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PROBLEMS OF THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT

*A Discussion of Imperialism and Underdevelopment**

By Walter Rodney

On reflecting on the problem of Third World development, I call to mind an incident many months ago when the Republic of Guinea was invaded by the Portuguese. As soon as the Chinese heard about the invasion, the Hsinhua News Agency put out a report denouncing American imperialism. America's name had not at yet been called by the Guineans, but the Chinese from objective analysis decided that if the Portuguese were invading Guinea, it had something to do with American imperialism. And in like vein, I would suggest that if we are talking about the problems of development in the Third World, the major problem is the United States of America because it crowns the whole structure of world imperialism. I will leave this as an assertion, because to go into a justification would consume time. However, I would like to illustrate in some ways the connections between imperialism and underdevelopment.

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In the United Nations, a certain euphemism is in use. They speak about the "developed" and the "developing" market economies. These two collectively constitute the imperialist world: the developed market economy being the United States, the Western European countries and Japan; and the curious category of developing market economy includes the rest of what we commonly refer to as the Third World, the economies of which are hooked into the metropolitan structures of North America, Western Europe and Japan. Some of the mechanisms for exploiting the so-called developing countries have been known for a long time. For instance, unequal trade has been a common subject of discussion, and in recent times it has received more careful analysis, so that we know rather more than we used to as to exactly how the captains of trade contributed to the exploitation of the underdeveloped world. This is not a position that is merely adopted by Marxists or radical nationalists; it is a position which is commonly asserted even in UNCTAD.

A second well-known mechanism of exploitation within the structure of imperialism is the transfer of profits from underdeveloped areas toward the metropoles. My only comment on this is to note that what is called 'profits' is in fact 'capital.' For too long most of us, including people who would call themselves leftists, have created an idiom of 'capital export' from the metropoles as distinct from 'profit expatriation' from the colonies, semi-colonies of what-have-you; and the very idiom obscures part of the reality, indeed, perhaps the whole reality. I am of the opinion that we cannot refer to the export of capital from the metropoles to the underdeveloped sector of the world except in a very limited sense. Historically, the movement of capital has always been on balance from the external or peripheral sectors of the imperialist economy to its epicenters. This began with the trade in slaves, while later it took the form of grossly unequal trade between Europe and the rest of the world. The most that can be said about European capital export is that Europe has been the center for the redistribution and reallocation of capital that is produced throughout the world. Capital produced in, say, the Caribbean or in North America in the epoch of slavery was shifted to Europe and, at a later date, was redistributed from Western Europe to Eastern Europe; or capital that was obtained by forcing the Chinese to smoke opium was redistributed into the Indian sector of the British imperialist economy; and so on and so forth. But, strictly speaking, there never has been any export of capital from the developed areas in the sense of capital being engendered and originating in the metropolitan sectors for export overseas. So my point about profit is that when we look at its mechanism closely we find that it is always a means of transferring to the metropolitan economy capital produced out of the material and human resources of the Third World.

Unequal trade and capital flows away from the underdeveloped countries are two of the principal mechanisms of imperialism. There are others which are proving to be significant in their own ways, which tend to be left out of the literature, and which are very operative when we come to think in terms of changing the status quo. One of these, for instance, is the blockage of technology. This takes a number of forms: it could mean actual technological retardation or arrest in the underdeveloped countries; or it could mean simply the blockage of the movement of technology from the metropolitan to the colonial economy. The best examples of the actual destruction and retardation of technology would come from Asia (notably China and India) and to a lesser extent from Africa. Examples of the failure to allow the transfer of whatever technology has developed in Europe itself to the Third World can be taken at random. Particularly in the more recent epoch, we have had in Africa striking instances of the refusal of the metropolitan capitalist-imperialist countries to allow the transfer of technology in certain critical areas which would pose a threat to their own exploitation and domination. In Africa today, one of the biggest and best known projects is that of the Tan-Zambian railway. The whole history of this railway is one in which metropolitan countries set out to interfere with the movement of this particular aspect of technology to a part of the Third World, and they failed because in this instance the People's Republic of China was available as an alternative source. The corollary to the blockage of skills and technology is that the international division of labor under imperialism has always ensured the development of world technology within certain specific sectors, namely the metropoles, and more recently in particular parts of the metropoles, allowing the United States to assume hegemony in most fields. This is an important phenomenon when we come to examine the contemporary evolution of imperialism, because the changes in technology which were possible in the metropolitan economy over the colonial epoch and within the last decade have made it possible for the imperialist countries to begin to adopt radically new strategies in terms of the international division of labor and in terms of the kinds of political controls which they exercise over the Third World.

Yet another general feature to which attention should be drawn is the way in which imperialism has restructured the world economy so that within the Third World there is no cohesion with respect to production and exchange. As one moves from colony or semi-colony to another colony or semi-colony, one finds the breaking of the ties which formerly integrated one with the other--that is to say, the breaking of the trade ties which integrated the productive resources. One finds within each colony the same disjunction, the same disaggregation of the constituent parts of a colonized economy. Instead, the linkages are with the metropolitan economy, and are determined exclusively by the latter in

its own interest--an interest which proves incompatible with the independence and any real development of the Third World.

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Moving on from the essentially economic concerns, I wish to highlight the political facet of imperialism. A number of writers on Latin America and to a lesser extent on Africa have paid considerable attention to the creation in the Third World of certain strata, or certain classes, which reflect the interest of the metropoles and which allow the requisite kinds of penetration and exploitation. This political control takes a number of forms: there is the classic colonial form; there is the utilization of white settlers; and most important in the recent period, there has emerged in Africa and Asia indigenous strata who conduct locally the activity required to support the international economy. These are the people who, in Fanon's words, perform the function of transmission lines for international monopoly capital.

The foregoing represents a very brief portrayal of the mechanisms of imperialism. I am not attempting to go into any serious theoretical justification of why imperialism is the big problem of Third World development because hopefully we understand that. So perhaps we could proceed to look rather more closely at the movement of contemporary Third World history, so as to better appreciate the problems of and possible solutions to underdevelopment. In the last decade, we have been in a sense in a counter-revolutionary epoch, in spite of many of the festivities that have taken place celebrating so-called independence in various parts of Africa and Asia, and in spite of certain foci of liberation. We can say that the general movement of history in the Third World has been counter to any direction that one may term independence. This I will illustrate using a number of criteria.

First of all, one can apply the Western bourgeois measurements of growth rates, although these are very limited and skewed. One finds that the growth of the Third World economy has failed to keep up with those norms which have been established by groups such as the Pearson Commission. Most Third World countries do not get that ratio of growth in bourgeois economic terms which is supposed to represent their march forward. Very, very few have achieved the percentages (6 or 8 percent growth rate) which are set by the bourgeois economists as prerequisites to development.

Secondly, and more important, is the fact that those criteria, where they are satisfied, do not lead to anything that the people of the country would call development. Hence, the

rise of the term "growth without development," which has already become current in the writings on West Africa. It has been seen that by using the criteria of GNP and per capita income, one finds a certain amount of growth undoubtedly taking place, but when this is examined in any serious detail, it is proved to be entirely misleading. As long as the local economy is part of the imperialist world economy, there is still the export of surplus (i.e., the actual export of capital); and the distribution of wealth within these so-called developing Third World countries is such that the vast majority of the people can and do experience an actual lowering of their living standards while the GNP and per capita income are supposedly rising.

A few economists looking at the problems of economic development are beginning to apply the simplest of yardsticks by returning to factors like housing, food and clothing--the principal elements of man's existence and the things that human beings have been striving for from the very onset of their attempts to deal with the material environment. In Jamaica, for example, it has been found that the units of housing for the vast majority of the people have been decreasing; more people are suffering from protein deficiencies than was true of an earlier period; and more people are going about without shoes or without proper clothing than has been true earlier. All this in spite of significant increases in domestic product. In Africa one can readily cite Ivory Coast and Kenya in this respect, for such growth as shown by the statistical indices in these parts of Africa is not matched by an increase in the well being of the mass of the population.

The most ominous factor undermining attempts to achieve independence and development in the Third World has been the rise of new forms of exploitation and domination within the global capitalist economy. One of them is tourism. It has a nasty history in the Caribbean, particularly in Cuba; but in more recent times, it is becoming very extensive. By 1969, tourism was one of the biggest things in Tanzania, of all places. Someone observed that, just as in Latin America there used to be 'Banana Republics,' so international imperialism was threatening to transform Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania into 'Wildlife Republics.' Every effort was made to attract tourists to look at the animals, and the animals assumed priorities higher than human beings. Incidentally, it is not at all true that it is the indigenous people who are responsible for such dimunition in the wildlife population as has occurred in recent years, since groups like the Masai have always co-existed with the lions and wild game. And in any event, the problem of game conservation is of far lesser magnitude than that of human development and that of the survival and creativity of the peoples of the region. Certainly, tourism in all its aspects is proving to be one of

the new areas of expansion of the imperialist economy. It is a new way of confirming the dependence and subjugation of Third World economies, being seen in its most arrant and vicious forms in the Caribbean territories. Several islands in the Caribbean have been transformed into backwaters of the world economy; they are no longer central to the development of the world economy, because they have lost the priority that they had a long time ago when sugar was king. It is a relatively simple task to transform them into cesspools, which is what the touristic economy is all about.

A more significant aspect of the new trend of domination is that which economists are calling the 'branch-plant economy.' It made its impact felt first in Latin America and then in Asia, and it is slowly beginning to touch on the African continent. This is a very subtle development, the negative effects of which remain unperceived for some time, because many people have been preoccupied with looking at the old forms of the international division of labor, whereby the underdeveloped countries were allocated roles connected either with agriculture or with the production of raw materials in the extractive mineral industry. It was felt by leaders like Nkrumah when he came to power, that the answer was to create industry in Africa. The dichotomy was simply industry versus agriculture or processing versus the export of unprocessed goods. Now, imperialism has been able to circumvent the criticism that it reduces the Third World merely to primary production. The international bourgeoisie and their agents have been able to start 'industrialization' of a sort within Third World countries. Looking at the development plans of every African nation, one finds that a beer factory will usually figure number one or number two on the list. Building a beer factory is considered as the first step towards industrialization! Quite apart from the fact that I don't know of beer as having developed any nation, one has to realize the fallacy on which the claims are based. The underlying notion is that industrialization *per se* is the answer to underdevelopment. Therefore, the logic of that argument is that if the country ceases to import beer and instead develops an import substitute by making the beer locally, then a step has been made in the direction of development. This resort to import substitution in the light industrial sphere has characterized a lot of the development plans of the Third World outside of the really progressive areas, and what in fact it means is that the capitalist structures in the metropoles have reached the stage where the export of consumer goods is no longer really critical, but export of certain capital goods is much more crucial. The capital goods sector has experienced tremendous growth in the period of colonial exploitation and the period of semi-colonial exploitation, and there is now an objective necessity for the metropoles to export these capital goods; namely, the plants that manufacture the beer, cigarettes or even textiles.

Of course, the metropoles seek to involve their overseas productive enterprises within the total structure of monopoly capital, which takes the form of the multinational corporation. The multinational corporation perceives the advantages of extending its operations into various other parts of the globe. Today it is not considered opportune merely to produce in the United States and Germany and to sell abroad. More markets can be explored by actually setting up the 'branch plants' in Brazil, in Singapore, in Ivory Coast and so on and so forth.

The movement of contemporary Third World political development throughout Africa and throughout Asia also shows tremendous deterioration. Latin America is exceptional only because it had its formal independence ever since the early nineteenth century, and Latin America has gone through the kinds of trauma which Africa and parts of Asia are only now beginning to experience. The dictators and the coups in Latin America were the butt of jokes even in the colonial world. In the West Indies, we used to say that if there was no coup in Latin America on a particular day, it would be announced on the radio as an item of significance--"no coup anywhere in Latin America today"! Latin American countries have perhaps settled down to a pattern of more stable dictatorships, but they certainly have not in most places begun to tackle the problem of political stability, in terms of the development of their own people. In any event, what I have to say relates more to Asia and Africa, and I will pick my examples mainly from Africa and from the Caribbean. In these instances, constitutional independence took place during the last decade. Subsequently, we have witnessed the realization of political dependency and economic dependency in much sharper forms, and of course the two cannot be separated. It is an illusion to put forward the notion of political independence without economic independence because politics is about making choices; and it seems to me incredible that someone or anyone should say, "We have no control over our economy but we can make political choices."

What happened after constitutional independence was, of course, the rise of new forms of political manipulation on the part of imperialism; and deterioration has been taking place because of a number of factors. Firstly, within Third World countries under the control of imperialism, there is created nationally a sort of political vacuum arising from the fact that power does not reside locally. The national government of the petit bourgeoisie has little control over production, and is endowed with a very feeble political base. They of course have police and military forces which are intended to serve as means of coercion of the population, but nothing else. An appreciation of these facts is fundamental to an understanding of the trend towards militarism, because if a political regime is so bankrupt that it is entirely dependent upon the military, if it has to resort to authoritarianism, then who is more

authoritarian than the army? So the army frequently decides to take over the role of governing, rather than merely being the police force of the civilians in power. We also find that the petty bourgeoisie in the Third World countries are not as capable as the bourgeoisie in the metropoles when it comes to playing a certain kind of political game. They are not capable of granting to their own population participation in bourgeois democracy because the colonial situation is antithetical to any form of democracy--even to bourgeois democracy. The American bourgeoisie (to use this example) is powerful enough to realize that it can afford certain forms of bourgeois democracy, unless the stage is reached where the system is so eroded that they must take to fascist alternatives. But, normally, the bourgeoisie will of necessity engage the large middle-class sector and a large segment of the working population in parliamentarianism, free speech and what have you. In the Third World, this is seldom possible. The petty bourgeoisie who reside in Accra and in Kingston and in Singapore cannot afford to have any formal exercise in democracy. They do not have the power. They do not have the economic base. They are entirely dependent on two things: firstly, their external support; and secondly, whatever local police forces they can muster. Increasingly, the political situation in these Third World countries becomes openly authoritarian. A striking example has been the regime of Forbes Burnham in Guyana. He began some years ago by trying to convice some folks that he was about nationalism and even about socialism. To a large extent, he succeeded in the mystification; but after just a few years, the mask has been removed, and it is apparent now that Guyana has the makings of a kind of Haitian situation, given the trend towards the creation of a *Ton-Ton Macoute*, aiming at political intimidation and assassinations. This and other indications in most of Africa and Asia suggest that neocolonialism is not merely a state but, like all historical forms, it has its own motion, and both politically and economically the motion is in a negative direction.

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I would like to try and explore some of the difficulties facing politically progressive groups within Third World territories--groups who analyze the situation and problems of development and who ask themselves the classic question, "What is to be done?" How do they function, or how have they been functioning, and what kinds of projections can be made for the near and distant future? Using the crude distinction between the political and economic facets of the problem, I will suggest that the real issue at the moment, and for the foreseeable future, is not an economic issue but a political one. It has already been affirmed that the fundamental nature of the development problem in the Third World is the relationship with the metropolitan economies and the nature of dependency, lack of internal integration, ab-

sence of technology, etc., which are all essentially or primarily economic phenomena. Nevertheless, we should distinguish between what may be fundamental (which I think is economic) and what has a priority. The latter refers to the question of timing, and that is where politics takes precedence. It will be necessary to look briefly at some of the economic problems, but the emphasis here will be on the political ones.

Progressives residing within Third World countries virtually without exception now pose the problem of economic development in terms of 'disengagement.' How do you break with the dominant imperialist system? This question marks a change from a lot of the preoccupations of a decade or five years ago, because it has become clear to a minority at any rate that some kinds of proposed solutions are not solutions at all, but rather an intensification of the problem. That is to say, solutions by way of aid, by way of further foreign entanglements, by way of so-called local capitalist development are not really solutions. An awareness of their insidious nature springs from a correct historical appraisal of the form of involvement between, on the one hand, Africa, Asia and Latin America, and, on the other hand, the European and North American economies plus Japan. Historically, this involvement has been to the detriment of the Third World countries; and, therefore, it becomes anomalous to suggest that further involvement, that an intensification of the involvement, would provide a solution. The solution lies in disengaging and disentangling from the historical bonds. In other words, if the answer is not in further engagement, if it is not in aid, if it is not in increasing one's traditional exports, if it is not merely in import substitution, then it must lie in terms such as rebuilding one's economy so it becomes a logical integrated whole. It must lie in terms of creating linkages between Third World economies, starting from a continental base within Latin America and within Africa. It must lie in rebuilding or regenerating, or starting from afresh if necessary, the technological development of the Third World which has been arrested or which has been side-stepped in one way or another. These are undoubtedly tremendous tasks. Certain kinds of solutions are already being indicated, but the main thing is to identify the direction in which one has to investigate. So long as many of our economists have been looking at aid theories and at forms of playing around with devaluating or re-evaluating currencies and other techniques which all have as their basis a preoccupation with maintaining links with the imperialist economy, then for so long we have not been looking at the real problem and we have not been turning up any valid solutions.

However, before any progressives within the Third World can get down to working out the economic minutiae, they have to deal with the political problems. Indeed, the tendency on the

part of progressive groups within these Third World countries to evade the issue of getting at the political preconditions to economic development is itself a problem of underdevelopment. In my own days as an undergraduate in the University of the West Indies, several of us did sit down and try to work out schema concerning what the new political economy would look like. There was no dearth of talk about what the society should be like. Many socialists in Africa, Asia and Latin America have been dealing with that issue for a long time, but it is only a very tiny minority who have been concerned with trying to analyze the movement of history as it is and subsequently to determine what necessary action was needed to obtain political leverage. In other words, the question of power was being avoided, and without that, one is only talking about blueprints, which is essentially an occupation for idle bourgeois philosophers.

With respect to tackling the problem of power, there is required more detailed social analysis than merely saying that we have on the one hand the enemy who are the metropolitan capitalists and on the other hand the exploited Third World. We have to make a closer analysis of the types of society which have been created within the Third World, to inquire as to what are the potential openings for a struggle to change the situation. Nationalist movements almost by definition tended to obscure and paper over the kinds of internal contradictions which existed in their societies, and when they achieved constitutional independence it very often came as a shock to realize that the internal contradictions were playing a much more crucial and determining role than had previously been allocated to them. Only a small number of progressives in the Third World are exempted from this stricture. The majority failed to make the clear analysis of the society which would allow them to locate within their own society the forces of change and the forces of reaction. The probable reason is that the social strata existing in Third World countries manifest a variety of forms that were not necessarily encountered in the metropoles. So that those of the Third World intellectuals who may have taken a progressive orientation coming from a Marxist framework still found themselves unable to understand their own society, to the extent that they failed to distinguish between the tools that they acquired from abroad and the conclusions that they were introducing from abroad. This is a very common misconception. Having adopted Marxism or Scientific Socialism as a framework of analysis, one may or may not apply it creatively to one's own environment. Besides, Third World intellectuals are very fascinated by models, models that were historically applicable to societies outside of their own. The principal model was Russia at one time, while later on it became China. There are very few who have had the courage (because it does take a lot of courage and a lot of energy) to deal with their own situations and to come up with the relevant answers.

One of the Third World social groups readily identified as having its own peculiarities is the petty bourgeoisie. There is a national bourgeoisie in India, Brazil and in parts of Latin America; but it is not a general phenomenon within the Third World. By and large, the personnel who control the reins of power undoubtedly adhere to the norms and values of the bourgeoisie in the metropoles. But they do not control any capital formations. At best, they own two or three houses, and they own one Mercedes Benz plus a Volkswagen, and so on and so forth. But these are not capitalists. We must formulate a position which allows us to see the dependency of this class, its roots in the international bourgeoisie and the peculiarities which develop from that. I myself prefer to portray them as a stratum serving that international capitalist class; and in each situation one has to examine their particular characteristics, including their behavior patterns. In Africa and the West Indies, the petty bourgeoisie display characteristics such as self-hate, because they are usually black men who have a certain white orientation. They have what is correctly identified as imitativeness and lack of creativity, which were not characteristic of the European bourgeoisie in its heyday. The European bourgeoisie was an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. In the Caribbean or in Africa, the only entrepreneurship that the petty bourgeoisie are capable of is buying a truck or investing in real estate. They have neither the capital nor the kind of aggressiveness which is required to engage in capital enterprise. The point at issue is that progressives within Third World countries have to confront the problem of development almost exclusively in relation to local particularisms. What are the forces existing in the society and how does one begin to organize to confront the recognized enemy? How does one begin to reach the masses--who are essentially peasants--with a very small minority of workers in the traditional, industrial sense of the word? I would like to reflect briefly on these questions with regard to one part of East Africa, on which I am fortunate to possess firsthand or very reliable secondhand information-- and that is Uganda.

Uganda is an intriguing case. In Uganda, under Obote, progressive groups were in existence and had to make decisions on how they were to participate in actualizing Uganda's development. Looking at their national society, they saw a phenomenon that is becoming increasingly evident in the Third World: namely, a government that could not easily be classified as being either fish or fowl--a government that was making certain rhetorical statements about socialism, about "moving to the left;" a government that within the context of African liberation was anti-apartheid, anti-the Smith regime, anti-imperialist <u>in its rhetoric</u> and therefore, a government that one could not place in the same bracket as, say, that of Banda or that led by Houphouet Boigny.

And yet at the same time when these Ugandan progressives looked at Ugandan society, they knew that it was no different from the society in Ivory Coast or very little different from the society in Malawi. There was the same continuation of the exploitation of the peasantry in the Ugandan countryside and the same rapid increase in the wealth--in terms of consumer goods and land--of a small elite. It was an elite that to some extent had a base in the 'traditional,' quasi-feudal structures, along with a new elite of the intelligentsia, the government officials, the new party officials and so on. In effect, Ugandan militants recognized that neocolonialism was running rampant within Ugandan society. Any ambivalence on their part derived from the ambiguity caused by Obote's preempting of certain Socialist terminology, thus making it difficult for Socialists to come out and completely denounce him. So the Socialists in Uganda began to work out a strategy for their particular situation. It was a strategy for immediate political action and it was tantamount to a strategy of development. They recognized that first of all they needed to establish an organization of their own. This is a real problem in Third World countries, especially where the government is playing games. How does one establish an organization of one's own? It appears that there were groups in Uganda who were concentrating on resolving that problem. At the same time, they had to decide that they must participate to a certain extent within the politics of Uganda and within the politics of the ruling party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC). Some of these individuals were in fact prepared to run in the elections which Obote had scheduled. Obote had scheduled a very fancy election where a single candidate was to appear in about four constituencies simultaneously. The election never came off because of the coup. But some of these individuals were prepared to participate in those elections. Eventually, of course, the coup interrupted this, and Uganda progressives were then faced with the situation where a government that was more clearly rightist, a government that was more clearly neocolonialist, had come into power.

Some Ugandan militants had predicted the military coup--a testimony to their insight into their own society--and yet their response to the new clique was far from uncompromising. Several among them produced rationalizations which permitted them to associate with a regime that was more blatantly opposed to the interests of the "Common Man" in Uganda than was the case under Obote. Kibede, who was appointed foreign minister, was previously one of the shining lights of the Uganda left, and apparently still retains pretensions to Socialism. Only a tiny fragment denounced the coup and began to take the steps which qualify to be called revolutionary, and which kept in sight the objective of people's power. Why did this ineptness, disintegration and collaboration arise on the part of groups who claimed to perceive the essential lines of solution to their own development problems? It does suggest a lack of serious analytical

framework, although many of those involved claim to be Marxist. Besides that, however, lack of self-confidence and a degree of opportunism also enter the picture. The new situation posed by the Amin takeover would have required the boldness to break completely with the state machinery and to operate entirely outside of the boundaries of petty bourgeois politics. Instead, several of the progressives came up with the lame alternative of 'working within the system,' and fobbed off many revolutionary Ugandan youth by saying that Amin was amenable to advice from the 'Leftists.'

The paradox of progressives seeking to give advice to reactionary governments is not new. There is a long history of this in Latin America, because Latin America has had many progressive economists and other social scientists who spent a lot of time advising the curious governments that arose in that part of the world. The paradox reveals that from the viewpoint of groups grappling with the problem of development in the Third World, the roots of the problem are political, being inextricably linked with the question of political power. The Ugandans would seem to have accepted this under Obote and then to have reneged on their responsibility in this regard subsequent to the coup. Nevertheless, one does not have to be pessimistic about the outcome. What is happening in Uganda and other arenas is that contradictions keep multiplying day by day. The creation of a militaristic or police state itself polarizes forces and causes people to react against the regime, if only for the sake of survival. If, on the other hand, the regime is flirting with anti-imperialist and Socialist ideas without any commitment, then it requires only a few years before the rhetoric is exhausted and the period of reckoning begins.

Inevitably, behind the facade of pseudo-progressive assertions, corruption increases and police brutality also. I am not at all pessimistic about the long-term prospects for liberation and development in the Third World. The propping up of regimes by imperialism is a short-term solution. Objective conditions in the Third World are worsening, as I suggested earlier. The living conditions of the vast majority of the people are deteriorating. That is what will maintain the initiative towards change and propel the Third World out of the counter-revolutionary phase which arose after formal independence. Besides, there is the factor of racism which is all pervasive throughout the Third World, and which is particularly strong where Black people live in Africa and the Caribbean. It is a unifying factor. Imperialism has used racism in its own interest, but it turns out to be a double-edged blade, and the very unity that is engendered among Black people--the unity of common conditions and common exploitation and oppression--is being turned around as a weapon to be used against imperialism.

Finally, perhaps the most important reason for confidence and for revolutionary optimism--with respect to both the political problem which is immediate and the long-term economic problem--is that the peoples of the Third World have not been dehumanized, in spite of everything: in spite of slavery, in spite of colonialism. The historical record will show that it is the peoples of the metropoles who have gone through the most dehumanization. That's the way it is. Slavery has dehumanized slave masters more than it has dehumanized slaves. Colonialism has dehumanized the colonialists more than it dehumanized the colonial people. The working class in the metropoles is more confused, more alienated and less in control of their own destiny than the peasants in the African countryside and the workers on plantations and so on in Third World countries. The latter do not have any crumbs of fruits which have been thrown at them to increase their confusion. Nor have they been living within a society which assails them on all sides with a variety of myths which cloud exploitation under the banner of God and country and so on. Ultimately, it seems to me that freedom will come from those who are the most oppressed. Slaves rather than slave masters are the repositories of freedom; liberation will come from those who are not yet liberated; and human dignity will be reasserted by those of us who have not yet been dehumanized.

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QUESTION: Would you consider the more important problems of imperialism to be the ones created by neocolonialism or those belonging to the old capitalist experience of imperialism?

ANSWER: The old imperialism is falling apart; one has to be more sensitive about the new changes. There are very powerful existing areas of the old imperialism, as in Southern Africa, but there the issues are clearly defined. Whatever the strength of the White minority regimes and of Portuguese colonialism backed by NATO and by foreign monopoly capital, the stage is set and armed struggles are already unleashed in those areas. I think it is easier to mobilize politically where the colonialism is open and blatant in the old-fashioned form.

The new colonialism is sometimes so difficult to decipher that one might think that one is doing something progressive when in fact one is really being co-opted by the system. Take nationalization as an example. There was a time, back in the early '50s, when people who nationalized were automatically regarded as progressive nationalists and Socialists, and imperialism moved against them to squash them immediately. But now nationalization has become a technique that can just as well be used

by the enemy as by progressive Africans, Asians or Latin Americans. Nationalizing a plant within the context of the international division of labor and the international allocation of resources could well mean that production is no more independent than if it had remained in the hands of foreign enterprises. A joint venture in which the government takes over 51 percent of the shares may superficially suggest control, while in practice the 51 percent comprises the problems of labor management and their 49 percent comprises the profits. There are all kinds of new techniques that are being devised by international capital. After all, mosquitoes today are able to cope with DDT. Similarly, imperialism has a certain flexibility and I think the new forms and adjustments are more difficult to combat, because they are subtle, and there is a time lag before it can be appreciated that imperialism can also turn retreat into success.

QUESTION: Could you analyze the Tanzanian situation?

ANSWER: Tanzania is one of the few instances where I think that the nationalist government which inherited power at independence does provide a framework within which a struggle can be conducted. Both things have to be recognized: firstly, that this nationalist government does provide a legitimate framework for onward development; and secondly, that a struggle is nevertheless necessary. One then has to determine what exactly is the struggle. Who is struggling against whom? What is the alignment of forces? There is a very useful analysis, by a young Tanzanian, which is entitled, Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle.* It is a silent class struggle because it does not take the form of armed struggle. Instead, it takes the form of a great deal of maneuvering within the structure between, on the one hand, the bureaucracy and the reactionary elements of the petty bourbeoisie and, on the other hand, a much smaller group committed to Socialism, [a group which is] attempting very slowly and with a great deal of difficulty to try and establish some links with the vast majority of the people. Meanwhile, the workers themselves have to find ways and means of confronting the petty bourgeoisie. Within this structure, within the idiom of Socialism, a struggle is going on all the time. Many individuals who are justifiably happy about what is going on in Tanzania sometimes romanticize the situation because they do not know how difficult the struggle is and they do not realize that it is a struggle that has produced not only gains for the working people but also many setbacks from day to day.

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* Issa G. Shivji, Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle, Dar es Salaam, 1970 and Lund, Sweden, 1971.

QUESTION: What role is being played by the nationalized sector and by trade unions in Tanzania?

ANSWER: Nationalization is a step in a forward direction. The next issue becomes the method of running these enterprises. Nationalized industry is a fairly small sector, because Tanzania is not an industrialized country; but what goes on within it is significant in ideological and political terms, apart from the economic implications. A bureaucracy has been developing. This is not unique; it happened in the Soviet Union, it happened in China, it happened in Cuba. The bureaucracy has emerged as a social formation crucial to Socialist development or lack thereof even where the property base of an exploiting class has been liquidated. So that is a very real problem in the nationalized sector. How does one deal with it? In Tanzania, there has been talk about workers' control in the factories. It has never reached the point of workers' control in practice, but there has been over the past year a very healthy self-assertion by the workers. This has not taken place through the trade union, which is virtually defunct. Workers in their own factories have been reasserting themselves in Tanzania, particularly since the TANU Guidelines, which Tanzanians refer to as the *Mwongozo*. There has been a spate of worker manifestations which have taken these Guidelines as their credo, because the Guidelines say that the country has to create new styles of work, new kinds of relationships between the party, the government, the officials and the bureaucrats and the workers and peasants; and this is getting at the root of the problem of the rise of a new bureaucracy and its relationship politically and socially to the rest of the population. Workers in their factories, using *Mwongozo* as a sort of article of faith, have been attacking the bureaucracy, have been attacking the managers and the officials who have been placed over them. Strikes and work stoppages therefore often mirror in a small way the ongoing struggle between the people who are directly at the production line and those who are supposedly making policy in the society. That is one facet of this silent class struggle.

QUESTION: I have a lot of trouble following your description of the nature of imperialism. You use imperialism as equivalent to 'dependency,' and I have two things that you mentioned that troubled me. On the one hand, you point out that one of the aspects of your imperialism is the refusal to transfer technology, and I agree that that is very problematic. But I can't envision any form of this technology being transferred in a form that would not be an extension to imperialism itself, in that it would increase the dependency of the Third World countries on the capitalist countries. For example, you don't transfer computer technology like IBM without transferring a series of dependency relationships. So, therefore, you either are being

imperialistic by withholding it or you are being more imperialistic by transferring it. The other aspect that somewhat troubled me concerns trading relationships between the Third World and certain socialist countries, for example, Cuba and the Soviet Union. Being involved in a trading relationship with the Soviet Union makes Cuba absolutely dependent and it suggests to me that if imperialism is equivalent to dependency, then imperialism is not necessarily exclusively inherent in a capitalist economy, but mainly in the relations of an underdeveloped with a developed economy, including that of socialism.

ANSWER: The Cubans have, since their revolution, increased the amount of sugar that they are exporting as a money earner because they have made a rational choice that this is the only way that they can get the goods that they require for their own development. But this is a far cry from the dependency of the Cuban economy on the dictates of the American economy. Pre-revolutionary Cuba was entirely dependent on the dictates of the American economy. It was dependent upon the decisions made by American producers within Cuba and by Americans outside of Cuba. What the Cubans have done now is to make decisions; they have made the decisions. This is an inter-dependent world. If you can make decisions, you are inter-dependent with somebody else. When they make the decisions for you, you are just dependent. This is the difference. The Cubans are making the decisions which are rational--short- and long-term decisions as to how they are going to organize their economy, how they are going to diversify. They need certain things--where are they going to get them from, how are they going to get them? These are the kinds of rational choices that the Cuban government has been able to make. A dependent economy never makes that kind of choice. It merely waits upon the metropoles to make the decisions as to what is to be done.

QUESTION: Then the issue should not only be one of dependency, it is also one of domination. With the case of the United States and Cuba, you say they are dependent and dominated. In the case with the Soviet Union, they are still as dependent but they are not dominated? Don't you agree?

ANSWER: Dependency includes domination or else we can say everybody is dependent upon everyone else, which would reduce the term to a trite generalization. Even the United States is absolutely dependent upon the Third World countries. Everybody is dependent in that sense. But when we use the term "dependency," as has been developed most particularly with respect to Latin America, we are talking about a historical period where the countries of the Third World are not in a position to make choices about changes and about the allocation of their own resources. That is what is intrinsic to this definition of dependency. So

domination is involved. Africans don't dominate the American economy, although the American economy is dependent upon raw materials that come out of Southern Africa. But when we talk about dependency, we say that Southern Africa is the dependency of the United States. Does the definition of dependency apply to the Cuban economy today? I think it doesn't, in spite of the fact that even the Cubans themselves would obviously prefer to have their economy and trading links more diversified.

You did ask a first question, concerning technology. What is happening with the underdeveloped countries is that they are not exercising any choice as to what aspect of technology they want, nor are they simultaneously beginning to develop the technology that is most relevant to their own needs. These are the two things that must go hand in hand. When you fail to exercise choice, imperialism will foist on you those aspects of technology which are beneficial to the development of the imperialist economy, and which might have no rationale with respect to the needs of the particular Third World country. If you choose to have technology from the imperialist countries, you are also involving yourself in a certain risk. But at least when you make the choice, within a total pattern of what is rational within your economy, you are retaining a certain degree of control, you are weighing the risks, and you are talking in terms of how you will phase out and when you will phase out foreign control. So it isn't as though you can afford not to deal at all with imperialism or with a metropolitan country. But the question is "to what extent do you really set the parameters of your own economy?" Do you set your own norms and then make the choice as to which form of contacts you can afford to make? Which forms of contact are least negative? Which forms of contact can be phased out over a period of time? Charting a course with these questions in mind seems to me to be the approach which is most logical.

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