University of California
Los Angeles

Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Florence Grace Hoi Yin So

2012

Abstract of the Dissertation

Party Leadership Selection in Parliamentary Democracies

by

Florence Grace Hoi Yin So

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2012

Professor Kathleen Bawn, Chair

My doctoral dissertation begins with this puzzle: why do large, moderate parties sometimes select leaders who seem to help improve their parties' electoral performances, but other times choose unpopular leaders with more extreme policy positions, in expense of votes? I argue that leadership selection is dependent on both the electoral institution that a party finds itself in and the intra-party dynamics that constrain the party. Due to a high degree of seat-vote elasticity that is characteristic of majoritarian systems, replacing unpopular leaders is a feasible strategy for opposition parties in these systems to increase their seat shares. In contrast, in proportional systems, due to low seat-vote elasticity, on average opposition parties that replace their leaders suffer from vote loss. My model of party leadership selection shows that since party members can provide valuable election campaign effort, they can coerce those who select the party leader (the selectorate) into choosing their preferred leader. When selectorate members are moderate, extreme leaders may emerge if non-selectorate members credibly threaten to withhold campaign effort. The more that the extreme non-selectorate members value issue advocacy over the party's electoral welfare, the more extreme the chosen party leader is.

Two original datasets on 12 parliamentary democracies of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), one comprised of the dates of party leadership tenure, and the other on leadership election results, highlight my research question's empirical

relevance. These data reveal that on average, new opposition party leaders in single-member district (SMD) systems increase their parties' vote share, but the reverse occurs in multi-member district (MMD) systems. Through field research in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, I interviewed 72 members of parliament (MPs), 7 former party leaders and party leadership candidates, and 18 senior party officers. These interviews serve to support my model's predictions.

My dissertation offers an explanation for why parties sometimes seem to injure themselves in the electoral arena by choosing unpopular leaders. It underscores the importance of electoral systems in understanding the dynamics of intra-party politics and the feasibility of different electoral strategies. In addition, intra-party policy conflict influences election outcomes. Moreover, it highlights how, paradoxically, large parties that prioritize their parties' electoral welfare sometimes sacrifice voter representation in order to mobilize party activists.

The dissertation of Florence Grace Hoi Yin So is approved.

James F. Adams

Jeffrey B. Lewis

Michael F. Thies

Kathleen Bawn, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2012

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Acknowledgments

This work is the product of generosity found within the political science community. I am truly fortunate to have an incredibly hands-on dissertation committee. Each of them has been honest with me when I needed a dose of humility, but also immensely encouraging when I needed a boost of confidence. In the beginning stages of writing my dissertation prospectus, my chair and advisor, Kathy Bawn, candidly told me that I needed to "learn to play the scales before I can play Rachmaninov." This remains one of the best career advices I have received. She showed me the beauty in simple theoretical arguments, taught me the finesse of conveying complex formal models in simple terms, convinced me to embrace different approaches in research design, and drilled into my head that good writing is an essential part of political science research. Most importantly, she shaped my ability to critique my own work. I owe my career as a political scientist to her.

Jim Adams has been an integral part of my dissertation writing process. Uncharacteristic of outside committee members, he read every word of this dissertation! Jim sees the potential of every research idea, and has the rare ability to parse out the good parts amidst the bad in every project. His keen judgment of the strengths and weaknesses of my earlier drafts made them immeasurably better. Jeff Lewis was a constant presence in my graduate education, not least because he taught me the necessary quantitative skills to complete this project. His mind reader-like ability to identify my reservations about certain parts of my dissertation and his insights on what I can do to improve upon them were invaluable. His sound counsel vastly improved both my theoretical analysis and statistical testing. Last but definitely not least, Mike Thies contributed to my graduate education much more than required of a committee member. As my "vice advisor," he illuminated the need to "know how things work on the ground" and taught me to consider the empirical validity of all my theoretical ideas. More importantly, as the most careful researcher I know, he trained me to meticulously comb through all my assumptions about the real world–the devil is in the details–and be precise in

presenting evidence. While my committee's imprints are on every page of this dissertation, all errors are truly my own.

I also thank Flemming Juuls Christensen, Thomas Meyer, Guillermo Rosas, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, Heather Stoll, and Jonathan Woon, who have graciously provided useful comments on earlier drafts of my dissertation chapters. Conference panel participants imparted valuable suggestions, which I incorporated into my dissertation.

The Stokes Dissertation Research Fellowship (British Politics Group of the American Political Science Association), the Summer Dissertation Research Fellowship (UCLA Center for European and Eurasian Studies), and UCLA Department of Political Science provided generous funding for my field research. Rudy Andeweg, Bert van der Braak, and Catherine de Vries educated me on the ins and outs of Dutch politics and party leaders. Nicholas Aylott and Jenny Madestam are integral parts of my field research in Sweden. Jenny imparted critical knowledge of the left-right policy divisions within the Social Democrats, particularly on the factions that different electoral districts and MPs belonged to. She also provided detailed accounts of the conflicts leading up to the selection of Håkan Juholt and Stefan Löfven. Nick, who inspired my choice of Sweden as a case study, gave me pointers on my interviews with Swedish MPs and Swedish social norms. He also educated me on the country's politics and offered sound analyses and up-to-date knowledge of the Social Democrats, including the (strange) dynamics of leadership selection in the party. In addition, he provided excellent comments on an earlier draft of this dissertation's Chapter 2. Tim Bale and Tim Heppell were responsible for any success I had in my field research experience in the United Kingdom. Tim Bale provided insider knowledge of the British Conservative Party and important insights on the characteristics of Conservative leaders. He also suggested names of MPs for interviews and, at one point, went through the complete list of current Conservative MPs with me in order to help me distinguish between the "conservative" and "liberal" ones. Tim Heppell was also generous with his time in providing his knowledge on the British Labour Party. Not only did he offer valuable advices on the interview process, but he also gave me a list of contacts for the British MPs' parliamentary aides to ensure a higher response rate

in my interview requests. These scholars deserve my deepest thanks.

I am indebted to the British, Dutch, and Swedish MPs and party officials who granted me interviews and patiently explained their perspectives and insider knowledge of their parties despite their hectic schedules, especially since some of these interviews were held during the last week of the parliamentary session and budget week. My special thanks goes out to MPs who offered me private tours of the British, Dutch, and Swedish parliaments. I am grateful to the parliamentary aides who helped me set up the interviews, in particular Erik Grol, who personally convinced some skeptical Dutch MPs that I was an academic and not a journalist in disguise. I also thank Johan Burger, who not only set up an interview with Ruth Peetom, CDA's party chair, but personally drove me to the 2012 CDA election congress and allowed me to observe a closed-door Executive Board meeting.

My political science peers at UCLA also provided generous help during my time there. In particular, Mac Bunyanunda, Darin Dewitt, and Koji Kagotani read drafts of my research proposals and fellowship applications. My coffee breaks and lunches with them were an important source of stress relief, and my foodie dinners and LaMill outings with them made my graduate education memorable.

I would not have finished this dissertation without the support of my friends and family. My "inner circle" friends have patiently listened to my petty complaints, indulged me with adventures and pursuits when I needed an escape, and poured out words of gut-busting hilarity, love, and "*droit au but!*" (and delicious care packages!) during the most difficult times. My reliable San Francisco gang allowed themselves to be exploited as the receiving end of my stress talks, and partook in all my spontaneous culinary and other activities. The "Euros," my home away from home, were responsible for coordinating the logistical side of my field research. They were the culprits behind some of the best late-night "kitchen conversations" and hipster meals on the other side of the Atlantic, and were also the granters of Arsenal football matches. My college friends witnessed my transition from a biochemistry major to a political science Ph.D., and were encouraging every step of the way. The McKees, the newest addition to this circle, were truly indispensable as my part-time copy-editors,

cheerleaders, comedians, and providers of mouth-numbing hot sauce.

Finally, I owe my first interest in politics to conversations with my aunt Lydia and uncle Albert, and I am grateful for their encouragements. The people I am indebted to above all others are also the ones I love the most. To my parents and my brother: words are truly inadequate to describe your contributions. This dissertation is for you.

Vita

2000-2003	B.S. (Biochemistry; Interdisciplinary Study of Political Science and Religion), Calvin College.
2003-2004	M.A. (International Relations), University of San Diego.
2007-2009	Teaching Assistant, Political Science Department, UCLA.
2009-2010	Teaching Assistant, Anderson School of Business, UCLA.
2010-2011	Research Assistant for Tim Groseclose, Political Science Department, UCLA.
2011-2012	Research Assistant for Richard Sander, School of Law, UCLA.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

One of the most public displays of family strife is the British Labour Party Leadership Election of 2010. In the center was the closely watched race between the former Foreign Secretary David Miliband and his younger brother, former Energy Secretary Ed Miliband. Although the electorally popular David was perceived as the candidate with the policy positions that could attract potential voters, his brother, nicknamed "Red Ed," won the contest. The public was surprised, but staff members at the British Conservative Party's headquarters let out a loud cheer when they heard the results.[1]

There were other party leaders whose selections were, in the least, bewilderments. The British Conservative Party had also elected "flops," such as William Hague in 1997 and Iain Duncan Smith in 2001. The former championed for issues no longer relevant to the British public. The latter was so far off the policy spectrum that even his own MPs ended up deposing him. The Swedish Social Democratic Party committed a similar electoral faux pas in 2011, choosing Håkan Juholt–a man whose facial features were compared to Stalin and Super Mario–as its chief. His policy gaffes were so severe that the party's executive committee forced him to resign in 2012.

Party leaders are clearly important. They are often featured in news, offering their opinions on important national policy issues. They are the program highlights for election rallies and party congresses. Voters also look to them for the party's political messages. In the Netherlands, during general elections, major television networks usually air series of debates

[1]Hasan, Medhi, and James Macintyre. 2011. *Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader.* London: Biteback. p. 241.

among party leaders. The content of these debates is also reported by newspapers and television news. Leadership selection processes also receive ample media attention. For example, before Håkan Juholt was chosen as the Social Democratic Party Leader, *Dagens Nyheter*, Sweden's largest newspaper, had a special column dedicated to tracking the selection process. With this level of media exposure, voters should have some knowledge of the policy views of large parties' leaders.

Party leaders wield power in setting their parties' policy direction. Choosing a leader with a political message that the public deems as extreme or irrelevant is akin to giving the party a botched policy makeover. If party leaders are important, why were the above leaders chosen? Readers may be tempted to attribute these outcomes to the rules parties used to choose their leaders. Some selection mechanisms may favor more extreme candidates. Yet, both extreme and moderate party leaders were chosen under the same selection methods, and extreme leaders were selected under both democratic leadership elections, in which all party members could vote, and un-democratic procedures, in which committees appointed leaders. Or, it may be that the aforementioned leaders were chosen because charismatic, competent, and experienced leadership candidates were not available. Yet, in each case, there was a media favorite who possessed these qualities.

The above party leaders may have been chosen because the parties themselves were extreme. Yet, these parties were moderate, government contenders that witnessed their previous leaders being crowned as prime ministers. Thus, they were capable of choosing "winners." Even more puzzling, these parties were all in opposition when those leaders were selected. With eyes for the prime minister's seat, they should have selected vote maximizers, ones who could attract voters from different backgrounds and diverse preferences. Sometimes, they did. After all, in 2005, the British Conservative Party did elect David Cameron, Prime Minister as of 2012. But, as I mentioned above, sometimes they did not, selecting leaders who the public regarded as the wrong choices.

My dissertation aims to piece together this puzzle. Party elites are strategic actors who value the party's electoral well-being, yet at times they choose unpopular leaders who do

not represent the average voter. I argue that the variation in leadership choices is due to the constraints of the electoral institutions that parties are in and the intra-party dynamics that these parties face. Electoral system functions as the set of rules that all parties in the system abide by. As such, it limits the types of electoral strategies that can produce a gain in vote and seat shares. In majoritarian electoral systems, opposition parties can enhance their chances of returning to government if they replace unpopular leaders. However, in proportional electoral systems, this strategy is likely to fail. This is because the threshold for winning a parliamentary seat, which differs across electoral systems, influences government type and interparty competition. The volatile seat swing that is characteristic of majoritarian systems creates an incentive for opposition parties to replace unpopular leaders in order to capture non-core voters and boost their seat shares. In proportional systems, the more predictable translation from votes to seats takes away this incentive and limits opposition parties' ability to choose popular leaders who attract voters.

At the same time, even if the electoral system that a party finds itself in rewards leadership replacement, intra-party dynamics may cause the party to select a leader with an extreme position that turns away potential voters. While party members espouse a common ideological orientation, they do not all have the same policy preferences. This creates potential conflicts, especially if some members support a leadership candidate whose policy direction may cost potential votes. Therefore, internal policy division and strategic interactions among party members are important determinants for leadership choice. Because party members are a vital source of election campaign effort, they can, in principle, demand a leader whose policy views agree with theirs, in the process holding the party's electoral well-being hostage. Consequently, even if a party aims to improve its electoral welfare, it may still end up with an extreme leader. I construct a theoretical model that spells out the strategic interplay involving intra-party policy division and divergent goals among party members. I illustrate the empirical applicability of the model using quantitative tests and qualitative analyses of British, Dutch, and Swedish parties.

The outline of my dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I show that the likelihood

of electoral success with party leadership replacement depends on whether the party is in a majoritarian or a proportional system. Research has shown that party leaders embody their parties' political messages, and their character traits influence their parties' electoral performances. This implies that changing the leader is a plausible electoral strategy for an opposition party to capture non-core voters, improve its parliamentary seat share, and attain government status. However, the likelihood of success with this strategy hinges on the seat-vote elasticity of the electoral institution. In systems with high degrees of seat-vote elasticity, swing voters matter more for entering government and gaining seats. Thus, in majoritarian systems, the popularity of the party leader can mean the difference between opposition and government. In proportional systems, the relatively low degrees of seat-vote elasticity imply that a party leader's popularity matters less for improving the party's seat share and increasing the likelihood of government participation. In addition, since replacing leaders may signal intra-party division, in this type of electoral system, the existence of multiple parties suggests that voters may punish a party for changing its leader. My Cox Proportional Hazard model reveals that leadership exit occurs more frequently in countries with majoritarian systems. My linear regression models support my claim that, whereas in majoritarian systems, opposition parties with new leaders witness vote gains, in proportional systems, new opposition party leaders cost their parties votes.

Chapter 3 begins by asking the following, "Why do large, mainstream parties sometimes select leaders with policy positions that seem detrimental to their parties' image, but other times end up with ones that seem to help their parties win elections?" Leadership choice rests on concerns over electoral welfare, the individuals who select the leader (the selectorate), and the depth of intra-party policy divergence. Selectorate members have their own positions on various issues, but they also desire a leader who can mobilize non-selectorate members into providing election campaign effort. However, because non-selectorate members may have different policy preferences than the selectorate, and because campaigning involves costs, non-selectorate members can influence leadership choice by threatening to campaign less. This is particularly relevant if selectorate members are greatly concerned about the party's

electoral welfare, but non-selectorate members prioritize having a leader who can advocate for their issue positions. Balancing these factors, selectorate members crown a leader with a policy direction that minimizes their aggregate utility loss. Non-selectorate members react to the leader's policy position by exerting a certain level of campaign effort. My model yields three propositions. First, the closer the party leader's policy position is to the non-selectorate's position, the more campaign effort the latter group provides (Proposition 1). Second, the more extreme the selectorate and the non-selectorate's positions are, the more extreme the leader's position also is (Proposition 2). Third, non-selectorate members have the most leverage when they prioritize advocacy, but selectorate members prioritize the party's electoral welfare. When extreme non-selectorate members can threaten to withhold their campaign effort, even if moderate selectorate members prioritize the party's electoral well-being, they may end up choosing a leader whose policy position is more extreme than the average voter (Proposition 3).

Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 test these propositions using party leadership selections in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For the British parties, I employ academic case studies, data on the Conservative members of parliaments' (MPs) policy positions, and leadership election results to test Propositions 2 and 3. Personal interviews with former leadership candidates and MPs serve as supporting evidence for these two propositions. Scholarly works on party leaders and leadership selections are sparse for the Dutch and Swedish parties. For these cases, I draw supporting evidence for Propositions 1 and 3 from opinion polls, news reports and editorials, and personal interviews with former party leadership candidates, MPs, party chairs, Dutch provincial party leaders, and Swedish district party leaders.

Chapter 4 focuses on leadership elections in the British Conservative Party, which I use to provide empirical support for Proposition 2. The party's 1997, 2001, and 2005 leadership elections show that first, the decisions to remove and select a leader were separate events. Second, Heppell and Hill's (2008; 2009; 2010) datasets on Conservative MPs' policy preferences reveal that MPs' vote choices for particular leadership candidates involved concerns over how closely the candidates' policy positions matched their own. Interviews with Con-

servative MPs hint at concerns over their constituency party members' potential reactions to their leadership vote choices.

In Chapter 5, I briefly examine the 1980 British Labour Party Leadership Election and use the 2010 British Labour Party Leadership Election to provide evidence for Propositions 2 and 3. Interview data and voting patterns for this leadership election suggest that MPs' first preference votes for particular leadership candidates incorporated policy preferences and concerns over reactions from their Constituency Labour Parties' (CLPs) members. While this evidence alone does not directly support Proposition 3, it does, to a degree, reveal that MPs' voting decisions took into account the candidate preferences of their own constituency parties.

Chapter 6 is an examination of party leadership selection in the Netherlands. This country differs from the United Kingdom in multiple aspects. Representation is perfectly proportional (one electoral district with open-list proportional representation). Multi-party competition and coalition governments dominate the electoral environment. I focus on the 2006 Liberal Party (VVD) *lijsttrekker* (party list leader) election and the 2012 Labour Party (PvdA) leadership election. I first discuss each party's policy division. Next, I examine how much candidate valence influenced leadership choice and test Propositions 1 and 3. While candidate valence alone does not explain the choice of Mark Rutte as VVD's *lijsttrekker*, I cannot dismiss valence as a significant factor for Dierderik Samsom's election as the PvdA leader. Although the patterns found in opinion polls, news reports, and personal interviews do not serve as direct support for these propositions, they do suggest that sharp policy division existed at the time of these leadership elections. Data from these sources also hint at how rank-and-file members' policy preferences shaped these leadership election results.

In Chapter 7, I use leadership selections in the Swedish Social Democratic Party to illustrate how the non-selectorate influenced the selectorate's leadership choices in 2007 and 2011. With 29 electoral districts, each with its own party list, Sweden's proportional electoral system allows district party leaders the opportunity to put their preferred MPs in parliament, and gives them influence over the party's policy directions. This offers a fertile ground

for testing how non-selectorate members, in particular district party leaders, affected the leadership choices of the selectorate, which were the party's nominating committees. I examine the selection of Mona Sahlin in 2007 and the selection of Håkan Juholt in 2011 to test Proposition 3. In 2007, left-leaning district party leaders (the non-selectorate) were willing to support potential candidates who belonged to the party's right wing. This gave the nominating committee (the selectorate) the freedom to choose the right-leaning Mona Sahlin as the party leader. In 2011, left-leaning district party leaders, particularly the leaders of Skåne and Stockholm City Party Districts, were unwilling to support right-leaning candidates, even if doing so could reverse the party's electoral fortunes. Consequently, the nominating committee was constrained to choose the left-leaning Håkan Juholt, who committed so many instances of gaffe that he was forced to resign just ten months later.

I conclude with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each empirical case study. I also point out the potential implications of my dissertation for the literature on elections and party competition, and offer ideas on future works on the topic.

CHAPTER 2

Electoral Systems and Party Leadership Replacement in Parliamentary Democracies

2.1 Introduction

New party leaders sometimes seem to enhance the party's electoral fortune, but other times seem to damage it. Strangely, parties at times defend these electorally "ineffective" leaders. For example, on October 4^{th}, 2011, Liliane Ploumen, chairwoman of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), the largest opposition party in parliament, resigned and criticized party leader Job Cohen for "not being visible in the country." Yet, PvdA MPs publicly supported Cohen despite opinion polls projecting the party losing half its seats. Cohen did resign eventually, but it was not until February 2012, when internal disagreement on the party's policy direction became public knowledge. The Dutch People's Party of Freedom and Democracy (VVD) faced a similar problem in 2006. Mark Rutte narrowly defeated the well-known Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk in the party leadership election and headed the VVD party list for the 2006 General Election. Not only did the party lose six seats and land in opposition, but Rutte also received fewer preference votes than Verdonk. Yet, he resumed his role for the 2010 General Election and subsequently became the prime minister.

Turning our attention to success stories, in the 1997 British General Election, Labour Leader Tony Blair led the party to its biggest victory, gaining 157 seats. Similarly, in the 2010 General Election, Conservative Party Leader David Cameron helped the party gain 97 seats. All four party leaders took office when their parties were thought to be "in trouble." Yet, while Blair and Cameron were able to increase their parties' seat shares in their first

elections as party leaders, Cohen and Rutte were unable to do so.

In this chapter, I examine the feasibility of leadership replacement as an opposition party's electoral strategy to capture non-core voters and attain government status. I argue that parties may seek to improve their electoral fortunes by selecting a new leader. However, since electoral system determines party leaders' importance for winning seats and entering government, it affects both the probability of leadership replacement and the effects of leadership change on election outcomes. Consequently, party leaders in majoritarian systems are more at risk for exit than those in electoral systems that yields a more proportional distribution of seats. In addition, new opposition party leaders in majoritarian systems enhance their parties' electoral success in the next general election, but those in proportional systems cost their parties votes.

I begin with a summary of the relevant literature on party leaders. I then present my argument and the statistical results on both the factors influencing turnover and the electoral consequences of leadership replacement in 12 parliamentary democracies. I conclude with a discussion of potential endogeneity in leadership change.

2.2 The Importance of Party Leaders

Since the 1980s, party leaders in OECD countries play an increasingly important role in election campaigns, as they represent the party image and carry the campaign message (Farrell and Webb 2000: 135). At the very least, many countries now have televised debates among party leaders during election periods. Leaders also control various aspects of participating in an election, including the drafting of election manifestos (Scarrow, Farrell, and Webb (2000: 145-146). In addition, the need for governments to delegate some policy-making power towards the European Union, coupled with party membership structures becoming more disorganized, has consolidated party leaders' agenda-setting power (Raunio 2002).

Just as party leaders are integral to the formulation of policy positions, voters pay at-

tention to leadership quality.[1] Bean and Mughan (1989), for example, find that in the 1987 Australian Federal Election and the 1983 United Kingdom General Election, party leaders' effectiveness, their ability to listen to reason, being caring, and adherence to principles are significant predictors of party vote choice.[2] Midtbø's (1997) study of the 1993 Norwegian Election suggests that Norwegian voters do consider party leaders' personality traits when deciding which party to vote for. With data from 35 election studies in seven OECD countries, Bittner (2008) finds that voters' decisions to vote for a particular party include evaluations of the leader's personality traits.

Meanwhile, party leaders' tenures are susceptible to election outcomes. Andrews and Jackman (2008) examine party leadership duration in 6 OECD countries and find that party leaders are more likely to exit office if their parties did not enter government after an election. These findings suggest that parties may replace ineffective leaders as an attempt to win more seats and participate in government. However, as I argue in the next section, electoral institution factors into the feasibility of such strategy in the following manner. It influences (1) whether or not capturing non-core voters helps a party to enter into government, (2) if the party's seat share and the re-election of (prominent) MPs depends on the identity of the party leader, and (3) how voters react to leadership replacement.

2.3 Electoral Systems and Party Leaders

I begin with a party contemplating the costs and benefits of replacing its leader as an electoral strategy. I assume that large parties value government status, that MPs care about

[1]Many case studies on leadership personality find that competence and charisma are the two main leadership traits that voters care about. See Bean and Mughan (1989); Stewart and Carty (1993); Jones and Hudson (1996); Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato (1996); Midtbø(1997); Curtice and Blais (2001); Blais et al. (2001); Gidengil et al. (2000); Bartle and Crewe (2002); Kabashima and Ryosuke (2002); King ed. (2002); Evans and Anderson (2005); Jenssen and Aalberg (2006); van der Brug, Wouter, and Mughan (2007); Aart, Kees, and Blais (2009).

[2]Leadership traits contribute to a 5.8% vote advantage for the UK Conservative Party and a 3.7% advantage to the Australian Labor Party; these results hold when they control for party identification, and they apply to both ruling and opposition party leaders (1172).

being re-elected, and that replacing party leaders incurs transaction costs. Electoral institution affects the feasibility and effectiveness of this strategy in three ways. The first and second relate to the incentives for replacement: does changing leaders improve a party's electoral performance and help elected officials safeguard their posts? The seat-vote elasticities that are affiliated with different electoral systems influence whether or not parties can blame unpopular leaders for their opposition status, and if keeping these leaders lowers these parties' seat shares and harms (prominent) MPs' chances for re-election. The third relates to how voters react to replacement. Does the presence of a new leader affect voters' perception of party unity, and does this alter voter behavior? Different degrees of seat-vote elasticities, associated with two-party and multi-party systems, affect voter forgiveness for publicized conflicts.

The hallmark of majoritarian electoral systems is a high degree of seat-vote elasticity. With this feature, a party can improve its odds of being in government by replacing objectionable leaders with popular ones. The elevated threshold for obtaining seats favors large parties and creates obstacles for small parties to gain parliamentary representation. Consequently, two-party competition dominates majoritarian systems.[3] Single-party majority government becomes the norm, as the party's seat share alone will, in most cases, determine government status. Voting for a party is synonymous with choosing a prime minister; as such, the party leader becomes an essential ingredient for gaining government status. Thus, parties can credibly fault their leaders for landing/remaining in opposition, either for their inability to alter voter perception of the party's policy direction, or for their own negative public image. Many British MPs I have interviewed stressed the importance of party leaders to "look and sound prime ministerial," and that leaders who do not possess this quality not only hurt their parties' performance at the polls, but they are also more likely to be replaced.[4]

The volatility of seat-to-vote ratio in majoritarian systems suggests that popular party

[3]See Duverger (1954); Shugart and Taagepera (1989).

[4]Interviews with the author, 07/07/2011; 07/11/2011; 09/06/2011; 09/07/2011; 09/08/2011.

leaders can prolong opposition MPs' tenure. Although MPs in this type of electoral system can cultivate personal votes (Carey and Shugart 1995), this strategy is more likely to succeed for government MPs, who can legislate policies that benefit their constituencies. Opposition MPs are faced with credibility problems, as they can only promise to deliver pork.[5] For these MPs, swing voters open the door to re-election. Due to high degree of seat-vote elasticity, an MP can retain his or her seat even with a small win margin, sometimes by a handful of votes. Swing voters provide these votes. And since this type of voters are non-partisan, they may hinge their choice on the popularity of the party leader.[6] Thus, a popular leader can bolster each MP's probability of being re-elected, regardless of how much party support the district traditionally enjoys. In contrast, an unpopular leader can damage the MP's chance for re-election.[7] On a national scale, then, even if leadership popularity only improves a party's vote share by a few percent, these additional votes may bring about a substantial gain in parliamentary seats.

Replacing party leaders may signal internal division, which lowers voter opinion on the party (Ezrow 2007). Yet, in majoritarian systems, voters dissatisfied with publicized conflict may nevertheless vote for the party. As mentioned, the disproportional nature of this type of system creates barriers against small parties winning seats. Since one party dominates each side of the policy spectrum, voters who desire parliamentary representation of their policy interests have few parties to choose from. As they are, in some sense, "stuck" with voting for large parties, public display of division does not necessarily lead to an exodus of votes.[8]

[5]British Conservative and Labour MPs whom I interviewed (10/12/2011; 10/13/2011) have expressed that this is the case. Also see Kam (2009).

[6]I use the term "popular" loosely in this context. A leader's popularity can be referred either to his or her advertised policy position, or to the valence qualities.

[7]A disastrous election campaign with an unpopular leader may unseat MPs, even those from districts with strong party dominance. This is a point that one British Labour MP whom I interviewed has emphasized. Interview date: 09/14/2011. Even prominent MPs of government parties are not immune to seat loss. In the 1997 UK General Election, the then Secretary of State for Defence and Conservative MP Michael Portillo lost his seat of Enfield Southgate, which has been held by Conservative MPs since its creation, to Labour candidate Stephen Twigg with a swing of 17.4%.

[8]Kam (2009) shows that MPs in Westminster parliaments who rebel against their parties can at times increase their own vote shares in their constituencies.

The above logic implies that in majoritarian electoral systems, opposition parties' efforts to replace unpopular leaders with more popular ones can yield a handsome return in seats.

Changing a party leader impacts an opposition party differently if parliamentary seats are more proportionally distributed. Unlike in majoritarian systems, an unpopular leader may not the death knell of a party's quest for government status. Low seat-vote elasticity is characteristic of proportional systems. It gives small parties a fair chance at winning seats and hinders large parties from having a majority. Thus, coalition governments should be more common. A party's ability to participate in government, then, not only depends on the party's seat share, but is also contingent on policy compatibility with other parties and these parties' own strategic decisions. Although elections in proportional systems seem to become more personalized,[9] which suggests that a popular leader can improve a party's performance at the polls, all is moot if other parties refuse the offer to govern together. Since the coalition negotiation process involves multiple parties, a leader carries less blame for landing or remaining in opposition. This reduces the incentive to replace him or her.[10]

In proportional systems, a party leader's popularity matters less for the party's overall seat share and its MPs' re-elections. Because of lower seat-vote elasticity, a small increase in votes does not translate into a healthy return in seats. In other words, a popular leader in a proportional system will always be rewarded with fewer seats than the number of seats that an equally popular leader in a majoritarian system can bring in. This is particularly relevant for party list systems, where the ranking on the list is as important, if not more, than the party's aggregate vote share. Under closed-list systems, MPs are entirely dependent on their rankings to remain in office. Although an open-list system offers the opportunity for preference votes, few candidates can cross the threshold for direct election, and those that do are usually near the top of the list.[11] Coupled with seat-vote inelasticity, the re-election

[9]See Samuels and Shugart (2010) and Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt (2011).

[10]After the Dutch general election in 2010, even though the PvdA landed in opposition, and despite disapproval from some party activists on leader Job Cohen's performance, Cohen remained the party leader for two more years (Interview with the author, 06/27/2011).

[11]The Netherlands and Sweden are two examples of such cases.

chances for candidates ranked near the bottom are slim, regardless of the party leader's popularity. In contrast, top-ranked candidates are virtually guaranteed election, regardless of the party's performance at the polls. Moreover, since the party leader and/or the central board are responsible for drafting the party list, MPs have little incentive to publicly urge unpopular leaders to step down. As a side note, in many parties, MPs do not have the power to replace their leaders. However, because they receive media attention and can influence the outcome of bills, they do affect a leader's tenure.[12]

Replacing party leaders in proportional systems may also signal internal division.[13] But, contrary to parties in majoritarian systems, publicized conflicts hurt parties in this type of system. The low degree of seat-vote elasticity creates favorable conditions for new parties to form and small ones to gain seats. This offers the general electorate more options at the polls. Since there are multiple parties on each side of the policy spectrum, voters unhappy with party infighting can support another party with similar policy positions as their own.[14] To avoid projecting conflict, opposition parties in proportional systems should refrain from changing their leaders unless absolutely necessary. Interviews with Dutch and Swedish MPs seem to confirm the link between the importance of party unity and the party's reluctance to replace its leader. They cited the need to maintain unity as a reason that their parties do not change leaders frequently, even if these leaders failed to usher the party into government.[15] Therefore, rather than as a strategy to elicit votes, the removal of a leader is more often caused by intra-party crisis. In such an environment, the party is constrained in its ability to choose someone who is a "vote maximizer," i.e. a popular leader. And, due to the signal of

[12]For example, In 2006, Josias van Aartsen, parliamentary party leader for the Dutch party VVD, resigned because he could not gather enough VVD MPs' support for his policy direction (Interview with author, 10/03/2011).

[13]This does not apply to cases in which the incumbent party leader resigned due to apolitical reasons, such as bad health or death.

[14]Voter migration to ideologically similar parties may not harm a party's chance of entering government if the votes are transferred to its expected coalition partner. However, it may limit the party's bargaining power during coalition negotiation. Also, dissatisfied voters who decide to abstain instead would harm the party's chance of entering government.

[15]Interviews with the author, 06/28/2011; 06/29/2011; 06/30/2011; 07/05/2011; 09/29/2011.

division, voters are less likely to reward the party even if the new leader is more appealing.

Three caveats need to be addressed. I treat a leader resigning as synonymous with a party replacing its leader since, in many cases, leaders resign in anticipation that they would be forced out. In addition, my argument applies to large parties. Leadership change in these parties does not threaten the party's existence. However, it may signal the end for populist and single-issue parties whose ideological cores lie with their party leaders.[16] Also, single-issue and/or small parties may view that opposition is the most effective route for promoting their ideal policies, which implies that their electoral strategies differ from parties that are credible government contenders. Therefore, the incentives of leadership replacement for these parties should be different.

Finally, my logic applies to opposition parties. New government party leaders need additional time to become adept at handling government business, and the transaction costs associated with leadership change may outweigh the electoral benefits of doing so. In addition, since prime ministers have the resources to co-opt their opponents (Kam and Indridason 2005; 2007), they are less likely to be outmaneuvered by their rank-and-file. These imply that government parties replace their leaders due to large-scale scandals or intra-party crisis, which damages the party's electoral performance (Esrow 2007).

One possible rival explanation is that in proportional systems, since there are many parties, the media pays less attention to the selection of new opposition party leaders. Parties who underwent a leadership change may lose votes because the electorate is uncertain of these leaders' qualities and policy positions. This may be true for small parties. However, the media is unlikely to ignore leadership replacement in large parties. When the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) held a leadership election in 2012, when the party was in opposition, major newspapers such as *de Volkskrant* and *Algemeen Dagblad* published profiles of each leadership candidate. The country's largest TV station, NOS, also televised the leadership candidate debates. Thus, the existence of multiple parties does not imply that voters will

[16]For example, Geert Wilders founded the Dutch anti-immigration Party for Freedom in 2006 and is regarded as the core of the party's identity (van der Pas et al. 2011). See Katz and Mair (1995) and Strøm and Müller (1999) for differences between these parties and single-issue parties.

have little knowledge of new leaders of large opposition parties. The more likely scenario is that, not only would these events covered nationally, but there would also be speculations on internal turmoil.

An alternative mechanism of leadership replacement is that, to the extent that opposition party leaders in proportional systems are less popular than those in majoritarian systems, a party might decide to install a more popular leader as a signal to voters that it is receptive to their demands. This is especially relevant if a party's goal is to become the largest party in parliament, rather than exclusively aiming to enter into government. If so, then leadership replacement should improve an opposition party's electoral fortune in all types of systems, as voters would reward parties who replaced unpopular leaders. In other words, government status, not electoral system, determines the electoral consequences of leadership replacement.

Two testable implications follow. In majoritarian systems, parties have a higher incentive to depose unpopular leaders and are not crippled by the electoral consequences of publicized conflict. Conversely, in proportional systems, parties have less incentive to depose unpopular leaders, as they need to prevent the perception of division. Thus, the first implication is that party leaders in majoritarian systems are more at risk for exit than those in proportional systems. Second, if leadership change does occur for an opposition party in the proportional context, it will hurt the party's vote share. In contrast, for opposition parties in majoritarian systems, new leaders improve these parties' electoral fortunes. If the alternative mechanism accurately describes leadership replacement, then new opposition party leaders should attract more votes in both types of electoral systems. For convenience's sake, in the next sections I use single-member district systems (SMDs) to refer to majoritarianism, and multi-member district systems (MMDs) for electoral proportionality.

2.4 Empirical Testing

My dataset includes 28 parties in 12 OECD countries–Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and

the United Kingdom. I conceptualize a large party as one that can credibly contend for the prime ministership. Although voters do not directly elect the prime minister, all leaders in my dataset are serious contenders to become the prime minister if their parties enter government. I define a party leader as the party's *de facto* prime minister candidate.[17] Appendix A lists the coding rules for defining a large party and a party leader.

2.4.1 Electoral Systems and Party Leadership Exit

I construct a Cox proportional hazard model of leadership survival to test whether or not party leaders in SMD systems have a higher risk of exit. The unit of analysis is a leader's tenure in office, measured in months. My dependent variable is a leader's exit from office at a particular month of tenure, and my time variable is the leader's number of months in office. Because I only have information on the year of selection and exit for the Danish and Norwegian party leaders, using months as my unit of analysis effectively excludes these parties.[18] Although this reduces my sample size, I can differentiate between a party leader who left office before an election and one who left after an election or government exit, which is necessary for testing my argument's first implication. Thus, for this analysis I exclude all Norwegian and Danish parties.

My main explanatory variable is *SMD*, which takes on the value of 1 if the country employs an SMD system, and 0 otherwise. Following Andrews and Jackman (2008), I control for opposition party status and the party's exit from government.[19] I also control for a leader's age since it may affect his or her political survival. Since left wing parties are conventionally

[17]For example, Spain's *Partitdo Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) has a President and a Secretary General. I choose the Secretary General as this party's leader because all holders of this position are also MPs and/or prime ministers, and because this is the position from which all *de facto* prime ministerial candidates are drawn.

[18]Despite newspaper and online archival research, as well as calling the party headquarters, I am unable to locate the precise dates of tenures for the majority of Danish and Norwegian party leaders.

[19]While a party's exit from government at time t perfectly predicts opposition party status at time t+1, a party never exits from government and holds opposition status at the same time. Therefore, they are no confounding effects between exit from government and opposition status. In other words, the model can properly attribute the risk hazard that stems from government exit and the hazard that stems from being in opposition.

thought of as more hierarchical and ideologically coherent than right wing parties, I include a dummy variable for left wing parties. Finally, I control for those who previously occupied the post, since they may have more tumultuous political careers, leading to shorter tenures.

Table 1 presents the results. Compared to a government leader, the hazard risk of an opposition party leader is 5 times larger. The leader of a party that just left the government is 31 times more at risk for exit than one whose party did not. This ratio, though surprisingly large, is consistent with Andrews and Jackman (2008). The hazard rate for party leaders who are one year older is 97% lower than their counterparts. Other things equal, older party leaders are slightly less at risk for exit than younger ones. Consistent with my expectation, a party leader who has previously held the same office is 3.15 times more at risk for exit. Most importantly, party leaders in SMD systems are 2.31 times more at risk for exit than their MMD counterparts, which supports my argument's first implication.

Table 1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model of SMD and Party Leadership Exit

Variable	**Proportional Hazard Ratio**
Single Member Districts	2.31*
	(0.43)
Opposition Party	5.21*
	(1.00)
Party Exited from Government	31.28*
	(9.38)
Party Leader's Age	0.97*
	(0.01)
Left Wing Party	0.82
	(0.15)
Previously a Party Leader	3.15*
	(1.33)
Log Likelihood	-1132
# Observations	12,448

Note: * refers to $p < 0.05$

2.4.2 Leadership Replacement and Election Outcomes

My argument implies that new opposition party leaders are electorally beneficial to parties in SMD systems, while the reverse holds for the MMD cases. If the rival mechanism mentioned above drives leadership replacement, then all opposition parties should improve

their electoral fortunes if they replace their leaders. In other words, new opposition party leaders in both types of systems should result in vote gain.

My dependent variable for this analysis is *Party Vote Share Change*, which is the percent change in the party's national vote share from the previous general election.[20] My explanatory variable is *New Leader*, which is dichotomous and coded 1 if the party replaced its leader since the last general election, and 0 otherwise. To discern the effects of government status on a party's vote share, I construct the binary variable *In Government*, coded 1 for government parties and 0 otherwise.[21] I interact *In Government* with *New Leader* in order to separate the effects of new opposition versus government party leaders. To examine whether new opposition leaders in SMD systems affect vote shares differently than those operating in MMD systems, I interact *SMD* with *New Leader* and construct a triple interaction variable with *In Government*, *New Leader*, and *SMD*. These interactions yield four types of new party leaders–(1) opposition party leaders in MMD systems (*New Leader*), (2) opposition party leaders in SMD systems (*New Leader*SMD*), (3) government party leaders in MMD systems (*New Leader*In Government*), and (4) government party leaders in SMD systems (*New Leader*In Government*SMD*). The descriptive statistics for all variables are located in Appendix B.

I control for the following. The first is electoral institution. Large parties operating in SMD systems may on average experience more volatile vote swings than in MMD systems. Second, I control for the number of months that the party leader has been in office. Leaders with longer tenure may be more experienced campaigners, but they also may be less willing to reorient the party's policy direction. The third control is for the country's economy at the time of the election, measured as the difference in GDP growth rate.[22] The economy may

[20]I define the legislature as the Lower House if the country has a bicameral legislature. Because Germany, post-1993 Japan, and post-1993 New Zealand employ mixed-member districts, in these countries I only include the vote shares for the party lists and exclude vote shares from single-member constituencies.

[21]A party is coded as being in government if it participated in the last non-caretaker government before the general election.

[22]See Appendix A for details.

be a determinant of election outcomes, with a bad economy hurting government parties.[23] Although the relationship is not straightforward,[24] the economy is a necessary control.

Fourth, I control for the party's policy positions. A party's change in issue stances may affect vote share (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009).[25] To account for this possibility, I control for two types of policy change: how extreme the party is relative to the centrist voter in the left-right issue dimension (using the Kim Fording Voter Ideology Dataset (2006)), and the absolute magnitude of change in the left-right issue dimension (using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (2010)).[26] Finally, I include the lagged dependent variable to control for potential serial correlation of votes. I also added the year that an election occurred to control for possible time trends. However, the variable and its interaction with *New Leader* are not significant in any of the models.[27] For clarity of interpretation, I present the models without the time controls. Since a party's government status may influence its vote share in multiple ways, I interact *In Government* with control variables. Coding details for these variables are in Appendix A.

Since there may be election-specific factors that influence vote share, I construct a linear regression model for party P's vote share change in a general election, with clustered standard errors by election. The model is:

[23]For examples of empirical evidence and comparative case studies, see Harrington Jr. (1993); Børre (1997); Alvarez et al. (2000); Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2000); Blais et al. (2001); Anderson (2006); Burden (2008); and Duch and Stevenson (2008).

[24]See Nordhaus (1975); Alesina (1987); Beck (1987); Heckelman and Berument (1998); Rogoff (1990); Cargill and Hutchinson (1991); Alesina et al. (1997); and Drazen (2000).

[25]Also see Adams et al. (2004), Ezrow (2005), Tavits (2007); Somer-Topcu (2009), and Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2012).

[26]The dynamics of two-party competition implies that a shift towards the median voter increases votes. However, in MMD systems, it is unclear if moderation or an absolute change in the Left-Right issue space will increase a party's vote share, as moving away from the median voter may actually earn more votes.

[27]Results available upon request.

$$\Delta Vote_{p,t} = \alpha_{0,p,t} + \alpha_1 NewLeader_{p,t} + \alpha_2 NewLeader * Gov't_{p,t} + \alpha_3 NewLeader * SMD_{p,t} + \alpha_4 NewLeader * SMD * Gov't_{p,t} + \alpha_5 Gov't * SMD + \alpha_6 Tenure_{p,t} + \alpha_7 GDP_t + \alpha_8 Gov't * GDP_t + \alpha_9 \Delta Vote_{p,t-1} + \alpha_{10} Gov't * \Delta Vote_{p,t-1} + \alpha_{11} Gov't_{p,t} + \alpha_{12} SMD_t + election_t + \eta_{p,t} \quad (2.1)$$

$election_t$ is a random component specific to election at time t and $\eta_{p,t}$ is the left-over mean-zero party-election level component. I also include two additional models, one controlling for how extreme opposition and government parties' left-right positions are compared to the centrist voter (the variables *Extremism* and *Govt*Extremism*, respectively), and the other controlling for the magnitude of left-right dimensional change in opposition and government parties (the variables *L-R Change* and *Govt*L-R Change*, respectively). These two models help ensure that new party leaders' effects on election outcomes are not due to any potential effects from changing these parties' policy programs.[28]

The results are in Table 2. The presence of a new opposition leader in MMD systems significantly reduces the party's vote share in all three models, while in SMD systems it has the opposite effect. These support my implication that, on average, replacing leaders hurts opposition parties in MMD systems (roughly a 2% vote loss), but benefits those in SMD systems (roughly a 4% vote gain). They also suggest that new leaders' effects on their parties' vote shares do not stem from their potential impacts on their parties' policy positions. In addition, the results do not support the alternative mechanism: to the extent that voters react favorably to popular leaders, opposition parties operating in proportional systems either do not choose popular leaders, or their fortunes do not improve with popular new leaders. [29]

The control variables behave in the following manner. First, *Month of Tenure* is insignificant and small in all models. This suggests that, on average, party leaders with more

[28]It is, however, possible that leadership and policy changes are related, i.e. a party that changes its leader also resets its policy direction.

[29]These results are robust to country- and party-fixed effects, as well as re-sampling via jackknife and bootstrapping, and are available upon request.

experience neither help nor hurt their parties' electoral performances. Second, on average, a 1% increase in GDP growth rate is correlated with a 0.5% increase in a government party's vote share, though the variable is no longer significant once I control for the party's policy position. Third, government parties lose votes, which is consistent with many previous research findings. Fourth, changing a party's issue positions does not significantly alter its vote share (Model 3). However, government parties that pull their issue positions away from the centrist voter by 10 points gain 0.8% more votes than in the previous election (Model 2). This supports the findings of Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2012). Although the presence of new government leaders in both MMD and SMD systems lead to vote loss, these effects are not significant. One reason may be due to a lower rate of leadership turnover within government parties (see Appendix B), such that the estimates of the coefficient are inefficient.

Table 3 presents the marginal effects of leadership replacement on a party's vote share. Holding all other variables at their means, for an opposition party in a SMD system, a new leader increases its vote share by 1.5%, but lowers the party's vote share by 2.3% if it is in an MMD system. Table 4 offers a more substantive interpretation of these effects. In SMD systems, a government party needs the GDP to grow by 3% in order to earn 1.5% more votes in the next election (the average change in GDP growth rate during an election year for SMD systems is 3.8%). The marginal effect may seem small. However, note that during an election period, government parties may be able to manipulate the economy in order to win votes (Smith 2000). Opposition parties, which do not have this advantage, can simply replace its leader to gain the share of votes that government parties would attract with a growing economy. In contrast, a government party in an MMD system loses 2.3% of votes if the country suffers a 4.5% drop in GDP growth rate (the average change in GDP growth rate during an election year for MMD systems is 2.9%). The economy would have to take a drastic downturn for a government party in an MMD system the lose the same percentage of votes that an opposition party would incur with leadership replacement.

Table 2: Leadership Effects on Party Vote Share Change, Clustered SE by Election

	(1)	(2)	(3)
New MMD Opposition Leader	-2.24*	-2.60*	-2.41*
	(1.04)	(1.07)	(1.07)
New SMD Opposition Leader	3.71*	4.17*	4.32*
	(1.40)	(1.40)	(1.40)
New MMD Government Leader	-1.56	-0.74	-1.21
	(1.45)	(1.61)	(1.51)
New SMD Government Leader	-2.25	-3.27	-3.21
	(2.81)	(3.12)	(2.91)
Government*SMD	-0.34	-0.37	-0.38
	(1.31)	(1.38)	(1.34)
Month of Tenure	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.13	-0.14	-0.11
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Government*GDP Growth Rate	0.51*	0.42	0.39
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)
$\%\Delta Vote_{t-1}$	-0.02	0.02	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Government*$\%\Delta Vote_{t-1}$	-0.18*	-0.23*	-0.21*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Government Party	-4.24*	-5.03*	-3.65*
	(1.05)	(1.35)	(1.19)
SMD System	-1.77	-1.87	-1.81
	(0.90)	(0.98)	(0.93)
Extremism		-0.04	
		(0.02)	
Government*Extremism		0.08*	
		(0.04)	
Abs(CMP Left-Right Change)			0.00
			(0.03)
Abs(Government*CMP Left-Right Change)			-0.01
			(0.05)
Constant	3.76*	4.50*	3.76*
	(0.99)	(1.23)	(1.15)
# Observations	425	364	408
R^2	0.19	0.18	0.18

Note: * refers to $p < 0.05$

Table 3: Marginal Effects, No Policy Controls

	Mean $\%\Delta Vote_{p,t}$ No New Leader	**Mean $\%\Delta Vote_{p,t}$ New Leader**	**Marginal Effects**
Party Is in MMD Systems			
Government	-0.46%	-4.25%	-3.79%
Opposition	3.79%	1.54%	-2.25%
Party Is in SMD Systems			
Government	-2.55%	-4.99%	-2.44%
Opposition	1.99%	3.50%	1.51%

Table 4: Marginal Effects when Compared to GDP Growth Rate

	SMDs	MMDs
Opposition Party with New Leader	1.51%	-2.25%
%ΔGDP growth rate needed for a government party with no new leader to change vote share by the same amount:	3.04%	-4.46%
Average %ΔGDP growth rate at election time	3.84%	2.85%

Alternative models with only pure SMD and pure PR systems show no significant differences from the models in Table 2.[30] I also construct an alternative dependent variable as the change in a party's logged vote share from election time t-1 to election time t ($Ln[\%Vote_{p,t}] - Ln[\%Vote_{p,t-1}]$), such that the vote shares are independent of election-specific effects. The results (Table 5) are consistent with expectation. In MMD systems, the vote shares for opposition parties who replaced their leaders are on average 90% less than those in the last election. However, for opposition parties in SMD systems, the vote shares are roughly 113% of the last election. Government parties with new leaders lose votes, though this is again insignificant. Interestingly, moving a party's policy position away from the centrist voter's position does not affect its vote share significantly, suggesting that the impact of position change on a party's vote share may be election-specific.

Separating new party leaders by electoral systems may mask the effects of government type. Single-party governments are more common in majoritarian systems, while coalition governments are more prevalent in proportional systems. This suggests that the type of government that an opposition party traditionally participates in would be a more powerful predictor of new leaders' electoral effects. If so, then replacing a leader in an opposition party that traditionally forms a single-party government would help the party's electoral fortune, while the reverse would be true for an opposition party that traditionally forms a coalition government. I construct a model which separates new leaders by government type. The variable, *Single Party*, takes on a value of 1 if the party governed by itself during its last two stints in government, and 0 otherwise. This captures opposition parties that traditionally form single-party governments in MMD systems.[31] It also highlights opposition

[30]Results available upon request.

[31]These are the Spanish and Portuguese parties, the Norwegian Labour Party, the Danish Social Democratic Party before 1990, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and the Irish Fianna Fáil before 1990.

parties that traditionally form coalition governments in SMD systems (the Australian Liberal Party). However, regression results indicate that for both types of governments, the effects of new opposition party leaders on their parties' vote shares are not significant (Table C1 in Appendix C). This casts doubt on the claim that my models are misspecified.

Table 5: Leadership Effects on Ln($\%Vote_t$) - Ln($\%Vote_{t-1}$), OLS

	(1)	(2)	(3)
New MMD Opposition Leader	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.11*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
New SMD Opposition Leader	0.13*	0.14*	0.15*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
New MMD Government Leader	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
New SMD Government Leader	-0.08	-0.11	-0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Government*SMD	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Month of Tenure	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Government*GDP Growth Rate	0.02*	-0.02*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ln($\%Vote_{t-1}$) - Ln($\%Vote_{t-2}$)	-0.16*	-0.13	0.15*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Government*(Ln($\%Vote_{t-1}$) - Ln($\%Vote_{t-2}$))	-0.05	-0.12	-0.08
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Government Party	-0.17*	-0.18*	-0.14*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
SMD	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extremism		0.00	
		(0.00)	
Government*Extremism		0.00	
		(0.00)	
Abs(CMP Left-Right Change)			0.00
			(0.00)
Government*Abs(CMP Left-Right Change)			0.00
			(0.00)
Constant	0.14*	0.15*	0.14*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
# Observations	424	363	407
R^2	0.16	0.13	0.14

Note: * refers to $p < 0.05$

2.5 Discussion

My statistical analyses show that all else equal, a party's change of vote share at the previous election ($\Delta Vote_{p,t-1}$) does not significantly affect its change of vote share at the current election ($\Delta Vote_{p,t}$). One explanation is that leadership replacement's effects are due to "reversion to the mean." It is plausible that an opposition party who gained or lost too many votes during the previous election will always "revert" toward its normal expected vote share. If this loads itself onto *New Leader*'s effects, then the significant results may not be a consequence of leadership replacement itself, but of this reversion to the mean. This would not be a serious problem if, without incorporating *New Leader* into my models, $\Delta Vote_{p,t-1}$ does not predict $\Delta Vote_{p,t}$, as this removes an indirect way for which $\Delta Vote_{p,t-1}$ can affect $\Delta Vote_{p,t}$. Indeed, regressing $\Delta Vote_{p,t}$ with all variables except *New Leader* and its interactions yields an insignificant effect of $\Delta Vote_{p,t-1}$ on $\Delta Vote_{p,t}$.[32]

One way to test the effects of leadership change, independent of the economy or "reversion to the mean," is by using the age of the previous leader as an instrumental variable. If a party leader has been replaced due to age, then it is unlikely that a bad economy, intra-party strife, or a bad election outcome influence the replacement. However, as I have shown in the Cox proportional hazard model, the effect of age is small and runs in the opposite direction, implying that using this variable is problematic. Moreover, it is uncertain how new leaders selected in this circumstance would affect election outcomes. If the outgoing leader is popular, a new leader may hurt the party's vote share. If the reverse is true, then a new leader would help the party in a general election.

It is important to note that potential endogeneity does not explain away my core results: electoral system influences the effects of party leadership replacement on an opposition party's vote share. Even if the correlation between a new leader and the party's vote share can be explained entirely by the economy and/or past election results, these factors alone cannot explain the observed differences across majoritarian and proportion systems.

[32]Results available upon request.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examine the feasibility of party leadership replacement as an electoral strategy for opposition parties. Party leaders' importance for gaining parliamentary seats and attaining government status differs depending on the seat-vote elasticities of electoral institutions. In majoritarian systems, leadership replacement enhances a party's electoral fortune, while the reverse holds for leadership change in proportional systems. Using an original dataset of party leadership tenure in 12 parliamentary democracies, I show that party leaders in majoritarian systems are more at risk for exit than those in proportional systems. Second, in majoritarian systems, a new opposition party leader increases the party's vote share, while in proportional systems the effect is reversed. Third, the presence of a new government party leader does not influence the party's vote share at the next general election.

How do parties choose new leaders? If intra-party crises drive leadership change in proportional systems, what constraints do these parties face in the leadership selection process? One implication of the findings is that electoral system affects intra-party dynamics by shaping the conditions under which replacing a party leader is electorally optimal. The institution that constrains a party's choice to replace its leader may also contribute to the party's internal power structure. Opposition parties in majoritarian systems, which can benefit from replacing their leaders, may take steps to prevent intense party activists–who tend to support more ideologically extreme leaders–from being able to influence the process of leadership selection. Parties in proportional systems, which are more immune to leadership replacement, may implement certain rules to make leadership challenges very costly, which would enhance the autonomy of these party leaders. Examining the logic behind choosing new party leaders are essential in understanding the relationship between party leaders and democratic elections. This is the task of the next chapter.

2.7 Appendix A: Data and Variable Coding

2.7.1 Cases

I define a large political party as one of the two parties that received the largest vote shares in the previous election if the last government is single-party majority, and one of the three parties who received one of the four largest vote shares in the previous election and participated in at least two governments, or has produced a prime minister since its formation if the last government is coalition or single-party minority. None of the parties changed their status as large political parties over the time span studied.[33] I include all party leaders who first came to power after 1944. I do not include interim party leaders, nor do I include periods of authoritarian rule. Thus, for Portugal and Spain, the starting years of analyses are 1976 and 1977, respectively. In 8 of the 12 countries, the two parties who receive the largest vote shares are the left- and right-wing parties that hold the largest number of seats in the legislature. In Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, the two parties winning the largest vote shares are not always the same; thus, for these four countries, I include three parties. None of the 12 countries' parties changed their status as major political parties over the time span studied. Table A1 presents the parties' names and dates studied.

A party leader should be the party's highest-ranking office holder. However, some parties have the titles "President," "Secretary General," "Leader of X Party," and "Parliamentary Party Leader," and it is often difficult to determine *a priori* which title holds the most significant political role. The relative importance among these positions also differs across parties. Since my definition should be relevant to my theoretical question, my set of party leaders should be publicly visible: voters should think of them as party leaders. Thus, not only do I exclude all interim leaders, but leaders of opposition parties should also be MPs. Thus, I define a party leader as one who meets all of the following qualifications. 1) He or

[33] In my dataset, the only exception to this rule is Canada's Progressive Conservative Party, who lost 151 seats during the 1993 Federal Election. I choose to include this party because it was the governing party at the time of that election.

she is a member of parliament and/or holds the prime ministership; 2) he or she holds the official post of "Secretary General," "President," "Leader of X Party," "Parliamentary Party Leader," or"Party List Leader;" and 3) the post produces *de facto* prime minister candidates in more than 50% of the elections in the dataset.

In Germany and Norway, prime minister candidates are not always drawn from the party chairpersons. Thus, these cases present a theoretical complication. For Germany's *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) and *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU), at times the chancellor candidate is not the "SPD-Vorsitzende" (SPD Chairman) or "CDU-Vorsitzende (CDU Chairman). The non-candidate chairmen are as follows. Willy Brandt of SPD was the nominal party leader but not the chancellor candidate from 1974 to 1987. Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD leader from 1987 to 1991, did not stand as the chancellor candidate at the 1990 Federal Election. Oskar Lafontaine, SPD leader from 1996 to 1999, did not stand as the chancellor candidate in the 1998 Federal Election. Conrad Adenauer, CDU leader from 1950 to 1966, did not stand as the chancellor candidate in the 1965 Federal Election. Helmut Kohl, CDU leader from 1972 to 1998, did not stand as the chancellor candidate in the 1980 and 1981 Elections. Finally, CDU's Angela Merkel did not stand as the chancellor candidate in the 2002 Election. In Norway's Labour Party, Reiulf Steen was the party leader from 1975 to 1981 but was not the prime minister candidate for the 1977 parliamentary election. Thorbjørn Jagland was the party leader from 1992 to 2002 but was not the prime minister candidate for the 1993 and 2001 parliamentary elections. In Norway's Centre Party, John Austrheim was the party leader but not the prime minister candidate for the 1969 parliamentary election.

There may be theoretical reasons why some chairmen are not selected as the chancellor candidate. Thus, I provide the following alternative definition. The leader must be the party's designated chancellor candidate or the *de facto* prime minister candidate (via official party statements). If there is no officially designated candidate, then the former definition applies. This means that out of the 551 observations in the dataset, 17 observations, all German and Norwegian cases, would be coded differently. Table A2 presents the list of

party leaders' official titles. I ran statistical analyses using both sets of definitions. Since there are no significant differences, only the results using the first definition are presented in paper. I also ran analyses without Germany and Norway, and the results show no significant differences from tests that include German and Norwegian party leaders. These results are available upon request.

All variables are coded using data from Keesings Online Archives, Lexis-Nexis Academic, official party websites, and Wikipedia. I use official party websites to locate the names and official titles of the party leaders. For each party, I searched for "President," "Secretary General," "Party Leader," and "Parliamentary Party Leader" to determine what the party calls its leader, then I search for the names of the leaders that have held this position since the party's first participation in a post-1945 election. If the website does not contain an English version, I used Google Translator to translate the page into English. If the website does not provide the complete list of past and present leaders, I searched Wikipedia to find the names of the leaders that hold this title. I then took each of these names and ran a search in Keesings Archives Online and Lexis-Nexis Academic, which provide articles that state the names of party leaders and dates of office tenure, to double check the titles they hold and determine their dates of tenure.[34]

2.7.2 Coding of Control Variables

All variables are coded using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (2006; 2010), the Kim Fording Dataset of Voter Ideology (2006), OECD Statistics Portal, and official party websites. The control variables are as follows. *Magnitude of Left-Right Policy Change* is the absolute change, from 0 to 100, in the Comparative Manifesto Project's coding of the Left-Right party ideology ("rile") from the previous general election.[35] *Extremism* is the

[34]An alternative way of searching in Lexis-Nexis Academic and Keesings Archives would be to use the party and the party leader's title. However, this process is more tedious as it yields more irrelevant results.

[35]I employ a standard left-right dimension not only because opinion polls suggest that voters conceptualize party ideology mainly in this dimension (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009a; 2009b), but also because left-right ideology is the main dimension that is comparable across countries.

absolute distance of the Kim-Fording Voter Ideology dataset's party L-R ideology from the dataset's centrist voter in a particular election. *Month of Tenure* is the number of months that the party leader has been in office in the month of the election studied.[36] The precise dates of leadership tenure are missing for some observations–all Norwegian and Danish cases–due to lack of information. In cases where the dates are precise to the month, I assign the date as the 15^{th} of that month. In cases where neither the date nor the month is available, I leave the observations as blank.

GDP Growth Rate is the percentage change in annual GDP from the previous year. Following Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2012), if the election occurs within the first 6 months of the year, the previous year's GDP growth rate is used. If the election occurs within the latter 6 months of the year, the current year's GDP growth rate is used.[37] For example, the 1997 UK General Election occurred in May of 1997. Because it was within the first 6 months of the year, I used the percent annual GDP change from 1995 to 1996. *Government*GDP Growth Rate* is an interaction variable, with the value as the country's GDP growth rate if the party is in government and 0 otherwise. *In Government* is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the party holds at least 1 seat in the last cabinet before the election,[38] and 0 otherwise. Because voters may evaluate government parties differently, and ruling status may exert different effects on policy position and election outcomes, I interact this variable with all other control variables. *Single Member Districts* is a binary variable coded 1 if the electoral district can only elect one representative to the legislature, and 0 otherwise. Left Party is a binary variable with the value of 1 if CMP codes the party as Social Democratic

[36]I calculate the number of months (full 30 days) that has passed since the party leader first took office. If the date of month that the party leader took office is within 15 days of the date of month of the election, I do not include the election month in my calculation, otherwise the month is included. For example, Gordon Brown became the Leader of the Labour Party on June 24^{th}, 2007. Since the UK held the general election on May 6^{th}, 2010, I do not count May in the total number of months that Brown has been a leader (34 months, or 2 years and 10 months) because only 12 days has passed between the 24^{th} of April and the 6^{th} of May.

[37]From 1945 to 2000, annual GDP is standardized in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. From 2000 to 2009, annual GDP is standardized in 2000 constant prices, PPP-adjusted.

[38]If the parliament is dissolved when the election is held, then I examine the composition of the last official cabinet prior to the election.

or Socialist, and 0 otherwise. *Vote Share Change t-1* is the percent change in the official party vote share of the previous election (t-1) from two elections before the current election (t-2).

Table A1: List of Parties and Time Periods Studied

Country	**Party**	**Years Studied**	**Left Party?**
Australia	Australian Labor Party (ALP)	1945-2011	Yes
	Liberal Party of Australia	1945-2011	No
Canada	Liberal Party of Canada	1948-2011	No
	Conservative Party	1948-2011	No
Denmark	Socialdemokraterne	1955-2011	Yes
	Det Konservative Folkeparti	1947-2011	No
	Venstre	1949-2011	no
Ireland	Fianna Fáil	1948-2011	No
	Fine Gael	1944-2011	No
Germany	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)	1949-2011	Yes
	Christlich Demokratisch Union Deutschlands (CDU)	1949-2011	No
Netherlands	Partij van Arbeid (PvdA)	1946-2011	Yes
	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)	1948-2011	No
	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)	1977-2011	No
New Zealand	New Zealand Labour Party	1951-2011	No
	New Zealand National Party	1949-2011	No
Norway	Det norske arbeiderparti (DNA)	1945-2011	Yes
	Høyre	1945-2011	No
	Senterpartiet	1948-2011	No
Portugal	Partido Socialista	1974-2011	Yes
	Partido Social Democrata	1973-2011	No
Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	1976-2011	Yes
	Alianza Popular /Partido Popular	1976-2011	No
Sweden	Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti	1949-2011	Yes
	Moderata samlingspartiet	1944-2011	No
	Centerpartiet	2949-2011	No
United Kingdom	Labour Party	1945-2011	Yes
	Conservative Party	1955-2011	No

Table A2: List of Party Leaders' Official Title

Country	Party	Title
Australia	ALP	Federal Leader of the Labor Party
	Liberal Party	Liberal Federal Leader
Canada	Liberal Party	Leader of the Liberal Party
	Conservative Party	Leader of the Conservative Party
Denmark	Socialdemokraterne Det Konservative Folkeparti Venstre	Partiformænd
Ireland	Fianna Fáil	Fianna Fáil Taoisigh
	Fine Gael	Leader of Fine Gael
Germany	SPD	SPD-Vorsizender
	CDU	CDU-Vorsitzender
The Netherlands	PvdA CDA VVD	lijsttrekker/ fractievoorzitter (if lijsttrekker retired)
New Zealand	Labour Party	Leader of the New Zealand Labour Party
	National Party	Leader of the New Zealand National Party
Norway	DNA Høyre Senterpartiet	Leder
Portugal	Partido Socialista	Secretários-Gerais
	Partido Social Democrata	Presidência de Comissão Política Nacional do Partido Social Democrata
Spain	PSOE	Secretário General
	AP/PP	Presidente del Alianza Popular/Partido Popular
Sweden	Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti	Partiordförande för socialdemokraterna
	Moderata samlingspartiet Centerpartiet	Partiordförande
United Kingdom	Labour Party	Leader of the Labour Party
	Conservative Party	Leader of the Conservative Party

2.8 Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Tables B1 to B5 present descriptive statistics for my dependent and explanatory variables. Of the 529 observations considered, 201 of them have party leaders without previous election experiences (approximately 38%). Table B2 and B3 show that in every country except for the United Kingdom, there are more opposition party leaders than government party leaders. Table B4 shows that the median party vote share change is -0.1%. Although this number seems low, the median absolute vote share change is 3%, while the median percentage changes in vote loss and vote gain are -3% and 3%, respectively, suggesting that the low percentage change may be due to the counterbalancing of winning and losing vote shares. Table B5, which presents the descriptive statistics by country, shows that there are intra- and inter-country differences.

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics of Party Vote Share Change by Electoral System

DV	$\%\Delta Votes_{p,t}$, **SMDs**	$\%\Delta Votes_{p,t}$, **MMDs**
Median	-0.33%	0.00%
Mean	-0.43 %	0.04%
Std Dev	5.86	5.39
Max	17.57 (Conservative Party of Canada) (1987 General Election)	20.70 (Portugal's Social Democratic Party) (1987 Parliamentary Election)
Min	-27.02 (Conservative Party of Canada) (1993 General Election)	-24.16 (Ireland's Fianna Fáil) (2011 General Election)
# Observations	156	343

Table B2: Descriptive Statistics, New Leaders

System	**# Obs**	**Elections**	**New Leaders**	**New Gov't PLs**	**New Opp PLs**
SMD	164	82	63	22	41
MMD	347	141	138	49	89

Table B3: New leaders, by Country

Country	**# Obs**	**#Elections**	**# New PLs**	**# New Gov't PLs**	**# New Opp PLs**
Australia	50	25	20	5	15
Canada	42	21	17	5	12
Denmark	65	25	21	8	13
Germany	33	17	13	5	8
Ireland	35	18	13	4	9
The Netherlands	50	20	21	10	11
New Zealand	44	22	14	5	9
Norway	49	17	27	11	16
Portugal	24	12	13	5	8
Spain	20	10	6	0	6
Sweden	56	19	18	4	14
United Kingdom	34	17	12	6	6

Table B4: Descriptive Statistics for Party Vote Share Change

Variable	**%ΔVote**	**Abs(ΔVote)**	**ΔVote Loss**	**ΔVote Gain**
Median	-0.09	3.06	-2.93	3.18
Mean	-0.11	4.06	-4.07	4.02
Std Dev	5.54	3.77	3.93	3.60
Max	20.70	27.02	-27.02	20.70
Min	-27.02	0	-0.05	0
# Obs	499	499	254	245

Table B5: Descriptive Statistics, by Country

Variable	$\%\Delta Vote$ **(Median, Mean, Std Dev)**	% **New PLs**
Australia	-0.25, 0.03, 4.08 48 obs	40% 50 obs
Canada	0.44, -0.09, 8.64 40 obs	40% 42 obs
Denmark	-0.23, -0.17, 4.27 72 obs	32% 65 obs
Germany	-0.79, -0.11, 4.69 32 obs	39% 33 obs
Ireland	1.20, 0.21, 4.35 34 obs	37% 35 obs
The Netherlands	0.20, -0.27, 5.48 48 obs	42% 50 obs
New Zealand	-0.48, -0.49, 6.15 42 obs	32% 44 obs
Norway	-0.10, -0.15, 4.66 48 obs	55% 49 obs
Portugal	0.36, 0.29, 10.57 22 obs	54% 24 obs
Spain	0.12, 2.57, 7.44 18 obs	30 20 obs
Sweden	-0.37, -0.03, 3.58 54 obs	32% 56 obs
United Kingdom	-0.30, -0.57, 4.82 32 obs	35% 34 obs

2.9 Appendix C: Table for Regression Results by Government Type

Table C1: Leadership Effects on %ΔVote by Government Type, Clustered SE by Election

	(1)	(2)	(3)
New Opposition Leader, Trad. Coalition	-1.59	-1.30	-1.46
	(0.97)	(0.94)	(0.99)
New Opposition Leader, Trad. Single-Party	1.93	1.24	1.86
	(1.44)	(1.49)	(1.43)
New Government Leader, Trad. Coalition	-1.51	0.93	-1.38
	(1.47)	(1.57)	(1.53)
New Government Leader, Trad. Single-Party	-1.78	-1.93	-1.92
	(2.63)	(2.81)	(2.70)
Government*Single-Party	-1.53	-1.51	-1.88
	(1.32)	(1.38)	(1.30)
Month of Tenure	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.14	-0.17	-0.10
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Government*GDP Growth Rate	0.49*	0.41	0.35
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.20)
$\%\Delta Vote_{t-1}$	0.01	0.04	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Government*$\%\Delta Vote_{t-1}$	-0.18	-0.25*	-0.21*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Government Party	-3.70*	-4.08*	-2.92*
	(1.09)	(1.27)	(1.08)
Trad. Single Party Government	0.43	0.76	0.46
	(1.00)	(1.07)	(0.99)
Extremism		-0.02	
		(0.02)	
Government*Extremism		0.05	
		(0.04)	
Abs(CMP Left-Right Change)			-0.00
			(0.03)
Abs(Government*CMP Left-Right Change)			-0.01
			(0.05)
Constant	2.82*	3.05*	2.77*
	(0.94)	(1.11)	(1.02)
# Observations	425	364	408
R^2	0.18	0.16	0.17

Note: * refers to $p < 0.05$

2.10 References

Aarts, Kees, and André Blais. 2011. "Pull or Push? Positive and Negative Leader Evaluations and Vote Choice." In *Political Leaders and Democratic Elections*. eds. Kees Aarts, André Blais, and Hermann Schmitt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 165-186.

Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2004. "Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results?" *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (4): 589-610.

Adams, James, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009a. "Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Parties Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2): 825-846.

Adams, James, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009b. "Moderate Now, Win Votes Later: The Electoral Consequences of Parties Policy Shifts in 25 Postwar Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 71 (2): 678-692.

Alesina, Alberto. 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102 (3): 651-678.

Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald Cohen. 1997. *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Anderson, Cameron D. 2006. "Economic Voting and Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2): 449-463.

Andrews, Josephine, and Robert W. Jackman. 2008. "If Winning Isnt Everything, Why Do They Keep Socre? Consequence of Electoral Performance for Party Leaders." *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 657-675.

Bale, Tim. 2010. *The Conservative Party: from Thatcher to Cameron.* Cambridge: Polity.

Bartels, Larry M. 2002. "The Impact of Candidate Traits in American Presidential Elections." In *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections*, ed. Anthony King. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 44-69.

Bartels, Larry M., and John Zaller. 2001. "Presidential Vote Models: A Recount." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 34 (1): 9-20.

Bartle, John, and Ivor Crewe. 2002. "The Impact of Party Leaders in Britain: Strong Assumptions, Weak Evidence." In *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections*, ed. Anthony King. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 70-95.

Bawn, Kathleen, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2012. "Government versus Opposition at the Polls: How Government Participation Changes the Impact of Policy Position on Vote Share." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2): 433-446.

Bean, Clive, and Anthony Mughan. 1989. "Leadership Effects in Parliamentary Elections in Australia and Britain'.' *American Political Science Review* 83 (4): 1165-1179.

Beck, Nathaniel. 1987. "Elections and the Fed: Is There a Political Monetary Cycle?" *American Journal of Political Science* 31 (1): 194-216.

Bittner, Amanda. 2008. *Platform or Personality? Understanding the Role of Leaders in Election Outcomes.* Ph.D. diss. The University of British Columbia.

Blais, André, Matheiu Turgeon, Elisabeth Gidengil, Neil Nevitte, and Richard Nadeau. 2001. "What Matters Most? Comparing the Impacts of Issues and the Economy in American, British and Canadian Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (3): 555-563.

Børre, Ole. 1997. "Economic Voting in Danish Electoral Surveys 1987-94." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 20 (4): 347-365.

van der Brug, Wouter, and Anthony Mughan. 2007. "Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties." *Party Politics* 13 (1): 29-51.

Carey, John, and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14 (4): 417-439.

Cargrill, Thomas F., and Michael M. Hutchinson. 1991. "Political Business Cycles with Endogenous Election Timing: Evidence from Japan." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 73 (4): 733-739.

Chappell Jr., Henry W., and Linda Goncalves Veiga. 2000. "Economics and Elections in Western Europe: 1960-1997." *Electoral Studies* 19 (2-3): 183-197.

Clark, Michael. 2009. "Valence and Electoral Outcomes in Western Europe, 1976-1998." *Electoral Studies* 28 (1): 111-122.

Clarke, Harold D., and Marianne C. Stewart. 1995. "Economic Evaluations, Prime Ministerial Approval and Governing Party Support: Rival Models Revisited." *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (2): 145-170.

Curtice, John, and André Blais. 2001. "Follow my Leader? A Cross-National Analysis of Leadership Effects in Parliamentary Democracies." Centre for Research Into Elections and Social Trends. Typescript.

Dewan, Torun, and David P. Myatt. 2008. "The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 102 (3): pp. 351-368.

Drazen, Allen. 2000. "The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years." *NBER Macroeconomics Annual* 15: pp. 75-117.

Duch, Raymond M., and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2008. *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Evans, Geoffrey, and Robert Anderson. 2005. "The Powerful Impact of Party Leaders: How Blair Cost Labour Votes (But Not Too Many)." Paper presented at EPOP, University of Essex.

Farrell, David M., and Paul Webb. 2000. "Political Parties as Campaign Organizations." in Russell Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Funk, Carolyn L. 1996. "The Impact of Scandal on Candidate Evaluations: An Experimental test of the Role of Candidate Traits." *Political Behavior* 18 (1): pp. 1-24.

Graetz, Brian, and Ian McAllister. 1987. "Party Leaders and Election Outcomes in Britain, 1974-1983." *Comparative Political Studies* 9 (4): pp. 484-507.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. 2000. "Are Party Leaders Becoming More Important to Vote Choice in Canada?" Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.

Glasgow, Garrett, and R. Michael Alvarez. 2000. "Uncertainty and Candidate Personality Traits." *American Political Science Quarterly* 28 (1): pp.26-49.

Harrington Jr., Joseph E. 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections." *American Economic Review* 83 (1): pp. 27-42.

Heppell, Tim. 2008. *Choosing the Tory Leader: Conservative Party Leadership Election from Heath to Cameron.* London: I B Tauris.

Heppell, Tim. 2010. *Choosing the Labour Leader: Labour Party Leadership Election from Wilson to Brown.* London: I B Tauris.

Jenssen, Anders Todal, and Toril Aalberg. 2006. "Party-leader Effects in Norway: A Multi- Methods Approach." *Electoral Studies* 25 (2): pp.248-269.

Johnston, Richard. 2002. "Prime Ministerial Contenders in Canada." In *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections*, ed. Anthony King. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 158-183.

Jones, Philip, and John Hudson. 1996. "The Quality of Political Leadership: A Case Study of John Major." *British Journal of Political Science* 26 (2): 229-244.

Kabashima, Ikuo, and Imai Ryosuke. 2002. "Evaluation of Party Leaders and Voting Behaviouran Analysis of the 2000 General Election." *Social Science Japan Journal* 5 (1): 85-96.

Kam, Christopher. 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kam, Christopher, and Indridi Indridason. 2005. " 'Engineered' Instability: How Prime Ministers (might) use Reshuffles to Control Government." Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, University of Granada, Granada, Spain.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1 (1): 5- 28

Kim, HeeMin, and Richard C. Fording. 1998. "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989." *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1):73-97

Kim, HeeMin, and Richard C. Fording. 2003. "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies: An Update." *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (1):95-105

King, Anthony, ed. 2002. *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewis-Beck, Michael, and Richard Nadeau. 2000. "French Electoral Institutions and the Economic Vote." *Electoral Studies* 19 (2-3): 171-182.

Midtbø, Tor. 1997. "The Electoral Effect of Party Leader Approval in Norway." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 20 (2): 135-158.

Müller, Woflgang C., and Kaare Strøm Eds. 1999. *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Makes Hard Decisions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nadeau, Richard, Richard G. Niemi, and Timothy Amato. 1996. "Prospective and Comparative or Retrospective and Individual? Party Leaders and Party Support in Great Britain." *British Journal of Political Science* 26 (2): pp. 245-258.

Nordhaus, William D. 1975. "The political business cycle." *Review of Economic Studies* 42 (2): 169190.

van de Pas, Daphne, Catherine de Vries, and Wouter van der Brug. 2012. "A Leader without A Party: Exploring the Relationship between Geert Wilders' Leadership Performance in the Media and His Electoral Success." *Party Politics*. Forthcoming.

Rogoff, Kenneth. 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles." The *American Economic Review* 80 (1): pp. 21-36.

Samuels, David J., and Samuel S. Shugart. 2010. *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scarrow, Susan E., Paul Webb, and David M. Farrell. 2000. "From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties." In *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Russell Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. New York: Oxford University Press, 129-155.

Smith, Alastair. 2003. "Election Timing in Majoritarian Parliaments." *British Journal of Political Science* 33 (3): 397-418.

Somer-Topcu, Zeynep. 2009. "Timely Decisions: The Effects of Past National Elections on Party Policy Change." *The Journal of Politics* 71 (1): 238-248.

Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Tavits, Magrit. 2007. "Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts and Political Competition." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1): 151-165.

Vavreck, Lynn. 2009. *The Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 3

A Theory of Party Leadership Selection: Why Moderate Parties Sometimes Choose Extreme Leaders

3.1 Introduction

In 2001, the British Conservative Party suffered its second landslide election defeat in four years. As a result, party leader William Hague resigned. Rather than electing the more popular Kenneth Clarke as the new party leader, the Conservatives chose Iain Duncan Smith, a backbencher described by the Conservatives' former Head of Media as simply "lacking the charisma necessary for a modern politician" (Bale 2010). He performed poorly during parliamentary debates. He also drew widespread internal party criticism by imposing a three-line whip on Conservative MPs over the bill on same-sex couples' adoption. More importantly, a staunch Euroskeptic, many British voters saw his policy positions as too far from their own (British Election Studies). Two years later, the Party's members of parliament (MPs) deposed him with a vote of no confidence and subsequently selected Michael Howard as their new leader. However, many voters regarded Howard's position as too extreme (British Election Studies), and, despite Tony Blair's plummeting popularity, he was unable to bring the party into government after the 2005 UK General Election.

Why do parties that are credible government contenders ever select leaders whose policy stances seem to damage the party's electoral fortunes? In addition, why are electorally popular candidates not always crowned as leaders? Empirical examples suggest that issue advocacy alone is insufficient in explaining this pattern. In addition, a moderate selectorate (those with the power to choose the party leader) does not guarantee the installation of a

moderate party leader. I argue that this phenomenon is due to the informal influence of the non-selectorate. Leadership choice incorporates concerns over the direct effect of the leader's policy position on the party's vote share, and how close this position is relative to the selectorate's policy position. More importantly, selectorate members anticipate how non-selectorate members react via campaign effort contribution. The non-selectorate's threat to withhold campaign effort can motivate a moderate selectorate to choose a leader whose policy positions attract few votes (an extreme leader), but can also prompt an extreme selectorate to choose a leader with electorally attractive policy positions (a moderate leader).

I first provide the relevant literature on party leadership selection and the empirical rationale for my model. Examples from British and Swedish parties suggest that a candidate's valence qualities are not dominant considerations in leadership choice and highlight the emphasis on the party leader's policy position. I then present the model and its comparative statics. A discussion of the model's implications follows.

3.2 The Dilemma of Party Leadership Choice

Party leaders help draft the party's election programme (Scarrow, Farrell, and Webb 2000). Their character traits also seem to influence election outcomes.[1] My analysis of leadership replacement in Chapter 2 reveals that new opposition leaders significantly influence their parties' vote share. Yet, case studies on British party leaders suggest that parties at times prioritize leadership candidates' policy positions.[2] For example, Conservative MPs had at times valued Euroscepticism when choosing a leader, in expense of votes (Bale 2010).

Why, then, do parties select such leaders? Electorally suboptimal policy positions may reflect the desire to advocate for certain policies rather than to maximize votes (Wittman

[1]Many case studies on leadership personality find that voters mainly care about competence and charisma. See Bean and Mughan (1989); Midtbø(1997); Gidengil et al. (2000); Bartle and Crewe (2002); King ed. (2002); and Aart, Kees, and Blais (2009).

[2]For examples of studies on leadership selection process in the UK Conservative and Labour Parties, see Norton (1990); Punnett (1992); Alderman and Carter (1995); Stark (1996); Alderman (1998); Cowley and Garry (1998); Denham and O'Hara (2008); Heppell (2008; 2010); and Jobson and Wickham-Jones (2010).

1983). This in part explains why, in a general election, candidates' positions diverge from those of the median voter (Calvert 1985; Adams at et 2005). In some cases, a party may even refuse to participate in government if it is required to sacrifice certain policies.[3] This implies that parties consider the potential trade-offs between policy and office (Müller and Strøm's 1999), which may result in moderate parties selecting relatively extreme leaders.

It is also possible that parties choose extreme leaders as an electoral strategy to increase vote shares. Kedar (2005) shows that German parties sometimes advocate for more extreme policies because voters discount these parties' actual realized policy positions from their advertised positions, should these parties win. Parties who lost votes in the last election also tend to increase the magnitude of position change in the next election (Somer-Topcu 2009). In addition, moving away from the center helps government parties gain more votes, but not opposition parties (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012). Yet, we observe party leaders whose extreme positions do not maximize votes. Iain Duncan Smith's policy stances are a case in point, as voters viewed them as too extreme. During his tenure, when asked whether to vote for the Conservative or the Labour Party, should there be an election tomorrow, the number of respondents who would vote for the Conservatives was consistently lower than the number of would vote Labour.[4]

Concerns over electoral welfare may still drive a party to select an "extreme" leader. A party's electoral well-being is not solely dependent on its policy direction, but is also determined by its electoral resources, such as donations or campaign activities from its rank-and-file. If there are tight regulations on contributions, or if the party's resources are scarce, the need to bolster campaign effort may motivate a party to cater to its activists. One way to do so is by promoting the activists' ideal positions. In U.S. Senate Elections, candidates have an incentive to adopt policy positions that are close to those of party activists in order to accumulate their electoral resources (Moon 2004). Candidates with more resources are on

[3]For example, Strøm (1994) argues that intraparty policy differences lead to the 1987 coalition bargaining failure in Norway. In their model of coalition termination, Lupia and Strøm (1995) show that parties value both government status and being able to advocate for a set of policy positions.

[4]Sources: *The Daily Telegraph* and *YouGov.com*

average more moderate, while the reverse holds for candidates with fewer resources (Moon 2004: 612). In addition, although activists may be more extreme than the general electorate, their campaign efforts can enhance the party image (Schofield 2009). Since party activists are an important component of a party's electoral welfare, parties may promote non-centrist policies in order to shore up activists' campaign efforts.

The above literature suggests that the mechanism of party leadership selection will not be uncovered through the lens of interparty competition. Depicting leadership choice in terms of intra-party dynamics can yield higher predictive power on the identity of the selected leader. Cohen et al.'s (2008) examination of presidential nomination in the US reveals that party insiders–what they call activists–strongly influence the presidential nomination process. My own interviews with MPs from the Swedish Social Democratic Party also suggest that regional party leaders, though not officially part of the selection committee, have a great deal of sway over leadership choice, more so than over the drafting of election programs.[5] Therefore, leadership selection should be conceptualized as a coordination process among different types of party members for determining the party platform, and the chosen leader becomes a delegate of that platform.

The next section offers a model of party leadership selection that incorporates concerns over the direct impact of a leader's policy on vote share, the selectorate's own desire to advocate certain policies, and the non-selectorate's reaction to leadership choice.

3.3 A Model of Party Leadership Selection

Leadership choice seems to be shaped by selectorate members' strategic calculation, instead of candidates' decisions to enter a leadership contest. Even when electorally popular (potential) candidates exist, the party sometimes still ends up with leaders who are ill-suited for the job. The Swedish Social Democratic Party's selection of Håkan Juholt in 2011 is one such example. The party's constitution requires it to form a "nominating committee"

[5]Interview with the author, 09/29/2011.

(*Valberedning*) for the specific purpose of searching for a party leader. At the time of the search, Mikael Damberg, a young and energetic MP well-liked by the Swedish public, was seen as someone whose moderate policy positions can win over middle class voters. However, according to one member of the nominating committee, regional leaders (not part of the selectorate)[6] did not support Damberg; neither could they form a conensus on 24 of the 25 names that the committee suggested.[7] Regional leaders eventually approved the choice of Juholt, whose policies are left of the party and the Swedish electorate. Subsequently, the Social Democrats faced a further downturn of public opinion, sinking to a record low projected vote share in October 2011, and Juholt was forced to resign in January 2012.

If selectorate members are instead only concerned with advocacy, they would never choose a leader who holds more extreme position than their own. Yet, the British Labour Party's selection of Michael Foot in 1980 does not support this claim. At the time, Dennis Healey's policy stances were viewed as closer to those of the general electorate, and he was thought to be the candidate most likely to lead the party back into government.[8] The majority of Labour MPs (the selectorate) also held positions that were closer to those of Healey than Foot. However, because party activists and trade unions, who were staunchly left wing, could credibly threaten to criticize the party using media outlets, or even exit the party, the majority of MPs chose Michael Foot.[9] Even more telling, after Foot became the party leader, party activists were able to dictate the party's policy direction, which resulted in the infamous 1983 Labour General Election manifesto that Labour MP Gerald Kauffman dubbed as the "longest suicide note in history."[10]

The desire for advocacy (how well the party leader represents the selectorate's ideal

[6]Although regional leaders are formally consulted, they do not have the right to select the leader.

[7]Interview with the author, 09/29/2011.

[8]Interview with the author 09/15/2011. Also see Stark (1996) and Heppell (2008).

[9]Interview with the author 09/15/2011.

[10]This is not to say that the party made an ex-ante wrong choice of leader. Rather, this example is akin to ex-post regret, where the party made a rational, utility-maximizing choice, even though it lowered their vote shares after the fact.

position) and concerns over the direct effect of the leader's issue position on vote share do not, by themselves, explain leadership choice. Selectorate members also need to consider potential reactions from non-selectorate members over the chosen leader. As such, electoral concerns may prompt selectorate members to choose a leader with an extreme policy position.

3.3.1 The Electoral Welfare, Advocacy, and Leverage Model

I present the conditions under which parties select leaders with policy positions that are close to the general electorate, and circumstances under which they select leaders whose policies are unrepresentative of voters. My model assumes a one-dimensional left-right policy space,[11] where movement along the dimension is correlated with a change in the party's vote share.[12] The selectorate consists of a policy wing $S \in \{M, E\}$, where M is the moderate wing of the party and E is the extreme wing. For the ease of modeling, I treat each wing as a unitary actor,[13] with the selectorate and the non-selectorate occupying different wings. Members of the selectorate choose a leader in an environment where, even though there is no shortage of leadership candidates, there are multiple goals to consider.[14] Empirically, the number of candidates is limited. The result, however, is not dependent on whether I model the policy positions of the candidates as continuous or discrete, since in the latter case

[11]While it is certainly true that politics in parliamentary democracies can be multi-dimensional, most voters are able to place mainstream political parties in a left-right policy dimension. In addition, this dimension can be operationalized across multiple countries for comparisons.

[12]I do not consider the median voter since, due to the existence of multiple parties within one side of the policy spectrum, being closest to the median voter may not help the party maximize its vote share.

[13]The composition of the selectorate is public knowledge, i.e., there is no uncertainty surrounding whether members of the selectorate belong to a moderate or an extreme wing. Empirically, the selectorate sometimes consists of more than one wing. However, modeling the case where the selectorate is represented by only one policy wing is not at odds with the empirical reality, since if there are more members from E than M, then E would be the majority. In this case, there is no reason why members of E would not choose a party leader whose policy position can maximize their own utility. Thus, the policy position of the party leader would be the same position as in the case where the selectorate consists of only members of E.

[14]Electorally popular candidates may choose not to participate in a leadership contest if the party had suffered a massive election loss because the chance of entering government in the next election is slim. However, because election outcomes are often unpredictable, and because popular leaders can help the party recover and gain votes, not only does this explanation resemble a self-fulfilling prophecy, but I also see no logical reason why a bad election defeat should preclude potential candidates from entering a contest, especially if said candidates are popular with voters and can help the party restore its electoral well-being.

the selectorate would simply choose a leader whose policy position is closest to the utility-maximing position.[15] Assuming candidate supply as unconstrained yields a more precise location of the utility-maximizing policy position.

Selectorate members make their choice based on the candidate's advertised policy position, $X_{PL,S}$, which is common knowledge.[16] The chosen party leader's position, $X^*_{PL,S}$, minimizes the selectorate members' utility loss.

> *Let $X_{PL,S} \in [0,1]$ be the policy position of the party leadership candidate relative to the position that will maximize the party's vote share. 0 represents the vote-maximizing policy position (which is not necessarily the median voter's position), and 1 represents the position furthest from that. The closer $X_{PL,S}$ is to 0, the more votes the position attracts. Conversely, the closer $X_{PL,S}$ is to 1, the fewer votes the position attracts.*

Selectorate members also hold a policy position, $X_S \in [0,1]$:

> *Let $X_S \in [0,1]$ be the policy position of selectorate members relative to the vote-maximizing position $X_V = 0$. The closer X_S is to 0, the more votes the selectorate's position attracts.*

I assume that policy wing M's position attracts more votes than E's position:

$$A1: \ X_M < X_E$$

Note that "extremism" in this model is contextual. It is not equivalent to the conventional definition, i.e., an "extreme" party leader is not necessarily one who holds a position that is far from the centrist voter. Rather, he or she is one who espouses a position that is far from the vote-maximizing position. This may be the centrist position in two-party competition,

[15] This is true assuming a left-right policy space.

[16] I do not factor in the leader's valence quality, such as charisma or competence. If potential candidates within a faction have the same policy position, there is no reason to choose one with lower valence characteristics. Thus, members of each faction are likely to coordinate amongst themselves to put forth a candidate with the highest valence, such that this quality will be negligible on average.

or a more left-leaning position in a system with three or more parties.[17]

My model of party leadership selection incorporates the impact of the party leader's policy position on non-selectorate members' campaign effort. I offer a hypothetical example. A party's selectorate consists of MPs, the party's moderate wing. Party activists (a party's officers who do not also hold nationally elected political office), the non-selectorate, occupy the extreme wing. Although only MPs can choose a leader, they care about keeping activists content since they are integral to the campaign process and contribute to the party's electoral well-being. If party activists are unsatisfied with the choice of leader, they may publicly criticize the party's policy direction. Or, they may dampen their campaign activities by not conducting door-to-door canvassing, etc., during a general election. Thus, they are central to voter mobilization and help the party present a unified policy direction.

Empirically, non-selectorate members may include party activists and/or MPs. Regardless of their identities, they are integral to the party's electoral well-being, either in terms of providing physical campaign activities, such as volunteering at party conferences, or clarifying voter perceptions of the party's stances on different issues through media interviews. The more the party depends on them for these activities, the more leverage they have:

> *Let* $e \in [0, 1]$ *be the fraction of total possible effort that non-selectorate members* NS $\forall NS \notin S$ *can offer to the election campaign process. The higher* e *is, the more electoral resources the party will accumulate at the next general election.*

This term represents the *leverage* that non-selectorate members have on leadership choice. It captures how much their campaign efforts can ameliorate the negative electoral consequences of choosing a leader whose position differs from the vote-maximizing position.

Leadership choice results from the strategic interaction between selectorate and non-selectorate members. Selectorate members choose a leader with a policy position $X_{PL,S}$. After the selection, non-selectorate members campaign for the next general election, exerting

[17] As Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2012) find, moving away from the centrist position does not necessarily lead to vote loss.

effort level e. The vote share that the party receives at the next general election is the combination of $X^*_{PL,S}$ and e. Figure 3.1 illustrates this timeline:

Figure 3.1: Timeline of the game between the selectorate and the non-selectorate.



The utility loss that selectorate members incur from choosing a particular leadership candidate should thus include how much effort the non-selectorate members will contribute given $X^*_{PL,S}$. Formally:[18]

> A2: The utility loss that selectorate members incur from choosing a leadership candidate with policy position $X_{PL,S}$ is:
>
> $$L_S(X_{PL,S}, e) = -\alpha_S((1-e)^2 V(X_{PL,S})) - (1-\alpha_S)P(X_S - X_{PL,S}) \qquad (3.1)$$

$\alpha_S \in [0,1]$ is a salience parameter. It represents the weight selectorate members place on the party's electoral welfare. $(1-\alpha_S)$ is the advocacy component. The higher α_S is, the more the selectorate members value the party's electoral well-being over advocacy. $V(X_{PL,S})$, termed the *direct electoral effect*, represents a class of functions that account for the party's vote loss given a leadership candidate with a position $X_{PL,S}$ $\forall$ $X_{PL,S} \neq 0$. It is decreasing in $X_{PL,S}$ at a decreasing rate: $V(X_{PL,S}) < 0$, $V'(X_{PL,S}) < 0$, and $V''(X_{PL,S}) > 0$.[19] This can be interpreted as follows: while a more extreme policy position leads to greater vote

[18]The loss functions for both S and NS are single-peaked and concave down. For verification of concavity, see Appendix.

[19]This differs from conventional assumptions of the party's policy impact on vote share (i.e. Adams et al. 2005), where the utility loss due to policy difference is decreasing at an increasing rate. If instead I assume that $V(X_{PL,S})$ is decreasing in an increasing rate, then my model's results would still hold if the selectorate's loss function is concave. That is, if I assume that $V(X_{PL,S}) < 0$, $V'(X_{PL,S}) < 0$, and $V''(X_{PL,S}) < 0$, my model's propositions would still remain unchanged as long as $2(P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) + P(X_j - X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S}))^2 > P^2(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})V''(X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) - (\frac{1-\alpha_S}{\alpha_S(\frac{(1-\alpha_{NS})^2}{4\alpha^2_{NS}})})P''(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})V^3(X_{PL,S}) - 2P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})P''(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})V^2(X_{PL,S})$.

loss, it is more difficult for voters to differentiate *among* leaders with very extreme policy positions. By assuming that voters are more able to distinguish among positions that are close to the vote-maximizing position, and that they can accurately punish parties for small deviations from it, I emphasize the *precision* of voters' perception of the leader's policy position. $(1-e)^2$, termed the *indirect electoral effect*, denotes how the non-selectorate's effort level e impacts the party's electoral welfare. Effort has decreasing returns to scale: a rise in effort from 90% to 100% is less consequential than an increase from 40% to 50%. Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationship between e, $X_{PL,S}$, and the party's electoral welfare, using the function $V(X_{PL,S}) = -(1 - exp[-X_{PL,S}])$. While choosing a more extreme party leader (higher $X_{PL,S}$) intensifies utility loss, more campaign effort dampens not only this loss, but also the rate of loss. This is most evident in the difference between $e = 0.2$ and $e = 0.4$, which reduces utility loss more dramatically than the same increase at higher effort levels.

Figure 3.2: Leader's Policy Position, Campaign Effort, and Electoral Welfare



$P(X_S - X_{PL,S})$, the *advocacy* component, represents a class of functions that account for the selctorate's utility loss from policy position difference with the party leader. The loss is decreasing in $X_{PL,S}$ at an increasing rate: $P(X_S - X_{PL,S}) < 0$, $P'(X_S - X_{PL,S}) < 0$ if $X_S > X_{PL,S}$, $P'(X_S - X_{PL,S}) > 0$ if $X_S < X_{PL,S}$, and $P''(X_S - X_{PL,S}) < 0$. Regardless of the direction of shift, members of S will incur a higher loss when $X_{PL,S}$ is far from the

selectorate's ideal policy position. Note that this is akin to expressive utility, rather than the utility derived from policy implementation.[20]

Non-selectorate members also care about the party's electoral welfare and advocacy. Given that campaign effort imposes a fixed cost regardless of the chosen leader's policy position, I assume that non-selectorate members incur no additional cost when campaigning for their own position (aside from the fixed cost), but campaigning for any other position does. The farther away the leader's policy position ($X_{PL,S}$) is to the non-selectorate's position (X_{NS}), the higher the cost of campaign effort. Thus, non-selectorate members balance the utility loss related to the party's electoral welfare and the loss associated with the difference between the party leader's and their own policy positions. But, unlike the selectorate's utility, campaigning is costly for non-selectorate members:

> A3: The utility loss that non-selectorate members incur from choosing an effort level e is

$$L_{NS}(X_{PL,S}, e) = -\alpha_{NS}((1-e)^2 V(X_{PL,S}))- \\ (1-\alpha_{NS})(P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) + e(P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})) \tag{3.2}$$

α_{NS} is the weight that non-selectorate members place on the party's electoral welfare, and $1 - \alpha_{NS}$ is the weight that they place on advocacy and the additional cost of campaigning for the leader's policy position. $P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})$, which carries the same functional form as $P(X_S - X_{PL,S})$, represents the expressive utility loss that non-selectorate members incur from inheriting a party leader with a policy position that is different from their position. For a given level of policy difference, if non-selectorate members choose to exert their full campaign effort, they will bear the maximum cost. They can reduce this cost by contributing less effort. If they choose not to participate in the election campaign, then there is no additional campaign cost that stems from the policy difference. Figure 3.3 illustrates the relationship between effort level and policy difference on campaign cost, using the function

[20] I conceptualize this as the selectorate's short term utility loss. Assuming that the leader's policy position will be implemented if the party attains government status, in the short term, selectorate members suffer from having a leader who advocates for a position that differs from their ideal position.

$P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) = -(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})^2$ and setting the non-selectorate's policy position at 0.5. The farther away $X_{PL,S}$ is from 0.5 in either direction, the higher the cost of additional campaign effort. However, for a given leader's policy position, less effort lowers the cost at a decreasing rate. Exerting 80% instead of 100% results in a larger cost reduction than changing the effort level from 40% to 20%.

Figure 3.3: Effort and policy difference on campaigning cost



3.3.1.1 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics

The party's electoral well-being is tied to selectorate and non-selectorate members' best response strategies. When choosing a leader, selectorate members anticipate the level of effort from non-selectorate members, and the chosen leader's policy position minimizes their utility loss.[21] In turn, non-selectorate members react to the choice of leader by exerting campaign effort e^*, which minimizes their own utility loss.[22] The selectorate's leadership choice affects the non-selectorate's campaign effort level, which is part of the selectorate's

[21] $X^*_{PL,S}$ satisfies $\alpha_i(\frac{(1-\alpha_{NS})^2}{4\alpha^2_{NS}})(\frac{-2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S})-P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})}{V^3(X_{PL,S})}) - (1-\alpha_S)P'(X_S-X_{PL,S}) = 0$. This is robust to different functional forms for both $V(X_{PL,S})$ and $P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})$ as long as $P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})$ is twice-differentiable, such that it is possible to evaluate $X_{PL,S}$ in relation to X_S and X_{NS}.

[22] $e^* = \frac{2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S})-(1-\alpha_{NS})P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})}{2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S})}$ $\forall$ $X_{PL,S} \in (0,1]$, $\alpha_{NS} \in (0,1]$, and $e^* \in [0,1]$.

utility loss function.

The policy difference between the party leader and the non-selectorate influences the latter's campaign effort. The farther $X_{PL,S}$ is from X_{NS}, the lower the effort. In contrast, the closer $X_{PL,S}$ is to X_{NS}, the higher the effort level:

> *Proposition 1*: The closer party leader's policy position ($X_{PL,S}$) is to the non-selectorate's position (X_{NS}), the more effort they exert. All else equal, if $X_S < X_{NS}$, then the equilibrium effort level e^* is increasing in $X_{PL,S}$ and decreasing in X_{NS}. If $X_S > X_{NS}$, then e^* is decreasing in $X_{PL,S}$ but increasing in X_{NS}.

All proofs are located in the Appendix. Proposition 1 implies that for a non-selectorate made up of the extreme wing E, the farther away the chosen party leader's policy position is from the vote-maximizing position (providing it is not more extreme than E's position), the more effort its members contribute to the campaign process. For a non-selectorate consisting of the moderate wing M, the closer the leader's position is to the vote-maximizing position (providing it is not more moderate than M's position), the more campaign effort there is.

Meanwhile, the chosen leader's policy position reflects the selectorate's ideal position. This relationship holds true for non-selectorate members since their campaign effort is integral to the party's electoral welfare. Formally,

> *Proposition 2*: The more extreme the selectorate and non-selectorate's positions are (X_S, X_{NS}), the more extreme the chosen party leader's policy position ($X^*_{PL,S}$) is. In other words, all else equal, $X^*_{PL,S}$ is increasing in both X_S and X_{NS}.

Heightened concerns over the party's electoral well-being does not guarantee a more moderate leader. Even if selectorate members only value the party's electoral welfare (i.e., when $\alpha_S = 1$), they still need to consider the non-selectorate's policy position (i.e., how far $X_{PL,S}$ is from X_{NS}). Choosing a leader with a policy position that is far away from the non-selectorate's position can result in less campaign effort from the latter, which hurts the party's electoral well-being. The more selectorate members care about the party's electoral welfare, the more they would need to account for the level of anticipated campaign effort

from non-selectorate members. As a result, the chosen party leader's position would be close to the non-selectorate's position.

Non-selectorate members may also value the party's electoral welfare. Observe that greater concern for it leads to more campaign effort: all else equal, the equilibrium effort (e^*) is increasing in the non-selectorate's weight on electoral welfare (α_{NS}). This implies that even if the policy position difference between the chosen party leader and non-selectorate is large, concerns over the party's electoral welfare incentivize non-selectorate members to "overlook" this and contribute more campaign effort. Because higher effort improves a party's electoral welfare, selectorate members are more free to choose a leader whose policy position is close to their own position. In contrast, non-selectorate members hold the most leverage when they are more sensitive to the costs associated with policy position difference (i.e., when α_{NS} is low) which motivates them to campaign less. Formally:

> *Proposition 3*: Non-selectorate members have the most leverage when they prioritize advocacy over electoral welfare (α_{NS}), but selectorate members value electoral welfare over advocacy. In other words, all else equal, the party leader's position, $X^*_{PL,S}$, is decreasing in α_S if $X_{NS} < X_S$, and increasing in α_S if and only if $X_{NS} > X_S$ It is decreasing in α_{NS} if and only if $X_{NS} > X_S$, and increasing in α_{NS} if and only if $X_{NS} < X_S$.

A moderate selectorate prioritizing the party's electoral welfare, i.e., $\alpha_M > 0.5$, may choose a leader whose policy position is more extreme than their own. Similarly, if extreme selectorate members care about the moderate non-selectorate's campaign effort, then the chosen leader's position ($X^*_{PL,E}$) may be closer to the position of the moderate wing. Moreover, the leader's policy position always diverges from the vote-maximizing position. In pure strategy Nash equilibria, the chosen party leader's policy position will always fall between the policy positions of the selectorate and the non-selectorate, i.e. $X_M \leq X^*_{PL,S} \leq X_E$.

Tables 1a and 1b summarize the model's predictions in a general manner. Intuitively, the chosen party leader's policy position largely reflects the selectorate members' position when they prioritize advocacy. Proposition 3 comes into effect when selectorate members prioritize the party's electoral welfare, but non-selectorate members prioritize advocacy. In

the bottom left-hand corner of both tables, non-selectorate members successfully coerce selectorate members into choosing a leader that *does not* reflect the latter's ideal position.

Table 1a: Predictions, selectorate is more moderate than non-selectorate

	Selectorate Prioritizes Electoral Welfare	**Selectorate Prioritizes Advocacy**
Non-Selectorate Prioritizes Electoral Welfare	Moderate Party Leader	Moderate Party Leader
Non-Selectorate Prioritizes Advocacy	*Extreme Party Leader*	Moderate Party Leader

Table 1b: Predictions, selectorate is more extreme than non-selectorate

	Selectorate Prioritizes Electoral Welfare	**Selectorate Prioritizes Advocacy**
Non-Selectorate Prioritizes Electoral Welfare	Extreme Party Leader	Extreme Party Leader
Non-Selectorate Prioritizes Advocacy	*Moderate Party Leader*	Extreme Party Leader

3.3.1.2 Examples

I now offer an illustration of how concerns over electoral welfare, advocacy, and the non-selectorate members' leverage affect $X^*_{PL,S}$ and e^*. I use the following functions: $V(X_{PL,S}) = -(1 - exp[-X_{PL,S}])$, $P(X_S - X_{PL,S}) = -(X_S - X_{PL,S})^2$, and $P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) = -(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})^2$. The loss functions for members of the selectorate S and members of the non-selectorate NS are:

$$L_S(X_{PL,S}, e) = -\alpha_S((1-e)^2(1-exp[-X_{PL,S}])) + (1-\alpha_S)(-(X_S - X_{PL,S})^2)$$
$$L_{NS}(X_{PL,S}, e) = -\alpha_{NS}((1-e)^2(1-exp[-X_{PL,S}]))+$$
$$(1-\alpha_{NS})(-(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})^2 + e(-(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})^2))$$

In equilibrium, non-selectorate members exert

$$e^* = \frac{2\alpha_{NS}(1-exp[-X_{PL,S}]) - (1-\alpha_{NS})(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})^2}{2\alpha_{NS}(1-exp[-X_{PL,S}])}$$

and selectorate members choose a leader with a policy position $X^*_{PL,S}$ that satisfies

$$-\alpha_S(\frac{(1-\alpha_{NS})^2}{4\alpha^2_{NS}})(\frac{-4(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})^3(1-exp[-X_{PL,S}]) - (X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})^4(e^{-X_{PL,S}})}{(1-exp[-X_{PL,S}])^2}$$
$$+2(1-\alpha_S)(X_S - X_{PL,S}) = 0$$

Figure 3.4 illustrates Proposition 1: the smaller the distance between the non-selectorate position (X_{NS}) and the leader's position ($X_{PL,S}$), the higher the equilibrium effort level (e^*) from the non-selectorate. X_{NS} is set to 0.5, while α_{NS} and $X_{PL,S}$ are varied. For each $X_{PL,S} \neq 0.5$, increasing α_{NS} results in a higher e^*. It is worthwhile to note that, holding the policy difference between the party leader and the non-selectorate members constant, e^* is larger for a given α_{NS} (non-selectorate members' weight on electoral welfare) when $X_{PL,S} > 0.5$ than when $X_{PL,S} < 0.5$. This is consistent with my model's logic. More campaign effort is needed to dampen the negative effects of having a leader with a more extreme policy position.

Figure 3.4: How the party leader's policy position affects campaign effort



Figure 3.5 exemplifies Proposition 2: all else equal, the more extreme the selectorate/non-selectorate, the more extreme the party leader is ($X^*_{PL,S}$ is increasing in X_S and X_{NS}). The solid line shows how changes in the selectorate's position (X_S) (movement along the X-axis) affect the leader's position ($X^*_{PL,S}$) when $X_{NS} = 0.5$, $\alpha_S = 0.5$, and $\alpha_{NS} = 0.6$. Consistent with Proposition 2, pulling the selectorate's position (X_S) away from the vote-maximizing position leads to a more extreme leader (a higher $X^*_{PL,S}$). This implies that all else equal, having a more extreme selectorate results in a more extreme party leader. The dotted line shows how changes in the non-selectorate's position (X_{NS}) (movement along the X-axis) affect the leader's position ($X^*_{PL,S}$) when $X_S = 0.3$, $\alpha_S = 0.5$, and $\alpha_{NS} = 0.6$. Also

consistent with Proposition 2, a more extreme non-selectorate yields a more extreme party leader. As X_{NS} increases, so does $X^*_{PL,S}$. However, the rate of increase that stems from the non-selectorate's policy position is lower than the rate from the selectorate's position change. The selectorate's position has a bigger effect on the chosen party leader's position.

Figure 3.5: Effect of X_S on $X^*_{PL,S}$



Figures 3.6 to 3.9 showcase Proposition 3: increased concern for the party's electoral welfare motivates selectorate members to solicit more effort from non-selectorate members, so as to mediate the negative effects of choosing a non-vote-maximizing leader.[23] Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate the selectorate's behavior. When non-selectorate members prioritize the party's electoral welfare (solid line, $\alpha_{NS} = 0.7$), the more the selectorate members value electoral welfare (higher α_S), the closer $X^*_{PL,S}$ is to X_{NS}. The pattern is similar when non-selectorate members prioritize advocacy (dotted line, $\alpha_{NS} = 0.3$). However, for this case, a higher α_S leads to a larger change in $X^*_{PL,S}$ than when the non-selectorate prioritizes electoral welfare (solid line, $\alpha_{NS} = 0.7$). This exemplifies leverage: since non-selectorate members now provide less effort for each given $X_{PL,S}$, selectorate members need to appease non-selectorate members by choosing a party leader whose policy position is close to the non-selectorate's position.

[23]The numbers that generated the graphs are listed in Appendix A.

Figures 3.8 and 3.9 demonstrate the non-selectorate's influence. When the selectorate prioritizes the party's electoral welfare (solid line, $\alpha_S = 0.7$), the more non-selectorate members prioritize electoral welfare (α_{NS}), the closer $X^*_{PL,S}$ is to X_S. This is consistent with Proposition 3: when non-selectorate members prioritize electoral welfare, they contribute more effort. This, in turn, provides a "cushion" for selectorate members to choose a leader whose policy position is close to their own without significant utility loss. The same trend is observed when selectorate members prioritize advocacy (dotted line, $\alpha_S = 0.3$). Here, though, for each $\alpha_{NS} \neq 1$, the chosen leader's position $X^*_{PL,S}$ is closer to the selectorate's position (X_S) than in the case where $\alpha_S = 0.7$. Since selectorate members care more about advocacy, they are less beholden to the non-selectorate's policy preference.

The Electoral Welfare, Advocacy, and Leverage model shows that, when choosing a party leader, members of the selectorate are constrained by the informal distribution of power within the party. This is consistent with the outcome of the British Labour Party leadership election of 1980. The year before the leadership election, the party lost the general election and returned to opposition. The party's opposition status suggests that selectorate members should be concerned with the party's electoral welfare. During that period, the selectorate Labour MPs, the majority of whom are moderate, felt the need to appease local councilpersons and campaign workers in their constituencies; they were also worried about being de-selected as candidates for the next general election.[24] Even though only MPs have formal voting power in that election, and despite their preference for the moderate Healey, local party leaders and councilpersons who were part of the extreme "Bennite Left" were able to pressure them into casting votes for Foot instead of Healey.[25]

[24]Interviews with the author, 09/07/2011; 09/15/2011, 10/10/2011

[25]Interview with the author, 09/07/2011, 09/15/2011.

Figure 3.6: Effect of α_S on $X^*_{PL,S}$, Moderate Selectorate



Figure 3.7: Effect of α_S on $X^*_{PL,S}$, Extreme Selectorate





Figure 3.8: Effect of α_{NS} on $X^*_{PL,S}$, Moderate Selectorate



Figure 3.9: Effect of α_{NS} on $X^*_{PL,S}$, Extreme Selectorate

3.4 Discussion

My model's predictions are independent of the selection procedure and leadership candidates' valence qualities, such as competence and charisma. I highlight how, without considering valence and procedural effects, intra-party policy differences and strategic interactions between the selectorate and the non-selectorate affect leadership choice. This is not to say that leadership selection procedures play no role. Rather, my model showcases the importance of intra-party dynamics and power distribution in choosing a leader. Nor does my model suggest that the general elecotrate disregard a party leader's valence, or that members of the selectorate do not value valence as a part of leadership qualities. There are works that hint at valence's effects on vote choice in a general election.[26] Yet, empirical examples suggest that in party leadership selection, policy preferences remain the most prominent consideration, overriding valence. Moreover, counter-intuitively, candidate valence may become a liability for potential leadership candidates. Competent, charismatic leaders may be more successful in unilaterally altering the party's policy direction in order to win office. Consequently, a candidate with charisma may actually engender mistrust among the party's rank and file, especially if his or her policy position differs from theirs.

Readers may question why, when $\alpha_S = 1$, I ignore $X_{PL,S} = 0$ (choosing a leader with a vote-maximizing policy position) as a best response strategy, since the utility loss for selectorate members can also be minimized in this manner. In the Electoral Welfare, Advocacy, and Leverage Model, $X_{PL,S} = 0$ is ruled out as a possible choice because the equilibrium campaign effort, e^*, would be undefined. By requiring that campaign effort affects a party's electoral welfare, I introduce the possibility that non-selectorate members are valuable assets. Keeping them satisfied with the choice of leader can be interpreted as a form of investment for their loyalty (akin to maintaining party unity) to prevent them from exiting, which may boost campaign effort in present and future elections. For example, a party's executive committee cannot freely choose any leader it desires, as it needs to be concerned with how MPs

[26]See Bittner (2008) for a multi-country, systematic study of the effect of personality traits on vote choice, and Duch and Stevenson's (2009) study on economic voting in Western Europe.

would react. If they disapprove of the choice, they may give unfavorable media interviews or, in the worst case, refuse to put themselves forward as candidates and decline to help the party campaign in the next election.

This model allows me to predict the circumstances under which more extreme leaders will be chosen. Having to consider the non-selectorate's reaction may prevent selectorate members from choosing their preferred leader. At the same time, the non-selectorate is only influential when selectorate members are at least somewhat concerned about the party's electoral welfare. If a leader is chosen by party hardliners, then the party would remain extreme regardless of its performance at the polls. This is not surprising, neither is the argument that leadership selection incorporates non-selectorate's preference. The counter-intuitive result, spelled out in Proposition 3, comes from the degree of difference in the selectorate and non-selectorate's prioritization of the party's electoral welfare. The surprising prediction is that, for a moderate selectorate, the condition that can produce the most extreme leader is one where the selectorate is most concerned over the party's electoral welfare.

One implication, then, is that changes in a party's electoral circumstances yield different "types" of leaders: a party "in trouble" can end up selecting a more extreme leader that one who is not. A selectorate, especially one of an opposition party that suffered successive election loss, may prioritize electoral welfare (α_S). Even for niche parties, generating votes may signal support from the electorate, which prevents party breakdown. Thus, α_S for selectorate members of an opposition party should be higher than α_S for selectorate members of a government party.

The composition of the selectorate should also influence how high α_S is. It is reasonable to imagine that an opposition party's elite members, such as MPs and the party executive, care more about the party's electoral welfare than party activists do, since their ability to retain office and ensure the party's well-being depends on how well the party does in the next general election. If party elites make up the selectorate, α_S should be high in opposition. Meanwhile, a non-selectorate that consists of the party's rank-and-file may view

the party's opposition status as an opportunity to realign the party's policy direction. Since they may care more about advocacy than the party's electoral welfare, α_{NS} should be low in opposition. Proposition 3 predicts that when the selectorate prioritizes electoral welfare more than non-selectorate members do (i.e., $\alpha_S > \alpha_{NS}$), the latter can pressure selectorate members into choosing their preferred leader. If we accept this logic, one testable implication is that, if party elites make up the selectorate, a party that just lost its government status should choose a leader with a relatively extreme policy position, one that resembles closely with the party's rank-and-file. It is also plausible that non-selectorate members prioritize electoral welfare if the party experiences successive electoral defeats, i.e. α_{NS} increases with time in opposition. Another testable implication, then, is that an opposition party with consecutive election losses should choose a leader with a more moderate policy position.

One way to expand this model is to vary a party's dependence on non-selectorate members for election campaigns. Parties with vast financial resources, or ones that are not restricted by campaign finance rules, may opt out of time-intensive campaign effort, such as door-to-door canvassing and distributing pamphlets, in favor of television ads, billboards, etc. Innovations in communication technology, such as Facebook and Twitter, may also reduce a party's need for labor-intensive campaign effort. In turn, low dependence may grant selectorate members the freedom to choose their preferred leader. At the very least, instead of catering to the party's rank-and-file, selectorate members may try to please donors of media campaign funds by choosing a leader that the latter group approves of. At the same time, it is important to note that a party's electoral well-being cannot be sustained solely by sending tweets and airing television advertisements during general elections. Even if a party has the resources to conduct large-scale media campaigns, on-the-ground activities by the party's rank-and-file are still important for signaling unity and high support for the party.

A second expansion is to incorporate multi-party competition into the model. My model has implicitly "nested" this by including a "vote-maximizing position" in both the selecotrate and the non-selectorate's utility functions. However, this alone does not capture the essence of inter-party electoral competition. Leadership selection is not simultaneous across parties.

Often times, parties can observe the policy positions of their rival parties' new leaders before an election. This, in turn, provides them with the opportunity to react by repositioning themselves in the policy spectrum. Even if we assume that selection is simultaneous across parties, and that each party effectively incorporates its rivals' positions when it determines its own vote-maximizing policy position, we still need to consider how campaign effort can influence the quality of electoral competition. In a multi-party competition setting, galvanizing the non-selectorate into campaigning for the party may actually hurt the party's vote share, since one party's surge in campaign activity also fuels its rivals' campaign effort. For example, if party A chooses a leader with a policy position that inspires the non-selectorate to campaign more, party B's non-selectorate members may react by increasing their campaign effort, even if their party leader's policy position is far from their own. This, in turn, grants party B's selectorate the upper hand in choosing a leader whose policy position is close to their own. Explicitly incorporating multi-party competition into my model will not only increase the accuracy of my prediction, but it will also further advance our understanding of parties and elections.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

My model of party leadership selection provides a theoretical framework for understanding how selectorate members balance their concerns over the party's electoral well-being, the policy direction that the party should take, and the need to appease different policy factions. In addition, it shows that informal influence from non-selectorate members constrain leadership choice. Thus, even if selectorate members value the party's electoral well-being, they do not necessarily choose a leader whose policy position can attract votes. In addition, a moderate selectorate does not always imply a moderate leader. As long as non-selectorate members can threaten to reduce their campaign effort, even if selectorate members recognize a need to increase the party's vote share, party leaders whose policy positions attract fewer votes can still arise. This is due to the selectorate's understanding that non-selectorate

members are an important component of the party's electoral well-being.

Why would non-selectorate members to disregard the party's electoral welfare? The British Labour Party in the early 1980s is one such example. The majority of Labour MPs (who are the selectorate) were not considered as part of the "hard left." However, Labour activists, who occupied the extreme wing of the party, were able to pressure the parliamentary party into choosing Michael Foot as the leader.[27] They also successfully gained formal voting power for leadership elections via the establishment of the electoral college. The natural next step for studying party leadership selection in parliamentary democracies is to understand how non-selectorate members are able to capture a party's institutional power, in the process damaging the party's electoral well-being. Understanding the consequences of such change on the party's electoral performance will illuminate the types of electoral strategies parties employ, and also the dynamics of elections in parliamentary democracies.

[27]Interviews with the author, 09/15/2011 and 10/10/2011

3.6 Appendix A: Tables for the Simulated Examples

Table A1: Effect of X_S and X_{NS} on $X^*_{PL,S}$

$X_{NS}, \alpha_S = 0.5$, $\alpha_{NS} = 0.6$		$X_S, \alpha_S = 0.3$,$\alpha_{NS} = 0.6$	
X_S	$X^*_{PL,S}$	X_{NS}	$X^*_{PL,S}$
0.1	0.1716	0.1	0.2945
0.2	0.2277	0.2	0.2992
0.3	0.3066	0.3	0.3002
0.4	0.4007	0.4	0.3009
0.5	0.5000	0.5	0.3066
0.6	0.5994	0.6	0.3209
0.7	0.6968	0.7	0.3427
0.8	0.7907	0.8	0.3705
0.9	0.8805	0.9	0.4030
1	0.9662	1	0.4388

Table A2: Effect of α_S on $X^*_{PL,S}$, Moderate Selectorate

α_S	$X^*_{PL,S}$, $\alpha_{NS} = 0.7$	$X^*_{PL,S}$, $\alpha_{NS} = 0.3$
0.1	0.3005	0.3089
0.2	0.3008	0.3172
0.3	0.3013	0.3253
0.4	0.3018	0.3330
0.5	0.3031	0.3412
0.6	0.3046	0.3504
0.7	0.3066	0.3610
0.8	0.3105	0.3741
0.9	0.3198	0.3940
1	0.5	0.5

Note: $X_{NS} = 0.5$ and $X_S = 0.3$.

Table A3: Effect of α_S on $X^*_{PL,S}$, Extreme Selectorate

α_S	$X^*_{PL,S}$, $\alpha_{NS} = 0.7$	$X^*_{PL,S}$, $\alpha_{NS} = 0.3$
0.1	0.4996	0.4947
0.2	0.4996	0.4889
0.3	0.4993	0.4828
0.4	0.4988	0.4756
0.5	0.4981	0.4680
0.6	0.4974	0.4586
0.7	0.4962	0.4473
0.8	0.4937	0.4325
0.9	0.4870	0.4096
1	0.3	0.3

Note: $X_S = 0.5$ and $X_{NS} = 0.3$.

Table A4: Effect of α_{NS} on $X^*_{PL,S}$, Moderate Selectorate

α_{NS}	$X^*_{PL,S}$, $\alpha_S = 0.3$	$X^*_{PL,S}$, $\alpha_S = 0.7$
0.1	0.3855	0.4238
0.2	0.3464	0.3874
0.3	0.3253	0.3611
0.4	0.3132	0.3406
0.5	0.3066	0.3252
0.6	0.3032	0.3138
0.7	0.3013	0.3067
0.8	0.3005	0.3025
0.9	0.3001	0.3005
1	0.3	0.3

Note: $X_{NS} = 0.5$ and $X_S = 0.3$.

Table A5: Effect of α_{NS} on $X^*_{PL,S}$, Extreme Selectorate

α_{NS}	$X^*_{PL,S}$, $\alpha_S = 0.7$	$X^*_{PL,S}$, $\alpha_S = 0.3$
0.1	0.3755	0.4192
0.2	0.4169	0.4630
0.3	0.4473	0.4828
0.4	0.4687	0.4920
0.5	0.4828	0.4962
0.6	0.4912	0.4981
0.7	0.4962	0.4993
0.8	0.4986	0.4997
0.9	0.4997	0.4999
1	0.5	0.5

Note: $X_S = 0.5$ and $X_{NS} = 0.3$.

3.7 Appendix B: Proofs

3.7.1 Proof of Equilibrium Strategies

Since this model utilizes a complete information, two-stage game form with continuous choice, I use backward induction to determine the e and $X_{PL,S}$ that would be the best response for both members of the selectorate S and the non-selectorate NS. To do so, I would determine which values of e and $X_{PL,S}$ would minimize the utility loss for members of S and members of NS.

I first determine the optimal value of effort, e^*, that would minimize the utility loss for members of the non-selectorate NS with the loss function $L_{NS}(X_{PL,S}, e) = -\alpha_{NS}((1-e)^2V(X_{PL,S})) - (1-\alpha_{NS})(P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) + e(P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}))$. The first order condition for the loss function is:

$$\frac{\partial L_{NS}}{\partial e} = -2\alpha_{NS}(1-e)V(X_{PL,S}) + (1-\alpha_{NS})(P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) = 0$$

Algebraic manipulation yields the following value for e:

$$e^* = \frac{2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}) - (1-\alpha_{NS})P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})}{2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S})}$$

which minimizes NS's loss function.

Since members of the selectorate S are strategic, they incorporate the optimal effort level that members of NS would provide for each given leadership candidate's policy position. As members of S incorporate the effort level from NS into their decision-making process, their loss function, $L_S(X_{PL,S}, e) = -\alpha_S((1-e)^2V(X_{PL,S})) - (1-\alpha_S)P(X_S - X_{PL,S})$, becomes:

$$L_S(X_{PL,S}, e) = -\alpha_S((1 - (\frac{2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}) - (1-\alpha_{NS})P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})}{2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S})}))^2V(X_{PL,S})) \\ -(1-\alpha_S)(P(X_S - X_{PL,S}))$$

which reduces to:

$$L_S(X_{PL,S}, e) = -\alpha_S(\frac{(1-\alpha_{NS})^2}{4\alpha_{NS}^2})(\frac{P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})}{V(X_{PL,S})}) + (1-\alpha_S)(P(X_S - X_{PL,S}))$$

The first order condition for S's loss function is thus:

$$\alpha_S(\frac{(1-\alpha_{NS})^2}{4\alpha_{NS}^2})(\frac{-2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) - P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})}{V^2(X_{PL,S})})$$
$$-(1-\alpha_S)P'(X_S - X_{PL,S}) = 0$$

While this does not offer a closed-form solution, it is possible to determine, for a given set of values for all other parameter, the value of $X_{PL,S}$ satisfies the first order condition. This is true if the loss function is single-peaked, which is assumed, and concave down, which is true if the second derivative of $L_S(X_{PL,S})$ is negative. If this loss function is not concave, then its second derivative would be 0 or positive. Taking the second derivative of $L_S(X_{PL,S}, e)$, we get:

$$\frac{\partial^2 L_S}{\partial^2 X_{PL,S}} = -\alpha_S(\frac{(1-\alpha_{NS})^2}{4\alpha_{NS}^2})[(\frac{2P'^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V^2(X_{PL,S})}{V^3(X_{PL,S})})$$
$$+(\frac{2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P''(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V^2(X_{PL,S})}{V^3(X_{PL,S})}) - (\frac{P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V''(X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S})}{V^3(X_{PL,S})})$$
$$+(\frac{4P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})}{V^3(X_{PL,S})}) + (\frac{2P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'^2(X_{PL,S})}{V^3(X_{PL,S})})]$$
$$+(1-\alpha_S)P''(X_S - X_{PL,S}) = 0$$

Setting this to greater than 0, we get:

$$2(P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) + P(X_j - X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S}))^2$$
$$< P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V''(X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) - (\frac{1-\alpha_S}{\alpha_S(\frac{(1-\alpha_{NS})^2}{4\alpha_{NS}^2})})P''(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V^3(X_{PL,S})$$
$$-2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P''(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V^2(X_{PL,S})$$

Which is not possible since the left hand side is positive and the right hand side is negative. Therefore, the second derivative of $L_S(X_{PL,S}, e)$ is negative, meaning that the loss function is concave down. Therefore, it is possible to determine the numerical value for $X^*_{PL,S}$ that would satisfy the F.O.C.

Q.E.D.

3.7.2 Why $X^*_{PL,S}$ Lies between X_S andX_{NS}

To show why the chosen party leader's policy position is always located between the ideal positions of the selectorate and the non-selectorate, let us examine the position that members of the selectorate will choose when they only care about the party's electoral welfare (when $\alpha_S = 1$) versus when they only care about their ability to advocate for their ideal policy position (when $\alpha_S = 0$). If the moderate wing makes up the selectorate, when $\alpha_M = 0$, the party leader's policy position that would minimize M's loss function is $X_{PL,S} = X_M$. In contrast, if $\alpha_M = 1$, then there are two ways to minimize M's loss function. Setting $X_{PL,S} = 0$ would mean $V(0) = 0$, which minimizes $L_M(X_{PL,M}, e)$. Alternatively, setting $X_{PL,S} = X_E$ would also minimize $L_M(X_{PL,M}, e)$. To see why, let us examine how the non-selectorate wing, E, will react to this choice. Since $X_{PL,S} = X_E$, $e(P(X_E - X_E) = 0$, meaning that they can exert 100% effort without incurring any additional cost for policy difference. As such, they will do so in order to minimize the utility loss otherwise incurred from $V(X_E)$. To ensure maximum effort from the non-selectorate, members of the selectorate M would choose a leader whose policy position corresponds to X_E I assume that when members of the selectorate S is faced with choosing $X_{PL,S} = 0$ or $X_{PL,S} = X_{NS}$, they will always choose X_{NS}, making $X_{PL,S} = 0$ is a weakly dominated strategy. Thus, pure strategy Nash equilibrium always result. Therefore, if the selectorate consists of members from the moderate wing, $X_{PL,M}$ would always be between X_M and X_E.

When members of the extreme wing E occupies the selectorate, when $\alpha_E = 0$, the policy position that would minimize E's loss function is $X_{PL,E} = X_E$. When $\alpha_E = 1$, by the same logic, members of E can either choose $X_{PL,E} = 0$ or $X_{PL,E} = 1$ to minimize the loss function. Since I assume away the existence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, members of E will always choose a party leader whose policy position lies between the ideal position of M and E. Therefore, regardless of the identity of the selectorate, $X_M \leq X_{PL,S} \leq X_E$.

Q.E.D.

3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 1

The derivative of e^* with respect to $X_{PL,S}$ is:

$$\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{PL,S}} = \frac{(2\alpha_{NS}V'(X_{PL,S}) + (1-\alpha_{NS})P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S}))2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S})}{(2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}))^2} - \frac{(2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}) - (1-\alpha_{NS})P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S}))2\alpha_{NS}V'(X_{PL,S})}{(2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}))^2}$$

$\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{PL,S}} > 0$ if and only if the following condition holds:

$$P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) > -P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})$$

Per conditions specified on the function forms $V(X_{PL,S})$ and $P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})$, the right hand side of this inequality is always negative. The left hand side is positive if and only if $P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S}) < 0$, which is the case where $X_{NS} > X_{PL,S}$, implying that e^* is increasing in $X_{PL,S}$ if $X_{NS} > X_S$.

If $X_{NS} < X_S$, then $P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S}) > 0$, meaning that the left hand side of the inequality will also become negative. In this case, $P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) < -P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})$. To see why, let us assume that $\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{PL,S}} > 0$. Examining the properties of $V(X_{PL,S})$ and $P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})$, since $V(X_{PL,S})$ is decreasing at a decreasing rate, for each unit of increase in $X_{PL,S}$, $V(X_{PL,S})$ is more negative than $V'(X_{PL,S})$. In contrast, since $P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})$ is decreasing at an increasing rate, for each unit of increase in $X_{PL,S}$, $P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})$ in absolute terms is larger than $P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})$. These conditions imply that the left hand side of the inequality is more negative than the right hand side: $P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) < -P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})$. This in turn implies that $\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{PL,S}} < 0$, which contradicts our assumption that $\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{PL,S}} > 0$. Thus, when $X_{NS} < X_S$, increasing $X_{PL,S}$ results in a decrease in e^*.

I now examine how e^* responds to changes in X_{NS}. The derivative of e^* with respect to

X_{NS} is:

$$\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{NS}} = \frac{-(1-\alpha_{NS})P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})}{2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S})}$$

$\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{NS}}$ is positive if and only if $-(1-\alpha_{NS})P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) < 0$, implying that it is positive if and only if $P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) > 0$. This is true when $X_{NS} < X_{PL,S}$, implying that $\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{NS}} > 0$ holds if and only if $X_{NS} < X_S$. If $\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial X_{NS}} > 0$ also holds when $X_{NS} > X_S$, then $P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) > 0$ when $X_{NS} > X_S$, which is impossible since $P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) < 0$ when $X_{NS} > X_{PL,S}$, implying that this condition is not possible when $X_j > X_i$. Therefore, e^* is increasing in X_{NS} when $X_{NS} < X_S$, and decreasing in X_{NS} when $X_{NS} > X_S$.

Q.E.D.

3.7.4 Proof that e^* is increasing in α_{NS}

The derivative of e^* with respect to α_{NS} is:

$$\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial \alpha_{NS}} = \frac{(2V(X_{PL,S}) + P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}))2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S})}{(2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}))^2}$$
$$- \frac{(2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}) - (1-\alpha_{NS})P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}))2V(X_{PL,S})}{(2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}))^2}$$

Algebraic manipulation yields the following necessary and sufficient condition for $\frac{\partial e^*}{\partial \alpha_{NS}} > 0$:

$$\alpha_{NS}(2V(X_{PL,S}) + P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})) > 2\alpha_{NS}V(X_{PL,S}) - (1-\alpha_{NS})P(X_j - X_{PL,S})$$
$$\implies 1 > 0$$

which is always true. Therefore, e^* is increasing in α_{NS} $\forall$ $\alpha_{NS} \in [0,1]$.

Q.E.D.

3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 2

Since no closed form solution is available for $X^*_{PL,S}$, I use implicit differentiation to determine how $X^*_{PL,S}$ corresponds to changes in X_S and X_{NS}. Let $\frac{\partial L_i(X_{PL,S})}{\partial X_{PL,S})}$ be defined as $g(X^*_{PL,S})$. Implicit differentiation of $\frac{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}{\partial X_S}$ is equivalent to $-\frac{\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X_S}}{\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}}$. $\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X_S}$ yields $-(1-\alpha_S)P''(X_S-X_{PL,S})$, which is positive $\forall X_S$. $\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}$ is equivalent to $\frac{\partial^2 L_S(X_{PL,S})}{\partial^2 X_{PL,S})}$, which as established in Proposition 1, is negative $\forall X_{PL,S}$. Therefore, $\frac{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}{\partial X_S}$ is positive, implying that $X^*_{PL,S}$ is increasing in $X_S \forall X_S \in [0,1]$.

Implicit differentiation of $\frac{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}{\partial X_{NS}}$ is equivalent to $-\frac{\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X_{NS}}}{\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}}$. $\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X_{NS}}$ yields:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X_{NS}} = \frac{\alpha_S(\frac{(1-\alpha_S)^2}{4\alpha_S^2})}{V^2(X_{PL,S})}(&-2P'^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S})\\ &-2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P''(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S})\\ &-2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S}))\end{aligned}$$

which is positive $\forall\ X_{NS}[0,1]$. Thus, $X_{PL,S}$ is increasing in X_{NS}.

Q.E.D.

3.7.6 Proof of Proposition 3

Similar to the proof for Proposition 2, I use implicit differentiation to evaluate the effects of changing α_S on $X^*_{PL,S}$. Let $\frac{\partial L_S(X_{PL,S})}{\partial X_{PL,S})}$ be defined as $g(X^*_{PL,S})$. Implicit differentiation of $\frac{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}{\partial \alpha_S}$ is equivalent to $-\frac{\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial \alpha_S}}{\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}}$. Since $\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}$ is negative, if $\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial \alpha_S}$ is positive, then $X^*_{PL,S}$ is increasing in α_i. Differentiating $g(X^*_{PL,S})$ with respect to α_S yields:

$$\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial \alpha_S} =$$
$$(\frac{(1-\alpha_{NS})^2}{4\alpha^2_{NS}})(\frac{-2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P'(X_S-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S})-P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})}{V^2(X_{PL,S})})$$
$$+P'(X_S-X_{PL,S})$$

This is positive if $P'(X_S - X_{PL,S}) > 0$, meaning that if $X_S < X_{PL,S}$, $X_S < X_{NS}$. Thus, $X^*_{PL,S}$ is increasing in α_S if $X_S < X_{NS}$. If $X_S > X_{NS}$, implying that $X_{NS} < X_{PL,S}$, $P'(X_{NS} - X_PL) > 0$, then $X_{PL,S}$ is increasing in α_S if and only if $-2P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,i}) < P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})$. Given the specifications on $P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})$ and $V(X_{PL,S})$, as discussed in Proposition 2, there are no values of $X_{PL,S}$ and X_{NS} that satisfies the inequality. Therefore, $X_{PL,S}$ is increasing in α_S if $X_S > X_{NS}$.

I use implicit differentiation to evaluate the effects of changing α_{NS} on $X^*_{PL,S}$. Let $\frac{\partial L_S(X_{PL,S})}{\partial X_{PL,S})}$ be defined as $g(X^*_{PL,S})$. Implicit differentiation of $\frac{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}{\partial \alpha_{NS}}$ is equivalent to $-\frac{\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial \alpha_{NS}}}{\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}}$. Since $\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial X^*_{PL,S}}$ is negative, if $\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial \alpha_{NS}}$ is positive, then $X^*_{PL,S}$ is increasing in α_{NS}. Differentiating $g(X^*_{PL,S})$ with respect to α_{NS} yields:

$$\frac{\partial g(X^*_{PL,S})}{\partial \alpha_S} =$$
$$\alpha_S(\frac{-2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P'(X_j-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S})-P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})}{V^2(X_{PL,S})})$$
$$(\frac{-2(1-\alpha_{NS})4\alpha^2_{NS}-(1-\alpha_{NS})^2 8\alpha_{NS}}{16\alpha^4_{NS}})$$

If $X_S < X_{NS}$, implying that $X_{NS} > X_{PL,S}$ and $P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) < 0$, then the above equation is positive if and only if $-2(1-\alpha_{NS})4\alpha^2_{NS} - (1-\alpha_{NS})^2 8\alpha_{NS} > 0$. Algebraic manipulation shows that this is not possible. Thus, when $X_S < X_{NS}$, $X_{PL,S}$ is decreasing in α_{NS}.

If $X_S > X_{NS}$, implying that $X_{NS} < X_{PL,S}$ and $P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S}) > 0$, then the above derivative is positive if and only if $-2P(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})P'(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S})-P^2(X_{NS}-X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S}) < 0$. Rearranging the terms show that the derivaitve is positive if and only

if $-2P'(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})V(X_{PL,S}) > P(X_j - X_{PL,S})V'(X_{PL,S})$. As discussed in Proposition 3, this is always true given the properties of $V(X_{PL,S})$ and $P(X_{NS} - X_{PL,S})$. Therefore, if $X_S > X_{NS}$, $X_{PL,S}$ is increasing in α_{NS}.

Q.E.D.

3.8 References

Aarts, Kees, and André Blais. 2011. "Pull or Push? Positive and Negative Leader Evaluations and Vote Choice." In *Political Leaders and Democratic Elections*. eds. Kees Aarts, André Blais, and Hermann Schmitt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 165-186.

Adams, James, Samuel Merrill III, and Bernard Grofman. 2005. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.

Adams, James, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009. "Moderate Now, Win Votes Later: The Electoral Consequences of Parties Policy Shifts in 25 Postwar Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* Vol. 71, No. 2: pp. 678-692.

Alderman, Keith and Neil Carter. 1995. "The Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1994." *Parliamentary Affairs* Vol. 48, No. 3: pp. 438-455.

Alderman, Keith. 1998. "The Conservative Leadership Election of 1997." *Parliamentary Affairs* Vol. 51, No. 1: pp. 1-16.

Andrews, Josephine, and Robert W. Jackman. 2008. "If Winning Isnt Everything, Why Do They Keep Socre? Consequence of Electoral Performance for Party Leaders." *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 38: pp. 657-675.

Bale, Tim. 2010. *The Conservative Party: from Thatcher to Cameron.* Cambridge: Polity.

Bartle, John, and Ivor Crewe. 2002. "The Impact of Party Leaders in Britain: Strong Assumptions, Weak Evidence." In *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections*, ed. Anthony King. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 70-95.

Bawn, Kathleen, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2012. "Government versus Opposition at the Polls: How Government Participation Changes the Impact of Policy Position on Vote Share." *American Journal of Political Science*, Forthcoming.

Bean, Clive, and Anthony Mughan. 1989. "Leadership Effects in Parliamentary Elections in Australia and Britain'.' *American Political Science Review* 83 (4): 1165-1179.

Bittner, Amanda. 2008. *Platform or Personality? Understanding the Role of Leaders in Election Outcomes.* Ph.D. diss. The University of British Columbia.

Blais, André, Matheiu Turgeon, Elisabeth Gidengil, Neil Nevitte, and Richard Nadeau. 2001. "What Matters Most? Comparing the Impacts of Issues and the Economy in

American, British and Canadian Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (3): 555-563.

Cohen, Martin, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform.* Chicago, Illinois: Chicago University Press.

Cowley, Philip, and John Garry. 1998. "The British Conservative Party and Europe: The Choosing of John Major." *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 28, No. 3: pp. 473-499.

Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.

Denham, Andrew, and Kieron O'Hara. 2008. *Democratising Conservative Leadership Selection: From Grey Suits to Grass Roots.* New York: Manchester University Press.

Dewan, Torun, and David P. Myatt. 2007. "Leading the Party: Coordination, Direction, and Communication." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 101, No. 4: pp. 827-845.

Dewan, Torun, and David P. Myatt. 2008. "The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 102, No. 3: pp. 351-368.

Dewan, Torun, and David P. Myatt. 2009. "On the Rhetorical Strategies of Leaders: Speaking Clearly, Standing Back, and Stepping Down." Working paper.

Duch, Raymond, and Randolph Stevenson. 2009. *Economic Voting.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Farrell, David M., and Paul Webb. 2000. "Political Parties as Campaign Organizations." in Russell Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. 2000. "Are Party Leaders Becoming More Important to Vote Choice in Canada?" Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.

Heffernan, Richard, and Mike Marqusee. 1992. *Defeat from the Jaws of Victory: Inside Kinnock's Labour Party.* New York: Verso.

Heppell, Tim. 2008. *Choosing the Tory Leader: Conservative Party Leadership Election from Heath to Cameron.* London: I B Tauris.

Heppell, Tim. 2010. *Choosing the Labour Leader: Labour Party Leadership Election from Wilson to Brown.* London: I B Tauris.

Hill, Michael. 2007. textitThe Parliamentary Conservative Party: The Leadership Elections of William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith. Dissertation, University of Huddersfield.

Jobson, Richard, and Mark Wickham-Jones. 2010. "Gripped by the Past: Nostalgia and the 2010 Labour Party Leadership Contest." *British Politics* Vol. 5, No. 4: pp. 525-548.

Kam, Christopher. 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics.* Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.

Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* Vol. 1: 1. pp. 5- 28.

Kedar, Orit. 2005. "How Voters Work around Institutions: Policy Balancing in Staggered Elections." *Electoral Studies* Vol. 25, No. 3: pp.509-527.

King, Anthony, ed. 2002. *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1990. "Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics." *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 20, No. 4: pp. 489-507.

Lupia, Arthur, and Kaare Strøm. 1995. "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 89, No. 3: pp. 648-665.

Midtbø, Tor. 1997. "The Electoral Effect of Party Leader Approval in Norway." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 20 (2): 135-158.

Moon, Woojin. 2004. "Party Activists, Campaign Resources and Candidate Position Taking: Theory, Tests and Applications." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (4): 611-633.

Müller, Woflgang C., and Kaare Strøm Eds. 1999. *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Makes Hard Decisions.* Cambridge University Press: Massachusetts.

Norton, Philip. 1990. "Choosing a Leader: Margaret Thatcher and the Parliamentary Conservative Party, 1989-1990." *Parliamentary Affairs* Vol. 43, No. 3: pp. 249-259.

van de Pas, Daphne, Catherine de Vries, and Wouter van der Brug. "A Leader without A Party: Exploring the Relationship between Geert Wilders' Leadership Performance in the Media and His Electoral Success." Working Paper.

Punnett, Robert. 1992. *Selecting the Party Leader: Britain in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Harvester Weatsheaf.

Scarrow, Susan E., Paul Webb, and David M. Farrell. 2000. "From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties." in Russell Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Schofield, Normal. 2009. "An Activist Model of Democracy." in Enriqueta Aragonés, Carmen Beviá, Norman Schofield and Humberto Llavador González, eds. *Political Economy of Democracy.* Barcelona: Foundación BBVA.

Somer-Topcu, Zeynep. 2009. "Timely Decisions: The Effects of Past National Elections on Party Policy Change." *The Journal of Politics* 71 (1): 238-248.

Stark, Leonard. 1996. *Choosing a Leader: Party Leadership Contests in Britain from MacMillan to Blair.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Strøm, Kaare. 1994. "The Presthus Debacle: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in Norway." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 88, No.1: pp. 112-127.

Tavits, Magrit. 2007. "Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts and Political Competition." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 51, No. 1: pp. 151-165.

Tsebelis, George. 1990. *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics.* Berkeley: The University of California Press.

CHAPTER 4

Advocacy Reigns Supreme? British Conservative Party Leaders

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I showed that in majoritarian systems, opposition parties that change leaders improve their performance at the next general election, while leadership change hurts opposition parties in proportion systems. Furthermore, party leaders in majoritarian systems are more at risk for exit than those in proportional systems. My model of party leadership selection, presented in Chapter 3, argued that leadership choice is dependent on policy congruence between the selectorate and leadership candidates (advocacy), how a candidate's policy position would affect the party's vote share (electoral welfare), and how the choice influences non-selectorate members' campaign effort during a general election (electoral welfare and leverage).

In this chapter, I use party leadership elections in the United Kingdom Conservative Party to support my model's Proposition 2: *all else equal, the chosen party leader's policy position reflects the selectorates' position.* There a plethora of works on this party, and the selection procedures and rules for deposing a leader are formalized. The clarity of institutional rules and the rich variety of expert opinions offer the opportunity for testing Proposition 2. Also, for this party, the members of parliament (MPs) are considered to be more moderate than party activists. This allows me to test my proposition in an environment where, broadly speaking, the selectorate was more the moderate than the non-selectorate.

I first discuss how the Conservative leadership selection process fits into my model and

examine rival hypotheses. More years in parliament and government experience did not enhance a candidate's likelihood of being elected, and potential "favorites" do not always win leadership elections. These lend credit to the idea that policy concerns trumped candidate valence.

A recounting of the Conservative Party's division over European integration provides the context for each of my cases. I then test Proposition 2 using data from the 1997, 2001, and 2005 Conservative Party Leadership Elections. Candidates' valence qualities cannot, by themselves, explain the outcome. Moreover, a candidate's ability to "unify" the party does not explain leadership choice. Next, I utilize Heppell and Hill's (2008; 2009; 2010) datasets on MPs' ideal positions in the economic, social, and European integration dimensions to conduct simple statistical tests. My logit models examine how MPs' policy preferences affect candidate support. Interviews with Conservative MPs validate my statistical results.

The empirics support Proposition 2. In the 1997 leadership election, European integration remained the pivotal issue that influenced Conservative MPs' vote choices. When Euroscepticism was prevalent among Conservative MPs in 2001 and 2005, leadership candidates' positions on social policies became the pivotal issues. There is also some evidence from the 2005 Leadership Election that partly supports (at least, does not contradict) Proposition 3: *if selectorate members prioritize electoral welfare, but non-selectorate members prioritize advocacy, the chosen leader should reflect the position of the non-selectorate.*

4.2 Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Tests

My model yields three propositions. First, non-selectorate members exert more campaign effort (e) during a general election when the chosen party leader's policy position reflects their own. Second, all else equal, the chosen party leader's position mirrors the selectorate's position. Third, if selectorate members value the party's electoral welfare (high α_S), but non-selectorate members prioritize advocacy (low α_{NS}), the chosen leader's policy position is be closer to non-selectorate members' position. In contrast, if the non-selectorate members

also prioritize electoral welfare (high α_{NS}), then the chosen party leader's policy position is closer to the selectorates' position.

There are potential limitations in testing all propositions. It is almost impossible to quantify selectorate members' weight on electoral welfare versus advocacy, or their ideal policy positions on the real number line. Contrary to my model, the number of leadership candidates is discrete rather than continuous. Furthermore, in the British Conservative Party, the selectorate is not unitary. Each MP can cast a vote, which counts toward the final tally. The lack of quantitative data on the non-selectorate members' issue positions prevents me from pinpointing the policy differences between British MPs, local party leaders, and ordinary party members. Finally, since the country uses a single-member district system, it is difficult to distinguish whether the party activists' campaign effort stems from their support for their local party candidate or the party leader.[1] In this sense, it is difficult to obtain evidence to test Propositions 1 and 3.

Despite these constraints, I can identify general trends, such as whether or not selectorate members prioritized electoral welfare, and where their policy positions lay relative to the leadership candidates' positions. Although I cannot quantify the policy differences between selectorate and non-selectorate members, or between non-selectorate members and each party leadership candidate, I can determine whether they were close or far apart. While the selectorate is not a unitary actor, since the Conservatives employ majoirty rule in their leadership elections, the selectorate's ideal policy point is equivalent to the position that is held by the majority of its members. For example, if 70% of all Conservative MPs were Eurosceptic, then I label the selectorate as Eurosceptic. Although this ignores the strategies and dynamics within the selectorate, since data on MPs' vote choices exist, I can still examine the rationale behind support for candidates.

One advantage of studying these leadership elections is that I can examine how longer years in opposition alters selectorate members' behavior. A party's electoral circumstances

[1]It is quite possible, for example, that support for the local candidate drives campaign effort even if they do not share the party leader's policy direction.

determine how much selectorate and non-selectorate members prioritize the party's electoral welfare (α_S and α_{NS}). The longer a large party has been out of government, the more its selectorate members should value electoral welfare. In other words, α_S should increase with each year in opposition. The term "electoral welfare" is also context-dependent. Some may judge a party with vast financial resources as one that is "in good shape" electorally, while others may see high party activism as the benchmark. Regardless, it should be uncontroversial to consider a large party in perpetual opposition as one that values the party's electoral welfare, and that a party with limited financial resources as one that is more dependent on activists' campaigns.

For those interested in British politics, a cursory overview of the country's party politics is in Appendix A. Information on leadership selection procedures, the list of leadership candidates, and leadership election results are in Appendix B.

4.3 Rival Explanations for Leadership Selection

Leadership selection may depend on the mode of incumbent party leaders' exit. A party that deposes its leader may have a "leader in waiting" to take over the post. If a popular leader has left office for health reasons, the power vacuum may invite more candidates to contest the position. The dynamics of Conservative leadership elections, however, reveal that the identities of the winners are not solely determined by how the previous leader left office. Table C1 presents how each party leader exited office and the number of candidates that participated in the subsequent leadership election. (All tables in this sections are located in Appendix C.) General election loss seemed to be the most common reason for leaving office. The mode of did not seem to influence the number of candidates in the subsequent leadership election. In 1975, the Conservative party activated a leadership contest without reaching a consensus on who would be the ideal candidate to replace Edward Heath, the incumbent leader. Margaret Thatcher's decision to challenge him was unanticipated by many inside the Party, and her subsequent victory even more surprising (Heppell 2008: 59).

The successful rebellion against Iain Duncan Smith in 2003 also (albeit weakly) supports this. While Conservative MPs were correct in thinking that Michael Howard would be the sole candidate if the position were to become vacant, the events that prompted the deposing were 1) the three-line whip Duncan Smith imposed on Conservative MPs against a bill to allow same-sex couples to adopt children, and 2) millionaire Stuart Wheeler's threat to stop all donations to the Conservative Party if Iain Duncan Smith remained in office (Heppell 2008; Bale 2010).

Neither did perceived competence alone determine leadership choice. Table C2 presents the parliamentary experiences of candidates in the 1997 Conservative Party Leadership Election. Kenneth Clarke held two of Britain's three great offices.[2] He was the Home Secretary from 1992 to 1993, and was the Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1993 to 1997. Hague, the eventual winner, was the Secretary of State for Wales and the youngest member of John Major's cabinet. Table C3 shows a similar pattern for the 2001 Conservative Leadership Election. Portillo was the Shadow Chancellor of Exchequer, but Duncan Smith had not shadowed the Foreign Office, Home Office, or the Treasury. Similarly, in the Conservative Leadership Election of 2005, Cameron was the candidate with the least experience (Table C4). His position as the Shadow Education Secretary only began in 2005.

The above suggests that leadership election results were not endogenous to how the incumbent leaders exited office. Conservative leadership elections were not only competitive, but also unpredictable. It also illustrates that the candidate with the most parliamentary experience did not always win. At the same time, although the previous leader's mode of exit did not determine leadership choice, and neither did a candidate's perceived competence, these factors may have been included in the selectorate's evaluation of each candidate's strengths and weaknesses. The next two sections examine the dynamics behind leadership elections and test Proposition 2.

[2]They are the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, and the Home Secretary.

4.4 Policy Preferences and Conservative Leaders

4.4.1 The Conservative Party and Europe

I first discuss how European integration became a divisive issue among Conservative MPs. Margaret Thatcher, a staunch Eurosceptic (against European integration) and a fiscal Conservative, led the party to victory in the 1979, 1983, and 1987 General Elections. However, in the late 1980s, her government formulated a series of policies that led to a sharp drop in public opinion. One of the most unpopular proposed policies was the Poll Tax, which was part of a proposal for the local government finance reform. While it was unrelated to European integration, the widespread negative public response and Thatcher's refusal to withdraw the proposal motivated backbench MP Anthony Meyer's unsuccessful challenge for the leadership post in 1989.[3]

Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Howe's resignation over Thatcher's intransigent position over European integration prompted the pro-Europe Michael Heseltine to challenge her for the leadership. Although he was regarded as capable of helping the Conservatives win a fourth consecutive term, 55% of the party's MPs voted for Thatcher in the first round, while 41% voted for him. As Thatcher could only retain half of the MPs' support, she resigned. John Major, a Eurosceptic, entered the contest's second ballot and won with the support of 50% of Conservative MPs. Many voted for him to prevent the pro-Europe Heseltine from being elected (Cowley and Garry 1997; Heppell 2008; Bale 2010). However, Major's win did not end the intraparty battle over Britain's role in European integration. Internal division over the issue had led to various rebellions against the party whip,[4] culminating in an unsuccessful leadership challenge by John Redwood in 1995.[5] Cabinet in-fighting also

[3]Although Thatcher was able to win by 84%, the fact that 33 MPs voted against her and a further 27 MPs abstained means that she had lost support of around 20% of Conservative MPs.

[4]In the Maastricht Treaty rebellion in 1993, 18 Conservative MPs voted against the ratification while a further 16 abstained. The next year, in a rebellion over the European Community Finance Bill, Major had to withdraw the Conservative whip from 8 MPs.

[5]Redwood noted that disagreements with the Major government's policies on Europe was his motivation behind this challenge. Interview with the author 07/13/2011.

became public, with many instances featured in newspapers (Bale 2010: 46).

European integration thus became a salient dimension of conflict for the Parliamentary Conservative Party, though Michael Heseltine emphasized that the Europe-based conflicts did not spill over to disagreements in other issue dimensions.[6] The party's policy positions were divided along three main dimensions. Some MPs were pro-European integration, while others were against it (the Eurosceptics). Some were socially liberal, while others were conservative. Some MPs supported government intervention in economic and welfare policies (the "wets"), while others rallied against it (the "drys").

Heppell and Hill (2008; 2009; 2010) construct three datasets of MPs' stances along these three dimensions in 1997, 2001, and 2005. They determine each MP's positions based on division lists (roll call votes) and early day motions in the House of Commons, membership of party groups, and public comments that were unrelated to support for leadership candidates (Heppell and Hill 2008; 391). With these datasets, I can identify a Conservative MP's stance on the economy, Europe, and social issues, though they are not fine-grained. The data only demonstrate broad policy divisions, not the degree (i.e. no information was given on whether an MP was staunchly or mildly Eurosceptic). I also cannot determine how MPs prioritized among the three issues. For example, the data do not reveal whether an MP advocated more strongly for Euroscepticism than for social conservatism. At the same time, the datasets help to show whether some MPs were unwilling to vote for candidates belonging to different policy factions. Thus, they are appropriate for testing Proposition 2.

Heppell and Hill's (2008; 2009; 2010) datasets on MPs' policy preferences reveal a clear pattern of Euroscepticism among Conservative MPs in 1997, 2001, and 2005. However, the large number of Eurosceptic MPs does not imply that European integration did not divide the party. It remained a salient dimension of conflict, and, as I show below, MPs were willing to sacrifice votes in order to promote Euroscepticism.[7]

[6]Interview with the author 09/14/2011.

[7]In October 2011, when the Conservatives were in government, over 80 MPs rebelled against the party whip and voted for a motion to schedule a referendum on Europe.

4.4.2 Europe Reigned Supreme: the 1997 Leadership Election

Publicizied Cabinet conflicts and voter attraction with Tony Blair's New Labour, led to the Conservatives' biggest general election defeat in 1997, losing 178 seats. As the party landed in opposition, John Major resigned, triggering a leadership contest.

Only Conservative MPs were eligible to vote in the 1997 leadership election. Five candidates emerged, with William Hague as the victor after three rounds of balloting (Table B4). Hague, Michael Howard, Peter Lilley, and John Redwood were "Thatcherites" (socially conservative Eurosceptics who were also economically "dry"). Kenneth Clarke was the only pro-Europe and socially liberal candidate. There are thus two combinations of the issue positions–the "Thatcherite" position (Eurosceptic, socially conservative, and "dry'), and the pro-Europe, socially liberal, and economically "wet" position (Table 1).

The previous section discussed the rise of Euroscepticism within the Parliamentary Conservative Party. This deep division suggests that selectorate members may have prioritized advocacy over the party's electoral welfare when choosing a leader (i.e., $\alpha_S < 0.5$). If Proposition 2 is at work, then MPs would have chosen a leader whose positions reflected their own (i.e. X^*_{PL} is close to X_S).

Table 1: 1997 Conservative Party Leadership Candidates, Issue Positions

Candidate	**Stance on Social Issues**	**Stance on Economy**	**Stance on Europe**	**Winner?**
Kenneth Clarke	Liberal	Wet	Pro-Europe	No (3rd Round)
William Hague	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	Yes (3rd Round)
Michael Howard	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	No (1st Round)
Peter Lilley	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	No (1st Round)
John Redwood	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	No (2nd Round)

Sources: Alderman (1998); Heppell and Hill (2008); Bale (2010).

4.4.2.1 Rival Explanations

The need to preserve parliamentary party unity may explain Hague's election.[8] If so, one would expect pro-Europe MPs voting for Eurosceptic candidates, and Eurosceptic MPs

[8]See Heppell (2008) and Bale (2010) for in-depth discussion on this point.

not voting for pro-Europe ones, in order to prevent Eurosceptic MPs from rebelling. Yet, if Proposition 2 holds, Eurosceptic, socially conservative, and economic "dry" MPs would have chosen a leader with all of the above policy preferences, and pro-Europe MPs would vote for a pro-Europe candidate. As I show below, evidence suggests that Proposition 2, rather than the desire for maintaining parliamentary party discipline is a more likely explanation for Hague's victory.

Candidate valence did not determine Hague's victory over Ken Clarke. Hague did represent a "fresh start" (Quinn 2005; Heppell 2008; Bale 2010), which may have prompted Conservative MPs to choose him over three other "Thatcherite" candidates in the first two ballots. Many Conservative MPs regarded Hague as the candidate most able to break away from the image of in-fighting that plagued the Major government (Alderman 1998; Heppell 2008; Bale 2010). In contrast, Howard, Lilley, and Redwood represented the "old guard," each considered by the media as a divisive figure. At the same time, when asked about his initial opinion on Hague's prospect of winning the leadership election, one anonymous MP commented, "please, you cannot be serious" (Brandreth 1999: 488). Among the British electorate, Clarke was more popular; his left-of-the-party stance was also closer to the majority of the electorate (Alderman 1998; Garnett 2003; Hill 2007; Bale 2010). Potential voters overwhelmingly highlighted domestic policies, such as healthcare and education, as the important issues, while the "Thatcherite" position was unrepresentative of their views (Gallup Poll). If Conservative MPs were choosing a leader based only on his ability to attract votes, either via his policy stance or valence qualities, Clarke would have won. However, the majority of Conservative MPs chose Hague, whose policy positions were more extreme than the electorate, over the popular Clarke. Hague's valence qualities may have given him an advantage against other candidates *within* his policy faction. However, valence played a smaller role when MPs were choosing between candidates from different policy factions.

4.4.2.2 The Importance of Policy Preference

Table 2 presents a breakdown of Heppell and Hill's (2008) distribution of Conservative MPs' policy preferences in 1997. The majority were socially conservative (75%), economically "dry" (67%), and Eurosceptic (85%). Out of the 164 Conservative MPs with identifiable policy positions, 87 were socially conservative, "dry," and Eurosceptic, and 9 were socially liberal, "wet," and pro-Europe. Yet, not all 139 Eurosceptic MPs were socially and economically conservative. 17 of them were social liberals, while 19 of them were "wet."

Table 2: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 1997

Stance on Social Issues	**Liberal**	**Agnostic**	**Conservative**
	29 (18%)	13 (8%)	120 (74%)
Government Intervention in the Economy	**More (Wet)**	**Agnostic**	**Less (Dry)**
	40 (25%)	13 (8%)	110 (67%)
Stance on Europe	**Pro-Europe**	**Agnostic**	**Eurosceptic**
	14 (9%)	10 (6%)	139 (85%)

Source: Heppell and Hill (2008)

Table 3a: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 1997, for Eurosceptic MPs

Out of 139 Eurosceptic MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	4	1	12
Socially Agnostic	2	2	6
Socially Conservative	15	9	87

Table 3b: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 1997, for Euro-Agnostic MPs

Out of 10 Euro-Agnostic MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	1	0	0
Socially Agnostic	2	0	0
Socially Conservative	4	1	2

Table 3c: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 1997, for Pro-Europe MPs

Out of 14 Pro-Europe MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	9	0	2
Socially Agnostic	1	0	0
Socially Conservative	1	0	1

Source: Heppell and Hill (2008)

Using newspaper sources (*The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Guardian* and *The Independent*) and questionnaires, Heppell and Hill (2008) determine each MP's vote choice for the third ballot (Clarke versus Hague). I construct two simple logistic models to test the relationship between MPs' ideological positions and their candidate support. Model 1 tests how MPs' ideological orientations affected their decisions to vote for Hague. The dependent variable is 1 if the MP voted for Hague, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables include the following. % *Majority* is the win margin for the MP in the 1997 UK General Election. This is the difference between the percentage of votes the MP received and the percentage for the candidate with the second largest vote share.[9] *Conservative* represents whether or not the MP was socially conservative (as coded by Heppell and Hill (2008), with 1 representing the MP holding a socially conservative position and 0 otherwise). *Eurosceptic* captures whether or not Heppell and Hill (2008) code the MP as Eurosceptic (1 representing a Eurosceptic position and 0 otherwise). I do not include the economic dimension in my model because 95% of the economic "drys" are also Eurosceptic.

Model 2 tests how these factors influenced support for Clarke. The dependent variable is 1 if an MP pledged his or her vote for Clarke in the third ballot, and 0 otherwise. Independent variables include (1) % *Majority*; (2) if the MP was (as coded by Heppell and Hill (2008)) socially liberal (the binary variable *Liberal*, with 1 representing the MP holding a socially liberal position and 0 otherwise); (3) whether or not Heppell and Hill (2008) code the MP as an economic "wet" (the binary variable *"Wet"*, which is 1 if the MP favors intervention

[9]This is taken from Pippa Norris' dataset on UK General Election Results (Norris 2005).

and 0 otherwise); and finally (4) if Heppell and Hill (2008) code the MP as pro-Europe (*Pro-Europe*, with 1 representing the MP holding a pro-Europe stance and 0 otherwise).

The regression results, presented in Table 4, support Proposition 2.[10] *Eurosceptic* is positive and statistically significant in Model 1, while *Pro-Europe* is positive and significant in Model 2. All else equal, Eurosceptic MPs were 12 times more likely to vote for Hague, while pro-Europe MPs were 5 times more likely to vote for Clarke. Interestingly, % *Majority* is insignificant and close to 0 in both models. A higher win margin for an MP did not lead to a higher likelihood of support for Hague, nor was a tightly won seat correlated with support for Clarke. In 1997, it may have been more difficult for socially conservative and Eurosceptic candidates to win a seat. Since MPs with these policy positions were more likely to vote for Hague, the win margins of MPs who voted for Hague would have been lower.[11] This, however, should be taken with a grain of salt, since an MP's win margin is statistically insignificant.

In my interview with John Redwood, he asserted that Europe was a defining factor for his decision to run for the leadership in 1997.[12] Michael Heseltine emphasized the importance of Euroscepticism in Hague's victory: "even if [it was Gordon Brown who was the Labour Leader in 1997], they would've still gone for the Eurosceptic choice."[13] He also stressed that, since Europe was a divisive issue during that time, some Conservative MPs were not willing to sacrifice their positions on Europe for the party's electoral benefit.[14] Indeed, during the Major government, some MPs, albeit a minority, rebelled against bills that would lead to higher European integration, despite the fact that rebellion would decrease an MP's likelihood for parliamentary career advancement.[15]

[10]My estimates may be inefficient due to small sample size.

[11]Since I do not know the scale of Euroscepticism, interacting *Win Margin* with *Eurosceptic* does not reveal much information. For example, the win margin for a mildly Eurosceptic candidate may be higher than the win margin for a staunchly Eurosceptic candidate.

[12]Interview with the author 07/13/2011.

[13]Interview with the author 09/14/2011.

[14]Interview with the author 09/13/2011.

[15]Interview with the author 09/14/2011; Kam (2009).

Table 4: Logit Results, 1997 Conservative Leadership Election

	(1) **Vote Hague**	**(2)** **Vote Clarke**
% **Majority**	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Conservative	0.90 (0.48)	
Eurosceptic	2.61* (1.05)	
Liberal		-0.04 (0.57)
"Wet"		0.60 (0.45)
pro-Europe		1.54* (0.73)
Constant	−3.37* (1.10)	−1.52* (0.40)
N	153	153
Log Likelihood	-90	-82

Note: * indicates 95% or higher significance level.

Not all MPs voted based on their ideological preferences alone. Michael Fabricant, a Eurosceptic but socially liberal MP, stated his reason for voting for Clarke:

> "I thought to myself, look, we're not going to win the election in four or five year's time. Ken Clarke can be taken as a serious big beast that can beat Blair. So I did back him in 1997 because I didn't think we would be in government in 2001...we have very little power in opposition [for changing policies]." [16]

This may help explain why some Eurosceptic MPs voted for Clarke. MPs' decisions to back Hague may have also coincided with perceived support from their local parties. According to Bale (2010), MPs who survived the landslide defeat and retained their seats seemed to have developed the idea that their policy stances were supported by their constituent parties. Michael Heseltine summed up some MPs' behaviors during that period:

> "The Labour Party went to their core [after 1979]...They were anti-Europe, anti-rearmament, anti-capitalism. They went back to their core believing that this would win them the election...We did exactly the same after '97, went to the core. So, we went off to our constituencies, all these Eurosceptic things, they

[16]Interview with the author 10/13/2011.

were all very popular. People said, 'oh yes, good on!' That sort of thing. What they never did is to look at middle politics, where we were going to get the votes to win from."[17]

Still, the fact that many Eurosceptics backed Hague, despite Clarke being the more popular candidate, highlights many MPs' prioritization of advocacy over winning votes.

4.4.3 Did Europe Still Reign Supreme in 2001?

William Hague's tenure as the Conservative Leader was plagued with gaffes, such as publicly donning a baseball cap as an attempt to "get with the times," which was ridiculed by numerous newspapers and television news. In addition, Hague and other senior Shadow Cabinet members were intransigent in changing the party's Eurosceptic, fiscally conservative stances (Bale 2010). The 2001 UK General Election witnessed the Conservatives' second landslide defeat, in which the party increased its seat share by only 2. Hague resigned as party leader, activating a second leadership contest in 4 years.

Table 5 presents the leadership candidates' positions on social, economic, and European integration issues. 4 out of 5 candidates–Michael Ancram, Iain Duncan Smith, David Davis, and Michael Portillo–were Eurosceptic. Clarke once again was the only pro-Europe candidate. Meanwhile, Portillo, who was once heralded as a favorite to become the Conservative Leader until he lost his parliamentary seat in 1997, was also socially liberal. This left three candidates–Ancram, Duncan Smith, and Davis–with the same position on all three issues. Thus, there were three different policy combinations. The first was the "Thatcherite" group–Eurosceptic, socially conservative, and "dry." The second was the Eurosceptic, socially liberal, and economically "dry" group. Finally, there was the pro-Europe, socially liberal, and economically "wet" category. If Proposition 2 is valid, then pro-Europe candidates would be much more likely to have voted for Clarke, while Eurosceptic candidates would be less likely to do so.

[17]Interview with the author 09/14/2011.

Table 5: 2001 Conservative Party Leadership Candidates, Issue Positions

Candidate	**Stance on Social Issues**	**Stance on Economy**	**Stance on Europe**	**Winner?**
Michael Ancram	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	No (2nd Round)
Kenneth Clarke	Liberal	Wet	Pro-Europe	No (Member)
Iain Duncan Smith	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	Yes (Member)
David Davis	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	No (2nd Round)
Michael Portillo	Liberal	Dry	Eurosceptic	No (3rd Round)

Sources: Hill (2007); Heppell (2008); Bale (2010); Heppell and Hill (2010).

4.4.3.1 Rival Explanations

One explanation for Duncan Smith's emergence as the frontrunner among the "Thatcherite" candidates is that he was the least controversial. Ancram, who was the Conservative Chairman, was partly to blame for the catastrophic 2001 election results. David Davis had the reputation of a "schemer" and was thus mistrusted among fellow parliamentarians (Bale 2010: 136-137). This leaves Duncan Smith as the "cleanest" candidate. The voting pattern for the third ballot did not support this claim. If MPs opted for the least controversial candidate, a majority of them should have chosen Duncan Smith. Instead, two-thirds of the voting MPs supported either Clarke or Portillo.

Nor was Duncan Smith chosen because he could help the party win back the government. He had the reputation of not being "the sharpest knife in the drawer" (Bale 2010: 138). Clarke and Portillo were both more popular; Clarke's positions were also closest to the majority of the electorate (Bale 2010). However, within the parliamentary party there was a push for the "anyone but Clarke" vote for Duncan Smith (Hill 2007; Heppell 2008; Bale 2010). Although Michael Portillo was also Eurosceptic, some MPs perceived him as being too socially liberal (Heppell 2008; Bale 2010). Although a majority of MPs supported either Clarke or Portillo, the fact that more MPs preferred Duncan Smith than Portillo suggests that the desire for advocacy played a role in Duncan Smith's selection.

4.4.3.2 Advocacy and Electoral Welfare

The Conservative Party in 2001 had moved more to the right as a whole. It became more Eurosceptic, though differences in the social and economic dimensions still existed. Table 6 presents the distribution of the 2001 Conservative MPs' positions on social, economic, and European integration issues, from Heppell and Hill (2010).[18] Compared to 1997, in 2001 the parliamentary party as a whole was more to the right. Of those surveyed, 80% were socially conservative (versus 74% in 1997), 73% were economic "drys" (versus 67% in 1997), and 90% were Eurosceptic (versus 85% in 1997). Among the 149 Eurosceptic MPs, 102 were also socially conservative and "dry" (68%), 5% higher than in 1997 (Tables 7a to 7c).

Table 6: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 2001

Stance on Social Issues	**Liberal**	**Agnostic**	**Conservative**
	25 (15%)	9 (5%)	132 (80%)
Government Intervention in the Economy	**More (Wet)**	**Agnostic**	**Less (Dry)**
	34 (20%)	11 (7%)	121 (73%)
Stance on Europe	**Pro-Europe**	**Agnostic**	**Eurosceptic**
	8 (5%)	9 (5%)	149 (90%)

Source: Heppell and Hill (2010)

Table 7a: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 2001, for Eurosceptic MPs

Out of 149 Eurosceptic MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	3	1	13
Socially Agnostic	2	0	5
Socially Conservative	15	8	102

[18]These data were gathered from the same sources as those for the 1997 Conservative MPs.

Table 7b: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 2001, for Euro-Agnostic MPs

Out of 9 Euro-Agnostic MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	1	0	0
Socially Agnostic	2	0	0
Socially Conservative	3	2	1

Table 7c: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 2001, for Pro-Europe MPs

Out of 14 Pro-Europe MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	7	0	0
Socially Agnostic	0	0	0
Socially Conservative	1	0	0

Source: Heppell and Hill (2010)

I expect that, since 90% of Conservative MPs in 2001 were Eurosceptic, MPs who prioritized advocacy would support candidates who shared their positions in the economic and social dimensions. To test this, I construct two multinomial logit models to examine Conservative MPs' vote choices in the third ballot using Heppell and Hill (2010).[19] For my first model (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8), my observations include all MPs whose votes are revealed in the Heppell and Hill (2010) dataset. For my second model (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 8), I exclude pro-Europe MPs in my observations. With the same types of sources as those used for the 1997 leadership election, Heppell and Hill (2010) obtained the vote choices of 157 out of 166 Conservative MPs. The independent variables, *Conservative*, and *Economically "Dry"*, and % *Majority* are coded the same way as those in Table 4. I do not include *Eurosceptic* in my models since all but one MP who were "dry" were also Eurosceptic. Since all supporters of Duncan Smith and Portillo were Eurosceptic, and there were only 8 pro-Europe Conservative MPs in 2001 (and only one of them, Stephen Dorrell voted for Michael Portillo), omitting *Eurosceptic* should not cause endogeneity problems.

[19]This type of model is used since, for this leadership election, there were 3 discrete and categorical options to choose from.

In both models, the three possible vote choices for an individual MP are a vote for Duncan Smith, a vote for Clarke, and a vote for Portillo.[20] The base outcome is a vote for Duncan Smith, meaning that each explanatory variable's effect in Table 8 should be interpreted in comparison to the variable's effect on the probability of voting for Duncan Smith. Thus, the coefficients in Column 1 represents the explanatory variables' impact on the likelihood of voting for Clarke in relation to a likelihood of voting for Duncan Smith. The coefficients in Column 2 represents the explanatory variables' effects on the likelihood of voting for Portillo in relation to voting for Duncan Smith. The coefficients in columns 3 and 4 (results for the model without pro-Europe MPs) should be interpreted in the same manner.

Conservative is negative and significant in the model including pro-Europe MPs (Columns 1 and 2, Table 8). Socially conservative MPs were less likely to have voted for Clarke when presented with the option to choose between him and Duncan Smith (the odds decreases by 85%), and also less likely to have voted for Portillo when presented with the choice between him and Ducan Smith (the odds decreases by 88%). This variable is also negative and significant for the Portillo voters in the multinomial logit model without pro-Europe MPs, but loses its statistical significance for the Clark voters (Columns 3 and 4, Table 8). Moreover, in both multinomial logit models, the probability of a socially conservative MP voting for Portillo was less than that for Clarke. *Economically "Dry"* is negative and significant across both multinomial logit models. For the model that included all MPs (Columns 1 and 2), an economically "dry" MP was significantly less likely to have voted for Portillo than for Duncan Smith (the odds of voting for Portillo decreases by 92%), he or she was also significantly less likely to have voted for Clarke than for Duncan Smith (the odds of voting for Portillo decreases by 99%). As in 1997, the win margin of an MP's constituency did not influence candidate support, since % *Majority* is near 0 and statistically insignificant in both models. These results suggest that Duncan Smith's support drew from those who

[20]Both models are tested for the validity of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption using the Suest-Based Hausman Test. Results suggests that I cannot reject the hypothesis of IIA. I also conducted a Wald Test for combining alternatives for both models. Results suggest that the alternatives (a vote for Duncan Smith, a vote for Clarke, and a vote for Portillo) should not be combined into two alternatives. (Results available upon request.)

were socially conservative or economically "dry."

I constructed an alternative multinomial logit model, in which the independent variables are % *Majority*, *Liberal*, and *Economically "Wet"*. Results reveal that the economically liberal MPs (the "Wets") were significantly more likely to have voted for Clarke than for Duncan Smith, and socially liberal MPs were significantly more likely to have voted for Portillo than for Duncan Smith.[21] These results are consistent with those in Table 8. All in all, the multinomial logit models support the proposition that leadership choice reflected selectorate members' positions.

Table 8: Multinomial Logit Results, 2001 Conservative Leadership Election

	All MPs		**No Pro-Europe MPs**	
	(1) **Vote Clarke**	**(2)** **Vote Portillo**	**(3)** **Vote Clarke**	**(4)** **Vote Portillo**
% **Majority**	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conservative	-1.89^{*}	-2.14^{*}	-1.73	-2.18^{*}
	(0.86)	(0.80)	(0.88)	(0.80)
Economically "Dry"	-4.37^{*}	-2.47^{*}	-4.24^{*}	-2.51^{*}
	(1.06)	(1.08)	(1.06)	(1.08)
Constant	4.67^{*}	3.77^{*}	4.40^{*}	3.85^{*}
	(1.38)	(1.34)	(1.41)	(1.35)
N	155		147	
Log Likelihood	-137		-133	

Note: The base outcome for both models is a vote for Iain Duncan Smith. * indicates 95% or higher significance level.

In this leadership election, the top two candidates in the third ballot were presented for the membership vote, with all dues-paying members of the Conservative Party eligible to request a postal ballot. That 60% of the membership votes went to Duncan Smith does not imply that the British electorate shared Duncan Smith's positions. The Conservatives' general election results in 2001 were only slightly better than in 1997; their out-of-date policy positions also contributed to a mass exodus of members (Bale 2010). It is not unreasonable to surmise that the eligible members represented the party core, and thus should have held more extreme positions that the general electorate.

[21]Results available upon request.

Interviews with Conservative MPs support my statistical findings. Socially conservative, "dry," and Eurosceptic MPs tended to support Duncan Smith. MP Andrew Turner told me that he supported Duncan Smith because he was socially conservative.[22] The few socially liberal Eurosceptics gravitated toward Portillo. MP Michael Fabricant backed him because "he was Eurosceptic and liberal."[23] If there had not been a membership vote, Portillo supporters probably would have transferred their votes to Duncan Smith. In addition, the membership's voting pattern suggests that core party members were willing to sacrifice the party's electoral performance for advocacy.

The fact that Duncan Smith received only one more vote than Portillo in the third ballot suggests that electoral concerns exerted some influence. Four years in opposition and a second landslide defeat may have translated to a higher regard for the party's electoral wellbeing (a larger α_S than in 1997). This may have prompted some "dry," Eurosceptic, and socially conservative MPs to vote for a more moderate candidate. Whereas 92 MPs voted for Hague in 1997, only 54 MPs voted for Duncan Smith. This implies that out of the 102 MPs who held the same positions as Duncan Smith, about half of them voted for either Portillo or Clarke. While I do not know if these votes came from more moderately Eurosceptic or moderately socially conservative MPs, rather than from staunchly Eurosceptic or conservative ones, the pattern does reveal a certain degree of concern over potential electoral consequences of choosing the candidate with the most extreme policy position. In either case, though, the results of the third ballot support my model's Proposition 2: more extreme selectorate yields a more extreme party leader.

4.4.4 Liberal Conservatism and Electoral Welfare in 2005

Iain Duncan Smith's performance during the Prime Minister's Questions were spectacularly poor. A series of policy gaffes (such as his article in a major newspaper on the Labour government's failure to deter and deport asylum seekers) earned the Tories the title of "The

[22]Interview with the author, 09/07/2011.

[23]Interview with the author 10/13/2011.

Nasty Party" (Bale 2010: 104). In November 2003, after he imposed a three-line whip against the bill for the adoption of children by same-sex couples, a majority of Conservative MPs voted to depose him. Michael Howard, the next party leader, attempted to moderate the party, a move that was met with resistance from within the parliamentary party. Opinion polls indicate that the British public consistently placed the Conservative Party to the right of the median voter (Bale 2010). They also find that European integration was not deemed as a pivotal issue when deciding which party to vote for (Bale 2010). After the party lost the 2005 General Election, Howard resigned as leader, paving the way for a new leadership election.

Four candidates participated in the election (Table 9). Clarke, who was eliminated after the first ballot, remained the only pro-Europe candidate, though Cameron was less Eurosceptic than Davis or Liam Fox (Bale 2010). Scholarly opinions and news articles reveal that while Clarke was seen to be decidedly left of the party, Cameron was perceived as somewhat liberal, somewhat "dry," and moderately Eurosceptic.[24] Davis and Fox shared the same "Thatcherite" position. The candidates in the second ballot were thus distinguished by the social dimension. If Proposition 2 holds, socially conservative MPs should have been less likely to vote for Cameron, and socially liberal MPs more likely to do so.

Table 9: 2005 Conservative Party Leadership Candidates, Issue Positions

Candidate	**Stance on Social Issues**	**Stance on Economy**	**Stance on Europe**	**Winner?**
David Cameron	Liberal (Moderately)	Dry (Moderately)	Eurosceptic (Moderately)	Yes (Member)
Kenneth Clarke	Liberal	Wet	Pro-Europe	No (1st Round)
David Davis	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	No (Member)
Liam Fox	Conservative	Dry	Eurosceptic	No (2nd Round)

Sources: http://www.bbc.co.uk; The Times; Denham and O'Hara (2008); Heppell (2008); Bale (2010).

[24]See Denham and O'Hara (2008); Heppell (2008); Bale (2010).

4.4.4.1 Rival Explanations

Some observers credited Cameron's charisma as the reason behind his selection.[25] In what became known as "A Tale of Two Speeches," Cameron, at the time a relatively unknown candidate, showcased his oratorical skill and delivered "an electrifying speech" at the Party Convention, while Davis gave a lackluster one that disappointed many of his potential supporters (Denham and Dorey 2005). Cameron's youthfulness and energy was also well-received by the media.

This explanation falls short in its predictive power. If MPs were voting for candidates based solely on their valence level, then socially conservative MPs should have voted for Cameron. Yet, there were enough votes for Fox and Davis (together making up 52% of the total votes) during the first round, and sufficient votes for Davis (29%) during the second ballot to prevent a membership vote between Cameron and Fox, both with more electoral appeal than Davis. During the leadership election campaign, Cameron had to cater to the right by toning down his social liberalism (Heppell 2008; Bale 2010). In addition, Davis was the second candidate presented to the membership ballot despite his poor campaign. This suggests that, while Cameron's charisma and communication skills were no doubt advantageous, they were not the determining factor for all Conservative MPs. These MPs' policy preferences may trump their concerns over the candidates' valence qualities.

4.4.4.2 Electoral Welfare versus Advocacy

Since the top two candidates were presented for membership vote in 2005, all dues-paying members of the Conservative Party were part of the selectorate. Although members ultimately decide the winner, Conservative MPs reserve the right to decide which two candidates to present for the membership vote. For the purpose of understanding MPs' vote choice, I treat this group as the selectorate.

With 55 new MPs, in 2005 Conservative parliamentary party as a whole had moved to the

[25]See Denham and O'Hara (2008); Heppell (2008); Bale (2010).

right.[26] Just 7 (a mere 4%) of all Conservative MPs were pro-Europe (Table 10). 145 MPs (73%) were socially conservative, compared to 132 in 2001. 160 (80%) were "dry," compared to 121 in 2001. Finally, 181 (91%) were Eurosceptic, compared to 149 in 2001. A breakdown of MPs' ideal points (Tables 11a to 11c) shows that while 15 of the 181 Eurosceptic MPs were "wet," and 20 were socially liberal, 121 were socially conservative and "dry."

Table 10: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 2005

Stance on Social Issues	**Liberal**	**Agnostic**	**Conservative**
	28 (14%)	25 (13%)	145 (73%)
Government Intervention in the Economy	**More (Wet)**	**Agnostic**	**Less (Dry)**
	27 (14%)	11 (5%)	160 (81%)
Stance on Europe	**Pro-Europe**	**Agnostic**	**Eurosceptic**
	7 (4%)	10 (5%)	181 (91%)

Source: Heppell and Hill (2009)

Table 11a: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 2005, for Eurosceptic MPs

Out of 181 Eurosceptic MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	3	1	16
Socially Agnostic	2	0	21
Socially Conservative	10	7	121

Table 11b: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 2005, for Euro-Agnostic MPs

Out of 10 Euro-Agnostic MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	1	0	1
Socially Agnostic	2	0	0
Socially Conservative	3	2	1

[26]Heppell and Hill 2009. Their coding for MPs' policy position in 2005 is the same as those in 1997 and 2001.

Table 11c: Distribution of MPs' Policy Positions, 2005, for Pro-Europe MPs

Out of 7 Pro-Europe MPs:	**Economically Liberal**	**Economically Agnostic**	**Economically Conservative**
Socially Liberal	6	0	0
Socially Agnostic	0	0	0
Socially Conservative	1	0	0

Source: Heppell and Hill (2009)

Since all three candidates in the second ballot were Eurosceptic, I expect MPs to have aligned their support with candidates that matched their preferences in the social policy dimension. I use my own interview data, The Guardian's published list of MPs pledges for the second ballot, and Heppell and Hill (2009) to construct a multinomial logit model to test if MPs' policy positions influenced candidate support in the second ballot. The codings of the independent variables, % *Majority*, *Conservative*, and *Economically "Dry,"* are the same as those in Tables 4 and 8. Since all but 7 MPs were Eurosceptic, I do not include the variable for this dimension. The possible outcomes (the choices for each MP) are a vote for Cameron, a vote for Davis, and a vote for Fox.[27] The base outcome for this model is Davis, which means that, as in Table 8, the explanatory variables' effects for both Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 should be in comparison with the possibility of voting for Davis in the second ballot. For example, the coefficient for % *Majority* in Column 1 refers to how a 1% gain in an MP's win margin would affect the likelihood of the MP voting for Cameron versus Davis.

The Wald Test for combining alternatives suggests that a vote for Davis was not significantly different than a vote fro Fox. As such, I construct an alternative logit model. The dependent variable for this model is *Vote Cameron*, equals to 1 if the MP as had voted for Cameron in the second ballot, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the same as those in the multinomial logit model. The results are presented in Column 3 of Table 12.

As with the 1997 and 2001 leadership elections, an MP's win margin in the 2005 General Election did not significantly influence his or her vote choice in the second ballot (Table 12).

[27]I conducted the Suest-based Hausman Test for the IIA assumption on the model. Results suggest that I cannot reject the hypothesis that the IIA assumption holds.

% *Majority* is insignificant and close to 0 in both models. The negative sign for Cameron, and the coefficient's positive sign for Fox, though, are consistent with the conjecture that MPs with tighter win margins voted for Cameron, and those with a more comfortable majority voted for Fox. In the multinomial logit model, socially conservative MPs were significantly less likely to vote for Cameron than for Davis (the odds of voting for Cameron decreases by 67%). However, socially conservative MPs were not significantly more likely to vote for Fox than for Davis. In the logit model (Column 3), *Conservative* is also negative and significant. When choosing between Cameron and one of the other two candidates, a socially conservative MP was significantly less likely to vote for Cameron (the odds of doing so decreases by 76%). It is worthwhile to note that, for both models, the coefficients for Cameron in the 2005 leadership election are less than the coefficients for both Clarke and Portillo in the 2001 leadership election (Table 8). This suggests that, although socially conservative MPs were still less likely to have voted for the socially liberal candidate, the odds of them doing so in 2005 were higher than than the odds in 2001.

For the multinomial logit model (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12), *Economically "Dry"* is negative and insignificant for the choice between Cameron and Davis, and positive and insignificant for the choice between Fox and Davis. This variable, however, is negative and significant for the logit model (Column 3). Compared to the likelihood of voting for Davis or Fox, the odds of a economically "dry" MP voting for Cameron decreases by 60%. This effect is also less than that in the 2001 leadership election. One possible explanation for the lower coefficients for *Conservative* and *Economically "Dry"* is that, in 2005, socially conservative and economically "dry" MPs valued the party's electoral welfare more than they did in 2001, and thus were more inclined to vote for a candidate with more moderate policy positions than they did in 2001.

Table 12: Multinomial Logit/Logit Results, 2005 Conservative Leadership Election

	(1) Vote Cameron	(2) Vote Fox	(3) Vote Cameron Logit Model
% **Majority**	-0.02	0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Conservative	-1.10^*	0.95	-1.45^*
	(0.40)	(0.62)	(0.36)
Economically "Dry"	-0.67	0.67	-0.92^*
	(0.45)	(0.64)	(0.40)
Constant	1.98^*	-1.28	1.73^*
	(0.62)	(0.90)	(0.55)
N	198		198
Log Likelihood	-196		-123

Note: The base outcome for the multinomial logit model is a vote for David Davis. * indicates 95% or higher significance level.

MP Philip Davies highlighted Davis' policy positions as the reason why he voted for Davis.[28] MP Greg Hands voted for Liam Fox because he "knows him the best, but also he was most closely aligned on my own position on the main issues."[29] MP Brooks Newmark supported Liam Fox in the first two ballots because of similarities in their policy positions.[30] MP Peter Bone was staunchly Eurosceptic, to the point of defying the party whip on policies regarding the European Union. He did not commit to any candidate in the beginning because, in his opinion, there was no one "right-wing" enough running for the post.[31] Having voted for Fox during the first and second ballot, he voted for Cameron in the membership vote only because he was able to "promise something on Europe."[32] MP Robert Goodwill stated his reasons for supporting Fox in the first two rounds:

> "He was reasonably a right wing and Thatcherite, and I am reasonably a right wing and Thatcherite. He gave me a promise on two issues which I am very keen on. One was that the Conservatives in the European Parliament should leave the EPP group, and form our own group with like-minded Eurosceptics. Secondly

[28]Interview with the author 09/12/2011.

[29]Interview with the author 09/08/2011.

[30]Interview with the author 07/12/2011.

[31]Interview with the author, 07/11/2011.

[32]Interview with the author 07/11/2011.

> that we should build a new generation of nuclear power stations in this country to maintain energy security."[33]

Parties that remain in opposition after successive elections may prioritize electoral welfare. Heppell (2008) notes that after three successive electoral defeats, Conservative MPs were now looking for a candidate that could help them win the next general election (2008: 182). How much did concerns over the party's electoral welfare enter into MPs' rationales for their vote choices? Comparing the 2001 and the 2005 leadership elections, Cameron and Portillo were both socially liberal, "dry," and Eurosceptic. In 2001, 15% of MPs were liberal and 80% were socially conservative. In 2005, 14% were liberal and 73% were socially conservative. Yet, socially liberal MPs were more likely to vote for a liberal candidate in 2005 than in 2001, while socially conservative MPs were *less* likely to vote for a socially conservative candidate in 2005 than in 2001. This may be due to vote splitting between Davis and Fox. Or, it may be a sign that MPs in 2005 were more concerned about winning elections than MPs in 2001, which helps explain why Cameron acquired 45% of votes in 2005, but Portillo only received 32% in 2001.

To investigate how advocacy and electoral concerns factored into Cameron's election, I conducted interviews with several MPs who pledged support for Cameron in 2005. MP Douglas Carswell, who "never listens to the whips"[34], supported Cameron not because of his perceived charisma, but because of his policy ideas. Recognizing the need for the party to innovate itself in policy terms, he stated that Cameron did not "reheat the old script" like the other candidates.[35] MP Tobias Ellwood was a vocal supporter of Cameron for the following reason:

> "I realized that David Cameron was the only one that was saying something very new, and also looking for the center ground. And whoever dominates the center ground in UK politics, wins. If you're on the extremes of the left and the right, you know, you're not going to win. And he was saying something very different,

[33]Interview with the author, 10/12/2011.

[34]Interview with the author 07/12/2011.

[35]Interview with the author 09/12/2011.

> in that we just lost three elections in a row, so we need to do something fresh. David Cameron provided that...so I decided to support him. This went against the grain at the moment because at that time David Davis looked like he was going to win."[36]

These suggest that electoral concerns played a role in some MPs' decisions to vote for Cameron. At the same time, it is important to note that while these MPs valued winning the next election, it is the impact of Cameron's policy positions, not his valence qualities, for which they perceived could improve the party's electoral well-being. In their opinion, the right policy was what could ultimately help a party to win an election.

4.4.4.3 Constituency Concerns?

My model's Proposition 3 states that the chosen leader's policy position is closer to the non-selectorate's position when the latter prioritizes advocacy, but selectorate members value the party's electoral welfare. Conservative MPs who prioritized electoral welfare would choose a leader preferred by non-selectorate members in order to extract campaign effort from them. This effort is not only essential for the party's overall vote share, but is also an important component for each MP's re-election. MPs from the 2010 cohort consistently stated that local party activists were a key part of their successful election into the parliament. Campaign effort included the distribution of leaflets by mail and by person, accompanying the candidates during the weekends for door-to-door canvassing, and letter writing to constituents.[37] If MPs wanted to galvanize local activists, they would have consulted them before deciding which candidate to support. MPs' vote choices should thus be based on both policy preferences and concerns over the activists' campaign effort.

MP Stephen Hammond voted for Liam Fox for the first two ballots because of policy similarities. He also informed me that, prior to deciding on who to support in the 2005 leadership election, some MPs conducted quasi-elections to determine their constituents' preferences:

[36]Interview with the author, 10/12/2011.

[37]Interviews with the author, 09/06/2011, 09/07/2011, 09/08/2011, 09/13/2011

some MPs took a scouting of counts, while some consulted their local Conservative groups.[38] Peter Bone, for instance, had a task force to sort out his Conservative constituents' opinions on who to vote for.[39]

MPs' voting pattern for this election seems to have been a combination of policy concerns and the party's electoral welfare. Since Euroscepticism dominated the Conservative Parliamentary Party, MPs cast their votes based on the candidates' positions on the social dimension. There is also some evidence that MPs were concerned with party activists' reactions to the leadership choice. In addition, the fact that it was Cameron and Davis who were presented to the membership ballot, instead of Cameron and Liam Fox, suggests that valence qualities are not a determining factor for the 2005 Conservative Party Leadership Election.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined leadership elections in the UK Conservative Party to provide evidence for my model's Proposition 2. Although there is lack of quantitative data to support my model's third proposition (non-selectorate's leverage over the selectorate), my interviews with Conservative MPs suggest that some of their vote choices took into account the preferences of their local constituencies' party members. There is strong evidence that MPs chose their party leaders based on their own desire for a leader that could advocate for their ideal policy positions. Electoral concerns over how the leader's position impacts the party's vote share may also, at least in part, explain MPs' candidate support in 2001 and 2005.

These leadership elections suggest that a candidate's valence qualities may have been significant determinants when deciding among candidates within a policy faction. In 1997, William Hague was the candidate with the highest level of valence among the socially con-

[38]Interview with the author 09/06/2011.

[39]Interview with the author 07/11/2011.

servative,"dry," and Eurosceptic candidates. In 2001, among candidates in the same faction (Michael Ancram, David Davis, and Iain Duncan Smith), Duncan Smith was the "cleanest" candidate. Yet, when comparing candidates between factions, policy preferences, not the candidates' valence qualities, determined MPs' vote choices. In 1997, Hague was chosen over Clarke despite the latter's electoral popularity. The same occurred in 2001 with Duncan Smith's victory over Portillo, albeit by 1 vote. In 2005, the splitting of votes between Davis and Liam Fox prevented the more popular Fox from being presented to the membership ballot. My statistical results suggest that an MP's position on European integration was a significant predictor on his or her vote choice in 1997, and his or her stance on social issues (liberal versus conservative) significantly influenced his or her vote choice in 2001 and 2005. This showcases the predictive power of policy positions in these leadership elections, which lend further justification for my focus on policy position, rather than incorporating valence, in explaining party leadership selection.

4.6 Appendix A: UK Parties and Party Leaders

The United Kingdom operates under single-member electoral districts, with a candidate winning a seat in the parliament if he or she receives a plurality of votes. This electoral system gives rise to two-party dominance in the UK House of Commons (the lower chamber). Single-party government is the norm, and the prime ministership has always been held by either the Labour Party, whose policies lie left-of-center, or the Conservative Party, whose policies lies right-of-center. If the Conservative Party holds the prime ministership, the Labour Party Leader would become the Leader of the Opposition, and vice versa. From 1964 to 2012, Conservatives and Labour had occupied the government in equal proportions (24 years). Both parties have also been relatively successful in retaining their majority (Table A1). The number of seats that other parties held in the parliament pale in comparison. Only the Liberal Democrats (formed in 1988) are able to obtain more than 10 seats. After the 2010 General Election, there were 10 parties in the House of Commons (Table A2). Although for the first time since 1974, neither the Conservatives nor Labour won a majority of seats, no other parties won more than 10% of the 650 seats. The brief description highlights the Conservative and Labour Parties' dominance in UK politics. It also shed light on the competitive nature and the high stakes involved in Conservative and Labour leadership elections.

Table A1: List of Governments in the United Kingdom, 1963-2012

Year of Election	**Incumbent Party**	**Resulting Party**	**Prime Minister before Election**	**Prime Minister After Election**	**Type of Government**
1964	Conservative	Labour	Alec Douglas-Home	Harold Wilson	Single-Party
1966	Labour	Labour	Harold Wilson	Harold Wilson	Single-Party
1970	Labour	Conservative	Harold Wilson	Edward Heath	Single-Party
1974 (Feb)	Conservative	Labour	Edward Heath	Harold Wilson	Single-Party Minority
1974 (Oct)	Labour	Labour	Harold Wilson	Harold Wilson	Single-Party
1976	Labour	Labour	Harold Wilson	James Callaghan	Single-Party
1979	Labour	Conservative	James Callaghan	Margaret Thatcher	Single-Party
1983	Conservative	Conservative	Margaret Thatcher	Margaret Thatcher	Single-Party
1987	Conservative	Conservative	Margaret Thatcher	Margaret Thatcher	Single-Party
1992	Conservative	Conservative	John Major	John Major	Single-Party
1997	Conservative	Labour	John Major	Tony Blair	Single-Party
2001	Labour	Labour	Tony Blair	Tony Blair	Single-Party
2005	Labour	Labour	Tony Blair	Tony Blair	Single-Party
2010	Labour	Conservative	Gordon Brown	David Cameron	Coalition

Note: I do not include interim/caretaker governments.
Sources: http://www.keesings.com; http://www.bbc.co.uk.

Table A2: List of Parties in the UK House of Commons, 2010-

Party	**Number of Seats**
Conservative	306
Labour	258
Liberal Democrats	57
Democratic Unionist	8
Scottish National Party	6
Sinn Fein	5
Plaid Cymru	3
Social Democratic and Labour	3
Alliance	1
Green	1
Independents	1
Speaker of the House of Commons	1
Total Number of Seats	650

Source: http://www.parliament.gov.uk

4.7 Appendix B: Trends in Leadership Contests

Table B1 presents the list of party leaders for the UK Conservative Party. The Conservatives' selection of Edward Heath in 1965 was the party's first competitive leadership election. Leadership turnover seemed to coincide with opposition status. Table B2 contains the number of candidates in all Conservative Party Leadership Elections from 1965 to 2005. With the exception of Michael Howard, all party leaders went through competitive leadership elections. The number of candidates during opposition is not always higher than the number of candidates when the party was in government, though there were more leadership elections occurring during opposition periods.

Table B1: Parties and Party Leaders

Party	**Leader**	**Dates of Tenure**	**Role in Parliament PM = Prime Minister OL = Opposition Leader**
Conservative	Edward Heath	07/1965-02/1975	OL from 07/1965-06/1970 PM from 06/1970-03/1974 OL from 03/1974-02/1975
Conservative	Margaret Thatcher	02/1975-11/1990	OL from 02/1975-05/1979 PM from 05/1979-11/1990
Conservative	John Major	11/1990-06/1997	PM
Conservative	William Hague	06/1997-09-2001	OL
Conservative	Iain Duncan Smith	09/2001-11/2003	OL
Conservative	Michael Howard	11/2003-12/2005	OL
Conservative	David Cameron	12/2005-present	OL from 12/2005-05/2010 PM from 05/2010-present

Sources: http://www.keesings.com, Bale (2010); Heppell (2008; 2010).

Table B2: Number of Candidates, Party Leadership Elections

Party	**Year of Election**	**Government Status**	**Winner**	**# Total Candidates**
Conservative	1965	Opposition	Edward Heath	3
Conservative	1975	Opposition	Margaret Thatcher	3
Conservative	1989	Government	Margaret Thatcher	2
Conservative	1990	Government	John Major	4
Conservative	1995	Government	John Major	2
Conservative	1997	Opposition	William Hague	5
Conservative	2001	Opposition	Iain Duncan Smith	5
Conservative	2003	Opposition	Michael Howard	1
Conservative	2005	Opposition	David Cameron	4

Note: The number of candidates include all who entered the leadership election, regardless of the ballot stage.

Sources: http://www.keesings.com; Stark (1996); Bale (2010); Heppell (2008).

The UK Conservative Party chooses its leaders via a majority system. If the vote margin between the first and second candidate in the first ballot is 15% or less, subsequent rounds of voting occur until one candidate reaches absolute majority of votes (Table B3). From 1965 to 1997, only Conservative MPs were eligible to vote. The party's selectorate consisted of MPs, while all other members were akin to the non-selectorate. After 1998, while MPs retain sole voting rights on the first ballot, all dues-paying party members also have the right to vote when two candidates remain in the election. In reality, their voting power is limited since they are constrained to choose only two candidates that the Conservatives MPs present to them. MPs are the party's selectorate before the membrship vote, and all party members are, formally, the selectorate during the membership vote.

Table B4 presents the ballot results for the Conservative Party leadership elections. It showcases the volatile nature of these elections. Winners of the first ballot did not always become the party leader. In 1997, Kenneth Clarke gained the most votes in the first two ballots but lost to William Hague in the third ballot. In 2001, Michael Portillo had a plurality of votes in the first ballot, but was eliminated in the third ballot. In 2005 David Davis won more votes than the other candidates on the first ballot, but lost to David Cameron in the membership vote.

Table B3: Conservative Party Selection Procedures, 1965-Present

Years	**Procedure**	**MPs Only**	**Change after Election Loss**	**Change after Removal of Leader**
1965-1975	Procedure in case of a vacancy: 1. Candidates required the backing of 2 Conservative parliamentarians to propose and second their candidates 2. Names of proposer and seconder confidential	YES	YES	YES
	No provision for a challenge to incumbent leader			
	In all contests: 1. Only one candidate declared an interested in party leadership → automatically elected 2. 2+ candidates → Conservative MPs invited to consult with their constituency associations → eliminative ballots a. First ballot: i. Simple majority + 15% lead over their nearest rival, not including abstainers and ballot spoilers ii. One MP one vote iii. No winner → second ballot b. Second ballot: i. Candidates can seek re-nomination to continue or drop out ii. New candidates permitted to enter the election iii. Simple majority of all Conservative MPs' votes to win iv. No winner → third ballot c. Third ballot: i. No new candidates permitted ii. 3 leading candidates from the second ballot compete to determine winner using the alternative vote system iii. Simple majority of all Conservative MPs' votes to win iv. No winner → fourth ballot			
1975-1991	From 1990, vacancy: as before, but names of challenger revealed	YES	YES	YES
	Rule changes for challenges: 1. Rules same as for vacancy 2. Annual elections permitted 3. Challenge had to be conducted within 4 weeks of a new parliamentary session or within 6 months of a new parliament			

Table B3 (Cont.): Conservative Party Selection Procedures, 1965-Present

Years	**Procedure**	**MPs Only**	**Change after Election Loss**	**Change after Removal of Leader**
1991-1998	Rule changes for challenges: 1. Activating a formal election required 10% of all Conservative MPs 2. Demand election by writing to the chair of the 1922 Executive Committee 3. Names of these 10% of MPs kept secret 4. Letter had to be received within 2 weeks fo a new parliamentary session or within 3 months of a new parliament 5. No winner in the second ballot → only 2 candidates allowed to third ballot	YES	NO	YES
1998-now	Introduction of no confidence votes: 1. 15% of Conservative MPs (names confidential) need to write a letter to the 1922 Executive Committee chair requesting a vote of confidence against the incumbent, or Incumbent can activate vote of no confidence 2. Can be activated at anytime 3. Only Conservative MPs can participate in the voting 4. Simple majority of all Conservative MPs with vote of approval → continue → no more confidence motions for 1 year 5. Defeat -¿ resignation and new leadership election. Defeated leader barred from participating in new contest	NO	YES	YES
	Changes in the leadership election: 1. Nominators (proposer and seconder) are publicly revealed 2. Only 2 candidates: one member, one vote of all dues-paying party members 3. 2+ candidates: a. Series of eliminative ballots among all Conservative MPs b. Bottom candidate from each ballot eliminated until only 2 remains 4. 2 remaining candidates presented to party membership vote via postal ballot a. Simple majority required for the winner b. 2 month campaign period from the date of ballot distribution			

Sources: Quinn (2005); Denham and O'Hara (2008).

Table B4: Ballot Results for the UK Conservative Party, 1965-2005

Year	**Candidate**	**Winner?**	**Ballot 1 Votes**	**Ballot 2 Votes**	**Ballot 3 Ballot**	**Member Vote**
1965	Edward Heath	Yes	150 (49%)			
	Reginald Maudling	No	133 (44%)			
	Enoch Powell	No	15 (5%)			
1975	Margaret Thatcher	Yes	150 (47%)	146 (53%)		
	Edward Heath	No	119 (43%)			
	Hugh Fraser	No	16 (6%)			
	William Whitelaw	No		79 (29%)		
	James Prior	No		19 (7%)		
	Geoffrey Howe	No		19 (7%)		
	John Peyton	No		11 (4%)		
1989	Margaret Thatcher	Yes	314 (84%)			
	Anthony Meyer	No	33 (9%)			
1990	John Major	Yes		185 (50%)		
	Margaret Thatcher	No	204 (55%)			
	Michael Heseltine	No	152 (41%)	131 (35%)		
	Douglas Hurd	No		56 (15%)		
1995	John Major	Yes	218 (66%)			
	John Redwood	No	89 (27%)			

Table B4 (Cont.): Ballot Results for the UK Conservative Party, 1965-2005

Year	**Candidate**	**Winner?**	**Ballot 1 Votes**	**Ballot 2 Votes**	**Ballot 3 Votes**	**Member Vote**
1997	William Hague	Yes	41 (25%)	62 (38%)	92 (56%)	
	Kenneth Clarke	No	49 (30%)	64 (39%)	70 (43%)	
	John Redwood	No	27 (17%)	38 (23%)		
	Peter Lilley	No	24 (15%)			
	Michael Howard	No	23 (14%)			
2001	Iain Duncan Smith	Yes	39 (23%)	42 (25%)	54 (33%)	155,913 (60%)
	Kenneth Clarke	No	36 (22%)	39 (23%)	59 (36%)	100,864 (40%)
	Michael Portillo	No	49 (30%)	50 (30%)	53 (32%)	
	David Davis	No	21 (13%)	18 (11%)		
	Michael Ancram	No	21 (13%)	17 (10%)		
2005	David Cameron	Yes	56 (28%)	90 (45%)		134,446 (68%)
	David Davis	No	62 (31%)	57 (29%)		64,398 (32%)
	Liam Fox	No	42 (21%)	51 (26%)		
	Kenneth Clarke	No	38 (19%)			

Note: the percentages of abstention/spoilt ballots are not included. Sources: Quinn (2005); Lynch and Garnett (2007); Heppell (2008).

4.8 Appendix C: Tables for the Rival Explanations

Table C1: Mode of Leaders' Exit

Leader	**Year of Exit**	**Mode of Exit Next Election**	**# Candidates in**
Edward Heath	02/1975	Lost Challenge	5
Margaret Thatcher	11/1990	Resigned after Challenge	3
John Major	06/1997	Resignation after Election Loss	5
William Hague	09/2001	Resignation after Election Loss	5
Iain Duncan Smith	11/2003	No Confidence Motion	1
Michael Howard	12/2005	Resignation after Election Loss	4

Sources: http://www.keesings.com; Bale (2010); Heppell (2008)

Table C2: 1997 Conservative Party Leadership Candidates, Parliamentary Posts

Candidate	**Government Post at the Time of Election**	**Previous Post**	**Winner?**
William Hague	Secretary of State for Wales (1995-1997)	Minister of State for Social Security (1994-1994)	Yes
Kenneth Clarke	Chancellor of Exchequer (1993-1997)	Home Secretary (1992-1993)	No
John Redwood	MP	Secretary of State for Wales (1993-1994)	No
Peter Lilley	Secretary of State for Social Security (1992-1997)	Secretary of State Trade and Industry (1990-1992)	No
Michael Howard	Home Secretary (1993-1997)	Secretary of State for the Environment (1992-1993)	No

Sources: http://www.bbc.co.uk; Heppell (2008); Quinn (2005); Bale (2010).

Table C3: 2001 Conservative Party Leadership Candidates, Parliamentary Posts

Candidate	**Post at the Time of Election**	**Previous Post**	**Winner?**
Iain Duncan Smith	Shadow Defence Secretary (1999-2001)	Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security (1997-1999)	Yes
Kenneth Clarke	MP	Chancellor of Exchequer (1993-1997)	No
Michael Portillo	Shadow Chancellor of Exchequer (2000-2001)	Secretary of State for Defence (1995-1997)	No
David Davis	Chairman, Public Accounts Committee (1997-2001)	Minister of State Foreign Office (1994-1997)	No
Michael Ancram	Conservative Party Chairman (1998-2001)	MP	No

Sources: http://www.bbc.co.uk; Heppell (2008); Alderman and Carter (2002); Bale (2010).

Table C4: 2005 Conservative Party Leadership Candidates, Parliamentary Posts

Candidate	**Post at the Time of Election**	**Previous Post**	**Winner?**
David Cameron	Shadow Secretary for Education and Skills (2005)	MP	Yes
David Davis	Shadow Home Secretary (2003-2008)	Shadow Deputy Prime Minister	No
Liam Fox	Shadow Foreign Secretary (2005)	Conservative Party Chairman (2003-2005)	No
Kenneth Clarke	MP	Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer (1997)	No

Sources: http://www.bbc.co.uk; The Guardian; Heppell (2008); Denham and O'Hara (2008); Bale (2010).

4.9 Appendix D: List of MPs and Lords Interviewed

Table D1: List of Conservative MPs and Lords Interviewed

Name	**Constituency**	**Position**	**Interview Date**
Bone, Peter	Wellingsborough	MP	07/11/2011
Carswell, Douglas	Claton	MP	09/12/2011
Davies, Philip	Shipley	MP	09/12/2011
Ellwood, Tobias	Bournemouth East	MP	10/11/2011
Evans, Jonathan	Cardiff North	MP	09/07/2011
Fabricant, Michael	Lichfield	MP	10/13/2011
Goodwill, Robert	Scarboough and Whitby	MP	10/12/2011
Grant, Helen	Maidstone and The Weald	MP	09/07/2011
Hammond, Stephen	Wimbledon	MP	09/06/2011
Hands, Greg	Chelsea and Fulham	MP	09/08/2011
Heseltine, Michael	N/A	Lord	09/14/2011
Kwarteng, Kwasi	Spelthorne	MP	09/08/2011
McVey, Esther	Wirral West	MP	09/13/2011
Newmark, Brooks	Braintree	MP	07/12/2011
Redwood, John	Wokingham	MP	07/13/2011
Turner, Andrew	Isle of Wright	MP	09/07/2011
Uppal, Paul	Wolverhampton South West	MP	09/06/2011

4.10 References

Alderman, Keith. 1996. "The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1995." *Parliamentary Affairs* 49 (2): 316-332.

Alderman, Keith. 1998. "The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997." *Parliamentary Affairs* 51 (1): 1-16.

Alderman, Keith. 1999. "Revision of Leadership Election Procedures in the Conservative Party." *Parliamentary Affairs* 52 (2): 260-274.

Alderman, Keith, and Neil Carter. 2002. "The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2001." *Parliamentary Affairs* 55: 569-585.

Bale, Tim. 2010. *The Conservative Party: from Thatcher to Cameron.* Cambridge: Polity.

Brandreth, Gyles Daubeney. 1999. *Breaking the Code: Westminster Diaries, May 1990 to May 1997.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Branigan, Tania. 2005. "Tory leadership race at risk from party activists." August 25, 2005, www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/26/uk.toryleadership20051/print (accessed January 12, 2011).

Cowley, Philip, and Matthew Bailey. 2000. "Uprising or Religious War? Re-Examining the 1975 Conservative Leadership Contest." *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (4): 599-629.

Cowley, Philip, and John Garry. 1998. "The British Conservative Party and Europe: The Choosing of John Major." *British Journal of Political Science* 28 (3): 473-499.

Cowley, Philip, and Jane Green. 2012. "New Leaders, Same Problem: The Conservatives." Working paper.

Crewe, Ivor, and Donald D. Searing. 1988. "Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party." *The American Political Science Review* 82 (2): 361-384.

Denham, Andrew, and Peter Dorey. 2005. "A Tale of Two Speeches? The Conservative Leadership Election of 2005." *Political Quarterly* 77 (1): 35-42.

Denham, Andrew, and Kieron O'Hara. 2008. *Democratising Conservative Leadership Selection: From Grey Suits to Grass Roots.* New York: Manchester University Press.

Garnett, Mark. 2003. "Win or Bust: The Leadership Gamble of William Hague." In *The Conservatives in Crisis.* eds. David Lynch and Mark Garnett. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

The Guardian. 2005. "The Candidates Compared." The Guardian, October 20, 2005, www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/oct/21/uk.toryleadership2005/print (accessed January 21, 2011).

Hayton, Richard, and Timothy Heppell. 2010. "The Quiet Man of British Politics: the Rise, Fall and Significance of Iain Duncan Smith." *Parliamentary Affairs* 63 (3): 425-445.

Heppell, Tim. 2002. "The Ideological Composition of the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1992-97." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 4 (2): 299-324.

Heppell, Tim. 2008. *Choosing the Tory Leader: Conservative Party Leadership Election from Heath to Cameron.* London: I B Tauris.

Heppell, Tim, and Michael Hill. 2008. "The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997: An Analysis of the Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians." *British Politics* 3: 63-91.

Heppell, Tim, and Michael Hill. 2009. "Transcending Thatcherism? Ideology and the Conservative Party Leadership Mandate of David Cameron." *The Political Quarterly* 80 (3): 388-399.

Heppell, Tim, and Michael Hill. 2010. "The Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians in the Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2001." *Politics* 30 (1): 36-51.

Hill, Michael. 2007. *The Parliamentary Conservative Party: The Leadership Elections of William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith.* Dissertation, University of Huddersfield.

Jones, Philip, and John Hudson. 1996. "The Quality of Political Leadership: A Case Study of John Major." *British Journal of Political Science* 26 (2): 229-244.

Kam, Christopher. 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics.* Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.

King, Oliver. 2005. "What Today's Tory Vote Will Mean." The Guardian, October 20, 2005, www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/oct/20/toryleadership2005.conservatives1/print (accessed January 12, 2011).

Lynch, David, and Mark Garnett. eds. 2003. *The Conservatives in Crisis.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

McSweeney, Dean. 1999. "Changing the Rules Changed the Game: Selecting Conservative Party Leaders." *Party Politics* 5 (4): 471-483.

Norris, Pippa. 2005. "The British Parliamentary Constituency database, 1992-2005. Release 1.3." June. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm (June 4, 2011).

Norton, Philip. 1990. "Choosing a Leader: Margaret Thatcher and the Parliamentary Conservative Party, 1989-1990." *Parliamentary Affairs* 43 (3): pp. 249-259.

Punnett, Robert. 1992. *Selecting the Party Leader: Britain in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Harvester Weatsheaf.

Quinn, Thomas. 2005. "Leasehold or Freehold? Leader-Eviction Rules in the British Conservative and Labour Parties." *Political Studies* 53: 793-815.

Seldon, Anthony, and Stuart Ball. eds. 1994. *Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Stark, Leonard. 1996. *Choosing a Leader: Party Leadership Contests in Britain from MacMillan to Blair.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Wickham-Jones, Mark. 1997. "Right Turn: A Revisionist's Account of the 1975 Conservative Leadership Election." *Twentieth Century British History* 8 (1): 74-89.

CHAPTER 5

Activism and Family Strife: British Labour Party Leaders

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter showed that for the 1997, 2001, and 2005 British Conservative Party Leadership Election, MPs chose leaders who reflected their preferred policy positions. Amidst conflicts over European integration, in 1997 a majority of Conservative MPs selected William Hague, a Eurosceptic, over Ken Clarke, who is pro-Europe. Slightly more concerned about the party's electoral welfare, in 2001 some Eurosceptic, socially conservative MPs opted for either Michael Portillo, Eurosceptic but socially liberal, or Ken Clarke, also a social liberal. In 2005, after 3 successive election defeats, many of the party's socially conservative MPs chose David Cameron, the most socially liberal of the candidates in the second ballot. However, it is unclear if each MP's vote choices also reflects their local party members' preferences. Questions remain regarding the strategic relationship between the selectorate and the non-selectorate.

Do local party members have leverage over MPs' candidate support? This chapter uses quantitative and interview data from the 2010 Labour Party Leadership Election to test my model's Proposition 3: *if selectorate members prioritize electoral welfare, but non-selectorate members prioritize advocacy, the chosen party leader's policy position will reflect the non-selectorate's position.* I also test Proposition 2: *all else equal, the party leader's policy position reflects the selectorate members' position.* Unlike the Conservative leadership elections, the vote choices of both Labour MPs and Constituency Labour Party (CLP) members are public.

This offers the opportunity to examine if MPs' first preference votes for the leadership candidates resembled the vote choices of their local members.

I first discuss the use of Labour leadership elections for hypothesis testing. The Party's factional struggles from 1980 to 2010 provide background on policy divisions within the party. The 1980 Labour Party Leadership Election result lends some credit to the claim that non-selectorate's preferences matter in leadership selection. I then test Propositions 2 and 3 with the 2010 Labour Party Leadership Election. Datasets on Labour MPs' policy positions in 2010 do not exist. Nevertheless, data on Labour MPs and CLP members' first preference votes highlight the relationship between MPs and their constituency members. Interviews with Labour MPs offer support for Proposition 2. Although the quantitative findings do not offer definitive support for Proposition 3, interview data reveal that Labour MPs engaged in consultation with local party officers during the 2010 leadership election. Concerns over the party's electoral welfare and the desire to win back the government may have played a role in MPs' candidate choices.

5.2 Empirical Testing with the Labour Party

Examining only one leadership election may result in bias. The last leadership election while the party was in government occurred in 1976, and the last leadership election before 2010 was in 1994. The lack of comprehensive data on previous leadership elections prevents proper hypothesis testing. I do, however, briefly discuss the 1980 leadership election to lend some support for Proposition 3. Leadership selection procedures for the party, the list of leaders and leadership candidates, and leadership election results from 1963 to 1994 are located in Appendix A.

Labour leadership selection rules may limit my ability to distinguish the selectorate from the non-selectorate. Since 1981, Labour has chosen its leaders using an electoral college (see Table A3). Ballot papers are distributed to all registered party members (collectively

referred to as Constituency Labour Parties, or CLPs)[1] and affiliated organizations, which include trade unions and socialist societies. This means that technically, the non-selectorate does not exist. To solve this problem, I treat Labour MPs as the selectorate. This allows me to highlight MPs' potential concerns over local parties' campaign effort. Positive correlation between CLP members' and MPs' first preference votes would suggest that, despite the fact that CLP members could vote, MPs still felt the need to incorporate their preferences when ranking the leadership candidates. Thus, in this chapter, I treat CLP and affiliated organization members as the non-selectorate.

5.3 Factionalism and Labour Leadership Elections

The Labour Party from 1963 to 1994 can be thought of as a coalition of the left, which pursued more nationalization of businesses, and the right, which advocated for welfare state-type provision of social services.[2] Each faction was further split into an "old" and "new" wing. The "old left," associated with Aneurin Bevan, promoted socialism and an unilateral approach to international politics (Heppell 2010: 14). The "new left," most notably associated with Tony Benn from the late 1970s, called for even more nationalization of industries and a complete exit from the European Community.[3] The "old right" (championed by figures such as Roy Hattersley) adhered to the values of traditional social democracy. In contrast, the "new right" (or New Labour), with Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and Peter Mandelson as its architects, was more tolerant of economic inequalities and advocated a more free-market approach to public services (Plant, Beech, and Hickson 2004).

[1]Each electoral district has its own CLP.

[2]See Drucker (1976; 1984); Heffernan and Margusse (1992); Punnett (1992); Alderman and Carter (1993); Stark (1996); Quinn (2004); Plant, Beech, and Hickson (2004); and Heppell (2010).

[3]Interviews with the author, 9/14/2011.

5.3.1 The Election of Michael Foot as the Labour Leader in 1980

In 1979, Labour lost the General Election and landed in opposition. When Prime Minister and party leader James Callaghan stepped down, an intense battle for dominance ensued among the "old left," the "new left," and the "old right" (Drucker 1981; Haffernan and Marqusee 1992). There was also a danger of MPs from the "old right" defecting to the newly formed Social Democratic Party.

Four candidates presented themselves for the 1980 leadership election. Denis Healey represented the "old right." John Silkin and Michael Foot occupied the "old left." Peter Shore was a member of Solidarity, which many of the "old right" faction also held membership in. However, unlike MPs from the faction, he was Eurosceptic (Hayter 2005: 8-9). Nevertheless, the "old left" did not claim him as their own (Heppell 2010: 127). Silkin was decidedly to the left of Shore (Drucker 1981: 385) and presented himself as such (Heppell 2010: 73). However, the party did not see him as a heavyweight against Healey (Punnett 1992: 92). Foot, at the age of 67, was the oldest and most politically experienced of the candidates. Although he initially declined to run, trade unions and left-leaning Labour MPs who wanted to "stop Healey" convinced him to do so (Drucker 1981: 385). Healey won the plurality of MPs' votes during the first ballot,[4] with 112 (42%) versus Foot's 83 (31%). However, in the second ballot Foot claimed victory with only 10 more votes than Healey (Table 1).

Table 1: Ballot Results for the UK Labour Party, 1980

Candidate	**Winner?**	**Ballot 1 Votes**	**Ballot 2 Votes**
Michael Foot	Yes	83 (31%)	139 (52%)
Denis Healey	No	112 (42%)	129 (48%)
John Silkin	No	38 (14%)	
Peter Shore	No	32 (12%)	

Note: the percentages of abstention/spoilt ballots are not included.

Sources: Punnett (1992); Stark (1996) Heppell (2010).

[4]This is the last leadership election in which only MPs were eligible to vote.

If Labour MPs desired a leader with policy positions that could help the party win the next general election, the majority would have gravitated toward Healey. As the Chancellor of Exchequer during the Callaghan government, he possessed greater electoral appeal and governing competence than the other candidates. Opinion polls indicated that Healey was the choice among Labour voters, while party activists supported Foot (Punnett 1992: 92). Yet, despite Healey's electoral appeal, Foot won the leadership election.

Readers may interpret this as a case of MPs prioritizing advocacy. Yet, many Labour MPs' ideological leanings did not resemble those of Foot. Punnett (1992) notes the inconsistency of the MPs' votes:

> "A PLP [Parliamentary Labour Party] in which a majority of members were drawn from the centre and right of the party had elected the most left wing of candidates" (1992: 93).

If MPs voted based on their policy preference, the majority should have voted for Healey in the first ballot, who would have won outright.

Many scholars highlight Healey's abrasiveness and Foot's "unifying" quality as the main contributing factor for the latter's victory.[5] A Healey victory would "enrage the unions and the CLP" (Drucker 1981: 386), but Foot could quell the fights between the "old right" and the "new left" (Drucker 1981: 386). Yet, that some Labour MPs were prepared to defect to the Social Democratic Party should Foot have won (Crew and King 1995: 74), which was to the right of Labour, should have motivated MPs who prioritized parliamentary party unity to choose Healey.

The 1980 leadership election manifested the leverage that local activists held over Labour MPs. Giles Radice, who was an MP during the period, agreed that some MPs who leaned toward the right of the party voted for Foot, despite Healey's electoral appeal, to appease activists working in their own constituencies and to prevent their own de-selection.[6] Drucker

[5]See Alderman (1981); Heffernan and Margusse (1992); Punnett (1992); Plant, Beech, and Hickson (2004); and Gouge (2012: 127).

[6]Interview with the author, 09/14/2011.

also notes: "Foot's victory would reassure the party that the PLP could be trusted" (1981: 387), a sign that Labour MPs were afraid of de-selection or the withdrawal of campaign support from local activists. The dynamics of the 1980 Labour Leadership Election illuminates how Labour MPs' vote choices were, at least in part, influenced by their concerns over reactions from activists.

5.3.2 Ideological Changes in the Labour Party, 1983-2010

Foot's tenure ended with Labour's landslide defeat in the 1983 General Election: even Labour MP Gerald Kaufman ridiculed the left-leaning manifesto as the "longest suicide note in history." The leadership election that year resulted in the convincing victory of Neil Kinnock, from the "old left," over the "old right's" Roy Hattersley. Yet, during his time in office, Kinnock moved the party away from the left (Punnett 1992; Stark 1996; Heppell 2010). Although the party remained in opposition throughout his tenure, he successfully engineered the replacement of many CLP officers who were part of the militant left.[7]

By 1994, the "new left" had all but disappeared.[8] In the leadership election that year, Tony Blair won against John Prescott, the left wing candidate. He received 61% of MPs' votes, 58% of the CLP votes, and, more importantly, 52% of the affiliated organizations' votes, which include trade unions. In 1997, he led the party into Labour's largest majority since 1945, winning 418 out of 650 seats. Popularity for the party remained high, as it only lost 2 seats in the 2001 General Election. However, problems with the country's National Health Services (NHS) and Blair's decision to enter the Iraq War reduced the Labour government's majority to 30 in the 2005 General Election. The publicized power struggle with Gordon Brown, the then-Chancellor of Exchequer and fellow architect of New Labour, also created policy division. By the time Blair resigned in June 2007, and Brown took over the prime ministership, Labour's MPs were split between the "Blairites," and "Brownites." The former faction advocated for less government intervention in the economy and more

[7]Interview with the author 10/11/2011.

[8]Interview with the author 09/14/2011.

market-driven social services, such as in health care and education.[9] The latter, in contrast, promoted more state intervention on social services and was less suspect of closer ties with trade unions.[10]

The salient policy division in 2010 thus lay between "Blairism" versus "Brownism." The next section uses the 2010 Labour Leadership Election to ask the following. Did the chosen party leader's position reflect that of Labour MPs (Proposition 2)? Did MPs who value the party's electoral welfare choose a candidate whose policy stance was closer to the ideal positions of CLP members (Proposition 3)? I use data on Labour MPs' first preference votes in the leadership election and interview data to test these propositions.

5.4 The 2010 Labour Leadership Election

The 2010 General Election resulted in the first hung parliament since 1974. After failed negotiation attempts between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, the first post-1945 coalition government was formed between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, with Labour returning to opposition. Party Leader and Prime Minister Gordon Brown resigned, triggering a new leadership election.

Blarite David Miliband, former Foreign Secretary, was the first to declare his candidacy. His younger brother, former Energy Secretary Ed Miliband, who was left of David (Quinn 2012: 67), announced his two days later. Brownite Ed Balls, left of David Miliband, also decided to run. Andy Burnham, who claimed to be politically unaligned, and the left wing backbencher Diane Abbott also announced their candidacies. Leftist backbencher John McDonnell had announced his intention to run, but dropped out of the race in favor of Abbott. Among the five candidates, David Miliband was most to the right of the party. As the outgoing Foreign Secretary, he was also the only candidate to have held one of the three great offices of the state (Table 2). Andy Burnham catered toward the center, while Ed Balls

[9] Giddens (2010); Mandelson (2010); Hasan and Macintyre (2011).

[10] Ibid.

and Ed Miliband adhered to the center-left. Abbott was most to the left.

Table 2: 2010 Labour Leadership Election, Candidates' Parliamentary Posts

Candidate	**Post before General Election**	**Previous Post**	**Winner?**
Ed Miliband	Energy Secretary (2008-2010)	Cabinet Office Minister (2007-2008)	Yes
David Miliband	Foreign Secretary (2008-2010)	Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2006-2007)	No
Ed Balls	Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families (2007-2010)	Economic Secretary for the Treasury (2006-2007)	No
Andy Burnham	Health Secretary (2009-2010)	Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (2008-2009)	No
Diane Abbott	MP	MP	No

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk.

Labour MPs and members of the European Parliament (MEPs), local constituency Labour parties (CLPs), and affiliated organizations were all eligible voters in 2010. MPs and MEPs (whom I refer to as MPs form this point forward) form one section of the electoral college. The second consisted of CLPs, and affiliated organizations made up the third. Each group's votes were weighted one third. The Party employed an alternative vote system, in which each eligible voter ranks the candidates, from most to least preferred. If no candidate was to achieve a majority of first preference votes in the first round, then the candidate with the least number of first preference votes was to be eliminated, and these votes would be transferred to those voters' next preferred candidates. The process would continue until one candidate had obtained a majority of preference votes.

Four rounds were required to establish the winner (Table 3). With only 6 first preference votes from the MPs, Abbott was the first to be eliminated. Burnham was next. After the elimination of Ed Balls in the third round, Ed Miliband edged out from his older brother to become the new Labour leader, with just 2% majority of the combined votes.

Table 3: Votes for the Labour Party Leadership Elections, 2010

Candidate	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4
Ed Miliband				
MPs & MEPs	11%	11%	12%	16%
CLPs	14%	11%	12%	15%
Affiliates	10%	15%	17%	20%
Total	34%	37%	41%	**51**%
David Miliband				
MPs & MEPs	14%	14%	16%	18%
CLPs	15%	15%	16%	18%
Affiliates	9%	10%	11%	13%
Total	38%	39%	43%	**49**%
Ed Balls				
MPs & MEPs	5%	5%	5%	
CLPs	3%	4%	5%	
Affiliates	3%	4%	6%	
Total	12%	13%	16%	
Andy Burnham				
MPs & MEPs	3%	3%		
CLPs	3%	3%		
Affiliates	3%	4%		
Total	9%	10%		
Diane Abbott				
MPs & MEPs	1%			
CLPs	2%			
Affiliates	4%			
Total	7%			

Note: these percentages are weighted and abstention/spoilt ballots are not included. The percentages from the first round are first preference votes. Source: Rogers (2010).

5.4.1 Rival Explanations

Hasan and Macintyre (2011) attribute Ed Miliband's victory to a combination of valence factors. He could better communicate political messages than his older brother, with the example that his supporters made T-shirts with the words "Ed Speaks Human" (Hasan and Macintyre 2011: 202). Meanwhile, David Miliband's association with the Iraq War (which he voted in favor of), Tony Blair, and other senior New Labour figures were liabilities (Hasan and Macintyre 2011: 197). Yet, David was seen as more popular and competent than Ed, even by Labour party members. The older Miliband was once hailed by Hilary Clinton as

a "man with great political talent."[11] David Cameron commented that the older Miliband was the "greatest threat to the Conservatives" (Watts 2010). A YouGov poll reveals that 19% of voters who were polled and 36% of polled Labour voters regarded David as the best leader for the party; only 8% of polled voters and 13% of the polled Labour voters thought the same of Ed (YouGov 2010b). 45% of Labour party members who were polled thought David would make the best prime minster, while only 28% gave this distinction to Ed (Quinn 2012: 72). 55% of polled Labour members ranked David as the candidate "most likely to lead Labour to victory at next general election," compared to 25% who regarded Ed as such (YouGov Poll 2010b).

MPs may have also based their votes on personal relationships. Hasan and Macintyre (2011) suggest that MPs who were in the same 2005 cohort as Ed Miliband were more likely to support him. If their logic holds, then Andy Burnham and David Miliband should have received more support from their 2001 cohorts, and MPs from the 2005 cohort would have also supported Ed Balls. The distribution of Labour MPs' first preference votes by cohort (Table 4), suggests otherwise. The numbers represent the actual number of first preference votes. The top percentage, in parenthesis, is the percent of the candidates' votes that are from the specified cohort. The bottom percentage, in parenthesis, is the percent of a cohort's votes to the candidate. David Miliband received the same percentage of first preference votes as Ed from the 2005 cohort, and only 7% more from the 2001 cohort. Except for the 2005 cohort, David Miliband received the plurality of MPs' first preference votes from all cohorts. Thus, contrary to the "relations" hypothesis, cohort effects did not seem to have influenced the outcome.

[11]Interview with the author 07/07/2011.

Table 4: MPs' First Preference Votes in the 2010 Labour Leadership Election, by Cohort

	Diane Abbott	**Ed Balls**	**Andy Burnham**	**David Miliband**	**Ed Miliband**	**Total**
2010	0 (0%) (0%)	6 (15%) (9%)	6 (25%) (9%)	30 (29%) (46%)	23 (29%) (35%)	65 (26%) (100%)
2005	2 (33%) (5%)	10 (25%) (27%)	1 (4%) (3%)	12 (11%) (32%)	12 (15%) (32%)	37 (15%) (100%)
2001	0 (0%) (0%)	6 (15%) (20%)	2 (8%) (7%)	12 (11%) (40%)	10 (13%) (33%)	30 (12%) (100%)
1997	3 (50%) (5%)	11 (28%) (19%)	4 (17%) (7%)	23 (22%) (40%)	17 (22%) (29%)	58 (23%) (100%)
Before 1997	1 (17%) (2%)	7 (18%) (11%)	11 (46%) (17%)	27 (26%) (43%)	16 (21%) (25%)	63 (25%) (100%)
Total	6 (100%) (2%)	40 (100%) (16%)	24 (100%) (9%)	105 (100%) (42%)	78 (100%) (31%)	253 (100%) (100%)

Note: MPs who won in by-elections are placed in the previous cohort that enter parliament. For example, MPs who won by-elections in 2007 are placed in the 2005 cohort. Source: Rogers (2010).

5.4.2 Did Advocacy Play a Role?

Did MPs' first preference votes reflect their own policy preferences? Since there is no equivalent dataset that resembles Heppell and Hill's (2008; 2009; 2010) datasets for Conservative MPs, I do not test Proposition 2 quantitatively. At the same time, MPs' voting pattern did not seem to contradict the proposition. Whereas David received the most first preference votes, the majority of MPs who cast their first preference votes for Abbott and Balls ranked Ed above David, while 11 of the 17 MPs who cast their first preference votes for Burnham preferred David to Ed. Table 5 presents the breakdown of votes. Of the MPs who cast their first preference votes for someone other than the Miliband brothers, 22 had ranked David above Ed, 25 ranked Ed above David. 7 of them ranked David but not Ed (thus transferring their votes to David), while 10 ranked Ed but not David (thus transferring

their votes to Ed). This means that Ed received 35 transferred votes, versus David's 29.[12] In sum, about 55% of MPs who supported Abbot, Burnham, or Balls transferred their votes to Ed, whose policy position was closer to these candidates.

Table 5: MPs' Rankings for David versus Ed Miliband

1st Preference Vote for	David Higher	Ed Higher	David Only	Ed Only	Ranked Neither
Abbot	0	2	0	3	2
Balls	11	19	4	4	2
Burnham	11	6	3	3	0
Total	22	25	7	10	4

Note: Source: Rogers (2010).

Interviews with Labour MPs who gave their first preference votes for David Miliband reveal that some based their choices on policy grounds.[13] Former Home Secretary Alan Johnson, a Blairite, cited the closeness between his and David Miliband's issue stances as a major factor behind his vocal support.[14] Shadow Secretary of State for Education, Stephen Twigg, also cast his first preference vote to the older Miliband: "For me, it was mostly about a judgment on politics, and a judgment on capability. And I felt David shares my politics and that he was ready to be leader."[15] More left wing MPs seemed more likely to have ranked Ed Balls or Ed Miliband as their most preferred candidate.[16] For instance, former Shadow Leader of the House of Commons, Hilary Benn, supported Ed Miliband because Ed shared his progressive ideology.[17] MP Chris Williamson cast his first preference vote for Ed Miliband for the same reason,[18] as did MP Austin Mitchell.[19] MP Dave Anderson ranked

[12]Part of the reason why David received 15 of Ed Balls votes, though, is that some MPs engaged in strategic voting by supporters of David as an effort to prevent Ed Miliband from winning. (Interview with the author 10/11/2011; 10/12/2011.)

[13]Interviews with the author 09/14/2011; 09/07/2011; 10/10/2011.

[14]Interview with the author 07/07/2011.

[15]Interview with the author 09/14/2011.

[16]Interviews with the author 09/06/2011; 09/08/2011; 09/14/2011; 09/15/2011; 10/12/2011.

[17]Interview with the author 07/11/2011.

[18]Interview with the author 09/12/2011.

[19]Interview with the author 09/13/2011.

Ed Balls first because "his politics was closer to mine than any other one's."[20] Although these testimonies are by no means comprehensive, they do reveal that, at least for some MPs, their votes could be predicted by their policy preferences.

5.4.3 Constituency Concerns and Electoral Welfare

So far, I discussed how advocacy factors into the Ed Miliband's election (Proposition 2). If Proposition 3 also holds, then MPs' candidate support would be consistent with their CLP members' preferences if these MPs prioritized electoral welfare, but their CLP members valued the opposite.

What were CLP members' preferences? YouGov polls conducted in July and September of 2010 reveal that over 70% of Labour party members and trade union members identified themselves as either "fairly left" or "slightly left of center;" the majority of these members also classified Ed Miliband as "slightly left of center" and David as "center" or "right of center."[21] CLP members' first preference votes were consistent with this pattern. 40% cast their first preference votes for David Miliband, while 60% cast theirs for Ed Miliband, Ed Balls, Andy Burnham, or Diane Abbott (Rogers 2010). The overall preference for David over Ed Miliband may be a sign that CLP members wanted a leader with a better chance of leading the party to election victory.[22] If that is the case, then MPs who shared the older Miliband's policy positions would have had more freedom to cast their first preference votes for him, and those who aligned their politics more closely with Ed would have felt pressured to vote for David instead. In addition, given that the majority of CLP members preferred David to Ed, if a CLP cast more first preference votes for Ed, then its MP should have also

[20]Interview with the author 10/11/2011.

[21]YouGov (2010a; 2010c); Quinn (2012: 75).

[22]Among Labour party members who identified themselves as "slightly left," 30% of them ranked David Miliband as the candidate who most shared their views, while 28% ranked Ed Miliband as closest to them politically (YouGov 2010b). However, among this group, 52% thought that David would make the best prime minister, compared to 25% who thought Ed Miliband would. In addition, 45% would support David Miliband, versus only 25% for Ed Miliband. Even among members who thought themselves as "fairly left," more thought that David would be more effective as an opposition leader and make a better prime minister than Ed.

cast his or her first preference vote to Ed.

To investigate whether or not Labour MPs were constrained by their constituencies, I construct five logistic models to examine the rationale behind each MP's first preference vote for David versus Ed Miliband. The binary dependent variable for Models 1 and 2 is *1st Pref DM*, equals 1 if an MP put David as his or her first preference, and 0 otherwise.[23] The binary dependent variable for Models 3 and 4 is *1st Pref EM*, equals 1 if the first preference vote was for Ed Miliband, and 0 otherwise. My independent variables include (1) % *Majority*, which is the win margin of the MP from the 2010 General Election; (2) the percentage of the MP's CLP members who voted in the 2010 leadership election (% *CLP Turnout*); (3) the percentage of the MP's CLP members who cast their first preference votes for David (% *CLP Votes for DM*) and the percentage for Ed (% *CLP Votes for EM*). Since data for each CLP member's full preference ranking are not available, I cannot determine how many members in each CLP preferred David to Ed. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to surmise that statistical significance for these variables would imply that CLP members' preferences influenced candidate support. I also include cohort dummies to control for the cohort that the MP belonged to, with MPs that entered parliament before 1997 as the omitted category.[24]

Figure 5.1 shows that % *Majority* and % *CLP Turnout* are negatively correlated. Higher win margin for the MP is associated with a lower CLP turnout for the leadership election. This may be due to low turnout in constituencies with very high win margins. Nevertheless, I omit % *CLP Turnout* in Model 1 and Model 3 to avoid potential collinearity.

To further analyze MPs' preferences between David and Ed Miliband, I also construct an additional logit model on how constituency concerns influenced MPs' preference rankings for David versus Ed Miliband (Model 5). The variable, $EM > DM$, equals 1 if an MP ranked

[23]Some MPs voted strategically by giving their first preference votes to a left wing candidate with little chance of winning the election, such as Ed Balls, but ranked David above Ed Miliband. This occurred for 10 MPs' votes. Regression results with alternative coding, in which I assign 1 if the MP voted this way, show no significance difference.

[24]If an MP won the seat through a by-election, I place him or her with the cohort that enter the parliament before him or her. For example, since Hilary Benn, MP for Leeds Central, entered parliament in 1999 via a by-election, I code him as a member of the 1997 cohort.

Figure 5.1: Correlation between an MP's win margin and CLP's % turnout



Ed Miliband above David or ranked Ed Miliband but not David, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the same as those for Model 4, with the addition of % *CLP Votes for DM*.

Table 6 presents the results. % *CLP Votes for DM* is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2: the higher the percentage of first preference votes for David from an MP's CLP, the more likely the MP would have cast a first preference vote for him. On average, a 1% increase in the MP's CLP votes for David Miliband boosted the odds of ranking David first by about 19%. The variable is negative and significant in Model 5, suggesting that the more first preference votes for David Miliband from an MP's CLP, the less likely the MP would rank Ed above David Miliband. A 1% increase in the MP's CLP votes for David lowered the odds of ranking Ed above David by 10%. % *CLP Votes for EM* is positive and significant in Models 3 and 4, suggesting that more first preference votes for the younger Miliband from an MP's CLP increased the MP's likelihood of giving his or her first preference votes to Ed. A 1% increase in the CLP votes raised the odds of a first preference votes for Ed by 27%. This variable is positive and significant in Model 5, but its effect is less than those in Models 3 and 4. The same increase in the CLP's votes raised the odds of ranking Ed above David

by only 1%. These results suggest that a constituency's preferences are a more powerful predictor for a Labour MP's first preference vote for David or Ed than for his or her relative preference for David versus Ed.

Cohort effects are insignificant in all models: an MP's time in parliament did not significantly influence the ranking of candidates. Interestingly, % *Majority* is negative and significant in Models 3 and 4, implying that higher win margins reduced the likelihood of a first preference vote to Ed. It may be that prominent MPs, many of whom supported David Miliband, were from "safer seats" with higher win margins. Another possibility is that, the more an MP's policy direction resembled Blairism, the more votes he or she received in the general election, and also the more likely he or she would support David. The distribution of MPs' win margins by their first preference votes (Figure 5.2) suggests that the median win margin for MPs who gave their first preference votes to David is higher than that for MPs with Ed Balls or Ed Miliband as their first choice, though the distribution in the former case is more scattered.[25] Meanwhile, the variable is positive and significant in Model 2 but not in Model 1 or 5. Controlling for the level of an MP's constituency turnout for the leadership election, higher win margins are correlated with first preference votes for the older Miliband. This may be a symptom of colinearity between % *Majority* and % *CLP Turnout*, which is positive and significant in Models 2 and 5. All else equal, MPs' whose CLPs have a higher turnout for the leadership election were more likely to support David Miliband, and less likely to prefer Ed over David. Higher CLP turnout may be an indication of more Labour activists in the constituency, which may have motivated MPs to cast their first preference votes in accordance with these activists' preferences. However, this should also apply to the first preference votes for Ed Miliband. Yet, % *CLP Turnout* is negative and insignificant in Model 4.

[25]The high median win margin for MPs who supported Diane Abbott may be due to these MPs contesting in very "safe" Labour seats.

Table 6: CLP Preferences, Win Margins, and 1st Preference Choice among Labour MPs

	(1) 1st Pref DM	(2) 1st Pref DM	(3) 1st Pref EM	(4) 1st Pref EM	(5) EM > DM
% **Majority**	0.01	0.03*	−0.03*	−0.04*	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
% **CLP Turnout**		0.05*		-0.03	−0.05*
		(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
% **CLP Votes for DM**	0.16*	0.17*			−0.11*
	(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.02)
% **CLP Votes for EM**			0.24*	0.24*	0.01*
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.00)
2010 Cohort	-0.09	-0.09	0.87	0.83	0.21
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.05)	(0.41)
2005 Cohort	-0.42	-0.48	0.28	0.23	0.63
	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.48)
2001 Cohort	0.54	-0.18	0.20	0.24	0.48
	(0.16)	(0.54)	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.51)
1997 Cohort	-0.24	-0.20	0.55	0.53	0.42
	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.42)
Constant	−7.71*	-11.63*	−8.00*	−5.64*	7.08*
	(1.11)	(2.22)	(1.09)	(2.01)	(1.91)
N	253	253	253	253	249
Log Likelihood	-129	-126	-103	-102	-144

Note: * indicates 95% or higher significance level.

Figure 5.2: Comparison of MPs' win margins (as a % Majority). AB = Andy Burham. DA = Diane Abbott. DM = David Miliband. EB = Ed Balls. EM = Ed Miliband



My model may suffer from endogeneity: MPs who held more left wing policy positions

were more likely to be selected in districts with stronger support for Ed Miliband. Since MPs are elected by their constituencies, it is not unreasonable to imagine that more left-leaning constituencies would elect more left wing MPs. If so, MPs' policy preferences would manifest themselves through constituency effects. Without data on individual MPs' policy positions, it is difficult to discern if MPs voted based on their policy preferences, or if they voted in accordance with their CLP members' wishes. The strongest conclusion to draw from the results is that, all else equal, MPs' first preference votes correlate with those of their CLPs.

Since my quantitative analysis does not directly support Proposition 3, I interviewed Labour MPs to investigate if those who were concerned about the party's electoral welfare were more likely to yield to their CLP members' preferences. The interviews suggest that, while some MPs treated their first preference votes as a private matter, others consulted with their CLPs when choosing which candidate to rank first; some even held meetings with their CLP leaders to discuss their opinions.[26] For example, Stephen Timms, MP from East Ham and former Financial Secretary to the Treasury, was a vocal supporter of Ed Miliband in part because "activists were attracted more to the idea to Ed Miliband."[27]

The interviews also reveal that those who were concerned about the party's electoral welfare were more likely to have preferred David over Ed Miliband.[28] Mary Creagh, Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and a member of the trade union GMB (the plurality of this union's first preference votes went to Ed Miliband), stated: "I voted for David Miliband because I want our party to win elections"[29] Chris Evans, MP for Islwyn with a background in trade unions, was one of the MP who ranked Ed Balls first and David Miliband second as an attempt to prevent Ed Miliband from receiving votes to win. When asked why he supported David, he responded:

"Sometimes we are more interested in feeling good about ourselves rather than

[26]Interviews with MPs 10/10/2011; 09/07/2011; 09/13/2011-09/15/2011; 10/11/2011.

[27]Interview with the author 09/08/2011.

[28]Interviews with the author 09/07/2011; 09/08/2011; 09/14/2011; 10/10/2011-10/12/2011.

[29]Interview with the author 10/13/2011.

> taking difficult decisions. And I felt that Tony Blair's success was that he was willing to challenge us and make those difficult decisions. In terms of the candidates, only David Miliband would have made that challenge. The only way that Labour can win is not by retreating back to its traditional left wing root...but by challenging itself...instead of talking about old left wing philosophers, to instead move toward things that most people want"[30]

My examination of the 2010 Labour Leadership Election yields the following. Through interviews with MPs, I find evidence that some Labour MPs placed their first preference votes based on their policy preferences. Statistical analyses and interview data offer some evidence for the claim that Labour MPs incorporated their constituencies' preferences in their vote choices. While it is unclear if, in 2010, CLP members were more concerned with the party's electoral welfare than advocacy, these findings do lend some support for my model's Propositions 3.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I briefly discussed the 1980 British Labour Party Leadership Election and examined the 2010 British Labour Party Leadership Election to test my model's Propositions 2 and 3. Although there is lack of quantitative data to test Proposition 2 (all else equal, the chosen leader's policy position reflects the selectorate's position), my interviews with Labour MPs reveal that, in 2010, some cast their first preference votes based on their own ideological leanings. Scholarly accounts for the 1980 leadership election, quantitative analysis with CLPs and MPs' first preference votes from the 2010 leadership election, and my interviews with Labour MPs suggest that some MPs took into account the preferences of their CLP members when ranking the leadership candidates. Concerns over how the leader's position would have impacted the party's vote share could also explain some MPs' first preference votes for David Miliband. Since I cannot gauge how local party activists weighed their parties' electoral welfare versus their desire for advocacy, the evidence provided in this chapter can only partially support (at the very least, does not contradict) Proposition 3.

[30]Interview with the author 10/12/2011.

Because the United Kingdom operates in a single-member district electoral system, it is difficult to determine whether or not Conservative and Labour party activists campaign on behalf of the party leader or for their local candidates. Thus, I did not use these cases to test Proposition 1 (non-selectorate members exert more campaign effort when the leader's policy position reflects their own). The next chapter attempts to test this proposition with party leadership elections in the Netherlands.

5.6 Appendix A: Trends in Leadership Contests

Table A1 presents the list of party leaders for the UK Labour Party. I include Labour's leadership elections from the 1963 election of Harold Wilson to Ed Miliband's election in 2010. As in the Conservative Party, leadership turnover in both parties seem to coincide with opposition status. Table A2 contains the number of candidates in all Labour Party Leadership Elections from 1963 to 2010. With the exception of Gordon Brown, all party leaders went through competitive leadership elections. The number of candidates when the party is in opposition is not always higher than the number of candidates when the party is in government, though there are more leadership elections occurring during opposition periods.

Table A1: Labour Party Leaders

Party	**Leader**	**Dates of Tenure**	**Role in Parliament** **PM = Prime Minister** **OL = Opposition Leader**
Labour	Harold Wilson	02/1963-04/1976	OL from 02/1963-10/1964 PM from 10/1964-06/1970 OL from 06/1970-04/1974 PM from 04/1974-04/1976
Labour	James Callaghan	04/1976-11/1980	PM from 04/1976-05/1979 OL from 05/1979-11/1980
Labour	Michael Foot	11/1980-02/1983	OL
Labour	Neil Kinnock	10/1983-07/1992	OL
Labour	John Smith	07/1992-05/1994	OL
Labour	Tony Blair	07/1994-06/2007	OL from 07/1994-05/1997 PM from 05/1997-06/2007
Labour	Gordon Brown	06/2007-05/2010	PM
Labour	Ed Miliband	09/2010-present	OL

Sources: http://www.keesings.com, Bale (2010); Heppell (2010).

Table A2: Number of Candidates, Labour Party Leadership Elections

Party	**Year of Election**	**Government Status**	**Winner**	**# Total Candidates**
Labour	1963	Opposition	Harold Wilson	3
Labour	1976	Government	James Callaghan	6
Labour	1980	Opposition	Michael Foot	4
Labour	1983	Opposition	Neil Kinnock	4
Labour	1983	Opposition	Neil Kinnock	2
Labour	1992	Opposition	John Smith	2
Labour	1994	Opposition	Tony Blair	3
Labour	2007	Government	Gordon Brown	1
Labour	2010	Opposition	Ed Miliband	5

Note: The number of candidates include all who entered the leadership election, regardless of the ballot stage.

Sources: http://www.keesings.com; Stark (1996); Bale (2010); Heppell (2010).

Formal rules for leadership elections in the Labour Party have existed since 1921. Until 1981, the selectorate consisted of only the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). Each MP was eligible for one ballot, one vote, and the candidate with a simple majority of votes would win. If not, the candidate with the lowest vote share was eliminated, and successive ballots would be issued until a simple majority of votes was reached. In 1981, Labour adopted the electoral college for its leadership elections, where the PLP, the Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs), and affiliated associations' (such as trade unions and socialist societies) members became eligible to vote. Before 1993, each CLP and affiliated association voted en bloc. Since then, it has been one member, one vote for CLP and affiliated association members, and alternative votes for PLP members. Each section carries one-third voting weight. Details about the the rules for leadership elections in the Labour Party are located in Table A3.

Table A3: Labour Party Selection Procedures

Years	**Procedure**	**MPs Only**	**Change after Election Loss**	**Change after Removal of Leader**
1922-1981	Procedure when the party is in opposition: 1. Nominations invited at the beginning of each parliamentary session 2. Ballot papers issued if 2+ candidates nominated a. Secret ballot, one MP one vote b. Due one week after ballot issue to allow for informal consultation with each MP's Constituency Labour Party (CLP) c. Simple majority of all Labour MPs → winner 3. No simple majority → bottom candidate drops out → ballots reissued 4. All candidates can only enter during the first ballot, but can drop out at any time	YES	N/A	N/A
	No procedure set for leadership elections when the party is in government. (above procedure used for the 1976 Labour Party Leadership Election)			
1981-1993	Contest must be approved by party conference if the party is in government. Otherwise annual contest is allowed.	NO	NO	NO
	Introduction of the Electoral College 1. Votes from Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) count for 30% (one MP one vote) 2. Votes from CLPs (bloc votes from each CLP) count for 40% (pre-balloting after 1989) 3. Votes from affiliated organizations count for 40% (bloc vote) 4. $>50\%$ of votes overall → winner. No majority → bottom candidate eliminated. Elimination process is repeated until one candidate receives a simple majority of votes			
	Introduction of Nomination Threshold 1. Nominations from 20% of the PLP (5% from 1981-1988) required for candidacy 2. Nominator's preferences are publicly revealed 3. CLPs, trade union, and socialist societies can nominate candidates 4. All candidates must be members of the PLP			

Table A3 (Cont.): Labour Party Selection Procedures

Years	**Procedure**	**MPs Only**	**Change after Election Loss**	**Change after Removal of Leader**
1993-now	Changes to the electoral college: 1. PLP, CLPs, and Affiliated Sections each occupy $\frac{1}{3}$ of total votes 2. PLP members include MPs and members of the European Parliament 3. Elimination of bloc votes. CLP members and affiliated sections vote by post (one member one vote) 4. Affiliated sections must confirm their membership in a Labour-affiliated union, indicate their support for Labour on their ballot paper, and confirm thta they do not belong to another political party	No	No	No
	Changes to the nomination threshold: must secure nominations from 12.5% of the PLP			

Source: Quinn (2005)

The results for all contested Labour Party Leadership Elections from 1963 to 1994 are located in Tables A4a and A4b. For the elections from 1963 to 1980, in which only Labour MPs were eligible to vote, no candidates obtained simple majority in the first ballot. There were no runaway favorites: the margin of victory has never been larger than 20%. When the electoral college was introduced, the margins of victory for the winning candidates became much higher. The PLP, CLP, and affiliated trade unions and socialist societies all gravitated toward the winning candidates (Table 26b).

Table A4a: Ballot Results for the UK Labour Party, 1963-1980

Year	**Candidate**	**Winner?**	**Ballot 1 Votes**	**Ballot 2 Votes**	**Ballot 3 Votes**
1963	Harold Wilson	Yes	115 (47%)	144 (58%)	
	George Brown	No	88 (36%)	103 (42%)	
	James Callaghan	No	41 (17%)		
1976	James Callaghan	Yes	84 (27%)	141 (45%)	176 (56%)
	Michael Foot	No	90 (29%)	133 (43%)	137 (44%)
	Roy Jenkins	No	56 (18%)		
	Tony Benn	No	37 (12%)		
	Denis Healey	No	30 (10%)	38 (12%)	
	Tony Crosland	No	17 (5%)		
1980	Michael Foot	Yes	83 (31%)	139 (52%)	
	Denis Healey	No	112 (42%)	129 (48%)	
	John Silkin	No	38 (14%)		
	Peter Shore	No	32 (12%)		

Note: the percentages of abstention/spoilt ballots are not included.

Sources: Punnett (1992); Stark (1996) Heppell (2010).

Table A4b: Votes for the Labour Party Leadership Elections, 1983-1994

Year	**Candidate**	**Winner?**	**PLP 30%**	**CLP 30%**	**Affiliates 40%**	**Total**
1983	Neil Kinnock	Yes	49%	92%	72%	71%
	Roy Hattersley	No	26%	2%	27%	19%
	Eric Heffer	No	14%	7%	0%	6%
	Peter Shore	No	10%	0%	0%	3%
1988	Neil Kinnock	Yes	83%	80%	99%	89%
	Tony Benn	No	17%	20%	1%	11%
1992	John Smith	Yes	77%	98%	96%	91%
	Bryan Gould	No	23%	2%	4%	9%
1994	Tony Blair	Yes	61%	58%	52%	57%
	John Prescott	No	20%	24%	28%	24%
	Margaret Beckett	No	20%	17%	19%	19%

Note: the percentages of abstention/spoilt ballots are not included. In 1994, the PLP, CLP, and Unions each carry $\frac{1}{3}$ voting weight.

Sources: Punnett (1992); Stark (1996); Quinn (2004); Heppell (2010).

5.7 Appendix B: List of MPs and Lords Interviewed

Table B1: List of Labour MPs and Lords Interviewed

Name	**Constituency**	**Position**	**Interview Date**
Mitchell, Austin	Great Grimsby	MP	09/13/2011
Mudie, George	Leeds East	MP	09/14/2011
Timms, Stephen	East Ham	MP	09/08/2011
Johnson, Alan	Kingston Upon Hull West and Hessle	MP	07/07/2011
Twigg, Stephen	Liverpool, West Derby	MP	09/14/2011
Love, Andy	Edmonton	MP	09/15/2011
Benn, Hilary	Leeds Central	MP	07/11/2011
Anderson, David	Blaydon	MP	10/11/2011
Creagh, Mary	Wakefield	MP	10/13/2011
Engel, Natascha	North East Derbyshire	MP	10/10/2011
Johnson, Diana	Kingston Upon Hull North	MP	09/07/2011
Blenkinsop, Tom	Middlesborough South and East Cleveland	MP	09/08/2011
Evans, Chris	Islwyn	MP	10/12/2011
Hilling, Julie	Bolton West	MP	09/06/2011
McClymont, Gregg	Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch	MP	09/14/2011
Onwurah, Chi	Newcastle upon Tyne Central	MP	10/12/2011
Perkins, Toby	Chesterfield	MP	10/11/2011
Reeves, Rachel	Leeds West	MP	09/15/2011
Williamson, Chris	Derby North	MP	09/12/2011
Kinnock, Neil	N/A	Lord	10/10/2011
Morgan, Kenneth	N/A	Lord	09/14/2011
Radice, Giles	N/A	Lord	09/14/2011

5.8 References

Alderman, R.K., and Neil Carter. 1993. "The Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1992." *Parliamentary Affairs* 46 (1): 49-65.

Alderman, R.K., and Neil Carter. 1994."The Labour Party and Trade Unions: Loosening the Ties." *Parliamentary Affairs* 47 (3): 321-337.

Alderman, Keith, and Neil Carter. 1995. "The Labour Party Leadership and Deputy Leadership Elections of 1994." *Parliamentary Affairs* 48 (3): 438-455.

Cowley, Philip and Mark Stuart. 2003. "In Place of Strife? The PLP in Government, 1997-2001." *Political Studies* 51: 315-331.

Cowley, Philip and Mark Stuart. 2011. "When Sheep Bark: The Parliamentary Labour Party, 2001-2003." Working Paper.

Drucker, H. M. 1976. "Leadership Selection in the Labour Party." *Parliamentary Affairs* 29 (4): 378-395.

Drucker, H. M. 1981. "Changes in the Labour Party Leadership." *Parliamentary Affairs* 34 (4): 369-391.

Drucker, Henry. 1984. "Intra-Party Democracy in Action: The Election of Leader and Deputy Leader by the Labour Party in 1983." *Parliamentary Affairs* 37 (1): 283-300.

Giddens, Anthony. 2000. *The Third Way and Its Critics.* Cambridge: Polity.

Gouge, Ed. "Michael Foot, 1980-3." In *Leaders of the Opposition: from Churchill To Cameron*, ed. Timothy Heppell. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 126-141.

Hasan, Medhi, and James Macintyre. 2011. *Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader.* London: Biteback.

Hayter, Dianne. 2005. *Fightback! Labour's Traditional Right in the 1970s and 1980s.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Heffernan, Richard, and Mike Marqusee. 1992. *Defeat from the Jaws of Victory: Inside Kinnock's Labour Party.* New York: Verso.

Heppell, Tim. 2010. *Choosing the Labour Leader: Labour Party Leadership Election from Wilson to Brown.* London: I B Tauris.

Jobson, Richard, and Mark Wickham-Jones. 2010. "Gripped by the Past: Nostalgia and the 2010 Labour Party Leadership Contest." *British Politics* 5 (4): 525-548.

Kam, Christopher. 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics.* Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.

Mandelson, Peter. 2010. *The Third Man: Life at the Heart of New Labour.* London: Harper Collins UK.

Norris, Pippa. 2005. "The British Parliamentary Constituency database, 1992-2005. Release 1.3." June. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm (June 4, 2011).

Norris, Pippa. 2010. "May 6th 2010 British General Election Constituency Results Release 5.0" May. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm (June 4, 2011).

Plant, Raymond, Matt Beech, and Kevin Hickson. eds. 2004. *The Struggle for Labour's Soul.* London: Routledge.

Punnett, Robert. 1992. *Selecting the Party Leader: Britain in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Harvester Weatsheaf.

Quinn, Thomas. 2004. "Electing the Leader: The British Labour Party's Electoral College." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6: 333-352.

Quinn, Thomas. 2005. "Leasehold or Freehold? Leader-Eviction Rules in the British Conservative and Labour Parties." *Political Studies* 53: 793-815.

Quinn, Thomas. 2010. "Membership Ballots in Party Leadership Elections in Britain." *Representation* 46 (1): 101-117.

Quinn, Thomas. 2012. *Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain.* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Rogers, Simon. 2010. "Labour leadership election result: get the full data." http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/sep/26/labour-leadership-results-election#data (October 5,
2010).

Stark, Leonard. 1996. *Choosing a Leader: Party Leadership Contests in Britain from MacMillan to Blair.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

The Telegraph. 2010. "Andy Burnham and Diane Abbott join Labour leadership race." The Telegraph, May 19, 2010, (accessed April 10, 2012).

Watt, Nicholas. 2010. "Cameron: David Miliband greatest threat to Conservatives." The Guardian, August 27, 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/aug/27/cameron-david-miliband-labour-leadership/print (accessed December 12, 2010).

YouGov. 2010a. "YouGov / Sun survey - headline figures." http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Pol-Sun-LabSummary UPDATED-290710.pdf (accessed August 01, 2012).

YouGov. 2010b. "YouGov / The Sun Survey Results." http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Pol-Sun-LabMembers-290710.pdf (accessed August 01, 2012).

YouGov. 2010c. "YouGov Survey - Headline Figures." http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-Pol-YouGov-LabourLeadSummary-100910.pdf (accessed August 01, 2012).

CHAPTER 6

Stay Close to Your Base(?) Party Leadership Elections in the Netherlands

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, I presented evidence from the British Conservative Party to support my model's Proposition 2: *all else equal, the chosen leader's policy position reflects that of the selectorate.* Socially conservative and Eurosceptic MPs chose leaders who shared their views, despite sacrificing potential electoral votes. My analysis of British Labour Party leadership elections in Chapter 5 suggests that MPs incorporated their local party members' preferences into their leadership choices, which partly supports Proposition 3. However, I have not shown that leadership choices influence non-selectorate members' campaign effort. Since the United Kingdom employs a single-member district electoral system, it is difficult to distinguish between campaigning for the local candidate versus activism for the leader.

This chapter tackles this problem. Using party leadership elections in the Netherlands, I examine if the party's rank-and-file members adjust their campaign efforts in response to leadership choice, and if party elites are concerned with the rank-and-file's reaction. Using personal interviews, news reports, and polls, I investigate rival explanations for leadership selection and test Proposition 1: *the more that the chosen leader reflects the non-selectorate's policy position, the more the non-selectorate members campaign (i.e., e^* increases as $|X_{PL,S} - X_{NS}|$ decreases).* I also test Proposition 3: *selectorate members choose their preferred leader when non-selectorate members value electoral welfare more than advocacy (i.e., $\alpha_{NS} > 0.5$), but are pressured to choose one whom non-selectorate members prefer when the reverse is*

true (i.e., $\alpha_{NS} < 0.5$*).*

I first discuss issues with examining leadership elections in the Netherlands. For clarity's sake, all terms are in English except the party list leader, *lijsttrekker*. A list of relevant Dutch terms and party names is in Appendix A. Next, I illustrate how policy and electoral concerns influenced the outcomes of the 2006 Liberal Party (VVD) *lijsttrekker* election and the 2012 Labour Party (PvdA) parliamentary party leadership election. Although limited data hinder full hypothesis testing, these cases do offer some insight into the empirical relevance of Propositions 1 and 3.

6.2 Empirical Testing in the Netherlands

The open-list proportional electoral system used in the country may suggest candidate-centered campaigns. Although voters may choose any candidate on the party list,[1] in practice the system resembles a closed-list one.[2] A candidate's chance of being elected depends mostly on his or her ranking on the party list, as it is uncommon for individual candidates to be elected based on preferential voting alone.[3] Thus, campaign effort should be directed toward the party, and not individual candidates.[4]

The prevalence of coalition governments in the Netherlands (Table B1) may cause ambiguity in the term electoral welfare, since "winning an election" is not necessarily the same as attaining government status. Choosing the PvdA and the VVD as my case studies ameliorate this problem. At least one of these parties had occupied the government since 1977,

[1]See Andeweg and Irwin (2009). For parliamentary elections, the entire country forms one district and all votes are aggregated to determine the allocation of the 150 seats in the *Tweede Kamer*, the Second Chamber.

[2]Although Andeweg and Holsteyn (2011) note that preferential voting is on the rise, the combined votes for all *lijsttrekkeren* in each election never dipped below 70% (2011: 8). The only instance in which a candidate received more votes than the *lijsttrekker* is the VVD in the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Election.

[3]For example, in the 2010 general election, only 2 out of 150 MPs (CDA's Sabine Uitslag and D66's Pia Dijkstra) were elected through preference votes instead of through their rankings. In the 2012 general election, CDA's Pieter Omtzigt was the only candidate who was elected through preference votes instead of the ranking on the list.

[4]During election campaigns, highly ranked MPs often appeared together with the *lijsttrekker* for rallies and other events. Interviews with the author 06/27/2011; 06/28/2011; 06/29/2011.

and both had cooperated with each other despite being from different sides of the left-right ideological spectrum.[5] This implies that each party had a realistic chance of entering government and becoming the prime minister's party. Also, the largest party was always the first party the informatuer consulted after an election (Andeweg and Irwin 2009), and, since 1986, the prime minister had belonged to the party with the most seats (Table B2). Thus, electoral victory could mean being the largest party in parliament. I assume that electoral welfare refers to a party's ability to win seats, and a party wins an election if it obtains a plurality of seats.

The PvdA's party constitution stipulates that the party's *political* leader is the parliamentary party leader during opposition, or the highest ranking minister if in government. In contrast, VVD's political leader is either the parliamentary party leader or the prime minister. The full list of party leaders is located in Tables B3a to B3c. I also include party leaders from the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) because this was the party that most frequently occupied the prime ministership from 1977 to 2012.

Since 1977, out of the 19 *lijsttrekkeren* from the three most salient parties CDA, PvdA, and VVD, only 4 were chosen through competitive elections (Table B4).[6] This, however, does not mean that the party leader is unimportant, or that there was not disagreement on leadership choice. A party may choose to keep internal conflicts out of the public eye and privately weigh the pros and cons of potential candidates before formally choosing one. Nevertheless, I examine competitive leadership elections to highlight the non-selectorate's leverage and the trade-off between advocacy and electoral welfare.

[5]See Andeweg and Irwin (2009). The PvdA promoted state-provided social services but freedom in personal choices. The VVD also advocated for preserving personal freedom, but desired less intervention in social services as well as the economy.

[6]Otherwise, the outgoing leader announced the sole candidate for the post, and the party congresses ratified the nomination. The lists of potential candidates and consultation with party elites were sometimes kept from the public eye.

6.3 Rival Explanations and Methodology

The PvdA and the VVD employ membership vote in their leadership elections, which complicates the strategic interactions between the selectorate and the non-selectorate. At the same time, party elites can influence leadership election outcomes. MPs who voice their support for candidates receive media attention, which may sway undecided party members to vote for particular candidates. Provincial party leaders can arrange meet-and-greet between their preferred candidates and their provinces' party members. Also, party elites may rally behind candidates for policy reasons and/or because they desire more campaign activities from the rank-and-file. Furthermore, since Proposition 1 focuses on the reaction of leadership choice on campaign effort, it is relevant to see how the rank-and-file members respond to this choice. For these reasons, I treat MPs and provincial party leaders as the selectorate. Since the party's rank-and-file members (municipal councilpersons, local party officers, and youth wing members) are most likely to engage in on-the-ground campaign activities, I treat them as the non-selectorate.

It may be that the party leader's valence qualities, rather than issue positions, inspire campaign effort. If so, then the selectorate would prioritize these qualities to galvanize the party's rank-and-file. This argument implies that the rank-and-file would support the most charismatic, competent candidate regardless of his or her policy views. This, though, treats non-selectorate members as general voters. While general voters may well be persuaded by a party leader's charisma or competence, the party's rank-and-file, as part of an ideological entity, should be more concerned with the party's policy direction. Nevertheless, although it is unlikely that rank-and-file members weigh candidates' valence qualities more than their policy positions, these qualities may have still have some impact on motivating campaign effort. In each of the three leadership elections, I investigate how much valence qualities mattered in these leadership choices.

Testing Proposition 1 involves illustrating that non-selectorate members' campaign effort depends on the leader's policy position. This hinges on my ability to measure effort. However,

labor-intensive activities, such as door-to-door canvassing and weekend rallies, are in practice unmeasurable. Because there are idiosyncrasies involving campaign output, comparing effort across elections–even within the same party–suffers from noise. Even if I conduct large-N surveys regarding activist campaigns, there are still identification problems. If I cannot determine whether the non-selectorate prioritizes electoral welfare or advocacy, I would not be able to distinguish between high campaign effort due to electoral concerns versus effort that results from enthusiasm toward the leader.

Open-ended interviews serve as my main source of evidence. They remain the best approach for examining the relationship between the party leader's policy position and the non-selectorate's campaign effort level. Although they lack precision and do not represent the views of every member of the party's rank-and-file, I can uncover the rationale behind candidate support, how the rank-and-file views the need to enter government versus "getting the policy right," etc. Because there are few academic literature on Dutch party leaders, in addition to personal interviews with Dutch MPs and party officials, I rely on Dutch news sources and opinion polls for most of my empirical support.

The next sections examine leadership elections in the PvdA and the VVD in the contexts of Propositions 1 and 3. If Proposition 1 explains the rank-and-file's campaign effort, then leadership election debates would be policy-based. The party's rank-and-file should also campaign less if the leader had advocated for policies disliked by its members. If Proposition 3 is empirically relevant, then, when the party's rank-and-file were not willing to sacrifice advocacy to win seats, the chosen party leader would be preferred by the rank-and-file. For each election, I first examine how much candidate valence influenced the outcome. Next, I identify each leadership candidate's policy position and reveal the dimension of intra-party policy division. I also investigate which candidates the parties' rank-and-file members preferred. I then compare the candidates' positions with those of the rank-and-file members as indirect evidence for my propositions.

6.4 The 2006 VVD *lijsttrekker* Election

In this section, I examine the election of Mark Rutte as the VVD *lijsttrekker* for the 2006 Dutch general election. Since the party's MPs, Senate members, and former leaders received media attention for their support, which could influence undecided ordinary party members' vote choice, I label this group as the selectorate. Since the party's rank-and-file members, which include municipal VVD councillors, the party's youth wing, and delegates to party congresses, are a vital source of the party's general election campaign effort, I treat them as the non-selectorate.

I test Proposition 3: selectorate members who prioritize electoral welfare choose a leader whose policy position stands closer to the non-selectorate's position if the non-selectorate prioritized advocacy, but choose a leader whose position stands closer to the selectorate's own if the revese is true. To provide direct evidence for this proposition, I must first show that for this *lijsttrekker* election, the party elites (MPs and former party leaders) and the party's rank-and-file members (the non-selectorate) held different policy preferences. I must also demonstrate that these party elites prioritized the party's electoral welfare and determine the rank-and-file members' weighing of electoral welfare versus advocacy. If these rank-and-file members prioritized advocacy, then I must show that VVD MPs and former party leaders supported a candidate preferred by rank-and-file members. If rank-and-file members prioritized electoral welfare, then the VVD elites should have supported their own preferred leader.

The evidence suggests that valence alone does not explain Mark Rutte's election. Although Rutte's rival, Rita Verdonk, was deemed to be more prime ministerial and could attract more votes, the majority of the VVD MPs, party notables, and rank-and-file members voted for him. The majority of the VVD youth wing and party members held views that were closer to Rutte's stances, but many within the VVD parliamentary party aligned themselves toward Verdonk's policy views. Although these patterns do not directly support Proposition 3, they are consistent with the pattern that some VVD MPs incorporated the

rank-and-file members' preferences in their vocal support for Rutte.

In 2006, VVD leader Josias van Aartsen resigned after the party only received 13.7% of votes in the municipal elections. Jan van Zanen, the party chairman, decided to hold a part-wide referendum to choose the party's next *lijsttrekker*, despite the fact that a general election had not yet been called.[7] Mark Rutte, State Secretary for Education, Culture, and Science, declared his intention to run. MP Jelleke Veenendaal followed suit. Rita Verdonk, Minister without Portfolio for Migration and Integration at the time, was the last candidate. 78% of all eligible VVD party members voted (Table 1). Rutte defeated Verdonk with a 6% margin and became VVD's parliamentary leader. When the government fell on June that year, he assumed his role as *lijsttrekker*, but was unable to prevent the party's 6-seat loss in parliament.

Table 1: Results of the 2006 VVD *Lijsttrekker* Election

Candidate	**Highest Position in Politics**	**Votes**
Mark Rutte	State Secretary of Higher Education Sciences	14,777 (51.5%)
Rita Verdonk	Minister of Immigration and Asylum	13,131 (45.5%)
Jelleke Veenendaal	MP	803 (3.0%)
Total Votes Cast % of VVD Voters		28,788 (74%)

Source: http://www.parlement.com; Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle (2008). The percentages do not include spoilt ballots.

6.4.1 Candidates' Valence Qualities

Rutte, the prime minister as of 2012, was perceived as a good communicator who could attract voters.[8] However, in 2006, opinion polls revealed, when asked which candidate would make the best prime minister, responders consistently answered that Verdonk would.[9] One source told me, on condition of anonymity, that before 2009, Rutte's performance as the

[7]Interview with the author 09/22/2011.

[8]Interviews with the author 06/29/2011; 06/30/2011; 07/05/2011; 09/22/2011; 10/03/2011.

[9]Polls by Maurice de Hond (2006b-e; 2006g).

parliamentary party leader was so poor that his own MPs contemplated deposing him.[10] In 2010, the hosts of Dutch talk show "Carlo & Irene: Life 4 You," described Rutte's image transformation from 2006 as the "New and Improved Mark Rutte."[11]

Throughout the campaign period, Verdonk, not Rutte, was the candidate that could attract more votes from the general electorate (Table 2).[12] More respondents were likely to vote for the VVD if Verdonk would have won. This applied to those who voted for the anti-immigrant party LPF in 2003 and those who would vote for Geert Wilders, a populist MP who formed the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim Party for Freedom (PVV) in 2006.[13] The pattern was similar among respondents who in 2003 voted for the CDA, the VVD, or the left wing PvdA, D66 and the Socialist Party) in 2003.[14] In the parliamentary election of that year, Verdonk received 67,355 more preference votes than Rutte–the first time that the incumbent *lijsttrekker* did not receive a plurality of his or her party's votes in Dutch parliamentary elections.

What is more surprising is that some VVD MPs expressed valence qualities as essential for a "good" *lijsttrekker*.[15] One MP even proclaimed, "The *lijsttrekker* is the face of the party. Let the number two guy worry about policy."[16] They may have emphasized these qualities because the party had not been plagued with intense policy divisions since 2010. Nevertheless, if charisma and competence were valued above policy concerns, party elites should have supported Verdonk.

---

[10]Interview with the author 12/20/2011.

[11]Carlo & Irene: Life 4 You 02/28/2010.

[12]Pollster Maurice de Hond (2006d) asked a sample of Dutch voters from the 2003 General Election: "Suppose that Verdonk/Rutte is to become the *lijsttrekker* of the VVD, how likely is it that you will vote for the VVD?" (Author's translation)

[13]See de Hond (2006b; 2006e; 2006g-k).

[14]Ibid.

[15]Interviews with the author 06/29/2011; 06/30/2011; 09/22/2011; 10/03/2011; 10/05/2011.

[16]Interview with the author 07/05/2011.

Table 2: Percentage of Voters Who Would Vote for VVD if Verdonk/Rutte Is the *Lijsttrekker*

	3/30	**4/04**	**4/21**	**5/10**	**5/16**	**5/17**	**5/21**	**5/29**
Verdonk	20%	23%	25%	25%	20%	22%	23%	23%
Rutte	16%	15%	15%	19%	17%	18%	16%	18%
Verdonk - Rutte	**4**%	**8**%	**10**%	**6**%	**3**%	**4**%	**7**%	**5**%

Source: Polls by Maurice de Hond (2006b; 2006e; 2006g-k). The percentages are from respondents who voted for the specified parties in 2003 and answered "almost certainly" (*Vrijwel zeker*), "likely" (*Groot*), and "pretty likely" (*Vrij groot*). For example, the percentages for"Verdonk VVD" represent respondents who voted for VVD in 2003 and would vote for the party in the next parliamentary election if Verdonk was to be the *lijsttrekker*. The numbers for"Wilders" are the % who would current vote for him.

6.4.2 Policy Factions and Candidates' Positions

During the early 2000s, the VVD was split into the socially liberal wing and the populist wing, which advocated for law and order, restrictions on immigration, and distance from Europe.[17]. In 2004, MP Geert Wilders left the VVD parliamentary party because he opposed the party's stance on Turkey's ascension to the European Union (*de Volkskrant* 09/04/2006). The most publicized controversy was the 2006 Ayaan Hirsi Ali's affair (Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle 2008). The Somali-born VVD MP had given false information on her 1992 asylum application to the Netherlands, which called into question the legality of her citizenship. While many fellow VVD MPs supported her citizenship, some did not (Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle 2008: 4). These internal conflicts had crippled the party in such a manner that Gerrit Zalm, deputy prime minister at the time, publicly called for unity (Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle 2008).

Verdonk, a populist, advocated for stricter immigration and distance from the European Union.[18] Her right wing stances on tax, policing, and immigration not only clashed with some VVD ministers, but were also deemed incompatible with social liberalism, so much that

[17]Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle (2008); interviews with the author 09/22/2011; 10/03/2011. Also see *Algemeen Dagblad* 05/21/2006

[18]Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle (2008: 6); *de Volkskrant* 04/01/2006; interviews with the author 06/29/2011; 07/04/2011; 09/22/2011; 10/03/2011.

former party leader Ed Nijpels labeled her as a danger to the party.[19] Rutte, in contrast, represented the party's left wing.[20] Whereas journalists predicted that Verdonk's positions would steal votes away from the extreme right, Rutte's positions would attract voters who leaned toward left (*de Volkskrant* 04/03/2006). He championed for more European integration and emphasized the need for special education and reduced mortgage interest rates (*de Volkskrant* 04/08/2006). These differences, along with the candidates' increasingly hostile campaigns, resulted in daily news reports and commentaries on party division.[21]

6.4.3 Selectorate and Non-Selectorate's Candidate Preferences

According to Proposition 1, the party's rank-and-file's campaign effort would vary depending on who was crowned as leader. I cannot provide evidence that can directly support this claim, as there are no surveys on individual VVD campaigners' effort levels. Interview data do not reveal whether the party's rank-and-file would have campaigned differently if Verdonk was the winner.[22] However, I can identify some of the groups that supported Rutte. He had deep support among the party's rank-and-file. For example, the majority of the May 19^{th} party congress attendees wore and distributed campaign material for him.[23] VVD's scouting committee,[24] Deputy Prime Minister Gerrit Zalm, and VVD's Youth Wing

[19]He called her a "*brokkenpiloot*," which means a person who poses danger to the road (*de Volkskrant* 04/22/2006). For example, at a party meeting on January 21^{st} of 2006, she called for only Dutch being spoken on the streets. Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle 2008: 6.

[20]Interviews with the author 06/29/2011; 06/30/2011; 09/22/2011. Also see Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle (2008) and *de Volkskrant* 03/09/2006.

[21]Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle 2008: 5; van Praag 2008: 139. The second largest Dutch newspaper *Algemeen Dagblad*, had more than 100 articles devoted to the leadership contest. The third largest Dutch newspaper, *de Volkskrant*, likewise had daily reports on the leadership contest from March 30^{th} to May 31^{st}, the day the results were announced.

[22]It was not feasible for me to conduct comprehensive surveys and interviews with each VVD campaigners for the 2006 General Election, least of all because VVD did not provide information on their identities and contact information.

[23]Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle 2008: 8. Also see *de Volkskrant* 05/20/2006 and *Algemeen Dagblad* 05/20/2006.

[24]This committee is responsible for recruiting, training, and establishing party list.

(JOVD), among other prominent VVD members, declared their votes for Rutte.[25] Mark Harbers, a member of the scouting committee, stated that Rutte was the choice among the "active" members of the party.[26] Verdonk, who considered herself as outside of the party establishment, received support from MP Charlie Aptroot, former party leader Fritz Bolkestein, and parliamentary president Franz Weisglas. Her distrust of the party executive was so great that she demanded an independent committee to oversee the election.[27]

Since the party's youth wing also officially endorsed Rutte, it is not unreasonable to imagine that general election campaigns would be more intense if Rutte was the *lijsttrekker*.[28] These rank-and-file members' support for Rutte went against the general Dutch electorate's preference for Verdonk. This suggests that the majority of the party's rank-and-file members were not willing to compromise policy for the sake of the additional seats–and perhaps even the prime ministership–that Verdonk could have delivered (*de Volkskrant* 06/01/2006).

If Proposition 3 holds, party elites' support for Rutte should have in part stemmed from concerns over reactions from the party's rank-and-file. My interview with former MP and the third *lijsttrekker* candidate, Jelleke Veenendaal, reveals that before 2006, Verdonk was already building momentum from MPs for her leadership bid.[29] Although Veenendaal perceived the parliamentary party as leaning to the right, many right-leaning MPs, such as Hans van Baalen, Bibi de Vries, and Zsolt Szabó, did not openly support Verdonk. Bibi de Vries had actually publicly criticized Verdonk for her populist stance (*de Volkskrant* 08/22/2006; *Algemeen Dagblad* 08/22/2006). VVD MP Anouchka van Miltenburg noted that candidate preferences among VVD MPs were divided.[30] Wilibrood van Beek, interim

[25]Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle (2008: 7); Remarque and Wanders (2006). Interviews with the author 06/29/2011; 09/22/2011; 10/03/2011.

[26]Interview with the author 06/30/2011.

[27]Lucardie, Bredewold, Voerman, and van de Walle 2008: 8.

[28]While it was not unanimous in its support (out of the 60 board members, 39 voted for Rutte and 19 voted for Verdonk (*de Volkstrant* 05/07/2006), because the majority of the youth wing members preferred Rutte, campaigning by these members could be higher under him.

[29]Interview with the author 10/03/2011. Newspapers also reported Verdonk as a possible successor to van Aartsen (*de Volkskrant* 03/08/2006).

[30]Interview with the author 06/29/2011.

parliamentary leader at the time of the *lijsttrekker* election, estimated the split to be about 60/40, in favor of Rutte.[31] Yet, only 2 VVD MPs openly supported Verdonk.

The strongest conclusion I can draw is that, while the parliamentary party was initially split between Rutte and Verdonk, by the end of the voting period, Rutte received support from many MPs. Given that the majority of the party's rank-and-file preferred Rutte, it is not unreasonable to infer that some right-leaning MPs' muted support for Verdonk was, at least in part, due to concerns over potential reaction from the majority of the party's rank-and-file members.

6.5 The 2012 PvdA Party Leadership Election

In this section, I examine the election of Diederik Samsom as the PvdA parliamentary party leader in 2012. As in the 2006 VVD leadership election, since Labour MPs and other prominent party members are much more likely to be interviewed by newspapers and television news, I treat these two groups as the selectorate. Since the party's rank-and-file members, include the youth wing and municipal PvdA councillors, are essential for the party's on-the-ground campaign effort, I treat them as the non-selectorate.

I analyze this leadership election in the context of Proposition 1: *the closer the chosen party leader's policy position is to the non-selectorate's position, the more campaign effort non-selectorate members provide for the general election.* To offer evidence for this, I must first determine how close the policy position of the eventual winner, Diederik Samsom, is to the positions of PvdA municipal councillors, the youth wing, and other rank-and-file members. If the policy positions were indeed close, then I must show that more members from these groups had volunteered at general election campaigns. I find the following. Valence qualities may be one of the main factors behind Samsom's victory. He was seen as an effective debater who could steal votes from rival parties. At the same time, Samsom's left-leaning policy positions also matched the rank-and-file's position. This is consistent with

[31] Interview with the author 06/29/2011.

(at least, does not contradict) some of the patterns that Proposition 1 would predict.

PvdA leader Job Cohen resigned in February 2012 amidst pressure from the parliamentary party (*de Volkskrant* 02/20/2012). At the time, the party was projected at 19 seats, 11 less then the 30 seats in parliament (*de Volkskrant* 02/20/2012). The party held a member-wide election to determine its next parliamentary party leader, with 5 MPs as candidates. Martijn van Dam was the first to declare. Diederik Samsom quickly followed. Former Minister of Education Ronald Plasterk was the third candidate. The fourth was former State Secretary for Security and Justice Nybehat Albayrak. Lutz Jacobi was the final candidate.

All eligible party members and those who pledged to support social democracy could vote in this election. An alternative vote system was used, in which candidates were ranked in order of preference.[32] Samsom won outright with 54% of party members' first preference votes, while Ronald Plasterk, the runner-up, received 32% (Table 3). When the Rutte Cabinet unexpectedly fell in April 2012, Samsom also became the party's *lijsttrekker*. In the 2012 Dutch General Election, the party gained 8 seats in parliament.

Table 3: Results of the 2012 PvdA Parliamentary Leader Election

Candidate	**Highest Position in Politics**	**2010 Party List Rank**	**Votes**
Diederik Samsom	MP	7	19,524 (54%)
Ronald Plasterk	Minister of Education, Culture, and Science	3	11,427 (32%)
Nybehat Albayrak	State Secretary of Justice	2	2,968 (8%)
Martijn van Dam	MP	13	1,410 (4%)
Lutz Jacobi	MP	26	815 (2%)
Total Turnout			36,284 (69%)

Source: http://www.pvda.nl. These results are first-round vote counts.

[32]All candidates were to be ranked (ballots were considered spoilt if not all the candidates were ranked). If no candidate received a majority of first preference votes, then the candidate with the fewest first preference votes was to be eliminated, and his votes transferred to his voters' second choice candidates. The process would continue until one candidate achieved a majority of preference votes. See http://www.pvda.nl for details on voting eligibility.

6.5.1 Candidates' Valence Qualities

Before any candidate declared, polls indicated that 20% of the respondents regarded Ronald Plasterk as the best person for the post, while 19% rated Samsom as the best. However, among the polled PvdA supporters, 28% preferred Samsom, while 18% preferred Plasterk. 15% of all respondents and 13% of PvdA supporters viewed Plasterk as the person most fit to be the *lijsttrekker*. 11% of the respondents and 9% of PvdA supporters thought so of Smasom (de Hond 2012c; 2012d). Samsom was the favorite among party supporters as well as Dutch voters in general. In a poll conducted by Maurice de Hond (Table 4), Samsom and Plasterk were initially neck-to-neck (each receiving 34% of votes), with Albayrak and van Dam trailing. 37% of potential PvdA voters most preferred Plasterk and 36% most preferred Samsom. Meanwhile, 44% of the PvdA supporters at the time most preferred Samsom and 37% most preferred Plasterk. Albayrak and van Dam only received 10% and 9%, respectively. Over the course of the leadership campaign, which included five public debates with the candidates, Samsom gained momentum among all groups of voters (Figures 6.1 to 6.3).[33] His rise in the polls could be due to his performance in these debates, especially since each of the opinion polls were conducted on the day after each debate.

Table 4: Respondents' Preferences for Candidates, 02/27/2012

1^{st} **Preference Votes for**	**Potential PvdA Voters**	**Current PvdA Voters**	**Ex-PvdA Voters**	**All Respondents**
Diederik Samsom	36%	44%	45%	34%
Ronald Plasterk	37%	37%	33%	34%
Nybehat Albayrak	14%	10%	10%	16%
Martijn van Dam	12%	9%	14%	14%

Source: Polls by Maurice de Hond (2012c; 2012d). The question is, *"Kunt u deze vier kandidaten in volgorde van uw voorkeur plaatsen?"*, translated as "Can you rank these four candidates in the order of your preference?" The responses are *Potentieel PvdA* (potential PvdA voters), *Stemt nu PvdA* (current PvdA voters), *Zijn weggelopen* (ex-PvdA voters), and *Alle Nederlandse* (all respondents).

[33]The exception was when Samsom made an unpopular comment against the mayor of Utrecht, a PvdA member, which led to a rise in preferences for Plasterk on March 14^{th}, the day before the polls closed. Source: Polls by Maurice de Hond (2012c-g). The question asked is, *"Op wie van deze wijf zou u nu uw stem uitbrengen?"*, translated as "Who among these five candidates would you vote for, if you can?" The respondent categories, in Dutch, are *Potentieel PvdA* (potential PvdA voters), *Stemt nu PvdA* (current PvdA voters), and *Alle Nederlandse* (all respondents).

Figure 6.1: PvdA Leadership Vote Intentions, All Respondents



Figure 6.2: PvdA Leadership Vote Intentions, Potential PvdA



Figure 6.3: PvdA Leadership Vote Intentions, Current PvdA



In a poll by *Politiekbarometer*, 37% of the potential PvdA voters, and 25% of all respondents, thought that PvdA would improve its image under Samsom. Only 22% potential PvdA voters, and 17% of all respondents, thought the same of Plasterk.[34] Samsom could also attract more votes than Plasterk. Compared to Plasterk, more PvdA supporters and Dutch voters thought Samsom was the best candidate to make PvdA the largest party. Samsom also scored higher than Plasterk as a good debater.[35] Interestingly, more respondents from all groups rated Plasterk as the candidate who would be the best prime minister.[36]

Since the party was choosing an opposition leader at the time, party members may have had viewed good debating skills as the most important quality of an opposition party leader. Consequently, PvdA members may have had judged Samsom as the candidate with the better set of valence qualities. Whatever the reason, I cannot dismiss candidate valence as a dominant explanation for the election result. The majority of the polled PvdA members preferred Samsom over Plasterk. Samsom was also perceived as the candidate with the best debating skills, as well as the candidate with the best chance of improving the party image. This, however, does not contradict my model's predictions if Samsom's policy positions best matched those of the party's rank-and-file.

6.5.2 Policy Factions and Candidates' Positions

The PvdA was plagued with policy conflicts.[37] In October 2011, party chairwoman Lilianne Ploumen resigned over disagreements with Job Cohen over the party's policy direction. She publicly stated that "there is much more to the party then what Cohen currently projects."[38] She also hinted at the need for the party to return to its progressive roots (Meijer 2011a). Although some MPs agreed with Ploumen that that party was becoming

[34] *Ipsos Synovate* 2012a.

[35] See de Hond (2012c-g) and *Ipsos Synovate* (2012b) for the percentages and the precise wording.

[36] See de Hond (2012c-g) for the percentages and the precise wording.

[37] Interview with the author 06/27/2011; 09/26/2011; 09/27/2011.

[38] *NOS Journaal* 10/04/2011. Author's translation.

too closely associated with the Socialist Party,[39] the party's rank-and-file were calling for a leftist renewal (Meijer 2011a, 20011b; interview with the author 09/26/2011). In December of 2011, former MP Hans Spekman, widely regarded as leftist, was elected as the new party chairman with 82% of the PvdA membership votes.[40] PvdA MPs were also divided over the party's policy direction. On February 16^{th}, the Dutch TV news NOS reported a leaked email from MP Frans Timmermans, which criticized Job Cohen and Hans Spekman's left-leaning stances and expressed the need to reorient the party towards its social democratic tradition.[41] At the time, some MPs shared Timmermans' disapproval of the party's policy direction.[42]

The candidates' positions reflected this division. On the right end of the policy spectrum stood van Dam, who leaned toward the Third Way, socially liberal ideology (Timmermans 2012a). Van Dam also called for closer cooperation with Europe, even if it meant accepting Brussels' requirement of setting the national budget deficit to 3% (*de Volkskrant* 03/14/2012). On the left end was Jacobi, a leftist who wanted to align the party with the Socialist Party (*NU.nl* 02/28/2012). In the middle were Albayrak and Plasterk. Albayrak presented herself as a "compromise candidate" who "listens, collaborates, makes choices, and deals." (Herdeschee 2012). Plasterk stood between van Dam and Samsom (*NU.nl* 02/23/2012). Contrary to van Dam, he argued that employee dismissal rules should not be relaxed. He was also not inclined to cooperate with the Socialist Party.[43] Samsom, a former

[39]Interviews with the author 10/05/2011; 10/06/2011.

[40]See Sommers (2011). In a chairmanship election debate, fellow candidate René Kronenberg described Spekman as the "16^{th} Socialist Party MP" (Meijer 2011c; author's translation). Spekman described himself as a "red nest" and emphasized that the PvdA and the Social Party should not work against each other (Meijer 2011c).

[41]Cohen and Spekman had given an interview for the Dutch newspaper *Trouw*, in which they distanced themselves from social liberalism and hinted at similarities between their party and the Socialist Party (We moeten linksom 2012). As a response, Timmermans wrote, "you gave this interview as our leader and on our behalf. Honestly I do not feel at home with everything that you said" (Timmermans 2012; author's translation.

[42]*NOS Journaal* 02/18/2012; Meerhof 2012a.

[43]Spitsnieuws.nl 03/08/2012; *de Volkskrant* 03/04/2012.

Greenpeace activist and a member of the "Red Engineers,"[44] was considered as a champion of the party's left.[45] During one of the televised candidate debates, he rallied the party to "go left" (*de Volkskrant* 03/04/2012). Whereas Albayrak and Plasterk would counterbalance party chairman Hans Spekman in the policy realm, Samsom's positions were complementary to Spekman's (Timmermans 2012b).

Samsom's left-leaning position manifested itself after his election. In April 2012, the interim government needed opposition parties to cooperate on drafting the 2013 budget. Samsom refused to participate in the talks, but the center-left party D66 and the Green Party did.[46] Subsequently, opinion polls projected a 6-seat loss for the party (*de Volkskrant* 04/29/2012). While two-thirds of ordinary Labour party members believed the PvdA should have joined the talks (van Lier 2012), Labour council leaders supported Samsom's decision (*de Volkskrant* 04/28/2012). Furthermore, Samsom acknowledged the Socialist Party would be a good coalition partner if the PvdA were to enter into government after the general election (*de Volkskrant* 05/23/2012).[47]

6.5.3 Selectorate and Non-Selectorate's Candidate Preferences

Support for Samsom from the rank-and-file, whom I treated as the non-selectorate, would lend some support (albeit indirectly) to Proposition 1's prediction that campaign effort is dependent on the leader's policy position. PvdA's rank-and-file did call for greater movement towards the left, which was in agreement with Samsom's stance. In a survey conducted with members of the Young Socialists (almost all are PvdA members), 47% would cast their first preference votes for Samsom, versus 22% for Plasterk and 21% for Albayrak. A poll

[44] Along with Staf Depla and fellow MP Jeroen Dijsselbloem, this group toured the the Netherlands during the 2003 and 2003 General Elections campaigns to highlight local problems facing Dutch citizens. They also argued for more integration among immigrants and the ethnic Dutch (Broer 2009).

[45] *NU.nl* 03/07/2012; Interview with the author 09/26/2011.

[46] The talks led to the five-party Spring Agreement (*"Lenteakkoord"*) with VVD, CDA, the right-wing Christian party CU, D66, and the Green Party.

[47] The Socialist Party had never participated in government.

conducted by EO Radio, in which 374 PvdA local councilors participated, suggests that Samsom had strong support from this group. 59% would cast their first preference votes for Samsom, versus 24% for Plasterk.[48] In addition, 15 aldermen, including those from Amsterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht, wrote a public letter of support for Samsom (*RTL Nieuws* 03/09/2012).

Interviews with PvdA provincial party leaders from Zuid-Holland (a battle-ground for all parties), Utrecht (its capital, Utrecht, is traditionally dominated by PvdA), and Groningen (a PvdA stronghold), reveal that local PvdA councilpersons generally supported Samsom.[49] More importantly, they agreed that Samsom's election did generate more volunteer energy for the party.[50] For this case, I cannot differentiate whether the increased campaign energy was due to the leader's valence qualities or his policy position. Samsom was perceived as the best debater and the candidate who could reverse the PvdA's party image. He was also the rank-and-file's preferred candidate. Nevertheless, the evidence that rank-and-file members were satisfied with the election of Samsom, and that they seemed to be re-energized by it, do not contradict Proposition 1.

6.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I utilized data from the 2006 VVD *lijsttrekker* election and the 2012 PvdA party leadership election to test the predictions of Propositions 1 and 3. Despite Mark Rutte's initial lack of charisma, and even though he was not thought of as the candidate most suited to be the prime minister, the majority of VVD's elites and rank-and-file members still supported him. The case of Diederik Samsom's election is less conclusive, as many within the rank-and-file preferred his policy position, and more voters rated him as the candidate most capable of parliamentary debates and attracting voters. I cannot pinpoint whether

[48]See *de Volkskrant* 03/13/2012.

[49]Interviews with the author 06/25/2012; 06/28/2012; 06/29/2012.

[50]Interviews with the author 06/25/2012; 06/28/2012; 06/29/2012.

or not Samsom galvanized the party due to his issue stances, or because of his valence qualities. Nevertheless, both cases do hint at the importance of policy position. While I cannot claim that the evidence directly supports Propositions 1 and 3, it does not contradict their predictions. Interviews with former and current party chairmen, as well as with regional party leaders, suggest that party activists were indeed more motivated to campaign for their preferred leader.

Since only 3 leaders from these two parties were chosen by competitive elections, readers may question if the same mechanism applies to non-competitive leadership selection. Interviews with former party chairs and party policy institutes' personnel reveal that policy divisions were also present in cases where the outgoing leader named the *lijsttrekker*. For example, when Wouter Bos nominated Job Cohen as the sole *lijsttrekker* candidate in 2010, the PvdA parliamentary party, as well as the party's rank-and-file, were divided over the more right wing social liberalism versus the leftist position.[51] This is not surprising. The larger the party, the more likely it attracts members with different policy preferences, which implies a higher probability of policy conflict.

At the same time, it is worth mentioning that clear-cut policy division between the selectorate and the non-selectorate does not dominate all leadership elections. The 2012 CDA *lijsttrekker* Election, in which Sybrand van Haersma Buma won, is one example.[52] There were no organized factions within the party's rank-and-file, and the *lijsttrekker* candidates promoted similar policy positions. Since 2010, the party had been criticized for "not having its own direction."[53] This was illustrated in the polls during the *lijsttrekker* election

[51]Interviews with the author 06/27/2011; 09/26/2011.

[52]This contest used a one-member-one vote majority run off system. All party members voted for one candidate. If no candidate won an outright majority in the first round, the candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated. The two candidates with the most number of votes enter the second round, and the one with the majority wins the election. There were six candidates–State Secretary of Economic Affairs Henk Bleker, parliamentary party leader Sybrand van Haersma Buma, Purmerend alderman Mona Keijzer, Interior Minister Liesbeth Spies, MP Madeleine van Toorenburg, and Marcel Wintels, the executive board chairman of the college Fontys.

[53]Interviews with the author 06/27/2011; 10/06/2011.

campaigns: 64% of all respondents did not know what the party stood for.[54] The party's rank-and-file was not united in a particular policy direction, and neither were its MPs and other party notables.[55]

The televised debates did not reveal clear differences among the *lijsttrekker* candidates, as news reports emphasized the need for the next *lijsttrekker* to set a clear policy direction for the party.[56] For example, van Haersma Buma addressed the need for more European integration and socially responsible budget cuts, which all candidates shared. The runner-up, Mona Keijzer, focused more on social issues, such as education and health care, which no candidates opposed. In the first *lijsttrekker* election debate, all agreed that budget cuts were necessary, but must not sacrifice "the family environment," and that the party should pay more attention to green energy (*de Volkskrant* 05/07/2012). Even van Haersma Buma praised that the candidates presented a united front (*de Volkskrant* 05/18/0212).

All these suggest that, when policy division does not result in organized factions, candidates' valence qualities may become the dominant criterion in choosing a leader. Van Haersma Buma had more national political experience. He was the parliamentary party secretary from 2007 and 2010 and the parliamentary party leader from 2010 to 2012. He was credited with maintaining parliamentary party discipline despite some MPs' disapproval of bills proposed by Geert Wilders' PVV, and also received praise from his own party for his handling of the 2013 budget negotiations.[57] According to the CDA Historian Pieter Gerrit Kroeger, van Haersma Buma's "pretty boring nature is associated with durability and reliability in the Netherlands."[58] Leon Frisson, former governor of Limburg and the chairman of the committee on CDA's 2010 election performance, voted for van Haersma Buma because "his integrity of leadership and simple form of communication fits well with the

[54] *de Volkskrant* 05/06/2012.

[55] *de Volkskrant* 05/02/2012; interview with the author 09/26/2012.

[56] *de Volkskrant* 05/04/2012; 05/16/2012.

[57] *de Volkskrant* 05/18/2012.

[58] *de Volkskrant* 04/27/2012. Author's translation.

CDA."[59] Many of the CDA provincial leaders whom I interviewed voiced that the motivating factors for supporting van Haersma Buma were his political experience and parliamentary party leadership.[60] While they acknowledged the runner-up Mona Keijzer's ability to attract votes, they thought she lacked experience in national politics.[61]

My interviews reveal that, since elections were becoming more media-centric, party leaders' valence qualities seemed to have become more important. This may be symptom of the party organization. All three parties had their own "scientific bureaus" for policy research, which served as consultants when drafting parliamentary bills and proposals. In addition, party chairpersons influenced their parties' long-term policy directions.[62] Nevertheless, the *lijsttrekker*'s policy position remained important.[63] As the leadership elections in this chapter showed, internal policy differences were present and candidates held different policy views. Furthermore, although the party leader's valence qualities was highly valued as an electoral asset (at least among MPs), the VVD *lijsttrekker* election suggested that valence was not a determining factor in Rutte's victory.

[59] *de Volkskrant* 05/16/2012. Author's translation.

[60] Interviews with the author 06/25/2012; 06/26/2012; 06/27/2012.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Interviews with the author 09/22/2011; 09/23/2011; 09/26/2011; 09/29/2012.

[63] Ibid.

6.7 Appendix A: List of Dutch Terms and Party Names

Name	**English Translation**
Christen-Democratisch Appèl(CDA)	Christian Democratic Party
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)	Labor Party
Partij voor Vrijheid (PVV)	Party for Freedom
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)	Liberal Party
fractievoorzitter	Parliamentary Party Leader
hoofdbestuur	Scouting Committee
lijsttrekker	Party List Leader

6.8 Appendix B: Tables on Dutch Politics

Table B1: list of Governments in the Netherlands, 1997-2012

Government	**Date**	**PM**	**PM Party**	**Party 2**	**Party 3**
van Agt I	12/19/1977-05/27/1981	Dries van Agt	CDA	VVD	
van Agt II	09/11/1981-05/12/1982	Dries van Agt	CDA	PvdA	D66
Lubbers I	11/04/1982-05/21/1986	Ruud Lubbers	CDA	VVD	
Lubbers II	07/14/1986-05/02/1989	Ruud Lubbers	CDA	VVD	
Lubbers III	11/07/1989-05/03/1994	Ruud Lubbers	CDA	PvdA	
Kok I	08/22/1994-05/05/1998	Wim Kok	PvdA	VVD	D66
Kok II	08/03/1998-04/16/2002	Wim Kok	PvdA	VVD	D66
Balkenende I	07/22/2002-10/16/2002	Jan Peter Balkenende	CDA	LPF	VVD
Balkenende II	05/27/2003-09/29/2006	Jan Peter Balkenende	CDA	VVD	D66
Balkenende IV	02/22/2007-02/20/2010	Jan Peter Balkenende	CDA	PvdA	CU
Rutte I	10/14/2010-04/23/2012	Mark Rutte	VVD	CDA	PVV (Minority Support)

Sources: http://www.parlement.com; www.keesings.com

Table B2: Election Results in the Netherlands, 1977-2010

Date	**Party 1 (Seats)**	**Party 2 (Seats)**	**Party 3 (Seats)**	**Party 4 (Seats)**	**Biggest Party PM?**
05/25/1977	PvdA (53)	CDA (49)	VVD (28)	D66 (8)	NO
05/26/1981	CDA (48)	PvdA (44)	VVD (26)	D66 (17)	YES
09/08/1982	PvdA (47)	CDA (45)	VVD (36)	D66 (6)	NO
05/21/1986	CDA (54)	PvdA (52)	VVD (27)	D66 (9)	YES
09/06/1989	CDA (54)	PvdA (49)	VVD (22)	D66 (12)	YES
05/03/1994	PvdA (37)	CDA (34)	VVD (31)	D66 (24)	YES
05/06/1998	PvdA (45)	VVD (38)	CDA (29)	D66 (14)	YES
05/15/2002	CDA (43)	LPF (26)	VVD (24)	PvdA (23)	YES
01/22/2003	CDA (44)	PvdA (42)	VVD (28)	SP (9)	YES
11/22/2006	CDA (41)	PvdA (33)	SP (25)	VVD (22)	YES
06/09/2010	VVD (31)	PvdA (30)	PVV (24)	CDA (21)	YES
09/12/2012	VVD (41)	PvdA (38)	PVV (15)	SP (15)	?

Source: http://www.parlement.com

Table B3a: List of CDA Party Leaders, 1977 - 2012

Leader	**Dates**	**Official Title when Selected**	**Position before Selected**	**PM Party when Selected**	**Government Party when Selected**	***Lijsttrekker?***
Dries van Agt	10/1976-11/1982	*Lijsttrekker*	Deputy PM	New Party	YES	1977 1981 1982
Ruud Lubbers	11/1982-01/1994	*Lijsttrekker*	Parliamentary Party Leader	YES	YES	1986 1989
Elco Brinkman	01/1994-08/1994	*Lijsttrekker*	Parliamentary Party Leader	YES	YES	1994
Enneüs Heerma	08/1994-03/1997	Parliamentary Party Leader	State Secretary	NO	YES	NO
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer	03/1997-10/2001	Parliamentary Party Leader	MP	NO	NO	1998
Jan Peter Balkenende	10/2001-06/2010	Parliamentary Party Leader	MP	NO	NO	2002 2003 2006 2010
Maxime Verhagen (de facto)	06/2010-06/2012	N/A	Foreign Minister	NO	NO	NO
Sybrand van Haersma Buma	06/2012-	*Lijsttrekker* Party Leader	Parliamentary	NO	YES	2012

Source: http://www.parlement.com

Table B3b: List of PvdA Party Leaders, 1966 - 2012

Leader	**Dates**	**Official Title when Selected**	**Position before Selected**	**PM Party when Selected**	**Government Party when Selected**	***Lijsttrekker?***
Joop den Uyl	09/1966-07/1986	*Lijsttrekker*	Economic Affairs Minister	NO	YES	1977 1981 1982 1986
Wim Kok	07/1986-12/2001	Parliamentary Party Leader	MP	NO	NO	1989 1994 1998
Ad Melkert	12/2001-05/2002	*Lijsttrekker*	Parliamentary Party Leader	YES	YES	2002
Wouter Bos	11/2002-04/2010	*Lijsttrekker*	State Secretary	NO	NO	2003 2006
Job Cohen	04/2010-02/2012	*Lijsttrekker*	Mayor of Amsterdam	NO	YES	2010
Diederik Samsom	03/2012-	Parliamentary Party Leader	MP	NO	NO	2012

Source: http://www.parlement.com

Table B3c: List of VVD Party Leaders, 1971 - 2012

Leader	**Dates**	**Official Title when Selected**	**Position before Selected**	**PM Party when Selected**	**Government Party when Selected**	***Lijsttrekker?***
Hans Wiegel	07/1971-04/1982	Parliamentary Party Leader	MP	NO	YES	1977 1981
Ed Nijpels	04/1982-07/1986	Parliamentary Party Leader	MP	NO	NO	1982 1986
Joris Voorhoeve	12/1986-04/1990	Parliamentary Party Leader	MP	NO	YES	1989
Frits Bolkstein	05/1990-07/1998	Parliamentary Party Leader	Defense Minister	NO	NO	1994 1998
Hans Dijkstal	07/1998-05/2002	Parliamentary Party Leader	Deputy PM	NO	YES	2002
Gerrit Zalm	05/2002-05/2003	Parliamentary Party Leader	Finance Minster	NO	YES	2003
Josias van Aartsen (de facto)	05/2003-03/2006	Parliamentary Party Leader	Foreign Minister	NO	YES	NO
Mark Rutte	05/2006-	*Lijsttrekker*	State Secretary	NO	YES	2006 2010 2012

Source: http://www.parlement.com

Table B4: Competitiveness of *Lijsttrekker* Selections in the Netherlands

Party	**Leader**	**Competitively Elected?**	**# Candidates**
CDA	Dries van Agt	NO (ratified in party congress)	
CDA	Ruud Lubbers	NO (ratified in party congress)	
CDA	Elco Brinkman	NO (ratified in party congress)	
CDA	Jaap de Hoop Sheffer	NO (ratified in party congress)	
CDA	Jan Peter Balkenende	NO (ratified in party congress)	
CDA	Sybrand van Haersma Buma	YES	6
PvdA	Joop den Uyl	NO (ratified in party congress)	
Pvda	Wim Kok	NO (ratified in party congress)	
PvdA	Ad Melkert	NO (ratified in party congress)	
PvdA	Wouter Bos	YES	4
PvdA	Job Cohen	NO (ratified in party congress)	
PvdA	Diederik Samsom	YES (PPL)	5
VVD	Hans Wiegel	NO (ratified in party congress)	
VVD	Ed Nijpels	NO (ratified in party congress)	
VVD	Joris Voorhoeve	NO (ratified in party congress)	
VVD	Frits Bolkstein	NO (ratified in party congress)	
VVD	Hans DIjkstal	NO (ratified in party congress)	
VVD	Gerrit Zalm	NO (ratified in party congress)	
VVD	Mark Rutte	YES	3

Source: http://www.parlement.com

6.9 Appendix C: List of Interviewees

List of MPs Interviewed				
Party	**Name**	**Region**	**Cohort**	**Interview Date**
CDA	Haverkamp, Maarten	Nederhorst den Berg	2002	06/28/2011
CDA	van Hijum, Eddy	Laag Zuthem	2003	10/06/2011
CDA	Koopmans, Ger	Velden	2002	06/28/2011
CDA	Knops, Raymond	Hegelsom	2005	09/22/2011
CDA	Ormel, Hank	Hengelo	2002	10/05/2011
CDA	Omzigt, Pieter	Enschede	2003	09/21/2011
CDA	van Toorenburg, Madeleine	Rosmalen	2006	10/06/2011
PvdA	Dijjselbloom, Jeroen	Wageningen	2002	10/06/2011
PvdA	Groot, Ed	Amsterdam	2010	09/27/2011
PvdA	Recourt, Jeroen	Haarlem	2010	10/05/2011
PvdA	Smeets, Pauline	Sittard	2003	10/06/2011
PvdA	van de Veen, Eelke	Nieuwegein	2006	10/06/2011
VVD	van Beek, Wilibrood	Maarheeze	1998	06/29/2011
VVD	Dijkhoff, Klaas	Breda	2010	10/05/2011
VVD	Harbers, Mark	Rotterdam	2009	06/30/2011
VVD	de Liefde, Bart	Den Haag	2010	07/05/2011
VVD	van Miltenburg, Anouchka	Zaltbommel	2003	06/29/2011
VVD	van der Steur, Ard	Warmond	2010	06/30/2011

List of Current/Former Party Officials Interviewed				
Party	**Name**	**Position Held**	**Dates**	**Interview Date**
CDA	van Asselt, Evert Jan	Deputy Director, CDA Policy Institute	N/A	06/27/2011
CDA	van den Biggelaar, Paul	CDA Chairman, Utrecht	2011-	09/26/2012
CDA	Burger, Johan	CDA Chairman, Zuid-Holland	2011-	09/27/2012
CDA	Peetom, Ruth	CDA Party Chairman	2011-	09/29/2012
CDA	Pieper, Hein	CDA Chairman, Overijssel	2011-	09/26/2012
CDA	van Rij, Marnix	CDA Party Chairman	1999-2001	09/23/2011
CDA	Visser, Reginald	CDA Chairman, Noord-Holland	2010-	09/25/2012
PvdA	Becker, Frans	Deputy Director, PvdA Policy Institute	N/A	06/27/2012
PvdA	Brouwer, Hans	PvdA Chairman, Utrecht	2010-	09/29/2012
PvdA	Duijneveld, Hans	PvdA Chairman, Groeningen	2011-	09/28/2012
PvdA	de Jong, Arie	PvdA Chairman, Zuid-Holland	2009-	09/25/2012
PvdA	Koole, Ruud	PvdA Party Chairman	2000-2005	09/26/2011
		Senate Member	2007-	
PvdA	de Vries, Jouke	Lijstrekker Canddidate	2002	09/26/2011
PvdA	de Vries, Klaas	MP	1973-1988 2002-2006	09/21/2011
		Minister of Social Affairs	1998-2000	
		Minister of Interior	2000-2002	
		Lijsttrekker candidate	2002	
		Senate Member	2007-	
VVD	Veenendaal, Jelleke	MP	2003-2006	10/03/2011
		Lijsttrekker candidate	2006	
VVD	van Zanen, Jan	VVD Party Chairman	2003-2008	09/22/2011
		Mayor of Amstelveen	2005-	

6.10 References

Andeweg, Rudy B. 2000. "From Dutch Disease to Dutch Model? Consensus Government in Practice." *Parliamentary Affairs* 53: 697-709.

Andeweg, Rudy B., and Joop van Holsteyn. 2011. "Second Order Personalization: Preference Voting in the Netherlands." Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, University of Iceland, Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland.

Andeweg, Rudy B., and Galen A. Irwin. 2009. *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Andeweg, Rudy B., and Jacques Thomassen. 2010. "Pathways to Party Unity: Sanctions, Loyalty, Homogeneity and Division of Labour in the Dutch Parliament." *Party Politics* 17 (5): 655-672.

Becker, Frans., and René Cuperus. 2010. "Innovating Social Democracy–Houdini-Style: A Perspective from the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA)." Working Paper.

Becker, Frans., and and René Cuperus. 2004. "The Party Paradox: Political Parties between Irrelevance and Omnipotence. A View from the Netherlands." *Europaäische Politik* 6: 1-16.

Broer, Thijs. 2009. "De Rode Ingenieurs in de PvdA." December 12, 2009, http://www.vn.nl/archief/politiek/artikel-politiek/ de-rode-ingenieurs-in-de-pvda.htm (accessed August 10, 2012).

Buma Gekozen Tot. 2012. "Buma gekozen tot lijsttrekker CDA." May 18, 2012, http://nos.nl/artikel/374351-buma-gekozen-tot-lijsttrekker-cda.html (accessed May 18, 2012).

Herdeschee, Gijs. 2012."'Ik kan luisteren, samenwerken, keuzes maken en doorpakken'." February 27, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/3203731/ 2012/02/27/Ik-kan-luisteren-samenwerken-keuzes-maken-en-doorpakken.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

van Holsteyn, Joop J. M. 2006. "The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2006." *West European Politics* 30 (5): 1139-1147.

van Holsteyn, Joop J. M. 2010. "The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2010." *West European Politics* 34 (2): 412-419.

van Holsteyn, Joop J.M., and Rudy B. Andeweg. 2010. "Demoted Leaders and Exiled Candidates: Disentangling Party and Person in the Voter's Mind." *Electoral Studies* 29: 628-635.

de Hond, Maurice. 2006a. "Nieuwe fractievoorzitter VVD." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006b. "Rita Verdonk als mogelijk lijsttrekker van de VVD (March 23, 2006)." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006c. "Lijsttrekkerskandidaten van de VVD." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006d. "Verdonk heeft grotere electorale potentie dan Rutte." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006e. "Lijsttrekkerschap VVD." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006f. "Nieuw electoral zelfbewustzijn vna rechts." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006g. "Verdonk wil waarnemer bij stemmen tellen." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006h. "Strijd om het lijsttrekkerschap van de VVD (May 10, 2006)." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006i. "Strijd om het lijsttrekkerschap van de VVD (May 17, 2006)." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006j. "Strijd om het lijsttrekkerschap van de VVD (May 21, 2006)." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006k. "Strijd om het lijsttrekkerschap van de VVD (May 29, 2006)." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006l. "CDA en Balkenende spinnen garen bij keuze Rutte tot lijsttrekker VVD." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2006m. "Rutte, de lijsttrekker van de VVD." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 04, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2010. “CDA congres en het besluit over het kabinet Rutte-Verhagen.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012a. “Aantreden nieuwe kabinet.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012b. “Aftreden van Job Cohen op 20 februari 2012.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012c. “Aan de start van de verkiezingscampagne voor het leidschap van de PvdA-fractie.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012d. “Voorkeur voor de PvdA-lijsttrekkers onder potentiele PvdA-kiezers.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012e. “Nieuwe meting oordeel kandidaat fractievoorzitters PvdA (7 maart 2012).” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012f. “Ontwikkeling voorkeur volgende fractievoorzitter PvdA.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012g. “Finale meting oordeel kandidaat fractievoorzitters PvdA.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012h. “Positie PvdA op links.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012i. “Teleurgesteld in de politiek.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012j. “CDA lijsttrekker.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012k. “Uitspraken Minister Spies over terugtrekken Boerkaverbod/Verbod dubbel paspoort.” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012l. “Lijstrekkersverkiezingen van het CDA (May 08, 2012).” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012m. “Lijstrekkersverkiezingen van het CDA (accessed May 12, 2012).” https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

de Hond, Maurice. 2012n. "Lijstrekkersverkiezingen van het CDA (May 17, 2012)." https://www.peil.nl/ (accessed August 15, 2012).

Ipsos Synovate. 2012a. "PvdA kan meeste kiezers terugwinnen met Samsom." http://www.ipsos-synovate.nl/content.asp?targetid=971 (accessed August 20, 2012).

Ipsos Synovate. 2012b. "Samsom kan de PvdA naar 32 zetels brengen." http://www.ipsos-synovate.nl/content.asp?targetid=977 (accessed August 20, 2012).

Ipsos Synovate. 2012c. "Samsom maakt goede start." http://www.ipsos-nederland.nl/content.asp?targetid=981 (accessed August 20, 2012).

Ipsos Synovate. 2012d. "Buma favoriet, Bleker meest controversieel." http://www.ipsos-nederland.nl/content.asp?targetid=1029 (accessed August 20, 2012).

van Kessel, Stijn. 2010. "The Dutch General Election of June 2010." *European Parties Elections and Referendums Network Election Briefing* 54: 1-14.

Lammers, Esther."Lokale VVD'ers smachten naar de terugkeer van Wiegel." January 19, 2006, http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/archief/article/detail/ 1697331/2006/01/19/ Lokale-VVD-ers-smachten-naar-de-terugkeer-van-Wiegel.dhtml (accessed July 27, 2012).

van Lier, Heleen. 2012 "Samsom reageert op kritiek: 'Ik had dingen anders kunnen doen."' April 28, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/10637/VK-Dossier-Verkiezingen-van-2012/article/detail/3248141/2012/04/28/Samsom-reageert-op-kritiek-Ik-had-dingen-anders-kunnen-doen.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Lucardie, Martine Bredewold, Gerrit Voerman, and Nelleke van de Walle. 2008. "Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)." *Jaarboek 2006 Documentatie-centrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*: 90-104.

Meerhof, Ron. 2012a. "Geloof in Cohen weg in PvdA-fractie." February 18, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/9704/2012/article/ print/detail/3188104/GeloofinCohenweginPvdAfractie.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Meerhof, Ron. 2012b. "Mediaaandacht brengt CDA nog geen renaissance." May 18, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/ 3257011/2012/05/18/Media-aandacht-brengt-CDA-nog-geen-renaissance.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Meerhof, Ron. 2012c. “CDAleden maken veiligste keuze.” May 19, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/3257625/2012/05/19/CDA-leden-maken-veiligste-keuze.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Meijer, Remco. 2011a. “”Samenwerking links kan veel beter”’ October 4, 2011, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/2945774/2011/10/04/Samenwerking-links-kan-veel-beter.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Meijer, Remco. 2011b. “PvdA-voorzitter: Cohen te weinig zichtbaar in partij.” October 4, 2011, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/2945778/2011/10/04/PvdA-voorzitter-Cohen-te-weinig-zichtbaar-in-partij.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Meijer, Remco. 2011c. “Concurrent: Spekman is ’te SP’ als gezicht PvdA.” December 5, 2011, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2824/Politiek/article/detail/ 3064480/2011/12/05/Concurrent-Spekman-is-te-SP-als-gezicht-PvdA.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

NOS Journaal 20:00. ”NOS Journaal 20:00 uur van dinsdag 04 oktober 2011.” http://nos.nl/nieuws/politiek/archief/datum/2011-10-04/ (accessed January 17, 2012).

NOS Journaal 20:00. ”NOS Journaal 20:00 uur van zondag 30 oktober 2011.” http://nos.nl/nieuws/politiek/archief/datum/2011-10-30/ (accessed January 17, 2012).

NOS Journaal 20:00. ”NOS Journaal 20:00 uur van zaterdag 18 februari 2012.” http://nos.nl/nieuws/politiek/archief/datum/2012-02-18/ (accessed February 19, 2012).

NOS Journaal 20:00. ”NOS Journaal 20:00 uur van mandaag 20 februari 2012.” http://nos.nl/nieuws/politiek/archief/datum/2012-02-20/ (accessed February 21, 2012).

van Praag, Philip. 2008. “Rutte Versus Veronk: Was dit nu echt het probleem van de VVD?” *Jaarboek 2006 Documentatie-centrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*: 135-153.

Remarque, Phillippe. 2006a. “Populair bij gewone VVD-leden.” April 5, 2006, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2824/Politiek/article/detail/758456/2006/04/05/Populair-bij-gewone-VVD-leden.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Remarque, Phillippe. 2006b. “De beste van de klas” June 1, 2006, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/805409/2006/06/01/De-beste-van-de-klas.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Remarque, Phillippe. 2006c. “Dag 1: uitbraak van stellingoorlog.” June 4, 2006, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2824/article/print/detail/761948/Dag-1-uitbraak-van-stellingoorlog.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Remarque, Phillippe, and John Wanders, 2006. "Recht-door-zee Rita moet buigen." May 18, 2006, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/770535/2006/05/18/Recht-door-zee-Rita-moet-buigen.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Samsom wil geen. 2012. "Samsom wil geen Paars." March 08, 2012, http://www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/binnenland/2012/03/ samsom-wil-geen- paars (accessed August 10, 2012).

Spekman, Hans. 2012. "Diederik Samsom politiek leider." March 16, 2012, http://www.pvda.nl/berichten/2012/03/ Uitslag-ledenraadpleging-politiek-leider-pvda# (accessed August 12, 2012).

Timmermans, Frans. 2012. Correspondence with Job Cohen and Hans Spekman. February 16, 2012.

Timmermans, Sebastian. 2012b. "Het PvdA-panel keurt de kansen: 'Het gaat om het voortbestaan van de partij'." February 29, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/.../HetPvdApanelkeurtdekansenHetgaatomhetvoortbestaanvandepartij.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

Timmermans, Sebastian. 2012a. "Het PvdA-panel keurt Martijn van Dam: 'Helaas is hij geen vrouw'." February 22, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/3196020/2012/02/22/Het-PvdA-panel-keurt-Martijn-van-Dam-Helaas-is-hij-geen-vrouw.dhtml (accessed August 10, 2012).

We moeten linksom. 2012. "We moeten linksom uit de crisis komen." February 16, 2012, http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4500/2012/article/print/detail/3185160/We-moeten-linksom-uitde-crisis-komen.dhtml

The following news sources were consulted:

Algemeen Dagblad:
May 20, 2012. August 22, 2012.

Een Vandaag:
May 10, 2012.

http://www.NU.nl:
October 18, 2011. February 22, 2012. February 28, 2012. March 7, 2012. April 21, 2012. April 23, 2012.

RTL Nieuws:
March 9, 2012.

de Telegraaf:
May 27, 2012.

de Volkskrant:
August 22, 2006. October 18, 2010. October 3, 2011. October 4, 2011. October 8, 2011. October 25, 2011. February 18, 2012. February 20, 2012. March 4, 2012. March 8, 2012. March 9, 2012. March 13, 2012. March 14, 2012. April 3, 2012. April 8, 2012. April 22, 2012. April 27, 2012. April 28, 2012. April 29, 2012. May 2, 2012. May 4, 2012. May 6, 2012. May 7, 2012. May 8, 2012. May 12, 2012. May 16, 2012. May 17, 2012. May 18, 2012. May 20, 2012. May 23, 2012. June 1, 2012. June 13, 2012.

CHAPTER 7

Electoral Welfare Versus Advocacy: Selecting Swedish Social Democratic Party Leaders

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the Swedish Social Democratic Party's selections of Mona Sahlin as leader in 2007 and Håkan Juholt in 2011. Both leaders were all chosen under electoral crises. After the party lost the 2006 Swedish General Election, Mona Sahlin, who belonged to the party's right wing and whose policy positions were thought to be able to attract voters, became the new party leader. Yet, amidst pressure from the party's rank-and-file, for the 2010 General Election, the party entered into a pre-electoral coalition with the Green Party and the ex-Communist Left Party. Subsequently, the Social Democrats received its lowest vote and seat shares since 1914. Moreover, for the first time in history, the Moderate Party-led "bourgeois coalition" remained in government for a consecutive term. Sahlin duly resigned. Yet, rather than rallying behind more moderate leader who could improve the party's electoral well-being, the party's nominating committee selected Håkan Juholt, a left-leaning MP, as its leader. After numerous gaffes and a scandal involving his alleged abuse of housing allowance, Juholt was forced to resigned in January 2012.

The British and Dutch cases in this dissertation hinted at how the selectorate and the non-selectorate's preferences have influenced leadership choice. The findings from Chapters 4 to 6 suggested the possibility that selectorate members incorporated the non-selectorate's policy preferences when choosing a leader. However, I have not provided detailed accounts of strategic interactions between the two groups. This chapter illustrates this relationship.

There are advantages in using the selections of Mona Sahlin and Håkan Juholt to provide evidence for my model's Proposition 3: *a moderate selectorate that prioritizes the party's electoral welfare chooses a more moderate leader if a non-selectorate prioritizes electoral welfare, but ends up with a more extreme leader if the non-selectorate is extreme and prioritizes advocacy.* With 29 electoral districts, each with its own party list, the Swedish open-list electoral system stands between the perfectly proportional electoral system in the Netherlands and the first-past-the-post system in the United Kingdom. Although district magnitudes in Sweden (ranging from 2 to 38) are low compared to that of the Netherlands (150), elections remain party-centric.[1] The existence of electoral districts gives district party leaders significant power in drafting their districts' party lists and the opportunity to recruit candidates with their preferred policy positions.[2] This environment allows me to examine how regional forces influenced leadership choice.

Because there are few scholarly works on the party's leadership selection, I rely on information provided by two researchers knowledgeable in Swedish politics, Nicholas Aylott from Södertörn University, and Jenny Madestam from the University of Stockholm. News reports, editorials, and personal interviews with party officials serve as my main sources of evidence for the prediction that non-selectorate members hold the most leverage when they prioritize advocacy, but selectorate members prioritize electoral welfare. I show the following. In 2007, most district party leaders, including the left-leaning districts Skåne and Stockholm City, offered support for right wing candidates. Consequently, the party's nominating committee nominated Mona Sahlin, whose right-leaning positions were deemed attractive to metropolitan voters. In 2011, because Skåne and Stockholm City Party Districts were not willing to support right wing candidates, the party's nominating committee chose the left-leaning Håkan Juholt, who proved to be problematic for the party's poll ratings.

I first discuss the issues involved with using the Swedish Social Democratic Party to provide evidence for Proposition 3. Next, I offer an overview of the party's internal organization

[1]Hermansson (2012); interview with Jenny Madestam 09/10/2012.

[2]Interview with the author 09/10/2012.

and conflicts over policy direction. I then investigate the level of influence non-selectorate members had over the nominating committees' choices of Mona Sahlin in 2007 and of Håkan Juholt in 2011. I conclude with a brief discussion of the Executive Committee's appointment of Stefan Löfven as the party leader in 2012. As district party leaders' became more concerned over the party's low poll ratings, the Executive Committee selected a leader who had, since assuming office, steered the party towards the right and helped the party improve its poll ratings.

7.2 Empirical Testing with the Social Democrats

Selecting only the Swedish Social Democratic Party and two of its most recent leadership selections may result in bias. Because the party only had three post-World War II leadership changes before 2007, the last being in 1996, I was unable to interview the relevant people to uncover the dynamics behind the previous leadership changes. At the same time, these two cases offer the opportunity to examine leadership selection under electoral crisis. Before Sahlin was chosen in 2007, the party experienced its second worst election result, with 130 seats in parliament. When Sahlin resigned in 2010, the party had received its lowest parliamentary seat share (112) since 1914. This suggests that in both cases, the selectorate should have prioritized the party's electoral welfare. I can thus focus on how changes in the non-selectorates' behavior affected the selection outcomes.

Also, the Social Democrats' party organization provides a good setting for investigating non-selectorate members' influence on the selectorate's leadership choice. In contrast to the membership votes employed by the British and the Dutch parties, the Social Democrats appointed nominating committees (one in 2007 and one in 2011) to select an official nominee for the leadership post. This allows me to identify the selectorate (the nominating committee) and the non-selectorate (party members who are not in the nominating committee). Nominating committee members were elected by the party congress to ensure that all regions were represented. Thus, in practice, the nominating committees in my cases were

not unitary. Nevertheless, if I can show that the 2007 committee and the 2011 committee incorporated each district party leader's preferences, then I would have found evidence that the non-selectorate influenced the selection outcomes. I treat party leaders and the party's rank-and-file members as the non-selectorate. Although district party leaders were consulted on the potential leadership candidates, the approval of each individual district party leader is not required. In practice, the non-selectorates in my cases were not unitary actors. As I explain in the next sections, district party leaders were not united in the party's policy direction. Yet, if some district party leaders opposed certain potential candidates, and the nominating committee did not select these candidates, then I would have found evidence that district party leaders influenced the outcomes of these leadership selections.

One potential problem with examining leadership selection in the Social Democratic Party is that selection processes were largely secretive. For each selection, there was one candidate– the nominee. In addition, potential candidates are discouraged against openly revealing their desires to become the party leader.[3] Consequently, no potential candidate would publicly ask for party-wide support for the leadership post, as that was considered to be the nominating committee's task. Each nominating committee's list of potential candidates was not revealed, and systematic opinion polls on these candidates do not exist. Consequently, unlike the British and the Dutch cases, I do not know the identities of all potential candidates and how they differed from each other in policy terms. At the same time, for each selection process, news reports were able to determine the identities of the main potential candidates on the list. Personal interviews with district party leaders and nominating committee members also revealed which candidates received more internal support. These sources shed light on the district party leaders and the rank-and-file's candidate preferences.

Proposition 3 states that *the chosen leader policy position reflects the selectorate's position when selectorate members prioritize advocacy, or when both selectorate and non-selectorate members prioritize electoral welfare. In contrast, the chosen leader's policy position reflects the non-selectorate's position when selectorate members prioritize electoral welfare, but non-*

[3]Interview with Nicholas Aylott 09/28/2011; *Dagens Nyheter* 11/10/2006.

selectorate members prioritize advocacy. To show that Proposition 3 holds for each case, I must first identify how much the nominating committee (the selectorate) and the district party leaders (the non-selectorate) valued electoral welfare versus advocacy. If the nominating committee prioritized the party's electoral welfare, then I must demonstrate that its members were concerned about the potential reactions from district party leaders and rank-and-file members. If these two groups also prioritized the party's electoral welfare, then the nominating committee should have nominated its preferred candidate. If they prioritized advocacy, then the nominating committee should have selected a leader whose policy position reflected their position.

7.3 Party Organization, Regional Influences, and Policy Divisions

The Social Democrats' organization is represented by its 26 party districts, which more or less represent the country's electoral districts. The party's central decision-making body is the National Party Board, which is elected by the party congress (Social Democratic Party Constitution 2009: 15). The Board is responsible for decision-making when the party congress is not in session and for ensuring implementations of motions adopted by the party congress (Social Democratic Party Constitution 2009: 15). Within this Board is the Executive Committee, which, among other elected members, includes the party leader, the party chairperson, the chair of Sweden's largest trade union LO, and the parliamentary party leader. The Executive Committee is responsible for carrying out day-to-day management and enforcing motions adopted at the party congress (Social Democratic Party Constitution 2009: 16). In practice, the central decision-making power is nested within the Executive Committee, while the National Party Board serves as a forum for discussions involving the party's policy direction.[4]

Regional influence within the party is high. For example, Social Democratic MPs return

[4]Interviews with the author 09/29/2011; 09/10/2012.

to their constituency every week to hold meetings with their local party members.[5] The National Party Board contains both MPs and district party leaders from the North the West, and the South, as well as from districts surrounding Stockholm. Within each party district, the leader, who is often the top-ranked MP on the electoral district's party list, is responsible for overseeing Social Democratic municipal councillors and drafting the party lists for general elections.[6] In addition, as mentioned, all nominating committees were regionally balanced. This fusion of regional, political and the organizational sides of the party implies that neither the parliamentary party nor the central organization is immune to conflicts among party districts over the formulation of the party's policy positions. It also implies that grassroots members, such as municipal council members, can channel their policy preferences to the National Party Board through their district party leaders.

The party is conventionally thought to be split into two broad policy factions, the left and the right wings.[7] This division pertains to government intervention in welfare policies, such as education and elderly care, and social issues, such as LGBT and immigrants' rights (Isaksson 2010: 64-71). Broadly speaking, the party's right wing calls for less state control of welfare policies (the economic liberals) and adopts a liberal approach to social issues (the social liberals).[8] The left wing advocates for more state intervention in welfare issues. For example, in 2012, right-leaning MPs were more receptive to companies receiving large profits from Swedish charter schools, but MPs who lean to the left called for a limit on

[5]Interviews with the author 09/29/2011; 09/10/2012; 09/13/2012.

[6]Interviews with the author 09/29/2011; 09/10/2012; 09/13/2012. For example, in 2012, 12 of the 26 district party leaders were also MPs.

[7]In my interviews, two MPs have disagreed with the labeling of a left and a right wing, though they did agree that differences among issues existed. This claim, however, was disputed by both political scientists Jenny Madestam and Nicholas Aylott (interviews with the author 09/10/2012; 09/17/2012). Ann-Kristine Johansson, who declared that she leaned to the left, Hans Ekström, who noted that he leaned right of center, and Morgan Johansson, who was reputed to belong to the party's left wing, acknowledged the existence of a left-right division within the party. Tomas Eneroth, MP and executive committee member who was considered as from the middle of the party, noted that there is a left and a right wing in the party, but an MP does not always advocate for a leftist stance on all types of issues: "It depends on the issues discussed (Interview with the author 09/20/2012)." This suggests that, consistent with news reports, a left wing and a right wing existed within the Social Democratic Party.

[8]Interview with Jenny Madestam, 09/10/2012.

profits.[9] However, a left leaning Social Democrat may either be a social liberal or a social conservative.[10]

Region also plays an important role in the party's policy divisions (Nilsson 2011). Due to their local industrial and forestry economies, Social Democratic members from the West Sweden and North Middle Sweden National Areas are considered to be moderately left.[11] The party districts in these areas have established a coalition to vote together on decisions regarding the party's policy directions.[12] The party districts in North Sweden (Upper Norrland and Middle Norrland), and the districts in Småland are likewise moderately left. Yet, these aforementioned party districts are also pragmatic, in that they may approve right-leaning policy positions that are economically or socially beneficial for their districts.[13] Stockholm City and party districts in South Sweden, in particular Skåne, bear strong, ideologically leftist profiles.[14] Generally speaking, party members from districts surround Stockholm belong to the right wing. Due to similar issues facing these districts, they have formed a coalition to vote together on party decisions.[15] Stockholm County is regarded as the most right-leaning party district, and also the district whose position is closest to the middle of the Swedish electorate.[16] District party leaders' left-right orientations generally follow the overall policy preferences of their district party members. For example, Heléne Fritzon, chairwoman of the Skåne Party District, was an adherent to the party's left wing (Isaksson 2010: 199). Hans Ekström, chairman of the right-leaning Sörmlands party district, was "right of cen-

[9]Isaksson (2010: 99-116); Interview with Jenny Madestam, 09/10/2012; interview with the author 09/19/2012.

[10]Interview with Jenny Madestam 09/10/2012; interview with the author 09/20/2012.

[11]Isaksson (2010); interview Jenny Madestam 09/10/2012; interviews with the author 09/10/2012; 09/13/2012.

[12]Interviews with the author 09/10/2012; 09/20/2012.

[13]Isaksson (2010); interview with Jenny Madestam 09/10/2012; interviews with the author 09/10/2012; 09/13/2012.

[14]Interviews with the author 09/10/2012; 09/13/2012.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Interview with the author 09/13/2012.

ter."[17] The list of all party districts by region is located in Appendix A. Due to regions' influences, trade union membership does not always translate into left-leaning positions on issues. While Social Democrats who belong to the mining unions in the South Sweden regard themselves as left wing, broadly speaking, trade union members in the metal industry (such as the Swedish Metalworkers Trade Union *IF Metall*, Sweden's largest metal trade union) belong to the party's right wing.[18]

One caveat needs to be addressed. In 2007 and 2011, both the selectorate (the nominating commitee) and the non-selectorate (district party leaders and the party's rank-and-file) were regionally balanced. This implies that there were differences in policy preferences within the nominating committee and among the district party leaders. Consequently, I cannot, in principle, determine whether or not the non-selectorate was more extreme than the selectorate. I also do not have evidence that non-selectorate members' campaign effort hinged on the identity of the chosen party leader. Thus, to the extent that the nominating committee incorporated the preferences of district party leaders in its leadership choice, I cannot be certain that this was due to considerations over future campaign efforts.

At the same time, evidence showing that the nominating committee was inclined toward certain candidates, but non-support from district party leaders prevented the committee from choosing such leaders, would support the claim the non-selectorate's leverage does matter–either due the ability to hold campaign effort hostage, or due to other considerations that would affect the party's electoral welfare. I can still uncover how, in each leadership selection process, the non-selectorate influenced the selectorate's choice.

7.4 The Selection of Mona Sahlin in 2007

The Social Democratic Party's electoral defeat in the 2006 General Election preceded its search for a new leader. Having lost 14 seats, the party landed in opposition, and its leader

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

and Prime Minister Göran Persson resigned. The nominating committee, consisted of MPs, regional leaders, and other party notables, selected Mona Sahlin as the sole candidate, who was elected at the party congress in March 2007.

If Proposition 3 holds for this particular selection, a nominating committee that prioritized the party's electoral welfare would have been concerned about the district party leaders and rank-and-file members' reactions to leadership choice. As such, members of the nominating committee should have incorporated the preferences of the district party leaders and rank-and-file members. If these two groups prioritized electoral welfare, then the nominating committee would have the freedom to choose their preferred candidate. In this case, district party leaders would support the candidate suggested by the nominating committee. In contrast, if district party leaders prioritized advocacy, then not only would they disapprove of potential candidates whose policy preferences differ from theirs, but the nominating committee would not choose these potential candidates.

Although I cannot determine if district party leaders in 2007 prioritized the party's electoral welfare, their behavior seemed to suggest that they did. Stockholm City, the party district with a strong left wing profile, nominated Sahlin as the party leader. Nominating committee member and Heléne Fritzon, left-leaning Social Democrat leader of the left-leaning Skåne Party District, supported Mona Sahlin's nomination as party leader. Other left-leaning district party leaders also supported her, and cited her perceived vote-attracting policy positions as the main reasons why. Subsequently, the nominating committee was able to present Sahlin as the sole nominee for the leadership post. This is consistent with, or at least does not contradict, Proposition 3.

7.4.1 Potential Candidates

Dagens Nyheter, Sweden's largest newspaper, indicated that right winger Margot Wallström, Sweden's Commissioner to the European Union, was a potential leadership candi-

date.[19] However, Wallström declined to be considered for the post. Another potential candidate was Carin Jämtin, opposition leader of Stockholm Municipal Council, though she also declined to be considered (Isaksson 2010: 179). Right winger Pär Nuder, former Finance Minister, was also mentioned by *Dagens Nyheter*, though his chance of was marginal at best, as the nominating committee wanted a female leader.[20] Left-leaning Ulrica Messing, former Minister for Transport and Infrastructure, was another potential candidate. In an interview with *Dagens Nyheter*, she declared that the Social Democrats must stay left instead of moving to the right.[21] She was regarded as a compromise candidate, in that no party district seemed to oppose her (Carlbom 2007). Mona Sahlin, former Minister for Development, belonged to the party's right wing and advocated for LGBT and minority rights as well as more personal choices in welfare policies.[22]

Sahlin was not considered to be a frontrunner until after Margot Wallström and Carin Jämtin both declined to be considered for the leadership post. She was infamous for the "Toblerone Affair" in 1995, in which she was accused of misusing her government credit card for her private expenses, including a Toblerone bar. This scandal effectively put her out of politics until 2004, when Göran Persson appointed her as the Minister for Development. Sahlin's public image was thus tainted. Polls by *Dagens Nyheter* and Sifo revealed that half of those who voted Social Democrat in 2006 did not prefer her as their leader. Many cited the Toblerone Affair and their distrust towards her as the reason (Brors 2007c). At the same time, a poll conducted by SiFo in March 2007 indicated that 44% of the respondents who voted for the Social Democrats in 2006 thought that Sahlin could help the party win the 2010 general election.[23] Sahlin was also regarded as a better debater than Ulrica Messing. When asked about Messing's potential as an opposition leader, one senior Social Democrat commented, "Ulrica Messing is strong enough to debate against [Prime Minister] Fredrik

[19]Isaksson (2010: 212); *Dagens Nyheter* 10/17/2006.

[20]*Dagens Nyheter* 10/17/2006; 10/21/2006.

[21]Isaksson (2010: 188-189); Carlbom (2006a).

[22]Brors (2007b); Isaksson (2010).

[23]*Dagens Nyheter* 03/14/2007.

Reinfeldt?"[24] After three months of discussions with all 26 district party leaders, in January 2007, the nominating committee chose Sahlin to be the party leader, for which she accepted.

7.4.2 Selectorate's Concerns

The Social Democratic Party during this period was divided into the left and right wings. Göran Persson's government ministers included members from both the right and left wings (Persson himself was right-of-center), who disagreed with each other about various policies (Isaksson 2010: 127-130). The division was not only between those who were economically left and right, but also between social liberals and social conservatives.[25] Within the party's rank-and-file, there was a movement towards the left (Isaksson 2010). At the same time, since the 2006 General Election resulted in the party lowest seat share (130) to that date and stripped the party from its government status, its Executive Committee was anxious for the party to return to government.[26]

No district or policy wings dominated the nominating committee. Heéne Fritzon, chairwoman of Skåne party district, and Anders Ygeman from Stockholm City, carried strong left-leaning policy preferences. Mikael Damberg, chairman of Stockholm County, was considered as one of the most right wing Social Democrats.[27] Lena Hjelm-Wallén, committee chair and former deputy prime minister, was considered to be from the middle of the party (Isaksson 2010: 131).

The nominating committee searched for a leader who could win elections, and govern the

[24]Carlbom (2007); author's translation.

[25]For example, Morgan Johansson, former Minister of Public Health during the Persson government, informed me that when he proposed a bill to ban smoking in indoor establishments, about one third of ministers, all belonged to the socially liberal wing, opposed it (Interview with the author 09/20/2012). When he proposed a needle exchange program for heroin addicts, about one third of ministers, all belonged to the socially conservative wing, opposed it (Interview with the author 09/20/2012).

[26]Interviews with the author 09/19/2012; 09/20/2012.

[27]See Isaksson (2010). In addition to the aforementioned ones, the other members of the nominating committee were Carina A. Elgestam from Kronoberg Party District, Agneta Gille from the Uppsala Party District, Kurt Kvarnström from Dalarna Party District, Carin Lundberg from Västerbotten Party District, Carina Ohlsson from Skaraborg Party District, Mats Sjöström from Örebro Party District, and Per-Olof Svensson from Gävleborg Party District.

country.[28] Nominating committee member and MP Anders Ygeman informed me that the committee had some potential candidates in mind in the beginning of the search process, but had also asked all district party leaders and municipal party councillors to submit their preferred candidates and/or a list of desired leadership qualities to gauge the support each potential candidate would receive.[29] When right winger Margot Wallström and left winger Carin Jämtin both declined to be considered as leadership candidates, the nominating committee consulted district party leaders to determine if they would support Mona Sahlin, whose right wing profile included anti-trade union views. Anders Ygeman informed me that there were doubts from some Social Democratic members on "whether she would stand up for social democratic values, does she put herself in the scale of left or right, etc."[30] Despite her previous scandal, all members of the nominating committee agreed on Sahlin as the nominee because her policy profile were thought to be able to attract voters from metropolitan areas, such as Stockholm, where the Moderate Party was electorally stronger.[31]

7.4.3 Non-Selectorate's Preferences

7.4.3.1 Electoral Welfare versus Advocacy

Most rank-and-file members and district party leaders who leaned to the left initially supported a right wing candidate. An overwhelming majority of district party leaders voiced their preference for Wallerström, whom the party's rank-and-file also supported.[32] Leaders of the traditionally left wing districts Bohuslän, Skaraborg, Värmland, Östergötland and Blekinge expressed their preferences for her (Idling and Bengtsson 2006). She even had the backings of trade unions and the northern counties of Västerbotten and Norrbotten.[33] Most

[28]Jonsson (2006a); interview with the author 09/19/2012.

[29]Interview with the author 09/19/2012.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Idling and Bengtsson (2006); Jonsson (2006b); *Dagens Nyhyeter* 01/08/2007.

[33]Ibid.

significantly, when news media reported Wallström as the frontrunner for the position, the party districts with the strongest leftist profile, Skåne and Stockholm City, did not object. This is particularly noteworthy, as Wallström was pro-Europe, while party members in Skåne were traditionally Eurosketpic.[34]

The other candidate with widespread support among rank-and-file members and district party leaders was the left-leaning Carin Jämtin, Stockholm City Council's Social Democratic leader.[35] Yet, she also declined to be considered as a possible leader. During the beginning of the nominating committee's search process, Margot Wallström, Carin Jämtin, and left winger Ulrica Messing received the strongest consensus among the 26 district party leaders (Jonsson 2006a). Yet, after both Wallström and Jämtin declined, only Gävleborg Party District (Messing's home district) explicitly voiced heir preference for Messing (Jonsson 2007). Although rank-and-file members leaned to the left, they rallied behind a right wing potential candidate, who said no, instead of promoting Messing, who would not refuse a nomination by the committee. This is by no means direct evidence that the party district leaders prioritized the party's electoral welfare. It is, however, useful to see that there were widespread support behind candidates from both factions. Although I cannot not make the claim that district party leaders prioritized electoral welfare, it is possible that, for this leadership selection, advocacy did not dictate the backings of potential candidates.

7.4.3.2 District Leaders' Support for Mona Sahlin

Did district party leaders' concerns for the party's electoral welfare enable the nominating committee to choose Mona Sahlin as the leader? Sahlin's policy positions were perceived as polarizing; the party's left wing remained skeptical of her right wing stance and called her an "ideologically unreliable" MP who leaned too much to the right.[36] Tomas Eneroth, MP and Executive Committee deputy member, noted that although people with different social

[34]Isaksson (2010); interview with the author 09/29/2011.

[35]Jonsson (2006b); Carlbrom (2006b).

[36]Carlbom (2007); *Dagens Nyheter* 01/08/2007; Brors (2007d).

backgrounds supported her,

> "Mona Sahlin was, during her political career, very ambitious in pointing out the future for Social Democrats, how we should change not only the party as organization, but also the party policy, to become more modern. Of course that scares some people also, because she challenged a lot of people, both when it comes to labor market policy, traditional social democratic policy, but also when it comes to questions about...take for one example, she was very hard on discussions about discrimination, not to discriminate people because of their...sexual orientation, ethnic backgrounds, so on, and that was really important for her..but also very challenging for some people."[37]

Around half of the district party leaders initially hesitated against her selection.[38] Members of the ideologically leftist Skåne Party District considered her as too "right."[39] In addition, some of the party's union members distrusted her, as they believed she would not stand up for their rights.[40] Transports Union leader Per Winberg stated that Sahlin believed too much in the market forces and too little on the politics of the society (Nandorf 2007). When the nominating committee were gauging support for Sahlin, trade union members in Skåne voiced their disapproval, citing her anti-union views as the reason (Jonsson 2007).

According to MP Tomas Eneroth, despite her more controversial policy positions, Mona Sahlin gained approval from the district party leaders because her policy positions were perceived to be more attractive to the Swedish electorate.[41] MP Urban Ahlin, Skaraborg District Leader and National Party Board member, thought she was able to attract voters in Stockholm because she focused on "urban city people's ideals and views, more on women's rights, and so on."[42] Ex-minister of Equality Jens Orback supported her because of her socially liberal views on gender equality, LGBT rights, and racial integration (Orback 2007).

---

[37]Interview with the author 09/20/2012.

[38]*Dagens Nyheter* 01/08/2007. In January 2007, 14 of the 26 party district leaders expressed reluctance toward her as the new leader (Hamrud and Hennéus 2007).

[39]Jonsson (2007); Brors (2007a)

[40]Carlbom (2007); *Dagens Nyheter* 01/08/2007; Jonsson (2007).

[41]Interview with the author 09/20/2012.

[42]Interview with the author 09/19/2012.

Emphasis on these social issues were thought to appeal to voters in the metropolitan areas.[43] Her supporters from the right wing noted that she was the candidate most able to lead the party into electoral victory (Carlbom 2007). Anna Lena Sörenson, Östergötland district board member, stated that Sahlin was a strong candidate because she could help the party win more votes (Hamrud and Hennéus 2007).

More importantly, leaders of traditionally left wing party districts conceded that Mona Sahlin's policy positions could attract new voters.[44] The left-leaning Stockholm City Party District supported Sahlin (Brors 2006). In fact, according MP Anders Ygeman, Stockholm City's decision to rally behind Sahlin was "quite early on."[45] After Wallström and Jämtin said no, the left-leaning Göteborg Party District switched its support from Jämtin to Sahlin.[46] She had the backings of the right-leaning Stockholm County, Sörmland, Uppsala, Västmanland, Örebro, and Östergötland Party Districts, and also the left-leaning Blekinge, Göteborg, Gotland, Kalmar, Stockholm City, and Västerbotten Party Districts .[47] Trade union LO's chairwoman Wanja Lundby-Wedin and *IF Metall's* chairman Stefan Lövfen also supported her (Jonsson 2007). Furthermore, nominating committee member and leader of Skåne Party District Heléne Fritzon stated that, despite initial protests by the trade union members in her district, Sahlin's political message could reach out to voters (Hamrud and Hennéus 2007). After the party congress confirmed her nomination, trade union leaders in Skåne publicly rallied behind her.[48]

The above suggests that while the party's non-selectorate members did not all agree with Mona Sahlin's right-leaning policy positions, they had nevertheless supported her because she was perceived to be the candidate who could help the party restore its government status. It is possible that leaders from traditionally left-leaning party districts had done so because

[43]Interview with the author 09/12/2012; 09/20/2012.

[44]Interview with the author 09/10/2012; 09/20/2012.

[45]Interview with the author 09/19/2012.

[46]Hamrud and Hennéus (2007); *Dagens Nyheter* 01/08/2007.

[47]*Dagens Nyheter* 01/12/2007.

[48]*Dagens Nyheter* 03/18/2007.

they prioritized the party's electoral welfare. While I cannot determine if this is the case, I can infer that these leaders backed a candidate whose policy views they thought could improve the party's electoral fortunes.

7.5 The Selection of Håkan Juholt in 2011

The Social Democrats suffered its worst electoral performance to date in the 2010 General Election (see Table B2). After several left-leaning district party leaders hinted at Mona Sahlin's need to step down, she announced her resignation in November 2010.[49] At the time, the party's policy conflict was public knowledge. It was divided between left wing, which advocated for more government intervention over welfare policies, and the right wing, which attempted to orient the party toward social and economic liberalism, mostly by emphasizing LGBT and minority rights and more privatization of welfare programs.[50]

Proposition 3 predicts that a moderate selectorate chooses a more extreme party leader if its members prioritize the party's electoral welfare, but the extreme non-selectorate prioritizes advocacy. To provide evidence for this, I must demonstrate that nominating committee members were more moderate than district party leaders, that they prioritized the party's electoral welfare, and that they incorporated district party leaders' preferences in their nomination decision. I also need to show that the majority of district party leaders and rank-and-file members were more extreme and prioritized advocacy. Given the party's disastrous election result, the nominating committee should have prioritized electoral welfare. Interviews with nominating committee members offer some support for this. I do not have information that indicates how district party leaders weighed advocacy versus electoral welfare, nor can I determine if district party leaders as a whole were more extreme than the nominating committee. As such, the evidence in this section does not directly support Proposition 3. However, my findings lend credit to the claim that district party leaders and

[49]See Holender and Kallin (2010); *Dagens Nyheter* 11/10/2010; 11/12/2010.

[50]Interviews with the author 09/29/2011; 09/10/2012; and 09/13/2012.

rank-and-file members were able to influence the nominating committee's leadership choice. This partly supports Proposition 3.

The selection of Håkan Juholt as the Social Democratic leader in 2011 showcases the non-selectorate's influence on the selectorate's leadership choice. Members of the nominating committee searched for a candidate that could unite the party's left and right factions, for which they deemed as essential for winning the next general election. In addition, more than the previous nominating committee, this committee solicited comprehensive opinions from all party districts. Meanwhile, when presented with the possibility of choosing the right winger Mikael Damberg, a popular Social Democrat who appealed to the wider Swedish electorate, Skåne and Stockholm City Party Districts were against his selection. This contrasts with the leadership selection in 2007, in which these two districts lent support for the right winger Mona Sahlin. When no potential candidate received party-wide support, the nominating committee was forced to settle on Håkan Juholt, who led the party to a further downturn in poll ratings, and was forced to resign just ten months later.

7.5.1 Potential Candidates

There was no apparent successor when Mona Sahlin resigned.[51] When the nominating committee was formed, *Dagens Nyheter* reported several potential candidates. Mikael Damberg, MP and leader of the Stockholm County Party District, was regarded as very right-leaning; the second was Veronica Palm, MP and leader of the Stockholm City Party District, who belonged to the party's left wing; the third was MP Sven-Erik Österberg, parliamentary party leader and leader of the Västmanland Party District, whose policy views aligned with the middle of the party; the fourth was right winger MP Thomas Östros, former economic policy spokesman responsible for the party's election program on economic policies; the fifth was former Finance Minister Pär Nuder, who belonged to the party's right wing.[52] As the leadership search progressed, *Dagens Nyheter* reported other potential candidates.

[51] *Dagens Nyheter* 11/14/2010.

[52] *Dagens Nyheter* 11/19/2010; Stenberg (2010b); Isaksson (2010: 175-225).

One was MP Tomas Eneroth, who was unaffiliated with neither factions (Kärrman, Olsson, and Stenberg 2011). Although he received party-wide support, Eneroth publicly declined to be considered as the nominee (Idling 2011). The other was former Minister for Education and MP Leif Pagrotsky, who belonged to the left wing and was against the introduction of the Euro in Sweden. He also declined to be considered for the post.[53] Left-leaning MP Håkan Juholt was not mentioned as a contender until 2 weeks before the committee's deadline to present a nominee.[54]

7.5.2 Selectorate's Concerns

The nominating committee for this selection process included members from Western, Northern, and Southern Sweden, as well as Stockholm City and Stockholm County. Left winger Berit Andnor, chair of this nominating committee, was from the left-leaning Göteborg Party District (Isaksson 2010: 225). Both right wing Stockholm County and left wing Stockholm City were represented in the committee, as were the right-leaning districts Örebro and Östergötland, and the left-leaning Skåne, among others.[55] The diverse composition ensured equal representation of region and policy preferences.[56]

This balance masked the party's deep division between the left and the right factions. During Mona Sahlin's tenure, many within the party criticized that she had moved the party too far to the right, and since she was from Stockholm County, she was perceived to have stifled the interests of Western and Northern Sweden.[57] As the Executive Committee leaned to the right, the party's rank-and-file members steered to the left and pressured Sahlin

[53] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/09/2011.

[54] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/04/2011.

[55] The nominating committee for the selection of the party leader in 2011 was composed of the following members: chairwoman Berit Andnor; Katarina Berggren from Stockholm County; Håkan Bergman from Örebro, Jan Björkman from Blekinge, Jonas Gunnarsson from Värmland, Göran Johansson from Göteborg, Anders Karlsson from Skåne, Teres Lindberg from Stockholm City, Louise Malmström from Östergötland, Hans Unander from Dalarna, and Kristina Zkrisson from Norrbotten. Source: *Dagens Nyheter* 12/01/2010.

[56] *Dagens Nyheter* 12/01/2010.

[57] Interviews with the author 09/10/2012; 09/13/2012; 09/19/2012; 09/20/2012.

into forming a pre-electoral coalition with the Left Party and the Green Party.[58] After the 2010 General Election, left wingers Morgan Johansson, Ylva Johansson, and Håkan Juholt openly attacked the party's policy profile (Stenberg 2010a). Left-leaning MP Veronica Palm acknowledged that the party was in a deep crisis and that the party needed to change its policy direction.[59] Anne Marie Lindgren, chief investigator for the think tank Labor Movement (Arbetarroörelsens), stated that the party lost the election because it did not provide a clear policy direction.[60]

Jonas Gunnarsson, MP and a member of this nominating committee, noted that the party needed a leader that could unify the party, which was important for winning elections.[61] Anders Karlsson, MP and another member of the nominating committee in 2011, expressed, "We must have a leader that has good speech, and we must have a leader that can tape the party together...so that the members of the party can identify with the [leader]...we need a leader that [can last for] a long time, three, four elections."[62] Committee chairwoman Berit Andnor stated the committee's desire for district party leaders to inform the committee their ideal candidate's qualities (Stenberg 2010b).

Based on the above evidence, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the nominating committee was concerned over the policy division's effects on the party's electoral welfare. If so, then the nominating committee would have incorporate the preferences of district party leaders and rank-and-file members. Jonas Gunnarsson informed me that, unlike all previous nominating committees, for this leadership selection, the committee traveled to different regions.[63] In addition to discussing potential candidates with district party leaders, these committee members also held meetings with local party members to hear their

[58]Interview with the author 09/13/2012; Isaksson (2010: 134-139).

[59]*Dagens Nyheter* 11/10/2010.

[60]*Dagens Nyheter* 11/10/2010.

[61]Interview with the author 09/29/2011.

[62]Interview with the author 09/29/2011.

[63]Interview with the author 09/29/2011.

opinions on potential candidates.[64] *Dagens Nyheter* reported a number of meetings between the nominating committee members and all 26 district party leaders, with the purpose of identifying potential candidates who were preferred by all districts, and those who did not receive support.[65]

7.5.3 Non-Selectorate's Preferences

7.5.3.1 Electoral Welfare versus Advocacy

Mikael Damberg, Tomas Eneorth, Sven-Erik Österberg, and Thomas Östros were regarded as the frontrunners for the leadership post. The party districts in Northern Sweden supported Österberg, while Stockholm County rallied behind Damberg (Idling 2011). The SSU President Jytte Guteland called for Damberg to be the leader, while trade union LO's Transport Association supported Österberg. Damberg was perceived to be the candidate that could most likely improve the Social Democrats' performance at the next general election.[66] In February 2011, the media analyst company Retriever revealed that, among newspapers, online newspapers, TV shows, and blogs, Damberg was most mentioned as one of the 10 most talked-about candidates.[67] Brokers placed his odds of being selected as 1.7 to 1.[68] If district party leaders preferred a candidate who could most likely lead the Social Democrats out of the public opinion crisis, then, as political scientist Nicholas Aylott stated, "Mikael Damberg would have been an infinitely better choice."[69]

Yet, Damberg, who had a strong right wing profile, was a polarizing figure inside the party. During his tenure as the leader of the Social Democratic Youth Wing (SSU), he was blamed for exacerbating the conflict between the left and the right wings (Isaksson 2010). In a poll

[64] Ibid.

[65] See Stiernstedt and Stenberg (2011).

[66] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/10/2010; interview with Nicholas Aylott 09/17/2012; Nilsson (2011).

[67] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/13/2011.

[68] *Dagens Nyheter* 02/18/2011; Kärrman, Olsson, and Stenberg (2011).

[69] Interview with Nicholas Aylott 09/17/2012.

by the Swedish newspaper *Expressen* in January 2011, among respondents who voted for the Social Democrats in the 2010 General Election, only 13% thought that Mikael Damberg could unite the party.[70] According to *Dagens Nyheter*, both factions admitted that opposition against Damberg was more intense than expected (Kärrman and Stenberg 2011). MP and National Party Board Member Urban Ahlin noted that supporters of potential candidates leaking harmful information about rival candidates to the media: "their supporters believe that this fight is more important than life itself...we have never seen that before."[71] This suggests that the party's rank-and-file held intense preferences.

District party leaders from Western and Northern Sweden were hesitant against having a leader from the right-leaning Stockholm County, as it was seen to have dominated the Social Democratic Party's power structure.[72] Ann-Kristine Johansson, MP and chairwoman of left-leaning Värmland Party District, noted:

> "The person that Stockholm wanted, we don't want. And what we said in West Sweden, in Värmland, in North, in Skåne. We say, 'We don't want a Stockholmer. Everything is Stockholm'...In some way, it was a direction about party politics, in some ways culture, both are mixed together."[73]

At the same time, she noted that her party district, Värmland, "quite liked Mikael Damberg. But [Thomas] Östros, that we do not want."[74] MP and Skaraborg District Party Leader Urban Ahlin also stated that this party district was not absolutely resistant against having Damberg as a party leader, who was more favorable than Östros. These suggest that some left-leaning districts, though did not prefer right-leaning potential candidates from Stockholm, were not completely against Damberg as a potential leader.

Meanwhile, Stockholm City and Skåne Party Districts staunchly opposed Damberg as

[70] *Dagens Nyheter* 01/22/2011.

[71] Interview with the author 09/19/2012.

[72] Interview with the author 09/29/2011; 09/10/2012; 09/19/2012.

[73] Interview with the author 09/10/2012.

[74] Ibid.

a potential nominee, as his policy stances were very much to the right of the party.[75] MP Morgan Johansson, National Party Board member from Skåne, informed me that his party district was against Damberg because of his lack of experience in government, and also because he was "too much on the right side of the broad spectrum. After Mona you have to have someone who could be in the middle."[76] These stood in contrast to the 2007 leadership selection, where Stockholm City Party District offered support to Mona Sahlin, the candidate with a strong right wing profile, and Skåne eventually supported her despite her reputed anti-trade union stance.

MP Hans Ekström, leader of the right-leaning Sörmland Party District, noted that Mikael Damberg was "a good candidate" and that his district members were hoping for someone who could "appeal to the people [and] must be a possible prime minister for the people."[77] He agreed that the movement against Damberg was centered on the two extremes in the party's policy spectrum, the left wing Skåne and the right wing Stockholm County.[78] When discussing the outcome of the leadership selection process in 2011, Ekström noted:

> "The problem for Damberg, who comes from Stockholm [County], that traditionally considered as...liberal within the party, is that the leftist party districts made a coalition with the traditional party districts.. traditionalist, those who did mining, forestry, and factories...and they were against...Stockholm...it was also something about him being a rightist."[79]

These two party districts seemed to have prevented the selection of a right wing candidate who could appeal to the general electorate. Although this is not direct evidence that these two districts prioritized advocacy in 2011, the pattern does contrast with the districts' willingness to support right-leaning candidates in 2007. It is not unreasonable to surmise that these districts' aversion against the nomination of a candidate who belonged to the

[75] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/04/2011; 03/09/2011.

[76] Interview with the author 09/20/2012.

[77] Interview with the author 09/13/2012.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Interview with the author 09/13/2012.

party's right wing, despite the fact that the candidate could help attract voters, stemmed from their desire to promote left-leaning policy positions.

7.5.3.2 District Leaders' Support for Juholt

MP Morgan Johansson noted that Håkan Juholt was well-known within the party.[80] According to political scientist Ulf Bjereld, Juholt was perceived to be a good communicator (Dutt, Stiernstedt, and Carp 2011). MP Tomas Eneroth informed me that there were, in reality, two campaigns. One was the campaign in the media, which did not recognize Håkan Juholt as a serious contender until much later in the search process, and one was the campaign within the party organization.[81] Anders Karlsson, MP and nominating committee member, stated that Juholt was on the committee's list 25 potential candidates.[82]

Juholt represented a more traditional social democratic side of the party and received support from the party's left wing.[83] He was perceived by voters as having a clear left profile.[84] Lars Ohly, leader of the Left Party, said, "It is clear that [Juholt] is much closer to us in view of the gains in welfare than many other Social Democrats."[85] MP and Värmland Party District Leader Ann-Kristine Johansson also stated that Juholt was more to the left.[86] According to MP Anders Ygeman, Juholt was able to "energize the base" with his ideological frame.[87] Ylva Johansson, MP and former Health Minister, expressed:

> "If you invite [Juholt] to a party meeting, you can be a hundred percent sure that this will be a good party meeting. He is really good at that. So they elected a party leader who was good at making enthusiasm in the party organization.

[80] Interview with the author 09/20/2012.

[81] Interview with the author 09/20/2012.

[82] Interview with the author 09/29/2011.

[83] Kärrman and Stenberg (2011); interview with the author 09/29/2011.

[84] Interview with the author 09/10/2012; *Dagens Nyheter* 03/10/2011.

[85] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/10/2011.

[86] Interview with author 09/10/2012.

[87] Interview with the author 09/19/2012.

> But they didn't look for a person who could really challenge the prime minister, who could possibly form a government, form an alternative budget, a shadow government...to be a party activist is one thing, to be minister, to run the country, is something else."

She also noted:

> "[For the selection of current party leader Stefan Lövfen], the VU [executive committee] did what the Valberedning [nominating committee] should have done in the first place. I mean asking not who is the popular person among grassroots, asking who, out of very few people, are able to take on this responsibility. But when they were looking for Håkan Juholt, they were looking for a popular person [within the party]."[88]

Yet, two weeks before the selection deadline, party districts in West Sweden promoted Leif Pagrotsky as the leader, who was also on Stockholm City Party District's list of acceptable leaders.[89] These party districts voice their support for Håkan Juholt when Pagrotsky declined to be considered.[90] Nominating committee member Gunnar Johansson explained that Juholt was chosen because "there was nobody else."[91] In fact, Social Democratic member of the European Parliament Jan Andersson had warned against selecting a compromise candidate that no one actively supported. He wrote in his blog, "No one seems to mention that we should choose a leader and a party leadership that has the potential to win future elections."[92] Former party secretary Lars Stjernkvist said, "With all due respect for Håkan Juholt, but I think [his selection] is more about blocking other solutions."[93]

Whether he was flagged early on as a serious candidate, or if he became a compromise candidate late in the selection process, Håkan Juholt's selection was a case where left-leaning district party leaders and rank-and-file members successfully influenced the leadership selection's outcome. Political scientist Jenny Madestam noted that Juholt became the frontrunner

[88] Interview with the author 09/12/2012.

[89] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/07/2011.

[90] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/09/2011.

[91] Interview with the author 09/29/2011.

[92] *Dagens Nyheter* 03/04/2011; author's translation.

[93] Kärrman and Stenberg (2011); author's translation.

because left-leaning party districts in South Sweden advocated for him late in the selection process.[94] This partly supports the claim that the left-leaning party districts and rank-and-file members were able to hold leverage over the nominating committee into choosing a left-leaning party leader who, since taking office, committed a number of serious gaffes and led the party to a dramatic downturn in public opinion.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examine the Social Democratic Party's selection of Mona Sahlin in 2007 and Håkan Juholt's selection in 2011 in the context of my model's Proposition 3: *Extreme non-selectorate members can coerce moderate selectorate members into choosing an extreme party leader if non-selectorate members prioritize advocacy, but selectorate members prioritize the party's electoral welfare. In contrast, selectorate members have the freedom to choose its preferred candidate when non-selectorate members value the party's electoral well-being above advocacy.* In 2007, despite her right-leaning policy stances, Mona Sahlin (eventually) gained the support of left-leaning party districts. However, in 2011, the nominating committee settled on the left-leaning Håkan Juholt as the nominee, even though right winger Mikael Damberg could have attracted more voters. Left-leaning districts, in particular Skåne and Stockholm City, supported Mona Sahlin in 2007, but did not rally behind Damberg in 2011. This hints at these districts' prioritization of advocacy in 2011, especially since the party had, for the first time in its history, suffered a consecutive election loss. Their unwillingness to support right-leaning potential candidates resulted in the nominating committee's selection of Juholt, whose inability to improve opinion poll ratings forced him to step down after only ten months in office.

The Social Democratic Party's most recent selection of Stefan Löven seems to be consistent with the predictions of Proposition 3. After Juholt resigned, the party's Executive Committee, desperate for a candidate that could reverse the negative public opinion against

[94]Interview with Jenny Madestam 09/10/2012.

the party,[95] took over the selection responsibility. In less than a week, it announced the nomination of Swedish Metalworkers' Union (*IF Metall*) Chairman Stefan Lövfen, who was seen to be able to promote both right- and left-leaning policies (Svahn 2012). MP Urban Ahlin noted that when Stefan Lövfen was elected, "everyone was very relieved."[96] When asked about Lövfen's policy direction, MP Ann-Kristine Johansson responded, "I think he is in the middle....that's interesting. If you look at Tage Erlander, Olof Palme, Ingvar Carlsson, they were in the middle. They must fix together these two wings." At the same time, it is important to note that since taking office, Lövfen began to emphasize issues that were traditionally associated with the party's right wing, such as job creation and the promotion of small businesses.[97]

Since Håkan Juholt's resignation, both left- and right-leaning district party leaders seem to have prioritized electoral welfare. According to MP Hans Ekström, at the time of Lövfen's selection, members of both wings agreed, "If we go like this, we will destroy the party. We have to cooperate. We have to find the common ground. We have to have one common enemy, and that is the government."[98] Ylva Johansson also expressed that party members recognized a need to end conflicts:

> "When Stefan Lövfen came, almost all active Social Democrats said, now, now we have to be proper. now we have to do it right. Now it's time to shape up...in all ways. Stefan Lövfen came to a party who was prepare to say, we stop quarreling, we stop doing these silly things. We have to focus on the most important issues...We have to stop fighting."[99]

District party leaders' recognition of the need to put the party's electoral well-being first may have, in some sense, given the Executive Committee the freedom to appoint a leader whose policy direction could attract voters. In February 2012, the Social Democratic MPs

[95] *Dagens Nyheter* 01/21/2012.

[96] Interview with the author 09/19/2012.

[97] Interview with Nicholas Aylott 09/17/2012; *Dagens Nyheter* 09/24/2012.

[98] Interview with the author 09/13/2012.

[99] Interview with the author 09/12/2012.

elected Mikael Damberg as their parliamentary party leader. This is significant since, as a non-MP, Lövfen could not hold debates in the parliament. Thus, Damberg effectively became Lövfen's representative in parliament. This suggests that the party's policy direction was moving to the right and towards the middle of the Swedish electorate. Since then, public opinion polls for the party improved, reaching a 33% projected vote share in September 2012, versus the 25% projected vote share when Juholt resigned (*TNS Sifo* 2012a; 2012b).

7.7 Appendix A: List of Swedish Terms and Party Names

Table A1: List of Swedish Terms and Party Names

English Term	**Swedish Term**
Swedish Social Democratic Party	*Socialdemokraterna*
Swedish Moderate Party	*Moderata samlingspartiet*
Swedish Center Party	*Centerpartiet*
Swedish Liberal Party	*Folkpartiet liberalerna*
Swedish Christian Democratic Party	*Kristdemokraterna*
Electoral District	*Riksdagsvalkrets*
Nominating Committee	*Valbereningen*
Parliamentary Party Leader	*Gruppledare för Socialdemokraterna i Riksdagen*
National Board	*Partistyrelse*
Executive Committee	*Verkställande utskottet*
Party Leader	*partisordförande*
Party Secretary	*Partisekreterare*
District Party Leader	*Partidistriktens ordfranden*

Table A2: List of Social Democratic Party Districts by National Area

National Area	**Party District**	**District Party Leader 2012**
Upper Norrland	Norrbotten	Karin Åström
Övre Norrland	Västerbotten	Lilly Bäcklund
Middle Norrland	Jämtland	Anna-Caren Sätherberg
Mellersta Norrland	Västernorrland	Elvy Söderström
North Middle Sweden	Dalarna	Peter Hultqvist
Norra Mellansverige	Gälveborg	Renström Yoomi
	Värmland	Ann-Kristine Johansson
West Sweden	Bohuslän	Kenneth G Forslund
Västsverige	Göteborg	Anna Johansson
	Halland	Hans Hoff
	Norra Älvsborg	Jörgen Hellman
	Skaraborg	Urban Ahlin
	Södra Älvsborg	Phia Andersson
East Middle Sweden	Sörmland	Hans Ekström
Östra Mellansverige	Uppsala	Agneta Gille
	Västmanland	Sven-Erik Österberg
	Örebro	Jonas Karlsson
	Östergötland	Lena Micko
Stockholm	Stockholms Stad	Veronica Palm
Stockholm	Stockholms län	Mikael Damberg
South Sweden	Blekinge	Mats Johansson
Sydsverige	Skåne	Heléne Fritzon
Småland and the Islands	Gotland	Christer Engelhardt
Småland med öarna	Jönköping	Ulla Gradeen
	Kalmar	Lena Segeberg
	Kronoberg	Monica Haider

7.8 Appendix B: Supporting Tables for the History of Social Democrats

Table B1: List of Governments in Sweden, Unicameral Legislature

Dates	**PM**	**PM Party**	**Second Party**	**Third Part**	**Fourth Party**
10/14/1969 - 10/08/1976	Olof Palme	Social Democrats			
10/08/1976 - 10/18/1978	Thorbjörn Fälldin	Center Party	Moderate Party	Liberal Party Party	
10/18/1078 - 10/12/1979	Ola Ullsten	Liberal Party			
10/12/1979 - 05/19/1981	Thorbjörn Fälldin	Center Party	Moderate Party	Liberal Party	
05/19/1981- 10/08/1982	Thorbjörn Fälldin	Center Party	Liberal Party		
10/08/1982 - 02/28/1986	Olof Palme	Social Democrats			
03/01/1986 - 02/26/1990	Ingvar Carlsson	Social Democrats			
02/26/1990 - 10/04/1991	Ingvar Carlsson	Social Democrats			
10/04/1991 - 10/07/1994	Carl Bildt	Moderate Party	Center Party	Liberal Party	Christian Democrats
10/07/1994 - 03/22/1996	Ingvar Carlsson	Social Democrats			
03/22/1996 - 10/06/2006	Göran Persson	Social Democrats			
10/06/2006 -	Frederik Reinfeldt	Moderate Party	Center Party	Liberal Party	Christian Democrats

Source: http://www.regeringen.se.

Table B2: Vote and Seat Shares, Social Democrats and Moderate Party

Year	**S Vote Share**	**S Seats**	**S Δ Seats**	**M Vote Share**	**M Seats**	**M Δ Seats**	**Turnout** %
1970	45.34%	163	NA	11.53%	41	NA	88.3%
1973	43.48%	156	-7	14.27%	51	10	90.8%
1976	42.75%	152	-4	15.59%	55	4	91.8%
1979	42.66%	154	2	20.34%	73	18	90.7%
1982	45.61%	166	12	23.64%	86	13	91.4%
1985	44.68%	159	-7	21.33%	76	-10	89.9%
1988	43.21%	156	-3	18.3%	66	-10	86%
1991	37.21%	138	-18	21.92%	80	14	86.7%
1994	45.25%	161	23	22.38%	80	0	86.8%
1998	36.39%	131	-30	22.90%	82	2	81.4%
2002	39.25%	144	13	15.02%	55	-27	80.1%
2006	34.99%	130	-14	26.23%	97	42	82.0%
2010	30.66%	112	-18	30.06%	107	10	84.6%

Source: *Statistika centralbyrn*; http://www.val.se. S = Social Democrats. M = Moderate Party.

Table B3: List of Swedish Social Democratic Party Leaders, 1948-2012

Name	**Dates**	**PM?**	**Mode of Exit**
Tage Erlander	10/11/1946 - 10/14/1969	Yes	resignation
Olof Palme	10/14/1969 - 02/28/1986	Yes	assassination
Ingvar Carlsson	03/01/1986 - 03/22/1996	Yes	resignation
Göran Persson	03/22/1996 - 03/18/2007	Yes	resignation (election loss)
Mona Sahlin	03/18/2007 - 03/25/2011	No	resignation (election loss)
Håkan Juholt	03/25/2011 - 01/21/2012	No	resignation
Stefan Lövfen	01/24/2012 -		incumbent

Source: http://www.keesings.com; http://www.wikipedia.com (for information on the party leaders' district).

7.9 Appendix C: List of Interviewees

Table C1: List of Interviewees from the Swedish Social Democratic Party Leaders

Name	Party District	Position	Interview Date
Urban Ahlin	Västra Götlands läns östra	MP	09/19/2012
		Party Chairman, Skaraborg	
		National Board Member	
Hans Ekström	Södermanlands län	MP	09/13/2012
		Party Chairman, Sörmlands	
		National Board, Member	
Tomas Eneroth	Kronobergs län	MP	09/20/2012
		Executive Committee, Deputy	
Jonas Gunnarsson	Värmlands län	MP	09/29/2011
		Nominating Committee, 2011	
Peter Hultqvist	Dalarnas län	MP	09/19/2012
		Party Chairman, Dalarnas	
		Executive Committee Deputy	
Ann-Kristine Johansson	Värmlands län	MP	09/10/2012
		Party Chairman, Värmlands	
		National Board Deputy Member	
Morgan Johansson	Skåne läns södra	MP	09/20/2012
		National Board Member	
Ylva Johansson	Stockholm City	MP	09/12/2012
		National Board Member	
Anders Karlsson	Skåne läns västra	MP	09/29/2012
		Nominating Committee, 2011	
Anders Ygeman	Stockholm City	MP	09/19/2012
		National Board Deputy Member	

7.10 References

Brors, Henrik. 2006. “Det Är Nu Infightingen Börjar På Allvar.” December 11, 2006, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/detarnuinfightingenborjarpaallvar (accessed September 10, 2012).

Brors, Henrik. 2007a. “Valet Av Partisekreterare Kan Orsaka Öppen Konflikt.” January 12, 2007 http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/valetavpartisekreterarekanorsakaoppenkonflikt (accessed September 10, 2012).

Brors, Henrik. 2007b. “Sahlin Blir En Partilojal Ledare.” January 16, 2007, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/sahlinblirenpartilojalledare (accessed September 10, 2012).

Brors, Henrik. 2007c. “Mona Sahlin Saknar Stoöd Hos Hälften Av S Vaäljarna.” March 15, 2007, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/monasahlinsaknarstodhoshalftenavsvaljarna (accessed September 10, 2012).

Brors, Henrik. 2007d. “Visst Kommer Sahlin Att Förändra Partiet.” March 16, 2007, www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/visstkommersahlinattforandrapartiet (accessed September 10, 2012).

Carlbom, Mats. 2006a. “Försvarsfågor Lockar Messing.” October 20, 2006, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/forsvarsfragor-lockar-messing (accessed September 10, 2012).

Carlbom, Mats. 2006b. “Jämtin Lanseras Som S-Ledare.” November 23, 2006, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/jamtin-lanseras-som-sledare (accessed September 10, 2012).

Carlbom, Mats. 2007. “Vänsterkritik Mot Sahlin Som S-Ledare.” January 03, 2007, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/vansterkritikmotsahlinsomsledare (accessed September 10, 2012).

Dutt, Sujay, Jenny Stiernstedt, and Ossi Carp. 2011. “Greider: Juholt Personifierar En Gråsosse.” March 10, 2011, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/greiderjuholtpersonifierarengrasosse (accessed August 31, 2012).

Hamrud, Annika, and Mårten Hennéus. 2007. “Starkt Motstånd Mot Sahlin.” January 07, 2007, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/starktmotstandmotsahlin (accessed September 10, 2012).

Hermansson, Jörgen. 2012. "The Personalization of Party Politics: The Voters' Perspective." Working paper.

Holender, Robert, and Jenny Kallin. 2010. "Starkt Stöd För Sahlin Trots Katastrofval." September 20, 2010, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/valet2010/starktstodforsahlintrotskatastrofval (accessed August 31, 2012).

Idling, Lillemor, and Tomas Bengtsson. 2006. "Fotfolket Vill Ha Margot Wallström." December 05, 2006, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/fotfolketvillhamargotwallstrom (accessed September 10, 2012).

Idling, Lillemor. 2011. "Trojka Slaåss Om Partiledarskapet I S." February 21, 2011, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/trojkaslassompartiledarskapetis (accessed August 31, 2012).

Isaksson, Christer. 2010. *Den Nya Vän(S)tern.* Stockholm:Ekerlids Förlag.

Jonsson, Gunnar. 2006a. "Forsatt Starkt Stöd För Wallström." December 09, 2006, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/fortsatt-starkt-stod-for-wallstrom (accessed September 10, 2012).

Jonsson, Gunnar. 2006b. "Sahlin Just Nu I Täten." December 15, 2006, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/sahlinjustnuitaten (accessed September 10, 2012).

Jonsson, Gunnar. 2007. "Skåne Stretar Emot Sahlin." January 10, 2007, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/skanestretaremotsahlin (accessed September 10, 2012).

Kärrman, Jens, Hans Olsson, and Ewa Stenberg. 2011. "S Kraäver Besked Av Kandidaterna." February 19, 2011, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/skraverbeskedavkandidaterna (accessed August 31, 2011).

Kärrman, Jens, and Ewa Stenberg. 2011. "Joker Kvar I Jakten På S-Ledare." March 10, 2011, www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/jokerkvarijaktenpasledare (accessed August 31, 2012).

Nandorf, Tove. 2007. "Vi Är Så Lyckliga Över Mona Sahlin." March 14, 2007, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/viarsalyckligaovermonasahlin (accessed September 10, 2012).

Nilsson, Torbjörn. 2011. "Att Undvika Schack-Matt." January 21, 2011, http://www.fokus.se/2011/01/att-undvika-schack-matt/ (accessed September 26, 2012).

Orback, Jens. 2007. “Mona Sahlin Bäst På Att Föra Arvet Efter Palme Dare.” January 16, 2007, http://www.dn.se/debatt/monasahlinbastpaattforaarvetefterpalmevidare (accessed September 10, 2012).

Stenberg, Ewa. 2010a. “Operation Utrensning Kan Boörja.” November 11, 2010, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/operationutrensningkanborja (accessed August 31, 2012).

Stenberg, Ewa. 2010b. “S Har Inlett Jakten På Ny Partiledare.” December 28, 2010, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/sharinlettjaktenpanypartiledare (accessed August 31, 2012).

Stiernstedt, Jenny, and Ewa Stenberg. 2011. “S I ‘Namnloöst Möte Om Ny Partiledare.” March 01, 2011, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/simoteomnypartiledare (accessed August 31, 2012).

Svahn, Clas. 2012. “Ledarskribenterna Ger Löfven Sitt Stöd.” January 26, 2012, http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/ledarskribenternagerlofvensittstod (accessed August 31, 2012).

Swedish Social Democratic Party. 2009. “The Constitution of the Swedish Social Democratic Party.” http://www.socialdemokraterna.se/upload/Kongresser/Jobbkongress09/ Engelska/The %20Constitution%202009.pdf (accessed September 5, 2012).

TNS Sifo. 2012a. “Väljarbarometern Januari 2012.” http://www.tns-sifo.se/rapporter-undersokningar/valjarbarometern/ (accessed September 6, 2012).

TNS Sifo. 2012b. “Väljarbarometern September 2012.” http://www.tns-sifo.se/rapporter-undersokningar/valjarbarometern/ (accessed September 6, 2012).

The following news sources were consulted:

Dagens Nyheter:

October 17, 2006. October 21, 2006. January 8, 2007. January 12, 2007. March 14, 2007. March 18, 2007. November 10, 2010. November 12, 2010. November 14, 2010. November 19, 2010. December 01, 2010. January 21, 2011. January 22, 2011. February 18, 2011. March 04, 2011. March 07, 2011. March 09, 2011. March 10, 2011. January 21, 2012. September 24, 2012.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

8.1 Leadership Choices in British Dutch, and Swedish Parties

Party leaders are an integral part of electoral competition in parliamentary democracies. Yet, parties do not always select popular, moderate leaders who can boost their parties' electoral performances. I offered an explanation. In my dissertation, I argued that electoral institution and intra-party dynamics affect leadership choice. The popularity of the party leader can bring about a higher return of parliamentary seats in majoritarian electoral systems, but not necessarily so in proportional systems. Meanwhile, given the institutional environment that a party finds itself in, intra-party policy differences and divergent goals influence leadership choice. Whereas some party members value their party's electoral performance above all else, others may prioritize the advocacy of their desired policy directions. In addition, party members are an integral part of a party's general election campaign. Thus, when the selectorate (those who choose the leader) prioritizes the party's electoral welfare, the non-selectorate, a source of election campaign effort, can informally affect the selectorate's leadership choice. My model of party leadership selection yielded three predictions. First, the closer the chosen leader's policy position is to non-selectorate members' position, the more these members campaign for the party (*Proposition 1*). Second, the more extreme the selectorate and non-selectorate's policy positions are, the more extreme the chosen leader's position also is (*Proposition 2*). Third, the more the selectorate prioritizes the party's electoral welfare, but the more the non-selectorate prioritizes advocacy, the closer the chosen leader's policy position is to the non-selectorate's position. In contrast, the more the non-selecotrate also prioritizes the party's electoral welfare, the closer the chosen leader's

policy position is to the selectorate's position (*Proposition 3*).

I drew my empirical support from leadership selections in the British Conservative and Labour Parties, the Dutch VVD and PvdA, and the Swedish Social Democratic Party. There are several advantages in using these parties as my case studies. Data on each MP's policy positions and leadership vote choice were available for the 1997, 2001, and 2005 Conservative Leadership Elections. Thus, I could offer empirical support for my model's Proposition 2 by constructing statistical tests of MPs' policy preferences and leadership vote choices. Data on British Labour MPs and Constituency Labour Parties' (CLPs) first preference votes for the 2010 Labour Leadership Election allowed me to conduct statistical tests of the relationship between Labour MPs and their CLP members' vote choices.

Opinion poll data on leadership candidates were available for the Dutch VVD and PvdA leadership elections, which revealed voter perceptions of leadership candidates' positions as well as candidate preferences among party supporters. The Swedish Social Democratic Party's selections of Mona Sahlin in 2007 and Håkan Juholt in 2011 offered detailed accounts of how the preferences of district party leaders (the non-selectorate) mattered in the nominating committees' (the selectorate) leadership choices. Inputs from regions were heavily valued in the Social Democratic Party, which provided an environment where district party leaders could potentially exert leverage over a nominating committee's leadership choice. Perhaps as the result of the district party leaders' prioritization of electoral welfare in 2007 and advocacy in 2011, left-leaning district party leaders supported the right-leaning Sahlin in 2007, but did not rally behind right-leaning and electorally popular leadership contenders in 2011. Consequently, in 2011, the nominating committee was constrained to choose Håkan Juholt, who belonged to the party's left wing.

Each case also contained weaknesses that prevented me from presenting direct evidence for my model's propositions. Since there is a lack of constituency-level data on British Conservative members' policy preferences, I could not rule out the possibility that Conservative MPs' policy positions stemmed from their constituency Conservative members' demands. This would imply that the real drive behind MPs' vote choices was due to concerns over re-

actions from their constituency members. This lack of data also prevented me from directly testing Proposition 3, which would require me to pinpoint the constituency members' (the non-selectorate) policy preferences and their weights of electoral welfare versus advocacy. At the same time, results from statistical tests did not contradict Proposition 2. Regardless of how Conservative MPs formed their policy preferences, Eurosceptic MPs were more likely to have voted for the Eurosceptic leadership candidate in 1997, and more socially conservative MPs were less likely to have voted for socially liberal candidates in 2001 and 2005. Interview data gave additional support for these patterns. They also revealed that some Conservative MPs sought their constituency Conservative members' opinions on candidate preferences.

The lack of systematic data on British Labour MPs' policy preferences hindered my ability to differentiate between advocacy versus concerns over Constituent Labour Party (CLP) members' reactions for MPs' first preference votes. In addition, I did not have large-N data on CLP members' weighing of electoral welfare versus advocacy. As such, I could not offer direct evidence for Proposition 3. However, statistical testing of the effects of CLP members' voting patterns on MPs' first preference votes for David versus Ed Miliband did suggest the following. The more first preference votes for David Miliband from an MP's CLP members, the more likely the MP would also cast his or her first preference vote for him. The same pattern was found in the casting of first preference votes for Ed Miliband. Interview data also showed that Labour activists' preferences influenced some Labour MPs' first preference votes. These suggest the possibility that CLP members were able to shape the vote choices of at least some Labour MPs.

My examinations of the 2006 Dutch VVD *lijsttrekker* election and the 2012 PvdA leadership election suffer from a lack of data that could directly support Proposition 1: the closer the party leader's policy position is to that of the non-selectorate's position, the more campaign effort non-selectorate members provide. To show this empirically, one would have to assume the counterfactual that, if the non-selectorate's preferred leader was not chosen, the number of volunteers for general election campaigns would be lower. Even if one could poll all rank-and-file members to determine their level of satisfaction with the chosen leader,

and could obtain data on the number of campaign volunteers, a comparison problem would still exist. Since there are election-specific effects, support for the party leader may not be the sole reason behind a higher number of campaign volunteers as compared to the previous general election. Nevertheless, Propositions 1 and 3 may still be empirically applicable for these leadership elections if there was no contradictory evidence against their predictions. If Dutch party elites (whom I treated as the selectorate) prioritized electoral welfare, but did not value the rank-and-file's (whom I treated as the non-selectorate) campaign effort, then this would be evidence that the non-selectorate had no leverage on the selectorate. However, this did not seem to be the case. My findings that right-leaning VVD party elites supported the left-leaning Mark Rutte, the candidate preferred by the majority of the rank-and-file, suggested that these elites may have been worried about potential reactions from the rank-and-file. In addition, PvdA provincial party leaders agreed that Diederik Samsom's election as the new PvdA leader had energized the base of the party. Although these findings did not directly support Propositions 1 and 3, at the very least, they did not contradict them.

For the the Swedish cases, my inability to determine the policy differences between the nominating committee (the selectorate) and district party leaders (the non-selectorate) was problematic, since I could not determine whether or not district party leaders were more extreme than the nominating committees. As such, for both selections, the nominating committees could have held the same policy positions as the overall positions of the district party leaders. Nominating committee members and district party leaders may have been united in their choice of Sahlin in 2007 not because both groups prioritized electoral welfare, but because the nominating committee prioritized advocacy, and thus was not concerned about district party leaders' reactions. Likewise, the nominating committee's choice of Håkan Juholt in 2011 may have been the result of similarities in policy positions between Juholt and the committee. Thus, my findings did not directly support Proposition 3. However, I found evidence that in both selection processes, the nominating committees had multiple consultations with all district party leaders. In addition, right and left-leaning potential candidates were seriously considered by the nominating committees. This suggested that

in 2007, the committee was able to choose Mona Sahlin because left-leaning district party leaders supported her, and Håkan Juholt was selected in 2011 because left-leaning district party leaders refused to rally behind electorally popular and right-leaning candidates. At the very least, the evidence revealed that district party leaders were able to influence leadership choices.

8.2 Policy and Valence in Leadership (De)-Selection

Leadership candidates' valence qualities seemed to matter more for the Dutch parties in my dissertation than they do for the British ones. In my interviews with Dutch MPs, when asked what they thought were important qualities for a party leader, almost all mentioned likeability by voters as an important quality.[1] One MP even stated that "Personality is 85%."[2] The multi-party system in the Netherlands may have resulted in the country having more politically homogeneous parties than in the United Kingdom. This would have meant that the PvdA and VVD leadership candidates did not exhibit significant policy differences. Thus, party members would have supported candidates based on valence. Yet, as my case studies showed, policy divisions were severe before the VVD leadership election in 2006 and the PvdA leadership election in 2012. This suggests that parties in multi-party systems do not necessarily experience less policy division than parties in two-party systems.

Another possibility for the higher regard for the leader's valence qualities may be due to party organization. In parties where the formulation of policy positions is decentralized (i.e. the party congress decides on the contents of election programs), the party leader has less control over policy direction. In the Dutch CDA, PvdA, and VVD, the party chairpersons served as checks to the leaders to ensure that the latter could not dictate their parties' policy positions.[3] Similarly, in the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the policy decision-making

[1]Interviews with the author 06/28/2011; 06/29/2011; 06/30/2011; 09/21/2011; 09/22/2011; 09/27/2011; 10/05/2011; 10/06/2011.

[2]Interview with the author 06/28/2011.

[3]Interviews with the author 09/22/2011; 09/23/2011; 09/26/2011.

power resided in the Executive Committee, which implies that the leader could not alter the party's policy positions without the committee's approval. Since these parties' organizations were involved in the formulation of their parties' policy directions, party members may have been able to focus more on leadership candidates' valences qualities. At the same time, note that policy positions were still dominant considerations in these parties' leadership selections. As Chapters 6 and 7 have shown, policy considerations led to the election of Mark Rutte as the VVD *lijsttrekker* in 2006, as well as the Swedish Social Democratic Party's selection of Håkan Juholt in 2011.

Although valence qualities did not dictate the outcomes of the leadership selections presented in this dissertation, they seemed to be a significant factor in these parties' decisions to remove their leaders. Parties seemed to withdraw their support of leaders who were not able to improve their negative public images. Margaret Thatcher and Iain Duncan Smith of the British Conservative Party, and Michael Foot of the British Labour Party, were stark examples.[4] Another case was the resignation of Jan Peter Balkenende, the Dutch CDA leader and prime minister from 2002-2010. Many of the CDA MPs I interviewed noted, with the same words, that Balkenende had "passed his expiration date."[5] In yet another example, Swedish MP Anders Ygeman explained the main reason why the Social Democratic leader Håkan Juholt was forced to resign:

> "[No matter] how good he is, or whatever extremely good qualification I or even the whole party think he had, he wasn't able to change the voters' view of him. The voters had lost confidence in him. And if we didn't say that, then the voters would lose confidence in us too."[6]

Former Swedish Health Minister and MP Ylva Johansson added:

> "It was the opinion polls that led to Juholt's forced resignation. He was unable to attract voters. When you meet with people out in the social life...[they say]

[4]See Bale (2010); Heppell (2010).

[5]Interviews with the author 06/28/2011; 09/21/2011; 09/22/2011.

[6]Interview with the author 09/19/2012.

> 'you can't have him! He could never be prime minister! You can't sell him to Brussels!" There was no faith, no respect for him. It was not the direction of his policy, it was all about his personality and the lack of respect for him and the lack of ability to be prime minister...a very huge majority agreed that he can't stay...the party would disappear."[7]

These examples further suggest that the removal and selection of a party leader involve different types of strategic calculation. While policy considerations are central to leadership choice, party leaders' (lack of) valence qualities may cause their political demise.

8.3 Future Research on Party Leadership Selection

The case studies in this dissertation highlight the need for sharper empirical tests to show whether or not non-selectorate members' campaign effort depends on the identity of the chosen party leader. One method would be to construct a dataset on the three biggest industries of each British and Swedish electoral district, since local economy can serve as a proxy for the constituency members' policy preferences. Another would be to conduct large-scale surveys in the United Kingdom by sending out questionnaires on (1) which leadership candidates' policy positions were closest to the constituency party members, (2) if the constituency party members were willing to sacrifice certain policy positions in order for their parties to win elections; (3) constituency party members' preferred leadership candidates for the Conservative Party, and (4) whether or not the polled party members participated in the subsequent general election campaigns. This, however, may only be feasible for the 2005 Conservative Leadership Election and the 2010 Labour Leadership Election, since it may be impossible to locate Conservative constituency party leaders from 1997 and 2001. One can also conduct the same surveys for the Dutch VVD and the PvdA to test whether or not Mark Rutte's victory resulted in more VVD campaign volunteers at the 2006 general election, and if Diederik Samom's election motivated more PvdA members to volunteer at the 2012 general election.

[7]Interview with the author 09/12/2012.

I conceptualized non-selectorate members' leverage in terms of their ability to provide campaign effort. Yet, my case studies suggested that campaign effort may not be the only source of leverage. When choosing a leader, selectorate members who prioritized the party's electoral welfare should also be concerned about negative, non-campaign-related reactions from party members, as this harms the party's opinion poll ratings. Thus, non-selectorate members' influences are not restricted to physical campaigns during general elections. These members could either promote the image of a united party, or generate negative media attention by dissenting against the selectorate's leadership choice. Further investigations into the possible reactions from the non-selectorate will offer a more comprehensive understanding on how non-selectorate members affect a party's electoral well-being.

It is also important to address how leadership candidates' valence qualities, such as competence and charisma, affect the dynamics of a leadership selection. Literature on parties and elections has largely supported the idea that valence is electorally advantageous in a general election.[8] Yet, a leadership candidate with high valence may induce mistrust among party activists, since the candidate may end up abusing his or her office-seeking incentive and refuse to promote the activists' more extreme policy positions. Thus, there is a need to consider how this type of valence affects the outcome of a leadership election. Because activists may shy away from rallying behind leadership candidates with high valence qualities, my conjecture is that all else equal, high activist influence in a leadership selection reduces the likelihood of a party leader with high valence qualities, such as charisma.

8.4 Broader Implications on Parties and Elections

One implication of this dissertation's findings is that intra-party politics affects a party's overall electoral well-being. For the Swedish Social Democratic Party's selection of Håkan Juholt, several district party leaders' intransigence against supporting vote-attracting lead-

[8]See Bean, Clive, and Anthony Mughan. 1989. "Leadership Effects in Parliamentary Elections in Australia and Britain." *American Political Science Review* 83 (4): 1165-1179. Also see King, Anthony, ed. 2002. *Leaders' Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ership candidates resulted in an ineffective leader who caused the party's dramatic downturn in opinion poll ratings. Similarly, for the British Conservative Party, some Eurosceptic and socially conservative MPs refused to vote for the electorally popular Kenneth Clarke or Michael Portillo, and instead supported Iain Duncan Smith, the more politically extreme candidate. When Duncan Smith and Clarke were presented to the membership vote, the majority of Conservative members chose Duncan Smith, who exacerbated the party's public opinion crisis.

These patterns highlight the need to uncover the conditions that motivate party members to prioritize advocacy in expense of the party's electoral well-being, and the conditions that incentivize them to put electoral welfare first. One way to do so is to explore how intra-party institutional reform influences party members' strategic incentives and alters a party's electoral performance. For example, within the framework of mechanism design, if an election loss results in a shift in party members' policy preferences and goals, then the party's internal power structure may no longer be compatible to the incentives of all types of party members. Under this environment, one group may become strategically advantaged in dictating the party's policy direction, while another group may become disadvantaged. If party activists are the advantaged group, the party's electoral performance may suffer. Institutional reform may be able to improve the party's electoral fortunes by dampening the influences of party members with more extreme policy positions.

My findings also imply that intra-party dynamics affect a party's policy positions. The opposition parties studied in this dissertation had all, at one time, selected leaders who were more extreme than the general electorate, even though these parties would be better off electorally by choosing more moderate leaders. This implies that the party's rank-and-file members are not only an integral component of leadership choice, but may also be important for determining the party's overall policy direction. Politically extreme activists sometimes refuse to campaign on more popular policy positions, even though these positions can improve the party's performance at the polls. They may also be able to lobby MPs against voting for certain bills in the legislature. Thus, it is essential to examine when party activists can

pressure the party into promoting issues that will hurt its vote share, and when they are willing to support a more moderate set of policy positions. Investigating issue position-taking through the lens of intra-party conflict is essential in understanding the nature of policy competition, both in the legislature and in general elections.