

UC Berkeley

Working Paper Series

Title

Tax Policy Toward Low-Income Families

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/87d6v10j>

Authors

Hoynes, Hilary
Rothstein, Jesse

Publication Date

2016-03-01



IRLE WORKING PAPER
#101-16
March 2016

Tax Policy Toward Low-Income Families

Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein

Cite as: Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein (2016). "Tax Policy Toward Low-Income Families". IRLE Working Paper No. 101-16. <http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/101-16.pdf>

Tax Policy Toward Low-Income Families

Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein¹

UC Berkeley and NBER

March 2016

Abstract:

In this paper, we review the most prominent provision of the federal income tax code that targets low-income tax filers, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), as well as the structurally similar Child Tax Credit (CTC). We frame the paper around what we see as the programs' goals: distributional, promoting work, and limiting administrative and compliance costs. We review what is known about program impacts and distributional consequences under current law, drawing on simulations from the Tax Policy Center. We conclude that the EITC is quite successful in meeting its three goals. In contrast, most of the benefits of the CTC go to higher income households. In addition to analyzing current law, we assess possible reforms that would reach groups – for the EITC, those without children; for the CTC, those with very low earnings – who are largely missed under current policy.

¹ hoynes@berkeley.edu and rothstein@berkeley.edu. We are very grateful to staff at the Tax Policy Center, and particularly Elaine Maag for providing us with simulations of the Urban Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation model. We thank Claire Montialoux, Audrey Tiew and Darian Woods for excellent research assistance. Portions of this paper draw heavily on Nichols and Rothstein (2015) and Hoynes and Patel (2015). We are grateful for helpful comments to Alan Auerbach, Louis Kaplow, Jim Hines, Len Berman, Diane Schanzenbach, Bob Greenstein, Chye-Ching Huang, and participants in the “Economics of Tax Policy” conference held in Washington, DC on December 3-4, 2015.

I. INTRODUCTION

The tax code focuses on high-income families because that is where the money is. The bottom 40% of tax filing units – those with incomes below \$39,370 – earned just 14% of pre-tax income in 2013 (Tax Policy Center 2013). Under any even slightly progressive tax schedule this group would contribute very little revenue.

But the tax code is used to pursue purposes and objectives other than revenue collection. Today, the two most prominent provisions of the federal income tax code that target low-income tax filers, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the less prominent but similar Child Tax Credit (CTC), are explicitly redistributive, designed to transfer money to families rather than tax it away from them.

The EITC is a tax credit available to lower-income families with positive earned income. Importantly, it is refundable: Many recipients' incomes are too low to generate substantial tax obligations, so with the EITC their liabilities are negative and they receive refund checks from the Internal Revenue Service. In 2013, 87 percent of the total tax expenditure of the EITC took the form of tax refunds (Internal Review Service 2015a).

Since its introduction in 1975, the EITC has grown to become a central element of the U.S. social safety net (Bitler, Hoynes and Kuka 2016). In 2013, the EITC reached 28.8 million tax filers at a total cost of \$68 billion. Almost 20 percent of all tax filers and 44 percent of filers with children receive the credit. The maximum credit in 2015 is \$6,242 for families with three children, \$5,548 for those with two children, \$3,359 for those with one child, and \$503 for those without children – this can be as much as 45% of a family's pre-tax income. Overall, the average credit amount for families with children is a substantial \$3,063 (Internal Review Service 2015a). The program dwarfs traditional cash welfare (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or

TANF), which reached only 1.6 million families in 2013, an almost 70 percent decline since 1994.

The CTC is more recent, introduced in 1997. It is structurally similar to the EITC, but more universal in design and less targeted on lower-income families. In 2015, it is available to families with incomes as high as \$150,000 for married couples (\$115,000 for singles), with the maximum credit available at incomes as high as \$110,000 for married couples (\$75,000 for singles). The CTC is not inflation adjusted, so these parameters are generally fixed in nominal terms from one year to the next; the nominal maximum credit has been unchanged at \$1,000 per child since 2003. Although this is much smaller than the maximum EITC, the CTC's broader reach across the income distribution means that total expenditures are comparable (\$56 billion for the CTC vs. \$68 billion for the EITC in 2013).

The CTC, unlike the EITC, is not fully refundable. This has limited its value to low-income families. But in 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act greatly expanded the refundability of the CTC, making the schedule similar to the EITC's. This expansion was originally a temporary one, but has recently been made permanent.

In this paper, we review the roles of the EITC and CTC, what is known about their impacts and distributional consequences, and the possibilities for reform. We begin in Section II by discussing the goals of the programs and in Section III we review their structure and history. Section IV discusses the economics of in-work tax credits like the EITC and CTC. Section V evaluates what we know about how the programs affect these objectives. In Section VI we discuss possible reforms that might help further the program goals set out in Section II. In Section VII we conclude.

II. FRAMING: WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF THESE TAX PROVISIONS?

The EITC and CTC are best seen not as taxes but as transfer programs that happen to be administered through the tax code. As we see it, they have three primary goals. First, all means-tested transfer programs are designed in part to achieve distributional objectives. In the case of the EITC, these are to transfer funds to low- and moderate-income families, and particularly to those with children. The CTC's distributional aims are less clear, given its high phase-out point – the target is clearly the broad middle class rather than just the lowest-income families. It may be better thought of as a “universal child benefit,” aimed at horizontal equity between families with and without children. Differing schedules by family type are a long-standing feature of the U.S. tax system, and distinguishing by the number of children may make sense if, for example, the marginal utility of consumption declines more slowly the larger is the family.²

The two other main goals are what distinguish the EITC and CTC from other transfer programs. Each aims to encourage work (though as we discuss below this is not true for all families) and to limit the high administrative costs associated with other transfer programs that require very labor-intensive eligibility screening.

The EITC is quite successful at all three goals. Almost three-quarters its benefits go to families with annual incomes below \$25,000, roughly the 24th percentile of the income distribution (Internal Revenue Service 2015a; DeNavas et al. 2015), and EITC payments lift millions of families out of poverty each year. The evidence indicates that the program has substantially raised the labor force participation rates of single mothers, by perhaps five to eight

² The dependent exemption would seem to be able to accomplish this, without need for the CTC. Like the CTC, the dependent exemption phases out as income rises. The primary differences between the two are that the CTC is (partially) refundable and that it distinguishes between children and other dependents.

percentage points (though there is also evidence of smaller negative effects on married women's participation and on the intensive margin). Finally, the tax system has many administrative advantages over a welfare bureaucracy, and has proved to be an efficient means of distributing the EITC. As we discuss below, however, there are nontrivial rates of noncompliance with the EITC, particularly on dimensions that are not well tracked by existing third party reporting).³

The CTC is much less studied. It performs much less well at transferring income to the neediest families, and is likely less effective at encouraging work as well. But like the EITC it is quite inexpensive to administer, and its redistribution to the middle and upper middle parts of the income distribution is apparently also valued by policymakers.

Nevertheless, although these provisions generally do a good job of meeting their objectives, neither is perfect. In Section IV we discuss some options for reforming the programs that might be considered.

III. CURRENT POLICIES AND RECENT REFORMS

To be eligible for the EITC, a taxpayer – or tax filing unit – must have earned income during the tax year.⁴ The value of the credit is determined by a benefit schedule with three regions, known as the “phase-in,” “flat” (or “plateau”), and “phase-out.” In the phase-in region, the credit increases by a share of each additional dollar earned. Once the credit reaches its

³ There are also drawbacks to tax-based administration, however. Two are that tax refunds are generally paid only once a year and relatively easily captured by for-profit firms via fees for tax preparation or high interest rates on tax refund anticipation loans. The now-defunct Advance EITC program allowed for more gradual payment, but take-up was extremely low (even in experiments designed to target information and default effects; see IRS and U.S. Department of the Treasury 1999; Jones 2010; U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007). Recent reforms have dramatically reduced the prevalence of tax refund anticipation loans

⁴ Earned income is the sum of wages, tips, salary, union strike benefits, some disability payments, and net self-employment earnings (IRS and U.S. Department of the Treasury 2013).

maximum value, the taxpayer is in the second, “flat” region, where additional earnings do not affect the credit value. In the final region, the credit declines with each additional dollar of earnings (or, adjusted gross income, or AGI, if that is higher) until it is zero.

The exact parameters of the schedule vary by filing status and by the number of qualifying children, but the basic shape is the same. Figure 1 displays the schedule in 2015 as a function of earned income for single taxpayers with no, one, two, and three or more children. The Figure makes clear that the credit for families with children is much different than that for childless families, and we start with the former. The phase-in or subsidy rate is substantial at 34 (or 40 or 45) percent for those with one (or two or three) children, while the phase-out rate is much lower, at 15.98 (21.06) percent for those with one (two or more) children. Maximum benefits range from \$3,359 for families with one child to \$6,242 for those with three or more. Single taxpayers with incomes above \$39,131 (with one child), \$44,454 (with two children), or \$47,747 (with three or more children) are ineligible for the credit.⁵ The credit for families without children is much less generous, with phase-in rate of 7.65, a maximum credit of \$503 and a maximum allowable income of \$14,820.

Importantly, the EITC is refundable: if the credit exceeds a taxpayer’s tax liability, he or she receives the difference as a refund. Typically, families with earnings below \$20,000-\$25,000 will owe very little income tax, so the bulk of the EITC will arrive as a refund even when withholding is zero.⁶

⁵ Unmarried taxpayers with dependents are termed head of household filers. In this paper, we typically refer to this group as “single filers with children” or “single parents with children.”

⁶ For example, a single parent with two children enters the first bracket (with a 10 percent marginal tax rate) at gross earnings of \$22,000.

As elsewhere in the tax code, there are many complexities and special cases, not all illustrated in Figure 1. Married couples, for example, have slightly different schedules – with longer “plateau” segments and higher phase-out points – than do single filers with the same number of children (as illustrated by the dotted lines in the figure). Defining qualifying children is also difficult, and qualification for the EITC differs from that for the dependent exemption.⁷ Finally, the schedule is slightly more complex for families with unearned income. When earnings place the family in the plateau or phase-out ranges and adjusted gross income (including unearned income) exceeds earned income, the credit is based on the latter.

The current EITC schedule reflects substantial growth over time. Figure 2 shows how the maximum credit has evolved for families of different sizes. After the program’s introduction in 1975, inflation gradually eroded the real maximum benefit. The 1987 expansion of the EITC, passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, increased the generosity of the credit and indexed the credit schedule to inflation. The most prominent change was the 1993 expansion, enacted as one of President Bill Clinton’s signature initiatives – it introduced a credit for families without children for the first time, and greatly increased the credit for families with two or more children. Elsewhere in the figure, one can see smaller expansions in the early 1990s, as well as the introduction of a separate three-child schedule in 2009. This last change was part of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and was originally set to expire at the end of 2010, but has since been extended through 2017. Table 1 shows the specific credit parameters for selected years.

⁷ A qualifying child for the EITC is younger than 19 (or younger than 24 and a full time student), lives with the taxpayer for more than half the year, has a valid social security number, and is not claimed as a dependent by another taxpayer (IRS and U.S. Department of the Treasury 2013). In some circumstances, a grandchild can qualify.

The Child Tax Credit (CTC) has a similar form to the EITC, with a phase-in, flat and phase-out structure and a schedule that differs somewhat across family types.⁸ However, the structure of the two programs is otherwise different. The CTC depends only on adjusted gross income (AGI), not on earnings. The phase-in and phase-out rates are 15% and 5%, much smaller in magnitude than the EITC. The maximum credit is \$1,000 per qualifying child and unlike the EITC the credit is fixed nominally and does not change each year with prices. Importantly, the CTC schedule has an extremely large flat (plateau) range. For two-child tax units, it ranges from \$13,333 to \$75,000 if single and to \$110,000 if married. As a consequence, families with quite high incomes can receive positive CTCs. For example, married couples with three children (who face the most generous schedules) are ineligible for the EITC if their earnings exceed \$53,267, but can receive the CTC with incomes as high as \$170,000. Table 2 shows specific CTC parameters for different family types.

Another major difference is that the CTC, unlike the EITC, is not fully refundable. The refundable portion of the CTC is known as the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), and is limited to 15% of earned income above a fixed threshold. This threshold was \$11,500 (in nominal dollars) in 2007, preventing most low income families from receiving meaningful CTCs. But in 2009, ARRA reduced the threshold to \$3,000 (again nominal). This allowed more taxpayers to claim the Additional Child Tax Credit and increased the amount of refundable credits, making the low-income portion of the schedule more similar to the EITC. Like the three-child EITC provision of ARRA, the reduced CTC threshold was originally set to expire at the end of 2010, but it was made permanent in late 2015.

⁸ The relevant family type distinctions differ somewhat from the EITC: Only children 16 and under (at the end of the tax year) qualify for the CTC, and it is available to married taxpayers who file separately (who cannot receive the EITC).

Figure 3 augments the EITC schedule for single (head-of-household) taxpayers with two children, as illustrated in Figure 1, with additional areas representing the portions of the CTC that are used to offset other taxes and refunded under the 2014 schedule.⁹ The figure also shows (in an area labeled as “forfeited”) the portion of the credit that is forgone by very low income families for whom the refundability limit is binding. This makes clear that the refundable portion of the CTC serves in large part to expand the EITC, serving approximately the same income range but increasing the benefit. By contrast, the portion of the CTC that offsets other tax liabilities rises much higher in the income distribution, not even beginning to phase out until income is double or more of the maximum value under the EITC.

Figure 4 shows tax expenditures on the EITC and CTC over time, in real 2014 dollars and including both tax refunds and foregone tax revenues. The EITC expanded from about \$5 billion per year in the 1980s to nearly \$50 billion in the mid-1990s, and has grown gradually since then. EITC expenditures were just shy of \$70 billion in 2013. The CTC was introduced in 1997, but has grown extremely rapidly since then – since 2003, its total cost has been comparable to the EITC.

An often-voiced concern about means-tested transfer programs is that they can create high effective marginal tax rates (MTRs) as they phase out, and that the constellation of overlapping programs can create an extremely complex budget constraint. Figure 5, taken from Steuerle and Quakenbush (2015), shows the combined value of the EITC, the CTC, and other tax- and universally-available benefit provisions affecting low-income families (the Child and Dependent Care tax credit; the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP; Medicaid;

⁹ The calculations are for a family with no unearned income or itemized deductions that does not receive the Child and Dependent Care Credit.

the Children's Health Insurance Program, CHIP; and health insurance premium assistance under the Affordable Care Act).¹⁰ We assume here that families participate in all of the available programs, where in fact there is substantial non-participation in each. The tax provisions are at the bottom, with transfers and health programs above them. Three things are of note here. First, the cash value of Medicaid and SNAP benefits (formerly known as food stamps) is much larger than that of the EITC for a family with income below \$25,000 (though families may not value health insurance at its full cost). Second, despite this, the overall trapezoid shape created by the EITC schedule, with negative marginal tax rates (i.e., a positive slope in Figure 5) at low incomes and positive marginal tax rates (a negative slope) at higher levels, shows through despite all of the other programs that are layered on top of it. Third, the EITC serves a population that is also targeted by other means-tested transfers, where the CTC serves a much higher-income population that is unlikely to be receiving other transfers.

Figure 6 provides another look at the interaction among programs. Here, we plot the net effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), again assuming 100 percent take-up of the tax and transfer programs. In the figure, the solid line shows the EMTR for all tax and benefit programs, the dashed line shows the EMTR generated by federal income taxes (EITC, CTC, and the ordinary income tax) and the dotted line shows the EMTR for the EITC and CTC alone. (This figure is also taken from Steuerle and Quakenbush (2015) but we modify it by adding the third series.) Again, we see that other programs shift the marginal tax rate schedule around, but that the basic

¹⁰ The figure shows the programs in Colorado. It would be qualitatively similar in other states, but Medicaid differs across states both in its value and in its reach into the income distribution (for states that did not take up the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion).

pattern of negative, zero, then positive MTRs created by the EITC and CTC carries through to the overall schedule.¹¹

The U.S. EITC has parallels in programs in place in many other developed countries (OECD 2011). One that is often discussed is the United Kingdom’s Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC; see, e.g., Blundell and Hoynes 2004). Like the EITC, it is available only to those who work. A key design difference is that the WFTC does not have a phase-in negative marginal tax rate; rather, it is available only to those who meet minimum weekly hours requirements.

Enumerating the universe of EITC-like programs (often referred to as “In-Work Tax Credits”) in other countries is difficult, as similar tax structures can appear quite different depending on how the different portions are labeled. (Consider, for example, the “program” consisting of the combination of payroll taxes, the EITC, and the TANF and food stamps benefit phase-outs.) There is a great deal of heterogeneity in implementation (see Nichols and Rothstein 2015; OECD 2011), in part reflecting different weights placed on the three goals we outline above. The OECD (2011) classifies programs into those that are more targeted (this group includes the U.S., UK, France) and those that are more universal with low or no phase-out (this group includes Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands). The U.S. program stands out as more generous and as having one of the largest phase-in rates.

¹¹ The figure shows average MTRs over \$5,000 income ranges, to smooth over spikes in MTRs when taxes and benefits change discretely. This smoothing obscures the zero MTR in the plateau region of the combined EITC and CTC schedule – the \$15,000 to \$20,000 range includes a portion of the phase-out range as well.

IV. THE ECONOMICS OF IN-WORK TAX CREDITS

We discuss labor supply incentives under the EITC; those created by the CTC are generally similar, though we discuss a few relevant differences below.

The EITC generates labor supply incentives on the intensive and extensive margins that differ depending on marital status.¹² Among single parents, who represent 60 percent of EITC filers and 74 percent of total EITC tax expenditures, the EITC increases the returns to entering employment for those outside of the labor force, leading to an increase in labor supply on the extensive margin. The phase-in marginal tax rates are large in magnitude, currently -34 percent for those with one child, -40 percent for those with two children and -45 percent for those with three or more children. This leads to sizable increases in the first-hour net-of-tax wage (though a small portion of this is offset by other taxes, most notably payroll taxes, and by phase-outs in other transfer program schedules), and thus to large incentives to enter work. Even for those whose potential earnings are beyond the phase-in, the EITC increases the net-of-tax wage for entering work so long as potential earnings are below the end of the phase-out range. Figure 7 illustrates the canonical budget constraint and income-leisure tradeoff under the EITC.

The effects of the EITC on the intensive margin, for those already in the labor market, are less unambiguously work-promoting. In the phase-in region, the EITC increases the net-of-tax wage; the effect on the intensive margin is ambiguous due to a positive substitution effect and a negative income effect. On the other hand, in the phase-out region, both substitution and income effects create a consistent incentive to reduce labor supply, while in the flat region the substitution effect is zero but the pure income effect also is predicted to reduce labor supply.

¹² This discussion draws from our prior work including Eissa and Hoynes (2006a), Hoynes and Patel (2015) and Nichols and Rothstein (2015).

Because the EITC is based on family income, the credit leads to a somewhat different set of incentives for married taxpayers. Overall, as with singles, we would expect higher rates of “family” employment (participation by at least one family member) for married couples, as a result of the credit being tied to work. But individual participation incentives can be more complex, particularly for secondary earners. Consider a sequential labor supply decision, where one spouse chooses his/her labor supply (non-strategically) before the other. The primary earner faces the same labor supply incentives as does a single filer, discussed above. However, suppose the primary earner earns enough to take the family into the phase-out range on his/her own. In this case the second mover can only reduce the family’s credit by working, and the EITC thus reduces net returns to labor market participation. Importantly, though, the effective positive tax rate here is smaller in magnitude than the negative rate faced by single parents: It can never be bigger than the EITC phase-out rate (currently maxing out at 21.06 percent), and will often be much smaller.

As this makes clear, there are two unambiguous pro-work incentives in the EITC: Single parents and married couples (jointly) are encouraged to work rather than to remain out of the labor force. This is perhaps not surprising, as it is exactly this intended response that motivated the design of the program. But for other groups (secondary earners) and at other margins (hours of work rather than annual participation) the incentives can work in the opposite direction, discouraging rather than encouraging work.

The broad EITC structure can be seen as an efficient way to redistribute income and encourage work. Saez (2002) shows that the optimal income tax schedule can take an EITC-like form when labor supply is more elastic at the extensive than at the intensive margin. However, Saez’s model, like most other optimal tax models, abstracts from the United States’ family-based

tax system. It is difficult to understand the positive tax rate that secondary earners face on the first dollar of earnings as anything other than a necessary consequence of implementing the EITC within such a system.¹³ (Other countries typically tax at the individual level.)

The self-employed face additional incentives not captured by the above discussion. These mostly relate to reporting – where wage and salary earnings are reported to the IRS by the employer (on the Form W-2 earnings report), self-employed workers report their own earnings with limited third party verification, and may be able to change the amount of earnings reported without changing their actual labor supply. Additionally, many self-employed workers make accounting decisions about how to allocate business income between earnings and profits, and may have some latitude about the costs they deduct from business earnings. Those in the phase-out range of the EITC schedule, and even some with earnings above the end of that range, can face an incentive to hide or reclassify some earnings in order to maximize their credit (this would also reduce federal income taxes).

By contrast, those in the phase-in range face incentives to *raise* their reported earnings. This is because the EITC phase-in rate is higher, in absolute value, than the additional payroll (and ordinary income) taxes that would need to be paid on additional reported earnings. Similar incentives apply to those choosing between formal and informal (i.e., under the table) work – the EITC raises the return to being paid formally, though it can also incentivize shifting a portion of compensation under the table for those in the phase-out range. Most IRS enforcement efforts are

¹³ Berlin (2007) and Kearney and Turner (2013) propose reforms that would move toward an individual-based system.

focused on identifying under-reporting, and a taxpayer who over-reported her self-employment income in order to increase her EITC may be hard to detect.¹⁴

Labor supply predictions under the CTC are similar, but more muted given the smaller credit amount. The general shapes of the two credits are similar, each with phase-in, flat, and phase-out regions. However, the “flat” portion of the CTC is very large and the phase-out rate is low, only 5 percent, and comes in at relatively high income levels—among families with two children the phase-out region starts at \$110,000 for married couples and \$75,000 for single parents and ends at \$150,000 and \$115,000, respectively.

The incentive to participate in the labor market under both the EITC and the CTC is based on the (negative) average tax rate at potential earnings. The CTC never creates an average tax rate smaller than -13.04% (this is for three-child families), and for most potential workers it is larger than this. (The combined ATR of the two programs in combination can be much more negative, but this is driven by the EITC.) Thus, while the CTC shares the EITC’s pro-participation incentive, the CTC’s contribution is likely to be small. The secondary earner and intensive margin incentives are less important as well, given the long reach of the program.

The EITC and CTC also create incentives surrounding other decisions that would affect the tax credit, most notably marriage and fertility. These are not explicit goals of the programs, and indeed the incentivized behavior is often counter to what we might hope to promote, but are inherent in a credit administered through the family-based tax system and tied to the presence and number of children. In particular, the EITC creates incentives for low-income one-earner couples to legally marry, while for low-income two-earner couples the incentive is to avoid

¹⁴ Consider, for example, a self-employed individual in the phase-in range who chooses not to claim a business expense deduction to which she would otherwise be entitled, as doing so would reduce her net earnings and thus her EITC. It is not clear that this would be preventable even if detected.

marriage or separate. The substitution effects are fairly clear here, but there may also be income effects at work, possibly in the opposite direction: Increased financial resources due to the EITC and CTC may free some women from the pressure to enter into unpromising marriages. On net then, the EITC and CTC, like ordinary income taxes, create marriage penalties for some and marriages bonuses for others. Additionally, because the credits increase with the number of children, they may incentivize additional births.

Given the distributional goal of the credits, it is useful to consider their expected effects on the distribution of income. We distinguish two types of effects: the *direct* and *indirect* effects of the programs on net disposable income. The direct effect is simply the EITC or CTC payment, which of course raises after-tax and transfer income. The indirect effect comes from any induced change in pre-tax earnings and other family income. For those induced to enter the labor market, increases in earnings increase family income (a positive indirect effect), but this may be partly offset by reductions in other income sources, such as cash welfare and SNAP. For those already in the work force, the indirect effect is likely to be negative, but for plausible elasticities much smaller than the positive direct effect.

There is another indirect effect as well, not yet discussed. Specifically, the EITC may affect *pre-tax* wages. Since the negative effective tax rate encourages increased labor force participation, standard tax incidence models suggest that the credit will be shared between the buyers and sellers of labor (Rothstein 2008, 2010; Leigh 2010). This occurs through a reduced pre-tax wage, allowing employers of EITC recipients to capture a portion of the money spent on the EITC (and, as a side effect, creating a transfer from non-EITC workers competing in the same labor markets as the recipients to their employers). This fact was not prominent in early

discussions of the EITC but concerns about incidence have become more prominent as the EITC has expanded in the presence of relatively low minimum wages.

It is useful to relate back to the credit schedule to consider where in the income distribution we expect to see these direct and indirect gains. Figure 8 provides some of this information by illustrating the 2015 EITC in income/poverty space for six groups defined by marital status and number of children. In each figure, the x-axis is pre-tax earnings (or AGI) and the y-axis is after tax income (earnings plus the EITC), expressed as a percent of the poverty threshold. Consider a single parent with two children working full time at the federal minimum wage (this group is in Figure 8e). Pre-tax earnings would be \$15,080, or about 75% of the poverty line. But this family would be in the plateau region of the EITC, with a credit of \$5,548 that would bring post-EITC income to 103% of the poverty line. Seen somewhat differently, a family with earnings as low as \$14,542 -- placing it just above the top of the EITC phase-in region -- would be at 72% of the FPL without the EITC but would be lifted to the poverty line by the EITC. Figure 8f shows that a married couple family with two children with earnings of \$18,702 (in the flat region) would be at 77 percent of the FPL without the EITC but would be lifted out of poverty by the EITC. By contrast, the credit for the childless (panels a and b) is sufficiently ungenerous that all recipients remain in poverty even when their credits are counted as income.

V. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT HOW WELL THE PROGRAMS ACCOMPLISH THEIR OBJECTIVES?

We organize our assessment of the available evidence around the three goals that we discussed above: distributional, encouragement of work, and limiting of noncompliance and

administrative costs. We begin in Section V.A by presenting empirical estimates of the distributional effects, neglecting behavioral adjustments. We then review the empirical literatures measuring behavioral effects on labor supply (and other outcomes) in Section V.B and noncompliance in Section V.C. There is much more direct evidence regarding the EITC, which has a much higher public profile, than about the CTC, so our discussion focuses on the former. In the final subsection, V.D, we present the available evidence on what is missed by the static perspective – on the distributional impacts of the programs once indirect effects operating through labor supply and other changes that influence pre-tax income are included.

V.A. Static distributional effects

Median family income in 2014 was \$53,657, the 20th percentile was \$21,432, and the 40th percentile was \$41,186 (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2015). Comparing these figures to Figure 8 shows that a large fraction of families have incomes that are both (a) not too far from the poverty line and (b) in the range where the EITC can have a substantial effect. This suggests that the EITC has the potential to have important effects on after-tax poverty and income distributions, even before considering any indirect effects operating through labor supply channels.

We rely on two sources in assessing the static distributional effects of the EITC and CTC. The first is the Census Bureau’s calculations for the new Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM).¹⁵ The SPM resource measure includes taxes and both cash and non-cash benefits, allowing for a simple static calculation as to the anti-poverty effects of the EITC and CTC covering the whole population of tax filers and non-filers alike. In 2014, the SPM poverty rate

¹⁵ Official poverty is based on pre-tax cash income. Thus, the direct (or static) impact of the EITC on official poverty is zero by construction. The SPM is designed, in part, to capture the effects of tax and other policies on poverty that are missed by the official poverty measure.

was 15.3 percent, but the Census Bureau calculates that it would have been 18.4 percent without the EITC and CTC (Short 2015). The effect on child poverty is even larger: The SPM poverty rate for those under 18 years of age was 16.7 percent, but would have been 23.8 percent without the refundable tax credits. Based on these numbers, the EITC and CTC can be credited with lifting 9.8 million people, including 5.2 million children, out of poverty. The effects on total poverty are far larger than those of any other single program except Social Security, and the effects on child poverty are the largest without exception.

Of course to gain these benefits, a family has to take-up EITC benefits (file taxes and request the EITC). In the past decades, take-up rates for families with children have been steady at 80% or more (Scholz 1994; Plueger 2009) fairly high compared to other programs serving low income families (Currie 2006). The expansions to childless taxpayers, who have lower take-up rates, has led to a decline in the overall take-up rate estimated to be 75% in 2005 (Plueger 2009).

The second approach limits attention to tax filers, as represented in the Statistics of Income Public Use File distributed by the IRS. We begin by illustrating the *potential reach* of the two programs. Figures 9 and 10 show the pre-tax income distribution of tax filers in 2009 (the most recent year available), inflated to 2014 dollars and presented by marital status (married, single) and number of children (zero, 1, 2, 3 or more).¹⁶ Figure 9 is for single filers and Figure 10 is for married. The income tabulations include all tax filers, not just EITC or CTC recipients.¹⁷ Overlaid on each figure are the EITC and CTC schedules. Several observations can be drawn from these figures. First, they illustrate the variation in the generosity of the schedule across the

¹⁶ In this and future figures, tax filers are divided by the number of children claimed as exemptions. This generally corresponds to the number of qualifying children for the EITC and CTC, though there are exceptions.

¹⁷ We limit the sample in each case to those returns with earned income between \$1 and \$200,000 and indicate in figure notes the share of total filers for that demographic group that are excluded from the histogram (those filers with earned income that is ≤ 0 or $> \$200,000$).

eight groups. The credits are substantially larger for families with children than for those without children and the credits are larger for families with larger children. Second, they show that the potential reach of the EITC, particularly among single parents, is very high. Only 30% of singles with one child and 18% of singles with two children have earnings higher than the top of the phase-out range (compared to 75% and 76% for married families with one and two children, respectively). Third, they show that the CTC extends to very high income levels, and the majority of both single and married parents qualify for substantial benefits.

Next, we move from the potential reach to the actual use of the programs – not all families are eligible, and while take-up rates are high they are not complete. We use the Tax Policy Center’s (TPC) microsimulation model, applied to the same Statistics of Income file, to measure the distribution of EITC and CTC benefits under current law. We discuss these current law findings in the next paragraphs. In a later section, we use the same approach to examine the distributional impacts of alternative policies.¹⁸

To illustrate the benefits of current law EITC and CTC, we use the TPC simulations to zero each out in turn. By comparing the resulting estimates to those obtained using the actual policies, we can estimate the distribution of the benefits from each. By design, the TPC simulations assume that pre-tax income and earnings, as well as all other characteristics (e.g., number of children) are unaffected by counterfactual tax rules, so only capture the *static* effects of the current policies. We discuss the implications for the full dynamics effects below.

Figure 11 summarizes the EITC and CTC in terms of their distribution across family types (as well as also showing the distribution of total tax filers across these groups). Over 60% of EITC benefits go to head-of-household filers (i.e., to single parents), but this group receives

¹⁸ We thank Elaine Maag and the TPC tax model team for providing us with these simulations.

only 40% of CTC benefits. This is due to the CTC's high income limits, which allow over half of the benefits to flow to married couples (many dual-earners); this group gets less than one-quarter of EITC benefits. Not surprisingly, childless single and married filers get few benefits under either policy.¹⁹

Figure 12a plots the distribution of EITC and CTC benefits across the income distribution, pooling tax filers of all different family types. The x-axis shows bins of 2015 filing-unit income. There are three sets of bars: The first plots the share of total tax units in each income group; the second the share of total EITC benefits that accrue to each income group; and the third the share of total CTC benefits received by each income group. As context for these shares, note that the total cost of the EITC in 2015 is estimated by the TPC model at \$69 billion, while the CTC is \$55 billion.²⁰ The line graph illustrates the share of total income accounted for by each income group – not surprisingly, the highest income categories account for a much larger share of income than of filing units or of program benefits.

The EITC series in Figure 12a shows the distributional goal of the program is well met – nearly 60% of the benefits go to filers with income below \$30,000. The CTC is less successful in this regard – only one-fifth of benefits go to families with incomes below \$30,000. At the other end of the spectrum, 57% of CTC benefits but only 11% of EITC benefits go to filers with incomes over \$50,000; over 20% of CTC benefits go to families with incomes above \$100,000

The remaining panels in Figure 12 show the distribution across both family type and income, distinguishing among married couples with children (Figure 12b), married couples

¹⁹ Both CTC and EITC bars are non-zero for the “single” and “joint no children” groups. There are some circumstances in which a filer can receive the EITC or CTC while not claiming child exemptions.

²⁰ The CTC series here includes both credits that are used to offset income tax liabilities and credits issued as refunds, but not those that are forfeited because they exceed the refundability limit.

without children (Figure 12d), single filers with children (Figure 12c) and single filers without children (Figure 12e). For each subgroup, we display the relevant series (tax units, pre-tax income, EITC benefits, CTC benefits) as shares of the total (all filers) amount. Comparing the EITC bars to the tax unit bars in these figures, it is clear that much of the variation in EITC benefits across married- and single-parent families, as seen in Figure 11, is a reflection of income distributions within each group. There are roughly 15% more married-with-children returns as head-of-household returns, but the latter are 3.7 times as likely to have incomes below \$40,000. CTC payments are much less sensitive to income, so are more concentrated in married-couple families.

One limit to the redistributive power of the EITC is not reflected in Figure 12: Most of the benefits are distributed as tax refunds in the spring. If families are credit constrained – as many EITC recipients likely are – then an annual lump-sum payment has a smaller effect on the household’s welfare than would one that is more evenly distributed, and thus the EITC is a less effective redistribution policy than it appears based on annual income distributions. The Advance EITC program allowed recipients to receive their credits throughout the year, but take-up was extremely low (under 1%) and the IRS eventually cancelled the program. Its failure does not seem to be due to lack of information or even default effects: Experiments that inform recipients about the program and to overcome default behavior had only minor impacts on take-up (IRS 1999; Jones 2010). This could indicate that recipients prefer their EITC payments as lump-sums, perhaps seeing the program as a form of forced saving (see the discussion in Nichols and Rothstein 2015). But the preferences of EITC recipients in this regard are not well understood.

V.B. Behavioral Effects

A significant body of research examines the behavioral effects of the EITC, much of it exploiting significant expansions in the tax acts of 1986, 1990, 1993, and 2009. There have even been several comprehensive reviews of the literature (e.g., see Hotz and Scholz 2003; Eissa and Hoynes 2006a; Nichols and Rothstein 2015). Rather than recapitulate those reviews, here we provide only a brief summary of the main findings in the literature.

The main focus of the empirical literature regarding the EITC, particularly in the early years, was to quantify and explore the main pro-work aspect of the program: the incentive it creates for single parents to participate in the labor force. In practice, this meant analyses of employment decisions (at the extensive margin) of low educated single mothers. Most studies take a quasi-experimental approach leveraging the variation across tax year and family size in the federal credit, essentially using women with no children or women with just a single child as controls. (A smaller set of papers uses variation in state EITCs, which add on to the federal credit.) The 1993 expansion provides a particularly attractive policy reform because it represents the largest expansion of the credit in its history (see Figures 2 and 4) and the expansion for women with two or more children was much larger than the expansion for women with one child (thus allowing for a comparison among single women with children, comparing those with two or more children to those with one child).

Across all of the different types of comparisons, the evidence nearly universally points to a significant positive effect of the EITC on the labor force participation (or employment) of single women with children. For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996) find labor force participation increased by 2.8 percentage points for single women with children, relative to single women without children after the EITC expansion of 1986. Over a longer period, Meyer

and Rosenbaum (2001) find that the EITC raised labor force participation by 7.2 percentage points for single women with children relative to those without children between 1984 and 1996. Hoynes and Patel (2015) find that the 1993 expansion increased employment by 6.1 percentage points, with larger effects for women with two or more children. Using the approach in Chetty, Guren, Manoli and Weber (2013), the extensive margin elasticities for these studies range from 0.30 to 0.45 (Hoynes and Patel 2015).²¹

The changes in employment, particularly for the 1993 expansion, are evident in the basic unconditional trends. This is illustrated in Figure 13 (based on Nichols and Rothstein 2015, Figure 8b) where we use the March Current Population Survey and plot the percent of single women (those with zero, one or two or more children) working at all during the year for each year from 1976 to 2013. The figure illustrates that for the two decades before 1993, the annual employment rate for unmarried women with children was substantially below that for single women without children. By 2000, the gap narrowed substantially, with an especially dramatic increase for single women with two or more children (who experienced a larger EITC expansion). Since then, employment rates show a decline for all groups, likely reflecting adverse macroeconomic conditions.

Figure 14, taken from Figure 7 in Hoynes and Patel (2015), illustrates the quasi-experimental estimates of the EITC from the 1993 expansion controlling for other contemporaneous effects such as welfare reform and the strong labor market (Blank 2001). The figure plots event time coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for single women with

²¹ These elasticities are with respect to the net of tax wage, taking account of other taxes. It is more common in the EITC literature to report elasticities with respect to gross earnings plus the EITC (or, equivalently, with respect to the EITC average tax rate). These are higher, in the 0.7-1.0 range. See Chetty et al. (2013), Appendix B.

two more children and with one child, both compared to single women without children. The omitted year is 1993 (the year prior to the policy expansion). The graph also displays the change in the real average maximum credit across the groups (dashed line, right axis) to give some guidance as to how the EITC is changing over time and across groups. The figure shows that differential labor supply increases after 1993 closely follow the pattern of EITC expansions—women with children increase their employment relative to women without children, with larger effects for women with two or more children.²²

This graph makes quite clear that the EITC has a large positive effect on single mothers' labor force participation. This conclusion is consistent across studies: Estimated extensive margin effects are quite robust across different time periods (including studies identified from pre-1993 expansions) and using different identification approaches (including more structural approaches or using state EITC expansions). There are fewer studies of married couples, but the available evidence shows that the EITC leads to small reductions in the employment of married women, consistent with the predictions above, and there is little evidence of any effects on men (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004, 2006b).

A second question concerns the EITC's effect on the intensive margin. Estimates based on quasi-experimental approaches like that illustrated in Figure 14 show little sign of meaningful effects (Hotz and Scholz 2003; Nichols and Rothstein 2015). However, standard difference-in-differences research designs are not ideally suited to this question due to the confounding effects of composition – the large extensive margin effects mean that the composition of the working population is different between the pre- and post-EITC period.

²²It also shows that in the years prior to the expansion employment was trending similarly across the groups, validating the use of women without children as controls.

In the past decade, the EITC literature has re-focused on the intensive margin using other methods. Saez (2010), which looks for “bunching” in the income distribution around the kinks in the EITC schedule, was one of the first in this vein. Like other bunching studies that have followed, Saez found little sign that families in the phase-out range reduce their labor supply to maximize their credits, but did find evidence that workers in the phase-in range adjust to increase their credits (Saez 2010; see also Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2013; Chetty and Saez 2013; Mortenson and Whitten 2015). Most of this effect derives from self-employed workers, who generally self-report their earnings without independent verification on the part of the IRS. It is thus difficult to determine whether it is a real behavioral effect or a change in reporting. Chetty, Friedman and Saez (2013) use earnings distributions of families in the year after the birth of a child to look for intensive margin responses. They find that the intensive margin elasticity is small on average, around 0.14, though they argue that this is attenuated due to a lack of information about the incentives that families face.

There are a handful of studies that examine the effect of the EITC on marriage (e.g., Ellwood 2000; Rosenbaum 2000; Herbst 2011; Michelmore 2014). The empirical evidence is largely inconclusive, though it generally points to small effects. There is less evidence on the effects of the EITC on fertility (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin 2009) but again the results suggest small effects. Finally, though somewhat outside the scope of this paper, there is a recent and growing literature that uses the increase in after-tax income generated by the EITC to examine impacts on downstream outcomes. The credit has been found to lead to increases in infant health (Baker 2008; Baughman 2012; Hoynes, Miller, and Simon 2015; Strully et al. 2010), maternal health (Evans and Garthwaite 2014), children’s cognitive outcomes (Dahl and Lochner 2012; Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2011) and educational attainment (Michelmore

2013; Manoli and Turner 2014). These are generally interpreted as income effects, though it is possible that a portion of each effect is directly related to increased maternal employment.

In sum, the evidence on behavioral effects shows that the EITC leads to substantial increases in employment for single mothers, concentrated among less-skilled women and among those with more than one child. There is also evidence of small reductions in employment for secondary earners in married couples, but little evidence of any induced changes in male labor supply. Though there is less evidence on the intensive margin of labor supply, the available evidence suggest at most small responses. There is little evidence that the EITC has much of an effect on marriage or fertility.

V.C. Compliance

Over-claiming of the EITC has been a persistent concern with the program. The most recent IRS study (Internal Revenue Service 2014a), based on audited 2006-2008 returns, found an overclaiming rate between 28.5% and 39.1% of all EITC dollars claimed (the range derives from assumptions about taxpayers who did not participate in the audit).²³ There are two primary sources of noncompliance—misclaiming of qualifying children and income misreporting.

Qualifying child violations occur in 30% of returns with over-claims, but represent over half of over-claimed dollars. The EITC's qualifying child rules are complex, and – despite recent changes aimed at harmonization – differ from those for child exemptions. IRS Publication 596 lists a multitude of examples in which many economists would have trouble identifying who was eligible to claim the credit, and many situations in which multiple filers could claim different

²³ The IRS is able to disallow some overclaims, so the overpayment rate is lower – around 24% in recent years. Moreover, the rates of overclaiming may be overstated in the administrative data, as filers who request reconsideration of credit denials succeed in overturning nearly half of IRS rulings (National Taxpayer Advocate 2004).

credits with choices over who claims qualifying children.²⁴ The optimal choice is often hard to determine. Greenstein and Wanchuck (2011) conclude that “EITC overpayments most commonly result from misunderstanding of how to apply the EITC's intricate rules regarding who may claim a child, especially in changing family situations involving separated, divorced, or three-generation families.” Although definitions have been changed to better align with those used elsewhere in the tax code and the IRS has increased its efforts to verify children’s identity (by, e.g., requiring reporting of the child’s social security number on the tax form), misreporting of qualifying children remains high.

The other major category of over-claiming, income misreporting, is more common but results in smaller overpayments, on average. About two-thirds of returns with overclaims misreport income. Incorrect reporting of self-employment income is the primary source of income misreporting (in part reflecting the lack of second party verification that is available for wage and salary income).

Another source of evidence related to reporting or noncompliance comes from the “bunching” studies discussed above. In the original Saez study (Saez 2010), since replicated by others (e.g. Chetty et al. 2013), there is substantial evidence of bunching at the end of the phase-in region, at the first EITC kink. Chetty and Saez (2013) found something similar as the result of an information treatment at H&R Block: The provision of information about the tax schedule led families to move toward the first kink point. There is no sign of bunching at the second kink

²⁴ Residency test failures are the most common in the over-claiming audits, suggesting that many non-custodial parents claim a child who should have been claimable only by the custodial parent. Enforcement is challenging for the IRS, as many components of the qualifying child definition are not readily observed.

point (between the plateau and the phase-out range), nor of a hollowing out of the density at the third (at the end of the phase-out range), though the standard model would predict all three.

As Saez points out, the total marginal tax rate, combining the EITC and other taxes (e.g., payroll taxes), is generally negative in the phase-in range, implying that a filer with earnings below the first kink point would come out ahead by reporting to the IRS *higher* earnings than he/she actually had. Saez (2010) and others find that the bunching at the first kink point is entirely driven by the self-employed, who likely have a fair amount of latitude over how much income to report. Thus, Saez suggests that the bunching he observes likely reflects decisions to report casual earnings (from, e.g., babysitting) that would not have been reported to the IRS in the absence of the EITC, though it is also possible that some of it reflects a true intensive margin response or reporting income that was not actually received in order to maximize the value of the EITC.

V.D. Dynamic distributional effects

The above evidence suggests that the labor supply impacts of the EITC are large, particularly on the participation decisions of single parents, and may have important implications for the distributional impacts of the policy. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that quantifies the distributional effects of the EITC taking account of the full behavioral responses.

A handful of studies estimate the effect of the EITC on income or poverty (Bollinger, Gonzalez, and Ziliak 2009; Grogger 2003; Gunderson and Ziliak 2004; Hoynes and Patel 2015). This literature shows that the *direct* (EITC payment) and *indirect* (through earnings net of changes in other income) channels combine to lead to large effects of EITC on income. For example, Hoynes and Patel (2015) use difference-in-difference (DD) and parameterized DD models to estimate the effects of the EITC on the distribution of after tax and transfer income

relative to poverty among single mothers with less than a college education. They find that the 1993 expansion led to a 7.9 percentage point increase in the share of families with children with after tax and transfer income above poverty. They estimate similar models for the propensity to have after tax and transfer income above various income to poverty thresholds. Figure 15 (taken from Figure 11 in Hoynes and Patel 2015) provides their core results. They find that the EITC has little effect on the very lowest income groups (below 75% of poverty), likely reflecting low labor market attachment of families in this range. Between 75% and 150% of the poverty line, the effects of the EITC are large and statistically significant; they then fall to zero by 250% poverty.

Hoynes and Patel then use these results to compare the static distributional effects of the EITC (direct effect only) to the dynamic distributional effects (direct and indirect effects). They find that for their sample of single mothers with children ignoring the indirect effects of the EITC (increased earnings net of changes in other income) leads to significant underestimates of the distributional effects. For example, they find that the total effect of the EITC removes 2.4 million children from poverty compared to 1.2 million when considering only the direct effect.

Another dimension of dynamic effects has to do with tax incidence, the effect of the EITC on pre-tax wages. As we discussed above, the standard incidence model predicts that the EITC should, to some degree, reduce pre-tax wages. These effects would be felt by EITC-eligible and non-eligible workers (who mix in the workplace) alike. Such general equilibrium effects are difficult to estimate using credible research designs, especially given the widespread use of the variation by tax year and number of children (e.g. OBRA 93), as wage effects would be common to all family types in the same year. Leigh (2010) exploits the introduction of state level EITCs in a DD framework, essentially relying on the assumption that employers do little

substitution of workers across states. He finds that a 10% increase in the EITC leads to a 5% (2%) reduction in pre-tax wages for high school dropouts (high school graduates) and no effect on the wages of college graduates. Rothstein (2010; see also Rothstein 2008) takes a simulation approach by relying on previous estimates of demand and supply elasticities to calibrate a calculation of the distributional effects of the EITC. He finds that \$1 in EITC payments leads to \$0.09 worth of increased labor supply but a \$0.27 decline in worker pre-tax incomes—the difference, \$0.36, is transferred to employers through reduced pre-tax wages. As a consequence, after-tax income rises by only \$0.73.

Although none of the evidence is airtight, it appears that employers of low-wage labor capture a meaningful share of the credit through reduced wages and that this comes to some extent at the expense of low-skill workers who are not eligible for the credit (due, e.g., to not having children). The implied effects are large enough to have quantitatively important implications for the EITC's distributional impacts – a crude calculation based on Rothstein's (2010) results suggests that static calculations could overstate the transfer to recipients by as much as one-third, and that dynamic calculations like Hoynes and Patel's (2015) overstate it by as much as one-half (based on the ratio of Rothstein's (2010) wage-constant effect on after-tax income, \$1.09, to the net effect inclusive of wage responses, \$0.73). But this remains an understudied topic, and the effective confidence intervals around these estimates are large.

VI. POTENTIAL REFORMS

The above evidence indicates that the EITC is doing a good job of meeting its objectives: It successfully targets low-income working families, bringing many of them out of poverty; it has meaningful positive effects on labor force participation, with small or zero negative effects

on the intensive margin and for secondary earners; and, while there is evidence of substantial overclaiming, the dollar amounts are not that large, and errors seem to relate in large part to qualifying child definitions. The CTC, while less studied, is clearly less effective on at least the distributive and labor supply dimensions.

But although the EITC is doing well on all three margins, it would be possible to improve. The concern most commonly voiced about the EITC is that it largely fails to reach childless workers (including non-custodial parents). For the CTC, an important concern is that it misses too many low-income families, certainly before but even after the 2009 expansion to its refundability (West, Boteach, and Vallas, 2015).

To illustrate the possibilities for reform, we consider potential changes aimed at addressing these concerns. First, we examine expansions of the childless EITC, both President Obama's proposal to double this credit and a more ambitious expansion designed to bring the childless EITC to rough parity (in family-need-adjusted terms) with that available to families with children. Second, we assess the impact of the recent reduction of the earnings threshold for refundability of the CTC, and consider reducing it further.

VI.A. The childless EITC

Because historically the EITC was seen (at least by some) as an alternative to cash welfare for families with children, it was initially unavailable to childless adults and remains comparatively limited for them. But views of the purpose of the EITC have evolved and it is now seen, at least in part, as a way of compensating for the erosion of real wages paid to low-income workers. This does not provide much rationale for excluding childless workers, and so there is increasing interest in expanding this portion of the credit. In 2015, President Obama proposed a substantial expansion – roughly doubling the generosity of the childless credit, as well as

extending the plateau and phase-out ranges to higher income levels. But even this proposal, if enacted, would leave the childless credit much smaller than that available to families with children.

We compare three versions of the childless EITC: Current law, the Obama Administration proposal, and with a more aggressive proposal of our own invention. The latter is designed to set the maximum credit for a single childless adult to the same level as for a single adult with one child, after adjusting for the different needs of one- and two-person families using a standard equivalence scale. We keep the phase-in range the same as in current law, and solve for the needed phase-in rate; this turns out to be nearly identical (33.8% vs. 34%) to that for one-child families under current law. We set the plateau for single adults to have a width of \$5,000, very similar to its width under Obama's proposal and to the plateau for multiple-child families under current law. Following the schedule for families with children, we extend the plateau range by \$5,500 for married couples. We set the phase-out rate to match the current one-child schedule (15.98%).

Figure 16 illustrates the schedules under the three alternatives, with the one-child single schedule shown as well for comparison. Either of the alternatives to current policy would better serve the purpose of redistributing more money to low-income families, and would do more to encourage labor force participation, than does the current schedule. They would likely reduce over-claiming: although childless individuals and couples would face the same incentives as do those with children to over-report self-employment income, the great incentive that families currently face to mis-claim qualifying children would be much reduced and, in many cases, nearly eliminated. The expanded credit would also lead to changes in incentives for marriage. Couples without children would face similar incentives as those we discussed above for couples

with children (marriage penalties for two earners and marriage subsidies for one earners), and marriage penalties for two earner couples with children would increase. The existing research, however, suggests these changes in marriage penalties (and subsidies) will not translate to meaningful changes in marriage.

We use the Urban-Brookings TPC Microsimulation model to quantify the cost of these changes. Table 3 shows the results: The Obama proposal would increase the number of recipients of the childless credit by over 60%, reaching higher into the income distribution, and more than double the average credit. The more generous, equivalence-scaled expansion would raise the number of recipients by 127% and nearly quintuple the average credit. Clearly, each of these represents a dramatic expansion of the program: The Obama expansion would transfer an additional \$4.6 billion to low-income childless families, more than tripling the cost of the childless EITC, while the more generous expansion would transfer an additional \$18.3 billion (each on top of the \$68.5 billion cost of the EITC under current law).²⁵ To reiterate, this is a static simulation and there is no response of labor supply modelled here, either on the extensive (we would expect more filers) or intensive margin. Such responses would increase the cost of each alternative, though likely not dramatically.

Of course, the above schedules are not the only option for expanding the EITC for taxpayers without children. One alternative that has received some attention is an expansion of eligibility for non-custodial parents, conditioned on the payment of child support and designed to create incentives to do so (Primus 2006). New York and Washington DC have implemented non-custodial parent credits, and a regression discontinuity evaluation of the New York program

²⁵ The Obama administration estimates the cost of the Obama proposal to be \$60 billion over ten years (Executive Office of the President and U.S. Treasury Department 2014).

shows positive effects on both employment and child support payment (Nichols, Sorenson, and Lippold 2012).

VI.B. CTC refundability threshold

Prior to 2009, the lowest income filers were effectively ineligible for the CTC, as they had no income tax liability and CTC refunds were limited to 15% of earnings in excess of \$11,500 (in 2007). The refundability threshold was reduced to \$3,000 in 2009, a provision that was made permanent in late 2015. We use the TPC microsimulation model to illustrate the importance of this expansion in the credit. The first set of bars in Figure 17 show the distribution of the additional \$10.4 billion in 2015 CTC payments that resulted from the 2009 reduction of the threshold, large relative to the total cost of \$56 billion.²⁶ (Once again, this is a static analysis that does not account for changes in labor supply behavior.) As shown in Figure 17, nearly all -- over 70% -- of the additional benefits flow to families with incomes below \$30,000. This shows that the increase in the CTC's refundability dramatically changed the program, making it much more progressive.

One might be interested in further increasing the progressivity of the CTC, which remains much more regressive than the EITC. The second series in Figure 17 explores a further expansion of CTC refundability, obtained by reducing the threshold all the way to zero (from \$3,000). This would make the CTC structure nearly identical to the EITC's (albeit with a much longer plateau region). Using the TPC simulation, we find that this policy (proposed by West,

²⁶ This simulation, along with the others, is for tax year 2015. We set the threshold for refundability under the pre-2007 policy at \$13,850 (2015 dollars), adjusted for inflation from the 2001 threshold of \$10,000 (nominal).

Boteach, and Vallas 2015) would cost \$2.2 billion (a 4% increase over current law), and again nearly all benefits would flow to the lowest-income families.²⁷

VI.C. Other reforms: Labor supply, compliance and timing

Neither of the above proposals are designed primarily to improve the EITC's labor supply impacts, though here too there are reasons to be dissatisfied with the status quo. As discussed above, the EITC has large positive effects on labor force participation among single parents, with little if any negative effect on hours of work of those who would work in any case. But for married couples the labor supply impacts are not so positive: Eissa and Hoynes (2004) document a negative effect on the labor supply of married women, many of whom are secondary earners and who therefore would qualify for a larger EITC if they did not work than if they did.

Unfortunately, there are few good options for avoiding this problem. It is merely an example of the marriage penalties that are inherent in any progressive, family-based tax system, and like other marriage penalties is quite difficult to avoid. Berlin (2007) proposes making the EITC depend on individual rather than family earnings. Holt and Maag (2009) propose replacing the EITC and CTC with a worker credit, based on individual earnings, and a child credit based on family earnings. This would eliminate the second worker penalty, but would represent an enormous change in the U.S. tax system and would cost tens of billions of dollars. A more incremental proposal comes from Kearney and Turner (2013), who would create a secondary earner deduction that would reduce the second worker penalty and effectively extend the EITC schedule for two-earner families.

²⁷ Maag (2015) explores the implications of changes in the CTC refundability threshold, as well as other potential changes to the program, in more detail.

In terms of compliance, the major issues concern over-claiming of qualifying children and mis-reporting of self-employment income. The first would be addressed by the expansion of the childless credit. The second is more difficult. California, which introduced its own EITC in 2015, disallows self-employment income from EITC calculations. TPC's model indicates that the total effect of adopting a similar rule at the Federal level would be to reduce EITC expenditures by \$11 billion. As this is far in excess of any plausible estimate of the amount of overpayment due to income misreporting, it is clear that the primary effect would be to deny the credit to many of the intended recipients. It might be better to tighten up enforcement around self-employment income, while recognizing that not all misreporting can be prevented.

Another way to improve the performance of the EITC vis-à-vis our three objectives is to increase the take-up rate. The estimated 75% take-up rate, while high relative to other parts of the social safety net, still leaves room for improvement. We know that take-up is lower among those eligible for smaller credits, notably childless taxpayers and those with very low earning levels (Plueger 2009). A challenge with increasing take-up for this group is that it disproportionately includes those not filing a tax return (and often not legally required to). Recent evidence based on experimental designs and IRS partnerships shows that informational mailers can lead to significant increases in take-up (Bhargava and Manoli 2015; Guyton et al. 2016).

A final type of change to consider would be one aimed at distributing EITC and CTC payments more gradually rather than as annual lump sums, as this is a persistent limitation of the EITC as an anti-poverty program. Unfortunately, the wake of the failure of the Advance EITC program, we are not aware of good proposals to do so. Much more needs to be understood about

the role that EITC payments play in their recipients' lives (see, e.g., Halpern-Meeekin et al. 2015) in order to inform welfare-improving changes of this type.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we examine the state of tax policy for families with children. We focus on the two most important provisions, the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit. We discuss these two programs within the lens of the three presumed goals of the programs: distributional, encouragement of work, and limiting of administrative costs and noncompliance. To discuss these three goals, we use tax data and quantify the static distributional features of the programs. We also summarize the existing research to assess how the programs meet the other two goals.

We conclude that the EITC well meets all three of these goals. The policy provides substantial increases to income for low to moderate income families. A large body of research shows that the first-order behavioral effect of the policy is to increase employment among single mothers with children. Married couples also benefit from the program, though the policy does induce modest reductions in secondary earner employment. Administrative costs are low, particularly compared to the public assistance alternatives to the EITC. Compliance remains an issue, with complicated rules for claiming children and incentives to overreport self-employment income (though it is not clear that noncompliance is any worse than for other redistribution programs). The CTC looks much less favorable within this lens. The credit is not targeted, with a large share of the expenditures extending way above median income groups. However, the 2009 expansion of the credit, making the CTC refundable at low earnings levels, is highly targeted and effectively represents an expansion of the EITC.

We also discuss and simulate proposals to reform the EITC that would improve one or more of the three program goals. Expansions of the childless EITC would be quite progressive, but also expensive. Limitation of the use of self-employment income to qualify for the EITC would reduce the program's cost, but would also exclude a group that is likely as deserving as traditional employees. Finally, the recent reduction of the refundability threshold for the CTC dramatically improved the program's redistributive value. A further reduction all the way to zero would be less costly, with equally progressive distributional impacts.

References

- Baker, Kevin. 2008. "Do Cash Transfer Programs Improve Infant Health: Evidence from the 1993 Expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit." https://economics.nd.edu/assets/24011/baker_paper.pdf.
- Baughman, Reagan A. 2012. "The Effects of State EITC Expansion on Children's Health." The Carsey Institute at the Scholars' Repository Paper 168.
- Baughman, Reagan A., and Stacy Dickert-Conlin. 2009. "The Earned Income Tax Credit and Fertility." *Journal of Population Economics* 22 (3): 537–63.
- Berlin, Gordon L. 2007. "Rewarding the Work of Individuals: A Counterintuitive Approach to Reducing Poverty and Strengthening Families." *The Future of Children* 17 (2): 17–42.
- Bhargava, Saurabh and Dayanand Manoli. 2015. "Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment," *American Economic Review* 105(11):3489-3529.
- Bitler, Marianne P., Hilary Hoynes, and Elira Kuka. 2016. "Do In-Work Tax Credits Serve as a Safety Net?" Forthcoming, *Journal of Human Resources*.
- Blank, Rebecca. 2001. "Declining Caseloads Increased Work: What Can We Conclude about the Effects of Welfare Reform?" *Economic Policy Review* 7(2):25-36. 2001.
- Blundell, Richard, and Hilary W. Hoynes. 2004. "Has 'In-Work' Benefit Reform Helped the Labor Market?" In *Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980–2000*, edited by David Card, Richard Blundell, and Richard B. Freeman, 411–59. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bollinger, Christopher, Luis Gonzalez, and James P. Ziliak. 2009. "Welfare Reform and the Level and Composition of Income." In *Welfare Reform and its Long-Term Consequences for America's Poor*, edited by James P. Ziliak, 59-103. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


- California Department of Health Care Services. 2015. *Federal Poverty Levels*. Sacramento: Medi-Cal Eligibility Division. <http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medical/eligibility/Documents/ACWDL2015/ACWDL15-14.pdf>.
- California State Legislature. 2015. *Assembly Bill No. 43*. 2015-2016 Regular Session. http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_43_bill_20150212_amended_asm_v97.pdf
- Chetty, Raj, John Friedman, and John Rockoff. 2011. *New Evidence on the Long-Term Impacts of Tax Credits*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
- Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, and Emmanuel Saez. 2013. "Using Differences in Knowledge Across Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings." *American Economic Review* 103 (7): 2683–721.
- Chetty, Raj, Adam Guren, Day Manoli and Andrea Weber. 2013. "Does Indivisible Labor Explain the Difference between Micro and Macro Elasticities? A Meta-Analysis of Extensive Margin Elasticities," *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2012* 27: 1-56.
- Chetty, Raj, and Emmanuel Saez. 2013. "Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an Experiment with EITC Recipients." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 5 (1): 1–31.
- Congressional Research Service. 2014. "The Child Tax Credit Current Law and Legislative History." <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41873.pdf>.
- Currie, Janet. 2006. "The Take-up of Social Benefits," in Alan Auerbach, David Card, and John Quigley (eds). *Poverty, the Distribution of Income, and Public Policy*, (New York: Russell Sage).
- Dahl, Gordon B., and Lance Lochner. 2012. "The Impact of Family Income on Child Achievement: Evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit." *American Economic Review* 102 (5): 1927–56.
- DeNavas-Walt, Carmen and Bernadette D. Proctor. 2015. *Income and Poverty in the United States: 2014, Current Population Reports P60-252*. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau.
- Eissa, Nada, and Hilary W. Hoynes. 2004. "Taxes and the Labor Market Participation of Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit." *Journal of Public Economics* 88 (9): 1931–58.
- . 2006a. "Behavioral Responses to Taxes: Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply." In *Tax Policy and the Economy*, vol. 20, edited by J. M. Poterba, 74–110. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- . 2006b. "The Hours of Work Response of Married Couples: Taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit." In *Tax Policy and Labor Market Performance*, edited by Jonas Agell and Peter Birch Sorensen. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Eissa, Nada, and Jeffrey B. Liebman. 1996. "Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 11(2): 605–37.
- Ellwood, David T. 2000. "The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms on Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements." *National Tax Journal* 53 (4, part 2): 1063-105.
- Evans, William N., and Craig L. Garthwaite. 2014. "Giving Mom a Break: The Impact of Higher EITC Payments on Maternal Health." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6 (2): 258–90.

- Executive Office of the President and U.S. Treasury Department. 2014. *The President's Proposal to Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit*. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/eitc_report.pdf.
- Greenstein, Robert, and John Wanchuck. 2011. *Earned Income Tax Credit Overpayment and Error Issues*. Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
- Grogger, Jeffrey. 2003. "The Effects of Time Limits, the EITC, and Other Policy Changes on Welfare Use, Work and Income Among Female-Headed Families." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 85(2): 394-408.
- Gunderson, Craig and James Ziliak. 2004. "Poverty and Macroeconomic Performance Across Space, Race, and Family Structure." *Demography* 41(1): 61-86.
- Guyton, John, Day Manoli, Brenda Schafer and Michael Sebastiani. 2016. "Reminders and Recidivism: Evidence from Tax Filing and EITC Participation among Low-Income Nonfilers." Working paper, University of Texas.
- Halpern-Meekin, Sarah, Kathryn Edin, Laura Tach and Jennifer Sykes. 2015, *It's Not Like I'm Poor: How Working Families Make Ends Meet in a Post-Welfare World*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Herbst, Chris M. 2011. "The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Marriage and Divorce: Evidence from Flow Data." *Population Research Policy Review* 30: 101–28.
- Holt, Stephen and Elaine Maag. 2009. "Considerations in Efforts to Restructure Refundable Work-Based Credits." Urban Institute Working Paper.
- Hotz, V. Joseph, and John Karl Scholz. 2003. "The Earned Income Tax Credit." In *Means-tested transfer programs in the United States*, edited by Robert A. Moffitt, 141–197. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hoynes, Hilary W., Doug L. Miller, David Simon. 2015. "Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit and Infant Health," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 7(1): 172–211.
- Hoynes, Hilary W., and Ankur Patel. 2015. "Effective Policy for Reducing Inequality? The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Distribution of Income." Unpublished Working Paper, July.
- Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 2009. "2009 Tax Model File." Statistics of Income Division (SOI). <http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/gdb/>.
- . 2014a. "Compliance estimates for the Earned Income Tax Credit claimed on 2006-2008 returns." Research, Analysis & Statistics Report Publication 5162.
- . 2014b. "Revenue procedure 14-61." <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-14-61.pdf>.
- . 2014c. "Table 1: Individual income tax returns: Selected income and tax items for Tax Years 1999 - 2012." <http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-1>.
- . 2014d. "Table 3.3 All returns: Tax liability, tax credits, and tax payments." *Publication no. 1304*. http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/12in33ar.xls.
- . 2015a. "Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 2013." *Statistics of Income Bulletin*, Spring. <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-inpd-id1505.pdf>.
- . 2015b. "Table 2.5." Statistics of Income Division Publication 1304. <http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---Individual->
- Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and U.S. Department of the Treasury. 1999. "Advanced Earned Income Tax Credit: 1994 and 1997 notice study: A report to Congress." Washington D.C.: IRS.
- . 2013. "2013 EITC Income Limits, Maximum Amounts and Tax Law Changes."

- <http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/2013-EITC-Income-Limits,-Maximum-Credit—Amounts-And-Tax-Law-Changes>.
- Jones, Damon. 2010. “Information, preferences and public benefit participation: Experimental evidence from the Advance EITC and 401(k) savings.” *American Economic Journal* 2(2):147-163.
- Kearney, Melissa S., and Lesley J. Turner. 2013. “Giving Secondary Earners a Tax Break: A Proposal to Help Low- and Middle-Income Families.” The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2013-07, December.
- Leigh, Andrew. 2010. “Who Benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit? Incidence Among Recipients, Coworkers and Firms.” *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* 10 (1).
- Maag, Elaine. 2015. “Reforming the Child Tax Credit How Different Proposals Change Who Benefits.” Urban Institute.
- Manoli, Day, and Nick Turner. 2014. “Cash-on-Hand and College Enrollment. Evidence from Population Tax Data and Policy Nonlinearities.” NBER Working Paper 19836.
- Meyer, Bruce D., and Dan T. Rosenbaum. 2001. “Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116 (3): 1063–114.
- Micheltmore, Katherine. 2013. “The Effect of Income on Educational Attainment: Evidence from State Earned Income Tax Credit Expansions.” SSRN Working Paper 2356444.
- . 2014. “EITC and Union Formation: The Impact of Expected Spouse Earnings.” Cornell University Working Paper.
- Mortenson, Jacob A, and Andrew Whitten. 2015. “How Sensitive Are Taxpayers to Marginal Tax Rates? Evidence from Income Bunching in the United States.” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2719859.
- National Taxpayer Advocate. 2004. *National Taxpayer Advocate 2004 Annual Report to Congress. Volume 2. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Audit Reconsideration Study*. Washington, D.C.: Internal Revenue Service.
- Nichols, Austin and Jesse Rothstein. 2015. “The Earned Income Tax Credit.” <http://eml.berkeley.edu/~jrothst/workingpapers/nichols-rothstein-Sep2015.pdf>
- Nichols, Austin, Elaine Sorensen, and Kye Lippold. 2012. *The New York Noncustodial Parent EITC: Its Impact on Child Support Payments and Employment*. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute.
- OECD. 2011. “Taxation and employment 2011.” OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 21.
- Primus, Wendell. 2006. “Improving Public Policies to Increase the Income and Employment of Low-Income Nonresident Fathers.” In *Black Males Left Behind*, edited by Ronald B. Mincy, 211-48. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press.
- Pomerleau, Kyle. 2014. “2015 Tax Brackets.” *Tax Foundation*, October 2. <http://taxfoundation.org/article/2015-tax-brackets>.
- Plueger, Dean, 2009. “Earned Income Tax Credit Participation Rate for Tax Year 2005.” Washington, D.C.: Internal Revenue Service, 151–95.
- Rosenbaum, Dan T. 2000. “Taxes, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Marital Status.” 1999-2000 ASPE Census Bureau Small Grants Sponsored Research Conference.
- Rothstein, Jesse. 2008. “The Unintended Consequences of Encouraging Work: Tax Incidence and the EITC.” Princeton University Working Paper.


- Rothstein, Jesse. 2010. "Is the EITC as Good as an NIT? Conditional Cash Transfers and Tax Incidence." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 2 (1): 177–208.
- Saez, Emmanuel. 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107 (3):1039-1073.
- . 2010. "Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?" *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 2 (3): 180–212.
- Scholz, John Karl. 1994. "The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, compliance, and antipoverty effectiveness." *National Tax Journal* 47 (1): 64–87.
- Short, Kathleen. 2015. "The Research Supplemental Poverty Measure: 2014." U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Report P60-254.
- Steuerle, Eugene and Caleb Quakenbush. 2015. *Marginal Tax Rates and 21st Century Welfare Reform*. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
- Strully, Kate W., David H. Rehkopf, and Ziming Xuan. 2010. "Aspects of Prenatal Poverty on Infant Health: State Earned Income Tax Credits and birth weight." *American Sociological Review* 75 (4): 534–562.
- Tax Policy Center. 2013. "Baseline Share of Federal Taxes by Filing Status; by Cash Income Percentile, 2013." <http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/displayatab.cfm?DocID=3806>.
- . 2014. "Real federal spending on EITC, CTC and welfare: FY1975-2011." <http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=266>.
- . 2015a. "Earned Income Tax Credit: Number of Recipients and Amounts of Credit, 1975-2012." <http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=37>
- . 2015b. "Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters , 1975-2015." <http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=36>.
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2014. "Table 24. Historical Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), 74. December to December changes." *CPI Detailed Report December 2014*. <http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1412.pdf>.
- U.S. Census Bureau. 2015. "CPS 2015 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC)." <https://www.census.gov/cps/data/>.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2007. *Advanced Earned Income Tax Credit: Low Use and Small Dollars Paid Impeded IRS's Efforts to Reduce High Noncompliance, Report No. GAO-07-1110*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO.
- U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO). 2011. 26 U.S.C. 24 – Child Tax Credit.
- Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center. 2015. *Microsimulation Model (version 0515-1)*. <http://www.urban.org/research/data-methods/data-analysis/quantitative-data-analysis/microsimulation/tax-policy-center-microsimulation-model>.
- West, Rachel, Melissa Boteach, and Rebecca Vallas. 2015. *Harnessing the Child Tax Credit as a Tool to Invest in the Next Generation*. Washington D.C.: Center for American Progress.

Figure 1. EITC schedule, by number of children and marital status (2015 tax year)




Source: Internal Revenue Service (2014b).

Figure 2. Real maximum EITC credit over time, by number of children



Source: Based on data from Tax Policy Center (2015b).


Figure 3. Combined EITC and CTC schedules for heads of households with 2 children



Notes: Figures reflect a head-of-household filer with two children who qualify under dependent exemption, EITC, and CTC rules but have zero Child and Dependent Care Tax credit eligibility. The “CTC Forfeited” area reflects the family’s CTC eligibility that cannot be received due to the limit on the portion of the CTC that is refundable.

Sources: Based on data from GPO (2011), Pomerleau (2014), Steuerle and Quakenbush (2015), and Tax Policy Center (2015b).


Figure 4. Annual cost of the EITC and CTC (Millions of 2014 dollars)



Notes: Each series includes both tax refunds and credits that offset tax liabilities.


Sources: Based on data from Internal Revenue Service (2014d, 2014c, 2015b), Tax Policy Center (2014, 2015a), and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014).

Figure 5. Tax and transfer benefits for universally available programs, by income (single adults with 2 children, 2015)



Notes: Estimated value of tax and transfer benefits for a single parent with two children living in Colorado. Calculations assume that both children qualify for dependent exemptions, the EITC, the CTC, and the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit. Premium assistance credit excludes the value of penalties paid by employers on the beneficiaries' behalf and the value of additional cost-sharing subsidies. Health coverage and quality of services provided varies by source: Medicaid and CHIP benefits are more comprehensive and have less cost-sharing than those in the exchange. Medicaid and CHIP also pay providers for services at lower rates than private insurers. *Source:* Based on data from Steuerle and Quakenbush (2015).

Figure 6. Effective marginal tax rates, by income (single adults with 2 children)



Notes: Average effective marginal tax rates facing a single parent with two children living in Colorado. See notes to Figure 5. The effective marginal tax rate is averaged over \$5,000 income bins and is calculated using changes in net income after taxes and transfers given changes in total compensation (including employer share of payroll taxes).
Source: Based on data from Steuerle and Quakenbush (2015).

Figure 7. EITC budget constraint

Panel A: "Following out" at the thirdpoint due to labor supply reductions






Figure 8. Pre-EITC and post-EITC income and poverty, 2015 tax year



Notes: Solid vertical lines indicate the locations of EITC kink points; see Table 1 for exact values. Dashed vertical lines indicate the pre-tax income at which a family reaches the poverty line, with and without the EITC. In panel a, these are at pre-tax earnings of \$11,770 without EITC or \$11,518 with EITC; in panel b, they are at \$15,930 and \$15,565, respectively.

Sources: Based on California Department of Health Care Services (2015), California State Legislature (2015), and Tax Policy Center (2015b).


Figure 9. Distribution of earnings by filing status and number of children



Notes: Graph displays EITC and CTC schedules from 2014, along with 2009 income distributions adjusted to 2014 dollars. Incomes less than or equal to zero or above \$200,000 are not shown; notes under each panel indicate the share of filers in each category. The sample excludes married couples filing separately, filing units receiving social security but without children, and those filing late. The left y-axis in panel (a) differs from the left y-axis in panels b-d. Panels a, b, c, and d represent 47%, 8%, 4%, and 1% of all filing units, respectively.

Source: Authors' calculations from 2009 Tax Model files created by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS.


Figure 10. Distribution of earnings by filing status and number of children



Notes: Graph displays EITC and CTC schedules from 2014, along with 2009 income distributions adjusted to 2014 dollars. Incomes less than or equal to zero or above \$200,000 are not shown; notes under each panel indicate the share of filers in each category. The sample excludes married couples filing separately, filing units receiving social security but without children, and those filing late. Panels a, b, c, and d correspond to 18%, 7%, 8%, and 5% of all filing units, respectively.

Source: Authors' calculations from 2009 Tax Model files created by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS.


Figure 11. Distribution of 2015 EITC and CTC benefits across filing types



Note: Filers are classified as with or without children based on the presence or absence of child exemptions, which may not correspond to qualifying children under the EITC and/or CTC. Married filing separately returns (1.7% of the total) are not shown.

Source: Based on data from Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0515-1).


Figure 12. Distribution of 2015 EITC and CTC benefits and total pre-tax income across filing types and income group



Note: Tax units, pre-tax income, and EITC benefits are each expressed as shares of their respective total over all tax filing units, across all filing statuses and income levels. Filers are classified as with or without children based on the presence or absence of child exemptions, which may not correspond to qualifying children under the EITC and/or CTC. Married filing separately returns (1.7% of the total) are not shown separately but are included in panel (a).

Source: Based on data from Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0515-1).


Figure 13. Employment rates of unmarried women over time, by number of children



Note: Sample consists of unmarried women aged 19-44.

Source: Authors' analysis of the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (U.S. Census Bureau 2015).


Figure 14. Event time estimates of the effect of the 1993 EITC expansion on the employment of single women with children



Notes: The sample includes single women, ages 24 through 48 with some college education or less from the 1992 through 1999 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Coefficients are estimates from an event study model with single women without children as the control group and 1993 as the omitted year. The dashed lines show the change in maximum EITC benefits for the treatment minus the control for each year. Vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals, adjusted for clustering at the state level.

Source: Figure 7 from Hoynes and Patel (2015).


Figure 15. Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the 1993 EITC expansion on the distribution of after tax and transfer income as a share of the federal poverty threshold



Notes: The sample includes single women, ages 24 through 48 with some college education or less from the 1992 through 1999 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Each dot and whisker represents a single regression estimate and 95% confidence interval (adjusted for clustering at the state level). Each model is a difference-in-difference model comparing women with children to women without children, before and after 1993. The dashed line is the weighted change in EITC benefits for families with children versus those without children across the 1993 EITC expansion.

Source: Figure 11 from Hoynes and Patel (2015).


Figure 16. Childless EITC schedules under current law and proposed alternatives



Note: Solid lines show the schedule for single and head-of-household filers; dotted lines for married filers. Dollar values expressed in 2015 dollars.

Source: Based on Executive Office of the President and U.S. Treasury Department (2014), updated to 2015, and authors' tabulations.

Figure 17. Distributional effect of changes to CTC refundability thresholds



Notes: Distribution of tax benefits for each change are expressed as shares of total CTC expenditures in 2015.
Source: Based on data from Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0515-1).

Table 1. Earned Income Tax Credit parameters, 1975-2015 (selected years), in 2014 dollars

Calendar year	Credit rate (percent)	Minimum income for maximum credit	Maximum credit	Phaseout rate (percent)	Phaseout range	
					Beginning income	Ending income
2015						
No children	7.65	6,580	503	7.65	8,240	14,820
One child	34.00	9,880	3,359	15.98	18,110	39,131
Two children	40.00	13,870	5,548	21.06	18,110	44,454
Three children	45.00	13,870	6,242	21.06	18,110	47,747
2014						
No children	7.65	6,582	504	7.65	8,238	14,821
One child	34.00	9,874	3,357	15.98	18,112	39,120
Two children	40.00	13,866	5,546	21.06	18,112	44,448
Three children	45.00	13,866	6,240	21.06	18,112	47,740
2009						
No children	8.44	6,587	504	7.65	8,242	14,829
One child	37.51	9,875	3,358	15.98	18,117	39,129
Two children	44.13	13,869	5,548	21.06	18,117	44,460
Three children	49.65	13,869	6,242	21.06	18,117	47,753
2003 [1]						
No children	10.09	6,582	504	7.65	8,231	14,813
One child	44.85	9,880	3,360	15.98	18,111	39,132
Two children	52.76	13,863	5,545	21.06	18,111	44,442
1996						
No children	7.65	6,583	504	7.65	8,237	14,821
One child	34.00	9,875	3,357	15.98	18,112	39,123
Two children	40.00	13,869	5,548	21.06	18,112	44,454
1995						
No children	7.65	6,578	504	7.65	8,231	14,809
One child	34.00	9,883	3,360	15.98	18,114	39,141
Two children	36.00	13,862	4,990	20.22	18,114	42,794
1994						
No children	7.65	6,585	504	7.65	8,231	14,815
One child	26.30	12,758	3,355	15.98	18,107	39,104
Two children	30.00	13,869	4,161	17.68	18,107	41,641
1993						
One child	18.50	13,148	2,433	13.21	20,697	39,104
Two children	19.50	13,148	2,563	13.93	20,697	39,104
1992						
One child	17.60	13,146	2,315	12.57	20,699	39,107
Two children	18.40	13,146	2,419	13.14	20,699	39,107
1991						
One child	16.70	13,141	2,194	11.93	20,705	39,110
Two children	17.30	13,141	2,273	12.36	20,705	39,110
1990	14.00	13,140	1,839	10	20,703	39,099
1989	14.00	13,137	1,839	10	20,695	39,087
1988	14.00	13,133	1,839	10	19,887	37,543
1987	14.00	13,134	1,838	10	14,949	33,337
1985-86	11.00	11,288	1,242	12.22	14,675	24,834
1979-84	10.00	14,679	1,468	12.5	17,615	29,358
1975-78	10.00	17,635	1,764	10	17,635	35,270

Notes: Beginning in 2002, the values of the beginning and ending points of the phase-out range were increased for married taxpayers filing jointly. The values for these taxpayers were \$1,000 higher than the listed values from 2002-2004, \$2,000 higher from 2005-2007, \$3,000 higher in 2008, \$5,000 higher in 2009, \$5,010 higher in 2010, \$5,080 higher in 2011, \$5,210 higher in 2012, \$5,340 higher in 2013, \$5,430 higher in 2014, and \$5,520 higher in 2015.

Source: Based on data from Tax Policy Center (2015b) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014).

Table 2. Child Tax Credit parameters, 1997-2015, in 2015 dollars

<i>Non-time-varying parameters (in nominal dollars)</i>						
<i>Phase-in rate</i>		15%				
<i>Phase-out rate</i>		5%				
<i>Beginning of phase-out range</i>						
Head of Household		75,000				
Married, Filing Separately		55,000				
Married, Filing Jointly		110,000				
<i>End of phase-out range</i>		1 child	2 children	3 children		
Head of Household		95,000	115,000	135,000		
Married, Filing Separately		75,000	95,000	115,000		
Married, Filing Jointly		130,000	150,000	170,000		
<i>Time-varying parameters (in 2015 dollars)</i>						
<i>Year</i>	<i>Max. Credit per Child</i>		<i>Refundable Component</i>			
	(\$ Nominal)	(\$ 2015)	Threshold (\$ Nominal)	Threshold	Rate above Threshold	
1997	500	742	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1998	400	584	n/a	n/a	n/a	
1999	500	717	n/a	n/a	n/a	
2000	500	695	n/a	n/a	n/a	
2001	600	808	10,000	13,461	0.1	
2002	600	795	10,350	13,714	0.1	
2003	1,000	1,295	10,500	13,603	0.1	
2004	1,000	1,266	10,750	13,613	0.15	
2005	1,000	1,228	11,000	13,510	0.15	
2006	1,000	1,182	11,300	13,357	0.15	
2007	1,000	1,156	11,750	13,578	0.15	
2008	1,000	1,108	8,500	9,421	0.15	
2009	1,000	1,106	3,000	3,319	0.15	
2010	1,000	1,090	3,000	3,271	0.15	
2011	1,000	1,064	3,000	3,193	0.15	
2012	1,000	1,038	3,000	3,113	0.15	
2013	1,000	1,020	3,000	3,061	0.15	
2014	1,000	1,005	3,000	3,014	0.15	
2015	1,000	1,000	3,000	3,000	0.15	

Sources: Based on Congressional Research Service (2014) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014).

Table 3. Childless filer proposals

Parameters	Current Law		Expanded Proposal		Equivalence Scaled	
Eligible ages	25-64		21-66		21-64	
Recipient filing units (millions)	6.6		10.9		15.1	
	Fraction receiving	Avg. credit among recipients	Fraction receiving	Avg. credit among recipients	Fraction receiving	Avg. credit among recipients
By income (in \$1,000s)						
Less than 10	19%	\$322	24%	\$594	24%	\$1,402
10-20	13%	\$281	22%	\$667	23%	\$1,778
20-30	5%	\$238	12%	\$488	29%	\$1,058
30-40	2%	\$303	4%	\$539	15%	\$764
40-50	2%	\$339	3%	\$659	4%	\$1,176
50-75	1%	--	1%	--	2%	\$1,111
75-100	0%	--	0%	--	0%	--
All	6%	\$284	9%	\$597	13%	\$1,339
Total cost for childless families (billions of \$)	\$1.9		\$6.5		\$20.2	
Incremental cost over current law (billions of \$)	-		\$4.6		\$18.3	

Notes: "Fraction receiving" columns represent the number of recipients of the childless credit divided by the number of tax filers without child exemptions. Average credits not reported for cells where 1% or fewer of filers receive the credit.

Sources: Based on data from Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0515-1). Cols 3-4 based on data from Executive Office of the President and U.S. Treasury Department (2014), updated to 2015.