

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Between Ethnic Minority and Diaspora:
Zainichi Koreans in the era of Global War on Terror

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Ethnic Studies

by

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2015

DEDICATION

For

Our halmŏni

Kim Sang-gŭm

And

Our halmŏni

Chŏn Mal-nyŏn

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Between Ethnic Minority and Diaspora:
Zainichi Koreans in the era of Global War on Terror

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Ethnic Studies

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My dissertation examines the negotiation of citizenship and belonging among Zainichi Koreans (Koreans in Japan) in contemporary Japan. My analysis focuses on the pro-North Korean schools that have become a target of state sanctions, racist hate crimes and media misrepresentation since the revelation of North Korean abductions of Japanese civilians on September 17, 2002. Situating Japan’s anti-North Korean sentiments in a broader context of the global War on Terror, my dissertation reveals how the War on Terror has shaped Japan’s national security discourses and practices, and how the United States has turned the issue of Japanese abductees into an “American” concern, together constructing North Korea as a military and moral threat and justifying various sanctions

against North Korea and its associates including those in Japan including pro-North Korean schools.

Through ethnographic observation and in-depth interviews, as well as analysis on newspaper articles, government documents, court transcripts, blog entries and tweets, my dissertation examines various survival strategies and tactics that Korean schools have employed. In their efforts to bring life to the space that is meant to disappear, members of the Korean schools devote material, intellectual, cultural and affective labors. In order to navigate and defy the stigma as well as material and symbolic consequences of being labeled as “(potential) terrorists,” Korean schools have also mobilized cultural and political discourses and practices, specifically employing “multicultural coexistence” (*tabunka kyōsei*) and “students are innocent” narrative as viable frameworks to explain why they are legible and sympathetic subjects. I argue that Zainichi Koreans’ recent social movements on local, national and international levels challenge the traditional pathways to belonging, and disavow full inclusion as the basis of claiming civil rights, while at the same time illuminating the limits of liberal multiculturalism that seeks to depoliticize and dehistoricize Korean schools and education. Simultaneously Korean diasporic subjects and ethnic minorities of Japan, Zainichi Koreans (re)claim ideological and emotional ties with their homeland(s) while claiming full membership and equal rights in Japan, posing a radical alternative to imagining “minority politics” that is not simply about liberal incorporation, but also about engaging in unthinkable politics.

Introduction

It would be this group of stateless Koreans, nakedly human and lacking the official stamp of any nation-state, that would be first loaded onto trucks, possibly given one hour to pack their bags, with the allowance of one bag per person, and sent away to the camps.

-Sonia Ryang, *Writing Selves in Diaspora*¹

On September 17, 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a historic summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. At the summit, Kim admitted to the abduction of Japanese civilians between 1977 and 1982 by North Korean secret agents. This admission immediately impacted the lives of Koreans in Japan, postcolonial exiles and their descendants known as “Zainichi Koreans.” Without having a nation-state that

¹ Sonia Ryang, *Writing Selves in Diaspora* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), xxvi.

² Suh Kyungshik, *Han-Nanmin no Ichikara [The From the Standpoint of Quasi-Refugees]* (Tokyo: Kage Shobō, 2002). Suh’s article on “quasi-refugee” or *han-nanmin* that appeared in *Gendai Shisō* Vol. 30, no. 13, (November, 2002), has also appeared on Japan Focus and other English-language journals.

³ The official name of the organization is “Chae Ilbon Chosōnin Ch’ongryōnhaphoe” (재일본조선인총련합회) in Korean or “Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengokai” (在日本朝鮮人総聯

fully represents them, these Koreans remain what Suh Kyungsik terms “quasi-refugees.”² As such, they are “nakedly human” in Ryang’s words who are vulnerable to state sanctions and racist hate crimes in the post-9/17 state of exception that has been increasingly normalized as the “rule.” Due to their alleged association with North Korea, Zainichi Koreans have been rendered essentially “non-human,” unworthy of sympathy or protection –all under the name of national security.

My dissertation focuses on the lived experiences of Zainichi Koreans in post-9/17 Japan when association with North Korea –no matter how remote or minor–would automatically make one a “(potential) terrorist.” Significantly, the post-9/17 anti-North Korean hysteria in Japan is strongly influenced by the U.S.-led global War on Terror, which unilaterally designates North Korea as an “axis of evil.” Seemingly distant and unrelated, the global War on Terror has had tangible impacts on the lives of Zainichi Koreans through its mutually reinforcing relationship with Japan’s imperial ideology and various sanctions against North Korea. Simultaneously, in the decade following 9/17, Zainichi Koreans endured physical and verbal violence and anti-Korean demonstrations in metropolitan areas in Japan. This specific context makes studies on Koreans in Japan highly urgent today.

Due to their visibility and connection with Chongryun,³ a pro-North Korea organization, Korean schools in Japan have been particularly vulnerable to state

² Suh Kyungshik, *Han-Nanmin no Ichikara [The From the Standpoint of Quasi-Refugees]* (Tokyo: Kage Shobō, 2002). Suh’s article on “quasi-refugee” or *han-nanmin* that appeared in *Gendai Shisō* Vol. 30, no. 13, (November, 2002), has also appeared on Japan Focus and other English-language journals.

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sanctions, racist hate crimes and media misrepresentation. My dissertation focuses on Korean schools as a lens through which to examine how Zainichi Koreans experience, operate within and against the global and national anti-terrorist discourses and practices, as well as the violence inflicted by Japanese nationalist groups. Furthermore, examining Korean schools and their political and cultural strategies and tactics –often contradictory and spontaneous –to survive also allows us to explore the questions of citizenship, belongingness and knowledge production for postcolonial subjects.

Koreans in Japan

At the end of Japanese colonization of Korea (1910-1945) upon Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, there were some two million Koreans living in Japan. Although the end of the war brought the dispersed Koreans hope for repatriation, this hope lasted only for a brief moment until the two mutually antagonistic ideologies, communism and capitalism started to collide in their homeland, which eventually escalated into the Korean War (1950-1953). The instability and uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula consequently left some 600,000 Koreans behind on their former colonial mother's soil, who became the primary group that constitutes today's diasporic community.⁴ While more than 90 percent of Koreans in Japan are born in Japan, out of those who originally came from (colonial) Korea, more than 97 percent are from southern parts the Korean Peninsula such as

⁴ In addition to the chaos in the Korean peninsula, restrictions on carrying property out of Japan, the shortage of return ships to Korea and the fact that they had established families and businesses in Japan also led some Koreans to decide to remain in Japan. However, most of them thought their stay in Japan would be temporary and were still going back to Korea, as they hoped the reunification would be realized shortly. There are also Koreans in China, Sakhalin and other parts of the former Soviet Union whose displacement is rooted in Japanese colonial rule that remained in respective region after the liberation for many different reasons. They, similarly to Zainichi Koreans, have created distinct diasporic communities.

Kyongsang province, Chŏlla province and Cheju Island.⁵ What is striking is that although the majority originated from the southern provinces of today's South Korea, they sympathized more with North Korea because they considered Kim Il-sung, the founding father of North Korea and a former guerilla fighter against the Japanese colonial rule as national hero as opposed to Syngman Rhee who was chosen as the first South Korean president in the illegal election under the U.S. occupation and allowed the Korean collaborators from the Japanese colonial period to continue to play important and influential roles.

Those first generation Koreans and their descendants later came to be known as "Koreans residing in Japan" or "Zainichi Koreans," in which "*zai*" means "residing in" and "*nichi*" means "Japan" in Japanese. Because Japanese nationality law employs *jus sanguinis*, or the principle of blood, one is not automatically given Japanese nationality by having been born in Japan. Today, there are 519,470 Koreans who are registered as "aliens" in the Alien Registration System (0.5 percent of the total Japanese population). Of those, 433,794 hold permanent residency, constituting a group of "quasi-refugees."⁶

Giorgio Agamben explains that refugees and stateless people are seen as threats to the modern nation-state system because their statelessness exposes the "original fiction of sovereignty."⁷ Dominant human rights discourses tend to reduce refugee identity to legal status and to attempt to re-domesticate stateless people and refugees within a nation-state through repatriation and naturalization. A total of 92,749 Zainichi Koreans (and 6,600 Japanese nationals, mostly female spouses) were "repatriated" to North Korea under the

⁵ Sonia Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 3.

⁶ *The Human Rights and Life*, Vol. 39, December 2014: 67-8.

⁷ Giorgio Agamben, "We Refugees" Symposium, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Summer 1995): 114-9.

“humanitarian” arrangement between the North Korean Red Cross and the Japanese Red Cross between 1959 and 1984⁸; and more than 350,000 were naturalized as Japanese between 1952 and 2013.⁹

Furthermore, for the majority of Zainichi Koreans –whether naturalized or not – “passing” has been a “default option” for not only Japan-born Koreans but also their first-generation parents. Sociologist John Lie contends that “*not* passing for Zainichi requires a decision to be out of ethnic closet: one must consciously assert ethnic identification by divulging one’s Korean name or ancestry” (emphasis in original), stark contrast to racialized minorities in the United States.¹⁰ Although “passing” produces “anxiety from the omnipresent threat of exposure and the ethical conundrum of leading a life of deception,”¹¹ Zainichi Koreans continue to engage in the practice of “passing.” The 2000 Mindan statistics reveal that nearly 90 percent of Zainichi Koreans use Japanese alias to hide their Korean background.¹²

While the majority are “passing” and conforming to the domestication and assimilation process, there is a group of Koreans who has made a deliberate choice to “be out.” The members of the Korean schools have resisted inclusion into Japan, thus have been deemed “threats” to the nation-state. Against the grain of the “structures of feeling,”¹³ which justifies skepticism, punishment and discipline targeting anything and

⁸ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Exodus to North Korea* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007).

⁹ Beginning in the mid-1990s, approximately 10,000 Zainichi Koreans naturalize as Japanese each year. See *The Human Rights and Life*, Vol. 39, December 2014, 68.

¹⁰ John Lie, *Zainichi (Koreans in Japan)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 19-20.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹² Mindan, *The 2000 Zainichi Korean Survey Interim Report [Zainichi Kankokujin Ishiki Chōsa Chūkan Hōkokusho]* (March 2001).

¹³ Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

anyone associated with North Korea in the name of national security, they have continued to embrace a stigmatized identity and remain a “monstrosity” who can only be “unrecognized and misunderstood.”¹⁴

Korean Schools

Education theorists have contended that schools are a primary site to create citizenry through teaching attitudes, beliefs and skills, using cultural symbols and rituals.¹⁵ As such, providing Korean-centered autonomous education has always been at the top priority for Zainichi Korean communities, especially for those affiliated with Chongryun, a pro-North Korean organization. Rooted in decolonizing theory and praxis, Koreans started schools throughout Japan immediately after the “liberation” from Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). Despite intense suppression by U.S. occupation authorities (1945-1952) and the Japanese government, including arrests, confiscation of property and forced closure, the schools persevered and have run an autonomous educational system for more than sixty years.¹⁶ At its height, there were more than five hundred schools all over Japan, serving a combined total of 43,362 students.¹⁷ Today, Chongryun operates one university, ten high schools, thirty-three middle schools and

¹⁴ Jacques Derrida, “Some Statements and Truisms About Neo-Logisms, Newisms, Positivisms, Parasitisms, and Other Small Seismisms,” *The States of Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 63-94.

¹⁵ For detailed discussions, see Cynthia Bejarano, *¿Qué Onda? Urban Youth Culture and Border Identity* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005); Aiwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); David Buckingham, *The Making of Citizens* (London: Routledge, 2000).

¹⁶ Zainichi Korean historian, Kim Kyung Hae authored, *Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōiku no Genten*, one of the first accounts of the clash between Koreans and Japanese/U.S. military authorities, generally known as *Hanshin Kyōiku Tōsō* in 1979. Also see, Kim Dok Ryong, *Chōsen Gakkō no Sengoshi* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2004); Mark Caprio, “Resident Aliens: Forging the Political Status of Koreans in Occupied Japan,” *Democracy in Occupied Japan* (London: Routledge, 2007).

¹⁷ Kim Dok Ryong, *Chōsen Gakkō no Sengoshi* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2004), 273.

fifty-four elementary schools, serving approximately 8,500 students or less than 10 percent of all school-aged children of Korean descent.¹⁸ The schools are run by second- and third-generation Koreans and serve the third-, fourth- and fifth-generation Korean students whose nationalities vary from South Korean and Japanese to virtually stateless “*Chōsen-seki*.”¹⁹ All subjects except Japanese are taught in Korean, and the textbooks and other educational materials used in schools are written and edited by the teachers and published by Chongryun’s own publishing company, Hagu Sobang.

The schools have long provided a refuge for Zainichi Koreans, many of whom now live in predominantly Japanese neighborhoods with few opportunities to meet other Zainichi Koreans, at least knowingly. They are also where Zainichi Korean epistemology is developed, nurtured and taught to later generations. At Korean schools, students learn who they are, where they come from and how Zainichi Koreans have survived in postwar Japan, none of which is taught at Japanese schools. Indeed, Korean schools have never been mere educational institutions, but highly political and politicized spaces, which

¹⁸ Song Kichan, “*Katararenai mono*” *toshite no Chōsen Gakkō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012). According to Min, in 1988, 86.5% of resident Korean children went to Japanese schools, while 12.5% went to Chongryun-operated schools and 1% went to South Korean ethnic schools. See Min Kwang-sik, *Zainichi Kankokujin no Genjou to Mirai*, trans. Kim Kyong Dok (Tokyo: Hakutēsha, 1994), 33.

¹⁹ “*Chōsen-seki*” literally translates as “a nationality of (unified) Korea” which essentially makes one stateless. When Korean colonial subjects were liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, they were all grouped into a “*Chōsen-seki*” category. However, when Japan established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965, Zainichi Koreans started to attain South Korean nationality for political reasons and out of convenience because with “*Chōsen-seki*” status, one is unable to obtain passport or excluded from various rights and privileges in Japan as Japanese state considers South Korea as the only legitimate state in the Korean Peninsula. Those who refuse to choose either North or South as their state hold onto “*Chōsen-seki*” status to this day. The number of “*Chōsen-seki*” holders is said to be less than 5% of some 500,000 Zainichi Koreans registered in Japanese Alien Registration (The Ministry of Justice, 2014). See Cho Kyung-hee, “Posuto Reisenki ni okeru Zainichi Chōsejin no Idō to Kyōkai no Seiji,” Matsuda Motoji and Chung Keun-sik eds. *Korian Diasupora to Higashi Ajia Shakai* (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2013), 104.

cultivate “authentic Koreans” [*shin no chōsenjin*] who “contribute to the development of their homeland and people, as well as Zainichi Korean community.”²⁰ This makes Korean schools fundamentally different from Korean language schools that focus on acquisition of language skills or international schools that tend to embrace universal cosmopolitanism beyond ethnic or national differences. Korean schools are of Koreans, by Koreans and for Koreans, meant to provide a Korea-centered education and perspective, and emphasize the autonomy of the Korean people –the legacy of anti-Japanese imperialism.

Many teachers, parents and community members describe the schools as their *kohyang*, or home that they must preserve--no matter what. When their ancestral homeland is still divided after more than six decades, when Zainichi Koreans are treated as “North Korean spies” in the southern half of their homeland, and when their way of living in Japan has been that of either assimilation or exclusion, Korean schools and surrounding communities have become an urgently important space (as much as the northern half of the homeland). Korean schools have provided their students and teachers with a sense of belonging and pride as Koreans. They eventually started to call the schools “*uri hakkyo*,” in which “*uri*” means “our” and “*hakkyo*” means “schools” in Korean. Instead of calling their schools “Korean schools” in somewhat neutral and culturally relative form, Zainichi Koreans have centered themselves in their education

²⁰ “Purpose of Ethnic Education,” *Zainihon Chōsenjin Sōrengokai* (Sōren in Japanese or Chongryun in Korean)’s official website, <http://www.chongryon.com/j/edu/index2.html>, retrieved on October 7, 2014. Translation mine.

and clearly demarcated “*uri/us*” from Japanese others. Accordingly, they call Korean language “*uri mal*,” Korean alphabet “*uri kŭl*” and Korean names “*uri ileŭm*.”

Due to the political climate surrounding the Korean schools, the existing literature primarily focuses on debates over their legitimacy.²¹ Moving away from these merit-based debates, other academic works focus on Korean schools’ bilingual education, pedagogy and students’ identity formation.²² Among them, Sonia Ryang’s groundbreaking work, *North Koreans in Japan* reveals the ways that rigorous language control has played a fundamental role in (re)producing a collective identity among Japan-born Korean students as Chongryun community members and overseas nationals of North Korea. More recent work demonstrates how multiple identities are managed and performed by Korean students within and outside the school context. Sociologist Song Kichan characterizes Korean schools as linguistically, culturally and socially separate spheres from the rest of the Japanese society.²³ He argues that the schools function as a “stage” on which students are expected to perform collective Koreanness through Korean language usage, class duties and extracurricular activities. However, as soon as students and teachers step outside the schools, many switch to Japanese aliases and language,

²¹ Japanese educational scholar, Ozawa Yūsaku theorized the importance of Korea-centered education for Korean students as early as the 1970s. See Ozawa Yūsaku, *Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōikuron* (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 1973). Park, Pyun and Chung have added important discussions from the perspective of Zainichi Koreans. See Park Samsuk, *Zainichi Chōsenjin no Minzoku Kyōiku* (Tokyo: Ariesu Shobō, 1980); Pyun Hee-jae and Chun Chol-lam, *Ima Chōsen Gakkō de* (Tokyo: Chōsen Sēnensha, 1988).

²² Japanese linguistic and educational scholars have argued yet another dimension of Korean education’s significance. See Miyawaki Hiroyuki, “Zainichi Chōsen Gakkō Shijo no Gengo Sētai/Minzoku Ishiki ni kansuru Chōsa,” *Miyazaki Gakuin Women's University Humanities/Social Science Bulletin*, 1993; Yukawa Emiko, *Kyotoshi no Chōsen Gakkō ni okeru Chōsenko/Nihongo Bailingaru Kyōiku no Hōhō to Sēka*, *Kaken Report*, 2001; Naka Kiyoshi and Hashimoto Jun, “Ethnic Identity and School Education,” *Gifu University College of Education Bulletin*, 2010.

²³ Song Kichan, “*Katararenai mono*” *toshite no Chōsen Gakkō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012).

completely blending into the Japanese society. Ryang (1997) also found that Korea University students in Tokyo live in the “dual linguistic/value system” where they flawlessly switch from “one language-value set to the other; when they do so, they even switch their ideology [*sasang*].”²⁴ This practice of identity management, or “code-switching” on a daily basis, remains barely legible to the broader Japanese society. Especially in the context of post-9/17 in which the overwhelming hostility between North Korea and Japan prevails, members of Korean schools are seen as “evil” that are unworthy of sympathy or protection, no matter how they wish to perceive and represent their identities in multifaceted and flexible ways.

My dissertation intervenes in this particular moment, and departs from previous studies that characterize Korean schools predominantly as a space to reproduce and perform Korean identity, or as targets of violence with impunity. I do not simply assume or celebrate Korean schools and education as icons of resistance to racism and discrimination in the era of global War on Terror. Instead, I explore contradictory strategies and competing discourses that Zainichi Koreans employ to navigate, defy and challenge the stigma and material, discursive and affective consequences of being labeled as “(potential) terrorists.” Remaining in the interstitial space between colonized and decolonized, diaspora and ethnic minority, and ally and enemy, I argue that Zainichi Koreans pose a radical alternative to imaging a “minority politics” that goes beyond a nation-state framework and a “rights-based” approach.

Residual and Ongoing Wars

²⁴ Sonia Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 41.

As part of sanctions against North Korea and Japan's effort in the global War on Terror, a Korean school was raided by dozens of fully equipped policemen in broad daylight. On January 28, 2007, approximately one-hundred police officers and riot policemen flooded to the Shiga Korean Elementary School in response to the false registration of a vehicle by a Zainichi Korean man in Osaka.²⁵ The police confiscated documents indicating students' names, information on family members, telephone numbers and other personal information, which had absolutely nothing to do with the violation.²⁶

In fact, this was not the first time that the police had entered the Korean school premises nor was it the first instance where they used direct force against the schools. From the very beginning, Korean schools were considered a "threat" not only by Japan, but the United States because they were operated by a pro-North Korean organization. Seen as hotbeds of communist propaganda, the schools suffered from intense suppression including arrests, confiscation of property and forceful closure of the schools, eventually culminating with the 1948 as *Hanshin Kyōiku Tōsō*.²⁷ During the only state of emergency declared during the seven-year U.S. occupation, the U.S. military police and Japanese police used armed force against unarmed protestors, killing two teenagers, arresting thousands and inflicting stiff penalties on the incident's leaders.²⁸ Even after the end of U.S. military occupation of Japan in 1952, Korean education and schools were repeatedly met with suppression by Japanese and South Korean governments as they both

²⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 29, 2007; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 29, 2007.

²⁶ Nicchō Kokkō Sējōka, *Seisai Hakusho* (June 2012), 18.

²⁷ Kim Kyung Hae, *Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōiku no Genten* (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1979).

²⁸ Kim Tae-gi, *Sengo Nihon Seiji to Zainichi Chōsenjin Mondai* (Tokyo: Keiso Shobō, 1997).

considered the schools as breeding ground for communist indoctrination, and thus posing threats to “national security” during the Cold War and its “protracted afterlife.”²⁹

Although the September 17 revelation in 2002 was a critical rupture for Koreans in Japan as skepticism, punishment and discipline targeting Zainichi Koreans have reached an unprecedented level of intensity, I contend that Korean schools have always been a “threat” well before the 9/17. The techniques and rhetoric of surveillance, discipline and punishment in post-9/17 must be understood not only through explicit comparisons to but as an extension of the Cold War within the layered histories of unending wars –the Korean War, the Cold War and the War on Terror. In all of these unending wars, North Korea remains a problem for the United States.³⁰

For this reason, I situate Zainichi Koreans in post-9/17 in the broader historical and geopolitical context as opposed to treating it as an issue between Japan-North Korea bilateral relations. As Sonia Ryang argues, Zainichi Koreans, along with others in the Korean diaspora, are “a product of national partition, the civil war that followed, and the eventual tensions of the Cold War.”³¹ Korean schools are rendered particularly vulnerable to the hostility and confrontation that are rooted in these historical events and trauma, as well as the global War on Terror that designates North Korea as an “axis of evil.” In other

²⁹ Jodi Kim, *Ends of Empire* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 4. Others have revealed that the 1965 Japanese Cabinet Research Unit report clearly identified the issue of Korean schools as that of “security” rather than “educational.” See Kim Dok Ryong, *Chōsen Gakkō no Sengoshi* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2004), 196; Ebara Mamoru, *Minzoku Gakkō Mondai wo Kangaeru* (Kyoto: Agenda Project, 2003), 23-24. Furthermore, classified diplomatic document with regards to the 1965 Japan-South Korea treaty disclosed in South Korea in 2005 indicates both governments’ wish to close down of *Chongryun* schools to maintain social order. See Park Samsuk, *Kyōiku wo Ukeru Kenri to Chōsen Gakkō* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 2011), 176.

³⁰ Bruce Cumings, “Decoupled from History: North Korea in the Axis of Evil,” *Inventing the Axis of Evil* (New York City: The New Press, 2004).

³¹ Sonia Ryang, *Writing Selves in Diaspora* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), xviii.

words, Korean schools are at once a product of and have bore witness to these unending wars. This makes Korean schools an important site to analyze how residual and ongoing wars have shaped lived experiences of Zainichi Koreans, and how Zainichi Koreans have resisted and navigated the consequences of being labeled as threats –of communist “evil empire” in the Cold War and terrorist “axis of evil” in the War on Terror.

Beyond “Damage-Centered” Approach

John Lie asserts that Zainichi Koreans have been “pawns in the struggle between North and South in particular and the communist and capitalist worlds in general” and have been easy to “sacrifice or ignore.”³² Particularly after the 9/17 revelations, Zainichi Koreans associated with North Korea have become target of state sanctions and hate crimes. Among diverse Zainichi Korean individuals and communities, Korean school students have been by far the most vulnerable targets of the backlash. According to a large-scale survey conducted with 2,710 students at twenty-one Korean schools (1st-12th graders), the number of incidents of harassment and threats targeting these students multiplied immediately before and after the 9/17 summit.³³ The report reveals that 522

³² John Lie, *Zainichi (Koreans in Japan)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 30.

³³ In the absence of the “official” record, a group of young Japanese attorneys conducted surveys and questionnaires with 2,710 students at twenty-one Korean elementary, junior high and high schools in Tokyo, Saitama and Kanagawa prefectures in January, four months after the September 17th revelation. The report, *Zainichi Korian no Kodomotachi ni taisuru lyagarase Jittai Chōsa Hōkokushu* was published in June 2003 by the group of young Japanese attorneys. According to the report, the numbers incidents of harassment and threats Korean schools and students received between 1998 and 2000 were relatively small with the average of 28.27 incidents per year (10 per year at minimum and 53 per year at maximum). In 2001, there were 101 incidents reported, and for about two weeks immediately prior to the Pyongyang summit, the number drastically rose to 157. In the post-9/17 period, the number multiplied and continued to stay high in the next several months.

Number of verbal and physical assaults:

Period	1998	1999	2000	2001	Sep 1-16, 2002	Sep 17-Dec, 2002
Number	10	25	53	101	157	522

students, or 20 percent, have experienced verbal or physical assault after the report of abduction. Younger students and female students were more likely to be targeted on their way to and from schools. Female junior high school students were almost four times as likely as to be targeted than their male counterparts (32.3 percent and 8.6 percent respectively). Similarly, female high school students were more than five times more likely to be targeted (23.3 percent and 4.5 percent respectively).³⁴ Almost half of the female junior high and high school students who have experienced harassment while wearing Korean-style school uniforms called, “*chima chogori*” at the time of attack. Moreover, in 2010, Japanese government excluded Korean high schools from the newly implemented High School Free Tuition Program as part of the sanctions against North Korea. Despite the numerous recommendations made by the Bar Associations and civic groups both in Japan and South Korea, as well as the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,³⁵ the Japanese government has yet to overturn the

³⁴ The survey reveals that younger students are more likely to be targeted.

Age	1-3 graders	4-6 graders	JHS students	HS students
Ratio in the age group (%)	23.2	19.0	19.8	14.5

In average, female students are almost twice as likely as to be targeted, while older female students were four to five times more likely to be targeted than their male counterparts. One-third of junior high school students and one-fourth of high school students have experienced some form of violence.

Age	1-3 graders	4-6 graders	JHS students	HS students	Average
Male (%)	23.3	18.8	8.6	4.5	14.1
Female (%)	23.1	19.1	32.3	23.3	24.8

³⁵ In March 2010, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination released the report and showed “concerns” about Japanese government’s exclusion of Korean schools from the free tuition program . See *Asahi Shimbun*, March 17, 2010. In February 2012, while political campaign strongly continued for equal educational rights, three non-governmental organizations in Japan requested CERD to demand the Japanese government to comply with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and stop discriminating against Korean schools. See *Asahi Shimbun*, February 28, 2012. See also Hurights Osaka website:

exclusion policy, appealing to the unresolved abduction issue, ongoing nuclear threats and the schools' close relationship with Chongryun, the pro-North Korea organization.

In my dissertation, I am not so interested in documenting these incidents and events of victimization, or engaging in what Eve Tuck calls “damage-centered” research that focuses on the “pain and brokenness” of the marginalized communities.³⁶ Rather than representing the communities in a monolithic way as “depleted, ruined, and hopeless,”³⁷ I intend to show how members of Korean schools have struggled to make lives and pleasure despite the stigma associated with their schools, as well as the contradictory and often spontaneous cultural and political strategies they employ to challenge and navigate the material, discursive and affective consequences of being labeled as “(potential) terrorists.” In other words, I am most interested in the ways these practices unsettle and disrupt the “structures of feeling” in post-9/17 Japan, which produces knowledge about who the terrorists are, who defends security against whom and whose security and human rights need to be protected at whose expense.

Rise of “Multicultural Coexistence” (*Tabunka Kyōsei*)

Treating nationality as a prerequisite to civil rights, Japanese immigration officers and scholars have called on Koreans in Japan to stop complaining about their lack of rights as “aliens,” and to become Japanese nationals to enjoy full civil rights and be more assimilated and integrated into Japanese society.³⁸ In response to such assimilationist

<http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/newsinbrief-ja/section3/2012/03/ngo227.html>, accessed on January 1, 2015.

³⁶ Eve Tuck, “Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities,” *Harvard Educational Review*. Vol.79, No.3 (Fall 2009): 409-27; citation, 409.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ A former director of the Tokyo Immigration Bureau, Sakanaka Hidenori won an essay competition organized by the Ministry of Justice's Immigration Bureau with an essay entitled

framework, Iinuma Jiro and Kim Dong Myung among others argued that Zainichi Koreans should actually have “a third way” [*daisan no michi*] that is beyond the dichotomy of either reparation or assimilation.³⁹ Without material or emotional ties to South Korea, “reparation” did not resonate with Japan-born Koreans.⁴⁰ While the second- and third-generation started to develop “Zainichi-oriented” political consciousness and identity that is more rooted in Japan than the “homeland,” they were still hesitant to naturalize. Instead, they have chosen a “third way,” remaining a precarious status as foreigners with limited rights in the country they were born and raised. The transformation in consciousness from “homeland-oriented” to “Zainichi-oriented” was manifested in the term that Koreans used to describe their identity. The pre-existing options such as *Chōsenjin* and *Kankokujin*, which essentially meant “(overseas) Korean,” were gradually replaced by a new *Zainichi* identity in the late 1970s with an emphasis on “Zainichi” (“residing in Japan”) that indicated not only the fact that they were born and raised in Japan but also their determination to continue to live in Japan without going through naturalization.⁴¹ Consequently, their political activism shifted its focus to the civil rights of Koreans in Japan.

“Towards Future Immigration Policy in Japan,” commonly known as “Sakanaka Essay.” Years later, a South Korean journalist Chi Tong-wuk and a Zainichi Korean scholar, Tei Taikin similarly proposed assimilation theory for Zainichi Koreans. See Sakanaka Hidenori, *Kongo no Shutsunyūkoku Kanri Gyōsei no arikata ni tsuite*, Immigration Bureau Thesis, 1975, later published in *Gaikokujin Tōroku*. Vol. 221 (1977); Chi Tong-wuk, *Zainichi wo Yamenasai* (Tokyo: Zamasada, 1997); Tei Taikin, *Zainichi Kankokujin no Shūen* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 2001).

³⁹ Iinuma Jiro and Kim Dong Myung, “Zainichi Chōsenjin no Daisan no michi,” *Chōsenjin* Vol. 17 (1979).

⁴⁰ Fukuoka Yasunori and Kim Myung-soo, *Zainichi Kankokujin Sēnen no Sēkatsu to Ishiki* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1997).

⁴¹ Yoon Kōn-ch‘a, *Zainichi wo Ikiru towa* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992).

It was in this context that Japan's concept of "*tabunka kyōsei*" or "multicultural coexistence" emerged. "*Kyōsei*," or the ideal of "coexistence" emerged in grassroots efforts to support Park Chung-suk, a second generation Zainichi Korean who sued Hitachi for rescinding an employment offer after discovering Park's Korean background. In his four-year long court battle, which he eventually won in 1974, Park and his supporters demanded a society where Zainichi Koreans could live in equality and dignity with Japanese. Park's case also ignited the civil rights movement, which called for equal access to social welfare and services programs, and the anti-fingerprinting movement in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, Zainichi Koreans and other long-term foreign residents have acquired a number of rights, which make them de facto citizens, or "*shimin*" ("people of the city") on the basis of their residency and involvement in their respective local communities without having to obtain Japanese nationality.⁴² Framing Zainichi Koreans as *shimin* within Japanese context, Chung argues that grassroots activism has focused on "the quality of Japanese democracy."⁴³

In their studies on outcomes of minority social movements, sociologists Tsutsui Kiyoteru and Hwaji Shin argue that social movements have the best chance of succeeding, i.e., tangible policy changes, when both the local community and international society put pressures on the given government.⁴⁴ In their empirical analysis of four distinct rights – civil rights, political rights, social and economic rights, and cultural rights – Tsutsui and Shin ascribe successful policy changes in civil rights and

⁴² Erin Aeran Chung, *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁴³ Ibid, 142.

⁴⁴ Tsutsui Kiyoteru and Hwaji Shin, "Global Norms, Local Activism, and Social Movement Outcomes: Global Human Rights and Resident Koreans in Japan," *Social Problems*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2000): 391-418.

social and economic rights to a strong impact of global norms and local activism. In contrast, Korean education as part of cultural rights has only attained a partial victory in terms of policy changes, despite repeated recommendations made by the international forums. Tsutsui and Shin blame dissension among the pro-North and pro-South Korean schools in Japan over the type of ethnic education they seek. They argue that without a cohesive and united movement at the local level, international support could not produce comprehensive policy change.

Nevertheless, civil rights movement has brought a number of changes, albeit partial, to the Korean schools. For example, after years of struggle, the students are finally allowed to purchase monthly train passes at a student rate. They are now allowed to participate in most of national and local competitions, such as those organized by the All Japan High School Athletic Federation in addition to the pre-existing Korean schools' own competitions and tournaments. Moreover, the graduates of the Korean schools are now eligible to take an entrance exam at most universities in Japan without having to obtain *daiken*, the GED-equivalent status. By 1975, all twenty-nine prefectures that house Korean schools granted them the “*kakushu-gakkō*” (miscellaneous school) status, gradually recognizing Korean education and schools as somewhat “legitimate.”⁴⁵ While this status of “*kakushu gakkō*” has put Korean schools outside of the realm of various rights and privileges such as their diploma is not recognized or the schools cannot receive tax-deductible donations, it has also allowed the schools to remain relatively autonomous from the Japanese government from curriculum design to textbook edit, as opposed to the

⁴⁵ Kim Dok Ryong, *Chōsen Gakkō no Sengoshi* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2004), 185-6.

“*ichijō-kō*,” (regular school) status, which would have put them under direct control of the Ministry of Education.

Still Japan stands out with its lowest naturalization rates among industrialized democracies. While more than half of the foreign-born Korean Americans had naturalized by the year 2000 in the United States, only 30 percent of the Korean residents are naturalized Japanese citizens although more than 90 percent were born in Japan.⁴⁶ Erin Chung contends that rather than becoming an insignificant ethnic minority citizen population, these Koreans have used their non-citizen status as an instrument to gain political visibility and power in Japan.⁴⁷ While multicultural coexistence has challenged the myth of homogenous Japan by making “foreigners” visible and recognizable to the broader public, it has left intact the definition of who is Japanese and what it means to be Japanese. Whatever is considered to comprise a “different culture” is automatically located in the realm of “foreignness” that “happens to exist” in Japanese society. Additionally, classifying different groups in multicultural coexistence unwittingly creates supposedly authentic and mutually exclusive categories of Japanese/us and Koreans/them while in reality these two entities have never been pure or distinct. Sociologist Jung Yeong-hae urges us to move beyond the identity politics that forces us to choose and mold ourselves to fit a pre-made ethnic category, and instead to embrace the hybrid self, which does not require any identity category, thus becoming free from identity.⁴⁸ Moreover, scholars have criticized Japanese multicultural coexistence, similarly to

⁴⁶ Erin Aeran Chung, *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 47, 85.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 116.

⁴⁸ Jung Yeong-hae, *Tamigayo Seishō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), 23.

American “liberal multiculturalism,”⁴⁹ for failing to challenge the fundamentally unequal relationship between the dominant and the marginalized, instead neutralizing legitimate diversity through extracting superficial symbols and activities as “culture” in an essentialized way.⁵⁰

Critical Zainichi Korean Studies: Beyond “Nation” or “Ethnic Minority”

Scholars such as Jung Jang-yeon⁵¹ and Suh Kyungshik⁵² point out the limitations of “multicultural coexistence,” which positions Zainichi Koreans solely within Japanese context and ignores the fact that Zainichi Koreans’ lived experiences are still heavily influenced by the “homeland” politics rooted in division as well as political tensions between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Drawing upon historian Kajimura Hideki, Suh conceptualizes Zainichi Koreans’ livelihood as inherently border crossing, neither “homeland-oriented” nor “Zainichi-oriented” –both of which fixate Zainichi Koreans as

⁴⁹ Drawing upon the discussion of Gordon and Newfield (1996), Lisa Yoneyama classifies various discourses around multiculturalism into three types: 1) liberal multiculturalism; 2) corporate multiculturalism and 3) critical multiculturalism. Yoneyama argues that liberal multiculturalism is premised upon a cultural relativist perspective that takes minorities’ voluntary participation and representation for granted while failing to address the dominant-subordinate power relations that have existed and determined one’s position in society and one’s access to resources. Under liberal multiculturalism, historically marginalized groups strive to gain recognition as a way to advance their political power and cultural representation (politics of recognition). Similarly, without addressing structural inequality, corporate multiculturalism focuses on how to better manage diversity in order to maintain efficiency and productivity and maximize profit in a globalization era. While acknowledging the pitfalls of these dominant forms of multiculturalism, Yoneyama does not discard multiculturalism altogether; instead she supports “critical multiculturalism”--a practice of “criticizing the situation where multiculturalism is conciliated to maintain the systematic orders such as nation-state, capitalism and patriarchy while attempting to recover and reinforce transformational significance that multiculturalism has” (translation mine: 24-5). See Lisa Yoneyama, *Violence, War, Redress: The Politics of Multiculturalism [Boryoku, Senso, Ridoresu: Tabunkashugi no Poritikusu]*, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten:2003).

⁵⁰ Tai Eika, “‘Korean Japanese’: A New Identity Option for Resident Koreans in Japan,” *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3: 355-382.

⁵¹ Jung Jang-yeon, “‘Pakkusu Ekonomika’ Jidai no Tōrai to Zainichi Shakai,” *Zainichi wa Ima*, ed. Kim Jin-hee (Tokyo: Seikyū Bunkasha, 1996).

⁵² Suh Kyungshik, *Han-Nanmin no Ichikara* (Tokyo: Kage Shobō, 2002).

either nationals of a (unified) Korean nation or ethnic minority of Japan, as mutually exclusive categories.⁵³ Instead of domesticating Zainichi Koreans in one location, Suh encourages us to see their lives that are rooted in border crossing practices –whether through literal traveling or imagination. Moreover, Suh argues that Zainichi Koreans’ diasporic consciousness is different from what Benedict Anderson calls the “imagined community,” which is mobilized through memories, customs, beliefs and food –“culture” broadly defined. Instead, Zainichi Koreans’ diasporic practices are characterized by its precarious political status of “quasi-refugee” that shapes their everyday lived experiences, most evident in the backlash of post-9/17.

Following Suh’s approach, I define Zainichi Koreans as simultaneously Korean diasporic subjects and ethnic minorities of Japan, and intend to understand their cultural and political strategies of everyday survival in post-9/17 Japan through this lens. As such, my dissertation will not argue that Zainichi Koreans should become domesticated by discarding their ties –familial, emotional and ideological–with North Korea in order to claim their worthiness in Japan. Instead, I pay close attention to the ways Zainichi Koreans have challenged the powerful anti-North Korea sentiments that justify and naturalize sanctions against North Korea and its associates. What does it mean to remain in Korean schools that are increasingly racialized and criminalized as “(potential) terrorists”? Why and how do members of Korean schools maintain their ties with North Korea when disavowal and denouncement of North Korea has become precondition to speaking –a “loyalty test” that determines who is “innocent/worthy” and who is

⁵³ Ibid, 170-2.

“evil/unworthy,”⁵⁴ rebuking the *shimin* or de facto citizen status previously acquired through the years of multicultural coexistence practices in Japan? Rather than victimizing the Korean schools or valorizing them as icons of resistance to racism and discrimination in the era of global War on Terror, my dissertation explores contradictory strategies and competing discourses members of Korean schools engage in enacting desires, creating lives, sustaining and dreaming in the space that is meant to disappear.

The decades long *shimin undo* (civic movement) and solidarity work between Zainichi Koreans and Japanese citizens has successfully mobilized support from South Korean individuals and organizations since the early 2000s. In the newly emerging “triangular collaboration,” Zainichi Koreans, Japanese citizens and South Korean supporters work toward the shared objective of protecting Korean schools and education in Japan. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the triangular collaboration has also allowed Zainichi Koreans to (re)claim material, emotional and ideological ties with their homeland(s) as diasporic subjects and assert their full membership as ethnic minority in Japan simultaneously. The collaboration promotes not only ethnic minority rights to education, but also preserving space and means to resist forceful forgetting of histories and memories of Zainichi Koreans that directly speak to Japan’s imperial past that continues to haunt and reappear in the form of anti-North Korea hysteria and xenophobia. Indeed, histories and memories are crucial factors in allowing one to be an autonomous subject; as Thu-huong Nguyen-vo asserts, “One does not become a recognizable human

⁵⁴ Asian American Studies scholar, Sunaina Maira discusses a similar condition surrounding Arabs, Muslims and South Asians in the post-9/11 American society. Sunaina Maira, *Missing: Youth, Citizenship, and Empire after 9/11* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

until one acts in one's history. And for that, one needs to have history.”⁵⁵ The struggle to protect Korean schools is thus a battle to claim active remembering “because forgetting deprives us of our humanist agency in relation to our history.”⁵⁶

Methodology

On the one hand, the dissertation discusses the ways the United States and Japanese imperial projects have worked in tandem and shaped the lived experiences of Zainichi Koreans. In particular, it discusses how the global War on Terror has shaped Japan's national security policies and discourses, and how the United States has turned the issue of Japanese abductees into an American concern. On the other hand, the dissertation elucidates how Zainichi Koreans are affected by the global and national anti-terrorists campaigns on a daily basis, and how they exercise agency as they negotiate their position, subjectivity and identity as Zainichi Korean in post-9/17.

As such, my methodology includes participant observation, in-depth interviews and analysis of various texts ranging from governmental materials and newspaper articles to Twitter correspondences and dance performances. For a total of twelve months in 2012 and 2013, I conducted ethnographic research, surveys and interviews at the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School where I became an assistant English teacher and co-taught high school sophomore, junior and senior classes. I went to the school three to four times a week to teach the classes and to observe the lives of students and teachers. The teachers at the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School gave me a spare desk and chair in the teachers' room, where I spent much time preparing for the lessons, discussing class

⁵⁵ Thu-huong Nguyen-vo, “Forking Paths: How Shall We Mourn the Dead?,” *Amerasia Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2005): 157-175; quotation, 159.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 169.

materials and chatting with teachers. Toward the end of my research in Kyoto, I also became a tutor for the afterschool program called “Mirae Seminar” (future seminar)⁵⁷ where I taught English to sophomore students. I conducted participant-observation in class, various school activities, and charity events organized in and outside the schools where I observed different strategies that the community members employed to make themselves intelligible to the broader Japanese society while attempting to maintain the autonomy of the schools. I also visited other Korean schools in Kyoto, Osaka and Hyogo prefectures, as well as a *minzoku* gakkyu, or ethnic class that exists in a Japanese public school where I conducted participant observation and interviews with the teachers and students.⁵⁸ This became extremely informative to learn about the general patterns and common practices at the Korean schools and the distinct characteristics of the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School. Furthermore, I participated in the Korean school charity concert, which featured South Korean singers and performers in Hiroshima and related programs (July 2014) in order to observe the triangular collaboration among Zainichi Koreans, Japanese citizens and South Korean supporters. The close-knit translocal network of Korean school community allowed me to establish relationship

⁵⁷ The Kyoto Korean High School launched a pilot program, called “Mirae Seminar” (“future seminar”) in May 2013 under the initiative of Kyoto Chong Sang Hoe, or the Korean Youth Commerce Community (KYC). Funded by the KYC -Kyoto and taught by the volunteer teachers from Ryuhaktong, or the Korean Student League in Japan Mirae Seminar is offered free of charge and served approximately forty students, four times a week in the academic year 2013-14. Mirae Seminar is innovative in which three different entities, the school, KYC and Ryuhaktong collaborate on a long-term project.

⁵⁸ In 2008, 105 or more than 20% of the public elementary and junior high schools in Osaka city have “*minzoku gakkyu*” [ethnic class] in various forms. A total of 17 *minzoku gakkyu* lecturers serve 2,000 students in the city. In Kyoto, there are three public elementary schools that hold *minzoku gakkyu*. See Kim Taeun, *Kōkyōiku ni okeru Zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin no Minzoku Kyōiku*, Diss. Kyoto University, 2012: 25-26.

with members of these other Korean schools and their supporters relatively easily and to conduct ethnographic observation and in-depth interviews with little difficulty.

At the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, I conducted surveys with the parents in order to quantify the various “burdens” that the parents bear in sending their children to the Korean school associated with “(potential) terrorists” in post-9/11 moment. Out of 155 households, I was able to collect 76 responses (49 percent) with the help of the teachers who distributed and collected the survey sheets on my behalf. In order to supplement these numbers, I conducted thirty-three interviews with the students, teachers, parents and alumni of the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School whom I met through my participant observation. I also conducted in-depth interviews with three Japanese and twenty South Koreans who are supportive of Korean school education, including movie directors Kim Myung-jun and Park Sayu who made documentary films about Korean schools in Japan. In addition to the ethnographic, survey and interview data, I obtained the textbooks and educational materials used in Korean school, newsletters published by the PTA, and court materials on the case of nationalist groups’ attacks at Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School (2009-2010). These documents elucidate how the Korean schools have become the site of contestation, as some utilize national security discourse to justify the sanctions, while others defend them using human rights discourse.

While “in the field,” I was cautious of my positionality as someone who has never attended Korean schools and whose speaking Korean, learned in South Korea, signaled her as an outsider. The Korean language spoken at the Korean schools is heavily influenced by revolutionary language spoken in North Korea, mixed with Japanese and

saturi, or dialect of Kyung-sang Province in South Korea where many first generation Koreans originated. During my fieldwork, I “fixed” the way I spoke and learned the way to behave as a Zainichi Korean woman to blend in. Thanks to my familial ties to the school, I was accepted relatively easily, however, as the only female person on campus who is not in *chima chogori*, a Korean style dress –the gendered dress form strongly associated with their ethnicity as Korean –I always stood out.

The school and teachers found my presence not only harmless, but also somewhat advantageous because of my affiliation with an institution outside of the Chongryun community and especially with an American research university. It seems that they desperately needed good recognition and attention from the people with “authority” while state sanctions and hate crimes continued to stigmatize their school. This made me mindful of the trap of “ethnographic multiculturalism,” which strives to include “never-before-heard languages that speak of never-before-heard things that actualize never-before-known consciousness” in order to make a claim of worthiness of the research subjects.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, the school and teachers were careful what to share and what not to share based on their experiences with “researchers” on multiple occasions. They were never passively studied, but actively exercised their agency –strategically filtered, modified and framed what they shared with me, and sometimes invoked “ethnographic refusal”⁶⁰ to tell me when and where to stop.

In reading, deciphering and trying to understand the meanings and implications of my data, I attempt to read them not only as facts and memories, but as analytics that open

⁵⁹ Denise da Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 169.

⁶⁰ Audra Simpson, “On Ethnographic Refusal,” *Junctures*. Vol. 9 (2007): 67-80.

up the space to examine competing discourses and contradictory strategies that Zainichi Koreans employ as they struggle for humanity in a society that only sees them as “monstrosity.” As I contend with Viet Nguyen’s attention to the burdens that minorities – who are not only smaller in numbers but in power – must bear when they tell their stories,⁶¹ I see the limits of treating interview and survey data as coherent narratives. I hope that ethnographic observation and readings of cultural performances have supplemented the interviews so that I could see what they did not show me and listen to what they did not tell me, enabling me to read between the lines of discrepancies of their narratives and performances and understand their “complex personhood.”⁶² Following John Lie, who employs C. Wright Mills’ idea of the sociological imagination –to make sense of the biographical against the larger contexts of history and social structure, I examine narratives, cultural productions and performances that allow us to better understand the connections between “the personal and the political, the past and the present, the concrete and the abstract.”⁶³

Chapter Outline

In Chapter 1, “Zainichi Condition in Post-9/17,” I contextualize post-9/17 Zainichi condition in a broader geopolitical context of the U.S.-led global War on Terror. I discuss the ways U.S. and Japanese imperial projects have worked in tandem and shaped lived experiences of Zainichi Koreans. In particular, the chapter discusses how the global War on Terror has shaped Japan’s national security policies and discourses, and

⁶¹ Viet Nguyen, “Speak of the Dead, Speak of Viet Nam,” *The New Centennial Review*. Vol 6, No. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-37.

⁶² Avery Gordon, *Ghostly Matters* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997).

⁶³ John Lie, *Zainichi (Koreans in Japan)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), xii.

how the United States has turned the issue of Japanese abductees into an “American” concern. I argue that these combined efforts to construct North Korea as a *military and moral* threat to the rest of the world have resulted in the targeting of Zainichi Korean organizations and individuals who are associated with North Korea. Under the circumstance, many Zainichi Koreans have actively disavowed North Korea and its military and moral threats, as well as distanced themselves from bodies and spaces associated with North Korea in order to win “good” Korean recognition amidst the “imperial feeling” permeating the society.

While the majority of Zainichi Koreans dissociate themselves from the “bad” Koreans and/or “passing” as Japanese in trying to avoid state sanctions, hate crimes and media misrepresentation, members of Korean schools make a deliberate choice to “be out.” Chapter 2, “Everyday Practice of Survival: Labor and Pleasure” examines a quotidian life of a Korean school-space associated with “terrorism.” Based on ethnographic observation and interview data, I explore “politics of living”⁶⁴ rather than simply documenting the damages and pains of the socially dead. I argue that teachers, students and parents devote material, intellectual, cultural and affective labors to bring life to the space that is meant to disappear. Simultaneously, despite limited resources available to them, the teachers and students respond to their desires and create pleasure – which often involve multiple transgressional acts between Japan, North Korea and South Korea. Some of these counter-imagination and practices remain carefully unrecognizable

⁶⁴ Anthropologist Ilana Feldman in her study of Palestinian Refugees urges us to see not just the “politics of life but the politics of living” (157) as a way to imagine viable, meaning social life which refugees manage to make. Ilana Feldman, “The Humanitarian Condition: Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Living,” *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism & Development*. Vol.3, No. 2 (2012): 155-72.

and illegible to the outside world, maintaining the distinct culture and autonomy of the school.

Contrary to these “internal” practices that bring life to the school associated with “bad” and “evil” North Korea, “external” political campaigns strive to win good recognition from the Japanese state and society, thus gaining equal access to resources to sustain the school operation. Chapter 3, “Between Recognition and Autonomy” discusses recent political campaigns that are trapped in temptation in pursuing recognition as legitimate and deserving subjects. In order to overturn the exclusion of Korean schools from the newly implemented free tuition program (2010) as part of sanctions against North Korea, members of Korean schools and Japanese supporters have focused on “students’ innocence” and “multicultural coexistence” as viable frameworks to explain why the students are legible, legitimate and sympathetic subjects who should be granted equal rights. Employing political theorist Patchen Markell’s idea of “politics of recognition,”⁶⁵ the chapter demonstrates that the pursuit of good recognition unwittingly reinforces Korean schools’ subordinate position vis-à-vis state actors, and has forced the Korean schools to accept various “conditions” that would radically alter the core principle, mission, and pedagogy of Korean school education rooted in decolonizing theory and praxis.

While Korean schools are torn between gaining recognition and resources and maintaining autonomy, in Chapter 4, “Dreaming and Practicing *Tongil*,” I discuss the newly emerging triangular collaboration between Zainichi Koreans, Japanese citizens and South Korean nationals that offers an alternative vision of Zainichi Korean social

⁶⁵ Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

movement. When Korean schools continue to be a contested site as the legacy of the Cold War and “division system”⁶⁶ persists, Japanese civic groups provide a unique space and means in Japan to make it possible for South Korean nationals and pro-North Korean schools to meet and build solidarity. Utilizing their citizenship and political power as citizens, Japanese civic groups help maneuver and ease the political tensions involving the two parties. Simultaneously Korean diasporic subjects and ethnic minorities of Japan, Zainichi Koreans (re)claim familial, ideological and emotional ties with their homeland(s), while claiming full membership and equal rights in Japanese society. The chapter explores the possibilities of a triangular collaboration and the ways in which it has changed and reframed Zainichi Korean social movement that is not simply about incorporation based on multicultural coexistence, but also about dreaming and practicing *tongil*, or unification.

* * * * *

Japanese and Korean names are written in accordance with East Asian convention (family name followed by given name) except in cases where authors have identified themselves with given names first, for example, in English-language publications. Japanese romanization follows the modified Hepburn style, while Korean romanization follows the modified McCune-Reischauer style except when there is another conventional or commonly used romanization. Unless otherwise indicated, all

⁶⁶ South Korean intellectual, Paik Nak-chung contends that division of the Korean Peninsula is not merely the division of the land, but the system that sustains hostility and spatial division, and is pervasive to virtually all areas of social life in South Korea. Division system is simultaneously producing and produced by various material and discursive affects among the ordinary citizens while it has allowed the politicians and corporate leaders to monopolize power. Paik proposes the idea of civic engagement as the most powerful force to dismantle the division system and bring about unification of the Korean Peninsula that is not only about spatial unity but also overcoming various forms of violence justified under the system. See Paik Nak-chung, “Toward Overcoming Korea’s Division System Through Civic Participation,” *Critical Asian Studies*. Vol. 45, No. 2 (2013): 279-90.

translations are my own. The names of the individuals that appear in the dissertation are pseudonyms.

Chapter One:

The Making of Post-9/17 Zainichi Condition

The Zainichi condition in post-9/17 is characterized by state sanctions, hate crimes and media misrepresentation. Many concerned intellectuals have compared the experiences of Zainichi Koreans in post 9/17 Japan and those of Arabs, Muslims and South Asians in post-9/11 United States.⁶⁷ I argue that these two moments of rupture are not simply comparable, but also related as anti-North Korean hysteria in Japan is strongly influenced by the U.S.-led global War on Terror, which designates North Korea as an “axis of evil.” I have two goals in this chapter. First, in order to situate the Zainichi condition in post-9/17 Japan in a broader geopolitical context, I will demonstrate how the global War on Terror has impacted the lived experiences of Zainichi Koreans through demonizing North Korea and implementing various sanctions against it. Specifically, my analysis focuses on how the global War on Terror has shaped Japan’s national security policies and anti-North Korean discourses, and how the United States has turned the issue of Japanese abductees into an “American” concern. I argue that these combined efforts to construct North Korea as a *military and moral* threat to the rest of the world have resulted in the targeting of Zainichi Korean organizations and individuals who are (deemed to be) associated with North Korea. The second goal of this chapter is to examine the “good” versus “bad” Korean dichotomy: how bodies and spaces associated with North Korea are

⁶⁷ See Suh Kyungsik, *Hakari ni Kaketewa Naranai* (Tokyo: Kage Shobō, 2003); Sonia Ryang, “Introduction: Between the Nations: Diaspora and Koreans in Japan” and “Visible and Vulnerable: The Predicament of Koreans in Japan,” *Diaspora without Homeland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), eds. John Lie and Sonia Ryang.

increasingly racialized and criminalized as “(potential) terrorist,” while those associated with South Korea have mostly received positive responses as a result of the *Hallyu* phenomenon –the global spread of South Korean popular culture. Finally, I examine how Zainichi Koreans have responded to the “imperial feeling”⁶⁸ that defines who constitute the terrorists, who defends security against whom, and whose security and human rights matter and need to be protected at whose expense.

North Korea’s Military and Moral Threat

Rooted in Japanese colonial rule, North Korea-phobia was reinforced during the Cold War, and has intensified since the 1990s due to the perceived military threats North Korea poses.⁶⁹ By October 2001, as an immediate response to the September 11 attacks in the United States, “taking measures to combat terrorism” was considered the number one priority in Japan’s foreign policy. According to the Yomiuri national poll of October 2001,⁷⁰ for the first time, North Korea was named the single most threatening country to Japan (50 percent), followed by China (14 percent) and Russia (10 percent). The poll also revealed that almost half of the Japanese population expressed interest in reinforcing the Self-Defense Force for potential terrorist attacks. Soon after President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law on October 26, 2001, Japan hastily enacted the so-called “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law” three days later, which went into effect

⁶⁸ Asian American Studies scholar, by “imperial feeling,” Sunaina Maira refers to the affective and cultural dimensions of imperial nationalism permeating various areas of our social life from education and work to popular culture and media, creating everyday structures of feeling among ordinary citizens including youths. Sunaina Maira, *Missing: Youth, Citizenship, and Empire after 9/11* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

⁶⁹ Itagaki Ryuta, “North-Korea-phobia in Contemporary Japan: A Case Study of Political Attacks on Korean Ethnic Schools,” *Ryukoku Corrections and Rehabilitation Center Journal*. Vol. 2 (2012): 76-85.

⁷⁰ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 31, 2001.

on November 2, 2001.⁷¹ With the new “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,” Japan could now actively participate in the global anti-terrorism and peace-making efforts while still retaining Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which outlaws war as a means to settle international conflicts.⁷²

As the United States and its allies were gearing up to start the War on Terror, President Bush delivered the infamous “axis of evil” speech at the State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002:

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.... States like these [North Korea, Iran and Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.⁷³

These countries allegedly posed threats to the United States and “the peace of the world” with weapons of mass destruction. Of the three countries, Bush criticized Iraq most harshly for its hostility toward America and for supporting terror by developing anthrax and nerve gas as well as nuclear weapons for over a decade.⁷⁴ The most devastating and immediate material consequence of this unilateral designation of an “axis of evil” was the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 amidst tremendous opposition within and outside of

⁷¹ Official title of the law reads as follows “The Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations.”

⁷² Office of the Prime Minister Website, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anpo/houan/tero/qa-tero.html>, retrieved on September 20, 2014.

⁷³ *The Washington Post*, January 29, 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm>, retrieved on September 20, 2014.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

the United States.

In his speech of calling out the “state sponsors of terrorism,” Bush did not forget to juxtapose the military threats that North Korea, Iran and Iraq posed to “the peace of the world” with human rights violations, which these regimes have allegedly committed against their own people. Bush described North Korea as “arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens,” and Iran as “pursu[ing] these weapons and export[ing] terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.”⁷⁵

This rhetoric is hardly new. Defining itself as a defender of freedom and liberty while casting Others as “uncivilized” and “undemocratic,” the United States has repeatedly used the threat of attacks – whether that of communism or terrorism – and logic of humanitarianism and democratization simultaneously to justify its military involvements and interventions around the world.⁷⁶ In doing so, the United States has successfully mobilized cooperation from its allies on military, financial, political and moral terms. In the era of the global War on Terror, Japan has become one of the most sympathetic allies (perhaps after Britain and Israel) to the U.S. efforts to eradicate terrorism.⁷⁷

With regards to North Korea, however, the United States and Japan did not share

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁷⁷ On February 18, 2002, the eve of U.S. invasion of Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi at the joint press conference with President Bush at the Prime Minister's Residence in Tokyo stated: “I expressed my respect for the strong leadership that President Bush has exercised to date. On September the 11th, these unforgivable terrorist acts took place. But in this fight against terrorism, we shall continue -- we shall need to sustain our cooperation and under international cooperation we need to carry forward this fight against terrorism.” See U.S. Department of State Archive, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2002/8611.htm>, retrieved on March 1, 2014.

the same level of urgency. While the U.S. public was primarily interested in weapons of mass destruction and human rights violations within North Korea, the Japanese people deemed abduction to be the most salient issue. The 2000 Cabinet Office Poll indicates that more than two-thirds of the respondents considered abduction as the most important issue in Japan-North Korea relations; the number rose to 83.4 percent in 2002 and 90.1 percent in 2003.⁷⁸ Indeed, from 2000 to 2013, abduction was considered by far the most critical single issue in Japan, over other issues such as nuclear weapons, missiles and “suspicious ships” that are believed to be involved with espionage activities within the territorial waters of Japan.⁷⁹ Japanese people feel more sympathetic and highly emotional about the abduction issue that involved “ordinary” citizens as victims, while they may find nuclear weapons and missile issues more “abstract” and distant.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ National polls on international affairs, the Cabinet Office, <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-gai.html>, retrieved on September 17, 2014.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Kenji Nakatsuji, “Prime Minister in Command: Koizumi and Abduction Question Revisited,” *The Ritsumeikan Journal of International Studies*. Vol. 21, No. 3 (2009): 205-220; quotation, 206.

Table 1.1: The Japanese Cabinet Office Survey on Japan-North Korea Relations
Areas of Concern (%): 2000-2013

	Abduction	Nuclear program	Missiles	Regime	Defectors	Illegal activities	“Suspicio-us ships”	Food aid
2000	68.6	39.3	52.1					50.5
2001	N/A							
2002	83.4	49.2	43.7				59.5	
2003	90.1	66.3	61.1				58.7	
2004	88.3	56.6	56.2	42.4			43.1	47.1
2005	87.6	63.9	52.2	46.3				
2006	86.7	79.5	71.5	44.5		46	43.8	
2007	88.7	75.1	58	44.6		44.1		
2008	88.1	69.9	51.5	41.2	40.4			
2009	86.7	76.8	67.3	42.2				
2010	83.0	68.4	56.9	50.7				
2011	84.7	65	52		50.5			
2012	87.6	59.1	49.6	41.7				
2013	86.4	70	60.8	41.8	38.6			

Embracing Victimhood: Abduction as “National Tragedy”

Immediately after Kim’s admission of the abductions, mass media coverage on North Korea in general and the abduction issue in particular reached saturation points, sensationalizing North Korea and Kim Jong-il as “evil” and grieving family members of the abductees as “sympathetic.” Historian Hyung Gu Lynn argues that major newspapers, TV news programs, documentaries and tabloid shows have shaped public opinion about North Korea and subsequent sanctions by creating what he calls “vicarious traumas” through continued personalization and dramatization of the abduction issue.⁸¹ Devoid of

⁸¹ Hyung Gu Lynn, “Vicarious Traumas: Television and Public Opinion in Japan’s North Korean Policy,” *Pacific Affairs*. Vol. 79, No. 3 (2006): 483-508. For months, not a day passed without discussion of the abduction issue. When the five surviving abductees eventually returned to Japan in October 2002, the six major Japanese TV stations spent a total of 30 hours of coverage, including specials and live coverage all day, while 32 hours were devoted to Koizumi’s second summit with Kim in Pyongyang on May 22, 2004 (491). The audience ratings survey demonstrates that North Korea-related news was consistently popular among viewers, generating a rating of 14.6% for a special on Yokota Megumi, one of the Japanese abductees, and her parents

historical and geopolitical context, these reports construct North Korea as inherently evil and the Japanese as innocent victims.



Photo 1.1: Five abductees arriving at Haneda, Source: Kyodo News⁸²

Five abductees made a safe return to Japan after nearly three decades of “confinement” in North Korea on October 15, 2002, a month after Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang. Their images such as photo 1.1 appeared repeatedly in the mass media, and viewers came to learn and eventually remember their names, faces, hometowns, family

(November 13, 2002), 14% for a dramatization of the Yokota Megumi case (May 14, 2003) and 18% for a similar program (September 12, 2003) (493-4).

⁸² Kyodo News, <http://www.kyodonews.jp/committee/conference/2002/8.php>, retrieved on September 17, 2014.

members, and other such personal details.⁸³ The government officials and family members of the abductees hold flowers and Japanese national flags outside of the airplane that had just arrived from Pyongyang. The image of national flags reinforces the idea of the abduction issue as a “national tragedy” and the abductees as “national heroes and heroines.”



Photo 1.2: Hasuike Kaoru (Left) and Okudo Yukiko (Right) at the press conference. Source: 47 News⁸⁴

In photos 1.1 and 1.2, we can observe that returning abductees are wearing the red badge that indicates “allegiance” to the Kim regime and North Korea, and the blue ribbon badge, the symbol of support for the abductees and their families, together indicating their precarious position as simultaneously “Japanese” and “North Korean.” Two months

⁸³ In the picture, we can observe that the first group of three, Nakayama Kyoko, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister (naikaku sōri-daijin hosakan) for the North Korean abduction issue, in the far left escorting Hamamoto Fukie and Chimura Yasushi. Behind them, Okudo Yukiko and Hasuike Kaoru with their arms linked while Soga Hitomi in the very back of the picture walking down the stairs by herself. Within ten days of their return, Hamamoto Fukie and Okudo Yukiko registered their marriages with the local municipal office to Chimura Yasushi and Hasuike Kaoru, respectively, and changed their last names in accordance with Japanese custom.
http://www.geocities.co.jp/WallStreet-Euro/1880/people_1.html, retrieved September 30, 2014.

⁸⁴ The press conference was held on October 25, 2002.
<http://www.47news.jp/smp/news/archive/200210/CN2002102501000441.html>

after their return to Japan, they finally removed the North Korean red badges.⁸⁵ Mass media and the Japanese public quickly became obsessed with the abductees and each documented moments of them “becoming Japanese again” during their visit, which was supposed to be only “temporary” as agreed between North Korea and Japan, but eventually became permanent.⁸⁶

As much as the mass media and government “propaganda” are responsible for the sense of victimhood embraced by the Japanese public, numerous grassroots efforts have also sustained and deepened the concerns over the abduction issue among “ordinary” Japanese. Established in March 1997, the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea [*Kitachōsen ni yoru Rachi Higaisha Kazokukai*], generally known as “Kazokukai,” has been actively organizing grassroots campaigns to raise awareness about the abduction issue among the Japanese public. Members of Kazokukai have traveled all over the country to give talks, collect petitions and meet their supporters. Small supporter groups came under the umbrella network, the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea [*Kitachōsen ni Rachi sareta Nihonjin wo Kyūshutu surutameno Zenkoku Kyōgikai*], known as “Sukuukai.” Today the network has branches in thirty-four of all forty-seven prefectures, or nearly 80 percent in Japan, and helps organize community events, petitions, photo exhibits and fund raising efforts.⁸⁷ As much as the abduction issue has been embraced as a “national

⁸⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 20, 2002.

⁸⁶ As North Korean and Japanese officials had agreed, this was going to be a “temporary visit” after which they were to be reunited with their children left in North Korea. However, in response to the outcry from Japanese public and abductees’ families, on October 24, the Japanese government announced that the five would remain in Japan.

⁸⁷ *Sukuukai* official website. <http://www.sukuukai.jp/index.php?itemid=1102>, accessed on October 30, 2014.

tragedy,” it has also become increasingly internationalized and universalized in the era of a global War on Terror. How has the issue of Japanese abductees gained global attention?

Abduction as Act of Terrorism

Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Yokota Shigeru, father of Yokota Megumi who was allegedly abducted at age thirteen on her way home from school in 1977, condemned the abduction as “on-going terrorism” in soliciting support from some 1,800 concerned audience members at a community event.⁸⁸ Naming abduction as an “act of terrorism” has enabled the issue to be legible within the larger efforts of the global War on Terror.⁸⁹

While the Clinton administration’s most pressing terrorism concern was the development of nuclear weapons, the Bush administration fully embraced the abduction issue in response to Tokyo’s repeated appeals. Bush and several officials in his administration publicized the issue as yet another example of human rights violations that they claimed to be widespread in North Korea. In March 2003, the family members of abductees flew to Washington D.C., hoping to raise awareness about the issue to the American public. Among fourteen high ranking officials, Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, seemed particularly sympathetic to the family members, criticizing abductions as an “unforgivable act of terrorism” that should be a criterion when considering the list of states sponsoring terrorism.⁹⁰ A handful of mainstream American

⁸⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, October 16, 2001.

⁸⁹ Although law Professor Shimada Yoichi stated that abduction of Japanese by North Korean spies is clearly international terrorism as early as May 2001, it was after the September 11 attacks that the term “terrorism” gained the kind of currency it has today. See *Asahi Shimbun*, May 5, 2001.

⁹⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 7, 2003; Asahi.com, March 6, 2003, <http://www.asahi.com/special/abductees/TKY200303050348.html>, retrieved September 30, 2014;

media outlets such as the Washington Post and CNN covered the story of the abduction issue and abductees' family's visit to Washington D.C.

In June of the same year, in the plenary session of Japan's House of Representatives, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that "abduction can be called 'terrorism' in common sense" although he also acknowledged that there was no legal definition of the term "terrorism" in Japan.⁹¹ Similarly, the pre-election survey conducted with 1,159 candidates for the House of Representatives in November 2003 indicated that 93 percent of the respondents considered abduction an act of "terrorism," a majority of which also supported economic sanctions against North Korea.⁹² Furthermore, in February 2004, John R. Bolton, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security who later served as the U.S. ambassador to the United States, also assured U.S. support of the abduction issue. He said:

North Korea remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and I can't think of any other way to describe the abduction of innocent civilians from Japan or any other country to North Korea as something other than acts of terrorism.⁹³

While "terrorism" became a strong narrative device on the global stage, Japanese politicians and family members of abductees made conscious efforts to universalize the issue by framing abduction as "acts of terrorism." Moreover, involving the United States seemed desperately necessary, as the bilateral negotiations between Japan and North Korea had not made major progress. As such, the United States fitted the abduction issue

Fukui Shimbun, April 8, 2003, <http://www.fukuishimbun.co.jp/jp/rachi/hikisakitop6.htm>, retrieved September 30, 2014

⁹¹ The Diet record, June 5, 2003.

⁹² *Asahi Shimbun*, November 4, 2003.

⁹³ U.S. Department of State archive, "International Security Issues, Arms Control Matters, and Nonproliferation" (<http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/29723.htm>), retrieved on March 8, 2014.

into their concerns over human rights violations in North Korea. Embracing the abduction issue as an “act of terrorism,” the Bush administration made sure that North Korea would remain on the 2004 U.S. State Department’s list of countries that sponsor terrorism. Additionally, the abduction issue was mentioned in the “North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004” (H.R. 4011) enacted on October 18, 2004. The text of the bill cited abduction of Japanese and South Korean civilians as part of North Korea’s human rights violation. The bill demands full disclosure of information in regards to abductees and assurance of their freedom and right to return to the home country.⁹⁴ The Japanese version of this act, called the “North Korean Human Rights Law” also passed in June 2006.

Abduction as Human Rights Violation

Family members and supporters of the abductees lobbied fervently in Washington D.C. to gain sympathy and support from the American public in various ways including making comic books about Yokota Megumi and translating books written by family members into English.⁹⁵ A Japanese citizen’s group based in Washington D.C., ReACH (Rescuing Abductees Center for Hope) helped promote a documentary film, *Abduction: The Megumi Yokota Story* (2006) made by Canadian journalists Chris Sheridan and Patty Kim. The film was screened at a number of major film festivals all over the world to raise awareness around the issue and even won many prestigious awards, including the Alfred

⁹⁴ Text of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004: <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr4011/text> , accessed on October 15. Refer to the earlier bill, the North Korean Freedom Act of 2003: <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/s1903/text>, accessed on October 15, 2014.

⁹⁵ English publications include a comic book, *Megumi: Documentary Manga on Abductions by North Korea*, published in 2008 and *North Korea Kidnapped My Daughter* published in 2009 among many.

I. duPont Award, one of the highest distinctions in American journalism.⁹⁶

Defining abduction as an “act of terrorism” has allowed the Japanese to make the issue more universal and recognizable to the United States and to international society, while embracing the abduction issue as human rights violation has allowed the United States to further demonize North Korea and the Kim regime. Here, we see how Japanese and U.S. interests collude, work in tandem and reinforce each other, together justifying a series of sanctions that follow.



Photo 1.3: Bush with the Yokotas (Right) and Han-mee (Left). Source: The White House archive⁹⁷

⁹⁶ *Abuduction: The Megumi Yokota Story* official website: <http://www.abductionfilm.com/>; The Washington Post (November 24, 2006) had a special article about the abduction issue and the documentary: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/23/AR2006112301048.html>, accessed on September 30, 2014. Because Yokota Megumi was only thirteen years old when she was abducted, her case evokes strong emotional reactions, and has received particularly great attention both in Japan, United States and the international society.

⁹⁷ The White House archive, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/04/images/20060428-1_p042806pm-0256jpg-515h.html, retrieved on October 7, 2014.

In April 2006, Yokota Sakie, mother of Yokota Megumi, made another trip to Washington D.C. with her son. They met with Bush –the first American president to meet a family member of the Japanese abductees – at the White House on April 28, 2006. In the center of photo 1.3, there are two framed pictures under the lamp. The one on the right is a portrait of Megumi at age thirteen before she was abducted, and the one on the left is a photo of Han-mee, another person invited to the meeting and sitting, in the photograph, next to Bush. Han-mee, her parents, and two other family members are North Korean refugees who became internationally known for their failed attempt to enter the Japanese Consulate in Shenyang, China in May 2002 –three months before the September 17 Pyongyang summit. This is the picture that is sitting next to Megumi’s portrait.



Photo 1.4: Han-mee and her mother at the Japanese Consulate in Shenyang, China. Source: Yonhap News⁹⁸

This is Han-mee at age two, who had successfully entered the premises of the Japanese

⁹⁸ Cited in “No Return until Liberation in North Korea,” *Daily NK*, February 2, 2007, <http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01300&num=1608>, retrieved on May 1, 2015.

Consulate while a few feet away her mother was captured by two Chinese military police officers (photo 1.4). All of her family members were eventually dragged out of the consulate and taken away by the Chinese authority. The image of Han-mee crying, and the video that captured the entire incident, circulated quickly and widely, and promoted an international outcry for humanitarian solutions for the desperate North Korean family. Two weeks later, they landed in Seoul.

Four years later in 2006, Han-mee, now six with her hair dyed and dressed in pink, sits excitedly with Bush and the Yokotas in the Oval Office in the White House –a powerful juxtaposition of the living proofs of ongoing North Korean human rights violation. Bush had the press conference immediately following the meeting with the Yokotas and Han-mee which he described as “one of the most moving.”⁹⁹ In his speech, Bush employs highly emotional terms to denounce abduction as something “hard for Americans to imagine” because it is a “heartless country” like North Korea “that would separate loved ones.”¹⁰⁰ Bush goes on to describe the struggle Han-mee and her family went through to escape “tyranny” to “live in freedom” because Han-mee’s parents, like “any mother and father” did not want her to “grow up in a society that was brutal, a society that did not respect the human condition.” Bush is happy that they have found “safe haven” and now “safely sit here in the Oval Office.” In addition to the use of sympathetic terms to which many Americans can easily relate regarding those in suffering, Bush’s statement also engages in the dichotomous rhetoric of “us versus

⁹⁹ The White House archives, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/04/images/20060428-1_p042806pm-0188jpg-515h.html, accessed on September 30, 2014.

¹⁰⁰ “President Meets with North Korean Defectors and Family Members of Japanese Abducted by North Korea,” the White House archives, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060428-1.html>, retrieved on June 30, 2015.

them”/ “here versus there” and effectively reinforces the image of North Korea as “tyrannical” and “dangerous” and the United States as “free” and “safe.”

At the end of his speech, Bush expresses his gratitude to those “special guests” for “confront[ing] people who do not respect human rights” and assures U.S. support:

... the United States of America strongly respects human rights. We strongly will work for freedom, so that the people of North Korea can raise their children in a world that’s free and hopeful, and so that moms will never again have to worry about an abducted daughter.”¹⁰¹

Sanctions as Deserving and Desirable

“Work[ing] for freedom,” as Bush proclaimed, has been increasingly equated with “sanctions” rather than “dialogue.” Successfully mobilizing U.S. and international society’s support for the abduction issue as part of the War on Terror agenda, the Japanese government has implemented various sanctions against North Korea to counterpose its *military and moral* threats to the world. The fact that the abductees were “ordinary” citizens with no political or special background increased public anxiety because it suggested that all Japanese and, by extension, the nation as a whole, were vulnerable to North Korean threats. Amidst escalating fears, the Japanese public consented to the series of sanctions against North Korea. More and more people supported economic sanctions over dialogue as a viable solution to “North Korean issues.” Asahi polls of July 2003 and February 2004 indicate that the ratio of those supporting economic sanctions was growing (45 to 49 percent) while that of supporting dialogue was slightly diminishing (40 to 38 percent).¹⁰² By November 2004, the difference became stark where 65 percent supported a “firm stance” and only 26 percent

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² *Asahi Shimbun*, February 24, 2004.

supported “deeper dialogue” in Japan-North Korea relations.¹⁰³

Sanctions against North Korea have had tangible, negative consequences on Zainichi Korean individuals and communities, particularly those affiliated with the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, a pro-North Korean organization, also known as Chongryun.¹⁰⁴ Sanctions include implementing new laws and amending existing ones to criminalize and illegalize one’s connection with North Korea, as well as a series of mass raids and arrests in the name of “national security.” For example, in February 2004, the Japanese Ministry of Finance amended the “Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law” to completely ban remittances to North Korea, claiming that the money sent from Japan could be used to assist “terrorist acts.”¹⁰⁵ Then, in June 2004, the Japanese Diet passed the “Act on Special Measures Concerning Prohibition of Entry of Specified Ships into Ports” to put surveillance on the “Mangyongbong 92” – the only passenger ferry between Japan and North Korea, mostly used by Zainichi Koreans who have family in North Korea, and Korean school students who take school trips to North Korea. As a response to the missile launch in the early morning of July 5, 2006, Mangyongbong 92 was banned entry to Japan (to this day), and the Japanese Ministry of Justice prohibited six Zainichi Koreans – all born in Japan – from visiting North Korea by stripping their right to re-enter Japan once they leave the country. These were all high-

¹⁰³ *Asahi Shimbun*, November 30, 2004.

¹⁰⁴ The official name of the organization is “Chae Ilbon Chosŏnin Ch’ongryŏnhaphoe” (재일본조선인총련합회) in Korean or “Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengokai” (在日本朝鮮人総聯合会) in Japanese.

¹⁰⁵ Ministry of Finance estimates that the remittances through official channels had fallen to 4 billion yen in 2002 (400 million in bank transfers and 3.6 billion in cash delivered by visitors to North Korea) and further fell to 2.7 billion yen in 2003 (101 million bank transfers and 2.57 billion in cash deliveries). *Japan Times* online Feb 13, 2005, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2006/02/17/national/spike-in-postal-remittances-to-north-korea-scrutinized/#.VFbayufHKLw>, retrieved on February 25, 2013.

ranking officials of Chongryun and members of the North Korean Parliament.¹⁰⁶ Local municipalities have also actively participated in the “national security” campaigns and started to implement sanctions against Chongryun. In 2003, right-wing Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro was the first to implement sanctions against Chongryun by removing their tax-exempt status, which was originally approved because the Chongryun Headquarters had functioned as a de facto embassy of North Korea in the absence of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. Many other municipalities followed his aggressive attitude, and by October 2007, twenty-two Chongryun-owned buildings had lost their tax-exemption status.

Making of (Unlikely) Terrorist Figure

In addition to the national and local governments, the police force actively contributed to the anti-North Korea campaigns. Between 2005 and 2008, 123 police mass raids were conducted against Chongryun-related organizations and private houses, resulting in the arrests of twenty-five individuals.¹⁰⁷ On November 27, 2006, 270 police officers were mobilized to investigate seven places, including the house of an elderly Zainichi Korean woman (age 74) who allegedly attempted to smuggle prescribed drugs for liver disease to North Korea via the aforementioned passenger ferry, Mangyŏngbong-92. The drugs are reportedly used to treat patients with radiation exposure, and the police suspected that the drugs were going to be used by those involved with North Korea’s nuclear development program. A Yomiuri Shimbun article of November 28, 2006 cites a former North Korean technician who had testified at a U.S. Congressional public hearing

¹⁰⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 7, 2006.

¹⁰⁷ Nicchō Kokkō Sējōka, *Seisai Hakusho* (June 2012), 19.

that 90 percent of the missile materials were made in Japan and smuggled regularly using *Mangyongbong 92*. Moreover, the Yomiuri editorial also accused the Zainichi Korean Scientists Association under Chongryun, as the elderly woman's husband happened to be a member of the association. Regardless of the "truth," whether or not she intended to smuggle the drugs or whether the drugs were going to be used for military purposes as Japanese police claims, I contend that it is significant that the "ordinary" elderly woman, an "unlikely" terrorist figure, is represented to have been involved with suspicious "terrorist assisting activity" in Japan.

The headline of an Asahi Shimbun article of November 28, 2006 reads, "Zainichi Woman Overturns Attempted Export of Drip Infusion Drugs to North Korea." According to the article, the woman "hid" drugs (60 bags of drip infusion drugs and 120 liver drugs) at the bottom of her baggage and tried to "smuggle" them to North Korea without declaring them. When asked, she initially responded that she would use all of them, but the customs officer insisted that there were too many. She then changed her explanation saying that they were for her relatives in North Korea who were medical doctors. The article emphasizes that her initial response was "false," thus rendering her suspicious. On the same day, Asahi's local section on Niigata (where the Mangyŏngbong-92 is docked) reported on the revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Control Law, defining North Korea as a "a country that may utilize civilian commercial goods for military purposes." This definition is significantly symbolic when we consider the situation of Zainichi Koreans, because the sentence implies that North Korea would utilize every ordinary thing and person, even an elderly woman, for its military purposes. The Commissioner General of the National Police Agency, Uruma Iwao commented on this case at the press

conference on November 30. He said, “We strive to expose *potential* cases and let the world know. We are urging police force throughout Japan to investigate cases involving North Korean-related people thoroughly” (emphasis mine).

It is important to note that, as Uruma’s statement indicates, one does not need to commit a crime, but only needs to be seen as *potentially* committing a crime. In other words, Zainichi Koreans, particularly those associated with North Korea, are already rendered “criminals” and “terrorists” who need surveillance, discipline and punishment *before* anything happens. As Lisa Cacho has argued, “illegal aliens,” “gang members,” “terrorist suspects” in urban U.S. cities are “unable to comply with the ‘rule of law’ precisely because the laws target ‘their being and their bodies, not their behavior’.”¹⁰⁸ Because their presence is criminalized and status is illegalized, they are rendered as illegible without “the right to have rights.” In a similar vein, it is Zainichi Koreans’ presence, and not behaviors, that is being targeted by anti-North Korea discourse and practice. Therefore, it is impossible for them not to be associated with criminality, illegality and illegibility even when they are not involved with any criminal activities. These “terrorist suspects” appear particularly threatening because they are not completely foreigners nor physically distinguishable. They can blend into the society with no difficulty as friends, colleagues and neighbors. In other words, “home-grown terrorists” (Burman 2010, 202) can be hiding anywhere. Familiar faces may actually be dangerous strangers. In this context, any and everyone is regarded as a potential threat. This fear unites Japanese public and further justifies sanctions against North Korea and its associates.

¹⁰⁸ Lisa Cacho, *Social Death*. (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 6.

Racialization of Korean Schools as Space of Terrorism

Zainichi Korean spaces that are associated with North Korea have also become targets of sanctions. On January 28, 2007, approximately one-hundred police officers and riot policemen stormed the Shiga Korean Elementary School in response to the false vehicle registration by a Zainichi Korean man in Osaka.¹⁰⁹ Although the case involved an extremely minor violation, the investigation lasted for four hours. Against the requests for restraint by the principal, the police continued to peruse rosters and confiscated documents indicating students' names, information on family members, telephone numbers and other personal information, which had absolutely nothing to do with the violation. Later denounced as "injurious" by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations,¹¹⁰ the investigation not only violated the privacy of the school community members, but also the reputation of the Korean school and the friendly and peaceful relationship it has built with local Japanese residents. What kind of emotional reactions did people have when witnessing dozens of fully equipped policemen entering a school in broad daylight? In Japan, it is extremely rare that police enters school premises as schools are considered highly "sacred" and should be free of police intervention, except in the case of extremely serious issues such as murder and arson. Moreover, it is an elementary school –that is supposedly nurturing and educating innocent young children—which was raided. The news reports of the investigation of Shiga Korean Elementary School effectively constructed Korean schools as a suspicious or even criminal entity. Zainichi Koreans

¹⁰⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 29, 2007; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 29, 2007.

¹¹⁰ The Japan Federation of Bar Associations submitted the warning statement to the Osaka Police Headquarters on April 22, 2010, http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/opinion/hr_case/data/100422.pdf, retrieved on September 17, 2014.

have become increasingly vulnerable because they are not only associated with the “terrorist state,” but also they themselves are seen as “terrorists” unworthy of sympathy or protection.

In 2010, Chongryun Korean high schools became the only schools in Japan that were excluded from the “free tuition program” which was implemented in April 2010 to grant equal educational opportunities to all high school students in Japan. Despite the numerous recommendations made by Bar Associations and civic groups both in Japan and South Korea, as well as the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,¹¹¹ the Japanese government has yet to overturn the exclusionary measures targeting Korean schools that are related to Chongryun and North Korea. Following the national government’s sanctions against Korean schools, some municipal governments have terminated the already-small subsidies to the schools as well. As of October 2014, four of the ten Korean high schools have sued the national government, and their struggles continue. I will discuss the political campaigns demanding recognition and equal access to resources by Korean school communities in Chapter 3.

In 2009 and 2010, *Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai* [Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi], widely known by its shortened name, “Zaitokukai,” staged a series of racist demonstrations in front of the Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School, claiming that the school was illegally occupying the land.

¹¹¹ In March 2010, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination released the report and showed “concerns” about Japanese government’s exclusion of Korean schools from the free tuition program. See *Asahi Shimbun*, March 17, 2010. In February 2012, while political campaign strongly continued for equal educational rights, three non-governmental organizations in Japan requested the CERD to demand the Japanese government to comply with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and stop discriminating against Korean schools. See *Asahi Shimbun*, February 28, 2012.

“Spy training school!” “*Chōsen Gakkō* [Korean schools] is operated by the *Chōsen Sōren* [Chongryun] that abducted Japanese. *Chōsen Gakkō* is not a school!”¹¹² These are just a few of countless verbal assaults Zaitokukai committed on December 4, 2009. Although the police officer (in uniform) and security police (not in uniform) soon arrived at the school, they just stood and observed the racist demonstrations, allowing the Zaitokukai to continue for nearly an hour. As Zainichi Korean journalist and writer Nakaura Ilsong describes, the police displayed “complicit generosity” [*kyōhan teki na kanyōsa*] allowing Zaitokukai’s acts of verbal and physical assaults to continue in front of their eyes.¹¹³ The fact the police did not intervene had a symbolic significance because their silence effectively showed that violence committed against Korean schools does not constitute a crime.

Kim Sangyun, a law professor and father of Korean school students, recounts the moments in which Zaitokukai members and police officers were indistinguishable.¹¹⁴ Chung Sang Geun, the principal of the Shiga Korean Elementary School, experienced the police raid a few years back. Chung later testified that the police raid of 2007 and Zaitokukai attacks had strange similarity as both were effectively criminalizing the space and people of Korean schools, both using enormous force backed by a sense of justice.¹¹⁵ Zaitokukai returned to the school twice in 2010: on January 14th in which fifty people “participated” in the attack, and on March 28th in which one-hundred gathered at the school, shouting “Cockroach Koreans, maggot Koreans, go back to Korea” and “Don’t

¹¹² Kyoto District Court, *Gaitō Senden Sashitome tō Sēikyū Jiken*, Wa-2655 (October 7, 2013), 8-9.

¹¹³ Nakamura Ilsung, *Rupo: Kyoto Chōsen Gakkō Shūgeki Jiken* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014), 16.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 3-4.

spread stinky Kimchi smell in Kyoto.”¹¹⁶ Each of these attacks was filmed by the members of Zaitokukai and disseminated widely on their own channels on YouTube and Nikoniko Dōga.¹¹⁷ Each of these videos has reached nearly 200,000 views, and the number is still growing. Underneath their videos, among hundreds of comments that support Zaitokukai’s “brave” acts against the “spy school,” dozens openly advocate for killing Koreans because they are “spies,” “illegal aliens,” and “inhuman.” Zaitokukai’s activities have not only solidified the atomized anti-Korean racists that had already existed, but also awoken/implanted anti-Korean sentiments among innocent and ignorant citizens.

Between “Good” and “Bad”

While Zainichi Koreans who are associated with North Korea have been racialized as “(potential) terrorists” unworthy of sympathy or protection under the name of national security, their South Korean counterparts have received mostly positive responses as a result of the *Hallyu* phenomenon –the global spread of South Korean popular culture. On the one hand, North Korea-phobia has become a “way of life,” unspoken feelings that justify and naturalizes sanctions and hate crimes against the “bad Koreans,” those who are associated with North Korea. Simultaneously, the “good” Korean image became readily available as the *Hallyu* phenomenon was thriving in Japan since the early 2000s. Just three months before the 9/17 Koizumi-Kim Summit, Japan co-hosted the 17th FIFA World Cup (May-June 2002) with South Korea, and as a result,

¹¹⁶ Kyoto District Court, *Gaitō Senden Sashitome tō Sēikyū Jiken*, Wa-2655 (October 7, 2013), 8-9.

¹¹⁷ Zaitokukai channel on Nikoniko Dōga was abruptly canceled by the website operating body, Dwango on May 19, 2015 as Zaitokukai “disturbed public order and standards of decency.” *Sankei Shimbun*, May 21, 2015, <http://www.sankei.com/economy/news/150520/ecn1505200030-n1.html>, retrieved on June 15, 2015.

interactions between Japanese and South Koreans multiplied before, during and after the World Cup. A number of Japanese universities and high schools introduced Korean language classes¹¹⁸ and the number of people who take Korean language proficiency test has also increased in the early 2000s. Meanwhile, *Winter Sonata* [*Fuyu no Sonata*], one of the most popular South Korean soap operas that was first broadcasted in Japan in 2003 and rerun for countless times, sold 360,000 DVD copies, generating a total of 122.5 billion yen (approximately 1.22 billion dollars) in 2004.¹¹⁹ The number of Japanese tourists to South Korea steadily increased from some two million in the early 2000s to over three million in 2009 and 2010.¹²⁰ Domestically, the historical Korea Town of Shinjuku in Tokyo suddenly attracted Japanese tourists who wanted to “taste” and “experience” South Korea. Today, not a single day passes without seeing *Hallyu* stars, and many of them have become role models for younger generation in Japan.

However, as media studies scholar Koichi Iwabuchi and others have noted, the rise of *Hallyu* is received and experienced by Zainichi Koreans in a rather complicated way.¹²¹ On the one hand, many have expressed that, for the first time, they gained confidence and pride of being Korean because of the significantly improved image of South Korea among Japanese. They also felt they no longer needed to lead a precarious life of “passing” as Japanese. On the other hand, many felt uneasy about the automatic

¹¹⁸ Ogura Akira, “Nihon ni okeru Kankokugo Kyōiku no Genzai,” *Kankokugo Kyōikuron Kōza*. Vol. 1 (2007): 51-6.

¹¹⁹ Sonia Ryang, “Visible and Vulnerable: The Predicament of Koreans in Japan,” *Diaspora without Homeland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), eds. John Lie and Sonia Ryang, 63.

¹²⁰ Tourism Statistics, Japan Tourism Marketing Co. (JTM), <http://www.tourism.jp/statistics/inbound/>, retrieved on February 25, 2015.

¹²¹ Koichi Iwabuchi, “When the Korean Wave meets resident Koreans in Japan: Intersection of the transnational, the postcolonial and the multicultural,” *East Asian Pop Culture*. Ed. Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008).

association of South Korean popular culture with Zainichi Koreans, who had lived in Japan for generations and were likely to be exposed to the culture for the first time just like their Japanese counterparts. Still others have criticized the exoticization and consumption of South Korean culture *over there*, while ignoring and dismissing the fact that Zainichi Koreans *over here* continue to experience racial discrimination and alienation on a daily basis.

In order to deal with racial discrimination and state sanctions *over here*, Zainichi Koreans have had to constantly disavow the abductions in order to claim their worthiness in post-9/17 Japan. The pressure was intense because, as denunciation of abduction and of North Korea has become what Suk Kyungsik calls a “loyalty test” to determine who is “good” and who is “bad.”¹²² If one were to defend North Korea or to even put abductions in the Cold War geopolitical context in order to better understand why and how such brutal acts could happen, she/he would immediately face the labeling of “pro-North” and “immoral.” Zainichi Koreans have been fearful that they may be associated with “bad” Koreans because the association would cause tangible consequences. This fear was in part reflected in their choice of nationality in post-9/17. Within a year since the 9/17 revelation, nearly 14,000 de facto stateless Zainichi Koreans with “*Chōsen-seki*” status, or “nationality of (unified) Korea, often conflated with being pro-North, gained South Korean nationality.”¹²³ Some have left Korean schools and Chongryun in order to establish themselves as recognizably “good Koreans.”

¹²² Suh Kyungsik, *Hakari ni Kaketewa Naranai* (Tokyo: Kage Shobō, 2003).

¹²³ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 5, 2004.

However, the boundary of “good Korean” and “bad Korean” is never fixed or easily demarcated. A “good” of today can be a “bad” of tomorrow, or vice versa. Indeed, the first time the word “abduction” struck Japanese society was in 1973 when Kim Dae-Jung,¹²⁴ who was then a renowned South Korean democracy activist and politician, was kidnapped in Tokyo in broad daylight. On August 8, Kim was abducted in a hotel in Tokyo by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) agents, taken on a spy ship, and released in Seoul five days later. Harsh criticism rapidly spread among Japanese politicians and intellectuals. Likewise, both the pro-South Korea organization, Mindan and the pro-North Korea organization, Chongryun showed strong opposition to the abduction and the military dictatorial regime of Park Chung Hee in South Korea.¹²⁵ “Abduction,” “spy ship” and “dictatorship” –the ghostly terms used to denounce South Korea’s violent acts in the 1970s have returned three decades later, and are now used to demonize and dehumanize North Korea.

In the context of post-September 17, the fear of being associated with North Korea is ever growing in which the “good” can quickly become the “bad” who deserves sanctions. As is the case with Muslim and Arabs in post-9/11 America, where one’s legal citizenship did not guarantee full membership in society, possessing South Korean nationality or belonging to a South Korean organization does not mean one is safe from being targeted. Instead, one is obliged to constantly prove her/his “good Koreanness,” and this process has divided Zainichi Korean communities. One incident that exemplifies

¹²⁴ Kim later became the President of South Korea (1998-2003) and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his dedication to democracy and peace in the Korean Peninsula. Kim is often referred as “Nelson Mandela of Asia.”

¹²⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 9, 1973; also see August 22, 1973 (evening).

the tension between the “good” and the “bad” Koreans was the failed reconciliation between Mindan (pro-South Korean organization) and Chongryun (pro-North Korean organization) in Japan. On May 17, 2006, the leaders of Mindan and Chongryun had the historic summit in Tokyo, and released a joint statement toward reconciliation. The so-called May 17th Reconciliation was, at least initially, received fairly warmly in prefectures such as Osaka, Kyoto and Fukuoka where a large number of Zainichi Koreans reside, and the two organizations had organized various grassroots collaborations for years prior to the summit.¹²⁶

In contrast, Mindan officials in some prefectures including Niigata, where Yokota Megumi and Soga Hitomi were abducted by North Korean agents, strongly opposed the 5.17 joint statement. Fearful of being conflated with the “terrorist-like” pro-North Chongryun, these Mindan local officials expressed tremendous dissatisfaction and distrust toward the Mindan Headquarters.¹²⁷ Meanwhile, some Japanese politicians publicly opposed the May 17th Reconciliation. For example, Saitama governor Ueda Kiyoshi stated that it was “regretful” because he believed Mindan should “confront more firmly about the abduction issue” especially since there are also South Korea abductees in North Korea.¹²⁸ Another example is an influential right-wing journalist, Sakurai Yoshiko’s essay titled, “Mindan, will you be the enemy of Japanese Society?” in which

¹²⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, May 17, 2006 (evening); May 17, 2006 (Osaka); May 18, 2006 (Kyoto); May 21, 2006.

¹²⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, May 21, 2006; May 30, 2005.

¹²⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, May 24, 2006.

she criticizes the reconciliation as a South Korea and Mindan's "surrender to the North Korean regime."¹²⁹

Mindan began to suffer sanctions soon after the 5.17 Mindan-Chongryun summit. According to Chosun Ilbo, a major South Korean newspaper, a local council member in Ishikawa prefecture abruptly canceled a meeting with a Mindan official although they had been working closely prior to the 5.17. Furthermore, the article reported that the city of Yokohama would lift tax exemption for Mindan properties, just as it had for those of Chongryun as part of sanctions against North Korea years before.¹³⁰ These are a few tangible examples of how Mindan faced the negative consequences as a result of being "friendly" to the "bad Koreans." What makes the matter worse, amidst escalating criticism and internal conflicts, North Korea conducted missile tests on July 5, and by the following day, Ha Byung Ok, the president of Mindan had to officially withdraw the 5.17 joint statement stating, "We cannot forgive such brutal acts... Now that Japanese society is entrapped with anxiety, our hope has come to naught."¹³¹ Ha soon resigned the position and was later expelled from Mindan by the newly elected president. Undergoing the anti-North Korean backlash as a result of being associated with the "bad Koreans" left a major trauma on Mindan, and in the years that followed, Mindan became one of the most powerful and vocal oppositional forces against North Korea, Chongryun and Korean schools.

On (Not) Reading the Atmosphere

¹²⁹ "Mindan-yo, Nihon Shakai no Teki to narunoka," published in *Shukan Shincho*, June 1, 2006, <http://yoshiko-sakurai.jp/2006/06/01/490>, retrieved on May 1, 2015.

¹³⁰ *Chosun Ilbo*, June 27, 2006; Tongil Ilbo reports on October 2, 2013 that thirty-one of the forty-eight Mindan prefectural headquarters are not enjoying tax-exemptions any longer.

¹³¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, July 7, 2006.

“You are not reading the atmosphere” Inoue Michiyoshi was told. Inoue is the music director of the Orchestra Ensemble Kanazawa (OEK) that performed with the North Korean National Symphony Orchestra in Pyongyang in March 2013. According to Himono Yoshiaki, the secretary general of Liberal Democratic Party of Ishikawa prefecture and other council members, the “atmosphere” is supposed to tell us that going to North Korea is an “abnormal act that deviates from society’s common sense” particularly after North Korea had just conducted another nuclear missiles test in a previous month. Similarly, the governor accused Inoue saying, “Visiting North Korea under this circumstance is unthinkable by common sense.”¹³²

Indeed, the powerful anti-North Korea sentiments continue to take over the country and structure the way we –not only Zainichi Koreans, but also Japanese –are supposed to feel about the abduction issue, North Korea and those associated with North Korea. Following this everyday “structures of feeling” in Raymond Williams’ words¹³³ or what Sunaina Maira calls “imperial feeling,”¹³⁴ Mindan wisely “read the atmosphere” and distanced itself from the “bad Koreans.” This has become an urgent survival strategy for many Zainichi Koreans who struggle to make sense of belonging, or lack thereof while negotiating surveillance and everyday disciplinary practices in Japan.

In this chapter, I intended to situate the post-9/11 Zainichi condition within a broader geopolitical context, particularly in the U.S.-led War on Terror in order to better understand the lived experiences of Zainichi Koreans. As the abduction issue quickly

¹³² *Asahi Shimbun*, April 29, 2013.

¹³³ Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

¹³⁴ Sunaina Maira, *Missing: Youth, Citizenship, and Empire after 9/11* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

became Japan's "national tragedy" and caught international attention for it is a violation of universal human rights, a series of sanctions have been justified and implemented not only against North Korea, but also Zainichi Koreans who are associated with North Korea. Under the circumstance, many Zainichi Koreans have actively disavowed North Korea and its military and moral threats, and distanced themselves from bodies and spaces associated with North Korea as a means to survive amidst the "imperial feeling" permeating the society. While the "imperial feeling" urges us to "read the atmosphere" as Mindan did, and one could easily jump into the flow of *Hallyu* and assert the "good" Koreanness, a small number of Koreans have refused to "read the atmosphere" and remained "bad Koreans." They are the teachers, students and parents of the seventy or so Korean schools in Japan. Why do the members of Korean schools make a deliberate choice not to "read the atmosphere" and remain "threats" in Japanese society? In the following chapters, I examine how and why Zainichi Koreans strive to protect their school communities, which many of my interviewees describe as *kohyang*, or home.

Chapter Two:

Everyday Practice of Survival:

Labor and Pleasure

Stepping into a Korean School

September in Kyoto is still quite hot and humid. On September 23, 2012, the annual athletic meeting (*ch'e*yukche** in Korean/*taikusai* in Japanese) at Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School was held on fields puddled with rain from the previous day. I was rushing to the school to observe the athletic meeting, the biggest event of the year at the seventy or so Korean schools in Japan. From the nearest train station, I took a taxi to the school. The taxi driver did not know about the Korean school nor where it is located. Not surprised at all, I told him to drive toward Ginkaku-ji, a 500-year-old Zen temple, one of the most popular tourist destinations in Kyoto, per my mother's suggestion. I had actually never been to the school where my mother, her siblings and most of my cousins had graduated from and taught as teachers. The taxi driver dropped me off right when we passed the temple. From there, I managed to find a tiny, barely-paved alley. Within a few minutes' walk, the school sign appeared in sight. I took a deep breath and proceeded to the first encounter with my "subject of study." I was fascinated by the proximity of the Korean school to the Japanese temple, as I wrote in my field notes: "The most Japanese site and the most *un-* or *anti-*Japanese site – at least imagined as such – are only a couple hundreds of meters away from each other. One,

internationally recognized, while the other, hidden in the back alley, essentially invisible and unknown to the rest of society.”¹³⁵

As soon as I passed the school gate, I was greeted by a number of vendors run by mothers of the schoolchildren, selling all kinds of Korean foods and, curiously, alcohol. Under the decoration of North Korean national flags, students were proudly marching just like the North Korean soldiers that are frequently shown on television.¹³⁶ There seemed to be twice as many adults (teachers, parents, grandparents and community members) as some two hundred students. Some of these adults did not seem to pay particular attention to the students' races and performances; instead, they were more interested in drinking and socializing among themselves. Others actively participated in a program in which students were supposed to find the person whose role was identified on a piece of paper they selected. For example, if one picked a paper that said “a father of a male senior student,” s/he had to find the person among crowds and run with him to the goal. This is one of the most popular programs at the athletic meeting. Another popular program involves senior students running with their mothers on their backs, holding hands with the rest of their family members. Growing up in Japanese schools, all these scenes were fascinating and yet not entirely unfamiliar, as I had been to a few similar gatherings held at Korean schools as a child. The school was like one big family. The highlight of the day involved all the students holding up a gigantic North Korean national flag (photo 2.1). Looking at the picture of the flag, my mother commented that the flag

¹³⁵ Field notes, September 23, 2012.

¹³⁶ The military march in North Korea resembles that of other totalitarian regimes, and the soldiers do not move their heads, lock elbows in 90 degrees, and lock their knees when they march. See *The Guardian*, October 11, 2010, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/11/march-like-north-korean-military>, last accessed on July 30, 2015.

she used to hold as a student was much bigger and lamented the declining number of students in recent years. I would learn this later, but many other schools hold a *ttongil-ki* or “unification” flag that has the Korean Peninsula drawn in light blue (photo 2.2).



Photo 2.1: Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School's Athletic Meeting. Source: Koppon-ori¹³⁷



Photo 2.2: Chiba Korean Elementary and Junior High School's Athletic Meeting. Source: The Choson Shibo¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Koppon-ori is a popular nickname for a civic support group based in Kyoto and Shiga prefectures, Chōsen Gakkō to Minzoku Kyōiku no Hatten wo mezasu kai/ Keiji. The picture was taken at the 2013 Athletic meeting and shared at the Koppon-ori official blog, <http://blog.goo.ne.jp/kopponori/e/a65d292298ad2eafb057971b6d767dbe>, retrieved on March 3, 2015

¹³⁸ *The Choson Shinbo*, July 15, 2015, <http://chosonsinbo.com/jp/2015/07/il-659/>, retrieved on July 4, 2015.

Toward the end of the day, drowsy from the constant drinking and eating, I started to hear the familiar sound of Psy's *Gangnam Style*, which was becoming extremely popular in Korea, the United States, and other parts of the world that summer. While the original music video reached one billion views on YouTube within the first month, a record high of all music videos on YouTube, it remained largely unknown in Japan except among some *Hallyu* fans.¹³⁹ As soon as I heard the melody, a group of senior male students appeared to perform the famous "horse dance" in front of several hundreds of audience members, just as Psy does in the video. This was happening all in front of my eyes: South Korean popular dance music performed by the students at the allegedly pro-North Korean school in Japan. This was my first encounter with the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School as a researcher.



Photo 2.3: Senior male students dancing to Psy's *Gangnam Style*.

¹³⁹ "'Gangnam Style': Is Japan Immune to PSY Mania?," *Time*, October 15, 2012, <http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/10/15/gangnam-style-is-japan-immune-to-psy-mania/>, accessed on April 1, 2015.

Focusing on students' creativity and playfulness within a space that is associated with terrorism, I attempt to *look for* rather than *document* different ways in which the Korean school and its members engage in creating lives, sustaining and dreaming in the space that is meant to disappear. In her work on Vietnamese refugee camps, Yen Le Espiritu details how Vietnamese refugees engaged in making political and social lives in a "context that was not supportive of, and often actively hostile to, their intimate lives."¹⁴⁰ While most scholars portray refugees as "objects of sympathy" who passively await U.S. benevolence, Espiritu provides a radically different account of what "refugee life" was like. Drawing upon Ilana Feldman's concept of "the politics of living," Espiritu examines various ways in which refugees managed to create a home and establish meaningful social relations within the camps – the very space and system that tries to reduce them into the form of "bare life."¹⁴¹ Importantly, everyday practice of living performed by members of Korean schools is not trapped in what Scott Lyons calls a "politics of purity," which sees any engagement with the present political, legal and economic system as a co-option¹⁴²; instead, it actively creates something new in an unexpected form out of what is available to them within limitations imposed upon them as teachers and students of the Korean schools. In the case of Psy's *Gangnam Style*, for example, the high school seniors were able to obtain permission from their homeroom teacher to feature the song, but with the condition that students use only the music without the lyrics, which may be "too South Korean" for the pro-North Korean school's athletic meeting. In this chapter, I focus on the quotidian life of Kyoto Korean Junior

¹⁴⁰ Y  n L   Espiritu, *Body Counts* (Berkeley: University of California, 2014), 50.

¹⁴¹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

¹⁴² Scott Richard Lyons, *X-Marks* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

High and High School. I will demonstrate small, and often spontaneous strategies and tactics that the teachers, students and family members of the school employ in making their daily struggle endurable and even somewhat entertaining amidst the state sanctions and public criticism.

The Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School

In 2013, the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School celebrated the 60th anniversary of its founding in 1953. Despite repeated suppression from U.S. military authorities (1945-1952) and Japanese government (1945-present), the school persevered, and in 2013 counts a total of 5,316 graduates, including my mother, uncles, aunts, and cousins. In the academic year 2013-2014, a total of 210 students (109 junior high school students [59 males and 50 females] and 111 high school students [48 males and 53 females] were enrolled in the school, comprising 16.6 percent of all school-aged Koreans in Kyoto and Shiga prefectures.¹⁴³ This indicates that more than 80 percent of Zainichi Korean school-aged children were enrolled in Japanese schools. While the Korean school students represented 19.7 percent of 554 Zainichi Korean junior high school students (age 13-15) in the prefectures, only 14.3 percent of 708 Zainichi Korean high schools students (age 16-18) were enrolled in the Korean school, indicating that many students leave the Korean school after completing compulsory education (grade 1-9). The majority of the

¹⁴³ According to the “Foreign Resident Statistics” (Japanese Ministry of Justice 2013), there are a total of 1,262 Koreans between age 13 and age 18 in Kyoto and Shiga prefectures, the school district of the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School. Of 210 students, 206 (98%) held either South Korean nationality or virtually stateless status of “Chōsen-seki” or “nationality of (unified) Korea” while only four held Japanese nationality. For the purpose of generating round percentage of those enrolled in the Korean school among all school-aged Zainichi Korean children, I assume all of 210 are “Koreans” by nationality. The numbers of enrolled students in previous years were not disclosed by the school, however, ethnographic observation and information interviews confirm that the number of student has been steadily declining in recent years.

students are fourth generation Koreans with “*Chōsen-seki*,” or “nationality of (unified) Korea” (47.1 percent), and South Korean nationality (50.9 percent); only 1.9 percent held Japanese nationality.¹⁴⁴

That same year, twenty-five teachers (17 males and 8 females), most of who were third generation Koreans, were working at the school. While the majority were graduates of Korea University in Tokyo which is also operated by Chongryun,¹⁴⁵ two had graduated from Japanese universities and two had completed a master’s degree in Japan and the United Kingdom. Their nationality breakdown was not disclosed, but based on informal conversations, I gathered that the majority had “*Chōsen-seki*.” About half of them (12) were in their 30s, five were in their 20s and eight were in their 40s or older.

Besides the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, Chongryun operates three elementary schools in Kyoto and Shiga prefectures.¹⁴⁶ There are also one junior high school and one high school called, “Kyoto Kokusai Gakuen” (Kyoto International School), formerly known as “Kankoku Gakkō” (South Korean School) operated by a pro-

¹⁴⁴ Although the Ministry of Justice does not differentiate “*Chōsen-seki*” and South Korean nationality in its statistics, the city of Kyoto’s resident registration reveals that there are 1,806 Koreans who hold “*Chōsen-seki*” and 21,638 Koreans who hold South Korean nationality in December 2013. This means that those with “*Chōsen-seki*” comprise only 8% of all Korean residents in Kyoto city. While “*Chōsen-seki*” represents only 8% in the entire Kyoto city, close to half (47.1%) represents in the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, revealing the fact that “*Chōsen-seki*” Zainichi Koreans are disproportionately concentrated in and around the Korean school communities. This is not an exception for Kyoto, but other places. For instance, the Osaka University research project (2013) reveals that approximately 40% of all students at the Ikuno Korean Elementary School in Osaka hold “*Chōsen-seki*.” See *Chōsen Gakkō heno firudowaaku wo chūshin to shita Zainichi Korian Komyunitii Kenkyū*.

¹⁴⁵ The official name of the organization is “Chae Ilbon Chosōnin Ch’ongryōnhaphoe” (재일본조선인총련합회) in Korean or “Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengokai” (在日本朝鮮人総聯合会) in Japanese.

¹⁴⁶ Chongryun used to operate five elementary schools, four junior high schools and one high school in Kyoto and Shiga prefectures at its height. Kyoto Daini Korean Junior High School was closed in 1998, Shiga Korean Junior High School in 2004 and Maizuru Korean Elementary and Junior High School in 2005.

South Korean organization, Mindan. Having gained the “clause-1 school” (*ichijō-kō*) status¹⁴⁷ in 2004, Kyoto International School receives financial support and full benefits from the Japanese government. In exchange, it is operated under direct supervision of the Japanese Ministry of Education, which has required the school to use textbooks approved by the ministry and teach all subjects in Japanese. On the other hand, categorized as “miscellaneous schools” (*kakushu gakkō*), Chongryun-operated Korean schools are deprived of the benefits and privileges of the “clause-1 schools” (*ichijō-kō*) and operate without any financial support from the Japanese government. However, unlike Kyoto International Schools, Chongryun-operated Korean schools retain relative autonomy over their education. Their textbooks are written and edited by Korean teachers, and all subjects are taught in Korean.

Every day is a State of Emergency

On a typical day, Yumi leaves home as early as 7:00 am. She takes a train, then transfers to a bus and walks for ten minutes to get to the Kyoto Korean High School every morning. At 8:20 am, the teachers gather for their daily meeting, and at 8:45 am, the students assemble in the homeroom. From Monday to Friday, there are four classes in the morning, a 40-minute lunch break, and then two more classes in the afternoon,

¹⁴⁷ Education studies scholar, Motani Yoko explains the difference between *ichijō-kō* or the schools that are recognized by the first article of the Japanese Education Law, and *kakushu gakkō*, or miscellaneous (non-academic) schools. One of the differences between “clause-1” schools and miscellaneous schools is that graduates of the former automatically qualify as applicants to higher education institutions, while those of the latter do not. Another difference is that the “clause-1” schools can receive tax-exempted donations while miscellaneous schools cannot. This has made it extremely difficult for Korean schools to receive large amount of donations and in part causing permanent financial crisis. See Motani, “Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: the case of Korean ethnic schools,” *Comparative Education*. Vol. 38 No. 2 (2002): 225-37.

followed by the end-of-the-day homeroom meeting and cleaning time.¹⁴⁸ While those who do not belong to any club leave the school at around 3:30 pm, Yumi, a member of the Korean traditional dance club, usually spends two to three hours practicing with her fellow members. Yumi is also a part of the student council, called *Chochong* and participates in weekly meetings to organize school events and discuss various issues. After fulfilling all her responsibilities, Yumi ends her long day and goes home around 7:30 pm. Some of Yumi's classmates, on the other hand, go to a private cramming school¹⁴⁹ or participate in the afterschool program called "Mirae Seminar" funded by *Chong Sang Hoe*, or the Korean Youth Commerce Community (KYC). They come home as late as 10:00 pm.

Once Yumi arrives at the school, she goes straight to the locker-room as she has to change from one school uniform to the other. While male students only have one kind of school uniform –blazer, pants and tie, just like the Japanese students, female students have two –one is indistinguishable from Japanese school uniforms and the other is *chima chogori*, a Korean-style dress. *Chima chogori* officially became the uniform of female Korean school students in the mid-1960s, as female students wanted something that clearly distinguishes them from Japanese students.

¹⁴⁸ In Japanese schools, it is common that students clean the classrooms, restrooms, hallways and stairs of their school buildings every day. At the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, the cleaning time was allotted between the sixth period and the end-of-the-day homeroom meeting around 3:00 pm.

¹⁴⁹ It is common in Japan that elementary, junior high school and high school students are enrolled in private schools that specialize in preparing for entrance exams. At the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, about half of the students attended such schools on a regular basis. Others have attended intensive courses offered in summer time.



Photo 2.4: Female school uniforms at the Kyoto Korean High School.

In photo 2.4, we see two kinds of *chima hogori* uniforms. The white *hogori* and navy *chima* summer uniform (middle one) had been abolished at the school for at least a few years while the navy uniform (left one) is still worn by all female students during the time they are on campus. On their way to and from the school, female students wear the so-called “Number 2” uniform that is indistinguishable from other school uniforms in Japan, thereby avoiding to stand out in public.

In her groundbreaking work on history of the *chima hogori* school uniform, Han Tonghyun argues that *chima hogori* was chosen by the female students themselves to assert their ethnic identity and pride as opposed to the Japanese feminist narrative that often criticizes Korean schools for being sexist and patriarchal by forcing the women to dress in a traditional dress.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, “culture” and its performance are highly gendered, and there is no “traditional” school uniform for the male students. This uneven

¹⁵⁰ Tonghyun Han, *Chima Hogori Sēfuku no Minzokushi* (Tokyo: Sofusha, 2006).

uniform practice has made the female students a visible “ethnic marker,” and forced them to bear the burden of keeping Korean culture and tradition disproportionately. As the *chima chogori* uniform was quickly adopted by the school officials and became the official uniform by the mid-1960s, it has become the symbol of resilience and pride of Korean schools, often featured in films and TV programs produced by Japanese and Zainichi Koreans. It also functioned as a “vulnerable armor,” a term I use to capture the dual role of pride and protection in the face of Japanese racism, similarly to the *hijab* for many Muslim women during anti-colonial and decolonial struggles in the 1960s and in the immediate post-9/11 moment.¹⁵¹ However, the uniform has also become a dangerous marker for the wearers and could easily be marked by perpetrators of hate crimes.¹⁵²

In 1999, the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School first introduced the so-called second school uniform [*dai-ni Sēfuku*], a “neutral” Western-style uniform as a response to a series of verbal and physical assaults against female students in *chima chogori* on the streets, crowded trains and other public spaces in the 1980s and 1990s.

The number of such incidents would dramatically increase every time tensions arose

¹⁵¹ Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “The Post-9/11 ‘Hijab’ as Icon,” *Sociology of Religion*. Vol. 68, No. 3 (2007): 253-267.

¹⁵² According to the large-scale survey conducted by 2,710 students at twenty-one Korean schools (1st-12th graders), the number of incidents of harassment and threats targeting these students multiplied immediately before and after the 9/17 summit. The report reveals that 522 students, or 20%, have experienced verbal or physical assault after the report of abduction. Younger students and female students were more likely to be targeted on their way to and from schools. While the percentage of male and female students of elementary schools who experienced abuse is almost the same, the number of junior high and high school students had a significant gap. Female junior high school students were almost four times as likely as to be targeted than their male counterparts (32.3% and 8.6% respectively). Similarly, female high school students were more than five times more likely to be targeted (23.3% and 4.5% respectively).¹⁵² Almost half of the female junior high and high school students who have experienced harassment while wearing *chima chogori* uniform at the time of attack. Even when they were not wearing the uniform, their school bag marked them as Korean school students. See the report, *Zainichi Korian no Kodomotachi ni taisuru Iyagarase Jittai Chōsa Hōkokushu* published by the group of young attorneys in June 2003.

between Japan and North Korea. For example, when the Japanese mass media reported North Korea's nuclear program in 1994, at least 155 incidents targeting Korean school female students were reported.¹⁵³ Similarly in 1998, soon after North Korea launched a "satellite" (reported as "missiles" in Japanese media), a number of violent acts against Korean school students were reported.¹⁵⁴ When the Japanese style school uniform was first introduced in 1999, wearing this new school uniform was considered to be a defeat and a submission to the violence, and so the *chima chogori* uniform was still favored among the students.¹⁵⁵ However, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 revelation in 2002, fearing for students' safety, Korean schools throughout Japan took various emergency measures, including enforcing the second school uniform on female students. More than ten years after the day, the emergency measure has become a norm and everyday ritual. Changing one's outfit symbolizes the students' daily transgression from the Japanese space to the Korean space that continues to be stigmatized. Indeed as Ryang and Song reveal in their close analyses of Korean school students' every day life, the transgression is often flawless and unconscious. While in schools, students wear *chima chogori*, speak Korean and are called by their Korean names. As soon as they step out to the Japanese space, they are dressed in indistinguishable clothes, speak in Japanese and even use Japanese names.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Chōsenjin Gakusei ni taisuru Jinken Shingai Chōsa Iinkai, *Kirareta Chima Chogori* (1994).

¹⁵⁴ Chōsenjin Gakusei ni taisuru Jinken Shingai Chōsa Iinkai, *Futatabi Nerawareta Chima Chogori* (1998).

¹⁵⁵ Ku Ryang-ok, "Kiete shimatta Watashi no Kokyo," *Chōsen Gakkō Monogatari* (Tokyo: Kadensha, 2015), 94.

¹⁵⁶ Sonia Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 37-41; Song Kichan, *"Katararenai mono" toshite no Chōsen Gakkō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012, 213-9.



Photo 2.5: One classroom at the Kyoto Korean High School.



Photo 2.6: The portraits are displayed right above the blackboard in each classroom.

At the high school, there are portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in the teachers' room and in almost every classroom (photos 2.5 and 2.6).¹⁵⁷ The portraits might be particularly noticeable if you are visiting the school for the first time whether you are

¹⁵⁷ The portraits were removed from classrooms in elementary and junior high schools in 2002 before the 9/17 abduction revelation, per North Korean state's direction. Song Kichan (2012) speculates this direction as North Korea's "consideration" over Korean schools and their community members in Japan. As the-late leader Kim Jong-il was going to admit to the abductions of Japanese civilians, North Korean state tried to take proactive measures for Korean schools that were likely to be targeted by post-revelation backlash (159).

Japanese, South Koreans or Zainichi Koreans, but as Song argues and as I have observed, they have become a part of the Korean schools' everyday life, and no teacher or student pays particular attention to them. Large-sized portraits are stored in the storage and only appear for special occasions, such as the commencement and anniversary ceremony. Today, the Kims are merely symbolic of how Korean education started and persevered, and their lessons and life stories have been almost completely removed from textbooks after the 1993 revisions.¹⁵⁸ As a consequence, when students were asked how they felt when they heard of Kim Jong-il's death in 2011, nearly 60 percent reported that they did not feel anything because they "had never met Kim" or "didn't know him personally."¹⁵⁹ "It was just like any other day," one student says. However, this does not indicate that the students do not have a sense of diasporic identity or nationalism at all. As Jin-kyung Lee contends in her discussion on Korean nationalism and identity among Korean immigrant women who had been involved in sex and sexualized service industry in South Korea, diasporic nationalism is selectively adopted and takes a specific and contextual form, such as speaking Korean, eating Korean food and sharing Korean culture and knowledge, while disavowing masculinist and patriarchal dimensions of Korean nationalism.¹⁶⁰ In a similar vein, (North) Korean identity, or rather consciousness among the Korean school students is not so much about the state nationalism or the country's leaders as about receiving letters from families in North Korea, remembering how tasteful a bowl of cold

¹⁵⁸ For detailed discussion on effects of the 1993 reform, please see Sonia Ryang, 1997 "Chapter 2: From Performative to Performance," *North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology, and Identity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

¹⁵⁹ Kim Cholsong, a member of the Korean Youth Networks –Kyoto, the youth organization affiliated with Chongryun, gave a lecture on reflecting the year after Kim Jong-il's death at the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School on December 20, 2012.

¹⁶⁰ Jin-kyung Lee, *Service Economies* (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 2010), 175-8.

noodles was at the Oklyukwan restaurant in Pyongyang on their senior trip, and learning dance and music repertoires at Pyongyang University of Music and Dance in the summer intensive program.

Drawing upon the lived experience of Palestinians, Ilana Feldman (2006) notes that a sense of home is “made in part in repetitive details of daily interaction and use of space. So having to do something ordinary different... is itself a sort of displacement.”¹⁶¹ Likewise, Korean school students have been “displaced” while at “home” space (schools) as their quotidian life is increasingly interrupted by racist attacks and state sanctions in post-9/17 Japan. For instance, on December 12, 2012, the news reported that North Korea had its first successful launch of a satellite, named “Kwangmyongsong-3 ho 2-hogi” [Bright Star-3 Unit 2]. Immediately after the report, the teachers at the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School had an emergency meeting and decided to cancel all afternoon classes to let the students go home safely.¹⁶² While anonymous death threats and silent calls are not uncommon in the Korean schools, the rise of anti-Korean movements in the mid-2000’s led by organizations such as “Zaitokukai” has brought a whole another level of disturbance to the otherwise peaceful school life. As I briefly discussed in Chapter 1, members of Zaitokukai orchestrated a series of verbal and physical attacks at the Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School in 2009 and 2010. Some of those who experienced the attacks became junior high school students during the time I was conducting research, and have told me that they are still traumatized from the experience.

¹⁶¹ Ilana Feldman, “Home as a refrain: Remembering and living displacement in Gaza,” *History and Memory*. Vol. 18, No. 2 (2006): 10-47; citation, 11.

¹⁶² Field notes, December 13, 2012.

In addition to the fear of racist hate speech and attacks, students are often forced to spend hours protesting national and local governments' discriminatory treatment against the Korean schools. In protest, the students at the Kyoto Korean High School spared hours on strategizing political activities, collecting signatures on streets, and delivering speeches at various events – time that should have been spent studying. As these examples reveal, national and local “anti-terrorist” campaigns shape the daily practices and realities of the Korean school, where the students are constantly obliged to address and deal with the material and discursive consequences of being associated with terrorism. When Korean schools, which many cherish as their *kohyang*, or home, become targets of surveillance and punishment in various forms, it seems natural and “logical” to avoid the schools at any cost. Many indeed have chosen this path, as we have seen in Chapter 1. The Kyoto Korean Junior High and High Schools is not an exception. Although I was unable to obtain the statistics on student enrollment transition before and after 9/17 because they were never disclosed, a teacher confirmed and several interviewees told me that there was a drop in the number of enrolled students immediately after the 9/17 revelation. How and why does a small number of Zainichi Koreans make the seemingly “illogical” decision to remain in the schools and embrace a stigmatized identity, even at the risk of personal and collective harm?

On Not Leaving: Making “Illogical” Choices

... One person's illogical belief is another person's survival skill. And nothing is more logical than trying to survive.

- Tressie McMillan Cottom¹⁶³

¹⁶³ “The Logic of Stupid Poor People,” October 29, 2013, Dr. Tressie McMillan Cottom's official website, <http://tressiemc.com/2013/10/29/the-logic-of-stupid-poor-people/>, retrieved on March 1, 2015.

In her blog entry, “The Logic of Stupid Poor People,” sociologist Tressie McMillan Cottom discusses why some poor people make “illogical” decisions in spending beyond their means on seemingly non-essential items like brand-name bags and suits. Based on her own experiences as well as her family members’ struggles, Cottom argues that poor people must pay a certain price to be recognized as someone “worthy of engaging.” This means dressing well and speaking well, which is not likely to work because one’s race and gender among others still function as determining factors for particular gains and losses. But as Cottom states “on the off chance that it would, you had to try” because it could possibly lead to employment and decent housing. Put another way, the seemingly illogical consumption choice that poor people make actually is a logical one and often the only survival strategy. Applying her theory to the Korean school community members, I argue that their supposedly illogical decision to send their children to the schools that are associated with terrorism might be the most logical choice if one were to actively resist the society where being Korean could easily mean that you are “criminal by being, unlawful by presence, and illegal by status” to borrow Lisa Cacho’s words.¹⁶⁴

Nevertheless, making “illogical” decisions is not an easy task. Nakajima Tomoko’s study on the parents of a Korean school in Osaka reveals that some parents initially had internal conflicts and were afraid of criticism from their family members for enrolling their

¹⁶⁴ Asian American Studies scholar, Lisa Cacho illustrates through her poignant case studies that immigrants, gang members, and other people of color in the United States are devalued, criminalized, and illegalized, and ultimately made “socially dead” subjects who are unable to live by the “norms” of capitalist, white, heteropatriarchy. Lisa Cacho, *Social Death* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 8.

children in the Korean school.¹⁶⁵ Yet, all her interviewees agreed that the Korean school is the only space where one's roots and identity is acknowledged and celebrated. Similarly, in her essay, Shin Kami explains why she decided to send her daughter to the Korean school. A second generation Zainichi Korean mother who had never attended Korean schools in her life, Shin wanted to provide her daughter with friends and community who could help her to confront and overcome the identity crisis and discrimination faced by Zainichi Koreans.¹⁶⁶ Accordingly, some Zainichi Koreans decided to stay with the Korean schools in spite of the negative consequences, which include terrorist-related stereotypes, high tuition, poor facilities, a greater disadvantage for Japanese university entrance exams, and a greater risk of the students' safety.

The in-depth interviews and surveys that I conducted with the parents of the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School students corroborate Nakajima's findings and Shin's narrative. The majority of the parents (80 percent) were educated in Korean schools for over twelve years, and 65 percent of them are alumni of the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School. These numbers indicate the close-knit nature of the school community. Additionally, there were two Japanese mothers and one South Korean mother who are married to Zainichi Korean husbands and who decided to send their "mixed" children to the Korean schools. Three-fourths of the survey respondents described their decision as "*atarimae*" [obvious] or "*shizen*" [natural]. This group includes current and former teachers and Chongryun officers who typically received their

¹⁶⁵ Nakajima Tomoko, "Chōsen Gakkō Hogosha no Gakkō Sentaku Riyū," *Journal of Poole Gakuin University*. Vol. 51 (2011-12): 189-202.

¹⁶⁶ Shin Kami, "Wagako wo Chōsen Gakkō ni Kayowaseta Riyū," *Chōsen Gakkō Monogatari* (Tokyo: Kadensha, 2015).

entire education in the Korean school system and were generally satisfied with it. Some of the former teachers told me that they send their children to the Korean school because they still feel indebted and attached to the community where they grew up and served. Those who are currently working at Korean schools or Chongryun do not have the choice to send their children to other schools. The shared understanding is that if their children leave the Korean schools, the parents would also leave their position or face tangible and intangible consequences, such as being transferred to a different school or position or face difficulty in securing a promotion.

The remaining one-fourth of the respondents said they had considered other options such as Japanese schools, South Korean schools and international schools before deciding on the Chongryun Korean school. Many of them are employed outside of the Chongryun community and have had their education in Korean schools questioned or considered irrelevant. There were also some parents who had never attended Korean schools but because of the harsh discrimination, inferiority complex, and identity crisis they experienced as young adults, they wanted to place their children in an environment where they can be accepted for who they are. As sociologist Han Tonghyun argues, Koreans in Japanese schools face interpersonal discrimination in the private sphere while Koreans in Korean schools face societal discrimination in the public sphere.¹⁶⁷ The parents who grew up in Japanese schools expressed the isolation that they felt as “the only Korean” in their class, so they wanted their children to have the support of their Korean peers. Particularly after the 9/17 revelation and the rise of Japanese nationalism,

¹⁶⁷ Han Tonghyun, “Media no naka no ‘Zainichi’ to ‘Chōsen Gakkō,’ sono Riariti no arika.” *Gendai Shisō*. Vol. 33, Nov. 4 (2005): 214-223.

many parents showed concern about how Japanese schools treat wartime atrocities, sexual slavery and recent land disputes. Some chose Korean schools merely by eliminating other more undesirable choices. To them, the Korean schools appear to be the most “logical” choice available to them.

However, their logical choice remains little understood in broader Japanese society and even among Zainichi Koreans, thus making the space of Korean schools “socially dead”--deprived of both protection and sympathy. This condition requires various forms of labor and sacrifice by teachers and parents to sustain the school. To make the students’ lives as ordinary as possible, parents have devoted an extraordinary amount of time, resources and labor (both material and emotional) to the school. Lacking adequate financial support from the Kyoto prefectural and municipal governments, parents pay a high monthly tuition and fee, 42,000 yen (approximately 420 dollars) for high school students and 22,500 yen (approximately 225 dollars) for junior high school students¹⁶⁸ in addition to the transportation fee of 8,000 yen (approximately 80 dollars) per month as many students travel more than one hour each way.¹⁶⁹ The parents prepare lunch boxes every morning, often take their children to the nearest train station or bus stop on their way to work, and come to school to prepare meals on occasion as the school does not have a meal program, unlike most Japanese public schools.

One may wonder if Korean school parents are financially better off than the average Japanese parents in that they can afford to send their children to the more expensive Korean schools. The fact is quite opposite. The surveys I conducted with the

¹⁶⁸ Interview, December 18, 2012.

¹⁶⁹ Ha, Survey, 2014.

parents of the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School reveal that about 60 percent of the households makes less income than the national average, 5,500,000 yen (approximately 55,000 dollars).¹⁷⁰ While more than half of the households earn less than the average, the Korean households have more children than the national average. The average number of children in a household among Korean school students (born between 1994 and 2000) is 2.59. According to the 2000 National Lifestyle survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office, among the households with children, 31 percent had one child, 49.5 percent had two children and 19.5 percent had more than three children.¹⁷¹ The surveys that I conducted reveal a stark difference in family composition. Among seventy-six households, only 5.5 percent had one child, 38.2 percent had two children and 55.3 percent had more than three children.¹⁷² These numbers indicate that the Korean school parents tend to have less income but raise more children than their Japanese counterparts, thus facing serious financial crisis. As a result, more than half are two-income families, and some of the parents have two jobs each.

Sending children to the Korean school does not just entail financial burden and physical labor, but also emotional labor. One mother told me that her daughter had been selected as a member of the Zainichi delegation for the annual New Year Performance, or *Sulmaji Kongyeon* in Pyongyang, North Korea. When chosen, the student performers (musicians, singers, dancers and narrators) from Korean schools throughout Japan would go to North Korea and stay there for forty days, practicing, rehearsing and performing on

¹⁷⁰ Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2011.

¹⁷¹ “Change in Marriage and Birth,” *Kokumin Seikatsu Hakusho*, 2000, http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/whitepaper/h17/01_honpen/html/hm01010001.html, retrieved on July 30, 2015.

¹⁷² Of 76 households, 5 had 1 child, 29 had 2 children, 37 had 3 children, 3 had 4 children, 1 had 5 children and 1 had 6 children.

New Year's Day in front of the country's leaders. And yet, the mother, who works part-time in a Japanese company, could not tell her Japanese colleagues that her daughter was in Pyongyang for this honorable occasion. Instead she told them that her daughter was in Seoul, South Korea.¹⁷³ The mother knows that visiting and staying in North Korea, and the honor of being selected as a *Sulmaji* performance member is hardly understandable and relevant outside of the Korean school community. Moreover, revealing this kind of information can easily put oneself in a difficult position of either having to answer millions of (ignorant and racist) questions or amplifying skepticism against Zainichi Koreans because of their connections with North Korea. Although the mother, who is an alumna of the Kyoto Korean High School herself, told me it was unfortunate that she could not share the great news with any of her coworkers, she seemed to quietly accept the negative consequences of sending her own child to the same school.

While parents expend physical and affective labor to bring life to the school, teachers seem to sacrifice their own lives in order to achieve the collective goal of preserving the schools. Teachers in Korean schools are expected not only to teach specialized academic subjects to the students, but also to develop the students' ethnic identity and political consciousness. As "*kyowŏn*" (teachers) –"occupational revolutionists," their tasks require a considerable degree of physical, intellectual and affective labor. Furthermore, their social and economic activities are highly regulated because of the nature of their underpaid (if not unpaid) reproductive labor, referred as "*saŏp*" which is defined as "organizational activities to achieve larger goals" and is

¹⁷³ Interview, January 25, 2013.

fundamentally different from a “(paid) job” in a capitalistic sense.¹⁷⁴ Long hours and weekends they spend for the school and the students, and habitual delays in their salary have made the teachers’ social circle and participation in capitalist consumption culture highly limited. Within the community, for instance, when teachers have meals with community members, they never pay. Community members are well aware of teachers not getting paid (enough) and show respect for their time and labor by covering all the financial costs. This has created an alternative economy without involving cash exchange among the community members. However, this economy does not apply once the teachers are outside of the community, and discourages and limits their socializing outside the community.

It is important to note that such labors and sacrifices are never equally and evenly distributed in a space where gender, class and other social disparities intersect and manifest on a daily basis as Choe Kŏn-il who used to teach philosophy at Korea University in Tokyo and currently teaches at the Osaka Korean High School, reminds us.¹⁷⁵ Here, my intention is not only to elucidate the extreme structure behind the operation of the Korean schools in which all sorts of labors and sacrifices are naturalized and justified under the name of protecting their *kohyang*, or home, but also to explore different ways in which the community members engage in practice of freedom. This practice entails the “quotidian *living* and *dreaming*” (emphasis in original), which La Paperson describes as “postcolonial” resistance among urban students and families in

¹⁷⁴ Sahoe Kwahak Ch’ulpansa, *Chosŏn mal taesajŏn* (Pyongyang: 1992), 1652; translation mine.

¹⁷⁵ Choe Kŏn-il, “Zainichi Chōsenjin Shakai to Undo ni taisuru Kōgeki no Honshitsu,” *Shakai Hyoron*. (Fall, 2012): 80-90.

Oakland.¹⁷⁶ I am most interested in how the students and teachers enact power in constructing themselves as subjects who insist on not only surviving but also thriving and continuing to dream. As opposed to reducing them to victims or to attribute legibility to these “devalued” people and communities, my intervention is to understand how they create their lives, respond to their desires and gain subjectivity on their own terms with the limited resources available to them.

From Space of Terrorism to Space of Pleasure

When I first started my fieldwork at the school, I remember being surprised to see how old the school buildings were. The four-story concrete school buildings where my mother also studied were built in 1961. After a major renovation in 1994, the school buildings remain fundamentally the same from the early 1960s.¹⁷⁷ In addition to being old, there were broken windows and cracked floors here and there, with temporary repair patches due to lack of funding. The school also lacks a gymnasium, which every Japanese school has. Instead, a medium-sized auditorium in the fourth floor of the building is used for physical education classes, after-class club activities and various school events and ceremonies including commencement. Shabby and insufficient at a glance, this space, with its unique and beautiful decorations, provided me a totally different look into the Korean school that is associated with terrorism and the “hermit kingdom” of North Korea.

¹⁷⁶ La Paperson, “The Postcolonial Ghetto: Seeing Her Shape and His Hand,” *Berkeley Review of Education*. Vol. 1, No. 1 (2010): 5-34.

¹⁷⁷ Field notes and the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School official website, <http://www.korea.ed.jp/school/>, accessed on April 1, 2015.



Photo 2.7: Senior students' classroom at the Kyoto Korean High School.



Photo 2.8: Junior students' classroom at Kyoto Korean High School.

These photos demonstrate how students make efforts to make their classroom charming and attractive with the banners, pictures and other decorations to nurture class unity. While these decorations are not uncommon in Japanese schools, they appear only at the elementary school level. The banner in photo 2.7 reads: “Together, we move forward. 3.1 (high school 3rd grade, class 1) class for real ~Make one person’s happiness nineteen others’ happiness~.” Other homeroom classes too have a year-long-slogan that they decide in the beginning of the school year. Below the banner, there are pictures of the classmates, current events with newspaper articles, classmates’ birthdays, and class schedule. Junior students’ classroom also had colorful decorations including each classmate’s picture with a unique posing style along with her/his name and birthday.

In addition, there are news boards to share local Korean community news and accomplishments of current and former students of the Korean schools, including a list of those who passed the English proficiency test and others who have become professional soccer players. The decorations are added and modified quite frequently. By decorating the space in their own creative ways, students seem to develop attachment to and ownership of their classrooms and school. By surrounding themselves with personal and affirmative pieces of information, the students not only assert their subjectivity, value and sense of creativity but also transform the space from the inherently negative one to an ever-emerging positive one.

During recess and lunchtime, students would gather and watch YouTube videos of South Korean TV shows and K-pop stars’ music videos on their iPhones (which they are not supposed to use at the school). With their linguistic and cultural fluency, they appreciate the humor and appeal of these shows and videos without the need for

translation. One girl who was into Big Bang showed me the dance move that she recently mastered from watching their music videos. Students not only engage in geographical, linguistic and cultural transgressions between Korean and Japanese spaces, but also between North Korean and South Korean spaces –the boundary that has never been as clearly defined as it appears on the map. Minutes before watching South Korean TV shows on their break, they would have learned in their classes about the Korean War or “*chokuk haepang chŏnchaeng*,” which literally translates as “Fatherland Liberation War” in which North Korea fought to liberate the South from American imperialism – a radically different perspective from that of Japan, South Korea or the United States. North Korean-centered academic texts and South Korean-centered cultural texts harmoniously coexist in these students’ lives seemingly without any internal conflicts. Some students and their family members take regular trips to South Korea to shop, eat and enjoy K-pop culture and the latest fashions. Some even “study abroad” in South Korea to pursue specialized subjects in undergraduate and graduate programs, as well as to brush up their Korean language skills in language institutes.

The teachers also appear to transgress the North and South binary just as much as the students. As teachers of the Korean schools operated by a pro-North Korean organization, they are officially prohibited to visit South Korea by the schools. They are not even supposed to refer to South Korea as “*Hankuk*” (which implies that it is a liberated, sovereign state), but as “*Nam-Chosŏn*” – an occupied territory that exists south of North Korea. While physical transgression is strictly restricted, the teachers travel to the world of the *Hallyu* through music, movies, and TV dramas. Among the two-dozen teachers at the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, I became particularly close

with Ryang-ja, a female teacher in her 60s. Unlike the younger and single teachers who typically live with their parents and have them perform all sorts of reproductive labor such as cooking and cleaning for them to continue to work as teachers, or those who are married and usually have their spouses work full-time outside of Chongryun to provide stable income, Ryang-ja has never been married and lives with her parents and younger sister in public housing about an hour away from the school. As the main breadwinner of the household, she supports her disabled father, who was a former Chongryun officer, aging mother and younger sister with the already small salary that often gets delayed. I could not ask Ryang-ja how much she earns, but she said that it was not much more than the monthly salary of new college graduates (198,000 yen or approximately 1,980 dollars) in Japan. The salary had been delayed for at least several months, and she was hoping to receive at least some of it before the new year so she could give her mother and sister money to prepare proper new year's meals. Ryang-ja would joke that she would be much better off taking menial jobs such as a custodian or convenience store clerk; however, she knows that these jobs would not give her *boram*, or sense of pride and reward.

To relieve the stress from a demanding job and family, Ryang-ja makes a daily escape to South Korean dramas. At least two or three times per week, she stops by the nearest rental video/DVD shop from her apartment on her way home and rents dozens of DVDs of South Korean dramas of all genres. While she eats a late dinner prepared by her mother and sister, they watch the drama together and forget about their present reality. One day she asked me to help her put music into her iPhone so she could listen to the music from the dramas during her one-hour commute. Ryang-ja would also

enthusiastically tell me about the new Korean words and sayings that she learned from watching the dramas. Hungered for *alternative* Korean texts to what she is used to hearing in the Korean school context, which is heavily influenced by the Korean used in North Korea, she quickly became passionate about *Hallyu*. It is also a process of empowerment in which Ryang-ja, generally deprived of means to participate in a capitalist consumption culture, is able to exercise her agency and knowledge in Korean language and culture and become an exceptionally “qualified” *Hallyu* fan, but one who is forbidden to make visits to South Korea and purchase *Hallyu* merchandise. Moreover, Ryang-ja often feels restricted in terms of how she spends her salary. Because the salary is usually combined with donations from community members, it may not be seen as an earned compensation for the time and labor that teachers devote. If Ryang-ja were to play pachinko (pinball gambling) or do something that is not considered productive or necessary which she hardly ever does, she would travel farther away to Osaka because she is afraid of being seen by community members. If she is caught in a pachinko parlor, she thinks she would be criticized for “wasting” the precious donations and goodwill of the fellow community members. In order to avoid such judgment, she prefers to travel thirty minutes to Osaka.

Although it is not easy for these teachers to start something new or pursue their personal goals – particularly outside of the community – due to limited time and resources, one teacher has gone back to school to pursue his dream. Having graduated from the Department of Music at Korea University in Tokyo and taught at a Korean school in another prefecture, Cholsu started working as the main music teacher at the Kyoto Korean school over ten years ago. Last year, Cholsu enrolled in a part-time

program in a Japanese university to expand his knowledge as a music teacher and composer. Because the Department of Music at Korea University only offers a two-year program, Cholsu had always felt that he needed and wanted to study music further. After years of teaching, Cholsu finally went back to school, and the principal and other teachers generously accommodated the change in his life. Now he is a part-time teacher and is no longer a homeroom teacher. He also devotes less time to the school's wind orchestra ensemble. However, some parents seemed to be unsatisfied with this change or are unable to understand why he desired to pursue further education. The real fear seemed, as the mother I interviewed said, that he might leave the school and “discover” the world beyond. Indeed, Cholsu is a talented composer and musician in addition to being an enthusiastic and compassionate teacher. If he chooses, he could probably work anywhere. While most parents think going to Japanese universities is a viable and desirable option for their children, they do not always think the same for the teachers of the Korean schools. Instead, many expect and take for granted that the teachers “remain Korean” and act as a repository of Korean tradition and cultural keeper in order to preserve the school. Resisting the expected immobility and fixed role (solely) as a teacher in a Korean school context, Cholsu has sought education outside the “comfort zone” and is proudly finishing up his program this year.

The Beauty of Dissonance: Exploring what it means to be Zainichi

The Chongryun defines the purpose of Korean school education as cultivating “authentic Koreans” [*shin no Chōsenjin*] who “contribute to the development of their

homeland and people, as well as [the] Zainichi Korean community.”¹⁷⁸ Accordingly, the mission statement of the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School reads as follows:

Our mission is to help Zainichi Korean students grow intellectually and become aware of their ethnicity, to create ethnic prosperity and expand Zainichi Korean community, and to cultivate human resources that can contribute to the friendship between Korea and Japan.¹⁷⁹

Under this mission, the students are never allowed to be just students. They are simultaneously activists and future leaders working for their community. For instance, Koma Press’ first feature length film, *60-man kai no Torai* (translates to “600,000 tries”; English title: “One for All, All for One”) which documents the nationally famous Osaka Korean High School’s rugby team, presents a symbolic scene in which the high school rugby players shout a slogan in Korean, “륙십만 동포의 꿈!” [*ryuksimman tongpoŭi kkum*], which translates as “For 600,000 fellow countrymen’s dream!”¹⁸⁰ The number 600,000 is typically used to describe the generations of Zainichi Koreans who remain “foreigners,” still holding onto either South Korean nationality or the de facto stateless status of “*Chōsen-seki*.” Considering themselves as “fulfilling a dream of *tongpo*,” these players hope to encourage fellow Zainichi Koreans who live in fear of rampant racism and xenophobia through their relentless spirit in the rugby field. In other words, these high school rugby players are not just playing for themselves or their families or their

¹⁷⁸ “Purpose of Ethnic Education,” *Zainihon Chōsenjin Sorengokai* (Soren in Japanese or Chongryun in Korean)’s official website, <http://www.chongryon.com/j/edu/index2.html>, retrieved on October 7, 2014; translation mine.

¹⁷⁹ The Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School official website, <http://www.korea.ed.jp/school/>, retrieved on March 3, 2014; translation mine.

¹⁸⁰ Koma Press is a team of two film directors, Park Sayu from South Korea and Park Tonsa, a third-generation Zainichi Korean, founded in 2010. Their first feature length film, *60-man kai no Torai* (2013) is a fruit of three years they spent with the Osaka Korean High School’s nationally famous rugby team. It won the Audience Award at the 2014 Chōnju International Film Festival.

school, but are also expected to do well for Zainichi Koreans whom they have never even met.

During my fieldwork, I observed similar moments on multiple occasions. For instance, during the rehearsal for the annual athletic meeting, the senior students kept reminding the juniors that the athletic meeting is not simply for the students to have fun, but an important opportunity where they can showcase their proud Korean identity in front of their families and community members. They emphasized that the students must always speak in Korean, march proudly and do their best during and between the programs to prove that they are the “future leaders.” In many occasions, the students manage to create something innovative and fun that meets both the school’s “official” mission and their own desire and pleasure. In other words, they do not passively play the expected role and fulfill expected tasks; they actively use their creativity to showcase “their own style,” and manage to embed their sense of humor into the performances. This practice is ambiguous in some cases and quite evident in other cases, depending on how “fluent” one is in deciphering the visual and audio contents and contexts through which these students play. Their performative act is “alternative” rather than “oppositional,” to borrow Raymond William’s constructive distinction, which can also be described as “disidentification.” According to Jose Muñoz, disidentification is not about counter-hegemonic or anti-assimilation, but about “recycling and rethinking encoded meanings... and using the codes as raw material for representing the disempowered.”¹⁸¹

One of the examples in which students engage in “disidentification” and “recycle and rethink encoded meanings” is seen at the annual cultural festival, held every year in

¹⁸¹ Jose Muñoz, *Disidentifications* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 31.

November. As opposed to the athletic meeting, where parents and community members prepare food vendors, at the cultural festival, each class organizes a food vendor of their choice. They include crepes and rice cakes. Each vendor booth is decorated in a unique way, and this one in particular caught my eye.



Photo 2.9: “Club Chuch’e” vendor.

This is the picture of one vendor, “Club Chuch’e” at the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School’s annual cultural festival. The sign in the center reads, “Club Chuch’e.”

“Club” refers a Japanese-style bar called “host club” where male hosts serve and entertain female customers, and “Chuch’e” or “self-reliance” is an official political ideology of North Korea developed by the founding father Kim Il-sung. Accurately reproducing the atmosphere of the host club, there are photos of “hosts” with their professional names that await customers. Juxtaposing the word Chuch’e, which is often sensationalized as “dangerous” and “absurd” in Japanese society, with a term that

represents Japan's nightlife entertainment industry creates an interesting dissonance that only those with knowledge of both cultures would find amusing. The juxtaposition of these two terms and worlds would be considered disgraceful and disrespectful to North Koreans and the country's leaders. However, with their ability to convert a supposedly sensational and ideological element of North Korea into something that can be played with, the students assert their ownership of what they have learned at the school and what they know from the media and the streets. Evoking Han Tonghyun calls the "sensibility of the Korean schools,"¹⁸² "Club Chuch'e" creates an intimate space of shared linguistic and cultural knowledge among students, parents and community members while carefully remaining illegible to the eyes of outsiders who are unable to decipher the beauty of the dissonance.

Another example where students demonstrate their creativity coupled with the "sensibility of the Korean schools" is seen in their band performance at the cultural festival. Led by two student MC's, the high school students sing and dance to various musical instruments. The songs they sang varied from Zainichi Korean songs such as *Uri lul bosira* [Look at us] and a South Korean rock band, Yoon Do-hyun Band's *1178*, a song about the division and unification of the Korean Peninsula. There was also a medley of *uri norae*, or North Korean songs, which high school seniors had learned during their two-week trip to North Korea in the past summer, a culmination of their twelve-year Korean school education. One of the songs they performed was, *Torp'ahara Ch'oech'ōmtanül* [Breakthrough the Cutting Edge], popularly known as "CNC song."

¹⁸² Han Tonghyun, "Media no naka no 'Zainichi' to 'Chōsen Gakkō,' sono Riariti no arika." *Gendai Shisō*. Vol. 33, Nov. 4 (2005): 214-223.

Composed by Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble in 2009, the song is about the newly invented revolutionary machine called “CNC” (computer numerical control) that is supposed to represent North Korea as a “strong country with science and technology.”

Three students sing the song with their original CNC dance in the picture.



Photo 2.10: Students performing the “CNC” song.

Here are the translated lyrics of the song.¹⁸³

Breakthrough the Cutting Edge

Whatever we set our minds to, made according to a program
Pride of the machine industry in the Sŏngun era,
Our style CNC technology

CNC – *Chuch’e* industry’s power!
CNC – an example of self-reliance!

¹⁸³ Translation mine. The original lyrics in Korean version of the song read as follows:

돌파하라 최첨단을
무엇이나 마음만 먹으면 프로그램에 따라 만드는
선군시대 기계공업의 자랑 우리식 CNC기술
CNC는 주체공업의 위력 CNC는 자력갱생의 본때
장군님 가리키는 길따라 돌파하라 최첨단을
아 - 아리랑 아리랑 민족의 자존심 높이
과학기술강국을 세우자 행복이 파도쳐온다

Following the General's leading path
Breakthrough the cutting edge

Arirang! Arirang! The people's pride is high
Let's build a strong country with science and technology
Happiness rolls over us like a wave

“The Sŏngun” in the song indicates North Korea’s “military first” policy where military is prioritized over everything else in state affairs. First appeared in 1995, Sŏngun ideology determines how resources are distributed, and controls people’s economic and political life. The CNC was invented under such circumstances and exemplifies North Korea’s industrial power and self-reliance. This breakthrough was made possible thanks to the General (Kim Jong-il), and happiness will come as we build a strong country, so the song ends. I doubt that the performers actually mean the message of the song. Nor does the audience pay particular attention to the lyrics or think deeply about the song other than catching some signaling keywords, such as Sŏngun, General (*ch’angkunnim*) and Strong Country (*kangkuk*) that often appear in North Korean “propaganda” songs. Not taking things in a literal sense or dismiss the (parts of) meanings of things such as these North Korean songs enables the students to balance the two mutually exclusive entities, North Korean-style education and Japanese lifestyle and upbringing.

In the Korean schools, the students cannot avoid learning various subjects from the North Korean perspective. They learn geography, history, political structure, and culture of North Korea, the country they call *chokuk* [homeland]. The students are well aware of how this sort of knowledge and information that they acquire at the school is not only irrelevant but also dangerous and scandalous in Japanese society that sees innocent

students being indoctrinated by the school that worships the world's most evil country. However, no student at the Korean school openly refuses to learn or engage in what is covered and expected in classrooms and extracurricular activities. Instead, they manage to incorporate such "abnormality" into their "normal" quotidian life through taming and modifying some of the contents. American studies scholar Adria Imada's scholarship on Hawaiian hula dancers sheds light on how one can interpret such practice. She contends that hula performers during the American colonial expansion did not always demonstrate explicit opposition to colonial institutions, but rather responded to colonization with what she calls "counter-colonial desires" that were neither clearly oppositional nor accommodating.¹⁸⁴ These students too do not show explicit discontent or skepticism toward "irrelevant" and "scandalous" contents that they are exposed to through Korean school's education. Instead, not taking things too seriously, but being playful with the contents without completely (or directly) disrespecting North Korea and its great leaders, these repertoires of knowledge become integrated into the students' lives without much hesitation and conflict, and can even become a source of entertainment in their mundane school life.

These nuanced "counter-imagination and practices" remain unrecognizable and illegible to the outside world. Easily classified as a "propaganda song," the scene where the students sing the CNC song can be used by anti-North Korea/Korean school racist groups as proof of how students at Korean schools are brainwashed by the North Korean ideology. Therefore, the students would never sing such songs at charity events and concerts that are open to a broader Japanese public because they know the possible

¹⁸⁴ Adria Imada, *Aloha America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).

consequences. These imagination and practices carefully stay in the school. In the next chapter, I will discuss and examine recent political campaigns in which Korean school communities interact with broader Japanese society and actively seek recognition as “legitimate” in order to secure resources to preserve their schools

Chapter Three:

Between Recognition and Autonomy

On one side you have a juridical conception of freedom: every individual originally has in his possession a certain freedom, a part of which he will or will not cede. On the other side, freedom is not conceived as the exercise of some basic rights, but simply as the *independence of the governed with regard to government*....With regard to the problem of what are currently called human rights, we would only need look at where, in what countries, how, and in what forms these rights are claimed to see that at times the question is actually the juridical question of rights, and at others it is a question of this assertion or *claim of the independence of the governed vis-à-vis governmentality* (emphasis in original).

-Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 41-42

In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, the lecture series at the College de France (1978-1979), Michel Foucault reminds us of these two conceptions of freedom, one based on the rights of individuals, and the other on the independence of the governed.¹⁸⁵ I find Foucault's distinction in the ways of achieving freedom useful in examining the ongoing political campaigns by Korean school communities that are deprived of access to various resources by the national and local governments as part of Japan's sanctions against North Korea. As this chapter reveals, Korean schools are caught in between these two forms of "freedom," seeking freedom in the form of equal rights to education and resources, which often comes at the expense of losing autonomy, and striving to maintain the "independence of the governed with regard to government." Examining different political strategies employed by the Korean schools and their supporters, I pay close attention to *how* they claim their eligibility for these rights while they negotiate state surveillance and intervention in the process. I argue that in their efforts to gain

¹⁸⁵ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (New York: Picador, 2010).

recognition as legible, legitimate, and sympathetic subjects, Korean schools are trapped in what political theorist Patchen Markell calls a “permanent temptation” in pursuing “recognition.” Markell critiques the politics of recognition, which considers injustice a “failure to extend people the good-recognition that they deserve in virtue of who they are.”¹⁸⁶ Based on this understanding, the disenfranchised must make efforts to win the good recognition from those who do the recognizing, which ends up binding them by recognition. Put differently, they are bound by recognition; what is supposed to emancipate them ironically binds them. They are simultaneously honored *and* constrained.

Escalating anti-North Korea sentiments have made the desire for good recognition even more urgent among Korean school community members. Denial of access to various resources on both national and local levels threatens the very existence of the schools. Under such circumstances, the pursuit of good recognition does not seem optional but essential for their survival. In order to win good recognition, members of Korean schools and sympathetic Japanese supporters have employed two approaches: 1) “students are innocent” narrative and 2) “multicultural coexistence” [*tabunka kyōsei*] to explain why the students are legible, legitimate and sympathetic subjects who should be granted equal rights. However, as the chapter will demonstrate, the search for recognition unwittingly reinforces and perpetuates existing relations of subordination and state dominance over their education. In other words, the pursuit of good recognition as a prerequisite to the “right to have rights” has forced the Korean schools to accept various “conditions” under the name of “protecting students’ right to education” and “advancing

¹⁸⁶ Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 178.

multicultural coexistence ideal” that would radically alter the core principle, mission, and pedagogy of Korean school education that is rooted in decoloniality and autonomy.

All, but Korean Schools: In the Time of War

As part of the series of sanctions against North Korea, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) decided to exclude the Chongryun Korean schools from the newly implemented free tuition program. “The Act on Free Tuition Fee at Public High Schools and High School Enrollment Support Fund” (hereafter, “free tuition program”) was passed on March 31 and enacted on April 1, 2010 by the-then ruling Democratic Party of Japan, “to ease family educational expenses and to contribute to equal opportunity in upper secondary education.”¹⁸⁷ This Act in effect makes public high school education free, and provides approximately 120,000 yen (approximately 1,200 dollars) per year, equivalent to the public school tuition, to those who attend private schools.¹⁸⁸

Among the non-Japanese schools that were initially excluded from the free tuition program, forty were eventually recognized as eligible by the special committee of experts established by MEXT.¹⁸⁹ These included South Korean, Chinese, French, and German

¹⁸⁷ The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)’s official website: <http://www.mext.go.jp/english/elsec/1303524.htm> accessed on November 15, 2014.

¹⁸⁸ About a month before the act went into effect, on February 21, *Asahi Shimbun* scooped that Nakai Hiroshi, the Minister for the Abduction Issue, had requested Kawabata Tatsuo, the Minister of the MEXT, to “consider carefully” whether or not to include Korean schools in the “free tuition program.” See *Asahi Shimbun*, February 21, 2010. Because Nakai thinks financially supporting the Korean school students would mean supporting “the nationals of the nation against which Japan has been imposing economic sanctions,” he strongly urged Kawabata to exclude those schools. In response, Kawabata firmly stated that neither diplomatic issues nor the contents of education should determine the eligibility when considering criteria for the “free tuition program.” See *Asahi Shimbun*, February 23, 2010.

¹⁸⁹ As of February 1, 2015, a total of forty non-Japanese schools have been recognized and have enjoyed the financial support according to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and

schools. When the Liberal Democratic Party regained political power as the ruling party in 2012, the new Abe regime quickly amended the act in February 2013 to officially exclude the Chongryun Korean schools. Abe justified this “sanction” against the Korean schools by appealing to the unresolved abduction issue and the schools’ close relationship with Chongryun, the pro-North Korea organization.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, Shimomura Hakubun, the Minister of MEXT, assured that Korean schools would not be included unless Japan and North Korea establish diplomatic relations, or if Korean schools attain the so-called “*ichijō-kō*,” or “clause-1 school” status, which would put them under direct control of MEXT.¹⁹¹ Today, five years, four Prime Ministers and six MEXT Ministers later, some 2,000 students in Korean high schools remain excluded from the free tuition program. As of October 2014, four of the ten Korean high schools have sued the government, and the court cases are ongoing.

Local Governments Join National Security Efforts

Despite North Korea’s missile program and abduction issue, I have always been a defender of Korean schools [*Chōsen Gakkō*] even putting myself on the line [*karada wo hatte*]. Although there has actually involved a great risk to provide financial support to them, I wanted to protect the schools at any cost. I had hoped that the new regime in North Korea would bring positive changes; however, the reality was the opposite. North Korea has launched missiles and continued with its nuclear program. It is indeed a reckless act against international society.

Moreover, it poses a great threat to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Considering the escalating tension, I lost my will to be their shield any longer. I did not feel confident that I could justify the financial support for Korean schools to the residents of Kanagawa prefecture. While I would like to show my support for the students, I do not believe that

Technology (MEXT)’s official website:

http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/mushouka/1307345.htm, accessed on March 10, 2015.

¹⁹⁰ Minister Shimomura’s press conference, February 19, 2013, the official MEXT website, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/daijin/detail/1330782.htm, retrieved on March 10, 2015.

¹⁹¹ Press conference at the MEXT, December 27, 2012, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/daijin/detail/1329446.htm, accessed on February 12, 2014.

they have absolutely nothing to do [with North Korea]. I want the students to understand this is how nations operate. You might say, individuals are individuals, but this is what it means to be part of the nation. I want the students to learn this.

- Kuroiwa Yuji, Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture¹⁹²

While the national government openly discriminates against Korean schools, local governments started to join the national security efforts and cut the already small amount of subsidies they had allocated to the Korean schools since the 1970s. A former popular news anchor and the governor of Kanagawa prefecture, Kuroiwa Yuji, decided to stop the subsidies to the five Korean schools in the prefecture. His remarks imply that the schools and students should take responsibility for a “reckless act against international society” and a “great threat to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty” that North Korea had posed because he believes this is “how nations operate.” Kuroiwa frames North Korea’s missile launches within the broader context of the War on Terror rather than as a bilateral issue between Japan and North Korea, and by emphasizing it as threatening the “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,” he reminds us that Japan is on the U.S.-side in this war against evil Others, as represented by North Korea.

Furthermore, Kuroiwa wants the Korean students to learn an important lesson: that if one is part of an “axis of evil” nation such as North Korea, she or he will be treated as such. His statement strongly resonates with the story of Samer Bishawi, a 27-year-old Palestinian who overstayed his visa in the U.S. and was arrested on his way back to the West Bank to see his sick mother. During his detainment, Bishawi asked what (else) he did (other than overstaying visa), and the officer told him “You did nothing. Your people

¹⁹² At the regular press conference held on February 18, 2013, Niconico Dōga, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm20152260>, accessed on November 10, 2014.

did.” Bishawi was one of countless Arab and Muslim men who were “punished” not for what they did, but for what “their people did.”¹⁹³ In a similar vein, Korean school students did nothing, but “their people” did, which, according to Kurosawa and many others, would justify punishment in the form of sanctions.

Indeed, Koreans find themselves in times of “war” and forced to prove their positionality as an ally, or be automatically labeled as an enemy. In post-9/17 Japan, the overwhelming binary has overridden the ideal of “multicultural coexistence” [*tabunka kyōsei*] that had once extended limited rights to minority populations, including the Chongryun Korean schools. For the last several decades, twenty-seven prefectural governments and numerous municipal governments had provided financial support to the Korean schools, hoping to enhance “friendship between Japan and North Korea” and “harmony among foreign residents and Japanese citizens.”¹⁹⁴ However, by August 2014, at least eight prefectural governments had suspended or abolished subsidies to the Korean schools, and the list continues to grow as many others join the national security efforts.¹⁹⁵ Between 2009 and 2014, financial support for Korean schools from local governments dropped by 70 percent from a combined total of 766,666,000 yen (approximately 7.66 million dollars) to 256,670,000 yen (approximately 2.56 million dollars).¹⁹⁶ Behind this

¹⁹³ *San Jose Mercury*, November 5, 2001.

¹⁹⁴ “Chiba-ken shokuin Sochi seikyū no Kansa kekka no Kōhyō,” *Chiba Kenpō*. Vol. 12582, February 1, 2011; “Sapporo-shi kara Hokkaido Chōsen Shochūkōkyū Gakkō,” June 23, 2011.

¹⁹⁵ The list was compiled by the Zainichi Korean Human Rights Association and submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in August 2014.

¹⁹⁶ “Sukuukai” has compiled a list of prefectural and municipal governments that provided financial support to the local Korean schools as of 2009. The list has how many schools there are, how much they have received by which government to call attention of how citizens’ tax money was “misused” to support the schools allegedly under the influence of North Korea. http://www.sukuukai.jp/report/item_2314.html, accessed on January 10, 2015. See also *Sankei*

drastic decline, the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea [*Kitachōsen ni Rachi sareta Nihonjin wo Kyūshutu surutameno Zenkoku Kyōgikai*], known as “Sukuukai” has actively lobbied and pressured national and local governments to stop “misusing” citizens’ tax money to fund Korean school education.¹⁹⁷

In addition to the connection with the pro-North Korean organization, Sukuukai members accuse the Korean schools of harming Japan’s national interests with their “abnormal” and “anti-Japan” education similarly to the way Ethnic Studies programs are seen as “threatening” and “dividing” by the right-wing and some liberals in the United States. In particular, they object to the portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il that are displayed in high school classrooms as well as the history textbooks that detail Japanese colonial occupation and Japan’s wartime atrocities, including forced labor and sexual slavery during the colonial period. These textbooks also contend that the Korean War, known as “*chokuk haepang chōnchaeng*,” which literally translates to “Fatherland Liberation War,” was about North Korea fighting to liberate the South from American imperialism. Most recently, the history textbooks in the Korean schools criticize the Japanese government and public for using the abduction issue as an excuse to dismiss the issues of violence inflicted upon people in Korea, China and other parts of the Asia-

Shimbun, April 14, 2014. <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/130414/lcl13041409430001-n1.htm>, accessed on December 10, 2014.

¹⁹⁷ For example, on August 25, 2010, Sukuukai and Kazokukai, the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (*Kitachōsen ni yoru Rachi Higaisha Kazokukai*) together submitted a request to the MEXT not to include Chongryun Korean schools into the “free tuition program.” See *Sankei Shimbun*, August 25, 2010. On a local level, Sukuukai has filed lawsuits against some prefectural governments, including Fukuoka and Hyogo, in regards to their “misuse” of citizens’ tax money. In both Fukuoka and Hyogo, the cases were dismissed. See *Kobe Shimbun*, April 22, 2014, <http://www.kobe-np.co.jp/news/shakai/201404/0006885294.shtml>, accessed on December 1, 2014; *Nishinihon Shimbun*, February 17, 2014.

Pacific during World War II. The anti-Korean schools groups and individuals have used these points as evidence of why the Korean schools are illegitimate and unworthy of any sort of government funding.

Forced Transparency: Pursuit of “Good” Recognition

In response to the exclusion of the Chongryun Korean schools from the free tuition program, a number of students have transferred to Japanese schools and even South Korean schools, where government support is abundant. At the same time, the members of the Korean schools have carried out different political campaigns to demand that equal rights to education be applied to the Korean schools at both local and national levels. For example, the Korean community members and Japanese supporters together collected more than 500,000 petitions and submitted them to MEXT,¹⁹⁸ while staging protests in urban cities such as Osaka and Tokyo on a weekly basis.¹⁹⁹ At the international level, the Korean schools have successfully mobilized support from the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.²⁰⁰ The most recent report,

¹⁹⁸ The petitions were submitted on July 27, 2010. Io web magazine, <http://blog.goo.ne.jp/gekkan-io/e/9efce0908988fa84645430774ead5b07>, accessed on January 1, 2015.

¹⁹⁹ In Osaka, Japanese and Korean local residents have organized “Tuesday Action” in front of the Osaka Prefectural Office every Tuesday for 129 times (as of December 16, 2014) according to a blog, “Nyonyo no Hitorigoto” by Ho Onnyo, a former Korean school teacher, <http://blog.goo.ne.jp/okuyeo/e/76dcac8858c0767186266c74a17b6123>, accessed on January 1, 2015. In Tokyo, students from Korea University gather in front of MEXT every Friday to demand the equal educational rights for their juniors currently enrolled in Korean high schools. This “Friday Action” brought 1,000 participants on July 4, 2014 amidst heavy rain in protest to the Japanese government’s discriminatory treatment. See *Choson Shimbo*, Chongryon’s own newspaper, July 7, 2014, <http://chosonsinbo.com/jp/2014/07/sk74/>, accessed on January 1, 2015.

²⁰⁰ In March 2010, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination released the report and showed “concerns” about Japanese government’s exclusion of Korean schools from the free tuition program. See the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under article 9 of the Convention: Concluding observations

published by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on August 29, 2014, accuses the Japanese government's policies of "hindering the right to the education of children of Korean origin" and makes a strong recommendation that it should "allow Korean schools to benefit, as appropriate, from the High School Tuition Support Fund, as well as to invite local governments to resume or maintain the provision of subsidies to Korean schools."²⁰¹ These campaigns directly confront the Japanese state by employing

of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD/C/JPN/CO/3-6)," released on March 16, 2010. See *Asahi Shimbun*, March 17, 2010. In February 2012, while political campaign strongly continued for equal educational rights, three non-governmental organizations in Japan requested CERD to demand the Japanese government to comply with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and stop discriminating against Korean schools. See *Asahi Shimbun*, February 28, 2012. See Hurights Osaka website: <http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/newsinbrief-ja/section3/2012/03/ngo227.html>, accessed on January 1, 2015. Furthermore, in April 2003, mothers of Korean school students orchestrated various actions on streets in Geneva and delivered speeches at the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Kim Kyung-suk, "15000-ba no tsuru to tomoni junēbu he," *Chōsen Gakkō no aru Fūkei*. Vol. 19 (May 2013): 14-22. The committee's final report called MEXT's exclusion of Korean schools as "discrimination" and demanded "the State party [Japanese government] to ensure that the tuition-waiver programme for high school education is extended to children attending Korean schools." Article 27 of the Final Report released by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on May 17 reads as following:

"The Committee is concerned at the exclusion of Korean schools from the State party's tuition waiver programme for high school education, which constitutes discrimination. (art. 13, 14). Recalling that the prohibition against discrimination applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education and encompasses all internationally prohibited grounds of discrimination, the Committee calls on the State party to ensure that the tuition-waiver programme for high school education is extended to children attending Korean schools." See, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Japan, adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth session (E /C.12/JPN/CO/3)," released on May 17, 2013.

²⁰¹ The concluding report released by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on August 29, 2014, shows considerable concerns over various human rights violation issues in Japan, including "hate speech and hate crimes" and "violence against foreign and minority women." Article 19 of the report on "Korean schools" read as following:

"The Committee is concerned about the legislative provisions and government's actions that hinder the right to education of children of Korean origin, including: (a) the exclusion of Korean schools from the High School Tuition Support Fund; and (b) the suspension or continued decrease of funding allocated by local governments to Korean schools (art. 2, 5). Recalling its general recommendation No. 30 (2004) on discrimination against non-citizens, the Committee reiterates its recommendation included in paragraph 22 of its previous concluding observations that the State party ensure that there is no discrimination in the provision of educational opportunities and that no child residing in its territory faces obstacles to school

the existing legal frameworks such as the Japanese Constitution and the Basic Act on Education, as well as the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Bill of Human Rights, both of which Japan ratified years before, while successfully mobilizing the U.N. commissions' support in issuing multiple recommendations. These "non apologetic" approaches have framed discrimination against the Korean schools as the failure of the Japanese state to fulfill the laws and conventions that they have enacted and ratified.

Simultaneously, the Korean schools have also focused on trying to "clear the misunderstanding" that Japanese people hold against (North) Koreans so that they will eventually come to see the Korean schools as legitimate. Toward this goal, the Korean schools have tried to accommodate every request for school visits, to explain every question that Japanese people may have, and to become as transparent as possible as it is considered necessary and one of the most effective ways to gain recognition as legitimate subjects. The Japanese public has asked for transparency,²⁰² and Korean schools have been willing to prove to the broader public that they are not providing "anti-Japan" education or brainwashing students to "worship North Korea." As an example, Song Su-

enrolment. The Committee encourages the State party to revise its position and to allow Korean schools to benefit, as appropriate, from the High School Tuition Support Fund, as well as to invite local governments to resume or maintain the provision of subsidies to Korean schools. The Committee recommends that the State party consider acceding to the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education of 1960." See the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, "Concluding observations on the combined seventh to ninth periodic reports of Japan (CERD /C/ JPN /CO/ 7-9)," released on August 29, 2014.

²⁰² The media has encouraged Korean schools to be transparent on numerous occasions. *Asahi Shimbun*, editorial, February 24, 2010; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, editorial, September 3, 2010; *Tokyo Shimbun* editorial of March 3, 2010. The Tokyo Shimbun editorial, for examples, reads as follows: "We would like the Korean schools to disclose the contents of their education. If they could gain understanding that teaching ethnic pride is not necessarily equated with anti-Japan education, people will start supporting."

hyun, a teacher at the Osaka Korean High School, urges people to visit the Korean schools, where they will find “students who study and participate in extracurricular activities passionately just like Japanese school students.”²⁰³ Similarly, Yoon Suk-hye, an alumna of the Korean school, wants people to know the “true character” [*shin no sugata*] of the Korean schools and their students.²⁰⁴ The schools organize “open campus” days on a regular basis, where visitors can freely walk around the campus, observe classes and enjoy cultural performances presented by the students – all of which are supposed to prove how normal and non-threatening the Korean schools are.

During my fieldwork at the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, I observed the annual “open campus” day where nearly one hundred visitors participated.²⁰⁵ They were mostly sympathetic Japanese high school teachers, university professors, students and local residents of Kyoto who are interested in learning about the school and seeing “true character” of the students. As is the case with other Korean schools, two hours of class observation were followed by a student cultural performance. Then, there was the lunch social hour [*kōryū-kai*] in which teachers and parents answered questions posed by visitors, discussed and strategized future collaborative programs, while eating Korean barbecue prepared by the mothers. For this open campus event, the

²⁰³ *Asahi Shimbun*, opinion section, February 28, 2010.

²⁰⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, opinion section, April 5, 2010. Suh’s narrative re-appeared on April 4, 2010. “I graduated from a Korean high school and am currently working in a Japanese company....I guess that the Japanese society still holds stereotypical image of Korean schools being “anti-Japan” and teaching the students to “worship North Korea.”...Educational contents at Korean high schools have changed in the last decade....Moreover, the majority of the students hold South Korean nationality. Surrounded by various news sources and Internet, anti-Japan and pro-North Korea education would not be accepted by the students. We have many alumni who are succeeding in the areas of sports, arts and business. If the schools had provided biased education, alumni would not be successful in Japan and the world.... Please see the true character of the Korean school students.”

²⁰⁵ During the academic year 2013-14, the open campus day was held on October 26, 2013.

school mobilized the limited time, labor, and resources of the teachers, students, and parents in order to ensure that the visitors would have a good time and leave the school with positive impressions. For example, in music class, the teacher included a few Japanese songs so that Japanese visitors would feel familiar and enjoy. In Japanese class, an award-winning Japanese poet was invited to give a guest lecture and students composed poetry in Japanese. These efforts are intended to demonstrate that the supposedly “abnormal” Korean school provides familiar and quality education to its students. In addition to the annual open campus program, there were several groups that requested a visit to the school. These included university professors and students from the local area, labor union organizers from South Korea and university students from the United States. When these requests were made, the school principal, teachers and administrative staff usually went out of their way to accommodate the visits, and sometimes changed the lesson plans of the day so that the visitors can interact with the students to know their “true character” better. In English class, instead of having a regular lesson, the students prepared the “welcome message board” to the American university students, sang an English song they had learned in class and had discussions in small groups where they talked about Japanese anime and music in English with the visitors. American university students were grateful to the warm welcome and extremely impressed with students’ proactive attitude and capability to speak English.

To a certain extent, these public relations efforts have paid off. Those who have visited the Korean schools generally share positive responses. Uchioka Sadao, a former teacher who had advised Zainichi Korean students enrolled in a Japanese school, participated in a Korean school’s open campus program in Fukuoka. He admires the fact

that the students are able to use three different languages, Korean, Japanese and English – which he considers a “sign of globalization” – and concludes that what they learn is not so different from what students learn in Japanese schools. Looking at the students’ smiles, he cannot help but hope that the Korean schools will be included in the free tuition program.²⁰⁶ Similarly, Morimoto Takako, a former teacher and a long-term supporter of the Korean school education in Tokyo, admires the “homelike atmosphere” [*attohому*] that nurtures a collaborative learning environment.²⁰⁷ The similar narratives were also shared by the visitors of the open campus program that I participated at the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, indicating that the open campus programs are quite successful in having visitors see the “true character” of the students who are “deserving” and “innocent” subjects. Indeed, the “students are innocent” narrative is one of the most popular strategies that the Korean schools and their Japanese supporters employ when protesting national and local governments’ exclusionary measures. As I will discuss in the following section, the emphasis on students’ innocence is often juxtaposed with the portrayal of the Korean schools as abnormal, backward, and incomprehensible to the broader Japanese public. I argue that the narratives that emphasize students’ “innocence” further demonize North Korea and Korean schools as “illegal” and “abnormal,” consequently justifying and encouraging Japanese state and public intervention.

Along with the “students are innocent, therefore should be granted equal rights” narrative, “multicultural coexistence” [*tabunka kyōsei*] is often employed in demanding

²⁰⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, opinion section, March 11; June 30, 2010.

²⁰⁷ Morimoto Takako, “Abunai Koto, Yowaimono Ijime Yurusenai,” *Chōsen Gakkō no aru Fūkei*. Vol. 22 (November 2013): 7.

equal educational rights for the Korean schools and their students. Many consider the exclusion of the Korean schools from financial support programs as a sign of the government's failure to put the ideal of multicultural coexistence into practice. In the following sections, I will examine these two popular frameworks used in recent political campaigns. The "students are innocent" narrative and "multicultural coexistence" framework are assumed to simply bring about benefits of rights and privileges among the socially marginalized. However, as I will demonstrate, claiming these rights comes at a cost. "Multicultural coexistence" is an ideological apparatus, or "a form of governance" that filters, alters and manages differences that would supposedly enrich and diversify Japanese society and culture.²⁰⁸ Both "the students are innocent" and "multicultural coexistence" approaches are trapped in the "permanent temptation" (Markell) in pursuit of good recognition, which unwittingly reinforces and perpetuates existing relations of subordination and state dominance over their education. In other words, the pursuit of good recognition as a prerequisite to the "right to have rights" has forced the Korean schools to accept various conditions that would radically alter the core principle, mission and pedagogy of Korean school education.

Innocent Students, Evil Schools

On March 12, 2010, Hashimoto Tōru, the-then Osaka governor, visited the Korean High School in Osaka, which has the largest population of Koreans in Japan.²⁰⁹ Earlier in the month, Hashimoto had stated that the Osaka prefectural government would

²⁰⁸ Joseph Hankins, *Working Skin* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 22.

²⁰⁹ According to the Japanese Ministry of Justice, as of December 2014, the number of Korean nationality holders (both South Korea and virtually stateless "Chōsen-seki") in Osaka was 114,373 followed by Tokyo (96,193) and Hyogo (46,680).

not continue the education subsidies to the eleven Korean schools (K-12) in the city, claiming they are connected to the “illegal” and “gangster-like” regime of North Korea.²¹⁰ He emphasized that his intention was not to restrict the Korean school students’ educational rights. On the contrary, he showed concerns for the students being educated in an “abnormal” institution. Hashimoto even proposed the idea of accepting these students in Japanese schools, as he feels ethically responsible to “rescue” and educate them in “normal” institutions.²¹¹ In his narrative, the Korean schools represent “abnormality” and “evilness” as opposed to the Japanese schools that represent freedom, democracy, human rights and peace. As discussed in Chapter 1, North Korea and its associates are increasingly portrayed as alienated from freedom and democracy in the time of War on Terror, and are therefore seen as incapable of providing the students with a democratic and peaceful education. It is in this context that Hashimoto asserts his and Japanese society’s moral superiority over the Korean schools in the name of protecting the educational and human rights of the “innocent” students.

²¹⁰ In justifying his decision to freeze education subsidies to the eleven Korean schools in the prefecture, Hashimoto Tōru, the-then Osaka governor, called North Korea an “illegal state,” likening it to “the gangsters,” and suggested that Korean schools are equally “guilty” of “deal[ing] with the gangsters.” He said, “North Korea is fundamentally the same with the gangsters. Is it okay that subsidies go to the schools that deal with the gangsters?” *Asahi Shimbun*, March 3, 2010. <http://www.asahi.com/special/08002/OSK201003030097.html>, accessed on November 2, 2014.

²¹¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 10, 2010; *47 News*, March 10, 2010. <http://www.47news.jp/CN/201003/CN2010031001000547.html>, accessed on February 1, 2015.



Photo 3.1: Hashimoto meets Osaka Korean High School students. Source: Asahi Shimbun²¹²

During his visit to the Osaka Korean High School, Hashimoto observed classes and extracurricular activities, and had a meeting with the nationally renowned rugby team. In picture 3.1, we can see that both Hashimoto and the students are smiling, suggesting a friendly encounter between the two parties. A former high school rugby player, Hashimoto showed respect and gratitude to the Korean high school players who had gone to the national tournament as one of the three Osaka teams in recent years.

Later in the day, Hashimoto met with the Osaka Korean Educational Board members and administrators, and presented four conditions that the schools must meet in order to receive financial support from the prefectural government. They were: 1) Korean schools must not receive donations from Chongryun (a pro-North Korean organization); 2) Korean schools administrators must not attend events organized by Chongryun; 3) portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il must be removed; and 4) expressions that

²¹² *Asahi Shimbun*, March 12, 2010, <http://www.asahi.com/special/08002/TKY201003120415.html>, retrieved on November 10, 2014.

elevate North Korean leaders and the regime must be removed from textbooks. These conditions thus require the schools to cut all ties to Chongryun and the North Korean regime without considering the historical and political contexts in which the schools had developed a relationship with North Korea. Noting that the national government has not presented any tangible solutions to the tuition issue,²¹³ Hashimoto boldly presented these “objective” rules, which would help the Korean schools disassociate from the “illegal” and “gangster-like” regime and focus them on providing the students with an appropriate education. Hashimoto believes that this is the only way that the schools can win the support of and sympathy from local Japanese taxpayers.²¹⁴

It is important to note that the Korean schools are seen as “abnormal” not only in relation to Japanese society, but also to their South Korean counterparts. Mindan, a pro-South Korean organization in Japan, has shown strong concern about the “innocent” students being educated in these “abnormal” institutions. In their proposal to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT),²¹⁵ Mindan emphasizes that their opposition to the inclusion of Chongryun Korean schools in the “free tuition program” is not meant to deny the students’ right to education, but instead to assure that “these rights are *justly protected*” (emphasis mine). Because Mindan believes that a

²¹³ Regular press conference, November 25, 2010, accessed on February 1, 2015.

²¹⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 3, 2010.

<http://www.asahi.com/special/08002/OSK201003030097.html>, retrieved on November 2, 2014.

²¹⁵ Mindan submitted the proposal, *Chōsen Kokyūgakkō ‘Koko jūgyōryō Mushōka Shūgakushienkin Shkyūseido’ ni tsuitemo Mōshiresho* (Proposal in Regards to Korean School and the “Act on free tuition fee at public high schools and high school enrollment support fund”) to the MEXT on February 13, 2012. <http://www.mindan.org/front/jijitaronDetail.php?sisaid=138>, retrieved on October 10, 2014. Mindan had submitted a similar proposal, *Chōsen Kōkō ni taisuru Jūgyōryō Mushōka ni tsuitemo Ikensho* in September 2010, urging national and local governments to intervene in Korean schools to ensure students’ rights to education, <http://www.mindan.org/front/jijitaronDetail.php?sisaid=98>, retrieved on October 10, 2014.

Chongryun Korean schools' education is "beyond common sense and practice in Japanese society," it strongly suggests that MEXT intervenes in the schools' internal affairs and educational contents if they were to be included in the program.

Sympathetic Japanese supporters further reinforce the image of "abnormal" Korean schools by overly emphasizing students' "innocence." Editorials and opinions sections of Japan's major newspapers detail what they consider to be "abnormal" practices at the Korean schools such as displaying the portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, teaching Chuch'e ideology in classes, and taking a high school senior trip to North Korea.²¹⁶ At the same time, they argue that students' right to education must be protected because the students are "innocent" and separate from the "abnormal" and "savage" regime of North Korea. For instance, an *Asahi Shimbun* editorial calls for separating the "North Korea's abnormal regime" from the "Korean school students"²¹⁷ while a *Tokyo Shimbun* editorial sympathizes with the students who are "born and raised, and will continue to live in Japan" and who have nothing to do with the "savage acts" that North Korea has committed against world peace.²¹⁸ As these narratives demonstrate, the construction of the students' innocence involves simultaneously separating them from

²¹⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 8, 2010. In high school classrooms, there are portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Students take a senior trip to Pyongyang (North Korea) via Beijing. Students learn "Chuch'e ideology" – the foundational principle of North Korea's dictatorial regime. However, It is strange to discuss the issue of supporting Korean school students and the treatment of North Korea's abnormal regime in the same manner. The children's right to education must be defended and protected indiscriminately.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ "Since North Korea bombed South Korea, the process of applying the free tuition program to Korean high schools has stopped. Providing educational support for young generation is different from political and diplomatic issues. Why bully Zainichi Korean children who are not responsible (for North Korea's attacks)? ... Children in Korean schools who are born and raised, and will continue to live in Japan, are not responsible for the savage acts by their homeland that pose threat to peace." See *Tokyo Shimbun*, February 3, 2011.

North Korea and domesticating them in the sphere of Japan (as in, “they are born and raised in Japan”), thereby transforming them into deserving and sympathetic subjects. Separating Zainichi Koreans from their homeland(s) and situating them as “local residents” in Japan is in part rooted in “civil rights movement” in the 1970s and 1980s. Zainichi Koreans and other long-term foreign residents have acquired a number of rights through the movement, which has made them de facto citizens, or “*shimin*” (“people of the city”) on the basis of their residency and involvement in their local communities without legal state membership.²¹⁹ Framing Zainichi Koreans as *shimin*, political scientist Erin Chung argues that grassroots activism has focused on “the quality of Japanese democracy” instead of encompassing their lives that lie in and around Japan and the Korea’s.

In contrast to Hashimoto, who “forces” reforms onto the schools, the newspaper editorials that are intended to support Korean schools’ inclusion in the national and local governments’ financial support program use a moralizing language to suggest various changes to the Korean schools. One editorial tells the schools to “voluntarily take this moment as a good opportunity” to self-reflect and become an “open-minded school” that can be accepted in a multicultural society.²²⁰ Disguised as “liberal,” the “students are innocent” narratives, vastly accepted among Japanese supporters of the Korean schools, unquestionably label North Korea and Korean schools as “guilty” and “abnormal,” and encourage them to welcome criticism and to change for the “better.” Highlighting both the “innocence” of the students (and parents) and the “abnormality” and “backwardness”

²¹⁹ Erin Aeran Chung, *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²²⁰ *Mainichi Shimbun*, November 6, 2010; December 30, 2012.

of the Korean schools, these editorial writers present themselves as the ultimate advocates of human rights and students' right to education. Assigning themselves to the role of "protectors" of the students and "correctors" of the "abnormal" schools, they justify and encourage the Japanese state and public to intervene in the schools' internal affairs, which they believe would help create the "right" learning environment.

Between Recognition and Autonomy: Negotiating "Multicultural Coexistence"

Along with the "students are innocent" narrative, "multicultural coexistence" [*tabunka kyōsei*] is often employed in advocating for equal educational rights for the Korean schools and their students. Korean school community members and Japanese supporters consider the exclusion of the Korean schools from financial support programs as a government's failure to actualize the ideal of "multicultural coexistence." These narratives assume that multicultural coexistence would directly accord rights and privileges to the socially marginalized. However, as I will demonstrate, claiming these rights comes at a cost. As a utopian concept, multicultural coexistence embraces differences as celebratory diversity without interrogating how this diversity originates in violent colonial and imperial practices. Multicultural coexistence is an ideological apparatus, or "a form of governance" that filters, alters and manages differences that would supposedly enrich Japanese society and culture.²²¹

This mechanism of multicultural coexistence manifests in the form of the four rules that governor Hashimoto proposed to the Osaka Korean Educational Board – rules that are intended to erase the historical and political aspects of their education as well as the material, emotional and ideological ties the schools have developed and maintained

²²¹ Joseph Hankins, *Working Skin* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 22.

with North Korea. This has put the schools in a difficult position, caught between the two forms of freedom – seeking freedom in the form of equal rights to education and resources, which often comes at the expense of losing autonomy, and striving to maintain the “independence of the governed with regard to government.”²²² At the end of the hour-long meeting with the board members, Hashimoto told the board members “to make a decision to choose either freedom or tax money.”²²³ While the Osaka Korean Educational Board and the Osaka Korean High School considered how to respond to the four rules, Hashimoto created a special committee of specialists to assess the school. The committee observed humanities classes, including Modern Korean History, Korean Language, and Social Studies, and evaluated the entire curriculum and educational contents on the basis of the MEXT guideline. The suggestions made by the committee urged the schools to “work toward a *more open-minded* school which can *coexist* with the local community” (emphasis mine). According to the committee, becoming a “more open-minded school” that can “coexist” with the local community requires the schools to teach subjects from a “politically neutral perspective” and make Modern Korean History an extra curricular activity rather than a required class.²²⁴ Citing the ideal of “multicultural coexistence,” the committee strongly recommends the school to be “open-minded” and accept changes in their political engagement and Korean-centered historical understanding, which allegedly pose threats to the coexistence of Koreans and Japanese.

Because their response could become an important precedent, the members of the Osaka Korean Educational Board were careful about crafting a response, trying to find a

²²² Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (New York: Picador, 2010).

²²³ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 13, 2010.

²²⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 23, 2010.

balance between “not compromising to the power”²²⁵ and securing the needed subsidies that comprise 23-26 percent of total operation budget.²²⁶ After a yearlong negotiation with teachers, parents, and community members, the Osaka Korean Educational Board submitted a response on March 8, 2011. Although the board was unable to fully incorporate the Hashimoto rules and special committee’s suggestions, it emphasized that the board members will continue to “work toward creating a *multicultural coexistence education* while also valuing the autonomy of the ethnic [Korean] schools” (emphasis mine). In order to provide a “multicultural coexistence education,” the board was able to promise Hashimoto that it would: 1) instruct the Korean School Textbook Editorial Board to revise the history textbooks; 2) eliminate Chongryun’s influence on school operations; 3) disclose their budget on the website; and 4) continue discussions with regards to the portraits of the two Kims, and “decide which way to go autonomously.” In fact, the issue of the portraits was divisive among the parents, as some supported the removal because they see the portraits as a “source of misunderstanding about the schools,” while others still felt indebted to them for having established the foundation of present-day Korean education in Japan. Still, others believe that such matters should be dealt with independently without Japanese state and public intervention. In the end, the response from the school board was deemed an “insufficient” effort to fit into the multicultural coexistence education ideal that Hashimoto has envisioned. Consequently, no financial support has been provided to the Osaka Korean High School since 2010.

²²⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 9, 2011.

²²⁶ *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 20, 2013.

The negotiations between Hashimoto and the Osaka Korean Educational Board reveal a discrepancy between the different stakeholders' ideas on what multicultural coexistence and its education should look like. For Hashimoto and his special committee, “coexistence” can only begin when Korean schools remove the offending political and historical elements from their education in a similar way that Ethnic Studies programs in the United States are confronted with the similar pressure to make the classes all about culture devoid of history and politics. Teaching the younger generation how and why Zainichi Koreans end up in Japan today – the foundation of Korean education in Japan – is an inconvenient imperial past that Japan wishes to forget and an obstacle to peaceful coexistence of Japanese and Koreans. Multicultural coexistence has become a contested site in other prefectures too. For example, in Saitama, governor Ueda Kiyoshi rebukes Korean school history education because he believes it is “harming multicultural coexistence” by preventing Zainichi Korean students from *blending and coexisting* in Japanese society” (emphasis mine).²²⁷ Furthermore, these advocates of multicultural coexistence attempt to control how Korean schools teach “current” issues concerning Japan and North Korea – namely, the abduction issue. Similarly in Kanagawa, the aforementioned governor Kuroiwa Yuji has required the Korean schools to teach the abduction issues in the “right” way, i.e. teaching it from the Japanese perspective, if the schools wanted to benefit from the newly introduced “Project to Support Students in Foreign Schools” [*gaikokujin gakkō seito to shien jigyo*]. Although the project aims to “assure equal educational opportunities for all, regardless of international affairs” and was implemented precisely to “advance multicultural coexistence education” through

²²⁷ Saitama prefectural assembly meeting, June 22, 2012.

financial support,²²⁸ the Kanagawa Korean Junior High and High School was not able to receive the funds until the prefectural staff members observed classes on the abduction issue.²²⁹ In the eyes of people like Hashimoto, Ueda, and Kuroiwa, who claim to be firm believers of multicultural coexistence, Korean schools are impossible subjects for multicultural coexistence education, unless they erase and modify the perspectives that contradict and compete with how Japan understands its past and present.

In the process of making Korean schools tolerable, the “advocates” use multicultural coexistence to actively alter and ultimately disempower Korean education in Japan. This disempowerment is manifest in South Korean schools that have become the so-called “clause-1 school,” or *ichijō-kō* (schools recognized by the first article of Education Law) under the direct supervision of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). In exchange for attaining the status and financial support from both national and local governments, these schools now use Japanese as their main language of instruction, textbooks that are approved by MEXT, and teach Korean language and history as extracurricular class activities, making them almost indistinguishable from Japanese schools. Cultural differences that these schools preserve such as extracurricular Korean language class and Korean dance club are considered unthreatening and tolerable within the multicultural coexistence framework. Despite the financial incentives, the Chongryun Korean schools reject this path (at least

²²⁸ Regular press conference, March 19, 2014, <http://www.pref.kanagawa.jp/cnt/p786888.html>, retrieved on March 1, 2015.

²²⁹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, November 28, 2014, <http://mainichi.jp/edu/news/20141128ddlk14100291000c.html>, retrieved on June 15, 2015.

for now) and are struggling to find a balance between the benefits and costs of the multicultural coexistence ideal and practice.

These negotiations do not occur only behind closed doors, but also in public forums, including social media. In January 2015, heated Twitter conversations about Korean school education unfolded between Hashimoto, now the mayor of Osaka City, and Song Jang-ho, a senior at the Kobe Korean High School.²³⁰ Due to tremendous slander and libel from other Twitter users, Song later deleted his Twitter account; however, the correspondence remains easily retrievable as many re-tweeted and wrote about this conversation. There were a total of sixteen tweets from Hashimoto and thirteen tweets from Song during the thirteen-hour-long conversation that took place between 8:14 pm on January 8th and 9:07 am on January 9th. The correspondence was prompted by the student's simple question: why the Korean schools could not benefit from the same financial support received by the other schools, both Japanese and "foreign"? Overall, Hashimoto's Tweets reinforce the stereotype of North Korea as pre-modern, undemocratic and backward, while placing Japan in the space of modernity, democracy and human rights. On the other hand, Song challenges the ahistorical nature of Hashimoto's tweets and situates the Korean schools and Zainichi Koreans in a broader historical and geopolitical context, tracing back to the colonial period.

Hashimoto takes pride in the above-mentioned four rules that are "clear and transparent," essential in a democratic country in order to maintain order, especially when such a society becomes diverse. He writes:

²³⁰ Twitter conversations between Hashimoto Tōru and a Korean School Student are documented at naver site, <http://matome.naver.jp/odai/2142078570098013101>, accessed on February 1, 2015

1:47 am

I am not denying the existence of the Korean schools themselves. What I am saying is that if we were to support the Korean schools using Osaka residents' tax money, they must follow Japanese rules.²³¹

1:48 am

Without clear rules, whoever is in power can decide whether or not Korean schools should receive money. That is why I think rules are important. I respect rules. As society gets more diverse, we cannot maintain order without respecting rules.

His tweets imply that these rules are the mark of an advanced democracy that respects different cultures and values. Throughout the correspondence, Hashimoto repeatedly emphasizes that one should not be allowed to “worship authorities” and “display portraits of the Kim family” in schools in Japan, unlike North Korea (1:51 am, 1:54 am).

Hashimoto urges Song to judge North Korea “objectively” on the basis of the international standard (1:54 am) and to compare North Korea with Japan, where people can vote, voice their opinions, and even criticize those in power because human rights is respected (8:53 am, 8:59 am and 9:02 am). The fact that the governor is open to having public conversations with a high school student over Twitter illustrates Japan's mature democracy, Hashimoto believes. This is a stark contrast to the North Korean regime that forces its people to worship its leaders.

In response, Song offers a detailed historical background for why the Korean schools display the Kims' portraits. Song writes:

8:27 am

Beginning with the annexation of Korea in 1910, resources and food as well as many Korean laborers, soldiers and comfort women were mobilized under Japanese colonial rule, as you probably know.

²³¹ The tweets by Hashimoto and Song are originally written in Japanese and translated into English by me.

You should also know that a great number of Koreans were killed (such as the instance of massacre in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake).

On August 15, 1945, the war ended. (For us, it was “liberation.”) However, the Japanese government and the GHQ prevented the repatriation of Koreans, to recall the explosion of a ferry in Maizuru. Meanwhile, the Korean War began and divided the country into North and South Korea. It’s been more than 60 years.

2.4 million Koreans in Japan at the time were so-called stateless people. I think you know the rest up to this moment. Then, Kim Il-sung extended his hand to us and declared that we are Korean and we have a country amidst the post-civil war chaos in the peninsula.

Then, he sent money so that Koreans in Japan could learn Korean language and history despite the difficulty he and his people were going through, and the DPRK still sends us money. They sent a tremendous amount of money to Chongryun and Japanese government in times like the Great Hanshin Earthquake and the recent Eastern Japan Earthquake.

This is why we display the portraits. Thanks to them, *uri hakkyo* [our schools] exist. It’s not about brainwashing or worshipping.

Song’s tweets about the history of Zainichi Koreans and Korean schools, as well as his reasoning behind the display of the portraits, simultaneously speak to what North Korea has done and what Japan has failed to do. Song’s tweets help contextualize why Korean schools have established such an intimate relationship with North Korea, which is unthinkable in Japan. Japan’s colonial rule, its failure to implement successful repatriation programs, its rendering of Koreans as stateless by unilaterally depriving them of Japanese nationality with the help of U.S. military occupation authorities (thus putting them outside of the realm of rights and privileges altogether), and its denial of Korean education – all of these conditions have made Korean schools so desperately reliant upon North Korea financially, politically, and otherwise. In other words, the resilient history of

Korean schools that Song wishes to remember is exactly what Hashimoto wants to look away from and erase. This goes back to Song's original questions: "Why am I Korean? What are the reasons why so many Koreans are in Japan? What are our roots?" (11:12 pm, January 8).

Having read Song's responses, which are grounded in historical knowledge, Hashimoto still does not confront Japan's past, but instead simply praises Song for his extensive historical knowledge and his ability to articulate his own opinions (8:53 am). Indeed, throughout the entire Twitter conversation, Hashimoto does not engage with Song, but parries Song through admiration and demonstrations of concern in a highly paternalistic way, while harshly criticizing North Korea and its "abnormal" regime, which he characterizes as being void of human rights. He also tells Song that he needs to take different opinions into consideration and keep working hard [*gambatte*] (2:08 am). In these tweets, Hashimoto envisions himself as a mentor, evaluating and giving advice to the marginalized subject in the same way that he did to the Osaka Korean High School years before. In his final tweet, Hashimoto reminds Song that Song, his friends, and the people in North Korea are innocent, but the problem lies with those in power (9:07 am), reaffirming Hashimoto's position as a "defender" of human rights who is on Song's side.

Beyond Pursuit of Recognition

I have observed the ways in which the "politics of recognition" have actually reinforced the Korean schools' subordinate position vis-à-vis state actors and self-identified liberals and advocates of multicultural coexistence in the form of surveillance and intervention. Both the "students are innocent" narrative and the "multicultural coexistence" framework are trapped in a "permanent temptation" in pursuing recognition,

as Markell cautioned. In pursuing recognition as legitimate subjects, Korean schools have laid bare their schools – explaining, answering, and defending who they are and what they do.

While Korean school communities have orchestrated various campaigns to pressure the national and local governments, an anonymous Zainichi Korean man suddenly appeared. On March 1, 2013, a man began a quiet protest in front of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) building in Tokyo. The nameless man calls himself “a man who sits” [*suwaru hito*]. His protests involve no chants, confrontations, or collaboration with others. He simply sits there with a sign that reads: “I oppose the exclusion of Korean schools from the free tuition program” (photo 3.2). The man sits there not because he could not think of any better way, but because he thinks he “does not need to do anything else.”²³² As exhaustion and despair permeated the Korean school communities after three years of struggles that seemed so futile, “a man who sits” quickly caught attention as many saw him as a ray of light in the deep darkness. The news of this man’s silent protest quickly spread on Twitter and Facebook. It was also featured in *Shūkan Kinyōbi*, a Japanese independent weekly magazine.

²³² “3-shu-me, Suwarimasu,” *Yanegon* (the “suwaru hito” blog), March 17, 2013, <http://suwaruhito.tumblr.com/post/45559259607/3%E9%80%B1%E7%9B%AE%E5%BA%A7%E3%82%8A%E3%81%BE%E3%81%99>, retrieved on March 1, 2015.



Photo 3.2: “A man who sits” [*Suwaru hito*]. Source: *Yanegon*, *Suwaru hito* blog²³³

“A man who sits” sits quietly by himself. He explains that this is an individual act, not meant to be incorporated into a more organized political campaign or social movement.²³⁴ As a different sign he had on a different day demonstrates, he does not see the issue merely as “ethnic discrimination,” but Japanese education becoming increasingly imperialistic and further marginalizing not only the Korean school students, but also other marginalized youths such as high school dropouts and students at unlicensed schools.²³⁵ In his blog, “a man who sits” writes multiple times that he is not “trying hard” [*gambaru*]. He also urges others not to “try hard” as he believes that all the efforts the schools have made would not have been made if there had been no discrimination against them. Instead, he turns to MEXT and sends them a message – that they are the ones who need to “try hard” to stop discrimination against Korean schools.

²³³ *Yanegon*, *Suwaru hito* blog, <http://suwaruhito.tumblr.com/>, retrieved on February 25, 2015.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ “Monbukagakushō-mae de kōgi wo Tsuzukeru Wakamonotachi,” *Gajetto Tsūshin*, March 30, 2013, <http://getnews.jp/archives/311061>, retrieved on March 1, 2015.

Therefore, in his protest, “a man who sits” simply positions himself in front of the entrance to the MEXT building, hoping that his presence would quietly disturb the otherwise “business as usual” every day life of the people on the street and officials of MEXT.

As members of Korean schools and their Japanese supporters were facing a dead-end in their political campaigns to gain recognition and equal access to resources, South Korean individuals and groups started to get involved. This is a new phenomenon that has emerged in the mid-2000s and become solidified in the wake of the 3.11 Great Tohoku Earthquake that hit Japan in 2011. In the next chapter, I will discuss the emerging triangular collaboration between Zainichi Koreans, Japanese citizens and South Korean supporters in a single mission of preserving Korean schools and education in Japan.

Chapter Four:

Dreaming and Practicing *Tongil*

There are difficult political issues between Japan and the North, Japan and the South and the North and the South. But today, we are dreaming together. Dreaming of *tongil* and peace to come.

-Kwon Hae-hyo²³⁶

On July 4th, 2014, I was among the 1,200 audience members “dreaming of *tongil* and peace” at a charity concert in Hiroshima organized by Japanese citizens, Zainichi Koreans, and South Korean supporters. “*Tongil*” is the Korean word for “unification,” which I often heard in the Korean schools as the ultimate goal for their nation. “Mongdang Yeonpil Concert in Hiroshima” was held to mobilize support for Hiroshima Korean Elementary, Junior High and High School (hereafter, Hiroshima Korean School) as they continue to fight against the Japanese government’s exclusion from the free tuition program as well as subsequent funding cuts from both Hiroshima prefectural and municipal offices. Mongdang Yeonpil is a South Korean non-profit organization founded in March 2011 in the wake of the 3.11 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that left nearly 16,000 dead, more than 6,000 physically injured and some 2,500 still missing to this day – the most devastating natural disaster in Japanese history. Actors, singers, movie directors and others in South Korea came together and established Mongdang Yeonpil to help Zainichi Koreans and Korean schools recover from the disaster by raising awareness

²³⁶ Kwon Hye-hyo is a popular supporting actor in South Korea and currently serves as the executive director of Mongdang Yeonpil. He has worked with various organizations working for social justice and Korea’s unification.

and money in South Korea.²³⁷ Initially started as a yearlong temporary relief project for the two Korean schools in the Tohoku region, which suffered the most from the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis, Mongdang Yeonpil was reborn as a non-profit organization in October 2012 with Kwon Hye-hyo, the *Hallyu* actor as the executive director due to popular demands among Zainichi Koreans. As a non-profit organization, Mondang Yeonpil is committed to “letting South Korean society learn *properly* about Korean schools in Japan” and “collaborating with Japanese civic groups to protect Korean schools from unfair treatment and discrimination” (emphasis mine).²³⁸

In the first fourteen months, Mongdang Yeonpil organized eighteen charity concerts in South Korea and one concert in Tokyo, mobilizing more than 200 performers and 20,000 audience members,²³⁹ and donated 300 million won (approximately 300,000 dollars) to the disaster-struck Korean schools and surrounding communities.²⁴⁰ After gaining NPO status in 2012, it has also organized various other events such as movie nights and flea markets, published a book (both in Japanese and Korean), produced original merchandise including calendars with Korean school students’ photographs, and organized two concerts in Japan (Osaka in 2013 and Hiroshima in 2014). In April 2014, Mondang Yeonpil opened a coffee shop called, “Café Yeonpil 1/3” in Seoul, which functions as the community base for the members of Mongdang Yeonpil and others to meet, gather, learn about and discuss issues surrounding the Korean schools and Zainichi

²³⁷ Mongdang Yeonpil official Japanese blog, “Mongdang Yeonpil ni Kanshashi, Ōenshimasu,” May 30, 2011, <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangj/entry-10907699580.html>, retrieved on May 1, 2015.

²³⁸ Mongdang Yeonpil official Japanese blog, November 12, 2012, “Hiēri Minkan Dantai ‘Mongdang Yeonpil’ Shuppatsu,” <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangj/entry-11402507825.html>, retrieved on May 1, 2015.

²³⁹ The 7th Annual Friendship Concert held at Doshisha University, October 21, 2012.

²⁴⁰ Kwon Hye-hyo, “Chōsen Gakkō ha Uketomerubeki Watashitachi no Rekishi,” *Chōsen Gakkō no aru Fūkei*. Vol. 20 (July 2013):154-9.

Korean communities over a cup of fair trade coffee and desserts.

Chapter 3 discussed the recent political campaigns in which Zainichi Koreans demanded recognition and equal access to resources by framing themselves as *shimin* or local residents in Japan. In the process of presenting themselves as legible subjects for multicultural coexistence, Korean schools have had to “tame” the radical anti-colonial nature of their education by mitigating and veiling historical and political perspectives and connections. This chapter examines the junctures of ethnic minority and diaspora politics as an emerging way in which Korean schools seek to survive. I focus my analysis on a “triangular collaboration” among Zainichi Koreans, Japanese citizens and South Korean supporters in the shared objective of protecting Korean schools and education in Japan. In the collaboration, Korean diasporic ties are strategically mobilized to advance the ethnic minority rights of Zainichi Koreans in Japan. Significantly, the diasporic ties become active and sustainable precisely because of the space and means that the Japanese civic groups create to ease tensions involving South Koreans and Chongryun Korean schools. Examining the role of Mongdang Yeonpil, a South Korea-based non-profit organization, borne out of the 3.11 crisis, I discuss the possibilities of a triangular collaboration and the ways in which it has changed Zainichi Korean social movement that is beyond incorporation based on multicultural coexistence.

In his article, “Accidental Diaspora and External ‘Homelands’ in Central and Eastern Europe,” Brubaker distinguishes accidental diaspora from the more familiar labor diaspora, focusing on the cases of Eastern European and former U.S.S.R countries.²⁴¹

²⁴¹ Rogers Brubaker, “Accidental Diaspora and External ‘Homelands’ in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present,” *IHS Political Science*. Series 71 (October 2000) [Working Paper].

While labor diaspora typically crossed national borders on an individual basis (often perceived as “voluntary” decisions), accidental diaspora was formed in the context of “dramatic, and often traumatic” reconfiguration of political space. Moreover, labor diasporas usually remain citizens of their home countries, lacking roots in their host countries. In contrast, accidental diasporas tend to be more rooted in their country of residence and often acquire citizenship. His distinction between the two diaspora groups is helpful in thinking about Zainichi Korean diaspora in the specific historical and geopolitical context, although they do not seem to fall into either category neatly. Today, the majority of Zainichi Koreans in Korean school communities have not become naturalized Japanese citizens and remained “foreigners” by holding either South Korean nationality or the virtually stateless status of “*Chōsen-seki*.” While having kept material, emotional and ideological ties with their homeland, both South and North, they are nonetheless rooted in their respective local communities as the history of Zainichi Koreans spans more than one hundred years, over five generations. Because of their precarious state of being – that is, they are at once ethnic minorities in Japan and diasporic subjects of a (unified) Korean nation – their social movements have had to take a distinct form in avoiding the situation where they have to give up on one identity at the expense of the other – both of which constitute who they are. However, because the schools are rapidly faced with state sanctions that threaten their very existence, the recent political campaigns have focused on immediate gains – recognition and access to resources as ethnic minorities. This chapter offers an insight into how Zainichi Koreans (re)claim their Korean diasporic ties and full membership as ethnic minority in Japan simultaneously, and define their survival struggles as dreaming and practicing *tongil*.

Disaster Nationalism

The ways Hurricane Katrina in 2005 brought disproportionate devastation onto the black and impoverished communities in New Orleans and other parts of the gulf coast during and after the hurricane hit appear particularly resonant when we think about Zainichi Koreans and Korean schools in the post-3.11 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that triggered the unprecedented nuclear disaster in 2011. As sociologist Haruki Eda eloquently puts, “Nature may be the primary cause of a disaster, but very little of its consequences is ‘natural’.”²⁴² In fact, the subsequent severity and duration of chronic impacts that survivors must endure are unequivocally different, unequal, and uneven depending on their race, class, gender, disability, immigration status, and sexuality. While the death toll continued to rise, there were no mass media reports on victims and survivors of “foreigners” or “ethnic minority” groups. Frustrated with the lack of information and enormously anxious about the safety of their family members and friends, Zainichi Koreans started to utilize social network services such as Twitter and LINE to find out who was alive, missing, or evacuating and whereabouts of the survivors. The fact that these informal communication sources were the only channels available to find out the safety of Zainichi Koreans and other non-Japanese residents indicates that their life does not really count and remains invisible to the eyes of broader Japanese society.

²⁴² Eda Haruki, “Disaster Justice Feat. Research Justice,” *Research Justice* ed. Andrew Jolivéte (Bristol: Policy Press, 2015), 95.



Photo 4.1: Hinomaru in Minami-Sanriku, Miyagi prefecture. Source: BLOGOS²⁴³

Soon after the relief efforts began, we started to see the Japanese national flag, *Hinomaru*, appearing among the heaps of rubble (photo 4.1). The rhetoric of national disaster became eminently prevalent not only in the disaster-struck region, but also throughout Japan and beyond. Sympathetic groups and individuals immediately associated the victim of the disaster with the Japanese nation-state, rather than the actual people in Japan, including immigrant and ethnic minority populations. Zainichi Koreans, undocumented laborers and Filipino wives married to rural Japanese men were put outside of the “national” recovery efforts represented by the *Hinomaru*, and thus reduced to a nonexistent population. For example, Tohoku Korean Elementary and Junior High School was excluded from the prefectural recovery efforts, being denied distribution of water, assessment of the damage at the school site and financial support to build temporary school buildings, even though this was all urgent for the safety of the students, teachers and other evacuees. Another affected Korean school, Fukushima Korean

²⁴³ “Hisaichi ha nanimo Susunde inai,” *BLOGOS*, July 27, 2011, <http://blogos.com/article/23735/>, retrieved on May 1, 2015.

Elementary and Junior High School, was excluded from the city's decontamination efforts amidst nuclear meltdown. Forgotten and marginalized from the "national" recovery efforts, a preexisting translocal Zainichi Korean support network was quickly mobilized. Within the next few days, trucks full of food, water, and gasoline began to arrive from all over Japan even when transportation facilities were still paralyzed. One of the first relief supplies arrived from the Kobe Korean school community that had experienced the 1997 Great Kobe Earthquake and subsequent "human-made" disasters in their recovery efforts.

Only four days after disaster struck the Tohoku region, filmmakers Park Sayu and Park Tonsa of Koma Press²⁴⁴ arrived at the Tohoku Korean Elementary and Junior High School in the Miyagi prefecture in order to document and report on the condition of the Korean schools and local Zainichi Koreans.²⁴⁵ Their news reports were distributed through a Zainichi Korean e-mail listserv and shared by a great number of people in and outside of Japan, myself included. They have also delivered news reports to South Korea through YTN, a 24-hour news channel,²⁴⁶ enabling South Koreans to get a glimpse of what had been happening to *tongpo*, their fellow countrymen on the ground, which eventually motivated concerned citizens to establish Mongdang Yeonpil.

Building upon grassroots network such as the Korea International Network (KIN), or *Chiguch'on Tongpo Yōndae* (지구촌동포연대) that flourished during the liberal

²⁴⁴ Koma Press is a team of two film directors, Park Sayu from South Korea and Park Tonsa, a third-generation Zainichi Korean, founded in 2010. Their first feature length film, *60-man kai no Torai* (2013) is a fruit of three years they spent with the Osaka Korean High School's nationally famous rugby team. It won the Audience Award at the 2014 Chōnju International Film Festival.

²⁴⁵ Park Tonsa, "Masumedia ga Tsutaenai Mainoriti no Shinsaihighai," *Shohyō*. Vol. 137 (Spring 2012): 54-61.

²⁴⁶ *YTN News*, March 18, 2011.

regimes of Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Mu-hyun (2003-2008), and persevered during the conservative regimes of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012) and Park Kun-hye (2012-current), Mongdang Yeonpil was founded with the intention to only last for one year in order to help Korean schools and Korean victims and survivors reconstruct their lives. All three co-founders, Kwon Hae-hyo (actor), Kim Myung-jun (film director) and Lee Jisan (singer), as well as several other core members, had worked with Korean school communities in a different capacity in the past several years. Kwon, Kim, and Lee visited the two Korean schools in Tohoku region that were most severely devastated by the 3.11 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis as well as several other Korean schools in eastern Japan, and delivered the donation money while the schools were excluded from the “national” recovery project initiated by the Japanese government. Other organizations such as the Chogyo Order of Korean Buddhism [*Taehan Bulgyo Cogyojong*] also donated ten million yen (approximately 100,000 dollars) along with shoes and clothes to the Tohoku Korean school.²⁴⁷ Elementary school students in Seoul raised 1,114,630 won (approximately 1,115 dollars) and donated the money along with a plaque full of encouraging messages through Mongdang Yeonpil.²⁴⁸

The 3.11 crisis created a momentum in which diasporic ties were mobilized to support the Korean schools, and encouraged a great number of “ordinary” citizens in South Korea to take part in these humanitarian efforts. Mongdang Yeonpil organized a total of eighteen concerts all over South Korea mobilizing thousands of people’s support.

²⁴⁷ *Yonhap News*, July 11, 2012, <http://japanese.yonhapnews.co.kr/relation/2011/07/11/0400000000AJP20110711001000882.HT> ML, retrieved on May 11, 2015.

²⁴⁸ *Catholic News*, April 25, 2011, <http://www.catholicnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=5198>, retrieved May 2, 2015.

Although as always, Mindan, a pro-South Korean organization in Japan, criticized such acts of diaspora solidarity as “harmful nationalism” in which South Korean supporters ended up supporting North Korean-led “undemocratic” schools in the name of humanitarianism,²⁴⁹ the humanitarian activities generally invite very little criticism in times of crises. Mongdang Yeonpil and its founders, whether consciously or unconsciously, seized this moment of crisis – not only the “natural” disaster itself, but post-disaster “human-made” consequences that targeted Korean school communities disproportionately – in order to jump-start the organization, and membership quickly grew to nearly one hundred within a year. Members’ occupational backgrounds vary from interior designers and aspiring actors to kindergarten teachers and professional interpreters. Although some of the members have been involved with issues pertaining to labor, environment, and child poverty, which led to interest in social disparities and inequalities that exist in South Korea, most had not had any contact with Zainichi Koreans or Korean schools before they joined Mongdang Yeonpil. In addition to their concern for social justice in general and post-disaster *tongpo* well-being in particular, interviews that I conducted with several members confirmed that their involvement in Mongdang Yeonpil is not only motivated by their belief that the Japanese government must treat its ethnic minority groups more justly and equally, but also by their belief that supporting Korean schools is ultimately about working toward *tongil* and peace, similar to what Kwon Hye-hyo said at the charity concert. With enthusiastic and talented members, Mongdang Yeonpil transformed into a non-profit organization in October 2012

²⁴⁹ *Mindan Shimbun*, May 11, 2011, <http://www.mindan.org/front/newsDetail.php?category=0&newsid=14358>, retrieved October 7, 2014.

and shifted its focus from immediate relief to long-term support work for Korean schools and education in Japan.

Korean Schools as a Contested Site

While South Koreans' interest in and understanding of Korean schools in Japan has continued to rise, and many have joined in working toward *tongil* through supporting Korean schools, their involvement with pro-North Korean schools is not without cost under what South Korean intellectual Paik Nak-chung calls "division system." For example, South Koreans who visit Korean schools in Japan must submit "*Pukhang Chumin Chŏpch'ok Shinch'ŏng-sŏ*" or "Application for Contacting North Korean Residents" to the South Korean Ministry of Unification before they visit the Korean schools. The current South Korean government defines visiting Korean schools in Japan as "contacting North Korean residents," thus violating the National Security Law. In other words, the Korean school community members are not simply seen as "undesirable" and "threatening" in a somewhat abstract way, but are clearly classified as "North Korean residents" with whom South Korean nationals are prohibited from interacting. If South Koreans visit and make contact with Korean school teachers or students without letting the ministry know, they could be arrested. As an example, for the Mongdang Yeonpil concert in Hiroshima held in July 2014, a few politically vocal South Korean singers and producers were not given permission from the Ministry of Unification, so they could not participate in the program at all. Another South Korean filmmaker and journalist told me that she received phone calls from South Korean consulate officials who threatened and harassed her because of her involvement with the Korean schools. These accounts underscore how the "end of the cold war" is merely a

“temporality provincial to the Western hemisphere,” and how its “geopolitical reality persists today in Northeast Asia” and is particularly salient among Koreans in the Korean Peninsula and diaspora.²⁵⁰

In the 2007 documentary film, *Uri Hakkyo*,²⁵¹ the fruit of three years director Kim Myung-jun spent at a Chongryun Korean School in Japan, there is a symbolic scene where such persisting “geopolitical reality” is felt so intimately. Director Kim narrates:

During the time I spent at the school, there has been no shadow of division felt between me and the children. But when I saw them off, I deeply understood for the first time in my life that my country is divided into two.²⁵²

Under South Korea’s National Security Law, South Korean nationals are prohibited from visiting North Korea freely. As a South Korean national, Kim was not an exception.

Having filmed and worked with the students and teachers day and night for three years, Kim was deeply disappointed that he was unable to travel to Pyongyang on their senior trip, a culmination of their twelve-year Korean school education. In the scene, Kim sees off the students from afar as Mangyŏngbong-92, the only passenger ferry between North Korea and Japan that has been banned entry to Japan since 2006 as part of sanctions against North Korea (see Chapter 1), is about to leave the Niigata port amidst

²⁵⁰ Lisa Yoneyama, “Politicizing Justice: Post–Cold War Redress and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” *Critical Asian Studies*. Vol. 42, No. 4 (2010): 653–71; citation, 660.

²⁵¹ *Uri Hakkyo* is one of the most successful documentary films in South Korean history, reaching 10,000 viewers within the first week, and exceeded 90,000 viewers in total in South Korea, breaking the record in documentary films. *Star News*, September 14, 2007, <http://star.mt.co.kr/stview.php?no=2007091418030589108>, retrieved on September 17, 2014. The award-winning film was shown not only in theaters, but also in university classrooms and community events, promoting understanding of and publicized the plight of Zainichi Koreans in general and Chongryun-affiliated Korean schools in particular among “ordinary” South Koreans, as my interviews with the Mongdang Yeonpil members reveal. The film was shown in South Korea and Japan, as well as traveled to other countries including the United States, creating a sense of unity among Korean diasporic communities.

²⁵² Kim Myung-jun (2007) *Uri Hakkyo* (131 min)

demonstrators demanding the return of Japanese abductees who are believed to be alive in North Korea.

The South Korean government has greatly curbed the mobility of both South Koreans and Zainichi Koreans. When former President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2008, he restricted the entry of “*Chōsen-seki*” Zainichi Koreans into South Korea due to the alleged “threats” posed by their precarious legal status. According to the *Kyung-hyang Daily*, the average entry refusal rate was only 0.2 percent between 2006 and 2008 but rose to 22.9 percent in 2009. Similarly the number of entry refusal increased from seven to 279 between 2008 and 2009.²⁵³ Chung Yeong-hwan, a Zainichi Korean scholar whose request for a special travel certificate was denied by the South Korean Consulate in Osaka, took the issue to court but lost the case in 2013, as the South Korean Supreme Court supported the Consulate’s decision.²⁵⁴ Today, it is almost impossible for “*Chōsen-seki*” Zainichi Koreans to obtain a special travel certificate; instead, they are strongly encouraged to “convert” to South Korean nationality by embassy and consulate officials if they wish to visit South Korea.

However, possessing South Korean nationality is not always perceived as adequate proof of one’s loyalty to South Korea. As an example, in many Chongryun Korean schools today, more than half of the students hold South Korean nationality.²⁵⁵ Subsequently, the South Korean government has started to harass Korean school students

²⁵³ *The Kyung-hyang Daily*, September 30, 2010.

²⁵⁴ *Yonhap News*, December 12, 2013, <http://japanese.yonhapnews.co.kr/headline/2013/12/12/0200000000AJP20131212002700882.HTM>, retrieved on May 2, 2015.

²⁵⁵ *Mindan Shimbun*, August 25, 2010, <http://www.mindan.org/front/newsDetail.php?category=0&newsid=13172>, retrieved on August 30, 2010.

and their family members who intend to visit North Korea. In 2013, a parent with South Korean nationality who sent her children to Chongryun Korean schools received a letter from the South Korean Embassy, which strongly discouraged the children from taking part in the schools' senior trip to North Korea, as it was against South Korea's National Security Law. The letter advised the parents to "make a wise decision for children's future" as this may cause "juridical and administrative disadvantages" if they visited North Korea without reporting to the embassy or consulate.²⁵⁶ These examples elucidate how Korean schools remain a contested site where the division system manifests its powerful antagonism against those populations that allegedly pose threats to South Korean national security – whether this threat is posed by Zainichi Koreans themselves or South Koreans who are sympathetic to the Korean school communities.

Rise of Triangular Collaboration

While the interactions between South Koreans and Chongryun Korean schools are susceptible to surveillance and punishment by South Korean government, the Japanese civic groups that have long been supportive of Korean schools provide a unique space and means to make it possible for the two parties to meet, learn about and from each other and nurture friendship. The members of Japanese civic groups situate supporting Korean education not only as part of advancing friendship between Japan and North Korea, but also as fulfilling "historical responsibility" to resist the states' efforts in

²⁵⁶ The General Consulate of Republic of Korea –Osaka website under "Anpo no Mado," or "National Security" section, http://jpn-osaka.mofa.go.kr/worldlanguage/asia/osa/relation/security/index.jsp?sp=%2Fwebmodule%2Fhtsboard%2Ftemplate%2Fread%2Fengreadboard.jsp%3FtypeID%3D16%26boardid%3D13787%26seqno%3D682423%26tableName%3DTYPE_ENGLEGATIO, last accessed on July 10, 2015.

erasing history of Koreans in Japan.²⁵⁷ Utilizing their citizenship and political power as citizens, Japanese civic groups help maneuver and ease the political tensions involving a South Korean group and pro-North Korean schools. Without the Japanese civic groups and the few decades of solidarity work between Zainichi Koreans and Japanese citizens, Korean diasporic support would not have been as successful and effective as it is today. I contend that the triangular collaboration is about mobilizing Korean diasporic ties to strategically advance the ethnic minority rights of Zainichi Koreans in Japan. The Mondang Yeonpil Concert in Hiroshima provides an example. In order to prepare for the concert, Mr. Murakami Satoshi, a long-time Japanese supporter of the Hiroshima Korean School, was chosen to be the chairperson of the executive committee. Under his leadership, fifty-seven committee members (forty Japanese and seventeen Zainichi Koreans) were brought together. Headed by a Japanese person, the executive committee was able to solve a number of logistical issues, including helping South Koreans obtain visas for the concert, booking the venue, making an appointment with the Hiroshima mayor and contacting local media. Furthermore, as a “neutral” entity neither pro-North nor pro-South Korea, the committee was able to accept and distribute the donation money collected for Korean schools without having Mongdang Yeonpil (the South Korean charity organization) and Chongryun (a pro-North Korean organization that operates Korean schools) directly contact each other, which would have jeopardized the safety of the South Koreans as well as the reputation of the pro-North organization. This was also

²⁵⁷ *The Choson Shinbo*, May 13, 2012, <http://chosonsinbo.com/jp/2012/05/0512ml-2/>, retrieved on September 17, 2014. See also Morooka Yasuko, “Edagawa Chōsen Gakkō no Torikowashi saiban de towareru Nihonshakai,” *Japan Institute of Constitutional Law*, March 7, 2005, <http://www.jicl.jp/hitokoto/backnumber/20050307.html>, retrieved on September 17, 2014.

the case for Mondang Yeonpil charity concert held in a previous year in Osaka. “Chōsen Kokyūgakkō Mushōka wo Motomeru Renrakukai – Osaka,” or the “Liaison Group Demanding Free Tuition Program for Korean High School in Osaka,” a Japanese civic group co-directed by Japanese university professors and lawyers, as well as a Zainichi Korean,²⁵⁸ helped maneuver the potential political tensions involving Mongdang Yeonpil and Korean schools. Accordingly, the donation collected at the charity concert was strategically delivered to the Korean schools not directly, but through the Liaison Group.²⁵⁹

As opposed to governors Hashimoto, Kuroiwa and Ueda in Chapter 3 who intend to domesticate Zainichi Koreans in Japan as ethnic minority and problematize the material, emotional and ideological ties that Korean schools have maintained with the homeland(s), the triangular collaboration allows Zainichi Koreans to claim their Korean diasporic ties and full membership as ethnic minority in Japan simultaneously. In other words, being ethnic minority does not foreclose the possibility of Zainichi Koreans also being diasporic subjects. The members of Mongdang Yeonpil have positively acknowledged Chongryun and North Korea’s role in sustaining the anti-colonial, ethnic Korean education in Japan for more than six decades.²⁶⁰ Kwon Hye-hyo, the executive director of Mongdang Yeonpil, writes that the Korean schools “collectively work toward nurturing children who would call the North *chokuk* ([ideological/political] homeland)

²⁵⁸ Chōsen Kokyūgakkō Mushōka wo Motomeru Renrakukai –Osaka was founded in March 2012. See their official website for <http://www.renrakukai-o.net/q.html>.

²⁵⁹ Mongdang Yeonpil blog, “Osaka Uri Hakkyo heno Kifu wo Watashimashita,” February 28, 2014, <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangji/entry-11783811974.html>, retrieved on May 10, 2015.

²⁶⁰ Interviews, July 12, 2014 with members of Mongdang Yeonpil.

and the South *kohyang* ([geographical/kinship] home).”²⁶¹ Furthermore, in *Korean Schools in My Heart*, which features Kwon’s biography and the artworks of Korean school students, Kwon writes:

Although they were born in Japan
They accept the South and the North as their *kohyang* (hometown)
And because they understand Japanese society accurately
They are the ones who can play a bridging role²⁶²

Elsewhere, Kwon also warns that one should not think that Zainichi Koreans have isolated themselves in the ethnic communities amidst Japanese colonialism and racism. Instead of representing Zainichi Koreans as “*tongpo*” (fellow countrymen) in a monolithic way, Kwon urges us to see them as multiple and hybrid beings.²⁶³

Simultaneously, Mongdang Yeonpil never fails to acknowledge the decades long *shimin undo* (civic movement) led by Japanese citizens and Zainichi Koreans to protect Korean schools in Japan. Kim Myung-jun, the director of *Uri Hakkyo* and the secretary general of Mongdang Yeonpil, contends that it is the “conscientious Japanese who have struggled with Zainichi Koreans while South Korean society had completely ignored the issue.”²⁶⁴

In this way, diaspora ties were mobilized to positively assert the Korean school communities’ relationship with Chongryun and North Korea to reclaim its legitimacy, and to help strengthen the claim for ethnic minority rights for Zainichi Koreans as they have closely worked Japanese citizens. Furthermore, as I discuss in the sections below

²⁶¹ Kim Yongsuk, “Kwon Hye-hyo san ga kataru ‘Watashi no Kokoro no naka no Chōsen Gakkō,’” *Chōsen Gakkō no aru Fūkei*. Vol. 26 (July 2014), 141.

²⁶² Kwon Hye-hyo, *Watashi no Kokoro no naka no Chōsen Gakkō* (Tokyo: HANA, 2012), 144. Translation mine.

²⁶³ Kwon Hye-hyo, “Chōsen Gakkō ha Uketomerubeki Watashitachi no Rekishi,” *Chōsen Gakkō no aru Fūkei*. Vol. 20 (July 2013):154-9.

²⁶⁴ Kim delivered a presentation at the “South Korea-Japan Peace Discussion” on August 14, 2014 as part of the “8.15 Peaceful Unification Festival” held in Seoul.

regarding the case of Mongdang Yeonpil charity concert in Hiroshima, *shimin undo* (civic movement) developed by Japanese citizens and Zainichi Korean residents, is strategically mobilized to provide means and space for *tongil* where Zainichi Koreans claim diasporic ties with South Koreans. The triangular collaboration has demonstrated a new way to imagine a Zainichi Korean social movement as they are faced with a dead-end with current political campaigns.

Preceding the birth of Mongdang Yeonpil in 2011, the triangular collaboration was beginning to unfold. In 2005, Tokyo Daini Korean Elementary School and Japanese civic group, “*Edagawa Chōsen Gakkō Shien Tomin Kikin*” [Tokyo Residents Fund to Support Edagawa Korean Schools], commonly known as “Tomin Kikin” successfully mobilized support from South Korean groups and individuals to endorse the cause of preserving the Korean school that was facing forceful eviction by Ishihara Shintaro, the then governor of Tokyo. Between 2003 and 2007, members of the Korean school and local Japanese activists framed the issue as protecting children’s rights and ethnic minority’s rights while appealing to international entities to pressure Tokyo. Meanwhile, the issue also caught the attention of many South Koreans after SBS, a major South Korean TV broadcasting company, aired a documentary on the school in 2005.²⁶⁵ During and after the court battle that lasted nearly four years, Tomin Kikin, a Japanese civic group and South Korean supporters organized various fundraising efforts, resulting in a

²⁶⁵ SBS Special documentary, “Nanūn Kayo Tokyo Che*2 Hakkyo ūi Yōrūm (나는 가요 도쿄 제 2 학교의 여름),” September 11, 2005, http://wizard2.sbs.co.kr/resource/template/contents/07_broadcast_view_ext_detail.jsp?vProgId=1000126&vVodId=V0000311936&vMenuId=1002036&rpge=10&cpge=2&vVodCnt1=00010&vVodCnt2=00&vUrl=/resource/template/contents/02_broadcast_ext_board_type_sx.jsp, retrieved on May 1, 2015.

total of 100 million yen (approximately 1 million dollars) donation to the Korean school.²⁶⁶ In March 2007, the school and the Tokyo government reached a settlement: the city rescinded the eviction order, but the Korean school had to pay 170 million yen (approximately 1.7 million dollars) in settlement money.

This pioneer triangular collaboration successfully overturned the eviction order and raised enough money to preserve the Korean school. The collaboration also challenged Japan's forceful attempt to "forget" its imperial past. Tokyo Daini Korean Elementary stands where it is today as a result of a forced migration of one-thousand Koreans from a Korean ghetto in Tokyo to the nearby land reclamation site by Tokyo government in 1941.²⁶⁷ Koreans had to secure clean water and electricity on their own as Tokyo refused to provide the basic infrastructure, and started the school, the predecessor of today's Tokyo Daini Korean Elementary School, in 1946 immediately after the "liberation." The collaborative work between Korean schools, Japanese citizens and South Korean supporters urged Tokyo and governor Ishihara to acknowledge the imperial history behind the school and resisted the forceful erasure of the history and memory. Indeed, histories and memories are crucial factors in allowing one to be an autonomous subject; as Thu-huong Nguyen-vo asserts, "One does not become a recognizable human until one acts in one's history. And for that, one needs to have history."²⁶⁸ The struggle to protect Tokyo Daini Korean Elementary School was thus a battle to claim their active

²⁶⁶ "Chōsen Gakkō Q & A," *Chōsen Gakkō Monogatari* (Tokyo: Kadensha, 2015), 48-9; Tongpo News, June 7, 2007, <http://www.dongponews.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=10409>, retrieved on May 15, 2015.

²⁶⁷ "Zainichi Korean wo meguru Soshō (1) Edagawa Uri Hakkyo Soshō 1," *Japan Institute of Constitutional Law*, <http://www.jicl.jp/now/saiban/backnumber/korean.html>, retrieved May 1, 2015.

²⁶⁸ Thu-huong Nguyen-vo, "Forking Paths: How Shall We Mourn the Dead?," *Amerasia Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2005): 157-175; quotation, 159.

remembering “because forgetting deprives us of our humanist agency in relation to our history.”²⁶⁹

From Haunted Space to Space of *Tongil* and Peace

They will play an important role as a bridge between the South and North, and Northeast Asia someday.

-Kwon Hye-hyo²⁷⁰

Solving the issues surrounding Zainichi Koreans and Korean schools is a short way to creating peace in Asia.

-Kim Myung-jun²⁷¹

In addition to their commitment to active remembrance, Mongdang Yeonpil members deliver a message *tongil*, unification through their act of solidarity. Kwon, the executive director and Kim, the general secretary of Mongdang Yeonpil clearly define supporting Korean schools as bringing peace in the Korean Peninsula and (Northeast) Asia.

Similarly, Yu Gi-hong, a member of the South Korean National Assembly formed a support group for Korean schools in South Korea in 2005 believes that providing support for fellow Koreans, regardless of their affiliation, would help overcome the ideological difference and move toward *tongil*.²⁷² In South Korea, especially among older generations, division continues to be a national trauma and unification remains a dream for the entire nation. Sociologist Giwook Shin argues that for the majority of South Koreans, unification is based on the idea of ethnic unity. He calls it the “ethnic

²⁶⁹ Ibid, 169.

²⁷⁰ Kwon Hye-hyo, “Chōsen Gakkō ha Uketomerubeki Watashitachi no Rekishi,” *Chōsen Gakkō no aru Fūkei*. Vol. 20 (July 2013):154-9.

²⁷¹ The director of *Uri Hakkyo* and the Secretary General of Mongdang Yeonpil, Kim delivered a presentation at the “South Korea-Japan Peace Discussion” on August 14, 2014 as part of the “8.15 Peaceful Unification Festival” held in Seoul.

²⁷² Yu Gi-hong, “Edagawa Chōsen Gakkō mondai no haikē ni aru Nihon no Ukēika,” *Tōitsu Hyōron*. Vol. 479 (2005):72-4.

homogeneity-national unification thesis.”²⁷³ Relatedly, a 2005 East Asia Institute survey reveals that South Koreans considered “Maintaining Korean nationality,” “Using Korean language,” and “Following Korean traditions and customs” the three most significant elements that make one a “genuine Korean.”²⁷⁴ In contrast, only one-third of survey respondents consider second-and third-generation overseas Koreans as “Koreans” while nearly 80 percent consider North Koreans as “Koreans.”²⁷⁵ In short, South Koreans’ imaginary of *tongil* that is based on “ethnic sameness/authenticity” tends to marginalize diasporic populations while centering South Koreans as most authentic.

Shin and historian Roy Grinker both caution against ethnic nationalism because the focus on homogeneity ignores the differences – cultural, social and political –between the two nations and among diasporas that grew in the last sixty years of division and history of immigration, thus not allowing room for diversity and flexibility if *tongil* were to happen.²⁷⁶ In contrast to the popular “ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis,” Kwon Hye-hyo, the executive director of Mondang Yeonpil and its members acknowledge differences that Zainichi Koreans embody as a result of being born and raised in Japan and educated in pro-North Korean schools. They also center Zainichi Koreans in *tongil* for they have long operated the schools and committed to “nurturing children who would call the North *chokuk* ([ideological/political] homeland) and the

²⁷³ Giwook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 185.

²⁷⁴ Cited in Yoonkyung Lee, “Migration, Migrants, and Contested Ethno-Nationalism in Korea,” *Critical Asian Studies*. Vol. 41, No.3 (2009): 363-380; citation, 377.

²⁷⁵ Ibid. p.378

²⁷⁶ Giwook Shin, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 233-5; Roy Grinker, *Korea and its Futures* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

South *kohyang* ([geographical/kinship] home).”²⁷⁷ This view is clearly distinguished from the dominant view that South Koreans hold of Zainichi Koreans: as displaced people who still faced Japanese colonial ideology and racism. One of my interviewees, a former Korean school teacher, told me that South Koreans showed greater interest in the old school buildings that appear to symbolize the “misery” of Zainichi Koreans than in the newly built ones. In contrast to the construction of Korean schools as “powerless” and students and teachers as “victims” who need to be protected and saved, Mongdang Yeonpil respects the resilience of the school communities that have survived repression in the last six decades.

Indeed, Korean schools have been haunted by and bore witness to the unending Cold War and the thriving War on Terror, both on material and discursive levels. As discussed in previous chapters, Korean schools were considered hotbeds of communist propaganda, thus posing threats not only to Japanese society, but also to South Korean society. In the era of War on Terror and the rise of *Hallyu*, the Korean schools and people associated with Chongryun have been further criminalized with severe surveillance under the name of national security. When the *Hallyu* and the Korean schools are presumed to constitute the exact opposite of what it means to be Korean today, even conservative ethnonationalism that builds fraternity on the basis of ethnic sameness –a gesture of solidarity –is a radical act.

In the case of the recent rise of Mongdang Yeonpil-Korean school collaboration, Korean schools are centered within the *tongil* ideal where one’s commitment and belief

²⁷⁷ Kim Yongsuk, “Kwon Hye-hyo san ga kataru ‘Watashi no Kokoro no naka no Chōsen Gakkō,’” *Chōsen Gakkō no aru Fūkei*. Vol. 26 (July 2014), 141.

in unification as a process of overcoming the “division system” (Paik) is considered more important than primordial ethnic sameness and bloodline. Decentering the authenticity question enables South Koreans to imagine *tongil* from the perspective of the periphery. From this perspective, Korean schools in Japan are no longer “less Korean” subjects or mere victims of unending wars and Japanese racism, but as diligent practitioners of *tongil* who strive to overcome the contradiction and violence perpetuated by the “division system” through education and creating a group of people who feel comfortable calling North Korea their *chokuk* ([ideological/political] homeland) and South Korea their *kohyang* ([geographical/kinship] home) simultaneously. By centering Zainichi Koreans in the *tongil* framework, Korean schools transformed themselves from a haunted and isolated space that only speaks to misery and hardship of being a minority in a postcolonial Japan to a space of hope for *tongil* and peace.

Performing *Tongil*: The Case of Mongdang Yeonpil Concert in Hiroshima

As a way to conclude the chapter, I would like to talk about how Zainichi Koreans and South Koreans participate in performing *tongil* at the Mongdang Yeonpil Concert in Hiroshima and other exchange programs arranged for the next two days. As I discussed in the previous sections, the executive committee for the concert, which was led by a long-time Japanese supporter of Hiroshima Korean School, and consisted predominantly of Japanese, took care of logistical issues as a “neutral” *shimin* (civic) entity that is neither pro-North nor pro-South Korean. While Japanese people fulfilled numerous backstage responsibilities, Zainichi Koreans and South Koreans were on the front stage. All three stage-directors were Zainichi Koreans, and performers of the concert were South Koreans and Zainichi Koreans, except for the last song, *Tsubasa wo Kudasai*, a

popular Japanese folk song in which performers, committee members and audience members all participated. In other words, Japanese *shimin undo* (civic movement) prepared the stage for *tongil* – not just something people dream of or passively wait for, but something they actively practice and participate in.

As soon as I arrived at the concert hall, I realized that all the staff members were dressed in the t-shirts with the Mongdang Yeonpil logo design. T-shirts were matched with all sorts of bottoms, jeans, black pants and flower design skirts, representing individual ways of trying to look fashionable. Some even modified the t-shirts by cutting the bottom and sleeves to tailor them to their own liking. The t-shirts were sold for 1,200 yen (approximately 12 dollars) in four different colors, and many audience members, including my mother, and myself bought the t-shirt and changed into it before the concert began. I was in my pink shirt, my mother in navy blue, feeling the power of connectedness and sense of unity with the performers and the rest of the people in the concert hall.



Photo 4.2: Mongdang Yeonpil official logo. Source: Mongdang Yeonpil official blog²⁷⁸

²⁷⁸ Mongdang Yeonpil official blog, “Mongdang Yeonpil T-shatsu hanbai kettē: Hiroshima Kōen,” June 21, 2014, <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangj/entry-11881970929.html>, retrieved on September 1, 2014.



Photo 4.3: Mongdang Yeonpil official t-shirt. Source: Mondang Yeonpil official blog²⁷⁹

While making and selling original t-shirts are common practice at such charity events, my eyes were captivated by the nail art that Mrs. Park, the president of *Omoni-kai*, the mother's association of Hiroshima Korean School, and a few others had. Their nails were painted with the same Mongdang Yeonpil logo (picture below) that they used to make t-shirts. Mrs. Park told me that it was for her to *kiai wo ireru* [get psyched] for the exciting coming few days for which the mothers and fathers spent a year to prepare.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.



Photo 4.4: Mrs. Park's nail art with Mongdang Yeonpil logo. Source: Mongdang Yeonpil official blog²⁸⁰

Mrs. Park and a few other mothers had their nails painted a few days before the concert – the one and only such nail art design in the world. It was their way to incorporate fashion into their politics and vice versa, which allows them to go beyond the struggles that often tend to be all about “self-sacrificing” – the valued characteristics in Korean school communities. By being playful, the mothers center themselves in the movement and demonstrate that their “politics” and “fashion/culture/creativity” are not mutually exclusive entities, but that they often overlap and reinforce each other. Furthermore, the nail art seems to effectively transform their bodies from being victimized objects of state sanctions, racist hate crimes and media misrepresentation to being subjects that “take

²⁸⁰ Mongdang Yeonpil official blog, “Ato 4-kka! –Hiroshima Omonitachi no Kiai-,” June 30, 2014, <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangji/entry-11886521821.html#main>, retrieved on September 1, 2014.

back their bodies for their own pleasure.”²⁸¹

At the concert, performers included Hiroshima Korean school students and professional dancers from Zainichi side and Kwon Hye-hyo, a *Hallyu* star, most well known for starring in *Winter Sonata* in Japan, folk singers such as the group Uri Nara who has been singing for peace and *tongil* in the last fifteen years. Notably, it also included a world-renowned break dancers’ group, Last For One, champion of the 2005 Battle of the Year, an annual international break dance competition from the South Korean side.²⁸² While most of the performers from South Korea fall into the so-called “386 Generation,” those born in the 1960s and became politically active in the democracy movement in the 1980s, members of Last For One were all born in the early-to-mid-1980s. Their breakdance performance has become the highlight of the charity concert, providing youthful energy and diversity to the usual repertoire of traditional cultural performances. Although the yearlong preparation for the concert has nurtured the sense of unity and *tongil* among the performers, I focus here on Last For One’s performances with Korean school community members on the day of concert. Last For One performed a dance collaboration with Hiroshima Chōsen Kamudan,²⁸³ a group of Zainichi Korean singers and dancers and elementary school students of the Hiroshima Korean School. A member and choreographer of Last For One had visited Hiroshima a month before the concert to work on the collaborative pieces and practice with the Kamudan dancers and

²⁸¹ Robin D.G. Kelley, *Race Rebels* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 45.

²⁸² *The Battle of the Year Boty History Booklet*, <http://www.battleoftheyear.de/download/BOTY-History-Booklet.pdf>, retrieved on February 25, 2015.

²⁸³ Hiroshima Chosun Kamdan is a group of Zainichi Korean dancers and singers founded in 1967. They perform in Hiroshima and neighboring prefectures. Hiroshima Chosun Kamudan is one of the seven Kamudan’s in Japan. Members of those Kamudan’s take special courses in North Korea on a regular basis.

students.²⁸⁴

In the collaborative piece, Last For One b-boys – representing South Korean street and youth culture, and Kamudan dancers – representing traditional Korean dance heavily influenced by North Korean modern dance²⁸⁵ performed together to the melody and beat of Korean traditional musical instruments. First appeared two female dancers of Kamudan, then two b-boys followed. Two pairs, each of a female dancer and a b-boy, came on stage and combined two distinct dance genres: breakdance and traditional Korean dance.

²⁸⁴ Mongdang Yeonpil official blog, “Hiroshima Kōen Junbichū: Last For One rainichichū,” June 18, 2014, <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangj/entry-11880011881.html>, retrieved on July 1, 2015. Also see a Facebook group page, “Uso mitaina Hontōno Zainichi-banashi” where members post various stories about Zainichi Koreans. Their post on June 19, 2014 introduces Last For One’s visit to Hiroshima and shares four pictures of the practice sessions, <https://www.facebook.com/zainichibanashi/posts/652170728204179>, retrieved on July 1, 2015.

²⁸⁵ This style of dance was developed by Choi Seung-hee (1911-1969). Choi Seung-hee was born in Seoul under Japanese colonial occupation. As a talented modern dancer, Choi performed not only in Japan and Japanese colonial territories such as Manchuria, but also in the United States and Europe. After the liberation of Korea, Choi moved to North Korea with her husband and established a dance institute where she trained a great number of dancers. She is said to have died in 1969 in North Korea.



Photo 4.5: Two pairs on the stage. Source: Mongdang Yeonpil blog²⁸⁶



Photo 4.6: A b-boy and a Korean traditional dancer. Source: Mongdang Yeonpil blog²⁸⁷

²⁸⁶ Mongdang Yeonpil official blog, “Mongdang Yeonpil Hiroshima Kōen –Last For One & Mai Dansu,” July 10, 2014, <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangj/entry-11891860715.html>, retrieved on July 1, 2015.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

In the middle of the dance, the b-boys and Kamdan dancers come together and performed a Korean traditional shoulder dance called *ökke*chu'm* (어깨춤) (photo 4.6), and then the b-boys suddenly grabbed the Kamdan dancers' scarves and went on to do the windmill move, rolling on their torsos in a circular path on the dance floor, one of the most difficult break dance moves. When the b-boys did handstand walks, the Kamdan dancers responded with *twitchanpal* (뒷잔발), or backward shuffle, one of the most common movements of Korean traditional dance that appears in almost all repertoires. The highlight was when the Kamdan dancers were doing *wöntolki* (원돌기), or spinning and circulating around the b-boy doing the head spin (photo 4.7).



Photo 4.7: A head spinning b-boy and *wöntolki*-ing Kamudan dancers. Source: Mongdang Yeonpil blog²⁸⁸

Seemingly polar opposites, these two dance genres – traditional Korean dance and break dance – were a surprising hit without much discord. A Korean traditional dancer from the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School told me it is in part because both

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

dance forms match with *changdan* (장단), a common triple measure rhythm used in many traditional Korean music as opposed to Japanese traditional music which commonly employs a quadruple time rhythm. Moreover, I was intrigued by some mildly provocative movements that the female dancers undertook during the dance collaboration with Last For One. Traditional dance is a highly respected cultural element in the Korean school community, and considered as symbolizing the elegance and grace of Korean femininity.²⁸⁹ And yet, the Kamudan dancers were able to incorporate some of these “unconventional” dance moves into their performance within the temporal space of *tongil*, which might have challenged the expected passivity and chastity associated with their role as dancers. Becoming like one family, calling each other *oppa* [big brothers] and *tongsaeng* [younger siblings], the traditional dancers and b-boys took pride in the temporal *tongil* dance program they created together in front of the 1,200 audience members.

Similarly, the elementary school students danced away their moves with Last For One (photo 4.8). Having ever been exposed to the South Korean street culture, these students were fascinated and inspired by a different way to “be Korean” than what they learned at school. Junior high school and high school students also made friends with these big brothers playing soccer together and enjoyed a Korean barbeque the following day at the Hiroshima Korean School.

²⁸⁹ Song Kichan, “*Katararenai mono*” *toshite no Chōsen Gakkō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012): 176-179.



Photo 4.8: B-boys and Hiroshima Korean Elementary School students. Source: Mongdang Yeonpil blog²⁹⁰

Along with the performers, a group of thirty-nine members of Mongdang Yeonpil also participated in the three-day solidarity program.²⁹¹ On the first day at the concert, they were in the audience, but on the second and third days, they had opportunities to interact with Korean school students. Some groups prepared a puppet play for the younger students, while other groups took part in a cooking class with all the ingredients they brought from South Korea. While cooking and eating *toppoki*, spicy rice cake and *jjajangmyun*, spicy miso-based noodles, Mongdang Yeonpil members and Korean school students were having conversations without the need of an interpreter. Observing the scene, I could not help but wonder how many people and organizations had to be involved, how many hours of overseas telecommunication in multiple languages had to take place, and how many permissions had to be obtained from the Ministry of Unification, to make this seemingly ordinary encounter possible at all.

Hiroshima and Beyond: *Tongil* as a Process

²⁹⁰ Mongdang Yeonpil official blog, “Mongdang Yeonpil Hiroshima Kōen –Last For One & Mai Dansu,” July 10, 2014, <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangj/entry-11891860715.html>, retrieved on July 1, 2015.

²⁹¹ Nikkan Io blog, “Mongdang Yeonpil, Hirōshima Chōsen Gakkō Hōmon,” July 16, 2014, <http://blog.goo.ne.jp/gekkan-io/e/69c8c4b0b6569a90deed08f987d36ecf>, retrieved on July 1, 2015.

Practicing *tongil* was not limited to the three days (July 4-6, 2014) in which Mongdang Yeonpil members and Korean school community members spent together. It preceded this event and continued past the official solidarity program. The yearlong preparation and the three-day program in Hiroshima created sustainable channels through which collaboration between Zainichi Koreans and South Koreans can become more reciprocal and constant. It has also expanded the horizon of the Zainichi Korean movement and solidarity. For example, less than three months before the charity concert in Hiroshima, the *Sewol* ferry sank, killing 476 people. The overwhelming majority of those on board were high school students from Seoul on a school trip. Concerned about the lives of the missing and the government's (mis)handling of the issue, South Korean university students started a "yellow ribbon campaign" to display solidarity with family members and friends of the victims. The campaign quickly spread nationally and internationally. Hiroshima Korean school teachers, parents and students, as well as Japanese supporters made and sent hundreds of yellow ribbons with solidarity messages to Mongdang Yeonpil, giving them comfort and strength in their time of despair.²⁹²

After the solidarity program, South Korean participants and Zainichi Koreans have kept in constant communication through social media such as Facebook, LINE, and Kakaotalk, which have allowed them to prolong *tongil* moments virtually. In November, members of Last for One returned to Hiroshima and performed at the school's annual cultural festival where officials from the Hiroshima municipal government also came to observe. During their stay in Hiroshima, Last for One's members visited the Deputy

²⁹² Mongdang Yeonpil blog, "Nihon kara Tondekita Kiiroi Ribon," June 8, 2014, <http://ameblo.jp/mongdangj/entry-11873488863.html>, retrieved on September 1, 2014.

Mayor of Hiroshima. In the group picture taken with the Deputy Mayor, we see South Korean and Japanese national flags being displayed between the two parties (photo 4.9). Likewise, according to the press release, the purpose of their visit to Hiroshima is to “perform at the Hiroshima Korean School’s cultural festival and promote Japan-South Korea friendship.”²⁹³



Photo 4.9: Last For One’s visit to Hiroshima City Hall. Source: Nikkan Io blog²⁹⁴

Due to the ambiguous nature of Japanese sentence structure, it is unclear whether the first half of the sentence (performing at Korean school) and the latter half (promoting friendship between Japan and South Korea) are interrelated, but from the picture, we can

²⁹³ City of Hiroshima, press release, November 17, 2014, <http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/1415923541759/index.html>, retrieved on July 1, 2015.

²⁹⁴ Members of Las For One had a meeting with Nishito Koji, the Deputy Mayor (right seat) at Hiroshima City Hall on November 17, 2014. Their visit was arranged and accompanied by Kim Yong-eun, the principal of Hiroshima Korean School (far left) and Murakami Satoshi, the head of executive committee of the Mondang Yeonpil concert in Hiroshima (far right). See Nikkan Io blog, “Sasshi ‘Mongdang Yeonpil in Hiroshima no Kiseki’ Kansē,” December 10, 2014, <http://blog.goo.ne.jp/gekkan-io/e/276e16527a4ce2d790a5ce367c33c6f3>, retrieved on July 1, 2015.

speculate that the city is trying to separate the two purposes of their visit. However, in the conversation with the Deputy mayor, Last For One clearly delivered their message. They demanded the City of Hiroshima resume the education subsidies to Korean schools that have been frozen since 2012.²⁹⁵ Against the city's intention of separating the South and North, and promoting friendship only with South Koreans, the presumably "good" ones, Last for One – the "good" ones – refused this notion adamantly because they "can't forget about you" – their *tongil* partners (the "bad" ones), as one of the members of Last For One's shirt declares in the picture.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

Epilogue

October 7, 2013 was one of the most unforgettable birthdays of my life. That morning, I was among some two hundred supporters of the Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School that gathered at the Kyoto District Court to hear the verdict on the civil trial case involving a series of physical and verbal attacks perpetrated by a ultra nationalist group, Zaitokukai, in 2009 and 2010.²⁹⁶ The court ordered Zaitokukai to pay 12.26 million yen (approximately 122,600 dollars) for tangible and intangible damages it has caused the school and its members, as well as banned racist demonstrations within a 200-meter (approximately 660 feet) radius of the school that had been relocated after the series of attacks.²⁹⁷ Drawing from the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which Japan had ratified in 1995, the court determined the Zaitokukai attacks were a form of racial discrimination and acknowledged the court's responsibility to effectively fulfill the principle of the convention.²⁹⁸ I shared the moment of joy and relief with the members of the Korean school and Japanese supporters who had spent nearly four years in the court battle. On July 8, 2014, I was back in Japan at the Osaka High Court and heard even better news: the appeal by Zaitokukai was dismissed.

²⁹⁶ Founded in 2006, *Zainichi Tokken o Yurusanai Shimin no Kai* [Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi], widely known by its shortened name, "Zaitokukai" has more than 10,000 members as of December 2013. Zaitokukai has organized a great number of racist demonstrations to demand abolishment of the "special privileges" that Zainichi Koreans allegedly hold. In 2009 and 2010, Zaitokukai members gathered in front of Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School, vandalized the school properties and screamed racist and abusive words toward the school, teachers and students.

²⁹⁷ Kyoto District Court, *Gaitō Senden Sashitome tō Sēikyū Jiken*, Wa-2655 (October 7, 2013), 2-3.

²⁹⁸ Ibid, 20.

In upholding the district court's ruling, the Osaka High Court clearly stated that Zaitokukai attacks "damaged not only educational environment of the school, but also social environment in which Zainichi Koreans run ethnic education in our country."²⁹⁹ Furthermore, the Osaka High Court criticized the Zaitokukai attacks for exposing the innocent students to "a derogatory and vulgar attack based solely on their ethnic origin" and making them "suffer major psychological damage through the irrational acts of racial discrimination" (translation mine).³⁰⁰ The Supreme Court, likewise, upheld the lower court rulings and dismissed the Zaitokukai appeal, bringing an end to the court battle on December 9, 2014.³⁰¹ Five years had passed since the first attack.

While the group of lawyers and members of the Korean schools won the victory through a "non apologetic" approach, employing the existing legal frameworks to question if there was human rights for Zainichi Koreans –the population rendered "nakedly human"³⁰² –when the police's "complicit generosity" [*kyōhan teki na kanyōsa*] effectively proved that violence committed against Korean schools does not constitute a crime.³⁰³ As Kim Kidon, the-then head of the fathers' association, or *aboji kai* proclaimed, the court battle was ultimately about regaining the "pride" that members of the Korean school had lost in the series of Zaitokukai attacks and police neglect.³⁰⁴ Historically, the Korean schools had not considered court trials as the most effective

²⁹⁹ Osaka High Court, *Gaitō Senden Sashitome tō Sēikyū Kōso Jiken*, Ne-3235 (July 8, 2014), 13.

³⁰⁰ Ibid, 14.

³⁰¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, December 10, 2014,

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201412100078, retrieved on May 1, 2015.

³⁰² Sonia Ryang, *Writing Selves in Diaspora* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), xxvi.

³⁰³ Nakamura Ilsung, *Rupo: Kyoto Chōsen Gakkō Shūgeki Jiken* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014), 16.

³⁰⁴ Ibid, 104.

means to advance minority rights in part because there is always a possibility that potentially disadvantageous precedents may be set, which would foreclose further possibilities of gaining recognition and resources.³⁰⁵ Accordingly, when they won various rights and privileges, including the right to purchase monthly train passes at a student rate and participate in the national and local athletic and musical competitions, they did so by evoking public opinions rather than suing the train companies or municipal offices that had excluded Korean schools. However, in the case of Zaitokukai attacks, the teacher and parents ran a risk and sought judicial affirmation of the very existence of Zainichi Koreans and Korean schools in the courtroom –that eventually functioned as a space of recovery and healing as well as of secondary victimization.³⁰⁶ At last, the four-year court battle ended with a “complete victory.”

What did this “victory” bring to the Korean school? Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School disappeared during the court battle. Fearing for students’ safety, the Kyoto Korean Educational Board [*Kyoto Chōsen Gakuen*], decided to relocate the school to the Kyoto Korean Daisan Elementary School, located about forty-five minutes north. The two elementary schools were integrated and newly started as “Kyoto Korean Elementary School” in April 2012, which was again relocated to southern district of Kyoto in 2013 where the board had obtained vast land years before and just completed the construction of the school facilities. The new school buildings and spacious field warmly welcomed the students who had been hurt and (re)moved by racist attacks. While

³⁰⁵ Interview, August 25, 2014.

³⁰⁶ Nakamura details the experiences of court rooms by Ku Ryang-ok, one of the lawyers involved with the case who was also an alumna of Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School. Nakamura Ilsung, *Rupo: Kyoto Chōsen Gakkō Shūgeki Jiken* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014): 180-204.

the students and teachers found a new “home,” Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School was demolished and ended its fifty years of history, with a few thousand graduates including my mother, uncles, aunts and cousins.



Photo 5.1: Neighborhood map at Jūjō station³⁰⁷

For some time after school’s relocation, Kyoto Korean Daiichi Elementary School remained on the map at its nearest subway station, Jūjō (photo 5.1), reminding us that the school indeed existed not in isolation but rooted in the local community as it is recognized in the map. In Nakamura’s book cover (picture 5.2), we see elementary school students gather in a small crowded courtyard area between the school building and the busy street, and enjoy playing soccer and practicing hula-hoops. This was a common afternoon scene. I can almost hear the voices of these students in this picture. This mundane school scene became extremely difficult to sustain and was eventually lost forever, as the school was completely erased without any indication or trace of what had been there. A piece of desolate land is quietly waiting for city’s redevelopment plan to build an apartment or commercial building. The “victory” obtained through the legal system is unable to recover or heal what is lost as a result of what happened on that day at

³⁰⁷ The photo was taken on November 4, 2013.

that place. This directly speaks to the incommensurability between “justice” in legal terms and the victims’ experience during and after the event.




Photo 5.2: Cover of Nakamura Ilsung's Reportage

As the Osaka High Court judge noted, the recovery and healing process for the students has required much effort.³⁰⁸ The teachers and parents of the Korean school and Japanese supporter groups put their focus on treating the PTSD of the students who started bed wetting since the attacks, and get anxious every time they hear loud voice through speakers which remind them of Zaitokukai. Japanese civic groups, “Korum”³⁰⁹

³⁰⁸ Osaka High Court, *Gaitō Senden Sashitome tō Sēikyū Kōso Jiken*, Ne-3235 (July 8, 2014), 14.

³⁰⁹ “Korum” is a nickname for the group, *Zaitokukai rani yoru Chōsen Gakkō ni taisuru Shūgeki-jiken Saiban wo Shien suru kai* [The group that supports the court case on Zaitokukai’s attacks on Korean Schools]. Korum received the 26th Yoko Tada Human Rights Award for its continued support for the court case, the Korean school and education. See the Tada Yoko Human Rights fund official website, <http://tadayoko.net/kiroku/2014/2014jyusyou.html>, retrieved on February 25, 2015.

and “Kopponori”³¹⁰ together created bilingual booklets with illustrations that teach the students what the court case was about, what the courts said about their school and education, and how the tangible and intangible damage was recognized in justice system.³¹¹ These efforts help students develop “critical remembering” (Fujitani, White and Yoneyama 2001) of the assaults they experienced, which further stigmatized the school that had already been associated with “terrorism” in the period following the September 17 revelation. The victory in courtroom did not bring an end to either students’ pains and trauma, or to “hate speech.” In fact, just last year, students at a local Japanese junior high school verbally assaulted the Korean students shouting, “Die” and “Go back to Korea” right after the two schools had an exchange program that was supposed to promote understanding of each other and friendship between the students.³¹² All the while, Zaitokukai and likeminded people continue to organize racist demonstrations in metropolitan cities in Japan where they are met with “counter-racist” groups, creating overwhelming tensions that sometimes escalate into physical confrontation.

Korean schools and the members of the schools have struggled to make sense of the world around them and navigate the “imperial feeling” that justifies state sanctions and hate speech/crimes targeting those associated with North Korea since 9/17. Despite the difficulty and negative consequences, Zainichi Koreans continue to remain in the

³¹⁰ “Kopponori” is a nickname for the group, *Chōsen Gakkō to Minzoku Kyōiku no Hatten wo Mezasu kai, Keiji* [The group that work toward the Growth of Korean schools and Ethnic education in Kyoto/Shiga].

³¹¹ The booklets (Korean and Japanese) are easily accessible free of charge: https://drive.google.com/drive/?rfd=1#folders/0B60d_nhxt-QfajloR24wNEVHLUk. As of June 2015, four volumes have been published.

³¹² Interview, May 27, 2015.

interstitial space between citizen and foreigner, diaspora and ethnic minority, and ally and enemy to resist the forceful forgetting of their histories and memories –reminders of Japan’s imperial past that continues to haunt and return in the form of anti-North Korea hysteria and xenophobia. Their political and cultural strategies for survival in this state of exception that has become increasingly normalized as the “rule” may not appear particularly successful, if not futile. Yet, I slowly come to realize that their struggles were not only about gaining recognition and resources to sustain their presence, but also about thinking “unthinkable politics” –to fight “the battle they have already lost.”³¹³ Drawing upon Derrick Bell’s “racial realism,” Cacho imagines an alternative view of empowerment of the socially dead that is “not contingent on taking power or securing small victories.” She writes:

Empowerment comes from deciding that the outcome of struggle doesn’t matter as much as the decision to struggle. Deciding to struggle against all odds armed only with fingers crossed on both hands is both an unusual political strategy and a well-informed worldview.³¹⁴

Likewise, even after many losses, members of Korean schools are not completely defeated, but continue their struggles because as Bell argues, “The fight itself has meaning and should give us hope for the future.”³¹⁵ The students, teachers and parents of the Korean schools are creating lives, sustaining them and dreaming in the space that is meant to disappear –today, tomorrow and as long as they last. As Ahn Min-yeop, the-then high school senior, writes, they never cease to believe in the “bright and dazzling future.”

³¹³ Lisa Cacho, *Social Death*. (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 31-2.

³¹⁴ Ibid, 32.

³¹⁵ Derrick Bell, “Racial Realism,” *Connecticut Law Review*. Vol. 24, No. 2 (1992): 363-379; citation, 378.

*What we have*³¹⁶
- Ahn Min-yeop

What we have is
Sad and painful past
What we don't have is
Fun and bright future

What we have is
Discrimination that should not exist
What we don't have is
Rights that should exist

What we have is
Bright and dazzling future
What we don't have is
Dark and receding future

³¹⁶ Ahn Min-yeop, "Watashi tachi ni aru mono," *Chōsen Gakkō Mushōka Jogai Hantai Ansology* (August 2010). The anthology was edited by a Kyoto-based poet, Kawazu Kiyoe and includes dozens of poetries by Korean school students, teachers and their Japanese supporters. Translation mine.

Original text of Ahn's poetry in Japanese:

「私たちにあるもの」

安珉葉

私たちにあるものは
悲しくつらい過去である
私たちにないものは
楽しく明るい過去である

私たちにあるものは
ないはずの差別である
私たちにないものは
あるはずの権利である

私たちにあるものは
明るく眩しい未来である
私たちにないものは
暗く進めない未来である

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