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Publication Date

2023

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Santa Barbara

Securing State Support for Indigenous Language Revitalization: Lessons from Aotearoa New

Zealand to the Chumash Homelands

A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Master of Arts

in Global Studies

by

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September 2023

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September 2023

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Securing State Support for Indigenous Language Revitalization: Lessons from Aotearoa New

Zealand to the Chumash Homelands

by

Jean-Michel Valentin Ricard

Indigenous languages have immense cultural and social value, providing unique

lenses to view reality and a means to bind together national identities. Unfortunately, these

same benefits became a liability when Indigenous nations were conquered by settler

societies, who have a vested interest in suppressing the national distinction and sovereignty

of those they subjugated. Integration into settler societies and the global economy have added

structural suppression of Indigenous languages to their deliberate erasure. Where Indigenous

nations could formerly conduct all aspects of daily life in their languages, their economic and

social livelihoods are now utterly entangled in national societies and transnational economies

where their languages hold virtually no practical value. The result of these dynamics has

been a precipitous decline in Indigenous languages. Nevertheless, Indigenous peoples across

the world have successfully compelled settler governments to support language revitalization

efforts, seemingly against the settler state's countersovereign interests. Nowhere has this

process been more successful than in Aotearoa New Zealand, where the Indigenous Māori

language enjoys official status and enormous financial and discursive support from the settler

government. This thesis seeks to identify the factors that enabled the Māori to secure settler state support for language revitalization, and whether the lessons of Aotearoa New Zealand can be effectively and appropriately applied by Chumash communities in California. Though aimed specifically at serving the Chumash peoples, the comparisons made in this study should prove helpful in helping Indigenous peoples anywhere measure the costs, benefits, and viability of pressuring settler governments for support.

Drawing on the insights of scholars of Indigenous studies, settler colonial studies, and norm entrepreneurship, as well as interviews with Chumash co-researchers, this thesis finds that the concessions won by the Māori owe a great deal to Māori political protest, electoral influence, autonomous educational initiatives, and unique norms stemming from the Treaty of Waitangi and Māori's relationship with the British Crown. Favorable norms provided a crucial fulcrum, but Māori victories ultimately depended upon leveraging these norms with credible threats to the statebuilding interests of the settler state. Chumash peoples lack the numbers and normative instruments that gave the Māori their victories, but I conclude that pro-Indigenous norm entrepreneurship, autonomous educational initiatives, and political protest could still successfully win concessions. I also warn that engaging with the settler state carries risks of repression and cooptation. If statebuilding interests are threatened without the requisite popular, electoral, or normative power to force concessions, then the state may further repress Indigenous languages, returning them to a "safety zone" where they cannot threaten national unity. If Indigenous communities align themselves too closely with settler state interests to cultivate support for revitalization, however, they might find themselves drawn into a form of neoliberal multiculturalism or politics of recognition, where

the settler state's cultural concessions "domesticate" the Indigenous challenge, trading limited concessions for legitimacy and stability. I draw on Chumash co-researchers to argue that any concessions not based on the principles of accessibility, relationality, and community control will be insufficient to revitalize Indigenous languages. I further argue that the settler state must bolster Indigenous institutional, material, and political power if Indigenous communities are to survive and thrive. Generations of state-led land theft and socio-political repression pushed Indigenous languages into marginality, so it will take generations of state-enabled Indigenous socio-political and economic empowerment to restore value to Indigenous languages. This aid combined with strengthened local identity and community institutions will be crucial to revitalizing languages that provide little global interconnectivity, which constitutes a serious structural limitation to language vitality in a globalized world.

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INTRODUCTION

The Chumash languages of California's Santa Barbara, Ventura, and San Luis Obispo Counties face existential battles. Centuries of genocide under Spanish, Mexican, and American rule have cost the languages all of their first-language speakers, and they have only recently reawakened from decades of slumber as the Chumash peoples have begun to speak their ancestors' tongues once more. This reawakening is in its early stages and — apart from a few notable allies — has largely been undertaken alone by Chumash organizations and individuals. Yet this lack of support is in no way a given for Indigenous languages. New Zealand, an Anglo-dominant settler colonial society like the United States, has since the 1970s reversed course on linguicidal policies and has instead embraced *te reo*, the Indigenous Māori language. The settler government granted official status to *te reo* and invested heavy financial, regulatory, and discursive support into its promotion, contributing to a stabilization of the percentage of fluent speakers. Though these efforts have been insufficient to outright reverse the trend of language loss, they are nonetheless globally recognized as a best practices model for state-supported Indigenous language revitalization. In collaboration with local Chumash individuals, allies, and organizations, this thesis seeks to identify what factors enabled New Zealand's dramatic about-face and determine which, if any, of these factors may be adapted by Chumash language revivalists to secure settler state support for their efforts. Its ultimate goal is to produce actionable knowledge to facilitate Chumash revitalization efforts while simultaneously accounting for the potential dangers of cooptation

inherent in collaborating with the same settler state that endangered the languages in the first place.

The introductory chapter of this thesis will outline my methodology and theoretical foundations. Central to my analysis of the factors behind settler state concessions and the risks of cooptation therefrom are the concept of norm entrepreneurship, language values, Wolfe's logic of elimination, Karuka's concept of countersovereignty, Lomaiwama and McCarty's safety zone theory, Coulthard's politics of recognition, Tuck and Yang's concept of settler moves to innocence, and Altamirano Rayo, Mosinger, and Thaler's theorization on the relationship between settler statebuilding interests and Indigenous autonomy. The first chapter will then outline the history of the Māori struggle to revitalize their language, highlighting the role that norm entrepreneurship, electoral politics, popular protest, and autonomous educational endeavors played in their success and underlining continued threats to the language in the form of structurally suppressed language values and settler cooptation. The second chapter will provide historical context on the Chumash languages and draw on interviews with Chumash co-researchers to identify the structural and normative strengths and weaknesses faced by the Chumash in their revitalization efforts. The chapter will also present the opinions of co-researchers on the appropriateness and feasibility of working with the settler state on language revitalization, concluding that any initiative that does so must be based on the principles of accessibility, relationality, and community control. The final chapter directly compares and contrasts the two case studies, determining that the New Zealand norm of Indigenous language as shared heritage, autonomous educational institutions, and popular protest are the tools most transferable to winning state support for

Chumash language revitalization, albeit primarily at a local scale. Ultimately, I conclude that an understanding of language values impresses the necessity of transferring land, resources, and political autonomy to Indigenous peoples if settler state support is to be genuinely helpful in sustainably revitalizing their languages in a national and global socio-economic context that structurally undervalues them.

Methodology:

Two case studies will guide this research: The case of *te reo* Māori (the Māori language) in Aotearoa[1] New Zealand and the case of the Chumash languages of Southern California. Both regions have been conquered by Anglo-majority settler states, but the fates of their languages have radically diverged. *Te reo* Māori enjoys official status, a large speaker base, and hefty financial and normative support from the settler government. Conversely, Chumash languages have endured the loss of all their first-language speakers and receive little to no recognition or support from settler institutions. The crudely similar political and cultural traditions that animate these settler states will act as a backdrop against which distinguishing characteristics that facilitate state support for Indigenous language revitalization may be identified. This study considers the revitalization of *te reo* to present a relative "best practices" case, from which lessons may be derived on how to replicate such success in Chumash lands and on how to avoid any possible risks of cooptation likewise made visible in Aotearoa. A secondary focus of this thesis will be establishing the affective connections that Chumash activists feel to their languages and their own cultural and political

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[1] "Aotearoa" is the Māori name for what is now called "New Zealand". I will use the terms somewhat interchangeably but will favor "New Zealand" when referencing the modern settler society and "Aotearoa" when referencing the land itself.

priorities so that readers may gain a greater degree of understanding as to why and how these individuals and communities seek to revitalize their languages. The overall objective is not only to identify Aotearoan strategies transferable to the Chumash homelands, but also to give readers a greater appreciation for the diversity of opinions, objectives, and concerns that suffuse language revitalization efforts.

Data for my first case study, the revitalization of *te reo* in Aotearoa, was generated through a review of the plentiful literature on the subject and two months of independent study in Rotorua and Whakatāne, two small Aotearoan cities with large Māori populations. Living in Aotearoa provided access to libraries of professionally curated collections of Māori academic literature and allowed me to develop an impression of the degree to which *te reo* is publicly visible/audible after decades of revitalization efforts. This lived experience confirmed that *te reo* is highly visible on public signage and enjoys positive social attitudes but is only rarely audible in public urban settings. This belies some optimism encountered in the literature and highlights critiques that revitalization has not attended thoroughly to structural barriers preventing greater language learning and use.

For my second case study — the revitalization of Chumash languages in the United States — knowledge was gathered from the slim literature from Chumash and settler scholars and from semi-structured interviews with four Chumash community members engaged in language revitalization work. Community approval and control are major tenets of this research. Those I work with are considered "co-researchers" who contribute equally to the

generation of knowledge.[2] Accordingly, individual co-researchers are given control over the

materials they generate (such as interview transcripts) and may revise their contributions,

including by withdrawing them entirely, at any time. To maintain their privacy, co-

researchers chose to contribute using pseudonyms, which they themselves chose or, in the

absence of a preference, were assigned. Monetary compensation was offered to co-

researchers for their time, but all four declined. Instead, nonmonetary gifts such as sage and

baked goods were given out of respect for the interpersonal relationship and the time offered

by co-researchers. In keeping with the honoring of contributors as co-researchers, each

individual's contributions were subject to their review, editing, and final approval. As the

field of Global Studies emphasizes the importance of situating one's case studies within a

global context, I have also studied language revitalization in other national contexts. This, I

believe, has provided me with a broader understanding of the universal challenges faced by

revitalizers and a deeper understanding of the national specificities of Aotearoa and the U.S.

Theoretical Bases and Conclusions:

Settler colonial theory, as elaborated upon by Patrick Wolfe, will constitute the

theoretical foundation of the study. In Wolfe's conception, settler colonialism is a form of

colonialism wherein an invading power "destroys to replace", inherently operating according

to a logic of elimination wherein Indigenous lands are seized, emptied, and re-populated with

non-Indigenous settlers in the service of capital accumulation.[3] Wolfe employs the term

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[2] R.M. Boylorn, "Participants as co-researchers", in *The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods,* ed. L.M. Given (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2012), 600-601.

[3] Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 388.

"logic of elimination" rather than "genocide" in part due to the loaded ideological baggage associated with the term, which devalues forms of genocide different from those perpetrated in the Holocaust.[4] Another part of his critique of the concept of genocide is that it does not include ways in which Indigenous peoples are eliminated in the imaginaries of the settler population, for instance through romantic stereotypes that preclude contemporary Indigenous peoples from being accepted as authentic and, thus, deserving of sovereignty.[5] In any case, the settler colonial logic of elimination serves the material purpose of acquiring territory which would otherwise be unavailable to the settler economy. So long as Indigenous peoples maintain distinct collective identities, they represent an ideological and material threat to the territorial sovereignty and economic growth of the settler society.

Manu Karuka's concept of countersovereignty is a useful conceptual additive in this instance. Under this framework, settler states are understood to never possess full, primary sovereignty. Instead, they exercise reactive projects of countersovereignty "in reaction to complex networks of relationship between humans, nonhuman lifeforms, and inanimate processes that together constitute a distinct place in the world," in other words, against everything that makes Indigenous peoples distinct.[6] Following Wolfe's logic of elimination, settler sovereignty can only be fully achieved when all that distinguishes Indigenous peoples from the settler population (culture, language, ancestry, citizenship, and so forth) has been eliminated. Without national distinction, there can be no claim to national sovereignty;

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[4] Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 402.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Manu Karuka, *Empire's Tracks: Indigenous Nations, Chinese Workers, and the Transcontinental Railroad* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019): xii.

Basques may present a separatist threat to Spain, but the Italian state has little to fear from the Samnites. Like "counterintelligence, counterinsurgency, and counterrevolution," countersovereignty is a mode of "reactive anxiety", carried out through the manipulation of information as much as through overwhelming violence.[7] The death of all Indigenous Americans would advance countersovereignty, but it is also well served (with less trouble) by promoting the myth that all "real Indians" are dead. As such, projects of countersovereignty are not advanced solely through destructive violence, but through assimilation, neglect, isolation, co-optation, the myth of *terra nullius*, and "fantasies of Indigenous disappearance" realized through "the repetition and dispersion of rumors, masquerading as empirical fact."[8]

This drive to homogenize is not unique to settler states and is generalizable to the nation-state itself. Under the nationalist principle of nation-state congruence, which "holds that the boundaries of political and national identity should coincide," nation-states (including settler states) are ideologically committed to the "establishment of an ethnically exclusive and culturally and linguistically homogenous nation-state,".[9] In other words, the principle of "one nation, one state" seems to necessitate a principle of "one state, one language". In spite of nation-state congruence and the countersovereign logic of elimination, settler states across the globe have come to support the revitalization of the Indigenous languages that they have historically targeted for elimination. This seemingly paradoxical behavior is theorized to be the product of three interrelated factors: norm entrepreneurship,

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[7] Karuka, *Empire's Tracks*, xii, 6.

[8] Karuka, *Empire's Tracks*, 6.

[9] Stephen May, "Uncommon Languages: The Challenges and Possibilities of Minority Language Rights," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 21, no. 5 (2000): 370.

the settler state's inherent investment in protecting its statebuilding interests, and the exercise of political power by Indigenous peoples.

Norm Entrepreneurship:

Norm entrepreneurship is the first of the three avenues of change. Norms are "collective, intersubjectively shared expectations of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity… [that] determine which actions are considered to be socially appropriate and thus permitted and which ones are considered to be inadequate and thus prohibited."[10] Norms are never free of contestation (indeed, even seemingly universal norms against theft and violence are regularly transgressed) but their expectations and consequences are systemic within the bounds of a given collective identity. In the context of this thesis, the collective identity under examination is primarily at the level of the settler state itself, a level characterized in my case studies by normative English monolingualism and Anglo culture. When English monolingualism and Anglo culture are said to be normative in Anglo settler states, that means that citizens of that state are expected to speak English and practice Anglo culture. This does not mean that there aren't countless individuals who do not conform to these expectations, but those who do are perceived as "normal" while those who are not are systemically perceived to some degree as outsiders and risk facing systemic disadvantages because of this status.

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[10] Carmen Wunderlich, *Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs*, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 5.

Crucially, the constant contestation and evolution that characterize norms give rise to the opportunity for norm entrepreneurship. Wunderlich's study of rogue states helpfully compiles existing scholarship on norm entrepreneurship, defining it broadly as a process wherein new norms or reinterpretations of preexisting norms are deliberately spread in an attempt to correct a perceived deficiency with the normative status quo and thereby encourage a change in behavior.[11] Though new norms may be successfully spread, reinterpretations of preexisting norms seem to spread more successfully.[12] This insight is strategically useful in the context of Indigenous rights battles, which are typically uphill battles against a status quo that benefits numerically superior and culturally distinct settlers. Prioritizing the reinterpretation of norms already internalized by settlers might immeasurably facilitate a struggle, but it may come with long-term compromises insofar as it compels the neglect of norms based in Indigenous epistemes (which may be far harder to spread amongst settlers but hold the promise of more radically beneficial change if successfully spread). Accordingly, the effectiveness of a strategy must be weighed against its cultural appropriateness, as determined by the entrepreneurial community. This will be one of the primary foci of interviews with Chumash co-researchers. In any case, norm entrepreneurship is considered successful when its chosen norms have been widely diffused (if not internalized) amongst members of the targeted collective identity.[13] An even greater level of success is achieved when these norms pass from the abstract and are institutionalized, meaning that they are integrated into socio-political frameworks such as laws and treaties.[14]

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[11] Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 23.

[12] Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 41.

[13] Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 24, 39.

[14] Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 31.

In addition to the relative strength of the norms themselves, myriad actor-specific and structural characteristics can help or hinder norm entrepreneurship. In the former case, Wunderlich lists "group size, the degree of social cohesion, a dense structural network, and clear membership criteria" as "decisive for the success of activist networks,".[15] Campaigns of norm entrepreneurship additionally benefit when their members (particularly the leadership) are charismatic, politically savvy, organizationally talented, and credible in terms of their expertise or connection to the subject matter and their moral authority and consistency.[16] Presumably, characteristics such as charisma are subjective, perhaps problematically so. Indeed, Rublee finds that norm entrepreneurship is more successful when the entrepreneurs are "similar" to those being targeted, which may be anticipated to disadvantage entrepreneurs coming from culturally dissimilar — and marginalized — minority populations.[17] Historically, this chasm was bridged with the greater integration of Indigenous peoples into settler societies (for example through military service and urbanization) and the familiarization of Indigenous individuals with settler ways of knowing and being, not least through Western education and assimilation. Anaya, for instance, cites "educat[ion] in the ways of the societies that had encroached upon them" as a critical factor in the rise of a (moderately successful) global Indigenous challenge to the normative status quo of

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[15] Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 28-29; Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 41.

[16] Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 41-42.

[17] Maria Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 3 (2008): 430; Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 41.

international law.[18] Framing pro-Indigenous norm entrepreneurship in settler ways of knowing, therefore, may prove more strategically potent than trying to bring settlers to accept norms derived from Indigenous ways of knowing, although this could risk leading to the internalization or assimilation of these epistemes at the expense of Indigenous epistemes.

As potent as norms are, they only spread and achieve true instrumentality when they are leveraged with political action. Actions promoting norm entrepreneurship fall along a continuum from "conversion" to "coercion". Actions at the "conversion" end of the spectrum may include consensual dialogue and praising actions that align with one's norms, while actions at the "coercion" end of the spectrum range from "naming and shaming" to civil disobedience and other means of protest (violence falls under this end of the spectrum, but in the context of this study is considered strategically and morally undesirable).[19] "Conversion" actions are a critical component of any campaign of norm entrepreneurship, but on their own I believe them to be inadequate to secure Indigenous rights. Settler states have vested interests in their projects of countersovereignty, and history bears out that these cannot be overcome by simple appeals to normative values. Instead, I theorize, settler states will (at least initially) only be moved to change their behavior if it accords with their statebuilding interests, though resulting normative change may later add its own weight to the calculus. Wunderlich states that "symbolic acts and deliberate violations of norms," like civil disobedience are "particularly suitable means for attracting public attention for non-state actors that lack traditional power resources," a descriptor particularly suitable for describing

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[18] James Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 46.
[19] Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 38.

the position of Indigenous peoples.[20] This is borne out by history, since popular protest

movements in the 1960s and 1970s were decisive in advancing Indigenous rights and

sovereignty in both Aotearoa and the United States.[21] The relationship between the

prerequisites of successful norm entrepreneurship, political action, and the successful

diffusion and enforcement of norms can be somewhat circular. Though primarily targeted at

changing norms and/or behavior, Indigenous popular protest in both countries (the Red

Power movements of the 1970s and 1980s and the 1975 *Hīkoi*) resulted in increased

identification with Indigeneity and the solidification of a "pan-tribal" Indigenous solidarity.[22]

Thus, public political action increased both "group size" and "social cohesion", making the

movements more powerful than ever before. All of this is to say that the strengths of a

movement cannot necessarily be determined from the outset since they may snowball as a

result of political action itself.

In Aotearoa, electoral politics have proven decisive in norm entrepreneurship and

material change in a way that they haven't in the United States. Ann Sullivan documents how

electoral reform pushed by Māori protests and norm entrepreneurship expanded designated

Māori seats in parliament and allowed Māori to opt to vote for non-Māori seats instead.[23]

Given that Māori had previously been limited to four seats in total and that they made up

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[20] Ari Adut, "Scandal as Norm Entrepreneurship Strategy: Corruption and the French Investigating Magistrates," *Theory and Society* 33, no. 5 (October 2004): 532; Wunderlich, *Rogue States*, 38.

[21] Anne Sullivan, "Effecting Change Through Electoral Politics: Cultural Identity and the Māori Franchise," *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* 112, no. 3 (2003): 228.

[22] Joane Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), loc. 254-258, Kindle.

[23] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 228.

roughly 15% of the electorate, this transformed national politics and helped force a turn towards conciliatory policies.[24] Again, norms are vital leverage with which to change settler behavior, but political power in the form of organized protest and electoral clout provides the pressure necessary to fully exploit that leverage. This presents a challenge for the Chumash peoples who, like Native Americans more generally, make up too small a percentage of the population to reliably tip elections. Thus, it is expected that Chumash norm entrepreneurship can be enforced through "conversion" and "coercion" alone. While Chumash protest has proven very successful in the past, their numerical insignificance on the national scale and the competing demands for attention from literally hundreds of other Indigenous nations leads me to hypothesize that their norm entrepreneurship and enforcement will be most successful at the city and county level where competing demands are fewer, normative advantages are greater (by virtue of their local indigeneity), and their numbers count for more.[25]

The crucial element of any campaign of norm entrepreneurship in service of Indigenous interests is the ability to appeal to or threaten the settler state's statebuilding interests. Rayo, Mosinger, and Thaler identify these interests as preserving and expanding governability ("the state's ability to extend some control over and render manageable previously ungoverned or little-governed territories,") identification ("Indigenous peoples' self-identification of as belonging to a national community overseen by a central government, alongside longstanding local and ethnic identities,") and extraction ("the state's

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[24] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 219.

[25] Emily Ariel Moline, "Indigenous Language Teaching Policy in California/the US: What's Left Unsaid in Discourse/funding," *Issues in Applied Linguistics* 21, no. 1 (2020): 32.

ability to exploit (or grant concessions over) resources in Indigenous lands for state-planned economic development,").[26] The authors found that the expansion (or preservation) of Indigenous autonomy can only be expected in those cases where it would bolster one of those three statebuilding interests. Since the settler states of New Zealand and the U.S. have full control over their national territories (apart from reservation land), Rayo et al.'s understanding of governability does not bear much relevance in these contexts. Accordingly, I would like to significantly stretch the concept by redefining it for the purposes of this paper as the state's ability to maintain social stability and its own legitimacy. In doing so, I hope to capture the reality of state accommodation in the face of popular protest while acknowledging that this definition is very different from that devised by Rayo et al. Indeed, insofar as they are discussing the advancement of Indigenous political autonomy rather than Indigenous rights in a broader sense, the entire framework's applicability may be questioned. I choose to employ it because the trifecta of governability, identification, and extractability succinctly describe colonial interests that, when threatened, have led colonial states to grant concessions.

Glen Coulthard, an anticolonial scholar of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation, warns that there are risks of cooptation inherent to receiving self-interested concessions from a defensive settler state. Coulthard was heavily inspired by the anticolonial scholar Frantz Fanon, who warned his readers that imperial powers have responded to anticolonial liberation movements with "the strategy of containment — respecting the sovereignty of

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[26] Giorleny Altamirano Rayo, Eric Mosinger, and Kai M. Thaler, "Statebuilding and Indigenous Rights Implementation: Political Incentives, Social Movement Pressure, and Autonomy Policy in Central America," Working paper, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2023: 9.

nations," ultimately ceding political hegemony for continued economic and cultural hegemony.[27] Coulthard articulates this danger as "the politics of recognition," arguing that decades of work "seek[ing] to "reconcile" Indigenous assertions of nationhood with settler state sovereignty via the accommodation of Indigenous identity claims in some form of renewed legal and political relationship," have backfired, instead "reproduce[ing] the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power that Indigenous peoples' demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend."[28] That the granting of autonomy can actually reproduce settler state power has indeed been academically documented. For example, increased identification with the settler state brought about by officially-recognized communal land titles was found to erode Indigenous Peruvian institutions, with political activity increasingly occurring through settler institutions instead.[29] The creation of autonomous Indigenous governments, for their part, may actually facilitate harmful resource extraction insofar as they integrate communities into market economies and prior consultation procedures, demobilizing decentralized protest movements that lack structural entanglements with the settler state.[30] In sum, greater incorporation into the settler state via the politics of recognition has resulted in increased identification with the settler state and dramatic land claim concessions by Indigenous nations, bolstering governability and extractability by diverting political energies away from protest movements grounded in

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[27] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 31, Kindle.

[28] Glen Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition,* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 9-12.

[29] Altamirano Rayo, Mosinger, and Thaler, "Statebuilding and Indigenous Rights Implementation," 14; Christopher L. Carter, "The Representational Effects of Communal Property: Evidence from Peru's Indigenous Groups," *Comparative Political Studies* 54, no. 12 (2021): 2191.

[30] Altamirano Rayo, Mosinger, and Thaler, "Statebuilding and Indigenous Rights Implementation," 15.

Indigenous epistemes and into settler legal and political systems, which can act to erode unique political structures and epistemes. Paolo Freire writes that "Cultural conquest leads [the invaded] … to respond to values, the standards, and the goals of the invaders… In cultural invasion, it is essential that those who are invaded come to see their reality with the outlook of the invader rather than their own; for the more they mimic the invaders, the more stable the position of the latter becomes."[31] The distinction under the politics of recognition is that this transformation is brought about through assimilative conciliation rather than overtly genocidal coercion. In effect, sweeping demands for cultural, political, and territorial autonomy are exchanged for a (dependent, often settler-style) government, state-validated (but significantly reduced) territorial claims, and deeper integration into (the structurally assimilative) settler society.

Evidently, settler state concessions forced by entrepreneuring norms and threatening statebuilding prerogatives are intended by the settler state to protect its own interests. As seen in the above examples, cooptation and "domestication" are real risks involved in uncritically accepting settler state concessions. In fact, even the potential for mild political and economic concessions is not a given. Writing on Latin America, Charles Hale identifies the phenomenon of neoliberal multiculturalism, wherein settler states grant limited, primarily cultural concessions to Indigenous groups in order to contain the threat that Indigenous

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[31] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 2000), 152-153; Vincent Olsen-Reeder, Rawinia Higgins, and Jessica Hutchings, "Language Value as a Tool for Māori Language Research," in *Te Ahu o te Reo Māori: Reflecting on Research to Understand the Well-being of te Reo Māori,* ed. Vincent Olsen-Reeder, Jessica Hutchings, and Rawinia Higgins (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2017), 51.

challenges pose to the dominant socioeconomic order.[32] Any concessions won by Indigenous

activists, then, may be anticipated to entail risks of containment by or concessions to the

settler state itself. In the context of language revitalization, these theoretical lenses help us

see how state support for language revitalization may act — if not paired with meaningful

political and epistemic concessions — as a tool to appease and contain Indigenous challenges

to the colonial status quo.

Beyond mere containment, the controlled promotion of aspects of Indigenous culture

can also provide ideological and material benefits for settler states. Wolfe notes that by

blending symbolic elements of Indigenous cultures into mainstream settler culture, settler

societies can further their projects of national differentiation from their former colonial

overlords, in effect bolstering their claims to national sovereignty even as they continue to

erode the differentiations that bolster Indigenous sovereignty.[33] At least the first half of this

phenomenon is at work in New Zealand, where the government has a "vision of Māori

language contributing to a post-colonial Kiwi identity,".[34] Speaking to the material interests

that settler governments may have in language revitalization, Nakagawa and Kouritzin

accuse the Japanese government of promoting a shallow, commercialized version of the

Amami language and culture, keeping Tokushima Island exotically appealing to tourists

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[32] Charles R. Hale, "Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America," *PoLAR* 28 (2005): 10.

[33] Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 389.

[34] Nathan John Albury, "Your Language or Ours? Inclusion and Exclusion of non-Indigenous Majorities in Māori and Sámi Language Revitalization Policy," *Current Issues in Language Planning* 16, no. 3 (2015): 320; Waitangi Tribunal, *Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Te Reo Māori Claim (Report No. Wai 11),* 50.

while actively continuing to exploit and discriminate against the Amami people.[35] On its own, then, limited revitalization can provide economic rewards to the settler state without undermining its hegemonic power. Both cases underline Wolfe's point that "settler colonialism does not simply replace native society *tout court*," since preservative allowances are made to further the settler state's economic and ideological interests.[36] Accordingly, careful attention must be paid to the circumstances under which the proverbial master's tools (settler institutions and funding) can be used to dismantle the master's house (normative monolingualism).

Lomawaima and McCarty's safety zone theory presents a useful lens for this purpose. Developed to explain the erratic shifts in U.S. "Indian" policy between tepid conciliation and open hostility, safety zone theory posits that the settler state's behavior towards Indigenous cultures will vary according to the level of threat that they pose to national unity. When Indigenous cultures and peoples are vibrant enough to pose a symbolic or material threat to the settler state's hegemony, then the state will engage in activities designed to suppress them. When they are perceived to have become too weak to pose a threat, then they have fallen within the "safety zone" and the state may begin to entertain a protective policy.[37] This pendulum-like process harmonizes well with Rayo et al.'s concept of identification, although the latter would additionally anticipate that settlers might support revitalization not only

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[35] Satoru Nakagawa and Sandra Kouritzin, "Identities of Resignation: Threats to Indigenous Languages from Neoliberal Linguistic and Educational Policies," *Journal of Language, Identity & Education* 20, no. 5 (2021): 303.

[36] Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 389.

[37] K. Tsianina Lomawaima and Teresa McCarty, "*To Remain an Indian": Lessons in Democracy from a Century of Native American Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2006), 6-7.

because it is non-threatening, but because it might increase identification by virtue of its conciliatory nature, retreating only when the identificatory benefits of "playing nice" are outweighed by a perceived identificatory threat of Indigenous nationalism. It must be noted that perception is indeed important, as genuinely competitive democratic states are characterized by broad diversities in political viewpoints and concomitantly broad swings in government policy from election to election. What is seen as "safe" or in the interests of statebuilding by one political group may be interpreted entirely differently by another. Under these circumstances, support from the settler state is of dubious sustainability as well as potentially being a means of containing or "domesticating" the threat that Indigenous sovereignty poses to the settler state.

The risks of the politics of recognition, neoliberal multiculturalism, and safety zone dynamics mean it is crucial to question under what structural conditions are concessions made, what consequences these structural conditions bear on concessions won from settler states, and what risks and concessions are deemed appropriate and worthwhile by Indigenous communities. The structural conditions influencing the viability of concessions towards Indigenous language revitalization can best be understood under the framework of language values. Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings draw on Te Paepae Motuhake's[38] *Te Reo Mauriora* report to detail seven values: intrinsic, social, cultural, educational, intellectual, spiritual, and monetary.

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[38] Te Paepae Motuhake is an independent government panel charged with planning and reviewing revitalization efforts.

The intrinsic value of a language describes the innate value and beauty that a language possesses just by virtue of its existence. Every language represents a unique way of "looking at the world, of explaining the unknown, and of making sense of life," and the richness of the human experience suffers immeasurably when one of these cosmic windows closes.[39] While it is my moral and philosophical position that all languages possess equal intrinsic value, this has not historically been a universally-held opinion, as evidenced by the global phenomenon of linguicide. Intrinsic value, interestingly, is often taken for granted when a language is healthy and becomes more commented upon as a language becomes endangered.[40]

The social value of a language describes two phenomena: the perceived importance of a language in making one part of a social group, and the status a language enjoys (or lacks) within a given social group or segment thereof. In the latter case, a language may be said to have social value when its speakers "feel important and their status is raised because their abilities… [in the language] are recognised."[41] This is typically not the case for non-dominant languages, which have often been viewed in nation-states as signs of backwardness and outsider status.[42] Beyond mere status, a language's social value may be said to

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[39] Darcy Hallet, Michael Chandler, and Christopher Lalonde, "Aboriginal Language Knowledge and Youth Suicide," *Cognitive Development* 22, no. 3 (2007): 393; Marie Battiste, "Enabling the Autumn Seed: Toward a Decolonized Approach to Aboriginal Knowledge, Language, and Education," *Canadian Journal of Native Education* 22, no. 1 (1998): 18.

[40] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 42.

[41] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 46; Te Paepae Motuhake, *Te Reo Mauriora: Review of the Māori Language Sector and the Māori Language Strategy* (Wellington: Government Printer, 2011), 63.

[42] Stephen May, "Accommodating and Resisting Minority Language Policy: The Case of Wales," *International. Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 3, no. 2 (2000): 104.

correspond to the degree to which its mastery is necessary to fully participate in the social and political life of a given country. With its interests in countersovereignty and nation-state congruence, settler states have historically refused to accommodate Indigenous languages and instead demanded mastery of the settlers' language, effectively reducing the national social value of the language to zero. Indigenous languages, however, potentially retain substantial social value inside Indigenous communities themselves.

It is in association with this social value that the inherently political nature of language becomes clear. As a marker and expression of distinct collective identity, language becomes an integral element in fights to retain one's identity and secure group rights in the face of assimilatory or genocidal pressures.[43] Speaking on the U.S. context, Svensson describes Indigenous languages as the "symbolic banner of [the] new American Revolution," which "stands out as a key point of attack on the trend towards ethnic extinction."[44] Protection and expression of one's distinctive collective identity bears heavily on the distribution of power and resources. Indigenous peoples can maintain a special relationship with the settler state precisely because they were once fully independent, distinctive nations. If they become indistinguishable from the overall population, then their claim to a special relationship and autonomy is grievously compromised. Federal officials in the United States and Canada understood this dynamic well when they devised the construct of blood quantum, which saw the elimination of "Indian" status (and its attendant entitlements to land and

[43] Megan Lourie, "'Canaries in the Coal Mine,': The Reframing of Biculturalism and non-Māori Participation in Māori Language Learning," *International Studies in Sociology of Education* 21, no. 3 (2011): 222.

[44] Lomaiwama and McCarty, *"To Remain an Indian"*, 136-137.

benefits) for those who exceeded a certain percentage of "non-Indian" blood.[45] With this racial strategy on the decline (albeit only partially), cultural and linguistic markers of distinction remain key to the politics of "authenticity" so often demanded under settler colonial contexts for a special relationship to be honored.[46] These politics of authenticity are deeply problematic, undercutting the ability of Indigenous communities to freely establish their own criteria for belonging. Nonetheless, a vibrant language has great strategic value in a settler colonial context, and this value must be attended to in any study on language revitalization.

A further complication related to the social value of language lies in the role that non-Indigenous people play in revitalizing Indigenous languages. When settlers learn an Indigenous language, they contribute to its normalization and vitality but, as previously discussed, settler societies can reap ideological rewards from processes of Indigenization. Language learning open to settlers, then, may potentially be perceived as a means of coopting the Indigenous language, claiming it as a nationally neutral entity, and eliminating its utility in supporting Indigenous sovereignty.[47] In their writings on decolonization, Tuck and Yang warn against "settler moves to innocence", which are understood as "strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege,".[48] Supporting language revitalization (through public

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[45] Chelsea Vowel, *Indigenous Writes: A Guide to First Nations, Metis, & Inuit Issues in Canada* (Winnipeg: Portage & Main Press, 2016), 28.

[46] Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 13.

[47] Lourie, "Canaries in the Coal Mine," 222-223.

[48] Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, "Decolonization is Not a Metaphor," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 10.

funding or individual settlers learning the language) but failing to act in support of Indigenous sovereignty could fall within their rubric of "settler adoption fantasies", wherein settlers adopt Indigenous practices and knowledge, but adopt along with these a sense of entitlement to Indigenous lands.[49] At a more basic level, the potential for language fluency to act as a means of group identification can lead to difficulties if language learning is more available to outsiders than to Indigenous community members. Accordingly, this thesis will also examine a range of affective connections held by speakers and prospective speakers to their ancestral languages, as well as the ways in which they articulate ideas of ownership, value, and threats of cooptation. In turn, this will allow for an assessment of what strategies for securing support for revitalization are appropriate to the needs and concerns of the community.

The cultural value of a language describes the extent to which fluency in it is perceived to be necessary to fully participate in, understand, and perpetuate the culture it is associated with. This value has made Indigenous languages a special target for elimination under the logic of countersovereignty. Since a difference in language presents a formidable "boundary maintaining mechanism" between Indigenous and settler cultures, it is only logical that eliminating linguistic diversity is a key step in creating cultural uniformity and identification with the settler state.[50] The corollary of this is that strengthening a language's vitality can help strengthen the vitality of its associated culture.[51] A language's cultural value,

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[49] Tuck and Yang, "Decolonization is Not a Metaphor," 14.

[50] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 51.

[51] Teresa McCarty, "The Holistic Benefits of Education for Indigenous Language Revitalisation and Reclamation (ELR^2)," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 42, no. 10 (2021): 933.

then, is also a product of how strong a connection exists between the Indigenous community and their culture. There thus exists a virtuous cycle between revitalizing culture and revitalizing language. Revitalizing culture, however, is a prerequisite for raising a language's cultural value. This is borne out in studies that highlight the critical importance of embedding language revitalization within Indigenous cultural frameworks and practices to which the language is adapted.[52] A key challenge is that existence within a settler colonial society structurally disadvantages a language's cultural value. On the one hand, campaigns of physical and cultural genocide leave Indigenous cultures badly mauled, and colonization's destruction of Indigenous land bases and traditional ways of life have made many cultural practices difficult or impossible to sustain.[53] This highlights again the necessity of a broader range of material concessions if language revitalization is to be viable. On the other hand, Indigenous languages typically have very little cultural value within the mainstream settler cultures that sought to replace Indigenous cultures, presenting another daunting limitation to the possibilities of language revitalization. This is one area where norm entrepreneurship may make some impact to the extent that a given Indigenous culture can gain importance within at least a segment of the mainstream settler culture, as will be discussed in later chapters.

The educational value of a language describes the degree to which it is valued within an educational context, including both the benefits it provides to learners and the degree to

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[52] Andrew Cowell, "The Hawaiian Model of Language Revitalization: Problems of Extension to Mainland Native America," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 218 (2012): 186; Natalie JK Baloy, ""We Can't Feel Our Language": Making Places in the City for Aboriginal Language Revitalization," *American Indian Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2011): 534-535; Barbara Harrison and Rahui Papa, "The Development of an Indigenous Knowledge Program in a New Zealand Maori-language Immersion School," *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2005): 67.

[53] Baloy, "Making Places in the City," 530-531.

which it is recognized as a medium of instruction. The educational benefits of learning an

Indigenous heritage language are well documented, leading on average to higher student

esteem and academic achievement.[54] In that sense, all Indigenous languages have inherent

educational value for their associated communities, although whether this value is perceived

and recognized by settler institutions is another matter. A language's educational value is at

its highest point when it is taken for granted as *the* language of instruction, at least within the

public sector. This role is typically monopolized by the dominant national language, as

enforced by policies that mandate the language of education or set rigid guidelines to try to

foster a certain standard of dominant-language proficiency.[55] Historically this was part of an

overt project of cultural genocide,[56] but it continues in the present under regimes allegedly

tolerant of diversity. Since the educational benefits of teaching students their Indigenous

languages are well documented, policies hindering or reversing language revitalization in

schools — purportedly in the interest of improving educational outcomes — work at cross

purposes with their alleged goals. The true objective, then, appears to be an attempt to

reinforce nation-state congruence and/or to cast threatening languages back into the safety

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[54] Anne Guèvremont and Dafna Kohen, "Knowledge of an Aboriginal Language and School Outcomes for Children and Adults," *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 15, no. 1 (2012): 1; Hallet, Chandler, and Lalonde, "Aboriginal Language Knowledge," 393; Teresa McCarty, "Revitalising Indigenous Languages in Homogenising Times," *Comparative Education* 39, no. 2 (2003): 159; McCarty, "Indigenous Language Revitalisation and Reclamation," 930-933; Teresa McCarty and Sheilah Nicholas, "Reclaiming Indigenous Languages: A Reconsideration of the Roles and Responsibilities of Schools," *Review of Research in Education* 38, no. 1 (2014): 121, 125; Larisa Warhol, "Legacies of NALA: The Esther Martinez Native American Languages Preservation Act and Implications for Language Revitalization Policy and Practice," *Journal of American Indian Education* 51, no. 3 (2012): 74.

[55] Graham McKay, "Policy and Indigenous Languages in Australia," *Australian Review of Applied Linguistics* 34, no. 3 (2011): 297; Christine Nicholls, "Death by a Thousand Cuts: Indigenous Language Bilingual Education Programmes in the Northern Territory of Australia, 1972-1998," *International Journal of Bilingual Educations and Bilingualism* 8, no. 2-3 (2005): 160; Moline, "Indigenous Language Teaching Policy," 22-24.

[56] McCarty and Nicholls, "Reclaiming Indigenous Languages," 115; Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 56-57.

zone.[57] This circumstance illustrates the insufficiency of merely changing norms. Political action is required to force compliance or create sufficient autonomy to work outside of settler strictures since settler states can and do violate norms that they publicly subscribe to. The hegemony of the dominant language as medium of instruction is most frequently challenged in relatively autonomous private or charter schools outside of the public sector. In these contexts, the language can enjoy a much greater educational value, but even here the settler state holds considerable power with its ability to set potentially stifling standards and deny full recognition of academic credits and credentials.

On a simple level, a language's intellectual value describes the degree to which learning a language contributes to one's intellectual enrichment and the broadening of one's worldview.[58] In practice, understanding intellectual value is not so much about understanding the actual intellectual value of learning a language, but about understanding how languages are perceived to have intellectual value. Indigenous languages face a special disadvantage in this regard because of their long association with primitivity in mainstream settler cultures.[59] This is even more troublesome for languages that do not have a literary tradition or, indeed, a significant written component since settler cultures themselves come from and place colossal value on literary traditions.[60] This is another domain where changing dominant norms holds transformational promise but might face significant headwinds due to cultural dissimilarity.

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[57] Nicholls, "Death by a Thousand Cuts," 160; McCarty, "Revitalising Indigenous Languages," 159.

[58] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 65.

[59] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 66.

[60] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 66-67.

The spiritual value of a language describes the spiritual or otherwise intangibly special bonds and fulfillment one enjoys from learning a language, such as feeling a stronger connection to one's ancestors.[61] Spiritual value will vary depending on the importance of these experiences for any given individual, underlining the importance of changing the normative environment within both Indigenous and settler societies to allow for pride in Indigenous identities and ancestries to flourish, as occurred in the wake of the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s.[62]

Finally, the monetary value of a language describes the degree to which fluency in a language helps one to make a living. A language's monetary value is easily one of the most influential factors in language gain or loss since it is so tied to one's survival and standard of living. The English language's role as the lingua franca of the global economy (and of the national economies of Anglophonic countries) lies at the heart of its amazing proliferation. The same dynamic, however, is visible even in competitions between Indigenous languages. Benedicto, Shettle, and Balna, for example, found that when Tuahka communities became economically integrated with more economically dominant Miskitu communities (including through substantial Miskitu in-migration), the Miskitu language swiftly gained prominence over the Tuahka language.[63] Given the power of monetary value, it is perhaps the most difficult one to revitalize in a settler colonial context, where colonization has destroyed

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[61] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 68.

[62] Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal*, loc. 254-258.

[63] Elena Benedicto, Amelia Chantal Shettle, and Mayangana Yulbarangyang Balna, "Linguistic Ideologies as a Crucial Factor in Language Revitalization: A Look at the Mayangna Languages of Nicaragua," in *Latin American Contexts for Language Documentation and Revitalization,* eds. Gabriela Pérez Báez, Chris Rogers, and Jorge Emilio Rosés Labrada (Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2016): 316.

Indigenous economies and methods of subsistence and replaced them with overwhelmingly monolingual national market economies.[64] Under these circumstances the vast majority of employment opportunities will neither require, nor provide opportunities to practice, fluency in an Indigenous language. An additional challenge lies in the fact that colonial dispossession typically creates systemic economic disadvantages for Indigenous communities and individuals, meaning that the opportunity costs of devoting limited resources to learning an Indigenous language with little monetary value are even more prohibitive. Individuals who choose not to make that investment should not be seen as craven, lazy, or otherwise morally deficient, but as making a choice to prioritize their livelihoods that is structurally logical under the modern settler economy.

An Indigenous language's monetary value may be increased by carving out spaces with which the language can be used to make a living, for example as a language teacher or a translator. This requires a great deal of resources and is one area where public funding can prove transformative. Nonetheless, the practical impossibility of transforming the United States and global (but not New Zealand) economy into monetarily rewarding domains for any given Indigenous language illustrates some of the hard limits one faces in a colonial context. In the absence of monetary value, the degree to which a given individual believes in the other six language values will determine whether they will try to learn the language.

This paper concludes that securing settler state support for Indigenous language revitalization ultimately depends upon the exercise of "coercive" norm entrepreneurship and

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[64] Harrison and Papa, "Indigenous Knowledge Program," 60.

enforcement. The settler state, though vulnerable to influence from below, is guided by its own statebuilding and countersovereign logics. Sustainable concessions cannot be expected to result from magnanimity; rather, they must be actively secured through exercise of power that change the state's interest calculus in such a way that conciliation appears more rewarding than hostility. Historically, military force has been one of the more effective means of securing Indigenous rights, but this option is neither practicable nor, in my estimation, morally or politically desirable at the present historical juncture. Instead, electoral and popular power (as exercised through social movements and protest) constitute the main means of securing sustainable changes in settler state behavior. Norms and legal constructs such as treaties provide critical fulcrums for the exercise of these types of power, but they are not sufficient in a vacuum. Only popular or electoral pressure can compel the settler state to act against its sovereign interests or, alternatively, can alter its interests or its calculus in how best to fulfill those interests.

Such exercises of power are by no means certain to succeed and, even if successful, vigilance is required to avoid cooptation. Any struggle to preserve Indigenous languages must recognize that language preservation is threatened not only by the monolingual ideologies of settler societies and economies, but by the integration of Indigenous lands and peoples within a global economy wherein their languages have extremely limited monetary value. To be preserved, a language must be valued, and to be valued a language must be seen as providing material and intangible benefits to its prospective speakers. The very structure of settler societies must be changed so that fluency in Indigenous languages is actively rewarding. Just as a colorblind racial lens cannot reverse the effects of centuries of systemic,

state-backed racism, so is the mere cessation of proactive linguicide incapable of revitalizing an Indigenous language after generations of repression within a normatively monolingual national environment. Ultimately, expansions of Indigenous cultural sovereignty cannot be expected to be sustainable without also expanding Indigenous economic, territorial, and political sovereignty.

The following two sections will examine the history of Indigenous language revitalization in Aotearoa and the Chumash homelands, with special emphasis on the factors that have helped and hindered those struggles. The final section will synthesize the lessons of Aotearoa with the history of the Chumash homelands and the contributions of Chumash co-researchers to assess the viability and appropriateness of strategies to secure settler state support for revitalization, highlighting above all the importance of accessibility, relationality, and community control.

TE REO and *TE AO* MĀORI: A STORY OF POWER AND STRUGGLE

Te reo Māori came to the brink of extinction and back over the 19th century. From a fully fluent and increasingly literate population at the time of de jure British annexation in 1845, intergenerational transmission of *te reo* had virtually collapsed by the 1970s. This triggered a groundswell of pro-*reo* Māori activism that eventually won enormous concessions from the state of New Zealand. It secured official status for *te reo*, revitalization funds, recognition of Māori schools, and pervasive discursive support from government ministries. Though insufficient to dramatically reverse trends of language loss, these efforts stabilized

levels of fluency amongst Māori and provide a valuable road map for other Indigenous peoples seeking state support for revitalization programs. After detailing the rise and decline of *te reo*, this chapter will show that the success of language activists in revitalizing *te reo* hinged on three variables: expanded electoral power, popular mobilization, and systematic norm entrepreneurship.

The Origin of *Te Reo* Māori:

Aotearoa's human history began in the early 14th century with the arrival of the first *waka* (canoes) from Hawaiki, a mythical homeland corresponding to the Cook, Society, and Austral Islands.[65] The people of these *waka* developed kinship groups known as *hapū*,[66] comprised of interrelated *whānau* (extended families). In turn, interrelated *hapū* would periodically coalesce into larger extended kinship groups known as *iwi*[67] to pool efforts in times of crisis. Though English translations suggest that *hapū* were subordinate to *iwi*, they were the basic political unit of Māori life, operating as "corporate groups, as primary political units, as operative functional units, and as categories or identity references."[68] The languages these *hapū* spoke grew apart from their closely related Polynesian cousins over centuries to become *te reo* Māori, the indigenous language of Aotearoa. Political and geographical diversity across the north and south islands resulted in numerous dialects with regional

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[65] Richard Walter and Michael Reilly, "Ngā Hekenga Waka: Migration and Early Settlement," in *Te Kōparapara: An Introduction to the Māori World*, ed. Michael Reilly et al. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2018), 68.

[66] Literally meaning "pregnant", often translated as "sub-tribe".

[67] Literally meaning "bones", often translated as "tribe".

[68] Merata Kawharu and Erica Newman, "Whakapaparanga: Social Structure, Leadership, and Whāngai," in *Te Kōparapara: An Introduction to the Māori World*, ed. Michael Reilly et al. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2018), 51.

variations in grammar, vocabulary, idioms, and pronunciation, but *te reo* is striking in that its dialects are all mutually intelligible.[69]

Settler Arrival and Conquest:

Aotearoa's first encounter with Europeans came in 1642 when a large naval force from the *iwi* Ngāti Tūmatakōkiri expelled the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman from their territorial waters in a brief but deadly skirmish.[70] European visits remained sporadic until the 19th century, when traders and settlers began to arrive in substantial numbers. The demographic and military strength of Māori polities eclipsed that of these early Europeans. Not only did they outnumber settlers by a factor of forty,[71] but European trade networks enabled *hapū* and *iwi* to field firearm-based armies, which quickly gained experience in Aotearoa's fractious political climate. This imbalance of power compelled early European arrivals to adopt an initially conciliatory approach to the Māori. For some, this conciliatory approach included learning *te reo*, something undertaken by Christian missionaries in particular. Māori-language missionary schools proliferated across Aotearoa, spreading with them written forms of *te reo*. Conciliatory as the early 1800s were, they ought not to be mistaken for a time of utopian conviviality. Just as Māori worked with traders, settlers, and missionaries to meet their own economic and political objectives, so too did these Europeans pursue their own agendas. Although the schools set up by European missionaries taught in *te*

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[69] Alison Hunter and Ian Hunter, "Māori Language Revitalisation: New Zealand Government Magnanimity," *The Canadian Journal of Native Studies* 40, no. 1 (2020): 16-17.

[70] Hilary Mitchell and John Mitchell, "Coming of the Pākehā," Stories: Te Tau Ihu tribes, Te Ara - The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, Accessed October 3, 2022, https://teara.govt.nz/en/te-tau-ihu-tribes/page-3.

[71] Hunter and Hunter, "Māori Language Revitalisation," 22.

reo, their objective was to inculcate Anglo ways of knowing, cultural norms, and religion.[72] Māori numbers and power, not a European embrace of Māori culture, ensured the predominance of *te ao* Māori (the Māori world). As the balance of power turned against the Māori, limited European acculturation into *te ao* Māori would be replaced by systemic efforts to assimilate Māori into English culture and English monolingualism.

The signing in 1840 of the Treaty of Waitangi provided the groundwork for the turn towards assimilation. Pressured by the colonization schemes of other European nations, the British Empire worked to solidify its influence over Aotearoa.[73] The obvious obstacles to this project were *hapū* and *iwi*, who retained not only de jure territorial sovereignty, but the demographic and military might to render it unassailable. With military conquest proving (for a time) impractical, Britain relied on diplomacy. The first major step in this direction was British support for the 1835 *He Wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirene* (Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand). By this time the wealth and might of European powers had become evident to Māori leaders, some of whom were greatly concerned that European powers may soon seek to seize the country.[74] Responding defensively to this threat (and that of retaliation by enemies made during the inter-*iwi* "Musket Wars"),[75] thirty-four *rangatira*[76]

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[72] Andrew Vercoe, "Resistance in Māori Education: A Critique of Kura Kaupapa Māori," Waikato Journal of Education 1, (1995): 123.

[73] D.F. McKenzie, "The Sociology of a Text: Orality, Literacy, and Print in Early New Zealand," *The Library* 6, no. 4 (December 1984): 361.

[74] Vincent O'Malley, Bruce Stirling, and Wally Penetito, eds., *The Treaty of Waitangi Companion: Maori and Pakeha from Tasman to Today* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2011), 24.

[75] Ron Crosby, *The Forgotten Wars: Why the Musket Wars Matter Today* (Auckland: Oratia Books, 2020), 70.

[76] High-status individuals, typically translated as "chiefs".

declared themselves independent as The United Tribes of New Zealand, with their formative

document establishing their absolute sovereignty and entreating the British Empire to

"become its Protector from all attempts upon its independence."[77] A mere four years later,

this same power they looked to as a guarantor of their independence decided to formally

annex Aotearoa. A letter from Viscount Palmerston to the British negotiator, Captain William

Hobson, on the latter's appointment reveals the Empire's ideological reasoning. Palmerston

described Aotearoa as a land of "great natural resources" that would allow any "civilized"

owner a "paramount influence in that quarter of the globe."[78] He described the government of

the United Tribes as comprising "numerous, dispersed, and petty tribes… incompetent to act,

or even to deliberate, in concert" but nonetheless asserted that its sovereignty was

"indisputable and has been solemnly recognized by the British Government."[79] While he

described a seemingly impassable moral barrier to colonization, he deftly neutralized the

obstacle by framing annexation as a charitable endeavor. Given the present rate of European

immigration and the weakness of the Māori, he argued, nonintervention would merely result

in "the same process of war and spoliation, under which uncivilized tribes have almost

invariably disappeared as often as they have been brought into the immediate vicinity of

emigrants from the nations of Christendom."[80] Accordingly, albeit with "extreme reluctance",

he asserted that the Empire had no ethical alternative but to pursue annexation to save the

Māori from extinction and save the settlers from "the evils of a lawless state of society,".[81]

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[77] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 31.

[78] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 33.

[79] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 33-34.

[80] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 34.

[81] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 33-34.

Adding to the moral justification, he stated that relieving the Māori of their sovereignty —

which he deemed "precarious, and little more than nominal" — must only be achieved

through the "free and intelligent consent of the natives, expressed according to their

established usages,".[82]

The contents of this letter align with 19th century international law. While practical

barriers to armed conquest may be glimpsed through oblique references in the viscount's

letter to the superior numbers of Māori, the main concern is with Māori sovereignty. Under

the contemporary Western-led regime of international law, only those polities recognized as

states by other states were considered to be true states with sovereign rights.[83] Indigenous

polities were ubiquitously denied recognition under this framework, partially because their

forms of social organization were alien to European states and partially because this (very

conveniently) denied them territorial sovereignty, giving legal free rein to colonization[84]

Britain's recognition of the United Tribes admitted it to the community of states, effectively

rendering interference by rival powers unlawful under international law. Technically this

meant that British conquest would also be illegal, but international law held a solution to that

obstacle as well. One of international law's founding fathers, Francisco de Vitoria, held that

annexation of a sovereign "Indian" polity could be lawful as long as it was beneficial to those

annexed (as determined by other nations, not least the annexing power).[85] British officials

had eagerly embraced such a "trusteeship doctrine" by the 1830s, framing it as a means of

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[82] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 34.

[83] Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples*, 15.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples*, 11.

turning "savage" neighbors into docile subjects and saving them from being driven extinct in a survival-of-the-fittest confrontation with "civilized" settlers (while, of course, expanding the empire).[86] To be legally valid, then, the enterprise of annexation had to be framed as a virtuous, consensual endeavor in which Māori eagerly saved themselves from extinction by surrendering their impotent sovereignty to a mighty and enlightened protector.

Legally and ethically protected by the emphatic assertion that the Māori people could only be saved from extinction by surrendering their claim to (a functionally defunct) sovereign status, Captain Hobson set sail under orders to secure sovereignty over as many Māori polities as possible. The enterprise met with great success, as over 500 *rangatira* (both inside and outside of the umbrella of the United Tribes) had signed Hobson's treaty by late 1840. What exactly these *rangatira* conceded, however, differed widely based on text. *Te Tiriti o Waitangi*, the Māori language version of the treaty, ceded rights to *kāwanatanga* ("governorship", a neologism derived from a transliteration of "governor") while guaranteeing the signatories' *tino rangatiratanga* (literally translating to something like "true/absolute/quintessential chiefly authority", typically translated as "sovereignty") over their lands, villages, and *taonga* (cultural treasures).[87] The English language version, on the other hand, declared that the signatories ceded "absolutely and without reservation all rights and powers of Sovereignty" and made no mention of *taonga*.[88] To what degree these

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[86] Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples*, 24.

[87] "Translation of the te re Māori text," The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi, Waitangi Tribunal, last modified September 19, 2016, https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/treaty-of-waitangi/translation-of-te-reo-maori-text/.

[88] "English version," The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi, Waitangi Tribunal, last modified September 19, 2016, https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/treaty-of-waitangi/english-version/.

discrepancies can be attributed to mutually unintelligible political cultures or intentional deception is unclear. Missionary and translator William Colenso later wrote of confronting the British governor, charging that the *rangatira* he had spoken to had "no idea whatever as to the purport of the treaty," only to receive the dismissive response that if the *rangatira* had not understood it was not the governor's fault, for he had "done all I could do to make them understand."[89] The treaty of annexation needed only to be signed willingly to be valid; whether Māori understood British legal reasoning and the terms of annexation was immaterial under international law. Substantial discrepancies in understanding were indeed visible in Nopera Panakareao's speech in favor of the treaty, in which he confidently stated that "The shadow of the land goes to Queen Victoria[90], but the substance remains with us,".[91] Not even one year later, it was reported that he now "fear[ed] the substance of [the land] will go to them and the shadow only be [the Māori's] portion."[92] Regardless of whether these gaping discrepancies resulted from genuine cultural miscommunication or willful deception — and most likely it was a mix of both — the outcome came to the same. Britain had established a legal claim to absolute sovereignty over Aotearoa. That the *rangatira* (apart from 39 signatories to the English version) had signed no such agreement and, furthermore, that the signatories did not represent all *iwi* and *hapū*, made no difference to the British or the contemporary Western regime of international law. Aotearoa in its entirety was henceforth considered a British colony.[93] The loss of Māori sovereignty was only further reinforced

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[89] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 44-45.

[90] Reigned from June 1837 to January 1901.

[91] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 45.

[92] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 49.

[93] Ibid.

when the empire granted self-government to an overwhelmingly Pākehā settler assembly

with the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852.[94]

Though it faced pressure from many quarters, the British government initially

maintained some commitment to the letter and spirit of the treaty, rejecting claims that it was,

as the governor of the New Zealand Company described it, merely a "praiseworthy device

for amusing and pacifying savages for the moment."[95] The persistent strength of Māori

polities was a major contributor to this restraint. Having blocked implementation of the 1846

New Zealand Constitution Act, Governor Grey complained about the lack of inclusivity of

the settler assembly it proposed, writing in 1847 that the Māori were "the race which is in the

majority [and] is much the more powerful," and that would never quietly submit to minority

Pākehā rule.[96] He warned that such a move would alienate the Māori and create a "feeling of

nationality," which he feared would prove "hurtful".[97] A number of commentators reacted in

similar horror to growing demands to unilaterally seize "unused" Māori land, with Bishop

William Williams warning in 1847 that this would push the Māori to "make common cause"

and "wage deadly warfare with all white people".[98] Settler appetite for land was thus

temporarily countered by fears that trampling Māori sovereignty would not only risk the

decimation of the Aotearoan colonies, but unify the Māori polities and lead to them

reestablishing primary sovereignty. Accordingly, the government acquired land through

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[94] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 74.

[95] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 50.

[96] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 75.

[97] Ibid.

[98] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 65.

purchase rather than seizure, which promised to preclude war and, in the words of Native Secretary Donald MacLean, lead Māori to "imperceptibly recognize the control of the Government" by integrating them into settler society.[99] Summing up the situation, a letter from Sir Robert Peel mused that "If the obligations of good faith vary with the military skill and prowess of the parties to a Treaty, the [Māori] New Zealanders have put in a claim to be respected which it has become prudent on our part to recognize."[100]

Māori "military skill and prowess" proved only a temporary guarantee of good faith. By 1858 the tide of European settlement and (largely disease-driven) Māori attrition that had pushed *rangatira* to accept the mediating presence of British kāwanatanga in 1940 had tipped the scales: Pākehā now outnumbered the Māori.[101] The settler government, confident in its belief that it had secured absolute sovereignty over Aotearoa, came to abandon its earlier (if only partial) restraint and embarked on a sustained campaign of land acquisition and confiscation, while sub-national entities added outright theft to the mix. The efforts of some *iwi* and *hapū* to protect their *rangatiratanga* resulted in a string of armed conflicts spanning 1845 to 1872, known collectively as the New Zealand Wars. Though land seizures were initially checked somewhat by early Māori victories and stalemates, they accelerated after the British empire's first unequivocal victory over an alliance of *iwi* in the 1863-64 Invasion of the Waikato. By 1877 the settler government's Chief Justice Prendergast declared that the Treaty of Waitangi was "a simple nullity," opining not only that the signatories hadn't had

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[99] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 73.

[100] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 51.

[101] Hunter & Hunter, "Māori Language Revitalisation," 22.

authority to cede sovereignty, but that they never had sovereignty to begin with.[102] With Māori robbed of their political and territorial sovereignty, all that remained for the settler government to completely secure their claim to sovereignty was to eliminate the Māori as socio-culturally distinct Indigenous peoples, including by eliminating their language.

Policies and Structures of Linguicide:

The erosion of *te reo* was a result both of deliberate government policy and the evolving socio-economic structure brought about by settler colonial rule. Educational policy sought to eliminate a threatening subject population by assimilating Māori into the mainstream culture (including into English monolingualism), while urbanization and integration into the national and global economy applied equally strong assimilatory pressures as Māori fought to sustain livelihoods in a normatively Anglo cultural and linguistic context. The following section begins by tracing deliberately linguicidal educational policies before examining structural (yet still partially government-directed) causes for the collapse of *te reo*'s language value and speaker base.

Linguicidal Educational Policies:

Linguistic relations between Māori and Pākehā initially unfolded on largely Māori terms. When missionaries arrived to proselytize the Māori, they learned *te reo*, taught in *te reo*, and collaborated with Māori to develop a written form of the language. A mere seven years after the signature of the Treaty of Waitangi, however, the British governor issued an ordinance withdrawing government subsidies from mission schools teaching in languages

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[102] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 220.

other than English. This was followed by the 1867 Native Schools Act, which initially directed schools to use as much English-language curriculum as practicable but was amended in 1871 to mandate English-only education.[103] Six years later, the Education Act of 1877 would make secular schooling both free and compulsory, funneling Māori children into colonial institutions that would be directed by the Native Schools Code of 1880 to "dispense with the use of Māori as soon as possible," providing for its use only as a tool to transition children to English.[104] *Te reo* was only officially allowed back in schools in 1909 — over 60 years after the government push to English monolingualism in education had begun — but corporeal punishment for speaking *te reo* on school grounds remained common.[105] The devaluation of *te reo* in the school system and wider society was pushed by both settlers and Māori. In the first case, Pākehā (in correspondence to Māori leaders) criticized *te reo* as a barrier to Māori participation in governance and New Zealand society, as well as (in internal documents) to the "civilizing" effects of greater integration with Anglo society.[106] Such arguments were, to a great extent, cynical ones, since the Native Schools curriculum was "intended to train young Māori to become rural labourers or housewives," integrating them only as a servile underclass.[107]

Some prominent Māori, for their part, vigorously advocated the uptake of English as a means of accessing the full range of opportunities that settler society had to offer. While the

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[103] Hunter & Hunter, "Māori Language Revitalisation," 19.

[104] Bernard Spolsky, "Reassessing Māori Regeneration," *Language in Society* 32, no. 4 (2003): 558.

[105] Spolsky, "Reassessing Māori Regeneration," 558.

[106] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 56-58.

[107] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 206.

settler government hoped to achieve "subtractive bilingualism" (the promotion of a second

language with the intention of having it replace the first), Māori did not at the time perceive a

threat to full bilingualism.[108] Instead, what leading advocates of English education like

Apirana Ngata encouraged was, in the legendary activist's own words, "grasping the tools of

the Pakeha [sic] for your physical wellbeing, remembering in your heart the works of your

ancestors which are worthy of being worn as a diadem upon your brow,".[109] The ideal, then,

was a bilingual society in which *te ao* Māori and *te ao* Pākehā coexisted without

confrontation. The structural imbalances of settler colonial rule, however, structurally

undercut this hope for equal coexistence.

Structural Linguicide:

Pākehā dominance had by the 20th century so thoroughly changed the socio-economic

order that many Māori began to conceive of assimilation as the path to socioeconomic

emancipation. Land theft largely destroyed independent Māori economies, and participation

in the Pākehā-dominated economy — beyond the most menial of positions — required some

mastery of Pākehā language and culture. Partly this was a matter of practicality (industrial

market economies being quite different from customary agrarian economies) but also a

matter of systemic racism: the more one resembled a Pākehā in appearance and behavior, the

more likely one was to escape negative stereotyping and secure employment. Many Māori

therefore sought to emancipate themselves from the weakened position settlers had forced

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[108] Olsen-Reeder, Higgins, and Hutchings, "Language Value," 59.

[109] Iritana Tawhiwhirangi, "Kua Tū Tāngata E! Moving a Critical Mass," in *The Value of the Māori Language: Te Hua o te Reo Māori,* ed. Rawinia Higgins, Poia Rewi, and Vincent Olsen-Reeder (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2017), 56-58.

them into by acceding to the settler's demands for assimilation.[110] Here again we see the processes of countersovereignty at work. Though Māori political and economic power was suppressed, their existence as Indigenous people remained, and with it their legitimate claim as the sovereign people of Aotearoa. By creating a situation wherein Māori would themselves become agents in their own assimilation, settlers could simultaneously eliminate the distinct identity of Māori and justify their rule as bringing prosperity and progress to the benighted.

Ironically, the very position of socioeconomic precarity that made English necessary for upwards mobility temporarily shielded *te ao* Māori from greater assimilatory pressures during the first half of the 20th century. In 1909 there were still roughly thirty thousand fewer Māori than there were in 1840, most of them concentrated into rural villages, whose land holdings were both too small and too resource-poor to provide prosperous Māori lifeways.[111] As far as *te reo* was concerned, this rural concentration had some benefits. Although children were, with some exceptions, educated in an English-only environment, they remained embedded within communities where much of the population was composed of either bilingual or monolingual speakers of *te reo*.[112] This kept the social, cultural, and monetary value of *te reo* elevated even as its educational and intellectual value were degraded in the schools. For decades, then, the settler government's project of linguicide was undermined by its own marginalization of Māori communities, which fostered bilingualism. However, as

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[110] Vercoe, "Resistance in Māori Education," 124.

[111] Hunter & Hunter, "Māori Language Revitalization," 22; Martin Fisher, *A Long Time Coming: The Story of Ngāi Tahu's Treaty Settlement Negotiations with the Crown* (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2020), 24.

[112] Kimai Tocker, "Living and Learning as Māori: Language Stories from Three Generations," *The Australian Journal of Indigenous Education* 46, no. 1 (2017): 117-118.

Hunter and Hunter point out, this marginalization naturally resulted in a deep and untenable impoverishment that pushed many Māori to migrate from Māori-dominated rural to Pākehā-dominated urban areas.[113]

With the national economy entering a boom period following the Second World War, huge numbers of Māori individuals and entire *whānau* moved to urban areas to seek jobs. The shift was striking, as urbanites accounted for a mere 5% of the Māori population in 1900 and a full quarter by 1945 alone.[114] The settler government seized upon this opportunity to further their logic of elimination, adopting a "pepper-potting" policy that sought to dilute Māori urbanites into majority Pakeha neighborhoods.[115] This, the government hoped, would prevent the maintenance of Māori communities (and thus a communal Māori identity) and increase both cultural assimilation and intermarriage (read: ethnic dilution) into Pākehā society.[116] The pepper-potting program was ultimately of limited reach and weakened by a lack of resources, Māori nonparticipation, and, ironically, housing racism by Pākehā actively opposed to sharing their neighborhoods with Māori.[117] Much of the damage, then, came from immersion in a hegemonically Anglophonic environment hostile to *te ao* Māori. Isolated not only from communities where most people were fluent in *te reo*, but from the ceremonial

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[113] Hunter & Hunter, "Māori Language Revitalization," 22.

[114] Ibid

[115] Richard Hill, "Maori Urban Migration and the Assertion of Indigeneity in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 1945-1975, *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 14, no. 2 (2012): 263.

[116] Hill, "Maori Urban Migration," 259; Karyn Paringatai, "Te Hūnuku: Māori Urban Migration," in *Te Kōparapara: An Introduction to the Māori World*, ed. Michael Reilly et al. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2018) 272-273.

[117] Aroha Harris, *Hīkoi: Forty Years of Māori Protest* (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2004), 17.

contexts where *te reo* still held great social, cultural, and spiritual value in spite of its tumbling monetary and educational value, urbanites lost many of their opportunities to regularly use *te reo*.[118] Studies into the decline of *te reo* find an alarmingly universal trend of bilingual parents — many motivated in part by the beatings they received for speaking Māori in school — choosing to raise their children as monolingual Anglophones, believing that *te reo* would only hold their children back in a hegemonically Anglophonic society and economy.[119] This socially-coerced decision-making was devastating to *te reo*, as a national study found that fewer than 100 Māori children were fully fluent by 1979.[120]

Despite its devastating successes, the project of urban assimilation failed in important ways. Many urban Māori regularly traveled back to their home marae, developing a sort of diasporic identity that maintained the importance of the homeland and communal identity even as daily life was lived in an alien society.[121] Moreover, some Māori sought each other out and founded new marae in urban environments, in effect creating wellsprings through which *te ao* Māori could flow even in an environment meant to destroy it.[122] To some degree the pepper-potting policy even outright backfired, as its intermixing of different *hapū* and *iwi* encouraged the formation of a pan-Māori identity that would facilitate national coordination

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[118] Tangiwai Rewi and Matiu Rātima, "Ngā Hurihanga o te Reo Māori i te Mātauranga: Changes in Māori Language and Education," in *Te Kōparapara: An Introduction to the Māori World*, ed. Michael Reilly et al. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2018), 307.

[119] Tocker, "Living and Learning as Māori," 115; Michelle O'Toole, "Responsibility, Language Movement, and Social Transformation: The Shifting Value of te reo for non-Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand," in *Responsibility and Language Practices in Place*, eds. Laura Siragusa and Jenanne Ferguson (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2020), 199.

[120] Albury, "Your Language or Ours?" 317.

[121] Hill, "Maori Urban Migration," 260.

[122] Hill, "Maori Urban Migration," 266.

against settler depredations.[123] Furthermore, urbanization resulted not only in new forms of political organization and a new generation of youth with a deeper understanding of Pākehā society and an appetite for nonviolent direct action,[124] but in an end to the geographical segregation that had kept Māori out of sight and out of mind of Pākehā for much of the 20th century. All these changes, combined with a rising population, proved crucial to the reassertion of Māori political power.

The Māori Renaissance; Electoral Politics, Protest, and Norm Entrepreneurship:

The recovery of the Māori population and their integration into the urban landscape were crucial prerequisites for a return of Māori power. Popular protest and electoral politics, leveraging upon norm entrepreneurship, proved decisive in forcing the settler government to open a new era of conciliation with Māori. Electoral politics, popular protest, and norm entrepreneurship will be separately discussed, although it must be understood that they are tightly interlaced.

Electoral Politics:

Since 1867 Māori had had four seats reserved for them in parliament, a unique and uniquely early concession to an Indigenous people.[125] Though Māori seats in parliament gave Māori interests a persistent voice in the halls of government, their small number meant that

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[123] Hill, "Maori Urban Migration," 263.

[124] Hill, "Maori Urban Migration," 266; Harris, *Hīkoi*, 25.

[125] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 220.

this voice was persistently ignored.[126] From the beginning Māori suspected that the reserved

seats were a means of pacifying them and legitimizing the actions of the government, all

while depriving them of true power.[127] Indeed, Ann Sullivan describes the seats as a political

expedient to entrench the North Island's legislative supremacy and "placate Māori loyalists

who had supported the British in the Land Wars, as well as the liberal lobby in "mother"

England".[128] She explains that these suspicions were further validated by prohibitions on full-

blooded Māori from running for general seats, the limitation of Māori representatives to four

seats irrespective of population, and the inaccessibility of ballot boxes in Māori

communities.[129] The urbanization of the Māori population made the ballot far more

accessible, while the recovery of population numbers gave greater electoral weight to those

who registered on general (rather than Māori) electoral rolls. The legislative influence of

Māori leapt forward in 1935, when a razor-thin election pushed the Labour Party to form a

decades-long alliance with the political-religious Rātana Movement that had come to

dominate the Māori seats.[130] In return for their help in forming a governing coalition and

securing Māori votes for Labour, the Party delivered some significant pro-Māori concessions.

In the medium run, however, the Labour Party took the Māori vote for granted; concessions

were the exception and a continued commitment to assimilation and paternalism were the

rule.[131] Nevertheless, one concession proved transformational: the passage in 1975 of Māori

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[126] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 222.

[127] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 201.

[128] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 220.

[129] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 221-222.

[130] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 224.

[131] Ibid.

MP Matiu Rata's Treaty of Waitangi Act. The Act established a permanent tribunal charged with inquiring into and adjudicating violations of the Treaty of Waitangi.[132] The government of New Zealand had since the 1930s promoted a mythical vision of Aotearoa as a racially harmonious land founded on the "Magna Carta" of the Treaty of Waitangi,[133] but this Act represented the first legislative institutionalization of the Treaty and its principles. Critics worried that it too was designed to placate Māori without ceding real power. The Tribunal was vested only with the power to issue nonbinding recommendations and could not address matters pre-dating its foundation. Such powers represented a momentous step forward but would be utterly insufficient to address the deep structural inequity created by over a century of racist, exploitative settler rule. The electoral power calculus would not change dramatically until 1993 when, spurred by widespread backlash to over a decade of neoliberal reforms, a national referendum instituted a mixed member proportional representational electoral model and pegged the number of Māori seats in parliament to the size of the Māori electorate. This had the effect of bringing Māori representation in parliament to parity with the size of their population and, crucially, resulted in the practical necessity of forming governing coalitions in parliament.[134] This, combined with Māori making up about 15% of the population, gave Māori a role as kingmakers in coalition-building, greatly increasing Māori political influence and executive appointments.[135] Until then, however, popular protest played the decisive role in protecting *te reo* and the Māori world that gives it meaning.

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[132] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 225.

[133] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion,* 248.

[134] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 229-230.

[135] Sullivan, "Effecting Change," 230-231.

Popular Protest:

The catalyst for a new era of self-assertion was the Maori Affairs Act of 1967, which permitted the reclassification of Māori-owned lands as general lands, rendering them eligible for compulsory acquisition.[136] Faced with yet another massive land grab, Māori nationwide increasingly organized — adapting organizational and protest strategies from national protests against the Vietnam War and Apartheid and from the American Civil Rights movement — and turned to more confrontational forms of popular protest.[137] The most notable of these was the 1975 *Hīkoi* (march), in which thousands of Māori and non-Māori allies participated in an 1,100 kilometer march to the capital. The impact of the 1975 *Hīkoi* and subsequent Māori protest was tremendous. Aroha Harris writes that it "left a wake in which successive governments could slowly begin to think about giving the treaty [of Waitangi] greater recognition,".[138] If this sounds less than revolutionary, in many ways it indeed was not. New Zealand remained a settler society, and neither Māori votes, nor Māori protest have fundamentally changed this fact. Land grabs, systemic racial inequity, and other colonial depredations — notably the legislative seizure of Aotearoa's foreshore and seabed following Māori arguments that they had not, technically, been formally ceded — have continued into the 21st century. Nonetheless, Māori activism dramatically expanded their ability to protect and advance their interests. Protest proved transformational for the revitalization of *te reo* in two crucial respects: by successfully embodying Indigenous

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[136] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 284.

[137] Harris, *Hīkoi,* 15.

[138] Harris, *Hīkoi*, 28.

epistemes and by forcing settler concessions by threatening the statebuilding interest in governability.

The first of these aspects, protest as epistemic embodiment, was notably carried out by the *kōhanga reo* movement. Though not truly a popular protest, understanding the movement is crucial to understanding *te reo*'s revitalization. Dissatisfied with the paucity of *reo* in mainstream schools, *whānau* drew upon Māori childrearing customs to create *kōhanga reo* (language nests), where elder women volunteered to care for young Māori children and lovingly immerse them in a reo-only environment.[139] Emerging in 1982, *kōhanga reo* had the autonomy to cultivate reo-only environments precisely because they operated outside of the mainstream education system, and the Māori cultural frameworks they were based on proved resoundingly popular among *whānau*. Their number rapidly proliferated, reaching a peak of 819 in 1993, and they proved successful in passing on *te reo* to parents as well as children.[140] Cultivating fluency wasn't the only success, since the embodied practice of autonomous Māori institution-building in and of itself strengthened Māori culture and created legions of parents fiercely dedicated to a Māori education for their children.[141] This collective strength allowed the parents to press forwards for *te reo* when their children faced graduation into mainstream schools where the educational and other language values of *te reo* were paltry.

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[139] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 348.

[140] Rewi and Rātima, "Ngā Hurihanga," 309.

[141] Rewi and Rātima, "Ngā Hurihanga," 310-311.

In one thrust, *whānau* pressured the mainstream schools to increase their accommodation of *te reo* and Māori epistemes. In another thrust, they founded *kura kaupapa* Māori (primary and secondary schools with varying levels of immersion), circumventing dependence on state largesse and giving further proof that Māori children could academically thrive in Māori schools.[142] Put together, the successful embodiment of Māori epistemes proved the viability of autonomous Māori education, while targeted activism forced increasing change in the mainstream education sector. They were significantly helped in this endeavor by the advocacy of Ngā Tamatoa (The Young Warriors), an activist group of mostly urban Māori youth whose relative disconnection from culture and language instilled them with a burning passion for revitalization.[143] Their combined efforts swept aside reasonable doubts and pushed the government to fund and fully recognize Māori educational institutions (eventually including tertiary *whare wānanga*), the transferability of credits, and the right to national testing materials in *te reo*.[144] The educational value of *te reo* was thus significantly raised, and education based on Māori epistemes institutionalized on a national scale.

The second way that protests contributed to saving *te reo* was by threatening the governability of the settler state, forcing it to institutionalize broad conciliatory measures. Pushed by popular pressure, the government voted in 1985 to allow the Waitangi Tribunal to rule on cases stretching back to 1840, which finally provided a path for Māori to obtain redress for past wrongs. The advisory role of the Tribunal meant that plaintiffs would

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[142] Spolsky, "Reassessing Māori Regeneration," 561.

[143] Spolsky, "Reassessing Māori Regeneration," 560; Harris, *Hīkoi*, 48.

[144] Spolsky, "Reassessing Māori Regeneration," 561; Harrison and Papa, "The Development of an Indigenous Knowledge Program," 57, 61.

subsequently need to secure legislative assent or, in the case of claims to land or natural resources, negotiate settlements with representatives of the British Crown, typically leading to significantly smaller redress than was initially sought by plaintiffs.[145] Nevertheless, the process has strengthened *iwi* institutions once targeted for elimination and delivered real benefits to Māori communities. Chief among these for the purposes of this thesis was when the Waitangi Tribunal ruled in the 1986 Wai 11 claim that *te reo* was a *taonga* under the principles of *Te Tiriti*, and thus must be proactively protected and promoted by the Crown. The government fell in line and passed the Māori Language Act in 1987, making *te reo* an official language of Aotearoa and establishing Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori (The Māori Language Commission), an independent body charged with monitoring and promoting *te reo*'s vitality.[146]

Analysis of parliamentary debate over the 1985 Treaty of Waitangi Act and the Wai 11 claim reveals the pivotal role that governability-threatening popular protest played in securing these momentous concessions at counter-purposes with the settler logic of elimination. Though a minority of MPs debating the Waitangi Tribunal expansion believed that opening the claims process would foment "disastrous tensions between the Maori and pakeha [sic],"[147] then Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer summed up the prevailing position when he explained that "The people who marched at Waitangi last year did not consider that the wounds had healed. If they do not see something being done by the

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[145] Jacinta Ruru, "Te Tiriti Ōna Whakatau: The Waitangi Tribunal and Treaty Settlements," in *Te Kōparapara: An Introduction to the Māori World,* ed. Michael Rielly et al. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2018), 297.

[146] Rewi and Rātima, "Ngā Hurihanga," 309.

[147] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 357.

Government to provide mechanisms for the settlement of real disputes that are truly felt, New Zealand will collapse as a democracy."[148] The effectiveness of Māori protest in this respect is especially significant when one considers that up to sixty percent of the Pākehā electorate disapproved of the Act.[149]

A similar governability-based rationale is found in the Wai 11 report, which — in regard to the despair felt by Māori at the prospect of losing *te reo* — warns that "there is no more dangerous element in the community than a sense of injustice, and when it is felt by a growing section of society the results can be explosive."[150] This was not an isolated remark; precluding social unrest and violence was presented as a benefit of protecting *te reo* no less than four times by the Tribunal.[151] In sum, threatening the settler state's governability proved a decisive factor in protecting *te reo*. Lauding this approach may seem to be an exercise in lauding a "might-makes-right" mentality, but it must be remembered that politics is by nature the exercise of power. To practice politics without power is an exercise in futility. Securing Māori rights was never solely a matter of applying power, but of leveraging it against the fulcrum of shared norms.

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[148] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 358.

[149] Jeffrey Sissons, "The Systematisation of Tradition: Maori Culture as a Strategic Resource," *Oceania* 64, no. 2 (1993): 101.

[150] Waitangi Tribunal, *Wai 11*, 16.

[151] Waitangi Tribunal, *Wai 11*, 16, 28, 37, 38.

Norm Entrepreneurship:

There are three main fulcrums for pro-Māori norm entrepreneurship in Aotearoa: The myth of racial harmony (which grew into the norm of biculturality), the Treaty of Waitangi, and the norm of the honor of the crown. This section will address all three in an intertwined, generally chronological fashion since they are all conceptually and chronologically interconnected.

The Treaty of Waitangi is the most potent source of normative pressure in favor of Māori prerogatives, even if its interpretation and efficacy has been historically variable. As previously discussed, *Te Tiriti* did not include all Māori polities, and its meaning was from the beginning subject to a broad range of interpretations from all parties. Some Māori did not sign on and rejected its authority. Others signed on but believed they had signed a power-sharing agreement. Some Britons, on the other hand, regarded it as a solemn treaty between two peoples. Others viewed it as nothing more than a clever ruse to divest Māori of their country. What perspective one took depended as much on one's personal interests as on one's personal convictions. The discrepancy in understanding between signatories soon became clear, and Māori and Pākehā uses of the Treaty evolved over time. The symbolic importance of *Te Tiriti* to Māori seems to have deepened over time; as their capacity to protect their prerogatives through other means eroded under British dominance, they came to rely heavily on appeals to the terms of the Treaty to protect their lands, communities, and culture. As the Treaty lost utility as a mediating force between two strong partners — the Māori having lost their strength through attrition, demographic reversal, and military defeat — the Pākehā increasingly consigned *Te Tiriti* to the dustbin of history, epitomized by Chief Justice

Prendergast's rejection of its legal validity. Nonetheless, the Treaty never ceased to hold a place in the national imaginary, at least amongst its tireless advocates, the Māori. They brought forth countless petitions and appeals based on the terms of the Treaty between the late 1800s and late 1900s, largely failing to wrest concessions from an indifferent settler government but successfully keeping the memory of *Te Tiriti* alive.[152] Its return to truly national consciousness would come about in part thanks to the effects of another national norm: the myth of racial harmony.

Despite the relentless theft of Māori land and oppression of the Māori people, New Zealand's settler society prided itself over the course of the 20th century on the supposedly harmonious nature of its racial relations, at least compared to other nations. Although this was in large part an artefact of geographical segregation and the "pacification" of Māori resistance, which made Māori and racism invisible to many Pākehā, there was nonetheless a sense of pride about the lack of blindingly overt racial tension.[153] As the Māori population recovered, the Treaty played a role in cementing this myth. The catalyst to its public return was Governor-General Bledisloe's purchase and donation of the original treaty-signing grounds to the nation in 1932. Two years later the nation held its first official annual commemoration of the signing.[154] The government deployed the Treaty as a set piece, trumpeting New Zealand's supposed racial harmony and celebrating the Treaty as this harmony's linchpin. Few substantive concessions were made in this exercise. *Te ao* Māori

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[152] Janet McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing the Historical Wrongs of Colonisation in New Zealand," *New Zealand Law Review* 27, no. 1 (2015): 189.

[153] Harris, *Hīkoi*, 20; John Harre, "A Case of Racial Discrimination in New Zealand," *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* 71, no. 2 (June 1962): 260; O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 277, 305.

[154] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 246.

was celebrated, but only a version of it that no longer threatened settler sovereignty. In the imaginary of Waitangi Day, the Treaty had "saved to the Maori [sic] people their much-prized freedom,"[155] (in Bledisloe's words) and united Pākehā and Māori as one harmonious people.[156] This time the Treaty genuinely was, to quote again from the New Zealand Company governor, used as a "praiseworthy device for amusing and pacifying savages for the moment."[157]

Yet this use of the Treaty came at a cost. Decades of neglect and official repudiation had substantially wiped the Treaty from Pākehā public consciousness. Rather poetically, the document itself had been neglected and ravaged by moisture and rats.[158] In seeking to wield the Treaty as a hammer to forge a hollow myth of racial harmony, the government spent decades very publicly ingraining the Treaty into the public imaginary. Indeed, commemorations featured repeated government pledges to abide by the spirit of the Treaty, tempered though they were by likewise repeated insistence that it was not or should not be legally binding.[159] This discursive institutionalization of the Treaty, thoroughly interwoven with the language of harmonious racial union, transformed a forgotten, rat-torn expedient into "the nation's founding document". Although it initially came with few concessions, this established a normative foundation that Māori protest movements could exploit.[160]

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[155] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 250.

[156] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 248, 249.

[157] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 50.

[158] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 246.

[159] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 251, 256.

[160] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 252.

Urbanization made New Zealand's systemic racism increasingly difficult to ignore, challenging the myth of racial harmony on a national scale. This mattered because a great many Pākehā believed that New Zealand should indeed embody racial harmony, or at least appear to do so.[161] Though some politicians may well have spouted the language of racial harmony simply to whitewash a racist reality, the regular lip service paid to the norm further reinforced its purchase, creating a growing moral imperative for some and a deepening "discursive trap" for others. Public and parliamentary sympathy appears to have been in part driven not only by the growing geographical proximity of Māori, but through their increasing incorporation into *te ao* Pākehā. As may be remembered from the previous chapter, Wunderlich explains that norm entrepreneurship is more likely to be successful when the entrepreneurs are "closer" to the target population. Urbanization and partial assimilation achieved this rapprochement, bringing Māori geographically and socio-culturally closer to the Pākehā. Crucially, this granted new generations a more thorough understanding of the Pākehā institutions and epistemes that they would need to leverage to secure their rights. Additionally, heroic (i.e., disproportionate) Māori battlefield losses in both World Wars were widely perceived to have bought Māori their full citizenship with blood.[162] All of these factors strategically facilitated norm entrepreneurship and fostered a greater degree of understanding and sympathy amongst Pākehā, even as this advantage came at a terrible cultural and bodily price. With Māori protest making racial disparities impossible to ignore, politicians faced heavy normative pressure to turn lip service into action. Again, without the

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[161] Harre, "A Case of Racial Discrimination in New Zealand," 260.

[162] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 342.

application of popular and institutional pressure, this norm would have been as potent as an unleveraged fulcrum, a reality borne out by the preceding decades of minimal to negative progress in Māori rights. In any case, combined with the effects of Māori protest and electoral politics, the myth of racial harmony helped usher in the institutionalization of *Te Tiriti* in 1975.

With *Te Tiriti* finally codified in law, its protections of Māori *taonga*, lands, and *tino rangatiratanga* could finally be brought to bear. This enforcement owes a great deal to a third normative influence: the concept of the honor of the Crown. The honor of the Crown is unique to the British Commonwealth and British common law. It essentially holds that insofar as the Crown has given its assent to an agreement, the Crown can do no wrong.[163] In other words, the Crown is held to be essentially honorable in nature, meaning that any agreements made on its behalf must be upheld in good faith. If an agreement endorsed by the Crown is reneged upon, this concept holds that redress must be issued to uphold the honor of the Crown. Though the honor of the Crown did help protect early adherence to the Treaty (when Māori polities could partially enforce compliance),[164] its utility in this respect withered following the full conquest of Aotearoa. Transfer of sovereignty to the settler government effectively rendered the Crown impotent in enforcing its provisions since the settler government was not a party to the agreement, even though they were technically royal subjects. Illustrating again the limited potency of a norm in and of itself, McLean pithily remarks that the "idea of honour is all very well so long as it can never be defined or

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[163] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 190.

[164] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 203.

enforced."[165] It was only when electoral/parliamentary politics and popular pressure ushered in the legal codification of *Te Tiriti* through the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act that it once again became materially consequential.[166] Once the Treaty had been codified and the necessity to uphold the honor of the Crown repeatedly upheld in court, it became a powerful norm for the purposes of securing Treaty settlements acceptable to claimants.[167]

McLean argues that another normative benefit to the honor of the Crown is that it facilitates the recognition of present responsibility for historical transgressions. Under dominant liberal conceptions of personal responsibility, she argues, individuals and societies resist taking responsibility for past depredations if they don't believe themselves to be personally responsible, even if their social group still benefits from said depredations.[168] This attitude is easily evident in statements by New Zealand officials, who throughout the 20th century had expressed regret for past abuses against the Māori but consigned these transgressions to the dustbin of history.[169]

The honor of the Crown, however, provides an escape from the bind of individual responsibility. First, as a constant, partially abstract concept, the Crown of today is technically the very same Crown that signed *Te Tiriti*. Thus, where living individuals might chafe against accepting responsibility for the actions of their ancestors, the Crown has an honor-bound duty to take responsibility for its actions and those of its representatives, even

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[165] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 204.

[166] Ibid.

[167] Ibid.

[168] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 204-205.

[169] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 305, 310, 357.

though the actual crown itself now rests upon an entirely different head.[170] Second, there are

powerful political benefits to the Crown assuming personal responsibility for past ills. When

the Waitangi Tribunal issues recommendations to redress a transgression of the Treaty,

Māori claimants have a chance to negotiate a settlement with the Crown's representatives in

Aotearoa (led by the Governor-General) rather than the national government. This is

significant because Crown representatives are non-elected, meaning they are insulated from

political pressures. Accordingly, they face minimal consequences for negotiating in good

faith with Māori, something that might be impossible for an elected official in a systemically

racist country. They still do have political interests in maintaining the stability of the settler

state and economy, as evidenced by the substantial discrepancies between the redress sought

by claimants and the frequently substantially smaller concessions granted to them at the end

of settlement negotiations. Nevertheless, they have no personal investment in appealing to

voters who may well be ambivalent or hostile to Māori interests and to whom the honor of

the Crown is far from a leading concern. Furthermore, although the settler government must

subsequently enact settlement agreements through legislation and, technically, has no legal

compulsion to do so, it is an established constitutional convention in New Zealand that they

enact and substantively adhere to the terms of such agreements.[171] The norm of the honor of

the Crown actually did substantial work in and of itself in this respect, with the conservative

MP Douglas Graham convincing his colleagues that "it followed from the ***Crown***'s obligation

to deal fairly and ***in*** utmost good faith that the contract should not be reopened by

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[170] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 205.

[171] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 194.

Parliament. [emphasis in original]"[172] Parliament is greatly aided in this enactment by the political insulation provided by the Crown's assumption of historical responsibility. In this respect, the Crown "acts as a placeholder which distances the citizenry, individual officials and particular governments from blame."[173] Thus insulated, politicians may enact settlements without fully taking responsibility and bearing political costs for potentially controversial provisions.

With *Te Tiriti* secured in law and its faithful enforcement protected by the honor of the Crown (and favorable court rulings based thereupon), the Treaty of Waitangi and the myth of racial harmony melded to form a new national norm: that of New Zealand as a bicultural nation. Though descended from the myth of racial harmony, the norm of biculturality is distinct in that it has been accompanied by substantial government action to positively transform New Zealand society. This normative and behavioral shift — which was institutionalized throughout the executive branch after the 1984 election — was also a result of Māori threats to governability and identification.[174] The nature of these threats was derived from the swelling Māori backlash to over a century of dispossession, discrimination, and inequity under settler rule. Sharp explains that the backlash was so pronounced that, as previously mentioned, "violence was often mentioned as a possible consequence of continued injustice."[175] The previous government strategy of assimilation and indifference was impracticable under these conditions, and accommodation of Māori language and culture

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[172] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 194.

[173] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 206.

[174] Sissons, "The Systematisation of Tradition," 100.

[175] Sissons, "The Systematisation of Tradition," 106.

was seen as providing a means to defuse the mounting threat to governability.[176] Beyond the threat to governability, Māori protest presented what Sissons calls a "state legitimation crisis".[177] Sharp elaborates that, more than violence, the leading government concern was that "the state as it was constituted was hardly the object of devotion of many Māori and that it stood to lose the adherence to still more,".[178] The crisis of legitimation, then, may be seen as a crisis of identification: the Māori people simply did not strongly identify as members of the nation of New Zealand. While this may not have been a concern when the Māori population was small and rurally segregated, it became increasingly problematic as their population grew and urbanized. Thus, the necessity to redefine New Zealand as a bicultural nation with Māori and Pākehā as (ideologically) co-equal partners. Significantly, if the policy of biculturalism was to have any more impact than the myth of racial harmony, the government would have to transform the settler society as a whole. Driven to action by Māori, the government did exactly that.

Sisson explains that the New Zealand government's campaign of bicultural norm entrepreneurship had four official, explicit goals: "(1), a strengthening of Maori [sic] identity and self-esteem; (2), improved social integration as reflected in greater tolerance and understanding of cultural differences between Maori and Pakeha [sic]; (3), improved Maori self- administration; and (4), an enhancement of the state's corporate image as a true representative of both Maori and Pakeha interests."[179] These sought to eliminate threats to

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[176] Sissons, "The Systematisation of Tradition," 106.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Ibid.

[179] Sissons, "The Systematisation of Tradition," 101.

governability and identification by improving socio-economic outcomes for Māori and making the settler society of New Zealand a less hostile environment, which necessarily involved changing the attitudes of systemically racist Pākehā society. In regard to language, the government engaged in concerted efforts to normalize *te reo* and improve Pākehā attitudes towards the formerly maligned language by reframing the language as shared element of a bicultural national identity.[180] In other words, the loss of *te reo* was discursively reframed as harmful to Pākehā and its revitalization was framed as beneficial to Pākehā and the nation. This proved effective in part because of the visible persistence of Māori themselves as members of the national body, but also because of the decades that had been spent ingraining the Treaty of Waitangi into the public consciousness. They merely needed to redefine the Treaty as having established a nation of two peoples (Māori and Pākehā) living in partnership, whereas the prior discursive emphasis was centered on the peaceful transfer of sovereignty to Pākehā.[181]

The government's efforts also addressed a legitimate desire to develop the national identity. The Waitangi Tribunal itself emphasized this aspect, citing R.Q. Quentin-Baxter's assertion that "if New Zealand has a destiny as a separate nation, rather than as a detached part of Australia, it will be principally because these islands were a meeting-place of two great races,".[182] Revitalizing *te reo*, then, was framed as a means of reinvigorating New

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[180] Albury, "Your Language or Ours?," 322; Megan Lourie, "Māori Language Education Policy: Different Outcomes for Different Groups?," *New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies* 51, no. 1 (2016): 23; O'Toole, "Responsibility, Language Movement, and Social Transformation," 201.

[181] O'Malley, Stirling, and Penetito, *Waitangi Companion*, 310.

[182] Waitangi Tribunal, *Wai 11*, 50.

Zealand's national identity and thereby solidifying its national sovereignty.[183] Under the lens of safety zone theory, this may be said to constitute a total realignment of the safety zone. Where *te reo* previously was targeted for elimination as a barrier to national unification-via-assimilation, the revitalization of *te reo* now fell within the safety zone as a necessary means of preserving national unity by promoting racial harmony, resolving Māori grievances, and forging a stronger, bicultural national identity. Coupled with substantial funding for education in *te reo* and enhanced language visibility (for example through bilingual signage and the promotion of Māori vocabulary in mainstream schools), this campaign of norm entrepreneurship proved highly successful. Where *te reo* was once maligned, a majority of Pākehā now feel positively towards it and the government's revitalization efforts.[184] This support and visibility have been of crucial importance for the expansion of *te reo*'s language values and the stability of state support for language revitalization.

Critiques of *te Reo*'s Revitalization:

In spite of the unparalleled success that Māori have had in securing state support for their language, there are substantial critiques to be made on the nature and success of government revitalization efforts. A first section will focus on the threats of cooptation connected to these efforts, while a second will focus on the persistent structural barriers that hinder revitalization itself.

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[183] Ibid; Nathan Albury, ""If We Lose Their Language We Lose Our History": Knowledge and Disposition in Māori Language Acquisition Policy," *Journal of Language, Identity, & Education* 17, no. 2 (2018): 71.

[184] Te Puni Kōkiri, "Nga Waiaro atu ki te Reo Māori Attitudes Toward the Māori Language," July 2006, 7.

Threats of Cooptation:

State revitalization of *te reo* has from the beginning been informed by a need to defuse threats to governability and identification, meaning that the statebuilding interests of the settler state are foregrounded in a manner that may be inimical to Māori sovereignty. While the paltry revitalization efforts of the early 1970s may fit under the rubric of neoliberal multiculturalism, the strength of Māori opposition and the norms they helped institutionalize seem to have guaranteed that language revitalization is merely one part of a greater empowerment of Māori. *Te Tiriti* has proved the linchpin of this success, securing the return of land and transfer of economic assets to *iwi*. Beyond language itself, though, it may be argued that the Treaty and related accommodation policies have brought Māori into the politics of recognition. This concern is to some extent justified, as the overall process of conciliation (of which language revitalization is a part) has in some respects contained the Māori threat to the status quo to a manageable level. Though Treaty settlement processes have seen substantial tracts of land returned to Māori control, government legislation specifically prohibits the Tribunal from even recommending that private land be acquired and returned to Māori.[185] Only Crown land and assets (notably state-owned enterprises) are eligible for return, effectively containing the costs of settlement and preserving the sanctity of Pākehā-dominated private land tenure.[186] The difference in value between Māori claims and Crown redress is acknowledged by the Crown through the deliberate use of the word "redress" rather than "compensation", which might imply equivalency.[187] Further

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[185] McLean, "Crown, Empire, and Redressing," 191.

[186] Ruru, "Te Tiriti," 297.

[187] Ibid.

constricting Māori access to redress, the Treaty of Waitangi Act was amended in 2006 to

prohibit the submission of historical (pre-1992) claims after September 2008.[188] Overall,

controlling financial costs and maintaining social stability is a key objective of the Crown

and legislature in settlement negotiations.

The nature of Crown negotiations and the systematization of Māori autonomy have

also resulted in the centralization of Māori polities. Even though *hapū* have historically been

the predominant Māori political unit, the Crown generally refuses to negotiate directly with

hapū, resulting in the consolidation of political recognition and power in *iwi* at the expense of

hapū.[189] This has effectively reduced Māori autonomy since *hapū* often have particular

interests that may go unaddressed when *iwi* balance the overall interests of their constituent

hapū. The Treaty settlement process has also arguably furthered Māori integration into a

capitalist market economy through settlements that transferred state-owned enterprises to *iwi*.

This may be problematic to the extent that it erodes non-capitalist ways of being amongst

Māori or, through the profit motive, harmonizes state and *iwi* interests in extraction in a

manner at odds with traditional Māori cultural values.

Another potential risk inherent in New Zealand's state *reo* revitalization is that it

might constitute a settler move to innocence, allowing Pākehā to absolve themselves of

historical responsibility to Māori by adopting elements of Māori culture. A corollary risk is

that increasing fluency amongst Pākehā might erode *te reo*'s contribution to the distinct

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[188] Ruru, "Te Tiriti," 289.

[189] Ruru, "Te Tiriti," 297.

Māori identity that forms the basis of Māori claims to sovereignty. This possibility has been a concern amongst some Māori commentators, but most seem to embrace the possibility of Pākehā learning *te reo*. One factor behind this is that fluency in *te reo* does not currently seem to be a deciding component of Māori identity. While some 20th century Māori intellectuals argued that non-fluent individuals couldn't truly be Māori, current generations seem to value *whakapapa* (genealogy) and adherence to Māori values as the markers of genuine Māori identity.[190] Moreover, legislation has recognized *whakapapa* as the sole determinant of legal Māori identity since 1953, reducing *te reo*'s strategic necessity as a basis for Māori sovereignty.[191] This is not to say that *te reo* isn't a valued element of Māori identity. It is deeply treasured as a *taonga* and for its (social) value in reinforcing one's Māori identity.[192] Indeed, an inability to speak it is often reported by Māori to be a source of shame or anxiety.[193] However, since Māori do not need *te reo* to prove their identity or claim sovereignty before the state, the primary threat of a settler move to innocence is not the elimination of national distinction, but an abandonment of responsibility to address non-language inequities. Even that risk, though, is reduced due to Māori political mobilization and robust norms and institutions dedicated to the protection of Māori interests, at least insofar as the latter do not foster demobilization. Moreover, only around one percent of Pākehā have attained fluency in *te reo*, meaning that the practical threat they pose to *te reo*'s

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[190] Albury, "Your Language or Ours?," 74.

[191] Waitangi Tribunal, *Wai 11*, 14.

[192] Steven Chrisp, "Māori Intergenerational Language Transmission," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 172 (2005): 171.

[193] Chrisp, "Intergenerational Language Transmission," 171-172.

special social value for Māori is quite limited. Indeed, this lack of settler uptake may be one element of a web of structural impediments to *te reo*'s vitality.

Structural Limitations to *te Reo*'s Revitalization:

Despite the tremendous success that revitalization efforts have had in arresting the decline of the language, the rate of fluency and transmission even among Māori remains low. Just over 17.9% of Māori respondents to the 2018 census self-reported being able to speak *te reo* "fairly well",[194] while just 4% of the overall population self-identified as speakers of *te reo*.[195] While fluency has risen among youth and non-Māori and overall numbers of speakers have increased since the beginning of revitalization efforts, the percentage of fluent Māori speakers has remained stagnant or decreased for several structural reasons. On the material front are perennial shortages in teaching resources. Though the government puts hundreds of millions of dollars towards revitalization every year, the investment is insufficient to match the depth of the problem.[196] Schools have for decades been beset by shortages of qualified language instructors and, on a deeper level, professors adept at teaching non-language subjects in fluent *reo*.[197] This latter problem is compounded by the shortage of materials such as textbooks written in *te reo*, which also reduces the educational and intellectual value of *te*

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[194] Stats NZ Tatauranga Aotearoa, "Te Kupenga: 2018 (final) – English," last modified November 9, 2020, https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/te-kupenga-2018-final-english/.

[195] Stats NZ Tatauranga Aotearoa, "2018 Census total by topic – national highlights (updated)," https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/2018-census-totals-by-topic-national-highlights-updated/.

[196] Rewi and Rātima, "Ngā Hurihanga," 305.

[197] Linda Tuhiwai Smith, "The Educational and Cultural Implications of Maori Language Revitalization," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 27.

reo.[198] A further structural complication is the decline in fluent elders as the pre-WWII

generation passes on and is replaced by generations raised in English-only environments.[199]

This is particularly bedeviling for the *kōhanga reo*, which depend heavily on the loving

instruction of fluent elders. The problem is all the more challenging when one considers that

many of those fluent enough to succeed these elders have attained fluency later in life,

meaning that the full range of subtleties inherent in the language may not have been passed

on to them as they would have been unto a native speaker.

A thornier challenge yet comes in the form of language values. Even though *te reo*

maintains high spiritual, intrinsic, and intellectual value and biculturalism has boosted *te*

reo's social and educational value, the bitter truth is that Aotearoa's current socio-political

and economic environment structurally suppresses its social, cultural, and monetary value.

Simply put, as native speakers of English, Māori must actively choose to learn and use *te reo*,

and this is a difficult choice to make when communication is easiest in English and *te reo*

unlocks relatively few socio-economic opportunities.[200] The broadest (if not necessarily the

most spiritually satisfying) social opportunity, full participation in New Zealand society, only

requires a proficiency in English. *Te reo* certainly has social value as a marker of Māori

identity but, practically speaking, the fact that virtually all Māori are fluent Anglophones

means that only English is necessary to participate in *te ao* Māori. Indeed, a monolingual

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[198] Smith, "Educational and Cultural Implications," 27.

[199] Mere Skerrett and Jenny Ritchie, "Te Rangatiratanga o te Reo: Sovereignty in Indigenous Languages in Early Childhood Education in Aotearoa," *Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences* 16, no. 2 (2021): 256.

[200] Rawinia Higgins and Poia Rewi, "ZePA – Right-shifting: Reorientation Towards Normalisation," in *The Value of the Māori Language: Te Hua o te Re Māori*, eds. Rawinia Higgins, Poia Rewi, and Vincent Olsen-Reeder (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2014): 26, 41.

speaker of *te reo* might arguably have a harder time fitting into modern Māori society since the great majority of Māori aren't fluent. The social values of *te reo* and English are comparable to the values of *pounamu* (jade) and currency. The former is indubitably valuable, but only the latter is indispensable. A second problem is that insofar as *te reo* has cultural value (discounting the fact that much of Māori culture is now accessible through English), this value is undermined since Māori culture remains an undervalued minority culture within a systemically racist settler society. Before colonization, mastery of Māori culture was essential for socio-economic success; now, embodying Māori culture can still be a socio-economic liability.

Te reo's low monetary value in an Anglophonic national economy also plays a role in suppressing cultural value. One of the most important domains for *te reo*, fulfilling ceremonial functions on the *marae*, illustrates the dilemma. *Te reo* has tremendous cultural value on the *marae*, but the market economy ensures that such demanding, unpaid, and sometimes thankless duties are structurally disincentivized.[201] Existence within a market economy is already a full-time occupation, so engagement with *te reo* and *te ao* Māori represents an extra-ordinary, typically uncompensated time investment that many Māori simply cannot afford due to structural impoverishment.[202] Effectively, the economic marginality of Māori ways of being undermines the cultural value of *te reo*. So long as *te ao* Māori and the global market economy are segregated from each other, the predominant

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[201] Fraser Toi, "Auē, Taukiri ē: The Changing Face of Marae," in *Maranga Mai! Te Reo and Marae in Crisis?*, ed. Merata Kawharu (Auckland, Auckland University Press, 2014), 131, 134.

[202] Merata Kawharu and Paratene Tane, "Casting a New Net: Connecting Marae and te Reo in the Information Age," in *Maranga Mai! Te Reo and Marae in Crisis?,* ed. Merata Kawharu (Auckland, Auckland University Press, 2014), 182.

importance of the (normatively Anglophonic) market to one's material quality of life will ensure that *te reo*'s monetary and cultural value is structurally constrained.[203] The touristic value of *te reo* and Māori culture have partially mitigated this problem, but the language's monetary and cultural value must be deeper than a means to entertain outsiders if it is to truly recover.

A solution to the problem is to make the experience of learning the language as rewarding as materially and socially possible by increasing the socio-cultural and economic benefits associated with fluency.[204] In many respects the government's efforts have proven helpful. The support for *kōhanga reo*, *kura kaupapa*, *whare wānanga*, mainstream *reo* classes, bilingual libraries, and Māori language television and radio have created jobs and positive role models for aspiring learners.[205] In other respects, the government's efforts have proven woefully insufficient or misguided. First and foremost is the lack of funding and guidance being invested in supporting Māori education. While millions have been spent in this endeavor, the spending has been insufficient to keep up with the damage caused by over a century of government-sponsored linguicide, not to mention the negative pressures on language value exerted by a normatively Anglophonic and systemically racist settler society. These pressures may be seen in sagging enrollment in Māori-medium institutions such as *kura kaupapa*, motivated in large part by concerns that they will confer fewer socioeconomic

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[203] Vercoe, "Resistance in Māori Education," 130.

[204] Ibid.

[205] Tocker, "Living and Learning as Māori," 121-122; Lilley, Spencer, "The Role of Libraries in Indigenous Language Revitalization: A te Reo Māori Perspective," *Book 2.0* 9, no. 1-2 (2019): 97.

advantages than a mainstream education.[206] Children transitioning from Māori to mainstream

schools subsequently face major challenges as mainstream schools are not properly trained to

receive students brought up in Māori epistemic, linguistic, and pedagogical contexts.[207]

Transmissibility of credits and bilingual testing materials are a good beginning, but if

Māori ways of knowing and being remain alien to mainstream institutions, then they will

continue to suffer a loss of prestige and valuation. Though the government has tried to

integrate the Treaty and *te ao* Māori into educational policy and teacher evaluation, it has in

the past been accused of issuing progressive-sounding educational policies but failing to

provide proper guidance and support, effectively kicking responsibility down to individual

schools and teachers and fostering tokenistic embraces of Māori culture akin to neoliberal

multiculturalism.[208] Beyond such tokenism, which requires persistent vigilance to prevent,

the level of financial support for Māori schools has also been insufficient to the task. The

lack of support has been so egregious in comparison to the depth of need that the Waitangi

Tribunal ruled in 2012 that it constituted a breach of the Treaty.[209]

The insufficiency of revitalization efforts are all the more troubling given the

structural limitations to *te reo*'s language values presented by embeddedness in a globalized

world. Māori need not only choose between learning *te reo* or remaining a monolingual

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[206] Richard Hill, "Level 2 Māori Medium Programmes: What are the Perceptions of Parents and Students on this Form of Education?," *New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies* 52 (2017): 308; Tocker, "Living and Learning as Māori," 121.

[207] Hill, "Level 2 Māori Medium Programmes," 312; Tocker, "Living and Learning as Māori," 121.

[208] Megan Lourie, "Bicultural Education Policy in New Zealand," *Journal of Education Policy* 31, no. 5 (2016): 644-645.

[209] Skerrett and Ritchie, "Te Rangatiratanga o te Reo," 256.

English speaker; if someone is to dedicate the time and resources to learn a language, then the values of all other languages in the world will compete for attention. Not only would languages such as Spanish, Mandarin, or Japanese potentially present greater economic opportunities to prospective Māori learners,[210] but they would give access to entire (larger) cultural and social universes as well. The competitive appeal of global languages must not be taken lightly since language preservation through isolation is becoming increasingly impracticable and the life of a national citizen is increasingly becoming the life of a global citizen. Competition on a global scale, where Māori efforts have limited influence, requires national efforts to be all the greater to keep *te reo*'s language values as appealing as possible.

Beyond the under-resourcing of revitalization efforts, there are substantial concerns with the overarching revitalization strategy. Rawinia Higgins and Poia Rewi have argued that the government's focus upon promoting *te reo* first and foremost in the home (to ensure intergenerational transmission) and on the marae (to uphold its cultural value) have inadvertently limited the number of domains in which *te reo* is valued, effectively framing it as a private rather than a public language.[211] Further, there are commentators that feel that the identification of *te reo* as a specifically Māori cultural property is a further step towards reducing the domains in which *te reo* is useful.[212] Settler moves to innocence aside, language is first and foremost a medium of communication, and its vitality is directly correlated to the degree to which one can use it to communicate with fellow humans. If Aotearoa's non-Māori

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[210] Albury, "Knowledge and Disposition," 75.

[211] Higgins and Rewi, "ZePA – Right-shifting," 49.

[212] Albury, "Your Language or Ours?," 324.

majority remains unable to speak it, then that by default severely limits its social and economic value. Second, one may regard language as a living entity towards which one can develop bonds of affection and responsibility; if non-Māori do not form bonds with *te reo* (as is encouraged in bicultural models that frame learning *te reo* as a convivial duty) then they can be expected to have far weaker bonds of responsibility to its vitality. *Te reo*, then, must be valued and promoted in Māori and non-Māori, private and (especially) public domains. Making *te reo* classes mandatory in schools might improve vitality and language values (including monetary value as more teachers are required) but the government has thus far declined to take that step. Even though a majority of the population is supportive to the idea, a lack of teachers, inherent costs, and the fear of a Pākehā backlash maintain inaction.[213] *Te reo*, then, still threatens the safety zone, as mandatory instruction may jeopardize the national unity cultivated under the bicultural model.

Conclusion:

The survival of *te reo* and *te ao* Māori ultimately seems to be a product of power as much as it is the product of the love that Māori feel for these *taonga*. At first this power was primarily military and demographic, as the large and well-armed Māori polities of the early 1800s forced partial British compliance with the Treaty of Waitangi. When immigration, disease, and wars disarmed the Māori and made them a small minority in their own country, the government ran roughshod over their rights and dignity. Though Māori never ceased to militate for their rights, they were only able to successfully challenge a century of settler land theft and cultural genocide by recovering their demographic might and exerting electoral and

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[213] Albury, "Your Language or Ours?," 322.

popular power in the public sphere, forcing the settler government to make concessions to Māori to preserve governability and identification. This is not to sell short the power of norm entrepreneurship. The leveraging and evolution of shared national norms of racial harmony, the Treaty relationship, and the honor of the crown were indispensable to *te reo*'s preservation. Nonetheless, these levers proved impotent until Māori had recovered the demographic and political power to leverage them.

The long-term challenge to *te reo* and *te ao* Māori is that although real power has been ceded to Māori institutions, the dominance and hegemonic power of European culture and global capitalism remain. As long as European culture remains dominant and Māori systemically marginalized, *te reo* will remain marginal and undervalued in the larger national and transnational socioeconomic context, threatening its long-term vitality. To assure the safety of their beloved *taonga*, Māori will have to continue to apply their power to transform the form and norms of the settler world. Just as the Hawaikians planted Aotearoa with the crops of their homeland, so must Māori plant and nurture the seeds of *te ao* Māori in *te ao* Pākehā, ingraining their ways of knowing and being into the social structure without compromising the values that are the *mauri* (life-force) of *te ao* Māori. For their part, if Pākehā and non-Māori wish to see the national myth of Aotearoa and the promise of *Te Tiriti* become a reality, they must remember that they live in relationship with Māori and humbly endeavor to deepen this relationship with flexibility, goodwill, and a willingness to cede power, or at least fold before Māori power.

LANGUAGE REVITALIZATION in the CHUMASH HOMELANDS: HISTORY and POSSIBILITIES

The Chumash peoples boast over ten millennia of continuous occupation in their ancestral homelands and a rich, enduring maritime culture. Compared to the Māori of Aotearoa, however, history has been far less kind to Chumash. Two and a half centuries of colonization nearly assassinated Chumash culture, and all the Chumash languages have lost the last of their first-language speakers. Myriad Chumash bands and organizations carry on the fight, but they face unique challenges in California. Thanks to its territorial sovereignty the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians, the only federally recognized band, can accumulate sufficient funds for revitalization programs by drawing federal support and running independent businesses. Lacking such sources of income, the other Chumash bands rely heavily upon donations, grants, and volunteerism to breathe life back into their languages. Government entities could be of tremendous aid to these efforts either directly contributing towards the needs of language revitalization or by returning territorial and economic resources to Chumash control, such that they may generate the necessary revenue from their own lands. Before the lessons of Aotearoa can be compared to the situation of the Chumash, this chapter will establish the unique historical and normative environment they face and, with the gracious contributions of four Chumash co-researchers, argue that accessibility, relationality, and community control are necessary preconditions to any potential cooperation on revitalization with the American settler state.

Political Origins and Organization:

Spanning the northern Channel Islands and the modern-day California counties of Santa Barbara, Kern, Ventura, Los Angeles, and San Luis Obispo, the Chumash homelands can boast a human history stretching back at least eleven thousand years, with archaeologically recognizable Chumash culture emerging four to seven centuries before the present day.[214] Though often grouped together under the label "Chumash", the Chumash peoples were and are linguistically and nationally diverse. Emerging several thousand years before the present, the Chumash language family branched, leading to what are now known as the Šmuwič/Barbareño,[215] Samala/Ineseño, tʔɨnɨsmuʔ tiɬhinkʔtitʸu/Obispeño, Mitsqanaqa'n/Ventureño, Kagimuswas/Purisimeño, Cruzeño, and a number of lesser-known dialects. Daily politics revolved largely around the village level, with one or more hereditary *wot'wot* (sing. *wot*, chiefly person) leading the community with the assistance of the politico-religious *'antap* society.[216] Historical evidence, including from the oral historian Fernando Librado Kitsepawit, indicates that Chumash politics transcended the village level, with alliances of villages (with smaller villages possibly in tributary relationships with large villages) gaining or losing influence according to their historical fortunes.[217] Kitsepawit also reported on a much larger pan-Chumash political entity, composed of a periodically

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[214] Jon McVey Erlandson, "The Making of Chumash Tradition: Replies to Haley and Wilcoxon," *Current Anthropology* 39, no. 4 (August/October 1998): 477.

[215] Naming conventions differ between bands, families, and individuals, so I will alternate depending on these preferences.

[216] Chester Dewitt King, *Evolution of Chumash Society: A Comparative Study of Artifacts Used for Social System Maintenance in the Santa Barbara Channel Region Before AD 1804* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990), 56-57.

[217] Chester Dewitt King, "The Making of Chumash Tradition: Replies to Haley and Wilcoxon," *Current Anthropology* 39, no. 4 (August/October 1998): 486.

convened council of twenty, including twelve primary or assistant *wot'wot* initiated into the

'antap society and eight non-initiated individuals referred to as "*shan*".[218] It is unclear how

much this council influenced Chumash politics, and as contemporary Chumash typically

trace their ancestry to individual villages it remains safe to assume that the village remained

the center of daily collective identity. While Brian Haley has argued that there was no pan-

Chumash historical identity in the Chumash period, it also remains safe to argue that

Chumash held a loose collective identity based on a shared cultural, linguistic, economic, and

religious complex.[219] Colonial marriage records indicate a high rate of intermarriage between

noble families (particularly those hailing from different ecological and, thus, productive

zones),[220] and intermarriage was higher amongst Chumash than between Chumash and

neighbors of differing cultures (though that too happened with some regularity).[221]

Archeological evidence demonstrates that the areas occupied by Chumash speakers traded

and exchanged goods at elevated rates, with different geographic locales specializing in

different types of products.[222] Finally, the Chumash shared one religious complex centered on

a shared ceremonial cycle and sacred landscape.[223]

[218] King, *The Evolution of Chumash Society*, 58.

[219] King, "Replies to Haley and Wilcoxon," 486.

[220] King, *The Evolution of Chumash Society*, xv-xvi; John Johnson, "Mission Recruitment and Community Transformations: An Ethnohistorical Study of the Cuyama Chumash," in *Forging Communities in Colonial Alta California,* eds. John Douglass and Kathleen Hull (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2018), 146.

[221] Erlandson, "Replies to Haley and Wilcoxon," 477.

[222] King, *The Evolution of Chumash Society*, 59.

[223] John Anderson, *The Chumash Nation: 1770's to 1996*, 6th ed., self-published, The John Anderson Library, 2020, 18.

Contemporary Chumash political identity is similarly complex. The Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians, Barbareño Band of Chumash Indians, Barbareño Chumash Tribal Council, Northern Chumash Tribal Council, and yak titʸu titʸu yak tiłhini Northern Chumash Tribe are organized on ethnolinguistic lines, representing Samala, Barbareño, and yak titʸu titʸu yak tiłhini communities, respectively. The Coastal Band of the Chumash Nation and the Barbareño/Ventureño Band are more pan-Chumash in nature, representing Barbareño and Mitsqanaqa'n families in the case of the latter and a swath of coastal (as opposed to inland) Chumash families in the case of the former. Though priorities and opinions differ between groups (as they do within them), they are all highly interrelated through kinship ties,[224] at least insofar as those ties are recognized as legitimate (which is a major point of disagreement between bands). Additional non-profit or private organizations, such as the Wishtoyo Foundation, Lulapin Foundation, Chumash Maritime Association, Barbareño Chumash Tribal Council, and hi stok'oy hil xus Cultural Circle provide non-governmental outlets for achieving Chumash cultural and political needs. Out of all the Chumash governments, only the Santa Ynez Band is federally recognized. The Barbareño Band of Chumash Indians, Barbareño/Ventureño Band, Chumash Council of Bakersfield, Coastal Band of the Chumash Nation, Northern Chumash Tribal Council, San Luis Obispo County Chumash Council, and yak titʸu titʸu yak tiłhini Northern Chumash Tribe are recognized by the state of California, while the Barbareño Chumash Tribal Council is not currently seeking recognition.

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[224] Anne Tipak, personal communication.

Decline of the Chumash Languages:

Permanent contact with Europeans began approximately in 1772 with the foundation of the first of a militarized network of Spanish missions intended to Christianize California and turn it into a profitable Spanish colony.[225] The mission system of California was founded upon the concentration of Indigenous peoples (obliquely referred to as "neophytes" in historical records and some modern sources) on mission grounds, where they would be proselytized and used as labor to turn missions into self-sufficient economic production centers. The regime to which Chumash and other Indigenous "neophytes" were subjected was a form of forced labor that contemporary commentators characterized as similar to or worse than slavery.[226] Starting in 1773, missionized Indigenous individuals were considered legal wards of the *padres,* effectively giving the latter full rights to control their labor and behavior in perpetuity.[227] The Spanish *padres* and soldiers instituted strict social controls over missionized communities, leveraging physical and epistemic violence to sunder Chumash religion and culture and mold it into something acceptable to Spanish mores.[228] Women and girls were sequestered from Chumash men, *aq'aqi* (the spiritually potent third gender), and their elders in cramped, unsanitary quarters that fueled the spread of disease.[229] Such sequestration — essential to the suppression of cultural transmission, traditional

[225] Deana Dartt-Newton and Jon Erlandson, "Little Choice for the Chumash: Colonialism, Cattle, and Coercion in Mission Period California," *American Indian Quarterly* 30, no. 3/4 (Summer & Fall 2006): 419.

[226] Benjamin Madley, "California's First Mass Incarceration System: Franciscan Missions, California Indians, and Penal Servitude, 1769-1836," *Pacific Historical Review* 88, no. 1 (2019): 21.

[227] Madley, "California's First Mass Incarceration System," 20.

[228] Madley, "California's First Mass Incarceration System," 18.

[229] Deborah A. Miranda, ""Saying the Padre Had Grabbed Her": Rape is the Weapon, Story is the Cure," *Intertexts* 14, no. 2 (2010): 97.

community life, and Chumash sexuality — was of little use in protecting Chumash women

and girls, who were subject to sexual abuse at the hands of soldiers and mission staff and

forced to endure serial pregnancies to shore up the labor force.[230] The beloved *aq'aqi*, for

their part, were all but erased in a campaign of gendercide.[231] Finally, to "earn" rations,

"neophytes" were subject to a coercive and physically punishing labor regime that ultimately

profited the Spanish empire.[232] Any "neophyte" who sought to leave a mission without

permission was brought back by force.[233] Missionization ultimately proved so brutal and

unsanitary that historians estimate that 75% of children died before the age of twenty and 10-

20% of adults died every year, leading to heavy reliance on the "recruitment" of ever more

"neophytes" ever farther afield.[234]

       Though missionization was nothing short of apocalyptic for the Chumash peoples,

they were not passive victims. Chumash found refuge in daily acts of resistance like the

covert maintenance of their traditions, as well as drastic acts of escape and rebellion. The

strength of Chumash endurance can be seen in the pan-Chumash revolt of 1824, in which

revolutionaries briefly seized Missions Santa Barbara, Santa Inés, and La Purisima before

falling to Mexican forces.[235] A further bastion of Chumash strength endured in the form of

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[230] Madley, "California's First Mass Incarceration System," 18; Miranda, "Story is the Cure," 98.

[231] Deborah A. Miranda, "Extermination of the Joyas: Gendercide in Spanish California," *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 16, no. 1-2 (2010). 257.

[232] Mia Lopez, "Chumash Perspective, A conversation with Mia Lopez, Wishtoyo Foundation," League of Women Voters of Santa Barbara, YouTube, last modified December 9, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqZhFMOI0cI.

[233] Madley, "California's First Mass Incarceration System," 26.

[234] Johnson, "Mission Recruitment," 153; Madley, "California's First Mass Incarceration System," 42.

[235] Johnson, "Mission Recruitment," 153.

the Tejon Band, an inland coalition of Chumash, Kitanemuk, and Yokut communities whose remote home and military strength allowed them to shelter escapees and resist colonization until the American conquest of California. The Mexican secularization of the missions in 1833 brought little respite to Chumash, as they were swiftly integrated into the Mexican economy as an oppressed underclass highly vulnerable to violence and exploitation.[236] Matters drastically worsened with the American conquest of California. California's 1850 Act for the Government and Protection of Indians authorized the "apprenticeship" of Indigenous children until adulthood, which in practice encouraged the murder of Indigenous parents and de facto enslavement of Indigenous children.[237] The Act was amended in 1860 to allow the "apprenticeship" of prisoners of war and those convicted of vagrancy, meaning that any unemployed Indigenous Californian was subject to de facto enslavement.[238] Adding explicitly genocidal policy to implicitly genocidal policy was the authorization of bounties for the killing of Indigenous Californians who impeded colonization, for which over one million dollars were allocated between 1851 and 1900.[239] Even those acts of brutality against Indigenous Californians that remained illegal went virtually unpunished, as the 1850 Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments and the 1851 Act to Regulate Proceedings in Civil Cases, in the Courts of This State forbade Indigenous Californians from testifying against

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[236] Miranda, "Story is the Cure," 98.

[237] Stacey Smith, *Freedom's Frontier: California and the Struggle over Unfree Labor, Emancipation, and Reconstruction* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2013): 11; Miranda, "Story is the Cure," 99.

[238] Smith, *Freedom's Frontier*, 11-12.

[239] Deborah A. Miranda, *Bad Indians: A Tribal Memoir* (Berkeley: Heyday, 2012), 45.

white people in court.[240] These provisions were not invalidated or repealed until after the American Civil War.

Adding to the threat against Chumash lives and freedom, Chumash landholding collapsed even further under American rule. The American government initially recognized reservations for the Tejon Band, the Santa Ynez Band, and the coastal community of Kašwa/Cieneguitas, but all but the Santa Ynez reservation were ultimately appropriated and sold off under the tenure of Thomas Hope and Edward Beale, the very Indian agents assigned by the federal government to safeguard Chumash interests.[241] With Chumash communities dispersed, stripped of all but 99 acres of their homelands, and more vulnerable than ever to settler violence, many non-reservation Chumash families made the strategic decision to blend into the Mexican American community, publicly assimilating while privately passing on Chumash culture.[242] This strategy, which afforded Chumash significantly better social and economic opportunities in a systemically anti-Indigenous context,[243] remained common until

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[240] Smith, *Freedom's Frontier,* 261; *Benjamin* Madley, *An American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian Catastrophe, 1846-1873* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 111; "Frequently Asked Questions: Indian Tribes and Tribal Communities in California Tribal," Documents, Tribal Court-State Court Forum, accessed August 3, 2023, https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/TribalFAQs.pdf.

[241] Yolanda Broyles-González and Pilulaw Khus, *Earth Wisdom: A California Chumash Woman* (Tucson: the University of Arizona Press, 2011), 3; James Yee, "An Introduction to the Barbareño Chumash Language," Channel Islands Restoration, YouTube, last modified July 21, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kto-9wbSFVw&t=3040s; More specifically, Hope transferred ownership of reservation lands to his wife, who sold them after his death.

[242] Broyles-González and Khus, *Earth Wisdom*, 73; Anderson, *The Chumash Nation*, 39; Erlandson, "The Making of Chumash Tradition," 478; Lopez, "Chumash Perspective."

[243] Lopez, "Chumash Perspective."

about the 1960s and 1970s, when national and transnational social justice movements raised the visibility and social legitimacy of marginalized peoples.[244]

Though public assimilation and intermarriage into other ethnic groups allowed for Chumash corporate identity and culture to survive until its public reemergence, the overwhelmingly racist social framework it was carried out in ensured that much was lost, as assimilatory pressures eroded intergenerational transmission. The full extent of the damage is unclear since Chumash culture remains first and foremost a private family matter. Some families maintained strong Chumash identities and traditions up to the present day. Thus, many stories, histories, songs, lore, religious beliefs, and even social formations like the Chumash clan system have endured. On the other hand, many other families stopped cultural transmission as parents sought to secure the socioeconomic status of their children in an anti-Indigenous society. Many Chumash individuals and families only began to reconnect with their heritage as national and transnational conditions for Indigenous peoples improved in the late 20th century.[245] The public and political rebirth of the Chumash, like that of the Māori, came about through a struggle to protect Indigenous land. When Humqaq/Point Conception (a sacred site revered by some bands as the place where souls depart for the afterlife) was threatened in 1978 by fossil fuel development, a pan-Chumash movement rallied to Humqaq's defense. These activists occupied the site for nearly a year — sometimes losing their jobs to do so — before ultimately defeating the proposed development and inaugurating

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[244] Broyles-González and Khus, *Earth Wisdom*, 4.

[245] Erlandson, "Replies to Haley and Wilcoxon," 478.

a tradition of public land defense.[246] State-recognized bands eventually emerged from these movements or because of political disagreements with those that did. Without the omnipresent threat of violence and with growing organizational capacity and ethnic pride, Chumash governments have developed their ability to publicly protect their interests and revitalize their cultures and languages. The work ahead is daunting, for over two centuries of alien rule has wrought a grievous toll on Chumash ways of knowing and being. Foremost amongst these casualties were the Chumash languages, whose language values collapsed under colonial rule.

Language Values Under Colonization:

Colonization and the genocide that accompanied it shattered the values of Chumash languages. The scattering of Chumash communities and the threat of anti-Indigenous violence essentially gave their languages negative social value since there was no longer much of a collective social body to be bound to through language and being identified as Indigenous placed one in considerable danger. The loss of community and the threats of violence also greatly reduced the ability to safely practice Chumash cultures, resulting in an attendant loss of cultural value for the languages. Notably, both culture and language endured relatively intact longer in the case of Luisa Ygnacia's family, whose ownership of land away from settler communities kept them together and relatively safe.[247] In any case, the intrinsic, spiritual, and (objective) intellectual values of the language weren't dramatically affected but their educational, monetary, and (perceived) intellectual value were virtually nil under

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[246] Erlandson, "Replies to Haley and Wilcoxon," 479; Broyles-González and Khus, *Earth Wisdom*, 3.

[247] Yee, "An Introduction."

Anglophonic American rule. Although there never was an explicit policy of linguicide, these conditions were so hostile that intergenerational transmission of the languages virtually ceased by the early 1900s,[248] and the last known first-language speaker, Mary Yee (Barbareño), passed away in 1965. While lesser degrees of fluency persisted amongst other individuals,[249] hope for the revitalization (or, more accurately, regeneration) of the sleeping Chumash languages has lain in the work that first-language speakers such as Yee, Maria Solares (Samala), and Rosario Cooper (tʔɨnismuʔ tiɬhinkʔtitʸu) conducted with linguists (notably John Peabody Harrington). The journey ahead for the revitalization of Chumash languages is thus fundamentally different to that faced by *te reo*, which relies upon preserving and expanding a large, extant community of speakers instead of recreating one from the ground up.

Chumash Revitalization Programs:

At present, bands, nonprofits, and private organizations serving Barbareño/Šmuwič, Samala, tʔɨnismuʔ tiɬhinkʔtitʸu, and Mitsqanaqa'n communities have gathered and developed sufficient language resources to enact revitalization programs. Due to the disorganized nature of available evidence on each language (most notably the field notes of John Harrington) extensive linguistic work was needed to develop usable language resources such as grammars and dictionaries. Such work requires years of training, access to archival materials, and countless hours of labor, meaning that academic linguists are virtually indispensable assets. With a sovereign government and budget of its own, the Santa Ynez Band was able to recruit

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[248] Šan, personal communication.

[249] Tipak, personal communication; Šan, personal communication.

the aid of the linguist Richard Applegate, who developed requisite materials and trained language apprentices to eventually develop a teaching program.

Without sovereign land bases or greater government support, language revitalization programs in non-Samala Chumash languages have remained considerably more limited in scope and capacity. As of the present moment, even dictionaries for the other Chumash languages remain in incomplete draft form. People capable of teaching the languages are also few in number and under great duress. For example, Deborah Sanchez, who spearheads the Wishtoyo Foundation's Šmuwič revitalization classes, works full time as a judge, leaving her only very limited time to dedicate to revitalization. Another teacher of the Šmuwič language, as recounted by Juan Lunes (pseudonym, assigned) of the Barbareño Chumash Tribal Council, lives outside of the Šmuwič homelands and is only infrequently able to return to teach classes.[250] As a result, the frequency and capacity of Šmuwič classes is well below the community's demand. Formal programs are not necessarily indispensable to learn Chumash languages. Exceptional individuals have been able to attain rudimentary levels of fluency largely through self-study, reclaiming their ancestral language from academic publications, original linguistic field notes, and archival recordings. However, this is obviously not universally viable, again highlighting the importance of economic questions in language revitalization. Without a land base or at least community ownership of economic resources, Indigenous nations may lack the resources necessary to cultivate their cultures. Public funding could bridge the gap but would be subject to the political vagaries of budget allocation of settler governments that have a basic interest in furthering the project of

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[250] Lunes, personal communication.

countersovereignty. Whether they will help will depend upon the norms available to the Chumash and the particular relationships that they have with American governments and institutions.

Norms:

The unique history of the United States and of transnational Indigenous activism have cultivated adherence to Indigenous self-determination and Indigenous rights as norms in and of themselves, even if their effectiveness is ultimately limited. In the first instance, the early reliance of British colonists on military alliances with Indigenous polities laid the foundation for norms favoring Indigenous self-determination, as the treaties of alliance recognized them as sovereign nations.[251] This norm was of very limited effectiveness, as conquest and colonization marched onwards whenever colonists no longer needed and were sufficiently strong enough to sweep aside their neighbors.[252] Treaty-making with Indigenous tribes still established partially sovereign reservations, but the U.S. generally acted to constrain their power, culminating in the termination era of 1945-1969 that sought to permanently eliminate Native American sovereignty in practice.[253] Indigenous activism and norm entrepreneurship, however, successfully reversed this policy trend, with President Richard Nixon inaugurating a shift towards self-determination in 1970.[254]

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[251] Siegfried Wiessner, "American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law," *St. Thomas Law Review* 7, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 574-575.

[252] Wiessner, "American Indian Treaties," 575.

[253] Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal,* loc. 3286-3295.

[254] Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal*, loc. 3340-3344.

Transnational Indigenous activism worked alongside national activism to build norms of Indigenous rights and sovereignty. The first true breakthrough was the 1989 International Labor Organization Convention 169, which bound signatories to "provisions advancing indigenous cultural integrity, land and resource rights, and nondiscrimination in social welfare spheres," and "generally enjoins states to respect indigenous peoples' aspirations in all decisions affecting them."[255] An even greater leap forwards came in 2007 with the ratification of the United Nations Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which established a strong foundation of rights to support from national governments in the maintenance of Indigenous communities and all that made them unique. Predictably, the settler states of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. were opposed to its passage, with New Zealand and the U.S. not reversing their objections until 2010.[256] The effects have been subtle, but gradual transformation can be detected through the spread of pro-Indigenous behavior such as the 2015 arrival in the U.S. of land acknowledgements and the passage of pro-Indigenous policies in California such as the 2001 California Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and the 2022 University of California Native American Opportunity Plan.[257] Speaking on local conditions, Andre Martes (pseudonym, assigned), a Santa Barbara Chumash man, reported noticing a palpable sense of "hesitation" in local officials when confronted with the possibility of going against Chumash prerogatives.[258]

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[255] Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples,* 48.

[256] Sheryl Lightfoot, "Emerging International Indigenous Rights Norms and 'Over-Compliance' in New Zealand and Canada," *Political Science* 62, no. 1 (2010): 84.

[257] Theresa Ambo and Theresa Beardall, "Performance or Progress? The Physical and Rhetorical Removal of Indigenous Peoples in Settler Land Acknowledgements at Land-Grab Universities," *American Educational Research Journal* 60, no. 1: 110.

[258] Martes, personal communication.

Though he was not entirely certain as to its origins and skeptical of the depth of its utility (beyond securing window-dressing actions like changing street names),[259] this normative pressure seems to indicate a degree of progress that could, if skillfully leveraged, be transformed into greater support for language and the full range of Indigenous cultural and sovereign rights that give it meaning. The next sections, then, will discuss the state of relations between Chumash groups and various levels of government, as well as the support that can reasonably be expected from each.

Federal Norms, Relations, and Recognition:

Federal recognition establishes an inter-governmental relationship between Indigenous nations and the federal government, where the former cede varying degrees of sovereignty in exchange for the "protection" of the United States. Beyond the British colonial period, where treaties were more often genuine treaties of alliance between relatively equal partners, treaty signing has typically been a means for Indigenous nations to secure a fraction of their historical homelands against American military conquest.[260] In effect, the "protection" that they receive is arguably against the very government that "protects" them. For the United States, federal recognition has long been a tool of conquest. A much fuller conquest could certainly have been obtained through total war against Indigenous nations but forcing them to negotiate settlements was an effective means of securing coveted lands quickly and relatively cheaply. Tellingly, Wiessner notes that treaties tended to be signed with powerful and influential tribes, while smaller, weaker Indigenous polities were simply

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[259] Martes, personal communication.

[260] Wiessner, "American Indian Treaties," 570.

displaced.[261] Such treaties also proved valuable in that they constituted a legal extinguishment of Indigenous sovereignty, thus bolstering U.S. countersovereignty. As noted by Wolfe and Karuka, this legal transfer of sovereignty forms the bedrock of U.S. national sovereignty, perversely necessitating the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty for the establishment of settler sovereignty. Though somewhat ambiguous, the current relationship between the U.S. government and federally recognized Indigenous nations is characterizable as a relationship between two sovereign governments. Though often described as "domestic dependent nations", Wiessner argues that the U.S.'s reserved rights doctrine (under which Indigenous treaties are held to have given certain, discrete rights to the U.S. while reserving all others), the lack of direct federal control over Indigenous governments, and the fact that Indigenous nations are not subject to the U.S. constitution render this description inaccurate.[262] Likewise, he argues, court rulings bear out that the "guardian/ward" relationship between Indigenous nations and the federal government exists only at the pleasure of congress, with no legally enforceable foundation to it.[263] This was not always the case, certainly in spirit as well as in practice. Until the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, agents of the Bureau of Indian Affairs held enormous power over "their" reservations, exercising legal and extralegal controls (such as denial of rations) to achieve Bureau and personal objectives. Quite often these objectives involved the demolition of Indigenous ways of being, paternalistically characterized as harmful to the best interests of poor, benighted savages in desperate need of civilizing. Even today, insufficient federal funding is an

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[261] Lee, "The Two Classes," 251-252.

[262] Wiessner, "American Indian Treaties," 588-589.

[263] Wiessner, "American Indian Treaties," 589-590.

enormous handicap to tribes' ability to exercise their sovereignty to the full benefit of their

people. Nonetheless, Indigenous activism and norm entrepreneurship has, since the

termination era, solidified tribes' status as sovereign nations. This too, however, comes with

vulnerabilities. Treaties of any sort are recognized as being co-equal in power to federal

legislation, which means that they can be altered or abrogated at any time through

legislation.[264]

The American conquest of California was marked by a dearth of treaties with

Indigenous nations when compared to its colonization of other North American regions. This

can be attributed in part to the fact that Mexico already claimed sovereignty over what is now

California before the U.S. conquered it, in theory cutting out the need to obtain sovereignty

from Indigenous nations. Practically speaking, Mexico had weak or no control over much of

California, but Indigenous Californians themselves were generally militarily weak,

dramatically reducing the practical utility of treaties to the U.S. government. Even those

tribes that signed treaties weren't necessarily recognized. Famously, the U.S. senate refused

to ratify 18 treaties signed by 134 California Indigenous nations, ordering them sealed from

public view.[265] The signatories quickly discovered that although they had honored their end

of the bargain, their land rights had been extinguished regardless.[266] Only two fully Chumash

polities, the Santa Ynez and Kašwa bands, were able to secure reservations, and the latter

was effectively dissolved when the Hope family appropriated and sold the land. As a result,

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[264] Wiessner, "American Indian Treaties," 580.

[265] Madley, *An American Genocide*, 267.

[266] Ibid.

only the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash has federal recognition and a sovereign land base. Currently, treaties are recognized as being co-equal in power to federal legislation. This means that states and the federal government are bound by treaty terms, but that the federal government can, as previously mentioned, legislatively alter or dissolve treaties at any time.[267] Continued Indigenous sovereignty in the United States, like in Aotearoa, is thus more the product of Indigenous activism and norm entrepreneurship than of any binding constitutional foundation.

The issue of federal recognition is a matter of contention amongst the Chumash communities not currently recognized. Recognition comes with many benefits, chief amongst them territorial sovereignty and government funding for social programs. These are typically meager in comparison to the historical sovereignty and current needs of Indigenous nations but are nonetheless of great utility for the maintenance of Indigenous community life. On the other hand, federal recognition does theoretically advance the project of countersovereignty. Since most Chumash lands have not been legally ceded to the United States, the majority of Chumash bands retain a legal and moral claim to sovereignty over their homeland. To sign a treaty with the federal government would likely entail recognizing the sovereignty of the settler state over most of their lands and being drawn into the political orbit of the governments responsible for the California Genocide. The debate, then, is whether the costs outweigh the benefits. This is a very difficult decision to make, and one which belongs solely to the Chumash bands. Beyond the desirability of federal recognition, there is also a problem of feasibility. The current administrative process for receiving federal recognition is

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[267] Wiessner, "American Indian Treaties," 580.

extremely onerous, requiring communities to prove continuous political and social existence

since 1900, something that state and federal governments spent much of the 19th and 20th

century trying to disrupt.[268] It is not uncommon for requests for federal recognition to cost

tribes millions of dollars and decades of effort, and most requests end in rejection.[269]

Arguably, the system is working exactly as intended. The First Circuit's 1975 *Joint Tribal*

Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton ruling "acknowledged that the federal laws

applied to all tribes, even new ones, whether or not the federal government previously

recognized the obligation," which "created concerns that if a tribe became federally

recognized, it would have subsequent land claims to all of its original territory."[270] Though

any agreement of recognition could conceivably include protections against such claims,

making federal recognition nigh unattainable is still in the countersovereign interests of the

U.S. since, although the legitimate claims of unrecognized Chumash nations pose a

theoretical threat to territorial sovereignty, federal recognition would reify a portion of those

claims in practice.[271] The disputes that can arise over such matters are evident in the lengthy

battle between the Santa Ynez Band and the County of Santa Barbara over the former's

attempts to incorporate a purchased plot of land into their reservation. Opposed to the loss of

property tax and control over land use that would entail, the county legally challenged and

lobbied against the annexation until the Band agreed to pay it off for the difference and

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[268] Lee, "The Two Classes," 263.

[269] Lee, "The Two Classes," 259-260, 274.

[270] Lee, "The Two Classes," 265.

[271] Ibid.

comply with state and county codes.[272] Presumably, similar settler recalcitrance could combine with documentary challenges to create a potent lobby against recognition.

If federal recognition presents a mixed promise, so does the prospect of helpful federal legislation. In the domain of language, the Native American Languages Act of 1990 made it the policy of the federal government to "promote the rights and freedom of Native Americans to use, practice, and develop Native American languages" and encourage states to follow suit.[273] This law exemplifies both the strength and weakness of lobbying the federal government for legislative support. That such a policy passed at all is due to the tireless work of grassroots Indigenous advocates and the interpersonal relationships they forged with legislators, demonstrating that these can deliver results even in the absence of strong Indigenous electoral pressure.[274] Its passage, however, was defeated several times over two years and only succeeded when it was discreetly incorporated as a section of an amendment to the Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act of 1978.[275] Thus, the federal government could only bring itself to support Indigenous languages if it did so in a covert fashion so as not to offend the sensibilities of the ideologically and electorally potent

[272] Mike Hodgson, "Supervisor Meeting with Congressional Officials on Camp 4 Issue," *Santa Maria Times*, April 26, 2017, https://santamariatimes.com/news/local/supervisor-meeting-with-congressional-officials-on-camp-4-issue/article_54799eef-f976-5952-9588-c6fbc98ba1be.html; Mike Hodgson, "Bureau of Indian Affairs Makes Final Decision on Taking Camp 4 Into Trust for Chumash," *Santa Maria Times*, October 1, 2020, https://santamariatimes.com/news/local/bureau-of-indian-affairs-makes-final-decision-on-taking-camp-4-into-trust-for-chumash/article_34a11e9a-bdc4-5ab5-856a-3a8d7e289f22.html.

[273] "S.2167 - Native American Languages Act," Legislation, Congress.gov, accessed March 3, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/senate-bill/2167.

[274] Larisa Warhol, "Native American Language Education as Policy-in-Practice: An Interpretative Policy Analysis of the Native American Languages Act of 1990/1992," *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 14, no. 3 (2011): 287.

[275] Warhol, "Native American Language Education," 288.

English-only movement.[276] This frankly tepid and largely rhetorical support for Indigenous

languages has proved to be primarily inspirational and aspirational in impact. The 2006

Esther Martinez Native American Languages Preservation Act was more impactful,

providing millions of dollars in grants for Indigenous nations to conduct assessments and

design and implement programs. Though of greater practical value, the grants have been

limited in number and in sustainability, with needs far outstripping resources.[277] Impacts can

be enormous when grants are secured, but with hundreds of potential competitors they are

not a reliable source of support, and funding for language revitalization needs to be

sustainable.

The federal government has also caused tremendous harm to revitalization programs

through other legislation, most notably the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). Even though

NALA and its lofty promises were still on the books, NCLB "failed Native language learning

in its curtailing of bilingual education funding, its requirement of schools to implement the

rote and English-based reading program Reading First, and the creation of high-pressure

environments to succeed on tests at the expense of Native language programs."[278] This is

only one of the latest iterations in swings in and out of the safety zone, as the federal

government funded revitalization through the 1972 Indian Education Act and 1974 Native

American Programs Act, but soon scuppered both programs through lack of funding.[279] It is

not outside of the realm of possibility that congress might come to play a more supportive

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[276] Ibid.

[277] Warhol, "Legacies of NALA," 83.

[278] Moline, "Indigenous Language Teaching Policy," 22.

[279] Moline, "Indigenous Language Teaching Policy," 23.

role in Chumash language revitalization, but it is not likely. Aside from the settler state's

inherent countersovereign interest in minimizing support for the sovereignty of Indigenous

peoples (including through the protection of their culture), the fact that hundreds of cultural

and linguistic groups exist in the United States makes it far less likely that the federal

government will devote adequate protection and resources towards any individual one.

Divide and conquer (or in this instance, divide and neglect) is rendered easy when any given

population demanding support is numerically small and politically disempowered. This

situation is unlike that of Aotearoa where the Māori population, despite being dialectically

and politically diverse, nonetheless constitutes a large, politically potent electorate capable of

lobbying the settler government for action. Making up two percent of the U.S. population but

speaking at least 245 languages, Indigenous American communities are at an enormous

disadvantage compared to their Māori counterparts when it comes to lobbying for language

rights. Greater potential, then, may lie at the level of the State of California.

California Norms, Relations, and Recognition:

Though only the Santa Ynez Band is federally recognized, the Barbareño/Ventureño

Band of Mission Indians, the Chumash Council of Bakersfield, Coastal Band of the Chumash

Nation, Northern Chumash Tribal Council, San Luis Obispo County Chumash Council, and

yak tityu tityu yak tiłhini - Northern Chumash Tribe are recognized by the State of California

through its Native American Heritage Commission. Contrary to state recognition elsewhere

in the United States, the benefits of state recognition in California come primarily in the form

of rights of consultation in matters where government actions may impact Indigenous

cultural sites.[280] The major benefit outside of the immediate purposes of consultation laws, then, has been that it fosters the cultivation of social capital with state and local governments through interorganizational and interpersonal relationship building.

As previously mentioned, California is currently in control of a liberal Democratic supermajority which has evinced a pro-Indigenous character. In addition to passing pro-Indigenous legislation, its party platform displays a number of pro-Indigenous stances, ranging from generic commitments to improve educational outcomes for Indigenous children to a commitment to "encourage government agencies to enter into agreements with Tribes and/or Indigenous Land Trusts regarding ecological management of ancestral lands and, where possible, the return of public lands to California Indian jurisdiction."[281] Whether these commitments will be adequately prioritized is an open question, but the apparent embrace of Indigenous rights norms seems to open opportunities that may be leveraged through "conversion" and "coercion" strategies to secure greater legislative support from the state of California for language revitalization. With sixty-four other languages calling California home, however, Chumash languages may struggle to secure adequate, sustainable funding from the state of California.

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[280] "State Recognition of American Indian Tribes," National Conference of State Legislatures, last modified October 10, 2016, https://www.ncsl.org/quad-caucus/state-recognition-of-american-indian-tribes; State of California Native American Heritage Commission, "Native American Heritage Commission Tribal Consultation Policy," accessed August 20, 2023, https://nahc.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Signed-NAHC-Tribal-Consultation-Policy.pdf.

[281] "Energy and Environment," Our Platform, California Democratic Party, accessed September 13, 2023, https://cadem.org/issues/energy-and-environment/.

Another aspect to consider is the established history of English-only backlash in California. In 1998 California voters passed Proposition 227 (English Language in Public Schools), a constitutional amendment that "had the effect of strangling many bilingual programs" and "earned California the reputation of being an "English-only state.""[282] The amendment passed thanks to a mix of anti-immigrant (and specifically anti-Hispanic) backlash and paternalistic rhetoric framing bilingual education as a danger to the futures Spanish-speaking children who deserved the socioeconomic blessings of English instead of the allegedly ghettoizing influence of bilingual education.[283] Though primarily anti-Spanish in character, it decimated bilingual education in all other languages as well. Fortunately, California voters overwhelmingly repealed Proposition 227 in 2016, seemingly heralding a turn towards multicultural acceptance. However, Katznelson and Bernstein caution that the repealing Proposition 58 (California Education for a Global Economy Initiative) framed access to bilingual education not as a cultural or human right, but as an indispensable economic asset in a globalized economy.[284] Whether Californians are truly invested in accepting non-English languages is, then, questionable since Proposition 58 does not pioneer or reinforce any ethical norms around language acceptance. This lack of ethics-based norms is especially problematic given its overwhelming focus on the monetary value of languages, which casts doubt as to how much it can be expected to bolster support for the revitalization of Indigenous languages, which are ubiquitously lacking in global monetary value.[285]

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[282] Noah Katznelson and Katie Bernstein, "Rebranding Bilingualism: The Shifting Discourses of Language Education Policy in California's 2016 Election," *Linguistics and Education* 40, no. 1 (2017): 11.

[283] Katznelson and Bernstein, "Rebranding Bilingualism," 11, 13.

[284] Katznelson and Bernstein, "Rebranding Bilingualism," 16-17.

[285] Katznelson and Bernstein, "Rebranding Bilingualism," 21.

Moreover, if Indigenous nations start to threaten the "unity" of California by reacquiring land and sovereignty (as they must to strengthen their communities and languages) then it is entirely possible that a settler backlash will follow, endangering revitalization efforts. As argued by Katznelson and Bernstein, local reinterpretation and norm entrepreneurship will be essential in turning this and other strategically expedient but normatively impoverished reforms into fruitful, self-reinforcing pro-Indigenous norms and policies.[286]

Local Norms, Relations, and Recognition:

Rights of consultation and the rising potency of Indigenous rights norms have also strengthened Chumash relations with local governmental and public entities, presenting another path to secure support for revitalization efforts. Progress may be seen in the rising frequency with which local entities present or invite Chumash representatives to present land acknowledgements at public functions. These acknowledgements of the legitimate historical claims that Indigenous peoples have to their homelands are themselves contested terrain. On the one hand, they represent a public recognition of Indigenous sovereignty and survival, something which goes against the logic of elimination. This recognition may cultivate public awareness of and empathy for Indigenous rights struggles, which may be leveraged to achieve concrete progress on such struggles. On their own, however, land acknowledgements provide no tangible benefits to Indigenous rights. Without concrete action advancing Indigenous rights, land acknowledgements can constitute a settler move to innocence that serves the interests of countersovereignty. If local entities stop at conducting land acknowledgements, then the acknowledgement merely serves to legitimize the

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[286] Katznelson and Bernstein, "Rebranding Bilingualism," 21-22.

acknowledging entity, allowing it to present itself as supportive of Indigenous rights while simultaneously maintaining settler sovereignty over Indigenous lands and communities.[287] Countersovereignty and the logic of elimination, after all, are not premised on the annihilation of all memory of Indigenous sovereignty; they seek to locate that sovereignty in the distant past and give it only as much relevance in the present as is necessary to bolster settler sovereignty and legitimacy. There has thus been rising interest amongst Chumash in seeing local entities go beyond acknowledgements and deliver concrete results, since if the Chumash peoples are the legitimate stewards of these conquered lands (as indeed they are), then those who acknowledge that fact must also acknowledge that they have a responsibility to actively protect the interests of these communities. Consistent public and normative pressure, then, must be applied so that local entities, be they city governments or public universities, continue to restructure their relationships with Indigenous communities such that the sovereignty (cultural and otherwise) of local first nations is respected.

Appropriateness of Strategy:

The simple availability of a norm or strategy doesn't mean that it is appropriate for the needs of the revitalizing community. The following section will draw on interviews with language-focused Chumash co-researchers to present a small slice of existing community perspectives on language revitalization. In all cases, the views of co-researchers are strictly their own; they do not purport to speak for their communities as a whole. Likewise, their views as they are reproduced here may evolve and ought to be considered as snapshots in time. Due to the sensitive nature of language revitalization — especially considering the

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[287] Ambo & Beardall, "Performance or Progress?," 105.

political disagreements between bands — some co-researchers have chosen to share their views under a pseudonym. These pseudonyms were either chosen by participants or, in the absence of a personal preference, assigned.

Language Values and Appropriateness:

Chumash languages currently have low monetary and educational value, as well as high spiritual value and intermediate social, cultural, and (perceived) intellectual value. Intrinsic value, as always, is equal to all other languages. Settler state support can be instrumental to boosting all these values, but some aspects of language value influence the forms under which such support would be acceptable, most notably their social value. Since Indigenous identity in the United States is far more contested than in Aotearoa — where lineal descent is legally enshrined as sufficient measure of Indigeneity — Indigenous languages have a high social value as a marker of Indigenous identity. Furthermore, since a distinct Indigenous identity is the cornerstone of Indigenous claims to sovereignty, Indigenous languages have immense value in reinforcing the sovereignty of Indigenous nations. The unique history of missionization makes this especially true for the Chumash. Juan Lunes (pseudonym, assigned) noted that the linguistic and communitarian amalgamation that occurred on the missions means that modern Chumash identity is grounded in ethnolinguistic identity. Whereas villages used to be the predominant political units, "today a lot of the political boundaries are considered linguistic."[288] Political fluidity still exits since organizations like the Barbareño/Ventureño and Coastal bands have mixed ethnolinguistic membership and many members of all bands can trace additional ancestry to

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[288] Lunes, personal communication.

other language groups, but ethnolinguistic identification rooted in descent from particular mission communities (Barbareño Chumash of Mission Santa Barbara, Ventureño Chumash of Mission San Buenaventura, etc.) has still assumed a central position. Speaking of the present-day value of Barbareño, Martes highlighted that "it distinguishes us from the other tribal groups, distinguishes us from Samala and Mitsqanaqa'n and tiłhini."[289] Language thus plays a significant role in establishing the different Chumash communities as distinct nations. This is important because each community has its own territories, needs, and priorities; if they were all subsumed under one banner, more localized priorities might easily go unaddressed. Given the social value of the Chumash languages, co-researchers all framed the appropriateness of settler state support in relation to accessibility, relationality, and community control.

Accessibility:

Accessibility was the first of the key concerns. This is partly a concern around equity; settler state support that creates revitalization resources (such as a class) that are disproportionately accessible to non-Chumash people and disproportionately inaccessible to Chumash people would obviously be inequitable. This inequity is already reflected in the status quo. A recurring critique amongst co-researchers was that although scholars have amassed vast quantities of information on Chumash languages, Chumash individuals have only limited access to those materials or the expertise to use them. Avoiding an extension of such inequity will be key to any potential state-supported revitalization. For example, although the idea of teaching a Chumash language at the University of California, Santa

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[289] Martes, personal communication.

Barbara (sited atop several Chumash villages) is occasionally floated, such a class would not realistically be widely accessible to Chumash communities. Accordingly, Šan (pseudonym, self-selected) of the Barbareño/Ventureño Band of Mission Indians characterized such efforts as a waste of time.[290] Given that there are so few resources and people dedicated to revitalizing Chumash languages in the first place, any such waste of time could represent a truly harmful opportunity cost to revitalization efforts.

On a deeper level, concerns about accessibility seemed rooted in a concern that Chumash communities might be left behind in the revitalization of their own languages. This prospect is greatly upsetting given the deep social and spiritual value of the language to Chumash individuals. Moreover, if speaking a Chumash language is important to one's Chumash identity, the prospect of an outsider being more fluent can be a source of hurt or discouragement. As explained by Juan Lunes:

"I have experienced that, where I feel a certain way if I see a non-Chumash speaking. I felt sad, and a little angry at them, at times. But that's because *I* was hurt. It's not because philosophically I think that only Chumash people should speak it. I had an emotional reaction because I couldn't speak it. I've always been someone who was a little self-conscious… So when I heard other people speaking Chumash I felt kind of hurt. I just felt like I wasn't Chumash enough to be who I was… that's not very logical but it's just how I felt. I get that.

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[290] Šan, personal communication.

There's an emotional response that you have. It's like: "that's our language, that's ours, don't be going taking it, thinking that you have control of it.""[291]

Anne Tipak (pseudonym, self-selected), a Coastal Chumash woman, mirrored those concerns, emphasizing the principle of fairness:

"There's people outside the community that want to learn the language like they learn Spanish. And it's OK, but it's not, because I feel like "no, you don't get to teach this in classrooms, no you shouldn't be teaching this at the university" because why do those people get to learn it in a classroom setting, and we who it's our language don't have that opportunity and we don't even have a full grasp on our language yet… to almost, like, give it out before [we] get to experience it is unfair… you shouldn't be able to speak fluently before I get to speak fluently or before I get to speak fluently and teach my child, my grandchild how to speak fluently. Why do you and your kid get to speak fluently because you learned it in college or in school? But here it's our language, you know?"[292]

Though they emphasized that there was no fundamental problem to non-Chumash learning Chumash languages, these and other concerns led Lunes, Martes, and Tipak to opine that it would be best if revitalization efforts focused on Chumash communities until such time as a substantial speaking base is established. Not all Chumash people necessarily share these concerns. On one end of the scale, Martes mentioned conversations with Chumash

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[291] Lunes, personal communication.
[292] Tipak, personal communication.

community members with "strong Chumash identity" who aren't fluent and don't consider language to be of central importance to their identity, or indeed even a priority amongst the community's other pressing concerns.[293] Šan likewise said that while the language is "helpful" for binding people together, it was not universally prioritized in his community, arguing that it would be "ludicrous" to say that those who don't focus on language aren't Chumash.[294] For individuals to whom the language doesn't have tremendous social value, then, the prospect of fluent outsiders may not be especially upsetting. Indeed, Šan opined that some language learning amongst outsiders could actually help encourage community members to learn by increasing the prestige of the language.[295] The benefit, under this scenario, would outweigh the potential harm.

The social value that Chumash languages have in expressing a Chumash identity means that there is additionally, in the abstract, an identitarian threat attached to outsider fluency. This is a significant component of the emotional harm potentially associated with outsiders gaining greater fluency than insiders. If speaking a Chumash language is part of being Chumash and an outsider can speak better than you, that could reasonably result in feelings of not being "Chumash enough". Beyond that, if distinct languages constitute a pillar of Indigenous sovereignty, then outsiders disproportionately learning the language may threaten that pillar of sovereignty. Co-researchers generally did not find this abstract threat to be of much practical concern. The most concerned was Tipak, who lamented that "already we

[293] Martes, personal communication.

[294] Šan, personal communication.

[295] Šan, personal communication.

have to prove who we are", and that having outsiders learning the language first could lead to people weaponizing the disparity to attack community members' Chumash identity.[296] Martes, for his part, saw little such threat:

"I don't think many people would feel very threatened by it. I don't feel threatened by it, but somehow it makes me want to learn more language… In my case I feel like this is the language of this land. This is not just the language of this community. Because of that, I think that it deserves to be shared. I don't think there should be that many resources dedicated to teaching it outside of our community, but I think it's good, personally, that people know about the language. And the distinction has to be made regarding learning about the language, not learning to speak the language necessarily. The two are not always necessarily the same thing."[297]

Šan shared parts of this perspective. Speaking about language classes, he explained that:

"You're not learning a language when you go to a class like that, you're learning *about* it… if a bunch of non-Natives learn your language in a classroom setting that doesn't mean they know what the community is saying and they're 'in-crowd'. The point is: is your community using the language? And when you focus on that, nothing else is threatening but

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[296] Tipak, personal communication.

[297] Martes, personal communication.

your own lack of commitment, or that's the bigger threat than anyone learning your language."[298]

The only exception he carved out was if language was being used to bolster a fraudulent claim of Chumash identity, and even that was described as a "doomed" endeavor.[299]

Relationality and Community Control:

A deeper concern amongst co-researchers was that those learning Chumash languages should be in relationship with Chumash communities and that Chumash communities should have control over the revitalization process. These two prerogatives, which are naturally intertwined, have practical purposes from both a revitalization and a sovereignty perspective. Relationality is important from a revitalizing perspective because language vitality is most important (and most valued) amongst the Indigenous speaker community. The vitality of a language technically increases when outsiders learn it, but the gain will be limited if they are not in contact with the speaker community. Language is social by nature, so the learning of language is most effective when it is spoken with others to the mutual enrichment of all involved. Moreover, its prestige can only increase if outsiders are interested in both the language and a deeper relationship with the community. Beyond the practicalities of revitalization, relationality also serves as a means of regulating outsider behavior, similar to how one may regulate the behavior of another person by teaching them one's likes and dislikes. After all, it is of little benefit to a community if an outsider learns their language but

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[298] Šan, personal communication.
[299] Šan, personal communication.

otherwise behaves harmfully towards them. The matter is particularly delicate in the Chumash homelands because of the depth of Indigenous erasure stemming from the California Genocide. Tipak explained that the reason that she didn't currently feel comfortable having public language classes at local schools was because "as a people we're still only talked about in history."[300] Martes expressed a similar concern, lamenting that "Here in Santa Barbara, people still think everything started with Spanish, [that] nothing happened before 1542 when Cabrillo came or before 1769 when the Spanish first settled in this region permanently."[301] Though the local situation has improved over the past decades, the general public's understanding on the diversity, vitality, or even mere existence of Chumash communities remains frustratingly low. Learning about a Chumash language wouldn't necessarily teach one that Chumash communities are alive and well, nor would it necessarily inculcate an understanding of proper cultural protocol or feelings of goodwill towards Chumash aspirations. Thus, an element of safety is necessary. Tipak explained her concerns through her tutoring of a non-Chumash friend, Maria (pseudonym):

"People could say: "Oh you gave Maria the dictionary, how come you don't give *me* the dictionary?" It's like: "Well because I don't know you, I don't trust you." But with Maria I do. I know her, I trust her, she's a part of my community. I know her heart and how she is within our community and so I feel comfortable sharing it with her… I wouldn't feel like that with ten classes coming through the university. And I think that's the difference, is just [that] relationship. And the safety… you can only feel comfortable if you trust, you can only trust if

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[300] Tipak, personal communication.

[301] Martes, personal communication.

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you *know* that person. You have to first get to know each other, right? And that doesn't happen in schools. With people that are learning a language, they don't get to have a relationship with the people of the language, they just have a relationship with their teacher and the language. And since our language isn't being taught by us at this moment, I just feel like that's not the right way."[302]

Similarly, although currently opposed to the idea of teaching the "larger community", Martes made an exception for "people close to our community".[303] On an even more intimate level, Lunes spoke of his desire to speak his language with his non-Chumash relatives, so that he could share his beloved language with his beloved family, regardless of blood.[304] In all cases relationality implies the forging of interpersonal bonds of affection and, crucially, responsibility. The aim is to establish a positive relationship with non-Chumash while foregrounding the needs of the community.

Community control is the prerequisite to broader relationality, which cannot genuinely be formed unless it occurs on safe terms and in a manner that preservers sovereignty and equitable access for Chumash communities. Another recurring frustration amongst co-researchers was that while the language is sacred to insiders, it has been put to use to further the careers and financial interests of outside scholars. Šan, for instance, found it problematic that Blackburn's *December's Child* republished Chumash stories recorded in

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[302] Tipak, personal communication.

[303] Martes, personal communication.

[304] Lunes, personal communication.

Harrington's notes and drew profits from book sales.[305] Martes, who worries about outsiders "commercializing" the language (for example by using Barbareño words to 'Indigenize' their branding), wondered whether it would be best if outsiders were taught only after the community developed a solid base of speakers, precisely because this would better enable them to call out disrespectful or profiteering behavior.[306] At issue is not only the monetization of beloved lore, but the fact that outside scholars have been able to monetize or develop their careers off working with Chumash lore that Chumash people themselves cannot easily access. This concern could be alleviated through community control over the dissemination of language knowledge and materials, but that capacity is currently limited by a lack of access to archives and linguistic training. These gaps may be bridged if academia is dedicated to serving the community, but the power imbalance is inherently problematic. For example, Tipak described encountering a situation where she felt that she could not receive help from outside linguists unless she agreed to a tit-for-tat sharing of information.[307] In other words, she felt that if she did not divulge linguistic information irrelevant to her queries, she would not receive guidance on how to perform her own linguistic work.[308] These problems may soon be somewhat alleviated since a handful of Chumash individuals are currently pursuing graduate degrees in linguistics, but the need to hold outsiders accountable remains.

An additional problem of cultural protocol was highlighted by Martes. Since language work is based on the contributions of individual Chumash ancestors like Maria Solares,

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[305] Šan, personal communication.

[306] Martes, personal communication.

[307] Tipak, personal communication.

[308] Tipak, personal communication.

Martes argued that "in keeping with Native protocol", those working with the language should seek the blessing of the descendants whose family members originally passed on their languages.[309] This is all the more so since some of that information is deeply personal or sacred in nature, and thus inappropriate for general circulation.[310] The importance of protocol and data sovereignty is further highlighted in Leah Mata Fragua's master's thesis on data sovereignty for the revitalization efforts of the yak tityu tityu yak tiłhini Northern Chumash Tribe, of which she is a member. In it she speaks of having the ability to choose the written form the language takes (allowing the community to take revitalization in their own hands) and employ a password-protected database to protect restricted knowledge, for example, by restricting women's songs to the women of the community.[311] In this way, the selective diffusion of knowledge practiced in the era of orality could be continued in this era of literacy.

Some co-researchers raised additional concerns on how outside funding might affect the independence or sustainability of their revitalization efforts. In his interview, Šan highlighted both the virtues and the risks associated with settler funding:

"With the damage they've caused to Native languages, why shouldn't they devote some of their resources — which should derive from their presence on our lands anyway — to righting their wrong? But personally, I don't want to be the one to tell them what to do. I

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[309] Martes, personal communication.

[310] Martes, personal communication.

[311] Leah Mata Fragua, "A Decolonized Approach to Archival Management for Language" (Ma. thesis, Goucher College, 2016), 17-18, 22.

mean, we could tell them *how* to do it, but they need to come to terms with that it's their responsibility and allocate those funds to fix those problems. And then if we're allowed to dictate how it works, then I could think it'd be helpful… no one that doesn't do what the operation is should be involved in saying how it's done or when and where. They shouldn't have any kind of meaningful effect on the program if they're not involved in it, don't understand the ins and outs of it."[312]

Though slightly more optimistic than Šan, Lunes shared his belief in community control:

"The more funding the better, I guess. The question is of who, when, where, how, and then teaching methodology, who gets access to that, and all that sort of tricky stuff. Funding is great, but the cultural, philosophical, and political willingness has come from the people… Being given something is great, but when you actually take it in your heart to work for it, that's different."[313]

Martes was similarly cautious about outside funding, highlighting concerns of sustainability and entanglement:

"We talk about how to get money for grants. I'm always thinking in the back of my head "Oh yeah, that's good, they're giving out free money. But what strings are attached to it?" How secure is this money if we come to rely on getting grants every year and build our language program from getting grants? What happens when that money runs dry? What's going to

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[312] Šan, personal communication.
[313] Lunes, personal communication.

happen to us? I'm also usually concerned about what is expected from us in return when we accept grants, especially from non-governmental organizations. Do we have to align with those orgs' values? Does our association with those orgs signal our support for whatever they espouse?"[314]

Accordingly, though language revitalization can be advanced through direct funding, a better means of helping may be through returning land and productive resources to Chumash bands so that they may strengthen their communities and develop financial autonomy. This is not to say that direct funding shouldn't be given, but that an understanding of the values of a language — as well as the stated importance of sovereignty to co-researchers — suggests that revitalization holds a greater chance of success if the speaker communities themselves are collectively strengthened and have control over the process. With these thoughts in mind, the conclusion of this thesis will compare the lessons of Aotearoa and the insights of co-researchers to suggest appropriate and feasible paths forward for securing settler state support revitalization of Chumash languages.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Having examined the specific context of Aotearoa and the Chumash homelands, this conclusion will be dedicated to analyzing which Māori strategies for securing state support for revitalization might be viable and appropriate in the Chumash homelands. Aotearoa's

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[314] Martes, personal communication.

most effective strategies were the use of the "shared heritage" strategy, the development of autonomous revitalizing institutions, norm entrepreneurship, and the exercise of electoral politics and popular protest. The viability of all strategies are found to be constrained by the relative disempowerment of Indigenous Americans and the more impoverished pro-Indigenous normative environment in the United States. Out of all options, the "shared heritage" strategy seems the most promising, but in order for it to go beyond the level of co-optation it must be carefully paired with pro-Indigenous norm entrepreneurship and, possibly, protest. Ultimately, the success of revitalization efforts seems to lie not so much in the hands of direct financial support from the settler state, but in the further empowerment and return of land to Chumash communities.

Viability of the "Shared Heritage" Strategy:

One of the most transformational steps taken by the government of New Zealand in regard to revitalization was its reframing of the Indigenous language as part of the shared national heritage, a strategy that might prove effective, if not necessarily unproblematic, in cultivating support for revitalization and raising the language values of Chumash languages. The strategy would not be effective at a national or state-wide level since the Chumash languages are only Indigenous to a few counties, but it could be entirely viable at the county or city level. Settlers' shallow historical roots in the Chumash homelands has kindled in them an appetite for a distinct local identity, something that Santa Barbarans, for example, have tried to cultivate through a connection to the Spanish colonial period. Though "Spanish Colonial" architecture and the annual "Old Spanish Days" festival have helped the newcomers form a distinct identity, these grasped-for Spanish roots are barely deeper than

those of Anglo settlers. With over eleven thousand years of history on the land, Chumash communities might be able to leverage a shared heritage model to secure governmental support for revitalization in exchange for helping settlers further develop their local identity through a connection with Chumash communities, language, and culture. If well-implemented, such an approach could significantly increase the social value of Chumash languages as a marker of local identity and its educational and monetary value insofar as it creates space for the language in the schools and on local governmental budgets. This prospect elicited mixed reactions from co-researchers, ranging from cautious interest to outright disinterest.

For Tipak, the "shared heritage" strategy raised issues of accessibility. Speaking of language classes opened under such a model, she cautioned that "If the city of Santa Barbara is going to do that, they're probably going to open it up to everybody."[315] Such classes would likely be more accessible to non-Chumash than to Chumash and, as discussed in the previous chapter, this lopsided accessibility was seen to be neither appropriate, nor equitable until such time as Chumash communities themselves have a solid foundation of speakers. Šan was far more skeptical, likening Pākehā to pretendians (individuals falsely claiming Indigenous ancestry for personal gain). Saying that it was essentially "co-opting" or a settler move to innocence, he argued that it was:

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[315] Tipak, personal communication.

"Not [appropriate] unless there's a lot of resources that come along with it. It's a two-way street. And I don't mean resources for teaching language. I mean perennial return of land and perennial return of wealth, part of the taxes."[316]

Reframing Chumash heritage as shared local heritage, then, would not be appropriate unless settlers genuinely and materially rectified the ills of colonization. This arguably makes sense from the perspective of both settler and Chumash communities, since a "shared heritage" strategy based on a disingenuous, shallow relationship would ultimately have no more than an unsustainable lie for a foundation. Though deeply skeptical about trusting the same government that stole their land, Martes was more optimistic about the strategy, though still framed it as inappropriate until such time as Chumash communities developed greater fluency:

"There's probably a lot of negatives associated with it, but I don't think it would be overall a negative thing. I think overall it would seem to be positive… If the government did that it would raise the visibility or the value, maybe. [Raise] the socially perceived value of the language, all over. And I think that would actually help revitalize it because we're in such a precarious position… So I think, overall, that would be a good thing if the government did that… I think that would be [appropriate] at a time when my specific community [and] when the language is already more firmly anchored… and that seems like at that time we would be part of the community."[317]

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[316] Šan, personal communication.

[317] Martes, personal communication.

He compared the prerequisite state of readiness to that achieved by the yak tiťʸu tiťʸu yak tiłhini Northern Chumash Tribe, which has its own language program, exercises control over the orthography of its language, and recently collaborated with Cal Poly San Luis Obispo to name dormitories in tʔinismuʔ tiłhinkʔtiťʸu. Overall, the "shared heritage" strategy holds promise for the Chumash languages, but its full potential will only be possible if local governments form genuine, accountable relationships with Chumash communities and give them the power and resources (including land) to direct the revitalization process and sustain their communities. It is also worth noting that California's established history of English-only education means that this strategy is not without risk. A further public resurgence of Chumash could rekindle anti-Indigenous anxieties and efforts to return Chumash languages to the safety zone, especially if a "shared heritage" strategy is accompanied by actual political and material concessions to Chumash communities. Indeed, even relatively minor "shared heritage" projects like the aforementioned dormitory names have been subject to controversy, with students criticizing perceived virtue signaling and the difficulty of reading and pronouncing tʔinismuʔ tiłhinkʔtiťʸu words.[318]

Viability of Norm Entrepreneurship:

Contrary to the relatively favorable normative environment of Aotearoa, the United States and California are a less propitious environment. At first blush the U.S. has a significant normative advantage in that it has a long tradition of recognizing Indigenous polities as sovereign nations, even if that tradition has often been honored in the breach.

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[318] "Cal Poly releases names for its new housing complex. Thoughts?," r/CalPoly, Reddit, last modified May 20, 2017, https://www.reddit.com/r/CalPoly/comments/6bkejb/cal_poly_releases_names_for_its_new_housing/.

What the U.S. lacks most, however, is an encompassing document like the Treaty of Waitangi that can function as a sort of semi-enforceable bill of rights for Indigenous peoples. Individual treaties reserve or encode varying degrees of rights, but the right to the affirmative protection of their culture is ubiquitously absent. The U.S. can and has taken steps to protect Indigenous cultures and languages between bouts of suppression, but it does so only at its pleasure, not out of any obligation to do so. Furthermore, the U.S. has no equivalent to the honor of the Crown. This is not necessarily problematic for treaties since they have the force of law and the Supreme Court has held that, when ambiguous, treaties should be interpreted in the interests of Indigenous nations.[319] Its absence becomes problematic in terms of the assignment of responsibility. As discussed in chapter one, the Crown's assumption of responsibility for past wrongs allows New Zealand politicians to sidestep political costs associated with potentially controversial settlements with Māori. Without any such responsibility diverting mechanism, action from the much more conservative national government (relative to California's government) in favor of genuinely reconciling with Indigenous nations will be difficult.

California, which has been under a Democratic super-majority since 2018, potentially presents a friendlier normative environment. Certainly, the 2016 electoral repeal of Proposition 227 and the passage of pro-Indigenous legislation bodes well, although it is uncertain how far this goodwill extends or whether significant concessions would trigger a backlash demanding that Indigenous Californians be returned to the safety zone. Additionally, the diversity of Indigenous nations in California means that norm

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[319] Wiessner, "American Indian Treaties," 596.

entrepreneurship carried out specifically in Chumash interests would face steep competition and carry limited normative weight since they are only Indigenous to a few counties. More generally, pooled norm entrepreneurship with other Indigenous nations may be the better potential strategy at the state level. One relatively simple action may be to lobby for the creation of scholarships for Indigenous linguists to study their own languages, raising their monetary value and the community control of Indigenous nations over the revitalization of their languages. A model to emulate, in its results rather than its methods, may be found in Guatemala, where Maya nonprofits provide linguistic training for community members to work on their own languages, leading to the training of hundreds of Maya linguists and greatly enhanced Maya control over Maya language programs.[320] Since many Indigenous Californian nations (particularly those not federally recognized) lack access to land or productive resources and may well prioritize other expenditures with the resources they do have, state funding may be an appropriate and helpful stopgap, albeit one that is less desirable than the return of land and resources. Such norm entrepreneurship would likely require a substantial devotion of time and resources, and the resultant opportunity costs may be deemed too great. Whether state-wide norm entrepreneurship is deemed a worthwhile investment will be up to individual communities.

The final level at which norm entrepreneurship may be exercised is the local level, comprising counties, cities, public schools, and so forth. This is where the normative claims to Indigenous rights and sovereignty of the Chumash will be at their most potent, as these are the lands that they have been Indigenous to for over ten thousand years. In some ways,

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[320] Nora England, "Mayan Language Revival and Revitalization Politics: Linguists and Linguistic Ideologies," *American Anthropologist* 105, no. 4 (2003): 734.

however, the challenges may be greater at the local level than at the statewide level. Lacking an equivalent to the honor of the crown, local decision-makers would have to take full responsibility for past depredations against the Chumash and for any concessions they make to them. This may disincentivize action for fear of an electoral backlash by unsympathetic voters, a particularly pertinent concern given that the Chumash homelands as a whole are less liberal than the statewide government. Nonetheless, combined with the "shared heritage" strategy, the local Indigeneity of Chumash may make a wider range of revitalization assistance feasibly attainable. This would not be limited to funding for classes, teachers, and other such direct support, but could also include the provision of space for classes, inclusion of Chumash languages in local curricula, or an increase in Chumash-language signage.

Autonomous Educational Institutions:

Another promising strategy for the revitalization of Chumash languages would be the development of autonomous language education institutions similar to *kōhanga reo*. The objective in this case would not only be to pass on the language to youngsters, but to strengthen community institutional capacity, raise the educational value of the language within the community, prove to outsiders that the language has educational value, and develop a corps of parents ready to advocate for the expansion of language education beyond the language nest. Since most Chumash bands lack access to land or resources, it is likely that any such efforts would have to rely heavily on volunteerism. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as Šan and Lunes emphasized that self-sufficient revitalization efforts are a good means of building strong commitments and strong communities. Nonetheless, volunteerism is unlikely to be sufficient for more than early childhood education. Primary and secondary

schools are expensive to operate, and unrecognized communities do not seem to have the means to meet those costs. Especially considering the low levels of fluency currently present amongst Chumash communities, the "language nest" model is thus more viable as a means of building community, raising language values, and presenting a compelling argument of viability to outsiders than it is as a means to actually inculcate sustainable fluency in Chumash youth. So long as this is well understood and the costs of volunteerism willingly shouldered, such limitations need not be a problem per se. Whether the model can effectively encourage settler state support, however, lies in the aforementioned strength of Chumash, norm entrepreneurship, as well as the exercise of electoral pressure and popular protest.

Electoral Pressure:

At 15% of the population in a parliamentary democracy, Māori voters and parties have significant clout as electoral kingmakers, an advantage not enjoyed by the Chumash. With only several thousand Chumash within and outside of the Chumash homelands, Chumash communities cannot exercise comparable voting bloc pressure. Local elections, sometimes decided by a mere handful of votes, could potentially be (and arguably have been) tipped by Chumash votes, but Chumash communities do not currently operate as political voting blocs. Even if they did, they could not be expected to be decisive beyond municipal level elections. What's more, the polarized nature of the U.S.'s two-party political system strongly disincentivizes Chumash communities from openly endorsing candidates or parties. With only very limited electoral clout and precarious social positions, they cannot afford to make enemies when it can be avoided. This is not to say that Chumash have no impact on local elections, but that the impact they do have is largely through norm entrepreneurship.

Insofar as candidates or parties take pro-Chumash positions, it is likely more in the interests of conforming to pro-Indigenous norms that support their overall legitimacy than in the interests of securing Chumash votes.

Popular Protest:

Chumash protest has proven its ability to enact great change, but its viability in the present for the purposes of language revitalization is mediated with risk. On the one hand, a relatively small number of people can make a big impact with civil disobedience tactics, rendering such a strategy potentially useful if normative groundwork has been completed ahead of time. Indeed, the language nest model depends heavily upon providing an example of Indigenous success on the one hand and using popular pressure to leverage that success into revitalization support on the other. The viability and appropriateness of protest actions, however, face some significant constraints. First, the relatively small size of the Chumash population makes these tactics unlikely to succeed beyond the local level, where their numbers and norm entrepreneurship count for more. Moreover, compared to the much larger Māori population, Chumash populations cannot realistically threaten the social stability of the settler state, even at the local level. Even if they used especially disruptive tactics viable with relatively small numbers like highway blockades, there is no guarantee that the action would be effective. As seen in the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020, rights-based protests can trigger substantial backlash and attempts to force oppressed populations back into the safety zone. Chumash communities thus must balance the promises of protest against the risks of backlash, which they are arguably less equipped to weather due to their relatively

small size. Šan highlighted another cultural and strategic concern associated with protest actions:

"I don't like fighting. [American Indian Movement leader] John Trudell said if you fight these people with their own methods and stuff and violence, then you're just getting down onto their level and you're just as nasty as them, ultimately. So I ought to fight *for* something. Which might be counter to somebody else and what they're trying to do, but I didn't make them do what they're trying to do. I'm not fighting against them. I'm fighting *for* something else that they happen to be fighting against. Why? I don't know. That's for them to tell *you*. And that way I don't add to the problem, just keep my focus. Granted, there's things we could do that strategically would move people along, but then you're taking time away from what other things you're trying to do. It's suspect to really get too involved in other people's paths."[321]

This is not a rejection of protest tactics per se, but a cautious awareness of the challenges and opportunity costs they can incur. One of these opportunity costs is the diversion of limited time and energy that could be dedicated towards in-community revitalization work towards interfacing with settlers and settler institutions instead. Even if the strategy ultimately pays off (which is not necessarily a given), there is the danger that settler norms and ways of being are inculcated in those involved to the detriment of the larger fight for linguistic and cultural revitalization. Šan also highlighted philosophical and sustainability issues with protest action:

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[321] Šan, personal communication.

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"Sovereignty in short to us is the ability to usher our language and culture into the future. It's struggle, that's what we focus on doing: that work. And with regards to outside influence, we can encourage people just like we can encourage our own people to enjoy their culture and language if they want. But you can't make anyone do anything. An elder once told me that it's mandatory to respect individual will, because if somebody does something because you influenced them or told them, it isn't as sincere as if they're doing it because of their own mandate. And it's almost coercion. That doesn't work. So all you can do is encourage others and engage in dialogue to expand consciousness and discuss things, to work through things, and when they choose to do something, then give them props for choosing to do the right thing and honor them for that, because it *is* all attributable to them and their will. Honor their will, the living will of that being, because they're part of us, you know? They're not something outside of us, really."[322]

This philosophical concern for respecting free will is paired with a strong practical concern. To reframe the matter in the language of norm entrepreneurship, there is an anticipation that if decision-makers don't internalize favorable norms, then any concessions achieved through tactics of coercion will be short-lived, ineffective, or both. The application of "coercion" tactics might also prove entirely ineffective, causing a harmful backlash in addition to wasting resources. Accordingly, Šan may be said to favor "conversion" tactics, though above all he favors focusing the community's limited resources on internal revitalization efforts rather than on influencing outsiders.

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[322] Šan, personal communication.

Martes, meanwhile, highlighted a more practical problem: a lack of numbers. This need not necessarily be a debilitating issue, but numbers certainly do matter, especially if protests are to have a lasting disincentivizing effect against future normative transgressions. Lunes agreed that this was a limiting factor, remarking that "a Chumash separatist movement just seems ridiculous because there's so many other people in Chumash territory in comparison to Chumash people."[323] Though he was partially joking since no Chumash person as far as he knew actually advocated for separatism, his words reflect a basic discrepancy between Aotearoa and the Chumash homelands. In the former, the Māori are strong and numerous enough to threaten the overall statebuilding project of New Zealand. In the latter, the relatively low population of Chumash all but guarantees that Chumash alone cannot fundamentally threaten the statebuilding project of the United States or California, which bodes ill considering how important threats to governability and identification were to winning language concessions in Aotearoa. Nonetheless, it has proven somewhat effective at winning local concessions. Speaking about fights for land acknowledgements and against "Indian" mascots, Lunes echoed some of Šan's concerns but framed protest as a tool among others available to Chumash, requiring savvy and strong community institutions to fruitfully employ:

"I see where there's a sense of futility in this sort of protest that doesn't actually solve structural issues or have practical [effects] like building [community] infrastructure for Chumash people. But at the same time, I think all the foundation of the language

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[323] Lunes, personal communication.

revitalization, of the land-back stuff that's happening in Chumash territory, the community organizing and everything, it's all on the back of people who since the 70s were protesting, had a sense of Indigenous political expression... I think protest is going to be and will be an important avenue of securing Chumash goals, but I also agree with the fact that if we just focus on protesting and don't focus on actually building cultural, political, economic, ecological institutions for our community, then at the end of the day we're going to do all this fighting first, then it's going to fall apart after the protest ends. So you need both."[324]

A final problem Martes highlighted was that colonial genocide has impacted much more heavily on Chumash communities than on Māori communities. The latter still had land, language, deep cultural mastery, and political organizations (*iwi* and *hapū*) to bolster their resurgence in the second half of the 19th century. Chumash communities, on the other hand, had largely been dispersed and assimilated before societal change and the fight for Humqaq/Point Conception (and its aftermath) led to their reorganization and public reemergence. This obviously doesn't preclude effective protest action, but the fact is that colonization is much more of a *fait accompli* in California. Māori are fighting to prevent an apocalypse, while Chumash are fighting to recover from one. With a greater depth of assimilation than Māori into settler society and without as deep of an understanding of the cultural and linguistic universe at stake, Martes fears that Chumash communities may face greater difficulties in raising the zeal necessary to sustain massive protest actions. Relative lack of cultural mastery, like relative lack of numbers, doesn't necessarily preclude protest action. Neither were debilitating handicaps for the occupiers of Humqaq/Point Conception,

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[324] Lunes, personal communication.

who succeeded before Chumash communities even had their moment of rebirth. It simply points to the importance of passing on treasured language and culture within the community which, if they aren't taken for granted, may fuel a virtuous cycle of ever greater dedication to their defense.

Overall, protest action does hold significant potential to bolster Chumash norm entrepreneurship and strengthen Chumash communities, with a mixed, yet proven, track record of both. It does, however, offer less promise than it does for the Māori since the Chumash cannot realistically threaten statebuilding interests on a national or state-wide level. It is still a powerful local-level tool, but to be truly effective it ought to be used as part of a strategy to build institutional capacity that allows communities to fully benefit from the concessions they win and maintain political momentum.[325] Even with these provisions (but especially without them), it carries the risk of counterproductive resource diversion, settler backlash, and, in extreme cases, neglect of Indigenous cultural values. Chumash communities themselves must carefully weigh whether they find this to be an appropriate and viable tool for securing language-based concessions.

Conclusion:

Language revitalization is an extraordinarily complex endeavor necessitating the mobilization of entire societies to fully achieve. The complexity of this task has skyrocketed in the era of globalization, with the language values (particularly social and monetary) of global languages like English and Spanish gaining ever more commercial, cultural, and class-

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[325] Lunes, personal communication.

based appeal. Local and especially Indigenous languages targeted by settler states are at an ever-growing risk of being silenced, taking with them unique lens for understanding our shared reality. Nonetheless, Indigenous nations still hold their languages in great spiritual, cultural, and social regard and fight on for their preservation. Settler states, meanwhile, struggle between the countersovereign logic of elimination and the countersovereign impulse of self-Indigenization, opening a possible, yet treacherous, avenue for progress. If Indigenous nations can skillfully leverage norms, electoral pressure, and popular protest, it could be possible to secure settler state support for language revitalization that doesn't constitute co-optation or a settler move to innocence.

Strong, well-resourced, landed communities are the best guarantor of language values and revitalization, and this should be the final, necessary objective of any genuine attempt to fully revitalize a language. In a globalized world where access to other ways of being is just a click away, maintaining and expanding the strength, socio-cultural relevance, and prestige of the relatively smaller Indigenous worlds is the only true guarantee that Indigenous peoples will choose to follow the ways of their ancestors. A settler state that does not genuinely return power and autonomy to Indigenous peoples must be dealt with cautiously, lest it attempts to "domesticate" Indigenous nations, exploit their heritage to bolster its own interests, or attempt to return Indigenous languages and peoples to the safety zone.

This thesis has presented an overview of the struggles to revitalize *te reo* and the Chumash languages, with a special focus on the transferability of Aotearoan lessons to the Chumash homelands. The extraordinary linguistic diversity of the U.S. and California, the

relatively small sizes of Chumash communities, and the comparatively impoverished normative environment in the U.S. mean that many Aoteroan strategies will be infeasible or only conditionally appropriate in the Chumash homelands. There is reason to question whether settler state support is even desirable at the present stage, or whether it would be best to focus efforts inwards until sufficient linguistic groundwork has been accomplished. Ultimately, a continuation of mostly local-level norm entrepreneurship based on Indigenous rights and sovereignty, buttressed as needed by "domestication"-bucking protest, seems the most appropriate backbone for interactions with U.S. settler institutions. The example of autonomous educational institutions and the leveraging of the "shared heritage" normative strategy seem promising for the Chumash homelands but carry risks and opportunity costs that must be carefully weighed by Chumash communities. Ultimately, this thesis is written for Chumash communities first and foremost, and never presumes to know better than those who daily spend their blood, sweat, and tears to breathe life into the Chumash cultures and languages. I aim not to present ironclad recommendations, but preliminary information and suggestions that Chumash and other communities might find useful in their fights to maintain land-based cultures and languages against the churn of globalization and settler elimination. I sincerely hope I and my gracious co-researchers were helpful in this regard.

Kaqinaliyuw, my friends.

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