran prince, John Frederick was away. John Frederick turned back and recaptured his lands, but this left the path open for Charles to move into Northern Germany. The other Schmalkaldic League leader of significance, Philip of Hesse, also retreated with his army to prevent an invasion by Charles. Thus separated, Charles' smaller army stood a much better chance. At the Battle of Muhlberg in 1547, the Emperor defeated the army of John Frederick and took him prisoner. His lands and his Electorship were both given to Maurice as reward. Recognizing defeat, Philip also surrendered and the war ended.

---

[395] The duchy of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel.

[396] Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Greenhill Books, 1987 [1937]): 246-252.

Arranging a peace proved to be more difficult than winning the war. In the Interim of Augsburg (1548), the Emperor presented a temporary religious settlement that included elements of both Catholicism and Protestantism that would be settled in the Council of Trent. Both Catholics and Protestants rejected this compromise arrangement. John Frederick and Philip of Hesse, both imprisoned by the Emperor, refused to accept the Interim, as did the Pope. In response, a new league of Protestant princes quietly formed around one-time traitor Maurice, now of Saxony. Charles still considered Maurice to be his man and asked him to raise an army to put down a rebellion. Maurice raised an army all right, but turned it against Charles. In 1552, his army caught the Imperial Court by surprise and Charles was forced to flee across the mountains. This renewed fighting coupled with the humiliation of running from Maurice "broke Charles' spirit."[397] Charles turned over all the affairs in the Empire to his brother Ferdinand, returned to Spain, and, three years later, abdicated his throne.

Ferdinand met with Maurice in Passau and signed a truce in 1552. Ferdinand remained more concerned with the Turks and needed the assistance of the Protestant forces.[398] In 1555, a more permanent treaty was arranged in Augsburg between Ferdinand and the Lutheran princes. This move sent shock waves through the Catholic Church. Pope Paul III agreed to the terms as he lay dying in Rome, but it was no coincidence that in this same year the hard-line Cardinal Caraffa was elected Pope Paul IV. Although the new Pope stopped short of excommunication, he was

---

[397] Bonney, *European Dynastic States*: 121.

[398] While Charles was Emperor, Ferdinand had been in charge of protecting the territory that bordered the Turks. Thus, having spent much of his life fending off Ottoman advances, it is likely that he considered the Muslim source of transcendent credibility a greater threat than the Lutheran source and was willing to work with the latter to defeat the former.

clearly disgusted with the actions of Ferdinand.[399] Imperial-papal relations were almost non-existent until the election of Pope Pius IV in 1559. Nor was it a coincidence that the participants of the Council of Trent, who had fled following rumors that the Protestant armies would target Trent, did not return to conclude their business until 1562.

The Augsburg settlement hinged on the formula *cuius regio, eius religio* (he who rules a territory determines its religion). In no way was this agreement construed as freedom of religion: within each territory only one confession was permitted. Princes had the right (and duty) to exclude persons from the other confession. Such an agreement was possible only because many who found themselves in the religious minority opted to migrate to more favorable locations. Those who chose to emigrate received specific economic protections in order to encourage geographical separation of the confessions. Thus, territories became increasingly concentrated, which solidified the political situation. The overall effect was to cement a division of the territory of the Empire into two separate blocs: Lutheran and Catholic.

Though far from perfect, this policy permitted the Empire to live free of full-scale civil war until 1618. Still, diplomatic skirmishes continued unabated. The treaty encouraged some instability since either confession could achieve a diplomatic coup by converting a prince or "arranging" for a territory to be inherited by someone adhering to the same source of transcendent credibility. Princes generally avoided tampering with the lower classes in rival territories, since such activity could backfire

---

[399] Paula Sutter Fichtner, "The Disobedience of the Obedient: Ferdinand I and the Papacy 1555-1564," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 1980 11(2): 25-34.

and lead to popular revolutions throughout all the territories. The clergy, however, were less constrained. Jesuits clandestinely entered Lutheran territories trying to win converts, just as Lutheran preachers (and laymen) also pursued missionary work in the south. In short, the Augsburg settlement resulted in a relatively stable situation in the Empire, but it would only take a death or conversion to upset this equilibrium.

Another deficiency in the Peace of Augsburg was that it gave princes only two choices: Roman Catholicism or Lutheran Protestantism. "All such as do not belong to the two above-mentioned religions shall not be included in the present peace but be totally excluded from it."[400] What could not have been foreseen, even in 1555, was the looming international success of John Calvin's Reformed Church.

The Establishment of Calvinism as a Source of Transcendent Credibility

Geneva, 1541-1565

In 1541, the City Council of Geneva asked John Calvin to come and repair the disorderly church in the city. Geneva would subsequently serve as a laboratory for Calvin's institutional design for the church. From this city, Calvinism's doctrines and institutions would eventually spread throughout Europe. Thus, it is important to focus more closely on the programs implemented by Calvin's supporters and gain a better understanding of the mutually supportive roles of the church and the state in Geneva.[401]

---

[400] "The Peace of Augsburg, 1555," quoted in Henry Bettenson, ed., *Documents of the Christian Church*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966 [1943]): 301.

[401] Much of this discussion is informed by Philip S Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001): 1-38; and Naphy, *Calvin and the Consolidation of the Genevan Reformation*.

The City Council assigned Calvin with the task of developing a code of regulations for the Reformed Church. In 1542 the Council ratified what Calvin came up with. The focus of these *Ecclesiastical Ordinances* was discipline, a trait that had been lacking in the city's church in the years before Calvin's return. The concept of "discipline" fit neatly into Calvin's theology and political theory.[402] Those who were among the elect would, by the intervention of God's grace, already act with discipline and self-control. Momentary lapses could be set right by the enforcement of discipline. Although the reprobate would not act with self-discipline, the Christian duty was to assist these damned persons to at least live an orderly life as prescribed in the Bible. Thus, disciplinary rules interpreted by the church and enforced by the state created order and allowed the elect to pursue their heavenly calling free from fear.

To this end, the clergy received a much higher status in the local church, but becoming a pastor also became a much more rigorous process that was constantly supervised by Calvin and other church leaders. The Ordinances established the Consistory (or Presbytery), which served as a standing council of the top clergy who would maintain a watchful eye over the clergy and any laymen who required greater supervision. Anyone could be called before the Consistory and it could involve itself in every aspect of civic life. For example, it aggressively reformed Geneva's educational system and, as a result, molded subsequent generations' worldviews.[403] It also held the power of excommunication and could assign other punishments, which

---

[402] So many of Max Weber's arguments have come under attack, but the importance of "discipline" to Calvinist thought, and subsequently Capitalism, is one that has withstood the test of time: Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Routledge, 2001 [1904]).

[403] Jeffrey R Watt, "Calvinism, Childhood, and Education: The Evidence from the Genevan Consistory," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 2002 33(2): 439-456.

would be carried out by the city government. John Calvin headed the Consistory until his death in 1564.

In addition, the *Ordinances* proclaimed that the fundamental law of the state would be the Bible and the interpreters of this law would be the highest of the clergy. The City Council agreed to enforce the law as interpreted by Calvin and the other clergy, submitting all civil power to the directions of the church. Heresy became explicitly equated with treason and Catholicism labeled heresy. Those who chose not to abide by the doctrines of Calvin and the Reformed Church were welcome to leave the city, but all who stayed would be held to the same rigorous standard. Again, it must be remembered that although this theocratic structure appeared incredibly restrictive, it was based on the theory that the elect would experience no restraint at all. In fact, by holding back the natural passions of the reprobate, this structure allowed the elect to finally experience real freedom.

Calvin's position was far from assured, however.[404] The doctrine developed in the Consistory and applied to Geneva's Reformed Church was continuously challenged by Lutheran ideas infiltrating from the north, the ideas of the "Radicals" and Anabaptists who roamed Europe searching for a place that would accept them, and clergy from within Calvin's own ranks who differed on one or two crucial points.

---

[404] Within Geneva, however, there were understandably many who resented Calvin. Two groups in particular, the Patriotes and the Libertins, disagreed with Calvin in terms of doctrine, but also wanted to reclaim the civic power that they had lost. The Consistory allowed Calvin and his supporters to stay a step ahead of any subversive actions these groups intended. In 1547, armed members from these groups entered the City Council chambers and demanded an end to the Consistory. Calvin entered and insisted that, if they wanted to kill someone, he should be the first victim. No one struck and Calvin arranged a truce. The moment for the opposition passed and they split into factions, temporarily leaving Calvin in control again. Heretics, on the other hand, were dealt with without delay, as the case of the execution of Michael Servertus (1553) demonstrated. See, Naphy, *Calvin and the Consolidation of the Genevan Reformation* (1994).

Many Lutherans disagreed with Calvin's position on the Eucharist. He responded to these attacks so effectively that several principalities in the Empire ultimately adopted Calvinism: Brandenburg, the Palatinate, and parts of Hesse, Bremen, Anhalt, and Baden.[405] The more "Radical" ideas that entered Geneva were easily snuffed out by the swift actions of the Consistory.

The Spread of Calvinism

In the early years, Calvin was most concerned with ensuring that there was at least one "city of god" in the world and concentrated his efforts on protecting the Genevan experiment. Although the Consistory pushed many non-Calvinists to migrate, Geneva also became a beacon for co-religionists. Thus, Calvin's position grew more stable in the city over time. By 1554, he could begin to assist those who shared his views in France. There is no evidence of a centrally-propelled missionary program prior to this, yet Calvinists had moved throughout Europe on business matters. In many places, Southern France for example, they found fertile soil for their beliefs to take root. Thus, Europe possessed isolated and relatively unorganized pockets of Calvinists. Still, the numbers converting in France had exploded to the extent that, in 1559, King Henri II sought peace with Spain, in part because he wanted to focus on the growing internal dissension among the Huguenots.[406]

This need to address the Huguenots became a critical issue as Calvin began to support the French sister churches institutionally and doctrinally. The Geneva

[405] Durant, *The Reformation*: 478.
[406] Bonney, *The European Dynastic States*: 128-129.

structure could not work in France since the Calvinists there lacked access to state power. However, Calvin could and did send trusted pastors to these congregations, on the one hand giving them encouragement to stay in France and practice their faith, and on the other hand ensuring that their doctrine was orthodox. In 1559, when Henri II died in a freak jousting accident, the Huguenots believed their persecution was over and began to practice more overtly. By 1562 it was estimated that there were 1,785 Calvinist congregations in France, each dreaming of the day when they too could convert their locality into a "city of God" on the scale of Geneva.[407]

The cities of the Low Countries were also particularly receptive to Calvinist doctrine. Calvinism appealed to merchants and the cities possessed plenty of these. The congregations here were much less reliant on Geneva and largely pursued their own course, though they stuck close to Calvin's major doctrines.[408] The Dutch Reformed Church embraced the principle of discipline as a means of ensuring orthodoxy and keeping out Anabaptist ideas, in particular.

Buoyed by these advances, the Consistory established the Geneva mission in 1559 with the primary goal of converting rulers to Calvinist doctrines. As mentioned above, many aspects of Calvinism had already begun to spread in several German principalities. In particular, Calvin's view that the Eucharist did not contain the Real Presence of Christ mirrored the Zwinglian view that had been popular in several areas. Elector Frederick of the Palatinate became the political leader of the German Calvinists after his conversion in 1561. It is difficult to understand what motivated

---

[407] Ibid., 53.

[408] Guido Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of the Reformation: Underground Protestantism in a Commercial Metropolis, 1550-1577* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution* (2003): 39-78.

German princes to shift to Calvinism besides true belief, especially considering the second-class status it received among the more dominant Lutheran princes and its even lower regard from Catholics.

The real advances in international Calvinism came in Eastern Europe, however.[409] Poland was a particularly receptive territory and Geneva focused much of its missionary effort there. Calvinists also took advantage of the uncertainty in Hungary generated by the tenuous boundaries drawn between the Catholic Habsburgs and the Ottoman Turks. With the assistance of the princes of Transylvania, Calvinists were allowed to convert the people, which enabled Transylvania to maintain its independent status. By the early 1600s, Calvinists began making headway into other portions of Hungary, a situation the Transylvanian princes exploited to their political advantage.

In sum, by the last half of the sixteenth century, it was clear that a third religion would be competing for the hearts and minds of the population. It remained unclear at this point whether it would be a natural ally of their fellow Protestants, the Lutherans, or compete with them for the same believers. At least initially it was a love-hate relationship. In Germany, in particular, Lutherans saw Calvinism as a threat to their already tenuous position under the terms of the Peace of Augsburg. Yet at the same time, Lutherans recognized that Calvinism was successfully weakening the power of the Emperor in Hungary and the Netherlands. Calvinism introduced a third

---

[409] Graeme Murdock, *Calvinism on the Frontier, 1600-1660: International Calvinism and the Reformed Church in Hungary and Transylvania* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); Maria Craciun, Ovidiu Ghitta, and Graeme Murdock, eds., *Confessional Identity in East-Central Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).

source of transcendent credibility into the European system. The effect was to further increase the distinctiveness of boundaries between political units.

Why Two Sources (Calvinism and Lutheranism) and not One (Protestantism)?

In the early stages of the Reformation, Lutheranism presented the only other source of transcendent credibility to rival the Catholic Church. There were several variations of Luther's doctrines that, if adopted by a ruler, would have to be considered entirely different sources of transcendent credibility. However, besides the occasional city that followed such a course (i.e. Munster in 1534), Lutheranism as expressed by Luther and Melancthon was the only rival source to Roman Catholicism considered by Christian rulers. To the outside world, Calvinist Geneva must have looked very similar to these small and short-lived civic experiments. Yet, Calvinism not only had a long successful tenure in the Swiss city, it also expanded into numerous parts of Europe. Its success among several rulers in Early Modern Europe forces the question of whether Calvinism should be seen as a separate source of transcendent credibility from Lutheranism or whether both should be lumped into a more general category of Protestantism.

The crucial variable must be how these two theologies link the authority of the clergy (and hence the ruler) to God. In other words, if the two see the interaction of God and man in radically different ways, this is a good indication that the two theologies are different sources of transcendent credibility.

The stance of Luther has been presented above, so only a brief recap will be necessary here. Since every believer was also a priest, and therefore had direct access

to God, there was only one difference between the layman and the priest: the call to preach. That earned the priest some respect in the community, but as far as the powers the Roman Catholic Church believed the clergy had, there were none. For Luther, the clergy should be allowed to marry – after all, they were just ordinary people. Thus, the preacher acted as a mouthpiece, offering guidance on holy living and performing some of the religious rituals, but it was the believer's responsibility to test the preacher's words and interpret Scripture for himself. As Luther repeatedly warned, on the Day of Judgment, the believer would stand alone before God and have to answer for his actions and beliefs.

John Calvin placed a much heavier emphasis on the Church as a mediator between God and man. The Church, for Calvin, was the community of believers, not the professionals of the institution (i.e. the Roman clergy). Everyone who was among the elect was also a priest. Yet, there was a lot of uncertainty in this statement. How could a person be sure they were elected? How could they be sure their neighbor was among the elect? Even Calvin was often beset with doubts about whether he was among the elect. Only God could be sure and He wasn't telling. Under such circumstances, a person could neither rely on himself nor could he rely on the clergy, whose salvation status was also uncertain. In addition to this, Calvin did not agree with Luther that election meant perfection. To be elected was only the first step in a lifelong process that required discipline, edification, and constant correction. The solution was to depend on the community of believers, the Church, to fulfill these roles. Using the imagery of Church as "Mother," he asserted that there is no way to be saved "unless she conceive us in the womb and give us birth, unless she nourish us at

her breasts, and, in short, keep us under her charge and government, until, divested of mortal flesh, we become like the angels."[410] God chose to use the community – the Church – to achieve salvation.

Like Luther, Calvin believed that the selection of the clergy depended on the consent of the whole Church. Again, Calvin's implication was very different from the Pope's here. Calvin argued that, in the early church, "none were admitted to the number of the clergy without the consent of the whole people."[411] After a time, the people were content to allow the bishop select persons for lesser clerical offices. This practice then became institutionalized in the Catholic Church, resulting in the struggles in Middle Ages between Pope and Emperor over who had the right to investiture. For Calvin, both positions in the investiture crisis were evil, since the right of election belonged only to the people. This right came directly from God and any who took it away from the people stole from God. The power and authority of God rested in the community directly and in the clergy only indirectly through the election of the people.

The clergy were not mere employees of the congregation, however. Once ordained, the clergy belonged to God, who "is pleased to instruct us in the present day by human means."[412] The believer is thus placed "under this modest yoke," and instructed to listen "with docility to the ministers whom God appoints."[413] Fallen man, even the elect, was incapable of acting on that grace without the assistance of the Church and its ministers. The Calvinist believer may need to test the things of the

---

[410] *Institutes* IV.1.4
[411] *Institutes* IV.4.10
[412] *Institutes* IV.1.5
[413] *Institutes* IV.1.6

world against his faith, but this independent thinking must be curtailed within the community of believers and the clergy they have selected.

In short, the Calvinist position must be seen to fall somewhere in between that of the Catholics and the Lutherans. For the Catholics, God interacted with man through the priests. For the Lutherans, God interacted with man directly. The Calvinists saw God interacting with man through the community of the elect, of which the believer was a part. Of course, this brief synopsis vastly simplifies the theologies of these three religions, yet it was the simpler messages and contrasts that were most easily communicated to and understood by the congregations.

This different emphasis between Lutheran and Calvinist had fairly large political implications. Both challenged the Catholic custom of, as Calvin put it, "Hereditary right, wherever bishops have been uniformly succeeded by bishops."[414] The difference in political implications between Lutheranism and Calvinism was similar to the difference between *liberalism* and *communitarianism* today and the different means of generating political authority each implies. Like communitarianism, the controlling discipline of the Calvinist Church placed a barrier between the Lutheran's direct connect with God. The Calvinist worried over the potential schisms that would be wrought as every ignorant, lazy, and vain person (in other words, every human being) interpreted Scripture without the gentle yoke of the Church. In short, Lutheranism and Calvinism must be treated as two distinct and competing sources of transcendent credibility.

---

[414] *Institutes* IV.2.3

The Catholic Reaction to the New Sources of Transcendent Credibility

The Catholic Church and the secular rulers associated with it fully recognized that their future depended on a reinvigoration. These rulers were thus faced with a double dilemma: protecting their authority from the rising popularity of Protestantism in its various forms and injecting new vitality into the flagging source of transcendent credibility that had served so well for over a thousand years. For many of the rulers of Europe, including especially the Holy Roman Emperor and the papacy, abandonment of Catholic doctrines was tantamount to suicide. Adaptations of centuries-old traditions were considered necessary – the readiness of all levels of European society to convert to Protestantism had demonstrated this fact. And yet, the core beliefs of the Catholic Church could not be jettisoned even as the Church modernized. This was the debate at the center of the General Council of Trent.

The action emerging from the Council of Trent was a strategic response to the growing threat Protestantism posed. The Church recognized that the introduction of alternate sources of transcendent credibility in Europe changed the political dynamics. In particular, the Church could no longer build its institutions around the idea that it was the only source of transcendent credibility. New sources of transcendent credibility meant that Europe was no longer a single "Christendom" with porous boundaries in which Catholic ideas flowed freely. Political units with different confessions needed to protect their borders from the dangerous ideas espoused by their neighbors. For Catholic ideas to penetrate some territories and to be perpetuated in others, the Church recognized that its institutions would have to be altered to cope with the changing conditions. Thus, not only did the Council of Trent reaffirm

important points of Catholic doctrine that were vital to the maintenance of traditional forms of ecclesiastical and political authority, it also reconstructed its institutions in order to best re-extend its influence throughout the "heretical" regions of Europe.

Pope Pius IV reconvened the Council of Trent in 1561 with the goal of reinvigorating the Catholic Church. The core theoretical debate at the heart of this last session of the Council concerned the authority of the bishops of the Church.[415] The outcome of this debate had enormous political implications and was closely watched (and influenced) by temporal rulers as much as by the ecclesia. The theological and historical question turned on whether Jesus himself instituted the office of the bishop. If so, then the bishops had significant authority vis-à-vis the Pope and the authority of the Church could be found in general church councils rather than the hierarchy of the papacy.[416] However, if Jesus directly instituted the position of Pope only, then the authority of the Church flowed from that position trickling down through the institution's hierarchy.[417] The outcome at Trent remained ambiguous. Neither the papal party nor the bishops could convince the other of either extreme. The wording of the final declaration attempted to find an acceptable middle ground. However, in combination with other centralizing reforms of the Council, it amounted to a reaffirmation that divine authority in the Catholic Church was located in the office of

---

[415] Diarmaid MacCulloch (2003), *Reformation: Europe's House Divided, 1490-1700* (New York: Penguin Books): 303-306.

[416] According to this position, each bishop inherited his authority from the bishop that came before him, all the way back to receiving the authority directly from Jesus. This gave every bishop an equal standing in terms of authority as the Pope. This was the position traditionally taken by the Orthodox Church.

[417] Matthew 16:18-19 is the key passage here: Jesus said, "And I tell you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not overcome it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven" (New International Version).

the Pope. In particular, interpretation of the decrees of Trent fell to the Pope and his staff. This, in turn, had the effect of reaffirming the notion that political authority was located at the top of the hierarchy and flowed down from that position.

While Trent left the doctrines of the Catholic Church largely unchanged, it radically reformed the institutions of the Church. Participants generally agreed that the cause of the Protestant Reformation was rooted in the declining quality of the clergy. Priests had grown more concerned with the income from their seat than the souls entrusted to them. In many cases, a priest or a bishop would not even live in his assigned diocese. Increasingly, persons joined the clergy to find a career path rather than respond to a calling. Thus, the Council of Trent sought to reform the Church first and foremost by reforming the clergy.[418]

Three very important clerical reforms highlight the Church's growing sense that Catholicism faced rival sources of transcendent credibility. First, Trent encouraged the development of religious orders. The Society of Jesus, or Jesuits, formed in the 1540s by St. Ignatius of Loyola, was the most important of these new orders. This group formed with the intent of raising the level of piety and the level of theological education among Catholics with the goal of reconverting heretics in Europe and converting the heathen elsewhere.[419] The Jesuits often portrayed themselves as a spiritual army going to battle in enemy territories.[420] The Jesuits, like other religious orders, were not tied to particular dioceses and were therefore free to

---

[418] See, in particular, the Council's decisions in the seventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth sessions.

[419] Harro Hopfl (2004), *Jesuit Political Thought: The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540-1630 (Ideas in Context 70)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 9.

[420] Jonathan Wright (2004), *God's Soldiers: Adventure, Politics, Intrigue, and Power – A History of the Jesuits* (New York: Doubleday): 13-42.

serve the Church in areas hostile to Catholic ideas. In addition, the colleges of the Jesuits quickly became the most respected centers of learning in the Catholic parts of Europe, thereby serving as a means of reinforcing Catholic doctrines among the elite and clergy alike.

A second crucial institutional reform of Trent was a stronger emphasis on the theological education of priests. Even parish priests at the bottom of ecclesial hierarchy could now receive deeper education. This not only increased the priests' ability to impart Catholic doctrines to the people, it also enabled the clergy to combat Protestantism and other heresies where they found them in the towns and villages. Indoctrination of the clergy meant indoctrination of the people. The dangerous competition Protestantism presented compelled the Church to return its attention to the quality of persons it sent into the midst of the people. The influence of humanism in this era also produced the corollary conclusion that more educated priests would also be more virtuous. Many Europeans had begun to lose respect for local priests that took advantage of their position to extort sex and money from their parishioners. The sale of indulgences, the "poster child" of the depravity of the Church, was merely the most overt of the many cracks in the respectability of the clergy. The Council of Trent eliminated this practice, but its predominant focus was on improving the quality of its clergy and thereby the people's perception of the Church itself.

A third reform imposed penalties on bishops and priests who did not live or work in the diocese the Church assigned them. The members of the Council argued that one reason Protestantism had spread unchecked was because the shepherds of the local flocks were too often absent. How could a bishop prevent the spread of heresy in

a see he had abandoned? The clergy's physical presence in the towns and villages put an immediate halt to the decline of Catholicism throughout Europe. These new-and-improved priests returned to the traditional responsibilities of the Church in terms of teaching and poverty relief, which bolstered the image of the Catholic Church among believers.

The institutions of the Catholic Church prior to Trent were lax in terms of keeping a close eye on the doctrines and practices of believers across Europe. The incentives of investing vast resources in such a program did not exist where the Catholic Church lacked a rival, as it largely had throughout the Middle Ages. The arrival of Protestantism changed the Catholic Church's incentives and, at Trent, its institutions. The Church needed to have personnel on the ground, perpetuating Catholic teachings in the remaining Catholic areas and fighting against the heretical enemy elsewhere.

These reforms demonstrate that the Catholic Church and Catholic rulers sought to gain greater control over the flow of ideas territorially. Heretical ideas would be expunged and repelled from Catholic territories. Catholic believers were expected to adopt "orthodox" beliefs and would be closely instructed, watched, and cajoled to do so. Rulers and clergy united to "purify" their lands. Inasmuch as Catholics and Jesuits were kept out of Protestant political units, the Catholic territories invested heavily in making sure their lands were Protestant-free.

Changing Distinctiveness of Boundaries

Some evidence has already been presented that suggests that the increase in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in sixteenth century Europe created incentives the led rulers to increase the relative distinctiveness of their boundaries. Because increased investment in boundary control is a function of perceived threat, changes in distinctiveness should be localized to boundaries between political units that rely on different sources. An examination of the proxy variables reveals that, in fact, boundaries did become more distinctive between Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic political units.

In effect, the Protestant Reformation cut the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire in half. After the Peace of Augsburg, rulers began investing heavily in ensuring that their borders were controlled in order to keep out rival religious ideas and personnel. While all of these lands continued to nominally recognize the Emperor as their suzerain, the authority he held in the southern Catholic lands far exceeded that in the northern Lutheran areas. Obtaining obedience from Lutheran princes now became a matter of negotiation rather than obligation.[421] The threat to German princes on both sides consisted in ensuring that missionaries and ideas from the other confession remained outside the boundaries of the territory. Thus, more and more resources were invested in controlling the boundaries, producing more distinctive borders.

[421] The Emperor's method of dealing with princes now became "the confessionalization of patronage," which according to historian Karin J MacHardy was not only unsuccessful in developing the Emperor's authority, it also accentuated deep divisions between elites that culminated in the Thirty Years' War: McHardy (2002), *War, Religion, and Court Patronage in Habsburg Austria: The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Political Interaction, 1521-1622* (Palgrave MacMillen): 47-66.

One piece of evidence of increased distinctiveness was the increased ability of territorial German princes to demand hegemonic membership from their citizens. In some cases, this involved changing the population through transfers, rather than changing their hearts and minds. Following the Peace of Augsburg, many Catholics left territories governed by Lutheran princes, and vice versa. A similar process occurred in the Spanish Netherlands in the 1580s as many migrated to the Protestant United Provinces.[422] The mass migration of Huguenots out of France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been credited as one of the reasons for the economic success of countries in the Protestant north. A greater percentage of the remaining population believed in the particular source of transcendent credibility espoused by the ruler.

A consequence of this was that rulers were increasingly able to centralize some aspects of government. An examination of the condition of the Holy Roman Empire in 1500 demonstrates that "[t]here was no central power, and no one grouping to which [the Emperor] could look for consistent support."[423] In 1527, in response to the emergence of Lutheranism, Charles V convinced the Imperial princes to create new centralized institutions of government, the most important being the Privy Council.[424] In addition, Emperors also centralized the Imperial judiciary and military. Although the degree of Imperial centralization by 1600 did not compare with the successes of

---

[422] "The amnesty of Antwerp lasted four years (1585-89) and 40,000 Protestants left for the north in these years, mostly going to Amsterdam and Middelburg," Bonney (1991): 162-63.

[423] Bonney (1991): 97.

[424] Perry Anderson (1974), *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso): 304; Henry Frederick Schwarz (1943), *The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Oxford University Press): 57-60. Other significant new centralized institutions emerging from the 1527 Ordinance were the Court Chancellery (*Hofkanzlei*) and the Court Treasury (*Hofkammer*), VG Kiernan (1980), *State and Society in Europe, 1560-1650* (New York: St. Martin's Press): 183-84.

the rulers of France, Spain, and England, sixteenth century Emperors had far more authority than their earlier counterparts.

Toward the end of the sixteenth century, rulers possessed even greater abilities to secure hegemonic loyalty from their subjects, thanks in large part to coercive measures. Backed by the Catholic Church and the stream of Jesuits flooding into central Europe, the Austrian Habsburgs combined the policies of a revitalization of Catholicism with the centralization of the machinery of state.[425] In Calvinist territories, governments likewise combined the concepts of "discipline" in religious life with stronger central institutions capable of monitoring social behavior.[426] Lutheran princes took a more direct approach, "becoming head of [their] own miniature church."[427] Governments in all three confessions transferred traditionally ecclesial responsibilities, such as education and charity, to new governmental institutions.[428] Finally, by the latter half of the sixteenth century, nearly every political unit possessed at least one confessional university that was closely tied to support of the territorial ruler.[429] The combination of these policies and institutions meant that the average subject tended to reserve his primary loyalty for his respective church and the territorial ruler who both supported and was supported by that religion.

---

[425] Kiernan 193.

[426] Gorski (2003): 39-78.

[427] Kiernan (1980): 171.

[428] In particular, see Michael Braddick (2000), *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 103-35; Brian Pullen (1976), "Catholics and the Poor in Early Modern Europe," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser.

[429] In Lutheran areas, universities were important "partly because governments of petty states with limited physical force depended on the pedagogue as well as the preacher to instill habits of obedience," Kiernan (1980): 172. In Habsburg lands, the Jesuits founded a university in Vienna in 1556. For a list of other Jesuit universities founded in Catholic German and Austrian lands, see Hajo Holborn (1982), *A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 279-81.

With respect to the second proxy, imposed standardization of currency, there is little evidence. Rulers tended to mint their own coins, but they were largely unable to maintain their value.[430] Circumstances in the sixteenth century made such a policy nearly impossible. The influx of gold and silver from outside Europe produced inflation, which created incentives for the devaluation of almost all currencies.[431] Money itself became an object to be traded internationally, taking the valuation of coins further out of rulers' hands. This is not to say that rulers did not try to gain control of their monetary policy.[432] For example, many rulers made the export of bullion a capital offense.[433] But, any clear examination of this proxy must wait until the end of the Price Revolution in the seventeenth century.

There is more evidence, however, that rulers pursued more hierarchical judicial systems in their territories. In the mid-sixteenth century, Emperor Ferdinand I

---

[430] Arthur J Rolnick, Francois R Velde, and Warren E Weber (1996), "The Debasement Puzzle: An Essay on Medieval Monetary History," *Journal of Economic History* 56(4): 789-808. Most early modern rulers definitely saw the ideological value of minting their own coins and putting representations and slogans on them that enhanced their authority and credibility, Martha McCrory (1994), "Coins at the Courts of Innsbruck and Florence: The Numismatic Cabinets of Archduke Ferdinand II of Tyrol and Grand Duke Francesco I de'Medici," *Journal of the History of Collections* 6(2): 153-72. For example, many German Lutheran princes commissioned their coinage minted in the 1540s and 1550s to carry the image of the three-headed dragon representing Lutheran resistance to the Empire's Catholic laws, Oliver K Olson (1993), "The Three-Headed Dragon, Scourge of the Reformation," *Lutheran Quarterly* 7(3): 293-314. As a means for promoting Lutheranism, most Lutheran coinage contained the slogan "Verbum Domini manet in Aeternum" (The Word of God flows into eternity), FJ Stopp (1987), "Verbum Domini Manet in Aeternum: The Dissemination of a Reformation Slogan, 1522-1904," *Lutheran Quarterly* 1(1): 54-71.

[431] Douglas Fisher (1989), "The Price of Revolution: A Monetary Interpretation," *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 883-902; Debra Glassman and Angela Redish (1988), "Currency Depreciation in Early Modern England and France," *Explorations in Economic History* 25(1): 75-97.

[432] It has been suggested, for example, that the French kings used the economic crisis to enhance the royal authority with respect to monetary policy, specifically by issuing edicts designed to restore public confidence in the French currency, Jotham Parsons (2003), "Governing Sixteenth-Century France: The Monetary Reforms of 1577," *French Historical Studies* 26(1): 1-30. English rulers used the financial crisis to shut down several competing ecclesiastical mints in England, CE Challis (1975), "The Ecclesiastical Mints of the Early Tudor Period: Their Organization and Possible Date of Closure," *Northern History* 10: 88-101.

[433] Bonney (1991): 423.

"revived the Imperial Aulic Council as the highest court of the Empire, under the direct control of the Emperor."[434] While the results for the Emperor of this move were mixed, it is significant that he possessed both the incentive and the capability to attempt modest judicial hierarchy. In Elizabethan England, it was evidence of "the decline of the great baronial and church households that private disputes were now brought frequently to Westminster."[435] The same was true, though on a smaller scale, for many other territorial rulers of the period.[436]

Rulers in the sixteenth century also demanded greater professionalization and standardization of the law throughout their territories. This was, in part, a response to humanist legal traditions sparked in the Renaissance who revived the Roman concept of the "common law" throughout Europe.[437] However, it was also a result of the increased capability and willingness of rulers to make and enforce such demands. The French kings, for example, ordered the regional courts to "codify" their particular customs, giving the legal scholars associated with the King the ability to identify common elements of "France" and begin to formulate territory-wide law.[438] This policy prepared the way for a judicial body, again associated with the royal court, which could serve as an appellate body for all French cases. In 1548, the Austrian

---

[434] Anderson (1974): 304.

[435] Michael Mann (1986), *The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 460-61. See also, Krista Kesselring (1999), "Abjuration and Its Demise: The Changing Face of Royal Justice in the Tudor Period," *Canadian Journal of History* 34(3): 345-58.

[436] For example, Paul Warde (2002), "Law, the 'Commune,' and the Distribution of Resources in Early Modern German State Formation," *Continuity and Change* 17(2): 183-211.

[437] Peter Stein (1999), *Roman Law in European History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 71-103; Manlio Bellomo (1995), *The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000-1800* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press): 203-35.

[438] Stein (1999): 83.

Habsburgs ordered that any jurist on the Imperial Supreme Court must be trained.[439] Such demands for educated legal scholars in the Empire, as in the rest of Europe, increased the importance of the universities associated with the rulers. Cases that were particularly difficult or politically troublesome were frequently referred to the faculty of the university.[440] Thus, gradually, rulers in Europe successfully began to form a judicial hierarchy of which they dominated the top position.

Rulers in the sixteenth century were also better able to generate efficient compliance generation than a century before. It has been frequently argued that the changing nature of war in the sixteenth century forced rulers to more efficiently and effectively raise revenues.[441] However, it is more accurate to say that the nature of war and the ability to raise revenues increased together, each impacting the other: the reason a ruler deployed a larger army or built better fortifications was because he had access to more resources, whether through accumulating debt or by generating revenues more efficiently. In fact, both of these variables are the effects of a common cause: an increase in the incentive rulers had to increase the distinctiveness of their boundaries to protect against threats.

The economist Joseph Schumpeter has argued that the source of revenues for European rulers switched during the sixteenth century from feudal sources to direct

---

[439] Stein (1999): 91.

[440] Stein (1999): 89-90.

[441] Brian M Downing (1992), *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 56; Clifford J Rogers, ed. (1995), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Westview Press); David Eltis (1998), *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (IB Tauris); Martin van Creveld (1991), *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present* (Free Press): 81-124; Edgar Kiser and April Linton (2001), "Determinants of the Growth of the State: War and Taxation in Early Modern France and England," *Social Forces* 80(2): 411-48.

taxation of subjects.[442] Such a transformation required a larger and more centralized bureaucracy. The resources required to protect one's territory from competing sources of transcendent credibility and to cope with inflation forced rulers to invest in a more expensive mode of raising revenues, but a mode that produced greater amounts of revenue as well. This new mode, direct taxation rather than indirect taxation via the landlords, was a distinctly territorial strategy. The most successful units "would be relatively centered and relatively territorial."[443] Physical control of territory and central government penetration into all areas constituted important characteristics of the direct taxation that emerged in the sixteenth century.

Finally, sixteenth century rulers made more credible commitments to defend territory distant from the center. The sixteenth century saw large changes in military technology and strategy, a phenomenon known in the literature as the "Military Revolution."[444] Improved guns led to improved fortifications. Fortifications necessitated more laborers to build them and more soldiers to be permanently garrisoned in them. This in turn required military organizations to become more centralized. As Michael Mann puts it, "The 'permanent war state' was arriving."[445] The "permanence" highlights the role "sunk costs" played in the credibility of ruler's commitment to defend a particular territory. The expense of fortifications and troops along a territory's boundaries suggested that the ruler would continue to be concerned with their security. Additionally, the desire of rulers to increase the distinctiveness of

---

[442] Joseph Schumpeter (1954), "The Crisis of the Tax State," *International Economic Papers* 6: 5-38.

[443] Mann (1986): 455.

[444] See footnote 110.

[445] Mann (1986): 453.

their boundaries created a situation in sixteenth century Europe where defensive strategies came to dominate. In particular, in Germany "[s]trategy tended to be reduced to a crude concern with territorial occupation or at least its denial to the enemy."[446] Together, these changes in strategy and technology suggest rulers' claims to defend a territory came off as more believable than a century before.

Together, the proxies point to an increased distinctiveness in boundaries in the sixteenth century following the introduction of new sources of transcendent credibility in Europe. Still, the evidence is not overwhelming. At best, the proxies argue for an *increase in relative* boundary distinctiveness from the medieval era, but they do not suggest that the boundaries were very distinctive. One reason for this was that Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist missionaries were fairly successful in their conversion efforts in the mid-sixteenth century. For example, in the 1570s, Emperor Rudolph II essentially became a recluse and did very little to protect his territory from outside influences. As a result, five of the strongest noble families in the Austrian Habsburg lands became Protestant. It is only with the election of Ferdinand II as Emperor in 1617 that the Imperial policy returned to "unrelenting administrative centralization and religious repression."[447] However, the Thirty Years' War began the following year, which destabilized boundaries and rulers in general. In short, this examination of the proxy variables requires a modest conclusion: the post-Reformation sixteenth century saw an increase in the relative distinctiveness of

[446] Bonney (1991): 348
[447] Anderson (1974): 305.

boundaries between political units; however, the degree of distinctiveness must remain an open question.

Conclusion

By 1570, it was possible to say there was not a single Christendom in Europe but several Christendoms. Each saw itself as representing the True Church and each saw the others as heretical pretenders. The lines drawn between them were not merely figurative – overlapping political boundaries between political units of different confessions had to be avoided as best as possible. Not only was this agreed on in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, but there was not a ruler in Europe that could allow the dangerous theological ideas freely infiltrating his or her territory.

Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist theological differences produced important political differences from which no ruler could feel safe. Authority in the Catholic Church flowed from God to the Pope and then trickled down through a vast hierarchy. The Catholic ruler depended on an analogous path of divine authority that fell on him directly from God and from his royal person could pass to the bureaucrats and nobles in his lands. Authority in the Lutheran Church, on the other hand, was bestowed directly on the believer without the Catholic "middle man." As a result, the authority of the pastor stemmed from the congregation of individual believers who selected him. The Lutheran ruler's authority came from the people, whether through election or tacit consent. This freed the ruler from a political hierarchy in which he was not supreme, an important motivation among many of the German princes in the Holy Roman Empire. Finally, authority in the Calvinist Church flowed directly from God to the

elect as a community of persons who had received grace. Politically, the elect should also rule. For a Calvinist ruler, this meant that he was selected by both God and the elect in the society.

These theological and political ideas were anathema to each other. The dangers they posed provided the necessary incentives for rulers to invest significant resources in controlling their borders and in attempting to change the sources of transcendent credibility in each other's territories. The next one hundred years was a period marked with internal crises as rival sources of transcendent credibility sought to take root (the Huguenots in France, for example), clandestine missionary enterprises infiltrated rival territories (the Jesuits and the Calvinists most famously), and outright confessional wars exploded (for example, the Thirty Years' War).

The Protestant Reformation was more than just a mere theological dispute. Where the credibility of rulers depends on religion, as it clearly did in the European Middle Ages, theological disputes can have the explosive potential of changing the entire international system. The number of sources of transcendent credibility in sixteenth century Europe had increased from one a century before to three. As a result, the blurred boundaries between political units in the Middle Ages began to grow significantly more distinct as rulers responded to the increased threats to their credibility.

CHAPTER 7: THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR: FROM GOD TO PROTO-NATIONALISM

A. Introduction
B. The Significance of the Addition of the Nation
    1. The Divine Right of Kings and Absolutism
    2. Early Modern Theories of Resistance
    3. Inserting the Nation between God and the Ruler in the Seventeenth Century
    4. The Usefulness to the Ruler of the Intermediate Step
    5. Nationalism in the Seventeenth Century
C. The Ideological Development of the Change
    1. Nicolo Machiavelli
    2. Jean Bodin
    3. Cardinal Richelieu
D. Richelieu as Innovator of Proto-Nationalism in the Thirty Years' War
    1. The Thirty Years' War as a War of Religion
    2. Richelieu's Foreign Policy
    3. Imitations of Richelieu's Policy
E. Distinctive Borders: The Peace of Westphalia 1648
F. Conclusion

Introduction

During the Thirty Years' War, a new type of source of transcendent credibility emerged. In the middle ages and in the Reformation era, the ruler's authority was derived directly from God. However, in the late sixteenth century, political theorists began to develop theories that envisioned the authority of God passing to the ruler through an intermediary, the "nation," "people," or "commonwealth." Because the ruler was perceived as the physical embodiment of the nation, such theories did not necessarily reduce the ruler's authority. In fact, when successfully applied, these theories freed a ruler from the responsibility of protecting the Church or orthodox belief and allowed him to pursue a foreign policy that prioritized his own realm over the more amorphous Christendom. Cardinal Richelieu first successfully applied these

theories when he devised French foreign policy in the Thirty Years' War. As a result, although his country was predominantly Catholic, he succeeded in supporting the Protestant war cause without a loss in the king's credibility. The success of this policy encouraged other European rulers to imitate Richelieu's strategy. Thus, by the end of the War, the Peace of Westphalia instituted an international system based on this new theory of "proto-nationalism."

Proto-nationalism was a developmental stage bridging the gap between the direct linkage of political authority familiar to the sixteenth century and the subsequent nationalism of the modern states system. It differed from later nationalism in that the ruler was so closely associated with the nation that he was seen as its *physical embodiment*. Later theories of nationalism would make popular the idea that the nobility, a representative institution, or the "people as a whole" embodied of the nation, rather than the ruler. In proto-nationalism, God granted authority to the political unit via the intermediary of the nation. When God bestowed authority on the nation, he thereby made it sacred, a thing that was blessed or even chosen.[448] Thus, the nation became a thing that must be protected because it was holy. The ruler, as the physical embodiment of the nation, contained in his person the whole of the authority that God had granted and, thus, subjects must obey the ruler without question. Proto-

[448] See Adam J Lerner (1991), "Transcendence of the Nation: National Identity and the Terrain of the Divine," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20(3): 407-27; Hertmut Lehmann (1991), "The Germans as a Chosen People: Old Testament Themes in German Nationalism," *German Studies Review* 14(2): 261-73; Dale VanKley (1991), "Protestantism, Catholicism, and the Religious Origins of the French and American Revolutions," *Fides et Historia* 23(1): 53-68; AJ Hoover (1987), "Religion and National Stereotypes: A German Protestant Example," *History of European Ideas* 8(3): 297-307; Bo Andersson (1999), "Sweden, the Elect Nation," *Lutheran Quarterly* 13(3): 305-14.

nationalism increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system, which increased the distinctiveness of boundaries between political units.

This chapter will begin with an outline of several Early Modern theories that described how the ruler possessed political authority. The crucial discussions of political authority in the late sixteenth century involved the question of whether a subject must obey a heretical ruler. This contradiction between the spiritual and political life, an inherent part of the theories developed in the Reformation, generated discussions in which the medieval idea of the nation emerged as a solution. The addition of the nation to the formula of political authority proved not only useful for the ordinary citizen, but also for the ruler who possessed the ability to put it into practice. The chapter concludes with a discussion about how and why the 1648 Peace of Westphalia instituted the practices of proto-nationalism and proto-sovereignty, establishing a new international system in Europe.

The Significance of the Addition of the Nation

The idea that political authority passes from God to the ruler *through* the people was not unheard of in the middle ages. Any discussion about authority in the middle ages must begin with the Pope. There were two distinct streams of thought regarding the source of the Pope's authority. Some argued that the authority came to the person of the Pope directly from God.[449] This, of course, is the precursor to the divine right of kings theory. Since temporal rulers of the period struggled to portray

[449] "God alone chooses, he alone confirms . . . . Neither those who are now called 'electors,' nor others who in whatever way have been so called, should be given this name; rather they should be thought of as 'proclaimers of divine providence,'" Dante (1996 [1314]), *Monarchy*, Prue Shaw, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 93.

themselves on, at a minimum, equal footing to that of the Pope, they too claimed their authority devolved directly from God. The second stream of thought emerged in the late Middle Ages from the Conciliar Movement, in which it was argued that the Pope's authority came from a general council of the Church.[450] God, it was asserted, granted a measure of authority on earth to the Church, meaning the community rather than any single person. This council, then, passed some of its inherited authority on to the Pope. The latter stream suggested that authority progressed from God to the ruler *through* the community, while the former stream argued that the link was direct. Each perspective was further developed in early modern Europe.

The Divine Right of Kings and Absolutism

That the ruler's authority came directly from God was an idea that flowed unabated into the Early Modern period. The supporting scriptural credentials had been well developed. Chapter 13 of Paul's Epistle to the Romans clearly stated: "Let everyone obey the authorities that are over him, for there is no authority except from God, and all authority that exists is established by God." Theologically there were no exceptions – it included Christian kings, tyrants, and heathen rulers. In addition, should a coup occur, then theoretically the new ruler would be as "established by

[450] "It must be held . . . that God permits those assembled in a general council, in defining a question of faith and in other matters, to proceed according to their intelligence, assisted by the general divine influence. It is therefore conceded that it is not possible for a general council to err," William of Ockham (1995 [1347]), "A Dialogue, Part III, Tract I, Book III, Chapter VIII," in *A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings*, Arthur Stephen McGrade and John Kilcullen, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 210; "A matter of faith is not always defined by the arbitrary will of the Roman pontiff alone for he could be a heretic . . . . Indeed in decisions on matters of faith which is why he possesses the primacy, he is subject to the council of the Catholic Church," Nicholas of Cusa (1991 [1443]), *The Catholic Concordance*, Paul E Sigmund, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): (I.61) 43.

God" as the old. The political rebel had no place in the theology of Paul: "The man who opposes authority rebels against the ordinance of God." Treason became punishable here on earth and in the afterlife. Political theories condoning resistance were likewise considered heresy. Although these verses protected the ruler's position, they did not enhance his credibility. Later in the chapter, as Paul described the ruler as "God's servant," the implication was not that all rulers actively serve God, but that God uses all rulers, Christian or heathen, as his tools to reward and punish humanity. Romans 13 could be and often was interpreted as a manifesto in support of the political status quo. Christian rulers enjoyed a special position in the unfolding of God's plans on earth and rulers anxiously encouraged the clergy to continuously remind the people on this score.

The middle ages did not see the development of a full-blown theory of the "Divine Right of Kings."[451] The lack of such a theory had two primary causes. First, the power and prestige of the Papacy precluded such an idea. From the Pope's perspective, only he inherited the "keys of the kingdom," placing him at the forefront of Christendom. The papal bull *Unam Sanctam* (1302) officially stated this theory.[452] Only God could hold temporal rulers accountable, but he did so through his earthly mouthpiece – the Pope. Thus, the Pope possessed the authority to excommunicate rulers who violated the will of God and, if necessary, interdict entire realms. The

---

[451] Yves-Marie Berce (1996), *The Birth of Absolutism: A History of France, 1598-1661* (New York: St. Martin's Press): 62.

[452] "If the earthly power errs, it shall be judged by the spiritual power, if a lesser spiritual power errs it shall be judged by its superior, but if the supreme spiritual power errs it can be judged only by God not by man," "Unam Sanctum" (1302), in Brian Tierney, ed., *The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300 (Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching 21)* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 189.

Pope could generate compliance from a ruler's population to a degree he was no longer able to achieve in the early modern period.[453]

A second reason Divine Right did not emerge in the middle ages is that rulers simply had to contend with a powerful set of nobles who had incentives to perpetuate an interpretation of the Christian source of transcendent credibility in which they possessed credibility rivaling that of the king.[454] The feudal system ensured that, while a monarch may be first among equals, he was still merely one of the nobility. Everything in the ruler-noble relationship, from the economy to the military, guaranteed that a ruler must consult with and listen to the lords of his realms. The nobility relied on the same theological arguments that the ruler did.[455] Thanks to Romans 13, even at these lower political levels rebelliousness entailed sin. These two medieval obstacles to Divine Right theory declined in the early modern period: the Pope's prestige had faded decidedly and, in many areas, the nobles no longer held the same ability to check the authority of the king.[456]

Under a Divine Right formulation the ruler's behavior was still seen as limited. Theologically, this was because God was self-limited. An important debate regarding

---

[453] The revitalization of the Catholic Church in the mid-sixteenth century enabled this theory to experience a brief renaissance. Toward the end of the 1500s, several Jesuits in Spain argued that God gave the Pope authority to judge secular rulers. Foremost among this group was Francisco Suarez who reasoned that, although security and order on earth are important, God ordained that the spiritual purpose of man was far more important. Just as God subordinated secular goals to spiritual goals, likewise, Christ made his "Vicar pastor over Christian princes no less than over the rest of Christendom, Francisco Suarez (1612), *A Treatise on the Laws and God the Lawgiver*, quoted in WM Spellman (1998), *European Political Thought 1600-1700* (New York: St. Martin's Press): 47.

[454] Georges Duby (1980), *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 13-64.

[455] Although both ruler and nobility relied on the same source of transcendent credibility, there remained crucial differences between the ruler and the nobles, for example, the ruler's divine ability to heal scrofula with a touch, EH Kantorowicz (1957), *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

[456] See Hendrik Spruyt (1994), *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 34-57.

the relationship between God and natural law raged during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.[457] On one side were those who said God was omnipotent and therefore unlimited in power. In the mid-seventeenth century, several royal absolutists (such as Hobbes and Filmer) would associate their political position with this absolutist theological position.[458] However, many theologians and mathematicians challenged this view, arguing that two plus two still equaled four for God. He created natural law and then he bound himself to this law. If God's power was limited, albeit under by his own will, then the ruler's power must be limited as well.[459] Divine Right theories at the turn of the seventeenth century did not find this latter interpretation antithetical primarily because such a construction was not considered a real limitation on the power of God or the monarch. After all, the king legislated and interpreted the laws, so he could not realistically break them. Some even argued that the ruler would not break the law if he could since that would be contrary to his nearly divine nature.

The medieval concept of the "common good" was considered another limitation on the power of the ruler. Thomas Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that government is necessary – not a necessary evil as Augustine portrayed it, but a necessary good. To live in a group is "a necessity of man's nature," and this requires a government.[460] Since there is One God governing creation, it stands to reason that

---

[457] Yves Charles Zarka (1999), "The Foundations of Natural Law," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 7(1): 15-32.

[458] Stephen M Fallon (1988), "'To Act or Not To Act:' Milton's Conception of Divine Freedom," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49(3): 425-53.

[459] The debate on the distinction between "absolute" and "ordained" power of God and the parallel with rulers is most thoroughly discussed by the medievalist Francis Oakley, especially (1998), "The Absolute and Ordained Power of God and King in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Philosophy, Science, Politics, and Law," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 59(4): 669-690.

[460] Thomas Aquinas (1961 [13th century]), "On Kingship," in Michael Curtis, ed., *The Great Political Theories, Volume I* (New York: Avon Books): 197.

rule by one person is the best form of government. As God's representative, his actions "should be directed toward securing the welfare of that which he undertakes to rule," namely his people.[461] Most of this logic would remain unquestioned for hundreds of years. Even those in the conciliar movement who stressed the authority of the group recognized that one of the first functions of the council must be to select a single ruler. The goal of "welfare" of the people or even "common good" also was not disputed (except perhaps by Machiavelli). The question was not whether a ruler had limits on his behavior. The questions were who decided when those limits had been violated and who imposed a punishment for out-of-bounds behavior.[462]

The ambiguity of the terms "welfare" and "common good" narrowed the core of the discussion on political authority in the Early Modern period to a overwhelming concern: who defined "welfare?" Only a very few claimed the judgment belonged to the people as a whole. More argued that it belonged to a representative body of the people, such as a parliament. They cited the precedent of the Magna Carta of thirteenth century England, where the nobles successfully grabbed their right to define welfare. In Early Modern Europe, however, the growing bureaucratization of royal courts permitted kings to reassert the claim that they alone defined welfare, agents accountable only to God. In many cases, rulers now possessed sufficient power and independence to reasonably back that claim up.

---

[461] Ibid., 198.

[462] These two questions must be considered together. According to seventeenth century Divine Right theorists, the king could not make laws without the consent of the people. However, if the monarch did violate this principle, he could not be resisted. Thus, the ruler had responsibilities, but no accountability to the people, Glenn Burgess (1992), "The Divine Right of Kings Reconsidered," *English Historical Review* 107(425): 837-61.

Hamstrung by the commandments in Romans 13, early Protestant reformers in the first half of the sixteenth century offered no alternative. Martin Luther and John Calvin each supported a literal reading of this passage, even in places where Protestant congregations found themselves persecuted. In England, Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell used Luther's and William Tyndale's doctrines of obedience to convince the Parliament that the ecclesial structure erected by the king should be acquiesced to without question.[463] Thus, any opposition to the growing Divine Right ideologies between 1500 and 1570 either came from the Radical Reformers or from Catholic nobles who were relatively secure from the growing Protestant movement.

Theory and practice of Divine Right of Kings merged in the reign of King James I of England, who argued that when a king is crowned, he "becomes a natural Father to all his Lieges." His "fatherly duty is bound to care for the nourishing, education, and virtuous government of his children."[464] In short, it was *he* who provided for and decided the welfare of his subjects. It was not for the subjects to question the King any more than nature allowed children to question their father. The King was "to be judged only by God, whom to only he must give count of his judgment."[465] James extended this idea in a speech he gave in 1609. Kings were not merely fathers, but gods — "even by God himself they are called Gods."[466] They were justly called this because "they exercise a manner or resemblance of Divine

---

[463] SW Haas (1980), "Martin Luther's 'Divine Right' Kingship and the Royal Supremacy: Two Tracts from the 1531 Parliament and Convocation of the Clergy," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 31(3): 317-27; Haas (1979), "Henry VIII's *Glasse of Truth*," *History* 64(212): 353-62.

[464] James I (1961 [1598]), "The Trew Law of Free Monarchies," in Michael Curtis, ed., *The Great Political Theories, Volume I* (New York: Avon Books): 282.

[465] Ibid.

[466] James I (1961 [1609]), "Speech of 1609," in *The Great Political Theories, Volume I*: 285.

power upon earth."[467] He would later, in 1616, explain to the Star Chamber: "It is Atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do: good Christians content themselves with his will revealed in his word. So, it is presumption and high contempt to dispute what a King can do, or say that a King cannot do this, or that."[468] So, for James, who defined welfare? The God among you. The King.

Early Modern Theories of Resistance

It is uncertain the extent to which Early Modern theories interposed the "people" between God and the ruler owed a debt directly to the conciliar movement. The conciliar movement was not anti-Church or even anti-Pope. It merely argued that the spiritual authority God gave to men depended on the consensus of the leaders of the Church as representatives of the larger community. The Pope could still be considered "infallible," since this was both a part of the authority granted him and a means of holding him in check.[469] On the other hand, Protestant theorists of the Early Modern period who used similar reasoning had different goals in mind. First of all, when they argued that God granted authority to His "Church," they did not mean the Roman Catholic Church, but what they argued was the True Church or the reformed church. Reformers did not see themselves as "breaking away" from the Catholic Church, but reconstructing the Church along the model God had originally intended. To these reformers, it was the Roman Catholic Church that broke away from God's

[467] Ibid.

[468] James I (1961 [1616]), "Speech in Star Chamber," in *The Great Political Theories, Volume I*: 286-87.

[469] Infallibility served as a check on the Pope because the current Pope was constrained by the decrees of his equally infallible predecessors, Brian Tierney (1971), "The Origins of Papal Infallibility," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 8(4): 841-64.

Church. Secondly, this theory mirrored the political situation in many of the towns of northern Germany and the Low Countries where Protestantism had most thoroughly taken root. Authority in these cities came from town councils, invested with power from the citizens. These councils could likewise create mayors. God was not perceived as directly appointing the officers of temporal authority in these urban areas. A theory of mediated authority killed two birds with one stone: it justified the actions of the Protestant Reformation and the political institutions already in existence in much of the urban North. Thus, it is possible to explain the existence of the theory in the early modern period without drawing direct links to the conciliar movement.

Catholic rulers' continued persecutions of Protestant congregations sparked some of these reformers to generate theories of resistance. A theory of resistance was impossible for both Catholics and Protestants so long as it was believed that God directly granted a ruler's political authority.[470] The most logical answer politically and theologically was to develop a theory of mediated authority in which the ruler's authority passed first through the community. The English restoration of Catholicism under Queen Mary (1553-58) became the first large-scale laboratory in which Protestants developed these theories of mediated authority and resistance.[471] During

---

[470] Although the overwhelming number of sixteenth century authors who advocated the right of the people to resist were Protestant, the Catholics also had a number, especially among the Spanish Jesuits, that advocated resistance to a tyrant and even in some cases assassination. Advocating mediated authority, the Jesuit priest Juan de Mariana asserted, "Assuredly the republic, whence the regal power has its source, can call a king into court . . . [and] it can strip him of his principate,' Juan de Mariana (1948 [1599]), *The King and the Education of the King*, George Albert Moore, ed. (Washington: Country Dollar Press): chapter 8. Many Catholics also still adhered to the Medieval version of resistance: the Pope had the authority to call for the resistance of a king.

[471] Christopher Goodman (1972 [1558]), *How Superior Powers Ought to be Obeyed of Their Subjects* (New York: Da Capo Press); Dan G Danner (1981), "Resistance and the Ungodly Magistrate in the Sixteenth Century: The Marian Exiles," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 49(3): 471-81.

this same decade, Scotland saw reformer John Knox publish numerous tracts against the Catholic regent Mary of Guise and Mary Queen of Scots that argued the people have the right and responsibility to determine whether their ruler was obeying God and resist and kill ungodly magistrates.[472] More controversially, the Scottish reformer George Buchanan wrote that Romans 13 was intended only for the historical context in which it was written: Christians in the Apostle Paul's day were not powerful enough to overthrow their Roman tyrants. The situation was very different in the sixteenth century, however. People gave authority to kings in exchange for protection. When a ruler no longer fulfilled his side of the bargain, the people could depose or kill him.[473] The installment of Protestant rulers in England and Scotland forced the next generation of Protestants to back away from theories of resistance that justified regicide – even as Catholic theorists began to develop theories of resistance of their

[472] "I say, it is not only lawful to punish to the death such as labour to subvert the true religion, but the magistrates and people are bound to so to do unless they will provoke the wrath of God against themselves. And therefore I fear not to affirm that it had been the duty of the nobility, judges, rulers and people of England not only to have resisted and againstanded Mary that Jezebel whom they call their queen, but also to have punished her to death, with all the sort of her idolatrous priests," John Knox (1994 [1558]), "An Appellation to the Nobility and Estates of Scotland," *On Rebellion*, Roger A Mason, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 104.

[473] Buchanan wrote his *Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots* in the 1550s while in exile, but the book was published posthumously in 1579, coinciding with the publication of several Calvinist tracts that promoted the same basic (though less radical) theory of resistance.

Buchanan specifically stated that each individual had the authority to lawfully assassinate a bad ruler: "A tyrant hath not only no just authority over a people, but is also their enemy . . . . A lawful war being once undertaken with an enemy, and for a just cause, it is lawful not only for the whole people to kill that enemy, but for every one of them," George Buchanan (2004 [1579]), *A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots: A Critical Edition and Translation of George Buchanan's* De Iure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus *(St. Andrew's Studies in Reformation History Series)* (Aldershot: Ashgate). Ironically, Buchanan served as a tutor for Mary Queen of Scots, Michel Montaigne, and James VI of Scotland (later James I of England). James did not have pleasant memories of his tutor.

own. However, the notion that authority was derived from the community endured among many Protestants, especially those associated with Parliament.[474]

It was during the French Wars of Religion (1562-98) that the theory of resistance came into its own. Before 1572, most Huguenots remained staunch supporters of the king, even as they rejected Catholicism.[475] If there existed a unified "Huguenot strategy" it was to replace the king's Catholic advisors with Protestants. However, the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 and its aftermath convinced many Huguenots that the king stood firmly on the side of evil (i.e. Catholicism) and must be resisted.[476] Like their predecessors in England and Scotland, the Calvinists in southern France developed a theory of resistance that placed the "people" between God's grant of authority and the ruler's exercise thereof. Since God transmitted authority to the king via the people, the king was not free to act in any manner he desired and claim God as his sole judge. A right to resistance demanded a theory of political authority that disconnected God and the ruler.

Perhaps the most influential tract published by the Huguenots during this period is *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* (*A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants*), written in 1579 by an unknown Huguenot.[477] A ruler's ultimate authority stemmed from God.

---

[474] For example, Richard Hooker (1989 [1593]), *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Thomas Smith (1565), *De Republica Anglorum*.

[475] Huguenots often claimed they were fighting for the purpose of defending the king and his estate, Kathleen A Parrow (1991), "Neither Treason Nor Heresy: Use of Defense Arguments to Avoid Forfeiture during the French Wars of Religion," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 22(4): 705-16.

[476] Luc Racaut (2002), "Religious Polemic and Huguenot Self-Perception and Identity, 1554-1619," in Raymond A Mentzer and Andrew Spicer, eds., *Society and Culture in the Huguenot World, 1559-1685* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 29-43.

[477] According to Julian H Franklin it was probably written by Philippe de Mornay; Julian H Fraklin, ed. (1969), *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza, and Mornay* (New York: Pegasus): 39.

However, "the people establish kings, puts the scepter into their hands, and who with their suffrages, approve the election."[478] This was not a usurpation of God's right. On the contrary, "God would have it done in this manner, to the end that the kings should acknowledge, that after God they hold their power and sovereignty from the people." This is

"to the end that Kings may always remember that it is from God, *but by the people*, and for the people's sake that they do reign, and that in their glory they say not (as is their custom) they hold their kingdom only of God and their sword, but withal add that it was the people who first girt them with that sword."[479]

Thus, when the king acted contrary to the will of God (in this case meaning that he persecuted and rejected the Huguenot doctrines), the people stood in a position within the hierarchy of authority to judge his actions and, if necessary, resist. It must be pointed out that the *Vindiciae* did not advocate mob rule. The "people" could resist only if their recognized leaders, in this case the Huguenot nobles and clergy, had judged the king as guilty of opposing God and, as a result of this determination, called for resistance.[480] If these conditions were met such resistance would not be heresy, but, on the contrary, the responsibility of the servants of God.

---

[478] "Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos," in Michael Curtis, ed., *The Great Political Theories, Volume I* (New York: Avon Books, 1961): 255-56.

[479] Ibid., 256 (emphasis added).

[480] Theodore de Beza, the most influential post-Calvin theologian among the Huguenots, probably inspired this limitation. In 1574, he wrote that the Romans 13 command of obedience to government applied locally. Thus, when the king violated the rights of the local magistrates, usually Huguenots, these magistrates were justified in resisting, deposing, and killing the king and in calling the populace to assist in this work, Scott M Manetsch (2000), *Theodore Beza and the Quest for Peace in France, 1572-1598* (Leiden: Brill). Also see Theodore de Beza (1969 [1574]), "Right of Magistrates," in *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century*: 101-35.

Thus, in the Huguenot theory of resistance, the "people," not just the monarch and clergy, were considered "servants of God," and had been given a charge that required collective action. Having been given one responsibility, it seemed perfectly logical that God should give the people other tasks in the fulfillment of His divine purpose. Here, then, was not merely a loose collection of individuals, but a divinely recognized corporate unit. God interacted with the collective people just as he would an individual. It was not merely the sum of its parts, but something much greater—it was a "nation."

Inserting the *Nation* between God and the Ruler in the Seventeenth Century

The idea that authority flowed from God to ruler through the consent of the people did exist among a few medieval authors. The popularity of Aristotle and Cicero in the late middle ages meant that there was awareness that the Greeks and Roman Republicans highly valued this political idea.[481] However, until the Renaissance these classical political ideas belonged to a time before Christ and, thus, required adaptation. John of Paris, for example, attempted to combine classical political ideas with those of medieval Christianity. For John, all legitimate authority came from God, but God granted each community the choice of which individual would exercise that authority. Thus, royal power was "from God and from the people who elect a king by choosing either a person or a royal house."[482] Note that John's theory said nothing about whether this consent was repeatedly sought or tacitly

[481] Antony Black (1992), *Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 19-20.

[482] John of Paris (1988 [1302-03]), "On the Origin and Nature of Government in Church and State," in Tierney, *The Crisis of Church and State*: 208.

implied. Once consent had been given, albeit hundreds of years ago, the people's consultation might be complete. This was very different from the early modern theories of resistance, though it adopted the same methodology of inserting the community or nation between God and ruler.

It is crucial to emphasize at this point that the "Nation," or to be more specific, the "French," had a very different meaning than it does today. The king was to aim for the common good of the people. But, who determined what was or was not for the common good of the people? It was with respect to *this* crucial distinction that absolutist and constitutionalist theories of government separated.[483] The constitutionalist argued that the people decided for themselves or, at the very least, the ruler consulted the people through formal institutions when defining the common

---

[483] Recent historical scholarship has attacked the traditional concept of absolutism, pointing out in particular that no monarch can rule without at least some form of consent, Richard Bonney (1987), "Absolutism: What's In a Name?" *French History* 1(1): 93-117; William Beik (1990), "The Culture of Protest in Seventeenth-Century French Towns," *Social History* 15(1): 1-23; Nicholas Henshall (1992), "The Myth of Absolutism," *History Today* 42: 40-47; John Rogister (1996), "Some New Directions in the Historiography of State Assemblies and Parliaments in Early and Late Modern Europe," *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 16: 1-16; William Beik (2005), "The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration," *Past and Present* 188(1): 195-224.

One example of this is that a king or duke who raised taxes without summoning the parliamentary body still usually activated informal channels of advise and consent with key lesser nobles and burghers, Matthew Vester (2000), "Fiscal Commissions, Consensus and Informal Representation: Taxation in the Savoyard Domains, 1559-1580," *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 20: 59-74. A parallel argument concerning the non-absolute nature of absolutism within the Catholic Church during the Counter-Reformation can be found in Barbara B Diefendorf (2004), "Contradictions of the Century of Saints: Aristocratic Patronage and the Convents of Counter-Reformation Paris," *French Historical Studies* 24(3): 469-99. Thus, absolutism was never absolute, Hilton Root (1989), "Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy During the Old Regime," *Rationality and Society* 1(2): 240-58.

Absolutism as a definitional term may be misleading, yet it remains a useful signifier of a type of political authority that existed in the early modern period and should not be discarded. At the very least, absolutism can be seen as the monarch's struggle "to move in the direction of greater independence without ever achieving complete freedom of action," JS Morrill (1978), "French Absolutism as Limited Monarchy," *Historical Journal* 21(4): 961-72. The private nature of informal networks provided the monarch greater independence than the more public formal institutions of assemblies. Thus, the distinction between absolutism and constitutionalism may be seen as reliance on formal versus informal institutions of representatives of the people.

good. For the absolutist, the king (or his appointed ministers) defined the common good, or the "national interest." As a result, the absolutist argued that regardless of how the ruler received his authority, the people lacked an adequate understanding of what was and was not in their interest; thus, they were in no position to judge.

Thus, if the modern phrase "government by the people and for the people" were presented to the absolutists Cardinal Richelieu and King Louis XIV, they would have had no objections to it. The king was the embodiment of the nation and acted in its best interests. They would have rejected the notion that the phrase implied the right and duty of the "people" to hold the monarch accountable. The nation was not merely a sum of its individuals. "France" was something greater than a sum of all Frenchmen. The king's sovereignty and authority was derived from God via this entity. The people could not control this "more-than-the-sum-of-its-parts" entity – the nation – because the inferior could not have authority over the superior. The king, on the contrary, was the physical embodiment of the nation. He was France. Louis XIV supposedly boasted "I am the state." One of Louis' bishops' put it this way: "The will of all the people is included in his."[484] The absolutist monarch *was* "government by the people for the people."

This theory of political authority also differed from social contract theories that developed in the seventeenth century. Social contract theory argued that political institutions were neither God-given nor natural. For a variety of reasons, men voluntarily chose to leave the State of Nature, pool their consent, and form a

[484] Quoted in Richard S Dunn (1979), *The Age of Religious Wars, 1559-1715* (New York: WW Norton and Company): 181-82.

government. In order for this to occur, each person required some assurance that he was not being left defenseless against every other person. Therefore, social contract theory imagined that each person signed a hypothetical (though binding) contract with every other person, thereby creating a collective government and protecting some individual privileges. Although often implied, this was followed with a second contract between the ruler and the ruled with the same end in mind.[485]

A contractual relationship was absurd without an enforcement mechanism capable of punishing violations. Three basic mechanisms were argued to exist. First, God was the neutral third-party adjudicator. Ultimately, all Christian confessions believed the ruler who violated his part of the contract had to face the judgment of God, if not in life then in death. This mechanism had the advantage of preserving many of the conclusions of the absolutist theories. Other princes constituted a second enforcement mechanism. Natural Law theorists had long argued that it was just to use force to compel a tyrant to cease mistreating his subjects. In the sixteenth century, the Spanish Jesuit Francisco de Vitoria argued in his treatise *On the Indians* that Spain was justified in waging war against rulers in the Americas that forbade the preaching of Christianity or oppressed native converts.[486] European rulers eventually rejected this mechanism, however. They responded to an increase in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the mid-seventeenth century by making internal matters of state off-limits to other rulers. Finally, a third mechanism to enforce the contract between ruler and ruled asserted that the injured party possessed the right to nullify the

---

[485] Yoram Barzel (2002), *A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 138-54.

[486] Francisco de Vitoria (1991 [1539]), "On the American Indians," in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence, eds., *Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 231-92.

contract. When the ruler failed to fulfill his part of the contract, the contract was void. This, of course, renewed the debate over who spoke for the "ruled" and possessed the authority to declare the contract void. The answer in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was resoundingly the nobility and the wealthy, in other words, the "best" of the ruled. The seventeenth century conditions that prompted the development of social contract theories favored approaches that stressed this third enforcement mechanism.[487]

In social contract theory the authority of the government stemmed from this contract and from the parties that were signatories thereof. While social contract theories gained in popularity and use through the rest of the century and into the next, many in the population believed any contract was still ultimately dependent on God.[488] A bridge was required linking the credibility of God with the credibility of the nation. The theories pursued by Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and Cardinal Richelieu allowed the nation to appropriate and perpetuate the credibility that had been held by God. Though it may have been an unintentional outcome, once the nation possessed enough credibility to stand on its own, at least in part, God was able to drift into the early retirement of Deism without a concomitant threat to political order and stability.

---

[487] Two conditions in particular made the success of the third mechanism inevitable. First, as God was replaced by the more secular idea of the nation as the source of transcendent credibility, the first mechanism became ineffective. Second, the development of Westphalian notions of sovereignty (also a consequence of the success of the idea of the nation as the source of transcendent credibility) increasingly rendered the second mechanism irrelevant. Thus, the third mechanism and the political ideas that necessarily accompanied it achieved dominance in Europe.

[488] In his *Reflections*, Edmund Burke would argue that any social contract was superseded by "the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appointed place" and which depends on the divine "Institutor and Author and Protector of civil society." Quoted in Don Herzog (1998), *Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 34.

Many narratives of political authority skip over this intermediate step because their thematic focus is the progression from absolutism to constitutionalism. This process, whereby the torch of transcendent credibility was passed from God to the nation, is crucial to understanding current ideas about the legitimation of authority.

Thus, authority derivation became mediated, progressing from God to nation to monarch, rather than directly from God to monarch, as in a Divine Right theory. However, even though an intermediate step was added in the derivation of authority, the nation and the monarch remained nearly synonymous. This made it very different from modern nationalism. Because this early use of the nation foreshadowed later developments, we may refer to it as "proto-nationalism." This constituted a transition stage between the period in which God was the source of transcendent credibility and a later era when the nation alone functioned as the source. In proto-nationalism, the nation of France was an entity recognized and sanctioned by God. Louis XIII (or more precisely, his minister Richelieu) claimed authority to act in the interests of France and *as the embodiment of France*.

The Usefulness to the Ruler of the Intermediate Step

Proto-nationalism's addition of this intermediate step gave a monarch many new options. First, religious division within the realm no longer hobbled the monarch to the same degree it once did. It was not coincidental that it is France that pioneered this new theory of political authority. The Wars of Religion in the last half of the sixteenth century and the tenuous peace maintained under the Edict of Nantes increased the salience of the issue of religion. Under the new conception, every

Frenchman owed allegiance to the king, whether or not they were Protestant or Catholic. The continued struggles later in the century revealed that this transformation was not an easy process.[489] Under the cover of proto-nationalism, Richelieu and Louis XIV re-imposed Catholicism on France through overt and covert means. After nearly everyone in France was Catholic again following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, it became easier for the state bureaucracy to transfer the onus from religion to nationalism.

Second, the addition of the intermediate step increased the options in foreign policy. The Catholic Habsburgs had been a threat to the realm of the French monarchs for a century and a half, but they shared a source of transcendent credibility. On the other hand, Protestant areas in the Low Countries threatened France's source of transcendent credibility, but were much less of a threat physically. Thus, France was beset with contradictions in foreign policy. Adding the intermediate step of nation allowed France to ally with "heretic" rulers and war against more powerful co-religionists. In short, once France's source of transcendent credibility shifted from

---

[489] While a transition to a "French proto-nation" as the source of transcendent credibility entailed several benefits for the government, there is still a question of why the French people went along with it. First, the French proto-nation would have been consistently linked to Catholic Christianity, so in large part, there would have been few instances where old beliefs would have been contradicted outright. Second, the French Catholic Church had a long history of distancing itself from the larger Catholic Church (a phenomenon known as Gallicanism), JHM Salmon (1991), "Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontanism, and Royalist Response, 1580-1620," in JH Burns, ed., *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 231-33. Thus, the average French subject would have been less surprised than other European Catholics to find the leaders of their respective proto-nation increasingly distancing it from the larger European Catholic community. Third, "reason of state" theories were increasingly used in France since the late sixteenth century in response to the civil wars in France, Nannerl Keohane (1980), *Philosophy and the State in France: Renaissance to Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): chs. 4-5. French subjects would therefore have been somewhat familiar with the vocabulary used by proto-nationalism. Fourth, Richelieu invested heavily in authors, artists, and scholars who were paid to produce propaganda that helped the new proto-nationalism to appear legitimate and natural [see below]. These four reasons suggest why the French subjects went along with the transition to the degree that they did, at least in the beginning.

Catholic Christianity to nationality (or "France"), the largest physical threats simultaneously became the largest threats ideologically, greatly reducing the potential for foreign policy contradictions.

The intermediate step was useful for a third reason: it allowed the monarch to openly act in the interests of France rather than Christendom. In the middle ages, when the Pope summoned a Crusade, many kings and lords often dropped everything and, at great expense, marched toward the Holy Land. Similarly, the Catholic Church urged the formation of Catholic Leagues and other internal measures to eradicate the Protestant heresy in the sixteenth century. Inasmuch as the credibility of the ruler depended on the support of the Catholic Church, the interests of a realm occasionally coincided with the interests of a greater Christendom, but not always. The insertion of the "nation" in the process of authority derivation allowed kings to openly set aside the idea of Christendom in favor of the national interest, or in the language of the day, *raison d'etat*. Kings could, in effect, pursue the self-interest of their kingdom unabashedly, as a duty God had placed on them.

Rulers who possessed the necessary power to pursue what they saw as the "national interest" thrived under this new conception. Any threat against the nation could be spun as a threat against an entity God had created and infused with authority. In addition, it was a small step from God-created to God-blessed to God-chosen. The language of the Old Testament in which God *chooses* the nation of Israel became part of the mythos of many of the early nationalist movements of the period. As a result of these changes, smaller and weaker realms suddenly found themselves alone, without

the implied support of co-religionists. On the other hand, this vulnerability could be compensated with alliances that would have been impossible (at least openly) before.

Nationalism in the Seventeenth Century

Nationalism, then, is analogous to the dogmas and traditions of a religion. The efficacy of a nation's credibility depends on the narratives that are told about it to succeeding generations. The heroes of the nation gradually replaced the function of the saints. Speeches, stories, and even law, fulfill the role of proverbs and admonitions of Scripture. Government, bureaucracy, and the courts supplant the Church and clergy as the primarily interpreters of doctrines. It is likely that both intentional and unintentional efforts were necessary to successfully sanctify the nation. Not only did nationalism resemble religion in its doctrinal and institutional forms, it could also mimic its function within the society: providing a source of transcendent credibility governments could use to more effectively generate compliance from the population.

This transitional "proto-national" phase differed from more modern versions of nationalism in that it depended on the added credibility that Catholicism provided. It was neither the Catholic God nor "France" alone that emerged as the source of transcendent credibility, but a melding of the two. The people of the nation were portrayed as a "chosen people." Thus, religion was not jettisoned as a source, but used in a new manner. The religion piece of the equation became less and less important as time progressed, though it has not completely disappeared as the 2004 United States'

Presidential election demonstrated. God (and gods) became seen as acting in history *through* nations, rather than merely *transcending* them.[490]

The Ideological Development of the Change

This shift to proto-nationalism developed in the writings of three important Early Modern theorists. Perhaps it is unfair to group Machiavelli, Bodin, and Richelieu together. Each lived in a different time from the others and promoted proto-nationalist ideas for very different reasons. While Richelieu probably had read Bodin and both Frenchmen were more than likely familiar with Machiavelli's theories, there is no evidence of an epiphinous moment where one writer radically transformed the way of the thinking of another. And still, there was a common strand of thought that ran through each that was different from other theories of political authority in the period: political authority passed from God to ruler through a new, very subtle, intermediate step of a nation. The nation was a political community created by, in relationship with, and in some cases *chosen* by God. Yet, in these early theories the nation and the ruler were described as nearly synonymous: authority passed almost instantaneously from the nation to the ruler at the moment God passed authority to the nation. This made these theories different from modern theories of political authority.

Nicolo Machiavelli

Machiavelli reversed the medieval ends-means relationship between politics and religion. Theorists of the Middle Ages, driven on by the looming presence of

[490] See, for example, Montesquieu, Vico, and Hegel.

Augustine's *City of God*, understood that the role of government was to create an atmosphere that was conducive to salvation of the soul.[491] Whether the sword of the state was wiping out heresy or maintaining peace in the realm, the government existed to allow God to work among the people. Fifteenth and sixteenth century Humanists largely preserved this relationship. Erasmus, for example, argued that the goal of the Christian prince must always be to live virtuously. All the good things of government would materialize if the prince were virtuous.[492] Machiavelli criticized this conclusion, saying that, in fact, the "virtuous" prince was the biggest sucker in Christendom. Other people would jump at opportunities to exploit the virtuous, and certainly naïve, prince to the detriment of the people he ruled, thereby defeating the purpose of government.

Thus, the goal of the prince must be survival and glory, because only once he had achieved these could the prince protect his people. Although Machiavelli believed that the virtue of Erasmus' prince would rub off on the people, others would take advantage of them and wipe them out. On the other hand, the glory of Machiavelli's prince would also transfer to the people and they would then be able to protect themselves and survive. Machiavelli's study of the Ancient Romans and contemporary rulers led him to this conclusion. Government did not exist to protect religion or religious belief—these things existed to preserve government.[493] He

---

[491] DE Luscombe and GR Evans (1988), "The Twelfth-Century Renaissance," in JH Burns, ed., *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – c. 1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 323-25.

[492] Erasmus (1997 [1516]), *The Education of a Christian Prince*, Lisa Jardine, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 2.

[493] Quentin Skinner (2000 [1981]), *Machiavelli: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 70-72.

illustrated this principle in his *Discourses* in which he described how Numa, an early king of the Romans, "turned to religion as the instrument necessary above all others for the maintenance of a civilized state"[494] Numa fabricated conversations with a nymph to convince the people of the validity of the religious institutions and ideas he was establishing. Machiavelli concluded that all legislators and wise men ultimately "have recourse to God."[495] In other words, religion served as a means to the end of politics.

In the final chapter of *The Prince*, Machiavelli proclaimed that an Italian leader should follow his prescriptions, unite Italy, and evict the foreign armies from Italian soil. He envisioned "Italy" as a unified entity: "Italy is waiting to see who can be the one to heal her wounds."[496] As opposed to a more general Christendom, Machiavelli pictured God caring about Italy itself. Like a mother bird pushing a baby out of a nest, "God does not want to do everything Himself, and take away from us our free will and our share of the glory which belongs to us."[497] Machiavelli had no desire to remove God from the equation, though many commentators accused him of such a purpose. After all, it was God who created and recognized this thing called "Italy." Granted, Machiavelli took numerous shots at the Catholic Church, placing much of the blame of the fifteenth century wars and discord in Italy on the Church.[498] But, this only

---

[494] Nicolo Machiavelli (1970 [1514]), *The Discourses*, Bernard Crick, ed. (New York: Penguin Books): 139.

[495] Ibid., 141.

[496] Nicolo Machiavelli (1961 [1513]), *The Prince*, George Bull, ed. (New York: Penguin Books): 134.

[497] Ibid., 135.

[498] *The Discourses*: Book I, Chapter 12.

served to emphasize the shift he was making from a single, united Christendom under the Catholic hierarchy to several God-ordained political units.

Putting his argument together, Machiavelli advocated a theory of political authority in which God granted authority to discrete political units or nations, who then passed that authority on to rulers through institutions. Whether the resulting institutions were absolutist, constitutionalist, or another variant depended on several factors, but the theory of political authority remained the same. Machiavelli clearly stated that a portion of the authority of a ruler came from his own skill, or the lion and the fox in him. But political authority also derived from the soundness of the institutions, which were dependent on religion, and from the *appearance* of virtuousness. Thus, whether God actually passed authority on to the political unit or not was unimportant – it was useful to let the people *believe* He does. The successful ruler would perpetuate this belief.

These theories made Machiavelli a pariah throughout much of the sixteenth century. The Catholics gave him a place of honor on their Index of Prohibited Books. His work fared no better among the Protestants as the publication of *Anti-Machiavel* in 1576 by the French Calvinist Innocent Gentillet attests. His image never recovered from the public relations beating that it took, but this only meant that people did not quote him – they still read him. Even Richelieu, who embodied a Machiavellian prince in his personal actions and foreign policy, eschewed association between himself and the Italian theorist. However, many of the rulers and political theorists of the sixteenth and seventeenth century paid the ultimate homage to Machiavelli as they began to follow his principles, all the while *appearing* to renounce them.

Jean Bodin

Jean Bodin published *Six Books of the Republic* in 1576, in the closing years of the French Religious Wars.[499] During this period, many groups and persons in France claimed the right to judge for themselves the validity of political authorities. Bodin responded with a definition of sovereignty that grew to be the standard definition of the seventeenth century. Bodin named sovereignty as that indivisible power a state possessed that stood above question. It was "the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonweal." The entity within the community that exercised sovereignty could not be lawfully resisted. The law that compelled this was not man-made, but Natural Law, and hence God's Law.

In Bodin's theory, authority was passed to men in discrete packages. Bodin did not imagine it passed directly from God to a ruler, but instead to a Commonweal. God used this intermediary because the Commonweal was the location where all of the disharmonious elements of the universe could be regulated.[500] This paralleled Bodin's beliefs about the human soul. In his last book, *The Theater of Nature*, Bodin described the soul as belonging to both the spiritual and physical worlds. Thus, the soul acted as an intermediary between these very different spheres, allowing one to impact the other.[501] The Commonweal or nation operated in much the same manner, functioning as an intermediary between the spiritual world of God and the individuals

---

[499] Jean Bodin (1992), *On Sovereignty*, Julian H Franklin, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[500] David Parker (1981), "Law, Society, and the State in the Thought of Jean Bodin," *History of Political Thought* 2(2): 253-85.

[501] Ann Blair (1997), *The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 137-42.

of the particular group of people. A Commonweal was as invisible as the soul, but both were necessary to allow the realms of Heaven and Earth to communicate.

However, temporal stability required that some entity within the Commonweal must be responsible for wielding the authority God granted to it.[502] To Bodin, the best option was a single person or a monarch. After all, divine authority, which was perfect, was structured with a single God at the top of all. Bodin agreed with Divine Right theories that God was all-powerful and, likewise, the monarch must be absolute. Also, God was merciful and just, and thereby limited His own power. Like God, Bodin's monarch is paradoxically absolute and limited.[503] However, Bodin insisted that customary law represented a crucial limitation on the monarch. Divine Right theorists did not concede such laws were a limitation.[504] For Bodin, customary law emerged from the Commonweal itself over time and was beyond the power of the monarch to abrogate.[505] Tellingly, the staunchly Catholic Bodin supported Protestant Henry of Navarre's claims to the throne because French customary law (Salic law) clearly stated that Henry was next in line.[506] Another limitation on the monarch's "absolute" power was that, once it was recognized that this person (or possibly group of persons) possessed sovereignty, the sovereign can neither voluntarily give any of

---

[502] Daniel Engster (1996), "Jean Bodin, Scepticism and Absolute Sovereignty," *History of Political Thought* 17(4): 469-99.

[503] Parker (1981), "Law, Society, and the State in the Thought of Jean Bodin."

[504] James I argued that the Chancery Court, "his own court of conscience," stood above customary law in England (common law), Mark Fortier (1998), "Equity and Ideas: Coke, Ellesmere, and James I," *Renaissance Quarterly* 51(4): 1255-81.

[505] JHM Salmon (1996), "The Legacy of Jean Bodin: Absolutism, Populism, or Constitutionalism," *History of Political Thought* 17(4): 500-22.

[506] Paul Lawrence Rose (1978), "Bodin and the Bourbon Succession to the French Throne, 1583-1594," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 9(2): 75-98.

the power up nor can anyone remove it from him, except God. Thus, with relatively few limitations, the monarch embodied the Commonweal.

What was presented in Bodin's theory was the idea that political authority passed from God to the Commonweal to the sovereign. However, this last step was extremely subtle. Because there was no authority in the Commonweal that could withdraw the power from the sovereign and there was no moment in time when the Commonweal (whatever that may be) consciously permitted the sovereign to exercise power, the sovereign and the Commonweal were nearly synonymous. The actions of the king *were* the actions of the political community and vice versa. It differed from earlier theories in that there was the crucial intermediate step of the Commonweal, but in practical terms it did not differ at all. It shook the monarch partially loose from allegiance to a universal Christendom and the foreign policy implications thereof. The monarch must protect his people spiritually – this was considered nothing new. Yet, he also must physically protect the Commonweal – a discrete unit – because this unit was the conduit of sovereign power.

How this power passed from the Commonweal to the ruler was a mystery. Bodin clearly opposed any suggestion that the sovereign ruled with the consent of the Commonweal.[507] Consent or not, once a sovereign, always the sovereign. William Barclay, who wrote *The Kingdom and the Royal Power* in 1600, suggested another possibility. He promoted an idea known as designation theory, which argued that *how* sovereign authority passed to a ruler did not matter; all that mattered was that once

[507] This made Bodin's theory very different from the theories of political authority being produced by the Huguenots in the same era. JHM Salmon (1973), "Francois Hotman and Jean Bodin: The Dilemma of Sixteenth-Century French Constitutionalism," *History Today* 23(11): 801-09.

passed it could not be questioned.[508] The analogy he used was that of the Pope. It did not matter if a council of the Church elected him or God appointed him directly – either means was a legitimate way of passing authority to him. In either case, he ruled only under Christ. Still, although designation theory absolved the sovereign of accountability, it did not lessen his responsibility. Thus, Bodin asserted that while the power of the sovereign must not be resisted, the sovereign must also fulfill his duties to both God and his Commonweal.

Bodin's ideas were extremely influential in late sixteenth and early seventeenth century France.[509] French nobles seeking to ensure that the monarch continued to respond to their concerns in the Estates General quickly adopted Bodin's broad definition of the "republic" or Commonweal.[510] This, in turn, significantly impacted the evolving French political structures and institutions. Thus, the political vocabulary and institutions in place when Cardinal Richelieu appeared on the scene were infused with Bodin's theories on political authority.[511]

---

[508] "God bestows on kings lawfully constituted, whether by divine inspiration or permission [of] the peoples this prerogative of authority, which is superior to all power of the people," William Barclay (1954 [1600]), *The Kingdom and the Regal Power*, trans. George Albert Moore (Chevy Chase, MD: Country Dollar Press): 145.

[509] Bodin's *Six Books of the Republic* "was arguably the most original and influential work of political philosophy to be written in the sixteenth century," Quentin Skinner (1978), *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume I: The Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 208.

[510] James B Collins (2001), "Noble Political Ideology and the Estates General of Orleans and Pontoise: French Republicanism," *Historical Reflections* 27(2): 219-40.

[511] Richard Bonney (1990), "Bodin and the Development of the French Monarchy," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 40: 43-61.

Cardinal Richelieu

It has been charged that Richelieu cared little for God except where the Almighty could serve his needs. His motivations matter less, however, than those of his target audiences. He understood the realities of political authority in early seventeenth-century France and acted in ways to take advantage of these. His goal was to increase the authority of the king (and therefore of himself), not to live virtuously. Whether Richelieu was a devout believer in God or merely a Machiavellian manipulator of the same, his advice to Louis XIII likely would be the same.

For example, Richelieu began the second part of his *Political Testament* with a chapter entitled, "The Reign of God the First Essential," arguing in part that "princes are expected to establish God's true church" within their kingdoms.[512] One may interpret this to mean that he was primarily concerned with the souls of the French, though it would be hard to find a modern account that asserts this. More importantly, Richelieu knew that God was a necessary part of any equation of political authority. The above statement could be more cynically read to mean that Richelieu urged the king to use his vast resources to protect a vital tool in the generation of those resources: the people's belief. In short, the Cardinal suggested a very Machiavellian strategy to the Bourbon king.

Richelieu then makes a second, less direct, appeal to God's credibility. He instructed the king to rule with reason. God implanted reason in human nature and so

[512] Armand Jean du Plessis, Duke of Richelieu (1968 [1638]), *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu*, Henry Bertram Hill, trans. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press): 69.

to act otherwise was "contrary to Him Who is its Creator."[513] Because of this, "it is impossible for subjects not to love a prince if they know that reason is the guide of all his actions."[514] Richelieu argued that love was a great motivator of obedience. Richelieu had an ulterior motive in presenting this argument. Louis had a tendency to angry tirades in front of his court. Richelieu believed these emotional outbursts undermined the king's authority, so he prescribed a stoical elevation of reason. Yet, like Machiavelli, the argument still stressed the primary importance of *appearing* to follow the precepts of God. Armed with these ideas and the political influence to put them into action, Richelieu proceeded to change the practice of foreign policy in the Continent-wide conflagration now known as the Thirty Years' War.

Richelieu as Innovator of Proto-Nationalism in the Thirty Years' War

Cardinal Richelieu seized the opportunity to put this political theory into action amidst the chaos generated during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). Militarily, France's principle threat was the greater Habsburg Empire. France's foreign policy dilemma revolved around the fact that one of the most potent checks on Habsburg power consisted of the Protestant heresy within its German territories. Protecting Catholicism, then, would mean helping the Habsburgs ever more powerful and threatening. Thus, Richelieu initiated a new foreign policy based on the idea that the legitimacy of the ruler derived from the French "people," which meant that France could now support Protestant forces against the Catholic Habsburgs without damaging

[513] Ibid., 71.
[514] Ibid., 72.

the French monarch's ability to generate compliance from the predominantly Catholic French people. This policy proved so successful that, in order to counter France, other European powers imitated it. Thus, although the Thirty Years' War began as a war of religion, by 1635 the religious motivations for fighting had broken down considerably. The pretence of a Catholic army fighting a Protestant foe gave way to national alliances arrayed against one another, crossing confessional boundaries.

The Thirty Years' War as a War of Religion

The Thirty Years' War began as a conflict between Catholic and Protestant. In 1619, the largely Protestant Bohemian Diet offered its kingship to Protestant Frederick of the Palatinate. The members of the Diet knew that Frederick's acceptance would spark a war, but they believed that Frederick would receive the military support of his father-in-law, King James I of England. Unfortunately for them, the Diet and Frederick guessed wrong on this and a number of other issues. James would likely have aided in the defense against a Catholic invasion into Protestant territory, but his foreign policy goals did not include Protestant expansion into Bohemia. The other Protestant nations of Europe were preoccupied as well: Sweden was bogged down in Poland, while the Dutch Republic nervously approached the last few months of a twelve-year truce with the Spanish. Frederick and the Diet also misjudged Protestant unity. Lutheran principalities did not come to the assistance of the Calvinist Frederick. Lutheran John George of Saxony even sent his troops to fight with the Emperor after receiving concessions targeted at Lutherans alone. Lacking allies, Frederick and the Bohemians were easily defeated by Imperial forces near White

Mountain in 1620. Thus, religious motivations produced this spark that flamed into the Thirty Years' War.

A common interpretation of this period is that these Wars were about politics, not religion. The evidence demonstrates that not only is this incorrect, it is a false dichotomy: religion and politics were inseparable. The Holy Roman Empire had already divided itself into two camps following the 1555 Peace of Augsburg. These camps solidified their alliances in the Protestant Union of 1608 and the Catholic Union of 1609. The solution of the Peace of Augsburg converted every change in political leadership into a religious question: *Cuius regio eius religio* (Whose region, his religion). Since the Bohemian king also was one of the seven electors of the Empire every ruler in the Holy Roman Empire had a stake in whether the next king of Bohemia was the Catholic Archduke Ferdinand or the Protestant Frederick. The Bohemians had elected Catholic Archduke Ferdinand of Styria as their king in 1617. As a result, the Imperial Electors were split 4-3 Catholic. When Ferdinand refused to meet the religious guarantees the Calvinist Bohemian Diet requested, they replaced him with the Protestant Frederick, shifting the balance of the electors in favor of the Protestants. Ferdinand was elected as Holy Roman Emperor a few days later, but his election was questioned legally since he technically no longer held the right to cast a vote for himself. Thus, while there were many political and economic causes for the Wars, they could not be separated from the basic religious confrontation.[515]

[515] Rivalries between Protestants and Catholics for positions in the Habsburg court, a rivalry that more often than not swung in favor of the Catholics, produced political divisions that mirrored the religious divisions in the Empire. Historian Karin J MacHardy calls this process "confessionalizing patronage," further demonstrating the inextricability of religion and politics in the early seventeenth

While Protestants in the Empire and throughout Europe refused to assist an expansion into Bohemia, they quickly responded to Catholic expansion into the Protestant Palatinate. Archduke Ferdinand's Jesuit advisors had inspired him to vow to eradicate heresy in his lands.[516] Once he became Emperor Ferdinand II, the power at his disposal increased enormously. The Emperor captured Heidelberg in 1622, transferring one of the Protestant elector votes to the Catholics. The Catholics now solidly controlled the Electoral Diet. The tenuous balance created in 1555 had been destroyed. Even Catholic princes grew wary of the new power Emperor Ferdinand II possessed.[517] Although this cautiousness did not blossom into outright resistance, it hindered the Habsburgs' ability to deal a final blow to Protestantism. The European Protestants, for their part, organized in the summer of 1624. The Dutch Republic, England, and Denmark signed an alliance against the Habsburgs. The Danish king saw Sweden and the Dutch Republic as his greatest military threats; nevertheless, he set this dispute aside to oppose the growing dominance of the Counter-Reformation in the Empire.[518] Once again ideological threats trumped physical ones and all the powers of Europe lined up behind their confessions. All, that is, except one.

---

century, *War, Religion, and Court Patronage in Habsburg Austria: The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Political Interaction, 1521-1622* (New York: Palgrave MacMillen): 198.

[516] Robert Bireley (2003), *The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and Confessors* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

[517] German Catholic princes were in a precarious position. The Emperor was able to demand more authority from the princes to counter the Protestant threat. However, although the Catholic princes benefited from the weakening of Protestantism, they also found themselves less able to counter the Emperor. A similar process had occurred in France as the struggle against the Huguenots had provided Richelieu was the opportunity to centralize authority in the hands of the king. It may be true in general that the Reformation (specifically the entrance of a new source of transcendent credibility into the European system) was a more significant factor in the decline of the power of the nobility than war or other hypothesized factors.

[518] Paul Douglas Lockhart (1995), "Religion and Princely Liberties: Denmark's Intervention in the Thirty Years War, 1618-1625," *International History Review* 17(1): 1-22.

Richelieu's Foreign Policy

The irony was that Cardinal Richelieu of Catholic France engineered this new European Protestant alliance. His foreign policy undermined the simplicity of the religious bifurcation. He pursued the interests of France first and foremost. With the Huguenot problem firmly in hand, the greatest threat to France was not Protestantism, but a powerful Spain that could only grow more powerful without the constant distraction of conflict in the Empire. Although Richelieu's Protestant alliance fell apart in 1626 thanks to the military successes of Wallenstein, he had given the Protestants sufficient time to recover from the initial defeats of the war and for Sweden to enter the war in opposition to the Habsburgs. France benefited from a Catholic-Protestant stalemate: this kept Protestantism from spreading and it prevented the Habsburgs from gaining absolute powers.

The old habits of the early sixteenth-century reemerged as France and Spain again fought over control of northern Italy. In 1624, France began an unsuccessful campaign to wrestle control of the Valtelline Passes through the Alps away from Spain. In 1627, fighting broke out again when the duke of Mantua died without a male heir. Spain besieged Casale where the French candidate was holed up. After a delay in which Richelieu took La Rochelle back from the Huguenots, France relieved Casale, driving back the Spanish. The Pope stepped in and arranged a truce, arguing that two Catholic powers should not fight when the real enemy was heresy. Many in France shared his perspective, believing that Richelieu's policy was both strategically wrong and morally evil. However, in October 1630, on the Day of Dupes, King Louis

XIII settled the question in favor of Richelieu, legitimating his policy and increasing his authority within the government.

How could Richelieu follow such a foreign policy and not simultaneously undermine the legitimacy of Louis XIII? If the King's authority came directly from God maintaining legitimacy would have been difficult. After all, his policy supported heretics and religious allies of the hated Huguenots. However, Richelieu created a large propaganda machine designed to persuade crucial segments of the population that authority passed through the nation, the "French," an entity recognized and created by God.[519] Thus, the monarch's job included protecting "France," a divine thing as valuable and as "holy" as the Catholic Church. From this perspective, Richelieu was not promoting Protestant heresy, but defending the chosen nation of God. Hence, his innovative political theory allowed for a new foreign policy that proved to be incredibly successful.

The specific conditions of in the early stages of the Thirty Years' War permitted the Protestants to justify working with Richelieu. After all, France's territorial concern was not northern Germany but northern Italy, and Protestants everywhere could delight in the spectacle of Catholics fighting it out in the Pope's backyard. Plus, the Protestants honestly needed the help; they were in real danger of

---

[519] RJ Knecht (1991), *Richelieu: Profiles in Power* (Harlow, England: Longman): 169-189. Richelieu founded the Academie Francaise in 1634, which was designed "to harness artists and writers to the chariot of the state, to present a favorable image of the king and his government," Peter Burke (1992), *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press): 185. Richelieu also established a weekly newspaper, the *Gazette*, that supported government policies, Howard M Solomon (1972), *Public Welfare, Science and Propaganda in Seventeenth-Century France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 111. Richelieu demonstrated a deep interest in using the arts (e.g., paintings, statuary) to portray the king (and himself) in favorable ways. One example of this use of the arts is the establishment of a ballet company, which became an important tool to generate nationalist sentiment and mock France's many enemies; Marie-Claude Canova-Green (1995), "Dance and Ritual: The *Ballet des nations* at the Court of Louis XIII," *Renaissance Studies* 9(4): 395-403.

being wiped out of Germany. The Protestants could accept the physical presence of soldiers from Protestant Sweden, while Richelieu and Catholic France merely paid the bills, but supplied no troops. The Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus, for his part, envisioned himself as the deliverer of the Protestants from the persecuting Catholics.[520] That France backed his army financially was less important than the ultimate goal of rescuing Calvinism.

Once the larger Protestant forces of the Dutch Republic and Sweden entered the fray, the Habsburgs once again faced a stalemate in their lands. This, rather than victory for one side or the other, was Richelieu's intent. Thus, for several years France remained comfortably behind the scenes in the larger Catholic-Protestant struggle. The Swedes signed an agreement with Richelieu in 1631 in which they would supply the men for an army, while France would pay for much of the fighting for the next five years.[521] At this stage, France was the only state pursuing a foreign policy linked to nation rather than religion.

Imitators of Richelieu's Policies

France's monopoly on this particular foreign policy changed over the course of the war. One of the earliest examples was Savoy, a duchy in northern Italy that had been the center of the conflict between the French and the Habsburgs for nearly a century and a half. Savoy's very existence depended on what historian Toby Osborne has called "diplomatic pragmatism," which was another way of saying that the

[520] Michael Roberts (1973), *Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden* (London: English Universities Press).

[521] Richard Bonney (1976), "The Secret Expenses of Richelieu and Mazarin," *English Historical Review* 91(361): 825-36.

Savoyard dukes in the early stages of the Thirty Years War pursued a foreign policy based on "national" interests over the interests of Catholicism.[522] Like France, the dukes' survival depended on controlling the power of the Habsburgs, even if that meant alliances with Protestant powers. Thus, Savoyard foreign policy appeared incredibly erratic as the dukes alternately allied with France and plotted Richelieu's death, all "as circumstances and pragmatism required."[523]

The major powers of Europe recognized the strategic value of imitating France's foreign policy more slowly. The death of the Swedish king Gustavus at Lutzen in 1632 and the crushing Protestant defeat at Nordlingen in 1635, greatly reduced the power of the major Protestant leaders. Sweden began to scale back on its commitments in Germany. Richelieu found that, to check the Habsburgs, France could no longer merely play the role of behind-the-scenes financial backer. Hence, Richelieu formed two new alliances in 1635, one with Sweden and one with the Dutch Republic. In each of these French troops and money would actively support the war efforts against Spain, in particular, and her allies. Although French troops had relatively few successes in the field (as Richelieu would lament in his *Testament*), the French spent money effectively in hiring mercenaries and preventing mutinies among the Swedish army. In terms of military organization, 1635 was a "turning point" in France as state-appointed *intendants* began to coordinate much of the logistics,

---

[522] Toby Osborne (2002), *Dynasty and Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy: Political Culture and the Thirty Years' War (Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture Series)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[523] Ibid., 140.

thereby centralizing authority.[524] For the most part, France's Protestant allies could accept this new situation with a clean conscience: the enemy remained Catholicism.[525] Catholic France could undermine its own legitimacy if it wanted.

However, Richelieu's new style of foreign policy did not go unnoticed for long. The policy was relatively successful and could only be countered with a similar approach. Many German Protestants began to argue that if they were going to fight side-by-side with Catholics anyway, it should be with fellow Germans rather than Frenchmen.[526] Among the Catholic Germans there existed a thorough understanding of the implications of Richelieu's policies, having been the victims of them for a decade and a half. Spanish Chancellor Olivares understandably distrusted the "Catholic Peace" the Pope brokered in 1630 and had since been preparing Spain for an offensive war against France.[527] Emperor Ferdinand also recognized that if the Empire faced internal religious divisions and France did not, it was clear who would emerge in the stronger position. Thus, sufficient incentives existed among both German Protestants and Catholics to pursue negotiations designed to set aside religious differences and present a national front against "foreign" powers. In the

---

[524] David Parrott (2001), *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France, 1624-1642* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

[525] Justifications for war continued for a while to revolve around defending Protestantism. Recognizing that alliance with Catholic France toward that end would quickly undermine the justification, Swedish leaders began to change their justifications, Partel Piirimae (2002), "Just War in Theory and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War," *Historical Journal* 45(3): 499-523.

[526] Gary Nichols (1989), "The Economic Impact of the Thirty Years' War in Habsburg Austria," *East European Quarterly* 23(3): 257-68. Nichols argues that economic factors, not religious ones, convinced persons in the Habsburg Empire to unite behind the Emperor to end the war. However, I would argue economic factors could only have an impact after the introduction of proto-nationalism had weakened the religious factors that had dominated at the start of the war. This explanation is also supported by Nichols data.

[527] RA Stradling (1986), "Olivares and the Origins of the Franco-Spanish War, 1627-1636," *English Historical Review* 100(398): 68-94.

Treaty of Prague, May 1635, the Emperor promised to suspend several of his anti-Protestant policies instituted during the war and the Protestant princes (who had not been bought off by Richelieu) agreed to help reclaim territory taken by invaders.[528] Within a few months, German Catholics and Protestants together turned on the Protestant Swedish armies and their Catholic French allies in northern Germany.

This new development forced Sweden to adjust its justification for war in Germany.[529] Sweden had entered the war using theological arguments, principally the persecution of fellow Protestants. Whatever the additional economic and strategic advantages Gustavus hoped to gain, it was the theological justifications that had been sold to the Swedish people and nobles. After 1635, however, Sweden found itself allied with and supplied by Catholic France, fighting against German armies that contained Protestants. The theological arguments began to lose their effectiveness. As a result, justifications back home morphed into an argument resembling a modern-day "police action." Sweden was forced to come to terms with Richelieu's new style of foreign policy and adjust its own arguments of authority accordingly, even though this meant a reduction in credibility in Sweden.

To a lesser extent, Richelieu's foreign policy spread to areas at the very fringes of the war. Scotland, for example, developed a stronger sense of national feeling as a result of the war.[530] Although predominantly Catholic through much of the sixteenth-century, it had undergone a Presbyterian Reformation. The Presbyterians were in

---

[528] Richard Bonney (1991), *The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 198.

[529] Piirimae (2002).

[530] Steve Murdoch, ed. (2001), *Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648 (History of Warfare 6),* (Leiden: Brill).

ascendancy as their King, James VI, had also been crowned James I of England. It was his daughter, Elizabeth, wife of Frederick of the Palatinate, who had been "dishonored" by the Catholics in the opening stages of the war in 1620. Scottish Protestants had turned out in droves for the war effort on the continent and were considered highly valued troops in both the Swedish and Dutch armies. But, even Scottish Catholics in the highlands were incensed at this effrontery to the Scottish Elizabeth. The changes brought about in 1635 provided the opportunity for all loyal Scots, regardless of confession, to fight against the Empire. France created brigades in its forces in which Scottish Catholics could defend the honor of their "favorite daughter." Here, at last, was a foreign policy goal that all "Scots" could unite behind.

Even the "soldiers" of the Counter-Reformation, the Jesuits, recognized the changing winds and adjusted their actions accordingly.[531] Muzio Vitelleschi, the Superior General of the Order from 1615 to 1645, had consistently urged the Jesuit confessors in royal courts throughout Europe to avoid acting as political advisors. He recognized that the survival of the Society of Jesus depended on the support of princes and kings. When a Jesuit became embroiled in politics, he necessarily made enemies within the court. In 1638, Nicholas Caussin, Louis XIII's Jesuit confessor, learned this lesson when he supported the noble faction that wanted to make peace with the Habsburgs against Protestants. Richelieu systematically decimated this group, forcing Caussin out of France. In order to continue the Jesuit mission in France, Vitelleschi ordered Caussin's successor to submit any and all moral and political issues to Richelieu. In a bow to Richelieu's Gallicanism, the Superior General even forbade

[531] Bireley, *The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War*: 167-203.

Jesuits from writing on the supremacy of the Pope. The letters of Vitelleschi to the Jesuit confessors throughout Europe demonstrated that he understood a change had taken place in 1635 – the Catholic princes were far more open to allying with Protestants.[532] Vitelleschi ordered the Jesuits to remain aloof of even this seemingly heretical turn of events and focus their energies entirely on the spiritual needs of their royal charges.

Though the war continued for another twelve years, a change in the definition of "we" was taking place in Germany. This should not be overblown: religion remained incredibly important to the people, but because the fighting no longer involved the extermination of heresy or the freedom of religious practice, it could be partially set aside in anticipation of peace. In addition, though we can talk about the "German" nation today, the concept would have been hard to pin down during the war. A somewhat shared culture had existed for many centuries and the devastation the war caused in the territories served to fuse the sense of "we" more strongly, yet the same influences applied to the individual principalities as well. No force within the Empire actively sought to fuse the various "national" tendencies into a single German movement and, in fact, many forces fought against such a move, in particular the princes. However, this does not negate the fact that there was a fundamental redefinition of why people fought and suffered. Protestantism could eventually be freely practiced in Saxony, for example, but only after the fighting was concluded.

[532] Ibid., 160-64.

Distinctive Borders: The Peace of Westphalia 1648

By the 1640s, a new theory of political authority dominated the European landscape. Authority devolved to the ruler from God through a discrete bundle that was alternately called the "commonwealth," "republic," "people," or "nation." While not divorcing itself wholly from the three confessions that constituted the sources of transcendent credibility of the sixteenth century, rulers and people increasingly tended to focus on the nation as the source of political authority rather than the confession. As a result, the number of sources of transcendent credibility in Europe increased. At the very least, every major power emerging from the War considered its nation a separate source of transcendent credibility. A stable resolution to the War therefore required a political solution that recognized the new reality of "proto-nationalism." In particular, far more distinctive boundaries were needed between political units of differing sources of transcendent credibility. For any peace to be stable, the European powers also had to develop rules regarding the mutual recognition of these borders and other issues involving territorial integrity. This became the key agenda at the multi-year talks that culminated in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The Peace of Westphalia returned to the 1555 Peace of Augsburg for a solution. At Augsburg, it had been decided that whatever religion the ruler of a territory was, Lutheran or Catholic, the people of the territory must be as well. Persons who found themselves in a territory embracing a different religion could emigrate to a more appropriate principality. Augsburg succeeded in keeping a tenuous peace in the Empire for more than half a century. It ultimately fell apart for two reasons. First, it did not foresee the success of Calvinism. Augsburg did not allow for

just *any* state religion, but only Lutheranism and Catholicism. Calvinism thus posed a threat to both recognized parties. However, over the course of the Thirty Years' War, Lutherans and Calvinists began to unify their efforts against the common enemy of Catholicism.[533] This made it easier to include Calvinists in any new settlement. The Peace of Augsburg also collapsed due to the popular strategy of replacing the prince of a territory with a prince of the other religion as a means of rooting out heresy in the Empire. This led to countless intrigues and conspiracies among the princes of Germany and contributed to the destabilization of the Empire. Negotiators knew that if the 1648 peace were to last, significant adjustments would need to be made to the Peace of Augsburg.[534]

These adjustments produced new international rules of behavior. The conferees at Westphalia started with the basic Augsburg formula, but added Calvinism as a legitimate third option for the ruler of a territory. This solved the immediate problem, but it was a far cry from suggesting that Westphalia resulted in religious toleration. As Historian John Coffey argues, "The Treaty of Westphalia did not stop the enforcement of uniformity within particular territories, it simply signaled an end to confessional wars between different states."[535] Lutherans who woke up in a Catholic principality still had to emigrate to practice their religion. The Treaty also accorded

---

[533] The Westphalian settlement recognized this new, albeit tenuous, alliance. Institutionally, the Imperial Diet adopted new rules that said matters that came before it must receive a joint resolution of Catholics (*Corpus Catholicorum*) and all Protestants (*Corpus Evangelicorum*), Richard Bonney (2002), *The Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing): 88-89. A Protestant alliance was possible now largely because proto-nationalism made the crucial differences between the Lutherans and Calvinists less significant.

[534] Ronald G Asch (2000), "Religious Toleration, the Peace of Westphalia and the German Territorial Estates," *Parliaments, Estates & Representation* 20: 75-89.

[535] John RD Coffey (2000), *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689* (Longman).

"territorial superiority . . . in matters ecclesiastical as well as political" to the princes within the Holy Roman Empire.[536] A political arrangement based on territoriality necessarily meant that a good deal of the remainder of the settlement's text would involve exactly which prince would be superior in which territory. One common misconception about Westphalia is that it instituted the notion of "sovereignty." However, although the German princes were superior in their territory and they could form foreign alliances without the Emperor's approval, the settlement clearly stated that the actions and alliances of the princes' could not be used against the Empire or Emperor. Hence, the princes were not "sovereign" in any absolute sense, even though they possessed some sovereign powers. In short, the new proto-nationalism produced a "proto-sovereignty."

Proto-sovereignty necessitated more distinctive boundaries between political units. Territorial superiority was not a gift bestowed but a right to be protected. The boundaries listed in the Peace of Westphalia became focal points at which one ruler's authority began and another's ended. The militaries of non-major powers that had been designed to fight within larger armies alongside other principalities were now reformed to be more self-sufficient and to protect their own borders. More powerful political units, such as the Austrian Habsburgs and France, created militaries that could both attack and defend. These reforms in support of more distinctive borders were enhanced by the fact that political units that could afford it frequently hired foreign mercenaries who brought significant expertise to the changing armies.[537]

---

[536] Quoted in Bonney (1991), *European Dynastic States*: 201.

[537] MS Anderson (1998), *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789* (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing): 82-94.

The settlement of Westphalia did not bring a utopian peace to Europe, but it did provide many of the smaller political units (especially within the Empire) with sufficient space and time to capitalize on their newfound proto-sovereign powers. Westphalia was just a peace of paper with no enforcement mechanisms so to speak. Still, at least in Germany, the exhaustion of the War enabled the Peace to be self-enforcing. For the most part, principalities left one another alone to rebuild what was destroyed and to consolidate their power in their respective territories. The princes took advantage of this with enhanced hierarchical judicial systems, the minting of coins of more determinate value than those circulating during the War, and the licensing of new mints under strict government control. However, it was difficult to establish national currencies during this period. Germany had been the international meeting place for soldiers from every land for the past three decades, which meant that there was a tremendous amount of foreign currency still in circulation. Thus, the idea that "market forces were more powerful than the coercive power of early modern rulers" must be balanced with the fact that, despite these difficulties and costs, early modern rulers kept trying to set up national currencies.[538] In sum, the boundaries between political units grew relatively more distinct in this period, although at least in the Empire they were still far from a modern conception of a distinctive border.

Many scholars have argued that Westphalia's primacy of place in the study of modern international relations has been overdone.[539] I would contend that such an argument is true if one is looking to Westphalia as a moment in which real sovereignty

---

[538] Bonney (1991), *European Dynastic States*: 423.

[539] Stephane Beaulac (2004), *The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia (Developments in International Law 21)* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers): 40, 97.

became the core principle of international relations practice. Westphalia was only a reflection of practices and beliefs that had begun to emerge during the War, first with France and soon imitated by other European powers. If a moment of change is demanded, two moments in particular stand out. First, the loose Protestant alliance Richelieu cobbled together in 1624 signaled a change in foreign policy as it had been practiced since Martin Luther. Second, the year 1635 brought France directly into the war effort in Germany and the Treaty of Prague united German Catholics and Protestants together against invaders. This Treaty was recognition that the rules of the game had changed – rulers now shifted to generating compliance using proto-nationalism rather than a confession. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 merely codified these new realities of inter-polity relations.

Westphalia also disappoints those who want to see it as the birthplace of the true sovereignty associated with the modern nation-state. The idea that it was the start of the modern nation-states system has taken many hits recently, and I would tend to agree with the modern critics.[540] However, I also would argue that it did institutionalize a system that was an evolutionary stage between the systems of the sixteenth century and the system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It represented the beginnings of sovereignty, rather than sovereignty itself. Hence, if Westphalia was not a *moment* of change, it was the background in which important

[540] Ronald G Asch (1997), *The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-1648* (New York: St. Martin's Press); Andreas Osiander (1994), *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990* (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Stephen Krasner (1993), "Westphalia and All That," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

changes were occurring. It marked the period in which rulers began to put new ways of thinking about legitimacy into practice.

Conclusion

Daniel Philpott has argued that "the complex religious clauses of the [Westphalian] settlement were a modus vivendi that enabled Protestants and Catholics to coexist in an age in which they cared less and less about the uniform establishment of their faith."[541] This chapter has demonstrated that the reason why the sixteenth century dominance of confessions became less important was the adoption of proto-nationalist ideas on political authority during the Thirty Years' War. France adopted this theory because Cardinal Richelieu believed that the minimal costs in compliance that resulted from the slight change in the source of transcendent credibility would be far outweighed by the benefits of the foreign policy that proto-nationalism now made permissible. Other European powers adopted this same proto-nationalist theory because France had demonstrated how effective it could be and because it was the only means to counter France's growing power. The change in sources of transcendent credibility was subtle, but the effects were enormous. God still held the position of prominence as ultimate source of political authority and legitimacy, yet because this power now passed through the "nation" and the ruler was the physical embodiment of that nation, the ruler could openly act in the interest of his realm rather than in the name of Christendom or orthodox belief.

---

[541] Daniel Philpott (2001), *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 136.

The adoption of proto-nationalism increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility as each major power, at the very least, saw political authority passing from God to ruler through a different nation. However, as the Peace of Westphalia made clear, this change was very subtle for two main reasons. First, God was still a crucial part of the proto-nationalist formula. Therefore, rulers still had to be aware of the religious questions within their territory and throughout Europe. The pursuit of national interest was not unlimited (hence, *proto*-nationalism). Second, at least within the Holy Roman Empire, princes continued to rule under the nominal sovereignty of the Emperor. Granted, they received many sovereign-like powers, yet they still lacked true sovereignty. Thus, in many ways they functioned as sovereigns within their territory, but on major matters of state, the Emperor and the Imperial institutions dominated (in theory, if not in practice). Thus, the system instituted in Westphalia was something very different from that which preceded it and that which would eventually follow it.

Since proto-nationalism increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility, this created a situation in which a political unit's security depended on investment in more distinctive boundaries. Within the Holy Roman Empire, however, boundaries between principalities were relatively more distinctive, but not as distinctive as would be the case for other major European powers who possessed powers approaching that of modern-day sovereignty. We may today call this proto-sovereignty, knowing with the advantage of hindsight that a far more developed form of sovereignty would follow over the course of the next century. However, in 1648,

these changes would have appeared incredibly significant in themselves producing boundaries that, when compared with the earlier century, were quite distinctive.

Proto-nationalism and proto-sovereignty enjoyed a reciprocal relationship: the growing acceptance of one enhanced the acceptance of the other and vice versa. Thus, proto-nationalism should not be considered an instance of punctuated equilibrium in the evolution of international systems. From its inception, it tended to move toward a system in which "nationalism" and "sovereignty" were the norms. The story of why and how this occurred and the effects of this change are the subjects of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 8: THE "WESTPHALIAN" STATES SYSTEM: THE IMPACT OF NATIONALISM ON POLITICAL BOUNDARIES

A. Introduction
B. Ideological Foundations of Nationalism
    1. God Wanes
    2. The Political Community Rises
    3. The Eighteenth Century: Bringing the Two Strands of Thought Together
C. Impact on the Political Boundaries of Europe

Introduction

Beliefs about political authority changed during the Thirty Years' War. Cardinal Richelieu's foreign policy had interposed a new intermediate between God and the ruler in the devolution of authority and credibility. This intermediate was broadly described as the political community during the period and later would become more popularly known as the nation. However, in the mid-seventeenth century, the political community and the ruler were viewed as nearly synonymous: as Louis XIV of France proclaimed, "*L'etat, c'est moi*."

Over the next one hundred years, two changes simultaneously occurred to alter this momentary equilibrium. First, God became less important as the ultimate origin of political authority and credibility. Natural law and natural rights theorists still invoked the name of God, but they increasingly argued that these laws and rights would remain the same with an active God or with an absentee God (or with no God at all). As God's role of guarantor of law was reduced, so was the usefulness of tying His credibility to that of the ruler. Second, the political community came to possess the inherent credibility forfeited by a receding God. The political community became

seen as the guarantor of natural laws and rights – without it there would be no order and no security. It was then seen as credible in its own right, and the rational ruler now appropriated that transcendent credibility to enhance his own. The transformation of proto-nationalism into nationalism required both changes and this, in turn, produced the modern nation-state system.

Middle ages and Reformation (chapters 5 and 6)



Proto-nationalism (chapter 7)



Nationalism (chapter 8)



As a result of these changes, every nation or political community had the potential to be a different source of transcendent credibility. The number of sources of transcendent credibility in Europe thus grew from two, Protestantism and Catholicism, to many as political communities that possessed the power to support their claim to separateness did so. The dissertation thesis predicts that the borders between these political units would also grow more distinct throughout this period. This, in fact, is what occurred – the nation-state system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries contained political units separated from one another by extremely distinctive

boundaries. In fact, distinctive borders and territoriality are considered essential characteristics of the modern nation-state.

This chapter explains how and why these changes in the theory and practice of political authority occurred during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Initially, political theorists were far more willing to mitigate God's role in political authority than were practitioners and rulers. This is understandable since the consequences of pursuing untested paths fall only indirectly on the theorist, while the ruler can occasionally lose his head in trial and error. The constant rebellions and wars of religion of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries clearly demonstrated that the old system had numerous flaws. Political leaders had several options including reinvigorating Christianity as a source of transcendent credibility, embracing humanity as the only source of transcendent credibility, or adopting a source being developed by political theorists: nationalism. In theory, any of these may have dominated the others, but it was nationalism that political leaders saw as most advantageous to their ultimate purpose of generating compliance from the population.

Central to this decision was ensuring that the population would see the "nation" as possessing its own inherent (transcendent) credibility that rulers and governments could appropriate. This chapter highlights how political theorists developed the concept of the nation and its inherent credibility *out of* already accepted concepts of God and His credibility. Political practitioners grew increasingly capable of appropriating credibility more heavily from the political community rather than directly from God. By the time the nineteenth century arrived, nationalism had either absorbed or swept Christian theories of political credibility aside in Europe. This had

an enormous impact on political boundaries: nationalism increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the European system, which produced an increase in the distinctiveness of boundaries between political units, producing the familiar "borders" of the twentieth century.

Ideological Foundations of Nationalism

In the aftermath of the wars of religion, there emerged a growing attitude that directly basing political authority on God could produce many negative consequences when there was more than one religious option.[542] Understandably, by the mid-seventeenth century, government entanglement with religion was frequently viewed as the primary cause of war. However, since political authority derived from God, there was no possibility that governments would or could remain aloof from theological discussions. These necessarily had political consequences that a ruler could not ignore. Some theorists suggested that if authority did not depend solely on God, religious conflicts would move out of the public sphere, thereby reducing the prevalence of war. However, taking God out of the equation entirely was not what they desired or, at least, not what the power structures of the time would allow them to say openly. If the people did not believe God was actively involved, the whole edifice of social order would collapse.

In short, the effort to move beyond the conditions created during the Reformation produced an inherent tension between the desire for peace, which

[542] Stephen Toulmin (1990), *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 69-87.

required marginalizing God to some extent, and the necessity to protect order and stability, which required continued access to the transcendent credibility of God. The Thirty Years' War verified that Europe could not return to single source of transcendent credibility – neither Catholicism nor Protestantism could eradicate the other. Thus, international stability depended on separating God from the political order. This process had already begun in the development of proto-nationalism, as an intermediate was inserted between God and the ruler in the devolution of authority. More distance was needed, however. The authority of the political community still rested on its connection with God. Thus, the potential for further religious conflicts still existed, as the civil wars in England exemplified.

Two different theoretical developments were required to successfully untether God from direct control over political authority. First, God must be distanced from his role as a necessary component of political authority. Such authority must depend on something other than God in order to prevent the conflicts that had plagued Europe for the past century and a half. Among others, Hugo Grotius, Baruch Spinoza, and Thomas Hobbes structured their theories of authority around the idea that, although God exists and plays an important role in the world, political authority would still be legitimate even if God did not involve himself. Such theories would begin to marginalize God's function in the legitimacy of political authority. This would open a transitional path for eighteenth century theorists, such as David Hume and the Enlightenment philosophes, to complete the sidelining of God and argue that political authority depended on something other than God. However, many practitioners of politics were unwilling to detach their authority from God without an alternative

source of credibility as effective as God had been. Grotius and Hobbes suggested reason and science as alternatives. Political practitioners did not consider these adequate bases for political legitimacy. Rulers understood that even if such sources effectively generated compliance from the elite in society, they could never work among the illiterate masses.

Thus, this first development produced a new puzzle: from where does the government obtain its credibility without God? The second development of the seventeenth century was endowing the political community or "nation" with a transcendent quality that could itself function as a source of credibility for the ruler. In proto-nationalism the political community had become an important step in the overall devolution of authority, but it was still seen as a middleman, not a source of authority in its own right. Further, it was intimately associated with the ruler, who was seen as the physical embodiment of the nation. For the ruler to use the nation as a source of transcendent credibility in its own right, he would need to separate himself from the nation. Only then could it attain a transcendent quality with an unquestioned credibility of its own.

Theorists within this line of thought, such as Johannes Althusius, George Lawson, and John Locke, had a problem of their own. At least initially, the nation had no credibility aside from that appropriated from God. The idea of the nation had to filter through society and become a part of worldview of people to the extent that it gained a credibility that did not necessarily need to rely on God. This would take time. In the meantime, God would have to stick around. Thus, the different lines of

thought of Hobbes and Locke had to develop separately, yet simultaneously, in the seventeenth century.

In the eighteenth century, however, after many Europeans had been given sufficient time to acclimate to these two theoretical developments, it was possible for writers such as David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Johann Gottfried Herder to begin to unite the separate strands of thought into a unified theory. This unification underwent several permutations before modern-day nationalism finally emerged as the dominant theory of political credibility in Europe late in the eighteenth century, notably following the American and French Revolutions.

God Wanes

Before nationalism could take hold, political credibility's traditional dependence on God needed to be weakened. For this it is necessary to turn to the Natural Law and Natural Rights theorists of the seventeenth century. These writers were concerned with what they saw as a direct connection between religious disputes and the prevalence of international and civil war. Despite some recent debate over the connection of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, they definitely agreed on one crucial point.[543] At a bare minimum, each sought to demonstrate "how people without theistic beliefs can have a moral life," and, by extension, how a government can maintain its

[543] At the heart of this debate is the idea that there was a "modern school of natural law," meaning specifically a conscious project by, in particular, Grotius, John Selden, and Hobbes, to combat skepticism and demonstrate the validity of a natural law based on reason and self-preservation. Proponents of this view include AP D'Entreves (1994 [1951]), Richard Tuck (1987), and JG Schneewind (1998). On the other side of the debate are those who argue that Hobbes's project was completely different than that of Grotius and any connection is incidental rather than consciously developmental. Scholars on this side include Perez Zagorin (2000), Johann P Sommerville (2001), and Annabel Brett (2003).

legitimacy and credibility without an active appeal to God.[544] Instead, they appealed to Reason.

Hugo Grotius

Hugo Grotius's desire to increase the separation of God from the political order stemmed from his tumultuous political career in the Dutch Republic. He had attached his career to Oldenbarnevelt, advocate to the States of Holland, and a domestic policy of toleration to the followers of Jacob Arminius. The Arminians rejected Calvin's central doctrine of predestination, arguing that the grace of God was intended for everyone, so every person has the potential to be saved. This belief, however, threatened the very foundations of the practices and discipline of the Calvinist faith, which was dominant in the Provinces.[545] Forced into exile, Grotius later tried to justify his policy with a new theory about God's role in political authority.

Grotius' theology may be described as a "minimalist religion" and it proved to be enormously influential in the seventeenth century.[546] The minimalist argued that

---

[544] Knud Haakonssen (1998), "Divine/Natural Law Theories in Ethics," in *Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, vol. II*, Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 1330.

[545] Richard Bonney (1990), *The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 181-83. The subsequent Dutch reaction in 1619 to the Arminians and anyone who dared to support them led to the execution of Oldenbarnevelt and the flight of Grotius to France. There is no indication that either of these statesmen professed Arminian doctrines themselves. Their policy of toleration was likely intended to present a united Protestant front against the constant threat from Catholic Spain, CG Roelofsen (1990), "Grotius and the International Politics of the Seventeenth Century," in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 95-133

[546] It had enormous effects on some of the clergy in France and among the Jesuits – missionary to China Matteo Ricci, in particular. Further, The Jansenist movement eventually emerged speaking out against such a theology and the casuistry that came to be associated with it. Peter N Miller (2000),

only a few shared, fundamental doctrines are *required* for humanity, while the other doctrines should be held loosely, if at all. Most importantly, Grotius argued that the government had a right (or duty) to enforce these fundamental doctrines of religion, while it should stay entirely out of other religious debates.[547] To the extent that God did involve Himself in temporal affairs, he did so only sparingly. If governments stuck to the enforcement of the fundamental doctrines and ignored the others, religious disputes would cease to become political battles and the conflicts that occurred within and between states would finally abate.

In *Of the Law of War and Peace* (1625), Grotius revolutionized Natural Law theory when he suggested that the Laws of Nature did not depend on the constant enforcement of God.[548] These universal laws applied to all people at all times because to act against them was to act against one's self-interest (against reason). Richard Tuck puts it this way: "Given the natural facts about men, the laws of nature followed by (allegedly) strict entailment without any mediating premises about God's will."[549] In effect, Natural Law was self-enforcing, or perhaps more accurately, *reason*-enforcing.

Peiresc's Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press): 102-29.

[547] Grotius directly addressed theological issues in two works, *Defensio fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi* and *De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra*, both written in 1617 in the midst of the Arminian controversy, though only the former was published at that time, Richard Tuck (1991), "Grotius and Selden," in *Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 511-14.

[548] Hugo Grotius (2005 [1625]), *The Rights of War and Peace*, Richard Tuck, ed. (Liberty Fund). The famous line of the Prolegomena is known as the *etiamsi daremus* sentence, which translated means "evcn if we should concede…", here meaning that even if we should concede that God did not exist. It should be noted that Grotius was not the first author to present such an inherently heretical argument. The Spanish Scholastics had also considered such a question, not to mention the rising neo-Stoical movement, both of which had an influence of Grotius' arguments, Schneewind 68.

[549] Richard Tuck (1979), *Natural Rights Theories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 76-77.

Whether God was actively present in the affairs of men or aloof made no difference in the Laws' validity or in the nature of human beings. To Grotius then, the Natural Laws themselves possessed an inherent credibility separate from God or a political community.[550] In fact, the government's credibility was derived from the role it had in forcing irrational persons to act according to Nature and reason. Christians, Grotius argued, have the benefit of redundancy: credibility comes from both natural rights and from God. However, even if a group of people were not Christian it was possible that they could use their natural rights to successfully create a political society.[551]

This idea was particularly useful during periods of European expansion throughout the world.[552] However, it was impractical as a source of transcendent credibility to seventeenth-century rulers, primarily because it argued for a much broader idea of individual rights (so long as one followed Natural Laws) against the authority of the government.[553]

---

[550] God did not reveal these Laws to man, but man was compelled by his nature to use his reason to understand and obey these Laws. However, some people would not obey these Laws. Thus, civil governments had been created to compel those people to obey.

[551] Knud Haakonssen (1998), "Divine/Natural Law Theories in Ethics," in *Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, vol. II*, Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 1317-1357.

[552] This idea had also been used in a similar way by the sixteenth-century Spanish Scholastics (Molina, Suarez, and Vitoria) in the early years of colonization, though these theories depended more on the direct authority of God than Grotius's did.

[553] It is for this same reason that Grotius' theory succeeded at the international level, at least among European political units. Each political unit possessed individual rights against the others in an international society. Political units outside of Europe were not seen to possess the same rights as European political units. Edward Keene (2002), *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This is also the reason why Grotius' theories have experienced a revival in the late-twentieth century as they closely mirror concepts of Universal Human Rights and global organizations such as the United Nations.

Baruch de Spinoza

Like Grotius, the Jewish philosopher Baruch de Spinoza was a Dutch outcast attempting to find a way to cope with increasingly inflexible Calvinism.[554] For both writers, the goal was not to oppose Calvinism or its institutions, but to find a political theory that could embrace a plurality of confessions simultaneously. In his *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670), Spinoza sought to accomplish this by distinguishing between an ideal world and the real world. In an ideal world, each person could use his reason to clear away the clutter in his mind: "Everyone would be free to choose for himself the foundations of his creed; . . . each would then obey God freely with his whole heart."[555] But, Spinoza argued, in the real world most people would not use their reason because they both despised it and ridiculed it.[556] While these people flailed about aimlessly, cut loose from the anchor of reason, it would be impossible for others who chose to follow reason to do so. The *real* world required government to keep the ignorant people from preventing others' pursuit of the best life.[557] Government existed primarily for this freedom.[558]

---

[554] Noel Malcolm (1991), "Hobbes and Spinoza," in *The Cambridge History of Political Though, 1450-1700*, JH Burns, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 550.

[555] Baruch de Spinoza (1951 [1670]), *A Theologico-Political Treatise* (New York: Dover Publications): 10.

[556] Ibid., 8.

[557] "Men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals," Ibid., 202.

[558] Optimistically, Spinoza said that it was almost possible for the ideal world to exist if a government successfully held the real world at bay. Of course, he also recognized that governments frequently acted in such a way to prevent a person from pursuing his best way of life. In particular, a government could impose one religious confession on all the people and try to coerce them to believe a particular set of doctrines. When it acted in this way, government became self-defeating and unstable, Michael A Rosenthal (2001), "Tolerance as a Virtue in Spinoza's *Ethics*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 39(4): 535-57. Still, this was not a justification to disobey the government, "for, if government be taken away, no good thing can last, all falls into dispute, anger and anarchy reign unchecked amid universal fear," which was clearly worse, Spinoza, *Theologico-Political Treatise*, 249.

For Spinoza, the right for an individual to pursue his best way of life and to live according to the dictates of reason – in other words, his right to liberty – pre-existed government. A government's legitimacy depended not on God, but on how well it permitted its' citizens to exercise their liberty. In fact, the opposite was true: God's legitimacy depended on the civil government.[559] Spinoza then searched history and found "Divine justice only in places where just men bear sway."[560]

However, Spinoza recognized the importance of religion in the *real* world. He attached a Machiavellian argument regarding the *use* of religion for the purpose of keeping the common people manageable.[561] History had shown that religion was a very useful means of controlling those who did not use their reason.[562] While a minority of the people would use their reason to achieve their well-being, the rest could justly be controlled using superstition and religion. Without this power, the society would fall apart in division and strife.[563] A government could command the ignorant people to follow certain outward observances of religion and rituals, as long as these acts were in "accordance with the public peace and well-being," though it could not command belief.[564] This division of the members of society into those who obey reason and those who do not became an important distinction in many subsequent political theories.

---

[559] God's decrees "do not receive immediately from God the force of a command, but only from those, or through the mediation of those, who possess the right of ruling and legislating. It is only through these latter that God rules among men," Spinoza, *Theologico-Political Treatise*, 248.

[560] Ibid., 249.

[561] Samuel J Preus (1989), "Spinoza, Vico, and the Imagination of Religion," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50(1): 71-94.

[562] "We all know what weight spiritual right and authority carries in the popular mind: how everyone hangs on the lips, as it were of those who possess it," Spinoza, *Theologico-Political Treatise*, 252.

[563] Ibid.

[564] Ibid., 249; 118-19.

Spinoza was not advocating the removal of God from the political stage. He was, in effect, arguing for two simultaneous theories of political authority, one for the ignorant masses of the real world and one for the minority who used their reason.[565] In general, a government should *pretend* to rely on the old theories of authority in which a ruler's legitimacy was derived from God. But, those who have chosen to live in the ideal world and who, therefore, use their reason would know the secret truth that the government's legitimacy and authority is actually the result of its ability to protect the Natural Right of Liberty. Only the superior persons of society *could* understand such an idea of legitimacy.[566]

Grotius and Spinoza provided two examples of political authority as it might have been (and may still become). Grotius began the task of dislodging God from a central role in the devolution of political authority to rulers, but his proposed alternative source of transcendent credibility did not appeal to practitioners. Both he and Spinoza transferred the credibility of government to its ability to protect rights that existed in the State of Nature but that could not be fully enjoyed due to the chaos of that condition. Spinoza hoped to make his system more appealing to practitioners by empowering the government to perpetuate the "myth" that older, more traditional, theories of political authority still reigned supreme. Neither suggested God played no

---

[565] Roger Scruton (2002 [1986]), *Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 95-102.

[566] There was also a further psychological advantage for the educated elite: by understanding and following Spinoza's theory, one *became* the superior in society, thereby affirming and perpetuating the already existing hierarchical arrangement. Applying different theories of political authority to different classes of society became generally accepted among Conservative movements in Europe over the next two centuries, Don Herzog (1998), *Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 89-139.

role in the establishment of political authority. They merely asserted that his part in the play had already been completed.

Thomas Hobbes

The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes took this idea to its radical conclusion: for all intents and purposes, the immortal God was replaced with the mortal god, the Leviathan. Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651) is often cited as a watershed in political theory. I would argue that this is because he was the first theorist to successfully reduce God's role in political authority and establish the political community as a workable alternative as a source of authority and credibility.

Like Grotius, Hobbes envisioned a State of Nature. Unlike Grotius, he found in this pre-government condition absolutely *no* laws, natural or otherwise: "Where there is no common power, there is no law." This did not mean there was no God, or that God did not possess the requisite power to establish and enforce laws if he so chose. By providing man with reason, God had already done all he needed to do.[567] God could safely recede from the political sphere.

Where did political credibility come from, however, if God was absent? Hobbes's answer required an examination of how government emerged from the State of Nature. In this State, man had only his nature and his reason. Although life in this condition was nasty, brutish, and short, every man possessed God-given reason, which suggested a solution in "convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn

[567] God designed human nature and gave man reason – this is all man needed to follow . For Hobbes, Grotius' argument that God both designed *and* enforced Laws was redundant. Scientific methodology demanded starting with the most basic premises and no more. Hence, God did not need to be involved in worldly affairs for this theory of political authority to be valid.

to agreement."[568] Still, this "contract" lacked an enforcement procedure. These precepts, "without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions."[569] For Natural Law theorists of the Middle Ages, the solution was God who, through His power and the power He bestowed on the state and the church, could monitor and punish any cheaters. For Grotius and Pufendorf, "sociability" did some of the work, the Natural Laws in many instances could enforce themselves, and government did the rest. For Hobbes, however, a civil government must carry the entire burden of enforcement.

Therefore, enforcement of the contract that created a common power required men to voluntarily reduce all their wills to one will and transfer that power to one man or one group of men.[570] This newly created sovereign enforced the agreements in the original contract and, therefore, worked for the peace and defense of every person. Hobbes called this sovereign the Leviathan, or the "mortal god," who served in the role traditionally assigned to God.[571] The Leviathan took on all of the transcendent qualities of God. The Leviathan inherently possessed credibility because it was a voluntary creation existing for the security of the people. Without it, life once again became nasty, brutish, and short.

---

[568] Hobbes, *Leviathan* 109. The articles of this agreement would be considered by other philosophers as "Natural Laws." Hobbes did not view these as "laws" in the traditional sense, but merely precepts that reason has shown individuals were necessary for their own security, Quentin Skinner (2002 [1990]), "The Proper Signification of Liberty," in *Visions of Politics, Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 217. Although they were human inventions, they did not depend on individual personalities. These precepts applied to all people at all times, thus they should be considered "natural."

[569] Hobbes, *Leviathan* 139.

[570] Ibid., 142.

[571] Ibid., 142-43.

The descent back into the dangerous chaos of the State of Nature was so horrific that once sovereign authority was in place, it could not be questioned or removed. Until the contract was signed, no political community or commonwealth existed. At the moment of agreement, the commonwealth and the Leviathan came into existence *simultaneously*.[572] Quentin Skinner argues that, in Hobbes's theory, "the legal person lying at the heart of politics is neither the *persona* of the people nor the official person of the sovereign, but rather the artificial person of the state."[573] However, this statement seems to mask the reality that, throughout the *Leviathan*, Hobbes insinuated that it is the "official person of the sovereign" who acted on behalf of the "artificial person of the state." The people were not permitted to usurp this position. In short, the legitimacy of the political community itself depended on the existence of the ruler. While the origin of the government ultimately came from the individuals (the multitude), its legitimacy did not depend on that group's continuing consent.

---

[572] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 142; Quentin Skinner (2002 [1999]), "The Purely Artificial Person of the State," in *Visions of Politics, Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 196-208. The contract may be voluntary, but once the dotted line was signed, there was no going back. In fact, a multitude of men was only a community (or "one" instead of many) "when they are by one man or one person represented," Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 135. Remove the ruler, and the community no longer existed.

Arguably, Hobbes did not consider the State of Nature and the ensuing contract an historical event, but only a mental exercise, or reason at work, despite the fact that there were several contemporary empirical examples of conditions that paralleled the State of Nature, such as tribes in the Americas and the international community itself, Richard Tuck (1999), *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 135-39. Since there was no actual moment of commissioning a sovereign, this meant that there could be no actual moment of de-commissioning. The creation of a society required that each person abrogate his right to nullify the contract. If any person were allowed to retain this right, the contract would have collapsed, since everyone at some point had an incentive to get out of it.

[573] Quentin Skinner (2002 [1989]), "The State of Princes to the Person of the State," in *Visions of Politics, Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 404.

Where then did its legitimacy come from? It derived primarily from three places. First, it came from the fear of plunging back into the anarchic State of Nature. Fear could strengthen the contract and could be generated through the government itself and from religion.[574] Inasmuch as the government used religion to avoid the collapse of society, it was just.[575] Second, the government's legitimacy emerged from the obligation willingly accepted by each member of the political community at the signing of the original contract. Third, since reason authored the contract, reason and "science" also legitimated it. To Hobbes, science was *how* human beings gained knowledge and reason was *the act* of gaining knowledge. The only purpose for pursuing reason and science was the "benefit of mankind."[576] Thus, the contract itself existed for mankind's benefit and was thereby legitimate. Hobbes did not believe that reason needed any further justification than itself. The additional step of "God" was redundant and, hence, unnecessary.

In a sense, Hobbes brought theories of political authority "down to earth." A ruler's authority did not trace back to God or Natural Laws, but to reason and the conditions that necessitated the formation of the government. It may even be said that he "secularized" political authority. Inasmuch as his theory replaced God with a "mortal god," there was a great deal of secularization. However, we should be careful about making Hobbes more radical than he actual was. Political authority still

---

[574] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 118. For Hobbes, governmental fear and coercion were not limitations on individual liberty (after all much of a person's liberty had been voluntarily ceded in the contract), but operated as useful means of preventing complete social collapse – a far greater threat to individual liberty.

[575] JB Schneewind paraphrases Hobbes in this way: "Our mortal god decides what is good and bad and what is to be believed about the immortal god," 99.

[576] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 50.

appropriated the credibility of transcendent entities. Hobbes also retained God as a backstop: "This is the generation of that great Leviathan (or rather, to speak more reverently, of that *mortal god*) to which we owe, under the *immortal God*, our peace and defense."[577] The idea that the political community possessed inherent credibility seduced practitioners who sought an escape from the negative consequences of God-based authority, justification for changes in international relations practice, and an alternative source of transcendent credibility that could be managed, manipulated, and sold to the people.

Grotius, Spinoza, and Hobbes believed theories that made political authority less dependent on God solved many of Europe's most pressing problems. Critics, however, stressed that, if the fundamental laws of nature developed from reason alone, God's role in the world ceased to be that of divine legislator and became, at best, observer from afar.[578] In other words, the political and theological implications to these theories were closely linked. Although some in Europe embraced this essentially deistic vision of the world, the vast majority were not willing to accept it.

Thus, while Grotius and Hobbes managed to move God further from the center of theories of political authority, neither was ultimately successful in shifting the source of legitimation to another entity. Grotius transferred it to the natural laws and Hobbes pushed it onto reason. Neither of these possessed sufficient means of

---

[577] Hobbes, *Leviathan*: 142-43. It has been argued that Hobbes was an atheist and inserted God and Biblical citations so that his work would not be rejected outright, Leo Strauss (1953), *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago): 202-32.

[578] See, for example, the arguments of Richard Cumberland (1632-1718), Ralph Cudworth (1617-88), Bishop Samuel Parker (1640-88), and Nathaniel Culverwel (1618-1651); JGA Pocock (1990), "Thomas Hobbes: Atheist or Enthusiast? His Place in a Restoration Debate," *History of Political Thought* 11(4): 737-49.

motivating a population to comply with the ruler's commands. Spinoza seemed to recognize this and suggested that two different theories should operate simultaneously: the rational members of society should adopt Grotius' and Hobbes' theories (for they are "True") and the commoners should continue to be guided through older theories, which although false, were very useful for generating compliance. The problem with Spinoza's policy was that it failed to solve the condition of religious dissent that sparked these discussions in many societies. What was needed was one inherently legitimate entity that all persons in society would believe as credible in the absence of God. This was provided in the concept of the political community.

The Political Community Rises

Calvinist Theories of Resistance

During the early modern period in Europe, the use of the notion of a "political community" centered in largely on Calvinist theorists. These writers were significant, Quentin Skinner argues, in that "they separate sovereignty from sovereigns," but they "make no comparable distinction between the powers of sovereignty and the powers of the people."[579] Like the proto-nationalists discussed in the last chapter, they saw political legitimacy as originating in God, passing *through* the people, and ultimately resting on the ruler. Unlike the proto-nationalists, however, these Calvinist theorists attempted to increase the separation between the ruler and the people. The ruler was not the embodiment of the political community, the "people" were.

[579] Skinner (2002 [1998]), "The State of Princes to the Person of the State," in *Visions of Politics, Vol. II: Renaissance Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 394. Skinner is referring in this passage to the "monarchomachs," but explicitly lists two Calvinist monarchomach sources: the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* and Johannes Althusius's *Politica*.

On the issue of resistance to rulers, these Calvinist theorists veered away from John Calvin, who insisted that, according to Romans 13, God commissioned all earthly rulers and no person could justly raise their hand against what God had put in place.[580] However, many Calvinists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries lived in circumstances in which obedience to Calvin's interpretation could mean the eradication of Calvinism altogether. Thus, these writers examined the Scriptures, sure that the reform Calvin had instituted possessed the right, even the duty, to protect itself legitimately from tyrants and heretics. In the end, they developed the concept of an independent "political community," which evolved alongside the strand of thought of Grotius and Hobbes, but with a complementary outcome. While Hobbes and Grotius edged God out of the formula of political authority, they failed to find a practical alternative. The Calvinists, most notably Johannes Althusius, George Lawson, and John Locke, established the political community as an inherently credible alternative in its own right, distinct from both God and ruler, but piously attempted to do so without minimizing the role of God in the least.

In the wake of roughly seventeen years of overt war between the Catholics and Huguenots of France, an anonymous Calvinist published *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* (1579). The *Vindiciae* was an attempt to expand the reasoning of Calvin and Romans 13 in such a way that it remained Scriptural (and thus authoritative), yet also contained conditions under which resistance to authority would be just. Its' solution was an insertion of "the people" between God and the ruler in the formula of political

[580] John Calvin (1991 [1559]), "On Civil Government," in *On Secular Authority*, Harro Hopfl, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 76.

authority: "it is the people that establishes kings, gives them kingdoms, and approves their selection by its vote. For God willed that every bit of authority held by kings should come from the people."[581] In this case, so the author of the *Vindiciae* argued, the king's continued persecution of the Huguenots demonstrated his inability to do his job *and* it was the responsibility of the "people" to correct the king. Thus, from this perspective, the true rebels were not the Huguenots, but the king who refused to step down.

There is a greater distance between the people and the ruler in this theory than in that of Bodin and Hobbes. Power transferred to an employee is *delegated*, not *alienated*. But, from where do the people get *their* authority? Here the *Vindiciae* only implied answers. It could not be all French people, because the Huguenots were a very small percentage of the total population and could not have mustered the necessary support in an assembly to oust the king. The *Vindiciae* implied that the "people" were the Calvinists themselves.[582] John Calvin argued that the elect, meaning those God predestined to receive grace, stood in a position to help instruct the reprobate, or those God predestined not to receive grace. The elect clearly belonged to

---

[581] Philippe du Plessis-Mornay (1969 [1579]), "Vindiciae contra tyrannos," in *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century*, Julian H Franklin, ed. (New York: Pegasus Books): 158. The king is an employee of the people. The *Vindiciae* uses the analogy of the pilot of a ship to illustrate the point. While aboard a ship, the owner will obey a pilot only while he looks out for the good of the ship. When the pilot no longer can or will do his job properly, he is quickly fired. The same is true for a king who is not "looking out for the public good." Thus, the people, if faced with a king who ceases to fulfill the job he was hired to do, are also represented by a parliament or "an assembly with a kind of tribunal authority," who may justly remove the king.

[582] In particular, the right (responsibility) of resistance fell to the local or inferior magistrates. However, the Huguenots tended to be geographically concentrated, thus their local magistrates also tended to be the elected of the elect, Robert M Kingdon (1991), "Calvinism and Resistance Theory, 1550-1580," in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700*, JH Burns, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 214; Spellman (1998), 82.

the Huguenots and, therefore, it was they who spoke for all the people through their representatives.[583]

Johannes Althusius

The aims of the Dutch Calvinist Johannes Althusius differed fundamentally from those of the author of the *Vindiciae*. The Huguenots needed a theory that could motivate and legitimate resistance, while the Dutch Republic of the final decades of the sixteenth century needed a theory that could produce *selective* obedience and submission. He required a theory that, among other things, justified the independence movement of the United Provinces, yet also prevented discontented individuals from encouraging further dissolution of this new political entity.[584] To resolve this, Althusius based ultimate political authority on small associations.

In *Politics Methodically Set Forth* (1603), Althusius asserted that sovereignty rested not in the people, but in the people as members of associations.[585] Family associations may choose to come together to form villages and churches and other groups. These groups can voluntarily create another level of association, a province for instance. Ultimately, ascending the scale of organization, a state can be voluntarily

---

[583] This concept of a political community was used successfully in a few smaller experiments in Europe – most notably by Theodore de Beza in Geneva and Heinrich Bullinger in Zurich. Likewise, it helped provide justification for political resistance among a persecuted church. However, as a *practical* political theory for a territory larger than a city it fell fall short.

[584] If the basis of authority rested in the larger state (ala Bodin), the United Provinces had unjustly broken away from the Holy Roman Empire; however, if authority resided with the people, resistance of the various provinces to the larger United Provinces could be legitimately supported.

[585] Spellman (1998): 76-78; Howell A Lloyd (1991), "Constitutionalism," in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700*, JH Burns, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 287-92; Johannes Althusius (1964), *The Politics of Johannes Althusius*, Frederick S Carney, trans. (London: Beacon Press).

created.[586] The creation of a higher level of association does not in any way abolish associations at a lower level. In Althusius's writings, the task of the highest level of political association is simply to prevent tyranny. The inferior magistrates of the people can withdraw authority from a ruler who attempts to use powers beyond this narrow purpose.[587]

This theory of authority was based on voluntary contracts *between associations of people*, not between the people and the ruler. The creation of associations, whether private or public, was the product of a *rational* consent among equals and a *passionate* "bond" between men.[588] These contracts rested on natural law and natural law rested on God's authority. The position of the ruler in this theory was both minimized and made accountable – exactly where Althusius wanted the Holy Roman Emperor. Thus, Althusius' federalist theory created a greater separation between ruler and political community, giving the latter a life of its own.

Still, the community remained an intermediary through which God's power passed, not an entity that was credible in its own right. Historian J. Wayne Baker points out that "Althusius specifically connects his entire political theory with the

---

[586] Each level of association can more effectively fulfill separate tasks, each of which is necessary to the citizens. The only powers that should be delegated to higher levels are ones that cannot be exercised as effectively or efficiently at lower levels. This is the same as the principle of "subsidiarity" the European Union added to Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty. Larry Cata Becker (1998), "Forging Federal Systems Within a Matrix of Contained Conflict: The Example of the European Union," *Emory International Law Review* 12: 1361-62.

[587] Which magistrates were empowered to act was an important question for Althusius, again, because he was developing a theory where only some groups possessed this power. "In his terminology the term magistrate applies to any office-bearer of the *res publica*, with terms such as *magistratus summus*, ephors, optimates and senators used to distinguish various office-holders from emperor via territorial nobility to urban council. His writings addressed primarily inferior magistrates like him," Robert von Friedeburg (2005), "The Problems of Passions and of Love of the Fatherland in Protestant Thought: Melanchthon to Althusius, 1520s to 1620s," *Cultural and Social History* 2(1): 94.

[588] Friedeburg (2005), 92.

religious covenant. In this religious covenant, the magistrate and all the members of the realm promised to introduce, conserve, and defend true religious doctrine and worship."[589] This is unsurprising in a territory that had been in a constant state of war with Catholic Spain for over three decades. His theory mirrored the organizational structure of Calvinist national churches that Theodore de Beza had initiated in 1558.[590] Althusius' political model allowed for lots of local empowerment, but he stopped far short of allowing for political or religious tolerance. Evidence that this reflected the mood of the United Provinces can be found in the 1619 execution of Advocate Oldenbarnevelt for his policy of tolerating Arminians.

George Lawson

Turning to England, in 1660 the minister George Lawson wrote *Politica Sacra et Civilis*, which more firmly placed sovereignty in the hands of the people, meaning the community as a whole.[591] Calvinist theorists had been unwilling to do this because of their doctrines of the elect and the strong connection they conceived between the political and Church organizations.[592] Supporters of the Stuart monarchy also

---

[589] J Wayne Baker (2000), "Faces of Federalism: From Bullinger to Jefferson," *Publius* 30(4): 33.

[590] Local congregations were associations that came together to form local colloquies and so on, until reaching the national synod at the apex. Each level was crucial and each played a different role. The structure was intended to allow local congregations to control themselves as much as possible. Yet, at the same time, the structure also protected itself from heresy.

[591] It is also possible to read Lawson as an elitist who argued that "political power devolves back not to the people but to their natural representatives: the original forty counts of the forty counties, that is, to the local gentry," James Tully (1991), "Locke," in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700*, JH Burns, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 622. Whether Lawson based ultimate political power in the "people" or in the "local gentry" is indicative of the inconsistency of portions of his theory – one reason why history remembers Locke rather than Lawson.

[592] Lawson was not a Calvinist, but was a clergyman in the Church of England who adjusted his position to whatever government happened to be in power, Stuart or Puritan. This proved to be an effective survival strategy in the English upheavals of the mid-seventeenth century. It is precisely this

hesitated to make such a radical move because admitting the people had such authority could be used to justify the beheading of Charles I. Lawson's ability to shift his arguments with the changing political winds enabled him to see political authority through new eyes.

The author of the *Vindiciae* and Althusius had argued that the right to resistance rested in the hands of the people's representatives. Lawson rejected this.[593] The whole people voluntarily had joined together under natural law and formed a political community. With voluntary and unanimous consent, this community created a coercive power to sustain society. The people retained "real majesty" and delegated a lesser form, "personal majesty," to the coercive power. Thus, the creation of representatives was a *delegation* of power that could be retracted at any time.[594] The "people" existed as a functioning political concept. Arguing against Hobbes, Lawson claimed that, if government collapsed, the community still existed. It is this community that possessed the authority to referee between the branches of government. Of course, it was not entirely clear *how* the people went about this. A

"accommodating attitude" that allowed Lawson to transform and adapt the dominant theories of political authority in vital ways that John Locke later adopted, Conal Condren (1992), "Introduction," in *Lawson: Politica Sacra et Civilis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): xv.

[593] George Lawson (1992 [1660]), *Lawson: Politica Sacra et Civilis*, Conal Condren, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 41-75.

[594] Lawson, writing in the Restoration, designed his theory to examine the past three tumultuous decades. The people of England created a government possessing multiple branches, a monarchy and a parliament. If either of these branches were eliminated, the whole government ceased to exist. According to Lawson, parliament did not have the authority back in 1648 to abolish the monarchy because there could be no parliament without a monarchy. The people could choose to adjust the structure of government, but neither branch could make such a decision single-handedly. Note how Lawson attempted to take a middle position. The execution of 1648 was illegitimate because parliament lacked the power to make such a decision. However, both the Cromwell government and the newly-restored Stuart monarchy were legitimate because the people chose to implement each.

more coherent version of this theory had to wait until the Glorious Revolution of 1688 cleared the path for John Locke to safely publish his *Two Treatises of Government*.

John Locke

Lawson's real impact on the history of political thought stems from his influence on Locke.[595] It is primarily through Locke that modern political theory derives the idea that sovereignty always rests in the people. Locke argued for a theory of political legitimacy founded on the consent of the members of the English nation, but which also retained the credibility of God to supplement this credibility. Locke had an enormous impact on the founding constitution of England following the Glorious Revolution. King William III found in Locke's ideas exactly the political theory that would solidify his authority despite the "revolutionary" context of his crowning. [596]

To do this, Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* first had to refute Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* of 1653 (reissued in 1680).[597] Tory politicians and clergy in the last years of the Stuart monarchy favorably read Filmer's statements of support for absolutism in the monarchy. Filmer's theory rested on the analogy of the state as a family: because the king is the father, political obligation is analogous to paternal

---

[595] Julian H Franklin (1978), *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). On the other hand, the most prolific George Lawson scholar suggests that Lawson should be studied as something more than just an anticipation of Locke's theory, Conal Condren (1981), "Resistance and Sovereignty in Lawson's *Politica*: An Examination of a Part of Professor Franklin, His Chimera," *Historical Journal* 24(3): 673-81.

[596] Lois G Schwoerer (1990), "Locke, Lockean Ideas, and the Glorious Revolution," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51(4): 531-48.

[597] Part of the subtitle of Locke's *First Treatise* is "The False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, and His Followers, Are Detected and Overthrown." See also Johann Sommerville (1991), "Introduction," in *Filmer: 'Patriarcha' and Other Writings*, Johann P Sommerville, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): ix-xxiv.

submission.[598] Locke's refutation accepted this well-accepted notion that the state is like a family and the accompanying analogy between political obligation and paternal submission within a household. However, Locke viewed this obligation very differently. The male parent was not absolute. Children are the property of God, created by Him, and entrusted to parents for proper care and training. Once the child reached an age of reason and understanding, the young adult was free and considered an equal of the father.[599] The parent's authority only continued with the voluntary consent of the child.

Having used Filmer's own analogy to set a new standard for political authority, Locke followed many of his fellow seventeenth-century theorists back to a State of Nature to understand how and why people first consented to create a government.[600] Locke argued government was not "natural," but was a human creation designed to secure property rights.[601] The only truly "natural" thing was the "law" of self-preservation. People would occasionally misjudge what actions would preserve them and which would destroy them. These "inconveniences" could effectively be solved

---

[598] Filmer supported this idea biblically, arguing that Adam was the first king and Charles I was Adam's eldest heir. Granted, this last addition was slightly strained, but the king-as-father analogy was easily understood in English society and carried a lot of weight among many, Johann P Sommerville (1991), "Absolutism and Royalism," in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700*, JH Burns, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 357-58.

[599] The child could *consent* to transfer authority to the father, but he could also refuse to consent to this. The father had the right to hold inheritance as a hostage to generate consent, but otherwise he had no legitimate power to compel the fully reasoning adult to submit to his authority. The parent's duty to God was fulfilled once the child was raised.

[600] Spellman (1998), 94-97.

[601] Filmer had implied that because Adam was made the first king, government was natural. There could have been no State of Nature because there were no people before Adam and, hence, no time when people lacked government. Locke responded: "Supposing we should grant, that a Man is *by Nature Governor* of his Children, *Adam* could not hereby *be Monarchas soon as Created*; for this Right of Nature being founded in his being their Father, how *Adam* could have a *Natural Right* to be *Governor* before he was a Father, when by being a father only he had that *Right*, is, methinks, hard to conceive." John Locke, *First Treatise of Government*, paragraph 17, *Locke: Two Treatises of Government*, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 153.

with the creation of a civil government. This was done when men "agree[ed] together mutually to enter into one Community, and make one Body Politick."[602]

Just as Locke took sovereignty away from Adam and gave it to the people, he did the same with property.[603] God *entrusted* the world "to Mankind in common" for life and convenience.[604] A person said something was "mine" if he mixed his labor with the stuff in nature. However, all property ultimately belonged to God – it was only temporarily entrusted to the individual. The competition for property produced disagreements between individuals, one of the most prominent "inconveniences" a civil government should solve.

Government began with a two-step process. In the first phase, a group of free individuals consented to put themselves under obligation to each other and submit to the majority. This act transformed the disparate group into a united community – a "people." In the next step, the community decided to erect specific political institutions and select personnel to exercise their authority. Like Lawson and contrary to Hobbes, Locke saw this as a delegation of power, not alienation. The institutions of government could completely dissolve (step two above), but sovereignty still remained in the people thanks to their original compact (step one).[605] If the government was not

---

[602] Locke, *Second Treatise*, section 14: 276-77.

[603] For Filmer, both sovereignty and property were given to Adam and passed down through inheritance.

[604] Locke, *Second Treatise*, section 25: 286.

[605] What made the contract language of Locke and other English Whigs so important was that it gave *the people* the right to decide when a contract was violated. Thus, the events of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 could be considered the choice of "the people," James Farr and Clayton Roberts (1985), "John Locke on the Glorious Revolution: A Rediscovered Document," *Historical Journal* 28(2): 385-98. This "radical" position was contrasted with the position of moderates and conservatives who argued that there was no "revolution" at all: either William legally conquered England (William's choice) or James II deserted his throne (James' choice), Tim Harris (1999), "The People, the Law, and

doing its job (i.e. protecting property) or if it began to act contrary to its purpose (i.e. confiscating property), it declared a state of war on the people.[606] Thus, people don't rebel, governments do. The author of the *Vindiciae* indicated that such a state of war could only be declared by the magistrates of the people, but Locke bestowed this judgment on the people as a whole.[607]

Locke also turned the concept of "the people" against a William Barclay's version of divine right of kings.[608] Barclay had argued that if a king set himself against the commonwealth, the people as a whole could *defend* themselves, but they could not *attack* the monarch. Barclay used the standard argument of hierarchical arrangements: "an inferior cannot punish a superior." But, in very extreme cases and in very specific conditions, Barclay argued that the parliament could rightfully remove the authority of the king. Locke again followed Lawson in his response: once the king set himself against the commonwealth, any relationship of inferior and superior

---

the Constitution in Scotland and England: A Comparative Approach to the Glorious Revolution," *Journal of British Studies* 38(1): 28-58.

[606] "Whenever the *Legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the Property of the People,* or to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any farther Obedience," Locke, *Second Treatise*, section 222: 412. "And if those, who by force take away the Legislative, are *Rebels*, the *Legislators* themselves, as has been shewn, can be no less esteemed so;… and so they putting themselves into a state of War with those, who made them the Protectors and Guardians of their Peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation, *Rebellantes* Rebels," Locke, *Second Treatise*, section 227: 416.

[607] One shouldn't expect a mass meeting or a vote on whether to resist the government, however. When people were treated unjustly or the government continually breached the public trust, people would fight back whether this was right or wrong, legitimate or not. The fact that the people were so roused to action that they would fight was a pretty good indication that the government had broken its trust with the people and deserved dissolution: "The People…are not apt to stir…. But if they universally have a perswasion, grounded upon manifest evidence, that designs are carrying on against their Liberties…who is to be blamed for it?... Are the People to be blamed, if they have the sence of rational Creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them?" Locke, *Second Treatise*, section 230: 418. This amounted to a very pragmatic (though circular) solution for the sovereignty of the people: the people *rightfully* reclaimed their sovereignty when they reclaimed their sovereignty. This would rarely happen, according to Locke, so when it did we should take special notice.

[608] Tully (1991): 638-39; William Barclay (1954 [1600]), *The Kingdom and the Regal Power* (Chevy Chase, MD: Country Dollar Press).

ceased to be, so Barclay's argument collapsed. In such cases, the people as a whole were the judges of right and wrong.[609] Of course, God was the final judge, but He encouraged the people to be industrious and pursue justice on their own.[610]

Since government existed to police violators of the Natural Law, every government action had to conform to natural law and reason for the government to be legitimate. God was the author of both natural law and reason. Locke argued that this meant the government had no business involving itself in confessional or doctrinal arguments about God. The theological disputes between Calvinists, Arminians, and Catholics were private concerns, not public ones. This is why Locke argued in *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1685) that a state should tolerate all religions, but not atheism. When the atheist denied God existence, he undermined the bases for government (natural law and reason).

This concept of "separation of church and state" was institutional only, however. Organized religion should be distanced from government, but God should be brought closer. Government should stay out of religious disputes, but it should be intimately involved in the morality of its citizens. And there was no doubt for Locke that God, not reason, was the source of this morality. In *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, Locke claimed that "human reason unassisted failed men in its great and proper business of morality."[611] On the other hand, whether the Eucharist changed

---

[609] "When a King has Dethron'd himself, and put himself in a state of War with his People, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no King, as they would any other Man," Locke, *Second Treatise*, section 239: 424-25.

[610] "*God* in Heaven is *Judge*: He alone, 'tis true, is Judge of the Right. But *every Man* is *Judge* for himself, as in all other Cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a State of War with him," Locke, *Second Treatise*, section 241: 427.

[611] Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, section 241.

form or just remained bread was irrelevant for government. Thus, Locke sought to avoid the religious disputes that had produced wars and civil wars, but he also kept God firmly in control as the ultimate source of legitimacy and credibility.[612]

The Eighteenth Century: Bringing the Two Strands of Thought Together

The Hobbesian and Lockean strands of thought described above developed somewhat separately for many years, but over the course of the eighteenth century they began to merge into a single theory of political credibility. This was done, in part, through a theoretical transformation of religion that jettisoned the metaphysical source of God, but which retained the crucial function of social cohesion. According to a new group of thinkers, the traditional religion of Europe should be set aside for "natural religion," or a religion that depended on reason rather than superstition. This new form, however, did not generate the same degree of passion among followers – a

[612] Locke scholarship over the past two decades has emphasized the importance of religion in his epistemological and political systems. This is a response to two interpretations of Locke in the 1960s and 1970s that marginalized Locke's Christianity. Straussians argued that Locke was really just a Hobbesian; see, for example, Leo Strauss (1953), "Modern Natural Right," in *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Thomas L Pangle (1988), *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). CB Macpherson contended that Locke was more concerned about capitalism and private property than he was about religion, (1962), *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

There has been a significant shift in the 1990s and 2000s toward following John Dunn's suggestions and returning Locke's religious background and beliefs to the center of his political theory: John Dunn (1969), *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); James Tully (1980), *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Mark Goldie (1983), "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies* 31: 61-85; Richard Ashcraft (1986), *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's 'Two Treatises of Government'* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); John Marshall (1994), *John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Kirstie M McClure (1996), *Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); BW Young (1998), *Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century England: Theological Debate from Locke to Burke* (Oxford: Clarendon); Jeremy Waldron (2002), *God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press) According to these scholars, Locke's theory *depended* on God. Removing Him would undermine his arguments regarding equality, property, contract, and consent. Thus, Locke's project was very different from Hobbes's.

necessary characteristic for generating compliance. Thus, some political theorists shifted from natural religion to "civil religion," which overtly connected it with a particular group of people. From this point, it was a relatively easy adaptation to what people of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would recognize as "cultural nationalism," where the nation substituted for the deity as the source of transcendent credibility.

The brevity of the following discussion might convey to the reader a sense of inevitability of this progression to nationalism. That would be an incorrect conclusion to draw. The developing political theory of nationalism co-existed with at least two other potential theories. First of all, there remained advocates of God and traditional religion as the continuing source of transcendent credibility.[613] England, in particular, experienced a resurgence of religious expression among the mass of the population, perhaps most evident among the Methodist movement of John Wesley. These movements were, in part, a reaction to the growing secularization of politics and the Hobbesian removal of God from the chain of political authority. A second competing political theory was presented by the several Enlightenments in Europe: "humanity" as the source of transcendent credibility. Since all humans shared the same nature, artificial divisions between them should be eradicated. This would take time, but all humans were perfectible, meaning that eventually they could and would all act according to reason. In theory, any of these three potential sources of transcendent

[613] The actual number of deists in Europe in the eighteenth century was relatively small, SJ Barnett (2004), *The Enlightenment and Religion: The Myths of Modernity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Deism, however, was still incredibly important since, although they lacked numbers, they were disproportionately represented among the elite and intellectuals of European society.

credibility might have dominated the others. Why one rather than the others dominated is beyond the scope of this study, although it is an important question.

This section concentrates on the theory of political credibility that eventually became nationalism because it was this competitor that dominated nineteenth and twentieth century politics in Europe and, through the extensive impact of colonialism, came to dominate the majority of the world. David Hume's writings explain the concept of "natural religion." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, among others, translated this natural religion into a more particular civil religion. Finally, the German theorist Johann Gottfried Herder facilitated the conversion of the more generic idea of civil religion into the unique notion of cultural nationalism.

David Hume

Following Grotius and Hobbes, David Hume sought to keep ethics and religion separate. Ethics (and politics) occurred in the physical realm, while religion was primarily concerned with the metaphysical realm. Hume argued we can *believe* things about the metaphysical realm, but we can not *know* anything about it. This skepticism insisted that knowledge depended on empirical demonstration – something metaphysics and theology could not provide. Hume was especially concerned with the damaging effect religious factions were having on *Scottish* economic development.[614] Scotland as a nation could not progress, he believed, until it had purged itself of bitter disputes over religious doctrines of which humans could say nothing.

[614] Jennifer A Hardt (1997), *Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Thus, when Hume considered the original contract of government, made famous by Hobbes and Locke, he argued that he could conclude *nothing* about it. The question of the origin of governments was unanswerable and, to a large extent, irrelevant. The more important question was why we government still existed and the answer was very practical: there was no other choice. People need what government provided and were afraid of a world without it. Necessity and fear not only maintained government, but they were also the source of each citizen's political obligation. Hume concluded that the obligation to submit to political authority arose from self-interest: without obedience, society would collapse.

Thus, in Hume, the two seventeenth-century strands of thought merged.[615] On the one hand, God had nothing to do with this process. God did not (and need not) command obedience to the political authority because rational persons would obey in their own self-interest. According to one interpreter, Hume's goal was to replace a religion of God with a rational "religion of man," meaning "a religion that is freed from the worship of the supernatural, as well as from reliance on the benignity of nature."[616] If all persons in society embraced this religion, there would be no need for anything beyond a minimal structure of government. This was idealistic, however.

---

[615] I do not want to suggest with this discussion that Hume represented a significant turning point in the story of the transformation of political credibility. Hume is but one (though perhaps the most famous today) of the elite in British society that argued for what may be called a *Deistic* political theory. Many others in this century sought a *natural* religion, as opposed to a *supernatural* religion. A short list may include Anthony Collins (1713), *A Discourse of Free-Thinking*; a number of writings by Voltaire; and Baron d'Holbach (1772), *Common Sense, or Natural Ideas Opposed to Supernatural*.

[616] Ernest Campbell Mossner (1994), "The Religion of David Hume," in *Philosophy, Religion and Science in the 17th and 18th Centuries*, John W Yolton, ed. (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press): 120. Another commentator suggests that one reading of Book 12 of the *Dialogues* reveals that Hume did not think it possible for skepticism to fully eliminate at least a minimal form of theism, which Hume equated with a *natural* belief. But, even here, Hume did not think this was sufficient to sustain a *popular* religion. Terence Penelhum (2000), *Themes in Hume: The Self, the Will, Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 177-203.

Following an argument of Spinoza, Hume divided persons in society into two groups: the *enlightened* and the *vulgar*. Practically speaking, the *vulgar* would not accept this religion of man. They "lack the capacity to work their own fate and stand in dire need of leadership" – hence, they are named the *vulgar*.[617] Eliminating God, by itself, was not enough. The few *enlightened* needed a way to ensure the compliance of the far more numerous *vulgar* in society.

To solve this, Hume brought in the second strand of thought: attach political credibility to the concept of the nation. This solution satisfied Hume's adherence to empiricism: the political units of Europe already demonstrated division into separate nationalities (thanks to the proto-nationalism of the preceding century),[618] the constituents of the nation were physical,[619] and the outcomes of a nation's success could be measured in terms of wealth and (more problematically) glory.[620] At the same time, Hume believed it was necessary to retain some metaphysical elements, at least in the short term, to ensure the compliance of the *vulgar*. Thus, he supported retaining some aspects of traditional religion for the benefit of the *vulgar*.[621] Still, traditional religion should be subject to the nation.[622] It must always be kept clear that

---

[617] Mossner 121.

[618] "An established government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumstance of its being established," Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth." Also see Hume, "Of National Characters"

[619] Without a doubt, the nation as a concept had metaphysical elements; however, the nation as a collection of individuals actually existed in the physical realm.

[620] See Hume, "Of Commerce," "Of Refinement in the Arts," "Of the Balance of Trade," and "Of the Jealousy of Trade."

[621] Hume's goal was for the *enlightened* to lead the *vulgar* into enlightenment as quickly as possible. Over time, more and more would become adherents of the religion of man, but in the meantime political stability was necessary and traditional religion served as a useful tool toward that end.

[622] In "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," Hume suggested the creation of a "council of religion and learning," which "inspects the universities and clergy."

religion was a tool of the nation, not the other way around. This concept of a "natural religion" gained in popularity through the course of the eighteenth century.[623] Among the elite of Atlantic, and even more notably, among political practitioners, the nation was fast becoming an acceptable alternative to God as a source of transcendent credibility.[624]

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Similar trends were occurring in France, at least among theorists. Most of the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment thinkers, the *philosophes*, were in favor of the Hobbesian argument of removing God from considerations of political credibility. For them, as for Hume, the elevation of Reason necessarily meant that the individual should no longer be held in sway by superstition. At a minimum, this required a rejection of the established church and, to a greater and greater degree, the affirmation of either deism or atheism.[625] Any political theory put forward by the philosophes required a source of legitimacy and credibility other than God (or gods). However, their position on the Lockean argument, whether the people or nation would be substituted as the ultimate source of transcendent credibility, was more ambiguous.

---

[623] For example, foremost among the British adherents was Henry St. John Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751), leader of the Tory Party in the last years of the Stuart monarchs. As a diplomat and leading statesman, he had a tremendous influence on many of the European elite in the first half of the eighteenth century, Isaac Kramnick (1992), *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 84-110, 137-187. Voltaire and Benjamin Franklin claimed to be admirers of Bolingbroke's religious doctrines. Among the elite of Atlantic, and even more notably, among political practitioners, the nation was fast becoming an acceptable alternative to God as a source of transcendent credibility

[624] On the increasing use of the concept of the "English" nation by Bolingbroke's supporters (and Walpole's opponents), see Christine Gerrard (1995), *The Patriot Opposition to Walpole: Politics, Poetry, and National Myth, 1725-1742* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

[625] Peter Gay (1995 [1966]), *The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism* (New York: WW Norton and Company): 212-421.

Because the philosophes focused on "human nature" and the improvement thereof, they tended to downplay national distinctions. Even though there were differences in how far each race or nation had progressed to that point, all mankind would eventually be free, rational and, hence, perfect. Thus, it was possible to take pride in one's own race and to recognize some differences in national characters, but still claim membership in the human race first and foremost. The ultimate source of transcendent credibility for such writers became the vision of a perfected *humanity*. Those races and nations that were more progressed (meaning, of course, the Europeans and, often, the British) had a responsibility to help the others catch up. Jean-Jacques Rousseau slightly altered the philosophes' theory of a perfected vision of humanity as the source of transcendent credibility and it was this version that the participants of the French Revolution relied upon.[626]

For Rousseau, the source of transcendent credibility was the "general will."[627] A rational person willed what was good for him, even though he might not act for his

---

[626] Even among his contemporaries, it was hard to know if Rousseau was one of the philosophes or their largest critic, Mark Hulliung (1994), *The Autocritique of the Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Though history tends to lump Rousseau in with Voltaire, Diderot, Condillac, and the other philosophes, there was tremendous animosity between these Enlightenment thinkers and Rousseau. It has even been argued that Rousseau was the first "Counter-Enlightenment" thinker, Arthur M Melzer (1996), "The Origin of the Counter-Enlightenment: Rousseau and the New Religion of Sincerity," *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 344-60. It is likely that Diderot and Condillac would not have disagreed with this assessment. Rousseau differed primarily from the other philosophes in arguing for a political theory that relied on a minimal version of nationalism rather than the broader concept of humanity, Daniel E Cullen (1993), *Freedom in Rousseau's Political Philosophy* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press): 130-55. Thus, it was no coincidence that the French Revolutionaries made Rousseau, rather than Condillac or Helvetius, the intellectual father of their movement. He supplied a much more manageable and practical source of transcendent credibility.

[627] This concept has been notoriously difficult to pin down, see, for example, David Lay Williams (2005), "Justice and the General Will: Affirming Rousseau's Ancient Orientation," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 66(3): 383-411. One interpretation is that the term did not mean the will of all, in the sense that the will of each person pursuing their own interests is added to every other will and a majority or super-majority is a measure of the general will. Thus, Rousseau was not promoting an institutionally democratic concept. Instead, the general will was a transcendent entity. It could not be physically measured, for example, by election.

good. Likewise, the *acts* of the people (elections, votes, legislation, etc.) may not be what were for the common good (here we may read "general will"). In *The Social Contract*, Book I.7, Rousseau brought this down to the level of the individual. Each citizen must decide between what was in his own interest and what was in the interest of his community. To know what the latter was, the citizen must consult the general will. This allowed Rousseau to bring in a communal element (the general will), while still retaining the freedom of the individual (*I* consult the general will).[628]

Although it is difficult to know exactly what Rousseau intended by the general will, it is possible to say several things about Rousseau's conception of it that demonstrate he promoted a version of nationalism, though a minimal version. First, the general will was for a finite set of individuals, not all of humanity.[629] Second, the general will was a transcendent entity. It was not the individuals themselves, nor the group of individuals. It was *meta*-physical, yet it was as real as anything in the physical world: it was engraved on the hearts of the citizens.[630] Third, the general will was the source of transcendent credibility. Individuals (and the community as a whole) consulted this metaphysical entity to know how to act. According to Patrick Riley, Rousseau intended the "general will" to replace the tradition political concept of

---

[628] Wokler, 86-87.

[629] Rousseau often stated his preference for smaller communities on the scale of the Athenian city-state or his native Geneva. There has been some debate about whether he would have supported the idea of the general will on the scale of modern-day nation-states, but it is more than possible to see that "the seed of nationalism" existed in Rousseau's thought, Arthur Melzer (2000), "Rousseau, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sympathetic Identification," in *Educating the Prince: Essays in Honor of Harvey Mansfield*, Mark Blitz and William Kristol, eds. (Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield): 123.

[630] The general will may be likened to the transcendent Platonic idea of justice, Williams (2005). There is a problem with this reading in that, if the general will were analogous to the Platonic ideal, then there would only need to be one general will for all humanity, which is not what Rousseau suggests.

the "will of God."[631] As such, the general will possessed validity far above any particular will. Rousseau's "general will" essentially meant the metaphysical conception of the "nation." It was a minimal version in that it did not attempt to explain why there were different nations (or several general wills) in the world. It merely asserted that such wills exist and that individuals were to consult their respective general will.

To supplement the general will as *form*, Rousseau advocated a "civil religion" as *content*. While Locke had promoted the nation as source of transcendent credibility, he retained Christianity to provide moral content for society.[632] More than a half century later, Rousseau suggested replacing "superstitious" traditional religion with a civil religion, not unlike Hume's natural religion.[633] Rousseau supported the philosophes' critique of traditional religion, but not to the extent that it undermined the social cohesion religious institutions provided.[634] To put it simply, Rousseau recognized that reason must be supplemented with passion, at least in the political sphere.[635] The passions of ordinary people would not be inspired by vague commitments to "humanity." Self-love could only be counteracted by another love.[636] Such love was generated when individuals felt "themselves to be members of the

---

[631] Patrick Riley (1986), *The General Will Before Rousseau* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

[632] David McCabe (1997), "John Locke and the Argument Against Strict Separation," *Review of Politics* 59(2): 233-58.

[633] Melzer (1996); EA Judge (1989), "The Beginning of Religious History," *Journal of Religious History* 15(4): 394-412.

[634] Graeme Garrard (1994), "Rousseau, Maistre, and the Counter-Enlightenment," *History of Political Thought* 15(1): 97-120.

[635] Frederick M Barnard (1984), "Patriotism and Citizenship in Rousseau: A Dual Theory of Public Willing?" *Review of Politics* 46(2): 244-65.

[636] Richard Noble (1988), "Freedom and Sentiment in Rousseau's Philosophical Anthropology," *History of Political Thought* 9(2): 263-81.

patrie." As a result, they would "love [the patrie] with that delicate feeling that any isolated man feels only for himself."[637] This provided the *passion* that prompted individuals to obey *reason*, meaning the general will.

The French Revolutionaries expanded Rousseau's minimal concept into a full-blown theory of nationalism.[638] The Revolutionary intellectuals and later nineteenth and twentieth century nationalists recognized that for nationalism to motivate action, the particular nation must be infused with meaning and purpose. Rousseau also recognized this when he suggested that a people shared *mouers*, or common traditions and values.[639] But, Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* argued that national distinctions were artificial (or "imagined"), rather than natural.[640] Thus, he likely viewed them as he did other political institutions: realities that must be lived with and dealt with, but historically damaging to the individual. The Revolutionaries and later nationalists redeemed the nation as *necessary* for human freedom.

Johann Gottfried Herder

According to the German historian Otto Pflanze, France provided one "spiritual father" of nationalism in Rousseau, who gave Europe the concept of "popular sovereignty," while Germany produced another "spiritual father" in Johann

---

[637] Rousseau, *Discourse on Political Economy*, quoted in Steven T Engel (2005), "Rousseau and Imagined Communities," *Review of Politics* 67(3): 524.

[638] Rousseau's influence on the French Revolutionaries, especially Robespierre, was far greater than the influence of other philosophes. Charles A Gliozzo (1971), "The Philosophes and Religion: Intellectual Origins of the Dechristianization Movement in the French Revolution," *Church History* 40(3): 273-83.

[639] John T Scott (1997), "Rousseau and the Melodious Language of Freedom," *Journal of Politics* 59(3): 803-29; Richard Fralin (1986), "Rousseau and Community: The Role of *Moeurs* in Social Change," *History of Political Thought* 7(1).

[640] Engel (2005).

Gottfried Herder, who developed "cultural nationalism."[641] He rejected the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke and rejected many of the Enlightenment ideas of the French philosophes.[642] But, it is Herder's theory of political legitimacy that is recognizably nationalist, at least in modern terms.[643]

Herder's theory of nationalism combined the two strands of thought previously discussed: God was relegated to a distant participant in the generation of political credibility, while the nation was elevated to the central role. The nation, for Herder, was "the basic unit of humanity."[644] The individual was nothing outside of his nation. Human nature was not universal, as the French philosophes argued, but "it is a pliant clay which assumes a different shape under different needs and circumstances"[645] Each culture was unique. For Herder, individual thought was shaped by language and language reflected culture.[646] Thus, a Frenchman was fundamentally different from a German.

The nation assumed a consciously transcendent status. On the one hand, the nation physically consisted of the individuals who shared a culture, and most

---

[641] Otto Pflanze (1966), "Nationalism in Europe, 1848-1871" *Review of Politics* 28(2): 129-43.

[642] Brian J Whitton (1988), "Herder's Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community versus Cosmopolitan Rationalism," *History and Theory* 27(2): 146-68.

[643] In fact, it is somewhat ironic that, although his ideas had an enormous impact on how European politics was actually practiced for the next two centuries, it has been the philosophes and the French Enlightenment that has received more of the scholarly attention. Herder, despite the best efforts of Isaiah Berlin and Frederick Barnard, remains relatively unknown. It is his conception of nationalism that dominated the nineteenth-century European mind and, arguably, still does today.

[644] Richard White (2005), "Herder: On the Ethics of Nationalism," *Humanitas* 18(1-2): 167. In contrast, earlier social contract theories and, to a large extent, natural law theories, suggested that the individual was the basic unit: the individual preceded the nation.

[645] Frederick M Barnard, ed. (1969), *J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 185.

[646] Vicki Spencer (1996), "Towards an Ontology of Holistic Individualism: Herder's Theory of Identity, Culture and Community," *History of European Ideas* 22(3): 245-60.

importantly, a language.[647] But the centrality of language in distinguishing one nation from another pointed to the nation as something existing beyond the physical world.[648] Since individual identity was derived in large part from the nation a person belonged to, the nation *was* the unique set of stories, myths, traditions, rituals, customs, language, and religion. This aspect was transcendent, but certainly existed since it could be continually modified and recreated.[649]

Although it was transcendent, why was the "nation" inherently credible? Herder suggested first of all that this was because it was the source of the individual's identity. There was a deep psychological need in every person to *belong*, and this was the role the nation filled and the role religion had once filled.[650] Contrary to the universalist arguments of the philosophes, a person existed in a particular time at a particular place, which meant he was a part of a particular culture, which was the source of that person's identity. Thus, the individual believed the nation to be credible in much the same way he knew he existed – it's just how it was.

However, the credibility of and loyalty to the nation came from more than just an accident of birth. Each nation was a *natural* part of humanity. The division of

---

[647] The term Herder uses to describe the culture and language of a particular community was its *Volksgeist.* Herder suggested that the *Volksgeist* was the basis of political association, as opposed to a theoretical "contract" as suggested by Hobbes and Locke. Peter Hallberg (1999), "The Nature of Collective Individuals: J. G. Herder's Concept of Community," *History of European Ideas* 25(6): 291-304.

[648] Russell Arben Fox (2003), "J. G. Herder on Language and the Metaphysics of National Community," *Review of Politics* 65(2): 237-62.

[649] Isaiah Berlin (1973 [1998]), "The Counter-Enlightenment" in *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux): 262-63.

[650] Isaiah Berlin, Herder's most famous modern day commentator, labeled this "belief in the value of belonging to a group or culture" as *populism*. It should be noted that Berlin was not a big fan, believing this to be a negative characteristic that, in most cases, produced inter-group violence and suppression of the individual. Berlin (1997 [1976]), "Herder and the Enlightenment," in *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux): 367-68, 370-80.

humanity into nations was not man-made: if this were true, the nation would appear less transcendent and less inherently credible.[651] Every nation, from the most advanced to the most primitive, revealed some important aspect of humanity (*humanitat*).[652] It was, with no intended paradox in terms, "multicultural nationalism."[653]

Despite the fact that Herder was a Lutheran minister, God's role in this theory was almost wholly mediated through the nation. This contrasted with earlier forms of nationalism (proto-nationalism) in which the nation was perceived as a tool through which God delegated his authority. For Herder, religion was a part of culture and, as such, under the list of things that defined and distinguished a particular nation. A government would often appeal to the credibility of its deity or deities, use religious language and symbols, and even maintain an official relationship with the priesthood, but this should be seen as an appeal to *culture* and the nation that embodies that culture. The *nation* was the ultimate source of transcendent credibility.

---

[651] The tendency to see nations as *natural* rather than *man-made* dominated political practice and scholarship until World War I, Elias Jose Palti (2001), "The Nation as a Problem: Historians and the 'National Question,'" *History and Theory* 40(3): 324-46. This raises the possibility that the post-modern questioning of the naturalness of the nation has played a significant role in the nation-state's perceived decline today.

[652] Each nation contributed to humanity as a whole, primarily through its particular arts. Herder put this belief into practice by attempting to collect and publish all of the German folk poetry he could find. William A Wilson (1973), "Herder, Folklore and Romantic Nationalism," *Journal of Popular Culture* 6(4): 819-35. This idea was more fully developed several decades later in Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* and had a significant impact on the development of German arts and, not coincidentally, German nationalism, see Christopher Janaway (2002), *Schopenhauer: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 70-87, 119-27.

[653] Charles Taylor (1994), "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Charles Taylor, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 30-32. It is interesting that this theoretical feature of nationalism has often been overlooked in studies of nationalism, but was almost universally believed in many versions of nationalism, even by the most extreme movements.

This is also why the response of persons to nationalism often resembled responses to religion. The philosophes of the Enlightenment attempted to separate two human faculties: reason and passion.[654] Herder and other Counter-Enlightenment writers argued that reason and passion could not be artificially separated from each other. The *passionate* response of nationalism was a *reasonable* reaction to a culture that fundamentally constituted an individual's identity. It was exactly this passion, so similar to that exhibited toward religion in previous eras, which rulers desired to tap into. It proved to be incredibly efficient at generating compliance and political practitioners all over Europe began to turn to their particular nation as the source of transcendent credibility.

Impact on the Political Boundaries of Europe

By the early nineteenth century, the proliferation of nationalism meant that Europe contained many sources of transcendent credibility. There are several reasons that historians have suggested for its success. However, at the most pragmatic level, nationalism proved to be a useful tool for governments to generate compliance from their populations. In the new age of large-scale, conscripted militaries, nationalism went a long way in helping to fill out the ranks with a minimum of physical coercion. The transcendent notion of the *nation* became seen as inherently credible and the government, as the physical manifestation of the nation, appropriated that credibility.

The age of nationalism is an age of many sources of transcendent credibility – each "people" uses a different source of transcendent credibility than its neighbors.

---

[654] White (2005): 175.

The expectation then is that this era would also witness very distinctive borders between these political units. In fact, distinctive borders are a necessary condition of standard definitions of the dominant political unit in this system, the nation-state. Max Weber, in his famous definition, argued that the state "lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical violence* within a certain territory."[655] This connection between nationalism and distinctive borders is significant for two reasons. First, it suggests that the concept of basing political credibility on the nation as a source of transcendent credibility and the adoption of this practice by more than one political unit *preceded* the modern distinctiveness of borders. Second, it also implies that relatively distinct borders between political units are not a necessary condition of the modern world, only of a world dominated by nationalism. If the various national sources of transcendent credibility are replaced with a single shared source, modern borders would also disappear.

A clear, demarcated, and relatively distinct border around a particular nation becomes a crucial means of recognition a particular nation's existence and a useful tool for perpetuating that existence. The nation, as a metaphysical entity, is a collection of stories, symbols, language, myths, etc. The border, as John Armstrong understood it, becomes a container of that culture.[656] If the nation is the soul of the people, the territory becomes the body and this body is distinct from other bodies around it. The symbols and stories act as "border guards," uniting the persons within

---

[655] Max Weber (1994 [1919]), "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," in *Weber: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 310-11.

[656] John Armstrong (1982), *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press): 6.

the border and keeping foreign objects out.[657] Thus, in an age of nationalism, distinctive borders are normatively demanded. However, this is true because these distinctive borders have a practical function: they perpetuate the nation as the source of transcendent credibility and protect it from the challenges of foreign competitors.

All five of the proxies that have been used to measure the relative distinctiveness of boundaries between political units confirm the emergence of incredibly distinctive borders in the modern age of nationalism, from roughly 1800 to the late twentieth century.

First of all, governments in the age of nationalism have, in general, successfully imposed their hegemonic authority on the citizens within their territory. While individuals have multiple sources of identity, the modern nation-state requires that the *primary* source of identity be the nation. In the transition period from religious sources of transcendent credibility to nationalist sources, the nation must appropriate the credibility still inherent in the religious sources.[658] Thus, ideally an individual is not asked to choose between his nation and his god, but the two would coincide as nearly as possible.[659]

---

[657] Ibid., 8.

[658] Even after the transition has successfully occurred, religious imagery and appeals to a deity often remain a vital part of politics, either intentionally or as artifacts of the transition. "In a path-dependent framework…, during a critical juncture an initial set of contingent factors may lead to the selection of a given institutional arrangement, after a critical juncture a subsequent set of more deterministic causal processes reproduces the institution with the recurrence of the original causes." James Mahoney (2001), "Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(1): 114.

[659] This can be done in two ways. First, this can be done by continuing the proto-national method of directly linking the god to the nation. For example, US westward expansion in the 1800s was the "manifest destiny" of the American nation or President Reagan referring to the US as a "city on a hill" (Matthew 5:14) throughout his presidency. A second method is to paint the nation as being strictly "neutral" with respect to religion. Charles Taylor argues that in the nineteenth century there was a shift "from a horizon in which belief in God in some form was virtually unchallengeable to our present predicament in which theism is *one option among others,* in which moral sources are

Individuals are required to choose between competing nationalities, however. As Etienne Balibar has put it, "One has only to see with what repugnance states, almost without exception, view dual or multiple nationality to understand how essential it is to the nation-state to behave as the owner of its nationals."[660] Even in international law at the start of the twenty-first century, an individual's primary identity is recognized as her nationality.[661] Being born on one side of a border rather than the other, for example, carries an enormous amount of weight in national and international law. This norm has, for the most part, been internalized by the individuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The nation to which an individual holds her primary commitment is largely connected with territory, which necessitates relatively clear lines of where that territory begins and ends.

The nation as source of transcendent credibility proved very effective and efficient in generating compliance. Britain became one of the first political units to embrace this new political theory, beginning with the new constitutional arrangements set up following the Glorious Revolution of 1689. Although still dependent on God as a source of transcendent credibility, Locke's political theory had made the English nation increasingly dominant in the process of political legitimacy. It is no coincidence that, following the Glorious Revolution (and prior to the Industrial Revolution), tax incomes exploded. Not only was there more money to tax, but tax

---

ontologically diverse." Charles Taylor (1989), *Sources of the Self* (Harvard: Harvard University Press): 401 (emphasis added).

[660] Etienne Balibar (2002), *Politics and the Other Scene* (London: Verso): 78.

[661] Malcolm N Shaw (2003), *International Law, 5th ed.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 232-33. The concept that the individual has access to international law via her nationality has come under increasing attack among international legal scholars in the last two decades thanks to a growing body of refugee law and laws concerning transnational workers and citizens, see for example Michael Peter Smith (2003), "The Social Construction of Transnational Citizenship," *University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy* 9(2): 105-26.

collection was more efficient due to greater compliance from British taxpayers.[662] While it may be said that this was the result of more secure property rights,[663] the fact is that these rights were the result of the *political* rights.[664] These latter rights depended on the new theory of political legitimacy that depended on the nation as the source of transcendent credibility. By the mid-eighteenth century, people all over Europe recognized that Britain had emerged as a major power and further recognized that the reason why this occurred was due to their changing source of transcendent credibility. Thus, one of the reasons nationalist movements in Europe emerged and gathered so much support was the desire to imitate the British model and achieve similar results in terms of compliance.[665] Successfully generating compliance on the Continent required far more distinctive borders than existed in Europe to that point. Thus, nationalist movements were inextricably intertwined with claims to particular territories.

The age of nationalism also saw political units far more credibly committed to protecting territories that were distant from the center. New forms of recruiting and training troops permitted states to mobilize loyal armies in response to any threats of

---

[662] Patrick K O'Brien and Philip A Hunt (1993), "The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485-1815," *Historical Research* 66(160): 129-76; John Brewer (1988), "The English State and Fiscal Appropriation, 1688-1789," *Politics & Society* 16(2-3): 335-85.

[663] Douglass C North and Barry R Weingast (1989), "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803-32.

[664] GW Jones (1990), "The British Bill of Rights," *Parliamentary Affairs* 43(1): 27-40.

[665] The journal *Parliaments, Estates & Representation* published a number of articles in 1990 and 1991 describing the influence the ideologies of the Glorious Revolution had on other European countries. Three, in particular stand out, highlighting the influence on Austria, Poland, and the Netherlands, respectively: Lothar Hobelt (1991), "Imperial Diplomacy and the 'Glorious Revolution,'" 11(1): 61-67; Waclaw Uruszczak (1990), "The Significance of the English 'Glorious Revolution' for Poles and Poland in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," 10(2): 165-76; HW Blom (1990), "'Our Prince Is King!': The Impact of the Glorious Revolution on Political Debate in the Dutch Republic," 10(1): 45-58.

invasion. Improved roads and waterways, and later railroads, allowed for rapid deployment in regions of a political unit far from the center. These new defensive technologies were supplemented with the collaboration of political units in the Concert of Europe to produce an era relatively free of international war – at least on the European continent. The commitment of governments to preserve territory went beyond mere military means. Growing bureaucracies inventoried and categorized extensively throughout the territory, including human beings.[666] By knowing, naming, and cataloging the contents of the territory, the government asserted an actual and a symbolic claim over those things – again, including the human beings.[667] Land and people became analogous to private property, which, even at the far edges of a territory, the government had a right and duty to protect. In addition, the scientific discipline of cartography produced maps with firm borders between political units.[668] Diplomats waged battles over these maps, fighting hard for a mutual recognition of a favorable border. The "science" aspect of cartography helped to legitimize and formalize these agreements. Governments proved unwilling to cede even an inch in the military and diplomatic battles over agreed-upon borders. These lines on a map

---

[666] Censuses had existed long before nationalism, but it is in this era that larger investments were made in technological improvements in census-taking and bureaucracies ballooned to improve the censuses quality and quantity. Censuses especially achieved this function in colonies and with a concentrated focused on the "abnormal" within a nation's territory, especially immigrants and non-national ethnic communities. Sumit Guha (2003), "The Politics of Identity and Enumeration in India, c. 1600-1800," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45(1): 148-67.

[667] According to Michel Foucault, governments used "biopolitics," which led to "a kind of bestialization of man achieved through the most sophisticated political techniques," quoted in Giorgio Agamben (1995), *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and the Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press): 3.

[668] Michael Biggs (1999), "Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41(2): 374-405; Marcelo Escolar (1997), "Exploration, Cartography and the Modernization of State Power," *International Social Science Journal* 49(1): 55-75; Josef W Konvitz (1990), "The Nation-State, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France," *Journal of Historical Geography* 16(1): 3-16.

took on a very real physical existence through border controls, troop deployments, and administrative jurisdiction.

Judicial systems within the territories of political units were increasingly structured in hierarchies in the era of nationalism. France, for example, underwent a significant shift toward a national modern judicial system.[669] Before 1789, the rural population had the opportunity to access the seigniorial justice system, but for a variety of reasons, more frequently turned to other forms of conflict mediation, the most popular being violence. After the Revolution, elected justices of the peace were instituted who were far more efficient and cheaper than the previous judicial system. The rural population increasingly submitted their disputes to these judicial bodies and, as a result, the government of the French nation-state succeeded in penetrating disparate provinces of France and redefining what it meant to be a "citizen" of France. What was true of France was true of the newly nationalized states. Even federal governments shifted towards hierarchical arrangements. The United States, for example, over the course of the nineteenth century, placed the various state court systems under the ultimate authority of the national judiciary.

In the era of nationalism, state governments compelled the standardization of currency, albeit through a relatively indirect process. State-compelled standardization of the value of money had been practiced on and off by European rulers from the end of the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century. Wars and rebellions had the tendency to encourage the debasing of coinage. As Gresham's Law predicts, these debased coins

---

[669] Anthony Crubaugh (2000), "Local Justice and Rural Society in the French Revolution," *Journal of Social History* 34(2): 327-50.

were exported, encouraging similar debasement in these countries and making the standardization of money a Europe-wide problem.[670] Following the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century, the major political units formed the Concert of Europe to promote peace. However, among the less analyzed outcomes of this collaboration were informal agreements to promote fiscal and monetary policies in order to avoid recurrences of hyperinflation caused by the production and exportation of bad money. This system, which Karl Polanyi has called *haute finance*, affirmed that it was the national government that was responsible for the value and standards of the money within its particular territory.[671] Private banks, many of which retained their international character, were also required to participate in the overall process of standardization, which was subjected first of all to the national governments and secondly to the Concert of Europe, which was seen as a collection of these governments. Monetary policy had always been somewhat independent of any particular political unit. However, in the nineteenth century we begin to see the political units working together to ensure the value of money. This resulted in increased standardization of currency within the individual political units.

Clearly there is much to criticize in this over-generalized analysis of the distinctiveness of borders over the past two hundred years. One can point to multiple examples over this time period where a government was unable to successfully achieve one or more of these proxy variables or create and maintain relatively distinctive boundaries. There are four responses to this. First, although exceptions

---

[670] Charles P Kindleberger (1991), "The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623," *Journal of Economic History* 51(1): 149-75.

[671] Karl Polanyi (1944), *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press): 3-19.

exist that may counter the argument that the modern state system has distinctive borders, I would argue that these exceptions are just that – exceptions to the far more numerous examples of distinctive borders. Second, it must be remembered that the variable is the *relative* distinctiveness of boundaries. The question then is whether the distinctiveness of boundaries in a system with multiple sources of transcendent credibility (e.g. the modern states system) is *greater than* the distinctiveness in a system with one source of transcendent credibility. This clarification further reduces the number of exceptions. Third, nationalism spread around the world gradually. Whereas the nationalist system was in full effect in Europe throughout most of the nineteenth century, its' success in other parts of the world came along at a later point. This leads to a fourth response. In many places of the globe, nationalism has *not* successfully been implemented as the source of transcendent credibility. For example, in certain parts of Africa the nation-state exists in name only, while the actual source or sources of transcendent credibility lie elsewhere. This will be more fully discussed in the conclusion.

Another possible criticism is that the age of nationalism also happens to coincide with the modern technology that makes more distinctive boundaries possible. According to this reasoning, if the many nationalisms are replaced by a single source of transcendent credibility, distinctive boundaries may stay intact. But, broadly speaking, technological improvement explains very little. The questions that must be asked are which particular technologies were improved and why. For example, technological improvements in border control do not just emerge – there must be a market for these improvements or very little time and money would be invested in

them. Thus, since technological improvements in border controls, census taking, cartography, and rapid mobilization and deployment of troops occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this begs the question of why these particular innovations were deemed worthy of time and resources. The answer, as this dissertation suggests, is that the proliferation of sources of transcendent credibility in Europe produced by nationalism created a demand for technologies that increased the distinctiveness of boundaries between political units.

CHAPTER 9: IMPLICATIONS

A. Introduction
B. Are Current Borders Enduring and Meaningful?
C. The European Union
D. Religious Sources
E. One Source: Humanity
F. Summation

Introduction

> To the extent that global civil society becomes a reality in the imagination and lives of its adherents, the reality of territorial states will often recede in significance even though it may never entirely disappear. In some settings, states under inspired leadership may engender strong loyalties precisely because the outlook is compassionate and globalized. These 'realities' are ideas or social constructs, not things, and their significance depends on how they influence feelings, beliefs, and actions, even without our full conscious appreciation.
>
> – Richard Falk (1995)[672]

Ideas play a significant role in how national governments establish legitimacy and how the international order is structured. Ideas are frequently ignored because they do not fit neatly into the quantitative methodologies that currently dominate the social sciences. Still, as the quote from Richard Falk highlights, ideas are "realities" that have important effects on human behavior and, thus, on how people structure the world. A clearer understanding of the future of national and international politics requires increased efforts to examine these ideas, their effects, the motives of actors to support or resist certain ideas, and which ideas dominate in different circumstances.[673]

---

[672] Richard Falk (1995), *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics: A Report to the World Order Models Project* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press): 212.

[673] Daniel Philpott (2001), *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Jeffrey Checkel (1997), *Ideas and*

This dissertation focused on the role of one particular set of ideas: sources of transcendent credibility. The cases analyzed through the course of this work have provided evidence in support of the hypothesis that the relative distinctiveness of the boundaries between political units is dependent on the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system. One source of transcendent credibility dominated the seventh century Chinese system, the fifteenth century Central Asian system, and the medieval European system. In each of these systems, the boundaries between the political units were indistinct, characterized by areas of overlapping authority and multiple loyalties. After new sources of transcendent credibility entered each of these systems, the boundaries between political units of differing sources became more distinct. In Europe, nationalism increased the number of sources of transcendent credibility from three to many, which further increased the distinctiveness of boundaries. These cases suggest that as the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system increases, the relative distinctiveness of the boundaries between the political units increases as well.

There is also evidence that the cause of more distinctive boundaries between political units is not military threat or technology. Political units in single-source systems faced significant military threats, yet their rulers did not invest resources in stricter boundary control. These cases examined in this dissertation suggest that rulers create more distinctive boundaries when faced with political units that are military

---

International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press); Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane, eds. (1993), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Peter J Katzenstein, ed. (1986), *The Culture of National Security: News and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press).

threats *and* that base their credibility on alternate sources of transcendent credibility. Technology designed to enhance boundary control is also not a sufficient explanation since relatively distinctive boundaries have existed in many different eras and regions of the world. Technology is a tool used by rulers for particular purposes. Thus, when rulers require more distinctive boundaries, there will be a greater incentive for the development of technology for that purpose. Thus, the type of technology is not a cause of more distinctive boundaries, but is an effect of the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the system. The fate of the modern nation-state does not depend on current technology or on the existence of military threats. If the nation is replaced with an alternative source of transcendent credibility and this alternative has the effect of reducing the total number of sources within a given system (international or regional), the relatively distinct borders of the states-system will begin to blur and the nation-state will disappear as the dominant political unit.

This concluding chapter considers the implications of this thesis in two areas. The first section assumes that nationalism remains a strong and viable source of transcendent credibility in the world today and raises a number of questions about the status quo of international borders and the current practice of "state-building." The thesis suggests that borders and 'state-building' are two sides of the same coin. Enduring and meaningful borders require the effective generation of compliance, which can only occur with a combination of coercive and ideological forces, more specifically, an effective source of transcendent credibility. As the costs of coercive force grow ever more expensive, enduring and meaningful borders require the construction and maintenance of an efficacious "nation." Two empirical cases are

examined: "failed states," in which there is a disjuncture between sources of transcendent credibility (in an age of nationalism) and the supra-national experiment of the European Union, which raises the issue of whether a new political unit is developing.

A second area the hypothesis directly addresses is the future of the global system. The question of whether the modern nation-state is weathering or withering in the current global environment depends on the continued viability of the nation as the dominant source of transcendent credibility. If a new source of transcendent credibility replaces the nation globally, the State may cease to be the dominant political unit in the world. The second section discusses two potential alternative sources of transcendent credibility and their resulting political units. The first challenger is the former champion: religion and god(s) as the source of transcendent credibility. The upsurge in fundamentalist movements around the world suggests that there are elements in the world that would prefer to make the political realm dependent on the religious community, God, or Allah as the source of transcendent credibility. The second challenger to the nation-state is something that resembles a return to medieval political units, based on a single source of transcendent credibility that is common to all human beings: "humanity."[674]

[674] Jorg Friedrichs (2001), "The Meaning of New Medievalism," *European Journal of International Relations* 7(4): 475-501; Alexander Wendt (2003), "Why a World State Is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9(4): 491-542; Stephen J Korbin (1998), "Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy," *Journal of International Affairs* 51(2): 367-409.

Are Current Borders Enduring and Meaningful?

In many parts of the world, borders are constructs that have been imposed by the West. In order to interact in international society, decolonized territories had to be transformed into nation-states, which meant the erection of distinct borders between these new political units. What this frequently meant in practice was that sources of transcendent credibility and the newly created borders did not coincide. For the sake of "political expediency," "'nation-building' was supposed to follow independence, not precede it."[675] Africa offers a plethora of examples on this score. In his recently published memoirs, the winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature, Wole Soyinka, puts it this way:

> My forays outside Nigeria were infrequent, but they triggered a habit of marveling at a meaningless separation. Ghanaian, Togolese, and so on—just what did these terms mean to those who were so described? Culture and language differed within each nation as frequently and as profoundly as they found identities across the borders of such nation spaces; the arbitrariness and illogicality of their groupings hit any traveler in the face—and remained meaningless to a huge majority of those whom the borders enclose or separate. It was true of the preindependence entities, and it is still mostly true today.[676]

International borders encased multiple sources of transcendent credibility, even as they purported to separate groups that shared the same source. As a result, in many places in Africa, there remains a lack of correspondence between indigenous institutions and state institutions.[677] It is therefore no surprise that African nation-states have appeared incredibly unstable in the decades since independence.

---

[675] Margaret Canovan (2005), *The People* (Malden, MA: Polity Press): 42.

[676] Wole Soyinka (2006), *You Must Set Forth at Dawn: A Memoir* (New York: Random House): 47.

[677] Sujai J Shivakumar (2003), "The Place of Indigenous Institutions in Constitutional Order," *Constitutional Political Economy* 14(1): 3-22.

The "state-building" literature that developed in response to this instability focuses to a large extent on the project of making these imposed international borders functional.[678] In the current international climate, scholars and policymakers usually mean the same thing when speaking of "state-building" and "nation-building," though the two terms should be kept distinct.[679] The nation is the ideological and metaphysical aspect of the community. It is, in effect, the *content* of the community, the values and beliefs it holds in common. It is the civil society concepts of trust, dialogue, and affection, far more than the nation is the actual associations and sites of deliberation. State-building, on the other hand, involves developing the physical institutional and administrative elements. The state needs the nation or some other source of transcendent credibility to endure. A constitution can be crafted in a matter of days, but a nation takes years to forge.[680] This time lag between nation-building and state-building has been the source of recent failures in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.[681]

---

[678] Donald L Horowitz (2000 [1985]), *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press): 563-684; Nicholas Sambanis (2000), "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," *World Politics* 52: 437-83; Radha Kumar (1997), "The Troubled History of Partition," *Foreign Affairs* 76: 22-34.

[679] See, for example, the RAND monograph, James Dobbins, et al (2003), *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). The "Lessons Learned" (chapter 9) from an examination of several cases involved the legitimacy of the international troops and police located in the rebuilding country. However, these aspects have very little to do with the construction of a "nation." This lack of distinction has also made its way into policy, as President George W Bush said in 2000, "I don't think our troops should be used for what's called nation-building," quoted in Francis Fukuyama (2004), "Nation-Building 101," *The Atlantic Monthly* 293(1). There is a possibility that troops can be used for "state-building," but not "nation-building."

[680] Sumantra Bose (2002), *Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 204-81

[681] Seth G Jones and James Dobbins (2006), "UN Reform: The UN's Record in Nation Building," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 6: 703-23; Toby Dodge (2003), *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied* (New York: Columbia University Press); Sean D Murphy (1995), "Nation-Building: A Look at Somalia," *Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law* 3: 19-43.

The goal of the "state-building" literature is to either find a way of allowing citizens to embrace different sources of transcendent credibility within the same institutional arrangement (e.g. consociationalism, federalism, etc.) or to actively encourage citizens to adopt the same source of transcendent credibility (e.g. multiculturalism, assimilation, population transfers, etc.). A truly consociational system has been difficult to implement outside of Europe and, where in several cases where it has been applied, it has been implicated in solidifying the divisions between different groups.[682] Multicultural projects have been shown to be successful in several metropolitan settings, though they remain a largely theoretical effort at the level of a state. Population transfers involve moving groups of people outside of the borders, either through force or threat of force, an effort that frequently produces many undesirable consequences.[683] Underlying all of these suggested policies is a commitment to preserve the international borders that exist, regardless of their origin.

This, however, is only one possible solution to the problem of state failure. The hypothesis also points to "right-sizing": readjusting borders to better coincide with the various sources of transcendent credibility, but which does so with the minimal amount of adjustment of the current map.[684] Partition theory has a small

---

[682] Daniel P Sullivan (2005), "The Missing Pillars: A Look at the Failure of Peace in Burundi Through the Lens of Arend Lijphart's Theory of Consociational Democracy," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(1): 75-96; Roberto Belloni (2004), "Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping* 11(2): 334-53.

[683] Elia Zureik (2003), "Demography and Transfer: Israel's Road to Nowhere," *Third World Quarterly* 24(4): 619-30; Robert M Hayden (1996), "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," *Slavic Review* 55(4): 727-48.

[684] Brendan O'Leary, Ian S Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds. (2001), *The Right-Sizing of the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

following among scholars.[685] Breaking states down into smaller parts must also be combined with combining contingent cultural communities that share a source of transcendent credibility. The alignment of international borders with shared sources of transcendent credibility will increase the ability of nation-states' to provide goods and services, including security, to their citizens.

I would contend that one of the reasons that nation-states are seen to be losing their effectiveness is because, on a global scale, the territory of nation-states does not coincide with the actual mapping of sources of transcendent credibility. Nigeria does not require better institutions so much as it requires a population that shares a source of transcendent credibility. If these pseudo-nation-states were replaced with nation-states that corresponded with communities that shared a source of transcendent credibility, the resulting institutions would be better able to generate compliance from their citizens and, as a result, have better prospects for effectiveness.

There are applications in other current contexts as well. For example, although the idea of "Iraq" as a nation has existed for many decades, it has not been embraced as a transcendent source of credibility by many (most?) who live in the territory. The Kurds' long quest for separate status and the recent sectarian conflicts between Shi'a and Sunni following the end of the Saddam Hussein regime suggest that compliance generation has depended far more on coercion than ideological sources. Those who wish to see Iraq as a stable state with its current international borders must focus on "nation-building" first and foremost. A consociational institutional structure, such as

[685] Alexander B Downes (2006), "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars," *SAIS Review* 26(1): 49-61; Jarsolav Tir (2005), "Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of Partitions," *Journal of Peace Research* 42(5): 545-62.

that of the current Iraqi government, must either be supported by a common source of transcendent credibility or be backed with sufficient coercive force for a sufficient period of time to allow a common source to develop.[686] If not, Iraq will be forced to choose between increasing reliance on coercion to generate compliance from the population or dissolution ("right-sizing") into at least three states. The US, as a liberal democracy that wants to limit Iran's power in the region, dislikes these latter two options, but can only have a very limited role in any "nation-building" project. Further, the stated US goal of withdrawing once Iraq can provide for its own security (i.e. possesses a functioning military and police force), without having constructed a common nation as an effective source of transcendent credibility, will likely only produce an increased reliance on coercion to generate compliance.[687] In short, a liberal democracy's commitment to forcible regime change also must entail a commitment to intervene for an extended period of time (years, not months) to have a chance at success.

---

[686] A consociational democracy combines "grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups" and "cultural autonomy for these groups." Arend Lijphart (1996), "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation," *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 258. Thus, a common source of transcendent credibility is needed for the government to generate compliance from these various groups. Arend Lijphart has further argued that consociational democracy is a tool that can be used to unite (i.e., establish a common source of transcendent credibility) countries with ethnic and religious divisions. Lijphart (1994), "Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South Africa," in Andrew Reynolds, ed., *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects* (New York: St. Martin's Press). This process, however, requires time to develop. Vincent Maphai (1996), "A Season for Power-Sharing," *Journal of Democracy* 7(1): 67-81.

On the proposal that consociationalism is the most appropriate institutional structure for post-Saddam Iraq, see Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield (2005), "The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model," *Publius* 35(3): 359-84; Arend Lijphart (2004), "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15(2): 96-109; Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (2003), "How to Build a Democratic Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 82(3): 36-50.

[687] Toby Dodge (2006), "Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective," *Third World Quarterly* 27(1): 187-200. A common policy proposal in Iraq is to focus on the training of Iraqi military and police personnel, Larry Diamond (2005), "Lessons from Iraq," *Journal of Democracy* 16(1), 9-23. However, this policy without or in place of nation-building will produce increased government reliance on coercion as a means of generating compliance.

The European Union

While the examples above involve devising strategies to bring the location of borders and sources of transcendent credibility into alignment, the European Union represents an experiment to transform both variables simultaneously. The European Union, at its very foundation, is an attempt to make the borders between member states less distinctive *and* to create a transcendent source of credibility called Europe that will replace the various nations of the member states. It is, in a very different sense from the cases of Yugoslavia and Africa, the *creation* of a brand new political unit.

Historically, there is nothing very special about this project. Most national projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries involved the melding together of two or more political units. Like the EU's current project, this involved making the boundaries between political units less distinct *and* the creation and reification of a new, and in some cases unheard of, nation. The assumption is that institutions can develop identities. For example, Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the European project, argued that the concept of "Europe" would best emerge from continuous cooperation in a variety of issue areas, both large and small. It was Monnet's hope, not so much that cooperation in the Coal and Steel Community would produce economic efficiency, but that it would create a spirit of cooperation that would result in a unified Europe.[688] The bureaucracy of the European Union institutions engage in

[688] John Gillingham (1992), "Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal," in *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity*, Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, eds. (Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan): 129-62.

a self-perpetuating exercise to extend the reach and effect of "Europe," a process that is legitimized as more and more people come to accept "Europe" as a source of transcendent credibility.

For years, the international relations debate regarding the European Union was between *intergovernmentalists*, who argued that the EU was just an organization of its member states, and *neo-functionalists*, who asserted that the EU was a political unit with a life beyond that of the sum of its member states. Recently, however, comparative political scientists became fed up with the seeming futility of this debate and have, more and more, begun with the assumption that EU *is* a polity.[689] Thus, instead of trying to determine what the EU actually is or is becoming, this new approach assumes the EU is "an independent variable, affecting policy-making in the member states."[690] Although there are valuable things to be learned from this latest approach, it is too soon to declare even this mild version of neo-functionalism the winner. The fact is that the EU does resemble a single political unit in some respects (such as monetary policy), while it does not in others (such as military policy). This dissertation suggests that the first variable to examine to determine if the EU is a single political unit is the source of transcendent credibility in the territory. Thus, the question is whether the national sources have been superseded by a "European" source of transcendent credibility.

There is some evidence that the distinctiveness of nations is being undermined by membership in the Union. A key feature of the EU is the freedom of movement

---

[689] Mark A Pollack (2001), "International Relations Theory and European Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39(2): 221-44; Ben Rosamond (2000), *Theories of European Integration* (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan): 74-97.

[690] Anne Mette Kjaer (2004), *Governance* (Malden, MA: Polity Press): 100.

between member states. Paulette Kurzer, in an examination of national policies involving "moral" regulation (e.g., recreational drug use in the Netherlands and abortion policy in Catholic Ireland), argues that the elimination of border controls between member states undermines national self-perceptions.[691] For example, the fact that an Irish woman would exercise her freedom of movement to obtain an abortion in a different member state suggests that the Irish are choosing more liberal European values over "traditional Irish" values. This, in turn, enables Irish domestic opponents of abortion restrictions to argue that the "national character" of the Irish is no different from other Europeans.[692] They can then push for the convergence of Irish abortion policies with other European states. Thus, reducing the distinctiveness of borders may help generate a single European source of transcendent credibility, or at least weaken the national sources. However, this is an extremely slow process and there are indications that nations may react to this process and reassert their national distinctiveness, even reapplying some border controls.[693]

Several surveys have been undertaken among the European population asking where primary loyalties lie. Some have found that, because the average citizen has very little to do with European Union governance, the idea of Europe has low salience.[694] Voters typically treat elections of members of European Parliament as

---

[691] Paulette Kurzer (2001), *Markets and Moral Regulation: Cultural Change in the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 143-84.

[692] Ibid., 173. See also Siobhan Mullally (2005), "Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27(1): 78-104.

[693] For example, Gallya Lahav (2004), *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

[694] Michael Marsh and Pippa Norris (1997), "Political Representation in the European Parliament," *European Journal of Political Research* 32: 153-64.

"second-order" or less important than national elections.[695] There is some indication that, throughout Europe, state elites are more likely to favor Europeanization than the masses.[696] This same elite-mass gap was true of the early modern transition to nationalism. Elites tend to have better access to media sources and can frame the future debates in favor of Europe. Thus, in terms of numbers, there are currently more people in Europe holding a primary allegiance to their national source of transcendent credibility. But the future is uncertain.

Some scholars have suggested that a person could simultaneously accept the two sources of transcendent credibility, Europe and the nation, without any conflicting loyalties.[697] According to the principle of "dual legitimacy," the authority of the EU derives from *both* the member states and the European citizens as a whole.[698] These proponents argue that for the EU to be a functioning political unit capable of effectively generating compliance, it would not matter if national loyalties did not diminish, so long as the acceptance of "Europe" as a source of transcendent credibility continued to grow. There has been mixed evidence, however, that Europeans are forming an effective allegiance to "a larger communal entity" as opposed to their

---

[695] Cliff Carrubba and Richard J Timpone (2005), "Explaining Vote Switching Across First- and Second-Order Elections: Evidence from Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 38(3): 260-81; Hermann Schmitt (2005), "The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?" *West European Politics* 28(3): 650-75.

[696] Trine Flockhart (2005), "Critical Junctures and Social Identity: Explaining the Gap between Danish Mass and Elite Attitudes to Europeanization," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(2): 251-72; Erik R Tillman (2004), "The European Union at the Ballot Box? European Integration and Voting Behavior in the New Member States," *Comparative Political Studies* 37(5): 590-620.

[697] Liesbet Hooghe (2005), "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission," *International Organization* 59(4): 861-98.

[698] Percy Lehning (1997), "European Citizenship: A Mirage?" in *Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe*, Percy Lehning and Albert Weale, eds. (New York: Routledge): 187.

separate national loyalties.[699] In fact, national loyalties tend to dominate in moments of perceived economic, cultural or security crises.[700] In some instances, Europeanization is reinvigorating sub-national loyalties, rather than a supra-national one.[701] National institutions, react to these developments and have demonstrated a will and capacity to reassert their authority vis-à-vis European institutions.[702]

As a result, the EU has refrained from directly demanding compliance from individuals. Thus far, issues of compliance within the EU primarily involve compliance of member states and corporations. European citizens are permitted to bring a very small range of cases before European courts and bureaucracies, but for the most part individuals participate in EU governance only through their nation-state. For example, EU funding comes from nation-state contributions rather than direct taxation. The lack of a need to foster individual compliance has meant that there has also been little need for an effective European source of transcendent credibility up to

---

[699] John McCormick (2002), *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction* (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan): 156.

[700] While Europeanization appears to dominate in "ordinary" times, nationalism tends to reappear during specific crises, for example, inflation in Germany triggered by reunification [AJ Knodonassis and AG Malliaris (1994), "Toward a Monetary Union of the European Community: History and Experiences of the European Monetary System," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 53(3): 291-301], perceptions of excessive immigration in Austria [Cecile Leconte (2005), "The Fragility of the EU as a 'Community of Values': Lessons from the Haider Affair," *West European Politics* 28(3): 620-49], and a challenge to Greek national identity [Rodanthi Tzanelli (2006), " 'Not My Flag!" Citizenship and Nationhood in the Margins of Europe (Greece, October 2000/2003)," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29(1): 27-49].

[701] Paolo Dardanelli (2006), *Between Two Unions: Europeanization and Scottish Devolution* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

[702] Arthur Benz (2004), "Path-Dependent Institutions and Strategic Veto Players: National Parliaments in the European Union," *West European Politics* 27(5): 875-900; George Pagoulatos (2004), "Believing in National Exceptionalism: Ideas and Economic Divergence in Southern Europe," *West European Politics* 27(1): 45-70.

this point. It has been argued, though, that the EU's need and ability to generate such compliance is "only a matter of time."[703]

What then are the chances for the emergence of Europe as an accepted source of transcendent credibility? The United States has been suggested as an historical analogy to the process of transforming the European nation-states into a single polity. Although the US began with a variety of individual political units, by the end of the nineteenth century it had become a single polity under the federal government. The boundaries between the states became less and less functional as citizens shifted their primary loyalty from their respective state to the "American" nation. In the same way, for Europe to exist as a single polity, its citizens must adopt "Europe" as their primary source of transcendent credibility. This does not mean that one is no longer, say, a Dane, only that one considers herself a European first and a Dane second. The transformation of "Virginians" and "Texans" into "Americans" may offer a good historical analogy of the process the EU is presumably undertaking. The analogy breaks down, however, because loyalties to nations in Europe are far more historically embedded in their citizens than was the case for individuals in the eighteenth and nineteenth century United States. It will be far harder to shake loose the separate European nations as sources of transcendent credibility among the European citizenry.

There have been efforts to create the idea of Europe institutionally. States that seek to join the EU must adapt national laws to accommodate the *acquis communitaire*, which includes all of the EU's legislative, judiciary, and *normative*

---

[703] Michael Zurn and Jurgen Neyer (2005), "Conclusions – the Conditions of Compliance," in *Law and Governance in Postnational Europe: Compliance Beyond the State*, Michael Zurn and Christian Joerges, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 185.

output. The policy of elimination of intra-Union borders is mirrored with increased efforts to make the borders of the EU with non-members more distinctive.[704] The Euro, for example, specifically features symbols of "Europe" as the source of transcendent credibility.[705] Electoral rules have been changed and (national) referendums have been held in an attempt to overcome criticisms of a "democratic deficit" and, thereby, generate the concept of a "European people" participating in *their* government.[706] The debate over the proposed EU Constitution has recognized the importance of developing an understanding of who "we" are as Europe.[707] Perhaps most important among institutional changes being wrought by the EU is the increased dominance of English as the language of the Brussels bureaucracy.[708] Still, symbols, institutions, and discussions about "Europe" are not the same as a "Europe" that is an effective source of transcendent credibility. They are efforts to *construct* such an idea and it is far from settled whether they will succeed.

It should be noted that to be a source of transcendent credibility the concept of "Europe" need not be a nation in the sense of taking on many of the connotations that term has come to represent. All "Europe" need be is a concept that possesses its own

---

[704] Peter Vermeersch (2005), "EU Enlargement and Immigration Policy in Poland and Slovakia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38(1): 71-88.

[705] Jacques EC Hymens (2004), "The Changing Color of Money: European Currency Iconography and Collective Identity," *European Journal of International Relations* 10(1): 5-32; Matthias Kaelberer (2004), "The Euro and European Identity: Symbols, Power and the Politics of European Monetary Union," *Review of International Studies* 30(2): 161-78.

[706] John Erik Fossum and Agustin Jose Menendez (2005), "The Constitution's Gift? A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union," *European Law Journal* 11(4): 380-451; Andrew Moravcsik (2002), "Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(4): 603-24.

[707] Kalypso Nicoladis (2004), "We, the Peoples of Europe…," *Foreign Affairs* 83(6): 97-110; Etienne Balibar (2004), *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 180-202.

[708] Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber (2005), "Language Disenfranchisement in the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(2): 273-86.

inherent credibility. Jurgen Habermas, for example, has suggested that for the EU to be a success it needs "a European-wide, integrated public sphere [that] develops in the ambit of a common political culture."[709] The question then becomes whether a "public sphere" can provide sufficient legitimacy and credibility to enable the EU to effectively generate compliance from citizens. It has been Habermas' project for many years to assert that the process of communicative action and dialogue is a functioning source of legitimacy in modern polities. But even Habermas admits that this is still an unsettled question.[710]

However, it does highlight the fact that if the nation-state is becoming a thing of the past, sources of transcendent credibility will continue to be essential. This raises the question of what alternative sources of transcendent credibility will take up the work of enabling governments to generate compliance. The remainder of this concluding chapter briefly examines two possible contenders: religious sources and humanity as a common source.

Religious Sources

Religious sources of transcendent credibility did not disappear in the age of nationalism. In fact, despite the best predictions of the Enlightenment philosophers, it is likely that religion will continue to function as an effective means for governments to generate compliance from their citizens and subjects. Again, we turn to Wole Soyinka:

---

[709] Jurgen Habermas (1998), *The Inclusion of the Other* (Cambridge: Polity Press): 160.

[710] Jurgen Habermas (1994), *The Past as Future* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press): 96-97.

> Given the fact that, in the present day—and, indeed, in a nearly unbroken continuum of history—both [the political and the religious] often prove to be merely two sides of the same coin, it should not be surprising if, from time to time, it would indeed appear that all we are engaged upon is tossing up, just like a coin, one two-sided notion. We watch it spin through the air in a blur of rapid alternations, and succumb to the law of gravity—known as coming down to earth—to reveal one side or the other, almost interchangeably. The sanctimoniousness that often characterizes one—the political—on the one hand, and the sacrosanctity that is claimed as the foundation of the other, even when it extends its constituency to the political and the mundane, make it clear that they are both claimants to the same highway of influence and control of human lives whose ultimate destination is power—the consolidation of power itself, or the execution of policies that aspire to the total control of a polity.[711]

Nationalism emerged in Europe in response to a period dominated by religious sources of transcendent credibility. Part of nationalism's subsequent success was its ability to allow the efficacious religious sources to continue to function, but now as a support to and servant of the nation. If the nation-state is losing its effectiveness, the question must be asked: Will religion return as the dominant theory of political authority in the world, even among a subset of political units, and thereby change the number of sources of transcendent credibility in the international system?

The answer for many social scientists is a resounding no. A dominant corollary of modernization is what is known as the "secularization thesis."[712] This says that "religion will gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with

---

[711] Wole Soyinka (2005), *Climate of Fear: The Quest for Dignity in a Dehumanized World* (New York: Random House): 61-62.

[712] Among the more famous supporters of this thesis are Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud. A more modern version may be found in the books of Steve Bruce, especially (1996), *Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

the advent of industrial society."[713] Thus, as the industrial revolution begins to make its way into every remote corner of the world, the centrality of religion in everyday life should fade. However, in the past two decades there have been numerous scholars who argue that secularization is not necessarily an outcome of modernization.[714] In fact, some argue that the side effects of modernization have actually contributed to the growing successes of religious organizations worldwide.[715] So long as religion retains the allegiance of people, it must continue to be thought of as a potential challenger to nationalism as a source of transcendent credibility.

Since the end of the Cold War, a growing literature on the "resurgence of religion" in the world has entered the sub-discipline of International Relations.[716] In particular, even as the Soviet Union began to break apart, some foreign policy observers predicted that the heavily Islamist areas in Central Asia would join together with their co-religionists in the Middle East, forming either a loose alliance or a pan-Islamic state. For a variety of reasons, this has not been the case.[717] Nationally-based

---

[713] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004), *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 3.

[714] The most famous example is the sociologist Peter Berger who, although a staunch supporter of the secularization thesis in his early years, has since recanted this position, see Peter L Berger, ed. (1999), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co.). See also Daniele Hervieu-Leger (2000), *Religion as a Chain of Memory* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

[715] Francis Fukuyama (2006), "Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 17(2): 5-20; SN Eisenstadt (1999), *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). French Sociologist Gilles Kepel warns that it is the more radical and fundamentalist movements of the major religions that most successfully use the problems generated by modernization as a recruiting tool, (1994), *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World* (Pennsylvania State University Press).

[716] See especially the series of books published by Palgrave Macmillan entitled "Culture and Religion in International Relations."

[717] One important reason is that there is a large degree of diversity among Muslim beliefs and practices, Jacob M Landau (1994), *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Islamic movements have managed to retain the upper hand on international Islamic movements.[718] And yet, it has been the terrorist actions associated with these latter groups that have kept the possibility of pan-Islam salient in the world's collective conscience. Islam is not the only religion that has been perceived of as having larger international ambitions. Turks, both Muslim and secular, are questioning if they want to join a "Christian club," meaning the European Union. In 2003, the Polish government spearheaded an unsuccessful effort to get the European Union Constitution's preamble to refer to the continent's "Judeao-Christian roots."[719] Since then, many countries in Europe have shifted toward the political Right and there has been increased talk of reviving this religious discussion.

Religion, as has already been shown in this dissertation, has enormous capacities in mobilizing populations to action. While the negative aspects of this frequently fill the news, some scholars suggest that a resurgence of religion may offer positive tools to diplomats to solve crucial issues.[720] For example, there is general agreement that cooperation between a group of individuals or states is more likely if they share common cultural characteristics or understandings of concepts. Thus, even if regional organizations form for specifically economic or security reasons, a shared

---

[718] The journalist Anthony Shadid argues that there is a tremendous difference between "Islamic internationalism" and "Islamic nationalism." The former lacks the coherent vision the latter has (by virtue of nationalism) and thus resorts to the drama of mass violence, (2001), *Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press): 1-10, 75-110.

[719] Stephen Mulvey (March 5, 2004), "EU Values – United in Diversity?" *BBC News Online.*

[720] See, for example: Scott M Thomas (2005), *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan): 149-96; Marc Gopin (2000), *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds. (1995), *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

culture or a "community of understanding," likely depending on religious and linguistic commonalities, may provide the backbone for these international agreements.[721] Of course, this inclusive idea implies an exclusive counterpart. It is this concept of "commonality" that is behind the second-thoughts being expressed by many in Europe concerning the enlargement of the European Union to include Turkey. For many in Islam, an EU rejection of Turkey would be seen as confirmation that the European Union is fundamentally a "Christian club" and that Muslims should all begin to turn toward their particular "civilization."[722]

The seminal statement in the last twenty years on the potential effects of religion as the dominant source of political authority is Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* thesis. He argues that, because "culture" is the dominant unifying force, nation-states will begin to cluster into "civilizations." The most dangerous and pervasive conflicts of the post-Cold War world will be "between peoples belonging to different cultural entities," especially "along the fault lines between civilizations."[723]

Huntington's use of the term "civilization" tends to be shorthand for religion. The rise of the various civilizations as political communities is due in large part to "the revitalization of religion throughout much of the world"[724] Four of his nine civilizations are explicitly religious,[725] two others are associated with Christianity,[726]

---

[721] Shivakumar (2003): 7-8.
[722] (Jan 17, 2004), "Erdogan's Gamble," *The Economist* 370(8358): 34.
[723] Samuel P Huntington (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone): 28.
[724] Ibid., 28-29.
[725] "Islamic", "Hindu", "Orthodox", and "Buddhist."
[726] "Western" and "Latin American;" see Huntington (1996): 46-47.

two are essentially national in character,[727] with the catch-all "Africa" left over. Thus, the post-Cold War world envisioned in his theory will observe new political borders between *religions* rather than between *nations*. The political authority of the nation will fade while the transcendent credibility of the respective civilization's religion will dominate.

Numerous empirical and theoretical articles written to refute this thesis argue that, in general, there is little evidence that this is how the world has operated since the end of the Cold War.[728] In fact, if anything, these studies confirm that the borders between nations have continued to be efficacious and Huntington's proposed boundaries between civilizations are only imagined. While I agree with this assessment, I also find Huntington's argument extremely compelling *if* political units turn to religion again as the ultimate source of transcendent credibility. Because they have not done so yet, the empirics do not support Huntington's thesis.

The obvious next question is if this transformation of the dominant source of transcendent credibility will occur. In other words, will rulers (or potential rulers) find it advantageous in terms of compliance to base their political credibility on the god (or gods) that dominate their respective civilization rather than on the nation? While there is no doubt that such an innovation will be tried by some rulers, such a transition on a

---

[727] "Sinic" and "Japanese."

[728] Among the work containing refutations of key aspects of Huntington's thesis are: Andrej Tusicisny (2004), "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer and Bloodier?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41(4): 485-98; Jonathan Fox (2004), "Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996," *International Political Science Review* 25(1): 55-76; Philip G Roeder (2003), "Clash of Civilizations and Escalation of Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflicts," *Comparative Political Studies* 36(5): 509-40; Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2002), "Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis," *Comparative Sociology* 1(3/4): 235-64; John Gray (1998), "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilizations: Misunderstanding the Present," *International Affairs* 74(1): 149-64.

global scale in the near future is unlikely for three reasons, each of which have historical parallels.

First, the transition to such an outcome would require quite a bit of time. The concept of "nation" existed in Europe since at least the Middle Ages, yet "nationalism" as a dominant theory of political authority did not emerge until the eighteenth century. Even if the concept of "civilization" is the wave of the future, it does not currently have the compliance-generating capabilities required by a ruler. While religion arguably does possess some of these capabilities, many rulers are currently able to appropriate the credibility of divine sources *via* nationalism, which means there are few incentives to change the current system.[729]

Second, before it is accepted on a global scale, this new source of transcendent credibility must be proven effective at generating compliance. Nationalism became dominant in Europe in the nineteenth century only after it had demonstrated its ability to mobilize the population (for example, in the French Revolution) and to produce a stable domestic political order capable of efficient resource extraction (Great Britain in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) given the context of the period. Similarly, political units will wait until experimenters demonstrate the effectiveness or failure of the new theory of political authority. If religion as a source of transcendent

---

[729] For US examples, see Elizabeth Edwards Spalding (2006), "True Believers," *The Wilson Quarterly* 30(2): 40-47. For global examples, see Edna Fernandes (2006), *Holy Warriors: A Journey Into the Heart of Indian Fundamentalism* (New York: Viking) [India]; Anonymous (2005), "The Ambiguity of Yasukuni," *The Economist* 377(8447): 15 [Japan]; Anonymous (2005), "God Under Howard," *The Economist* 375(8425): 11 [Australia]; Sultan Tepe (2005), "Turkey's AKP: A Model 'Muslim-Democratic' Party?" *Journal of Democracy* 16(3): 69-82 [Turkey]; Anonymous (2004), "Toughs at the Top: The Last Personality Cults," *The Economist* 373(8406): 109-10 [North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Togo]; Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar (2004), *Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [Various African countries].

credibility proves itself effective in contrast to nationalism, other political units *may* imitate the new model. Arguably, the current political system in Iran is a laboratory of religion as a source of transcendent credibility, but there is still far too much overlap between Islam and the Iranian nation as sources of transcendent credibility to make an accurate statement on this.[730] At a minimum, however, one or two "civilizations" would first need to form and demonstrate effectiveness at generating compliance before a global shift would occur.

Third, there will be very powerful persons and groups who will actively (and even violently) resist any such transition. Again, if we look back at the early days of nationalism, we find that some religious groups in particular resisted nationalism, fearing the implications on European Christianity. Also, there were powerful individuals (most notably monarchs and members of the aristocracy) who opposed the effect nationalism's mobilization of the masses would necessarily have on social systems. In this modern case, we could also expect resistance to the rise of "civilizations" from two main fronts. One source of resistance would be those who currently benefit from the nation-state system. Among these potential resisters are nationalist politicians who approve of nationalism's dominance of religious symbols and imagery and would likely lose some influence to a rising "priest class." Also included in this group would be the Capitalist class, who, according to Marxism, depend on the partitioning of the population into nation-states to most effectively

[730] RK Ramazani (2004), "Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign Policy," *The Middle East Journal* 58(4): 549-60.

accumulate capital.[731] Another source of resistance would be "Classical Liberals," who normatively oppose the re-introduction of religion into the public sphere.[732] These persons embrace the Enlightenment relegation of religion to the private sphere and argue that religion has a cumulatively negative effect in domestic or international politics.

Although it is unlikely that religion will return as the dominant source of political authority and credibility in the near future, it is extremely likely (perhaps even inevitable) that some political thinkers and practitioners will experiment with the possibility. This will, in turn, motivate those who would like to see these experiments fail to actively undermine those projects. Thus, for example, the more Iran pushes its reliance on religion as its source of transcendent credibility, the more it will be ostracized from the larger international society and become the target of rhetoric designed to cause their experiment to fail before it has a chance to be fully tested. This does not mean Iran will fail necessarily. It only highlights the uphill road any transition to religion as a dominant source of transcendent credibility faces.

One Source: Humanity

Many today not only argue that the day of the nation-state is over, but that the demise of nationalism is a good thing. "Anti-nationalists" make arguments that parallel the critiques many early modern theorists made about sources of transcendent

---

[731] Immanuel Wallerstein (2004), *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press): 42-59; Martin Carnoy (1984), *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 172-207; Bob Jessop (1982), *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods* (New York: New York University Press).

[732] For example, John Rawls (1996), *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press): 173-253.

credibility based on religion. Margaret Canovan summarizes the three main commitments of anti-nationalists:

1. A peaceful acceptance of differences in place of militarism and genocide.
2. Shared humanity and equal human rights for all people in place of the exclusive claims of a superior *Volk*.
3. Membership based on political will and individual choice, not determined by genetic make-up.[733]

The early modern assault on religion as the dominant source of transcendent credibility began with a belief essentially the same as the first commitment, except that they were responding not to genocide, but to the efforts of religious groups to eliminate one another. The early modern response of Grotius, Rousseau and others was to move towards a minimalist religion. Likewise, as the second commitment states, modern cosmopolitans focus on a minimal concept of humanity: every human has human rights simply because he or she is a human. It is the third commitment that represents the largest difference between the early modern theorists and the cosmopolitans of today. Late eighteenth and early nineteenth century nationalists would have assumed that individual choice was closely tied to genetic make-up, meaning that individual choice was far less important than loyalty to one's nation. Such an assumption is not made by cosmopolitans: people will often choose loyalties to groups (and sources of transcendent credibility) other than their respective nation. The further implication of this is that loyalties to and beliefs in sources of transcendent credibility are conscious choices and, as a result, can be shifting. This instability points back to the second commitment: shared humanity. "Humanity" emerges, as

[733] Canovan (2005): 49.

the nation did in the early nineteenth century, as the group a human belongs to *by nature* and which becomes imbued with metaphysical meaning.

This suggests the possibility that "humanity" may emerge as the dominant and only source of transcendent credibility in the world.[734] In order to be useful as a source of transcendent credibility, specific meanings are assigned to it. Humanity, for example, is intended primarily as a *moral* term rather than a *biological* one. Humans are beings who, if left alone (autonomous), are able to determine and implement a "good life."[735] Thus, a *self-fulfilling* list of human "rights" emerges designed to make this a reality. The implications of the growing success of this single source of transcendent credibility on political boundaries are clear: "Human rights law, predicated on human dignity, does not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens."[736] Currently, powerful states retain a great deal of choice in when and where they apply international law. However, the source of transcendent credibility, "humanity," is increasingly being combined with the international legal concepts of *jus cogens* and *erga omnes*,[737] establishing a hierarchy of law in which national institutions are subordinated to global laws and values.[738]

---

[734] David Cole (2006), "The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 37: 627-58.

[735] Jack Donnelly (2002), *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 7-54.

[736] Cole (2006): 653.

[737] *Jus cogens* are international norms (laws) that have "the highest hierarchical position among other norms and principle," meaning they pre-empt all other laws and norms, including national ones. (67) The legal term *erga omnes* means "flows to all." "Obligations deriving from *jus cogens* are presumably *erga omnes*." M Cherif Bassiouni (1996), "International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59: 67, 72.

[738] This has been asserted in a number of areas of international law: crime, humanitarian law and the laws of war, the environment, issues of gender equality and rights, and sovereign immunity in general (references follow respectively): Bassiouni (1996): 63-74; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds. (2005), *Customary International Humanitarian Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, International Committee of the Red Cross); Eva M Kornicker Uhlmann (1998), "State

To be effective as a source of transcendent credibility, this specific meaning of "humanity" must have the appearance of naturalness. For example, this may emerge from a religious tradition in which "all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." Of course, such an argument has limited appeal outside the particular tradition. Another method is to have humanity itself endow humanity with these rights. Humanity accomplishes this through "a partly moral, partly empirical discovery based on thousands of years of accumulated experience of human existence."[739] Humanity, in a sense, realizes itself. Thus, just as historically gods tend to reveal their own existence, so the transcendent entity of humanity recognizes itself over the ages.

Admittedly, there is a certain awkwardness in discussing "humanity" as a source of transcendent credibility largely because this is not how current discourse consciously perceives it. Making a similar argument of the "nation" in the early nineteenth century would have been absurd to most. Just as nationalists claimed that a person made moral choices only as a participant of his or her community, so it seems natural today that an autonomous individual is best able to make moral choices. It is also rarely questioned that *every* human being has the necessary capabilities to do this. Questioning these metaphysical assumptions places one in the same category as the heretic or the traitor. What is a perpetrator of "crimes against humanity" but

---

Community Interests, Jus Cogens and the Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms," *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 11: 101-35; Ladan Askari (1998), "Girl's Rights under International Law: An Argument for Establishing Gender Equality as a Jus Cogens," *Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies* 8: 3-42; Jack Alan Levy (1998), "As Between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law of Foreign Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Jus Cogens Violators," *Georgetown Law Journal* 86: 2719-33.

[739] William J Talbott (2005), *Which Rights Should Be Universal?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 3.

inhuman? The weakening of the dominance of religion as the source of transcendent credibility in the early modern period opened up a space for questioning fundamental religious doctrines. The strength of the concept of "humanity," at least among a certain subset of the world's population, is the reason why it presents some discomfort in claiming it to be a source of transcendent credibility – a tool of political manipulation – rather than the most natural thing in the world.

Very few who support the idea of "humanity" as the source of transcendent credibility also support a "world government" that resembles the institutional structure of a nation-state's government. This is usually done for normative reasons: world government tends to be equated with world dictatorship, which is rather unappealing. The hypothesis also suggests that such a world government is not necessary: the governance responsibilities of the nation-state are very different *because* there are multiple sources of transcendent credibility in the system. If there were only one source, the very different governance concerns would necessitate different political institutions. It is difficult to predict what institutions would be associated with "humanity" as a single source of transcendent credibility.[740]

An examination of the relevant literature reveals that the most likely political institution to be associated with "humanity" is a global civil society.[741] For example, April Carter argues that the global citizen's primary allegiance is to a global civil

---

[740] One suggestion is to examine the differences between the medieval and nationalist European political institutions. However, such a project would return limited results because, although medieval Europe contained only one source of transcendent credibility, it lay next to systems dominated by different sources (e.g. Islam). Presumably, "humanity" would be global, meaning no systems containing alternative sources would co-exist.

[741] While there is a large and growing literature on this subject, a good introduction is found in Mary Kaldor (2003), *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

society. The global citizen actively pursues "social justice, diversity, sustainable economic development respecting the environment, and…a peaceful world."[742] These values point to a concept of "humanity" that is transcendent, often using the vague, yet powerful notion of "dignity."

A single source of transcendent credibility worldwide would substantially change the nature of borders and, as a result, the nation-state itself. The most common imagery in the literature is a "neo-medievalist" system, in which there are many sources of authority that frequently overlap each other.[743] Those who suggest the future holds a single source of transcendent credibility also almost universally argue that it is a world in which distinct borders have become more indistinct or have disappeared. For example, while the prevailing rule of international law has traditionally been that individuals had no access to international courts except through their nation-state, this practice has been gradually weakened.[744] The "exhaustion of domestic remedies rule" permits individuals who cannot obtain justice in local and

---

[742] April Carter (2001), *The Political Theory of Global Citizenship* (New York: Routledge).

[743] Anthony Clark Arend (1999), *Legal Rules and International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 171-85.

[744] There is increasing support for and evidence of considering as "subjects of international law:" indigenous peoples, James S Anaya (2004), *Indigenous Peoples in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); "states-in-the-making" (e.g., the Palestinians), Peter Malanczuk (1996), "Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law," *European Journal of International Law* 7: 485-500; NGOs, G Steve Charnovitz (2006), "Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 100(2): 348-72; and even, though more rarely, individuals, Rosalyn Higgins (1985), "Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law," in Richard Falk, Freidrich Kratochwil, and Saul H Mendlovitz, eds., *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press): 480. There is a "growing entitlement of individuals and non-governmental organizations to a more formal and informal involvement in international judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings," Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands (1999), "Introduction," in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands, eds., *International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 10.

national courts to apply their case to international bodies.[745] This rule has been applied to recent international law concerning migrant workers. Legal, and following a 2003 Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling illegal, [746] migrant workers have the right "to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language."[747] More visibly is the subfield of customary humanitarian law, which includes prohibitions against violating the human rights of *individuals* (i.e. prohibitions against torture, slavery, and discrimination).[748] Such shifts in the subjects of international law, although a small number of instances in the vast corpus of international law, suggest some weakening in the distinctiveness of international borders and a challenge to the traditional Westphalian definition of "sovereignty."

"Cosmopolitan" views are not necessarily held in a cosmopolitan manner, meaning that they remain highly contested by many groups and persons in the world today.[749] Though numerous international agreements stress these commonalities of human beings, codification in international law is not always an accurate reflection of

---

[745] Malcolm N Shaw (2005), *International Law, 5th ed.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 254-55.

[746] Sarah H Cleveland (2005), "Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Workers, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, September 17, 2003," *American Journal of International Law* 99: 460-65.

[747] Margaret Satterthwaite (2005), "Crossing Borders, Claiming Rights: Using Human Rights Law to Empower Women Migrant Workers," *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal* 8: 54 [1-66]

[748] Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, eds. (2005): xxv-xlv.

[749] Zhou Qi (2005), "Conflicts Over Human Rights between China and the US," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27(1): 105-24; Liu Huaqiu (2001), "Vienna Conference Statement (1993)," in *The Chinese Human Rights Reader*, Stephen C Angle and Marina Svensson, eds. (ME Sharpe); David A Bell (2000), *East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Mashood A Baderin (2003), *International Human Rights and Islamic Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). The topic of universal human rights versus cultural relativity decreased in frequency in articles of major international law journals from the 1990s to the 2000s, suggesting that universality has carried the day. In a signal that "humanity" may be an effective source of transcendent credibility, academics representing other cultural backgrounds (i.e. Islam, Hinduism, etc.) tend to focus their efforts on explaining how their particular culture has always supported the same basic rights, thus affirming the universality (as opposed to the Western origin) of human rights. Opponents of this position are frequently characterized as "fundamentalists" who improperly understand their own cultural traditions.

state practice.[750] Although the idea that human rights are "universal" unquestionably dominates academic and state policymaker discourses, the degree to which changes in *state* discourse alter *individuals'* self-perception of their identities remains an open question. The relationship between state discourse and individual identity suggests a new area of interdisciplinary research between Psychology and Political Science.

It is unlikely that a single source of transcendent credibility will come to dominate the world. A functioning idea of "us" requires a "them."[751] The concept of "Christendom" in medieval Europe only had force when it was contrasted with the parts of the world that were outside of Christendom. The threat of Islam on many sides of Europe revitalized the idea of Christendom. Even when external threats were perceived to be minimal, Christendom attacked the enemies within – the various heretical movements that challenged the notion of a truly Catholic Church. Nationalists also recognize that an "us" requires a "them." Thus, with absolutely no levity intended, I suggest that a single, worldwide source of transcendent credibility is only possible if we come into contact with life from outer space.

Summation

This dissertation argues that changes in the number of sources of transcendent credibility in a system precede changes in the distinctiveness of boundaries between

---

[750] Michael Glennon (2001), *Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Intervention after Kosovo* (New York: Palgrave).

[751] David Berreby (2005), *Us and Them: Understanding Your Tribal Mind* (Little, Brown); Donald L Horowitz (1985), *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Los Angeles: University of California Press): Chap. 4. For a contrasting view, see Lowell Gaertner, et al (2006), "Us Without Them: Evidence for an Intragroup Origin of Positive In-Group Regard," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90(3): 426-39.

political units. The dominant political unit of the Westphalian system is the nation-state, an entity that is defined in part by its very distinctive borders. The institution of the modern state depends on the co-existence of many "nations" as multiple sources of transcendent credibility. The Westphalian system of nation-states will only wither away if the "nation" is replaced as the dominant type of source of transcendent credibility in the world.

This concluding chapter contends that nations will continue to serve as the dominant sources of transcendent credibility in the global system in the near future. The two alternative sources of transcendent credibility – religious sources and "humanity" – offered here face the obstacles of time, inexperience at generating compliance in the modern world, and numerous actors who would actively resist any potential transition away from the nation as the dominant source of transcendent credibility. Thus, at least in the near future, the nation will continue to dominate and governments will continue to make large investments of resources to control extremely distinctive borders.

At the same time, we have not reached, nor are we likely to reach, the "end of history." The nation has proven effective as a source of transcendent credibility in the environment of the past two centuries, but its usefulness will likely fade as global transformations occur, and rulers will once again begin to search for more efficient sources of transcendent credibility. In fact, that search has already begun.

REFERENCES

Abels, Richard (1998). *Alfred the Great: War, Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England*. London: Longman.

Abercrombie, N, S Hill, and BS Turner (1980). *The Dominate Ideology Thesis*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Abisaab, Rula Jurdi (2004). *Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire.* IR Taurus.

Abu-Lughod, Janet L (1989). *Before European Hegemony: The World System, AD 1250-1350*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Achinstein, Peter (2001). *The Book of Evidence*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Albert, Mathias, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid, eds. (2001). *Identities, Borders, and Orders: Rethinking International Relations Today*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Algaze, Guillermo (1993). *The Uruk World-System: The Dynamics of Expansion in Early Mesopotamian Civilization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Amoretti, BS (1986). "Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Periods." In Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 610-55.

Anaya, James S (2004). *Indigenous Peoples in International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, Liam, and Gareth Stansfield (2005). "The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model," *Publius* 35(3): 359-84.

Anderson, MS (1998). *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789*. Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing.

Anderson, Perry (1974). *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: Verso.

Andersson, Bo (1999). "Sweden, the Elect Nation," *Lutheran Quarterly* 13(3): 305-14.

Andrews, Frances, Christoph Egger, and Constance M Rousseau, eds. (2004). *Pope, Church and City: Essays in Honour of Brenda M Bolton*. Leiden: Brill.

Apter, David (1963). "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States*. New York: Free Press.

Arend, Anthony Clark (1999). *Legal Rules and International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Artz, Frederick B (1980 [1953]). *The Mind of the Middle Ages: An Historical Survey, AD 200-1500*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Asch, Ronald G (1997). *The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-1648*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

_____ (2000). "Religious Toleration, the Peace of Westphalia and the German Territorial Estates," *Parliaments, Estates & Representation* 20: 75-83.

Ashley, Richard (1988). "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," *Millennium* 17: 227-262.

_____ (1996), "The Achievements of Poststructuralism." In Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 240-53.

Askari, Ladan (1998). "Girl's Rights under International Law: An Argument for Establishing Gender Equality as a Jus Cogens," *Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies* 8: 3-42.

Babayan, Kathryn (1994). "The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi'ism," *Iranian Studies* 27(1-2): 135-61.

Baderin, Mashood A (2003). *International Human Rights and Islamic Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bainton, Roland H (1982). "Thomas Muntzer, Revolutionary Firebrand of the Reformation," *Sixteenth-Century Journal* 13(2): 3-15.

Baldwin, David, ed. (1993). *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Balibar, Etienne (2004). *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ballou, Robert O, ed., (1972 [1944]). *The Portable World Bible*. New York: Penguin Press.

Barclay, William (1954 [1600]). *The Kingdom and the Regal Power*, George Albert Moore, trans. Chevy Chase, MD: Country Dollar Press.

Bartelson, Jens (2001). *The Critique of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barzel, Yoram (1997). *Economic Analysis of Property Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (2002). *A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bassiouni, M Cherif (1996). "International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59: 63-74.

Batchfelder, Ronald and Herman Freudenberger (1983). "On the Rational Origins of the Modern Centralized State," *Explorations in Economic History* 20: 1-13.

Bates, Robert H and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1985). "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government," *Politics and Society* 14(1): 53-70.

Bates, Robert H, et al (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt (2002). *Society Under Siege*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Beaulac, Stephane (2004). *The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia (Developments in International Law 21)*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Beik, William (1990). "The Culture of Protest in Seventeenth-Century French Towns," *Social History* 15(1): 1-23.

_____ (2005). "The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration," *Past and Present* 188(1): 195-224

Bell, Charles (1968), *Tibet, Past and Present*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bell, David A (2000). *East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bellomo, Manlio (1995). *The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000-1800*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

Belloni, Roberto (2004). "Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping* 11(2): 334-53.

Bendix, Reinhard (1978). *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Benn, Charles (2002). *China's Golden Age: Everyday Life in the Tang Dynasty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benz, Arthur (2004). "Path-Dependent Institutions and Strategic Veto Players: National Parliaments in the European Union," *West European Politics* 27(5): 875-900.

Berce, Yves-Marie (1996), *The Birth of Absolutism: A History of France, 1598-1661*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Berend, Nora (2001). *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and 'Pagans' in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000 – c. 1300 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 4th Series)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berger, Peter, ed. (1999). *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Berman, Harold J (1984). *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Bettenson, Henry, ed. (1963). *Documents of the Christian Church*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Binder, Leonard (1964). *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*. New York: John Wiley.

Bingham, Woodbridge (1941). "The Rise of Li in a Ballad Prophecy," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 61.

Bireley, Robert (2003). *The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and Confessors*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Black, Antony (1992). *Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blackburn, Mark (1996). "Mints, Burhs, and the Grately Code ch. 14.2." In D Hill and AR Rumble, eds., *The Defense of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon Fortifications.* Manchester: Manchester University Press: 160-75.

Blair, Ann (1997). *The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Blickle, Peter (1981). *The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants' War from a New Perspective*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

_____ (1998). *From the Communal Reformation to the Revolution of the Common Man (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 65)*. Leiden: Brill.

Bloch, Marc (1961). *Feudal Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bodin, Jean (1992). *On Sovereignty*, Julian H Franklin, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bonney, Richard (1976). "The Secret Expenses of Richelieu and Mazarin," *English Historical Review* 91(361): 825-36.

_____ (1987), "Absolutism: What's In a Name?" *French History* 1(1): 93-117.

_____ (1990). "Bodin and the Development of the French Monarchy," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 40: 43-61.

_____ (1991). *The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____ (2002). *The Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

Bose, Sumantra (2002). *Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1990). "From Rules to Strategies." In *In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology*, trans. M Adamson. Cambridge: Polity Press: 59-75.

Bowler, John, ed. (2000). *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Braddick, Michael (2000). *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Peter (1982). *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____ (1996). *The Rise of Western Christendom*. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers.

Bruce, Steve (1996). *Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brumfiel, Elizabeth M (2001). "Aztec Hearts and Minds: Religion and State in the Aztec Empire." In Susan Alcock, et. al., eds., *Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History*: 283-310.

Buchanan, George (2004 [1579]). *A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots: A Critical Edition and Translation of George Buchanan's* De Iure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus *(St. Andrew's Studies in Reformation History Studies)*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Buchanan, James M (1980). "Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking." In James Buchanan, Robert D Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., *Toward a Theory of a Rent-Seeking Society*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press: 3-15.

Burger, Thomas (1976). *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Burgess, Glenn (1992). "The Divine Right of Kings Reconsidered," *English Historical Review* 107(425): 837-61.

Burke, Peter (1992). *The Fabrication of Louis XIV*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Burns, JH, ed. (1988). *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – c. 1450*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Butin, Philip Walker (1995). *Revelation, Redemption, and Response*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Calvin, John (1960 [1536]). *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. John T McNeill, ed. Ford Lewis Battles, trans. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Campbell, Angus, et. al. (1960). *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley.

Canova-Green, Marie-Claude (1995). "Dance and Ritual: The *Ballet des nations* at the Court of Louis XIII," *Renaissance Studies* 9(4): 395-403.

Canovan, Margaret (2005). *The People*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Carnoy, Martin (1984). *The State and Political Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Carrubba, Cliff, and Richard J Timpone (2005). "Explaining Vote Switching Across First- and Second-Order Elections: Evidence from Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 38(3): 260-81.

Carter, April (2001). *The Political Theory of Global Citizenship*. New York: Routledge.

Cavadini, John C (1993). *The Last Christology of the West: Adoptionism in Spain and Gaul, 785-820*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Cave, Roy C, and Herbert H Coulson, eds. (1965 [1936]). *A Source Book for Medieval Economic History*. New York: Biblo and Tannen.

Challis, CE (1975). "The Ecclesiastical Mints of the Early Tudor Period: Their Organization and Possible Date of Closure," *Northern History* 10: 88-101.

Chang, KC (1983). *Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Charnovitz, G Steve (2006). "Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 100(2): 348-72.

Chazournes, Laurence Boisson de, and Philippe Sands (1999). "Introduction." In Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands, eds., *International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-25.

Checkel, Jeffrey (1997). *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Ch'en, Kenneth KS (1964). *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cherry, David (1998). *Frontier and Society in Roman North Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Chrisman, Miriam Usher (1996). *Conflicting Visions of Reform: German Lay Propaganda Pamphlets, 1519-1530 (Studies in German Histories)*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Claessen, Henri JM and Jarich G Oosten, eds. (1996). *Ideology and the Formation of Early States*. Leiden: Brill.

Cleveland, Sarah H (2005). "Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Workers, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, September 17, 2003," *American Journal of International Law* 99: 460-65.

Coffey, John RD (2000). *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558-1689*. New York: Longman.

Cole, David (2006). "The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 37: 627-58.

Collins, James B (2001). "Noble Political Ideology and the Estates General of Orleans and Pontoise: French Republicanism," *Historical Reflections* 27(2): 219-40.

Comaroff, Jean, and John L Comaroff (1991). *Of Revelation and Revolution, Volume 1: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa.* Chicago: University of Chicago.

_____ (1999). "Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony," *American Ethnologist* 26(2): 282-3.

Constable, Giles (1995). *Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cooter, Robert D (2000). *The Strategic Constitution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cosgil, Metin M (2004). "Ottoman Tax Registers (*Tahrir Defterleri*)," *Historical Methods* 37(2): 87-100.

_____ (2004). "Taxes, Efficiency, and Redistribution: Discriminatory Taxation of Villages in Ottoman Palestine, Southern Syria, and Transjordan in the Sixteenth Century," *Working Paper 2002-22*, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

_____ (2005). "Efficiency and Continuity in Public Finance: The Ottoman System of Taxation," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37(4): 567-86.

Cotterell, Edward, ed. (1997). *A Dictionary of World Mythology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coupland, Simon (1991). "The Fortified Bridges of Charles the Bald," *Journal of Medieval History* 17: 1-12.

_____ (1998). "From Poachers to Gamekeepers: Scandinavian Warlords and Carolingian Kings," *Early Medieval Europe* 7: 85-114.

Craciun, Maria, Ovidiu Ghitta, and Graeme Murdock, eds. (2002). *Confessional Identity in East-Central Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Cristi, Marcela (2001). *From Civil to Political Religion: The Intersection of Culture, Religion, and Politics*. Waterloo, ON: Willfrid Laurier University Press.

Curtis, Michael, ed. (1961). *The Great Political Theories, Volume I*. New York: Avon Books.

Danner, Dan G (1981). "Resistance and the Ungodly Magistrate in the Sixteenth Century: The Marian Exiles," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 49(3): 471-81.

Dante (1996 [1314]). *Monarchy*, Prue Shaw, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dardanelli, Paolo (2006). *Between Two Unions: Europeanization and Scottish Devolution*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Davidson, Hilda Ellis (1990 [1964]). *Gods and Myths of Northern Europe*. New York: Penguin Books.

Davis, RHC (1982). "Alfred the Great and Guthrum's Frontier," *English Historical Review* 97: 803-10.

Dawisha, Adeed, and Karen Dawisha (2003). "How to Build a Democratic Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 82(3): 36-50.

Dawson, Christopher (1950). *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company.

Dearden, Brian (1989). "Charles the Bald's Fortified Bridge at Pitres (Seine): Recent Archaeological Investigations," *Anglo-Norman Studies* 11: 107-12

De Bary, Wm Theodore, and Irene Bloom, eds. (1999). *Sources of Chinese Tradition: Volume 1: From Earliest Times to 1600*, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press.

Diamond, Larry (2005). "Lessons from Iraq," *Journal of Democracy* 16(1): 9-23.

Diefendorf, Barbara B (2004). "Contradictions of the Century of Saints: Aristocratic Patronage and the Convents of Counter-Reformation Paris," *French Historical Studies* 24(3): 469-99.

Dillenberger, John, ed. (1962). *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings*. New York: Anchor Books.

Dixon, C Scott (1996). *The Reformation and Rural Society: The Parishes of Brandenburg-Ansbach-Kulmbach, 1528-1603*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (2002). *The Reformation in Germany*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Dobbins, James, et al (2003). *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Dodge, Toby (2006). "Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective," *Third World Quarterly* 27(1): 187-200.

Donnelly, Jack (2002). *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Dost, Timothy A (2001). *Renaissance Humanism in Support of the Gospel in Luther's Early Correspondence: Taking All Things Captive*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Downes, Alexander B (2006). "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars," *SAIS Review* 26(1): 49-61.

Downing, Brian (1992). *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Doyle, Michael (1986). *Empires*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Doyle, Michael W and G John Ikenberry, eds. (1997). *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Duby, Georges (1974). *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

_____ (1980). *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Duckett, Eleanor Shipley (1956). *Alfred the Great*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dueck, Abe J (1982). "Religion and Temporal Authority in the Reformation: The Controversy Among the Protestants Prior to the Peace of Nuremberg, 1532," *Sixteenth-Century Journal* 13(2): 55-74.

Duffy, Eamon (2001). *The Voices of Morebath: Reformation and Rebellion in an English Village*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dunn, Richard S (1979). *The Age of Religious Wars, 1559-1715*. New York: WW Norton and Company.

Durant, Will (1957). *The Reformation*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Durkheim, Emile (1915). *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Eagleton, Terry (1991). *Ideology: An Introduction*. London: Verso.

Earle, TK, ed. (1991). *Chiefdoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Easton, Stewart C, and Helene Wieruszowski, eds. (1961). *The Era of Charlemagne*. Princeton: D Van Nostrand Company.

Edwards, Mark U, Jr. (1994). *Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Effros, Bonnie (1997). "*De partibus Saxoniae* and the Regulation of Mortuary Custom: A Carolingian Campaign of Christianization or the Suppression of Saxon Identity?" *Revue belge de philology et d'histoire* 75: 267-86.

Einhard (1960 [830]). *The Life of Charlemagne*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel, ed. (1968). *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization*. New York: Basic Books.

Eisenstadt, SN (1999). *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eisenstein, Elizabeth L (1980). *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Emerton, Ephraim, ed. (2000). *The Letters of St. Boniface*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Engster, Daniel (1996). "Jean Bodin, Scepticism and Absolute Sovereignty," *History of Political Thought* 17(4): 469-99.

_____ (2001). *Divine Sovereignty: The Origins of Modern State Power*. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

Erasmus (1997 [1516]). *The Education of a Christian Prince*, Lisa Jardine, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ergene, Bogac A (2001). "On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict (1600-1800)," *Islamic Law and Society* 8(1): 52-87.

_____ (2004). "Evidence in Ottoman Courts: Oral and Written Documentation in Early-Modern Courts of Islamic Law," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 124(3): 471-491.

Ertman, Thomas (1997). *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Estep, William R (1996). *The Anabaptist Story: An Introduction to Sixteenth-Century Anabaptism*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B Eerdman's Publishing.

Estes, James M (2002). "Johannes Brenz and the German Reformation," *Lutheran Quarterly* 16(4): 373-414.

Evans, GR (2000). *Bernard of Clairvaux*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Falk, Richard (1995). *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Fallon, Stephen M (1988). "'To Act or Not To Act:' Milton's Conception of Divine Freedom," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49(3): 425-53.

Feinman, Gary M and Joyce Marcus, eds. (1998). *Archaic States*. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.

Ferrier, Ronald (1986). "Trade from the Mid-14th Century to the End of the Safavid Period." In Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 412-90.

Fichtenau, Heinrich (1957). *The Carolingian Empire: The Age of Charlemagne*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

Fichtner, Paula Sutter (1980). "The Disobedience of the Obedient: Ferdinand I and the Papacy 1555-1564," *Sixteenth-Century Journal* 11(2): 25-34.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917.

Fischer, Markus (1992). "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization* 46(2): 427-466.

Fisher, Douglas (1989). "The Price of Revolution: A Monetary Interpretation," *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 883-902.

Flockhart, Trine (2005). "Critical Junctures and Social Identity: Explaining the Gap between Danish Mass and Elite Attitudes to Europeanization," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(2): 251-72.

Forte, Antonio (1977). *Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century.* Naples: Institutio universitario orientale.

Fortier, Mark (1998). "Equity and Ideas: Coke, Ellesmere, and James I," *Renaissance Quarterly* 51(4): 1255-81.

Fossum, John Erik, and Agustin Jose Menendez (2005). "The Constitution's Gift? A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union," *European Law Journal* 11(4): 380-451.

Foucault, Michel (1970). *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. London: Vintage Books.

Fox, Jonathan (2004). "Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996," *International Political Science Review* 25(1): 55-76.

Fragner, Bert (1986). "Social and Internal Economic Affairs." In Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 491-567.

Frank, Roberta (1984). "Viking Atrocity and Skaldic Verse: The Rite of the Blood Eagle," *English Historical Review* 99: 332-43.

Franklin, Julian H, ed. (1969). *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza, and Mornay*. New York: Pegasus.

Friedrichs, Jorg (2001). "The Meaning of New Medievalism," *European Journal of International Relations* 7(4): 475-501.

Fukuyama, Francis (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Hamish Hamilton.

_____ (2004). "Nation-Building 101," *The Atlantic Monthly* 293(1).

_____ (2006). "Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 17(2): 5-20.

Gause, Gregory (1992). "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs* 45(Winter): 441-469.

Geary, Patrick (1991 [1978]). *Furta Sacra: Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Giddens, Anthony (1985). *The Nation-State and Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gillingham, John (1992). "Jean Monnet and the European Coal and Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal." In *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity*, Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, eds. Houndsmill: Palgrave MacMillan: 129-62.

Gillmor, Carol (1989). "The Logistics of Fortified Building on the Seine Under Charles the Bald," *Anglo-Norman Studies* 11: 87-106

Gilpin, Robert (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (1986). "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Keohane, ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ginsburgh, Victor, and Shlomo Weber (2005). "Language Disenfranchisement in the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43(2): 273-86.

Glassman, Debra, and Angela Redish (1988). "Currency Depreciation in Early Modern England and France," *Explorations in Economic History* 25(1): 75-97.

Glennon, Michael (2001). *Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Intervention after Kosovo*. New York: Palgrave.

Goetz, Philip W, ed. (1989). "Taoism." In *Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia Knowledge in Depth*, Vol. 28, 15th ed. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica: 394-407.

Goffman, Daniel (2002). *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O Keohane, eds. (1993). *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Gonzalez, Justo L (1984). *The Story of Christianity, Volume I: The Early Church to the Reformation*. San Francisco: Harper.

Goodman, Christopher (1972 [1558]). *How Superior Powers Ought to be Obeyed of Their Subjects*. New York: Da Capo Press.

Gopin, Marc (2000). *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gorski, Philip S (2001). *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gose, P (1996). "The Past is a Lower Moiety: Diarchy, History, and Divine Kingship in the Inka Empire," *History and Anthropology* 9(4).

Gramsci, Antonio (1978). *Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Grane, Leif (1987). *The Augsburg Confession: A Commentary*. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Publishers.

Gray, John (1998). "Global Utopias and Clashing Civilizations: Misunderstanding the Present," *International Affairs* 74(1): 149-64.

Grell, Ole Peter, ed. (1994). *The Scandinavian Reformation: From Evangelical Movement to Institutionalization of Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grieco, Joseph M (1997). "Realist International Theory and the Study of Politics," in Doyle and Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 163-201.

Gyaltsen, Sakyapa Sonam (1996 [1368]). *The Clear Mirror: A Traditional Account of Tibet's Golden Age*. McComas Taylor and Lama Choedak Yuthok, trans. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications.

Haas, SW (1979). "Henry VIII's *Glasse of Truth*," *History* 64(212): 353-62.

_____ (1980). "Martin Luther's 'Divine Right' Kingship and the Royal Supremacy: Two Tracts from the 1531 Parliament and Convocation of the Clergy," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 31(3): 317-27.

Habermas, Jurgen (1994). *The Past as Future*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

_____ (1998). *The Inclusion of the Other.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Haider, Najaf (1996). "Precious Metal Flows and Currency Circulation in the Mughal Empire," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 39(3): 298-364.

Hall, Rodney Bruce and Friedrich V Kratochwil (1993). "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization* 47(Summer): 479-500.

Halpern, Manfred (1963). *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hardin, Russell (1982). *Collective Action*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Harrison, Mark (2002). "Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet Command Economy," *The Economic History Review* 55(3): 397-433.

Heidegger, Martin (1996). *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hekman, Susan (1983). *Weber: The Ideal Type and Contemporary Social Theory*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds. (2005). *Customary International Humanitarian Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, International Committee of the Red Cross.

Henshall, Nicholas (1992). "The Myth of Absolutism," *History Today* 42: 40-47.

Herbst, Jeffrey (1990). "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa," *World Development* 18: 949-958.

Hervieu-Leger, Daniele (2000). *Religion as a Chain of Memory*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Herzog, Don (1998). *Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Higgins, Rosalyn (1985). "Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law." In Richard Falk, Freidrich Kratochwil, and Saul H Mendlovitz, eds., *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Hirschman, Albert O (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hobbes, Thomas (1991). *Leviathan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holborn, Hajo (1982). *A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet (2005). "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission," *International Organization* 59(4): 861-98.

Hooker, Richard (1989 [1593]). *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoover, AJ (1987). "Religion and National Stereotypes: A German Protestant Example," *History of European Ideas* 8(3): 297-307.

Hopfl, Harro, ed. (1991). *Luther and Calvin: On Secular Authority (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hopfl, Harro (2004). *Jesuit Political Thought: The Society of Jesus and the States, c. 1540-1630 (Ideas in Context 70)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L (2000 [1985]). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Huaqiu, Liu (2001). "Vienna Conference Statement (1993)," in *The Chinese Human Rights Reader*, Stephen C Angle and Marina Svensson, eds. ME Sharpe.

Hudson, John (1996). *The Formation of the English Common Law: Law and Society in England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta.* New York: Longman.

Huntington, Samuel P (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone.

Hymens, Jacques EC (2004). "The Changing Color of Money: European Currency Iconography and Collective Identity," *European Journal of International Relations* 10(1): 5-32.

Inalcik, H (1973). *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*. London: Phoenix Press.

Inalcik, H, and D Quataert (1994). *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jacoby, Wade (2001). *Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

James, Dominic (1998). *God and Gold in Late Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

James, William (1999 [1902]). *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Modern Library.

Jardine, Lisa, ed. (1997). *Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jelen, Ted Gerard and Clyde Wilcox, eds. (2002). *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jessop, Bob (1982). *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods*. New York: New York University Press.

Johnston, Douglas, and Cynthia Sampson, eds. (1995). *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jolly, Karen Louise (1996). *Popular Religion in Late Saxon England: Elf Charms in Context.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Jussen, Berhard (2000). "Liturgy and Legitimation, or How the Gallo-Romans Ended the Roman Empire." In Berhard Jussen, ed., *Ordering Medieval Society: Perspectives on Intellectual and Practical Modes of Shaping Social Relations.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 147-99.

Kaelberer, Matthias (2004). "The Euro and European Identity: Symbols, Power and the Politics of European Monetary Union," *Review of International Studies* 30(2): 161-78.

Kaldor, Mary (2003). *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kantorowicz, EH (1957). *The King's Two Bodies.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kapferer, Bruce (1988). *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution.

Katzenstein, Peter J, ed. (1986). *The Culture of National Security: News and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kaye, Sharon M, and Robert M Martin (2001). *On Ockham*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning.

Kedourie, Elie (1960). *Nationalism*. London: Blackwell Publishers.

Kedourie, Elie, ed. (1971). *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Keohane, Nannerl O (1980). *Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O, ed. (1986). *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Keown, Damien, ed. (2003). *A Dictionary of Buddhism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kepel, Gilles (1994). *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Kesselring, Krista (1999). "Abjuration and Its Demise: The Changing Face of Royal Justice in the Tudor Period," *Canadian Journal of History* 34(3): 345-58.

Keynes, Simon, and Michael Lapidge, eds. (1983). *Alfred the Great, Asser's* Life of King Alfred *and Other Contemporary Sources*. New York: Penguin Books.

Kiernan, VG (1980). *State and Society in Europe, 1560-1650*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Kiser, Edgar, and April Linton (2001). "Determinants of the Growth of the State: War and Taxation in Early Modern France and England," *Social Forces* 80(2): 411-48.

Kjaer, Anne Mette (2004). *Governance*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Knecht, RJ (1991). *Richelieu: Profiles in Power.* Harlow, England: Longman.

Knox, John (1994 [1558]). "An Appellation to the Nobility and Estates in Scotland." In *On Rebellion*, Roger A Mason, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kolb, Robert, and James A Nestingen, eds. (2001). *Sources and Contexts of the Book of Concord*. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Publishers.

Kondonassis, AJ, and AG Malliaris (1994). "Toward a Monetary Union of the European Community: History and Experiences of the European Monetary System," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 53(3): 291-301.

Korbin, Stephen J (1998). "Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy," *Journal of International Affairs* 51(2): 367-409.

Kozlowski, Gregory C (1995). "Imperial Authority, Benefactions and Endowments (*Awqaf*) in Mughal India," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 38(3): 355-70.

Krasner, Stephen (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

_____ (1993). "Westphalia and All That." In *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane, eds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

_____ (1999). *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kristeller, Paul (1961 [1955]). *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains*. New York: Harper and Row.

Kuhn, Thomas (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kumar, Radha (1997). "The Troubled History of Partition," *Foreign Affairs* 76: 22-34.

Kurzer, Paulette (2001). *Markets and Moral Regulation: Cultural Change in the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1982). *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: New Left Books.

Lahav, Gallya (2004). *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lai, Whalen (2003). "Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey." In Antonio S Lua, ed., *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*. London: Routledge: 7-19.

Laistner, MLW (1966 [1931]). *Thought and Letters in Western Europe, AD 500 to 900*, 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Laitin, David (1986). *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yoruba*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakatos, Imre (1970). "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and A Musgrove, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (1978). *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Landau, Jacob M (1994). *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lane, Frederic C (1958). "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," *Journal of Economic History* 18: 401-417.

_____ (1966). "The Economic Meaning of War and Protection," in *Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C Lane*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lapidus, Ira M (2002). *A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laursen, John Christian, and Cary J Nederman, eds. (1997). *Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment.* University of Pennsylvania Press.

Lavelle, Ryan (2003). *Fortifications in Wessex, c. 800-1016: The Defenses of Alfred the Great Against the Vikings (Fortress 14)*. London: Osprey Publishing.

Leconte, Cecile (2005). "The Fragility of the EU as a 'Community of Values': Lessons from the Haider Affair," *West European Politics* 28(3): 620-49.

Leeming, David, ed. (2001). *A Dictionary of Asian Mythology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lehmann, Hertmut (1991). "The Germans as a Chosen People: Old Testament Themes in German Nationalism," *German Studies Review* 14(2): 261-73.

Lehning, Percy (1997). "European Citizenship: A Mirage?" in *Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe*. Percy Lehning and Albert Weale, eds. New York: Routledge. Pp. 175-98.

Lerner, Adam J (1991). "Transcendence of the Nation: National Identoty and the Terrain of the Divine," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20(3): 407-27.

Levi, Margaret (1983). "The Predatory Theory of Rule," in Michael Hechter, ed., *The Microfoundations of Macrosociology*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

_____ (1988). *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

_____ (1997). *Consent, Dissent and Patriotism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levi, Margaret and Douglass C North (1982). "Toward a Property Rights Theory of Exploitation," *Politics and Society* 11(3): 315-20.

Levy, Jack Alan (1998). "As Between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law of Foreign Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Jus Cogens Violators," *Georgetown Law Journal* 86: 2703-34.

Lindberg, Carter (1996). *The European Reformations*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Lijphart, Arend (1994). "Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South Africa." In Andrew Reynolds, ed., *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

_____ (1996). "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation," *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 258-68.

_____ (2004), "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15(2): 96-109.

Locke, John (1988). *Two Treatises of Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lockhart, Paul Douglas (1995). "Religion and Princely Liberties: Denmark's Intervention in the Thirty Years War, 1618-1625," *International History Review* 17(1): 1-22.

Losee, John (1972). *A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lovejoy, Arthur O (1964 [1936]). *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Loyn, HR (1967). *Alfred the Great.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MacCulloch, Diarmaid (2003). *Reformation: Europe's House Divided, 1490-1700*. New York: Penguin Books.

MacHardy, Karin J (2002). *War, Religion, and Court Patronage in Habsburg Austria: The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Political Interaction, 1521-1622*. New York: Palgrave Macmillen.

Machiavelli, Nicolo (1961 [1513]). *The Prince*, George Bull, ed. New York: Penguin Books.

_____ (1970 [1514]). *The Discourses*, Bernard Crick, ed. New York: Penguin Books.

MacMullen, Ramsey (1997). *Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Magagna, Victor V (1991). *Communities of Grain: Rural Rebellion in Comparative Perspective*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Malanczuk, Peter (1996). "Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law," *European Journal of International Law* 7: 485-500.

Maltby, William (2002). *The Reign of Charles V*. New York: Palgrave.

Manetsch, Scott M (2000). *Theodore Beza and the Quest for Peace in France, 1572-1598*. Leiden: Brill.

Mann, Michael (1986). *Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (1997). "Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?" *Review of International Political Economy* 4: 472-497.

Maphai, Vincent (1996). "A Season for Power-Sharing," *Journal of Democracy* 7(1): 67-81.

Marcus, Joyce and Gary M Feinman, eds. (1998). *Archaic States*. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.

Mariana, Juan de (1948 [1599]). *The King and the Education of the King*, George Albert Moore, ed. Washington DC: Country Dollar Press.

Markus, RA (1997). *Gregory the Great and His World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marnef, Guido (1996). *Antwerp on the Age of the Reformation: Underground Protestantism in a Commercial Metropolis, 1550-1577*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Marsh, Michael, and Pippa Norris (1997). "Political Representation in the European Parliament," *European Journal of Political Research* 32: 153-64.

Matthee, Ruti (2001). "Mint Consolidation and the Worsening of the Late Safavid Coinage: The Mint of Huwayza," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 44(4): 505-39.

Mayer, Thomas F (2000). *Reginald Pole: Prince and Prophet*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCormick, John (2002). *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction*, 2nd ed. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan.

McCrory, Martha (1994). "Coins at the Courts of Innsbruck and Florence: The Numismatic Cabinets of Archduke Ferdinand II of Tyrol and Grand Duke Francesco I de'Medici," *Journal of the History of Collections* 6(2): 153-72.

McEntegart, Rory (2002). *Henry VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, and the English Reformation (Studies in History New Series)*. Bury St. Edmunds: St. Edmundsbury Press.

McKitterick, Rosamond, ed. (1995). *The New Cambridge Medieval History II: c. 700 – c. 900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McKitterick, Rosamond (2004). *History and Memory in the Carolingian World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Menocal, Maria Rosa (2003). *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain*. Boston: Back Bay Books.

Milgrom, Paul R, Douglass C North, and Barry Weingast (1990). "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges and Champagne Fairs," *Economics and Politics* 2(1): 1-24.

Millett, Martin (1990). "Romanization: Historical Issues and Archaeological Interpretations." In TFC Blagg and M Millett, eds., *The Early Roman Empire in the West*. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

Minorsky, Vladimir (1992 [1957]). *Persia in AD 1478-1490*. London: Royal Asiatic Society.

Moore, RI (1994 [1986]). *The Origins of European Dissent (Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching 30*). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Moravcsik, Andrew (2002). "Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(4): 603-24.

Moreira, Isabel (2000). *Dreams, Visions, and Spiritual Authority in Merovingian Gaul*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Morgan, David (1988). *Medieval Persia: 1040-1797*. London: Longman.

Morgenthau, Hans (1978). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed. New York: Alfred A Knopf.

Morrill, JS (1978). "French Absolutism as Limited Monarchy," *Historical Journal* 21(4): 961-72.

Mouffe, Chantal (1979). "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci." In *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*. London: Routledge.

Mullally, Siobhan (2005). "Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27(1): 78-104.

Mulvey, Stephen (2004). "EU Values – United in Diversity?" *BBC News Online* (March 5).

Muntzer, Thomas, "Sermon Before the Princes." In George H Williams and Angel M Mergal, eds., *Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers*. Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox Press: 47-70.

Murdoch, Steve, ed. (2001). *Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648 (History of Warfare 6)*. Leiden: Brill.

Murdock, Graeme (2000). *Calvinism on the Frontier, 1600-1660: International Calvinism and the Reformed Church in Hungary and Transylvania*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Murphy, Kristina (2004). "The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders," *Law and Human Behavior* 28(2): 187-210.

Murphy, Paul V (2002). "Between *Spirituali* and *Intransigenti*: Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga and Patrician Reform in Sixteenth-Century Italy," *Catholic Historical Review* 88(3): 446-469.

Myerson, Roger B (2004). "Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 5(1): 91-108.

Naphy, William G (1994). *Calvin and the Consolidation of the Genevan Reformation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Nederman, Cary J (2000). *Worlds of Difference: European Discourses of Toleration, c. 1100 – c. 1500*. Pennsylvania State University Press.

Nicholas of Cusa (1991 [1443]). *The Catholic Concordance*, Paul E Sigmund, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nichols, Gary (1989). "The Economic Impact of the Thirty Years' War in Habsburg Austria," *East European Quarterly* 23(3): 257-68

Nicoladis, Kalypso (2004). "We, the Peoples of Europe…," *Foreign Affairs* 83(6): 97-110.

Nielsen (2003). "Saxon Art between Interpretation and Imitation: The Influence of Roman, Scandinavian, Frankish, and Christian Art on the Material Culture of the Continental Saxons AD 400-1000." In DH Green and F Siegmund, eds., *The Continental Saxons from the Migration Period to the Tenth Century: An Ethnographic Perspective (Studies in Archaeoethnology 6)*. Woodbridge: Boydell: 193-246.

Nikam, NA, and Richard McKeon, eds. (1978 [1959]). *The Edicts of Asoka.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart (2002). "Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis," *Comparative Sociology* 1(3/4): 235-64.

_____ (2004). *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C (1981). *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: Norton.

_____ (1991). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C and Robert P Thomas (1973). *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oakley, Francis (1998). "The Absolute and Ordained Power of God and King in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Philosophy, Science, Politics, and Law," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 59(4): 669-690.

Oberman, Heiko A (1989). "*Die Gelehrten die Verkehrten:* Popular Response to Learned Culture in the Renaissance and Reformation." Reprinted in *The Impact of the Reformation: Essays by Heiko A Oberman*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994.

Ohmae, Kenichi (1999). *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy*, revised ed. New York: Collins.

O'Leary, Brendan, Ian S Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds. (2001). *The Right-Sizing of the State: The Politics of Moving Borders*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Olson, Mancur (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Olson, Oliver K (1993). "The Three-Headed Dragon, Scourge of the Reformation," *Lutheran Quarterly* 7(3): 293-314.

Oman, Charles (1987 [1937]). *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*. London: Greenhill Books.

Osborne, Toby (2002). *Dynasty and Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy: Political Culture and Thirty Years' War (Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture Series)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Osiander, Andreas (1994). *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ostrom, Elinor (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oz, Mehmet (2003). "Ottoman Provincial Administration in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: The Case of Bidlis in the Sixteenth Century," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 9(1-2): 144-56.

Ozel, Oktay (1999). "Limits of the Almighty: Mehmed II's 'Land Reform' Revisited," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 42(2): 226-46.

Pagoulatos, George (2004). "Believing in National Exceptionalism: Ideas and Economic Divergence in Southern Europe," *West European Politics* 27(1): 45-70.

Pamuk, Sevket (2000). *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (2004). "Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35(2): 225-47.

Parker, David (1981). "Law, Society, and the State in the Thought of Jean Bodin," *History of Political Thought* 2(2): 253-85.

Parker, Geoffrey (1976). "The 'Military Revolution' 1550-1660—A Myth?" *Journal of Modern History* 46: 195-214.

Parrott, David (2001). *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France, 1624-1642*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Parrow, Kathleen A (1991). "Neither Treason Nor Heresy: Use of Defense Arguments to Avoid Forfeiture during the French Wars of Religion," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 22(4): 705-16.

Parsons, Jotham (2003). "Governing Sixteenth-Century France: The Monetary Reforms of 1577," *French Historical Studies* 26(1): 1-30.

Peters, Edward, ed. (1980). *Heresy and Authority in Medieval Europe*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Philpott, Daniel (2001). *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Piirimae, Partel (2002). "Just War in Theory and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War," *Historical Journal* 45(3): 499-523.

Pirenne, Henri (2001 [1939]). *Mohammed and Charlemagne*. Dover Publications.

Poggi, Gianfranco (1978). *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pohl, Walter, ed. (1998). *Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300-800 (Transformation of the Roman World 2)*. Leiden: Brill.

Pohl, Walter (2001). "The Transformation of Frontiers." In Walter Pohl, Ian Wood, and Helmut Reimitz, eds., *The Transformation of Frontiers: From Late Antiquity to the Carolingians (The Transformation of the Roman World 10)*. Leiden: Brill: 247-60.

Pollack, Mark A (2001). "International Relations Theory and European Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39(2): 221-44.

Posner, Eric A (2001). *Law, Cooperation, and Rational Choice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Posner, Richard A (1975). "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," *Journal of Political Economy* 83: 807-27.

Potter, Lawrence G (1994). "Sufis and Sultans in Post-Mongol Iran," *Iranian Studies* 27(1-4): 77-102.

Poulantzas, Nicos (1973). *Political Power and Social Classes*. London: New Left Books.

_____ (1978). *State, Power, Socialism*. London: New Left Books.

Pufendorf, Samuel (1934). *De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (The Law of Nature and Nations)*, translated by CH and WA Oldfather. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pullen, Brian (1976). "Catholics and the Poor in Early Modern Europe," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser.

Pye, Lucian (1962). *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Qi, Zhou (2005). "Conflicts Over Human Rights between China and the US," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27(1): 105-24.

Racaut, Luc (2002). "Religious Polemic and Huguenot Self-Perception and Identity, 1554-1619." In *Society and Culture in the Huguenot World, 1559-1685*, Raymond A Mentzer and Andrew Spicer, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rae, Heather (2002). *State Identities and the Homogenization of Peoples*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rawls, John (1996). *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Richardson, Hugh (1984). *Tibet and Its History*. Boston: Shambala Press.

Richelieu, Duke of, Armand Jean du Plessis (1968 [1638]). *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu*, Henry Bertram Hill, trans. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Richter, Melvin (2002). "Montesquieu's Theory and Practice of the Comparative Method," *History of the Human Sciences* 15(2): 21-33.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1994). "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization* 48(2): 185-214.

Roberts, Michael (1973). *Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden*. London: English Universities Press.

Roeder, Philip G (2003). "Clash of Civilizations and Escalation of Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflicts," *Comparative Political Studies* 36(5): 509-40.

Roemer, HR (1986a). "The Turkmen Dynasties." In Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 147-188.

_____ (1986b). "The Safavid Period." In Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 189-350.

Rogers, Clifford J, ed. (1995). *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Rogister, John (1996). "Some New Directions in the Historiography of State Assemblies and Parliaments in Early and Late Modern Europe," *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 16: 1-16.

Rogowski, Ronald (1989). *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rolnick, Arthur J Rolnick, Francois R Velde, and Warren E Weber (1996). "The Debasement Puzzle: An Essay on Medieval Monetary History," *Journal of Economic History* 56(4): 789-808.

Root, Hilton (1989). "Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy During the Old Regime," *Rationality and Society* 1(2): 240-58.

Rosamond, Ben (2000). *Theories of European Integration.* Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rose, Paul Lawrence (1978). "Bodin and the Bourbon Succession to the French Throne, 1583-1594," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 9(2): 75-98.

Rosecrance, Richard (1986). *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. New York: Basic Books.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1973). "Discourse on the Origins of Inequality." In *The Social Contract and Discourses*, translated by GDH Cole. London: Everyman's Library.

Rueter, Timothy, ed. (1999). *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Volume III: c. 900-1024*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rueter, Timothy, ed. (2003). *Alfred the Great*. Burlington: Ashgate.

Ruggie, John Gerard (1989). "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35(2): 261-86.

_____ (1993). "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47(Spring): 139-174.

Ruggie, John Gerard, ed. (1993). *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of Institutional Form*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Russett, Bruce (1993). *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post Cold War World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Salmon, JHM (1973). "Francois Hotman and Jean Bodin: The Dilemma of Sixteenth-Century French Constitutionalism," *History Today* 23(11): 801-09.

_____ (1991). "Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontanism, and Royalist Response, 1580-1620." In JH Burns, ed., *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 219-53.

_____ (1996). "The Legacy of Jean Bodin: Absolutism, Populism, or Constitutionalism," *History of Political Thought* 17(4): 500-22.

Sambanis, Nicholas (2000). "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," *World Politics* 52: 437-83.

Sartorius, Christian (2002). "The Relevance of the Group for the Evolution of Social Norms and Values," *Constitutional Political Economy* 13(2): 149-72.

Satterthwaite, Margaret (2005). "Crossing Borders, Claiming Rights: Using Human Rights Law to Empower Women Migrant Workers," *Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal* 8: 1-66.

Savory, Roger M (1986). "The Safavid Administrative System." In Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 351-372.

_____ (2003). "Relations between the Safavid State and Its Non-Muslim Minorities," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 14(4): 435-58.

Sawyer, Birgit, and Peter H Sawyer (1993). *Medieval Scandinavia: From Conversion to Reformation, Circa 800-1500 (The Nordic 17)*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Sawyer, Peter (2001). *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Vikings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schachter, Oscar (1997). "The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 36: 7-23.

Schmitt, Hermann (2005). "The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?" *West European Politics* 28(3): 650-75.

Schoenfeld, EJ (1995). "Anglo-Saxon *Burhs* and Continental *Burgen*: Early Medieval Fortifications in Constitutional Perspective," *The Haskins Society Journal* 6: 49-66.

Schumpeter, Joseph (1954). "The Crisis of the Tax State," *International Economic Papers* 6: 5-38.

Schwarz, Henry Frederick (1943). *The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scribner, RW (1994). *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sells, Michael, ed. (1999). *Approaching the Qur'an: The Early Revelations*. Ashland, OR: White Cloud Press.

Shadid, Anthony (2001). *Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Shaw, Malcolm N (2005). *International Law, 5th ed.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shechter, Relli (2005). "Market Welfare in the Early-Modern Ottoman Economy – A Historiographic Overview with Many Questions," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 48(2): 253-76.

Shivakumar, Sujai J (2003). "The Place of Indigenous Institutions in Constitutional Order," *Constitutional Political Economy* 14(1): 3-22.

Sibly, WA, and MD Sibly, eds. (2002). *The History of the Albigensian Crusade: Peter of Les Vaux-de-Cernay's* 'Historia Albigensis.' Woodbridge: Boydell Press.

Sidaway, James (2002). "Signifying Boundaries: Detours Around the Portuguese-Spanish Borderlands," *Geopolitics* 7(1): 139-64.

Skinner, Quentin (1978). *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume I: The Renaissance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (2000 [1981]). *Machiavelli: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Skinner, Quentin, ed. (1985). *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Anthony D (1998). *Nationalism and Modernity*. London: Routledge.

Snavely, Iren L, Jr. (1993). "Huldyrch Zwingli and the Preaching Office in German Switzerland," *Fides et Historia* 25(3): 33-45.

Solomon, Howard M (1972). *Public Welfare, Science and Propaganda in Seventeenth-Century France: The Innovations of Theophraste Renaudot*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Somers, Margaret R (1996). "Where is Sociology after the Historic Turn? Knowledge, Cultures, Narrativity, and Historical Epistemologies." In Terrance McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*. University of Michigan Press, 53-89.

Southern, RW (1953). *The Making of the Middle Ages*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Soyinka, Wole (2005). *Climate of Fear: The Quest for Dignity in a Dehumanized World*. New York: Random House.

_____ (2006). *You Must Set Forth at Dawn: A Memoir*. New York: Random House.

Spellman, WM (1998). *European Political Thought 1600-1700*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Spruyt, Hendrik (1994). *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stahl, Alan M (2000). *Zecca: The Mint of Venice in the Middle Ages.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stayer, James M (2000). "The German Peasants' War and the Rural Reformation," in Andrew Pettegree, ed., *The Reformation World*: 127-145. London: Routledge.

Stein, Peter (1999). *Roman Law in European History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stephenson, Carl (1956). *Medieval Feudalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Stevenson, William, Jr. (1999). *Sovereign Grace: The Place and Significance of Christian Freedom in John Calvin's Political Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stopp, FJ (1987). "Verbum Domini Manet in Aeternum: The Dissemination of a Reformation Slogan, 1522-1904," *Lutheran Quarterly* 1(1): 54-71.

Stradling, RA (1986). "Olivares and the Origins of the Franco-Spanish War, 1627-1636," *English Historical Review* 100(398): 68-94.

Strange, Susan (1996). *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strayer, Joseph R (1955). *Western Europe in the Middle Ages*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

Subtleny, Maria Eva (1988). "Socioeconomic Bases of Cultural Patronage under the Late Timurids," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20(4): 479-505.

Subtleny, Maria Eva, and Anas B Khalidov (1995). "The Curriculum of Islamic Higher Education in Timurid Iran in the Light of the Sunni Revival under Shah-Rukh," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 115(2): 210-36.

Sullivan, Daniel P (2005). "The Missing Pillars: A Look at the Failure of Peace in Burundi Through the Lens of Arend Lijphart's Theory of Consociational Democracy," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(1): 75-96.

Swanson, Guy E (1967). *Religion and Regime: A Sociological Account of the Reformation*. University of Michigan Press.

Taylor, Charles (1964). *The Explanation of Behavior*. London: Routledge.

_____ (1985). *Philosophical Papers I: Human Agency and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (1989). *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

_____ (2003). *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, Michael (1982). *Community, Anarchy and Liberty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tellenbach, Gerd (1948). *Church, State, and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest (Studies in Medieval History)*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Thapur, Romila (1997 [1961]). *Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thomas, Julia Adeney (2001). *Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Political Ideology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Thomas, Scott M (2005). *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Thompson, Kathleen (2002). *Power and Border Lordship in Medieval France: The County of Perche, 1000-1226*. Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer.

Tierney, Brian (1971). "The Origins of Papal Infallibility," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 8(4): 841-64.

Tierney, Brian, ed. (1988). *The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300 (Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching 21)*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Tillman, Eric R (2004). "The European Union at the Ballot Box? European Integration and Voting Behavior in the New Member States," *Comparative Political Studies* 37(5): 590-620.

Tilly, Charles (1985). "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (1992). "Futures of European States," *Social Research* 59.

_____ (1992). *Coercion, Capital, and European State: AD 990-1992*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Tir, Jaroslav (2005). "Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of Partitions," *Journal of Peace Research* 42(5): 545-62.

Toulmin, Stephen (2001). *The Return to Reason*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tracy, James D (1999). *Europe's Reformations, 1450-1650*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Tuck, Richard (1999). *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tullock, Gordon (1974). *The Social Dilemma*. Blacksburg, VA: University Publications.

Turner, Colin (2001). *Islam Without Allah? The Rise of Religious Externalism in Safavid Iran.* New York: Routledge.

Tusicisny, Andrej (2004). "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer and Bloodier?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41(4): 485-98.

Twitchett, Denis, and John K Fairbank, eds. (1979). *The Cambridge History of China: Volume III: Sui and T'ang China, 589-906, Part I.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tyson, John R (1993). "A Protestant City Handbook from the Mid-Sixteenth Century," *Sixteenth-Century Journal* 24(1): 3-20.

Tzanelli, Rodanthi (2006). "'Not My Flag!' Citizenship and Nationhood in the Margins of Europe (Greece, October 2000/2003)," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29(1): 27-49.

Uhlmann, Eva M Kornicker (1998). "State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and the Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms," *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 11: 101-35.

Van Creveld, Martin (1991). *Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present*. New York: Free Press.

van Egmond, Wolfert (2000). "Converting Monks: Missionary Activity in Early Medieval Frisia and Saxony." In Guyda Armstrong and Ian N Wood, eds., *Christianizing Peoples and Converting Individuals (International Medieval Research 7)*. Turnhout: Brepols: 37-45.

VanKley, Dale (1991). "Protestantism, Catholicism, and the Religious Origins of the French and American Revolutions," *Fides et Historia* 23(1): 53-68.

Vermeersch, Peter (2005). "EU Enlargement and Immigration Policy in Poland and Slovakia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38(1): 71-88.

Vester, Matthew (2000). "Fiscal Commissions, Consensus and Informal Representation: Taxation in the Savoyard Domains, 1559-1580," *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 20: 59-74.

Vitoria, Francisco de (1991 [1539]). "On the American Indians." In *Political Writings*, Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Voegelin, Eric (1997). *History of Political Ideas: The Middle Ages to Aquinas (Collected Works of Eric Voegelin 20)*. University of Missouri Press.

Waines, David (1995). *An Introduction to Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Waite, Gary K (2003). *Heresy, Magic, and Witchcraft in Early Modern Society*. Houndsmill: Palgrave.

Walker, Robert BJ (1993). *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel (2004). *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Walzer, Michael (1965). *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

_____ (1992). "The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem," *Dissent* 39: 164-171.

Warde, Paul (2002). "Law, the 'Commune,' and the Distribution of Resources in Early Modern German State Formation," *Continuity and Change* 17(2): 183-211.

Watt, Jeffrey R (2002). "Calvinism, Childhood, and Education: The Evidence from the Genevan Consistory," *Sixteenth-Century Journal* 33(2): 439-456.

Weber, Max (2001 [1904]). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London: Routledge.

_____ (1956 [1922]). *The Sociology of Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press.

_____ (1978). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____ (2003). "Why a World State Is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9(4): 491-542.

Wengert, Timothy J (1998). *Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip Melanchthon's Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wengert, Timothy J (2001). "Luther and Melanchthon on Consecrated Communion Wine," *Lutheran Quarterly* 15(1): 24-42.

Whitelock, Dorothy (1959). "The Dealings of the Kings of England with Northumbria in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries." In Peter Clemoes, ed., *The Anglo-Saxons: Studies in Some Aspects of Their History and Culture Presented to Bruce Dickins.* London: Bowes and Bowes: 70-88.

Wickham, Chris (1984). "The Other Transition: From the Ancient World to Feudalism," *Past and Present* 103: 3-36.

William of Ockham (1995 [1347]). "A Dialogue, Part III, Tract I, Book III, Chapter VIII." In *A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings*, Arthur Stephen McGrade and John Kilcullen, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Witte, John, Jr. (2002). *Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wokler, Robert (2001). *Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wolf, Eric R (1999). *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wong, R Bin (1997). *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wright, Jonathan (2004). *God's Soldiers: Adventure, Politics, Intrigue, and Power – A History of the Jesuits*. New York: Doubleday.

Wright, William J (1973). "The Homberg-Synod and Philip of Hesse's Plan for a New Church-State Settlement," *Sixteenth-Century Journal* 4(2): 23-46.

Yao, Xinzhong (2000). *An Introduction to Confucianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zarka, Yves Charles (1999). "The Foundations of Natural Law," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 7(1): 15-32.

Zmora, Hillay (1997). *State and Nobility in Early Modern Germany: The Knightly Feud in Franconia, 1440-1567*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zurn, Michael, and Jurgen Neyer (2005). "Conclusions – the Conditions of Compliance," in *Law and Governance in Postnational Europe: Compliance Beyond the State*, Michael Zurn and Christian Joerges, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 183-217.