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Innovations in Sustainable Groundwater and Salinity Management in California's San Joaquin Valley

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Abstract: The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) of 2014 and the Central Valley 8 Salinity Alternatives for Long-Term Sustainability (CVSALTS) initiative were concieved to reverse 9 years of inaction on over-pumping of groundwater and salination of rivers that both threaten agri-10 cultural sustainability in the State of California. These largely stakeholder-led, innovative policy 11 actions were supported by modern tools of remote sensing and Geographic Information System 12 technology that allowed stakeholders to make adjustments to existing resource management and 13 jurisdictional boundaries to form policy-mandated Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs) 14 and Salinity Management Areas (SMAs) to address future management responsibilities. Additional 15 resources mobilized by the California Department of Water Resources (CDWR) and other water 16 resource and water quality management agencies have been effective in encouraging the use of 17 spreadsheet accounting and numerical simulation models to develop robust and coherent quantita-18 tive understanding of the current state and likely problems that will be encountered to achieve re-19 source sustainability. This activity has revealed flaws and inconsistencies in the conceptual models 20 underpinning this activity. Two case studies are described that illustrate the disparity in the chal-21 lenges faced by GSAs in subregions charged with developing consensus-based Groundwater Sus-22 tainability Plans (GSPs). Local leadership and advocacy will play a significant role in achieving 23 long-term goals for both the SGMA and CVSALTS initiatives. 24

Keywords: groundwater sustainability planning; salinity management; SGMA; CVSALTS; stakeholder participation; numerical simulation modeling; State of California; land subsidence; water quality 27

1. Introduction

The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) and Central Valley Salinity 30 Alternatives for Long-Term Sustainability (CVSALTS) initiatives have fundamentally 31 changed future groundwater management in California [1][2]. Both embrace a holistic 32 conceptual understanding of the resource and the interconnectedness of this resource 33 with other vulnerable resources and the citizenry of the State. This shift in perspective 34 also creates a need for a new suite of decision support tools to help stakeholders make 35 cost effective, efficient, equitable, transparent and socially responsible decisions in the fu-36 ture. 37

This paper describes the genesis of these two initiatives and reviews recent advances38as California water agencies and stakeholders work together to develop the institutional39capability to implement these policies. Although this paper deals with groundwater and40salinity management issues in California one of the major lessons we hope the interna-41tional readership draws from the analysis we present is that good policy, properly imple-42and salinity management records to a path to having one of the best.44

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The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), which affects everyone in 45 California, was signed into law by Governor Brown of California on Sept 14, 2014 [1]. The 46 objective of SGMA is to ensure long term sustainable yield of groundwater within 20 years 47 that accounts the following undesirable results: (a) surface water depletion resulting from 48 groundwater use near irrigation canals, (b) reduction in groundwater storage, (c) degra-49 dation of water quality, (d) seawater intrusion, (e) land subsidence, and (f) lowering 50 groundwater levels. Between 2014 and 2017, the Department of Water Resources identi-51 fied 515 alluvial basins and prioritized the severity of the groundwater overdraft as high, 52 medium or low [3]. Those prioritized as high and medium, and critically overdrafted were 53 obligated to submit groundwater management sustainability plans by January 2020 [1]. 54 The remainder of the areas, not covered in this preliminary round, will have until January 55 2022 to file their management plans. 56

Local control of groundwater is a unique aspect of SGMA. Development of manage-57 ment plans to assure a sustainable groundwater yield are done by the Groundwater Sus-58 tainable Agency (GSA) formed for each subbasin. The structure of each GSA consists of a 59 Board of Directors whose membership consists of people from county governments, water 60 districts and stakeholders. These Boards and constitutive committees include a Technical 61 Advisory Committee (engineers, geologists, water managers), a Rural Advisory Commit-62 tee consisting of officials from rural public water systems, and a Stakeholder Committee. 63 The interests at stake include: 1. agriculture and domestic holders of overlying ground-64 water right, 2. public water systems, 3. local land use planning agencies, 4. environmen-65 tal users of groundwater, 5. holders of surface water rights, 6. native American tribes, and 66 7. disadvantaged consumers that include those served by domestic wells or small com-67 munity water systems. The powers of a GSA include registration, metering, monitoring, 68 reporting, and regulation of all groundwater wells in the subbasin; the purchase of surface 69 water replenishment; adoption of rules, regulations, ordinances, and enforcement actions, 70 and the imposition of administrative fees and assessment [1]. Development of a water 71 budget for current and projected future conditions to 2070, to include the impacts of cli-72 mate change, is the first step in developing a management plan [4][5]. 73

2. Genesis of SGMA and CVSALTS

The legal history of water development in California dates back to 1887 [6] with the 75 passage of the Wright Act followed by Federal and State bills that provided funds to de-76 velop the dams to collect and store water and canal systems to convey the stored surface 77 water to crop land where it was used for irrigation. While the majority of these laws tar-78 geted water rights and water allocation fewer dealt with water quality and the ground-79 water resource was largely ignored. The recognition of groundwater subsidence due to 80 over-pumping of groundwater in the San Joaquin Valley [7] between 1925 through the 81 1950's led to the importation of surface water from the pump stations located in the Sac-82 ramento-San Joaquin River Delta as a means of reversing damage to water conveyance 83 infrastructure. However, this solution, applauded at the time, initiated an increase in soil 84 salinization in the San Joaquin Basin and necessitated the introduction of environmental 85 legislation -the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act in 1969, and the California En-86 vironmental Quality Act, in 1970 - that recognized the San Joaquin River as an impaired 87 waterbody [8][9]. This designation resulted in Federal action by the US Environmental 88 Protection Agency and the imposition of a Total Maximum Daily Load to sustain stake-89 holder beneficial uses of the San Joaquin River [10]. 90

This conservative regulatory approach for water quality management led to the development of an alternative real-time stakeholder-involved real-time water quality management approach that relied upon 30-day running average salinity concentration objectives at compliance monitoring locations along the mainstem of the River and a commitment to real-time monitoring, stakeholder cooperation and coordination and investment in the cyberinfrastructure for real-time salinity forecasting [11]. The innovative regulatory approach undertaken for the San Joaquin Basin has been extended to the entire Central Valley of California through a more recent stakeholder led salinity management initiative 98 known as CVSALTS [2] - that is developing strategies for salt management to maintain 99 and sustain beneficial use of water resources. The CVSALTS initiative is financed by entirely stakeholder voluntary contributions in recognition of the greater flexibility offered 101 by local control and management of salinity in surface waters of the State [2]. 102

Surface water and groundwater have long been managed by the Federal and State 103 water agencies as two entirely distinct and separate systems despite knowledge and evi-104 dence of their interaction and inter-relationship. Despite this conceptual and institutional 105 oversight - the importation of water supply from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta to 106 offset widespread land subsidence issues caused by groundwater overpumping had suc-107 cessfully reversed a regional decline in groundwater storage until 1990. The severe 108 drought in 1977 and the steady increase in urban demand did not impact recovery of the 109 groundwater system. Policy initiatives in 1991/1992 listed winter run salmon in the San 110 Joaquin River and the Delta smelt (a small endemic fish that inhabits the freshwater-salt-111 water mixing zone in the Delta) estuary. These policies changed the reservoir flow rea-112 lease patterns and restricted water export through the Federal and State pumping plants 113 during certain times of the year where the smelt were in danger of entrainment. In 1992 114 the Central Valley Improvement Act brought about a significant reallocation of developed 115 water supply – 800,000 acre-ft (987 million m³) in support of environmental resource res-116 toration including seasonally managed wetlands. Although, at the time, these initiatives 117 to redress the imbalance between agricultural municipal and environmental beneficial 118 uses were popular within the State of California, the long-term consequences of these ac-119 tions are now being realized. Agricultural customers of Federal water supply located 120 south of the Delta received a 100% water supply allocation in 1979 - today agricultural 121 customer allocations are between 40% and 50% of the Federal supply contracts. 122

California's passage of the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 123 (SGMA) in 2014 "is an example of how what occurs "overnight" can be a century in the 124 making" [12][1]. California frequently now leads the nation in progressive legislation as 125 evidenced by sections of the State's Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Actbeing used 126 as an exemplar for the Federal Clean Water Act. In 2006 the California legislature, under 127 a republican administration took action on climate change - the first State to do so. Pro-128 gressive as this action was, California remained the only State in the nation that had not 129 adopted statewide mandates for groundwater regulation. Prior to the passage of SGMA 130 groundwater use was unregulated. Irrigators could augment existing surface water sup-131 ply, by drilling wells and accessing available groundwater. Groundwater is the sole 132 source of irrigation water supply in some areas of the State, and is a backup water source 133 in others, during prolonged droughts,. The general perception among such landowners, 134 called "overliers", was that they had to right to extract as much water as they wanted [12]. 135 See (a) below. The Supreme Court of California did not agree when it decreed that land-136 owners share equally. See (b) below. 137

- a. The issue in a case known as Katz v. Walkinshaw [12] was the assertion " that each landowner owns absolutely the percolating waters in his hand, with the right to extract, sell and dispose of them as he chooses, regardless of the results to his neighbor, is part of the common law, and as such has been adopted in this State as the law of the land"
- b. The wording of the ruling by the presiding judge of the Supreme Court of California was as follows [12]: "Disputes between overlying landowners, concerning water for use on the land to which they have an equal right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for all, are to be settled by giving to each a fair and just proportion." Between 1903 and 2014, there were several instances where there were opportunities to establish a statewide system to regulate groundwater use.

Between 1903 and 2014 the courts of California and the California legislature enacted policy that gave precedent to the establishment of a statewide system to regulate groundwater. In 1914 the enactment of the Water Commission Act created the agency that 151

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has become today's State Water Resources Control Board. The first amendment of this Act 152 clarified that it only applied to surface water - it established a permit system for appropri-153 ation of surface water rights. This was followed by several bills that mandated a series of 154 groundwater investigations (Leahy, 2016). In 1949 adjudication of a groundwater basin in 155 southern California, used by the cities of Pasadena and Alhamba, played a key role in 156 establishing how to manage and allocate groundwater within a basin as well as a defini-157 tion of safe yield: "the maximum quantity of water that can be continuously withdrawn 158 from a groundwater basin without adverse effect [13]. Legislation passed in the 1953-54 159 set up the legal authority for a pump tax, the proceeds of would be only used to acquire 160 water for replenishment of district groundwater supplies [12]. Frank Durkee, the State 161 Director of Public Works at that time, wrote Governor Earl Warren, urging signature of 162 the bill stating the "proposal to levy assessments upon production of groundwater for the 163 purpose of replenishing an overdraft on groundwater basins is a new principle in this 164 State" [12] [13]. 165

The extended drought that began in 2007 and lasted through 2013 stimulated legis-166 lative actions dealing with water policy [12]. The future of irrigation and available drink-167 ing water was at stake. During this drought period, the availability of surface water for 168 irrigation was severely limited and groundwater became a major source of irrigation wa-169 ter. Groundwater levels declined to historic lows, irrigation and drinking water wells 170 went dry, land subsidence cracked and misaligned irrigation canals, and permanent de-171 pletion of storage space in the aquifers that underly California. The capability and capac-172 ity of canals to deliver surface water was reduced, as was the amount of groundwater 173 available to buffer against future droughts. Continued use of groundwater greater than 174 the rate of recharge was hastening the time when major reductions in irrigation would 175 occur. 176

The conception of SGMA was a departure from previous groundwater management 177 policies that relied on an understanding of safe yield and sustainable use of the resource 178 from an extraction perspective. SGMA, instead, requires that attention be paid to the po-179 tential undesirable impacts of groundwater pumping including chronic lowering of 180 groundwater levels, reduction of groundwater storage, land subsidence, water quality 181 degradation, and depletions of interconnected surface water systems (Figure 1)[14]. Sea-182 water intrusion was the sixth undesirable result that isn't applicable to =groundwater ba-183 sins in the San Joaquin Valley 184

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Figure 1. Sustainable management criteria applicable to Groundwater Sustainability Plan (GSP) development [1] - <u>https://acwi.gov/swrr/p&p_library/May_2018/19_al-</u> <u>tare_sma_smc_swrr_may_2018.pdf</u>).

3. Implementing CVSALTS and SGMA Policies

The CVSALTS and SGMA initiatives both followed a Little Hoover Commission re-191 view of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program (2005) that recommended that all future water 192 policy initiatives have direct stakeholder involvement [15]. The Little Hoover Commission 193 is an independent California State oversight agency created in 1962, that investigates State 194 government operations and promotes efficiency, economy and improved service through 195 reports, recommendations and legislative proposals. The CALFED Bay-Delta Program [8] 196 was formed as a joint State-Federal entity in 1994 to coordinate water management activ-197 ities primarily in the Sacramento – San Joaquin River Delta and develop appropriate sci-198 ence-based Delta water quality standards. State and Federal government agencies and 199 stakeholders representing many local water agencies and environmental organizations 200 signed an agreement on water quality titled, "Principles for Agreement on Bay- Delta 201 Standards between the State of California and the Federal Government," commonly re-202 ferred to as the Bay-Delta Accord [8]. The Accord was supposed to mark a critical mile-203 stone in California water history, resolving conflict and leading to greater future collabo-204 ration and joint planning activities. 205

Despite a considerable record of accomplishment the Commission determined that: 206 (a) the current CALFED governance structure did not efficiently and meaningfully in-207 volve the broader public, provide the necessary transparency in the decision-making pro-208 cess or assertively resolve conflicts ; and (b) the State of California should, in future, be 209 obligated to provide more meaningful opportunities for the public and stakeholders to 210 participate in the CALFED planning process to raise awareness, increase transparency, 211 reduce conflicts and provide accountability [15]. The Commission recognized an overall 212 lack of public access to critical information for making planning decisions and the lack of 213 an effective means of communication to ensure that the public was being heard [15]. 214

The lessons drawn from the CALFED review and directed at the CVSALTS and 215 SGMA initiatives were built upon the premise that conflict over water policy was more 216

likely to be resolved locally and without resort to costly, long-term litigation when priority 217 was given to local involvement at program onset. In the case of both CVSALTS and SGMA 218 - the disaggregation of the river basin into distinct management zones (CVSALTS) or 219 Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (SGMA) gave stakeholders significant control of the 220 boundary setting for these areas and fostered the development of a coalition of interested 221 parties from within the stakeholder group. The California Department of Water Resources 222 provided initial maps of groundwater basins previously established for reporting of 223 groundwater conditions that provided an initial basin for GSA formulation and jurisdic-224 tional boundary delineation [17]. 225

Under SGMA the GSA was recognized as the primary entity responsible for achiev-226 ing groundwater sustainability. The GSAs in basins ranked high-and medium-priority 227 [17] were charged with early to development and implementation of groundwater Sus-228 tainability Plans (GSPs) by January 2020. The formulation of the GSPs had to consider the 229 interests of all beneficial uses and users of groundwater within their jurisdictions. The 230 rationale for this prioritization was the recognition that the severity of the problems faced 231 in these basins would require more time to resolve. The policy analysts responsible for the 232 design of the SGMA allowed basins to adopt one or multiple GSPs but made sure in these 233 instances that coordination agreements be designed and enacted between the GSAs 234 named under each GSP. The SGMA legislation was expansive providing GSAs with new 235 authorities and decision support tools to manage the groundwater resource with the goal 236 of meeting the primary objectives of the GSP. These new authorities included a mandate 237 to conduct investigations, measure pumpage and impose limits on extraction, perform 238 analysis to estimate the sustainable groundwater yield of each basin, recover the cost of 239 groundwater management activities, and enforce the goals of the GSP filed with the Cal-240 ifornia Department of Water Resources (CDWR) [18]. These authorities and their ability 241 to survive legal challenges will be key to the long-term success of the program. In the 242 interim State planning and enforcement laws may need to be updated and amended to 243 provide maximum flexibility and support to stakeholders encouraging the high level of 244 cooperation and coordination necessary to develop equitable and long-lasting manage-245 ment solutions. 246

Osterling [19] suggested that there is a need to more clearly accounting for the 247 sources of aquifer recharge to better assign groundwater sustainable yield. He posed that 248 analysts recognize three sources of water, native, foreign and salvage. Native sources are 249 those available to everyone including rain, canal seepage from GSA sources, surface re-250 turn flows from groundwater pumped within a GSA, inflow from watersheds above the 251 Valley floor often drained by ephemeral streams, and infiltration diverted from streams 252 into subsiding subareas within the Basin [19]. Foreign sources can include canal seepage 253 from imported sources, subsurface drainage from adjacent basins or subsiding subareas 254 and irrigation return flows from imported sources. Salvaged sources can include canal 255 seepage from water supply conveyances to the GSA service areas and return flows from 256 storm water. In California all surface water sources are appropriated in that all water sup-257 ply belongs to some entity including seepage losses from appropriated water supplies. 258 Water budget developed by water agencies and other planning entities rarely recognize 259 these distinctions. 260

Some entities [4] have criticized some of the regulatory deficiencies in the initial for-261 mulation of the SGMA conceptual framework in particular the boundaries of the ground-262 water basins based on CDWR Bulletin 118 that are used to define each GSA jurisdictional 263 area. The authors note that by focusing only on alluvial basins and ignoring hard rock and 264 volcanic aquifers and not defining the lower boundary of each groundwater basin (allow-265 ing local agencies to exclude lower lying brackish groundwater) this potentially allows 266 use of these resources unconstrained by SGMA regulations [4]). The same authors note 267 that approximately 40 percent of all wells exist in fractured hard rock and volcanic for-268 mations, that are relied upon for drinking water by rural communities, forest and aquatic 269 ecosystems and that can provide recharge to alluvial groundwater aquifers downslope in 270

the alluvial valley floor. Discounting these resources outside the SGMA jurisdictional
boundaries can significantly underestimate the volume of the usable groundwater system.
Similarly, with SGMA focusing initially on alluvial basins in medium or high priority
groundwater basins - groundwater pumping in lower priority basins can still lead to undesirable results over time, such as the depletion of streamflow. Failure to recognize the
interconnectedness of the surface and groundwater systems could have unanticipated secondary impacts.

The availability and promotion of analytical tools and accessible numerical models 278 was recognized early in the SGMA process as being key to GSA formation and successful 279 GSP development and implementation. A technical committee was formed to help de-280 velop guidelines for the use of these tools. Ideally the models used would be in the public 281 domain providing transparency and the ability to replicate results of simulations of future 282 scenario projections on the relevant sustainability indexes. The CDWR organized work-283 shops to encourage use of their Central Valley regional C2VSIM model [20][21]. The 284 model had been formulated at two levels of discretization to facilitate choice in the most 285 appropriate level of hydrologic detail for use by GSAs [21] while recognizing that this is 286 dictated by the fidelity of available data. A common template was developed by CDWR 287 for the formulation of annual water balance spreadsheets in lieu of more complex numer-288 ical simulation models. This option was chosen by many GSAs who had not invested in 289 groundwater simulation models as part of their groundwater resource management ac-290 tivities. Those GSAs that did have established models were permitted to continue their 291 use and to further development of these models for formulation of management scenarios 292 and assessment of these scenarios relative to implementation of the GSP. Data sets and 293 output from these models were required to be accessible to analysts at CDWR and other 294 interested stakeholders. 295

One important analysis made possible by these analytical tools are the assessment of groundwater recharge directly from precipitation, irrigation or surface water banking activities or indirectly through aquifer-stream inflow or deep well injection [4]. These tools 298 can also help establish pumping setbacks from streams to protect surface water allocations 299 of water and riparian habitat in instances where hydraulic gradients toward the rivers are 300 reversed and streams are losing water to the local groundwater aquifer. 301

4. Governance Issues - Alternatives Methods for Organizing a GSA

Following the mandates of the Little Hoover Commission [15] the SGMA architects 303 have striven to aid and abet stakeholder jurisdiction acting through the GSA over policy 304 related to future groundwater management encouraging innovation while making sure 305 that the process adheres to State law. The GSA would still need to coordinate with local 306 land use and water agencies within each basin. Where no like entity exists, a new entity 307 would need to be formed either expanding the jurisdiction of an existing water district or 308 forming a new entity as a Joint Powers Agency or enacting legislation that allows the 309 recognition of a special administrative district. There are significant challenges in manag-310 ing multi-use, multi-jurisdictional groundwater basins under a single entity especially 311 when these involve additional cost sharing and reporting obligations when hitherto these 312 did not exist. 313

An alternative governance model might call for more distributed jurisdictional au-314 thority and the creation of multiple GSAs with collective jurisdiction over the whole 315 groundwater basin with the police power for planning, monitoring and implementation 316 of a GSP established within each GSA [4]. This distributed model has been adopted by 317 stakeholders in the San Joaquin Valley. This governance structure allows existing local 318 agencies to retain existing authorities and assume new authorities for groundwater man-319 agement in their existing service area and allow for more localized control. However, this 320 option requires significant coordination among all the entities on an array of management 321 issues because each GSA would need to adhere to constraints imposed on the basin as-a-322 whole. 323

A third option is a hybrid approach that centralizes certain important authorities and 324 practices while distributing other less important functions among multiple entities [4]. For 325 instance, general tasks that relate to groundwater management planning activities, GSA 326 coordination and public outreach could be conducted within a single centralized GSA, 327 whereas groundwater management and pumping enforcement tasks would be split 328 among responsible GSAs. This governance model is more complex in its architecture but 329 ultimately should offer a high degree of flexibility and autonomy in those areas that may 330 be politically problematic. The development of viable groundwater management solu-331 tions may require novel and previous untried strategies - these can be fostered in an en-332 vironment where flexible governance, better tools for resource management and the avail-333 ability of dedicated expertise can be mustered to achieve SGMA objectives. Developing a 334 high fidelity understanding of the dynamics of the groundwater system can take time and 335 is best achieved through an adaptive management approach where models are calibrated 336 and validated as a means of archiving this knowledge [22]. 337

4.1. GSA Formation and Planning under SGMA

The design of an institutional framework for SGMA implementation was achieved 339 with the decision to require all entities, initially those in the medium and high priority 340 basins in the Central Valley, to develop Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs) 341 [1][4][5]. These institutions would provide the oversight and governance needed to 342 achieve groundwater sustainability goals. The first decision that stakeholders needed to 343 make was to work out the geographic boundaries of these areas in accordance with stake-344 holder preferences and priorities (Figure 2). Nine factors were suggested for consideration 345 in the formation of GSAs [5][23]. These factors are scale, human capacity, funding, author-346 ity, independence, participation, representation, accountability, and transparency [23]. 347 The first five factors were those that directly affect the ability of a GSA to meet sustaina-348 bility goals. The scale and jurisdictional boundaries of the GSA are critical not only for 349 long-term financing of SGMA related resource management activities but also for the co-350 ordination that might be needed if a large number of jurisdictions and resource bounda-351 ries were folded into a single GSA [23]. The CDWR developed a useful GIS-based resource 352 (Figure 2) to assist in the process of negotiating these jurisdictional boundaries facilitating 353 the decision-making process but giving stakeholders ultimate responsibility for the out-354 come. 355

4.2. Decision Support for CVSALTS and SGMA Policy Implementation

The water agencies responsible for the allocation and distribution of developed water 357 supplies in the State of California – the USBR and CDWR – have traditionally focused 358 their planning activities on water supply [24]. The decision tools developed and maintained by these agencies were used primarily to determine and justify water allocation 360 decisions and coordinate water supply deliveries between the state and Federal water 361 projects [24]. These decision tools typically regarded groundwater as a residual that could 362 be counted upon to fill the deficit between water needs and water supply. 363

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


Figure 2. The GIS-based Water Management Planning Tool used for overlaying jurisdictional and hydrology-related maps to aid delineation of GSA boundaries. https://sgma.water.ca.gov/portal/#intro. Accessed: 05/08/21.

The water needs in the State has always been dominated by agricultural water re-369 quirements to satisfy crop evapotranspiration losses – typically allocated around 80% of 370 the developed water supply. In 1990, an interagency initiative to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the Central Valley groundwater resource led to the development of the Central Valley Groundwater Simulation Model (CVGSM). The model simulated Central Valley hydrology from 1922 - 1980 and quantified the steady decline in groundwater levels in some parts of the Valley and the concern of a diminished groundwater resource in these areas. Although the original CVGSM model has since spawned 376 new improved variants such as DWR's C2VSIM model [20][21] and the USGS Central Val-377 ley Hydrology Model (CVHM) [25][26][27]- full integration with surface water allocation 378 models such as the interagency California surface water allocation simulation model 379 (CALSIM) has still not been achieved even after thirty intervening years of development. 380 However, progress has been made in the recognition that groundwater is a finite and lim-381 ited resource and that simplistic metrics such as safe yield are of limited utility in provide 382 decision support to agency managers and impacted stakeholders. 383

Another persistent oversight by the water agencies and entities representing stake-384 holders has been the lack of commitment to developing decision tools for water quality 385 management. The CVSALTS initiative [2] has taken the first steps compiling and analyz-386 ing groundwater monitoring data collected by the United State Geological Survey (USGS), 387 CDWR, the US Environmental Protection Agency, researchers within the University of 388 California system and local planning agencies to develop preliminary maps of salinity 389 and nitrate contamination within the Central Valley [2]. One of the major constraints to 390 the use of this data has been the lack of easy access and different protocols for data quality 391 assessment across the entities responsible for data collection and reporting. Attempts to 392 develop GIS-based, publicly accessible data web portals for groundwater data have been 393 less successful than those developed for surface water quality data. This fact and the low 394 priority status of this requirement can explain the lack of decision support capability in 395

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the area of groundwater quality management. Likewise, the lack of water quality simula-396 tion capability in the groundwater and surface water simulation models such as C2VSIM 397 and CVHM has significantly lagged improvements in the ability of these models to accu-398 rately track changes in water table elevations and groundwater storage 399 [20][21][25][26][27]. This heightened concern with respect to groundwater quality and the 400 need to coordinate activities between CVSALTS and SGMA led to a relatively recent 401 change in prioritization by CVSALTS to develop implementation strategies for ground-402 water nitrate management as part of their Salinity and Nitrate Control Program. Manage-403 ment zones for salinity management and for providing relief to communities whose wells 404 now register above the 10 mg/l public health concentration limit for nitrate pollution have 405 been reconciled. 406

Land subsidence is one of the most potentially costly of the undesirable impacts of 407 unsustainable groundwater pumping that caused significant damage to water convey-408 ance infrastructure in the period between 1925 and 1950 and that has reappeared in the 409 past decade as a serious constraint to sustainable agricultural production in the San 410 Joaquin and Tulare groundwater basins [9][25][26][28]. Differential subsidence can cause 411 cracks in the concrete lining of conveyance structures resulting in water leakage and costly 412 repair combined with water supply disruption. Several earth-lined canals have had to be 413 dredged and the levees raised in the Grasslands subarea of the San Joaquin River Basin at 414 the cost of several million dollars to combat loss of conveyance capacity [28] and the fact 415 that road crossings now impede canal flow in numerous locations. Although current 416 groundwater simulation models of the Central Valley C2VSIM and CVHM have the ca-417 pability to simulate land subsidence due to over-pumping [20][25][28] only the more re-418 cently completed version of the CVHM model (CVHM2) has been calibrated to perform 419 realistic simulations of this phenomenon [25][26]. In fact, the new CVHM2 model, with a 420 greater number of layers assigned to aquitard layers, the ability to separately simulate 421 elastic and inelastic properties of these aquitards and the added capability of recognizing 422 the delay as these layers dewater in response to imposed pumping-induced stresses – has 423 demonstrated superior performance [25][26][27]. Associated USGS subsidence monitor-424 ing and modeling studies have dispelled a common assumption that has pervaded for 425 more than 30 years which is that the majority of land subsidence is related to inelastic 426 compaction of the Corcoran Clay aquitard in the San Joaquin and Tulare basins [28]. Re-427 cent studies suggest that most non-recoverable subsidence occurs in the interbedded thin-428 ner aquitards that lie below the Corcoran Clay and that further hydro-compaction of the 429 Corcoran Clay plays a much-reduced role. Despite the improvements made in subsidence 430 simulation in the newly release CVHM2 model, until this model is more widely distrib-431 uted and utilized in SGMA-related planning and implementation studies the analysis of 432 subsidence impacts due to over-pumping within each GSA will be limited. 433

A potential future constraint on the performance of the CVHM2 model, even if more 434 assiduously applied in GSA implementation planning, is the dearth of extensometer and 435 other deep well monitoring data needed to rigorously calibrate and validate this routine 436 within CVHM2. Extensometer monitoring is highly specialized and funding of this effort, 437 primarily for the work of USGS scientists, has not been reliable and consistent in past 438 years [28]. Other techniques such as InSAR (Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar) 439 that makes high-density measurements by using radar signals from Earth-orbiting satel-440 lites to measure changes in land surface altitude can accurately assess surface deformation 441 over large areas. However, these surveys require highly trained personnel to perform 442 the analysis and can be more costly to complete than a network of appropriately spaced 443 extensometers. The utility of decision support tools such as CVHM2 is directly related to 444 the availability of appropriate monitoring data to continually update and validate the 445 model. 446

4.3 Socioeconomic secondary impacts addressed by SGMA and CVSALTS

The COVID ongoing pandemic has been especially hard on rural and disadvantaged 449 communities with limited financial resources that often rely on shallow groundwater 450 wells for domestic water supply. Nitrate pollution is endemic in rural California [13] and 451 the recent lockdown and loss of work income has exacerbated the vulnerability of these 452 communities. These communities are also subjected to lowering of the local water table 453 when water shortage encourages nearby agricultural operations to improve their water 454 supply reliability through investment in deep wells. Although these wells are typically 455 screened at great depth either immediately above or below the Corcoran Clay aquitard in 456 the San Joaquin and Tulare Basins aquifer stress induced by aggressive pumping will 457 eventually dewater the overlying aquifer despite the flow retarding influence of interbed-458 ded discontinuous clay lenses between the soil surface and Corcoran Clay aquitard. Wide-459 spread water table lowering can impact an entire community that do not have the finan-460cial wherewithal to replace new wells or deepen expiring wells. CVSALTS, has recently 461 made groundwater well water quality assessment a priority relative to the longer- term 462 salinity assessment and planning activities. This change in focus is directed at ensuring 463 safe drinking water for compromised disadvantaged communities and promises to pro-464 vide CVSALTS with a near-term success – a politically savvy strategy when reliant on 465 stakeholder financial support. Recognition of the plight of disadvantaged communities 466 has been increasingly recognized in bond-funded grant solicitations and requests for pro-467 posals over the past 5 years. These new grant initiatives have encouraged direct technical 468 assistance efforts by outside consultants and newly formed entities who are being paid to 469 work with these communities to develop comprehensive and cost-competitive drinking 470 water enhancement programs. 471

The design and implementation of these grant programs has been somewhat ad-hoc 472 in the recent past, limited by a lack of decision support tool capability that might allow a 473 multi-objective optimization analysis of investments in water supply infrastructure. 474 Model objective functions can be reformulated to include community welfare and socio-475 economic goals with other more traditional profit maximization and cost minimization 476 goals that account for the undesirable impacts of groundwater pumping, described ear-477 lier. These undesirable impacts include the chronic lowering of groundwater levels, re-478 duction of groundwater storage, land subsidence, water quality degradation, and deple-479 tions of interconnected surface water systems. Developing appropriate metrics and 480 weighting systems that promote equity in resource availability and sharing while provid-481 ing assurance of resource sustainability will require fresh thinking and new approaches 482 to regional resource planning. This paper suggests some potential approaches. 483

5. Case Studies of SGMA Planning and Early Implementation Actions

The multitude of GSAs that represent the San Joaquin Valley of California are diverse 485 in the problems they need to address and the resources they have available to overcome 486 the many hydrologic, water quality and socioeconomic challenges associated with 487 groundwater resource sustainability. This diversity is best illustrated by way of two pre-488 liminary case studies of GSAs located at either end of the San Joaquin Valley. Both of the 489 regions that are the subjects of these case studies are impacted by five of the six previously 490 described undesirable factors, although each has taken a different approach that has re-491 sulted in differential progress on attainment of GSP goals to date. Given that the GSPs 492 for both GSAs were only recently filed with the State (January, 2020) and that the GSP 493 implementation period is 20 years many of the more controversial decisions within each 494 GSA have yet to be made and any resource management issues between GSAs are un-495 likely to have been identified. A more comprehensive case study and analysis of these 496 GSAs will be the subject of a future paper. The following discussion describes the different 497 challenges faced by the GSAs in their respective basis that has been gleaned from the GSPs 498 filed with the State and offers some insight as to how the stakeholder-determined GSA 499 boundaries topology might play into their ability to meet long-term SGMA objectives. 500

5.1. Greater Kaweah Groundwater Sustainability Area (GWGSA)

The Kaweah Subbasin is a prime agricultural area of about 700 square miles (1,800 502 km²) of the San Joaquin Valley of California [29]). The Kaweah subbasin is one of 127 sub-503 basins in the State classified as critically overdrafted and subject to early implementation 504 of sustainable pumping actions by December 2020. The Greater Kaweah GSA (GKGSA) 505 jurisdictional area is approximately 340 square miles (50% of the Kaweah subbasin-884 506 km²) comprising the East Kaweah GSA, the GKGSA and the Mid Kaweah GSA (Figure 3 507 - [29]). Annual precipitation in the Central Valley of California diminishes from north to 508 south and this region relies on surface water for the local Kaweah River system, as well as 509 an allocation of Federal stored water from Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River as part of 510 the Friant Unit of the Central Valley Project (CVP). Surface and groundwater have been 511 conjunctively-use in this region for decades (Figure 4) – however demand for water has 512 outstripped supply leading to the Basin being classified by the CDWR as critically over-513 drafted. 514

Water quality of the imported water supply is high and low in salinity given its 515 source in the snowpack of the Sierra Nevada mountain range. Regional groundwater flow 516 within the GKGSA is towards the southwest and the Valley trough with the appearance 517 of local groundwater cones of depression during the irrigation season [29]. A geologic 518 feature - the Corcoran Clay aquitard divides the upper and lower aquifers in the west of 519 the subbasin but pinches out in the eastern half. Where present, the Corcoran Clay signif-520 icantly retards flow between the upper and lower aquifers and has led to localized sub-521 sidence [29] where aquifer stresses have exceeded the pre-consolidation pressure heads 522 in the lower aquifer (Figure 5). There is a more pronounced vertical flow gradient between 523 the upper semiconfined aquifer and lower confined aquifer in those areas of western sub-524 basin where the Corcoran Clay is thinner or absent resulting in higher recharge. The major 525 groundwater quality concerns in the Kaweah subbasin are for public water supply and 526 domestic wells and include arsenic, nitrate and certain volatile organics such as 1,2,3-tri-527 chloropropane (1,2,3 TCP) associated with agriculture [29]. The contaminant risk in the 528 lower aquifer is obviously greater where there is greater recharge. 529





Figure 3. The Greater Kaweah Groundwater Sustainability Agency service area within the Kings River Basin showing the jurisdictional boundaries chosen by each GSA. [29]. https://sgma.water.ca.gov/portal/gsp/preview/30.

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534 Figure 4. Water sources and water use within the GKGSA. The shaded area depicts agricultural 535 areas served by a combination of surface and groundwater resources whereas the yellow areas are 536 served by groundwater alone [29]. https://sgma.water.ca.gov/portal/gsp/preview/30,

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


Figure 5. Active subsidence monitoring in the GKGSP service area largely in the Valley trough where the influence of the Corcoran Clay aquitard on reducing lower aquifer recharge is greater [29]. https://sgma.water.ca.gov/portal/gsp/preview/30.

A review of the online documentation for the Kaweah Basin and each of the compo-542 nent GSAs suggests that GSA boundaries were decided largely along institutional lines 543 coinciding with the existing CDWR groundwater basin delineation and water district ad-544 ministrative boundaries. The acceptance of prior jurisdictional boundaries has provided 545 these GSAs with considerable advantages and stakeholder support in initial planning ef-546 forts under SGMA. In the case of the GKGSA, governance has been assigned to a newly 547 appointed nine-member Board of Directors with seats assigned to the agency itself and 548

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the original founding agencies with various subcommittees representing stakeholders, 549 farmers and a private water utility reporting to the Board [29]. The GKGSA appears to 550 have made a determined effort to develop a governance structure that represents diverse 551 views and interests of individuals and entities within the GSA including both surface wa-552 ter and groundwater interests. Typically, in resource planning discussions, the entities 553 that bring the most resources to the table and that have the time to be actively engaged in 554 the process receive the lion's share of the benefits. The GKGSA seems to have taken active 555 steps to have solicited widespread representation. 556

The Board of Directors has likewise been proactive in SGMA-related conferences and 557 meetings in entertaining ideas to improve the function of the GSA[29]. The GKGSA has 558 also been proactive in aligning its activities with other stakeholder groups such as 559 CVSALTS and has a committee specially designated to enhance communication with this 560 salinity and groundwater nitrate planning effort. As previously noted, the CVSALTS sa-561 linity management effort has, hitherto, been focused on management of surface water 562 quality although there is considerable overlap with SGMA water quality sustainability 563 goals. 564

In general, CVSALTS has a less ambitious mandate, accomplishment goals and time-565 line than SGMA although the program is similarly regional in its scope. A major regional 566 focus in long-term plan development and implementation for long-term salt balance and 567 in addressing current shallow well nitrate contamination issues is on disadvantaged com-568 munities. CVSALTS is conceptually aligned with SGMA GSAs in the recognition of stake-569 holder accepted "salinity management zones" although without the police power that is 570 provided under SGMA. Although there has been recognition of the parallel efforts by en-571 tities such as the GKGSA, as previously noted, this has been the exception rather than the 572 rule that might produce conflicting internal policy mandates among other stakeholder 573 groups and GSAs unless addressed in the short to medium term. 574

5.2. The Northern and Central Delta GSP Service Area

The Delta Mendota subbasin is one of the most agriculturally productive and re-576 source vulnerable high priority sustainability area under SGMA in the San Joaquin Valley. 577 The subbasin has subdivided into six GSAs each charged with developing their own GSPs 578 in close coordination with the other GSAs in the subbasin. These GSP groupings include 579 the Aliso Water District GSA, Farmers Water District GSA, Fresno County GSA, the Grass-580 land GSA, the Northern & Central Delta-Mendota Region (NCDMR) GSA, and the San 581 Joaquin River Exchange Contractors GSA [30] (Figure 6). The GSP service area gets its 582 name from the fact that all areas are served by the Federal Delta Mendota Canal (DMC) 583 that derives its water supply from a large pumping facility located in the Sacramento San 584 Joaquin Delta. This pumping facility is subject to environmental restrictions related to the 585 anadromous salmon fishery and vulnerable protected fish species such as the Delta smelt 586 that can curtail allowable pumping rates. 587

The term "regulatory drought" has been used to describe restrictions in water supply 588 imported from the Delta that can occur even during normal and wet years where water 589 supply reservoirs have sufficient available storage. This imported water supply contains 590 salts although at concentrations low enough to have any effect on agricultural crop yields. 591 Agricultural return flows and subsurface drainage often contain elevated salinity concen-592 trations that can impact crop yields if applied directly. The salinity impairment of the San 593 Joaquin River is largely the result of Federal water development initiatives in the 1960's 594 that permanently impacted the sustainability of the western San Joaquin River Basin [30]. 595

The NCDMR GSA [30], is the most diverse of the six GSAs within the GSP service 596 area and is the GSA that will likely experience the greatest adjustments to current practices to meet SGMA long-term objectives over the next 20 years. This GSA and the other 598 GSAs in the subbasin combine component organization and administrative structures and 599 legal authorities following the semi-distributed model described earlier. This compromise 600 has melded together entities that have resources and groundwater management 601

challenges in common. For example, the three largest entities the Grassland GSA, the 602 NCDMR GSA, and the San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors GSA have uniquely rec-603 ognized rights to irrigation water supply that have a direct effect on annual aquifer re-604 charge. Grassland Water District (private) and the adjacent State and Federal wildlife ref-605 uges receive direct and incremental (when available) water supply to maintain seasonally 606 managed wetlands from the USBR under legislative mandate to sustain overwintering 607 waterfowl habitat on the Pacific flyway [9]. The San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors 608 GSA holds senior, pre-1914, water rights on the San Joaquin River on account of their trade 609 of San Joaquin River diversions for water pumped south from the Sacramento San Joaquin 610 Delta [33]. This "exchange contract" for water supply, enacted in 1939, typically provides 611 this region with adequate supply to meet most crop demands although, with a shift in 612 land use and the cultivation of orchards and other permanent crops over the past decade, 613 some areas are overdrafted and have experienced significant groundwater pumping in-614

duced land subsidence [33].615The NCDM GSA is supplied largely by DMC surface water deliveries, groundwater616pumpage and drainage reuse in the southern sector of the subarea and by a combination617of surface water deliveries, groundwater pumpage and diversions from the San Joaquin618River in the northern sector (Figure 7). Because of this significant difference in water resource availability aquifer sustainability issues are less severe in the northern sector with620no reported instances of land subsidence.621

The San Luis and Delta Mendota Water Authority (SLDMWA) is a USBR contractor 622 that is responsible for operation and maintenance of the Delta Mendota Canal and other 623 Federally owned conveyances throughout the Delta Mendota subbasin and is the logical 624 entity to provide liaison with stakeholders to manage coordination of groundwater re-625 sources in the Basin. This charge is outside the SLDMWA's normal portfolio and has re-626 quired the development and acquisition of expertise in hydrogeology and modeling that 627 hitherto has not been essential for the SLDMWA operation. Data acquisition and assimi-628 lation activities such as the monitoring of canal deliveries and the structural integrity of 629 the canal have been supplemented with active monitoring of land subsidence in the vicin-630 ity of the water distribution canals and other infrastructure. Differential land subsidence 631 can cause significant structural damage to the canal lining that is very costly to repair as 632 well as diminishing the volume of water that can be conveyed along the canal as canal 633 flow gradients are reduced. Land subsidence monitoring is concentrated on the western 634 fringe of the GSA (Figure 8) where water supply allocation has, historically, been lower 635 and soils are coarser grained - retaining less moisture in the crop rootzone. 636

Agricultural landowners expect the SLDMWA to identify projects and management 637 actions for implementation over time that reduce reliance on the groundwater resource 638 and entrust the Authority to be a neutral facilitator in the development of equitable and 639 cost-effective water resource management strategies. Communiques to date suggest that 640 no internal regulatory actions affecting subbasin GSAs are expected during the first five 641 years of the twenty-year GSP implementation glide path. Initial efforts will address infor-642 mational and data gaps and the reconcile the results provided by preliminary water bal-643 ance models with more rigorous regional numerical models of the sub-basin. The strategy 644 undertaken appears to have begun with the lowest common denominator analytical tool 645 to bring all stakeholders on board and then introduce more highly discretized and rigor-646 ous numerical modeling tools once a basic level of acceptance has been achieved and a 647 level of trust has been achieved between neighboring GSAs. 648

The stakeholder engagement strategy adopted has sought to provide a forum to solicit and discuss the interests of all beneficial users of groundwater in the subbasin [30] To this end a website was created where all meeting and public workshop materials, as well as supplemental resources, are posted regularly in addition to more typical information distribution to property owners and other stakeholders. Committees have been formed to include representatives from water and irrigation districts representing large and small landowners as well as municipal water providers with the aim of representing the diverse 655 social, cultural, and economic characteristics of the subbasin population. Despite this progress the current status and activity level on the web portal suggests that this endeavor has not been wholly successful and that latent resource competition among stakeholders both within and between GSAs has made it difficult to fully recognize and protect minority stakeholder interests. This is contrast to the GSA cooperation and stakeholder outreach in the Kaweah subbasin where a less diverse stakeholder community has made accommodations easier.




Figure 6. The Delta Mendota sub-basin showing the boundary of the Northern and Central Delta Mendota GSA and GSP planning area [30). https://sgma.water.ca.gov/portal/gsp/preview/13,

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


Figure 7. Land ownership in the Delta Mendota sub-basin showing the boundary of the Northern and Central Delta Mendota GSA and GSP planning area [30. https://sgma.water.ca.gov/por-tal/gsp/preview/13

It is generally recognized within the GSP service area that major curtailment in 672 groundwater pumping will need to occur to sustain agriculture. This curtailment will not 673 be uniformly spread across the GSP service area and the brunt will most likely be felt by 674 the NCDM GSA that generally has the most junior water rights in the Basin and where 675 subregional irrigation recharge is lowest. Although the GSP service area appears to be in 676 a holding pattern at the present time during severe drought conditions that will likely stall 677 groundwater pumping curtailment a number of startup companies such as AquaOSO 678 Technologies PBC, specializing in decision support to stakeholders and agricultural lend-679 ers have become active [31]. It follows that as available water supply becomes more 680

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restricted due to drought and SGMA mandated reductions in allowable groundwater extraction that the risk to agricultural financial institutions and investors in crop land becomes more acute [33]. The marketplace generally deals with this increased risk by deflating the value of land and farming enterprises to a point where the reduction in value offsets the higher financial risk [31][32][33]. These new entities will likely become a catalyst for future anticipated change in future land use and agricultural investment outcomes. 686




Figure 8. Areas of active land subsidence monitoring where excess groundwater withdrawl has caused differential subsidence and damage to some water conveyance facilities [30]. *https://sgma.water.ca.gov/portal/gsp/preview/13*

6. Summary and Conclusions

The innovative nature of the SGMA and the CVSALTS initiative both underway in 692 California to address serious resource management issues of groundwater over-pumping 693 and impairment of river water quality have elevated the State to be recognized among the 694 most progressive resource managers in the Nation. The emphasis and empowerment of 695 stakeholders in these largely stakeholder-led initiatives has been guided by current re-696 search in the social sciences that has shown that bottom-up approaches can work and be 697 effective if supported by modern tools of remote sensing and Geographic Information 698 System technology and appropriate models. These tools provide a springboard for stake-699 holder innovation and compromise that will be essential elements of long-term, equitable 700 and robust sustainable solutions. In the course of implementing these two initiatives many 701 weaknesses in the support system were revealed largely around data availability, data 702 sharing and data quality assurance. Flaws also were revealed in the ability of sophisticated 703 numerical models to adequately estimate current levels of groundwater pumping as a re-704 sidual between water requirements and water supply and in the impacts of this pumping 705 for water quality of surface and groundwater and land subsidence. These findings have 706 stimulated further innovation especially in the recognition for better decision support 707 tools and web-based data portals to facilitate safe data sharing and cooperation among 708 impacted stakeholders. The case study of two very different GSP development efforts -709 one on the westside of the San Joaquin Valley in the North-west side and Grasslands sub-710 basins and the other mostly on the eastside of the Kings River Basin contrasts the resource 711 management issues and the approached being taken to develop stakeholder consensus 712 and empower decision making. Early successes and high public visibility of efforts under-713 way within the GKGSA suggest that strong local leadership, advocacy and an emphasis 714 on coordination can play a significant role in achieving long-term goals for both the SGMA 715 and CVSALTS initiatives. 716

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