

On the Performance and Use of Government Revenue Forecasts

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Introduction

Over the years, a key issue in the design of fiscal policy rules has been the accuracy of government budget forecasts, particularly those of tax revenues. During the early years of the Reagan administration, “supply-side” forecasts of budget surpluses gave way to the reality of large deficits that persisted into the 1990s, despite several policy changes aimed at deficit reduction (Auerbach 1994). The persistence of overly optimistic forecasts led to the perception that, as budget forecasts came to occupy a more central role in the policy process, the pressure on forecasters to help policy makers avoid hard choices led to forecasting bias. However, the experience of recent years suggests that prior conclusions may need to be amended.

The remarkable U.S. economic expansion of the 1990s has also been a challenging period for government revenue forecasters, but with different consequences than before. Continual surprises as to the overall strength of the U.S. economy and the share of income going to those in the top income tax brackets have led to a series of what turned out to be overly pessimistic aggregate revenue forecasts. Large predicted deficits gave way to smaller predicted deficits and, ultimately, the realization of budget surpluses and the forecast of larger surpluses to come. These large revisions have had a significant impact on the budget process of a government that has lashed itself to the mast of revenue forecasts to help it withstand the political sirens in its path. Even without such budget rules, though, revenue forecasts would remain an important input to the design of fiscal policy, for they provide a sense of what fiscal actions are sustainable over the longer term.

Some critics of the recent government revenue forecasts have suggested a bias, albeit in the direction opposite to that argued to exist in the earlier period. They point to the size of forecast errors and the consistent sign of these errors in arguing that the forecasters should have

been able to do better. But over short periods, any sequence of individual forecast errors can be given a rational justification, and virtually any statistical error pattern is consistent with an efficient forecasting process that uses all available information in forming its predictions. One needs more data to get a better sense of whether the recent forecasts really are consistent with forecast efficiency, or whether they simply illustrate the continuation of a process of biased forecasting, with perhaps a change in bias.

In this paper, I begin by considering the issue of forecast bias and efficiency. To do so, I augment the recent data in three ways. First, I consider forecasts over a longer period. Second, I compare these government revenue forecasts to contemporaneous private forecasts. Finally, I distinguish forecasting errors according to their source, to get a better idea of the extent to which what are called “errors” are attributable to institutional forecasting conventions. After performing this data analysis, I go on to consider its implications for the forecasting process, and the use to which revenue forecasts should be put.

The results of analyzing the data are mixed. On the one hand, the performance of government forecasters – the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) – has not differed significantly from that of the private forecaster, Data Resources, Inc., (DRI). Further, over the full period considered, there is no evidence that either OMB or CBO has been overly pessimistic in its revenue forecasts. The recent string of overly pessimistic forecasts is balanced by an even more impressive string of overly optimistic forecasts in the years immediately preceding the current expansion. Even when the “pessimistic” and “optimistic” periods are considered separately, forecast errors have such large standard errors that it is difficult to conclude that the forecasts exhibit any underlying bias.

On the other hand, I also find that the government forecasts fail various statistical tests of efficiency; in principle, the process could be improved. In particular, the forecast revisions exhibit significant serial correlation and, perhaps more puzzling, the patterns of bias in revisions exhibit strong seasonality.

These results suggest that government revenue forecasts could convey more information than they do at present. But without understanding the reasons for existing forecast inefficiency, it is not clear how to accomplish this objective. Further, the large standard errors associated with the forecasts remind us of the care needed in the use of point estimates for policy purposes. Because the budget process ignores the uncertainty inherent in individual forecasts, the “best” forecasts for budget purposes need not be the most accurate point estimates; it might well be appropriate, for example, for these forecasts to reflect a pessimistic bias. In short, the requirements of forecast efficiency and those of a poorly conceived budget process are inconsistent. Perhaps both needs would be best served simultaneously through a separation of forecasting into “official” and “unofficial” functions, although it is unclear how such functions can be kept distinct.

Data and Methodology

Twice each year (and, on occasion, more frequently), CBO and OMB produce revenue forecasts for the current and several upcoming fiscal years. One forecast typically occurs around the beginning of February with the presentation of the *Federal Budget* by OMB and the roughly coincident *Economic and Budget Outlook* published by CBO. The second typically occurs in August or September, with OMB’s *Midsession Review* and CBO’s *Economic and Budget*

Outlook: An Update. For most of the sample period, both winter and summer forecasts have been for six fiscal years, including the one ending September 30 of the same year.¹

In revising its revenue forecasts for a particular year, each government agency incorporates changes in its own economic forecasts as well as estimates of the effects of policy changes. For a number of years, both CBO and OMB have followed the practice of dividing each forecast revision into three mutually exclusive categories: *policy*, *economic*, and *technical*. *Policy* revisions are those attributed to changes from “baseline” policy. *Economic* revisions are changes attributed to macroeconomic events. *Technical* revisions are residual, containing changes that the agency attributes neither to policy nor to macroeconomic changes. For example, a technical revision in revenue would result from a change in the rate of tax evasion, a shift in the composition of capital income from dividends to capital gains, or a change in the distribution of income.

We may express this revision process as:

$$(1) \quad x_{i,t} - x_{i+1,t-1} = p_{i,t} + e_{i,t} + r_{i,t}$$

where $x_{i,t}$ is the i -step-ahead forecast at date t and $p_{i,t}$, $e_{i,t}$, and $r_{i,t}$ are the policy, economic, and technical components of the revision in this forecast from period $t-1$. For CBO, these semiannual data on revisions are available continuously from 1984 through the present. While OMB does not publish comparable forecasts, it has produced them internally for revenues over roughly the same period, for the same forecast horizons as are considered by CBO. For the two agencies together, comparable semiannual data are continuously available for revisions during

¹ Recently, CBO has begun to report forecasts over an eleven-year horizon.

the period from the summer of 1985 to the winter of 1999.² Initially, I analyze the sample that begins one forecasting period later, with the revision between forecasts made in the summer of 1985 and the winter of 1986, for this is the first period for which I have been able to obtain comparable DRI forecasts.³ For the corresponding DRI forecasts, though, only the aggregate revisions, $x_{i,t} - x_{i+1,t-1}$, are available.

Because there are two forecasts made each year for revenues in each of six fiscal years, there are twelve forecast horizons and twelve corresponding revisions for the revenues of each fiscal year being predicted. The last such revision, however, differs from the others, in that it reflects changes over the very brief period between the late summer forecast during the fiscal year itself and the September 30 end of that fiscal year.⁴ Thus, for the statistical analysis below, I consider only the first eleven forecast revisions for each fiscal year, labeling these revisions 1 (shortest horizon, from winter to summer during the fiscal year itself) through 11 (longest horizon, five years earlier). Odd-numbered revisions are those occurring between winter and summer; even-numbered revisions are those occurring between summer and winter. I refer to the final revision, occurring between the final forecast and the end of the fiscal year, as revision 0.

Figure 1 illustrates the timing of revisions made by OMB during the last full fiscal year in the sample, 1998, showing the correspondence between revision horizons and fiscal years. For

² Actually, OMB and CBO data on overall revisions $x_{i,t} - x_{i+1,t-1}$ – but not their breakdown by source – may be constructed for a longer period from successive revenue forecasts, $x_{i,t}$. For an analysis of revisions during this earlier period, see Plesko (1988).

³ DRI makes forecasts at 3-year horizons monthly, but publishes long-range (10-year) forecasts only twice a year – currently in May and November, but with some timing changes over the years. For purposes of comparison with the forecasts of CBO and OMB, I align the May and November forecasts with the CBO and OMB forecasts immediately following.

⁴ Indeed, CBO does not provide a breakdown of this last forecast revision into components.

example, the revision at horizon 5 included in the 1998 *Midsession Review* was the change in forecast revenue for fiscal year 2000 from that given one period earlier, in winter 1998.

Revision Patterns

Table 1 presents basic means for OMB, CBO and DRI forecast revisions, for the period 1986-99. To ensure that revisions from different years comparable, each revision is scaled by a projected value of the revenue being forecast, based on an exponential time trend, and expressed as a percentage of trend revenue (i.e., multiplied by 100). The mean cumulative revision equals the sum of the means at each horizon; it represents an estimate of the cumulative revision (as a percentage of trend revenues) during the period from initial to final published forecast for a particular fiscal year's revenue.⁵

A basic implication of the theory of optimal forecast behavior is that forecasts should have no systematic bias, at least if the perceived costs of forecast errors are symmetric. Over a long enough period, then, the mean forecast errors should not differ significantly from zero. Looking at the means in Table 1, then, the most notable aspect of these individual and cumulative averages is that they are reasonably close to zero; they *do not* reveal the huge upward revisions of recent years. Indeed, the OMB and DRI averages indicate net downward revenue revisions, the CBO net is only slightly positive, and all three sets of cumulative revisions average less than 1.5 percent of revenue in absolute value over the six-year revision period – hardly an enormous error.

⁵ Note that this is not equal to the average cumulative error during the period for fiscal years for which complete forecast data are available, for it also incorporates the long-horizon revisions for future fiscal years and short-horizon revisions for fiscal years early in the sample.

However, if one breaks the sample down into periods of roughly equal length defined by the election of Bill Clinton in 1992⁶, as is done in Table 2, it is evident that the aggregate results mask very different experience during the two distinct periods. All three organizations have revised their forecasts sharply upward during this period, with CBO's revisions being greatest and OMB's smallest.

This sharp break in forecast patterns coincident with a change in the political landscape is suggestive. Persistent errors in one direction could be produced by a bias in favor of initial overstatement or understatement of expected revenues. Hence, the observed pattern is consistent with a shift in bias from one favoring overstatement (and hence eventually having to revise revenue forecasts downward) to a bias toward understatement (and eventually having to revise revenue forecasts upward). Indeed, this is a plausible scenario, given the change in climate in 1993, as exemplified by the enactment of a large tax increase. However, any explanation based on government agency bias must confront the fact that the same general pattern of revisions is observed in the forecasts of a private business that, presumably, is not directly influenced by the political incentives and pressures that may color the forecasts of those in government.

Even if it is not the result of any direct bias, DRI's relative performance does not, in itself, rule out the possibility of government agency bias. A bias could spread indirectly if private forecasters had little independent information and there were strong enough incentives not to deviate too much from "consensus" estimates. Such behavior could be justified more formally using models in which a principal must set an agent's compensation and cannot fully identify

⁶ This procedure includes the winter, 1993 revisions in the pre-Clinton period. This set of revisions was the first to use forecasts made by the Clinton administration. Hence, the revisions span the presidential transition. It is not clear how these revisions should be treated, if one wishes to distinguish behavior in the two periods. However, leaving this observation period out or including it in the Clinton period does not have an important impact on the results presented.

the sources of particular errors. Considering relative performance helps distinguish between errors caused by common shocks and those caused by the agent's own limitations (e.g., Holmström 1982), but it may, in turn, lead to an incentive to follow the behavior of others (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Zweibel 1995). The impact of this incentive has been considered (and some of its cross-section implications rejected, notably that forecasters would tend to mimic the predictions of forecasters deemed most competent) in a related context by Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996), who modeled the behavior of professional forecasters predicting Treasury bill rates.

Indeed, the DRI forecast revisions are strongly correlated with those of CBO and OMB. While the CBO and OMB revisions have a correlation coefficient of .63, the correlations between DRI and the two agencies are .54 (CBO) and .39 (OMB), values made all the more remarkable by the fact that the timing of the DRI forecasts differs from those of OMB and CBO. However, with so little data and so few forecasters, it is not really possible to tell whether this strength of correlation reflects excessive reliance on government projections, or simply the lack of independent information. After all, it is not clear how important it is for a private forecaster to obtain information and make accurate forecasts about government revenues. While clients may see a direct financial gain from having superior information about the movement of interest rates, there is no organized market directly tied to the level of government revenues.

Yet another possible explanation for the observed pattern of government forecast revisions is that the aggregate forecasts considered thus far do not really represent statistical predictions of future revenues, but rather “baseline” projections that incorporate assumptions about future policy that are inconsistent with optimal forecasting procedures. By practice, baseline forecasts of policy are in some cases determined by certain mechanical rules that do not

reflect expectations regarding future policy. As a consequence, many of the revisions attributed to policy changes do not represent “surprises,” but simply the application of these rules.

Therefore, if one wishes to determine the extent to which forecasts reflect the unbiased and efficient use of available information, it is useful to exclude policy revisions from the analysis.

One might further divide the remaining revisions into their “economic” and “technical” components, making it possible, potentially, to determine the extent to which forecasting errors arise from underlying macroeconomic forecasts, as opposed to other factors. This would be a useful exercise, as the macroeconomic forecasts and the ultimate revenue projections are typically done in stages by separate groups of individuals. However, the distinction between these two components is somewhat arbitrary. For example, the impact of revisions to the macroeconomic forecast that are anticipated but not yet “official” at the time of a revenue forecast may be incorporated as a “technical” element.

Some initial analysis suggests that the components do not represent “independent” sources of error, and that OMB and CBO use different methodologies to divide forecast revisions into these two categories.⁷ Thus, I focus only on these two components together for each agency, represented by the sum $e_{i,t} + r_{i,t}$ in expression (1). For compactness of notation, I refer to this sum as $y_{i,t}$. Unfortunately, the same exercise cannot be conducted for the DRI forecasts, revisions of which are not broken down by category.

⁷ Particularly for OMB, the technical and economic revisions are not independent. At all but the longest horizon, the OMB technical and economic forecast revisions are negatively correlated. Also, while technical and economic revisions are both highly correlated at contemporaneous horizons across agencies (with coefficients of .73 and .64, respectively), the combined sums of economic and technical revisions are even more highly correlated (.77). By contrast, the policy revisions have a correlation coefficient of only .22, suggesting stronger differences in procedures.

Table 3 repeats the calculations of Tables 1 and 2 for CBO and OMB, excluding revisions attributed to policy changes.⁸ In its first three sets of columns, the table presents estimates for the full sample period, the pre-Clinton (1986-93) period, and the Clinton (1993-99) period. Looking first at the cumulative means, we note that they are lower for both agencies for the full sample, meaning that policy revisions over the period as a whole are estimated to have increased revenues.⁹ This is also true for the pre-Clinton period, but only true for CBO during the Clinton period, suggesting a divergence between OMB and CBO in the conventions used for determining baseline policy. The cumulative forecast revisions for both OMB and CBO are negative over the entire period, in contrast to the recent experience.

An interesting question that arises is whether these average forecast errors, in particular the cumulative errors, are significant. That is, could these large (in absolute value) average forecast errors from the two separate sample periods reasonably have come from an unbiased forecasting process? As calculation of the standard errors of these cumulative forecasts requires that we take account the correlation of forecasts across time and, at each date, across horizons, we return to it after such correlations have been estimated and considered.

Aside from the strong break between the two periods evident in Table 3, we note one other anomaly of the forecasts. The revisions at odd horizons are generally of higher mean than the revisions at even horizons. This pattern is remarkable, in that it holds for both agencies in both subsamples, for which the overall means are quite different. In terms of timing, this suggests that there is a tendency to be more optimistic in the summer than in the winter. There may be differences in the institutional procedures for preparing the documents at the different

⁸ The table also excludes revisions at horizon 0, which are available only for OMB and typically smaller in magnitude than those made over full revision periods.

⁹ I return below to the issue of whether these estimates of policy impacts, themselves, may be systematically biased.

times of the year, but there is not any obvious reason for more bias toward pessimism in the winter, at the time of initial budget presentation. Indeed, one might have expected the opposite result, that the pressure toward optimism would be stronger for those initial forecasts given more attention and hence carrying greater political weight.

Some further insight into this pattern comes from breaking the pre-Clinton period down even further. The first part of this period, ending with the summer, 1990 revision, corresponds roughly the era under which the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) budget rules were in force – an era that ended with fall, 1990 “budget summit.” The GRH legislation, first passed in 1985 and later amended, set a deficit target trajectory and required that each year’s budget, as submitted by the president, conform to that year’s GRH target. Subsequently, during the actual fiscal year itself, based on the estimate contained in the *Midsession Review*, GRH could trigger a sequestration process of automatic budget cuts to meet the budget target. In terms of our notation, these two aspects of GRH would lead to greater pressure for optimistic forecasts at horizon 4 (to satisfy the GRH requirement with the initial budget presentation) and horizon 1 (to avoid sequestration with the current fiscal year’s *Midsession Review*). It is less clear what this implies for the forecast *revisions*, except perhaps that the revisions at horizon 4 should have been relatively more optimistic.

The last two columns of Table 3 present mean economic and technical revisions for the GRH period for both OMB and CBO. The revision pattern *was* different for OMB during the GRH period. In fact, the shift in seasonal pattern is observable not just around horizon 4, but at all other horizons as well, with the even horizons now exhibiting more “optimism;” perhaps the greater optimism of budget-year forecasts spilled over into the other forecasts being made simultaneously. For such a short sample period, though, it is difficult to know whether this shift

was attributable to GRH or to something else. After all, mean revisions during the GRH period were also much less negative than those from the remainder of the pre-Clinton era, which covered the 1990-91 recession and the period of relatively slow growth that immediately followed. Indeed, the onset of that recession contributed to the demise of GRH, as deficit targets became unachievable. But it is interesting that this seasonal shift is not present in the parallel forecast revisions of CBO, which was not directly affected by the GRH legislation.

Forecast Evaluation

Using the individual revisions underlying the means in Table 3, one can construct formal tests of forecast efficiency. Consider the relationship between successive forecast revisions for the same fiscal year, $y_{i,t}$ and $y_{i+1,t-1}$. According to theory, if each forecast is unbiased and uses all information available at the time, these revisions should have a zero mean and should be uncorrelated. Letting a_i be the mean forecast revision for horizon i , we relate these successive forecasts by the equation:

$$(2) \quad y_{i,t} - a_i = r_i (y_{i+1,t-1} - a_{i+1}) + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

or

$$(3) \quad y_{i,t} = r_i y_{i+1,t-1} + a_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

where $a_i = a_i - r_i a_{i+1}$ and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ has zero mean and is serially independent.¹⁰ The hypothesis of forecast efficiency implies that $a_i = 0$ (no bias) and $r_i = 0$ (no serial correlation).

¹⁰ For revisions at horizon 11, there is no lagged revision, so expressions (2) and (3) become $y_{11,t} = a_{11} + \epsilon_{11,t} = a_{11} + \epsilon_{1,t}$.

The mean values, a_i , in expression (2) have already been presented, in Table 3. Table 4 presents estimates¹¹ of the coefficients r_i for OMB and CBO¹². The table presents estimates based on two alternative assumptions regarding the sample period. The first is that values of a_i and a_i are constant throughout the period, the second that the means differ between the pre-Clinton and Clinton periods. The table also lists standard errors for each coefficient, r_i . At the bottom of each column of estimates are p-values corresponding to F-tests of three joint hypotheses related to forecast efficiency.¹³ The first is that all means are zero for the agency in question ($a_i \equiv 0$); the second, for the case in which separate subsample means are allowed thorough the use of dummy variables d_i , is that the differences in means across subsamples are zero ($d_i \equiv 0$). The third is that all correlation coefficients are zero ($r_i \equiv 0$). Of the first two sets of tests, only the test of different means for CBO fails to be rejected at the .05 level of significance.

The coefficients in the first panel of the table, based on common means, show substantial serial correlation for both agencies. The finding of serial correlation in revenue forecasts is not a new one. For example, Campbell and Ghysels (1995) report some evidence of serial correlation in aggregate annual OMB forecasts. As discussed above, one might have expected some of this serial correlation to be due to the presence of the policy component in each forecast. However, it turns out that eliminating the policy components of the successive revisions actually strengthens the results, typically increasing the estimated serial correlation coefficients.

All serial correlation coefficients based on the common means are positive, and the hypothesis that all are zero is strongly rejected. This suggests a partial adjustment mechanism,

¹¹ The estimation is based on the full sample, using lagged values from the summer, 1985 revision.

¹² Formally, these coefficients are correlation coefficients only if the variances of forecasts at successive horizons are the same. However, sample variances typically do not vary much across horizons.

¹³ These tests are based on the estimated variance-covariance matrix of each agency's contemporaneous revisions for different horizons, and so reflect the strong correlation among these revisions.

with not all new information immediately incorporated into forecasts. One can readily imagine institutional reasons for such inertia. For example, it might be perceived as costly to change a forecast and then rescind the change, leading to a tendency to be cautious in the incorporation of new information in forecasts. However, the serial correlation patterns differ between the two agencies.

While the CBO coefficients in Table 4 have a fairly smooth pattern over different horizons, the OMB correlations exhibit a strong seasonal variation. Even-numbered revisions – those made in the winter – are strongly dependent on those made the previous summer. Odd-numbered revisions – those made in the summer – are relatively independent of those made the previous winter. As with the seasonality exhibited by the means for both agencies in Table 3, it is difficult to understand this pattern. Recall that we are looking at forecast revisions, not the forecasts themselves. Thus, this strong serial dependence cannot be explained, for example, by a lack of new information in winter forecasts. This would cause the winter *forecasts* to be strongly correlated with those of the previous summer, but it would suggest that the winter *revisions* should typically be small in magnitude, rather than strongly correlated with previous revisions.

Given the fact that the full sample includes two very different subsamples, one might infer that these estimates of high serial correlation simply reflect a regime shift, i.e., a long period negative revisions followed by a long period of positive revisions. This is true to some extent, as allowing separate means for the two sample periods (as shown in the second and third panels of Table 3) does reduce the estimated serial correlation coefficients for CBO. A joint test that the CBO serial correlation coefficients are zero cannot now be rejected at any standard level of significance. However, the change in the OMB coefficients is less consistent. Indeed, there is even greater evidence of seasonality in this second panel of the table, and the joint test that the

OMB correlation coefficients are zero is still strongly rejected.¹⁴ As just discussed, a distinct question is how much new information is incorporated into the forecasts at different horizons. Table 5 provides an answer. For each forecast horizon, it lists the standard error of estimate, equal to the standard deviation of that part of the revision not explained by expression (3).¹⁵ It is a measure of how much new information is incorporated at each horizon, as represented by the magnitude of the unpredictable component of a typical revision. Depending on the agency and estimation procedure, the table does provide some evidence that even-numbered revisions add less information, in that the residual variance is smaller at these horizons. This makes sense, as perhaps the single largest source of new information for revenue forecasts, the annual filing of tax returns, occurs in April, during the odd revision period. However, the differences at odd and even horizons are not great. Even for OMB, the even-numbered revisions appear to incorporate substantial new information.

One last question that the estimates in Table 4 can be used to answer is that raised earlier, whether the cumulative mean forecast errors in Table 3 are significantly different from zero. Using expressions (2) and (3), we can recover estimates of the individual means a_i and their associated covariance matrix, from which we can construct a t-test that the sum of the individual means is zero.

The results of these tests are given at the bottom of Table 3. One cannot reject the hypothesis of a zero mean for either agency for the sample as a whole. However, perhaps more surprising is that only one of the four subsample means – for CBO projections during the pre-

¹⁴ On the other hand, if serial correlation follows a first-order process, there is now essentially no serial correlation at the *annual* frequency for the OMB estimates, as represented by the product of successive serial correlation coefficients.

¹⁵ In constructing these standard errors, I divide the sum of squared residuals by the number of observations, rather than by the number of degrees of freedom, as the observations at odd and even horizons differ in sample size.

Clinton period – differs significantly from zero at the .05 level. In particular, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the huge, persistent forecast errors since 1993 come from a distribution with zero mean. The explanation is straightforward. Although we apparently have a lot of data for this period (66 separate forecast revisions for each agency), the contemporaneous revision at different horizons are highly correlated and, as we saw in Table 4, so are the revisions reported at different dates. Thus, our effective sample size is substantially smaller – a single large forecasting error will influence several of our observations. In fact, the p-values in Table 3 may overstate significance levels, if the underlying forecast revisions are not drawn from a normal distribution. A test for normality of forecast errors (a joint test for skewness and kurtosis) is accepted for OMB, but not for CBO.

We thus have two separate sets of conclusions. First, CBO and OMB are not producing optimal forecasts. Second, the forecasts that they are producing are subject to so much uncertainty that even very large and persistent errors do not offer conclusive evidence of any underlying bias.

The Potential Impact of Taxpayer Behavior

Another implication of forecast efficiency is that forecast revisions should not depend on information available to the forecasters at the time that the initial forecast was made. Failing to take account of such information is one potential source of bias and serial correlation, depending on the nature of the information being ignored. When one considers the behavioral impact of tax changes, “ignoring” information would amount to incorporating systematically incorrect forecasts of taxpayer response; for example, forecasts might systematically understate the strength of taxpayer reaction.

The logic is simple. If revenue estimates overstate the impact of tax increases then, during the period after which taxes increase, there will be subsequent downward revisions in estimated revenue, as estimators realize that they initially had overestimated the impact of the policy change.¹⁶ If this realization occurs over time, it would impart serial correlation to the revisions. If the tax changes being evaluated tend to be in one direction or another during the sample period, this could also impart a bias to the forecast revisions, causing excessive optimism in a period of tax increases and excessive pessimism in a period of tax reductions.

One approach to testing this hypothesis involves regressing the combined economic and technical revisions on lagged policy revisions (thus far excluded from the statistical analysis) for the same fiscal year, a procedure introduced in Auerbach (1994, 1995). However, estimation using the OMB and CBO data, for a variety of lagged policy revisions, in no cases led to a significant effect, and in most cases led to insignificant effects of the wrong sign (a positive coefficient).

These findings stand in contrast to those reported in Auerbach (1995), where I found significant effects in an examination of short-horizon OMB revenue forecasts. However, there are at least four differences between the two data sets that can help explain the difference in findings. First, the prior study did not include observations from recent years, during which the large tax increases of 1993 were followed by stronger than predicted revenue growth. Second, the earlier paper considered just technical forecast errors, which I argued there should show more evidence of behavioral response, for they represent precisely the errors that cannot be explained by macroeconomic phenomena. Third, that study found significant effects only for certain

¹⁶ Systematic errors of this sort would not occur simply as a result of the convention of excluding macroeconomic feedback effects from estimates of the impact of policy changes. While such feedback effects are not attributed to individual policies, they are, in principle, incorporated in subsequent macroeconomic forecasts. Thus, if feedback effects were estimated correctly, there would be no need for subsequent forecast revisions.

disaggregate revenue categories (corporate tax revenues and excise tax revenues), not for the aggregate revenue category being considered here. Finally, as emphasized above, the policy revisions to forecasts do not necessarily measure true changes in policy, but simply changes in the “baseline,” which need not reflect actual current policy. My earlier paper made use of an alternative series that better measured the policy effects of legislative changes, but such a series is available only for OMB, and only at annual frequencies.

Thus, the current findings do not contradict my earlier ones; we simply lack the data necessary to address the question of taxpayer response in the current context. More generally, these findings in no way rule out the possibility that there could be other types of information available to forecasters at CBO and OMB that are not incorporated in the forecast revisions studied here.

Implications for Forecasting and Policy

It requires a certain boldness to draw strong implications from the empirical results presented above. We don’t really know why the revisions of government forecasts exhibit serial correlation and seasonality, and hence we can’t predict whether this pattern will continue. We can’t rule out the possibility that the seemingly huge and persistent forecast revisions of recent years occurred by chance. But we can safely conclude that the information conveyed by these forecasts and the process by which they are produced is not adequately summarized by the point estimates delivered twice a year to policy makers.

Budget rules currently in effect, and those of earlier periods, don’t account for the fact that revisions are persistent. Nor do they make any allowance for the very large standard errors surrounding each forecast, and the fact that a rational policy response to uncertainty might include some fiscal precaution, much as a household would engage in precautionary saving when

facing an uncertain future.¹⁷ For example, even if a zero deficit were an appropriate target (and there are good reasons why it probably is not, given the looming fiscal pressures of demographic transition), it might be optimal to structure revenues and expenditures so that an unbiased forecast would predict a surplus. Therefore, in reaction to the fact that budget rules are based only on point estimates of revenue, it might be optimal to build a downward bias into these point estimates. This illustrates the difficulty of producing forecasts intended simultaneously to provide information and to act as inputs to the budget process.

To this state of affairs, one might suggest a number of responses.

First, take whatever measures may be available to improve current forecasting methods. This recommendation undoubtedly falls into the category of “easier said than done,” but there must be some explanation for the anomalous pattern of forecast revisions discussed above. Perhaps the explanation lies in the use of mechanical rules, even for the economic and technical components of forecasts, in accordance with certain requirements of the budget process. Alternatively, the pattern may reflect the various incentives present when budget forecasts play such a central role in the policy process. If either of these explanations applies, then the problem may also be addressed by the some of the remaining suggestions.

Second, as it is probably unrealistic (and perhaps also unwise) to consider incorporating greater sophistication into budget rules, reduce the mechanical reliance of policy on such rules. As a vast literature elucidates, there are trade-offs of costs and benefits in adopting rules. As to the benefits, many believe that the rules provide credibility to fiscal discipline that would be lacking otherwise. This may or may not be so. But rules also impose costs, by restricting the flexibility of policy responses. While such restriction is inevitable when rules are imposed,

¹⁷ For a discussion of the impact of uncertainty on optimal fiscal policy, see Auerbach and Hassett (1998).

being bound by budget rules that so fully ignore available information seems to present very significant costs as well.

Third, don't ask even more of the forecasting process than we presently do, at least until the previous two recommendations are accepted. In particular, don't require "dynamic scoring" for official purposes, or other projections likely to be based on limited information. In brief, dynamic scoring involves incorporating macroeconomic feedback into each individual revenue estimate, as opposed to the current practice simply of updating the baseline over time to take all changes, including those induced by legislation, into account.¹⁸ In principle, dynamic scoring is a good idea, for it permits the legislative process to be based on all available information. But it would require the use of more speculative forecasting procedures, to the extent that reasonable forecasts easily might differ not only in magnitude but also in the sign of estimated policy feedback effects.

Attempting to carry out dynamic scoring in an environment in which forecasts already have statistical difficulties, are produced under political pressure, and are relied on without sufficient caution seems ill-advised, a point that has been recognized for some time. For example, Penner (1982) advocates the use of very mechanical rules for constructing official forecasts, not because they produce the most accurate forecasts, but because there will be little disagreement about how the forecasts should be constructed, and hence little bias in the process. The Appendix below presents a simple model that formalizes this trade-off, confirming that the use of more ambitious, and less easily monitored forecasting methods should hinge on how uncertain these methods are and how much additional information they have the potential to impart.

¹⁸ Auerbach (1996) discusses dynamic scoring and the associated issues in more detail.

Fourth, given the current environment in which forecasts are produced, an attractive evolution of the government forecasting process may be the further development of a parallel, and more ambitious, “unofficial” forecasting approach. An illustration is the long-term budget forecasts produced in recent years by CBO (1997), incorporating macroeconomic feedback, long-term projections and, to some extent, uncertainty. These forecasts have arisen because they serve an important purpose, helping us to understand the long-run fiscal effects of factors such as population aging and the growth of medical expenditures. But they are even less suited than short-run forecasts to a budget process that ignores uncertainty and, inevitably, applies political pressure. If they can remain unhindered by the constraints of budget rules of the type presently in effect, the development of such forecasts actually might provide information of use to thoughtful policy design.

Ultimately, we must confront the fact that budget forecasts currently serve two distinct purposes that are inconsistent, as summary statistics of available information and inputs to the policy process. If we are not able to alter the nature of this second function, then we face a challenge in performing the first. To do so, perhaps it is time to apply to fiscal policy what we have learned about the benefits of an independent monetary authority, and provide some additional autonomy and protection to those in government charged with providing the budget forecasts.

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Appendix

This appendix presents a simple, static model that may be used to illustrate the trade-off that may exist in asking more from the forecasting process, as in the case of “dynamic scoring.”

Suppose that there is a basic information set, say W , which is commonly observed by all. On the basis of this information, the expected value of revenue, x , is, $\bar{x}_\Omega = E(x|W)$. One can think of \bar{x}_Ω as the prediction of a relatively simple, commonly understood forecasting methodology. Let us also assume that the forecasting agency has access to a more comprehensive information set, say P (of which W is a subset), that allows more precise forecasts. The additional information included in P may be viewed as the greater accuracy of a more sophisticated forecasting process that is not transparent or easily verified, such as the incorporation of dynamic feedback effects. This greater accuracy means that, if the true value of x equals the prediction $\bar{x}_\Pi = E(x|P)$ plus a zero-mean stochastic error term, e , then there is an additional, independent, error term, n , involved when forecasting x with the information set W , equal to the error in forecasting \bar{x}_Π . That is, $x = \bar{x}_\Pi + e = \bar{x}_\Omega + n + e$.

Imagine that the government (as distinct from the agency) wishes to ensure that the agency's estimates are as accurate as possible, as represented by minimizing the value of a loss function of its expected squared deviation, $L = E[(\hat{x} - x)^2|W]$, of actual revenue, x , from that predicted by the agency, \hat{x} . Normally, we might expect this objective to lead it to ask the agency to use all its own available information, P , in formulating \hat{x} . However, if the agency's forecasting process is biased, its use of this superior information will not result in a forecast equal to the expected value, \bar{x}_Π .

To make this point concrete, suppose that the agency desires to minimize its own loss function, $L = E [\alpha (\hat{x} - x - q)^2 | P]$, where q represents the bias in its forecasting process. This would lead to a forecast of $\bar{x}_\Pi + q$. If q were observable, the bias would present no problem for the government, which could then make the appropriate adjustment to the agency's biased forecast to recover \bar{x}_Π . But, as it may be difficult to know what the inherent forecasting bias is, it makes sense to treat q as a random variable from the government's viewpoint. For simplicity, we also let the mean of q equal 0, for, as just shown, the deterministic part of q is unimportant.

The government faces a difficult choice in deciding whether to let the agency use its "superior" forecasting process, for this will then also open the door to the inclusion of bias. To see how different factors affect this trade-off, suppose that the government may influence the extent to which the agency bases its forecast on W , rather than P , by imposing a penalty on the agency, $P = b(\hat{x} - \bar{x}_\Omega)^2$, determined by the deviation of the agency's forecast from that based on common information. Setting $b = 0$ will lead the agency to use P to minimize its own loss function, L , while setting $b = \infty$ will cause the agency simply to report the common forecast, \bar{x}_Ω . More generally, its choice of \hat{x} to minimize the sum of its own loss function and the additional penalty, $L + P$, will be the weighted average, $b' \bar{x}_\Omega + (1-b')(\bar{x}_\Pi + q)$, where $b' = b/(b+g)$ ranges from 0 to 1 as b ranges from 0 to ∞ . It is straightforward to show that the value of the relative penalty b' that minimizes the government's expected loss function, L , is $V(q)/[V(q)+V(n)]$, the ratio of the variance of q to the sum of this variance and the variance of n .

Thus, the agency should be encouraged to use its superior information, the greater this informational advantage is (i.e., the larger $V(n)$ is), and the less unpredictable the influence of bias on its unobservable forecasting process (i.e., the smaller $V(q)$ is).

Table 1. Average Forecast Revisions, by Horizon, 1986-1999
(percent of trend revenue)

Forecast Horizon:	OMB	CBO	DRI
0	-0.03	-0.16	0.50
1	0.64	0.43	0.38
2	-0.53	-0.22	0.34
3	0.00	0.57	0.77
4	-0.09	-0.28	0.02
5	-0.09	0.52	-0.40
6	-0.19	-0.23	-0.03
7	-0.38	0.21	-0.37
8	-0.04	-0.09	-0.66
9	-0.40	0.12	-0.48
10	0.15	-0.20	-1.01
11	-0.45	0.13	-0.52
Cumulative	-1.40	0.80	-1.47

Table 2. Average Forecast Revisions, by Horizon, 1986-1999
(percent of trend revenue)

		Pre-Clinton Period (1986-93)			Clinton Period (1993-99)		
		OMB	CBO	DRI	OMB	CBO	DRI
Forecast Horizon:							
	0	-0.29	-0.46	0.07	0.31	0.24	1.08
	1	-0.38	-0.57	-0.33	1.83	1.60	1.19
	2	-1.37	-1.05	-0.80	0.60	0.89	1.86
	3	-0.84	-0.60	-0.15	0.99	1.93	1.83
	4	-0.95	-1.23	-0.53	1.06	0.99	0.75
	5	-0.94	-0.60	-1.90	0.90	1.84	1.35
	6	-0.85	-1.18	-0.17	0.67	1.05	0.14
	7	-1.02	-0.77	-1.72	0.36	1.36	1.20
	8	-0.59	-1.06	-1.20	0.69	1.22	0.06
	9	-0.87	-0.81	-1.87	0.16	1.21	1.15
	10	-0.20	-1.22	-1.74	0.62	1.16	-0.03
	11	-0.94	-0.90	-1.85	0.13	1.33	1.04
Cumulative		-9.23	-10.48	-12.17	8.32	14.81	11.61

Table 3. Average Economic + Technical Forecast Revisions, by Horizon, 1986-1999

(percent of trend revenue)

Sample Period:		1986-99		1986-93		1993-99		GRH Period 1986-90	
		OMB	CBO	OMB	CBO	OMB	CBO	OMB	CBO
Forecast Horizon:									
	1	0.63	0.52	-0.35	-0.40	1.78	1.59	-0.06	0.09
	2	-0.63	-0.61	-1.61	-1.71	0.66	0.87	-0.32	-0.75
	3	0.13	0.41	-0.84	-0.65	1.25	1.65	-0.78	-0.18
	4	-0.76	-0.65	-1.97	-1.87	0.85	0.99	-0.36	-0.93
	5	0.01	0.25	-1.00	-0.70	1.19	1.36	-0.93	-0.23
	6	-0.82	-0.50	-1.81	-1.68	0.50	1.06	-0.18	-0.98
	7	-0.15	-0.02	-1.10	-0.88	0.96	0.98	-0.81	-0.47
	8	-0.74	-0.43	-1.60	-1.67	0.41	1.22	-0.10	-1.07
	9	-0.08	-0.13	-0.97	-0.92	0.96	0.79	-0.42	-0.41
	10	-0.70	-0.53	-1.48	-1.84	0.33	1.20	-0.06	-1.34
	11	-0.12	-0.15	-1.04	-1.02	0.95	0.86	-0.43	-0.33
Cumulative		-3.24	-1.85	-13.78	-13.34	9.85	12.57	-4.46	-6.60
p-value (t-test)		.7582	.9126	.0883	.0131	.0895	.1019		
Cumulative = 0									

Table 4. Serial Correlation of Successive Economic + Technical Forecast Revisions, by Horizon, 1986-1999

Treatment of Subsamples:	Common Means				Separate Means			
	OMB		CBO		OMB		CBO	
Forecast Horizon:	Coeff.	Std. Error	Coeff.	Std. Error	Coeff.	Std. Error	Coeff.	Std. Error
1	0.52	0.17	0.70	0.24	0.34	0.25	0.57	0.28
2	0.81	0.21	0.56	0.14	0.69	0.23	0.34	0.16
3	0.19	0.19	0.61	0.26	0.03	0.22	0.42	0.24
4	1.28	0.21	0.67	0.16	1.30	0.27	0.37	0.21
5	0.11	0.24	0.59	0.31	-0.03	0.20	0.38	0.29
6	1.28	0.17	0.71	0.14	1.45	0.31	0.37	0.22
7	0.07	0.24	0.50	0.32	-0.01	0.19	0.31	0.31
8	1.21	0.26	0.71	0.14	1.35	0.42	0.34	0.22
9	0.08	0.19	0.39	0.32	0.05	0.15	0.19	0.32
10	1.16	0.39	0.60	0.16	1.37	0.53	0.21	0.20
p-value (F-test) $a_i \equiv 0$.0290		.0213		.0037		.0012	
p-value (F-test) $d_i \equiv 0$	--		--		.0009		.1165	
p-value (F-test) $r_i \equiv 0$.0000		.0011		.0006		.2218	

Table 5. Standard Errors of Estimate, Economic + Technical Forecast Revisions, by Horizon, 1986-1999

Treatment of Subsamples:	Common Means		Separate Means	
	OMB	CBO	OMB	CBO
Forecast Horizon:				
1	1.80	1.65	1.64	1.62
2	1.24	1.40	1.20	1.16
3	1.87	1.88	1.59	1.79
4	1.32	1.58	1.32	1.29
5	1.67	1.68	1.25	1.59
6	1.21	1.42	1.18	1.10
7	1.58	1.50	1.18	1.41
8	1.43	1.51	1.41	1.09
9	1.57	1.54	1.22	1.44
10	1.86	1.67	1.82	1.19
11	1.62	1.87	1.25	1.59

Figure 1. Timing of Forecast Revisions During Fiscal Year 1998

Winter 1998: Fiscal Year 1999 Budget		Summer 1998: Midsession Review	
Revision Horizon	For Fiscal Year	Revision Horizon	For Fiscal Year
0	1997	1	1998
2	1998	3	1999
4	1999	5	2000
6	2000	7	2001
8	2001	9	2002
10	2002	11	2003