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Publication Date

2013

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Historicizing the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Contemporary Korean History
from the Late 1970s to the Late 2000s

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Asian Languages and Cultures

By

Yeun-Jee Song

2013

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Historicizing the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Contemporary Korean History
from the Late 1970s to the Late 2000s

By

Yeun-Jee Song

Doctor of Philosophy in Asian Languages and Cultures

University of California, Los Angeles, 2013

Professor John Duncan

My dissertation aims at historicizing the formation, spread, and institutionalization of the discourse on pro-Japanese collaborators (ch'inilp'a discourse) in contemporary South Korean society from the late 1970s to the late 2000s. The ch'inilp'a discourse is a unique historical narrative that claims to resolve the issue of unpunished pro-Japanese collaborators—who were not punished right after Korea's liberation from Japan—in the present. This discourse attributes all post-1945 political mishaps to the failure to punish collaborators immediately after liberation. Located at the interlocking position of calling for dealing with the unsolved task of decolonization and democratic progress, the ch'inilp'a discourse reflects a victimized postcolonial historical consciousness of Korean progressives and functions as progressives'

powerful political rhetoric against political conservatives after the demise of radical socio-political reform movement in the early 1990s.

Closely looking at media coverage and intellectual writings on pro-Japanese collaboration issue, this dissertation examines how specific socio-political culture and events interactively worked together to form, disperse, and popularize this discourse, after bringing this once-taboo subject back into society in the 1980s to the biggest polemical issue in politics and civil society by the 2000s. Furthermore, the rise of the movement for resettling the *ch'inilp'a* issue (*Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement), in association with memorial project disputes, drastically reshaped public memory of powerful post-1945 elites as well as 20th century Korean history.

The inarguable political victory of the discourse—successfully transforming itself from a marginalized historical narrative to a state-sanctioned one—was greatly indebted to its reproduction and mobilization of historical trauma from Japanese colonialism and unhealed memory in postcolonial Korea. The birth of the *ch'inilp'a* discourse is closely tied to the strong postcolonial historical consciousness of progressives, encapsulated with a phrase “liberated, but in fact not,” and associated with the absence of a “proper” decolonization process, continuing foreign influence, and frustrated democratization process up until the 1980s. However, the social phenomenon of *ch'inilp'a* at turn-of-the-21st-century Korea has taken place at the intersection of the rise of a new form of anti-foreign nationalism and desire for further democratic progress among the public after Korea’s democratization in 1987.

The dissertation of Yeun-Jee Song is approved.

Namhee Lee

R. Bin Wong

John Duncan, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2013

To My Late Father and Mother

Who are a source of inspiration for my graduate study, but passed away before my completion.

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Abbreviations

ADIMM	순국선열유족회 (Sun'guk sŏnyŏl yujokhoe) Association of the Descendants of the Independence Movement Martyrs
ADMMIM	독립유공자유족협의회(Tongnip yugongja yujok hyŏphoe) Association of the Descendants of Men of Merit of the Independence Movement
AMFMC	삼일동지회 (Samil tongjihoe) Association of March First Movement's Comrades
APWV	태평양전쟁희생자유족회 (T'aep'yŏngyang chŏnjaeng hŭisaengja yujokhoe) Association for the Pacific War Victims
AWNLC	민족문화작가회의협의회 (Minjok munhak chakka hoeŭi hyŏbŭihoe) Association of Writers for National Literature Council
CCDM	민주언론을 위한 시민연대 (Minju ŏllon ŭl wihan simin yŏndae) Citizen's Coalition for Democratic Media
CCEJ	경실련 (Kyŏngsillyŏn) Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice
CCK	한국기독교총연합 (Han'guk Kidokkyo ch'ongyŏnhap) The Christian Council of Korea
CSON	시민사회단체연대회의 (Simin sahoe tanch'e yŏndae hoeŭi) Civil Society Organizations Network in Korea
CSPU	평화통일시민연대 (P'yŏnghwa t'ongil simin yŏndae) Citizens' Solidarity for Peace & Unification
CPAJ	천주교정의구현사제단 (Ch'ŏnjugyo chŏngŭi kuhyŏn sajedan) Catholic Priests' Association for Justice
FKTU	한국노총 (Han'guk noch'ong) Federation of Korean Trade Unions
FKU	녹색연대 (Noksaek yŏnhap) Green Korea United
JCMH	독도수호와 일본의 유엔안보리 상임이사국 진출 저지를 위한 진주운동본부(Dokdo suho wa Ilbon ŭi UN anbori sangim isaguk chinch'ul chŏji rŭl wihan Jinju undong ponbu) Jinju Citizen's Movement Headquarters for Protecting Dokdo Islets and Preventing Japan's Bid for a Permanent Seat in the UN Security Council

KCTU	민주노총 (Minju noch'ong) Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
KCWDMSSJ	정신대대책협의회 (Han'guk chöngsindae taech'aek hyöbühoe or Chöngdaehyöp) The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan
KDF	민주화운동기념사업회 (Minjuhwa undong kinyöm saöphoe) Korean Democracy Foundation
KFEM	환경연합 (Hwangyöng yönhap) Korean Federation for Environmental Movement
KLA	광복회 (Kwangbokhoe) Korea Liberation Association
KPAF	민족예술인총연합 /한국민예총 (Minjok yesullin ch'ongyönhap) Korean Peoples Artist Fedcraction
KSVC	전국노점상연합 (Han'guk nojömsang yönhap) Korean Street Vendors Confederation
KTU	전교조 (Chön'gyojo) Korean Teachers & Education Workers' Union
LDS	민주화를 위한 변호사의 모임 (Minjuhwa rül wihan pyönhosa üi moim) Lawyers for a Democratic Society
MCMFM	삼일운동기념사업회 (Samil undong kinyöm saöphoe) Meeting for Commemorating the March First Movement
MPVA	보훈처 (Pohunch'ö) Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs
NDC	민주단체협의회 (Minju tanch'e hyöbühoe) National Democratic Council
NFMND	전국민족민주운동연합/전민련 (Chön'guk minjok minju undong yönhap) National Federation for the Movement of Nation and Democracy
NGEU	전국공무원노동조합 (Chön'guk kongmuwön nodong chohap) National Government Employees' Union
NNC	반핵반김국민협의회 (Pan-haek pan-Kim kungmin hyöbühoe) People's Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Kim Jong Il Alliance, its official English title is Nonuclear.co.kr

PKAR	조국통일범민족연합 /범민련 (Choguk t’ongil pŏm-minjok yŏnhap) Pan-Korean Alliance for Reunification
PSPD	참여연대 (Ch’amyŏ yŏndae) People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

Political Party

DP	민주당 (Minjudang) Democratic Party
DLP	민주노동당 (Minju nodongdang) Democratic Labor Party
GNP	한나라당 (Hannaradang) Grand National Party
NFP	새누리당 (Saeruridang) New Frontier Party
PDP	평화민주당 (Pyŏnghwa minjudang) Peace Democratic Party

Collaboration-related Organizations

AHOS	열린사회희망연대 (Yŏllin sahoe Hŭimang yŏndae) Alliance of Hope for Open Society
CAITP	친일반민족행위진상규명시민연대 (Ch’inil pan-minjok haengwi chinsang kyumyŏng simin yŏndae) Civic Association for the Investigation of the Truth of Pro-Japanese Anti-National Activities
CAPC	친일청산시민행동연대 (Ch’inil ch’ŏngsan simin haengdong yŏndae) Citizens’ Action for Settling the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaboration
IRCA	민족문제 연구소 (Minjok munje yŏn’guso) Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities
MPSJ	진주정신 지키기 모임 (Jinju chŏngsin chik’igi moim) The Meeting for Protecting the Spirit of Jinju
NAMSG	민족정기를 세우는 국회의원모임 (Minjok chŏnggi rŭl seunŭn kukhoe ũiwŏn moim) National Assembly Members’ Study Group for Correcting the Falsified National History
PCIC	대통령소속친일반민족행위진상규명위원회 (Taet’ongnyŏng sosok ch’inil pan-minjok haengwi chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe) The Presidential

Committee for the Inspection for Japanese Imperialism

PCJRP

올바른 과거청산을 위한 범국민위원회 (Ŏlbarŭn kwagŏ ch'ŏngsan ũl wihan pŏm-kungmin wiwŏnhoe) People's Coalition for Just Resettling of the Past

Notes on Romanization and Translation

Throughout my dissertation, I follow the McCune-Reischauer Romanization system. However, there are several exceptions: 1) geographical names and 2) well-known historical names, names of celebrities whose names are spelled differently in public, and Korean authors who published in English and romanized their names differently than the McCune-Reischauer system. I use the official Korean government's Romanization system (announced on July 7th, 2000) for geographical names such as cities and administrative districts to avoid confusion with many geographical names—including the official titles of organizations, institutions, events, and museums—included in my dissertation. In the case of personal names, I respect publically circulated usage. First of all, the names of former presidents, well-known historical figures, and celebrities follow the way in which it is used in Korean print. For example, Park Chung Hee, Roh Moo Hyun, and Kim Gu. Secondly, in the case of Korean authors published in English with a different spelling, I use their own English spelling. In the two exceptions of geographical names and personal names, I give the McCune-Reischauer Romanization in parentheses at the first occurrence. The examples for geographical names are Jinju (Chinju), Tongyeong (T'ongyŏng), Daejeon (Taejŏn) and those for personal names Choi Jangjip (Ch'oe Changjip) and Im Jiehyun (Im Chihyŏn).

In terms of English translations of organizational names and book titles, I follow the official English translations of the organizations, institutions, and groups. I use my own translation only in the case that no official English title exists or was found. I also apply this rule for book titles. In the case of author-given English translations, I capitalize all principal words in

the book title, i.e. Cho Hüiyŏn edited *The Politico-Social Dominant Discourses and Dynamics of Democracy in Korea*. In cases of my own English translation for titles, I capitalize only the first word, i.e. Han Wansang's *With my uprooted body: Rethinking Korea and the U.S.*

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my dissertation committee members, Professor John Duncan, Professor Namhee Lee, and Professor Bin Wong. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my advisor, Professor Duncan. He has not only directed my dissertation, but also guided me with such great patience and enthusiasm throughout my graduate study at UCLA. He has been an excellent role model for a moral, hard-working, and dedicated scholar and teacher. I am grateful to Professor Namhee Lee and her work, through which I learned a conscientious and sincere approach to contemporary Korean history. Also, I am greatly indebted to her warm encouragement and advice both for my academic and personal life. As a female scholar, she has demonstrated to me how to strike a balance between one's academic and personal life. Professor Wong has always helped me sharpen my research questions with the most constructive and critical comments throughout my dissertation writing process. With the help of his keen intellect and lively conversations, I was able to reshape my dissertation in a better way. Without this support from my committee members, I would not have been able to complete my dissertation.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of people around me. Above all, I am truly thankful for the legacy of my late parents, who inspired me with their life-long pursuit of intellectual life. Their memory and love led me to stay in the Ph.D. program, even in tough times and challenges. Also, I deeply appreciate the steadfast love and sacrifice of my husband and two children, Eunjae Lee and Jungwoo Lee. It was a pure blessing of my life to have a chance to raise them and earn their support and understanding.

My dissertation writing is enormously indebted to the great collaborative environment of the UCLA Korean Studies program. At school, I was fortunate to meet and work with wonderful colleagues and friends such as Sonja Kim, Sophia Kim, Hanmee Na Kim, Chris Hanscom, Serk Bae Suh, Minsuh Soh, Hijoo Son, Ellie Kim, Janet Lee, Todd Henry, Yongju Ryu, Howard Kahm, and others whom I have not named here. Their endless intellectual stimulation, encouragement, and friendship were the best part of what I could get while studying at ULCA. Also, my friendships with Minsun Kim, Jinkyung Park, and Heeyang Hong have nurtured and sustained me in the difficult situations and challenges of my life.

Last, but by no means least, I would like to acknowledge the Korea Foundation and the Academy of Korean Studies, which generously offered me funding to conduct archival research successfully in Korea. Without their financial support, my dissertation would not have been possible.

VITA

Education

MA **University of California, Berkeley**, Asian Studies,
specializing in Japanese History. May, 2001

BA **Ewha Woman's University**, Seoul, Korea, History

Conference Papers & Presentations

“Changing the Present by Changing History: The Movement of *Ch'inilp'a Ch'ongsan* as a New Form of Democratic Movement.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies. Hawaii. April 1, 2011

“The Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators and the Issues of Post-Colonial Consciousness in the 1980s.” Paper Presented at the Academy of Korean Studies, Korea. May, 2010.

“The Formation of the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in the 1980s: Centering on Anti-Japanese Sentiments in S. Korea.” Paper presented at the Sogang-Korea Foundation Forum, Sogang University, Korea. Oct. 2009.

“Writing the Present's Past: The Development of the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators from the Early 1980s to 2007.” Paper presented at the Annual SNU-Harvard-UCLA Graduate Student Workshop, Seoul National University, Korea. Aug. 2009.

“*Mansenshi* (Manchuria-Korean History): Japan's Modern Invention of the Historical Geography of Northeast Asia.” Paper presented at the Tenth Annual Korean Studies Graduate Student Conference. Harvard University, Boston, MA. April, 2006.

“Kim Hwallan and Korean National Historiography: Recreating a Colonial Woman's Wartime Collaboration from a Multicultural Perspective.” Paper presented at Comparative Interdisciplinary Research in Asia Conference: “Reconfiguring Colonialism: Negotiations of Colonial Cultures in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.” UCLA, CA. Feb. 2003.

Publications

“*Mansenshi* (Manchuria-Korean History): Japan’s Modern Invention of the Historical Geography of Northeast Asia” Selected Paper of the Korean Studies Graduate Student Conference, Vol. 4 (2006), Korean Institute, Harvard University.

Scholarships

Academy of Korean Studies Research Fellowship, Korea Jan. 2010-May, 2010

Dissertation Research Fellowship, Korea Foundation, Korea Jan. 2009-Oct. 2009

Lenart Graduate Travel Fellowship, Graduate Division, ULCA Nov. 2006-Feb. 2007

Introduction

The purpose of my dissertation lies in historicizing the discourse on pro-Japanese collaborators (ch'inilp'a discourse) in contemporary Korean history from the late 1970s to the late 2000s.¹ What I call ch'inilp'a discourse is a specific historical narrative on the unfolding of South Korean history from 1945 to the 2000s.² This narrative attributes the mishaps of post-1945 South Korean history to the failure of punishing pro-Japanese collaborators under colonial rule (1910-1945) immediately after Korea's liberation from Japan. Specifically after the forced dissolution of the Special Committee to Judge Anti-national Crimes (Panminjok haengwi t'ükpyöl chosa wiwönhoe, 1948-1949), the so-called collaborators returned to public life and continued to thrive in society as powerful elites. As a result, the narrative claims that this injustice damaged the Korean national spirit (*minjok ch'önggi*) and also the historical legitimacy and social justice of the newly born nation-state. Furthermore, it accuses the demoralization and collaborators' support for dictators as the major causes of the repeated failures of democratization such as dictatorship, military coups, and massacres. The only way to restore the

¹ Ch'inilp'a is the most frequently used term in my dissertation. The direct translation of *ch'inilp'a* is "someone who is pro-Japanese." In the Korean context, however, the term is used to describe an individual as a self-seeking, opportunistic, and immoral traitor of the nation. From a historical prospective, it includes a wide range of notions from traitors (*maegungno*) around the Protectorate Treaty in 1905 to wartime collaborators (1938-1945). Also, several similar terms were confusingly used after liberation such as *ch'inilp'a*, *ch'inil punja*, *maegungno*, *puil hyömyöckcha* (pro-Japanese collaborator), and *minjok panyöckcha* (betrayal of the nation). To me, the particular image and notion of ch'inilp'a has evolved throughout history, rather than maintaining the same meaning during and right after Japan's colonialism. For example, many progressive intellectuals tend to associate the notion not only with anti-nation, but also anti-*minjung* (the oppressed common people of Korea who constitute the genuine national subject), anti-democracy, and the unification movement. That is to say, the notion of ch'inilp'a itself is a product of the specific historical writing and culture of the 1980s. Although the term itself contains a strong moral judgment, I use ch'inilp'a as more than a neutral Romanization of the English translation of pro-Japanese collaborators. First, this term is already socially accepted to indicate pro-Japanese collaborators in Korea. More significantly, by using it unitalicized, I can properly convey its meaning and nuance within a specific context.

² I clarify that my discussion on ch'inilp'a discourse is only limited to the case of South Korea. Therefore, any Korea-related term, such as Korean society, Korean history, indicates the case of South Korea unless there is further remark.

national spirit, correct historical wrongs, and prevent further historical misfortunes, according to the ch'inilp'a narrative, is to resettle the issue of collaboration in the present (*Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan*).³

Studying ch'inilp'a discourse is not merely about a fictive narrative or past history. It is significant in that the discourse has been used as a hermeneutic framework for perceiving and interpreting present socio-political phenomena, as well as contemporary history, among many (progressive-minded) Koreans. What is more, from the 1980s to the 2000s, a small group of young activists that were later joined by many sympathizers acted upon and made their political decisions based on this "historical truth." Therefore, ch'inilp'a discourse is in a sense still on-going history and is located at the heart of contemporary Koreans' social and political life.

Therefore, my dissertation traces back to the formation, spread, practice, and institutionalization of this ch'inilp'a discourse in Korean society from the late 1970s to the 2000s. Meanwhile, my dissertation also attempts to address several significant points. First of all, my dissertation contends that this is the most representative discourse of Korean progressives since the late 1990s. Stuart Hall summarizes some of Foucault's major ideas on discourse in the following: "discourse is about production of knowledge through language... It constructs the topic. It defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about."⁴ Also, in the book titled *Politico-Social*

³ Another frequently used expression is "*Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan*." The original translation is to liquidate the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators. Its meaning is to resolve the issue of collaborators thoroughly, by providing them with appropriate legal or historical judgment. Also, *kwagö ch'öngsan*, which is not used as frequently as *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan*, in a broad sense indicates "correcting or resettling past wrongs in modern and contemporary history." The latter, used widely as "resettling the past," became a major government agenda under the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations.

⁴ Stuart Hall, "Foucault: Power, Knowledge, and Discourse," in *Discourse Theory and Practice: A reader*, eds. Stephanie Taylor, Margaret Wetherell, and Simeon J. Yates (London: Sage Publ. 2001), 72.

Dominant Discourses and Dynamics of Democracy in Korea, Cho Hüiyŏn defines the function of discourse:

The systematized language [discourse] includes the aspect of justifying social actors' action or of justifying one's action to others. As all the other logics do, discourse came to acquire "persuasive power." With this, the acts of specific social actors are accepted something justifiable or one is won over to someone else's thoughts and perceptions in his/her logic. In this sense, discourse provides "a hermeneutic frame" or "a cognitive frame" which interprets a series of events and acts in reality. For example, members in ruling bloc or in resistance bloc come to interpret various events with this hermeneutic framework. Sharing this frame makes people constitute a "cognitive community" or "hermeneutic community."⁵

The reason why I name this particular narrative "a discourse" is that it forms a systematic historical knowledge, providing a way through which Korean people can think, utter, and judge pro-Japanese collaborators in a certain way, not the other way.⁶ Furthermore, it functions as the hermeneutic framework of Korean progressives to interpret not only post-1945 South Korean history, but also a series of socio-political events in the 2000s. In a sense, the discourse is the very reflection of the mentality of Korean progressives and their historical consciousness. Within the discourse, the utterances on ch'inilp'a and their social influence in post-1945 Korea were continuously produced, reproduced, and consumed in print, media, and on the Internet.

My dissertation also addresses significant historical moments regarding the development

⁵ Cho Hüiyŏn, "Chŏngch'i sahoejŏk tamnon ũi kujo pyŏnhwa wa minjujuŭi ũi tonghak- Hanguk hyŏndaesa sok esŏ chibae tamnon kwa chŏhang tamnon ũi sangho chagyong ũl chungsim ũro" (The structural change of politico-social discourse and dynamic of democracy: focusing on the interaction between the dominant discourse and the opposite discourse in contemporary Korean history), in *Hanguk ũi chŏngch'i sahoejŏk chibae tamnon kwa minjuŭi ũi tonghak* (The Politico-Social Dominant Discourses and Dynamics of Democracy in Korea), ed. Cho Hüiyŏn (Seoul: Hamkke ingnŭn ch'aek, 2003), 15-6.

⁶ Here I am not denying that there was a stereotypical image of ch'inilp'a before the emergence of this discourse. Yet, the spread of ch'inilp'a discourse reshaped the images of collaborators closely tying them with such attributes as opportunistic, elites, pro-U.S. followers, and flatterers to the powerful.

of the ch'inilp'a discourse. Hall asserts that the study of discourse should include—exemplifying Foucault's studies on madness, punishment, and sexuality—“how this knowledge about the topic acquires authority, a sense of embodying ‘truth’ about it; constituting the ‘truth of the matter,’ at a historical moment.”⁷ Therefore, I attempt to answer the following questions, 1) how the public attention in the unresolved ch'inilp'a issue returned in the 1980s after a long break, 2) how the discourse was gaining interpretative authority among the public in the post-1987 democratic process, and 3) how the narrative was officially authorized as historical truth by the state through the legislation and institutionalization processes in the 2000s.

Regarding this historical development, my dissertation highlights the historicity of the ch'inilp'a discourse: I pay attention to the advent of “the discourse on history” as a rhetorical tool of the progressive camp, replacing the Marxist ideology prevalent in the 1980s. There is general consensus that the discourse was the representative political rhetoric of Korean progressives in the 2000s. However, what did not receive sufficient attention is the influence of leftist ideology on this discourse to the extent I suggest that ch'inilp'a discourse since the late 1990s essentially became a substitute for the leftist ideology prevalent in the 1980s. After the demise of the radical reformist movement and socialist ideology in the early 1990s, the ch'inilp'a discourse gradually came to the fore as a resistance discourse of the progressives that was used to fight against powerful political conservatives for further democratization. Intersecting with turbulent political situations in the mid-2000s, it transformed into a dominant discourse that fostered a strong anti-conservative position throughout society. For this reason, this study of the ch'inilp'a discourse investigates the unique political, social, and historical role that it played in the democratic

⁷ Ibid., 73.

evolution after democracy after the 1980s' era of revolution.

Historicizing the ch'inilp'a discourse also addresses the issues of post-coloniality and the decolonization dilemma in Korea.⁸ In the Korean context, the formation of post-colonial consciousness is associated with the recognition of following domestic and international conditions until the 1980s in the following ways: 1) Japanese colonial legacy was not properly wiped clean after liberation; 2) Korea is either economically and militarily under the threat of a powerful postwar Japan. Moreover, many assert that the nation is in fact already a in a neo-colonial condition under U.S. imperialism. Based on practical reasons and obsessive anxiety, this post-colonial consciousness deeply affected the birth, spread, and strengthening of the ch'inilp'a

⁸ My dissertation is essentially an investigation of “post-colonial history of South Korea” through the ch'inilp'a issue. Here, “post-colonial history” specifically signifies that post-1945 history exists only within the relationship to Japanese colonial history and the decolonization process immediately after liberation, not just simply meaning history after colonialism. One of the points of my dissertation is that the prevalent historical consciousness among Korean progressives/members of the left wing was formed largely based on criticism of “the history of collaboration” or “history of anti-nation and traitors” in the context of Koreans' colonial experiences. This “post-colonial history” focuses on how these issues were not properly dealt with in the decolonization process and effected all post-1945 historical developments. Ch'inilp'a discourse, as a historical narrative, is an extraordinary example of a reading of history with a postcolonial mind (consciousness) from the late 1970s to the present. To proponents of ch'inilp'a discourse, post-1945 history is postcolonial history because of long-enduring ties to colonial history. In general, the study of ch'inilp'a categorizes the formation of pro-Japanese collaborators in three historical stages: 1) the rise of a group of traitors from the late 19th century to Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 (such as Ŭlsa ojök or Ilchinhoe), 2) various collaborator groups from the 1920s up to the mid-1930s, and 3) wartime collaborators under Japan's total war period (1937-1945). The Korean collaborators during the second period were produced within the context of relatively soft cultural rule (*munhwa t'ongch'i*) after the March First Movement in 1919, a nation-wide independence movement against the brutal military rule of Japan. The collaborators in this second category were not only colonial bureaucrats and aristocrats, but also those who pursued the increase of Koreans' political rights—i.e. suffragists or autonomists—through cooperation with colonial ruling system. However, what the study of ch'inilp'a underlines most is wide-scale wartime collaboration, which took place mostly among elites and ordinary Koreans in the form of war mobilization. This is the time when a vast series of ordinances, such as *sinsa ch'ambae* (regularly visit to Japanese Shrine), *kungsöng yobae* (bowing down to the direction of the Japanese Imperial Palace), *ch'angssi kaemyöng* (forced Korean name change to Japanese style), forced use of Japanese language, were imposed upon Koreans as part of Japan's wartime assimilation policy. Furthermore, Korean people were forcibly driven to comply with various wartime mobilizations efforts, such as offering various materials to the government for wartime production, forced labor, wartime moral education, and the military “volunteer” system (later conscription). In order to achieve the active participation of locals, Korean elites and leaders were organized by the colonial government to give public speeches and coerced to write or produce war propaganda. In particular, the ch'inilp'a discourse highlights elites' wartime collaboration as the epitome of pro-Japanese collaboration, whose nature was summarized as the betrayal of formerly “nationalist” elites and their anti-national activities against the Korean people.

discourse. The discourse itself is a product of this victimized mentality. Particularly from the perspective of tenacious personal networks from the colonial period in society, many progressive intellectuals claim that the very existence of ch'inilp'a symbolizes the delayed decolonization of South Korea. Therefore, my dissertation addresses how the discourse reflects the complicated post-colonial consciousness, as well as the decolonization agenda. Meanwhile, I also illuminate the post-colonial nationalist aspects of the discourse by closely examining its interaction with anti-Japanese sentiment and anti-U.S. sentiment.

In addressing the above problematics, my dissertation consists of five chapters, excluding the introduction and conclusion. The first chapter acts as a prelude and offers significant historical background for later chapters by explaining why the ch'inilp'a issue remained as an uncomplete historical task after liberation and how it could return as a topic of public debate more than thirty years later. Covering extensively from 1945 up to 1987, it focuses on two time-periods: 1) the first part (from 1945 to 1950) highlights the turbulent political conditions that were unfavorable for bringing justice to national traitors and that eventually frustrated its attempts; 2) the second part explains the radical and reformative socio-political atmosphere of the 1980s that invoked the forgotten collaboration issue back and revived it into a powerful historical narrative. In particular, the second part pays attention to the deep impact of the 1980 Gwangju Democratization Movement⁹ and the influence of Marxist ideology along with the

⁹ Several English translations refer to the events surrounding Gwangju in May 1980, such as the Gwangju Massacre, the Gwangju Uprising, and the Gwangju Democratization Movement. In general, Gwangju Massacre tends to highlight the large-scale sacrifice on the side of protestors and innocent civilians by the violent crackdown of airborne army. The term Gwangju Uprising emphasizes the aspect of the Gwangju people's rise against the martial law and for democracy. Yet, those who deny its historical meaning can negatively understand this term as a revolt or rebellion. Therefore, my dissertation uses the relatively current term, the Gwangju Democratization Movement, which is the official government term for the event since the Kim Dae Jung administration publically recognized its contribution to Korean democracy and memorialized it as such.

bitter post-colonial consciousness against Japan among college students and intellectuals as the very social, political, and cultural matrix of the discourse.

The second chapter specifically deals with the rise and spread of ch'inilp'a discourse from the late 1980s to the 1990s. The first section explains post-1987 political situations under the Kim Young Sam administration (1993-1997), under which society became far more open to talk about past wrong issues, including ch'inilp'a. The second section finally brings our attention to the formation, spread, and logic of the discourse in full-scale. In order to do that, it traces back to the genealogy of the discourse in the late 1970s to show how earlier ch'inilp'a criticism took shape into a systematic historical narrative under the influence of the 1980s' Marxist ideology. Furthermore, it analyzes the inner logic, as well as the routes it spread in public throughout the 1990s. The third section examines how Korean progressives, particularly *The Hangyoreh* (*The Hangyoreh* Newspapers), took advantage of the discourse as a historical reference against the challenge of the conservative camp in the post-1987 democratic transition.

Throughout the 1990s, the ch'inilp'a discourse developed into the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement (The movement for resettling the issue of ch'inilp'a), claiming the immediate resettlement of collaborationist issues in the present. Therefore, the third chapter investigates how the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement as a full-fledged political project of the progressives bore fruit on the following two levels: 1) the legislation of the Ch'inil Investigation Law at the state level, 2) the publication of the *Who's Who Dictionary on Pro-Japanese Collaborators* in civil society. The first section deals with the politicization and institutionalization processes of the ch'inilp'a issue—addressing why it was a site of intense political contestation between the right and the left and analyzing the political, social, and diplomatic contexts of the day. The following

section looks at how the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement as a result of fierce political struggle was materialized in the forms of state legislation (2004-5) and ensuing installation of the presidential investigation committee for solving the issue. In contrast to the second section, the third section deals with the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement on the level of civil society, focusing on the activities of the Institution for Research in Collaborationist Activities (Minjok munje yōn'guso).

While the earlier chapters shed light on ch'inilp'a discourse and the movement on a national level, the fourth chapter brings our attention down to specific local cases. This chapter thus pays attention to the disputes over local memorial projects on “collaborators,” focusing on the cases of three cities: Masan, Jinju and Tongyeong. By analyzing these local cases, I attempt to show how the discourse can be localized and re-contextualized under a specific local situation interwoven with competing historical traditions, cultural power struggles, and economic interests based on the burgeoning tourist industry. In the process, this chapter highlights the critical role of specific local historical identities in defining, formulating, and rationalizing the position and discourse of mainly *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* advocates in the memorial project controversy.

The final chapter deals with the counter-discourse against ch'inilp'a discourse. My definition of the counter-discourse here indicates scholarly comments, debates, or sometimes a movement that cautions against the discourse's political abuse, tendency to moralize, and the state's intervention in solving the historical issue through legislation. The focus of the first section is to discuss scholarly debates on those negative aspects. More broadly, the second section concerns modern and contemporary high school history textbook debates that took place between progressive historians and a group of conservative scholars in the mid-and late 2000s.

Examining the textbook debate informs us how much the specific reading of modern and contemporary history, including the ch'inilp'a issue, became a focus of the hegemonic struggle for the education of the next generation.

In order to answer my research questions, I use a wide range of magazines, academic and semi-academic journals, newspapers, major intellectuals' writings on ch'inilp'a, and ch'inilp'a-related publications from the late 1970s to the 2000s. These primary sources cover a broad ideological spectrum of writings from the left/progressive to the right/conservative in Korea. Since my research concerns a contemporary issue, I also conducted interviews with those who are engaged with the movement for resettling the collaboration issue and worked for the Residential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism.

Chapter I

Prologue: Forming the Stage for Ch'inilp'a Discourse

In this dissertation, the first chapter offers crucial background knowledge about why the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement came to be the main historical task in contemporary Korea. Beginning with the liberation in 1945 to the 1980s, this chapter first narrates the origin of the so-called twisted beginning of the nation: the frustrated process of serving “justice” to pro-Japanese collaborators immediately after Korea’s liberation from Japan, specifically in the Special Committee to Judge Anti-National Crimes (hereafter the Special Committee). The second part highlights the 1980s’ socio-political conditions that created the environment for breaking the prolonged silence and tacit taboo of the ch'inilp'a issue and reviving it into a mainstream historical narrative. Here, my special attention will be given to discuss the following two issues: 1) the social effects of the Gwangju Democratization Movement, which announced the beginning of the new revolutionary era for fierce democratic struggle, and 2) the prevalent ideologies of the 1980s, such as anti-foreign nationalism and leftist ideology among anti-government activists. Between the first and second parts, I also take a brief look at the political handling of the ch'inilp'a issue in the Second Republic after the April 19 Revolution (4·19 hyōngmyōng).

Section 1. The Failed Beginning of South Korea?

On August 15, 1945, the much-anticipated liberation arrived in Korea. However, the future of this newly born nation was not as bright as what the Koreans had hoped to be. Immediately after the liberation, the Korean Peninsula was divided and placed under the occupation of two powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. in the southern part and the Soviet Union in the northern part. The first three-years after liberation—which some scholars prefer periodizing this time as eight years to include the Korean War—were extremely chaotic politically, economically,

and socially. This was also the time when the two competing ideologies gave birth to two split states based upon the political understandings of the two occupying world powers. Naming this specific period *haebang konggan* (the space of liberation), Korean historians, especially progressive ones since the 1980s, define success at this time as building a unified nation-state and bringing justice to collaborators. Based on this standard, these historians assert that the immediate post-liberation years were an ultimate failure.

It is needless to say that once an occupied/colonized nation restores its national sovereignty, it is highly crucial to resolve so-called the issue of traitors and collaborators in order to restore justice and integrity among people. However, the complicated interwoven political context of Korea did not allow political leaders to recognize the collaboration issue simply as a matter of ensuring justice and morality. Instead, Cold War ideology and political calculations of competing political groups were prioritized first in handling collaborators. Keeping this in mind, I trace back the historical path in which the efforts to treat collaborators were made, but did not produce results satisfactory to the Korean people.

Generally speaking, the memories of Koreans on the failure of *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* tends to be directly connected with the dissolution of the Special Committee in 1949.¹⁰ Given the fact that the practical goal of the Special Committee, as a state institution, was to investigate, prosecute, and try collaborators, it was located at the heart of early *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* attempts in the 1940s. Therefore, I mainly focus on discussing the activities and symbolic dissolution of the Special Committee in June 1949, while briefly addressing other immediate

¹⁰ Strictly speaking, the Special Committee did not break down in June 1949 or immediately after that. The political upheaval of June of that year suspended its original function and the Rhee regime further debilitated the committee. Yet, a number of public-gear history books use the term, “dissolution” (*wahae*) in describing the aftermath of the police’s attack on its main office on June 6th and of the National Assembly Spy Incident in June and July.

post-1945 attempts to handle *ch'inilp'a*.

Concerning the early failure of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement, what one cannot ignore is the falsehearted attitude and sabotage of the two significant players, the U.S. Military Government (U.S.M.G.) and Syngman Rhee, in the political scene from 1945 to 1950. The two were not only uninterested in dealing with the collaboration issue, but also accountable for allowing collaborators to return to public life by hiring them extensively in government offices. The most urgent political goal of the U.S.M.G. was no other than to establish a self-sustainable government under the ideal of “liberal democracy,” which could successfully fight against socialist maneuvering and challenges inside and outside the territory. In order to achieve this goal in the shortest possible time after the establishment of the 38th Parallel, the U.S.M.G. prioritized hiring well-trained bureaucrats and allying with political partners who were may have been “morally doubtful,” but were faithful native right wing elites.¹¹ Immediately after its arrival, the U.S.M.G recycled the pre-existing colonial bureaucratic, police, and juridical systems, rehiring most of the collaborators within the system. From the perspective of the U.S.M.G., what should be priotized in hiring people was not their past career, but their present will to be anti-communist.

Similarly with the U.S. army marching into Korea without much knowledge or preparation about the people and land, Syngman Rhee, in spite of his public recognition and popularity, arrived without much of a power base or support of political groups within the peninsula. However, driven by political ambition, Rhee soon formed an affiliation with the Korean Democratic Party (Hanmindang), consisting of many colonial landowners and

¹¹ Sō Chungśōk points out that the U.S.M.G. clearly recognized the “moral” issue of collaborators that they were hiring.

businessmen such as Kim Sŏngsu, Song Chinu, Chang Tŏksu, Cho Pyŏngok, and Yun Posŏn. They, as political and social leaders under the colonial rule, were not completely free from charges of collaboration in many different ways. Furthermore, after becoming the first president of the Republic of Korea in August 1948, Rhee desperately sought strong police and military support in order to maintain peace and order. According to the evaluation of Myung-Lim Park (Pak Myŏngnim), the pragmatist Rhee was far less concerned about obtaining the justification and legitimacy of his regime from the public than weakening his ruling base by punishing his political partners, former collaborators.¹²

According to Park, *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* was one of the three most compelling tasks of the newborn state, along with land reform and unification. Most of all, the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement had received strong popular support since liberation. Yet, what primarily occupied the leaders of the U.S.G.M. and President Rhee was the confrontation with communists in the North and below the 38th Parallel. Park describes this situation as “the urgency of the present agenda, the anti-Communist struggle, overshadowed the agenda belonging to the past, which was *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan*.”¹³ Furthermore, he asserts that anti-Communist fighting for President Rhee was a matter of life or death specifically from 1945 to the breakout of the Korean War when Communist-related regional uprisings and brushfire wars with the North persisted.

On top of the lukewarm attitude of President Rhee and U.S., the *ch'inilp'a* issue was always entangled with political interests. For example, even Kim Gu (1878-1949), the major political competitor of President Rhee over the issue of unified government, as well as a

¹² Myung-Lim Park, *Han'guk chŏnjaeng ūi palbal kwa kiwŏn II* (The Breakout and Origin of the Korean War, vol. 2), (Seoul: Nanam, 1996), 456.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 433.

respected independence movement leader, prioritized political solidarity over excluding and punishing *ch'inilp'a* in his first interview on November 23, 1945 after returning from his Exile Government in China. Yet, he shifted his position afterwards, presumably with a political reason, into an obstinate *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* advocator. This was soon after he formed a confrontation with Rhee and the Korean Democratic Party around January 1949.¹⁴ On the other hand, Yō Unhyōng (1886-1947), a leader of the center-left, urged caution about the excessive claims of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* within the Korean Communist Party (Chosŏn Kongsandang). Yō judged carefully that it was politically unwise for the Party to ask for unnecessarily extensive punishment of *ch'inilp'a*. He thought that it would end up driving out a number of Communist sympathizers with a career of minor collaboration from the Party and eventually lead them to join in with hard-core (right wing) collaborators.¹⁵

In the middle of post-1945 political turmoil, *ch'inilp'a* was also often used as an effective pretext to attack one's political enemy, as "naming one a communist" was a great excuse for any kind of political suppression a little later during and after the war. What made this attack even easier is that the standard/boundary of *ch'inilp'a* with other similar expressions *ch'inil punja* (pro-Japanese elements), *maegungno* (nation-selling traitor), *puil hyōmnyōkcha* (pro-Japanese collaborator), and *minjok panyōkcha* (betrayed of the nation) was not decisively firm. Rather, it was to some extent flexible due to the present need or an individual's judgement. According to Hō Chong, both the right and the left groups accused their political enemy as being collaborators

¹⁴ Sō Chungŏk, *Han'guk hyōndae minjok undong yōn'gu 2: 1948-50: Minjujuŭi, minjokchuŭi kŭrigo pangongjuŭi* (A study on nationalist movement in contemporary Korea: Democracy, nationalism, and anti-communism from 1948 to 1950) (Seoul: Yōksa pip'yōngsa, 1996), 108-9.

¹⁵ Sō, *ibid*, 112-3.

as early as the stage of establishing the Preparation Committee for Nation Foundation (Kōnguk Chunbi Wiwōnhoe, hereafter abbreviated as Kōnjun) and the People's Republic (Chosōn Inmin Konghwaguk, hereafter abbreviated as Ingung) before October 1945.¹⁶ Another telling example is that economic speculators (*kansangbae*), a cause of the biggest socio-economic problem of the day, were included under the category of national traitors by the South Korean Interim Government.

According to Yi Kangsu, three attempts were made to bring justice to *ch'inilp'a* in the political realm from August 1945 to September 1949. The first period was right after liberation to December 1945, when the idea of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* was accepted as common sense, as well as a major agenda among various political parties and groups. The second attempt was by the South Korea Interim Legislature (Nam-Chosōn Kwado Ippōp Ŭiwōn) in 1947. Finally, the activities of the Special Committee from January to August 1949 came in as the third and final attempt.

At least before the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945, Yi Kangsu says that major parties had a tacit agreement in dealing with *ch'inilp'a* issue as a primary principle. Around this time, the issue was discussed in line with the political exclusion of collaborators, reformation of the colonial social structure, and the building of a new nation-state.¹⁷ However, Hō Chong, another expert on the Special Committee, points out that Yi's discussion about the agreement on "the primary principle" did not necessarily mean the same

¹⁶ Hō Chong, "Haebang chikhu 'ch'inilp'a' ch'ōri e taehan kak chōngch'i seryōk ũi insik kwa taeūng" (The perceptions and responses of various political groups regarding the handling of 'pro-Japanese collaborators'), *Taegu sahak* 55 (December 1998), 2-6.

¹⁷ Yi Kangsu, *Panmin t'ūgwi yōn'gu* (A Study on the Special Committee to Judge Anti-National Crimes) (Seoul: Nanam, 2003), 46-7.

approach among different political groups on the timing and method in purging and punishing collaborators, as well as its standard for naming ch'inilp'a. His research reveals how members of major political groups, representatively Syngman Rhee and Pak Hōnyong in the Chosōn Communist Party, confronted each other over the political exclusion of ch'inilp'a from October to December 1945, and this was one of the biggest stumbling blocks in their attempts to form a united front of various political groups.¹⁸

The 1945 Moscow Conference not only greatly reshuffled the political situation, but also altered the political and social approach toward the handing of ch'inilp'a in the southern part of the peninsula. One of the decisions of the conference was to put Korea under joint trusteeship, which could be never welcomed by Koreans. After the conference, the *Donga Ilbo* misreported on December 27, writing that the U.S. argued for the immediate independence of Korea while the Soviets supported the trusteeship.¹⁹ In the meanwhile, the left wing—including the Chosōn Communist Party—declared to accept all the decisions of the conference following the Soviet guidelines in January 1946. Consequently, this announcement and the earlier misreport together nursed ill feelings against the left wing and the Soviet Union among Koreans who opposed extending foreign rule. While the right wing's anti-trusteeship movement was sweeping the southern part of the Korean peninsula, ideological and dogmatic categorizing spread throughout the public. Within this dynamic, the United States and the right wing came to symbolize immediate independence and patriots, while the Soviet Union and the left wing trusteeship

¹⁸ Hō, *ibid.*, 6-11.

¹⁹ Among the decisions that the 1945 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (December 16-26) made, the most sensitive issue to Koreans was the trusteeship. Originally, the U.S. suggested the maximum ten years' trusteeship in Korea by four powers, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China without establishing an interim government. In contrast, the U.S.S.R. suggested the establishment of an interim government, holding of the U.S.- U.S.S.R. Committee, and participation of Korean parties and social groups during the period of the trusteeship.

supporters came to symbolize traitors. Therefore, the anti-trusteeship movement was a golden opportunity for former pro-Japanese collaborators that completely changed the standard for categorizing a patriot/traitor: before the movement, the representative traitor was *ch'inilp'a*, but after the anti-trusteeship movement, patriots now also included anti-trusteeship supporters. By actively participating in the anti-trusteeship movement, a number of *ch'inilp'a* were able to return to public life, claiming themselves as patriots. On the other hand, supporting the trusteehip drove the left wing into a corner, offering the right a chance to attack them as national traitors advocating trusteehip.

The second stage for *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* took place in the South Korean Interim Legislature (hereafter the Interim Legislature). In March 1947, three months after the opening of the Interim Legislature, it proposed a Special Law Ordinance regarding Pro-Japanese Collaborators, National Traitors, War Criminals, and Profiteering Scoundrels (Puil hyömnyökcha, minjok panyökcha, chönböm, kansangbae e taehan t'ükpyöl pömrul chorye). After the Daegu October Incident (Daegu siwöl hangjaeng or Daegu p'oktong)²⁰ in 1946, public opinion rose once more against the harms of former colonial police. Under this social pressure, the Interim Legislature prepared the law treating *ch'inilp'a*. Regarding its historical meaning, Yi Kangsu and Hō Chong evaluate that the Ordinance, as the first one specifically stipulating the process and punishment on collaborators, included all the diverse opinions among various political groups. More significantly, it also paved the way for the principle of *ch'inilp'a*

²⁰ The Daegu October Incident was a large-scale people's protest, which began in Daegu (Taegu) on October 1st, 1946. According to viewers, it is named differently either Daegu siwöl p'oktong (implying Communist instigation of the riot) or Daegu hangjaeng and Daegu siwöl inmin hangjaeng (emphasizing the nature of people's resistance against misgovernment of the U.S.M.G. and wrongdoings of pro-Japanese policemen). Partly under the leadership and influence of communists, it continued more than two months and expanded over other locals beyond Gyeongsang province. The protestors criticized the wrong economic policy of the U.S.M.G. (representatively, rice ration policy) and arrogance of pro-Japanese policemen. Also, they proposed to set up a people's committee.

exclusion in the May 10 General Election and ch'inilp'a legislation in the National Assembly, both in 1948.²¹ Unfortunately, the Ordinance did not survive the objection of the U.S.M.G. At first, the Military Government rejected it based upon the principle of the "First Election Law, and then Ch'inilp'a Law."²² However, even after both laws were passed, it simply declined to approve the laws under the pretext that the Legislature was not the official representative organ in South Korea.²³

After the frustration in the Interim Government, the South Korean National Assembly promptly enacted the Special Law on Punishing Anti-national Crimes (Panminjok haengwi ch'öböl pöp) in September 1948 based on the Article 101 of the Constitution.²⁴ The Special Committee was set up according to this law, which was composed of the Special Investigation Committee, Special Court, Special Prosecutor's Office, Special Constabulary Unit,²⁵ and local branches for handling local cases. The birth of the Special Committee took place in the second session of the National Assembly from late 1948 to early 1949. Considered the golden days of

²¹ Yi, *ibid.*, 85; Hö Chong, "1947-yön Nam-Chosön Kwado Ippöp Üiwön üi 'ch'inilp'a ch'öböl pöp' chejöng kwa kü sönggyök" (The legislation of South Korea Interim Legislation's Special Ordinance for Handling Pro-Japanese Collaborators in 1947 and its nature), *Han'guk künhyöndaeyön'gu* 12 (Spring, 2000), 151.

²² Under the goal of replacing government-appointed lawmakers to representatives elected by a popular vote by the end of March 1947, the U.S.M.G. proposed the legislation of the universal suffrage law as the primary goal of the Interim Legislation. However, as the Legislation showed more interests in legislating the Ch'inilp'a Legislation, the military government took it as secondary and urged to legislate the suffrage law first.

²³ C.G. Helmick explained the reasons of the disapproval: 1) it is difficult to recognize pro-Japanese collaborators and anti-national traitors, 2) it is necessary to distinguish voluntary collaborators and passive collaborators, 3) it is inappropriate to exclude able figures (because of his collaboration career). Hö, *ibid.*, 176.

²⁴ According to Sö Chungsoök, President Rhee opposed the Special Law and rejected its promulgation from the beginning. Yet, he unwillingly sanctioned it because of other legislations that he needed to pass in the National Assembly. See Sö, *ibid.*, 121-125.

²⁵ Special Constabulary Unit (*t'ükkyöngdae*) was organized to 1) protect the Special Committee members, Special Prosecutors, and investigators, and 2) arrest "pro-Japanese collaborators." This Unit was located directly under the Special Committee or Special Prosecutor's Office, independent from the Home Ministry or police system.

junior assemblymen, this was the time when a group of reform-minded junior politicians played a central role in the activities of the Special Committee as well as the legislation of the Special Law. The *Ch'inilp'a* Law was one of the critical political issues, along with the National Security Law, in which the junior group conflicted with President Rhee and the Korean Democratic Party. In spite of the turbulent beginning, the activities of the Special Committee received broad popular support, enjoying extensive media coverage in early 1949 for the arrest of major collaborators such as Pak Hŭngsik, No Tŭksul, Yi Kwangsu, and Ch'oe Namsŏn.²⁶

On the other hand, the resistance of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* opponents was organized, persistent, and strong from the beginning: they tried to create a negative public opinion and to threaten its support in the following ways: distributing leaflets, organizing massive rallies, planning assassination plots and acts of terrorism against core Special Committee members.²⁷ On the government level, President Rhee made incessant efforts to revise the Special Law in order to circumscribe its power under the pretext that the law was against the Constitution. Firstly, he attempted to dissolve the Special Prosecutor's Office and Constabulary Unit. When the dissolution was unsuccessful due to the opposition of the National Assembly and various supporting groups, he next tried to shorten the statute of limitations.

In spite of the earlier ambitious activities, the Special Committee did not survive the right wing's so-called "Great Offensive of June" (6-wŏl ũi ch'onggongse). In June 1949, a series of aggressive political offensives resulted in the collapse of the junior group and the Special

²⁶ For details see, Pak, *ibid.*, 446-448.

²⁷ The well-known case was an assassination attempt on assemblymen Kim Ungjin, Kim Changryŏl, and No Ilhwan by professional terrorist Paek Mint'ae in early 1949. This plot was planned by pro-Japanese such police officers as No Tŏksul, Ch'oe Nansu, Hong T'aekhŭi, and Pak Kyŏngnim.

Committee. Following the prosecution of three assemblymen in charge of the National Security Law in the mid-May, the police attacked the main office of the Special Committee on June 6th. Excusing the earlier incident as an arrest of high police officers Ch'oe Unha and Cho Ŭngsŏn, who were accused of being behind the anti-Special Committee rallies, the police disarmed the Constabulary Unit, confiscated its documents and arms, and arrested its officers. The government was apparently on the side of the police: Chang Kyŏnggŭn, the Vice Minister of Home Affairs, openly announced in front of the National Assembly that the attack was done under the authority of his department. Furthermore, the president confirmed that it was his order to dissolve the Constabulary unit on June 11th. Although the National Assembly and the government fought each other over the attack, the ensuing the National Assembly Spy Incident eventually caused the breakdown of the minor group. The Spy Incident occurred when the police arrested a group of assemblymen, including Kim Yaksu, the Vice-Chairman of the Assembly, under the charge of being a secret agent of the Southern Communist Party (Namnodang) on June 20th and again more people from the late July to August. It was known as the earliest political conspiracy of the Rhee regime in that without substantial evidence, the police accused a number of junior assemblymen. Furthermore, the final blow to the minor assemblemen came in June 26th with the assassination of Kim Gu, their spiritual leader in several critical political issues.²⁸

The loss of the supporting group in the National Assembly made the Special Committee only nominal. Soon after, the opponents of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* occupied the main offices and accepted all government actions which were designed to diminish its original function. In particular, the decision that shortened the statute of limitations on collaborators by August 1949

²⁸ In spite of much research on the death of Kim, the power behind his assassination remains unclear.

gravely damaged the boundary of the Committee's activity: after this point, it only dealt with those who were previously accused (most of them were released either through the suspension of prosecution, bail, or the cancellation of confinement). In total, the Special Committee resolved 41 cases from its first verdict hearing on March 28th to August 31, 1949: it included 1 death penalty, 1 life-sentence, 13 jail sentences, 18 suspensions of civil rights, 2 penalty exemptions, and 6 innocent verdicts. According to Yi Kangsu, only 0.6 percent of the 688 accused stood at the trials, and among them, only 15 people received actual punishments by the end of August. What was worst is that most of the malicious criminals, such as higher police detectives, were either deemed innocent or released on bail.²⁹ In conclusion, the attempt to punish collaborators in South Korea was unsuccessful and merely a political gesture.

In contrast with South Korea, it is known that the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement in North Korea was sweeping and thorough. This became one of the critical reasons that student activists of the 1980s in South Korea held North Korea as the legitimate government in the peninsula. This myth around North Korean *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement remained firm throughout the 1990s. However, since the early 2000s, new research points out that the North's attitude toward the collaboration issue was at least as politically calculated as the case in the South.³⁰ Most of all, it took part in the socialist nation-building, as well as sweeping away the

²⁹ Yi, *ibid.*, 299-300.

³⁰ Chōn Hyōnsu, "Haebang chikhu Pukhan ūi kwagō ch'ōngsan, 1945-1948" (The purge of pro-Japanese collaborators right after the liberation in North Korea, 1945-1948), *Taegu sahak* 69 (2002): 33-60; Yi Kangsu, "Haebang chikhu Nam-Pukhan ūi ch'inilp'a chukch'ōng nonūi yōn'gu" (A study on the discussions of purging pro-Japanese collaborators in the South and the North right after the liberation), *Yōksahak yōn'gu* 20 (2003): 23-50; Sin Hyōnggi, "Kungmin swaesin kyuyul rosō ūi ch'ōngsan: Haebang chikhu Pukhan esō ūi kwagō ch'ōngsan kwajōng ūl pomyō" (Resettling the past as a discipline for reforming national subjects: Reviewing how North Korea resettled the past right after the liberation), *Tangdae pip'yōng* 28 (Winter, 2004): 254-271.

colonial political, social, and economic structure.³¹ For this reason, confiscating the land or property of collaborators was none other than the first step for socialist reforms, such as land reform and state-ownership of the future North Korean socialist state. Also, the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement was politically utilized to attack the right wing nationalists and opponents of trusteeship after the Moscow Conference. On the other hand, North Korean leaders gave exceptions in handling collaborators to those who could contribute to the socialist nation-building process.³² Therefore, purging collaborators was closely related to contemporary political and socio-economic demands. Also, many scholars indicate that Kim Il Sung respected professionals and engineers with special techniques, regardless of their previous career under Japanese rule.³³ Therefore, it is at best only partly true that North Korea's *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement was carried out under a pure nationalistic ideal.

Section 2. A Brief Fissure in 1961 in the Middle of a Long Silence

After the failure to purge pro-Japanese collaborators immediately after liberation in the

³¹ On September 15, 1945 in the Pyōngnam Local Committee of North Korean Communist Party, the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* issue officially appeared in North Korea. Here, as a way of socialist reform, the committee suggested confiscating property and land of pro-Japanese collaborators, reactionaries, and the Japanese colonial state. For the details, see Chōn, *ibid.*, 40; Yi Kangsu, *Panmin t'ūgwi yōn'gu*, 60-64.

³² Sin Chuhyōn, "Pukhan ūi *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*" (*Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* in North Korea), *Wōlgan Chosōn* 311 (27-2) (February 2006), 531-2; 536-7; Chōn, *ibid.*, 41-2; 45-47. For example, Protestant pastors opposing trusteeship were accused as collaborators who participated in Japanese shrine visits and propagated Japanese imperial war. Also, Cho Mansik, a nationally renowned Christian leader, was attacked as a war criminal who encouraged students to volunteer for student soldiers.

³³ As an example, Kim Sōnho points out the strong colonial legacy in the creation of North Korean Air Force. In the early stage of North Korea nation-building, many former members of the Japanese Air Force contributed to the formation of the North Korean Air Force. See Kim Sōnho, "Pukhan konggun ch'angsōl kwajōng ūl t'onghae pon singminji yusan ūi yōnsok kwa tanjōl" (The continuity and discontinuity of Japanese colonial legacy seen in the process of creating North Korea's Air Force), *Hyōndae Pukhan yōn'gu* 15, no. 2 (2012): 249-294; Pyōn Chiyun, *Haebang hu Pukhan ūi Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan, 1945-1946* (The settling of pro-Japanese collaborators in North Korea after liberation, 1945-1946) (Unpublished master thesis, Sōnggyunwan University, 2007).

South, public outcry demanding *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* largely disappeared until the 1980s. Yet, the *ch'inilp'a* issue briefly regained public attention during the Second Republic (from June 15th, 1960 to May 16th, 1961) after the April 19 Revolution in 1960. Most of the talks were similar in terms of claiming that pro-Japanese collaborators who flourished under the Rhee regime should not be hired again in the new era. In one account, the social leaders Kim Ch'angsuk, Kim Pyōngno, Yi Kang, and Sin Suk, announced a statement criticizing the personnel policy of the Hō Chōng Interim Government (April 27-June 15, 1960) on May 6th. The second and third articles of this statement addressed the issue of hiring collaborators in public offices. They proposed that the Hō Chōng government should not re-hire pro-Japanese policemen who had served under the Rhee regime and at the same time, both collaborators and sycophants of the former president should be purged from public offices.³⁴ This line of criticism continued under the Chang Myōn Cabinet, which formed after the promulgation of a new constitution. An article in *Donga Ilbo* expressed concerns about the news that many pro-Japanese policemen were promoted to the position of chief officer.³⁵ Before the General Election in July, one *Donga Ilbo* article urged readers not to vote for the so-called traitors of democracy (*minju panyōkbae*). The first category of those traitors, the writer indicated, was *ch'inilp'a*, which included both Rhee's cronies and those who fabricated their own complaints as patriotic voices in the opposition party.

Soon after the Chang Myōn Cabinet was called pro-Japanese (*ch'inil naegak*) by the

³⁴ *Donga Ilbo*, May 7, 1960; *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 7, 1960.

³⁵ *Donga Ilbo*, September 8, 1960.

media,³⁶ the Foreign Minister Chŏng Ilhyŏng created a social sensation regarding his views on the ch'inilp'a issue in early September. The original incident occurred when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited Pak Ch'ungŭm, a notorious ch'inilp'a, to a party for Kosaka Zentarō the Japanese Foreign Minister. Regarding the reporters' question about the appropriateness of his invitation of Pak, Chŏng answered that the statute of limitations regarding the ch'inilp'a issue was over. Twisting his view, an article in *The Kyunghyang Shinmun* argued that when Korea eventually re-established a diplomatic relationship with Japan, ch'inilp'a should be more firmly punished than when an official Korea-Japan relationship did not exist.³⁷

Even though it had its own political interests, members of the National Assembly discussed the restrictions on the civil rights³⁸ of ch'inilp'a while preparing the so-called Revolution Legislation (*Hyŏngmyŏng ippŏp*).³⁹ One of central debates around the Legislation was to what degree to retroactively punish so-called “traitors of democracy” (*minju panyŏkcha*). Many different opinions were raised. Interestingly, some assemblymen argued strongly that the Legislation to limit the civil rights of “traitors of democracy” should apply to ch'inilp'a in the old Korean Democratic Party and the present Democratic Party, while others claimed that it should be retroactively applied to the political wrongdoings of the Rhee regime since the early

³⁶ *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 9, 1960.

³⁷ *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, September 11, 1960.

³⁸ Here, the restrictions on the civil right are mostly related to the election: the right to vote and the eligibility for election.

³⁹ As the Chang Myŏn Cabinet postponed punishing those who were responsible for the fraudulent March 15 election and those who suppressed the April 19 Revolution, a band of demonstrators besieged the National Assembly Building on October 10th 1960. After five hours' besiegement, party leaders promised to: 1) re-prosecute the released responsible personnel for March 15 and April 19; 2) stop a factional strife between Old Faction (*kup'a*) and New Faction (*sinp'a*) within the Democratic Party; 3) and legislate a Special Law to punish those who were engaged in March 15 and April 19. Based on the third article, the National Assembly legislated what was named Revolution Legislation.

1950s. In the end, the restriction of the civil rights of accused “traitors of democracy” was decided to apply up to the Busan Political Upheaval (May 1952),⁴⁰ Rounding Off the Vote for the Constitutional Amendment (May 1954)⁴¹, and the Twenty-four Clash for the National Security Law (December 1958)⁴² on October 21, 1960. Therefore, *ch’inilp’a* were ultimately excluded from this category. Although the discussion on the restriction of civil rights of so-called “traitors of democracy” was not separated from political calculations to deal a blow to one’s political opponents, it is telling that the *ch’inilp’a* issue was still a viable topic in politics at this time. After this, the issue of *Ch’inilp’a ch’ongsan* disappeared in the public until the 1980s when it erupted as a topic of strong public discourse.

Section 3. In the Era of Revolution in the 1980s

The democratization in 1987 offered the *ch’inilp’a* issue a crucial turning point, for it could now be talked freely about in public, eliminating the previous taboo. As the next chapter will present, the *ch’inilp’a* discourse as a historical narrative was created a little earlier around the mid-and late 1980s. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to explore the critical ideas of

⁴⁰ The Busan Political Upheaval (Pusan *ch’ongch’i p’adong*) is a series of political incidents revolving around constitutional amendment from May to July 1951 during the Korean War. President Rhee proposed a constitutional amendment for direct presidential election based on the judgement that he could not be re-elected by the indirect election system in the National Assembly. As the National Assembly voted down this proposal and, taking one more step forward, suggested the constitutional amendment for a cabinet system, military policemen under the order of President Rhee arrested ten oppositional assemblymen under the charge of international communist party. Furthermore, he enforced the direct presidential election system.

⁴¹ In September 6, 1954, President Rhee and the Liberal Party submitted a constitutional amendment proposal for abolishing the limitation on president’s re-election. As the proposal failed to meet the quorum, which was 136, with the lack of one vote in the National Assembly in November 1954, the Liberal Party turned over and passed the law two days later, with an absurd logic that the two-thirds of 203 assembly members was 135.33 and it should be counted as 135, rounding off the nearest whole number, instead of 136.

⁴² The Twenty-four Clash for the National Security Law (*Isa posanp’op p’adong*) is an incident that the ruling Liberal Party passed the new National Security Law and other bills while martial policemen closed the door of the National Assembly Building and locked out oppositional assemblymen who had been protesting the revision of the Security Law.

the 1980s that provided the intellectual environment for the revival of the ch'inilp'a issue as a progressive discourse. Broadly speaking, the keen historical perception of progressive intellectuals since the late 1970s, in combination with a strong will to reform corrupt realpolitik, developed into a historical narrative critical about Korean regimes and ruling elites. Throughout the 1980s, these progressive intellectuals, including student activists and anti-government leftists, were the key element of social change and reform movements. In order to grasp the rich intellectual and psychological climate which produced this unique historical narrative, I put particular focus on how two elements interacted and influenced each other in this discourse: the rise of a radical counter-ideology and anti-foreign nationalism.

The opening of “the 1980s’ era of revolution” is closely tied up with historical tragedy of Gwangju in May 1980. The Gwangju Democratization Movement, also known as the Gwanju Messacre and Gwangju Uprising, was an incident in which so-called the new military group, led by Security Commander Chun Doo Hwan, brutally suppressed thousands of Gwangju citizens who were protesting against martial law, as well as for democracy, for ten days. The violent crackdown of the airborne forces took enormous casualties not only among protesters, but also innocent non-participating civilians that numbered more than several thousands of deaths and injuries.⁴³ In spite of the strict media control over the violence, the news spread widely throughout informal routes, especially among students nationwide. The very memory of the suppression of the Gwangju Democratization Movement left a deep psychological wound,

⁴³ The website of the May 18 Memorial Foundation records the casualties of the Gwangju Democratization Movement as the following. The dead are 240, the missing are 409, and the injured reach 2052. For more details, see “5·18 minjuhwa undong kwanryōn p'ihajabyōl ch'ongkwāl” (The statistics on the casualties of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement), The May 18 Memorial Foundation, accessed March 25, 2013, <http://www.518.org/ease/menu.es?mid=a10304010000>.

traumatizing many to the extent to which non-participants eventually felt a sense of guilt and liability to those who collapsed in the city.⁴⁴ As a result, “Gwangju” became a symbol that energized the rigorous anti-dictatorship struggle in the 1980s.

It is a widely known fact that the Gwangju Democratization Movement brought far-reaching changes to various realms, such as social and democratic movements, the worldview of progressives, and research trends in academia. Scholars point out that one of the influences of Gwangju is that social movement groups began pursuing fundamental changes in society, breaking away from the earlier romantic and elite-centered student movement of the 1960s and 1970s. This radicalizing counter-ideology led to the enthusiastic acceptance of ideas of radical democracy, socialist ideology, the *minjung* movement,⁴⁵ and anti-Americanism.⁴⁶ According to scholars, the Gwangju Democratization Movement made student activists realize the essence of Korean problems on the level of the world system and history: what prevented democratic progress and unification in Korea was none other than U.S. imperial hegemony.⁴⁷ This realization resulted in the dissolution among many Koreans of the pro-American worldview that

⁴⁴ Ch’ae Changsu, “1980-yöndae Han’guk haksaeung undong üi chaju nosön” (The independence line in the 1980’s student movement in Korea), *Han’guk Tongbuga nonch’ong* 42 (2007): 249-250.

⁴⁵ *Minjung* is a term that appears throughout my dissertation. According to Namhee Lee, Korean intellectuals and university students identified *minjung* with the common people, believed to be the true subject of historical development and capable of social change. Lee also points out that the concept of *minjung* was not an analytic one which was materially or historically grounded. It was rather constantly re-defined by its counterpart images, such as military dictatorship, corporate conglomerates, and foreign powers. See more, Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 2-8.

⁴⁶ Kim Chöngghan, “5·18 Gwangju hangjaeng ihu sahoe undong üi ideollogi pyönhwa” (Ideological changes in social movements after the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement), *Minjujuüi wa ingwön* 10, no. 2 (August 2010): 174-183.

⁴⁷ Until the 1980s, one of the symbolisms of the U.S. hegemony was Korean forces’ subordination to the U.S. Military; that is to say, the operational control of the former was under the command of the Eight United State Army (until the end of November 1994). In spite of continuous debates, the wartime operational control of Korea is still under the command of the U.S. Army.

had firmly governed Korean politics and society for more than thirty years.⁴⁸ In order to analyze the historical, economical, and social stages of Korea, progressive scholars and student activists actively and extensively embraced Marxist ideology, which remained a social taboo under the anti-communist state ideology.⁴⁹ One of their conclusions was that modern and contemporary history should be a process to overcome exploitation from imperial power from a world history perspective and what prevented this historical progress in Korea was the pro-American ultra-right wing comprador monopoly group in control of political power.⁵⁰

For this reason, one of the most significant influences of Gwangju that many scholars did not hesitate to point out was the rise of anti-Americanism and the autonomy line (*chajuhwa nosŏn*) among the 1980s student movement.⁵¹ These transformed the image of the U.S. from a friendly ally to a governing foreign power. While anti-Americanism in the first half of the 1980s still remained on the emotional level, denouncing specific policies or actions,⁵² ideological anti-Americanism in the second half defined the U.S. as an imperialist state. The latter placed the

⁴⁸ “T’oron: Gwangju hangjaeng ūi yŏksajŏk sŏnggyŏk kwa 80-yŏndae pan-Mi chajuhwa t’ujaeng” (Discussion: The historical characteristics of the Gwangju Democratization Movement and the struggle for anti-American independence), *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 7 (May 1989), 70-71.

⁴⁹ Hong Tŏkyul, “1980-yŏndae Han’guk sahoehak ūi sŏngkwa wa kwaje” (The achievement and task of Korean sociology in the 1980’s), *Sahoe munhwa yŏn’gu* 9 (1990): 148-160.

⁵⁰ “T’oron,” 69.

⁵¹ Yi Samsŏng, *Miguk ūi taehan chŏngch’aek kwa Han’guk minjokchu’i: Gwangju hangjaeng, minjok t’ongil, Han-Mi kwangye* (The U.S. foreign policy toward Korea and Korean nationalism: Gwangju Democratization Movement, unification, and Korea-U.S. relationship) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1993): 23-25; Kim Chinung, *Han’guggin ūi panmi kamjŏng* (Anti-American sentiment among Koreans) (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1992): 66-102; Yi Kangno, “Han’guk nae panmiju’i ūi sŏngjang kwajŏng punsŏk” (A analysis on the developmental process of anti-Americanism in Korea), *Kukche chŏngch’i nonch’ong* 44, no. 4 (December 2004): 251-252; Ch’ae, “Chaju nosŏn,” 250-252; Yi Suin, “1980-yŏndae Haksae undong ūi minjokchu’i tamnon” (The discourse on nationalism in the 1980’s student movement), *Kiŏk kwa chŏnmang* 18 (2008):103-109.

⁵² Chang Talchung, “Pan-Mi undong kwa Han’guk chŏngch’i” (Anti-American movement and Korean politics), in *Han’guk kwa Miguk 1: Chŏngch’i anbo kwangye* (Korea and America 1: Political and security relationship), ed. An Pyŏngjun (Kyŏngnam: Kyŏnnam Taehakkyo, 1988), 134-146; Kim Chinung, *ibid.*, 63-64.

ultimate responsibility of the political mishaps in the post-1945 Korea on the U.S. Student activists and progressive intellectuals argued that in the pursuit of its own imperialistic interests, the U.S. diplomatic policy caused all kinds of problems and conflicts in Korea. The rapid spread of this anti-Americanism is related to the rise of National Liberation Line (hereafter NL) as the dominant group in the student movement after 1986.⁵³ The NL characterized Korea as a semi-feudal colonial society (later, semi-capitalist colonial) and its major target of struggle as U.S. imperialism. As a consequence, anti-foreign nationalistic slogans such as “driving out foreign power,” and “achieving anti-American independence” came onto the center stage in the student movement. However, it is noteworthy that this ideological anti-Americanism of the NL was grounded on North Korea’s *chuch’e* ideology, not orthodox Marxism.⁵⁴ Furthermore, it says that Korean authoritarian regimes had always been the de facto domestic agent of U.S. imperialism. For this reason, the struggle against U.S. imperialism was the first and primary step to achieve democracy and unification in the student movement from the late 1980s to the early 1990s.

Along with emerging anti-Americanism in the 1980s, traditional anti-Japanese nationalism governed the emotions and mentality of ordinary Koreans.⁵⁵ If the former was limited to the

⁵³ The earlier ideological confrontation between Chamint’u (Struggle Committee for Anti-U.S., Anti-Fascist, and Autonomous Democratization) and Minmint’u (Committee for the Struggle for an Anti-Imperialist, Anti-Fascist National Democracy) within the student movement groups reshaped into that of NL and CA (Constituent Assembly)-PD (People’s Democracy) around 1986-1987. Different from the former, emphasizing the contradiction between the nation and foreign power, the latter, based on Marxism, prioritizes the class contradictions in society.

⁵⁴ Ch’ae, *ibid.*, 252-256.

⁵⁵ In spite of President Rhee’s opposition to *ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan*, he is equally famous for his anti-Japanese policies and attitude. He confronted the Japanese government in the setup of a fishery line in the East Sea/the Sea of Japan in the mid-1950s and encouraged massive anti-Japanese protests on the national government level. Furthermore, he frequently adopted anti-*ch’inilp’a* rhetoric. Regarding his inconsistent attitude toward the *ch’inilp’a* issue, scholars such as Son Hoch’öl and Sō Chungšök assert that his anti-*ch’inilp’a* or anti-Japanese attitude sought to legitimize his rule by attacking his biggest political enemy, the Korean Democratic Party (Hannindang, hereafter KDP), because the KDP consisted of many colonial landowners and businessmen. See Sō Chungšök, “Rhee Syngman kwa pukchin

student activists and progressives/leftists, the latter was what was firmly entrenched in the minds of Koreans within post-1945 Korean history. In the 1980s, anti-Japanese sentiment was closely tied with the concern that the Korean economy might become subordinate to the far stronger Japanese economy. This kind of intensive “re-subordination/re-colonization” anxiety in society, beginning with the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty in 1965, reached its peak in the early 1980s.⁵⁶ Many economists, representatively Pak Hyönc’h’ae, Yun Inho and Pak Uhüi, critically pointed out the unequal triangular trade relationship of the U.S., Japan, and Korea, in which the Korea was located at the bottom stratum below the “two imperialistic powers.” These scholars claimed that Japan’s economic policy toward Korea had been unchangeably invasive and imperialistic since the late 19th century.⁵⁷

This alarmist view, in spite of some variations in emphasizing the “imperialist intentions” of the U.S. and Japan, prevailed in the 1980s, along with concerns over possible Japanese military intervention in the peninsula. For example, Sin Yongha, a retired Seoul National University sociologist as well as the most famous anti-Japanese commentator in the 1980s and 1990s, linked the revision of Japanese high school history textbooks in 1982 to the “darkest plot”

t’ongil: 1950-yöndaek kuku pangong tokchae üi haebu,” *Yöksa pip’yöng* 29 (Summer, 1995):131-151; Son Hoch’öl, *Hyöndaek Han’guk ch’ongch’i: Iron kwa yöksa, 1945-2003* (Seoul: Sahoe p’yöngnon, 2003), 163-167.

⁵⁶ In fact, Korea in the early 1980s was the fourth most heavily indebted nation in the world. The accumulated trade deficits of Korea to Japan recorded around over 23 billion U.S. dollars in 1982 and over 33 billion at the end of 1985. Also, in 1984, the three-fourths of approximately forty billion U.S. dollars of international debt in Korea came from Japan. Pak Unhüi, “Chongsok kujo simhwa üi naemak kwa silch’e”(The reality and backstory of the deepening subordination structure), *Sindonga* 302 (Nov. 1984): 283.

⁵⁷ For example, see Yu Inho, *Han-Il kyöngje 100-yön üi hyönjang* (The scene of 100 year’s Korea-Japan economic relation), (Seoul: Irwöl sögak, 1984): 154; Pak Hyönc’h’ae, “T’ükchip: Han-Il pulp’yöngdöng kyöngje kangye: Kyöngje ch’imryak 1-segi üi yusan kwa taewing” (Special edition: Korea-Japan unequal economic relationship: A century’s economic invasion and our response), *Sindonga* 302 (November 1984): 289-297; Pak Unhüi, “Chongsok kujo simhwa,” 278-297.

of the Japanese right wing to prepare young people for another aggressive war.⁵⁸ Based on the notion of an unhealed postcolonial mentality, this anti-Japanese nationalism was thus socially accepted, recognized, and also promoted under state sponsorship in the 1980s. One's ideological orientation did not make any difference regarding this issue.⁵⁹

Korean society in the 1980s boiled with energy for social reform and democracy. The ch'inilp'a discourse was born within this social, political, psychological, and cultural matrix of revolution, social reform, anti-foreign nationalism, and uneasy post-colonial anxiety. The voice for reforming domestic politics was clearly linked with the lucid recognition of "foreign imperialist powers" as the biggest stumbling block for Korea's democratization and unification. Under the strong post-colonial consciousness of "being liberated, but in fact not liberated" and aggressive anti-foreign nationalism, the suppression of the memory of anti-national collaborators was invoked as the very domestic element that propped foreign rule at home. This historical consciousness gradually developed into ch'inilp'a discourse in the process of the democratic struggle. Yet, what was ironic and intriguing was that only after the fall of the combative reformist movement of the NL in the early 1990s, the discourse started earning its true voice in society.

⁵⁸ Sin Yongha, "Ilbon kyogwasŏ wa 'singungukchuŭi'" (Japanese textbook and 'neo-militarism'), *Sindonga*, 276 (Oct. 1982), 132-147.

⁵⁹ Yi Yŏnghŭi, a representative progressive/leftist ideologue since the 1970s, also wrote several alarmist articles in the 1980s such as "Ilbon ŭi munhwa ch'imt'u rŭl kyŏngye handa" (Warning against Japanese cultural penetration), *Sindonga* 300 (September 1984), 206-215; "Ilbon ŭi 'posu hoegwi' rŭl kyŏnggye ham" (Alarming about 'Japan's return to conservatism'), *Sindonga* 323 (August 1986), 148-163. Also, the authoritarian state consistently intensified the anti-Japanese history education that put a great emphasis on Japan's colonial exploitation and Korea's independence movement in the 1970s and the 1980s. See Sin Chubaek, "Uri nŭn Ilbon ŭro put'ŏ haebang toedŏnŭnga: Ilbon e taehan sŏnmang kwa kyŏngmyŏl ŭi sai esŏ" (Are we liberated from Japan?: Between envy and contempt toward Japan), *Hwanghae munhwa* 48(Fall, 2005), 131-135; Pak T'aegyŭn, "Han'guk hyŏndaesa wa minjokchuŭi, kŭriŭgo Ilbon" (Contemporary Korean history and nationalism, and Japan), *Munhak kwa sahoe* 64 (Winter, 2003), 1659-1664.

Chapter II

The Emergence of Ch'inilp'a Discourse in the Late 1980s and 1990s

After the forced dissolution of the Special Committee to Judge Anti-national Crimes in 1949, the collaboration issue seemed to be erased from public memory, with only a few exceptions. The publication of Im Chongguk's *Ch'inil munhangnon* (Pro-Japanese literature, 1965) is one of these rare exceptions. On top of his bravery, the publication was only possible due to the unique historical context of Korea in the early 1960s: the resignation of President Syngman Rhee from power due to the April 19 Revolution in 1960 and the fierce student movement against the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty. In general, the collaboration issue remained a social taboo up to the 1980s and was mentioned only as a type of cliché that attributed all the social evils of the post-1945 Korea to this unresolved issue.⁶⁰ Despite this

⁶⁰ As for why public discussion on the unsolved ch'inilp'a issue disappeared in the 1960s and 1970s, *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* advocates point out that many collaborators re-emerged as the real political power and influential elites under the Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee authoritarian regimes. Most former colonial bureaucrats and the judiciary remained in their positions after liberation. Also, leading elites in the fields of education, art, religion, and literature from the colonial period continued to exercise strong influence after 1945. Furthermore, it is highly remarkable that colonial policemen and military officials were widely rehired in the chaotic socio-political situation after liberation and during the Korean War. According to a U.S.M.G. statistic in 1946, 82 % of police official (higher or equivalent to police lieutenant, 949 out of 1,157) had a background as former colonial period policemen. In the case of the Korean Army, a number of military officers with a background in the Japanese Army and Manchurian Army rose to the highest positions from the 1950s to the 1970s, such as the Army Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (as seen in the case of Paek Sönyöp, Chöng Ilgwön, Ch'ae Pyöngdök, and Yi Chongch'an). The contested "pro-Japanese career" of Park Chung Hee as former Japanese military officer may also be a crucial element that suppressed the public discussion of the ch'inilp'a issue in the 1960s and 1970s. Park graduated from the Japanese Military Academy through the Manchurian Military School in Sinjing. Serving as a second lieutenant in the Manchurian Army (1944-45), it is claimed by his opponents that he and his unit participated in suppressing independence efforts. It is arguable whether he was in fact fighting against the Kwangbokkun (Korea liberation Army). Nevertheless, according to several testimonies including his supporters, he clearly admired the leaders of the Meiji Restoration and idealized the Japanese military spirit. See for the details of the pro-Japanese career of Korean policemen and military officers, Im Taesik, "Ch'inil, Ch'inmi kyöngch'al üi hyöngsöng kwa pundan hwaltong" (The formation of pro-Japanese and pro-U.S. policemen and (their) activities for division), in *Pundan 50-yön kwa t'ongil sidae üi kwaje* (The fifty years' division and the task for unification era), ed. Yöksa munje yön'guso. (Seoul: Yöksa pip'yöngsa, 1995), 11-48; Han Yongwön, "Han'gukkun hyöngsöng kwajöng esö Ilbongun ch'ulsin üi lidöswip changak kwa kü yöngnyang" (The domination of former Japanese military officers in the formation process of the Korean Army and its influence), in *Hanguk künhyündaesa wa ch'inilp'a munje* (Modern and contemporary Korean history and the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators), ed. Minjok munje yön'guso. (Seoul:Asea munhwasa, 2000), 259-303.

general apathy, the term ch'inilp'a (pro-Japanese collaborator) has always been one of the most derogatory expressions possible in the Korean language, meaning roughly "unconscionable profiteers or traitors" or "those who are against the interests of the Korean nation and people."

This chapter investigates the resurgence of the ch'inilp'a issue after the long silence of the 1960s and 1970s during the democratic movement in the 1980s and the public's growing interest in it after 1987. More specifically, I examine how earlier critical views on collaborators came to evolve into what I call ch'inilp'a discourse, which later became the common rhetoric of Korean progressives in the post-1987 democratic struggle against the conservatives up through the early 2000s.

Therefore, the first section of this chapter sheds light on the historical background of the rise of ch'inilp'a discourse, in tandem with the changing socio-political situation after Korea's turn to democracy in 1987. The second section traces back the genealogy of ch'inilp'a discourse from the late 1970s to the 1990s and discusses its underlying logic and historical consciousness, focusing on critical writings on collaborators in the 1990s. Finally, the third section investigates how *The Hangyoreh*, Korea's major progressive newspaper since 1988, took advantage of the collaboration issue to formulate a progressive discourse in relation to on-going political affairs as well as fighting against "the right wing conservatives," whom it believed to be the enemies of Korean democracy.

Section 1. The Democratic Transformation of Korean Society as Background to the Emergence of Ch'inilp'a Discourse

After the historic June 29 Declaration of 1987, Koreans witnessed a gradual but steady progress in democracy which was initially impossible under four decades of dictatorships

following Korea's liberation in 1945. This section attempts to investigate the reasons why the rise of ch'inilp'a discourse coincided with Korea's democratic turn and how it was able to extend its social influence throughout the 1990s. In order to do that, I focus on three elements: first, the victory of the democratic movement and the ensuing establishment of the "political system of '87" as the decisive foundation for further democratic progress; second, the Kim Young Sam government's project entitled "Setting History Right" (*yōksa paro seugi*); third, the resurgence of anti-Japanese sentiment in the 1990s. This section roughly covers three post-1987 governments: Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992), Kim Young Sam (1993-1997), and the early years of Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002). It also discusses how the reforms that each government brought forward eventually resulted in creating more public space for publicizing the collaboration issue.

"The political system of '87" is a political and social structure that heavily influenced the characteristics of post-1987 democratic development in Korea. It was established as the ruling Democratic Justice Party (Minjōngdang) accepted the democratic demands of widely organized anti-government activist groups in the form of the June 29 Declaration. As a result, a direct presidential election system was re-installed and democratic progress was made under the party politics in the National Assembly. Korean political scientists define the system as "conservative democratic development from above," referring to its limitations in introducing a more comprehensive democratic system in society. Despite its innate systemic weakness, the democratic struggle of 1987 opened up a new era and began an unstoppable move toward democratic progress.

The 1980s, "the era of revolution," were characterized by a confrontation between two powers: the Chun military regime and organized anti-authoritarian movement groups. Their ever-

escalating conflict finally culminated in the great democratization movement of 1987. Choi Jangjip (Ch'oe Changjip), a renowned political scientist, defines the June 1987 movement as “the most sensational revolutionary event in the last forty years of Korean political history; an anti-military dictatorship front was formed by the people themselves, and for the first time in Korean history, the power of the two groups—the state/the ruling class and the people—met the balance.”⁶¹

An initial wave of public antagonism upon hearing the news of the torture and death of Pak Chongch'öl, a student activist,⁶² in early 1987 quickly developed into a nation-wide anti-government movement in May, demanding a Constitutional amendment for direct-presidential election and the overthrow of the Chun military dictatorship. On May 27th, movement activists organized the Front of the People's Movement for Achieving the Democratic Constitution (Minjuhönpöp chaengch'wi kungmin undong ponbu), which declared all-out confrontation with the regime. Successfully mobilizing their supporters from within the white-collar and middle class, the demonstration camp quickly grew into a national phenomenon, mobilizing more than five hundred thousand people in total. Under inexorable public pressure, Roh Tae Woo, the presidential nominee of the ruling party, announced the June 29 Declaration, which promised eight significant democratic reforms, including a Constitutional amendment for direct election.⁶³

⁶¹ Choi Jangjip (Ch'oe Changjip), *Han'guk minjujuüi üi iron* (Theories on Korean democracy) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1993), 134

⁶² Pak Chongch'öl, was a Seoul National University student and student activist. In January 1987, he was tortured to death in the process of police interrogation. After his death, the police tried to cover up the truth of his torture-induced death in several ways. However, the truth was exposed by the testimonies and efforts of several individuals and organizations, including the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice (Ch'önjugyo chöngüi kuhyön sajedan). His death is considered to trigger the democratization movement of 1987.

⁶³ The eight articles are: 1) a constitutional amendment for a direct-presidential election system; 2) negotiation for presidential election laws; 3) a promise of political amnesty and restoring the rights of

As a result of the direct election at the end of the year, Roh was elected the 13th President of Korea.

In comparison with the previous regime, in spite of Roh's military background, the Roh government was able to obtain relative legitimacy based on the direct-presidential election. On the other hand, it had an innate limitation on taking democratic reforms; along with Chun Doo Hwan, Roh was one of the two main players of the military coup of December 12th in 1979 and the suppression of Gwangju Democratization Movement. However, when opposition parties won a sweeping victory in the 13th General Election in April 1988, the National Assembly passed a series of political reforms, including authorizing an investigation into the political wrongs and corruption of the previous regime and the Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1980. As a result, Chun was sent to exile in the Paektam Buddhist temple in Gangwon Province (Kangwŏn Province). These political reforms rapidly increased the public's desire to learn more about the truth of past wrongs during the colonial period, as well as under authoritarian regimes.

Under these circumstances, the ch'inilp'a issue began to be publicized in nationally circulated magazines and newspapers. The 1987 abrogation of the standard law on mass media, a media censorship law promulgated under the military regime, tremendously contributed to the increase of the number of daily newspapers and magazines, including progressive magazines and newspapers such as *The Hangryoreh*, *Wŏlgan mal* (Speech), *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* (Critical review of history), and *Ch'angch'ak kwa pip'yŏng* (Creation and criticism, resuming its publication after

political prisoners; 4) promotion of freedom of speech; 5) support for basic human rights; 6) introduction of a self-government system; 7) the freedom of the activities of political parties; 8) the eradication of all kinds of corruptions. In Cho Hŭiyŏn, "Han'guk ũi minjujuŭi ihaeng kwa chŏngch'i pyŏndong" (Korea's transition to democracy and political changes), *Han'guk ũi kukka, minjujuŭi, chŏngch'i pyŏndong* (The state, democracy, and political changes in Korea) (Seoul: Tangdae, 1998), 175.

its forced discontinuation in 1980).⁶⁴ Many members of this new progressive media were active in introducing the heretofore unspoken ch'inilp'a issue, collaboration, and the 1949 dissolution of the Special Committee.

Meanwhile, the election of Kim Young Sam as Korea's next president in December 1992 became a watershed moment in bringing public attention to the ch'inilp'a issue. In particular, his project "Setting History Right" was the key in increasing social recognition of the issue. Although the election of Kim heralded Korea's return to civilian rule after three decades of military rule, despite his long-time career as an opposition party leader, he was elected as the presidential nominee of the conservative ruling Liberal Democratic Party (Minjudang, hereafter LDP)⁶⁵, and his civilian rule was not completely free from old politics and interests.⁶⁶ His early term was nevertheless characterized by sweeping reform policies against all kinds of political, social, and economic evils. One of these first acts was a blow to the power of former bureaucratic and military elites under the former military dictatorship: he set a rule that made high officials publically report their property and also banned military secret societies such as the

⁶⁴ According to Im Yōngt'ae, from 1987 to 1990, the number of daily newspapers increased from 30 to 85, a 61 % annual increase rate. At the same time, weekly magazines jumped from 226 to 1,208, a 355% increase, and monthly magazines grew from 1,298 to 2,460, a 90 % increase. Im Yōngt'ae, *Taehanmin' guksa* (A history of the Republic of Korea) (P'aju, Kyōnggido: Tullyōk, 2008), 710-711.

⁶⁵ The Liberal Democratic Party (Minjudang, January 1990 to December 1995) was born as a result of a political union of three conservative parties: the Democratic Justice Party (Minjōngdang), Unification Democratic Party (T'ongil minjudang), and New Democratic Republic Party (Sinminju konghwadang). After his Democratic Justice Party failed to earn a majority in the National Assembly in the 1988 General Election, President Roh Tae Woo pursued an alliance with other conservative opposition parties. Responding to his call, Kim Young Sam and Pak T'aejun joined in the alliance and launched the LDP in January 1990.

⁶⁶ Regarding the conservative nature of his government, Cho Hūiyōn comments that it was, rather than a true democratic regime, a "pseudo-democratic regime," "transitional civilian government," "incomplete democracy," or "limited democracy." See Cho, *ibid.*, 205-6.

infamous Hanahoe.⁶⁷ In March of 1994, Kim went further and passed three reforms that became an institutional step stone for corruption-free campaign: a new election law aiming at preventing illegal campaigns, a law regulating illegal funding of political activities, and a local self-government law. Economically, an August 1993 finance reform law created the “real-name” financial system, which required individuals to register their property under their own names instead of the names of family members or other persons to control the shadow economy and to prevent political and economic corruption.⁶⁸

On top of political and economic reforms, Kim was deeply interested in fostering the ideals of historical legitimacy (*yöksajök chǒngt’ongsǒng*) and national spirit (*minjok chǒnggi*). His pursuit of these ideas was well resonated in his “Setting History Right” project (hereafter SHR). According to the government’s white paper explaining the goal and achievement of SHR, the project had three aims: 1) succeeding to and developing the spirit of the independence movement and the national spirit; 2) resettling the colonial past with Japan; and 3) reframing society through reforms.⁶⁹ The major focus of the first two directions can be summarized as restoring national spirit and historical legitimacy. In order to accomplish these goals, the Kim administration carried out historical projects such as bringing back the remains of independent fighters buried abroad, tearing down the Central National Museum (*ku-Chosǒn ch’ongdukpu kǒnmul*, the headquarters of the former colonial Governor-General), changing the name of

⁶⁷ Hanahoe was a secret circle within the Korean Military Academy. Beginning in 1963, it consisted of Gyeongsan-do based junior military officers. Later on, it developed into a new military group (*singunbu*) and its members were deeply engaged with the December 12 Military Coup, the May 17 Incident, and also the suppression of the Gwangju Democratization Movement.

⁶⁸ Cho, *ibid*, 207-209.

⁶⁹ Yun Yǒng’o, *Yöksa paroseugi* (Setting history right: A series on the reform policies of the Kim Young Sam government) (Seoul: Mirae Midiö, 1996), 39-40.

elementary schools from the colonial era term *kungmin hakkyo* to *ch'odŭng hakkyo*,⁷⁰ reviewing the problematic pro-Japanese careers of “people of merit,” and even getting rid of spikes believed to be nailed down by the Japanese colonial authorities in crucial geomantic locations to lower the energy of Koreans. The nature of the projects was, of course, politically calculated as much as idealistic: taking advantage of the projects, President Kim, who had been a leading opposition politician throughout the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan regimes, apparently hoped to use modern Korean history to build up his own legitimacy. Regardless of his savvy political calculations, the SHR projects became a national interest. For example, destroying the Central National Museum, a building that had been essentially the symbol of Japanese colonialism at the heart of Korea’s capital city, drew tremendous attention in society, and created a number of heated debates on the appropriateness of the demolition of the building from the initial suggestion in May 1993 all the way through to the ceremonial removal of its steeple in August 1995.⁷¹

The national interests of the SHR projects brought issues of contemporary history back into the Korean public consciousness. On the national level, expressions such as SHR and “cleaning off the colonial legacy” (*ch'inil chanjae ch'ōngsan*) were adopted into everyday Korean vocabulary.⁷² President Kim frequently used these abstract terms in his speeches to

⁷⁰ The term, “*kungmin hakkyo*” was first introduced to colonial Korea in 1941 during the Pacific War and its use continued until February 1996. The term “*kungmin*” holds a meaning of national subjects and therefore, the title implies that elementary school nurtures faithful national subjects for the empire (and later on, for the state). In contrast, the term, “*ch'odŭng hakkyo*,” means primary or elementary school for children.

⁷¹ *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, October 21, 1995.

⁷² An editorial warns about the frequent use of the terms such as “the fortune of the nation,” “national spirit,” and “pulse” in media. “Sin Han’guk ūi koesanghan posuhwa kyōngnyang” (Weird conservative tendencies in New Korea) *The Hangyoreh*, August 19, 1993; Similarly, *Wōlgan Chosun*, a conservative monthly magazine, criticizes the usage of the term “national spirit” of the Kim Young Sam government regarding his SHR projects. “Kim Young

justify his project. During a 1995 speech marking the 16th anniversary of the December 12

Military Coup in 1979, he stated:

In order to build a new Korea for the 21st century and establish our national spirit, we need to re-examine our history. “Setting History Right” is the core of the Glorious Revolution to restore national self-esteem and to open up a bright future for the nation. As President, for the rest of my term, I will exert all the possible efforts to set our history right. Given my belief that this is our second nation-building, I will complete it without fail, breaking down any anti-historical and anti-democratic challenges in its path... “Setting History Right” is not just revisiting the past, but “a great undertaking of creation” (*ch’angjo ūi taeŏp*) for the future.⁷³

In such speeches, Kim emphasized that the past needed to be revisited in order to guarantee the bright future of the nation and should not simply remain undisturbed. Therefore, his government made history into a major project of the state and a part of the media’s rhetoric, adopting language such as *ch’ŏngsan* (cleaning off) and national spirit along the way.

Such projects at the state level also facilitated various civic movements for getting rid of Japanese colonial legacies. For instance, upon the news of the possible cancellation of the plan to demolish the Central Museum building due to its astronomical cost, civil groups rose to organize the Committee for Pursuing the Removal of the Official Residence of the Colonial Governor-General (Ku-Chosŏn ch’ongtokpu ch’ŏlgŏ ch’okchin wiwŏnhoe) to raise the funds themselves.⁷⁴ Similarly, new groups and organizations sprang up both locally and nationally with a specific agenda for revisiting the colonial past. Some of the more notable ones included the National

Sam chŏnggwŏn ūn ‘p’ungsu chŏnggwŏn’ inga?’” (Is the Kim Young Sam government the ‘geomancy regime’?), *Wŏlgan Chosun* 187 (October 1995): 156-179.

⁷³ “Announcement to Korean people around the 16th anniversary of the December 12 Affair” in the booklet, “*Yŏksa paroseugi*” *kwallyŏn ŏllon podo* (Media reports regarding “Setting history right”) (Seoul: Kongboch’ŏ, 1995): 5-7.

⁷⁴ Eleven organizations, including Kwangbokhoe, Han’gŭl hakhoe, and Han’guk minjok undongsa yŏn’guhoe, jointly organized the committee. See *Hankook Ilbo*, August 27, 1993.

Conference for Making a Right History (Parŭn yŏksa rŭl wihan minjok hoeŭi),⁷⁵ Meeting for Changing the Title of Elementary Schools, the Group for Restoring the Original Name of Daejeon (to T’aejŏn), the Group for Removing Japanese Spikes, and the Group for Removing the Portrait Scroll of Non’gae (a scroll drawn by pro-Japanese artist Yi Ŭnho in Jinju (Chinju)).⁷⁶

The public interest in colonial legacies naturally led to discussion on the issue of unpunished pro-Japanese collaborators. A suitable occasion came up in early 1993: the Ministry of Veterans and Patriots Affairs finally reviewed a previously raised “suspect of collaboration” charge levied on many men of merit that May.⁷⁷ In July, the Ministry named eight people suspected of collaboration, many of whom were in fact previously respected figures such as Kim Sŏngsu, Yi Ŭnsang, and Yi Kapsŏng. When the naming itself caused a small backlash (regarding the appropriateness of the announcement in the National Assembly), the incident ended shortly with an apology by the Ministry regarding its carelessness. In the middle of the political disturbance, newspapers jumped into merit versus harm debates on celebrities’ collaboration. *The Hangyoreh*, reacting to the “unnecessary” apology of the Ministry, cried out against how the

⁷⁵ The national conference was an association of forty-eight groups that were organized to memorialize the independence movement under Japanese imperialism including Tongnip yugongja yujok hyŏphoe, 3·1 undong kinyŏm saŏphoe, and Hŭngsadan. In February 15, 1995, the conference was launched as part of the movement for recovering national legitimacy. See *Hankook Ilbo*, February 15, 1995.

⁷⁶ “Il chanjae ch’ŏngsan sinminjok munhwa ch’angjo” (Cleaning off the remains of Japanese colonialism and creating new national culture), *Hankook Ilbo*, February 26, 1994.

⁷⁷ The subject was raised as early as 1991. For example, see Chŏng Unhyŏn, “Tongnip ungonja tasi sŏnjŏng haeya handa” (The selection of men of national merit for the independence movement need to be re-examined), *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 16 (August 1991): 84-98, as well as a summary of Chŏng’s article in *The Hangyoreh*, August 15, 1999; Kim Sohŭi, “Tongnip kinyŏn tanch’e edo ch’inil inmaek itta” (There is a pro-Japanese network within organizations memorializing the independence movement!), *Wŏlgan mal* 82 (April 1993): 72-77.

prevailing conservatism prevented people from addressing the ch'inilp'a issue.⁷⁸ However, this incident nationally publicized the heretofore forgotten collaboration issue to all Koreans and allowed the public to learn about the suspected collaboration of well-respected figures. Also, the great-grandson of Yi Wanyong, the most infamous “traitor” engaged in Japan’s annexation of Korea, filed a lawsuit in December 1993 to regain his great-grandfather’s property. It raised great antipathy among Koreans. In response to Yi’s lawsuit, two lawmakers, Kim Wŏn’ung and Che Chŏnggu, proposed a law for punishing those who committed anti-national crimes (Panminjok haengwija ch’ŏlbŏl pŏpan).

Finally, in order to grasp why the ch'inilp'a issue strongly appealed to Koreans in the 1990s, anti-Japanese sentiment also deserves full attention. In post-1945 Korea, anti-Japanese nationalism largely remained in the realm of state ideology for public mobilization⁷⁹ and as understandable public sentiment of the formerly colonized for their colonizers. It was also one of the ever-favorite topics of the media. However, in the 1990s, there was a shift: instead of the state organizing and stimulating anti-Japanese sentiment itself, civic organizations turned this sentiment into a full-fledged social movement.⁸⁰ After the failure of radical reform movements in the early 1990s, new forms of civic movements began to spring in society, including several

⁷⁸ For examples, see “Ch'inil haengwi chosa wa pallangun susa” (The investigations on pro-Japanese activities and rebellion army), *The Hangyoreh*, July 23, 1993; “Ch'inil seryŏk ūl natnatch'i ch'ŏngsan hara” (Cleansing off pro-Japanese collaborators completely), *The Hangyoreh*, August 18, 1993.

⁷⁹ For more on the anti-Japanese policy during the Rhee Syngman regime, see Sŏ Chungŏk, “Rhee Syngman taet'ongnyŏng ūi pan-II undong kwa Han'guk minjokchu'i” (The anti-Japanese movement of President Rhee Syngman and Korean nationalism), in *Pigŭk ūi hyŏndae chidoja* (Tragic leaders of contemporary Korea) (Seoul: Sŏnggyungwan taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2002), 121-176. Also, on the anti-Japanese discourse as a national/state ideology in South Korea, see Sin Chubaek, “Uri nŭn Ilbon ūroput'ŏ haebang toeŏnnŭnga—Ilbon e taehan sŏnmang kwa kyŏngmyŏl sai esŏ”: 125-139.

⁸⁰ Sin Chubaek, *ibid.*, 135-137. Sin argues that until the 1990s, authoritarian regimes and democratization movement activists dominated anti-Japanese discourse. However, since the 1990s, it began to be led by the victims of colonial rule, their families, and the civil organizations supporting them.

major civic movements targeting Japan. Some of these representative organizations include The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Chöngsindae taech'aek hyöbühoe), Association for the Pacific War Victims (T'aepyöngyang chönjaeng hüsaengja yujokhoe), the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities (Pan-minjok munje yön'guso, later renamed Minjok munje yön'guso), and A Party for Dokdo Protection (Tokdo subidae). Their primary goal was (and remains) to resolve past issues of Japanese colonialism. In the meantime, their activities provoked Koreans' antagonism against the Japanese government by informing them of forgotten or rarely known colonial atrocities.

Especially from the 1990s onward, Korea and Japan developed a rocky relationship over several historical and diplomatic issues. These included the public exposure of the existence of forced military sexual slavery in the early 1990s, a new fishing treaty coupled with territorial conflicts over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets since the mid-1990s, Japanese right wing politicians' remarks on Japanese imperialism, and ongoing issues since the late-1990s over a Japanese right wing group's revisionist history textbook on Japan's imperial expansionism in Asia in the first half of the 20th century.⁸¹ The case of so-called "military comfort women" is particularly illustrative in its transformation into the wider issue of ch'inilp'a, increasing public antagonism toward pro-Japanese collaborators and the Japanese government.

The public exposure of the stories on military comfort women in 1991 roughly coincided

⁸¹ In mid-2001, a survey asked Korean students at different ages about the Korea-Japan relationship. Students answered the question of what they think is the most significant issue between the two countries over a five-point scale: Dokdo issue averages 4.20, the history textbook issue 4.04, military comfort women issue 3.63, discrimination against Korean-Japanese 3.26, economy and trade 3.16, military and national security 3.09, and cultural and sport exchanges 2.59. The students prioritized the issues of *Dokdo/Takeshima*, Japan's history textbook issue, and military comfort women. In the survey, 476 middle-school students, 453 high school students, and 1,183 college students participated. Hyön Taesong, "Han'guggin üi Dokdo üisik hyöngsöng kwajöng kwa kü kujo" (The formation process of Dokdo consciousness among Koreans and its structure) in *Ilbon ün Han'guk ege muösinga* (What does Japan mean to Korea?), ed. Kim Yöngjak and Yi Wondök. (Paju: Hanul, 2006), 108-138.

with the re-introduction of the ch'inilp'a issue into public discourse by the progressive media. In the early 1990s, the revelation of the activities of collaborators hit a peak with the exposure of many unknown crimes of elite collaborators. Collaborators in the publication of the time period are depicted as those who directly helped Japan's brutal crimes—military sexual slavery, the military draft, and forced labor mobilization. They were shown to be inside accomplices who were accountable for the miseries of the Korean people.

In the late 1990s, there was a further incident that clearly revealed a discursive link between the two issues of pro-Japanese collaborators and Japan's use of military comfort women; as a source of deep anti-Japanese antagonism, these women's status was utilized to underscore the "anti-national criminality" of elites' wartime collaboration. Going one step further, the incident clearly shows that any accountability for mobilizing comfort women, even if it was merely alleged, would henceforth make it easy to brand one as a collaborator, regardless of one's valuable contributions to society. In October 1998, Ewha Woman's University, one of the nation's most prestigious private universities, planned to set up an international "Hellen Kim Award" which was named after Kim Hwallan. Kim was not only the first Korean female president of a university, but was also a renowned Christian activist and diplomat. Until the early 1990s when the anti-ch'inilp'a writings highlighted her wartime collaboration, her public image was that of a respected female educator. Upon this revelation, the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities (hereafter, IRCA) and Ewha's student union jointly opposed the award on the grounds that it was named after an individual who had a career of "pro-Japanese" collaboration and eventually persuaded the school to withdraw the establishment of the award.⁸²

⁸² *The Hangyoreh*, October 22, 1998.

This issue quickly became one of the most crucial moments in which the ch'inilp'a issue received the national spotlight and developed into a civic movement that would oppose memorializing anyone charged with collaboration. Those who opposed the award particularly highlighted Kim's alleged recruiting tours for military comfort women as part of her anti-woman attitude, which contrasted her life-long devotion toward improving women's social position. During the Pacific War, she in fact made encouraging speeches as part of recruiting *chōngsindae* (labor battalions and comfort women)⁸³ and military "volunteers." However, there is no evidence that Kim made speeches specifically for recruiting military comfort women, as was widely claimed in public at the time. Yet, a cartoon in *Minjok chōnggi*, an organ of IRCA, depicted her working enthusiastically to recruiting military comfort women, which alone seemingly made her an unacceptable collaborator.⁸⁴

When the topic of collaborators was later brought up at the National Assembly in the mid-2000's, many (though not all of) movement leaders would go on to distinguish the issue from overall anti-Japanese sentiment.⁸⁵ However, the ch'inilp'a issue was in many cases raised alongside anti-Japanese nationalism, particularly at the early stage of discourse formation and spread. Under the Kim Young Sam government, the ch'inilp'a discourse circulated widely.

⁸³ At least until the mid-2000s, there was conceptual confusion between the terms military comfort women (*wianbu*/J. *ianfū*) and *chōngsindae* (J. *seishintai*). The former term was mainly used to describe sexual service and the latter was originally for labor mobilization. Therefore, *chōngsindae* was mistakenly known as military comfort women among the public throughout the 1990s and until now. To be sure, some of those who joined in the latter were also drafted for the latter. Yet, this earlier misunderstanding of the term made the nature of her "anti-national crimes" look even more severe.

⁸⁴ Ha Chuwōn, *Minjok sarang 2* (November 1998): 10-11.

⁸⁵ In the interview, Kang Mangil, a well-known progressive historian who was deeply engaged with the movement for revisiting the ch'inilp'a issue in the 1990s and 2000s, said that when he was appointed the chairman of the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism (PCIC), he made clear to the Japanese mass media that the project was not for instigating anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans, but for historical truth and self-reflection. Kang Mangil, Interview, Seoul, February 11, 2010.

As early as 1995, small local groups began a movement to get rid of the remnants of collaborators in their locales, e.g., the removal of the statue of Kim Ch'unsu in Ilchodae in Chuncheon (in Ch'unch'ŏn, 1995) and the movement for removing the Non'gae's portrait drawn by Yi Ŭnho in Jinju (1995-2008). In the late 1990s, social debates over memorializing two public figures, Park Chung Hee and Kim Hwallan, upgraded the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement from a local to a national one. Successfully drawing public attention and bringing public opinion to its side, the ch'inilp'a discourse set the stage for a broad public movement in the 2000s.

Section 2. The Genealogy, Spread, and Logic of Ch'inilp'a Discourse

Continuing the examination of the historical background of the resurgence of the ch'inilp'a issue in public after 1987, this section discusses its formation, circulation, and underlying logic. The purpose of this section is first to investigate the intellectual tradition of ch'inilp'a discourse when it first began in the late 1970's. From there, it examines how criticism of collaborators evolved into the discourse in the mid- and late 1980s. Finally, this section examines its spread, underlying logic, and historical consciousness by closely reading various publications about collaborators in the 1990s.

In order to locate the genealogy of the ch'inilp'a discourse, it is significant to find the first public speaker on the issue. Even though Im Chongguk published his *Ch'inil munhangnon* (Pro-Japanese literature) as early as 1965, it seems that Im is not responsible for creating the historical narrative itself. His writings about collaborators up to the early 1980s rarely include political messages against South Korean regimes and elites, although it is unclear whether he might have intentionally abstained himself from presenting his political views in order to avoid attack from former collaborators now ensconced in positions of power and influence, both political and

academic. Even in his two articles in *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik I, II* (The understanding of Korean history before and after liberation, vol. 1-2, 1980 and 1985), he does not attribute the mishaps of South Korean history to the existence of collaborators, as was later argued in early criticisms of collaborators. The two articles, which played a tremendous role in informing the public of the collaboration issue in the early 1980s, rather objectively deliver the story of collaborators and their careers after liberation. In the articles, Im declares that ch'inilp'a studies should not be utilized to attack collaborators themselves. Rather he hopes that Koreans will recognize this issue as part of the wrenching reality of colonial rule, not as sins of individual collaborators.⁸⁶ Although his second article is more assertive about the necessity of investigating the collaboration issue thoroughly, Im still cautions not to take it as an individual scandal, and simply demands sincere apologies from former collaborators.⁸⁷ To some extent, his later political criticism of collaborators seems to have gradually emerged in the mid- and late 1980s. Therefore, it is clear that Im was not the creator of the rigorous ch'inilp'a discourse of the post-1987 era. But if not him, who?

One early sign of ch'inilp'a discourse can be found in the writings of Yi Yŏnghŭi (1929-2010), who has been called the teacher of consciousness-raising (*ŭisikhwa kyosa*) in the 1970s.⁸⁸

As a representative intellectual and journalist of his day, Yi wrote two influential books,

⁸⁶ Im Chongguk, "Ilche mal ch'inil kunsang ūi silt'ae" (The reality of a group of pro-Japanese collaborators in the late phase of Japanese imperialism), in *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik* (The understanding of Korean history before and after liberation), ed. Song Kŏnho et al. (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1980), 172-74.

⁸⁷ Im Chongguk, "Che-1 konghwaguk kwa ch'inil seryŏk" (The First Republic and pro-Japanese collaborators), in *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik II* (The understanding of Korean history before and after liberation, Vol. 2), ed. Kang Mangil et al. (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1985), 143-46, 205-08.

⁸⁸ In the Korean context, the term consciousness-raising (*ŭisikhwa*) was often used from the 1970s to the 1990s in relation to the student movement and labor movement. It signifies the radicalization of one's thoughts by recognizing confronting political, economic, and social problems and the potential transformation of such a person into an anti-regime activist for social reforms.

Chŏnhwan sidae ūi nollī (The logic of transitional time) in 1974 and *Usang kwa isŏng* (Idol and reason) in 1977. The two books audaciously touch upon forbidden political issues under the oppressive Yusin dictatorship,⁸⁹ such as the People’s Republic of China, the Vietnam War, the Korea-U.S.-Japan security relationship, etc. The first book, once rated the fourth most influential book in the post-1945 intellectual world by Korean professors,⁹⁰ is evaluated as “destroying false consciousness, rejecting distorted anti-communist ideology, promoting an objective scientific-mind, and suggesting a democratic civic movement.”⁹¹ In his second book, Yi warns of the increasing political, economic, and military influence of Japan on the peninsula, and simultaneously harshly criticizes the frustrated nation-building process of South Korea due to (in his view) the failure to punish collaborators. According to him, Korea’s liberation did not actually bring about the disruption of foreign rule; rather, it was simply a continuation of the old colonial class hierarchy, as well as of its oppressive police, prosecution, court and prison systems, and intelligence agencies. He argues that Koreans themselves rejected liberation by avoiding the agonizing process of self-reform.⁹² These two books are considered to have shaped the worldview of South Korean progressives in the late 1970s and 1980s.

His musings on the twisted beginning of the nation and ch’inilp’a became even sharper in

⁸⁹ Yunsin dictatorship (Yusin tokchae ch’eje, December 1972 to October 1979) indicates a life-long dictatorship system that President Park Chung Hee created. Under the martial law and contingency actions in late 1972, President Park nullified the Constitution of the Third Republic and legislated new Yusin Constitution. According to the new constitution, the president held the absolute power over administration, legislation and judicature including unlimited 6-year terms for presidency.

⁹⁰ *Kyosu Sinmun*, August 22, 2005.

⁹¹ Yi Yŏnghŭi, *Chŏnhwan sidae ūi nollī* (The logic of transitional time), reprinted in 2006 (Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa pip’yŏng, 2006), 5-6.

⁹² Yi Yŏnghŭi, “Kwangbok 32-chunyŏn ūi pansŏng” (Self-reflection on the thirty-two years’ anniversary of liberation), in *Usang kwa isŏng* (Idol and reason) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1977), 15-18.

his writings in *Pundan ūl nŏmŏsŏ* (Going beyond the division, 1984). Retrospectively looking back upon Korean history forty years after liberation, Yi blames the failure of the Special Committee in purging collaborators as the primary cause for what he describes as a blemish upon the spirit of the nation.⁹³

Yi was not the only prominent scholar who held a critical view on the linkage between the “unsuccessful” nation-building process and *ch’inilp’a* in the late 1970s. A group of progressive intellectuals clearly shared his view on collaborators, which was reflected in another extremely influential book, entitled *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi insik*. Considered to be the academic manifesto of the progressive movement, the book was published in the transitional period between the Yusin regime and the Chun Doo Hwan regime known as “the Spring of Seoul.”⁹⁴ Its historical significance is that it represented the new historical perspective of the progressives on post-1945 Korea, as well as further shaped the historical consciousness of the next generation in the 80s who actively fought against military dictatorships. This book defines post-1945 Korean history as “post-colonial history,” which is identified with an uncompleted liberation with two historical conditions—division (into North and South) and foreign influence. In the first article, entitled “Haebang ūi minjoksajŏk insik” (The recognition of liberation from a perspective of Korean national history), Song Kŏnho, famous for his long fight for the freedom of speech, writes:

The purpose of this writing is to investigate the fact that while our liberation was given as a gift (from outside), the fate of our nation has been unilaterally manipulated, exploited, and humiliated by powerful countries. I will also illuminate how in the middle of that, pro-Japanese flunkeys became dominant, trampled on patriots, and

⁹³ Yi Yŏnghŭi, “Haebang 40-yŏn ūi pansŏng kwa minjok ūi naeil” (Self-reflection upon the forty-year’s anniversary of liberation and the future of the nation), in *Pundan ūl nŏmŏsŏ* (Going beyond the division) (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1984), 17-20.

⁹⁴ According to a survey carried out among college professors, this book was ranked the 6th most influential book in South Korean intellectual history. *Kyosu Sinmun*, August 22, 2005.

made the division permanent for their own interests, accelerating the tragedy of our nation.⁹⁵

As seen above, Song blames the ch'inilp'a, whom he calls flunkeys (*sadaejũija*), as the major cause of the peninsula's division. He further says that the dependent nation, in inviting the dominance of flunkeys, "eventually lowered morality and conscience, increased internal conflicts within the nation, and created a gulf between the rich and the poor, practiced corruption and embraced dictatorship, and finally put *minjung* in a pit of hardship." The true independence of the nation, Song writes, will come only when "*minjung* from all social realms participate in history as subjects; only upon that condition will democracy flourish."⁹⁶

Throughout the 1980s, more intellectuals seemed to agree upon the "pernicious" role of collaborators in post-1945 Korean history. One such intellectual is Han Wansang, a progressive Christian who was dismissed from a university professorship in the early 1980s and later became the Vice Prime Minister in 2001 under the Kim Dae Jung administration. In his book, *Ppuri ppop'in momũro* (With my uprooted body), Han points out the remnants of Japanese imperialism and Cold War McCarthyism as the two fundamental causes behind all structural evils in Korean society. Han criticizes the then-prevailing "selfish expedient way of thinking" (*pyõnpõpchuõi*) as a social and cultural characteristic of society after liberation. He seizes the dissolution of the Special Committee as its historical background.⁹⁷ Although Han merely alludes to it, judging from the context, he attributes the lack of desirable moral values in Koreana society to the

⁹⁵ Song Kõnho, "Haebang ũi minjoksajõk insik" (The recognition of liberation from a perspective of Korean national history), in *Haebang chõnhusa ũi insik*, ed. Song Kõnho et al (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1980), 14.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁹⁷ Han Wansang, "Uri rül sũlpũge hanũn kõttũl" (What makes us unhappy), in *Ppuri ppop'in momũro: Han'guk kwa Miguk ũl tasi saenggak handa* (With my uprooted body: Rethinking Korea and the U.S.) (Seoul: Irwõl sõgak, 1985), 11.

dominance of ch'inilp'a.

A similar view on ch'inilp'a can also be found among critical economists, such as Yu Inho. In his book, *Hanil kyŏngje 100-yŏn ũi hyŏnjang* (The scene of 100 years of Korea-Japan economic relations), Yu characterizes the economic relationship as the former's subordination to the latter. Yu indicates collaborators were the primary reason the relationship is still unequal in post-1945, saying:

Leaving alone the “false thought” of a Chosŏn invasion (*Chosŏn ch'imryak*) among the Japanese ruling class, there are also other problems that we need to take into consideration. One of them is that we missed a chance to judge those who participated in all kinds of anti-national activities, cooperating with Japanese imperialists for their own interests, as well as those whom the imperialists raised as pro-Japanese traitors. As a consequence, these individuals lead [today's] Korea-Japan relationship... They principally hate “the nation, democracy, and the people (*minjung*).” Because of that, they don't compromise with “the nation, democracy, and the people” and instead choose to curry favor with the foreign power. Therefore, if something contributes to the interests of the foreign power whom they flatter, even if it contradicts the interests of ‘the nation, democracy, and the people,’ they would choose the alternative. As a result, the inner conflict became more intensified and in general [we (Koreans)] have come to reproduce several contradictions within us on a larger scale. It is similar to the scene of one hundred years ago.⁹⁸

What is noteworthy in his writing is that Yu brings in the concepts of “the nation, democracy, and the people” (*minjok, minju, minjung*) to conceptualize ch'inilp'a. The “*min*”-trilogy (*sam min*) were first introduced in the statement of National Federation of Democratic Youth and Students (Chŏn'guk minju ch'ŏngnyŏn haksae ch'ongyŏnmaeng) in 1974. Shortly after, it was considered to embody the fight of liberal students and youth for the betterment of the nation. In the 1980s, the *undongkwŏn* (student activists in democratic and labor movements) accepted the tripartite slogan as the goal of their struggle. The term the “*min*”-trilogy became a

⁹⁸ Yu Inho, *Han-Il kyŏngje 100-yŏn ũi hyŏnjang* (The scene of 100 years of Korea-Japan economic relations) (Seoul: Irwŏl sŏgak, 1984), 4.

favorite in the students' democratization movement.

Yu defines *ch'inilp'a* as a historical reality whose interests are opposed to those of the nation, democracy, and the people. Furthermore, in his writing, *ch'inilp'a* symbolizes the structural ruling class that routinely flatters foreign powers. This view is particularly reinforced in the historical narrative of *undongkwŏn* after 1986. O Yŏnho's writing is an example that reveals how *undongkwŏn* students in the 1980s historicized the identity of the Korean ruling class.⁹⁹ When Yu was arrested for exchanging letters with high school students for the purpose of consciousness-raising, he made this statement as part of his appeal:

The purpose of "exchanging letters" lies in letting all our patriotic Koreans know who our enemies are.... At that time, the enemy was not only Japanese imperialism. Since pro-Japanese traitors, bureaucrats, policemen, and comprador landowners arrested, tortured, and exploited fellow countrymen under the protection of Japanese imperialists, the nation called them all "enemy." ... Who are those who impose disadvantages and dehumanization on the Korean nation in the 1980s? The tragedy of contemporary Korean history after liberation and the dissolution of the Special Committee tells us that the heretics (*idanja*) that once tormented our compatriots were not punished, didn't vanish and didn't apologize. Instead, they still remained the heretics, transforming themselves into traitorous pro-American bureaucrats, policemen, and pro-American monopolistic capitalists. And once again, they emerged as the rulers. These deceivers, all of a sudden replacing the mask of pro-Japanese with that of pro-Americans, spread the word that pro-Americanism is patriotism.¹⁰⁰

Comparing O's statement with Yu's writing, we can notice a clear change from the former to the latter. Notably different from Yu, O Yŏnho introduces the U.S. rather than Japan as the primary post-1945 antagonistic foreign power. The association of *ch'inilp'a* with the U.S. as the foreign power had rarely been made in earlier intellectuals' writings. Except for Han Wansang's

⁹⁹ From the late 1980s to the 1990s, O worked as a reporter for *Wŏlgan mal* and was famous for his anti-American reports.

¹⁰⁰ O Yŏnho, "Ajiktto Miguk ūl tchaksasang hanŭn, Pukhan ūl miwŏhanŭn 'singminji ūi adŭl' ege" (To "the son of a colony" who still loves the U.S. in vain and dislikes North Korea), in *Singminji ūi adŭl ege* (To the son of a colony) (Seoul: Paeksan sŏdang, 1989), 248-251.

vague accusation against the U.S. for the Cold War, statements about the harmful consequences of ch'inilp'a after 1945 were in most cases related to Japan's influence in Korea. However, differentiating itself from earlier ch'inilp'a criticism, O's writing reflects the growing recognition of the U.S. as the foreign power among *undongkwŏn* throughout the 1980s after the Gwangju Democratization Movement. Written in 1987, O's writing might also have been under the influence of emerging anti-imperialism thought (*panje nosŏn*), which became more widespread among *undongkwŏn* after 1985. As the first underground pamphlet propagating an anti-imperialism line, "Haebang sŏsi" (Overture to liberation) narratives: "One-hundred year's modern Korean history, from the late-19th century to the present, is that of imperialist invasions and of *minjung*'s fight against them." Also, the pamphlet defines current Korea as "a neocolonial society governed by U.S. imperialism and its agents in a fascistic way."¹⁰¹ Under this historical consciousness, ch'inilp'a are redefined as the comprador ruling class that first ingratiated itself to Japan, and the U.S. next, in the 20th century. In the 1980s, ch'inilp'a criticism seems to have spread from a few progressive intellectuals to the younger generation (such as *undongkwŏn*) and those who were critical about the authoritarian socio-political system. The dispersion cannot be separated from the *undongkwŏn*'s Marxist reading of Korean society.

In tandem with the *undongkwŏn*'s worldviews in the 1980s, the *minjung* history movement had a great impact on the establishment of the structural understanding of ch'inilp'a's role in Korean history. *Minjung* historiography began as a part of the *minjung* movement since the mid-

¹⁰¹ Kang Sinch'ŏl et al, *80-yŏndae ūi haksaeŅg undongsa* (The student movement of the 1980s) (Seoul: Hyŏngsŏngsa, 1988), 437-442.

1970s and developed into a unique movement in the mid-1980s.¹⁰² The *minjung* history project is an attempt to grasp Korean history from the bottom up through the lens of groups that were isolated from elite-centered notions of historical development.¹⁰³ One major aspect of this project is that it rejects the existing elite-centered historiography as a ruling ideology that served the existing political and social system. Instead, it attempts to locate *minjung* as the main subject of historical development from the late Chosŏn dynasty, to South and North division, and to the present (meaning the early 1990s). As a natural consequence, on top of foreign powers, its narrative demonizes traitorous elites, the bourgeoisie (nationalists), and supporters of dictatorships as the enemies of the true Korean people. For this reason, *ch'inilp'a* under the historical epistemology of the 1980s can be equated with a class concept which represents the ruling class and elites, regardless of their original economic and social backgrounds.

As I have discussed, the overall narrative structure of *ch'inilp'a* discourse was completed in the mid-1980s. Throughout the decade, a hermeneutical community centered on intellectuals and *undongkwŏn* judged *ch'inilp'a* as the “original sin” of Korean history. Soon after Korea’s

¹⁰² Yi Manyŏl and Chŏng Ch’angnyŏl were earlier advocates of the movement. In the mid-1980s, progressive research institutes and junior scholars led the movement. The research institutes are Mangwŏn Han’guksa yŏn’gusil (1984), Han’guk kŭndaesa yŏn’guhoe (1987), Han’guk yŏksa yŏn’guhoe (1988, formed by unifying the first two groups), Kuro yŏksa yŏn’guhoe (1988, later Yŏksahak yŏn’guso in 1993), Yŏksa munje yŏn’guso (1984). Pae Sŏngjun, “1980-90-yŏndae minjung sahak ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa somyŏl” (The formation and demise of *minjung* historiography in the 1980s and 90s) (paper presented at the symposium, “Kyŏnggye e sŏn minjung, saeroun minjungsa rŭl hyanghayŏ” organized by Yŏksa munje yŏn’guso, Seoul, December 5, 2009), 3-10; Yi Seyŏng, “‘Minjung’ kaenyŏm ŭi kyebohak” (The genealogy of the concept of *minjung*), in *Uri an ŭi pop’yŏnsŏng* (The universality within us), ed. Kim Kyŏngil et al. (Seoul: Hanul, 2006), 339-348.

¹⁰³ Kim Sŏngbo sees that *minjung* historiography is one of the two trends of South Korean post-colonial historiography. According to him, “the theory of internal development” came out in the 1970s as the first generation post-colonial historiography to fight back negative Japanese colonial historiography, i.e. “stagnation theory.” Later in the 1980s, “*minjung* historiography” (*minjung sahak*) and “historiography in the era of division” (*pundan sidae ŭi sahak* or in other term, “historiography toward unification” (*t’ongil chihyang sahak*)) were established to overcome post-colonial conditions of the South Korean nation. Pae Sŏngjun comments that *minjung* history is broadly-speaking “scientific and practice-oriented historiography” and narrowly “the history of people’s movement” under the influence of leftist ideology. See Kim Sŏngbo, “‘Minjung sahak ajik to yuhyo hanga” (Is *minjung* historiography still applicable?), *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 16 (fall, 1991), 48-49; Pae, “1980-90-yŏndae minjung sahak,” 2.

democratization in 1987, this narrative began to be circulated among the public. At this time, previously ambiguous identities of collaborators became unveiled, as writings on collaborators called out the names of individuals. It is also around this time that ch'inilp'a criticism first made a claim for revisiting the issue (*Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*). It was in the late 1980s that ch'inilp'a was finally transformed into a public discourse, circulating among ordinary Koreans beyond the limited circle of critical intellectuals, *undongkwōn*, and the progressives.

Once established, ch'inilp'a discourse circulated, spread, and was popularized in the public eye from the late-1980s onward. The dissemination of the discourse occurred in two ways: 1) (serialized) reports in newspapers, journals, and magazines and 2) publications on collaborators. The former includes *The Hangyoreh*, *Wōlgan mal*, *Sun'guk* (Patriotic martyrs) *Yōksa pip'yōng* and organs of the IRCA. The latter was largely expressed as semi-academic writings on collaborators, the details of their collaboration, and Korea-Japan relations.

First of all, I will examine serialized reports on collaborators in journals and magazines. It is not surprising to note that politically progressive media were active in introducing the issue. (Except for *Sun'guk*, all other mentioned media hold a reputation in their field for political progressiveness.) The early circulation of ch'inilp'a discourse should largely be credited to *Wōlgan mal*.¹⁰⁴ In response to repeated public demand for correcting past wrongs in 1989,¹⁰⁵ it

¹⁰⁴Originally, the magazine began as the organ of the Council for Democratic Mass Media Movement (Minju ōllon undong hyōbūihoe) in 1985. In 1989, it became a registered monthly magazine geared towards the general public. In the middle of the democratization movement in the late 1980s, it covered several special reports that other media dared not under the press law. The magazine's staff took pride in its wide circulation among undonggwōn, college students, and progressives from the 1980s to the 1990s.

¹⁰⁵ An official investigation on the corruption of the former Chun regime was launched in April 1989. That October it resulted in parliamentary inspection of the administration for the first time in sixteen years. As a result, the Special Committee on the Gwangju Democratization Movement and the Special Investigation Committee on the 5th Republic came into operation.

serialized special reports on anti-national activities of Korean elites from October 1989 to November 1990 under the title “Re-opening the Special Committee for Punishing Anti-national Activities.”¹⁰⁶ It added three more articles from September 1990 to March 1991, disclosing pro-Japanese networks in politics and focusing on collaborators initially honored as independence movement fighters and nationalists.¹⁰⁷ What is significant about the articles is that they name many post-1945 power elites as collaborators. Taking one more step forward from Im Chongguk’s works, they provide the detailed life story of collaborators to prove their “anti-national crimes.” By doing so, the articles underscore the consistency of the collaborators’ anti-national inclination before and after 1945. This particular reporting style became a model for a large number of *ch’inilp’a* publications shortly after in the early 1990s.

In contrast with *Wōlgan mal*, *Sun’guk*, *Yōksa pip’yōng* and organs of the IRCA were magazines for a specific audience, reaching only a limited circulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In spite of their limitation in spreading the discourse, each magazine played a unique role in increasing social interests and in propagating the message of *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan*.

For example, the bimonthly magazine *Sun’guk* patronized those who were interested in the issue from its very beginning in 1988. With the patriotic Association of the Descendants of Independence Movement Martyrs (*Sun’guk sōnyōl yujokhoe*) as the publisher, the magazine provided a rare publication opportunity for representative *ch’inilp’a* critics such as Kim Samung

¹⁰⁶ The reports deal with the following seven figures and *Chosun Ilbo*: So Chōngju, Mo Yunsuk, Pak Chung Hee, Chōng Ilgwōn Kim Hwallan, Sin Hwakh’yōn, and Kim Sōngsu.

¹⁰⁷ Chōng Unhyōn contributed three reports to the magazine: “Chōngch’igwōn ūi ch’inil inmaek” *Wōlgan mal* 51 (September 1990): 28-33; “Tongnip ungongja ro tungaphan ch’inilp’a dūl” 54 (December 1990): 68-73; “‘3·1 Munhwasang’ susangja dūl ūi ch’inil iryōksō” 57 (March 1991): 66-69.

and Chŏng Unhyŏn to publish in the middle of a still-unfavorable social atmosphere.¹⁰⁸ It also enabled them to form their network for research and advancing the movement in the late 1980s.¹⁰⁹ *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* is a history journal that originated from the progressive history movement among junior scholars in the 1980s. Under the goal of popularizing contemporary history, the journal interrogated ch'inilp'a-related issues as a way of understanding 20th century Korea. From the 1990s to the 2000s, it featured several special issues on ch'inilp'a while academically advocating the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement.¹¹⁰ Finally, the organ of IRCA was first published in 1993. At its earliest stage, it was only distributed to a small number of people so that its public influence was fairly limited, but towards the late 1990s, it played a significant role in educating and motivating local leaders to lead the *ch'ŏngsan* movement.

Ch'inilp'a publications in the 1990s also greatly affected the formation of an anti-ch'inilp'a perspective in society. This largely indicates semi-academic writings that deal with collaborators, their life-long “anti-national activities,” evaluate their lives, and discuss the dissolution of the Special Committee, the Korea-Japan relationship, and so forth. This dissertation focuses on public writing, since that is primarily what was available to the Korean public at the time; academic works, although extensive in their own right, will be discussed only

¹⁰⁸ With the renaissance of publications on the topic, a group of people with strong interests in vocalizing the issue appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s. My dissertation names them ch'inilp'a critics, meaning those who made firm claims for a full-scaled investigation on collaborators and their activities and demanded historical re-evaluation of their lives.

¹⁰⁹ According to the brief preface of *Ch'inilp'a* vol. 1, Kim, Yi and Chŏng met through their writings in *Sunguk* and decided to work together to publicize the issue. Kim Samung, Yi Hŏnjong, and Chŏng Unhyŏn, *Ch'inilp'a* (Collaborators) (Seoul: Hangminsa, 1990), 4.

¹¹⁰ For example, the winter issue of 1993 was a special about collaboration, released under the title of “Ch'inilp'a, tŭngjang kwa puhwal ũ kujo” (Pro-Japanese collaborators, the structure of emergence and revival).

to the extent they influenced the formation of public opinion.¹¹¹

The publication of collaborators' names enjoyed its heyday during the Kim Young Sam government. In 1993 alone, five different books spanning eight volumes were published on the topic, including the best-selling *Ch'inilp'a 99-in* (Ninety-nine collaborators). Throughout the 1990s, more than eighteen books spanning twenty-eight volumes were published. The publications include: three volumes of *Ch'inilp'a* (Collaborators, 1990-1993), three volumes of *Ch'inilp'a 99-in* (Nintey-nine collaborators, 1993), *Inmul ro ponŭn ch'inilp'a yŏksa* (A History of collaborators reading through individuals, 1993), three volumes of *Ch'ŏngsan haji mottan yŏksa* (History, failed to cleanse off, 1994), *Ch'inilp'a 100-in 100-mun* (Pro-Japanese collaborators: 100 persons and 100 questions, 1995), and the series *Ch'inil munje yŏn'gu* (Studies on collaboration issues, 1994-1996).

This publication boom was mainly led by ch'inilp'a critics and research groups or institutions such as the IRCA, Ch'inil munje yŏn'gu,¹¹² and Yŏksa munje yŏn'guso. A couple of representative figures among the critics are Kim Samung and Chŏng Unhyŏn. As journalists with a special interest towards the issue,¹¹³ they have been loyal advocates to the claims of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* from the very beginning to the 2000s. Both are also prolific writers on the topic:

¹¹¹ For a review of academic research on ch'inilp'a from the 1980s to 1990s, look at Kim Minch'ŏl and Cho Seyŏl, "Ch'inil' munje ūi yŏn'gu kyŏnghyang kwa kwaje" *Sach'ong* 63 (Sept. 2006), 173-186.

¹¹² From 1994 to 1996, a group of researchers including Kim Samung and Chŏng Unhyŏn published a four volume book, *Mook: Ch'inil munje yŏn'gu*, ruminating on the remnants of Japanese colonialism, thirty-three collaborators, the Special Committee, and the history of Japanese invasion of Korea accordingly.

¹¹³ Kim, originally a journalist, worked for the organs of the opposition Peace and Democratic Party (Pyŏngmindang) and others. After Kim Dae Jung's election as the president in 1997, he worked for the *Seoul Newspaper*. Later, he was appointed the director of The Independence Hall of Korea (Tongnip kinyŏn'gwan) in 2004 and a committee member of the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism (PCIC) in 2005. Chŏng is also a journalist. He first worked as a researcher for *Jungang Ilbo* and later became an editor of *Ohmynews*, one of the most popular progressive internet newspapers. He also served the chief of general affairs at PCIC.

including editing and translations, Kim published ten ch'inilp'a-related books and Chŏng published twelve.¹¹⁴

Although not as specialized as the two afore-mentioned accomplished scholars, a number of junior scholars also emerged to speak about the ch'inilp'a issue in their own fields of study. For example, Im Hye bong and Kim Sŭngt'ae both published books regarding the pro-Japanese activities of religious leaders; they heavily criticized the unapologetic attitude of religious bodies toward their elders' collaboration.¹¹⁵ Two other scholars, No Tongŭn and Yi Kwangho, raised the collaboration issue in the fields of music and education as early as the late 1980s and early 1990s.¹¹⁶ IRCA at its early stage attempted to make the ch'inilp'a a social issue through publication activities; one of its early projects was to republish collaboration-related (along with other) writings of Im Chongguk in memory of his contribution to the study on collaborators. The institute also organized junior scholars in different fields to compile anti-collaborator works, such as *Ch'inilp'a 99-in* and *Ch'öngsan haji mottan yöksa*.

There is little research on how Korean society accepted these books and the overall movement's messages during the time period. However, several clues allow us to make an informed conjecture about their influence. Importantly, according to Kim Samung, he went

¹¹⁴ Kim wrote *Chinilp'a I, II, III* (1990-1993), *Chinil chöngch'i 100-yönsa* (1995), *Ch'inilp'a 100-in 100-mun* (1995), and *Panmin tŭgwi* (1995). Chŏng wrote *Ch'inilp'a I, II, III* and *Nanŭn hwangguk sinmin ũrosoida* (1999). He edited *Ch'inilp'a choesanggi* (1993), *Hakto yö söngjŏn e nagara* (1997), *Ilöbörin kiök ũi pogosö* (1999) and translated *Chungguk Taeman ch'inil chaepansa* (1995). Both published Mook entitled *Ch'inil munje yŏn'gu* (1994-1996).

¹¹⁵ Kim Sŭngt'ae, *Han'guk Kidokkyo ũi yöksajök pansöng* (The historical self-reflection of Korean Protestant churches) (Seoul: Tasan külpang, 1994) and Im Hye bong, *Ch'inil Pulgyoron*, 2 vols (Pro-Japanese Buddhism) (Seoul: Minjoksa, 1993).

¹¹⁶ No Tongŭn, "Ilche ũi hwangŭmhwa chöngch'aek e pongsahan ũmakkadŭl" (Musicians serving for the imperial music of Japanese imperialism), *Sahoe wa sasang* 15 (Nov. 1989): 334-350; Yi Kwangho, "Kyoyukkyö ũi ch'inil inmaek" (Pro-Japanese network in the field of education), *Uri kyoyuk ?* (August 1990): ???.

through several rejections until finally finding a publisher for his co-authored book (*Ch'inilp'a I*) in 1990,¹¹⁷ but the situation quickly turned around with the victory of Kim Young Sam in the presidential election; in 1993, the three volume book *Ch'inilp'a 99-in* was recorded as the number one best-seller among social science books and sold more than 100,000 copies, a large number for a market of less than 40 million people.¹¹⁸ From 1993 to 1999, ten books containing fourteen volumes were published solely on the topic of pro-Japanese collaboration. In spite of a heavy overlap of content, continuous publication under the same *ch'inilp'a* topic indicates that it had strong marketability.

To look at the social effects of *ch'inilp'a* publications, it is probably best to focus on the enthusiasm of a large number of Koreans about the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement and legislation process in the 2000s, as will be discussed in later chapters. However, even taking a quick glance at the Members' Column section of the IRCA's organ tells us about its deep impact among certain individuals.¹¹⁹ The writings show how strongly an anti-*ch'inilp'a* message appealed to readers and motivated some of them to become involved in the movement. For instance, Yō Hwangwōn, the leader of the earliest local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement in Daegu, confesses how frustrated he was in reading *Ch'ōngsan haji mothan yōksa* (The history, failed to cleanse off) and how that led him to join the IRCA in order to revisit the collaboration

¹¹⁷ Kim Samung, Interview, Seoul, February 23, 2010.

¹¹⁸ Kim Minch'ōl, Interview, Seoul, January 3, 2009; "Chonghap t'oron: Han'guk hyōndaesa wa *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan munje*" (Roundtable discussion: Contemporary Korean history and resettling the issue of collaborators), *Minjok munje yōn'gu* 4 (Fall, 1993): 4.

¹¹⁹ For examples, see Pak Kyōngsu's interview with Sō Yonghūi in *Minjok chōnggi* 4 (December 1995), 8; Report on a local branch meeting in Daegu in *Minjok chōnggi* 5 (Feb. 1996), 17; Yō Kyōnghwan's writing in *Minjok chōnggi* 8 (June 1996), 4; Kim Chōmgū's writing in *Minjok sarang* 2 (Nov. 1998), 7; Im Sōnghūi's interview with Ko Yangmi in *Minjok sarang* 20 (Mar. 2000), 12.

issue.

Considering the large number of volumes dedicated to this issue, ch'inilp'a books are highly standardized in terms of their organization and style. The following books exemplify this standardization: *Ch'inilp'a 99-in*, *Inmul ro ponŭn ch'inilp'a yŏksa*, *Ch'ŏngsan haji mothan yŏksa*, *Ch'inilp'a 100-in 100-mun*, and *Ch'inil munje yŏn'gu 2: ch'inil pyŏnjŏlcha 33-in*. These books share a typical structural pattern of anti-ch'inilp'a writings in the 1990s. That pattern consists of the collections of approximately less than ten pages of short biographies of each collaborator. In spite of certain variations among texts, most of the books intend to prove a similar pattern of “anti-national” tendency in collaborators’ careers by juxtaposing their lives before with their lives after liberation. Therefore, the similar pattern of anti-national charges on dozens of collaborators is repeated throughout the books. And it seems to have developed into a unique organizational and writing style of anti-ch'inilp'a publications in the 1990s. However, this particular strategy is highly compelling in claiming collaborators that opportunism and collaboration have been as the class characteristics of the modern Korean (bourgeois) elite.

In tandem with the uniformity in organization and writing style, what makes the books sound unified is their similar moralistic approach to collaborators’ lives. As Namiki Masahito problematizes the moral reductionism in their discourse, the writings tend to simplify collaboration unilaterally as a moral defect in a collaborator’s character.¹²⁰ In addition, collaboration is located within a binary epistemology of nationalists/patriots versus collaborators/traitors. Even Yi Manyŏl, a historian of Korean Christianity and later advocate of

¹²⁰ Namiki Masahito, “Singminji sigi Chosŏnin ūi chŏngch'i ch'amyŏ-haebang ihusa e kwallyŏn haesŏ” (The political participation of Koreans during the colonial period in relation to the post-1945 history), in *Haebang chŏnhusa ūi chaeinsik* (The re-visiting of Korean history before and after liberation), ed. Pak Chi-hyang et al. (Seoul: Ch'aeksesang, 2006), 663.

the *ch'ōngsan* movement, expresses his uncomfortable feeling toward the approach of early writings on *ch'inilp'a*. In his book review on *Ch'ōngsan haji mothan yōksa*, Yi points out several problems in the books, such as an ambiguous standard for collaboration, an already-set conclusion, and in some cases overemphasis on post-1945 careers in defining one as a *ch'inilp'a*.¹²¹ The European scholar Koen De Ceuster, who is generally sympathetic to progressive views, also criticizes that their accusations of collaboration were made loosely based on even one pro-Japanese article during the difficult war-time years of the late 1930s and early 1940s.¹²²

The underlying and ultimate message of the *ch'inilp'a* criticism of the 1990s is essentially criticism of the historical development of 20th century Korea. It strongly singles out Korea's leading elites for continuing to follow the imperialistic powers that collaborators had earlier been claimed to serve. Since the 1990s, *ch'inilp'a* have frequently been referred to as the “original sin,” “pro-Americans,” or “the protagonists that blocked the proper historical development of Korea in the 20th century.” What lies behind these epithets is a deeply rooted negative historical consciousness among progressive intellectuals. In her book, *The Making of Minjung*, Namhee Lee aptly points out that intellectuals and college students shared the widespread perception of Korea's post-colonial history up to the 1980s as a “failure” towards modernity.¹²³ In the same vein, the issue of *ch'inilp'a* is considered to be the very element that created the result of these

¹²¹ Yi Manyōl, “Ch'ōngsan haeyahal yōksa, k'allal ūl seunūn yōksa” (History that needs to be sorted out, history that is sharpening its blade), *Yōka pip'yōng* 27 (Summer, 1994), 378-379.

¹²² Koen De Ceuster, “The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in South Korea,” *Korean Studies* 25, no. 2 (2002), 225-226. In his article, Koen exemplifies Kim Samung's compilation of one hundred “collaborationist” articles that came out in 1995.

¹²³ Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung*, 2-8.

continuous failures. The points progressive intellectuals and leftists made in the early and mid-1980s came to be manifested in the ch'inilp'a discourse in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In the early 1990s, progressive/leftist intellectuals such as Sŏ Chungšök, Kim Pongu, Kang Mangil, Kang Chŏnggu, Han Sangbŏm, and Yi Yŏnghŭi conclusively stated that ch'inilp'a is the fundamental structural element that has caused the division of the peninsula and an undemocratic political system in South Korea. For example, Im Hŏnyŏng contends that post-1945 South Korean politics can be stereotyped following the same dualistic framework of collaboration and resistance: capitalism/anti-imperialism, pro-American/anti-American, pro-regime/anti-regime, pro-government/anti-government, patriotism/anti-state (*pangukka*), and anti-Korean national/siding with the Korean nation (*minjok chinyŏng*).¹²⁴ In other words, he emphasizes that the ch'inilp'a issue cannot be separated from reading current political affairs, and that it is characterized by a confrontation between the two ideologically divergent camps. In the same vein, Han Sangbŏm stresses that (Koreans) should see the issue not as an academic subject, but as a battle from the perspective of both national and democratic struggles. He frames the discussion in this way because to him, ch'inilp'a followers consist of the ruling class—that is, the privileged and the conservative.¹²⁵ Sŏ Chungšök, one of the leading experts on post-1945 Korean history, associates the “evil” role of ch'inilp'a with ultra-right wing dictatorships (*kŭgu pangong tokchae*). Sŏ claims that they have supported dictatorships and have constituted an anti-democratic and fascistic anti-reunification group in society. In the post-colonial context of South

¹²⁴ Im Hŏnyŏng, “Singminji chibae ũi ch'ŏngsan ũl wihan mosaek” (Search for cleansing off the remnants of colonial rule), in *Han'guk kŭndaesa wa ch'inilp'a munje* (Modern Korean history and the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators), ed. Minjok munje yŏn'guso (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 2000), 66.

¹²⁵“Ch'inilp'a 99-in,' Ch'ŏngsan haji mothan yŏksa' ch'ulp'an p'yŏnggahoe” (A meeting for evaluating the publication of *Ch'inilp'a 99-in* and *Ch'ŏngsan haji mothan yŏksa*), *Minjok munje yŏn'gu* 5 (Winter, 1994): 26.

Korea, Sō argues that ch'inilp'a is essentially equalivalent to pro-American.¹²⁶ Kim Pongu, the director of the IRCA (1991-2001), conceives ch'inilp'a as a firmly entrenched dominant element of the social structure that has promoted undemocratic elements in society. Especially given their alliance with foreign powers (*oese*), Kim contends, collaborators have caused all the problems of post-colonial Korea. For this reason, Kim states that Korean democracy cannot advance without getting rid of them first.¹²⁷

In comparison with its highly critical historical and political consciousness, the ch'inilp'a discourse presented to the public a relatively familiar and benign rhetoric of national spirit and anti-Japanese nationalism in the 1990s. The damage to the national spirit (*minjok chōnggi ūi hweson*) was one of the most widely used rhetorics in order to account for the origin of all kinds of social evils in post-1945 Korea. Not exclusive to ch'inilp'a criticism, however, the term was broadly utilized to explain the remnants of colonial legacies and their lasting influences throughout society. Particularly in the 1990s, the ch'inilp'a discourse was more closely tied with the rhetoric of national spirit. According to Yi Hōnjong, the failure in purging collaborators essentially damaged the national spirit because the Korean regime officially prioritized collaborators' merit over the issues of historical legitimacy and morality. As a result, Korea's low morality made the nation more susceptible to historical wrongs, such as military coups, dictatorships, and corruption. This spiritual and organic understanding of the reciprocal relation between historical development and national spirit was deeply entrenched within the early

¹²⁶ Sō Chungśök, "Ch'ongnon: ch'inilp'a ūi yōksajōk chonjae yangt'ae wa kŭgubangongdokchae" (Introduction: the existence of pro-Japanese collaborators in history and ultra-right wing anti-communist dictatorship), in *Inmul ro ponŭn ch'inilp'a yōksa*, ed. Yōksa munje yōn'guso (Seoul: Yōksa pip'yōngsa, 1993), 30-31.

¹²⁷ Kim Pongu, "Minjoksa chōnghwa ūi yōksajōk yoch'ōng" (A historical call for the purification of the national history), *Panminjok munje yōn'guso hoebo 2* (June 1992): 1-2.

discourse. Advocating the necessities of resettling the ch'inilp'a issue, ch'inilp'a critics argued, was the very way of restoring self-esteem, morality, national spirit, and historical legitimacy.

On the other hand, early ch'inilp'a discourse was also expressed in connection with anti-Japanese nationalism. Earlier, I discussed that one of its underlying messages was anti-imperialism or anti-foreign nationalism. Within the epistemology of Korean progressives and leftists, imperialism in 20th century Korean history implicates both Japan and the U.S. However, the issue of U.S. imperialism was not yet pronounced in the 1990s; anti-U.S. sentiment became part of ch'inilp'a discourse as a phenomenon of the 2000s in terms of public discourse. For this reason, the issue of imperialism in the ch'inilp'a discourse is by and large associated with Japan's colonial legacies and its neo-nationalist tendency. The discourse was thus combined with a pre-existing alarmist discourse on Japan in the 1980s. Not always seen in ch'inilp'a publications, many of them are cautious about Japan's imperialist intentions toward the peninsula. Im Chongguk, in an article, entitled "Che-2 ūi ch'imnyak—sin singminjuŭi" (The second invasion—Neo-colonialism) in 1988, is also concerned about Japan's military power.¹²⁸ In highlighting the significance of the ch'inilp'a issue, Yi Hŏnjong claims that possessing correct knowledge about ch'inilp'a will prevent not only a future Japanese military invasion, but also its penetration in Korean economic, cultural, and political realms.

In particular, anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiment is predominant in the three volumes of *Ch'inilp'a* and *Mook: Ch'inil munje yŏngu*. Kim Samung, one of the co-authors, holds a firm position regarding this issue. Not only in the above books, but also in his other Japan-related

¹²⁸ Im Chongguk, "Che 2 ūi ch'imrak-sinsingminjuŭi" (The second invasion—Neo-colonialism), reprinted in *To Mangguk ūl hal kŏsinga* (Again, will we lose our nation?), ed. Minjok munje yŏn'guso (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1995), 207-217.

books, Kim constantly asserts that Japan, with its growing economic and military power, has never given up the intention to re-invade Korea. In his book, *Ch'inilp'a II* subtitled *Ilbon singukka chu'ui ūi chōngae wa ch'inilp'a ūi puhwal* (The process of Japanese neo-nationalism and revival of pro-Japanese collaborators), Kim warns that Japan's dispatching of its military to the Persian Gulf in 1991 is the first stepping stone to building up another Greater Asian Co-Prosperity sphere.¹²⁹ This alarmist tone on Japan within the discourse is exactly identical with the prevailing anti-Japanese tone in the 1980s. Within the discourse, ch'inilp'a are depicted as those who promoted Korea's economic subordination to Japan after the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty.¹³⁰ It is needless to say that many Koreans identified with the ch'inilp'a discourse expressed in the language of anti-Japanese nationalism. This may explain one of the reasons why the Korean public came to embrace the historical narrative of the discourse in such a short period of time.

This section examined the process in which earlier criticism of collaborators developed into a ch'inilp'a discourse from the late 1970s to the late 1980s and looked at its underlying message and historical consciousness. In the next section, I investigate how *The Hangyoreh* took advantage of the discourse to vindicate the necessity of further democratization in society after the events of 1987.

Section 3. Contextualizing Ch'inilp'a Discourse in the Post-Democratization Process from the Late 1980s to the Early 2000s.

“Although the gigantic social movement in the 1980s made Korean democracy possible, Korea still has the very same problems, while the chance for change has lowered and the powers

¹²⁹ Kim Samung, *Ch'inilp'a II*, 91-100.

¹³⁰ Yi Hōnjong, “Ch'inilp'a munje e taehan yōn'gu hyōnhwang kwa kwaje” (The present stage and task for the study on the collaborationist issue) in *Ch'inilp'a: kŭ ingan kwa nollŭ* (Seoul: Hangminsa, 1990), 113-117

opposing the changes became far more organized and stronger.”¹³¹

What Choi Jangjip, a prominent political scientist in Korea, gloomily suggests about Korean democracy is, I believe, part of the socio-political context of the emergence of ch'inilp'a discourse as the political rhetoric of progressives. In his book *Minjuhwa ihu ūi minjujuūi* (Democracy after democratization), Choi controversially comments that Korean society after democratization has been declining in terms of its quality and content. He primarily blames the “evil” influences of persisting anti-communist ideology and a political structure monopolized by conservatism.¹³² In addition, he feels the biggest problem of Korean democracy is an ideologically narrow representative party system which speaks only for conservatives and the ultra-right wing.¹³³

Like Choi, many Korean progressives have felt a sense of insecurity about the path of democracy after 1987.¹³⁴ It was under these circumstances that ch'inilp'a discourse came to emerge as the rhetoric of progressives contextualizing many on-going political situations. *The Hangyoreh* published perhaps the most representative progressive voices in society from this

¹³¹ Choi Jangjip, *Minjuhwa ihu ūi minjujuūi* (Democracy after democratization) (Seoul: Pollit'eia, 2002), 36-7.

¹³² Ibid., 20.

¹³³ Similarly to Choi, Son Hoch'ōl, another prominent progressive political scientist, points out that one of the problems in Korean politics is an ideologically abnormal political cartography (*chihyōng*) which prevents the advent of a progressive party. He also indicates low-level (that is to say, limited) democracy as one of the other problems. For details, see his *Sinchayujuūi sidae ūi Han'guk chōngch'i* (Korean politics in the era of neo-liberalism) (Seoul:P'urūnsup, 1999), 129-130.

¹³⁴ Even though coming out a little later in 2005, Kim Tongch'un, a prominent progressive socialist, indicates the vulnerability of Korean democracy, which, in his view, remains in the stage of incomplete procedural democracy. He argues that the following three reasons are responsible for that: 1) persisting presence of fascistic anti-Communist force; 2) the widespread recognition that democracy is already completed in society; 3) the intensification of socio-economic inequality as the introduction of neo-liberalism after the IMF Financial Crisis. Kim Tongch'un, “‘Minjuhwa’ ūi hwansang ūl nōmōsō” (Beyond the fantasy of “democratization”), *Hwanghae munhwa* 47 (Winter, 2005), 118-121.

period.

As Choi points out, progressives never considered democracy in Korea fully established even after formal democratization in 1987, feeling Korean society was under constant threat from the conservative bloc who attempted to “row against the stream” of democracy. To some extent, the political realities after 1987 supported their belief. Korean democracy in 1987 was burdened with many political, social, and economic legacies and holdovers from the military regimes; the transfer of political power to the opposition party did not come easy and traditional ruling elites still retained power. For instance, the fact that Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, the two opposition party leaders, could be elected president only after collaborating with conservative parties demonstrates the undiminished power of conservatives in society. It was only after the first three presidential elections in 1987, 1992, and 1997 that Korea witnessed the election of Roh Moo Hyun, who had no links with former military regimes either in administration or in legislation. Furthermore, only in 2004 after the futile impeachment of President Roh did a single ruling progressive party take power as a majority government. Ch’inilp’a rhetoric in *The Hangryoreh*, then, clearly served as part of a progressive discourse aimed at increasing democracy even after democratization; the purpose of the discourse thus lay in protecting, fostering, and furthering Korean democracy felt to be challenged by conservatives, relying on alarming messages associated with historical references to ch’inilp’a.

Based on a long modern Korean history of fighting for freedom of speech from 1988 onwards, *The Hangryoreh* declared itself as a supporter of democracy and quickly asserted itself

as a mass media watchdog aiming to deliver reliable news reporting.¹³⁵ Its stance on the ch'inilp'a issue followed the conventional view of progressives, so it held a position for revisiting the issue more firmly than most other media. In addition, the critical attitude of the key members of the newspaper, such as Song Kõnho (founder and president) and Yi Yõnghũi (non-residential board member and chief editor), toward collaborators certainly influenced its negative tone. As early as the late 1980s, the newspaper made calls to revisit the collaboration issue on every possible occasion, such as during discoveries of new records on collaborators, anniversaries such as the March First Movement Day and Independence Day, and whenever Korea had any diplomatic troubles with Japan. It also remained highly supportive of any political and social moves for *Ch'inilp'a ch'õngsan*.

During the Roh Tae Woo administration, anti-ch'inilp'a rhetoric was associated with the political moves of opposition parties and progressive groups dealing with the political wrongs and corruption of the Chun regime. In 1988, a series of corruption scandals affecting the Chun family were exposed to the public. The National Assembly, under the command of opposition parties, conducted a full investigation into suspicious political activities of the former dictator, including inspections of all government offices (for the first time in sixteen years) and public hearings on the Gwangju Democratization Movement. However, despite clearly sufficient evidence of his crimes, the Roh government repeatedly postponed the indictment of Chun.

Frustrated by this delay in early November, college students from 104 universities organized into special units in order to charge Chun's residence and make a citizen's arrest.

¹³⁵ For a look at the founding history and ideas of the newspaper, see Ko Sũngu, *Hangyoreh ũi ch'anggan kwa õllon minjuhwa* (The publication of *The Hangryoreh* and the democratization of mass media) (P'aju, Kyõnggido: Nanam, 2004).

Upon reporting this incredible story, *The Hangyoreh* published an editorial in favor of setting up a special committee that could handle arresting and judging former political leaders. In the editorial, the editor specifically chose to use the term, “*panmin t’ŭgwi*” (The Special Committee), to which the historical memory of failure was attached. By referring back to the rhetoric of the Special Committee, the editorial makes readers rethink the significance of providing justice to Chun by reminding them of the disastrous results that its failure could bring in the future.¹³⁶ In this sense, the mention of the Special Committee functioned as a symbol whose meaning was related to the failure to deal with past wrongs equated with *ch’inilp’a*.

In addition, the rhetoric of the Special Committee was frequently utilized to juxtapose the situation after 1945 with the on-going situation. In November 1988, a newspaper contributor associated the ongoing Gwangju Democratization Movement hearing with the investigation activities of the Special Committee in 1948-9. In order not to repeat the same miserable wrongs of the past, he claimed, the hearing should be the place where accused criminals receive an appropriate ruling. Through calling upon the traumatic memory of the death of Pak Chongch’ŏl under torture in 1987, he indicated this would be the result of not purging pro-Japanese policemen after liberation.¹³⁷

Nevertheless, under the leadership of opposition parties, the reform drive fizzled out. One of the reasons for this has to do with a series of unsanctioned visits to North Korea by South Korean figures in the first half of 1989, which put Kim Dae Jung’s Peace Democratic Party (P’yŏngmindang, PDP) and the progressive camp in a difficult position. Breaking the strict

¹³⁶ *The Hangyoreh*, November 5, 1998.

¹³⁷ *The Hangyoreh*, November 24, 1988.

National Security Law prohibiting any unofficial inter-Korean exchange, Reverend Mun Ikhwan, a renowned unification and democratization movement activist, visited North Korea for ten days in March and April. His visit caused troubles in the progressive camp: the police subsequently cracked down on the National Federation for the Movement of Nation and Democracy (Chǒnguk minjok minju undong yǒnhap), a progressive democratic and unification movement organization, raided the main office of *The Hangyoreh*, and arrested Yi Yǒnghŭi due to his connection to Mun's visit. At the same time, news broke that the Peace Democratic Party's Sǒ Kyǒngwǒn had also visited the North the year before. Sǒ was affiliated with Pyǒngminyǒn, a minority group in the PDP that consisted of former democratic activists who were not politicians. Shortly afterwards, Im Sugyǒng—a college student affiliated with a student movement group—also went to North Korea to attend the Pyongyang Youth Festival. Taking advantage of these events, the government and the ruling Democratic Justice Party tried to move public interest from the investigation into the Chun regime towards this “national security issue.” The conservatives brought up the alleged relationship between the Peace Democratic Party and democratic organizations with the North, questioning their ideological soundness.

Due largely to Sǒ's visit to the North, Kim Dae Jung, the leader of the opposition, became the major target of the Agency of National Security Planning (Kukka anjǒn kihokpu or An'gibu).¹³⁸ Upon hearing the news of his visit, the party quickly dismissed Sǒ to distance itself

¹³⁸ The origin of this intelligence agency was the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (Chungang chǒngbobu, January 1961- April 1981) under the Park Chung Hee regime. The KCIA was a notorious key secret organization for information gathering and special inspections that served and contributed to maintain the Park's dictatorship nearly twenty years. It was in charge of both domestic and international affairs, such as collecting national-security information, carrying out anti-communist tasks, inspecting and controlling anti-governement activities, and creating pro-government public opinions. As the offspring of the KCIA, the Agency of National Security Planning played the similar role until it was named and reorganized into the National Intelligence Service (Kukchǒngwǒn, NIS) in January 1999 under the Kim Dae Jung administration.

from the controversial figure. However, the agency attempted to define Sō's activity as a typical North Korean spy affair within the National Assembly. Regarding the development of the situation, an editorial in *The Hangyoreh* compares it with the National Assembly Spy Incident (*Kukhoe p'ŭrakch'i sajŏn*) in 1949. That incident, when the police arrested fifteen junior lawmakers on trumped up charges of spying on behalf of North Korea, played a direct role in the subsequent failure of the Special Committee. Progressive historians claimed that it was part of a bigger conspiracy of President Rhee and his pro-Japanese policemen to frustrate the investigative efforts of the Special Committee on collaborators.

Because P'yŏngminyŏn was the center of reform-minded progressives within the Peace Democratic Party, the author of the editorial worries that its collapse might lead to the loss of the reform-oriented nature of the party. For this reason, the editorial first describes the connection between the collapse of the Special Committee and the Spy Incident. It then implies that the arrest of P'yŏngminyŏn members might have the same effect on the future of the Peace Democratic Party and Korean democracy.¹³⁹ The editorialist thus points out the great historical magnitude of the growing political attack on the Party by referring to the 1949 Spy Incident. It shows the fallacy of the Agency's claim of "a spy affair," comparing it with the earlier false claim revealed in the Spy Incident.

When all three visitors to North Korea were brought to trial later that year, *The Hangyoreh*, with its unification-oriented view, was critical about the judicial process, claiming the outcome was predetermined. An editorial raises the wider issue of flawed justice in post-1945 Korea. Entitled "'Yŏksa ūi pŏpchŏng' kwa 'hyŏnsil ūi pŏpchŏng,'" (The court of history and the

¹³⁹ Sŏng Hanpyo, "'Pyŏngminyŏn' ūn tomabaem ūi kkori inga" (Is 'Pyongminyŏn' the tail of a lizard?) *The Hangyoreh*, July 8, 1989.

court in reality), Chang Yunhwan indicates there are two different types of courts in Korean history. According to him, “the court of history” is based on an idealized legal system or on the belief of historical progress, while “the court in reality” reflects the actual current repressive law. Speaking of the ongoing trials of Mun Ikhwan, Yu Wŏnho, and Im Sugyŏng, Chang rhetorically questions whether the court of history ever actually existed in Korean history. As a representative case, he indicates the failure of purging ch’inilp’a; his suggestion for correcting its negative results is to begin a historic trial of collaborators. His editorial views the ch’inilp’a issue as the original sin of distorting Korean judicial justice, and further, as something inseparable from the frustration of Korean democracy.¹⁴⁰

Anti-ch’inilp’a rhetoric was also widely adopted to attack both the Korean and Japanese governments on foreign affair issues. In the early 1990s, colonial victims—such as comfort women, forced laborers, and involuntarily drafted Korean soldiers—began vocalizing their demands for an apology and compensation by the Japanese government. Various civil organizations supporting the war victims took the opportunity of the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Korea in January 1992 to state their demands. In the middle of an anti-Japanese rally, Chu Kisŏng, a member of the Association for Pacific War Victims (T’aep’yŏngyang hŭisaengja yujokhoe), unexpectedly died. Kim Pongu, the director of the IRCA, used this as the occasion to write an article that emotionally provoked its readers as a way of underlining the urgency of revisiting the ch’inilp’a issue in order to further progress Korean democracy. One day before the March First Movement Day, Kim comments:

Last mid-January when the Prime Minister of Japan visited Korea, there was an accident; combat policemen trampled an old man to death. His name is Chu Kisŏng,

¹⁴⁰ *The Hangyoreh*, November 21, 1989.

and he died because he participated in a street demonstration for demanding the Japanese government's apology about and compensation for Japanese colonial rule. His death has received extensive media coverage based on Koreans' anti-Japanese sentimentality, but the aftermath soon faded away. The old man "impudently" participated in a "disrespectful" parade protesting the visit of the Prime Minister of the great Japanese nation because of intermingled emotions towards the *han*¹⁴¹ of his older brother, who was sent into forced labor and died, and his own miserable life due to his brother's death. He then ended his *han*-filled life under the combat boots of the healthy policemen of Taehan minguk...What I wonder is how the responsible representatives of the Korean government reacted to this outrageous act, which was shamelessly done by the government, that was in fact responsible for investigating the historical *han* of the old man. Maybe this violence was the actual answer of the historical *han* of the old man, Chu Kisŏng.¹⁴²

This account continues on to describe how a number of influential politicians in the Rhee regime were in fact pro-Japanese collaborators, while Rhee paradoxically claimed the necessity of exposing dark crimes during the colonial period. After listing the pro-Japanese career of significant political and business figures up to the Chun regime, Kim argues that by preventing historical progress, these *ch'inilp'a* covered their colonial crimes and trampled on Koreans' will for independence. Juxtaposing the misery of the past with that of the present in the life of an old man, Kim attempts to evoke multiple-layered emotions in Koreans. By using ironic language, Kim intended to maximize anger and shame among readers toward both Japan, which had not apologized for past crimes, and toward the Korean government, which had neglected past issues and refused to deal with the death of Mr. Chu. Furthermore, readers can easily feel the sense of injustice regarding the attitudes of the two governments and anxiousness about the possible repetition of the same history. Therefore, the language of the discourse becomes deeply engaged

¹⁴¹ *Han* is the sense of Koreans' indigenous feeling (*koyu chŏngsŏ*), which is difficult to be translated into English. It is a complicated emotional state, which is combined with anguish, emptiness, grief, sorrow, and suffering.

¹⁴² Kim Pongu, "Pantch'ok yŏksa kŏmŏchwin ch'inil kunsang: Tasi Chu Kisŏng noin ūi chugŭm apesŏ"(A group of pro-Japanese collaborators grasping half of Korean history: Again in front of the death of old man Chu Kisŏng), *The Hangyoreh*, February 28, 1992.

in the politics of emotion, as well as the politics of memory; it tries to obtain democratic progress in the present through invoking the past.

During the Kim Young Sam government, the anti-ch'inilp'a rhetoric in *The Hangyoreh* did not change much from the earlier period in terms of its content. What is different is that, as discussed in an earlier section, the Setting History Right project enabled society at large to be far more easily engaged in the talk about the historical mistakes of the colonial and post-colonial periods. However, in contrast to his dedication to correct historical wrongs done by the Japanese, President Kim was far less willing to confront politically sensitive contemporary issues, such as the December 12 Military Coup and the Gwangju Democratization Movement. In May 1993, two months after his inauguration, Kim made a special statement that finally declared the December 12 Affair as a military coup by low-ranking officials¹⁴³ and the 1980 Gwangju Democratization Movement as the landmark democratic movement that set the foundation for both Korean democracy and his own civilian government. While promising all possible efforts to memorialize the movement and restore the rights of those who were engaged in it, he simultaneously expressed his hope to leave the investigation into the truth to history.¹⁴⁴ The progressive movement strongly renounced his decision as irresponsible. *The Hangyoreh* also criticized his wish to “leave the investigation to history” as neglecting the historical

¹⁴³ *Kukmin Ilbo*, May 13, 1993. This is the first official recognition by the state that the December 12 Affair was a military rebellion. The December 12 Affair, also known as the December 12 Military Revolt, occurred when a new military group, centering on Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, without the agreement of the then interim President Choi Kyu Ha, arrested high military officials such as Chŏng Sŭnghwa, the martial law commander as well as the Army Chief of Staff. After this, the group seized control of the military and emerged as the real political power.

¹⁴⁴ *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 14, 1993.

responsibility of the present.¹⁴⁵ Regarding this, Sin Ilsöp, a history professor, writes:

The current government denies its own legitimacy when it, without figuring it out clearly, uses the abstract term, “the judgment of history” (*yöksa üi simp’an*) for such emblematic incidents as May 16 Military Coup and May 18 Democratization Movement. [They] can decide the nature of the government and as a matter for the whole nation, are an obstacle to reform projects.¹⁴⁶

Sin claims that without figuring out the truth behind the May 16 Military Coup of 1961 and the series of events leading from the December 12 Military Coup to the Gwangju Democratization Movement, the civilian government will not be able to achieve either its historical goal to become the first Korean civilian government or its legitimacy. Toward the end, he advises the government to take a lesson from the morally distorted beginning of the Rhee regime. Comparing Kim’s speech with Rhee’s refusal to deal with the colonial past (specifically collaborators), he contends that President Kim should not repeat the same mistake of leaving his own responsibility of cleansing past history to the next generation.

Against the wishes of the President Kim, numerous civic groups tried to bring a series of lawsuits against the leaders of the various political disturbances from 1979 to 1980. With the help of these groups, Chöng Sünghwa, the former Army Chief of Staff (Feb.- Dec. 1979), accused the leaders of December 12 Military Coup of rebellion in a lawsuit filed in the highest Korean court in July 1993. In 1994, the City Council of Gwangju accused thirty-five military leaders associated with the Gwangju Democratization Movement of the charge of internal disturbance. In response to the former accusation, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s office

¹⁴⁵ Editorial, “‘Yöksa paro chapkki’ wa ‘yöksa e makkigi’” (‘Setting history right’ and ‘leaving it to history’), *The Hangyoreh*, June 17, 1993. Also see “Kwagö ch’öngsan mani minjuhwa üi chirümki” (Only resettling the past is the shortcut to democracy), *The Hangyoreh*, August 11, 1993.

¹⁴⁶ “‘Yöksa üi simpan’ ün ‘yöksa üi chim ida’” (‘Historical judgment’ is historical burden), *The Hangyoreh*, June 13, 1993.

immediately embarked on an investigation, but the result of the investigation (which eventually lasted sixteen months) was highly disappointing. In October 1994, the prosecution, in contrast to its own definition of the December 12 Affair as a military rebellion, declared a suspension of the indictment of the military leaders of the coup. The prosecution's excuse was that it could cause an unnecessary waste of national power. Similarly, the investigation of the May 16 Military Coup ended with the prosecution declining to indict the leaders for a "successful military coup" in July 1995. It is needless to say that both of these decisions outraged a large number of Koreans.

Rather than acquiescing to the announcements, progressive civic groups kept calling for justice for the two former presidents and other military leaders through 1994 and 1995. The following is one of the articles which emphasize the necessities of punishing the two. In his editorial, Kim Samung, a representative ch'in'ilp'a critic, criticizes the unfaithful attitude of the government defending the former presidents while also memorializing the shameful forty-sixth anniversary of the forced dissolution of the Special Committee on June 6th. Kim writes:

....as Syngman Rhee prevented judicial punishment of ch'inilp'a, Kim Young Sam now disregards punishing the slaughterers of Gwangju and those who were engaged in the Military Coup. Even though they shared the commonality as "civilian government" (*munmin chǒngbu*), Rhee and Kim have both equally disregarded the punishment of anti-national traitors and traitors of democracy. We still sigh with regret for the loss of our national spirit and acknowledge that the decedents of independent fighters weren't treated fairly because the Rhee regime didn't punish ch'inilp'a. But today, we once again disregard and are silent about the punishment of military dictators and slaughterers. What an irony and what a false consciousness this is!¹⁴⁷

As seen above, Kim underlines the criminality of the former presidents Chun and Roh by

¹⁴⁷Kim Samung, "Panminjok pǔmjoe tanjoe anŭl ttan husejit'an" (There will be regret in the next generation if we didn't punish anti-national crimes) *The Hangyoreh*, June 3, 1995.

equating the military dictatorship and the massacre to pro-Japanese anti-national crimes. He figuratively identifies the two with ch'inilp'a. His rhetoric is compelling because he mobilizes the collective memory of Koreans that morally disapproved Japanese colonialism and ch'inilp'a. Rather than enumerating the necessities of the indictment, Kim urges readers to identify the necessity of punishing ch'inilp'a under colonial rule with that of punishing dictators and slaughterers. By equating the two with ch'inilp'a, Kim attempts to inflame Koreans' anger toward them and underlines the necessity of judicial punishment.

Finally, under the term of President Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002), ch'inilp'a discourse transformed into firmly settled progressive rhetoric; the progressives adopted this rhetorical strategy to claim to be fighting against anti-democratic elements in society. In comparison with the earlier period, where it was utilized mainly as a historical reference regarding settling past wrongs, this time, the rhetoric was adopted as an ideological tool of progressive media (and also progressives) to attack the moral flaws of those in the conservative camp—many of whom were spiritual successors of or were members of groups who were founded by so-called collaborators—who were associated as collaborators. One such representative case can be found by focusing on the anti-ch'inilp'a rhetoric of *The Hangyoreh* when it attacked the “ultra-right wing” conservative newspaper *Chosun Ilbo* (Daily Chosun). Since the late 1990s, this newspaper, which has the highest circulation in Korea, came to be considered a major enemy of genuine democracy by Korean progressives after the 1987 democratization.

When Kim Dae Jung came to office as the head of the first progressive administration in South Korea's history, the *Chosun Ilbo* clarified its position as a conservative opinion leader in society by criticizing Kim's moderate approach to North Korea, as well as other political issues.

This attitude soon provoked confrontation with the progressive camp, which responded by initiating the Anti-*Chosun* Movement to decrease the *Chosun Ilbo*'s public influence in 1999. As a voluntary civic organization, this movement officially rejected the paper's right wing ideological orientation in addition to its "distorted" reporting style. As a representative progressive newspaper, *The Hangyoreh* soon joined the fight and became highly provocative towards the *Chosun Ilbo* around 2000.

The ill-fated relationship between the two newspapers actually originated two decades earlier, after two forced lay-off incidents of the *Chosun Ilbo* and *Donga Ilbo* in 1975 and 1980,¹⁴⁸ but it intensified by the 2000s. In July 2000, the chief editor of *The Hangyoreh* opened up with a barrage of harsh criticism, sensationally accusing the *Chosun Ilbo* of being a gangster newspaper (*chop'ok sinmun*). In February 2001, Son Sökch'un identifies the negative role that the *Chosun Ilbo* played in the development of Korean democracy. According to Son, in agreement with other progressives,¹⁴⁹ the two pillars that held up forty years of dictatorship in post-1945 Korea were the military and the mass media. He stated that the democratization movement of 1987 successfully removed the military from the stage, yet "the power of the media" still functioned as the critical anti-democracy element in society. For the purpose of preserving democracy, he argues that civil society could not help but fight against the anti-democratic and conservative

¹⁴⁸ In spite of a notorious acronym, *Chojungdong* (Chosun, Donga, Jungang newspapers), three conservative newspapers with strong anti-government tendencies during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun terms, *Chosun Ilbo* and *Donga Ilbo* played a leading role as opposition newspapers up until the early 1980s. In the case of the *Chosun Ilbo*, there are confronting opinions about its nature and role as an opposition newspaper in this period, *Donga Ilbo* was in general considered one of the representative (conservative) oppositional newspapers from liberation up to the Kim Young Sam government. This tendency, particularly under the Rhee and Park regimes, has to do with *Donga Ilbo*'s connection to Democratic Party line (both were founded by Kim Söngsu).

¹⁴⁹ For instance, Choi Jangjip views the uncontrolled power of mass media as the biggest threat to Korean democracy after 1987. For details, see his *Minjuhwa ihu üi minjuhwa*.

politics of newspaper conglomerates like the *Chosun Ilbo*.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, Kang Chunman, a well-known professor of journalism and outspoken anti-*Chosun* activist, opines that all reforms under a democratic government are inseparable from the struggle for winning public opinion over to one's side. He claims that in order to make the reform policies of the Kim administration successful; the first thing task is to curb the power of conservative media that views the government unfavorably.¹⁵¹

In order to attack the *Chosun Ilbo*, *The Hangyoreh* attempted to prove that, in contrast to its own claim as the proper voice of the nation, the *Chosun Ilbo* was anti-national and anti-democratic. When the government carried out a tax investigation into newspaper companies in 2001, *The Hangyoreh* serialized a full-page special report on “news-media powers” (*öllon kwölllyök*) on its first page from March to April 2001. The reports consisted of three topics under the titles of “the tyranny of unlimited power,” “the ugly past,” and “the solution for mass media reform.” Even though the titles broadly named news media, the contents specifically targeted the *Chosun Ilbo* and *Donga Ilbo*.¹⁵² In particular, in the section entitled “the ugly past,” the newspaper highlighted the pro-Japanese articles of the *Chosun Ilbo* during the Pacific War as unmovable evidence of its anti-nationalist tendency.

The intention of its muckraking was to cut down the credibility and influence of the *Chosun Ilbo* among Koreans who were sensitive to Japanese colonial wrongs, by imbuing the newspaper with the image of a national traitor. *The Hangyoreh* furthermore emphasized the

¹⁵⁰ Son Sökch'un, “Pudüröun ümmo” (Soft conspiracy), *The Hangryoreh*, February 19, 2001.

¹⁵¹ Kang Chunman, “Sugu sinmun ttaemune” (Because of reactionary newspapers), *The Hangyoreh*, March 26, 2001.

¹⁵² In response to the criticism, *Wölgan Chosun* released the documents of the Agency of National Security Planning on *The Hangyoreh*, in which the agency negatively depicted it as the southern branch of the North Korean *Nodong* newspaper in April 2001. *The Hangyoreh* subsequently brought libel action against the editors and reporters of *Wölgan Chosun*.

Chosun Ilbo's close ties with military regimes as a grim legacy from the colonial period. According to the accusations of *The Hangyoreh*, the *Chosun Ilbo* was not only anti-nationalistic (serving Japanese interests while turning its back on its own people), but was also anti-democratic for siding with military dictatorships in order to maintain its power. By reporting so, *The Hangyoreh* intended to emphasize that the *Chosun Ilbo* played the exact same role in the present when it opposed the democratic government (anti-democratic) and discouraged a reconciliatory relationship between the two Koreas (anti-nationalist).

This section examined how *The Hangyoreh* utilized ch'inilp'a discourse and its related concepts as political rhetoric after democratization in 1987. Ch'inilp'a discourse clearly became the major political rhetoric of Korean progressives in order to criticize the conservatives and delegitimize their views in the name of achieving further democratization. The next chapter will deal with the nationalization and institutionalization of ch'inilp'a discourse –how it was transformed into a full-scaled *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement, both in politics and in civil society, in the 2000s.

Chapter III

Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan as a Political Project in the 2000s

One of the characteristics of the 2000's Korean society was sharpened ideological and political confrontation between the right and the left. This full-scale ideological competition was unprecedented in South Korean history, excluding the nation-building process right after Korea's liberation. The two camps in politics, media, and civil society created constant opposition and antagonism. On the other hand, nationalism based on anti-foreign sentiment combined with new types of civic movements, i.e. anti-U.S. candlelight vigil¹⁵³ and anti-Japanese protests.¹⁵⁴ The *ch'inilp'a* discourse, born out of the 1980's spirit of revolution, grew in the 1990s' era of socio-political reforms, and flourished in the 2000s. Moreover, it also eventually evolved into a socio-political practice, *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement. At least by the mid-2000s, the discourse, entangled with on-going political battles, reproduced itself into heavily politicized everyday language. Furthermore, the movement took place on a nationwide scale, rising into a predominant socio-political phenomenon.

This chapter focuses on the nationalization and institutionalization of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* issue, which the progressives believed to be one of the most urgent historical tasks of the Korean nation for the half-century after Korea's liberation from Japan. The first section of this chapter traces back the process since the late 1990s in which the *ch'inilp'a* issue gradually

¹⁵³ The first nation-wide anti-U.S. candlelight vigil began in November 2002. It was to memorialize two young schoolgirls who were killed by a U.S. armored vehicle and also to protest the unfair regulations of the Korea-U.S. SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement). It also continued as a popular form of anti-U.S. protestss from the Anti-Iraq War Movement in 2003 in Korea.

¹⁵⁴ There were several waves of anti-Japanese protests in Korea in the 2000's in relation to the Japanese right wing history textbook issue (2001 and 2005) and territorial disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima in 2005.

emerged into the center of the socio-political realm in the 2000s from a marginalized position, illuminating the unique political, social, and diplomatic contexts of the day. The issue culminated in a 2004-2005 political and social battle over *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan*. The second section deals with how this escalated conflict expressed itself within the legislation process of the Special Law on the Investigation of the Truth on the Pro-Japanese Anti-national Collaboration Activities under Japanese Imperial Rule (Ilche kangjöm ha ch'inil panminjok haengwi chinsang kyumyöng tükpyöi pöp, 2004-2005). In addition, this section examines the historical meaning and activities of the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism under the Special Law that finally made resettling the ch'inilp'a issue possible on the state level. In contrast to the second section, the third section highlights the *ch'ongsan* movement on the level of civil society, focusing especially on the activities of Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities (IRCA, Minjok munje yön'guso). Since the late-1990s, the institute was at the center of various *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movements including the publication project for the *Who's Who Dictionary on Pro-Japanese Collaborators* (Ch'inil inmyöng sajön).

Section 1. Background of the Politicization and Institutionalization of the Ch'inilp'a Issue in Society

In March 2004, President Roh Moo Hyun was impeached in the National Assembly on allegations of violating the Election Law. This unprecedented incident, viewed by many as an unjustifiable display of arrogance by majority opposition parties, stirred anger among a number of Koreans and made them fight against the decision (bill). On March 15th, three days after the impeachment, thirty-six writers announced in *The Hangyoreh*:

When the impeachment passed, reminding us of the assassination of Kim Gu and the May 16 Military Coup, [we] witnessed that the ghost of ch'inilp'a—a remnant of twisted history— has not disappeared....in order to complete the last page of the 1987

Great Democratic Movement with the Korean people, we will cooperate with the cooperation of every living soul.¹⁵⁵

Their statement shows us how the historical consciousness of the writers identified the current political wrong-doers, specifically conservative parties and conservative media, with historical ch'inilp'a. Also, they saw the *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* as part of an unfinished democratization movement in Korean history. Equally, progressive historians, such as Han Honggu and Sö Chungşök, accused the ch'inilp'a as the historical foundation of the ultra-right wing who passed the impeachment. Han asserted that the fundamental reason of the impeachment was “democracy without cleansing past wrongdoings” (*kwagö ch'öngsan ömnün minjuhwa*), relating it to the ch'inilp'a issue. That is to say, Korean reactionaries (*sugu seryök*), symbolized in such past issues as ch'inil and Yusin and also strong opposition to the Ch'inilp'a Investigation Law, proposed the impeachment motion.¹⁵⁶ In fact, the April 15 General Election, carried out in an atmosphere of opposition to the impeachment and opposition to corrupt right wing politicians, ended up with a great victory for progressive parties.¹⁵⁷ *The Hangyoreh* celebrated this election as the very completion of Korean democracy, which they asserted had been delayed since 1987.¹⁵⁸ In some sense, the above responses of Korean progressives to the impeachment testify that ch'inilp'a discourse as a political rhetoric reached its peak around 2004. From this time on to the late 2000s, the extremely politicized and divisive ch'inilp'a discourse

¹⁵⁵ *The Hangyoreh*, March 16, 2004.

¹⁵⁶ For Han, see *The Hangyoreh*, March 16, 2004; March 27, 2004 and for Sö, see *The Hangyoreh*, March 17, 2004.

¹⁵⁷ The election made Uri Party, the progressive ruling party, the majority (153 seats out of 300). Also, the Democratic Labor Party (Minodang), a leftist party, won ten seats for the first time.

¹⁵⁸ *The Hangyoreh*, May 17, 2004.

was widely circulated and exercised strong influence over the political realm, as well as society.

Therefore, the purpose of this section is to trace back the process in which *ch'inilp'a* discourse was gradually but intensely politicized and gained more social influence from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. More specifically, it focuses on what socio-political circumstances and phenomena affected making the discourse the powerful political rhetoric of the progressives. This section also provides background on how *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* came to be possible on the state level in 2004-2005.

1) Two Progressive Presidents and Increasing Ideological Tension in Society

The growing influence of *ch'inilp'a* discourse was tied up with the election of two progressive presidents in a row for the first time in Korean history. Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun were successfully elected (in 1997 and 2002, respectively) as the President of Korea, and each had previously suffered personally from four decades of dictatorships. Their victory was different from that of the other, less progressive, democratic fighter, Kim Young Sam, who ran for the office as the nominee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (Minjudang).¹⁵⁹ The election of the two Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun eventually intensified the ideological polarization of Korean society.

The Kim Dae Jung administration, the first elected oppositional party-background government, suffered from a weak position in legislation. His separation from Kim Jongp'il in September 2001, a conservative political partner of President Kim during the presidential election, made his political position even more vulnerable and difficult until the end of his term

¹⁵⁹Both Kim and Roh were members of the traditional Democratic Party line. Kim Dae Jung was from the People's Conference for New Politics (Sae-chōngch'i kungminhoeüi) and Roh Moo Hyun was from the New Millennium Democratic Party (Sae-ch'ōnyōn Minjudang).

in 2002.¹⁶⁰ Throughout his term, uncooperative Grand National Party (GNP),¹⁶¹ the ruling-turned-oppositional party, remained dominant in the National Assembly. In the meantime, his reconciliatory policy toward North Korea, called “Sunshine Policy” (*haetpit chǒngch’aek*), the first of its kind in Korean history, made the conservative camp uncomfortable. In spite of his achievements in normalizing the inter-Korean relationship and in the early resolution of the IMF Financial Crisis, domestic politics were in turmoil with a series of suspicious corruption incidents, as well as the strong challenges of the conservative GNP and media.

The government’s investigation of tax fraud in major newspaper companies in January 2001 made the Kim administration’s relationship with the conservative media even worse.¹⁶² Although this investigation was undertaken in the name of mass media reforms, its original purpose was to investigate gigantic newspapers companies’ hyper-criticism about government policies, which had secretly misappropriated a large amount of unlawful slush fund. Centering on this investigation, the tension between conservative newspapers and the progressive camp

¹⁶⁰ For the victory of the 1997 presidential election, where deeply-rooted regional party support practices dominated, Kim strategically cooperated with Kim Jongp’il and Pak T’aejun in the Liberal Democratic Union (Chaminnyŏn) to gain the votes of Chungcheong and Gyeongsang Provinces. The political and ideological inclination of these two figures was highly distinctive from that of Kim Dae Jung. After being elected as the president, Kim Dae Jung appointed conservative Kim Jongp’il the Prime minister (August 1998-January 2000). However, this uncomfortable political alliance functioned as a setback for his reform policies. The president and Kim Jongp’il could not remain on good terms over political issues. The conflict with Kim Jongp’il finally culminated when opposition parties passed the dismissal motion of Im Dongwŏn, the Unification Minister, in September 2001. Im was the main proponent of the president’s Sunshine policy toward North Korea. Kim Jongp’il supported the motion against the will of the president.

¹⁶¹ The Grand National Party was launched in November 1997 by merging the New Korea Party (Sinhan’guktang) and the Democratic Party (T’onghap Minjudang). It was considered to represent the traditional conservative political party in Korea. It changed its name into the New Frontier Party (Saenuridang) in February 2012, which is the present ruling party.

¹⁶² In particular, Kim Dae Jung was on bad terms with the *Chosun Ilbo*. In the three presidential campaigns since 1987, the dislike of the *Chosun Ilbo* toward Kim was explicitly expressed as either direct or indirect support for his opponents. Also, the newspaper argued for the necessity of thought verification (*sasang kŏmjŭng*) on his inclination toward leftist ideology. Even outside of presidential races, newspapers’ coverage of Kim and his party had not been favorable.

culminated while the latter enthusiastically campaigned for the government's media reforms. At the same time, the issue split Korean society and its public opinion into the two following ideological lines: 1) the government and progressive intellectuals, citizens, media, and civic groups on the one hand; 2) the GNP, the three major conservative newspaper companies (*Chosun Ilbo*, *Donga Ilbo*, and *Jungang Ilbo*), and the conservatives on the other.

Within this ideologically tenuous situation, the victory of Roh Moo Hyun in the 2002 presidential election further accelerated the left-right competition in politics and civil society. His supporters fervently celebrated Roh's election as a political revolution and the beginning of a new era.¹⁶³ However, his unique political strategy and freehearted speech style as president contributed to the increase of political and ideological tension in society. Regarding his strategy, one political commentator notes that "by picking up on a specific issue and forming a war front, (he) attempts to increase political tension and as a result, makes his supporters mobilize and solidify."¹⁶⁴ In other words, he was a person with a clear moral and strategic distinction between good versus evil and friends versus enemies. Also, he, unlike his predecessors, was famous for his non-authoritarian behavior and overly straightforward speech style. His "unconventional" attitude as a Korean president, while helping break down the traditionally authoritative image of a president, created a number of sensations, giving his political enemies plentiful targets for

¹⁶³ Roh did not belong to the old political culture represented with the term, "Three Kims' Era" (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, Kim Jongp'il)" and shared no political linkage with earlier military dictatorships. With this reason only, many considered Roh as accomplishing the only true transfer of power to the democratic movement group. Furthermore, his unique career as human rights lawyer, only with a high school diploma, was viewed by many as an example of his indomitable spirit against social injustice and inequality. All these reasons made many people think of Roh as the icon of the new democratic era and of underrepresented non-mainstreamers of society, distinct from elite politicians. See Yu Ch'angsön, *Kutppai Nopung: Roh Moo Hyun sik lidösip kwa Hanguk minjujuüi* (Goodbye Roh-sensation: Roh Moo Hyun's leadership and Korean democracy) (Seoul: Arüke, 2007), 6.

¹⁶⁴ Pak Ch'angsik, "Kwagö ch'öngsan, tto hana üi püllækhol" (Cleansing past wrongs: Another black hole?) *Hangyoreh* 21, 524 (Sept, 2nd, 2004), 16.

political attacks.

Furthermore, at the beginning of his term, President Roh clearly declared that his political enemy was the reactionary conservative right wing. In particular, he pin-pointed powerful print media companies, i.e. the *Chosun Ilbo*, as the embodiment of the reactionary right wing in society. His contentious relationship with major newspapers, especially with the *Chosun Ilbo*, dated back as early as the late 1980s when he was a novice lawmaker. During a 2002 presidential rally, Roh even rejected an interview with the newspaper while enjoying strong support from new online progressive media, such as *Ohmynews.com*, as well as traditional print media like *The Hangyoreh*.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, the *Chosun Ilbo* and other conservative media explicitly sided with Yi Hoech'ang, the GNP presidential nominee. This enduring antipathy between the president and conservative media remained characteristic throughout his term. On the other hand, the conservative newspapers, defining his administration as leftist, were hyper-critical about every single policy of his administration. It is needless to say that this greatly affected the shape of the left-right ideological confrontation in public opinion.

Following the political realm and media, signs of ideological polarization in civil society gradually appeared since the late 1990s. Around this time, a new form of civic movements gained popularity with great participation of an Internet-savvy young generation, i.e. the Blacklist Movement (*naksŏn undong*) in the 2000 General Election, the “Anti-*Chosun* Movement,” and the “Anti-Park Chung Hee Movement.” On top of that, Korean society in 2002

¹⁶⁵ For this reason, Roh's victory was also perceived as a victory of progressive mass media. When he was confirmed as the next president on December 19, 2002, O Yŏnho, the president of Ohmynews.com, proudly announced that “the power of mass media was replaced (from *Chosun Ilbo*, *Donga Ilbo* and *Jungang Ilbo* to internet news)” See O Yŏnho, *Ohmynews: Taehan min'guk t'ŭksanpum* (Ohmynews: The special product of S. Korea) (Seoul: Humŏnisŭtŭ, 2004), 195.

had two crucial cultural/political experiences: the Korea-Japan World Cup street cheering and a more than one month-long candlelight vigil against the SOFA revision. These two occasions helped progressive-minded members of the young generation sharpen their own political consciousness and develop a street rally culture that expressed their political concerns in public space in the form of cultural festivals rather than direct confrontation. Witnessing this young and internet-based organizational power as a new political force of the progressive camp, the conservative camp also began reshaping its organizations and methods in the early 2000s.

Escalating conflict between the two camps in civil society came to the surface on the 8·15 Independence Day of 2003. For the first time in post-1945 Korean history, conservative and progressive camps held separate Independence Day celebrations at various different locations. On the conservative side, the People's Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Kim Jeongil Alliance (Pan-haek·Pan-Kim (Jeongil) kungmin hyöbühhoe, hereafter its official English title: NoNuclear), an organization of more than one hundred conservative groups, held a rally which denounced North Korea's nuclear policy and progressive groups opposing the Korea-the U.S. military alliance. In the meanwhile, leftist and progressive organizations held multiple anti-(Iraq) War, anti-U.S. military, and peaceful unification without the U.S.'s intervention campaigns.¹⁶⁶ Their public rally competition lasted until the next March First Movement celebrations in 2004. Each camp organized several meetings under contrasting catchphrases: The conservative groups such as NoNuclear and The Christian Council of Korea (Han'guk Kidokkyo ch'ongyönhap) called out opposing the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea while condemning anti-U.S. and pro-N. Korean groups including the Roh administration. In contrast, the progressive/left groups rallied

¹⁶⁶ Nam Siuk, *Han'guk posu seryöck yön'gu* (A research on Korean conservatives) (P'aju, Kyönggido: Nanam, 2005), 527-8; *Hankook Ilbo*, August 16, 2003.

for peace in the peninsula, cooperation between two Koreas, and anti-(Iraq) War.¹⁶⁷ In 2004, the competition of the two camps on the street was magnified over such issues as dispatching Korean troops to Iraq¹⁶⁸ and reform policies of the Roh administration.¹⁶⁹

2) The “Anti-*Chosun Ilbo* Movement” and The “Anti-Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum Movement”

Although the *ch'inilp'a* issue was revisited in the 1980, it was not until the late 1990s that progressive activists fully embraced the discourse as their own political rhetoric. According to the staff of the IRCA,¹⁷⁰ Korean progressives accepted the *ch'inilp'a* issue as their own project through the Anti-Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum Movement (1999-2002, hereafter the Anti-Memorial Museum Movement).¹⁷¹ Also, even though they did not explicitly point this connection out, I think that the Anti-*Chosun Ilbo* Movement— which was initiated approximately at the same time—played the same role. Before the Anti-Memorial Museum Movement, Pak Hanyong, an IRCA staff member, states that many progressive activists considered the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement rather “an odd history movement.”¹⁷² Engaged

¹⁶⁷ *Donga Ilbo*, March 2, 2004; *The Hangyoreh*, March 2, 2004.

¹⁶⁸ *The Hangyoreh*, May 15, 2004.

¹⁶⁹ *Donga Ilbo*, August 16, 2004; *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 16, 2004.

¹⁷⁰ Pang Hakchin, Interview, Seoul, December 16, 2009; Ch'oe China, Interview, Seoul, March 19, 2010.

¹⁷¹ The Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum was planned to build to memorialize his life and political contribution to the modernization and economic development of Korea.

¹⁷² Pak Hanyong told me how some of the hard-core progressive/leftist activists originally recognized the movement. When Pak, a former student movement activist from the late 1970s to the 1980s, talked to one of his senior activists about his joining the IRCA as a staff member, his senior was dubious about whether or not this was a new type of movement targeting the in-between market between civic movements and labor movements. I consider “history movement” a specific term in Korea because it is in many cases based on the unique historical view of Korean progressives—Korean progressives argue that correcting history (historical wrongs) will bring a better future to Korea. History movements work on a wide range of issues, such as investigating the truth on crimes committed

with the anti-Japanese sentiment, the *ch'inilp'a* topic was a traditionally popular rhetoric regardless of one's ideological inclination after liberation. However, the Anti-*Chosun* Movement and Anti-Memorial Museum Movement from the late 1990s to the early 2000s eventually made the claim of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* exclusively belong to the progressives. In other words, the two movements ideologically factionalized and politicized the discourse. Therefore, this part of the chapter looks at how the two civic movements led to the progressive camp join in the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement and adopt the discourse as its own political rhetoric.

First of all, let me discuss the Anti-Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum Movement. The movement reveals how the political needs of Korean progressives and the historical claims of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* activists converged in the historical context of the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1999, President Kim Dae Jung honored his election pledge by announcing financial support for the Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum totaling 10.5 billion won (renewable in the next year).¹⁷³ The decision raised severe opposition by those in the progressive camp who considered Park an atrocious dictator. These progressives warned that building a memorial museum for a dictator could cause serious confusion in the public value system. However, as the government carried forward plans to construct the memorial, the Anti-Memorial Museum Movement turned out to be the single biggest anti-Park Chung Hee Movement for which

under Japanese colonialism and South Korea authoritarian state (i.e. military comfort women, forced labor during the Pacific War, suspicious deaths, and massacres) and correcting misperceptions on modern and contemporary history in the public (i.e. the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement and the Anti-Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum Movement). Pak Hanyong, Interview, Seoul, December 16, 2009.

¹⁷³ During his presidential campaign in Gumi, Gyeongbuk Province (Kumi, Kyōngbuk) in 1997, Kim Dae Jung promised to support Park Chung Hee's memorial project. Kim made this promise as a reconciliation gesture with Park, his former political enemy, as well as out of a political calculation to attract more votes from the Yeongnam region (Yōngnam). This province is conventionally known for its admiration for Park and as traditional supporters of the conservative ruling party. He confirmed his promise in his visit to Daegu in May 1999.

members of the progressive camp jointly fought.

Progressives' negative evaluation of Park's place in history was not the only reason that made them enthusiastically come forward in support for the movement. The movement intertwined with realistic concerns of the progressive camp, which faced increasing public veneration of Park Chung Hee (Park Chung Hee syndrome) since the mid-1990s. Many scholars believed that the public disappointment on the incompetence of civilian governments, i.e. economic failures and misrule in the 1990s,¹⁷⁴ raised nostalgia for a strong leader. In fact, Park was repeatedly selected the number one historic figure or favorite president (or sometimes the historical figure whom you want to duplicate most in the present) in several public opinion polls. The progressive camp took this as a grave threat to them, as well as an ahistorical phenomenon for following reasons: 1) it challenges their historical legitimacy that was rooted in the anti-Yusin movement under the Park; 2) it provides an enormous political asset for the conservative camp to take advantage of, by advertising them as the successor of Park's political and economic legacy. As a result, the growing public popularity of Park posed a tremendous challenge to the position of both progressive political parties and the progressive camp in general. In particular, the symbolic meaning of Park magnified even further as Park Guen Hye, the first daughter of Park Chung Hee, ascended as the chairwoman of the GNP (from March 2004-March 2006) and became one of the promising presidential candidates for the 2007 Presidential Election.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ In contrast to the high expectations and popularity of the Kim Young Sam government in the beginning of his term, the latter part of his term was smeared with several economic failures and corruption incidents. In 1997, Korea witnessed a series of major company bankruptcies, such as Hanbo Steel Company and Kia Motors. This economic failure culminated in the IMF Financial Crisis in December 2007. Furthermore, Kim politically suffered from the corruption incident of his son, Kim Hyōnch'ōl, who accepted several bribes from individuals and companies in exchange for helping them win business contracts.

¹⁷⁵ Although she did not win the 2007 election, she was elected the first female president of the Republic of Korea in 2012.

In order to fight against the growing Park Chung Hee nostalgia and the establishment of his memorial museum, the anti-Park activists attacked his positive image as “the founder of the Korean economic miracle” with ch’inilp’a discourse. Taking advantage of the strong negative connotation attached to the notion of ch’inilp’a, they highlighted Park’s career as one of ch’inilp’a, pointing out his career as a Japanese military official. In the eyes of the anti-Park activists, his life in fact shows traces of a typical collaborator of what the ch’inilp’a discourse narrates—from a former Japanese military officer to a post-1945 dictator and human rights oppressor.¹⁷⁶ Widely advertising his career as that of ch’inilp’a, the progressives attempted to transform the public image and memory of Park from that of a nationalist who selflessly dedicated himself to the modernization of the nation into one of an opportunistic anti-national collaborator.

The Anti-*Chosun* Movement is another occasion that made the progressives fully accept the ch’inilp’a discourse as their political rhetoric. In the previous chapter, I addressed *The Hangyoreh*’s attack on the *Chosun Ilbo* with ch’inilp’a discourse. In order to avoid repetition, here, I simply address how the discourse was taken up into Anti-*Chosun* rhetoric. What initially motivated the Anti-*Chosun* Movement was the Choi Jangjip Incident in late 1998.¹⁷⁷ This

¹⁷⁶ Because of the political stake surrounding the evaluation of Pak, the legislation process of Ch’inil Investigation Law was turned out to be a political turmoil between Uri Party and GDP over the categorization of ch’inilp’a—from which military official rank the law would define as a collaborator.

¹⁷⁷ In November 1998, the *Chosun Ilbo* carried out a “thought investigation” on Choi Jangjip, a prominent political scientist and progressive-turned-liberal who was appointed the chairperson of the Presidential Consultation Committee on Policy Planning (April 1998- April 1999). After the appointment, the newspaper and *Wŏlgan Chosun*, its sister monthly magazine, depicted Choi as a North Korean follower by citing his academic works on the Korean War out of context. In response to this political attack, Choi filed a lawsuit for their misrepresentation of his works, but it resulted in his resignation from office in the next spring. Progressive groups, as well as college professors, officially announced their support for Choi and criticized the biased reporting practices of the newspaper.

incident, which was a typical ideological attack by the *Chosun Ilbo* on a progressive figure in the government,¹⁷⁸ led a large number of Koreans to turn their backs away from the newspaper. Furthermore, outspoken intellectuals and citizens rose up to criticize the detrimental social influence of the newspaper. In particular, the progressives claimed that the *Chosun Ilbo* had intentionally disseminated the ideas of cold war anti-communism and regionalism into society—with ideologically twisted reports throughout the 1990s—expressly to further its own interests.¹⁷⁹ In late 1999, the Anti-*Chosun* Movement was launched to officially criticize and oppose the newspaper.¹⁸⁰ The activists created a movement that mobilized for more than simple mass media reform, but as a larger social movement against Cold War reactionaries, represented by the *Chosun Ilbo*. According to them, the reactionaries have discouraged the development of a peaceful relationship with and reunification with North Korea from their concern that the current ruling structure—which has been built upon anti-communist and anti-North ideology—may collapse.¹⁸¹

Meanwhile, the ch'inilp'a discourse offered the progressive movements essential historical

¹⁷⁸ Before the “thought censorship” of Choi, *Wŏlgan Chosun* attacked Han Wansang, the Vice Prime Minister, and Kim Chŏngnam, a senior Presidential Secretary for Education, Culture, and Society in 1993. These thought censorships were responsible for their resignation from office.

¹⁷⁹ Chin Chunggwŏn, “Anti-Chosun kyorimundap” (The catechism of anti-*Chosun*), in *Wae? Chosun Ilbo inga* (Why? Is it Chosun newspaper?), ed. *Chosun Ilbo* pandae sinmin yŏndae (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang, 2001), 77-78.

¹⁸⁰ In November 1999, an online anti-*Chosun* group, urimodu.com, was launched to oppose the newspaper. In the summer of 2000, the group put up a full-page advertisement on their mission in *The Hangyoreh*. Shortly after, Hwang Sŏgkyŏng, a prominent novelist, refused to be a candidate of the Dongin Literary Award under the sponsorship of *Chosun Ilbo* out of political protest. In August 2000, agreeing upon the idea that democratic progress would no be longer possible without curbing the conservative media’s power, eighty-six intellectuals announced the Anti-*Chosun* Declaration of Intellectuals. More intellectuals supported the declaration later. In September, the Anti-*Chosun* Alliance (Ant’i-Chosŏn yŏndae) was set up to carry out an organized movement.

¹⁸¹ Kim Tongmin, “Anti-*Chosun* simin undong ūi yŏksajŏk ūimi” (The historical meaning of Anti-*Chosun* civil movement), in *Wae? Chosun Ilbo inga* (Why? Is it Chosun newspaper?), ed. *Chosun Ilbo* pandae sinmin yŏndae (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang, 2001), 18.

authority. Anti-*Chosun* activists claimed that the history of the newspaper showcases the path of ch'inilp'a before and after liberation. In contrast with its own argument that it was the upright voice of the nation, progressives argued that the *Chosun Ilbo* newspaper served Japanese and military dictatorships before and after liberation, respectively. This claim, even though only partially veritable, was adopted as the whole truth by progressives who felt uncomfortable with the newspaper's subservient attitude toward the Chun military regime, as well as its hyper-critical attitude toward post-1987 democratic governments and progressive figures. The effectiveness and persuasiveness of the ch'inilp'a discourse in publically attacking the *Chosun Ilbo* encouraged Anti-*Chosun* activists to deeply incorporate it within their own rhetoric. Due to the social stigma associated with ch'inil, Anti-*Chosun* activists actively utilized ch'inilp'a rhetoric rather than pointing out other problems of the newspaper. The following political cartoon lampoons the *Chosun Ilbo*.¹⁸²

¹⁸² *The Hangyoreh*, July 14, 2000.



Figure 1. “*Kildŭlyŏ chiji annŭn...*” (Cannot be tamed...), *The Hangyoreh*, July 14, 2000.

The above cartoon is a response by *The Hangyoreh* to the lengthy *Chosun Ilbo* article on July 1, 2000 titled “*Chosun Ilbo nŭn kildŭlyŏ chiji annŭnda*” (*Chosun Ilbo* won’t be tamed). In this article, the *Chosun Ilbo* claims that in spite of the evil intentions of Kim Dae Jung’s administration to “tame” the newspaper companies through investigations into their taxes, newspapers will never yield (nor be tamed). Focusing upon the term, “*kildŭlyŏjida*” (to be tamed), the cartoon humorously depicts the newspaper as a dog that claims itself to be untamed, but in fact served many owners unfaithfully, from the Japanese colonial authorities, to military dictators, and to presidents such as Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam.

As discussed above, the centrality of the ch’inilp’a discourse in the two civic movements is outstanding. The rhetorical union of the discourse with the two civic movements eventually

raised its position from the claim of some history-minded progressives in the 1980s and 1990s to the universal progressive discourse in the late 1990s and 2000s.

3) The Ch'inilp'a Issue and Diplomatic Relations with Japan and the U.S.

In tandem with the changing socio-political situation from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, foreign relations also greatly affected the issue of readdressing ch'inilp'a. Let me first begin with the reinforcement of the ch'inilp'a discourse through the uncomfortable diplomatic relationship with Japan. Since the late 1990s, the relationship with Japan grew tenuous with the following issues: territorial disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima Islets, controversy over Japanese right wing history textbooks (especially in 2001 and 2005), and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (2001- 2006).¹⁸³ What makes Korea's diplomatic relationship with Japan more difficult is its association with the colonial past, which deeply stirred post-colonial consciousness and anti-Japanese nationalism among Koreans. For example, the diplomatic relations between the two countries rapidly worsened in March 2005 over the textbook issue and the bill of the Shimane Prefecture that laid claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets. In the same month, the Japanese Ambassador to Korea was summoned on the 13th, and President Roh even stated that Korea would risk a diplomatic war against Japan over the islets. Here, I specifically focus on how the Japanese textbook issue, ensuing anti-Japanese nationalism, and ch'inilp'a discourse interactively reinforced each other's claims in 2001.

¹⁸³ From 2001 to 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro periodically visited the Yasukuni Shrine, even though his visit raised diplomatic conflicts with neighboring countries. The Yasukuni Shrine is where it is believed that the spirit and body of high military officials and soldiers are enshrined. What is the most problematic part about the Prime Minister visiting this shrine is that many top-level war criminals from WWII, such as Tojo Hideki, are also enshrined here. Korea and China strongly criticize Japanese politicians' visits to the shrine because they believe that the visits officially honor Japan's invasions of their countries.

Historically, the Japanese right wing textbook issue occasionally has caused severe diplomatic conflicts between Korea and Japan, particularly since the 1980s. At this time, the right wing textbook controversy began as early as the late 1990s when the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai, since 1995) planned to publish a new history textbook with a revisionist perspective on Japan's imperial expansionism in Asia. In 2001, the Japanese government sanctioned publishing and circulating the textbook while rejecting the Korean government's request to review a "sensitive" part of the textbook. In response to that, Korean civic groups, in alliance with Japanese counterparts, jointly set up the Head Office for Correcting Japanese Textbooks (Ilbon kyogwasō parojakki undong ponbu) and led various public movements to inform the iniquity of the textbook, as well as to reduce its acceptance rate in local school boards in Japan.¹⁸⁴ In particular, the IRCA played a central role in the movement, by organizing participating groups, offering the use of its main office, and providing its staff members to the anti-textbook organization, such as Kim Minch'öl, who served as its chief executive from May to November 2001.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ On the Korean side, more than 20 civic and labor movement organizations participated, including the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD, Ch'amyō yōndae), Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ, Kyōngsillyōn), Korean Teachers & Education Workers' Union (KTU, Chōn'gyojo), Seoul YMCA, Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU, Han'guk noch'ong).

¹⁸⁵ Specifically in order to lower the acceptance rate of the Fushōsha textbook in August, the institute carried out activities such as organizing a Korea-Japan joint seminar on the textbook issue (March 26th), cyber protests on websites of related Japanese authorities (March 31st), collecting signatures both in Korea and in Japan for banning the circulation of the textbook (from April to August), holding a Korea-Japan joint press conference (April 3rd), meeting with Korean lawmakers (April 6th), formally requesting the Japanese government to revise the textbook (April 3rd to May 10th), holding protests in Japan (April 25th to May 2nd), participating in the Inter-Asian Conference against Japanese History Textbooks (Ilbon kyogwasō munje Asia kongdong taeūng ūl wihan Asia yōndae hoeūi) (June 9-11), boycotting the Shimimoto Tobacco Company—which officially supported the Textbook Forum, requesting Korean local governments to contact their sister city Japanese local governments for not selecting the textbook (June-August), and fund-raising for putting advertisements in Japanese newspapers on the given issue.(July). For details, look at *Minjok sarang* (March 2001), 20; (April 2001), 14; (April 2001), 19; (May 2001), 19; (June 2001), 12-13, 15-23; (July 12), 12; (August 2001), 12; (September 2001), 15.

When the public attention on the textbook issue, as well as anti-Japanese sentiment, ran high in society in early April of 2001, a contributor to *The Hangyoreh* provided a unique perspective on the on-going textbook controversy.¹⁸⁶ He argued that what was required now for Koreans was not an (easily disappearing) temporal emotional reaction toward Japan, but a fundamental measure to deal with the issue. His point is that Korea first needs to restore its own historical legitimacy before blaming Japan. More specifically, he claimed that Koreans should make Japan dare not look down on the Korean nation by correcting their own historical wrongs, such as the ch'inilp'a issue.¹⁸⁷ In the same vein, *The Hangyoreh* claimed that public opinion was now arguing for cleansing its own ugly past of ch'inil before demanding Japan to correct its history textbooks. Furthermore, the newspaper wrote that even Korean high school history textbooks were not much different from their Japanese counterparts in terms of hiding the nation's shameful past, such as the collaboration of the *Chosun Ilbo* and *Donga Ilbo* during the Pacific War.¹⁸⁸

A more specific discursive linkage among *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan*, *Anti-Chosun Ilbo*, and anti-Japanese sentiment was made in the political realm in 2001. The two Millennium Democratic Party (Saech'önyön Minjudang) lawmakers, Sin Kinam and Kim Hüisön, attempted to redirect Koreans' anger toward Japan to supporting the media reform of the Kim Dae Jung

¹⁸⁶ However, his view is not original. As early as 1994, Yi Yöng hüi asked Koreans to be more self-reflective before blaming Japan's distortion of history or Japanese right wing politicians' bold remarks. Yi pointed out that Koreans themselves were also accountable for distorting history by allowing ch'inilp'a to reemerge after 1945 and by keeping biased descriptions of socialists based on Cold War ideology. "Ilbonin mangön kyut'an chön e kungmin üi ch'ongbansöng i p'ilyohada" ((We, Korean people) need to have thorough self-reflection before denouncing Japanese's bold remarks), *Wölgan mal* 96 (June 1994): 28-35.

¹⁸⁷ *The Hangyoreh*, April 9, 2001.

¹⁸⁸ *The Hangyoreh*, April 20, 2001.

administration. In the National Assembly, Sin stated that Koreans should take this issue as an opportunity for cleansing pro-Japanese collaborators, targeting the *Chosun Ilbo*. His statement came out right after the *Chosun Ilbo* condemned the government for its “lukewarm” response to the textbook issue. In response, Sin argued that the “ch’inil” newspaper was disqualified from criticizing the government regarding Japan-related issues.¹⁸⁹ Similarly in July, Kim Huisŏn made a connection between the textbook issue and Japanese colonial legacies in society. Kim argued that the unbroken rule of ch’inilp’a in our society should hold the responsibility for Japan’s repeated history distortion.¹⁹⁰ Later that year, she initiated the National Assembly Members’ Study Group for Correcting the Falsified National History (Minjok chŏnggi rŭl paro seunŭn kukhoe ūiwŏn ūi moim), which aimed at legislating the Ch’inil Investigation Law. In her memoir, she recollected that the textbook incident inspired her to start the group.

Although not as strong as anti-Japanese sentiment, anti-U.S. sentiment also played a critical role in reaffirming the ch’inilp’a discourse as a historical reality among Korean people. In the 1980s and even in the 1990s, the expression of anti-Americanism was considered a social taboo, emerging only in the realms of student activists, labor movement activists, and leftists or social activists.¹⁹¹ Yet, by the 2000s, Korean society witnessed a popular upsurge in anti-U.S. sentiment.

What became the turning point in terms of Koreans’ attitude toward the U.S. was a series of incidents in 2002. In the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games, a controversial decision

¹⁸⁹ *The Hangyoreh*, April 13, 2001.

¹⁹⁰ *The Hangyoreh*, July 19, 2001.

¹⁹⁰ *The Hangyoreh*, July 19, 2001.

¹⁹¹ There was an exception during the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Anti-American sentiment, induced by the NBC’s biased reports on Korea and U.S. swim players’ stealing incident, was widely spread among Koreans.

in the speed skating arena erupted in an upsurge of Korean anti-Americanism. Olympic officials determined that the Korean short track athlete Kim Tongsŏng did not win the gold medal in his event because of a foul, although video recording demonstrated that the accident was in fact due to the actions of the American skater Apolo Anton Ohno. The perceived biased judgment of Olympic referees and the American skater's sarcastic remarks on the incident greatly hurt Koreans' national pride and provoked public anti-U.S. sentiment. After this, Koreans boycotted American products and created anti-U.S. websites on the Internet. What is noteworthy here is that the Korean media began using the once-forbidden expression of "anti-Americanism" in a causal manner around this time. An even graver incident occurred in June: a U.S. armored vehicle accidentally ran over two schoolgirls, killing them. Their two deaths drew great public attention in November, as the U.S. military court determined that the two U.S. soldiers involved in the mishap were innocent. In November and December, Koreans held a series of nation-wide candlelight vigils to memorialize the two young girls, while protesting the unfair regulations of the Korea-U.S. SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement).¹⁹² Around the same time, the U.S. request for the Korean military to participate in the Iraq War fanned the flames of growing anti-U.S. sentiment. Throughout the early term of Roh Moo Hyun, the issue of dispatching troops to Iraq created friction in politics and public, continuously feeding anti-U.S. sentiment among anti-war protesters and progressives. Also, the enduring rumor of a possible U.S. preemptive attack on North Korea made Koreans anxious about the possible eruption of war and antagonistic about U.S. foreign policy in the peninsula.

¹⁹² The full term is "Agreement under Article 4 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of American, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea."

The spread of anti-U.S. sentiment reshaped the ideological geography of a Korea captivated under the ideology of anti-communism and pro-Americanism for more than a half-century. The public acceptance of anti-Americanism finally allowed the progressives to voice their critical opinions on the U.S. policies on the Korean peninsula. That also functioned to exacerbate the ideological division and tension between the right/conservatives and the left/progressives. According to the historical narrative of ch'inilp'a discourse, the pro-Japanese collaborators turned into pro-Americans after 1945 and became strong supporters of post-1945 Korean authoritarian regimes. In the early 2000s, Korean society was full of anti-U.S. sentiment, and the atmosphere was not particularly conducive to the friendly attitude of Korean right wing conservatives toward the U.S. On top of that, the arrogance of the conservative majority GNP in the National Assembly made Koreans ready to accept the dogmatized historical narrative of ch'inilp'a as a reality: pro-Japanese collaborators = pro-U.S. authoritarian regime supporters = present Korean conservatives (such as GNP, conservative media, and reactionary/conservative groups). This kind of overly simplified classification, even though making a number of conscious people feel uncomfortable, was widely adopted and circulated in public rallies, media, internet websites, etc. in the early 2000s.

4) The Political Situation of 2004

As I discussed at the beginning of this section, the impeachment of President Roh extremely weakened the position of the conservative camp in society. In particular, the anger of many Koreans from a wide range of ideological positions focused on the opposition parties that

passed the impeachment bill (and conservative newspapers which supported them).¹⁹³ Enraged people cried out for driving out corrupt right wing politicians who voted in favor of the decision.¹⁹⁴ Among the oppositional parties, the GNP received the greatest blow. Already infamously nicknamed as *ch'attögi chöngdang* in 2003,¹⁹⁵ the party was identified with the representative reactionary party that tried to reverse the stream of democratic progress. The below *Hangyoreh* cartoon captures the prevailing public image of the GNP among politically progressive Koreans.¹⁹⁶



Figure 2. “*Ilchangi hwinallimyö*” (Waving the Hinomaru), *The Hangyoreh*, February 28, 2004.

The cartoon titled “*Ilchangi hwinallimyö* (Waving the Hinomaru)” is a parody of a famous

¹⁹³ According to the results of nine media researches right after the impeachment, negative opinion was absolutely high up to 66.7~ 76.2 % and the significant percentage of Koreans (54~64%) believed that oppositional parties were responsible for this incident. *The Hangyoreh*, March 15, 2004.

¹⁹⁴ Koreans began street rallies as well as an online signing movement from the very first day of the impeachment. In a few days, more than 550 civic groups, as well as general citizens, launched the All Citizens’ Action for the Cancellation of the Impeachment and Eradication of Corrupted Politics (T’anhaek muhyo-pup’ae chöngch’i ch’ökköyl ül wihan pöm-kungmin haengdong). On Kwanghwamun Street in downtown Seoul on March 14, more than 40,000 people gathered together to voice their opposition against the impeachment. The rallies culminated in the candlelight vigil event on March 20th, in which at least 100,000 people joined across the nation on the streets or online, and was the largest of its kind after the 1987 democratization movement.

¹⁹⁵ The rough translation of the term is “a political party selling or trading fresh products in a truck.” This nickname originated from when Yi Hoech’ang, the then presidential nominee of the GNP, received an astronomically large illegal election fund from *chaebols* in 2003. The money was delivered to him in several dozens of apple boxes in a truck in an apartment basement garage.

¹⁹⁶ *The Hangyoreh*, February 28, 2004.

Korean movie title, “*T’aegŭkki rŭl hwinallimyŏ*” (Waving the T’aegŭkki). Across the title in the middle, the upper space is filled with three “ch’inilp’a” figures: Ch’oe Pyŏngnyŏl, the chair of GNP (June 2003-March 2004), a person name-tagged ch’inilp’a (who looks like the owner of the *Chosun Ilbo* news company), and Park Chung Hee in Japanese military attire. Below the title, three scenes symbolically depict the dire historical situations in relation to ch’inilp’a: (from the left) 1) the forced dissolution of the Special Committee in 1949, 2) the mobilization of young women for military sexual slavery, and 3) the death of Grandma Chŏng Sŏun, the first Korean witness on military comfort women in Korea. The whole scene focuses on Ch’oe, who wears an armband of the GNP and a mustache conventionally symbolizing a colonial Japanese official in old Korean movies and dramas. He rumples a paper on which is written “Ch’inil Investigation Law,” staring at other “ch’inilp’a” standing behind him. The cartoon strongly delivers a message of how the GNP distorts history again by circumscribing the force of the Ch’inil Investigation Law in alliance with or on behalf of collaborators (like the *Chosun Ilbo* and Park Chung Hee followers). On the other hand, the cartoon depicts that Ch’oe himself, largely by means of the GNP, is a ch’inilp’a as well. It is telling how the public image of the GNP shaped into “national traitors” around this time.¹⁹⁷

What is significant to note is that the ch’inilp’a discourse was fully (re-)contextualized under on-going political situations in the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments in depictions of the right-left confrontation, as that between pro-Japanese anti-democratic elements (*pan-minju ch’inilp’a*) and national democratic camp (*minjok minju chinyŏng*). Now, one’s

¹⁹⁷ According to a public poll in *The Hangyoreh* on the ideological identity of political parties in March 2004, Uri Party was considered the most progressive party while the GNP was considered the most conservative. As an analyst points out, this perception was more exaggerated than what each party exactly stood for in the ideological spectrum. See *The Hangyoreh* 21, 500 (March 18th 2004): 52-54.

position toward the collaboration issue came to be a matter of political and ideological inclination, not depending on one's historical view. At the same time, this recontextulization blurred the conceptual boundary between the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement and civic movements for further democratic progress among progressive Koreans in the early and mid-2000s.

President Roh, returning back to his office in May 14th, announced his goals of legislating four reform policies: canceling the National Security Law, legislating media reform laws, legislating special laws for readdressing past wrongs, and updating private school laws.¹⁹⁸ Particularly in regard to redressing past wrongs, Roh suggested carrying out comprehensive investigations to set up special committees in the National Assembly. This announcement provided the very opportunity that the issues of *kwagō ch'ōngsan*, including *ch'inilp'a*, came to the fore as a major political issue in 2004 and 2005.

Section 2. The Struggle for Legislation of the Ch'inilp'a Issue

This section illuminates the process of politicization and institutionalization of the *ch'inilp'a* issue in Korea, specifically in the years of 2004 and 2005. The media frequently depicted the political situation of this period as “the politics of past wrongs” (*kwagōsa chōngguk*), which means that the past issues functioned as the most urgent political agenda both in politics and civil society and also shaped other social and political concerns. “Politicization” here indicates that the politically hyper-sensitive *ch'inilp'a* issue came to be inseparable from

¹⁹⁸ The four reform legislations (*4-dae kaehyōk ippōp*) are considered the bills that symbolically show the reform-oriented nature of the Uri Party. However, the bills raised tremendous criticism and opposition on the side of conservatives. Political commentators claimed that it drove political circles to extreme confrontation. At the end, only media reform laws, special laws for readdressing past wrongs, and private school laws were legislated through negotiation with the GNP.

political interests and the political context of the day. The institutionalization of the ch'inilp'a issue was made possible as *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* advocates sought address the issue through legislation. What I term institutionalization is thus the legislation process in the National Assembly, as well as the installation and activities of the Presidential Committee Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism (PCIC) to deal with investigating former collaborators. Throughout the process, the claim of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*, once a dissident discourse in the 1980s, transformed into the orthodox historical view of the state regarding the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators.

This section thus traces back the two above processes that were interwoven with other political concerns of the day from June 2001 to May 2005. Toward this end, I also examine the historical meanings and complexity of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* project that the PCIC carried out by relying on its final reports and interviews I conducted with its employees. In discussing the politicization process, I mainly focus on two newspapers: the *Chosun Ilbo* and *The Hangyoreh*, each representing two distinctive voices regarding the legislation of the ch'inilp'a issue. The merits and demerits of each vary: 1) they clearly reflect the two competing “official” positions of the conservatives and the progressives over the issue; 2) on the contrary, their voices tend to marginalize a wide spectrum of in-between opinions and thoughts which might have been more complex among Koreans.¹⁹⁹ While recognizing these limitations fully, I examine carefully the twists of politicized language in the middle of the left-right confrontation over the legislation process.

¹⁹⁹ Also, *Hankook Ilbo*, considered an “objective” and politically and ideologically “middle of the road” newspaper by many, has not been very successful in terms of circulation in comparison with the three conservative newspapers and *The Hangyoreh*. Therefore, it has had limited influence in forming public opinion.

1) The Legislation Movement of the Ch'inilp'a Issue in the National Assembly from June 2001 to March 2002

The movement for legislation to deal with the ch'inilp'a began with the launch of the National Assembly Members' Study Group for Correcting Falsified National History (Minjok chōnggi rül seunūn kukhoe ūiwōn moim, hereafter NAMSG). In June 2001, the group, organized with twenty-one nonpartisan lawmakers, took the initiative in preparing legislation on the ch'inilp'a issue with other Japan-related past wrongs in the National Assembly. According to the memoir of Kim Hūisōn, a female Uri Party lawmaker who played a leading role in the group, two incidents inspired her to start the movement in the spring of 2001: the civil actions for removing the tomb of Kim Ch'angyong, infamous pro-Japanese police officer from the Daejeon National Cemetery and the outbreak of the Japanese right wing history textbook issue.²⁰⁰ In its early stage, the group sought cooperation with other related organizations, such as the IRCA and the Korea Liberation Association (Kwangbokhoe, hereafter KLA). In my interview, Kim Minch'ōl, a senior research chief in the IRCA, told me that Kim Hūisōn was not only interested in straightening out historical wrongs, but in using the ch'inilp'a issue politically to drive the GNP into a corner. Members of the IRCA in fact considered her ideas for legislation unrealistic, yet considered it worth trying because they thought that the ch'inilp'a issue could be publicized even more in the process.²⁰¹ For this reason, the IRCA cooperated with the NAMSG in writing a bill for *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*.

²⁰⁰ Kim Hūisōn, *Arūmdaun t'uchaeng: Kim Hūisōn kwa Minjok chōnggi ūiwōn moim, ch'inil kwagō ch'ōngsan ūi yōjōng* (A beautiful struggle: Kim Hūisōn and National Assembly Members' Study Group for Correcting the Falsified National History, the journey for settling the pasts of pro-Japanese collaboration) (Seoul: Taech'ōng midio, 2006), 45-53.

²⁰¹ Kim Minch'ōl, Interview, Seoul, January 3, 2010.

As I discussed in the earlier section, a sign of early politicization of the ch'inilp'a issue already appeared in the late 1990s with the Anti-Memorial Museum Movement and Anti-*Chosun* Movement. Also, political parties used the term ch'inilp'a to assault oppositional party leaders. For example, the Millennium Democratic Party attacked Yi Hoech'ang, the chairman of GNP, as the offspring of a collaborator. The MDP harbored suspicions on the role of Yi's father, who was a clerk for the prosecution during the colonial period. In response, the GNP problematized the "overly-friendly" attitude of President Kim Dae Jung toward his former Japanese teacher, whom he greeted with his old Japanese name in the Japanese language.²⁰² The two parties (GNP and Millennium Democratic Party, later on Uri Party) frequently adopted these smear tactics since the late 1990s.²⁰³

The NAMSG list of 708 pro-Japanese collaborators invited full-scale politicization of the ch'inilp'a issue. On February 28, 2002, the announcement of the list created serious political and social repercussions. For the first time after the dissolution of the Special Committee, public authorities such as National Assembly members officially touched upon the issue. In addition, the list arguably included sixteen figures under intensive scrutiny (*chipchung simŭi taesang*) that the KLA exercised caution not to release their names for the first round of the announcement.²⁰⁴ Most of the sixteen are key-elites in post-1945 Korean society whose tremendous contributions to building Korean society in a wide range of fields are far-reaching, make it difficult to just write them off as a collaborator.

²⁰² *Chosun Ilbo*, August 1, 2001; *Chosun Ilbo*, August 18, 2000.

²⁰³ *Chosun Ilbo*, February 19, 2002; *Chosun Ilbo*, March 2, 2002.

²⁰⁴ The sixteen people are: Ko Hwanggyōng, Kim Hwallan, Mo Yunsuk, Pak Indōk, Song Kūmsōn, Hwang Sindōk (female leaders), Kim Ŭnho, Sim Hyōnggu, Hyōn Chemyōng, Hong Nanp'a, Yi Nūnghwa, Chōng Manjo (cultural figures and artists), Kim Sōngsu, Pang Ŭngmo, Chang Tōksu (journalists), and Kwōn Sangno (religious figure).

Originally, the KLA and NAMSG collaboratively prepared the list ever since the former notified the latter as early as in July 2001 that it was making a list to investigate the anti-national crimes of collaborators. Upon receiving the KLA's preliminary list, the NAMSG reviewed it with specialists in *ch'inilp'a* study.²⁰⁵ According to Kim Hŭisŏn, NAMSG members, after an internal debate over whether to put the names of the sixteen in the list, decided to announce them together.

Not surprisingly, the list received contrasting responses in the media. The two newspapers, the *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Donga Ilbo*, whose founders were among the sixteen, raised suspicion on the intention of the NAMSG for including the sixteen people in the last minutes before the announcement without the permission of the KLA. Tailoring the interview with Yun Kyŏngbin, the president of the latter, they claimed that the NAMSG was dominated by progressive lawmakers and intentionally politicized the announcement in order to highlight the wartime careers of their founders and other right wing elites.²⁰⁶ For this reason, the newspapers attempted to de-legitimize the list by depicting it as politically-motivated, not produced by reliable lawmakers who strove for "universality, publicity, objectivity, and representativeness" and was not a result of thorough and severe scrutiny or investigation.²⁰⁷ In contrast, *The Hangyoreh* imbued the list with the historically significant meaning of "rekindling *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan*" which had been postponed for more than a half century. In particular, the newspaper paid much attention to underlining the wartime career of the sixteen figures. Naturally, the two sides took

²⁰⁵ Kim, *ibid.*, 59-61, 67-73.

²⁰⁶ *Chosun Ilbo*, March 1, 2002; *Donga Ilb*, March 1, 2002.

²⁰⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, March 2, 2002.

issue with each other. In the meanwhile, whether or not the insertion of the sixteen to the list was at discretion of the NAMSG became one of the main debating points between the two newspapers even though it was not such an essential issue.²⁰⁸

Eventually, the list raised social debate as for how to evaluate the wartime collaboration of elites in terms of their lifelong merits and demerits. Media like the *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Donga Ilbo* argued that it was an unbalanced way of thinking how to consider only the faults of those who lived through the most turbulent time of Korean history.²⁰⁹ On the contrary, *The Hangyoreh* claimed that their idea of covering one's faults with bigger merits was just a way of distorting the truth.²¹⁰ Furthermore, the newspaper emphasized that the renowned elites' collaboration should be judged more strictly than those of ordinary people, given their social influence and accountability to Koreans.²¹¹ In addition to these two conflicting positions, many other newspapers in general welcomed the announcement as the first step for dealing with the unsolved historical task of pro-Japanese collaborators, and on the other hand, asking for sensitivity in approaching collaboration cases committed under complicated social and political circumstances.²¹²

2) The Struggle for the Legislation of the Ch'inil Investigation Law from March 2002 to March 2004

The announcement of the NAMSG's list took the first step for the legislation of the Ch'inil

²⁰⁸ *The Hangyoreh*, March 2, 2002.

²⁰⁹ *Donga Ilbo*, March 2, 6, 2002; April 1, 2002.

²¹⁰ *The Hangyoreh*, March 4, 2002; March 5, 2002.

²¹¹ *The Hangyoreh*, March 5, 2002.

²¹² For examples, see *Munhwa Ilbo*, March 1, 2002; *Hankook Ilbo*, March 1, 2002; *Kukmin Ilbo*, March 1, 2002.

Investigation Law in the National Assembly. On March 13th, the NAMSG set up a pre-operational meeting for the legalization. In her memoir, Kim Huisŏn writes that shaping the Ch'inil Investigation Law took enormous research and help from specialists in ch'inilp'a issue and legal advisors. According to Kim, the biggest challenge in the early stage was the very structure of this specific law. Because the law would deal with collaboration cases from at least more than a half century ago, the lawmakers labored over how the law could officially "settle the past" in a possible and appropriate way. A number of consultations with researchers and specialists gave birth to a truth-investigating law (*chinsang kyumyŏng pŏp*) that focused on: 1) the re-inspection of past collaboration cases by a state-sanctioned institution; and 2) the production of official records on collaborators. After solving the first problem, the most challenging in the final stage, she recalls, was to set the boundary of "pro-Japanese anti-national activities." It was an issue of establishing a standard determining from which position and with what kind of activities the law would stipulate a person as a collaborator.²¹³ After this whole process, lawyers and scholars reviewed the drafted law in public hearing in September 2002. The law was finally submitted to the National Assembly and was passed with the votes of 154 lawmakers (approximately 57% of the total lawmakers) in August 2003.

However, none of the committees at the National Assembly either tried to accept or discuss it for the first three months. Due to the complex nature of the law, existing standing committees tended to avoid or put off reviewing the Ch'inil Investigation Law and other past-

²¹³ Kim, *ibid.*, 84.

related laws.²¹⁴ In order to solve this problem, Kim and others came up with the idea of setting up the Special Committee Dealing with Past Wrongs (Kwagösa t'ükpyöl wiwönhoe, hereafter SCDP) in the National Assembly. As a result, the general meeting of the SCDP passed the Ch'inil Investigation Law and other laws within a month. Yet, the law confronted more challenges in the Judicial and Legislation Committee (Pöpche saböp wiwönhoe, hereafter JLC), a standing committee whose role was to review the structure and letters of proposed laws.

In the JLC, the Ch'inil Investigation Law met several objections of the government as well as opposition parties, mainly the GNP. In the first round of the JLC screening, the unexpected objection of the Vice Minister of the Department of Administration and Self-Government disappointed the NAMSG members on January 7, 2003.²¹⁵ In the second round, the second review committee of the JLC under the leadership of a GNP lawmaker did not pass the law in its review, and sent it back to the SCDP on February 2nd. This rejection made the prospect of sending the law to the plenary session look gloomy. In the last minutes of the 16th National Assembly session, the SCDP accepted all the advice of the JLC on the law, sending the law back to the JLC for submission to the National Assembly plenary session.²¹⁶ On February 26, the amended law barely made its way through the JLC. Yet, the GNP objected to submitting it to the plenary session with only one day left in the 16th session of the National Assembly. *The Hangyoreh* denounced that move, saying that the GNP rejected the law based on the belief that it

²¹⁴ There were ten past-related laws in relation to Tonghak Uprisings, the investigation and compensation on those who were forced drafted during the Pacific War, the investigation on civilian victims by S. Korean army during the Korean War, etc.

²¹⁵ *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, January 8, 2004; *Seoul Sinmun*, January 8, 2004; *Donga Ilbo*, January 8, 2004; *The Hangyoreh*, January 9, 2004.

²¹⁶ *The Hangyoreh*, February 5, 2004.

could attack the GNP's established supporters.²¹⁷ Under the pressure of public opinion,²¹⁸ the GNP-led legislation reluctantly passed the law in the plenary session on March 2nd.

The passing of the Ch'inil Investigation Law was greatly indebted to the strong support of progressive civic groups and opinion from the Internet. On January 5th, the Committee for the Legislation of Investigation Law on the Truth of Forced Mobilization during Japanese Imperialism (Ilche kangje tongwŏn chinsang kyumyŏng t'ŭkpyŏlpŏp ch'ujin wiwŏnhoe), which consisted of more than thirty civic groups, held a press conference to press for the passing of the Ch'inil Investigation Law and Special Law for Investigating the Truth of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism in the National Assembly.²¹⁹ When the Ch'inil Investigation Law looked like it was about to fail on February 27, a day before the final day of the National Assembly session, NAMSG and netizens promptly organized a rally in front of Seodaemun Prison History Hall for passing the law on March 1st.²²⁰ On the same day, civic groups, such as The Meeting of the Descendants of Independence Patriots (Tongnip yukongja yujokhoe) and The Meeting of the Descendants of Independence Movement Fighters (Sukguk sŏnyŏl yujokhoe), held a rally blaming the GNP for continuing to delay passage of the law.²²¹

²¹⁷ *The Hangyoreh*, March 1, 2004.

²¹⁸ In an internet vote asking as for why the law was not passed at www.daum.net, more than 90 % people answered that it was due to the systematic interference by those who were charged for collaboration or their patrons. In the same vein, a number of netizens called for voting against the GNP, as well as the opponents of the law, in the coming 2004 April General Election. See more in details for *The Hangyoreh*, March 1, 2. Except the so-called three conservative newspapers, *Chosun Ilbo*, *Donga Ilbo*, and *Jungang Ilbo*, most major newspapers, not even particularly categorized progressive, were supportive for the law. For examples, see *Hankook Ilbo*, February 3, 18, March 1; *Munhwa Ilbo*, January 28, February 7, 12, 25, 28; *Seoul Sinmun*, March 1, 2; *Kukmin Ilbo*, March 1.

²¹⁹ *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, January 6, 2004.

²²⁰ *Seoul Sinmun*, March 1, 2004; *Segye Ilbo*, March 1, 2004; *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 1, 2004.

²²¹ *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, March 1, 2004.

3) Further Politicization of the Ch'inilp'a Issue around the Amendment of Ch'inil Investigation Law from March 2004 to December 2004

Soon after the law passed, the impeachment incident of the President Roh Moo Hyun on March 12th rapidly and comprehensively reshaped the political geography of Korea. The impeachment eventually resulted in empowering the president and progressive parties, such as Uri Party and Democratic Labor Party (Minju Nodongdang), in the April 2004 General Election. With the official support of President Roh and powerful progressive ruling party, the issue of “settling past wrongs” was taken up to the next stage of “*kwogŏsa chŏngguk*” (political situation revolving around the issues of past wrongs) in the mid- and late 2004.

Even before the Ch'inil Investigation Law passed in the plenary session on March 2, civic groups like the IRCA requested amending the law, calling it “a tattered law” (*nudŏgi pŏp*). They argued that two corrections in the JLC deeply damaged the original intention of the law so much that *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* no longer seemed possible with the law. From this perspective, civic groups launched the Civic Association for the Investigation on the Truth of Pro-Japanese Anti-National Activities (Ch'inil panminjok haengwi chinsang kyumyŏng simin yŏndae, hereafter Association for Pro-Japanese Investigation) as early as February, and it was preparing the grounds for revising the law.

In the middle of preparing the revision of the law by the civic group, several political situations amplified the significance of “settling past wrongs”: 1) the emergence of Park Geun Hye as the central figure of the GNP, 2) President Roh's decision to bring the issues of past wrongs to the central political agenda of his administration, 3) continuing exposure of the collaboration activities of major politicians' parents. The impeachment incident enabled Park

Geun Hye, the first daughter of Park Chung Hee, maintain 121 seats in the legislation as the heroine of the GNP. As a natural consequence, the rise of Park in the GNP intensified the political and social debate on her father's career as a Japanese military officer. In the meantime, the Association for Pro-Japanese Investigation announced the revised version of the Ch'inil Investigation Law on June 11, 2004, which expanded investigators' category of who is considered pro-Japanese. This revised version was picked up as the platform of the Uri Party on July 13 and the Democratic Party and Democratic Labor Party soon followed.

In mid-July (to early August), Park Geun Hye initiated the debate of national identity (*kukka chŏngch'esŏng nonjaeng*), attacking the Roh administration for undermining the national identity of South Korea. The debate had the background of 1) a problematic decision of the Presidential Committee for the Investigation on the Truth of Suspicious Deaths (Ŭimunsa chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe, hereafter PCSD)²²² and 2) continuing political attack on Park Geun Hye's father's pro-Japanese career.²²³ Judging from the decisions of the PCSD and the "leftist" economic policies of the government, she raised a question about the national identity of the Roh administration: that is to say, it did not respect the essential principles of the South

²²² In early July, the Presidential Committee for the Investigation on the Truth of Suspicious Deaths decided to recognize the tortured deaths of three unconverted (from socialism to democracy) long-term political prisoners as "the cases that are associated with democratic progress." The progressives, even though not all of them, supported the committee's view that the cases could positively influence South Korean democratic progress. The committee argued that their deaths, even though they were North Korean spies and unconverted, preserved the idea of constitutional rights, i.e. freedom of thought and conscience, and eventually influenced the cancellation of forcible converted policy later in the 1980s. On the contrary, the majority of newspaper editorials fiercely opposed the decision to name them as being associated with the democratic progress as a judgmental challenge to "the identity of South Korea as a democratic state." They condemned the committee for trying to recognize North Korean followers as strong candidates for South Korean merit figures. This decision was eventually turned over by the Committee for the Recovery of Honor and Compensation for Those Who Participated in the Democratic Movement several days later, but the original decision created suspicion on the ideological inclination and direction of the PCSD. For details, see *The Hangyoreh*, July 3; *Chosun Ilbo*, July 2, 3, 7; *Munhwa Ilbo*, July 3, 5, 7; *Donga Ilbo*, July 3, July 5; *Hankook Ilbo*, July 3; *Seoul Sinmun*, July 3; *Segye Ilbo*, July 3.

²²³ *The Hangyoreh*, July 21, July 26, August 2, 2004.

Korean state, liberal democracy and the free market economy to the extent that his action shook its national identity.²²⁴ In response to her comments, the ruling Uri Party expanded the national identity issue into a debate of historical legitimacy, including the issue of “settling past wrongs,” such as passing laws on pro-Japanese collaboration, civilian massacres during the Korean War, and suspicious deaths during military dictatorships.²²⁵

The strong intention of President Roh and the Uri Party to deal with past wrongs manifested again in the presidential message for the 8·15 Independence Day ceremony. Here, President Roh suggests his blueprint for comprehensive legislation on various past issues that were dealt with or legislated separately issue by an issue.²²⁶ As expected, this announcement raised contradictory responses. GNP and conservative newspapers voiced that it was a part of President Roh’s political conspiracy to attack the conservative camp. Not surprisingly, the *Chosun Ilbo* criticized the revised version of the Ch’inil Investigation Law as politically targeting Park Chung Hee and the *Chosun* and *Donga* newspapers²²⁷: the newspaper indicated that the revised clause expanded investigation subjects from lieutenant-colonel up to second lieutenant in military officials as a direct attack on Park Chung Hee and his daughter Park Geun Hye. Also, the newspaper argued that the expansion of investigation subjects into the areas of culture, art, media, academia, education, and religion was designed to specifically target the *Donga Ilbo* and itself. In conclusion, *Chosun Ilbo* contended that the Uri Party, under the pretext of “straightening out national spirit,” intended to smear the image of its political enemies. For

²²⁴ *The Hangyoreh*, August 5, 2004.

²²⁵ *The Hangyoreh*, August 2, 2004.

²²⁶ *The Hangyoreh*, August 16, 2004.

²²⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, July 14, 15.

example, it referred to how pro-Roh Moo Hyun internet websites, i.e. www.ohmynews.com and www.surprise.com, explicitly instigated people to support *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement, claiming they were taking advantage of the legislation to attack the *Chosun Ilbo*, *Donga Ilbo*, and the GNP.

At the same time, the pro-Japanese careers of major politicians' parents were exposed to the public in mid-August. It was conventionally the progressive (politicians) that mobilized this kind of exposure to assault their political enemy, seen in the cases with Yi Hoe-ch'ang, Park Geun Hye, Pak Kwangyong, and Cho Sun. Ironically however, strong *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* advocates such as Sin Kinam, Kim Hūsōn, and Yi Migyōng were located at the center of the disclosures. In addition, the three were major politicians of the ruling Uri Party (Sin Kinam as the chairperson, Kim as the leader of the Ch'inil legislation movement, and Yi as the Committee Chair of Culture and Tourism Division in National Assembly). Moreover, Kim Hūsōn and Sin Kinam were suspected of deceiving people regarding the careers of their late fathers.²²⁸ Therefore, the conservative camp used the exposure of their fathers to smear the morality of the progressives themselves.

Without being disturbed by those exposure tactics, the progressive camp collectively showed a firm resolve for realizing comprehensive legislation on past wrong issues. On August 18th, the ruling Uri Party set up a task force for preparing the legislation to resolve hitherto unaddressed historical wrongs and tried to drive the GNP into a corner. In early September, more than 700 progressive civic groups organized The People's Committee for Settling Past Wrongs (Olbarūn kwagō ch'ōngsan ūl wihan pōm kungmin wiwōnhoe) in order to suggest the "right"

²²⁸ See for Sin Kinam, *The Hangyoreh*, August 17, 18, 19, 2004; *Chosun Ilbo*, August 17, 18. For Kim Hūsōn, *Chosun Ilbo*, August 18, September 17, October 18. For Yi Migyōng, *Chosun Ilbo*, August 25.

direction for the legislation.²²⁹ It was such a gigantic gathering that almost all progressive and related civic groups participated. This committee was not only active in proposing the ideas for the draft of the legislation for past wrongs, but also took a wide range of actions to influence directly the legislation process, i.e., holding public hearings and press conferences, announcing statements, organizing symposiums and panel discussions, and organizing public advertisements and street rallies.²³⁰ Furthermore, some civic groups also launched The Citizens' Alliance for the Cleansing of Pro-Japanese Collaboration (Ch'inil ch'ōngsan simin haengdong yōndae) for as part of the systemic *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement on October 2, 2004. Meanwhile, "settling past wrongs" emerged as one of the biggest socio-political issues in the second half of 2004.

Within the mass media, *The Hangyoreh* and the *Chosun Ilbo* waged a fierce war against each other in order to justify their own contrasting positions, either promoting the legislation project or to prove the absurdity of the present context. Referring to progressive intellectuals, the former enthusiastically proclaimed its historical significance, not failing to mention the "shamelessly" pro-Japanese activities of the *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Donga Ilbo*. On the other hand, the *Chosun Ilbo* focused on demonstrating how the project was "past-obsessed," "stirring up disintegration among people (*kungnon punyōl*)," "politically motivated," and "wasting the nation's coffers."²³¹ In addition, the two newspapers frequently released opinion polls which

²²⁹ The People's Committee for Settling Past Wrongs held the first preparation meetings on September 3rd, but it officially launched on November 9, 2004. *Wōlgan Chosun*, a conservative monthly magazine, categorized it as a typical leftist organization in which a number of previous and current major left activists participated. For details, see *Wōlgan Chosun* 295 (Oct. 2004):84-95.

²³⁰ Olbarūn kwagō ch'ōngsan ūl wihan pōm kungmin wiwōnhoe, *Kwagō ch'ōngsan undong paeksō* II (A white book on the movement for settling past wrongs, Vol. 2) (Gyeonggido, P'aju: Han'guk haksul chōngbo, 2005), 367-380.

²³¹ For examples, see *Chosun Ilbo*, September 3 and 9, 2004.

supported their own positions.²³²

The revised Ch'inil Investigation Law finally passed as the Uri Party and the GNP came to a compromise at the end of the year. In early September, the Uri Party and the GNP separately submitted revised versions of the Ch'inil Investigation Law to the Administration and Self-Government Committee. The two versions had several significant differences. Comparing with the original, the version of the Uri Party first provided more authority to investigating teams. It offered inspectors the right to officially request materials or documents to related institutions and to issue an accompanying instruction sheet. In addition, it expanded the investigation pool of police and military officials and removed conditional terms like “on the national level” in investigating wartime collaborators. On the other hand, the tentative revised version of the GNP suggested establishing an independent civilian institution for pro-Japanese investigation. Regarding giving inspectors the right to issue an accompanying instruction sheet, the GNP strongly opposed the idea. However, the GNP was in agreement with the Uri Party in terms of expanding the scope of investigation.²³³

Throughout October and November, the two parties found middle ground on different parts of their versions. On October 25, the ruling Uri Party made more changes, including the following clauses: 1) changing the standard for selecting investigation subjects from position-focused to activities-focused, 2) making all three subjects—the president, the legislation, and the Constitutional Court—recommend ch'inil investigation committee members, 3) eliminating a

²³² In the case of *Chosun Ilbo*, see August 9, September 15, 2004.

²³³ *The Hangyoreh*, September 9, 2004; *Chosun Ilbo*, September 9, 11.

criminal charge in the violation of following an accompanying instruction sheet.²³⁴ After another round of negotiations, the revised version of the Ch'inil Investigation Law passed in the plenary session on December 29, 2004. In addition, additional legislation for resettling past wrongs named the Basic Law Resettling Past Wrongs for the Truth and Reconciliation (Chinsil·hwahae rūl wihan kwagōsa kibon pōp), passed at the end of May 2005 after a number of debates in the National Assembly.

4) The Historical Significance and Activities of the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations during Japanese Imperialism

The Ch'inil Investigation Law was promulgated on January 29, 2005. As a result, the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism (hereafter PCIC) was set up to embark on its historical project on May 31st in the same year. The first clause of the law defines the purpose of the PCIC as the following: “This law aims at ascertaining the historical truth and legitimacy of the nation and contributing to the administration of social justice by investigating the truth of pro-Japanese and anti-national activities for Japanese imperialism from the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, when Japan’s encroachment on Korea’s sovereignty began, to the Independence Day of August 15, 1945.”²³⁵ Concerning the historical significance and characteristics of the PCIC, its final report declares: “its project is unprecedented in world history in that the resettling was carried out sixty years after colonial rule by the state, neither by academia nor civil society.”²³⁶ In

²³⁴ *The Hangyoreh*, October 27, 2004; *Chosun Ilbo*, December 8.

²³⁵ PCIC, *Ch'inil panminjok haengwi chinsang kyumyōng pogosō* (The report on the investigation on the truth of pro-Japanese anti-national activities) (2009), 28-9. CD Rom.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 29.

declaring so, this statement highlights resettling the past as the state's project: "the state can not only become the subject of history or historical memory, but also play a certain role in reconstructing past memory in a transitional society that requires a new social norm." Kim Minch'öl, an IRCA senior staff member and research team leader at the PCIC, defines the meaning of the PCIC's final report as "realizing the postponed justice symbolically as the state institution settled down the historical task" of *ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan*.²³⁷ Also, the report differentiates its activities from those of the Special Committee as: "the PCIC did not focus on imposing criminal penalties on offenders, but on comprehensive research and analysis of the structure of Japanese imperial rule, the logic of pro-Japanese activities, and thorough investigation on those activities."²³⁸

In terms of organization, the PCIC was largely composed of three divisions: 11 committee members including the chairperson and a standing committee member, advisory committee, and executive office. The committee consisted of eleven members who were appointed by the president (4 persons including the chairperson), the legislation (4), the Constitutional Court (3), and their qualifications were stipulated by law. The advisory committee comprised no more than 30 persons (but in fact, less than 10 persons) who could offer professional knowledge and experience on the *ch'inilp'a* issue. Finally, the executive office was in charge of not only general administration affairs such as finance and planning, but it was also under the office in charge of investigators practically conducting research and investigation and professional staff that took

²³⁷ Kim Minch'öl, "Chiyöndeon chöngüi: Tu kae üi pogosö" (Postponed justice: Two reports), *Hwanghae munhwa* 68 (Fall, 2010): 94.

²³⁸ PCIC, *ibid.*, 29.

care of collecting investigation materials.²³⁹

According to its report, the PCIC made a decision on “those who committed pro-Japanese activities (*ch’inil haengwija*)” by taking the following steps: 1) based on the second clause of the Ch’inil Investigation Law, it formed an investigation to poll the following populations and fields: aristocracy, bureaucracy, economy, military, police, pro-Japanese organizations, religion, media, education, academia, culture, Korean nationals residing abroad, etc. From there, it narrowed the populations down to preliminary investigation subjects and finally to investigation subjects. 2) Research teams scrutinized each case by collecting and analyzing materials. After the investigation, they created a research report on each individual and submitted it to the committee. 3) It was then the role of the main committee that made a final decision by majority vote on *ch’inil haengwija*, based on the law and the report.²⁴⁰ To ensure the efficacy of the process, PCIC researchers divided the investigation period into three: from 1904 to 1919, 1919 to 1937, and 1937 to 1945. Accordingly, the PCIC publicized the list of “*haengwija*” three times, in December 2006, December 2007, and finally November 2009, totalling 1,006 figures (originally there were 1,052 investigation subjects). Besides the investigating activities, the PCIC dealt with civic appeals, i.e. dissent filing, issues of public discontent, and public reports as well as academic activities, i.e. organizing conferences and funding academic research projects on the given issue. When the committee closed its term in late November 2009, it released 25 volumes of reports on general information and judgment-related documents on each offender and also published 16 volumes of historical documents.

²³⁹ Ibid., 38-46.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 57, 213-4.

As for the limitations of the PCIC's activities, the report evaluates these from two perspectives: general limitations and specific limitations of the law. The general limitations are related to the temporal nature of the committee. The PCIC report notes that the four and a half years allotted for the investigation was extremely short for covering all the suspected collaborators from 1904 to 1945. Also, it was even more challenging to locate scattered overseas materials in Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea. For this reason, the report evaluates that the inspection of overseas collaborators was to some extent not balanced. In addition, there was an initial miscalculation on the working period of the PCIC: lawmakers did not take into account extra time for its setup and closure.²⁴¹ As a matter of fact, the PCIC ended up spending too much time just for the preparing and closing, time that could have otherwise been spent for more inspection.

On the other hand, the law itself imposed several setbacks on the investigation. The report points out that abstract conditional terms in the law like "conspicuous," "remarkable," and "positive," raised difficulties for inspectors and committee members in setting a unified and consistent standard in deciding investigating subjects in different fields. By limiting investigating subjects by one's rank, i.e. in the cases of bureaucrats, members of the military, and police, the law forestalled the committee from inspecting local offenders and those in a low rank with substantial evidence of collaboration. Furthermore, since the law stipulated all charges be confirmed by paper evidence, other verbal evidence such as a testimony was not able to be considered in the investigation.

Finally, this section addresses some of the complexities and ambiguities when the state

²⁴¹ Ibid., 215-6.

legislation resolves controversial issues of the past like collaboration. Here, I discuss this mainly in terms of my interviews with PCIC committee members.²⁴² First of all, an individual historical interpretation in a specific setting of the PCIC committee meeting could have heavily influenced the decision of who a collaborator was. One example was whether the Great Han Empire judges, who tried participants of righteous armies (*ũibyǒng*) from 1904 to 1910, were collaborators. The “collaboration” decision on those judges was made based on the second clause of the Ch’inil Investigation Law, which defined a collaborator as those who cracked down on any independence movements from 1904 to 1910. Yet, a couple of committee members raised objections on whether they could be considered a collaborator when they ruled based on the law of the Great Han Empire. Kang Mangil, the PCIC chairman (from May 2005 to May 2007), states in his memoir that the decision was also based on his own progressive historical view. According to the memoir, he was worried about the situation that if the judges were not collaborators, the righteous army should be historically re-defined as anti-state activists, not as the fighters for national sovereignty.²⁴³ His comment reveals that the decisions in the committee

²⁴² From December 2009 to February 2011, I conducted interviews with six former PCIC committee members who generously accepted my interview requests. They were Kang Mangil, Kim Kyǒngil, Kim Samung, Im Kyǒngsǒk, Pak Yǒnch’ŏl and one who asked not to reveal his name. My questions covered the issues of the PCIC activities and on *Ch’inilp’a ch’ǒngsan* in general: 1) the biggest achievements and limitations of the PCIC activities, 2) the historical significance of the PCIC and its activities, 3) future approaches to the ch’inilp’a issue, 4) comments on controversial figures in deciding “*ch’inil haengwija*” (those who committed pro-Japanese activities), 5) the issue of maintaining fairness in deciding “*ch’inil haengwija*,” 5) the political meaning and impact of the PCIC activities, 6) any change of perspective in solving the ch’inilp’a issue in the late 2000s, sixty years’ after Korea’s liberation, 7) the key point of the ch’inilp’a issue as a social phenomenon, 8) any other comments. However, my interviews with them were not always carried in the question order that I prepared. Also, in the above, I included my interview with Kim Minch’ŏl, who was not a PCIC committee member. Even though he participated in the PCIC as a research team chief, Kim, as a senior staff and founding member of IRCA as well as a ch’inilp’a scholar, was one of a few who can speak to the development of the *Ch’inilp’a ch’ǒngsan* movement and legislation process of the Ch’inilp’a Investigation Law in great detail.

²⁴³ Kang Mangil, “Ch’inil panminjok chinsang kyumyǒng ilchi” (The memoir of PCIC), in *Yǒksaga ũi sigan* (The time of a historian) (Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa pip’yǒng, 2010), 596.

depended on the specific historical views of each committee member.

According to the committee members I interviewed, another challenge was the conflict between a historical approach and a legal framework that governed the whole investigating and decision-making process. That is to say, investigating historical truth/facts within a legal framework gave committee members certain limitations and challenges. Kim Minch'öl, who participated both in the legislation process as a senior staff of IRCA and in the PCIC, recollected that no one in the legislation process could expect the rise of such a conflict when the law was actually applied to solve a specific historical case. He further commented that historians' and lawyers' views often split in approaching a collaboration case in the committee. He exemplified how the two groups viewed a figure differently when a subject was accused of attaining wealth at a price of collaboration: the historian group tended to assume that all the privileges the subject enjoyed in life as the result of collaboration, while the lawyer group asked for the specific evidence of this interpretation.²⁴⁴ In the case of Pak Yönoch'öl, a lawyer committee member, he pointed out both the advantages and disadvantages in settling the ch'inilp'a issue with this law. First, Pak indicated from a legal perspective, the problem of several inappropriate and ambiguous terms in the Ch'inil Investigation Law that restricted investigators from applying laws precisely. On the other hand, he signified that the specific nature of the special law, which was not a criminal law, eventually allowed the Ch'inil Investigation Law to pursue "historical truth and justice."²⁴⁵

Kim Kyöngil, a historian committee member, problematized the double-edged nature of

²⁴⁴ Kim Minch'öl, Interview, Seoul, February 22, 2010.

²⁴⁵ Pak Yönoch'öl, Interview, Seoul, February 27, 2010.

decision-making on collaborators in the committee. Kim first pointed out that the Ch'inil Investigation Law was the product of a political compromise between the ruling Uri Party and the GNP. Because of that, the standard for selecting a collaborator was rather inconsistent, depending on the subject's profession and a field. He further added that the PCIC list should not be canonized in defining "who a collaborator is." His understanding is that "those whom the committee categorized as a collaborator" does not necessarily mean that he or she was psychologically or existentially a collaborator or traitor. Rather, the decision of the committee recognized certain of his/her activities as collaboration. On the other hand, he stresses that the PCIC's list of 1,006 should not and does not provide any clemency to those who committed pro-Japanese activities but are not on the list.²⁴⁶

Section 3. The *Ch'inil ch'öngsan* Movement of the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities

In February 2004, Cho Mungi (1927-2008), a hero of the Pumingwan Incident in 1945²⁴⁷ as well as the president of the IRCA (2001-2008), expressed his overwhelming emotion after the institute dramatically raised more than a half million won for the compilation of the *Who's Who Dictionary on Collaborators* (hereafter, Ch'inil Dictionary) only in 11 days:

...I realize that the hard work of the last ten years was not labor in vein. It is officially confirmed that our institute is not a powerless small civic organization, but everybody recognizes it is firmly established and rooted as the only professional organization in Korea that deals with the ch'inilp'a issue, the biggest task of our nation....[We] are no longer lonely. Several ten thousands of new independent comrades are with us. Just because there are concerns over procuring a war chest, we don't need to put up any longer with the arrogance and high-handedness of a handful of pro-Japanese anti-

²⁴⁶ Kim Kyöngil, Interview, Seoul, January 7, 2010.

²⁴⁷ This incident is also called Pumingwan p'ukp'a üigö (Righteous bomb attack to Pumingwan) on July 24, 1945. Three Korean young men including Cho Mungi threw a bomb to Pumingwan, a multi-purpose hall of Keijo-fu, where a political gathering for the Pacific War was being held.

nationalists. Now, the only thing that we will do is to show our actions for the second independence movement, which will achieve complete national independence from fear-stricken pro-Japanese and anti-national powers and their offspring whose eyes are fixed on us.²⁴⁸

This was one of the most highlighted moments for the IRCA in the eighteen years' struggle for the compilation of the Ch'inil Dictionary; the IRCA raised such a large amount of money in a short period of time after the National Assembly cut off funds to the project in December 2003.²⁴⁹ The enthusiastic response of citizens in the fundraiser reflects that a large number of Koreans sympathized with the claims of the ch'inilp'a discourse and also supported the Ch'inil Dictionary project to punish collaborators by recording their wrongdoings in history. In early March of the same year, the same strong public support safeguarded the Ch'inilp'a Investigation Law from the danger of not being passed in the National Assembly. These two incidents demonstrate that the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement formed a cohesive social consensus among a wide range of Korean people. As I discussed in detail in the first section of this chapter, this nationalization phenomenon should be considered under the complex interwoven political, diplomatic, social circumstances in the late 1990s and 2000s. However, what I cannot fail to mention is the central role of the IRCA in spreading ch'inilp'a discourse and

²⁴⁸ Mungi Cho, "Ch'ōndang kwa chiok sai (Between Heaven and Hell) " *Minjok sarang* 96(Jan. & Feb., 2004), 1. In his writing, a handful of pro-Japanese anti-nationalists mean GNP lawmakers who cut off the budget for the Dictionary.

²⁴⁹ Originally, the National Assembly decided to subsidize the Ch'inil dictionary project with the amount of a half a million won in 2003. However, it turned over the decision and cut off all the money on December 29, 2003. Alarmed by this news, an IRCA member suggested a national fundraiser to compensate the money at the internet news site *ohmynews.com* on January 8th 2004. Under the catchphrase of "Compiling *Who's Who Dictionary on Pro-Japanese Collaborators* with the Power of the Netizen," the fundraising campaign reached its goal of a half million won only in eleven days with the participation of more than 25,000 people (it finally reached seven hundred thousand won from more than 30,000 people). The campaign itself stimulated public interests in and enthusiasm on *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*. *Minjok sarang* 96 (Jan. /Feb., 2004), 5-6.

developing that into a nationalized civic movement.²⁵⁰

Therefore, this section specifically illuminates the activities of the IRCA as the best way of investigating the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement on the level of civil society. As I already briefly covered earlier, the activities of IRCA can be divided into the following categories: 1) propagating their claims by offering public lectures, conducting interviews with the media, and publishing articles and books on pro-Japanese collaboration and collaborators, 2) carrying out the Ch'inil Dictionary project and supporting passage of the Ch'inil Investigation Law, 3) actively engaging in ch'inilp'a-related issues as well as colonial history-related diplomatic issues, and 4) campaigning against memorial projects and existing memorial artifacts of accused collaborators. After briefly looking at its history, this section examines the activities of the IRCA on the level of the institute and of individual local branches.

1) A Brief History of the IRCA and its Membership

I will introduce the history of the IRCA before delving into analysis of its *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* activities. Uniquely combining the characteristics of a research institute and civic movement organization, the IRCA was established in 1991 in order to continue the pioneering works of Im Chongguk (1929-1989) on pro-Japanese collaborators after his death and also to succeed the spirit of the Special Committee. Its original name was the Research Institute for Anti-National Issues (Panminjok munje yonguso, 1991-1995). Well-known progressives of the day, such as Song Kõnho, Kang Mangil, Kim Namsik and Yi Yõnghũi, joined the effort in

²⁵⁰ Certainly, IRCA was not the only major player of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement. Yet, it is noteworthy that the institute devoted to this specific movement for over twenty years.

organizing and running the institute in its early stage.²⁵¹ According to the first issue of *Panminjok munje yŏn'guso hoebo* (Bulletin of the research institute for anti-national crimes) its first research-oriented organ (1991-1997),²⁵² the earliest “family” members of the IRCA consisted of researchers like Kim Pongu, Kim Samung, Kim Hyŏnsan and Chŏng Unhyŏn.²⁵³ In the early days,²⁵⁴ the activities of the institute focused on researching, publishing books on and organizing symposiums on the collaboration issue and Japan’s imperialism in Korea.²⁵⁵ At this time, its biggest achievement was the publication of *Ch'inilp'a 99-in* (Pro-Japanese collaborators, 3 vols. 1993) and *Ch'ŏngsan haji mottan yŏksa* (The history, failed to cleanse off, 3 vols. 1994). As I mentioned earlier, these two bestsellers greatly contributed to bringing back

²⁵¹ The above intellectuals joined the IRCA as leading committee members (*chido wiwŏn*). See Minjok munje yŏn'guso, ed. “Olbarŭn kiŏk ŭl wihan t'uchaeng” (A struggle for correct memory) (pamphlet) (2008); *Panminjok munje yŏn'guso hoebo* 1 (September 1991), 20; *Panminjok munje yŏn'guso hoebo* 2 (June 1992), 25; *Panminjok munje yŏn'guso hoebo* 4 (Fall, 1993), 2.

²⁵² Since 1991, the IRCA published four different publications: *Panminjok munje yŏn'gu* (September 1991~Spring, 1995, irregular research-oriented journal), *Minjok munje yŏn'gu* (Summer, 1995~Fall, 1997, quarterly research-oriented journal), *Minjok chŏnggi* (August 1995~August 1998, monthly), and *Minjok sarang* (October 1998~present, monthly).

²⁵³ In addition, Kim Kyŏngil, Kim Kyŏngt'aek, Kim Minch'ŏl, Kim T'aeil, Yi Hyoin, Yun Taewŏn, Yun Haedong, Chu Kanghyŏn, and Chi Sugŏl worked with the IRCA in the early days. Not all of them, however, stayed with the IRCA. Unlike steadfast members like Kim Minch'ŏl and Chi Sugŏl, some began independently carrying out their research and publication activities (i.e. Kim Samung and Chŏng Unhyŏn). In the case of Yun Haedong, he pursued a different academic trajectory to pursue the study of post-nationalism and post-colonialism, which deviated from the official *ch'inilp'a* discourse in the 2000s.

²⁵⁴ My dissertation defines “the earlier period of the IRCA” from 1991 to 1998. This period was when the IRCA was more of a research institute than a movement organization, with a small group of members and limited finances. It was also the period before the IRCA recovered from the IMF Financial Crisis.

²⁵⁵ The titles of the early symposiums are the following: “Singmin chibae ch'ŏngsan munje ũi minjoksachŏk ihae” (Understanding the removal of the legacies of colonial rule from a perspective of national history, 1992), “Han'guk hyŏndaesa wa *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* munje” (Korean contemporary history and the issue of eradicating pro-Japanese collaborators, 1993), “Ch'inil hyŏpchŏng, 30-yŏn tongan ũi kuryok” (The “pro-Japanese” Normalization Treaty between Korea and Japan, thirty-years of humiliation, 1995), “Pohun chŏngch'aek, muŏt i munje inga” (A policy for patriots and veterans, what is the problem?, 1996), “Minjoksachŏk kwanchŏm esŏ pon yŏktae chŏngkwŏn ũi tae-Il chŏngch'aek pigyo” (Comparison of Japanese policies towards South Korean governments from the perspective of national history, 1997).

public attention to the ch'inilp'a issue by provocatively exposing rarely known pro-Japanese activities of respected elites. In 1993, it took the shape of a civic organization by finding its monthly contributors (members) in the Meeting of *The Hangyoreh* Newspaper Small Stock Holders and elsewhere. The year of 1995 is remembered for organizing local branches for facilitating individual members' participation. Even though the activities of the members at this time were fairly limited in comparison with the later period, we can still trace local activities such as the removal of the stone in honor of Pak Chungyang²⁵⁶ in Daegu (Taegu) in 1995.²⁵⁷

Before the 1997 IMF Financial Crisis threatened the IRCA, it enjoyed a gradual increase in its membership. However, according to Pang Hakchin, the executive secretary (*samu kukchang*) since 1998, the contributors (members who paid dues) rapidly dropped approximately from 1,000 to 200 people during the period from June 1996 to August 1998 (IMF period).²⁵⁸ Naturally, the tightened financial situation resulted in curtailing all the activities except a few individual activities and research. When Pang returned to the institute from his military service in mid-1998, he recollected that he was one of only three remaining staff members—including the director and treasurer—in charge of the entire organization. Recovering from the time of stagnation, the IRCA revived in the late 1998 and early 1999 by engaging in the campaigns against the commemorative projects of two elites: Kim Hwallan and Park Chung Hee. In order to increase public awareness about the publication of the Ch'inil Dictionary, the institute also initiated collection of supporting signatures from college professors under the catchphrase of

²⁵⁶ Pak Chungyang (1872-1959) was a high officer and diplomat of the Great Han Empire and Japanese colonial government. He, as a representative pro-Japanese collaborator, served the Vice President of Chungch'uwŏn (Korean advisory body of the Japanese colonial government).

²⁵⁷ Pang Hakchin, Interview, Seoul, March 19, 2010; *Olbarŭn kiŏk ūl wihan t'uchaeng*, 13.

²⁵⁸ Pang Hakchin, Interview, Seoul, March 19, 2010.

“Holding the Second Special Committee to Judge Anti-National Pro-Japanese Collaborators” in April 1999. This movement resulted in a great success: more than 10,000 signatures were collected within two and a half months. The IRCA claimed that these signatures represented approximately one fourth of the entire number of Korean professors’ participation.²⁵⁹ From this time on, the main focus of the IRCA’s activities shifted from research to full-fledged movements for *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan*.

Contributing members and their active participation became the driving force of the IRCA *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan* movement in the 2000s. The contributing members gradually increased after the financial crisis and reached more than 4,000 in November 2009. *Minjok sarang* monthly offers the statistics on the number of the total member and the rate of contributing members among them.²⁶⁰ In August 2001, the total members reached approximately 1,350 people, but contributing members were only 41% (560 persons). Throughout the early 2000s, both numbers continuously grew: the total member reached 2113 and ration of contributing members was 52% (1105 out of 2113) in August 2003. Especially during the national fundraiser, which took place from January to March 2004, membership almost doubled to 4476 (contributing rate still remained 46.5%). However, the contributing rate gradually caught up from the period of 2004 to 2006 and reached over 80% in November 2005 and stayed in over 80% to the present (here, up to 2009). The increase of membership, particularly that of active and contributing members, not only provided more financial resources for the IRCA office, but also came to build the

²⁵⁹ *Minjok sarang* (April 1999), 9; (August 1999), 3-11.

²⁶⁰ *Minjok sarang* started to offer the number of total members, of contributing members, and the ratio between the two as of August 2001. But, as of April 2004, it only publishes the number of contributing members and its rate over the total registered member.

foundation for a community-based *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* movement.

According to Pak Hanyong, the ideological spectrum of members is as wide as from admirers of right-wing nationalist Kim Gu to leftist nationalists.²⁶¹ Pak described them as the following: those who are anti-Park Chung Hee, anti-Syngman Rhee, anti-American, anti-Vietnam War, pro-Roh Moo Hyun, active participants in candlelight protests, and admirers of progressive intellectuals like Yi Yönghui, a representative progressive intellectual and writer of the 1970s, and Kang Mangil. He summarized them as “democratic supporters who are rooted in nationalism (*minjokchuüi rül ppyödae ro kajyöganün minjujuüija*).”²⁶² In general, the range of political inclinations of the membership roughly represented that of general Korean progressives/leftists.

2) The IRCA's *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* Movement

The year 1998-1999 was a watershed time for the IRCA's activities for the *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* movement. As the *ch'inilp'a* issue rapidly became a socially and politically hot topic under the early term of the Kim Dae Jung government, the institute redirected the focus of the movement from research-publication to a full-fledged civic movement. As mentioned earlier, the three incidents that earned the institute authority to lead the movement were: Ewha Woman's University's Kim Hwallan Memorial Project (1998), Anti-*Chosun Ilbo* Movement (1998-mid-2000s), and the Anti-Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum Movement (1999-2002). I will

²⁶¹ However, it is difficult to take his comments on the “broad ideological spectrum of the IRCA members” as it is. Different from many other Western countries, one's ideological orientation in Korea does not necessarily decide whether one is nationalist or not. In the historically-structured ideological geography of Korea, one's political inclination to the left does not deter one from being a nationalist. Seen in support of the unification movement and anti-foreign nationalism, progressives and leftists have become more nationalistic since the 1980s. Also, just because one is an admirer of right wing nationalist Kim Gu does not necessarily mean that he or she is ideologically right wing.

²⁶² Pak Hanyong, Interview, Seoul, December 16, 2009.

examine the role of the IRCA specifically in the last two movements.

The involvement of the IRCA in the Anti-Museum Movement made the movement far more organized and powerful. Even before the participation of the IRCA, progressive historians launched The Meeting of the Historians across the Nation against Building the Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum and the Government's Subsidization (Park Chung Hee kinyömgwan ūi söllip mit kukka chiwön ūl pandae hanün yöksa hakcha ūi moim). The meeting set up "The Week of Park Chung Hee" (October 18~23, 1999) to problematize the state's subsidization of the project, collecting more than 1,110 signatures of historians, including school teachers.²⁶³ Even further collective action was taken in August 2000. Covering all major social, civic, and labor movement groups, 247 progressive organizations organized The People's Solidarity against the Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum (Park Chung Hee kinyömgwan pandae kungmin yöndae, hereafter Anti-Museum Solidarity).²⁶⁴ The IRCA played a critical role in the Anti-Museum Solidarity as the liaison office in charge of organizing the movement and sharing information among participating groups.²⁶⁵ In addition, the key members of the IRCA took central positions in the Anti-Museum Solidarity, i.e. Cho Mungi serving as the standing consultant and Yi Kwanbok and Kwak T'aeyöng as standing co-presidents. Until the unofficial closure of the museum project in the summer of 2002, the Anti-Museum Solidarity and the IRCA carried out a wide range of protest

²⁶³ *The Hangyoreh*, October 14, 1999; *The Hangyoreh*, November 1, 1999.

²⁶⁴ The People's Solidarity against the Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum includes the four biggest civic groups in the nation: People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (Ch'amyö yöndae, hereafter PSPD), Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (Kyöngsillyön, hereafter CCEJ), Korean Federation for Environmental Movements (Hwangyöng yönhap, hereafter KFEM) and Green Korea United (Noksaek yönhap, hereafter FKU), as well as two influential labor unions: Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (Minju noch'ong, hereafter KCTU) and The Korean Teachers & Education Workers' Union (Chön'gyojo, hereafter KTU).

²⁶⁵ *Minjok sarang* 56 (September 2000): 11.

activities in two directions: 1) academic and public relations, such as organizing symposiums and public hearings, publishing books, i.e. White books, pamphlets, newsletters, and running advertisements on newspapers; 2) more direct protest, including meetings with the parties concerned, sending out letters of opposition to lawmakers and high officials in the Seoul Metropolitan Government, holding one-person protests,²⁶⁶ and large-scale public rallies.

The activities of the Anti-Museum Solidarity greatly affected the formation of negative public opinion toward the Museum Project. One of dramatic actions that IRCA took was to remove the bust of Park Chung Hee located at Mulla Park in November 5, 2000. This incident especially raised public interest in the Anti-Museum Movement, while the participation of other groups slowed down over time as the struggle continued for over two years.²⁶⁷ Mulla Park is the site of where the army assembled for the May 16 Military Coup. The removal of Park's bust was particularly meaningful because its being in the park was considered by many progressives as a "shameful symbol" that officially celebrated the success of his coup.²⁶⁸ Also, the IRCA ventured into a five days-long camping out rally near the construction site for the museum from May 15-19, 2002.²⁶⁹ After this rally, the Anti-Museum Solidarity found out that construction at the site would not resume until after the 2002 Korea and Japan World Cup. According to *Minjok sarang*, the suspension decision was made due to the failure of the Committee for Building the Park

²⁶⁶ The Anti-Museum Solidarity carried out more than 190 one-person demonstrations for ten months in front of the main gate of the Seoul Metropolitan Office in order to fight against the city's contract that set aside a building construction site to the Committee for Building the Park Chung Hee Museum (from February 13 to November 2001). *Minjok sarang* 71(December 2001): 17.

²⁶⁷ Regarding this event, ten organizations announced a supporting statement. For details, see *Minjok sarang* 58 (November 2000): 5-10.

²⁶⁸ This incident caused the arrest of three IRCA staffs (Among them, Kim Yongsam, the chief of executive committee, was sentenced two years' prison term).

²⁶⁹ *Minjok sarang* 75 (April 2002): 4; *Minjok sarang* 76 (May 2002): 2-4.

Chung Hee Museum in providing sufficient funds for the project (the committee supposedly had to collect 25 billion won total on top of a 20 billion won subsidy, yet only raised 1.6 billion won).²⁷⁰ However, the troubling public image of the project must have also influenced the government's decision to delay construction.

While it did not lead the movement, the IRCA actively participated in the Anti-*Chosun* Movement. In September 2000, more than fifty civic groups sharing the idea of Anti-*Chosun Ilbo* organized the Citizen's Alliance for Anti-*Chosun* Movement (*Chosun Ilbo* pandae sinmin yōndae), including the IRCA. Setting aside the Alliance, the Anti-*Chosun* Movement still functioned on various levels, i.e. progressive media (*The Hangyoreh* and Ohmynews.com), private fan clubs (i.e. Nosamo: The meeting of people who love Roh Moo Hyun), Okcheon(Okch'ŏn)'s local movement named *Chosun Pabo* (The idiot *Chosun Ilbo*), and online websites. Due to its wide scope and diversity, it is difficult to measure exactly the degree of the IRCA's involvement in the Anti-*Chosun* Movement. However, the monthly publication of the IRCA reveals much on the personnel networking and exchanges between the two movements. First, the IRCA offered historical sources on the pro-Japanese activities of *Chosun Ilbo*, according to Kim Tongmin, standing co-president of the Alliance.²⁷¹ Also, Cho Mungi, president of the IRCA Foundation (from 2001 to 2008), joined the first round of the Intellectual Declaration Denouncing the *Chosun Ilbo*. Later, he served as the leader of the jury in a special civilian court (*Chosun Ilbo* panminjok pant'ongil haengwi e taehan mingan pōpchōng) composed of civic groups specifically designed to try the anti-national and anti-unification activities of

²⁷⁰ *Minjok sarang* 79 (August 2002): 9.

²⁷¹ *Minjok sarang* 61 (February 2001): 31-32.

Chosun Ilbo on January 2002. Furthermore, Im Chongil served as the chief of the executive committee in the Anti-*Chosun* Movement. On the institutional level, it co-sponsored annual the Anti-*Chosun* Chuncheon Marathon since 2003 (Anti-*Chosun* Ch'unch'ŏn Marathon). According to *Minjok sarang*, Pang Hakchin attended the official meetings of the Alliance as a representative of the IRCA.

Setting aside the IRCA's participation in socio-political issues, the biggest characteristic of the Institute was to initiate and support a wide range of civic movements in relation to resettling Korea's colonial past with Japan since the late 1990s. The movements include: Movement for Protecting the Territorial Rights over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islets (1999-2000 and 2005), Movement against the Japanese Right Wing's History Textbooks (especially in 2001 and 2005), Movement for Legislating the Special Law for the Investigation of Drafted Soldiers, Forced Laborers, and Military Comfort Women under Japanese Imperial Rule (Ilche kangjŏm ha kangje tongwŏn chinsang kyumyŏng pŏp, 2001-04) and Movement for Bringing the Spirit Tablets of Koreans Enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine Back to Korea(2005-2010). The IRCA organized the above movements, representing all the other participating groups, as seen in the controversy over Japanese history textbooks. In these cases, an IRCA staff became a chief hands-on worker and planned the general direction of the movement. The IRCA also associated with other movement group (or groups) that had lesser organizational power and experience. For example, the IRCA helped establish an organization for the legislation for forced labor, drafted soldiers, and military comfort women until it passed the bill in the National Assembly from 2001 to 2004. In addition, an IRCA representative served as the Secretariat of the Korean Committee for the Joint Action Opposed to Yasukuni (Yasukuni pandae kongdong haengdong) for the lawsuit against Yasukuni

Shrine for jointly enshrining Korean soldiers from the Pacific War alongside accused Japanese war criminals. Some of the above issues are directly related to the ch'inilp'a issue, others not. By serving a key role in diplomatically sensitive issues with Japan, the IRCA was able to achieve moral authority over past wrong issues as a history movement organization among Koreans, freely bringing up "the vicious linkage" between the failure of removing colonial legacies and its continuing socio-political effects.

In talking about the IRCA's activities, I cannot fail to mention its enormous contribution to passing the Ch'inil Investigation Law. From the beginning of the legislative process, the IRCA provided consultation to the NAMSG concerning drafting the law. In May 2004, it organized the Civic Solidarity for the Investigation of the Truth of Pro-Japanese Anti-National Activities (Ch'inil panminjok haengwi chinsang kyumyong simin yŏndae) to suggest revisions of the Ch'inil Investigation Law. Also, it was involved in the activities of the People's Coalition for Proper Resettling of the Past (Ŏlbarun kwagŏ ch'ŏngsan ũl wihan pŏmgungmin wiwŏnhoe) after President Roh's Independence Day message in August 2004. After the setup of the PCIC, the IRCA offered its primary research data on pro-Japanese collaborators in 2005, which became the foundation of the PCIC's investigation. Not stopping there, several IRCA staff members, including Kim Minch'ŏl, joined PCIC to facilitate its investigating process.

Most of all, the greatest achievement of the IRCA was the compilation and publication of the *Who's Who Dictionary on Collaborators* in 2009. The three-volume dictionary, which is in fact closer to an encyclopedia than a dictionary, records the pro-Japanese careers of 4,389 "collaborators" and their lives.²⁷² Along with the ch'inilp'a investigation activities of the PCIC,

²⁷² According to the preface of the *Ch'inil Dictionary*, the compilation committee put the highest value on objectivity and rigorous investigation. On the compilation process, the committee collected 3,000 primary texts such

the Ch'inil Dictionary revisited the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators that remained unsolved after the liberation. Full-fledged preparation for the Dictionary began with the establishment of the Foundation for National Culture in the Era of Unification (T'ongil sidae minjok munhwa chaedan) in December 2001. As I mentioned in the beginning of this section, the project encountered several challenges, including the cancellation of the state's subsidy in December 2003. After announcing the first preliminary list of collaborators in August 2005, the institute was attacked by conservative groups as a representative pro-North Korea and anti-U.S. organization and anti-Taehanmin'guk (anti-South Korean state) organization. In spite of all the challenges and difficulties, the IRCA published the three-volume *Who's Who Dictionary on Collaborators* with the help of a number of scholars and specialists in various fields. Regarding its purpose, Yun Kyöngno, the President of the Compilation Committee for the Dictionary, writes that the dictionary attempts to overcome the self-deprecating historical consciousness and historical nihilism among Koreans, which was the consequence of the continuous success of collaborators in post-colonial society. Furthermore, it aims to establish a new standard of values and historical lessons by reviewing and historicizing what happened in the past, not by denouncing and asking individuals' faults.²⁷³ Kim Minch'öl summarizes the historical significance of the dictionary as the following: 1) it contains the hope for democracy in society

as newspapers, magazines, journals, government documents from the Japanese colonial period. After analyzing these, it built up a database of 2,50,000 figures. From this database, the committee selected approximately more than 5,000 people for further investigation. Finally, the final list was made after more than 50 conferences, consultations with advisory committees, and a plenary session. In the process, more than 150 scholars participated in the compiling committee and 180 specialists joined in writing the Dictionary. Also, over 80 researchers were involved in collecting, organizing, indexing, computerizing, supervising the primary sources. See, *Ch'inil Inmyöng sajön* Vol. 1 (Who's Who Dictionary on Collaborators) (Seoul: IRCA, 2009), 5-6; *Minjok sarang* 161 (October/November 2009), 2-3.

²⁷³ *Ch'inil Inmyöng sajön*, 5.

because many collaborators joined in spreading statism and militarism in post-1945 Korea, 2) it advocates universal values because the dictionary defines wartime collaborators as anti-humanitarian criminals, 3) it is an accumulation of knowledge which represents the era, because it is the best collection which contains the most comprehensive information on modern and contemporary figures.²⁷⁴

3) The *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* Movements of Local Branches and Individual Activities

The nation-wide politicization of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* in the 2000s received support through increasing participation in the movement on the local and community levels. This part is thus dedicated to highlight the role of individual participants in local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movements, focusing on the activities of IRCA branch members. Since the late 1990s, the local movement was in a sense a reaction to growing interests of the local government in memorial projects on locally born elites suspected of collaboration. In many cases, local IRCA branches were actively engaged in organizing the movements against memorial projects.²⁷⁵ For this reason, understanding the activities of IRCA local branches and their membership is significant to grasp the characteristic of the local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement.

IRCA local branches covers a wide range of activities from holding a regular branch

²⁷⁴ Kim Minch'ōl, "Chinyōndoen chōngūi," 94-95.

²⁷⁵ The local branches, playing a pivotal role in local movement, initially began to be organized as early as mid-1995. By the late 1990s, four to five branches seemed to exist, but it is unclear whether all of them survived the IMF Financial Crisis. The activities of the early local branches focused on the education of and mutual friendship among members, with a couple of exemptions such as the Daegu branch. Under the charismatic leadership of and devotion of Yō Hwangwōn, the Daegu branch removed the memorial stone of Pak Ch'ungyang in Ch'imsang Park in Daegu and opposed erecting the statue of musician Hyōn Chemyōng, who was accused of being a collaborator for joining in many pro-Japanese organizations. The revitalization of local branches began only after the IRCA built a nationwide membership network in the early 2000s. In 2002, the institute organized 13 branches (including previously established ones). Throughout the 2000s, it kept extending its local units; 21 branches (including 3 sub-branches, and a youth group) in 2005 and 30 branches (including sub-branches, over-seas branches and a youth group) at the end of 2009.

meeting, supporting major events, inviting *ch'inilp'a*-related exhibitions, and planning and carrying out local *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* movements. For example, the IRCA arranged a series of pro-Japanese art exhibitions that visualized the “wretched reality” of Koreans under Japanese imperialism and displayed the works of renowned pro-Japanese artists and writers during the Pacific War²⁷⁶ with other groups like the local Korean Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Union (hereafter KTU). In the case of the exhibition entitled “Pro-Japanese Artists and Their Works,” five out of nine local branches held this exhibition from May to September 2001. Inspired by their enthusiastic participation, the main office encouraged other branches to host the exhibition as a way of advertising the institute’s project and to boost the involvement of local members in the movement.²⁷⁷

The energetic engagement of the branches made the *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* movement a representative community movement in the 2000s. It inarguably resulted in the national spread of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* movement. The following table briefly introduces the well-known local or community *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* cases that took place since the late 1990s.

Table 1. Local *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* Movement Cases, chronologically ordered

Date	Location	Figure in controversy/The details of movement	Participating organizations
Aug.-Sept. 1999	Hanam, Gyeonggi-do (Kyönggi-do)	Mo Yunsuk (poet)/ Opposition to the plan of the Hanam City and Hanam Cultural Center to set up a memorial stone inscribed with her poem	IRCA and the Meeting of Hanam Citizens (Hanam ül saenggak hanün simin üi moim)
Fall,	Nation-wide	Park Chung Hee/ Movement against	IRCA and The

²⁷⁶ From 2001 to 2004, the three exhibitions particularly illuminated pro-Japanese arts, “Pro-Japanese Artists and Their Works” (*Ch'inil yesullin kwa küdül üi chakp'umjön*), “The Presentation of Pro-Japanese Music” (*Ch'inil ümak üi chinsangjön*), “Colonial Korea and War Arts” (*Singminji Chosön kwa chönjaeng misuljön*), accordingly.

²⁷⁷ *Minjok sarang* (April 2002), 5-6.

1999- Summer, 2002		Park Chung Hee's Memorial Museum	Solidarity against Building the Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum
Dec. 1999	Seoul	Syngman Rhee/ Opposition to the plan to set up the statue of Rhee in the National Assembly Hall	IRCA
1999-2005	Masan, Gyeongnam (Kyongnam)	Yi Unsang (traditional poet)/ Opposition to Masan's plan to build the "Yi Unsang Memorial Center" and later on fighting for changing its name from "Nosan Literature Museum" to "Changwon City Masan Literature Museum" (Ch'angwon City Masan Literature Museum, 2005)	The Alliance of Hope for Open Society (Yollin sahoe Hui-mang yondae) and other local organizations
Sept. 1999; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2005 (multiple occasions)	Seoul, Jeonju (Chonju) and Gochang (Koch'ang)	Sŏ Chŏngju (poet) a. Opposition to build his memorial center in Gochang (1999) b. Opposition to Midang Literature Award by <i>Jungang Ilbo</i> (2001) c. Debates on the collaboration charge against him (Oct. 2002; Sept. 2003) d. Boycotting the Chrysanthemum Poetry Festival which took the theme from his poem and also requesting to close the Midang Poetry Museum (Nov. 2005)	IRCA, the Jeonbuk branch(the Chonbuk branch), and "The Jeonbuk Citizens' Solidarity for Removing the Traces of Japanese Colonialism"
Feb. 2000; June 2004	Tongyeong/ Geoje-do, Gyeongnam (T'ongyong/ Kŏje-do, Kyongnam)	Yu Ch'ihwan (poet) a. Campaigning against the Yu Ch'ihwan Literature Museum and Ch'ongma Literature Award (Feb. 2000) b. Movement against changing the name of Tongyeong Post Office to Ch'ongma Post office (June 2004)	Ch'oe Chonggyu and civic groups
June-Oct. 2000; Mar. 2003	Seoul and Suwon (Suwon)	Hong Nanp'a (musician)/ Campaigning against commemorative projects in honor of Hong by the Hwaseong (Hwasong)/ Suwon local government	IRCA
July 2001	Seoul	Hwang Sinduk (female educator)/ Campaigning against erecting her	Korean Teachers and Education

		bust at Chungang Girls' High School (removed in July 14)	Workers' Union (KTU) at Chungang School and Seoul IRCA branch
Jan. 2001-present	Mainly Daejeon (Taejŏn)	Kim Ch'angyong(policy officer)/ Campaigning for removing his tomb from the Daejeon National Cemetery	IRCA Daejeon branch with fourteen local organizations
Aug. 2001-Jan. 2002	Seoul	Pak Hŭngsik (businessman)/ Campaigning for removing his statue at Kwangsin High School	IRCA Kwanak branch (in Seoul)
2002-2005	Masan, Gyeongnam (Kyŏngnam)	Cho Tunam(musician)/ Campaigning for changing the name of Cho Tunam Memorial Center to Masan Music Center (changed in June 2005)	The Alliance of Hope for Open Society (Yŏllin sahoe Hŭimang yŏndae) and other local groups
July-Aug. 2002	Miryang, Gyeongnam	Pak Ch'ungŭm (businessman)/ Campaigning for removing Pak's memorial stone in Miryang	IRCA Busan branch and other local groups such as KTU, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPC), The Student Union of Miryang Univ., Korea Street Vendors Confederation (KSVC)
Mar.-May 2003; 2005; Oct. 2009	Seongju, Gyeongbuk (Sŏngju, Kyŏngbuk)	Paek Nyŏnsŏl (pop singer) a. Campaigning for changing the name of Seongju Pop Festival, which was named after Paek Nyŏnsŏl (2003) b. Opposition to the attempt to bring back Paek's name to the Pop Festival (2005) c. Opposition to the plan of the Alumni Association of Seongju High School that erected his statue and a memorial stone inscribed with his song (2009)	IRCA Daegu branch, Seongju Farmers' Union (Sŏnju nongminhoe), KTU Gyeongbuk Branch, etc.

May 2003	Seoul	Kim Sökkwön (higher military officer) / Campaigning for removing his statue in Seongnam High School	IRCA Kwanak branch in Seoul
Jan. 2004-Apr. 2005	Yesan, Chungnam (Ch'ungnam)	Park Chung Hee/ Campaigning for removing his tablet hung at Yun Ponggil Shrine in Yesan, which Park Chung Hee wrote (forcibly removed in Mar. 2005 but replaced within a month)	IRCA Chungnam branch
May 2004-Aug. 2007	Jeonju	Pak Kisun (local magnatet) a. Campaigning for removing his memorial stone in Jeonbuk University campus(put up the information panel on his pro-Japanese activities in 2007) b. putting in information panels on Pak's pro-Japanese career in front of Ch'wihyangjǒng and Ch'wihyangbi within the Jeonju Deokjin Park (Chönju Dökchin Park) that Pak built (Aug. 2005)	IRCA Jeonju branch and "The Jeonju Citizens' Solidarity"
May 2004	Miryang	Pak Sich'un (pop singer)/ changed the name from Pak Sich'un Pop Festival to Miryang Arirang Pop Festival	IRCA Geyongnam branch and local groups
June 2004	Daejon	Sö Ch'un(journalist)/ Removal of the tomb of Sö in Daejon National Cemetery	
June 2004	Yangsan, Gyeongnam	Yi Wönsu (writer of stories for youths)/ Changed the title of a student writing competition that was named after Yi	An IRCA member who organized the event
Sept. 2004-Apr. 2005	Jeonju	Kim Yönsu (businessman)/ Campaigning for removing his tablet at the front gate of the Jeonju Sports Stadium that was named after Kim's pseudonym (<i>sudangmun</i>)	Jeonbuk branch and local organizations (later on organized into "The Jeonbuk Citizens' Solidarity")
Oct. 2004	Cheongwon-gun, Chungbuk (Ch'öngwön-gun,	Kim Kich'ang (painter)/ Opposition to the Special Art Exhibition for Kim and his wife, Pak Raehyön in the opening ceremony of the Taecheongho Art Museum	local civic groups and IRCA

	Ch'ungbuk)	(Taech'ongho Art Museum)	
Apr. 2005	Daejon	Yi Tonjik/ Removal of his memorial stone in Hyopyeogdong (Hyop'yongdong) , Daejon	IRCA Daejon branch
Aug. 2005	Kunsan, Cheonam (Chönnam)	Ch'ae Mansik (writer)/ Campaigning to oppose the Ch'ae Mansik Literature Award (suspended in 2005, but revived in 2006)	IRCA Jeongbuk branch and "The Jeonbuk Citizens' Solidarity"
Sept. 2005	Jeonju	Removing four stones and a table (<i>ponganjön</i>) set up for Japanese imperial photos in the Jeonju Elementary School campus	IRCA Jeonbuk branch
2005-2008	Jinju, Gyeongnam (Chinju, Kyöngnam)	Yi Ünho (painter)/ Movement for removing his Non'gae portrait in Jinju Non'gae Shrine (originally initiated in 1993 and resumed in the mid-2000s)	Local civic groups
Sept.2005- July 2008	Jinju, Gyeongnam	Nam Insu (pop singer)/ Campaigning for changing the title of Nam Insu Pop Festival	More than fifty local organizations (Ch'inil chanjae ch'öngsan ül wihan Jinju simin undong)
2006; 2008		An Ikt'ae (musician) / debates over his collaboration and whether to change Korea's national anthem (composed by An). It was claimed to be similar to another of An's songs celebrating the foundation of Manchukuo	
May 2008	Gyeongbuk	Yi P'unghwan (local leader)/ Rejecting his memorial project by the Korea Ginseng P'unggi Agricultural Cooperative	IRCA North Gyeongbuk branch

The above table demonstrates the prevalence of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* movement as a social phenomenon in the 2000s. Unlike deeply politicized *ch'inilp'a* debates on the national level (i.e. the cases of Park Chung Hee, Kim Söngsu, Pang Ünghmo), local controversies on collaborators were associated with cultural elites and their memorial projects. (The various aspects of local *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* cases will be discussed in the next chapter.)

Even beyond the above local controversies, miscellaneous nation-wide *ch'inilp'a* debates changed the way in which Koreans looked at modern and contemporary history, as well as the lives of Koreans under Japanese colonial rule. There are many examples from 2004. For example, the IRCA advised the War Memorial of Korea to be more careful about selecting its monthly figure. The institute indicated that its previously selected figures included several collaborators, such as Yu Ch'igŏn, Kim Paegil, and Kim Tongha. Also, in February, the institute requested the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs to review twenty persons of distinguished service to the nation concerning the independence movement including Reverend Yi Sŭnggil, an influential Presbyterian Church elder. Soon after in March, citizens protested against a descendant of Yi who was leading the March First Movement Memorial in Incheon, thinking that he was not qualified for the honorable role as an offspring of a collaborator. As a result, he needed to excuse himself from the position of Incheon Branch Chair of Korea Liberation in April.

However, successful local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movements were not only credited to local IRCA branches. Many other local groups also greatly contributed to the movements. For instance, one of the longest-running local struggles is the issue of removing the tomb of notorious policeman Kim Ch'angyong from the Daejeon National Cemetery (Jan. 2001--present). Even before the participation of the Daejeon IRCA branch, other local organizations had sought the removal of this tomb. When the Daejeon branch looked for help locally in August 2004, more than fourteen nationally organized local groups responded to the call and joined in the Committee for Removing the Tomb of Kim Ch'angyong (Kim Ch'angyong myo ijang ch'ujin

wiwŏnhoe).²⁷⁸ Known for their enthusiastic activities, the Jeonbuk and Gyeongnam IRCA branches pursued a direct alliance with other local groups specifically for the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement. In July 2005, the Jeonbuk branch launched the Jeonbuk Citizens' Solidarity for Removing the Traces of Japanese Colonialism (Ilche chanjae ch'ŏngsan ūl wihan Jeonbuk simin yŏndae) with the help of approximately thirty other groups. The Jeonbuk Citizens' Solidarity raised protest in many local so-called "ch'inilp'a" memorial projects, including the cases of Yi Ūnho in Namwŏn, several Sŏ Chŏngju memorial projects in Gochang, Pak Kisun in Jeonju Dokjin Park, and Ch'ae Mansik in Kunsan.²⁷⁹ Similarly, the Gyeongnam branch formed the Coalition for Citizens' Action for *Ch'inil ch'ŏngsan* (*Ch'inil ch'ŏngsan simin haengdong yŏndae*) with fifty local organizations in October 2004. Regarding the high participation rate of civic groups in the movement, Pak Hanyong explains that with the "universal" nature of the *ch'inilp'a* issue, the movement strongly appealed to most Koreans and also rarely raised conflicts with other civic movements.²⁸⁰

On the other hand, the multiple memberships of IRCA members in other civic organizations enabled the movement to form well-built cooperation with other local groups. That is to say, overlapping personal networks made collaboration between IRCA and other groups easier. The following table shows the distinguished civic movement activist careers of some of the IRCA members.

²⁷⁸ The participating civic groups included: Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (Kyŏngsillyŏn, CCEJ), Citizens' Coalition for Democratic Media (Minŏnryŏn, CCDM), Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (Minju noch'ong, KFTU), Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (Hwan'gyŏng yŏnhap, KFEM), Korea Street Vendors Confederation (Nojŏmsang yŏnhap, KSVC), Korean Teachers & Education Workers' Union (Chŏn'gyojo, KTU), the Meeting of *The Hangyoreh* Small Stock Holders.

²⁷⁹ *Minjok sarang* 113 (Jan. & Feb., 2005), 33-4.

²⁸⁰ Pak Hanyong, Interview, Seoul, December 16, 2009.

Table 2. Careers of IRCA Members in Civic Movement

Name /Reference	Position in IRCA	Career and other affiliations
Yi Kwanbok / <i>Minjok Sarang</i> 22 (May 2001)	Director of the IRCA Foundation since 2001; Member since 1998	A social activist, lived 3 years-prison term due to anti-government comments in 1972, captured and tortured by the police without any substantial evidence after the 1980 Gwangju Democratization Movement An active participant in the reunification movement (chief of the financial division in the Pan-Korean Alliance for Reunification (Pömminyön), from the late 1980s to early 1990s) Deeply engaged in progressive civic movements from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, such as Anti-Park Chung Hee Memorial Museum Movement, Anti- <i>Chosun</i> Movement, and the SOFA Revision Movement
Im Chonggil/ <i>Minjok sarang</i> 90 (July 2003)		The chief executive of the Citizens' Solidarity for the Anti- <i>Chosun</i> Movement
Kim Chich'öl/ <i>Minjok sarang</i> (Nov. 2002)		The representative of the National Democratic Council (NDC) in Cheonan (Ch'önan) (Cheonan minju tanch'ae hyöbüihoe) The representative of Citizens' Solidarity for Peace & Unification (CSPU) in Cheonan·Asan Areas The representative of the Solidarity for Anti- <i>Chosun</i> Movement in Cheonan·Asan Branch Chairperson of Chungnam KTU ('89, '93, and '99-00)
Yö Inch'öl/ <i>Minjok sarang</i> 91 (Aug. 2003)	One of the earliest members; The chairman of Daejeon branch Since 2000	An executive committee member of Citizens' Coalition for Democratic Media (CCDM) in Daejeon·Chungnam branch The representative of Daejeon Mulch'ong (an anti- <i>Chosun Ilbo</i> group) Co-president for Committee for the School Girls' Deaths ²⁸¹ Reporter for <i>Ohmynews.com</i> Hani reporter (amateur citizen reporter) for <i>The Hangyoreh</i> Member of the Daejeon Chungnam Association of Writers for National Literature Council (AWNLC)

²⁸¹ The translation of the full title of the organization is the National Citizens' Committee Dealing with the Murder of Two Junior High School Girls, Sin Hyosun and Sim Misön, by a U.S. Military Vehicle (November 2002-May 2004).

		Member of Daejeon Chungnam CSPU; a member of PSPD
Yi Yonggil/ <i>Minjok sarang 92</i> (Sept. 2003)	Member since 1999	Chairman of Democratic Labor Party in Cheonan Ŭl branch The representative of Cheonan NDC; the president of Daejeon Chungnam Korean Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU) and a co-presidents of Chungnam KFEM (in May 2003)
Cho Manhŭi/ <i>Minjok sarang 102</i> (Aug. 2004)	Member since 2001	President of Okcheon KTU Vice President of Korean Peoples Artist Federation (KPAF) in Okcheon President of Mulch'ong Vice President of the Solidarity of Hope in Okcheon President of the Song Kŏnho Memorial Committee
Kim Tŏkchin/ <i>Minjok sarang 131</i> (Apr. 2007)	Member since 2005; Ran several marathon races with a “ <i>Ch'inilp'ach'ŏngsan</i> ” flag since Jan. 2006	A participant in the June Great Democratization Movement in 1987 (joined in the five-day rally at the Myondong Cathedral After 1987, back to being a public servant and active in various civic movement First chairman of National Government Employees' Union in Central Division (2003)

As seen above, many members were involved in multiple local organizations or local branches of national organizations, sometimes playing a leading role in each organization. In addition, the chart reveals tightly cross-connected personal networks among progressive groups in Korea. Also, many members were school teachers in affiliation with the KTU. The KTU in particular, held a similar ideological tendency with IRCA and was highly enthusiastic about introducing the activities of the institute into classrooms.²⁸² For example, Kim Myŏnghŭi, a

²⁸² Chŏn'gyojo (Korean Teachers & Education Workers' Union) was established in May 1989 under a long tradition for the struggle of democratization in education. From the very beginning, however, the Roh Tae Woo government deemed the movement illegal and laid off 1,465 teachers affiliated with the KTU in November 1989. Under the Kim Young Sam term, 95% of the laid-off teachers returned to their positions in October 1993 and the union was finally legalized as a normal labor union in January 1997. In the 2000s, the KTU was one of the major targets of conservative groups' attack, which believed that it led pro-North and anti-U.S. leftist education in schools. Vocalizing their voice in politically sensitive issues as well as in education issues, the KTU confronted both the Roh Moo Hyun government (regarding such issues as the dispatchment of Korean troops to Iraq, the Korea-U.S. FTA, introduction of an evaluation system of teachers, introduction of a performance-related payment system to schools)

school teacher also serving in the Committee for Unification Education of Gyeongbuk KTU, coordinated six local branches in her province to hold the IRCA exhibition “Pro-Japanese Artists and Their Works.”²⁸³ Furthermore, KTU teachers often produced educational materials for history classes from the exhibition panels.²⁸⁴

Finally, I will review the activities of some individuals in the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement. The following individual activities might have been the most effective and pervasive way in advertising the movement among the younger internet generation in their twenties. There are two examples of how IRCA members, who are members of the internet-generation, carried out their “historic” project of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan*. One member left a short report on his activities in the IRCA website: he visited three local libraries and made a library card for each. Upon coming back home, he requested a new book purchase in each library website. He ordered *Manhwa Park Chung Hee* (Cartoon Park Chung Hee, 2 vols. 2005), a publication sponsored by the IRCA as part of the movement. He proudly posted his future plan: once the cartoons came in, he would leave a nice book review that recommends others to read it.²⁸⁵ Another example is the story of a gamer. In 2005, *Minjok sarang* introduced a new website where a group of people who called themselves “cyber independence fighters,” developed a “*Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan*” computer game in which collaborators and independent fighters fought each other. Apparently targeting young gamers in a new and fun way, this game is to some extent “problematically” simplistic,

and Lee Myung Bak government (over the issues of the introduction of free school meals and evaluation system on each subject).

²⁸³ *Minjok sarang* (May 2004): 4.

²⁸⁴ *Minjok sarang* (July 2004): 6.

²⁸⁵ *Minjok sarang* 112 (June 2005): 25-6.

yet spreads the history of ch'inilp'a supposedly to those who are uninterested in it.²⁸⁶ Both of these cases demonstrate how the movement became deeply entrenched in the quotidian lives of the young generation in the mid-2000s. Also, the case of Kim Namyŏl in middle age, while not as young as the above two activists in their twenties, reveals the self-directed nature of membership activities. When the IRCA was raising the fund for the Ch'inil Dictionary after the budget cut in the National Assembly in 2004, he advertised the fundraiser on all the Internet websites he visited. He suggested a special March First Day Event at the Independence Hall of Korea, featuring the ch'inilp'a and IRCA dictionary project. After the great success of the event, he was invited to serve in the institute's executive committee.²⁸⁷

This chapter examined the spread of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement and finally the fulfillment of the historical task in a way of completing the PCIC activities and the Ch'inil Dictionary in the 2000s. From a slightly different angle, the next chapter investigates the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement in a local context, exploring what *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* meant to local people in their specific local contexts.

²⁸⁶ *Minjok sarang* 115 (October/November 2005): 15.

²⁸⁷ *Minjok sarang* (March 2004): 20-21.

Chapter IV

Local Memory Politics and the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* Movement

From the late 1990s to the 2000s, Koreans witnessed the reshuffling of their historical knowledge and memories with the increasing social acceptance of *ch'inilp'a* discourse. What the discourse ushered in—the full-scale re-evaluation on the lives of prominent elites and their memories—took place nationwide and local areas were no exception. *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* activities on the local and community levels were carried out as vigorously as in the center, and were not merely a historical reevaluation of so-called pro-Japanese collaborators and their cultural achievement. The purpose of this chapter lies in investigating local memorial project controversies in the 2000s that arose around cultural figures accused of pro-Japanese activities.

The vitalization of local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movements was closely associated with the flourishing of local cultural projects in the era of local self-government in Korea. In the mid-1990s, Korea finally witnessed the structural settlement of local government systems with the election of local government heads.²⁸⁸ Throughout the 2000s, one of the earlier popular projects of these local governments was to characterize their local cities with a specific cultural product and to invigorate the local tourist industry. Local cultural projects were also a great way of securing a budget from the central government, which intended to decentralize cultural and educational facilities that had been hitherto heavily focused in the Seoul metropolitan area. In

²⁸⁸ The original purpose of local self-government (*chibang chach'i chedo*) lies in the fact that locally elected representatives (i.e. the local council and local government head) automatically handle local political and administrative affairs. In 1961, the Park Chung Hee regime suspended the self-rule government system, which was installed under the Chang Myōn cabinet (1960-1961). After democratization in 1987, the self-rule law was amended in 1989 and the system was officially re-introduced in 1991. However, the government only allowed the local to elect local council members, but not the government head. Therefore, it was only in 1995 that the self-rule system was practically in effect as the local government heads were elected for the first time.

order to develop local cultural products, characteristics, and tourist spots, local governments turned their eyes to the commodification of locally born cultural celebrities. A series of local government projects were designed to build statues, memorial museums, cultural centers, and memorial stones, and hold festivals in honor of these figures. By taking advantage of these celebrities' fame, the local governments hoped to upgrade the name-value of their local events and cultural centers and further attract non-local tourists. However, many of the figures nominated for memorial projects by local governments were also accused of being collaborators. Therefore, local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movements were a struggle between the promoters of local memorial projects and *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* advocates.

In examining local memorial project controversies, this chapter aims at providing examples of how each local context can offer a more nuanced understanding of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* discourse and movement. Until now, this dissertation has dealt with *ch'inilp'a* discourse and movement mostly on the national level. This might run a risk of overly abstracting or simplifying the actual discourse or the course of movement in each case. Therefore, this chapter illuminates how each case—while under the same name of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan*—held its own specific content and context, i.e. a dispute solving process, major debating points and concerns, and the formation of an antagonistic relationship among local players. These local cases are distinct from what happened in the central political stage on the national level.

One of the purposes of this chapter is to prove how unique local historical traditions functioned among the locals to perceive, define, and rationalize their own positions over on-going memorial project controversies and the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement. In order to discuss this issue, I specifically investigate the local disputes of three cities: Masan, Jinju, and

Tongyeong in Gyeongnam Province, in the southeast of the peninsula. I believe that the cases of these cities are three of the fiercest and longest struggles of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement in the nation. Most of all, they unveil the complicated structure of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* issue in a local context, which was interwoven with local historical identity, cultural power struggles, and economic interests based on the tourist industry. In particular, I pay attention to the rhetoric and logic of local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* advocates—expressed in the terms, “nationalism” (*hoguk ch'ongsin* or *minjokchu'i*) and “democracy”—played out during their fight against “ch'inilp'a” memorial projects.

Section 1. The Debates on the Memorialization of Yi Ŭnsang and Cho Tunam in Masan

The memorial project controversy of Masan is an outstanding example of how locals contextualized their movement under the discourse of nationalism and democracy. In Masan, the controversy over local memorial projects was most intense from 1999 to 2005, centering on two nationally famous cultural figures, Cho Tunam (1912-1984) and Yi Ŭnsang (1903-1982).²⁸⁹ In the late 1990s, the Masan city government planned several cultural projects in order to boost local tourism and the economy. Among the city's plans were to culturally commodify Cho and Yi by erecting stones and statues in honor of the two, a memorial museum, and a literature hall in honor of these two figures to highlight their role in the city's history and attract more tourists.²⁹⁰ Upon hearing the news, local civic groups immediately opposed the plans, taking issue with their

²⁸⁹ The memorial project controversy on Yi is still on-going. When the Korean Railroad Corporation erected a memorial stone to honor Yi in front of the new Masan train station in early February of 2013, AHOP resumed a movement for removing the stone.

²⁹⁰ The Masan city planned to create a Cho Tunam theme park, which consisted of the Cho Tunam Memorial Museum, an outdoor concert hall, and sport facilities. It began constructing the park in June 2001 and finished in December 2002.

pro-Japanese careers and support of dictatorships.

Over eight years, the memorial project controversies in Masan centered around two groups. The group advocating the memorial projects consisted of the Masan city government, the families and followers of Yi Ŭnsang and Cho Tunam, and local organizations in relation to the two figures. The group opposing the memorial projects consisted of civic groups and the *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*. Among the civic groups, the Alliance of Hope for Open Society (Yŏllin sahoe Hŭimang yŏndae, hereafter AHOS) played a leading role in organizing the movement and encouraged the participation of other local groups.²⁹¹ Kim Yŏngman, the chairperson of AHOS, was a renowned local civic activist. In September 2004, Kim initiated the inter-regional Citizens' Act for Cleaning off Pro-Japanese Collaboration (Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan simin haengdong yŏndae) in Gyeongnam Province to promote effective local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement.²⁹² Also, the *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, a progressive local newspaper, assiduously advocated the movement, even filing a lawsuit against the city government regarding its proposed memorial projects. Kim Chuwan, a reporter of the newspaper and a member of AHOS, characterized this local dispute as a fight of local democratic groups against local magnates (*t'oho*). The opposing group characterized memorial projects as the product of an illicit union between the interests of local cultural elites and tourist projects of the local government.²⁹³

In addition, the opponents to the proposed projects essentialized the disputes as “a fight

²⁹¹ The Alliance of Hope for Open Society (Yŏllin sahoe Hŭimang yŏndae) was first organized in 1999. Since then, it has been mainly working for 1) opposing memorial projects on ch'inilp'a and supporters of authoritarian regimes and 2) succeeding and memorializing local democratic movement tradition.

²⁹² *The Hangyoreh*, August 26, 2004; www.OhmyNews.com, August 16, 29, September 8, 2004; *Pusan Ilbo*, August 30, 2004.

²⁹³ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, August 21, 2004.

over local historical identity” between two competing local traditions. One is a tradition of the democratization movement, which proudly offered the city the title of “*Minjuhwa ũi sŏngji*” (The sacred land of Korean democratization). Two events central to the democratization movement occurred in Masan: the March 15 Movement (1959) and the October 15 Movement (1979), both of which focused on fighting against two dictators, Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee accordingly. The rich cultural tradition of the city was often mobilized in contrast to the democratization tradition. What consisted of the former is the pride of the Masan people that its cultural foundation and beautiful nature gave birth to and nurtured famous cultural figures like Cho and Yi. However, opponents to the memorial projects characterize the nature of Masan’s “rich cultural tradition” as pro-Japanese, pro-dictatorship, pro-establishment, and represented with cultural elites and local magnets. Therefore, the controversy was about 1) whether Cho and Yi were in fact collaborators and 2) whether it was appropriate for the government to officially memorialize figures accused of being collaborators. On the other hand, in a larger local context, the memorialization controversies demonstrated a struggle between two versions of Masan historical identity: the spirit of the March 15 Democratic Movement and the cultural heritage of Yi ũnsang and Cho Tunam. This section traces back the processes of each struggle over memorial projects and investigates the symbolic meanings around their debates and movements in Masan society.

1) The Controversy over Cho Tunam’s Memorial Projects

Cho Tunam (1912-1984) was a musician who is most famous for his song, “*Sŏnguja*” (Pioneer). Since the 1960s, so many Koreans have loved the song to the extent that it was once

considered a national song (*kungmin kagok*) or second national anthem.²⁹⁴ The song touched the hearts of many Koreans with its tragic melody and lyrics that glorify the unshaken spirit of an independence fighter in Manchuria during the Japanese colonial period.

Around the planned opening of the Cho Tunam Memorial Museum (Cho Tunam Kinyōmgwan) in the spring of 2003, suspicions arose around Cho's past. In the November issue of *Wōlgan mal* in 2002, Ryu Yōnsan, a Yanbian-based Korean-Chinese scholar, published his interview with Pak Chonghwa, Cho's contemporary. Referring to his interview, Ryu testified that Cho composed several war propaganda songs for the Japanese in the early 1940s.²⁹⁵ What made Koreans more disappointed is that the beloved "Pioneer" was not originally a song honoring the sublime spirit of an independence fighter from the Japanese colonial period, but simply a revised version of "Yongjōng ūi norae" (The Song of Yongjōng) that sang the grief and hardship of unsettled Koreans in Manchuria.²⁹⁶

In the middle of growing suspicions on Cho's career in Manchuria, civic groups—representatively the AHOS—in November proposed to delay the opening of the Memorial Museum until a thorough investigation could clear Cho of any collaboration charges. In response, Masan city mayor Hwang Ch'ōlgon promised to investigate the case before the

²⁹⁴ The song became well known after baritone Kim Hakkūn sang it at Seoul Citizens' Hall on December 30, 1963. Since then, it was used as a signal song of "Chōngdūn uri kagok" (Our beloved song) in the Christian Radio Station for seven years, which made it more famous. In 1975, Cho Tunam published an essay titled, "Sōnguja," which narrated the behind-the-scenes story of composing the song. Ryu Yōnsan, "Ilsongjōng p'urūn sup e 'sōn'guja' nūn ōpsōta" (There was no pioneer in the Ilsongjōng), *Wōlgan mal*, 197 (November 2002), 174. Hwang Hyejōng, *A Study on the Figures Suspected of their Pro-Japanese Activities and the Controversy of their Memorial Project in Kyungnam· Masan Area- Focusing on Lee Eun Sang, Jo Doo Nam and Jang Ji Yeun* (unpublished Master thesis, Ch'angwōn Univ.: 2008), 11.

²⁹⁵ The titles of the three songs that Pak mentioned are "Chingbyōngje manse" (Hurrah! Conscript), "Hwangguk ūi ōmōni" (The mother of the Japanese Empire), and "Kanch'ōp ūn naltwinda" (Spies rampage around).

²⁹⁶ Ryu, *ibid.*, 172-177.

opening. However, the city government did not honor the agreement and proceeded to hold the opening ceremony as it was originally scheduled on May 28, 2003. In order to stop the opening, the AHOS held press conferences, announced statements, and several campout rallies near the museum site from late 2002 to early 2003.²⁹⁷ In the end, the AHOS members boycotted the opening. During the ceremony, AHOS members doused Mayor Hwang in flour. Their “rude” action, as well as fierce protesting, resulted in the arrest of three members, including Kim Yŏngman.²⁹⁸ This incident led to the tentative closure of the museum four days after its opening and opened up public discussion on the appropriateness of the protesting style and of the penalty charged on the AHOS members, as well as proposed memorial projects in general in honor of Cho and Yi.²⁹⁹

The incident created a great sensation throughout local society. Soon after, in June and July, several civic organizations announced their support for the AHOS, such as the Conference of Civic Organization in Gyeongnam (Gyeongnam simin tanch’e hoeŭi, May 30), IRCA (May 30), the Democratic Party (July 2), the Association of Democratic Professors at Kyungnam University (Kyungnamdae minjuhwa kyosu hyŏbŭihoe, July 2), Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (Ch’ŏnjugyo chŏngŭi kuhyŏn sajedan, July 3), the Association of Won Buddhism for Social Reform (Wŏnpulgyo Gyeongnam sahoe saebyŏk kyomudan, July 4), and the National Association of School Parents for Better Education (Chŏn’guk ch’am kyoyuk hakpumohoe, July

²⁹⁷ “Cho Tunam kinyŏmgwan kwallyŏn sŏngmyŏngsŏ I, II” (The AHOS statement regarding Cho Tunam Memorial Museum I, II) (announced on December 4, 2002 and May 2003 accordingly), *Yŏllin sahoe Hŭimang yŏndae*, accessed August 31, 2011, <http://hopenews.or.kr/>; *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, December 5, 31, 2002; May 20, 27, 28, 2003; <http://OhmyNews.com>, May 26, 2003 (accessed August 31, 2011).

²⁹⁸ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, May 29, 30, June 1, 2003.

²⁹⁹ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, May 31, June 7, July 19, 2003.

6).

In the middle of on-going controversy over opening Cho's memorial museum, the role of the media and civic groups intensified and complicated the situation. Kim Chuwan, a reporter for the *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, requested from the city a list of all the committee members who participated in Cho Tunam Memorial Museum project and Nosan Literature Center project. Kim also requested all the minutes of each of the committee meetings. However, the request was rejected in early June.³⁰⁰ Kim criticized the city's rejection as a negative example of "closed" governance and "autocratic" administration.³⁰¹ In response to that, the city government and Mayor Hwang brought libel charges against Kim Chuwan and Pak Kŭnch'ŏl in the *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo* on August 18, 2003.³⁰² In the end, the city, civic organizations, and the family of Cho Tunam dispatched a team to Yanbian to investigate Cho's activities in Manchuria from July 18 to 23, 2003. After the trip, the investigation team concluded in their final report on August 28 that Cho was "a musician under strong suspicion of pro-Japanese collaboration (*ch'inil hyŏmŭi ka chit'ŭn ŭmakka*)."³⁰³

As the local disputes on Cho and Yi continued, Masan citizens organized a Civic Committee (Simin wiwŏnhoe) in late November to deal with these lingering issues. The committee consisted of various local figures from the fields of literature, music, education, and women, as well as local activists, city councilors, and scholars.³⁰⁴ After several long discussions

³⁰⁰ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, June 4, 5, 2003.

³⁰¹ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, June 25, 2003.

³⁰² *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, September 2, 2003.

³⁰³ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, August 29, 2003.

³⁰⁴ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, November 21, 2003.

and debates, the committee finally decided to change the museum name from the Cho Tunam Memorial Museum to the Masan Music Center (Masan ūmakkwan) on December 8, 2003.³⁰⁵ Nevertheless, the Masan City Council voted not to adopt the name change the next spring.³⁰⁶ It took another half-year's struggle for civic groups to rename the museum to the Masan Music Center in July 2004.³⁰⁷

What were the main points of controversy raised by civic groups' accusations of Cho Tunam's collaboration activities? Ryu pointed out three songs as evidence of Cho's collaboration: "Chingbyōngje manse" (Hurrah! Conscript), "Hwangguk ūi ōmōni" (The mother of the Japanese Empire), "Kanch'ōp ūn nalttwinda" (Spies rampage around). He made his claim primarily based on the oral testimony of Pak Chonghwa in Yanbian. Due to the lack of more substantial evidence, the charges of Cho's collaboration were relatively weak in comparison with other major figures accused of collaboration. Also, some problematized his career as the first president of the Federation of Artistic & Cultural Organizations of Korea, Masan Branch³⁰⁸ from 1962 to 1968 (Masan Han'guk yesul munhwa tanch'e ch'ongyōnhaphoe, hereafter FACOK). Given the fact that the FACOK was a representative government-patronized organization under the Park Chung Hee regime, the opponents of his memorial projects assumed that Cho must have at least tacitly supported the Park regime.³⁰⁹ Yet, what his case made locally

³⁰⁵ *Kyōngnam Tomin Ilbo*, December 9, 2003.

³⁰⁶ *Kyōngnam Tomin Ilbo*, April 24, 2003.

³⁰⁷ *Kyōngnam Tomin Ilbo*, July 17, 2003.

³⁰⁸ Federation is the term that FACOK uses as the official English name on its website.

³⁰⁹ *Kyōngnam Tomin Ilbo*, June 6, 2003.

and nationally significant was more specifically 1) the very symbolic and emotional meaning of the song “Pioneer” to Koreans and 2) the spatial arrangement of the museum centering around the song.

First of all, the sensation of Cho’s collaboration charge is related to the fact that “Pioneer,” a beloved national song, was a pure fabrication of Cho. The song was in fact the primary reason why the city built the Cho Tunam Memorial Museum, with a budget of over 1 billion won for construction. However, further investigation into Yun Haeyōng, the lyric writer of the song, reveals more about the truth of the song’s origins. In his memoir in 1982,³¹⁰ Cho mystifies Yun as an unknown independence fighter in Manchuria. According to the same book, Yun soon disappeared after handing over the lyrics to Cho, and Cho never met him again. In the early 1990s, Cho’s story about the lyrics’ origins was revealed as a pure fabrication. Kwōn Chōl and O Yangho found out the true identity of Yun as a major Korean collaborationist in Manchuria who wrote several pro-Japanese lyrics, poems, and war propaganda writing and served as a senior staff member in the Concordia Association (K. Hyōphwahoe and J. Kyowakai).³¹¹ Later on, Pak Chōnghwa even testified that Cho and Yun in fact worked together in the early 1940s for the Japanese. Investigation into Yun’s past reveals that he was undeniably a confirmed collaborator.³¹² This new truth made Koreans furious that a collaborator ironically wrote the beloved patriotic lyrics of “Pioneer.”

³¹⁰ Cho Doonam, *Kūrium* (Yearning) (Seoul: Segwang, 1982); *Kyōngnam Tomin Ilbo*, June 4, 2003.

³¹¹ The Concordia Association was a self-rule organization in Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state in Northeast China (1932-1945). It was established in July 1932 after the Manchurian Incident in order for the realization of Manchukuo’s ideal of harmony among multiple races and effective management of the population within the territory.

³¹² *Wōlgan mal*, 206 (August 2003): 114-121; 207 (September 2003): 150-155.

Furthermore, the opponents of Cho's memorial project highly criticized the geographical location of the museum and its spatial layout. The AHOS pointed out that the museum was located near where the dead body of Kim Chuyŏl, a March 15 Democratic Movement participant, was removed from water. Given the fact that the discovery of his dreadful dead body became a catalyst for April 19 Revolution, the location was considered a sacred place in the history of Korean democratization. According to the AHOS, the city continually rejected its request to designate the nearby streets as "The Street of Kim Chuyŏl" for two years. The AHOS denounced the Masan city government for promoting Cho, who had an ambiguous career in Manchuria, while rejecting to celebrate Kim and the proud democratization movement tradition of the city.³¹³

In addition, what was equally unacceptable for the opponents was the spatial layout of the museum, which was based on the lines of the song. The space outside the museum was arranged around Ilsonjŏng (Pine tree cottage) and a pine tree. Originally, Ilsonjŏng means a pine tree on the top of Piam Mountain in Yongjŏng under where, it was told, independence fighters refreshed their spirit and will for independence. Also, the museum set up a replica of Yongdurye, a well from which the name of Yongjŏng city was originated. Inside the museum, a waxwork figure of Cho automatically played the song "Pioneer" on the piano. Furthermore, the opponents were offended that the museum incorrectly introduced the collaborator Yun as a mysterious independence fighter just as Cho had written.³¹⁴ For all these reasons, the AHOS argued that the spatial symbolism that memorialized "collaborationist Cho" was inappropriate for a government-

³¹³ "Cho Tunam kinyŏmgwan kwallyŏn sŏngmyŏngsŏ I," *ibid.*

³¹⁴ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, June 7, 2003; *Weekly Kyŏngnam*, June 7, 2003.

sponsored museum. In conclusion, AHOS members believed that memorializing a musician accused of collaboration contradicts the very historical identity of Masan. In spite of the fierce fight against Cho's memorial museum, his case received less attention than the case of Yi Ŭnsang, who held a clearer record of pro-Japanese activities and as a pro-authoritarian regime supporter.

2) The Controversy over the Collaboration of Nosan Yi Ŭnsang³¹⁵

In comparison to Cho's case, Yi's case more dramatically highlights the complicated aspects of local memorial projects and local power struggles. It also reveals how civic groups adopted the discourse of democratization and of *ch'inilp'a* in the process. Nosan Yi Ŭnsang (1903-1982, Nosan is his pseudonym) is a renowned historian and poet who greatly contributed to reviving and modernizing traditional Korean poetry (*sijo*). He has been considered the father of the modern form of *sijo*, a poetic genre of the Chosŏn period. His representative poems include: "*Kagop'a*" (I am yearning to leave), "*Pomch'ŏnyŏ*" (A spring lady), "*Yet tongsan e olla*" (Upon my old garden). All of these poems were made into songs that many Koreans love to sing. In Masan, the enthusiasm for memorializing and honoring Yi has run high and a number of people feel proud of him as part of the city's cultural heritage. Especially in the 2000s, several local locations and festivals were named after him and his poems: Nosanno (Nosan street), Nosan-dong (Nosan town, where he was born), Ŭnsangisaem (The spring of Ŭnsang), Kagop'a

³¹⁵ In comparison with his political inclination supporting dictatorships, his pro-Japanese career remained rather vague. His past during the last phase of Japanese colonial rule is still controversial (specifically after being released from Hamhŭng Jail in 1943). For example, Kim Kyohan argues that Yi went to hide in a friend's house in Gwangyang, Jeonnam Province in the fall issue of *Kyŏngnam Munhak*, 2003, see *Kyongnam Tomin Ilbo*, September 18, 2001. On the other hand, the opponents of his memorial projects point out that he introduced himself as the editor of *Chogwang*, a representative pro-Japanese magazine around the time, in *Pando sahwa wa nakt'o Manchu* (Historical episodes of the Korean Peninsula and the Manchurian paradise), a book which was published to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Manchukuo in 1943.

ch'ukche (Kagop'a festival celebrating Masan Citizens' Day), Masan Kagop'a kukhwa ch'ukche (Masan Kagop'a Chrysanthemum Festival since 2005), Kagop'a land (Masan Marine Park).

Among a number of controversies on various memorial projects celebrating Yi, I particularly focus on the local controversy over the naming of the so-called Yi Ŭnsang Memorial Center (Yi Ŭnsang kinyŏmgwan) that continued for more than six years from 1999 to 2005.

As early as in 1999, local debate erupted as the Masan city government suggested building the Yi Ŭnsang Memorial Center with a central government subsidy of three million won. The AHOS and other local groups fiercely opposed the decision based on Yi's problematic pro-Japanese and pro-dictatorship career.³¹⁶ Confronting this opposition, the city decided to downgrade its name from *kinyŏmgwan* (memorial center) to *munhakkwan* (literature house) in 2000. However, this change did not appease the opponents. Backing down even further, the city renamed the Yi Ŭnsang Literature House to the Masan Literature House in January 2002.³¹⁷ This decision dissatisfied the supporters of the memorial project. In September 2002, the city government turned over the decision at the meeting of "The Committee for Building the Literature Center" (Munhakkwan köllip ch'unjin wiwŏnhoe). The Committee, consisting of Yi's followers, reclaimed the title Nosan Literature House (Nosan munhakkwan).³¹⁸ Under the persisting pressure of the AHOS and other civic groups, the Masan city government finally requested the Gyeongnam Poetry Circle (Kyŏngnam si sasang munhwain hyŏbŭihoe) to

³¹⁶ "Sidae ŭi kokhak ase, Yi Ŭnsang kinyŏm saŏp ŭl pandae handa" (Opposing the memorial projects on Yi Ŭnsang, a compromiser of the day) (announced on December 15, 1999, Yŏllin sahoe Hŭimang yŏndae, accessed September 2, 2011, <http://hopenews.or.kr/>).

³¹⁷ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, January 24, 2002.

³¹⁸ However, the news was released to the public only in February 2003. *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, February 26, 2003.

investigate the pro-Japanese and pro-dictatorship activities of Yi in November 2003.³¹⁹ In December, the Civic Committee suggested to call the literature center Masan Literature House.³²⁰ However, in the next February 2005, the Masan City Council made an attempt to reverse the decision.³²¹ Concluding more than six year's of dispute, the final decision was made at the City Council in May 2005 (14 out of 27 votes):³²² the building was to be called the Masan Literature House and opened to the public in October 2005. Once again, Masan literary circles made another attempt to change the name to Nosan Literature House in late 2008 and early 2009.

In this prolonged dispute over naming the Yi Ŭnsang Literature House, the two axes of the confrontation were 1) civic groups and *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo* and 2) literary circles, the City Council, including the Masan mayor, and “local culture elites.”³²³ Kim Chuwan derisively calls the local cultural elites *t'oho seryŏk* (local cultural magnates). Regarding this local elite group, Kim writes that while dictatorships and *chaebol* have maintained corrupt ties for each other's interests throughout Korean history, cultural figures (*munhwa yesulgye*) actively glamorized dictatorships and compensated for the lack of the latter's legitimacy.³²⁴ According to Kim, Yi Ŭnsang is a cultural figure who served dictatorships for decades: he made national speech tours

³¹⁹ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, July 25, 2003.

³²⁰ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, December 9, 2003.

³²¹ *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, February 23, 2005.

³²² *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, May 23, 2005.

³²³ See the interview of Kim Yŏngman with *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, December 11, 2003; the interview of Kim Chuwan at KBS 1 station on January 31, 2004. Quoted in *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo* ed. *Yi Ŭnsang, Cho Tunam nonjaeng: Chiyŏk sahoe ūi yŏksa t'ujaeng, kŭ 6-yŏn ūi kirok* (The Controversies over Yi Ŭnsang and Cho Tunam: The struggle over history in local society, the six years' record) (Masan: Pulhwi, 2006), 251-2.

³²⁴ His serialized reports on local magnates can be found in *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, February 19, 20, 24, and March 3, 2003.

for President Syngman Rhee before the corrupt March 15 Presidential Election in 1960. In addition, he celebrated the inauguration of two military dictators, Park and Chun. Furthermore, Kim pointed out Yi as one of the three most powerful men from Masan in the Park Chung Hee era,³²⁵ along with Pak Chonggyu, the Head of the Office of Presidential Security in the Blue House and No Chaehyŏn, the Defense Minister (1977-9).³²⁶ He stresses that those who were indebted to Yi Ŭnsang then became today's supporters for his memorial projects. Kim asserts that these cultural magnates were afraid that local rejection of Yi might lead to a decline in the local influence of those who identified with Yi.³²⁷

Specifically, Kim Chuwan outlines the relation between government-subsidized cultural and art organizations and their support for Yi Ŭnsang. Kim argues that the Masan Literati Association (Masan munin hyŏphoe) and Masan branch of FACOK were traditionally the loyal hands of the Park, Chun, and Roh regimes. They are now the staunch advocates of Yi memorial projects, organizing traditional poetry societies, i.e. the Research Institute for Nosan Sijo (Nosan sijo yŏn'guhoe) and Gyeongnam Sijo Literature (Gyeongnam sijo munhak). Kim claims that people in the organizations were connected with local powers since the military dictatorship

³²⁵ Under the Park Chung Hee regime, he served powerful positions in the Minjok munhwa hyŏphoejang (Chair of National Cultural Association), munhwajae wiwŏn (Cultural Properties Committee Member), Ch'onggyŏk anbo kungmin hyŏpwihoe ũijang (Chair of People's All-Out Security Council), Sŏnggok haksul munhwajaedan isajang (Board President of the Sŏnggok Academic Cultural Foundation), Sookmyung yodae chaedan isajang (Board President of Sookmyung Women's University). Also, he received several significant awards, including the May 16 minjoksang (May 16 National Award), Yelsulwŏnsang (Art Academy Prize), Taet'ongnyŏng sang (Presidential Award), Kungmin hunjang aejoksang (Order of Civil Merit, Chapter Aejok (devotion to one's people)). In Kim Chuwan, "Yi Ŭnsang ũn ōttŏn sam ũl salatna" (What kind of life did Yi Ŭnsang live?), *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, November 11, 1999.

³²⁶ Kim Chuwan, "Chibang punkwŏn kwa t'oho: T'oho ran muŏt inga" (Local self-rule and local magnates: What is a local magnate?), *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, February 19, 2003.

³²⁷ Kim Chuwan, "Chibang punkwŏn kwa t'oho: Munhwa yesulgye ũi t'oho dŭl" (Local self-rule and local magnates: Local magnates in the realms of culture and arts), *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, February 20, 2003.

period.³²⁸ Therefore, the opponent groups identified their struggle as one for preserving local cultural and historical identity over their competitor.

The opponents essentially conceptualize their fight as a confrontation between two historical traditions of Masan: “*Kagop’a munhwa*” (The culture of *Kagop’a*) and “3·15 *munhwa*” (The culture of the March 15 Democratic Movement). According to Kim Chuwan, this is equal to the way in which Chŏng Sŏnggi at Kyungnam University seizes the nature of Masan society.³²⁹ Chŏng perceives the former as the culture of pro-Japanese, pro-dictatorship, pro-establishment, and the main-stream while the latter as that of the nation, democracy, *minjung* (the people), and the non-mainstream.³³⁰ Here, “*Kagop’a*” (I am yearning to leave) is one of the most representative poems of Yi: it starts with a lyrical rhythm, “my hometown, the southern sea/the freshly blue water/ (I could) see/ even in a dream, how could I forget.” The poem became even more popular after being made into a song singing the beauty of and serene yearning for his hometown Masan. Because the song praises Masan’s beauty, its title contributed a peaceful image of the city. In the era of local self-rule since the late 1990s, the Masan city government actively took advantage of this lyrical image of Masan for the promotion of tourism.

On the other hand, Masan takes pride in its history in the democratization movement such as the March 15 Democratic Movement and Busan·Masan Democratization Movement (Buma Hangjaeng). The former is a democratic movement protesting against the corrupt March 15

³²⁸ Ibid, Feb. 20; Kim Chuwan, “Chibang punkwŏn kwa t’oho: Yusin seryŏk i chibae hanŭn chiyŏk sahoe” (Local self-rule and local magnates: Local society under those who are related with the Yusin rule), *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, February 24, 2003.

³²⁹ Kim Chuwan, “‘3·15 ũigŏ’ ‘Buma hangjaeng’ kŏp’um iŏtna” (Were ‘March 15 Democratic Movement’ and ‘Busan, Masan Democratic Movement’ bubble?), *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, October 18, 2000.

³³⁰ Kim Chuwan, “‘Kagop’a munhwa’ wa ‘3·15 munhwa’” (“The culture of *Kagop’a*” and “The culture of March 15 Uprising”), *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, June 11, 2003.

Presidential Election in 1960. What made this local movement even more historically significant is its connection to the April 19 Democratization Movement. During a street rally in Masan, seven citizens were killed and more than 870 people were injured when police shot into the crowds of protesters. This local protest spread into a nation-wide anti-government protest a month later. On April 11, the dead body of Kim Chuyŏl, a high school participant in the rally, emerged in the Masan Bay with a teargas bomb piercing his head through on the left. This news provoked people's anger and led to the April 19 Movement that overthrew the Rhee regime. The latter indicates a democratic movement in the Busan and Masan areas in opposition to the Yusin dictatorship from October 16 to 20, 1979. After the defeat of the ruling Republic Party in the 1978 General Election in December, the demands and protests for democracy increased. This demonstration, which took place in the stronghold of Park Chung Hee, is considered to have advanced the collapse of his rule, influencing the circumstances around the assassination of President Park known as the October 26 Incident.

Under this historical tradition, people in Masan love to call the city “The sacred land of democratization” (*minjuhwa ūi sŏngji*). For instance, the two major players of the opponent group, the AHOS and the *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, were founded under the very spirit of progressive democratic tradition. Specifically, they see Yi Ŭnsang as the last person who can fit in the spirit of March 15 Democratic Movement. For example, Kim Yŏngman names Yi a typical opportunistic artist consistently from Japanese colonial period to post-liberation period—Kim accuses Yi as being not a simple sympathizer but a committed collaborator throughout his life. Kim describes Yi as a political chameleon who contrastingly praised the April 19 Democratization Movement (before he gave supporting speeches for Rhee) and wrote an epitaph

memorializing the March 1 Independence Movement. Considering his lifelong career, Kim concluded that the destination of his poem, “*Kagop’a*,” was not his hometown Masan, but in fact a place in the sun (whatever that costs!).³³¹

The opponent groups claimed that the two traditions, democracy and ch’inil-pro-dictatorship, could not co-exist in Masan. Therefore, their confrontation transformed into a fight over symbolism. The AHOS, an enthusiastic supporter for the memorialization of Kim Chuyŏl and the March 15 Democratic Movement, saw Kim Chuyŏl and Yi Ŭnsang as the two symbolic figures representing the competing local identities. On March 17, 2006, YSHY held a street photo exhibition contrasting the lives of Kim and Yi. The intention of the exhibition was to inform the public that the current corrupt election in Masan could not be separated from some inconsiderate people’s admiration of ch’inilp’a (like Yi). Reporting on this exhibition, the *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo* insisted that it was shame on Masan that it had at every corner monuments honoring Yi, only remembering his bright literature achievements. In contrast, Kim Chuyŏl was poorly memorialized in the city.³³²

The protest against The Spring of Ŭnsang is another good example of a fight over symbolism. The Spring of Ŭnsang is a tourist spot where Yi as a boy used to drink. After the original Spring disappeared due to the city development, the Masan city government restored the Spring with a monument in 1999, 200 meters away from the original location. Since 2001, the AHOS requested the city to remove the spring named after Yi. What was particularly problematic for the Alliance was its very location right next to the March 15 Democratic

³³¹ Kim Yŏngman, “Yi Ŭnsang ũi yangji man ũl ch’annŭn ‘Kagop’a’” (Yi Ŭnsang’s ‘*Kagop’a*,’ selectively longing for only the sunny side), *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, August 13, 2003.

³³² *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, March 18, 2006.

Movement Monument. In the 41st anniversary of the April 19 Democratization Movement in 2001, the AHOS performed a symbolic ceremony of building a wall to block crossing between the two monuments. Its underlying message is clearly that the March 15 Monument and the monument for Yi should not coexist in the same space.³³³ The opponents believed that the “holy” space dedicated to the democratic movement should not be shared with the spatial memory of a collaborator with the Japanese and dictators.

As seen above, the controversies over memorial projects in Masan were none other than a local competition over prioritizing one’s own version of historical identity. It is also a local power struggle between progressive civic groups and media and local cultural elites holding interests in memorial projects. Although widely known to the outside as a local *Ch’inilp’a ch’öngsan* movement, the pro-Japanese activities of Cho and Yi was to some extent ambiguous and debatable.³³⁴ *Ch’inilp’a ch’öngsan* was widely utilized as the discourse of the opponents struggling over prestige and power for themselves.

Section 2. The Controversy over the Removal of the Non’gae Portrait in Jinju

In Jinju, the local *Ch’inilp’a ch’öngsan* movement was carried out in the form of removing the Non’gae Portrait at Jinju Ŭigisa (Righteous Gisaeng Shrine) that “pro-Japanese” artist Kim Ŭnho painted. From the 1990s to 2000s, the movement took place in two stages: first, the initial attempt at removing the portrait by a small group of people from 1993 to 1997; secondly, as a

³³³ *Kyöngnam Tomin Ilbo*, April 20, 2001.

³³⁴ In comparison with the relatively ambiguous pro-Japanese career of Yi, Yi Ŭnsang was certainly a pro-government artist of his day. Yi actively participated in the election campaign for President Rhee at the end of his rule along with other literary figures, such as Pak Chonghwa and Kim Malbong. Under the Park Chung Hee regime, he served in various high-ranking positions in cultural circles in the 1960s and 1970s, which was difficult without remaining in good terms with the regime. Even after the assassination of Park, Yi declared support for Chun Doo Hwan and soon after served as a member of the Advisory Council on State Affairs.

joint action of civic groups in tandem with the anti-Japanese government movement from 2005 to 2008. What is interesting in the case of Jinju is that the focus did not lie in proving the pro-Japanese career of Kim Ŭnho or in removing a collaborator's art piece at a Shrine. What was significant for the Jinju people was an issue of originality and purity—which is to say, whether the painting of a pro-Japanese artist could indeed contain the spirit of Non'gae and its symbolic meaning to which Jinju people have been attached. Before narrating the process of the whole event, this section first discusses the history and legend of Non'gae and the associated historical identity of Jinju. From there, it examines how the movement can be located in the local and historical context of Jinju.

The local identity of Jinju is deeply embedded in the history and legend of Non'gae, as well as the Battles of Jinju Castle during the Imjin War (1592-98). The first battle of Jinju Castle (from October 4 to 10, 1592 in the lunar calendar) is considered one of the three great victories of the Chosŏn army during the Imjin War, along with the Victory of Haengju (by General Kwŏn Yul) and the Victory of Hansan Islands (by Admiral Yi Sunsin). In the second battle (from June 22 to 29, 1593 in the lunar calendar), however, more than three thousand soldiers and over sixty thousand civilians died in fighting against one hundred thousand Japanese military. This battle is remembered as the biggest single sacrifice on the Chosŏn side throughout the War. The story of Non'gae is located at the heart of the tragic defeat of the latter.

Non'gae (1574(?)-1593) was a *kisaeng*³³⁵ affiliated with a local government office (*kwan'gi*). On the day when the castle fell to Japan, she charmed a Japanese general into jumping

³³⁵ *Kisaeng* indicates female entertainers in Chosŏn society. Depending on their classification (rating), high-level *kisaeng* (*ilp'ae kisaeng*) entertained customers with artistic and academic talents such as painting, playing music, composing poetry, and calligraphy, not necessarily including sexual business. On the other hand, lower-level *kisaeng* (*samp'ae kisaeng*) were largely considered professional sex workers of the day.

together into the Nam River to their deaths. After her death, in spite of her low social status as a court *kisaeng* within the strict Chosŏn hierarchical system, Non'gae was remembered by people in Jinju and by their continuous requests, honored as righteous *kisaeng* by the Chosŏn Court in 1739. In *Öuyadam* in 1621, Yu Mongin wrote the first record about her death based on what he heard from local people in the winter of 1593. In the book, he succinctly describes how she threw her life into the river with an enemy general, not providing much information about her background except the fact that she was a court-affiliated *kisaeng*. Kim Suöp, the writer of the non-fictional book, *Non'gae*, indicates how people's imagination added up over time about the details of her death, i.e. in what way she charmed the Japanese general.³³⁶ Also, Kim notes that documents came out later to testify about Non'gae's hometown (in 1799), her relationship with General Ch'oe Kyönghoe (in 1750 and in 1799), and the location of her tomb (in the early 1970s).³³⁷ However, Kim is rather skeptical about the veracity of all the information on her emerging so late after the event of her death. Kim cautions that the literature in the 20th century tends to create the image of Non'gae by adopting unfounded information on her.

However, what is significant to pay attention to is the sincerity of admiration on Non'gae among the locals that began soon after her death. In *Öüiamgi* (A record on a righteous rock, 1651), O Tuin recorded that people in Jinju had held a ritual to Non'gae on her site of death every year. In 1722, local people inscribed the story of her righteous death on a stone (*Öüiamsajök pi*) with a wish that the court officially recognized her act. After several requests, the court in 1740 finally allowed Jinju to build her shrine (*sadang*) and held semi-annual rituals in honor of her. After

³³⁶ Kim Suöp, *Non'gae* (Seoul: Chisik sanöpsa, 2001), 27-37.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 83-91, 93-97, 98-105.

building her shrine, two kinds of rituals honored her locally: 1) voluntary annual ritual by the locals on the day of her death near the Nam River right after her death, 2) semi-annual rituals at her shrine by court-affiliated *kisaeng* since the mid-18th century. During the Japanese occupation, the colonial state prohibited the latter, yet the former continued.³³⁸

This long tradition on memorialization as well as the admiration and love for Non'gae remains vividly alive in the minds of Jinju people. Based on the sacrifice of military and civilians in the Battles of Jinju Castle and of Non'gae, the locals call the city “the town of loyalty and fidelity” (*ch'ungjöl ūi kojang*): this became the local historical identity. Here is a telling example on the prevailing admiration on Non'gae: in 2006, the Jinju City engraved the Non'gae image on the manhole covers of drains and installed them on sidewalks. Regarding this, Jinju citizens debated over whether it was appropriate. The opponents disliked the decision that made pedestrians step on the image of Non'gae who was the “holy” symbol of the city. Their opinions give us a glimpse at the depth of people's respect for Non'gae—even her image should not be disgraced.³³⁹ For this reason, removing the Non'gae portrait by a pro-Japanese artist cannot be separated from the discourse on the spirit and symbol of Jinju. This very discourse of “her patriotic spirit” (*hoguk chōngsin*) and the spirit of Jinju was constantly emphasized throughout the portrait removal movement.

The movement's first stage of removing the Non'gae portrait (Non'gae yōngjōng pyech'ul undong) began in 1993. This was in fact the earliest *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement throughout the nation. Under the social atmosphere to eliminate the traces of Japanese imperialism under the

³³⁸ Ibid., 114-120.

³³⁹ *Kyōngnam Ilbo*, August 30, 2006.

Kim Young Sam government, a group of local leaders organized The Meeting for Protecting the Spirit of Jinju (Jinju chǒngsin chik'igi moim, hereafter MPSJ), taking issue with the Non'gae *yǒngjǒng*. According to Pak Nojǒng, a publisher of *Jinju Sinmun* (Weekly Jinju newspaper) and leader of the movement, one of his colleagues in 1993 learned about the pro-Japanese activities of Kim Ŭnho, the painter of the Non'gae portrait at her shrine. Kim Ŭnho (1982-1979) was a renowned Oriental-style painter (*tongyang hwaga*, using traditional papers and pigments) of his day. But, he was also one of the representative pro-Japanese artists who drew “Kŭmch'a pongnapdo”³⁴⁰ for Governor-General Minami Jiro in 1937 and was active in several pro-Japanese organizations including the Association of Chosǒn Artists (Chosǒn misulga hyǒphoe, a representative pro-Japanese artist association). Charges of his collaboration are undebatable. Pak and his colleagues also found out that the painting was not originally drawn as a *yǒngjǒng* (portrait of a dead person for a ritual purpose, usually located at a shrine or at funeral or at ancestral ritual). It was in fact a lawmaker's gift for President Rhee: it is just a painting of a beauty (*miindo*)³⁴¹ which imitated his earlier work, “the Portrait of Ch'unhyang.”³⁴²

On July 5th, the *Jinju Sinmun* called for the removal of Kim's portrait of Non'gae, calling it a shame on Jinju, the town of loyalty. According to the report, it is unacceptable that a collaborator's work was located at the sacred site within Jinju Castle, where more than seventy thousand military and civilians including Non'gae died for the country and where their spirits

³⁴⁰ “Kŭmch'a pongnapdo” is a famous pro-Japanese painting of Yi. This painting depicts the scene in which Korean high class women delivered military funds to the Governor-General Minami Jiro, which they collected by selling out their gold accessories.

³⁴¹ Also, there is a different story about the origin of the Non'gae Portrait. It was in fact President Syngman Rhee who ordered Yi Ŭnho to draw the portrait after its loss during the Korean War.

³⁴² Ch'unhyang was a legendary *kisaeng* in the late Chosǒn period who was famous for her fidelity and high-spirit.

gathered: it is nonsense to hold the trace of a collaborator at a site memorializing the patriotic spirit of Jinju.³⁴³ Furthermore, they saw it wrong that young students visiting the shrine, bowed and burnt incense in front of an image that is not even an accurate representation of Non'gae. Therefore, the MPSJ tried to form public consensus over the issue by investigating the pro-Japanese activities of Kim, holding symposiums, and collecting signatures.³⁴⁴

However, the initial three year-long attempt turned out to be a failure in 1997. Based on local public opinion on the removal, the MPSJ submitted the request for the portrait removal to the Ministry of Culture and Sports, the Blue House, the National Assembly, the Gyeongsangnam-do Provincial Office, and Jinju City Council in December 16, 1993. It turned out that the portrait was not a nationally recognized one (*p'yojun yǒngjǒng*) supervised by the state. As a result, the Ministry of Culture and Sports transferred the decision to Gyeongnam Province in January 1994, and again from there, down to the Jinju City Council in April 1995.³⁴⁵ Especially after the decision was left to the City Council, the movement became a local hot issue in 1996.³⁴⁶ Yet, the Jinju City Council kept postponing the decision and finally voted down the removal petition in May 1997. Pak and others decided to wait for another chance.³⁴⁷

In 2005, the portrait removal movement revived as anti-Japanese nationalism ran high

³⁴³ *Jinju Sinmun*, July 5, 1993.

³⁴⁴ *Jinju Sinmun*, August 2, 1993.

³⁴⁵ *Jinju Sinmun*, March 13, May 1, 2005.

³⁴⁶ On February 8, 1996, the Jinju City Council held a symposium to discuss the removal of the portrait in Jinju. On February 19 and March 7, 1996, 113 professors at Kyungsang University and 35 (out of 53) at the Jinju National University of Education announced their support for the removal of the portrait. Following the announcements, the movement received extensive local and national media coverage in early March. *Jinju Sinmun*, February 12, March 4, 8, 11, 1996.

³⁴⁷ *Kyǒngnam Ilbo*, May 17, 2005.

over the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima Islets and the Japanese right wing history textbook controversy. In the Jinju area, 43 social and civic groups organized the Jinju Citizen's Movement Headquarters for Protecting Dokdo Islets and Preventing Japan's Bid for a Permanent Seat in the UN Security Council (Dokdo suho wa Ilbon ũi UN anbori sangim isaguk chinch'ul chŏji rŭl wihan Jinju undong ponbu, hereafter JCMH). After failing to get permission from the city, this JCMH illegally removed the portrait at the Non'gae Shrine on May 10, 2005. The following statement summarizes the logic behind their removal:

...facing the revival of Japanese militarism/neo-conservatism, we as the offspring of the brave 70,000 spirits in Jinju Castle, feel shameful about not keeping the spirit of Jinju. Our removal of the portrait is a way of showing our self-reflection and building up our self-respect. And it is also the first step of cleansing the persisting legacies of Japanese imperialism....³⁴⁸

What is intriguing to see is how the statement made a connection among the Battle in the Jinju Castle, (traces of) Japanese colonialism, and present Japanese neo-conservatism under the same discourse of nationalist spirit in Jinju. According to this statement, removing the fake Non'gae Portrait by a collaborationist artist could preserve the national spirit, which is its local historical identity.

Seen in the above rhetoric, the essence of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement in Jinju was to keep the spirit of the city in its quintessential form. From the beginning, the focus of the debates was not about Kim Ũnho's collaboration charge.³⁴⁹ Similar to other *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan*

³⁴⁸ *Kyŏngnam Tomŏn Ilbo*, May 10, 2005.

³⁴⁹ But, there was an exception like Kim Pŏmsu, a local historian. Kim continuously claimed for the cancellation of the removal petition, defending Yi's collaboration charge. His point was that Yi's collaboration was inescapable for someone like him. *SinKyŏngnam Ilbo*, November 27, December 4, 11, 1996.

debates, many opponents of the movement pointed out the inescapable nature of collaboration and impossibility of getting rid of all traces of colonialism.³⁵⁰ However, the advocates for the removal of the portrait argued that the movement was fundamentally about the spirit of Jinju as well as the symbolism of the Non'gae Portrait. According to them, drawing *yŏngjŏng* means drawing a spirit into a painting. It is generally considered as the substitute of the dead in a funeral or shrine. For this reason, what is significant in the Non'gae *yŏngjŏng* is the honorable spirit contained within the painting. Therefore, the value the portrait holds as an art piece (*yesulsŏng*) is not important. Rather, the public symbolism (*kongchŏk sangjingsŏng*) is significant: what people see in it— the spirit of Non'gae who chose death over a slave's life and sacrificed herself along with the fate of the Castle. Therefore, the advocates of portrait removal believe that this special portrait, containing the spirit of Non'gae and also the representation of her image, should not be inappropriately tainted by the hands of a collaborationist artist.³⁵¹

In the same vein, Kim Ŭnho's portrait was rejected based on the following claims: 1) the costume of the figure (Non'gae) is historically incorrect (i.e. the length and style of her *chŏgori* and skirt); 2) the painting is a replica of Ch'unhyang's portrait, rather than originally drawn to depict Non'gae; 3) it is not authentically drawn as a *yŏngjŏng* for the purpose of her shrine; 4) the painting style is influenced by the Japanese painting style, "the painting of a beautiful woman," in prevalent in Kim Ŭnho's day. Conclusively, the point is that the *yŏngjŏng* is not authentic, which means that it is not sufficient enough to contain the spirit of Jinju.

The compulsive action of the JCMH divided the public opinion into two: 1) criticizers said

³⁵⁰ *Jinju Sinmun*, February 12, April 22, 1996.

³⁵¹ *Jinju Sinmun*, February 28, 1994.

that even with the cause of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*, a civic group should not break the law; 2) removal supporters said for example, “an art piece is a reflection of the artist’s spirit and collaboration is an act of selling out the spirit of the nation.” Therefore, Jinju should not keep a portrait at the shrine drawn by a collaborationist artist who sold his spirit to Japanese.³⁵² In the meantime, several local groups declared their support for the removal, such as the AHOS (May 11), the Korean Peoples Artist Federation in Jinju (Han’guk minjok yesulin ch’ongyōnhap Jinju chibu, May 19), the Civil Society Organizations Network in Gyeongnam (Gyeongnam simin sahoe taech’e yōndae hoeūi, May 23), and the Association of Writers for National Literature Council in Gyeongnam (Minjok munhak chakka hoeūi Gyeongnamdo chihoe, May 22). After the removal incident, the city government and the JCMH on July 14 negotiated to make a new state-approved Non’gae *yōngjōng*. In addition, they decided to relocate the old portrait in the shrine temporarily until the completion of the new portrait. The state finally enshrined the new *yōngjōng* in Ŭigisa on May 23, 2008 during the Nonjae festival.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the deification of Non’gae as the symbol of loyalty and fidelity did not necessarily deter the city from the commodification of Non’gae for local festivals and tourism. People in Jinju showed great interest in making her a local tourist product. A reporter in the *Kyōngnam Ilbo* claimed that the city should make the righteous *kisaeng* Non’gae the central tourist theme of the city.³⁵³ In addition to the Ŭiam pyōlche (The ritualized dance for Non’gae) that originated in the 18th century, the Jinju City Council began holding the Jinju

³⁵² Sasōl: Non’gae yōngjōng ch’ōlgō wa 5·18 (Editorial: The Removal of Non’gae Portrait and May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement), *Kyōngnam Tomin Ilbo*, May 18, 2005.

³⁵³ “Non’gae ũi ch’ungjōl ũl palcha” (Let’s sell the loyalty and fidelity of Non’gae), *Kyōngnam Ilbo*, February 23, 2002.

Non'gae Festival since 2002. It announced the Day of Non'gae's Rings (*Non'gae karakchi nal*) since 2005, based on the legend that she wore jade rings on her ten fingers when she jumped into the Nam River in order to hold the enemy general tightly.³⁵⁴ The city government designed the Non'gae image and established the Non'gae Foundation in November 2003 to promote tourism.³⁵⁵ Not only the city government, but also individuals took advantage of Non'gae as a brand name, such as Jinju Non'gae Golden Rice (*Jinju Non'gae hwanggŭm ssal*).³⁵⁶ In this sense, the movement of removing the Non'gae *yŏngjŏng* to some extent shows the selectivity of the local people in performing and maintaining their historical identity of what can be included and what should be excluded. Furthermore, it is revealing how the purpose and form of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement can be distinctive based on local history and identity.

Section 3. The Controversy over the Memorial Projects of Yu Ch'ihwan in Tongyeong

In the 2000s, the local *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement in Tongyeong unfolded over the memorial projects for Ch'ŏngma Yu Ch'ihwan (1908-1967, Ch'ŏngma is his pen name). The movement in Tongyeong was similar with that of Masan in light that it was a struggle against the local government and local cultural powers. In terms of the result of the movement, Tongyeong was less successful in terms of stopping local memorial projects than Masan. Here, I examine Tongyeong civic groups' fight against Yu Ch'ihwan memorial projects. I particularly focus on the issue of changing the name of Tongyeong Post Office to Ch'ŏngma Post Office from 2004 to 2009. In the meanwhile, this section closely looks at how local *ch'ŏngsan* movements were

³⁵⁴ *Kyŏngnam Ilbo*, August 7, 2005.

³⁵⁵ *Kyŏngnam Ilbo*, November 26, 2003.

³⁵⁶ *Kyŏngnam Ilbo*, September 5, 2005.

closely related to two historical identities of Tongyeong and furthermore, how local cultural interests and power struggles intertwined in Yu's memorial projects.

Tongyeong, located on the south coast of the peninsula, has two historical identities: 1) people in Tongyeong call the city, "The holy land of defending the fatherland" (*hoguk ūi sŏngji*) which originated from its founding history: the city was born as "The General Headquarters of the Chosŏn Navy covering Three Provinces" (*Samgun sugun t'ongjeyŏng*; Jeolla, Gyeongsang, and Chungcheong) in 1604 right after the Imjin War. For the next four hundred years (1604-1895), as the Chosŏn Navy Headquarters protecting the nation from the south, the locale flourished economically and culturally in relation to the warship industry. The name of the city is the abbreviation of *Samdo sugun t'ongjeyŏng*. In addition, the front sea of Tongyeong is the historical site where Admiral Yi Sunsin, the first *Samgun sugun t'ongjesa* (the Navy Chief of Staff) in the Imjin War, won a sweeping victory over the Japanese Navy (Hansando taech'ŏp, the 8th day of the 7th month 1592 in the lunar calendar), which enabled the Chosŏn Navy to grab control of the seas.

Because of its deeply rooted history with the Choson navy, Tongyeong has several pieces of architecture such as Sebyŏnggwan and Ch'ungryŏlsa. The former is the headquarters building of the Chosŏn navy, used for the navy to clean up and maintain its weapons. It is one of the three largest wooden buildings in the Chosŏn period (with Kyŏnghoeru in Seoul and Chinnamgwan in Yeosu). Its historical significance led to its designation as National Treasure Number 305 (rare and valuable cultural properties under the special maintenance of the state). The latter is a state-sanctioned shrine dedicated to the Admiral Yi Sunsin built in 1606 in honor of his distinguished service to the Chosŏn court. Many people in Tongyeong believe that the spirit of the city is

identified with that of Admiral Yi in defense of the fatherland. The Tongyeong City has held an annual Hansan Taech'ŏp Festival since the 1960s in order to celebrate the victory of Admiral Yi and the tradition of the Chosŏn navy. Also, the city held semi-annual rituals at the Ch'ungryoŏlsa in remembrance of his loyalty and bravery.

What is significant to note is that this very local tradition survived throughout the Japanese occupation period. According to Ch'oe Chŏnggyu, the local leader of the *ch'ŏngsan* movement as early as in the 1990s, this local tradition became his major reason for opposing memorial projects on collaborators. He recalled how spectacular the rituals at Ch'ungryoŏlsa were, how they persisted four times a year even under Japanese colonial rule, and how the day of the rituals became an occasion in which elders gathered to decide local issues. Japanese colonial authorities disliked the shrine, for it was associated with the tradition of anti-Japanese nationalism, as well as a history of Japan's defeat. Also, Ch'oe witnessed in his youth that adults were so dedicated in maintaining the tradition that they did even not plant a single Japan-originated tree within the shrine. In the 1980s, out of the same tradition, the local youth—including Ch'oe—fought more than 7 to 8 years against a church's plan that extended its building into a five-story one right across from Sebyŏngwan (less than 20 meters' distance). They protested the plan because of the symbolic and spiritual meanings of the building. Growing out of this historical tradition, Ch'oe testifies how he became imbued with anti-Japanese consciousness and later on involved in the problematics of the *ch'inilp'a* issue.³⁵⁷

On the other hand, Tongyeong produced a number of renowned artists and writers, based on the accumulated prosperity of the fishery industry in the 20th century. The following are

³⁵⁷ Ch'oe China, Interview, March 19, 2010.

nationally and internationally well-known artists and writers born in the town: Yun Isang (composer), Kim Sangok (a poet of traditional *sijo*), Kim Ch'unsu (poet), Yu Ch'ihwan (poet), Pak Kyöngni (novelist), Yu Ch'ijin (playwright), Chön Hyöngnim (artist), Kim Hyönggün (painter). Also, the locality is famous for traditional dance performances, such as Sŭngjönmu, Ogwangdae, and Namhaean pyölsin kut, as well artistic handicrafts and foods. For these reasons, the locals proudly call it “the town of art” (*yehyang*).

In addition to the two existing local identities described above, the changing economic situation shaped local ch'inilp'a disputes. During the colonial period, Tongyeong emerged as a center of the fishery industry to the extent that the first modern fishery guild was organized in the town. However, the fishery industry that brought wealth and prosperity to the city began declining because of the great decrease in fish hauls in the 2000s (beginning in the 1990s). For the revival of the local economy, the members of the city decided to promote the local tourist industry, taking advantage of its beautiful natural environment, rich cultural heritage, historic sites, and the traces of locally born artists and writers. In 2004, Mayor Chin Ŭijang officially proclaimed making tourism another pillar of the local economy.³⁵⁸ Therefore, the controversy over memorial projects on Yu Ch'ihwan can be contextualized within such historical identities and present needs for the promotion of the tourist industry. In tandem with the local tourist industry, local cultural magnates and followers of Yu Ch'ihwan had a stake in memorial projects, i.e. the Yu Ch'ihwan Literary Award and Yu Ch'ihwan Literature House.

In spite of earlier suspicions of Yu's collaboration in the late 1990s, his wartime career began receiving a local spotlight only in 2004. In May, the Tongyeong Literati Society

³⁵⁸ For examples, *Hansan Ilbo*, October 8, 2004; May 25, 2005.

(Tongyeong munin hyŏphoe, hereafter TLS) suggested changing the name of the Tongyeong Post Office to Ch'ŏngma Post Office. In response, the IRCA Tongyeong branch and the March First Movement's Comrades Association in Tongyeong (3·1 Tongjihoe Tongyeong chibu) opposed the renaming because of Yu's pro-Japanese career. Furthermore, they proposed to investigate his wartime activities more thoroughly. The controversy over his collaboration continued the rest of the year, along with the promotion of the Ch'ŏngma Post Office and a "Letter-writing competition in honor of Ch'ŏngma."

Two local camps confronted each other over his memorial projects: Yu's followers and project supporters including the local government and local literary societies, i.e. TLS, Association of Artists and Writers in Tongyeong (Tongyeong yesurin ch'ongyŏnhap), Ch'ŏngma Literature Society (Ch'ŏngma munhakhoe), People Who Are Guarding Ch'ŏngma (Ch'ŏngma rŭl chik'inŭn saramdŭl, organized in February 2006); the other is the opponents of the memorial projects: Citizens' Alliance for Opposing Yu Ch'ihwan's Memorial Projects (Yu Ch'ihwan kinyŏm saŏp pandae simin yŏndae), IRCA Tongyeong branch, The March First Movement Comrades Association in Tongyeong, KTU, Association of Writers for National Literature Council in Tongyeong, Citizens' Alliance for Cleansing Pro-Japanese Collaboration (since August 2004), and local newspapers like the *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*.³⁵⁹

The central figure of the latter is, already mentioned above, Ch'oe Chŏnggyu. Before the case of Yu Ch'hwan, he was engaged in other local disputes, such as a fight against building a

³⁵⁹ Concerning the Ch'ŏngma Post Office controversy, civic groups organized The Committee for Investigating the Truth of Ch'ŏngma Yu Ch'ihwan's Collaboration Charge (Ch'ŏngma Yu Ch'ihwan ch'inil ũihok chinsang kyumyŏng taech'aek ũiwŏnhoe) in 2004. Participating organizations included: the IRCA Tongyeong branch, the AHOS, the Gyeongnam AWNLC, the Tongyeong KTU, and the Tongyeong Association of the March First Movement Comrades.

church building in front of Sebyŏngwan in the 1980s and in disputes over memorial projects on Tongnang Yu Ch'ijin (Ch'ŏngma's older brother and playwright) in the 1990s. He is a leader of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* movement (or better defined as the movement for dispending the spirit of Tongyeong) as well as a local cultural figure due to his literary career and service for local festivals.³⁶⁰ According to Ch'oe, memorial projects were connected to local cultural magnates and their interests. He exposed that the TLS planned to open its office in the same Tongyeong Post Office building after its name was changed into Ch'ŏngma Post Office. Conferring the Ch'ŏngma Literature Award, he pointed out, can be seen in the same vein. In order to reveal a hidden connection between the literature awards and the memorial projects, Ch'oe used the example of Mun Tŏksu. The case of Mun shows all the connections and networks around Ch'ŏngma in the local community: Mun, as a student of Ch'ŏngma, is an enthusiastic supporter for Ch'ŏngma memorial projects. In his case, Ch'ŏngma-related businesses greatly help him maintain his current prestigious position in local artist circles. He received the Ch'ŏngma Literature Award and other literature awards, and also served as the president of the Ch'ŏngma Literature Society (in 2004). Therefore, people like Mun, Ch'oe claimed, promoted Ch'ŏngma memorials for reproducing the privileges of their own literary circle, as well as their local cultural power and interests.³⁶¹

The basic arguments of the two sides over the controversy were the following. The opponents argued that the city should not memorialize Yu with a collaboration charge, especially

³⁶⁰ Earlier, Ch'oe was the president of the Association of Writers for the National Literature Council (AWNLC) in Gyeongnam. When the Post Office Controversy was going on, he was leading the local IRCA branch. Also, he was an executive committee member for several Yi Sunshin festivals.

³⁶¹ Ch'oe China, Interview, Seoul, March 20, 2010. Also, Kim Yŏngman attacked Mun as the representative supporter of Yu.

given the fact that the historical identity of the city was based on the spirit of Admiral Yi.³⁶² Even for the memorial project per se, they questioned why the city tried to promote Yu in particular, ignoring other renowned artists or literary figures (i.e. Kim Ch'unsu). On the other hand, the followers of Yu formed a strong supporting group for his memorial projects. From their perspective, the opponents pointlessly found fault with only a couple of Yu's poems, poems with multiple possible interpretations. Compared with his literary achievements, his pro-Japanese controversy to them was peripheral and meaningless. In this situation, the Tongyeong City Council sided with the latter in the name of developing the local tourist industry.

The fight of the civic groups against Yu's memorial projects was rocky for several reasons in comparison with the cases of other cities. Different from his brother, Yu Ch'ijin with the clearer traces of collaboration, the collaboration charges against Yu Ch'ihwan were rather debatable. Because of this uncertainty, he was excluded from the final list of the *Who's Who Dictionary for Pro-Japanese Collaboration* in August 2008. Whether he was a collaborator or not was in fact a major local controversy in the mid- and late 2000s. The claim on his collaboration was made primarily based on three of his poems and his career in the Concordia Association in Manchuria.³⁶³ Among the three poems, the most controversial piece is "Su" (The head). The major debating point is whether a rebel (*pijŏk*) in the poem is an independence fighter or simply a bandit in the region.³⁶⁴ Regarding the other two poems, "Chŏnya"(On the

³⁶² For examples, see *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, December 4, 2005; <http://OhmyNews.com>, December 13, November 8, 2006 (accessed in November 10, 2011).

³⁶³ In December 2005, Chŏn Kapsaeng published a copy of *Chosŏn sijip*, vol. 2 (The poetry of Chosŏn, 1943) of which he found in 2002 in the National Library of Korea. The book introduces the brief history of Yu Ch'ihwan, including his career at Hyŏphwahoe in Harbin. *Kyŏngnam Tomin Ilbo*, December 13, 2005.

³⁶⁴ Some of the debates are following: Chŏng Haeryong, "Ch'ŏngma ūi si 'Su' saeropke tŭlyŏda pogi" (Re-reading of Ch'ŏngma's poem, 'The head'), *Hansan sinmun*, July 9, 2004; Kim Chaeyong, "Yu Ch'ihwan ūi ch'inil

eve) and “*Puktusǒng*” (The great dipper), their contexts are open for multiple interpretations. However, both were published in pro-Japanese magazines, *Chogwang* and *Ch’unch’u* accordingly. In particular, the first poem “*Chǒnya*,” was in the special issue for celebrating the announcement of student military conscripts. Therefore, *Ch’inilp’a ch’ǒngsan* advocates argued that this poem was part of the colonial government’s war propaganda to reach the minds of student volunteers.³⁶⁵ Later on in October 2007, Pak T’aehwan at Kyungnam University discovered the first pro-Japanese prose of Yu in *Mansǒn Ilbo*, a Korean language newspaper in Manchuria.³⁶⁶ This new discovery gave more credit to those who argued that he was involved in pro-Japanese activities during wartime.

Another complication in the controversy is that Yu Ch’ihwan was involved in the local dispute between the two neighboring administration districts, Tongyeong city and Geoje Island (Kǒje Island): each district claimed that they were the true birthplace of Yu. Therefore, they competed with each other for accommodating more of his memorial projects throughout the 2000s: Geoje Island restored his birthplace, opened the Ch’ǒngma Memorial Hall (Ch’ǒngma kinyǒmkwan, started construction in 2001) in January 2008, and built five monuments inscribed with his poems in August 2005. As a part of the dispute, Yu’s family initiated a lawsuit in 2004

haengjǒktūl” (The traces of pro-Japanese activities of Yu Ch’ihwan), *The Hangyoreh*, August 7, 2004; Pyǒn Sehwa, “Ch’ǒngma si ‘Chǒnya,’ ‘Puktusǒng’ ch’inil kǔngǒ ǒpsǒ” (There is no evidence on pro-Japanese tendency in ‘Chǒnya’(On the eve) and ‘Puktusǒng’(The great dipper)), *The Hangyoreh*, August ???, 2004; Mun Tǒksu, “Han Yongun kwa Yu Ch’ihwan” (Han Yongun and Yu Ch’ihwan), *Kyǒngnam sinmun*, October 11, 2004.

³⁶⁵ The former is included in the November 1943 of *Ch’unch’u* that featured the introduction of the student soldier volunteer system in October. The latter is in *Chogwang* in April 1944 that had a strong pro-Japanese tendency. Therefore, Kim Chaeyong, a Korean literature professor at Wonkwang University specializing in pro-Japanese literature claims that given the nature of the two magazines, the two poems were written to celebrate Japanese imperialism and the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.

³⁶⁶ “Ch’ǒngma Yu Ch’ihwan ch’ǒt sanmun palgyǒn” (The first discovery of the pro-Japanese prose of Yu Ch’ihwan), *Yonhap news*, October 19, 2007. According to Pak, his prose was published in *Mansǒn Ilbo* on February 6, 1942.

against the Tongyeong City Council with the financial support of Geoje Island. This local rivalry made his memorial projects an issue of local pride and economic interest; consequently, people in Tongyeong did not want to lose the battle due to his “vague” collaboration charge.

The dispute around Yu’s collaboration revived again in late 2006. The TLS proposed to hold a “letter writing competition in honor of Yu Ch’ihwan” in December. Also, the Tongyeong City Council and Geoje Island requested a central government subsidy for gigantic memorial projects for the centennial anniversary of Yu’s birth in 2008. At this time, the fight took place between the TLS and KTU Gyeongnam branch.³⁶⁷ Despite the enthusiastic support of the Citizens’ Alliance for Cleaning off Action of Pro-Japanese Collaboration since August 2004, the attempt to stop the memorial projects in Tonggyeong remains unsuccessful. At the end, most of the memorial projects in honor of him, i.e. the literature hall (Tongyeong), the memorial center (Geoje), the literature award (Tongyeong), restoring his birthplace (Tongyeong and Geoje), street naming, and other memorial events under his name, continued except for changing the title of the post office.

Similar to the case of Masan, the struggle for *Ch’inilp’a ch’öngsan* in Tongyeong was presented as that between memorial project opponents and the local government and local cultural magnets. However, the two local identities of Tongyeong, even though strongly reinforcing the positions of the two sides of the movement, are not in conflict with each other (unlike the case of Masan). Both sides respected the two historical traditions of the city. Yet, the opponents’ discourse contended that the official memorialization of Yu, a pro-Japanese collaborator, was in contrast to the ideal and identity of the city built upon Admiral Yi’s patriotic

³⁶⁷ *Kyöngnam Tomin Ilbo*, October 31, 2006; November 1, 4, 6, and 30, 2006.

spirit.

The local memorial project controversies I examined in this chapter demonstrate how each *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* movement could be distinctive, depending on the figure in controversy and its specific context. In the three cases, the local historical identity based on (anti-Japanese) nationalism and democracy played a crucial role in forming the opponents' discourse against memorial projects honoring "collaborators." However, what is intriguing to note is that the nature of their nationalism, what the locals held, was not necessarily and exactly that of modern nationalism, which was specifically born in late 19th century Korea in the process of building a modern nation-state. It is rather a traditional concept of "protecting the country from the enemy" (*hoguk*) in the case of Jinju and Tongyeong. In spite of the difference between the traditional idea of *hoguk* and the modern concept of nationalism, this outdated concept was smoothly blended into their present anti-Japanese sentiment, as well as their repulsion to pro-Japanese artists and to their memorial projects in the local contexts. Therefore, these local cases allow us to look at the delicate and complicated details of each *Ch'inilp'a ch'ongsan* case and their discourse, different from either the debates on a collaborator or *ch'inilp'a* discourse on the national level, which came to be much dogmatized in the process of politicization and institutionalization.

Chapter V

The Discourse and Counter-Discourse of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*: Academic Debates on the Feasibility of Resettling the Collaboration Issue and History Textbook Debates

The purpose of this final chapter lies in examining the counter-discourse to *ch'inilp'a* discourse in Korean society in the 2000s. What I call the counter-discourse here means scholarly statements, discussions, or sometimes a movement that cautions against the underlying logic of *ch'inilp'a* discourse, its hyper-politicization, its evolution into a social and political movement, and the state's involvement in the issue. Originally, *ch'inilp'a* discourse was a marginalized historical view in the 1980s that audaciously raised the legitimacy issue on the formation of Korean regimes and powerful elites. However, the flow of post-1987 Korean history transformed it into an authoritative socio-political discourse. In the earlier chapters, I covered the responses of the conservative camp to the increasing empowerment of the discourse as the representative political rhetoric of the progressive since the late 1990s. However, the attitude of the conservative media and politicians was somewhat ambivalent and inconsistent; that is to say, they could not neglect Japan-related colonial issues, but hoped to reject the political mobilization of an issue targeting right wing elites. Beyond the sometimes overly simplistic and sometimes ambivalent counter-discourse created in the media, this chapter proposes to examine the more systematic and scholarly response on the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* discourse and movement in the 2000s.

The first section concerns how Korean scholars and professionals polemicized the idea of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* and its movement. Under the steadfast political backing of two progressive presidents in the 2000s, *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* earned more credibility and turned itself into a

major political polemic. In that process, crucial issues such as politicization, moralization, and the state's intervention were raised as a problem among scholars from different ideological backgrounds. Therefore, this section examines diverse scholarly views and their arguments on the underlying problems of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* and of the state's legislation.

Turning our attention to a broad picture of 20th century Korean history and history education, the second section specifically explores the debate on high school modern and contemporary Korean history textbooks in the mid- and late 2000s. The textbook controversy was a debate over the historical views of two ideologically distinctive history textbooks that took place between progressive historians and a group of conservative scholars. The two textbooks are *Kūmsōng Modern and Contemporary Korean History* (Kūmsōng kūnhyōndaesa kyogwasō, 2002) and Text Forum's *Alternative Modern and Contemporary Korean History* (Taeon kūnhyōndaesa kyogwasō, 2009). The controversy was the reaction of conservative scholars against the spread of the progressive historical view that supported ch'inilp'a discourse. Despite the fact that it was raised over modern and contemporary history in general, and not limited to the boundaries of the collaboration issue, the collaboration issue—including the reevaluation of President Rhee and President Park— was the central component of the debate.

Section 1. Feasibility versus Infeasibility: Academic Discussion over *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*

Following journalistic interest in the ch'inilp'a issue since the late 1980s, studies on collaboration and collaborators slowly emerged as a major academic interest in the late 1990s.³⁶⁸

The social atmosphere—revolving around a series of controversies over collaborators, their

³⁶⁸ Here, I am not considering journalistic chinilp'a publications in the early 1990s as a full-fledged academic work. According to Ryu Posōn, pro-Japanese literature became a major academic interest after *Silch'ōn munhak* announced a list of 42 pro-Japanese writers in August 2002.

memorial projects, the dictionary project, and chinilp'a legislation—interactively stimulated various academic engagements with the issue. Regarding research on individual ch'inilp'a, the field of literature has been most productive in terms of analyzing issues such as the motivation of collaboration, the inner world of “turncoat writers,” and their specific pro-Japanese writings. Yet, not limited to the works on individual collaborationists, a wide range of scholarly debates took place on the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement and legislation process. Therefore, the intention of this section, not lying in addressing every single issue of each debate on collaborators, focuses on two essential scholarly discussions on *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* and its movement: The first is the issue of feasibility, the debates on its possibility, necessity, difficulty, and appropriateness and also whether it is possible to define or categorize clearly pro-Japanese collaborators (*ch'inilp'a*)/collaboration. The second is more specifically whether the state's intervention in the issue (in the form of legislation) is a desirable or appropriate way of figuring out past wrongs. While addressing the above questions, I focus more on the counter-discourse against the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement that advocated caution in order to avoid readdressing the main arguments of the supporters laid out in the earlier chapters of this dissertation.

Before addressing scholarly discussions, let me briefly review publicly-circulated views in opposition to *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*. The conservative media was in general accused of spreading the following negative aspects in public. The *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* advocates called them the defense for pro-Japanese collaborators (*ch'inilp'a onghoron* or *pyōnhoron*). Pak Hanyong summarizes ten problems with the media's coverage of the issue: 1) the statute of limitations on the ch'inilp'a issue has expired metaphorically as well as legally. That is to say, it is meaningless to punish deceased collaborators over fifty years after their anti-national acts; 2) an accomplice

theory that most Koreans under Japanese colonial rule committed collaboration no matter what scale it was; 3) the inescapability of Koreans' collaboration under the threat of the Japanese colonial state ; 4) collaboration was actually an ordeal faced by national leaders (they were in fact martyrs of history (Kim Tonggil argues)); 5) the merits of the social contributions of national leaders and elites to Korea were greater than their faults (collaboration); 6) collaboration was to uphold their own cause (i.e. Kim Hwallan's collaboration was for female education); 7) the revival of an unreasonable system of implication that places the responsibility of collaboration on the innocent descendents of accused collaborators; 8) the waste of national power and division of public opinion; 9) *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* advocates are communist-followers (*ppalgaengi*); 10) political conspiracy to attack a leader of a specific political party.³⁶⁹ The above ten theories are not identical in terms of how influential each was or how frequently it appeared in the media. From now on, I analyze scholarly discussions on *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*, some of which overlap with the above claims.

Pok Kōil, a social commentator as well as a writer, officially declares the present impossibility of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*. In 2003, Pok published a sensational book titled *Chugŭn cha tŭrŭl wihan pyōnho: 21-segi ūi ch'inil munje* (The defense for the dead: The collaboration issue in the twenty-first century). The publication of this book made Pok one of the representative *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* opponents. His book drew great attention in society partly because it was the first publication of this kind, which officially rationalized the position of

³⁶⁹ Pak Hanyong, “(Pundan ihu) *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* undong ūi chōn'gae wa kwaje” (The resume and tasks of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement after the division of North and South), in *Kiōk ūl tullōssan t'uchaeng: Kwagō ch'ōngsan undong ūi iron, yōksa, hyōnsil* (The struggle over memories: The theory, history and reality of the Movement for Resettling the Past), ed. Olbarŭn kwagō ch'ōngsan ūl wihan pōm kungmin wiwōnhoe (Seoul: Han'guk haksul chōngbo, 2005), 54-59.

collaborators. According to him, his position is based on the effectiveness of and socio-economic conditions under Japanese colonial rule. He claims that the effectiveness of Japan's rule in Korea made Koreans accept colonial rule and collaborate with the colonial government. Essentially agreeing with the theory of colonial modernization, he contends that Japanese colonialism helped Korea modernize and provided a springboard to the post-1945 economic development of South Korea.

In order to refute the claims for *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*, Pok attacks its premises that 1) pro-Japanese activities are fully definable, 2) those who committed collaboration can be identified objectively, 3) contemporary Koreans have the legal and moral authority to ask and judge the sins of ch'inilp'a and their pro-Japanese activities, 4) *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* is inevitable, or at least is helpful, for the improvement and development of Korean society.³⁷⁰ He tries to prove the fallacies of these premises. One of his well-known claims is the fallacy of the concept of ch'inilp'a: because Koreans were legal subjects of the Japanese colonial state, the official governing body in the peninsula, it is not logical to call collaborators ch'inilp'a because the term ch'inilp'a implies helping a foreign nation at the expense of selling out one's own nation. For him, ch'inilp'a and their activities is rather appropriately named "pro-regime activities" (*ch'inch'eje haengwi*) or "pro-government"/ "pro-establishment" (*ch'inch'ejep'a*).³⁷¹ Also, he raises doubt about the possibility for colonial Koreans to reject the call for the cooperation with the colonial government, given the fact that the colonial regime had ultimate power over their

³⁷⁰ Pok Kōil, *Chugūn cha tūr ūl wihan pyōnho: 21-segi ūi ch'inil munje* (A defense for the dead: The collaboration issue in the twenty-first century) (Seoul:Tūllin ach'im, 2003), 19.

³⁷¹ Pok, *ibid.*, 80-81.

lives.³⁷² In the same vein, he contends that Koreans living in free society do not have the moral authority to judge those who lived through severe colonial rule. With the perspective of a practical realist, he rejects the idea that society will improve with the punishment of collaborators, or even through dealing with the issue now.

Not surprisingly, Pok's defense invited a number of heated criticisms from *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* advocates and scholars. Kim Minch'öl is one of them. Kim criticizes Pok's argument that collaboration committed under threat does not hold accountability. In refutation, Kim says that if we can ask responsibility only in decisions made with free choice, this will end up with a logical conclusion that we could not ask any accountability for any action or activity. From there, he lists situations, following Pok's logic, in which we cannot condemn a torturer of independence fighters or a kidnapper of military comfort women only because these actions were done by at the command of colonial rulers.³⁷³ While receiving fierce criticism from the movement advocates, Pok's book was on the other hand warmly welcomed by a wide of range of audiences, from practical realists to conservative opponents to the idea of *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* in the present.

The following are more academically sophisticated, though less well-known than Pok's, claims on the difficulties of *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan*. Differing from Pok, a self-claimed liberalist yet recognized as an outspoken conservative, Pak Yuha, Kim Ch'öl, An Pyöngjik,³⁷⁴ Yun

³⁷² Pok, *ibid.*, 85-91.

³⁷³ Kim Minch'öl, "Ch'inil' munje- Insik, ch'aegim" (Pro-Japanese collaboration: Recognition and responsibility), in *Kiök ül tullössan t'uchaeng: Kwagö ch'önsan undong üi iron, yöksa, hyönsil* (The struggle over memories: The theory, history and reality of the Movement for Resettling the Past), ed. Olbarün kwagö ch'öngsan ül wihan pöm kungmin wiwönhoe (Seoul: Han'guk haksul chöngbo, 2005), 22-23.

³⁷⁴ Two renowned scholars with the same name, An Pyöngjik, were engaged in *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* discussions. One in the above is An Pyöngjik in German History at Seoul National University. He argued for the complexities of

Haedong, and Yu Chongho, cannot be clearly defined as either conservatives or progressives. Firstly, Pak Yuha, a scholar of Japanese literature, discusses the emptiness of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* claims. Pak points out that the ch'inilp'a issue is a social dilemma. She says, “if we put away for a while those who collaborated with Japan for their own interests and safety, and understand the desires of colonial Korean elites working for the betterment of self and society, and the marginalized who were eager to escape from their poverty, you can accept the fact that they exist nowhere else other than within us.”³⁷⁵ Therefore, Pak grasps the existence of ch'inilp'a in society with the concept of “a being within us.” Eventually, she urges Koreans to recognize that the ch'inilp'a issue is located in the psychological realm, not in reality, by saying that “the desire for resettling the issue of collaboration” is just a desire of excluding impure existence within us and construction of an immaculate self.

Similarly to Pak, Kim Ch'öl, a scholar of post-nationalist studies (*t'alminjokchu'i*) and of Korean literature, sees the ch'inilp'a syndrome as a by-product of Korean nationalism. Kim Ch'öl defines ch'inilp'a discourse as a dominating discourse of Korean society. He argues that as socialists (*ppalgaengi*) were stigmatized during the Cold War period, so collaborators were made the enemy of the nation (*konggong ūi chōk*). From his perspective, the ch'inilp'a discourse is itself a product of nationalist thinking that eliminates any impure memory or self from an “immaculate us.” Thus, Kim rejects what the *ch'ōngsan* advocates claim as a link between the

defining a collaborator. The other An is a Marxist-turned Neo-liberal (free-market economist). With some of his students at Seoul National University, the latter was deeply involved in the conservative new history textbook movement in the mid- and late 2000s.

³⁷⁵ Pak Yuha, “Han-Il kan ūi kwagō kūkpok ūn öttōke kanūnghanga” (How could (we) overcome the past between Korea and Japan), in *Han-Il yōksa insik nonjaeng ūi met'ahisūt'ori* (The meta-history of the debates over Korea-Japan historical perception), ed. ‘Han-Il, yōndae 21’ (Seoul:Ppuri wa ip'ari, 2008), 79-80.

frustration of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* right after liberation and the negative characteristics of post-1945 Korean society.³⁷⁶ For Kim, the true problem of the Korean nation is its rejection of its own impure past and its dwelling in an illusion of a great Korean nation without defects. As long as such an illusionary misconception is widespread, he thinks that *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* is essentially impossible. Under this circumstance, he argues that the collaboration issue has been publically consumed and politically utilized.³⁷⁷

Kim Chaeyong, another Korean literature critic, rejects Kim Ch'ōl's post-nationalist view. Kim is the first literature critic who argues for the significance of the internal logic of pro-Japanese writers.³⁷⁸ By theorizing this as internal criticism (*naejajjōk pip'an*), Kim greatly contributed to making pro-Japanese literature an established field within Korean literature. Siding with *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* advocates, Kim also denounces the post-colonialist and post-nationalist perspective on pro-Japanese literature, as well as collaboration. He contends that in spite of their superficial criticism of pro-Japanese literature, post-colonial and post-nationalist scholars in fact provide an excuse for collaborators.³⁷⁹ According to Kim, they criticize pro-

³⁷⁶ Kim Ch'ōl, "Chōhang kwa chōlmang" (Resistance and despair), in *Han-Il yōksa insik nonjaeng ūi met'ahisūt'ori* (The meta-history of the debates over Korea-Japan historical perception), ed. 'Han-Il, yōndae 21' (Seoul:Ppuri wa ip'ari, 2008), 63.

³⁷⁷ Kim Ch'ōl, '*Kungmin' iranūn noye* (Slaves named 'national subjects') (Seoul: Samin, 2005), 36-40.

³⁷⁸ He rejects previously used standards for judging a pro-Japanese writer, i.e. whether s/he used a Japanese surname, wrote in Japanese, and participated in a wartime mobilization organization. Instead, he pays attention as the conditions for defining a pro-Japanese writer to individual willingness, spontaneity, and pro-Japanese tendency in his/her writings (like whether his/her writings praised the Japanese colonial government's policies on total war and Japanese imperialization).

³⁷⁹ Kim directs his criticism to the scholars of post-colonialism (*t'alsingminchuūi*) and the theory of the nation-state (*kungmin kukkaron*). However, his book describes the latter not exactly as *kungmin kukkaron*, but rather indicates a position of criticizing the nation-state. Also, he does not name those who hold the position of post-colonialism and post-nationalism in his book. This makes his criticism to some extent vague, because he does not differentiate the delicate differences among those theories.

Japanese writings as a product of nationalism, which is also not free from the fantasy of the nation-state. Furthermore, they insist that pro-Japanese literature was later re-produced into a new form of suppressive nationalism, growing out of Japanese imperialist nationalism. Yet, Kim reasons that their criticism of pro-Japanese writing fundamentally results in denying the position of resistance literature under Japanese imperialism. They see resistance literature as equal to pro-Japanese literature, in the sense that they are not free from the frame of the nation-state and nationalism. As a consequence, any literature produced under this logic was subsumed into the empire. Therefore, Kim considers that the position of the post-colonialist studies end up validating pro-Japanese writings under the name of ambivalence, while threatening the legitimacy of resistance literature.³⁸⁰ Due to the perceived danger of this ambivalence, Kim insists that there are ultimately only two positions—either collaboration or resistance in the late stage of Japanese imperialism—excluding any possibility of grey zone in the field of literature.

An Pyŏngjik and Yun Haedong attempt to redefine anti-national “ch’inil” with the concept of collaboration (*hyŏmnyŏk*), especially quotidian cooperation with the colonial regime. First of all, An Pyŏngjik, an historian of Germany, tries to highlight “small” collaboration in ordinary life as the very essential part of colonial collaboration. To him, the on-going *Ch’inilp’a ch’ŏngsan* movement as a political project, singling out a handful of elite collaborators, can be dangerously misleading in that it just gives people psychological catharsis. On the other hand, it suppresses the fact that collaboration was a prevailing phenomenon in the lives of colonial Koreans.³⁸¹ In

³⁸⁰ Kim Chaeyong, *Hyŏmnyŏk kwa chŏhang* (Collaboration and resistance) (Seoul: Somyŏng, 2003), 42-45.

³⁸¹ An Pyŏngjik, “Kwagŏ ch’ŏngsan kwa yŏksa sŏsul – Togil kwa Han’guk ūi pigyo” (Resettling the past and historical narrative – The comparison between Germany and South Korea), *Yŏksa hakpo* 177 (Spring, 2003): 240-241. An’s article was originally presented in an international conference celebrating the semi-centennial of Yŏksa

order to make his argument, An introduces German studies on everyday life under the Nazis. As a way to investigate the colonial mechanism of maintaining society for thirty-six years, he suggests to focus on the prevailing small collaboration with Japanese and adaptation to the system among Koreans. Therefore, his approach sees collaboration not from a perspective of abnormal deviation from one's true patriotic national self, such as an anti-nationalist betrayal of or moral defect of selfish elites. Rather, An views collaboration as adaptation and accommodation of the ordinary colonial Koreans to colonial rule. He points out that the general public was also not free from charges of collaboration in terms of adaptation. In addition, An makes it clear that collaboration is not a subject of moral or political condemnation, but that of speaking and narrating.

His view, originally presented in a conference in the summer of 2002, sparked an academic debate in *The Hangyoreh*. Yi Chinmo and Park Ch'ansŭng refute An's view while Yun Haedong supports An. Yi, a professor of Western history, comments that An ignores Germans' political, social, and historical backgrounds in which the study on everyday life was born and flourished—Nazi collaborators were punished after the war and ostracized from government offices. Furthermore, many aspects of Nazism were fully discussed and studied in academia after the war. Under these circumstances, the study on everyday life was initiated to add complexity to Germans' criticism of Nazism. Therefore, it is incorrect that An applies this concept to the Korean context, in which, Yi says, collaborators were never initially charged. Furthermore, Yi points out that the inappropriate parallel comparison between the ordinary life of relatively-well-to-do Germans under Nazism and poverty-stricken Koreans under Japanese rule. As a Korean

Hakhoe in Seoul, from August 15-8, 2002. His presentation was introduced by *The Hangyoreh* and raised further debates in the newspapers.

historian, Pak denounces An on the grounds that Koreans under Japanese exploitation and violence could not afford the ordinary life Germans enjoyed under Nazism. In contrast, Yun agrees with An. Yun argues that resettling the past under the name of the nation is a moral value judgment, and history cannot be a subject of that judgment.³⁸² Differing from the above scholars, Kim Minch'öl elsewhere argues against An that while the goal of the German studies consists in criticizing Nazism from the bottom, An unfairly equates the responsibility of ordinary people for collaboration with that of bureaucratic elites.³⁸³ By doing that, Kim claims that An mistakenly gives the latter an excuse.

Similarly to An Pyöngjik, Yun Haedong claims to use the term of *hyomyöök* (collaboration), instead of *ch'inil*, which is tainted with negative political connotations, focusing on its everyday nature throughout the colonial period. Furthermore, he contends that the Korean term, *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan*, literally means liquidating pro-Japanese collaborators and needs to be replaced with the expression, "asking responsibility for political collaboration." He thinks that the past is not the subject of liquidating, but only overcoming, healing, compensating or recovering. In this reason, *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* is no more than a moralistic categorical imperative. And, in order to nullify the moralistic dualism, Yun conceptualizes the idea of a grey zone as a political space where collaboration and resistance meet. According to him, both collaboration and resistance came to be constructed and routinized throughout the colonial

³⁸² *The Hangyoreh*, August 24; September 7, 14; October 5, 2002.

³⁸³ Kim Minch'öl, *ibid.* 23-25.

period.³⁸⁴ Yun theorizes collaboration as a kind of political participation, or a pattern of the colonized for improving their life and political rights. His view eventually raises the complexities of addressing the issue of collaboration and its accountability. Furthermore, he goes as far as reproaching Korean nationalism, saying that the political responsibility of collaboration essentially became the moral norm because it takes place under the name of the abstract “Korean nation.” Responsibility and sin, which are not based on moral shame, Yun contends, tends to be violent. When we ask for responsibility for collaboration without recognizing the remnants of Japanese colonialism within our own thoughts and lives, he insists that the act of asking becomes violent. For this reason, Yun essentially underlines the impossibility (complexity) of the *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan* project.³⁸⁵

Equally exercising caution against nationalism, Im Jihyun (Im Chihyōn), a strong critic of Korean nationalism, talks about the political risk of falling into victim consciousness from the perspective of memorial politics. In dealing with such issues as resettling past wrongs including *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan*, he cautions against recognizing the issues from the angle of a few offenders versus the majority of innocent victims.³⁸⁶

Yu Chongho, a senior literature critic, warns about the potential pitfalls of *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan* as a political project. Yu says that people’s thoughts and imaginations about an

³⁸⁴ Yun Haedong, “Singminji insik ūi hoesaek chidae--Ilche ha konggongsōng kwa kyuyul kyōllyōk” (The grey zone in understanding the colonial issues: The publicity and disciplinary power under Japanese imperialism), in *Singminji ūi hoesaek chijae* (The grey zone in colony) (Seoul: Yōksa pip’yōngsa, 2003), 23-52.

³⁸⁵ Yun Haedong, “Ch’inil kwa panil ūi p’yeswaehoero pōsōnagi” (Getting out of the closed circuit of pro-Japanese collaboration and anti-Japanese), *Tangdae pip’yōng*, 21 (2003), 201-204.

³⁸⁶ Im Jiehyun (Im Chihyōn), “‘Taejung tokchae’ wa ‘posūtū p’asisūm’ – Cho Hūiyōn kyosu ūi pip’an e puch’ō” (‘Mass Dictatorship’ and ‘Post-facism’: In response to the criticism of Professor Cho Hūiyōn), *Yōksa pip’yōng* 68 (2004), 308-310.

unlived period tend to be arbitrary and construct misleading imaginary structure. Emphasizing “lived experience,” Yu indicates that this arbitrary coloring and structuring can prevent a balanced understanding of reality and can unconsciously distort history. In saying that, he implies that contemporary people are too easily judgmental about collaborators. He also opposes the move of politicizing the collaboration issue. In relation to that, he problematizes the tendency of lineal reductionism among *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan* advocates, which translates the reality of people’s lives into a simplified political level. Yu, who was an elementary school student during Japan’s total war, speaks out about his own experience of the colonial regime’s policies, such as the use of Japanese language and Japanese name was not optional but compulsory.³⁸⁷ From the position of a literary critic, he asks the public to adopt a lenient attitude toward intellectuals’ wartime collaboration, particularly writers. Compared with professional collaborators, he insists that it is unfair that writers with a couple of insignificant pro-Japanese writings are treated as felons. This view is highly unique in that most *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan* advocates consistently argue for the application of more rigid standards for the collaborations of elites and intellectuals, stressing their moral and social responsibility toward the nation.³⁸⁸

On the other hand, the discourse of *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan* grew diverse and complicated in terms of rationalizing its cause throughout the 2000s. One of the notable changes is that democratization emerged as a significant rationale for resettling past wrongs, partly

³⁸⁷ Yu Chongho, “Chiptanjök kiök sangsil ūl nōmō...” (Beyond the loss of collective memory...), *Donga Ilbo*, November 4, 2002.

³⁸⁸ Stressing colonial elites’ and intellectuals’ accountability for their collaboration is a general tendency within the *ch’inilp’a* discourse. It was also the general direction of the PCIC and the IRCA’s investigation on pro-Japanese collaborators. For example, Yun Kyōngno claims that the collaboration of leaders should be treated more strictly than that of the general populace. More details, see for Yun, *Han’guk kūnhyōndaesa ūi sōngch’al kwa kobaek* (The self-reflection and confession of modern and contemporary Korean history) (Seoul: Hansōng taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2008), 116-118.

overshadowing an outdated nationalist cliché of restoring national spirit (*minjok chǒnggi ūi hoebok*). Another change was made under the influence of the study on everyday life and the study on memory: scholars and activists started paying attention to *Ch'inilp'a ch'ǒngsan* from the perspective of memory. Kim Minch'ŏl, a representative theorist of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ǒngsan*, defines the essence of ch'inilp'a debates (or memorial project controversies) as a fight against the Korean ruling class' attempt to privilege its own history. Therefore, the goal of the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ǒngsan* movement eventually lies in democratizing their privileged history and memory and pursuing the coexistence of contrasting memories among different social groups. In addition, he suggests that the ch'inilp'a issue goes as far as investigating the internalized logic of collaboration. He thinks that the very logic has unfolded negatively in Korean history in the form of statism (*kukkajuŭi*), anti-communism, and a tendency to worship power. Also, it functioned as the governing mechanism of an authoritarian society. He stresses that ch'inilp'a studies in the future could and should be mature enough to analyze these tendencies, should undergo transmutations over time and finally be able to suggest how to overcome those negative influences.³⁸⁹

Furthermore, scholars came to rediscover the meanings of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ǒngsan* in the realms of healing, recovering, or achieving morality, consciousness, and norms of the national community. For an example, Kim Minch'ŏl provides a new meaning of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ǒngsan* in relation to social norms: “(*Ch'inilp'a ch'ǒngsan*) is to set up a minimum social norm which a community needs to retain by bringing into the open the truth on quislingism, collaboration with Japanese colonial ruling body, and cooperation for the aggressive war. And then, it is to ask for

³⁸⁹ Kim Minch'ŏl, “Chiyōndeon chǒngŭi,” 108.

historical responsibility about the sins.”³⁹⁰ Yun Kyōngno, the president of the Committee for Compiling the *Who’s Who Dictionary on Collaboration*, highlights the importance of consciousness. As a historian of Korean Christianity, Yun stresses the necessity of “confession” of the past. He sees confession as a mature historical consciousness that could make possible true reconciliation and forgiveness within us and with others. He understands that the authority and power of history begins in the sincere confession of the past and that Korean society is now sufficiently mature enough to embrace its shameful past wrongs. Therefore, he argues that “*ch’ōngsan*” is not an option, but rather a prerequisite for historical progress.³⁹¹ Also, many scholars like the colonial era historian Chōng T’aehōn indicate that collaboration was in fact an anti-humanitarian crime that went beyond anti-nation and anti-national community activities.³⁹² Therefore, *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan* for them is a way of punishing heinous crimes and recovering a humanitarian ideal in society.

From now on, I will discuss the scholarly views on the state legislation for *Ch’inilp’a ch’ōngsan*, in other words, scholars’ debates over whether the state could be the main agent in resolving the issue of collaboration. As I mentioned in an earlier chapter, the positions of the conservatives and the progressives, at least what was presented in the media, were clearly split with only a few exceptions. The progressive camp was initially supportive of the legislation as early as 2002 and grew even increasingly supportive over time. On the contrary, the conservative camp in principle opposed the state’s direct involvements, i.e. the special legislation

³⁹⁰ Kim Minch’ōl, *ibid.* 91.

³⁹¹ Yun Kyōngno, *Han’guk kūnhyōndaesa ūi sōngch’al kwa kobaek*, 114-116.

³⁹² Chōng T’aehōn, “Purwanjōn hajiman ūimi innūn ‘yōksa chōngni’ ūi ch’ōtkōrūm- Ch’inilp’a chaesan hwansu munje e kwanhayō” (An incomplete but meaningful first step for resettling history- Regarding the confiscation of pro-Japanese collaborators’ property), *Yōksa wa hyōnsil* 64 (June 2007):3-13.

and presidential investigation committee. Their point was that it was inappropriate for the state to engage directly in the history issue. Instead, the conservatives, especially the GNP and conservative media, insisted that the issue could be sufficiently dealt with, investigated, and resolved by a private or government-supported research institute.

Even though state legislation for *Ch'inilp'a ch'öngsan* began in the summer of 2003, scholarly discussion on "*kwagö ch'öngsan*" including *ch'inilp'a* issue became active only after the August 15 announcement of President Roh Moo Hyun in 2004. The announcement suggested the necessity of a comprehensive legislation package for settling unresolved issues of the past. Soon after, the progressives and people involved in these past issues launched the Korean Democracy Foundation and People's Coalition for Resettling the Past (Olbarün kwagö ch'öngsan ül wihan pömgungmin wiwönhoe). It jointly organized a series of weekly discussions on the direction and various issues for resettling the past. Specifically, the final round table discussion shows the position of Korean progressives and social activists on the legislations. I readdress the main issues of the round table discussion, focusing on Yun Haedong, Han Honggu, Hong Sehwa, and Kim Minch'öl.

Among the above participants, Yun is the only one who cautions against state involvement in resettling past. He sees the ultimate limitations of the top-down *kwagö ch'öngsan* style of the state legislation. He comments that it can be seen as another attempt of the state to construct national memory and impose that onto individuals. In order to resolve past issues, he asserts that Koreans firstly need to form a kind of a social consensus on the solution based on common understanding of a given history. He finds particularly problematic the impetuous attitude of the progressives who want to utilize the current political power to legislate the issue without making

efforts for people to understand history comprehensively. Also, he worries about the prevalence of a simplistic historical view that supports a specific political project: that is to say, the tragedy of Korean history by the same ruling class (originated from ch'inilp'a) repeated itself for over a hundred years. Yun claims that this ungrounded abstractive understanding is dangerous because it confers absolute moral superiority on the position of the victim. He thinks that it can eventually cause what he calls the moralization of the past.³⁹³

In contrast, Han Honggu, a progressive historian, highlights the moralistic and political nature of resettling the past in the Korean context. Han claims that the legislation process itself can make people more knowledgeable about the past and help form a social consensus. He is confident that the very investigation will bring national consensus, not the other way around. Therefore, state legislation is inevitable as a way of reinforcing the investigation. In particular, Han stresses the responsibility of the state as the inflictor of all the human rights violations, including massacres after 1945.³⁹⁴ Because of that, he believes that the state is obliged to objectify, publicize, and reflect on its own wrong doings. He also considers ch'inilp'a the overall issue of 20th century Korean history, that it is not limited to the colonial period because of its post-1945 influence in the society.³⁹⁵

Similarly with Han, Hong Sehwa, a progressive journalist and politician, clearly

³⁹³ “Tŭkpyŏl chwadam: Wae chigŭm kwagŏ ch'ŏngsan inga” (Special discussion: Why is ‘resettle the past’ now?) *Kiŏk kwa chŏnmang* 9 (Winter, 2004), 19-22, 30.

³⁹⁴ In Korea, massacres of civilians took place most intensively between 1945 and 1953, revolving around a left/right ideological conflict, madness, and retaliation during and around the Korean War. Before the Korean War, a number of civilian casualties occurred in the suppression of “leftist” rebellions, such as the April 3 Jeju Uprising (Cheju 4·3 sakŏn) and the Yeosu Suncheon Incident (Yŏsun sakŏn). During the Korean War, a number of large-scale massacres were committed, sometimes systematically and sometimes indiscriminately, by the U.S. military, and both South Korean and North Korean armies.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 27, 41-42.

recognizes *ch'inilp'a* as the transgressor group (*kahaeja chiptan*) over the last fifty years of Korean history. Hong seizes the inseparable connection between “resettling the past” (*kwagō ch'ōngsan*) and the issues of social justice and political power. He considers the claim for *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* as a unique right of the progressives who have fought against wrongdoers at the expense of their own careers.³⁹⁶ Similar to Han, Hong believes that legislating and setting up state committees to deal with past issues can bring public consensus among Koreans.

Kim Minch'ōl's position forms a middle ground between Yun and other progressive discussants. He is both a scholar of collaborationists as well as an activist associated with the IRCA. On the one hand, Kim agrees with Yun in terms of the negative aspects of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan*, such as the problems of politicization and moralization. In relation to the latter, Kim is aware of the danger of seeing victims from the perspective of absolute goodness.³⁹⁷ However, Kim, who is deeply involved in the IRCA, PCIC, and other history movements, does not fundamentally deny the issues of morality, value, and responsibility engaged in the *Ch'inilp'a ch'ōngsan* movement.³⁹⁸ Elsewhere, he asserts that the political choice of an individual and its following action (here, specifically one's decision to collaborate with Japan) is inevitably subject to the moral judgement of other people and society. By saying so, he refutes those who claim the innocence of political collaboration committed under Japanese threat or who claim to put aside applying moral judgement to collaborators.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁶ Ibid., 16-17, 28.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., 22-25.

³⁹⁸ Kim Minch'ōl and Cho Seyōl, “‘Ch'inil' munje ūi yōn'gu kyōnghyang kwa kwaje” (The research trend and future task of ‘pro-Japanese collaboration’ issue), *Sach'ong* 63 (Sept. 2006), 203, 220.

³⁹⁹ Kim Minch'ōl, “Chiyōndeon chōngūi,” 110.

Regarding Yun's views on the state's involvement, Kim admits the danger of maintaining a group's historical legitimacy based on the state's authority. However, on the other hand, he points out that Yun's view tends to absolutize the state's authority in terms of producing history and memory within a national community. Rather, he suggests objectifying the role of the state as one of many agents that produce and create national memory.⁴⁰⁰ By doing so, he believes that the prevailing collective memory, what the ruling elite privileged and appropriated under the authoritarian regimes, can be properly deconstructed and democratized. At the same time, he opposes the claims of the conservative camp that places the responsibility of dealing with past issues on a private institution or civil society. According to Kim, displacing responsibility of this task can put the project in danger under the threat of the privileged group. As a way of dealing with the collaboration issue properly, he suggests to extend research into how collaborators rationalized their pro-Japanese activities.⁴⁰¹

Section 2. History Textbook Controversy: What Should be the Next Historical Narrative for Future Generations?

In April 2004, *Wŏlgan Chosun*, an influential conservative monthly magazine, alarmed its audience with the sensational title, "Warning! Your children are exposed to dangerous textbooks: High school history textbooks' 'Attacking South Korea and Embracing the Kim Il Sung Family.'"⁴⁰² In summary, the report announces that leftist textbooks are imbuing a distorted image of South Korea in students, and as a consequence, students who study these textbooks will

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., 109.

⁴⁰¹ Kim & Cho, *ibid.*, 224.

⁴⁰² Pae Chinyŏng, "Kyŏnggo! Kwiha ūi chanyŏdŭl ūn wihŏmhan kyogwasŏ e noch'uldwae itta: Kogyo kuksa kyogwasŏ ūi 'Taehan min'guk ttaerigo Kim Ilsonng puja kamssagi'" (Warning! Your children are exposed to dangerous textbooks: High school textbooks' 'Attacking South Korea and Embracing the Kim Il Sung family'" *Wŏlgan Chosun* 289 (April 2004): 221-233.

not have any kind of patriotism for the Korean nation. This message created a great sensation among conservative readers who were already concerned with the spread of the “leftist” historical view of President Roh and ruling elites. Beginning around 2004, the modern and contemporary high school history textbook controversy contributed to intensifying the on-going history and memory war between the conservatives and the progressives, on top of the state legislation on past wrongs. This textbook controversy is an excellent example of how the ch’inilp’a issue can be engaged with the overall interpretation of modern and contemporary Korean history.

The history textbook and ch’inilp’a issues are inseparable in the context of the history and memory controversy in the 2000s. The former began with the right wing’s attack on “left wing” textbooks and soon after, progressive historians joined in the debate as the right wing Text Forum declared the compilation of a new revisionist textbook. For the next five years, the controversy was carried out focusing on the contents of the two textbooks, *Kŭmsŏng Modern and Contemporary History* (Kŭmsŏng kŭnhyŏndaesa kyogwasŏ, hereafter *Kŭmsŏng Textbook*, 2002) and Text Forum’s *Alternative Korean Modern and Contemporary History* (Tae’an kŭnhyŏndaesa kyogwasŏ, hereafter *Alternative Textbook*, 2009).⁴⁰³ While the right wing exemplified the former as the representative left wing textbook, progressive historians denounced the major historical arguments of the Text Forum as a form of right wing deviationism. During the controversy, which centered on the two textbooks’ treatment of the ch’inilp’a issue, these two textbooks represented the positions of the left and right wings and progressive and conservative historians.

In terms of the ch’inilp’a issue, the two textbooks and their writers took distinctive

⁴⁰³ Before the publication of the *Alternative Textbook* in 2009, the progressive’s criticism was made base on the conference papers and books of the Text Forum as well as the textbook’s preliminary guidelines.

positions. The *Kŭmsŏng Textbook* is based on the traditional progressive view on collaborators and is highly critical about pro-Japanese collaborators and their influence in post-1945 Korea. In comparison, the attitude of the *Alternative Textbook* toward collaborators is far more forgiving: the elites' collaboration with the colonial regime was either inescapable or unavoidable. The debate over the two textbooks give us an example of what kind of historical trajectory *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan* advocates and opponents can draw for 20th century Korean history. While the *Kŭmsŏng Textbook* reflects the general historical consciousness of progressive historians and advocates of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan*, the *Alternative Textbook* contains one of many possible historical narratives of conservatives and opponents of *Ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan*. I assume that all conservative historians would not necessarily share the same historical narratives contained in the *Alternative Textbook*. The textbook controversy was thus another incident, which brought public attention to the two contesting historiographies. In the following section, I will historicize the ideological competition over historical interpretations of modern and contemporary Korea.

1) Historicization of Two Competing Historical Perspectives

Even before the emergence of “leftist textbooks” in the 2000s, sensitive conservative media raised concerns over a “leftist move” in some history textbooks since 1993. In March 1994, the preliminary guideline of the 6th Educational Curriculum suggested that new textbooks change several terms and descriptions in modern and contemporary history. However, the strong opposition of conservative groups frustrated many of the major changes, with only a few exceptions. Conservatives asserted that the changes were not only overly drastic, but also reflected leftist and pro-North Korea tendencies.⁴⁰⁴ In the early 1998, after the presidential

⁴⁰⁴ Kim Hanjong, “Han’guk kŭnhyŏndaesa kyoyuk ūi chemunje” (Problems in modern and contemporary history education), 26; Im Hayong, “Han’guk kŭnhyŏndaesa kyoyuk ūi pŏnch’ŏn kwa chŏngchŏm” (The changes and issues

election of Kim Dae Jung, *Han'guk nondan*—a conservative (often considered extreme right) monthly magazine—criticized the textbooks' negative descriptions of previous presidents as an anti-South Korean government and anti-state tendency. In the first two issues of 1998, the magazine highlighted “leftist tendencies” such as *minjung* and revisionist historiographies in school textbooks. For example, Pak Pönggyun comments that the “comprehensive” revision of history textbooks in 1996 confused the students' value system by denying the political and historical legitimacy of South Korea. He claimed that these textbooks distorted South Korean history with an evil intention while legitimizing the nation-building process and existence of the North Korean state.⁴⁰⁵ However, the influence of “leftist” views in the school classroom was still limited around this time. In the early and mid-2000s, a progressive historical perspective, which treats North Korea as equal to South Korea as one of the two divided nations in the peninsula, emerged as the powerful competitor to the formerly state-supported conservative historical view in modern and contemporary high school history textbooks.

In order to understand the rise of progressive historiography, we need to look at the development of the field of Korean history since the late 1970s. In the early 1990s, Han Söngjo, a conservative political scientist, summarizes that the field before the 1980s was represented by a

in modern and contemporary Korean history education), 66, both in *Han'guk künhyöndaesa kyoyuknon* (A theory on Korean modern and contemporary history education), Kim Hanjong et al. (Seoul: Sönin, 2005). The major focus for changes were: socio-political situations under U.S. military rule, the Korean War, political upheavals such as May 16, December 12, and May 18, the democratization movement, economic development, and North Korean history.

⁴⁰⁵ Pak Pönggyun, “Kyogwasö put'ö ttödö kochyöya handa” (We first need to change our school textbooks), *Han'guk nondan* 101 (January 1998): 24-41. However, his argument is not firmly grounded. Even though Pak argues that all the history textbooks are colored with a dangerous “leftist” perspective, his major criticism was made not on state history textbooks, but on two history course reading materials in colleges. The two books are Pak Segil's *Tasi ssünün Han'guk hyöndaesa*, 3 vols. (Re-writing Korean contemporary history) (Seoul: Tolbegae, 1989-1992) and Kang Mangil's *Koch'ö ssön Han'guk hyöndaesa* (Rewritten Korean contemporary history) (Seoul, Ch'angjak kwa pip'yöngsa, 1994). The influence of these two books as course material was probably fairly limited compared to state history textbooks at the level of elementary, junior, and high schools. Therefore, he significantly exaggerates the claim that the majority of school students were imbued with “leftist” historiography at this moment.

positivist approach, a nationalist approach, and a combination of the two. However, the arrival of Marxist approach in the 1980s reshaped the history field largely into two: 1) a traditional approach based on nationalism, especially from the perspective of right wing conservatism and anti-communism, and 2) a revisionist approach from the position of the left wing and reformists. Even though Han overlooks the strong nationalist tendency in the latter, his summary shows the change of the general trend of historical research around the 1980s.⁴⁰⁶ Im Yōngt'ae, a progressive historian, defines the challenge of the latter to the former as “a battle between the progressives and the conservatives (in history field).” Im declares that the progressive history movement, under the catchphrase of “scientific and practical history,” was the first meaningful and organized effort to challenge the conservative history circle (*posu sahakkye*) and the state-sanctioned version of historiography that had governed the field ever since 1945.⁴⁰⁷

On the other hand, Young Ick Lew, a conservative historian, critically views the advent of progressive history writings as the direct influence of Western revisionism, indicating the timing of the official introduction of Bruce Cumings' books on the Korean War into Korean society with the ensuing surge of publications of modern and contemporary history books since 1982.⁴⁰⁸ Compared with Lew, Pak T'aegyūn provides a more sophisticated understanding of the progressive historiography of the 1980s, specifying the development into two groups: *minjung*-centered historiography (*minjung sakwan*) and a historiography based on unification and

⁴⁰⁶ Han Sūngjo et al, *Haebang chōnhusa ūi chaengchōm kwa p'yōngga* (The issues and assessment of Korean history before and after 1945) (Seoul: Hyōngsōl ch'ulp'ansa, 1990), 13-14.

⁴⁰⁷ In the 1980s, junior scholars organized several research centers such as the Mangwōn Han'gukksa yōn'gusil (1984), Yōksa munje yōn'guso (1986), Han'guk kūndaesa yōn'guhoe (1987), Han'guk yōksa yōn'guhoe (1988) and Kuro yōksa yōn'guso (1988) In Im Yōngt'ae, “Han'guk sahakkye ka kōrōn kil kwa kŭ hyōn'juso” (The traces of the academic circle of Korean history and its current location), *Sahoe wa sasang* 23 (July 1990): 208-222.

⁴⁰⁸ Young Ick Lew et al. *Sujōngjuūi wa Han'guk hyōndaesa* (Revisionism and Contemporary Korean History) (Seoul: Yonsei taehak ch'ulp'anbu, 1998), 9-14.

nationalism. The goal of the latter is to resolve the unequal relationship between South Korea and the U.S.⁴⁰⁹

The competition between the two historical circles, Im points out, led to active academic publications from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Both sides published several introductory Korean history books: the publication of the progressive history fields include *Han'guk minjungsa* (A history of Korean people, 1986), *Han'guksa kangŭi* (A lecture on Korean history, 1989), and *Paro ponŭn uri yŏksa* (Our history with a true perspective, 1990); the conservative history field published *Taehan min'guksa* (A history of the Republic of Korea, 1988) and *Han'guksa t'ŭkkang* (A special lecture on Korean history, 1990). Progressive historians opened up the rarely explored modern and contemporary history field in this period. Working under the impact of the Gwangju Democratization Movement, progressive historians were in a privileged position in narrating 20th century history. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, their historical productions were widely circulated and avidly consumed among college students involved in the anti-authoritarian government movement.⁴¹⁰ Even after the official end of the democratization

⁴⁰⁹ Pak T'aegyŏn, "Yŏksa ssŭgi wa tasi ssŭgi" (Historical writing and re-writing), in *Haebang 60-yŏn ŭi Han'guk sahoe* (The sixty years' Korean society after its liberation), ed. Haksul tanch'e hyŏbŭihoe (Seoul: Hanul, 2005), 295-299.

⁴¹⁰ Representative modern and contemporary Korean history books with a progressive perspective are: Han'guk minjungsa yŏn'guhoe's *Han'guk minjungsa*, Vol. 2 (A history of Korean people, 1986), Yŏksa munje yŏn'guso's *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa immun* (An introduction to modern and contemporary Korean history, 1988), Han'guk hyŏndaesa yŏn'guhoe's *Algi swiun Han'guk hyŏndae chŏngch'isa* (An easily written political history of contemporary Korea, 1988), Yŏksa munje yŏn'guso's *Haebang 3-yŏnsa yŏn'gu immun* (An introduction to the first three year's history of Korea after liberation, 1989), Mangwŏn Han'guksa yŏn'gusil's *Han'guk kŭndae minjung undongsa* (A history of people's movement in modern Korea, 1989), Pak Segil's *Tasi ssŭnŭn Han'guk hyŏndaesa*, 2 vols. (Re-writing contemporary Korean history, 1988-89), Kuro yŏksa yŏn'guso's *Paro ponŭn uri yŏksa*, Vol. 2 (Our history with a true perspective, 1990), Han'guk yŏksa yŏn'guhoe's *Han'guk hyŏndaesa*, 2 vols. (Contemporary Korean history, 1991), Song Kwangsŏng's *Migun chŏmnyŏng 4-yŏnsa* (The four years' history under the U.S. Military Occupation, 1993), Cho Sŏngo's *Uri yŏksa iyagi: 8·15 esŏ 6-wŏl minju hangjaeng kkaji*, vol. 3 (A story of our history from liberation to the Great June Democratization Movement in 1987, 1993), Yŏksa munje yŏn'guso's *Paro chabaya hal uri yŏksa 37 changmyŏn*, Vol. 1 (The thirty-seven moments to be corrected in our history, 1993), Han'guk chŏngch'i yŏn'guhoe's *Han'guk Hyŏndaesa iyagi chumŏni*, Vol. 1 (A story bag of contemporary Korean history, 1993), Pak Hyŏnch'ae edited *Ch'ŏngnyŏn ŭl wihan Han'guk hyŏndaesa* (Contemporary Korean history for

movement, they remained as public-friendly introductory contemporary history texts throughout the 1990s. Under the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments, this progressive view naturally came to be reflected in new modern and contemporary history textbooks.

2) The Process of the History Textbook Controversy

Under this set of circumstances, the installation of the 7th Educational Guidelines enabled the progressive perspective to be adopted in history textbooks. Revised in 1997 and taking effect in the early 2000s, the new guidelines brought two significant changes in teaching Korean history in high schools: 1) it separated introductory modern Korean history and contemporary Korean history into an optional advanced course; 2) it allowed each school to choose its own modern and contemporary history textbook from a list of government-approved textbooks. As a result, six history textbooks became available in 2003 and 2004.⁴¹¹

After the report of *Wōlgan Chosun* on “dangerous leftist textbooks” that I mentioned in the beginning of this section, Kwōn Ch’ōrhyōn, a GNP assemblyman, politicized the issue in the parliamentary examination of the Ministry of Education in early October.⁴¹² In particular, Kwōn focused on the *Kūmsōng Textbook* by the Kūmsōng publishing company, which was enjoying

the youth, 1994), Yōksahak yōn’guso’s *Kangchwa Han’guk kūnhyōndaesa* (A lecture on modern and contemporary Korean history, 1995), Han’guk yōksa yōn’guhoe’s *Han’guk yōksa immun*, Vol. 3 (A guide to Korean history, 1996).

⁴¹¹ The six publishing companies are Kūmsōng ch’ulp’ansa (Kim Hanjong et al.), Chungang kyoyuk chinhūng yōn’guso (Chu Chino et al.), Taehan kyogwasō (Han Ch’olho et al.), Tusan (Kim Kwangnam et al.), Pōpmunsa (Kim Chōngsu et al.), and Ch’ōnjae kyoyuk (Kim Hūngsu et al.). The first four received government authorization in 2004 (began being used in 2003) and the last two passed in 2005 (began being used in 2004).

⁴¹² In response to the report at the National Assembly, three research organizations, Yōksa kyoyuk yōn’guhoe, Han’guksa yōn’guso, and Han’guk yōksa yōn’guhoe, held a symposium to discuss the modern and contemporary history textbook on October 14, 2004 and refuted Kwōn’s opinion. See for the details, *Yōksa Kyoyuk* 92 (December 2004).

approximately a 50% share in the textbook market.⁴¹³ The conservatives asserted its popularity as a conspiracy of politically “impure” KTU teachers. The social controversy over the ideological bias in high school textbooks became one more issue in an already turbulent political realm and civil society engaged in “resettling past wrongs” in late 2004.

In the beginning of the next year, this sensitive reaction of the conservatives resonated in the establishment of Text Forum (Kyogwasŏ porŏm) on January 25, 2005. The Text Forum contended that progressive history textbooks have been misleading young Koreans ideologically and imbuing them with distorted ideas on the nation’s proud history. In order to correct this problem, it suggested publishing a new alternative history textbook by collecting scholarly and public opinions.⁴¹⁴

The launching of the Text Forum can be contextualized under the rise of the New Right Movement. In late 2004, a group of conservatives declared the initiation of a new type of right wing movement distinctive from existing political groups.⁴¹⁵ Following the establishment of the Association of Freedom (Chayu yŏnhap) on November 2, the new movement rapidly spread,

⁴¹³ Approximately 1415 out of around 2700 high schools chose modern and contemporary Korean history as a subject for the second and third grades. Among them, 701 schools used the *Kŭmsŏng Textbook*. Pae Chinyŏng, “Aidŭl ege kyesok irŏn kuksa rŭl karŭch’imyŏn, nara rŭl chik’il saram i sara chinda” (If (we) continue to teach our kids Korean history this way, no one will fight for our nation), *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* 296 (November 2006), 211. Kim Yŏngsŏk analyzes that the high market share of the *Kŭmsŏng Textbook* is due to its interactive classroom-friendly contents, as many school teachers gave it the best review. For details, see Kim Yŏngsŏk, “Yŏksa kyogwasŏ wa haksang, kŭrigo yŏksa kyosa” (History text book, and students, and history teachers), *Yŏksa kyoyuk* 92 (November 2004), 286.

⁴¹⁴ “Ch’angnip sŏnŏnmun” (The declaration of the foundation), Text Forum, accessed January 20, 2013, <http://www.textforum.net/sub1b.php>; <http://www.textforum.net/sub1a.php>.

⁴¹⁵ Ironically, the central figures of the movement were former leading activists of the student movement in the 1980s and early 1990s. For example, the three leading members of the Association for Freedom were Sin Jiho, Hong Chinpyo, and Ch’oe Hongjae. Hong and Ch’oe were enthusiastic NL activists. Because a large number of former student activists participated in the New Right Movement, some media called the movement the “converted 386” (*chŏnhyanghan 386*).

quickly reconfiguring the ideological geography.⁴¹⁶ The New Right criticized the Roh Government and its leading elites as the reactionary left with an anti-U.S. and pro-North Korea tendency. It also denounced the oppositional GNP, what was conventionally considered the conservatives in Korean society, as the reactionary right.⁴¹⁷ According to Chŏng Haegu, a progressive political scientist, the rise of the movement mirrored increasing insecurity and anxiety about the future of the right after the defeat in two presidential elections in 1997 and 2002. More recently, the “old” right GNP lost its parliamentary leadership in the 17th General Election in early 2004 due to the impeachment incident of President Roh.⁴¹⁸ The Text Forum was a member of the New Right Network, one of the biggest New Right Movement groups. Also, it shared core leaders with other New Right Movement groups such as Sin Chiho, the representative of the Association of Freedom.⁴¹⁹ During the textbook controversy, the historical view of the Forum was considered by many to represent that of the New Right.

⁴¹⁶ The spread of the New Right Movement can be traced back to the organization of New Right groups as following: The Association of Freedom (November 2004), Text Forum (January 2005), New Right Think.net (March 2005), National Association of New Right (Nuraitŭ chŏn’guk yŏnhap, November 2005), New Right Teacher’s Union (January 2006), New Right Culture and Athletes’ Union (Nuraitŭ munhwa ch’eyuk yŏnhap, April 2006), New Right Foundation (April 2006), and the Christian New Right (June 2006). According to Chŏng Haegu, the New Right Movement can be divided into two lines: 1) intellectuals-centered line, i.e. Association of Freedom (Chayu yŏndae), New Right Think.net, New Right Network (consisting of eight groups) and New Right Foundation; 2) popular movement-focused National Association of the New Right (Nyu raitŭ chŏn’guk yŏnhap). Chŏng explains that the former pays more attention to the ideological formulation and spread, in contrast to the latter, which focuses on popular organization and mobilization. In addition, the former tends to distinguish itself from the old right wing while the latter leaves room for cooperating with the GNP. Regarding the recognition of the reality of the New Right, Chŏng says: 1) stressing market-centered economic liberalism, 2) counting the Roh government and democratic movement groups as the left, 3) putting high value on international cooperation (esp. with the U.S. and Japan), looking down on the value of self-reliance, 4) critical about “old” right wing group and its authoritarianism and corruption. See for the details, Chŏng Haegu, “Nuraitŭ undong ũi hyŏnsil insik e taehan pip’anchŏk kŏmt’o” (A critical review on the perception of reality of the New Right Movement), *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 76 (Fall, 2006), 229-231.

⁴¹⁷ Chŏn Hyŏnjun, “Andre Gide wa Nuraitŭ ũi ch’ai” (The difference between Andre Gide and New Right), *Wŏlgan mal* 223 (January, 2005), 66.

⁴¹⁸ Chŏng Haegu, *ibid.*, 215-237.

⁴¹⁹ The leading figures in the group are three co-presidents, Pak Hyojong, Yi Yŏnghun, and Cha Sangch’ŏl, and ten committee members.

While preparing its own textbook, the Forum propagated its own historical perspective in several ways, such as holding symposiums,⁴²⁰ publishing books,⁴²¹ and holding media interviews. Also, the Forum utilized *Sidae chǒngsin*, the organ of the New Right group that was reissued as of June 2006, to spread its message. With these activities, the Forum criticized the *Kǔmsǒng Textbook* while suggesting the blueprint of its own textbook. The most crucial problem of the *Kǔmsǒng Textbook* in the view of the Forum was that it described South Korean history as a failed history that was born illegitimately and resulted in a crippled state. The Forum claimed that the textbook fundamentally failed to implant a sense of pride as a Korean among the young generation by teaching them an ideologically distorted history. The Forum calls the perspective of the *Kǔmsǒng Textbook* a self-tormenting one. For example, An Pyǒngjik, one of the mentors of the New Right group as well as a prominent (left-turned-right wing) economic historian, denounces that the textbook as no more than “a history of the people’s movement.” An made his argument based on four reasons: 1) the text is predominantly structured on the development of the people’s movement up to the post-liberation period, 2) it either states briefly or depicts

⁴²⁰ The following are the titles of the symposiums: “Is It Okay as It Is?-- Modern and Contemporary History Textbooks for High School” (January 25, 2005), “Is It Okay—Economic Related Subjects in the Junior High and High School?” (April 29, 2005), “The field of Korean History in Korea and Korean History Textbooks, What is the Problem?” (September 29, 2005), “The Truth and False in the Descriptions of Modern History in Junior High and High School Textbooks” (December 15, 2005), “What Is the Problem in the Curriculum Developing System in our Country” (April 16, 2006).

⁴²¹ The following books were published either directly by the Forum (for the first three books) or by a sympathizer (or scholar affiliated with the group): 1) *Han’guk hyǒndaesa ūi hǒgu wa chinsil: Kodǔng hakkyo kǔnhyǒndaesa kyogwasǒ rǔl pip’an handa* (The false and the truth of contemporary Korean history: Criticizing modern and contemporary Korean history textbook for high school) (2005); 2) *Kyǒngje kyogwasǒ muǒt i munje inga* (What is the problems of economic textbooks?) (2006); 3) *Ppaeakin uri yǒksa toech’akki* (Returing back our stolen history) (2006). Also, following books are advocating and reflecting the position of the Forum: *Han’guk hyǒndaesa ūi ihae* (A understanding of contemporary Korean history) (2007), *Taehan min’guk iyagi: Haebang chǒnhusa ūi chaeinsik kangūi* (The story of the Republic of Korea: A lecture on *The re-visiting of Korean history before and after liberation*) (2007), *Taehan min’guk yǒksa ūi kiro e sǒda: An Pyǒngjik-Yi Yǒnghun taedam* (Korea standing in a crossroad: A dialogue between An Pyǒngjik and Yi Yǒnghun) (2007).

negatively the foundation of South Korea and its economic achievements, 3) it describes only the democratization movement itself, neither explaining its socio-economic background nor its process (therefore, the textbook commits a mistake of identifying the movement with democracy itself), 4) it stresses North Korean history and also evaluates its socialist nation-building process positively in contrast to the case of South Korea.⁴²² Chŏn Sangin, another New Right scholar, indicates that it is a problem that the “division” (*pundan*), rather than economic modernization or democracy or globalization, is the very keyword for understanding contemporary Korean history. Chŏn claims that the textbook countlessly misreads and misinterprets history. Chŏn attributes this to the inundation of leftist ideologies, such as sentimental nationalism and revisionism. In the same vein, he contends that the textbook mistakenly authorizes the legitimacy of the North Korean government over that of the South.⁴²³

The Forum’s critique on the *Kŭmsŏng Textbook* is in fact directed to overall progressive history circles and their historiography. For instance, *Ppaetkin uri yŏksa* (Our stolen history), a symposium publication series of the Forum, specifically targets the major arguments of conventional progressive historiography. Each of the three chapters in the book, except the first and last chapters, is dedicated to problematizing the major aspects of progressive historiography: 1) emphasis on the nation and the people (*minjok/minjung chisangjuŭi*), 2) emphasis on colonial exploitation and deprivation in describing economic history under Japanese rule, 3) *minjung*-and unification-centeredness. In this sense, the new history movement of the Forum (and the New

⁴²² An Pyŏngjik, “Han’guk hyŏndaesa ŭi ch’egye wa pangpŏp” (The structure and method of contemporary Korean history), *Sidae chŏngsin* 40 (Fall, 2008), 248-254.

⁴²³ Chŏn Sangin, “Kwangbok kwa Taehan min’guk kŏnguk kwajŏng” (The liberation and the nation-building process of the Republic of Korea), in *Han’guk hyŏndaesa ŭi hŏgu wa chinsil: Kodŭng hakkyo kŭn-hyŏndae kyogwasŏ rŭl pip’an handa* (The fiction and truth of contemporary Korean history: Criticizing modern and contemporary Korean history textbook for high school), ed. The Text Forum (Seoul: Ture sidae, 2005):29-56.

Right) was a challenge to the hegemony of historical interpretations of the progressives that had been built over the previous twenty years.

The publication of the two volumes of *Haebang chŏnhusa ũi chaeinsik* (The re-visiting of Korean history before and after liberation, hereafter *The Re-visiting*) in early 2006 can be understood in the same vein. Manifested in the title of the book, it was written in response to the famous book, *Haebang chŏnhusa ũi insik* (The understanding of Korean history before and after liberation, 6 vols. 1989- 1996, hereafter *The Understanding*). Many believe that *The Understanding* implants “leftist oriented historiography” in society. In the preface of *The Re-visiting*, Pak Chihyang clearly states that its purpose lies in correcting the harmful effects of nationalism and the *minjung* revolution.⁴²⁴ The contributors consist of not only scholars deeply engaged in the New Right Movement such as Yi Yŏnghun, Chŏn Sangin, and Young Ick Lew, but also post-nationalist scholars (*t'al minjokchuŭicha*) like Kim Ch'ŏl and Pak Chihyang and foreign scholars also contributed their papers to the book. However, this book was largely introduced by media as taking sides with the New Right. This is one of the reasons that made the book receive contrasting media and intellectual reviews based upon reviewer's ideological orientations.

Around 2006, some progressive historians started arguing with the Forum's view in progressive newspapers, magazines, and academic journals such as *The Monthly mal*, *Yŏksa pip'yŏng*, and *Hwanghae munhwa*.⁴²⁵ The major refutation was announced: 1) in the symposium

⁴²⁴ Pak Chihyang, “Mŏrimal” (Preface), in *Haebang chŏnhusa ũi chaeinsik* (The revisiting of Korean history before and after 1945), ed. Pak Chihyang et al. (Seoul: Ch'aeksesang, 2006): 13-16.

⁴²⁵ Also, Kim Inho wrote a book from a critical position of the Forum, which is *Kongjon ũl wihan Han'guk hyŏndaesa: Haebang ihu ũi Taehan min'guk ũi yŏngkwang kwa siryŏn* (Contemporary Korean history for coexistence: The glory and ordeal of the Republic of Korea after liberation) (Seoul, Kukhak charyowŏn, 2008).

titled, “Kyogwasō nonjaeng, irōke haja (Let us discuss the textbook issue this way, co-sponsored by history and history education related associations on May 20th, 2006; 2) after the announcement of the preliminary version of the *Alternative Textbook* on November 30, 2006; and 3) after the publication of the *Alternative Textbook* on May 24, 2008.

In the 2006 fall issue of *Yōksa pip’yōng*, Sin Chubaek disputes the Forum’s view previously presented in its symposiums. One of Sin’s major points is the inevitability of nation-centered history writing vis-à-vis the state-centered history writing that the Forum advocates. Agreeing with some of the Forum’s positions, including the extensive coverage on colonial exploitation and Koreans’ resistance in the *Kūmsōng Textbook*, however, he objects to the Forum’s description of the colonial period as that of the burgeoning modern economic system. He thinks that it could jeopardize the position of colonized Koreans. That is to say, if the national issue were not to be prioritized in writing a colonial history, the basic contradictory relationship between the colonized and the colonizer would not be established. Nor would the issue of colonial discrimination and cultural annihilation policy against Koreans be clearly addressed. Therefore, he refuses to rule out the nation (*minjok*) in history writing. Instead, he suggests redirecting nation-centered history education to highlight the positive role of the nation in dealing with social democracy, human rights, and the task of unification.⁴²⁶

The Forum’s view received particularly severe attacks after its announcement of the preliminary version of the textbook in late November 2006. Before its official presentation, the textbook was reported by the media as an overly right wing deviation from “conventional

⁴²⁶ Sin Chubaek, “Kyogwasō porōm ūi yōksa insik pip’yan- Han’guk kūnhyōndaea kyogwasō pip’yan e taehan pyōnnon” (A criticism on the historical consciousness of the Text Forum- A refutation on the criticism on the *Kūmsōng Textbook*), *Yōksa pip’yōng* 76 (Fall, 2006), 181-214.

understanding” of modern and contemporary history. Inflamed by the news, April 19 Democratization Movement-related organizations interrupted the official textbook announcement symposium on November 30th.⁴²⁷ Furthermore, other New Right groups and conservative media did not welcome the textbook. Right after the symposium, five New Right groups including the AF denounced the Forum’s “problematic” view on the April 19 Democratization Movement and May 16 Military Coup. Even members of the conservative media expressed deep concerns about its “radical” right wing interpretation.⁴²⁸ The progressive media such as *The Hangyoreh* and *The Kyunghyang Shinmun* compared the Forum with Japan’s right wing group, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform.⁴²⁹

After creating a number of social controversies, the textbook finally came into the world on March 28, 2008. Celebrating its publication, the writers stated that it was an attempt to provide an alternative perspective on Korean history. One of its characteristics is that it recognizes only the Republic of Korea as the legitimate government in the peninsula, distinctive from other textbooks, especially the *Kŭmsŏng Textbook* that tends to treat North Korea equally

⁴²⁷ The preliminary outline was released in the media (*Munhwa Ilbo*) on November 28. According to the report, the outline argumentatively offers a different interpretation on major historical incidents. For example, it renamed the May 16 Military Coup as a revolution and the April 19 Democratization Movement simply as a student movement (*The Munhwa Ilbo*, November 28, 2006). Outraged by this news, the members of April 19 related organizations (4·19 Minju hyŏngmyŏnghoe, 4·19 Hyŏngmyŏng kongnojahoe, 4·19 Hyŏngmyŏng hŭisaengja yujokhoe) interrupted the symposium, causing some injury among the symposium participants.

⁴²⁸ “Inyŏm e chilgok esŏ chayu roun yŏksa ch’aek” (A history textbook free from the fetter of ideology), *Hankook Ilbo*, December 1, 2006; “Nyuraitŭ, Yusin kkaji ch’anyang hana” (New Right, is it lauding even the Yusin?), *Jungang Ilbo*, December 1, 2006; “Hyŏndaesa haesŏk ūi kŭktansŏng ūl kyŏnggye handa” (Warning the extremist interpretation on contemporary history), *Donga Ilbo*, December 2, 2006; “Sagwan ūi chŏnjaeng” (The war over a historical perspective, *Chosun Ilbo*, December 2, 2006.

⁴²⁹ “Kyogwasŏ p’orŏm yŏksa waegok, Ilbon ‘Saeyŏkmo’ wa p’anbagi” (The Text Forum’s distortion of history, the very image of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform), *The Hangyoreh*, December 1, 2006; “Kyogwasŏ p’orŏm kwa ‘Saeyŏkmo’” (Text Forum and the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform), *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, December 4, 2006.

from the perspective of a divided Korean nation. Not surprisingly, the ideological inclinations greatly influenced evaluations of the *Alternative Textbook*. Compared with the welcoming or neutral review of the conservative media, members of the progressive media such as *The Hangyoreh* and *The Kyunghyang Shinmun* introduced intellectuals' negative evaluations of the textbook. *The Hangyoreh* pointed out its major problems as: 1) it supports the colonial modernization theory, 2) it defines the Jeju April 3 Event as a leftist revolt, and 3) it glorifies the dictatorships of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee. Also, many people problematized the absence of historians among its writers (the authors were composed of only social scientists such as political scientists and economists). The most sensational criticism, which instigated anti-Japanese sentiment, compares the Forum and its textbook project with Fushosha's New Japanese History, the Japanese right wing textbook discussed earlier.⁴³⁰ This accusation was made because the *Alternative Textbook* stressed the bright sides of South Korean history, such as economic achievement and democratization, while attacking other textbooks' views as self-agonizing. Furthermore, its opponents rebuked the textbook for also recognizing Japanese colonialism as the source of Korea's modernization instead of a gradual internal economic development from the late Chosŏn period.⁴³¹

The progressive history journal *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* opened fire on the textbook in the summer issue of 2008 (May 2008). Three historians intensively analyzed the *Alternative Textbook*. First of all, Chu Chino strongly criticizes that the textbook is no other than a return to Japanese

⁴³⁰ For example, Im Taesik, "Kwagŏsa naejŏn ūl ap'tugo" (Waiting for the civil war over history), *Yŏksa pip'yŏng* 71 (May 2005), 24-30.

⁴³¹ According to *The Hangyoreh* 21, a progressive weekly magazine, more than a thousand people signed up for appealing "Stopping the *Alternative Textbook*" at Daum Agora only for one day, March 25. *The Hangyoreh* 21 (April 8, 2008), 48.

colonial historiography because it depicts Chosŏn society as economically stagnant and politically dependent on Qing China.⁴³² In the same vein, Pak Ch’ansŭng argues that the textbook practically propagates the theory of colonial modernization by emphasizing the adaptation of modern civilization and of the modern economic infrastructure under Japanese colonial rule.⁴³³ Regarding its description of post-1945 history, Hong Sŏngnyul denounces it for closing its eyes to the mistakes of former presidents, especially Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, and other governing elites.⁴³⁴ According to *The Yonhap News*, progressive and leftist groups blamed the textbook for its distorted description of North Korea, overly generous attitude toward pro-Japanese businessmen, and justification for human self-interest and bourgeois freedom.⁴³⁵ In addition, the Research Institute of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (Ch’amyŏ sahoe yŏn’guso) organized a series of lectures refuting the positions of the textbooks.

3) How the Ch’inilp’a Issue is Engaged in the Historical View of the *Alternative Textbook*

As discussed earlier, the two textbooks were written with different approaches to Korean history: the *Kŭmsŏng Textbook* highlights the tradition of the independence movement and democratization while the *Alternative Textbook* focuses on the tradition of liberal democracy and free market economy of the Republic of Korea exclusively. In this section, I will outline how these two divergent historical consciousnesses are associated with their perceptions on the

⁴³² Chu Chino, “Nyraritŭ ŭi singmin sagwan puhwal pŏrojektŭ: Kŭndae ch’ogi sŏsul ŭi munjehŏm” (The colonial historiography revival project of the New Right: The problems in describing the early modern period), *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 83 (Summer, 2008), 335-349.

⁴³³ Pak Ch’ansŭng, “Singminji kŭndaehwaron e maemoldŏen singminji sigi sŏsul” (The descriptions on the colonial period buried under colonial modernization theory), *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 83 (Summer, 2008), 321-334.

⁴³⁴ Hong Sŏngnyul, “‘Taeon kyogwasŏ’ ŭi nangamhan yŏksŏl: Hyŏndaesa sŏsul punsŏk” (The hopeless paradox of ‘the *Alternative Textbook*’: An analysis on the descriptions of the contemporary period), *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 83 (Summer, 2008), 335-349.

⁴³⁵ *The Hangyoreh*, June 4, 2008, Yonhapnews.com, June 5, 2008.

ch'inilp'a issue.

The collaboration issue composed the integral part in forming the historical consciousnesses of both the Forum's *Alternative Textbook* and the *Kŭmsŏng Textbook*. First of all, the latter tends to attribute to unpunished collaborators the two biggest tragedies in contemporary history: the South/North division and military dictatorships.⁴³⁶ Consequently, the *Kŭmsŏng Textbook* approaches the pro-Japanese collaboration issue critically, covering extensively both wartime collaboration and the failure to deal with collaborators after 1945. On top of that, it seems to set up a principle of not covering collaborators as far as possible, regardless of their historical significance. Instead, it replaces them with secondary figures in explaining political, social, economic and cultural developments as pointed out by a Textbook Forum scholar. In contrast, the Forum's view fundamentally acknowledges the establishment of a South Korean government that adopted democracy and the free market system. The *Alternative Textbook* at least does not superficially defend or lionize pro-Japanese collaboration or collaborators, despite its infamous nickname as the "ch'inilp'a textbook." However, it sees collaborators as the importers of intrinsically foreign systems such as the free market, democracy, advanced technology, and new religions listed under the "modernization package." Also, the textbook gives more weight to economic growth under dictatorships than problems of dictatorships themselves. Therefore, it embraces right wing elites with careers of collaboration, representatively President Park Chung Hee.

In the *Alternative Textbook*, this lenient attitude toward collaborators is deeply related to

⁴³⁶ Im Hŏnyŏng, "Ch'inilp'a ūi chŏngŭi wa pŏmju" (The definition and category of pro-Japanese collaborators), in *Han'guk kŭnhyŏndaesa wa ch'inilp'a munje* (Modern and contemporary Korean history and the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators), ed. Minjok munje yŏn'guso (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 2000), 101-102.

the Text Forum's civilizational history approach (*munmyōngsajōk chōpkūn*), which proclaims a new way of reading Korean history. According to the Forum, the approach reads post-1876 history as an acculturation process between traditional civilization and foreign civilizations. From a broader perspective, it is also a transition from a China-centered continental civilization to a Western-centered ocean civilization.⁴³⁷ What the Forum particularly highlights in the process is the role of a small pioneer elite group who led this transition. The Forum highlights that the elite group carried over from the Enlightenment Movement Group (*kaehwadang*), to so-called bourgeois nationalists under Japanese rule, to post-war leading elites in the process of nation formation and industrialization. This trajectory is identical with what historians call the genealogy of the Korean right wing group. From the perspective of world history, the Forum scholars believe that adopting Western-centered ocean civilization was the right direction for 20th century Korean history. Therefore, being pro-Japanese or pro-Western followers in this process is to some extent unavoidable.

Let me look at how representative figures in Text Forum recognized the ch'inilp'a issue in detail. For example, An Pyōngjik says: "our modern and contemporary history is not only a struggle against imperialism, but also a complicated catch-up process which has learned and practiced modern civilization by collaborating with imperialism."⁴³⁸ Yi Yōnghun, a student of An as well as a major writer of the *Alternative Textbook*, claims "democratization of history" is a paradigm change from an ethnic-centered history to a civilization-centered history. From the latter's perspective, Yi explains modern and contemporary history as a transforming process

⁴³⁷ Text Forum, *Taeon kyogwasō Han'guk kūnhyōndaesa* (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2009), 149.

⁴³⁸ An Pyōngjik and Yi Yōnghun, *An Pyōngjik-Yi Yōnghun taedam*, 202.

from Sino-centric civilization to modern and Western civilization.⁴³⁹ Therefore, in that perspective, pro-Japanese collaborators were not so much traitors, as facilitators in importing and learning the new Western civilization through Japan (later the U.S.). Similarly, Yi Chuyǒng even lionizes ch'inilp'a as “the believers in maritime civilization” (*haeyang munmyǒng ūi sinbongja tūl*) Therefore, the Forum naturally considers collaboration a necessary evil in the process of importing a new civilization.

Many “patriotic” Koreans considered this the most unforgivable mistake of the textbook. The “pro-Japanese tendency” of the textbook, such as a lenient attitude toward collaborators and recognition of the economic growth under Japanese colonialism, also received the most scholarly and public attention. Unfortunately, this was different from what the Forum intended to draw attention to.⁴⁴⁰ The unintended centrality of the pro-Japanese issue in the textbook has much to do with its public sensationalism. For example, Pak Sǒngsu, a senior historian of the independence movement, calls the *Alternative Textbook* simply nothing else than “a pro-Japanese” textbook, not even a right wing textbook or an alternative as its defenders or critics argued. Pak insists that its argument on “the benefits of Japanese imperialism” is identical with that of the Ilchinhoe, known as a notorious pro-Japanese organization working for Japanese’s annexation of Korea.⁴⁴¹

Discussed in the section, the social influence of the ch'inilp'a issue is not simply

⁴³⁹ “Int’ōbyu: Sinhwa esō yōksa ro” (Interview with Yi Yǒnghun: From a myth into a history), *Sidae chǒngsin* 28 (Spring, 2005), 8-29.

⁴⁴⁰ Yi Myǒnghūi, a scholar of the Textbook Forum, complains that media-led debates over the *Alternative Textbook* were off the point, missing out its general guideline and essential points. Yi Myǒnghūi, “‘*Taeon kyowasō Han’guk kūnhyōndaesa*’ ūi t’ūkching kwa hyōndaejōk ūimi” (The characteristics and present meaning of the *Alternative Textbook*), *Sidae chǒngsin* 39 (Summer, 2008):159-160.

⁴⁴¹ Yǒnhap news, April 27, 2008.

circumscribed within the boundary of changing either the past memory or the present image of elite collaborators. Ultimately, the “politicized” history of the ch’inilp’a has emerged as critical historical knowledge whose interpretation could shape the ideological direction of history education among the future generations, as seen in the history textbook debates. Furthermore, it is telling that the issue of history textbook writing in Korea finally became an object of contestation among different ideologies in society. History textbooks are no longer a method of imposing state ideology or its historical perspective on to people. Under this situation, “writing a history textbook” is a competition among different ideological groups to make more members of the young generation adhere to their specific worldview or historical perspective. In that sense, we can find out some commonalities between local struggles over “ch’inilp’a” memorial projects. Similar to the memorial project controversy, the textbook debate was none other than a struggle over the hegemony of historical interpretation for the next generation. What is distinctive is that the textbook debate took place not specifically on collaborators, but on modern and contemporary history in general. Yet, the issue of collaboration still remains crucial in both controversies.

Epilogue

Ch'inilp'a discourse is so far the most successful socio-political discourse of Korean progressives, after the eclipse of "the era of socialist ideology" in the early 1990s. It might not be as powerful as its heyday during the terms of President Roh Moo Hyun, but the discourse survived and played its own function as the progressive rhetoric at least until the last presidential election in December 19, 2012. During the 2012 presidential campaign, one of the closest competitions in Korean history, Park Geun Hye and Mun Jae In represented the conservative and the progressive camps accordingly, eliminating any chance of standing politically in the middle ground among the public.⁴⁴² Considered as "the total war" between the two camps, Han Honggu, a popular contemporary historian, tried to shake the emotions of Koreans, utilizing a political rhetoric blended with anti-ch'inilp'a and anti-Japanese sentiment in order to gain the victory for the progressive camp.

December 19th is the 80th anniversary of the death of the Patriotic Martyr Yun Ponggil. The Japanese imperialists executed Yun in the most vicious and insulting way at the army engineering workplace in Migou-shi, Ishikawa-ken. Japanese imperialists tied the 25-year-old Yun at his knees into a small cross and hid his eyes and forehead with a cloth. And then, [they] shot the right center of his forehead with only one bullet from ten meter's distance. They drew the Hinomaru in his death as his shedding blood turned the cloth red. It was an unusual coincidence that Park Chung Hee made the day of Ito Hirobumi's death, who was his role model as well as the leader of Meiji Restoration, his own dying day. But also, it is exceptionally coincidental that Yun's 80th anniversary is the 18th presidential Election Day and that it is on the very day when the force worshipping Takiki Masao (Japanese name of Park Chung Hee) and the democratic force will have a match.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴² Compared to the previous presidential elections in which multiple progressive or conservative candidates ran in the same race, both camps eventually succeeded to unify their candidates for the victory of the election. Therefore, there was no significant candidate who could influence this ideologically divided election. As a result, Park won 51.22 % votes, slightly more than Mun, who received 48.02% of the votes. The total votes of four other independent candidates were approximately only 0.3 percent.

⁴⁴³ Han Honggu, "Park Geun Hye ka paeun kŏn kajang nappŭn mosŭp ūi Park Chung Hee yŏtta" (What Park Geun Hye learned was the worst side of Park Chung Hee), *The Hangyoreh*, December 8, 2012.

In the above essay, Park Geun Hye was completely identified with her father, his career, and historical legacy without any individuality. Again, she was unfairly represented as *ch'inilp'a* and her supporters as its following force who are located in opposition to “democratic forces.” With graphic details and a vivid photo of the execution scene of a Korean nationalist martyr, his writing based on popularism sensationally instigated the deep pop psychology of Koreans against Japanese (imperialism) and *ch'inilp'a*.

Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the influence of the *ch'inilp'a* discourse is most strikingly apparent in cyber space. In the ideologically polarized political geography of 2000s Korea, a self-claimed progressive or conservative were able to harshly criticize each other on the Internet. Behaving as though only two ideological camps existed, ignoring a wide spectrum of in-between zones, many internet commentators sensationally attacked those who considered anyone located in the opposite side of their position or holding different opinions: “The left” called “the right,” pro-Jap, pro-U.S., and diehard reactionists, (*ch'inilp'a*, *ch'inmipa*, *sugu kkolt'ong*). And equally, the latter named the former, anti-U.S., pro-North left wing, and communist (*panmi*, *chongbuk chwap'a*, *ppalgaengi*). Throughout the 2000s, this mud-slinging became widespread, ignoring a specific political context, simplifying the complexity of events, and steamrolling any nuanced in-between opinions. Along with another exaggerated expression used for progressives, *chongbuk chwap'a* (leftists who follow North Korea), *ch'inilp'a* was the most frequently used cliché among self-claimed progressive Internet commentators.

Therefore, it is inarguable that *ch'inilp'a* discourse, which arose from a marginalized

historical narrative to become resistance discourse and finally to dominant discourse, was highly successful, effective, and influential in various senses. Politically, it dutifully kept up its end as a progressive rhetorical tool against conservatives in political strife, either for guarding democracy or to support the interests of the Uri Party. More significantly, the spread of the discourse greatly altered the collective historical memory of the colonial period and beyond. Previously, Koreans under the influence of what Henry Rousso calls “resistancialism”⁴⁴⁴ tended to imagine and structure the colonial period as a confrontation between exploited but resisting Koreans versus vicious Japanese colonialists. However, the advent of the discourse dramatically changed the socio-political scene of the colony as one between anti-national elite collaborators on top of Japanese and pure Korean *minjung*. Taking one more step forward, it was raised into a competitive counter-narrative to the authoritarian state-sanctioned version historiography of post-1945 Korean history, only colored with successful modernization and industrialization. Since the late 1990s, Koreans were also required to reshape their own memories of respected elites, artists, and writers and to view their careers with dubious eyes in light of their accused wartime collaboration.

Then, what are the reasons of the success of the ch’inilp’a discourse in post-1987 Korean society? In spite of the danger of simplistic parallel comparison with the Marxist ideology of the 1980s, shaking the whole South Korean intellectual world, the discourse as a progressive and oppositional discourse was far more successful in terms of inducing popular support and

⁴⁴⁴ In his book, Henry Rousso names a dominant myth on the memories of French Civil War (1944-5) “resistancialism.” He writes that the French during the period of 1954–1971 tended to minimize any influence of the Vichy Regime while exaggerating memories on “Resistance” and identifying it with the nation as a whole. Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 10.

achieving its reform agenda in the long term. I partly attempted to answer this question in my dissertation. One of the answers I can offer here is that the discourse was in fact the mobilization of memory based on historical trauma.

From the perspective of the mobilization of traumatized memory, it might be useful to compare ch'inilp'a discourse with anti-Communist ideology (*pangong ideollogi*), the most influential and governing ideology of the authoritarian state for more than forty years after the Korean War. Regarding this ideology, Kim Tongch'un, a progressive socialist, writes that "it was the highest state ideal which functioned to tie people tightly together and also a powerful weapon which subdued any kind of social conflicts raising suspicion on the preexisting order...."⁴⁴⁵ However, Kim points out that in spite of all the evils of the ideology, being used as the taboo to suppress opponents and to make the nation an inflexible authoritarian dictatorship state, its formation was not possible without the vivid lived experiences of the people on top of the manipulation of the ruling class.⁴⁴⁶ In the case of Korea, what consisted of "the lived experience," he highlights, was what Koreans acquired and experienced from the Korean War, like rejection of and antipathy toward communism, mental tension and frustration, and silence and fear among North Korean sympathizers.⁴⁴⁷ Although Kim does not use the term trauma, it is crystal-clear that war-induced trauma was the major source in which the state and ruling class could be able to reconstruct, maintain, and practice the ideology without strong resistance from

⁴⁴⁵ Kim Tongch'un, "Han'guk chŏnjaeng kwa chibae ideologi ūi pyŏnhwa: Pangong ideologi rŭl chungsim ūro" (The Korean War and the change of ruling ideology: Centering on anti-Communist ideology), in *Han'guk chŏnjaeng kwa Han'guk sahoe pyŏndong* (Korean War and the transformation of Korean society), ed. Han'guk sahoe hakhoe (Seoul: P'ulp'it, 1992), 135.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., 138.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., 166-167.

the bottom for more than forty years.

If the formation and practice of anti-Communist ideology was associated with deeply-entrenched mental stress and shock of the war, the multiply-layered traumatic experiences of Japanese colonialism, the sense of loss from frustrated social justice after liberation, and continued anxiety about a “threatening” Japan in the post-colonial period fed the growth of ch’inilp’a discourse. In addition, the state began to operate the former right after the traumatic Korean War. . However, in the case of the latter, it was only in the 1980s after a prolonged silence that these traumatic experiences came back to reorganize into the ch’inilp’a narrative. The discourse gained tremendous popularity since the 1990s. From the point that public anxiety about unsolved colonial legacies and continuing pro-Japanese networks, which had been suppressed,, resurfaced in the later period (after the 1980s) and repeated in later events, contemporary Korea presents a case of what Dominick LaCapra describes as “the belated temporality of trauma.”⁴⁴⁸

What is intriguing here is that anti-Japanese nationalism and post-colonial consciousness, partly under the state’s mobilization, was originally a shared mentality in the public regardless of ideological inclination after liberation. Yet, the birth of ch’inilp’a discourse itself was the result of the progressive’s appropriation of the historical trauma (by bringing in suppressed memory of what they claimed to be “right wing elite” collaborators) into their own historical narrative in the 1980s. In that process, ch’inilp’a was reconceptualized as the antithesis of the Korean nation and true Korean people (*minjung*), which was heavily imbued with the notion of class.

⁴⁴⁸ Dominick LaCapra came up with the expression, “belated temporality of trauma,” using Freud’s widely accepted view, “the trauma as experience is ‘in’ the repetition of an early event in a later event- early event for which one was not prepared to feel anxiety and a later event that somewhat recalls the early one and triggers a traumatic response.” See his *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 81-2.

Also, the historical trauma in which the ch'inilp'a discourse is rooted is secondary or self-inflicting. That is to say, Japanese colonialism-induced trauma was experienced secondarily for most contemporary Koreans (through vicarious traumatization), rather than their own lived experience, by hearing, reading, or watching about the atrocities of Japanese rule and the evil-doing of self-interest seeking anti-national traitors. One example of vicarious traumatization is how many college students learned about the Gwangju Democratization Movement second-hand.⁴⁴⁹ In a sense, what is ironic about the discourse is that it was not only formed, spread, and thrived based on historical trauma; it continuously reproduced the old trauma in order to create a new progressive political identity in combination with anti-Japanese sentiment. As seen in Han Honggu's essay, his mobilization of the discourse and anti-Japanese nationalism in some sense plays a role of producing secondary trauma as a consequence of his readers' empathic engagement in his writing.

Particularly in the political context of the 2000s for the public and earlier among student activists in the 1980s, the ch'inilp'a discourse made them believe in a highly unrealistic historical thesis: pro-Japanese collaborators, the supporting elites of past authoritarian regimes, and the conservative camp in the present are in fact all the same ch'inilp'a. This monolithic view

⁴⁴⁹ In his essay, "Historical Trauma: Anti-Manchuism and Memories of Atrocity in Late Qing China," Peter Zarrow reveals how Han nationalist intellectuals in late Qing China frequently utilized the graphic accounts on the atrocity of the 17th century Manchurian conquest in order to invoke Anti-Manchurism among the public and to stimulate Han nationalism. According to him, the formation of Han nationalism based on anti-Manchuism was possible by making Han Chinese feel the past history as personal memory (as a result, get traumatized by this) by secondary witnessing of the old trauma. Eventually, this traumatization created new identity among people relying on what they now believed "their personal memory." I think that a similar process of vicarious traumatization (or secondary traumatization) took place among Koreans who did not directly experience Japanese colonial rule, but equally felt a strong sense of anger about Japanese colonial rule by hearing, listening to, or reading about it. Furthermore, this secondary historical trauma became their personal memory in post-colonial Korea, too. And also, it is where ch'inilp'a discourse is located. Peter Zarrow, "Historical Trauma: Anti-Manchuism and Memories of Atrocity in Late Qing China," *History and Memory* 16, no. 2 (Fall/Winter, 2004), 67-107. Also, for the concept of vicarious traumatization, see Andrew B. Phipps and Mitchell K. Byrne, "Brief Interventions for Secondary Trauma: Review and Recommendation," *Stress and Health* 19 (2003), 139-147.

of historical “evildoers” over eighty years is not unrelated to what post-nationalist scholars such as Im Jiehyun and Yun Haedong indicate regarding the ideological belief in one’s privileged status as victim. In his essay, “Revisiting the Historians’ Debate: Mourning and Genocide,” LaCapra questions whether the mourning can be done effectively on the level of the nation-state and also whether interviews, testimonies, discourse, dialogue, and debate—including historiography—can function as the sites of working through and mourning.⁴⁵⁰ Part of his conclusion warns against “one’s attempt to construct the present and future with the past effects.”⁴⁵¹ Building on LaCapra, my view is that coming to terms with the traumatic past can come about more easily when discourse without ideological mobilization is possible. In this very way, we can overcome continuous revivings of the troublesome past in the present, a major symptom of trauma. My final question is whether the two achievements for resettling the ch’inilp’a issue—the state legislation of the Ch’inil Investigation Law and the PCIC activities and the publication of *Who’s Who’s Dictionary on Pro-Japanese Collaborators*—became or will become a site of working through or mourning.

⁴⁵⁰ Dominick LaCapra, “Revisiting the Historians’ Debate: Mourning and Genocide,” *History and Memory* 9, no. 1 (Spring/Summer, 1997), 80-81. Also, LaCapra points out working through as a way of overcoming trauma and also indicates mourning as a significant modality of working through. By memory work especially involved in working through, he says: “one is able to distinguish past and present and to recognize something as have happened to one (or one’s people) back then which is related to, but not identical with, here and now.” For details, see his *Writing History, Writing Trauma*, 66.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 105-6.

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