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IRVINE

Unity Defective: Figurations of Sovereignty in Early Modern English Literature

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in English

by

James Biddinger Funk

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Victoria Silver, Co-Chair
Professor Julia Reinhard Lupton, Co-Chair
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2018

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DEDICATION

To

My parents,
in loving thanks.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Unity Defective: Figurations of Sovereignty in Early Modern English Literature

By

James Biddinger Funk

Doctor of Philosophy in English

University of California, Irvine, 2018

Professor Victoria Silver and Professor Julia Lupton, Co-Chairs

This dissertation traces the role of figural language and aesthetic form in representations of English political sovereignty between 1589 and 1674. The ideological power of the monarch emerges in part from his or her association with various figures of authority, including the father, the human mind, and God; I show that early modern poets—including George Puttenham, William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Andrew Marvell, and John Milton—disrupt the connection between the monarch and his or her metaphoric vehicles, highlighting contradiction rather than presupposing the union of the sensible body and the intelligible figure in the ruler. At the same time, they often register nostalgia for an idealized political past that ironically resembles monarchical order. Not only is this temporal predicament crucial for understanding the patterns of revolution and restoration that characterize the seventeenth century, but I argue that the same dynamic is at work in contemporary critical accounts of the period: recent interest in embodiment and aesthetics risks repeating T. S. Eliot's nostalgia for early modern England as a cultural space where thought and sense could intersect, forgetting the problematic political implications of such fusion. In moving from the Elizabethan era to the Restoration, I do not seek to provide a narrative of progressive political demystification; rather, I chart an ambivalence

about monarchy that emerges from the legal and figural grounding of sovereignty itself. It is for this reason that the fantasies of order and control once associated with the king return among even the most ostensibly radical republicans and in later moments of the critical tradition, including our own.

INTRODUCTION

In a 1610 speech to Parliament, English monarch James I justifies kingship by considering the "three principall similitudes that illustrate the state of MONARCHIE":

> In the Scriptures kings are called gods, and so their power after a certaine relation compared to the Diuine power. Kings are also compared to Fathers of families: for a king is truly *Parens patriae*, the politique father of his people. And lastly, kings are compared to the head of this Microcosme of the body of man. (181)

The king's argument highlights the crucial role of figural language (and its proper interpretation) in the ideology of monarchy, unsurprising given the predominance of analogical thinking in early modern England.[1] James draws on figural relationships that encompass much of human existence and belief, setting up a series of correspondences that demonstrate the connection between not only the human and divine realms, but also between the family and the state and the intellect and the body. The difficulty of maintaining James's symbolic system becomes clear, however, in the post-civil war era, even among those arguing for the return of monarchy. In his 1652 *Observations Upon Aristotle's Politiques*, Robert Filmer defends the legitimacy of divine right kingship against republicanism by tracing the conditions of possibility for representation in each form of government. According to Filmer, the notion that there ever existed "an independent multitude who at first had a natural right to a community" is "a fiction or fancy" used to rationalize republicanism (236), whereas the king's position in society can be justified on "natur[al]" grounds since "the first kings were fathers of families," a fact confirmed for Filmer not only by Aristotle's *Politics* but, more importantly, by Adam's position in Genesis (237). This theological defense of kingship, which resembles James's, also leads to Filmer's claim that "the supreme power being an indivisible beam of majesty, cannot be divided among, or settled upon a multitude. God would have it fixed in one person, not sometimes in one part of the people and sometimes in another" (238). The problem with republican forms of government, Filmer thus argues, is that a group of representatives can never adequately account for each citizen in society, rendering impossible "a true or full representation of the whole people of the nation, the representers of one part or other being absent" from assembly. To supplement this absence, representatives must be "imagined to be the people" (274), an assumption that will have no basis in reality since "the people, to speak truly and properly, is a thing or body in continual alteration and change" (277).

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[1] The most influential (if equally maligned) account of this system of correspondences remains Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture*.

While one might assume that this signifying situation, which depends for its legitimacy on the imperfections of the imagination rather than empirical fact, would find an alternative in the embodied unity of a single monarch, it is curious that Filmer draws on the very imagination he condemns in his critique of republicanism to defend loyalty to the sovereign. Noting that "it hath been said that there have been so many usurpations by conquest in all kingdoms that all kings are usurpers, or the heirs or successors of usurpers," Filmer claims in *Directions for Obedience to Government in Dangerous or Doubtful Times*, appended to the *Observations*, that

> The first usurper hath the best title, being, as was said, in possession by the permission of God; and where an usurper hath continued so long that the knowledge of the right heir be lost by all the subjects, in such a case an usurper in possession is to be taken and reputed by such subjects for their true heir, and is to be obeyed by them as their father. As no man hath an infallible certitude but only a moral knowledge, which is no other than a probable persuasion grounded upon a

> peaceable possession, which is a warrant for subjection to parents and governors. For we may not say, because children have no infallible or necessary certainty who are their true parents, that therefore they need not obey, because they are uncertain. It is sufficient, and as much as human nature is capable of, for children to rely upon a credible persuasion. (283)

Filmer is here addressing obedience to the usurping, kingless regime that replaced James's son, Charles I, but in doing so he not only acknowledges the possibility that "all kings are usurpers" but that fatherhood, the literal and figural justification for kingship, depends on a "credible persuasion" rather than empirical knowledge. Like a child in his or her relationship with the father, the subject must "take and repute" the usurper as the legitimate sovereign, an act of the imagination that perhaps represses but does not extinguish "uncertainty." The harmony initially presupposed by Filmer, who attempts to trace a stable line of descent from God to Adam to the king to the ordinary father, requires as a supplement the sort of "fiction or fancy" that he associates disparagingly with republicanism: if in that form of government the assembly is merely "imagined to be the people," in monarchy the usurper is "reputed" to be the "true heir." The "indivisible beam of majesty" representing "supreme power" may be more appropriately expressed "in one person," but Filmer's analysis reveals that the king is himself subject to a sort of doubleness, a tension between usurpation and hereditary propriety that can be resolved only by positing—in the absence of certain knowledge—a link between father, king, and God. While Filmer appears to make a similar argument to James, his language simultaneously acknowledges the epistemological uncertainty inherent in divine right, dependent as it is on the imagination rather than self-evident, empirical fact.

How are we to explain this shift from James to Filmer? One reason is of course the

English Civil War, which deeply unsettled traditional notions of political obedience. In the aftermath of Charles's execution, thinkers like Filmer, Thomas Hobbes, and Antony Ascham contemplated from a number of directions the extent to which subjects are bound to obey the authority of the newly established republic.[2] As Filmer's work reveals, however, even the ostensible propriety of hereditary, divinely ordained monarchy is subject to a sort of representational instability. Whereas the consistency of Filmer's royalism depends on the neutralization of such tension, I argue in this dissertation that the literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries often resides in the space opened between the figure of the monarch and what he or she must be understood to represent. Debates over the conditions of possibility for both political and literary representation inform the writing of George Puttenham, William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Andrew Marvell, and John Milton, contributing not only to the thematic content of their work but also to their figural and linguistic strategies. This mutual imbrication of politics and aesthetics can be attributed not simply to the active role some of these writers played in the political affairs of the day—Milton wrote on behalf of the Commonwealth, while Marvell served in Parliament—but to the very nature of literary language: close attention to figuration in literary texts can shed light on the ways in which the figural grounding of sovereignty is both constructed and destabilized. While James seeks to unproblematically join the king to what he signifies, noting in the 1610 speech that "euen by GOD himselfe they [kings] are called Gods," the poets I consider both join and sever the king (or king-substitutes like Oliver Cromwell) from his metaphoric vehicles, registering ambivalence and contradiction rather than presupposing the fusion of the sensible and the intelligible or spiritual in the figure of the ruler (181).

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[2] For a detailed summary of this so-called "Engagement Controversy," see Wallace, pp. 9-68.

The possibility of such fusion in early modern literature has recently become a point of critical fascination. In *Phenomenal Shakespeare*, Bruce Smith locates in the early modern period a pre-Cartesian space where thought and sense can intersect, generating “a way of knowing that connects subject and object via the subject’s body” (10). According to Smith, “coming-to-know” in the Renaissance “may have started as something external and material and ended as something internal and immaterial, but in between was something that partook of both” (35). It is precisely this model of embodied cognition, Smith argues, that practitioners of post-structuralism and New Historicism neglect when they dismiss “sensations, feelings, emotions, [and] aesthetic pleasure” as ideological mystifications, “act[s] of ‘false consciousness’” that “are the possessions of individuals, bourgeois or otherwise.” Smith certainly does not discount ideological distortion altogether, but he does claim that his phenomenological approach can harmonize the New Criticism’s attention to “structural form and aesthetics” and the hermeneutics of suspicion, suggesting that “after the thesis of New Criticism and the antithesis of post-structuralism a synthesis can be found in phenomenology” (7).

It is unclear, however, whether Smith’s call for a phenomenological turn represents dialectical recuperation or uncomfortable repetition. In “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921), T. S. Eliot argues in terms similar to Smith that in the course of the seventeenth century a “dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered” (64). In the English poets and dramatists of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries “there is a direct sensuous apprehension of thought into feeling” (63); if “the ordinary man’s experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary,” a mind like Donne’s is “constantly amalgamating disparate experience” and “forming new wholes” (64). As Eliot puts it in “Philip Massinger” (1920), “with the end of Chapman, Middleton, Webster, Tourneur, Donne we end a period when the intellect was immediately at the tip of the senses. Sensation became word and the word was sensation. The next period is the period of Milton (though still with a Marvell in it)" (156). The problem with Milton, Eliot will claim in his 1936 essay on that poet, is that "at no period [even before his blindness] is the visual imagination conspicuous in Milton's poetry" (259). While Shakespeare's "combination of words offer perpetual novelty" and "enlarge the meaning of the individual words joined," Milton's "language is, if one may use the term without disparagement, *artificial* and *conventional*" (260). Because the poet's "syntax is determined by the musical significance, by the auditory imagination, rather than by the attempt to follow actual speech or thought," Eliot argues that

> a dislocation takes place, through the hypertrophy of the auditory imagination at the expense of the visual and tactile, so that the inner meaning is separated from the surface, and tends to become something occult, or at least without effect upon the reader until fully understood. To extract everything possible from *Paradise Lost*, it would seem necessary to read it in two different ways, first solely for the sound, and second for the sense. […] Now Shakespeare, or Dante, will bear innumerable readings, but at each reading all the elements of appreciation can be present. There is no interruption between the surface that these poets present to you and the core. (263)

At this point Eliot is offering what is primarily an aesthetic judgment: Milton's poetic images lack the immediacy of his sixteenth century predecessors and therefore display the sort of "fragmentation" that he condemns in "The Metaphysical Poets," insofar as the linguistic "surface" of the poem is severed from its "core" of meaning.

This aesthetic problem also has political implications, however. As David Norbrook points out, Charles's execution represented for Eliot "a key moment in a shift from a poetic monarchical order to a republican or Whiggish world of prose. The poetic imagination, on this reading, was stimulated by traditional rituals which established intricate analogies between the individual and the natural and social orders," analogies which disappeared upon the death of the king (9).[3] It is perhaps for this reason that, in a 1947 essay on Milton, Eliot will transfer blame for the "dissociation of sensibility" from Milton himself to the political event that he so loudly welcomed:

> If such a dissociation did take place, I suspect that the causes are too complex and too profound to justify our accounting for the change in terms of literary criticism. All we can say is, that something like this did happen; that it had something to do with the Civil War; that it would even be unwise to say it was caused by the Civil War, but that it is a consequence of the same causes which brought about the Civil War; that we must seek the causes in Europe, not in England alone; and for what these causes were, we may dig and dig until we get to a depth at which words and concepts fail us. (266)

Eliot's comments are worth taking seriously, for the adequation between the sensible and the intelligible is as crucial for monarchy as it is for the poets who wrote under it. Inigo Jones in fact anticipates Eliot's and Smith's favored intersection of perception and thought in his explanation of the "allegory" of *Tempe Restored* (1632), a masque performed for Charles's court: "Corporeal beauty, consisting in symmetry, colour, and certain unexpressable graces, shining in the Queen's majesty, may draw us to the contemplation of the beauty of the soul, unto which it hath analogy"

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[3] For an illuminating discussion of Eliot's nostalgia, see Kermode, *Romantic Image*, pp. 141-57. For Eliot's admiration of Filmer, see Bradshaw.

(Orgel and Strong, 483). The figure of the monarch, in this case the queen, allows for the fusion of body and soul in a perfect harmony. It is not difficult to see how Jones's "analogical" notion of representation dovetails with the wider aims of the royalist ideology, especially if we keep in mind James's assertion that the supremacy of kings is "after a certaine relation compared to the Diuine power." In order to assert such a "relation," the monarch must be understood as the sensible representative of an immaterial God, just as the queen's physical beauty operates on the same principle as her spiritual perfection. Heinrich Plett is surely correct to claim that, "in betaking itself into the fictitious world of the masque, the court underlined the ideology it sustained via the aesthetic objectivity of an artistic event" (614-15). However, I would argue that "aesthetic objectivity" is not simply a means of disseminating royalism but is presupposed in its very structure: that is, the condition of possibility for royalism in its most idealized (and ideological) form is the assumption that sovereignty as a concept is susceptible to perception through the embodiment of the king or the queen, the political manifestation of what Eliot calls "a direct sensuous apprehension of thought."

It therefore makes sense that Eliot would attribute the "dissociation of sensibility" in part to the death of Charles, but I think he is right to suggest that it goes back further than that, to the "causes" of the civil war rather than the war itself. Eliot, after all, detects a similar sort of disruption in *Hamlet*, a play obviously written well before the 1640's. In "Hamlet and His Problems" (1919), he argues that "the only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked." Hamlet as a character is instead "dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in *excess* of the facts as they appear." He is angry at Gertrude, but his mother "is not an adequate equivalent" for his "disgust"; indeed, Eliot claims that "the very nature of the *donnees* of the problem precludes objective equivalence" (48), for "it is just *because* her [Gertrude's] character is so negative and insignificant that she arouses in Hamlet the feeling which she is incapable of representing" (48-49). *Hamlet* thus fails to live up to the aesthetic ideal Eliot establishes in "The Metaphysical Poets," which is to "find the verbal equivalent for states of mind and feeling" (65).

I want to consider the possibility that a similar representational predicament imperils traditional notions of sovereignty in early modern England. If we think of the monarch as a political version of the "objective correlative," we could argue that his absence between 1649 and 1660 contributed to (or went hand in hand with) what Eliot perceives as the failure of Milton's poetry, where "the inner meaning is separated from the surface." In political terms, the execution of Charles opened a disjunction between the ideal sovereignty of God and the sovereignty of the monarch, God's sensible representative. It is my argument, furthermore, that such a gap can be observed far earlier than Milton and may in fact be inscribed in the representational grounding of monarchy itself, competing with what Plett calls "aesthetic objectivity" for pride of place. To transfer the language of Eliot's reflection on aesthetic unity to this political context, the "very nature" of sovereignty in the period "precludes objective equivalence" because the divine power that it ostensibly figures is overdetermined, subject to an "excess" that eludes the symbolic power of the king. While Smith claims that critics import categories of Marxist ideology critique to dismiss sensation as mystification, therefore forgetting that perception and thought operated on a continuum in early modern England, I plan to show that the ideological stakes of this continuum are legible in the literature of the period itself.

The theological dimension of this problem is crucial and will receive significant attention in the chapters that follow, but it cannot be separated from the question of rhetoric. When discussing the politics of early modern rhetoric, critics like Norbrook and Victoria Kahn have understandably emphasized its relationship to ancient forms of civic humanism and therefore to its role as an art of persuasion. For my purposes, however, rhetoric is understood primarily as the system of tropes that both sustains monarchical power and subverts it. In order to develop this tropological reading of rhetoric, Chapter 1 focuses on George Puttenham's *The Art of English Poesy* (1589), particularly his definition of allegory as "when we speak one thing and think another, and that our words and our meanings meet not" (270). While critics often read this statement as a Machiavellian endorsement of courtly deception, it serves first and foremost as a comment on figural language. For Puttenham, "every speech wrested from his own natural signification to another not altogether so natural is a kind of dissimulation, for the words bear contrary countenance to the intent"; it is for this reason that allegory occurs "as well when we lie as when we tell truth." Puttenham attempts to control the inherent "dissimulation" of this trope by insisting that a word or figure "wrested from [its] own signification" should be "applied to another not altogether contrary, but having much conveniency with it" (271). At the same time, he will make the claim that the meaning of a "full *allegory* should not be discovered, but left at large to the reader's judgment and conjecture," suggesting that the figure simultaneously exceeds the "conveniency," or proportionate resemblance, that ensures its propriety (272). Puttenham's assertion that allegory "draw[s]" the mind "from plainness and simplicity to a certain doubleness" differs significantly from the notion of allegory in *Tempe Restored*, which, we will remember, emphasizes the perfect adequation of body and soul and, by extension, the word and its intended meaning (238).

Although Puttenham will at points praise Elizabeth I in the same terms as Jones celebrates Henrietta Maria, the former's exposition of tropes unsettles the stability of the representational system undergirding the sovereign's authority. This destabilization is most legible in the tension between metaphor and catachresis throughout Puttenham's text. As James's speech indicated, metaphor is *the* trope of royal supremacy, insofar as it presupposes the stable resemblance between the king and, variously, God, the father, and the human mind. Catachresis, on the other hand, involves the imposition of a purely linguistic relationship that does not exist in empirical reality. A close reading of the *Art* reveals that Puttenham blurs the boundary between the analogical harmony of metaphor and the erroneous force of catachresis, not only in his analysis of those tropes but in his assertion of a metaphorical connection between the power of Elizabeth and that of God. It turns out that such a link must in fact be posited in the absence of certain knowledge, an act of the imagination that calls into question the precise nature of the sovereign's connection to the divine realm and anticipates the tension in Filmer between the king as father-god and the king as usurper. While Elizabeth seems initially to function as a figure of proportionate "simplicity" in Puttenham's text, the catachrestic dimension inscribed in the supposedly analogical foundation of her power suggests that she is subject to the "doubleness" that is for Puttenham characteristic of allegory, at least in part because of the "dissimulation" inherent in a representational system whose head seeks to model herself on an inaccessible God.

Puttenham does not merely provide an arbitrary starting point for my analysis but a methodology through which to read representations of sovereignty in early modern British literature: close attention to the "doubleness" that for Puttenham characterizes literary language, I argue, reveals the overdetermined, contradictory nature of sovereignty throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Chapter 2, I bring Shakespeare's *Richard II* (1595) into conversation with John Calvin's *Institutes* (1535) to expand on the ambivalent connection between monarch and God that I explore in Puttenham. While Calvin argues that the king's power should resemble God's, he admits that subjects "often beholde no forme of the image of God which ought to shine in a magistrate" (505). This discrepancy between the ideal form of sovereignty and its actual practice, which can be attributed not only to the shortcomings of the human ruler but to the fundamental hiddenness of God, is double-edged: on the one hand, God's inscrutability can justify obedience to a tyrannical ruler as a sort of divine punishment; on the other, the inevitable disjunction between the king and the divine ordinance that authorizes his authority allows for the possibility of rebellion. *Richard II* stages the ambiguous consequences of Calvin's political dialectic, but rather than focusing on Richard and Bolingbroke themselves I concentrate on the language of their ambivalent subjects. While Northumberland justifies Richard's deposition by calling attention to the contingency of the link between the empirical person of the king and his divinely ordained office, a gap registered in the text through Northumberland's use of metonymy, his assertion that Bolingbroke's ascendancy will "make high majesty look like itself" suggests that his usurpation can be reduced to the representational logic presupposed in traditional, hereditary kingship (2.1.295). I argue that York, whose passive obedience first to Richard and then to Bolingbroke would seem to make him the polar opposite of the action-oriented Northumberland, articulates an understanding of political change that is potentially more destabilizing to divine right than is Northumberland's. In claiming of Bolingbroke's usurpation that "heaven hath a hand in these events / To whose high will we bound our calm contents," York calls attention to the discrepancy between the inscrutable God and his human representative rather than their correspondence (5.2.37-38).

If *Richard II* is arguably the most ambiguous work by a playwright famous for his ambivalence, Ben Jonson's masques would seem to represent the ultimate expression of that poet's allegiance to monarchy. In staging dramatic allegories of the king's quasi-divine power over the social and natural worlds, the masque's phenomenalization of the metaphors supporting Jacobean divine right may in fact make it the royalist genre *par excellence*. However, in Chapter 3 I read the perceived aesthetic shortcomings of Jonson's first Jacobean masque, the *Masque of Blackness* (1605), as a repetition of King James's struggles to create a union between England and Scotland. Unlike later masques, *Blackness* fails at the level of spectacle to confirm what it promises linguistically: the masque elements of dancing and emblem, typically expressive of a (purely imaginative) unity and resolution, do not result in the transformation of the Ethiopian women—portrayed in blackface by Queen Anne, among others—from black to white, an outcome supposedly ensured by the presence of the sun-like James. Indeed, the only transformation in the masque occurs at the level of language, the goddess Ethiopia renamed as the European Dian. While Stephen Orgel views the discrepancy between the visual or dramatic and the verbal as an artistic failure that will need to be corrected in the more mature masques, it gains considerable interest when we remember that *Blackness* is in part emblematic of James's desired transformation of England and Scotland into Great Britain, a union rebuffed by Parliament. I suggest that the tension between language and spectacle presents a different allegory than the one Jonson ostensibly privileges. Rather than simply exulting the monarch, the representational failure of the masque repeats James's own inability to establish a legitimate union between the countries. Though the king himself claimed that his unifying project was grounded in perceptual reality, he could in fact do little more than assume the mere "name and style of King of Great Britain" ("Proclamation Concerning the Kings Majesties Stile").

In Chapter 4 I turn to Andrew Marvell, who draws frequently on masque imagery in his poetry of the 1650's, the decade that saw the rise of Oliver Cromwell following the 1649 execution of Charles I. While Marvell was clearly influenced by Jonson—in "Tom May's Death" he imagines the poet's ghost condemning May for his republican sympathies in the underworld—I focus more on the connection between Marvell's pastoral and political poetry and the Caroline masques written after Jonson had fallen out of favor with the court, particularly Thomas Carew's *Coelum Brittanicum* (1634). In that text, Jove seeks to model his heavenly kingdom after the example of Charles and Henrietta Maria, an expression of divine right so extreme that it inverts the usual hierarchy of king as the merely human representative of God. Written and performed during the period of Charles's personal rule, which would ultimately lead to the civil war, *Coelum Brittanicum* presents an idealized world where the social disorder of the antimasque is extinguished and the sovereign's power is both restored and enhanced. Critics have noted that Marvell's "Upon Appleton House" follows the structure of a masque, moving from disorder to order, and I detect linguistic echoes of Carew's work in the poem. However, I argue that the logics of appearance and temporality in Marvell's poem differs fundamentally from those of the masque. Whereas that genre privileges the restoration of stability through the transition from antimasque to masque, often troped as the dawn of a new day, Marvell's poem ends with darkness impinging on Nun Appleton. Rather than representing former parliamentary Lord General Thomas Fairfax's estate as a model for England at large, the ostensible aim of the poem, the speaker reveals instead the indistinction between sovereignty—understood both as Fairfax's control over his estate and the ability of the republic's leaders to impose order on dissenting factions in English society—and its disruption in a post-civil war world.

It is for this reason that the specter of Cromwell, whose destructive force Marvell captures so ambivalently in "An Horation Ode Upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland," lurks in the background of "Upon Appleton House" as a sort of antimasque figure Fairfax helps to birth, even as his retirement served as a disavowal of his former subordinate's rise. In the second part of the chapter I explore the ways in which Marvell positions Cromwell himself as a masque-like sovereign figure in "The First Anniversary under His Highness the Lord Protector, 1655." While I do not necessarily agree with John Wallace's claim that Marvell here encourages Cromwell to discard the quasi-monarchical position of Lord Protector in favor of the actual throne, there is no doubt that the speaker associates Cromwell with royalist imagery throughout. However, references to Cromwell's sun-like power compete in the poem with warnings about the clouds that prevent Cromwell from achieving the apocalyptic goals of his reign. As in *Richard II*, providential inscrutability frustrates efforts to link the sovereign to God. If the royalist masque demands transparency, both as an aesthetic ideal and as a corollary to Charles's emphasis on a visible Church, Marvell and Cromwell must vie with spiritual and political darkness.

My final chapter focuses on Milton, foe of both Filmer and Eliot and, not coincidentally, the most ardent republican of the writers under consideration here.[4] I read Milton's depiction of Adam's marriage to Eve in *Paradise Lost* (1674) as an allegory of the relationship between kingship, republicanism, and patriarchy, one that sheds light on the tension between political unity and dissent in Milton's poetry and prose. Milton's theory of gender relations as established in his divorce tracts of the 1640's privileges hierarchical unity within a stable system of signification: the woman in a marriage is subordinate to the man just as the man is subordinate to God. While Milton despises the divine pretensions of Stuart monarchy, his series of correspondences is not unlike the chain that for Filmer links the father to the king and the king to God. At the same time, Milton's claim in *Tetrachordon* (1645) that woman "most resembl[es] unlikeness” and is “most unlike resemblance” introduces a tension within the analogical structure supporting marriage; if woman is “most unlike resemblance,” she potentially exceeds the system that would control her (597). I argue that Adam’s inability to control Eve in *Paradise Lost*, which he attempts to do in part through the totalizing trope of synecdoche, reveals the limits of the patriarchal ideology that sustains royalism and, occasionally, Milton’s own writing. If Filmer traces the legitimacy of kingship to the first father, Milton’s Adam reveals the shortcomings of such an ideology, predicated as it is on the imposition of what James calls “similitude” rather than the actual existence of it. *Paradise Lost* suggests instead that the antagonism inscribed in the “unity defective” of Adam and Eve’s marriage—as opposed to the fusion of man and woman or human and God—is constitutive of human society (8.425). I read this paradox in conjunction with the transition from Milton’s *Aereopagitica* (1644), which promotes dissent while insisting on “brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional” (744), to *The Ready and Easy Way To Establish a Free Commonwealth* (1660), which seems to further foreclose the radical possibilities of the former essay even as it attempts to stave off the return of monarchy.

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[4] Filmer addresses Milton's political writing in *Observations Concerning the Originall of Government* (Filmer, pp. 197-208).

This dissertation comes at a time of increasing authoritarianism throughout the Western world. Donald Trump’s election to the presidency of the United States was welcomed by neo-reactionaries advocating for the establishment of monarchy. While writer Michael Perilloux lamented the fact that Trump was unlikely to “cancel the constitution” and “declare himself emperor to be succeeded by his children,” his campaign nevertheless “warrants excited interest as a historical case-study and promising fore-shock of a true [monarchical] restoration” (qtd. in Matthews). Venture capitalist Peter Thiel, a Trump supporter, once suggested that “a startup is basically structured as a monarchy” (qtd. in Goldhill). Even French president Emmanuel Macron, neoliberal icon and sometime Trump foe, has mourned the consequences of the French

Revolution, which “dug a deep emotional abyss, one that was imaginary and shared: The King is no more!” (qtd. in Halls). Trump appears on a June 2018 cover of *Time* magazine scowling into a mirror; reflected back is an image of the president outfitted in all the trappings of monarchy (Wattles). We might recall that the titular character of *Richard II* summons a mirror during his deposition, but once he realizes that “a brittle glory shineth in this face” he shatters the glass (4.1.287). The chapters that follow trace the preconditions for and consequences of this “brittleness.”

CHAPTER 1

Politicizing Proportion in Puttenham's *The Art of English Poesy*

In this chapter I read George Puttenham's *The Art of English Poesy* as an ambivalent meditation on the relationship between politics and aesthetics, one that highlights the self-destructive link between the ideology of monarchy and the volatile nature of figural language. Despite its notorious eccentricity, Puttenham's treatise would at first glance seem to belong to a long line of Renaissance texts that privilege what Puttenham calls "proportion," a principle that emphasizes order and applies not only to the correct use of literary language but to the ideal condition of the imagination, society, and the universe itself (153). Although Puttenham acknowledges from the outset that all figural language is an "abuse" of proper meaning, insofar as it strays from the literal signification of the words used, he insists that "proportion" can be maintained by the poet so long as he remains in control of his discourse, deploying figures nimbly depending on context and intent (238). As I will show, however, Puttenham's own analysis of tropes blurs the boundary between the analogical harmony of metaphor and the abusive force of catachresis. This confusion not only ironically reveals that Puttenham cannot maintain proportion within his own text, but it calls into question the ideological consistency of monarchy, a representational system that itself depends on the metaphorical correspondence between monarch and God presupposed in the Chain of Being. Despite his apparent flattery toward Queen Elizabeth I, bringing Puttenham's ambivalent discussion of figural language into conversation with his more overt references to monarchy suggests that the link between monarch and God is at best a posited relationship, potentially ungrounded in reality but presented as natural by the very tropes that ultimately destabilize it.

My analysis belongs to a long and diverse tradition of critical accounts that consider the relationship between Puttenham's poetics and his politics. Indeed, responses to the *Art* constitute an interesting chronology of the key motivations and presuppositions of early modern literary studies. Writing in 1983, Louis Montrose argues that while "Puttenham's preoccupation with the complexities of poetry's formal features and the pleasures of its aesthetic effects [...] would seem to mark his text as prophetic of the central concerns of modern literary criticism," the text in fact "contaminates the purity of its own aestheticism" by "disclos[ing] the basis of poetic disinteredness in social self-interest" (450). By "modern literary criticism," Montrose refers primarily to the New Criticism and other formalisms, which bracketed consideration of social or political context in favor of the inherent literariness of the text. Whereas a somewhat earlier critic like Daniel Javitch claimed that "Puttenham encouraged indirection and ambiguity in language because he realized that the pleasures derived from poetry are related to the way it obscures and retards the disclosure of its meaning" (879), Montrose emphasizes the "instrumentality of ornament, its utility to both the prince and the subject in forwarding their often opposed interests" (440).[5] Puttenham may appear as a New Critic *avant la lettre*, but for Montrose a demystified reading reveals that he in fact anticipates the analysis of power associated with Marxism, New Historicism, and post-structuralism.

I do not want to insist on the division between Javitch and Montrose too much, however, since both characterize *The Art* as an essentially mimetic document. According to Javitch, "Puttenham knew that a courtly audience, so alert to the discrepancy between surface and reality in conduct, could only cherish the same effects in poetic discourse" (880). It is crucial, however, that such a discrepancy, which replicates the various dissimulations that structure courtly life, not spin out of control: discussing Castiglione's *The Courtier*, a text that influenced Puttenham, Javitch notes that "if the courtier is encouraged to be deceptive, his dissimulation must never be so total that his authentic intentions fail to be recognized" (873). Despite his attempts to distance himself from Javitch, Montrose reaches similar conclusions, arguing that "the courtier becomes a living trope; he actually incarnates the verbal figure Puttenham personifies as The Courtier" (440). In this sense, Puttenham generates "a *meta*courtly discourse," one that "simultaneously exemplifies and anatomizes the art it purports to describe" (442). Montrose may be more attentive to the ideological dimensions of Puttenham's project, but he and Javitch both insist on *The Art* as an "instrumental" text that reveals the "authentic intentions" of the author. Even if Puttenham's intention is to deceive in order to advance in Elizabeth's court, his text achieves an adequation between language and reality so successful that Montrose can describe it as an "incarnation."

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[5] Derek Attridge similarly argues that Puttenham "must produce a manual that is designed to fail" because "the existence of poetry, like the power of the court, is predicated on its exclusiveness" (270).

More recent critical accounts of *The Art*, which I would characterize as instances of the New Formalism,[6] have tended to focus on Puttenham's valorization of decorum and proportion, concepts that sit uneasily with the author's encouragement elsewhere of deception. Julian Lamb, for example, claims that "the courtier is the implicit subject of all his poetry for his figures lead back to the intent that orders them" (34). Rebecca Wiseman argues similarly that "decorum lies at the crux of Puttenham's poetic project because it links formal beauty and proper action; it is an artful means of accessing and expressing proportion, propriety, and harmony in a courtly world" (43). Both Wiseman and Lamb attribute political significance to proportion and decorum. Lamb claims that because "poetic beauty" is for Puttenham "purposive by nature," it is also "intrinsically political": Puttenham's fundamental task is to "accommodate purposiveness, the contextual use of poetry for certain ends, in his instruction" (29). Wiseman likewise claims that Puttenham "theoriz[es] the physiological and social dimensions of the poetic encounter" by striving for "an aesthetic ideal of proportionate composition and response; as a partnership flourishing under the conditions of a universal natural order; and as a crucial social tool, essential to decorum and courtly success" (33-34).

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[6] I am thinking especially of what Marjorie Levinson calls "normative formalism," which "assigns to the aesthetic norm-setting work that is cognitive and affective and therefore also cultural-political" (559).

At first glance, the political stakes that Wiseman and Lamb identify in the *Art* seem diametrically opposed to those emphasized by Montrose. Where these more recent critics see a pedagogical effort to build community, the latter imagines a world of duplicity. Each of their accounts, however, presupposes the governing role of "purpose" and "intent" in Puttenham's text.[7] Whether read as an exercise in Castiglionean *Sprezzatura* or Machiavellian instrumentality, critics tend to assume that Puttenham's discourse is designed to rather unproblematically achieve a particular purpose, aesthetic, political, or otherwise. In order to reach this conclusion, however, critics of all persuasions must neutralize or altogether ignore the numerous mistakes that riddle Puttenham's text, including printing errors, mistranslations, and inconsistent definitions. Despite its reputation as a controlled performance of the deception that it advocates, the text quite often seems to exceed Puttenham's control.[8] In this chapter I argue that taking such mistakes seriously allows us to read the *Art* as an exposure of the limits of proportion in Renaissance literary theory and the ideologies that it appears to support. While critics like Wiseman and Lamb have treated proportion primarily as an aesthetic and philosophical category, the fact that Elizabeth often functions for Puttenham as the most potent symbol of hierarchical correspondence calls attention to the link between poetic and political power in early modern England: just as the monarch maintains singular authority over the country, the writer maintains control over the text. This connection between ruler and author would have been familiar to Puttenham from the work of his maternal uncle, Thomas Elyot, whose 1531 *The Book Named the Governor* has often been identified as a foundational formulation of the Renaissance doctrine of cosmic order in England.[9] Elyot not only makes a case for the political and pedagogical necessity of order at the level of his argument but also performs it in his writing. As I will show, however, Elyot can only maintain coherence in his vision of the universe by both bracketing the possibility of deception *and* constructing fictions himself, therefore calling into question the stability he values so highly.

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[7] Ethan Guagliardo largely avoids this tendency in his claim that "Puttenham's irony, though meant to support the crown, winds up eroding the very foundations of sovereignty" (609). However, even he argues that Puttenham "suggest[s] that divine right sovereignty—and indeed religion as such—was nothing more than a fiction, the idol of an autonomous poetics, necessary for persuading subjects to obey" (596-97). In this chapter I want to think about Puttenham's rhetoric in terms of its tropological dimensions rather than the persuasion that can result from it.

[8] Lamb does claim that Puttenham is "not afraid of inconsistency or anomaly," but he understands the text's inconsistency as "a potential entry point into the conceptual intents that course through its structure" (46).

It is tempting to read Puttenham's text as a demystified rearticulation of his uncle's. Puttenham certainly doesn't leave Elyot's emphasis on proportion behind, but because the *Art* functions as an instructional manual for the courtier-poet rather than the prince, Puttenham self-consciously argues for and performs within the text the various fictions and deceptions that structure courtly life. Nowhere is this more apparent than in his discussion of allegory, the "courtly figure" *par excellence*, which Puttenham defines as "when we speak one thing and think another, and that our words and our meanings meet not" (270). While critics like Montrose have read Puttenham's definition as the defining feature of an instrumentalized poetics, insofar as it allows the courtier to create a discrepancy between appearance and reality and thus advance politically, I argue that it in fact marks the fissure between Puttenham's authorial intention and the effects of his text. In other words, I attribute the failure of Puttenham's "words and meanings" to correspond not to deliberate dissimulation but to tensions inscribed within his exposition and use of figural language. Puttenham's difficulty in distinguishing between the analogical harmony of metaphor, so essential to the system of correspondences governed by proportion, and the abusive force of catachresis calls attention to the inherent dissimulation within language and causes Puttenham several problems as he attempts to impose order on his own text. This understanding of allegory destabilizes not only the proportionate organization of the *Art* but the connection between proportion and monarchy that Puttenham frequently posits. Allegorical "doubleness" can be found most obviously in Puttenham's references to Elizabeth. On the one hand, Puttenham's shape poems praise the queen through their geometrical perfection, and his analysis of the rhetorical figure of the Gorgeous seeks, as Rosemary Kegl points out, to link "the queen's inseparable beauty and royal authority" (12). However, these conventional forms of praise are juxtaposed with oblique references to the ruler as a monstrous entity, one associated with the "abuse" that emerges from the improper use of figural language. I trace this apparent contradiction to the representational structure of monarchy itself, which, as Puttenham's analysis of history inadvertently shows, is based on an erroneous link between the monarch's power and God's generated by Roman poets and misrecognized as truth by political subjects. That Puttenham himself seems to both accept this truth and reveal its internal contradictions suggests that the political import of *The Art* resides not in the controlled dissimulation of Puttenham's courtly persona but in the disruptions that threaten linguistic and political proportion.

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[9] See E. M. W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture*; and Patricia Parker, *Literary Fat Ladies*.

I.

Puttenham’s interest in proportion should come as no surprise given the early modern period’s tendency to privilege political, spiritual, and intellectual order as codified in the Chain of Being. Indeed, one of the most influential formulations of what E. M. W. Tillyard long ago called “the Elizabethan world picture” comes from Thomas Elyot, Puttenham’s maternal uncle. Elyot begins *The Book Named the Governor*, an instructional manual for princes and other noblemen, by discussing the meaning of a “public weal,” which he defines as “a body living, compact or made of sundry estates and degrees of men, which is disposed by the order of equity and governed by the rule and moderation of reason” (1). There are two features of Elyot’s conception of order, one dealing with hierarchy and the other with analogy, both of which can be observed here. Not only must society be ordered by observing “degrees,” or hierarchies, but the governor must ensure such order by being himself “governed by the rule and moderation of reason.” From the outset, then, Elyot is creating correspondences, links in the Chain of Being, by connecting a well-ordered mind with a well-ordered society, thus performing the very chain he explicates. This system takes its point of departure from the ordering power of God, who has “set degrees and estates in all His glorious works,” from his “heavenly ministers” to the elements to the divisions between “birds, beasts, and fishes” (3). Perhaps more importantly, the very way in which one recognizes God depends on “degrees,” insofar as “things as well natural as supernatural hath ever had such a preeminence that thereby the incomprehensible majesty of God, as it were by a bright leam of a torch or candle, is declared to the blind inhabitants of the world” (2). Elyot seems to be suggesting here that because God is “incomprehensible” and humans “blind,” one can only know Him by analogy—in this case, Elyot uses the image of a “torch or candle” to “declare” God’s power, a figure that will reappear in Puttenham’s description of the queen. The distance between the “natural” and “supernatural” realms is thus bridged by the stability of analogy, an analogy that depends on human understanding, which is “the most excellent gift that man can receive in his creation, whereby he doth approach most nigh unto the similitude of God” (4). The relationship between human and God remains hierarchical—human understanding is not equivalent to God’s—but the establishment of “similitude” ensures a properly ordered connection.

This “similitude” extends to the political realm, which should be ordered analogously to God’s power over the world. According to Elyot,

> undoubtedly the best and most sure governance is by one king or prince, which ruleth only for the weal of his people to him subject; […] For who can deny but that all thing in heaven and earth is governed by one God, by one perpetual order, by one providence? One sun ruleth over the day, and one moon over the night; and to descend down to the earth, in a little beast, which of all other is most to be marveled at, I mean the bee, is left to man by nature, as it seemeth, a perpetual figure of a just governance or rule. (7)

Whereas Athenian democracy amounted to “a monster with many heads” that was “never certain nor stable,” monarchy succeeds for Elyot because it revolves around the authority of a single individual (6). In order to illustrate the superiority of monarchy, Elyot notes that before the reign of the English King Edgar, “this most noble Isle of the world was decerpt and rent in pieces” (11). Edgar, however, avoids the “confusion” that would have resulted from a “multitude of sovereign governors” by “reduc[ing] the monarch to his pristine estate and figure: which brought to pass, reason was revived, and people came to conformity, and the realm began to take comfort and to show some visage of a public weal” (11-12). “Reduce” in this context means to “bring or draw together; to contract," suggesting that Edgar united the people by concentrating power within his person (*OED*). "Figure" should not be taken here simply as Edgar's body but what that body represents. If power exists in multiplicity it becomes difficult to recognize and, in a sense, powerless; if one person can fully represent or "figure" power, however, a one-to-one and therefore stable signifying relationship exists. Such stability should be inscribed in the very existence of the monarch, whose majesty "is the whole proportion and figure of noble estate, and is properly a beauty or comeliness in his countenance, language and gesture apt to his dignity, and accommodate to time, place, and company; which, like as the sun doth his beams, so doth it cast on the beholders and hearers a pleasant and terrible reverence" (99). Just as the bee provides for Elyot "a perpetual figure of just governance," the human monarch functions at least in part as a symbol of the "proportion" that inheres in society and the universe more generally. It is perhaps for this reason that Elyot marshals the solar metaphor once again, a commonplace trope that naturalizes the authority of the king, making him as inevitable as the rising of the sun.

The ability of a strong sovereign to "reduce" or concentrate power and therefore embody the state within his person is not unlike the task that Elyot sets for himself as a writer and educator. In the definition of the "public weal" that begins the *Governor*, Elyot claims that "I have compiled one definition out of many, in as compendious form as my poor wit can devise, trusting that in those few words the true signification of a public weal shall evidently appear to them whom reason can satisfy" (1). Just as the power of the state "evidently appear[s]" in the human figure of the monarch and therefore attains representational stability, Elyot seeks to establish a stable definition of the "public weal" by "reducing" several meanings into one. The author thus becomes a sort of monarch over his own text, not only writing *about* order but also demonstrating it through proper organization and arrangement, a task that extends to the education of young noblemen. Depicting himself as a “wise and cunning gardener” who will “find the most mellow and fertile earth” in order to “put the seed of the herb to grow and be nourished, and in most diligent wise attend that no weed be suffered to grow or approach nigh unto it,” Elyot vows that “semblable order will I ensue in the forming the gentle wits of noblemen’s children, who, from the wombs of their mother, shall be made propise or apt the governance of a public weal” (15). The political overtones of this garden imagery will be familiar to readers of Shakespeare’s *Richard II* (1595), where the royal groundskeeper famously compares his garden to England, claiming that Richard “had not so trimmed and dressed his land / As we this garden!” (3.4.57-58). But as his co-worker points out, whereas the gardeners “keep law and form and due proportion, / Showing as in a model our firm estate,” England itself is infested with “weeds” and “caterpillars” (3.4.42-43, 45-48). If Shakespeare draws on the gardener analogy to highlight the distance between the ideal representation of monarchy and its actual function in the world of the play (a point we will explore in other moments of the play in Chapter 2), Elyot presupposes the analogical stability between the gardener, educator, and ruler.

Given the correspondences that run through the *Governor*, it should come as no surprise that Elyot draws on an extended analogy to dancing to demonstrate the qualities necessary for good governance. As Tillyard argues in another context, the dance “stands […] for something central to Elizabethan ways of thinking: the agile transition from abstract to concrete, from ideal to real, from sacred to profane” (*Elizabethan World Picture*, 98). Elyot anticipates this Elizabethan mindset, suggesting that dancing between a man and woman not only allegorizes but literally embodies abstract virtues necessary for rule and establishes a proportion between qualities traditionally associated with each gender. If a man “is fierce, hardy, strong in opinion, covetous of glory, desirous of knowledge, appetiting by generation to bring forth his semblable,” a woman “is to be mild, timorous, tractable, benign, of sure remembrance, and shamefast.” Elyot instructs the reader that “when we behold a man and a woman dancing together, let us suppose there to be a concord of all the said qualities, being joined together, as I have set them in order. […] These qualities, in this wise being knit together and signified in the personages of man and woman dancing, do express or set out the figure of very nobility” (77-78). Elyot here promotes an ideal vision of the world: he calls on the reader to “suppose” that the “order” he posits actually exists, but such order is dependent on the imagination of the reader and is achieved through a hypothetical (“let us suppose”). This dependence on the imagination is a point of anxiety for Elyot, particularly as it concerns dancing. He has already acknowledged, after all, the opinion of some that “dancing generally is repugnant unto virtue” (69). He must thus justify his perspective on dancing, part of a more general concern on Elyot’s part over the “assaults of malign interpreters” against which he asks Henry VIII to guard in the proem to the book (xiv).

Perhaps more importantly, Elyot gives us reason to believe that the “nobility” that is “figured” by dancing may only exist at the level of appearance. In a later chapter devoted to the definition of “nobility,” he points out that when “virtue joined with great possessions or dignity hath long continued in the blood or house of a gentleman, as it were an inheritance, there nobility is most shown” (104). This “joining” of the external (“great possessions” and “house”) and the internal (“dignity” and “blood”) is not unlike the “joining” that occurs in the “concord” of a dance, and Elyot argues that both moments of “joining” depend on interpretation. Although Elyot traces the origin of nobility to the fact that “good men […] engendered good children” who “endeavoured themselves by imitation of virtue to be equal to them in honor and authority,” he is fully aware that nobility is not always securely transferred from one generation to another (104). In such cases, attempts to mimic nobility will be discovered by the discerning individual: “If he have an ancient robe left by his ancestor, let him consider that if the first owner were of more virtue than he is that succeedeth, the robe being worn, it diminisheth his praise to them which knew or have heard of the virtue of him that first owned it. If he that weareth it be vicious, it more detecteth how much he is unworthy to wear it" (105). Elyot acknowledges that nobility does not always unproblematically correspond to an individual who has the merely external trappings of the quality, in this case symbolized by a "robe," but he discounts the possibility of dissimulation by promising "detection."

Such "detection" will always be possible in the ideal world that Elyot constructs, a world structured by a system of correspondences that reveals the order inherent in the universe and offers a framework for properly interpreting and dealing with the disruptions that occasionally threaten it, such as a dissimulated manifestation of "nobility." But the security that Elyot promises no longer appears to exist in the world of his nephew, George Puttenham. Indeed, what Stephen May refers to as Puttenham's "lewd and illicit career," which involved everything from "spouse abuse, sexual slavery, and multiple excommunications from the Church of England," would seem to constitute the very breakdown of intergenerational nobility against which his uncle warns (143). Whereas Elyot promises that such transgressions of true nobility will reveal themselves to the light of day, Puttenham appears to revel in the duplicity of courtly behavior even as he insists on the moral and intellectual values of his uncle. While Elyot constructs a text that formally reflects his focus on proportion, order, and hierarchy, Puttenham's *Art* is characterized by disruption and contradiction, calling into question not only Puttenham's ostensible privileging of proportion in the literary realm but also the political system that supposedly reflects and ensures proportion in early modern society at large. Before examining the disruptions, however, we must consider the positive role that proportion plays in the text.

II.

For Puttenham, “proportion” or “decorum” refers not only to the use of language but to the very organization of the world. Puttenham begins the Second Book of the *Art*, titled “Of Proportion Poetical,” with the claim that “it is said by such as profess the mathematical sciences that all things stand by proportion, and that without it nothing could stand to be good or beautiful. The doctors of our theology to the same effect, but in other terms, say that God made the world by number, measure, and weight” (153). Even at this early stage of definition, Puttenham is following his uncle in establishing analogies or correspondences between planes of existence (the human and divine realms), in this case through the shared aims of the disciplines of mathematics and theology. He was also likely influenced by the philosophy of the continental Renaissance. As Ernst Cassirer argues, Nicholas of Cusa “had established as the medium of knowledge the concept of proportion, which contains within it, as a condition, the possibility of measurement. […] But proportion is not just a logical-mathematical concept: it is also a basic concept of aesthetics. […] Thus, the speculative-philosophical, the technical-mathematical, and the artistic tendencies of the period converge in the concept of proportion” (51). Following Aristotle, Puttenham claims that any sort of proportion falls into one of three categories, namely “the arithmetical, the geometrical, and the musical.” Poetry corresponds to the latter sort of proportion: insofar as it requires “a certain congruity in sounds pleasing the ear,” Puttenham writes that “verses or rhyme be a kind of musical utterance” (154). While Puttenham here privileges the relationship between sound and poetry, the type of proportion most relevant to the hierarchical organization after which Elyot strives is what Puttenham calls “proportion in figure.” By “figure” Puttenham does not refer to figurative language, which he will discuss later in the text, but to the correspondence between a poem’s shape and its thematic content, something quite similar to Tillyard's identification of "the agile transition from abstract to concrete, from ideal to real, from sacred to profane" in the figure of the dance. Proportion by figure "yields an ocular representation, your meters being by good symmetry reduced into certain geometrical figures, whereby the maker is restrained to keep him within his bounds, and showeth not only more art, but serveth also much better for briefness and subtlety of device" (179).

Part of the appeal of such proportion is that it ensures the self-discipline of the poet, who is "restrained" by the demands of meter. Equally important, though, is what is conveyed through the "ocular representation." In the case of three of the shape poems—the "Pyramis," the "Pillar," and the "Roundel or Sphere"—Puttenham aims to represent both the power of Queen Elizabeth I and the relationship between that power and the divine realm. The manner in which Puttenham presents these poem types itself achieves the sort of balance inherent in proportion: in his discussion of each he includes two examples, and in the case of the "Pyramis" and "Pillar" poems one of the examples must be read "upward" and the other "downward." He explains that the "Pyramis" poem is also known as a "taper" poem because "the taper is the longest and sharpest triangle that is, and while he mounts upward, he waxeth continually more slender, taking both his figure and name of the fire, whose flame, if ye mark it, is always pointed and naturally by his form covets to climb" (184). Correspondence runs through Puttenham's description: just as fire is the uppermost element in the Chain of Being, the taper is "the longest" triangle, "mounting upward" like a flame. It is crucial that the flame's desire to "climb" upward is "natural" since Elizabeth, who possesses the highest form of human power, will soon be compared to it, her "Majesty" being "resembled to the spire" because of "her most noble and virtuous nature" (185). Like Elyot, who drew on the image of a candle to describe divine revelation, Puttenham is here enacting the system of correspondences necessary for understanding both the natural world and the world of politics, the “nature” of which follows a logic similar to the elements. By doing so, Puttenham helps to justify the “naturalness” of the English system of monarchy.

It is not just the shape of the pyramid poem that corresponds to the power of the monarch, however, for the language contained within the poem repeats and thus confirms its structure. In the first example, the queen, “like flame of fire,” “mount[s] on high” as she “aspire[s] / After an higher / Crown and empire.” Importantly, her mission consists in “virtue” that is “not feigned but true,” an implicit contrast to the deceptive “aspirations” of the courtier over which, as we will see, Queen Elizabeth herself expresses anxiety. That her “virtue” is “true” can be confirmed by the second of Puttenham’s examples, which considers the link between God’s power and that of the queen. Whereas the first poem must be read upward, perhaps because it begins with a reference to the pyramid itself and then moves to the queen, one must read this second poem downward. At the top of the pyramid is the word “God,” who of course exists at the top of the Chain; his power is transmitted to the queen, who appears near the bottom. God “bestow[s] / All men’s fortunes”; the queen receives “power sovereign, / Impugnable right, / Redoubtable might, / Most prosperous reign,” and “eternal renown” from God, who of course embodies each of these qualities at a more advanced level. This emphasis on “power” and “might” continues in Puttenham’s next shape poem, “the Pillar, Pilaster, or Cylinder.” According to Puttenham, the pillar is the “most beautiful” of the “geometrical” figures because it is “tall and upright and of one bigness from the bottom to the top,” which represents “stay, support, rest, state, and magnificence” (186). If the pyramid poem expresses the height of the queen’s power, the pillar ensures that such power remains proportionate and secure.

In a sense, though, the pyramid and pillar poems are merely preparations for the "Roundel or Sphere," which Puttenham describes as "the most excellent of all the figures geometrical." He gives a number of reasons for the superiority of the sphere:

> First, because he is even and smooth, without any angle or interruption, most voluble and apt to turn and to continue motion, which is the author of life, he containeth in him the commodious description of every other figure, and for his ample capacity doth resemble the world or universe, and for his indefiniteness, having no special place of beginning nor end, beareth a similitude with God and eternity. (187)

The shape of the sphere is the ultimate embodiment of coherence, its "evenness" and "smoothness" uncorrupted despite its ability to contain "motion" within itself. While Puttenham associates the quality of "roundness" with the pillar poem as well, the roundel is superior because it can "contain" within itself all other shapes, including the pillar and the pyramid. More importantly for my purposes, however, is the fact that it "resemble[s] the world or universe" and "beareth a similitude with God and eternity." It is for this reason that Puttenham describes the first of his exemplifications as "a general resemblance of the roundel to God, the world, and the Queen." The roundel is "all, and whole, and ever, and one, / Single, simple, each where, alone": even though it maintains a "still turning by consequence" that "breed[s] both life and sense," the "center point" of the roundel "doth never move." This combination of "oneness" and "turning," which the editors describe as a "paradoxical union of circular form, sequential motion, and change, with stillness and eternity," is crucial for the stability of the resemblance the poem seeks to convey (187). Because Puttenham seeks to connect the divine and the earthly realms, he must find a way to make the static eternity of heaven susceptible to human perception.

Nor is it enough to link God, highest entity in the heavens, to the “sky,” the highest aspect of the “world”; he must connect both to a human representative. He thus concludes the poem with a reference to the queen, who is “All, and whole, and ever alone, / Single, sans peer, simple, and one.” The language used to begin and end of the poem is virtually identical, a performance of the “evenness” that he attributes to the shape of the roundel.

On the surface, then, Puttenham seems to abide by the emphasis on proportion favored by Elyot and the Renaissance more generally. But within his description of the roundel there are hesitations. What, for example, does Puttenham mean when he claims that the “indefiniteness” of the sphere, which has “no special place of beginning or end,” resembles “God and eternity”? The poem glosses this notion of “indefiniteness” by claiming that there is no “wit that comprehends, / Where it begins, or where it ends, / And therefore all men do agree, / That it purports eternity.” The signification of the pillar and pyramid poems was predicated on perception, on the link between the pillar and stability or the pyramid and hierarchy, but sandwiched between the “oneness” of the sphere and the “oneness” of the queen is an expression of negativity: because one cannot “comprehend” the nature of “eternity,” “all men” must “agree” that the roundel “purports eternity.” (Puttenham similarly notes in the pyramid poem that the pyramid “taper[s] in the air” until it is “vanished out of our sight.”) Because we have never seen eternity, how can we know that the queen’s power resembles God’s? What authorizes us to posit a link between the temporal and the eternal realms? The inaccessibility of eternity is of course a commonplace; Cassirer explains that for Nicholas of Cusa

> the spiritual remains unattainable in itself; we can never grasp it except in a sense-image, a symbol. But we may at least demand that the sense-image itself contain nothing unclear, nothing doubtful; […] he requires of the symbols in which the

> divine becomes graspable by us not only sensible fullness and force but also intellectual precision and certainty. (53)

The problem, however, is that in the roundel poem Puttenham has moved from the sensible proof of the shape structure to an interpretation of the relationship between the temporal and the divine grounded in mere "agreement" rather than observation, an "indefiniteness" quite different from the kind that occurs as a result of the all-encompassing power of God or the queen. Making matters even more complicated, the roundel poem is not presented in the *Art as* a sphere, suggesting an inability on Puttenham's part to achieve the intersection of sense and intelligibility that he claims. It could be that the "turning" in this poem is attributable not to the paradoxical but ultimately unified motion of the spheres but to an "indefiniteness" that never allows certainty, including the certainty of the connection between the monarch and God.

This disjunction between the structure of the poem and the ambiguous signification of the words within it evokes yet another meaning of "turning." The word "trope" is derived etymologically from the Greek for "turn," involving as it does a turn from the literal signification of words to their figural meaning(s). Puttenham addresses tropological language in the Third Book of the *Art*, titled "Of Ornament." He begins his analysis by claiming that an exposition of figures is the culmination of his project. While "good proportion," by which he means the proportion achieved through the poem's structural elements addressed in the previous book (rhyme, meter, shape, etc.) "doth greatly adorn and commend" poetry, "there is yet requisite to the perfection of this art another manner of exornation, which resteth in the fashioning of our maker's language and style to such purpose as it may delight and allure as well the mind and the ear of the hearers with a certain novelty and strange manner of conveyance" (221). The "perfection" promised to the courtly poet if he can master tropes should not be understood simply as an ability to create aesthetic delight or to achieve social advancement; whereas the shape poems appealed primarily to the senses, Puttenham here is claiming that figural language can "allure as well the mind and the ear of the hearers," suggesting that a successfully executed figure represents the intersection of perception and thought, an intersection that for Cassirer constitutes the ideal of Renaissance philosophy. As Juliet Fleming argues, for Puttenham "the apprehension of beauty by the mind is itself an instance of decorum, for it is the discovery of due proportion between the mind and the sensible world" (15). At the same time, and even at this early stage of definition, the "strange manner" by which tropes "convey" meaning implies a certain instability: can the turn from literal meaning find its way back to epistemological propriety?

III.

The first chapter of Book 3 foregrounds the relationship between proportion and figural language with which we will concerned. According to Puttenham, "figures and figurative speeches" are "the flowers, as it were, and colors that a poet setteth upon his language by art, as the embroiderer doth his stone and pearl or passements of gold upon the stuff of a princely garment, or as the excellent painter bestoweth the rich orient colors upon his table of portrait." Puttenham expands the comparison of the poet to the "embroiderer" of a "princely garment" by comparing figures to the clothes of "great madams of honor," who, though their "personage or otherwise" makes them "never so comely and beautiful," still depend on "courtly habiliments, or at leastwise such other apparel as custom and civility have ordained to cover their naked bodies" to make them "more amiable in every man's eye" (221). Just as courtly clothing creates a "more amiable" impression, figural language can "convey" the meaning of a speech or poem "somewhat out of sight—that is, from the common course of ordinary speech and capacity of the vulgar judgment," even as it "yield[s] it much more beauty and commendation." In order to succeed, the poet must use his figures "discreetly," with "a delectable variety, by all measures and just proportion, and in places most aptly to be bestowed"; if the figures are "not well-tempered, or not well-laid, or be used in excess, or never so little disordered or misplaced, they not only give it no manner of grace at all, but rather do disfigure the stuff and spill the whole workmanship, taking away all beauty and good liking from it" (222). Despite this emphasis on proportion, it is not difficult to detect in Puttenham's formulation a certain anxiety over the representational status of figures. Following the logic of the "great madams of honor" example, figures would be fundamentally supplementary insofar as they add a layer of beauty to a body already "comely and beautiful" by dint of its "personage," or high sociopolitical status. At the same time, the fact that figures necessarily depart from "the common course of ordinary speech" and thus "convey" meaning to a point where it is "out of sight," susceptible neither to immediate perception nor to understanding, raises the possibility that language leads the mind astray, perhaps especially in the political context that Puttenham here evokes.

Elsewhere in the book Puttenham acknowledges the potentially disruptive effects of figural language, though he does his best to neutralize this disruption by appealing to proportion. A later definition of tropes is a case in point:

> As figures be the instruments of ornament in every language, so be they also in a sort abuses, or rather trespasses, in speech, because they pass the ordinary limits of common utterance, and be occupied of purpose to deceive the ear and also the mind, drawing it from plainness and simplicity to a certain doubleness, whereby our talk is the more guileful and abusing. (238)

On the one hand, figural language has an “instrument[al]” quality, allowing the accomplishment of a particular act, in this case persuasion or perhaps aesthetic delight. On the other, it is associated with “abuse,” which the editors gloss variously as the “improper use of language, misuse, corrupt practice, deceit, injury.” Such abuse emerges in this context from the tendency of figures to “draw” the mind “from plainness and simplicity to a certain doubleness.” This “doubleness,” which Puttenham also calls “duplicity,” does not necessarily have a negative connotation; rather, it refers more neutrally to the multiple planes of meaning required for figural language. Indeed, Puttenham will go so far as to argue that “every speech wrested from his own natural signification to another not altogether so natural is a kind of dissimulation, because the words bear contrary countenance to the intent” (271). However, Puttenham is quick to point out that one must use figures “*of purpose* to deceive the ear and also the mind,” emphasizing a level of discursive control that prevents figurative language from running astray of the speaker’s intention. An “abuse” is permitted, in other words, if the speaker realizes that he or she is committing it for a particular purpose. A problem only emerges when “such trespasses in speech (whereof there be many) […] give dolor and disliking to the ear and mind by any foul indecency or disproportion of sound, situation, or sense.” The proper use of inherently improper figural language thus depends on intentionality and context, both of which are established by what Puttenham calls “decorum” (239). As Heinrich Plett emphasizes, the courtier must “respect the decorum of the communication situation” and “feign at the right time the correct, the situationally appropriate role” (613-14).

Puttenham’s reduction of the errancy of abuse to a proportion it potentially resists is crucial for his project insofar as he seeks throughout the text to defend the intellectual respectability of poetry, its ability to both stably transmit knowledge and contribute to an ordered society even though it involves deception. In the first book, for example, Puttenham goes to great lengths to prove that poetry does not necessarily distort the imagination through its "doubleness." While "the evil and vicious disposition of the brain hinders the sound judgment and discourse of man with busy and disordered fantasies," Puttenham claims that if the imagination is "well affected" it serves an essentially mimetic function, resembling "a glass or mirror" that "represent[s] unto the soul all manner of beautiful visions, whereby the inventive part of the mind is so much helped, as without it no man could devise any new or rare thing." Far from generating only distortions of reality, a properly ordered imagination is necessary for any intellectual endeavor; in this sense, the poet is not a "light-headed or fantastical man" but a contributor to knowledge (109). In the same book, however, Puttenham distinguishes poetry from "ordinary prose" by claiming that the former is "decked and set out with all manner of fresh colors and figures, which maketh that it sooner inveigleth the judgment of man and carrieth his opinion this way and that, whithersoever the heart by impression of the ear shall be most affectionately bent and directed" (98). Figurative language differs from ordinary speech in its ability to deceive or "inveigle," which the editors gloss as "blinding" or "beguiling." Puttenham seems to admit here that poetry appeals not to the intellect or a well-ordered imagination but to the "heart," generating an unstable "opinion" rather than knowledge.

Aside from the fact that poetry itself "inveigleth the judgment of man," thus enacting the very condition that for Puttenham is "evil and vicious" as it applies to the imagination, it is worth noting the tension between mimesis and pure imagination here. According to the metaphor of the mirror, the "well proportioned" imagination ought to stably reproduce reality; at the same time, it is necessary for "devis[ing] any new or rare thing," which ostensibly exceeds the bounds of mimesis. Puttenham elaborates on this fine line between proper invention and an errant imagination when he notes that “the fantastical part of man (if it be not disordered) [is] a representer of the best, most comely, and beautiful images or appearances of things to the soul and according to their very truth. If otherwise, then doth it breed chimeras and monsters in man’s imaginations, and not only in his imaginations, but also in all his ordinary actions and life which ensues” (110). While the “monstrous” potential of the imagination is here something to be controlled through “proportion,” Philip Sidney’s *Defence of Poesy*, with which Puttenham was likely familiar, actually privileges the very “chimeras” that Puttenham discounts. In arguing for the superiority of poetry to other intellectual endeavors, Sidney claims that “only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any subjection, lifted up with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect into another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature, as the heroes, demigods, cyclopes, chimeras, furies, and such like” (257). Sidney’s reference to “demigods” and “chimeras” acquires a particular significance when one considers the nature of these creatures. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, a “chimera” is “a fabled fire-breathing monster of Greek mythology, with a lion’s head, a goat’s body, and a serpent’s tail,” and more generally refers to “an unreal creature of the imagination, a mere wild fancy, an unfounded conception.” While less obviously monstrous, a “demigod” is “a being of partly divine nature, as one sprung from the intercourse of a deity and a mortal, or a man raised to divine rank; a minor or inferior deity.” In both cases, Sidney is calling attention not only to the relationship between poetry and mythology but to language or the imagination’s ability to create unnatural combinations, whether the incongruous joining of animal parts or the intersection of the divine and temporal realms.

Although Puttenham appears to privilege a properly ordered imagination that maintains a mimetic relationship with reality, his own categorization of figures threatens to devolve into the very “disproportion” he warns against, one quite close to Sidney’s valorization of poetry’s ability to generate chimeras. Puttenham divides tropes into three categories:

> That first sort of figures doth serve the ear only and may be therefore called *auricular*; your second serves the conceit only and not the ear, and may be called *sensable*, not sensible nor yet sententious; your third sort serves as well the ear as the conceit and may be called *sententious figures*, because not only they properly appertain to full sentences, for beautifying them with a current and pleasant numerosity, but also giving them efficacy, and enlarging the whole matter besides with copious amplifications. (244)

Glossing this sentence, the editors explain that “*sensable* here means ‘consisting in an alteration of the sense of words,’ as distinguished from *sensible* (perceptible by the senses; evident) and *sententious* (meaningful; aphoristic)” (244, emphasis in original). If, as Puttenham earlier pointed out, the purpose of figural language in general is to “delight and allure as well the mind and the ear of the hearers,” here he offers a model for achieving such an intersection: auricular figures appeal simply to the ear, sensable figures appeal simply to the mind, and sententious figures represent the combination of perception and thought. One can think of Puttenham’s classification as a series of links in a chain or perhaps as a dialectic, with sententious figures serving as a synthesis of the sensible and the intelligible, which is precisely what Puttenham failed to achieve in the roundel poem. Puttenham’s “sensable” figures, which include among others metaphor, metonymy, and catachresis, thus occupy a sort of intermediary position, functioning in a manner different from perception—they deal with the “sense” of words and their exchange rather than with their sound—but also prior to the full establishment of meaning, though they are necessary for it. Establishing the proper relationship between these categories of figure is crucial for

Puttenham's project: by demonstrating the necessary role that figural language plays in connecting perception and the intellect, Puttenham will highlight the epistemological value of poetry and a well-ordered mimetic imagination more generally.

However, a close analysis of Puttenham's discussion of "sensable" figures, specifically his exposition of metaphor and catachresis, reveals a level of confusion that disarticulates the connection between perception and thought, making the category of the "sensable" a highly unstable link between the "auricular" and the "sententious." Metaphor, which Puttenham calls the "Figure of Transport," involves "a kind of wresting of a single word from his own right signification to another not so natural, but yet of some affinity or conveniency with it" (262-63). Note that there is a tension inscribed in the very definition of metaphor: while Puttenham insists that it results in "conveniency," or congruence between tenor and vehicle, his description of metaphor as a "wresting" alludes to a twisting that carries with it the implication of violence. One of Puttenham's first examples is to "call the top of a tree or of a hill, the crown of a tree or of a hill" because the crown is "the highest ornament of a prince's head," just as the top of a tree is its highest point (262-63). This figure corresponds to Aristotle's influential definition of metaphor "by analogy" in the *Poetics*, which refers to "cases where *b* is to *a* as *d* is to *c*"; the substitutions of metaphor allow one to "speak of *d* instead of *b*, or *b* instead of *d*" (105-07). In Puttenham's example, the "crown" and the "top" of the tree can be unproblematically substituted since both terms are available to perception and thus to knowledge: we can see the crown on a prince's head and therefore use it to describe the top of a tree.[10] Puttenham's reference to the crown is far from innocent, of course: not only does the example emphasize hierarchical organization, a top down political structure, but just as the evenness of the roundel's shape sought to offer sensible confirmation of the proportionate power of the queen, Puttenham here naturalizes the signifier of the monarch's authority.

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[10] This analysis of metaphor is indebted to Andrzej Warminski's discussion of Aristotle's *Poetics* in "The Future Past of Literary Theory."

Puttenham's next example of metaphor, however, is much closer to the "wresting" invoked in the definition. Quoting the lines "'As the dry ground that thirsts after a show'r / Seems to rejoice when it is well ywet,'" Puttenham notes that "here, for want of an apter and more natural word to declare the dry temper of the earth, it is said to thirst and rejoice, which is only proper to living creatures." While Puttenham claims that these lines do not "much swerve from the true sense" and that "every man can easily conceive the meaning thereof," this example differs crucially from the first: unlike the "crown" substituting for the top of the tree, Puttenham admits here that we do not have a word available to depict the "dry temper of the earth" and thus cannot be sure if it "rejoices" in the same way a human does. The ground must thus be anthropomorphized in order to convey meaning, a figural strategy that emerges not through a substitution of terms based in a logic of perception but through catachresis, the imposition rather than the exchange of a word or set of words that cannot be subsumed to the analogous structure presupposed in metaphor and requires instead the sort of "agreement" without knowledge that was necessary for the resemblances posited in the roundel poem (263). It is curious, then, that Puttenham defers the introduction of catachresis to the next page: "But if for lack of natural and proper term or word we take another, neither natural nor proper, and do untruly apply it to the thing which we would seem to express, and without any just inconvenience, it is not then spoken by this figure *metaphor* or of inversion as before, but by plain Abuse" (264). The difference between catachresis and the second example of metaphor would seem to hinge on determining what is "natural and proper," the suggestion being that the earth "rejoicing" after a shower is not literally “proper” but close enough to the natural process in question. Puttenham, however, has already noted that the earth “thirsting” and “rejoicing” is neither “apt” nor “natural,” implying that catachresis, the abuse of metaphor, can in some cases be inscribed in metaphor itself. Catachresis is not easily distinguishable from metaphor and thus threatens it from the inside, a violence already legible in the initial description of metaphor as a “wresting” of language from its proper place.[11]

The “abuse” inherent in metaphor should perhaps come as no surprise given Puttenham’s claim from the outset that figures are always “in a sort abuses,” but the slippage between metaphor as a fairly straightforward exchange of properties (one that, incidentally, Elyot assumes in his account of the Chain of Being) and metaphor as a catachrestic imposition of meaning suggests that Puttenham is in fact violating his earlier prescription that such abuses must be deployed intentionally by the writer. His explication of tropes is designed to fit into a unified account of poetry’s structure (established in the previous book through the presentation of the shape poems) and its tropological language, but Puttenham’s analysis of figures simultaneously imperils the consistency of a system predicated on analogy by suggesting that the relationship between two entities (in this case, human and nature) can be imposed rather than observed. This blurring of the boundary between metaphor and its abuse calls into question the extent to which we can follow the critical consensus in reading Puttenham's text as an exercise in courtly decorum, a manual that not only defines figures but performs their proportionate use. Lamb, for example, argues that Puttenham's ostensibly decorous poetics privileges "intentionality," or what Puttenham calls "intendment," which for Lamb "only occurs when one is aware of the deliberate deployment of a figure, and this can only take place if the art is known and recognized. An intendment is perceptible, then, when ornamental usage carries a semantic power" (31). I am suggesting, by contrast, that Puttenham's examples of metaphor disarticulate the connection between "ornamental use" and "semantic power" by revealing the ways in which figural strategies like anthropomorphism and catachresis disrupt the assumed link between perceptible analogy and knowledge.Furthermore, the fact that the meaning of metaphor itself "swerves from the true sense" of its initial definition calls into question Puttenham's privileging of a well-ordered imagination rather than one that "breed[s] chimeras and monsters." Not only does this "swerving" suggest a certain amount of disorder in Puttenham's conception of tropes, but his second example of metaphor, where the inanimate earth acquires a quasi-human life through personification, in fact constructs the sort of monstrous entity language can generate if it is not regulated by proportion. Given these inconsistencies, we must develop a more nuanced understanding of Puttenham's claim that figures "draw" the mind "from plainness and simplicity to a certain doubleness" (238). While he seems to be referring here to the poet's audience, Puttenham's own account of figural language has swerved from the "plain" distinction between metaphor and catachresis to the conflation of those tropes, generating multiple and contradictory meanings of metaphor that cannot be reduced to a logic of proportion.

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[11] Puttenham’s analysis of figures in this sense anticipates Paul de Man’s, who argues in “Lyrical Voice in Contemporary Theory: Riffaterre and Jauss” that “if there is to be consciousness (or experience, mind, subject, discourse, or face), it has to be susceptible of phenomenalization. But since the phenomenality cannot be established a priori, it can only occur by a process of signification. The phenomenal and sensory properties of the signifier have to serve as guarantors for the certain existence of the signified and, ultimately, of the referent.” The achievement of phenomenality in language, however, only emerges through catachresis, though this dubious origin is subsequently masked: “Once the phenomenal intuition has been put in motion, all other substitutions follow as in a chain. But the starting, catachretic decree of signification is arbitrary” (62).

In a certain sense, this contradictory "doubleness" is found within Puttenham's definition of "allegory," which he terms "the chief ringleader and captain of all other figures either in the poetical or oratory science" (271). As we have already pointed out, allegory takes place "when we speak one thing and think another, and that our words and our meanings meet not" (270). Critics like Montrose have read Puttenham's discussion of allegory in Machiavellian terms: the successful courtier must understand how to deceive in order to advance politically. Puttenham claims, for example, that "every common courtier, but also the gravest counselor, yea, and the most noble and wisest prince of them all are many times enforced to use" allegory (270-71). Such an understanding of allegory presupposes that the subject "dissembles" for instrumental purposes, but, as we have seen, Puttenham himself is not always in control of his own discourse, especially when he is discussing figural language. I thus want to suggest a different reading of Puttenham's definition. What if Puttenham's claim that "our words and our meanings meet not" refers not to deliberate deception but to a necessary condition of language? Puttenham himself notes in this chapter that "every speech wrested from his own natural signification to another not altogether so natural is a kind of dissimulation, because the words bear contrary countenance to the intent" (271). We have seen the instability that emerges from such "wresting" in Puttenham's discussion of metaphor and catachresis, which called into question whether "words" could ever live up to "intent" that attempts to govern them. When Puttenham claims that allegory is a "long and perpetual metaphor," one that "extend[s] to whole and large speeches" rather than "single words," does he refer to metaphor by analogy or metaphor by catachrestic abuse? Such undecidability makes the definition of allegory itself a "full allegory," which, according to Puttenham, emerges when meaning is "not discovered, but left at large to the reader's judgment and conjecture" (272).

I locate the political force of Puttenham's text in his failure to maintain decorum, to correctly distinguish between figures and thus to generate, according to Lamb, "a convenient proportion between words and intent by which the mind is revealed without being represented" (34). What Lamb sees as Puttenham's critical project is also his apparent ideological mission: just as he seeks to "reveal" the mind of the poet by establishing a harmonious relationship between "words and intent," Puttenham wants to make the realm of intelligibility, associated with the divine, perceptible through the figure of the queen and the language that undergirds her authority, thus revealing an intentional structure within the universe. Reading Puttenham's text catachrestically, however, calls into question the tropological schemes that allegedly confirm the power of the monarch. We have already pointed out that such doubts are inscribed in the language of the roundel poem, where the failure of the human intellect to "comprehend" God's power compels subjects to "agree" that figures like the sphere and the queen "purport eternity." But what authorizes this "purporting"? What motivates the link between what Puttenham calls the "indefiniteness" of God and the sensible figure of the queen? The "doubleness" that emerges from allegory might offer an answer. Puttenham's own examples of allegory are thoroughly political: he claims that "if we should call the commonwealth a ship, the prince a pilot, the counselors mariners, the storms wars, the calm and haven peace, this is spoken all in allegory" (271). While these allegorical commonplaces depict the power structure in a positive light, elsewhere in the text Puttenham presents allegories that oscillate between praise of the queen's symbolic power and recognition of the epistemologically violent origins of the state, an oscillation that I connect to Puttenham's uneasy distinction between metaphor and catachresis. Does the monarch's power emerge analogically from the power of God, or is such a relationship ideologically posited? The monarch is in many ways the ultimate trope, but is she best understood as a metaphor or a catachresis? I will argue that Puttenham's references to monarchy repeat the "doubleness" characteristic of figural language, making the *Art* an allegory of figural kingship, the meaning of which is necessarily "left at large to the reader's judgment and conjecture."

IV.

Puttenham thematizes metaphor and catachresis in two figures of the queen presented in Book 3. The "Gorgeous," which Puttenham terms "the last and principal figure of our poetical ornament," is the ultimate "sententious" figure, which, we will remember, affects both the mind and the senses. According to Puttenham, "this figure […] polish[es] our speech and as it were attire[s] it with copious and pleasant amplifications and much variety of sentences all running upon one point and to one intent, so as I doubt whether I may term it a figure, or rather a mass of many figurative speeches, applied to the beautifying of our tale or argument" (333). The all-consuming nature of the Gorgeous functions as a metaphor for Elizabeth: not only does Puttenham here and elsewhere associate the queen with beauty (Elizabeth is "the most beautiful, or rather beauty, of queens" (334)), but the fact that the various instances of the Gorgeous within a poem "all run upon one point and to one intent" evokes the unifying power of the monarch, not to mention the all-important "intention" of the poet that Puttenham seems to privilege elsewhere in the text. Puttenham draws on two figures to explain the function of the Gorgeous. His first metaphor is taken from the plastic arts and appears to follow a mimetic model, the sculptor "reduc[ing]" a statue to "that fashion they will" and applying to it a "glass," or gloss, that is "so smooth and clear as ye may see your face in it." Though this gloss does constitute an "amplification" of the statue's appearance, it also allows the stable transmission of the viewer's reflection, implying that the Gorgeous poem is both beautiful and truthful in a way similar to the well-ordered imagination, which, we will recall, functions as "a representer of the best, most comely, and beautiful images or appearances of things to the soul and according to their very truth." The second metaphor, however, alters reality more deceptively: Puttenham points out that the Gorgeous covers "the bare and naked body, which, being attired in rich and gorgeous apparel, seemeth to the common usage of the eye much more comely and beautiful than the natural" (333). If the first metaphor suggests that the Gorgeous offers a mirror image, the second pits appearance against reality, the "apparel" only "seem[ing]" to the "common usage of the eye" superior to the "natural." This statement can be read in two ways. On the one hand, the artistic enhancement provided by clothing appears to be superior to the natural but is not, or the clothing conceals a merely ordinary body. So while Puttenham claims that the Gorgeous "run[s] upon one point and to one intent," his use of two not entirely equivalent figures to explain its power introduces a certain doubleness that calls into question whether the Gorgeous can, in Puttenham's words, both "polish *and* as it were attire" a speech or poem.

We can see the intersection between mimesis and political power in the poem authored by Elizabeth that Puttenham cites as an example of the Gorgeous. Puttenham describes the poem, which Elizabeth addressed to nobles supporting Mary, Queen of Scots, as a "sweet and sententious" warning to those whose "ambition and disloyalty" threatens the "quiet of the realm" (334). The extent to which the poem exemplifies the Gorgeous seems to reside in its content rather than its form: to adapt Puttenham's earlier description of the figure, Elizabeth is "reduc[ing]" her work of art, in this case the state, to the "fashion [she] will" by vowing to remove her enemies who, in her words, "sow discord" (11).[12] We should think here to Elyot's claim that King Edgar restored order at an earlier stage of English history by "reduc[ing] the monarch to his pristine estate and figure," at which point the "people came to conformity, and the realm began to take comfort and to show some visage of a public weal" (11-12). Elizabeth promises that the reader “shall see” the “grafted guiles” of her opponents, whereupon “dazzled eyes with pride, which great ambition blinds, / Shall be unseeled by worthy wights whose foresight falsehood finds” (8-10). This vow of revelation, of an “unseeling” that can refer both to the ambition-blinded eyes of her foes and to her loyal audience, positions Elizabeth on the side of truth and “foresight” by suggesting that England will once again be able to recognize itself as a stable land, just as Puttenham’s statue becomes “so smooth and clear as ye may see your face in it.” The behavior of the rebels, on the other hand, seems to correspond to Puttenham’s second metaphor for the Gorgeous, at least in terms of the dichotomy between appearance and reality that the “rich and gorgeous apparel” created. In this case, though, the deceptive implications of the metaphor are explicit: “clouds of toys untried do *cloak* aspiring minds” (5, my emphasis), implying not only the distorting effects of ambition on the conspirators but the concealment of such ambition through “guile” (8). Elizabeth allies herself with truth, which corresponds to the first metaphor Puttenham uses to describe the Gorgeous, while she associates the conspirators with deception, characteristic of the second figure for the Gorgeous.

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[12] Elizabeth's poem is included in Puttenham's text; references to it are cited by line number.

One cannot understate the significance of this moment for Puttenham, both in terms of the intellectual consistency of his project and its connection to the political structure. We will recall that Puttenham describes figural language as “requisite to the perfection of this art” and the figure of the Gorgeous as “the last and principal figure of our poetical ornament.” It is thus the ultimate example of the “sententious” trope, the most important category of figure insofar as it appeals to the mind and the senses by fusing “sensable” and “auricular” figures. Indeed, Elizabeth’s poem is quite similar to Puttenham’s pyramid poem addressed above. Just as Elizabeth asserts the truth of her ultimate power, Puttenham praises Elizabeth’s metaphorical relation to the “tall comely stature” of the pyramid, which expresses a power that is “not feigned," like the conspirators in the queen's own poem, but "true" and allows Elizabeth, the superior human, to "aspire" to power like "flame of fire," the superior element. By demonstrating these analogical resemblances at the levels of structure and language, Puttenham is not only confirming the ideological power of monarchy but proving the coherence of his argument. We should thus read Puttenham's claim that the Gorgeous "attire[s]" a work "with copious and pleasant amplifications and much variety of sentences all running upon one point and to one intent" as both a description of Elizabeth's poem and as a commentary on his own treatise. If Puttenham's "intent" is to compose a well-ordered discourse on each aspect of poetry, he has apparently succeeded by connecting the "proportion" of poetic structure with the "decorum" of figural language, which themselves connect metaphorically to the superiority of the monarch.

As we have seen, however, Puttenham's valorization of "intent" does not in fact govern the entirety of his discourse. His discussions of tropes like metaphor, catachresis, and allegory expose the inherent "doubleness" of figural language, a duplicity that goes beyond even the intentional dissimulation necessary for the successful courtier and extends to Puttenham's representation of monarchy. While the shape poems and the figure of the Gorgeous function as ideological supports for Queen Elizabeth, Puttenham's discussion of the "high style," a mode of writing reserved for "the gods and divine things," "the noble gests and great fortunes of princes," and "the greatest affairs of war and peace," registers an ambivalence that calls into question the origins of political power (237). As in his exposition of the Gorgeous, Puttenham draws on two metaphors to explain the inappropriate use of the high style, first claiming that it is "disgraced and made foolish and ridiculous by all words affected, counterfeit, and puffed up, as it were a wind-ball carrying more countenance than matter," suggesting that using high language in situations that do not call for it amounts to an inauthentic glorification of an essentially mundane situation and thus fails to maintain decorum. Puttenham's reference to "counterfeit" words revealing "more countenance than matter" repeats his description of Elizabeth at the beginning of the *Art* as "a most cunning *counterfeiter* lively representing Venus in *countenance*," though the meaning ostensibly shifts with the context (95; I will discuss this passage in more detail below): in Elizabeth's case, "counterfeiter" would seem to connote an "artist" or perhaps an "imitator" of God's power, while her "countenance" refers to her authentically beautiful appearance; when Puttenham draws on these words to describe the abuse of the high style, however, "counterfeit" suggests "inflated" or even "fraudulent" language and "countenance" an appearance that may have nothing real beneath.

The contexts of "counterfeit" may be different, but it is important to note that the same sort of doubleness emerged in Puttenham's analysis of the Gorgeous, which both created a "goodly glass so smooth and clear," indicating a mimetic and therefore truthful connection between language and reality, *and* clothed speech in "rich and gorgeous apparel" that "seemeth to the common usage of the eye much more comely and beautiful than the natural," which suggests the ability of tropes to manipulate and distort reality (333). Indeed, Puttenham's second metaphor for the high style makes legible language's tendency toward deception in an explicitly political context. For Puttenham, the abused high style

> cannot be better resembled than to these midsummer pageants in London, where to make the people wonder are set forth great and ugly giants marching as if they were alive and armed at all points, but within they are stuffed full of brown paper and tow, which the shrewd boys underpeering do guilefully discover and turn to a great derision. (237-38)

The editors argue that the figure of the “midsummer pageant,” a common occurrence in Elizabethan England, “stages a clash between a more traditional mentality in the Renaissance that expressed itself in such civic pageantry and a more skeptical, perhaps modern, mentality that is evident in the irreverent behavior of the ‘shrewd boys’ as well as in the author’s recounting of their activity” (238n). On the one hand, the “great and ugly giants marching” causes the common people to “wonder,” to be not only amazed by this exercise of state power but also terrified. A select few, however, described as “shrewd boys,” are capable of piercing the surface and discovering that the apparently all-powerful “giants” are in fact “stuffed full of brown paper and tow,” a “guileful discover[y]” that leads them to ridicule the display rather than revere it. Puttenham’s description of this scene seems to position him on the side of the “shrewd boys,” calling into question his attitude toward state power.

While Puttenham refers most immediately to English “midsummer pageants,” which are not necessarily associated with the monarch, the editors point out that this passage is likely also inspired by a scene from Castiglione’s *Book of the Courtier* that discusses the errors of “bad prince[s]” (238n). In Thomas Hoby’s English translation of *The Courtier*, Signor Ottaviano claims that because bad princes

> Suffer themselves to bee leade with selfe liking, they waxe lofty, and with a stately countenance, with sharpe and cruell conditions, with pompous garments, golde and jewels, and with coming (in a manner) never abroad to be seene, they thinke to get estimation and authoritie among men, and to bee counted (almost) Gods. But they are (in my judgment) like the Colosses that were made in Rome the last year upon the feast daye of the place of Agone, which outwardly declared a likenesse of great men and horses of triumph, and inwardly were full of towe

> and rages. But the Princes of this sort are so much worse, as the Colosses by their own waighty peise stand upright of themselves, and they because they be ill counterpoised, and without line and level placed upon unequall ground, through their owne waightines overthrow them selves, and from one errour runne into infinite. Because their ignorance being annexed with this false opinion, that they can not erre, and that the port they keepe commeth of their knowledge, leadeth them every way by right or by wrong to lay hand upon possessions boldly, so they may come by them. (263)

The extent to which Ottaviano's speech resembles not only Puttenham's reference to the "great and ugly giants" composed of "brown paper and tow" ("towe and rages" in Hoby's translation) but many of the other passages under consideration in this chapter is striking. Just as Ottaviano claims that bad princes "get estimation and authoritie" by outfitting themselves "with pompous garments, golde and jewels" and "coming (in a manner) never abroad to be seen," Puttenham earlier compares the work of the poet to the "embroiderer" of a "princely garment" who provides "madams of honor" with "kindly clothes and colors, such as may convey them somewhat out of sight" (222). Puttenham suggests that clothing (and, by extension, figural language) is the "manner" by which princes conceal themselves, insofar as it "convey[s]" the true identity of a person "out of sight," away from "the common course of ordinary speech and capacity of the vulgar judgment." This language reappears in Puttenham's description of the Gorgeous, a trope that ostensibly discloses identity, which "seemeth to the common usage of the eye much more comely and beautiful than the natural," and in his description of the pageant giants associated with the abused high style, who make the people "wonder" at their stature and deceptively create the impression of power. It seems possible that the Gorgeous, arguably the most proper and proportionate figure given its association with Elizabeth, “the most beautiful, or rather beauty of queens,” follows a logic similar to the *abuse* of proper figuration expressed through “the great and ugly giants” filled with “brown paper and tow,” themselves associated with bad princes (334).

I do not think it’s coincidental that Puttenham’s oscillation between the political proportion embodied by Elizabeth and its ugly, tyrannical violation emerges in a discussion ostensibly about figural language.[13] Indeed, this Janus-faced conception of political power becomes perversely appropriate (even proportionate!) given the primacy of allegory for Puttenham, the master trope that occurs “when we speak one thing and think another” so that “our words and our meanings meet not” (270). This “doubleness” destabilizes virtually every reference to monarchy under consideration here. How, for example, can one distinguish between the spherical shape poem, which created “a general resemblance of the roundel to God, the world, and the Queen,” and the “wind ball” of the abused high style, which appears spherical but in reality “carr[ies] more countenance than matter”? Is Elizabeth’s likeness to the pyramid’s “tall comely stature” naturally beautiful or does it occur through language that makes her figure “much more comely and beautiful than the natural”? Does the assumed continuity between Elizabeth’s power and God’s emerge through metaphor by analogy, which presupposes truth, intention, and perception, or catachresis, which, like the pageant giants who only *seem* “as if they were alive and armed at all points,” personifies an abstract power through a linguistic act that takes place in the absence of knowledge, thus generating what Ottaviano calls only “(almost)

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[13] As Wayne Rebhorn points out, “from the start of the Renaissance to the end, rhetoricians cannot seem to prevent grotesque elements from appearing in their characterizations of their art, with the result that the ‘body’ of rhetoric is always double, imagined as both a harmonious, well-proportioned entity and a monstrous one” (17).

Gods"? If Puttenham is on the side of the "shrewd boys" who "guilefully discover" the "brown paper and tow" beneath the giants, does this ally him as well with the rebels whose "grafted guiles" Elizabeth attempts to neutralize in her poem?

While Puttenham's analysis of the Gorgeous, which comes near the end of the *Art*, should function as the culmination of his poetic and political project, juxtaposing it with his analysis of the abused high style, its ostensible opposite, destabilizes not only the coherence of Puttenham's text but the legitimacy of the monarchical authority that so often goes hand in hand with the authority of the writer. In the context of the *Art*, Ottaviano's claim that because bad princes "be ill counterpoised, and without line and level placed upon unequall ground, through their owne waightines [they] overthrow them selves, and from one errour runne into infinite" should thus be read not only as a warning about political tyranny but a commentary on the tensions inscribed within Puttenham's treatise. To be "counterpoised" refers to a state of equilibrium, something quite close to the proportion after which Puttenham strives. As we have seen, however, Puttenham's difficulty in distinguishing between metaphor and catachresis opens up an allegorical reading of the text that not only violates proportion but seems to exceed intentional courtly dissimulation. To use Ottaviano's terminology, the text "overthrows itself" as "one errour runne[s] into infinite." The point, however, is not simply that Puttenham unsettles the distinction between proportion and its perversion. If Puttenham's mind has itself been "drawn" from "plainness and simplicity to a certain doubleness, whereby [his] talk is the more guileful and abusing," his account of the historical emergence of poetry at the beginning of the *Art* reveals why this doubleness is inescapable (238). As we will see, the very foundation of monarchical and authorial supremacy itself emerges from an "errour," one that sets the stage for the confusions that follow.

V.

Puttenham's description of poetry's relationship to both political power and the production of knowledge in Book 1 of the *Art* oscillates between stable meaning and multiplicity, imitation and deception, harmony and the threat of accident. In a strange way, the ideological power of language emerges unintentionally, an accidental byproduct of the ostensibly pure aims of poetry. Noting that poetry predated "any civil society," Puttenham claims that "Orpheus assembled the wild beasts to come in herds to hearken to his music and by that means made them tame, implying thereby how by his discreet and wholesome lessons uttered in harmony and with melodious instruments, he brought the rude and savage people to a more civil and orderly life" (96). As Wayne Rebhorn points out, this "myth of the orator-civilizer," a commonplace in Renaissance rhetoric manuals, is an "intensely ideological pronouncement" that constitutes "a mystification of the real power relations that obtain in society" (25-26). Thinly concealed beneath its valorization of "harmony" and "wholesome[ness]" is an element of coercion: poetry enraptures the "rude and savage people," luring them into civilized society. Poets also made a contribution to epistemology and science, being "the first that intended to the observation of nature and her works, […] by degrees coming to know and consider of the substances separate and abstract, which we call the divine intelligences or good angels," which led to the establishment of organized religion. The poets are here allied with knowledge, a knowledge which allows them not only to explore the "celestial courses" but to "devis[e] all expedient means for the establishment of commonwealth, to hold and contain the people in order and duty by force and virtue of good and wholesome laws." This intersection of the philosophical and the political is reminiscent of Puttenham's shape poems, where a Neoplatonic emphasis on proportion and ideality accompanied an assertion of political order. The religion of the ancient poets had another, accidental effect, however, one that makes legible the force underlying the “harmony” of Orpheus’s lyre. According to Puttenham, the “preservation of the public peace and tranquility” was “*not purposely intended* but greatly furthered by the awe of their gods and such scruple of conscience as the terrors of their late invented religion had led them into” (97, my emphasis). It is not clear here whether “their” refers to the poet-philosophers, the lesser members of the commonwealth, or both. In any case, the work of the poets, which initially generated knowledge, also unintentionally produces fear and thus submission to political power. Even at this early stage of human history, Puttenham reveals the ability of language to exceed its intention: whereas poetry initially served a fundamentally epistemological purpose, it morphs into a “terror.”[14]

Despite this association between the ideological power of language and political fear, which is reminiscent of the people enthralled by the pageant giants, Puttenham returns in the next chapter to a valorization of the wholesomeness of poetry, noting not only that poets are “meetest to register the lives and noble gests of princes and of the great monarchs of the world,” which he will later identify with the proper use of the “high style,” but that they “made the first differences between virtue and vice, and then tempered all these knowledges and skills with the exercise of a delectable music by melodious instruments, which withal served them to delight their hearers and to call the people together by admiration to a plausible and virtuous conversation” (98-99). At the same time, he makes the claim discussed above that poetry “inveigleth the judgment of man and carrieth his opinion this way and that,” suggesting that poetry produces ideological distortion rather than a “virtuous conversation.” Puttenham’s analysis once again arrives at the relationship between poetry, politics, and philosophy, but what is the precise nature of this relationship? How can poetry accurately capture the lives of kings and establish morality if it also "inveigleth the judgment of man"? By the logic of this passage, education and governance, held in such esteem by Elyot and identified by Lamb as the entire purpose of the *Art*, would be themselves deceptive, predicated on poetry's ability to bewitch and discipline the subject (45). What results would not be a "plausible and virtuous conversation" but a relationship predicated on linguistic force, one that, like the wind-ball associated with the abused high style, "carrieth" the "opinion" of the hearer "this way and that," not necessarily in a proper direction. Poetry would thus generate the "busy and disordered fantasies" Puttenham later attributes to a distorted imagination, one that produces ideological "monsters and chimeras" (109-110).

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[14] It is for this reason that I take issue with Victoria Kahn’s suggestion that in Puttenham and other “early humanists” the “epistemological threat of skepticism is contained by the practice of social consensus” (377). Puttenham consistently reveals that such consensus is coerced.

If we connect Puttenham's analysis of the imagination to his historical narrative of poetry's constitutive role in forming the state, it becomes clear why he registers anxiety over the "chimeras" of a disordered fancy. As a ruler by divine right, the English monarch is, to borrow the words of Sidney, herself something of a "demigod" insofar as she possesses both a mortal and an immortal body, what Kegl calls a "fantastically double existence" (28). The ideology of divine right hinges on the assertion of a mimetic relationship between the monarch and God, the former imitating (but not entirely embodying) the power of the latter, rather than a "chimerical" one, where the link between the spiritual and human would be little more than an "unreal creature of the imagination" generated perhaps by catachresis, which endows inanimate nature with life and thus creates the sort of "chimera" against which Puttenham guards. The monstrous potential of figural language is especially legible in a chapter titled "In what form of poesy the gods of the gentiles were praised and honored," where Puttenham attempts to differentiate between the Roman worship of pagan gods and Christian praise of the One True God, a distinction that for him pits truth against falsehood and thus serves a function similar to the tension between the Gorgeous and the abused high style. While Puttenham notes that even Roman poets “were after a sort restrained, so as they could not with their credit untruly praise their own gods,” he points out that their praises “were not from the beginning all historically true, and many of them very fictions, and such of them as were true were grounded upon some part of a history or matter of verity, the rest altogether figurative and mystical” (117). The Romans have an essentially “figurative” view of religion since as they divinize the behavior of their human rulers: according to Puttenham, “Jupiter “married his own sister Juno” because “such was the guise of all great princes in the oriental part of the world” (118). There is thus an element of (misrecognized) historical truth in the Roman account of the gods, but it sheds more light on the customs of society than the divine realm. Indeed, the notion that the “incontinent” Jupiter “should be the highest god in heaven” is for Puttenham “absurd,” either a “witty device and fiction made for a purpose, or a very noble and impudent lie.” Puttenham discounts the latter possibility since the Roman poets “were otherwise discreet and grave men,” the implication being that the “purpose” of the fiction is to legitimize the behavior of human authority by attributing it to the gods. Note at this point that the Romans are remaining within the regulatory system of figurative language that Puttenham will establish later in the *Art*: the poets are “discreet,” another word for “proportion,” because they “deceive the ear and also the mind” of the Roman people by constructing a figurative scheme that seems to describe the gods but actually refers to the human rule; they do so with a particular objective in mind and are therefore in control of their discourse.

In contrast to Roman religion, the triumph of Christian doctrine is its ability to transcend figuration and achieve unadulterated spiritual truth rather than the historical truth misrecognized by Romans as spiritual. Puttenham's discussion of Christian superiority is worth quoting at length:

> But with us Christians, who be better disciplined and do acknowledge but one God, almighty, everlasting, and in every respect self-sufficient (*autharcos*), reposed in all perfect rest and sovereign bliss, not needing or exacting any foreign help or good: to him we cannot exhibit overmuch praise, nor belie him any ways, unless it be in abasing his excellency by scarcity of praise, or by misconceiving his divine nature, weening to praise him if we impute to him such vain delights and peevish affections as commonly the frailest men are reproved for. Namely, to make him ambitious of honor, jealous and difficult in his worships, terrible, angry, vindictive, a lover, a hater, a pitier, and indigent of man's worships—finally so passionate as in effect he should be altogether *anthropopathis*. To the gods of the gentiles they might well attribute these infirmities, for they were but children of men, great princes and famous in the world, and not for any other respect divine than by some resemblance of virtue they had to do good and to benefit many. So as to the God of the Christians such divine praise might be verified; to the other gods, none but figuratively or in mystical sense, as hath been said. (118-19)

This distinction between the fictional Roman gods, who are subject to human "infirmities" and appetites because they are "but children of men," or human creations, and the Christian God, who exists "in all perfect rest and sovereign bliss," is a commonplace, but the way in which Puttenham expresses the difference between the religions is curious and symptomatic. As the editors point out, he confuses "*autarkes*," the Greek word for "self-sufficient," with "*autarchos*," which means “autocratic ruler.” In a passage where Puttenham claims the superiority of the Christian god precisely because of His absolute distinction from created being, he conflates the divine and human orders by referring to God as an autocrat, perhaps a king (or queen). So while he claims that the Roman gods are mere reflections of “great princes,” Puttenham’s mistaken, apparently accidental description of the Christian god suggests that he too is drawing on human government to describe a spiritual entity.

This contradiction, created perhaps by a mere slip of the pen, raises important questions not only about figural language but about its relationship to the political realm. Despite Puttenham’s insistence that the Christian god is not “*anthropopathis*,” his use of “*autharcos*” *does* anthropomorphize god by comparing his “self-sufficiency” to that of an absolute monarch. Puttenham is, in his own words, “misconceiving his [god’s] divine nature” by drawing on the “foreign help or good” of a human system of government to represent the divine. We might thus argue that this description of God corresponds to his second definition of metaphor, where the lack of “an apter and more natural word” demands one that is “only proper to living creatures” but that nevertheless “doth not so much swerve from the true sense but that every man can easily conceive the meaning thereof” (263). The problem, however, is that Puttenham’s reference to autocracy may very well “swerve” too far afield of the meaning for which he aims, insofar as he is interested in distinguishing god from human creation. The definition of catachresis might help us more: “If for lack of natural and proper term or word we take another, neither natural nor proper, and do untruly apply it to the thing which we would seem to express, and without any just inconvenience, it is not then spoken by this figure metaphor or of inversion as before, but by plain Abuse” (264). Although in this context there *would* seem to be a more “natural and proper term” that Puttenham could have used to designate God’s being, namely “*autarkes*,” the fact remains that he “untruly appl[ies]” a word designating human power, with a great deal of “inconvenience” to his overall claim that the praise of the Christian god “might be verified” while that of the Roman gods is only “figurative.” Not only does Puttenham contradict his valorization of the Christian religion, but he appears to violate his advice that the poet’s use of language should correspond to his intention, something the Romans supposedly achieved but that Puttenham himself does not. This failure is made even more ironic by the editor’s claim that Puttenham’s use of “*autharcos*” “may be influenced by ‘author’” (118n). That is, the very assertion of the organizing power of the author generates a major mistake in the text.

In a discussion of the *Art*, Jacques Lezra describes catachresis as a “violent, improper figure, neither rational nor pedagogical, that appears to draw together things that cannot be otherwise joined, particularly not on the basis of resemblance” (61). Though Lezra is not concerned with this passage, his characterization of catachresis is relevant to the system of political, spiritual, and linguistic proportion that Puttenham both constructs and disrupts in the course of his text. The roundel poem is an idealized (and ideological) reinscription of Puttenham’s accidental replacement of “*autarchos*,” or autocrat, with “*autarkes*,” or divine self-sufficiency. Like Puttenham’s second example of metaphor, which self-consciously imbued inanimate nature with human life and thus exceeded the knowledge generated by proportionate analogy, the eternal “stillness” of the roundel, itself compared to God’s infinity, gains “life and sense” through anthropomorphic abuse in the figure of the queen. To quote Lezra, by “drawing together things that cannot otherwise be joined,” in this case an autocrat and an inaccessible God, Puttenham exposes the linguistic mechanisms by which the human sovereign comes to allegedly resemble her divine counterpart. It is precisely this insight that Puttenham must repress in order to assert the harmony of divine right. As we have seen, however, this initial mistake constantly returns, generating a doubleness that destabilizes the aesthetic and political ideologies of the text.

The extent to which Puttenham's slip of the pen ironizes the system of correspondences he builds elsewhere in the text will be evident from one final example. At the very beginning of the *Art*, Puttenham attempts to establish an analogy between poet, monarch, and God, the very entities that he confuses in his discussion of Roman religion. Defining the poet as a "maker," Puttenham claims that just as God's "divine imagination made all the world of nought," the poet "makes and contrives out of his own brain both the verse and matter of his poem." While Puttenham here argues that poetry is the work of pure imagination, a creation *ex nihilo* that needs no "foreign copy or example" for its efficacy, he quickly qualifies his definition by pointing out that the poet also "may in some sort be said a follower or imitator, because he can express the true and lively of every thing [that] is set before him" (93). On the one hand, then, the poet creates from whole cloth, constructing a fiction in every sense of the word; on the other, he remains within an essentially mimetic structure of representation that does not exceed the bounds of lived experience or the "true." In an attempt to prove that there is no "repugnancy" (93), or contradiction, in his Janus-faced formulation, Puttenham expands his definition of poetic creation even further, claiming that the poet's art "cannot grow but by some divine instinct—the Platonics call it *furor*—or by excellence of nature and complexion, or by great subtlety of the spirits and wit, or by much experience and observation of the world and course of kind, or peradventure by all or most part of them." While Puttenham here reserves a place for "experience and observation of the world," his two examples of poetry seem to privilege the imagination over an imitation of empirical reality. He first points out that, despite his blindness and status as a "poor private man," Homer managed to "so exactly set forth and describe, as if he had been a most excellent captain or general, the order and array of battles" and "naturally paint out the speeches, countenance, and manners of princely persons and private" (94). What appears to be a "natural" and "exact" description, however, actually takes place "without any subject of verity," making of Homer, "by manner of speech," a "creating god." Homer may very well achieve a level of verisimilitude in his depiction of military endeavors, but such representation emerges in the absence of both historical truth and sensory perception.

If Puttenham likens Homer to a "creating god," he is careful to point out that this relationship is purely figural, a comparison rather than a conflation. It is in the figure of the monarch that the poet and God, the human and divine realms, supposedly achieves a true synthesis. Whereas the poet is a god only "by manner of speech," Elizabeth *is* a "most excellent poet," not because of her writing (though, as we have seen, he does later address her poetry) but because she "mak[es] in manner what [she] list, the poor man rich, the lewd well learned, the coward courageous, and vile both noble and valiant." The work of the monarch, in other words, has an aesthetic or poetic dimension insofar as it is capable of fundamentally transforming, if not replacing, social reality. Elizabeth also seems to function as a resolution to the possible tension between imitation and imagination Puttenham establishes earlier in the chapter. While the queen is capable of recreating reality through fiat, part and parcel of the imagination, she herself is "a most cunning counterfeiter lively representing Venus in countenance, in life Diana, Pallas for government, and Juno in all honor and regal magnificence" (95).

It is unclear, however, who reigns supreme in this hierarchy of God, monarch, and poet. After all, it would seem that the most direct link to God belongs to the poet, to whom the queen is only subsequently compared, making her two steps removed from the divine realm. This confusion becomes even more legible in his reference to the antique goddesses. While at this moment in the text the goddesses serve as a commonplace form of praise for Elizabeth, during his discussion of Roman history Puttenham attributes the worship of Diana, Pallas, and other gods and goddesses to a religion of "blindness and ignorance" that "reigned in the hearts of men at that time" (119). Just as Puttenham confuses the anthropomorphic gods of the Romans with the singular Christian God by referring to the latter as "*autharcos*," one can read his comparison of Elizabeth to the goddesses as an expression of ambivalence over monarchical power, implying that a certain level of "blindness and ignorance" is necessary for the establishment of the queen's authority. The question thus becomes whether English poets, far from surpassing their Roman predecessors, repeat their mistakes by ensuring "preservation of the public peace and tranquility" through establishing "the awe of their gods and such scruple of conscience as the terrors of their late invented religion had led them into," even if they did not "purposely intend" such effects (97). In the case of Elizabethan England, the "awe" in question would refer not just to the "gods" but to the connection between monarchy and the divine realm, a link ensured by the Chain of Being. Despite Puttenham's praise of this concept through his privileging of "proportion," not to mention his flattery of Elizabeth, his apparently innocent references to monarchy betray a more complex attitude toward state power, one that, like his account of religion, hinges on language.

While Puttenham calls upon the likes of Venus and Diana to praise the physical, spiritual, and ethical excellence of the monarch at the beginning of the text, in doing so he simultaneously suggests a deceptive component of political power, one that is inscribed in his description of Elizabeth as a "most cunning counterfeiter." As the editors point out, "counterfeit" takes on several meanings for Puttenham, from the neutral ("imitate") to the negative ("create fraudulently"), a slippage that calls attention once again to the tension between poetry as an act of pure creation—here with an implication of falsehood—and one of faithful imitation. Even if we were to read "counterfeit" simply as "imitate," the queen would be imitating not "the true and lively of every thing [that] is set before" her, the sort of imitation ascribed earlier to the poet, but a fiction of Roman goddesses that Puttenham will in fact place under erasure later in his text by dismissing it as the work of a degraded imagination. Puttenham's overdetermined analogy thus raises more questions than it answers; indeed, it threatens the very notion of analogy undergirding not only monarchy but literary language itself. Whereas Ottaviano's tyrannical princes gain "estimation and authoritie among men" by seeking to "bee counted (almost) Gods," Puttenham's God acquires the name of an autocrat. The "ignorance" and "false opinion" that guides the behavior of tyrants is reproduced in ancient Roman political subjects, who cling to a religion that for Puttenham is full of "blindness and ignorance" and that reappears in the behavior of English political subjects, who "wonder" at the midsummer display while the "shrewd boys" demystify it. While Puttenham seems to associate himself with these "shrewd boys," he is not immune from the effects of ideological distortion.

In an illuminating essay on Puttenham's relation to political theology, Ethan Guagliardo argues that Puttenham "bracket[s] metaphysical and theological questions as too obscure and ultimately superfluous for politics" (599). I would suggest, however, that this very obscurity unsettles the assumed link between monarch and God in the *Art*, making religion a potentially explosive political issue. Christianity may, in Guagliardo's words, appeal to Puttenham "only as a prop of the state's authority," but a close reading of his text reveals that God's incomprehensibility, His resistance to representation, problematizes the epistemological grounds of a political system that claims divine authorization (608). There is certainly an element of what Puttenham might call "dissimulation" in his account of religion, but, as he himself claims, we must expand what we mean by this term. Dissimulation is not only the intentional, instrumentalized duping of the masses but a description of any "speech" that is "wrested from his own natural signification to another not altogether so natural.” The “wresting” in this case is from the divine to the human realm, and it is not at all clear that it approximates the analogical propriety that supposedly characterizes Elizabeth’s power. The political challenge that God’s hiddenness poses is theorized by Calvin and dramatized by Shakespeare, to whom we will now turn.

CHAPTER 2

Eyeing Authority in Shakespeare's *Richard II* and Calvin's *Institutes*

In the 1536 preface to *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, addressed to the French king Francis I, John Calvin defends his theological doctrine against the charge that "it tendeth to no other ende but to writh from kings their scepters out of their handes" (n.p.). While Calvin insists that he does not "practise the ouerthrowing of kingdomes," he acknowledges in the last paragraph that the king's "minde" is "now turned away and estranged from us, yea and enflamed against us." If Francis continues to allow "the whisperings of the malicious" to "possesse [his] eares," Calvin and his followers will,

> as sheepe appointed to the slaughter, be brought to all extremities, yet so that in our patience we shall possesse our soules, and waite for the strong hand of the Lord: which shall without doubt be present in time, and stretch foorth it selfe armed, both to deliuer the poore out of affliction, and so take vengeance on the despisers, which now triumph with so great assurednesse. The Lorde the King of Kinges stablish your throne with righteousnesse, and your seate with equitie, most noble King. (n.p.)

Calvin's closing words alternate between passive obedience to political authority and the threat of divinely sanctioned violence. On the one hand, Calvin seems to accept his role as a "sheepe appointed to the slaughter," emphasizing "patience" and the promise of God's eventual justice. On the other, his invocation of the "strong hand of the Lord," "armed" to "take vengeance" on those defaming his doctrine, can be read as an indirect warning to Francis; blaming those "whispering" to the king, after all, could serve in the period as a way to criticize the monarch himself. Even in the final sentence, where Calvin prays that "the Lord the King of Kings stablish

[Francis's] throne with righteousnesse," he highlights the gap between divine and human sovereignty as much as their possible connection: not only has this "establishment" yet to take place, but the form of such righteousness may not be amenable to the monarch, given the violent imagery immediately preceding the prayer.

Compressed in this address to Francis is an ambiguity that characterizes Calvin's political perspective more generally. Calvin will spend much of the final chapter of the *Institutes*, concerned with "ciuill gouernement," advising absolute obedience to temporal authority by instructing the subject to perceive in the prince the righteousness of God, even if his actions suggest otherwise (496). This fundamentally ironic mode of viewing power, which calls attention to the discrepancy between the king and what he must be understood to represent, posits a distinction between the empirical person and the divinely ordained office that would seem to forbid rebellion at all costs, insofar as it attributes the sins of the prince to the providence of a hidden God. As it turns out, however, this gap functions for Calvin as the condition of possibility for resistance when he must explain manifestations of the "strong hand of the Lord" against tyrants: the divine ordinance by which kings maintain authority can take precedence over the king himself and may in fact apply to human political actors who challenge him, even if they do so for ungodly reasons. Such dialectical tension helps to explain the ambivalent political legacy of the Reformation, which, according to Francis Oakley, served "initially and directly to bolster the dignity and power of kings and to emphasize the religious duty of their subjects passively to obey their commands" but "ended by undercutting indirectly that dignity, status, and power" (127).[15] As Calvin's political writing reveals, this paradox is not simply a historical anomaly but a result of the overdetermined connection between divine and temporal power in Protestant thought.

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[15] See also McCoy, pp. 1-22; and Schwartz, pp. 18-35. McCoy argues that divine right emerged in part as an attempt to "relocate the sacred in the monarchy" in the midst of Protestant critiques of transubstantiation (16). For Schwartz, "Reformers saw transubstantiation as not exceeding

The fact that Calvin's political dialectic revolves around a question of representation—how is the subject to reconcile the gap between the unjust prince or the usurping rebel and the divine power that they signify?—makes it a particularly useful companion for early modern literature. In this chapter, I bring Calvin's insights to bear on William Shakespeare's *Richard II* (1595), a play concerned not only with the link between monarch and God but with the difficulties of representing that relationship.[16] While critics have tended to focus on King Richard's conflation of his merely human power with that of God or the Machiavellian Bolingbroke's role in shattering such an illusion, less attention has been paid to the complicated political situation facing their subjects, who must come to terms with the ambiguous representational status of the sovereign in ways strikingly similar to Calvin's treatment of

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substance, but embodying it, and ironically, this vision—so thoroughly rejected as idolatrous—became the foundation of the state" (34). I agree with these claims, but I explore what McCoy calls the "inherent ambiguity and instability of Protestant notions of sacred kingship" in discourses on political obedience rather than the sacraments (16).

[16] For a discussion of the relationship between *Richard II* and Calvin's theory of the sign, see Canning. For recent accounts of Calvin's influence on early modern drama more generally, see Streete and Waldron. Streete includes a chapter on *Richard II* that focuses primarily on the relationship between Calvinist typology (rather than his explicitly political writing) and the issue of monarchy, arguing that the play "reasserts the political utility, even expediency of monarchy, while at the same time subjecting its inner workings to a forensic critical demystification" (174). I agree that *Richard II* is concerned with "demystification," but my focus on the influence of Calvin's ambivalent political position on the play calls into question the very foundations of a monarchy modeled on divine power. Although Waldron does not address *Richard II*, I share her interest in the phenomenological stakes of Calvin's theological project. But while her reevaluation of Calvin's analysis of idolatry concentrates on his effort to "reorient" the subject's "sensory apparatus in relation to God's true manifestations in nature, scripture, and the sacraments" and thus to "harmonize divine effects with the ordinary capacities of the human body and the senses," I am arguing that Calvin's discussion of politics revolves around a perceptual crisis that emerges from the disjunction between the human and divine realms, specifically the discrepancy between monarch and God (27).

temporal authority. As I will show, characters like Northumberland and York draw on Calvinist language to justify both rebellion and obedience, acts that become blurred by the play's end in part because of the unpredictability (if not incomprehensibility) of the hidden God of Calvinist theology.[17] Reading Shakespeare with Calvin, and shifting the focus from the kings to their subjects, allows us furthermore to rethink the political and spiritual meaning of Bolingbroke's usurpation, which is often seen as a purely secular disruption of sacral monarchy.[18] Calvin, by contrast, offers a theological model that accounts for the potential bad faith of political actors: Bolingbroke's rebellion may in fact be sinful, his appeals to God little more than instrumental, but his rise can still be understood in terms of providence, the very concept that ostensibly ensures Richard's rule. If this transformation of the usurper into God's agent seems to involve little more than ideological misrecognition, it also serves as the condition of possibility for political change in Shakespeare's world. The subject's negotiation of such ironies requires a contradictory structure of perception that can envision the disjunction between divine and temporal power as much as their connection. I argue that Bushy's advice to Queen Isabel to "eye" her sorrow over Richard's absence "awry" articulates such a structure, and it is with that famous speech that I begin (2.2.19).

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[17] For a discussion of political obedience in the play that focuses on the Catholic doctrine of resistance, see Mayer, pp. 59-76. I follow Mayer in exploring the conflict between what he calls "quietist modes and more radical means of redress" in the face of tyranny, but I locate this tension within Protestant doctrine rather than thinking of it as a divide between Catholic resistance and Protestant submission (61). My approach is closer to that of Gilman, pp. 88-128, who explores the contradictory nature of Elizabethan political and religious orthodoxy in relation to the play. While Gilman focuses on how this ambivalence impacted Tudor constructions of history, I sketch the broader Protestant context in which such tensions emerged.

[18] See, for example, Grady, pp. 26-82. For a reconsideration of the spiritual implications of Bolingbroke's rise that is somewhat different than mine, see Jackson, pp. 62-82.

I.

In an effort to console Isabel upon Richard's departure for Ireland, the king's advisor Bushy compares the object of the queen's grief to "perspectives, which rightly gazed upon / Show nothing but confusion" but that "eyed awry, / Distinguish form" (2.2.18-20). He then explains to her that by "looking awry upon your lord's departure" she "find[s] shapes of grief more than himself to wail / Which, looked on as it is, is nought but shadows / Of what it is not" (2.2.21-24). Bushy alternates between two meanings of "awry": his first use of the word suggests viewing an object "away from the straight (position or direction); to one side, obliquely; unevenly, crookedly, askew," a decentered gaze that paradoxically allows the queen to recognize "form" amid "confusion." His second use implies a perception that occurs "out of the right course or place; in a wrong manner; improperly, erroneously, amiss," leading to the production of "shadows" rather than the thing itself (*OED*). As Anthony B. Dawson and Paul Yachnin explain in their 2011 edition of the play, Bushy's confusion emerges at least in part from an ambiguity surrounding the object in question. By conflating two meanings of "perspectives"—"a particular kind of painting whose true image or deeper meaning can be discerned only when it is looked at obliquely" on the one hand and "glass instruments whose multi-prism lenses show the viewer multiple images of an object" on the other (184n)—Bushy inadvertently suggests that "eye[ing]" perspectives "awry" is both necessary for establishing true vision ("distinguishing form") *and* constitutive of delusion ("finding shapes of grief more than himself to wail").

While several critics have treated this passage as an interpretative key to the play, the fact that Bushy arrives at such a rich formulation has been met with some embarrassment.[19] For Scott

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[19] Readings of the scene that I found particularly useful include Gilman, pp. 91-95; Luis-Martinez; Pye; and McMillin.

McMillin, “the idea that Bushy rejects—about the oblique perception available to tearful eyes—deepens into profundity by the end of the play, although its introduction by a character who fails to grasp it is peculiar and not particularly Shakespearean” (42). However, Raphael Holinshed’s *Chronicles of England, Scotlande, and Irelande* (1587), a source text for Shakespeare’s play, suggests why it might be appropriate that Bushy stumbles upon this ambivalent notion of perception. Holinshed notes that when addressing Richard the historical Bushy “did not attribute to him titles of honour, due and accustomed; but inuented vnused termes, and such strange names as were rather agreeable to the diuine maiestie of God, than to any earthlie potentate” (51). Reading Holinshed next to Shakespeare (and viewing the speech itself “awry” by shifting the perceived object from Richard’s departure to the status of his kingship more generally), we could say that Bushy “eyes” the status of King Richard’s authority “awry” by confusing the monarch’s merely temporal power with God’s. Bushy would thus be guilty of “find[ing] shapes” of “divine majesty” in a human king who is in reality a “shadow / Of what [he] is not.” While Holinshed depicts such flattery as an idolatrous aberration, another text associated with Shakespeare’s history plays, the English Church’s 1570 *Homily against Disobedience and Wylful Rebellion*, maintains that “eyeing” temporal authority “awry” is necessary for political order.[20] The homilist claims not only that the power of the king “should resemble his [God’s] heavenly governance, as the majesty of heavenly things may by the baseness of earthly things be shadowed and resembled” but that “God himself […] sometimes vouchsafe to communicate his name with earthly princes, terming them Gods, doubtless for that similitude of government which they have or should have, not unlike unto God their king” (97). If Holinshed sees impropriety in Bushy's comparison of Richard to God, the homilist reveals how to "distinguish form": Bushy's use of "strange names," more appropriate to God than the king, is for the homilist the way that God himself refers to rulers. The king's authority, far from being a "shadow of what it is not," is in fact a site where God's "majesty" should be "shadowed and resembled." Even if, as in Richard's case, the ruler is unjust or incompetent, the subject must shift his or her perspective in order to recognize his governance as "punishment by God's justice" (98).

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[20] For the influence of this homily and related discourses of political obedience on Shakespeare, see Tillyard, *Shakespeare’s History Plays*; and Cox, pp. 131-60.

Reading Bushy's speech next to Holinshed and the homilist raises important questions about the connection between perception and political obedience: how is the subject to recognize the temporal ruler as divinely ordained, despite his or her obvious shortcomings? Is the king's relationship to God a genuine connection or one that emerges through misrecognition? If "eyeing" authority "awry" reproduces ideological fictions, can it also resist them?[21] This last question becomes especially pertinent when considering Calvin's political writing and its influence on early modern England. On the one hand, critics have traced the orthodox position of the Tudor homily to Calvin.[22] Divine right apologist Robert Filmer will claim in the aftermath of the English Civil War, however, that in the *Institutes* Calvin "look[s] asquint" at the possibility of rebellion (3). "Asquint," a synonym for "awry," refers to "look[ing] to one side instead of straight forward; obliquely, out at the corner of the eyes" (*OED*). Filmer here refers to Calvin's seemingly permissive perspective on political resistance, but as we turn to the *Institutes* I want to suggest that the radical consequences of that text emerge, at least in part, from the ways in which

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[21] Although he does not address doctrines of obedience, Pye's interest in the ways in which "grief can at once create false shadows and take them for the truth" constitutes precisely the ideological distortion that I explore in this essay, though I do so in a more explicitly religious context (582).

[22] Cox, for example, argues that the doctrine in the homily is "traceable to Calvin" (290n).

Calvin “eyes” the representational status of authority itself “awry.”

Structuring Calvin’s analysis of the political realm is a perceptual crisis concerning the figure of the monarch. Although rulers should “represent in themselues vnto men a certaine image of the providence, preseruation, goodness, good wil, and righteousnesse of God” (498), Calvin concedes that subjects often “beholde no forme of the image of God which ought to shine in a magistrate.”[23] Instead, they are left with leaders who “do set out to sale all lawes, priuileges, judgementes, and grauntes: othersome spoile the poor communalitie of monie which they may after waste vpon mad prodigall expendings: othersome exercise meere robberies, in pilling of houses, defiling of virgins and matrones, murdering of innocentes” (505). It is worth noting that Shakespeare’s Richard is guilty of most of the offenses Calvin lists here: not only does the king’s “liberal largesse” (1.4.44) compel him to unjustly tax the nobles and strip the recently deceased Gaunt of “his plate, his goods, his money and his lands,” thus hastening Bolingbroke’s return from exile, but his alleged involvement in the Duke of Gloucester’s murder sets in motion the events that ultimately lead to the king’s deposition (2.1.210).

Despite these transgressions, Gaunt tells the Duchess of Gloucester while he is still alive that because Richard is “God’s substitute, / His deputy anointed in his sight,” he “may never lift / An angry arm against his minister” (1.2.37-38, 40-41). Calvin draws on similar language to describe the importance of obedience, claiming that “the first dutie of subiects toward their magistrates is, to think most honourablie of their office, namelie which they acknowledge to be a iurisdiction committed of God, and therefore to esteeme them and reuerence them as ministers &

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[23] As we will see, Calvin does sometimes distinguish between kings and lower magistrates. However, as John T. McNeill points out, Calvin “often ranges kings, magistrates and other officers indifferently, as alike God-ordained and so to be revered and obeyed, and as alike responsible for the public good” (83).

deputies of God" (504). To account for the sins of those in power, Calvin encourages the subject to focus on the monarch's "office" rather than the man himself. Indeed, he makes it clear that

> the obediences that are shewed to them [kings] are shewed to God himselfe, forasmuch as their power is of God. I speake not of the men, as if the visor of dignitie did couer foolishnesse, or sluggishnesse, or cruelties, or wicked manners and full of mischieuous doing: but I say that the decree it selfe is worthy of honour and reuerence: that whosoeuer bee rulers may be esteemed with vs, and have reuerence, in respect of their being rulers. (505)

If earlier Calvin claimed that the subject ought to "esteem" the person of the ruler, here he "speake[s] not of the men" and claims instead that "the decree itselfe is worthy of honor and reverence." While he also notes that "rulers" deserve "reuerence, in respect of their being rulers," this tautology does not mean that a "visor of dignitie" actually removes their manifold sins. Indeed, the image of the "visor" suggests that princely "dignitie" can, at least in some cases, function as a deceptive appearance, a point to which we will return below.

This discrepancy between the empirical person of the ruler and the office that he represents has two contradictory consequences. On the surface, it amounts to what Herbert Marcuse calls the "reification of authority" in Protestant thought (68).[24] That is, in elevating the "decree it selfe" over "the men," Calvin forecloses any possibility of revolt since, according to him, "euen the worst kings are ordeined by the same decree by which the authoritie of [all] kinges is stablished" (506). If this is the case, though, why does Filmer claim that Calvin

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[24] I disagree, however, with Marcuse's claim that Luther's "separation of office and person and the 'double morality' linked with it […] disappear in Calvin" (68). As Michael Walzer argues, Calvin registers a "surprisingly realistic and unmoralizing recognition of political reality" that acknowledges the discrepancy between the actual prince and what he represents (26).

"look[s] asquint" at rebellion? While his anxiety can be attributed in part to Calvin's more radical followers, whom I will discuss below, and to Filmer's own hardline political theory, I would argue that by reading the *Institutes* itself "asquint" or "awry" we can locate an ambivalence over state power registered precisely in Calvin's tendency toward what Marcuse labels "reification." Calvin's frequent invocation of the "office" of kingship or the "decree" authorizing it gestures toward a transcendent, divine realm that can be incongruous with existing power structures and may in fact undermine them. Summarizing Peter, for example, Calvin writes that one should be "subject to euerie humaine creature (or rather as I translate it, Ordinance) for the Lordes sake, either to king as moste excellent, or to the rulers that are sent by him, to the punishment in deede of euill doers, but to the praise of well doers" (505). Calvin makes two significant distinctions. He first differentiates between the "humaine creature" who embodies authority and the "Ordinance," which is either the law imposed by the king or, more likely, the divine decree that authorizes temporal authority in the first place. He then distinguishes between the "king" and "the rulers that are sent by him." Of interest here is the ambiguous referential status of "him": the most obvious reading is that the "king," who is "most excellent," sends inferior "rulers" or magistrates to impose or enforce his laws. According to the grammar of the sentence, however, "him" could also refer to the "Lord," for whose sake subjects follow authority.

While this latter reading may seem unlikely in the immediate context, it helps to explain passages elsewhere in the *Institutes* that address rebellion against established powers who are themselves "euill doers." Calvin will point out that in the Hebrew scriptures God sometimes "raiseth vp open reuengers, & furnisheth them with his commandmet, to take vengeance of their vniust gouernment, and to deliuer his people many wayes oppressed out of miserable distresse."

These “reuengers” take two forms: some, like Moses, “were by the lawful calling of God sent to doe such actes”; therefore, in “taking armour against kinges, they did not violate that maiestie which is planted in kings by the ordinance of God: but being armed from heaue they subdued the lesser power with the greater: like as it is lawful for kings to punish their Lords vnder them.” The split in the previous passage between the king and the “Ordinance” from which he derives his authority is here intensified, insofar as that ordinance can function antithetically to the “humaine creature” of the sovereign. This position is not particularly radical; not only does Calvin cite biblical examples, but his comparison of God to “kings” who “punish their Lords vnder them” suggests that divinely sanctioned rebellion can be justified as a higher power punishing a lower. While Calvin does seem to allow for the possibility of rebellion, then, he neutralizes it by reducing the act to a “law,” albeit a law that challenges the laws of the human sovereign.

The second type of rebel, however, is less easily assimilable to Calvin’s general insistence on obedience. God, according to Calvin, “sometime […] directeth to the same ende [that is, divinely sanctioned rebellion] the rage of men that entend and goe about an other thing.” Though these avengers were similarly “directed by the hande of God whither it pleased him,” they “vnwittingly did his worke, yet purposed in their minde nothing but mischeefe” (507). In this case the relationship between divinity and rebellion is somewhat mysterious, closer to the workings of the hidden God that Calvin discusses elsewhere in the *Institutes*.[25] One aspect of this hiddenness is that God’s work in the world appears incongruously, that is, it defies human expectations. The “vnwitting” avenger may not be aware of his divinely ordained task—indeed, he may undertake it for the most questionable reasons—but he nevertheless shares in God’s secret plan for humanity. The irony of Calvin's formulation is that this recognition of the "hande of God" in the "mischeefe" of the rebel also governs the subject's obedience to the tyrant who would be deposed; Calvin mentions earlier in the chapter, after all, that even a monarch "full of mischieuous doing" must be obeyed because of the divine "decree" that authorizes the authority of all kings. As Michael Walzer argues, the "fundamental ambiguity" of Calvin's political doctrine is that "the divine will must be active also in any group of men actually in revolt, manifest in revolutionary organizations as much as in the institutions of government" (58). It is up to the subject to look beyond the shortcomings of the political actor in question, whether king or rebel, to recognize the workings of God, but such a recognition is paradoxically predicated on the disjunction between the empirical person and the inscrutability of God's decrees.

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[25] For a discussion of the hidden God in Calvinist theology, see Gerrish, pp. 141-45. For an account of the influence of the hidden God on early modern drama, see Sellin.

Calvin's ambivalence on the question of rebellion helps to explain his volatile reception in early modern England. As we have already seen, the traditional doctrine of obedience for which he advocates in much of the *Institutes* is essentially repeated in the Tudor homily. But the more radical aspects of Calvin's political theory are taken up by English theologian Christopher Goodman and the Scottish reformer John Knox, both of whom fled to Calvin's Geneva during Mary Tudor's repressive reign. If, as Quentin Skinner claims, Calvin is a "master of equivocation" on the issue of temporal authority, the Marian exiles developed Calvin's distinction between person and office to a point where deposition and even regicide were permitted in cases where the ruler failed to live up to his or her divinely ordained office (192). Such claims scandalized Calvin and tarnished his image in the eyes of the recently crowned Elizabeth I, who, according to Skinner, was angry that Calvin "permitted Knox's inflammatory writings against female rulers to be printed at Geneva" (217).

I will address Knox's work in more detail below; of interest here is Calvin's response to

Elizabeth's criticism, which is that he had already made clear "'his displeasure that such paradoxes should be published'" (qtd. in Skinner 217). I want to argue, however, that it is precisely the paradoxical nature of Calvin's own meditation on kingship that serves as the condition of possibility for the incautious conclusions of his more radical disciples. By accentuating the gap between the person of the prince and the office that he occupies, Calvin highlights the discrepancy between the divine and temporal realms in a way that deeply unsettles the legitimacy of authority, even if he himself remains rather conservative. To draw on Bushy's language, Calvin urges the subject to "eye" the flawed governance of the sovereign "awry," to recognize in it an "image" of God's justice, but his own discourse swerves toward an ambivalent endorsement of rebellion when he must "eye" the manifestly ungodly actions of biblical avengers "awry" to justify their divine ordinance. His English and Scottish followers in turn "eye" Calvin's writing "awry": Calvin thinks of it as an incorrect viewing, a misinterpretation, but one could just as easily claim that amid the confusion of Calvin's oscillation between obedience and rebellion his disciples locate a way into the text whereby they "distinguish" the "form" of a radical politics. Once this oblique angle has been discovered, it is not all that difficult to imagine a situation where, when one recognizes "no forme of the image of God to shine in the magistrate," he or she shifts perspective, not in order to (mis)recognize the monarch as the "minister & deputy of God" but rather, in Goodman's words, as a mere "'private person'" (qtd. in Skinner 223). Both acts emerge from an oblique viewing made even more complicated by Calvin's equivalence between the "mischeefe" of the unjust king and that of the ill-intentioned yet divinely ordained rebel.

Richard II foregrounds this structure in the tension between Richard and Bolingbroke, of course. The former's authority depends on the recognition of his sacral status despite his numerous flaws, while the latter can be read as either of the rebel types that Calvin discusses. If we take seriously Bolingbroke's claim that he does not "oppose" the "will" of heaven (3.3.18) in challenging Richard and ultimately "ascend[s] the regal throne" in "God's name" (and therefore by God's providential design), we might classify him as the first kind of avenger that Calvin addresses (4.1.114). It is perhaps for this reason that, as Adrian Streete observes in a discussion of the language of "messianic Christology" (189) used by both Richard and Bolingbroke, the latter "tacitly appropriate[es] for himself the symbolic role and function that should properly only belong to the king" (180), therefore articulating a "rival ritual framework that invokes Christ's atoning status" (183). But even if we assume that Bolingbroke instrumentally deploys such religious language in order to create the appearance of legitimacy, his rebellion could still be perceived to have some providential basis; as Calvin reminds us, those who "purposed in their minde nothing but mischeefe" may still "vnwittingly" execute God's plan. In order to understand how this representational predicament affects the Protestant concept of political obedience, however, we must turn not to Richard and Bolingbroke themselves but to their ambivalent subjects, specifically Northumberland and York. It is in the language of these relatively minor characters, I would argue, that the symbolic dilemma surrounding the figure of the king is most vexed.

II.

At first glance, Northumberland would seem to be an odd choice for a discussion of Calvinist influence in *Richard II*. We certainly cannot think of Northumberland himself as a godly man; his most explicit scriptural allusion comes when he tells Richard, who is lamenting Northumberland's role in his deposition, that "my guilt be on my head, and there an end" (5.1.69). These dismissive words have several biblical resonances, including the people's insistence to Pilate that Jesus's "'blood be on us and on our children'" (Matthew 27.25).[26] If not utterly sacrilegious, Northumberland is at the very least a Machiavellian manipulator who, according to Paul Gaudet, reveals that "power works through concealed motives and rationalized means" (148). I do not necessarily disagree with this assessment, but, as David Norbrook points out, the meaning of Northumberland's shifting allegiance is complicated by the duties attending nobility in the period. Norbrook argues that "while modern critics tend to concentrate on [Northumberland's] personal moral duplicity, an audience of the 1590s would have been equally alert to his role in trying to maintain a discourse of the aristocratic, and occasionally of the common, good, independently of whichever monarch may be in power" ("'A Liberal Tongue'" 129). This emphasis on aristocratic duty at the expense of obedience to the king was also important for Calvinist political thinkers. While the aristocratic nature of Calvinist resistance was more pronounced in France, Walzer points out that prior to the Earl of Essex's 1601 uprising against Elizabeth "a small number of Puritan ministers gathered in [Essex's] London house," where they "preached the Huguenot doctrine of the rights of the lesser magistrates" to challenge the monarch's authority (116n). Essex's followers also of course commissioned a performance of *Richard II* before his rebellion, and I think it is no coincidence that he would combine Shakespeare's play and Calvinist doctrine: both texts interrogate the legitimacy of political power and open avenues for resistance. While I am not arguing for a direct connection between Northumberland and Calvin, then, the character's language and behavior suggest surprising parallels between conceptions of noble resistance and religious discourses on the limits of political obedience.

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[26] For biblical allusions in *Richard II*, see Shaheen, 94-120. Although Shaheen traces this passage to the Hebrew scriptures, I would argue that Richard's frequent comparison of himself to Christ invites the connection to Matthew as well (117).

Like Calvin, Northumberland calls attention to the distance between the physical king and the majesty that he represents to justify rebellion against Richard, although he initially suggests the opposite. When he tells fellow noblemen Ross and Willoughby shortly after Richard seizes Bolingbroke's lands that "the King is not himself, but basely led / By flatterers," Northumberland suggests that Richard is "not himself" because he has submitted to poor counsel and made unjust decisions on behalf of his supposedly duplicitous advisers (2.1.241-42). Northumberland equates kingship with the person who holds the office, implying that while Richard has recently erred there is nevertheless a possibility that he could rediscover the qualities that once made him an honorable ruler, perhaps by restoring Bolingbroke to his lands and therefore observing what York calls the "fair sequence and succession" that ensures the legitimacy of Richard's own power. Like York, who tells Richard that he will "be not thyself" if he prevents Bolingbroke's inheritance, Northumberland indicates that the role of king is intimately connected with the individual who occupies that position (2.1.198-99). The question is whether Richard's flatterers can be resisted without disturbing the king himself.

There is, of course, reason to believe that Northumberland has other intentions. As the editors point out (and as we saw in Calvin's dedication to Francis I), the claim that the "king is not himself" as a result of poor council is a "conventional way of accusing the ruler and also absolving him of direct blame for wrong-doing," suggesting that if Northumberland is indeed interested in removing Richard from office he must tread lightly (180n). This ambiguous scenario is frequently addressed in Protestant treatments of political obedience. In *The Obedience of a Christian Man* (1528), for example, English reformer William Tyndale raises the possibility that even if a subject were "thoroughly persuaded that it were not lawful to resist his king, though he would wrongfully take away life and goods: yet might he think that it were lawful to resist the hypocrites and to rise, not against his king: but with his king to deliver his king out of bondage and captivity, wherein the hypocrites hold him with wiles and falsehood." Although Tyndale initially depicts this position as potentially beneficial to the monarch—one would be joining "with his king to deliver his king out of bondage and captivity," just as Northumberland purports to save Richard from being "basely led" by his advisors—he quickly dismisses it as an avenue to "disobedience, rebellion and insurrection," suggesting that resisting the king's flatterers is little more than an excuse for rebellion against the king himself (29). The true Christian will instead "obey and suffer for the word of God" (30). While the Lutheran Tyndale's advice seems to anticipate Calvin's doctrine of obedience as it applies to those the latter calls "priuate men," such obedience does not extend for Calvin to those in positions of power (507). Indeed, Calvin blasts "flatterers of the court" who "couer themselues and deceiue the simple, while they say that it is not lawfull for them to refuse any thing that is commaunded them of their Princes: as though God had resigned his right to mortall men, giuing them the rule of mankinde" (508). Those Calvin refers to ambiguously as "Magistrates for the behalfe of the people" must therefore not "winke at kings willfully raging ouer and treading downe the poor communaltie"; doing so constitutes a "wicked breache of faith, because they deceitfully betray the libertie of the people, whereof they know themselues to be appointed protectors by the ordinaunce of God" (507).[27] Once again the tension between the divine ordinance by which all kings (including unjust ones) are legitimized and the ordinance of resisters is paramount: under what circumstances is opposition to tyranny justified and even demanded?

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[27] As Carlos Eire points out, "Calvin never defined the role of the 'inferior magistrates,' nor did he say in what manner they were to correct tyrants. He also limited his examples to ancient history, making no direct reference to contemporary officials, such as the members of the Estates General in France" (289). However, the fact that Thomas Norton, the translator of the 1587 edition of the *Institutes* on which I draw, identified this section as being concerned with "Parliaments" suggests that Calvin's English followers may have had that institution in mind (507). Northumberland himself is particularly interested in Parliament; as Norbrook points out, during Richard's deposition "he is more keen than Bolingbroke to keep attention on constitutional issues as opposed to Richard's personal emotions" ("'A Liberal Tongue'" 129-30).

According to Calvin's more radical followers, it would be necessary for nobles like Northumberland to challenge Richard if he has exceeded the bounds of his authority. In his *Appellation to the Nobility* (1558), John Knox argues that Scottish nobles must not "flatter [their] king in his folly and blind rage" but "correct and repress whatsoever ye know him to attempt expressedly repugning to God's word, honor, and glory, or what ye shall espy him to do, be it by ignorance or be it by malice, against his subjects great or small" (125-26). It is true that Northumberland and the other nobles are not concerned with the religious persecution foremost in Knox's mind (and Tyndale's, for that matter), but Ross's claim that Richard has "pilled" the "commons" with "grievous taxes" and "fined" the "nobles" suggests that the king has, in Knox's words, "persecuted" his "subjects great or small" (2.1.246-47). It is therefore Northumberland's responsibility to "correct and repress" Richard's transgressions; doing so is in fact a form of what Knox calls "obedience": "if ye defraud your king, ye commit against him no less treason than if ye did extract from him your due and promised support what time by his enemies injustly he were pursued." By this logic, the "traitors" would not be Northumberland and the other nobles but Richard's flatterers, who are "defrauding" the king by leading him astray. But if Knox initially justifies the "correction" and "repression" of the king's faults as a paradoxical form of obedience to him, his tone changes considerably in the next paragraph. Knox acknowledges that while "God hath commanded kings to be obeyed," it is equally true "that in things which they commit against his glory, or when cruelly without cause they rage against their brethren the members of Christ's body, he hath commanded no obedience, but rather he hath approved, yea, and greatly rewarded such as have opponed themselves to their ungodly commandments and blind rage" (126). Knox has virtually abandoned the notion that resistance to the unjust edicts of the ruler can somehow remain within a framework of ultimate loyalty: paradoxical "obedience" gives way to "no obedience," or perhaps political obedience gives way to spiritual obedience.

I want to suggest that this same movement is legible in Northumberland's speech to Ross and Willoughby. Northumberland begins by blaming Richard's advisors, implying (however disingenuously) that their removal could restore the monarch's legitimacy, but he increasingly severs kingship from its foundation in the individual ruler:

> If then we shall shake off our slavish yoke,
> Imp out our drooping country's broken wing,
> Redeem from broking pawn the blemished crown,
> Wipe off the dust that hides our sceptre's gilt
> And make high majesty look like itself,
> Away with me in post to Ravenspur. (2.1.291-96)

While he initially claimed that "the King is not himself," Northumberland now argues that Bolingbroke's return will "make high majesty look like itself," thus signaling a transition from the title of king as a signifier inherently linked to a signified—in this case, Richard—to one unmoored from its basis in human embodiment. In moving from the physical person of Richard to the "majesty" that he represents, Northumberland is calling attention to the abstract concept of "majesty" and the ways in which the current king may not live up to that ideal, just as Calvin distinguishes between the "humaine creature" of the sovereign and the divine ordinance that authorizes his power. While one might argue that Northumberland is merely observing the fact that Richard has not fulfilled the duties expected of his office, the change from the personal to the impersonal pronoun ("himself" to "itself") suggests something more damaging to the very notion of kingship. That is, monarchy remains stable so long as one assumes that the physical person of the king fully embodies his office, but when one begins to wonder what constitutes an abstract notion like "majesty," when the emphasis falls on the concept rather than the person, it becomes much more difficult to determine who can adequately correspond to such an ideal. In creating a gap between the concept and its empirical embodiment, Northumberland introduces the possibility of a disjunction between the realms of ideality and actuality, a discrepancy to which Calvin called attention in the figure of the ruler and that the ideology of kingship would want to foreclose.

How, after all, can one ensure that "high majesty" will "look like itself"? At first glance, such a statement might seem similar to York's observation in Act 3 that, despite his impending doom, Richard "looks […] like a king: behold, his eye, / As bright as is the eagle's, lightens forth / Controlling majesty" (3.3.67-69). But Whereas York at this point remains within the system of metaphorical correspondences so essential to the Chain of Being and the kingship it supports—Richard's eye is "as bright as is the eagle's," a simile that suggests a connection between the king as the superior man and the eagle as the superior, indeed the kingly, bird—Northumberland depends on metonymy not to join the person of the king to his office but to distance one from the other. By invoking the accoutrements of power, from the "blemished crown" to the "sceptre's gilt," Northumberland eschews analogical resemblance (the king is like the eagle) in favor of contingent association. Metonymy works by substituting a term that is linked to, rather than analogous with, another: the king is not "like" a crown or a scepter in the way that he supposedly resembles an eagle; these objects are frequently identified with the office of the king, but they do not substitute for him metaphorically. Puttenham distinguishes metaphor and metonymy by defining the former as "The Figure of Transport," by which he means the figurative exchange of meaning between terms (262), and the latter as “the Misnamer” insofar as it engages in the “wrong naming, or otherwise naming of them than is due,” an operation that “carrieth not only an alteration of sense but a necessity of intendment figuratively” (265). Metonymy calls attention to the “necessity” of its figurality; one must understand (“intend”) it as a trope, hence its status as “Misnamer.” We might call a king an eagle because both are powerful, but referring to the monarch as an inanimate object, even one associated with his rule, can ironically imply a lack of correspondence between person and office. As Madhavi Menon argues, “what ties metonymy to itself is a vaguely defined affinity rather than a physically determinable resemblance” (658).[28] In “misnaming” the king as the “crown” that he wears and the “sceptre” that he holds, Northumberland reduces the physical person of the monarch himself to a metonym only contingently linked to his office, thus providing the rhetorical condition of possibility for Bolingbroke’s usurpation.

While there is no obvious religious connotation in Northumberland’s speech, his increasingly extrinsic language reveals a perspective on the relationship between king and God markedly different from the traditional understanding of divine right expressed elsewhere in the play. In the buildup to Richard’s deposition, the Bishop of Carlisle will tell Bolingbroke and Northumberland that because Richard is the “figure of God’s majesty” he should not be “judged by subject and inferior breath” (4.1.126, 129). The editors gloss “figure” here as the “model” or “image” of divine majesty, making Carlisle’s position very close to that of the Tudor homilist, who, we will remember, argues that the power of princes “should resemble his [God’s] heavenly governance, as the majesty of heavenly things may by the baseness of earthly things be shadowed and resembled" (241n). The analogical relationship that Carlisle and the homilist posit between king and God is significant for political and spiritual reasons: not only does the alleged resemblance between the divine and temporal realms justify the authority of the monarch (there is one true God just as there is one true king, a correspondence unsettled by Puttenham), but such a view presupposes a stable cosmology. Northumberland, by contrast, has encountered the situation described above by Calvin, where the subject "beholde[s] no forme of the image of God which ought to shine in a magistrate." He is thus faced with two possibilities, both of which involve "eyeing" the figure of the king "awry." The loyal subject would recognize that although Richard is clearly corrupt he nevertheless, according to Calvin, "beare[s] that personage in which the Lord himselfe hath imprinted and ingraued an inuiolable maiestie" (507). On the surface, such a statement would seem to completely forbid resistance. However, Calvin's language here is oddly extrinsic: the "maiestie" in question refers not to the ruler himself but to the "personage" that he "beare[s]." While a "personage" can designate a "person of high rank, distinction, or importance," such as a king, Calvin's use of the word suggests something closer to "a character adopted or impersonated; a guise; an assumed role or office" (*OED*). What I want to suggest is that Northumberland's speech takes Calvin's external language to its logical (if extreme) endpoint, opening a second political possibility: if majesty is no longer inherent in Richard's body but rather a "guise" that exists on the surface, it could potentially attach itself elsewhere.

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[28] See also Canning, 7-9. Menon, who does not discuss this passage, focuses primarily on the relationship between metonymy and sexuality in the play.

My analysis of Northumberland's altered understanding of the figural status of the monarch shares some similarities with Ernst Kantorowicz's examination of the king's two bodies in the play. However, I want to approach the separation of the body natural and the body politic from a different angle than Kantorowicz, who focuses on the "reduc[tion]" of Richard "to the banal face and insignificant *physis* of a miserable man, a *physis* now void of any metaphysics whatsoever" (40). Interpreting *Richard II* as a meditation on the tragic consequences of Richard's embodiment threatens to obscure the altered political and spiritual landscape opened by the separation of the king's person from his office. Like Kantorowicz, Zenon Luis-Martinez argues that *Richard II* displays "a violent reaction to notions of 'graduated mediation,' of ideas of superabundance of the absolute, and of continuity of the earthly with the divine" (675). While Richard's trust in divine right depends on a "political theology that grants continuity from God to monarch through the sacrosanct power of symbols," Luis-Martinez claims that "the mystical self-sufficiency of the symbol must turn into the dialectic uncertainty of allegory in the selfsame instant that the monarch's experience of theological comfort yields to creaturely dejection" (687-88). We can chart a similar structure in the rhetoric of Northumberland's speech, where analogical resemblance gives way to metonymical association. Viewed from the perspective of Northumberland rather than Richard, however, the emphasis falls not on "creaturely dejection" but on an ideal "majesty" that exceeds Richard. The abstract quality of "majesty" is here not an occasion for sorrow but for political possibility, insofar as the disjunction between the divine and temporal realms opens the door for change.

But if Northumberland's perspective severs kingship from a foundation in human embodiment, his assertion at the end of the speech that "high majesty" can indeed "look like itself" through Bolingbroke's return sets the stage for a mystification of the latter's usurpation, one that repeats the problems inherent in Richard's assumption of divine right. Northumberland's use of metonymy threatens the representational power of kingship because it depicts the ruler as, in Calvin's words, a "personage" only contingently linked to an inaccessible God, just as the trope itself works on the basis of contiguity rather than resemblance or substitution. Metonymy, in other words, cannot "make" something "look like itself." The question, then, is whether Northumberland's metonymic political vision can be reconciled with the analogical propriety of metaphor, whether "majesty"—conceived either as the appearance of sovereignty or as the divine power that it represents—can return to a stable signification predicated on the resemblance between the monarch and God, something like Carlisle's formulation of the king as the "figure of God's majesty."

This representational dilemma is inscribed in Northumberland's vow in his speech to "imp out our drooping country's broken wing," which compares the state of England, injured by Richard's misgovernment, to a wounded falcon in need of repair from Bolingbroke. While this metaphor again seems to resemble York's reference to Richard's eagle-like majesty, the language of grafting that Northumberland employs problematizes his ostensible desire to return to a political order where kingship would be as strong as the birds of prey that figure it. According to the editors, "imp[ing] out" is "a term from falconry meaning to repair broken feathers by grafting" (182n). As the *Oxford English Dictionary* points out, though, the term can signify either an act of "mending" or an "adding" that "make[s] good losses or deficiencies," a seemingly minor distinction that is nevertheless crucial in this context. Will Bolingbroke's return to England "repair" Richard's damage in the sense that the former will regain his lands and restore the proper balance of power? Bolingbroke's aim would thus be essentially conservative, an attempt to reestablish the appropriate relationship between monarch and noble subject. On the other hand, if we read "imp out" as designating not a restoration but an alteration, an unnatural addition that may supplement a deficiency in kingship or even entirely replace its loss, the implications become much more radical. Even if we assume that the restoration Northumberland has in mind would involve Bolingbroke's usurpation of the throne—and I'm not entirely sure we can, given his insistence to York later in the play that Bolingbroke "hath sworn his coming is /

But for his own," not to mention his rebellion against Bolingbroke himself in *1 Henry IV*—we must wonder whether "restoration" could even appropriately describe Bolingbroke's action (2.3.147-48). Any effort to "imp out our drooping country's broken wing" would signify not only its repair but also its fundamental change. Read "awry," Northumberland's metaphor thus alternates between the restoration of kingship's true image in the figure of Bolingbroke and the potential disruption that could result from his return, a tension that pervades Northumberland's entire speech and that can be traced to the way that he himself "eyes" monarchical authority "awry." Northumberland engages in an erroneous viewing of the figure of the king, the sort of "misnaming" that Puttenham associates with metonymy, but it is this very tropological error that allows Northumberland (and the reader, for that matter) to imagine the possibility of resistance, to "distinguish" the "form" of kingship's relation to—or perhaps disjunction with—the divine realm in non-absolutist ways. However, this oblique form of viewing gives way at the end of the speech to another dialectic of "eyeing awry," in which Northumberland reimagines the sin of Bolingbroke's usurpation as a restoration (rather than a violation) of majesty, thus performing on behalf of the future king the misrecognition that Calvin and the Tudor homilist claim is necessary for political order.

III.

If Northumberland's revolt against Richard requires a change in his and the other nobles' perspectives, York must perform a similar perspectival reorientation to justify allegiance to Bolingbroke, whom he regards as an illegitimate usurper even if he also sympathizes with his mission. Nowhere is this shift more apparent than when he recounts to his wife Bolingbroke and Richard's entrances into London after the latter's deposition. Indeed, the fact that York's "weeping" interrupts his account should remind us of the queen's tears, which prompted Bushy's ambiguous meditation on "eyeing awry" earlier in the play (5.2.2). But while imagery of the eye dominates this passage, it appears initially that those viewing Bolingbroke's entrance "awry"—in the sense of an incorrect or delusive perception—are the common people rather than York, who reports that the "greedy looks of young and old / Through casements darted their desiring eyes / Upon his [Bolingbroke's] visage" (5.2.13-15), whereas "men's eyes / Did scowl on gentle Richard" (5.2.27-28). York implies that the "rude misgoverned" multitude fasten on the mere appearance of Bolingbroke (5.2.5), looking with "desire" upon his victorious "visage"—which can simply denote the face but in this context suggests something closer to "an assumed appearance; an outward show; a pretense or semblance," given the metatheatrical drift of the passage (*OED*)—while "throw[ing] dust" on Richard's "sacred head" (5.2.30). York famously compares both Bolingbroke and Richard to "actor[s]," but there seems to be a clear distinction between the former's guise of majesty and the latter's position as an anointed monarch, suggested not only by Richard's "sacred" status but by the physical attribute of the "head" rather than Bolingbroke's more ambiguous "visage" (5.2.24). This visage might remind us of Calvin's "personage" of "maiestie," or, perhaps even better, the "visor of dignitie" against whose deceptive appearance in sinful kings Calvin warns.

The irony, of course, is that Bolingbroke not only possesses more real power than Richard but that at this point in the play he has been declared the true monarch. As David Kastan argues in another context, "in the face of Bolingbroke's substance and power, Richard holds to the efficacy of insubstantial assertions of sacred authority" (471). One could say the same for York: while he attributes a delusive "desire" for Bolingbroke's legitimacy to the multitude, he himself still perceives the fallen Richard through his own desire for political and spiritual coherence. York must therefore shift his perspective to "eye" the scene correctly, and he seems to do so in his declaration at the end of the speech that "heaven hath a hand in these events / To whose high will we bound our calm contents" (5.2.37-38). The reader could be forgiven for feeling a bit of whiplash at York's conclusion. After spending the entire speech mourning the replacement of the sacred monarch by a dissimulating usurper, York suddenly attributes Bolingbroke's rise to the "high will" of heaven, which the editors gloss as "God's high (perhaps inscrutable?) designs" (260n). This sense of inscrutability can also be found in Holinshed, who claims of Richard and Bolingbroke that "'in this deiecting of the one, & aduancing of the other, the prouidence of God is to be respected, & his secret will to be woondered at'" (qtd. in Wilson xxii). Calvin frequently expresses a similar sense of wonder at what he calls the "incomprehensible wisedome" of God in the *Institutes* (58). Because "the dulnesse of our vnderstanding can not by a great way attaine to the height of Gods prouidence," Calvin insists on a "distinction" between the seemingly random appearance of events and their actual relation to God:

> Because the order, meane, end, and necessitie of those things that happen, doth for the most part lie secret in the purpose of God, and is not comprehended with opinion of man, therefore those things are as it were chanceable, which yet it is certain come to pass by the wil of God. For they seeme no otherwise, whether we consider them in their own nature, or whether we esteeme them according to our knowledge and iudgement. (60)

In order to reconcile this discrepancy between the providential and the fortuitous, the mysterious event must be filtered through the eyes of faith, which lends the subject a "quiet and stil mind" and allows for a shift in perspective, whereby "those things that seeme to vs to happen by chance, faith wil acknowledge to haue beene a secret mouing of God" (61). York's reaction to Bolingbroke's emergence as king demands the structure of perception that Calvin here delineates. Although York begins by registering a sense of discomfort with what he perceives to be an inverted world, one where the true king is debased while the usurper is praised, he seems to achieve what Calvin calls a “quiet and stil mind” (“calm contents”) by attributing Bolingbroke’s usurpation to an inscrutable but nevertheless active divine force.

York’s newfound allegiance to Bolingbroke has understandably been read as a conservative capitulation to power. McMillin argues that York here “assigns himself to God and to the new King” and therefore “reminds us that one’s ‘eyes’ are finally a way of giving assent to power and command, both in the theatre and in the state” (52). For John D. Cox, York is “at best excessively meek or weak-minded; at worst, uncritically acquiescent and opportunistic” (139). Norbrook, in another context, contrasts the passive York with Northumberland, claiming that whereas the former “keep[s] subversive thoughts away from the threshold of consciousness,” Northumberland “translate[s]” such thoughts into “effective action” by openly resisting Richard and allying himself with Bolingbroke (“‘A Liberal Tongue’” 128). We might therefore read York and Northumberland as expressing the sort of dialectical tension that characterizes Bushy’s speech and Calvin’s *Institutes*. Both characters encounter situations where the person of the king is in some way incongruous with the divine office that he represents, generating a perceptual crisis whereby, in Calvin’s words, the subject “behold[s] no forme of the image of God which ought to shine in a magistrate.” Whereas Northumberland “eyes” Richard’s authority “awry” by accentuating the gap between the flawed, unjust person of the king and his divinely ordained office, therefore paving the way for rebellion, York deliberately misrecognizes Bolingbroke’s usurpation in order to “distinguish” the “form” of providence amid chaos. These characters thus express what Roland Boer calls “the tension between the reactionary and the radical, between the conservative and revolutionary” in Calvin’s thought: the distinction between person and office can lead to resistance in Northumberland's case or obedience in York's (88).

The situation is not quite this simple, however. Indeed, I want to argue that York's appeal to God's "high will" is, ironically, more destabilizing to divine right kingship than is Northumberland's. As we have seen, Northumberland's metonymical political perspective gives way in the course of his speech to the claim that Bolingbroke can "make high majesty look like itself," a statement that presupposes (if only for rhetorical purposes) the return of monarchy's proper form and, by extension, the analogical resemblance between Bolingbroke's excellence and God's "high majesty," even as Northumberland's impersonal and external rhetoric undermines such a conclusion. York, on the other hand, seems unable at this moment to achieve such analogical reconciliation in acknowledging Bolingbroke as the king, despite his best efforts. His declaration of allegiance may be an attempt to "make high majesty look like itself"—to transform Bolingbroke's dissimulation, which projects the mere "visage" of majesty, into the real thing—yet his ultimate appeal to the inscrutability of providence paradoxically reveals that "high majesty" can never "look like itself," if we understand this statement as designating an originary monarchical model (God's "majesty," for example) that subsequent kings can embody. Bolingbroke's rise instead makes legible what Luis-Martinez describes as "a separation (*chorismos*) of human knowledge from heavenly designs" in the play (689). Majesty can only "look like itself" if we emphasize the "like" rather than the "itself": it can appear as a stable entity through a shift in the subject's perspective, and this appearance or "visage" is crucial for the maintenance of its ideological legitimacy; however, it is severed from any divine foundation its apologists claim for it.

While *Richard II* therefore stages the separation of the temporal and divine realms, we cannot necessarily think of this separation as a mere secularization of political power. Hugh

Grady argues that the play "implies a secular, realpolitik, non-Providential view of power and legitimacy," but we should keep in mind that the disjunction between king and God is inscribed in the very notion of providence (48). As Jonathan Dollimore points out, this doctrine "constituted an ideological underpinning for ideas of absolute monarchy and divine right" (89), but taking the implications of providence seriously can lead to a situation where "paradox is intensified into contradiction" and "an authoritarian discourse is indicted through ironic allegiance" (106). Dollimore here refers to overtly cynical uses of providence, but similar ironies emerge in the work of Calvin himself, who draws on providence to rationalize political obedience and resistance. This double-edged—and self-defeating—providential structure is necessary in a political world governed by an inscrutable God, one whose designs are inaccessible to the subject, including the sovereign and the rebel who would challenge him.[29] Monarchy, whether usurped or hereditary, is therefore ironic, insofar as it is predicated on the discrepancy between king and God as much as their connection. Tyranny or usurpation might make this divergence clear, but Shakespeare and Calvin suggest that the disruption of sacral kingship is not fundamentally different, at the level of representation, from what is considered its proper manifestation. Propriety can only emerge by "eyeing" the figure of the ruler "awry," a representational predicament that authorizes sovereignty in the very moment that it unsettles its coherence.

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[29] Ken Jackson makes a somewhat similar point, claiming that the difference between Richard and Bolingbroke is that while the former "has wildly overestimated the access he has to the Divine," the latter comes to recognize that "a monarch should rule with a certain religious fear and trembling, a certain awe and unease with relation to the inscrutable, unknowable 'Other' that provides the throne" (72). It seems difficult, however, to ascribe to Bolingbroke a more authentic display of the spiritual nature of kingship than Richard, not because the deposed king possesses the proper understanding of sacral monarchy but because, as Jackson himself points out, Shakespeare ironizes Bolingbroke's most religious moments. As I have tried to argue, Calvin is useful for showing the ways in which Bolingbroke's rebellion acquires a spiritual meaning quite apart from his conscious understanding of the sovereign's spiritual responsibilities.

It has often been observed that *Richard II* anticipates the 1649 trial and execution of Charles I, but the structure of perception that I have been tracing is just as prophetic of the rise of Oliver Cromwell, whose disruption of the traditional political order also appeared to be justified by providence.[30] It should come as no surprise, then, that throughout his poetry Andrew Marvell will "eye" Cromwell's authority "awry." In "An Horation Ode upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland," Cromwell's role in the civil war has "ruin[ed] the great work of time" (l. 34). By the time of "The First Anniversary of the Government under His Highness the Lord Protector, 1655," however, Cromwell "contracts" the "force of scattered time" (l. 13). If Marvell's transition from Cromwell's revolutionary destruction to his sovereign restoration resembles Northumberland's vow that Bolingbroke will "make high majesty look like itself," the poet sounds closer to York when he notes in "The First Anniversary" that the apocalyptic fulfillment promised by Cromwell's quasi-monarchical reign is obscured by a "thick cloud" that "intercepts the beams of mortal eyes," leading him to ambiguously concede that "the most which we determine can, / if these the times, then this must be the man" (l. 141-44). In Chapter Four I will examine the ways in which Marvell's ambivalent depiction of Cromwell departs from the praise of Charles in the Caroline masque. Before doing so, however, we must explore a similar (and perhaps more surprising) ambiguity in Ben Jonson's early masques for King James.

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[30] Those connecting the play to the civil war include Kastan, 475; and Kantorowicz, 39.

CHAPTER 3

Political and Poetic Union in Jonson and James I

In *James I and the Politics of Literature*, Jonathan Goldberg argues that in Ben Jonson's Jacobean masques "a meeting of minds, king's and poet's, is made possible; in writing, authority is established" (56). Discussing *Mercury Vindicated from the Alchemists at Court* (1616), for example, Goldberg suggests that "at the end of the masque natural procreation serves as a metaphor for royal power and its reflection in the poet's creation—the text that gives back to the king what he authorizes. The vindication of Mercury is a triumph of language in which real and imaginary meet" (61). This alliance of poetry and power presupposes the mimetic stability of metaphor: not only does "procreation" function as a figure for "royal power," but the entire world of the masque should "reflect" the supremacy of the king. But as Graham Parry points out (and as Goldberg himself is well aware), "the distance between [James's] real and imagined self was immense. His Court was destined to be renowned for its venality, for its intemperance, for favoritism so extreme that it subverted good government, for neglect of affairs of state, and for gross flattery" (*Golden Age Restor'd*, 19). The fact that Jonson both satirizes such corruption in his *Epigrams* and idealizes James's reign in the masques leads Isabel Rivers to detect in his work a "curious amphibiousness," an "antipathy to and conscious support of his society":

> Jonson was aware of the hollowness of a social hierarchy unsupported by useful moral purpose, and the danger of the monarchy's self-inflation; yet he himself contributed to that aggrandizement of the court which increased political and social tension and helped bring about the collapse of the whole structure. Jonson could not see the logical incompatibility of his various tones and positions; one can trace no chronological development in these attitudes. His consciousness of

> social upheaval did not make him revise his view of the conventional political framework. (71)

For Rivers, such a pose has little political value; it would be up to later poets, such as Milton, to develop an artistic and ethical stance capable of transforming society.

In this chapter, I argue that the political interest of Jonson's work lies precisely in the "logical incompatibility" that Rivers condemns, which emerges in part from the incompatibility between the ideal image of the monarch's authority and its reality. This disjunction, versions of which we have already observed in Puttenham and Shakespeare, gives rise to Jonson's ambivalence even as his own work widens it. One of Jonson's primary tasks as a writer of masques is to naturalize the authority of James, especially when it comes to the monarch's goal of uniting England and Scotland as Great Britain. According to Martin Butler, "it exaggerates only a little to say that the Union was the ideological crucible out of which the court masque was made" (70). This political issue should be of particular interest to literary critics because it revolves around the relationship between language and reality: James insisted that the name "Great Britain" would accurately reflect the geographical and cultural unity of the two countries, but Parliament argued that such a change constituted an act of symbolic violence, an imposition of harmony that did not exist in reality. Although Jonson's first masque, the *Masque of Blackness* (1605), seems to offer James an artistic realization of the political unification he so desperately desired, I argue that its language and dramatic action in fact trouble the unity essential both for James's political program and for Jonson's poetic theory, which he formulates most explicitly in the posthumously published *Timber: or Discoveries* (1640). If, as Butler claims, the failure of James's union project revealed "the structural tensions inherent in British kingship" and "contributed substantially to the severity of the political breakdown that was ultimately to come" under James's son, Charles I, I suggest that close attention to the "structural tensions" on display in one of the earliest instances of the masque genre foregrounds the shortcomings of the aesthetic ideology supporting Stuart monarchy (68).

I.

I would like to begin with *Timber*, a commonplace book that sheds light on the relationship between the imagination (poetic and otherwise) and political sovereignty. Throughout this text, Jonson is at pains to distinguish a properly ordered imagination from an errant one, and much of Jonson's polemic is reserved for bad poetry on the one hand and the flawed judgment of the multitude on the other. Both of these groups fall victim to "opinion," which "is a light, vain, crude, and imperfect thing, settled in the imagination; but never arriving at the understanding, there, to obtain the tincture of reason" (376).[31] Without the intervention of the "understanding," the imagination will generate lies that deceive the audience:

> It is an art to have so much judgment, as to apparel a lie well, to give it a good dressing; that though the nakedness would show deformed and odious, the suiting of it might draw their readers. Some love any strumpet (be she never so shop-like, or meritorious) in good clothes. But these, nature could not have formed them better to destroy their own testimony; and over-throw their calumny. (384)

Jonson's ideal reader might recognize the discrepancy between the "good dressing" of appearance and the "deformed and odious" reality, but Jonson seems to hold out little hope for such a distinction from the public at large, who are "taken" with "clothes and titles, the birdlime of fools": the multitude "runs made to gaze on […] statues, marble pillars, pictures, gilded roofs, where underneath is lath, and lime; perhaps loam. Yet, we take pleasure in the lie, and are glad, we can cozen ourselves. Nor is it only in our walls and ceilings; but all that we call happiness is mere painting, and gilt" (417). For Jonson, the viewer is not simply lured into the falsehood but engages in a mode of self-deception, whereby we "take pleasure in the lie" and "cozen ourselves."

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[31] All references to *Timber* are from *The Complete Poems*.

Such self-deception in the audience equally infects poets, who embrace a style of writing that departs from nature. According to Jonson,

> now nothing is good that is natural: right and natural language seems to have least of the wit in it; that which is writhed and tortured, is counted the more exquisite. Cloth of bodkin, or tissue, must be embroidered; as if no face were fair, that were not powdered, or painted! No beauty to be had but in wresting, and writhing our own tongue! Nothing is fashionable, till it be deformed; and this is to write like a gentleman. (392)

If earlier "good dressing" concealed deformed "nakedness," here "deformity" goes hand in hand with "fashion," as if the line between appearance and reality were no longer stable. The ideal or "learned" poet, on the other hand, will "ever use election, and a mean; they look back to what they intended at first, and make all an even, and proportioned body. The true artificer will not run away from nature, as he were afraid of her; or depart from life, and the likeness of truth; but speak to the capacity of his hearers" (397-98). The "best writers," according to Jonson, "obtained first to write well, and then custom made it easy, and a habit. By little and little, their matter showed itself to them more plentifully; their words answered, their composition followed; and all, as in a well-ordered family, presented itself in the place." While this process is not quite mimetic in the natural sense—Jonson here refers primarily to the imitation of other writers rather than the poet's depiction of natural reality—the result is still a work of truth grounded in order and proportion; as Jonson argues, “as in an instrument, so in style, there must be a harmony, and consent of parts” (426). It is for this reason that Jonson compares good writing to a “well-ordered family,” a figure that acquires particular significance given Jonson’s later claim that language “springs out of the most retired, and inmost parts of us, and is the image of the parent of it, the mind. No glass renders a man’s form, or likeness, so true as his speech” (435).

While Jonson employs references to the mind and parenthood to describe the proper relationship between a writer and his or her language, these figures served equally in the period as expressions of a well-ordered commonwealth. James I will argue in a speech to Parliament on March 31, 1610, for example, that there are “three principal similitudes that illustrate the state of monarchy”: “In the Scriptures kings are called Gods, and so their power after a certain relation compared to the divine power. Kings are also compared to fathers of families: for a king is truly *Parens Patriae*, the politic father of his people. And last, kings are compared to the head of this microcosm of the body of man” (181).[32] James’s analogical view of monarchy seeks of course to naturalize his own authority and social hierarchy more generally; since the “power” of kings works in the same way as that of God, it is not to be questioned. If for James God is the original and supreme king, for Jonson He is the superior poet: “The order of God’s creatures in themselves, is not only admirable, and glorious, but eloquent: then he who could apprehend the consequence of things in their truth, and utter his apprehensions as truly, were the best writer, or speaker” (438). God’s creation was an act of poetic “eloquence,” and the good poet will recognize and reproduce the “consequence,” or arrangement, of divine order through a devotion to “truth.” This emphasis on arrangement applies equally to James’s and Jonson’s mutual interest in the ordering power of the mind over the body. James compares the king to the “head of the natural body" because "the head hath the power of directing all the members of the body to that use which the judgment in the head thinks most convenient" (182). We will remember that Jonson's ideal poet will ensure that his work constitutes "an even, and proportioned body" whereas the bad poet will succumb to "opinion," which is a product of the imagination without the "tincture of reason"; accordingly, Jonson will claim that "in all speech, words and sense are as the body, and the soul" (430) and that the "skin, and coat" of language "rests in the well-joining, cementing, and coagmentation of words," while the misuse of language amounts to an imbalance in the humors (436).

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[32] Unless otherwise indicated, all references to James are from *Political Writings*.

Thus far, the relationship between language and mind seems relatively straightforward: ideally, words will reproduce "the mind" of the poet and be ordered by the power of his or her reason. A potential disruption to Jonson's mimetic scheme, however, emerges in his discussion of metaphor. According to Jonson, words can attain "elegance" and "propriety" when

> we use them fitly, and draw them forth to their just strength and nature, by way of translation, or metaphor. But in this translation we must only serve necessity […] or commodity, which is a kind of necessity; that is, when we either absolutely want a word to express by, and that is necessity; or when we have not so fit a word, and that is commodity.

Unlike Puttenham, whose analysis of metaphor shifted from a discussion of analogical harmony to something closer to the abusive force of catachresis, Jonson here takes it as a given that this trope is useful for cases of "necessity" or "commodity." It is not so much a question of observing the resemblance between tenor and vehicle, then, but of negotiating the gap in meaning that emerges either in the utter absence of a proper word or when the existing word is incongruous and "not so fit" to the situation. Because of the difficulty of fitting a word to an unfamiliar context, Jonson notes that metaphors are “many times deformed” and that “all attempts that are new in this kind are dangerous, and somewhat hard, before they be softened with use. A man coins not a new word without some peril, and less fruit; for if it happen to be received, the praise is but moderate; if refused, the scorn is assured” (431). The use of metaphor is accompanied by “peril” because it departs from Jonson’s poetic ideal, which is the use of “right and natural language”; if one is to draw on metaphor for the purposes of “necessity” or “commodity” he or she is, at least to some extent, necessarily performing the “writhing” and “wresting” characteristic of bad poets. As Puttenham puts it, even the proper use of metaphor involves “a kind of *wresting* of a single word from his own right signification to another not so natural, but yet of some affinity or conveniency with it” (262-63, my emphasis). And as we saw in Puttenham, the mind’s (and, by extension, language’s) ability to establish resemblances or correspondences can give way imperceptibly to acts of pure positing, the creation of new realities rather than the observation or reproduction of the natural order.

If the mind has a tendency to generate “deformed” figures, where does Jonson’s cautious description of metaphor leave James, whose authority is based on the “similitude” between the king and various figures of authority? Jonson will in fact compare the incorrect use of language to the defacement of the king:

> The shame of speaking unskillfully were small, if the tongue only thereby were disgraced: but as the image of a king, in his seal ill-represented, is not so much a blemish to the wax, or the signet that sealed it, as to the prince it representeth; so disordered speech is not so much injury to the lips that give it forth, as to the disproportion, and incoherence of things in themselves, so negligently expressed.

There is some ambiguity here as to what Jonson means by the “things in themselves.” He quickly adds that “neither can his mind be thought to be in tune, whose words do jar; nor his reason in frame, whose sentence is preposterous; nor his elocution clear and perfect, whose utterance breaks itself into fragments and uncertainties,” suggesting that disordered speech reveals a disordered mind, but, according to the terms of the figure of the king’s seal, the flawed representation of the monarch could indicate a certain “disproportion” and “incoherence” in his actual authority (438). Such a reading may seem preposterous given Jonson’s praise of monarchy throughout his work and in *Timber* itself. In a section on the “sickness of Parliament,” for example, Jonson condemns the tendency of the “multitude” to “censure their sovereign’s actions,” whereby “all the councils are made good or bad by the events. And it falleth out, that the same facts receive from them the names; now, of diligence; now, of vanity; now, of majesty; now, of fury: where they ought wholly to hang on his mouth; as he to consist of himself, and not others’ councils” (404). One should instead treat the prince as if he “were already furnished with the parts he should have, especially in affairs of state” (378). While the multitude’s imposition of different “names” to the same “facts” evokes Jonson’s earlier criticism of society’s obsession with the mere title, it is worth noting that Parliament’s renaming of “diligence” as “vanity” is not fundamentally different than the imaginative act required for the loyal subject to perceive the sovereign as complete and to “consist of himself,” a form of “eyeing awry” that, as we saw in *Richard II*, is highly unstable. Indeed, supplementing the “parts” that the king *should* have follows Jonson’s logic of metaphor, which is useful in cases of “necessity” or “commodity” (it is necessary to recognize the king as a more refined version of what he actually is) but carries with it an inherent risk, insofar as the figure could turn out to be improper in itself or rejected by the audience.

The instabilities of the imagination and the mere title had more than theoretical implications for early modern notions of sovereignty. James's attempts to establish a union between England and his native Scotland, the most important political project in the early years of his reign, hinged on determining the proper relationship between name and thing. James retained the title of King of Scotland upon his accession to the English throne in 1603, but he sought something much greater than the union of the crowns represented in his person, pushing for a sweeping political unification that would involve the concentration of legislative authority into a single parliament and the combination of England and Scotland into "Great Britain." In making the case for unification to a wary Parliament on March 19, 1604, James draws frequently on metaphorical correspondences to underscore what he sees as self-evident unity of the countries, insisting that

> What God hath conjoined then, let no man separate. I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawful Wife; I am the Head, and it is my Body; I am the Shepherd, and it is my flock: I hope therefore no man will be so unreasonable as to think that I that am a Christian King under the Gospel, should be a Polygamist and husband to two wives; that I being the Head, should have a divided and monstrous Body; or that being the Shepherd to so fair a Flock (whose fold hath no wall to hedge it but the four Seas) should have my Flock parted in two.

For James the union was obvious; in fact, "God" had "already established it" in his "person" (136). Earlier in the speech the king argues that because England and Scotland are "separated neither by Sea, nor great River, Mountain, nor other strength of nature, but only by little brooks, or demolished little walls" the two countries are "divided" more "in apprehension, then in effect" (135). By suggesting that the separation of the countries is little more than intellectual, a product perhaps of the degraded imagination, James emphasizes the naturalness of his political project; indeed, his fear that a continued distinction will render the geographical "Body" over which he is the "Head" "divided and monstrous" might remind us of Jonson's claim that the "learned" poet's well-ordered imagination will ensure that his work has an "even and proportioned body." James views unification as a form of restoration: like a successful work of art, combining the two countries will reflect natural reality.

Far from treating it as a restoration, parliamentary opponents of James's unification proposal worried that it amounted to a political innovation that would extinguish cultural differences between England and Scotland. Francis Bacon reported that the House of Commons objected to the change because an

> alteration of the name of the King doth inevitably and infallibly draw on an erection of a new kingdom or estate, and a dissolution and extinguishment of the old; and that no explanation, limitation, or reservation can clear or avoid that inconvenience; but it will be full of repugnancy and ambiguity, and subject to much variety and danger of construction.

The extent to which parliamentary objections to the change resemble Jonson's discussion of metaphor is striking. Jonson, we will recall, argues that the shifts in meaning carried by metaphor "must only serve necessity […] or commodity"; the Commons agree, claiming that "any innovation or change" of name should emerge in cases of "urgent necessity or evident utility" but that they "find no grief of our present estate, and foresee no advancement to a better condition by this change" (qtd. in Galloway 28). And just as Jonson warns that "a man coins not a new word without some peril, and less fruit" because "if it happen to be received, the praise is but moderate" and "if refused, the scorn is assured," the Commons argue that "the change of name will be harsh in the popular opinion, and unpleasing to the country" (qtd. in Galloway 29). Presupposed in this political tension between King and Parliament, then, is a tension over the connection between a name and what it represents. For James, adopting the name "Britain" would not only restore the ancient, Roman dignity of the island but would reestablish a proper understanding of the relationship between the two countries. For the Commons, the change of name is not a restoration but a disruption, perhaps even an obliteration of cultural particularity.

Although James sought to naturalize the union, his own rhetoric occasionally pointed in the direction that the Commons feared. In the 1604 speech, for example, he claims that "even as little brooks lose their names by their running and fall into great Rivers, and the very name and memory of the great Rivers swallowed up in the Ocean: so by the conjunction of divers little Kingdoms in one, are all these private differences and questions swallowed up" (137). The imagery of rivers "losing" both their "name" and "memory" once they are "swallowed up" by the ocean could not have eased Parliament's concern that the "contracted name of Brittaine will bring in oblivion the names of England and Scotland" (qtd. in Galloway 29). Moreover, James's description of unity as "swallowing" or "eat[ing] up" (136) exists in tension with his overarching emphasis that the union he seeks has nothing to do with "conquest." James will point out in the speech that "since the success was happy of the Saxon's kingdom being conquered by the spear of Bellona; how much greater reason have we to expect a happy issue of this greater Union, which is only fastened and bound up by the wedding ring of Astrea?" (137). While James suggests that his union is predicated on "love and peace" rather than the "war" associated with Bellona, or Mars, the violent connotations of the king's rhetoric and the fact that the precedents he cites—whether from English history or from other countries—all involve military intervention reveals that peaceful unification potentially follows the same logic as conquest. The

Commons seemed to recognize this blurred boundary between war and peace, arguing that "we find no precedent, at home or abroad, of uniting or contracting of the names of two several kingdoms or states into one name, where the union hath grown by marriage or blood; and that those examples which may be alleged, as far as we can find, are but in the case of conquest" (Galloway 28).

It is important to note that the motives of James's parliamentary opponents were by no means pure. According to Derek Hirst, "the Commons' fears that unification under the name of Great Britain would wreak havoc with all laws that referred specifically to England had some legal plausibility," but "the debates made clear that much of the resistance was purely xenophobic—and MPs' prejudices were probably shared by peers jealous of Scottish rivals at court" (*Authority and Conflict*, 105). Nevertheless, the debate over the union represented one of the earliest instances of the ubiquitous tension during the Stuart era between king and Parliament that would ultimately result in the English Civil War. As Hirst points out, when the Commons again refused to endorse the union in 1607 James "recognized that there was little hope of further parliamentary cooperation on a union, and ceased to press the point. He may correspondingly have begun to lose interest in parliaments" (108). Between the March 1604 speech and his abandonment of parliamentary approval for the union in 1607, however, James took it upon himself to issue a "Proclamation concerning the King's Majesty's Style, of King of Great Britain, &c." In this proclamation, released on October 20, 1604, James declares that he will "discontinue the divided names of England and Scotland out of our Regal Style" and "take and assume" the "Name and Style of KING OF GREAT BRITTAINE, including therein according to the truth, the whole Island." While James acknowledges that this move would not "extend to any legal proceeding, Instrument, or Assurance, until further Order be taken in that behalf," the new style would apply to “all proclamations, missives foreign, and domestical, treaties, leagues, dedicatories, impressions” and would be “used upon all Inscriptions upon our current Moneys and Coynes of Gold and Silver hereafter to be minted.”

In justifying his assumption of the new title, James is anxious to defend himself against parliamentary opponents who worry about the lack of precedent for the union. Not only does he claim “that we do not innovate or assume to us any new thing, but declare that which is and hath been evident to all,” but he describes his move as a “blessed Union, or rather reuniting of these two mighty, famous, and ancient kingdoms of England and Scotland, under one imperial crown.” James’s renaming of “Union” as “reuniting” performs at the level of language the restoration that he seeks, and the “ancient” foundation of his project goes hand in hand with its supposed grounding in perceptual reality: those who oppose the union “omit those things which are evident to sense, that the Isle within itself hath almost none but imaginary bounds of separation without, but one common limit or rather Guard of the Ocean Sea, making the whole a little world within itself” (*Proclamation*). However, in making this appeal to perception—as James puts it in the March speech, opponents of the union are “blinded with ignorance”—the king must of course blind himself to the fact that his decree will not have the wider-ranging effects that would come with parliamentary approval. He must also ignore the very real opposition to the union that remained in English society. While in March he had claimed that “no honest Subject of whatsoever degree within my whole dominions, is less glad of this joyful Union then I am” (136), here he argues that “we think it unreasonable, that the thing, which is by the work of God and Nature so much in effect one, should not be one in name; Unity in name being so fit a means to imprint in the hearts of people a Character and memorial of that Unity, which ought to be amongst them indeed” (*Proclamation*).

It is worth pausing on this sentence, which expresses ambivalence not only about the obedience of subjects but about the function of language. In the first clause James notes a discrepancy between, on the one hand, divine and natural reality, both of which supposedly prove that the union is legitimate, and the "name" on the other, which until this proclamation had failed to reflect reality. In the second clause, however, James reverses the hierarchical arrangement of the "thing" and the "name" when it comes to public opinion: while "unity in name" would initially seem to reflect nature by creating a "character and memorial" of "unity" in the "hearts of people," he quickly adds that such "unity" does not necessarily exist but "*ought* to be amongst them indeed." That the name has the potential to bring something into existence points to a distinction inscribed within James's description of "Great Britain" as a "character and memorial" of "unity." While the conjunction suggests an identity between the terms, a "memorial" refers to an object that preserves the memory of unity; a "character" might serve a similar purpose, but the fact that it will be "imprinted" on the "hearts of people" implicitly acknowledges the absence of that unity. Indeed, the act of forgetting will be just as important to union as that of memory. According to James, an "express testimony of God's authority in this work" is that England and Scotland,

> having been ever from their first separation continually in blood against each other, should for so many years immediately before our succession, be at peace together, as it were to this end, that their memory being free from sense of the smart of former injuries, their minds might, in the time of God's appointment, more willingly come together. (*Proclamation*)

There is a lot of hedging here: in order to create a “memorial” of the ancient unity of the island the people’s “memory” must be “free from sense of the smart” of previous conflict, at which point “their minds *might* […] more willingly come together.”

James may begin his proclamation by insisting that the unity he seeks is obvious to anyone who opens his or her eyes, then, but as he continues it becomes clear that the process he has in mind will require a reorientation of the subject’s understanding, if not the replacement of one version of reality by another. As Jonson has shown, such a replacement carries with it a significant risk, insofar as the creation of a new word (or, in James’s case, the use of an ancient word in a new political context) tends to encounter resistance and is often ill-suited in its application. Given Jonson’s political sympathies—he in fact writes an epigram in support of the union, claiming that no event had been “celebrated with more truth of state” (2), though he will also be imprisoned in 1605 for contributing to the anti-Scottish satire *Eastward Ho!*—we might assume that he would dismiss parliamentary resistance to James’s project as a manifestation of vulgar “opinion.” In his discussion of metaphor, after all, he does claim that in creating new forms of language “we must adventure, for things, at first hard and rough, are by use made tender and gentle” (431-32). This recourse to “use” or what Jonson elsewhere calls “custom,” which for him is “the most certain mistress of language, as the public stamp makes the current money,” seems to be precisely what James hopes will achieve his dream, especially when we recall his claim that the word “Britain” will “imprint” the “character” of “unity” on the people (432). Jonson quickly narrows his definition of custom to “the consent of the learned” rather than “the manners of the vulgar,” but James cannot make such distinctions in his political context. This perhaps helps to explain Jonson’s disdain for Parliament, whose members, we will recall, “censure their sovereign’s actions” to the point that “the same facts receive from them the names; now, of diligence; now, of vanity; now, of majesty; now, of fury." In this situation, however, James is the one changing the "name" of the same "fact"; the "unity in name" will hopefully create a "unity indeed." Insofar as James's assumption of a new style failed to have the effect on political reality that he hoped, it seems that the king is falling prey to the supposedly vulgar obsession with what Jonson calls "clothes and titles, the birdlime of fools." In insisting that a new name will somehow resolve social antagonism, could it be James who is "tak[ing] pleasure in the lie" of unity and is "glad" that he can "cozen" himself?

I would argue that we must understand Jonson's turn to the masque in this political context. Not only do the early masques take up the issue of the union, but in performing the reconciliation of imagination and reality more generally they function as the literary counterpart to James's assumption of a new title. A connection between the literary and the political would have appealed to James. We have already seen the extent to which he depends on metaphorical correspondences to confirm his rule, and, as Jonson well knew, James was himself a poet. Indeed, Jonson begins the early epigram "To King James" by linking James's roles as poet and sovereign: "How, best of kings, dost thou a sceptre bear! / How, best of poets, dost thou laurel wear!" (1-2). Jonson concludes by setting up James as both his poetic inspiration and measuring stick, asking "Whom should my muse then fly to, but the best / Of kings for grace; of poets for my test?" (9-10). Quite apart from his actual writing of poetry, though, James, like Elizabeth, saw his role as king in poetic, or at least artistic, terms. As he explains in the proclamation, "we are purposed towards the building of this excellent work" and the assumption of the new title is the "first stone of this work, whereupon the rest may be laid" (*Proclamation*). Jonson will similarly compare writing to building in *Timber*, arguing that "the congruent, and harmonious fitting of parts in a sentence, hath almost the fastening, and force of knitting, and connection: as in stones well-squared, which will rise strong a great way without mortar" (433); he claims furthermore that "he which can feign a commonwealth (which is the poet) can govern it with councils, strengthen it with laws, correct it with judgments, inform it with religion, and morals." Jonson will have his opportunity to "feign a commonwealth" in the masques, but this act of creation, which demands not simply "mere elocution; or an excellent faculty in verse; but the exact knowledge of all virtues, and their contraries" (405), must be distinguished from the sort of "feigning" he associates with mere "opinion." Jonson will point out, after all, that "nothing is lasting that is feigned; it will have another face than it had, ere long: as Euripides saith, 'No lie ever grows old'" (391).

It may seem difficult to separate positive "feigning" from its negative counterpart when it comes to the masques, which to many modern readers amount to little more than Stuart propaganda. An essential part of the masque is the establishment of order in the God-like figure of the monarch. According to Graham Parry, "it is perhaps not entirely coincidental that the most magnificent event of the Court year took place on Epiphany, or Twelfth Night, for a god was indeed revealed amongst men, and a succession of miracles occurred within the Whitehall Banqueting House to witness the presence of divinity in the person of the King" (*Golden Age Restor'd*, 42). However, throughout the masques Jonson seems to recognize that there is a potential gap between the ideal presented on stage and reality. In the preface to *Love's Triumph Through Callipolis* (1631), one of his final masques written for Charles I, Jonson explains that his goal is "to make the spectators understanders," noting that "all representations, especially those of this nature in court, public spectacles, either have been or ought to be the mirrors of man's life" (1-3).[33] The notion of the "spectacle" as a "mirror" is complicated, however, by the role of the understanding, which must to some extent transcend the action on stage. As Jonson puts it in the preface to *Hymenaei* (1606), a much earlier Jacobean masque that foregrounds the issue of the union, "it is a noble and just advantage that the things subjected to understanding have of those which are objected to sense that the one sort are but momentary and merely taking, the other impressing and lasting" (1-4). The "personators of these actions" must therefore be

> not only studious of riches and magnificence in the outward celebration or show, which rightly becomes them, but curious after the most high and hearty inventions to furnish the inward parts, and those grounded upon antiquity and solid learnings; which, though their voice be taught to sound to present occasions, their sense or doth or should always lay hold on more removed mysteries. (11-17)

In both of these quotations, Jonson is anxious to separate mere "spectacle," which he associates in *Timber* with the multitude, from the experience of the spectacle combined with the "understanding," which will gesture beyond the theatrical "body" toward "more removed mysteries." The audience will accomplish this interpretative act by focusing more on the language than the spectacle; we will remember that for Jonson "language most shows a man" because it serves as an "image" of the "mind." A further distinction is necessary for interpreting language, of course, since "words and sense are as the body, and the soul." In order to achieve a proper understanding of the masque, one must first separate the mere spectacle from the more "impressing and lasting" features located in its language and then distinguish between that language's "body" and its "soul." These acts of division should give way to combination, however, for a successful masque will ultimately combine body and soul. As Inigo Jones puts it in *Tempe Restored* (1631), the "corporeal beauty, consisting in symmetry, color, and certain unexpressable graces, shining in the queen's majesty" should "draw us to the contemplation of the beauty of the soul, unto which it hath analogy" (Orgel and Strong, 483). Jonson may privilege language over spectacle, but, as Roy Strong points out, he would largely agree with this statement (155): a successful masque will synthesize language and spectacle, not only to affirm the power of the sovereign (who is both the soul to the body politic and the sensible representative of God's power on earth) but to create an ordered work of art.

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[33] All references to Jonson's masques other than *Blackness* are from *The Complete Masques* and are cited by line number. References to *Blackness* are from *Masques of Difference* and are cited by line number.

Jonson seems to understand, however, that such a synthesis is difficult to achieve. He writes that masques "have been *or* ought to be the mirrors of man's life" and that "their sense or doth *or* should always lay hold on more removed mysteries." This implicit discrepancy between the ideal and the real demands some sort of supplement. Despite the image of the mimetic mirror associated with the masque, such a supplement can involve creation rather than resemblance; as Jonson puts it, the participants in the masque should be "curious after the most high and hearty inventions to *furnish* the inward parts" and thus transcend the mere spectacle. What we have here is a different understanding of language: rather than "spring[ing] out of the most retired, and inmost parts of us," the work of "invention" will "furnish," or provide rather than reflect, "the inward parts" that lead to "more removed mysteries." As we turn to the masques, I want to suggest that this ambiguity has political and literary consequences that make the genre something more than mere propaganda. The masque is certainly an enactment of Jonson's advice in *Timber*, quoted earlier, that one should view the prince as if he "were already furnished with the parts he should have, especially in affairs of state." While such a statement would seem to amount to little more than an encouragement of ideological misrecognition (and can of course tend in that direction, particularly in Jonson's later masques), I would argue that the masque offers an opportunity to examine the construction of this "as if" structure. Reading the masques as a sort of meta-commentary on the tension legible in *Timber* between an ideology of mimetic resemblance—understood both as the metaphorical correspondences that confirm the king's authority and the more general assumption of a secure relationship between language and reality—and the volatile category of "invention" or creation, which for Jonson can both enhance and distort our understanding of reality, considerably complicates the political meaning of the genre: what does it mean if, in the case of both the "inward parts" of the masques that contain "more removed mysteries" and the ideal "parts" that the king must be assumed to possess, such "parts" are fabricated by the poet? Can these ultimately be traced back to the ordering powers of reason or do they rather reside in the imagination, which is necessary for successful art (and, indeed, for thought itself) but also condemned for its tendency toward error?

Furthermore, the masque encourages us to take seriously Jonson's comparison of his role as poet to that of sovereign and James's role as sovereign to that of poet. I want to suggest that Jonson's claim that a poet must be able to "feign a commonwealth" through an allegiance to the truth can work as reference both to his work in the masques and to James's unification project, as can Jonson's seemingly opposite assertion that "nothing is lasting that is feigned." These positive and negative connotations of "feigning," legible also in Puttenham's description of Elizabeth, are inscribed in James's unification and Jonson's masque. James grounds his call for unity in what he claims is perceptual, historical, and even divine truth, but he must ultimately supplement this appeal with a speech act that "take[s] and assume[s] unto us" the "name and style of King of Great Britain." An emphasis on restoration, on the resemblance between the present and the ancient past, therefore gives way to an act of "invention" or pure positing. Although James insists in the proclamation that “this union is not enforced by Conquest and violence,” I would argue that his performative declaration brings with it a sort of linguistic or symbolic violence not unlike the “wresting and writhing” that for Jonson is characteristic of bad poets. James may claim that he does not “innovate or assume to Us any new thing, but declare that which is and hath been evident to all,” but he also hopes that “unity in name” will *create* a sense of “unity” that “ought to be amongst” the people “indeed.” James is here closer to the “lie” associated in Jonson with deceptive “feigning,” and it will be Jonson’s responsibility in the masques to neutralize the tension between restoration and creation and make “all an even, and proportioned body.”

But Jonson is no court parasite. Although at first glance his masques seem to do nothing but flatter, a close reading reveals that, at least in some masques, the poet keeps alive the tension between imagination and reality, creation and resemblance, that runs through *Timber* and threatens the consistency of James’s political project. By doing so, however, Jonson is also threatening the consistency of his own dramatic corpus. In *Timber* Jonson will define the “fable,” which can apply to “epic or dramatic” works, as “the imitation of one entire, and perfect action; whose parts are so joined, and knit together, as nothing in the structure can be changed, or taken away, without impairing, or troubling the whole: of which there is a proportionable magnitude in the members” (454). This vision of mimetic unity would seem to be the literary equivalent of James’s ideal view of the commonwealth, but Jonson will add that while the action “should be one, and entire,” “one is considerable two ways: either, as it is only separate, and by itself; or as being composed of many parts, it begins to be one, as those parts grow, or are wrought together” (456). Moreover, actions can “agree, and hang together, not as they were done; but as seeming to be done; which made the action whole, entire, and absolute” (458). If we apply these definitions to James's proclamation, we have to wonder whether the "parts" of a commonwealth will in fact "grow" into one, which suggests the natural process that he desperately wants to confirm his authority, or will have to be "wrought together," an act of human intervention that may bring with it "writhing and wresting." If the parts of the commonwealth cannot "agree, and hang together" *as if* "they were done," will the sort of "seeming" accomplished through James's speech act suffice to make his "action whole, entire, and absolute"? These questions will be foregrounded in the masque, a fable not only of political authority but of its construction.

II.

The *Masque of Blackness* has rightfully received recent critical attention for its racial and gender politics. As Kristen McDermott points out, it was produced as "England was just entering in an organized way into the triangular slave trade" (35) and "marks the first appearance of true 'blackface' makeup in a court masque" (36). If one function of the masque is to resolve social tension, we might argue that *Blackness*'s staging of the Ethiopian nymphs' acceptance in England recasts the violence of slavery as a peaceful process, one desired by its victims. However, this absurd vision of geopolitical harmony exists in tension with the prominent role of Queen Anne in the performance: not only did her use of blackface scandalize some spectators, but it arguably drew attention away from King James, who as monarch is the presumed focal point of the masque.[34] However, the fact that *Blackness* was performed in January 1605, mere months after James's assumption of a new title, also invites a consideration of its role in promoting the king's unification project; indeed, Mary Floyd-Wilson argues that critics have "underestimated" the role of this political issue in the masque, claiming that its "foremost purpose is to venerate King James's ability to achieve a successful union between Scotland and England" (190).[35] The moon goddess Ethiopia, for example, draws on language remarkably similar to that of James in praising what she calls "Brittania," which "with that great name" has "won her ancient dignity and style, / A world divided from the world" (232-34). As we will see, the masque is obsessed with the notion of union, whether conceived in philosophical, artistic, or political terms.

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[34] For Hardin Aasand, Anne's use of blackface "transmogrifies the typical allegorical representation of royalty into a grotesque mockery of orthodox ideology that threatens the conventional image of beauty and dominance" (272). Bernadette Andrea, however, examines the tension between subversion and containment in the masque by analyzing the conjunction of race and gender, arguing that while the queen resists the "division between privileged whiteness and suspect blackness" by "deliberately staining her skin black," therefore asserting "women's sexual and textual agency," her "subversion finally depends on an appropriation, since it is white (European) women in blackface, not black (African) women as such, who are celebrated in the masque. This contradiction fundamentally complicates the Queen's flouting of patriarchal

The action opens with a conversation between Oceanus, the "king of floods" (107), and his "lovely son" Niger (104), with Oceanus observing that Niger, "the Ethiop's river" (105), has "mix[ed] thy fresh billow with my brackish stream" (111). These images would appeal to James for a number of reasons: not only does the relationship between Oceanus as "king" and Niger as "son" dramatize the patriarchal power that James assumes as the "politic father of his people," but the fusion of river and ocean literalizes James's comparison in his March 1604 speech of England and Scotland combining to "the very name and memory of the great Rivers [being] swallowed up in the Ocean." Niger's response, however, seems to overturn his presumed subordination to Oceanus: noting that "since the immortal souls of creatures mortal / Mix with their bodies, yet reserve for ever / A power of separation," Niger claims that he can "sever / My fresh streams from thy brackish, like things fixed, / Though with thy powerful saltness thus far

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authority by placing her resistance within the confines of incipient British imperialism and the emerging model of racial slavery to which it is inextricably connected" (248).

[35] While Wilson focuses primarily on legal and administrative issues related to the union (see esp. 191-92), I am more interested in how the masque stages the mutual imbrication of sovereignty and aesthetics.

mixed" (116-20). Whereas Oceanus had pointed out that by flowing into the Atlantic Niger has arrived at "this squared circle of celestial bodies," indicating spiritual perfection, Niger suggests that *his* waters are associated with the "soul" and are therefore superior to Oceanus's, which constitute the mere "body."[36] This assertion, which challenges the early modern colonial assumption that "African and New World peoples […] have no souls or 'black' souls [are] justly subject to the mastery of good Christian souls" (Andrea 281), is unsettling given Oceanus's status as "king," who should not only be the "soul" of the "body politic" but should represent at the level of sense the transcendent power of God. Moreover, the soul-like Niger's insistence that he "reserve[s] for ever / A power of separation" from the body potentially threatens the fusion that Oceanus presupposes.

Niger's attitude here helps to explain his position on his daughters' desire to attain white skin and thus achieve the ideal form of beauty, the main issue of the masque. For Niger, blackness is an indication of divine favor: while "Death herself" is "pale and blue," his daughters are "near divinity" because their skin is "from passion or decay so free" (139, 143-44). Niger explains to Oceanus that his daughters' failure to recognize their quasi-divine status can be attributed to "poor brainsick men, styled poets here with you," who have "sung / The painted beauties other empires sprung, / Letting their loose and winged fictions fly / To infect all climates, yea, our purity" (146, 148-50). According to our standards, Niger's condemnation of these "poor brainsick men" constitutes an admirable demystification of racialist and imperialist ideology; according to the logic of the masque, however, it must constitute a mistake. While Jonson will not develop the formal antimasque until later, some have connected Niger's position to the distortions that characterize that element of the genre, which must be resolved by the end of the performance. As Stephen Orgel argues, "the masque world, in fact, is a world of self-evident truths, such as that whiteness is better than blackness or good better than evil. It is only the figures of the antimasque to whom these are not obvious facts" (*Jonsonian Masque*, 123-24).[37] It is worth pointing out, though, that Niger draws on language similar to *Timber*'s discussion of bad poets, where Jonson claims that "it is an art to have so much judgment, as to apparel a lie well, to give it a good dressing; that though the nakedness would show deformed and odious, the suiting of it might draw their readers" and that bad poets write "as if no face were fair, that were not powdered, or painted!" Against this obsession with mere appearance, or what Niger calls "painted beauties," Jonson maintains that "if we will look with our understanding, and not our senses, we may behold virtue and beauty (though covered with rags) in their brightness; and vice, and deformity so much the fouler, in having all the splendor of riches to gild them, or the false light of honor and power to help them" (417). Bringing this logic to bear on Niger's speech, we might suggest that his daughters have misrecognized their own beauty by subscribing to the "loose and winged fictions" backed by the power of "other empires," specifically England's. And if we are to believe Niger's association of himself with the "soul" and Oceanus with the "body," it would seem that he is in fact the character most closely aligned to Jonson's ideal view of the masque. As Jonson puts it in the preface to *Hymenaei*, the spectator should privilege the "soul" of the masque over its "body," and the "inward parts" of the court entertainment should be “grounded upon antiquity.” Niger is the character in *Blackness* associated with “antiquity,” backing up his claim that “in their black the perfectest beauty grows” (134) by explaining to Oceanus that his daughters “were the first formed dames on earth” (128).

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[36] As Glenn Odom points out, "brackish water, a mixture of fresh and salt, is the birthplace of much aquatic life, but it is also a breeding ground for mosquitoes and disease" (371).

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[37] Critics have in recent years called into question Orgel's binary opposition. Andrea, for example, shows that there was in fact a "residual equation of blackness and beauty that circulated in late medieval Europe and worked against the opposition between blackness and beauty that was emerging in England at the beginning of the early modern period" (256). Floyd-Wilson argues that "characteristically northern 'whiteness' does not yet metonymize the dominant identity of European culture in the early seventeenth century" but rather "had to be constructed as the dominant and fixed perspective" (185).

What are we to make of the fact that this proto-antimasque character seems to articulate Jonson’s ideal understanding of the masque in particular and aesthetics more generally? We might compare this apparent contradiction to Jonson’s use of the antimasque in *Hymenaei*, performed one year after *Blackness*, where the characters of “Opinion” and “Truth” appear to the audience “both so alike attired as they could by no note be distinguished” (621-22). A successful masque depends on making such “distinctions,” of course; if, as Truth observes of Opinion, “how / Like Truth her habit shows to sensual eyes!” (646-47), it is the responsibility of the understanding to reveal that this “likeness the black sorceress Night / Hath of these dry and empty fumes created” (634-35). Truth undertakes this task first through a debate with Opinion over the value of virginity, an appropriate topic considering the wedding theme. Opinion maintains that “virgins in their sweet and peaceful state / Have all things perfect, spin their own free fate, / Depend on no proud second, are their own / Center and circle, now and always one” (717-720), a sentiment strikingly similar to Puttenham’s in his shape poems to the virgin queen Elizabeth and that Opinion, like Puttenham, connects not only to the existence of “one god” but to “one king that doth inspire / Soul to all bodies in this royal sphere” (722, 724-25). Truth seizes on Opinion’s example of kingship to make her own case for marriage, asking “Is there a band more strict than that doth tie / The soul and body in such unity? / Subjects to sovereigns? Doth one mind display / In th’one’s obedience and the other’s sway?” (727-30). This disagreement resonates with Niger’s and Oceanus’s conversation: while Oceanus would likely agree with

Truth in privileging the "unity" of "soul and body," Niger insists on an ultimate "separation" between the body and the spirit, even if they can combine temporarily.

In any event, what's most important here is the way in which the tension between Truth and Opinion is resolved. Failing to reach a satisfactory conclusion to their debate, the characters first enlist knights to fight for supremacy on their behalf. Before the battle is complete, however, "a striking light seemed to fill all the hall, and out of it an angel or messenger of glory appear[s]" (791-93). Seeking to "end with reconciled hands these wars" (798), the Angel announces that "Truth is descended in a second thunder" (795). Apparently a more idealized version of the Truth who is presumably still on stage, this figure "beats back Error, clad in mists," while "Eternal Unity behind her shines, / That fire and water, earth and air combines" (820-22). After asserting that Opinion "in Truth's forced robe for Truth hath gone" (836), Truth commands Opinion to "vanish" (839), endorses marriage over virginity, and turns for confirmation to James, the "royal judge" (845) to "whose right sacred highness I resign / Low, at his feet, this starry crown of mine" (847-48). By handing over her "bright keys," which have the "power to ope the ported skies, / And speak their glories to his subjects' eyes," Truth essentially merges with the sovereign, or at least endorses him as her substitute on earth (853-55). *Hymenaei* therefore unites truth and appearance, soul and body: not only is "Opinion" banished, the antimasque destroyed, but the figure of the monarch makes concrete the concept of "Truth," which would otherwise remain mere allegory.

Just as Opinion submits to Truth after the former is shown to be mistaken, Niger's conviction that blackness is the highest form of beauty *should* give way to an equation of beauty with whiteness. It appears initially that this is what will happen: as Niger explains to Oceanus, "a face" reflected in a lake and "all circumfused with light" (174) has told his daughters to travel to a land governed by “a greater light, / Who forms all beauty with his sight” (184-85). The moon goddess Ethiopia soon appears to identify herself as that “face” and report that the land Niger seeks is “Britannia, which the triple world admires” (227). This land is governed by a sun possessing “beams” that “are of force / To blanch an Ethiop, and revive a corse” (240-41). Given this setup, we might expect the action to more or less follow that of *Hymenaei*: just as an angel helps to re-establish the properly hierarchical relationship between Truth and Opinion by appearing in “a striking light”—a light ultimately transferred to the king—the sun in *Blackness*, ostensibly associated with James, should be capable of “blanch[ing] an Ethiop.”

But such a transformation is notably absent from *Blackness*. Rather than “blanch[ing] the “Ethiops,” James and the rest of the audience are presented with one of the most bizarre moments in Jonson’s masques. Ethiopia summons the daughters, impersonated by the queen and her ladies, to the stage in couples, each of whom bear fans, “in one of which were inscribed their mixed names, in the other a mute hieroglyphic expressing their mixed qualities.” Jonson explains that he chose “this manner of symbol” over the “imprese” both “for strangeness as for relishing of antiquity, and more applying to that original doctrine of sculpture which the Egyptians are said first to have brought from the Ethiopians” (253-59). The “strangeness” of this turn to hieroglyphs is perhaps fitting given Jonson’s claim that the masque should contain “more removed mysteries” comprehensible to the “understanders” rather than the mere “spectators,” but it is difficult to understand how it relates to the overarching issues of blackness and beauty. As Orgel puts it, “for a moment (and let us remember that it is the climactic moment of the masque), this work, which has been developing and analyzing a poetic symbol, renounces the methods of poetry and drama and takes on the aspect of an emblem book” (*Jonsonian Masque*, 126). Such generic indistinction is not necessarily a problem—indeed, Jerzy Limon argues that “masques were the theatrical equivalent of an emblem book" (210)—but Orgel is right to recognize the disruption that it causes in *Blackness*. In later masques, the dramatic action typically gives way seamlessly to a dance that serves as an expression of harmony and order. In this case, however, the dance following the presentation of the hieroglyphs takes place independently of the drama: the Ethiopian nymphs in fact have to be recalled to the stage in a song that warns against the "sirens of the land," or the audience (287). According to Orgel,

> not until the dance is over can the emblems again become figures in a world we recognize. That world is the world of the theater, which the nymphs have left in order to perform their dance […] To the masque, it is the real world of the audience that contains the sirens and the rocks on which the fiction may founder; and the song urges the nymphs to return to the safety of the stage and the theatrical illusion. (*Jonsonian Masque*, 126)

But even this return to "illusion" will not accomplish the ostensible goal of the masque, which is the transition from black to white; indeed, Orgel argues that the nymphs must return to the stage because we are otherwise "in danger of believing that with this climax an unmasking *is* possible and that the point of the masque has been reached" (*Jonsonian Masque*, 127). What we get instead is a promise from Ethiopia that while the nymphs must return to the sea now, in one year they can return "and in the beams of yond' bright sun / Your faces dry, and all is done" (339-40).

Orgel reads the curiously incomplete conclusion of *Blackness* as a shortcoming: while the "dialogue" and the "climax" should ultimately unite, "it is a measure of the immaturity of the work that the two parts do not coincide and that, in fact, there is no stage action corresponding to the real point of the masque," which is the transformation of the women from black to white. Jonson must resolve this problem in his subsequent masques, must "turn this disparity to creative use" and "make of it a tension integral to the art form, rather than a threat to its coherence" (*Jonsonian Masque*, 128). Considering Jonson's own standards in *Timber*, we might well judge *Blackness* a failure: the seemingly arbitrary transitions from poetry to hieroglyph to dance do not seem to result in the "even, and proportioned body" that is the poet's ideal and that will later be the ideal of the masque form. What makes *Blackness* interesting, however, is that this aesthetic failure is also evidence of a political failure. Just as, according to Orgel, the "tension" within the masque should give way to a "coherent" whole, discordant elements in society should be resolved into a well-ordered commonwealth, precisely what James is attempting to accomplish with the union of England and Scotland. Indeed, a condition of possibility for the promised transformation of the nymphs is this union: Ethiopia tells Niger that "Brittania" will "extend / Wished satisfaction to their [his daughters'] best desires" (225-26), and this is at least in part because "this isle hath now recovered [Brittania] for her name, / Where reign those beauties that with so much fame / The sacred muses' sons have honoured" (228-30). By having Ethiopia make this assertion, Jonson is simultaneously communicating to James the fulfillment of one of *his* "best desires," that of union. Jonson's emphasis on the "name"—he will mention "name" or "style" three times in the next seven lines—therefore sets up Ethiopia's presumed reference to the monarch, whose "light sciential is, and, past mere nature, / Can salve the rude defects of every creature" (242-43).

Ethiopia refers first and foremost to the black skin of the nymphs, but the movement of this passage also suggests parallels to the tensions that surface in James's justification of the union. In the context of the union debate, the "creature" whose "rude defects" this magical light "can salve" could refer to the "divided and monstrous body" that results from the current separation of England and Scotland on the one hand and to James's "rude" parliamentary opponents “blinded with ignorance” on the other. James’s “light,” which is “sciential” and therefore allied with knowledge, will not only “salve”—which, according to the *OED*, can mean “to heal, remedy, mend, smooth over”—the arbitrary cultural division the king sees between the countries but also perhaps rescue opponents of the union from their ignorance. “Salving” gestures toward the notion of union as restoration (or, as James puts it, “reuniting”), as does Ethiopia’s claim that the island has “recovered” its proper “name”; but in saying that England’s “*new* name makes all tongues sing” Ethiopia seems to invoke the specter of “innovation” that James is at such pains to reject (237). This tension between newness and restoration is compressed in the promise that James’s “beams” are “of force / To blanch an Ethiop, and revive a corse” (240-41). While “blanching” is a bleaching that will replace one color with another, a “whitening” of black skin that seems little different from the “painting” that Jonson condemns in *Timber*, “reviving” a corpse is the restoration of a previous life. Both of these acts, moreover, are distinguished by “force” and are “past mere nature.” “Force” can of course refer neutrally to power, and the fact that such power transcends “nature” could simply invoke the quasi-magical qualities of divine right. But, as we have seen, James wants to avoid an association between the less savory connotations of such terms and his union project, arguing that the latter is “not enforced by conquest and violence” and that it reflects natural reality.

Oddly enough, the tension concentrated in Ethiopia’s description of the sun seems initially to find a resolution not in James’s own power but in that of Niger’s daughters, whom Ethiopia summons immediately after describing the monarch to “indent the land with those pure traces / They flow with in their native graces” before the “Britain men” (245-47). This act of “indenting,” which McDermott glosses as “imprinting” (101n), might remind us of James’s assertion in his proclamation that “unity in name” can “imprint in the hearts of people a character and memorial of that unity, which ought to be amongst them indeed." Ethiopia quickly adds that such purity, a naturalness that seems to anticipate that of the "noble savage," will be "refine[d]" by James's "radiance," but the suggestion is that the nymphs can provide something to James as much as he can to them (250-51). The combination of the nymphs' "purity" with James's "light sciential" could analogize the "ancient" foundation of Great Britain: because the Ethiopians are, according to Niger, the "first formed dames of earth," their presence in England signals the return to origins that James seeks at the political level. As Floyd-Wilson suggests, "Jonson is not only narrating the Ethiopians' quest for a physical metamorphosis from black to white, but he is also relating the transmission of ancient wisdom from Ethiopia to Egypt to Brittania" (188). It is perhaps for this reason that Jonson presents the women accompanied by hieroglyphs, which "the Egyptians are said first to have brought from the Ethiopians" and that he chooses "as well for strangeness as relishing of antiquity" (102). For McDermott, "Jonson's identification of the 'mute hieroglyphic' with the Egyptians is another example of his linking the Jacobean court to the ancient world" (102n). Ironically, though, such a link complicates the presumed teleology of the masque, which is the overcoming of the Ethiopian notion of beauty by the English one. The nymphs should not have to provide a "purity" which is subsequently "blanched" by James, nor should what Orgel calls the "static" quality of hieroglyphs have to replace the transformational power of drama and spectacle that would come to characterize the later, more advanced masques (*Jonsonian Masque*, 126). There seems to be a regression here: far from restoring the ancient purity of the British Isles, the apotheosis of the masque nearly gives way to the sort of cultural otherness that James's opponents feared from a union with Scotland.[38]

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[38] According to Floyd-Wilson, English hostility toward the Scottish people revolved around their perceived "'rudeness' or ignorance stemming from their sluggish humors" (199). It is therefore possible that anti-Scottish sentiment is displaced onto black bodies in the masque. Floyd-Wilson

In this moment, the figures of both James and the nymphs are overdetermined: James is associated with the sun, but his rays are also “past mere nature”; the blackness of the daughters is inferior to the whiteness of British women, but the country also needs their “pure traces.” Perhaps this overdetermination would not result in contradiction if it were resolved, if the nymphs were transformed into white women and otherness was therefore reduced to identity, but the “daughters of the subtle flood” (294) are called away by Ethiopia and must “remain the Ocean’s guests” until their promised transformation (320). McDermott reads “subtle” as implying that “the ‘nymphs’ are still ‘forms’ of beauty, not flesh-and-blood women” (103n). While “subtle” refers most immediately to the ocean where the daughters will return and therefore has the sense of “clear,” McDermott’s gloss is suggestive. According to the *OED*, when applied to a person “subtle” refers to “the mental faculties, or intellectual activity,” and when related to an “immaterial thing” it can mean “difficult to understand; abstruse; complicated.” On the one hand, such a description is appropriate given Jonson’s distinction between the mere spectacle and the “more removed mysteries” that are themselves difficult for the uninitiated to comprehend. Indeed, the nymphs’ association with the “strangeness” of the “mute hieroglyphic” has already foregrounded their opacity: it is up to the spectator to understand the connection between their “mixed names” and their “mixed qualities,” a task that

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goes on to show that “early modern historiography […] asserted that the Scots are in fact descendants of the Egyptians,” who are themselves descended from the Ethiopians in *Blackness* (200), and that “the masque plays on the association between blackness and wisdom and seems to suggest that an uncorrupted quality has been transmitted over time (from the ancient Scots to the present-day Britons” (201-02). While “James’s blanching light brings refinement to the Ethiopian nymphs and to his subjects, Brittania’s incorporation of ancient wisdom—represented most plainly by the Ethiopian nymphs’ hieroglyphs—is enacted by a dance that imitates the flow of southern waters into northern land” (202).

was not easy for Jonson's contemporaries and that remains challenging for modern readers.[39] But why is this subtlety not transformed by the sun-like James into clarity, their skin from black to white?

One reason perhaps is the strangely abstract depiction of James himself, which marks a discrepancy between the person of the king and the majesty of his office that Northumberland exploited for revolutionary purposes in *Richard II*. While the association of James with the "light sciential" seems obvious, Orgel points out that "the identification of the symbolic figure [the sun] with the character who physically represents it is never made in the world of *Blackness*. The monarch in 1605 is carefully left as an abstract concept" (*Jonsonian Masque*, 124-25). Orgel attributes this disjunction between the empirical king and "that figure which James, as the center of both the fictive and the actual court, represents" to the "structural problem" he detects in the awkward organization of the masque; but, as already mentioned, what is for Orgel an aesthetic problem is also a political one (*Jonsonian Masque*, 125).[40] In his speech to Parliament, after all, James insists that the legitimacy of the union stems from the fact that "God hath in my person already established" it. It is crucial, in other words, that James function as the *physical* manifestation of his political project, just as the absence of a geographical division between England and Scotland is physical, perceptible evidence of a political link. The abstract connection between the countries must be made concrete, must move from allegory to symbol, but such a transformation fails even to occur in the masque, let alone in political reality. Hardin Aasand argues that allegory is the "appropriate mode for the epideictic masque presentation" because the device "perpetuates the noumenal mysteries of the monarchy in iconic personations that bind together court members in a social structure of hierarchical assumptions." While Aasand contrasts allegory with "mimesis," I would suggest the opposite, at least in the case of *Blackness* (272): it is in fact crucial that the masque (and, by extension, royal ideology) move from "mystery" to what Aasand calls "embodiment," just as the allegorical figure of Truth yields to James, the "royal judge," at the end of *Hymenaei*. Presupposed in this embodiment is the ability of the allegorical figure to resemble the king and thus maintain a mimetic relationship to reality, precisely what fails to occur in *Blackness*.[41] We are certainly invited to make the connection between the physical king and the symbolic sun, but even in the fictional world the sun is not capable of transforming the Ethiopian "forms of beauty" into "flesh-and-blood women," just as a discrepancy remains between James's ideal image of himself as unifier of kingdoms and the quite limited union he actually manages to achieve between the two countries.[42] James may claim that England and Scotland are "divided" more "in apprehension, then in effect," but the masque ironically suggests that their union follows the same logic.

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[39] As Parry points out, "both Jonson and Jones had to educate their audience into an appreciation of the new hybrid art that they had created, Jonson using the published texts to convey detailed accounts of what the spectators had seen, with clues to the symbolism of costume and setting, Jones relying on the repeated glory of his effects" (*Golden Age Restor'd*, 47).

[40] Odom suggests in a different context that the masque shows that "the power of the monarchy is not locked within the identity of James. James may enact the monarchy, but he is not the monarchy: they are connected and mixed, as are the body and the soul, but the mixture is uneasy" (372).

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[41] Perhaps my quibbling with Aasand, with whose general argument I largely agree, can be attributed to our different understandings of "allegory." There is no doubt that the masque world is thoroughly allegorical and that it traffics in "mystery" (Jonson says as much in the preface to *Hymenaei*), but I would insist that such allegorical mystery must be translated to perceptual reality in order to maintain its ideological allure. If we follow Puttenham, who defines allegory as "when we speak one thing and think another, and that our words and our meanings meet not" (270), the suggestion is that allegory should remain curiously indistinct, even unstable (272). Such instability has no place in the Jacobean court's ideal vision of itself. And as we saw in *Richard II*, an emphasis on the quasi-divine "mysteries" surrounding kingship can lead to its subversion as much as its maintenance.

[42] James's inability to "blanch" the nymphs also of course reveals the limits of his patriarchal ideology of kingship: not only does the king, according to Andrea, "fail" to "contain the Queen and her ladies' resistance through their Africanist symbolic system" (274), but we will recall that

Indeed, there are in the end only two transformations in the masque: those Niger describes to Oceanus as “poor brainsick men, styled poets here with you,” who praise “the painted beauties other empires sprung,” become for Ethiopia the “sacred muses’ sons” who “honour” English “beauties,” while Ethiopia’s name is changed, without explanation, to “Dian” in the masque’s final song (344). Far from offering resolution, however, these transformations raise more questions than they answer. Let us begin with Ethiopia. While McDermott claims that her shift to Diana, the “goddess of the moon and virginity,” shows that “Ethiopia has been fully transformed into her European counterpart,” this transformation occurs in name only, just as James in 1604 would “take and assume unto us” the “name and style of King of Great Britain” (105n). But like that political move, which failed to perform the true union that James imagined, this new name neither enacts nor marks the actual “blanching” of the nymphs. If anything, it repeats the confusing logic that permeated James’s assertion in his proclamation that “we think it unreasonable, that the thing, which is by the work of God and Nature so much in effect one, should not be one in name; unity in name being so fit a means to imprint in the hearts of the people a character and memorial of that unity, which ought to be amongst them indeed.” As I argued above, this statement shifts from the assumption that the union already exists (“so much in effect one”), rendering the name little more than a “memorial” of “unity,” to the tacit acknowledgment that the name will “imprint” a “character” of unity that does not exist among James’s English subjects but that “ought to be amongst them indeed.” Similarly, the transformation from “Ethiopia” to “Dian” may give the impression that the masque’s union of

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in his argument for union James claims that “I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawful Wife.” Insofar as the masque was performed amid “Anne’s domestic estrangement from James,” Aasand argues that it “promotes the dissolution of a metaphor James had publicly adopted when he ascended the English throne” (279).

Africa and England has been fulfilled, but it occurs only after the nymphs have, according to the stage direction, "returned to the sea," away from the king's rays (105).[43] As Aasand observes, "the distance between total perfection of the Brittania sun and the imperfection of the Nigerian princesses trapped between their past imperfection and their future redemption resists a poetic closure" (282). Like James's assumption of a new style, which functioned as a linguistic compensation in the face of parliamentary resistance to his political desires, the change in Ethiopia's name marks a disjunction between language and reality that may in fact be misrecognized as their union.

It is this potential misrecognition that sheds light on the masque's other transformation, the shift from Niger's rejection of English poets as "poor brainsick men" whose "loose and winged fictions" have "infected" his daughters to Ethiopia's description of poets as "sacred muses' sons" whose praise of English women reflects the proper understanding of beauty. McDermott suggests that the poets are "apparently not 'brainsick' when they honor the Queen, as opposed to 'beauty' in general," though it is worth remembering that at this point in the masque Queen Anne remains in blackface, awaiting the "blanching" by James that never actually occurs (100n). One could easily dismiss this apparent contradiction if we assume that, as an antimasque character, Niger articulates a degraded notion of beauty; however, we have seen that his denunciation of "painted beauties" is quite close to Jonson's claims about mere appearance in *Timber*. Moreover, the transition in the masque's perspective on the poets seems also to reflect Jonson's ridicule of the multitude's erroneous judgment, whereby "the same facts receive from them the names; now, of diligence; now, of vanity; now, of majesty; now, of fury." As we saw, though, a similar reorientation is necessary for establishing what Jonson considers the proper perspective on the king, since the subject should behave *as if* the sovereign "were already furnished with the parts he should have, especially in affairs of state." Might the masque's changing depiction of these seemingly identical poets anticipate the misrecognition necessary for the political and aesthetic reconciliation that *Blackness* promises but does not fulfill? Such a reconciliation requires that the poetry associated with the English court is truthful; the masque must reflect reality, must, in Jonson's words, "be the mirror of man's life." If we read *Blackness* as an imaginative fulfillment of a political union that could not take place in reality, it threatens to become the "loose and winged fiction" that Niger condemns: the spectator must willfully misinterpret the action in order to believe that James has the power to transform the country, therefore "furnishing" him with the "parts he should have." Such a reading would render the masque a mere ideological vehicle; indeed, it would amount to a dramatization of the work of "opinion," which Jonson defined in *Timber* as "a light, vain, crude, and imperfect thing, settled in the imagination; but never arriving at the understanding, there, to obtain the tincture of reason," just as James's "sciential" rays fail to lend a "tincture" of whiteness to the nymphs. I have attempted to show, however, that it is equally possible to read in *Blackness* a demonstration of the irreducible gap between the ideal and the real or the abstract and concrete, a gap that can only be covered (or perhaps "painted" over) through the "writhing and wresting" that for Jonson characterizes bad poets but also applies to James's efforts to transform discord into unity. As I suggested earlier, the coincidence of poet and sovereign is no accident, for both are tasked with "feigning a commonwealth," a positive project that must be distinguished from Jonson's claim that "nothing is lasting that is feigned." Perhaps Jonson discovers in his first masque how difficult it is to separate these different connotations of “feigning”: unlike the competition between Truth and Opinion in *Hymenaei*, Niger’s and Ethiopia’s varied understandings of the role of the poet must exist side by side, competing for pride of place but neither yielding to the other.

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[43] We should also remember that the goddess "Dian" represents virginity, which Opinion privileges at the expense of Truth's union in *Hymenaei*. Not only does this transformation take place at the level of the name only, then, but that name marks a resistance to the union that has supposedly been achieved.

The *Masque of Blackness* therefore can be read as a “mirror” of James’s “life,” but it is a mirror where political failure is reflected as aesthetic failure, a failure that Jonson will have to correct in subsequent masques. When we encounter the nymphs in the *Masque of Beauty* (1608), they are already white (though this transformation has taken place two years after the one-year delay promised in *Blackness*); as Aasand describes it, “Queen Anne and her ladies, as statuaries atop the rotating Throne of Beauty, are inviolate monuments to Jonson’s integrated design of verse and dance. The heterodoxy so explicitly presented in The *Masque of Blackness* is suppressed by a machinery that Jonson assimilates in the later masque” (283).[44] While *Beauty* is understandably read with *Blackness*, the masque that immediately follows the latter, *Hymenaei*, also functions as a thematic sequel.[45] As we have seen, this masque not only deals with the issue of union but avoids the abstraction of *Blackness* by merging the allegorical figure of Truth with that of the king. This masque also contains the preface cited above, where Jonson claims that the participants should be “curious after the most high and hearty inventions to furnish the [masque’s] inward parts,” and that the “sense” of the performance “doth or should always lay hold on more removed mysteries.” It will indeed take the increasingly advanced “inventions” of Jonson and Inigo Jones to “furnish the inward parts” of the masque, an artistic advance that allows both for a cleaner resolution than that offered in *Blackness* and provides a stronger ideological support through which to view James’s own political “invention” as a restoration. In doing so, however, much of the “mystery” that Jonson ostensibly privileges is removed. In the transition from the “mixed” nature of the hieroglyphics in *Blackness*, on which Jonson draws for their “strangeness,” to the clarity of the “striking light” that “seemed to fill all the hall” in *Hymenaei*, Jonson seeks to replace darkness with illumination and therefore to “blanch” the corpus of his masques, which will come to be seen as unproblematic celebrations of Stuart monarchy. But Jonson’s preface works like James’s proclamation, which sought to “imprint in the hearts of people a character and memorial of that unity, which ought to be amongst them indeed”: the supposed unity in the masque between “the outward celebration or show” and the “inward parts” will have to be inaugurated in *Hymenaei* and retroactively imposed on *Blackness*, which provides a “memorial” not of “unity” but of its disruption.

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[44] As Andrea points out, however, “it was Jonson who, in a gesture of proprietary authorship over the contested masque form, paired the masques of 1605 and 1608 in his 1608 quarto edition of the masques (and later in the 1616 folio edition of his collected *Workes*), thus forcing a retrospective closure of the ambivalent *Masque of Blackness* in the apparently whitewashed conclusion of *The Masque of Beauty*” (270).

[45] Aasand similarly reads *Hymenaei* as a sort of answer to the disruptions of Jonson’s first masque, calling it “a useful counterpoint to the heterodoxy of *Blackness*” (275). In that masque, “the state of marriage symbolically reflects a union with several levels of interpretation: the concord internally between man’s humors, the bliss of husband and wife, and the political confederation of separate kingdoms.” As Aasand points out, though, the occasion of the masque, which was the “celebration of a disingenuous and insubstantial union between the scandalous Lady Frances Howard and the Earl of Essex,” ironized and undermined its assumption of harmony (276).

If Jonson himself sought to neutralize the tensions within *Blackness* in his later Jacobean masques, the poets who collaborated with Inigo Jones after Jonson’s departure from the Caroline court went even further in providing an aesthetic justification for the increasingly authoritarian rule of James’s son. As Butler explains,

> in attempting to conduct a more rigorously coordinated style of government in the three kingdoms, and especially by forcing the Scottish and Irish churches into conformity with the English, he [Charles] activated latent tensions which proved

> to be catastrophic and which showed him to be insensitive to the desirability of respecting delicate national differences. Arguably, the Caroline masques were helping to reinforce this questionable impetus towards uniformity, by the totalizing and personalizing way in which they aligned British identity with the individual will of the king. (79)

Reading *Blackness* as an allegory according to Puttenham's definition, however, allows us to consider the possibility of a "doubleness" emerging not only within the masque but in its reception by subsequent poets. In the next chapter I will argue that Jonson's influence, like Calvin's, runs in two directions: poets like Thomas Carew and William Davenant may have taken the Jacobean masque's deification of the monarch to its most extreme point, but Andrew Marvell, writing in a world without kings, intensifies Jonson's disruption of the aesthetic principles undergirding sovereignty. Both of these perspectives are possible because, in Puttenham's words, the "meaning" of Jonson's inaugural masque cannot "be discovered, but left at large to the reader's judgment and conjecture" (272).

CHAPTER 4

Andrew Marvell's Cromwellian Masque

The trajectory of Andrew Marvell's poetry of the 1650s has long been seen as a shift from political ambivalence to commitment.[46] In "An Horation Ode Upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland," written shortly after Charles I had been executed and Oliver Cromwell began his ascent to power, Marvell balances nostalgia for a royalist past with a highly cautious and ironic admiration for Cromwell's destruction of the monarchy. By the "First Anniversary of the Government under His Highness the Lord Protector, 1655," Marvell, according to Blair Worden, "says, without irony, everything about [Cromwell] that the protector would have liked to hear said,"[47] and he does so in terms strikingly similar to the royalism that Marvell (and Cromwell himself) has seemingly rejected (102). How are we to explain the strange political movement of Marvell's verse, which transitions from regret for the king's death to a celebration of the regicide's catalyst couched in the very imagery that Cromwell helped to delegitimize? In this chapter I suggest that an answer can be found in Marvell's frequent allusions to and distortions of the Caroline masque. In a world without kings, Marvell resists the political and imaginative harmony supposedly offered by the masque even as he seems to draw on that genre in an effort to stabilize Cromwell's rise to power by reducing it to Caroline aesthetic principles.

While several critics have noticed elements of the masque in Marvell, Muriel C. Bradbrook has provided the most detailed analysis, arguing that the poet utilized the genre

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[46] Annabel Patterson summarizes, but does not subscribe to, this view: "By entering Cromwell's service and committing himself to a life of political action, Marvell abandoned the intellectual delicacy which was his greatest strength" (5).

[47] Warren Chernaik argues similarly that "'The First Anniversary' contains none of the reservations and qualifications of 'The Horation Ode,' but is entirely committed to Cromwell's continued role. Indeed, the poem's aim is to convince others of the legitimacy of the Protectorate government" (42-43).

> to give to his lyric that special drive and momentum which characterizes it, while within the poems the social consequences of the breaking of old patterns produced tragic ironies. The perplexed and troubled conscience, the divided loyalties of the men who lived through so many changes of government in church and state, could be reunited only by toil within "the quick forge and working house of thought." (210)

Bradbrook gestures toward the political significance of Marvell's use of the masque, but she ultimately claims that he transcends the vulgar flattery of the Caroline court entertainment and perhaps politics altogether, insofar as his "poetry turns retreat into measured advance, dominance, triumph; not by the social ritual of the old masque—too often an instrument for self-delusion—but by the 'esemplastic power' of solitary meditation" (221). Such "solitary meditation" is most apparent for Bradbrook in "Upon Appleton House," a poem presumably written between "The Horation Ode" and "The First Anniversary" as Marvell tutored the daughter of Thomas Fairfax, the former parliamentary general who had resigned his post to Cromwell and retired to Nun Appleton, his Yorkshire estate, for a life of contemplation. Bradbrook claims that in this poem "memory of the courtly revels and of the civil war can be harmonized, if only momentarily" by the speaker, an imaginative reconciliation that seems to restore order after the discord of the civil war (219). It is worth pointing out, however, that contemplative "harmony," for Bradbrook the particular virtue of Marvell's pastoral poetry, is in fact also the ideal of the masque, which draws on pastoral elements to naturalize authority and make absolutism, according to Stephen Orgel, "benign" (*Illusion of Power*, 52). Far from representing an advance over what Bradbrook describes as the "obsolete political rite" of the masque, the notion that discordant social and political elements are recombined by Marvell's imagination could potentially replicate the representational logic of that genre, if not for the same political purpose (210).

I would like to instead follow Derek Hirst and Steven N. Zwicker, who propose a reevaluation of the “conventional reading” of Marvell’s career, which sees in pastoral poetry like “Upon Appleton House” “lyric compensation standing clear of political engagement” (57), something close to Bradbrook’s valorization of “solitary meditation.” For Hirst and Zwicker, even Marvell’s ostensibly non-political work is characterized by a “complex and fraught dialectic of idealization and subversion” (45). “Upon Appleton House,” for example, functions on the one hand as “apologia,” whereby “Lord Fairfax’s political, dynastic, even marital, ineffectualities are softened and transmuted in a lyric tribute to masculine destiny, and brilliantly rewritten as a drama of protestant vigilance and paternal authority.” Hirst and Zwicker, however, call attention to moments in that poem “that escape Fairfax’s governance, and that even seem to escape the architectonics of the poem’s form” (45), therefore “subvert[ing] the whole issue of mastery, poetic and patriarchal alike” (59). This tension applies equally for Hirst and Zwicker to Marvell’s representation of Cromwell, whose rise to power—coming as it did on the heels of Charles’s execution—entailed “the displacement of the royal patriarch by a structurally ambiguous figure,” neither king nor republican (58). Hirst and Zwicker suggest that the “conjectures of authority” and “myths of origin and metaphors of destiny” in “The First Anniversary” rest uneasily with its “fascination with the Protector’s demise, its dwelling in the details of catastrophe” (61). The tension between “idealization” and “subversion” that Hirst and Zwicker detect in Marvell’s poetry on both Fairfax and Cromwell, I argue, goes hand in hand with Marvell’s idealization and subversion of the masque genre itself.

Poems like “Upon Appleton House” and “The First Anniversary” reverse the traditional temporality of the masque, moving not from disorder to order but from some semblance of harmony to its destabilization, and reveal Marvell's suspicion of the totalizing reconciliation that the genre generally posits. Reading Marvell with the masques therefore calls into question the conventional wisdom, inaugurated during the era of the New Criticism but still prevalent today, that, in A. Alvarez's words, "the main element in Marvell's poetry is its balance, its pervading sense of intelligent proportion" (qtd. in Wilding 117). While no one would deny that Marvell traffics in ambiguity, Alvarez's emphasis on "proportion" needs to be qualified. Marvell (like Puttenham) certainly announces proportion as an aesthetic and political ideal, claiming in "Upon Appleton House" that within Fairfax's estate "things greater are in less contained" (44) and in "The First Anniversary" that Cromwell is "founding a firm state by proportions true" (248).[48] As I will show, however, these poems fail in their attempts to master contradictions: the "decent order tame" (766) of Nun Appleton gives way to the "dark hemisphere" (775) at the end of that poem, while the "firmness" of the "state" that Cromwell constructs is undermined by the "thick" apocalyptic "cloud" that both represents and obscures him (141). As is so often the case in the seventeenth century, this lack of proportion at the level of politics and aesthetics is inextricably linked to the spiritual realm. Charles's view of religion, a significant factor in the English Civil War, presupposed that the human king was the sensible representative of God, hence the monarch's power in the masque to illuminate and to restore; in the world of the Caroline court entertainment, particularly in masques like Thomas Carew's *Coelum Brittanicum* (1634), divine providence goes hand in hand with the king's supremacy. In the aftermath of the civil war, however, God's hiddenness and inscrutability—aspects of divine being antithetical to the logic of appearance underpinning the masque—demands a conception of providence that accounts for the destruction of monarchy as much as its restoration, not unlike York's tortured negotiation of Bolingbroke's usurpation in *Richard II*. In his poetry Marvell offers an account of this paradoxical status of providence, but in doing so he ironizes and perhaps even undermines a figure like Cromwell, who resides between destruction and restoration in the "new and empty face" of the Interregnum ("Upon Appleton House," 442).

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[48] All references to Marvell are from *The Complete Poems* and are cited by line number.

I.

If Marvell's poetry of the early 1650s attempts to come to terms with the chaos unleashed by the civil war, which he captures so ambivalently in the "Horation Ode," his allusions to the masque genre might be read initially as an effort to neutralize such ambivalence through a valorization of the royalist past. As Roy Strong argues, the masques "express the power of the monarchy to bring harmony, the rich gifts of nature and the natural world into obedience. All move from initial statements of disorder and cosmic chaos [the antimasque] towards revealing king and court abstracted in emblematic form as gods and goddesses" (157).[49] In "Tom May's Death," presumably written after the "Horation Ode," Marvell imagines Ben Jonson's "shade" (39) in the underworld denouncing the recently deceased republican poet May as a "foul architect" (51) who helped to impose the "Roman-cast similitude" of commonwealth on England (44). According to Marvell's Jonson, the true poet, "when the wheel of empire whirleth back, / And though the world's disjoined axle crack, / Sings still of ancient rights and better times, / Seeks wretched good, arraigns successful crimes" (67-70). After Jonson's condemnation of May, the latter "vanished in a cloud of pitch, / Such as unto the Sabbath bears the witch" (99-100). Marvell here gestures toward Jonson's *The Masque of Queens* (1609), where a group of witches attempting to "loose the whole hinge of things" (136) through their sorcery are suddenly met with "loud music," upon which they "quite vanished, and the whole face of the scene altered, scarce suffering the memory of such a thing" (336-37). What emerges in their place is the House of Fame, which consists of "men-making poets" who praise the beauty of Queen Anne, wife of James I (362).

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[49] A close reading of *Blackness* in the previous chapter, of course, revealed that its failure to achieve aesthetic unity constituted an ironic repetition of James's own inability to establish a full union between England and Scotland in the early years of his reign.

While the satirical defiance of "Tom May's Death" can be contrasted with the elegiac mood of "The Unfortunate Lover," this earlier lyric similarly draws on the masque form. Marvell's speaker imagines the violent birth amid a "masque of quarreling elements" (26) of an orphan who sees "no day […] but that which breaks / Through frighted clouds in forked streaks" (22-23). The child succumbs to the "storms and wars" (60) that mark his birth, and the speaker claims in the penultimate line that "he in story only rules" (63). Graham Parry suggests that this orphan represents Charles, not only because the king is executed but because during his life he came increasingly to depend on the "stories" provided by masques to assert his authority, just as in the poem the "masque of quarreling elements" gives way to what is at best an illusory harmony (*Intellectual and Cultural Context*, 33). If Charles's life can be described as a masque, his antimasque foil would surely be Cromwell. For Marvell's speaker in "An Horation Ode," the "ancient rights" that, according to Jonson's ghost in "Tom May's Death," should be defended by the poet are precisely what "justice" invokes "in vain" (37-38) on behalf of Charles against Cromwell, "the Wars' and Fortune's son" (113). Cromwell is furthermore compared to the "three-forked lightning" (13) who "burn[s] through the air" (21) while seeking to "ruin the great work of time" represented by Stuart kingship (34). We might thus read Marvell's curious transition from the "Horation Ode" to "Tom May's Death" as itself a sort of masque: while the former poem captures the political reality of Charles's powerlessness in the face of Cromwell's rise, the latter depicts a triumph over the antimasque of republicanism represented by May and associated with Cromwell, even if Cromwell himself rejected that ideology. Like the "rule" of the "orphan of the hurricane," however, Jonson's victory occurs only in a self-consciously fictional underworld, achieved by a poet who is already dead (32).[50]

The space that Marvell opens between royalist nostalgia and political reality in poems like "Tom May's Death" and "The Unfortunate Lover" was in many ways anticipated by the historical context of the Caroline masque itself. As Strong points out, the growing tension between king and Parliament that resulted in the civil war meant that "the illusion of control manifested in these spectacles was unable to bring with it any corresponding reality" (157). The masque therefore served as a sort of imaginary compensation, a way to reconcile social conflict and assert the absolute power of the monarch.[51] Perhaps the most famous Caroline masque was Carew's *Coelum Brittanicum*, where Jove seeks to model his heavenly kingdom after Charles's. According to Mercury, Jove "viewed himself" in the "crystal mirror" offered by Charles's "reign" and found his divine government, predicated on mythological violence, badly in need of reform (82-83).[52] While the stars had once memorialized his various vices, Jove determines to "chase / Th' infamous lights from their usurped sphere" (85-86) and replace them with "British stars" representing Charles and Henrietta Maria, who "alone dispense / To 'th world a pure refined influence" (99-101). Once the degraded stars are "unriveted from the sphere" (287-88) the audience views in their "monstrous shapes" an "antimasque of natural deformity" (308-09), after which Mercury vows that the "sacred hand of bright Eternity" will "mold" the fame and virtue of Charles and Henrietta Maria "to Stars, and fix [them] in the Sphere" (868-69). This return to cosmic purity is equally a political restoration: the audience witnesses a dance of "Picts, the natural inhabitants of this isle, ancient Scots and Irish" (885-86) who, according to Strong, "recalled the Britain of antiquity, a preface to a vision of the Stuart imperial renovation which, in the figure of James I of England, had reunited the three kingdoms once more into their ancient unity. […] The crown as reassumed for this empire was not a new creation but a return to ancient purity" (167). This scene leads ultimately to the king and queen's union in the Hesperian Garden, which for Parry is "expressive of Caroline civility and the triumph of order and government over the wildness of nature" (*Golden Age Restor'd* 195). Carew's view of history is therefore dialectical, synthesizing the ancient, natural origins of the Stuart line with the Caroline valorization of art.

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[50] The political events of the 1640s obviously do not follow the triumphant logic of the masque (the king loses his head, after all), but perhaps Marvell believes in "Tom May's Death" that poetic victory remained with the royalists; as David Norbrook points out, "for some literary scholars the execution of Charles I has been a key moment in a shift from a poetic monarchical order to a republican or Whiggish world of prose" (*Writing the English Republic*, 9).

[51] This compensatory argument, with which I tend to agree, is made most forcefully by Strong and Parry (*Golden Age Restor'd*). For reevaluations of the Caroline masque that call attention to its subversive elements, see Sharpe, pp. 179-264; Kroll, pp. 122-68; and Butler, 57-94.

[52] All references to the Caroline masques are from *Inigo Jones: The Theatre of the Stuart Court* and are cited by line number.

The extent to which Marvell's "Upon Appleton House" draws on images from *Coelum Brittanicum* and other Caroline masques is striking, and it is tempting to read the poem at points as an argument for a return to the aesthetic and political principles favored by royalists after the upheavals of the civil war.[53] Such an aim is perhaps more appropriate than it would initially appear for a poem dedicated to a former parliamentary general: as Nigel Smith notes, Fairfax "claimed that he had always understood his charge as soldier and commander in the Parliamentarian cause as a Royalist act: to rescue the king from evil counsel," and Michael Wilding points out that he played a role in the restoration of Charles II in 1660 (88). According to his nephew, Fairfax spent his retirement "'always earnestly wishing and praying for the restitution of the royal family, and fully resolved to lay hold on the first good opportunity to contribute his part towards it; which made him always looked upon with a jealous eye by the Usurpers of that time'" (qtd. in Wilding 169). As the two companion poems to "Upon Appleton House" suggest, Marvell's time at Nun Appleton seemed to offer the poet a refuge from the trauma of the English Civil War represented most prominently by the figure of Cromwell. In "Upon the Hill and Grove at Bilbrough: To the Lord Fairfax," Marvell's speaker notes that because the "arched earth does here / Rise in a perfect hemisphere" (1-2) Fairfax's estate "seems as for a model laid, / And that the world by it was made" (7-8):

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[53] Hirst and Zwicker date the poem to the summer months of 1651 (14).

> Here learn, ye mountains more unjust,
> Which to abrupter greatness thrust,
> That do with your hook-shouldered height
> The earth deform and heaven fright,
> For whose excrescence, ill-designed,
> Nature must a new centre find,
> Learn here those humble steps to tread,
> Which to securer glory lead. (9-16)

It is difficult not to read, as Patterson does, an echo here of the "Horation Ode" (100): just as the landscape outside the Fairfax estate is "unjust," "justice against fate complain[s]" over Cromwell's rise (37); the mountains' "hook-shouldered height," which "deform[s] and fright[s]," resembles Cromwell's ability to "climb" and "ruin the great work of time" (33-34).[54] Whereas

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[54] Cromwell is also the "force of angry heaven's flame" (26) in the "Horation Ode," but "heaven" in "Upon the Hill and Grove" seems to refer to the air rather than the divine realm.

Cromwell seeks to “cast the kingdoms old / Into another mould” (35-36), Marvell is here searching for some sort of restoration, a return to the “model” by which the “world was made.” As in *Coelum Brittanicum*, where the entire universe looks to the Stuart monarchy as a pattern of harmony after the king and queen replace the “usurping” stars, the poet seems to be suggesting that Nun Appleton can triumph over Cromwell’s antimasque of usurpation.

The “model” that Marvell has in mind is not only the land, of course, but also the Lord Fairfax, to whom the poem is dedicated. Unwilling to invade Scotland, Fairfax had recently resigned his command of the parliamentary army and retired to Nun Appleton, where he practices “humility” in an effort to achieve “securer glory.” One should not make too firm a distinction between the qualities represented by the two generals, however, for in the “Epigram on Two Mountains, Almscliff and Bilbrough: To Fairfax” Marvell suggests that Fairfax can in fact reconcile Almscliff, which is “lofty, steep, uneven, and arduous,” and the “sloping, gentle, soft, and pleasing” Bilbrough: “Nature joined dissimilar things under one master; / And they quake as equals under Fairfaxian sway” (13-16). The emphasis is slightly different here than in “Upon the Hill and Grove at Bilbrough,” where the ill-proportioned “mountains” must “learn” to conform to the “perfect hemisphere” of Nun Appleton. Marvell is suggesting instead that a *discordia concors* combining the “gentle” and the “uneven” can be achieved by the presence of Fairfax, who himself possesses the “dissimilar” qualities of warlike valor and contemplative peace. The possibility of such a union is a frequent concern of the Caroline masques, particularly in *Coelum Brittanicum*. Prior to the deification of the king and queen, “there began to arise out of the earth the top of a hill, which by little and little grew to be a huge mountain that covered all the Scene; the underpart of this was wild and craggy, and above somewhat more pleasant and flourishing” (887-90). Contained within this mountain, which like the topography of Nun

Appleton is both “wild” and “pleasant,” is Charles, the “mighty British Hercules” (947) called forth by the Genius of the British Isles to enter the “Hesperian bowers” of Henrietta Maria, “whose fair trees bear / Rich golden fruit” (936-37). Like the mountain from which the king emerges, the union of Charles and his queen fuses seemingly opposed qualities; the Chorus asks Henrietta Maria to “plant in their [the male masquers’] martial hands, war’s seat, / Your peaceful pledges of warm snow” (1036-37). Not only does Marvell in the epigram refer to Fairfax as “the Northern Hercules” (21), the mythological figure associated in the masque with Charles, but in “Upon the Hill and Grove at Bilbrough” the speaker claims that Fairfax’s martial prowess—“men could hear his armor still / Rattling through all the grove and hill” (39-40)—is somewhat softened by “Vera the Nymph that him inspired, / To whom he often here retired, / And on these oaks engraved her name” (43-44). By expressing admiration in the epigram for Fairfax’s ability to “glide over the land in triumphant car” while his “equitable wheel, passing, draws […] together” war and peace (17-18), Marvell is possibly evoking the words of Jonson’s ghost in “Tom May’s Death,” who insists that the poet should “sing still of ancient rights and better times” even “when the wheel of empire whirleth back” and “the world’s disjoined axle crack.”

Fairfax’s ability to establish such proportion may not be possible outside of Nun Appleton or the poetry that inspires it, but it seems that the estate can at least offer an imaginary compensation for the discord outside its boundaries. In this sense it serves the same purpose as the masque, which neutralizes social and political antagonism and allows for figures of authority to impose order. Such order is foregrounded in the opening stanzas of “Upon Appleton House”: unlike “unproportioned dwellings” (10), the speaker asserts that “all things are composed here / Like Nature, orderly and near: / In which we the dimensions find / Of that more sober age and mind” (25-28). Based on these opening lines, there would seem to be no antimasque here, no interference of Fairfax's ordering power. But although "Upon Appleton House" "celebrate[s] the possibility of erecting an impenetrable bastion against the world, a self-sufficient realm of nature and the imagination," Chernaik argues that its "ultimate lesson […] is that such a victory over the world is at best temporary or delusive'" (24). The outside world in fact constantly intrudes on the pastoral peace of this green world. Not only do explicit references to Levellers and more covert allusions to Cromwell register an anti-monarchical threat to the hierarchies of the Fairfax estate, but unsavory images of episcopacy and royalism equally imperil the harmony achieved at Nun Appleton, suggesting that "restoration" cannot simply mean a return to Stuart rule. If we are to read the poem with the logic of the masque in mind—and I believe that Marvell encourages us to do so—the resolution of its tensions will perhaps not be located in a king or even in the poetic techniques designed to appeal to the monarch.

The speaker's depiction of the estate can be divided into several moments that resemble the logic of the masque. The order and beauty of Fairfax's garden gives way to the sublime violence of the meadow scene; the speaker then seeks refuge from this antimasque in the contemplative harmony offered by the woods, preparing him for the final scene involving Mary Fairfax, who restores order on the landscape and on the thoughts of the poetic observer. But before any of this action, which takes place in the poem's present, Marvell unveils the origin story of Nun Appleton, which itself functions as a sort of masque. The estate, formerly a convent, had fallen to the Fairfax family around the time of the dissolution of the Catholic monasteries during the reign of Henry VIII. As Marvell's editor, Elizabeth Story Donno, explains, "in 1518 the heiress Isabel Thwaites was to marry William Fairfax of Steeton. When she was confined by her guardian the prioress, her future husband was forced to obtain an order for her release and then seize her by force" (249n). In the poem the "subtle" prioress (94) delivers a speech to the “blooming virgin Thwaites” (90) in an attempt to convince her to remain in the convent, telling Isabella that “around you glory breaks, / That something more than human speaks” (143-44). Because her “beauty, when at such a height, / Is so already consecrate” (145-46), the nun claims idolatrously that the Virgin Mary “resembles” (132) Isabella and that the latter’s image will “through every shrine […] be bestowed” (134).

Although the prioress’s seduction of Isabella is first and foremost a satirical treatment of England’s Catholic past, her obsession with beauty possibly gestures toward Charles’s own religious policies, which emphasized external order and ritual and therefore moved away from the Protestantism (however moderate) embraced by his father James and Elizabeth.[55] According to Julian Davies, the king sought to “carve out a more distinct Anglo-Catholic identity” (23) in religious affairs and “effectively diffused throughout the parishes of his realm his own cult and apotheosis—an *imago dei*” (15). This intersection of spirituality and kingship is legible in the prioress’s speech: she tells Isabella that she can “here live beloved, and obeyed” (153) and that “our abbess too, now far in age, / Doth your succession near presage” (157-58). The cult of beauty established by Charles in worship went hand in hand with his love for the masque; indeed, Davies compares his religious preferences to the court entertainment: “Charles I had effectively enrolled the parish church as the main vehicle for the propagation of his sacramental kingship. Within this new perspective theater (in some ways similar to the stage sets of Inigo

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[55] Norbrook develops this line of argument, claiming that “the satire of the lesbian nuns hits at the female Catholic patronage of Henrietta Maria,” while “parliamentarian propaganda was constantly warning against the dangers that the king’s return would reinstate the Roman church” (289). For Hirst and Zwicker, however, this passage refers not to Caroline religion but to the “parallel between the ecclesiastical disciplines of Presbyterianism and Roman Catholicism,” for “each church hankered, their enemies claimed, to become the visible church triumphant.” Fairfax’s wife was a devoted Presbyterian, and this satirical passage might “have been a discreet and carefully veiled way to distance his [Marvell’s] patron from the pro-Scottish and pro-Stuart advice his wife had offered in 1650 and which she was suspected to be offering again” (29).

Jones), the royal and divine attributes merged in a synesthesia of awe and spectacle" (21). The parallels between the masque and the church service went beyond architectural design, however, for the language of the Caroline masques and related poetry often describe Queen Henrietta Maria in terms strikingly similar to those of the prioress's appeal to Isabella. In *Coelum Brittanicum* (where, we will remember, Jove seeks to model his kingdom after Charles's, just as the Virgin Mary resembles Isabella, not the other way around), the Chorus notes the "divine / Aspects" of Henrietta Maria, whom it describes as a "bright deity" (127-28). In Carew's poem "To the Queene," the speaker likewise "turne[s"] from the "prophaner Altars" of love to "adore Thy Deitie" (5-6).

While Carew's texts and the nun's speech venerate Henrietta Maria and Isabella Thwaites, respectively, the difference is that the prioress ultimately emphasizes homosocial desire, objecting to Isabella's relationship with William Fairfax by arguing that "'twould more honor prove / He your *devoto* were than love" (151-52) and promising that "each night among us to your side" she will "appoint a fresh and virgin bride" (185-86). The nun's claim that "here pleasure piety doth meet" (171) might gesture toward Ben Jonson's *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*, but her ideal of union takes place in the absence of "those wild creatures called men" (102). We have seen, on the other hand, that in Carew's masque Charles's warlike valor must combine with Henrietta Maria's peaceful beauty, while in his poem Carew claims that the "wilde / Satyr" is "already reconcil'd" to the queen (19-20); her "sacred Lore" (13) allows "either sex to each unite, / And form love's pure Hermaphrodite" (16-17). Just as the virginity-favoring character of Opinion must submit to Truth in Jonson's *Hymenaei*, the nun's speech, which appears to espouse the aesthetic and religious values of the masque, must be understood in the context of "Upon Appleton House" as in fact an antimasque, a work of deception, in order to justify William Fairfax's rescue of Isabella from the convent, the foundational act of the Fairfax estate. Fairfax accordingly describes the nuns as "hypocrite witches" who "enchant" Isabella (205-06); whereas their religious house is "founded by folly, kept by wrong" (218), "religion taught" Fairfax "right, / And dazzled not but cleared his sight" (227-28). Indeed, his rescue of Isabella evokes the final transformation necessary for the conclusion of a masque: "Thenceforth (as when the enchantment ends, / The castle vanishes or rends) / The wasting cloister with the rest / Was in one instant dispossessed" (269-71). As in *The Masque of Queens*, where the witches are overwhelmed by the arrival of the House of Fame and the truthful view of beauty that it represents, Fairfax's act leads to a proper understanding of religion and love.

Why does Marvell's speaker turn to this masque-like digression before embarking on his tour of the estate, and what can it tell us about the poem's attitude toward the Caroline aesthetic ideology? One reason is surely religious: if, as A. D. Cousins has argued, Thomas Fairfax serves as a figure of Calvinist moderation in the poem, his ancestor's effort to secure the property from the perversions of Catholicism while remaining within the confines of the law anticipates the behavior of the current Fairfax, who helped to reclaim the country from the crypto-Catholic innovations of Charles but ultimately withdrew from military service on the grounds of conscience. This union of military discipline and conscience finds its clearest expression in the Fairfax garden, a description of which immediately follows the speaker's recounting of the pre-history of the estate. Fairfax may have struggled to contain the more radical elements of the New Model Army during his time as Lord General, but here his botanical forces gladly submit to their "Governor" (297): in the presence of Fairfax and his family the "flowers their drowsy eyelids raise, / Their silken ensigns each displays" (293-94); referring to the "fragrant volleys" of the flowers' odor, the speaker notes "how sweet, / And round your equal fires do meet" (305-06).

Fairfax's garden becomes a metaphor for England itself, "that dear and happy isle / The garden of the world ere while" (321-22) that "heaven planted us to please, / But, to exclude the world, did guard / With watery if not flaming sword" (324-26). Marvell's conventional description of the island can also be found in the masques: Britain in Jonson's *Masque of Blackness* is "a world divided from the world" because of its oceanic boundaries (218); in *Coelum Brittanicum* the king and queen unite in "a delicious garden" (1016). Although Marvell's nearly 800-line poem is only 300 lines old, it almost appears as though Fairfax's garden scene represents the conclusion of a masque that began with the nuns, whose spiritually and sexually perverse antimasque has been transformed into a scene where human and nature unite as much as man and woman. Through a fidelity to "conscience" and a rejection of "ambition," Fairfax has restored the Golden Age (354).

We might wonder, though, what exactly is being restored: after all, the speaker's description of England as "exclude[d] from the world" evokes the nun's claim that the "walls" of the cloister "restrain the world without, / But hedge our liberty about" (99-100). If, as I argued earlier, the convent in part evokes Caroline religion, the pastoral imagery that characterizes Charles's masques and Fairfax's garden suggests that the latter may in fact amount to a regression, a return not to purity but to illusion. Indeed, Marvell's speaker almost immediately questions the very possibility of restoration, asking "shall we never more / That sweet militia restore, […] When roses only arms might bear, / And men did rosy garlands wear?" (329-30, 333-34). The "sweet militia" surely refers to a pre-war England; in William Davenant's *Salmacida Spolia* (1639), the final Caroline masque, the "good Genius of Great Britain" appears as "a young man in a carnation garment, embroidered all with flowers, an anticke sword hung in a skarfe, a garland on his head" (165-67). While this character and the figure of Concord ultimately praise Charles and Henrietta Maria because “all that are harsh, all that are rude, / Are by your harmony subdu’d” (471-72), Marvell’s speaker highlights the insufficiency of such a pastoral vision: while Fairfax “might once have made our gardens spring / Fresh as his own and flourishing,” he “preferred to the Cinque Ports / These five imaginary forts, / And, in those half-dry trenches, spanned / Power which the ocean might command” (347-52). The speaker quickly offers a religious justification for Fairfax’s withdrawal from public life, but the gap between the “imaginary” order of Fairfax’s garden and the garden of England “overgrow[n]” by “war” remains (343).

Critics like Patterson have suggested that Marvell is gently criticizing Fairfax for his substitution of contemplation for military action, but I would argue that the poet is just as interested in interrogating the aesthetic forms through which sovereignty can be understood and represented in post-civil war England, where a king has lost his head and the world has been turned upside down. Until this point “Upon Appleton House” has unfolded according to the logic of a masque, but unlike *Coelum Brittanicum*, where Charles’s and Henrietta Maria’s union in the Hesperian garden becomes an emblem for harmony in England and indeed the entire universe, the Lord and Lady Fairfax’s survey of their “imaginary forts” fails even at the level of poetry to have any impact beyond the walls of the garden. It is at best a hopelessly ideal model, at worst a potential return to the illusions embraced by the previous occupants of Nun Appleton. Perhaps this is one reason that in the second half of the poem the speaker moves beyond the boundaries of the garden, first to the meadow, where he observes the mowers of the estate at work. While he describes this landscape in terms of a court entertainment—“No scene that turns with engines strange / Does oftener than these meadows change,” a reference to the stage machinery that allowed for the transition from antimasque to masque (385-86)—it is noteworthy that we seem to be descending back into the world of the antimasque, albeit a different sort than that represented by the nuns: if the prioress valorized an artificial and even idolatrous sense of order, the mowers represent chaotic violence. Fairfax's garden organizes the perception of its observer through proportion, what Hirst and Zwicker describe as a "strict regimen of the senses" (23). It is designed "in the just figure of a fort; / And with five bastions it did fence, / As aiming one for every sense" (286-88). The speaker describes the meadow, on the other hand, as an "abyss" of "unfathomable grass" (369-70); as he witnesses "men through this meadow dive" he "wonder[s] how they rise alive, / As, under water, none does know / Whether he fall through it or go" (377-80).

This disorienting lack of knowledge equally affects the mowers as they "massacre the grass along" (394). One "unknowing[ly]" slaughters a bird (395) and "fear[s] the flesh untimely mowed / To him a fate as black forebode" (399-400). It seems clear that this episode alludes to the violence of the civil war in general and to the execution of the king in particular. The speaker's assertion that in the meadow "chance o'ertakes, what 'scapeth spite" (412) invokes the doctrine of Fortune, which appears as an allegorical character in *Coelum Brittanicum* to challenge Charles and Henrietta Maria for the stars they are promised by Mercury. Fortune claims supremacy because she determines the outcome of wars that "dispute the Right of Kings," arguing that "when Crowns are staked, I rule the game" (719,721). Mercury dismisses Fortune as a poor precursor to Christian providence, however, claiming that

> in the dark
> The groping world first found thy deity,
> And gave thee rule over contingencies,
> Which, to the piercing eye of Providence,

Being fixed and certain, where past and to come
Are always present, thou dost disappear,
Losest they being, and art not at all. (736-42)

It would seem that the meadow offers an instance of the "groping world" that Mercury describes: neither the speaker nor the mower can make sense of the events unfolding, and the "piercing eye of Providence" is unable to impose order. Instead, the chaotic power of Cromwell, who is described in the "Horation Ode" as "the Wars' and Fortune's son," lurks in this scene, the announcement after the "untimely funeral" of the bird (414) that "the mower now commands the field" hinting at his ascendancy (418). It is worth keeping in mind, however, that in the "Horation Ode" Marvell also describes Cromwell providentially as "the force of angry heaven's flame" (26). Furthermore, the speaker's comparison of the mowers to "Israelites" (389) has conjured for Don Allen the Puritan notion, favored by Cromwell, of the English as God's chosen people (208). In a post-regicide England providence has become far more complicated than its "fixed and certain" status in *Coelum Brittanicum*. Chernaik argues that, "in speaking of providence, Marvell consistently emphasizes its inscrutability," especially in political contexts: "Kings are raised up and pulled down, events follow one another in rapid and confused succession, and we are aware of the providential pattern only in hindsight" (20). Fairfax himself highlighted the ambiguities surrounding the concept in his poem on the death of Charles, hoping that the execution would "from time be blotted quite […] so that the kingdom's credit might be saved" while acknowledging that "if the power divine permitted this [that is, the regicide] / His will's the law and we must acquiesce" (qtd. in Patterson, 97). Providence, for Carew a protector of the divine right of kings, can for Fairfax authorize the murder of one.

In any case, the carnage of the mowing finally gives way to a masque-like transition, the speaker observing that

> This scene again withdrawing brings
> A new and empty face of things,
> A levelled space, as smooth and plain
> As cloths for Lely stretched to stain.
> The world when first created sure
> Was such a table rase and pure.
> Or rather such is the *toril*
> Ere the bulls enter at Madril. (441-48)

It would appear that the mower "scene" has been "withdrawn," just as antimasque leads to masque in *Salmacida Spolia*, in which a "horrid scene" of "darkness, confusion, and deformity" (111-12) "change[s] into a calm; the sky serene," with a "landscape [of] corn fields and pleasant trees, sustaining vines fraught with grapes, and in some of the furthest parts villages, with all such things as might express a country in peace, rich, and fruitful" (156-59). But whereas this royalist vision of pastoral harmony must remain a hierarchical expression of the subjects' submission to a sovereign, in "Upon Appleton House" the threat of democracy lurks: the speaker notes not only that the "villagers *in common* chase / Their cattle" but that "Levellers take pattern at" the "levelled space" created by the mowers (450-52). The Levellers emerged as a political organization from the radicalism of the New Model Army during the civil war, and although their name, imposed by their enemies, was a caricature of their position—Hirst notes that they "spoke for master craftsmen and shopkeepers rather than employees" and therefore did not seek to "level" or destroy social hierarchy entirely (*Authority and Conflict* 273)—Hirst nevertheless points out that their critique of "exploitation was all-encompassing, and exposed a nerve which looks remarkably like class hostility" (274). This emphasis on economic reform went hand in hand with calls for religious, legal, and especially political liberty; as Hirst explains, Leveller Robert Overton, an acquaintance of Marvell and Milton, was "by 1647 voicing what was to become a pregnant theme, the sovereignty of the people as a bar to the sovereignty of parliament; that sovereignty necessarily entailed a more democratic franchise" (274-75). If such a call disturbed Parliament and army leaders like Fairfax and Cromwell, one can imagine how threatening it would be to a king.

Given the speaker's condescending references to the Levellers, this "new and empty face of things" might then gesture toward the new order that obtains in a society without a monarch. There is a suggestion, however, that the "levelled space" is not an innovation but a restoration, since "the world when first created sure / Was such a table rase and pure." Ironically enough, this *tabula rasa* is the condition of possibility for the glorification of the Stuarts in *Coelum Brittanicum*; according to Momus, the "ethereal lights" must be "reduced to their primitive opacity, and gross dark subsistence" before the stars representing Charles and Henrietta Maria can be installed (286-87). Marvell's speaker, meanwhile, first compares the "levelled space" not to the Levellers themselves but to "cloths for Lely stretched to stain." Dutch painter Peter Lely rose to prominence as an artist of the Stuart court: his portraits of Charles I were memorialized in Cavalier poet Richard Lovelace's "To My Worthy Friend Mr. Peter Lilly, on that excellent picture of his Majesty, and the Duke of York, drawn by him at Hampton Court," but Lely also painted Oliver Cromwell during the latter's time as Lord Protector (after "Upon Appleton House") and then worked for Charles II at the Restoration. Just as Lely prepares his blank canvases for royal portraits, Mercury erects the stars of Charles and Henrietta Maria in a universe emptied of light. Crucially, however, no such sovereign figure emerges at this point in Marvell's poem. One might expect Fairfax to appear and regain authority after the mower has taken "command" of the "field," therefore restoring order, but this moment resists such closure. Indeed, immediately after comparing the "levelled space" to the "world when first created" the speaker likens it to "the toril / Ere the bulls enter at Madril." We could attribute this potential for violence to the intentions of the "Levellers," who "pattern" their ideal society on the mowers' work. But if we take the allusion to Lely seriously, we must consider the possibility that such violence could also come from the ideology of royalism, especially when we remember the assertion in *Coelum Brittanicum*, written during Charles's period of Personal Rule (also known as the "Eleven Years' Tyranny"), that the rest of the world should model itself after the Stuarts. The emptiness created by the mowers seems to ridicule the hopes of the Levellers, then, but it equally ironizes the illusions of restoration presented by royalist art.[56]

Royalism has not been eliminated from the poem, however, for the scene changes once again as "Denton sets ope its cataracts, / And makes the meadow truly be / (What it but seemed before) a sea" (466-68), compelling the speaker to "retire from the flood" and "take sanctuary in the wood" (481-82). As Wilding points out, "retirement" is a common theme of royalist writers in the period, who withdrew from public life upon the king's execution, eschewing the realities of social and political conflict in favor of the imaginary reconciliations offered by the pastoral (163). The speaker quite clearly sees his retreat in similar terms:

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[56] Norbrook suggests that "Lely is in a position analogous to Marvell's Cromwell as architect of a new state: the political upheavals have permitted a new clarity of vision, a new sense of possibility. Lely and other artists would soon be planning to seize this opportunity with their designs for huge paintings depicting Parliament and the Council of State" (292). As Smith points out, though, "the north of England in 1652 experienced a most uneasy peace, with the enduring threat of a Royalist rising, and further Leveller insurgency against enclosure just to the east of the Fairfax estates" (95). In other words, the threats of royalism and republicanism, ideologies that could both be traced to the overdetermined figure of Lely, were equally present.

> How safe, methinks, and strong, behind
> These trees have I encamped my mind:
> Where beauty, aiming at the heart,
> Bends in some tree its useless dart;
> And where the world no certain shot
> Can make, or me it toucheth not.
> But I on it securely play,
> And gall its horsemen all the day. (601-08)

For Marvell's editor, this passage echoes the prioress's claim that the convent's "walls restrain the world without," but I would add that it also recalls the imaginary compensations provided by Fairfax's garden. Just as the Lord General retired from military service shortly after the execution of the king, the speaker has withdrawn from the confusion of the meadow. It is only in these withdrawals that the "mind" can master the world, "securely play[ing]" on it rather than succumbing to violent reality. The speaker's valorization of the "useless" pleasures provided by "beauty" is of course also a concern of the masque, which both praises the beauty of Henrietta Maria and asserts the king's ability to impose order on society. The speaker's refuge in the wood would seem to be a last-ditch effort to preserve some semblance of the stability offered by a previous political order.

Masque imagery appears at crucial moments in the forest, but its ironic use by the speaker highlights the difficulty of returning to the world view that the genre conventionally posits. The speaker's observation that "the double wood of ancient stocks, / Linked in so thick, an union locks" (489-90), a reference to the marriage of the Lord and Lady Fairfax, echoes the wider claims for union in *Coelum Brittanicum*. Mercury celebrates "the growing Titles" of

Charles's "Ancestors," claiming that "These Nations glorious Acts, joined to the stock / Of your own Royal virtues" (853-55) will raise "those ancient worthies of these famous Isles" from the dead to join the king and queen as stars (861). Competing with the celebratory image of the Fairfacian union in Marvell's poem, however, is that of

> The stock-doves, whose fair necks are graced
> With nuptial rings, their ensigns chaste;
> Yet always, for some cause unknown,
> Sad pair unto the elms they moan.
> O why should such a couple mourn,
> That in so equal flames do burn! (523-28)

Although Carew similarly refers to the king and queen at the end of *Coelum Brittanicum* as "royal turtles" (or turtle-doves) who paradoxically generate "ripe fruits" from their "chaste bed" (1126, 1128), for Marvell such union goes hand in hand with "mourning." The speaker leaves the "cause" of the doves' "moaning" "unknown," but could it have something to do with the fact that Charles's "fair neck" was ultimately "graced" not with "nuptial rings" but with the executioner's sword, just as in the meadow the "rail" is killed by the mower's scythe? Stanzas later, after all, the speaker observes the work of the "hewel," or woodpecker, who "mines through the tainted side" of a tree, marveling that "the tallest oak / Should fall by such a feeble stroke!" (550-52), a passage that evokes for Harold Toliver Charles's death (189). The speaker may think that he has "encamped his mind" from the world, but the events of the civil war continue to intrude.

As I have already pointed out, the speaker is in a certain sense reproducing the themes of Fairfax's garden. In the wood he finds images of political and marital union that are constantly undercut by the realities of war, just as Fairfax's garden offers a model of society that cannot be imitated in post-war England. Fairfax’s botanical ideal, however, offers a fundamentally mournful and nostalgic perspective on the relationship between art and reality: the ordered beauty of the garden once also governed the political realm, but such a pastoral vision is no longer possible. While the speaker’s communion with nature might appear to follow a similar logic, I want to suggest that he in fact undercuts even this version of pastoralism. His time in the wood initially seems to offer a level of knowledge approaching that of a prophet; claiming that “no leaf does tremble in the wind / Which I, returning, cannot find,” he explains that

> Out of these scattered sibyl’s leaves
> Strange prophecies my fancy weaves:
> And in one history consumes,
> Like Mexique paintings, all the plumes.
> What Rome, Greece, Palestine, ere said
> I in this light mosaic read.
> Thrice happy he who, not mistook,
> Hath read in Nature’s mystic book.
>
> And see how chance’s better wit
> Could with a mask my studies hit!
> The oak leaves me embroider all,
> Between which caterpillars crawl:
> And ivy, with familiar trails,
> Me licks, and clasps, and curls, and hales.
> Under this antic cope I move

Like some great prelate of the grove. (577-92)

The claims contained in the first stanza are considerable. The speaker asserts that his "fancy" is capable of gathering the "scattered sibyl's leaves" both to generate "strange prophecies," suggesting knowledge of the future, and to organize ancient wisdom into "one history." Although he describes the prophecies as "strange," he also insists that he has not "mistook" the lessons of "Nature's mystic book." For Toliver, the "woodland scene offers Marvell an inherent symbolic view of and control over the historical disorder described earlier" (114). One can find here a theoretical formulation of the aims of "Upon Appleton House" as a whole, if we choose to read the poem as a panegyric for Fairfax: Marvell has moved from the history of the Fairfax estate to its present, attempting to highlight continuities along the way between the heroic endeavors of Thomas Fairfax and those of his ancestors. (The speaker will soon move on to prophesy the future of the family.) The same movement also of course governs *Coelum Brittanicum*, where the Stuart ancestors (who themselves only "prophesy" the perfection of Charles (866)) join with the current rulers, from whose "fruitful race shall flow / Endless Succession" (1132-34).

Marvell's second stanza, however, immediately qualifies the speaker's neo-Platonic communion with "Nature's mystic book." According to Hirst and Zwicker, "the narrator's willingness to embrace ecstatic knowledge is repeatedly and surely strategically broken by a striking self-awareness" (23). If his "reading" of nature generated knowledge, here he notes how "chance's better wit / Could with a mask my studies hit!" Chance, we will recall, reigns in the meadow scene, the chaos of which functioned as the antithesis of the knowledge and security supposedly found in the wood, where the speaker has "encamped" his "mind," or in Fairfax's garden, which similarly posited a union of nature and the imagination. The notion that "chance" apparels the speaker with the costume of leaves and insects suggests a bastardized version of the "mystic" wisdom of the previous stanza: the union he experiences with the natural world occurs by misrecognizing as substantial what is in fact accidental. It is appropriate, then, that he likens the "mask" of his neo-Platonic "studies" to the "antic cope" of "some great prelate." Resistance to the hierarchies of the English Church represented by a prelate—alluded to perhaps in the convent scene, and stated quite clearly in the speaker's ridicule of "the ambition" of the neighboring Cawood Castle's "prelate great" (366)—was a driving force of the civil war and often went hand in hand with resistance to monarchy. As the editor points out, "antic" can refer here to both the "grotesque" quality of the "ecclesiastical vestment" and to its "ancient" lineage. She also notes, but does not comment on, the etymological link between the speaker's costume, described as a "mask," and the genre of the "masque." The overdetermined meanings of "antic" and "mask" are crucial here, for the speaker is exposing the masque-like logic of the previous stanza as illusory, a mystification of the supposedly ancient political hierarchies and structures of meaning presupposed in the court entertainment.

It should come as no surprise, then, that once the speaker returns to the meadow after it has been flooded he finds in the river that remains not purity but a repetition of the narcissism that characterizes the Caroline masque:

> See in what wanton harmless folds
> It everywhere the meadow holds;
> And its yet muddy back doth lick,
> Till as a crystal mirror slick,
> Where all things gaze themselves, and doubt
> If they be in it or without.

And for his shade which therein shines,
Narcissus-like, the sun too pines. (633-640)

The river may be "harmless," but it is also deceptive. Compared to a "crystal mirror," the same image on which Mercury draws to describe the perfections of Caroline government, creatures are confused by their reflection. A masque like *Coelum Brittanicum* itself functions as a sort of "crystal mirror" in which the royal couple can view themselves, and they could assume that it reflected their actual reign only by ignoring the discord bubbling outside the banqueting hall. It is perhaps for this reason that the "sun," a conventional image of royalist power associated in Carew's masque with Henrietta Maria (and, as we will see, with Cromwell), is drawn "Narcissus-like" to the "crystal mirror."

Although Marvell in many ways presents his poem as a masque, "Upon Appleton House" thus far differs fundamentally from *Coelum Brittanicum* at the level of temporality. Whereas that masque transitions from the politically destabilizing antimasque of Fortune (among others) to the union of king and queen in the Hesperian garden, Marvell's speaker departs Fairfax's garden relatively early in the poem, recognizing it as an "imaginary" construct that cannot restore England to its former (and perhaps equally imaginary) status as the "garden of the world," and *then* advances to the chaos of the meadow. Against Carew's idealizing, mythological temporality Marvell presents something closer to an allegory of properly historical temporality: the convent and the garden resembles the Stuart past, the meadow the English Civil War, and the "new and empty face of things" the transitional period of the poem's presumed composition during the precarious English republic. In the wood the speaker attempts a return to the implicitly royalist fusion of mind and nature presupposed in the masque and also in Fairfax's garden, but the "antic cope" that marks such a union suggests its contamination by the rejected religious past of Nun

Appleton. As we move to the final scene of the poem, we must wonder what will be imprinted on this “new and empty face of things”: will the appearance of Fairfax’s daughter Maria impose order on the landscape and on the poem itself, therefore reducing it to the logic of the masque, or will we continue to head in unanticipated directions? Will we end “Upon Appleton House” with restoration or innovation?

Based on the speaker’s initial description of Maria, it seems that we are headed toward a fairly straightforward royalist resolution. Celebrating her chastity—“She, that already is the law / Of all her sex, her age’s awe” (655-56)—Marvell echoes Carew’s poem on Henrietta Maria, the “great Commandresse, that doest move / Thy Scepter o’re the Crowne of Love, / And through his Empire with the Awe / Of Thy chaste beams, doest give the Law” (1-4). The speaker compares Maria first to the “modest halcyon” whose “flight betwixt the day and night” will “calm and “benumb” “Admiring Nature” (670-72) and then to a star by whose “flames, in heaven tried, / Nature is wholly vitrified” (687-88). The language here is remarkably similar to Carew’s description of the royal pair in *Coelum Brittanicum*, where the Chorus calls on Henrietta Maria to “becalm the Air” with “fair / And Halcyon beams” (1028-29), while Jove prepares the “bright flames” of the king and queen to “attire / These glorious lights” (982-83). There is an important difference between Carew’s masque and Marvell’s poem, however. While the former associates the halcyon and heaven’s flames with Charles and Henrietta Maria, the latter reserves its highest praise not for the Lord and Lady Fairfax but for their daughter. It is true that *Coelum Brittanicum* prophesies “endless succession” from the royal couple’s bed, but they remain the ultimate focus of the masque: they will “in the unpeopled sky / Succeed, and govern Destiny” (980-81); it is in their presence that “Fate will / Make motion cease, and Time stand still, / Since good is here so perfect as no worth / Is left for after ages to bring forth” (1090-93). “Succession” entails pure reproduction; because "good is here so perfect," there is no need to advance beyond it.

Such an advance seems necessary in "Upon Appleton House," however. If *Coelum Brittanicum* ends in the Hesperian garden, we will remember that Marvell's speaker moves beyond the illusive comfort of Fairfax's garden relatively early in the poem. Given the masque imagery associated with Maria, it might seem that her appearance represents a return to a royalist ideal. How, for example, are we to distinguish the speaker's claim that Maria's "flames" have been "in heaven tried" from the prioress's assertion to Isabel Thwaites that "around you glory breaks, / That something more than human speaks," or his hope that Maria will "prevent / Those trains by youth against thee meant" (713-14) from the nun's discouragement of Isabel's impending marriage with William Fairfax? Even the speaker's anticipation of the day when "fate" "worthily translates" Maria and "find[s] a Fairfax for our Thwaites" (747-48), for Allen a "combination of history and prophecy" (219), ironically suggests that the daughter's current "domestic heaven," where she is "nursed" "Under the discipline severe / Of Fairfax, and the starry Vere," is somehow comparable to the convent that Isabel must leave in order to marry Fairfax (722-24). While the speaker claims that "loose Nature recollects itself" in the presence of Maria, her appearance is certainly not imposing order on the poem; a disavowed past instead seems to be resurfacing, just as it did in Fairfax's garden and in the speaker's role as a "prelate of the grove."

It is perhaps for this reason that, unlike in *Coelum Brittanicum*, "succession" must involve more than just *re*production. The speaker prophesies that Maria,

> with graces more divine
> Supplies beyond her sex the line;
> And like a sprig of mistletoe

> On the Fairfacian oak does grow;
> Whence, for some universal good,
> The priest shall cut the sacred bud,
> While her glad parents most rejoice,
> And make their destiny their choice. (736-44)

The notion that the Fairfax parents will "make their destiny their choice" through Maria's marriage echoes the claim in *Coelum Brittanicum* that Charles and Henrietta Maria will "govern Destiny," but in "Upon Appleton House" such fulfillment is deferred to the future, a future that the poem shows is far from certain. The speaker's comparison of Maria to a "sprig of mistletoe / On the Fairfacian oak" perhaps alludes to the Celtic myth recorded in Pliny the Elder's *Natural History*, where druids cut mistletoe from an oak and use it to promote fertility. "Mistletoe" may be associated with fertility once it is "cut" by the "priest," but it is a parasite as long as it remains on the tree. We will remember that earlier in the poem the speaker had encountered a "hollow oak" in Fairfax's forest, which a woodpecker attacked through the tree's "tainted side," ultimately destroying it. This tree, made vulnerable by a "traitor-worm, within it bred," perhaps conjured the execution of Charles, and it is worth wondering why the image would reappear at this moment of celebration.

Patterson has associated Maria with "Cromwell, as a figure who will leave her private gardens to fulfill her dynastic obligations" (109), and I want to suggest that in the closing stanzas of the poem Fairfax's daughter merges strangely with the Cromwellian specter, whose destructive force Marvell sought to exorcise by retreating to the pastoral landscape of Nun Appleton in the first place. Cromwell could very well be seen as a "traitor worm" nursed within the "Fairfacian oak"; Richard Baxter observed that Fairfax was "one that Cromwell could make use of at his pleasure" and that the latter deceived his military superior into allowing the execution of Charles (qtd. in Patterson 96). Earlier in the poem, moreover, the speaker had claimed that William Fairfax's marriage to Isabella would produce "offspring fierce" who "shall fight through all the universe" (241-42). These "offspring" have been identified as Thomas and his father, but the speaker also mentions "one, as long since prophesied" whose "horse through conquered Britain" will "ride" (245-46). For Hirst and Zwicker this prophecy marks Cromwell's "intrusion" into the poem, for he was the only "hero who had ridden through all of conquered Britain" by this point (58). Marvell had praised Cromwell's military success along these lines in the "Horation Ode": "the Irish are ashamed / To see themselves in one year tamed" (73-74), while the Scottish "Pict no shelter shall find / Within his parti-colored mind" (105-06). Fairfax in fact resigned his military post because he had no desire to invade Scotland and therefore "conquer Britain." Reading this line as a reference to Cromwell threatens to disturb the panegyric aim of the poem, insofar as it suggests that William Fairfax's moderation has birthed not only the similarly moderate Thomas Fairfax (a version of reproduction that is essentially mimetic, not unlike the one posited in *Coelum Brittanicum*) but the figure who in the "Horation Ode" has "ruined the great work of time" and in the meadow scene of "Upon Appleton House" generates a Puritan rather than a quasi-Catholic antimasque. (Wilding even suggests that William Fairfax's confiscation of the nuns' property itself evokes Cromwell's "Irish campaign" by "seizing the land of papists and putting it to profitable Protestant uses" (149).) Rather than moving unproblematically from the antimasque of the nuns to the masque of Fairfax, the speaker announces rather early the possibility that the Fairfax lineage contains within itself the seeds of antimasque, an antimasque that constantly intrudes on the remainder of "Upon Appleton House" and that is most intense at the poem's end, where it is unclear if the notion of destiny that Maria represents will lead the country toward moderation—perhaps even the restoration of monarchy—or to further discord.

The final two stanzas concentrate this tension between Fairfax and Cromwell and are worth quoting in their entirety:

> 'Tis not, what once it was, the world,
> But a rude heap together hurled,
> All negligently overthrown,
> Gulfs, deserts, precipices, stone.
> Your lesser world contains the same,
> But in more decent order tame;
> You, heaven's center, Nature's lap,
> And paradise's only map.
>
> But now the salmon-fishers moist
> Their leathern boats begin to hoist,
> And like Antipodes in shoes,
> Have shod their heads in their canoes.
> How tortoise-like, but not so slow,
> These rational amphibii go!
> Let's in: for the dark hemisphere
> Does now like one of them appear. (761-76)

As in so much of "Upon Appleton House," the poem's penultimate stanza contrasts the ideal world of the Fairfax estate to the "rude heap" beyond its boundaries. There is not a complete opposition, however, for the speaker asserts that the estate “contains the same, / But in more decent order tame.” The establishment of such order certainly appears to be the speaker’s poetic and political ideal, but I have tried to show that the tensions remain unresolved: Fairfax’s garden is too close to a decadent monarchical past, his own “offspring fierce” too close to a kingless future. The notion that Nun Appleton could be “paradise’s only map” belongs to the *milieu* of *Coelum Brittanicum*, where England functions as a pattern for the rest of the world. It is unsurprising, then, that the “but now” which introduces the final stanza functions as an interruption not only of the speaker’s nostalgia but of the very teleology of the masque form. For we end the poem not with the establishment of Nun Appleton as “heaven’s centre” but with the world turned upside down, as the speaker compares the “salmon-fishers” to “Antipodes in shoes,” or “those who dwell directly opposite to each other on the globe, so that the soles of their feet are as it were planted against each other” (*OED*). Order has therefore not been restored, and the “dark hemisphere / Does now like one of them [that is, the fishermen] appear.” The final lines of the poem are diametrically opposed to the logic of appearance that governs the masque. In *Coelum Brittanicum* the Chorus “see at once in dead of night / A Sun appear, and yet a bright / Noonday, springing from Starlight,” a starlight that belongs to Henrietta Maria (916-18). In William Davenant’s *Brittania Triumphans* (1638), Charles is the “cheerful morning” who will “rise / And straight those misty clouds of error clear, / Which long have overcast our eyes, / And else will darken all this Hemisphere” (519-22). In “Upon Appleton House,” on the other hand, the “morning ray” is associated with Fairfax’s garden, which the speaker has long since left (289). The poem cannot close itself off; rather than remaining with the estate as “Paradise’s only map,” the speaker introduces the possibility of yet another antimasque.

II.

Cromwell does not function in Marvell's poetry simply as the antimasque grotesque to the "royal actor" Charles or the moderate Fairfax, however ("Horation Ode," 53). By 1654 the poet in fact imagines Cromwell as a source of quasi-monarchical order in his own sort of masque, and it is worth wondering why. One reason is that, according to Hirst, "the inauguration" of Cromwell's protectorate "has strong claims to be a turning-point, as England retraced its steps towards the safely monarchical order of the restoration" after the innovations of the republic by establishing "a single person executive, the lord protector, restrained by a council as well as by a parliament" (*Authority and Conflict*, 316). Barry Coward notes that "Cromwell as protector often looked and acted like a king," and "in the early months of the Protectorate the Council of State ordered that the former royal palaces […] as well as the king's manor house at York, be vested in Cromwell and his successors" (99), while "the Protectorate court soon adopted some of the other outward trappings of regality" (100). According to Bulstrode Whitlocke, Cromwell admitted in 1651 that "a settlement with somewhat of monarchical power in it would be very effectual" (Cromwell, 207). Although he ultimately rejected the crown, the Lord Protector's interest in "healing and settling," which he announced at the first Protectorate parliament, was an attempt to neutralize the "humors" of "men of Levelling principles" and to put a new "face" on a republican government that had grown increasingly "arbitrary" (Cromwell, 30).

Marvell's "The First Anniversary" can be read as a contribution to these attempts to legitimate the reign of Cromwell along quasi-monarchical lines. If Cromwell in the "Horation Ode" "ruins the great work of time," we witness him in this later poem restoring it: Marvell compares the ability of Cromwell to "tune the ruling Instrument" (68), a reference to the

Instrument of Government under which Cromwell became Lord Protector, to Amphion's use of music in building Thebes. This mythological figure had deep royalist roots. Not only does he herald Charles I's appearance in Inigo Jones and Aurelian Townshend's 1631 masque *Albion's Triumph*, but in "Upon His Majesty's Repairing of Paul's" poet Edmund Waller claims that Charles can "like Amphion make those quarries leap / Into fair figures from a confus'd heap" (11-12). Waller here refers to Charles's plans to renovate St. Paul's Cathedral, a project that came to represent the Laudianism that so enraged Puritans (including, presumably, Cromwell himself). In "The First Anniversary" Cromwell similarly converts "confusion" into unity, as "the rougher stones, unto his measures hewed, / Danced up in order from the quarries rude" (51-52), while "the crossest spirits here do take their part, / Fastening the contignation which they thwart; / And they, whose nature leads them to divide, / Uphold this one, and that the other side" (89-92). Marvell advances beyond even the "lesser world" of the Fairfax estate, which "contains the same rude heap" as the outside world "but in more decent order tame"; in "The First Anniversary," the Lord Protector imposes order on the entire society. It appears that Cromwell has been utterly transformed from the political force in the "Horation Ode" who "thorough his own side / His fiery way divide[s]" (15-16) to one who neutralizes those whose "nature leads them to divide." In drawing on the figure of Amphion, John Wallace argues, "Marvell could pretend that the quarrels and disappointments of the republicans were a concordant discord, not a real threat to the state" (118).[57]

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[57] I am not suggesting, however, that we necessarily need to follow Wallace's claim that the "First Anniversary" constitutes an "argument that Cromwell should accept the English crown and institute a new dynasty of kings" (108). Norbrook in fact contrasts the poem with a panegyric to Cromwell written by Waller himself, who encourages the Protector to embrace kingship and even "manages to make Cromwell the true heir of the Roman emperors and of the Stuarts" (*Writing the English Republic*, 306). According to Norbrook, Marvell instead "offer[s] a complex synthesis of courtly and apocalyptic elements" that could "potentially unite more

Marvell's reference to Amphion goes hand in hand with the restorative power of the sun, also ascribed to Cromwell and familiar from such masques as *Coelum Brittanicum* and *Brittania Triumphans*. Whereas "Man, declining always, disappears / In the weak circles of increasing years" (3-4), the "sun-like" Cromwell's "vigour" ensures that "the day which he doth next restore, / Is the just wonder of the day before. / Cromwell alone doth with new luster spring, / And shines the jewel of the yearly ring" (8-12). Cromwell's association with the sun may evoke the royalist imagery of the masque, but Norbrook points out that Marvell "qualifies the expected associations of the sun with cyclical repetition," instead "enact[ing] the sublime process of returning to and restoring lost perceptions: the monarchical sun imagery had become banal and stereotyped, but in the Cromwellian/Marvellian reworking it gained a new luster" (*Writing the English Republic*, 342). Marvell, after all, associates mere monarchs not with the sun but with "Saturn," claiming that "though they all Platonic years should reign, / In the same posture would be found again" (17-18). Cromwell, on the other hand, famously favors speed and change. The temporality of "The First Anniversary" might therefore be contrasted with that of Carew's "A New-yeares Gift. To the King," which calls on Janus to

> Turne o're the Annals past, and where
> Happie auspitious dayes appeare,
> Mark'd with the whiter stone, that cast
> On the dark brow of th' Ages past
> A dazeling luster, let them shine

---

radical friends like Robert Overton [whom I mention above] with Protectoral monarchists" (339). I tend to agree that Marvell does not here favor a return to monarchy, but I hope to show that the tension between the "courtly" remnants of the masque form and the "apocalyptic" tendencies of the poem resists the "synthesis" for which Norbrook argues.

In this succeeding circles twine,
Till it be round with glories spread,
Then with it crown our *Charles* his head,
That we th'ensuing yeare may call
One great continu'd festivall. (5-14)

Given the temporal scheme that we observed in *Coelum Brittanicum*, it is unsurprising that Carew emphasizes the continuity between past and present. The "dazeling luster" that marks the "happy auspitious days" throughout time should join in a "succeeding circle" to "crown" Charles.

Marvell draws on imagery similar to Carew, but the newness of Cromwell's reign breaks through. Rejecting the "weak circles" that represent a merely cyclical notion of time, Cromwell brings "*new* luster" to the "yearly ring." As the sun he "restore[s]" the "next day," but this day is "the just wonder of the day before," a line that needs some unpacking. If this new day is a "wonder" to the previous one, the sun is not so much "restoring" as creating anew, insofar as the day astonishes and therefore transcends its predecessor rather than merely reproducing or reflecting it. We might even think of such "wonder" in religious terms, as "a deed performed or an event brought about by miraculous or supernatural power" (*OED*). The notion of "restoration" (rather than innovation) remains important, however, for Marvell will later claim that as protector Cromwell is "here pulling down, and there erecting new, / founding a firm state by proportions true" (247-48). As we saw in Chapter One, proportion is a crucial concept in Renaissance politics and aesthetics, referring to everything from the analogical resemblance between sovereign and God to the proper balance in society to the correct use of metaphor. The protectorate cannot break the mold each and every day; it must be capable also of creating order and some level of continuity between past and present. Perhaps this is why the “wonder” is described as “just.” While the most immediate sense of this adjective is “justifiable” (it is appropriate that the previous day marvel at the new day’s excellence), it can also refer to proportion, both to the ability of an object to “conform to a required or agreed standard” and to a “copy” that “conforms exactly to an original, or correctly represents one” (*OED*). Compressed in these two lines is the paradoxical nature of Cromwell in Marvell’s imagination: a source both of innovation and restoration, Cromwell seeks “healing and settling” by means other than monarchy, though his protectorate did (and perhaps had to) resemble monarchy in crucial ways. Cromwell may exceed monarchs, but the solar metaphor indicates his association with their sovereign power even if he does not completely correspond to the figure of the king.

The rest of “The First Anniversary” can be read as a working through of the representational predicament opened by the tension inscribed within the “just wonder” that Cromwell creates. We can compare it with a poem like John Bond’s “King Charles his welcome home,” which celebrated the monarch’s return to London in 1641:

> Welcome thou Sun of glory, whose bright beames
> Doe so illuminate those obscure dreames
> Of adverse Fortune, unto which we were
> Late incident, by our quotidian feare.
> But the bright raies of your return absolv’d
> Us from that passion, and sweetly dissolv’d
> That cloud of feare into the glorious day
> Of triumph. (Qtd. in Knoppers, 74)

Laura Lunger Knoppers points out that “the appearance of the sun-king dissolving the clouds of disorder and fear functions much like the dispelling of an antimasque," and it appears that Cromwell will achieve something similar in Marvell's poem (74). Fear of the Lord Protector's potential demise after his coaching accident, for example, is compared to Adam's inability to understand the sun's disappearance at night: "'Why did mine eyes once see so bright a ray; / Or why day last no longer than a day?' / When straight the sun behind him he descried, / Smiling serenely from the further side" (339-42). To the disappointment of the Levellers and Fifth Monarchists, Cromwell reemerges like the sun and "does with himself all that is good revive," just as the "cloud of fear" gives way to the "glorious day" in Bond's poem (324).

Earlier, however, Marvell's speaker indicates that Cromwell's restoration of the day is perhaps more difficult to achieve than this prelapsarian image suggests. We may begin with the Lord Protector's solar supremacy over mere kings, but he soon becomes obscure:

> Hence oft I think if in some happy hour
> High grace should meet in one with highest power,
> And then a seasonable people still
> Should bend to his, as he to heaven's will,
> What we might hope, what wonderful effect
> From such a wished conjuncture might reflect.
> Sure, the mysterious work, where none withstand,
> Would forthwith finish under such a hand:
> Foreshortened time its useless course would stay,
> And soon precipitate the latest day.
> But a thick cloud about that morning lies,
> And intercepts the beams of mortal eyes,

> That ‘tis the most which we determine can,
>
> If these the times, then this must be the man. (131-44)

As I mentioned earlier, a similar moment occurs in Davenant’s *Brittania Triumphans*, where a character announces that “this *happy hour* is call’d to celebrate / Britanocles” (483-84), the representative of Charles who appears when Fame asks that “our cheerful morning rise / And straight those misty clouds of error clear, / Which long have overcast our eyes, / And else will darken all this Hemisphere.” As Patterson points out, though, Marvell’s lines are “conditional,” “indicating the limitations of vision” (69). The “wished conjuncture” provided in the “happy hour” has not yet arrived, as it does quite unproblematically in Davenant; the “morning” in the masque is “cheerful,” cloudless and therefore “error-free,” but “a thick cloud” remains over the “morning” of Cromwell’s ideal, apocalyptic reign. While the Lord Protector had earlier moved through the “region clear” to “tune this higher to this lower sphere,” the connection in this passage between the human and divine realms is obscure at best (47-48). Indeed, the speaker’s assertion that “if these the times, then [Cromwell] must be the man” seems as exhausted as York’s response to Bolingbroke’s rise or Fairfax’s reaction to Charles’s execution. According to Chernaik, this passage reveals that “though a poet may see reason to hope for the millennium, he can never assume that it has occurred. […] Poets are not exempt from the taint of mortality, nor from the dangers of error and self-delusion” (4). Indeed, Cromwell may himself be subject to the “interception” enacted by the “thick cloud”: while up to this point he “well has guessed” (145) the intentions of providence, even he “know[s] not where heaven’s choice may light,” though he “girds yet his sword, and ready stands to fight” (147-48).

At least two ironies emerge from this passage. First, the speaker seems to blame this failure of perception on the “[un]seasonable people” who oppose the Lord Protector, even though earlier in the poem Cromwell was able to convert such opposition into unity. There the “crossest spirits” paradoxically “fasten[] the contignation which they thwart,” an expression of *discordia concors*, but here “that blest day still counterpoised wastes” (155). To “counterpoise” is to “balance by a weight on the opposite side” (*OED*); the achievement of such “balance” (perhaps a byproduct of the “proportions true” that govern Cromwell’s construction of his “firm state”) is supposedly the condition of possibility for the successfully mixed constitution of the Protectorate, but in this passage it marks the deferral of Cromwell’s apocalyptic aims. Second, and more interestingly, the Lord Protector’s rise to power is later described in the same terms as the “thick cloud” that here blocks one’s perception of him:

> Thou in the skies,
> As a small cloud, like a man’s hand, didst rise;
> Then did thick mists and winds the air deform,
> And down at last thou poured’st the fertile storm,
> Which to the thirsty land did plenty bring,
> But, though forewarned, o’ertook and wet the King. (233-38)

While it is true that Cromwell’s “thick mists” produce “fertile” rain, they nevertheless “deform” and obscure. If in the previous passage Cromwell’s “hand” would “finish” the “mysterious” apocalyptic “work” if not for the “thick cloud,” here the “cloud” that Cromwell generates is itself compared to a “hand.” It is not clear, moreover, how Cromwell’s “winds” are to be distinguished from the “whirling winds” associated later in the poem with the Levellers or with the millenarian Fifth Monarchists, a sect that believed the rule of Christ on earth was imminent and hoped, according to Marvell, “that their new king might the fifth sceptre shake, / And make the world, by his example, quake” (297-98). Marvell’s description of this sect as Cromwell’s “Chammish issue" (293), or offspring, in fact acknowledges that the Lord Protector had, in the words of Hirst, "been directly responsible for the establishment of the Barebone's Parliament, the main hope of the Fifth Monarchists" ("'That Sober Liberty,'" 27). If, as I suggested earlier, Fairfax inadvertently contributes to the birth of Cromwell as a political force, the Lord Protector has himself spawned the factions that he must now neutralize, ironizing the speaker's claim that, between unrestrained "freedom" and mere "tyranny," it is Cromwell "who of both the bounders knows to lay" and therefore "Him as their father must the state obey" (280-82). Such moderation is the key to the "sober liberty" (289) that the speaker will soon claim that the Protectorate offers. Unlike Noah, whose son Ham (the "Chammish issue") was cursed after he witnessed his father drunkenly naked, Cromwell "didst for others plant the vine / Of liberty" but was himself "not drunken with its wine" (287-88). Even if this were the case—and the chaos that Cromwell unleashes in "The Horation Ode" suggests otherwise—the fact remains that the enthusiasm of the sect emerges, in however distorted a fashion, from Cromwell's own actions.

In "The First Anniversary" antimasque can no longer be distinguished from masque, at least in part because the figure of Cromwell is overdetermined, standing both for order and disorder. Toliver is surely right to argue that Marvell attempts to "transfer to Cromwell whatever prestige the sun-king image, Amphion myth, angelology, and scriptural parallels will afford," but I am arguing that Cromwell also comes to resemble what Toliver describes as the "anti-maskes or invective opposites" that challenge him (196-97). It is tempting to read the transition from "The Horation Ode" to "The First Anniversary" in terms of the movement of a masque: Cromwell functions as an antimasque to the "royal actor" Charles in the former poem, while in the latter poem he is transformed into a figure of sovereign authority who resists the antimasques of sectarianism and republicanism. While such a logic would differ in crucial ways from the

Caroline court entertainment—the king is never himself the antimasque and therefore has no need for transformation—it would at least help to explain the famous discrepancy between Cromwell as a force who “ruins the great work of time” in the earlier poem and “contracts the force of scattered time” in the later one (13). But even this scheme fails to account for Marvell’s ambivalent depiction of Cromwell in “The First Anniversary,” for the Lord Protector frustrates the logics both of appearance and temporality characterizing the masque form, represented by the comparison of Cromwell’s power to that of the sun and the father, respectively. Carew combines these two metaphors in his poem on Charles, who as a “Father” should “be / With numerous issue blest, and see / The faire and God-like off-spring growne / From budding starres to Suns full blowne” (23-26). The same concept of reproduction, which presupposes mimetic purity, also governs *Coelum Brittanicum*. In “The First Anniversary,” however, Cromwell is not just the sun (which itself is not purely restorative since it generates new “wonder” from one day to another rather than mere stability) but also the cloud, the mist that deforms and obscures. Cromwell’s brilliance can never shine in its purity, not simply because of the sins of his people but because he carries within himself the antimasque qualities that laid the groundwork for his masque of supremacy. It is for this same reason that the antimasque he helped to produce—the radicalism that he spawned, inadvertently or not—can never be resolved into the masque-like order of the Instrument of Government. He may be a paternal figure, then, but he fathers discord.

Cromwell’s doubleness perhaps helps to explain the strange ending of the poem. In a satirical passage that echoes Milton’s *Second Defense*, the speaker imagines the confusion that Cromwell, who “‘seems a king by long succession born, / And yet the same to be a king does scorn’” (386-88), creates for the ambassadors of foreign princes. The speaker then addresses Cromwell directly:

> Pardon, great Prince, if thus their fear or spite
> More than our love and duty do thee right.
> I yield, nor further will the prize contend,
> So that we both alike may miss our end:
> While thou thy venerable head dost raise
> As far above their malice as my praise,
> And as the Angel of our commonweal,
> Troubling the waters, yearly mak'st them heal. (395-402)

The poem ends with an admission of failure, the speaker referring to Cromwell as a "great Prince" but immediately acknowledging that the Lord Protector transcends such a title. As Patterson points out, the "inexpressibility" of Cromwell's power has been a theme throughout "The First Anniversary": "the theoretical question with which the poem deals is […] how to express Cromwell's uniqueness, the unprecedented position he holds in England, in Europe, in God's providential plans and, above all, in the literary imagination" (70). Earlier the speaker had claimed that "my muse shall hollo far behind / Angelic Cromwell, who outwings the wind" (125-26), while here his "venerable head" is out of the reach of the poet's "praise." I want to suggest, however, that Cromwell's resistance to representation is not simply a product of his quasi-divine status—as Hirst notes, Cromwell here "shadows Christ" ("'That Sober Liberty,'" 41)—but of the contradictions inscribed within his figure. Cromwell may be the "Angel of our commonweal," but that angel "trouble[s] the waters" even as he "yearly mak'st them heal." This paradoxical image has been read as a reference to the Instrument of Government, a "reminder," according to Norbrook, "that the Instrument had not been fully defined at the time the poem was published, some details having been left to Parliament; like Cromwell, the Instrument is an agent of restoration which may never take a completely fixed and final form" (*Writing the English Republic*, 350). The closing line also implies, however, that Cromwell's acts of resolution or restoration cannot be securely distinguished from his acts of disruption. Lying within the conclusion of the poem, at first glance the ultimate expression of Cromwell's transcendent power, is in fact the failure of apocalyptic transcendence that the speaker registers earlier, where a "thick cloud" blocks access to the "happy hour" when "high grace should meet in one with highest power": "Hence that blest day still counterpoised wastes, / The ill delaying what the elected hastes; / Hence landing nature to new seas is tossed, / And good designs still with their authors lost" (155-58). It is worth emphasizing that this "delay" is never resolved in the poem; the "blest day *still* counterpoised wastes," just as Cromwell's "troubling" and subsequent "heal[ing]" of the political "waters" will continue *ad infinitum*. If Cromwell's role as the "elected" exists in diametrical opposition to the "ill" elements of society, the poem will go on to show that both the "good designs" *and* their "author" are "lost" because they cannot be fully distinguished from the ill-intentioned obstructionists generated by Cromwell himself. Reading the closing lines of the poem with this earlier passage in mind deeply ironizes the claim that Cromwell "trouble[es] the waters," for this act of disruption, intended to lead to "healing" and therefore resolution, conflates the antimasque where "landing nature to new *seas* is tossed" and the masque-like assertion that the "day" which the "sun-like" Cromwell "next restore[s], / Is the just wonder of the day before." The poet's fear that he will "miss" his panegyric "end" is appropriate, for it reproduces the fear that Cromwell's "good designs" will be lost to the ironies of history that he has himself set in motion, not unlike Jonson's reproduction of James's failure to unify England and Scotland on the stage in the *Masque of Blackness*. As Christopher Wortham argues, "the first parliament elected under the Protectorate was doomed when Marvell wrote these lines and, almost certainly, Marvell knew it" (40).

This political or historical irony is also perhaps a spiritual one. While Cromwell attributed his military victories (and, indeed, any success) to the hand of God, he also recognized his own shortcomings in interpreting the divine will. In a speech to open the Barebones Parliament, for example, Cromwell claims that the assembly is "marvelous and it is of God, and it hath been unprojected, unthought of by you and us. And that hath been the way God hath dealt with us all along, to keep things from our eyes; so that in what we have acted we have seen nothing before us; which is also a witness in some measure to our integrity." This emphasis on "integrity" leads Cromwell to assert that "this way may be the door to usher in things that God hath promised and prophesied of" (25), but Hirst points out that even at this "highest of times," before the dissolution of Barebones, the establishment of the Protectorate, and the increasing drift into military rule, Cromwell "checks himself" ("'That Sober Liberty'" 35-36), claiming that "I may be beyond my line, these things are dark." Cromwell was right to hesitate: overcome by tensions between its moderate and radical members, Barebones would end in failure, a failure that would characterize the remainder of the Interregnum and that is registered throughout "The First Anniversary." Cromwell makes a connection in 1653 between the "marvelous" character of the assembly and the fact that it is "unprojected," or unanticipated, but in Marvell's poem it is precisely the unintended consequences of Cromwell's actions that frustrate his efforts to impose order and achieve apocalyptic fulfillment. (The Fifth Monarchists, we will remember, put a great deal of faith in Barebones.) Cromwell's reign may indeed be "marvelous," then, but it cannot be the "just wonder" praised by Marvell because its contradictions exceed every attempt to maintain "justness" or proportion.

If Cromwell claims in the speech to Barebones that "we are at the threshold, and therefore it becomes us to lift up our heads and to encourage ourselves in the Lord" (25), we find him in "The First Anniversary" still waiting. The divine "darkness" that Cromwell acknowledges in 1653 remains, as does the social tension that hastens his rise even as it undermines the legitimacy of his power. Marvell concludes the "Horation Ode" by imploring Cromwell to "still keep thy sword erect," for, "besides the force it has to fright / The spirits of the shady night, / The same arts that did gain / A power, must it maintain" (115-20). The irony of the Interregnum, though, is that a version of this "shady night" will always remain, and no amount of royalist or even protectoral "sun" can eradicate it. In *The Rehearsal Transpros'd* (1672), Marvell will warn his ecclesiastical opponent Samuel Parker to

> take heed of hooking things up to heaven […]; for, though you look for some advantage from it, you may chance to raise them above your reach, and if you do not fasten and rivet them very well when you have them there, they will come down again with such a swing, that if you stand not out of the way, they may bear you down further than you thought of. (qtd. in Toliver, 192)

Though written after the restoration of the Stuart monarchy, Toliver is right to trace this passage's premise to Marvell's poetry of the 1650s. Charles and Henrietta Maria had already become "unriveted" from their quasi-divine "sphere" when Marvell began to write, and his poetry reveals that Cromwell himself would never quite "learn a music in the region clear, / To tune this lower to that higher sphere." John Milton will offer perhaps the most rigorous poetic account of the origins of this disparity between the temporal and the divine in *Paradise Lost*, with which we will conclude.

CHAPTER 5

Joining, Disjoining, and Misjoining in *Paradise Lost*

In this chapter, I read Milton's representation of Adam and Eve's relationship in *Paradise Lost* (1674) as an allegory of the fancy's impact both on the marital relation dramatized in the poem and in the language used to describe that relationship, one that sheds light on the tension between kingship and republicanism in the Restoration. By "fancy" I have in mind the role Adam assigns it in his explanation of Eve's Satan-inspired dream in Book 5: while reason "join[s] or disjoin[s]" the "Aery shapes" created by the fancy while awake, Adam suggests that in sleep reason rests and the fancy dominates, the latter "misjoining shapes" rather than making the distinctions characteristic of the former faculty (5.1105-06; 110).[58] However insufficient Adam's discourse is as an explanation of Eve's dream or dreams in general,[59] his description of the fancy as a "misjoining" that replaces the proper "joining and disjoining" of reason nevertheless calls attention to the status of the most important joining in the poem, the marriage of the first parents. Not only does Adam experience Eve's creation through the fancy, but he presents his request for a wife in the first place as the desire for a more appropriate "joining" than that between human and animal. At the same time, Adam's recognition that the "unity" emerging from marriage is “defective”—and this even before Eve’s creation—points to the potential for a “misjoining” that threatens the marital relation from within (4.425). Taking this “unity defective” seriously allows us to assess the conditions of possibility (or impossibility) for marriage in Eden, revealing that the very structures of understanding that Adam articulates and enacts in an attempt to conceptualize his union with Eve ensures the failure of that marriage even before its institution.

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[58] Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Milton's prose and poetry are from *The Complete Poems and Major Prose*.

[59] As Victoria Silver points out, Adam both "fail[s] to grasp the imaginative power, the real seductiveness" of Eve's dream (335) and is unable to recognize that one's relationship to God itself "has an imaginative, mediated existence" (339). For a similar account of the poem that reassesses and attempts to redeem the role of the fancy by exploring its relationship to faith, see Knedlik. It is not my intention to substantially intervene in the debate over Milton's general attitude toward the fancy—as Knedlik points out, critics like John Guillory argue that "Milton exhibits intense resistance to any notion of the imagination as a valid faculty of cognition" (21)—but rather to explore the ways in which Adam's specific (and quite possibly flawed) account of the fancy informs his conceptualization of Eve.

Adam’s “unity defective” registers a simultaneous insistence on likeness and a creeping recognition that a certain insufficiency attends marriage, a tension that Milton takes up in his divorce tracts. Arguing that he attempts to “establish unity and sameness in the place of seeming difference and contradiction” (169), Mary Nyquist points out that in the tracts Milton neutralizes the ambiguity of the Genesis account of marriage by assigning the “nongenerically masculine ‘he’” to “plural forms” that in Hebrew are “potentially inclusive of both sexes,” thus attributing a primacy to man that scripture does not necessarily allow (171). If Nyquist’s examination highlights a sort of “misjoining” in Milton’s interpretative methods in the prose, I focus on one in *Paradise Lost* that enables a different reading of the divorce tracts: Milton’s substitution of “adhere” for scripture’s more ambiguous “cleave” (the man “shall cleave unto his wife”) represents, I argue, an attempt on Milton’s part to repress the “defect” Adam has already anticipated in his initial request for a wife, a move also legible in the replacement of the Genesis “bone of my bones” with *Paradise Lost*’s “bone of my bone.” Adam can assert this perfect fusion of man and wife only through an imposition of “likeness” that Milton’s divorce tracts do not necessarily allow, though they may appear to at first glance.[60] Close attention to

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[60] I am indebted to Lee Morrissey’s argument that *Paradise Lost* highlights the problems generated by “Adam’s seeing Eve as, literally, part of himself, which is to say, the same as himself,” but while Morrissey focuses primarily on the ways in which “Adam treats Eve as if she

Tetrachordon (1645) and to the comments by Paul on marriage and society in 1 Corinthians, which influenced Milton's thinking about marriage, reveal a far more complicated picture of the hierarchical unity ostensibly presupposed by both writers' theories of gender relations, suggesting that Adam's desire for total fusion with Eve—a conceptual fusion that results in a literal effort to control her—can emerge only by denying the presence of contiguity and difference, both at the level of the text and of human society.

A similar predicament characterizes Milton's explicitly political writing. While the poet attempts to carve out a space for certain forms of difference in *Areopagitica* (1644), therefore contributing (albeit cautiously) to the pluralist energies of the English Civil War, in *The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth* (1660) he proposes a system of government more oligarchic than republican, in part because the English people overwhelmingly favored a return to Stuart monarchy. In attempting to stave off the imminent restoration of Charles II, however, Milton must sacrifice the democratic openness that contributed to the overthrow of kings in the first place. If in *Areopagitica* Milton recognizes that instability and antagonism are in a sense constitutive of society, in *The Ready and Easy Way* he attempts to impose a social and political harmony that does not exist in reality. I argue that this transition in Milton's thinking amounts to more than pragmatic adjustment; rather, it reveals that the sort of "unity defective" which constitutes but also disrupts Adam's marriage to Eve poses fundamental challenges for republicanism as well. In previous chapters I have shown the ways in which the unity supposedly inscribed in the figure of the single sovereign is defective, but this final chapter explores how such deficiency creates the possibility of republican forms of government even as it frustrates

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were there to fulfill his process of self-fulfillment," I am more interested in the conditions of possibility for such a drive toward totalization (330).

their stability. Perhaps the strongest formulation of this paradox (at least in the seventeenth century) can be found in the work of Robert Filmer, who maintains that the unity ostensibly embodied in a single monarch is superior to the multiplicity of republicanism, which claims to be representative of the people but cannot adequately account for the will of each citizen. While the royalist Filmer's conclusion amounts to little more than authoritarianism, certain aspects of his critique are worth taking seriously, particularly his argument that republicanism purports to be transparently representative even though it substitutes a part (the legislative assembly) for the whole (the people), excluding in the process women, the poor, and other marginalized groups. Filmer himself has no interest in making such accommodations, of course—they would be beside the point in the absolute monarchy that he favors—but I suggest that his work sheds light on Milton's ambivalence when it comes to the issue of unity, political, religious, and otherwise.

I.

Before discussing the problem of marriage in *Paradise Lost* explicitly, I want to expand on my reading of Adam's attempt to console Eve after her nightmare in Book 5. The passage is worth quoting at length:

> Best Image of myself and dearer half,
> The trouble of thy thoughts this night in sleep
> Affects me equally; nor can I like
> This uncouth dream, of evil sprung I fear;
> Yet evil whence? in thee can harbor none,
> Created pure. But know that in the Soul
> Are many lesser Faculties that serve
> Reason as chief; among these Fancy next

Her office holds; of all external things,
Which the five watchful Senses represent,
She forms Imaginations, Aery shapes,
Which Reason joining or disjoining, frames
All what we affirm or what deny, and call
Our knowledge or opinion; then retires
Into her private Cell when Nature rests.
Oft in her absence mimic Fancy wakes
To imitate her; but misjoining shapes,
Wild work produces oft, and most in dreams,
Ill matching words and deeds long past or late. (5.95-112)

According to Adam's account of faculty psychology, the soul is arranged hierarchically: reason, which is "chief," holds sway over the fancy by regulating and ordering the "Imaginations" created by the latter. It should be pointed out, however, that Adam does not here understand reason as the primary faculty, as if the fancy only subsequently distorts the proper understanding of phenomena. Instead, reason emerges only after the fancy interprets sense perception, arriving on the scene to "join or disjoin" its "aery shapes." It is perhaps this belatedness that leads to the ambiguity in Adam's claim that reason "frames / All what we affirm or what deny," generating what we "*call* / Our knowledge *or* opinion." If we read "or" here parallel to the conjunction in the previous line, Adam would be "affirm[ing]" knowledge and "deny[ing]" opinion, respectively. It is possible, however, to read in the second "or" the registration of a slight hesitation on Adam's part, an uncertainty over the status of knowledge that the faculties afford. Such a reading seems implausible unless we keep in mind that reason depends on the fancy in the first place; that is, reason establishes knowledge on the basis of the imagination rather than empirical reality. Indeed, Milton's claim in *Areopagitica* that "opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making" points to the blurring of "knowledge" and "opinion" that Adam's lines suggest, though I would argue that we should read "in the making" here as designating a necessarily incomplete project rather than the assurance of an unproblematic establishment of knowledge (743).

If the grammatical division of reason and the fancy is belied by the temporality of Adam's account, inasmuch as the fancy is the initial way in which one encounters the world, Adam seems to negotiate the groundlessness that threatens his narrative through the imposition of a name: according to him, we *call* the work of reason either knowledge *or* opinion. But as Lee Morrissey points out, the epistemological status of naming here and elsewhere in Milton's Eden is not as stable as the traditional account of Paradise presupposes. Arguing that "the gap between the name and the object implicit in his discursive, nominalist impulses" undermines Adam's assumption that naming and understanding are synonymous (334), Morrissey suggests that because, in his discourse on the faculties, "it is a mystery how Adam might have acquired this information, one cannot help but suspect yet more nominalism from Adam, more presumption that he can name and know, in this case naming elements of human psychology" (335). Adam's claims to both knowledge of the functions of the mind and to the identification of what constitutes knowledge more generally could thus emerge from a "misjoining" on his part, the contingency of which is concealed by the imposition of a name. Far from dividing the knowledge yielded by reason and the opinion generated by the fancy, Adam's conjunctive "or" actually unites and confuses them, rendering his attempt to distinguish the faculties difficult indeed. If reason emerges from the fancy, what is to prevent it from drifting into the fancy once again?

It is not quite the case, then, that reason as Adam understands it ensures the regulation of the fancy; while reason does indeed intervene in the relationship between the fancy and perception, it is unclear whether the result of such an intervention is unproblematic understanding or an interpretation of phenomena that always possibly errs by devolving into subjective judgment, generating yet more "aery shapes." Not only does Adam's explanation of Eve's dream demonstrate the mutual imbrication of sense and fancy, but his attempt to neutralize such confusion by assigning names to these mental processes does not entirely distinguish them from each other. We must therefore question the second part of Adam's allegory of the faculties, where he claims that in sleep "mimic Fancy wakes / To imitate" reason, distorting the latter's work by "misjoining shapes." The implication here is that sleep reverses the power relations of the mind, but, as I have already pointed out, even in waking reason both depends on the fancy (it organizes fancy's version of perception, not perception itself) and runs the risk of itself falling into fanciful "opinion." Although Adam wants to suggest that sleep is a decayed distortion of wakefulness, according to the terms of his analysis sleep is not all that different from waking and may perhaps be a more authentic version of that very phenomenon. Whether waking or sleeping, one's perception is subject first to the fancy. Reason does intervene while one is awake, but the threat of fanciful regression remains insofar as reason originates in the fancy. While reason is absent in sleep—"joining or disjoining" gives way to the fancy's mere "misjoining"—the fact that the fancy contaminates and threatens reason from within suggests that, in the terms of Adam's argument, one is always in a sense sleeping when awake. Making matters even more complicated, the "shapes" that fancy "misjoins" in sleep would presumably refer to the "Aery shapes" that in wakefulness themselves emerge from the fancy, strangely implying that in sleep fancy misjoins neither reason nor a piece of reality but the fancy itself. Reason may "join or disjoin" rather than altogether "misjoin," but each of these actions depends equally on the fancy it would supposedly surmount. If we are to believe Adam's claims about the "wild work" of the imagination, we have to acknowledge that such work is constitutive of thought rather than a hindrance to it, that any "joining" (or "disjoining") is always already a "misjoining" whose originary effects cannot necessarily be neutralized by the subsequent division or union by reason, a possibility implicit in the "misjoining" that attends Adam's imposition of such names as "knowledge" or "opinion."

With the implications of Adam's meditation on reason and the fancy in mind, we can return to the beginning of his speech and to the relationship between the fancy and marriage. When he addresses Eve as "Best Image of myself and dearer half," Adam compresses into a single line the confusions that emerge in his account of the faculties. Eve is on the one hand an "image," a reflection of Adam just as Adam is a reflection of God. In both of these signifying relationships, though, the emphasis is on difference, on what Victoria Silver calls "the sexual protocol of revelation" whereby "the image is understood to be not only distinct from what it pictures, but so palpably different that it requires interpretation and acknowledgment" (305). Adam reflects divinity but does not embody it, and although Eve literally emerges from Adam's body, one could argue that her separation from him is just as necessary as her origin in him. His description of Eve as his "dearer half," however, suggests that she remains a part of him, perhaps even more valuable ("dearer") than himself. The line's transition from "Image" to "dearer half" thus allegorizes the relationship between the fancy and reason that Adam will unfold. Eve here does not emerge as such in Adam's perception but only her "Image"; that is, he recognizes her as something other than she is in herself, an "aery shape" that almost immediately becomes his "dearer half" through a sort of joining not unlike that performed by reason. This union, moreover, is also a splitting of Eve, who assumes a symbolic as well as an ontological status. But the fact that Adam posits "Image" and "half" as equivalent terms suggests that a certain "misjoining" is also at work here, a fundamental inability on Adam's part to separate the image from the person. Such a "misjoining" is even more legible in Adam's first words of the poem, which describe Eve as "Sole partner and sole part of all these joys" (4.411). On the one hand, Eve shares in the bounties of Paradise with Adam, a statement of equitable union not unlike Adam's claim that the terror of Eve's nightmare "affects [him] equally"; on the other, Eve's status as "sole part of all these joys" to some extent evacuates the claim of equality in the first part of the line, simultaneously elevating her above the environment of Eden and reducing her to an object, albeit one in which Adam has a strong symbolic investment.

One of the most vexing issues of the poem, then, is how Adam is to negotiate the disparity between what Eve is and what she signifies. As Silver points out, Eve's "image has an irresistible power over Adam," but he "also finds it curiously indistinct, opaque, resistant to his assumptions of meaning and value" (287). I would suggest that the fancy plays a significant role in both generating and negotiating this opacity, and that the complications I have identified in Adam's understanding of the soul reproduce themselves—or perhaps first emerge—in his efforts to make sense both of Eve herself and his marriage to her. This relationship between marriage and the fancy is evident not only in *Paradise Lost* but in *Tetrachordon*, a tract where Milton attempts to justify divorce through scriptural exegesis. While I will discuss Milton's reading of Genesis in more detail below, for now it is sufficient to recall his general understanding of marriage. For Milton, a true marriage not only entails physical attraction but, more importantly, intellectual compatibility, which Milton describes as "likenes" and "fitness of mind and disposition" (*Complete Prose*, 605). Divorce therefore primarily exists not to release a husband from a wife who cannot bear children, for example, but from one whose company he does not enjoy intellectually or emotionally. Indeed, Milton argues that a couple who fails to display this "fitness of mind" are already divorced: "For as the unity of minde is nearer and greater then the union of bodies, so doubtles, is the dissimilitude greater, and more dividual, as that which makes between bodies all difference and distinction. […] In whom therefore either the will, or the *faculty is found to have never joyn'd*" (*Complete Prose* 606, my emphasis). Keeping in mind Adam's account of the faculties, it appears here that just as reason "joins or disjoins" the products of the fancy in the mind, it necessarily "disjoins" a marriage that does not yield intellectual stimulation but remains in effect simply because of the delusions of custom, itself a sort of errant fancy ungrounded in reason. A marriage without "unity of minde" is, in the words of Adam, a "misjoining" that badly needs the "disjoining" of divorce.

Milton's emphasis on "unity" and "likenes" as constitutive of marriage is not, however, the only story to tell in *Tetrachordon*. While Milton certainly privileges a model of marriage that emerges through the power of reason and operates on the principle of similarity, he also reserves a space for difference, even "unlikenes." Discussing the pleasures of a proper marriage, Milton points out that

> We cannot therefore alwayes be contemplative, or pragmaticall abroad, but have need of som delightfull intermissions, wherin the englarg'd soul may leav off a while her severe schooling; and like a glad youth in wandring vacancy, may keep her hollidaies to joy and harmless pastime: which as she cannot well doe without company, so in no company so well as where the different sexe in most resembling unlikenes, and most unlike resemblance cannot but please best and be pleas'd in the aptitude of that variety. (*Complete Prose*, 597)

If “unity of minde” was the precondition of marriage in the previous paragraph’s quotation, here Milton describes marriage as a departure from rational thought, a transition from a “contemplative” state to the “wandring vacancy” that characterizes one’s encounter with a wife “most resembling unlikenes, and most unlike resemblance.” Insofar as this passage comes after a contrast between divine and human wisdom, we should read “unlikenes” as referring in the first place not to the wife’s compatibility (or lack thereof) with her husband but to her position below man in the signifying chain linking God and humankind; as Milton points out, following Paul, “woman is not primarily and immediately the image of God, but in reference to the man” (*Complete Prose*, 589). The husband enjoys the wife’s company because it represents a respite from the rigors of contemplation that approximates (but of course never equals) divine wisdom. There would still be a sort of unity here—albeit a hierarchical one—since neither man nor woman can approach the excellence of the divine image, but to say that woman “resembles unlikenes” is to suggest not only that she is one more step removed from God but that she appears *as* difference, not as the image of man who is in turn the image of God. Nevertheless, man ostensibly benefits from marriage because of the fundamental similarity between husband and wife, a “likenes” not particularly threatened by “unlikenes” so long as we understand the latter as a mere representation of an alterity that the husband can easily control. To resemble something, even something as seemingly self-contradictory as otherness or difference, is to remain within a coherent structure of meaning, especially if the “unlikenes” manifested by the wife is simply a reflection of the husband’s difference from God.

The second part of Milton’s formulation—that the wife is “most unlike resemblance”—is a bit more problematic, however, for the implication there is that woman potentially confounds the Pauline representational schema within which marriage and gender relations operate. We can think about this difference in terms similar to Adam's division between reason and the fancy. If the husband recognizes that his wife "resembles unlikeness," reason is doing its job insofar as it is distinguishing difference by "joining and disjoining," which in this case refers both to the joining of the man and woman in their mutual difference from God and to the disjoining of the woman from the superior condition of man. To describe woman as "unlike resemblance," however, is to suggest the absence (or at least the deficiency) of the faculty that would make such distinctions. We are back to the threat of the fancy's "wild work," which does not necessarily operate on the principle of resemblance, or does so only imperfectly. It should come as no surprise, then, that Milton compares the "enlarg'd soul['s]" respite in marriage to "a glad youth in wandring vacancy." While "vacancy" here most immediately signifies a vacation, it can also suggest a more general gap or absence, and the addition of "wandring" implies an open-endedness that does not guarantee a return to the propriety of reason and its correct distinctions. The structure of Milton's "most resembling unlikenes, and most unlike resemblance," which Ronald Levao describes as a "chiasmus of pleasing variety," thus veils an important incongruity between the phrases (91). The resemblance of difference can always be reduced to the logic of the same through the self-sufficiency of a subject whose reason organizes the world; an entity unlike resemblance, however, dwells in "vacancy" rather than correspondence, always already a threat if we take seriously the ambiguities of Adam's account of the faculties, which posits a gap between perception and reason.

When Milton argues that a marriage is already null if "the faculty is found never to have joyn'd" two people in "unity of minde," he is making an argument not only about the marital relation but about the function of the "faculty" of reason, which, as Adam claims, can "join or disjoin" the work of the fancy. The latter has an impact on marriage because this relationship can always emerge from misleading or false apprehensions about the other person's "fitness of mind." Such an account, which emphasizes the ability of reason to determine the proper course of action regarding marriage, seems to conflict with Milton's point that marriage actually involves a departure from contemplation, the transition of the "enlarg'd soul" to a "wandring vacancy" that is "unlike resemblance." I am not trying to suggest that Milton is embracing some sort of irrationalism, but rather that the "unity of minde" he supposedly privileges does not—and possibly cannot—emerge as such in the human realm, not least because the status of the "minde" itself is in question both in his prose and in *Paradise Lost*. It is perhaps for this reason that at a crucial moment in that poem Raphael tells Adam, who has just claimed that Eve's "words and actions" "declare unfeign'd / Union of Mind, or in us both one Soul" (8.601-603) that in Heaven the angels participate in a "Union of Pure with Pure / Desiring; nor restrain'd conveyance need / As Flesh to mix with Flesh, or Soul with Soul" (8.627-29). Adam presupposes that his and Eve's "Union of Mind" (here ostensibly synonymous with "Soul") represents an ideal Miltonic marriage, but Raphael points out that not only is a relationship of "flesh" imperfect but that even the mixture of human "Soul with Soul" is necessarily mediated, a "conveyance" rather than direct access.

If we take Raphael seriously here, we must reevaluate the status of marriage in Eden from its institution. Indeed, Adam's initial request to God for a wife captures the ambivalence with which Milton regards the relationship between marriage and mind, reproducing *Tetrachordon*'s oscillation between marriage as "unity of minde" and as a "wandring vacancy." At first Adam couches his appeal for a wife in terms of the "harmony" and "proportion" that would attend a relationship between humans (8.384-85): whereas man's interaction with animals is inevitably one of "disparity," which signifies inequality or simply difference, Adam desires a companion who is “fit to participate / All *rational* delight” (8.386, 390-91, my emphasis). At the same time, Adam suggests that marriage represents not simply “rational delight” but a departure from those contemplative activities that resemble divine intelligence. Adam tells God that he needs a partner because “all human thoughts come short” of comprehending “the highth and depth of thy Eternal ways”:

> Thou in thyself art perfet, and in thee
> Is no deficience found; not so is Man,
> But in degree, the cause of his desire
> By conversation with his like to help,
> Or solace his defects. No need that thou
> Shouldst propagate, already infinite;
> And through all numbers absolute, though One;
> But Man by number is to manifest
> His single imperfection, and beget
> Like of his like, his Image multipli’d,
> In unity defective, which requires
> Collateral love, and dearest amity. (8.413-26)

This passage hinges on how we understand the “unity defective” that Adam identifies as constitutive of human relationships, especially since such a phrase would seem susceptible to the very “disparity” that Adam wishes to avoid. First and foremost, any “unity” that emerges through human propagation is of course “defective” compared to the “perfet” self-sufficiency of God; man’s inherent “deficience” ensures that no amount of procreation will equal the divine “One,” which requires no replication. More interesting for my purposes, however, are the ways in which

Adam's language already seems to recognize a fundamental instability in marriage that goes beyond its imperfect correspondence to the divine realm. When Adam claims that a man's "conversation" with his wife will "help, / *Or* solace his defects," the signification of the conjunctive "or" is at issue, as it was in both the "knowledge *or* opinion" generated by the interplay of reason and the fancy and in Adam's declaration that Eve expresses a "Union of Mind, / *Or* in us both one Soul." The question in this context is whether we are to read the "or" as a term of equivalence or as a hesitation that disrupts the relationship between the two words. In the case of "help" and "solace," it is by no means clear that the terms are the same: according to the *OED*, "help" tends to designate "aid or assistance" in "supplying the wants or needs" of a person, suggesting that to "help" Adam's "defects" would involve not only relieving them but supplying the conditions for his completion, his triumph over "deficience." To "solace" the "defects," on the other hand, is "to allay, alleviate, assuage, soothe" or to "cheer, comfort, or console," a term by no means opposed to "help" but one without the suggestion of supplementation and eventual fulfillment. The wife, in other words, either contributes to the actual diminishment of the "deficience" that necessitates her presence, *or* she exists to comfort the man without fully eliminating his shortcomings.

Given the slippage between these terms, it is no surprise that Adam describes the love he envisions as "Collateral." Marshall Grossman glosses this word as designating "the exchange of adoration for the image of the lord at a particular level of the great chain of created being" to a relationship with an "embodied other," one that "will extend God's creation through the procreation of his image" (122). Grossman claims that this love operates on the principle of "exchange," which suggests a relatively unproblematic substitution of "adoration" for "procreation," but it is worth keeping in mind that, according to the *OED*, "collateral" also signifies both a “side by side” relationship and one “lying aside from the main subject, line of action, issue, or purpose” and that by consequence is “subordinate” or “indirect.” By his own admission, Adam’s relationship with Eve is imperfect compared to the self-sufficiency of God, but I also want to suggest the possibility that the “collateral” or contiguous quality of marriage renders even the prospect of the all-too-human fusion Adam and Grossman presuppose in the “begetting” of “like of his like” problematic. That is, likeness can only exist as the privileged term here and elsewhere in Milton’s discussion of marriage if one forgets the simultaneous presence of a remnant inscribed in the marital relation that is not modeled on the mimetic reproduction of Adam’s “Image” and that may in fact interfere with it through its purely “collateral” contiguity, a contiguity similar to the one on which Northumberland draws to undermine the “Image” of Richard’s governance in *Richard II*. We might think such a disruption in terms of the chiasmic formulation in *Tetrachordon*: Adam wants a partner who “resembles unlikenes,” who shares his “imperfection” but can nevertheless both reflect and reproduce his “Image” in a relatively stable way. What he gets at the same time is a being “unlike resemblance” who cannot combine with Adam in the totalizing way he both presupposes and undermines in his use of words like “solace” and “collateral.”

In assessing the relationship between Adam and Eve, then, we have to consider not only their interactions after her creation but also the ways in which Adam frames and conceptualizes such a relationship in the first place, what we might call the conditions of possibility of marriage rather than its actual practice or articulation. In such an examination, the role of the fancy is crucial. Adam not only experiences the creation of Eve through that faculty, which he refers to as his “internal sight” (a curious description given his suspicion of the fancy’s tendency to distort perception, of which sight is obviously a part, in his discussion of Eve’s dream), but Eve’s emergence from his rib deals rather literally with the work of separation and combination so important in his description of the relationship between reason and the fancy (8.461). If we use Adam's account of the faculties to analyze his own experience with the fancy, however, we must determine at which point reason intervenes to "join or disjoin" the fancy's potential "misjoining." Although the fancy is in this case generated through an encounter with divinity, Silver helpfully points out that "continuity of experience between the fancied sight and the actuality is […] disallowed even when God, as truth itself, deploys images" (320). How, in other words, can we know when Adam's reason translates and regulates his fancy and avoids returning to its previously fanciful condition? When does the rationality that supposedly distinguishes a proper marriage intervene and successfully manage the surplus of illusion generated by the fancy, which can erroneously yoke perceptions and even people together?

Such a yoking threatens the very language with which Milton explains the joining of Adam and Eve in the poem and in the prose, which diverges minutely but crucially from the account in Genesis and has serious implications for how we read Adam's (and Milton's) conception of gender relations. In *Paradise Lost*, Adam describes Eve's creation in the following way:

> I now see
> *Bone of my Bone*, Flesh of my Flesh, my Self
> Before me; Woman is her Name, of Man
> Extracted; for this cause he shall forgo
> Father and Mother, and to his Wife adhere;
> And they shall be one Flesh, one Heart, one Soul. (8.494-99, my emphasis)

In the version of Genesis Milton follows in *Tetrachordon*, by contrast, Adam claims that "'This is now *bone of my bones*, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man. Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh" (2.23-24, my emphasis). There are three primary differences between Genesis and *Paradise Lost*, the most obvious being Milton's addition of Adam's claim that he and Eve "shall be one Flesh, one Heart, one Soul," a series connecting the body and the soul that Genesis does not spell out. Such an addition is unsurprising given Milton's argument in *Tetrachordon* that the scriptural Adam "does not establish an indissoluble bond of marriage in the carnal ligaments of flesh and bones" but speaks "*as if* he had said, this is she by whose meet help and society I shall be no more alone; this is she who was made my image, ev'n as I the Image of God; not so much in body, as in unity of mind and heart" (*Complete Prose* 602, my emphasis). In this sense, the poetic version of the creation simply supplements the Genesis account by literalizing the "as if" of the biblical Adam's utterance, thus legitimizing Milton's reading of the relationship between the fleshly biblical letter and its figural interpretation, or "soul."

If the first difference between poem and scripture seems to justify Milton's reading practices, which reveal the divine "soul" in Adam's "words of flesh and bones" by providing a sort of gloss, the second difference is a bit more complicated and potentially more disruptive (*Complete Prose*, 603). In describing the joining of Adam and Eve, Milton substitutes "adhere," which possesses the relatively univocal meaning of devotion or joining, for the biblical "cleave," which in this context refers to connection but can also signify its opposite, namely separation. It would obviously be absurd to suggest that when scripture maintains that the man shall "cleave unto his wife" it most immediately means that he will divide from her. Such a reading is not beyond the realm of possibility, however, when one considers that Adam and Eve's joining both presupposes the rib's initial division from Adam and, at least according to Milton, the potential for separation if such a union is flawed.[61] Marriage may constitute a "Unity of Minde," but it is also already a "unity defective," not only because it pales in comparison to God's self-sufficiency but because it is "collateral," a side-by-side relationship between two people that includes the potential for division within itself and does not guarantee the fusion Adam assumes. We might therefore read Milton's "adhere" as the registration of an anxiety about the "defect" or "disparity" present in marriage, an additional layer of linguistic protection against the possibilities of "misjoining" both necessary to and destructive of that union. The use of "adhere," which seems to repress this more vexed relationship between unity and separation constitutive of marriage, lays the groundwork for the connection between the "flesh" and the "soul" that Milton posits in *Paradise Lost*, but it also calls such a link into question.

The replacement of "cleave" with "adhere" sheds light finally on the third difference between Genesis and the poem. While the former has Adam call Eve "bone of my bones," Milton describes her as "bone of my bone" in both *Paradise Lost* and in the 1643 *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce* (309), though in *Tetrachordon* he sticks with the biblical plural. The difference may seem insignificant, but in the context of my analysis it highlights a fundamental instability between unity and contingency that takes us back to the tension between the wife's status as both “resembling unlikeness” and “unlike resemblance.” If Eve is a “bone” of Adam’s “bone,” she is an essential part of a single entity; if, on the other hand, she amounts to one bone in a series, she occupies—at least potentially—a greater level of independence. An analysis of two seemingly contradictory statements from Adam about Eve might make this discrepancy clearer. When he confesses his infatuation with Eve to Raphael, Adam speculates that in creating his wife God “from my side subducting, took perhaps / More than enough” (8.536-37). After they eat the fruit, however, Adam will tell Eve, whom he describes significantly as a “fair defect / Of Nature” (10.891-92) that he regrets

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[61] Indeed, as Lana Cable points out in a discussion of *Paradise Lost* and the divorce tracts, divorce for Milton is "granted full realization in the primal order of things. In fact, we eventually find that the concept of divorce has for Milton an existence prior to the order of things; that it is, indeed, an operative principle upon which that very order depends" (93). While Cable has in mind God's creation of the world from Chaos, which involves separation as much as combination, I would argue that in the specific instance of Adam's combination with Eve the substitution of "adhere" for "cleave" represses this larger significance of division. Cable herself argues that the Son identifies "Adam's own engrossment in an image of perfect union" as a primary cause of the Fall (91). In my reading, the illusion of this unproblematic "union" is legible even before Adam interacts with Eve.

> trust[ing] thee from my side, imagin’d wise,
> Constant, mature, proof against all assaults,
> And understood not all was but a show
> Rather than solid virtue, all but a Rib
> Crooked by nature, bent, as now appears,
> More to the part sinister from me drawn,
> Well if thrown out, as supernumerary
> To my just number found. (10.881-88)

Adam’s first description of Eve suggests that God might have taken “more” than he should have, as if Eve is endowed with a surplus of Adam’s nature that interferes with his ability to correctly understand her status within the system of Pauline correspondences set up in the poem and in the prose. Adam, that is, fails to recognize at this point that Eve is “dependent” on him and instead reads into her not only completeness but an almost mystical power. In the second quotation, however, Eve not only emerges from “a Rib / Crooked by nature”—suggesting in the first place that Adam shares her status as a “fair defect / Of Nature” insofar as she emerged from *his* supposedly defective rib—but one that is “supernumerary / To [his] just number found.” Adam attributes Eve’s actions to the contingent or accidental nature of her birth, to the rib’s status as “supernumerary” and thus simultaneously unessential to Adam’s survival and flawed in itself. The imbalance generated by Eve’s creation here emerges not from an excess taken from him but from a certain deficiency within Adam, somehow both superfluous (“well if thrown out”) and capable of causing utter destruction. Whereas in the first description Eve was too complete, in the second she is too inadequate.

In a sense, of course, this shift in Adam’s perspective is precisely the point of the poem, at least where it concerns his relationship with Eve. Raphael claims that Adam’s initial description of his wife smacks of idolatry rather than proper understanding, and Adam himself notes that he incorrectly “imagin’d” that Eve was both “wise” and “constant” enough to withstand Satan’s temptation. As Gordon Teskey points out, Adam has a tendency to “see Eve as Eve will see herself in the pool, as an *eidolon*, a visible thing that is also an illusion, potentially an idol, a ‘goddess humane’” (110). We could also explain the discrepancy in Adam’s accounts through the different circumstances in which he utters them, a moment of joy in the first instance giving way to disappointment and anger over her transgression in the second. Both of these explanations are valid, however, only to the extent that they ignore the fact that Adam’s new understanding of Eve is still mediated by the fancy that undermined his initial account. He may have wrongly “imagin’d” that Eve was sufficient in herself in the first place, but his revised understanding still exists at the level of appearance (she “now appears” to be flawed). I think that we can attribute Adam’s epistemological uncertainty over Eve’s ontological status—almost dangerously complete on the one hand, woefully contingent and even accidental on the other—to the initial slippages I have identified in Adam’s account of Eve’s birth. It matters, in other words, whether we understand Eve as an essential part of Adam's "bone" or as one bone among others, for the "unity defective" inscribed within Adam and Eve's relationship resides in the space opened between these two readings. Eve's creation, according to Levao, concerns "not the dependency of the part on the whole but a less certain interdependency of parts, the problematic drive by human beings for completion in each other" (87). This discrepancy between unity and difference also raises questions about the structures of perception and meaning that emerged in Adam's account of the fancy. It is my position that we can read the replacement of "bone" with "bones" in *Paradise Lost* as a fanciful "misjoining," one that brings to the surface the tensions in Milton's understanding of marriage and divorce and that helps to explain why Adam conceptualizes Eve in the way that he does.

II.

This meditation on the (mis)joining of body parts takes us back to Paul's accounts of both marriage and Christian society more generally. As I have already pointed out, Milton leans heavily on the former in the divorce tracts, particularly Paul's claim in 1 Corinthians that while man "is the image and reflection of God," woman "is the reflection of man" (11.7), a signifying relationship that Paul traces to Christ's position as "the head of every man," just as "the husband is the head of his wife, and God is the head of Christ" (11.3). Paul tropes the husband as the "head" in part because his comments come amid an obscure discussion about whether or not women should don veils while praying. According to Paul, woman's status as an inferior signifier of God necessitates that she wear a "symbol of authority on her head," whereas a veil on a man denies the greater immediacy of his representational function (11.10). Paul, however, qualifies man's authority in two ways, first by claiming that "in the Lord woman is not independent of man or man independent of woman" since "just as woman came from man, so man comes through woman," suggesting a relationship ultimately of interdependence rather than pure domination on the part of the man (11.11-12). More interesting is Paul's claim later in the letter that whereas "now we see in a mirror, dimly," at the moment of revelation "we will see face to face": "Now I know only *in part*; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully known" (13.12, my emphasis). While this second quotation deals not with gender relations but with the nature of God's disclosure to humankind, Paul and Milton have both indicated that these two relationships are inextricably linked, insofar as woman and man relate to each other in a way that resembles (but does not entirely embody or replicate) that of humankind and God. Indeed, I want to suggest that the image of the "mirror," which the Oxford editors gloss as signifying a condition in which "one does not see the thing itself, but only its reflected image," highlights the mediated nature of knowledge precisely by evoking the "veiled" status of woman as an indirect representation of God. Knowledge here is not only reflected but "dim," suggesting the potential for misrecognition as much as resemblance, not unlike Milton's claim that woman is "most unlike resemblance" rather than simply a "resemblance" of "unlikenes." In Paul's discourse, then, woman is undoubtedly inferior, but that inferiority paradoxically reveals the most authentic (if negative) condition in which we know God. It may be necessary for woman to wear a veil during religious worship, but such a gesture merely literalizes the veil metaphorically inscribed in our relationship to the divine, a veil to which Puttenham, Shakespeare, and Marvell also called attention.

The ambivalence with which Paul regards women in 1 Corinthians—as representing inferiority, though an inferiority that I am arguing negatively reveals a wider structure of knowledge and thus occupies a privileged position in his analysis—comes to a head, as it were, in his revaluation of power relations in Christian society, which seems to call into question his previous reliance on the trope of the head to designate man's status of superiority. Because "the body does not consist of one member but of many," Paul argues for a model of interdependence and even inversion already suggested in his claim that neither man nor woman exists independently of the other:

> The eye cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of you," nor again the head to the feet, "I have no need of you." On the contrary, the members of the body that seem to be weaker are indispensable, and those members of the body that we think less honorable we clothe with greater honor, and our less respectable members are treated with greater respect; whereas our more respectable members do not need this. But God has so arranged the body, giving the greater honor to the inferior member, that there may be no dissension within the body, but the members may have the same care for one another. (12.21-25)

While traditional accounts of the body politic (including, significantly, Paul's own where gender relations are concerned) privilege the head as the figure of superiority, Paul recognizes the necessary connection among all the members, a mutuality that leads to the absence of "dissension" rather than the potential for revolt. The organic unity emerging from interdependence—"the members may have the same care for another"—seems to rest uneasily, however, with Paul's simultaneous claim that the "inferior member" actually acquires more honor than the superior through the former's "clothing," especially in light of his comments about the necessity of veils for women. In Paul's paradoxical formulation, it is not simply that the existence of inequality must give way to unity but that the very way one represents inequality—by "clothing" it out of a desire for concealment—actually comes to signify superiority, as if the veil's status as a "symbol of authority" actually represents the authority *of* the woman rather than a recognition of her inferiority.

It is this passage, I would suggest, that links Paul's initial comments about the "veiled" inferiority of women with his later claim that in this life we experience God only "dimly," through a mirror that veils as much as it reveals. What at first appeared to be the establishment of an ontological difference between man and woman is at the same time a figure that marks a certain epistemological shortcoming that characterizes humankind in general. Bringing these passages together also sheds light on Paul's acknowledgment that claims to spiritual truth are necessarily contiguous—at this point he "know[s] only in part"—if we remember his insistence that "the body does not consist of one member but of many." Although he will subsequently argue that the mutual dependence of the inferior and superior members of the body politic leads to the absence of "dissension," the contiguity of knowledge also ensures that there is a sort of "dissension" built into human structures of meaning that resists the totalizing tendency to generate organic unity, whether in human society or in claims to knowledge. Milton will make a similar observation in *Areopagitica*, one that unites even more vividly Paul's twin focus on the political and the epistemological while maintaining the tension within that unity. While Milton does draw on tropes of the body to describe the search for truth in a passage that I will discuss below, I am more interested at this point in his related figure of a building under construction:

> When every stone is laid artfully together, it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be *contiguous* in this world; *neither can every piece of the building be of one form*; nay rather the perfection consists in this, that out of many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional, arises the goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure. (744, my emphasis).

Just as Paul recognizes the freeplay within political structures but simultaneously neutralizes the paradox of the inferior member's superiority by asserting the absence of "dissension," Milton both marks the presence of difference—the "piece[s] of the building" cannot "be of one form"—but ultimately privileges "graceful symmetry," which emerges so long as "brotherly dissimilitudes" are not "vastly disproportional." Milton's seemingly liberal endorsement of a public sphere that can attain some level of "symmetry" is, however, belied by his simultaneous assertion that the "contiguity" constitutive both of thought and society "cannot be united into a continuity."[62] Any "perfection" that actually emerges here is necessarily qualified, not unlike the "unity defective" of Adam's marriage to Eve. Just as Paul posits a body without "dissension" and Milton envisions a "perfect" building, Adam initially asserts Eve's status as "bone of my bone," a fusion without remainder. In each of these accounts, however, the necessarily contiguous nature of human knowledge carves out and leaves open a space beyond the control of the subject's desire for totalization. One can attempt to reconstruct some semblance of unity, but the threat always remains that such a reconstruction will amount to a fanciful "misjoining" rather than a proper "joining."

Milton risks just such a "misjoining" in *The Ready and Easy Way*, where he defends the republic against the impending restoration of the Stuart monarchy. Though the "treatise is full of anxiety about the dangers of a public sphere that is being captured by the royalists," David Norbrook points out that Milton's "solution to this problem is not a new constitution but a desperate combination of elements of the existing polity into a rigid oligarchy. […] Rather than something to be actively embraced, opinion-forming and the active life are burdens to be taken by the few," a position quite different from Milton's openness to a "democratic element" in the earlier *Areopagitica* (412). Milton condemns monarchy's potential reappearance in 1660 as a "return to bondage […] nourished from bad principles and false apprehensions among too many of the people" (880). Against this negative impact of the fancy ("false apprehensions"), he proposes a commonwealth governed by a "grand or general council" that would be "perpetual": "the grand council is both foundation and main pillar of the whole state; and to move pillars and foundations not faulty, cannot be safe for the building" (888). The figure of the building returns in this later pamphlet, but its function is significantly different than in *Areopagitica*. Whereas in that text the parts of the building were "not of one form" and thus "contiguous," here the permanent council will serve to prevent the "floating foundation" to which other forms of republican government might succumb (889), since "successive and transitory parliaments" are "much likelier continually to unsettle rather than to settle a free government" and "to breed commotions, changes, novelties, and uncertainties" (888). If the inability of society to "be united in a continuity" was presupposed in *Areopagitica*, Milton's attempt to impose order in *The Ready and Easy Way* leads him to neutralize the very contiguity that he once claimed was constitutive of community. Milton wants a "unity" without "defect," but his proposed model of government, resting on the authority of a permanent council, risks slipping into a version of the totalitarianism that monarchy is certain to restore and that Oliver Cromwell had displayed in his own quasi-royal reign. While Milton does suggest at one point that "the third part of the senators may go out according to the precedence of their election, and the like number be chosen in their places, to prevent the settling of too absolute a power," he quickly registers his "wish that this wheel or partial wheel in state, if it be possible, might be avoided, as having too much affinity with the wheel of Fortune" (889). Furthermore, unlike previous historical versions of the

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[62] For an account of the relationship between *Paradise Lost* and public reason, see Kuzner. For the shortcomings of Milton's endorsement of pluralism in *Areopagitica*, see LaBreche.

"perpetual senate," such as Rome's, Milton's would exclude the "popular remedies against their growing too imperious," for "the event tells us that these remedies either little availed the people, or brought them to such a licentious and unbridled democracy as in fine ruined themselves with their own excessive power" (890).

While Norbrook argues that Milton expresses "the kind of anti-political attitude which republicans often denounced as intrinsic to monarchy" in *The Ready and Easy Way*, royalist Robert Filmer suggests in 1652 that such conservatism is intrinsic even to Milton's earlier brand of republicanism (412). In *Observations Concerning the Originall of Government,* Filmer claims that Milton "will not allow the major part of the representers to be the people" in his *Defensio pro Populo Anglicano* (1651), "but 'the sounder and better part only' of them." Filmer then wonders "if the 'sounder, the better, and the uprighter' part have the power of the people, how shall we know, or who shall judge who they be?" (198-99). In questioning "how the major part, where all are alike free, can bind the minor part," Filmer calls attention what he sees as the primary inconsistency of republican forms of government (203). He notes in *The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy* (1648) that "the word 'people' […] hath different acceptations, being sometimes taken in a larger, other whiles in a stricter sense":

> Literally, and in the largest sense, the word signifies the whole multitude of mankind. But figuratively and synecdochally it notes many times the major part of a multitude, or sometimes the better, or richer, or the wiser, or some other part. And oftentimes a very small part of the people, if there be no other apparent opposite part, hath the name of the people by presumption. (140)

A parliamentary system claims unity based on the substitution of a part of the people for the whole, not only because a small group of representatives purports to account for the will of the much larger population but because only a select few from that population actually vote those representatives into power, a reduction that undermines the supposed grounding of republicanism in human freedom. As Filmer puts it in his *Observations Upon Aristotles Politiques* (1652), “if but once that liberty—which is esteemed so sacred—be broken or taken away but from one of the meanest or basest of all the people, a wide gap is thereby opened for any multitude whatsoever that is able to call themselves (or whomsoever they please) the people” (277). Given this “wide gap,” republicanism comes to resemble the very system it opposes. Once representatives are elected, parliament must “interpret the major or prevailing part in every assembly to be but as one man, and so do feign to themselves a kind of monarchy” (255). Furthermore, “monarchical principles” govern the very “power of assembling,” since “the entire and gross body of any people is such an unwieldy and diffused thing as is not capable of uniting, or congregating, or deliberating in an entire lump, but in broken parts, which at first were regulated by monarchy” (260). Filmer calls attention to a political problem that equally troubles Adam’s marriage to Eve: not only does Adam, a “part” of their relationship, seek to stand in for the “whole” of it, but in doing so he elides Eve’s status as herself a “part” potentially resistant to unadulterated union. As we have seen, his occasional claims for equality exist in tension with his subordination of his wife to hierarchy.

Interestingly, Milton draws on arguments similar to Filmer’s in order to justify his oligarchic system in *The Ready and Easy Way*. It is implausible, he claims, to balance the power of the council with a “popular assembly” that would be “unwieldy with their own bulk, unable in so great a number to mature their consultations as they ought” and sure to govern “without reason shown or common deliberation; incontinent of secrets, if any be imparted to them, emulous and always jarring with the other senate” (890). As for elections, rather than "committing all to the noise and shouting of a rude multitude," Milton will allow "only those of them who are rightly qualified to nominate as many as they will; and out of that number others of a better breeding to choose a less number more judiciously" (891). Milton argues that his system will provide more stability than monarchy—the "death of a king causeth ofttimes many dangerous alterations, but the death now and then of a senator is not felt, the main body of them still continuing permanent in greatest and noblest commonwealths and as it were eternal"—but for Filmer the process of exclusion ensuring such stability may amount to a bastardized version of kingship (889). As he claims in *Observations Upon Aristotles Politiques*,

> in all popularities where a general council or great assembly of the people meet, they find it impossible to dispatch any great action either with expedition or secrecy if a public free debate be admitted; and therefore are constrained to epitomize and sub-epitomize themselves so long till at last they crumble away into the atoms of monarchy. (274-75)

Milton faces a seemingly impossible situation: including the "unwieldy" multitude keeps open a space for the sort of dissension that he favors when it comes to (non-Catholic) religious difference in *Areopagitica*, but dissension in a political context will inevitably lead to the repression promised by the return of the Stuarts; excluding it, however, requires a violation of the principles that contributed to the overthrow of monarchy in the first place.

There is no doubt that Filmer's critique of republicanism is made in bad faith and that the inconsistencies he identifies equally undermine his own vision of absolute monarchy. A representative body may possess "the name of the people" only by "presumption," but, as I discussed in the Introduction, Filmer admits in *Directions for Obedience to Government in Dangerous and Doubtful Times* (1652) that if "an usurper hath continued so long that the knowledge of the right heir be lost by all the subjects, in such case an usurper in possession is to be taken and reputed by such subjects for the true heir, and is to be obeyed by them as their father" since "no man hath an infallible certitude but only a moral knowledge." Just as an elected assembly assumes the title of "the people," a usurper may take what is properly a hereditary office; indeed, Filmer admits the possibility "that all kings are usurpers, or the heirs or successors of usurpers" (283). Nevertheless, Filmer insists in *The Anarchy* that monarchy can be traced back to the originary power of Adam, initially identifying the "original grant of government" as "Genesis iii, 16, where God ordained Adam to rule over his wife, and her desires were to be subject to his; and as hers, so all theirs that should come of her" (138). Perhaps recognizing that this verse locates the institution of monarchical power after the Fall and therefore in sin, Filmer later adds that

> as soon as Adam was created he was monarch of the world, though he had no subjects. For though there could not be actual government until there were subjects, yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity. Though not in act yet at least in habit Adam was a king from his creation, and in the state of innocency he had been governor of his children. For the integrity or excellency of the subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the governor. Eve was subject to Adam before he sinned; the angels, who are of a pure nature, are subject to God—which confutes their saying who, in disgrace of civil government or power say it was brought in by sin. (145)

As Gordon Schochet explains, Filmer's "origins-determined account of political authority" rests on the fact that initially "only one man, Adam, had been created" (121). Adam's singularity authorizes not only his absolute authority but that of his descendants, and it negates the republican claim that a multitude ever possessed original freedom.

Critics have read *Paradise Lost* as an indirect challenge to Filmer's account of Genesis. Su Fang Ng argues that "while Filmer uses the story of Genesis to conflate fatherhood and monarchy, Milton denies Adam a greater status. Through the fall, Adam is 'brought down / To dwell on even ground now with [his] Sons.' Moreover, there is no suggestion that the prelapsarian Adam would be made king. Monarchy is reserved only for God" (144). According to Erin Murphy, the poem "provid[ed] the now defunct commonwealth with a less scandalous origin by telling a story of freedom, complete with Adam and Eve" (116), one that "not only demonstrates the corruption of royalist family-based government, but also elaborates a distinction between the realm of government and the domain of the domestic couple" (93).[63] I agree with the broad thrust of these accounts, but both Ng and Murphy to some extent idealize Adam's relationship with Eve in order to contrast republican Milton and royalist Filmer: while Ng claims that "Milton's conception of family, in the tracts as well as in *Paradise Lost*, is remarkably free from assumptions of unquestioned patriarchal hierarchy" (165), Murphy maintains that, compared to the public and perversely regal birth of Sin in the poem, "Eve's private birth signals the kind of subjectivity that enables politics precisely because it keeps its family life to itself" (110). I want to suggest, however, that Adam's difficulty in acknowledging what Morrissey refers to as "Eve's otherness" can be read alongside Milton's ambivalence over democracy in his prose; that is, Milton's consistent rejection of kingship should not prevent us from considering the intrusion of quasi-monarchical elements in his republicanism. We will remember that Adam attempts to transform the "collateral" contiguity that underlies his "unity defective" with Eve into a unity without defect that "adheres" instead of "cleaves," that involves one bone rather than many. Milton does something similar in *The Ready and Easy Way*, reducing multiplicity to unity through an oligarchic system of political representation.

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[63] This distinction is of course absent from the Jacobean masques, where marriage frequently stands in for the illusory union of England and Scotland, and from their Caroline successors, which posit Charles and Henrietta Maria's marriage as a model for the entire universe.

This neutralization of contiguity in the drive toward unity plays itself out both in Eve's creation and in Adam's pursuit of her after her birth, arguably the foundational act of human society. While much critical discussion revolves around the implications of Eve's interest in her own "smooth wat'ry image"—is it a sign of narcissism grounded in the misrecognition of the fancy or an authentic expression of and preference for femininity?[64]—I want to focus on the complexities of Adam's appeal to his wife, which Christine Froula reads simply as the intervention of patriarchal authority (4.479). The assertion of patriarchy is undoubtedly present in Adam's words and actions, but what is more interesting is the way in which Adam both reproduces and attempts to control the ambiguities I discussed in his account of Eve's creation. According to Eve, Adam "cri'd'st aloud" to

> Return fair *Eve*,
> Whom fli'st thou? whom thou fli'st, of him thou art,
> His flesh, his bone; to give thee being I lent
> Out of my side to thee, nearest my heart
> Substantial Life, to have thee by my side
> Henceforth an individual solace dear;

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[64] For the former perspective, see Kerrigan, who claims that Eve's "entrancement with her form is transferred, as it were, to Adam, lifting the figure reflected in the mirror of narcissism into the higher dialectics of mutual love" (70). Froula, on the other hand, argues that Eve must "abandon not merely her image in the pool but her very self—a self subtly discounted by the explaining 'voice' [of God], which equates it with the insubstantial image in the pool" (247-48). For a psychoanalytic account of this scene more sympathetic to Eve, see Champagne.

> Part of my Soul I seek thee, and thee claim
> My other half: with that thy gentle hand
> Seiz'd mine […] (4.481-89)

Adam's address is essentially a narrativized repetition of his initial naming of Eve upon her birth, which declared man and woman a totality consisting of "One Flesh, One Heart, One Soul." But in Adam's temporalization of this unity there remains a curious incompleteness: while Adam is able to account for bone, flesh, and heart, he explains that in his pursuit of Eve he still "seek[s]" his "Soul." This admission of deficiency, which complicates the very notion of union, is especially legible in Adam's uses of the word "side." Adam gives flesh "from [his] side" to create Eve so he will have her "by [his] side," but the repetition of the word to some extent conceals the contiguity that emerges in the transition from one "side" to another, both at the level of content—no longer connected (if they ever were), Adam must seek Eve in an effort to attain selfhood, to capture his soul—but also at the level of the text: the same word is placed in close proximity to its repetition, but the two are significantly different in meaning, their joining contiguous at best.

Adam ultimately forecloses this contiguity and does achieve some sort of union through his "gentle seiz[ure]" of Eve's hand. Just as significant as the paradoxical violence of Adam's gesture, however, are the words that precede it. In his declaration to Eve that "Part of my Soul I seek thee, and thee claim / My other half," it seems that Adam has unproblematically identified Eve as already possessing the status of his "other half." In the space of fewer than two lines, then, Adam has moved from incompleteness—"seeking"—to the certainty of a "claim": Adam claims that Eve has a "claim" to his essential nature. This transition hinges on a speech act not necessarily aligned with knowledge, and it allows Adam to shift from a conception of Eve as a more ambiguous "part" of him (one that he is still seeking, moreover) to an assertion of her as his "other half." To return to the fancy/reason dichotomy, Adam attempts to completely supplement his soul through a re-joining of himself with Eve, but he does so by replacing "part" with "half," a "misjoining" that denies the possibility that Eve is something other than the sign of his completeness. I agree with Grossman that "Adam depends on Eve to remain the rib he donated to her creation—to maintain a synecdochic relation to him," but this passage reveals that moving from the part to the whole requires for Adam the imposition of such a relationship rather than the simple recognition of one, and it is no surprise that the same performative force will allow Adam to generate the names of "knowledge or opinion" in his speech on the soul (123).[65] Adam's encounter with Eve demonstrates the ways in which the first parents' "joining" is necessarily a "misjoining," one that emerges first and foremost through the imposition of a name.

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[65] My analysis of the precarious combination of "soul" and "flesh" here deals implicitly with the issue of Milton's monism. According to Stephen M. Fallon, Milton's later work, including *Paradise Lost*, seeks to "eliminate the Platonists' ontological gap between soul and body. Considered as a tenuous substance not different in kind from the body, the soul can become carnal and fleshly in more than symbolic terms" (85). Fallon traces Milton's turn from the Platonism of *Comus* (1634) to the divorce tracts, which assert the "interrelationship of spirit and body" (89). Rachel A. Trubowitz has recently put pressure on the notion that Milton is a monist, however, arguing that although critics "generally agree that his monism deeply informs his subversive politics," Milton's "antipathy to dynastic kingship and its organic measures of personal entitlement and social belonging require him to repudiate the body and traditional body politic and to revalue personal and collective identity in disembodied rather than embodied terms" (388-89). For Trubowitz, Milton "wants and needs to integrate spirit and body but also to separate them" (389). I tend to side with Trubowitz, since I am arguing that Adam's presumed union with Eve—which he tropes as a combination of flesh and soul—is predicated on "misjoining" and remains unfulfilled. More work needs to be done on the potential (but of course ambivalent) political value of Platonism in the seventeenth century. While Kevin Sharpe maintains that the "ideal of the state of nature as a reconciliation, an integration of the worlds of sense and soul" is "a different ideal from that of the masque," I have attempted to show that the masque genre, and royalist aesthetics more generally, depends on the presumed fusion of the bodies of the monarch, the nation, and God (243). Fallon furthermore acknowledges that the monist conception of society in *The Ready and Easy Way* is hierarchical, positing a "progressive sifting reminiscent of the distillation of the spirits in Raphael's lecture on the one first matter" in *Paradise Lost* (110), which Fallon describes as "synecdochic" (103).

In *Paradise Lost*, the foundation of human society rests in an utterance that renames division as combination, an utterance that is necessary to manage (but not fill) the gap that separates the part and the whole.

Whether and how to keep open this gap is one of the most important questions that Milton's work raises, a question that is simultaneously epistemological, spiritual, and political. In *Areopagitica*, Milton claims that "Truth," in the form of Christ, "indeed came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on" (741). After Christ's death, "the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them. We have not yet found them all, Lords and Commons, nor ever shall do, till her Master's second coming. He shall bring together every joint and member, and shall mold them into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection." Against those who insist that religious schism destroys society, Milton maintains that

> they are the troublers, they are the dividers of unity, who neglect and permit not others to unite those dissevered pieces which are yet wanting to the body of Truth. To be still searching what we know not by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it (for all her body is homogeneal and proportional), this is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic, and makes up the best harmony in a church; not the forced and outward union of cold and neutral and inwardly divided minds. (742)

Although Milton claims here that the "body" of Truth is "homogeneal and proportional," he admits later that "it is not impossible that she may have more shapes than one […] without being unlike herself" (747). How does one maintain proportion and homogeneity within multiplicity?

How is society—Christian, political, or otherwise—to achieve "harmony" rather than the "outward union" of "inwardly divided minds"?

The solution for Filmer, of course, is recognition of and subservience to the embodied unity of the single monarch. Despite his ambivalent justification of usurpation, the king and truth are inextricably linked. Neither *should* "have more shapes than one"; "majesty" must, in Northumberland's words, "look like itself." Filmer traces this unity to Adam's supremacy over Eve, but Milton's depiction of their relationship reveals its contingency. To draw on the language of *Areopagitica*, Adam and Eve's marriage does not "bring together every joint and member" and constitute "an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection," the sort of union of body and soul or temporal and divine that is supposedly achieved in the Caroline masque. Any human relationship—including one in Eden—is made precarious by the presence of difference. As Milton argues in *Tetrachordon*, it is "most unlike resemblance," even if the unity emerging from "resemblance" is its ultimate goal. *Paradise Lost* and *The Ready and Easy Way* both struggle to accommodate difference, but that does not necessarily mean that they mark Milton's retreat from politics. Rather, they demonstrate the irreducibly complex and paradoxical foundation of community in his writings, a complexity that will always possibly lead to the "misjoining" of "every joint and member" because, for now, we know only in part.

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