

Coordinating Supply and Demand on an On-demand Service Platform with Impatient Customers

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Abstract

We consider an on-demand service platform using earning sensitive independent providers with heterogeneous reservation price (for work participation) to serve its time and price sensitive customers with heterogeneous valuation of the service. As such, both the supply and demand are “endogenously” dependent on the price the platform charges its customers and the wage the platform pays its independent providers. We present an analytical model with endogenous supply (number of participating agents) and endogenous demand (customer request rate) to study this on-demand service platform. To coordinate endogenous demand with endogenous supply, we include the steady-state waiting time performance based on a queueing model in the customer utility function to characterize the optimal price and wage rates that maximize the profit of the platform. We first analyze a base model that uses a fixed payout ratio (i.e., the ratio of wage over price), and then extend our model to allow the platform to adopt a time-based payout ratio. We find that it is optimal for the platform to charge a higher price when demand increases; however, the optimal price is not necessarily monotonic when the provider capacity or the waiting cost increases. Furthermore, the platform should offer a higher payout ratio as demand increases, capacity decreases or customers become more sensitive to waiting time.

We also find that the platform should lower its payout ratio as it grows with the number of providers and customer demand increasing at about the same rate. We use a set of actual data from a large on-demand ride-hailing platform to calibrate our model parameters in numerical experiments to illustrate some of our main insights.

Keywords: On-Demand Services, Endogenous Supply and Demand, Queueing Models.

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1 Introduction

Recent advances in internet/mobile technologies have enabled the creation of various innovative on-demand service platforms for providing *on-demand* services anytime/anywhere. Examples include grocery delivery services (e.g., Instacart, Google Express), meal delivery services (e.g., Sprig, Blue Apron), and food delivery services directly from restaurants (e.g., DoorDash, Deliveroo (U.K.), UberEats, Yelp Eat24), consumer goods delivery services (e.g., UberRush), dog-walking services (e.g., Wag), and ride-hailing services (e.g., Uber, Lyft, Didi). Furthermore, the adoption of mobile applications as well as the availability of on-demand service platforms increase the expectations and demands of impatient customers for quick services.

To meet dynamic customer demand anytime/anywhere, it is economical for on-demand service firms to use independent providers (or agents) to fulfill customer requests quickly. However, using independent agents to deliver on-demand services can be challenging, as work participation of independent providers is primarily driven by earnings. As independent agents do not get compensated for idle times, earnings depends on wage rate and utilization, whereas utilization depends on customer demand. At the same time, the demand associated with time and price sensitive customers depends on two key factors: price and waiting time. Since customer's waiting time is highly dependent on the number of participating agents (which is a function of agent's wage and customer demand), the "supply" of participating agents and the "demand" of customer requests are endogenously dependent on the wage and the price specified by the firm.

An on-demand service firm needs to analyze the underlying interactions between supply and demand so as to select the optimal wage and price. The firm must carefully coordinate endogenous supply and demand in different time periods by: (1) setting the right wage (i.e., compensation) to get the right supply (i.e., the right number of earning sensitive participating agents); and (2) charging the right price to control the right demand (i.e., the right number of time and price sensitive customers). To elaborate, consider the simple case when the demand is fixed. If the firm offers a higher wage, more agents will participate and customer satisfaction will increase due to a quicker service. However, each participating agent will earn less due to low utilization. On the other hand, if the firm offers a lower wage, fewer agents will participate and customer satisfaction will decrease due to longer waiting times.

In view of the intricate relationship between endogenous supply and demand through wage and price selections, we develop an analytical framework to examine how an on-demand service firm should set its price rate for the customers and its wage rate for the providers. In our framework, we use a queueing model to capture the underlying waiting time where both supply (i.e., number of providers) and demand (i.e., customer arrival rate) are “endogenously” dependent on wage, price and other operating factors. Our model captures an operating environment where (1) time and price sensitive customers are “heterogeneous” in their *valuation* of the service; and (2) earning sensitive independent providers are “heterogeneous” in their *reservation earning rate* (i.e., the minimum wage for work participation).

We only consider time-based pricing (instead of dynamic pricing) in our analytical framework, i.e., the price rate can change across different time periods, but is known in advance to customers. Also, we only consider time-based wages so that the wage schedule is known in advance to service providers. Besides the fact that time-based pricing (and wages) is practical, it is considered to be fairer than the dynamic pricing/wages that is not known to customers/providers in advance. For instance, the behavior experiments conducted by Haws and Bearden (2006) reveal that consumers viewed price changes within very short time periods as being more “unfair” than price changes over a more extended period of time. Therefore, for practical reasons and for tractability, we focus on time-based strategy in this paper.

We first use the analytical framework to construct a base model for a common situation in which an on-demand service platform adopts a *fixed payout ratio* of wage over price to pay its service providers. (Throughout this paper, we refer to “payout ratio” as the wage offered to the providers as a percentage of the price paid by the customers.) By including waiting time performance based on an $M/M/k$ queueing model in the customer utility function, we analyze the optimal price and wage rates that maximize the expected profit of the service platform. We conduct extensive numerical experiments to generate managerial insights on how to select the optimal price and wage rates for the platform. We further develop a good approximation of the steady-state waiting time function to provide analytical results that support the insights derived from our numerical experiments.

For the base model, we find that the platform should increase the price rate (and the wage rate accordingly) when customer demand increases. This result thus supports an on-demand ride-hailing service platform that uses a fixed payout ratio (such as Uber) of charging a higher price (and

offering a higher wage) during rush hours when the customer demand is high. Interestingly, we find that the optimal price (and wage) rate is not necessarily monotonic in the maximum number of available service providers.

We then extend our base model to analyze the general situation in which the on-demand service platform can use a *time-based payout ratio* to pay the providers in order to maximize its profit. We analyze the optimal price and wage rates and evaluate the potential benefit of using a time-based payout ratio over a fixed payout ratio. Similar to the base model, we use an approximation of the waiting time function to provide analytical results that support the insights derived from our numerical experiments. Our results can also be extended to a more general setting under which the objective is to maximize the platform's profit plus the welfare of the consumers and providers.

For the general model (based on time-based payout ratio), we find that the optimal price and wage rates increase as customer demand increases. Interestingly, the impact of service capacity on the optimal price rate is more subtle. We find that the optimal price is not necessarily monotonic as the maximum number of available service providers increases. Similarly, the optimal price is not necessarily monotonic as waiting cost increases. This non-monotonic property can be explained by the queueing effects captured in the customer utility function. We also find that, when the customer's valuation of the service and the provider's earning reservation are uniformly distributed, the optimal payout ratio increases when demand increases, service capacity decreases, or customers become more sensitive to waiting time. In other words, the platform should increase its payout ratio at time periods with high demand, but reduce its payout ratio when the number of registered independent providers increases. For urgent on-demand services with highly time sensitive customers, the firm needs to increase its payout ratio to attract more service providers to handle the increasingly impatient customers. We also find that the platform should lower its payout ratio as it grows with the number of providers and customer demand increasing at about the same rate.

Our results also show that the profit can be greatly reduced if the platform uses a fixed payout ratio that is far from the optimal time-based payout ratio, and that the optimal time-based payout ratio can vary widely depending on specific operating characteristics. This implies that, while it is simple for the platform to share a fixed percentage of its revenue with its independent providers, the platform should adopt a time-based payout ratio to maximize profitability across different time periods when the underlying operating characteristics can change significantly. We hope our results

might motivate on-demand service firms adopting a fixed payout scheme to carefully re-evaluate the effectiveness of such a fixed payout scheme.

This paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief review of related literature in Section 2. Section 3 presents our modeling framework of endogenous supply and demand along with heterogeneous providers and customers. In Section 4, we develop our base model for analyzing a common situation in which the on-demand platform adopts a *fixed payout ratio*. We analyze the optimal price and wage rates that maximize the platform’s profit using extensive numerical experiments. We further develop a good approximation scheme to provide analytical support of the insights derived from the numerical experiments. In Section 5 we extend our base model to analyze the general situation in which the platform can use a *time-based payout ratio* in order to maximize its profit. In Section 6, we summarize the results of our illustrative numerical examples based on actual data provided by Didi, the leading on-demand ride-hailing service in China, and provide our concluding remarks. All mathematical proofs for the results in the main text can be found in the full version of our paper, Bai, et al. (2017).

2 Literature Review

Our paper relates to pricing strategies in two-sided markets in the industrial organization literature. Our framework is akin to the models developed by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Armstrong (2006) in the following sense. Our framework studies a service platform that maximizes its profit by charging prices (wage can be viewed as a negative price) to both sides of the market, which captures some positive “cross-group” externalities, i.e., the utility of an agent in one side increases with the number of agents in the other side. However, our framework differs from their setting in two important aspects. First, our framework incorporates a queueing model, which is a salient feature of a ride-sharing platform. As such, our framework also captures the within-group effects in which an increase in customer demand would reduce customer utility due to an increase in waiting time in the demand side, and an increase in service providers would reduce provider earnings due to lower utilization in the supply side. We shall further discuss how the non-linear queueing effect can affect the structural results in Section 5.2. Second, our framework considers a different objective function. Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) use the product of the difference in price and wage rate, supply and demand in the objective function. Hu and Zhou (2017) use the product of the difference in price

and wage rate and the minimum of supply and demand in the objective function. In contrast, our framework uses the product of the difference in price and wage the “throughput rate”. Notice that the throughput rate is a non-separable function of the arrival rate (or throughput) and the number of servers in an equilibrium, and these two factors depend on the underlying price and wage rates.

Our paper belongs to an emerging stream of research that examines operations and pricing issues arising from the *sharing economy*; see e.g., Benjaafar et al. (2015), Fraiberger and Sundararajan (2015), and Jiang and Tian (2015) examined a customer’s decision to purchase or to rent assets in the presence of “product sharing platforms” such as Airbnb. By crawling data from Airbnb, Li et al. (2015) showed empirically that “professional” owners earned more. For many of such sharing platforms, the owners set the price, the platforms set the payout amounts to the owners, and customers often reserve the service in advance. In contrast, our paper studies on-demand service platforms which provide time-sensitive service in an on-demand manner and addresses different decision issues in managing the underlying service request mechanisms.

Recent developments of various on-demand service platforms such as Uber and DoorDash (see Kokalitcheva (2015), Wirtz and Tang (2016), and Shoot (2015)) have motivated researchers to explore various operational issues. First, there is an on-going debate regarding the definition of independent contractors for various on-demand service platforms (e.g., see Roose (2014)). At the same time, it is of interest to examine how dynamic wage affects supply, especially when independent providers can freely choose whether and when to work. Chen and Sheldon (2015) examined transactional data associated with 25 million trips obtained from Uber and showed empirically that dynamic wage (due to surge pricing) could entice independent drivers to work for longer hours. Sheldon (2016) analyzed data from a peer-to-peer ride-sharing firm to examine the supply elasticity of individual contractors in the ride-sharing market. Moreno and Terwiesch (2014) also examined empirically the independent contractor’s bidding behavior on freelancing platforms. Allon et al. (2012) explored the process for matching providers to consumers when capacities were exogenous.

A number of researchers have recently studied the impact of wage and price on supply and for on-demand services and examined whether it would be beneficial for an on-demand service firm to adjust its prices and wages dynamically based on real-time system information including the current number of customers requesting service and the number of providers in the system. Riquelme et al. (2015) and Cachon et al. (2015) compared the impact of static versus dynamic prices and wages.

When customers were heterogeneous in terms of valuation and the payout ratio was exogenously given, Riquelme et al. (2015) found that static pricing performed well. On the other hand, Cachon et al. (2015) found that surge pricing performed well when customers were homogeneous and the payout ratio was endogenously determined. When the profit function of the platform is the minimum of demand (a linear function of price) and supply (a linear function of wage), Hu and Zhou (2017) showed that it is optimal for the platform to offer a constant payout ratio, which depends on the price and wage sensitivity coefficients of the linear demand and supply functions. Moreover, their main focus is to provide performance bounds for an endogenized fixed payout ratio. Gurvich et al. (2015) developed a newsvendor-style model to examine the optimal price and wage decisions. This stream of research has assumed that customer demand is independent of waiting time and service capacity is independent of system utilization over time. In contrast, our model captures the rational behavior of customers who are sensitive to waiting time (and price) and independent providers who are sensitive to earnings which depend on the system utilization.

One research stream in the queueing literature has studied pricing decisions for services where customers can incur waiting or delay costs. In particular, a number of research papers have examined an operating environment that uses a static uniform (non-discriminatory) pricing strategy for heterogeneous customers. Afeche and Mendelson (2004) analyzed the revenue-maximizing and socially optimal equilibria under uniform pricing for heterogeneous customers and found that the classical result that the revenue-maximizing admission price was higher than the socially-optimal price (e.g., see Naor (1969)) could be reversed under a more generalized delay cost structure. Zhou et al. (2014) analyzed the structure of the optimal uniform pricing strategies for two classes of customers with different service valuations and waiting time sensitivities. Armony and Haviv (2003) and Afanasyev and Mendelson (2010) studied the competition between two firms under uniform pricing for two classes of heterogeneous customers. All the above research papers were based on the assumption that capacity was exogenously given. In contrast, our paper considers the situation where service capacity is endogenously dependent on wage and system utilization.

Finally, our model is closely related to some recent work by Taylor (2016). To our knowledge, Taylor (2016) is the first to examine pre-committed price and wage based on customer demand and other operating factors in the context of on-demand services. He compared the optimal prices when the providers were independent contractors or regular employees, and examined the impact

of waiting time sensitivity on the optimal price and wage using a two-point distribution for both the customer valuation of the service and the provider’s reservation earning rate. Our model allows these two distributions to be continuous, and complements Taylor’s work in two important ways. First, our focus is to examine the impact of demand rate, waiting time sensitivity, service rate, and the size of available providers (who are on-reserve) on the optimal price, wage and payout ratio. Second, in addition to maximizing its profit, we also consider the case when the firm maximizes the sum of its own profit and the total consumer and provider surplus.

3 A Modeling Framework with Price and Time Sensitive Customers and Earning Sensitive Service Providers

We consider an on-demand service platform that coordinates randomly arriving (price and time sensitive) customers with (earning sensitive) independent service providers. To simplify our exposition, we shall use on-demand ride-hailing service platforms (such as Uber) to illustrate our model formulation and results throughout this paper. However, our model can also be used to study other on-demand service applications.

Customers arrive randomly at the platform to request for service, and each service request consists of an (random) amount of service units to be processed by a service provider (e.g., travel distance in km). Throughout this paper, we assume that the requested service by any customer can be met by any of the available service providers. The platform charges each customer a *fixed price rate* p per service unit (e.g., dollar per km), and offers a *fixed wage rate* w per service unit to each participating service provider. Here, we use “wage rate” per service unit so that the payout ratio $\frac{w}{p}$ is well defined. We shall compute “earning rate” per unit time later for providers who decide whether to participate or not.

In the same spirit as in Taylor (2016), the price rate p and wage rate w are pre-committed, but their values can vary across different time periods depending on the specific market characteristics such as the average customer demand rate and the expected number of available providers. In other words, we focus on time-based pricing/wage instead of real-time dynamic pricing/wage that depends on real-time system status such as the number of customers requesting service and number of available providers in real time.¹

¹As articulated in MacMillan (2015) and Taylor (2016), many customers resist real time dynamic pricing due

Each customer decides whether to use the platform to request for service, and each independent provider decides whether to participate. We assume that the price rate p and wage rate w are known to the customers and the providers in advance so that they can make their informed decisions. For each service request, the platform will assign one of the available participating providers to serve the customer.² The primary objective of the service platform is to select the optimal price rate and wage rate, denoted by p^* and w^* , so as to maximize its average profit.

3.1 Realized customer request rate λ and price rate p

Consider a certain time period (e.g., peak hours from 8am to 10am). The maximum potential customer demand rate for the service during this time period is given by $\bar{\lambda}$, each of which has a valuation of the service that is based on a value rate v per service unit, where v varies across customers. To model heterogeneous customers, we assume that there is a continuum of customer types so that the value rate v spreads over the range $[0, 1]$ according to a cumulative distribution function $F(\cdot)$, where $F(\cdot)$ is a strictly increasing function with $F(0) = 0$ and $F(1) = 1$.

For a customer with valuation v and a service request of D units, the customer's service surplus is equal to $(v - p)D$.³ To simplify exposition, we assume that the service units requested D is independent of the customer type v . (If D and v are dependent, we can still apply our analysis by treating the random variable vD as the new "valuation".) As our focus is on the steady state analysis, it suffices to use the average service units requested by customers in our analysis. Let $d = E(D)$ denote the average service units requested by customers. To capture the notion of waiting time sensitivity, we assume that the expected utility function of a customer of value rate type v is given by

$$U(v) = (v - p)d - cW_q, \tag{1}$$

where c denotes the cost of waiting per unit time and W_q represents the expected waiting time for

to fairness concerns and most on-demand service providers, other than Uber and Lyft, tend to adopt this form of time-based pricing.

²Our model does not consider any specific assignment mechanism. For instance, the service platform can assign an available participating provider based on certain specific criteria (e.g., Uber assigns an available driver closest to the pickup location), or can announce a service request to all available participating service providers and assign the request to the first respondent.

³By leveraging internet and mobile technologies, customer requests (e.g., pick up and drop off locations) and the service operations (e.g., route) can be monitored or controlled by the on-demand platform. As such, we assume that the number of service units (e.g., travel distance) in each requests is dictated by the customers, and the service providers cannot manipulate or maximize their earnings by deliberately increasing the service units (e.g., travel distance) due to information transparency and real-time location tracking capabilities.

the service. (For instance, Uber and Lyft provide estimated pick-up time to customers.)

Using (1) and assuming that a rational customer with valuation v will request for service only if $U(v) \geq 0$,⁴ the platform can use p and w to indirectly control the effective demand (i.e., the realized customer request rate) λ so that

$$\lambda = \text{Prob}\{U(v) \geq 0\} \cdot \bar{\lambda} = \text{Prob}\{v \geq p + \frac{c}{d}W_q\} \cdot \bar{\lambda}.$$

Define the “target” service level $s = \text{Prob}\{v \geq p + \frac{c}{d}W_q\}$. Then, the realized customer request rate λ is given by:

$$\lambda = s\bar{\lambda}. \quad (2)$$

Since $v \sim F(\cdot)$, it follows from (1) that the price rate p satisfies the following equation:

$$p = F^{-1}\left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c}{d}W_q. \quad (3)$$

Note that the price rate p decreases in the expected waiting time W_q and the unit waiting cost c .

3.2 Realized number of participating providers k and wage rate w

Let K be the (maximum) number of potential earning sensitive providers who may decide to participate over the same time period, i.e., K represents the number of registered providers who are eligible to participate. For any given (p, w) , let k be the realized number of providers participating in the platform, where $k \leq K$. Also, let μ denote the average service speed (number of service units processed per unit time; e.g., travel speed measured in terms of km per hour) of the service providers so that μ/d represents the service rate of the providers (i.e., average number of customers served per hour).⁵ Given the realized customer request rate λ and the realized number of participating providers k , the utilization of these k participating providers is equal to $\frac{\lambda}{k \cdot (\mu/d)}$, where $\lambda d < k\mu$ to ensure system stability. The average wage per unit time of a participating provider (when working) is equal to the wage per service unit w multiplied by the average service speed μ . Accounting for the utilization, the average “earning rate” per unit time of a participating provider is equal to $w\mu \cdot \frac{\lambda d}{k\mu} = w \frac{\lambda d}{k}$.⁶

⁴In other words, in equilibrium, only customers with value rate $v \geq p + \frac{c}{d}W_q$ will use the platform to request for service, and customer requests with value rate $v < p + \frac{c}{d}W_q$ will not use the platform to meet their service need.

⁵If the service units d are already measured in terms of time units, we can simply set $\mu = 1$ in this case.

⁶For independent service providers, utilization and wage rate are the two key factors for their participation. For example, DePillis (2016) reported that Uber drivers obtain higher earnings primarily because their utilization rate (measured in terms of percentage of miles driven with a passenger) is much higher than that for taxi drivers. For instance, Uber driver’s utilization is 64.2%, while taxi driver’s utilization is only 40.7% in Los Angeles.

To model the notion of earning-sensitivity, we assume that each potential provider has a reservation earning rate r per unit time (i.e., corresponding to his outside option), where r varies across different providers. To model the heterogeneity among providers, we assume that there is a continuum of provider types so that the reservation rate r spreads over the range $[0, 1]$ according to a cumulative distribution function $G(\cdot)$, where $G(\cdot)$ is a strictly increasing function with $G(0) = 0$ and $G(1) = 1$. For a (potential) provider with reservation rate r , he will participate to offer service only if his average earning rate $w\frac{\lambda d}{k}$ is at least equal to r .

Let β denote the proportion of providers who participate in the platform to offer service during this time period. Then, $\beta = Prob\{r \leq w\frac{\lambda d}{k}\} = G(w\frac{\lambda d}{k})$, and the realized number of participating providers k (i.e., supply) is given by

$$k = \beta K. \quad (4)$$

Also, in equilibrium, $\beta = G(w\frac{\lambda d}{k})$ so that:

$$G^{-1}(\beta) = w\frac{\lambda d}{k}. \quad (5)$$

From (4) and (5), we can express the wage rate w as a function of the number of participating providers k :

$$w = G^{-1}(\beta)\frac{k}{\lambda d} = G^{-1}\left(\frac{k}{K}\right)\frac{k}{\lambda d}. \quad (6)$$

3.3 Problem Formulation

Since the platform earns an average profit of $(p - w)d$ for each customer request, the platform's average total profit is then equal to $\pi = \lambda(p - w)d$. By substituting (3) and (6) into the profit function, we can express the profit function π as a function of (k, λ) below:

$$\pi(k, \lambda) = \lambda d \left[F^{-1}\left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c}{d}W_q - G^{-1}\left(\frac{k}{K}\right)\frac{k}{\lambda d} \right]. \quad (7)$$

Considering the system stability condition $\lambda d < k\mu$, the optimization problem of the platform can be formulated as

$$\max_{k, \lambda} \pi(k, \lambda) \equiv \lambda d \left[F^{-1}\left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c}{d}W_q - G^{-1}\left(\frac{k}{K}\right)\frac{k}{\lambda d} \right], \text{ subject to } \frac{\lambda d}{k\mu} < 1, \quad (8)$$

from which we can determine the optimal supply (i.e., the number of participating providers k^*) and the optimal demand (i.e., the realized customer request rate λ^*). Then, we can use (3) and (6) to retrieve the corresponding optimal price rate p^* and optimal wage rate w^* from k^* and λ^* .

3.4 Notation

For ease of reference, we list below the basic notation used in the paper.

- K : Maximum number of potential service providers who may opt to participate;
- k : Realized number of participating service providers ($k \leq K$);
- $\bar{\lambda}$: Customer demand rate who may opt to use the platform to request for service;
- λ : Realized customer request rate ($\lambda \leq \bar{\lambda}$);
- s : Target service level;
- D : Random amount of service units per service request;
- d : Average amount of service units per service request, i.e., $d = E(D)$;
- μ : Average service speed of the service providers;
- v : Value rate per service unit of a customer;
- $F(\cdot)$: Cumulative distribution of value rate of customers v ;
- r : Reservation earning rate of service providers;
- $G(\cdot)$: Cumulative distribution of reservation rate of service providers r ;
- c : Unit waiting cost of customers;
- p : Price rate (price per service unit) charged to customers;
- w : Wage rate (wage per service unit) paid to service providers.

4 The Base Model with A Fixed Payout Ratio

A common practice for many on-demand service platforms is to set the wage rate as a fixed proportion of the price rate, i.e., $w = \alpha p$ for some fixed α , $0 < \alpha < 1$. For example, Uber set $\alpha = 0.8$ for its first cohort of drivers in San Francisco (Huet (2014)). We can use our modeling framework to analyze this common practice by imposing an additional constraint of $w = \alpha p$ in the optimization problem as given in (8). We refer to this model as the base model with a fixed payout ratio, or simply the “base model”, in our subsequent discussions.

We model the expected waiting time W_q used in the customer’s utility function (1) based on an $M/M/k$ queue. For an $M/M/k$ queue with arrival rate λ and service rate $\frac{\mu}{d}$, it is well-known (see e.g., Gross et al. (2008)) that the expected waiting time is given by

$$W_q = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{k!(1-\rho)}{k^k \rho^k} \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \frac{k^i \rho^i}{i!}} \left[\frac{\rho}{\lambda(1-\rho)} \right], \quad (9)$$

where $\rho = \lambda d/k\mu$ represents the system utilization with $\rho < 1$.

To simplify our analysis here, we shall assume that the distributions of value rate v and reservation earning rate r are uniformly distributed over the range $[0,1]$ so that $F(v) = v$ and $G(r) = r$ in our models for the rest of this paper. However, all our analytical and numerical results can be directly extended to the more general case where the positive support of the uniform distribution of $F(\cdot)$ or $G(\cdot)$ is within the range of $[a, b]$ rather than $[0, 1]$, as used in our illustrative numerical examples in Section 6.

With the above assumptions, the respective price, wage and profit functions given in (3), (6) and (7) can be expressed as follows:

$$p = \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c}{1 + \frac{k!(1-\rho)}{k^k \rho^k} \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \frac{k^i \rho^i}{i!}} \left[\frac{\rho}{\lambda d(1-\rho)} \right] \quad (10)$$

$$w = \frac{k^2}{K\lambda d} \quad (11)$$

$$\pi(k, \lambda) = \lambda d(p - w) = \lambda d \left\{ \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c}{1 + \frac{k!(1-\rho)}{k^k \rho^k} \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \frac{k^i \rho^i}{i!}} \left[\frac{\rho}{\lambda d(1-\rho)} \right] - \frac{k^2}{K\lambda d} \right\}, \quad (12)$$

where the system utilization $\rho = \frac{\lambda d}{k\mu} < 1$. Using (10) and (11), the fixed payout ratio constraint, $w = \alpha p$, can be written as

$$\frac{k^2}{K\lambda d} = \alpha \left\{ \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c}{1 + \frac{k!(1-\rho)}{k^k \rho^k} \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \frac{k^i \rho^i}{i!}} \left[\frac{\rho}{\lambda d(1-\rho)} \right] \right\},$$

or equivalently,

$$k^2 = K\alpha \left\{ \lambda d \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c}{1 + \frac{k!(1-\rho)}{k^k \rho^k} \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \frac{k^i \rho^i}{i!}} \left(\frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \right) \right\}. \quad (13)$$

Also, as $w = \alpha p$, we can use (11) to rewrite the profit function (12) as

$$\pi(k, \lambda) = \lambda d(p - w) = \lambda d \left(\frac{w}{\alpha} - w \right) = \frac{k^2(1-\alpha)}{K\alpha}. \quad (14)$$

Then, the optimization problem is to maximize the profit function (14) subject to the constraints (13) and $k \leq K$. It is easy to see that the optimal k^* is given by the largest value of k , with $k \leq K$, that possesses a feasible λ to (13).

While it is difficult to derive tractable results using (13), it is straightforward to numerically search for any feasible λ satisfying (13) for each fixed value of k . For each fixed value of k , with

$k = 1, 2, \dots, K$, we search through all possible values of λ , with $\lambda d/k\mu < 1$, that would satisfy (13). The optimal solution k^* is given by the largest value of k with a feasible λ to (13), and the optimal p^* and w^* are given by (10) and (11) accordingly.

The left panel of Table 1 provides a sample set of results in our numerical experiments. For this set of numerical experiments, we set $\alpha = 0.5$, $c = 1$, $K = 50$, $\mu = 1$, and $d = 1$ with values of $\bar{\lambda}$ ranging from 10 to 100. Table 1 shows that the optimal value of k^* (and the optimal profit π^*) is non-decreasing in $\bar{\lambda}$, i.e., the optimal number of participating providers and the optimal expected profit of the platform would increase (or remain the same) as the customer demand rate who may opt to use the service increases. However, the optimal values of λ^* and p^* are not necessarily monotone in $\bar{\lambda}$.⁷ In particular, the optimal price could possibly decrease when the customer demand increases. We shall provide an explanation of why this seemingly counter-intuitive result could occur in our numerical results later.

Table 1: Comparisons of results for the base model with exact formula (9) and approximation (16).

$\bar{\lambda}$	W_q is given by exact formula (9)				W_q is given by (16) with $n = k^*$				
	k^*	λ^*	p^*	π^*	n^*	k^*	λ^*	p^*	π^*
10	7	2.71	0.72	0.98	7.48	7	2.76	0.73	0.98
20	10	5.79	0.69	2.00	10.02	10	6.22	0.64	2.00
30	11	6.20	0.78	2.42	11.57	11	6.34	0.76	2.42
40	12	7.14	0.81	2.88	12.64	12	7.29	0.79	2.88
50	13	8.32	0.81	3.38	13.41	13	8.53	0.79	3.38
60	14	9.80	0.80	3.92	13.99	13	8.05	0.84	3.38
70	14	9.29	0.84	3.92	14.45	14	9.50	0.83	3.92
80	15	11.16	0.81	4.50	14.82	14	9.18	0.85	3.92
90	15	10.62	0.85	4.50	15.13	15	10.97	0.82	4.50
100	15	10.36	0.87	4.50	15.39	15	10.60	0.85	4.50

4.1 An Approximation Scheme

To obtain some analytical results that can enable us to understand why λ^* and p^* are not necessarily monotonic in $\bar{\lambda}$, we next develop an approximation scheme by using a simpler function for the expected waiting time function W_q . The approximation scheme serves two purposes. It gives a more efficient way of finding a near-optimal solution numerically and provides analytical results for supporting the insights obtained from our numerical experiments.

⁷With the integer constraint on k , there generally exists two feasible values of λ^* corresponding to the optimal integer solution k^* . For consistent comparisons, we always present the smaller value of λ^* . The larger value of λ^* also shows similar non-monotonic property as well.

Our approximation scheme is motivated by the following well-studied approximation for the expected waiting time of an $M/M/k$ queue with arrival rate λ and service rate $\frac{\mu}{d}$:

$$W_q = \frac{\rho\sqrt{2(k+1)}}{\lambda(1-\rho)}, \quad (15)$$

where $\rho = \frac{\lambda d}{k\mu}$ represents the system utilization. The approximation formula (15) is exact for an $M/M/1$ queue, i.e., (9) reduces to (15) when $k = 1$, and it has been shown (see Sakasegawa (1977)) to provide a very good estimate of (9) when $k > 1$.

However, using (15) for W_q is still too complex for developing tractable results for the base model. The decision variable k appears in both $\rho = \frac{\lambda d}{k\mu}$ and the exponent of the expression given in (15), which makes the first-order conditions of the optimization problem difficult to analyze. Therefore, we use a simpler approximation for W_q by assuming that:

$$W_q = \frac{\rho\sqrt{2(n+1)}}{\lambda(1-\rho)}, \quad (16)$$

where $\rho = \frac{\lambda d}{k\mu} < 1$ and n is some fixed positive number. By using (16) for W_q , the price and profit functions given in (10) and (12) now become:

$$p = \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c\rho\sqrt{2(n+1)}}{\lambda d(1-\rho)} \quad (17)$$

$$\pi(k, \lambda) = \lambda d \left[\left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c\rho\sqrt{2(n+1)}}{\lambda d(1-\rho)} - \frac{k^2}{K\lambda d} \right], \quad (18)$$

and the fixed payout ratio constraint given by (13) becomes

$$k^2 = K\alpha \left\{ \lambda d \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}}\right) - \frac{c\rho\sqrt{2(n+1)}}{1-\rho} \right\}. \quad (19)$$

Then, for each fixed value of k , we now use (19) instead of (13) to find a feasible λ numerically, and the optimal solution k^* is given by the largest value of k , with $k \leq K$, that possesses a feasible λ to (19).

The only difference between (15) and (16) is that the exponent in (15) is based on the decision variable k , whereas the exponent in (16) is based on a fixed parameter n . Thus, (16) would be very close to (15) when n is close to k . We develop an iterative procedure to determine the parameter n in (16) such that the resulting optimal value of k^* is equal to n itself. By setting $n = k^*$, (16) can be approximated by (15) for $k \approx k^*$, and so the approximation (16) would be close to the exact formula (9) when $k \approx k^*$. (Details of the iterative procedure are provided in Bai, et al. (2017).)

The right panel of Table 1 provides the corresponding results for the same set of numerical experiments using our approximation scheme that involves the aforementioned iterative scheme. We note that the optimal solutions given by the approximation scheme exhibit similar patterns as those using the exact formula as shown in the left panel; e.g., Table 1 shows that both k^* and π^* are non-decreasing in $\bar{\lambda}$, whereas p^* and λ^* are not necessarily monotone in $\bar{\lambda}$.

We next derive some analytical results for the base model using the approximation formula (16) for W_q and allowing the decision variable k to take on positive numbers rather than positive integers only. We can establish the following analytical results under the formal assumptions as stated below:

Assumption 1: $F(\cdot) \sim U[0, 1]$, $G(\cdot) \sim U[0, 1]$, and W_q is given by (16) where n is a fixed positive number. Also, the decision variable k is not restricted to positive integers only.

Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and $\frac{w}{p} = \alpha$, $0 < \alpha < 1$. Then,

- (i) p^* (and the corresponding $w^* = \alpha p^*$), k^* , λ^* and ρ^* increase in $\bar{\lambda}$; and
- (ii) p^* (and the corresponding $w^* = \alpha p^*$), k^* and ρ^* increase in d , and λ^* decreases in d .

We note that the monotonicity results given in Proposition 1 are established for any fixed positive number n . In our approximation scheme, n is chosen such that $n = k^*(n)$ using the iterative procedure, which changes as the values of the model parameters change. However, the monotonicity properties stated in Proposition 1 remain valid for all our numerical results using the approximation scheme. For instance, our numerical results using the approximation scheme (when k can take on any positive number) have confirmed that both the optimal price p^* and realized customer demand rate λ^* increase in $\bar{\lambda}$, as given in Proposition 1(i).

With the integer constraint on k , the results in Table 1 show that p^* and λ^* are not necessarily monotone in $\bar{\lambda}$. We can now explain this non-monotonic behavior of p^* and λ^* observed in Table 1 as follows. When k is restricted to be (positive) integers, it is not possible to increase k^* by any amount less than one. Consequently, with a small increase in $\bar{\lambda}$, k^* might stay the same, and the optimal p^* and λ^* would then need to be reduced. Without the integer constraint on k , this behavior will no longer occur. Any increase in $\bar{\lambda}$ will cause k^* to increase, and the resulting p^* and λ^* will always increase, as shown in Proposition 1(i).

4.2 Main Insights

We performed an extensive set of numerical experiments using our approximation scheme (with k being a continuous variable). Based on these numerical results, together with analytical support of Proposition 1, we summarize below the main insights for the base model.

First, the optimal price rate p^* increases when the customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$ is higher (or when the average service unit d is higher). Note that the profit of the platform is equal to the product of the realized customer request rate λ and the profit margin $p(1-\alpha)$. When $\bar{\lambda}$ increases, the platform can increase its price p^* while sustaining a higher demand request rate λ^* , resulting in a higher profit. A higher price rate p^* also corresponds to a higher wage rate (as $w^* = \alpha p^*$), which attracts more participating providers k^* to handle the higher demand request rate λ^* . Thus, our results suggest that an on-demand ride-hailing service platform using a fixed payout ratio should charge a higher price to increase profitability during rush hours when the customer demand is high.

Second, while a higher customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$ (or a higher d) would increase the optimal price rate p^* and wage rate w^* , the optimal price and wage rates are not necessarily monotone as service capacity increases (with a higher K or μ). We can explain this contrast as follows. When the number of available providers K (or service rate μ) increases, the platform can decrease its wage rate w^* while still attracting more participating providers k^* . Also, the corresponding decrease in price rate p^* would increase the realized demand request rate λ^* as its capacity increases. However, this does not necessarily increase the profit as the profit margin $p^*(1-\alpha)$ would reduce. Overall, the optimal price p^* is not monotonic in K , but depends on the relative changes in demand request rate λ^* and profit margin $p^*(1-\alpha)$.

Similarly, the optimal price and wage rates are not necessarily monotonic in the unit waiting cost c . As c increases, a direct effect is a decrease in demand request rate, and the platform needs to adjust its price rate (and the corresponding wage rate) to reduce the adverse effect of a higher waiting cost. If the platform increases its wage rate w to attract more participating providers to reduce waiting time, the corresponding price increase p^* would further reduce demand request rate λ and possibly lead to a lower profit. On the other hand, if the platform reduces its price rate p to stimulate demand request rate λ , the corresponding reduction in wage rate w would reduce supply capacity k and profit margin $p^*(1-\alpha)$. Therefore, the impact of c on the optimal price and wage

rates are not necessarily monotonic, but depends on specific values of the model parameters.

5 The General Model with A Time-based Payout Ratio

Our base model is based on the situation where the platform uses a fixed payout ratio for its service providers. While a fixed ratio payout scheme is easy to implement and widely adopted in practice, it raises an interesting question of whether a time-based payout ratio that depends on specific time-based market characteristics could significantly improve the profitability of an on-demand service platform. To answer this question, we now analyze the general situation where the optimal price and wage rates are determined without imposing the constraint of $w = \alpha p$ in solving the decision problem of the platform. We refer to this model as the general model with a time-based payout ratio, or simply the “general model”, in our subsequent discussions.

For the general model, the decision problem is to find the optimal values (k, λ) that maximize the profit function $\pi(k, \lambda)$ given in (12) subject to the utilization constraint $\rho = \frac{\lambda d}{k\mu} < 1$. As for the base model, the profit function (12) is too complex for conducting tractable analysis, but we can solve the problem numerically. Specifically, we can perform an exhaustive numerical search for the optimal λ that maximizes (12) for each fixed value of k , $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$, and we then compare the optimal profit for each value of k to select the optimal k^* and the corresponding optimal λ^* .

The left panel of Table 2 provides the results for the same set of numerical experiments as given in Table 1. Table 2 shows that k^* and π^* for the general model are also non-decreasing in $\bar{\lambda}$, i.e., both the optimal number of participating providers and the optimal expected profit of the platform increase (or remain the same) as the customer demand rate increases. Furthermore, p^* and w^* generally (but not always) increase in $\bar{\lambda}$, i.e., the platform would most likely increase price and wage rates when the customer demand rate increases.

We next illustrate in Table 3 how the optimal expected profit would be affected if the platform uses a fixed payout ratio instead of the optimal time-based payout ratio. By using the parameters associated with the numerical experiments discussed above, we conduct the following analysis. For a given $\bar{\lambda}$, we compute the ratio (in percentage) between the expected profit under a fixed payout ratio α (value is given in the first row) and the expected profit under the optimal time-based ratio α^* (value is given in the second column). The results in Table 3 show that the expected profit can be greatly reduced if α is substantially different from α^* . For example, when $\bar{\lambda} = 10$, the platform

Table 2: Comparisons of results for the general model with exact formula (9) and approximation (16).

$\bar{\lambda}$	W_q is given by exact formula (9)					W_q is given by (16) with $n = n^*$					
	k^*	λ^*	p^*	w^*	π^*	n^*	k^*	λ^*	p^*	w^*	π^*
10	6	3.32	0.613	0.217	1.32	5.48	6	3.28	0.603	0.220	1.25
20	8	5.14	0.677	0.249	2.20	7.90	8	5.11	0.663	0.259	2.11
30	10	6.87	0.706	0.291	2.85	9.61	10	6.86	0.692	0.292	2.75
40	12	8.61	0.723	0.335	3.34	10.87	11	7.82	0.722	0.310	3.22
50	13	9.55	0.745	0.354	3.73	11.90	12	8.74	0.742	0.330	3.60
60	14	10.47	0.761	0.375	4.04	12.70	13	9.65	0.756	0.350	3.92
70	14	10.55	0.780	0.372	4.31	13.38	14	10.55	0.767	0.371	4.18
80	15	11.44	0.789	0.393	4.53	13.91	14	10.61	0.782	0.369	4.38
90	15	11.49	0.802	0.392	4.71	14.43	15	11.50	0.789	0.391	4.58
100	16	12.39	0.807	0.413	4.88	14.84	15	11.55	0.799	0.390	4.73

can only obtain 31% of the expected profit under the optimal time-based payout ratio $\alpha^* = .35$ if a fixed payout ratio $\alpha = .8$ is used.

Table 3: Ratio of expected profits between using a fixed payout ratio and using the optimal time-based payout ratio.

$\bar{\lambda}$	α^*	$\alpha =$							
		.2	.3	.4	.5	.6	.7	.8	.9
10	.35	.55	.89	.82	.74	.65	.53	.31	.17
20	.37	.58	.76	.87	.91	.73	.56	.38	.20
30	.41	.45	.80	.85	.85	.79	.68	.45	.23
40	.46	.38	.68	.90	.86	.78	.66	.48	.27
50	.48	.34	.80	.97	.91	.80	.74	.54	.26
60	.49	.49	.74	.90	.97	.84	.77	.55	.29
70	.48	.46	.69	.84	.91	.89	.72	.56	.30
80	.50	.44	.66	.80	.99	.85	.76	.58	.31
90	.49	.42	.63	.92	.95	.92	.80	.56	.32
100	.51	.41	.61	.89	.92	.89	.78	.59	.31

Table 4 provides the values of the optimal time-based payout ratio α^* for the above set of numerical experiments with $\bar{\lambda}$ ranging from 10 to 100 and K ranging from 10 to 100. Observe that the optimal dynamic payout ratio α^* can vary widely depending on the specific values of the model parameters. Thus, the combined results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that, when the operating characteristics (such as $\bar{\lambda}$ or K) can change significantly at different time periods, it is not possible to choose one single fixed payout ratio that would be close to the optimal payout ratios across all time periods. Consequently, the platform using a fixed payout ratio scheme can achieve near-optimal results for only certain time periods. Instead, the platform needs to adopt a time-based payout ratio scheme to maximize profitability across different time periods.

Table 4: Values of the optimal time-based payout ratio α^* .

$\bar{\lambda}$	$K =$									
	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
10	.68	.56	.47	.35	.35	.29	.31	.28	.24	.22
20	.78	.57	.45	.46	.37	.35	.35	.30	.31	.28
30	.75	.62	.54	.46	.41	.38	.37	.36	.32	.31
40	.74	.59	.51	.48	.46	.42	.40	.38	.36	.33
50	.73	.58	.55	.50	.48	.43	.40	.40	.39	.35
60	.72	.57	.53	.52	.49	.44	.44	.41	.39	.37
70	.72	.63	.57	.51	.48	.46	.45	.41	.41	.39
80	.72	.63	.56	.54	.50	.47	.46	.42	.42	.40
90	.71	.62	.56	.53	.49	.49	.47	.43	.43	.40
100	.71	.62	.55	.52	.51	.48	.48	.45	.44	.41

5.1 An Approximation Scheme

We can use (16) for W_q to develop a similar approximation scheme for finding near-optimal solutions for the general model in which the price and profit functions are given by (17) and (18), respectively.

In this case, the optimal (k^*, λ^*) can be obtained from the following two first-order conditions:

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial k} = c\mu \frac{\rho \sqrt{2(n+1)}}{k\mu(1-\rho)} \left(\sqrt{2(n+1)} + \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \right) - \frac{2k}{K} = 0 \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \lambda} = d \left\{ \left(1 - 2\frac{\lambda}{\bar{\lambda}} \right) - c \frac{\rho \sqrt{2(n+1)-1}}{k\mu(1-\rho)} \left(\sqrt{2(n+1)} + \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \right) \right\} = 0. \quad (21)$$

For each fixed value of n , we can use the two first-order conditions (20) and (21) to find the optimal values of (k, λ) , as denoted by $(k^*(n), \lambda^*(n))$. We can also develop an iterative procedure to select the parameter n given in (16) such that the resulting optimal value of $k^*(n)$ is equal to n itself. (Details of the iterative procedure is provided in Bai, et al. (2017).)

The right panel of Table 2 provides the corresponding results for the same set of numerical experiments discussed earlier for the base model. Observe that while k^* under the exact formula (9) and approximation (16) are slightly different in some cases (e.g., $\bar{\lambda} = 40$), λ^* is adjusted accordingly to achieve near-optimal profit. Also, p^* and w^* are mostly (though still not always) increasing in $\bar{\lambda}$.

We can also establish the following monotonicity results for the general model using approximation (16) for W_q .

Proposition 2 *Under Assumption 1, the optimal solution for the general model exhibits the following characteristics:*

- (i) When K or μ increases, w^* decreases, π^* increases, but p^* is not necessarily monotonic.
- (ii) When c increases, w^* increases, π^* decreases, but p^* is not necessarily monotonic.
- (iii) When $\bar{\lambda}$ or d increases, w^* , p^* and π^* increase.
- (iv) The optimal payout ratio $\alpha^* = \frac{w^*}{p^*}$ decreases in K and μ , and increases in c , $\bar{\lambda}$ and d .

It is important to observe from Proposition 2 that, even though the optimal price rate is not necessarily monotonic in K , μ and c , the optimal time-based payout ratio α^* is monotone in all model parameters. In particular, the optimal time-based payout ratio α^* decreases when the service capacity increases (with a higher K or μ), but increases when the waiting cost c is higher or when customer demand increases (with a higher $\bar{\lambda}$ or d).

As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, we also obtain monotonicity properties for other system performance measures as summarized in Table 5. The monotonicity properties given in Proposition 2 and Table 5 are established for a fixed value of n , whereas the value of n used in (16) in our approximation scheme changes as the values of the model parameters change.

Table 5: Impact of model parameters on s^* , k^* , W_q^* , λ^* and ρ^* .

	s^*	k^*	W_q^*	λ^*	ρ^*
K	↑	↑	↓	↑	×
μ	↑	×	↓	↑	×
c	↓	×	↓	↓	↓
$\bar{\lambda}$	↓	↑	↑	↑	↑
d	↓	↑	↑	↓	↑

↑(increasing); ↓(decreasing); ×(non-monotonic)

We also performed numerical experiments to validate these properties for the optimal solutions using our approximation scheme. Results from all our numerical experiments are consistent with the analytical results given in Proposition 2. For example, Table 6 provides the optimal values of α^* for the numerical experiments discussed earlier, which is consistent with Proposition 2(iv) that α^* generally decreases in K and increases in $\bar{\lambda}$. Consequently, Proposition 2(iv) provides analytical support that the optimal time-based payout ratio α^* generally decreases in K and increases in $\bar{\lambda}$, as observed in Table 4 using the exact formula (9) and in Table 6 using the approximation scheme.

Proposition 2 shows the impact on the optimal wage, time-based payout ratio and the profit of the platform when either the number of providers K or the customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$ increases. As

Table 6: Optimal values of α^* using the approximation formula (16) with $n = k^*(n)$.

$\bar{\lambda}$	$K =$									
	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
10	.67	.49	.42	.36	.33	.30	.27	.25	.24	.22
20	.67	.52	.46	.41	.37	.34	.32	.30	.28	.27
30	.67	.54	.48	.44	.40	.38	.35	.33	.31	.30
40	.67	.55	.49	.46	.42	.40	.38	.36	.34	.32
50	.67	.56	.51	.47	.44	.42	.39	.38	.36	.34
60	.68	.56	.51	.48	.45	.43	.41	.39	.38	.36
70	.68	.57	.52	.49	.46	.44	.42	.40	.39	.37
80	.68	.57	.53	.49	.47	.45	.43	.41	.40	.39
90	.68	.57	.53	.50	.48	.46	.44	.42	.41	.40
100	.68	.57	.53	.50	.48	.46	.45	.43	.42	.41

a platform grows, it is common that both K and $\bar{\lambda}$ would increase at the same time. Therefore, it would be useful to understand how these optimal results would change as both K and $\bar{\lambda}$ increase. It is clear from Proposition 2 that the optimal profit of the platform would increase when both K and $\bar{\lambda}$ increase. However, it is unclear as how the platform would adjust its wage and price rates as well as its payout ratio as the platform grows, as both the optimal wage rate w^* and the optimal payout ratio α^* would change in opposite directions with respect to the changes in K and $\bar{\lambda}$.

It is intuitive that the changes in the optimal wage rate, price rate and payout ratio would generally depend on the relative growth rates of the number of providers K and customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$. However, we can derive the following results for the special case when K and $\bar{\lambda}$ increase at the same rate. Specifically, suppose that the initial number of providers and customer demand rate are given by \hat{K} and $\hat{\lambda}$, respectively. Let $\epsilon > 1$ represent the (same) growth rate of number of providers and customer demand rate, i.e., $K = \epsilon\hat{K}$ and $\bar{\lambda} = \epsilon\hat{\lambda}$. The following proposition shows the effect of ϵ on the optimal wage and price rates, and the optimal payout ratio.

Proposition 3 *Under Assumption 1, both w^* and $\alpha^* = \frac{w^*}{p^*}$ decrease as ϵ increases. However, p^* is not necessarily monotonic in ϵ .*

Proposition 3 shows that, under Assumption 1, a platform should lower its wage rate and payout ratio as both the number of providers and customer demand rate grow at the same rate. We further performed some numerical experiments to confirm these monotonicity results using our approximation scheme $n = k^*(n)$. Table 7 provides some sample results of our numerical experiments that also illustrate the monotonicity results. For this set of numerical examples, we

set $\hat{K} = \hat{\lambda} = 10$, $c = 1$, $\mu = 1$ and $d = 1$, with ϵ increasing from 1 to 5. Observe that both w^* and α^* decreases as ϵ increases, as supported by the analytical results of Proposition 3.

Table 7: Impact of growth rate ϵ on p^* , w^* , α^* and π^* .

ϵ	p^*	w^*	α^*	π^*
1	0.64	0.43	0.67	0.15
2	0.71	0.37	0.52	0.86
3	0.73	0.35	0.48	1.71
4	0.74	0.34	0.46	2.63
5	0.74	0.33	0.44	3.60

The results for the general model remain valid when we also include the total consumer and provider surplus in the objective function of the platform. This extension is useful for studying situations in which the platform may have an interest in managing the welfare of its customers and providers carefully in addition to its profit, especially when the practices of some on-demand service platforms could be potentially controversial. For example, Uber has been challenged by consumer rights group due to concerns about public safety including sexual assaults, physical attacks, by independent drivers due to their concerns about being treated as regular employees without benefits, by the government due to concerns over regulations, and by other taxi drivers due to their concerns over unfair competition; see Rogers (2015) for a comprehensive list of social costs of Uber including public safety, privacy, discrimination, and labor law violations.

All results as stated in Propositions 2 and 3 continue to hold when we include the total consumer and provider surplus in the objective function. Furthermore, our analysis shows that when the platform puts a larger weight on the total consumer and provider surplus than its profit, the optimal payout ratio α^* exceeds one, which implies that the platform is willing to increase the total consumer and provider surplus at the expense of a profit loss. This suggests that an emerging service platform might be willing to suffer a profit loss when it adopts the strategy of placing a higher weight on the welfare of the consumers and providers initially in order to increase market share; e.g., this strategy was used by Didi during its early stage of competition with taxis and other ride-hailing firms. Details of these results can be found in Bai, et al. (2017).

5.2 Main Insights

Based on our numerical experiments, together with analytical support from Propositions 2 and 3 and Table 5, we summarize the main insights for the general model below.

First, the platform should reduce the wage rate w^* as the number of available providers K (or average service speed μ) increases. In addition, the optimal profit π^* increases as K or μ increases, which implies that it is beneficial for the platform to recruit more providers to join the platform and to help providers increase their average service speed. However, the optimal price p^* is not necessarily monotonic in K .⁸ Our numerical results suggest that the optimal price could first increase and then decrease in K , and we can explain this behavior using the well-known “queueing effect” that the expected waiting time increases convexly in the system utilization as follows.

When K is small (relative to the customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$), the constraint is on the supply side, and the platform needs to operate in high utilization. In this case, an increase in supply capacity from a higher K can significantly reduce the waiting time W_q (due to the non-linear queueing effect), so the platform can afford to increase the optimal price p^* to maintain a higher realized customer request rate λ^* and achieve a higher profit π^* . This explains why the optimal price p^* could initially increase in K when K is small. On the other hand, when K is large, the constraint is now on the demand side, and the system can operate in lower utilization. In this case, an increase in K would only reduce the waiting time W_q slightly (due to the non-linear queueing effect), and the platform now chooses to reduce the optimal price p^* in order to stimulate a higher customer request rate λ^* and achieve a higher profit π^* . This explains why the optimal price p^* would decrease in K when K is large. Overall, we show that the queueing effect has caused the optimal price p^* to be non-monotonic in K .

Our results show that the optimal price and the optimal wage may move in the same direction or opposite direction when the maximum number of service providers increases. This non-monotonic property of the optimal price in our model is apparently due to the fact that our model captures the nonlinear effect of utilization on waiting time. When the queueing effect on customer demand is not captured in our model (i.e., $c = 0$), it is straightforward to show that both p^* and w^* decrease in K , which provides a further justification that the non-monotonic property in the optimal price

⁸For a numerical example using the exact formula (9), set $c = 5$, $\mu = 1$, $\bar{\lambda} = 500$ and $d = 1$. The optimal price p^* increases as K increases from 50 to 70, but then decreases as K increases further from 70 to 150.

rate is due to the queueing effect captured in the customer utility function (1) of our model.⁹

Second, we find that the platform should offer a higher wage rate w^* as the waiting cost c increases. This helps to attract more providers k^* to participate, but will reduce the optimal profit of the platform π^* . However, the optimal price p^* is not necessarily monotonic in c .¹⁰ Our numerical results suggest that the optimal price p^* could first increase in c when c is small, but then decrease in c as c increases. This non-monotonic behavior can be again explained by how the queueing effect captured in our model.

When c is small (relative to the price p), the platform can operate in high utilization (with few providers) since customers are less sensitive to waiting time than price. In this case, an increase in c would reduce demand and decrease waiting time significantly at high utilization (due to the non-linear queueing effect). Consequently, the platform can take advantage of the significant waiting time reduction by increasing the optimal price p^* to maximize its profit. On the other hand, when c is large, customers are now more sensitive to waiting time than price, and the platform now needs to operate at lower utilization. In this case, an increase in c would reduce demand, but would provide only marginal waiting time reduction (due to the non-linear queueing effect). As a result, the platform would now choose to reduce the optimal price p^* in order to stimulate the customer request rate λ^* to maximize its profit. This explains why the optimal price p^* would decrease in c when c is large. Overall, we explain that the non-linear queueing effect has caused the optimal price p^* to be non-monotonic in c .

Third, the platform should increase its price rate p^* as customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$ (or average service units d) increases. At the same time, the platform should also increase its wage rate w^* in order to attract more participating providers k^* to handle the higher customer request rate λ^* . Overall, the profit of the platform π^* increases as $\bar{\lambda}$ (or d) increases.

Finally, the platform should reduce its payout ratio α^* when the service capacity (i.e., a higher K or μ) increases. This implies that the platform can lower its payout ratio as it attracts more providers to the platform. Also, the platform should increase the payout ratio when the customer waiting cost c is higher or when customer demand increases (i.e., a higher $\bar{\lambda}$ or d). One interesting

⁹When the profit function is not a multiplicative form of demand and supply, Hu and Zhou (2017) show that the optimal price has a U-shape relationship with the exogenous wage when the profit function of the platform is the minimum of demand and supply.

¹⁰For a numerical example using the exact formula (9), set $K = 50$, $\mu = 1$, $\bar{\lambda} = 50$, $d = 1$. The optimal price p^* first increases as c increases from 10 to 80, but then decreases as c increases further from 80 to 100.

implication of this result is that an on-demand ride-hailing service platform should increase the payout ratio to its participating drivers during rush hours when the customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$ is higher and/or the travel speed μ is lower. More interestingly, the platform should also reduce its payout ratio as it expands with the number of providers and customer demand growing at about the same rate. This result could provide an economic justification for Uber’s strategy as reported by Huet (2014) of offering a payout ratio of 0.8 for its first cohorts of drivers in San Francisco initially, but lowering its payout ratio to 0.75 for its second cohorts of drivers in 2014, as both the number of registered drivers and customer demand rate had increased.

6 Numerical Illustrations Using Didi Data and Conclusion Remarks

We collected some actual data from Didi, the largest on-demand ride-hailing service platform in China that was founded in June 2012, to calibrate our model parameters for constructing realistic numerical examples to illustrate some implications on the optimal price and wage with respect to the underlying operating characteristics. Our data was based on rides that took place in Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang province with an urban population of over 7 millions, during the time periods between September 7-13 and November 1-30 in 2015. We use data from two specific time periods to illustrate our model results, one time period representing peak-hour characteristics with high demand and travel congestion levels, and the other representing non-peak hour characteristics with lower demand and congestion levels. In each numerical experiment, we solve for the optimal price and wage rates numerically for the general model using the exact formula (9) for W_q .

Our numerical results show that the optimal price rate p^* and the optimal wage rate w^* are higher during the peak hour than those during the non-peak hour, which are intuitive as the peak hour period has a higher customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$ and a slower service speed μ than that during non-peak hour period. Furthermore, our numerical results show that the optimal payout ratio α^* is always higher during the peak hour than that during the non-peak hour. More importantly, our numerical result suggests that a fixed payout ratio would not perform well across different time periods, and that using the optimal time-based payout ratio can substantially increase the profit of from using a fixed payout ratio. This suggests that the platform should deploy a time-based payout ratio scheme to achieve a much higher profit across all time periods. Details on the Didi

data and our numerical illustrations can be found in the Online Appendix.

Although our framework does not capture certain important practical issues due to intense competition existed in China when the data were collected (and thus cannot be used to accurately predict the actual behavior of the players in the market), our model results can help to illustrate and explain some observations that are consistent with the actual data provided by the company. More importantly, our model results can serve as a guideline for potentially increasing profitability when the underlying market conditions were to evolve to be consistent with the operating environment captured in our modeling framework. In particular, we illustrate the potential benefits if the company were to adopt a time-based payout ratio versus their current practice of using a fixed payout ratio.

Motivated by the increasing popularity of on-demand service platforms with independent service providers and time sensitive customers, we develop an analytical framework to understand how such platforms should set their optimal price and wage to match the needs of providers and customers taking into account the underlying supply and demand characteristics. Our framework incorporates waiting time performance based on a queueing model in customer utility and captures some important market characteristics including time sensitive customers and earning sensitive service providers. We conduct extensive numerical experiments to illustrate the behavior of the optimal price and wage rates as predicted by our modeling framework. We further derive analytical results to support the main insights observed in our numerical experiments. Our findings provide some interesting implications in managing prices and wages for on-demand service platforms.

Our results are obtained under the assumption that the customer's valuation of the service and the provider's earning reservation are uniformly distributed. We also conducted some numerical experiments using exponential distributions for both the customer's valuation of the service and the provider's earning reservation, and the results are consistent with those under uniform distributions. However, a comprehensive numerical study is needed to confirm the robustness of our results under more general distributions.

Our model considers price and wage rates that are pre-committed, and we analyze the equilibrium behavior of the system. One future research direction is to study dynamic pricing strategies in which the platform can offer dynamic prices and wages to customers and providers based on the real-time status of the system. Specifically, one can develop a modeling framework that considers

the real-time interactions among the customers, providers and the platform where the customers and providers need to make real-time decisions on whether to accept the dynamic prices and wages offered by the service platform. Another possible future research direction is to study platform competition so as to characterize the optimal demand-contingent price and wage strategies in a competitive setting.

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Online Appendix

A Numerical Illustrations Based on Data Data

A.1 Background information

Didi is the largest on-demand ride-hailing service platform in China that was founded in June 2012.¹¹ Our data was based on rides that took place in Hangzhou, the capitol city of Zhejiang province with an urban population of over 7 millions, during the time periods between September 7-13 and November 1-30 in 2015.

In Hangzhou city, Didi offers different types of services including Taxi (traditional taxi service), Express/Private (equivalent to UBER X/Black with on-demand drivers), and Hitch (equivalent to UBER Pool)¹². For our numerical illustrations here, we focus on the data associated with the Express/Private service, which accounts for 60% of all rides provided by Didi in Hangzhou. Didi had approximately 13,000 registered drivers for all services in Hangzhou, but the exact number of Express/Private drivers was not known to us. So, we simply assume that 60% of Didi drivers were Express/Private drivers so that the number of registered Express/Private drivers in Hangzhou was assumed to be around 7,800.

A.2 Number of rides and drivers across different hours

Figure 1 depicts the average number of Express/Private rides and drivers across different hours on any given day. (Here, Hour 8 represents one-hour interval 8am-9am, Hour 19 for 7pm- 8pm, and so on. Data for Hours 1-7 were omitted due to incomplete data in the database.) We observe from the Didi data that the pattern depicted in Figure 2 is consistent throughout the weekdays (even though the average number of rides and drivers were slightly lower on Saturdays and Sunday) and that the peak hours are being Hours 9 and 19, and the slowest hours are being Hours 23 and 24. For instance, during the peak Hour 19, there were an average of 1,211 drivers and an average of 2,006 Express/Private rides in a weekday. However, there were only an average of 597 drivers and

¹¹<http://www.xiaojukeji.com/en/company.html>. Didi merged with Kuaidi (a major competitor) in February 2015 as a way to defend its market share when Uber officially launched its service in China in July 2014. In August 2016, Uber decided to retreat from China and its China operations merged with Didi.

¹²Unlike Uber's business model that aims to displace the traditional taxi services, Didi integrates taxi services into its business model by providing its mobile hailing service to taxi drivers free of charge. Chen et al. (2017) have recently used the data provided by Didi to analyze ridesplitting behavior of passengers using on-demand ride-hailing services.

an average of 1,029 rides during the late night Hour 23. (The mean and standard deviation of the number of drivers and number of rides over the weekdays are provided in the Online Appendix.)

A.3 Travel distance and travel speed

While the average number of rides and drivers vary substantially across different hours of the day, Figure 2 shows that the average travel distance for each Express/Private ride was rather stable across different hours. For example, the average travel distance d during the peak Hour 19 and during the late night Hour 23 were 6.3 km and 6.6 km, respectively. The Didi database also provided the average travel times μ across different hours from which we can estimate the average travel speed across different hours. For example, we estimated that the average travel speeds were about 19 km/hour for Hour 19 and 26 km/hour for Hour 23. These numbers are consistent with the actual expected traffic conditions, where traffic is much less congested during late night hours. (The travel distance and travel time distributions across different hours are provided in the Online Appendix.)

A.4 Price and wage rates

Didi's price p for its service consists of two components so that $p = p_1 + p_2$, where p_1 represents the fare that is primarily based on the travel distance, and p_2 represents surcharges (e.g., tolls). Accordingly, Didi paid its drivers based on the following scheme. When a passenger pays a total fee of p , the driver receives $(p_1 * 80\% - 0.5) * (100\% - 1.77\%) + p_2 * (100\% - 1.77\%)$, but the driver needs to cover the surcharges p_2 . Thus, the actual wage that Didi paid its drivers was approximately 80% of the total price; i.e., $w \approx 0.8p$.

Figure 2 also shows that the average price per km charged by Didi (excluding the surcharges) was relatively stable across different hours of the day. Overall, the price per km had a mean of 3.07 RMB and a standard deviation of 1.45 RMB. In particular, the average prices per km charged were RMB 3.13 for Hour 19 (peak hour) and RMB 2.76 for Hour 23 (non-peak hour). We also observe from the Didi data that the average price per km p was highly correlated with the number of rides λ over the peak (non-peak) hours, with a correlation coefficient of 0.81. In other words, the price per km was usually higher during peak hours when the customer request rate is high, and was lower during non-peak hours when the customer request rate is low. This pricing pattern is

consistent with the results obtained from our base model (see Proposition 1) that p^* increases as $\bar{\lambda}$ increases. (The mean and standard deviation of the average price per km across different hours are provided in the Online Appendix.)

A.5 Strategic factors and their implications

It is important to note that the observed price that Didi charged its passengers was heavily discounted during the data collection periods for two strategic reasons: (a) Didi wanted to attract more passengers by pricing its service below the traditional taxi services;¹³ and (b) Didi was engaged in a price war with Uber by offering discount coupons to compete for market share. In addition to offering heavily discounted price to attract passengers, Didi also provided extra “side payments” to its drivers to entice drivers to join its platform due to the intense market competition. For instance, Didi had offered an extra bonus if the number of rides provided by a driver exceeds a certain quota within a 7-day period. BBC (2016) had reported that the extra payment can be as high as 110% of the fare paid by the passengers. With such generous payments, more drivers reported to work and Didi did not need to use surge pricing during peak hours, which explains why Didi was able to offer relatively stable pricing in Hangzhou as depicted in Figure 2. Furthermore, the waiting time for Didi’s service was reasonably short with an adequate supply of drivers. Specifically, the average waiting time of all Express/Private rides over the aforementioned time periods was about 6 minutes, of which the waiting time for accepting a ride request was approximately 1 minute and the waiting time for picking up a passenger was approximately 5 minutes.

In view of the heavily discounted price due to the above strategic reasons, the average price per km p as reported in Figure 2 was biased and did not accurately represent the regular prices p that the firm should quote and the actual wages w should offer in equilibrium. Nevertheless, we use the data given in the Didi database to calibrate our model parameters for constructing realistic numerical examples to illustrate some of our model results.

¹³In Hangzhou, taxi charges RMB 11 initially and then RMB 2.6 per km. As a way to entice passengers to choose Didi over taxi service, Didi had priced its service below taxi rates to increase market share. Based on our discussions with passengers in China, there was an expectation that Didi’s price rate was lower than the taxi rate.

A.6 Numerical examples for illustrative purposes

We next provide some numerical results using parameter values calibrated from the Didi data. As Hangzhou is a large urban area of over $5,000 \text{ km}^2$, it is not possible to assign any available driver to serve a call request due to a long pickup time. Instead, only nearby drivers can be used to serve a local request. For simplicity, we assume that the city is divided into 20 zones with equal passenger and driver distributions such that only drivers and riders within the same zone would be matched. As such, we simply re-scale the demand and number of available drivers by a factor of 20 and set the maximum number of drivers $K = 7,800/20 = 390$.

We examine the average income for taxi drivers in Hangzhou and the average major out-of-pocket expenses borne by the Didi drivers (including car insurance, license, fuel cost, etc.). We estimate that a minimum hourly wage of RMB 30 is required for a Didi driver to offer service. Thus, the hourly wage reservation r is assumed to be distributed uniformly between RMB 30 to RMB 40.

As discussed earlier, the data were collected during the time when Didi was offering large fare discounts to attract riders such that riders expected that Didi price would be around or even less than the taxi rate of RMB 2.6 per km in Hangzhou. Thus, we use the taxi rate as a benchmark and assume that the customer value per km v is distributed uniformly between RMB 2 to RMB 4.

As shown in Figure 2, the average travel distances did not vary significantly across hours, so we simply set the average travel distance $d = 6 \text{ km}$ across all hours. It is difficult to provide an accurate estimate of the waiting cost per hour c . Gomez-Ibanez et al. (1999) reported that the waiting cost for a working class passenger in San Francisco is approximately 195% of the passenger’s after-tax wages. Using this estimate and the fact that the average hourly wage of workers in Hangzhou is approximately RMB 40 per hour (China Daily, 2016), one can argue that the waiting cost for an average passenger in Hangzhou is approximately RMB 80 per hour. Accounting for the income inequality and the impatient characteristics of most city dwellers in China (Li (2016)), we simply choose the range of c from RMB 0 to RMB 1,000.

We use data from two specific time periods to illustrate our model results. In particular, we use Hour 19 to represent peak-hour characteristics with high demand and travel congestion levels, and Hour 23 to represent non-peak hour characteristics with lower demand and congestion levels.

For Hour 19, we set the average customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda} = 200$ with an average service speed $\mu = 19$ km/hour so that the average demand request rate is equal to 100 ($\approx 1969/20$) when the price rate is equal to RMB 3 to match the Didi data. For Hour 23, we set $\bar{\lambda} = 100$ and $\mu = 26$ km/hour such that the average request rate is equal to 50 ($\approx 1033/20$) when the price rate is equal to RMB 3. We summarize the parameter values used in our illustrative examples in Table 8.

Table 8: Summary of parameter values for our illustrative examples.

Parameters	Peak hour	Non-peak hour	Data source
K	390	390	Didi data with assumption of 20 equal zones
$\bar{\lambda}$	200 /hour	100 /hour	Didi data with assumption of 20 equal zones
d	6 km	6 km	Didi data
μ	19 km/hour	26 km/hour	Didi data
v	U[2,4] RMB/km	U[2,4] RMB/km	Benchmarked against taxi rate
r	U[30,40] RMB/hour	U[30,40] RMB/hour	Estimated from taxi driver wages
c	0 to 1,000 RMB/hour	0 to 1,000 RMB/hour	Assumption for sensitivity analysis

In each numerical experiment, we solve for the optimal price and wage rates numerically for the general model using the exact formula (9) for W_q . Figures 3 and 4 show the optimal number of participating drivers k^* (in each zone), price rate p^* and wage rate w^* for the peak hour and non-peak hour scenarios, respectively, as the waiting cost c increases from 0 to 1,000. Observe that w^* increase as c increases in both Figures 3 and 4, and that k^* (scale on the left), p^* and w^* (scale on the right) are all higher during the peak hour (Figure 3) than those during the non-peak hour (Figure 4), which are intuitive as the peak hour period has a higher customer demand rate $\bar{\lambda}$ and a slower service speed μ than that during non-peak hour period. Also, k^* increases and p^* slightly increases as c increases.

Figure 5 shows that the optimal payout ratio α^* increases from 0.57 to 0.78 for the peak hour scenario and increases from 0.45 to 0.70 for the non-peak hour scenario, respectively, as c increases from 0 to 1,000. Observe that the optimal payout ratio is always higher during the peak hour than that during the non-peak hour. As the optimal payout ratio α^* increases significantly when c increases, this suggests that a fixed payout ratio would not perform well across different time periods. To illustrate, Figure 6 shows the result for the peak hour scenario (Hour 19) that using the optimal time-based payout ratio α^* can substantially increase the profit of from using a fixed payout ratio of 0.8, especially when c is small in which α^* is much lower than 0.8. In particular, when $c = 0$ (i.e., ignoring waiting cost), the optimal profit is equal to 843 with with optimal payout

ratio $\alpha^* = 0.57$, as compared with an optimal profit of 479 with a fixed payout ratio of 0.8. Thus, our numerical results suggest that the platform should deploy a time-based payout ratio scheme to achieve a much higher profit across all time periods, especially when the waiting cost c is small.



Figure 1: Number of rides and drivers across different hours.




Figure 2: Average travel distance and average price per kilometer across different hours.




Figure 3: Optimal number of participating drivers, optimal price and wage rates during peak hours ($\bar{\lambda} = 200$ and $\mu = 19$ km/hour).




Figure 4: Optimal number of participating drivers, optimal price and wage rates during non-peak hours ($\bar{\lambda} = 100$ and $\mu = 26$ km/hour).




Figure 5: Comparisons of the optimal time-based payout ratio between peak and non-peak hours.




Figure 6: Comparisons of optimal profit between the optimal time-based payout ratio and a fixed payout ratio for the peak hour scenario.