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Globalisation, marginalisation and illegal

Muslim migration to the EU:

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INTRODUCTION

Migratory flows from less developed countries to the first world have become one of the first priorities to be tackled by policy makers in both countries of origin and host ones. By 1991, there were about 27 million migrant workersⁱ, an additional 30 million irregular migrantsⁱⁱ, 12 million refugeesⁱⁱⁱ, 14 million displaced persons^{iv}, and about one million persons were emigrating permanently each year^v.

The dimensions acquired by the phenomenon of mass migration, the degree of involvement of organised crime groups in the smuggling of migrants, the appalling conditions in which immigrants often find themselves in the hosting countries, pose a number of questions which make it imperative to investigate on the underlying causes and consequences of the problem.

There seems to be a certain degree of consensus in the literature on the fact that the process of globalisation has indeed modified the terms within which migratory processes take place^{vi}. However, scholars are still divided on the assessment of the “hows” and “whys” of the impact of globalisation on migration.

This is partly due to the fact that the issues relating to migration tend to be interdisciplinary by their very nature, covering the most various academic fields, from urban studies, to anthropology and from sociology to political economy. Moreover, the definition itself of globalisation seems surrounded by a certain degree of mystery, being often invoked in different contexts or debates without a proper systematic attempt to define it^{vii}.

The main objective of this paper is to study the impact of globalisation on migratory flows, with a particular attention to the dynamics of migration from the MENA area, especially Egypt.

The theoretical aim of the paper is, first, to understand the problem of illegal migration in the context of globalisation; and, second, to assess the relation between globalisation, regionalisation and the EU response to threats of mass immigration from less developed countries.

The paper is therefore focusing on the following theoretical questions:

How is the process of globalisation related to the increase of migratory flows from less developed countries to western ones? What are the main political economic causes and consequences of migration, in general, and illegal migration, in particular? Is there a tension between legal and illegal migration?

From the empirical point of view, the paper will present the case of Egyptian migration. The related research questions are:

Which are the dynamics of migration from Egypt? What is the profile of the Egyptian migrant? Is economic migration prevailing over political migration? How to explain Egyptian migration? Is there a relation between globalisation and Egyptian migration? Is marginalisation of Egypt and lack of regionalisation a possible explanation?

The empirical analysis is based on the results of a survey carried out by the author on motivations for migration at the point of origin. The survey has been conducted during the period between April and May 2003 in Cairo with the support of the International Office for Migration based in Cairo and included 110 interviews to Egyptians willing to migrate abroad. The interviews took place in the Egyptian Office for Manpower and Emigration. The project is a pilot project financed by the British Academy^{viii}.

The paper argues that the case of Egypt is one in which the lack of regionalisation and the progressive marginalisation of the region and, in particular, of the country under analysis, do explain the increase in permanent migration to more developed countries. Moreover, though the data collected do not allow for definitive conclusion on the subject, the fact that the main countries of destinations of Egyptian migration to Europe have adopted very strict migratory policies, in line with the paradox of the fortress Europe, allows for the legitimate suspicion that the bulk of this migratory flows is illegal. The analysis, however, does not include an assessment of the political

economy consequences of illegal migration on receiving countries due to the necessity of more research on the subject.

The paper is divided into two parts. The first part deals with migration in theory. It assesses the relevance of different definitions of globalisation to explain global mass migration. It then introduces the definition of the new global division of labour and identifies the three basic theoretical paradoxes within which to analyse the issue of legal and illegal migration from less developed countries. These paradoxes are:

1. The paradox of regionalisation within globalisation
2. The paradox of marginalisation within globalisation
3. The paradox of the “Fortress Europe”

The second part presents the case of migration from Egypt, identifying the dynamics of Egyptian migration, the profile of the Egyptian migrant, the countries of destination and the motivations for migration at the point of departure. Reference is made to both official sources and the survey conducted by the author.

In the conclusions, the case of Egypt will be inserted in the broader theoretical context to verify whether the three paradoxes identified with the help of the theory are capable of framing a more informed analysis of the case of Egyptian migration to the EU.

1. MIGRATORY FLOWS IN THEORY

1.1 A qualitative definition of Globalisation

The notion of globalisation is by no means an uncontroversial one in the academic debate as well as in the wider public discourse^{ix}. It seems however possible to classify the positions adopted by scholars on the subject into three broad groups^x: those who deny the existence itself of the phenomenon of globalisation^{xi}; those who admit it but tend to give only a quantitative definition of globalisation^{xii}, and those who adopt a qualitative definition^{xiii}.

The thesis denying globalisation rests on considerations about the historical recurrence of periods of increased international and cross-border interactions. In reality, those who adopt a similar perspective deny the “originality” of globalisation and its characterization as a “new phenomenon”. Sometimes, they can get as far as to deny to the current phase of the world economy development any “global”, “globalised” or “globalising” nature. It seems however that, whether you multiply the number of “globalisations” taking place in the course of history or even deny its occurrence in the present historical moment, the question of how to define “globalisation” remains unsolved and ultimately the terms of the debate rest on the dichotomy between the “quantitative” and the “qualitative” definition of the phenomenon^{xiv}.

It might even be suggested that the denial of globalisation stems from the failure to identify the distinctive characteristics of the current phase of capitalist development by adopting a quantitative definition of the phenomenon.

Indeed, from the quantitative point of view, globalisation is defined as:

“...The intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across borders^{xv}.”

This definition leaves unsolved a number of issues regarding on the one hand, the means by which to measure the degree of economic, social and cultural relations across the border as well as their intensification. On the other hand, it leaves unclear the kind of relationships between the economic, social and political aspects of globalisation, and, indeed, it does not even specify whether there is any relationship at all. Moreover, by accounting for the phenomenon of globalisation only in quantitative terms, one can hardly get to grasp its causes and consequences. This makes it extremely difficult to relate it to other phenomena such as mass migration from less developed countries. It is therefore necessary to deepen the perspective by adopting a qualitative definition of globalisation.

Indeed, from the qualitative point of view, globalisation is defined as a process comprising a number of qualitative transformations, which in turn characterise the current phase of capitalist development. In this context, globalisation is identified as a qualitatively new phenomenon, comprising a number of components all of them concurring to define globalisation as a process or, as Mittleman suggests, a “syndrome”. Moreover, these components tend to spill over one onto the other without any predetermined single cause/effect relation but in a dialectical way, which makes it possible to identify the direction of the change, if not to react accordingly.

The components included in such a qualitative definition of globalisation are represented by: the technological transformation, the financial transformation, the geographical reallocation of production, the process of commodification, the

polarization of wealth, the subordination of politics to economics and the related decline of the nation state, and the emergence of a new global division of labour^{xvi}.

Technological transformation is an exogenous component of the qualitative definition of globalisation, and it is the factor which brings about transformation in the realms of financial transactions and production. This, in turn, triggers related changes in the economic, social and political spheres.

Technological transformation is at the roots of the exceptional developments of financial markets producing what is normally defined as financial globalisation, i.e., the existence of a round-the-clock access to financial transactions all over the world. This, however, does not mean that the physical location of financial markets loses significance nor that financial elites become disentangled from national boundaries. On the contrary, their role and their bargaining power inside the national polity increases as their economic position improves, leading to a shift in the power relations between the different socio-economic groups whose relevance can hardly be overestimated.

Technological transformation is also the driving force behind the process of transformation of global production and the related global reallocation of production alongside the lines of the dramatic increase of foreign direct investment and mergers and acquisitions, and the creation of the export processing zones. Indeed, the possibility for multinational companies to modify their productive structure to exploit geographically displaced cost reduction opportunities, is greatly improved by the availability of technological progress allowing for cheap transport costs, distant labour control or economies of scale in specific locations.

This restructuring and geographical re-allocation of production, in turn, coupled with financial globalisation, spills over on a number of social and political changes affecting all levels of organisation, from the local to the global one.

Amongst the social consequences of the processes so far described, there is the so called phenomenon of “commodification” defined as the inclusion in the market sphere of relations previously left outside its boundaries and regulated by different logics. This certainly happens in the western industrialised world, where the number of activities submitted to the market rules of the supply, demand and price tend to increase and include also those spheres of life previously left outside, like, for example, the organization of leisure time. However, the tendency of multinational companies to move abroad and, mainly, to the less developed countries to take advantage of both lower production costs and market opportunities, brings about the expansion of the phenomenon of “commodification” to cultural enclaves where the market was traditionally a recessive form of organization of economic relations, with all what that means in terms of cultural clashes and related social and political consequences.

Moreover, the process of globalisation as so far defined, is not neutral in social and wealth terms, but entails new social cleavages and challenges, as well as new winners and new losers. In fact, given the innovative nature of the technological tools necessary to grasp the opportunities of globalisation, the necessity arises for a continuous updating and re-qualification of skills. This poses the problem of the polarization of wealth both in social and geographical terms, since it appears pretty intuitive that those who have already the means to access the educational and vocational systems and have the economic possibility to remain in education for longer, if not to stay in education forever (the so called concept of the “knowledge

society”), will be by far better placed in the global economy. It seems also evident that the lower strata of society, as well as the weakest ones, like the elders or the women, and, finally, those living in less developed countries, will be increasingly marginalized by the fast moving world of the new skills necessary to keep up with globalisation. It follows, that the social and geographical wealth gap is deemed to increase, leading to the paradox of “marginalization within globalisation”.

In political terms, the overcoming of national boundaries for the exploitation of global financial and productive opportunities modifies the existing balance of power between national political institutions and an increasingly globalised economic elite. The latter is placed by globalisation in a position to exert credible pressures at the domestic political level by threatening to move its economic activity abroad in exchange for favourable economic policy measures. The credibility of the threat, in turn, is ensured by the effective possibility to move easily short to medium term capital across the border, as well as to displace production and long term investment^{xvii}. Whether this leads to a de facto disempowerment of national politics vis-à-vis globalising capital, or there is still a margin for reaction by national political actors, is still the subject of many debates in both academic and political circles^{xviii}. It seems however, that the terms of the debate over the role of national politics and, in particular the role of the nation state, change as a consequence of the process of globalisation.

Indeed, the latter consideration leads to a further component of the qualitative definition of globalisation. In fact, globalisation, not only produces the conditions for the creation of a transnational capitalist elite, but, on the other hand, creates the premises for the transnationalisation of the working class through the restructuring of the international labour division and the establishment of a new global division of labour.

2.2 The new global division of labour and the increase of mass migration

Technological change represents the engine of a process of transformation, which interests both the productive and the financial structure. Leaving aside the latter, what is particularly relevant to frame the analysis of migratory flows, is the geographical reallocation of production. This takes place through the creation of Export Processing Zones in developing countries, through a policy of Mergers and Acquisitions or through straightforward Foreign Direct Investment.^{xix}

As a consequence of the restructuring of production, also the labour structure changes with a substantial reallocation of labour intensive production in third world countries. However, this outcome is compounded by the opposite effects of technological development in terms of the increase of distant work, and of the increase of labour mobility, including mass migration.

On the one hand, production tends to move to some specialised regions of the globe^{xx}, where it is possible to exploit the advantages of lower production costs both in the form of lower labour costs and/or in the form of lower costs of primary resources. This phenomenon gives rise to the paradox of regionalization within globalisation

characterized by the creation of economically integrated regions^{xxi}. This further adds to the marginalisation of those zones of the globe, which are not interested, for reasons too long to analyse here, by the process of geographical displacement of production or by the globalisation of financial markets^{xxii}.

On the other hand, however, the populations of those marginalized zones of the globe, whose economic conditions are likely to worsen as a consequence of the process of globalisation, experience an increased incentive to leave their home countries and move to the more developed regions of the world looking for better standards of life. This produces the two interrelated phenomena of the “brain drain”, when skilled or highly educated labour flees the country of origins, and “mass migration”, when migratory flows interest unskilled labour.

The ensemble of the above described dynamics leads to a new global division of labour whose main characteristics are, thus, on the one hand, the geographical displacement of production alongside regional patterns and the increased use of third world cheaper labour; and, on the other hand, the increase of brain drain and mass migration from the regions left behind by the process of regionalization within globalisation.

One of the outcomes of this new division of labour is an overall decrease of production costs both in third world countries and in industrialized ones. Indeed, this process not only brings about lower production costs through the reallocation of production abroad or the hiring of immigrants, particularly illegal ones, but it also lowers the prices of domestic labour by putting pressure on organized labour and reducing its bargaining power.

Moreover, mass migration, both legal and illegal, acquires regional patterns, due to historical, geographic, social or cultural reasons. All responses to mass migration, therefore, take the form of regional policies, like the US or the EU immigration policy. Here a fundamental paradox arises. The paradox is between the advantages of immigration in terms of reduction of the costs of production and of contribution to the sustainability of the welfare state (particularly given the aging problem in the more developed world) and the implementation of stricter migration policies at the regional level^{xxiii}.

In Europe, for example, despite the fact that the implementation of a common migratory policy is still far to be achieved, the outlook of public policy responses to mass migration has accredited the idea of the creation of the so-called “Fortress Europe”, i.e., an area where internal mobility is promoted while barriers are erected vis-à-vis countries outside the EU^{xxiv}.

The origins of the “Fortress Europe” have been traced back by the scholars to the Council regulation 1612/68, which distinguished between the right of free movement of nationals of member states and the right of free movement of nationals of third countries^{xxv}. The establishment of the freedom of movement only for EU citizens has exacerbated this divide. This was initiated by the Single European Act in 1986 and brought forward by the “EU citizenship” provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Third country nationals’ rights of movement within the EU were, on the other hand, progressively but steadily restricted by the Schengen agreements, the third pillar on justice and Home affairs, the Dublin Convention, and the few legislative provisions more recently adopted under the new title on migration instituted by the Amsterdam Treaty^{xxvi}. The consequences of the adoption of a this extremely tight approach to migration from third countries, both at the EU and at the national level^{xxvii}, have been

an increase of irregular migration, and the progressive “securitisation” of migration. By “securitisation”, the experts mean the development of migration into a “security issue” which has to be managed by security agencies, like, for example the Europol^{xxviii}.

Of course the main reasons for the adoption of similar responses to mass migration are the traditional concerns over political unrest, social conflict, cultural clashes, or religious struggles. This became particularly relevant in the aftermath of the September the 11th attacks to the World Trade Centre in New York, which sparked a wave not only of “securitization” of migration, particularly from Muslim countries, but also of straightforward “Islamophobia”^{xxix}.

However, a further aspect of the issue is represented by the political economy consequences of "illegal" migration (as opposed to the legal one), in terms of cost reduction and increase of bargaining power vis-à-vis organized labour. There seems indeed to be some evidence of the fact that the use of illegal migrant work reduces the wages of legal work and consequently, the power of organised labour. For example, in Germany studies have shown that a 1% increase in the share of less-skilled foreign workers in the labour force leads to a 5.9% fall in the wages of blue collar workers and in a 3.5% increase in white collar wages^{xxx}. In this context, it would be interesting to carry out further investigation on the economic sectors involved in the use and exploitation of illegal immigration and to assess the political economy consequences of similar practices in terms of shift of power between different socio-economic actors^{xxxi}.

Moreover, analysing the dichotomy between legal immigration and illegal immigration, the second is more favourable to the neo-liberal order than the first,

because it allows for the flexibilization of the internal labour market, while legal immigrants should be integrated in the existing welfare state provisions system.

As Saskia Sassen writes:

"Indeed, those who deal with the real political economy of the city already know this: the rhetoric of the law-and-order Republican mayor here in New York City is surprisingly friendly to illegal immigrants^{xxxii}"

Summing up, the political economy consequences of the increase of mass migration in the context of globalisation are: a precarization of working conditions both in developed and in less developed countries; an increase of the power of the transnational companies at the international level and the reaction of the governments through the constitution of regional governance scheme, such as the EU, where the labour/capital dynamics are reproduced but with a strong reduction of power on the labour side^{xxxiii}.

Concluding, from the theoretical point of view, the following issues appear particularly relevant:

1. The paradox of regionalisation within globalisation and its consequences in terms of increase of intra-regional temporary migration.
2. The paradox of marginalisation within globalisation and its consequences in terms of increase of brain drain and mass migration from marginalized countries.

3. The paradox of the "Fortress Europe" and its consequences in terms of illegal migration.

These paradoxes impact on the decision of people to migrate, and on their modalities and motivations for migration.

Egypt is considered here as a paradigmatic case of marginalisation within globalisation and the MENA area as a clear example of lack of regionalisation, in line with the relevant literature^{xxxiv}. This makes it important to define the profile of Egyptian migrants and their motivations for migration to verify to what extent they confirm or falsify the research hypotheses derived from the specific theoretical context of the research.

The research hypotheses are the following:

- Egyptian migration to Europe should be permanent.
- Egyptian migration should be mainly motivated by economic considerations. Political or religious issues shouldn't play a major role in the decision to move.
- Egyptian migration should include not only unskilled labour but also skilled personnel (brain drain) fleeing the country as a consequence of its marginalisation.
- Egyptian migrants are not supposed to be "documented" in all phases of their migration process.
- Egyptian migrants are not supposed to have a job contract at the point of departure.

- Familial or national networks are supposed to play a major role in the choice of the country where to move.
- Egyptian migrants are supposed to be inserted in the labour structure of the receiving country in activities, which do not correspond to their preferred sectors of employment.
- The existence of an underground economy is supposed to influence positively the decision to move to a given country.
- Egyptian migrants are supposed to have some knowledge of the existence of an underground/informal economy

The following section will deal with the case of Egypt.

2. MIGRATORY FLOWS IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF EGYPT

2.1 *Egyptian migration to Europe: A general overview*

2.1.1 Patterns of Egyptian migration and the “Fortress Europe”

“Egyptians have a reputation of preferring their own soil. Few leave except to study or travel; and they always return... Egyptians do not emigrate^{xxxv}”.

This was the case until very recently. Only a reduced number of Egyptians, primarily professionals, had left the country in search for employment before 1974.

Scholars^{xxxvi} identify three phases in the evolution of the Egyptian migratory flows, the common thread being a marked prevalence of migration within the Arab world.

Coexisting political, demographic and economic pressures led to the first wave of international migration in post-revolutionary Egypt, which, however, interested only a very limited number of students and professionals. During the 1960s, international migration thus took various forms including permanent, temporary, legal and illegal, but was always very restricted in scale and scope.

With the advent of the 1970s, Egyptian emigration changed in nature, size and destination. More Egyptians left their homeland and headed towards the rich oil-producing states, first after the 1973 boom in oil prices and again after the second increase in oil prices in 1979.

However, it was only in the second half of the 1980s that Egyptian migration became a relevant phenomenon, entering its last phase of development. By the end of the

1980s Saudi Arabia was a favoured destination for Egyptian migrants because of the high competition faced by unskilled Egyptians at home from Asian and Yemeni workers. Other Gulf States (Kuwait and the UAE) later became favoured destinations for the unskilled groups. Peak demand for contract labour occurred in 1985, with an increase of 255% over 1984. This was a turning point in the evolution of contract labour. By 1990 the number of contracts was double the number in 1981, indicating that despite fluctuations on a yearly level during the second half of the '80s, demand for Egyptian labour continued.

The three distinct phases of Egyptian emigration may be summarised as follows:

Table 1 Egyptian migratory phases

Phase	Period	Labour category	Profession	Destination
I	1965-1975	Skilled/unskilled	Teaching/construction	GCC/Lybia
II	1975-1985	Unskilled rural	Agriculture/construction	Jordan/Saudi/Iraq
III	1985-1995	Skilled/unskilled	Scientists/agriculture	Saudi

Source: Appleyard, R., (ed) (1999), *Emigration Dynamics in Developing countries, Volume IV: The Arab Region*, London: Ashgate

Nowadays, according to the Egyptian official estimates, the total number of Egyptians abroad is about 2.7 million. They comprise about four percent of the total population of Egypt, and about 1.5 percent of the total migrants all over the world (total number of migrants all over the world is estimated to be about 175 million)^{xxxvii}.

Two-third of Egyptian migration is temporary, while the other third is permanent. Temporary migration is mainly labour migration to oil-rich Arab countries. Saudi Arabia absorbs about 50 percent of the Egyptian temporary migration. Permanent migration is mainly to USA, Canada, Australia, and Western European countries. USA is the first destination of permanent migration from Egypt. Egyptian migrants to USA comprise about 40 percent of the total Egyptian permanent migration^{xxxviii}.

Table 1 Estimated Number of Permanent Egyptian Migrants by Country of Destination-Year 2000

Country of destination	Number in thousands	Percentage (%)
USA	318	38.6
Canada	110	13.3
Italy	90	10.9
Australia	70	8.5
Greece	60	7.3
Holland	40	4.9
France	36	4.4
England	35	4.2
Germany	25	3.0
Switzerland	14	1.7
Austria	14	1.7
Spain	12	1.5
Total	824	100

Source: CAPMAS

Also European countries (EU countries plus Switzerland), however, host, overall, around 40% of Egyptian permanent migrants, which makes Egyptian migration to the EU a very relevant phenomenon. The results of the survey confirm that most of the migrants going to western European countries (55.5%) and almost all those who go to the US and Australia (93%) are permanent migrants. On the contrary, the whole sample of those going to Arab countries (100%) intends to go back to Egypt.

The European country experiencing the highest inflow of Egyptian migration is Italy. According to Egyptian official data reported above, in the year 2000, 10.9% of permanent Egyptian migrants were living in Italy, which means around 90,000 people. However the OECD reports a stock of only 32,8 thousands residence permits held by Egyptians in Italy for the year 2000. This discrepancy between the Egyptian and the OECD figures on the number of permanent Egyptian migrants in Italy points to the possibility of the existence of a high number (around 60,000) of undocumented Egyptian permanent migrants, although, of course there are no official data on this subject. This is clearly related to the very strict migratory policy enforced by the Italian Government, which makes it extremely difficult to obtain a residence permit or a work permit^{xxxix}. In terms of trends, the number of residence permits held by

Egyptians in Italy has increased substantially in the last decade, from 7 thousand in 1985 to 32.8 thousand in the year 2000^{xl}.

Table 1. ITALY, stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands

	1985	1990	1995	2000
Morocco	2.6	78.0	94.2	159.6
Albania	34.7	142.1
Romania	..	7.5	24.5	68.9
Philippines	7.6	34.3	43.4	65.4
China	1.6	18.7	21.5	60.1
United States	51.1	58.1	60.6	47.4
Tunisia	4.4	41.2	40.5	45.7
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	13.9	29.8	56.1	40.0
Senegal	0.3	25.1	24.0	39.0
Germany	37.2	41.6	39.4	37.3
Sri Lanka	2.5	11.5	20.3	33.7
Egypt	7.0	19.8	21.9	32.8
Poland	..	17.0	22.0	31.4
India	5.3	11.3	14.6	30.3
Peru		5.4	10.0	29.9
Other countries	289.5	381.9	463.7	524.6
Total	423.0	781.1	991.4	1 388.2
Of which: EU	..	148.6	164.0	151.8

Note: Data are from residence permits and refer to the population on the 31 December of the years indicated. For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.
Figures for 2000 include 116 253 regularised persons.

Source, OECD

The second country of destination in Europe for Egyptian migrants is Greece, with 60 thousands estimated permanent migrants according to the CAPMAS figures. This is followed by Holland (40,000), France (36,000), England (35,000) and Germany (25,000). A more limited number of Egyptians reside in Switzerland, Austria and Spain.

The results of the survey confirm that the main destination countries in Europe for Egyptians are the UK, Holland, France and Italy, but in a reversed order. Italy and England are, therefore, the main countries of destination respectively according to the official data and according to the survey. Both countries have experienced, in recent

years, a marked inclination to toughen their immigration policy strengthening the idea that Europe is moving even closer to the notion of a “Fortress Europe”^{xli}.

1.2.2. The profile of the Egyptian Migrant


Egyptian migration has always proved a selective phenomenon in which migrants are not a random sample of the population of origin. Egyptian migrants are a selected group in terms of age, sex and educational status. They are predominantly concentrated in young age groups, with more males than females, and with a relatively high educational status, especially among those from an urban background^{xlii}. This section sheds some light on the characteristics of Egyptian migrants in general and as emerged from the survey.

The 1987 CAPMAS^{xliii} survey indicated that Egyptian migrants were almost exclusively males (97.7% of current migrants). The age group was in 89.8% of cases between 20 and 44 years old. In 63.5% of cases, emigrants were married.

The results of the survey largely confirm the profile of the Egyptian migrant outlined above.


The majority of perspective migrants interviewed in the Emigration section of the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower were, indeed, males (71.8%), though the percentage of females (28.2%) was by far above the figures reported by the CAPMAS in 1987 (2.4%).

Graph. 1: The survey: Gender characteristics of Egyptian migrants




As in the official figures, the biggest majority of migrants was composed by young people between 20 and 50 years of age (86.4%).

Graph. 1: The survey: Age composition of Egyptian migrants




The figures relating to the marital status are perfectly coincident with the official ones indicated by the Egyptian statistical office in 1987. Indeed, 63.1% of Egyptian migrants interviewed were married (63.5% in the CAPMAS data).

Graph. 1: The survey: Marital status of Egyptian migrants




Moreover, the survey shows that 80.6% of interviewed migrants do possess some form of education, with 69.9% of the sample having at least secondary education. These figures are much higher than the ones reported by the official statistics, according to which only 41% of migrants have education at the secondary level and above.

Graph. 1: The survey: Level of education of Egyptian migrants



Finally, the sample includes potential migrants from all parts of Egypt, although the survey was conducted in Cairo. As reported in the graph below, 35% of the sample was born in greater Cairo, 40.8% in Upper Egypt and 24.2% in Lower Egypt.

Graph. 1: The survey: Birth place of Egyptian migrants



Concluding, with respect to the official sources on the profile of the average Egyptian migrant, the sample analysed by the survey is over representing both the female component and the level of education. Whether this result is related to an effective change in the migrant profile, to include more educated people and more women is indeed not possible to infer from such a limited number of questionnaires.

2.2 Egyptian migration to Europe: The economic background


2.2.1 The marginalisation of Egypt and of the Middle East

What it is important to assess is whether the Middle East in general, and Egypt in particular, have been excluded or marginalized in the process of globalisation. To be sure, the qualitative definition of globalisation adopted here would require a holistic approach to the marginalisation of the region. However, given the importance of economic regionalisation or marginalisation to assess the phenomenon of mass migration within the new global division of labour, the analysis here will be mainly an economic one^{xliv}. The main economic indicators of the integration of a country's economy into globalisation are Foreign Direct Investment stocks and inflows, the number of Mergers and Acquisitions, and the relative openness of the economy, measured by ratio of the sum of exports and imports over GDP, used as a proxy of production for exports. These indicators are assessed below with reference to the case of Egypt.

Since the 1990s the shift to a free market economy and the adoption of macroeconomic policy reforms and structural adjustments in Egypt has produced mixed results. Stabilisation programs have been successful and a series of IMF agreements along with massive external debt relief, particularly from the US through US Aid, helped Egypt improve its macroeconomic performance during the 1990s.

Also the fiscal balance, the level of foreign reserves and the size of the external debt improved in the course of the 1990s. As a consequence, inflation decreased drastically from almost 20% in 1990 to below 2% in 2000. This enabled the exchange rate to be pegged to the dollar at £E 3.9 and kept within a 1.5% band until the crisis following September the 11th 2001 that led to a marked devaluation of the Egyptian pound. (In June 2003 1USD=5.97LE; in November 2003 1BP=10.2EGP). However, neither the relative macroeconomic stability experienced by Egypt in the course of the 1990s, nor the substantial programme of privatisation, nor its commitment to economic reform and structural adjustment has helped Egypt attracting Foreign Direct Investment. In 2002, the inward stock of FDI in the country was \$2,074.5 billions, which represented 0.29% of the overall stock of world FDI, steadily down from the 0.6% of 1987.

Graph. 1 % of Egyptian inward stock of FDI over world total



Source UNCTAD

Indeed the Northern Africa Region, (to which Egypt belongs) received only 0.4% of the total world FDI inflows on average in the period between 1999 and 2002, down from 0.8% of the period 1987-1992 and 0.5% of the period 1993-1998. This is compared to the 8.7% of the developing American countries and to the 11.5% of Asia.

However, west Asia^{xlvi}, which includes most of the Middle Eastern countries, received a mere 0.2% of the world total inflows in 2002^{xlvi}. This makes the MENA area as the region receiving the least FDI inflows in the world, apart from the developing Oceania countries.

Official Egyptian sources report that in 2002 the total amount of foreign direct investments of companies registered with the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones was still only around 30 billion £E (3 around billion £)^{xlvii}. According to the United States Department of Commerce, total US direct investment in Egypt stood at \$2.959 billion at the end of 2002^{xlviii}.

In the period between 1999 and 2002, the average Foreign Direct Investment inflow in Egypt was only \$864.4 million, barely up from the average of the period between 1987 and 1992 (\$805.6 millions)^{xlix}. However, the world total FDI increased from an average of \$171.8 billion in 1987-1992 to \$986.8 billion in 1998. In the Fiscal year 2000/2001 and 2001/02 FDI inflows in Egypt fell to just \$509.4 million and \$448.2 million respectively. The FDI inflow through the first three quarters of the Fiscal Year 2002/2003 (July 2002/March 2003) was \$578.1 million¹. As a term of comparison it is worth noting that the inflow of remittances from immigrants for the year 2001 was six times higher than the FDI inflow (namely \$2,876 millions).

Furthermore, the IMF defines foreign direct investment as net inflows of investment in order to acquire lasting management interest, which is interpreted as 10% of more in the voting stock of a company^{li}. In the case of Egypt, not only is the level of foreign direct investment limited, but western portfolio investment in company shares quoted on regional stock markets is also minimal if not negative. Net portfolio investment in Egypt in the fiscal year 2001/02 amounted to \$45.3% million, and the first three quarters of the FY 2002/03 saw a net outflow of \$206 million.

In terms of mergers and acquisitions, the percentage share of sales over world total was negligible in Egypt (0.1% in 2001). The same is to be said about the other Arab countries (West Asia Region) recording a mere 0.2% of total sales in 2001.

Table 4 Mergers and Acquisitions sales % shares and total numbers per region

YEAR	Avg 1987/92	% Over total world	AVG1993/98	% over tot world	2001	% over to world
COUNTRY/ GROUP						
TOTAL	106848.3		243381.0		593960.0	
WORLD						
Developing countries	6614.8	6.2	38530.3	15.8	85812.7	14.4
Africa	423.8	0.4	1957.7	0.8	15523.5	2.6
Egypt	99.3	0.1	87.5	0.0	660.3	0.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	3959.9	3.7	24871.5	10.2	35837.0	6.0
Asia and the Pacific	2301.8	2.2	11701.2	4.8	34452.2	5.8
Central and Eastern Europe	981.4	0.9	3830.8	1.6	11607.3	2.0
West Asia	113.1	0.1	199.0	0.1	1323.1	0.2

Source: UNCTAD

Finally, in the 1990s trade as a share of purchasing power parity GDP fell in most countries in the Middle East and in the region as a whole. The figures refer to the sum of exports and imports divided by PPP GDP. This index is usually regarded as a measure of openness of the economy. The table shows that very few countries in the region opened up in the period considered, while the majority underwent a closure of their economies. Egypt remains stable with a very low percentage of trade over PPP GDP moving from 8.9% in 1990 to 9.1 in 1999.

Moreover, inter-Arab trade amounts to less than 10% of the region's total trade. ^{lii}

Table 5 Trade as a % of PPP GDP for Middle Eastern countries, 1990 and 1999

Country	1990	1999
Algeria	19.9	14.3
Bahrain	128.3	76.5*
Egypt	8.9	9.1
Iran	15.4	8.4
Israel	45.9	52.4
Jordan	34.2	29.4
Lebanon	45.1	30.9*
Morocco	15.9	18.6
Saudi Arabia	45.9	36
Syria	22	10.4
Tunisia	28.4	25.5
Turkey	13	16.2
UAE	85.3	106.7
Yemen	25.9	34.1
Middle East	23.5	16.8

*1998

Source: World Bank, (2001), The Little Data Book, Washington DC: World Bank

Indeed Egypt's economy relies mainly on tourism, remittances from Egyptians living abroad, revenues from the Suez Canal, oil and foreign development aid. UNDP data in 2003 suggest that almost 50% of Egypt's GDP in the year 2000 was generated by the services sector, with tourism as the most important voice, employing around 2.2 million people. The events of September the 11th and its aftermath severely affected this important economic sector of the country leaving it in an even more difficult situation. As a result, Egypt's real economic growth has declined from an average of approximately 5% to 2.1% per annum. This growth rate is not enough to absorb Egypt's growing labour force.

Table 6: Remittances in Egypt

Year	Remittances (millions of \$)	Number of migrants (millions)
1990	3,748	2.20
1996	3,107	2.90
2001	2,876	2.70


Source: IOM

2.2.2 The economic motivations of Egyptian migration

Given this economic climate, it is not surprising that the results of the survey show that Egyptian migration is mainly based on economic reasons.

Specifically asked about the motivations to migrate, the respondents to the questionnaire answered in 66% of cases that the reasons prompting them to leave their country were mainly economic.

Graph. 1 The survey: Why do you go abroad?




Of course, a big difference can be noticed by disaggregating the data by gender. Indeed, economic motivations represent the main reason for male migration in 73% of cases, while for female migration it was only 48% of cases, whereas family unification represented the main motivation for female migration in 14% of cases and 0% of male migration.

It seems also important to note that while 64% of the overall sample claims that they chose a specific destination country for general job opportunities, only 12.6% of Egyptian migrants have a specific job offer, let alone a contract. Considering that in many EU member states having a job contract is a necessary precondition to being admitted legally in the hosting country^{liii}, it might be possible to speculate on the lack of proper documents by Egyptian migrants.


It is true that, when asked about whether it was possible to enter a destination country without appropriate documents 93.2% of the respondents answered no, but obviously no different answer could have been expected and, yet, almost 7 of the respondents were not aware of the necessity to hold appropriate entry documents.

Graph. 1 The survey: Can you go abroad without the required papers?



Further adding to the conclusion that the majority of potential migrants have an economic interest to move abroad is the fact that, asked about their expectations from migration, around 74% of the sample answered that they would like to earn a good income as opposed to increase their expertise and skills.

Graph. 1: The survey: What do you expect from the experience of working abroad?




In terms of the insertion into the labour market of the receiving countries, potential migrants expected to be working first and fore mostly in the services sector (56%) with 40% wanting to be involved in general services, 9% in tourism and restaurants,

and 7% in home services. Only 14% were willing to work in industry and even less (3%) in agriculture.

Graph. 1 In which of these fields can you work abroad ?

Q18



Although there are no data available on the insertion of Egyptian migrants in the European labour markets, pointing to the necessity of more research in this field, a comparison may be effected between their expectations and the reality of their integration in the labour markets of the Arab countries.

The data collected by the Egyptian Ministry of manpower and Emigration^{liv} show that in the year 2002, 33.8% of Egyptian migrants were working in industry, while according to our survey only 14.7% were willing to be employed in the industrial sector. The agricultural sector was absorbing 8.6% of the Egyptian migrant labour force, against a 4.4% of people expecting to do so; and finally the services sector was employing only 12.7% of those migrating to the Arab states, whereas at least 41%

would have liked to be integrated into the services sector. The existence of a discrepancy between the expectations and the actual integration of migrants in the labour markets might point to the existence of a mismatch between the demand and the supply of migrants labour and to a less than efficient utilisation of the resources.

Conclusions

Egypt is increasingly becoming a source of permanent migration to the EU. This is in contrast with a long tradition of stability of Egyptians as well as a more recent tendency to migrate mainly within the regional borders of the Arab world. Though the numbers relating to Egyptian Migration to Europe are not especially worrying, other groups of migrants, like Turks, Albanians or Moroccans being by far more relevant, this trend does not seem likely to be revertible.

The roots of these new developments have to be traced back in the new position of Egypt in the global economy. The country, once integrated in a thriving regional bloc, with the crisis of the latter (for reasons too long to mention here), is now finding itself more and more marginalized from the new global dynamics, and less and less integrated in it. The consequence is an increase of brain -drain and mass migration to more developed countries.

Both these phenomena have been analysed in this paper making reference to the results of a field survey. The survey has helped defining the profile of the Egyptian migrant, his/her expectations, his/her motivations to leave his/her country and its preferred pattern of migration.

The survey and the analysis carried out in the paper allow for some preliminary answers to be given to the set of hypotheses made explicit in the theoretical introduction of this contribution.

In particular, it is possible to conclude that Egyptian migration to Europe is mainly permanent, motivated by economic considerations. Moreover, it concerns not only unskilled labour but also skilled personnel (brain drain) fleeing the country as a consequence of its marginalisation. About the illegal, legal dimension of Egyptian migration, although it is impossible to find out how many migrants have proper documents in the different phases of the migration process, the survey clearly shows that not all those wishing to migrate to Europe have a job contract, which makes it very likely that they will become irregular migrants at a certain point after their entry into the receiving country. Familial and national networks do play a major role in the choice of the country where to move. And finally Egyptian migrants are inserted in the labour structure of the receiving country in activities, which do not correspond to their preferred sectors of employment. No conclusions can be drawn about the insertion of Egyptian migrants into the underground economy from the data so far collected.

Clearly many questions still remain open to be able to draw any relevant academic or policy-oriented conclusions. These refer, for example, to the dynamics of migration, the kind of documents used to cross the Mediterranean, the role of organised crime, the insertion in the economy of the receiving country and their likelihood to be involved into the thriving underground economy of some of the European States, like Italy and Greece, where Egyptian migration is more numerous.

All these questions, however, might only be tackled by further research.

Words: 7271

ⁱThe International Organisation for Migration defines a migrant worker as “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national (1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Article 2). See IOM web-site accessed on May 17, 2004: http://www.iom.int/en/who/main_service_areas_labour.shtml#chap1

ⁱⁱ Irregular migrants (or undocumented / illegal migrants) are defined by UNESCO as: “people who enter a country, usually in search of employment, without the necessary documents and permits”. See UNESCO, web-site accessed on May 17, 2004: http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=3020&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

ⁱⁱⁱ The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees states that a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country..." See UNHCR, Protecting Refugees – Questions & Answers, on UNHCR web-site accessed on May 17, 2004: <http://www.unhcr.ch>

^{iv} According to the definition of the UNHCR, internally displaced people are “individuals or groups of people who have been forced to flee their homes to escape armed conflict, generated violence, human rights abuses or natural or man-made disasters.” They differ from refugees because “the internally displaced, so-called IDPs, remain, for whatever reason, in their own states.” See UNHCR , Internally Displaced persons, questions and answers, on the UNHCR web-site accessed on May 17, 2004: <http://www.unhcr.ch>

^v See Appleyard, R., (1999), *Emigration dynamics in developing countries*, London: Ashgate

^{vi} See for example, Gardezi, Hassan. *The Political Economy of International Labor Migration*. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1995; Ghosh, Bimal. *Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores: Insights into Irregular Migration*. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998; Ghosh, Bimal., (2000), *Managing migration: time for a new international regime*, OUP; Sassan, Saskia. *Losing control*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; Sassan, Saskia. *Globalisation and its discontents*. New York: New

York Press, 1998; Weiner, Myron. The global migration crisis: challenge to States and human rights. HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995.

^{vii} See the Conclusions of this book for a more detailed account of this debate.

^{viii} The report of the project is available at the web-site of the Egyptian Ministry for Manpower and Migration, <<http://www.emigration.gov.eg/publications/Publication.asp>>

^{ix} See conclusions in Talani, L.S. (2004), European Political Economy: Political Science perspectives, London: Ashgate

^x A similar distinction is contained in Dicken, P., (1998), Global Shift, Paul Chapman publishing ltd, p.5

^{xi} See, for example, Hirst, P. and Thompson G., (1999), Globalisation in question, Polity Press.

^{xii} See, for example, Garret, G., (1998), Partisan Politics in the Global Economy, Cambridge University Press

^{xiii} See, for example, Mittleman, J.H., (2000), The Globalisation Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance, Princeton: Princeton University Press. For the relations between globalisation and migration see, for example, Sassen, S., (1998), Globalisation and its discontents, New York: The New Press; Weiner, M., (1995), The Global Migration Crisis, Haper Collins;

^{xiv} See the conclusions of this book for further details.

^{xv} See Holm, H.H. and Sørensen, G., (1995), Whose world order? : uneven globalization and the end of the Cold War, Publisher: Boulder : Westview Press, p. 12

^{xvi} For a more detailed analysis of this approach to globalisation see the conclusions in Talani, L.S., (2004). See also Overbeek, H., (2000), "Globalisation, Sovereignty and Transnational Regulation: Reshaping the Governance of International Migration", in Gosh, Bimal, ed (2000), Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime, Oxford: Oxford University Press

^{xvii} See Overbeek, H.W., (1995), "Globalisation and the restructuring of the European Labour Markets: the role of Migration", Simai, M., (ed), (1995), Global employment. An international investigation into the future of work, London Tokyo: Zed Books and United Nations University Press

^{xviii} See Garret, G. (1998)

^{xix} Dicken, P., (2003), Global shift : reshaping the global economic map in the 21st century, Sage Publs

^{xx} Scholars refer to the “triad” to indicate the three main zones of production of the globe, i.e.: Asian Pacific region, America and Europe.

^{xxi} See, for example Breslin, S., Hughes C.W., Philis, N., and Rosamond, B., (2002), *New regionalisms in the Global Political Economy*, London: Routledge, Hettne, B., Inotai, A., Sunkel, O., (1999), *Globalism and the new regionalism*, MacMillan Press l.t.d

^{xxii} On this subject see for example Mursheed, M.S., (2002), *Globalization, Marginalisation and Development*, London: Routledge

^{xxiii} For a detailed analysis of the number of migrants necessary to cover the needs of EU member states see United Nations, “Replacement Migration: is it a solution to declining and aging population?” accessed on line at: www.un.org/esa/population/execsum.htm, on May 7, 2001.

^{xxiv} Though the Amsterdam Treaty moved migratory issues from the third (intergovernmental decision making) to the first pillar (Community law), there is still no common migratory policy and the member states retain full competence on legislating on migration. The alien model of immigration regime based on soft law is still the one prevailing at the European level. There have been some moves to devise a common policy to combat illegal immigration (see European Council in Tampere, 1999 and European Council in Seville, 2002) but still no concrete measures have been taken.

^{xxv} See Huysmans, J., (2000), “The European Union and the securitization of migration”, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, December 2000, Vol.38, No.5, pp.751-77. See also Ugur, M., (1995), “Freedom of movement vs Exclusion: A reinterpretation of the “Insider”-“Outsider” divide in the European Union”, *International Migration Review*, Vol.29, No. 4, pp.964-99

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^{xxvii} For a detailed analysis of some EU member States migratory policies see Geddes, A, (2003), *The politics of migration and immigration in Europe*, London: Sage Publications

^{xxviii} Huysmans, J., (2000), “The European Union and the securitization of migration”, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, December 2000, Vol.38, No.5, pp.751-77. See also Guiraudon, V.,

“European Integration and migration policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue shopping” in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, June 2000, Vol.38, No.2, pp.251-271.

^{xxix} See for example, BBC, “Children ask: Is terrorism allowed in Islam?” The attacks in America on 11th September 2001 shocked the world, 30/03/2004, on BBC web site accessed on May 17, 2004: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/print/bristol/content/faith/2004/03/11/911.shtml>

^{xxx} See Overbeek, H., (2000), *Globalisation, Sovereignty and transnational regulation: reshaping the governance of international migration*, in Bimal Gosh, ed., (2000), *Managing migration: time for a new international regime*, Oxford: Oxford University Press).

^{xxxi} For some data see: Gosh, B, (1999), *Challenges and opportunities of economic globalisation: some implications for labour, industry and nation states*, paper prepared for the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit workshop on “Internationalisierung der Arbeitsmarkte”, 27-28 April, Frankfurt a/M. See also Harris, N., (1995) *The new untouchables. Immigration and the new world worker*, London: Penguin books

^{xxxii} See Sassen, S., (1998), *Globalization and its discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money*, New York: The New York Press, p. XIII

^{xxxiii} See for example the relations ETUC-European Round Table or UNICE at the European level.

^{xxxiv} See below.

^{xxxv} See IOM, (2003), *Contemporary Egyptian Migration*, IOM: Cairo

^{xxxvi} See Appleyard, R., (ed) (1999), *Emigration Dynamics in Developing countries, Volume IV: The Arab Region*, London: Ashgate

^{xxxvii} See Egyptian Ministry for manpower, Migration section, web-site:

<<http://www.emigration.gov.eg/>

^{xxxviii} See Egyptian Ministry for manpower, Migration section, web-site:

<<http://www.emigration.gov.eg/>

^{xxxix} See Chapter 3 of the report.

^{xl} See OECD, *International Migration statistics*

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/46/2956579.xls>

^{xli} For an analysis putting the fortress Europe image into perspective see A. Geddes, 'International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe', *International Migration* 2001 vol 39(6), 34-37. See also Chapter 3 in the Report.

^{xliii} For more information see Eurostat working paper, (2000), Push and Pull factors of international migration. Country Report: Egypt, Population and social conditions 3/2000/E/n.7

^{xliiii} See CAPMAS, (1987).

^{xliv} For a detailed analysis of the issue of marginalisation of the Middle East within globalisation see Dodge, T. and Higgot, R, (2002), *Globalisation and the Middle East*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. See also Hakimian, H. and Moshaver, Z., (2001), *The State and Global Change: The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa*, Richmond: Curzon Press; Fawcett, L., and Sayigh, Y., (1999), *The Third World Beyond the Cold War: Continuity and Change*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

^{xlv} In the classification of UNCTAD West Asia includes: Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Islamic Rep. Of, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

^{xlvi} See UNCTAD, <http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1923&lang=1>

^{xlvii} See IOM, 2003.

^{xlviii} See Investment Climate Report, Egypt-July 2003, Embassy of the United States of America. www.Usembassy.egnet.net

^{xlix} See UNCTAD, *World Investment Report* (New York, UN: 1999)

^l See Investment Climate Report, Egypt-July 2003, Embassy of the United States of America. www.Usembassy.egnet.net

^{li} See The World Bank, *The little data book*, Washington, DC: World Bank, (2001), p.233

^{lii} See Dodge, T., (2002), Introduction, p.24

^{liii} See Report chapter 3.

^{liv} See IOM, (2003), *Egyptian Migration 2003*, Cairo: IOM