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Marshaling Culture:

Strategies of Japanese Mobilization in Colonial Taiwan

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by

Winifred Kai-wen Chang

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Professor Richard von Glahn, Chair

In 1895, Japan annexed Taiwan, nominally ruled by China, and embarked on a period of expansion that only ceased at the end of World War II. Aside from military force, early colonial policies preserved Taiwanese lifestyles and sought the acceptance of Japanese rule. The colonial government administered cultural policies centered on sentimentality to remake Taiwanese people of aborigine and Han origin into Japanese citizens and imperial subjects amenable to mobilization. New standards of citizenship based on emotional affinity and sympathy were constructed for the Taiwanese, whose feelings and consequent actions became crucial for their positions in the empire. Japanese official documents, newspapers, and textbooks are evidence of Japanese manipulation of Taiwanese emotions and identity in order to motivate submission and collaboration. Martial ideals involving violence were broadly imparted through literacy and ethics. When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the colonial apparatus aimed to cultivate genuine self-effacing love for Japan, convertible into direct participation in the war effort by Taiwanese men, women, and children. Stories of patriotic emotional outbursts and

moving though violent deaths were disseminated through schools and the press, perpetuating a focus on the empire despite wartime hardships increasingly troubling for the Taiwanese people in their everyday experiences. Generally, Japanese cultural strategies were more effective for Taiwanese born in the last three decades of Japanese rule. However, Japan could not completely harness Taiwanese emotions. Apart from patriotism, sources generated by Taiwanese people such as diaries and postwar oral histories demonstrate ambivalence, apathy, avoidance and pretense.

This dissertation chronologically covers the five decades of Japanese rule on Taiwan through three sets of interrelated themes. The first is the paradigm shift in Japanese cultural policy from colonial expediency to wartime necessity. The second is the dialectical relationship between the “cultural” and the “martial,” exemplified by the power of education to effect mobilization. The third consists of the changing ideals and meanings of masculinity and femininity. This dissertation’s focus on the emotional dimension of colonialism affirms individual experiences and agency, sees institutional power as contingent, and contributes to the study of Taiwanese and Japanese history, colonialism, and identity formation.

The dissertation of Winifred Kai-wen Chang is approved.

Andrea S. Goldman

William Marotti

Theodore Hutters

Richard von Glahn, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

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Vita

EDUCATION

M.A. in History (China), 2008, University of California, Los Angeles; Los Angeles, CA
B.A. in History and Philosophy, 2004, Pomona College; Claremont, CA

INVITED TALKS

Preparing for the Final Exam: Wartime Patriotism in Children's Textbooks in Colonial Taiwan.
Conference on Children in Wartime Asia, Pomona College, November 11, 2011.

SELECTED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Model Colony to Imperiled Stronghold: Educating Children on Colonial Taiwan, 1930-45.
Toronto, Canada; The Seventy-first Annual Conference of Association for Asian Studies, March
15-18, 2012.

Imperiled Stronghold or Certain Victory: Between Everyday Life and Extraordinary Performance
in Colonial Taiwan, 1937–1945. International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan; The Fifteenth
Asian Studies Conference Japan, June 25-26, 2011.

Imperiled Stronghold or Certain Victory: Between Everyday Life and Extraordinary Performance
in Colonial Taiwan, 1937–1945. Pomona College, Claremont, CA; ASPAC/WCAAS Joint
Conference, June 17-19, 2011.

The Pen for the Sword: Japanese Management of Emotions and Violence in Pre-War Taiwan.
Honolulu, Hawaii; The Seventieth Annual Conference of Association for Asian Studies, March
31-April 4, 2011.

The Pen for the Sword: Japanese Management of Emotions and Violence in Pre-War Taiwan.
University of Melbourne, Australia; Taiwan Studies Postgraduate Symposium, December 7-8,
2010.

Dōka: Paradoxical Approaches to Difference in Early Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan. National
University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland; Education and Empire: The Sixth Galway Conference on
Colonialism, June 24-26, 2010.

Dōka: Paradoxical Approaches to Difference in Early Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan. Waseda
University, Tokyo, Japan; The Fourteenth Asian Studies Conference Japan, June 19-20, 2010.

Marshaling Culture: Japanese Strategies of Mobilization in Taiwan, 1920-1945. University of
California, Berkeley; 2009 Graduate Workshop on Violence and Social Creativity with Dr. Ashis
Nandy, March 7, 2009.

Newly Imperialist: Early Years of Japanese Colonial Administration and Education in Taiwan.
Modern Chinese History University of California Graduate Conference, June 1, 2008.

Unhonored Veterans: Taiwanese Imperial Soldiers in World War II. UCLA; China Undisciplined,
May 30-31, 2008.

PUBLICATIONS

Book Reviews

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Website, (Sep 2011). [http://asianintegration.org/index.php?option=com_joomlib
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AWARDS, GRANTS, FELLOWSHIPS

American Historical Association Bernadotte E. Schmitt Grant	Jun 2011
UCLA History Department Dissertation Year Fellowship	2011 – 2012
UCLA Center for Japanese Studies Aratani Fellowship	2011 – 2012
UCLA Center for Japanese Studies Sasakawa Fellowship	2011 – 2012
University of Melbourne Taiwan Studies Symposium Travel Grant	Dec 2010
UCLA Rogger International Student Fellowship	2010 – 2011
UCLA Center of Study for Women Conference Travel Grant	Jun 2010
UCLA Center for Chinese Studies Conference Travel Grant	Jun 2010
UCLA Asia Institute Hiroshi Wagatsuma Memorial Fund Fellowship	2010 – 2011
UCLA Center for Japanese Studies Aratani Field Experience Fellowship	2010 – 2011
UCLA History Department Tabor Pre-Dissertation Fellowship	2009 – 2010
UCLA Asia Institute Hiroshi Wagatsuma Memorial Fund Fellowship	2009 – 2010
American Historical Association Bernadotte E. Schmitt Grant	Jun 2009
Sasakawa Japanese Language Study Fellowship	Jun 2009
Pacific Rim Research Program Mini-Grant	Jun 2009
Harvard-Yenching Library Travel Grant	Mar 2009
UCLA History Department Non-Resident Tuition Award	2008 – 2009
UCLA History Department Research Travel Stipend	Jun 2008
Pomona College Scholar	2003 – 2004

Chapter 1: Hard Feelings and Soft Power

“Then in Taishō Year 12 (1923), the attendance of the august Crown Prince was viewed with great honor. The islanders were feverishly enthusiastic with such honor, and welcomed His Highness with profound thankfulness and gratitude, as well as with deepened understanding of themselves as Imperial Subjects.”¹ – *Taiwan Imperial Subject Reader*, 1943

Passages like the one above were prevalent in texts, images, songs, and films propagated by Japan in the course of its colonization of Taiwan. The first word “then” connotes a temporal link between events, underscoring a process that raises several important questions. What happened before 1923 that elicited these feelings in the Taiwanese people? Why were Japanese authorities concerned with feeling? How did the Japanese arouse these emotions? What did the Japanese want to do with these powerful feelings? If the Taiwanese people really conveyed such zeal toward the presence of the Crown Prince, to what extent was it genuine or mere performance? What did it mean to be an Imperial Subject?

Unlike types of propaganda that appeal to rational or instrumental thinking about homeland defense against aggressors, Japanese propaganda used on Taiwan appealed almost exclusively to the emotions. Rather than dismiss such texts as merely tainted with political signification, it is necessary to delve more into why and how emotional propaganda functioned

¹ Kōmin Bunkō Kankōkai, *Taiwan kōmin dokuhon* 台湾皇民讀本 [*Taiwan imperial subject reader*] (Taipei: Tōdōshoseki kabushiki kaisha, 1943), 93.

or did not function. Words in the passage, such as “honor,” “gratitude,” and “deepened understanding” were intangible and unquantifiable; yet it is possible that their propagandistic value lies in their very vagueness. This passage—published in 1943 about a real event in 1923—focuses above all on the excited (and perhaps exaggerated) reactions of the Taiwanese “islanders.” This emphasis on the Taiwanese responses to the emotional appeals of Japanese colonial propaganda encapsulates the issue and structure of this dissertation.

Introduction

Taiwan has had a long history of colonialism, and as the first colony of Japan, the first non-Western colonial power, it was subjected to a unique series of policies designed to influence its culture from 1895 to 1945. Japan’s involvement in World War II as one of the Axis Powers in the latter years of possessing Taiwan created a context in which Japan sought to remake Taiwanese people into loyal Japanese subjects. At the heart of Japan’s pan-Asian rhetoric, the cultural reconstruction of Taiwan as part of the Japanese empire was meant to serve as an example to the other Asian states.

In general, Japanese rule on Taiwan can be divided into two periods, assimilation (*dōka* 同化; roughly from 1895 to 1937) and imperialization (*kōminka* 皇民化; roughly from 1937 to

the end of the war in 1945).² The period of assimilation was characterized by cultural policies that were geared toward slowly incorporating Taiwanese people into the Japanese empire, often allowing them to retain their own languages, practices, and cultural idiosyncrasies. The period of imperialization, which coincided with increased material and military pressure arising from the Pacific War, was characterized by qualitative and quantitative changes in assimilation policies. Japanese military efforts in the Pacific increasingly taxed Japanese resources at home and in its colonies. Imperialization policies implemented in response to such pressure sought to facilitate the extraction of Taiwanese resources, the most important of which was manpower for military pursuits. In the cultural arena, imperialization policies in Taiwan were pragmatic in their emphasis on the practical utility of colonized peoples as subjects of Japanese Empire in aiding the war effort.

In the imperialization period, Japanese cultural and educational policies emphasized the promotion of Japanese spirit and symbols and patriotism. Myths were created by the Japanese

² For Japanese kanji, both Chinese and Japanese readings of such terms will be listed to denote that the term was or is still meaningful in both Chinese and Japanese. In this particular case, since the words “皇民化” is specific to a Japanese policy stance, only the Japanese reading is listed.

state to create or maintain an affective stronghold in Taiwan.³ The state, in its totalizing impulse, penetrated all aspects of life in its colony. Political ideology permeated education and propaganda more than ever, and various forms of propaganda were used to instill unquestioning loyalty. As Japanese expansion in Asia culminated in a war against the Allied Powers, imperialization policies took a turn for the practical. What these policies sought to accomplish was wartime mobilization in the form of military or civil participation in the war effort. Able-bodied men volunteered for military service, women applied to become battlefield nurses, and children sang songs and wrote stories to inspire those who were directly involved in the war. Cultural policies not only enabled but also encouraged colonized Taiwanese people to participate in activities that had tended to be reserved for Japanese citizens in the assimilation period. Various anecdotes of isolated instances of emotional loyalty became idealized norms through iteration by the Japanese state, repeatedly manifested in stories, textbooks, songs, statues, and other tangible or intangible marks upon Taiwan's memory and landscape.

Taiwan under Japanese colonialism was already a site of multiple colonialisms. By the time the Japanese arrived, Taiwan had already been used as a trading outpost by the Dutch and

³ Zhou Wanyao, *Haixingxi de niandai: Riben zhimin tongzhi moqi Taiwan shilunji* 海行兮的年代: 日本殖民統治末期臺灣史論集 [*The era of going to the sea: historical essays on Taiwan at the end of Japanese colonial rule*] (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2003), chap. 1.

Spanish in the seventeenth century and had been receiving waves of Chinese immigrant settlers for several hundred years as well. While many Taiwanese aborigines retained their traditional practices of hunting and gathering, some aborigines had become more like the Han Chinese. Between 1683 and 1895, Qing administration on Taiwan ensured that the culture and lifestyles brought by southern Chinese immigrants were well in place. As a result, Japanese colonialism had to contend with these preexisting layers of cultural identities. Education and cultural policies under Japanese colonization meant that Taiwanese people of aboriginal or Han Chinese descent had to change their behavior and hearts, and many demonstrated their loyalty to the Japanese cause. Yet, individual struggles and collective resistance do not tell the whole story; complicity and collaboration also inevitably exist in the colonial context. The second half of the Japanese occupation saw the intensification of assimilationist policies in the turn toward imperialization. The renewed concern with the creation of Japanese subjects in Taiwan was to some extent successful on the level of practical mobilization. This dissertation will investigate the reasons and processes involved.

Major Themes

I envision the process of Japanese mobilization of Taiwanese people via several sets of interrelated concepts to understand how Japanese pedagogical practices in education, newspapers,

and propaganda shifted over the course of fifty years of colonization, as did Taiwanese feelings, reactions, and actions. The first overarching axis is defined by paradigm shifts in policy, first for colonial expediency then for wartime necessity. There were pronounced changes in the character and purposes from initial policy to later wartime policy, caused by measurably increased demands on resources and the commensurate increased demand on intangible loyalties.

The second axis, as illustrated by the title for this dissertation, reflects the dialectical relationship between the “cultural” and “martial.” Beginning in 1895, the Japanese actively engaged in a cultural modification of Taiwan that made it easier for foreign rule to take hold until it would be ripe for the provision of military resources. Before the war, Japanese education not only sought to equip Taiwanese people with the Japanese language for the sake of convenient rule, but also prescribed an ever-expanding set of normative standards of what it meant to be more like the Japanese, or at least ideas of what it meant for a Taiwanese person to live on land possessed by the Japanese Empire. During the wartime years, Taiwanese people were made to be devoted to the Japanese war effort, and on some levels to perform more Japanese characteristics: civilians had their roles in logistical support, and Taiwanese soldiers participated in Japanese theaters of battle in Southeast Asia, with varying degrees of voluntariness.

Third, the spectrum of emotion and rationality will be emphasized as the key to explaining why and how Japanese colonialism functioned in Taiwan. “Feelings” have long been

linguistically embedded in Asian political discourse. For example, terms like popular sentiment (C: *minxin*; J: *minshin* 民心) and conditions of the people (C: *minqing*; J: *minjō* 民情) exist in both Chinese and Japanese, and these concepts implicitly address emotional responses.

Furthermore, these examples are both collective terms; it can be inferred that they are comprised of individual emotions, with which the state ought to be concerned. Evidently, when governments considered the welfare of their subjects, they took account not only of their material well-being, but their emotional lives as well. Bringing affective responses to the fore would help clarify the great effort expended by the colonial state on the psychological modification and fortification of the Taiwanese people, as well as the Japanese assumption that influencing feelings could ultimately dictate behavior. My usage of broad terms such as “popular sentiment” follows the usage by the Japanese state in its official pronouncements and newspaper articles to assess the social zeitgeist, but will be defined with greater specificity when dealing with individuals or smaller groups of people. Of course, the Japanese did not simply administer cultural rule; the police apparatus was in place and physical violence was always in the background.

Using these three major themes, I will attempt to show that various aspects of civil, literary, and political culture (C: *wen*; J: *bun* 文) were used to produce military force (C: *wu*; J: *bu* 武); at the same time, emotions considered to be feminine and behavior deemed to be

masculine were merged in mobilization, without regard to whether the mobilized person was male or female. The sentimentalization of patriotism, the convergence of femininity and masculinity in militarization, and the political legitimization of emotions, rather than being undercut by Japan's supposed modern rationalism and logic, actually justified and supported patriotic wartime responses. These actions, whether caused by genuine identification with Japan or by fear of negative consequences for disobedience, could be assessed by the potency of the emotions behind it. In this context, emotions became state-sanctioned and associated with virtue, rather than considered a destabilizing force. During the wartime years, the more emotionally patriotic an act was, the more legitimization it received from the Japanese regime. Furthermore, what was normally considered feminine, the "feeling" of obligation and patriotism, was legitimized through the very masculine act of joining the military.

In this dissertation, the key focus of exploration will be the encouragement of affective display by a rational government. By "rational," I am referring to the notion that the colonial government sought to maximize efficacy of rule in support of Japan's wartime effort. While colonial rule itself always remained rational in this sense, Japanese discourse about Taiwan between 1920 and 1945 tended to promote affective identification with the state. The clear emphasis of Japanese cultural policy on modern education actually sought to do more in terms of inspiring extreme emotion and patriotism rather than promoting rational thought. There are many

examples of Japanese mythmaking in Taiwan, and I intend to use these instances to delineate the trend toward affective extremism in the second half of the Japanese occupation, such as writing letters in blood begging to be allowed to enlist in the military. State pressure on “culture” to become increasingly “martial” was a significant departure from the traditional Chinese practices of separating the civil and the military. The Japanese merging of aesthetics, morality, and war through the valorization of death was yet another way in which culture was made a handmaiden of military pursuit.

While similar policies were implemented in Japan itself, Taiwan’s colonial status necessitated attempts at localizing Japanese patriotism in Taiwan. Instilling love for the Japanese Empire was impossible before eradicating or at least downplaying preexisting affinity to Qing China and all aspects of Chinese culture that had existed in Taiwan for several hundred years due to Chinese settler colonialism. The differences between Japan and Taiwan in 1895 meant that the task of assimilation would require more attention to shaping a discourse of assimilation for the Taiwanese people that on one hand connected Japaneseness simultaneously to the spiritual and modern, while on the other quickly attenuated links to China.

Underlying this study will be a fundamental concern with the shifting identities of the Taiwanese population, their available options, and possibilities for future change. I will show how political ideology molded education, and how education disseminated normative standards

that in turn dialectically induced personal motivation. Furthermore, I will rethink the processes that are involved in the sentimentalization of political and military action. In the context of changing conceptualizations of identity in Taiwan, increasingly based on identification with abstract ideals rather than race or ethnicity, the emotional dimension should also occupy a more central role in identity formation. In present day Taiwan, “identity” has become disconnected from race and ethnicity and accepted as a matter of political, cultural, and personal identification with an extrinsic idea (such as democracy or “Taiwanese-ness”) rather than any intrinsic property. While this study will be primarily concerned with the last twenty-five years of the Japanese occupation, I will also make the connection between past development in the emotional realm and its role in legitimizing the conceptions of identity.

The great cultural enterprise that encouraged sentimental and practical patriotism by the Japanese during the war time was evidently motivated by a belief that emotions have political and military potential. Japanese wartime mobilization was a phenomenon of colliding extremes, the convergence of what one might normally consider to be opposites, such as masculine/feminine or cultural/martial. Wartime conditions merged these traditionally separate ideals, and the cultural and the martial reinforced each other in a cycle that was only brought to an end by the end of the war. The creation of “hard feelings” through the “soft power” of culture, before its contextual conversion into wartime-appropriate behavior, then, is at the heart of this

dissertation.

This dissertation aims to capture Japanese cultural policies and the range of Taiwanese responses, including open rebellion, covert resistance, tacit agreement, ostensible patriotism, and even volunteer participation in the kamikaze squad. In order to understand the unstable colonial relationships, a correspondingly wide range of primary sources are utilized in this dissertation. Sources of various genres each provide a different angle to the story of Japanese military and cultural mobilization of Taiwan. At the most official level, pronouncements and public edicts from Japanese governors-general can be considered the definitive, though non-specific, stance of the Japanese government. Newspapers in Taiwan were published in Chinese and Japanese until Chinese sections were abolished in 1937; they tended to corroborate official positions, but often with a more nuanced understanding of local circumstances. Textbooks published in Taiwan were used for a variety of purposes such as instruction of language and ethics; these are paramount resources for understanding the subtexts of “modern Japanese education.” Diaries by Taiwanese elites will be used to show the effectiveness of colonial policies; more often than not, the educated elite retained some freedom in their behavior. Finally, oral histories conducted by research institutions in Taiwan through interviews will aid in my reconstruction of non-elite views on Japanese colonialism.

The cultural history focus of this dissertation involves interpreting human historical experiences through records of the everyday and traces left by different groups of people, while avoiding the pitfall of overemphasizing the historical roles of elites or institutions. An understanding of the unstable and porous nature of political and social power is also very useful in conceptualizing colonialism as sets of relationships that were not absolute. Cultural history has the potential of explaining aspects of the human past by discovering the subtexts in historical sources. Furthermore, this study acknowledges that colonial policies could often have unintended consequences. This awareness motivates the employment of various types of sources permitting better coverage of the different sectors of Taiwanese society, to hear the voices of both elites and common people.

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Emotions

A study of the emotions involved in the Japanese colonization of Taiwan implicates many historiographical issues and finds many opportunities to intersect disparate fields to construct a research framework. Reading different scholarly fields together helps to create the foundation for this dissertation. This dissertation first draws from secondary sources on emotions, Taiwanese history, Japanese history, and colonialism, and is to a lesser extent supported by studies on gender, Korean and Chinese history, and literature. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is first

necessary to establish that since emotions are significant in human life, their role in historical processes need to be explored. Then, works from the separate but often intertwining fields of Taiwanese history and Japanese history are used to discover how topics such as public sentiment, education, patriotism, and cultural policies have been treated. Beyond these topics of most immediate concern, the scope of the groundwork for this dissertation is broadened to works on gender, European colonialism, Japanese colonization of Korea and Manchuria, and Japanese occupation of China. On the whole, the interdisciplinary and transnational character of this dissertation relies on the fields outlined below.

The study of emotions has generally been a subset under the fields of psychology, anthropology, and literature. While historians may offhandedly employ words such as “public sentiment,” “general mood,” or “collective feeling” in their historical narratives, these words tend to be taken at face value, as an abstract description of how people experienced feelings in history, without necessarily searching for nuance in such “feelings” or clearly defining how they are created, reinforced, or restricted by the state. With the “cultural turn,” some historians have attempted to analyze emotion in historical contexts or in the process of historical change, even while there continues to be debate over the nature of emotions as well as how our perceptions of emotions have continuously evolved. For instance, scholars in philosophy have considered how the medieval European notion of “passions” gradually evolved into “emotions” as a

psychological category in the nineteenth century.⁴ Philosophers have also raised other important questions on how feelings originate, how emotions motivate action, and whether feelings could be regarded as part of rational thought.⁵ These ruminations inform this dissertation by highlighting the difficulties in defining “emotions” as a concept, but this does not detract from its usefulness as a historicized analytical category.

Among the historical works that have considered emotions, romantic or courtly love in the Western context has received most attention.⁶ As a departure from focusing on a single type of emotion, William Reddy’s *The Navigation of Feeling* is an important work that refers to emotional expressions as “emotives,” drawing a comparison to “performatives” and argues that like performatives, emotives are capable of “doing something to the world.”⁷ The concept of emotives affirms the connection between emotions and actions, and is an important inspiration for this dissertation. Reddy’s book then uses the concept of emotives to analyze the French

⁴ Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁵ Robert C. Solomon, ed., *Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions*, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁶ Peter Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards,” *The American Historical Review* 90, no. 4 (1985): 813–836.

⁷ William Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 111.

Revolution, and considers how political regimes are also “emotional regimes,” defined as “the set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them.”⁸ Thus, in Reddy’s conceptual framework, the state can and does prescribe emotions for society, and this framework is used to historicize the “emotional excesses” of the French Revolution. In the end, his analysis yielded the following conclusions:

(1) that the dominant language of emotion available by that time was the language of late sentimentalism; (2) that this language, viewed in the light of the concept of emotives, was ideally suited for eliciting intense emotions, emotions of a kind that many novel readers, letter writers, and theatergoers had already trained themselves to feel; and (3) that this language was also well suited for raising doubts about the sincerity of these emotions - just because they were supposed to be, but never could be, ‘natural.’⁹

This conclusion is consistent with my view that an emotional education was a significant part of the Japanese colonial project in Taiwan, and that Japan was consciously acting as an emotional regime in accordance with Reddy’s terminology.

From this theoretical model, we can derive better understanding of how emotions function. Two examples in Chinese literature and Chinese history serve as examples of how to use emotions as the core analysis. In the first, Lee Haiyan’s *Revolution of the Heart* applies the concept of – in the words of Raymond Williams – “structures of feeling.” Lee’s genealogical approach traces the evolution of “structures of feeling” in Chinese literature from Confucian to Enlightenment to Revolutionary paradigms. Emphasizing the significance of emotions, she

⁸ Ibid., 129.

⁹ Ibid., 185.

writes, “discourses of sentiment are not merely representations or expressions of inner emotions, but articulatory practices that participate in (re)defining the social order and (re)producing forms of self and sociality. Emotion talk is never about emotion pure and simple, but is always also about something else, namely, identity, morality, gender, authority, power, and community.”¹⁰ If, as she says, emotions are integral to and can correspond to what takes place in society, then they are especially worthy of exploration in a colonial context where feelings are evidently part of colonialism itself. It is necessary to see emotions not only as responses to external stimuli but also as motivators of action.

In the second example, Eugenia Lean uses the notion of “public sympathy” to explain how one woman’s act of filial piety helped construct a collective identity and motivate political participation based on emotions.¹¹ Unlike Habermas, whose “public sphere” is one based on rational discussion of issues in salons, Lean portrayed a society whose hearts were moved by sympathy, and whose political engagement formed a different sort of modernity. Furthermore, she describes the mechanisms by which one event was projected outward to the rest of society through media exposure and theatrical portrayals. In this way, Lean underscores socialization as

¹⁰ Haiyan Lee, *Revolution of the Heart: A Genealogy of Love in China, 1900-1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 8.

¹¹ Eugenia Lean, *Public Passions: The Trial of Shi Jianqiao and the Rise of Popular Sympathy in Republican China*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2007).

the link between individual emotions and collective sympathy. Emotions do not exist in a vacuum; regardless of their source, stimuli must be disseminated to have the capacity to arouse emotions. Likewise, for my dissertation, the link of socialization between emotions and mobilization was forged by education, propaganda, and cultural policies. Scholarly works like these also help to demonstrate the ways in which emotions can be assessed in relation to actions.

Emotions taught by the state toward its subjects have been evaluated elsewhere as a significant element in education and ritual. For instance, aside from school textbooks, the influence of which is more readily apparent, literature and fiction for children in Britain in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century have been analyzed, discovering them to be “texts that reflect imperialism and empire as a normal part of the world and often encourage child readers to accept the values of imperialism.”¹² On the other hand, public rituals and spectacle serve to “reinforce the collective memory that is so important to maintaining a sense of national community,” and “inform us about definitions of national identity.”¹³ Likewise, the rise of emperor-centered patriotism in Japan itself, while having been invented in the Meiji era, was

¹² M. Daphne Kutzer, *Empire's children: Empire and Imperialism in Classic British Children's Books* (New York: Garland Pub., 2000), xiii.

¹³ Kenneth Ruoff, *Imperial Japan at Its Zenith: the Wartime Celebration of the Empire's 2,600th Anniversary* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 2.

projected back in time so that “later it became commonplace to think of the flow of time, the organization of political space, and even Japanese culture as converging on the emperor.”¹⁴ The process by which emotions were controlled and regulated through education and other means naturalized ideas such as empire, nationalism, and emperor for the Taiwanese people. For the state, education and cultural policies are important tools to promote ways to feel, to remember, and to self-identify. Thus, it is necessary to apply such methodology to the study of Taiwanese history under Japanese rule.

Brief History of Taiwanese Historiography

Taiwanese scholarship on the Japanese colonial period has been highly problematic and complicated by political positions. The problems plaguing Chinese historiography that prompted ideas such as Paul Cohen’s “China-centered” approach have also afflicted Taiwanese historiography in the same way.¹⁵ Just as historians of China have struggled to disentangle Chinese historiography from being solely considered in Western terms, so have historians of Taiwan confronted the baggage of Chinese historiography in Taiwan studies. The message of

¹⁴ T. Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (University of California Press, 1998), 3.

¹⁵ Paul A Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*, Studies of the East Asian Institute (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

reunification of all China under the Kuomintang (KMT) government was thoroughly and forcefully promulgated by the KMT to the Taiwanese people after World War II; only very recently have they begun to understand it as myth and propaganda. Inevitably, Taiwanese historiography has also in large part been viewed by historians as a subset of Chinese history. Taiwanese historians often write from specific viewpoints somewhere on the independence-unification spectrum, which posits Taiwan in relation to China and to China alone, and the history they write is derived from this narrow perspective. Before official political liberalization in 1987, the KMT position dominated mainstream scholarly views toward the Japanese occupation, often referring to those five decades as years of “resistance to the Japanese (*kangri* 抗日).” One important historian, Wang Xiaobo, views Taiwanese reaction to Japanese rule as resistance and simply as an expression of Chinese nationalism.¹⁶ Along the same lines, the implicit hostility toward Japanese rule would often be embedded in the language; for example, Taiwan under Japanese rule was seen as an insult to the Chinese people (*Zhongguo ren* 中國人).¹⁷ Before 1987, Taiwanese historical scholarship generally extolled national unification and was highly critical of the Japanese colonial period as detrimental to Taiwan. It is difficult to

¹⁶ Wang Xiaobo, *Taiwan kangri wushinian* 台灣抗日五十年 [*Taiwan's fifty years of Japanese resistance*], Taiwan yan jiu xi lie (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1997), 373.

¹⁷ Ibid.

find academics who were able or permitted to transcend perspectives grounded in Han or Chinese nationalism.

After the late 1980s, the study of Japanese colonization in Taiwan was rehabilitated. It was finally considered politically acceptable to conduct historical research on the colonial era as a period that saw Japanese contributions rather than only oppression. Chinese translations of Japanese scholarship on such contributions have recently begun to appear in Taiwan, further propelling scholarly interest in both the literary and material culture brought by the Japanese. In recent years, Taiwanese history between 1895 and 1945 has undergone some reevaluation in Taiwan, evidenced by the existence of two different names that have been applied to the era. The first and older one is “the period of Japanese Occupation (*Rijushidai* 日據時代),” which denotes and implies forceful and to an extent unrighteous occupation. A newer term is “the period of Japanese Governance (*Rizhishidai* 日治時代).” The character 治 (*zhi*) in Chinese refers to rule, and even connotes peaceful and proper reign. While these two terms are essentially interchangeable in referring to the same period, both terms are political, and the latter term signifies a different way of evaluating this period that may include perspectives that have been overlooked in past historical study.

In the last decade, the field of Taiwanese history in the Taiwanese academia has seen some scholarly development with increased sophistication both in terms of theoretical bases and

engagement with previously neglected subject areas or time periods. I locate my study among these works, viewing the period of Japanese rule critically, seeking to unveil the motives for policy without judging colonialism to be an inherent evil. It has become possible to discuss the effects of Japanese colonialism as being not wholly negative, and as a period that is significant to the formation of Taiwanese national identity. Beyond considering the pros and cons of Japanese rule in Taiwan, there are other welcome trends that encourage stepping back to see Asian developments through Taiwan. One recent volume edited by Wakabayashi Masahiro and Wu Mi-cha, *Transcending the Boundary of Taiwanese History: Dialogue with East Asian History*, reflects the recent trend of placing Taiwan studies in the greater context of Asian or global interconnections, illustrating the importance of transnational approaches to studying colonial Taiwan.¹⁸ Zhou Wan-yao's *Haixingxi de niandai: Riben zhimin tongzhi moqi Taiwan shilunji* [*The era of going to the sea: historical essays on Taiwan at the end of Japanese colonial rule*] contains a series of essays on the “wartime generation” of people who were youths during the last eight years of the Japanese occupation and explores the discourses that helped to influence this generation. Her volume investigates the relationship between culture, power, and identity

¹⁸ *Kuajie de Taiwanshi yanjiu: yu dongyashi de jiaocuo* 跨界的臺灣史研究：與東亞史的交錯 [*Transcending the boundary of Taiwanese history: dialogue with East Asian history*] (Taipei: Bozhongzhe wenhua youxian gongsi, 2004); Xu Shikai, *Riben tongzhixia de Taiwan* 日本統治下的台灣 [*Formosa under the Japanese rule: resistance and suppression*], trans. Li Mingjun and Lai Yujun (Taipei: Yushanshe chuban shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2006).

formation, and argues implicitly for the efficacy of Japanese cultural policies by pointing to how the wartime generation differed from their parents or grandparents.¹⁹ Taiwanese historiography in the last decade clearly has been more willing to discover and assess hybrid phenomena in Taiwan's colonial past. Other works dealing with Japanese language policy, modernization, and the colonized space of Taiwan are also helpful in shedding light on the cultural aspects of Japanese colonization.²⁰ In this way, scholarly attention not focused directly on politics can actually dialectically contribute more to understanding how the everyday was politicized. These types of studies strive to discover previously hidden connections to clarify the colonial period as a rich and complex era in Taiwanese history.

In the American academia, there is correspondingly an increasing specificity and

¹⁹ Zhou, *Haixingxi de niandai*.

²⁰ Wu Jieh-min et al., eds., *Reimagining Taiwan: Nation, Ethnicity, and Narrative* (Taipei: Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan, 2004); Chen Peifeng, “*Dōka*” *no dōshō imu: Rizhishiqi Taiwan de yuyanzhengce, jindaihua yu rentong* 「同化」の同床異夢: 日治時期臺灣的語言政策, 近代化與認同 [*The different intentions behind the semblance of “Douka”: the language policy, modernization and identity in Taiwan during the Japan-ruling period*] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 2006); Huang Ying-che, “*Quribenhua*” “*zaizhongguohua*”: *zhanhou Taiwan wenhua chongjian (1945-1947)* 「去日本化」「再中國化」: 戰後台灣文化重建 (1945-1947) [*Uprooting Japan, implanting China: postwar cultural reconstruction of Taiwan*] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 2007); Lü Shaoli, *Zhanshi Taiwan: quanli, kongjian yu zhimin tongzhi de xingxiang biaooshu* 展示臺灣: 權力, 空間與殖民統治的形象表述 [*Exhibiting Taiwan: power, space and image representation of Japanese colonial rule*], *Wen shi Taiwan* 3 (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 2005).

theoretical abstraction in works on Taiwan, and the history of publications on Taiwanese history demonstrates this welcome trend. General overviews, however, remain helpful in establishing some of the basic features of Japanese administration.²¹ An early monograph especially relevant to this dissertation is E. Patricia Tsurumi's 1977 work, titled *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*.²² Although dated, this book is a comprehensive study based on Japanese sources that depicts Japanese colonialism from the perspective of Japanese colonial administrators. Tsurumi's book carefully documents top-level administrative acts, but only presents sketchy responses from grassroots level. Her study concludes that Japan achieved fairly successful elementary education, in the sense that it was common, and this point is useful as a foundation of my study.

In recent years, Taiwanese historians have also increasingly focused on the period of Japanese rule, and their works have taken on diverse topics in cultural history, such as baseball and the medical profession.²³ In addition, significant works have been produced on Taiwanese

²¹ Murray A. Rubinstein, *Taiwan: A New History* (M.E.Sharpe, 2006).

²² E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

²³ Andrew Morris, *Colonial Project, National Game: A History of Baseball in Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Ming-cheng M. Lo, *Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

literature. Leo Ching's *Becoming "Japanese"* expands upon the influence of Japanese rule on Taiwanese identity and provides a highly theoretical study of assimilation and imperialization through literature. One of the major contributions of Ching's work is that he focuses on aborigines as a distinct group targeted by the Japanese colonial policies and considers the discrete identities of the aborigines. Ching acknowledges that the discourse created by the Japanese on topics such as "spirit" and the consequent mythmaking process for colonial purposes played a significant part in creating cultural and political identities. *Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: History, Culture, Memory* edited by Binghui Liao and David Wang, is another important rethinking of Japanese-era education, administration, art, and literature in Taiwan. Chapters in the book also examine Taiwan's role at the edge of the Dutch, Chinese, and Japanese empires; cultural hybridity is acknowledged to be a fundamental basis for Taiwan's modernity and identity.²⁴

Aside from cultural history and literature, political institutions have also been analyzed in insightful ways. For instance, Caroline Ts'ai's *Taiwan in Japan's Empire-Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering* relies on Foucault's concepts of governmentality, subjectivity, and disciplinary society to define the term "colonial engineering" as the

²⁴ Liao Ping-hui and David Der-Wei Wang, eds., *Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-1945: History, Culture, Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

“socio-political grafting of colonial rule that the Japanese began as soon as they took over Taiwan in 1895.”²⁵ Although she painstakingly uses the Governor-General Archives to document the names of offices and job titles in the bureaucracy installed by the Japanese, she discusses the functions of positions as automatic, and offers no real explanation for why bureaucrats carried out their duties or why colonized people obeyed orders. As a result, her narrative stops short of actually discussing what makes “colonial engineering” work. On the other hand, *Statecraft and Spectacle in East Asia*, edited by Adam Clulow, tracks the relationship between Japan and Taiwan from uncertain diplomacy to formal colonialism in an effort to emphasize the historical contingency of Japanese efforts in the aggrandizement of its power.²⁶ While this approach maintains politics at the center, the authors are able to construct compelling historical contexts in which “international culture” functioned with greater contingency. These two works provide instructive yet contrasting ways on how to examine the political elements of Taiwanese history under Japanese rule.

²⁵ Ts'ai Hui-yu Caroline, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire-building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 10.

²⁶ Adam Clulow, ed., *Statecraft and Spectacle in East Asia: Studies in Taiwan-Japan Relations* (Routledge, 2010).

Japan's Colonial Empire

A dissertation on Taiwanese history under Japanese rule should also be informed by studies on other parts of the Japanese Empire, including Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and parts of China.²⁷ While not central to this study, comparisons to other colonies can help to draw out the distinctive features of Japanese actions in Taiwan. The growing body of English-language scholarly works on the Korean experiences under Japanese colonialism often shed light on Japanese colonization of Taiwan, even though conditions were clearly different; Taiwan was smaller and colonized for a longer period of time. Although these works discuss different colonial experiences, the methodologies and premises they employ are useful references for thinking about Taiwan.

²⁷ Shimazu Naoko, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Elise K. Tipton, *Society and the State in Interwar Japan* (Routledge, 1997); Richard M. Reitan, *Making a Moral Society: Ethics and the State in Meiji Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010); Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Theodore Jun Yoo, *The Politics of Gender in Colonial Korea: Education, Labor, and Health, 1910-1945*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2008); Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Mark Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); Peter Duus, *The Japanese informal empire in China, 1895-1937* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 1999).

On the whole, while there are a number of studies on the history of Taiwan, there are no works that directly address the role of sentimentality in the Taiwanese cultural experience of colonialism. I consider this dissertation to be filling in the gaps of Taiwanese political and institutional history under Japanese colonialism. The interrelated fields of emotions, Japanese Empire, Taiwanese history, and East Asian history at large comprise the background to my analysis of the primary sources.

Dissertation Structure

This dissertation contains six chapters. The four substantive chapters each deal with a distinct period of time in Taiwan's colonial history. The study of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan is bookended by relatively solid dates, beginning with the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ceded Taiwan to Japan, and ending with the end of World War II. However, historians have periodized the colonial era in different ways. For chapters two through five, the periods are roughly divided as follows: policies of initial colonization in 1895-1930, assimilation in 1930-1937; and wartime policies in 1937-1945.

Chapter Two covers the period of initial colonization in 1895-1930, and while there were certainly differences in Japanese discourse in 1896 and 1929, for example, I am more concerned with highlighting the trends that enabled the creation of internalized patriotism in the later years.

This chapter begins with the differences between Taiwan and Japan in 1895 to consider the significance the Japanese government placed upon education and cultural policies in their first formal colony. Taiwan was undeniably different from Japan in numerous ways – climate, language, culture, customs, and the extent of modernization. Official Japanese documents and edicts recognized such differences, and showed an understanding that they could not be eradicated by force alone. During the assimilation phase, the Japanese colonial government professed the objective of transforming Taiwanese people into Japanese through cultural policies. Cultural production from the formative years of Japanese rule often left social or religious customs undisturbed, as the base of commonality was slowly broadened and the possibilities of cultural and economic exchange between Japan and Taiwan increased. Japan pushed for modernized modes of education in Taiwan, seeking widespread literacy. In particular, Japanese language textbooks, rather than simply teaching Japanese, often contained subtexts of sentimental education to inspire an emotional affinity to Japan. Textbooks were often trilingual in Japanese, Chinese Mandarin, and the Taiwanese dialect to facilitate teaching, and there were Taiwanese dialect classes for Japanese instructors from Japan. Furthermore, textbooks imparted knowledge about the world, ranging from political and historical to scientific ideas. The changes that the Japanese sought to impose upon the Taiwanese were amplified through the press, with publications written in Chinese and Japanese to maximize readership. During this period,

Japanese authorities planted the seeds for the later manipulation of Taiwanese emotions toward passionate patriotism. However, the partial success of these efforts was shown by diaries of Taiwanese elites, trained in the Chinese literary tradition while holding positions in the Japanese bureaucracy, who showed casual attitudes toward being colonized. Ultimately, assimilation was less about remaking Taiwanese into Japanese, than about creating practical and imagined connections of dependency to Japan in the minds of the Taiwanese.

Chapter Three focuses on the Musha Incident of 1930, in which several hundred aborigines rose up against the Japanese, slaughtering over a hundred people in one morning. The incident challenged the political myth of assimilation, raising unavoidable questions about the intersection of violence, emotions, and “civilizing progress” in Taiwan as a Japanese colony. As the last major uprising, this was a significant event in the history of Taiwan under Japanese rule. The chapter analyzes Japanese views of aborigines and how Japanese policies that aimed to “civilize” instead provoked anger among many aborigines. In the aftermath of the violent uprising, the discourse in newspapers published by the Japanese in Taiwan appealed to public sympathy for the Japanese victims, while avoiding wholesale denigration of the aborigines’ martial character. The Japanese state marshaled military and discursive responses to deal with the shock of rebellion, seeking to weave the incident into the authoritative imperialist narrative. In fact, after the Musha Incident, many writers equated the aborigine rebels’ “purity of spirit” with

“the Japanese spirit” and *bushido* or “the way of the warrior,” simultaneously exoticizing and taming the insurrection. The language of emotions was used to create a common ground of civility between the Japanese and the Taiwanese who were descended from Han Chinese, while allowing for aborigine violence to become dormant for later Japanese manipulation.

Chapter Four examines how the Japanese made patriotic feelings central to colonial pedagogy in the period between 1930 and 1937. Edicts, newspapers, and colonial textbooks increasingly clarified the meaning of Japanese Imperial subjecthood much more forcefully than in the previous thirty-five years since Japan took over Taiwan in 1895. Coherent colonial pedagogy in cultural policy taught all Taiwanese people, regardless of ethnicity, social status, or gender, to love the Japanese Empire. The state offered a vocabulary to express implicitly regulated emotions and prescribed normative standards for performing fervent patriotism. Rhetorical strategies drew from Confucian ethics, Japanese history and mythology, and depictions of Taiwan as a natural and significant part of the Empire. Both print and non-textual sources showed that as mobilization intensified in Japan’s “model colony,” Japanese militarism became the focus in attempts to shape Taiwanese emotions. In particular, this period before Japan’s all-out war with China is useful in allowing us to examine the interplay between emotions and violence, which can be used to refine our understanding of the mechanisms of wartime mobilization in colonial Taiwan.

Chapter Five covers the wartime period of 1937-1945. Taiwan had been a Japanese colony for forty-two years when the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937. Following its full-scale invasion of China, Japan initiated imperialization policies in Taiwan, intensifying its efforts to reshape the Taiwanese people into Japanese imperial subjects. Japanese cultural policies instilled through textbooks, newspapers, and other media stressed emotional and spiritual affinity toward Japan. As Japan gradually began to lose the war, it called upon Taiwan to become a “stronghold.” At the same time, the state continued to propagate the rhetoric of “certain victory,” demanding increasingly extraordinary performance by the Taiwanese people in their daily lives. Glorifying all types of involvement—whether it was taking a Japanese name or volunteering to fly kamikaze missions—demanded performance with affective overtones, regardless of genuine emotional foundation. When extraordinary wartime circumstances became everyday, along with the emphasis on “heart and spirit” in patriotism, the alignment of internal emotions and external performance was a prime concern of Japan regarding Taiwan. Ultimately, clear inconsistencies between the difficulties of wartime living, promises of war glory, and inner grappling with imagined Chinese identities resulted in cognitive dissonance for some intellectuals, as shown through their diaries. Oral histories of common Taiwanese people, however, revealed a greater willingness to conform to and participate in the martial ideals of Japanese imperial nationalism.

These four body chapters form the core of the dissertation, with emphasis on documenting the range of emotions and affective responses that were promoted by the Japanese state, how they achieved these goals, and which emotional responses they were able to elicit from the Taiwanese population. In the years of wartime mobilization, Taiwanese men, women, and children acted in ways that could be documented by the Japanese to create propaganda for further reinforcement of Taiwanese loyalty to the Imperial cause. The extent to which such mobilization was effective had its roots in the assimilation years and accelerated in the imperialization period.

Finally, Chapter Six will summarize the dissertation and assess how cultural representations, pedagogy, and definitions of subjectivity were used to colonize Taiwanese psyches throughout Japan's five decades of rule in Taiwan. A thorough grasp of the many uses of emotion in Japanese colonial policy will serve to augment the study of the history of Taiwan under Japanese rule.

Chapter 2: Dōka: Paradoxical Approaches to Difference, 1895-1930

Introduction

Many official Japanese documents on education in Taiwan begin with an account of Shizangan School (*Shizangan Gakudō* 芝山巖学堂) in present-day Taipei City, which praised Shizangan as a “hallowed ground” (*reichi* 靈地) of Taiwanese education. The Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded Taiwan to Japan on April 17, 1895; a Dominion Inauguration Ceremony (*shiseishiki*; 始政式) was held in Taipei on June 17, and the next day an Office of Educational Affairs was established. By July 1895, a school was constructed from an old Chinese temple on a hill at Shizangan. Even though there were bandits nearby, and Taiwan was not yet remotely close to being pacified, for the “civilization and happiness of the Taiwanese islanders, under the Meiji Emperor’s imperial edict,” six students began studying at the school under six teachers recruited from six provinces in Japan.¹ By September, there were 21 students and in October six outstanding students were given completion certificates, marking the “gradual dawn of the new educational enterprise.”

¹ Taiwan Sōtokufu Bunkyōkyoku, “Taiwan no gakkō kyōiku (Showa 16 nendōhan) 台湾の学校教育 (昭和十六年度版) [School education in Taiwan (Showa 16 edition),” in *Nihon shokuminchi kyōiku seisaku shiryō shūsei* 日本植民地教育政策史料集成 [*Collection of historical materials on Japanese colonial education policies*], vol. 6, Reprint. (Tokyo: Ryūkeishosha, 2007), 5–8.

However, tragedy struck on January 1, 1896. When the teachers left the school to attend a new year's celebration, they were attacked and killed by a group of "bandits." Later, "to their memory a stone tablet was set up at Shizangan Hill where the sacred blood of the first six teachers was shed on New Year's Day in 1896 and ever since an annual memorial service is held to commemorate their sacrifice and in memory of others who died for the cause of education in Formosa."²

This incident highlights a context of initial colonialism – colonizers arrived and immediately began attempting to civilize the unruly natives, some progress was made, and then the civilizing colonizers were senselessly martyred, but colonial efforts marched on, sustained by an affective attachment to a spiritual mission. From such humble and chaotic beginnings, by 1945 Japanese education on Taiwan had become a complex and powerful enterprise, propelled forward by the hearts of the colonized people. Violence against the Japanese in 1896, mediated by education, emotions, and time, would be channeled against the enemies of Japan just a few decades later.

² Department of Educational Affairs of the Government-General of Formosa, Japan, "A Review of Educational Work in Formosa, 1916," in *Nihon shokuminchi kyōiku seisaku shiryō shūsei* 日本植民地教育政策史料集成 [Collection of historical materials on Japanese colonial education policies], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Ryūkeishosha, 2007), 10.

This chapter considers Japanese colonial policies prior to 1930 in the context of Japanese authorities encountering differences in the hot and un-Japanese island, with its malarial pestilence and unruly population behind a language barrier. Before Japan could establish itself as an emotional regime, it was first necessary to come to terms with the fact that it was in possession of a foreign land. On one hand, Japanese saw numerous differences between themselves and Taiwan, and also saw a need to interpret these differences in a way that integrated the colony. On the other hand, the Japanese state had to begin the gradual detachment of Taiwan from China by establishing discursive distinctions and accentuating differences between the Chinese and Japanese administrations of Taiwan. In short, a period of familiarization was required before prescribing normative emotional expression. Although Japanese culture was undeniably influenced by China, administrators and educators had to construct new yardsticks for measuring and claiming Japanese superiority. Cultural policies were strategically deployed during this period – official edicts, newspapers, and textbooks all played different roles in coming to terms with the unfamiliar, but this was not exactly “assimilation.” A great concern for expediency and utility was instrumental in early policies for the new realm. Many such policies were geared toward avoiding negative reactions, and as a result there was a relatively high

degree of accommodation; this was especially true in the Japanese education of Taiwanese people during the period of so-called assimilation. While many policies and their manifestations could be interpreted as moderate, the Japanese were quite proactive in pressing for transformative governance in Taiwan. As this chapter will show, cultural policies during the assimilation period were broad and conciliatory, aimed at defining and instilling affective affinity in Taiwanese through acculturation and modernization. In doing so, the first three decades of Japanese cultural policy in Taiwan was a period of grappling with how to situate Taiwan in the Japanese worldview.

According to Takenaka Nobuko, who published four volumes on the lives of Japanese women in Taiwan during Japanese rule, the three “ō’s” of Japanese colonization were *gunbō* (軍帽; military berets), *setsuhō* (説法; teaching, with a religious connotation), and *nyōbō* (女房; women).³ At the outset, it was clear that the Japanese state’s policies were as much about modifying Taiwanese culture as about the practical aspects of merely making Taiwan a tame part of Japan. Control, acculturation, and modernization converged in Japan’s conception of how to

³ Takenaka Nobuko, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi: Riben nüren zai Taiwan, Mingzhipian (1895-1911)* 日治台灣生活史: 日本女人在台灣. 明治篇 (1895-1911) [*History of life in Taiwan under Japanese rule: Japanese women in Taiwan, Meiji volume (1895-1911)*] (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban qiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2007), 58. These books were originally published in Japanese in 1995.

possess and govern the new colony. Within what the Japanese state envisioned for Taiwan, it was first and foremost necessary to deal with Taiwan as an island wholly different from Japan. *Dōka* (assimilation) was the name given to the set of cultural policies implemented in Taiwan in the initial years of Japanese rule. The dual objectives of acculturation and modernization were bolstered by a sentimental education, in which Taiwanese people were edified on how to feel toward themselves, other Taiwanese people, and their “fellow” Japanese citizens.

Through pronouncements, newspaper editorials, and educational policies, the Japanese colonial government was consciously constructing a unique and evolving definition of assimilation in the process of creating both tangible and intangible change in Taiwan. The Japanese state was laying down a foundation for interaction, although most of it originated from the Japan side, on which to structure an education of feelings, one that incorporated emotions and affect into language, performance, and subjecthood. According to Chen Peifeng, the notion of Japan’s national essence (*kokutai* 国体) was a significant basis for Japanese assimilation policies in Taiwan, and *dōka* was a “strategy of rule.”⁴ It is also possible to conceive of initial Japanese colonialism on Taiwan as a fledgling emotional regime on the path toward tyranny.

⁴ Chen Pei-feng, “Chongxin jiexi zhimindi Taiwan de guoyu tonghua jiaoyu zhengce 重新解析殖民地台灣的國語同化教育政策 [Reanalysis of National Language Assimilation Education Policies in the Colony of Taiwan],”

Taiwan Historical Research 7, no. 2 (December 2000): 1.

This chapter will conclude with discussion of two diaries from elite Taiwanese men who left records of their lives under the first half of the era of Japanese rule. The longer diary is from Zhang Lijun, a member of the landed elite (and thus occupied a social position that freed him from having to toil for money) whom the Japanese often consulted regarding local affairs. The shorter supporting diary is from Huang Wangcheng, whose experiences in teaching Japanese to elementary schoolchildren in Taiwan offers a unique glimpse into how one uses language to mediate between colonial authorities and colonized children. Although they were only two individuals from the literate class and their writings were not representative of the experiences of the majority of Taiwanese, their diaries can be valuable in demonstrating how Japanese education and cultural policies influenced them as producers of culture themselves.

Initiating Cultural Change in the First Five Years

On May 8, 1895, less than one month after Taiwan was ceded to Japan in accordance to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi issued an edict instituting the departments under the Office of the Governor-General in Taiwan. In this early conception of administrative structure, the order of primary departments was listed as follows: Civil Governance (*Jiminbu* 治民部), Finance (*Zaiseibu* 財政部), Foreign Affairs (*Gaimubu* 外務部),

Production (*Shokusanbu* 殖産部), Military Affairs (*Gunjibu* 軍事部), Transportation (*Kōtsubu* 交通部), and Judiciary (*Shihōbu* 司法部);.⁵ The first in the list, the Department of Civil Governance, was to be in charge of “implementation of all administration, [as well as] education and technical skills.”⁶ This description, terse yet all-encompassing, signified that the Japanese state recognized that military force was necessary but insufficient to rule Taiwan, and that education was a top priority in forging a peaceful and eventually productive colony, even though the Japanese were not yet entirely sure what that would mean in Taiwan.

The earliest orders from the Office of Governor-General were relatively conciliatory, and even characterized by a sense of trepidation in entering the new territory. When the first Governor-General of Taiwan, Kabayama Sukenori, arrived in Taiwan, he made a number of pronouncements that covered a broad range of topics; as could be expected, every aspect of governance in the new colony required attention. Kabayama’s edicts and orders, such as ones dealing with hygiene, finances, Taiwan’s aborigine population, and the prohibition of opium, emphasized the pacification of a relatively dangerous new realm.⁷ The few orders that did not

⁵ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shōchoku, reishi, yukoku, kuntatsu ruisan* 詔勅・令旨・諭告・訓達類纂 [Collection of imperial declarations, orders, promulgations, and edicts], vol. 1 (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1999), 2–3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1:2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:9, 10, 12, 14.

explicitly deal with control deserve special consideration because they attended to the emotional and affective elements in colonialism. Aside from the expected problems inherent in colonial encounters, such as the language barrier, and orders that were overtly administrative, the Japanese colonial government was searching for a possible entry into common ground in order to reach the “hearts of the people” (民心; minshin). Official actions in the cultural sphere frequently sought to restructure Taiwanese conceptions of identity; existing ideas about similarity and difference between Taiwan and Japan, or between Taiwan and China, were amended to legitimize Japanese rule.

On June 24, 1896, Governor-General Kabayama prohibited the acceptance of gifts by bureaucrats, stating that this was expressly forbidden by the law of the Great Nation of Japan.⁸ This statement was made to set Japan in contrast to the Qing state, whose bureaucracy, according to Governor-General Kabayama, was corrupt and oppressive toward the people. This particular order accentuated an apparent difference between Japan and China in terms of political culture. Regardless of whether his statement was true, Kabayama’s pronouncement was significant in exhibiting some awareness of Chinese practices that were unsavory to the Taiwanese, or at least an interest in creating a Taiwanese preference for Japanese rule, leading to a common ground

⁸ Ibid., 1:8.

between the colonizers and colonized.

At the end of 1895, the Director of the Bureau of Civil Affairs, Mizuno Jun, instituted one of the first orders that employed the phrase, “hearts of the people.” In the order to dispel rampant rumors of an imminent attack on Taipei by bandits, Mizuno told the people not to be confused or frightened by the rumors, and that they should be calm, because the Japanese army was in the capital and would maintain their safety.⁹ In 1895, the top officials were concerned with pacifying people in the most general sense, since they had yet to understand the emotional motivations of Taiwanese people – Japanese officials could only appeal to “hearts” on a basic human level at this time by promising physical security.

Upon his arrival in 1896, the second Governor-General, Katsura Tarō, issued an edict that covered a multitude of concerns of the colonial state. In particular, he noted, “the education of aborigines cannot be neglected even for one day... It goes without saying that it is necessary to cultivate ideas of empire, and at the same time their intelligence should be developed.”¹⁰ The edict then stated that officials, especially the officials who were involved in policing and taxation, should learn the local ways (*ninjō fūzoku* 人情風俗; literally human emotions, habits, and customs) as well as the local languages. In a separate edict pertaining to aborigines, Katsura

⁹ Ibid., 1:17.

¹⁰ Ibid., 1:20.

noted that treating the aborigines with sincerity and honesty in speech and actions would naturally elicit their respect and love; Japanese people who came into direct contact with the general population should assume polite and sincere attitudes, so as to inspire respect in return. He then declared that since the old customs and habits have occupied minds of the locals, attempting to wipe them out quickly would backfire; harmless and beneficial customs were best left alone until further understanding and future advisement.¹¹ Ill feelings were a major concern of the Japanese colonial state in the first five years of its rule. While negative feelings were nebulous and difficult to ascertain, Japanese administrators knew they had to do their best to avoid provoking them. Similarly, in December 1896, the third Governor-General, Nogi Maresuke, reiterated in a bureaucratic meeting that it was of utmost importance to calm the people's hearts and to avoid their hatred of harmful methods of rule.¹²

A few years later, in 1900, the fourth Governor-General, Kodama Gentarō, held a “meeting to advance literary (cultural) progress” with some Taiwanese literati. At this meeting, he stated that the literary and cultural realms in Taiwan were important and should follow the martial actions that have already been carried out, and urged that the literati rally to assist in

¹¹ Ibid., 1:23–24.

¹² Ibid., 1:28.

improving the civilization of Taiwan.¹³ It is noteworthy that Kodama made this statement as a Japanese general; his military position reveal the stance of the Japanese colonial state in emphasizing cultural rule as being concurrent and interdependent with military pacification of Taiwan. Gotō Shinpei, Kodama's Director of Civil Affairs (one of the most important administrators of Taiwan during the Japanese era), then proceeded on this foundation to carry out policy reforms that facilitated the modernization of infrastructure and the promotion of education.

According to the biography written by his son-in-law, the organization of education that Gotō envisioned for Taiwan was fairly comprehensive. Aside from the elementary schools for children, he also wanted to create national language schools and teacher's colleges. In addition to regular middle schools, he wanted to establish schools in specific subjects such as railways, telecommunications, and agriculture that would be taught by teachers from Japan. Furthermore, Taiwanese people who were already past school age would still be taught Japanese, while Taiwanese women would be taught practical domestic skills such as sewing and embroidery.¹⁴ It is clear from this basic structure that the Japanese colonial government was already planning to

¹³ Ibid., 1:53.

¹⁴ Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Seiden Gotō Shinpei: Ketteiban*. 正伝・後藤新平: 決定版 [*The true biography of Gotō Shinpei*], vol. 3 (Tōkyō: Fujiwarashoten, 2004), 446.

incorporate all Taiwanese people into the fold of Japanese-style education, the most important facet of which would be national language education.

The Role of Opinion-Editorials in Creating Consciousness of Difference and Similarity

Both Chinese and Japanese newspapers and periodicals were published in Taiwan during the first half of the era of Japanese rule. As can be expected, the linguistic form of these newspapers dictated their functions. Japanese-language newspapers articulated discourse that was closely aligned to stances found in official documents, while the government also published Chinese-language newspapers that were meant to be read by Taiwanese people before they became literate in Japanese. There were also privately-operated Chinese-language newspapers, but such newspapers did not permit expressions of dissent. The opinion-editorial pieces, especially those in Chinese-language newspapers, are valuable resources for evaluating Japanese efforts at cultural transformation, since these were read by the Taiwanese elites (this is confirmed by their diaries). Ideologies latent in cultural policies were contextualized by newspapers, which also articulated ideas regarding governance that were not part of colonial administration. Notions about political and cultural differences among Taiwan, Japan, and China were developed in complex ways, and generic and abstract official formulations of terms such as “assimilation” and

“patriotism” were explained to an increasingly broad audience, initiated into literacy by Japanese education.

One of the most influential Japanese newspapers at the time was the *Taiwan New News* (*Taiwan Shinpō* 臺灣新報). It was one of the first newspapers to be established in Taiwan during Japanese rule, and it was quickly absorbed by *Taiwan Daily New News* (*Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* 臺灣日日新報). While *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* was not published by the Governor-General Office, it did receive official backing.¹⁵ *Taiwan jihō* became the official magazine of the Governor-General Office between 1919 and 1945, and contained both news as well as fiction.¹⁶ The precursor to *Taiwan Times* (*Taiwan jihō* 臺灣時報) was the *Taiwan Association News* (*Taiwan kyūkai kaihō* 臺灣協會會報), published by the Taiwan Association (*Taiwan Kyūkai*; 臺灣協會), a group established to study colonialism in Taiwan.

Japanese newspapers were filled with praise for official policies and were most likely intended to be read by Japanese living in Taiwan – bureaucrats and educators. At the same time, they also contained Chinese pages as well as pages that included Japanese pronunciations of

¹⁵ “Taiwan ririxin bao jianjie 台灣日日新報簡介 [Introduction to Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō],” 台灣日日新報, n.d., <http://smdb.infolinker.com.tw/about.html>.

¹⁶ “Rizhi shiqi Taiwan shibao ziliao jianjie 日治時期臺灣時報資料庫簡介 [Introduction to database for Taiwan Jihō, during period of Japanese rule],” *Taiwan Jihō*, n.d., <http://cdnetc.lib.ncku.edu.tw:8080/twjihooapp/menu/intro.html>.

Chinese characters (*furigana* 振り仮名) in order to help Taiwanese people read Japanese as Japanese. The views in Japanese newspapers were extensions of the official stance, since the article form of narrative allowed for more exposition. Generally, news stories in these newspapers were often interwoven with government propaganda, selling stories of educational or economic success that arose from colonial policies.

At this time, the major Chinese-language newspaper was the *Chinese Language Taiwan Daily News* (*Hanwen Taiwan ririxinbao* 漢文臺灣日日新報). It was originally a two-page section of the *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, but was expanded and ran as an independent paper between 1905 and 1911, and was then reabsorbed by the *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* until the outright abolishment of Chinese-language newspaper sections in 1937.¹⁷ This valuable source contains many articles that directly pertain to the issues of difference, acculturation, and modernization; it is especially useful for discerning what was preached to the Taiwanese after Japan had already ruled Taiwan for some time. At the same time, newspapers covered current events in the rest of the world from a Japanese perspective, implicitly teaching the Taiwanese people to do the same.

In the first few years of colonialism, op-ed pieces in both Chinese and Japanese

¹⁷ “Hanwen Taiwan ririxin bao ziliaoku 漢文臺灣日日新報資料庫 [Chinese-language Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō database],” n.d., <http://www.tbmc.com.tw/tbmc2/cdb/intro/Taiwan-newspaper.htm>.

newspapers were principally concerned with dislodging Taiwan from the influence of Chinese culture and politics. Rather than maintaining a respectful silence about developments in China, op-ed authors frequently discussed Chinese political affairs in great detail and at great length, but with an air of superiority concerned with pointing out Chinese mistakes and aggrandizing Japanese achievements. Articles created and underscored imagined and real differences between an old corrupt China and a new progressive Taiwan ruled by an enlightened modern Japan. An editorial from *Taiwan shinpō* on December 15, 1896 stated that by becoming part of the Japanese Empire, Taiwan became visible to the world; Taiwan would finally have a chance to be on the world stage by virtue of being colonized by Japan.¹⁸ When the *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* became an independent newspaper on July 1, 1905, its début editorial emphasized the temporal distance of ten years that separated Taiwan from China and connected Taiwan to Japan, stating, “Japan is not the Japan after the Sino-Japanese War, and the Taiwanese people are not the Taiwanese people of ten years ago. Further, as Japan has leapt into the ranks of powerful nations in the world, so are Taiwanese people the citizens of a powerful nation.”¹⁹ This piece was evidently buoyed by Japan’s exhilarating success over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, which

¹⁸ “Taiwan wo sekai no butai ni yakushutsu seshimuru kikai 台湾を世界の舞台に躍出せしむる機会 [The opportunity for Taiwan to leap onto the world stage],” *Taiwan shinpō*, December 15, 1896.

¹⁹ “Tongbao tingzhe 同胞聽著 [Listen compatriots],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 1, 1905.

also seemed to validate Japanese rule in Taiwan.

Japan claimed the rite of passage into the ranks of a “powerful nation” through the acquisition of Taiwan as its first formal colony. In this sense, Japan and Taiwan mutually validated each other’s rise in status. In many articles, Japanese writers attempted to consolidate its position respective to other powerful nations, offering a global or at least East Asian outlook to readers. Japan’s relationship with the rest of the world was presented in terms that amalgamated martial and cultural advancement. For instance, the Russo-Japanese War was frequently cited as incontrovertible evidence that Japan had become a world power. The defeat of Russia by Japan was further saturated with moral and spiritual meaning as well as expanded military prowess to signify holistic Japanese superiority. For instance, spirit (*seishin* 精神) was credited as the source of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, as “[The Japanese] armies had benevolent and righteous anger, which is the reason they had such a cooperative spirit... Without this spirit, it would not have been possible to destroy the steel ships of Russia.”²⁰

Another commentator stated that defeat in the Russo-Japanese War was a blessing for the Russian people, since it caused Russia to turn to a constitutional government, and that “Russian

²⁰ Ono Irizima, “Zhansheng lun 戰勝論 [On winning wars],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1917): 9–10.

citizens, who love freedom and equality, should really give thanks to our Empire,” adding that the Qing state should learn from Russia.²¹

According to these newspaper articles, China at the turn of the century was plagued by foreign powers and failed domestic reforms. The Chinese people were unflatteringly described as “[having] no thought of group harmony and no enthusiasm for public virtue. They work for themselves and do not promote public outrage, and do not care to fulfill their obligations.”²² Chinese literati and scholars, people at the top rung of traditional Chinese society, were criticized as the reactionary root of political corruption.²³ Chinese styles and modes of learning were useless and even detrimental because the old system was opposed to reform.²⁴ Only Chinese immigrants and the handful of elite Chinese students studying in Europe, America, and Japan harbored any possibility of hope for China.²⁵ A fifteen-part serial titled “Assorted Views on

²¹ “Qingguo zhi lixian zhengzhi 清國之立憲政治 [The constitutional politics of Qing],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, September 2, 1906.

²² “Zhina zhi geming tan 支那之革命談 [On the revolution of China],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 30, 1905.

²³ “Qingguo zhi lixian zhengzhi 清國之立憲政治 [The constitutional politics of Qing].”

²⁴ “Qingguo xuetang fubai zhi yuanyin 清國學堂腐敗之原因 [The reasons for depravity of Qing academy],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, August 27, 1905.

²⁵ “Zhina zaguan (5) 支那雜觀 (5) [Miscellaneous observations of China (5)],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, September 26, 1906.

China,” published over the course of seven weeks in 1906, even went so far as to predict that massive turmoil will rise in China in the next three years²⁶; this prediction fell short of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, but the intention to denigrate China was abundantly clear. China lost Taiwan because of Chinese failures, and this was captured in a 1908 article: "On the same island of Taiwan, there was turmoil when governed by China, and peace when governed by Japan. It is clear this is due to different methods of governance. Today, when China looks at Taiwan, how can it not feel regret?"²⁷

The discourse of difference and differentiation further emphasized the change brought to Taiwan by the Japanese since 1895. Newspapers depicted Taiwan before Japanese rule as backward, and the lack of civilization was most readily apparent in the Taiwanese aborigine population. The aborigine tribes were perceived to present both security and cultural problems for the colonial state simply by continuing their various traditional practices. Both Chinese and Japanese newspapers were exceedingly harsh in their treatment of aborigines. One report stated, "There are eight aborigine tribes, they number in the hundreds of thousands, and they are all

²⁶ “Zhina zaguan (13) 支那雜觀 (13) [Miscellaneous observations of China (13)],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, November 1, 1906.

²⁷ “Jiwang ji xianzai zhi Taiwan 既往及現在之台灣 [Taiwan in the past and present],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, January 17, 1908.

ruthless and belligerent. They are proficient in cutting off heads, hate the Han Chinese, and are an obstruction to industry. They contradict civilization.”²⁸ The article concluded by noting that while it would be good to eradicate them, it was disappointingly infeasible since they all live in the mountains. Another article took a similar view when explicating the legal rights and status of these “raw aborigines,” stating “The raw aborigines of this island are as ignorant as the grass and trees; their character is akin to beasts, violent and unstable. For them, it is impossible to hold definitive law to undefined characteristics. As their character is undefined, they are the same as the insane,” and should not be permitted to breed like beasts.²⁹ These ethnographic tactics were similar to the ones described by Laura Hostetler as used by Chinese authorities in bringing Guizhou into the Chinese empire.³⁰ Although these commentators saw aborigines as deadweight hindering colonial development in Taiwan, the Japanese colonial government did create special schools for aborigines, and a wholly different view on aborigines was propagated in the later

²⁸ “Zhu hengduandui chenggong 祝橫斷隊成功 [To the success of the mountain-crossing team],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, October 6, 1905.

²⁹ “Shengfan falushang diwei (1) 生蕃法律上地位 (1) [The legal status of raw aborigines (1)],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, March 15, 1906; “Shengfan falushang diwei (2) 生蕃法律上地位 (2) [The legal status of raw aborigines (2)],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, March 18, 1906.

³⁰ Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (University of Chicago Press, 2005), 101.

wartime years.

On the spectrum of civilization, the Han Chinese population living in Taiwan was deemed a shade better than aborigines, but stagnant Qing customs were entirely unfit for the forward-looking Japanese Empire. The Qing-style queues worn by men and the bound feet of women were no longer considered appropriate physical appearances for colonized Taiwanese people. One article argued that Taiwanese educators and literati should be the first to cut their queues so they can lead the way in becoming new citizens.³¹ More interesting were the articles against the salient practice of footbinding; commentators often labeled it as a form of male oppression that was uniquely Chinese, urging the women to cease this practice both to shed their primitive Chineseness and to be liberated from male domination. A three-part series in the *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* stated that women no longer required “protection” from footbinding, because the modern age had released them; that footbinding was a way for Chinese men to keep women foolish and inexperienced, making it easier to oppress them; and that while

³¹ “Gaizhuang bian 改裝辨 [For change in dress],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 6, 1905.

women with small feet inspire lust, women with natural unbound feet inspire respect.³² Female bodies, then, became symbolic of the chosen subjugation or freedom of women from a specifically Chinese form of gendered oppression. Aside from regulating physical appearance through cultural rhetoric, articles attacked traditional superstitions and rituals because they tend to be wasteful, stressing instead the importance of rule of law and the value of cultivating the spirit.³³

Certainly, the Japanese role in modernizing both the infrastructure and the cultural landscape of Taiwan was frequently praised. Due to Japanese influence, on which the Taiwanese were unquestionably dependent, “the Taiwanese have received civilization and have rights. They are not slaves. As they have become incorporated into the Empire, they have equality and

³² “Chanzu huoshuo (1) 纏足禍說 (1) [On the disaster of foot-binding (1)],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 12, 1905; “Chanzu huoshuo (2) 纏足禍說 (2) [On the disaster of foot-binding (2)],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 13, 1905; “Chanzu huoshuo (3) 纏足禍說 (3) [On the disaster of foot-binding (3)],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 22, 1905.

³³ “Wo tairen zhi mixin 我台人之迷信 [Superstitions of Taiwanese people],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, August 23, 1905; “Shuo falu 說法律 [On the law],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, November 8, 1905; “Zongdu zhi rexin jiaoyu 總督之熱心教育 [Governor-General’s efforts in education],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, December 6, 1906.

freedom, unlike the Qing slaves.”³⁴ Change, according to these newspapers, was directly and singularly caused by Japanese rule, which introduced a special combination of Eastern and Western culture.³⁵

The nebulous term, “spirit,” had become a significant part of the Japanese lexicon about Japaneseness since they arrived in Taiwan and began setting out on their imperialist enterprise. Newspapers of early Japanese colonialism began explicating on the content of “spirit,” and its distinctly emotional dimension became increasingly and actively clarified and expanded with the passage of time. “Spirit” was the quality that the Japanese claimed to motivate their progress in modernization and expansion in Asia, and it was something that the Taiwanese people could assume to become more like Japanese and to bridge the gap of existing difference between themselves and their colonizers. Patriotism was not prescribed for the Taiwanese in the earlier newspapers, which were merely trying to present the Japanese colonial government as a regime acceptable to the Taiwanese people, but the concept of “spirit” was explained in various ways and attached to an increasing number of other notions of being a civilized citizen of the Japanese

³⁴ “Wo tairen zhi jiazhi 我台人之價值 [The value of Taiwanese people],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, July 8, 1905.

³⁵ Ono Irizima, “Lun guoyun xinglong ji minzu fanrong 論國運興隆及民族繁榮 [On prosperity of the nation and the people],” *Taiwan jihō* (April 1918): 2–6.

Empire.

For instance, when a severe earthquake shook central Taiwan in 1906, the *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō* implored its readers to donate money toward disaster relief. Words such as “rescue *your* brethren” and the emphasis on the fact that the readers and those suffering from the earthquake’s aftermath were all living in Taiwan fostered a sense of imagined connectedness. Moreover, according to the article, Emperor Taishō, in his august benevolence, was sending emissaries to the affected areas.³⁶ Four months later, an article praised those who had made donations, saying that such donations manifested the “affective power of civilization (文明之感動力).”³⁷ Civilization and civility were construed as qualities capable of influencing behavior by literally moving hearts through empathy. Similarly, after the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, *Taiwan jihō* published a statement from the Emperor that advised people to “raise their spirits.”³⁸ Indeed, “spirit” was accorded with an almost mystical power to overcome natural adversity through the inspiration of action; later “spirit” would be reconceptualized with greater

³⁶ “Jiuji ji tongbao zhi ganqing 救濟及同胞之感情 [Relief and feelings of compatriots],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, April 6, 1906.

³⁷ “Wenming zhi gandongli 文明之感動力 [The affective power of civilization],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, August 3, 1906.

³⁸ “Shinshin shinsaku no yukoku 精神振作の諭告 [Edict on restoring spirit],” *Taiwan jihō* (December 1923): 2.

performativity in support of hardships in the Pacific War.

The manipulation of “spirit” as an inclusive concept ushered in the possibility to unite all citizens into action. In the early years of Japanese rule on Taiwan, colonial authorities sought to achieve peaceful and peacetime mobilization of the Taiwanese people to engage in productive activities, or at least to prevent them from actively resisting Japanese rule. Conceiving of Taiwanese as Japanese subjects was also something that could transcend the traditional gender roles and spheres of activity. As previously stated, the defeat of Russia was a flashpoint with ample pedagogical utility. An article on the establishment of the Red Cross in Japan stated that:

The Russo-Japanese War was not only a war of soldiers, but it was a war of citizens. It was not only a war by men, but was also a war by women. Thus the Red Cross Society, growing and developing under the aegis of our loving, merciful, and benevolent empress, with its members from high society and in rural villages, both men and women, seek to give themselves in assistance. It is not only to share in the glory of victory, but also to see that the incandescence of the Japanese Red Cross Society is praised by the world for its unique merit.³⁹

In this way, newspapers began constructing a paradigm of citizenship that was conducive to general mobilization on behalf of the state, in the sense that a person was qualified to act for the good of the Japanese state, as long as the person was a subject of Japan. By extension, a person living in Taiwan could also become a Japanese subject by displaying compassion to other Japanese citizens. This connected the “knowledge” of being a Japanese subject to the appropriate

³⁹ “Chishizi zonghui 赤十字社總會 [Headquarters of the Red Cross Association],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, June 15, 1906.

feelings of being a Japanese subject that the Japanese state sought to inculcate.

The appearance of a formulation of subjecthood went hand in hand with the discourse on patriotism in newspapers. In the early day of Japanese rule, authors of newspaper articles promoted a patriotism that was generally peaceful and conceived as a tool of national advancement. A 1908 article titled “Patriotism and Peace” struggled incoherently to reconcile imperialism, patriotism, and peace. It began by saying “imperialism promotes patriotism, in other words, hearts that love the country.”⁴⁰ Then it discussed the contemporary state of competition among nation-states and empires: “There is intense competition, and there is winning and losing. If a state wins, the citizens are happy about the benefits. If a state loses, the citizens are directly harmed. If a state is strong, then the citizens enjoy happiness. If a state is weak, then the citizens cannot hope for peace... . Thus the hearts of citizens must be inspired to work for the country.”⁴¹ The article concluded with the notion that the European nations were at peace at the time because only the powerful could make and maintain treaties amongst themselves; those who were strong enjoyed peace, and strength was achieved through the cultivation of spirit and patriotism.

⁴⁰ “Aiguo zhuyi ji pinghe 愛國主義及平和 [Patriotism and peace],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, January 9, 1908.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

On the whole, the newspapers did the work of setting down layer upon layer of connections between Taiwanese and Japanese and presenting such connections as vital to Taiwan, while weakening the psychological and cultural linkages to China. Based on the colonial government's general directives, newspapers explained the international situation, clarified the meaning of "spirit," and elucidated the new conception of Taiwan as a part of the Japanese Empire.

Teaching Japanese and Inspiring Japaneseness

Before 1885, when Taiwan was still a part of Fujian Province, there were private academies teaching Confucian classics and ethics in Taiwan. In 1885, the Qing government appointed Liu Mingchuan as the governor of the newly-created province of Taiwan. His efforts at increasing the level of modernity in Taiwan included the establishment of new style schools, such as Western academies and "telegram academies" (*dianbao xuetaang* 電報學堂) to train telecommunications personnel.⁴² However, when Liu Mingchuan was ousted from his post by conservatives in 1890, his policies were reversed. When Japan annexed Taiwan in 1895, the main institutions of learning in Taiwan were the traditional private academies offering teaching in the

⁴² Yoshihiro Okabe, *Shokuminchi Taiwan ni okeru kōgakkō shōka kyōiku* 植民地台湾における公学校唱歌教育 [Singing education in common schools in Taiwan under colonial rule] (Akashi shoten, 2007), 29.

Confucian classics.⁴³

Assimilation policies were implemented almost as soon as Japan took over Taiwan. Despite having little knowledge and experience about how to deal with educating colonial subjects, administrators were ambitious. In 1897, one principal stated at an entrance ceremony, “Our work on this island represents the first effort in 2500 years to apply Japanese education to foreigners... ..educators of the world are watching for our success or failure.”⁴⁴ Japanese administrators clearly understood that while military force could effectively subdue Taiwan, it was not a feasible mode of governance. On one hand, Japan used its superior military to quell rebellions, and on the other, they established schools, built Shinto shrines, introduced modern infrastructure, and began to transplant what they believed to be Japanese culture into Taiwan. Here, a crucial point is that as Japan confronted a colonized people of a different culture, they had to consider the nature of Japaneseness before bringing it to the colony. The cultural encounter between the Japanese and Taiwanese had to be mediated through language, and this accounted for the great emphasis on teaching the Japanese language in Taiwan. Yet, administrators knew culture could not be forced; in the first decade there were Taiwanese dialect

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Zhong Qinghan, *Nihon shokuminchika ni okeru Taiwan kyōikushi* 日本植民地下における台湾教育史 [*History of Taiwanese education under Japanese colonialism*] (Tōkyō: Taiga Shuppan, 1993), 87.

classes for Japanese teachers and there were trilingual (Chinese, Taiwanese, and Japanese) textbooks. Educational strategies were accommodating and pragmatic in this respect.

The primary way in which cultural modification and progress toward modernity could be combined was education. At this time, it would have been impossible to attempt “assimilation,” and Japanese educators were more concerned with finding and producing common ground with Taiwan. One possible realm of interaction was in the Japanese usage of Chinese characters, known as *kanji* (漢字). At this time, Japanese writing contained many more *kanji* than present-day Japanese. The role of *kanji* coincided with Lydia Liu’s notion of the “super-sign” which she describes as a linguistic unit that is “good at camouflaging the foreignness and internal split of a verbal unit by adopting the unchanging face of an indigenous word, be it in written or phonetic form, and projecting an illusion of homogeneity onto the façade of concrete wordness, the materiality of the written script, to the unsuspecting eye of a native speaker.”⁴⁵ Studying Japanese as a second language with preexisting reading ability in Chinese could mask the degree of difference between the two languages; Japanese language education in Taiwan utilized Chinese characters first as a common basis of understanding, and second as a starting point for acculturation. In other words, Japanese *kanji* were pre-infused with meaning for a learner who

⁴⁵ Lydia Liu, *The Clash of Empires: the Invention of China in Modern World Making* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 14.

could read Chinese; even if the Japanese meaning differed from the Chinese meaning, such difference could be easily overlooked. Some textbooks used during this early period of colonization demonstrated profound understanding of similarities and differences between the Chinese and Japanese languages; similarities created affinity while differences could be creatively interpreted to drive a cultural wedge between Japanese and Chinese characteristics.

My analysis of Japanese textbooks used in Taiwan will follow the progress of how a Taiwanese person would have learned Japanese. I assume that a Taiwanese person descended from Han Chinese ancestors was fluent in the Taiwanese dialect for everyday conversation, but might not necessarily be able to read or write Chinese characters. Thus, it would have been necessary for such a Taiwanese person to first learn to read and write at least some Chinese to have a basic grasp of *kanji* before one could begin the arduous task of learning Japanese with its multiple syllabaries and complex grammar.

Taiwanese textbooks were written by Japanese educators, but they did not simply transplant textbooks used for Japanese children to Taiwan. For instance, Wang Jinque found that textbooks for Japanese children emphasized advancement and personal abilities, but textbooks for Taiwanese children emphasized honesty and ability to live harmoniously with family and

local community.⁴⁶ Also, during this period, while Japanese children were taught to respect their own flag as well as those of other countries, Taiwanese children were only taught that they needed to become part of the Japanese Empire, without understanding what it meant to become world citizens.⁴⁷

Although Japanese educational efforts began nearly upon their arrival in Taiwan, it took some time for Taiwanese people to respond. According to Lin Maosheng's study of education in Taiwan under Japanese rule, industrial development carried out during Governor-General Sakuma's administration between 1906 and 1915 was significant in strengthening the desire of Taiwanese people to become educated. This was in turn proven by increased enrollment and increased attendance rates.⁴⁸ Furthermore, although in 1907 only 20 or 30 students studied in Japan, by 1918 their number had increased to 500. These students voluntarily came to study in Japan so that they could occupy important positions when they returned to Taiwan.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Wang Jinque, *Rizhi shiqi Taiwan gongmin jiaoyu yu gongmin texing* 日治時期台灣公民教育與公民特性 [*Taiwanese civic education and characteristics under Japanese rule*] (Taipei: Taiwan guji chuban youxian gongsi, 2005), 29.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 174.

⁴⁸ Lin Maosheng, *Riben tongzhixia de Taiwan de xuexiao jiaoyu* 日本統治下臺灣的學校教育 [*Public Education in Formosa under the Japanese Administration*], trans. Yongmei Lin (Taipei: Xinziranzhuyi gufen youxian gongsi, 2000), 113.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

The *Chinese Reader* (*Hanwen duben* 漢文讀本), split into four small volumes, was a textbook geared toward teaching *kanji* by using Chinese grammar, with illustrations for visual aid. It was first published in 1913 by the Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpōsha 臺灣日日新報社, which also published *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*. In earlier portions of this book, the pictures rather than the words provided more revelation of Japanese beliefs about Taiwanese society. The textbook begins with the Chinese characters with the fewest strokes: “one person, two persons; one person big, one person small.”⁵⁰ The illustration for this lesson was comprised of a tall Chinese man in Qing-style dress and a cap, and a young boy with a distinctly visible queue. The illustration in Lesson 14 shows a woman in Chinese dress with seemingly bound feet.⁵¹ Qing style dress was certainly not hidden in this official textbook. This sort of realism might have helped to augment the notion that Japan did not simply seek to eradicate or conceal Chinese characteristics in Taiwanese culture. Rather, by taking control of such elements, Japanese textbooks could tame and manipulate these images of Chineseness to serve Japanese interests.

As might be expected, illustrations of Japanese people were not absent in *Hanwen duben*. In a lesson on the importance of receiving an education, the text states, “Here is a student with a

⁵⁰ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Hanwen duben* 漢文讀本 [*Chinese reader*], vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpōsha, 1913), 1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 1:4.

book bag. He has his meal in his right hand and an umbrella in his left hand. Now he is going to school. This student, regardless of wind, rain, cold, or heat, does not miss one day of school in one year.”⁵² The pictorial representation of such an assiduous student was a boy in a modern Japanese-style uniform with a cap and no queue. The next two lessons are comprised of contrasting depictions in a single spread. The illustration on the right is a classroom scene with boys reading in class, and neither the students nor the teacher wear queues; the illustration on the left is a scene of boys playing hide-and-seek, and all of them have queues and wear Chinese-style clothing.⁵³ The implied message was easily discernible. While the textbook sought to establish a Chinese-language foundation for the reader, it used visual cues to locate diligence, a desirable trait, in the Japanese-looking exemplars of learning.

In the last two volumes of *Hanwan duben*, the role of text becomes more significant, presumably because the reader should have become more proficient in reading Chinese by this point. Descriptions of the “Japaneseness of Taiwan” also become more obvious. Lesson 19 of Volume 3 teaches a student to describe his own residential address in Japanese terms, even if still in the Chinese language. This strange hybridity was exemplified by the following passage: “My

⁵² Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Hanwen duben* 漢文讀本 [*Chinese reader*], vol. 2 (Taipei: Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpōsha, 1913), 4.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 2:5.

house is located in [blank for place name], under the jurisdiction of [blank for prefecture name].

Both [the prefecture] and the Governor-General Office are both in Taiwan. Taiwan belongs to the territory of the Great Japanese Empire. Indebted to the virtuous Emperor, although the climate is hot, the land is fertile. [Taiwan] is productive in the five grains, tea, sugar, and camphor. It is a good place to live in.”⁵⁴ This point of Taiwan “belonging” to Japan would be repeated again and again for rhetorical potency. Furthermore, the blanks in the original text allow for students to interact, at least slightly, with their education and situate themselves in the imaginary geopolitical context provided by the Japanese textbook.

Geographic possession was not the only link between Taiwan and Japan. The textbooks also work hard to create temporal connections by emphasizing mythical Japanese history and attempting to convince Taiwanese students that it was in fact their history as well. Lesson 32 teaches: “In the past, our Japanese nation was filled with bandits and the people could not live peacefully. Emperor [Jimmu] (711BC?-585BC?) led the charge himself to quell the bandits and rescued the people from hardship. The emperor's august goodness fills the country. The date of his ascension is *Kigensetsu*, and the people and ministers celebrate it with great joy.”⁵⁵ At the

⁵⁴ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Hanwen duben* 漢文讀本 [*Chinese reader*], vol. 3 (Taipei: Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpōsha, 1913), 11. The blank spaces were part of the original text.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 3:19.

time, *Kigensetsu* (紀元節; February 11) was a commemoration of the day the mythical Emperor Jimmu founded the nation. The possessive “our” or “my” in relation to Japan, its history, and Japanese characteristics appears time and again in various textbooks.

The *National Language Textbook with Taiwanese Translation* (*Taiyaku kokugo kyōkuhon* 台譯國語教本) published in 1913 was a trilingual textbook used to teach Japanese. In the preface, the president of the National Language School system Kumamoto Shigekichi stated that since it was difficult to teach Taiwanese children only Japanese, it was necessary to utilize a textbook that involved the native languages of the Taiwanese people for the sake of expediency.⁵⁶ On each page, the top half was Japanese text, the bottom half had translations in Taiwanese dialect, and at the end of each lesson, grammar points were explained in standard Chinese. The textbook was divided into three sections: the grammar lessons were comprised of short sentences and explanations, conversation lessons had simulated dialogue, and speaking lessons were in fact coherent longer prose pieces. This textbook is an excellent resource for discovering how Japan viewed Taiwan in terms of current and present differences as well as potential for future change.

In the grammar section, lessons progress from Lesson 1’s “what is this? / this is a hat” to more complex prose, covering a large number of commonly used grammar forms and sentence

⁵⁶ Ui Ei, *Taiyaku kokugo kyōkuhon* 台譯國語教本 [*National language textbook with Taiwanese translation*] (Taipei: Shinkōdō, 1913), iii.

patterns. There are several significant points to be noted about the content and subtexts. In the first place is the Japanese effort in writing a textbook that catered to local needs. Localization was manifested in two ways in this particular textbook. First, the author took care to strike a balance between Taiwanese and Japanese in terms of place names, which instilled a measure of familiarity and belonging with respect to a greater (imagined) Japanese Empire. The ability to use Japanese to speak about (and for) Taiwanese things was doubtlessly significant in covering up difference and to some extent expressed rhetorical ownership of such Taiwanese things. For example, when adjectives are taught in Lesson 24, “新高山 (Shingaoshan; Niitakayama) is the tallest mountain in Taiwan. 觀音山 (Guanyinshan; Kannonsan) is not tall, but it is famous,” the geography of Taiwan is incorporated to provide Taiwanese students with a sense of familiarity with the content, if not yet the language.⁵⁷ At the same time, it is important to note that the name Niitakayama means “new high mountain,” because it was higher than Mount Fuji; by annexing Taiwan, Japan also acquired a new highest mountain.

The other facet of localization is to speak about Taiwanese things that have been transformed into Japanese or Japanese things that have been transplanted to Taiwan. In other words, textbooks describe Taiwan as if it were Japan. If Taiwan belonged to Japan, then it was

⁵⁷ Ibid., 41.

only natural that certain elements of Japaneseness also already belonged to Taiwan. For instance, Lesson 31, which taught the student to speak about his place of residence, presents the following sample sentence: “I live in Tōmonkai 2-chōme, no. 16 (東門街二丁目十六番地).”⁵⁸ Then, the same lesson offers a dialogue between teacher and student in this fashion:

“Teacher, which prefecture (*shū* 州) are you from?
‘I am [originally] from Nagasaki Prefecture.’
‘Which prefecture are you from?’
‘I am from Tainan Prefecture.’”⁵⁹

In the first statement about residence, locations are inscribed in a Japanese system of addresses, and in the next dialogue, it is absolutely clear that the student was from Taiwan, while “*shū*” clearly places the student in a Taiwan that is administered by Japan. The selection of “Tainan” is also unlikely to have been accidental, since the *katakana* transcription was the same in Chinese as in Japanese, which would not have been the case with Kaohsiung / Takao or even Taipei / Taihoku. Choosing “Tainan” had the best effect in terms of masking difference. This point is further clarified by the mention of another teacher, not present in Taiwan, who has a name and a “real” address in distant Tokyo:

“Where does Teacher Yamagawa live now?
‘Mr. Yamagawa’s residence is 3-15 Nishikichō, Kanda-ku, Tokyo.’”⁶⁰

In the same lesson, a speaker poses the question, “Do you know where Mr. Go Kōdō (吳江東;

⁵⁸ Ibid., 57.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 58.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Wu Jiandong) lives?" "Go" is not a Japanese surname; the text renders names in both Japanese and Taiwanese readings via *katakana*, the Japanese syllabary used to phoneticize and absorb foreign words. In these language textbooks, *katakana* performed a function complementary to that of *kanji*; whereas *kanji* provided a visual linguistic common ground, *katakana* was employed to create an aural connection between Taiwanese and Japanese.

As might be expected, the *Taiyaku kokugo kyōkuhon* served to teach Japanese values and concerns as much as it did the Japanese language. Consistent with early Japanese colonial policies, textbooks were future-oriented in their intention to accomplish acculturation. In order to inculcate ideas about modernity and modern practices, there are lessons that describe the importance of catching rats to prevent plague, the undesirability of physical disabilities as a direct consequence of incestuous sexual unions, and the availability of further education in medical, language, industrial, and agricultural experiment schools.⁶¹ These recommendations clearly demonstrate the administrative concerns of a still new colonial regime.

Language textbooks sought to achieve acculturation through teaching general ethics as well as Japanese qualities or practices. For example, Lesson 30 of *Taiyaku kokugo kyōkuhon* states, "Do not say bad things about others. Do not steal things belonging to other people. Do not

⁶¹ Ibid., 79, 172, 195.

play around this way. Do not gossip.”⁶² Teaching of Japanese traits begins lightly with simple admonishments of Japanese etiquette, as Lesson 67 teaches that “it is impolite to leave your hat on indoors. Do not walk on *tatami* with your shoes on.”⁶³ Learners were being taught to accept a new ethical system, and they were learning what was desirable and what was undesirable. Later, the propaganda side of the language textbook becomes clearer in Lesson 81, as the section on grammar lessons concludes with the assertion that “the powerful reputation of our Great Empire of Japan is probably known by every other country in the world.”⁶⁴ In the grammar section, while the foremost concern was indeed language instruction, in the later lessons, when the student had become better equipped with linguistic abilities, indoctrination did take place at least at a slow rate.

The conversation section of *Taiyaku kokugo kyōkuhon* more forcefully gives instruction in etiquette, embellishes Japanese history, and forges an emotional and imagined connection to Japan, both as an idea and a place. Here, too, lessons progress from linguistically simple to advanced. In the early lessons, as in the grammar section, it is possible to detect an interesting interplay of Taiwanese dialect and Japanese in the context of the Japanese desire for common

⁶² Ibid., 55.

⁶³ Ibid., 175.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 227.

ground. For example, *こんばんは* (*konbanwa*; good evening) was literally translated into Taiwanese as the more familiar greeting “have you eaten?” This concern with functionality superseding literal accuracy emerged in more than just one passage in the textbook, but was representative of Japanese policy in early colonial Taiwan.

Beyond establishing some basic points of commonality where exchange could take place in Japanese cultural production, the difference between Taiwan and Japan had to be settled on Japan’s terms. Japanese condescension could be detected when textbooks give instruction on culture or modernity. Conversation Lesson 4 teaches, “It is polite to ask after someone's family after greeting them by talking about the weather. However, it is all right not to do so for someone you see every day.”⁶⁵ The text seems to imply that Taiwanese people were somehow stunted in their socialization, unaware of how to have polite interaction with each other (or perhaps specifically with the Japanese), and that a language textbook would be a good place to begin to correct the ignorant Taiwanese. Similarly, Conversation Lesson 10 instructs that one should not visit someone else’s home unannounced; if it must be done, one should adhere to the following: “When visiting someone's house, at the entrance first request to see the person. If someone from the house comes out, give your name card, or speak your name. But if the person already knows

⁶⁵ Ibid., 247.

you, it goes without saying that you do not need to state your name.”⁶⁶ Yet these rules were still mentioned in the lesson because language education bore the responsibility for transmitting acceptable means of civilized human interaction that the Taiwanese lacked.

The conversation section also contains some curiously specific rules for socializing. Lesson 15 states that one should not visit someone who has just given birth, but should wait for more than one week.⁶⁷ If one wishes to visit an ill relative, “other than for relatives and very close friends, it is better not to get close to the bed.”⁶⁸ Lesson 20 on visiting a friend after their home has been damaged by flooding is interesting because it attests to the Japanese understanding of the prevalent weather conditions in Taiwan – typhoons and flooding were sufficiently frequent that a Japanese language textbook suggested a form of socializing for the occasion.⁶⁹ The climate similarities between Taiwan and Japan with respect to typhoons could also serve to create imagined connections to Japan.

Occasionally, the lessons also reveal gaps between actual conditions in Taiwan and Japanese hopes. According to Conversation Lesson 28, if one entertains guests in one’s own

⁶⁶ Ibid., 277.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 294.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 301.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 310.

home, “to please your guests, show them rare items and works of art such as calligraphy. Or play music for them on zithers, flutes, sound recorders. (these are important things when entertaining guests.)”⁷⁰ Surely, this was a standard too high even for most Japanese households! The emphasis on culture and perhaps on being conspicuously cultured, however, was consistent with the Japanese desire for a civilized colony in Taiwan. It is possible that the same sort of cultural advice was being written into textbooks used in Japan, and that it was simply being copied into textbooks for the Taiwanese.

Along with the promotion of culture, lessons also sought to influence Taiwan with ideals of modernity and modern modes of behavior. First, Taiwanese interaction with technology was the theme of a few lessons. Lesson 26 taught telephone etiquette, stating that “when someone calls you on the telephone, it is better to take the call right away. Making someone wait is not only rude to the individual, but you also obstruct the use of a tool of civilization. You also cause problems for other people's time.”⁷¹ In a similar vein, the lesson on trains associated the use of technology to social etiquette: “In the train, it is very rude when there is someone who wants a seat and you pretend to not know while you take up two seats, put your baggage on the seat next

⁷⁰ Ibid., 342.

⁷¹ Ibid., 335.

to you, or when you use seats as a bed.”⁷² In these lessons, modernity and culture become intertwined, and Japanese colonialism was implicitly and quietly incorporated into the modern way of life associated with the new technologies.

However, there are also instances in this textbook where the Japaneseness of culture and politics was loudly trumpeted and praised to the highest. There were various lessons that sought to create in Taiwanese learners of Japanese a yearning for Japan, unseen but imagined to be wonderful, historic, and futuristic all at the same time. Discussion of travel is one such tool for this type of construction of Japan. Conversation Lesson 32 contains the following dialogue, rife with implications of teaching envy with the goal of ultimately converting it into patriotism:

‘Did you see Osaka and Kyoto?’

‘I landed in Kobe and went to Osaka and Kyoto. But only for one or two days, so there is not much to say. Osaka had many smokestacks, it surprised me.’

‘Really. I heard that Osaka is the commercial and industrial center of our country. How was Kyoto?’

‘Like we heard before, Kyoto is really a beautiful place, because for over a thousand years until the Meiji Restoration, this was the capital city, so there are many famous ancient sites.’

‘Did you pay your respects at the Momoyama Royal Mausoleum (桃山御陵; the tomb of the Meiji Emperor)?’

‘Yes, I went to pay my respects there on the day I arrived in Kyoto.’”⁷³

Beauty, history, industry – these are all good features that can be found in *our country*, where one could also discover concrete items and abstract ideas worthy of respect. At the same time, the

⁷² Ibid., 357.

⁷³ Ibid., 365–6.

positive depiction of Japan simultaneously includes modernity and antiquity. The otherness of Japan, a more powerful entity, was being discussed in a positive light by two speakers whom the reader was evidently supposed to construe to be Taiwanese, precisely due to their spatial removal from Japan. The power disparity is actually made to reinforce the allegedly positive side of colonialism. In the dialogue, the one who visited Kyoto even prioritized a visit to the Royal Mausoleum. This sort of passage signaled to the Taiwanese reader that it was already possible to “act Japanese,” and going through the motions in this way could be a foundation for internal change.

National language education itself becomes the topic of Lesson 37, in which a Japanese teacher interviews a potential Taiwanese pupil in the following exchange:

‘Have you ever attended a public school?’
‘I did, but for family reasons, I withdrew before graduation.’
‘Have you learned *kanbun* (漢文; Chinese)?’
‘I learned for four or five years in my spare time at Chengde Academy.’
‘You want to learn *kokugo* (國語; the National Language, Japanese); why?’
‘It is a real shame for a member of the Japanese Empire to not know the national language, and not knowing Japanese makes it inconvenient to deal with people from Japan, so I wanted to learn it for daily life.’
‘This is very good.’
‘Please teach me what you can.’⁷⁴

While this is an exchange involving a definitive disparity of power relations, it optimistically portrays an eager Taiwanese student with both the aptitude and the desire to learn, conversing

⁷⁴ Ibid., 397–8.

with an approving Japanese teacher. This particular dialogue promoted integration, but a process that must be carried out on Japanese terms.

The final section of the *Taiyaku kokugo kyōkuhon*, ostensibly on “speaking,” actually contains essays on diverse topics, such as planes, recycling, contagious diseases, and basic scientific knowledge.⁷⁵ However, there are also essays that might be characterized as most decidedly propagandistic, attempting to define the concept of “our country” and to establish its psychological hegemony. For example, Lesson 16 on the Great Japanese Empire stated,

Our country has had a royal house from the same family for ten thousand generations. Since Emperor Jimmu established the country, it has been over 2570 years. All the emperors in between were benevolent in governance toward the people. All the generations of ministers and people faithfully served the Emperors. Although there are many countries in the world, there are no other countries as great. How fortunate we are to have been born into this country!⁷⁶

Along the same lines, the revered Meiji Emperor also receives special attention in a separate lesson, which seeks to solidify the connection between Taiwan and Meiji Emperor on a personal level:

Taiwan was an uncultured place. The Emperor established the Governor-General’s Office to implement kind governance, so education advanced daily, and hygiene improved yearly. Communications and transportation helped the rise of industry. Agriculture also has made significant gains because canals have been opened for irrigation... Such a benevolent and merciful Emperor passed away in July 30 in the forty-fifth year of Meiji. This is truly a sad and painful event. We must never forget the goodness of the Emperor, be careful in our ways, engage in enterprise, and be good people for the current Emperor.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Ibid., 452, 468, 465, 470–482.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 430.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 432–3.

Colonization, then, was associated to the bestowal of imperial benevolence, for which the Taiwanese reader was expected to reciprocate with everlasting remembrance in commemorating Meiji and obedience in the present, with the assumption that such model behavior was to continue into the future. The text also pressed the reader to feel sadness and pain in response to the death of the Meiji Emperor – an emotional pedagogy that taught subjects how to respond affectively to distant events. Furthermore, this lesson echoed the earlier passage about Emperor Jimmu; just as Jimmu pacified Japan, Meiji did the same for Taiwan.

The creation of new memories via teaching rather than lived experience and the prescription for contemporary feelings and sentiment were efforts toward a colonization of Taiwanese feelings. Textbooks were used to create a coherent educational agenda that combined the elements of civilization, modernity, and Japaneseness for the Taiwanese. These three elements were blended together in a framework of knowledge that was meant to supplant the traditional Chinese worldview. The following section will use diaries written by Taiwanese elites to examine how they received Japanese cultural policies and interacted with Japanese colonizers.

Assimilation?: Diaries of Colonized Taiwanese Elite Men

Diaries were used by Taiwanese elites to record daily life events, interaction with

Japanese officials, and concern for family members. Thus, they can be useful for studying the political identity and social life of elites.⁷⁸ As private accounts often meant only for the writer's own eyes, diaries not only cover money matters, current events, births, and deaths, but can also be a good place to discover private emotions and feelings in response to family members, supervisors, and even the state.⁷⁹ The final section in this chapter will emphasize the diary kept by one member of the Taiwanese elite during 1906 to 1930 to examine how Japanese colonial cultural policies affected or did not affect his daily life. Reading such a diary written under colonial rule, it appears that he was largely unaffected by Japanese rule. This analysis will be supported by a shorter diary of a Taiwanese man who worked as an elementary school teacher. In reading these diaries of Taiwanese men who engaged the Japanese colonial authorities, one is struck by the unobtrusiveness of Japanese cultural policies in the period between 1895 and 1930. For Taiwanese elites, the regime change did not at this time seriously force them to confront what it meant to be a Taiwanese subject of the Japanese Empire.

⁷⁸ Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, *Riji yu Taiwanshi yanjiu yantaohui huiyi lunwenji: jinian Lin Xiantang xiansheng shishi 50 zhounian* 日記與臺灣史研究研討會會議論文集：紀念林獻堂先生逝世 50 週年 [Conference papers from research symposium on the diary and Taiwanese history: commemorating 50 years after the passing of Mr. Lin Xiantang], vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhong yang yan jiu yuan Tai wan shi yan jiu suo, 2006), 37.

⁷⁹ Beatrice Didier, *Nikkiron* 日記論 [On the Diary], trans. Nishikawa Nagao and Gohira Takashi (Shoraisha, 1987), 56–104.

It is necessary to first address the problems of using diaries to illustrate Taiwanese reactions to Japanese colonial rule. As stated earlier, the narratives kept by these diarists are not representative of Taiwanese experiences in the first thirty-five years of Japanese rule, but are important for illustrating the place of Taiwanese people in relation to the Japanese colonial state in the context of its cultural policies and educational practices. Rather than using these diaries to generalize about colonial experiences, it would be more compelling to ask questions about the degree of state intrusion via cultural policy into the lives of these literati. As readers and writers, the literati were people who were most likely to engage with a state concerned with influencing them through language.

The diarist receiving primary attention here is Zhang Lijun (1868-1941), whose diary spanned more than three decades from 1906 to 1937. He lived in Feng Yuan, a prosperous area in the formative days of Japanese rule, where literary men were actively engaged in political and social pursuits. Some of the most significant diary sources for this period of Taiwanese history have come out of Feng Yuan and nearby areas. As his writings show, Zhang was a very well-connected man, and his diary is indispensable in our attempt to understand the efficacy of Japanese cultural policies. The supporting diary discussed here is by Huang Wangcheng (1888-1978), whose diary began in 1912 and also spanned many years. Since Huang's complete

diary has not yet been published in Taiwan, it will be used to corroborate Zhang's diary and broaden the picture on the reach of the Japanese state into the lives of literati.

In reading a diary of Taiwanese elites under Japanese rule, our commonly-held assumptions about their lives might make us imagine expressions of nostalgia toward China as well as angst and distress at being colonized by Japan. However, as the representation of a lived life, Zhang's diary centered far more on his daily life and personal concerns than on the actions of the colonial state. His writings reveal a fascinating personal history of interactions with his local environment; his literati status involved him in various official functions with colonial bureaucrats and Japanese emissaries. As a learned man, Zhang was also frequently called upon to resolve economic or social disputes between local villagers. Zhang's diary is an ideal site for the discovery of his personal feelings and affective responses to a changing Taiwan and for the clarification of a dynamic triangle of identity relations. In this section I will look at the first two-thirds of Zhang Lijun's published diary, with special focus on his emotional reactions to the intricate net of affective influence that the Japanese state placed on Taiwan.

A biography of Zhang's life is beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation, but a point of departure that allows for an initial foray into this ten-volume testament to life is the language. Zhang wrote his diary in Mandarin Chinese. As a literary man, he frequently jotted

down his own Chinese-style poems, as well as such poems written by his friends at literary parties where they enjoyed wine and the company of women. While the diary was in Chinese, he also included Japanese phrases in *kanji*, using them as if they were functional Chinese phrases. Whether it was intentional or accidental, Japanese linguistic and social influence had begun to percolate into Zhang's mind, such that pieces of a foreign language could be utilized even in a private document that he wrote in his native language. The small linguistic distance between Japanese *kanji* and Chinese characters, it seems, made Japanese more readily acceptable. Zhang's diary also contained phrases that, when pronounced in Chinese, actually sound more like the Taiwanese dialect. In short, it is possible to surmise that for Zhang and some other Taiwanese elites, while colonialism forced them to deal with the Japanese language, the commonality of Chinese characters eased the transition and narrowed the cognitive gap.

As for the content of Zhang's diary, there are several noteworthy points to be made about Zhang's engagement with colonialism and the place of emotions in his own life. On the whole, Zhang's diary revealed a deep connection to his local community. He was religious, devoted to the local temples and customs. His diary also showed encounters with many other lives, through events such as festivals, weddings, births, and funerals; these public events held private meaning for him, which he frequently recorded in his personal diary. He was popular with women, and

often documented his trysts with elaborate flowery euphemisms for sexual activity. On various occasions, he had to deal with local Japanese officials. Because of his status as a member of the local elite, he was selected to be the nominal cultivator of “tribute rice,” which would be sent to Tokyo and eaten by the Emperor – this job he considered an honorable hassle.⁸⁰

In Huang’s case, working as a teacher in an elementary school meaning that he interacted with other faculty, few of whom were from Japan. Furthermore, school administrators were always Japanese, and were the most visible agents of the colonial state in the schools. Huang occasionally noted that there was an aloofness between the Japanese and Taiwanese teachers, and the Taiwanese teachers often did not attend social functions for the faculty.⁸¹ It seemed that although Huang was in an educational institution, responsible for teaching ethics and Japanese to Taiwanese students, and placed great stock in being an educator, he did not fully believe in the message of assimilation. His diaries do not express any affinity toward the Japanese people whom he worked with, even if he wanted his students to succeed on Japanese terms.⁸²

On most days, Japanese colonialism was insufficiently significant to record in diaries.

⁸⁰ Zhang Lijun, *Shuizhuhu zhuren riji* 水竹居主人日記 [*The Diary of Zhang Lijun*], vol. 6 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2000), 124.

⁸¹ Huang Wangcheng, *Huang Wangcheng xiansheng riji* 黃旺成先生日記 [*The Diary of Huang Wangcheng*], vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo, 2008), 199.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 1:227.

Unlike the diaries of the imperialization and wartime periods, which often acknowledged the dangers of censorship or begrudged participation at official functions, Zhang's diary had a relatively casual attitude toward the Japanese colonizers. For instance, on *Kigensetsu* (February 11) of 1906, Zhang wrote rather lethargically, "I was going to go to the prefecture branch (*shichō* 支廳) to pay my respects to Japan, but did not because it rained."⁸³ This particular statement deserves further consideration precisely because of its quotidian nature. Before 1930, Taiwanese life was allowed to carry on as before on many levels, and a natural and simple occurrence like rain trump paying respect to Japan. Even though he knew that it was an official holiday, he did not feel obligated to go, nor did anyone enforce this gesture of patriotism on him. Similarly, there are entries from Huang that show him taking the opportunity of national holidays to be lazy at home rather than attending school celebrations.⁸⁴

Zhang's social relationships dominated his private diary. It is possible to comb through these entries looking for the Japanese state, but outright denunciation of Japan as a direct reaction to colonialism is difficult to find. For instance, he was glad that his mother was lucky enough to see electric lights in Feng Yuan at the ripe old age of 80, and even wrote a

⁸³ Zhang Lijun, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji* 水竹居主人日記 [*The Diary of Zhang Lijun*], vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2000), 13.

⁸⁴ Huang, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji*, 1:502.

Chinese-style poem commemorating the occasion in his diary.⁸⁵ In fact, for the most part Zhang seemed to have acclimated well to living under Japanese colonialism. He was involved in various semi-official organizations that promoted the interests of the Japanese state. In 1910 he wrote that he wished more women would join the Taiwan branch of the Patriotic Women's Association.⁸⁶ He frequently wrote Chinese poems to celebrate Japanese events in a peculiar application of Chinese literary skill to praise Japan. Interestingly, one day in 1917 he heard sounds made by an airplane, and remembers that he had read about a plane invented by the Germans, "and our country (*woguo* 我國) has also learned to use it."⁸⁷ For Zhang, a display of technology had become associated with Japan, which Zhang had apparently acknowledged as "our country."

The question arises, then, why Zhang might have been inspired to conceptualize Taiwan as a part of the Japanese Empire in his private diary. A prime connection to the "home country" seemed to have been through the act of reading. The newspapers – as delineated in a previous

⁸⁵ Zhang Lijun, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji* 水竹居主人日記 [*The Diary of Zhang Lijun*], vol. 4 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2000), 12.

⁸⁶ Zhang Lijun, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji* 水竹居主人日記 [*The Diary of Zhang Lijun*], vol. 2 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2000), 317.

⁸⁷ Zhang Lijun, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji* 水竹居主人日記 [*The Diary of Zhang Lijun*], vol. 5 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2000), 71.

section of this chapter – seemed to have some of the desired effects on him. He read about the Great Kantō Earthquake and sympathized with those who suffered because of it,⁸⁸ which was what the newspapers were trying to arouse. But Zhang still knew that Taiwan was not Japan. He was friends with Lin Xiantang, a proponent of autonomous self-rule in Taiwan, and agreed with the movement for Taiwanese self-rule. He also called Gu Xianrong, who was one of the men who welcomed the Japanese into Taiwan in 1895, a sycophantic dog.⁸⁹

Reading the diaries does not necessarily offer any clear stance or political identification of diarists. Zhang's political allegiance could not be located simply in China. While he enjoyed Chinese literature and helped with arranging plays based on Chinese historical figures at his local temple, there seemed to be a psychological distance from the idea of China as homeland. In China's momentous year of 1911, when he read about the events of the Chinese Revolution, he noted that the Qing Dynasty appeared to be unsalvageable (in the next sentence he mentioned going to visit a prostitute that same day).⁹⁰ This sort of frivolous juxtaposition showed that this news did not seem to have affected his daily business or caused an emotional reaction. Huang's

⁸⁸ Zhang, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji*, 6:84–5.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 6:437, 221.

⁹⁰ Zhang Lijun, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji* 水竹居主人日記 [*The Diary of Zhang Lijun*], vol. 3 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2000), 136.

diary exhibited a similar detachment, albeit from Japan, when the death of Meiji Emperor in July 1912 was merely noted in a few words without any emotional engagement; unlike what was taught by the textbooks described in the previous section.

In a 1929 entry, Zhang wrote regarding Sun Yat-sen, whom he considered the greatest man of the Republic of China, "Today, the Nationalist government buried his coffin at Zijin Mountain. The Republic expressed its condolences, and various major nations also sent emissaries to pay their respects at the Nanking Auditorium. In comparison, various [Chinese] emperors of the past may not have been honored as much."⁹¹ When Taiwan was ceded to Japan, it was ceded by a weak Qing state nearing its end. Since that time, the definition of "China," along with the reality of the fallen dynastic system, had changed for the Taiwanese people. A conceptual leap was required to continue to equate Qing with the Republic of China. For Taiwanese people to continue to be loyal to China, they would have had to shift the object of their loyalty accordingly – but they were even less familiar with this new China. It is telling that Zhang compares Sun to Chinese emperors, because the emperorship was what Zhang understood China's political system to be. While Taiwan's relationship with China has become more tenuous, Japan's work on building conceptual bonds in Taiwanese minds has gradually elicited at least

⁹¹ Zhang Lijun, *Shuizhujū zhuren riji* 水竹居主人日記 [*The Diary of Zhang Lijun*], vol. 8 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2000), 53–4.

some degree of acceptance of the colonial situation.

For the Taiwanese people, if both China and Japan were geographically and psychologically distant entities, and the Japanese regime was willing to expend time and effort through education and cultural policies to convince them of an imaginary closeness and eventual similarity to a culturally sophisticated and modernized Japan, then the idea of being Japanese could become more palatable. For these Taiwanese diarists who were more familiar with the Chinese literary tradition, the Japanese emphasis on education and advancement actually conformed to their long-held notions about the value of education, and could even offer them modern knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge in Japanese, on Japanese terms, did much to help elites accept colonial rule as something that did not demand resistance; this was the goal of early Japanese rule in Taiwan.

Conclusion

Japan is an archipelago comprised of thousands of islands; it was fairly easy to incorporate Taiwan conceptually into the already long chain of islands. Yet, when Japan faced the challenges entailed by taking possession of Taiwan, assimilation was not a simple task, nor was it a practical goal at the beginning of the colonization process. One might argue that in the early

years, the priority for Japan was to broaden the common ground of engagement with Taiwan.

Needless to say, the increased possibilities of cultural exchange were not promoted simply for the sake of Taiwan. Rather, such cultural interaction with profound concern for psychological colonization facilitated Japanese rule and created further possibilities for mobilization, both for peace and for war.

A better interpretation of the “assimilation period” might be “non-assimilation” (*hidōka* 非同化), a theory postulated in a 1911 article from the *Taiwan jihō*. The Japanese writer cited examples from the history of European colonialism, such as the French in Tunisia and British in India, which he deemed too confrontational, causing colonized populations to hate the colonizer. He concluded that modes of assimilation that sought to destroy the systems and habits of a people were destined to fail, and recommended that it would be better to get people to conform out of their own free will.⁹² In essence, he suggested that rather than active acts of assimilation, such as the direct transplanting of the colonizer’s legal or land policies wholesale, it was more important to push people in the direction of choosing to align themselves psychologically (*shinri* 心理) with the colonial power. To achieve this on a holistic level and therefore ensure greater security, it was necessary to provide both economic and sentimental incentives. This description

⁹² Tōgō Miroru, “Hidōkaron 非同化論 [On non assimilation],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1911): 16–21.

was more fitting of the first twenty-or-so years of Japanese colonization of Taiwan.

The Japanese state colonized through a pedagogy that taught Taiwanese to feel closer to Japan, or at least to be open to learning about Japan with its various (constructed) facets of superiority in terms of modernization and civilization, which were now available to Taiwan via the process of colonization. At the same time, the connection to China was being slowly chipped away by the same pedagogical enterprise, as China was constantly depicted as unworthy of allegiance. This was not assimilation, but it was indeed pulling Taiwan into Japan's orbit, a change that would become clarified by imperialization and wartime cultural policies. More significantly, as in the cases of newspaper reports on earthquakes, in both Taiwan and Japan, the Taiwanese people were being conditioned to evoke sympathetic responses, laying the groundwork for learning how to feel about Japan as an idea and the Japanese Empire as a concrete political entity. Moreover, in this period, feelings and emotions were construed to be universal traits that generate and legitimize affinity to Japan in the form of peacetime patriotism, which was in turn consolidated as a natural character trait. Japanese cultural production in its colonization of Taiwan served in large part to manipulate difference and similarity.

Education implemented by Japan in Taiwan, as viewed through the textbooks, encouraged academic learning as well as ethical modification. Traditional Confucianism was no

longer sufficient for the present day; it was to be supplanted by an ethics of Japanese subjecthood that integrated modernity and culture. However, since it was impossible to destroy Chineseness quickly, on one hand the Japanese abolished and prohibited some of the practices they considered to be most “Chinese,” and on the other hand some Chinese characteristics were Japanified or rebranded as universal. For example, the ethics textbooks contained praise for filial piety, propriety, and trustworthiness; while this was consistent with Confucian teachings, these values were portrayed as impotent in a corrupt Chinese context and purified by the Japanese spirit.

This treatment of Japanese-taught values as universal also elevated them above gender roles. Women were taught that they were citizens who could choose to be freed from a system of bondage that was Chinese. Men were taught that they had progressed into Japaneseness, beyond the stagnation of Chinese society and the failure of Chinese politics. Overall, they were taught what they should desire from the state—which happened to be the same as what the state promised: modernization and cultural advancement. At this stage, becoming Japanese, in the uncomplicated sense of living in a territorial location governed by the Japanese Empire, meant the ability to participate in modern citizenship. This carried an increasingly well-defined set of cultural meanings, including having appropriate feelings and affection for other human beings,

regarding Japan as the “home country,” and the idea that Japaneseness could be made to reside in Taiwan. Furthermore, they were taught to feel dependency on Japan – Japanese discourse at this time was replete with statements about Taiwan’s elevated status due to its association with Japan instead of China. Such a sense of dependency also augmented notions of citizenship, reinforcing the idea that the absence of Japanese rule would have left Taiwan primitive and uncultured.

It may be said that in the early years of taking Taiwan as a colony, “Japaneseness” was a largely imagined value that subsumed traits such as patriotism, Japanese norms of behavior, modernity, Confucian ethics, and a sense of cultural superiority. In colonizing Taiwan, Japan had to come to terms with the preexisting variations of Han Chinese culture. Esteem for literacy and knowledge was a key element that remained consistent between pre-colonial and colonial rule. Japan did not attempt to dumb down the Taiwanese population; it attempted to create an atmosphere of learning that was common, available, and saturated with the sense that the Japanese version of knowledge was better than what China and its culture had offered. The importance of literacy and education was maintained, but the content of education was infused with Japanese values, or what Japan sought to promote in the Taiwanese people. On a wider scale, revaluation did not only occur with regard to Taiwanese society. Japanese colonialism, with the values it imposed, also presented a re-conceptualization of Japan’s place in Asia,

especially with regard to China.

Ultimately, differences were exploited and redefined to suit Japan's colonial efforts in Taiwan. The Japanese were able to overcome this potential obstacle by a series of discursive maneuvers predicated upon differences between Japan and China as well as between China and Taiwan. The status quo of difference between Taiwan and Japan, on the other hand, was conceptualized to be a bridgeable distance. Taiwan was eligible to "catch up" to the relative advancement of Japan – so long as it remained a part of the Japanese Empire.

Chapter 3: The Musha Incident: Japanese Management of Emotions and Violence in

Pre-War Taiwan

Introduction

On the morning of October 27, 1930, at a sports event in a Japanese elementary school in central Taiwan, aborigines of Musha (霧社)—previously thought by Japanese authorities to be a tame and “model tribe” despite their well-known martial prowess—launched a full attack on the Japanese. The aborigines killed many Japanese men, women, and children, often using their traditional method of decapitation. According to a later Japanese report, 134 Japanese people were killed that morning, along with two Taiwanese people who were mistakenly killed because they were wearing Japanese dress.¹ As the aborigine perpetrators hid in the mountains and the Japanese authorities marshaled their military resources to hunt them down, more disturbing details began to emerge. Hanaoka Ichirō and Hanoka Jirō – two “model aborigines” who had been given Japanese names and educated by the Japanese since they were children – were

¹ “Musha Jiken no tenmatsu (1) 霧社事件の顛末(1) [Details of the Musha Incident],” *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, January 7, 1931, 2.

thought to have played central roles in the uprising.² The Musha Incident posed a direct challenge to the political myth of assimilation, and raised unavoidable questions about the intersection of violence, a cultural policy that emphasized the governance of emotions, and the so-called “civilizing progress” in Taiwan as a Japanese colony. If such “civilized” aborigines – who had experienced years of cultural assimilation policies – could still rise up against the Japanese colonizers and become “violent natives,” then perhaps the colonial government was overconfident about its achievements.

This chapter will explore how the Japanese state managed violence and the emotions that underlay it and defined the relationship between the two in Taiwan between 1930 and 1937. The Musha Incident was a significant event in the colonial history of Taiwan and shocked the Governor-General’s Office as well as the central government in Japan. The incident brought into clear focus the fact that Taiwan, though it could be conceived as a part of the Japanese Empire, remained culturally distinct and not fully under the control or influence of the Japanese. Although the aborigines’ violence contradicted every lesson in civilization taught by the

² Takenaka Nobuko, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi: Riben nüren zai Taiwan, Zhaohepian (1926-1945)* 日治台灣生活史：日本女人在台灣，昭和篇 (1926-1945) [*History of life in Taiwan under Japanese rule: Japanese women in Taiwan, Showa volume (1926-1945)*], vol. 1 (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban qiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2009), 257.

Japanese and completely deviated from the colonial narrative Japan wrote for Taiwan, some Japanese commentators found ways to understand the Musha Incident in Japanese terms, as was necessary to ensure continued governance, thereby simultaneously exoticizing and taming the uprising. There are two distinct “archetypes” of aborigines in the story of the Musha Incident, represented by the Hanaoka men and the real leader of the uprising, Mona Rudao. The Hanaokas were raised to become Japanese, and to a certain extent they did. Mona Rudao, on the other hand, was taken on a tour to Japan as part of the Japanese efforts at civilizing him, but he always retained his name, continuously plotted uprisings, and finally succumbed only to modern Japanese military power, not to its civilizing policies. The Japanese state was able to co-opt the martial character of the aborigines, and in just fifteen years turned the violent Musha natives (*Musha kyōban* 霧社凶蕃) into the Takasago Volunteer Corps (*Takasago giyūtai* 高砂義勇隊). By analyzing official edicts and newspaper articles, this chapter examines the colonial government’s reactions to the Musha Incident, both in the realm of military action and of colonial discourse.

Background on Aborigines in Taiwan

During the Qing dynasty, intensification of Chinese settlement in Taiwan strengthened assimilation of aborigines into Han culture. The de facto incorporation of Taiwanese aborigines

into the Qing frontier entailed a process of transformation that can be traced through depictions in travel writings by Han Chinese authors as well as the administrative efforts propelling change. Viewing Taiwan as a frontier, Qing writers saw aborigines as having very different appearances and customs, while Qing officials sought to remake them into Chinese. As an empire, the Qing rulers had to accommodate different cultures and ethnicities, while maintaining their distinct ethnic identity as Manchus.³ On the Taiwan frontier, the Qing state attempted to absorb aborigines into the Han culture and to impose Confucian ideals. Its writers generally described aborigines as backward and having very different values yet not lacking the potential to change. Furthermore, the fact that Taiwanese aborigines had no written language, and as a result no written history and genealogy, made them especially backward in the eyes of Qing literati.⁴

Traditionally, the aborigines in Taiwan were divided most broadly into two categories: “raw savages” and “cooked savages.” Cooked savages generally lived in the plains and were comparatively more assimilated than the raw savages by the Han settlement population. Cooked savages were increasingly recruited with economic incentives to settle on the edge of the plains as a buffer zone between Han Chinese and the raw savages, while raw savages maintained their

³ Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 34–5.

⁴ Emma Jinhua Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895* (Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), 242.

headhunting ways as late as the reign of Emperor Yongzheng.⁵ The Qing administrators considered raw savages considered to exist beyond the pale of civilization, while the cooked savages were subject to Qing jurisdiction, although held to different standards compared to people of Han descent.⁶ According to Shepherd, even though there were many differences in physical appearance and daily life between the aborigines and Han Chinese settlers, “the Chinese perceived no racial divide between Han and aborigines that would impede the ability of aborigines to acquire Chinese status characteristics or deny legitimacy to mixed marriages and their offspring.”⁷ In other words, in spite of differences, there existed a possibility of cultural and economic integration in the future, which could be seen as the primary goals of Qing administration in Taiwan.

Under Qing administration, Chinese immigration to Taiwan continued, in many cases encroaching upon the lands held by aborigines. The immigrants’ need for land pressured the Qing government to allow Chinese entry into the mountainous regions of Taiwan, which

⁵ Ka Chih-ming, *Fan toujia: Qingdai Taiwan zuqun zhengzhi yu shoufan diquan* 番頭家：清代臺灣族群政治與熟番地權 [*The aborigine landlord: ethnic politics and aboriginal land rights in Qing Taiwan*] (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan shehuixue yanjiusuo, 2001), 26.

⁶ Teng, *Taiwan’s Imagined Geography*, 246.

⁷ John Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 1993), 379.

provoked armed resistance from aborigines.⁸ Qing administrators employed a passive policy, blockading raw aborigines and in effect keeping them in the mountainous regions of Taiwan.⁹ Han Chinese also were prohibited from crossing over the boundary lines into aboriginal territory.¹⁰ Due to this quarantine policy, Taiwanese aborigines were able to maintain their ways of life and some living space.¹¹

In general, the Taiwanese aborigines were disdained by the Qing administration. Emma Teng has argued in *Taiwan's Imagined Geography* that since the Taiwanese aborigines never played a historical role in the creation of the Qing state, posed a challenge to the Qing Empire, or had centralized leadership, the Qing continued to view them as primitive and did not care to foster closer ties with them, simply using a divide-and-conquer strategy to impose its rule.¹² Furthermore, although the Qing did see education as the “most direct (noncoercive) means of fostering cultural change,” it did not create specialized curricula for the aborigines, and failed to

⁸ Ronald G. Knapp, “Cultural Contact and the Migration of Taiwan’s Aborigines: A Historical Perspective,” in *China’s Island Frontier* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980).

⁹ Deng Xiangyang, *Fengzhong feiyang* 風中緋櫻 [*Red cherry blossoms in the wind*] (Taipei County: Yushanshe chuban shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2000), 29.

¹⁰ Teng, *Taiwan’s Imagined Geography*, 244.

¹¹ Knapp, “Cultural Contact and the Migration of Taiwan’s Aborigines: A Historical Perspective.”

¹² Teng, *Taiwan’s Imagined Geography*, 242.

devote tax revenues to create a coherent educational effort.¹³

When the Japanese arrived, they used many of the same linguistic terms pertaining to the aborigines, but the similarity in policy ended there. The significant difference between Qing and Japanese governance over Taiwanese aborigines was based in their attitudes. Compared to Qing passivity based in the desire to avoid confrontation or even engagement with aborigines (especially with those they designated “raw savages”), Japanese administrators were drawn to the lumber resources of Taiwan’s virgin forests, and in seeking to control the aborigines placed limits on various aborigine traditional practices such as facial tattoos and headhunting in the name of civilization.¹⁴ The Japanese extension of power into aborigine areas significantly altered their lifestyles.

The Japanese continued to use the Qing designation of for aborigine communities, *fanshe* (蕃社; now pronounced *bansha*), as an administrative unit, which included one or more tribes that may or may not have belonged to the same ethnic group.¹⁵ Like the Qing authorities, the

¹³ Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*, 373.

¹⁴ Qiu Ruolong, *Manhua Balai 漫畫巴萊 [Comics Bale]* (Taipei: Yualiu chuban shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2011), 58–9.

¹⁵ Kitamura Kae, *Nihon shokuminchika no Taiwan senjūmin kyōikushi 日本植民地下の台湾先住民教育史 [History of aborigine education in the Japanese colony of Taiwan]* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō daiigaku shuppankai, 2008), 21.

Japanese envisioned differences between themselves and aborigines in cultural terms. One report from Taidong in eastern Taiwan states,

Even though it is thought that ‘raw savages’ are fierce and difficult to tame, they are of a simple sort... if we offer them trust and teach them the correct way to manage themselves, it would be like walking on flat ground; how would it be difficult to teach them? Thus, if we instill the spirit of Japan in their empty brains so they can understand what a nation is, they would be willing to use their bodies to bear possible dangers. If an enemy intrudes, those willing to shatter their own bodies to bravely repay the country would not be the Taiwanese people in front of the mountain [i.e. on the western half of Taiwan], but rather the raw savages of Taidong.¹⁶

This shows the view that “raw savages” can actually be more malleable than the Han Chinese and ultimately more useful to the Japanese colonial enterprise. In addition to the traditional view of aborigines as violent, the Japanese colonial imperative reconceptualized them as blank slates on which to inscribe Japaneseness.

According to the study of Japanese education in Taiwan by Lin Maosheng, while education for aborigine children began in 1896, by 1905 not much progress had been made. However, compared to 1906, by 1918 the numbers of schools and students had both doubled and there were 27 common schools for aborigine children, in which 4,155 students were enrolled.¹⁷

The Japanese believed that it was necessary to institute different schools for aborigines, as *A*

¹⁶ Lin Pintong, *Taiwan zongdufu gongwen leizuan: jiaoyu shiliao huibian yu yanjiu* 台灣總督府公文類纂: 教育史料彙編與研究 *Taiwan Governor-General Office public documents compilation: compilation and research on historical materials on education* (Nantou: Taiwan Sheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 2001), 411.

¹⁷ Lin, *Riben tongzhixia de Taiwan de xuexiao jiaoyu*, 119.

Review of Educational Work in Formosa published in English by the Governor-General Office in Taiwan referred to them as “the primitive race.” Their mandatory curriculum for these aborigine schools only included ethics, Japanese, and arithmetic, with agriculture, manual training, and singing as electives; compared to the curriculum for Taiwanese children, the aborigines “have no need of Chinese classics, Science, and Commerce.”¹⁸ Thus, the education imposed on aborigines was consistent with the Japanese view of them as needing to be initiated into basic “civilization” through Japanese mediation.

Since Musha was located at the intersections between major north-south and east-west thoroughfares, the Japanese emphasized their efforts at taming aborigines here. By 1930 Musha was thought to be pacified, to the point that Japanese tourists would visit Musha. Japanese authorities had constructed post offices, health centers, police stations, hotels, and a school here, making this area appear to be a “model tribe.”¹⁹

The two key figures involved in the Musha Incident, Hanaoka Ichirō and Hanaoka Jirō, were part of the second wave of Japanese education that began in 1906. For their outstanding

¹⁸ Department of Educational Affairs of the Government-General of Formosa, Japan, “A Review of Educational Work in Formosa, 1916,” 39.

¹⁹ Qiu, *Manhua Balai*, 64.

academic performance, their education was funded by the Governor-General Office.²⁰ In them, the Japanese sought to create two “civilized” aborigine individuals to serve as examples and ambassadors to their tribes.

The Musha Incident

The events of the Musha Incident were closely investigated by Japanese authorities immediately after the event, and have also been widely studied; the basic facts are generally agreed upon among scholars. Japanese policies on aborigine management were often harsh: the Japanese held aborigine culture in contempt and forced the aborigines to change their lifestyles and to work for the Japanese. These were all among the causes for the Musha Incident.²¹ The story of an aborigine uprising in response to the inherent injustice of the colonial context is not a historically unusual one. However, it is important to delve deeper into the emotional implications of these causes in order to understand how the Japanese government explained the uprising to itself and its subjects, and in turn to understand how the Japanese were able to harness aborigine

²⁰ Hayashi Eidai, ed., *Shashin kiroku Taiwan shokumin tōchishi* 写真記錄台灣植民統治史 [*Photographic records of history of colonial rule in Taiwan*] (Tokyo: Azusa shoin, 1981), 54.

²¹ Tali Pusin, “Wushe Shijian fasheng de guocheng 霧社事件發生的過程 [How the Musha Incident Happened],” in *Wushe Shijian: Taiwanren de jitijiyi* 霧社事件: 台灣人的集體記憶 [*Musha Incident: the collective memory of Taiwanese people*], ed. Syat Yabu, Xu Shikai, and Shi Zengfeng (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 2001), 223–227.

violence just a few years later. Japanese policies were not just disembodied rules and regulations; they touched and affected Taiwanese aborigines in very real, personal, and often sentimental ways.

The Japanese held dualistic and conflicting notions regarding the aborigines. Contempt for aborigine culture and practices did not preclude them from romanticizing aspects of aborigine life. On one hand, the Japanese generally conceived of the aborigines as noble savages, a people “as pure and genuine as gods” who were not part of the materialistic modern world.²² On the other hand, the Japanese saw the important resources of land and timber as more significant than the aborigines themselves. According to a later aborigine writer, the utilitarian Japanese policy was in pursuit of “aborigine land without aboriginal [human] existence.”²³ Regardless of the “noble savage” rhetoric, the Japanese drive to civilize the aborigines in order to increase their colonial instrumentality ultimately led to the purposeful alteration of their “pure” lifestyles. For example, one emotionally destructive practice was to marry Japanese police officers to the daughters of tribal leaders in an effort to make tribal leaders less likely to turn on the Japanese

²² Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 1:108.

²³ Nabu Siyac, “Feiren de jingyu: Saideke zu kan Wushe Shijian 非人的境遇: 賽德克族看霧社事件 [Inhumane Treatment: Seediq Perspective of Musha Incident],” in *Wushe Shijian: Taiwanren de jitijiyi 霧社事件: 台灣人的集體記憶 [Musha Incident: the collective memory of Taiwanese people]*, trans. Ukan Walis (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 2001), 59.

police forces, which were often isolated in the mountainous regions of Taiwan. In one such union, the son witnessed his aborigine mother being deserted by his Japanese father, who later returned to Taiwan with a Japanese wife.²⁴ The son's narrative included an absurd scene in which his father introduced the Japanese woman as "your new mother."²⁵ Naturally, the polygamous situation angered the aborigine mother, and the damaged familial and social relationships became a reason for aborigine discord. While intrusive, this particular Japanese policy was at least in part premised upon the belief that the establishment of emotional ties between aborigines and Japanese would be a positive factor in controlling the colonized aborigines.

One concrete example of Japanese disdain for aboriginal culture and customs has been frequently cited as a proximate cause of the Musha Incident. According to an aborigine man who was two years old at the time of the Musha Incident and constructed his account from conversation with his elders, some days before the Musha Incident, Tadaw Mona, a son of Mona Rudao (later the leader of the attack on the Japanese), was holding a celebration while a Japanese police officer passed by. The aborigines "were so happy to welcome this Japanese man to be among them. In order to express their deepest sincerity, they offered a cup of wine to drink with

²⁴ Hayashi Eidai, *Musha no hanran, minshūgawa no shōgen: Taiwan hiwa* 霧社の反乱・民衆側の証言: 台湾秘話 [The people's testimony regarding the Musha Uprising: Secret words of Taiwan] (Tōkyō: Shinhyōron, 2002), 56.

²⁵ Ibid., 56–57.

the Japanese man. But the Japanese man was unwilling to drink with them, because the 'Mnuupu [ceremonial wine]' must be drunk side by side and the two people's mouths had to touch together. The Japanese man thought this was not hygienic, and he did not accept the good intentions of the Seediq [Tribe]. He even scolded and beat Tadaw Mona with a whip. But this caused Tadaw Mona to resist.²⁶ A Japanese newspaper printed a report with a slight variation, saying that Tadaw Mona had pig blood on his hands after killing a pig for the celebration, and Officer Yoshimura thought this was too dirty.²⁷ The Japanese man used the concept of “modern hygiene” to denigrate this significant gesture, and the Seediq people left this encounter, which began with friendly intentions, feeling insulted and afraid of future consequences. After his son was beaten by a police officer at a celebration, Mona Rudao brought wine to the police station to appease the officers, but even this apology was rejected. Fearing further punishment, he apparently decided to strike first.²⁸

In their own minds, however, the Japanese believed that they did work hard to civilize the aborigines in the Musha region. An important account comes from Hanaoka Jirō's wife. Born

²⁶ Siyac, “Feiren de jingyu,” 57–58.

²⁷ “Musha Jiken no tenmatsu (2) 霧社事件の顛末(2) [Details of the Musha Incident],” *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, January 8, 1931, 2.

²⁸ Yoshikawa Satoshi, ed., *Musha Jiken no shinsō 霧社事件の真相 [The truth of Musha Incident]* (Tainan: Shinkō shinpō kagi shikyoku, 1931), 353.

Obin Tadao to a tribe leader, she had her name changed to Takayama Hatsuko by the Japanese, and after 1945 she again changed her name to Gao Caiyun.²⁹ The changing of an aborigine woman's name into three different languages following regime changes signaled these regimes' claims to ownership over her identity. Her story is valuable in studying the Musha Incident because hers was one of the few aborigine voices that remained after the Japanese military retaliation against her tribe in response to the Musha Incident. According to Obin, the two model aborigines, Hanaoka Ichirō and Hanaoka Jirō, were hand-picked by local educators from among the aborigine children of Musha. Hanaoka Jirō was chosen because he was the son of a tribal leader, and Hanaoka Ichirō was chosen because he had good grades in school.³⁰ Although they were not brothers, they were given the same family name, Hanaoka. Obin's cousin was also given a Japanese name, and when the girls were about seventeen years old, the Japanese authorities decided to marry them to the young Hanaoka men, who had become minor police officers, in a double Japanese-style wedding ceremony that was widely covered by newspapers. Even though Obin did not want to marry a police officer, because of Japanese benevolence in having given [her] an education, she felt there was no choice but to submit.³¹

²⁹ Hayashi, *Musha no hanran, minshūgawa no shōgen*, 116.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 130.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 131.

The two Hanaoka couples were described as exemplars of how civilized aborigine people could be, and their stories were engineered to inspire in readers a sense of awe for the great Japanese accomplishment in bringing the aborigines out of their primitive darkness. However, the definition of civilization was always a Japanese one. The only way for an aborigine to become civilized was for him to take on Japanese attributes, even though the Japanese would not have allowed an aborigine (or any colonized person) to be perceived equally in their own eyes. As Japan patronizingly trumpeted colonial advancement, in reality, however, the Hanaokas were caught between two distinct societies. The aborigines working in the lumber industry often came to Ichirō, complaining of hardships such as frequently being ordered to carry lumber for the Japanese when they should have been harvesting their own fields.³² In sum, even though Japanese rule offered aborigines some education and a slim possibility for advancement (though purely on the colonizers' terms), aborigines suffered physically and emotionally from ill treatment that disrupted their social relationships and lifestyles.

Early in the morning on the 27th of October, a pregnant Obin and her cousin were making Japanese-style rice balls for their husbands when Mona Rudao came in, shouting “This has been

³² Ibid., 132–135.

decided. Gather all the men of Hogo Tribe, and we will attack Musha. Let's hurry and go!"

Obin's father argued with Mona Rudao for a while, but was eventually convinced to fight, leaving with a knife at his waist.³³ Later, Obin heard that something terrible had happened at the elementary school sports festival, and ran to the police box near the school, finding her cousin carrying her baby son and standing with Ichirō and Jirō. Jirō was holding an inkstone, while Ichirō was writing their suicide letter on the wall.³⁴ Seeing this, Obin realized there was nothing to do but for them all to die together. But Jirō told her, "You are a woman, it should be all right. If they let you live you, should raise the child. If they do not let you live, I will see you in Heaven. Take care of yourself."³⁵ She was arrested on November 6th, and according to one later historical account, she was barefoot and wore a kimono, looking like a lovely Japanese lady.³⁶

According to the Chinese-language *Taiwan New People's News* (*Taiwan xin minbao* 台灣新民報), at eight in the morning on the 27th of October, several hundred aborigines from Musha suddenly rose up and surrounded the sports festival at Musha Common School, attacking the police box and killing over a hundred Japanese. The insurgents also had sufficient

³³ Ibid., 137–139.

³⁴ Ibid., 145.

³⁵ Ibid., 153.

³⁶ Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 1:259.

understanding of modern technology to have taken the precaution of cutting the telephone lines and all communication with the outside, but word had already spread that many “horrific murders” had taken place.³⁷ Interestingly, the Japanese-language newspapers devoted much more space to sensational eyewitness accounts of the horrors, provocatively asserting that women and children only survived because they were fortunate enough to hide under the corpses of their friends, who were covered in blood and decapitated with aborigine knives.³⁸ The Japanese-language newspapers emphasized the plight of the helpless Japanese, while the Chinese-language newspapers were more matter-of-fact, with detailed reporting on the mobilization efforts of the Japanese police, military, and airplanes as they moved into the mountains in search of the aborigine culprits.³⁹

As the Japanese historian Haruyama Meitetsu wrote, “the uprising of Taiwanese aborigines in Musha, suppressed amidst the cannon sounds and smoke, explosions and stinking

³⁷ “Zhifan zhengce de weiji? Wushe fanren turan fengchi `治蕃政策的危機? 霧社蕃人突然蜂起 [A crisis of the aborigine management policy? Sudden uprising by Wushe aborigines],” *Taiwan xin minbao*, November 1, 1930, 3.

³⁸ Ueda, “Gunshu ha senkatsu ni shimi, yabu no naka de zanshi 郡守は鮮血に染み、やぶの中で惨死 [Covered in blood, the district governor dies violent death in thicket],” *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, October 29, 1930, 3.

³⁹ “Zhifan zhengce de weiji?,” 3.

smells, violently shook the foundation of the governing institutions in colonial Taiwan.”⁴⁰ In order to reestablish order and authority as soon as possible, the Japanese quickly mobilized and retaliated, pressing forward into the mountains. The newspaper reports from the first few days showed a great deal of confusion and conflicting facts and opinions over the role of Ichirō – there were reports that claimed that although Mona Rudao was the ringleader, Ichirō was the prime planner of the uprising; other reports assumed Ichirō would never help the aborigines by virtue of having been educated by the Japanese.⁴¹ Soon, however, the suicide letter written on the wall, as witnessed by Obin, was found. It was written in Japanese and stated, “The two of us must leave this world. The common anger [*kōfun* こうふん] of the aborigines is due to the oppressive labor demanded of them, which caused this incident. We have been captured by the aborigines too, and there is nothing we can do. 9 o’clock in the morning, October 27th, Shōwa Year 5. The aborigines have surrounded us from all directions, and all the bureaucrats below the

⁴⁰ Haruyama Meitetsu, *Kindai Nihon to Taiwan: Musha jiken shokuminchi tōchi seisaku no kenkyū* 近代日本と台湾: 霧社事件・植民地統治政策の研究 [*Modern Japan and Taiwan: Research on Musha Incident and colonial policies*] (Tōkyō: Fujiwara Shoten, 2008), 19.

⁴¹ “Taofajun yong shinshi zhanshu jingong, fanren chu sili wanqiang dikang 討伐軍用新式戰術進攻, 蕃人出死力頑強抵抗 [Army attacks with new strategies, aborigines resist to the point of death],” *Taiwan xin minbao*, November 8, 1930, 3. “Shifan chushen zhi Huagang sifei shoumou 師範出身之花岡似非首謀 [Hanaoka from the normal school does not seem to be the mastermind],” *Kanbun Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, October 31, 1930, 6.

rank of district governor have died at the school.”⁴²

The words of the suicide note require further analysis. Different versions of the suicide note made their way into Chinese-language and Japanese-language newspapers. From Japanese newspapers and accounts, it seemed certain that the inscription on the wall explaining the aborigine uprising contained the *hiragana* letters *kōfun* (こ う ふ ん).⁴³ The most likely *kanji* characters to fit in the context would be 興奮 (feverish excitement) or 公憤 (public/common anger and resentment), and the latter was actually inserted parenthetically by the Japanese article in *Taiwan xin minbao*. The Chinese translation of the suicide note in the same newspaper on the same day simply left out the link to emotion, merely stating, “This event results from the excessive forced labor of the aborigines.”⁴⁴ This disparity could have been a simple oversight by a translator or editor, but it was unlikely that something so significant would not have been attended to with the greatest care by newspapers, especially when it is known that the Governor-General Office actually clamped down on reporting the incident immediately after the uprising. The implication was perhaps that the Japanese authorities understood the potential for

⁴² Hayashi, *Musha no hanran, minshūgawa no shōgen*, 145–146.

⁴³ “Musha sōdō no shinsō 霧社騒動の真相 [The truth of the disruption at Musha],” *Taiwan xin minbao*, November 8, 1930, 14.

⁴⁴ “Fanren fanpan de zhijie yuanyin yi mingliao 蕃人反叛的直接原因已明瞭 [The direct reason for aborigine revolt is clear],” *Taiwan xin minbao*, November 8, 1930, 3.

negative feelings toward the Japanese to arouse the Taiwanese people reading Chinese-language newspapers. Furthermore, if “excessive forced labor” was reserved for the aborigines who had to haul lumber in the mountains, then Taiwanese readers had no reason to involve themselves in any anti-Japanese action, and would only watch from the sidelines. At any rate, as soon as the Musha Incident happened, even before their military gained the upper hand, the Japanese began to control the information in an effort to prevent the Taiwanese population from being affected by a potentially emotionally-resonant aborigine uprising.

After the suicide letter was found, a few days after Obin’s arrest, the police told her to help identify her husband’s body, which had been discovered along with those of Ichirō, his wife, and their baby son. Ichirō had apparently cut the throats of his wife and son before disemboweling himself in the Japanese fashion, while Jirō waited to cover their faces with white cloth, and at last hung himself on a nearby tree. At the time of their deaths, both Ichirō and Jirō were wearing the same Japanese ceremonial dress they were made to wear at their weddings.⁴⁵ Death was a performative statement, the last one in their short lives, which were full of coerced performances that belied constructed colonial identities and ethnic conflict. The formal and clearly Japanese manner of their deaths may have caused the Japanese to exonerate the Hanaokas

⁴⁵ Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 1:261.

posthumously and to allow them to remain model aborigines who had been remade in the image of the Japanese. A nearby hill was even renamed Hanaoka Yama by the Japanese in their honor, a name which remains to this day, albeit in Chinese pronunciation (Huagangshan).⁴⁶ Their deaths allowed them to be seen as having been caught up in a tragedy due to their circumstances. One Japanese commentary stated, “Aborigines have their own legends, customs, beliefs, pride, and speech, which have existed for a thousand years. This can be said to be similar to the spirit of ancient warriors in Japan.”⁴⁷ Rather than stopping at conceding that aborigines had their own identity, the martial character in Japanese history and in the present aborigine uprising was used as the discursive commonality and natural link that connected Japanese and aborigine culture. The suicides eventually garnered sufficient sympathy to clear the Hanaokas’ names as far as the Japanese state was concerned, but whether they led or signaled the aborigine warriors’ attack on the sports festival will never be known definitively. Several decades and two political regimes later, Obin, now wearing her Chinese name Gao Caiyun, said in an interview, “The Hanaokas were standing as both aborigines and Japanese, and they died well. They did not wrong the

⁴⁶ Deng, *Fengzhong feiyong*, 90.

⁴⁷ “Musha jiken ni kansuru no isshisaku 霧社事件に関する一思索 [Thoughts about the Musha Incident],” *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, November 8, 1930, 6.

Japanese who brought them up, and they did not wrong those of their own blood!”⁴⁸ Their suicides were important in contributing to their rehabilitation in Japanese public discourse, and the aboriginality of their lives was tamed.

The real leader of the Musha Incident, Mona Rudao, lived a very different life. Compared to the model aborigines, much less is known about Mona Rudao. When he committed suicide after realizing the futility of fighting the Japanese troops sent to hunt the insurgents down, he was about 48 years old. Mona was described by the Governor-General Office as having a “violent and haughty character” and a “heart of resistance.”⁴⁹ According to the same report, he was among the aborigine leaders selected in Meiji Year 44 (1911) to participate in a tour group to Japan to see its modern weaponry and technological wonders. Rather than being impressed into submission, he carried out two minor failed uprisings in the Taisho era, and was placed on the list of “unruly aborigines” who were subject to surveillance. Furthermore, Mona Rudao’s sister was married to a Japanese police officer in accordance to the aforementioned Japanese policy, but he eventually abandoned her, and this also inevitably contributed to anger and indignation in Mona

⁴⁸ Deng Xiangyang, “Fengzhong feiyang 風中緋櫻 [Red cherry blossoms in the wind],” *New Taiwan*, September 3, 2004, para. 3, <http://www.newtaiwan.com.tw/bulletinview.jsp?bulletinid=19309>.

⁴⁹ “Musha Jiken no tenmatsu (2) 霧社事件の顛末(2) [Details of the Musha Incident],” 2.

Rudao on her behalf.⁵⁰ After the slaughter of Japanese at the sports festival triggered Japanese military retaliation, Mona Rudao and his followers retreated into the mountains, where he was presumed to have shot himself.⁵¹

Japanese military suppression of the Musha Incident proceeded on two fronts, and as can be expected, violence was central to both. In the first way, Japan directed its military forces into the mountains in central Taiwan to hunt down the aborigines. Since it was difficult to penetrate the rough terrain of the mountains, contemporary Taiwanese at the time and later scholars alike widely speculated that poisonous gas was used in addition to incendiary bombs.⁵² The use of poisonous gas was prohibited by international agreement, and while some Taiwanese newspapers reported on its use, such stories were missing from the Tokyo newspapers. Even in one Taiwanese news report, the name of a “new weapon” was censored out, and it was instead cryptically reported that “modern warfare had come to the island for the first time.”⁵³ When

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Pusin, “Wushe Shijian fasheng de guocheng,” 121.

⁵² Deng, “Fengzhong feiyong 風中緋櫻 [Red cherry blossoms in the wind],” 102; Pusin, “Wushe Shijian fasheng de guocheng,” 237; Leo T. S Ching, *Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of identity formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 139.

⁵³ “Qianxian budui yong lujun xinbingqi 前線部隊用陸軍新兵器 [Frontline troops use new army weapons],” *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, November 6, 1930, 4.

Minister of War Kazushige Ugaki was asked about the use of poisonous gas, he replied that it was only tear gas.⁵⁴ In addition to deploying its own military power, Japan instigated other aborigine tribes to channel their traditional longstanding animosities, accumulated over hundreds of years of headhunting, toward those involved in the uprising. Some aborigines who had participated in the Musha Incident and surrendered to the Japanese were congregated together as *hogoban* (保護蕃; protected aborigines) and placed under Japanese “protection.” In reality, many were later massacred by the *mikataban* (味方蕃; aborigine allies to the Japanese) in what is commonly referred to as the Second Musha Incident.⁵⁵ Although the *hogoban* were supposed to be protected by the Japanese, the Japanese did not intervene when the *mikataban* attacked and almost wiped out the *hogoban*. The Japanese themselves did not want to kill aborigines who had surrendered, and instead allowed the *mikataban* to kill the *hogoban* with their tacit approval. In using the *mikataban*, the Japanese violated its own previous orders against aborigine headhunting; this practice, labeled as “barbaric,” was freely used against the remnants of Mona Rudao’s Seediq tribe.

As might be expected, with its more advanced weapons, greater numbers, and better

⁵⁴ Hayashi, *Musha no hanran, minshūgawa no shōgen*, 224.

⁵⁵ Satō Minyō, *Daiichi, daini Taiwan Musha Jiken ji* 第一、第二台灣霧社事件誌 [*Chronicles of the first and second Musha Incidents*], 1931, 95.

organization, the Japanese colonial government was successful in eradicating those it held responsible for the Musha Incident. Like the Hanaokas and Mona Rudao, aborigines often resorted to suicide when they had no more options. Aborigine suicides were widely reported, especially when they were interpreted to be for the sake of honor or for other people. For example, one newspaper reported on a group of 108 aborigine women who killed themselves *en masse* to signal to their husbands that they had nothing to fear, and to encourage these men to fight to the death.⁵⁶ This sort of death, carried out with great determination, bore considerable cultural and symbolic meaning in the eyes of the Japanese. Aside from generating shock value, these suicides reinforced the Japanese view of aborigines as an inherently and fiercely martial people, none of whom, not even the women, feared death. As a result, although to the Japanese the Musha aborigines were certainly savage, their deaths expressed a quality of nobility with which the Japanese could paradoxically identify.

In an article titled “The Musha Rebellion as Unthinkable: Coloniality, Aboriginality, and the Epistemology of Colonial Difference,” Leo Ching called the Musha Incident itself as well as the later volunteerism of surviving aborigines “unthinkable” to the Japanese. He writes that it is

⁵⁶ “Fanfu jisha jili qi fu 蕃婦自殺激勵其夫 [Aborigine women commit suicide to encourage their husbands],” *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, November 1, 1930, 4. Also “Maimushe fan fu baiba ming quanbu jisha 買畝社蕃婦百八名全部自殺 [108 women of Maimu Tribe all commit suicide],” *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, November 2, 1930, 4.

the “contradiction between savagery and civility within colonial discourse that confers the paradoxical nature of [the Musha Incident’s] unthinkability,” in which “unthinkability” was a result of the Japanese epistemological framework in carrying out colonial administration: on one hand subhuman savages ought not to have been capable of planning and executing a rebellion, yet on the other hand civilized aborigines ought not have committed these acts of violence by virtue of their proximity to civilization.⁵⁷ Further, postwar Japanese scholars were befuddled when just a decade later descendants of Musha warriors who had died fighting the Japanese and whose tribes were all but wiped out wrote letters in their own blood imploring the government to let them fight on behalf of the Japanese Empire. Ching posits that this contradiction occurred because while it was considered “natural” for the Japanese to believe in ideology, it was perceived as “an outright abomination” for aborigines to do the same.⁵⁸ In other words, difference and incommensurability contributed to the “unthinkability” of the Musha Incident and of later volunteerism by aborigines.

Ching ultimately uses the Musha Incident as a foil for discussing Franz Fanon’s classic treatise on colonialism, *The Wretched of the Earth*, to make the point that “the condition of

⁵⁷ Leo T. S. Ching, “The Musha Rebellion as Unthinkable: Coloniality, Aboriginality, and the Epistemology of Colonial Difference,” in *Identity Conflicts: Can Violence be Regulated?*, ed. J. Craig Jenkins and Esther E. Gottlieb (New Brunswick N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 47.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 56–57.

coloniality is best construed and apprehended not as ‘ambivalence’ or ‘hybridity’ but as ‘contradiction.’”⁵⁹ Fanon’s construction of a colonial world as one in which the “settler” and “native” are pitted against each other in a struggle that only ended when one side fell perhaps is a fitting description of European colonialism, but it is less appropriate for Japanese colonialism in Asia. Japan’s Pan-Asian ideology certainly rang hollow at times, but it laid rhetorical claim to so-called Asian brotherhood and was much more amenable to superficial or theoretical inclusion of various ethnic groups. Even though the aborigines in Taiwan were in practice largely excluded from such discourse and were often treated like pack animals, the mandated policy of *dōka* paved the way for their education and at least placed them on an imagined course toward Japanese civilization and modernity. In reality, aborigines (or Taiwanese) were never deemed “full Japanese,” not even when they were forced into Japanese civilization as much as the Hanaokas were, but there existed discursive possibilities for them to progressively approach Japaneseness. Finally, although the Musha Incident was “unthinkable,” the Japanese state showed signs that it was thinking quite hard about it immediately after the massacres occurred and as repression was taking place. The rationality of the state was channeled toward producing discourse and knowledge about the Musha Incident and about imagined connections between Japan and

⁵⁹ Ibid., 58. For relevant passages in *The Wretched of the Earth*, see Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington ([S.I.]: Penguin Books, 1963), 28, 42.

Taiwanese aborigines; the emotional character of the language used to talk about the Taiwanese aborigines and the Musha Incident itself needs to be explored.

Official Reflections and Unofficial Opinions

Because the Musha Incident was instigated by an ethnic minority in Taiwan, its nature was much more complex than a general colonial uprising, and its emotional significance was unique in colonial Taiwanese history. The emotional character of the Incident was due in part to the Japanese cultural context and in part to the history of assimilation policies used in Taiwan. First, the deaths of women and children on both the Japanese and aborigine sides were especially poignant for everyone who heard about the incident. Japanese women and children were killed indiscriminately by the aborigines. Many aborigine women and children either committed suicide on their own, or were killed by their family members on their way to fight the Japanese, as a way of eliminating their worldly connections and thereby fixing their minds singularly to their grisly task. Second, even though the Japanese viewed aborigines with disdain and treated them poorly, they believed themselves to have been benevolent rulers who kindly offered education and civilization. In this regard, the Japanese felt as though their “grace” had not been reciprocated, and were dismayed by the uprising. These emotional foundations were reinterpreted in Japanese discursive reactions to the Musha Incident.

Japanese production of knowledge regarding the Musha Incident employed a language of emotions to render the uprising as something “acceptable” to the Empire. Most of the extant information on aborigines involved in the Musha Incident derives from either deductions by the Japanese state or contemporary interviews with the descendants of the rebels long after the Japanese left Taiwan. As Zhou Wanyao writes, “Since the rebels either died or escaped, they lost the ability to speak on the historical stage.”⁶⁰ The Musha Incident’s inherent and unique emotional dimensions overlap but are not quite the same as how it is represented by Japanese discourse. The “unthinkability” of the incident perhaps necessitated explanations that drew from the realm of feelings, especially aborigine feelings, which were clouded by a sense of incommensurability. The emotional character of the Musha Incident also lent credence to speaking about it as an emotional incident. By designating “anger” and “resentment” as causes of the Musha Incident, the Japanese state could paradoxically protect the self-proclaimed rationality of its policies. At the same time, the Japanese state also discovered that closer and more nuanced management of aborigine feelings could prove conducive in controlling their violence as well.

First, the Japanese found it useful to point to the incident as an emotional, passionate

⁶⁰ Zhou Wanyao, *Taiwan lishi tushuo: shiqian zhi 1945 nian* 台灣歷史圖說: 史前至 1945 年 [*Taiwan history in images: prehistory to 1945*], 2nd ed. (Taipei Shi: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo chouben, 1998), 124.

affair that was more an immediate and direct response to minor problems in Japanese policy rather than a concerted and calculated plan to oppose the fundamental fact of Japanese colonialism. In one official compilation of contemporary newspaper reports that purports to tell the truth about the Musha Incident, the Japanese government generally identified excessive labor demands, failure to pay aborigines for their work, violation of aborigine female chastity, Hanaoka Ichirō's sense of injustice, Mona Rudao's ambition, and other failures of administration as the causes of the Musha Incident. The same report notes that since most of the aborigines involved were dead, it was impossible to know the "real reason" of the uprising; however, deductions could be made.⁶¹ By making these deductions, the Japanese state was taking authoritative interpretive control over the Musha Incident; this compilation was made public in book form and ended with the statement from Governor-General Ishizuka Eizō, who attempted to downplay the incident as the result of the aborigines' insufficient exposure to civilization.⁶² A language of emotions is implicitly used to describe motivations for the uprising. In each of the items described above, the collective but latent reason was that the aborigines fell into despair.

⁶¹ Yoshikawa Satoshi, ed., "Musha Jiken to shōrai no riban seisaku 霧社事件と将来の理蕃政策 [Musha Incident and aborigine management policy in the future]," in *Musha Jiken no shinsō 霧社事件の真相 [The truth of Musha Incident]* (Tainan: Shinkō shinpō kagi shikyoku, 1931), 355.

⁶² Yoshikawa, *Musha Jiken no shinsō*, 407.

For example, when the piece discusses instances of aborigine women being sexually violated by Japanese, it notes the “unbearable bitterness and pain” caused both to the women themselves and to the men for ruining their own romantic hopes.⁶³ In the case of Mona Rudao, the report blamed his recalcitrant character and ambition that moved the six tribes of Musha, and stated that he planned everything.⁶⁴ By localizing the rational planning to just one person who was followed by a handful of disgruntled aborigines, it allows for hope that different leadership could lead the aborigines toward goodness.

Second, the Japanese state was ready to place some blame on itself, or at least on the Japanese police, who were the readily visible bearers of its power. Every instance of conceding that harsh treatment led to the Musha Incident was an admission that the state had engaged in misrule. As Takenaka writes, “In the remote mountains that no one is concerned about, the police officer is the Emperor with absolute power.”⁶⁵ The Office of the Governor-General, by pointing specifically to the abuses of power by Japanese police officers, could actually distance itself from being seen as a direct cause of the uprising.

Third, immediately after the Musha Incident, donations from the rest of Taiwan and all of

⁶³ Yoshikawa, “Musha Jiken to shōrai no riban seisaku,” 357.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 1:262.

Japan began to pour into the area for the Japanese survivors. Newspapers and compilation accounts of the Musha Incident often covered such expressions of sympathy with complementary levels of emotion in their language. An uprising by the aborigines could be construed to allow the Japanese people and the Han Chinese population in Taiwan to stand together. Regardless of how much money they were able to spare, donors unfailingly stated their profound sympathy for the Japanese victims and their doubtlessly suffering families. An ironwork factory owner from Osaka sent three thousand yen, even though he had no connections to Taiwan. When the reporter asked him why he sent so much money, he said, “It is simply that I take pity (*ki no doku* 気の毒) on them.”⁶⁶ An elementary schoolgirl in Kyoto sent one yen. Her letter stated that her father told her that elementary school children were killed in Musha; she was greatly saddened (*kawaisō* 可哀想) upon hearing this, and moved to send her savings. The hostesses and geishas of the “pleasure quarters (*karyūkai* 花柳界) in the Taiwanese cities of Tainan and Kagi also wished to express their condolences for the event that “shocked all the Islanders in unison” by donating their money.⁶⁷ An anonymous woman paid her respects at the memorial for two soldiers who died fighting the aborigines and gave money to their family members; her action was received flowery praise, in which a report called it “the crystallization of beautiful sympathy (*utsukushii*

⁶⁶ Yoshikawa, *Musha Jiken no shinsō*, 203.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 232.

dōjō no kesshō 美しい同情の結晶).”⁶⁸ Here, rich men, young girls, even prostitutes could be commended for their participation in the emotional performance of personal sacrifice through sympathetic donations of money.

Fourth, the martial character of the aborigine suicides allowed them to remain honorable; even though the aborigines lived under Japanese rule, they were never perceived to have completely conformed to Japanese ways, so they were not necessarily considered traitors. Their suicides actually elicited sympathy from some commentators. The aborigine warriors were, in a paradoxical way, connected through death to the Japanese people they massacred in Musha. Their suicides allowed the aborigines who attacked Musha to reclaim some honor in the eyes of the Japanese. As for the Japanese people who were killed, the manner of their death immediately enabled them to be perceived as victims or martyrs. For example, Principal Nihara Shigeshi of the Musha Common School died while trying to defend his students at the site of the uprising. The report states that his death aroused the greatest sense of sorrow; the writer was deeply moved by the sacrificial character of his death and proclaimed that Principal Nihara will always be respected and loved by posterity as an exemplary model.⁶⁹

As much as the Japanese colonial government allowed for emotional discourses to

⁶⁸ Ibid., 220.

⁶⁹ Satō, *Daiichi, daini Taiwan Musha Jiken ji*, 53.

dominate as it coped with the aftermath of the Musha Incident, it also worked hard to control the discourse at large. The *Taiwan xin minbao* solicited opinions from the public regarding the Musha Incident. Opinions that conformed to the official position were allowed to be published; opinions that used words like “colonialism” were heavily censored by blacking out characters. It is interesting, however, that the censorship was so evident as to be mostly useless. Characters were replaced with Xs or Os that corresponded to the number of words that had been censored, and it was relatively easy to guess what had been excised. Perhaps the purpose of blacking out obvious words rather than the wholesale excision of articles was to remind the people of the presence of colonial authority. This enabled the colonial government to seem as if it were open to at least some opinion from the people, while demonstrating its ultimate control. For instance, one opinion stated: “Thus if the X-humane (X人道) tyranny continues, in their future they will perish, or there will be an attempt at a second Musha Incident to vent their [the aborigines’] pent-up resentment and anger.”⁷⁰ It is glaringly obvious what the X was meant to have covered up – the word should have read “inhumane.” The publication of this opinion is surprising, and may demonstrate that while newspapers wanted to show a range of opinions from the people, editors had to censor language that the government specifically proscribed. Possibly the author’s

⁷⁰ “Musha Jihen to shoka no kenkai 霧社事変と諸家の見解 [Musha Uprising and various opinions],” *Taiwan xin minbao* (Taipei, January 1, 1931), 23.

words made it past the censors largely intact due to the pronoun “they” with a referent that was not made exceedingly clear throughout the passage, although it is reasonable to guess that “they” referred to the aborigines. Another author’s words were mostly censored, leaving what he thought to be the reasons of the Musha Incident to be “The XX of nation. Differential treatment, economic XX, and the control of XX.”⁷¹ “Economic XX policies” and “XX-ism (presumably colonialism, 植民主義; *shokumin shugi*)” were spread all over the newspaper as well. Criticisms of the assimilation policies and economic repression were thinly veiled by the largely ineffective censorship. Thus, as the Japanese authorities were occupied with creating their own interpretation of the Musha Incident, they were also intent on repressing alternative explanations, especially those that placed colonialism and its economic mechanisms in a causal relationship with the Musha Incident.

Ultimately, in the context of colonialism, difference and sameness are what constitute hybridity and contradiction. Difference and incommensurability between the Japanese and aborigines was noted by commentators as one way to gain a superficial explanation of the Musha Incident without really explaining anything. One reporter, Sekiuchi Hiro, wrote, “trying to surmise the things in the heart of the savage aborigines is an impossible task for civilized

⁷¹ Ibid.

people.”⁷² On the other hand, the delicate balancing act between difference and sameness is perhaps as contradictory as argued by Ching. Commentators also recognized that the traditional lifestyle of the aborigines, in which the women grew millet and men relied on their martial ability to hunt animals for food, was generically similar to the Japanese warriors glorified in their own history.⁷³ The comparison of Taiwanese aborigines in the present to Japanese people in ancient times puts the Taiwanese and Japanese on the same imagined temporal trajectory in Japanese terms, and implicitly allows for the possibility of future convergence. However, many of the more effective ways to maintain the link between the Japanese colonizers and the colonized aborigines were promoted through accentuating the human emotions – shock and sympathy in response to tragedy, and admiration and nostalgia in response to honorable death. In this way, the emotional discourse in the aftermath of the Musha Incident was used to at least partially assuage its devastating effects on Japanese perceptions of the extent of their control over the Taiwan as a colony.

Among its other ramifications, the Musha Incident also effected a change in the top

⁷² Yoshikawa, *Musha Jiken no shinsō*, 376.

⁷³ “Musha Jiken no genin ni kansuru no ikkōsatsu 霧社事件の原因に関する一考察 [An inquiry into the reasons of the Musha Incident],” in *Musha Jiken no shinsō 霧社事件の真相 [The truth of Musha Incident]* (Tainan: Shinkō shinpō kagi shikyoku, 1931), 393.

leadership in Taiwan. The Governor-General of Taiwan at the time of the Musha Incident, Ishizuka Eizō, was heavily criticized in the Japanese Diet and was promptly replaced on January 16, 1931 by Ōta Masahiro.⁷⁴ Two weeks before Ishizuka was removed from his position, he issued a proclamation declaring the end of Musha Incident, stating that aborigines had not received sufficient influence from the Empire; since they were still the Emperor's infant children (*heika no akako* 陛下の赤子) they should still be led to goodness through benevolence and love while their evils should be corrected through imperial authority (*kōi* 皇威).⁷⁵ To be sure, this is typical bureaucratic verbiage, but it signaled that aborigines in the Empire were maintained on a trajectory that is moving toward an imaginary future sameness. Japanese education of the aborigines up to this point was considered merely insufficient rather than futile.

Consequences of the Musha Incident

After the Musha Incident, the Seediq tribe was virtually wiped out. Most of the men who participated directly in the uprising died fighting the Japanese or the *mikataban*, or took their own lives as well as those of their wives and children. Some of those under Japanese

⁷⁴ Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 1:276.

⁷⁵ Yoshikawa, *Musha Jiken no shinsō*, 407–408.

“protection,” were tortured and executed, leaving only 300 members alive.⁷⁶ For the Japanese colonial administration, the Musha Incident necessitated a revision of its aborigine policies. According to Ching, “the new and primary directive was to ‘enlighten and educate’ (*kyōka*) the aborigines as they become loyal imperial subjects. Whereas civility had previously existed only in a universal opposition to savagery, now civility was conjoined with the particularity of Japanese nationality, with specific reference to loyalty to the Emperor.”⁷⁷ The Japanese saw in their failure as manifested by the Musha Incident that it was not enough to civilize the aborigines, but it was necessary to focus the content of their education on Japaneseness. In the five years after the Musha Incident, having effectively decimated aborigine opposition, the Japanese authorities implemented new policies on changing the lifestyles of aborigines, encouraging them to adopt the lifestyles of the Han Chinese by living in houses and move toward an agriculture-based economy.⁷⁸

Japanese education, along with the later movement of *kōminka*, produced surprising results on the orphaned aborigine children whose parents died in the Musha Incident. In 1943, 33 of the Musha orphans wrote letters in blood pleading with the colonial government to let them

⁷⁶ Deng, *Fengzhong feiyang*, 107, 109.

⁷⁷ Ching, *Becoming “Japanese,”* 153.

⁷⁸ Deng, *Fengzhong feiyang*, 130–1.

volunteer to fight in the Pacific War, and 12 eventually died fighting for the Japanese Empire.⁷⁹ Leo Ching cites postwar Japanese historians who spoke with aborigine volunteers, confused by the fact that they had steadfastly identified with “the Japanese spirit.”⁸⁰ Ching arrives at the conclusion that the dispossessed aborigines overcame the oppositions in colonialism through “a strategic construction of sameness and equality, not as an end in itself, but as a temporary transcendence of the alienated and battered condition inflicted on them by colonialism.”⁸¹ While this interpretation is compelling, it is also important to note that the “sameness and equality” that the aborigine volunteers strove for was defined in Japanese terms. Japanese control over what it meant to be an aborigine after the Musha Incident allowed the aborigines to identify with Japaneseness, whose meaning was expanded to incorporate the admired aspects of the aborigines, such as purity of spirit and martial ability. Post-Musha Incident changes in policy and increased emphasis on possible ways for aborigines to become Japanese imperial subjects perhaps facilitated the aborigines’ adoption of a Japan-centered identity.

However, this is not to say that there was a strong feeling of ambiguity for the aborigines.

We lack sources from the aborigines at the time of the Musha Incident, and can only find

⁷⁹ Ibid., 143.

⁸⁰ Ching, *Becoming “Japanese,”* 168–72.

⁸¹ Ibid., 173.

glimpses of their emotional engagement with the colonial history through postwar interviews, often decades after the fact. However, before she died in 1996, Gao Caiyun said in an interview, “I know that the people in the mountains of Wushe (Musha) need to be educated, we cannot stay in the days of headhunting and facial tattoos! We love and hate the Japanese! We hate that the Japanese saw our people as working animals, and they killed a lot of our people, but we love them for bringing us civilization and enlightenment (*wenming kaihua* 文明開化!)”⁸² The failures of Japanese policy in pacifying the feelings of aborigines prior to the Musha Incident was perhaps what led to the policy revisions that emphasized identity transformation and emotional attachment that ultimately won over the aborigines, inspiring them to fight with Japan rather than against it.

Conclusion

This chapter described the Musha Incident of 1930 by sketching it as an event, by reading the emotions inscribed by the Japanese colonial government in the event, and by examining how the Japanese delicately balanced emotions with violence. As an event, it was planned and carried out by aborigines in response to oppressive Japanese policies. The high death toll of Japanese

⁸² Deng, *Fengzhong feiyi*, 161.

people in a single day forced the Japanese to respond swiftly with its military force in the mountains while mobilizing its mouthpieces on the island to prevent the spread of Taiwanese opposition to Japanese rule. The Japanese authorities achieved the latter goal by generating sympathy toward the Japanese victims, and in doing so aligned Taiwanese people of Han descent with the Japanese in terms of “civilization.” At the same time, while people of the Seediq tribe directly responsible for the incident were being slaughtered by other aborigine tribes with Japanese permission, Japanese newspapers only decried the act of killing Japanese, but did not denigrate the imagined martial ability of aborigines.

The Musha Incident and ensuing Japanese rhetorical responses demonstrate the significance of emotions in Japanese policy. As stated in the previous chapter, the language of official edicts showed concern with the feelings of the people under colonial rule. When the aborigines of Musha rose in rebellion, the Japanese immediately found it necessary to take control of the situation in both the military and the discursive realms. Newspaper depictions evolved from shock and anger at the aborigines to gradually coopting their martial behavior into an imagined Japanese past, thereby opening the possibility of incorporating the aborigines themselves into Taiwan’s future as part of the Japanese colonial enterprise.

Chapter 4: Teaching Patriotic Feelings: the Reach of Colonial Cultural Policies in Taiwan in the Prewar Japanese Empire

The Musha Incident of 1930 challenged the Japanese Empire and cast doubt on the efficacy of imperialism. However, rather than attempting to tame the aborigines by declawing them or eradicating their so-called violent character, the Japanese utilized emotion-centric rhetoric first to grasp interpretive power over the Incident, and then to educate the aborigines in the feelings they should have toward the state. As for the Taiwanese population, Japan continued expanding its education from the teaching of Japanese to instituting an ethical system that was centered on parallel but related notions – repayment of imperial grace, however ill-defined, and the increased glorification of death. Schoolteachers taught war stories to schoolchildren of Han Chinese descent to instill in them a martial character, something that the Japanese believed the aborigines naturally possessed as part of their wild nature. By using emotional discourse to increase the martial potential of the Han Chinese population in Taiwan, and by keeping aborigine violence dormant through education, the Japanese slowly developed an environment for fevered militarism while maintaining peace and stability in Taiwan after the Musha Incident. Alongside state management of emotions and violence, the Japanese colonial government also attempted to supplant the Chinese identity, which some elites refused to abandon, with the identity of a

Japanese subject that experienced increasing intensity of emotion for the Japanese state.

In turn, the emotional character of Taiwan's image in the imagination of the Japanese Empire actually bestowed upon Taiwan a sort of centrality, despite its colonial and peripheral status. Interestingly, as Japan moved on its militaristic trajectory toward aggressive war with China, the discursive position of Taiwan was also elevated, as Japan used Taiwan to signal to the rest of Asia that becoming a Japanese colony or a part of the Japanese Empire would not be an undesirable outcome. As stated in the charter of the Co-Prosperity Association, "in terms of politics, economics, thought, and society, there may not be any place in Japan that surpasses the stability of Taiwan."¹ Thus, although Taiwan was a new acquisition, it became the center of Japanese colonial discourse, the model colony. Taiwan's relatively central geographic location in Asia and previous Chinese influence also allowed it to be described as a center of future growth and development. Indeed, one article in 1936 went as far as to describe Taiwan in these terms: "As the center point of Eastern society, or, standing at the intersection of the Eastern Seas, the Southern Seas, and the Pacific Ocean in terms of their nature, culture, politics, commerce, and

¹ Tōa kyōei kyōkai, *Tōa kyōei kyōkai no seishin* 東亜共栄協会之精神 [*The spirit of the East Asia Co-prosperity Association*] (Taichū: Tōa kyōei kyōkai honbu, 1934), 10–11.

military aspects, the meaning of Taiwan is extremely significant.”² The author also stated that Taiwan was “standing in the morning light of history.”³ Commentators were aware that with the increasing possibility of military conflict with China, Taiwan would be important for the output of raw materials, labor, and military manpower.

As a model colony, then, the question for Japan was how to truly bring Taiwan under control, and to avoid another Musha Incident in Taiwan. While the Musha Incident was violent and alarmed the colonial authorities, the roughly contemporaneous rise of militarism in Japan made it unproductive to simply eradicate aborigine violence altogether. As seen in the previous chapter, the emotional responses elicited by Japan from those who cared about the incident and the emotional interpretations created by official authorities instead sought to open appropriate outlets for violence in the future. This process of diverting violence was carried out through schools and social education, which showed violence to be acceptable, even if it was highly abstract and did not yet have specific targets.

In 1931, the Manchurian Incident occurred, an event which led to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the eventual establishment of Manchukuo as Japan’s puppet state.

² Masuda Fukutarō, “Shiteki shokō uchi no Taiwan 史的曙光裡の台湾 [Taiwan in the historic dawn],” *Taiwan jihō* (January 1936): 6.

³ *Ibid.*, 7.

The Manchurian Incident contributed to the rise of militarism in mainland Japan, a trend that also influenced Taiwan. The Japanese government became increasingly cognizant of the urgency in assimilating Taiwan, to make it an economically functioning colony that would no longer threaten violent uprisings against the Japanese colonizers. In education, the intentions of Japanese cultural policies became clear, as Japanese pedagogy sought to shape young Taiwanese into loyal colonial subjects. In contrast to earlier Japanese textbooks, which sought to create imagined and emotional connections between the Taiwanese people and the Japanese Empire, textbooks used in Taiwanese classrooms in the 1930s attempted to deal with the possibility of future military conflict. At the same time, Japanese social education (for adults) and newspapers also began teaching patriotism as part of the ethics of subjecthood, which also valorized conflict, war, and death. Taiwanese elites—who were more involved in politics, had more ties with Japanese officials, and enjoyed access to Chinese friends and news from abroad—were also beginning to think more about politics, especially the relationship between colonial Taiwan and China.

Compared to the previous period of Japanese rule, between 1930 and 1937 the questions about differences and similarities between Japan and Taiwan largely were tabled or rendered irrelevant. With large-scale war looming in Asia, the Japanese concern shifted from attempting to define Japaneseness and imposing it upon the Taiwanese population to an instrumental view of

the Taiwanese as subjects. The nobility of the assimilationist ideals was dropped in favor of directly teaching a more urgent and practicable sort of patriotism to Taiwanese people that involved thinking and feeling as the Japanese state wanted them to think and feel, rather than thinking and feeling like Japanese people. As the state praised violence in history, it concurrently hinted that war was a real and not-so-distant possibility, and connected patriotism implicitly to the magnanimity of dying for Japan. As the new system of ethics designated by the Japanese became dominant, all spheres of life in Taiwan began to fall under political and colonial control. Unlike patriotism in Japan proper, which was promoted but assumed to be inherent by virtue of the simple fact that people in Japan had an innate obligation to support Japan in all its endeavors, patriotism in Taiwan required more strenuous effort in convincing the Taiwanese that they should feel self-effacing love for the Empire. While the pre-war period was one in which Japan worked to manage violence and emotions in a peaceful context that presented few opportunities to exhibit zealous patriotic action, the Japanese state was certainly teaching the Taiwanese people to be ready to deliver. It would not be long before the Japanese state would discover the extent to which Taiwanese patriotic zeal could be converted into the willingness to conform to and participate in the martial ideals of Japanese imperial nationalism.

According to the historian Chen Peifeng, the Shōwa period, starting in 1926, saw the focus of “assimilation” education turn from assimilation into civilization to assimilation into the

nation.⁴ This chapter looks at how this process made emotions integral to the school education and social education carried out by the Japanese in Taiwan. The textbooks on ethics and the Japanese language used in Taiwan increasingly focused on glorifying certain types of violence and death as honorable, while at the same time largely abandoning the civilizing objectives of education. The second half of this chapter uses the diaries of two Taiwanese elites for a glimpse into their private feelings about the rise of Japan in Asia. The diaries demonstrate two distinct ways of coping psychologically with Japanese expansion, particularly after the Manchurian Incident made clear Japanese objectives to conquer China. Reading diaries across long periods of time also enables us to discern small but gradual changes in the mindsets of the diarists, whose identity as thinkers and writers allowed them to internalize or challenge Japanese cultural policies.

Changing Discourse for the Taiwanese Population

Some of the same ways in which emotions were manipulated in the post-Musha Incident discourse were similarly employed on the Taiwanese population through education, both inside schools and for the public at large. Between 1923 and 1937, when enrollment of Taiwanese youth in schools increased from 28.60% to 46.69%, the top three categories of lesson topics in

⁴ Chen, “*Dōka*” *no dōshō imu*, 257.

National Language Readers for Public Schools were general knowledge, matters of Taiwan, and matters of Japan.⁵ The “matters of Japan” category also included an increased emphasis on emperor-oriented thought and patriotic education compared to earlier textbooks.⁶ Between 1930 and 1936, funding provided to national language lecture schools also increased by ten times.⁷

The reason for changes in the curriculum was the inclination toward war in Japan proper, especially after the Manchurian Incident in late 1931 and the subsequent Japanese invasion of Manchuria. In Japan, right-wing organizations became stronger and as Zhou Wanyao states, “aimed to bring about an Emperor-centered dictatorship,” further mandating that Taiwanese self-determination movements should be quashed and that military rule should be instituted in Taiwan.⁸ As a result of these shifts, Japanese cultural policies and education in Taiwan began to

⁵ Zhou Wanyao, “<Gongxuexiao yong guoyu duben> de neirong fenlei jieshao <公學校用國語讀本>的內容分類介紹 [Classification of content of National Language Readers for Public Schools],” in *Rizhi shiqi Taiwan gongxuexiao yu guomin xuexiao guoyu duben: jieshao, zongmuci, suoyin* 日治時期臺灣公學校與國民學校・國語讀本: 解說・總目次・索引 [*Public schools and citizen schools and national language readers in Taiwan under Japanese rule: explanations, contents, index*] (Taipei: Nan tian shu ju, 2003), 59, 62, 71.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁷ Keiya Takao, “Kokugo fukyū no shin dankai 國語普及の新段階 [New phase in diffusion of the national language],” *Taiwan jihō* (January 1938): 15.

⁸ Zhou Wanyao, “The Kōminka Movement: Taiwan under Wartime Japan, 1937-1945” (Yale University, 1991), 31–32.

take on an increasingly militaristic character, and the inculcation of patriotism became more forceful in comparison to the previous period. According to Takenaka, by 1932 there was feverish militarism among the Japanese in Taiwan and some Taiwanese as well; newspapers published incendiary reports full of emotional appeal to the Taiwanese people, who responded by buying more newspapers.⁹ Thus, a cycle of sensationalist information and popular response to it was created and reinforced.

Aside from school education, the Japanese colonial regime in Taiwan also devoted its energy to social education, that is, education for young people who were too old to be in school. The Japanese state arranged various youth groups to further imperialist teachings for a group that was widely considered to be still malleable. By late 1933, there were 24,806 men and 7,112 women in youth groups, and another several thousand in other youth education centers.¹⁰ According to an article in the *Taiwan jihō*, the five major objectives of these youth groups were: cultivation of the citizen's spirit (*kokumin seishin* 国民精神) and improvement of character, cultivation of public spirit (*kōkyōshin* 公共心) and character of service, cultivation of self-disciplinary spirit, cultivation of knowledge and abilities necessary for practical life as well

⁹ Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 1:284.

¹⁰ Sasaki Kameo, "Hontō seinendan undō no kisū 本島青年団運動の帰趨 [Trends in Taiwan's youth group movements]," *Taiwan jihō* (November 1933): 12.

as frugality and diligence, and improvement of health through physical education.¹¹ The same article also stated that the youth in Taiwan should grow to love and enjoy (*aikō* 愛好) various Japanese holidays, especially those with patriotic significance. They should also be happy to give national defense donations and participate in activities involving the national flag and national language as well as other public works and services. In short, through these youth groups, the Japanese state was not only prescribing a set of activities which could be performed, it was also prescribing normative standards for the appropriate feelings toward these activities.

The national language of Japanese continued to be infused with an almost mythical efficacy for creating patriotism in Taiwan. In an article titled “The National Language Movement in Taiwan,” the author claimed that Japanese honorific and respectful speech reflected the gratitude that its citizens felt for each other, and that Japanese dramas and novels reflected the deeply merciful and loving national character.¹² As a result, everyone in Taiwan should be able to use Japanese. The three purposes of promoting the use of Japanese all over Taiwan were: to establish an attitude amenable to the habitual use of Japanese, to cultivate a respectful spirit

¹¹ Ibid., 13.

¹² Sasaki Kameo, “Taiwan ni okeru kokugo undō 台湾に於ける国語運動 [The national language movement in Taiwan],” *Taiwan jihō* (April 1933): 32.

toward Japanese, and to improve comprehension of Japanese.¹³ Furthermore, the author equated “promotion of the national language” with “love of the national language,” and believed that one day everyone in Taiwan will be able to realize a “spiritual life of the national language (*kokugo no seishinteki seikatsu* 国語の精神的生活).¹⁴

As the Japanese Empire edged closer to all-out war, the previous emphasis on language was expanded to other aspects of society. The colonial government began to push for greater social change among the Taiwanese population, seeking not only to modify behavior but also hearts as well. In 1936, the Governor-General Office of Taiwan promulgated the Guidelines for Civilizing Taiwanese Society (*Taiwan shakai kyōka yōkō* 台湾社会教化要綱), the highest priority of which was to “promote thoroughly the imperial spirit (*kōkoku seishin* 皇国精神) and strengthen the citizen consciousness (*kokumin ishiki* 国民意識).”¹⁵ These objectives, while rather vague, did provide important catchphrases that necessitated elaboration. According to the Governor-General Office, the imperial spirit and citizen consciousness contain the seven following sub-points: to follow the imperial decrees and to effect utmost devotion to repaying the

¹³ Ibid., 34.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Taiwan Sōtokufū, “Taiwan shakai kyōka yōkō 台湾社会教化要綱 [Guidelines for civilizing Taiwanese society],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1934): 95.

country and fulfilling loyalty; to affirm the essence of the national polity; to sense the citizen spirit flowing forth from the history of the imperial nation; to understand the true meaning of shrine worship; to truly possess the character and attitude of citizens who frequently use the national language; to arouse sincere loyalty to the Emperor and love for the country when engaging in activities for holidays and events and to have thorough respect for the national flag; and to use only the imperial reign dating rather than the Gregorian calendar.¹⁶ It is clear that many of these directives, such as feeling, sensing, or understanding, were largely internal. Thus, it is also evident that emotional responses to the Japanese Empire were considered significant in the colonial enterprise. Teaching Taiwanese society to feel sincerity, love, and devotion toward the Japanese Empire was important in Japanese cultural policies. Next, it is necessary to examine how violence and martial consciousness were incorporated into these cultural policies to prepare the Taiwanese population for war and mobilization.

Textbooks and Psychological Preparedness for War

Unlike the textbooks between 1895 and 1930, which were generally written with the purpose of fostering a basic understanding of the Japanese language and culture in Taiwanese people, textbooks between 1930 and 1937 pushed them toward Japan with greater urgency.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Taiwanese people were taught that they were part of Japan as a greater collective, and that Japan was an expanding entity. The specter of war, violence, and death also became a central leitmotif in lessons on ethics, the Japanese language, and even in singing. In addition, cultural and social movements in Taiwan also had to engage increasingly with political developments in the Japanese metropole and abroad. More and more Taiwanese people were incorporated into mobilization movements as Japan moved toward the self-fulfilling prophecy of war with China.

The rise of militarism also inevitably entered the cultural and educational realms, as seen in a compilation of Japanese elementary school textbooks in 1933. In textbooks on the subject of ethics, the ordering of lessons reflected national priorities. Whereas in the past filial piety or personal cultivation would be the first virtues taught to students, textbooks in the early 1930s began with lessons focusing on the Emperor, his ten-thousand-year lineage, and the value of obedience.¹⁷ Being a “good Japanese (*yoi nihonjin* よい日本人)” also took precedence over the traditionally paramount notion of filial piety.¹⁸ It is also important to note *how* the virtues were conveyed. For instance, calm courage (*chinyū* 沈勇) was taught via the example of a submarine captain who bravely and calmly took emergency measures when his submarine malfunctioned

¹⁷ Shōgaku kyōkasho sōran kankōkai, *Shōgaku kyōkasho sōran* 小學教科書總攬 [*Compilation of elementary school textbooks*] (Tōkyō: Shōgaku kyōkasho sōran kankōkai, 1933), 3, 15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 68.

and could not surface.¹⁹ The lesson on incorruptibility (*seiren* 清廉) was imparted through the example of General Maresuke Nogi, who was the third Governor-General of Taiwan and earned his fame for military ability in the Russo-Japanese War; the lesson also includes a picture of him as a military man on a horse.²⁰ Although incorruptibility was generally considered to be part of literati or bureaucratic morality, the choice to teach it by using the example of a military man shows that the state had insidiously and quietly shifted its emphasis in education toward promoting the cognizance of and imagination for future military conflict.

Between 1931 and 1937, even textbooks that taught Chinese characters (*kanbun* 漢文) emphasized the greatness and uniqueness of Japan as a state. Two such textbooks are *Chūtō kanbun dokuhon* (*Intermediate Chinese Reader*), used in the third year of middle school in Taichū (台中; present day Taichung) according to a student's handwritten note on the title page; and the *Shinsen kanbun kyōkasho kenichi* (*New Selection Chinese Textbook Volume 1*), used in Private Taihoku Citizen's Middle School (in present day Taipei; the alma mater of former Taiwanese president Lee Tenghui) for second year students. Although these are textbooks of Chinese characters, the study of Chinese characters as part of understanding for Japanese *kanji* has become accepted. In a 1933 article in the *Taiwan jihō*, the author claimed that while *kanji*

¹⁹ Ibid., 75.

²⁰ Ibid., 81.

came from China, they had become uniquely Japanese in spirit. He further stated, “it is a clear fact that the national language and writing can unify the people’s hearts (*minshin* 民心) and inspire patriotism (*aikokushin* 愛国心).”²¹ The two textbooks differ, however, in terms of the degree of Chineseness that was permitted to remain.

In *Shinsen kanbun kyōkasho kenichi*, virtually all of the lessons were written by Japanese authors, culled from Japanese classic histories, and had Japanese themes. For example, the first lesson in *Shinsen kanbun kyōkasho kenichi*, “The Great Japanese Empire,” described Japan as “a major nation in the Eastern Sea, [in which] after the descent of the Heavenly Grandchild, one imperial line has connected the ages, the ruler is benevolent and the people are loyal, and there is harmony between the top and bottom [of society].”²² As a textbook for *kanji*, it actually reads much more like a textbook of Japanese history and places that had significant spiritual meaning for the Japanese people. Such cultural pedagogy was a continuation from the earlier Japanese textbooks used in Taiwan.

As for the *Chūtō kanbun dokuhon*, even though it began with a lesson on “national

²¹ Okamoto Shinichi, “Nihon seishin hatsuyō nihongo 日本精神の発揚と日本語 [Rousing the Japanese spirit and Japanese],” *Taiwan jihō* (February 1933): 83–84.

²² Iijima Tadao, *Shinsen kanbun kyōkasho kenichi* 新選漢文教科書卷一 [New selection Chinese textbook volume 1] (Tōkyō: Sanseido, 1931), 4.

essence (*kokutai* 国体),” it surprisingly contained a series of stories from Chinese history, covering roughly from the heavily mythologized Three Dynasties period to Tang Dynasty. So why the willingness to include Chinese tales? The answer can perhaps be found in their content. The first lesson on Chinese history is Lesson 31, about a third of the way into the textbook, and the topic is “civilization of the Han land.” It stated, “even though the Chinese exaggerate the cultural prosperity of Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties, when all its neighbors were simply barbarians, China alone was a nation of ritual and music... ..this was an example of ancient civilization.”²³ Then, it goes on to describe the “cultural stagnation” for two thousand years after the Han Dynasty; even though foreigners can conquer China with their military, they often submit culturally – this is why China’s civilization is so different from that of the West.²⁴ This lesson establishes the notion that while China possessed civilization, its military was weak. The following lessons outline in chronological order the rise and fall of China’s various dynasties, clearly contrasting it with Japan’s so-called single imperial line reaching back through the ages. The final lesson on Chinese history was on the benevolent governance of Tang Taizong, who was able to manage different ministers into working together without bickering amongst

²³ Ibid., 64.

²⁴ Ibid., 64–65.

themselves.²⁵

The two textbooks, despite their divergent treatment of history in a context of teaching Chinese characters, coincide in their similar extensive coverage of wars, conflicts, and various other martial aspects of history. One possible reason for this could simply be that stories of conflict are potentially more interesting to young teenage students, but it is also more likely that the state deliberately sought to infuse a consciousness of war into the minds of students. For example, the lessons included stories about the conflict between the Liu Bang and Xiang Yu before Liu succeeded in founding the Han Dynasty and the poignant end of Xiang Yu, as well as the exploits of the shoguns Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, who unified Japan in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.²⁶ The effect of repeating these stories of heroic violence from both Chinese and Japanese history is the naturalization of violence as a concept. These textbooks inform students that history has seen many instances of violence between groups, and encourages the inevitability of and preparedness for future war.

Concurrent with the consciousness of war (the collective as martial), the state also began to instill a consciousness of death (the individual as being potentially martial, with the

²⁵ Ibid., 183–186.

²⁶ Oyanagi Shigeta, ed., *Chūtō kanbun dokuhon* 中等漢文讀本 [*Intermediate Chinese reader*] (Tōkyō: Shūbun kan, 1931), 152–153, 51–56.

implication that the individual is expendable for some higher purpose) into the readers of these textbooks. For instance, *Chūshingura*, or “The Tale of the Forty-Seven Masterless Warriors,” was reproduced in the *Chūtō kanbun dokuhon*. This is a well-known story of loyalty from Japanese history in which a group of samurai warriors carry out revenge for their lord long after his death. The textbook lesson describes the vendetta in detail, including the revenge plot, the treatment of the samurai by the authorities, and to the ultimate honorable suicides of the samurai. There was even a Chinese-style poem honoring the gravesites of the lord and his samurai that is drenched in emotional overtones: “Mountains may crumble and seas may overturn / The spirits of the forty seven subjects will not vanish / The grass and moss before the graves are wet / With the tears of passersby.”²⁷ Similarly, the *Chūtō kanbun dokuhon* contained a eulogy for General Maresuke Nogi, who committed suicide with his wife to follow the Meiji Emperor after he passed away.²⁸ These suicides, ultimately ritualistic and committed out of loyalty to dead lords, were represented as being honorable and venerable. In the prewar context, teaching stories of honorable suicide to young students served the purpose of allowing them to imagine the violence of war as a natural part of state- and empire-building.

Aside from an emphasis on the martial, the textbooks also utilized a rhetoric of

²⁷ Iijima, *Shinsen kanbun kyōkasho kenichi*, 97.

²⁸ Oyanagi, *Chūtō kanbun dokuhon*, 195–197.

universalism for imagining the collective nature of Japan's imperial nationalism – the individual should be a productive member of the empire. Lesson 18 of the *Shinsen kanbun kyōkasho kenichi* is the Edict to Encourage Agriculture by Emperor Keitai (r: 507-531), in which he stated, “I have heard that if one man does not farm, then all under heaven may starve. If one woman does not weave, then all under heaven may suffer the cold.”²⁹ The universality of “all under heaven” was used to prompt individual action, and it was this line of thinking and discourse that foreshadowed the wartime mobilization that involved everyone and assigned roles to each person individually.

The use of universalism in pressing for individual action also fostered the creation of a new ethics for Japanese subjecthood. Even in these textbooks intended for teaching Chinese characters, the imposition of new ethical considerations on the students was clear. In *Shinsen kanbun kyōkasho kenichi*, the character 恩 (*on*) was used several times in the opening lessons. The concept of *on* has a wide range of meanings: grace, benevolence, kindness, and other kinds of goodness, resulting in a moral debt borne by the receiver. The preface of the textbook directly stated, “The grace (*on*) of our sovereign and father must be repaid.”³⁰ The fact that “grace” results in a binding relationship between the giver and receiver is soon clarified: “Parents gave birth to me, teacher teaches me, and the sovereign governs me. The grace of these three cannot

²⁹ Iijima, *Shinsen kanbun kyōkasho kenichi*, 30.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

be forgotten even for a day.”³¹ Grace was not a new concept in either Chinese or Japanese culture, but this particular passage presented a novel interpretation. In emphasizing the sense of obligation that students *ought to feel* toward parents, teachers, and the Emperor, the first two types are based on concrete personal relationships, but the latter is constructed out of an abstract idea received only through state-imposed education.

In this way, students learned that they were supposed to *experience* gratitude toward the Emperor, despite the lack of any direct relationship. Even though a student was precluded from contact with the Emperor, barring some very unique circumstances, the student was also expected to feel a sense of obligation toward the Emperor on a par with what one should feel toward one’s parents and teachers. The reconstruction and imposition of this new ethical system was certainly based largely on a sentimental education. Of course, although militarism was flaring up around this time in Japan and beginning to infect Taiwan, the specific ways of repaying such a debt of grace to the Emperor remained undefined. Nonetheless, students were still admonished to remember imperial grace and to cherish it on a daily basis.

Music was also used as a way of incorporating the expectation of future violence and war into curricula and in turn into the minds of students. The Japanese imposition of Western-style

³¹ Ibid., 5.

education in Taiwan created various new academic subjects in school, such as singing and art, in an effort to go beyond only studying texts and classics. One of the main purposes of instituting singing as a subject was to have children sing songs in ceremonies to enhance ritual gravitas and to create a virtue of subjecthood based on the imperial ideology.³² It was also believed that singing, as part of a curriculum of national language, geography, history, and science, could “cultivate hearts and minds as well as raise the spirit of the youth.”³³ Songs lend themselves to oral repetition, and musical melodies help the students remember lyrics that contained imperial significance, praise for violence, and eulogies for glorious death.

In a 1935 textbook of songs taught in school, each song was accompanied by simple musical notations for the melody, and the lyrics contained many of the same themes as in the other textbooks. Generally, there was only one verse of melody, which was then repeated four or five times. Lyrics were written under the music in *hiragana* and *katakana* so the students could sing correct words along with the musical notes, and lyrics with *kanji* were printed on separate

³² Lin Minxuan, “Modeng shidai de yinyue shenghuo: rizhi shiqi changge jiaoyu yu changpian chanye zhi tantao 摩登時代的音樂生活: 日治時期公學校唱歌教育與唱片產業之探討 [Musical life in modern times: contemplation on singing education in elementary school and record industry during Japanese colonial period]” (Taipei National University of the Arts, 2008), 9.

³³ Hirose Takao, “Hontō seinen kunren no gaikyō 本島青年訓練の概況 [Overview of training for youth on the island],” *Taiwan jihō* (December 1932): 31.

pages. Of course, many of these songs were not written specifically for children, but the fact of their selection and subsequent placement in textbooks for children is worthy of analysis. One song called “Ocean Battle in the Sea of Japan” described Japan’s different fleets, and ends with “the enemy’s fleet has all been destroyed / Long live the Empire / Long live.”³⁴ The ratio of patriotic songs was high – in a songbook with only 20 songs, Japanese sea power was further extolled in songs such as “I am a Child of the Sea,” “Seafaring” and “Warship.”³⁵ Another song was “Song of Women in Military Service,” which was significant in that it defined one possible role for women as battlefield nurses in the context of war. Its fourth verse provides a vivid image that contrasts red and white colors: “Stretching out a thin and pure white hand / Wash away the flowing blood / On the bandages and white / [Her] sleeve is stained with red.”³⁶ Needless to say, the image of red on white also evoked the Japanese flag.

In addition to images of war, the positive outcome of a Japanese victory from history is remembered and praised. *Kōgakkō shōka* (*Singing for Common Schools*) also included the song “Meeting at the Navy Camp (*suishiei no kaiken* 水師營の会見),” which depicted the meeting

³⁴ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Kōgakkō shōka* 公學校唱歌 [*Singing for common schools*] (Taipei: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1935), 11–12.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 19–20, 23, 26–27.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 14–17.

between General Nogi on the Japanese side and General Anatoly Stoessel on the Russian side when Russia surrendered after the Russo-Japanese War. This song had an unusually high number of verses – nine – in order to describe the conversations between the generals. Stoessel asked Nogi how he felt regarding the loss of his sons in war, to which Nogi replied that he was pleased that they had died honorably as members of a military family.³⁷ Here again, violent death resulting from a military engagement was connected emotionally to glory, family ties, and parental approval. It is interesting to note here that often in Japanese discourse, whenever war was described, writers were careful to weave a personal dimension into the overarching narrative of large-scale military conflict. The individual always had a place in war, and was always eligible for greatness and honor. The ninth verse concludes the song with a final reminder of Japan's success: "On the fort of silenced gunfire / Stood the fluttering Sun flag."³⁸ Thus, one of Japan's most significant victories could be celebrated in nine verses by schoolchildren, made aware of death and glory as two concepts that converged in song.

Militarism, violence, and acceptance of virtuous death were all prevalent themes in prewar colonial education in Taiwan. The Japanese reconstructed a new ethics of colonial subjecthood, in which values associated with war received unprecedented prominence. Building

³⁷ Ibid., 36–37.

³⁸ Ibid., 36.

on the earlier period's emphasis on constructing similarity out of differences, passages and songs in textbooks appealed to the emotions in a more intense and insidious way. As Zhou Wanyao states, "In modern nations, national rule penetrates society all the way to its periphery, and the most basic spirit of this system may be so-called 'rationalization,' an attitude that abandons religious, magical, and metaphysical considerations, and systematically, regularly, and objectively completes its work."³⁹ One way of adding nuance to her statement would be to argue that the Japanese state may have been rational, but its rationality was evidently devoted to driving the emotions of its people through psychological manipulation. If the Japanese state was so concerned with controlling Taiwanese feelings in response to various aspects of colonial rule, to what extent did the people feel accordingly, and to what extent were there unintended consequences?

Elite Actions and Feelings

This section will introduce two Taiwanese elites who kept diaries between 1931 and 1937. Their diaries, to an extent, show that Japaneseness had become a part of their daily lives over three decades of colonial rule, although they were affected differently by Japanese rule. Their elite status set them apart from the common Taiwanese people. Moreover, they had greater

³⁹ Zhou, *Taiwan lishi tushuo*, 138–140.

ability to use Japanese rhetoric in their attempts to wrest concessions from the Japanese state for Taiwanese interests. Unfortunately, with the trend toward discouragement of Taiwanese political participation, elite activities were often limited to futile audiences with colonial officials members or perhaps the governor-general. At the same time, the elites were also the ones most aware of the power of performance, often going through the motions expected of them without feeling any of what the Japanese state wanted them to feel.

The first half of Zhang Lijun's diary was covered in Chapter 2 to illustrate one person's emotional life under early Japanese colonialism. His diary ended in early 1937; between 1931 and 1937 his diary continued to have an intimate character, listing details of his relationships, his thoughts about political developments in Taiwan and beyond, and even his venereal diseases.⁴⁰ During this period, his diary was characterized by a closer imagined connection to Japan. For instance, he identified with Japanese state power in opposition to Taiwanese aborigines. After Zhang had the opportunity to read about the Musha Incident a few days after the uprising took place, his diary entry revealed that his position was largely aligned with that of the Japanese state. He referred to the aborigines as the "Musha violent aborigines," and expressed his faith in the ability of the Japanese government to quell the aborigine uprising.⁴¹ This is perhaps related to

⁴⁰ Huang, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji*, 1:262, 270; Zhang, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji*, 8:464.

⁴¹ Zhang, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji*, 8:287–288.

the historically problematic relationship between the Taiwanese aborigines and the Han Chinese population – Zhang was merely taking the default position that opposed the aborigines and their ostensible backwardness, manifested through their violence. However, he also acknowledged with approval, albeit implicitly, Japanese military power.

The key political dichotomy in the consciousness of the Taiwanese elite at this time was between identification with China or Japan. Zhang was usually more sympathetic to the people rather than to governments. The Manchurian Incident came soon after the Musha Incident, and Zhang also had his own thoughts on the conflict between China and Japan. Zhang clearly saw that China was plagued by foreign forces (Japan) and a serious internal warlord problem. He pondered in his diary, “When would China be peaceful?”⁴² This lament, however, was raised with more sympathy for the Chinese people than for the sovereignty or government of China.⁴³ However, it still seemed easier for him to identify with Japan because of its clearly stronger international position at the time, which was also almost entirely defined through military power, or the potential for violence. In a February 1933 entry Zhang wrote that the “strength of Japan and weakness of China” was very clear from Japan’s military campaign in China.⁴⁴ Japan’s

⁴² Ibid., 8:464.

⁴³ Ibid., 8:491.

⁴⁴ Huang, *Shuizhuju zhuren riji*, 1:204.

comparative strength based on its military power had apparently become a significant way for a Japanese subject to assess the world. As a result, China's relative weakness made it a less desirable object of loyalty.

In “Imagined and Real: The Motherland Impressions of Taiwanese People,” Chen Cuilian studies the writings of four Taiwanese elites—contemporaries of Zhang—who lived under Japanese rule and argues that “Taiwanese literati intellectually identified with the civilization and progress as represented by Japan, but emotionally they gravitated toward the motherland of their blood and culture. This conflicting complex made the 'reality' of what they witnessed unimportant.”⁴⁵ However, in the case of Zhang, it is possible to contend that in the lived everyday life of a colonized Taiwanese subject of Japan, impressions of China and the desire to avoid denigrating China were still easily overwhelmed by the powerful presence of Japan, a perception created in part by Japan's own cultural policies and education.

In April 1935, Zhang went on a three-week sightseeing tour of Japan along with 170

⁴⁵ Chen Cuilian, “Xiangxiang yu zhenshi: Taiwanren de zuguo yinxiang 想像與真實：台灣人的祖國印象 [Imagined and real: the motherland impressions of Taiwanese people],” in *Riji yu Taiwanshi yanjiu yantaohui huiyi lunwenji: jinian Lin Xiantang xiansheng shishi 50 zhounian* 日記與臺灣史研究研討會會議論文集：紀念林獻堂先生逝世 50 週年 [Conference papers from research symposium on the diary and Taiwanese history: commemorating 50 years after the passing of Mr. Lin Xiantang], vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhong yang yan jiu yuan Tai wan shi yan jiu suo, 2006), 167–168.

other Taiwanese people, spending much of his time in Tokyo.⁴⁶ On his trip, he saw a wine factory and was very impressed by the assembly line which he found “indescribably intricate”; he paid his respects at the Momoyama Meiji Royal Mausoleum; he saw Tokyo’s Ueno Park and appreciated the various natural and artificial wonders at the heart of Japan proper.⁴⁷ Furthermore, he seemed acclimated to the idea that Japan was his country, frequently referring to it as “[my] own country (*hongoku* 本国).” For instance, upon visiting the *Osaka Daily News* headquarters, he saw that the building had elevators for its eight floors, and marveled that “the prosperity of Osaka allows one to call it the Second Tokyo of our country.”⁴⁸ A friend treated him to a play at the theatre, which was “something I had never seen before.”⁴⁹ His visit conformed in large part to Japanese cultural policy – just as Japan sent Mona Rudao and other aborigines to Japan in 1911, and just as Japanese textbooks depicted the tourist experiences of Taiwanese people in Japan, Zhang’s visit to Japan was a replication of the performance recommended by the Japanese state. From his diary, it can be seen that his trip was by no means perfunctory nor merely performative; rather, it influenced his views toward Japan through his personal enjoyment of

⁴⁶ Zhang Lijun, *Shuizhujū zhuren riji* 水竹居主人日記 [*The Diary of Zhang Lijun*], vol. 10 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2000), 27.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 10:30, 34, 35, 38.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 10:34.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 10:39.

these new experiences. The personal performance of going on this trip created feedback into his emotional reaction to the Japanese empire. However, it is significant that Zhang's experiences in Japan were for the most part in the realm of culture, or "soft power." It gave him a view of modernity in Japan that supplemented what he was absorbing from newspaper reports, and helped him understand that Japan not only had military power, but that it also had a considerable degree of civilization. The experiential aspect of his visit to the metropole also had the effect of consolidating a holistic psychological colonization.

Zhang passed away in 1941, and his last diary entries were written in early 1937. In one of his final entries with political implications he recorded a meeting between himself and some friends. In the conversation, a friend who lived in China for several years told him that the Chinese government was only concerned with selfish interests and ignored local security; that the Chinese people were lazy and frequently smoked opium, so "no wonder Manchuria was occupied by Japan"; and the Chinese lands with strategic importance were only spared being divided up due to the protection by the League of Nations.⁵⁰ It was not clear from the diary entry how Zhang responded to these statements, but he found them worthy of being recorded. On the whole, since Zhang did not live to see the full extent of imperialization policies, it is only

⁵⁰ Ibid., 10:232.

possible to argue that the almost four decades of Japanese colonialism he experienced did cause him to see some aspects of being a Japanese colony favorably. It would be untrue to say that he “became Japanese,” since he did not see himself as such, but it is arguable that he saw himself as a citizen of the Japanese Empire. As the Manchurian Incident pitted Japan in opposition to China, being a Japanese citizen meant that Zhang saw Chinese people as different, despite his own cultural roots.

In contrast to Zhang, during this period another important member of the Taiwanese elite also kept a diary, but it was of quite a different character. Lin Xiantang (1881-1956) lived in present day Wufeng Township in central Taiwan, and maintained a diary between 1927 and 1955 (diary entries are missing for 1928 and 1936, however). Under Japanese rule, he was active in local politics as well as in Taiwanese political movements, the most important of which was the Taiwan parliamentary movement promoting self-rule on Taiwan; it was forcibly dissolved in 1934. In 1941, he was appointed as a commissioner on the Public Service Association of Imperial Subjects (*kōminhōkō undō iinkai* 皇民奉公運動委員會), and in April 1945, a few months before the war ended, he was appointed a member of the Japanese House of Peers in an

effort to consolidate Taiwan's allegiance to Japan.⁵¹ Lin not only involved himself in politics, but the responsibility for participating in politics was also occasionally foisted on him by the Japanese government, which sought to use his influence to promote its own ends. As one of Taiwan's best-known public figures, Lin's politicized relationship with the Japanese state complicated his own identity. After one instance of giving a speech in Shanghai and referring to China as the "motherland" in 1936, his loyalty to Japan was in serious doubt to the colonial government.⁵² Lin's agreement to serve on the Public Service Association of Imperial Subjects was probably in attempt to appease the Japanese government. His own political engagements prior to the period of *kōminka*, however, will be explored in this chapter.

Unlike Zhang, who never raised serious objections about being a Taiwanese subject of Japanese colonialism, Lin maintained more of a Chinese identity, and disliked the idea of living under Japanese rule, even though he did enjoy some of the modern comforts it afforded him. Lin described his political goals as free speech, local self-rule, and popularization of education in

⁵¹ Xu Xueji, "<Guanyuan xiansheng riji> de shiliao jiazhi <灌園先生日記>的史料價值 [The value of <The Diary of Lin Xiantang> as historical materials]," in *Guanyuan xiansheng riji 灌園先生日記 [The Diary of Lin Xiantang]*, vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2000), (2)–(4).

⁵² *Ibid.*, (3).

Taiwan.⁵³ He never thought of himself as Japanese, and he neither believed that the Japanese people actually understood Taiwan nor that Japanese bureaucrats could really love Taiwan.⁵⁴ Thus, the way Lin viewed Japan was also at least in part based on a belief that Japanese intentions toward Taiwan were disingenuous. As a self-conscious colonial subject, he was frequently frustrated at being a member of the Taiwanese elite who had the opportunity to speak with many Japanese bureaucrats and even governors-general, but still was unable to change how the colonial government ruled Taiwan. His diary expressed many disagreements with Japanese officials he considered to be divorced from the reality of Taiwan. In one instance, he told Japanese officials working in Taiwan that one problem of colonial rule was that the bureaucrats did not share power or rights with the Taiwanese people. He told them that if they really loved Taiwan, they would work with the locals toward reform; but since they did not intend to live in Taiwan forever, sometimes they did not work to help the Taiwanese.⁵⁵

Based on his belief that Japanese rule and Taiwanese interests were separate, Lin also had

⁵³ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 5 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2000), 390.

⁵⁴ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 4 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2000), 275–282.

⁵⁵ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 6 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2000), 240.

grim doubts about the stated policy of assimilation. When asked about whether the key manifestation of assimilation, treating everyone with impartiality (*isshidōjin* 一視同仁), could be actualized, Lin replied, “to be able to see everyone as equal meant seeing no difference between the Japanese and the Taiwanese. At the current time, the Taiwanese and Japanese are at different levels. Those who seek to elevate the islanders are those who understand how to see everyone as equals. If islanders are seeking to elevate their own abilities but face oppression, the oppressors are in contradiction to the meaning of equality.”⁵⁶ Whenever he had a chance to speak with Japanese officials about the issue of equal treatment, he would make similar arguments, and would be routinely ignored by exasperated officials on this point.

Lin gradually grew to understand his own position in relation to the colonizers and the futility of trying to change the Japanese. Instead, his diary recorded his attempts to work within the colonial structure to create his own pro-Taiwan rhetoric based on the colonial government’s official position. In other words, rather than directly counter Japanese rhetoric, Lin attempted to use it as rationale for improving the Taiwanese colonial condition. Because his arguments acknowledged Japanese interests, the Japanese found them difficult or at least inconvenient to rebuff. While the officials sometimes admonished Lin for saying or thinking what he did, they

⁵⁶ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 7 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2000), 211.

did not punish him. According to Lin's diary, in 1934 Governor-General Nakagawa told Lin to stop asking for Taiwan's self-rule because it would lead to Taiwan's independence, and there would be no reason to for Japan to give up Taiwan unless the Japanese Empire fell. Lin responded that Taiwan did not have the conditions for independence, and that colonial rule must continue, but establishment of special rules for Taiwan would be better than ruling Taiwan as if it were an ordinary Japanese prefecture. Nakagawa then insisted that even though the intention for Lin's movement was not for independence, self-rule would certainly lead to independence.⁵⁷ This exchange shows that although Lin was dissatisfied with Japanese rule, he realized that if he communicated with the Japanese on their terms, he could at least make his hopes for Taiwan known. By acceding that colonial rule still legitimately provided the superstructure to Taiwanese self-rule, Lin did not challenge Japanese rule, and even though the governor-general turned down his request, his opinion was at least voiced.

Lin also wanted to keep the usage of vernacular Chinese alive in Taiwan. This goal was directly opposed to the Japanese state's objective of popularizing the Japanese language. However, Lin was able to construct an argument in favor of Chinese by affirming Japanese imperialism. In a meeting with the Taichū Prefecture Governor Takeshita Toyoji, Lin stated,

⁵⁷ Ibid., 7:285.

“each year, Taiwan's population increases by over a hundred thousand, and in the future there will be too many people. In order to resolve the population problem, it would be necessary to emigrate to southern China or Southeast Asia for development. Such development would be absolutely contingent upon knowing Chinese. Daily life also requires Chinese.”⁵⁸ Predictably, Governor Takeshita told him that teaching Chinese in schools would hinder the learning of Japanese, so people should just bear the difficulties of learning Japanese until it becomes sufficiently prevalent in Taiwan.⁵⁹ It is significant, however, that a Taiwanese person claimed to be in favor of Japanese expansion as a way of preserving the study of Chinese in Taiwan. Evidently, Lin believed that even though at the moment Japan had greater military power, eventually the cultural reach of Chineseness would be farther.

Although Lin clearly identified himself as a Chinese person living in Taiwan under Japanese rule, his elite status meant that it was necessary for him to work on behalf on the Japanese Empire, or at least publicly endorse Japanese policies. In late 1933, Lin was appointed as a consultant to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Association (*Tōa kyōei kyōkai* 東亜共栄協会) and was involved in drafting its charter. In an earlier draft, the charter stated that “the Japanese spirit was the basis for uniting Asians,” and Lin was opposed to this wording because

⁵⁸ Ibid., 7:211.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

he believed it would offend Chinese people.⁶⁰ The next day, this passage was changed to state “the co-prosperity spirit was the basis for uniting Asians.”⁶¹ Ultimately, the charter downplayed Japaneseness in the leadership role for East Asia, but accentuated Pan-Asianism, Asia’s spiritual culture, and intimacy and friendliness between Japan and China.⁶² Of course, the Co-Prosperity Association was simply another tool used by Japan in creating moving rhetoric that further motivated Taiwanese people to become good Japanese subjects. When one reads Lin’s diary stating his frustration at being unable to help Taiwan achieve self-rule, and at the flowery but empty praise of Japan’s purity of spirit in the Co-Prosperity Association’s charter, it is not difficult to see that any feelings that did not conform to the positions of the colonial state must be driven underground and into the privacy of one’s own thoughts.

A few months after the formation of the Co-Prosperity Association, Lin was invited to give an address for the organization at which both Taiwanese and Japanese people would be present, and he agreed. He decided to talk about how he felt about having recently climbed the Niitakayama (present day Yushan, the tallest mountain in Taiwan). He spoke about the way in which the vastness of nature can broaden one’s mind, that his adventurous spirit was stoked by

⁶⁰ Lin, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji*, 6:494.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 6:495.

⁶² Tōa kyōei kyōkai, *Tōa kyōei kyōkai no seishin*, 8–11.

the rigorous climb, and his feeling that aborigine management policies had been successful.⁶³

Lin was not genuinely interested in the work of the association, and while he felt he compelled to speak, he gave a speech that was only tangentially related to politics. Similarly, in late December of 1935, when a reporter asked Lin to describe his specific “feelings and hopes” to be printed in the New Year’s Day edition of the newspaper, he turned down the offer to voice his thoughts.

However, he wrote in his diary that his true feelings and hopes would cause problems [for him] with the government, and he would rather not write something simply to please the government.⁶⁴ As a member of the Taiwanese elite, Lin clearly understood his own position.

While not convinced by the Japanese state’s policies to love the Japanese, he also understood that he could not openly express his own negative feelings and thoughts. As far as performance was concerned, the Japanese state was at least successful in causing some elites to censor themselves. Although the colonial government was unable to control Lin’s resentment, it could at least incapacitate him from influencing the feelings of other Taiwanese subjects.

In using the diaries of Zhang and Lin to examine the emotional attachments of the Taiwanese elite, it is necessary to keep in mind while these diaries are not representative of the

⁶³ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 8 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2000), 343.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 8:450.

emotional life of Taiwanese elites, they do indicate two possible ways of engaging the colonial state. On one hand, Zhang's case showed a sort of nonchalance at being a colonial subject, as he went on writing his diary in Chinese, but reacted quite positively to the colonial modernity being brought to Taiwan. The everyday presence of Japanese colonial power in Taiwan was apparent, but still not intrusive before the outbreak of full-scale war with China in 1937. Lin, on the other hand, perceived a personal responsibility as an educated man to attempt to intercede with the colonial government on behalf of the Taiwanese people. In some instances, it also seemed that Lin approved of the colonial state's professed goal of impartiality and equal treatment, but he knew it was not really happening in Taiwan. The gap between rhetoric and reality would soon become even clearer after Japan entered full-scale war with China after 1937.

Conclusion

For Taiwan under Japanese rule, the period between 1930 and 1937 was bookended by violence on and off the island, respectively. As a Japanese colony, this was a period of peace during which the specter of war was not absent. The consolidation of Japanese rule over Taiwan after the Musha Incident, the last major armed uprising in Taiwan, was accompanied by a shift in the philosophy of education toward an emphasis on loving the empire through violence. Textbooks for children devoted more time to instructing them in the meaning of imperial grace

as well as appropriate emotions and responses to it. Textbooks also inculcated in schoolchildren awareness and expectation of inevitable war. Aside from school education, documents and policies in social education also had similar objectives of teaching patriotism to adults by stressing the cultivation of spirit. Between 1930 and 1937, statistics on school and social education certainly showed rising enrollment numbers. Japanese educator Satō Genji hailed the turn toward imperialization after the Manchurian Incident a “significant leap forward,” a watershed moment in the history of education in Taiwan.⁶⁵

However, by delving into the private emotional realm of two Taiwanese elites, it is possible to see that these advances in education did not produce an even effect, and did not cause adult men, relatively set in their beliefs and identities, to drastically change their ways of thinking and feeling. Zhang Lijun’s diary showed him to be mostly indifferent about where he situated himself in the Taiwan-China-Japan conceptual triangle. As for Lin Xiantang, his involvement in politics meant that he had to grapple with the issues of political and cultural identity, and while he maintained his Chineseness, he was shrewd enough to use the rhetoric of the colonizer in trying to plead for Taiwanese self-rule. Soon, however, indifference or political concerns in peacetime would both be swept away by the harsh reality of war. Following Japan’s

⁶⁵ Satō Genji, *Taiwan kyōiku no shinten* 台湾教育の進展 [*The progress of Taiwanese education*] (Taihoku: Taiwan chuppan bunka kabushiki gaisha, 1943), 119.

attack on China in 1937, the colonial government would redouble its efforts at patriotic education and mobilize the Taiwanese people in earnest. As a result, even the literati, who had been able to remain relatively disengaged in the colonial enterprise, would find themselves having to choose a side.

Chapter 5: Imperiled Stronghold or Certain Victory: Between Everyday Life and

Extraordinary Performance in Colonial Taiwan, 1937-1945

A Taiwanese man named Su Huo recalled in an oral history interview nearly fifty years after the Pacific War ended:

“At that time lots of people volunteered for the military, and the Japanese spirit was very important, with people saying they wanted to fight for the country. The Japanese were very sharp, they made the salaries very high, and education was also very successful. They taught people so that they *naturally* wanted to become soldiers, this was completely true. . . I volunteered to join the military in Shōwa 17 (1942); 30 people signed up for 22 spots. The Japanese paid well, and since after war started with the U.S. the economy was very bad, there was no work, and our food and clothing were all really bad. At the time, in the village some Taiwanese people who went abroad came back early, and they were dressed nicely and shiny from head to toe when they came back, so everyone envied them. . . So in my heart, I really wanted to go work abroad. . . Japanese education really was very successful. When I was young and studying at school, *whenever I picked up a stick, I would imagine I was carrying a gun*. We can say, even children really wanted to become soldiers.”¹ [Emphasis added]

This testimony is a good indication of the ways in which various explicit and implicit Japanese strategies of mobilization whetted the desires of young Taiwanese to join the war effort. In this particular account, the vivid memories that lingered were of well-dressed returnees, of feeling as if a gun (the awareness of the implements of modern warfare was brought to Taiwan by Japan) was in his hand, and of the desire to become a soldier. This is one example of the effective mobilization Japan was able to achieve in Taiwan in support of its war.

¹ Zheng Li-ling, *Taiwanren ribenbing de zhanzheng jingyan* 臺灣人日本兵的戰爭經驗 [*War experiences of Taiwanese imperial soldiers*] (Taipei County: Taibei xianli wenhua zhongxin, 1995), 174–175. Italics mine.

Introduction

After the Second Sino-Japanese War began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, the assimilation movement was transformed into the imperialization (*kōminka* 皇民化) movement, which attempted to remake the Taiwanese people into loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire willing to endure all wartime hardships. As Zhou Wanyao states, “The *kōminka* movement can be viewed from two perspectives, as an intensification of an ongoing process of assimilation and as an integral part of the wartime mobilization of the Japanese empire as a whole.”² During the period from the fall of 1937 until Japan’s surrender in the summer of 1945 official discourse became increasingly divorced from reality. From roughly 1937 to 1942, when the attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the Pacific War, Japan’s “martial fortune” was indeed quite spectacular, and its rhetoric of certain victory seemed compelling. During this period, Taiwan was often optimistically referred to as “the base for southward expansion.” However, after 1942 Japan struggled to keep up with the United States in both civilian and military production and began losing hold of islands in the Pacific. In response,

² Zhou Wanyao, “The *Kōminka* Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations,” in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 41.

while newspapers and officials continued to praise the spiritual superiority of the Japanese Empire, the government intensified its imperialization efforts in Taiwan, which covered every aspect of daily life. Taiwan was called upon to become a “stronghold” for defense of the Empire.

Wartime colonialism presented a paradoxical context for Taiwan. There were often immense discrepancies between the official policies passed down from the Governor-General Office and lived wartime experience. Yet sometimes the seductive discourse became irresistible to the Taiwanese elites who found it difficult to extricate the fate of Taiwan from Japan’s military charge, and to the hundreds of thousands of young Taiwanese men who volunteered or were conscripted as military workers and soldiers. Japan had erected a complex wartime mobilization system fundamentally based on emotion and imagination that created a willingness to participate in the war effort. Simultaneously, emotional patriotism was reinforced by Japanese policies offering concrete incentives.

According to Barak Kushner’s *The Thought War*, Japanese wartime propaganda should be seen as “a tool for integrating Japan’s wartime empire.”³ There are many examples of this. Japan always glorified its spirit of universal brotherhood (*hakkō ichiu* 八紘一宇) and pursuit of eternal peace in Asia. The death of soldiers was expressed in beautiful, evocative, and purely

³ Barak Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006), 6.

symbolic language such as “fallen cherry blossoms,” (*sange* 散華) “smashed jade,” (*gyokusai* 玉碎) “war gods,” (*gunshin* 軍神) and “silent return in triumph” (*mugon no gaisen* 無言の凱旋), euphemisms far removed from the bloodshed they signified. The special attack forces (*tokkōtai* 特攻隊), better known as kamikaze squads, were praised as exercising “the purest way of the [Imperial] subject.” (*shijun na shindō* 至純な臣道)⁴ Along similar lines, the image of cherry blossoms raining down was widely exploited for the sake of propaganda and the “aestheticization of nationalism.”⁵ The year 1940 also imparted special significance as the 2,600th anniversary of Japan’s mythical founding, used as a basis to aggrandize Japanese national history and to hold mass rituals to promote the cohesion of the Empire.⁶

Even in Japan’s downward military trajectory, its wartime Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki was quoted as saying, “I am sure of victory in this war. I never think about defeat. Defeat can come only in two ways. One is if our imperial army or navy are defeated. Of this I have no fear. The other is if our country breaks from within. To counter that danger, we shall act thoroughly to

⁴ Kurihara Etsuzō, “Shijun na shindō no hakken 至純な臣道の発見 [Discovery of the purest way of subjects],” *Taiwan jihō* (December 1944): 13.

⁵ Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, *Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese Student Soldiers* (University Of Chicago Press, 2006), 26.

⁶ Ruoff, *Imperial Japan at Its Zenith*, 3.

stop any speech or action which might harm our internal unity.”⁷ Having established the legitimacy of violence in the years prior to the war, the Japanese state brought every speech and action under its control, even while every mouthpiece of the Japanese Empire assured its subjects of victory. Moreover, unlike the assimilation period before 1937, the *kōminka* movement sought to rid Taiwan of its Taiwanese and Chinese characters while imposing Japaneseness upon the colony.⁸

Official statements further characterized the war as a “war of thought” (*shisōsen* 思想戦), a formulation that demonstrated concern for the people’s feelings and for ensuring total acceptance of Japanese ideals and the corresponding rejection of Western thoughts and ways. Of course, the only way to verify whether the people’s minds were aligned with the state position was through performance and action. Mobilization efforts were designed to motivate both thought and action, and realization (*kakugo* 覚悟) was a significant part of the policy. Thus, as the distant war loomed larger in the form of air raid drills, then air strikes, then families with absent fathers and sons who had left for the battlefield, it was possible to see that elites and commoners alike absorbed Japanese wartime discourse to a significant extent. However, these same people also experienced doubt and cognitive dissonance as the war progressed. In many

⁷ Ben-Ami Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 12.

⁸ Zhou, “The Kōminka Movement,” 39.

instances, they recorded their private and psychological transgressions in diaries or oral histories.

This chapter will analyze the language of Japanese mobilization with emphasis on how the *kōminka* movement managed to win over the Taiwanese people by playing on their emotions. The wartime context demanded that daily life become performative, just as the Japanese state demanded more from its model colony. While the people were forced to endure the rationing of goods and the loss of friends and relatives to the Allied torpedo attacks on civilian ocean traffic, Japanese rhetoric remained brimming with beautiful if empty echoes disconnected from real life, even as it attempted to dictate the lives of the colonized through the arousal of emotions.

Kōminka: Situating Taiwan in the “War for Everlasting Peace”

Early Japanese successes in the Pacific and Southeast Asia were seen not only as military achievements, but also as lending legitimacy to the entire Japanese expansion enterprise. As Governor-General Kobayashi Seizō announced to the Taiwanese people in May 1938, Japanese expansion was for the sake of peace in East Asia and to assist in the construction of new regimes.⁹ The rhetoric of peace also appeared in other newspapers or semi-official publications. The main source used in this section is the *Taiwan Times* (*Taiwan jihō*), a monthly journal published by the Governor-General Office of Taiwan, which functioned as a mouthpiece of the

⁹ Kobayashi Seizō, “Tōmin ni tsugu 島民に告ぐ [To the islanders],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1938): 2.

colonial regime. The justification for war was summed up succinctly in *The Way to Imperialization*, published in 1939: Japan is seeking to correct all injustice, infidelity, and unrighteousness in the world, to save the East Asian peoples from the yoke of the Western powers, and to ensure eternal peace in Asia.¹⁰ Furthermore, the war with China was a sacred war, fought to achieve the grand mission to unify East Asia, and to beat back the European and American regimes that ruled parts of the region as colonies or semi-colonies.¹¹ China itself was under heel of the abusive and corrupt Chiang Kai-shek, whom, the Japanese state alleged, must be punished to bring peace.¹²

Even though “Taiwan used to be a barbaric land filled with swamp gas,” one colonial official stated, “it had become bathed in the goodness of the imperial culture.”¹³ Consequently, the Taiwanese were told that their land had become a significant part of the Japanese Empire, and that it was imperative they support the motherland in achieving her goals. When Japan looked

¹⁰ Kanno Hideo, *Kōminka e no michi* 皇民化への道 [*The way to Imperialization*] (Taichū: Taiwan Shinbunsha Insatsubu, 1939), 24.

¹¹ Satō Tasuke, “Tōa kyōdōtai no rinen to jissen 東亜協同体の理念と実践 [The vision and practice of East Asia union],” *Taiwan jihō* (November 1939): 11.

¹² Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, “Aikoku chochiku undō nitsuite 愛国貯蓄運動について [On the patriotic savings movement],” *Taiwan jihō* (June 1938): 2.

¹³ Morita Shunsuke, “Taiwan ni okeru gimu kyōiku seido no shōrai 台湾に於ける義務教育制度の将来 [The future of the mandatory educational system in Taiwan],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1940): 3.

forward to expansion, Taiwan was dubbed the “key and gate of the Empire in the south”; its geographical location at the heart of “Greater Asia” made it the essential southern base of the Empire for national defense, and a treasure trove of unique resources for Japan.¹⁴ As the Empire’s largest tropical territory, Taiwan offered ample agricultural resources; as a colony, Taiwan possessed human resources that could supply the military with much-needed manpower. Development and mobilization of Taiwan, then, was clearly a crucial task for wartime Japan. In addition, Taiwan could be used as a positive example in propaganda aimed at China thanks to its large Han Chinese population, astonishing economic development under Japan, and peaceful living conditions, surely the envy of mainland Chinese people.¹⁵ Japan could also use Taiwan’s proximity to China to further consolidate holdings in southern China such as Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shantou, and Hainan Island.¹⁶ Taiwan was even the subject of a 1939 documentary for Japanese audiences called *Southward Expansion to Taiwan* (*Nanshin Taiwan* 南進台湾), which portrayed Taipei’s cosmopolitanism and Japan’s desire to use Taiwan as a base for further

¹⁴ Sasaki Kameo, “Jikyoku to Taiwan seinen undō (1) 時局と台湾青年運動 (1) [The times and Taiwanese youth movements (1)],” *Taiwan jihō* (June 1938): 31.

¹⁵ Andō Kōotsu, “Taiwan to senden 台湾と宣伝 [Taiwan and propaganda],” *Taiwan jihō* (January 1939): 65–66.

¹⁶ Ōta Shūkichi, “Minami Shina no kensetsu ni kyōryoku suru Taiwan 南支那の建設に協力する台湾 [Taiwan’s assistance in constructing southern China],” *Taiwan jihō* (January 1940): 23.

acquisitions in Southeast Asia, with its abundant natural resources.¹⁷ Taiwanese people needed to cooperate under the banner of imperialization, since they were vital in helping Japan bring peace to Asia and the world.

Having thus established the importance of Taiwan, official publications also paid much attention to young people, who would become especially important to the Japanese war effort. Governor-General Kobayashi stated in 1938 that the youth had the capacity to be enthusiastic, pure, and true, and that they had a uniquely positive view of life that prioritized progress and advancement. As a result, Kobayashi said, they needed to understand their responsibility, and train their own hearts and bodies to advance wisdom and virtue, becoming loyal and good subjects of the Emperor.¹⁸ The young people were thus idealized as having a special capacity for loyalty in a time that required performances of this paramount virtue. Just as the youth were elevated in colonial discourse as having certain worthy emotional and psychological traits, youth mobilization movements emphasized an intangible but essential connection to the Japanese Empire and its cause. In a two-part article in the newspaper *Taiwan jihō*, Sasaki Kameo laid out the following agenda for implementing youth mobilization: a spirit that reveres the emperor and

¹⁷ National Taiwan History Museum, *Piange zhuandongjian de Taiwan xianying* 片格轉動的台灣顯影 [Colonial Japanese Documentaries on Taiwan] DVD (National Taiwan History Museum, 2007).

¹⁸ Kobayashi Seizō, “Seinen ni tsugu 青年に告ぐ [To the youth],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1938): 5–6.

loves the country; thorough participation in the *kōminka* movement; correct and thorough understanding of the times; strengthening of the patriotic and public service spirit; strengthening of home front defense; expansion of military material production; and thorough attacks on speech and actions unbecoming of Japanese citizens.¹⁹ Most of these items were to be practiced in the mind, constituting guidelines for a mobilization of youth psychology.

The article also contained a sample “oath” to be taken when one joined a youth group: “We are always thankful and promise to be children (*sekishi* 赤子) who repay the nation with exhaustive loyalty. We are always earnest and promise to be brave, repaying the nation with diligent action. We are always cooperative and promise to be the rock upon which an advancing Japan is founded.”²⁰ These pledges from 1938 seem relatively vague, but were based on a distinctive wartime mentality. Similarly, another article urged people not to differentiate between the home front and the battlefield, because a “sacred war” was taking place at both locations. Servicemen could repay the nation with death, while the people on the home front could also give everything they had to the state.²¹ These ill-defined precepts on loyalty and patriotic action

¹⁹ Sasaki, “Jikyoku to Taiwan seinen undō (1),” 34.

²⁰ Sasaki Kameo, “Jikyoku to Taiwan seinen undō (2) 時局と台湾青年運動 (2) [The times and Taiwanese youth movements (2)],” *Taiwan jihō* (July 1938): 49.

²¹ Sasaki, “Jikyoku to Taiwan seinen undō (1),” 30.

became progressively more concrete and tethered to real actions as part of the *kōminka* movement and total war. It is important to note the performative aspect of these words. As part of a genre of texts meant for performance, these lines were to be uttered aloud in a group, standing with other youths who were presumed to have felt the same way.

Similarly, writers had to articulate an appropriate definition of Japaneseness or the Japanese spirit as they applied it to the colonial subjects of Taiwan. In 1939, Tachikawa Yoshio attempted to trace the Japanese spirit from its mytho-historical origins, saying that while hundreds and thousands of nations of the world have risen and fallen like bubbles on water, the Japanese Empire had endured for three thousand years, and that it was perfect, with awe-inspiring natural beauty.²² He then listed previous scholarly definitions of the Japanese spirit, ultimately asserting that the “Japanese spirit is respect and love for the national essence, in which each person maximizes one’s own abilities to support and serve the imperial destiny.”²³ The connection between the emotions of “respect and love” and the actions of “support and service” was at the center of Japanese wartime mobilization. The *kōminka* movement permeated the daily lives of Taiwanese people, and its various cultural mandates covered everything from

²² Tachikawa Yoshio, “Nihon seishin ni kansuru jakkan no kōsatsu (1) 日本精神に関する若干の考察 (1) [Some observations on the Japanese spirit (1)],” *Taiwan jihō* (February 1939): 115.

²³ *Ibid.*, 117.

dress and improvement of hygiene to religion, ceremonies, and the arts.²⁴

As early as 1938, apprehensions of a long war in China as well as military engagement with the West, which justified the intensification or “completion” of imperialization, could be found in government publications and newspapers.²⁵ It is necessary to pause for a description of the smaller movements under the umbrella of *kōminka*, even though, as Zhou Wanyao writes, “At the height of the *kōminka* movement, the term of [sic] *kōminka* was misused to such an extent that almost everything having to do with the wartime situation was part of the *kōminka* movement.”²⁶ The *kōminka* movement encompassed the national language movement, religious reforms, the name-changing movement, and the military volunteer program.²⁷ The national language movement in the wartime period incentivized families to speak Japanese in daily life in addition to educational programs for both children and adults. The religious reforms aimed at eradicating Taiwanese gods and worship customs. The name-changing program offered

²⁴ Wang, *Rizhi shiqi Taiwan gongmin jiaoyu yu gongmin texing* 日治時期台灣公民教育與公民特性 [*Taiwanese civic education and characteristics under Japanese rule*], 246.

²⁵ Sōtokufu Rinji Jōhōbu, “Aikoku chochiku undō nitsuite,” 5.

²⁶ Zhou, “The Kōminka Movement,” 46.

²⁷ Zhou, “The Kōminka Movement in Taiwan and Korea,” 45.

privileges for Taiwanese people to shed their Chinese names for Japanese ones.²⁸ Finally, the military volunteer program sought to recruit young Taiwanese men to go to the front lines as soldiers or military porters, or to participate in agricultural service teams. Studying the Japanese language had always been promoted by Japan in Taiwan, while the other three were largely the result of wartime psychological and practical necessity. Zhou's research on *kōminka* led her to conclude that the concept of generations was important in Japanese colonialism on Taiwan, demonstrated by the fact that the military recruitment program directed at the young male population of the time had a more significant impact on them.²⁹

In February, 1938, air strikes on Taiwan by the Nationalists and Russians began, and steadily became more frequent and indiscriminate.³⁰ Even when the Japanese military was winning impressive victories early on in the war, the specter of fighting in Taiwan or Japan was never dismissed as impossible. The notion of “total mobilization (*sōdōin* 総動員)” introduced in

²⁸ Guidelines existed to make sure that the new Japanese names had no association to a place in China, were not ironic renderings of the original Chinese name, and only entire Han Chinese families could apply for name change while aborigines were permitted to change their names individually.

²⁹ Zhou, “The *Kōminka* Movement,” 223.

³⁰ Takenaka Nobuko, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi: Riben nüren zai Taiwan, Zhaohepian (1926-1945)* 日治台灣生活史：日本女人在台灣，昭和篇 (1926-1945) [*History of life in Taiwan under Japanese rule: Japanese women in Taiwan, Showa volume (1926-1945)*], vol. 2 (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban qiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2009), 70.

1939³¹ expressed how urgent the Japanese state felt about convincing the Taiwanese people of the severity of the wartime situation and making them more willing to join up with and contribute resources to the war effort. Thus, *kōminka* could be broadly defined as consciously dealing with emotions and actions as distinct categories under a unified concept of the “Japanese imperial subject.” According to one article published in January 1940, since Japan was in the midst of a great enterprise, Taiwan could no longer consider only its own affairs; although the Taiwanese people were still only infants as imperial subjects, they could achieve absolute purity of heart if they participated in *kōminka* as a spiritual movement.³² It was thought that if Taiwanese people accurately understood national policies, the “psychological strength of society” would be firm and dangerous rumors would not spread.³³

When Hasegawa Kiyoshi was installed as Taiwan’s eighteenth governor-general in December 1940, he announced that Taiwan would have increasingly important missions.³⁴ Six

³¹ Kihara Enji, “Shinten suru kokka sōdōin taisei 進展する国家総動員態勢 [The state of progressing national total mobilization],” *Taiwan jihō* (October 1939): 2.

³² Shiroy Asakichi, “Taiwan kōminka no shomondai 台湾皇民化の諸問題 [Various issues in Taiwan imperialization],” *Taiwan jihō* (January 1940): 32–37.

³³ Imazaki Hideichi, “Fusetsu no hayari to genron no seijōka 浮説の流行と言論の正常化 [The prevalence of rumors and the normalization of discourse],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1941): 58–59.

³⁴ Hasegawa Kiyoshi, “Shinnen no ji 新年の辞 [Words for the new year],” *Taiwan jihō* (January 1941): 3.

months later, he proclaimed the slogan “utmost exertion in carrying out the way of the subject,” (*funkotsu saishin shindō* 粉骨碎身臣道) which literally meant “to shatter one’s bones and body in following the way of the subject.”³⁵ This idea can be seen as a precursor to the prevalent use of the word *hisshi* (必死), or “in face of certain death,” to describe the diligence required of all subjects of the Empire. While it can be argued that the literal meanings of the individual Chinese characters are not as important as the semantic meanings of the words as a whole, the choice of these specific terms also belies a subtext of sacrifice and death demanded from the imperial subject. In July 1941, to commemorate the 46th-year anniversary of Japanese rule on Taiwan, Governor-General Hasegawa predicted that the intentions and feelings of the zealous patriotic spirit manifested after the war began would provide the power to overcome the adversities ahead.³⁶

In 1942, around the time of the Battle of Midway, the military volunteer program was officially instituted out of necessity. Japanese discourse referred to it as fulfilling the will of the Taiwanese people. One Taiwanese author stated that the six million people living in Taiwan at the time were intoxicated by battle victories and were galvanized by the new recruitment system

³⁵ Hasegawa Kiyoshi, “Sōtoku kunji 総督訓示 [Words from the Governor-General],” *Taiwan jihō* (June 1941): 2.

³⁶ Hasegawa Kiyoshi, “Shisei yonjū yū rokunen no kan 始政四十有六年の感 [Reflections on forty six years of governance],” *Taiwan jihō* (July 1941): 7.

instituted in response to the heated desires of the people.³⁷ The Empire represented itself as a benevolent state that acknowledged its people's needs, while simultaneously bestowing great honor on those who answered the call.

In general, civilian participation in the war through industrial production or resource conservation was given rhetorical honor of the kind granted to the “invincible imperial soldiers (*muteki kōgun* 無敵皇軍).” In 1943 Governor-General Hasegawa called Taiwanese citizens “warriors in a total war (*sōryokusen no senshi* 総力戦の戦士),” while another article labeled them “industrial warriors (*sangyō senshi* 産業戦士).”³⁸ The colonial government told the Taiwanese people that the home front was a battlefield where martial values mattered. As resources became scarce, government newspapers and publications also extolled the virtues of using substitute items in daily life, such as mixing yams into rice to lower the demand for grain.³⁹ One postwar Japanese autobiography recalls posters that gravely declared, “The era of

³⁷ Wu Jianlian, “Daitōa sensō to shiganheisei no jisshi 大東亜戦争と志願兵制の實施 [Great East Asian War and implementation of the volunteer recruitment system],” *Taiwan jihō* (January 1942): 128.

³⁸ Hasegawa Kiyoshi, “Nentō shokan 年頭所感 [Reflections at the beginning of the year],” *Taiwan jihō* (January 1943): 18; Ōtsubo Tesshin, “Kessenki ni sasageru beki Taiwan no mono to hito no kesshū 決戦期に捧げるべき台湾の物と人の結集 [Concentration of things and people of Taiwan that should be offered in the period of decisive war],” *Taiwan jihō* (March 1943): 39.

³⁹ Ōbayashi Fumio, “Hisshō shokuryō seisakuron 必勝食糧政策論 [The food policy for certain victory],” *Taiwan jihō* (August 1943): 40.

snack foods is over, [we will] win with yams and rice.”⁴⁰ Even home life was associated with war through the somewhat morbid slogan, “*ichinichi senshi* (一日戦死),” which literally translates as “fight to the death in a day,” exhorting Taiwanese to treat their mundane daily exertions as a struggle for their lives.⁴¹ Gradually, shortages became a matter of course, and people were encouraged to live a “life of combat (*sentō seikatsu* 戦闘生活)” in defiance of the inhumane British and American air strikes, which had become commonplace.⁴²

In May 1943, Attu, the westernmost island in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska, which had been taken by the Japanese in 1942, fell to the US troops after bloody fighting; the consequent mass suicides of Japanese soldiers led to the coining of the term *gyokusai*, meaning “smashed jade.”⁴³ Japanese newspapers appropriated this term—which had a long history in China as a metaphor for choosing death over surrender—to describe such suicides by imperial soldiers. According to David Earhart, the Attu suicide charge “was heralded in the Japanese press as an outstanding example of military valor and ‘Japanese spirit,’ for which a new word was

⁴⁰ Okano Kaoruko, *Taiheiyō Sensōka no gakkō seikatsu* 太平洋戦争下の学校生活 [*School life under the Pacific War*] (Tōkyō: Heibonsha, 2000), 200.

⁴¹ Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 2:154.

⁴² Lin Foshu, “Kūshūka no shokuryō taisaku 空襲下の食糧対策 [Food policies in response to air raid circumstances],” *Taiwan jihō* (November 1943): 57, 61.

⁴³ Okano, *Taiheiyō Sensōka no gakkō seikatsu*, 198.

needed.”⁴⁴ Using this symbolic and stylized term to glorify the deaths of Japanese soldiers made the realization of death indirect and postponed the awareness of defeat; at the same time it exalted the dead soldiers with mythical honor and inspired others to follow their sublime example. *Gyokusai* was but one manifestation of the decoupling of discourse and reality. If the reality of defeat could be deliberately obscured through the usage of a magnificent new term with abstractly positive characteristics, then by extension all other negative aspects of war potentially could be cloaked by rhetoric. Indeed, the following months saw the rise of official discourse that gradually departed from reality, because the reality of Japan’s military situation was deteriorating. As *gyokusai* suicides occurred on other islands, newspapers reported on them in the noblest terms to unify readers in their rage, provoke vengeful feelings (*fukkyūshin* 復仇心), bolster morale, and raise funds for the government.⁴⁵ The April 1944 issue of *Taiwan jihō* expressed on the one hand the primary importance of believing in certain victory while understanding the reasons for victory, and on the other hand the idea that even though success would be natural for Japan, the people still have to understand what it means to be Japanese in

⁴⁴ David C Earhart, *Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media* (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), 380.

⁴⁵ “Tarawa, Makintō no gyokusai ni fungeki タラワ・マキン島の玉砕に憤激 [Anger at *gyokusai* at Tarawa and Makin Islands],” *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, December 24, 1943, 4.

the final moment of “one hundred million pieces of smashed jade (*ichioku gyokusai* 一億玉碎).”⁴⁶ While it is clear that the purpose of the article was for people to do even more to prepare for war on the home front, the premise of certain victory was inconsistent with the conclusion.

The following issue of *Taiwan jihō* focused on the next invented term in the war effort: the fortification (*yōsaika* 要塞化) of Taiwan, or in other words the transformation of Taiwan into a defensive stronghold. Several articles were dedicated to making the Taiwanese people understand the importance of their efforts. One author claimed that 1944 would be the year of “worldwide counterattack” by the enemy, predicted to lead to unprecedented war. He assured the reader that it would be extremely difficult for the enemy to attack mainland Japan, but the Taiwanese people must do their part both in the war of production (*seisansen* 生産戦) and in the war of the ocean (*kaiyōsen* 海洋戦). The ultimate key to the final outcome was the fighting will and morale of the people.⁴⁷ Another author claimed that the enemy had spiritual weaknesses while all Japanese (including Taiwanese) were compatriots who fought for a unified cause.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Ōta Shūkichi, “Kōkoku hisshō no shinnen ni taisuru ikkōsatsu 皇国必勝の信念にたいする一考察 [An observation of the belief of certain victory for the imperial nation],” *Taiwan jihō* (April 1944): 1, 5.

⁴⁷ Kurihara Hiromi, “Taiwan yōsaikaron 台湾要塞化論 [On the fortification of Taiwan],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1944): 1–6.

⁴⁸ Kimura Masao, “Taiwan yōsaika no igi 台湾要塞化の意義 [The meaning of the fortification of Taiwan],” *Taiwan jihō* (May 1944): 130–131.

Evidently, although words like “certain victory” continued to occupy centrality in discourse, the Japanese were concerned with marshaling mighty words to the war effort, pressing people to sacrifice creature comforts and even their lives. Ben-Ami Shillony writes, “as the military setbacks became more obvious, the more strident became the voices proclaiming that ultimate victory would be determined by strength and purity of spirit.”⁴⁹

The military draft was instituted in Taiwan in August 1944. Although the draft, like the volunteer system, was shrouded in the language of benevolent imperial grace, it belied Japan’s desperate need for manpower. The draft was meant to represent the equality between Japanese and Taiwanese, supposedly coming in response to powerful pleas by the Taiwanese. The *Taiwan jihō* published letters purportedly from young people who were overjoyed at being given the opportunity to participate in the war. These letters were full of slogans that mimicked the official rhetoric. One said he wanted to become a ghost that protected his nation; another wanted to be a humble shield for his sovereign lord, to beat the brute Americans and British until they were stopped; still another claimed he possessed the spirit of the sword.⁵⁰ Putting aside whether they

⁴⁹ Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*, 134.

⁵⁰ Su Zhanglin et al., “Kōei no chōheisei jisshi wo mukae waretō no kangeki to kakugo 光栄の徴兵制実施を迎え我等の感激と覚悟 [Our gratitude and realization in welcoming implementation of the honorable draft system],” *Taiwan jihō* (September 1944): 78, 79, 83.

were genuine letters, these performances on paper showed that state rhetoric could become part of the youth lexicon. At the very least, when the youths responded to the state they were clearly aware of what was expected from their language.

During the two final months in which the *Taiwan jihō* was published, February and March 1945, grandiose visions continued to prevail. The paper still touted certain victory, but referred to Taiwan as the site for a decisive battle (*kessenjō* 決戦場) and urged people to live the “life of the decisive battle (*kessen seikatsu* 決戦生活)” while putting their money into “certain victory savings (*hisshō chochiku* 必勝貯蓄).”⁵¹ Another article pointed to Japan’s glorious history of certain victory, then immediately stated that the imperial nation was in danger and had to be protected, with the lives of its people if necessary.⁵² In the March 1945 issue, an article titled “To the Compatriots of Taiwan” concluded with a poignant paragraph that exemplified the wartime rhetoric. It is translated here in full:

As Taiwan has become a stronghold, numerous young people have accordingly gone to war in high spirits. As the blossoms of the special attack [kamikaze] forces are scattered, and they become gods who protect the nation, we are choking on our tears of gratitude for these soldiers, whose memory will last for all eternity. Together, passing through this dangerous situation, in the daybreak of victory in this war, we will hold one another’s hands, in a time for exchanging the deep feelings of righteous victors to our hearts’

⁵¹ Kurihara Hiromi, “Kessenjō Taiwan no shomondai 決戦場台湾の諸問題 [Various issues of the decisive battleground Taiwan],” *Taiwan jihō* (February 1945): 83.

⁵² Ida Masataka, “Taiwan no iku beki michi 台湾の行くべき道 [The path Taiwan should take],” *Taiwan jihō* (February 1945): 8–9.

content.⁵³

The immense emphases on the emotional resonance of the actions of fighters and on unity, expressed through the action of holding hands, are concrete examples of what the Japanese sought to elicit from the Taiwanese population.

Aside from *Taiwan jihō*, an important vehicle for discourse about the war, the Japanese colonial government also controlled another significant wing of the colonial structure – education – that was often more effective at reaching the Taiwanese. Schools and specially-instituted social programs elaborated upon many of the official policies and beliefs about the Japanese spirit, and specified the prescribed performance expected of the colonized Taiwanese people.

Mobilizing through Wartime National Language and Social Education

Wartime education in Japan was an education of militarist ideology. In her book on school life in Japan during the Pacific War published in 2000, Okano Kaoruko stated, “completely unlike vigorous education that faces tomorrow with rich senses, children were instructed that they may die at any time for the Imperial nation.”⁵⁴ The Japanese wartime

⁵³ Kurihara Hiromi, “Taiwan dōhō shokun ni tsugu 台湾同胞諸君に告ぐ [To compatriots of Taiwan],” *Taiwan jihō* (March 1945): 3.

⁵⁴ Okano, *Taiheiyō Sensōka no gakkō seikatsu*, 105.

obsession with death was a part of the lives of children. Moreover, when air raids became frequent, teachers were instructed to protect the emperor's picture and their class's copies of imperial edicts before the children under their charge.⁵⁵ Indeed, throughout the Japanese Empire, education and cultural policy took a turn for patriotism over real learning, as the leading education journal of Taiwan at the time employed rhetoric such as "Forward, one hundred million fireballs" (*ichioku hinotama* 一億火の玉) to describe the kamikaze attacks.⁵⁶ The job of the educators had become "spiritual education," which compelled them to elicit love and gratitude from their students.

For the Japanese, teaching the Japanese language and broadening education in the colony of Taiwan had always been a priority. The war ushered in new needs and terms in education that linked it to this context. "Southward expansion education," for instance, was a general concept that emphasized the aspects of Taiwanese education that were particularly suited to cultivating a base of human and material resources.⁵⁷ Whereas textbooks prior to 1937 frequently cited Chinese historical figures, wartime textbooks purged nearly all Chinese references. Only

⁵⁵ Ibid., 213.

⁵⁶ Nanshin, "Sensō to kyōiku (2) 戦争と教育 (2) [War and education (2)]," *Taiwan Kyōikukai Zasshi* no. 481 (1942): 66.

⁵⁷ Shimada Akizei, "Nanshin kyoten Taiwan to kyōiku 南進拠点台湾と教育 [The southern expansion stronghold of Taiwan and education]," *Taiwan jihō* (October 1940): 50.

Japanese tales of loyalty and martial prowess were permitted to appear. Even all the names of fictitious characters used in Japanese textbooks had been changed to Japanese, and the majority of people in illustrations wore Japanese dress.⁵⁸ In March 1941, the National School Law (*Kokumin gakkōrei* 国民学校令) was promulgated to consolidate the school system; the separate schools for Taiwanese children and Japanese children would now be merged and henceforth simply referred to as “elementary schools.”⁵⁹ It was definitively declared that the purpose of the new school system was “training imperial subjects,” while also teaching basic skills in industry and home economics, enabling students to live a “national language life.”⁶⁰ The National School Law was roughly contemporaneous with the military volunteer program, denoting the convergence of cultural and military policies as Japan became increasingly beleaguered.

National Language Mobilization Guide

In 1941, the *National Language Mobilization Guide* (*kokugo dōin shidōsho* 國語動員指

⁵⁸ Xu Peixian, “Zhanzheng shiqi de guoyu duben jieshuo 戰爭時期的國語讀本解說 [Explanation of Wartime National Language Readers],” in *Rizhi shiqi Taiwan gongxuexiao yu guomin xuexiao guoyu duben: jieshuo, zongmuci, suoyin* 日治時期臺灣公學校與國民學校・國語讀本: 解說・總目次・索引 [*Common schools and citizen schools and national language readers in Taiwan under Japanese rule: explanations, contents, index*] (Taipei: Nantian shuju, 2003), 80.

⁵⁹ Satō, *Taiwan kyōiku no shinten*, 160–161.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 163.

導書) was published for national language teachers in Xinzhu Shū (新竹州) in central Taiwan. This book and ones like it elsewhere directly merged the teaching of Japanese with mobilization. The layout of the guide itself deserves attention. Each page was divided into five rows, itemizing the month, week, phrases to be taught, instruction points, and important items in instruction. For instance, on the first page, to be taught in the first week of April, the first three phrases were “The Great Japanese Empire,” “I am Japanese,” and “[I] speak the national language.” The instruction point was “to make [students] possess self-consciousness as a Japanese person,” and the first important item in teaching this lesson was “Each day, before national language instruction, make sure [students] say this.”⁶¹ The calendar schedule conformed to the Japanese academic year, which began in April, and the teachers had to explain the meanings of important national holidays to students. Recurring national holidays evoked a bond between past significance, present actions, and future imaginings. By 1941, there were many national holidays or festivals with mythical-religious, imperial, or military significance that had to be observed, resulting in many teachable moments for the Taiwanese people.

It is impossible to cover all of the national holidays and the language lessons, but I will highlight several in this section, noting the link between learning, emotions, and performance.

⁶¹ Ōtani Gun kyōka rengōkai, *Kokugu dōin shidōsho* 国語動員指導書 [National language mobilization guide] (Shinchiku Shū: Ōtani Gun kyōka rengōkai, 1941), 1.

The Emperor's Birthday (*Tenchōsetsu* 天長節) during the Shōwa era was on April 29, and this was used to teach students about the vast imperial grace and to instill a spirit of “selfless devotion to the public good (*messhihōkō* 滅私奉公).” The student was also instructed that he or she should pray for the prosperity of the imperial house and for the emperor to live ten thousand years.⁶² While it was clearly important for Japan to promote the value of public service in its subjects, the fact that it was bundled with self-effacement through a term as strong as “extinguish one's selfhood (*messhi* 滅私)” is significant, and remains consistent with the contemporary Japanese emphasis on dying for the Empire. Navy Day was celebrated on May 27, and this day was used to explain the three reasons why Japan was able to defeat Russia in 1905: the Emperor's majestic power (*miitsu* 御稜威), the faithful righteousness of the servicemen, and the sincerity and “all-for-one power” of the citizens.⁶³ Interestingly, while the Russo-Japanese War was a genuinely impressive triumph, it was supposed to be taught as a wholly spiritual victory with full emphasis on Japanese virtues, with no mention of the sizes of the navies and the quality of the weaponry involved. By attributing resounding Japanese victory to the unity of virtue, the lesson implied that if the people all believed in victory, it would be so.

One exceedingly important lesson was the national anthem of Japan, the *Kimi ga yo* (君が

⁶² Ibid., 7.

⁶³ Ibid., 12.

代). Students had to understand the meaning of the lyrics clearly, and sing it with respect and faith in body and mind at every ceremonial assembly.⁶⁴ The goal was to align the outward expression of singing together with correct individual internal emotions. The Japanese national anthem, of course, had inherently intense emotional meaning. It is appropriate to pause briefly to discuss the story of “Kimi Ga Yo Shōnen (the national anthem boy),” meant to be an uplifting tale of patriotism unto death. In 1935 a massive earthquake mortally injured a 15-year-old Taiwanese boy named Chan, who was glorified as the perfect example of a Japanized Taiwanese child. When he was on his deathbed, his teachers came to see him as he sang the national anthem to his last breath.⁶⁵ Taiwanese historian Zhou Wanyao believes that this event did take place because it was corroborated by Chan’s immediate family members, but she characterizes the story as “a governance myth.”⁶⁶ The story was embellished and circulated by newspapers and more importantly in textbooks. Even though Chan’s death in the earthquake occurred before the war, and some readers might find the various iterations of his story to be merely narratives of a senseless, accidental death, to the Japanese state his death was beautiful, and therefore valuable, because singing the national anthem on one’s deathbed signified an act of patriotism that was

⁶⁴ Ibid., 13.

⁶⁵ Zhou, *Haixingxi de niandai*, 2–4.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 6, 11.

ultimately self-effacing, the highest and purest kind of performance.

In the *National Language Mobilization Guide*, the next important commemoration was for the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, more commonly known in Japan as the China Incident, which marked the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The teaching points focused on the purpose and causes of the military conflict underway at this time. The stated goal of the war was to ensure eternal peace in East Asia; its proximate causes were anti-Japanese sentiment in China and the fact that Communism was destroying peace in Asia, and its direct cause was that Chinese soldiers fired on Japanese soldiers.⁶⁷ These statements, consistent with the way the Second Sino-Japanese war was portrayed in other media, helped to frame war in the language of peace.

By 1941, send-off ceremonies for Taiwanese men going to the battlefield became more frequent, as did the welcoming of returning soldiers, in many cases as ashes. One lesson contained the following dialogue: “A: ‘Take that flag and come here, please.’ B: ‘Where are you going?’ A: ‘Going to see a soldier departing for the front.’ B: ‘Take me too, please.’”⁶⁸ The teaching points affirmed that participation in such ceremonies was a home front citizen’s

⁶⁷ Ōtani Gun kyōka rengōkai, *Kokugu dōin shidōsho*, 20.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 39.

obligation, and that gratitude should flow from their hearts (*kokoro kara kansha* 心から感謝).⁶⁹

Again, students were given a set of actions with corresponding emotions, based on the hope that actions and emotions would be mutually initiated or reinforced. The concept of gratitude was especially useful because it always entailed repayment. As will soon become clear, the Japanese state was keen on making Taiwanese youths aware just how they would be summoned to tender repayment.

National Language Readers

Textbooks themselves are also useful for analyzing what was imparted to students through texts and illustrations. This section explores two sets of textbooks – four volumes of *National Language* (*Kokugo* コクゴ) published in 1942 for students beginning their foray into the Japanese language, and eight volumes of *Elementary National Language* (*Shotōka kokugo* 初等科国語) published in 1944 for more advanced students. Before the war, Japanese language and ethics textbooks were concerned with localization through the frequent inclusion of Chinese or Taiwanese elements, incorporated to inspire a sense of familiarity and to emphasize some common values between Japanese and Chinese culture. However, after the war with China began, Japanese colonial education brought differences between China and Japan into sharp relief.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

The *Kokugo* series was mostly comprised of pictures and very simple words and sentences written in Japanese *kana*. These textbooks, which did not use Chinese characters, depicted children who looked and acted Japanese, going to the shrine with mother or celebrating various national holidays.⁷⁰ The popular Japanese folk tale of Peach Boy (*Momotarō* 桃太郎), a perennial favorite of Japanese nationalism, was also included with a series of drawings.⁷¹ The Japanese concern with the wartime context was also self-evident in the drawings of children waving to the Japanese army and pointing at Japanese planes flying overhead.⁷² In one textbook illustration of a sea battle, a Japanese ship was depicted sinking an enemy ship.⁷³ Japanese for beginners was thus taught through pictures that bound Taiwanese children to a Japanese worldview, with visual and emotional engagement with the war.

The eight volumes of *Shotōka kokugo* contained increasingly advanced lessons, but the purpose of inculcating patriotism by appealing to emotions remained the same. Two lessons in Volume 1 were written from the perspective of a young child. In the first, he has an elder brother

⁷⁰ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Kokugo 1* コクゴ 1 [*National language 1*] (Tokyo: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1942), 60; Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Kokugo 3* コクゴ 3 [*National language 3*] (Tokyo: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1942), 27; Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Kokugo 4* コクゴ 4 [*National language 4*] (Tokyo: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1942), 15.

⁷¹ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Kokugo 3*, 10.

⁷² Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Kokugo 1*, 23, 29.

⁷³ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Kokugo 2* コクゴ 2 [*National language 2*] (Tokyo: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1942), 41.

who has returned from the battlefield and received a medal for working as an interpreter; in the second, a letter came from his elder sister in Tokyo, describing famous places there.⁷⁴ These two lessons forged an emotional connection, a sense of yearning for imaginary places. To a child reader, the ideas of a battlefield or of cosmopolitan Tokyo were introduced in a more intimate way by using elder siblings as intermediaries. In other words, these lessons sought to create deeper impressions by linking the distant to the familiar.

These textbooks were certainly a wartime cultural product whose value for language instruction was limited. Vocabulary centered on submarines, airplanes, bravery, and air raids soon became repetitive. As patriotism manuals consistent with the Japanese views on death and loyalty, however, these textbooks met their objectives. Some of the lessons were simply lyrics of wartime propaganda songs. One was the song “Military Flag (*gunki* 軍旗)” which honored the flag with the lyrics, “For His Majesty the Emperor / Forward to a hostile land with the realization of death / The military flag is the light of our army.”⁷⁵ Thus, education deviated from its prewar purpose to civilize the Taiwanese population via language and modern knowledge. Education

⁷⁴ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shotōka kokugo 1* 初等科国語 1 [*Elementary national language 1*] (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1944), 16–29.

⁷⁵ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shotōka kokugo 2* 初等科国語 2 [*Elementary national language 2*] (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1944), 99–102.

became the cultural arm of the war effort. Rather than civilization, the goal was mobilization, with lessons designed to inspire students to give up their lives, in daily life or on a more existential level, for their paradoxically invincible yet vulnerable empire.

Among the lessons in *Shotōka kokugo*, military topics stand out, in part because there were so many lessons on ships, “our navy,” and specific battles. One lesson titled “The Final Moment of the Unsinkable Ship” occupied fifteen pages with exchanges of torpedoes, cannons, and flying shrapnel, and the necessary gesture of crying out of *banzai* (ten thousand years to His Majesty the Emperor) before a glorious death.⁷⁶ Another lesson titled “Military Gods of the Sky” contained two stories of air force pilots who died heroically. In the first, when an attack expedition turned hopeless for one pilot, he shouted, “*Banzai!*” as he plunged into the ocean; the second story described a send-off ceremony for a pilot who also died and became a protector god of the nation.⁷⁷ A final example of a lesson on the military involved the Battle of Midway. Since this expedition resulted in a decisive American military victory, the choice to include it in a textbook warrants further inspection. The lesson’s title is “The Hard Fight of the Iron Whale,”

⁷⁶ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shotōka kokugo 6* 初等科国語 6 [*Elementary national language 6*] (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1944), 45–60.

⁷⁷ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shotōka kokugo 7* 初等科国語 7 [*Elementary national language 7*] (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1944), 44–52.

and it describes torpedo attacks on the submarine named *Iron Whale*, which ultimately managed to survive because of the hard work of the reverent captain (who prayed to the gods as he searched for enemy submarines through his periscope) and the brave crew.⁷⁸ There is no doubt that these lessons were fictionalized for stronger impact on feelings. Japanese writers of textbooks reconstructed news reports to accentuate the values they were attempting to instill in the students' reading.

Fictionalization maximized emotional resonance and found outlets beyond textbooks. Like the story of National Anthem Boy, another of what Zhou Wanyao describes as “governance myths” constructed around a real person was “The Bell of Sayon,” which was also found in *Shotōka kokugo*. Set in 1938, the story idolizes Sayon, a 17-year-old aborigine girl in northern Taiwan who had received some Japanese education. Her Japanese teacher was drafted to fight in China; as she helped him carry luggage down from a mountain on a stormy day, she slipped and fell into a river, and her body was never recovered.⁷⁹ According to Zhou, Sayon's story was especially appealing and worthy of honor because it displayed the “purity of emotions” of a

⁷⁸ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shotōka kokugo 8* 初等科国語 8 [*Elementary national language 8*] (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1944), 34–44.

⁷⁹ Zhou, *Haixingxi de niandai*, 13–15.

“civilized aborigine,” and because her death was connected to a military expedition.⁸⁰ Naturally, the Japanese media manipulated this story, since the narrative potential of uninitiated femininity and sexual tension would be tantalizing for a male audiences. The “bell of Sayon” was a large bell forged in her honor, inscribed with the words, “The bell of Sayon, patriotic maiden.”⁸¹ Subsequently, her story was published in textbooks with great emotional embellishment. For instance, Sayon and her teacher were fictionalized for the narrative, with Sayon saying to her teacher with sincerity (真心), “[You are] no longer our teacher, but a soldier of Japan. Please allow me to carry the luggage of a soldier.”⁸²

Beyond language textbooks, Sayon’s story received further dramatization in many forms. Wu Mansha published a story titled “Patriotic Story: The Bell of Sayon” in 1943. He stated that he fictionalized her as a way of commemorating her,⁸³ and indeed every aspect of the story was augmented with florid characterization and dialogue. He gave the character of Sayon hopes,

⁸⁰ Ibid., 16–17.

⁸¹ Ibid., 17.

⁸² Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shotōka kokugo 5 初等科国語 5 [Elementary national language 5]* (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu, 1944), 101–102.

⁸³ Wu Mansha, “Aiguo xiaoshuo Shayang de zhong ‘zhongguoyu ban’ 愛国小説莎秧的鐘「中国語版」 [Patriot story: the bell of Sayon],” in “*Sayon no kane*” *kankei shiryōshū* 「サヨンの鐘」関係資料集 [*Information on “Bell of Sayon”*], vol. 28, *Nihon tōchiki taiwan bungaku shūsei* (Tōkyō: Ryokuin Shobō, 2007), 4.

desires, a boyfriend (to augment her pure emotions), a father loyal to the Japanese, a loving and enlightened teacher, and even a new death. In his version of the story, her teacher was a man named Takita, who treated the aborigines like his own younger brother and sisters, and who had a wife kind enough to squat down by young aborigine girls to mend their skirts.⁸⁴ Thus, Wu painted the Japanese people as model colonizers. The Taiwanese aborigines were placed in the narrative, prop-like, as the obedient and simple people imagined in official discourse. In a brief digression in the story, one ill aborigine woman says to her daughter, “the reason you are so filial towards your parents today is completely due to the teaching of Mr. and Mrs. Takita. Now that I am sick, Mr. Takita came to examine me. This kind of benevolence is higher than the sky and deeper than the ocean. We should always remember it.”⁸⁵ She attributes the goodness of her daughter to Japanese influence and emphasizes Japanese benevolence, prefiguring the later sacrifice of Sayon.

In Wu Mansha’s rendition of the tale, Sayon’s youth group puts on a play about a poor Japanese girl who ends up being adopted by her teacher, which moves everyone, including the Japanese audience, to great sympathy and tears.⁸⁶ Emotions are portrayed as central to these

⁸⁴ Ibid., 15, 39.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 56.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 71–83.

colonial relationships, and there was inherent value to the feelings involved because they were so benevolent and pure. Sayon's relationship with her fictitious boyfriend, Bacai, operated in the same way. Although they are very affectionate toward each other, she tells him with solemn concern, "One day, I will marry you, but now it is still early. And the country is in extraordinary times. You are a man, and you should have the bravery of the warriors, and go to the front to fight! If you have the enthusiasm to follow the warriors to the front, then you can be my lover, and my fiancé!"⁸⁷ Then Bacai agreed to volunteer. Later, Sayon has a conversation with Takita while he is cleaning his Japanese sword, in which he tells her, "This is a Japanese sword, and all Japanese people should have one. The Japanese sword has a long history, and simply put, it is a manifestation of the Japanese spirit (*Yamato Damashii* 大和魂). Japanese men should all have the steely strength and sharpness of this sword, kill all enemies, and express the sense of righteousness and spirit of the Japanese race!"⁸⁸ In this fictional scene, fighting, Japaneseness, and death are mingled in one statement to a Taiwanese aborigine girl.

Finally, Sayon's death is worth mentioning because it is highly romanticized in Wu's rewriting. When Sayon falls into the river, she is critically injured but rescued. Even though she drops everything else, she tenaciously clings to Takita's Japanese sword. Right before her death,

⁸⁷ Ibid., 89–90.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 99.

she insists on using her last bit of strength to sign her name on a Japanese flag, one which Takita would later take to the battlefield.⁸⁹

Peeling back the label of “pure emotions,” Wu’s story is actually a narrative abounding in sexual undertones. Sexual tension between Takita and Sayon was downplayed by accentuating her purity and diverted through the creation of Bacai, but the emphasis on Takita’s sword can be read as phallic symbolism. Furthermore, Sayon’s girlhood crush on her teacher utilizes many colonial tropes. She is younger, “less civilized,” and submissively feminine, while Takita is older, knowledgeable, and steadfast in his masculinity with Japanese characteristics. Bacai is similar to Sayon in age and race, but he would have to assert his manhood to her. In the wartime context, the only way to be a man was to enlist in the military. Taiwanese men who read this story were not supposed to emulate Sayon, but were instead meant to be aroused by sexual desire to fight by for Japan in hope of returning to the embrace of a pure and innocent girl. The war was placed in the background while the narratives focused on the qualities of aborigine subjects, and through emphasis on aborigines, Taiwan could be wholly absorbed into the discourse of Japanese Empire.

Subsequently, this literary work about Sayon was translated into Japanese, many plays and poems were based on it, and a film with Yamaguchi Yoshiko (better known to Chinese

⁸⁹ Ibid., 141–144.

audiences as Lee Xianglan) starring as Sayon was made in 1943.⁹⁰ As Sayon's story and her image rippled outward into Taiwanese society, the Japanese underscored the fact that even a simple aborigine girl could become idealized for her indirect contribution to the war effort; it was perhaps no wonder that many Taiwanese youth, both aborigine and of Han Chinese descent, did indeed volunteer for the front, aspiring to a constructed ideal of subjecthood.

Imperializing Society

In addition to teaching in schools, the Governor-General Office extended its reach through every type of media to prepare Taiwanese society for war. According to Takenaka Nobuko, starting in 1938 women's magazines were prohibited from running stories or ads that were anti-militarist or anti-war, love stories that weakened the will for war, and anything on contraception. Then as rationing became a regular part of daily life, people were instructed to save carrot and turnip skins and find ways to cook them.⁹¹ Imperialization evolved beyond its four core movements as total war engulfed civilian life. One could be regarded as a good

⁹⁰ See Shimomura Sakujiro, ed., "Sayon no kane" kankei shiryōshū 「サヨンの鐘」関係資料集 [Information on "Bell of Sayon"], vol. 28, 30 vols., Nihon tōchiki taiwan bungaku shūsei (Tōkyō: Ryokuin Shobō, 2007). Clips of the film *The Bell of Sayon* (サヨンの鐘) are available on Youtube: Sayon no Kane (dir. by Hiroshi Shimizu), 2007. <http://youtu.be/fL0sb6SBD-s>.

⁹¹ Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 2:132, 166–167.

imperial subject through simple gestures such as going to worship at a Shinto shrine or eating more rabbit meat, which was still readily available.⁹² Meanwhile, the demands of *kōminka* grew even harsher, as the state media added to the list of the traits of a “good Japanese” based on standards constructed around the emotional engagement with the military enterprise. For example, in one publicized case, a pregnant woman ran with heavy water buckets in a fire-prevention drill and suffered a miscarriage. While this incident may appall present-day readers, contemporary newspapers praised the woman for her diligent dedication to her task at the expense of everything else. (Still, as a consequence, pregnant women were exempted from physical training.)⁹³

As *kōminka* subsumed all aspects of life, both physical and spiritual training (*rensei* 錬成) became crucial and quotidian, although in many cases “training” could be understood to mean “obedience to official precepts.” One list that elaborated on the content of imperialization included the following items: engage in remote worship toward the capital; sing the national anthem; renovate main halls in family homes; switch to the solar calendar from the traditional lunar calendar; adopt Japanese-style names; train for total mobilization; engage in prayer and worship; and finally, collect empty bottles, make towels, give money for national defense, and

⁹² Ibid., 2:188.

⁹³ Ibid., 2:169.

give vegetables as tribute to the army.⁹⁴ Thus, the spiritual aspect of *kōminka* was augmented with specific actions to aid the war effort. The people were to avoid a “life of inconsistencies between the heart and body (*shinshin fuicchi no seikatsu* 心身不一致の生活) and should become Japanese completely.⁹⁵

In the 1940s, numerous instructional readers were published for different sectors of Taiwanese society to instruct people in appropriate behavior. The *Taiwan Imperial Subject Public Service Reader* (*Taiwan kōmin hōkō dokuhon* 台湾皇民奉公読本) of 1941 discussed the work of the Imperial Subject Public Service Association (*Kōmin Hōkōkai* 皇民奉公会), the *Taiwan Imperial Subject Reader* (*Taiwan kōmin dokuhon* 台湾皇民読本) of 1943 was a general reader for anyone literate, and the *Taiwan Volunteer Soldier Reader* (*Taiwan shiganhei dokuhon* 台湾志願兵読本) of 1942 focused on the martial ideals of volunteers and included sample test questions for the volunteer’s oral examination.⁹⁶ Social organizations such as the Public Service

⁹⁴ Ema Tsuneyoshi, *Kōminka undō* 皇民化運動 [*The kōminka movement*] (Taipei: Taiwan chūzai naichi kisha kyōkai, 1939), 262–263.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁹⁶ Morita Seio and Ishido Shigeyori, *Taiwan kōmin hōkō dokuhon* 台湾皇民奉公読本 [*Taiwan imperial subject service reader*] (Taipei: Nanshinsha Taiwan shisha, 1941); Ishikawa Kumaichiro, ed., *Taiwan shiganhei dokuhon* 台湾志願兵読本 [*Taiwan volunteer soldier reader*] (Taihoku: Tōdō shoseki kabushiki gaisha, 1942); Kōmin Bunkō Kankōkai, *Taiwan kōmin dokuhon*.

Association, the Youth Corps, and the Patriotic Women's Association tailored their messages to their constituent members, and as a supplement to the school system, they were able to generate overlapping influence covering a vast portion of Taiwanese society. For instance, one women's youth association passed an internal resolution stating that its members would not marry men who did not volunteer for the military, that married women should encourage their husbands to volunteer, and that mothers should encourage their children to volunteer.⁹⁷ Whenever the imperializing effect was broadcast by some official organization, it was always meant to be echoed outward by the person directly receiving it. As these various readers demonstrates, the Japanese state believed in and exploited word of mouth to mobilize the common people through emotions.

The *Taiwan Imperial Subject Service Reader* of 1941 certainly resembled a textbook. It was organized with the main text underneath a row about an inch wide across the top of the page where the main points of each paragraph were briefly summarized. All *kanji* in the text had their *furigana* readings written to the right side, so the entire text could be read aloud by a Taiwanese person who could read the Japanese syllabary. This text began with the official interpretation of what it meant to be an imperial subject: "Imperial subjects are the people of the imperial nation,

⁹⁷ Takenaka, *Rizhi Taiwan shenghuoshi, Zhaohepian*, 2:252.

in other words, true Japanese people.”⁹⁸ While this internally reflexive definition did not clarify the meaning of “imperial subject,” it did conflate Taiwanese people with “true Japanese people,” even though the very existence of the reader attested otherwise. However, the label of “true Japanese people” was at the same time implied to be a great honor for the Taiwanese.

Following the designation of Taiwanese people as imperial subjects, the next section was the “pledge of the citizens of Great Japan (*Dainippon kokumin no seishi* 大日本国民の誓詞),” which read, “We are the national citizens of Greater Japan,” repeated three times with different subsequent statements, “We will faithfully serve the public to repay the monarchy,” “We will exert ourselves and encourage each other to carry out our responsibilities,” and “We will be of one heart in cooperation to promote the Imperial Way.”⁹⁹ Although the text accentuated the spiritual and mystical quality of Japaneseness, the book actually was fairly practical in advising people how to cope with wartime life, encompassing issues such as why Japan was at war, and exhorting readers to participate in the war effort, frequently use the national language, increase productivity and efficiency, be mindful in defense against air raids, and help prevent disease through improvement in hygienic practices.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Morita and Ishido, *Taiwan kōmin hōkō dokuhon*, 2.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 79, 97, 67, 89, 98, 143, 150.

The *Taiwan Imperial Subject Reader* has a very similar layout compared to the *Taiwan Imperial Subject Service Reader*, with main points listed across the top of pages. It begins with the mythical founding of Japan, a time when gods begat the line of Japanese emperors. Then, it offers a history lesson noting the significant points in Japan's domestic development and foreign engagement, paying special attention to recent wars.¹⁰¹ Most of the *Taiwan Imperial Subject Reader* was concerned with the then ongoing war. It admonished the people that in everything relating to the war, one must always possess "heart." The national language was credited with the ability to inspire intimate affection among speakers of Japanese, and to make their hearts "correct."¹⁰² Japanese culture and art, it was believed, could cultivate beautiful hearts, promote preparedness in Japanese people, and comfort the weary. Through study of culture and art, people could have hearts like those of the Japanese and be able to endure a long war.¹⁰³ Thus psychological fortitude was said to come through Japaneseness and Japanese sensibilities.

The link between emotional preparedness and the war effort was most direct in the act of volunteering. Even prior to the institution of conscription, the volunteer system was already churning out thousands of Taiwanese soldiers for the Japanese. According to Zhou Wanyao, "in

¹⁰¹ Kōmin Bunkō Kankōkai, *Taiwan kōmin dokuhon*, 1–23.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 98–99.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 169.

1942, 425,921 Taiwanese, or 14 percent of the male population, turned in applications for one thousand or so volunteer slots. The second round of the army volunteer program had even more applications - 601,147 applicants for the same number of slots.”¹⁰⁴ While some applicants submitted applications knowing they would be turned down, the performative act of “volunteering” was important for Taiwanese men at this time. For the Japanese state, volunteers had to be fortified further with the specialized reader, the *Taiwan Volunteer Soldier Reader*. For these men, mundane life was over. Their instructions were almost entirely in the spiritual and emotional realm. Reproduced in the *Taiwan Volunteer Soldier Reader* were the “Instructions for the Battlefield (*Senjinkun* 戦陣訓),” a code of military ethics issued by Prime Minister Tōjō in 1941.¹⁰⁵ The instructions were divided into three parts, and their section headings illustrate the emphasis on intangible emotional qualities. Part 1 covers the imperial nation, the imperial military, military discipline, cohesiveness, cooperation, attack spirit, and belief in certain victory. Part 2 includes respect for the gods, filial piety, respectful and proper actions, the way of compatriots, leading by example, responsibility, views of life and death, cherishing one's name, fortitude and vigor, and incorruptibility. Finally, Part 3 has some practical advice for military life,

¹⁰⁴ Zhou, “The Kōminka Movement in Taiwan and Korea,” 64.

¹⁰⁵ Ian Dear and Michael R. D. Foot, eds., *The Oxford Companion of World War II* (The Easton Press, 2006), 476.

with more specific admonishments and norms for being on the battlefield.¹⁰⁶

“Instructions for the Battlefield” deserves closer examination for a few reasons. First, it is important that this text was distributed to all imperial soldiers. Even though the Japanese still implicitly distrusted the Taiwanese and usually sent them to Southeast Asia rather than to China, Taiwanese soldiers were receiving psychological training that was at least similar to that given to the Japanese on the front. Second, possession of many of the qualities listed above promoted solidarity with one’s fellow soldiers, the army, and ultimately the imperial nation. Traits such as “attack spirit” and the elaboration of “view of life and death” as “[possession of] the self-effacing public service spirit, the grandness of which transcends life and death” reinforced the notion that the individual life was of no consequence. In Japanese wartime propaganda, “transcendence of life and death” usually encouraged one to live *toward* death, which was painted in layers of flowery language.

In the *Taiwan Volunteer Soldier Reader*, there is a section bearing the same name as the book. While this was written from the perspective of Japanese authorities, it is interesting for the sample questions it provides to help volunteers study for the oral examinations that determined eligibility. It was observed in 1942 that while Taiwanese volunteers were enthusiastic, their oral

¹⁰⁶ Tōjō Hideki, “Senjinkun 戦陣訓 [Instructions for the battlefield],” in *Taiwan shiganhei dokuhon* 台湾志願兵讀本 [*Taiwan volunteer soldier reader*] (Taihoku: Tōdō shoseki kabushiki gaisha, 1942), 1–15.

examination results were not satisfactory because their understanding of “national essence” was superficial.¹⁰⁷ However, the *Reader* also noted with some relief, “everyone clearly understands that they are subjects of the imperial nation. Even those who could not explain the Yamato Spirit insisted on the belief that they possessed it as Japanese men.”¹⁰⁸ In other words, everyone knew the correct answer, even if some could not demonstrate the logical steps to reach it. The understanding of appropriate performance, at least, meant that a Taiwanese person could meet the minimum standards for imperial subjecthood.

In general, examples from the oral examinations were divided into four categories for the four types of applicants: aborigines, primary school graduates, secondary school graduates, and graduates of higher education. Aborigines were given the easiest questions, which could be answered without in-depth knowledge of Japanese discourse, while those who had received more education were supposed to know specific national holidays, the reason for worshiping at Shinto shrines, why Germany lost the First World War, and the meaning of military spirit.¹⁰⁹ For instance, one exchange between an examiner and an aborigine applicant went as follows, “Q:

¹⁰⁷ Tōdō shoseki kabushiki gaisha, “Taiwan shiganhei dokuhon 台湾志願兵読本 [Taiwan volunteer soldier reader],” in *Taiwan shiganhei dokuhon* 台湾志願兵読本 [*Taiwan volunteer soldier reader*] (Taihoku: Tōdō shoseki kabushiki gaisha, 1942), 1–2.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 9, 22–25.

America and England are large and wealthy. Do you think that Japan can win the war? A: I think Japan can win the war. Everyone in the Japanese army is brave and no one would surrender. Since the people are loyal and righteous with great patriotic hearts, with a hundred million people of the same heart (*ichioku isshin* 一億一心), we will certainly win the war.”¹¹⁰ This response only utilized one specific catchphrase, and provided a fairly straightforward explanation of the belief of certain victory. Questions for graduates of higher education were more difficult: “Q: Was the special volunteer soldier system implemented [in Taiwan] because there are not enough soldiers in the Japanese military? A: No. Since the nearly fifty years of [Japanese] rule in Taiwan have effectively trained Taiwanese as imperial subjects, the Emperor allowed this system because of his benevolent belief in universal brotherhood” (*isshidōjin no oomigokoro* 一視同仁の大御心).¹¹¹ This question not only required a negative answer, but expected the applicant to cite policy referring to the Emperor that was unrelated to the question at hand. These questions make it clear that the Japanese education system, especially in wartime, was geared toward teaching the Taiwanese to perform patriotic—although sometimes counterintuitive—mental exercises.

As these texts show, Japanese propagandists sought outward expressions of patriotism,

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 11.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 24.

which took many forms and were expected of all segments of society. It attempted to inspire the Taiwanese to take personal possession of Japanese spiritual and emotional characteristics, thus ensuring that appropriate performances would follow. But to what extent did Japan achieve its goal of psycho-political hegemony over the Taiwanese? In the remaining sections of this chapter I will use diaries from elites and oral histories from common people to answer this question, exploring the extent to which behavioral conformity indicated emotional conformity in a wartime colonial context.

Elite Diaries: Alongside Japan with Emotions or Rationality

The two Taiwanese diarists I will examine in this section are Lin Xiantang and Wu Xinrong, who wrote between 1937 and 1945. At this point, unlike in the prewar period, colonial policies and state agents had become intrusive. Gone were the days when elites could be indifferent about the Japanese regime. In the wartime, the Japanese state evidently had become more demanding of the Taiwanese individuals it considered influential in mobilizing the rest of the population. Thus, even though elite diaries are not representative of the views of all Taiwanese at the time, the experiences recorded by Lin and Wu can still shed light on how intellectuals responded to the onslaught of Japanese imperialization policies.

Lin Xiantang (1881-1956) lived in present day Wufeng Township in central Taiwan, and

maintained a diary between 1927 and 1955. Earlier sections of Lin's diary were examined in the previous chapter. Before 1937, he had on occasion voiced his hopes for Japanese rule in Taiwan, and sought to maintain Chinese culture in Taiwan. After 1937, the Japanese government sought to use his influence to promote its own ends, occasionally foisting upon him political tasks which he found distasteful.

The onset of war between Japan and China affected Lin's political position and cultural identity. When several Chinese cities had fallen by the end of 1937, it became clear that China was unable to cope with the Japanese military threat. Watching the developments in China, Lin referred to the Japanese army as "our army (*wojun* 我軍)," but he also wrote letters to his sons telling them that if the conflict between Japan and China is not quickly resolved, they should all be very careful about their words in public assemblies.¹¹² Chinese weakness also made China difficult to support. Lin wrote in his diary on the last day of 1937, "Chiang has declared a long-term resistance, but it is not known what kind of power he has to resist. Alas!"¹¹³ In a wartime context, fence-sitters could not last long, due to rapidly escalating *kōminka* efforts and propaganda by Japan. The formal beginning of the war seemed to force Lin into choosing a side,

¹¹² Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 9 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2000), 240–241.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 9:422.

as he came to understand that his previous position as a politically ambivalent intellectual could no longer be maintained.

Lin's diary began to describe shortages as early as June 1938. "It has not even been one year of war, and the lack of material resources has become more serious," he wrote, "if the war lasts another two years, who knows to what extent it will reach."¹¹⁴ Indeed, life was increasingly disrupted by wartime measures such as blackouts, frequent ceremonious rituals, and other policies that caused Lin tremendous personal and financial difficulties.¹¹⁵ Money was tight for several reasons. The police were given quotas of gold to buy from the Taiwanese people, but the Lins were unable to produce their allotted quota, and were forced to buy it from others for a higher price to sell to the government. New rice price controls and the enforced Patriotic Savings were also counted as losses.¹¹⁶

As a part of the *kōminka* movement, government officials and police officers frequently visited Lin because of his stature as a member of the literati elite with local influence to ask him to change his name and serve as an example to the other Taiwanese. Since his name Lin

¹¹⁴ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 10 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2000), 157.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 10:32, 112.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10:153, 201.

happened to use a Chinese character that could be pronounced as Hayashi, a Japanese surname, he dismissed them by saying, “There are many Japanese people with the surname Hayashi, and mine is already the same, there is no need to change it.”¹¹⁷ On this point, he was absolutely resolute, even when he agreed to participate in ceremonies or give public speeches that affirmed the official position. One week after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Lin gave a speech in which he conceded that Japan had no choice but to go to war and called on the Japanese to guide the Taiwanese as one would a dull younger brother.¹¹⁸

Moreover, Lin seemed to accept intellectually Japanese discourse quite readily. The day after Pearl Harbor, he spoke about the attack’s success to friends who came to visit, telling them that “British and American bravery and agility is indeed not as great as that of the Japanese. If the war can be short, victory will belong to Japan.”¹¹⁹ Though his strategic analysis might have been shared even by some American military commanders in the dark final days of 1941, his comments about the spiritual qualities of the Japanese indicate that he may have given in and internalized state propaganda at least to a small extent in Japan’s moment of triumph. As the war

¹¹⁷ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 12 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2006), 335.

¹¹⁸ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 13 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2007), 415.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13:409.

began to turn against Japan, he privately agreed with his brother that Taiwan should work with Japan to avoid defeat. Lin wanted to impress the governor-general with his sincerity to counter what he perceived as the Taiwanese people's reputation as rumor-mongers.¹²⁰ Even though he had no Japanese identity and still saw the Japanese as colonizers, there was a sense of the inevitable entwining of the fates of Taiwan and Japan, and thus Lin believed it was necessary for them to stand together. In other words, Lin chose to align his Taiwanese identity pragmatically with the Japanese Empire as a political entity. When the draft was instituted in September 1943, Lin said in his diary that he believed it to be honorable for the Taiwanese people to carry out their obligations, and even telephoned Governor-General Hasegawa and other high officials to express his congratulations.¹²¹ As far as is possible to tell from the diary entry, these actions were voluntary and might even be said to come "from the heart."

Still, Lin's abilities as a writer caused trouble with the colonial government. He spent the month of June 1942 trying to control the political damage he suffered after writing a literary travel piece in which he had offhandedly remarked that the British royalty were friendly to their people. He also wrote, "In the future, Britain may be the monarchy with greatest longevity,"

¹²⁰ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 15 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2008), 311.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 15:323.

comparing it to other monarchies, even though he did not intend that comparison to include the Japanese Empire. A reader had reported this article to the police, accusing Lin of over-praising the enemy.¹²² The local magistrate told him to write a new article to “clarify” that British civilization was past its golden age and in decline; later it was decided that Lin would write a piece titled “Our Awakening at the Great East Asian War” to atone for this mistake.¹²³ In another instance, when the passenger ship Takachiho Maru was sunk by the Allied Powers in the spring of 1943, Lin’s nieces died in the attack.¹²⁴ Lin wrote a poem eulogizing them, but censors kept it out of the newspaper, and Lin wrote in his diary, “I almost could not sleep thinking about this.”¹²⁵ Presumably the government wanted more time to deal with the killing of civilians, or it did not want newspaper readers to know the extent of the enemy’s success. Still, in this case, literary expression of emotions was suppressed, demonstrating the government’s awareness that these emotions could have a negative impact on readers.

This incident probably reinforced Lin’s belief that Japan’s defeat would cause adverse consequences for Taiwan, and beginning in 1944 Lin’s diary recorded more instances of active

¹²² Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 14 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2007), 156, 165.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 14:157, 168.

¹²⁴ Lin, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji*, 15:113.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 15:133.

and public assistance for the war effort. It was quite telling that in May 1944 he confided in his diary that while the government was very concerned with constructing a “spiritual fortress,” Taiwanese commoners did not understand the times and therefore did not cooperate, so speeches should be given to the public to inspire them.¹²⁶ These notions offer compelling evidence that even if Lin had not fully accepted the content of Japanese discourse, he had come to follow its practice, believing that understanding would be a direct link to cooperation. Furthermore, after the fall of Saipan and the subsequent mass suicide on the island, Lin paid a visit to Governor-General Hasegawa to express how the event “intensely moved (*ganji* 感激)” him.¹²⁷ This episode occupied only a few words in his diary, but it was a voluntary visit, and choice of using the term “intensely moved” seems to be in line with the official position that the suicides in Saipan were voluntary and honorable.

By 1945, wartime life in Taiwan had also become desperate. Lin records instances of grain hoarding, lack of wood for coffins, and incendiary bombs falling in central Taiwan to the point that the sound of bombs was almost constant.¹²⁸ In May, when the governor-general

¹²⁶ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 16 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2008), 172.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 16:247.

¹²⁸ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji* 灌園先生日記 [*The Diary of Lin Xiantang*], vol. 17 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwanshi yanjiusuo choupeichu, 2008), 54, 92, 147, 170.

requested the opinions of Taiwanese on efforts to achieve defensive self-sufficiency on the island

by consolidating local efforts, Lin responded with the following points:

1. While the Taiwanese people are thankful that Taiwan will receive better treatment, Japanese attitudes among the bureaucrats and people in leadership positions have not changed, and this is an obstacle to the spirit of combining Japanese and Taiwanese efforts.
2. Taiwanese deserters are uneducated, untrained, and do not know Japanese. They cannot bear harsh treatment in the army camps, so they must be guided with love.
3. The volunteer teams are only paper organizations, and should be combined with the police force for defense and security maintenance.
4. Food should be dispersed for safekeeping in response to the incendiary bombs. Each person should be given more than one or two months' rations.
5. The production [of food] from different areas should be coordinated.¹²⁹

Lin's advice was earnest and humble as he gingerly embraced the Japanese cause. Even while speaking to the Governor-General about the adverse conditions the Japanese war was bringing to Taiwan, Lin still wanted the Taiwanese people to have the opportunity to improve their situation, and he still believed Taiwan's fate was tied to that of Japan. Lin's recommendations were made out of concern for Taiwan's welfare, and he was unable to see a future for Taiwan without the colonizers.

Either way, these suggestions came too late. In early August 1945, the governor-general was still telling the Taiwanese people that even though Japan was being bombed, they should not fear and must have faith in certain victory.¹³⁰ Amidst this increasingly hollow rhetoric, on August 15 the Emperor gave his radio address announcing Japan's surrender. Lin expressed

¹²⁹ Lin, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji*, 17:161.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 17:235.

surprise when conversing with his relatives regarding how fast the surrender came, and commented in his diary, “Alas! A territory forged from military force for fifty years is also lost to military force.”¹³¹

After the war, Lin was immediately contacted by the Kuomintang to help turn over Taiwan to the Republic of China. After the February 28 Incident of 1947 (a Taiwanese uprising against KMT rule that ended in bloody suppression), he maintained a position as a provincial legislator but became dissatisfied with the KMT. Lin finally moved to Japan in September 1949 under the pretext of seeking treatment for chronic dizziness. Political turmoil in Taiwan made it impossible for him to return, and he finally passed away in September 1956.¹³² It was perhaps ironic that Lin, who stubbornly refused to adopt a Japanese identity while living as a colonized subject, could only seek refuge in the arms of the former colonizer to avoid yet another authoritarian power.

The diary of Wu Xinrong represents a very different Taiwanese elite position. Wu lived in the southern Taiwanese city of Tainan between 1907 and 1967, and kept a diary in Japanese from 1923 to 1967. According to his son, diaries only remain from 1933 to 1967, and the one for 1934 was thrown away after becoming unreadable because it was buried under a tree for

¹³¹ Ibid., 17:245.

¹³² Xu, “<Guanyuan xiansheng riji> de shiliao jiazhi,” (4)–(5).

safekeeping.¹³³ Wu studied at a medical school in Japan and worked as a doctor in Tainan, and was interested in literature. As Lo Ming-cheng's study of Taiwanese doctors shows, Taiwanese doctors trained in Japan had a unique position as "in-betweens" in relation to their Taiwanese patients and the colonial government, and their profession enabled them to appreciate "colonial modernity."¹³⁴ Unlike Lin, who was part of the old entrenched literati whose positions were based on learning and landholdings, Wu's socioeconomic status was tied to his profession, which was inherently bound up in a specialized colonial relationship with Japan. His attitudes toward colonial subjecthood, then, were also quite different from those of Lin.

Compared to Lin, who was born in 1881, Wu found it much more natural to "be Japanese" because he was born under Japanese rule. In early 1938 he wrote, "come to think of it, since I was born, I have been a person under Japanese rule, and in the first half of my life I was completely educated in Japanese. This is a significant fact, causing me to speak Japanese and write in Japanese."¹³⁵ He not only felt that he was Japanese, but in the privacy of his diary he even asserts, "we are Taiwanese people who have been assimilated out of convenience and

¹³³ Wu Nantu, "Xu 序 [Preface]," in *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 1 (Tainan Shi: Guo li Tiawan wen xue guan, 2007), 9.

¹³⁴ Lo, *Doctors within Borders*.

¹³⁵ Wu Xinrong, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 2 (Tainan: Guoli Taiwan wenxueguan, 2007), 181–182.

necessity. No one can deny that we are Japanese. Perhaps the Japanese people before the formation of the Yamato race were almost like this!”¹³⁶ Wu wanted to equate the Taiwanese with the Japanese, but conceded that the Taiwanese had not quite achieved the same level of civilization, and so he suggested to himself that perhaps the Taiwanese people were fledgling Japanese. Wu made these political statements to no one but himself. While being a doctor certainly brought with it material benefits and elevated status in Taiwan, it is interesting that these statements show him identifying with the Japanese in an abstract sense. Rather than being someone who cynically reaped the benefits while nursing anti-Japanese feelings, it might be safe to say that the Japanese education of emotions worked effectively on him.

Many other passages in Wu’s diary show his direct responses to Japanese appeals to emotion. He saw one national policy film (*kokusaku eiga* 国策映画) that moved him to tears in the theater, and he afterward wrote “I finally understood that before I knew it, I had fully become Japanese. Or perhaps the warmhearted humanity of the Oriental type (*Tōyōteki ninjōmi* 東洋的人情味) matched my own nostalgia?”¹³⁷ While it was unclear what he meant by “nostalgia”—perhaps a nostalgia for his years spent in Japan—here was another statement in

¹³⁶ Ibid., 2:192.

¹³⁷ Wu Xinrong, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 3 (Tainan: Guoli Taiwan wenxueguan, 2007), 239.

which Wu self-identified as Japanese. Later Wu saw a German propaganda film and cried again; he attributed his emotional reaction to his Japaneseness.¹³⁸ It is interesting that rather than referring to his personal sensitivity as a writer or to some other past experience to explain his feelings, he always attributed his emotional outbursts to being Japanese.

If Wu believed himself to be Japanese, the theory was that he would also enact corresponding actions, which would in turn reproduce patriotic feelings. In one May 1938 entry, he recorded that he had replaced the images of traditional Chinese gods, Guanyin and Buddha, with an image of the Meiji Emperor, replaced another painting with the Japanese flag, and replaced Buddhist couplets with the Imperial Rescript of Education. After his clearing away of Chinese cultural expressions, he stated in his diary, “for this reasonable, unique, and voluntary improvement, I felt satisfied. Strengthening life with national character makes tiny personal emotions meaningless. We must submit voluntarily, rather than being forced, and this is an element in the pursuit of a certain degree of beauty and truth.”¹³⁹ Thus Wu voluntarily remade his home to be Japanese, thereby following one significant aspect of the *kōminka* movement – the removal of Taiwanese religious practices.

¹³⁸ Wu Xinrong, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 4 (Tainan: Guoli Taiwan wenxueguan, 2007), 279.

¹³⁹ Wu, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji*, 2:270.

From the perspective of *kōminka*, Wu was almost a perfect Taiwanese imperial subject. He wrote his diary in Japanese, and was certainly fluent in the national language. He came close to participating in the name-changing campaign, devoting many pages in his diary over several years to mulling over what name he should choose for himself, and which new Japanese names should be given to his children. Furthermore, his diary showed that he was trying to become psychologically prepared for the possibility that he might be drafted, not for the use of his medical expertise, but as a soldier to fight.¹⁴⁰ Ultimately, his own words showed that he had to a great extent accepted the wartime discourse of the Japanese state.

Wu's diary frequently replicated what he read in newspapers about certain victory. In early 1939 he wrote with vicarious awe, "Japan has taken Manchuria and subjugated China; Germany has annexed Austria and conquered Czechoslovakia. Without question, these two nations could be said to be powerful nations that divide the world into east and west and control the world of tomorrow. For us to be born in this period, as bystanders, we should feel this is sufficient."¹⁴¹ Even though he had already begun to complain about wartime shortages, of which as a doctor with special needs such as medicine and gasoline for house calls he was acutely aware, Wu concluded, "At any rate, this is what has been caused by a long-term war, a modern

¹⁴⁰ Wu, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji*, 2:308.

¹⁴¹ Wu, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji*, 3:211–212.

war, and a total war. We can still withstand this kind of material lack; spiritual lack is still our greatest worry.”¹⁴² Wu’s abstract interest in the war caused him to view newspaper reports uncritically as he looked forward to the promised victory. As a result, early Japanese victories in the Pacific buoyed Wu’s spirits. He cheerfully parroted Japanese propaganda after the attack on Pearl Harbor, saying, “this massive operation crossing the Pacific Ocean is enough to prove the greatness of the Japanese Navy.”¹⁴³ Wu also believed the Japanese racial discourse, expressing exhilaration as Southeast Asian cities fell to the Japanese in the spring of 1942. He wrote regarding Batavia: “This initial base of white pioneers in the Orient was under white men’s control for over 300 years, and it has finally fallen. Japan has taken Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, and Batavia, and one could say that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is complete.”¹⁴⁴ Japanese victories made it easy for Wu to support Japan because its assertions were coming true.

As Japan’s military fortunes declined, however, everyday life was affected by the necessity of public performances of patriotism as well as private coping with the realities of war.

¹⁴² Wu, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji*, 4:179.

¹⁴³ Wu Xinrong, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 5 (Tainan: Guoli Taiwan wenxueguan, 2007), 286.

¹⁴⁴ Wu Xinrong, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 6 (Tainan: Guoli Taiwan wenxueguan, 2007), 223.

In May 1943, having been appointed to deliver the oath at a ceremony celebrating institution of the navy volunteer system, Wu said, “I have never experienced such a tense and somber atmosphere as at this ceremony.”¹⁴⁵ The purpose of these Japanese ceremonies was to further motivate people, thereby reinforcing the cycle of emotional zeal for the war. After Japan lost a number of islands in the Pacific, and especially after the fall of Saipan, Wu became concerned about the outcome of the war. Nonetheless, in his mind he still stood with Japan, writing, “The Pacific front is also approaching a decisive moment... In this way, Taiwan is the crucial point that determines the fate of East Asia. Thus, the government is calling for ‘fortification of the whole island,’ and in fact it is already underway. In this time of destiny, what do we have to fear? We have to understand this.”¹⁴⁶ Even though Wu did not volunteer for the army and was not drafted, one of his brothers died while serving in the military, and another brother was sent to the front. Although he mourned his brother, Wu believed it right for his other brother to go to war to avenge his brother.¹⁴⁷ Rationalizing war with this desire for revenge signaled a departure from his earlier belief in the righteousness of Japanese war.

¹⁴⁵ Wu Xinrong, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 7 (Tainan: Guoli Taiwan wenxueguan, 2007), 175.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 7:432.

¹⁴⁷ Wu Xinrong, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 8 (Tainan: Guoli Taiwan wenxueguan, 2007), 89.

Near the end of the war, Wu complained often of the psychological stress caused by air raids. Bombs fell all over Taiwan; one heard of air raids in conversations with friends and relatives, and often one directly heard planes overhead. Daily life was completely disrupted because many people were forced to spend all their time building air raid shelters. This was a wartime requirement enforced by the government, and needless to say people worried about their personal safety and strove to protect themselves. In turn, air raids and incendiary bombs resulted in daily uncertainty, and may have stoked anger with the Allies among some Taiwanese people. Indeed, Wu noted his belief that the indiscriminate incendiary bombing of small towns in Taiwan demonstrated the “enemy’s bestial character.”¹⁴⁸

On the morning of August 15, 1945, Wu heard that there would be a major radio announcement at noon, but his radio did not work that day; he did not hear the shocking news of the surrender until that evening, when he went to look for his friends.¹⁴⁹ The next day, in an interesting and symbolic act of shedding his Japaneseness, he went swimming with some friends, and shouted at the sea, “We are about to start our new lives!”¹⁵⁰ After the war, he switched back to Chinese in his diaries, and attempted to participate in politics under the KMT regime.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 8:153.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 8:171.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 8:174.

However, he was in and out of jail for political reasons on a few occasions, and ultimately returned to working in his clinic while writing literature and helping to publish local gazetteers. He passed away at the age of 61 of heart problems.¹⁵¹

These diarists allow us to measure wartime responses based on personal backgrounds. With his background in the Chinese literary tradition, Lin gradually came to internalize the impotence of Taiwanese political ventures and had little choice other than to gingerly promote the Japanese cause. Without knowing how international politics would function after the war, Lin believed that a positive outcome of the war for Japan would translate to a positive outcome for Taiwan. Wu's age and greater immersion in the Japanese cultural policies imbued him with a sense of genuine affinity with the Japanese, even as he occupied the subordinate colonized position. His writing showed his that his feelings rose and fell with Japan's military success or failure, and that Japanese education taught him the correspondence between emotions and Japan's destiny. The distinctions between Lin and Wu can be found in the level of emotional engagement with the Japanese Empire.

For both Lin and Wu, however, there remained significant ambiguity in their actions and thoughts during the wartime under Japanese rule. Neither openly challenged the ruling regime,

¹⁵¹ Wu Xinrong, *Wu Xinrong riji quanji* 吳新榮日記全集 [*The complete diary of Wu Xinrong*], vol. 1 (Tainan: Guoli Taiwan wenxueguan, 2007), 373-379.

even though both left written evidence denouncing the reality of war. Their actions after the end of the war also illuminate their attitudes toward Japanese rule. In his political pragmatism, Lin immediately and willingly worked with the KMT in seeking to improve the lives of his fellow Taiwanese; while Wu's reaction was an emotional and symbolic withdrawal as he discarded the Japanese identity and slipped into Chineseness. Educated elites such as these men were in a unique position in colonial society, with greater resources enabling them to think critically about the war and to commit their thoughts to paper. But for common people without the benefit of learning, wealth, leisure, or even adequate food in the wartime—many of whom became direct participants in the war—experiences were different.

Ordinary People Caught in Extraordinary Times

The difference between the educated elites and the ordinary people was that ordinary people directly participated in war as soldiers. Without money, young men were obliged to volunteer for the military, both to perform their patriotic duty and to gain material benefits for themselves or their families from the colonial government. Unlike the Taiwanese elites who had the leisure of writing in their diaries as they conversed with the colonial authorities, ordinary Taiwanese people were compelled to enlist out of financial necessity and the influence of socialization from schools. Without a solid grasp on a Chinese cultural and political identity, the

ordinary people were more susceptible to Japanese cultural policies, and many were affectively influenced by Japanese socialization. Young Taiwanese men in their 20s in the 1940s had been socialized as Japanese for their entire lives. As we have seen, Japanese cultural policies imbued patriotism with significant moral and nationalistic meaning, then designated patriotism as an integral part of the imperial subject identity. As a result, for Taiwanese people at the time, living in Japanese-ruled Taiwan as obedient and zealous imperial subjects was a source of great honor.

A phrase frequently used to represent the wartime in Japanese discourse was “extraordinary times” (*hijō jiki* 非常時期), which was synonymous with endurance and sacrifice. After the war, a number of oral histories were published in Taiwan in which wartime memories were revisited. The common Taiwanese people had diverse emotional and intellectual reactions to Japanese rule, and sometimes these reactions were quite unpredictable, even surprising to the people who experienced them. By and large, postwar efforts at conducting interviews for oral history purposes were generally focused on the Taiwanese people who volunteered or were drafted into the Imperial Forces. There are relatively few compilations of stories told by women or those who were not directly involved in the war. However, it is still possible to learn about the lives of ordinary people from these accounts.

In a volume titled *Local Administration in Taiwan under Japanese Rule*, personal narratives of civilians represented various ways of thinking about identity. I reviewed these

interviews to get an idea of how the interviewees felt about Japan, and to what extent they were indeed “imperialized.” Although these are postwar accounts mediated by memory and regime changes, we can at least know that the statements are what the interviewees wanted readers in the late 1990s to know about their experiences under Japanese rule. From an emotional standpoint, these narratives are important because they reveal not only actions they took in response to the wartime difficulties, but also the feelings that motivated them to take such actions. The stories of ordinary people also show that the influence of Japanese cultural policies was uneven, producing different levels of ambiguity in Taiwanese subjects.

These accounts showed different permutations of emotions and performance, but the ordinary people generally exhibited a greater degree of being emotionally moved by Japanese policies. For instance, one man identified himself as Taiwanese while under Japanese rule even though his family all spoke Japanese and wanted Japan to win the war. He himself still felt conflicted because of “blood ties” to China.¹⁵² Another man seems to have held fast to his Chinese identity, saying, “even though I was born in Taiwan, my ancestors came from the Mainland. Actually, where’s the identity problem? Taiwanese people are Chinese people, because the ancestors came from the Mainland, so of course I see myself as Chinese. Even during the

¹⁵² Cai Huiyu, ed., *Rizhi shidai Taiwan de jiezhuang xingzheng* 日治時代台灣的街庄行政 [*Local administration in Taiwan under Japanese rule*] (Taichung: Taizhong xianli wenhua zhongxin, 1997), 46.

Japanese period I did not think I was Japanese. In the end, it's that [I am] 'Chinese by blood, just living in Taiwan.' That's all.”¹⁵³ This is a very strong response that seemingly rejected even the suggestion of Taiwanese and Japanese identities. Yet another civilian was rather blasé about regime changes, saying, “after the war I changed from Japanese into Chinese, but this fact did not cause me too much psychological trouble or problems in adaptation; my life was mostly the same as in the past. But if I can choose, I want to be Taiwanese, because the Japanese oppressed us, and we have a language barrier with the Mainlanders, who also oppressed us.”¹⁵⁴ His nonchalance in a context where he had no real choice over the political situation was probably similar to what many civilians felt. The lack of options for the majority of Taiwanese living under Japanese rule was probably a major factor that prompted so many simply to be involved in the war effort.

Those who did respond to the call of the wartime Japanese government to leave Taiwan and join the cause can be divided roughly into workers and soldiers. While in many cases the Japanese state promised similar financial incentives for both, the decision to sign up as a worker or soldier involved different calculations. A documentary film made in 2007 titled *Emerald Horizon* (its English title is *Shonenko*, or “Young Workers”) consisted of interviews with a dozen

¹⁵³ Ibid., 79.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 98.

Taiwanese men who were anywhere between 13 and 20 in the last three years of the war and who worked in aircraft factories in Japan, either because they volunteered or because they were pressured to volunteer.¹⁵⁵ Over 8,400 Taiwanese youths were sent to Factory C in Kanagawa Prefecture between 1943 and 1944. One such youth, named Jiang Fushen, gave a succinct list of reasons for actively wanting to go to Japan for this work: “Japanese education was very successful, and they told great things to the kids. My teacher at the time told me that I could study and build planes at the same time, and then in five years I could become a technician. At the time, most families in rural Taiwan were poor, and we did not know what we would do after graduation, so this brought me great confidence as a kid, and I really hoped to go.” One boy stole his father’s seal to forge parental permission; he said that he had heard many good things about being recruited to work, and wanted to go out of vanity. It is perhaps unsurprising that young boys, having been told throughout their formative years that Japan was the place to be, would impulsively want to identify with Japan, or at least the opportunities exclusively present in Japan.

However, there were also examples in the documentary of “being volunteered.” One interviewee recalled wistfully that while he wanted to stay home and farm, “we were smacked by the teacher, so we had to volunteer.” Another said that his school withheld student diplomas until

¹⁵⁵ Guo Liangyin, *Lü de haipingxian - shaoniangong* 綠的海平線- 少年工 [Emerald Horizon - Shonenko's Stories] DVD, Documentary, 2007.

the students volunteered to fight or work. This informant, preferring the option with a smaller chance of death, said, “if I had become a reserve cadre, after I got out they would have certainly sent me to China. So when I went to [the factory site], I was thinking that if I am going to die anyway, I would rather die in Japan than in a foreign country.” Indeed, when the military conscription program began in 1945, it prompted another wave of volunteers for the work program.

Upon arriving at their main training facility and plane construction base in Kanagawa, however, the conscripted laborers realized that building planes was not as glamorous as their teachers had made it out to be. One young man finally realized it was a mistake to have gone to Japan after he was repeatedly beaten in the course of military training. Japanese winters were harsh for Taiwanese boys used to the subtropical climate, and they were made to take off their clothing as “training” as well. The documentary also contained footage from the factory, in which a Japanese trainer shouted at the young workers, “if you are so afraid of hitting your fingers with the hammer, how can you use the hammer to break the skulls of Roosevelt and Churchill? Even though you might smash your finger, you must use all your strength to slam down the hammer!” In this way, trainers were attempting to inspire the young workers by equating the hammering of rivets and bolts into planes with the smashing of foreign enemies, and again with a self-effacing overtone. Over and over again, Japanese voices of authority told

individuals that their physical bodies were of little consequence in the context of the war.

Even though many were promised a work-study program with only five days of work a week, near the end of the war factories were operating 24 hours a day. In addition to the difficult and tedious work, the Taiwanese youths also had to cope with dangerous air raids, which often targeted factories. On December 18, 1944, a major air strike killed many Taiwanese and Japanese workers at the factory, and later an underground factory was constructed to avoid further loss of life and resources.

Taiwanese workers reacted to the news of the war's end with divergent feelings. A few recalled that they cried, most were shocked because they had always been told Japan would win, and some were happy that they would be able to go home. The Japanese workers could simply return home, but the Taiwanese workers had to remain at the factory to wait to be collected by the Allied forces. One Taiwanese boy said that a Chinese man came and gave them a copy of Sun Yat-sen's nationalist manifesto, *The Three People's Principles*, which caused him to "understand" that he was Chinese, and made him want to go home because he had nothing left at the factory. Taiwanese youths began to be repatriated in groups starting in December 1945, a few of them bringing back the ashes of classmates who had died, a moving image symbolic of Taiwan's position at the time, unsure if it had won or lost the war but mourning its dead either way.

Taiwanese men who became soldiers one way or another had different reasons to join the army and exhibited different degrees of acceptance of their roles as imperial subjects.¹⁵⁶ Many enlisted because they were promised financial support for their families. Others believed that they had to repay their mother country Japan, or simply that life would be better if they left Taiwan. A few simply said that they admired the way uniforms looked. The end result of enlisting, however, might be seen as demonstrating the success of the Japanese authorities in offering converging options. In essence, colonial authorities had created a solid foundation through cultural policies and education, and when the wartime conditions narrowed the range of choices of what men should do with their lives, it became “natural” for many to join the Japanese military.

However, some interviewees realized the discrepancy between what the Japanese state claimed and what actually transpired on the ground. One said, “When I was young I always wanted to be a true Japanese, and believed that Japan was the country of the gods. But in secondary school, I felt that the Taiwanese received differential treatment in food rationing and

¹⁵⁶ See Chen Pengren, *Shiji zhi zuji: Taiwanren Riben haijun zhiyuanbing* 世紀之足跡: 台灣人日本海軍志願兵 [*The century's traces: Taiwanese imperial volunteer navy*] (Taipei: Zhiliang chubanshe, 2007); Lin Jintian, ed., *Shanghen xielei: zhanhou yuan Taiji guojun koushu lishi* 傷痕血淚: 戰後原臺籍國軍口述歷史 [*Scars, blood, and tears: postwar oral histories of Taiwanese Nationalist soldiers*] (Nantou: Guoshiguan Taiwan wenxianguan, 2006); Zheng, *Taiwanren ribenbing de zhanzheng jingyan*.

the examination system, and I asked myself whether the Taiwanese people were subjected to this fate because they were incompletely imperialized.”¹⁵⁷ Taiwanese people who had been educated by the Japanese inevitably wondered whether they measured up to Japan, which had always told them that it was the center of their civilization. Thus, this sense of inferiority drove some Taiwanese to try to live up to the standards that they imagined the Japanese imposed upon them. The emotional need for approval from the colonizers in the system they created could partially explain why there were many volunteers who sought to be impressive in their performance.

These short accounts showed that it was common for Japanese teachers to paint their students a picture of Japan or life in Japan that far exceeded real life anywhere. The significance of the “idea of Japan” as a driving force behind mobilization efforts cannot be overlooked. In the time of war, construction of Japan as an idea was also bound up in vague notions of honor, masculinity, and a future of peace that was to follow certain victory. One Taiwanese man recalled his Japanese teacher who told students that boys should join the army or else they would all be laughed at and not be able to marry well.¹⁵⁸ Certainly, the teacher had a grasp of youth psychology and was able to motivate young students by playing on their fears.

¹⁵⁷ Chen, *Shiji zhi zuji*, 128.

¹⁵⁸ Tang Xiyong and Chen Yiru, eds., *Taibeishi taiji ribing chafang zhuanji* 臺北市臺籍日兵查訪專輯 [Interviews with Taiwanese Imperial soldiers in Taipei] (Taipei: Taibeishi wenxian weiyuanhui, 2001), 190.

Of course, it is necessary to mention that other than those who were genuinely attracted to the visions imposed upon them by the Japanese and those who volunteered out of financial concern, there were people who were semi-coerced into volunteering. One Taiwanese man said, “Even though people volunteer, it was usually, if the Japanese said, ‘Hey! You look strong and healthy, are you willing to be a soldier or military worker?’ You had to say, ‘Ah! Yes! I really want to go, I am happy that I can go!’ You could not say no, or there would be trouble.”¹⁵⁹

Barely veiled by the discourse of “universal brotherhood” and “great Imperial benevolence” was the Japanese colonial apparatus that had the power to incentivize, cajole, and punish.

In the end, it might be said that the Japanese state was successful in convincing many Taiwanese people to fight a war that was not theirs. The inspiration aroused in some if not all Taiwanese by Japan’s state rhetoric, through education and other programs, points to the integral function of emotions in wartime mobilization. By presenting enlisting in the military—for reasons of honor, family finances, and personal fulfillment—to young men who had known little else but Japanese socialization as the best option, Japanese authorities aligned wartime mobilization with emotional choices, and were able to sway tens of thousands of Taiwanese men.

¹⁵⁹ Zheng, *Taiwanren ribenbing de zhanzheng jingyan*, 30.

Conclusion

In the wartime period, Japanese propaganda played a significant role in mobilizing the people. According to Barak Kushner, “the Japanese government also realized that effective propaganda did not grow out of explicit directives issued from its offices. Propaganda that could be counted on to mobilize had to ‘grasp the hearts and minds of the people,’ *minshin haaku* [民心把握].”¹⁶⁰ In addition to grasping the hearts and minds of the people by using school education, social education, and propaganda, the wartime conditions exerted different pressures on elites and ordinary people.

Between 1937 and 1945, Taiwan’s role in the Japanese Empire’s trajectory in the Pacific War was first as a base for southward expansion, then as a defensive stronghold as the Empire began to crumble. Throughout the wartime years, the Japanese consistently used the notion of “certain victory” to inspire faith, zeal, and sacrifice. As a narrative, “certain victory” itself was clearly untenable, arrogant, and dismissive of wartime reality. However, it is undeniable that it was as effective a mobilizing ideology in Taiwan as it was in Japan. Although “certain victory” demanded that imperial subjects offer up their livelihoods and lives, the Japanese state was generous in showering intangible honor upon those who complied.

In particular, the Japanese language was used as the central tool to mobilize the

¹⁶⁰ Kushner, *The Thought War*, 9.

Taiwanese people at this time. Outside of textbooks, newspapers praised Japanese victories but euphemized Japanese defeats as sublime manifestations of the pure Japanese spirit. Grassroots associations promoted by the government held sway over all men and women in society, providing not only lofty ideals for becoming good Japanese subjects but also promising tangible incentives such as increased rations or financial advantages. While remains of Taiwanese soldiers were being received at home with increasing frequency, the ideological system established by the Japanese became a self-sustaining one: Taiwanese realized they had little choice but to comply, because their fate was bound up with that of Japan. It is significant that the Japanese had found a way for the colonized people to perpetuate their own colonial condition, and it was through their hearts.

This sort of internal colonization was achieved through Japanese exploitation of the relationship between performativity and emotional identification. The state prescribed various types of performance, ranging from attending school, speaking Japanese, and singing military songs, to participating in patriotic ceremonies. For the Japanese state, making the Taiwanese people perform in these ways also put them on the path to internalizing the corresponding patriotic sentiments. During the wartime, the Japanese colonial authorities sought the performance of mobilization for war, for which segments of the population were fit into different roles that suited their abilities. Learned elites like Lin Xiantang were to publicly marshal support

for the empire, while ordinary teenage boys could build planes for military campaigns.

The wartime period of 1937-1945 represented a convergence of Japanese policy and rhetoric with wartime performance. The question about the extent to which Japan succeeded can be answered in terms of readiness and involvement. It is clear that in the prewar years, Japan dedicated its educational and cultural policies to fostering emotional affinity toward Japan among Taiwanese people while reminding them of the high likelihood of war. During the war, Japan rallied the elites to lend rhetorical support to the Japanese cause and marshaled the common people to contribute actively to the war effort. Despite the lingering ambiguities in personal emotions and identities, the performance of Taiwanese people supported the Japanese war effort.

Chapter 6: Rethinking Colonial Identity through Emotions

In 1944, the textbook *Elementary National Language* (*Shotōka kokugo*) was published for young Taiwanese students. It contained a lesson called “The Power of the National Language.”¹ This lesson encapsulates the Japanese vision of how language could be used to arouse emotion, which then could be converted to patriotic action. First, it attributes the transmission of knowledge in ethics, history, geography, arithmetic, science and music to the Japanese language. Second, it explains that since Japan has possessed an incomparable national essence from the time of the gods until now, its language is infused with the emotions and spirit of the Japanese people, and as a result, its use will enable one to become a true Japanese person. Third, Japanese is used to connect all the people of Japan (including the empire) as well as all of its history. Fourth, in perhaps the most self-evident combination of language and war, the lesson claims that when the country is in need, the one hundred million Japanese citizens will all hear the call to action, and become mobilized until they cry out “long live the Emperor” before becoming heroic spirits that protect the nation. In other words, “The national language is truly the crystallization of the Japanese spirit (*Nihon seishin* 日本精神) and the manifestation of the

¹ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Shotōka kokugo* 8, 7–9.

Yamato Damashii (大和魂).”² While “Japanese spirit” and “Yamato Damashii” can be used interchangeably, “Japanese spirit” has modern and inclusive connotations, while “Yamato Damashii” evokes an imagined ancient Japanese spirit empowered by the mystical beginnings of the Japanese race. The usage of both indicates a desire to validate both interpretations of Japaneseness. The lesson concludes by admonishing the reader to respect and love the national language, the utmost importance of which should have already become clear to the reader.

On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito read his surrender address on the radio, broadcast to all of his subjects. Its language was remarkably similar to the wartime rhetoric in its accentuation of Japanese spirituality and the oneness of its people. Emperor Hirohito spoke as if he were dispensing “imperial grace,” as he pacified his people by saying, “We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all ye, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictate of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.”³ Human emotions had a place after the war, just as in the rest of the Japanese colonial enterprise. However, since the people were now to be living under the American Occupation, the Emperor was telling his people to

² Ibid., 9.

³ Hirohito, “Imperial Rescript on Surrender - Wikisource,” trans. Hirakawa Tadaichi, *Wikisource*, September 1, 2010, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Imperial_Rescript_on_Surrender.

keep their feelings to themselves, persevering in their belief in a noble, divine, and glorious Japan while “enduring the unendurable.”

In his seminal work *The Intimate Enemy*, which examines the British colonization of Indian psychology and epistemology, Ashis Nandy takes one definition of colonialism to be “a shared culture which may not always begin with the establishment of alien rule in a society and end with the departure of the alien rulers from the colony.”⁴ The two sketches above indicate the emotional impact of colonialism, the way that feelings can be taught by the Japanese to the Taiwanese and subsequently converted into actions. In the first, while Japan maintained a tight grip on the education of Taiwan, it vested transcendent significance in the national language as a tool for moving emotions, and in turn for creating imperial subjecthood. In the second, the Emperor acknowledged that feelings for Japan now had to be quietly cherished after the disintegration of the Japanese Empire.

In the preceding chapters, this dissertation has assessed how cultural representations, pedagogy, and definitions of subjectivity were used by the Japanese to colonize Taiwanese psyches, against the backdrop of wartime mobilization. This dissertation has argued that

⁴ Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1983), 2.

emotions played a crucial role in Japan's colonization of Taiwan. Japan's instrumental view of emotions could be found in its official discourse and policy statements. In the stage of initial contact, the Japanese authorities used emotions first to establish contact with the Taiwanese people and simply open the door to assimilation, so that they would not quickly reject Japanese rule or resort to prolonged rebellion. Then, the Musha Incident in Taiwan and the rise of militarism in Japan forced the Japanese colonial government to tame or find a future outlet for violent Taiwanese emotions. Finally, open war between China and Japan necessitated the arousal of Taiwanese patriotism to motivate subjects to take appropriate action to defend the empire.

Some of the emotional and spiritual characteristics cultivated by Japanese education ran counter to the warlike nature of the mobilization campaign, yet this contradiction constituted the lived experience of many Taiwanese people. As these cultural policies were imposed upon Taiwanese people, they responded with a range of different opinions, some of which attested to the efficacy of education and propaganda. Elite diaries and oral histories allow us to paint in broad strokes the affective evolution of the Taiwanese people. While at the outset of Japanese colonization elite diaries exhibited uncertainty about Taiwan becoming a Japanese colony, by the end of Japan's fifty years in Taiwan the reach of Japanese cultural policies had at least convinced

many that it was in Taiwan's best interest for its citizens to be fully aligned with Japanese military and support operations.

In Chapter 1, I asked, "what did it mean to be an Imperial Subject?" and throughout the dissertation I have attempted to answer this question. Specifically, I was concerned with the arousal and construction of emotions of Taiwanese subjects by the Japanese colonial enterprise. In looking at official policy documents, newspaper articles, and textbooks taught in Taiwanese schools, I found that the Japanese state conceived of emotions as having a direct and causal relationship with colonial identity. In reading diaries and oral histories of the Taiwanese, I discovered that they carved out spaces that enabled the survival of their identities. As colonial identities are inherently hybrid, contested, and transnational, the Japanese seized upon the shaping of emotion as a transcendent common ground.

Japanese policies were concerned with Taiwanese feelings and sensibilities from the very beginning of colonial rule. When Japan annexed Taiwan, the initial wave of administrators was concerned first with being inoffensive conquerors, and second with bringing civilization and modernization to the Taiwanese people through education. Bilingual and trilingual textbooks used in Taiwan showed that Japanese authorities believed it was a priority to facilitate

communication between Taiwanese and Japanese. The Japanese textbooks were not only vehicles for language training, but also carried with them the Japanese vision of civilization and modernity for Taiwan, a vision that challenged the Chinese identity held by Taiwanese people of Chinese ancestry. Taiwanese people who underwent Japanese education were expected to accept the Japanese administration as legitimate and increasingly view themselves as Japanese subjects rather than Chinese settlers in Taiwan. Even though Japanese considered Taiwan uncivilized, they believed that this backwardness was a temporary condition that could be remedied under Japanese administration.

After ruling Taiwan for 35 years, the Japanese had pacified the Han population and expanded its civilization efforts to the aborigines in mountainous areas in Taiwan. Therefore, the Japanese were shocked when the Musha aborigines rose up and slaughtered more than a hundred Japanese. As Japanese administrators responded the Musha Incident, which destabilized the image of solid rule in Taiwan, they took discursive control as the official narrators of the event. Aside from decisively crushing the Seediq tribe that led the uprising, Japanese authorities disseminated the official story of the Musha Incident through newspapers and compiled volumes that emphasized the anger of martial aborigines as well as the sympathy of the Taiwanese and Japanese people toward the Japanese victims. These interpretations of the Musha Incident

focused on the emotional dimension to distract readers from thinking more deeply about oppressive colonial policies. Complex Japanese rhetoric strove to assert reestablishment of control and to downplay the incident as an isolated one while employing a series of military and cultural policies to ensure that the aborigines would not rebel again.

Less than a year after the Musha Incident, the Manchurian Incident clearly demonstrated the expansionist intentions of the Japanese Empire. The Japanese increased their efforts at inculcating appropriate feelings toward the empire in the Taiwanese, and this meant a greater push for patriotism in textbooks and social education programs. At the same time, the pedagogy of patriotism toward Japanese meant that Chineseness began to be crowded out as the appeal to Taiwanese people to “become Japanese” intensified. School education taught exemplary Japanese stories through the language of martial valor while Japanese virtues filled the curriculum. “Modernization” and “civilization” became synonymous for “Japaneseness,” and the Taiwanese people were encouraged to perceive greater affinity toward Japan, the emperor, and the Japanese Empire.

Then, when Japan began its all-out war against China in 1937 and launched the *kōminka* movement on Taiwan, the concern of the colonial state shifted to converting the colonized Taiwanese people into imperial subjects. Similarly, as the tide of war turned against Japan in the

last three years of the war, Taiwan's role as model colony was reconfigured to that of a fortress that must devote all of its resources to defending the mother country. The language of Japanese cultural production, whether in textbooks, newspapers, or official pronouncements, highlighted the symbolic link between death and beauty while stressing that everyone could achieve honor. Japanese wartime mobilization via *kōminka* facilitated participation in the war effort by all sectors of the Taiwanese population, and the numbers of young people who became volunteers attested to the considerable success of Japanese cultural policy.

The reflections of Taiwanese elites during five decades under Japanese colonial rule as seen through their diaries allow us to read their emotions to some extent. Although only a few diarists were discussed here, the longitudinal value of their accounts—several of them kept diaries for decades—lies in revealing how their emotions evolved in relation to the Japanese state. In the first 35 years, diaries showed that Japanese colonial authorities were relatively unobtrusive in the personal daily lives of the elites. The Taiwanese elites understood that they had been conquered by a foreign people, but they were not harassed by the Japanese, and as a result did not seem to have harbored ill-will against the new regime. After the Musha Incident, some diarists described similar feelings to what the Japanese colonial authorities had advocated, such as sympathy for the Japanese victims and belief that the uprising should be put down to restore

peace. Their diaries also show that the period between 1930 and 1937 was a time when elites became more aware of the cultural reach of the state into their lives and their social environment. Finally, during the wartime years the Japanese colonial regime encouraged full Taiwanese participation by mobilizing them with florid language, some of which made its way into the diaries of the elites, who had no option but to accept that Taiwan and Japan were on the same side, and thus they had to support Japan in the war.

As these chapters have demonstrated, language was a significant vehicle for transmitting the values and images of the Japanese Empire in Taiwan. As Pierre Bourdieu states, language and representations have “a specifically symbolic efficacy in the construction of reality.”⁵ Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan was exerted through language in two ways. First, the Japanese used its linguistic circulation, cultural production, and knowledge dissemination to inform the Taiwanese of their place in the empire and how they should feel toward the empire. Second, the imposition of the Japanese language itself on the Taiwanese was new in Taiwanese history. Although Han Chinese immigrants brought Chinese writing and various dialects with them, the Japanese colonial state was imposing a foreign language on the Taiwanese. As Bourdieu writes, an official language “helps in turn to reinforce the authority which is the source of its

⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 105.

dominance.”⁶ Thus, the institution of Japanese language helped consolidate Japan’s grasp on power by offering Taiwanese people avenues for social mobility and symbolic capital in Japanese terms.

For Taiwan, Japanese authorities constructed a reality in Japanese terms and then attracted the Taiwanese to internalize it via its powerful network of cultural policies that spoke directly to emotions. The initial edicts from the Japanese governors-general urging colonial officials to be careful not to disturb Taiwanese feelings were an early clue to their understanding of the central role of emotion, which was bundled with language for maximum effect in ruling Taiwan. Later, public pronouncements about spirit or patriotism toward Japan were broadcast by Japan-controlled Chinese- and Japanese-language newspapers (and later radio) and amplified by the education system with concrete examples from Japanese history, creating a cycle that repeatedly reinforced in different voices the same Japanese message in the Japanese language. Textbooks and newspapers were saturated with ideas about subjecthood, love for the emperor, and the value of self-sacrifice. These words and the emotions they carried would not have been effective, but they were being uttered by the Japanese authorities, who by then the Taiwanese considered the legitimate regime in Taiwan.

⁶ Ibid., 45.

The Japanese construction of reality expanded to the rest of Asia as well. Although Japan claimed to be an empire of Asians with the same script and common civilization, coming from the same racial stock (*dōbun dōshu* 同文同種), it sought to forge a multiethnic empire with individuals functioning in effect as Japanese people. Emotional correctness constituted a sort of “affective citizenship” that became the inclusion principle of the Japanese Empire, even as it clung onto notions of Japanese racial superiority. For the Japanese state, when one lived somewhere in its vast colonial holdings, if one *chose* to engage the state emotionally, or if one were capable of being moved, or *affected* by its cultural policies, one’s status as an Imperial Subject could be confirmed.

It is important then to note that in the colonial context of Taiwan under Japanese rule, the cultural politics of affect formed a dual and interrelated hierarchy in which emotions ranged from public to private, from what was explicitly valued by the state to what was implicitly rejected by the state. By emphasizing the importance of certain emotions and affected behaviors over others, Japan prioritized patriotism, submissiveness, and a worldview that accepted death as inevitable sacrifice. At the same time, for a Taiwanese person to become valued or valuable to the Japanese, these emotional traits also had to be performed and therefore made public. The Japanese offered ample opportunity for the open display of the affective behaviors they solicited. Young

schoolchildren could sing in classrooms and at ceremonies about the strength of the invincible Japanese Navy. The elderly could donate their money to the coffers of the Patriotic Savings accounts. Aborigines could embody the purity and martial valor untouched by the polluting effects of civilization. Women could participate in neighborhood drills, cook vegetable scraps for their families, and ensure that their children spoke the national language at home. Men could go to the front themselves, or teach and inspire others to do so. There was a space for every colonized subject in Taiwanese society to further the Japanese cause.

The Japanese meticulously devised roles based on gender, age, social status, and ethnicity. While a colonial hierarchy persisted in Taiwan, with Japan-born Japanese at the top, followed by Taiwan-born Japanese, Japanized Taiwanese, Taiwanese, and aborigines at the bottom, the Japanese colonial government demonstrated itself willing to glorify patriotic feelings from any person, and it was those emotions that determined individual worth. As a result, some of the important governance myths from the wartime were based on children or aborigines. The praise heaped on the smallest and weakest members of society inspired new cycles of public sympathy and sentimental patriotism throughout Taiwanese society. Thus, the specialized cultural policies or educational agendas for different segments of the Taiwanese population yielded maximum coverage. Through these educational and cultural policies, the Japanese state was able to create a

common base of conditioned emotions, enabling it to garner support for the war from all segments of Taiwanese society. By employing methods that were more reliant on intrinsic motivation, the patriotism of the Taiwanese (performative or genuine) sometimes exceeded Japanese expectations.

In the sentimental education of the Taiwanese people, it is also possible to see the vision of modernity that the Japanese brought to Taiwan. Japanese cultural policies promoted an acceptance of modernization, teaching the Taiwanese people how to use modern goods. Moreover, Japanese forms of psychological management had modern and individuated characteristics, appealing to and inscribing each subject. In essence, Japanese ideas of civilization and modernization were transplanted to Taiwan, and the mission of civilization and modernization in turn forced Japan to reflect upon what precisely “Japaneseness” meant or could mean. In other words, the Japanese state had to figure out the content of the values and behaviors it considered Japanese and would want to elicit from the Taiwanese. As a result, while this is a study of colonial Taiwan, it ultimately reveals much about Japan as a colonizing power – its assumptions about the Taiwanese Other, its aspirations for domination of Asia, and its emphasis on managing colonized emotions.

In the beginning of its reign on Taiwan, Japan was first troubled by what it saw as a backward tropical island that threatened its colonists with debilitating heat, disease, and violent resistance. The landscape had to be tamed through mapping and cartography, while the people had to be pacified with military force and cultural influence. Early on, the Japanese recognized the importance of creating a docile population through education, and their belief in the affective power of civilization was a common theme throughout the fifty years they spent in Taiwan. When the Musha Incident—one of the most shocking and violent native challenges to Japanese power—occurred in 1930, the colonial government was determined to make it Taiwan’s last anti-colonial rebellion. State-sponsored newspapers were filled with discourse about Japanese and aborigine feelings derived from the incident, which was used to garner public sympathy for victims. Yet the idea of aborigine masculinity and violence was always remembered by the Japanese state as something they could file away for future manipulation. Then, as the cultural infrastructure erected in over forty years of Japanese rule was mobilized for the war with China, Japan found that Taiwan could be a reliable source of desirable emotions and actions.

As the Taiwanese experienced active Japanese colonization, the writings of the elites showed ambivalence as well as frustration at the inability of China to keep Japan from annexing Taiwan. They struggled to hold on to what they believed was their Chinese racial heritage and

identity. Nonetheless, in the 1930s, rather than showering praise on the violent aborigine uprising, they seemed to feel more akin to the colonizers, perceiving a greater distance from the aborigines on the cultural spectrum and failing to see the aborigines as Taiwanese. The core of Taiwanese identity was beginning to shift into the space sanctioned by the Japanese. While some continued to express suspicion or discomfort about Japanese expansion, they were no longer willing to show any public resistance to the regime. In the private world of diaries, some elites continued to believe in their Chineseness, but they also became cognizant of the fact of Taiwan as a Japanese colony. They came to believe that the destinies of Japan and Taiwan were now entwined, and thus the Taiwanese people had no choice but to help uphold Japan's political, cultural, and military designs in Taiwan and beyond. Thus, at the end of the Japanese Empire, the historical convergence between fifty years of Japanese rule and the wartime reality served to mobilize the emotional identity of Taiwanese people as imperial subjects into military participation in the Pacific War.

Restoring Feelings to the Study of History

While historians have long made references to terms like “public sentiment” and “general apathy,” these collective characterizations of “social mood” deserve to be discussed at greater length. This can be achieved by acknowledging the individual emotions that make up the overall

assessment. The placement of emotions at the center of my study of colonial Taiwan should inform us of some of the ways in which emotions are useful to the study of history. First and foremost, as I have attempted to show, the inclusion of sentiment and affect in historical studies enables us to look beyond but not neglect the analytical categories of nationality, gender, class, and race. As the Japanese colonial government itself did, we can extrapolate the power of affect from these existing categories, and in turn understand how emotions were made to function from or in spite of these more traditionally-acknowledged sources of identity.

For instance, Japanese administration differentiated according to nationality, gender, class and race in Taiwan. The aborigines were subject to different land policies, children who were Japanese nationals received education in separate schools, and Taiwanese elites were treated differently by Japanese officials. However, the fifty years of Japanese rule on Taiwan shows that distinct groups could be appealed to in different ways through emotion. Spirit and patriotism could be differentiated for different segments of population to ensure maximum coverage. Social education for young Taiwanese men that stressed military valor was not the same as school education for young Taiwanese girls that exhorted them to bear the difficulties of wartime living. Men and women were expected to feel similar love for the empire while carrying out different actions. Looking at emotions allows us to see how important they were to the

colonial regime, and the specific ways Japanese administrators strove to guide actions derived from emotions. The usefulness of emotional manipulation merited its continued and intensified application throughout Japanese rule on Taiwan. As the Japanese colonial regime legitimized emotions such as patriotism, so did Taiwanese patriotism legitimize the colonial regime. By emphasizing patriotism, something that anyone could achieve, Japanese sentimental education produced a universality through affective citizenship.

Second, histories of emotions are deeply connected to histories of everyday life, in which the historian focuses on how people interacted with social and political institutions, how they perpetuated culture, and how they dealt with each other. In considering the wartime lives of the people, for instance, describing human reactions to poverty, death, and defeat completes the picture of objective wartime conditions. Analysis of emotions in their historical contexts also helps to explain occurrences such as passive resistance, collaboration, and rebellion without using a rubric of rationality. In other words, emotions provide us with an alternative to the predilection to assess historical actors by assuming that they are always “rational.” Nor has this study been merely about the process of mass indoctrination. As Haiyan Lee has stated, “the process of inculcation has to be integrated into a more elementary process of fixing the affects of

love and hate and the representation of the self.”⁷ The emotional lives of colonial subjects were directly bound up with and affected the other elements that make up their identities.

Third, studying affect and emotions allows us to avoid political binaries such as pro-war/anti-war, pro-Japan/pro-China, and so forth. It makes it possible for us to discuss the Taiwanese who were “happy” about being colonized, or who felt a profound sense of loss when they were suddenly no longer imperial subjects. Their feelings were contingent upon and inspired by their historical circumstances. An emphasis on learned colonial feelings might have avoided the postwar finger-pointing at so-called collaborators. It is possible to look past ideology, and to read the Taiwanese colonial condition as lived experiences rather than make assumptions about how a colonized subject ought to have felt toward the colonizer. Even if the historical actors themselves felt compelled to choose between binaries, students of history should be able to deconstruct binaries and restore complexity to feelings in relation to historical situations.

Emotions, Choice, and Identities in Transnational Contexts

Stepping back from the core argument of this dissertation regarding the centrality and instrumentality of emotions in a colonial context, we can also see that the Japanese Empire was a place where one not only had the option to “become Japanese,” but also where one was strongly

⁷ Lee, *Revolution of the heart*, 309.

encouraged to “be Japanese.” Many Han Chinese people living in Taiwan in 1895 assumed that they were Chinese because their ancestors came from Fujian or Chaozhou. They considered aborigines to be a distinct and disdained race that hunted heads as well as deer. The cultural and political identity of these Han Chinese, who had been in Taiwan for generations and maintained ties to root clans in China, was not truly shaken until the arrival of the Japanese. Colonization by the Japanese, who had similar facial features and physical builds yet were indisputably foreign, challenged the comfortable mindsets of the Han Chinese in Taiwan. It was not until Taiwan was annexed by Japan that its people even had to really think about what it meant to be Chinese, or to be an imperial subject.

It is arguable that one major difference between Japanese colonialism and Qing colonialism was the way in which emotions were handled. Many Taiwanese people of Han descent maintained loose ties to mainland China and a Han Chinese identity, for instance by burning incense to ancestral plaques on which the family origin place was also inscribed. However, although Taiwan had a local bureaucratic organization that represented the Qing, “it did not have concrete symbols of nationhood.”⁸ The Treaty of Shimonoseki also gave Taiwanese people the choice to stay or go, so many left for China but then returned again by

⁸ Zhou, *Haixingxi de niandai*, 39.

1901. From this, historian Zhou Wanyao surmises that “psychologically, this undoubtedly brought a sense of fate to the Taiwanese people, that they had no choice. These feelings were perhaps related to the inability of civil leaders in Taiwan to resist the Japanese strenuously.”⁹

The component of Chineseness in Taiwanese identity before Japanese colonization was cultural rather than political, and when Japanese administrators worked directly for fifty years to create an “imagined community” between Japan and Taiwan, it is unsurprising that they conditioned many to feel as if they were Japanese.

As stated earlier, Japanese administration in Taiwan began by highlighting similarities between Taiwan and Japan, or at least by discursively placing Taiwan on the same historical trajectory as Japan. Early Japanese educators often used the Chinese language and Chinese cultural elements in their attempts to find a foothold in Taiwan. More importantly, the Japanese colonial framework dedicated to the cultural and emotional modification of Taiwan people gave the Taiwanese the choice to become Japanese through feeling and acting like Japanese. This is not to say that the Japanese were gentle and conscientious colonizers who only wanted to improve the lives of the Taiwanese – far from it. However, that the Japanese from the beginning were interested in using positive feelings to build their empire is significant. Personal, cultural

⁹ Ibid., 40.

and political identities, given the possibility of choice influenced by affective inclinations, became fundamentally fluid and hybridized. It was not inconceivable for a Taiwanese person to adopt a public Japanese persona while remaining Taiwanese or Chinese in his inner convictions.

If identities could be multiple, fragmented, and selective, then in the transnational context one's identity was also a choice to identify with a foreign identity. As I have shown in this dissertation, the affective component of the choice to identify could be taught and learned, meaning that emotions were extremely significant forces in determining identity. This view makes it difficult to generalize about any identity, but ensures careful and historicized handling of identities. Of course, elements such as ethnicity and gender played important roles in the construction of Taiwanese identities, but the inclusive principles of imperial Japan, based on emotional attachment to Japan, allowed for people originating in Taiwan to lay claims to this foreign identity, regardless of their gender, class, social background, or ethnicity.

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