

## **UC Berkeley**

### **The Charles H. Percy Undergraduate Grant for Public Affairs Research Papers**

#### **Title**

The Tea Party Movement: A New Force in Republican Politics?

#### **Permalink**

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/89g322zc>

#### **Author**

Jellins, Sigourney

#### **Publication Date**

2011-05-31

Undergraduate

# The Tea Party Movement: A New Force in Republican Politics?

By: Sigourney Jellins  
Thesis Advisor: Eric Schickler  
PS 190  
5/2/2011

Table of Contents

An Introduction to the Tea Party Movement in Republican Politics.....	1
Chapter I: The Tea Party Movement: Common Misperceptions and the 2010 Election.....	2
Chapter II: Third Party Rise and Protest Movement Inclusion: Diverse Perspectives.....	12
Chapter III: An Investigation into the Tea Party Movement: Research Design.....	25
Chapter IV: Trends of Tea Party versus Non-Tea Party Republican Candidates.....	28
Chapter V: Tea Party Candidates: Some Interesting Examples.....	57
Chapter VI: What the Future Holds for the Tea Party Movement.....	63
Appendix I: Candidate Coding Tables.....	68
Works Cited.....	72

## **The Tea Party Movement: A New Force in Republican Politics**

### **An Introduction to the Tea Party in Republican Politics**

The 2010 midterm elections heralded the emergence of a new force in the political arena--the Tea Party. My thesis examines what issues united Tea Party candidates in House and Senate 2010 races and how they differ from other Republican candidates. Conducting a content analysis of candidate websites, election databases, and newspaper articles, I find that Tea Partiers and other Republican candidates have very similar issue positions on healthcare and federal spending. Tea Partiers, however, are more conservative than non-Tea Party Republican candidates on social issues like abortion and gay marriage, more extreme on tax reform, and prioritize fiscal responsibility. Given my analysis, I predict that the Tea Partiers will push the Republican Party to the right.

Few scholars and commentators have attempted to explain the common features of Tea Party candidates' platforms, and what effect they will have on the Republican Party's politics. Through the method of coding the background and issue positions of both Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican candidates, my analysis suggests that in many ways these candidates have very similar positions, slightly differing in their priorities for the country, and level of conservatism (Tea Partiers being more conservative). Approaching the subject of Tea Party candidates in this manner leads to the conclusion that Tea Partiers will emerge as a force within the Republican Party that is capable of pushing the party to the right if the succeeding candidates become part of the permanent political landscape.

### **Chapter I: The Tea Party Movement: Common Misperceptions and the 2010 Election**

There was little doubt in the minds of Republican leaders entering the 2010 election season: Democratic incumbents in both the House and Senate would be vulnerable to conservative challengers. The absence of presidential coattails, a still suffering economy, a high unemployment rate, and uncertainty over the healthcare bill were simply a few of the issues lingering in the political conscience of American voters. However, the Republican establishment may not have expected a new and passionate political force to complicate what might have been a Republican takeover of both the House and Senate--the Tea Party Movement, and 2010 Tea Party challenger candidates.

Throughout the country during the 2010 election, many Tea Party-backed congressional candidates became real contenders in their respective races. Often, these candidates were challengers in races that already had well known establishment Republicans running. These senatorial and representative candidates vehemently professed their allegiance to fiscal and economic conservatism. Out of grass-roots opposition to the 'culture of spending' in Washington emerged full-fledged political candidates, all of whom were also registered Republicans. Though many stood in opposition to mainstream Republicans during their primary elections, by beating establishment Republicans in primary elections, Tea Party candidates usually gained the support of conservative voters and organizations--even those who backed their opponents. This inquiry into Tea Party and establishment Republican candidates makes the argument that despite their challenge to Republican candidates, the Tea Party movement is quickly becoming an 'anchoring group' of the Republican party. An 'anchoring group' possesses enough power within a political party to play a major role in determining the party's positions on issues, but is not a 'third party' entity (Schlozman 2010). Supporting the Tea Party's growing influence is the idea that the group can employ the threat of running on a third party platform, effectively challenging elected

Republicans if they are not afforded the power and conservative policies they prefer. The 2010 midterm elections contain prime examples of this phenomena, as Tea Partiers displayed their ability to put forth challenger candidates--and in some cases, victorious ones--while eventually (as the following research will show) displaying policy preferences which complement mainstream Republican candidates' views.

The Tea Party's emergence onto the political scene is fraught with debate surrounding the motives, positions, and participants of the movement. While Tea Party candidates are supported by a network of conservative media, it is difficult to nail down exactly who is a Tea Party member and what they want. Indeed, as remarked by the New York Times, the Tea Party is "hard enough to define, let alone to evaluate" (Silver 2010). As a conservative movement, it seems logical that Tea Partiers would be closely aligned with the Republican Party. In addition, the fact that the majority of the movement's members are also Republicans makes an alliance likely. But just what constitutes a Tea Partier, and how much in common do they have with mainstream Republicans? Answering this question is essential to predicting what sort of impact the Tea Party will have on United States' politics.

As a fundamentally conservative movement, the Tea Party is more likely to look to the Republican Party as a bargaining partner and ally than to the Democratic Party. However, because it is also a new movement, it is just beginning to develop its relationship with the Republican Party. A looming question for the United States' political system involves what sort of impact the Tea Party will have on American politics, through its relationship and involvement in the Republican Party. Wrapped up in this inquiry is also the question of how a Tea Party candidate can be differentiated from a typical Republican candidate. If candidates of each type seem to have similar positions, this might indicate a closer attachment between the Republican

Party and the Tea Party, supporting the theory of the Tea Party exercising influence within the Republican Party. Also, if positions are similar, particularly after the 2010 primaries but before the conclusion of the 2010 general election, it is possible that Tea Party and Republican leaders converged on a set of positions acceptable to both. To answer this question, one must examine the background, positions, and values of both Tea Party and mainstream Republican candidates within the time frame of the 2010 general election.

Tea Party candidates' entrance into the political arena may hold important implications for the Republican Party. Tea Party candidates are the most identifiable and concrete examples of Tea Party members available for research purposes. Though the line is definitely blurred between Tea Partier and mainstream Republican--as 79% of Tea Party supporters also identify themselves as Republicans--Tea Party candidates offer the clearest picture of what positions and specific policies the movement stands for (Newport 2010). Tea Partiers are affiliated with the Republican party, but the important question this study seeks to answer is whether they will simply be absorbed into the Republican Party, strike out on their own in third party fashion, or become a powerful force or group within the Republican Party, with the ability to direct party positions. Another interesting question is whether Tea Party candidates are simply establishment Republican candidates which are taking advantage of the hostile political environment by calling themselves local, apolitical, and grass-roots oriented Tea Partiers.

The American political system may be undergoing a historic transformation with the growing prominence of the Tea Party movement. What originally was only a fringe protest movement willed its way into the system of legitimate political power with the election of its candidates (or candidates with Tea Party sympathies) to Congress. Inclined to align to the right of the Republican Party on some issues, the Tea Party movement may have the effect of shifting

the Republican Party's positions farther to the right. This, in turn, is significant because of what it may mean for governmental policy-making and the voting public in America: Republican politicians may be forced to advocate for more conservative positions, the already overwhelming gap between polarized political parties may widen, and voter allegiances may shift.

Interestingly enough, the profile of both Tea Party voters and Tea Party candidates depicts a definitively upper-middle class population, dealing with less hardship than most of the country during the current period of economic downturn. Indeed, Tea Party voters, by the data of the New York Times/CBS News poll, are "better educated and wealthier than the general public...more likely to describe their economic situation as very or fairly good" (Zernike 2010). Despite their generally comfortable condition, they harbor a great deal of anger at America's economic situation. In order to understand the Tea Party and their possibly historic impact on the American political system (or at least on the 2010 election), one must get a sense of their background, occupation, and education.

### **Impact of the Tea Party on Republican Politics**

Examining the relationship between Tea Party candidates and Republican ones may shed on the discrepancy between Tea Partiers position in society and their rage at the fiscal state of the country. As they are affiliated with the party that is not currently 'in power' in Washington, Tea Party anger may be indicative of opposition to a government with a different ideological alignment than their conservative, small-government mind set. If the motivation behind the Tea Party stems from a concern about the ideological stance of the United States, both because of the concern that President Obama is far too 'liberal', and establishment Republicans are not conservative enough, the movement's main concern would be pushing the Republican party towards the right and then into power. Supporting this claim, Tea Partiers tend to harbor a



“unanimous” dislike of President Obama, concluding that he neither shares their values nor understands their problems (Zernike 2010 “Supporters”). In addition, Tea Partiers spend less time mourning lost jobs and the economic climate, and more time proclaiming the need to reduce the size of government, the debt, and taxes.

One may presume that the Tea Party has the potential to help the Republican Party, both in an election context and with its newly elected, conservative members of Congress. Indeed, their grass-roots movement contains a large number of passionate, dedicated members willing to both donate and volunteer for candidates they believe in. 2010 Tea Party candidates were all registered Republicans, suggesting a possible alliance between the two groups once installed in Congress. The excitement of the ‘political outsider’ persona maintained by the Tea Party may help the GOP mobilize its conservative base in the future. In addition, Tea Party candidates elected to Congress will most definitely stand with Republicans on issues like lowering the deficit, and limiting government power.

However, there are also examples that illustrate how the Tea Party can be harmful to the Republican Party. A cautionary tale unfolded in 2009 in the special election in New York’s 23rd district. In a district widely known as a “Republican stronghold”, a Democrat clinched victory when Dan Hoffman, a Conservative Party candidate, forced Dede Scozzafava, the moderate Republican candidate, to withdraw from the race. This caused a rift in Republican leadership and split Republican support, as Scozzafava endorsed the Democrat. (Peters 2010). The Tea Party has the potential of creating the same sort of divisiveness as it pushes for conservative positions that more moderate Republicans may abhor. Recently, Tea Party members elected to Congress chose to complicate the conservative response to the 2011 State of the Union by delivering their own separate response. While Tea Party fervor probably propelled more

Republicans to the midterm polls than would otherwise have been the case, it was also responsible for replacing well-established Republican candidates with less known, less qualified Tea Party members. For example, Ken Buck, Christine O'Donnell, and Sharon Angle were unsuccessful Tea Party candidates in Senate elections where a more moderate, more experienced Republican candidate would have had a good chance of winning. The Tea Party is clearly not a group that will allow itself to be easily controlled. Studying the Tea Party's budding relationship with the Republican Party is crucial to understanding the direction in which Republican politics is headed because of the movement's innate ability both to help and hurt Republican politics.

Generally, a Tea Partier or an affiliated candidate might be conceptualized as disaffected with the direction the country is headed, angry at the bailout and stimulus bills—believing they represent a waste of taxpayer money--and concerned about the rising debt and current level of spending. Under the surface however, candidate profiles suggest that Tea Party candidates may also be just as conservative, if not more conservative than their regular Republican counterparts when it comes to social issues like abortion and gay rights. These issues are not normally included in generalized thinking about the Tea Party's platform, as Tea Party leaders (those which can be identified) say that they focus on economic conservatism because it appeals to all in a time of deficit and recession. These economically conservative issues include “fiscal responsibility, limited government, and [allowing] free markets” (Zernike 2010 “Avoids”). One defining characteristic of Tea Party candidates appears to be their attempt to redefine and remold the ‘Republican’ label to better suit their conservative aims. This is evident in their willingness to challenge established Republican candidates. They win public support through their appeal as dark horse candidates, seeing themselves as ‘citizen legislators’ looking out for the interests of the people, not currying political favor. Driven by outrage at the climate of spending and fiscal

responsibility in Washington politics, their positions adhere more to the idea of repositioning the G.O.P. farther to the right, and less about addressing immediate pressing issues beyond the deficit and spending.

While Republican and Tea Party candidates are similar in many ways, Tea Party candidates are more conservative when it comes to fiscal policy, and in some cases in terms of social policies like abortion. With the success of more than a few of the Tea Party candidates in the midterm elections, it appears that Tea Partiers may have won themselves a seat at the table when it comes to dictating Republican positions. The Tea Party movement, with its willingness to stand in opposition to establishment Republican politicians, presents the possibility that the formation of a third party is possible. For example, a recent New York Times poll states that 19% of respondents believe that there is “a lot” of difference between the movement and the Republican party, and 61% think there is at least “some” difference (Thee-Brenan and Zernike 2010). In addition, Tea Party candidates seem to be more likely to prioritize spending and the deficit as the top issues facing the country, as opposed to a slumping economy or job creation.

One might be tempted to consider the Tea Party movement to be a trend or a fad that will fade out over the next year. Mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, for instance defined the Tea Party as a “fad”, insisting that while the public’s anger at government is not without cause, anger, ”is not a government strategy, [nor] a way to govern” (Barbaro 2010). However, it is clear from the number of representatives and senators in Congress whom adhere to Tea Party values that the movement may be around for quite a while. The Tea Party Caucus was started in the 2011 session of Congress, and is a show of legitimate political power and an indication that the Tea Party is here to stay. Despite its small size--less than 10 percent of Republicans joined--it still acts as a channel between Tea Party sympathizers and Congress (Senate Tea Party Caucus,

Herszenhorn). While admitting that the caucus is small, a freshman senator from Utah, Mike Lee insists that, “In time, it may grow” (Herszenhorn 2011).

Some political analysts choose to view the Tea Party movement strictly through the lens of a third party. However, creating a third party has never proven to be a very effective way to influence the American political system, which inherently encourages the two party system. Additionally the Tea Party movement is far too similar to the Republican Party to justify existing as a completely separate entity. A New York Times/CBS poll conducted in April 2010 shows that though Tea Party supporters believe that the country is headed in the wrong direction, they “do not want a third party and say they usually or almost always vote Republican” (Thee-Brennan and Zernike 2010).

The Tea Party movement, as a recent political development, appears as a new topic in the world of political science academia. Therefore, it is important to ground the choices facing the Tea Party--whether to become a third party, a separate interest group, or an anchoring group within the Republican Party--in theories and political writings which explain how groups have gone about making this choice in the past. The literature review will make sense of these choices, providing examples of other groups, and eventually identifying the anchoring group method as the one most likely to be followed by the Tea Party. The research design section explains the technique used to identify the differences and similarities between Tea Party and Republican candidates, as well as describing why certain candidate positions were recorded in great detail--for example, degrees of opposition to abortion and ideas for improving the healthcare bill. In the section that focuses on the results of Tea Party candidate coding, significant trends and topics are addressed, differences and similarities between the types of candidates are discussed, and a workable definition of a Tea Party candidate is produced. Within this section, each coding trait--

affiliation with the Tea Party, education, political experience, position on the Obama administration, healthcare, taxes, abortion, military spending, family values, and spending and the deficit--is discussed and broken down to reveal either a similarity between Tea Party and Republican candidates, or an important difference. The case studies section identifies some of the most pertinent examples of trends for each coding characteristic. A specific Tea Party candidate offers the example for each trend. Immediately following, results of candidate coding are summarized, conclusions drawn, and implications for the future are stated. Finally, the Tea Party caucus, and political predictions on the future of the Tea Party movement are explored. Tea Party candidates who won their 2010 election are shown to be participating in the normal processes and culture of Washington, despite campaign promises to the contrary. This development offers an interesting account of how neophyte politicians make the transition from 'citizen legislators' to savvy senators and representatives. For example, while most of the Tea Party candidates ran on an anti-Washington platform, those that won have accepted the role lobbyists and interest groups play in the money side of politics (Eggen 2010). The body of this work will hopefully provide a more detailed picture of the profile of a Tea Party candidate, a more in depth look at what issues are important to the group, and how this new breed of candidate matches up against its mainstream Republican counterpart.

## **Chapter II: Third Party Rise and Protest Movement Inclusion: Diverse Perspectives**

In Madison's Federalist 10, factions are presented as ills of American society and a threat to responsible government. Organizing into factions is a draw to each and every citizen of the Republic. Madison considered factions to be great evils that would prevent the effective governance of the United States by dividing citizens (Madison 1787). In the fledgling days of the United States, political parties were referred to as factions, and shrouded in overwhelmingly negative connotations. Today, however, parties have shed this divisive image and the definition of faction has changed. Factions have become the counteractive elements that arise within majority parties or separately, in opposition to mainstream political forces. It is hotly debated whether the recently formed Tea Party movement is its own emerging party, an interest group that will lobby for its policies through a major party, or simply a faction that will be quickly

incorporated into one of the dominant political parties. The choices facing the Tea Party – and the likely outcome of this process--can be understood in terms of Dahl's trilemma of social movements--the choice to become a third party, a pressure group or an "anchoring group" within a political party--and Karol's work on group incorporation into political parties.

Though the media has speculated on whether the Tea Party will go full bore into the American political realm as an independent party, a more likely choice will be affiliation with the Republican party. As argued later in this paper, the Tea Party movement exhibits enough similarity to the Republican party to provide for a close alliance between the two forces. Some differences exist between the movement and the Party on specific positions, but for all intents and purposes, Republican and Tea Party views coincide.

### **What Constitutes a Political Party?**

To determine whether the Tea Party is a fledgling political party or a wing of the Republican Party, a definition of the term 'political party' must be established. Political parties deal with "intersections of the political process--conflict regulation, integration, public opinion formation, policy formulation" and are organized around "public interest or private gain" (Hawkesworth et al. 1992). In the case of the Tea Party, a concerned group of citizens is adamantly protesting the Obama administration's approach to governance. "Externally created parties" are those created outside, and usually in opposition to, the dominant political system (Hawkesworth et al. 1992). A useful definition of parties provided by political scientist David Karol is to think of parties as "coalitions of groups with intense preferences on issues managed by politicians" (Karol 2009). In the case of the Tea Party, their intense preferences concern fiscal conservatism, opposition to government assistance or interference in states or private citizens' business, and strict adherence to their interpretation of the Constitution. Political parties are also

viewed as building a sort of voter identity, with its measure of success being how many people vote for their party. Methods parties use to create this identity are “official labels and symbols to party platforms and complex ideologies, from propaganda and educational programmes to a vast apparatus of auxiliary party organizations” (Hawkesworth et al. 1992). Though today voter loyalty to his or her party is not as strong as it once was, political parties still form the crucial link between elected officials and the populace. Thus, groups looking to change the course of the nation look to harness the political power that comes with having your candidates elected to office. In the case of the Tea Party, the creation of a new party may occur if Tea Partiers can distinguish themselves from Republicans enough to build political strength by getting many candidates elected. However, it is more likely that the Tea Party will choose to incorporate itself into the Republican party, which already has legitimacy and a well-established persona.

### **Definition of a Faction or Interest Group**

Interest group-type organizations arise to advocate or deal with the concerns of a like-minded group of individuals. These interest groups will negotiate with the political party most likely to cater to their desired policies at any given time--they are not limited to one group or the other, and may decide to strike out on their own at times. That being said it can be a difficult process, requiring “time, money, ‘boldness’, and generally an ‘angel’ or two” (Hakesworth et al. 1992). The most important mission for movements migrating into political party status is the building of political legitimacy. The Tea Party has attempted to claim some political legitimacy since its angry, tumultuous rise to fame by trying to appear non-partisan and calling out members of both parties for votes or policies they consider to be too liberal. In addition, Tea Party members, many for the first time, are now running for office, which may have the effect of integrating their party into the mainstream political dialogue. For many commentators and



scholars, the Tea Party movement falls under the label of faction--a curious, anomalous phenomenon marked by its temporality and occurrence during a time of crisis (Belle and Belloni 1976). Defined by William N. Chambers, the organizations of emerging factions (and budding political parties) are defined as “semi-visible” (difficult to identify), irregular and unstable...coming into existence...in an almost unconscious fashion” (Belle and Belloni 1976, 535). This almost precisely coincides with the very loose linkages (if any exist at all) between branches of the Tea Party, which make it difficult to pin down the extent of the movement’s appeal, and the identity of their members. Members of groups have similar concerns about certain policy positions, and look to influence other organizations and political parties so that their ideals are realized. On the other hand, the power that an interest group holds stems from whether the party elite believe that adopting a group’s favored positions will help them win a political majority. While the Tea Party movement does appear to have an independent streak, it also seems willing to work within the existing framework of the GOP--an easier and faster way to turn its momentum into votes and policies.

### **The Tea Party as an “Anchoring Group”**

Furthering Karol’s model of group incorporation is the concept of “anchoring groups”: “large, socially important interest groups that, having joined together with major political parties, exercise broad influence on national politics by virtue of money, votes, and networks” (Schlozman 2010). One of the political parties must be open to affiliation with the group, in this case, the Tea Party. Parties incorporate groups when they think it will help them achieve electoral majorities. Anchoring groups are not simply limited to one issue, but may advocate for a variety of policies. The Tea Party movement arose to reverse the path government is heading down--big government, out of control spending, and universal healthcare. Tea Party members are

organized around a set of shared principles; specifically, they argue that the current health care system “already provides adequate care to the poor and the elderly” (Katel 2010). The Republican Party is incentivized to incorporate the Tea Party Movement because its grass roots support can be turned into votes. Additionally, incorporation is probable because most Tea Party members are both conservative and registered Republicans that generally vote for GOP candidates. The “Grand Old Tea Party” attributes the rise of the Tea Party to an increasingly more conservative and involved Republican base (Abramowitz 2010).

### **Using Political Pressure: Interest Groups**

Interest groups work outside the party system by trying to influence policy through whatever channels necessary. These groups do not confine their alliances to one political party or the other. Instead, they ally themselves on an issue to issue basis--siding with whatever party's position is closest to their own. Social movements like the Tea Party will make the choice to become an interest group if there are like-minded individuals in both the Republican and Democratic Parties (Schlozman 2010). While they attempt to get their policy choices put into action, they do so without nominating political candidates. Pressure groups use the already established political parties indiscriminately to achieve their goals. Another characteristic of interest groups is that they often attempt to achieve small scale, specific changes. As most of the Tea Party's aims are broad--a re-invocation of fiscal conservatism and constitutional bounds on government, the pressure group label does not seem like a good fit. In addition, the Tea Party has already gone a step beyond the interest group level by nominating their own candidates and casting themselves as strict conservatives, which makes alliance with the Democratic party seem unlikely.

### **A New Party Emerging?**

There are those that believe the Tea Party movement indicates a larger shift in the United States, and the creation of a new brand of politics. Law Professor Harlan Reynolds goes as far as to suggest the Tea Party is the third Great Awakening (Reynolds 2010). Fiorina, in his perspective, indicates that he no longer believes that voter identification with parties is unchangeable as it was in the 1950s (Fiorina 2002). The willingness of voters to single out politicians who are oriented around their ideology--conservatism--and perhaps orient with a third party depicts what Fiorina describes as a rising trend in the 1980s that has continued to today. While political parties in government (i.e. among elites) remained strong, party affiliation among the voting masses grew increasingly weaker perhaps allowing a realignment of political attitudes (Fiorina 2002). His opinion indicates that there is room within the US political electorate for alternate forms of party identification. This school of thought suggests that the Tea Party Movement, while originally aligned with the Republican Party, is splintering away from the dominant party and becoming a factional political force. As defined by Dahl's trilemma, a movement will choose to become a third party if both parties are hostile to the movement's aims (Schlozman 2010). This will happen if the Republican Party in particular, decides that Tea Party positions are too conservative or radical. Throughout United States political history, some authors argue, waves of protest sentiment among the voting population indicate that a major realignment of political power is about to take place. Sundquist discusses the importance of a "voter revolution" to such a shift in political power (Sundquist 1983). Tea Party candidates have emerged to challenge Democrats and Republicans alike in the 2010 midterm elections (running as challenger Republican candidates), adding an electoral component to their cause. Interestingly, the interest groups and protest movements that are outside the dominant

Democratic-Republican political mainstream often choose to exert their influence in the traditional way, through the accumulation of electoral power.

Formation of a political party is often the way movements generate staying power. Indeed, Belle and Belloni suggest that factionalism is perhaps a stage of political system and party development (Belle and Belloni 1976). In order to take the next step, they need to establish political legitimacy and relevance by winning elections. The Tea Party has been viewed as a top down organization--one run by media and financial elites (Abramowitz 2010). However, they also contain the “sympathizing” laymen that are essential to a successful political party (Abramowitz 2010). The political party as an entity is a sort of status symbol of legitimacy. Indeed, Samuel Huntington states that the political party is so important as to be “*the distinctive institution in the modern polity*” (Hawkesworth et al. 1992). The purpose of parties is to guide and shape government policy, which is exactly what the Tea Party intends on doing: turning government away from democratic, or ‘socialistic’ policies toward conservative fiscal and societal solutions. However, despite the Tea Party’s ability to recruit their own candidates to run for election (as a third party would) they are still running as Republicans. This suggests that the third party route is more of a bargaining chip that the Tea Party may use to get the GOP to focus on its issues.

### **Incorporation into a Major Political Party**

The theoretical framework of factionalism may also be applied to the movement inclusion school of thought. This viewpoint indicates that the Tea Party is a portion of the Republican Party, an “intra-party unit”, and not its own political phenomenon (Belle and Belloni 1976, 536). As mentioned previously, parties adopt groups’ positions if they feel that there is an electoral incentive to do so. The relationship between the Republican Party and the Tea Party

Movement hinges on whether elite Republicans feel that they can harness the Tea Party's voter support.

The Tea Party will also have more influence over policy if it decides to work within a major political party that has already amassed power in the political system. As Karol explains, the degree to which groups are incorporated into a party determines how much leverage they have over the positions the party takes--key groups within parties have more say in the policies that are adopted (Karol 2009). Karol asserts that parties may go through a process called "coalition group incorporation" (Karol 2009). Examples of this phenomenon include abortion and gun control. Originally, opinions on abortion cut across political affiliation. It was not until the 1970s and Nixon's presidency that Republicans saw that the political expediency in incorporating abortion into their national platform: Nixon "[envisioned] our own new coalition based on the Silent Majority, blue collar Catholic, Poles, Italian and Irish" (Karol 2009, 59).

Similarly, incumbent Republican candidates have begun to seek the backing of their local tea party organizations, and have begun preaching the Tea Party's platform issues. They discuss fiscal conservancy, and government intrusion. Party leaders and politicians adjust their positions and adopt the opinions of their affiliated groups because ultimately, their goal is either to get elected or stay in power.

Karol highlights several ways an issue and a group can become prominent: it can just emerge in the consciousness of a party, those issues that formerly cut across party lines can proceed to divide parties, and parties can switch positions on issues (Karol 2009). The issues highlighted by the Tea Party are in popular society's focus (fiscal conservatism, small government) because of the catastrophic economic downturn, and the start of a new presidential administration. Furthermore, scholar Richard Rose defines factional ideology--if one can define

the Tea Party as such--as placing emphasis on a certain set of principles of the larger party, and it is around this set of ideas that actions and membership in the faction are centered (Belle and Belloni 1976). The Tea Party Movement has in fact centered on fiscal conservatism, a long standing plank of the Republican Party. 80% of Tea Party identifiers also identify themselves as Republican (Abramowitz 2010). The political path taken by the Tea Party so far indicates the likelihood it will become an 'anchoring group' within the GOP. Historically, several pivotal issues depict the transformation of issue based groups into major political parties, illuminating the process the Tea Party is undergoing.

### **Other Incorporated Movements**

Abortion and gun rights are two causes which exemplify the incorporation of specific issues into major party platform. Karol delves into the history of incorporation of movements into political parties. He mentions abortion and gun rights as issues of groups that became politically important and caused the incorporation of interested groups into the Republican Party. The records of politicians can also be telling in terms of the shifts that they (and their party) must make to accommodate newly incorporated groups. One example is the career of Lyndon B. Johnson and his position on race relations in the United States: he went from representing conservative Texas, to a proponent of civil rights in his time in the White House (Karol 2009). Karol suggests that the incorporation of other groups into parties, like Grover Norquist's Americans for Tax Reform into the Republican Party, indicates the politicization of a previously non-partisan issue (Karol 2009). The religious right is an example of a group that actively advocates for their favored policies, mainly through the Republican Party. Across the aisle, labor interests like the AFL-CIO have lobbied the Democratic Party for the policies they desire to be enacted.

Abortion is an example of an issue of groups once outside the party system, that is now an indicator of party identification. In fact, up until the 1980s, at the mass level Democrats were, on average, significantly more pro-life than their Republican counterparts (Karol 2009). However, pro-life and pro-choice groups have increasingly become important parts of the Democratic and Republican Parties, as the issue has grown increasingly polarizing. On each side of the issue, party elites have taken strong positions in accordance with the desire of pro-life and pro-choice groups. In each case, these groups are now integral parts of their respective parties. In turn, these elites give cues to voters who often align their opinions with the party. For Nixon, incorporating pro-life groups into the coalition of his presidential campaign stemmed from his awareness of George Wallace's potential to cut into the traditional Republican electorate. He appealed to democratic white Catholics by standing in opposition to abortion, though in the mid 1960s, Republicans were more supportive of the right to choose than Democrats (Karol 2009). The status quo gradually developed: abortion and its related groups became important politically, and the positions of these groups became a standard part of their respective political parties. A similar opportunity now presents itself to the Republican Party: they can address the concerns of the Tea Party, adopting their issues, and thus draw its supporters more closely into the Republican fold.

### **The Tea Party Movement: Assimilation into the Republican Party**

Of the trilemma choices, the most politically advantageous choice for both the Republican Party and the Tea Party Movement is the incorporation of the movement into the larger political party, both because of sacrifices necessary to build a third party, and the suitability of an 'anchoring group' relationship. Reasons that are often cited to explain the unlikelihood of a powerful third party in American politics include: the plurality method of

election of presidents and governors, and the single member district method of choosing senators, representatives and state representatives. The Tea Party Movement is also prevented from becoming a separate political force by the negative connotations attached to being another division between citizens in society. As Madison suggests, being a force within society that is seemingly dedicated to separating citizens and causing competition and conflict over political resources is not something that encourages support (Madison 1787). Instead, being incorporated into the Republican party allows the Tea Party to advocate for its policies without becoming a separate party.

The Tea Party seems to be undergoing the process of “coalition group incorporation” as defined by Karol: a major party shifts its positions in order to assume the constituency of a movement (Karol 2009). The Tea Party movement is similar enough to the Republican Party to be considered affiliated, and the Tea Party cannot separate themselves effectively because such behavior is seen as divisive and counterproductive. In other words, the choice that is posed to Tea Partiers is either to remain separate and allow Democrats to prevail, or choose to assimilate into the similarly conservative Republican Party. The Republican Party has indicated it is open to a relationship with the Tea Party; most members of the Republican establishment have supported the Tea Party Candidates that challenged and beat Republicans in the primary. The Republican Party’s incentive to incorporate the Tea Party lies in the potential of electoral support, and the possibility of benefiting from the public’s animosity toward the government by adopting the anti-government stance and political newcomer reputation of the Tea Party. As the groups that make up a party’s coalition change, already established politicians may feel “pressure on them to accommodate the new faction” (Karol 2009). Through this accommodation, the structure and policy preferences of the Republican party may change.



Abramowitz determined that the two best indicators of Tea Party supporters were animosity towards the president and conservatism; on these two fronts, the movement may push the Republican Party further right (Abramowitz 2010). Because factions are centered around issues, says J. Nyomarkay, they develop enough organization and structure to advocate for their interests effectively, but face no incentive to develop beyond this level (Belle and Belloni 1976). Abramowitz views the Tea Party as an outgrowth of the increasing conservatism of the Republican base (Abramowitz 2010). Their willingness to criticize Republican politicians (the political party that most closely subscribes to their beliefs) has helped create the impression that the Tea Party is a movement with no particular political affiliation. However, it is clear that the Tea Party movement aims to “push the national Republican Party to the right” by running their own candidates against Republicans in the midterm elections, where they determine that Republicans are not conservative enough (Katel 2010). While Tea Partiers seem to be content to secure conservative policies through the GOP, other options are available if this fails to happen.

Once group incorporation has taken place, if the group’s desired policies are not upheld, “the group can support challengers in primaries” (Karol 2009). This threat to support challengers in Republican primaries (as evidenced by the 2010 midterm elections) can be used by the Tea Party group as leverage to uphold their preferred policies. Tea Party members themselves remark that though “the GOP has lost the mantle of fiscal responsibility and small government...[it] is the most likely breeding ground for fiscally responsible constitutionalists” (Katel 2010). Therefore, the Tea Party will not be inclined to bargain with the Democratic Party. Factions, like the Tea Party movement are lacking the key ingredients of a permanent political party: “the symbols, the history and the enduring organic “personality” of parties” (Belle and Belloni 1976). As a brand new movement, the Tea Party does not have the legacy or power to hold its own as a

separate political party. In conclusion, the school of thought which interprets the Tea Party movement as moving into an 'anchoring group' relationship with the Republican party, possesses the most credibility.

## **An Investigation into the Tea Party Movement**

### **Research Method**

As Tea Party candidates are the most accessible examples of what the Tea Party Movement stands for, they served as the prime subject of research. They are also important because they are the face of the movement--as politicians, they are the most clearly defined examples of Tea Party members. Candidates tell us what movements and parties stand for, and positions they take have the potential to be reflected in actual policy. Candidate coding proved to be the easiest way to complete a comparison analysis of Tea Party to non-Tea Party Republican candidates, though this comparison was also limited by a candidate's status as a challenger. All Senate Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican challenger candidates were coded, and 50 and 19 Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican House challengers were researched respectively. Non-Tea Party Republicans were chosen from similar areas of the country as Tea Party candidates, and for their exclusion from the New York Times' Tea Party candidates list. Tea Party candidates were identified using the New York Times Tea Party electoral map. This map identified all Tea Party Senate and House candidates based on whether they had Tea Party endorsements, support, were members, or had spoken at rallies or meetings.

### **Research Sources**

Researching candidate biographies and candidates' positions proceeded in the same manner for each candidate. First, the candidate's campaign website was inspected for all positions and information it might offer. Then, secondary sources, like candidate profile websites, such as whorungov.org were examined for information not listed on candidate websites. Thirdly, newspaper articles were searched to fill in any remaining gaps. If some information was still not found after this process, it was concluded that candidates did not care to emphasize these issues, or were perhaps purposefully leaving their opinions on the subject (for example, on the Don't Ask Don't Tell military policy) ambiguous.

Background and issue position characteristics were quantified on a number scale. The number scale was based on the opinions that were most favored or disfavored by candidates, and on the range of responses candidates gave. Issues that were more complicated were broken down into multiple coding columns, like position on healthcare, which had six columns: whether reform was needed, whether healthcare costs were too high, position on the healthcare bill, infringement on patient rights, favorability of free market reforms, and whether the candidate emphasized tort reform.

### **Candidate Coding**

This breakdown of issues allowed for research to determine the minute differences or similarities between Tea Party and Republican candidates. A full list of coding topics is available in the appendix, along with the reason why they were included, and what implications they might hold for the Tea Party movement's relationship with the Republican Party. For the characteristics that revealed a significant difference between the two types of candidates, an example was selected to be elaborated on within the conclusion section.

### **Addressing Possible Sources of Error**

As with many methods of analysis that involve coding, an element of subjectivity is involved in determining and classifying candidate opinions and positions. Particularly in the case of politics, where candidates can emphasize or de-emphasize topics or the strength of their position based on the present audience, objectivity can be difficult. However, the process of researching candidates--based first on their website, then on candidate databases, then on newspaper articles--lends a systematic sense to candidate coding. Another complication which occurs when trying to separate out Tea Party candidates from non-Tea Party Republican candidates is that there is no formal committee of Tea Party leaders that decide who qualifies as

a Tea Party Republican candidate. Therefore, the line separating traditional Republican candidates from Tea Party candidates is not completely clear--some candidates may call themselves Tea Partiers, others may be considered Tea Party candidates because of the positions they hold, but do not actually identify themselves in this manner. For example, all Tea Party candidates are also registered Republicans, and some of the support they receive from Tea Party organizations can be found supporting candidates not considered Tea Party candidates. This concern was addressed by recording the level of support from or involvement with the movement for each Tea Party candidate. However, it also serves to support the point that the Tea Party movement and the Republican Party are becoming increasingly unified.

#### **Chapter IV: Trends of Tea Party Versus Non-Tea Party Republican Candidates**

##### **Candidate Coding: Trends and Statistical Data**



This section explains major trends of differences and similarities between Tea Party Republican and non-Tea Party Republican candidates, and common characteristics of Tea Party

candidates. The first set of qualities coded determined the average profile of a Tea Party Republican candidate in both House and Senate elections. House Tea Party Republican candidates were less likely to come from “elite” backgrounds--in terms of education and occupation--and had less political experience than non-Tea Party Republican candidates. One element of the Tea Party that has made it controversial is its members’ tendency to be extremely hostile to and cynical of the Obama administration--a trend that held true in this Tea Party candidate analysis. Social issues, supposedly not a focus of the Tea Party platform, actually proved to be very important to Tea Party Republican candidates--revealing that they are both more conservative, and more unequivocal in their opinions than non-Tea Party Republican candidates. However, true to Tea Party ideals, they were most concerned with transforming the United States’ fiscal policy, by reducing government and prioritizing spending cuts, and reforming the tax system. On the whole, the depiction of Tea Party Republican candidates gained from this study shows that the Tea Party is close to the Republican Party on many issues--thus, they will be able to collaborate--and will most likely encourage the party to adopt far-right positions.

### **Affiliation with the Tea Party**

As with any grass-roots movement, the extent to which someone is a full-fledged ‘member’ of the political group is difficult to ascertain. There are those who claim to be ‘members’ of the Tea Party but have never donated money nor participated in rallies. In essence, this type of ‘member’ simply subscribes to Tea Party beliefs and supports the political goals of the movement. On the other hand, there are those citizens who are actively involved in organizing protests, meetings, and raising money for the Tea Party cause. In an effort to make note of how involved Tea Party candidates are in the movement, this section seeks to provide a

better understanding of what it means to be classified as a Tea Party candidate. In Senate elections, half of Tea Party Republican candidates refer to themselves as members of the movement. Another 37% were endorsed by Tea Party organizations (or notable leaders), while an additional 12% spoke at Tea Party rallies or were involved in their activities in some way. I coded a candidate as endorsed by the Tea Party or Tea Party leaders if candidates were either endorsed by their local Tea Party organization, by national groups which support the movement (like the Tea Party Express or FreedomWorks), or by individuals which are known as the figureheads of the movement (like Sarah Palin). For House Tea Party candidates, the most common level of affiliation with the movement was to be endorsed by Tea Parties and their leaders--for 70% of candidates this was the case. 16% of House Tea Party candidates were involved in Tea Party activities, and only 12% called themselves Tea Party members. Though it is possible for candidates to have several different types of support, the point of coding this trait was to determine level of involvement. Therefore, if a candidate both declared themselves a Tea Partier, and spoke at Tea Party events, they were coded as "identifies as a Tea Party member", because this indicates a higher level of engagement in the movement. As the graphs below show, Senate Tea Party Republican candidates are were more likely to have a higher level of affiliation with the Tea Party, as a greater percentage of them identified themselves as Tea Partiers than was true in the House. The second graph on the next page depicts the tendency of House Tea Party Republican candidates to be called Tea Partiers because they were endorsed by a Tea Party leader, though there was also the smaller chance that they were members of the movement or recurring speakers.






### **Candidate Background: Education and Employment**

Level of education and type of employment can help indicate where a candidate is situated in the American economic hierarchy, as well as provide a better understanding of who makes up the Tea Party movement. Senate Non Tea Partiers and Tea Partiers had essentially the same amount of education--of non-Tea Party Republican candidates, 63% had graduate degrees, 36% had college degrees, for Tea Party candidates, 62% had graduate degrees, 37% had college degrees. Interestingly, House Tea Party candidates were far more likely to hold a graduate degree than non-Tea Party candidates: 54% of Tea Partiers have a graduate degree, versus 26% of non-Tea Party Republicans. In this sense, Tea Party House candidates were the more educated group. These graduate degrees were often in fields like law or medicine, which were common occupations for Tea Party Republicans to have.

Employment trends were almost opposite in the House versus in the Senate. Many Non-Tea Party Republican and Tea Party Republican candidates in the Senate were both participants in the political system, contrary to the notion that the Tea Party movement stands for those for whom politics is a new endeavor. For Non Tea Partiers, the most common occupation was that of a career politician, though many Tea Party candidates were also career politicians (37%). Career politicians were coded as such if they had dedicated at least two years to a state-wide elected office prior to running for Congress, or if they had held congressional office before. For Tea Partiers, the most common occupations were that of lawyer and career politician--37% and 37% respectively. In House elections, however, Tea Party candidates did have much less political experience than non-Tea Party Republican candidates. Tea Party House candidates were most commonly lawyers, while other Republican candidates were commonly career politicians (42%). This contrasted sharply with the low percentage of Tea Partiers that were career politicians--6%.

The differences between Tea Party candidate experience in Senate and House elections may be explained by the more prominent status held by those holding Senate seats. Often, a candidate running for a Senate seat has already served as a Representative. Perhaps, in order to be taken seriously as a Senate candidate, one must have political experience, even in an election season where political newcomers are welcomed. In House elections, the notion of Tea Partiers being political outsiders rang true--a much lower percentage were career politicians. A comparison of Senate Non-Tea Party and Tea Party Republican candidates is shown below, illustrating the similar levels of education in the Senate:



### Candidate Demographics: Gender, Age, and Race

While House Tea Party candidates were distinct for their lack of political experience, Senate Tea Partiers were a unique bunch because of their relative youth. Tea Party Republican Senate candidates were significantly younger than non-Tea Party Republicans, while House

candidates of both types were spread over a similar range of ages. Tea Party non-Tea Party Republican candidates are more likely than Republican candidates to be below the age of 50. Non-Tea Party Republican candidates were more likely to be over fifty, and even into their sixties. On the whole, non-Tea Party Republican and Tea Party candidates in House elections were of similar ages: 5% were approximately 39, 26% were approximately 50, and about 5% were over the age of 65.

Comparing the gender of Tea Party candidates to that of non-Tea Party candidates is important because one theory that has been advanced about the Tea Party is that it may be encouraging women to become more involved and politically engaged than has typically been the case among conservative Republicans. In the candidate pool, this did not appear to be true. Both the groups of candidates in the House and Senate had percentages of female candidates at 25% or less. Non-Tea Party Senate Republican candidates were a field of 8 male and 3 female candidates, while the Tea Party candidate group was made up of 6 male and 2 female candidates (25%). House Tea Party candidates had more women running than non-Tea Party Republicans, though both posted a low percentage at 14 and 10% respectively.

Race is another element of diversity that must be examined to get a sense of whether the Tea Party Movement is finding more success getting minority candidates to run for office than is typical for the GOP. Senate Tea Partiers were slightly more racially diverse than non-Tea Party Republican candidates, with one candidate of latino descent but no African Americans. For the House elections sample of candidates, Tea Party candidates were also a more diverse group with 2 African-American candidates and 4 Latino candidates. Non-Tea Party Republican candidates were less diverse with only 1 African-American candidate and 1 Asian candidate. It is ironic that Tea Party Movement candidates appear to be more racially diverse than non-Tea Party

Republican candidates, because the Tea Party is often accused of being racist or xenophobic. However, as a response to this point, and as will be shown in the candidate case study section, minority candidates of the Tea Party persuasion also often held the most extreme, conservative issue positions.


In sum, Senate Tea Partiers were very similar to non-Tea Party Republican candidates in most categories except for age, where they were significantly younger. It also appears that they were slightly more racially diverse, but less diverse in terms of gender. House Tea Party candidates were distinguishable from their Republican counterparts by education and occupation. They were more likely to hold a graduate degree, supporting the conclusion drawn about Tea Partiers in the introductory chapters of this thesis, that they are part of the upper-middle classes of America. In terms of occupation, House Tea Party candidates were also much less likely to be career politicians.

### **Political Novice or Consummate Politician: Previous Political Experience and Previous Run for Congress**


Being a political outsider is seen as an appealing quality for a political candidate, because it is supposed to mean that they are not beholden to special interests, and approach political problems with the mindset of an average American, not the mindset of a self-interested politician. Particularly in a mid-term election (no presidential coattails), in a time when much anger is directed at the government, being outside the Washington culture is seen as a positive trait. The allure of political neophyte Tea Party candidates in the House did seem to help politically inexperienced people win primary elections--with a twist.

Though Senate Tea Party candidates had experience holding political office while the majority of House Tea Party candidates did not, it turns out, for House Tea Party candidates, this

was not for lack of trying. House Tea Party candidates had run for Congress unsuccessfully more often than non-Tea Party Republican candidates prior to the 2010 election--37% to 9%. This data shows that some of the Tea Party candidates may have seen a political opportunity to join with the Tea Party--having lost before, they were thinking they could capitalize on the movement's anti-Washington, anti-incumbent mood. On the other hand, the majority of both types of candidates did not possess experience in Congress: half of the House Tea Party candidates, and 63% of non-Tea Party Republican candidates had never run for Congress before. House Republican candidates were also more likely than their counterparts to have served in Congress prior to 2010. This proves that on the whole, there is some truth to Tea Party candidates having little political experience, at least in House elections: 62% of candidates had no previous political experience versus only 47% of non-Tea Party Republican who were political newbies. House Republican candidates were also more likely to have had held elected office in their local governments. However, 6% of House Tea Party candidates had experience in Congress, while this was true for 0% of non-Tea Party Republican candidates, 20% of both types of candidates had some experience in the state legislature. Below is a graph which illustrates the lack of political experience found among House Tea Party candidates. Interestingly enough, the one House candidate with previous political experience also happened to be a Tea Partier. Though this might seem unusual, this particular candidate had been out of political power for a few years, and was looking to be regain political office--he was not an incumbent.



A majority of candidates in the Senate had previous political experience. Senate Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans were very similar in the amount of political experience they had: 50 and 36% had zero political experience, respectively. Of Tea Party Republican and non-Tea Party Republican candidates, 12% and 9% of each had experience in local government, 25% and 18% of each had experience in state government, and 12% and 36% had experience in Congress, respectively. Senate non-Tea Party and Tea Party. Therefore, as shown in the graph below, Tea Party Republicans were more likely to have experience at the local and state-wide levels, while non-Tea Party Republicans were more likely to have congressional experience.





### Contract from America

The Contract from America is supposedly a mark of a Tea Party candidate, as it was created by a Tea Party follower and outlines some of the movement's most well-known positions. However, of all House Tea Party candidates, only 48% of candidates advertised that they signed the contract. Others may not have signed, or did not view signing the contract as a campaign position that would be rewarded by voters. One possible shortcoming of this trait's analysis is that even though a candidate may not have advertised signing the pledge on his or her website does not mean they did not sign it. However, if a candidate was a true Tea Partier, one would assume that they would want the public to know that they signed the movement's pledge. Comparatively, 10% of non-Tea Party Republican House candidates signed the Contract from America. These results reveal the difficulty of studying the Tea Party, as much of the time members of the Tea Party can also be entwined in the Republican Party, such as non-Tea Party

Republicans who sign the Contract from America. Like many traits between the two types of candidates in Senate elections, signing the Contract for America was a popular thing for both to do. For Senate candidates, the percentage of candidates of each type that signed the Contract from America were--82% of non-Tea Party Republican candidates and 87% of Tea Party candidates. It is possible that people may want to see their senate candidates putting forward the more broad, nationalistic policies stated in the Contract from America, while candidates for representatives seats need to focus on issues specific to their districts to win voter support. This would explain the discrepancies in signature of the Contract from America between House and Senate Tea Party Republican candidates. Below are density graphs which compare the numbers of "sign" versus "did not sign" in the House and Senate elections. As seen in the graphs on the next page, a similar high percentage of non-Tea Party Republican and Tea Party Republican candidate in the Senate signed the Contract from America. Comparatively, a low percentage of Tea Party Republican candidates in the House signed the pledge.





### **Position on Obama Administration**

An important aspect of discovering how the Tea Party Movement will affect politics in the United States is figuring out how Tea Party adherents feel about the current direction and leadership of the country. Tea Party candidates were 17% more likely than other Republicans to view the Obama Administration as part of the ‘radical’ left, as holding socialist or very liberal values, and as taking the country in the wrong direction. This trend held true in House elections, where Tea Party candidates are more likely (72% versus 10%) to view the Obama administration as a part of the ‘radical left’, driving the country in the wrong direction. Candidates who included Obama as part of the ‘radical’ left were defined as those which made statements or had information on their webpage stating that Obama is leading the country towards socialism, destruction of key American values, or those candidates who subscribe to “birther” beliefs. One preconceived notion many hold about the Tea Party is that they do not believe the Barack Obama’s presidency is legitimate because they think he was born outside the United States. While many Tea Party candidates assumed Obama is leading the country away from its founding principles, and some even described him as a socialist, there was only one candidate who seemed to believe that the president is not a United States citizen. However, one explanation for the lack of “birther” candidates is that the candidates included in this study were those that succeeded in their primary elections. Tea Party candidates who subscribed to this very extreme and reactionary view were likely defeated in primaries across the country. Additionally, even if general election candidates sympathized with the “birther” notion, in order to win general elections, candidates often find it necessary to present themselves as more moderate to appeal to


a wider range of voters, and thus probably resisted from discussing this topic. If this was a study of primary Tea Party candidates, perhaps there would be more “birthers”.

**Position on Healthcare: Need for Reform, Cost of Healthcare, Repeal of Healthcare Bill, Restriction of Patient Freedom, Free Market Reform, and Tort Reform**

Health care reform, particularly with the passage of the landmark healthcare reform bill, was the subject of much debate during the 2010 midterm elections. The majority of the Republican Party, unhappy with the result of the health care reform process, while claiming that the bill was either not needed or the wrong kind of reform, continued to suggest their own free market improvements. This section will determine to what extent Tea Party Republican and non-Tea Party Republican candidates agreed on the need for and type of changes. Republican candidates were divided almost in half on the question of whether US healthcare actually needs reform (though they agreed that the healthcare reform that was passed was the wrong kind of change). Senate Tea Party candidates on the other hand, were split 25% to 75%, with the majority being in favor of improvements and reform to the system. However 25% of Tea Party candidates, or two candidates given that the number of senate candidates is small, believed that healthcare in the United States is both reasonably priced, and covers enough Americans. 36% of Republican candidates, along with 25% of Tea Partiers did not emphasize the cost of healthcare as a problem, thus one may assume that they do not see healthcare reform as a pressing issue. A similar percentage of both types of candidates--63% of [non-Tea party] Republican, 50% of Tea Partiers--believed that healthcare costs are too high and that more people should be able to afford coverage. A greater percentage of Tea Party candidates called for the total repeal of the healthcare reform bill (88%) though almost all of both categories of candidates viewed the bill negatively. One issue that 100% of Tea Partiers agreed on was that if the healthcare reform bill

was allowed to go into effect, it would negatively affect patient freedom, and individual and doctor control over treatments. Non-Tea Party Republicans were slightly more ambiguous on this issue, with 72% concerned about patient freedom, and 27% not emphasizing the issue. Tea Party candidates were unanimous in their endorsement of free market reforms to fix the healthcare system. While a majority of Republican candidates agreed, 27% did not offer free market reforms as a solution. Candidates also agreed that tort reform would help cut costs within the healthcare system--around 75% of each type of candidate felt favorably towards this measure.

House Tea Party candidates are 54% more likely than Republicans to think that US healthcare is perfect the way it is, and is not in need of reform. 100% of Republican candidates emphasized that the existing cost of healthcare is too high. Tea Party candidates on the other hand, were most likely to de-emphasize cost of healthcare (58%) in their attack on the healthcare reform bill. Tea Party candidates were slightly more likely than Republican candidates to call for a total repeal of the health care bill, and slightly more inclined to emphasize that the healthcare bill would mean restricting patient freedom (60% versus 52%). Republicans, however more often group their suggestions for reforming the healthcare systems under the label of free market reform, while Tea Partiers, who are more negative about the bill are less inclined to offer solutions. When it comes to recommending tort reform as a cost cutting measure for healthcare costs, Republicans are again 10% more likely to identify this measure as a specific option. Overall, Tea Party candidates tend to have a more drastic aversion to the healthcare bill--both clamoring for its repeal and arguing that the system is fine as it is. As demonstrated in the graphs below, a higher percentage of Tea Party Republican Senate candidates declared that the healthcare system needs little reform.



### Position on Abortion: Pro-choice or Pro-life and Specific Limitations

Mainstream interpretations of the Tea Party Movement often conclude that Tea Party members are concerned mainly with fiscal issues, and resist taking stands on social issues. However, Tea Party Republican candidates were more likely to state where they would draw the line on limiting abortion, as opposed to merely stating that they were pro-life. In addition, the limits they would place on abortion portrayed them as more conservative than their non-Tea Party Republican counterparts. Both Senate non-Tea Party Republican and Tea Party Republican candidates were unsurprisingly pro-life, however, one Republican candidate was in favor of a woman's right to choose. Furthermore, these Tea Party candidates are more conservative on limits to abortion than non-Tea Party Republican candidates--38% of Tea Partiers maintained the opinion that abortion should never be allowed, while 12% thought abortion should be allowed

only when the mother's life is in danger. In comparison, only one Republican candidate would outlaw abortion all together, while 36% would allow abortion when the mother's life is in danger, and 27% did not specify. Candidates' websites usually revealed whether a candidate was pro-life or pro-choice and whether they had objections or would make allowances for abortion for certain reasons--such as in cases of rape or incest. Alternatively, if candidates do not elaborate further on their pro-life position, they were coded as "does not emphasize". Tea Party Republican candidates for House elections also proved to be more conservative than other Republican candidates concerning abortion. 100% of Tea Party candidates were pro-life, while two Republican candidates were pro-choice and two others did not specify. Furthermore, 38% of Tea Party candidates felt abortion should never be allowed, while only 14% felt it should be allowed in cases of rape or incest or danger to the life of the mother. A tabulation of non-Tea Party Republican candidates' positions on abortion reveals that the majority position was to leave specific limitations ambiguous (74%). This perhaps reflects the heightened political savvy that comes with being a career politician, versus a political newcomer. One might draw the conclusion that because a greater number of Republican candidates had political experience, they might have already figured out that taking a direct stance on an issue can be a bad move politically, as it may divide voters or diminish support for your campaign.

### **Position on the Tax System: Bush-era Tax Cuts, Overhauling the Tax System, Income Tax, and Sales Tax**

Reforming the tax system is another way the Tea Party Movement approaches limiting federal power and fixing the country's fiscal problems. One issue that proved to be common ground between the two types of candidates was whether the Bush era tax cuts should be extended. Senate non-Tea Party Republican and Tea Party candidates are nearly unanimous in

their support for continuing the Bush tax cuts. However, Tea Party candidates are more in favor of overhauling the tax system--62% compared to 36% for other Republican candidates. By the same percentages, Tea Partiers and non-Tea Party Republicans were in favor of going to a flat rate income tax. Interestingly enough, Republican candidates were more in favor of replacing the income tax system with a flat rate sales tax: 3 non-Tea Party Republicans proposed the idea, while zero Tea Partiers endorsed the plan. Replacing the tax system with a flat rate sales tax is a rather radically conservative idea, which is why it is surprising that it was supported by non-Tea Party, but not Tea Party Republican candidates.

In House elections, non-Tea Party Republican and Tea Party Republican candidates were also almost in 100% agreement on continuing the Bush-era tax cuts. This position is often emphasized through a no tax increases pledge subscribed to by both types of candidates. Tea Party candidates are 40% more likely to advocate for the major changes or reform of the tax system. Often these candidates also emphasize that overhauling the tax system should be a priority of Congress. A portion of both types of candidates believed that the income tax should be made into a "flat tax", though Tea Partiers were 17% more likely to subscribe to this position. An even larger contrast is evident when Tea Party and Republican positions on the sales tax are compared. The radical notion of moving to a "fair tax" type of sales tax (where sales tax is the one of the only taxes the government levies) was supported by 26% of Tea Partiers versus only 5% of non-Tea Party Republicans.

### **Politics of National Security: Military Spending and Position on Gays in the Military**

Pushing for increases to the military budget, or being a 'war hawk', are characteristics often associated with the Republican Party. Coding for positions on military issues gives a sense of whether Tea Party Republican candidates are also of the 'war hawk' persuasion, and

determines how they feel about the social aspect of some military issues--like the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy. All Senate Tea Party candidates gave the impression of wanting to increase the military budget, mostly because they declared that the government's first and most important job is national security and protection of its people. More specifically, though all Senate Tea Party candidates were in favor of spending cuts overall, no one pointed to the military budget as a place where excess spending could be found. Non-Tea Party Republicans were less definite, with 54% appearing to want an increase, and 36% wanting to keep the level of spending as is. Therefore, in this case, Tea Party Senate Republican candidates were actually even more supportive of military funding than non-Tea Party Republicans, despite the fact--as will be shown later--they are also very concerned about the amount of money spent by the federal government. In the House elections, with respect to their position on military spending, House Republican and Tea Party candidates were different in that a larger percentage of House non-Tea Party Republicans wanted military spending to be held at the same level (63% versus 36%) and Tea Party Republicans wanted the budget increased (56% versus 31%). Less than ten percent of each type of candidates would favor a reduction in military spending to address the deficit or spending concerns.

Senate Tea Party candidates were split half and half between the positions of keeping the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy and not specifying either way. Republican candidates yielded a wider range of results: 18% wanted to get rid of the policy, 36% would follow the recommendations of military commanders, 18% would keep the policy, and 27% did not specify. One can conclude that Tea Party candidates were more conservative on this issue, as half stated that they would keep the policy, but none stated that they would support abolishing it. In the House elections however, Tea Party and Republican opinions on the Don't Ask Don't Tell



military policy were similar. A majority of both types of candidates--around 80% of each--declined to emphasize their position on the issue. Another route by 12% of Tea Partiers and 5% of Republicans was to say that the decision should be left up to military commanders. This may be related to whether it is politically expedient to announce a position one way or the other on the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy. If it does not win over more voters to take a position on an issue, politically experienced candidates may be more likely to decline to state their opinion, and avoid dividing voter support.

### **Position on Gay Marriage**

Gay marriage is a social issue which can help determine both the level of conservatism among Tea Party Republican candidates, and whether these candidates are invested in topics outside of the fiscal realm. Senate: 100% of Tea Party candidates were opposed to gay marriage, while 72% of non-Tea Party Republicans were also opposed. Data on position on gay marriage is based on a coding of candidates' publicly known positions, it is quite possible there are others who are opposed to gay marriage who did not emphasize it. These statistics also coincide with candidates' favorability towards a constitutional amendment declaring marriage between a man and a woman: 75% of Tea Partiers supported such an amendment, while only 55% of Republicans agreed with this position. One may conclude from this data that Tea Party Republican candidates (and thus, the movement as a whole) are more conservative than the non-Tea Party Republican candidates, and more willing to take a direct stand on social issue. 18% of Republicans were in favor of allowing gay marriage to occur, with 1 candidate refusing to specify. A large difference between House Tea Party candidates and non-Tea Party Republican candidates was that a higher percentage of Tea Party candidates supported adding a sanctity of marriage amendment to the constitution--36 versus 21%. Generally, this might be considered a

very conservative position to take. However, a majority of both kinds of candidates declined to state their position on the subject so strongly.

### **Position on TARP and Stimulus Bills**

Part of the Tea Party Movement's notoriety stems from their outrage at the government's usage of taxpayer money--particularly 2008's bank bailouts and 2009's stimulus bill. The importance of this issue to the Tea Party makes it an essential trait to code for because its similarity or difference between candidates' positions will indicate how far the Republican Party would have to shift its position to satisfy the movement. In accordance with the anti-Washington mood, Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican candidates agreed on the distasteful nature of the federal government supporting the economy, Tea Party candidates felt that the federal government should never engage in bailouts or offer stimulus packages. While the majority of Senate Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican candidates held the position that TARP and the stimulus bill were unsuccessful, 27% of non-Tea Party Republicans saw some value in both bills, or believed that governmental action was necessary to keep the economy from descending into a deeper recession. 0% of Tea Party candidates felt that the TARP and stimulus bills were successful. House Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican candidates were also nearly unanimous in agreeing that the TARP and Stimulus bills were failures--they did not believe that they stimulated the economy, or saved the economy from an even worse fate. Tea Party candidates were more often adamant that bailing out the banks and spending stimulus money were unconstitutional reaches on the behalf of the federal government. To come to this conclusion, candidates were coded as "seeing TARP and the stimulus as a failure (just adding to the deficit)" and "seeing TARP and the stimulus as necessary and helpful to the economy". From this data, one may conclude that the Tea Party Movement is more fiscally conservative than the

Republican Party, in that its members do not believe that the constitution allows the federal government to intervene in the economy, and would like to see less government restriction of the business sector.

### **Outrageous Deficit and Spending, Whose Fault?**

With the fervent depictions of Tea Party rallies protesting Obama and the Democrats extension of federal power gracing the covers of newspapers, magazines, and TV screens over the last two years, one might expect Tea Party candidates to blame Democrats for out of control spending to a greater degree than non-Tea Party Republicans did. In addition, based on their status as the political ‘outsiders’, Tea Party candidates might seem more likely to blame both parties for the size of the deficit. However, percentages of the ‘guilty party’ of each type of candidate blamed for the United States deficit were very similar in both the Senate and the House. Around 25% of each type of Senate candidate blamed the huge deficit and out of control spending on Democrats--either generally or on Pelosi and the Obama administration. Another 25% of each type of Senate candidate did not blame anyone in particular, while about 50% of each attributed the deficit to both Democrats and Republicans. House non-Tea Party Republicans and Tea Party candidates’ positions on where to attribute blame for the country’s deficit and spending issues were also very similar. 30% of both types blamed Obama or the Democrats directly, approximately 55% did not blame anyone in particular, and 12% blamed both Democrats and Republicans alike. In conclusion, non-Tea Party Republicans and Tea Party Republicans have common ground in terms of their formulation of the ‘enemy’--Obama and the Democrats.



### **Deficit and Spending, Priority Level**

Coding for fiscal issues revealed one of the stark differences between non-Tea Party Republican and Tea Party Republican candidates. As one of the professed missions of the Tea Party Movement is to rein in spending and limit federal power, Tea Party Republican candidates were overwhelmingly in favor of making reducing the deficit and reducing spending congressional priorities. On the other hand, (although not coded for specifically) non-Tea Party Republican candidates wanted to focus on other pressing issues like fixing the healthcare system and putting the economy back on track. To determine whether candidates would focus on the deficit and spending if elected, Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans were coded as either “does not emphasize” or “reducing the deficit, reigning in spending should be a priority of Congress”. One can assume that if the candidate did not declare the deficit and spending as a priority, they were more interested in focusing on revitalizing the economy or creating jobs. Position on whether the deficit and spending should be a priority drew a stark contrast between non-Tea Party Republican and Tea Party candidates. 100% of non-Tea Party Senate Republicans prioritized. 87% of the Senate Tea Partiers, on the other hand, emphasized reducing the deficit and reigning in spending as the first priority of the federal government. The same major difference between candidates can be seen when comparing the priorities of House candidates. House Tea Party candidates were 64% more likely than non-Tea Party Republican candidates to place a high priority on improving the deficit situation.


### **Status of Seat, Win or Loss and Safety of District**

Senate and House Non-Tea Party Republican candidates were more electable in their respective districts than were Tea Party candidates (won more often), perhaps because both types of candidates were running in ‘toss-up’ races (moderate districts) but Tea Party candidates tended to offer very conservative views. Senate and House candidates were also more likely to

run for open seats than incumbent ones. Prior studies on congressional elections indicate that incumbents usually hold an advantage in elections, which may explain why candidates did not run for this type of seat as often. Senate non-Tea Party Republican candidates were more likely than Tea Partiers to win their races: 63 to 50%. Though the House Tea Party victory percentage was very similar to that of the Republican candidates, in the House Republican candidates were 6% more likely to win their races--58% versus 52%. Both Senate Republican and Tea Party candidate were frequently running in states that were considered 'toss-ups'. Neither type of candidate was running in a solidly Democratic state in the Senate, and both non-Tea Party Republicans and Tea Partiers were most likely to run in 'leaning-Republican' states. Both types of House candidates also ran in similar districts. Around 30% of each ran in districts where their races were tossups, while 27% of each ran in districts that were strongly democratic. House Tea Partiers were 10% more likely to be a candidate in a district that was strongly Republican than non-Tea Party Republican candidates. Tea Party and non-Tea Party victory and loss percentages are pictured in graphical form below, showing the greater likelihood that non-Tea Party Republicans in both the Senate and House won their races as compared to Tea Party Republican candidates.



The presidential vote share from 2008 is an excellent way to determine whether Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republican candidates were running in the same types of districts. If the candidates included in this analysis were running in completely different types of districts, the information obtained would not reflect an accurate estimation of candidate differences and similarities. If one type of candidate is running in mainly conservative districts across the country, they may tend to be more conservative as a group, making a comparison with another type of candidate running in liberal districts very skewed. Each House candidate's district was coded either greater than 50% voting for Obama, greater than 50% for McCain, or equal percentages voting for each presidential candidate. Tabulating the results revealed 66% of coded non-Tea Party Republican candidates ran in House districts where over 50% voted for Obama, versus 52% of Tea Party candidates. 27% of non-Tea Party Republicans and 46% of Tea Party Republican candidates ran in races where over 50% of the voting citizens cast their ballots for McCain in 2008. Each type had a single candidate whose district had an equal vote percentage for McCain and Obama in 2008. Therefore, this candidate comparison analysis relies on data which represents all three types of presidential vote districts. A graphical depiction of 2008 presidential vote of candidates' districts, by non-Tea Party versus Tea Party candidates appears below. It indicates that non-Tea Party candidates were running in districts that tended to be more conservative. However, all three types of districts are represented for both types of candidates.



## Conclusions

As shown by candidate coding, while more conservative than establishment Republican candidates in terms of social positions, Tea Party candidates positions are similar enough to make bargaining within the Republican Party worthwhile. In terms of big ticket issues like healthcare and federal spending, Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans were generally in agreement--the healthcare bill is an expansion of government power, and greater spending will only increase the deficit, not help the economy. Thus, a relationship in which the Tea Party Movement plays the role of 'anchoring group' within the Republican Party is foreseeable. However, the severe conservatism of Tea Party positions does threaten to eliminate moderation within the Republican Party. Providing the Tea Party continues to receive popular support, the Republican Party may be pushed rightward by the movement's reactionary positions--such as doing away with the current tax structure, outlawing abortion, and making drastic spending cuts



in areas like education and the environment. In this scenario, moderate Republican candidates will be discouraged from running because the Tea Party will put up challenger candidates as they did in many of the 2010 midterm elections.

## **Chapter V: Tea Party Candidates: Some Interesting Examples**

### **Case Studies**

Elaborating further on the trends of Tea Party requires specific examples of Tea Party candidates and their campaigns. In this section, the candidate traits of multiple runs for congressional seats, opposition to the Obama administration, positions on social issues, tax reform, and the deficit are discussed in greater detail. Candidates used to elaborate on these traits are Sharron Angle, Joe Miller, Christine O'Donnell, John Foster, Donna Campbell, and Jon

Barela. Traits were chosen for their ability to differentiate Tea Party from non-Tea Party Republican candidates. Examining major trends from the level of a specific candidate will personalize and animate the statistical analysis of candidates.

***Sharon Angle: multiple runs for congressional seats.***

Sharon Angle was a Tea Party candidate who was also a member of the state legislature, and had run unsuccessfully for Congress twice before. Though many of the Tea Party candidates who had run for Congress multiple times were usually House candidates, she was running to defeat Harry Reid in the Nevada Senate election. She made the climb up the political ladder from local government (school boards), to the state legislature, and in 2006 made her first unsuccessful run for Congress. In 2010, the Senate seat belonging to Harry Reid of Nevada was predicted to be one of the most vulnerable in the country. Republicans hoping to win the Democratic Majority Leader's seat were somewhat disappointed when Sharron Angle won the primary. She became an easy target for Reid, as her ultra-conservative positions made her easy to portray as wacky and unelectable: "she has...called for the elimination of the Energy Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, denounced the BP compensation fund for victims of the oil spill...and suggested that her candidacy was a mission from God" (Nagourney 2010). She is an example of a candidate who may have taken advantage of the anti-incumbent atmosphere to make another run for Congress.

***Joe Miller and tea party militancy.***

As shown by the analysis of candidate opposition to the Obama administration, Tea Party Republican candidates are likely to sensationalize their rhetoric, such as when they liken the Obama administration to socialism. Joe Miller, Senate candidate from Alaska did the very same in his run for congressional office. Describing Obama's presidency in one sentence, he calls it

“bad for America”, and moving the country “towards socialism” (DeLong 2010). He continues on to iterate that under the current president, American exceptionalism has been rejected to the detriment of the nation’s progress. In protest campaigns such as the Tea Party Movement, shock value and extremism can be effective ways to gain recognition and support. Tea Party candidates declaring that the Obama presidency as socialistic, or taking the country away from its founding principles effectively use fear-mongering and populist oratory to gather voter favor. A North Iowa Tea Party used the same tactic when it posted a billboard depicting Hitler, Obama, and Lenin with message “Change” and labeling them as leaders of different types of socialism (Zeleny 2010). This element of the Tea Party, the notion of a constant threat to the American life, lies at the very root of whether the Tea Party Movement will be able to sustain itself over a long period of time. If a new message besides Obama is to the United States as Hitler was to Germany, and a new tactic besides fear are not invoked, the movement will lose its relevancy because people will no longer believe in the threat it represents. One way to remain pertinent and powerful is for the Tea Party to align itself with the Republican Party and influence its candidates and policies.

***Christine O’Donnell: taking a conservative stand on social issues.***

Though some Tea Party organizations, like the Tea Party Express, purposefully focus on fiscal problems, ignoring the inevitably divisive nature of social issues, this was not the strategy of Tea Party Republican candidates included in this analysis. Instead, candidates held specific, conservative positions that they were unafraid of declaring. Senate candidate Christine O’Donnell is one of those Tea Party candidates who has serious and pointed views on social issues. Her political career was built around “campaigns for abstinence-only education and bans on pornography and on abortion” (Lorber 2010). O’Donnell’s primary win in Delaware was

greeted with shock and dismay on behalf of other Republicans. In the primary election, she beat out an establishment Republican that was expected to be a shoo-in in both the primary and the general election. Her far-right views--including seeing masturbation and abortion even in cases of rape as sins--led other Republicans to be skeptical of her ability to win and to discuss how her ultra-conservative views fit in with the rest of the party (Rutenberg and Steinhauer 2010). A debate occurred within the Republican Party about how to address social issues during the 2010 election without drawing attention away from the economic problems of the country. Tea Party candidates, however were "pushing the party to take a stand on many divisive issues like abortion" contrary to notion that they want the Republican Party to only focus on fiscal issues (Lorber 2010). In sum, Tea Party candidates positions on social issues show that they are not simply fiscal conservatives, but social conservatives as well, and in many cases are more conservative than the average non-Tea Party Republican candidate. The Tea Party's desire to push America's social policies farther right fits well with the goals of other Republican 'anchoring groups'--like the religious right--perhaps signaling the future possibility of these groups aligning themselves with one another.

***John Foster and the tea party position on gay marriage.***

The Tea Party Movement is often interpreted as maintaining neutral views on social issues like gay marriage. However, this candidate analysis has shown that overall, on fiscal and social issues Tea Party candidates (and thus, Tea Party members) are more conservative than non-Tea Party Republican candidates. However, these candidates are first and foremost concerned with the fiscal issues that trouble them most--the huge deficit and inflated federal power. A prime example of social conservatism combined with concern for fiscal responsibility

is candidate John Koster, who ran for Congress in Washington's 2nd district. While Koster "physically flinches when asked about the prospect of two gay men kissing at the altar" and opposes abortion even in cases of rape and incest, he vehemently believed he could beat out the Democratic incumbent because of his focus on economic issues like lower taxes and less government intrusion (Thompson 2010). Despite a "likely Democratic" rating on the district he ran in, Koster asserted that his focus on solving economic issues with free market solutions would win voters over, and claimed that his opposition to increasing the deficit and expanding federal power was more important than his social views. However, in the past Koster also participated in Referendum 71--the failed attempt to exempt same-sex couples from a state legal protection--and ultimately lost his bid for the 2nd District congressional seat. Koster's candidacy supports the claim that though Tea Party members harbor concern for America's fiscal state, they also hold strongly conservative social values. It also suggests that the very conservative views of the Tea Party movement may cause the Republican Party to lose votes from more moderate voters.

***Donna Campbell and the tea party's revolutionary ideas for tax system reform.***

Donna Campbell, a doctor who ran for Congress in Texas' 25th district exemplifies both the Tea Party Movement's position on the tax system and the reason that many novice candidates decided to run for office in the 2010 midterm elections. Overwhelmed with discontent because of the state of the country and the political dealings of Washington, Campbell ran for Congress with the backing of the Tea Party. She declared her willingness to overhaul and reform the tax system, and replace all taxes with a flat rate tax--her preference being a 23% sales tax combined with the elimination of income taxes and payroll taxes (Bartlett 2010). In addition to her eagerness to

dramatically change the tax code, Campbell viewed her political outsider status as a positive thing, one that would allow her to go “against the establishment, [and the] Republican establishment” necessary because “people are tired of government [and] politics as usual” (Bartlett 2010). Besides the willingness to go against the Republican Party, which Campbell held in common with many other 2010 Tea Party candidates, her candidacy also raises the issue of what the Tea Party Movement means for Republican politics in the larger partisan arena. In Texas’ 25th district, Doggett, the Democratic incumbent used Campbell’s conservative views to paint her as out of touch with the moderate voters, a tactic that Democrats used in many 2010 races against Tea Party Republicans. Eventually, this depiction accomplished its purpose: Doggett held onto his congressional seat and Campbell lost the race. Inclusion of the Tea Party in Republican politics can mean a liability for the Republican Party, as portrayals of Tea Party candidates as extremists color the minds of voters--even allowing an incumbent to win in an election year in which voters were extremely hostile towards experienced politicians.

***The tea party’s bread and butter issue: fiscal responsibility and Jon Barela.***

Like many Tea Party Republicans that ran for Congress in the 2010 midterm elections, Jon Barela sought to differentiate himself from mainstream Republicans, emphasizing that he is not a “stereotypical member of the GOP”. As is characteristic of Tea Party Republican candidates, Barela’s concern over the direction of the country are based on fiscal concerns. After expressing his political priority--reducing the debt--Barela declared “I am not a country club Republican” in an interview with a local newspaper (Coleman 2010). This claim, however is somewhat contradicted by his career as an Intel executive, businessman, lawyer, and former Republican congressional aide--all prestigious and the majority of which are highly paid, allowing Barela to at least be a member of the upper class, if not the country club set. By

distinguishing themselves from establishment Republicans, Tea Party candidates keep themselves relevant to the Republican Party. To be influential within the GOP, the Tea Party Movement must demonstrate that it can gain political power outside of the mainstream party. In the 2010 midterm election, Tea Party candidates have shown their willingness to adopt a third party strategy if the Republican Party does not adhere to their preferred policy positions.

## **Chapter VI: What the Future Holds for the Tea Party Movement**

Predicting what kind of role the Tea Party will play within Republican politics is essential to forecasting what their general influence in the political arena will be. By offering a comparison of Tea Party candidates to non-Tea Party candidates, this thesis attempts to answer this question by displaying the similarities and differences between the two types of candidates. Using a comparative method offers a depiction of what type of relationship is likely to develop between the Tea Party movement and the Republican Party: one in which the Tea Party is absorbed by the Republican Party, allowing Tea Party members to influence politics from within. That being said, it is clear that other alternatives are open to the Tea Party, particularly that of putting up conservative challenger candidates against those Republicans they deem too moderate--just as occurred in the 2010 midterm elections. The next few years will determine whether the Republican Party adjusts its positions--on social issues, and fiscal issues like the deficit and spending--to suit Tea Party views, or whether the Tea Party will utilize the third party route as a threat to get the Republican Party to embrace the conservatism it desires. I will address

whether the Tea Party midterm election strategy was successful, summarize candidate similarities to support the theory that the Tea Party will undergo incorporation into the Republican Party, and describe the difficulties that have recently arisen between newly elected Tea Party congresspeople and non-Tea Party Republican members.

In this analysis, Tea Party candidates were more conservative than non-Tea Party candidates overall. They preferred more stringent rules on abortion and gay marriage, and wanted the tax code completely overhauled. Tapping into the anger that has been caused by a recession and 9.6% unemployment, Tea Party candidates channel this outrage toward the Obama administration, more so than Non-Tea Party Republicans were inclined to. Senate Tea Party candidates had levels of political experience comparable to that of non-Tea Party Republicans. This probably indicates the greater prestige and exclusivity associated with the Senate, causing some sort of political experience to be a necessary pre-cursor to running successfully. Analysis of House Tea Party candidates, however, revealed an interesting phenomenon. While on the whole they had less political experience than non-Tea Party Republicans, many had previously run for Congress and lost. Here enters the possibility of political opportunism on behalf of Tea Party candidates--interpreting the current wrathful nature of the public, they joined up with the political outsider, grass-roots movement to try to get elected to Congress. True to Tea Party form, Senate and House Tea Party candidates prioritized fiscal issues like reducing the deficit and limiting federal spending over other items. Non-Tea Party Republicans in both the Senate and the House were more electable than Tea Party Republican candidates. However, if the Tea Party Movement is to be an 'anchoring group' within the Republican Party, this is not really a downside for the Tea Party. For the Tea Party Movement, the point of the 2010 midterm elections was to prove to non-Tea Party Republicans that they could win enough primaries and



overall congressional seats to make an impact on the election--which they did--and thus legitimate themselves as a force to be reckoned with.

The Tea Party Movement shook up many congressional elections--particularly primaries--in 2010. In many cases, the movement backed more conservative candidates in primaries that surprisingly defeated more establishment Republicans to become Republican nominees. Candidates like Sharron Angle and Christine O'Donnell defeated more moderate candidates in the Republican Senate primaries. Challenging the Republican Party politically has paid off for the Tea Party Movement--many establishment Republican leaders have begun to make their positions on issues more conservative, as well as starting to pursue Tea Party support. For example, John McCain made his immigration and tax cut positions more conservative after facing a challenge from a Tea Party backed candidate, and Mitt Romney is "assiduously courting the group" (Hunt 2010). Even in those elections where Tea Party candidates did not succeed, they made their mark by forcing non-Tea Party Republicans to move farther to the right. Additionally, congressional Republicans up for re-election in 2012 will view any collaboration with Democrats, or moderate issue positions as perilous to their re-election campaign. Thus, the Tea Party has both forced non-Tea Party Republicans to adhere to hard-line conservatism, and take more right-of center positions on issues. The 2010 midterm election proved the Tea Party movement's ability to influence Republican politics.

While the Tea Party can be seen as well integrated into the Republican Party, it has also taken measures to prove that it will not be controlled by the party. This year, the traditional response to the State of the Union was followed by a response from Tea Party leaders, delivered by Representative Michelle Bachmann of Minnesota. Bachmann was careful to insist that she

was delivering the address on behalf of Tea Party leadership, which raises the issue of who actually makes these decisions for the movement. Though the non-Tea Party Republican response focused on the deficit--perhaps because of the Tea Party focus on fiscal responsibility during the 2010 election--the Tea Party found it necessary to deliver their own address, despite the displeasure of establishment Republican leaders (Zeleny 2011). The Tea Party response highlighted the Obama administration's unkept promises and heightened federal spending. Deviating from the Republican Party's leadership and normative tradition, the Tea Party Movement has emphasized its political independence in an attempt to maximize its influence within the Republican Party.

The Tea Party movement is opposed to allowing budget earmarks for state by state projects as part of their fiscal responsibility platform. However, budget earmarks have long been a way of life in Congress, and may prove to be a point of difference between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans. At any rate, the issue of budget earmarks raises the issue of just how far the Republican Party is willing to shift its positions for Tea Partiers. In some ways, establishment congressional Republicans appear to acquiescing to the movement's policies: during the lame-duck session of Congress in 2010, Republican leader Mitch McConnell "[supported] a proposed ban on Congressional earmarks, reversing his longtime practice of pursuing money for his state" (Hulse 2010). On one hand, this shows the willingness of establishment Republicans to give the Tea Party--which helped Republicans take back the House and win several seats in the Senate--political influence over Republican policy. However, some Congress members were unwilling to abdicate the ability to send money back to their districts, spotlighting a possible point of contention between Tea Party and non-Tea Party Republicans.

The Tea Party and its candidates--some of which are new Representatives and Senators--played an innovative role in 2010 midterm elections. They proved not only could grass-roots candidates compete with established politicians, but that a protest movement could influence the way a majority party behaves. Though Tea Party Republican candidates in 2010 challenged more moderate Republicans, it seems likely that they will support conservative mainstream Republican candidates in the future as opposed to adopting a third party strategy generally. It also appears that should the Tea Party continue to have political importance, which seems likely given they have achieved political legitimacy by gaining congressional seats, they will continue to advocate for policies that are far to the right of centrist Republican positions. The more conservative positions of the Tea Party reach all the way from social to fiscal issues, calling into the question the existence of moderate Republican politicians in the future.

## Appendix

Coding Category	Why Included	Impact on the Tea Party-Republican Relationship
Affiliation with the Tea Party	Tea Party Republican candidates' affiliation--in terms of endorsement and support, speaking engagements, and membership in the movement--with the Tea Party was measured to provide a more precise definition of what a Tea Party candidate looks like.	Varying degrees of affiliation with the Tea Party may also prescribe to more or less conservative or extreme issue positions. This will provide some indication of whether the Tea Party is indeed more conservative than the Republican Party, and what being termed a Tea Party Republican candidate actually means.
Signing the Contract From America	Signing the Contract From America was an easily identifiable pillar of the Tea Party's 2010 election platform. Revealing how many candidates signed this pledge was a way to determine whether Tea Party candidates subscribe to a concrete set of ideals.	Signing the Contract from America was not a political move that was exclusive to Tea Party Republican candidates. Signatures from both Tea Party Republican and non-Tea Party Republican candidates shows that the ideals encompassed by the Tea Party are currently politically expedient.

Coding Category	Why Included	Impact on the Tea Party-Republican Relationship
Background: Level of Education, Gender, Age, Race, Occupation, Previous Political Experience, and Previous Run for Congress	Background characteristics show the differences between the profiles of Tea Party versus non-Tea Party Republican candidates. Previous political experience was a particularly important category, as one trait that can be definitively attributed to Tea Party members is their pride in being political newcomers.	By comparing the backgrounds of the two types of candidates, one kind may be identified as more elite--more educated, more political experience, and a more prestigious occupation--than the other. In turn, this may influence whether candidates will be able to survive and succeed in the political arena, such as whether Tea Party candidates will have the political savvy to negotiate with the Republican Party.
Position on the Obama Administration	Some sources have characterized the Tea Party Movement as being overly vitriolic and hostile to the current administration. Measuring candidates' positions on the Obama administration gave a sense of whether Tea Party candidates voice more, less, or an average amount of criticism as compared to non-Tea Party Republican candidates.	Comparing candidates' responses to the Obama administration offers a sense of whether the Tea Party movement is more extreme than Republicans in its negative view of the Obama administration. If the Tea Party becomes an influential player within Republican politics this position may determine whether congressional polarization worsens.

Coding Category	Why Included	Impact on the Tea Party-Republican Relationship
Position on Healthcare: Reform Needed?, Cost, Repeal?, Restriction of Patient Freedom?, and Tort Reform	Healthcare reform was a big issue during the 2010 midterm election. Categorizing Tea Party Republican and non-Tea Party Republican candidate positions on the issue promises revealed whether this issue was a priority for both, and whether they took similar positions.	For many Republicans, healthcare reform and the healthcare reform bill were big issues in 2010. Comparing the positions of the two types of candidates shows to what degree either disapproved of the healthcare bill, and what specific changes they would make to the US healthcare system.
Abortion: Pro-Choice or Pro-Life, and Specific Limitations	Another common assumption made about the Tea Party Movement is that it mainly focuses on economic, financial, and constitutional issues, and is less proactive in their advocacy on social issues. Recording the specific limitations or lack emphasis candidates placed on the controversial issue of abortion illuminates whether this assumption is true.	Being more or less conservative or specific than their non-Tea Party Republican counterparts might reveal how the Tea Party movement will influence the Republican Party on social issues in the future.
Tax System: Bush Era Tax Cuts, Reform Needed?, Income Tax (Fair Tax), and Sales Tax (Flat Tax)	Tax system reform is an issue associated with the Tea Party Movement. Determining whether the two types of candidates have similar positions on this issue helped identify similarities and differences between candidates.	Categorizing Tea Party Republican versus non-Tea Party Republican positions on tax reform indicated both whether they agreed this should be a priority, and how far each type thought reform should go.

Coding Category	Why Included	Impact on the Tea Party-Republican Relationship
<p>Position on Military Issues: Military Spending, Gays in the Military, Gay Marriage, and the Sanctity of Marriage Amendment</p>	<p>Coding for social issues like position on gay marriage and the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy, as well as level of military spending indicated how passionate Tea Party Republican candidates felt about social issues in comparison to non-Tea Party Republican candidates.</p>	<p>Determining both the level of Tea Party Republican interest in these issues, and comparison with non-Tea Party Republican positions, shows whether the Tea Party movement is indeed interested in social issues and whether the movement's social agenda corresponds with that of the Republican Party.</p>
<p>Position on Economic Issues: Success of Tarp and Stimulus Bills, Tarp, Stimulus and the Deficit--Who's Fault?, and Deficit/Spending, Priority Level?</p>	<p>Fiscal issues like lowering the deficit and reducing federal spending were some of the first issues to be identified with the Tea Party Movement. Therefore, coding Tea Party Republican candidates for these issues shows whether the movement has a standard fiscal and economic platform that is common to their candidates.</p>	<p>Fiscal policy is arguably the area where the Tea Party Movement would most like to influence the Republican Party. Showing the differences between the positions of the two types of candidates reveals how much the Republican Party would have to shift their platform to satisfy the Tea Party Movement.</p>
<p>Seat Characteristics: Status of Seat, Won/Lost, and Safety of District</p>	<p>Comparing the seats and districts of Tea Party Republican and non-Tea Party Republican candidates shows if candidates are running and winning in the same types of districts, or if it is more likely for a dark horse, Tea Party candidate to run in a district with strong democratic support (thus eliminating the chance of a strong establishment Republican challenger).</p>	<p>Coding for these characteristics shows whether Tea Party Republican candidates have the potential to compete with non-Tea Party candidates. Depending on whether this is true, the Tea Party threat to run as a third party candidate against an establishment Republican may or may not be effective in the long run.</p>

## Works Cited

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. "Grand Old Tea Party: Partisan Polarization and the Rise of the Tea Party Movement." Prepared for delivery at the Conference on the Tea Party Movement, University of California at Berkeley.
- Ackerman, Bryon. 2009. "Hanna: Health Care Bill 'Ill-Conceived.'" *Observer-Dispatch*. November 10. <http://www.uticaod.com/news/x311590135/Richard-Hanna-releases-a-statement-about-health-care> (March 15, 2011).
- Allen, Kevin. 2010. "Donnelly, Walorski, Vogel Square Off in First Debate in Race for 2nd District Congressional Seat. *South Bend Tribune*. October 26. <http://www.southbendtribune.com/> (March 16, 2011).
- Amash for Congress. 2010. "Justin Amash for Congress." <http://amashforcongress.com/> (March 14, 2011).
- Americans for Tax Reform. 2010. "ATR Releases 2010 Lists of Pledge Signers." <http://www.atr.org/atr-releases-lists-pledge-signers-a5523> (March 15, 2011).
- Austin Scott for Congress. 2010. "Austin Scott Congress." <http://www.scottfora.com/> (March 15, 2011).
- Barbaro, Michael. 2010. "Bloomberg Pushes Moderates in National Races." *New York Times*, September 18. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/nyregion/19bloomberg.html> (January 30, 2010).
- Bartlett, Martin. 2010. "Experts: Doggett's Seat Safe, Doggett: Campbell is 'Tea Party Extremist'." *KVUE.com*. October 29. <http://www.kvue.com/news/Experts-call-Doggetts-seat-safe-Doggett-calls-Campbell-a-tea-party-extremist-106345834.html> (March 15, 2011).



Belle, Dennis C. and Belloni, Frank P. 1976. "The Study of Party Factions As Competitive Political Organizations." University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association 29: 531-549.

Benishek for Congress. 2010. "Benishek Republican for Congress."

<http://danbenishekforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Berenger, Christopher. 2010. "2010 Pennsylvania 12th District Race: Democrat Mark Critz and Republican Tim Burns Running Again After Special Election." Associated Content. September 16. [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20100916/pl\\_ynews/ynews\\_pl3641](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20100916/pl_ynews/ynews_pl3641) (March 14, 2011).

Beth Anne Rankin for Congress. 2010. "Beth Anne Rankin Congress."

<http://www.bethannerankinforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Berman, Russell. 2010. "In House Rematch, Critz, Burns Spar Over Taxes and Spending." Ballot Box. October 22. <http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/house-races/125513-in-house-rematch-critz-burns-spar-over-taxes> (March 15, 2011).

Bill Flores for Congress. 2010. "Bill Flores for Congress." <http://www.billfloresforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Bill Johnson for Congress Committee. 2010. "Bill Johnson for Congress."

<http://www.billjohnsonleads.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Billy Long for Congress. 2010. "Billy Long U.S. Congress." <http://billylongforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Bill Marcy for Congress. 2010. "Bill Marcy for Congress." <http://www.billmarcyforcongress.net/> (March 15, 2011).

Broden for Congress. 2010. "Pastor Stephen Broden Republican for U.S. Congress."

<http://www.broden2010.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Brown, Jennifer Jacob. 2010. "Bill Marcy to Run in 2nd Congressional District." The Meridian Star. March 1. <http://meridianstar.com/local/x1004928519/Bill-Marcy-to-run-in-2nd-Congressional-District> (March 15, 2011).

Buck for Colorado. 2010. "Ken Buck U.S. Senate." <http://www.buckforcolorado.com/support-movement> (March 15, 2011).

Chabot for Congress. 2010. "Chabot for Congress." <http://www.stevechabot.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Citizens for Rothfus. 2010. "Keith Rothfus Congress 2010." <http://www.keithpa4.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Clift for Congress. 2010. "Gary Clift: Constitutionalist for Congress." <http://www.cliftforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Cochran, Sylvia. 2010. "2010 New Mexico 1st U.S. House District Race: Republican Jon Barela takes on Incumbent Democrat Martin Heinrich." Associated Content. September 24. [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20100924/pl\\_ynews/ynews\\_p13724](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20100924/pl_ynews/ynews_p13724) (March 14, 2011).

Coleman, Michael. 2010. "Barela: Country Way Off Course." Albuquerque Journal. October 10. <http://www.abqjournal.com/elex/2010generalelection/2010congressraces/102357282010congressraces10-10-10.htm> (Marh 14, 2011).

CQ-Roll Call. 2010. "Congress.org: Election Guide." <http://www.congress.org/election/guide/> (March 15, 2011).

Crawford for Congress. 2010. "Rick Crawford Congress." <http://www.meetrickcrawford.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Curry, Tom. 2010. "GOP Candidate: This Election is like WWII." MSNBC. May 5.

[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36958211/ns/us\\_news-the\\_elkhart\\_project/39592132](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36958211/ns/us_news-the_elkhart_project/39592132)

(March 15, 2011).

Daily Courier. 2010. "Election 2010: Q&A with Ann Kirkpatrick, Paul Gosar." The Daily Courier. October 15.

<http://www.dcourier.com/Main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=86338> (March 15, 2011).

Dan Coats for Indiana. 2010. "Dan Coats U.S. Senate." <http://www.coatsforindiana.com/> (March 15, 2011).

David Schweikert for Congress. 2010. "David Schweikert: Principled Leadership, Conservative Values." <http://www.davidschweikert.com/> (March 15, 2011).

DeLong, Matt. 2010. "Joe Miller: Obama moving America 'Toward Socialism'." The Washington Post. September 2. <http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/09/joe-miller-obama-moving-america.html> (March 13, 2011).

Djou for Hawaii. 2010. "Charles Djou for Congress." <http://forms.djou.com/charles.html> (March 14, 2011).

Dr. Donna Campbell for U.S. Congress Committee. 2010. "Dr. Donna Campbell for Congress." <http://www.drdoonaforcongress.com/> (March 14, 2011).

Duffy for Congress. 2010. "Sean Duffy Congress 2010." <http://www.duffyforcongress.com/> (March 16, 2011).

Eggen, Dan. 2010. "New GOP Freshmen Embrace Big-Money Fundraisers." *Washington Post*, December 6.

[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/06/politics/washingtonpost/main7122354.shtml?source=related\\_story](http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/06/politics/washingtonpost/main7122354.shtml?source=related_story) (January 30, 2011).

Elect Blake Farenthold Committee. 2010. "Blake Farenthold: Congressman Elect District 27 Texas." <http://blakefarenthold.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Fenn for the 5th. 2010. "Fenn Little U.S. Congress: 5th District of GA." <http://www.fennforthe5th.org/> (March 15, 2011).

Fiorina, Morris P. 2002. "Parties and Partisanship: A 40 Year Retrospective." *Political Behavior* 24: 93-115.

Friends of Anthony Mele. 2010. "Anthony Mele for Congress." <http://www.meleforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Friends of David Harmer. 2010. "Harmer Congress." <http://www.harmerforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Friends of Kelly Ayotte. 2010. "Kelly Ayotte U.S. Senate." <http://www.ayotteforsenate.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Friends of Mike Lee. 2010. "Mike Lee US Congress." <http://www.mikelee2010.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Friends of Morgan Philpot. 2010. "Philpot U.S. Congress." <http://www.philpotforcongress.com/> (March 16, 2011).

Friends of Nan Hayworth. 2010. "Nan Hayworth: Republican, Conservative, and Independence Party Candidate for Congress." <http://nanhayworth.com/> (March 14, 2011).

Friends of Roy Blunt. 2010. "Roy Blunt for U.S. Senate." <http://www.royblunt.com/> (March 16, 2011).

Friends of Dr. Scott DesJarlais. 2010. "Dr. Scott DesJarlais U.S. CONgress." <http://www.scottdesjarlais.com/www> (March 16, 2011).

Friends of Sharron Angle. 2010. "Sharron Angle for U.S. Congress." <http://sharronangle.com/>  
(March 16, 2011).

Hansen, Ronald J. 2010. "Paul Gosar Poses Big Challenge for Incumbent An Kirkpartrick." The Arizona Republic. October 5.  
<http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles/2010/10/05/20101005arizona-us-district-house-paul-gosar.html> (March 16, 2011).

Hawkesworth, M. E., Kogan, Maurice, and Paynter, John. 1992. *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*. New York: Routledge.

Henry, Reg, Mannella, Susan, Norman, Tony, Simpson, Dan, and Waseleski, Tom. 2010. "4th U.S. House: Altmire is the Better Choice for Congress." Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 19. <http://blogs.sites.post-gazette.com/index.php/opinion/a-fine-point/22446-4th-us-house-altmire-is-the-better-choice-for-congress> (March 13, 2011).

Herszenhorn, David M. 2011. "Senate Tea Party Caucus Holds First Meeting." *New York Times*, January 27. <http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/senate-tea-party-caucus-holds-first-meeting/?scp=1&sq=Senate%20Tea%20Party%20Caucus&st=cse> (January 30, 2011).

Hulse, Carl. 2010. "With Tea Party in Mind, Republicans Have Change of Heart About Earmarks." The New York Times. November 15.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/us/politics/16cong.html> (March 16, 2011).

Hunt, Albert R. 2010. "Tea Party Doesn't Need Votes to Win U.S. Elections." The New York Times. September 26. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27iht-letter.html> (March 15, 2011).

Issues 2000. 2010. "Senate Races for 2010." <http://www.ontheissues.org/Senate/Senate.htm>  
(March 15, 2011).

James, Madison. 1787. "The Federalist #10: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection." Accessed: 21 October 2010  
[http://www.brucesabin.com/pdf\\_files/readings/Federalist\\_10.pdf](http://www.brucesabin.com/pdf_files/readings/Federalist_10.pdf).

Jim Renacci for Congress. 2010. "Jim Renacci for Congress."  
<http://www.renacciforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

John Boozman for Arkansas. 2010. "John Boozman for U.S. Senate."  
<http://www.boozmanforarkansas.com/> (March 14, 2011).

Jon Barela for Congress. 2010. "Jon Barela for Congress." <http://jonbarela.com> (march 16,  
2011).

John Kupiec for Congress Committee. 2010. "John Kupiec for Congress."  
<http://johnkupiecforgress.com/> (March 16, 2011).

Joe Miller for US Senate. 2010. "Joe Miller: Restoring Liberty." <http://joemiller.us/2011/01/joe-miller-remarks-the-end-of-the-beginning/> (March 15, 2011).

Kapanke for Congress. 2010. "Kapanke for Congress." <http://www.kapankeforcongress.com/>  
(March 15, 2011).

Karol, David. 2009. *Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Katel, Peter. 2010. "Tea Party Movement: Will Angry Conservatives Reshape the Republican Party?." *CQ Researcher*: Volume 20 (Number 11): 241-264.

Kelly, Andrea. 2010. "Ad Watch: McClung Position on Taxes Attacked." Arizona Daily Star.

October 23. [http://azstarnet.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/elections/article\\_9b0d5045-9ccd-501d-bdc7-7b29683c6c57.html](http://azstarnet.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/elections/article_9b0d5045-9ccd-501d-bdc7-7b29683c6c57.html) (March 15, 2011).

Kelly for Congress. 2010. "Jesse Kelly for Congress." <http://www.votejessekelly.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Kelly, Erin. 2010. "Harry Mitchell, David Schweikert Rematch Called a Toss-Up." AZ Central.

October 7. <http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/10/07/20101007arizona-harry-mitchell-david-schweikert-rematch.html> (March 15, 2011).

Kinzinger for Congress. 2010. "Adam Kinzinger U.S. Congress." <http://www.electadam.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Kirk for Senate. 2010. "Kirk United States Senate." <http://www.kirkforsenate.com/> (March 14, 2011).

Koster for Congress. 2010. "Koster for Congress (R)." <http://www.kosterforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2010).

Landry for Congress. 2010. "Jeff Landry Conservative for Congress."

<http://www.landryforlouisiana.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Lorber, Janie. 2010. "G.O.P Struggles Over Social Issues." The New York Times. September 22.

<http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/g-o-p-struggles-over-social-issues/> (March 14, 2011).

Marco Rubio for Senate. 2010. "Marco Rubio for Senate, Florida." <http://www.marcorubio.com/> (March 15, 2011).

McAdam, Thomas. 2009. "Republican Todd Lally Wants to Be Louisville's New Congressman."

Louisville City Hall Examiner. November 21. <http://www.examiner.com/city-hall-in-louisville/republican-todd-lally-wants-to-be-louisville-s-new-congressman> (March 16, 2011).

McCormack, John. 2010. "Mark Critz and Tim Burns Debate in PA-12." SF Examiner. May 4.

<http://www.sfexaminer.com/blogs/beltway-confidential/mark-critz-and-tim-burns-debate-pa-12> (March 15, 2011).

Mick Mulvaney for Congress. 2010. "Mick Mulvaney: Republican Congress."

<http://www.mulvaneyforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Nagourney, Adam. 2010. "Tea Party Choice Scrambles in Taking on Reid in Nevada." The New

York Times. August 17. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/us/politics/18vegas.html>

(March 16, 2011).

Newman, Teri. 2010. "Teri Newman: Why You Should Vote for Me." Aol.com. October 11.

<http://www.aolnews.com/2010/10/11/teri-newman-why-you-should-vote-for-me/> (March 16, 2011).

Newport, Frank. 2010. "Tea Party Supporters Overlap Republican Base." *Gallup*.

<http://www.gallup.com/poll/141098/tea-party-supporters-overlap-republican-base.aspx>  
(January 30, 2011).

Nichols, Lee. 2010. "Doggett vs. the Doctor: Will Right Wingers Oust the Liberal Congressman?" The Austin Chronicle. October 22.

<http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2010-10-22/doggett-vs-the-doctor/>  
(March 15, 2011).

Nintzel, Jim. 2010. "CD8: Paton, Kelly Both Criticize California Court Ruling on Gay Marriage & Oppose Federal Benefits for Domestic Partners." Tucson Weekly. August 20.



<http://www.tucsonweekly.com/TheRange/archives/2010/08/20/cd8-paton-kelly-both-criticize-california-court-ruling-on-gay-marriage-and-oppose-federal-benefits-for-domestic-partners>

(March 15, 2011).

Observer-Dispatch. 2008. "24th Congressional District Candidate Questionnaire: Richard Hanna, Republican." Observer-Dispatch. October 14.

<http://www.uticaod.com/elections/x1157480855/CONGRESSIONAL-CANDIDATE-QUESTIONNAIRE-2008-Richard-Hanna-Republican> (March 13, 2011).

Pabst, Georgia. 2010. "Moore Challenger Faces Cash Disadvantage." Journal Sentinel. October 9. <http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/104646064.html> (March 15, 2011).

Palm Beach Post. 2010. "Election Central: Bernard Sansaricq." The Palm Beach Post. 2011. <http://projects.palmbeachpost.com/yourvote/candidate/bernard-sansaricq/qa/2010/> (March 15, 2011).

Peters, Jeremy W. "Conservative Loses Upstate House Race in Blow to Right." *New York Times*, November 3. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/nyregion/04district.html> (January 30, 2011).

Pierce, Paul. 2010. "GOP Picks Nominee for Murtha's Seat." Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. March 12. [http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s\\_671299.html](http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_671299.html) (March 15, 2011).

Portman for Senate. 2010. "Rob Portman for US Senate." <http://www.robportman.com/> (March 14, 2011).

Project Vote Smart. 2010. "Project Vote Smart: Find Your Candidates." <http://www.votesmart.org/> (March 16, 2011).

Pyrah, Joe. 2010. "Feds Infected with 'Disease of Overspending,' Says Matheson Challenger."

Daily Herald. August 11. [http://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/article\\_287e04dd-3ab7-5c0b-9294-1632818937b0.html](http://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/article_287e04dd-3ab7-5c0b-9294-1632818937b0.html) (March 15, 2011).

Rand Paul for US Senate. 2010. "Rand Paul U.S. Senate." <http://www.randpaul2010.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Raul Labrador for Idaho. 2010. "Labrador Congress: Proven Leadership." <http://www.labrador4idaho.com/> (March 16, 2011).

Reynolds, Glenn Harlan. 2010. "Tea Parties are a New Great Awakening." Washington Examiner 8 February.

Ribble for Congress. 2010. "Ribble for Congress." <http://www.ribbonforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Richard Hanna for Congress Committee. 2010. "Richard Hanna for Congress." <http://www.richardhannaforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Rob Steele for Congress. 2010. "Dr. Rob Steele for Congress." <http://www.robsteeleforcongress.com/> (March 14, 2011).

Rutenberg, Jim and Steinhauer, Jennifer. 2010. "Rebel Republican Marching On, With Baggage." New York Times. September 15.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/us/politics/16odonnell.html> (March 15, 2011).

Ruth McClung for Congress. 2010. "Ruth McClung for Congress, District 7." <http://ruth4az.com/> (March 16, 2011).

Ryan, Tim. 2010. "Roth Says Experience Gives Him Edge in 8th District GOP Race." Shawano Leader. March 10.

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/06/politics/washingtonpost/main7122354.shtml>

(March 15, 2011).

Schilling for Congress. 2010. "Bobby Schilling." [www.bobby2010.com](http://www.bobby2010.com) (March 15, 2011).

Schilling, Bobby. 2010. "Q&A with Bobby Schilling." Quad-City Times. October 22.

[http://qctimes.com/article\\_199139e6-d42a-11df-ad32-001cc4c03286.html](http://qctimes.com/article_199139e6-d42a-11df-ad32-001cc4c03286.html) (March 16, 2011).

Schlozman, Daniel Aaron. 2010. "The Making of Partisan Majorities: Parties, Anchoring Groups, and Electoral Change." Ph. D. diss. Harvard University.

Schutze, Jim. 2010. "Is Tea Party Darling and Republican Congressional Candidate Stephen

Broden Still Electable After Endorsing Violence As a Means of Changing the

Government." Dallas Observer. October 28. <http://www.dallasobserver.com/2010-10-28/news/is-tea-party-darling-and-republican-congressional-candidate-stephen-broden-still-electable-after-endorsing-violence-as-a-means-of-changing-the-government/> (March 15, 2011).

Silver, Nate. 2010. "Assessing the G.O.P. and the Tea Party." *New York Times*, September 20.

<http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/assessing-the-g-o-p-and-the-tea-party/?scp=1&sq=Assessing%20the%20GOP&st=cse> (January 30, 2011).

Singer, Dale. 2010. "Illinois Longshots in November Don't Give Up Hope." St. Louis Beacon.

October 12. [http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-politics/174-Illinois\\_Races/105446-longshots-in-november-dont-give-up-hope-part-2](http://www.stlbeacon.org/issues-politics/174-Illinois_Races/105446-longshots-in-november-dont-give-up-hope-part-2) (March 16, 2011).

Skilling, Greg. 2010. "Has the GOP Found a Winning Strategy in Indiana's 9th District?"

Louisville Independent Examiner. June 16. <http://www.examiner.com/independent-in-louisville/has-the-gop-found-a-winning-strategy-indiana-s-ninth-district> (March 15, 2011).

Stanton, Ryan J. 2010. "Tea Party Republicans Rally Around Rob Steele's Message of cutting Big Government." Ann Arbor. October 28. <http://www.annarbor.com/news/tea-party-republicans-rally-around-rob-steeles-message-of-cutting-big-government-spending/>

(March 16, 2011).

Stark, John. 2010. "Larsen, Koster Spar Over Economic Principles in Race for U.S. House." The Bellingham Herald. October 18.

<http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2010/10/15/1671203/larsen-koster-spar-over-economic.html>

(March 15, 2011).

Stivers for Congress. 2010. "Steve Stivers for U.S. Congress." <http://www.stivers4congress.com/>

(March 15, 2011).

Stutzman for Congress. 2010. "Stutzman United States Congress." <http://gomarlin.com/> (March

15, 2011).

Sundquist, James L. 1983. *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Terrell, Steve. 2010. "3rd Congressional District Race: 'Traditional Republican' vs. Anti-War Veteran." Santa Fe New Mexican, May 16.

[http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/3rd-congressional-district--Traditional-](http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/3rd-congressional-district--Traditional-Republican--squares-off)

[Republican--squares-off](http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/3rd-congressional-district--Traditional-Republican--squares-off) (March 13, 2011).

The People for Mark. 2010. "Mark Levya U.S. Congress in District 1." <http://markleyva.com/>

(March 15, 2011).

Tim Burns for Congress. 2010. "Tim Burns for U.S. Congress."

<http://www.timburnsforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Thee-Brenan, Megan and Zernike, Kate. 2010. "Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More Educated." *New York Times*, April 14.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/politics/15poll.html> (January 30, 2011).

Thompson, Lynn. 2010. "2nd Congressional District: Koster, Incumbent Focus on Economy--Very Differently." *Seattle Times*, July 3.

[http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/localnews/2012274482\\_2nddistrict04m.html](http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/localnews/2012274482_2nddistrict04m.html) (March 13, 2011).

Todd Young. 2010. "Todd Young for Congress." <http://www.toddyoungforcongress.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Toomey for Senate. 2010. "Toomey U.S. Senate." <http://www.toomeyforsenate.com/> (March 15, 2010).

Townhall Election Center. 2010. "Townhall: Election 2010."

<http://election.townhall.com/election-2010/> (March 14, 2011).

Underwood, Bryan. 2010. "Bryan Underwood: U.S. Representative Candidate (TX-28)."

<http://texasgopvote.com/blog/bryan-underwood-us-representative-candidate-tx-28-01185> (March, 15, 2011).

Vidak for Congress. 2010. "Vidak Farmer for Congress." <http://www.vidakforcongress.com/>

(March 15, 2011).

Walorski for Congress. 2010. "Jackie Walorski for Congress."

<http://www.standwithjackie.com/thank-you.php> (March 16, 2011).

Washington Post. 2010. "Who Runs Gov." <http://www.whorunsgov.com/> (March 15, 2011).

Zeleny, Jeff. 2010. "In Iowa, Tea Party Trouble Over Obama Poster." *The New York Times*.

July 14. <http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/14/tea-party-trouble-in-river-city/?scp=1&sq=Tea%20Party%20socialism%20Obama&st=cse> (March 13, 2011).

Zeleny, Jeff. 2011. "Two G.O.P. Responses Point to Potential Fault Lines." *The New York Times*. January 25.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/us/politics/26repubs.html?\\_r=1&scp=1&sq=separate%20tea%20party%20response%20to%20the%20state%20of%20the%20union&st=cse](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/us/politics/26repubs.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=separate%20tea%20party%20response%20to%20the%20state%20of%20the%20union&st=cse) (March 16, 2011).

Zernike, Kate. 2010. "Tea Party Avoids Divisive Social Issues." *New York Times*, March 12.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/13/us/politics/13tea.html> (January 30, 2011).

Zernike, Kate. 2010. "Tea Party Supporters Doing Fine, but Angry Nonetheless." *New York Times*, April 17.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/weekinreview/18zernike.html?pagewanted=all> (January 30, 2011).

