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Different than the Sum of its Parts:

Examining the Unique Impacts of Immigrant Groups on Neighborhood Crime Rates

There has been a veritable explosion of studies on the relationship between immigration and crime. The literature has produced one of the most robust findings in the field: neighborhoods with greater concentrations of immigrants have lower rates of crime. One drawback of this research is that it typically treats immigrants as a homogeneous population and fails to account for significant variation among immigrants. Examining the immigration-crime nexus across neighborhoods in the Southern California metropolitan region, this study builds on existing literature by unpacking immigration and accounting for the rich diversity that exists between immigrant groups. We capture this diversity using three different approaches, operationalizing immigrant groups by similar racial/ethnic categories, areas or regions of the world that immigrants emigrate from, and where immigrants co-locate once they settle in the U.S. We also account for the heterogeneity of immigrant populations by constructing measures of immigrant heterogeneity based on each of these classifications. We compare these novel approaches with the standard approach, which combines immigrants together through a single measure of percent foreign born. The results reveal that considerable insights are gained by distinguishing between diverse groups of immigrants. In particular, we find that all three strategies explained neighborhood crime levels better than the traditional approach. The findings underscore the necessity of disaggregating immigrant groups when exploring the immigration-crime relationship.

Just over a decade ago, scholars lamented the fact that criminologists knew very little about the relationship between crime and immigration. Martinez (2006:2), for instance, noted that while studies of immigrants in many social science disciplines have proliferated, "less attention has been paid to immigrant crime or the consequences of immigration on crime, despite an intensified public debate about this topic" (see also Lee et al. 2001:559 and Reid et al. 2005:758). Today, these claims no longer remain valid. Research on the immigration-crime relationship has increased dramatically, ranging from individual-level studies of immigrants to aggregate-level analyses of immigrant concentrations.

This growing body of literature yields several key findings. One is that immigrants are generally less crime prone than their native-born counterparts. On average, immigrants commit less crime than the native-born population (Bersani 2014; Butcher and Piehl 1998b:654; Hagan and Palloni 1999:629; MacDonald and Saunders 2012; Martinez and Lee 2000; Martinez 2002; McCord 1995; Olson, Laurikkala, Huff-Corzine, and Corzine 2009; Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005; Tonry 1997). Studies also find, however, that the individual-level relationship between immigrants and crime varies across generations, where the U.S.-born children of immigrants commit crimes at higher rates than their parents (Lopez and Miller 2011; Morenoff and Astor 2006:36; Rumbaut et al. 2006:72; Sampson et al. 2005; Taft 1933). Most relevant to the current study, aggregate-level research on the immigration-crime relationship consistently arrives at the same conclusion: places with higher immigrant concentrations, especially neighborhoods, exhibit comparatively lower crime rates (Akins, Rumbaut, and Stansfield 2009; Butcher and Piehl 1998a; Chavez and Griffiths 2009; Desmond and Kubrin 2009; Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009; Graif and Sampson 2009; Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012; Lee and Martinez 2002; Lee et al. 2001; MacDonald, Hipp and Gill 2013; Martinez 2000; Martinez, Stowell, and Cancino 2008; Martinez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Martinez et al. 2004; Nielsen and Martinez 2009; Nielsen, Lee, and Martinez 2005; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Reid et al. 2005; Stowell et al. 2009; Stowell and Martinez 2007; Stowell and Martinez 2009; Velez 2009; Wadsworth 2010).

Despite rapid growth in the immigration-crime literature and the cultivation of such robust findings, many important areas of study remain. Namely, there are particularities of the immigration-

crime relationship that warrant further examination. One of the most critical issues worth addressing, we argue, is that aggregate-level research treats immigrants as a homogeneous population, which fails to account for significant variation across types of immigrants and neglects fundamental differences across groups.

The current study addresses this gap in the literature. Examining the immigration-crime nexus across neighborhoods in the Southern California metropolitan region—a racially and ethnically heterogeneous region with over 20 million persons that has received, and continues to receive, a large influx of immigrants—this study builds on existing literature by unpacking immigration and accounting for the rich diversity that exists between immigrant groups. Our research captures this diversity using three different approaches, operationalizing immigrant groups by 1) similar racial/ethnic categories, 2) areas or regions of the world that immigrants emigrate from, and 3) where immigrants co-locate once they settle in the U.S. We also account for the heterogeneity of immigrant populations by constructing measures of immigrant heterogeneity based on each of these classification schemes. We compare these novel approaches with the standard approach employed in the literature, which combines immigrants together through a single measure of percent foreign born. Findings from this study address a variety of research questions: Does the relationship between immigration and crime vary across particular immigrant groups? If so, which groups exhibit crime reducing or crime enhancing effects on neighborhoods? And given the findings, what might be the most appropriate method of categorizing immigrant populations in future research?

Before presenting the study's methodology and results, we describe key findings from the literature, discuss theoretical explanations that account for these findings, explain why the typical approach used in studies may limit what we know about crime and immigration, and describe how the current study attempts to address this shortcoming. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings as well as future directions for research.

Theoretical Explanations

In his 2012 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology, Robert Sampson (2013) identified five substantive problems facing the field of criminology. One of them—the dilemma of race and the new diversity—reminds us that Black-White distinctions are not sufficient for examining 21st century America. Immigration has reshaped the country and the world in ways that demand criminological attention. Sampson raised a series of questions worthy of scrutiny, among them "What is the macrolevel effect of immigration on U.S. crime rates?" (pg. 14).

As noted earlier, the field is already closing in on an answer to this question: areas, and especially neighborhoods, with greater concentrations of immigrants typically have lower rates of crime and violence when controlling for standard neighborhood covariates of crime. This finding, according to the collective literature, holds true for various outcomes (e.g., violent crime, property crime, delinquency) and remains strong across both cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches (Ousey and Kubrin 2009, 2014; Stowell et al. 2009; Martinez et al. 2010; Wadsworth 2010).

Despite public perceptions to the contrary, there are compelling theoretical reasons to expect that immigrants are less likely to engage in crime relative to the native-born and that immigration to an area may decrease crime rates. For one, immigrants are not representative of all people from their respective countries of origin; rather, immigrants are a self-selected group. Those who travel to the United States usually do so in pursuit of employment opportunities and better lives (Van Hook and Bean 2009). As a result, these individuals are often highly motivated, hardworking, and goal-oriented. Consistent with these immigrant selective effects, research commonly finds that immigrants have low criminal propensities (Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012:150; Stowell, Messner, McGeever, and Raffalovich 2009). Because criminal convictions can lead to deportation for immigrants, even documented residents, those who wish to remain in the country are likely to have a greater stake in conformity. Similarly, the threat of deportation may deter immigrants from committing crime (Butcher and Piehl 1998a:672). These arguments suggest that the foreign-born will engage in less crime than the native-born and that places with greater immigrant concentrations will have comparatively lower crime rates.

Another argument suggests the protective effects of ethnic enclaves, or areas with high concentrations of immigrants often characterized by strong social ties among residents, intricate social networks, small businesses that provide jobs, and high levels of informal social control. Ethnic enclaves can provide immigrants with a sense of home, enhancing social ties among residents. Some scholars describe immigrant communities as "little worlds" that foster positive relationships with like-minded and culturally similar individuals (Breton 1964). For example, Mazumdar and colleagues (2000) examine Vietnamese Americans in Little Saigon and describe how ingrained social activities combine with elements of the physical environment, such as architectural design, to cultivate strong ties and relationships between residents. Moreover, co-ethnic communities can promote dense networks of "localized ties" that provide immigrant families with social capital (Guest and Wierzbicki 1999:109).

The limited financial means of many immigrants make these strong networks vital in successfully adapting to a new environment, especially in terms of employment. As Waters and Eschbach (1995:437) explain, "When immigrants enter a new society they often face barriers to full inclusion in the economic activities of the host society. Besides through outright discrimination, this occurs, for example, because of the absence of network ties necessary to gain access to or to succeed in certain kinds of activities, because of barriers to entry to professional or internal labor markets that have the effect of excluding those with foreign credentials, because the skills of immigrants are concentrated in specific occupations, and because these skills may not be well matched to the needs of the employers in the host society." Ethnic social networks can help to bypass these barriers, however, by providing informal recruitment opportunities, on-the-job training, and an encouraging atmosphere for new businesses (Bailey and Waldinger 1991; Phillips and Massey 2000). Additionally, employment through ethnic enclaves offers greater human capital than would be found in the outside secondary labor market (Waters and Eschbach 1995:438). Despite often being low wage positions, these jobs provide income and help to mitigate poverty, which is a strong correlate of crime and delinquency (Desmond and Kubrin 2009:586). To this effect, Engbersen and van der Leun (2001:51) argue that illegal immigrants' embeddedness in the labor sphere explains their relatively limited involvement in crime.

Although earlier versions of social disorganization theory suggest that immigration leads to heightened crime rates due to residential turnover, weakened social ties, and decreased informal social control, scholars have been challenging these claims and arguing instead that immigration can lead to revitalization and enhanced social control. Called the immigration revitalization thesis, this argument maintains that immigration is essential to the continued viability of urban areas, especially areas that have experienced population decline and deindustrialization (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001:564; see also Lee and Martinez 2002). Portes and Stepick (1993) provide an example, discussing how immigrants helped to stabilize and revitalize Miami's economic and cultural institutions. In effect, strong familial and neighborhood institutions within ethnic enclaves as well as enhanced job opportunities promote greater development and stability: "…larger immigrant populations in metropolitan areas may invigorate local economies leading to redevelopment of the stagnating economies of the urban core of metropolitan areas. The causal process by which the size of the immigrant population could lessen crime is via job growth, both for immigrants and the native-born; business development in previously economically depressed areas; and the repopulation of the urban core" (Reid et al. 2005:762).

A final perspective suggests that family structure helps account for why immigration to an area may decrease crime rates. Criminological research consistently finds that single-parent households and areas with higher rates of single-parent families are associated with higher levels of crime (Sampson 1987). The breakdown in traditional family structures, this scholarship argues, exhausts social capital and attenuates processes of socialization and informal social control (Land, McCall and Cohen 1990; Ousey 2000; Sampson 1987; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994). Yet, many scholars contend that immigration alters local family and household structures in ways that strengthen informal social control and prevent crime. Many immigrant groups have more familistic and pro-nuptial cultural orientations than the native-born (Fukuyama 1993; Oropesa 1996; Oropesa, Lichter and Anderson 1994; Vega 1990; Wildsmith 2004) and scholarship suggests that social networks in contemporary immigrant communities reinforce traditional (i.e., two parent) family structures and promote the legitimacy of parental authority norms (Martinez et al. 2004). Immigrants' intact family structures and pro-family cultural orientations suggest

lower propensities toward crime compared to the native born and that increased immigration to an area will contribute to lower crime rates (Ousey and Kubrin 2009).

Re-conceptualizing Immigration

Despite generally consistent research findings on the immigration-crime relationship, critical questions and unresolved issues remain. Perhaps of greatest concern for the present paper is the unknown extent to which the immigration-crime relationship is truly generalizable or robust *for all immigrant groups*. Part of the uncertainty stems from researchers' narrow conceptual treatment of immigration along with the limited measures employed in studies. Nearly all macro-level research focuses on "immigrant concentration," generally defined as "the tendency of immigrants to concentrate geographically by ethnicity or origin within the host country" (Chiswick and Miller 2005:5). Researchers frequently use a single measure of immigrant concentration: the percent foreign born in an area. Or, studies may combine several measures such as percent foreign-born, percent Latino, and percent persons who do not speak English well or at all to create an "immigrant concentration index" (Desmond and Kubrin 2009; Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012; Lee and Martinez 2002; Lee et al. 2001; Martinez 2000; Martinez et al. 2004; Martinez et al. 2008; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Nielsen et al. 2005; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Reid et al. 2005; Sampson et al. 2005; Stowell and Martinez 2007; but see Stowell and Martinez 2009).

The problem with these approaches is that they combine all immigrants together and neglect important between-group differences. By narrowly emphasizing the foreign-born-native-born comparison, researchers discount the widespread diversity that exists across immigrant groups. Yet over 80 years ago, Taft (1933:74-75) identified variation in arrest rates between immigrants of different nationalities as do some scholars today (Mears 2002:284). For this reason, researchers advocate for a more complex treatment of immigration (Bursik 2006:29; Desmond and Kubrin 2009:601; Ousey and Kubrin 2009:467).

Accounting for variation across immigrant groups is necessary for several reasons; first, not all immigrants migrate for the same reasons, reasons which, ultimately, may be associated with country of

origin or other factors such as race/ethnicity. Prior research finds that migration motives powerfully shape criminality and other indicators of successful adaptation (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann 2000; Lee et al. 2001:573; Tonry 1997:24).

Another layer of complexity is that immigrant groups vary by racial and ethnic identities, as well as nationalities. Long ago Taft (1933:74) acknowledged the wide variation in arrest rates "as between the different nationalities." This variation likely bears implications for assimilation into U.S. society. Given the large neighborhoods and crime literature examining the consequences of neighborhood racial and ethnic composition for levels of crime (see Peterson and Krivo 2010 for a review), it is reasonable to presume that the assimilation experiences and outcomes of immigrant inflows will differ based upon the race/ethnicity of the particular immigrant groups moving into a neighborhood (see, for example, Harris and Feldmeyer 2013; Feldmeyer and Steffensemeier 2009).

Yet another layer of complexity is the fact that immigrants from different parts of the world bring different cultural traditions with them. Variation across cultural traditions can have important consequences for how in-moving immigrant groups interact with the existing residents in a neighborhood, realize common goals and values, and engage in informal social control. Relatedly, immigrants from different regions of the world may share a language with other immigrant groups or face a language barrier with non-immigrant residents in a neighborhood, which also can affect social interaction and consequently impact the generation of collective efficacy.

Still another layer of complexity relates to the fact that certain immigrant groups may share common cultural traditions despite emigrating from different regions of the world. In such cases, we might observe that some immigrant groups are more likely to spatially co-locate in neighborhoods with other immigrant groups even if these groups do not share a common origin. This co-location might suggest similarity in cultural attitudes. For example, whereas many Muslims come from the Middle East, the country of Indonesia in Southeast Asia has the largest Muslim population in the world. Therefore, we might observe immigrants from Indonesia and immigrants from certain Middle Eastern countries co-locating in neighborhoods due to religious similarity.

A final consideration involves the role that heterogeneity of immigrant populations may play, an area of recent interest among scholars (Graif and Sampson 2009; LaFree and Bersani 2014). Social disorganization theory maintains that neighborhood heterogeneity increases crime rates primarily by limiting the capacity of residents to effectively communicate with each other, form strong ties and networks, and achieve common goals such crime reduction (Kornhauser 1978; Kubrin 2000; LaFree and Bersani 2014; Shaw and McKay 1929). Yet in their study of immigration, diversity and homicide, Graif and Sampson (2009) propose that cultural diversity of immigrant populations within neighborhoods may actually benefit communities. This is especially likely, they suggest, if this diversity "increases the variety and complementarity of goods, skills, abilities and services…spurring innovation and creativity…cultural diffusion and hybridization" and inter-cultural tolerance (pg. 245), all of which, in turn, may promote conditions that prevent inter-group conflict and violence. Graif and Sampson (2009) find support for such an argument in their analysis of Chicago neighborhoods. Although varying in magnitude across the city's spatial landscape, they find that immigrant heterogeneity (as reflected in a measure of language diversity—see also LaFree and Bersani 2014), is consistently associated with lower homicide rates, net of disadvantage, residential stability, population density, and other controls (pg. 251).

In sum, despite numerous studies finding that immigration and crime are negatively associated, the particularity of this relationship remains under-examined. The current study begins to address this limitation. Examining the immigration-crime nexus across neighborhoods in the Southern California metropolitan region, we build on the existing literature by unpacking immigration and capturing the rich diversity that exists between immigrant groups. Our methodological approach captures this diversity using several different approaches, including grouping immigrants by similar racial/ethnic categories, by areas or regions of the world immigrants emigrate from, and by where immigrants co-locate once they settle in the U.S. We also account for the heterogeneity of immigrant populations by constructing measures of immigrant heterogeneity based on each of these classification schemes. We compare these novel approaches with the standard approach employed in the literature, which aggregates all immigrants together through a single measure of percent foreign born.

Research Context

Our focus is on the Southern California region, a large and growing region that contains three metropolitan statistical areas: Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, the second largest metro area in the U.S. (12.8 million population); Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, the 12th largest (4.2 million population); and San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, the 17th largest (3.1 million population). The region we study includes five counties (Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego), and 341 cities and minor civil divisions.

The Southern California region is an ideal setting for this study because, among other things, it is a growing region with over 20 million persons and it is a racially and ethnically heterogeneous area that has received, and continues to receive, a large inflow of immigrants. The history of immigration to this region is a long and varied one. In the first half of the 20th century, white migrants set the dominant cultural tone in Southern California but beginning in the 1960s, immigration to the region increased substantially with migrants coming from a diverse array of countries. Very quickly the region attracted immigrants from around the globe. Today, Southern California is home to the largest concentrations of Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Iranians, and other nationalities outside of their respective countries of origins (Rumbaut 2008:197). Southern California is also home to sizable contingents of Armenians, Arabs, mainland Chinese, Hondurans, Indians, Laotians, and Russian and Israeli Jews (Rumbaut 2008:197). These groups are typically spatially clustered. For example, the San Gabriel valley northeast of downtown Los Angeles has a large composition of different Asian immigrant groups, the city of Glendale (north of Los Angeles) has a large Armenian enclave, and the Westminster/Garden Grove area of Orange County (known as "Little Saigon") has a large Vietnamese population.

Data and Methods

Data

As part of a larger project, we made an effort to contact each police agency in the region and request point crime data from them, an arduous task. Many of the agencies were willing to share their data with us. As a consequence, we ended up with crime data for 2,740 of the 3,852 tracts in the region (these cover 219 of the 341 cities in the region). We geocoded the crime incidents to census tracts and then averaged crime events from 2009-11. We utilize tracts as our unit of analysis given that they approximate neighborhoods and because the Census does not provide detailed information on immigrants at units smaller than tracts (Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012; MacDonald et al. 2012).

Dependent variables

We created a count of *violent crime events*, which combines aggravated assault, robbery, and homicide events. We created a count of *property crime events*, which combines burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny events.

Independent variables

Our key independent variables capture the presence of immigrants in the tracts of our study area. We conceptualized the presence of immigrants in tracts using four different approaches. The first approach follows the standard practice in the literature and computes a measure of the percentage of the tract population that is foreign born: *percent immigrants*. This measure does not make any distinctions among immigrants and instead treats them as a homogeneous group. The remaining three approaches all—in different ways—attempt to capture some of the important variation and layers of complexity discussed earlier. We fully acknowledge, however, that these approaches and their constituent measures constitute only rough proxies for many of the theoretical mechanisms proposed including migration motive, culture, assimilation, and so on, a point we return to at length in the Discussion and Conclusion section of the paper.

The second approach groups immigrants based on the racial/ethnic grouping that most characterizes, or is most representative of, the people from their country of origin. We determined this in a two-step process: first, we used the individual-level Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of

residents in Southern California to assess the most common race/ethnicity reported by residents for a particular country of origin. For some countries such analyses are hardly necessary, as the analyses revealed that, for example, immigrants from most Latin American countries are typically Latino. However, for some countries, it may not be so clear and these analyses allowed making a proper determination. In the second step, we used information on the country of origin (and the results of the first-step analyses) to compute measures of the tract population that is *percent Asian immigrants*, *percent black immigrants*, *percent white immigrants*, and *percent Latino immigrants*. Table A1 in the Appendix displays the racial group into which each country's immigrants are classified.

The third approach focuses on the region of the world from which the immigrants originate. We categorized immigrants from 92 countries into 18 world regions based upon the definition of world region from the United Nations Division of Statistics (United Nations Division of Statistics 2014). These regions are: East Africa, Mid-Africa, North Africa, South Africa, West Africa, Caribbean, Central America, East Asia, East Europe, North America, North Europe, Oceania, South-East Asia, South America, South Asia, South Europe, West Asia, and West Europe. We computed the percentage of the tract population composed of immigrant groups from each of these regions. This approach considers immigrants originating from a similar region of the world who might share cultural cues and/or language. This similarity in origin may lead to more cohesion and consequently generate more neighborhood social control when such immigrants reside in the same U.S. neighborhoods.

The fourth approach clustered immigrant groups based upon their empirical distribution in the Southern California region. This approach does not consider where immigrants are from but instead focuses on where they ultimately locate in the region. Here the idea is that any co-location in space among immigrant groups reflects some latent tendency towards similarity, whether it is similar values, cultural cues, or something else. We do not know what this latent tendency might be, and make no claim about what it may be, but rather use this inductive approach to detect these groups. In this approach, we took the 33 largest immigrant groups in the Southern California region, each of which constituted at least

3 percent of the immigrant population in the region,[1] and conducted a principal-component factor analysis. Afterward we performed an oblique rotation to more clearly align each immigrant group with a particular factor. We retained each factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (n=11) and each immigrant group with a factor loading of at least .3 was considered part of that factor. However, we emphasize that we did not use the factor loadings in the subsequent construction of the factor groups, but rather simply summed members of each country that were identified as part of a group. After summing, we computed the group's percentage of the total tract population. The resulting factors capture the tendency of certain immigrant groups to spatially co-locate in Southern California. These groups are: Chinese (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia); East Asian (Japan, Korea, Philippines, India); Southeast Asian asylum seekers (Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam); Central American asylum seekers (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua); South American (Argentina, Colombia); New World (Cuba, Ecuador, Italy); Anglo-Saxon (Canada, Germany, United Kingdom); Jewish (Russia, Ukraine, Israel); Muslim (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Armenia); Pyramid societies (Egypt, Peru); and, Mexico. While some of these factors overlap with the regions of the world measures, others are quite different. As such, this approach captures geographic co-location in the region regardless of the geography of the groups' origin nations.

Figure 1 visually displays the different consequences of our three grouping strategies. Panel 1 shows the classification by race/ethnicity, focusing on Asian immigrants for illustrative purposes. We plot neighborhoods in which the population is at least 3 percent Asian immigrants. Panel 2 plots the neighborhoods for the dominant group based on region of the world when it constitutes at least 3 percent of the population, and demonstrates that whereas all highlighted neighborhoods in panel 1 contained Asian immigrants, there are more fine-grained distinctions between those coming from different regions of the world in panel 2. Panel 3 plots the neighborhoods for the dominant group based on our co-location strategy in which there is the most overlap with the Asian immigrants. We plot the Chinese group (countries are China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Taiwan), the East Asian group (countries are India, Japan,

[1] We chose this value because: 1) it reflected a relatively discrete point in the distribution of the groups based on size; 2) below this point the groupings began to reflect aggregations across regions (e.g., other Europeans).

Korea, Philippines), and the Southeast Asian asylum seekers (countries are Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam). Note that this clustering technique demonstrates a different pattern across the environment compared to grouping based on region of the world as done in panel 2.

<<<Figure 1 about here>>>

In addition to these three sets of immigrant composition measures just described, we constructed measures of immigrant heterogeneity based on each of these sets of variables. For each, we constructed a Herfindahl index, which is a measure of sums of squares for the proportion in each immigrant group. Thus, we constructed measures of *immigrant race/ethnicity heterogeneity*, *immigrant world area heterogeneity*, and *immigrant spatial co-location heterogeneity*. We estimated models that included each of these measures, but they were never statistically significant, so we do not present these results.

To minimize the possibility of obtaining spurious results, we also included a set of measures that are commonly incorporated into ecological studies of crime. We constructed a measure of *concentrated disadvantage*, which combines the following measures in a factor analysis: 1) percent at or below 125% of the poverty level; 2) percent single parent households; 3) average household income; and 4) percent with at least a bachelor's degree. The latter two measures have negative loadings. We constructed a measure of *residential stability* by standardizing and summing two measures: 1) average length of residence and 2) percent homeowners. We account for possible racial/ethnic effects beyond those of immigrant groups by constructing measures of *percent black* and *percent native Latino*. The latter measure computes the number of Latinos in a tract, subtracts the number of foreign born from Latino origin countries, and divides by the total population. We account for racial mixing with a measure of *racial/ethnic heterogeneity* computed as a Herfindahl Index of five racial/ethnic groups (black, white, Asian, Latino, and other race). We account for the possible criminogenic effect of vacant housing units with the *percent vacant units*. A measure of the *percent aged 16 to 29* captures those in the most crime-prone years. We also computed the *population density* of the tract. Finally, we accounted for the possible effect of land use characteristics. We constructed measures of the percent of the land area that is: 1)

industrial; 2) office; 3) residential; and, 4) retail. "Other land use types" (e.g., parks, churches, government buildings, parking structures, etc.) is the reference category.

To address potential spatial effects, we followed the approach of prior work (Kubrin and Hipp 2014; Peterson and Krivo 2010) and account for the demographic characteristics of nearby tracts. We created a spatial weights matrix based on an inverse distance decay function capped at five miles and multiplied this by the values of measures in these nearby tracts. We thus constructed spatial measures of: 1) concentrated disadvantage; 2) residential stability; 3) racial/ethnic heterogeneity; 4) percent black; 5) percent Latino; 6) percent occupied units; 7) percent aged 16 to 29. We display summary statistics for the variables used in the analyses in Table 1. There was no missing data given that we are using Census data.

<<<Table 1 about here<<<

Methods

Given that the outcome variables are counts, we estimated Poisson models. We believe that our structural models are properly specified (Berk and MacDonald 2008); nonetheless we detected overdispersion. We account for this by using robust standard errors as suggested by Wooldridge (Wooldridge 2002). We account for possible differences across city police departments in reporting practices by estimating fixed effects models with indicator variables for the cities in which the tracts are located. The estimated models are:

$\mu_i = E(y_i \mid \mathbf{x}_i) = \exp(\mathbf{x}_i B)$

and $\mathbf{x}$ is a vector containing the variables of interest:

$\mathbf{x}i = [I_i, T_i, WT_i, C_i]$

where I includes our various immigrant concentration measures, T contains the neighborhood control variables, WT contains the spatial lagged versions of the neighborhood control variables, and C contains an indicator of the city the tract is in.

We performed various diagnostics to assess whether our data violated any assumptions of the modeling strategy. There was no evidence of multicollinearity problems, as the variance inflation factor

values were all below 5.9 (Kennedy 1998). We also performed several tests and found no evidence of influential cases. For example, we estimated separate models excluding tracts with populations of less than 300 or 500 and found similar results for each. We therefore used a tract population of 300 as a threshold for inclusion to minimize the number of observations excluded. We assessed possible influential cases by estimating ancillary models that excluded observations with the most extreme 1% of Hadi values. These results were essentially identical to those presented below.

We assessed spatial dependence by mapping the residuals from our models and found that our models essentially account for the spatial clustering of crime across the tracts in this sample. Although there is spatial correlation for violent and property crime, with Moran's I values of .16 and .05, respectively, the Moran's I values for the residuals (constructed as the difference between the crime count and the predicted crime count) of the violent and property crime models were .02 and .01, respectively. Thus, there is effectively no spatial autocorrelation among the residuals after accounting for our model.

Results

Descriptive results

To gain a better understanding of what Southern California immigrant neighborhoods in our study look like for the various grouping strategies, we first compare socio-demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods. To do this, we selected neighborhoods in which at least 3 percent of the total population was of a particular group. Table 2 shows the socio-demographic characteristics for these neighborhoods based on the predominant race/ethnicity of the immigrant group, sorted in descending order by the average home value in the neighborhood. Immigrants from countries with predominantly white residents reside in neighborhoods in the Southern California region with the highest average income and home values and lowest violent and property crime rates compared to other immigrants. This is followed by immigrants from countries with predominantly Asian, black and Latino residents, respectively. It is notable that this categorization approach yields the fewest differences in socio-

demographic characteristics across the immigrant neighborhoods in the study compared to the other two categorization strategies.

<<<Table 2 about here<<<

We next consider neighborhoods based on grouping by region of the world in Table 3. Whereas immigrant groups from Northern Europe, Western Europe, and North America tend to reside in neighborhoods with relatively high income and home values, it is noteworthy that immigrants from South Africa and Oceania also live in neighborhoods with high income and home values. Alternatively, immigrants from Central America and East, West, and Mid Africa reside in neighborhoods with the lowest income and home values. The lower-income immigrant group neighborhoods also tend to have higher concentrations of immigrants overall, lower percentages of white residents, lower levels of education, higher proportions of families with children, fewer households in owner occupied units, and higher population density. These sharp differences suggest that treating all immigrants as a uniform group is likely not justifiable. It is also striking that some groups live in neighborhoods with much higher or lower crime rates compared to their level of income or home values; for example, immigrants from east or west Asia, and particularly those from mid-Africa, live in neighborhoods with much lower violent or property crime rates than might be anticipated based upon their income level.

<<<Table 3 about here<<<

Finally, going back to the second panel of Table 2 we display the summary statistics when grouping the immigrant groups based on co-location in the region. We see that the Anglo-Saxon, Muslim, and Jewish groups tend to live in neighborhoods with the highest average home values and income. The neighborhoods constituted by the Anglo-Saxon, New World, and the South American groups have the highest percentage of long-time immigrants (in the country more than 28 years). Focusing simply on neighborhoods with the greatest concentration of immigrants in general, these are most likely to occur in neighborhoods of the Chinese group as well as the Central American and South-east Asian asylum seekers. The neighborhoods of the Jewish, Anglo-Saxon, Muslim, and Chinese groups have the highest percentage of highly educated residents. The groups of Jewish, South American, and Central American

asylum seekers reside in neighborhoods with many renters and a high population density. Groups from South America live in neighborhoods with much lower violent or property crime rates than might be anticipated.

Multivariate results

We now turn to results from the regression models. We first discuss findings from our baseline regression models, which mimic the common approach in the literature by including only a measure of the percent of the tract population that is foreign born (e.g., immigrant concentration). In model 1 of Table 4, we see that immigrant concentration is not significantly associated with neighborhood violent crime. In model 1 of Table 5, however, we see that tracts with greater concentrations of immigrants have significantly lower property crime rates than other tracts (b = -.0052, $p < .01$), when controlling for other measures in the model. Thus, we see a pattern consistent with the vast majority of recent research which finds that immigrant concentration has a null or negative relationship with neighborhood crime rates.

<<<Table 4 about here>>>

<<<Table 5 about here>>>

We next consider whether distinguishing between the racial/ethnic backgrounds of immigrants further clarifies the immigration-crime relationship. In the next set of models, we distinguish between Hispanic/Latino immigrants, white immigrants, black immigrants, and Asian immigrants, compared to non-immigrants (see Appendix Table A1 for classification). The violent crime results in model 2 of Table 4 reveal sharp distinctions among these groups. On the one hand, neighborhoods with a higher percentage of Latino immigrants in the population have higher violent crime rates, holding constant the other measures in the model (b = .0069, $p < .01$). Thus, a neighborhood with 10 percentage point more Latinos will have 7.1 percent more violent crime, on average.[2] On the other hand, neighborhoods with a higher

[2] Here it is important to remind readers to exercise caution with respect to this finding, as we do not claim to have identified causal mechanisms underlying individual behavior. A positive association between percent Latino and violent crime does not necessarily mean that Latino immigrants are more violent. This association could occur, as examples, because they are more likely to be victims, or due to over-policing in these communities (Butcher and Piehl 1998b:459; Hagan and Palloni 1999).

percentage of black or Asian immigrants have lower violent crime rates, controlling for the other measures in the model (b = -.0482, $p < .01$ and b = -.0055, p < .10, respectively). Thus, a neighborhood with 1 percentage point more black immigrants will have 4.7 percent less violent crime, on average.

The relationships between immigrants of differing racial/ethnic backgrounds and property crime also differ for various groups, as shown in model 2 of Table 5. Higher percentages of Asian immigrants are associated with less property crime in neighborhoods ($p < .05$). Neighborhoods with 10 percentage point more Asian immigrants have 7.4% lower property crime rates. Although we see a large negative coefficient for black immigrants on property crime, it is not statistically significant.

In the next set of models, we adopt a different strategy and disaggregate immigrant groups by 18 regions of origination (see Appendix Table A1 for classification). In model 3 of Table 4, we find that four groups from different origins have significant negative relationships with violent crime rates (at least $p < .10$). The biggest negative relationship is found for immigrants from West Africa (b = -.1000), the second largest is for North American immigrants (b = -.0728). A one percentage point increase in immigrants from West Africa in a neighborhood is associated with a 9.5% lower violent crime rate. The third largest negative relationship is found for immigrants from North Africa (b = -.0635), which includes Middle Eastern immigrants; a one percentage point increase in this group is associated with a 6.1% lower violent crime rate. The fourth largest negative relationship is documented for immigrants from South Asia (b = -.0175). Alternatively, three groups show modestly significant positive relationships with violent crime: immigrants from Western Europe (b = .0742), immigrants from Eastern Europe (b = .0184) and immigrants from Central America (b = .0065).

In the property crime results in model 3 of Table 5, three different groups are negatively related to property crime in Southern California neighborhoods. Neighborhoods with more immigrants from West Africa (b = -.0856) are associated with lower property crime rates. A one percentage point increase in immigrants from West Africa in a neighborhood is associated with an 8.2% lower property crime rate. Neighborhoods with more immigrants from East Asia and South-east Asia also have modestly lower property crime rates. Two groups are associated with higher property crime rates: neighborhoods with

more immigrants from Southern Europe (b = .0649), the Caribbean (b = .0678); in each case a one percentage point increase in the group in a neighborhood is associated with nearly a 7% increase in the property crime rate.

A final set of models disaggregate immigrant groups based on their observed geographic clustering in the Southern California region (see Appendix Table A1 for categorization). In model 4 of Table 4 for violent crime, we find that three of the groups are positively associated with violent crime rates, whereas one is negatively associated with violent crime rates. Neighborhoods with more immigrants in the group we have labeled "Chinese" (from the countries China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia) have lower violent crime rates. On the other hand, neighborhoods with more immigrants from Mexico, from the countries in the "Jewish" group (Russia, Ukraine, Israel) and from countries in the "Central American asylum seekers group" (countries are El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) have higher violent crime rates, holding constant the other measures in the model. A ten percentage point increase in immigrants from Mexico is associated with 8.7% more violent crimes, whereas a one percentage point increase in immigrants from the "Jewish" group is associated with 3% more violent crimes.

In the property crime models, we find that two of the groups are associated with lower property crime rates whereas just one is associated with higher property crime rates (model 4 of Table 5). Neighborhoods with more immigrants from the countries associated with the "Chinese" group have lower property crime rates (model 4 of Table 5) as do neighborhoods with more immigrants from the countries in the "Central American asylum seekers" group. However, neighborhoods with more immigrants from the countries in the "New World" group (countries are Italy, Cuba, Ecuador) have higher property crime rates.

These three different approaches to conceptualizing immigrant groups all perform relatively similarly when viewing the immigrant neighborhoods and crime relationship. Importantly, all three of these alternative approaches out-performed the standard approach of including a single percent foreign born measure. Note that the lowest pseudo R-squared values for both violent and property crime models

are for the standard approach in the literature—the sole inclusion of a measure of immigrant concentration. Furthermore, statistical tests showed that these three alternative specifications were superior to the standard approach. We assessed this by performing a test after each estimated model in which we constrained our multiple measures of immigrant concentration to be *equal* (which is the assumption of the model including just percent foreign born). Constraining these coefficients equal always resulted in a very significant reduction in model fit: for the immigrant groupings based on race/ethnicity, the chi-square tests were 21.8 and 15.2 on 3 degrees of freedom for violent and property crime, respectively ($p < .001$ and $p < .01$). For the regions of the world measures the chi square results were 45.9 and 37.6 on 17 degrees of freedom ($p < .001$ and $p < .01$). For the co-location groups the results were 36.1 and 33.9 on 10 degrees of freedom (both $p < .001$).

We briefly mention the control variables only to note they have the expected relationships with crime that mirror the existing literature. Neighborhoods with greater concentrated disadvantage, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability, percent black or Latino residents, and percent vacant units have higher violent crime rates, whereas higher population density is associated with less violent crime. Likewise, neighborhoods with more racial/ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability, and vacant units have higher property crime rates. Neighborhoods with more industrial and retail land use have more violent and property crime, whereas those with more office areas have more property crime, compared to other types of land use. For the spatial lag variables, neighborhoods surrounded by higher levels of vacant units have higher violent crime rates and those surrounded by more percent black have higher property crime rates.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study has argued for moving beyond a unitary conceptualization of immigration and instead considered the multidimensionality of immigrant groups and the consequences for neighborhood crime. The results showed that considerable insights are gained by distinguishing between diverse groups of immigrants. In particular, we find that all three strategies for distinguishing between immigrant groups—

by similar racial/ethnic categories, by areas or regions of the world that immigrants emigrate from, and by where immigrants co-locate once they settle in the U.S.—explained levels of neighborhood crime better than the traditional approach of including only a measure of the percent foreign-born in the neighborhood. These findings underscore the necessity of disaggregating immigrant groups when exploring the immigration-crime relationship.

For both violent and property crime, we found that the models that did the best job (based on variance explained) disaggregated immigrant groups from where immigrants originate based upon the region of the world of the sending country. For example, whereas neighborhoods with more immigrants from West Africa had lower levels of both violent and property crime, there was no such relationship with more immigrants from East Africa, Mid Africa, or South Africa. Neighborhoods with more immigrants from the Middle East (North Africa) also had lower levels of violent crime. Neighborhoods with more Central American immigrants had higher violent crime rates, whereas neighborhoods with more immigrants from South Asia had lower violent crime rates and those with more immigrants from East Asia had lower property crime levels.

Another effective strategy for explaining levels of crime clustered immigrant groups based upon their co-location patterns with other groups in the Southern California metropolitan region. Recall we found that two of the factors, those we have labeled "Jewish" and "Mexico," are positively associated with violent crime rates, whereas two of the other factors, those we have labeled "Chinese" and "Central American asylum seekers," are negatively associated with violent crime rates. These results are not determined by the socio-economic status (SES) of these immigrant groups: whereas the Jewish group have some of the highest income and education levels of these groupings, the Mexican immigrants have some of the lowest, and yet these groups each live in higher violent crime neighborhoods.[3] In the property crime models, we find that "Chinese" and "Central American asylum seekers" are associated with lower property crime rates whereas just the "New World" group is associated with higher property crime rates.

[3] These numbers are based on IPUMS data for the Southern California region for 2009. These household-level data allow us to characterize these specific households (although they have limited spatial precision).

Again, SES is not a determining factor as the Chinese immigrants have relatively high SES whereas the asylum seekers have some of the lowest SES levels. It is worth noting that many of these groups were geographically clustered based on the sending country, suggesting minimal gain over an approach simply focusing on the region of origin for immigrants. Interestingly, however, the groups that were not geographically clustered based on sending country actually showed some robust effects: the Jewish factor was positively associated with violent crime, whereas the New World factor was positively associated with property crime. Perhaps in different research areas that do not have such large immigrant populations a strategy focusing on unobserved cultural factors that lead to certain groups co-locating in neighborhoods will be more consequential.

Whereas disaggregating immigrant groups based upon the predominant race/ethnicity backgrounds of immigrants was the least explanatory of crime locations of our three grouping strategies, it still improved over the default approach of lumping all immigrants together by using a measure of percent foreign-born. Recall the results reveal sharp distinctions among these groups; on the one hand, neighborhoods with a higher percentage of Latino immigrants have higher violent crime rates while on the other hand, neighborhoods with a higher percentage of black or Asian immigrants have lower violent crime rates, controlling for the other measures in the model. The relationships between immigrants of differing racial/ethnic backgrounds and property crime also differ for various groups, as neighborhoods with more Asian immigrants had lower levels of property crime.

Despite the relative effectiveness of our three different strategies of disaggregating immigrant groups in detecting relationships with neighborhood levels of crime, we highlight that on the other hand there was no evidence that *heterogeneity* measures based on these classification schemes were statistically significant. Likewise, ancillary models using an immigrant heterogeneity measure based on the individual groups themselves also was not statistically significant. Thus, although we might expect based on the insights of social disorganization theory that such mixing based on immigrant groups would result in higher levels of crime, we found no such evidence here. This may imply that by adopting the approach we

did here of theoretically considering the similarities and differences across various immigrant subgroups that our approach indirectly accounts for what some might otherwise interpret as heterogeneity effects.

Of course we point out that the study's findings, regardless of grouping strategy, should be interpreted within the context of the study's limitations. These include a focus on only one region of the United States, which raises questions of generalizability; the fact that our data span a very short and specific time period (2009-11), which raises questions about whether the findings would be replicated in a different historical time period; and a lack of data to measure possible mediating factors (e.g., culture, religion), which may help explain or contextualize the findings. In addition, there are selection effect concerns in which poorer immigrants may be more likely to move into higher crime neighborhoods, which can impact parameter estimates in these cross-sectional models.

A crucial question is what accounts for these—in some cases drastic—differences in findings both within and across immigrant grouping strategies? How do we explain these results? Clearly a proper explanation requires much closer examination of the particular immigrant groups that comprise each grouping strategy, their motivations for emigrating to the U.S., and consideration of the commonalities among the immigrants with respect to, for example, religion, language, and culture than is possible in this paper. Given the diversity of findings, rather than attempt to explain each one, below we discuss two broader considerations that may help explain this diversity and that, we believe, warrant detailed investigation in future research.

Perhaps one of the strongest driving forces behind the findings relates to immigrants' reasons for migrating to the U.S. It should come as no surprise that the reasons groups migrate powerfully shape criminality and other indicators of successful adaptation (Tonry 1997:24). Migration motive varies along several dimensions but one useful distinction is between economic and non-economic motives (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann 2000; Lee et al. 2001:573). Instructive here is economic theory on the international transferability of human capital (Chiswick 1978, 1986; see Duleep and Regets 1997 for a formal model; see Borjas 1994 for an overview on the earnings assimilation of immigrants). Economic theory predicts that immigrants from countries that are similar to the host country with respect to

economic development, the schooling system, and language and culture are better able to assimilate into the labor market, largely due to a rapid transferability of the human capital they accumulated in their home country. Consequently, the theory predicts that these individuals will be less likely to commit crime.

As just one example, consider that non-economic migrants such as asylum seekers and refugees do not migrate for economic reasons but rather due to the political situation in their home country. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that these migrants do not fully plan migration and may not invest in advance in the transferability of their stock of human capital or in the country-specific human capital of the receiving nation. Hence, asylum seekers and refugees are likely to face greater earnings disadvantages compared to those who migrate for economic reasons, which has implications for their propensity to engage in crime. Stated alternatively, immigrants who are selected according to their skills are more likely to be successful in the labor market of the receiving country and to adapt more rapidly into the new economic environment as compared to chain migrants or refugees, which suggests they should be less likely to commit crime (Bauer et al. 2000). Compounded with this, refugees from war torn countries often experience physical torture and suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, making adjustment into the new country even more challenging.

The implication of this discussion is that a fuller understanding of the findings of this study require comparing and contrasting immigrant groups based upon their motives to migrate to the U.S. One critical distinction, as just noted, is between those with an economic motive to migrate (e.g., workers) and those with a non-economic motive to migrate (e.g., refugees, asylum seekers). Our expectation is that Southern California neighborhoods with greater concentrations of immigrants that migrate due to non-economic motives will have higher crime rates, all else equal. We also suspect that variation in migration motive is strongly associated with different immigrant/immigration characteristics, such as the country of origin of different immigrant groups as well as their racial and ethnic composition. It is also the case there may be sharp contrasts between differing groups that migrate for the same general reason. In the context of an economic motive to migrate, for example, consider the fact that immigrants from India are far more

likely to enter the U.S. with a college degree than, for example, immigrants from Mexico or Ecuador (Zhou 2001), a finding also true in Southern California. Indeed, the undocumented immigrant population in Southern California, as much of the U.S., is disproportionately comprised of poor young males who have recently arrived from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and a few other Latin American countries to work in low-wage jobs requiring little formal education (Rumbaut and Ewing 2007:4). Differences such as these may account for some of the findings reported in the study.

Another explanation behind the study findings is likely linked to varying assimilation levels among the different immigrant groups both across and within grouping strategies. A firmly established finding in the literature is that immigrants are less crime-prone than their native-born counterparts (Bersani 2014; Butcher and Piehl 1998b:654; Hagan and Palloni 1999:629; MacDonald and Saunders 2012; Martinez and Lee 2000; Martinez 2002; McCord 1995; Olson, Laurikkala, Huff-Corzine, and Corzine 2009; Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005; Tonry 1997). In fact, in an extensive review of the literature, Martinez and Lee (2000:496) conclude that: "…the major finding of a century of research on immigration and crime is that immigrants…nearly always exhibit lower crime rates than native groups." This finding is often referred to as the immigrant paradox, or the "counterintuitive finding that immigrants have better adaptation outcomes than their national peers despite their poorer socioeconomic conditions" (Sam, Vedder, Ward, and Horenczyk 2006:125) as well as "despite community conditions that sociologists traditionally associated with 'social disorganization'" (Lee and Martinez 2006:90; see also Taft 1933:76).

A related observation from this research, however, is that the individual-level link between immigrants and crime appears to wane across generations. That is, the children of immigrants who are born in the U.S. exhibit higher offending rates than their parents (Lopez and Miller 2011; Morenoff and Astor 2006:36; Rumbaut et al. 2006:72; Sampson et al. 2005; Taft 1933; Zhou and Bankston 1998). Relatedly, research finds that assimilated immigrants have higher rates of criminal involvement compared to unassimilated immigrants (Alvarez-Rivera, Nobles, and Lersch 2014; Bersani, Loughran, and Piquero 2014; Morenoff and Astor 2006:47; Zhou and Bankston 2006:124). Findings such as these have led

scholars to describe an "assimilation paradox" (Rumbaut and Ewing 2007:2), where the crime problem reflects "not the foreign born but their children" (Tonry 1997:20).

These findings are puzzling to many because as traditionally theorized, the process of assimilation is hypothesized to involve acquisition by immigrants and their descendants of English-language proficiency, higher levels of education, valuable new job skills, and other attributes that ease their entry into U.S. society and improve their chances of economic success, thereby reducing—not increasing—criminal behavior. So how can we explain these counter-intuitive findings? One explanation focuses on the idea that assimilation presents a specific set of challenges, which increase the propensity to engage in crime: "Born or raised in the United States, they [the children of immigrants] inherit their immigrant parents' customs and circumstances but come of age with a distinctively American outlook and frame of reference and face the often-daunting task of fitting into the American mainstream while meeting their parents' expectations, learning the new language, doing well in school, and finding decent jobs" (Rumbaut et al. 2006:65; see also Foner and Dreby 2011; Samaniego and Gonzalez 1999). Illustrating this challenge, a case study of Vietnamese youth living in a New Orleans' Vietnamese enclave reveals that children are subject to two opposing sets of contextual influences: "On the one hand, the ethnic community was tightly knit and encouraged behaviors such as respect for elders, diligence in work, and striving for upward social mobility into mainstream American society. The local American community, on the other hand, was socially marginalized and economically impoverished, and young people in it reacted to structural disadvantages by erecting oppositional subcultures to reject normative means to social mobility" (Zhou and Bankston 2006:119). Fortunately, the family and broader community can help adjudicate the competing forces associated with assimilation. Zhou and Bankston (2006) find, for example, that "although Vietnamese young people lived in a socially marginal local environment they were shielded from the negative influences of that environment by being tightly bound up in a system of ethnic social relations providing both control and direction" (pg. 119-120), and conclude that "The more that families function to pull young people into the ethnic community and the more the ethnic community

guides them toward normative orientations consistent with those of the larger society, the less those young people are drawn toward the alternative social circles of local youth" (pg. 136).

The implication of this discussion is that some of the variation in findings both within and across immigrant grouping strategies may be associated with differential assimilation levels among the immigrant groups. Those neighborhoods with higher concentrations of 2nd and later generation immigrants, or more assimilated immigrants, are more likely to have higher crime rates, all else equal. Of course there are always exceptions to this, which will likely be the case for immigrants in Southern California neighborhoods. For example, research finds that self-selected economic migrants from many Asian cultures have lower crime rates than the resident population in the first *and* in subsequent generations (Tonry 1997:22). This may or may not be true in the case of Asian immigrants in Southern California, especially because "The fact that most Vietnamese, Cambodians, Lao and Hmong arrived in the United States—California included—as refugees rather than as immigrants has made their adjustment here different from that of other Asian groups" (Allen and Turner 1997:154).

Given space constraints, we have focused on motives for migration and levels of assimilation as two key factors that may help account for some of the findings of this study. However, we acknowledge additional factors are likely at play including, for example, the historical time period in which particular immigrant groups settled into the Southern California region. In line with Reid et al. (2005:762), "it is quite possible that the relationship between immigration and crime is historically contingent." Indeed, "…ethnic groups in Southern California with a large proportion of immigrants may differ from each other in characteristics that relate to the timing of their arrival and modifications of U.S. law" (Allen and Turner 1997:39), although what those differences are may be less obvious. Moreover, we recognize there is great variation among immigrant groups in terms of their levels of transnationalism, or of sustained social contacts over time and across national borders (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999). Many immigrant groups in Southern California, but especially those from Mexico as well as Central and Latin America, retain active ties to their home countries even as they remain in the Southern California region. The effects of these multiple bonds on economic, social, and psychological integration and ethnic identity

formation—not to mention crime—are no doubt salient and warrant attention in future research. And finally there is the role of culture, which is notoriously difficult to measure let alone define. Yet we know that cultural differences between structurally similarly situated immigrants (and immigrants in structurally similar neighborhoods) can result in sharply different crime patters (Tonry 1997:23).

In sum, explanations for the findings of this study are likely tremendously complex. Differences in immigrant cultural backgrounds and reasons for migration, as well as structural circumstances that contextualize migration and settlement experiences, no doubt play a role in making sense of the study's findings more specifically—even as they powerfully condition the relationship between immigration and crime more generally. Regardless of the explanations, this study has demonstrated the utility of moving beyond a unitary view of all immigrant groups as undifferentiated in understanding neighborhood crime rates.

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Tables and Figures

Table1. Summary statistics of the variables included in models

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Outcomes				
Violent crime	38.61	46.02	0.00	560
Property crime	217.05	207.18	0.00	2479
Independent variables				
Percent Immigrants	33.53	14.91	0.00	100
Racial/Ethnic grouping				
Hispanic/Latino Immigrant	18.92	15.59	0.00	78.22
White Immigrant	4.09	5.58	0.00	44.88
Black Immigrant	0.33	0.85	0.00	13.88
Asian Immigrant	8.22	10.02	0.00	80.46
Region of the World				
East Africa	0.12	0.53	0.00	10.57
Mid Africa	0.01	0.12	0.00	4.87
North Africa	0.13	0.42	0.00	7.66
South Africa	0.06	0.30	0.00	8.44
West Africa	0.10	0.45	0.00	9.67
East Asia	3.47	6.67	0.00	68.50
South-East Asia	4.04	5.45	0.00	44.17
South Asia	1.53	2.83	0.00	30.51
West Asia	1.00	2.55	0.00	31.31
Oceania	0.07	0.26	0.00	4.50
East Europe	0.63	1.57	0.00	26.95
North Europe	0.27	0.55	0.00	10.75
South Europe	0.25	0.53	0.00	8.56
West Europe	0.39	0.65	0.00	6.12
North America	0.36	0.64	0.00	10.75
South America	0.85	1.14	0.00	10.99
Caribbean	0.26	0.55	0.00	7.00
Central America	17.88	15.67	0.00	77.34
Immigrant Factors				
Chinese	1.83	4.92	0.00	68.50
East Asian	4.64	6.29	0.00	51.64
Southeast Asian	1.44	3.33	0.00	42.68
Central America	4.00	5.98	0.00	54.34
South America	0.27	0.61	0.00	7.37
South-central America	0.35	0.64	0.00	7.59
Western European	0.76	1.02	0.00	10.75
Russian	0.50	1.53	0.00	26.38
Middle East	1.43	3.27	0.00	40.86

Egypt-Peru	0.34	0.72	0.00	10.27
Mexico	13.84	12.74	0.00	56.38
Controls				
Concentrated disadvantage	0.19	10.96	-49.45	50.17
Residential stability	-0.03	0.78	-1.90	2.21
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	47.58	17.12	0.00	77.22
Percent black	6.70	11.44	0.00	89.63
Percent native Latino	24.51	15.24	0.00	100.00
Population density	0.00425	0.00404	0.00	0.04525
Percent occupied units	93.42	5.64	22.19	100
Percent aged 16 to 29	23.40	9.17	0.00	100
Percent industrial area	5.40	10.96	0.00	100
Percent office area	3.58	6.52	0.00	86.69
Percent residential area	58.82	26.03	0.00	100
Percent retail area	6.80	7.63	0.00	66.69
Spatial lags				
Concentrated disadvantage	0.00	0.97	-2.32	2.64
Residential stability	0.00	0.57	-1.31	1.76
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	57.65	10.12	13.37	73.48
Percent black	6.79	7.08	0.00	39.42
Percent native Latino	44.62	19.51	4.99	91.30
Percent occupied units	93.47	1.91	77.31	99.22
Percent aged 16 to 29	23.42	3.64	0.00	43.38

N = 2,740 tracts in 219 cities

Table 2. Socio-demographic composition of neighborhoods with at least 3 percent residents of immigrants for each racial/ethnic group, and from a particular factor

		Particular racial/ethnic group				From a particular factor										
	All	White	Asian	Black	Latino	Anglo Saxon	Muslim	Jewish	Chinese	East Asian	Pyramid societies	New World	South America	Southeast Asian asylum	Mexicans	Central American asylum
Violent crime	38.6	23.9	29.7	45.5	42.6	21.7	20.3	28.2	20.7	27.6	25.6	33.1	19.5	33.5	45.6	52.1
Property crime	217.0	212.6	215.9	235.9	221.2	214.1	186.7	236.9	203.0	215.1	204.7	315.0	146.9	232.5	220.1	206.3
Avg household income	80,519	103,538	86,010	73,176	71,008	127,924	108,097	99,312	93,452	85,513	83,371	80,043	77,211	75,601	65,712	56,901
Avg home value	170,948	242,364	182,419	182,420	147,053	326,364	245,564	305,274	201,009	183,162	155,789	206,305	177,929	144,459	131,352	116,470
Percent Immigrant	33.5	29.5	35.5	34.4	35.7	24.9	35.0	35.2	40.2	36.5	39.2	37.3	37.5	42.1	37.1	43.4
Avg years since migration for immigrant	18.7	18.9	18.8	17.7	18.6	19.5	18.8	18.5	18.5	18.7	18.6	20.2	19.9	18.2	18.5	18.3
Immigrated within 1-7 years	21.8	22.0	22.2	24.9	22.3	20.9	23.0	22.4	24.1	22.7	24.5	22.2	21.5	23.5	22.5	23.5
Immigrated within 8-17 years	23.8	22.2	23.5	24.8	24.6	19.7	22.7	25.3	24.2	23.4	21.6	19.4	19.8	25.8	25.1	26.1
Immigrated within 18-27 years	24.5	22.6	24.8	24.8	25.3	20.3	24.3	22.3	23.9	24.8	26.2	21.9	25.3	26.3	25.6	27.3
Immigrated more than 28 years ago	25.4	27.9	25.4	21.3	24.2	32.4	26.0	25.7	24.6	25.2	24.5	33.4	29.9	21.7	23.4	21.1
Percent Asian	12.4	13.3	18.1	14.3	11.9	9.0	13.3	8.6	33.7	20.2	15.5	10.8	13.1	28.1	11.3	9.7
Percent Black	6.7	3.9	4.7	18.4	7.2	3.2	3.3	3.7	2.7	4.7	3.8	3.1	4.7	4.0	7.4	9.1
Percent Latino	43.6	23.2	37.5	34.9	49.8	13.0	22.2	17.5	29.0	35.8	42.6	45.9	41.2	41.1	55.0	64.8
Percent White	34.7	56.4	36.9	29.2	28.7	72.0	58.1	67.1	32.0	36.4	35.6	37.3	38.3	24.5	24.2	14.8
Percent with bachelor's degree	28.6	44.5	33.3	31.3	23.6	54.0	44.6	50.2	42.0	34.9	30.6	31.0	31.9	26.8	20.0	16.1
Avg length of residence	9.5	9.4	9.5	8.6	9.4	9.7	9.5	8.4	9.8	9.2	9.4	11.1	9.2	9.8	9.4	9.2
Percent family with kids	48.9	43.7	47.1	47.6	50.1	37.7	43.9	38.5	44.5	46.8	50.4	42.9	46.3	48.6	51.2	53.4
Percent persons in owner-occupied units	52.1	55.7	54.0	41.8	49.8	58.2	54.6	40.1	56.8	53.5	59.0	48.0	49.5	53.5	48.5	39.9
Population density	10,996	9,116	10,931	13,753	11,868	6,934	10,205	13,626	9,896	11,599	10,600	14,472	14,610	10,768	12,381	16,706
N	2788	1097	1772	285	2347	115	384	109	365	1272	40	25	28	362	2051	1023

Table 3. Socio-demographic composition of neighborhoods with at least 3 percent residents of immigrants from a particular region of the world

	All	South Africa	North Europe	West Europe	South Asia	Oceania	North America	East Europe	North Africa
Violent crime	38.6	31.5	23.0	24.5	18.5	50.5	21.9	29.5	24.0
Property crime	217.0	293.5	216.3	209.1	203.6	247.1	215.9	238.2	162.4
Avg household income	80,519	150,470	146,962	127,022	113,572	112,000	106,250	95,552	93,102
Avg home value	170,948	327,983	378,411	345,968	244,270	334,413	271,361	297,703	187,054
Percent Immigrant	33.5	29.3	25.9	26.0	34.3	28.4	26.8	35.0	32.7
Avg years since migration for immigrant	18.7	18.8	20.6	20.1	18.6	17.5	19.7	18.2	19.9
Immigrated within 1-7 years	21.8	22.1	15.8	19.1	23.9	27.2	22.0	22.3	19.6
Immigrated within 8-17 years	23.8	22.8	22.7	18.9	22.7	20.6	18.9	26.1	21.4
Immigrated within 18-27 years	24.5	21.6	20.1	23.3	23.9	19.9	19.6	22.3	26.8
Immigrated more than 28 years ago	25.4	27.9	35.2	32.7	25.6	25.6	33.7	24.5	28.4
Percent Asian	12.4	13.6	7.2	8.4	19.8	13.0	7.8	9.0	14.7
Percent Black	6.7	2.5	2.6	2.6	3.8	3.7	6.6	3.9	5.4
Percent Latino	43.6	15.0	10.4	12.9	19.5	16.6	17.6	18.5	34.6
Percent White	34.7	65.8	76.9	72.5	53.6	63.6	65.2	65.3	42.5
Percent with bachelor's degree	28.6	59.6	61.0	54.1	48.8	53.0	49.1	48.2	34.2
Avg length of residence	9.5	9.0	9.8	10.8	9.1	9.4	8.6	8.3	9.8
Percent family with kids	48.9	43.9	34.4	38.4	45.3	39.6	38.3	38.8	47.7
Percent persons in owner-occupied units	52.1	56.7	57.1	58.9	57.7	48.4	48.5	39.7	61.2
Population density	10,996	8,505	9,337	6,166	9,641	10,873	8,137	13,711	9,298
N	2788	39	17	28	450	44	21	119	107

Table 3. (continued)

	East Asia	West Asia	Caribbean	South Europe	South-East Asia	South America	Mid Africa	West Africa	Central America	East Africa
Violent crime	24.2	25.0	35.7	56.0	30.7	26.0	15.0	32.5	44.5	59.4
Property crime	201.7	190.9	377.0	282.2	220.5	198.8	71.5	157.4	220.4	213.3
Avg household income	91,178	84,526	84,526	82,315	79,448	77,556	75,507	70,681	67,740	65,443
Avg home value	210,227	206,380	189,096	240,501	157,139	197,032	188,833	184,153	137,336	181,826
Percent Immigrant	38.5	38.7	34.7	26.9	38.1	37.8	28.8	35.4	36.5	37.8
Avg years since migration for immigrant	18.6	18.3	19.8	18.4	18.7	18.5	17.6	17.6	18.6	16.9
Immigrated within 1-7 years	23.5	23.7	23.7	26.4	22.2	24.7	24.5	24.8	22.4	28.0
Immigrated within 8-17 years	23.3	24.3	19.3	20.9	24.3	22.8	26.8	25.1	25.0	25.9
Immigrated within 18-27 years	24.4	25.2	24.4	14.1	25.7	24.1	17.2	26.0	25.5	23.5
Immigrated more than 28 years ago	25.2	23.4	30.4	32.3	24.1	25.0	25.8	20.3	23.7	19.2
Percent Asian	25.6	11.2	13.2	11.5	21.4	14.2	6.9	14.4	11.7	16.4
Percent Black	3.9	3.7	9.7	3.5	4.7	4.1	18.7	21.0	7.5	16.5
Percent Latino	31.2	30.0	41.4	21.9	40.3	38.4	20.3	36.8	52.6	37.3
Percent White	36.6	52.2	33.4	59.5	30.9	40.4	49.7	24.8	26.0	26.8
Percent with bachelor's degree	40.0	35.4	32.5	38.9	29.6	35.0	39.1	31.3	21.5	29.1
Avg length of residence	9.3	9.5	10.5	9.3	9.5	8.8	8.4	8.3	9.4	7.9
Percent family with kids	45.3	44.7	45.0	38.4	48.0	46.7	48.4	48.2	50.7	48.1
Percent persons in owner-occupied units	51.8	48.1	47.1	47.4	54.4	45.1	38.1	39.6	48.9	36.2
Population density	12,522	11,462	11,204	11,883	11,102	13,287	13,370	15,569	12,302	15,248
N	782	247	19	13	1154	157	6	92	2180	90

Table 4. Violent crime models (Poisson regression models with robust standard errors)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Percent Immigrant	0.0007			
	0.3240			
Aggregated Census Code				
Hispanic/Latino Immigrant		0.0069 **		
		2.9707		
White Immigrant		0.0017		
		0.3596		
Black Immigrant		-0.0482 **		
		-2.9258		
Asian Immigrant		-0.0055 †		
		-1.9365		
World Regions				
East Africa			-0.0287	
			-1.2730	
Mid Africa			-0.0647	
			-0.5622	
North Africa			-0.0635 *	
			-2.1937	
South Africa			-0.0093	
			-0.2129	
West Africa			-0.1000 **	
			-3.2793	
East Asia			-0.0061	
			-1.5791	
South-East Asia			-0.0023	
			-0.5759	
South Asia			-0.0175 *	
			-1.9896	
West Asia			0.0019	
			0.2486	
Oceania			0.0154	
			0.1654	
East Europe			0.0184 †	
			1.6989	
North Europe			-0.0239	
			-0.4767	
South Europe			0.0265	
			0.6618	
West Europe			0.0742 †	
			1.7941	

North America					-0.0728	†		
					-1.8347			
South America					0.0029			
					0.1885			
Caribbean					0.0255			
					1.0276			
Central America					0.0065	**		
					2.7394			
Immigrant Factors								
Chinese							-0.0092	†
							-1.9218	
East Asian							-0.0027	
							-0.7213	
Southeast Asian asylum seekers							-0.0071	
							-1.1616	
Central America asylum seekers							0.0056	†
							1.6575	
South American							-0.0078	
							-0.3295	
New World							0.0209	
							0.9961	
Anglo Saxons							-0.0005	
							-0.0145	
Jewish							0.0301	**
							2.7337	
Muslim							-0.0070	
							-1.0435	
Pyramid societies							0.0199	
							0.8786	
Mexico							0.0083	**
							3.1404	
Controls								
Concentrated disadvantage	0.0170	*	0.0131	†	0.0120		0.0142	†
	2.4811		1.8439		1.6402		1.8803	
Residential stability	-0.1974	**	-0.2119	**	-0.2167	**	-0.1905	**
	-3.9695		-4.1903		-4.2519		-3.8177	
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	0.0063	**	0.0087	**	0.0083	**	0.0090	**
	4.3157		5.2160		4.8841		4.9449	
Percent black	0.0148	**	0.0170	**	0.0171	**	0.0156	**
	3.9843		4.3032		4.4659		4.1093	
Percent native Latino	0.0100	**	0.0069	*	0.0072	*	0.0068	*
	3.1500		2.1431		2.2069		2.1706	

Population density	-29.2128	**	-29.9107	**	-27.8895	**	-30.2470	**
	-3.7279		-3.9121		-3.6478		-3.7604	
Percent occupied units	-0.0163	**	-0.0166	**	-0.0166	**	-0.0168	**
	-3.7584		-3.8503		-3.9749		-3.9190	
Percent aged 16 to 29	-0.0012		-0.0014		-0.0015		-0.0012	
	-0.4017		-0.4781		-0.5080		-0.4061	
Percent industrial area	0.0039	*	0.0035	†	0.0032	†	0.0034	†
	2.1512		1.8974		1.8042		1.8760	
Percent office area	-0.0069	*	-0.0060	*	-0.0056	†	-0.0068	*
	-2.1767		-1.9750		-1.9070		-2.2331	
Percent residential area	0.0020		0.0019		0.0016		0.0019	
	1.4862		1.4345		1.2126		1.3798	
Percent retail area	0.0239	**	0.0238	**	0.0240	**	0.0236	**
	8.2464		8.3043		8.4928		8.3670	
Spatial lag measures (0.5 mile)								
Concentrated disadvantage	0.1847	†	0.1835	†	0.1809	†	0.1947	*
	1.8450		1.8627		1.7947		1.9733	
Residential stability	-0.0949		-0.0837		-0.0612		-0.0613	
	-1.3007		-1.1714		-0.8191		-0.8559	
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	-0.0154	**	-0.0141	**	-0.0144	**	-0.0156	**
	-5.2006		-4.6575		-4.8114		-5.1995	
Percent black	0.0102		0.0077		0.0083		0.0078	
	1.1497		0.8641		0.9278		0.8769	
Percent native Latino	-0.0027		-0.0025		-0.0027		-0.0037	
	-0.6237		-0.5877		-0.6222		-0.8645	
Percent occupied units	-0.0906	**	-0.0849	**	-0.0837	**	-0.0912	**
	-3.3111		-3.2590		-3.1484		-3.3480	
Percent aged 16 to 29	-0.0006		0.0020		0.0039		0.0042	
	-0.0522		0.1945		0.3713		0.3942	
Intercept	13.1212	**	12.4383	**	12.3305	**	13.0976	**
	5.4257		5.4348		5.2798		5.4422	
pseudo-r square	0.6343		0.6385		0.6422		0.6387	
chi2			21.83		45.9		36.06	
Prob > chi2			3		17		10	
df			0.0001		0.0002		0.0001	
N	2740		2740		2740		2740	
*** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).*								
Fixed effects of cities are included but not shown								
T-values below coefficients.								

Table 5. Property crime models (Poisson regression models with robust standard errors)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
Percent Immigrant	-0.0052	**						
	-3.0623							
Aggregated Census Code								
Hispanic/Latino Immigrant			-0.0025					
			-1.2228					
White Immigrant			0.0048					
			1.3456					
Black Immigrant			-0.0182					
			-1.1587					
Asian Immigrant			-0.0077	**				
			-3.5409					
World Regions								
East Africa					0.0058			
					0.2680			
Mid Africa					-0.0293			
					-0.1932			
North Africa					-0.0473			
					-1.6201			
South Africa					0.0044			
					0.1506			
West Africa					-0.0856	**		
					-2.8575			
East Asia					-0.0084	**		
					-2.8904			
South-East Asia					-0.0063	†		
					-1.9499			
South Asia					0.0051			
					0.8776			
West Asia					0.0019			
					0.3548			
Oceania					-0.0019			
					-0.0388			
East Europe					0.0050			
					0.6095			
North Europe					-0.0017			
					-0.0530			
South Europe					0.0649	*		
					2.3555			
West Europe					0.0037			
					0.1561			

North America					0.0086			
					0.2772			
South America					0.0042			
					0.2892			
Caribbean					0.0678	†		
					1.7830			
Central America					-0.0027			
					-1.2997			
Immigrant Factors								
Chinese							-0.0138	**
							-4.2786	
East Asian							-0.0043	
							-1.5035	
Southeast Asian asylum seekers							-0.0078	
							-1.5295	
Central America asylum seekers							-0.0072	*
							-2.3969	
South American							-0.0065	
							-0.3077	
New World							0.0806	*
							2.3528	
Anglo Saxons							0.0136	
							0.6856	
Jewish							0.0115	
							1.5982	
Muslim							0.0018	
							0.3676	
Pyramid societies							-0.0067	
							-0.3680	
Mexico							-0.0010	
							-0.4066	
Controls								
Concentrated disadvantage	0.0001		-0.0008		-0.0005		0.0003	
	0.0415		-0.2113		-0.1269		0.0724	
Residential stability	-0.1823	**	-0.1788	**	-0.1708	**	-0.1682	**
	-5.8474		-5.7040		-5.6492		-5.4574	
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	0.0061	**	0.0073	**	0.0067	**	0.0071	**
	4.4922		4.7618		4.2340		4.3983	
Percent black	-0.0015		-0.0004		0.0002		-0.0006	
	-0.6850		-0.2030		0.0733		-0.2692	
Percent native Latino	-0.0005		-0.0003		0.0003		-0.0004	
	-0.2186		-0.1281		0.1295		-0.1549	

Population density	-85.1006	**	-85.0892	**	-83.1918	**	-84.9816	**
	-11.7776		-11.6263		-11.6074		-11.6893	
Percent occupied units	-0.0117	**	-0.0119	**	-0.0117	**	-0.0113	**
	-2.9324		-2.9317		-2.7636		-2.7629	
Percent aged 16 to 29	0.0010		0.0012		0.0014		0.0016	
	0.4752		0.5250		0.5999		0.7322	
Percent industrial area	0.0095	**	0.0093	**	0.0091	**	0.0090	**
	5.9881		5.8158		5.7810		5.7676	
Percent office area	0.0057	*	0.0054	*	0.0055	*	0.0049	†
	2.2320		2.1165		2.0901		1.8944	
Percent residential area	0.0036	**	0.0034	**	0.0032	**	0.0033	**
	3.6719		3.4823		3.2139		3.3343	
Percent retail area	0.0298	**	0.0299	**	0.0299	**	0.0299	**
	12.2574		12.3791		12.2987		12.4420	
Spatial lag measures (0.5 mile)								
Concentrated disadvantage	-0.0093		-0.0042		-0.0036		0.0145	
	-0.1196		-0.0546		-0.0445		0.1836	
Residential stability	-0.0438		-0.0387		-0.0406		-0.0426	
	-0.7276		-0.6480		-0.6262		-0.6897	
Racial/ethnic heterogeneity	-0.0011		-0.0013		-0.0019		-0.0031	
	-0.4758		-0.5328		-0.7825		-1.2820	
Percent black	0.0126	*	0.0130	*	0.0133	*	0.0131	*
	2.2880		2.3804		2.3623		2.3236	
Percent Latino	0.0040		0.0043		0.0041		0.0028	
	1.1620		1.2572		1.1688		0.7839	
Percent occupied units	-0.0271		-0.0249		-0.0260		-0.0218	
	-1.4344		-1.3373		-1.3638		-1.1458	
Percent aged 16 to 29	0.0145	†	0.0159	†	0.0152	†	0.0171	*
	1.7612		1.9537		1.8529		2.0748	
Intercept	7.6497	**	7.3608	**	7.5025	**	7.1745	**
	4.5663		4.4698		4.4650		4.2424	
pseudo-r square	0.5558		0.5579		0.5639		0.5625	
chi2			15.19		37.64		33.92	
Prob > chi2			0.0017		0.0028		0.0002	
df			3		17		10	
N	2740		2740		2740		2740	
*** p < .01(two-tail test), * p < .05 (two-tail test), † p < .05 (one-tail test).*								
Fixed effects of cities are included but not shown								
T-values below coefficients.								

Appendix

Table A1. Classification of Immigrant groups in three classification schemes: 1) world region; 2) racial group; 3) geographic co-location factors

Country Name (census)	World region	Racial group	Factor
Afghanistan	South Asia	White	
Argentina	South America	Hispanic/Latino	South American
Armenia	West Asia	White	Muslim
Australia	Oceania	White	
Austria	West Euro	White	
Bangladesh	South Asia	Asian	
Barbados	Caribbean	Black	
Bolivia	South America	Hispanic/Latino	
Bosnia	South Euro	White	
Brazil	South America	White	
Cambodia	South-East Asia	Asian	Southeast Asian asylum seekers
Canada	North America	White	Anglo Saxon
Central Africa	Mid-Africa	Black	
Chile	South America	Hispanic/Latino	
China	East Asia	Asian	Chinese
Colombia	South America	Hispanic/Latino	South American
Costa Rica	Central America	Hispanic/Latino	
Cuba	Caribbean	Hispanic/Latino	New World
Czech	Eastern Europe	White	
Dominican Republic	Caribbean	Hispanic/Latino	
Ecuador	South America	Hispanic/Latino	New World
Egypt	North Africa	white	Pyramid societies
El Salvador	Central America	Hispanic/Latino	Central American asylum seekers
Ethiopia	East Africa	Black	
France	West Euro	White	
Germany	West Euro	White	Anglo Saxon
Ghana	West Africa	Black	
Greece	South Euro	White	
Guatemala	Central America	Hispanic/Latino	Central American asylum seekers
Guyana	South America	Black	
Haiti	Caribbean	Black	
Honduras	Central America	Hispanic/Latino	Central American asylum seekers
Hong Kong	East Asia	Asian	Chinese

Hungary	Eastern Europe	White	
India	South Asia	Asian	East Asian
Indonesia	South-East Asia	Asian	Chinese
Iran	South Asia	White	Muslim
Iraq	West Asia	White	Muslim
Ireland	Northern Europe	White	
Israel	West Asia	White	Jewish
Italy	South Euro	White	New World
Jamaica	Caribbean	Black	
Japan	East Asia	Asian	East Asian
Jordan	West Asia	White	
Korea	East Asia	Asian	East Asian
Laos	South-East Asia	Asian	
Lebanon	West Asia	White	Muslim
Malaysia	South-East Asia	Asian	
Mexico	Central America	Hispanic/Latino	Mexican
Netherlands	West Euro	White	
Nicaragua	Central America	Hispanic/Latino	Central American asylum seekers
Nigeria	West Africa	Black	
Other Australian	Oceania	White	
Other Caribbean	Caribbean	Hispanic/Latino	
Other Central America	Central America	Hispanic/Latino	
Other East Africa	East Africa	Black	
Other East Asia	East Asia	Asian	
Other East Europe	Eastern Europe	white	
Other North Africa	North Africa	white	
Other North America	North America	white	
Other North Europe	Northern Europe	White	
Other South Africa	South Africa	Black	
Other South America	South America	Hispanic/Latino	
Other South Europe	South Euro	white	
Other South-Central Asia	South Asia	Asian	
Other South-East Asia	South-East Asia	Asian	
Other West Africa	West Africa	Black	
Other West Asia	West Asia	Asian	
Other West Europe	West Euro	White	
Pakistan	South Asia	Asian	
Panama	Central	Hispanic/Latino	

	America		
Peru	South America	Hispanic/Latino	Pyramid societies
Philippines	South-East Asia	Asian	East Asian
Poland	Eastern Europe	White	
Portugal	South Euro	White	
Romania	Eastern Europe	White	
Russia	Eastern Europe	White	Jewish
Sierra Leone	West Africa	Black	
South Africa	South Africa	White	
Spain	South Euro	Hispanic/Latino	
Sweden	Northern Europe	White	
Syria	West Asia	White	
Taiwan	East Asia	Asian	Chinese
Thailand	South-East Asia	Asian	Southeast Asian asylum seekers
Trinidad	Caribbean	Black	
Turkey	West Asia	White	
UK	Northern Europe	White	Anglo Saxon
Ukraine	Eastern Europe	White	Jewish
Venezuela	South America	Hispanic/Latino	
Vietnam	South-East Asia	Asian	Southeast Asian asylum seekers
Yugo	South Euro	White	