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How do We Watch the Watchers?: A Two-Agent Approach to Civil-Military Relations Within Ministries of Defense

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To my parents for all the support.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This thesis examines the complexity of civil-military relations through an innovative lens of the Principal-Agent theory that considers two agents: the military and the civilian workforce within the Ministries of Defense. The study presents an in-depth comparative analysis of Brazil, France, and the United States, focusing on the dynamics between these agents. Our findings delineate stark variations between the case studies. In Brazil, the Ministry of Defense operates primarily under a single-agent model, with the military being the dominant force, thereby leading to potential policy biases. In contrast, France and the United States present a more balanced power distribution within their Ministries of Defense. This balance promotes healthier civil-military relations, more diverse perspectives, and effective policy-making. Strong civilian presence as second agents in France and the US represent an evolution in traditional Principal-Agent frameworks.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This dissertation embarks on a comprehensive exploration of the histories, structures, and institutional evolutions of defense departments in three countries — Brazil, France, and the United States — focusing on civilians' role and applying the principal-agent-agent (PAA) framework.

Starting with Brazil, the youngest of the cases, we delve into the history of its Ministry of Defense, established in 1999. Here, civilians within the ministry operate under significant political influence, thereby constraining their autonomy from the military and limiting their capacity to act as independent agents. This analysis draws from archival research and in-depth interviews conducted from 2013 to 2022. We study the unique Brazilian landscape marked by limited political participation and civilian activity in defense matters, allowing the military primary control. We further investigate the significant shifts following the 1988 democratic constitution

promulgation, the subsequent creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1999, and the military's continued autonomy.

Turning our attention to France, we examine the Ministère des Armées (Ministry of Armed Forces). Established initially as the Ministère de La Defense during the Fourth Republic and renamed in 2017, the ministry is integral to France's national security and policy-making. Our exploration draws on archival research from the Service Historique de la Défense (SHD) and the online archives of the Assemblée National, supplemented by semi-structured interviews conducted in 2022. We trace the institution's evolution from the medieval era to the present, emphasizing the expanding role of civilians, who now hold crucial positions within the organization. France is a positive example in our PAA framework application, showcasing the independent operation of civilians and military within the Ministère des Armées.

Our final case is the United States, with its unique military tradition and massive defense budget. We investigate the history, structure, and evolution of the Department of Defense (DoD), emphasizing civilian roles. Our analysis here, sourced from the U.S. National Archives, media databases, the Library of Congress, and semi-structured interviews conducted between 2021 and 2022, presents unique insights and challenges. The U.S. case deviated from standard PAA cases and was the subject of seminal applications of the principal-agent theory to civil-military relations. Here, we propose a broader characterization of civilians in the DoD, viewing them

as a second agent actively contributing to military efforts, contrary to Peter Feaver's view of them as mere extensions of the principal.

Through this tripartite exploration, this dissertation hopes to elucidate the evolving dynamics of civil-military relationships and the role of civilians in the defense sectors across these diverse political landscapes.

This dissertation is organized into seven comprehensive sections. The study begins with an introduction, providing an overview of the work and setting the research context. An extensive literature review summarizes existing works related to civil-military relations, this research's central focus. The third chapter delves into the theory, subdivided into civil-military relations, the role of civilians, institutions, power balance, information, and principal-agent theory. This theory section ends with a conclusion summarizing the theoretical underpinnings. The following three sections are individual case studies, starting with Brazil (Chapter 4), followed by France (Chapter 5), and finally, the United States (Chapter 6). Each case study begins with an introduction and continues with a detailed discussion of leadership, military and civilian contexts, structures, and expectations.

Additionally, each case study applies the previously explained theoretical framework to its context, providing an in-depth analysis and understanding of the topic. The final part of the thesis (Chapter 7) offers a comparative analysis of the three case studies regarding their principal-agent relationships and structures, leading to a conclusion synthesizing the study's findings. The thesis concludes with recommendations

for future research, thereby providing a path for subsequent scholarly exploration in this area.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

From the inaugural debate between Samuel Huntington (1957), and Morris Janowitz (1963), the concept of civilian control has evolved, as has the recognition of its importance. Many authors discuss the importance of establishing a relationship between civilians and the military in which the former has decision-making supremacy over the latter (Bruneau et al., 2009; Cohen, 2012; Desch, 1998; Feaver, 2003; Pion-Berlin, 2005). Some authors consider it crucial for democratic survival (Ugarte and Pion-Berlin, 2013). However, designing mechanisms to enforce this relationship has proven more difficult and laborious than expected. Ultimately civil-military authors have determined that civilians guard the guardians but have yet to figure out how.

The critical question is, "How do we guard the guardians?". The literature presents a severe deficiency on this topic as it pays little attention to interactions between civilians and the military, especially within defense ministries. While cov-

ering the issue of civil-military relations (CMR), most of the literature overlooks interactions between civilians and the military, usually focusing their analysis on military behavior, missions, deployment, and needs — I call this the "military focus trap". The literature also frequently ignores the civilian contributions to defense. Looking attentively at the discipline, we can identify a clear gap in knowledge about how civilians should operate in defense, making it hard to determine whether their contribution is beneficial, harmful, or even relevant. Filling this gap and escaping the military focus trap is crucial for improving civil-military relations.

The literature identifies several benefits of civilian supremacy. Societies in which civilians have control over the military are more stable and less susceptible to military interference with politics and coups d'État; moreover, these countries can align their interests, foreign policy, and security policies with their military activities.

When looking at the military activities and role in history, we have a clear understanding that preventing the regime's breakdown at the hands of the military is the primary objective of many researchers (Albrecht, 2015; Stepan et al., 1988; Belkin and Schofer, 2003). Military interference with domestic politics is frequent in many countries, and it is also not uncommon that this interference culminates in a coup (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Albrecht, 2015). Both democratic and autocratic regimes are susceptible to this form of interference, and many are the mechanisms used to try and prevent that (Albrecht and Ohl, 2016).

According to Holger Albrecht (2015; 2016), autocratic regimes use multiple strategies to prevent coups by establishing close loyalties with military officers through different forms of identification — i.e., cultural, religious, and personal bonds. Autocratic regimes can also quickly change strategies to address military dissatisfaction increasing benefits, changing commanders, and even creating rivals. However, coups are still a threat as they rely on the rational assessment of the military about their benefits of siding with incumbents or opposition in moments of unrest. Still, according to Albrecht (2015), democratic regimes do not benefit from the same flexibility in developing mechanisms to ensure the military's loyalty, making them even less likely to be fully coup-proof.

According to the literature, the best option for democracies is to establish civilian control over the military, maximizing their loyalty and dedication to national interests rather than institutional benefits (Coughlan, 1998). On this matter, Huntington (1957) identifies two possible forms of control with seemingly different outcomes: objective and subjective. Under *objective* control, the military leaves politics with the prerogative of focusing exclusively on military issues, while under *subjective* control, the focus is on the political alignment of interests between civilians and the military, which could increase loyalties and cooperation. According to Huntington, establishing *objective* control would reduce the opportunities for political interference. Robert Egnell (2009) exemplifies *objective* control when debating the US Department of Defense's structure:

> Within the Department of Defense, the civilian and military sections are not well integrated. Instead, the department is purposefully divided to ensure the purification of military and political affairs. Pure military advice is highly valued and the Huntingtonian principle of objective civilian control, by ensuring that politicians stay out of military affairs and vice versa, remains strong. (Egnell, 2009, p. 54)

In contrast, *subjective* control would bring the military inside the political life of the country, which might benefit particular political groups over the State's interest. Huntington's (1957) choice to support objective control hints at a question that many other authors tried to answer after him, the question of harmful interference by civilians. *Objective* control implies that the military will have autonomy in conducting its activities if it follows the guidelines presented by civilians and the national interest. However, allowing the military to have such a degree of autonomy goes against democratic principles, as in a democracy, nobody but the government should have full authority over processes and issues, even in particular professional spheres (Ugarte and Pion-Berlin, 2013). Thus, a certain level of meddling is necessary. In his book, "Supreme Command," Elliot Cohen (2012) describes an unequal dialog between military and civilians, in which, regardless of exchange and expertise, one side had decision-making supremacy over the other — Civilians over the military. Cohen (2012) understands that decision-making supremacy relies on a structure of information and advice from military and civilians alike. Many cases challenge the clear-cut definitions of control, as skillfully highlighted by Martin (1996); the French army and its subordination to politicians and the State vary between objective and

subjective control over time and at irregular intervals, ultimately relying on tight-knit normative solutions to the establishment of civil supremacy. Using France as one of his examples, Barry Posen (1984) shows how civilian supremacy influences military doctrine beyond simple control definitions. The author discusses the mechanisms that develop and establish military doctrine and presents an important observation about civilians' participation in these mechanisms. According to the author, civilians' interference in military doctrine aims at innovation, it frequently follows military failures, and due to their lack of expertise, their innovation stems from sources of military knowledge within the military branches. Posen (1984) also argues in favor of close integration between civilians and military in discussions about military mission and overall strategy. Regarding innovation, Adam Grissom (2006) corroborates Posen's (1984) argument about the importance of civilians pointing out studies by Edmund Beard et al. (1976), Kimberly Zisk (1991) and Deborah Avant (1993) that show how civilian officials influence changes in strategy and technology.

The literature has a clear focus on the military side of CMR. Constant analysis of their relevance in war or conflict scenarios gives little attention to the routine interactions inside governments and defense institutions. One recent example of this focus is Donald Travis (2018), whose work connects civilian control to different war scenarios. Not without merit, Travis (2018) highlights some exciting limitations of the control typology proposed by Huntington (1957), such as the militarization of politics as an indication of a well-established objective control. From this author's

work, three main criticisms of Huntington's work emerge: 1) Professionalism that transcends human nature is an ideal type; 2) There are multiple authorities with decision-making supremacy over the military, i.e., Congress and Presidency, rather than a central one, and; 3) Military autonomy is a prerogative only when waging total wars, other scenarios prove that the autonomous military activity is either unreliable or unachievable. Future research should address all these critical points; however, they serve as an example of the "military-focus trap".

As introduced earlier, this trap consists of authors focusing on the military side of the CMR and neglecting civilians, leaving them unequipped to perform. Therefore, the literature knows what civilians and military roles are and understands how the military should perform and the possible difficulties of submitting them to civilian control. However, it has no idea how civilians should perform their roles and prepare to do so. By disregarding the day-to-day interactions, Travis (2018) falls into this trap by disregarding the day-to-day interactions and expands this crucial literature gap, like others before (Croissant, 2004; Jaskoski, 2012; Desch, 1998; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, 2000).

Literature understands that the military is a specialist in their field, so their input is crucial for developing missions. Most authors focus on these missions when debating civilian control over the military. Pion-Berlin (2009); Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux (2000), and other authors debate how the nature of the missions performed by the military alters the likelihood of military interference with domestic politics. Accord-

ing to Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux (2000), the military may turn their attention to domestic politics when performing internal missions, the likelihood of which depends on how aligned the missions are with their skill set and structure. In summary, civilians have difficulty maintaining civilian control when the military performs internal missions that force them out of their comfort zone, expanding their mission beyond the original. In this case, the military is more likely to turn its attention to domestic politics, which may lead to interference and even coup attempts, a scenario frequently observed in Latin America. In this situation, establishing efficient control over the military is fundamental to allow civilians to comfortably count on the armed forces to perform the necessary missions without risking a coup. Ugarte and Pion-Berlin (2013) state that, in a democracy, government decisions should only be susceptible to criticism by voters, not by non-elected organs. Therefore, in a democracy, the armed forces should abide by civilian decisions and not interfere with politics. This claim draws straight from Cohen (2012), and Huntington (1957) and presents an exciting approach to the elements that may interfere with civil-military relations that previous authors might have overlooked.

While addressing these puzzles, Pion-Berlin (2006) uniquely assesses another crucial concern in Latin America: wisdom and attention deficit over defense issues. Latin-American politicians and civilians have little interest in defense issues due to the region's lack of voting relevance and relative peace. These conditions reduce the civilian capacity and desire to interfere with military issues. Despite the region's

history of military interference and regime breakdown, Latin-American politicians and civilians "attach marginal importance to the subject" and allow the military to maintain significant autonomy and prerogatives (Pion-berlin and Trinkunas, 2007; Pion-Berlin, 2006). In this scenario of particular disinterest, efforts to establish civil supremacy are commonly empty. The development of civil institutions is a recent and unconcerned effort, and politicians will not dedicate their time or invest personnel in doing an adequate job (Pion-berlin and Trinkunas, 2007).

An excellent illustration of Latin-American CMR is Brazilian literature. While many authors debate civilian control and military contribution to society, much still needs further discussion. Authors in Brazilian CMR highlight the importance of establishing the ministry of defense as a mechanism of civilian control over the military and how its establishment followed steps dedicated to smooth out the transition (de Oliveira, 2005a; Fuccille et al., 2006; Zaverucha, 2006). However, analyses that go past the macro arrangements of power and structure and dive into internal dynamics and seat distribution are rare. Brazilian authors are aware of the limited capacity of civilians inside the ministry due to their temporary nature, but very few research efforts dedicate to understanding their capabilities and conditions (Castro and D'Araujo, 2000). When it comes to the military focus trap, Brazilian CMR authors have timidly tried to escape it on some occasions (de Oliveira, 2005a; Flemmes, 2005; Amorim Neto, 2010, 2012; Castro and D'Araujo, 2000). For example, Octavio Amorim Neto (2010; 2012) and Daniel Flemmes (2005) have debated legislative ac-

tivity related to defense issues and identified Congress's modest attempts to meddle with the military. Furthermore, Amorim Neto (2012) hints at the analysis of the civilian presence in the Ministry of Defense by observing the number of civilians in it, while Pimenta (2014, 2022) introduces a more profound observation of these civilians and their perspectives on defense.

The civil-military literature in France follows the same pattern observed in Latin America and the US but dwells even more profoundly on the focus on the military over civilians, nearing a complete disregard for the civilian contribution to defense. The principles of CMR seem pervasive to the approach to those in France; the idea that in a democracy, civilians should retain decision-making supremacy over the military exists and seems to guide most analyses (Joana, 2012; Irondelle, 2011; Genieys, 2004). The focus of said analyses is constantly directed to the military and their activity, leaving close to no attention dedicated to the civilians and their involvement in defense. It is evident in the French literature that the military do-follow and accept civilian supremacy (Irondelle, 2003a), which seems to be an uncontested principle; however, the day-to-day ramification are unclear.

Rynning (2001) and Kier (1995) debate the role of civilians in military doctrine. Kier (1995) argues that military doctrine is a highly political subject and that domestic cultural preferences, including the military's and external conditions, influence its development, giving the military plenty of political power to limit civilian interference. Rynning (2001) reviews Kier's (1995) argument and asserts that in France,

defense structures depoliticize military activity, and civil supremacy exists regardless of how united civilian interests are, that the external conditions are less influential and that the military follows the civilian command and respect decisions made by civilians, especially those regarding military doctrine, his argument lines up with Posen's (1984).

Civil-military relations partially focus on establishing civil supremacy over the military through institutions (Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006). These institutions are necessary to ensure the military will not interfere with politics. For the most part, the literature on CMR has hinted at the importance of institutions several times; however, few authors address the institutional structure. Many authors understand that older, better-developed, and established institutions will perform better in maintaining control over the military and that these institutions appear more frequently in democratically consolidated countries. Consequentially, countries with longstanding democratic regimes should present strong forms of civilian control. In response to this assumption, Pion-Berlin (2009) premiers a deeper look into the ministries of defense and civilians inside them, highlighting the importance of strengthening defense ministries and increasing the presence of civilians in defense institutions, ultimately concentrating civilian power while dividing military power. Along the same lines, Pion-Berlin et al. (2019) debate another classic assumption of the CMR, that democratic countries whose armed forces are engaged in severe external threats and align to the NATO guidelines should feature robust civilian control, reassessing and

reinforcing Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux (2000) argument about military missions and civilian control. This assumption stems from a combination of other understandings. One is that the absence of coups is a testament to the strength of civilian control over the military (coup-proof). The second one is that older democracies, those who had time to develop and improve their control institutions and instill democratic values in their soldiers, will profit from the unity promoted by external threats, making their soldiers more supportive of the governments and more obedient. Pion-Berlin et al. (2019) debate how civilian control and civilian participation vary within these democracies, and, thus, the democratic consolidation itself does not explain civilian control over the military.

Bastien Irondelle (2011) remarks that in France, the distribution of functions and transparency inside the Ministère des Armeés (MdA) seems to favor the continuity of work, regardless of cabinet formation, and that civilians and military occupy relevant seats. The author highlights the existence of a sturdy bureaucratic structure meant to organize and oversee defense issues and the formation of *ad hoc* committees that fulfill decision-making needs regarding more significant issues, for example, the military reform in the mid-1990s. A fundamental piece of the civil-military literature in France is the monopoly of the expertise highlighted by Irondelle (2011) and reinforced by Joana (2012). The defense bureaucracy of the MDA is the intermediary between the presidency, the armed forces, and the government, through which communications and information flow. The military and civilian experts in the MdA are

a fundamental part of the strategic decision-making process in France. Both Bastien Irondelle (2011) and Jean Joana (2012) present in their broader analysis a strong focus on the military structure and actions, typical to the vast civil literature, and in their study of the MDA institution and structure, they pay exclusive attention to the macro-level decision-making, looking at the interactions between the president, government, armed forces, and MdA. This focus overlooks the day-to-day interactions that may favor military preferences and allow for institutional capture.

Following the same pattern of attention to military activity and disregard for civilians' contribution, Grégory Daho (2019) analyses the transformation undergone by the French military to adapt to their participation in peacekeeping operations. Daho (2019) highlights how the professionalized army in France developed a form of Civilian-Military- Cooperation (CIMIC). During deployments between 1992 and 2010, CIMIC allowed a combination of civilianized officers and militarized civilians to engage in PKO, facilitating integration and coordination between the military, local authorities, and the population. The fascinating analysis details the military activity and the successful civilian participation without going into the minutia of decision-making processes or civilian activities.

Louis Gautier (2009) highlights the purposes and importance of the MdA in France. In his book, "*La défense de la France après la Guerre froide*," the author details the structure and ramifications of the defense strategy in the decade following the end of the Cold War. In Gautier's book (2009), we can observe the same ideas

identified by Pion-Berlin et al. (2019)— i.e., France deals with civil-military relations as a stabilized issue. According to Gautier (2009), the 1958 constitution establishes unequivocal supremacy of the executive over defense, which improves interactions between defense specialists and politicians during the Fifth Republic. As Irondelle (2003a; 2011) and Joana (2012), Gautier (2009) focuses on the military when assessing the quality of interactions between defense and politicians, highlighting the dedication and subordination of the military institutions to the will of the executive.

A previous effort to observe the civilian contribution to CMR is in Peter Feaver's book "Armed Servants" (2003). The author describes the relationship between civilians and the military as a contractual arrangement that fits the agency theory model (Eisenhardt, 1989). The author characterizes the strategic interactions between civilians and the military as a trade relationship in a hierarchical setting. Due to the hierarchical nature of this relationship, "civilians have legitimate authority over the military, whatever their de facto ability to control the military may be." In summary:

> In the civil-military context, the civilian principal contracts with the military agent to develop the ability to use force in defense of the civilian's interests. Once the contract is established, the civilian principal seeks to ensure that the military agent does what civilians want while minimizing the dangers associated with a delegation of power. (Feaver, 2003)

In Feaver's (2003) use of agency theory, as in most Principal-Agent relations, the contracting parties have different interests and incentives (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal sets goals of what is desirable from the agent, which, in turn, has incentives to try and reach these goals by doing minimal work (shirk) and signaling

a better performance (misinform) to the principal. This situation called the moral hazard problem (Eisenhardt, 1989), derives from the information disparity between parts; as agents are specialists in the field, they are capable of withholding and controlling information the principal accesses, including its performance, the more specialized work the agents do, the more significant the information disparity, the harder it is for the principal to control the agent's performance. This argument is similar to the one made by Akerlof (1970); the disparity in information between the principal and the agents creates incentives that need artificial mitigation. In this scenario, information is the good traded between agents and principals, and the agents' honesty determines the quality of the good. Given the disparity in CMR, the agents have many incentives to behave dishonestly, as they may receive rewards while shirking or redirecting resources away from the principal's interests. Establishing systems that distribute information or bring other sources of information to both sides of the interaction reduces the incentives for shirking and the ability to misinform (Eisenhardt, 1989; Akerlof, 1970).

Feaver (2003) makes a series of theoretical claims applying agency theory to civil-military relations. The author proposes a theoretical approach combining monitoring, agent quality improvement, and interest alignment to solve the moral hazard. Feaver lists some monitoring mechanisms that represent fundamental tools for civilians. These are 1) Contract incentives; 2) Screening and selection; 3) Fire alarms; 4) Institutional checks; 5) Police patrols, and; 6) Revising delegation decisions. The

main contribution of this theoretical approach is the understanding that though civilians delegate, they should not relinquish their responsibility for the defense's missions. So creating monitoring mechanisms that ensure the fulfillment of said mission is fundamental. Furthermore, though shared interests exist, the military still rejects monitoring. History shows that even when sharing common goals, civilians and the military have different preferences on how to achieve those; it is typical for the military's interests, in these situations, to trump the civilian ones (Feaver, 2003).

The literature on principal-agent (PA) theory, from which Feaver (2003) drew his analysis of CMR, follows a baseline of assumptions regarding roles, delegation, and incentives (Hart and Holmström, 1989; Grossman and Hart, 1992). The critical assumption for most studies and applications of PA is that "[...] principals are unable to observe the characteristics of the actions of the agents whom they monitor." (Varian, 1990). The combination of the principals' inability to monitor the agent and the agent's inherent desire to maximize their utility comprises the critical concern in most PA theory models, the *moral hazard* (Kotowitz, 1989; Stiglitz, 1989). Thus, many authors have dedicated themselves to developing analysis models that minimize this crucial issue's impact (Grossman and Hart, 1992). The solutions to the moral hazard vary from increased stochastic monitoring mechanisms (Kanodia, 1985), modified incentives (Al-Najjar, 1997; Rauchhaus, 2009), moral sensitivity, and multiple agent arrangements (Varian, 1990).

Feaver's (2003) application of PA theory to CMR focuses on changing incentives and reinforcing monitoring mechanisms but misses on more complex arrangements such as the multi-agent approach. The multi-agent approach initially puts agents as competitors, disputing rewards based on performances; this scenario creates multiple conditions under which the agents may find equilibria for these agents to reach equilibrium strategies that maximize their rewards and reduce risks of punishment, ultimately cheating the principal (Demski and Sappington, 1984; Ma et al., 1988). Ma et al. (1988) formalized a response to this problem; it creates a structure that forces agents to stop the others from shirking by arranging incentives, identifying possible agents' strategies and their equilibrium points, allowing the principal to adjust incentives that favor one agent's particular strategy that leads to principal-favorable equilibria.

Though very well structured, Feaver's (2003) analysis still needs some more profound assessments of the nature of power dynamics inside ministries of defense, a consequence of its focus on macro-level decision-making, similar to the one observed in Irondelle's (2011) and Joana's (2012) works, that leaves an opening for military capture of the routine tasks inside institutions.

Furthermore, Feaver (2003) does not identify possible strategies to eliminate shirking from civilians and the military effectively. Thus the gap this research will address, I will steer away from the military-focus trap and develop Feaver's principal-agent theory further to explain better what we observe in micro-level interactions, looking

specifically at the interactions between civil servants and military personnel inside defense institutions and incorporate the multi-agent approach, and its developments, into the CMR study.

Chapter 3

Theory

3.1 Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations (CMR) discipline has come long since its inaugural works. The initial concerns, presented by Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1963), about objective and subjective control segued into much more complex questions about the interactions between civilians and the military in society, politics, and institutional settings. Some of the latest developments in the discipline address the institutional conditions under which CMR happens. This development concerns the formal and informal arrangements establishing boundaries for CMR inside government organizations. Scholars understand that CMR's critical venue is the administrative institution that imposes civilian control over the military — Ministries, Secretaries, or Departments of Defense.

The focus on institutional arrangements increased recently, and plenty of gaps remain unexplored by the literature. One of the larger ones concerns civilians' role and contribution to defense. In summary, the discipline still lacks a deeper understanding of two elements: Who are the civilians in defense? Moreover, what do they do in defense?

It is common to observe civilians' one-dimensional characterization in the literature, contrasting with the military's extensive descriptions. In general, civilians are background characters whose contribution passes as binary — either they control or do not control the military. My theory aims to break this conceptualization and provide a more complex and nuanced assessment of civilian participation in defense. Even works dedicated to analyzing work culture in defense focus on the detailed analysis of the military while disregarding civilians as nuanced actors.

Understanding civilian actors' different identities and contributions is a fundamental contribution to the CMR theory. Most analyses identify civilians as those responsible for running the State and keeping the military in check, preventing praetorian adventures, without going much further. Means that, for traditional theory, civilians' work is mostly political; they determine policies and objectives and make sure the military does not venture into intervention (Albrecht, 2015; Quinlivan, 1999; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 2010; Pion-Berlin, 2005; Bruneau and Matei, 2008; Bruneau et al., 2009; Amorim Neto, 2010; Amorim Neto, 2019). Some authors also identify civilians as the cause of inefficiencies in defense policy (Donnithorne, 2018). This understand-

ing limits the possible activities and the mechanisms used to control the military; if civilians are only political actors, their participation in defense reduces, and the military increases[1]. CMR as a discipline has exponentially increased its weight and influence by focusing just on the military contribution to defense, generating an imbalance that possibly harms civilian control. An actor who does not fully understand his contribution to a field is bound to underperform; thus, civilians must understand their role to implement civilian control better.

Civilians have a supporting role in many theories and analyses of defense management and application. This supporting role is mostly due to the prominent part of the military, a consequence of their threatening nature to governments and society[2]. The focus on the managers of violence is relatively self-explanatory and remained the sole reasoning behind CMR literature for decades- watching the watchers. Lately, the developing new understandings about how defense relates to society and a healthy democracy has opened further questions, especially about who should be monitoring these managers of violence — Who watches the watchers —. On the one hand, the literature seems to agree that "civilians should control the military." On the other, this consensus raises many questions that are left unanswered about this control, how

[1]Political appointees' tenure is short and usually attached to minor tasks inside these institutions.

[2]Donnithorne (2017, 2018), for example, provides a deep analysis of the cultural differences between the four individual forces of the American military and ignores the civilians acting inside the DoD.

it should look, how to implement it, and what it requires of the civilians. In summary, the target is clear; everything else is not.

3.2 Civilians, what are they good for?

To answer some of the questions regarding participation in defense, this research looks into Brazil, France, and the United States. Today in these countries, there is a total of 1,411,118[3] individuals working in defense, out of which 195,506 classify as civilians — roughly 14%. Though seemingly small, this percentage concentrates on high-ranking managerial positions, which gives them considerable influence over defense policy planning and application. However, the CMR literature has consistently neglected their contribution, making it hard to understand their relevance and improve it.

Civilians in defense exist under confusing circumstances. For some, the defense is a purely military issue, and civilians should only monitor and make sure the military complies with their mission (Huntington, 1957). Others believe civilians should take an active part in managing violence and interfering with military action imposing strict control over the military (Janowitz, 1963; Schiff, 1995; Bland, 1999; Cohen, 2002; Desch, 1999a). This theory assumes that civilians' presence and participation should be encouraged; well-trained civilians should be able to monitor, control, and

[3]Value based on information retrieve from i) https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/portail-defense ; ii) https://www.fedscope.opm.gov; and iii) http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br (Sep/2020)

support their military counterparts. Furthermore, imposing a civilian presence should go beyond the creation of new bureaucratic obstacles to military action. Civilians should be trained and capacitated to perform tasks that actively contribute to more efficient military performance while preventing misuse of force and shirking.

Considering these two different approaches, we have two possible conditions for civilian control. Under the first understanding, civilians should only be monitoring and not interfering with the military; thus, a civilian minister/secretary should be enough to impose control over the military. According to the other format, civilians should be better trained and able to cooperate, support, and even supplement the military in some activities; thus, the minister should occupy the highest seat in a reputable and civilian-populated organization.

Ultimately there are three actors in CMR: i) Politicians, ii) Civilians, iii) Military. Each actor brings a set of interests and performs tasks. Each serves a particular kind of activity, with some overlap. The fundamental difference between them is the conditions they have to perform these activities. They all have different incentives, rationality, and resources to serve in the field.

Politicians represent the current administration's interests and usually occupy the higher seats in the organization– particularly the minister or secretary ones–. Politicians are not defense experts; however, they are the ones setting the macro objectives and policies. Politicians fit into the category of temporary workers; they

are subject to replacement during their terms. Changes in politicians usually reflect dissatisfaction with policies and imply a change in leadership and praxis.

Civilians, of the three actors, have the most role variety (see Table 3.1). They can be: i) politically appointed[4], ii) outsourced from other government departments, iii) contracted for their expertise or iv) tenured bureaucrats[5]. This wide variety of roles presents a challenge for theories to grasp their nuanced participation adequately. Three central elements impact the potential contribution of civilians. The first is **presence**, whether there are civilians in the institution or not, and where across the hierarchy they are. The second is **stability**, whether civilians are temporary or permanent workers and if they have tenure or not. The third and last of the central elements is **knowledge**, whether they know how to perform or not; this element divides into two categories functional and defense knowledge:

- Defense knowledge: how trained and informed of defense-related issues the civilians are, whether they are experts in defense.
- Functional knowledge: how trained and informed in the tools to perform their tasks civilians are, whether they understand bureaucracy and bureaucratic tools inside the institution.

[4]Politically appointed civilians are not necessarily politicians themselves.

[5]Tagarev (2008) divides civilians according to functions — politicians, experts and technicians —, I choose to also look at their status and employment as it adds political depth to the conditions under which they perform their functions.

Politically appointed workers usually represent an extension of the minister, president, or political parties. Their lack of knowledge to perform defense-related work and short-term presence usually limits them to clerical or office-management work activities. They also represent easily replaceable parts of the workforce, as politicians will likely avoid significant altercations with the military or bureaucracy to protect their appointees.

Time is a crucial variable for these workers; the longer they remain in their jobs, the more likely they are to perform better. Contractors, politicians, and political appointees differ from bureaucrats, in general, due to their temporary character; usually, these are bound by a short-term contract without tenure or electoral cycles.

The constant change in political personnel causes issues with the military. Dealing with activities related to the State's very survival, the military adheres to a strict code of conduct and is tight-lipped with most information types. It is in their nature to avoid leaks and oversharing. Thus, civilians usually have to prove they are trustworthy and capable of interacting with the military, which takes time[6] (Gibson, 2008). Proving their capability goes beyond just accessing information. Proving their capability goes beyond just accessing information. Civilians have to prove they are experts and understand the nuances of defense and military issues (Pion-Berlin, 2020); the problem is that civilians lack this expertise to deal with information, even when

[6]Gibson (2008) describe the many iterations in which generals felt shackled by civilian authorities who lacked the understanding of the issues at hand during the cold war and the early years of the war on terror.

available in sources not regulated by the military. In places where the bureaucratic workforce is well-established, workers have more chances of reaching those conditions. They receive training inside the institutions and support developing their expertise in academic institutions. However, when bound by electoral cycles or short-term contracts, individuals tend to circle out before. Particularly in cases where defense ministries have no permanent workforce and high rotativity of civilian personnel, these tend to have minimal access and relevance to defense's daily management.

Meanwhile, outsourced workers, or detailees[7], present a more profound contribution in particular areas. It is prevalent to see judicial specialists from the Department of Justice providing support inside other bureaus. They also usually stay away from defense-related activities focusing more on their areas of expertise. The same goes for contractors; unlike outsourced workers, contractors are not initially within the government, and they provide some sort of knowledge not present in the government ranks.

The tenured bureaucrats are the crucial civilian actors; when present, they are the institution's permanent workforce. In theory, these workers have time to develop their skills and a rapport with their military counterparts, breaking the trust barrier raised by the military. The differences in these workers go beyond the timespan of their presence. Bureaucrats are innately a group of workers not strictly connected

[7]Detailee is an employee of the executive branch temporarily assigned to work an agency that is different from the one he was originally hired.

with political administration, meaning that their interests are not the same as the politicians (Mukherjee, 2019).

The military is active inside defense institutions in two forms: i) active duty officers (ADOs) and ii) civilianized officers (COs)[8]. These two differ in the roles they perform. ADOs occupy mostly military seats in the institutions as a mission, with a set period to remain in office and then go somewhere else. COs, on the other hand, occupy seats designed for civilians, with more freedom to stay more extended periods in them. It is safe to assume that civilianized military presence is detrimental to civilian control; not only do they occupy civilian seats, but they also represent military interests. It is necessary to highlight that COs and ADOs have different levels of influence inside the institutions. ADOs officially represent their forces while occupying high seats in the structure, while COs occupy lower ranks, do not officially represent the forces[9], and may not exist in every institution — out of the three case studies selected, they are ubiquitous in Brazil (Pimenta, 2014, 2022), but do not appear to be as common in France (Ambler, 1966) or the US.

The presence of military inside defense is not necessarily detrimental to the work's quality, but it imposes negatively on civilian control and monitoring mechanisms.

[8]Civilianized Officers — high-ranking officers who retired from the armed forces and now participate in defense institutions as civilians. Because they served long periods in the military, they know what the forces interests are, and maintain intimate relations with active military personnel. Thus, they are more likely to advocate for military interests than civilian interests.

[9]Their habitus and ethos may still be military, but they no longer carryout missions and assignments.

Under normal conditions, military men are well-trained bureaucrats capable of institutional capture, and this capacity exponentially increases when they can incorporate former military into civilian functions.

Table 3.1 contains a summary of the types of actors, their roles in the institution, whether they have tenure or not, and the kind of knowledge they develop. See below:

Table 3.1: Actors and their roles in civil-military institutions

Type	**Role**	**Tenure**	**Knowledge**	
			Functional	**Defense**
Politician	Politician	No	Low	Low
Civilian	Bureaucrat (career CS)	Yes	High	Low
	Outsourced/ Detailees	No	Low	High
	Contractor	No	Low	High
	Political appointee	No	Low	Low
Military	Civilianized	No	High	High
	Active duty	Yes	High	High

Source: Elaborated by author.

3.3 Institutions

Institutions are the center of attention when debating civilian control over the military. As the central interaction's arena, defense institutions (aka ministries and departments) represent the ignition and resolution point for many disputes. The ultimate goals are to enforce civilian control over the military, but they do not always achieve it. Different configurations of these institutions generate different outcomes (Pion-Berlin, 2005; Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006; Croissant, 2006; Pion-Berlin, 2009).

There is a working culture gap inside defense institutions – even between the armed forces branches, as highlighted by Donnithorne (2017, 2018). A civilian-controlled defense institution should often represent civilian interests and values more than military ones. In summary, defense institutions should not punish civilians for not abiding by military codes of conduct or anything similar inside said institutions. Furthermore, civilians should determine the procedures and mechanisms adopted inside the institution and ensure that they can use and follow all of these. Although they should work as civilian control agencies, it is common for defense institutions to adopt procedures that mimic military ones. Furthermore, the codes of conduct inside these institutions tend to resemble the military more than a civilian-established set of values, which means that the environment that should favor civil control develops a military institution's format and makes it more difficult for it to set.

The habitus is a system of dispositions and structures — aka principles — that generates practices and representations that impact the outcome of groups or insti-

tutions (Bourdieu, 1990). If the defense institution is a civilian control agency, its habitus should represent it. Even though the armed forces are a bureaucracy, the civilian bureaucracy has an intrinsically different habitus. Thus, civilian bureaucracies contain particular values, practices, and representations that are different from those in military institutions, and these are the cornerstones of civilian control. A civilian defense institution should generate an outcome representing civilian interests, as these are society's interests. They do it by imposing control and monitoring over the military (Feaver, 2003) and ensuring they favor society's interests rather than self-interest. However, these institutions should be careful when interacting with the military. There is a level of expertise in military activity that civilians cannot reach. Because of that, extensive meddling in military action should not be a common practice inside these institutions[10]. However, as (Egnell, 2009) pointed out, the State's civil-military interface determines whether experts of all relevant agencies are participating in military strategy planning, which means that better-qualified civilians, capable of more than monitoring, are necessary for a more effective and efficient organization[11].

Ultimately, these institutions aim to establish clear-cut mechanisms that will guide the management of defense. Rather than meddling in military deployment, this in-

[10]Uninterested, or unprepared civilians meddling in military action will hinder its effectivity and negatively impact it.

[11]Though Egnell (2009) discusses coordination in peace operations, the same logic applies to routine military management, as coordination between military, civilians, and politicians is required.

stitution should focus on the day-to-day activities related to resource allocation and policy implementation that support and monitor the armed forces' performance. The focus of ministries of defense should be efficiency. The military's focus should be efficiently fulfilling missions. Very few authors venture inside the black box of civilian defense institutions. Thus, assessing whether they promote civilian control or management efficiency is difficult. The literature on these institutions agrees that there is typical bureaucratic formatting and that this format establishes long-term stable civilian leadership through "procedural advantage" (Pion-Berlin, 2009). This format brings stability and limitations to these institutions, as other Weberian bureaucratic institutions maintain order based on a robust hierarchical structure and an ironclad set of rules. According to Weber (2009), bureaucracies depend on hierarchy, continuity, impersonality, and expertise to develop a stable and efficient environment. In this environment, power and authority are built upon a rational-legal nature, meaning it derives its legitimacy from rationality and rules.

The central concern regarding establishing control and efficiency derives from this bureaucratic structure. Inside bureaucracies, authority is mostly rational-legal, meaning that charismatic and traditional authorities' relevance diminishes or does not exist, which is to say that a robust bureaucratic institution hinders political influence. Bureaucrats can evade political authority by using the bureaucratic structure against it. The key mechanism to limit political influence is the tight control of information about resource allocation. If done efficiently, the political authority has only one form

of influence over it, budget control, which is a powerful but limited tool. When unable to effectively influence bureaucrats, politicians can choose to defund the bureaucracy at the cost of the services' quality or reduce its authority over the services.

When looking into CMR, the military actor's nature potentializes this phenomenon. If the regular bureaucracies are already blurry, the armed forces are bureaucracies that increase the blur. Outside actors' influence over the bureaucrats is minimal in a world of classified information and need-to-know briefings. Thus, imposing control over the military by subjecting the armed forces to another bureaucratic institution is challenging. When looking into it, Peter Feaver (2003) identifies a classic moral hazard problem[12] common in institutions dedicated to highly specialized activities.

Feaver's work provided insight into how civilians and the military should interact in what he deemed healthy CMR in the CMR literature. According to him, the structure follows the Principal-Agent logic, with civilians serving as principals and the military performing as agents. The essential contribution from Feaver is his exploration of monitoring mechanisms that the principal can use over the agent. However, to better understand institutions' role in establishing civilian control and why some perform better than others, we must understand more of the internal dynamics.

[12]A moral hazard problem arises when one of the contracted parties is not acting in good faith. According to Holmstrom (1982) "Moral hazard refers to the problem of inducing agents to supply proper amounts of productive inputs when their actions cannot be observed and contracted for directly"

Furthermore, his monolithic characterization of civilians disregards the nuanced interaction between the military, bureaucrats, and politicians. Feaver sees bureaucrats as monitoring extensions of the principal and assumes that both share the same interests. In my understanding, we need to break down this connection; bureaucrats operate in the field as a separate actor, a second agent. This separation would allow for a more sophisticated approach to the institution, isolating their interests and adjusting our expectations regarding how they should perform and what they should be doing in the field.

When operating inside defense institutions, the civilian bureaucrat behaves like any other bureaucrat; it has a particular set of interests and skills and goes beyond mimicking political leaders' interests. Once occupying posts inside the structure, these actors develop their rational-legal authority and dissociate from their political principals. Thus, characterizing these as simple extensions of the principal removes much of their contribution's necessary nuance.

The bureaucratic nature of defense institutions is the only constant element across the more current literature, and this is not a coincidence. The armed forces are a well-established bureaucracy, and military bureaucrats operate inside it by identifying and obeying hierarchy, using a predefined set of tools, and following strict rules. The keyword in the military is discipline. Thus, governments impose a familiar structure on top of the armed forces when confronted with the need to establish control mechanisms, something they can easily recognize and integrate. It seems to fit the common

ground of government institutions and military organizations. The military is familiar with bureaucracies' hierarchical nature; they can easily navigate the structure, occupy it, and circumvent it if necessary[13].

The most significant risk of imposing such a familiar structure is institutional capture. Soldiers are used to dwelling in bureaucratic structures; thus, it is easy to manipulate and bend them to their will. Furthermore, being aware of the power distribution inside these structures, the military can keep civilian monitoring mechanisms out or limit their actual capacity by distributing information within the institution or implementing bureaucratic barriers.

It is possible to understand that *untrained* civilians are disadvantaged simply because the military knows the battlefield better. Therefore, creating ministries of defense is only the beginning of civilian control over the military. Capable civilians who can prevent institutional capture and support the military must occupy its structure, avoiding significant friction. The big question remains. "how do we watch the watchers?"

3.4 Power Balance

he fundamental transformation of the civilian's new characterization as a second agent is a modified power balance. If we initially perceived the balance as the middle

[13]Some systems, as in India for example, are built with strong civilian bureaucrats that are ill informed about defense issues (Mukherjee, 2019)

ground (or something like it) between two actors' preferences, a third actor changes the whole dynamics. The significant interests, incentives, and risks of pursuing self-rewarding action are no longer the same. Assuming all the actors are rational and equivalent in capabilities, the cost-benefit equilibrium with a third actor significantly differs from that of only two actors.

Under the traditional approach (one principal and one agent), the military's monopoly over resources and expertise determines shirk incentives (defect). The military will comply with orders based on their interests in a way that minimizes their costs and reduce the chance of getting caught shirking. The consequences of shirking are minimal in this scenario, as the military is the specialist in the field, aka it can monopolize and manipulate information. This characteristic is even more vital under bureaucratic structures due to the structure's hazy nature for outsiders. Indeed, civilian bureaucrats can also abuse the structure, as pointed out by Mukherjee (2019); however, inside defense institutions, the knowledge advantage likely favors the military. If civilians lay out ambiguous or unclear goals with low policy coherence, the military can and will use the opportunity to shirk.

According to Donnithorne: "Ambiguity activates culture, which animates the different beliefs and interpretations [...]" (2018, p. 221). Even though the author refers to the cultural differences between the military branches, this idea easily translates to the ambiguity between civilians and the military. Inside defense institutions, this ambiguity likely favors those with better knowledge and expertise, aka the military.

Thus, to foster healthy and efficient CMR, it is necessary to develop civilian bureaucrats' expertise to surmount the knowledge gap that favors the military inside bureaucratic institutions. Knowledgeable bureaucrats will develop cohesive policies and outline clear goals, undermining the civil-military cultural gap.

Following my new approach, we establish a competition between the two agents. The military is no longer able to monopolize information. Well-trained civilian bureaucrats can access and understand the same resources as their military counterparts and act as a parallel source to the principal. This new arrangement substantially increases the risk of shirking, forcing the military to cooperate with the principal.

The second agent should understand the nature of the military activity, the structure within which it operates, and how the military thinks. This group has a particular skill set and attributions but rivals the military's ability to navigate bureaucratic structures, rules, and defense knowledge. This actor must perform activities that go further than monitoring. They should represent a more stable interaction between the military and society, forming a partnership with their military counterparts to improve efficiency rather than impose barriers and obstacles that make their work stiff and sluggish.

Though the fundamental role is to oversee the military, creating a second agent that makes their jobs more difficult could generate friction between soldiers and the government and reduce efficiency — as it does in India (Mukherjee, 2019). Furthermore, it would inevitably lead to a waste of resources and revenue. Creating these bu-

reaucratic jobs should improve efficiency, ameliorating military responsiveness to government requirements while assimilating military demands. Thus, countries should establish a specialized workforce supporting the military without mindlessly pursuing their interests beyond establishing a bureaucratic barrier. Equivalent expertise actors should foster open dialogues and a free flow of information.

It is also essential to understand that these agents may incur a moral hazard, as any other agent in agency theory, and choose to shirk instead of work. However, these agents will also be kept in check by the other agents having fewer opportunities to shirk under these circumstances. This power distribution generates a balance that relies on mutual monitoring, competition, and cooperation between actors, ultimately benefiting the principal.

3.5 Information

What is the role of information in all this? I have said before that the military could monopolize resources, namely information, but why does that matter? As in many other fields, information in defense is a crucial factor in decision-making[14] (Pion-Berlin, 2020). Those who control information can influence the outcome of actions and negotiations. Though in advanced democracies, the military is subservient to the government, aka civilian leadership, how they oblige varies.

[14]According to Pion-Berlin (2020): "A key study of the US decision-making process revealed that with shared defense duties, the knowledge either side brought to the table translated into real influence."

Furthermore, civilians rely on the military's information to make decisions and pass on these orders. So, misinformation can be helpful for the military. By giving incomplete information to the civilians, the military can avoid doing laborious chores, riskier missions, or undesirable missions without displaying it as indiscipline. It is a game of appearances; the military appears to be complying by manipulating information.

The outlined scenario exists because the only source of information to the principal is the agent itself, aka civilians, who request the military the information they use to evaluate their performance. In that sense, the determinant is access to information. Information is the good that trades hands, and in doing so, it influences decision-making, qualifies performance, and ultimately determines whether the agent followed the orders.

Understanding the nature of information as a good is fundamental for this analysis. Goods contain different characteristics that determine whether they are excludable and rivalrous. Table 3.2 contains the distribution of types of goods based on rivalrousness and excludability:

Table 3.2: Types of Goods

	Excludable	**Non-Excludable**
Rivalrous	A) Private good	B) Common-pool Resources
Non-Rivalrous	C) Club good Information in a traditional PA model.	D) Public good Information in a framework with two agents.

Source: Elaborated by author based on Ostrom (1990)

A good whose quantity diminishes with use is "rivalrous," as its use by one actor reduces the availability of the good for others to use. Excludable goods are those to which we can prevent access. Excludable goods are not necessarily rivalrous, and vice versa.

In this research's theoretical scenario, the principal can use the agent's same information if he accesses it, meaning that this information is a non-rivalrous good. Simultaneously, the agent can prevent access to the information due to the cost and expertise necessary to obtain it, which grants it excludability. Thus, we can say that, under these conditions, information behaves like a club good, as the expert actor can prevent access to it (excludable), but it does not become less available to other actors with use (non-rivalrous) (Table 3.2 — C) (Ostrom, 1990; Cornes and Sandler, 1986)[15]. It is essential to highlight that information does not disappear after use;

[15]In this framework information has a constant value that does not change with use. Thus the good remains as desirable regardless of how many actors access it.

thus, it remains usable by other actors. In case information did, it would behave like a private good for the military, which can limit access and use information in a zero-sum way — if the agent used the information, the principal could not use it.

Under the new organization, with two actors competing for information and providing it for the principal, the good changes its behavior. Though the non-rivalrous nature persists, a single agent cannot entirely prevent access to information, making it non-excludable and thus behaving as a public good[16] (Table 3.2 — D) rather than a club good.

Having a rival source facilitates access to the good. With further access to information, the principal should make better decisions about which path to take when implementing policy and projects. It is also beneficial that the principal receives information from two sources as it likely mitigates bias. Civilians and the military may receive similar data but choose to analyze different aspects of a problem; the reports would provide a more comprehensive analysis of the issues at hand without the military perspective's prevalence.

Another essential role of information in this model is the information about actors' activities. When actors compete or cooperate, they assess their counterparts to understand whether they are underperforming. This information represents a fundamental game component between agents and principals; agents will try to outperform other agents and signal it to the principal. While the principal has minimal access to

[16]Information is a public good only within the institution.

information about an agent's performance within the single-agent scenario, it becomes available from different sources in a scenario with multiple competing agents.

3.6 Principal-Agent-Agent Theory

The principal-agent theory is a well-established theoretical framework dedicated to delegating tasks and resource allocation. It assumes a set of conditions that concern every relationship between actors (Miller, 2005; Bendor et al., 1987; Güth et al., 2001). These assumptions are:

- Agents' actions impact the principal's pay-off;
- Information is costly and inherently asymmetric;
- Preferences are asymmetric, and each actor has a determined risk-aversion level and cost-benefit coefficients;
- The initiative belongs to the principal, as he is the one offering the contract;
- There is common knowledge about the rules of the game, incentive structure, and the agent's rationality;
- The principal can impose an ultimatum over the agent.

The nature of the principal-agent theory is one of delegation and negotiation. Principals and agents exchange expertise for payment. The principal delegates activities that are either too costly or require too much expertise, and the agent lends

his expertise in exchange for payment. A contract usually determines the expected performance requirements and outlines possible punishment for failure or underperformance. Embedded in this relationship is a disparity in the knowledge that can influence its outcomes. As stated previously, the agent is an expert in delegated activities, meaning he understands them better than the principal. The agent knows the costs and mechanisms to perform these tasks, and thus it can choose the most efficient ways to complete said jobs. However, it may be in the agent's interest to underperform or oversell his performance in exchange for higher rewards. Being the expert, the agent can lie to the principal and cheat in their relationship (shirk) with little chance of getting caught.

Simply put, the agent has incentives to mask the costs to reach the principal's desired payoff. The principal focuses on the outcome and does not comprehend the process. Thus, the agent can operate inefficiently if it fits their interests better. The necessary time and resources and the allocation of these to achieve the goals are not clear to the principal; thus, the agent may choose to distribute them according to private interests with a low risk of being caught or punished.

For example, military deployment causes an increase in the budget for the forces; the military may use exceeding revenue to complete projects and to reward officers; thus, to keep the extra revenue, the military may overestimate the number of soldiers, ammunition, and time required to complete the mission. Uninformed politicians and

civilians will not successfully contest the estimation, reducing the likelihood of the military being punished for using the revenue on goals they did not establish.

To avoid this situation, the principal can impose robust monitoring mechanisms or adjust the agent's incentives. Increase, for example, the number of civilian observers — both government officials and media representatives alike — on the field or increase the revenue of the military whilst not deployed. However, these options are often costly, meaning they bring fewer benefits for the principal, while they have questionable efficacy. Even though military compliance, as a result, is desirable, the main concern is efficiency, especially in developing countries that often lack the resources to pay higher costs. In this sense, I choose to focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness, meaning that I look at the costs of monitoring mechanisms and assume that improved monitoring will improve outcomes[17].

This theory in this chapter proposes creating a scenario with multiple agents. This proposed solution follows the traditional model's assumptions; however, it understands that two contracts with two different actors follow the same premises. What changes, then? With two agents, the principal can favor the agent that provides the most efficient outcome, and each agent monitors the outcome. Thus, underperforming is inherently costly to either agent, as the other agent may outperform and reap the rewards. In other words, there is competition for the rewards, and underperforming

[17]I also believe that costly outcomes are less desirable and thus less effective, meaning that the principal is not getting what it wants out of the relationship.

is riskier. In addition, with two agents monitoring the outcome, the allocation of resources gains further relevance. The principal may punish inefficiency; thus, agents that inefficiently allocate resources may suffer, even if they produce the more desirable outcomes.

Using agents to monitor agents is present in the economics literature and improves our understanding of the field. First and foremost, it understands that monitoring, albeit feasible, is costly if done only by the principal (Varian, 1990). In our previous example, sending observers is possible but requires a suboptimal allocation of resources by the government. Second, it helps us understand that agents can monitor other agents while performing their tasks given the right incentives and that a relationship of cooperation between them increases the chances of the desired output by the principal (Varian, 1990). And third, principals prefer agents that increase efficiency of others, over agents that increase the cost of inefficiency (Varian, 1990).

In the multiple-agent scenario, the knowledge disparity between agents and principals still exists, agents are still specialists, and the principal still has a limited understanding of the field. However, the redundancy of information from the two competing agents can mitigate its negative impacts. Ideally, both agents would provide as much information as possible — at times redundant information — allowing the principal to double-check the veracity by comparing and contrasting. The principal can then use the information to decide on rewards or punishments for the agents.

The complexity of this arrangement is beneficial to the principal. Agents have incentives to monitor and inform the principal about the other's inefficiencies and deviant behavior in search of greater rewards. Therefore, an agent acting independently now has to deceive both the principal and its counterpart and faces a significant risk of getting caught by either. Shirking, thus, depends on the collective action of agents against the principal (collusion); hence its likelihood decreases significantly. To shirk without punishment, agents would need to trust each other, align interests, agree on desired resource and rewards allocation, and match the information passed to the principal without raising any red flags.

The principal must use the distribution of attributions to its favor. Though the complexity of the arrangement itself is enough to force compliance (collusion is difficult and costly), the principal needs to understand it well enough to avoid being cheated by a unified force of agents. This structure allows, expects, and desires cooperation (Varian, 1990). However, too much cooperation and frequent interactions can lead to expanded trust and/or alignment of interests between agents that do not necessarily include the principal's interests. These conditions could increase the benefits or reduce the risk of shirking for both agents, bringing the principal back to square one.

Too much cooperation between agents can cause problems, and so does too much competition. Initially, competition between actors gives the principal access to information and better situation assessment. However, under some circumstances, agents

competing with other agents may act based exclusively on their self-interest. This behavior happens when:

1. rewards are valuable enough to outweigh the risk and even the punishment; or,

2. if the competitor constantly outperforms; or,

3. competitor misinforms the principal about performance without punishment.

Furthermore, when involved in substantial competition, the agents may increase the monitoring cost, making it too expensive and forcing the other agents to relegate their monitoring duties. The principal will then face a scenario in which both agents either do not convey reliable information, act according to their interests, or do not monitor one another, doubling the initial moral hazard.

While the new structure brings new barriers to shirking in favor of the principal, it also demands significant attention and effort when establishing goals, outlining incentives, and distributing rewards and punishments. According to the literature, Agents will respond to incentives and compare rewards and punishments given to them and their counterparts, and this assessment may impact their performance (Bartling and von Siemens, 2004). Agents reject inequity in wages and rent, and an agent that feels disfavored may choose to underperform or to collude with the other agent (Bartling and von Siemens, 2004; Güth et al., 2001). Thus, the principal must adjust incentives to avoid a more complex moral hazard. There are multiple possible outcomes with the interactions between the principal and two agents simultaneously.

Each agent has two possible actions: 1) Compliance and 2) Non-compliance. The principal has four choices: 1) Punish both, 2) Not punish both, 3) Punish A1, and 4) Punish A2. The combination of actions will lead to many possible outcomes; noteworthily, some outcomes are more likely to happen than others[18]. There are sixteen (16) possible combinations of actions summarized in Figure 3.1 (see below). Outcomes fall into two main groups, those in which agents cooperate and those in which agents compete.

3.6.1 When agents cooperate

Positive cooperation scenarios (1, 2, 3, 4)

The first possible outcome is where all agents choose to comply, and the principal rewards both (Fig. 3.1— 1). The military performs adequately, the civilian agents perform adequately, and the principal rewards both agents. This scenario is the ideal one that represents a well-established system and overcomes the asymmetry of information, producing optimal outcomes for the principal.

The second outcome is when both agents comply, and the principal punishes both (Fig. 3.1 — 2). The agents perform their duties diligently in this scenario, but the principal punishes both. It is an unlikely scenario representing a significant disconnection between politicians and defense personnel. In this scenario, despite having all

[18]Empirically speaking some outcomes are borderline impossible to happen, however, as part of a theory development effort it is necessary to describe them and try to understand them.

the information available correctly, the principal still chooses not to trust the agents, which may lead to agents underperforming or colluding against the principal in future interactions.

The third and fourth outcomes have both agents comply, but the principal chooses to punish one of the agents. On the first agent 1 (military) (Fig. 3.1 — 3) and on the later agent 2 (bureaucracy) (Fig. 3.1 — 4). These scenarios have the principal giving unbalanced treatment to the agents. This unbalanced treatment may represent some sort of resentment or a fundamental distrust of both bureaucrats and the military, but only one suffers the consequences. In these scenarios, the information asymmetry is minimal, and the agents have incentives to underperform and switch to competitive strategies.

Negative cooperation scenarios (13, 14, 15, 16)

The 13th outcome has both agents not complying and the principal choosing to reward both (Fig 3.1 — 13).This scenario represents a collusion between actors that reaches its goal of evading punishment from the principal. In this scenario, the military and bureaucracy do not adequately perform, and due to an aggravated asymmetry of information, the principal is either unable or unwilling to correctly assess the underperformance and rewards them. The principal may trust the agents, or at least agent 2 enough not to question the information conveyed, or the cost of monitoring both actors is too high, and both are confident that the principal will not identify

the underperformance. This scenario has no incentives for changes in strategy for the agents.

The 14thoutcome has both agents not complying and the principal choosing to punish both (Fig. 3.1 — 14). In this case, the principal gives equal treatment to both agents' behavior. It may represent a principal capable of monitoring both actors simultaneously regardless of the information asymmetry or a principal that does not trust either agent to perform their tasks adequately. The agents have incentives to adopt different strategies, but it is unclear whether they would choose competitive or cooperative strategies depending on the principal's monitoring capacity.

The 15th and 16th outcomes have both agents not complying; on the first, the principal chooses to punish agent 1 (military) (Fig. 3.1 — 15) and on the second to punishing agent 2 (bureaucracy)(Fig. 3.1 — 16). Both scenarios represent some distrust between agents and principals that impact agents unevenly. In both scenarios, the principal punishes only one agent, signifying either a negative relationship with that agent or an inability to identify the other agent's transgression, which a misunderstood information asymmetry can explain. Under these conditions, the agents have incentives to choose competitive strategies.

3.6.2 When agents compete (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)

The fifth outcome has agent 1 comply and agent 2 not comply, resulting in no punishment for both (Fig. 3.1 — 5). This scenario has agent 2 misinforming the

principal about agent 1 but results in no punishment for either. This scenario has the principal unevenly relating to the agents, trusting the information provided by agent 1 over the one provided by agent 2 but choosing not to punish agent 2. This scenario incentivizes agent 1 to change strategy towards a collusion arrangement with agent 2 with non-compliance.

The sixth outcome has agent 1 comply and agent 2 not comply, resulting in punishment for both (Fig. 3.1 — 6). This scenario has agent 2 misinforming the principal about agent 1 but results in punishment for both. This scenario has the principal evenly not trusting both agents. These conditions signal to agents that monitoring from the principal is weak and that a cooperation strategy with simultaneous non-compliance.

The seventh outcome has agent 1 comply and agent 2 not comply, resulting in no punishment for agent 1 (Fig. 3.1 — 7). In this scenario, the principal trusts agent 2 over agent 1 and unfairly punishes the military based on misinformation provided by the bureaucracy. This results in a change of strategy by agent 1, which may search for a collision with agent 2.

The eighth outcome has agent 1 comply and agent 2 not comply, resulting in punishment for agent 2 (Fig. 3.1 — 8). In this scenario, the principal trusts agent 1 over agent 2 and fairly punishes the bureaucracy for misinformation. This scenario incentivizes agent 2 to change strategies and pursue cooperation with agent 1 with simultaneous compliance.

The ninth outcome has agent 1 not complying and agent 2 complying, resulting in no punishment for either (Fig. 3.1 — 9). This scenario has agent 2 accurately informing the principal about agent 1 but results in no punishment for either. This scenario has the principal unevenly relating to the agents, trusting the information provided by agent 1 over the one provided by agent 2 but choosing not to punish agent 1. This scenario creates incentives for agent 2 to change strategy in future interactions. Meanwhile, agent 1 has no incentives to change his behavior.

The tenth outcome has agent 1 not complying and agent 2 complying, resulting in punishment for both (Fig. 3.1 — 10). This scenario has the principal not trusting the agents. Despite agent 2 correctly informing about agent 1 non-compliance, punishment happens for both, which reveals that the principal is prepared to question both actors at all points. This scenario introduces incentives for changes in strategies for both agents; agent 1 may pursue compliance to avoid future punishment, and agent 2 may choose non-compliance in search of more optimal outcomes.

The eleventh outcome has agent 1 not comply and agent 2 comply, resulting in punishment for agent 1 (Fig. 3.1 — 11). This scenario has the principal trusting agent 2 over agent 1. This scenario is a natural result of this arrangement and has the military behaving as expected according to self-interest and bureaucracy, performing their role as monitor agents. It incentivizes agent 1 to change its strategy toward compliance to avoid further punishment.

The twelfth outcome has agent 1 not comply and agent 2 comply, resulting in punishment for agent 2 (Fig. 3.1 — 12). This scenario has the principal trust Agent 1 over Agent 2. The principal believes the misinformation presented by the military over the accurate information the bureaucracy gave. This scenario incentivizes the bureaucracy to change strategy and pursue collusion with the military.



Figure 3.1: Principal-Agent-Agent Game Tree

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Table 3.3 summarizes the behavior of each actor in each outcome and the incentives to change strategy in future interactions. See below:

Table 3.3: Principal-Agent-Agent Game Outcomes' Summary

Outcome	Behavior		Punishment		Incentives for Strategy Change	
	Military A1	Civilians A2	Military A1	Civilians A2	A1	A2
1	Comply	Comply	No	No	No	No
2	Comply	Comply	Yes	Yes	High	High
3	Comply	Comply	Yes	No	High	Low
4	Comply	Comply	No	Yes	Low	High
5	Comply	Not Comply	No	No	Low	No
6	Comply	Not Comply	Yes	Yes	High	High
7	Comply	Not Comply	Yes	No	High	No
8	Comply	Not Comply	No	Yes	No	High
9	Not Comply	Comply	No	No	No	Yes
10	Not Comply	Comply	Yes	Yes	Medium	High
11	Not Comply	Comply	Yes	No	High	No
12	Not Comply	Comply	No	Yes	No	High
13	Not Comply	Not Comply	No	No	No	No
14	Not Comply	Not Comply	Yes	Yes	High	High
15	Not Comply	Not Comply	Yes	No	High	No
16	Not Comply	Not Comply	No	Yes	Medium	Medium

Source: elaborated by author

Table 3.4 summarizes the estimated gains in each outcome for each actor and lays out the desirability of each outcome accordingly.

Table 3.4: Principal-Agent-Agent Outcomes' Desirability Summary

Outcome	Score A1	Score A2	Desirability Principal	Desirability Agents
1	4	4	6	Best for Principal
2	2	2	5	Worst for Agents
3	2	5	5	Undesirable for A1
4	5	2	5	Undesirable for A2
5	4	6	5	Desirable for A2
6	2	2	4	Undesirable for All
7	1	6	4	Worst for A1 / Best for A2
8	5	1	4	Desirable for A1
9	6	5	3	Desirable for Agents
10	2	1	3	Undesirable for All
11	2	5	3	Desirable for A2
12	6	1	3	Worst for A2 / Best for A1
13	6	6	1	Worst for Principal
14	2	2	3	Worst for All
15	2	6	2	Desirable for A2
16	6	2	2	Desirable for A1

Source: Elaborated by author

3.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, despite all developments, the discipline of civil-military relations still needs some changes in its paradigms. This two-agent theory aims to provide a fundamental shift that contemplates the civil servants' relevance in CMR. Through this paradigm shift, I aim to add much-needed nuance to how the literature understands civilian contribution to defense policy and management. Ultimately, the two-agent model's application will explain performance differences in defense institutions that share similar structures.

Chapter 4

Brazil: One Step Forward, Three Steps Back

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will cover the history of the Ministry of Defense (MD) and present an in-depth overview of institutional evolution focusing on the role of civilians. I will analyze the historical, political, and structural context influencing civilian participation in the Brazilian defense ministry.

Brazil achieved independence from Portugal in 1822 and only transitioned to democracy, most recently in 1985. The country founded its defense ministry in 1999, making it the youngest institution among the cases selected in this research. The Brazilian case is a negative example of the principal-agent-agent (PAA) framework

presented here. This framework only applies when the possible agents can act independently from other agents and the principal. However, in Brazil, civilians working within the ministry are heavily influenced by the political power (principal) and are restricted in their ability to act independently from the military. As a result, they cannot perform as independent agents. In the following sections, I will provide evidence to support this assessment, historical context, and possible explanations for why this is the case in the country.

The evidence gathered, summarized, and explored in this chapter comes from archival research and in-depth semi-structured interviews collected between 2013 and 2022. The interviews were conducted anonymously with civil servants and high-ranking government officials that worked within or in direct contact with the Ministry of Defense; table 4.1 contains their roles and origin[1].

[1]DAS (Superior Advice and Management) is the official designation for commissioned civil servants in Brazil, there are six levels possible, six being the highest.

Table 4.1: Table of Participants

Code	Role	Origin	Code	Role	Origin
P1	DAS 4	Ministry of Planning	P9	DAS 6	Judiciary
P2	DAS 5	Attorney General	P10	DAS 2	Outsourced
P3	DAS 2	Outsourced	P11	Minister	Defense
P4	DAS 2	Outsourced	P12	Official	Defense
P5	DAS 2	Outsourced	P13	Official	Strategic Affairs
P6	DAS 4	Outsourced	P14	DAS 5	Outsourced
P7	Manager	Ministry of Planning	P15	Official	Ministry of Planning
P8	DAS 5	Ministry of Planning			

Source: elaborated by author.

4.2 Leadership and Context

First and foremost, the Ministry of Defense in Brazil exists in a context of little attention to the topic of defense. *Defense* is a political topic that attracts the interest of very few individuals, impacting the debate between political elites and the military. Participants repeatedly mentioned this problem. The short attention results in low political participation, civilian activity, and oversight, giving the military control primarily. Participants 13 and 15 summarize:

> "[...] through the defense ministry tried to bridge the cultural gap and resentment. The problem is that Brazil has no strategic culture, so we cannot tune the dialogue between society and the forces. [...] There is no national debate about defense; the [civilian] political elite is, particularly, alienated when it comes to defense. It self-alienates from its constitutional duties. There is no debate; the topic does not emerge during presidential campaigns, the country does not identify external threats, has not been at war in over 150 years, and in summary, defense does not generate votes." — P13

> " In general, civilians do not go there [the ministry of defense]. During my time in the government [ministry of planning], a couple joined to help negotiate and manage the [internal] budget." — P15

Brazil promulgated a new democratic constitution in 1988 after four years of civilian government and two years of constitutional assembly. The country underwent a series of transformations in the following decade, moving from rural to urban and changing its economy and currency. Nevertheless, the most relevant transformation is the structural reform of the State apparatus that aimed to improve managerial capabilities, reduce bureaucratic swelling, grant autonomy and training to the public servant, and ensure quality services to the citizens Bresser-Pereira (1995).

In 1995, the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) administration planned and implemented this structural reform reducing the number of public companies, organs, and overall bureaucratic structure, focusing on flexibility in government action. Simultaneously Brazil pushed an international integration agenda; these aspirations forced the administration to signal its interest in defense. At the time, Brazil desired a seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a prospect severely weakened by the status of the defense folder in the administration (Zaverucha, 2005). Despite

historical attempts to unify the forces under a single ministry, until 1999, Brazil retained four ministries managing defense issues: the ministries of war (army), navy, airforce, and the military house. This structure granted the forces plenty of autonomy from civilian oversight and interference in disaster relief and public security areas[2].

In 1999, the FHC administration transformed the three ministries into commands and established the Ministério da Defesa (Ministry of Defense - MD) to oversee them. The Institutional Security Cabinet replaced the military house, changing the institution's expectations and military presence. This reform targeted two objectives: the modernization of the government structure to reduce expenditure and increase efficiency, and removing part of the privileges the armed forces retained since the democratic transition fourteen years earlier, the autonomy and control over part of the administrative structure. However, the reform alone did neither establish nor intend to establish civil control (Zaverucha, 2005).

4.3 Military, Ministry & Ministers

4.3.1 Rocky Start

In the early years of the ministry, the military retained significant autonomy and control over processes in and out of the ministry. The forces, notoriously the navy, occupied the ministry's structure which granted them significant control over the in-

[2]Medida Provisória No 1.498, 07/07/1996

ternal procedures and information in the institution. The crucial change between the previous organization with four ministries and one with a single organization is the presence of a civilian minister, which forced some civil authority over the forces. However, it became evident in the first few years that this authority was fragile; the commanders could control which information the minister accessed, circumvented the minister by directly communicating with the presidency and other government entities, and were able to overthrow ministers that disagreed or challenged their autonomy. The military frequently blocked indications and forced ministers out of their seats in two different administrations, FHC and Lula da Silva (de Oliveira, 2005b)[3].

The shift from a four-institution structure to an individual one had implications for the military's future influence. FHC appointed General Benedito Onofre Leonel, Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA) Commander, to oversee the transition. Despite delaying the project for years, there were few complaints from the president, as the administration showed little interest in overseeing the process. As a result, the military controlled the transition and shaped the institution to their interests.

In 1999, the selection of Brazil's Minister of Defense revealed the military's influence on the country's political landscape. Initially, President FHC nominated career diplomat José Sardenberg, but his appointment faced resistance from the military due to longstanding tensions between the armed forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[3]Most recently, the military reverted to old habits and pressured the Lula III transition team to prevent nominations until the future government reached a name that pleased them

(Amorim Neto and Malamud, 2019). The longstanding rivalry between the forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought a strong backslash to Sardenberg's nomination, and he did not take office; instead, the president forcefully brought in another name, Elcio Alvares. The former senator, who recently lost his seat in a tight race in his home state, was a close ally of FHC. As the ministry of defense, Alvares had a weakened nomination from the get-go; the military saw the nomination as a favor to a losing politician and used every opportunity to push the minister around. Alvares's situation worsened during a small-scale scandal involving his law-firm partner; the minister faced open criticism from the airforce commander, Brigadier-General Bauer. The president chose to replace the commander to protect the minister; however, in his final speech, the Brigadier criticized the administration and found support from the force and retired officials who publicly expressed their concerns about the change in command[4].

To defend his position, the minister accused the airforce of trying to retain exaggerated benefits and prevent changes in the structure that would give civilians oversight on civil aviation. This attrition lasted until, in an event funded and organized by the MD, on-duty soldiers assaulted two reporters trying to capture images of damages to the event's structure; as a response, the president demanded that the soldiers be thoroughly investigated and reprimanded, the minister, on the other hand, pushed

[4]https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1901200006.htm
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1901200005.htm

for a lighter solution, on par with the military's desires. Alvares displayed apparent discomfort in going against the military after the long friction with the forces, and FHC replaced him days later (Zaverucha, 2005).

The new minister, Geraldo Quintão, an experienced jurist from the Attorney General of the Union, occupied the seat symbolically. Like Alvares, Quintão had small-scale scandals that displeased the armed forces; however, unlike his predecessor, he chose to cater to the military instead of pushing back. In the different moments of crisis, budgetary and political, the minister sided with the military and supported claims for increased funding, salaries, and pensions. The minister slow-rolled on political matters, such as information requisitions from the public, ensuring that the military did not push for his removal.

In 2003, Lula da Silva took office, and despite the change in the administration, the defense ministry remained an afterthought. Lula chose José Viegas, another career diplomat like Sardenberg. Unlike his predecessor, Viegas faced a different military attitude, resulting from consultation between Lula and commanders before the nomination. The consultation signaled to the new minister that his survival on the job would rely heavily on his subordinates' approval. The minister, however, chose not to abide by and pursued to actively monitor and impose policy decisions on the military, including restricting salary raises and attempting to remodel military administration and education. These efforts led to open disputes and insubordination from the military. Neither the weakened minister nor Lula imposed their authority

over the military in the several instances of insubordination. Consequential to the debilitated position comes the resignation of Viegas; the former minister stated that the army had inadequately used the authority of the ministry of defense to justify past misconduct, highlighting the unmistakable defiant conduct of the military[5].

Out of options and looking to re-establish the chain of command, Lula nominated his vice president Jose Alencar as Defense minister. The occasional commander-in-chief borrowed the legitimacy from his elected seat to occupy the ministry chair. Alencar faced a complex context during his tenure and saw himself as unfit to perform. The vice-president referring to his background as a businessman, constantly mentioned not understanding or not feeling prepared to perform in the ministry, even offering to resign on multiple occasions. During his time as minister, the seat be- came symbolic; the military had plenty of autonomy and faced little pushback from the civilian authority[6]. In 2006, Alencar left the ministry to focus on his electoral future. Thus, In 2006 Lula appointed Waldir Pires as the MD. Pires was minister of the Comptroller-General of the Union (CG) and was responsible for establishing successful public monitoring programs and internationally praised transparency initiatives. The seasoned politician maintained a similar track as its predecessor, letting the military control most of the work.

[5]https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc0511200402.htm

[6]https://monitormercantil.com.br/ministurio-da-defesa-uma-crutica-necessuria/

In September 2006, an airplane crash set off the Brazilian civil aviation crisis. Under Brazilian law, air traffic control falls under the responsibility of the military, in particular the airforce. The crisis culminated with an air-traffic controller strike, which was military personnel. The response to the strike caused a rift between the military and civilian leadership. Representing the presidency, the minister moved for a pragmatic solution, listening and trying to cater to the strikers' demands. The military demanded respect for hierarchy and discipline; by law, military personnel in Brazil could not legally go on strikes, and the commanders intended to discipline them severely[7]. The divide in leadership accompanied an increased crisis without a solution for almost an entire year; Pires went on public exchanges of accusations with the Airforce commander over responsibility. In this context, the worker's party (PT) saw Pires, a member since 1997, as a personal nomination of the president and did not publicly support its permanence in the seat, understanding that the ministry could be a bargaining chip to amass support from other coalition parties[8]. A second airplane crash pushed the minister over the edge, and Lula fired Pires.

4.3.2 Brief Stability

A period of progressive civilian control over the military emerges from the ashes of the aerial blackout. Looking to resolve the crisis, Lula appoints Nelson Jobim as

[7]https://atarde.com.br/politica/greve-foi-crime-militar-diz-ministro-do-stf-138834

[8]https://www.estadao.com.br/politica/novo-ministro-da-defesa-define-como-golpe-o-movimento-de-64/

a replacement for Pires. One year into his supreme court retirement, Jobim brought political and technical credibility to the position, a high-profile political figure with undeniable experience and no history of open criticism of the military. The former judge dealt with the crisis by replacing leadership in two key organizations, receiving praise, and amassing credibility with subordinates[9].

The longest-serving minister of defense, Jobim, set a new tone in the institution. Under his tenure, the ministry slowly became more welcoming to civilians, and significant changes to legislation and documentation occurred. Under Jobim, Brazil produced the National Defense Strategy (END) and the White Book o Defense (Livro Branco); these historical documents established a unique interaction between military and civil society in their preparation and increased transparency on defense matters, making them accessible to anyone interested.

Jobim's leadership style, constant praise to the military, and frequent courtesy to the forces granted him recognition from the military commanders. While previous ministers adopted a confrontational approach which often worsened moments of crisis and tried imposing unpopular decisions on the forces, Jobim established a good relationship with the forces, constantly signaling respect and bestowing prestige over the military institutions; the transformations in policy and structure were all negotiated and took the military's input in consideration. The former judge also often appeared

[9]https://www.bemparana.com.br/noticias/brasil/nelson-jobim-assume-o-ministerio-da-defesa-36128/

in military events, made statements about the importance of the forces, defended the forces' interests against the truth commission[10], and even appeared in military uniform[11], establishing a rapport between him and the force that remains unique. These movements ensured that even in moments of military discontent with government policies had negligible negative impacts on the minister's image and stability (Zaverucha, 2005).

Jobim is the first of the defense ministers to leave the office due to a poor relationship with the president, not the military. One of nine of Lula's ministers that remained in office with Dilma Rousseff, Jobim continued his work but fell between the military and the new president. Dilma, a former guerrilla fighter in the dictatorship years, imposed several unpopular decisions on the military; her behavior towards the minister himself did not help. Jobim made veiled, yet harsh and noticeable, criticism of the president's managerial style, which forced his dismissal in 2011, less than a year into the new presidency[12].

Dilma quickly replaced Jobim with Celso Amorim, an experienced diplomat who had occupied the ministry of foreign affairs in two opportunities under Itamar Franco

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[10]Para Jobim, ideia de punir militares é "revanchismo" 06/11/2009. https://www.conjur.com.br/2009-jun-11/ideia-punir-militares-ditadura-revanchismo-nelson-jobim

[11]Ministério da Defesa diz que Jobim tem direito de usar uniforme militar 01/22/2010 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2010/01/683383-ministerio-da-defesa-diz-que-jobim-tem-direito-de-usar-uniforme-militar.shtml

[12]https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2011/08/04/apos-polemicas-nelson-jobim-deixa-o-ministerio-da-defesa-celso-amorim-e-confirmado.htm

and Lula da Silva. The president's objective was to propagate an image of normality by appointing an equally seasoned politician to the seat. The new minister took charge of defense and continued with projects moving the national strategy, written under Jobim, and a steady increase in civil occupation. During his tenure, Amorim faced sparse yet severe criticism from the military, especially retired officers, which signaled a reduction in the synergy between the military and minister. Amorim, however, benefited from the president's firm stance in her relationship with the military. A former political opposition, Rousseff did not cater to the military like most past presidents and made clear that not only Amorim would remain in office and have her full support in developing projects, but he would also be the only interlocutor between the military and the presidency. Amorim, on occasion, reaffirmed his commitment to modernizing the military and advocated for deeper investments in defense[13] [14]. Amorim left office at the end of the first Dilma administration; during the reelection process and transition Jaques Wagner, finishing his second term as Governor in Bahia, accepted the nomination to replace Amorim in the new government, being the first minister to take office without a prior rupture.

Wagner's tenure was stable, with little criticism from the military. The minister continued the work of Amorim, pushing the national strategy and advocating for

[13]https://www.defesanet.com.br/cyberwar/noticia/15962/celso-amorim-ministro-da-defesa-visita-cdciber-e-cc2fter/

[14]O Globo. (2011, August 6). Militares querem influência junto a Dilma. [military wants influence with Dilma]. O Globo.

increased investments in defense. The main point of contention was a presidential decree that transferred the authority over changes in military personnel to the minister. Defended by the minister as "a correction of an anomaly," the decree united military and opposition politicians in criticism; both understood the decision as interference with the military chain of command and autonomy. Jaques Wagner left office in 2015 to occupy a different ministry.

Dilma appointed Aldo Rebelo as a substitute for Wagner. Rebelo, a longstanding ally of the president's party, occupied the Ministry of Science and Technology since the beginning of Dilma's second term and served as minister of sport through her first term. The politician faced mixed reception from the armed forces; the active personnel saw the nomination as desirable as Rebelo had supported demands for investment and criticized attempts to change the amnesty law and the truth commission; the retired and reserve officers, on the other hand, questioned his past affiliation to the communist party. Aldo took office amid a political crisis involving the presidency; consequently, Rebelo tried to minimize conflict inside the organization, unbalanced increased the number of positions available to civilians and military personnel, and returned key offices to military control, effectively reducing civil participation. Aldo Rebelo left the ministry in 2016 due to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff.

The new president, Michel Temer, nominated Raul Jungmann as the new minister of defense. Jungmann, a seasoned politician that participated in previous administrations, was well-accepted by the military. The new minister initiated a structural

reform of the ministry meant to strengthen the structure. According to the minister, the ultimate goal was strengthening the bureaucracy and establishing a permanent civilian workforce. Jungmann's contribution was limited, and the military presence that increased under its predecessor remained extensive and strategically decisive. The minister maintained stable proximity to the military until he left the ministry to take over a newly created public security ministry, which also pleased the military since the federal representative defended their participation in public security. The relocation of Jungmann accompanied the promotion of General Joaquim Silva e Luna from the ministry's secretary-general to the minister of defense, the first in a series of military to occupy the seat since its creation.

4.3.3 Return of the Military

The nomination of General Silva e Luna to the ministry sped up the re-occupation of the institution by the military. With the end of Temer's government, Silva e Luna left office, and his successor was another general. The nomination of military men to the ministry became the norm under Jair Bolsonaro; the former army captain declared his disapproval of attempts to impose civilian control over the forces, sometimes declaring that the ministry's very creation was an attempt to end the armed forces. Thus under his presidency, the military increased its presence in the ministry even further. The first minister appointed was General Fernando Azevedo e Silva, which remained in office until late 2019. Increased investments in the forces, special

treatment to the military, and constant visits by the president marked Azevedo e Silva's tenure in the ministry. The General left the office amidst increased pressure from the president to politicize the forces[15].

Bolsonaro appointed then General Walter Souza Braga Netto, which occupied the Casa Civil (Chief of Staff), to replace Azevedo e Silva and secure the ministry's support in his politicization efforts. Braga Netto represented the more extreme political positions of the military, a public supporter of the military regime. Braga Netto's support of the president paid off, and Bolsonaro appointed the general as his running mate in the reelection campaign[16].

When Braga Netto resigned to campaign for the vice presidency, Bolsonaro appointed General Paulo Sérgio Nogueira as his replacement in the ministry. Nogueira maintained Braga Netto's strategy, increasing military control in the ministry and providing political support to the president. During the electoral proceeding, the general commanded the ministry structure in an attempt to impose military oversight in the process[17]. The minister was a crucial player in the president's attempts to cast doubt over the fairness and legality of the electoral urn and proceedings.

[15]https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2021/03/29/ministro-da-defesa-deixa-o-cargo.ghtml

[16]https://jovempan.com.br/opiniao-jovem-pan/comentaristas/alvaro-alves-de-faria/general-braga-netto-se-esforca-para-conseguir-o-cargo-de-vice-de-bolsonaro-nas-eleicoes-de-2022.html

[17]https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/eleicoes-2022/noticia/2022/10/tse-nao-acolhe-sugestoes-do-ministerio-da-defesa-para-fazer-alteracoes-no-processo-de-fiscalizacao-das-urnas-no-segundo-turno.ghtml

Overall, the changes in minister highlight a few crucial elements of the relationship between military-ministry-minister. First and most relevant, the military still holds a strong influence over the minister, the forces, through political pressure, choose who occupies it despite the president's support. Second, ministers either do not influence or routinely cater to the military needs; those who stayed longer in office avoided confrontation altogether, an evident subversion of the civilian control goal the ministry should establish. Third, the position is under constant pressure and instability, which makes new leadership focused on sudden or large-scale changes unlikely and frequently unsuccessful.

4.4 Beyond the Minister

The relationship between the military and the ministry goes beyond influencing nominations for the minister. The forces frequently circumvented the ministry and hijacked budget negotiations. P15, who often interacted with them in these situations, highlights the forces' singular approach to negotiations; according to P15:

> "[for the military] strength lies in numbers [...] Everything is three for one; you must manage the forces as they compete [and self-represent]. The defense budget is monstrous and negotiated in large groups. The forces' top brass joins the negotiations with the planning teams, making the meeting long and full [about 12 people in a room where otherwise would have 4]. And the forces use their numeric advantage in the meetings to push expenditure as far as possible with minimal regard for cost-benefit. [...] I have received requests for purchases [related to the submarine project] that would scare any civilian, they are out of the civilian grasp, and defense contracts are costly and opaque. They are not necessarily cost-effective. The defense is among the most inefficient [or corrupt] ministries because

> nobody checks. The military also is recognized as very efficient, but efficient in this case means that they deliver, not that they do things with a good cost-benefit ratio".

P15 statement attests that the ministry is a secondary part of this process and that the military relies on themselves to negotiate the budget.

It is also important to highlight that the communication between the ministry and other government entities is scarce, focused on budget, and often done through mechanisms that do not include the minister. P13 states that the military, not the minister, "frequently reaches out to Congress with budgetary concerns, which is easily detectable; they have not established or explored a more profound symbiotic culture of bringing information regarding activities continuously and transparently. It creates the impression that when the military reaches out to Congress is to demand more money. [...]"

Going further, both P13 and 15 express that the dialogue between civilians and the military also suffers due to the lack of attention civilians give to pertinent topics. Civil society pays significant attention to welfare concerns and disregards the many benefits of investment in defense. Accordingly:

> "Part of civil society and public opinion does not understand why we need to invest in the armed forces, and they believe we need to invest in schools and hospitals instead of giving money to the Gripen fighter jets or the nuclear-propelled submarine. They simply do not understand that these things are not related or codependent. [civil society] fails to understand that developing the military's technological, scientific, and industrial basis and keeping them up-to-date promotes and is fundamental to the country's development. The military branch of EMBRAER is responsible for the submarine, the Gripen, and the KC-390, all products that can gen-

> erate jobs and revenue as exports, and society does not recognize their importance." — P13
>
> In Brazil, the armed forces' image associates with the Welfare State; the military is a family business, a private community, and a social ascension tool. Consequently, we discuss more the welfare state concerns, namely pensions, and salaries, than the modernization of the forces. [...] I thought that the new [Bolsonaro] presidency would champion the modernization of the forces, but it did not happen; even with all the major government structures being highly militarized, the concerns remained on the welfare.[...] I am from a generation that has few military connections in reaction to the previous regime, I have recently come closer to the military mindset, and it is astonishing; it is cartoonish [the way they still behave according to the 1980s worldview].

In summary, the ministry seat embodies the political oversight over the defense. It is responsible for outlining, guiding, and monitoring the implementation of the macro defense strategy. However, combining a lack of interest in particular topics with the substantial military control of negotiation and communication creates a scenario that significantly limits the institution's impact. Analyzing the past 22 years, we observe that political oversight is weak or ineffective in all aspects, frequently overthrown or influenced by the military. Most concerning, longer-lasting ministers aligned the institution's activities with military interests. In the principal-agency framework, this represents a principal unable to oversee, monitor or control the agent.

4.5 Structure and Expectations

The structure of the ministry, though centered on the minister, extends far beyond the top cabinet. Reflecting on the objectives behind the existence of the insti-

tution and how they inform the structure allows us to understand how well or poorly equipped it is to perform. In theory, the structure of the ministry would establish critical positions that allow civilians to oversee and support military activity; furthermore, the structure would establish a transparent chain of command and clear-cut authority over different aspects of defense. In this section, I will analyze the evolution of the ministry's structure.

In general terms, the structure of the ministry has had steady core macro organs subdivisions since its establishment. Each macro division covers particular types of activities, all connected to the ministry's goal of directing the armed forces to fulfill their constitutional function and subsidiary attributions (see Table 4.2). The number of organs that compose each subdivision varies and alters the distribution of responsibilities and authority.

Table 4.2: Macro divisions of the ministry and their descriptions

Macro Division	**Description**
Direct assistance	**Strategy and Direction**. Provides administrative, military, legal, and legislative support to the minister and acts as a bridge between civilian and military authority.
Superior advising	Provides information to the presidency and minister on military matters but lacks decision-making and authority capabilities.
Sectoral control	Oversees the ministry's budget, projects, and financial execution, including the armed forces.
Lower advising	Deals with routine military matters and informs the ministry's policy decision-making processes.
Specific singular bodies	**Policy and Oversight**. Covers policy-making, strategy, healthcare, education, and sports activities.
Study, assistance, and support	Provides specialized support in developing studies and evaluations.
Armed forces	The military force under the control of the ministry.
Central governing bodies	Assists the ministry with guidelines and coordinated activities since 2013.
Collegiate bodies	Develops guidelines and plans activities in specific areas, notably governance and Amazon protection, since 2017.

Source: elaborated by author.

The institutional structure presents a formal map of attributions and hierarchy; however, informal mechanisms may strengthen or weaken it[18]. Although independent, the organs that compose the structure are interconnected and should cooperate to improve efficiency and overall quality of work. Furthermore, the structural chart represents hierarchy in the institution directly and vertically; subordinate organs will appear directly connected and under those to which they respond; thus, the higher on the chart, the closer to political decision-making the organ is; in contrast, the lower on the chart, the closer to planning and direct implementation of end activities the organ is.

4.5.1 Foundational Structure

Although FHC established the ministry in 1999, the first formal description of its structure occurred only in May 2000, when the president signed decree number 3466 outlining its structure, attributions, and budget. At that time, the ministry's structure was as shown in the image below:

[18]The military, in the presence of weak authority, may circumvent it and look to pressure superior figures to reach their goals.



Figure 4.1: Brazil's Ministry of Defense Organizational Chart (2000)

Source: developed by the author based on decree 3466

The Image is color-coded:

- Green: Exclusive Military Units;
- White: Units that both civilians and military can occupy;

At the very top of the structure are the assistance and superior advising units such as Military Council, Legal Advice, and Cabinet. These are responsible for supporting the minister in making strategic decisions about defense and connecting the institution to the rest of the administration by working as liaisons with the presidency and Congress. Ideally, civilian presence in these units should surpass military presence, as it would ensure more significant civilian influence on the broader institutional strategy.

This structure's policy-making power concentrates on the specific singular bodies — The three central secretaries —. These secretaries gather information and set the parameters for all defense policy aspects. In theory, these are the core units of the ministry, able to impose oversight and guidance to the defense activities. Directly under these secretaries are the departments and subdivisions of these units that focus on more restricted topics and are closer to the implementation of decisions and oversight. Civilian presence in these units is fundamental to establishing control over the military; not only civilians leading these units would set the parameters for defense policy, but they would also access crucial information regarding it.

The institutional structure features an informal separation between the civilian and military "sides ."This arrangement ensures that each side has clear-cut functions and isolates military functions from civilian presence[19].

The lower right side of the structure has units exclusively occupied by military personnel. These units are directly responsible for the practical application of military activities. For instance, this includes units that focus on developing military doctrine, making operational and logistic decisions, and deploying intelligence-gathering resources. Exclusively placing these units on the military side of the institution isolates the practical aspects of defense from civilian decision-makers.

On the other hand, the lower left side of the structure contains most units that civilians or military personnel can occupy. These units focus primarily on policy-making and oversight. Including units that draft defense policies, analyze their effectiveness, and monitor their implementation. By including military and civilian personnel in these units, the institution can benefit from diverse perspectives and expertise, ultimately leading to better policies and oversight.

Notably, this structure has intentionally portrayed civilians as close to policy-making while granting exclusive military placement near the practical aspects of defense. This design should ensure that the institution's civilian and military com-

[19]Decree 3466 05/17/2000 explicitly allows the military to occupy seats in the secretaries and departments and excludes civilians from occupying seats under the Defense Joint-Staff.

ponents can work together effectively while maintaining a degree of separation that allows each side to focus on its core responsibilities.

4.5.2 Changes

Changes in the structure happen in irregular intervals and, at times, reflect only changes in nomenclature; thus, rather than going year-by-year, this analysis will condense the changes and their impacts into a table (table 2) and discuss their overall significance.

Table 4.3: Ministry of Defense structure changes (1999-2022)

	Changes in Structure	Impact
FHC		First formal structure description.
Lula	Extinct: Special Assistance Office and SIPAM Secretariat;	Fewer civilians involved in Amazon issues; and,
	Created: Secretary of Education and Cooperation, CONAC and INFRAERO;	Less military control over civil aviation.
	Reform: Secretary of Institutional Organization.	
	Extinct: Department of Sectoral Policy (Civil Aviation)	Transference of *de jure* authority over civil aviation to civilian entities.
	Created: Secretary of Defense Products (SEPROD); Reorganized: 1) Sec. of Institutional Organization; and 2) Sec. of Education, Health and Sports. Expanded: Defense General-Staff becomes the Joint-Staff of the Armed Forces.	Create a civilian oversight mechanism for military technology. Separated institutional relations from personnel issues. Expanded military control on defense activities: 1) policy and strategy; 2) intelligence; 3) foreign affairs; 4) logistics; and, 5) mobilization. All units and activities previously under the civilian "side".
Dilma	Returned: The CENSIPAM; and, Transfered out: INFRAERO, ANAC, and CONAC.	The military regains influence over amazon issues but no longer directly influences civil aviation.
	Created: General Secretary; Expanded: Joint-Staff subsidiary units.	Civilians now have a unit similar to Joint-Staff to oversee their activities, and more military units to the military side increase military control over defense activities such as mobilization, intelligence and deployment.
Temer	Reformed: departments subordinate to SEPROD,	Increased possible civilian oversight over defense products.
	Created: Department of Engineering and General Services and the Military Special Advisory Board; Extinct: the Projects' Special Advisory Board.	Expanded presence of military on direct assistance units increase their influence over strategic decision-making.
Bolsonaro	Created: Special Advisory boards of: 1) Integrity, 2) Social Communication, 3) Institutional Relations, 4) Defense intelligence. Chief and Deputy Chief of Education and Culture. Defense college; and, Higher Governance Council.	Increased number of direct assistance units to improve efficiency in their particular attributions by redistributing tasks. The military deepens its control over military education and training, further isolating it from the civilian side with the new chief and deputy chief units. The new governance council ensures yet another venue for military influence over the strategic decision-making.

Source: elaborated by author

The table above contains the formal changes undergone by the ministry; despite not fully reflecting the power dynamics that emerge from informal arrangements inside it, this table summarizes the expected distribution of responsibilities and possible influence held by civilians and the military.

Over the past two decades, the Ministry of Defense has undergone several changes that changed the formal mechanisms for civil control over the military. The changes in structure happen with varying frequency and have not always resulted in increased civilian oversight of the military, which should be the ultimate objective of structural reforms. Instead, some of the changes have benefited the military and limited civilian oversight, particularly in the aspects of defense controlled by the military.

It is noteworthy that the administrations have approached the ministry differently and inconsistently. During Lula's administration, there were attempts to increase civilian participation, reflecting the expanding number of units civilians could occupy, resulting in a more complex oversight structure. The units established formal venues for civil control over policy-making on 1) military technology; 2) military education; 3) health and social security; and 4) National Defense Policy. Furthermore, units removed from the scope of the ministry also show the commitment to reduce the military influence in different aspects of the government, namely civil aviation, which was under military control for decades. It is necessary to say that the more complex structure does not necessarily reflect actual control but signals a formal search for it.

Rousseff's administration faced a complex challenge in balancing the roles of the military and civilians. While attempting to strengthen the civilian structure by organizing a central coordination unit akin to the joint staff, the administration also sought to empower the military to have more control over end activities, such as logistics, intelligence, and mobilization. This move pushes away from civilian oversight critical aspects of defense and has severe consequences for accountability and transparency.

While the balance between civilian and military authority in national defense is a complex and ongoing issue, it is essential to ensure civilian oversight mechanisms are in place to ensure transparency, accountability, and effective functioning of the military. This balance may involve finding innovative solutions that balance the need for security with the need for democratic accountability and civilian control while also considering the unique historical and cultural factors that shape national defense policy.

In later administrations, namely Temer and Bolsonaro, the previous structural changes were either undone or received an equivalent response on the military side, furthering formal military control. The units created under Temer and Bolsonaro opened venues of influence over the grand strategy in the form of advisory units and control over particular topics, namely military education and training. The military units responsible for control over education and training isolates a fundamental aspect of military activity from civilian influence. Figure 4.2 reflects the structure in 2022.



Figure 4.2: Brazil's Ministry of Defense organizational chart (2021)

Source: downloaded from defense.gov.br on November 20, 2022.

4.6 Structure impact on the PAA model

From a principal-agent perspective, the Ministry of Defense has established a structure that allows for the existence of multiple agents and the principal's monitoring of their activities. This structure, with a civilian side responsible for policy-making and oversight and a military side, focused on practical aspects, can effectively ensure that civilian government holds the military accountable.

The critical aspect of this structure is the clear definition of the attributions of units, which allows for monitoring agents' activities. This monitoring is vital in ensuring that the military is using its resources effectively and efficiently and that its actions align with the interests of the civilian government.

However, the distribution of civilians and military officials within the units conditions the effectiveness of this structure. If the military occupies most of the policy-making seats and the civilians are primarily in charge of internal oversight, then the military may be able to exercise significant control over the ministry and its activities.

On the other hand, with the correct distribution of civilians in the units, it is possible to use the ministry to oversee and control the military. This distribution would require ensuring that civilians have the necessary training and access to information to perform their oversight duties effectively and are empowered to take action when necessary.

Overall, the structure can follow the principal-agent-agent model and be an effective tool for ensuring civilian oversight of the military. However, it requires careful attention to the occupation and allocating responsibilities within the defense ministry. With a suitable occupation, the ministry can serve as an effective mechanism for ensuring that the military is held accountable to the civilian government and that its actions align with the interests of the country as a whole.

4.7 Occupation

During the 23 years since the MD's inauguration, civilians have been present in its structure; however, the extent of said presence varies in the different moments. This section aims to shed some light on this phenomenon.

4.7.1 Legal and Contextual

A combination of legal and contextual factors profoundly impacts civilian occupation. First, civilian presence, though expected, is not guaranteed; no law or decree establishes that civilians are the only ones qualified to occupy specific units or seats. In contrast, military officers have reserved seats and a hierarchical structure that makes their presence in the ministry's units compulsory. The legal distinction between expectations and guarantees is fundamental from a political standpoint. Under this framework, the military can interpret civilian occupation requirements to suit their corporative objectives — i.e., without pushing legal boundaries, they can pressure the government for nominations and retain control of higher-importance units —. The military has historically highlighted its legalist behavior. According to the armed forces, they always behave within the boundaries of the constitution and laws. While the validity of those claims is debatable, it is a fact that this legal framework facilitates military occupation rather than secures civilian occupation. P11, a former defense minister, highlights the political domino effect of reduced attention to civilian occupation:

> "The lack of external threats cause defense to fall down the social priority ladder; the intangibility of defense issues drives voters' attention away. Consequently, political elites allocate the available resources to dealing with the plethora of more palpable Brazilian frays- unemployment, health crisis, and public violence- hoping they will captivate the electorate's attention and more votes in return. In turn, the elite's limited attention reduces incentives to bring civilians into defense, both in the public debate and in more practical ways — as civil servants operating in the ministry —.[...] So it is possible to nominate generals and other officials [to seats in the ministry] without negotiating those seats [with Congress]. [...] there are budgetary constraints; in a country with so many other priorities, we see a vacuum of debate, and people have a hard time understanding why, when the forces have 300 thousand members, we would need to hire even more [civil servants].[...] The political elite seems not to fulfill its responsibilities, and it does not, which leaves this gap in civilian participation. It has been 21 years since the establishment of the ministry, and there has never been an open call exam for civilian specialists in the ministry, much due to the inactivity of the political elite." — P11

The domino effect described by P11 culminates in the widespread presence of retired military officers occupying seats as civilians; thus, when analyzing occupation, it is necessary to double-check if *de jure* civilians are de facto civilians. P1 highlights the logic behind retired military presence in the ministry:

> It is very easy for a [military manager in the ministry] to get in touch with a career colleague who is in the reserve and say, 'I need a person with your profile,' and the reserve soldier ends up occupying the position. Consequently, you often have civilians, who look like civilians, wear a suit and tie, and hold civilian positions but are called a Colonel and have 30 years of military life. And their reactions are military and not civilian reactions.

The occupation data reveals that the military, as a consequence of the legal and contextual elements, kept civilians from controlling crucial secretariats and their subordinate departments, namely the *secretary of policy, strategy, and international affairs* and the *secretary of logistics and deployment* which guaranteed them oversight

over critical by-products of the institution. By controlling these two units, the forces controlled the formulation and execution of national policies [20] and monopolized information over defense capabilities [21].

4.7.2 The Civilians

Looking at the civilians, the first few years of the ministry had limited presence. Between 1999 and 2000, civilians simultaneously occupied a maximum of six of twenty-three possible supervisory seats. Beyond scarcity, the crucial element of their presence is its temporary nature; most are politically appointed, sometimes from outside the federal administration, others from a different ministry; thus, changes in the administration condition their permanence. Amongst the participants in this research, for example, 60% of the superior advice and management (DAS) occupants were not permanent members of the federal administration. This small presence reflects the lack of political interest in defense. Considering the institution's incipience and military control over its development, it is unsurprising that the armed forces occupied most of the organization and the most relevant seats. Some may argue that bringing the military as the primary workforce, due to their familiarity with the field, satisfied an immediate need society could not furnish.

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[20] National Defense Policy, National Mobilization Policy, and National Military Science and Technology Policy

[21] Military training, resources, application, and development and commerce of military materials

Civilians occupied the *ministry's cabinet*, the *legal consultancy*, the *secretary of internal control*, and the *secretary of internal organization*. These seats have limited relevance outside the ministry; they mostly produce internal policy and procedures with little impact on military activities. The first two, the chief of staff is a personal choice of the minister meant to support routine activities [22] and the legal consultancy [23] have, understandably, remained under civilian control from the start. The remaining units' occupation brings exciting elements. The *secretary of internal control* is a crucial element to the oversight in budget and execution; though not attached to the formulation of policies, the secretary oversees the progress on goals set by the government in the multi-annual plan (PPA)[24].

The secretary of the institutional organization oversees the ministry's and forces' non-military activities, including management, healthcare, social security, and education. The fact that civilians were able to influence both budget execution and non-military aspects of the forces at a time in which the military retained profound influence over the structure and policy shows that civilians could progress in both monitoring and controlling the military.

Furthermore, civilians face complex issues inside the structure that go beyond which seats they occupy. Due to several internal factors, civilians' contribution to the

[22]Writing memos, organizing schedules, coordinating internal and external communication

[23]Appointed from the attorney general's office to oversee the legality of internal activities

[24]The PPA is the main budgetary planning instrument of the Brazilian government, it establishes the goals for expenditure and investment over four years.

ministry of defense in Brazil is minimal. Statements collected from civilians engaged with the institution at different levels and moments corroborate this assessment. During this research, I have spoken to former ministers, directors, and civil servants who participated in the ministry between the early 2000s and late 2010s[25]. Participants' views about occupation combine concerns with the permanence of the workforce, the lower hierarchical positions occupied, and the lack of preparation and knowledge retention.

Career

Most participants discuss civilian presence in terms of career and stability, pointing out that civilians exist in a limited fashion due to lacking a career plan. All interviewees point to the absence of a long-term career plan to establish a stable civilian workforce as a concerning point.

According to Participant 8, a Ministry of Planning civil servant transplanted into the Ministry of Defense, the majority of civilians present in the ministry are heirlooms of the previous structure, the Armed Forces Joint Staff. Which makes them non-specialists in defense that perform administrative tasks unrelated to the end activities of the ministry. According to P8:

> "What we have here is what was inherited from the former General Staff of the Armed Forces, which had a level of equivalence with a ministry. Employees of the former "great career" on the esplanade, which are ad-

[25]I could not access any civilian working under president Bolsonaro's administration

> ministrative support employees, still have military informants[26] of these employees. Today we have the "great career" transformed, there was this change in nomenclature, so we have civil servants but not in [decision-making] positions. For administrative support and not to participate in defense matters. It has already been requested from the Ministry of Planning, it has already been forwarded and the creation of a Defense Analyst career is being studied by the Ministry of Planning. This career has the purpose of making you select civilians through a public tender, specialists in the field of defense, so what is being thought are salaries compatible with this task, but this is still being studied, the Ministry of Planning has not approved it."

Regarding developing a long-term career, P1 explains that despite considerable benefits, according to him, the main obstacles to its creation are bureaucratic and political rather than legal.

> "Public tender for the new career of civilian analyst, national defense analyst, a career that needs to be created. When seventy independent civilians come in without ties, without being from a military family, without being a husband, son, or reserve military, those seventy can make a huge difference. At this time [this career is blocked], if you look at the Ministry of Planning processes, everything is public, there is nothing hidden about it, it does not have to be, the process is public, and the Ministry of Planning is analyzing the creation, there are no illegal blocks for career creation is much more bureaucratic blocks, so the government has its guidance, Lula's government had one, Getulio's government had one, Collor's government had another, Fernando Henrique's government had another, so one of the guidelines current in the ministry planning is to avoid creating new isolated careers, as they would be, just careers in the ministry, choose more careers that are easier to expand, so there is this conflict between the policy proposed at that moment and the need for the ministry. However, it is a process that is in the planning ministry, I can assure you, if you manage to talk to Dr. Ari [secretary o internal organization] one of the things he wants to do in the ministry of defense is to create this career."

[26]Informants in this context are the decision-makers who "inform" the employees with orders and tasks

The concern with a civilian career, expressed by the participants, appears faint from outside the ministry — equally appearing in ministries such as health and education with their respective interest groups taking over —. Still, according to P15, the evolution of careers in different ministries is long and happens in waves.

> "This is my world [government career development]. The 1988 constitution is similar to all others [brazilian constitutions] in one aspect: it tries to contemplate all interest groups simultaneously — expanding tenure, retirement, and other privileges —. Professionalism and meritocracy only appeared during the first FHC administration when the core ministries — economy, planning, and state department — modernized. During Lula's first mandate, the country began to populate the peripheral ministries and agencies, and it became clear that there were not enough professionals to fill the seats. We created one career in infrastructure, which transversally served some ministries, but there was only one hiring process [in 8 years]. If you look at the esplanade [of ministries] today, there are three groups of ministries: 1) the hard nucleus, fully professional central management; 2) an intermediary group with poorly structured careers that still benefit plenty from the 1988 heritage; and 3) younger ministries attached to powerful corporations — defense and education for example. The main reasons for this situation are that left-wing governments only debate salaries, and right-wing governments avoid hiring new people." P15

It is clear that this wave has yet to hit the Defense Ministry when it comes to establishing a career and stable workforce.

Hierarchy

Another crucial element evident in the data is that civilians occupy lower hierarchical seats. The participants claim that when present, civilians occupy lower hierarchical levels, consequentially receiving orders from the military. This element becomes clear in P2's statement:

> "It is essential because some of our interlocutors in command are military, so there is no way around it; there are hardly any commands [level of management], at least in my area, that are civilians. In the case of the military, this does not constitute any harm [to the ministry]. They know the mechanisms. [...] Here, the difficulty is that there are three cultures. You cannot want the Army guy to think the same as the Air Force guy or think the same as the Navy guy; they have their cultures, their traditions, and their way of thinking. But I think this incompatibility of thoughts is even good, you get used to working, and in the end, you find yourself.[...]"

Furthermore, P2 was amidst a merger in units; about it, they stated:

> "Specifically here [in this department], there are more civilians, currently. The division of military personnel was incorporated recently, about four months ago. The tendency is for it to be formed mainly by military personnel, today there are more civilians because the positions only have three people, the structure is a little bigger, and it has not been completed yet due to lack of physical space, see that this building is all under construction, being adapted to receive us. They [the military] were next to us and had to go to the end of the corridor due to a lack of physical space. So that is two civilians [including me] and two ex-military."

About the structure and number of individuals, P2 seemed confused but ultimately said:

> "The two ex-soldiers are two colonels and there is one more sea-and-war [captain], so there are three colonels, 2 DAS civil positions, and one military position. The structure [of the military division] will only have these two DAS [civilians] really, the others are another six or seven, they will all be military. In the case of the civilian personnel division, until a week [ago] the head was ex-military, he was a sea-and-war [captain] of the reserve. He was actually the one who set up the division, he was here at MD since 1999, he created this division. Let's say, he structured this division, and he was our first boss during this entire period of 15 years."

Other interviewees mentioned working with other civilians but usually being hierarchically below the military, who retained the senior seats of the institution. Most

interviewees described conflicts in culture with the military and difficulty in adaptation upon arrival at the ministry and when moving inside the structure. Out of the fifteen participants, P1 and P12 present the most remarkable statements:

> "Well, with me the conflict happened in a more veiled way, there was only one situation openly, but as I was nullified in that department. I let this conflict pass, and later this officer even came to talk to me, apologizing for speaking out loud in front of everyone. I pulled him aside and went to talk to him; I said, 'look, there is no problem with wanting to maintain the military hierarchy in front of the other soldiers, you are an authority, and I am not; however, respect my condition as a civilian,' this was the first and last time I had an open conflict. [...] The question of the second conflict in that department that I told you about at ****, the situation got more and more ridiculous to the point that in a certain week, the most important thing I did was to xerox some papers. So I asked to leave, because that is not what I am here for, I am a public servant, and I do not need to stay here, and that is when I got another job in another department. I was hugely ostracized in that department." — P1

> I arrived at the ministry by invitation. I was invited to support with the finance sector initially, but eventually, I began helping to deal with some budgetary issues which needed support. [...] My vision was to give the industry [of defense] operated more freely. The initial routine was to get to know the situation and do a gap analysis to identify the necessary technical and structural movements. I was the zero-two [second in command]; the chief was an Admiral. The secretary invited me. Initially, we did not have enough people, we needed about ten to twenty people, but we initially had only five, and we needed to rely on the PTTC [retired military temporarily hired]. [...] On the economic side, I had difficulty finding adequately prepared military individuals; there was only one [navy] captain. [...] Before the arrival of the Admiral, I had some difficulties, I am a civilian, and they [the rest of the team] are military, [...] I had difficulties, such as they would not pick up the phone; they did not know who I was. They are used to knowing all the rights and wrongs of someone's [another military] career, looking at a civilian they do not know, and there on top of that, they were afraid of corruption, so some people would not even talk to me, or treat me as if I was a corrupt civilian. After I spoke with the Admiral, he laughed and started calling and introducing me to people. It took about two months, and I even considered leaving, thinking it would not work, until they started treating me normally. I had been through the

> experience of creating new teams and structures before, but that was the first time people would not even pick up the phone." — P12

These two accounts clearly show how the military retain hierarchical control of processes and structures and can limit civilian participation inside the ministry by retaining control of top seats and isolating civilians from processes.

The numbers in Table 4.4 make it possible to confirm that the occupation of leadership seats favors the military. Mainly military personnel occupies the top policy seats (Secretaries and Departments) that concentrate the power of the ministry. Table 4.4 contains the number of top hierarchical seats each group occupies in policy seats.

Table 4.4: Ministry of Defense's unit leadership distribution

Year	Policy Seats Civilians	Policy Seats Military	Total Civilians	Total
1999-2002	4	8	6-8	30
2003	5	12	11	35
2004-2006	5	11	11	35
2007-2008	5	13	13-14	38
2009-2010	7	9	13-16	38-41
2011-2012	3	8	7-10	36
2013-2014	5	11	17-20	47-51
2015-2016	4	11	23-24	55
2017-2018	5	11	21	55
2019-2020	6	11	24	60
2021-2022	5	12	20-27	60-63

Source: elaborated by author.

Looking through the distribution of seats over the years, it is possible to observe that the trend observed in the first couple of years of the ministry repeats itself consistently; the military retains control of most seats responsible for policy and oversight. This presence ensures that the military guides and sets the desired milestones observed by civilians turning civilian oversight limited, if not ineffective. In more recent years, since the inauguration of Michel Temer, the military has gained further control of the ministry. Under the new presidency, the military began to occupy more seats;

initially, retired officials replaced senior civilians in seats such as the secretary-general, and later, active duty officers took their places. Temer appointed the first military official in history to serve as minister of defense, officially placing military personnel at all levels of policy and decision-making since the establishment of the MD and breaking two decades of tradition[27].

Knowledge

The Ministry of Defense is well-known for its management of classified information. As mentioned by interviewee eleven, the military is privy to relevant information and cultivates the habit of not sharing it with other authorities. However, more concerning limitations to the spread of knowledge happen inside the ministry, both through the lack of training given to civilians and through the lack of transference of knowledge between nominees.

Regarding the training, interviewees are inconsistent; some mention limited training and some attribute to training their accession. When observing all the different statements, a few stand out. Interviewee six mentions preparation before joining the ministry and within it and explains that part of their success inside the institution comes from such preparation.

> I did an internship in defense affairs that ESG does here within the ministry, I did this internship in 2011, but It does not happen anymore. At the time, I was very critical of the internship, not because of the content

[27] Army General Joaquim Silva e Luna took office in February 2018 after acting as secretary-general the year before.

> of the internship itself, but because they tried to level civilians in MD in knowledge about 'What is defense?'. I already came from an international relations course with a postgraduate degree [...], taking the same course with people trained in executive secretariats who had no idea what was being transmitted during those three months of course, and it was not fruitful. [...] Today, the MD has a Superior Policy and Strategy course which aims at civilians, the ministry of defense, and the executive. I think it is important; I came to this role as [high-level ministry seat] because of my training; it was no coincidence, so for civilians working in the ministry, these courses make a difference. (...)

Interviewees one, eight, and nine say:

> "When civil or military personnel are allocated here within the ministry, there is no formal preparation, okay? When I arrived at the ministry, I had a 'small class' in the afternoon explaining the structure of the ministry." — Interviewee 1

> "No, I looked for that there [preparation for work], I took [federal executive training] courses, other courses outside, I have a postgraduate degree in Political Science. So, out of personal interest, I received this training." — Interviewee 8

> "Do you mean ministry preparation? From the ministry, none, practically you who prepare on your own." — Interviewee 9

About the transfer of knowledge between nominees, interviewee one mentions that in the context of leadership change, the military facilitates the coming of a new leader by providing successors with information, which comes from their tradition of moving posts every two years, according to the interviewee. On the other hand, Civilians do not engage with their successors or prepare their teams for the newcomer.

> "Yes, in any institution [the leadership change] is a hindrance. Here at the Ministry of Defense, I faced a very traumatic, very bad change of leadership, but I think it was because of the new boss who had entered, not because of the change itself. In the case of the military, there is a great deal of ease because they are already prepared for the change

> every two years, so they already have a roadmap on how to carry out this change, pass on all the assignments and everything that happens, then a new boss arrives in In the beginning, the adaptation process is always much faster than any situation in companies, any organization, he arrives and will have to take care of things and civilians do not have the tradition of passing this information on to others, difficult to happen, so the person ends up arriving very raw, unless he is already from here and already knows, so when there are internal exchanges, it facilitates a lot, when there are external exchanges there is a little more conflict, but this is normal as in any institution.

From a principal-agent perspective, the civilian occupation in Brazil constitutes a weak monitoring tool by the principal. Civilians' presence is scarce and often limited to less relevant parts of the structure, such as internal organization and secretarial jobs. Meanwhile, decision-making, high-advising, policy-making, and, more recently, even institutional command fall under the military's grasp. Civilians are inefficiently capable of observing military activity and seem unable to inform the principal or punish misbehavior properly. Elements such as their unstable jobs, lack of preparation, and difficulties in receiving and retaining knowledge from predecessors put civilians in a much unfavorable position concerning the military, who train in the field, have stable appointments, and receive all the necessary information from predecessors prior to starting their tenure in the units. Furthermore, when debating whether civilians are an agent or efficient monitoring tools, evidence points to the military's capacity to isolate and summarily disregard civilians inside the structure, regardless of hierarchical position, which disqualifies them as agents and critically puts in question their monitoring capabilities.

4.8 Applying the Model

This research intends to implement a theoretical framework for analyzing the Ministry of Defense. This framework observes the two groups – civilians and military – as agents in a principal-agent-agent model. This framework entails that both groups have similar capabilities to perform tasks. By analyzing the data gathered, it is clear that in Brazil, this framework does not apply; civilians do not have capabilities similar to the military to perform defense policy and decision-making.

From a theoretical standpoint, Brazil comes much closer to what was proposed by Peter Feaver (2003). Civilians are primarily political nominees who can perform basic monitoring duties and oversee the performance of the military with limited information and biased guidelines. In the seat distribution, military officials primarily occupy policy-making seats, while civilians mainly temporarily oversee internal elements of the ministry. This arrangement produces a principal with inefficient extensions and an agent who overextends and self-monitors by occupying the activity and oversight units.

To achieve the power distribution outlined in the PAA model, Brazil needs to increase its civil servants' stability and presence, particularly in the ministry's policy-generating sectors. Civilians need further training to access information, cooperate with the military, and control certain aspects of the ministry's routine. The goal of the PAA framework is to view civilians as a competing source of information for politicians and decision-makers, compensating for the military's lack of transparency. However,

under the current conditions, civilians are not a competing source of information, especially since they have difficulty accessing said information themselves, as noted by Participant 13.

According to the data, civilians in Brazil are an extension of the political leadership and reflect their limited interest in the topic, which reflects Feaver's (2003) principal-agent model. Under this scenario, the military holds autonomy and is privy to information regarding its performance, giving them incentives to shirk its responsibilities with minimal risk of punishment, as noted by several participants. Furthermore, the military exercises significant political power to force the political principal to adjust institutional goals according to military interests, evidenced by the short tenure of ministers who attempt to impede the armed forces' goals.

While political oversight may exist beyond the ministry in the form of congressional oversight, Brazil still falls short. Congressional defense activity primarily focuses on budgetary control, with limited interactions with the ministry and access to seldom information. Most of the information to which Congress has access comes from the military when the military contacts Congress to negotiate budget expansions, as highlighted by Participant 13.

Under the current conditions, the principal-agent model in Brazil contains a weak and uninterested principal with limited extensions and a powerful agent with a monopoly over information and action. Essentially, the military in Brazil exercises virtual control over all defense policy aspects and their application. It controls

defense policy by retaining control over the secretaries responsible, negotiating its budget and contracts with other executive institutions, and setting the goals civilians need to monitor. In essence, the military in Brazil has all the incentives to shirk their responsibilities, as evidenced by interviews and data.

Chapter 5

France: When They Join Hands

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the French Ministère des Armées and examine its institutional development, particularly emphasizing the role of civilians. The *Ministère des Armées* (Ministry of Armed Forces), formerly known as the *Ministère de La Defense*[1], is responsible for maintaining France's national security. It oversees the country's military forces and intelligence services and is crucial in its domestic and foreign policy strategies. Over the years, the ministry has undergone significant institutional evolution, with a growing emphasis on civilian participation. Today, civilians hold critical positions within the organization, including the minister,

[1]Established as Ministère de la Defense Nationale in the Fourth Republic (1946 - 1958), it was renamed several times without a significant change in attributions; in 2017, Emmanuel Macron chose to rename it again to Ministère des Armées.

typically a civilian appointed by the President of France. History, political context, and structural factors have contributed to the increased importance of civilian involvement in the *Ministère des Armées*.

The French State and its apparatus trace their origins back to the medieval era and dynastic monarchies. The first established structures to oversee and manage the military were the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy under the reign of Henri III in 1589. The structure and control mechanisms have undergone several changes and adjustments to achieve the current format inaugurated by De Gaulle in 1947 (Carré, 2001). In this study, France is the positive case of the principal-agent-agent (PAA) framework. The PAA framework adequately applies to this case because civilians and the military working on the current *Ministère des Armées* (MdA) perform independently from each other and the principal. The political influence on the *Ministère* is limited to the appointed high-level hierarchy posts; meanwhile, civilian bureaucrats and the military occupy lower-level management according to the organization's needs. This chapter will introduce evidence backed by the historical context and possible explanations.

The evidence gathered, summarized, and explored in this chapter comes from archival research on the *Service historique de la Défense* (SHD) and on the online archives of the *Assemblée National* and from in-depth semi-structured interviews collected in 2022. Interviews were conducted anonymously with civil servants within the *ministère*.

5.2 A Brief History of The *Ministère des Armées*

5.2.1 Defense in the Ancien Régime

The need to oversee the armed forces is fundamental to any State, the military is intimately connected to the State's very existence, and France is a prime example of this. The establishment of the absolutist Monarchy of France brought increased power and influence from prominent military leaders; the recently unified State favored noble leaders with the strong military capacity to remain unified and protected from invasions and expansion. During this time, many of the funds of the Kingdom, and later empire, served to support military activities (Carré, 2001).

Critical issues arose when, under Henri III, religious disputes plagued France; with its army constantly engaging in conflict on several fronts and the navy also dividing its attention between the northern and southern coasts, the financial and political costs of maintaining the military soared (Carré, 2001; Wood, 1984). The Monarchy faced difficulty managing the spread-out forces and ensuring that they followed the desires and designations; thus, in 1589, his last year as King, Henri III established the secretaries of War and Navy to control the forces better. As with all affairs of the Monarchy, noble court members controlled both secretaries and constantly disputed with one another for the prestigious position. The fundamental goal was to ensure that the forces responded to the Monarchy's interests and their adequate

preparation to deal with issues that the battles on different fronts of the Wars of Religion[2] highlighted (Carré, 2001).

Although the structure aimed to impose further centralized control over the military, the disputes between nobles and the succession of the seats caused different challenges. Disputes between the leadership of each secretary, controlled by different noble families, caused a dispute over the resources and prestige that influenced the development of each force. Furthermore, disputes over resources within the branches were part of nobility disputes (Carré, 2001).

By 1636, under Louis XIII, the shape of defense affairs was unstable noble disputes, and the Thirty Years War[3] created challenges to the Monarchy; thus, the King decided to centralize decisions. He established the Ministry of the State of War and the Navy to make coherent policy decisions, limiting the dispute between nobles. During the Louis XIII reign, for example, disputes over the allocation of resources and deployment were frequent between Secretary of the Navy Richelieu[4] and Secretary of War Sublet de Noyers[5] until the establishment of the unified secretary under Richelieu's control and Louis's direct supervision. The objective was to facilitate the coordination of forces deployed in battle and ensure that the grand strategy and pol-

[2]Conflict between Protestants and Catholics for control of territory and influence (1562-1598)

[3]1618-1648

[4]Armand Jean du Plessis, Duke of Richelieu, Cardinal Richelieu.

[5]François Sublet de Noyers.

icy decisions remained under the King's control and were not impacted by nobles' personnel ambitions (Carré, 2001).

5.2.2 III^{e}, Vichy, and IV^{e} Republics

General Charles de Gaulle is an overarching and omnipresent figure in French social, military, and political contexts of the early XX century. The WWI veteran rose to the role of free France's military and political leader during WWII, presenting a contrasting option to Philippe Pétain, leader of the Vichy regime, in the war efforts. De Gaulle became a prominent voice of the resistance against the nazi occupation and the direct liaison between free France and the Allied Forces. If Pétain promoted the idea of a unified country under its government that accepted Nazi presence in the French territory, de Gaulle promoted the idea of a unified people against the occupation and voiced discontent with Pétain's centralizing and authoritarian tone. After the defeat of Germany and thanks to his central role in organizing the resistance efforts, de Gaulle takes over as chief of the Gouvernment Provisoire de la République Française (GPRF)(Carré, 2001).

The GPRF was central to the reconstruction of France in the years after WWII and Nazi occupation. The challenging period proved fertile ground for State reform and modernization. General de Gaulle is heavily responsible for the push for modernization of the armed forces in France. A stern advocate for a fundamental change in military doctrine and nature towards an entirely professional format, de Gaulle used

his role and political influence to centralize management and limit political influence from and over the forces.

The fundamental proposition was to transform the conscripted forces into a fully professionalized group receiving better and more focused training. In addition, De Gaulle believed the end of conscription would increase cohesion and national unity as the doctrine of *le nation en armes* was slow to mobilize, costly, and morally destabilizing due to its hefty personnel cost. However, such a transformation only occurred in 1996 under Jacques Chirac. Most of the transformations achieved by de Gaulle happened within the central administration.

In the IV^{e} republic period, De Gaulle's defense reorganization focused on the central institutions responsible for policy and decision-making. Conducted under pressure, his re-structuring of defense was a layered response to different political and practical demands of the country's reform. The country went through a period of scarcity and looked to reduce expenditure on several fronts, political allies during the war made claims for influence over different government areas, and the provisional government had to cater to all of those. In the General's words, "the Army is anxious to put itself in harmony with the country, to suffer with it, to save (money) with it" (Carré, 2001; Ambler, 1966).

The post-war French republic faced a political conundrum; on the one side, their behavior during the nazi occupation discredited many political elites; on the other side, new political groups that supported de Gaulle pushed for a more significant

presence in politics and government. National defense was the focus of particular disputes between the Gaullist armed forces, who felt entitled to significant political influence and control over the recently liberated areas of the territory, and the French Communist Party that amassed vast popular support during the 1945-1946 elections but retained significant distrust from more conservative political leadership.

De Gaulle's response to the disputes was reorganizing defense, still under his direct control, into a set of two ministries and one council. The council, which de Gaulle commanded, retained policy and decision-making supremacy. The two ministries controlled personnel and equipment, respectively. This reform reduced the forces' political influence by removing the commands from ministry statuses and limited political influence over management by separating the management of personnel from equipment. In the practical sense, unifying the commands of the three forces under a single ministry reduced redundancies and costs of management and increased efficiency and oversight of expenditure primarily by combining the production of materials for all forces in a singular structure. On the political aspect, it allowed De Gaulle to give in to some communist allies, who pushed for heavy influence over defense, without surrendering complete control of a crucial area(Carré, 2001).

5.3 The Political Movements of the Army

The post-WWII in France saw a decline in civilian political power and the reinforcement of military influence. The victorious French army saw the reconstructing

country as its responsibility; the forces believed themselves to be the fundamental protectors of French unity. This belief reflects in their behavior towards both domestic and foreign policy. The crucial example of this military behavior was the activities towards Algeria; however, civilian authority understood that a settlement for independence was the best course of action; the army insisted that Algeria was an integral part of the empire and pushed for increased repression against the rebels.

The literature recognizes two movements in the military's political involvement. The first is a gradual approximation of the military to politics which took place in several opportunities since the ancient regime[6]. The second is ruptures of political influence, and repositioning of the forces that happened in some instances post conflicts and revolutions (Carré, 2001; Ambler, 1966; Irondelle, 2011; Horne, 1984).

5.3.1 Increase in Power

The armed forces have positioned themselves as part of political life since the ancient regime; the profound ties with nobility ensured that the military had a presence and widespread influence in government. Nobles, members of the King's court, were the military leaders during the 100 Years' War, allowing them to retain political influence once the absolutist monarchy took form. A similar phenomenon happened during the French Revolution[7]; the military involvement in overthrowing the ancient

[6]The military skillfully used wars and instability moments to assert its presence in the political life of France

[7]1789-1799

regime and the accession of Napoleon Bonaparte allowed them to regain a part of the influence lost in the later years of the Bourbon dynasty. Lastly, in the WWI period[8], the military saw the need and opportunity to push for a more intimate presence in the government under the premise of empowering coordination and cooperation with civilians.

5.3.2 Reduction of Power

The reign of Henri III saw a change in perception of how active the military should be with politics and a move towards a centralized civilian authority. The major defeat in the Franco-Prussian wars led to the reduction of military influence. The period following the military contained reforms in the military apparatus and civilian management which partially reduced the military's influence over other aspects of political life. The IV^{e} republic observed a similar trend as of the past with the military using an instability moment in which it emerged victorious to try and expand political influence; however, this time, leadership and the changing social conditions resulted in a reorganization of the structure that isolated the military from more relevant political positions. As a direct result of the need from civilian leadership to prevent military influence, the GPRF established a group of institutions that split military authority and responsibilities, namely the Ministry of Defense, the high military council[9], and

[8] 1914-1918

[9] 1949

changed fundamental aspects of military doctrine that limited the force's capacity to gather political power, such as reducing retirement age to allow younger officers to reach command positions and force more influent older officers out of the military.

5.3.3 Stability

The V^{e} Republic[10] sees the military's political influence reducing and stabilizing. The failure of the parliamentary government of the IV^{e} brings a renovated de Gaulle to the President's seat, and along with him comes the socio-political push to remove the military from overseas territories, Algiers in particular, to which the military responds with a coup attempt[11] which was skillfully countered by the PM Debré. The attempted coup provided the necessary support for De Gaulle to successfully isolate the military from politics and impose civilian supremacy and professionalization. The President General understood that the constantly changing environment, evolving technology, and threats growing in the post-WWII created conditions to which the conscripted forces[12] were not prepared to engage; according to de Gaulle, the elevated budgetary and social costs of mobilization hindered the national forces response capacity; thus, there was a clear need for modernization on equipment and increasing the specialization of the forces.

[10] Unitary semi-presidential constitutional republic (1958-)

[11] the Generals' putsch

[12] *nation en armes*

5.4 Structure & Expectations

The *ministère des armées* is a part of the *administration d'État* in France, as such it organizes under the principles that govern the public service[13], operates directly under the presidency and prime minister, and are competent in all territory. Akin to other State administration units the MdA has a hierarchical structure divided in subunits and occupied by public servants with different origins.

Since the *ancien régime*, the structure responsible for imposing State control over the military has changed and evolved. The changes in said structure are responses to transformations in the country's social, political, and economic conditions. In this sense, the *ministère* is very much a reflection of French needs. It is also important to highlight that structural reforms do not happen unprompted, and as highlighted previously, much of the results rely on leadership.

This section summarizes the significant transformations France's national defense structure underwent since the end of World War II. I have highlighted the most critical points of the structure, from establishing the provisory government (GPRF) to the ministry's current structure. These moments are significant due to their impacts on the chain of command and the political influence they allow the forces.

[13] *l'administration agit dans l'intérêt général et respecte le principe de légalité. Elle est tenue à l'obligation de neutralité et au respect du principe de laïcité. Elle se conforme au principe d'égalité et garantit à chacun un traitement impartial*

5.4.1 GPRF - French Republic Provisory Government

As mentioned before, the national defense structure of the provisory government post-WWII reflects the conditions the country faced after reunifying its central administration and territory. Still finding its footing, the country relied heavily on the national defense apparatus to perform a myriad of rebuilding, unifying, and stabilizing tasks.

This structure splits the authority over national defense into two main tracks: 1) *Management*, controlled by the ministries, it covers the most practical application of decisions and routine aspects of defense, and 2) *Deployment*, controlled by the National Defense Committee and the National Defense Joint- Staff, which covered strategic and policy decision-making in both defense and non-defense issues.

During the GPRF period, national defense decision-making was at the hands of the president. De Gaulle was both president and minister of national defense and formally relied on the national defense committee to inform, support and convey his decisions to other administrative areas (Carré, 2001). Furthermore, as commander-in-chief, the president retained supremacy over the Deployment of forces and direct influence over the chiefs and joint staff. On the administrative aspect, de Gaulle divided national defense into two components the first directed at the management and preparation of personnel, and the second focused on the development, production, maintenance, and distribution of materials.



Figure 5.1: The French Republic Provisory Government's National Defense Structure

Source: elaborated by author based on data available from Carré (2001)

Figure 5.1 contains the organizational structure of National Defense under the GPRF; above the dotted line are the government units, and below the dotted line are the functions and responsibilities exercised by these units in each branch.

The top unit represents the unified office of the presidency and minister of national defense. This situation is a direct consequence of the post-war context in which

national defense still concentrated much of the government's focus and capabilities. The combined office responded to a need for efficiency and expediency in decisions and to De Gaulle's powerful position at the time.

To the right are the management units, ministries of the armies, and armament dedicated to the practical aspects of defense dealing with the production and maintenance of equipment and personnel training and deployment. Under this organization, the military heavily controlled the personnel component; the armament's unit was under civilian[14] authority, as most of its functions, using technical skills that did not require military experience.

To the left is the rest of the government, mainly under the national defense committee, which at the time retained both advisory and decision-making capacities; it was formally through the NDC that de Gaulle conveyed his plans and orders to the rest of the government. Table 5.1 below contains the composition of the NDC divided into permanent and eventual members:

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[14]The French Communist Party pressured De Gaulle for more influence over defense issues, and the Ministry of the Armament was the solution found.

Table 5.1: National Defense Committee components by membership type

Permanent Members	1) President and Minister of Defense; 2) Minister of the Armies; 3) Minister of the Armament.
Eventual Members: *Presence is dependent on relevance to the topics.*	1) Civilian Ministers; 2) Chief of the National Defense Joint-Staff; 3) Chief of Joint-Staff of the Armies.

Source: National Decree N^{o} 903 DM/IP 1945

Routinely, the NDC contained civilians and military representatives of the most powerful political forces that emerged in the aftermath of WWII — Military, De Gaulle's close supporters, and Communists —. The NDC discussed and made decisions on all topics relevant to the government. It is important to note that civilians and the military had permanent representatives in the NDC, and civilian authority participated in discussions related to civilian interests.

As commander-in-chief, the President had direct influence over the National Defense Joint Staff. This military unit was responsible for managing the deployment of troops and strategy in the broad sense. It controlled several aspects of military activity, including career planning, mission planning and implementation, troop deployment, and coordination with other domestic actors and foreign allies.

This structure makes evident the power of the armed forces at the time. All processes were tightly connected and relied on the national defense apparatus to

implement them on the recently recovered territory. Both civilian ministries and administration units responded to the President through the NDC and the NDJS as they did during the war[15]; consequentially, the military retained oversight and direct control over most governmental processes and functions — represented below the dotted line.

5.4.2 Parliamentary France (1948-1949)

The end of the provisory government and the establishment of the IV^{e} republic brought a revision of the changes made by de Gaulle. As the French politicians attempted to establish a parliamentary model, the national defense structure adjusted, and the authority moved from the President of Government to the Prime Minister (PM)[16].

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[15]The nation's general organization law still governed the civilian administration during war times of July 11th, 1938 (Loi du 11 Juillet 1938 sur l'organisation générale de la nation pour le temps de guerre.).

[16]*Président du Conseil des Ministres*



Figure 5.2: 1948's National Defense Structure

Source: elaborated by author based on data available from Carré (2001)

Figure 5.2 presents the structural map of national Defense as of 1948. An element of complexity in this rearrangement appears on the multilevel bridges between deployment and management units. Beyond the higher units — committees and PM —, there are complicated mechanisms of influence and control over national defense activities that grant neither civilians nor military complete processes' oversight. This structure directly reflects the still-developing government structure in France between

1946 and 1948 and is heavily impacted by the shifting legal structures[17] and unstable political alliances[18].

A few things change in the relationship between national Defense, government authority, deployment, and administration. First, the National Defense Committee is no longer the only connection between the head of the government and the rest of the government units, significantly reducing the influence of military leadership on decision-making, a reflection of the progressive stabilization of the country and diminishing relevance of the army post-war. It is essential to highlight that while military influence over other aspects of government diminished, so did the civilian influence over defense activities.

The new Permanent Military Committee [19] emerges as a decision-making mechanism on military affairs connecting the PM, the Minister of the Armed Forces, and the Joint Military Staff. The separation between deployment and administration remains, but the division between personnel and armament units has disappeared.

Below the dotted line at the bottom of Figure 5.2 is a list of functions of each branch of the structure. The lists show that both branches of the structure influence deployment without a highlighted or preferential chain of command. In summary, orders can pass from the prime minister to deployment with or without going through

[17]Multiple constitutions were drafted and submitted to referenda.

[18]In particular, the communist party went from a significant political force with heavy influence in the government to a political pariah excluded from the coalition.

[19]*Comité Militaire Permanent*

either committee, the joint staff, the minister of the armed forces, or the bureaus of the armed forces.

In 1949, the structure suffered further changes that partially fixed the chain of command represented in figure **??**. The changes attempt to partially simplify and clarify chains of command and reflect the reducing relevance of the national defense apparatus for the government.

The central transformation is the separation of the offices of the minister of national Defense and prime minister. The first worked as a liaison between the PM and the joint staff, which empowered the unit as an oversight mechanism that civilians could use. However, it is essential to highlight that there is no direct connection between the minister and the State Secretaries of each force, which severely impacts its authority and capacities over practical aspects of Defense and military activity.

The NDC, with strictly advisory functions, is the only committee to remain in the structure; this represents both a simplification of the advising apparatus and a reduction in the influence of collegiate bodies in the practical aspects of government. The NDC retains its connections to the PM, the minister, and the joint staff but loses all influence over decision-making and civilian aspects of the government.

The armed forces joint staff transforms into a permanent civil-military joint staff, signaling an attempt to highlight civilian authority on national Defense. This new joint staff concentrates the influence over the end activities of National Defense, which reduces the competing chains of command present earlier; however, this structure still

has problems. A direct connection between the military secretaries of State and the prime minister causes a dual chain of command that sometimes renders the joint civil-military staff and the minister of national Defense ineffectual.



Figure 5.3: 1949's National Defense Structure

Source: elaborated by author based on data available from Carré (2001)

5.4.3 1960 - Semi-Presidentialist France

The next relevant transformation observed in the structure occurred under de Gaulle's presidency. The national defense structure becomes vastly complex, as the new government understands that the previous simplified structure had reached its limits and caused unsatisfactory results (Carré, 2001).



Figure 5.4: 1960's National Defense Structure

Source: elaborated by author based on data available from Carré (2001)

As described above in Figure 5.4, the new structure contains fifty-four subdivisions from government authorities and management boards (in red) to *ad hoc* committees (in blue). The complexity of this structure reflects the necessity observed by De

Gaulle in dealing with the new cold-war context France integrated. It is unclear in this structure how the chain of command unfolds; it is observable that the PM and President hold the authority over national defense, but different than other structures, this one does not present the outcomes expected from each subdivision on the practical end.

To elements are fundamental to highlight. First, at the bottom, the Ministerial Delegates, the North Africa Commands, and the Joint Staffs of each force are likely responsible for overseeing military deployment. Second, the minister's solidified presence as a liaison between political authority (PM and President) and the practical units indicates the reestablishment of civilian authority between the core of political power and military leaders.

It is also necessary to highlight that the Ministry has two civilian and military cabinets, ensuring both groups' influence. However, the civilian cabinet appears isolated from all other units, which shows that, under this arrangement, the military has more formal attributions, and places in the chain of command, in policy-making and practical aspects of defense, and civilians have a limited oversight capacity.

Another exciting element is the power shifts caused by new units in the structure. The increased complexity reveals new units responsible for activities concentrated under other units in prior arrangements. For example, the new operational commands (Operational COMs) and the Finances Board cover elements previously concentrated under the JCS, representing increased transparency in processes that lead to a reduc-

tion in military power, despite these new units not appearing directly connected to civilian authorities.

5.4.4 1990s-2020s

The structure underwent a reorganization in the 1990s that transformed the chain of command to a much clearer one, which empowered civilian authority and changed fundamental characteristics to isolate armed forces from political authority. It highlighted the centrality of the Ministry and its dual composition of civilians and military. In addition, it establishes that all aspects of defense, including deployment, training, armaments, and general management, submit exclusively to the political authority of the minister, which is the only connection between the President and Prime Minister and the national defense apparatus. It is essential to highlight that under a semi-presidential system, the French President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and also chairs the Council of Defense and National Security. On the other hand, the Prime Minister, as the head of government, is re- responsible for the execution of the government's policies and the day-to-day operation of the government. In defense matters, the President has more authority and can make key decisions without the Prime Minister's approval, such as dispatching troops or ordering a nuclear strike. The legally described structure places the minister between both authorities and the rest of the national defense structure.

Figure 5.5 presents the most current version of this structure of the Ministry, which divides into four main groups while maintaining the chain of command characteristics established in the 90s. The groups are the Joint Chief of Staff, the Secretary-General (SGA), the General Armament Board (DGA), and the Ministry Bodies. Each group focuses on different aspects of the national defense activity.

The JCS focuses on military deployment; it contains a group of subunits that cover activities directly related to deployment and which require military expertise. The Secretary-General focuses on management, mainly personnel, information, and bureaucratic efficiency; its leadership and workforce are primarily composed of civilians. The General Armament's Board focuses on managing materials, technology, and innovation, akin to the SGA civilians holding many leadership positions and places in the workforce. The Ministry Bodies cover many elements mostly connected to policy and decision-making, including four advisory councils, and civilians and the military equally occupy its workforce and leadership positions.

In contrast to previous ones, this structure is clear regarding the chain of command and reflects the expected limited attributions of military commands in national defense; each unit of the Ministry responds to a single chain of command that starts with the minister; there is no secondary chain of command or committee which could circumvent the minister's authority.



Figure 5.5: 2022's National Defense Structure

Source: elaborated by author based on data available from Carré (2001)

Figure 5.6 is an example of the robustness of each group that forms the ministry. The SGA, represented in the figure, contains 26 units. At the very top is the Secretary-General, responsible for transforming the political decisions presented by the minister into guidelines and policy. Immediately below are the Adjunct Secretaries, with flexible supporting roles defined by the secretary. Going down the SGA hierarchy, five Mission and Project directors are responsible for special projects, advising, and support activities meant to help the secretary. Further, Lower on the hierarchy are the directors and coordinators of each subunit responsible for overseeing the development of each area of interest; these are subordinates to the SGA who hold executive functions and are close to practical activities than decision-making. In addition, civilians occupy most leadership positions, directors, and adjunct directors, which shows how present they are in critical positions to oversee the military.



Figure 5.6: Secretary General Leadership Seats (2022)

Source: elaborated by author based on data available from Carré (2001)

5.5 Civilian Occupation

The occupation of the MdA evolved. Civilians have been present in the structure in different capacities since the beginning. The transformations in structure, as in other developed democracies, allow for greater or smaller control over the activities depending on which posts civilians occupy. Currently, the State Administration (*administration d'État*) has three categories of employees in their workforce, they are:

- Category A (**Cat. A**): the hierarchically superior category responsible for policy design, decision-making, and supervisory activities;
- Category B (**Cat. B**): functions of application and drafting; and,

- Category C (**Cat. C**): with executive functions (end-activities).

Each category has clear-cut functions and objectives; the higher they are, the closer they are to policy-making and strategic decisions; lower categories focus on end activities such as data collection, communication, and clerkships.

According to the legislation on public service and the interviews conducted, civilians can enter the MdA through different means; they can be politically appointed, enter through public tender, join on temporary contracts of up to three (3) years duration, or transfer from other government units also on a limited assignment of up to four (4) years. It is fundamental to point out, and it was highlighted in the interviews, that jobs on the *ministère* are highly technical and directed at individuals with high skill and capacity to work in the field. Another essential factor about jobs on the MdA is that the military hardly, if ever, occupies civilian seats. The ratio of military to civilian seats may vary from unit to unit according to military pressure; however, neither active nor retired military appear listed as part of the civilian workforce.

The government produces yearly data regarding personnel on the MdA and presents it on a document called *Bilan Social*, and it has been available from 2009 until 2021[20]. The following analysis will focus on data from 2021; the trends observed in 2009-2019 remain constant, with negligible changes, and are well reflected in the 2021 data, making a multi-year analysis unnecessarily complex and repetitive. The graph below reflects the trends between 2009 and 2019 according to the *Bilan*:

[20]2022 and 2023 editions have not yet been released.



Figure 5.7: Ministry of the Armies' workforce 10-year evolution

Source:Bilan Social Ministère des Armée 2019

The graph above (figure5.7), part of the 2019 *Bilan*, portrays a dramatic decrease of 13.7% in overall employees (red line) until 2015 and a marginal increase of, on average, 1% a year since. The data from 2021 shows a continuation of this trend with the same 1% increase per year in personnel. The continued trend and stable ratio of civilians to military make the isolated analysis of 2021 enough to understand the complex distribution of personnel within the MdA.

In addition, analyzing the distribution of personnel according to the French registry is a complex task due to the redundant controls used by the government. The

French public service uses different metrics to keep track of employment. The three metrics used are 1) Operational Program Budgets (BOP)[21], 2) Full-Time Employment Units (ETPE)[22], and 3) Workload (ETPT)[23]. Analyzing a combination of the first two metrics, BOP and ETPE, presents a clear panorama of the MdA's occupation, showing both the budget allocated and the number of full-time spots civilians and military occupy.

[21] *Budgets Opérationnels de Programme*

[22] équivalent temps plein emploi.

[23] équivalent temps plein travaillé.

5.5.1 Operational Program Budgets (BOP)

Table 5.2: 2021's Operational Program Budgets Personnel Percentages

	Military					Civilian				
BOP	**Off**	**Sub Off**	**Res**	**Vol**	**Total**	**Cat A**	**Cat B**	**Cat C**	**Spec**	**Total**
Army	6.2	16.8	26.9	50.1	100%					0%
Navy	6.6	32.9	50.2	10.3	100%					0%
Air	8.1	29.2	12.5	50.2	100%					0%
HR						16.3	22.1	38.2	23.4	100%
Health	18.1	24.5		42.9	85.5%	3.1	2.0	8.6	0.8	14.5%
Mail	8.3	8.7	0.8	17.8	35.6%	31.1	18.2	15.0		64.4%
DGA	20.7	2.6		24.0	47.3%	43.1	9.6			52.7%
Energy	7.5	11.4	31.1	50.0	100%					0%
Comissary	49.6			50.2	99.8%	0.2				0.2%
Infrastr.	49.8			49.8	99.7%	0.3				0.3%
Others	19.7	29.7		50.6	100%					0%
Overall Budget	6.3	16.9	20.1	44.9	88.2%	2.8	2.6	4.2	2.3	11.8%

Source: Formulated by the author based on data from Bilan Social Ministère des Armée 2021

Figure 5.2 presents a table elaborated based on the 2021 *bilan* and reflects percentages of the budget dedicated to each category. The BOP expresses personnel as units of a budget, meaning that units appear on the table under the budget which pays for them, not on units where they work. According to the table, the expenditure on military and civilian according to the BOPs is split, with some units — Commands (Army, Navy, Air) and Energy[24] — having their entire budgets dedicated to the military and the Civilian Human Resources[25] entirely dedicated to civilians. Some BOPs —, Comissary[26] and Infrastructure[27] — have the majority of their budget allocated to military personnel, but it is interesting to notice that the few civilians that pertain to this budget are of the highest hierarchical level (Cat. A), the supervising and policy-making level.

The remaining BOPs — Health[28], Officer's Mail Services (Mail)[29], and Armament (DGA)[30] — have split budgets between civilians and military, with the DGA and Mail favoring the civilians and Health having almost three times as many militaries as civilians.

[24] *Service de l'Énergie opérationnnelle*

[25] *Service des ressources humaines civiles*

[26] *Commissariat*

[27] *Ingénieur militaire d'infrastructure*

[28] *Service de santé des armées*

[29] *Bureau du Courrier de l'administration centrale et des cabinets*

[30] *Direction générale de l'armement*

The distribution of budgetary responsibilities between civilians and the military reflects a separation between civilian and military authority. There is a clear-cut and direct line between budgetary plans and groups of employees. Having limited civilians hired under the responsibility of the military command's budget implies a limitation of the influence the forces have over civilians. In addition, it highlights the compartmentalized expectations; military funds are spent on military issues and personnel, which may prevent misallocation and misappropriation of funds.

5.5.2 Full-Time Employee (ETPE)

Figure 5.3 contains a table describing the distribution of employees in percentage of full-time units (ETPE). These units measure how many work hours each government unit requires in the year, meaning that the table displays how many workers performed tasks within a particular unit rather than which budget paid for their work. It is observable on the table that civilians are present in all units, including the commands of each force. A few elements of this distribution are worth mentioning.

First, civilians retain the majority of seats in four of the eleven subunits or groups of subunits — Commissary, DGA, SGA[31], Others[32] — these units cover fundamental aspects of the ministerial functions; thus, the presence of civilians in them signals the capacity to oversee these activities. These units are responsible for most non-military

[31]https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sga/au-service-armees/ressources-humaines/bilans-rapports-sociaux

[32]combination of smaller contingent units

activities the ministry covers and influence policy-making and implementation. The SGA, the core unit responsible for transforming political directions into guidelines and policy, has civilians occupying 75% of its allocated workforce. Furthermore, 40% of those civilians occupy the hierarchy's top categories (A & B), meaning they control the unit in numbers and leadership. The same is true for the DGA, with 80% of the civilian workforce, 58% of whom occupy leadership positions.

The military is the majority of employees under the umbrella of the *ministère* covering 76% of the workforce units. However, their occupations are not uniform. The command of the Army is three times as big as both the Navy and the Air Force; it employs the most significant absolute amount of civilians. Between the commands, the Army and Navy have a similar military-to-civilian ratio of approximately 11 militaries for each civilian employed. The air force has a smaller ratio, approximately six militaries to each civilian, as a result of including under its structure the Air Force Industrial Service[33] a maintenance service that contains 80% of its workforce composed of civilians.

[33] *Service industriel de l'aéronautique*

Table 5.3: 2021's Full-Time Personnel Percentages

	Military					Civilian				
Unit	**Off**	**Sub Off**	**Res**	**Vol**	**Total**	**Cat A**	**Cat B**	**Cat C**	**Spec**	**Total**
Army	10	29	52	0	92%	1	1	3	3	8%
Navy	12	59	20	1	92%	1	2	3	2	8%
Air	14	50	22	1	86%	2	3	2	7	14%
Health	23	33	11	0	67%	5	6	19	4	33%
Infrast.	9	45	5	0	58%	8	19	11	4	42%
Energy	9	16	43	0	68%	2	7	13	10	32%
Comissary	6	22	22	0	51%	3	9	29	8	49%
JCS	36	32	6	0	75%	5	5	8	7	25%
DGA	16	3	0	1	20%	45	13	7	15	80%
SGA	8	12	4	0	25%	19	19	28	8	75%
Others	17	23	2	0	43%	27	16	13	1	57%
Overall Workers	13	34	30	.01	76%	6	5	8	5	24%

Source: Bilan Social Ministère des Armée 2021

Furthermore, civilians occupy functions on all hierarchical levels (Cat. A, B, and C) of all subunits of the MdA, which implies their proximity to both decision, policy-making, and operational aspects in the myriad activities of defense. An exciting highlight of this presence is the balanced occupation at the Commissary, the unit

responsible for supporting field and routine activities to the forces. These activities include logistics, administration, and non-military services provided directly to the forces inside and outside of French territory. The commissary workforce har 49% civilians and 51% military; this balance reflects an increasing effort to reduce military responsibilities and standardize and increase coordination of non-military activities, boosting efficiency in management and allocation of resources. Using civilians to perform such tasks signals that the military is less frequently allocated to non-military functions, which allows for more remarkable professionalism for the forces. This redistribution of functions represents an integration of civilians into military life, similar to what Egnell (2009) defines as the integrated civil-military model in military missions.

Overall the budget allocation and workloads reveal that civilians and military co-exist in a balanced fashion inside the MdA. The evolution of the structure allows for increased professionalism of the military, who are constantly pushed further into their core missions and activities with reduced influence mechanisms and lower hierarchical positions, and for an expanded civilian presence in every non-military aspect of National Defense, including oversight and direct in-field support functions.

5.6 Civilians

The *ministère des armée*, as part of the central French administration, follow overall trends observed in the government in hiring and occupation; however, some

remarkable unique elements are observable and need analysis. The following section will present information collected from interviews and congressional reports revealing key details.

5.6.1 Origins and Legal Status

Civilians occupying the ministry come from different backgrounds and through different hiring mechanisms allowing for various roles and contributions, comprising a diverse workforce with nuanced relevance for national defense[34]. Despite occupying the same bureaucratic space, different legal statutes govern civilians and the military, guaranteeing different restrictions and protections as they perform their jobs. The legal status of civilians guarantees that in the MdA, they enjoy job stability and legal protections that allow them to develop profound contributions to national defense without concerns over political pressure and regardless of the length of their contracts. According to the french national assembly:

> The law of 1983 thus establishes the common rights and obligations of the general status of civil servants. Among these rights is the freedom of political, trade union, philosophical or religious opinion, the right to strike, the right to trade union, the right to permanent training, the right to participate, remuneration after service, and the right to protection. The main obligations of civil servants are professional secrecy, the obligation of professional discretion, information to the public, to carry out the tasks entrusted, hierarchical obedience, reserve, and the neutrality of the public service. — (Rapport D'information No 4076)[35]

[34]Rapport D'information No 4076.

[35]Translated by the author.

5.6.2 Presence

Civilians are present in every part of the MdA (Figure 5.3), which according to the interviews, makes the environment welcoming to civilians and prevents the establishment of a military culture. Militarized environments reduce civilians' capacity to access information, oversee activities and perform tasks adequately; thus, this welcoming environment indicates that civilians have adequate working conditions.

In addition to the environment, civilians occupying the top hierarchical positions have academic and technical backgrounds contributing to their jobs. According to the interviews, the hiring process filters civilians by their knowledge and technical skills to perform specific tasks in varying degrees; thus, civilians seldom arrive at the MdA with no prior training or preparation; highly competitive processes recruit most individuals.

Furthermore, civilians have more extended contracts, presence, and experience in public service than their military counterparts, frequently having served in other public organizations before pursuing a job at the MdA. In this sense, civilians are hired for more extended periods and spend more time in the MdA than the military, which, in their careers, are subject to age limits and time-restricted assignments. These limitations on the military allow civilians to form a long-term workforce while forcing a high turnover of military officers.

Notably, the military appears to have a more significant presence in units that deal with areas where forces are currently deployed. For example, according to the

interviews, in the International Relations Board (DGRIS), military individuals are more frequently employed in the African and Asia subunits where French forces have currently active missions; meanwhile, the Latin American subunit, an area with no military missions, has fewer military officials attached to it. This characteristic, combined with other elements of the ministry, hints at flexibility from civilian authority to delegate functions to the military for efficiency and expediency.

5.6.3 Training

Another contributing factor to civilians' presence and active contribution to defense is the training and preparation provided by the *ministère*. Civilians and military alike have the opportunity to undergo extensive training in *Écoles* and *Grands Écoles* that prepare them to perform duties in the public service and particular tasks relating to national defense. This preparation aims to adequately build a workforce that enhances effectiveness in managing the forces and provides relevant knowledge to those responsible for supporting national defense activities in the broader spectrum. It is also vital to highlight that many of the civilian workers in the MdA have post-grad education in related fields, which increases the quality of their potential contribution to the organization.

Interviewees describe the work divisions of the ministry as diverse and efficient, highlighting how supportive their colleagues, civilians, and military are to their work routine. The ministère also accompanies the French government in a trend to increase

diversity in their ranks, increasing the number of females in both the bureaucratic and military ranks, increasing the different perspectives and innovative approaches to management and policy.

5.6.4 Interactions

Civil and military interactions seem stable, with no large-scale conflicts emerging. The civilians interviewed describe the military as reliable colleagues; however, some interactions are remarkable. Some instances that highlight the expected difference in cultures while highlighting the civilian authority appear when describing routine activities.

Interviewees describe the military from outside their organizations — military deployed on the field or recently transferred to within the bureaucratic ranks — as more reactive and resistant to civilians. In this sense, civilians highlight that military personnel of all ranks and occupying different hierarchical positions in the ministry appear to react differently to civilians' "orders" and feedback depending on how long they have worked with civilians. Military individuals with more extensive experience in the bureaucratic side of the *ministère* are more accustomed to interacting with civilians and, thus, are more willing to accept recommendations and feedback from civilian colleagues.

Another exciting element highlighted in the interviews is that the newly arrived or deployed military often needs reassurance from other military members about

civilians' input; regardless of civilians' experience or rank, top leadership must often intervene. However, the fundamental characteristic of this element is that most of these negative interactions resolve with civilians being the decisive voice and having their opinions prevail over the questioning military.

5.7 Applying the Model

This research's framework observes the military and civilian as two agents in a principal-agent-agent arrangement. When looking into the French case, we observe some crucial characteristics that solidify and support this theoretical framework and allow for rich analysis.

The evidence gathered in this research points towards a solid political interest and control over defense affairs. Dating back from the first empire and passing throughout the republics, national defense has a tight connection to the French State and its interests; thus, politicians and society alike have paid close attention to the topic, which is part of constructing a French national identity.

Politicians in different moments have approached and understood national defense as fundamental for the management of the State, at times directly as seen in the post-WWII; thus, they pay close attention to its conduction. Furthermore, since establishing the V^{e} republic, civilians have successfully removed the military from directly meddling in domestic politics and even fully professionalized the forces in the 1990s; the French army during the cold war mostly became a foreign policy

instrument. In addition, the French government, both legislature and executive, constantly produce documents and data regarding different aspects of defense — modernization, administrative structure and techniques, civilian workforce, oversea deployment, databases format, and coding — this responsibility falls at the hands of working groups and frequently goes through the scrutiny of the assembly. In summary, the French political elites are a **Principal** with clear-cut objectives, expectations, and mechanisms to monitor the agents. The delegation of functions, especially in recent years with empowerment or the ministry as the only venue of interaction between politicians and the military, is deliberate and structured.

The military, the **first agent**, is a highly professionalized force. With strong ties to the French national identity, the military has on more than one occasion meddled in domestic politics; however, in the V^{e} republic, they saw their role and space in domestic politics dwindle due to different elements[36], gradually, the national force converted into a voluntary professional force that does not interfere in domestic politics. Today's military activities exist to promote French interests and do so constrained by tight professional restrictions[37]. The French military is well-equipped and trained to perform a variety of missions with the support of a qualified civilian workforce. It is essential to highlight that the military still has partial political influence; however, it appears limited to the realm of defense and in particular aspects of it; evidence

[36]De Gaulle's leadership, WWII heritage, focus on international issues, conflict of interest with the civilian leadership, end of conscription.

[37]Temporary assignments, young retirement age, limited political rights, strict labor rights.

of this appears in their higher presence in bureaucratic areas related to where the French forces are currently active. This group of characteristics constitutes an agent, in the theoretical framework, that is capable of performing its duties while bound by the contractual constraints established by the principal; the high level of qualification and specialization achieved, especially in the past 30 years, imply that the agent if left unmonitored, could present a severe risk to the principal.

The civilian bureaucratic force, the **second agent** in the framework, occupies an interesting position. Their professionalized nature, with a minority of political appointees at the highest levels of leadership, establishes a separation between them and the principal despite both being civilians. Their nature establishes them as a separate entity, not a simple monitoring tool or extension. According to the evidence gathered, the civilian agent presents high technical capacities and actively contributes to developing defense activities in close coordination with their military counterparts and on various topics. The nature of civilian presence, with balanced long-term and short-term hires, allows for stable monitoring and contribution while keeping a frequent change in the civilian workforce, constantly introducing new perspectives and preventing the calcification of political influence and practices that could damage the defense. The French civilian workforce is thus the example of a strong agent that supports its military counterpart, informs the principal, and develops activities.

The French case thus contemplates a format that closely represents the PAA framework, resulting in efficient outcomes within the defense realm. Both agents are

capable and perform their tasks adequately while allowing the principal to monitor e ensure the pursuit of national interest goals. This example highlights the strengths of professionalized elements in the management of defense. Some authors characterize this arrangement as an unstable equilibrium due to the changing nature of political leadership (Maire and Schmitt, 2022); however, the evidence on bureaucratic structure and occupation characterizes the MdA, especially in the 65 years of the V^e republic, as an evolving and resilient venue for civilian authority beyond political authority.

Chapter 6

United States: Money Can Buy You Happiness

6.1 Introduction

This Chapter will cover the history of the United States Department of Defense (DoD); I will present an in-depth analysis of the structure, its evolution, and the historical context highlighting the role of civilians in the context. I will analyze how the structure influences civilian participation in the department.

A country with a longstanding military tradition that shapes territory, independence, regime, and social structure. The United States formed most of its identity through wars and conflict; the country relied on military leaders to be the first of the colonies in America to achieve independence and was involved in active conflicts for

most of its history. Today the United States military is the largest funded military in the world, achieving unrivaled levels of investment and mobilization; this reflects on the structure of the DoD, which shapes to manage such a gargantuan budget.

In this research, the US is a deviant case; this means that different than the other cases that represent negative and positive applications of the framework for comparison, this case presents particular elements that uniquely contribute to the analysis. First and foremost, it is the case studied by Peter Feaver (2003) in his book *Armed Servants* and Deborah Avant (1996) and represents the groundbreaking application of principal-agent theory to civil-military relations. Second, the level of investment and engagement of the US military place it in a unique condition that very few countries in the world could replicate and non currently do, so using that case as a parameter for comparison would skew the analysis of the proposed framework. Therefore, I will apply the Principal-Agent-Agent (PAA) framework to the US case study to highlight the improvements and adjustments made to the framework used by Feaver (2003) and Avant (1996).

According to Feaver (2003), civilians working on national defense in the US are extensions of the principal; they perform several tasks whose main objective is to oversee military activity and performance. This research understands that civilians in the DoD go beyond that characterization, actively behaving as a second agent contributing to and cooperating with the military to achieve strategic goals and efficient

management of resources. In the following sections, I will present evidence, historical context, possible explanations, and consequences of this assessment.

The evidence in this chapter comes from archival research conducted in the US National Archives, media databases, the Library of Congress, and semi-structured interviews conducted between 2021 and 2022. The interviews were conducted anonymously with civilian and former military individuals with experience in the DoD bureaucratic setting.

6.2 Leadership & Context

This section examines the various Department of Defense (DoD) leaders since its inception, focusing on their roles in altering the department's structure and the subsequent impact of these changes on power distribution and civil-military relations. Consequently, this section summarizes historical events that underscore the DoD's most influential leaders and critical contextual shifts that affected their contributions to national defense management.

The Department of Defense was established in September 1947 during the Harry S. Truman administration[1], replacing and unifying the Departments of War and Navy. A change in the country's geopolitical environment and its new position as a global military superpower and leader drove this transformation of the national defense

[1] 1945-1953

structure. The National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment aimed to strengthen, centralize, and enhance the coordination of the national defense structure. The Declaration of Policy outlines the following objectives:

- Developing a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States.
- Establishing integrated policies and procedures for government departments, agencies, and functions relating to national security.
- Creating a Department of Defense which includes the three military departments under the Secretary of Defense's direction, authority, and control, ensuring unified direction under civilian control.
- Instituting unified or specified combatant commands and a clear, direct line of command to such commands.
- Eliminating unnecessary duplication within the DoD, leading to more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense.
- Unifying the strategic direction of combatant forces, facilitating their operation under a unified command, and integrating them into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces without establishing a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces or an overall armed forces general staff.

The structural transformation occurred during the considerable upheaval of previously established paradigms. Domestically, the United States faced social and eco-

nomic challenges that demanded attention, notably the industry's transition to civilian production and the demobilization of millions of World War II veterans. Simultaneously, the nation's international role and responsibilities expanded; isolationism was no longer viable, and intervention in regions beyond the American continent became the standard in foreign policy. The primary focus was on containing the spread of Soviet Union influence (Rearden, 1984).

In this context, the unification and increased efficiency of military management were critical; the law also brought a new emphasis on civilian control over military activity. The lessons from WWII showed that strategic coordination was at the core o military success. However, the process of establishing a unified authority did not happen seamlessly as in the past the proposal to unify the departments of war and navy faced backlash from each department and their respective congress suporters[2]. However, with the real-life experience of a unified coordination unit during the war[3] and the changing context, this process gained momentum in the Truman administration (Rearden, 1984). Thus, as the administration pushed for unification, the forces responded with their proposals. The army introduced a centralized plan that created a single civilian secretary, chief of staff, high command, and service branches. The navy, concerned with the possible loss of autonomy, pushed back with its own plan; this plan mimicked and expanded the WWII experience and generated a

[2]unification and reform of the forces had been proposed in many occasions prior to the events of WWII and had always met starch resistance from the forces, and little support from politicians

[3]A total of 75 joint agencies emerged during WWII

wide and permanent network of interagency units that would carry out coordination tasks. According to Rearden (1984), from the many debates that covered the topic came one realization:

> As the debate progressed, it revealed big philosophical differences and suspicions between the services that no amount of compromising or word juggling could totally resolve. The best that could be accomplished, as it turned out, was to legislate a structure acceptable to the services, test the new arrangement, and hope that time and patience would yield a workable and effective organization.(Rearden, 1984)

The rift between the forces made it so that the decision relied on leadership rather than the force's plans, which empowered civilian authority as neither military branch seemed to amass enough support to capture the process independently. A supporter of "a single authority over everything that pertains to American safety" since his campaign, Truman favored an approach closer to what the army had proposed. The key concern of the president was a reduction in costs; thus, supporting a single department instead of an array of agencies seemed to produce more interesting results; Congress also agreed with this assessment. The final proposal addressed key concerns of the navy while closely reflecting the army's proposal; it maintained a single department with a civilian secretary while keeping each force under its own "sub" secretary; it ensured the autonomy of each force from one another and the permanence of both the marine corps as a separate branch of service and the naval aviation as a fundamental part of the navy.

The literature on the unification process highlights the importance of leadership. The first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, a civilian and the former secretary

of the navy, was one of the leading proponents of a decentralized unification, making his selection to lead the centralization controversial. However, under the political turmoil and open disputes for missions, budget, and resources, Forrestal pushed the centralized unification model, chosen by the president and outlined in the National Security Act, at a steadily evolving pace. His replacement by Louis Johnson in 1949 came as a response to the slow-paced implementation of the unified structure and weak economic performance; Forrestal had severe issues in controlling the budget while trying to please the forces, which made the core selling point of unification moot in the eyes of the legislature, his resignation reinforced the supremacy of civilian over military interests. On the other hand, Johnson took over with aggressive moves focused on budget control, which added to the political turmoil and disputes that made Forrestal's work difficult; however, it signaled to Congress a much more palatable stance that granted Johnson political support[4]. Furthermore, Johnson benefited from Forrestal's demand for legislative action from Congress, as reflected in the 1949 amendments.

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act dealt with a few crucial factors and reinforced the importance of Congress in overseeing the structure. First and foremost, it solidified and concentrated DoD's political power on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and reduced the forces' autonomy, removing most le-

[4]In the first two months of his tenure Johnson cut funding of several military prized projects, including the navy's super carrier.

gal basis for the forces to question the secretary's authority. Second, it increased the OSD's control and granted decision-making powers to staff agencies[5], mainly advisory boards, before the amendments. A political victory for the presidency, the amendments gave President Truman the sense that unification was going o happen fast and decisively. However, he faced plenty of resistance from the forces and suffered from "disagreements over strategy, competition among the services for scarce dollars, and divergent opinions over the composition of the best suited for the support of national policy." (Rearden, 1984).

The new legislative framework empowered the DoD's structure and supported, albeit not decisively, the new secretary. Johnson, a more imposing character, fared consistently better than Forrestal in imposing his control and oversight over the forces. However, the disputes and questions over the role of the DoD persisted and increased with the Korean war[6] (Condit, 1988). Johnson also outperformed its predecessor in establishing a relationship with other government departments and strengthening DoD as part of the central administration, something Forrestal appeared not to have time to address. The changes promoted by Johnson focused on reducing expenditure, the secretary focused on removing duplicate functions when possible, and frequently established boards and offices that standardized policies for all military branches and civilians in the DoD alike. Johnson, and the DoD under his command, struggled on

[5]The Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board.

[6]1950-1953

three main fronts health and public communication. Both had split authority as the DoD formed boards to deal with both, but each branch retained its separate units and direct subordinates, whose frequent changes at times hindered the progress of projects and transformations. Johnson's management style often clashed with his civilian subordinates, who were constantly replaced, to the point where young and inexperienced army and air force secretaries had recently taken office when the conflict on the Korean Peninsula emerged (Condit, 1988).

In the initial years of the DoD, both under Forrestal and Johnson, the military was politically powerful and tried to influence the direction of reforms when possible. However, civilians retained supremacy and controlled the department, and it is evident in texts and documents describing the time that disputes amongst civilians rather than military pressure caused the revolving door of civilian authority in the secretaries (Rearden, 1984; Condit, 1988). Furthermore, there are very few direct clashes between civilian officials and force commanders; the forces accustomed to, or at least temporarily unaffected by, subordination to civilian authority in the figure of the secretaries of War and Navy. Thus, the transition to a centralized authority seems to have focused more on format rather than whether civilians or the military would take the lead; military input was frequent both directly and through political supporters in Congress (Rearden, 1984; Condit, 1988).

The beginning of the Korean War forced Johnson to revert his tendencies and promises. The secretary, who had focused the first semester of his tenure on re-

ducing expenditure and constraining military mobilization, saw increased demand for both. Furthermore, Truman's attention to the war forced changes in the national defense structure that essentially weakened the OSD's position in policy and decision-making by empowering the National Security Council (NSC), which the president and Congress had primarily forgotten up to that point. Consequently, Johnson forcefully reviewed his relationship with civilian and military subordinates and began taking their advice more frequently, increasing the coordination among the forces, if only slightly. The pressures of war and declining political support forced Johnson out of office by the late 1950s; his departure did not significantly impact the structure or *modus operandi* of the DoD (Condit, 1988).

Army General George Marshall, who served as Chief of Staff during WWII and Secretary of State between 1947 and 1949, replaced Johnson in September 1950. Seasoned in war times, Marshall established the unified army command during WWII, an experience he used and replicated to modify the structure and establish the Executive Office of the Secretary (EXOS), whose function was to evaluate several courses of action and advise the secretary over which one they should pursue. In summary, Marshall created a unit that concentrated communications between leadership and subordinates to favor coordination, consistency, and expediency. Despite his short tenure and partial discontent with the civilian units of the OSD, the EXOS retained its power and relevance with the following secretary Robert Lovett. A key concern within the OSD as the EXOS gained relevance was that as a unit within the DoD, it

concentrated plenty of power, and military personnel heavily occupied it under Marshall and Lovett. Under the guise of coordination and expediency, the EXOS became the venue through which the military regained influence over policy, circumvented the civilian OSD, and reverted the initial tendency of military subordination.

Another change brought in by Marshall was the nomination of budget comptrollers to oversee Defense funds. These fast-paced transformations included the establishment of an advisory council composed of OSD and force representatives to work on accounting and finances, which improved overall financial efficiency, resource allocation, and civilian oversight. Another crucial transformation promoted by Marshall and reinforced by Lovett was the inclusion of the Bureau of the Budget (BoB) representatives in the preparation of the annual defense budget. The presence of representatives of an external civilian agency signaled that the military was committed to keeping a transparent relationship with civilian authorities and increased civilian influence over military expenditure and projects (Condit, 1988). Marshall's tenure is one of the contrasts in the DoD. While the former general centralized authority over personnel and communications at the hands of a heavily militarized EXOS, he also opened venues for increased internal and external civilian control over the military budget. The conflict in the Korean peninsula, while causing significant turmoil on the structuring of the DoD, benefited civilian presence in the structure, as it increased the need for combat-able manpower and pushed for a replacement of those who were present in the DoD by civilians and non-combatant military (primarily women).

Lovett, Marshall's successor, continued the steady pace of transformations and the balance in military and civilian power; however, under his tenure, one element gained particular attention, the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS). Lovett's focus on the role of the JCS was, at that moment, crucial for the DoD. The act of 1947 and the amendments of 1949 had established the JCS but left its function and, most importantly, its relationship to the president vague. Lovett highlighted that the JCS concentrated most of the broad spectrum of military activities and advice capabilities essential to national defense, which forced the OSD, primarily civilians, to over-rely on the JCS, which decreased its efficiency. Lovett advocated for a legislative transformation of the JCS, which would focus almost exclusively on planning, with advisory capabilities but no decision-making power; in addition, its other functions would transfer to the OSD, which would combine civilian and military staff to oversee the budget, manpower, and logistics effectively making the secretary the core of authority on the DoD. Despite his heavy advocacy and constant pressure on the legislature and presidency, Lovett's idea only found support in the following administration.

Former General Dwight Eisenhower wins the 1952 election and appoints Charles Wilson[7] as his Secretary of Defense. Wilson and the president sympathized with Lovett's ideas of reorganizing the JCS and pushed them forward. Eisenhower, heavily leaning on his popularity and respect due to his military career, pushed his Reorganization Plan No. 6 through the legislature. First and foremost, Eisenhower and Wilson

[7]President of General Motors one of the prominent supporters of Eisenhower's campaign.

agreed with Lovett's assessment that the JCS was overworked and overpowered. In addition, Eisenhower's experience in the military led him to believe that the structure of the JCS reinforced military loyalties, which disrupted the desired efficiency in decision-making. Therefore, the initial transformations focused on concentrating functions and limiting influence. Decisions and appointments of the JCS would concentrate in the chairman's hands and subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense; furthermore, the OSD took over most of the administrative responsibilities (Condit, 1988; Leighton, 2001).

Unlike previous administrations, Eisenhower brought in corporate representatives in several areas, and defense was no different. Wilson composed his DoD with seasoned executives from different corporations; his objective was to increase the department's efficiency; he also implemented corporate practices that increased communication and cooperation between the OSD and the JCS. The Eisenhower-Wilson relationship is unique up to that point in the DoD's history; the president considered himself a defense minister and considered that the secretary served to implement policy rather than make it (Leighton, 2001).

The Eisenhower years represented an exciting moment in the DoD; its structure changed and empowered civilians with oversight and expanded responsibilities while allowing the military to focus on their missions with limited authority and room to question civilians; in addition, the relationship between the presidency and the OSD divided policy-making and policy-application responsibilities allowing the civilian sec-

retary to perform duties within his skills set. The efficiency-driven management of the DoD complemented the presidency's understanding of the military field. It allowed for quick and innovative approaches, particularly in the research and development of new technologies[8], a tendency that benefited and enabled the focus on retaliatory nuclear power Eisenhower desired (Leighton, 2001; Watson, 1997). The following two secretaries of the Eisenhower presidency[9] did not promote significant changes in the structure; their focus, as well as the president's, became streamlining authority[10] (Burke, 1958) , managing the budget and dealing with congressional pressure to reduce costs while effectively competing with the USSR and retaining staffing on all branches (Watson, 1997).

The Kennedy presidency appoints Robert S. McNamara as secretary of defense. The new secretary takes office intending to keep the structure similar to what its predecessor left but aiming to expand the service secretaries' responsibilities beyond advisory and advocacy[11]. However, in his first year, McNamara began increasing the number of units under the DoD. The secretary understood that the control over

[8]As exemplified by the decision to produce new intermediate and long-range missiles in 1956 simultaneously.

[9]Neil H. McElroy (1957-1959) and Thomas S. Gates Jr. (1959-1961)

[10]The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, empowered the secretary as part of the operational chain of command between the president and combatant commands.

[11]McNamara openly disregarded the Symington report, a document produced during the presidential campaign by a committee appointed by Kennedy which recommended significant changes in the structure.

military operations he desired required more than changes in responsibility and appointing the right personnel (Kaplan et al., 2006; Stevenson, 2006).

Akin to what happened at the end of the Eisenhower administration, other aspects of defense management took precedence and drove the secretary's attention away from changing the structure; in McNamara's case, he was concerned with adjusting the budget to the rapidly transforming environment of the cold was and readjusting policy and civilian authority mechanisms that, according to his assessment, were rigid and prone to disastrous mismanagement of the military, in particular the nuclear capacity, by civilians. Therefore, most of the changes in the DoD under the first half of his tenure happened without the disappearance or creation of new units and favored a centralized authority controlled by civilians at the OSD while delegating to the more experienced military the operational control of military capacity to the commands. Furthermore, McNamara used the extent of his authority to interfere in all aspects of defense, from budget planning to the management of the Vietnam War[12] (Kaplan et al., 2006; Drea, 2011; Stevenson, 2006). On the OSD, McNamara hired and empowered mostly civilians reinforcing their authority over the military in the planning and execution of policy.

The Lyndon B. Johnson presidency[13] maintained a similar course that Kennedy left; McNamara remained as secretary and central political figure in national defense

[12]1955 - 1975

[13]1963-1969

until 1968. The B. Johnson administration brought greater reliance on the policy-making capacity of the OSD; the president was less inclined to meddle with military affairs through formal means and relied far less on the NSC than his predecessors, which gave McNamara a stronger position in controlling the agenda as the main interlocutor between the president and the forces (Drea, 2011). In addition, the JCS became weaker, and McNamara concentrated decision-making in the OSD and consulted only sporadically with the chiefs of staff; according to the records, the secretary benefited from B. Johnson's informal approach to decision-making and often used his direct access to influence and even reverted decisions (Drea, 2011; Stevenson, 2006). McNamara and his successor, Clark Clifford[14], the main challenge was dealing with the stalemate in Vietnam, an inheritance the Nixon presidency and his new secretary, Melvin R. Laird[15], strived to put an end to (Hunt, 1998; Drea, 2011; Stevenson, 2006).

Laird took over the DoD and found a robust structure whose power concentrated mainly on the OSD, but with weak relations with Congress, the JCS, and service secretaries (Hunt, 1998), his time in office was dedicated to rebuilding this relationship and improving the structure. Laird used his congressional experience and established the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, an independent commission to evaluate and propose changes. Ultimately, none of its significant organizational changes were adopted (Hunt, 1998; Stevenson, 2005).

[14]McNamara left office in the last year of the Johnson presidency to preside over the World Bank Group

[15]1969-1973

Unlike McNamara, who possessed strong influence but still responded to the president, Laird negotiated with Nixon with almost complete autonomy, appointments, and decision-making but received less autonomy over policy as the president saw and used the NSC as a fundamental asset in foreign and defense policy. Furthermore, the new secretary's experience as a representative gave him a particular perspective on valuing relations with the legislative when producing policy. Like his predecessors, Laird surrounded himself with competent managers with corporate backgrounds and maintained the military outside of the OSD. However, he considered military leadership a fundamental asset in decision-making and constantly consulted with the JCS and service secretaries (Hunt, 1998; Stevenson, 2005).

Despite the many challenges, the Nixon presidency was a period of considerable stability in civil-military relations. With few changes in the structure and organization of the DoD, Secretary Laird faced considerable challenges to its authority from other administration members than from the military and bureaucracy subordinates. Particularly National Security Advisor Kissinger[16], whose presence and advice to the president greatly shadowed national defense issues[17]. It is essential to highlight that the disputes between Laird and Kissinger did not impact the effectiveness of the DoD or the national defense structure that effectively dealt with a diminishing budget,

[16]1969 - 1975

[17]Kissinger advocated for and controlled the Defense Program Review Committee responsible for overseeing diplomatic, military and political consequences of Defense budget and programs (Hunt, 1998)

withdrawing from Vietnam, ending the draft, and developing a new anti-ballistic missile (Hunt, 1998).

The political context between Nixon's renunciation and Ford's mandate made the leadership of the DoD focus on political relations and expectations rather than major organizational changes. In addition, all three secretaries — Elliot Richardson[18], James Schlesinger[19], and Donald Rumsfeld[20] — had short terms in office. While all three managed to keep stable relationships with the military and not give up civilian power and control established since Eisenhower, Rumsfeld differs from his two predecessors by successfully advocating for the increase in budget and expenditure and by promoting significant shifts in policy towards more robust and more competitive strategic and conventional forces. The former members of Congress took advantage of his excellent relations with both the White House and Congress, which were obstacles to Schlesinger, to advocate in favor of innovative investment in the forces and technology, as well as strenuously fighting against Kissinger's overarching influence over defense (Stevenson, 2005, 2006).

The Jimmy Carter administration takes office with ideas of reorganizing the government; with that task in mind, Harold Brown[21] is Rumsfeld's successor. Unlike

[18] 1973

[19] 1973-1975

[20] 1975-1977

[21] 1977-1981

the previous secretary and in line with the president's expectations, Brown desired significant change in the structure he commanded. A few key concerns were reducing the number of direct subordinates, which Brown deemed too large and inefficient, strengthening the R&D structure, and increasing oversight over the JCS. Although the military already had reduced autonomy, given the OSD-JCS distribution of tasks, Brown intended to create a secretary-level seat responsible for gathering information on the JCS's processes and activities (Keefer, 2001).

Brown's intended structuring of the DoD increased the number of steps between the secretary and the operational staff and created limited communication channels, improving his "control span." However, despite the pressure from the presidency and the secretary's insistence, most of the desired transformations did not come to fruition; the reform effort found little support in Congress and even less in the bureaucracy. The main evidence of the fruitless effort is in Brown's partially reorganized structure that reduced the number of units directly reported to him from 32 to 25; the secretary had set out to cluster all units under two undersecretaries but never managed to (Keefer, 2001; Stevenson, 2005). It is important to highlight that Brown's failure to achieve major reform has little to do with civil-military relations; the JCS and the service secretaries did not question or openly criticize the reform efforts, with most barriers coming from within the civilian bureaucracy, which dragged their feet in abiding by the secretary's demands (Keefer, 2001; Stevenson, 2005).

The Reagan administration came to power with concerns regarding the Soviet Union and modernizing the military apparatus to keep on par with the perceived threat. To fulfill this task, Reagan chooses Caspar Weinberger[22]. The seasoned politician with a reputation for focusing on severe budget cuts adopted a different posture while in office; he became a strong advocate for increased expenditure and an expanding budget. This posture, aligned with constant public praise and increased monetary compensations, was well received within the military, which saw the new leadership as beneficial to their interests. Weinberger increased the budget and the military contribution to defense, empowering the service secretaries and the JCS as part of the budget, operations, and policy production, reverting a long-established concentration of those in the OSD. The secretary understood and publicly stated that the military should be an integral part of planning all aspects of defense as they were the ones responsible for transforming plans into action; in addition, Weinberger, who had little experience in defense affairs, paid more attention to political interactions outside of the DoD than to routine affairs within the institution, which gave the military leadership even further room to influence the DoD. Weinberger left the DoD after almost seven years due to increasing political pressure on his ventures on foreign policy and declining influence as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) which restricted the budget and reorganized the structure of national defense, changing the power and function of the OSD.

[22]1981-1987

A prime example of civilian control over the military, the GNA changed the national defense structure on a fundamental level. The act, enacted as a response to accumulating military failures and a perceived lack of coordination between the branches of service, targets a few central elements of national defense organization by congressional initiative. Senators Samuel Nunn, and Barry Goldwater, later joined by Representative William Nichols, introduced the reform act due to an understanding that business-like civilian management of defense had become detrimental to the forces, civilians, according to the members of Congress, micromanaged defense issues that would be more efficiently dealt with by the forces, and controlled the functional structure in a manner that discouraged integration (Nemfakos et al., 2001; Stevenson, 2006).

The Goldwater-Nichols dealt with a few critical elements of the structure. First and foremost, the GNA centralized in the chairman of the JCS both chain of command and military advice responsibilities to civilian leadership (Presidency, NSC, and Secretary) while allowing for, on special occasions, direct communication between field officers and civilian leaders (Stevenson, 2006). Secondly, the act transformed the JCS-service relationship by making the commanders-in-chief the operational authorities through the JCS regardless of branch, significantly reducing the autonomy and influence of the service chiefs; in addition, it turned serving in the joint service a mandatory step for those interested in becoming flag officers. Lastly, the act concentrated the responsibility for equipment acquisition in the secretary of each branch and

overall DoD acquisition authority in the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD). The Goldwater-Nichols Act inaugurates a new era in national defense organization and changes the civil-military balance in the DoD (Nemfakos et al., 2001; Stevenson, 2006).

Despite the significant changes brought on by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, most consequences only impacted the George H. W. Bush[23] administration; the first secretary in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era is Frank C. Carlucci[24], still under Reagan, a seasoned politician with years of service in different government departments, including the DoD, Carlucci had a short tenure that focused on reorganizing foreign affairs and re-establishing DoD-Congress relations damaged in previous years.

The H. W. Bush administration appointed Richard "Dick" Cheney as secretary after a failed attempt to nominate John Tower. Well-liked and experienced in Congress, in the Intelligence Committee, and as Ford's chief of staff, Cheney occupied the remodeled DoD and focused on creating coordinated and stable relationships with his subordinates. According to Cheney, his main concern when taking office was reducing the conflicting voices within the DoD; according to the secretary, the OSD and JCS should coordinate before informing and advising the president (Stevenson, 2005). Despite open disagreements over strategical concerns with the Chairman of JCS, Colin Powell, Cheney's policy decision-making and advising frequently coordinated and ac-

[23] 1989-1993

[24] 1987-1989

commodated Powell, showing his recognition of his position and experience. Cheney showed a strong understanding of his position in the post-GNA DoD, delegating most of the operational and routine activities to his subordinates on the OSD and JCS but constantly meddling in their selection; Cheney personally oversaw appointments for DoD personnel and Military promotions of three and four-star flag officers, and decisively fired those who went against his wishes, constantly displaying his commitment to impose civilian oversight (Stevenson, 2005). Cheney left office alongside the H. W. Bush administration.

The Clinton administration[25] had three secretaries at the top of the DoD Leslie Aspin[26], William Perry[27], William Cohen[28]; however, no significant changes on the DoD structure and practices took place during their tenure. Each secretary dealt with the traditional challenges of managing a large budget with even greater demands and responding to congressional concerns in their way. However, the new international context without a major rival and the growing domestic partisan divide made it hard to justify significant transformations (Stevenson, 2005, 2006).

[25] 1993-2001

[26] 1993-1994

[27] 1994-1997

[28] 1997-2001

The George W. Bush administration[29] brought back Donald Rumsfeld for a second tour as Secretary[30]. Rumsfeld focused on preparing the military for new challenges in this new opportunity in the DoD. The key concern of Rumsfeld was ensuring that military technology was in a constant update; the expectation was that with the correct effort and investment, the military would be capable of skipping a generation of technology and gaining a strategic advantage over its enemies (Stevenson, 2005, 2006).

At the beginning of his new cycle, Rumsfeld imposed a strong separation between civilians and the military in the decision-making process. The military often complained about feeling left out from the key policy steps and constrained by internal policies that required the secretary to warn ahead of any contact between the military and the legislative. Alongside the growing criticism from Congress, the secretary's leadership style and policy choices appeared to be doomed; however, the attacks on 9/11 led to a total transformation of the scenario.The "war on terror" engagement placed Rumsfeld in a new and much more powerful position. Leading the military efforts in the middle east, Rumsfeld established a never before seen level of civilian control over military action, constantly overseeing and checking decisions on the field. The secretary used the new context to centralize the processes inside the DoD into his own hands; according to Rumsfeld, the power centers of the structure operated

[29] 2001-2009

[30] 2001-2006

like a "factory with disconnected production lines," and thus, he took control over the processes, and established mechanisms to evaluate them. In summary, Rumsfeld deflated the power of subunits in the structure and concentrated it in the secretary seat[31]. In addition to the revolutionary approach to managing the DoD, Rumsfeld benefited from an ever-expanding budget that allowed for significant investment in staffing, equipment, and technology, which the secretary wanted from day one and now had complete control over (Stevenson, 2005, 2006).

The successors of Rumsfeld, both at the end of W. Bush and through the Barack Obama and Donald J. Trump administrations, benefitted from the transformations and elevated powers of the position but did not promote major changes to the overall structure and dynamic of the DoD, focusing in dealing with the routine issues and the occasional change in policy to accommodate domestic and international demands. Civil-military relations under these administrations remained somewhat stable within the DoD with no major changes to its structure and internal guidelines[32].

In conclusion, this section outlined the historical progression of leadership. It highlighted the pivotal points of the DoD — The National Security Act of 1947, the 1949 Amendments, Eisenhower's streamlining, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986,

[31]The secretary proposed the merger of the OSD and the JCS but was dissuaded by political pressure

[32]Trump attempted to alter CMR's status quo; however, his changes happened in political and policy interactions between the presidency and the military rather than inside the DoD. Trump also signed an exemption to the National Security Act to allow James Mattis to serve as secretary within less than seven years of his retirement from the Marine Corps, showing his intention to politicize the military and break the established norms.

and Rumsfeld's second tour revolution — which inform the following section of this chapter.

6.3 Structure & Expectations

This section will cover the evolution of the DoD's structure and outline how power arranges in the structure. The focus of this section is to present the expected distribution of power in three different moments of the DoD that represent the defining moments for the structure. The selected moments represent the key formal transformations rather than political changes promoted by leadership.

6.3.1 National Security Act of 1947 and 1949 amendment



Figure 6.1: 1947's U.S. Department of Defense organizational chart

Source: developed by the author based on the National Security Act of 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 establishes the central organization of the DoD with eleven main units; it is the first attempt to centralize control and coordination over the defense. The base structure is a limited expression of this intent and was quickly modified to further its goals.

At the top of the structure, in 1947, was the Secretary of Defense (1), responding directly to the president and serving as the primary advisor and supported by four special assistants on the second level, responsible for providing advice on particular topics. On the third level of the structure, hierarchically below the SecDef and with

equivalent authority to each other, are the Joint Staff (2), the War Council (3), the Munition Board (4), and the Research and Development Board (5), each unit is responsible for developing activities and policy in particular areas of interest of the organization, amongst them the Joint Staff takes a prominent role, as at the time it took the additional responsibility to advise both the secretary and the presidency, directly, in defense affairs. Below them, but responding directly to the secretary, are the Service departments — Army (6), Navy (7), and Air Force (8) — and their respective chiefs of staff (9, 10, 11); these units focused on the operational side of the defense.

In this structure, the top five units concentrated the policy-making responsibilities, which included the military at the Joint Staff. In addition, the 1947 Act did not establish legal guarantees of the secretary's authority over the other units, which made centralized policy-making and advising activities reliant on the relationship between the secretary and the subordinate units. Furthermore, despite the structure describing the two boards as responding to the secretary, the legal apparatus also allowed severe military influence on their routine (Rearden, 1984). From a civilian control perspective, the structure lacked robust and explicit formal organization and mechanisms to impose control over the military, even with widespread civilian presence. Through informal mechanisms, the forces could still influence policy, decisions, operations, and advice outside the main chain of command and away from civilian oversight.

The 1949 amendment, from a structural point of view, brought powerful changes. The new law strengthened the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), transforming the special assistants into assistant secretaries, each with statutory responsibilities over different support activities — Administrative and Public Affairs (1), Legal and Legislative Affairs (2), Comptroller (3), and Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance (4). The OSD thus becomes the center of decision and advising and receives the necessary tools to oversee the mechanisms connecting strategic and policy aspects to the practical side of the defense.

In addition, the amendment established the staff agencies to advise and assist the OSD in the operational side of its responsibilities. These agencies were committees and boards composed of civilian and military representatives responsible for implementing a myriad of plans and performing practical activities but limited in their policy-making authority — Office of Public Information, Office of Medical Services, Civilian Components Policy Board, Personnel Policy Board, Munitions Board, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission —. Despite their limited role, it became quickly noticeable to the OSD that the service agencies, due to their proximity to the operational aspects of defense, had a similar potential to interfere with policy and control as did the services and the JCS, thus, as they grew in scope and relevance so did the attention and formal authority imposed on them (Rearden, 1984).

In this new structure, the JCS retained its hierarchical level on par with the staff agencies and remained the primary advisor in professional military affairs to all other decision-makers of national defense within and beyond the DoD. Furthermore, its responsibilities expanded to include the operational coordination of all military activity. Despite the rearrangement of authority promoted by the 1949 amendment, the JCS remained a significant center of power within the DoD and highly influential in national defense affairs.

Overall, the 1947 Act and the 1949 Amendment represented an innovative approach to managing and coordinating national defense in the US. The expected results of establishing the DoD did not come to fruition immediately. However, it initiated the civilian control process. In particular, after 1949, the OSD becomes a powerful tool for managing and overseeing defense affairs.

6.3.2 Streamlining under Eisenhower's Administration



Figure 6.2: 1953's U.S. Department of Defense organizational chart

Source: developed by the author based on (Stevenson, 2005)

President Eisenhower's administration significantly transformed the pre-existing military structure into a more streamlined version. Rather than downsizing the number of units, the reforms strategically aimed at enhancing and optimizing the current ones through status modification or functional and structural reorganization.

Assistant secretaries supplanted most service agencies, a move that marked a significant shift in the balance of power. In the past, the structure of service agencies obstructed civilians from acquiring primary authority, thus placing military representatives on an equal footing. This parity engendered constant inter-branch rivalry and a notable deficiency in civilian control. The establishment of assistant secretaries introduced a system of flexible control and oversight over the personnel in these units and their functions. These assistant secretaries, appointed directly by the Secretary of Defense, assumed executive authority and reporting responsibility over military officials within their units. This adjustment amplified civilian control by curbing military influence at the operational level and instituting a formal hierarchy that vested power in the assistant secretaries.

Eisenhower further bolstered the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as the primary military advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense. As the JCS's spokesperson, the Chairman provided strategic military counsel, ensuring policy decisions were well-informed and operationally viable.

This concentration of advisory power within the Chairman aimed to streamline decision-making processes. The single point of communication for the highest levels of the military mitigated potential bureaucratic hurdles and ensured efficient communication of the military's perspective to the administration's top policymakers. In addition to this, Eisenhower clarified the chain of command between the Secretary

of Defense and the military departments via the JCS. This restructuring meant that orders from the Secretary were conveyed through the Chairman of the JCS to the military departments, thus enhancing the efficiency of military operations by establishing a clear command hierarchy.

Nevertheless, the JCS's role was predominantly advisory under Eisenhower's reforms. Although the Chairman offered insights into military affairs, civilian leadership controlled the ultimate policy-making power. This strategic division of power was crucial in preserving civilian control over the military.

This structural recalibration had far-reaching implications for the balance of power within military administration. Directly resulting from Eisenhower's reforms, civilians within the Department of Defense obtained unprecedented control over military operations. Civilian oversight broadened to cover a more expansive range of military affairs, enhancing the accountability and transparency of the armed forces.

On the other hand, this restructuring decreased the military's formal influence over policy. While the military departments maintained their operational roles, their policy-making authority diminished. In this way, Eisenhower's reforms successfully defined the roles of civilian leadership and military command, striking a balance between operational efficiency and civilian oversight.

6.3.3 Goldwater-Nichols Act



Figure 6.3: 1986's U.S. Department of Defense organizational chart

Source: developed by the author based on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 initiated a monumental transformation within the Department of Defense (DoD), creating a more unified and streamlined structure that continues to govern the organization today. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary sit at the helm of this redesigned structure. Reporting directly to them are the service departments—comprising the Army, Navy, and Air Force—the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Inspector General, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the combatant commands. Beneath the OSD, the Defense Agencies and the DoD Field Activities are two distinct unit groups. This refined hierarchy promotes a more efficient allocation of responsibilities and a clearly delineated chain of command.

Within this hierarchical structure, the primary responsibility for policy-making resides with the Secretary of Defense and the OSD. In contrast, the JCS and the service departments perform primarily as advisory and planning bodies. This clear division of authority expedites the decision-making process and enables the Secretary of Defense to dedicate more attention to shaping policy, leveraging the expertise of military professionals for planning and advisory functions.

Concurrently, the Act reshaped the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Although the JCS, composed of the nation's highest-ranking military officers, traditionally had a significant role in policy formulation, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reassigned them to primarily an advisory function. They provide expert military counsel to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council (NSC) and also spearhead planning activities, translating strategic policies into actionable operational plans.

The NSC, a critical forum for deliberating on national security and foreign policy matters, also benefits from the advisory function of the JCS. The strategic insights and expertise offered by the JCS play a pivotal role in aiding the NSC in making informed decisions concerning national security.

Moreover, individual service departments that manage operations in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force also emphasize planning and advisory functions. This clear demarcation of roles allows the Secretary of Defense to focus on signifi-

cant policy decisions, drawing on the profound operational knowledge of the military professionals for planning and advisory purposes.

The organizational structure introduced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act promotes a more efficient decision-making process within the DoD. The Act facilitates swifter and more effective policy formulation and implementation by defining roles and reducing bureaucratic barriers. Moreover, integrating military professionals' expertise in decision-making ensures that policies are rooted in operational realities.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is integral in assisting the Secretary of Defense, offering vital guidance and coordination across a myriad of defense-related domains. Within the OSD, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries aid the Secretary of Defense in executing their duties, encompassing a broad spectrum of functions. These include:

- **Policy-making:** Undersecretaries and assistant secretaries contribute to the development and execution of defense policies, ensuring alignment with national security objectives and effective response to emerging challenges.
- **Advising:** They provide valuable advice to the Secretary of Defense, drawing upon their specialized expertise in acquisition, technology, or logistics.
- **Personnel oversight:** They supervise the management of DoD personnel, ensuring the department cultivates and retains a skilled and diverse workforce capable of meeting current and future defense requirements.

- **Intelligence:** They facilitate informed decision-making by the Secretary of Defense by delivering timely and accurate intelligence assessments and coordinating closely with the broader intelligence community.
- **Research:** They supervise research and development initiatives within the DoD, guaranteeing the department stays at the cutting edge of technological innovation and successfully integrates emerging technologies into defense strategies and capabilities.

By entrusting specific responsibilities to undersecretaries and assistant secretaries within the OSD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has enabled a more efficient and focused Department of Defense, more adept at responding to the multifaceted and dynamic national security challenges.

6.4 Occupation

The presence of civilians within the Department of Defense (DoD) is vital in balancing military and civilian perspectives, ensuring that defense policies and actions align with broader national interests and democratic principles. Civilians in the DoD occupy various positions, from high-level leadership roles to more specialized areas of expertise. Integrating civilians into the department serves multiple purposes, such as fostering accountability, offering diverse perspectives, and promoting civilian oversight over military affairs. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, civilians have had a

preferential presence in the OSD, with exceptions granted by the president's request and congressional approval. Civilians are the leadership of the DoD and retain most of the politically appointed seats at all levels of the structure.

Civilians have occupied several top positions in the structure, most notably in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which currently serves as the principal power center of the DoD and holds overall authority over it. In addition to leadership roles, civilian oversight is another essential component of civilian presence in the DoD. The presence of civilians in high-level decision-making roles ensures that defense policies remain aligned with broader national interests and adhere to democratic principles. Civilian oversight helps maintain a system of checks and balances, preventing the undue influence of military perspectives and supporting a balanced approach to national security.



Figure 6.4: Yearly Civilian Personnel Percentage (1954-2019)

Source: developed by the author based on Defense Manpower Data Center's data.

Workforce composition is a crucial contention point in the DoD; arguments for the presence of civilians or military in specific posts are plenty. The presence of civilians contributing in non-military essential posts serves, in theory, to develop and implement better defense policies and programs by offering a wide range of expertise and perspectives foreign to military training and reducing workforce costs for the government (Eisler, 2017). Their backgrounds may span science, engineering, economics, law, and management. This diversity of experience and knowledge enriches decision-making, promoting innovative solutions to complex defense challenges. However, over the years since the establishment of the DoD, different perspectives and interests have played a role in the size and distribution of these actors in the DoD structure. Rear-

rangements in the number of civilians occupying posts beyond leadership respond to pressures from the military and Congress.

Civilianization of non-military essential positions is an effective cost-reduction method, which the perspective of Congress, makes the government more cost-efficient. Military personnel has a series of benefits beyond salary, which impact them; the forces pay housing stipends, unique retirement, family stipends, and many other perks that make them much more costly than their civilian counterparts. Thus Congress frequently pressures the DoD to favor civilians when hiring new employees.

The military pressure for the reduced presence of civilians in non-military essential positions stems from different concerns. The military sees the presence of civilians in certain positions as detrimental to troop cohesion as it may bring into the military context outsiders that do not necessarily share the same perspectives and experiences as the rest of the units, negatively impactful career progression as it reduces the opportunities and types of positions that soldiers may occupy, and even influencing combat capabilities as often support positions need to be deployed into conflict zones and having civilians occupy those reduces the number of combatants available in emergencies.

Beyond the cost, opting between civilian and military personnel impacts the line of command. Despite serving in non-military posts, the military individual respects hierarchy; thus, when given a choice to hire civilians or the military for new support-

ing positions, military leaders prefer the military as they expect these to be more disciplined and easier to control.

Table 6.1: OSD and JCS Personnel (1956, 1957 and 1960)

	1956		1957		1960	
	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil
Office of the Secretary	73	60	39	48	143	57
Director of Defense Research and Engineering	192	63	147	17	244	90
ASD International Security Affairs	0	0	216	86	215	92
ASD Comptroller	142	6	147	4	172	1
ASD Supply and Logistics	492	25	257	16	180	13
ASD Properties and Installations	73	0	70	0	61	0
ASD Manpower, Personnel and Reserve	254	71	211	63	85	43
ASD Health and Medical	11	9	11	10	11	9
ASD Public Affairs	0	0	74	50	75	55
General Counsel;	47	0	58	0	57	0
SA Special Operations	5	3	12	6	17	8
SA Atomic Energy	13	19	12	19	12	17
SA Legislative Affairs	93	52	7	5	7	8
Special Programs	5	3	13	3	42	3
Joint Chiefs of Staff	177	312	176	311	304	614
Total	1577	623	1450	638	1625	1010

Source: Prepared by the author with data available on (Watson, 1997).

The graph in Figure 6.4 and Tables 6.1 and 6.2 detail the trends in different moments of civilian occupation; they show that civilians have historically occupied between 24% and 40% of positions in the entire structure of DoD, including the agencies, special organizations, and forces.

Table 6.1 displays the occupation of the DoD central units between 1957 and 1960 and a distribution that favored civilians, with most units having more civilians than military hired. This distribution clarifies that civilians consistently compose a third of the workforce and occupy the higher units of the DoD.

Table 6.2: OSD and JCS Personnel (1998 and 1999)

Units	1998		1999	
	Civ	Mil	Civ	Mil
Office of the Secretary of Defense	1443	4493	1357	4400
The Joint Chiefs of Staff	199	—	195	—
Inspector General of the Department of Defense	1203	1202	1202	1186
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces	55	—	59	—
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences	712	—	701	—
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization	328	—	321	—
DA: Advanced Research Projects	133	—	134	—
DA: Commissary	19779	18503	20062	18425
DA: Contract Audit	4058	3412	3975	3979
Defense Finance and Accounting Service	17991	17991	18388	17961
DA: Information System	6350	6332	6146	6202
DA: Legal Services	84	—	76	—
DA: Logistics	41443	40984	40648	40814
DA: Security Assistance	104	—	120	—
Defense Security Service	2433	2492	2472	2433
DA: Special Weapons	898	—	909	—

Source: elaborated by the author with data available on DMDC.

As illustrated in Table 6.2, there has been a discernible shift in the composition of the Department of Defense's top units over time. The data reveals a consistent decrease in the proportion of civilian personnel, a trend so pronounced that the balance has, in some units, completely reversed in favor of military personnel. These findings emerge from careful examination of data gleaned from various government reports, underscoring the dynamic nature of the workforce within these critical organizational units.

However, it is imperative to understand the limitations and context of this data. Due to the nature of the source material, some figures were not accessible or available for inclusion in these tables. The numbers included here encompass the totality of civilian employees and military personnel assigned to these units, which span a wide range of roles and responsibilities. They include not just leadership positions but also mid-level managers, technical specialists, and other support roles within the organization.

Furthermore, the data does not inherently provide a clear metric for assessing civilian dominance or supremacy in leadership positions within these units. Interpreting these figures requires careful consideration and a nuanced understanding of the underlying organizational structure and dynamics.

Table 6.3: Department of Defense's Civilian and Military personnel in Leadership Positions

	2018			2022		
	Total	Civilians	Military	Total	Civilians	Military
Office of the Secretary of Defense	23	20	0	25	25	0
Joint Chiefs of Staff	27	0	27	29	1	28
Assistant Secretaries of Defense	15	14	0*	18	16	0*
Service Departments	30	21	9	33	22	11
Agencies and Field Activities	27	19	8	28	20	8

Source: elaborated by the author based on 1) virginiatap.org and 2) acqirc.org

The structural dynamics of the Department of Defense (DoD) under the most recent administrations - specifically, the years 2018 and 2022 (Table 6.3) - exemplify the enduring influence of political appointments. These appointments have solidified the presence of civilians within the department, serving as pivotal enforcers of civilian oversight across all levels and functions. Under the Trump administration, which faced criticism for its alleged attempts to politicize the forces, there was significant civilian representation in the leadership hierarchy. Even with the appointment of a recently retired military officer as Secretary of Defense, the number of civilians occupying leadership positions outweighed their military counterparts. This robust

civilian representation continued and was further reinforced under the subsequent Biden administration, underscoring the crucial role of civilians within defense leadership.

The civilian presence within the DoD introduces a diverse range of expertise, facilitating a multi-disciplinary approach to tackling defense-related challenges. Their role is not confined to policy-making; it also extends to the realms of oversight and regulation, fostering accountability within the department. Moreover, civilian involvement encourages robust civil-military cooperation, contributing to a well-rounded and inclusive approach to defense strategy.

These contributions from civilians—ranging from providing critical oversight to driving strategic policy-making and fostering civil-military cooperation—play a significant role in equipping the department to navigate complex defense challenges. This collective effort helps create a resilient defense system capable of safeguarding the nation's interests, both at home and abroad.

6.5 Applying the Model

This study aims to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing the Department of Defense (DoD) by considering civilian and military personnel as agents within a principal-agent-agent model. This model assumes that civilians and military personnel possess similar capabilities to perform policy-related tasks, make decisions, and apply their expertise. Consequently, the principal can exert greater

control over military activities by expanding the available information channels and minimizing the knowledge gap between itself and the agents. Upon examining the data collected about the DoD, it becomes evident that this framework is applicable in the United States.

6.5.1 The Agents

The military in the US is a powerful agent. They are experts in their craft, managing considerable soldiers and operatives on and off the field and a gargantuan budget covering various missions and projects with different technical requirements. The high complexity of the national defense environment makes it difficult for outsiders to navigate and interpret information about it[33], which makes shirking a real possibility for the forces. Over the years, the military has, by structural demand, focused more on the strategic-operational side, often counting on civilian counterparts to perform policy decisions. It is also fundamental to mention that the forces, given their size and vote-producing capacity, are politically influential and have, on many occasions, mustered support and gained advocates within the administration and legislature, which often pressured for increased budgets, prevented changes in structure, and constantly advanced military interests. These characteristics are a dangerous combination as the agent, if left unmonitored, may shirk its responsibilities and use its political influence to avoid punishment.

[33]Data available to civilians and most government officials is severely restricted and codified.

On the other side of the structure are the civilian agents. Skilled bureaucrats with policy and decision-making capabilities surpassing those of their military counterparts, civilians in the DoD operate from a place of power and constant presence, often occupying the higher leadership positions and various posts all the way to the bottom of the operational structure; civilians oversee the military closely. They are the majority in leadership positions and constantly communicate and coordinate with the political principal while also being a constant presence in lower levers of the hierarchy, which makes it hard to isolate implementation from oversight. In addition, the DoD frequently hires civilians due to their technical capacity and experience in government or in managing defense resources, which makes them capable of, at least partially, understanding the complex nature of defense, positively contributing to its effective management, and identifying misconduct. This dynamic often allows civilian agents to impose decisions on the military agent, ensuring a balanced power distribution and authority within the department.

6.5.2 The Principal

It is necessary to highlight that the structure established in the US has a two-headed, highly-powerful political principal, with the president and Congress sharing plenty of influence, authority, and oversight capabilities both over the DoD and directly over the forces. In many instances, Congress demands formal explanations over budgets and programs directly from the military. As described in the section regard-

ing leadership and context, the relationship between Congress and secretaries plays a major role in how much change and influence the latter can impose over the DoD. Meanwhile, the DoD, in particular the Secretary of Defense, possesses the capacity to appoint its subordinates, both civilians and military, to most positions along the structure and, on occasion, even determine promotions of flag officers, which gives them a vast amount of control and influence over leadership in the structure.

It is important to recognize that the political principal in the United States may sometimes overshadow civilian agents. Congress, Presidents, and Secretaries using their powers can dictate the organization's pace, dynamics, and overall direction. This phenomenon can lead to, on occasion, civilian agents acting as an extension of the principal rather than as independent entities with their agendas and perspectives. However, this scenario is less frequent and relies on a combination of factors, including extreme conditions where defense is at the center of attention, like in the aftermath of 9/11, or the political representatives have a particular agenda like Forrestal, McNamara, and Eisenhower.

In contrast, there have been instances where civilian agents impeded the principal's interests, particularly in efforts to transform the structure and organization of the DoD; a prominent example was the attempts to transform the structure by Harold Brown that the bureaucrats stifled. These obstacles often arise due to differences in priorities, opinions, or long-term strategic visions between the civilian agents and the political principal. Changes in formal structures and institutional arrange-

ments require skill and patience as many frictions emerge; bureaucrats are resistant to change and will constantly fight for the status quo; such friction can result in delays, suboptimal decision-making, or even policy gridlock.

6.6 The Assessment

This study suggests that Peter Feaver's (2003) conception of civilians as extensions of the principal is not entirely inaccurate, but it does warrant further scrutiny. While it is evident that the principal occasionally exerts an overriding influence on the structure and the agent, this research reveals a more nuanced picture. It shows that civilians undertake a broad spectrum of responsibilities that extend well beyond monitoring and control in their roles within the bureaucracy. In carrying out these responsibilities, they wield significant influence. Additionally, civilians frequently manage to advance their interests within this setting. According to Feaver's theory, such maneuverings should be immaterial, given that civilians ostensibly serve as representatives of the principal. However, the evidence gathered in this study calls this assumption into question, suggesting a more complex interplay of power and influence within the bureaucratic framework.

The Pentagon, often called a "maze of bureaucracy," is renowned for its ability to resist or impede decision-making processes due to its intricate structure (Rearden, 1984; Watson, 1997; Kaplan et al., 2006; Drea, 2011). This level of resistance is such that various political leaders have earned accolades for their skill in managing its

complexities. For instance, during Secretary Brown's leadership, the bureaucratic machinery of the Pentagon showed considerable pushback against the reforms he proposed, which the President also supported. These reforms intended to decrease the total number of units and centralize responsibilities. However, the bureaucracy reluctantly responded to these high-level directives, initiating only minor changes that reshuffled units rather than reduced them.

Under Eisenhower, recognizing the value of diverse perspectives, the President encouraged civilian officials to play a more proactive role in formulating defense policy. As a result, these bureaucrats began generating policy drafts, providing opinions, and writing briefs. These were not mere administrative exercises; these documents contained unique insights and strategic perspectives of the individuals who created them. They encapsulated the bureaucrats' interests, their interpretations of global and national security environments, their expectations concerning strategic decisions, and their visions of future military operations. Over time, this practice became embedded in the culture of the civilian bureaucracy within the Department of Defense. Having been given a platform to voice their strategic perspectives, these civilian officials grew accustomed to their roles as critical contributors to the policy-making process.

A significant turning point in the Johnson administration was the replacement of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara with Clark Clifford in 1968. This transition has been partially attributed to the considerable strains McNamara experienced due

to the challenging nature of managing the Pentagon's vast bureaucracy. McNamara, known for his rigorous analytical methods and systems-based approach to management, had been tasked with transforming the Department of Defense, a complex entity riddled with longstanding traditions and entrenched interests. The intricate task of controlling this bureaucracy, grappling with competing interests, and implementing policy changes, posed an enormous challenge. As time passed, the toll of managing this elaborate bureaucratic machinery became more apparent. McNamara, once a dynamic force for change, appeared increasingly worn down by the relentless demands of his position. This exhaustion played a significant role in President Johnson's decision to replace McNamara with Clifford, a seasoned Washington insider known for his political savvy and skill at navigating the corridors of power.

In conclusion, given the demonstrable autonomy and influence of the civilian agent within the Department of Defense, the principal-agent-agent model proposed in this research presents a more accurate and insightful framework for understanding and analyzing the DoD when compared to the traditional principal-agent paradigm.

Chapter 7

Comparisons & Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter presents a systematic comparison of the analyzed cases from Brazil, France, and the United States, drawing conclusions and unearthing patterns from these diverse political and institutional landscapes. I have meticulously studied civilians' roles, institutional structures, and historical evolutions of defense departments in these countries, applying a novel theoretical framework - the Principal-Agent-Agent (PAA) model. The unique elements, similarities, and contrasts discovered in this cross-case study are presented and examined in depth in the following sections.

Each section of this chapter dedicates to a component of the PAA framework: the Principal, Agent 1, and Agent 2. I will conduct a comparative analysis of

each element, drawing from the case-specific conclusions I have previously discussed. This comparative analysis aims to delve deeper into understanding the underlying commonalities and distinctions in the civil-military relationships in these countries, thereby offering a more comprehensive picture of the dynamics at play.

For ease of understanding, each aspect of the findings is neatly summarized and presented in tabular form. This visual representation facilitates a more intuitive comparison across cases and aids in comprehending complex institutional interplay. While discussing the findings, I will also underscore how the results reinforce or challenge the existing literature on civil-military relations and their implications for the PAA framework.

In addition to the comparative analysis, I reflect upon the adaptability and utility of the PAA framework based on its application to these three cases. I critically evaluate how effectively the PAA model managed to capture the realities of each case, the adjustments I made in the process, and the lessons I have learned about the framework itself.

This chapter provides a cross-case comparison and takes a step back to analyze the broader implications of my findings. It hopes to contribute to the ongoing academic discourse on civil-military relations, offering insights that could guide future research.

7.2 Cases and Framework

Table 7.1: Selection and Model Findings by Case

	Brazil	**France**	**United States**
Case Selection Type	Negative	Positive	Deviant
Civilian Control	Low	High	High
Two-Agent Model	No	Yes	Yes
One-Agent Model	Yes	No	No

Source: elaborated by author

Table 7.1 provides a summary of the selection criteria and the application of the model across cases. Brazil is the negative case in this analysis, given its preliminary display of no solid civilian control over the military. In contrast, France emerges as the positive case with a high degree of anticipated civilian control. The United States is a deviant case, not due to its level of civilian control but because it presents a unique case study that has inspired previous research to which this current study responds.

Consistent with expectations, Brazil demonstrates low levels of civilian control; there is minimal evidence to suggest that civilians exert substantial oversight or control over the military, which enjoys significant freedom and influence over decision-making and policy within the country. Despite gradual improvements in the Ministry

of Defense's[1] (MD) structure over time, the evidence suggests that the military primarily operates most units within this increasingly robust and focused institution.

On examining the two frameworks discussed in this research — Feaver's (2003) and Avant's (2007) one-agent model (PA) and the two-agent model (PAA) proposed in this study — it is apparent that Brazil aligns more with the former. The evidence suggests that civilians in National Defense are not separate agents but a limited extension of the principal, executing severely restricted monitoring functions.

In contrast, the French case displays robust and active civilian control. The evidence highlights well-established mechanisms allowing civilians to exert full control over National Defense and the military. The Ministry of the Armies'[2] (MdA) structure is complex and robust, promoting transparency and clearly delineating functions. Civilians are represented at all levels and effectively oversee all aspects of Defense.

Concerning the theoretical models, France epitomizes the two-agent model. Civilians and the military operate as independent agents performing complementary tasks. Particularly, civilians act as a separate entity from the political leadership (principal), responding to it without merely serving as extensions.

In the United States, as expected, civilian control is well-established. Civilians within the robust structure of the Department of Defense (DoD) exert strong oversight

[1]Ministério da Defesa

[2]Ministère des Armées

over the military. Additionally, the U.S. case reveals unique oversight elements that extend beyond the DoD and enhance civilian control through non-bureaucratic means.

Although Feaver's (2003) original work uses the United States as the primary case study, the two-agent model proposed in this research provides a more accurate depiction of the U.S. Department of Defense's structure and function. At first glance, the principal, with its extensive powers and myriad oversight mechanisms, might appear as the only entity besides the military. This perception, however, overlooks the significant autonomy and influence that civilians within the DoD exercise. Notably, these civilian agents have demonstrated their independence by opposing political pressures, even resisting top-level mandates such as during Secretary Brown's attempted reforms. Therefore, while the simplicity of the single-agent model might make it appealing, it falls short of capturing the complexity and nuances of the U.S. DoD's civilian-military dynamic. By accounting for the independent role of civilians within the DoD, the two-agent model offers a more precise and nuanced understanding of this relationship.

7.2.1 Principal

Table 7.2: Summary of Findings about the Principal by Case

Case	Controls					Principal
	Attention	Legislative	Budget	Bureaucracy	Information	
BRA	Low	Low	High	Low	Low	Weak
FRA	Medium	High	High	High	High	Strong
USA	High	High	High	Medium	High	Strong

Source: elaborated by author

Table 7.2 provides a summary of the findings concerning the principal in each case. The role of the principal in the proposed PAA model parallels that in the original PA model, which entails delegating tasks and monitoring the performance of agents. A potent principal typically elicits optimal performance from agents by clearly expressing its goals, taking an active interest in activities, obtaining information regarding field performance, and exerting control over agents using a variety of mechanisms to prevent shirking and suboptimal achievements. While all these characteristics are significant for a principal, some are more impactful and consequential than others. An inattentive principal can induce serious problems by giving imprecise and conflicting directives to agents.

This research finds that the **principal** in Brazil is **extremely weak**. The collected evidence indicates a lack of interest in defense issues among both the political elite and the wider society. This lack of attention triggers a cascade effect—since voters display little interest in Defense, so do their representatives. As a result, there is minimal legislative activity — reports, laws, decrees, or commissions — that could guide and oversee Defense. Coupled with a scarcity of expertise on the topic, the principal struggles to access information regarding Defense, rendering the MD and its subordinate units enigmatic black boxes to the principal. In this context, the principal often opts to limit Defense resources rather than establish sophisticated mechanisms to enforce their correct usage. Thus, budget control, usually enacted through budget cuts rather than allocation monitoring, becomes the principal's main control tool.

In France and the U.S., the **principal** is **strong**, though this strength is asserted differently in each case. In France, the relevance of National Defense affairs has decreased over time, which has subsequently diminished the attention accorded by society and political elites. Nevertheless, due to the country's long military tradition and global conflict involvement, attention to defense has not disappeared completely.

A notable feature of the French case is its established transparency structure. National Defense regularly encounters legislative activity, with the National Assembly, Senate, and Cabinet producing yearly legislation and reports on it. The country also possesses a robust bureaucratic structure that oversees the execution of all defense

activities with a clear chain of command and delineated responsibilities. Budget control, paired with a robust bureaucracy, allows the French government to maintain a tight grip on Defense. Based on the evidence, the MdA's bureaucracy is the primary control mechanism for Defense affairs, with most routine legislative activity relying on information provided by the organization.

The U.S. principal exhibits the highest level of attention among the cases. National Defense, a defining topic for Americans, drives votes, job creation, and substantial investment and thus receives extensive legislative and budgetary scrutiny. Directing the DoD's budget is a source of prestige and an effective means of garnering electoral attention for Senators and Representatives.

The activities of the DoD, being the most well-funded in the world, are likely also the most heavily monitored. Regular information requests, congressional hearings, and legislation greatly influence the direction, focus, and scope of National Defense. The American political elite primarily employs legislative activity to maintain firm control over National Defense. Moreover, the DoD's structure incorporates a strong bureaucracy with extensive monitoring capabilities that facilitate congressional access to information regarding its activities. According to the evidence, successful Secretaries of Defense often maintain solid relations with Congress.

Comparing the cases, it is evident that the principal's power predominantly stems from its attention to the topic. Principals demonstrating high interest in Defense establish more diverse and potent mechanisms to regulate its activities.

7.2.2 Agent 1 - The Military

Table 7.3: Summary of Findings About Agent 1 by Cases

Case	Bureaucracy Autonomy	Structural Presence	Political Influence	Missions		Information Control	Agent
				Dom.	For.		
BRA	High	High	High	High	Low	High	**Strong**
FRA	Low	Varying	Low	Low	High	Low	**Strong**
USA	Low	Medium	High	Low	High	Low	**Strong**

Source: Elaborated by authors.

Table 7.3 presents the characteristics of the military (**Agent 1**) in each case. A constant and potent component in both one-agent and two-agent models, the military's strength is not related to its military capability but to its influence over National Defense, either directly or indirectly. The table highlights the most relevant attributes of the principal, reflecting their capacity to impact particular aspects of National Defense.

In Brazil, the gathered evidence indicates a powerful and unregulated agent. Bureaucratically separated from other government units, the military conducts most internal processes and tasks autonomously with little to no external supervision. Simultaneously, it has representatives with advisory and decision-making capacities at all levels of the National Defense management structure, strengthening its grasp and influence beyond its fundamental roles. Moreover, by controlling the majority of the

information, the military can restrict other actors' access. Previous research notes that the military in Brazil tends to focus on domestic missions that increase its political influence. The evidence gathered in this research corroborates this and adds that in recent years, the forces have amplified their political sway, with numerous former military members being elected to executive and legislative positions[3] at different levels of government.

In contrast, the historically influential French military has lost much of its power in the past century. Pressures from the political leadership for a more professionalized, rapidly mobilizable force with specialized training led to a transformation of the French military. Changes in the rules imposed earlier retirements and shorter deployments, thereby increasing turnover in command positions and reducing officers' ability to accumulate political influence[4]. With the establishment of the modern defense structure, the military has progressively lost control and become an integral part of the government, with most of its processes subject to significant external scrutiny.

There are, however, certain nuances to the military as Agent 1 in France. Firstly, while the French military occupies a minor part of the *Ministère des Armées*, its presence in units varies according to military deployment. Units directly attached to areas with active military missions tend to have more military officials in their ranks. This suggests that civilian leadership might delegate more tasks to the military under

[3]Jair Bolsonaro, elected president in 2018, was a reformed Army captain, for example.

[4]Prior to the GPRF Generals retired well into their 70s and occupied positions frequently for more than a decade.

specific circumstances, potentially increasing the forces' influence over the structure and autonomy to act. Secondly, the forces have specialized and developed expertise in several areas that may be beyond the comprehension of civilian officials. Consequently, despite occupying a position with less political power, the French military retains significant strength and, if left unchecked, may undermine civilian control.

A similar situation prevails in the US, where the military, integral to the state and American culture, conducts many of its processes in connection with other government units under heavy external supervision. The military's role as a vote driver and job creator endows it with political leverage and support. Moreover, since the early 20th century, the US armed forces have developed advanced expertise and technology, making them indispensable state tools.

Considering its role within the Department of Defense, available evidence suggests that, unlike in France, the military's presence in the National Defense structure in the US does not vary according to deployment or the relevance of assignment. This means that military officials do not necessarily occupy more positions in units directly connected to active missions. This consistency implies that civilian leadership does not believe their presence and leadership compromises expediency and efficiency in decisions and that the military, though influential, does not directly influence seat allocation. These characteristics combined constitute a potent agent that, under specific conditions such as wartime, rapid technological advancement, or shifts in public opinion, may evade civilian control.

As previously stated, all three cases feature potent military agents. It's important to highlight that, under the two-agent approach, the power of the military agent is not necessarily reduced. However, the structure and dynamics of this approach make it less likely that the military will wield its power and influence in a way that could undermine civilian control.

7.2.3 Agent 2 - Civilians

Table 7.4: Summary of Findings About Agent 2 by Cases

Case	Tenure	Ministry Training	Leadership Positions	Political Appointee	Contracts		Knowledge		Agent
					Short	Long	Tech	Def	
BRA	No	Low	Low	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	**Weak**
FRA	Yes	High	High	Low	Med.	High	High	High	**Strong**
USA	Yes	Low	High	Low	Med.	Med.	High	High	**Strong**

Source: elaborated by author.

Table 7.4 presents a summary of the findings regarding the civilians (**Agent 2**) in each case. Agent 2 is the pivotal element of this research, making this section a significant contribution. The analysis focuses on key elements identified initially and during the research.

The first element, **Tenure**, refers to job security and turnover. It denotes whether civilians in the institutions have stable contracts with fixed terms or are subject to

frequent replacement. In Brazil, civilians do not enjoy any stability concerning their assignments or within the institution, indicating that political pressure could result in reassignment or neglect. In contrast, France and the US employ civilians under competitive, fixed-term contracts associated with specific units, providing them with greater job stability.

The level of **Ministry Training** available to civilians reflects the workforce's preparedness for ministry-specific tasks. This factor impacts the workforce's understanding of bureaucratic processes and its ability to oversee and identify shirking. France stands out among the cases as the only one where civilians have established training mechanisms and programs through dedicated schools and colleges. According to the interviews, Brazil and the US provide minimal training for their civilians, with Brazil's most recent iterations remarkably taking place within a day.

Evaluating the **Leadership Positions** occupied by civilians helps us gauge their ability to control the military and policy. Brazil, with the fewest civilians in leadership positions, significantly lags behind. While France and the US maintain a high proportion of civilians in relevant seats, Brazil has a limited civilian presence and crucial positions under military control.

The number of **Political Appointees** within the civilian workforce influences the extent of the workforce's ties to political leadership. Institutions with higher levels of political appointees are more likely to align with the principal's interests and serve as monitoring tools. Conversely, civilian workforces with fewer political

appointees tend to function as separate entities, better equipped to perform tasks beyond monitoring. In this aspect, Brazil, with a substantial portion of its workforce composed of political appointees, significantly contrasts with France, which has few political appointees, and the US, which has a medium number.

Whether civilians are on **Contracts** also affects the workforce's relationship with political leadership. Contracts with fixed terms protect workers from political pressure from the principal and military. Moreover, contributing to national defense requires time for workers to acclimate to their tasks. Consequently, workforces with lower turnover rates have more opportunities to contribute significantly. Brazil employs the fewest workers on contract, while France engages large numbers of civilians on short and long-term contracts.

The final element, **Knowledge**, bifurcates into **Technical** and **Defense** types. Technical knowledge pertains to bureaucratic and management aspects and influences the workforce's ability to perform routine tasks, including overseeing procedures, budgets, and resource allocation. Defense knowledge, on the other hand, impacts the workforce's capacity to understand and influence policy, strategy, and end activities. According to the evidence, Brazil ranks low on both types of knowledge, while the US and France rank high.

Despite being major world powers with substantial defense needs, France and the US employ quite different strategies to build their defense workforces. In the US, the approach to hiring does not typically include direct training by the government or the

military. Instead, the focus is on bringing in individuals with extensive experience and advanced education including seasoned managers with proven track records in their respective fields and academically trained civilians who bring high levels of technical expertise and defense knowledge. Often hired from outside the government, from sectors such as academia, private industry, and non-profit research organizations, these individuals bring their pre-existing skills and knowledge to their roles within the defense structure.

On the other hand, France takes a more directed and comprehensive approach to recruiting and preparing its defense workforce. The government often targets individuals from within academia and other branches of the government for recruitment. This process is highly competitive, designed to select those individuals who demonstrate the capacity to perform the specific tasks required by their roles. In addition to this rigorous selection process, France invests heavily in the training and development of its recruits. This commitment to training ensures that these individuals are qualified and well-prepared for the specific demands and challenges of their roles within the Ministère des Armées. This approach contributes to a high competency and specialization within the workforce. Once hired, these individuals carry out their duties within the framework of the defense structure, applying their carefully cultivated skills and knowledge to contribute their expertise to the overarching goals of the Ministère des Armées.

7.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, this research has proposed a novel framework for civil-military relations, utilizing a two-agent model that perceives civilians as multifaceted actors whose contributions to national Defense depend on their capacities. Unlike previous civil-military approaches that treated civilians as secondary or merely extensions of other actors, this framework scrutinizes their characteristics and determines the key elements influencing their contribution quality.

The original impetus for this research was to address the question, "How do we watch the watchers?" Limited literature in civil-military studies has explored civilian participants' necessary characteristics and various activities. Peter Feaver's (2003) analysis of civilians in the US Department of Defense, which regarded civilians as a monitoring tool and an extension of the political principal, was a notable exception. However, as this research has demonstrated, while Feaver's model intriguingly applies more to Brazil than the US, such an approach restricts our understanding of the phenomenon.

The analysis of other cases reveals that civilians, under varying circumstances, are indeed complex actors who can contribute far beyond mere monitoring and oversight in Defense. These civilians behave as independent entities with potentially divergent interests from political leadership or military factions. Their relationship with the principal determines their Defense contributions. France and the US showcase civilian

actors who often align their interests with political leadership, exerting stringent control over the military and ensuring efficient defense resource management.

It is worth noting that even in cases where civilians are influential actors, the mechanisms for achieving such conditions differ significantly. While France heavily invests in training its workforce and recruiting academically trained individuals, the US prefers to hire more experienced workers with external training and invests less in in-house training. Both strategies yield notable outcomes.

The key difference between these cases, and the corresponding theoretical frameworks, lies in the composition of the civilian workforce. As Peter Feaver (2003) describes, a workforce dominated by political appointees often acts as an extension of the principal, focusing on monitoring. However, competitively selected, well-trained, and strategically positioned civilians contribute as second agents.

One factor that appears to impact the outcome is the level of interest political leadership shows toward defense issues. As literature often highlights, Brazil's lack of attention to defense issues has seemingly hindered the politicians' desire to develop control mechanisms. Conversely, France and the US have instances where political leadership expressed substantial interest in defense matters, resulting in robust control structures over politically influential militaries. De Gaulle's France and Truman's US initiated decades-long efforts, yielding strong structures for military control. Similarly, Brazil saw brief periods of positive transformation under Nelson Jobim when political leadership turned its attention to Defense.

This study also draws attention to the structure of defense institutions. It is important to note that complex structures do not necessarily lead to greater relevance in Defense. Despite increasing complexity over time, Brazil's Ministry of Defense (MD) yields limited control due to its personnel. In contrast, the US's more straightforward structure since the 1980s provides precise oversight and command chains. France follows a similar pattern, adjusting the structure's complexity while improving its grasp on Defense issues. Though not a primary factor, ministry structures do hold some significance. Highly complex structures with convoluted command chains often yield suboptimal results and adversely impact civilian control and military efficiency. The French case between 1948 and 1958 exemplifies this, where the complicated structure of National Defense mixed with the French national government resulted in multiple command chains, enabling the military to retain autonomy and political influence.

7.4 Future Research

This research framework opens up new pathways for exploring civil-military relations, focusing on civilian roles. The selected cases offer a range of civilian control scenarios but allow space for adding more cases, especially from non-western countries not included in the current study.

An additional intriguing dimension left open for further exploration by this research is the concept of non-cooperative agents. This dimension could include instances where the interests of civilians and political leadership are not aligned or

where civilians and the military compete for power and influence. Both cases analyzed in this study, where civilians act as independent agents, show primarily aligned interests between civilians and the political principal and cooperative interactions between civilians and the military. Further investigation into the dynamics of non-cooperative relationships could yield valuable insights into how these power struggles impact civil-military relations and contribute to national defense.

In addition to the facets of civilian involvement discussed in this research, several other factors can potentially influence the efficacy of the two-agent framework in civil-military relations. For instance, social attention to defense issues plays a significant role. Public awareness and engagement can influence political priorities, possibly affecting the level of investment and focus given to defense matters by civilians and the political leadership.

Another key factor is the availability of academic training and professional development for civilians in defense-related disciplines. A robust infrastructure for training civilians in defense-related subjects enhances their ability to contribute to the sector meaningfully, not merely as a monitoring extension of the political principal but as competent agents able to understand and influence policy, strategy, and operations.

Finally, we should not disregard the role of media activity and the press in defense matters. A vigilant and well-informed media can critically hold the military accountable, illuminate issues that could otherwise remain hidden, and offer a platform for public discourse and debate. The presence of such an active media can further rein-

force civilian control by promoting transparency and providing an additional layer of oversight.

These factors underscore the multi-dimensionality of civil-military relations and the need for a comprehensive approach beyond simple monitoring and control. The two-agent framework, as proposed in this research, provides a strong starting point for this comprehensive analysis, and these additional factors further enrich the understanding of the dynamics at play.

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