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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
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Policing as a Vocation: Centralization, Professionalism, and
Police Malfeasance in Latin America

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Diego Esparza

June 2015

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. David Pion-Berlin, Chairperson

Dr. Harold Trinkunas

Dr. Marissa Brookes

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The Dissertation of Diego Esparza is approved:

Committee Chairperson

University of California, Riverside

Acknowledgement

A Dissertation can be a lonely enterprise. But it does not have to be. My dissertation is the product of my own work that could not have been completed without the support of three groups of important people: mentors, colleagues, and family. Thank you all for your love, patience, friendship, and encouragement.

I was accepted into UC Riverside in 2007 and wanted to come here to work with David Pion-Berlin. He was the mentor of one of my favorite professors at Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, Craig Arceneaux, who I thank for introducing me to civil-military relations. While at UCR, David has been the greatest source of intellectual support that I could have asked for. He has mentored me in writing, research, and on the stressful journey through the job market. A very special thanks to you and Lisa, for none of this would be possible without you. Marissa Brookes and Harold Trinkunas, thank you for kindly accepting to be on my search committee, and providing excellent feedback and support, without which I am sure I would not have been able to get a job. Yuhki Tajima and Will Barndt, your impact on me cannot be understated. Thank you for taking time out of your lives to help me become a better, and more professional political scientist. Ben and Laura Bishin have been great friends and mentors to me and my wife, and we appreciate all that you have done—Go Kings Go! My graduate experience at UCR was shaped by various professors who each imparted a bit of their knowledge in me, and I am eternally grateful. Martin Johnson, Bronwyn Leebaw, John Laursen, John Cioffi and John Medearis, you are all great individuals and professors who have helped me to think in ways about the world that I

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Dedication

To Altagracia Lopez de Esparza. I miss you.

To Andrea Silva. I love you.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Policing as a Vocation: Centralization, Professionalism, and Police
Malfeasance in Latin America

by

Diego Esparza

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science
University of California, Riverside, June 2015
Dr. David Pion-Berlin, Chairperson

Police in Latin America have a history of protecting and serving their own interests (i.e. the abuse of authority for personal gain). Why do police engage in malfeasance? Conventional wisdom would argue that police malfeasance is less likely where police were locally controlled and based on occupational models. The logic is that decentralized control over police empowers local communities to hold their police accountable, and occupational models would engender closer ties to the civilian population. My dissertation finds the opposite. I argue that a nationally organized and professional-bureaucratic police offer better control over malfeasance. The reason is that nationalizing the police can help break patrimonial domination, whereas the elites use police as a reward for loyal followers. Additionally, shifting away from an occupational model where police service is just a job to a professional model where police service is a vocation will improve benefits, training,

and oversight institutions—these lower the levels of malfeasance. These findings came from nine months of field research in Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. In the field, I conducted in-depth elite interviews, and retrieved archival documents, newspaper articles and government documents. The data was analyzed using historical process tracing, within-case comparison, and a combination of most-similar-most-different case methods.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

There is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

—Thomas Hobbes

Introduction

In June of 2012, I was riding with a law enforcement officer in Riverside, California. This was the first part of my research into policing. The officer shared his world-view with me and stated that:

The world is made up of good and bad people. Most people are trying to do well for themselves. 98% of the people out there are sheep, grazing in the open. But there are a few out there who want to take advantage of them. The bad guys; the wolves. They are 1% of the population. The police, we are the sheep dogs. We protect the sheep from the wolves.

In much of Latin America the real question is not only ‘how do you stop the wolves?’ but also ‘how do you keep sheep-dogs from eating the sheep?’ For example, in Brazil from 2003 to 2009 the Rio and São Paulo police had killed more than 11,000 people (Human Rights Watch 2009). Furthermore, 54% of Mexicans perceived their police as involved in crime and 18% had been asked to pay a bribe to them (LAPOP 2008). This dissertation

addresses the puzzle by analyzing the following research question: ‘What explains the variation in police malfeasance across Latin America?’ I reason that police malfeasance is a function of centralization and professionalization.

Some police systems have many local police at the city, state, and federal level. In these systems local mayors or councils control the police, but only in their jurisdiction. I call these ‘local’ systems. Other systems have either a single police force, or multiple police forces at the local level, but are managed and overseen by a semi-national or national body like a state/national commission on peace officer standards of training or a government ministry. Japan and the United Kingdom both have police that are controlled at the city and provincial/county levels by local mayors, but who are trained, paid, and overseen by national commissions. In France both the civilian ‘surete’ and militarized ‘gendarmerie’ are managed by a government ministry, although they cooperate with local mayors. I call these ‘national’ systems. My argument, which I will flesh out in the theory section, is that police in local systems hamper necessary professionalization of police. Conversely, national systems facilitate necessary professionalization reforms. The type of structure, therefore, influences the feasibility of effective police reform in Latin America.

As discussed above, there is a connection between police professionalism and structure. Administratively decentralized models of police work promote less professional or occupational models of police. As a result, they create police with weak benefits, weak training, weak recruitment, and weak oversight. The logic here is that police are not professionals; they are like any other low skill labor. However, police can also be organized along professional lines that have strong benefits, training, recruitment and

oversight. Because police are professionals, like doctors, they need to be extensively trained, well paid and accredited to work. Professionalized police, in general, are less likely to engage in malfeasance.

Although this dissertation focuses on structural and institutional determinants of police malfeasance, there are additional considerations that I think are valid, but are not the focus of this dissertation. The role of civil society, I acknowledge, is of key importance towards controlling malfeasance. The pressures of civil society not only encourage the initial reforms but can sustain them in the long-term by providing political capital to address the policing issues. Politicians and political incentives also play an active role in police malfeasance. Lack of political will or pressure can hamper reform attempts, and in turn, police will not be professionalized. Finally, civil society and external oversight institutions can provide redundancy in holding police horizontally accountable. Although this dissertation looks at these dynamics, they are on the periphery of this work. My contribution is to focus on the structural and institutional configurations that factor into police malfeasance because it is a bridge between societal pressures and external accountability. What happens when society is ready for a new police force and mobilizes to that end? What changes to the police will make them better and be more amenable to external control? This is the area that my work discusses.

At the same time, this work challenges the conventional approach to policing that promotes decentralization of police back to local authorities and maintains that professionalization would have negative consequences on how close police can get to society. I find that centralization can both help break patron-client political relations that

harm police work, but also facilitates the development of professionalization of a country's police force. Breaking the patrimonial control of the police is the first step that allows for the professionalization of the police in the second step. The following section discusses the research on which these arguments are based.

Literature

This literature review provides a primer of the major debates about police malfeasance and its causes. Police malfeasance has been studied through various lenses, but most of the literature I draw from is based on Anglo-American or European research. For this reason, much of what the review deals with are debates in these academies, and then draws central and alternative hypotheses to be tested in the context of Latin America. This literature review is organized as follows. First, I discuss two key concepts that are important moving forward, those being security and preventative policing. Second, I will discuss the literature on police jurisdiction and the arguments for and against national or more centralized police. Third, I focus on the debate regarding occupational and professional models of policing. The fourth area commences our section on alternative hypotheses and will discuss police militarization, threat environment, corrupt cultures, political regimes, colonial legacy, and religion as additional structural and institutional determinants of police malfeasance.

Security, the State and Preventative Police

The state in the modern era gave rise to more complex political systems. It became necessary to divide the labor of security into internal and external functions. To the military

falls the primary role of ensuring ‘national security’. National security, according to Paul Shemella (2006, 139) is “a matter of safeguarding the state’s sovereignty over its territory and population.” This implies that the military will look to defend the country from external threats when significant threats to public security and citizen security arise. The military may also be temporarily called in to aid the police in restoring order.

As for the police, their primary role is to safeguard public security and citizen security. Public security is “the ability of a government to maintain the civil order necessary for commerce, transportation, and communication” (Shemella 2006, 139). Citizen security is the “ability of individuals and groups to exercise the political, economic, civil, and human rights that make them citizens” (Shemella 2006, 139). Police are thus charged with internal security. On the rare occasion of invasion, police forces may be marshaled to supplement the standing military; however, their normal function is not national defense, but rather to combat crime.

David Bayley (1990, 7) conceptualizes the police as: “people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations within the group through the application of physical force.” However, this definition is too broad as it captures pre-state group policing dynamics. Rather, I consider police to be a state sanctioned institution made up of individuals who are empowered to regulate interpersonal relations within a modern society, to enforce the rule of law, and to protect rights through the threat of force.

There are three areas in which police work can be divided: preventative, investigative, and corrections. First, preventative police are charged with patrolling the streets, manning police stations, attending emergencies, serving the public, preventing

crime, and addressing crimes in progress. Second, investigative police are technical positions charged with investigating crimes that have already occurred. Finally, corrections police, are the least visible police force. What is important to note is that this dissertation focuses on preventative policing in countries and brackets investigative and correctional policing. From now on then, when I refer to police, I mean preventative police.

Police Jurisdiction: Local or National

The earliest debates about centralization or decentralization of police began in the United States during prohibition. From the 1920's through the early 1970's the conventional wisdom on American policing had made the case that the local system cost more and was less efficient at providing public security than more centralized police departments (Reuss 1970; Callahan 1972). This literature proposed the elimination of departments in smaller municipalities and providing more centralized services from metropolitan or state level police forces. However, these assertions came under increasing criticism during the 1970's. In this period, a set of scholarly work that came out of Indiana State University under the guidance of Elinor Ostrom, building on Tiebout's (1956) model of public choice, began testing the hypothesis that smaller police departments are less efficient than larger departments. However, Ostrom's research found that the conventional wisdom was not supported by her empirical analysis. Instead, Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker (1973) found that decentralized police outperformed centralized police. Subsequent scholarship (Ostrom and Whitaker 1973; Rogers and Lapse 1974; Ostrom and Smith 1976) corroborated the thesis that "smaller police departments are consistently

performing at higher levels than” more centralized police departments. On the basis of this evidence Ostrom and Smith (1976, 198) “infer that wholesale elimination of small-scale police departments would be marked by a serious decline in the quality of police services and in public confidence about the peace and security of local communities.”

However, this decentralization thesis of police administration was controversial. Scholars that focused on the value of centralizing police (Skogan 1976; Skogan 1980, Murphy 1989; Hunter 1990; Krimmel 1997; Staley 2005) suggested that larger agencies were in fact more cost efficient and were able to serve more citizens. Skogan (1976) critiqued the Ostrom school of thought on the grounds that the dependent variable was measured through survey instruments that focused on citizen satisfaction rather than effectiveness. These measures were subjective. It was contended that more objective measures of policing ought to be used in measuring police effectiveness, such as homicide clearance rates (Skogan 1976). Subsequent research (Hsu 2007; Kennedy 2009) found that larger police departments were able to solve more homicide cases and other crimes than smaller departments, thus supporting the centralization thesis of police effectiveness.

This debate has been influential in Latin American public security studies. As a result, the common prescription given to developing democratic police abroad emphasized decentralization. Scholars of policing have claims that centralized policing makes oversight more difficult, reduces community trust, and increases malfeasance (Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Kelling and Moore 1988; Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Goldstein 1990; Reiss 1992; Mastrofski and Ritti 2000; Maguire 2003; Skogan 2006; Glebeek 2009). In contrast, other scholars maintain that in Latin America small municipal police forces are

part of the problem of increased violence and criminality (Soares and Naritomi 2007; De La Torre 2008; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011). They go on to assert that centralization of policing can be beneficial to ensuring uniform training in penal codes, due process, and human rights. Centralized policing will also be better at coordinating anti-crime activity and have more resources to deal with asymmetric threats.

As Newburn (1999) asserts, the “context in which police agencies work is always likely to have a significant impact on the nature and style of that work, including the extent to which officers engage in corrupt practices.” There is significant literature that links political control to police malfeasance in the United States (Fogelson 1977; Goldstein, 1975; Knapp, 1972; Mollen, 1994; Fitzgerald, 1989; Wood, 1997). Sherman (1978:32) asserts that “capture by the political environment is the leading explanation of why police departments become corrupt.” However, the “literature on police and police reform in Latin America pays less attention to the relationships between police and civilian politicians” (Caumartin 2007, 108). In particular there has been minimal work to analyze the role of sub-national leadership in policing. In his analysis of the deteriorating Mexican security situation, Daniel Sabet (2010) noted that local “executive power and police dependence on the executive appears to be one of the biggest obstacles to reform.”

The problem, with decentralized systems is that sub-national “executive appointment of police chiefs should make the police more accountable to citizens and executive discretion should facilitate rapid reform, but in practice, this power has led to window dressing reform patronage appointments, poor policies, and a lack of continuity in reform efforts” (Sabet 2010, 266). Furthermore, Lucia Dammert has noted that “Brazil’s

federal structure, like that of Argentina, gives state officials much more autonomy in developing and implementing policing strategies,” but does not discuss how this influences police malfeasance. Mark Ungar has also noted that a decentralized system “accentuates executive and legislative imbalances. Compared to their national counterparts, provincial legislatures and municipal councils have less of the political leverage, information and funding needed to regulate police action” (Ungar 2011, 40). Another problem is that decentralized police systems end up giving power to “provincial and municipal forces [that] repeat and often amplify the poor management, accountability, and policies of their national progenitors. Although crime does not get simpler at the local level, the range of agencies to deal with it [are] narrower, giving local executives a smaller base of expertise and support” (Ungar 2011, 40). As Cardona (2008, 23) notes, decentralized control of police into civilian hands can breed a particular type of corruption, “one in which police are not loyal to the system but to an individual or an office. Such police are contingently attached to this individual or office.” In short, the literature is hinting that there are problematic differences in policing that are linked to the nature of politics in a country, which in turn is related to whether it is centralized or decentralized in its management of police. This is the first reason that centralization is important. The second reason is that centralization facilitates the process of professionalizing a country’s police force, which is the topic of the next section.

Policing as an Occupation or Profession

This section discusses the literature on police professionalism and the history of police reform in the United States to frame the discussion of why police professional models of police work are not a world-wide standard.

A profession “arises when any trade or occupation transforms itself through the development of formal qualification based upon education, apprenticeship, and examinations, the emergence of regulatory bodies with powers to admit and discipline members, and some degree of monopoly rights” (Bullock and Trombley, 1999). Samuel Huntington (1957) claims that three qualities define professionalism: expertise, responsibility, and corporate-ness. For Huntington, professionals must undergo substantial time in training which imparts expertise. Professionals are practicing experts that perform a service that is essential to society (Huntington 1957, 9) because the client is society and being a professional means being a part of a group whose membership is selective. This membership is given to individuals who meet the strict qualifications to entry, an extensive series of exams like the BAR, or medical board exams. These groups provide for theoretical and empirical sharing of knowledge through seminars, conferences and journals. To advance police professionalism as defined by Huntington, reforms need to be made to the remuneration of police through benefits, police selection and training, and oversight bodies. What is key here is that advancing professionalization is exactly what Max Weber is discussing in his theory of a rational bureaucracy. By advancing professionalization as Huntington notes, the lines between what is private and what is public become more delineated. In Huntington’s use, professionalization was the process

by which the military insulated itself from external political influence in their internal affairs. In the same way, police professionalism also means an insulation from patrimonial dominations as discussed by Weber. Weber provides more practical discussion of how professionalism is instituted in a system, but Huntington's contribution is in line with the same precepts that professionalization is an important process that allows for the modernization of state institutions that removes patrimonial interests and replaces them with rational-legal logics of behavior.

In the U.S. professionalization and increased education/training was blamed for making police departments "insular, arrogant, resistant to outside criticism, and—perhaps most disastrous of all—feckless in responding the social ferment of the 1960s and 1970s" (Slansky, 2013, 6). During that period, scholars like Westley (1970: xvi) had warned that professionalization would also be used by police to "draw away from the public, to resist public control and accountability" (Westley, 1970: xvi). Arthur Niederhoffer's analysis of the New York City police's defeat of a civilian review board added credence to this anti-professionalization argument (1967:188). Furthermore, Milner's (1971) work illustrated that professionalism reinforces police's "tendency to discount the views of citizens, to isolate themselves from citizen review, to create barriers to recruitment of blacks to their ranks, and to incorporate in police practices stereotypes of groups in the community that are detrimental to the interests of blacks" (Smith, 1978).

Professionalism in the police force was blamed, but it was not professionalism that was the problem. The real problem was that police, at this time, increasingly became a tool of city officials to suppress political dissent and crime through a 'mano dura,' or iron glove,

policy. These terms are more often used in Latin America, but they imply a ‘tough on crime’ approach wherein police officers, despite increased training, had internal policies of harassment of marginalized communities that were directed by mayors and police chiefs that did not understand alternative ways of dealing with the drug and crime epidemics. Chief Daryl Gates in the city of Los Angeles, along with the LA County Sheriff’s Department in the 1980’s, is emblematic of this approach. American society still views our penal system as a form of punishing criminals rather than rehabilitating them. And here is the point. It wasn’t professionalism that was failing; rather, public security policy was. Professionalism, hence, was a victim of poor policy construction, and society wanted to throw out both.

Hence, professionalism had developed a bad reputation among police reformers in the United States. For much of the past three decades, in fact, the “professional model” has been taken by many American police reformers to encapsulate what they are against (Slansky 2013, 2). In the 1980’s a new policy approach, which supplanted the tough on crime and professionalism, was community oriented policing (COP). COP arose as a rejection to police professionalism that instead “emphasized the plurality of police functions rather than a single-minded focus on crime control; it prioritized community input and involvement over expertise and technical analysis; and it favored decentralization over centralized authority and locally tailored rather than globally rationalized solutions” (Slansky, 2013, 2). Along with the COP approach came a more attenuated approach to policing as a craft, rather than something that can be learned like a profession. A craftsmanship/occupational orientation stresses apprenticeship, a generalist approach to

policing, a lack of deference to authority, and an oral tradition rather than written documentation. That is to say, policing is something best learned ‘on the job’ (Crank 333, 1990). Furthermore, this model of work assumes that “it is best to have the majority of training/mentoring undertaken by experienced officers in a master/apprentice arrangement” (Murray, 2005, 352). Although COP improved community police relations, abuses by police persisted precisely because professionalism was no longer advanced.

Thus, American policing today is halfway between professionalism and occupational models. This has meant that educational standards have not changed much from 1970 to today. As such, we can consider police professionalism as stuck in an embryonic state. The argument given by police administrators against changing professionalization standards is that it is “unnecessary or likely to generate barriers to entry, and therefore, recruitment problems” (McCellan and Gustafson 2012, 117). Some scholars suggest that there would be unintended consequences of professionalization such as reduced accountability, and reduced public trust in law enforcement (Bayley and Shearing, 2000). Other scholars also suggest that professionalization would reduce public engagement (Van de Ven, 2007).

What this dissertation maintains is that too many police forces in Latin America are organized along occupational lines and de-emphasize professionalization of their police, just like in the United States. This is due to 3 phenomena. First, the proximity to the United States, and its influence in directing police development in the region, has promoted occupational models. During the Cold War, police were seen not as sources of public security, but as part of the national security doctrine and charged with stopping

communism, not with ensuring public security. Second, governments in the region tended to professionalize the militaries and used them as police forces as well. This led to police in Latin America being treated as the poorer and neglected cousin of the military. It is only since democracy and the rise of violent crime in the region that governments have reversed this course and started to try to professionalize their police. Third, the colonial history of Spanish rule developed political systems based on patrimonial or ‘patron-client’ relationships. This reality hampered professional development for the same reason it did in the United States during the 1920s. Simply put, police were a means to an end rather than an end itself, and hence politicians ignored the need to professionalize them. Today, professionalization in Latin America is necessary to deal with many of the rising security threats, but it remains a monumental challenge to advance professionalization (Garner, 1999; Hawley, 1998). Occupational models cannot transform into professions without substantial training and certification (Collins 1979).

Centralization is a key factor that is necessary to break patrimonial bonds. Once these are broken, reforms are possible, but only happen when exogenous factors such as social pressure, political leadership and punctuating events align. Such a theory of when reform happens is beyond the scope of this dissertation. What I do focus on is what reformers can do to professionalize the police, once they have decided to do so. According to Eitle et. al. (2014, 3) there are few studies on how organizational factors can attenuate police malfeasance. The scholarship that does exist has an “underdeveloped organizational theory of policing, which is rooted in the notion that police departments” through professionalization can control malfeasance (Eitle et al. 2014, 3). The scholarship that does

exist is not unified, but is rather a patchwork of different scholars that all study different organizational factors that relate to malfeasance. Mastrofski (2004) proffers a useful framework for professionalization as the process by which police “establish structures (centralization, hierarchy, rules), incentives and sanctions, supervision, and so on to coordinate and control the activities of the organization’s members” (Mastrofski, 2004, p. 103). There are three institutional reforms that I claim advance professionalization: welfare benefits, development (recruitment and training), and oversight. I reason that strengthening this framework increases professionalization and in turn reduces malfeasance. There is theoretical and empirical support for this argument.

First scholars have linked rules and policies that circumscribe police compensation as important for reducing malfeasance (Botella and Rivera 2000; Mas 2006). Neild (2001, 27) has recognized that compensation “should be adequate to attract appropriately qualified candidates, provide a decent standard of living, and to reduce incentives for corruption.” To reduce malfeasance, Becker and Stigler (1974) used a game theory model to illustrate that pensions, salary, and other benefit streams must, over a lifetime, outweigh the levels gained from engaging in malfeasant practices. Second, policing scholars study training duration and content as valuable in advancing professionalization of police (Celador 2005; Otwin Marenin 2007; Cohen and Chaiken 1972; Winer 1974; Wiatrowski and Goldstone 2010). These authors profess that police that are poorly trained can undermine the legitimacy of a new democratic government; therefore, the desire for security should not be met with more police, but instead better police. Third, scholars also focus recruitment of police personnel in order to increase diversity, representation and decrease the abuse of

police powers by one group over others (Slater and Reiser, 1988; Nield 2001). Police recruitment is also important for democratic policing because it “can play a substantial role in the attitudinal development and shifts that may be experienced by those beginning their professional police services” (Garner 2005). Fourth, a large body of work studies police accountability and oversight. The idea is that police need to be accountable “for the way in which they perform their duties” (Bayley 2006; 53). As such there should be horizontal civilian oversight institutions outside of the police institution, and strong vertical oversight from within the police, to hold police accountable (Bayley 1990; Goldsmith 1999; Mendes 2005).

This section has discussed the origins of the difference between occupation and professional views of police work. In short, professionalization encompasses efforts designed to augment the “capital of the individual police officer. It is believed that by screening applicants carefully, hiring educated officers, furnishing officers with proper training, and by paying them a competitive salary, the likelihood of officers making appropriate decisions during the performance of their duties will be maximized” and malfeasance controlled (Eitle et al. 2014, 4). In this dissertation, I will test these arguments and see if the occupational or professional model carries weight in explaining the variation in malfeasance. In the following sections I will be discussing other arguments that are controlled for in this study, beginning with military models of police.

Militarized Vs Civilian Policing

Militarization of the police and the public security sphere is largely viewed by policing scholars as contradictory to democratic policing (Freisendorf and Krempel 2011; Errol Mendes 1999; da Silva 2000; Costa And Medeiros 2006; Kraska and Cubellis 2004; Basombrio 2003; Hill, Beger and Zanetti 2007). According to these sets of authors, there is a theoretical connection between the militarized identity of police and negative behavior towards citizens. Hugo Fruhling contends that “militarization has unquestionably had an impact on the excessive use of force by the police, which in the case of Latin America means a high number of citizen deaths, along with other human rights violations” (2003, 19).

Although these sets of authors make the case against police militarization, other authors promote a militarized model of policing (Bigo 2000, Beato 2001; Megie and Scherrer 2004, Lutterbeck 2004; Lutterbeck 2005; Beede 2008; Gobinet 2008). These authors claim that the assumptions about the desirability of "demilitarizing" police need to be questioned. They specifically note that the proponents of demilitarization are oversimplifying their cases and are not grounding their research on empirical evidence. They note that there is a greater need to understand militarized police in comparative context due to recent changes in domestic and international security situations (Lutterbeck 2004, 64). The reality is that some police forces and systems are moving towards militarized models as states seek to cope with increasingly complicated internal security situations. Does increased militarization threaten democratic policing? Is militarizing the police too high of a price to pay for security? Benjamin Beede has reasons that the “enhancement of police

capabilities may not be too high a price to pay both to meet security challenges and to obviate the threats inherent in military involvement in law enforcement, but such enhancement is hardly without problems” (2008, 60). David Pion-Berlin has noted that militarized police forces may be a viable solution to the security challenges currently facing Latin America (2010, 124). Does militarizing increase malfeasance, or is it not relevant at all? Hypothetically, I consider that police militarization is not necessarily a problem, and in many cases it may be a useful mechanism by which to professionalize the police. However, this topic merits further investigation in a different project. Nevertheless, because the literature mentions this hypothesis as a potential argument for why police engage in abusive and corrupt practices, I will test for it as well.

Criminal and Violent Environment

Another alternative hypothesis is that police malfeasance is a product of police being continuously exposed to high levels of criminality and violence. For instance Sherman (1978) explains that “New York police have used their official powers to protect or commit a crime from burglary to election fraud and murder” and police have “always been the purveyors of illegal pleasures: prostitution, alcohol, gambling, and, in recent years, narcotics” (1978: xxv). The argument is that officers working in illicit areas are on the ‘invitational edge of corruption’ where the temptations are particularly acute. It is asserted that countries with more criminal activity will have higher levels of police malfeasance. Klinger’s research (1997) echoes this and finds that the level of criminal, violence and illicit activities in a community influences the behavior of a police officer.

Klinger (2004) asserts that because of daily interactions with criminal environments, cynicism increases amongst patrol officers, who then judge these communities as less deserving of police protection, and are hence more likely to engage in malfeasance themselves. In a statistical analysis, Eitle et al. (2014, 7) finds that a violent crime environment is a significant predictor of police malfeasance.

Corrupt Culture

Another argument concerning environmental factors has to deal with a corrupt society hypothesis. The basic argument is that police engage in malfeasance not because the institution is organized poorly or training is inadequate, but rather the society that surrounds them condones it. Many individuals see it as cheaper and more efficient to pay off a police officer than to go to proceedings in front of a court, or to go take their towed car out of a police lot. Hence, the argument goes, malfeasance is an outgrowth of a corrupt culture in society. Sherman (1978:32) declared that “community tolerance, or even support, for police corruption can facilitate a department’s becoming corrupt.” But it is not just society that promotes a culture of corruption, it is the whole political culture. When malfeasance is rampant among judges, prosecutors, politicians, and in the business world, police will rationalize their malfeasant behavior as normal (Newfield and Barret, 1988; Roberg and Kuykendall, 1993).

Other Arguments

There are three additional arguments that are included in the analysis as control variables. First, Tresiman (2000) notes that police's "risk of exposure may also be higher in more democratic, open political systems. Freedom of association and of the press engender public interest groups and reporters with a mission and the right to expose abuses." Hence, having a democratic system may factor into levels of police malfeasance. Second, Treisman (2000) also notes that colonial heritage was a significant predictor of corruption. In particular, having a Spanish heritage versus a British heritage seemed to be important. Finally, Treisman (2000) also found that religion was a significant predictor of corruption as protestant country's had lower levels of corruption. This is why my scope conditions narrow in on Latin American countries that were Spanish colonies, are predominantly Catholic, and are democratic.

Theory of Bureaucratic Policing

In this section, the dissertation will discuss the theoretical foundations for the argument being presented. The theory is rooted Weberian theories of the state, and the cornerstone concept is the idea of rationalization. Rationalization, according to Max Weber, is the process by which society replaces traditional influences of behavior like values, beliefs, and emotions with the rational bureaucracy (Weber 1922, 954). The rational bureaucracy is a way to structure a system of public administration to provide public goods along rational, rather than traditional, mechanisms. When Weber is speaking about the development of a rational bureaucracy, he is referring to 'professionalization'

and how to effectively structure public administration to compel organizational behavior towards efficient, expedient, effective outcomes that are free of malfeasance. In this sense, professionalism is defined as “formal employment, salary, pension, promotion, specialized training and functional division of labor, well-defined area of jurisdiction, documentary procedures, hierarchical sub and super ordination” (1922, 1393).

Weber has six organization rules that belie professional bureaucracies. First, they have “fixed and official jurisdictional areas which are ordered by rules” (Weber 1922, 956). Second, organizations have a strict hierarchical system of authority—each rank in the hierarchy comes with a fixed salary and a pension. Third, professional administration is based on written documents, known as ‘the files’ (Weber 1922, 957). This emphasizes standard recording procedures, replicability of work, and normalized methods of researching. Fourth, professional bureaucrats must undergo “thorough and expert training” (Weber 1922, 958). Fifth, bureaucratic activity is considered a full-time occupation with stable tenured benefits (Weber 1922, 958). In a professional bureaucracy, holding a position does not mean that the person owns the right to exploit the position for rents in exchange for the rendering of certain services. Nor does it mean that the professional official is a personal servant of the ruler or executive (Weber 1922, 958-959). Finally, the management of the bureaucracy "follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned" (Weber 1922, 958).

The creation of such an organizational structure, for Weber, is the reason that the bureaucratic apparatus provides superior work through “precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of

friction and of material and personal costs” than other forms of political domination (Weber 1922, 973). Weber is thus telling us to move from older forms of legitimacy towards a modern one rooted in the development of professionalism for public offices.

But what is the older form of domination? Weber focuses on patrimonial domination, which is based on patriarchal relationships. According to Weber, patrimonialism is “a special case of patriarchal domination—domestic authority decentralized through assignment of land and sometimes of equipment to sons of the house or other dependents” (Weber 1922, 1011). Patrimonialism, in Latin America, was institutionalized by the Spanish colonizers, and manifests itself in today’s politics as ‘patron-clientelism’. Patrimonialism is “not based on the official’s commitment to an impersonal purpose and not on obedience to abstract norms, but strictly on personal loyalty” (Weber 1922, 1066).

Another key difference between a patrimonial office and a professional office is the separation of the private and the official sphere (Weber 1922, 1029). In patrimonial systems, political administration is a personal “affair of the ruler and political power is considered part of his personal property, which can be exploited by means of contribution and fees. His exercise of power is therefore entirely discretionary” (Weber 1922, 1029). This patrimonial system was built upon the benefice and prebendary systems. In exchange for loyalty, office holders were given benefice or wide discretion of local affairs, including taxation as a prebendary right. In this circumstance, rather than getting a wage, office holders were expected to earn their living through the moneys generated in their area of influence, through their hold on the office. This decentralized patrimonialism gave the

office holder the right to exploit their office “like any economic asset—sell it, pledge it as security, or divide it by inheritance” (Weberian 1922, 232).

Using these concepts and theoretical contributions from Weber, I will now discuss my theoretical argument. I will start from the dependent variable and move backwards. Police choose to engage in malfeasance based on incentive and disincentive structures: ‘How do I benefit?’, ‘What is the likelihood that I get caught?’, ‘Will I even be punished?’, and ‘What will I lose if I get caught?’ There is also the perverse possibility that police are required to engage in malfeasance from superiors or leaders, which is also a rational choice: ‘I do not want to fleece citizens, but my commander forces me to do that. If I do not do this, I will get worse assignments, or get fired.’ In short, police agents are rational actors who choose, based on incentives structures, when to engage in malfeasance. The structure then must make sure that the gain of malfeasance is outweighed by the cost and the likelihood of being caught. I found that a strong benefits package, strong recruitment and training, and strong oversight mechanisms greatly increase the cost of malfeasance, the likelihood of being caught, and weeds out people predisposed to that deviant behavior. But what are benefits, development, and oversight if not the same, albeit condensed, arguments that Weber put forward in the earlier discussion. These three institutional families, or regimes, all define professionalism. As such, when police professionalization is strengthened malfeasance will decrease.

There is a key to the sequencing. First, welfare reforms should come first. Having a strong welfare system is critical as it provides labor stability and a higher quality of life for the agents and their families, but can be held as ‘leverage’. What I mean by ‘leverage’

is that if police do engage in malfeasant practices and they are discovered, they will lose this quality of life for them and their families. The opposite logic is true for police that live in a system with weak benefits. When they engage in malfeasance such as abuse or corruption, they have nothing to lose, and more to gain. In the case of corruption, it is rational to shake down citizens to make up the difference between their salary and the middle class life they desire. Welfare should come first because it draws high quality applicants; this will allow you to raise the entrance standards.

The second step is to take this pool of applicants and weed out weak candidates. First, having high standards like a complete basic k-12 education or its equivalent is important in ensuring that there is a police force that is intelligent and has capable officers. Applications are then processed, with candidates lacking basic requirements being disqualified. Selection continues to more thorough physical, mental, and background examinations. As a result, there are now people that want to do the job that are morally, mentally and physically likely to do a good job. The next component of personnel development is the training process where the moral, mental and physical aptitudes are strengthened. A long term training process of 1 year provides ample time to accomplish the goal of developing basic police, and 3 years for introductory command positions. A major component during this time period is ethical training, where corruption is clearly discussed and illustrated so that officers have a complete moral understanding of when their actions can qualify as corruption. However, there is an important component that is necessary to reinforce the training and development of officers as many can fall prey to

corrupt activities. Thus, the last necessary reform then has to be the strengthening of internal control mechanisms.

Internal control is made up of three components: prevention, investigation and sanctioning. Prevention is geared towards studying and identifying characteristics of officers engaged in corruption, or officers who are showing traits of corruption, and intervening early in their careers to dissuade that activity. Another component is undercover investigative units that are in plain clothes and bribe uniformed officers. Finally, having a strong and expedient sanctioning mechanisms is important. Command officers must have the capacity to immediately remove officers suspected of corruption or other malfeasant activity. The reason is that due process in many cases allows many officers who are corrupt to continue to stay in the institution and continue their activities. This shows other officers that corruption does not lead to severe consequences, and hence, promotes a culture of impunity. When there is no due process they engage in corruption or observe corruption, but do not do anything about it. The stronger the sanctioning mechanism, the lower the corruption. But it also draws ‘teeth’ from the strong benefits discussed earlier. The sanction is not so much that the individual is excommunicated from the brotherhood of policing, but that they have lost a guaranteed or insured quality of life for them and their families.

In summary, the welfare benefits ensure better candidates. Better candidates will have less corrupt proclivities at the individual level and be more amenable to training they receive. Welfare benefits also make the loss of the job more salient and provide stronger ability to sanctions. However, oversight mechanisms must be able to effectively investigate

and sanction behavior for this to happen. Thus the oversight and personnel development build on welfare systems. Taken together, enhancing the three areas will professionalize the police.

Professionalization is also more likely to arise when police are centralized rather than when they are decentralized. This has to do with the prevalent political institutions that were inherited from Spain. When political order is predicated on patrimonialism—but which we recognize today as patron-clientelism—reforms are unlikely. Police were the instrument of local political actors who used police as their personal rather than public servants. Positions as police chiefs and commanders were rewards to those who were loyal, and would continue to show their loyalty. For this reason, patrimonialism promoted policing as an occupation not as a profession, and provided little resources towards its professionalization. Furthermore, having a decentralized systems provides police powers to local politicians who can succumb to local or trans-regional criminal forces. I say succumb, but the reality is some politicians may even seek out these illegal sources of income and use police as a bargaining tool. I profess that the key to breaking this patrimonial control is centralization of control over the police, not in the hands of a particular politician, but in a national coordinating body such as a ministry of defense, autonomous national public security council, or ministry of interior. Once police are centralized, patrimonial forms of domination can be broken. This is because political leadership and accountability are also centralized. Thereafter, a central, autonomous, and professional institution of oversight can be set up for all of the police. Furthermore, the responsibility over police is squarely on the shoulders of the national executive. This

provides a focal point for social pressure. But this will only happen when societal forces mobilize to pressure politicians to take action. Once patrimonialism is broken through centralization, professionalism can be a reality.

But centralization also facilitates professionalization. National police have a significant advantage over local police forces because they have access to large pools of money in the national treasury. Local police rely on their local governments for resources. As a result, police have more resources and leverage in attaining medical insurance, life insurance, and pension benefits precisely because they are comprised of a larger collective body unlike in local systems.

Conversely, recruitment methods at the local municipal police systems are more likely to be based on patronage or political clientelism. Local systems draw recruits from within the same community that they serve in and rarely have resources to conduct background checks on police applicants. This is unlike national systems that deploy and rotate police nationally. Placing police throughout the country and moving them randomly precludes the development of corruption at the lower levels. By placing police in their hometowns, as is done in decentralized systems, they can be connected to criminal networks and simply tap into a pre-established system of corruption. Further, in decentralized systems, police in wealthy municipalities will have more police than they need and poor municipalities will not have enough creating security gaps.

In terms of personnel development, centralized police have a unified system of academies or a central academy to train all of its police agents under the exact same standards as prescribed by current policy. Training for enlisted persons may vary from six

months to a year. The training available officer-level agents is more advanced and can extend from 2 to 4 years. However, in decentralized police systems, training is done through enlisting in private policing schools, on the job, or seasonal police academies offered by the municipal government, but there are no nation-wide training standards and in many cases police may not receive any training at all.

The differences in oversight mechanism between centralized and decentralized systems are important. National police function as a large organization and therefore need to develop institutions that can coordinate activities and guarantee bureaucratic consistency (Kaufman 1967). Administratively, centralized police systems rely on standard operating procedures that are codified in documents and published in training manuals. This system is overseen by hierarchic chain of command structures and oversight mechanisms to ensure uniform behavior. Policing in national systems develop oversight mechanisms to ensure that police will not waver from the standards set forth from the top brass. In contrast, decentralized systems are smaller, do not need to rely as much on written documents, and are more flexible in their use of standard operating procedures. Although rules may be written and codified, smaller systems will function with a higher level of informal norms, which means that police standards and behaviors will vary throughout a country with this type of system. Internal affairs will not exist, and if they do, they will be subjective as they will know the officers involved in smaller departments. Thus, oversight systems in decentralized police systems are non-existent. Instead, decentralized systems tend to develop ad hoc committees to investigate alleged police misconduct rather than having a standing oversight body.

Table 1: Comparing Local vs National Police by Professional Dimensions of Welfare, Development and Oversight

	National Jurisdictional Structure	Local Jurisdictional Structure
Welfare	Access to National Resources Middle Class Salary Merit Based Rewards Pension Plans Health Care Coverage Life Insurance Disability Insurance Discount Housing House Purchase Loans Small Loans Low Interest Education for Children Adult University Education Vacation Time Off Discount Vacation Locations Social Clubs	Resources Tied to Local Tax Base Minimum Wage Salary Spoils Based Reward Poor Pension Plans No or Limited Health Care Coverage No or Limited Life Insurance No or Limited Disability Insurance No Discount Housing No House Purchase Loans No Small Loans Low Interest No Education for Children No Adult University Education No or Limited Vacation Time Off No or Limited Discount Vacation Locations No Social Clubs
Personnel Development	National Talent Pool National Recruitment National Rotation Objective Standards of Selection Strong Recruitment Standards Strong Selection Mechanism Long Training Periods Curriculum Teaching Human Rights, Ethics alongside Policing Strategy Continual Training Meritocratic Advancement Horizontal Integration of Professionals	Local Talent Pool Local Recruitment No Rotation Politicized Officer Selection Weak Recruitment Standards Weak Selection Mechanism Weak Training Periods Basic Policing Curriculum No Continual Training No Meritocratic Advancement Limited Horizontal Integration of Professionals
Oversight	National Jurisdiction Hierarchic Chain of Command National Internal Affairs Department Preventative Investigation	Local Jurisdiction Hierarchic Chain of Command Weak Internal Affairs Department Ad Hoc Investigation

It may be the case that some centralized systems do not fulfill the above expectations. That is not the point. The logic is that professionalism can be best implemented in centralized systems than they can be in decentralized systems. Once a police force reaches a crisis situation and it needs to reform its police forces, it will be easier to build a professionalized police on the centralized platform than on a decentralized platform.


Simplifying the theory, I contend that centralization is an opportunity structure that allows for the breaking of patrimonialism and facilitates the shift from occupational to professional models. This is supported by Weber as he claims that “as far as complicated tasks are concerned, paid bureaucratic work is not only more precise, in the last analysis, it is often cheaper than even formally unremunerated honorific service” as occurs in patrimonial networks (Weber 1922, 974). All things being equal, “rationally organized and directed action, is superior to a kind of collective behavior and also social action opposing it. Where administration has been completely bureaucratized the resulting system of domination is practically indestructible” (Weber 1922, 987). And this is the way police should be organized as a means to counter criminal threats. In this theory, and in Weber’s own work, a strong bureaucracy is the best means of public goods provisions, and policing is no different.

The illustration below shows the causal links that undergird this theory. First, whether an administration is centralized (national) or decentralized (local) matters for two reasons. First, local systems tend to expose police to patrimonial predators at the local level who, in seeking to advance their own political or economic interest, use the police to suppress dissent and to facilitate criminal activity. By having a national administration,

we take patrimonial predators at the local level out of the equation, and facilitate the necessary process of insulation from politics. Of course, patrimonialism can exist at all levels of government, and centralization is no guarantee that patrimonialism will be rooted out. However, it is easier to depoliticize one single police force than it is to try and do so in a decentralized system. One key set of reforms that are rather easy to implement is to provide police autonomy to promote their own ranks within based on their own criteria, to appoint the chief/general of police from within ranks, to provide for overlapping terms as head of police, and to not allow police to vote in elections. Although this is a clear and easy to implement reform at the national level, there are too many veto points to implement it at the local level. There is a big difference in getting 1 police force to reform this part of its system, than to get 2,100 local police to do so. A second factor is that having a national police force is more efficient in its use of resources, and gets marginal returns on investment in creating infrastructures for development, training, benefits, and oversight systems. Thus professionalization is much easier to develop when a system is centralized than when it is purely local. The strengthening of professionalism means that police are better trained, smarter, and have more to lose. By centralizing and professionalizing police, different countries can root out patrimonialism, and improve on the systems of control over the police. These two changes themselves will improve police behavior and lead to a decrease in police malfeasance. Since police are no longer politicized in such a way as they see their future linked to a political party or a particular politician, and they have job security in a profession that pays well, they have less reason to abuse their authority. And indeed, because there are more resources for oversight and accountability, it will increase

the fear of losing this job. These two factors, the external and internal, insulate the police and shifts the logics of police officers away from predators to protectors of society.

Figure 1: Theoretical Mechanism Driving Police Malfesance



To provide more nuance to the argument the tree below will dissect the combination of the dichotomous independent variables. Although this project treats these variables as dichotomous, the reality is that centralization and professionalization exist on a continuum. There are more and less professional police, and more and less centralized police. The

argument is that the more centralized and more professional the police, the lower the levels of malfeasance. In addition, these variables also interact to reduce malfeasance, and it's the combination of them that matters as much as their independent effects do as well. To begin, I hypothesize that the combination of Nationalized and Professionalized police forces will decrease malfeasance. The more a country moves in this direction, the lower their police malfeasance will be.

Second, there may be national police with occupational models of policing, and I expect these to be less malfeasant than decentralized occupational systems. Nevertheless, these systems may exhibit high levels of abuse and corruption, precisely because they lack professionalization. The value and superiority of having established a centralized police is that despite having an occupational model, political leaders can quickly reform police to improve professionalism if they desired. This is because centralized systems represent less costs to reform, and circumvent collective action problems that are found in decentralized models with entrenched local interests that resist reform.

Theoretically, it is possible that in a local (decentralized) police system, some degree of professionalism is possible. However, that professionalism will be rare and concentrated in a few places that have both politically progressive leadership and wealth to enact reforms. However, these professional police will be like an oasis in a desert of ineptitude. In the case of Mexico, the city of Chihuahua represents a professional police force with low levels of malfeasance, but Mexico in general has local police that are highly abusive and corrupt. Hence, the hypothetical argument here is that in general, local and

professional systems do not exist, as the combination of both produces malfeasance, except in a few cases.

What is more is that localized systems produce occupational models of policing. This is the worst possible combination of structural features and is the causal agent behind the high levels of malfeasance found in the history of Latin American police, and in the cases of Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil. The theory of Democratic Policing thus predicts high level of malfeasance in these types of police systems.




Figure 2 Predicted Relationships Between Administration, Work Model, Bureaucratization and Malfeasance

Key Variables

The Dependent Variable: Police Malfeasance

Barker and Carter (1994: 7) define police malfeasance as: “any action by a police officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, trespass upon human dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal right of a member of the police constituency in the course of performing ‘police work.’” My conceptualization of malfeasance is in line with the intention of this definition but is simplified as the abuse of authority for personal or ideational gain. My definition is different in that there is a motive and intent to injure for personal advancement. I understand malfeasance as a principal-agent concept. There is the principal investor who hires someone (an agent) to conduct some sort of business for them. A client (the principal) hires a lawyer (an agent) to file a lawsuit for them. Malfeasance is when an agent uses this power and trust for their own personal gain at the cost of the principal. Expanding this concept further, society at large (principal) hires/develops a police institution (agent) to provide security. But instead, the police use this power for their own material/ideological benefit at the cost of society and security. When this occurs the police are engaged in malfeasance.

In contrast, there are concepts of police misfeasance and nonfeasance. Misfeasance is when police, doctors, lawyers as agents have the goal of achieving a particular outcome for their principal, but they go about it the wrong way. In other words they are inept, but had no intent to hurt their principal. There is also nonfeasance, where a particular agent is

required to do something for their principal, but through neglect do not accomplish this. This concept is different in that the intent was not for personal gain by the agent at the cost of the principal, but through inaction the latter's interests are nevertheless harmed.

In this dissertation I use historical documents and secondary data to observe and measure the level of malfeasance in a society at a particular time. If there are accounts of either rampant police corruption or ubiquitous accounts of police engaged in political corruption or political violence, then this would indicate that the police force was engaged in high 'systematic and generalized' malfeasance. Conversely, accounts of limited or isolated incidents of corruption, or police engaged in political corruption would indicate a low level of police malfeasance. It is important to note that if the historical documented accounts mention that the incidents are not the norm for the period, it would add additional evidence for the general trend of police behavior in terms of malfeasance, for that period.

Independent Variable 1: Jurisdictional Scope: Local and National Police Frameworks

Police jurisdiction can be local/provincial or national in jurisdictions. Local police are based in cities, towns and states and are beholden to local authorities. These police are part of decentralized policing framework found in federal systems. National police are institutions controlled by national authorities, with national jurisdiction. These police are centralized as they fall under the control of the national executive through a cabinet ministry, such as a minister of interior, a minister of defense, or a minister of public security that is appointed by the chief executive of the nation.

There are two types of national police. First, there is the preventative police institutions that have a single chain of command for enforcing the law and maintaining order throughout the entire country. Although these police can cooperate and coordinate with local political leaders, their hierarchic structure puts the ultimate control and responsibility in the hands of a national ministry or cabinet. A second type of national police is when a centralized body, such as a national commission, is in charge of setting benefits, recruitment and training, but who provide local political leaders the day-to-day control over fulfilling those standards. In these systems, police oversight is controlled by the national commission. I use these definitions to code systems as local or national.

Independent Variable 2: Police Work Models: Occupational or Professional

There are three police ‘regimes’ that are important for advancing professionalization to control malfeasance, and which can find their strongest support in national oriented police systems. I identified in my research three important regimes for police behavior: 1) welfare benefits, 2) development and 3) oversight of police. Each one of these regimes have various institutional rules and components that can be manipulated to decrease malfeasance.

Welfare regimes are rewards, remunerations and insurance benefits for police. Strong systems will include middle-class wages, plus bonuses for time in position. Other benefits of strong systems are: long-term job security, lateral and vertical mobility, a pension of 75-100% of salary after 25-30 years of service, medical coverage for the officer and immediate family, life insurance, education for children, 15-30 days of paid vacation

per year, access to vacation locations, access to housing, and access to low interest loans. In contrast, weak welfare systems do not have the same quality of benefits. Instead, these weaker systems have lower class wages, limited bonuses, no job security, no lateral or vertical mobility, 50% or less police pension, or a reliance on a government pension and healthcare system. Additionally, they have limited life insurance coverage, no child education benefits, limited paid vacation, and no access to discounted vacation rentals, housing or low interest loans.

Development regimes are the rules and norms that govern the development of police professionals including recruitment, incorporation and training. Strong development systems will have high entrance standards that include high school education, physical fitness tests, high tests scores, psychological tests, and thorough background checks of the applicant and family members. Strong training would constitute 9 months or more for troop level, and 3-4 years for officers. The training itself ought to be physically and mentally demanding, and have substantial academic components. Conversely, weak development regimes will have low or non-existent entrance standards of education, physical fitness, and psychological exams. Their training will be short, anywhere from 3-6 months (less than 3 months for troop level, and less than 1 year for the officer track), will not be physically difficult, and will largely be done on the job. Additional continual training will also be limited. Further, less than 0-6 years of education will be required, and there will be no criminal background checks, no psychological or physical exams, and no committee interviews.

Oversight regimes are the formal mechanisms of monitoring, investigation, sanctions and prosecution of officers that deviate from institutional norms. A strong hierarchic system of control emphasizes subordination to commander's orders and disciplinary measures from commander to troop in accordance with the law. This includes a swift system of removing officers suspected of criminal behavior by the top ranked officer of the institution. External oversight bodies further bolster the strength of the oversight regimes. On the contrary, a weak oversight regime lacks effective oversight mechanisms. No external bodies of oversight exist to investigate the police. Internal bodies may exist, such as penal police justice; however, these internal bodies cover both regulatory infractions and criminal behavior. This system has a weak emphasis on hierarchy and discipline, providing troops with more autonomy in their behavior. The system also makes it difficult to remove police for suspicion of criminal behavior by top ranked officers. Strong systems will have multiple internal systems of control starting with a strong chain of command oversight, an internal investigation agency, and a head of police discretionary power to remove agents. In addition, strong oversight mechanisms should have external oversight bodies, such as a public prosecutor's office, a government accountability organization, and a citizen review board that have auditing power over the police. Weak mechanisms will lack internal investigation, lack discretionary powers and have weak or non-existent external control mechanisms. The diagram below summarizes the dimensions of each variable that will be used to measure the strength and weakness of each regime in the cases analyzed. The table below illustrates how welfare, development and oversight will be compared within and across cases.

Table 2: Three Measures of Professionalization

Welfare	Development	Oversight
<i>Salary</i> <i>Healthcare</i> <i>Vacation</i> <i>Bonuses</i> <i>Job Security</i> <i>Pensions</i> <i>Life Insurance</i> <i>Loans</i> <i>Discount Goods</i> <i>Childcare</i> <i>Child Education</i>	<i>Education</i> <i>Recruitment</i> <i>Entrance Standards</i> <i>Interview Process</i> <i>Academy Training</i> <i>Difficulty, Length and Content</i> <i>Probationary Period</i> <i>Differentiation Between Rank Training Requirements</i>	<i>Rank Subordination</i> <i>Hierarchy</i> <i>Discipline</i> <i>Internal Investigations</i> <i>Discretionary Removal By Top Brass</i> <i>Democratic Control</i>

Hypothetical Implications of the Theoretical Model

A national and professional police force will best approximate a rational legal bureaucratic framework, whereas a local and occupation style police force best approximates a patrimonial bureaucratic system. As a system moves from a local and occupational to a centralized and professional model, it not only breaks patrimonialism, but also structures incentives in such a way as to deter malfeasance. This is the concise version of the theory. For these premises to be validated, I must test the observable implications/hypotheses through empirical means. What follows is an enumeration of the central and alternative hypotheses being tested empirically in this dissertation.

The Central Hypotheses:

My central hypotheses are rooted in my theory of democratic policing. The observable implications of my theory are the things that should be observed if my theory holds strong explanatory power. First, if police forces shift from local to national models,

that is, they go from decentralized to centralized models, then malfeasance must go down. Second, if police shift from occupational models with weak benefits, development and oversight to professional models, malfeasance should go down.

H1: National administration of police will lower police malfeasance.

H2: Professional models will lower police malfeasance.

Alternative Hypotheses

You will notice the following two hypotheses are simply the opposite of the central hypotheses. Why do I frame them this way? The literature that I am looking at notes that police in local and occupational systems are better, and that centralization and professionalization are dangerous. Although the above hypotheses may illustrate that national and professional models are not malfeasant, I want to also refute the arguments that would undermine my theory of democratic policing. This provides a stronger test than simply finding evidence for my hypotheses. The observable implications that must be true in order for my theory to be false must be that local and occupational models correlate with low levels of malfeasance.

AH1: Local administration will lower police malfeasance.

AH2: Occupational models will lower police malfeasance.

Control Hypotheses

The remaining hypothesis are other arguments found in the literature that I seek to control for, but that I am also implicitly testing for. These arguments include the idea that

police malfeasance are related to militarization, crime, societal corruption, regime type, colonial and religious influences. Hence, the additional control hypotheses are as follows:

CH1 If a police system is militarized, then it will have high levels of malfeasance.

CH2 If society is corrupt, it will have high levels of police malfeasance.

CH3 If a society has high levels of crime insecurity, then it will increase the level of police malfeasance.

CH4 If a country is democratic it will have less malfeasance than in an authoritarian regime.

CH5 Catholic and former Spanish Colonies will have less malfeasance.

Methods: Case Selection, Data Collection, and Case Analysis

This section discusses the logic of case selection and methods. I employ qualitative methods that include most-similar systems, most-different systems, historical cases, and within-case analysis. The data was gathered using structured focused comparison instruments. I did field research that relied on gathering documents and conducting elite-interviews. The analysis conducted relies on process-tracing and case comparisons that are derived from the data. The emphasis on the qualitative design is rooted in my desire to understand the causal mechanism linking structural conditions with police behavior. This section is thus organized as follows. First, I want to discuss the general qualitative approach to research. Second, I turn my attention to the scope conditions of my project. Third, I discuss the cases I selected and what the logic of that selection was. Fourth, I then discuss the data collection and analysis methods of each chapter.

The Qualitative Approach

The question guiding this research asks why some countries have police that are malfeasant and why others do not. One approach, and perhaps the most concrete way to go about it, is to create an experiment. Although experiments are appropriate for some questions, large questions such as what causes police malfeasance are elusive. Creating an experiment that uses a lab and student subjects would not be valid because it is not a sample of the larger population of police. Using police in an experiment would also prove elusive, as police are insular and protective of their own interest and the interest of their brothers in blue.

Although some data are available on corruption, they can only tell us the correlation between police structure, and police corruption or police human rights abuses. I will employ statistical data, which will be presented in Chapter 6, but again, I am interested in the causal mechanism at work more than a simple confirmation of correlation between two variables. In order to address my question, a qualitative approach provides the only acceptable avenue for exploring the causal relationship between independent, intervening and dependent variables. As John Gerring (2007; 86) notes, in case study research the sample is small and makes randomization problematic. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a few cases, chosen randomly, will provide leverage into the research question that animates an investigation. The sample might be representative, but uninformative.” Thus, I use a different logic of case selection.

Scope Conditions

Selection has to be strategic with the goal of maximizing inferential leverage. First, I decided to narrow the scope of my investigation to democratic countries in Latin America, formerly colonized by Spain: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Cuba is left out because it is communist, and Suriname and French Guyana do not have an Iberian relationship. The other Caribbean countries are largely British, French and Dutch in cultural orientation. Brazil was colonized by Portugal and had a different direction from its Iberian cousins. These initial scope conditions allow me to establish controls for the case comparison.


Logic of Case Selection

Looking at the methodology literature, I began creating a logic of case selection using two important pieces of work. First, following Stephen Van Evra (1997), I narrowed the scope of cases based on the following criteria: 1) they are data-rich cases; 2) they have extreme values on independent variables and dependent variables; 3) cases about which competing theories make opposite predictions; 4) cases that resemble current situations for policy concern; and 5) select cases that are well matched for controlled cross-case comparisons.

Second, building on Van Evera's last point of controlled comparison, I look towards Przeworski and Teune's (1970) most-similar *and* most different systems design to select and analyze cases to provide inferential leverage and control in comparison, while

making sure they also fulfill his other standards. Because there is limited data on ‘malfeasance,’ I had to use other measures to approximate it. The best available measure of this variable is the level of citizen trust in the police. There is a high correlation between trust and actual malfeasant behavior. Using Latinobarometro data from 1996-2010, I aggregated the overall levels of citizen trust and found that Chile, Uruguay and Colombia had the best police in this category. Meanwhile, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic had the worst.

This led me to my first case of interest—Colombia. I didn’t expect to see this country so high in citizen trust, given the difficult security issues they have historically faced, including high levels of police abuse during the 1980s. The CNP also had a nationally organized police allowing me to test part of my theory that this structure is linked to malfeasance, but I did not know a priori their level of professionalism. However, Colombia, according to competing theories of decentralization, should exhibit high levels of malfeasance and low levels of trust. Another interesting aspect of Colombia is that it is militarized, has high levels of insecurity and high levels of governmental corruption, has a Spanish colonial legacy, is largely catholic, and is a democracy. Thus, according to some of Van Evera’s criteria, Colombia acts as an important case to understand given the relevant literature on police malfeasance.



Having selected Colombia based on Van Evera's criteria of case selection, the other cases need to fulfill the fifth important requirement of providing controlled comparison. First, to gain leverage, I employ the logic of most-similar systems. According to Seawright and Gerring (2008) "The most-similar method... employs a minimum of two cases. In its purest form, the chosen pair of cases is similar on all the measured independent variables except the independent variable of interest." In terms of the literature, it is important to select a case that has similar criminal situations, corrupt society/politics, and has a militarized component to public security policy. The diagram below shows the logic of comparison where X1 is Administration Level, X2 is work model type, AH are alternative hypotheses, and Y is level of malfeasance.

Table 3 Most-Similar Systems

Cases	X ¹	X ²	AH	Y
Case 1	+	+	+	-
Case 2	-	-	+	+

Colombia has had a history of insurgency, drug trafficking, paramilitaries, criminal violence, weak governmental institutions and an Iberian cultural heritage, but it has a national and professional police force with decreasing levels of malfeasance. Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico all have a similar cultural heritage to Colombia, but they have different values in the independent variable and dependent variable as they all have local police systems and high levels of malfeasance. Of these three, only Mexico has a similar problem with security and corruption. Mexico has paramilitary self-defense forces, drug cartels, and rampant criminal violence. The other similarity is that in both Colombia and

Mexico, the military is heavily involved in public security and internal policing missions. Colombia and Mexico, therefore, represent the closest or most-similar cases along the lines of alternative hypotheses. Along Van Evera's criteria, Mexico is a good selection because it is 1) a data-rich case, 2) has extreme values on independent and dependent variables, 3) has competing theories that make opposite predictions, and 4) is an important case for policy concerns in the region and in the United States. The guiding question with that comparison is, 'Why is Colombia different from Mexico in terms of malfeasance if they both have similar security situations, corrupt societies, and militarized components to public security?'

To add more analytical leverage, I employ the logic of most-different systems design. Ideally a most-different design has "just one independent variable, as well as the dependent variable, co-vary, and all other plausible independent variables show different values" (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Instead of having just one variable co-vary with the dependent variable, I have two, which weakens this approach by decreasing analytical leverage. But as I shall show later, I employ other techniques to improve upon this weakness. For now, in order to use this method I need to find a case that is different from Colombia as it pertains to the alternative hypotheses, while maintaining the presence of a centralized administration and professional police system, and have low or decreasing malfeasance. The logic is detailed in the diagram below.

Table 4:: Most-Different Comparison

Cases	X ¹	X ²	AH	Y
Case 1	+	+	+	-
Case 3	+	+	-	-


I did not choose a case with a different cultural heritage, religion or regime because I am controlling for that. However, a case with a different criminal environment and different levels of societal corruption setting would provide more leverage to my argument. Thus, I selected another centralized and professional police force that lacks insurgencies, drug cartels, criminal violence and paramilitary groups, has low levels of governmental corruption, and is militarized. Chile is the best example of this type of case. In this sense, the comparison with Colombia and Chile is guided by a case selection logic of most-different systems. As such, I gain significant analytical leverage from the combined analysis of the three cases as illustrated in the diagram below.

Table 5 Most Similar and Most Different Design

Cases	X ¹	X ²	AH	Y
Case 1	+	+	+	+
Case 2	-	-	+	-
Case 3	+	+	-	+

I selected cases according to the categories of the key explanatory variables. Again, although I use the proxy of citizen trust for police malfeasance as a measure in contemporary cases, I did not know a priori the actual values on the dependent variable and for this reason my “selection procedure does not predetermine the outcome of our study...” (KKV 1994, 137).

Figure 4: Most-Similar and Most-Different Diagram



However, as King, Keohane and Verba note, “we can learn nothing about a causal effect from a study which selects observations so that the dependent variable does not vary” (KKV 1994, 147). In this study design the dependent variable is assumed to vary between Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. Nevertheless there is a degree of freedom issue. How can we say anything about these cases if we do not have enough observations? Adding cases, as KKV recommend, is the clear answer.

I chose the ‘most-similar and most-different’ design as a starting point, and thereafter looked for additional leverage as I went along. I, therefore, also decided to employ the method of what Gerring (2007) calls diachronic case study design, but can also be called a longitudinal case design. The logic here is that you take one country, study it through time, and observe the correlation between the changing independent and dependent

variables. That is, through time, as X1 and X2 change, so should Y. The value in this case design is that many things are held constant, such as cultural factors. I conduct this historical analysis within the cases of Chile and Colombia. The diagram below illustrates the logic. T+1 is meant to denote time periods where changes occur to x1 and x2 and a change should also be observed in y, with c standing for controls.

Table 6 and Table 7: Logic of Historical Comparison in Colombia and Chile

Colombia				
	x ¹	x ²	c	y
t ¹				
t ²				
t ³				
t ⁴				
t ⁴				
t ⁶				
t ⁷				

Chile				
	x ¹	x ²	c	y
t ¹				
t ²				
t ³				
t ⁴				
t ⁴				
t ⁶				
t ⁷				

To add more leverage and further mitigate the problem of degrees of freedom, I employ process-tracing methods. Process-tracing, in this project is employed as a supplementary tool in conjunction with a standard research design (Gerring 2009, 177). According to Gerring, process-tracing employs multiple types of evidence “for the verification of a single inference—bits and pieces of evidence that embody different units of analysis. Individual observations are therefore non-comparable. Additionally, process tracing

involves long causal chains” (2009, 173). The value in doing this is explained by Alexander George and Andrew Bennet (1997) who maintain that:

Within a single case there are many possible process-tracing observations along the hypothesized causal paths between independent and dependent variables. A causal path may include many necessary steps, and they may have to occur in a particular order. At each step, the researcher may measure the magnitudes and signs of intervening variables to see if they are as the hypothesis predicts. These many predicted observations may provide sufficient "degrees of freedom," or many more observations than variables, even when the researcher is studying a single case and using several independent variables.

Finally, Chapter IV on Mexico rests on the comparison of three types of police forces operating in contemporary Mexico. Mexico has police at the municipal level, state level, and federal level. The observable implication, and the logic of comparison, is that the municipal police in Mexico, being decentralized and occupational, would be the one engaged in the most malfeasance, and engender the lowest levels of trust. The state police and the federal police are more centralized and professional and should have lower levels of malfeasance. The value of studying the case of Mexico, and the three police models within it, is that it offers a controlled comparison. The other hypotheses regarding public security, such as militarization, corrupt culture, and criminal environments are controlled for and are present throughout Mexico. Hence municipal, state, and federal police all operate in a similar context, with the only difference being their degree of centralization and professionalization.

Table 8: Logic of Mexican Police Comparisons

	Administration	Work Model	Level of Malfeasance
MUNICIPAL	Local	Occupational	Hypothesized High
STATE	Semi	Professional	Hypothesized Medium
FEDERAL	National	Professional	Hypothesized Low

In sum, the overall structure is geared towards increasing observations so that degrees of freedom will not pose a threat to validity of the theory at hand. In addition to this, the heavy emphasis on the historical chapters of Chile and Colombia apply the method of process tracing in order to further increase leverage on the problem. As KKV (1994, 45) notes, “One of the often overlooked advantages of the in-depth case-study method is that the development of good causal hypotheses is complementary to good description.” As George and Bennet note (2005, 6), the method of process tracing “attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in the case.”

This subsection discussed the logic of case selection. However it did not address the logic of data gathering. The next section describes the a priori formulation of research instrument and the subsequent data that was gathered to conduct the case analyses.

Research Tools and Field Research Results

The collection of the data follows the George and Bennett (2005) method of structured and focused comparison, which requires that the same set of questions be asked

and answered for each of the cases systematically. A copy of the interview instrument and data points that were targeted for research are in the appendix. In short, I wanted to learn about the historical development of police along the dimensions of centralization, and professionalization, along with corollary changes in police behavior.

Political scientists turn to the written record when the political phenomena that interest them cannot be measured through personal interviews, with questionnaires, or by direct observation. For example, interviewing and observation are of limited utility to researchers interested in large-scale collective behavior (such as civil unrest and the budget allocations of national governments), or in phenomena that are distant in time (Supreme Court decisions during the Civil War) or space (defense spending by different countries) (Buttolph, 1991: 205). Researchers should consider the analysis of documentary accounts if their primary research goals are the testing of particular hypotheses, and theory verification and development (Hodson, 1999: 9). Thus, the historical components of each chapter were gathered using newspaper articles, interviews, and secondary data sources. For analysis of welfare, development, and oversight, I gathered data from interviews, e-mail correspondences, and primary sources from police websites, archives, and government documents. Measures on the dependent variable are taken from surveys and NGO reports.

I sought police officers at varying ranks, academics, politicians, and journalists to gather data and to test theoretical propositions. By engaging in the interview process, I was able to discern how it is that the structural features of centralization can advance control over police corruption and abuse as well as increase efficiency in providing security. The

interviews provided a historical view of the changes that have thus far taken place. The counterpoint was to illustrate the relative difficulties of a decentralized policing system in achieving similar aims. Interviews will allow me to compare and contrast changes in training and oversight in centralized and decentralized systems.

Full confidentiality was offered to participants who wished to remain anonymous, but many did not feel the need to maintain that anonymity. In writing up the dissertation, coded names are used for those who remain anonymous and no particular notes will designate an anonymous name from individuals that chose not to remain anonymous. All notes with names and dates were modified for those wishing to remain anonymous. I used newspaper articles to understand the degree of violence or corruption and police malfeasance on a qualitative level. This was important for the historical context. I also relied on academic writing on police malfeasance to build on the historical data. Absent surveys and statistics, this was the only way to establish a pattern of malfeasance through time.

The primary online data source that I used was police websites. The police themselves often post significant amounts of information regarding police welfare, development, and oversight structures. In addition, police websites include a vast amount of contact information that I utilized to engage in e-mail correspondences with several officers. These correspondences confirmed or elaborated on key features of these three institutions, providing richer detail for the theoretical argument at hand. Both Colombia and Chile had freedom of information systems to send queries to appropriate government officials. This also provided me with further evidence.

When available, I used data from surveys to understand changes in police malfeasance through time. The Latin American Public Opinion Project and Transparency International corruption perception surveys provide useful insight into police behavior along the two types of malfeasance being addressed, that being corruption and abuse. However, the negative police behavior “malfeasance” can be indirectly observed by studying the aggregate level of citizen trust in police as well. That being the case, this dissertation also employs indicators from the Latino-Barometro, Iberobarometro, and World Values Survey.

I have travelled to Chile, Colombia, and Mexico to gather material and interviews. I was in field from October 2012 to January of 2013 in Chile. I gathered material documentary material from the National Archive of Chile. I also took advantage of Chile’s freedom of information act to solicit information and e-mail correspondences from various parts of the Carabineros. I assembled book materials from various academics in Chile. I made expeditions to Valparaiso and Temuco from my base in Santiago. This dissertation assimilates only a few of the 35 interviews I conducted in Chile with officers, academics, politicians and security experts in the field. In addition to this information, I was able to take a tour of the 36th Commissary in La Florida in December of 2013 with ALTUS, a group focused on improving citizen police relations throughout the world. Beyond these sources of hard data, I was also able to witness several student mobilizations while I was in the country first hand in Plaza Italia and La Alameda around the University of Chile.

I was in Colombia from February to May of 2013. The data I gathered from this field trip included archival information, interviews, descriptive statistics, and survey data.

I gathered some material from the Centro Estrategico de Direccionamiento Institucional Historico Virtual, April 19, 2013. I also took advantage of Colombia's freedom of information act to solicit information and e-mail correspondences from various parts of the National Police. I assembled book materials from various academics in Colombia. I made expeditions to Medellin and Cartagena from my base in Bogota. This paper assimilates only a few of the twenty-seven interviews I conducted in Colombia with officers, academics, politicians and security experts in the field. In addition to this information, I was able to undertake a small survey with thirty-seven officers studying at the Police Post Graduate School in May 2013. The sampled group have graduated from their third-year course officer training at the Escuela de Cadetes de Policia General Santander. I was hosted in Medellin by Lieutenant Colonel Yed Milton Lopez, who provided me with an inside view of the institution there.

I was in Mexico from September 2 through September 25 of 2014. The data I gathered from the trip included interviews with NGOs and academics. I also made extensive use of Mexico's freedom of information act to gather information on Municipal, State and Federal police agencies. The remainder of the data for Mexico was made up of secondary sources such as the JusticiaBarometer, and data from INEGI, the national statistics research organization.

Roadmap of Dissertation

This dissertation is laid out in five chapters. In the present chapter I have discussed the literature, concepts, theory and methods. Chapter 2 studies the evolution of Chilean

policing from 1833 to 2012, and finds that as the system moved from local and occupational organization to a national and professional system, the level of police malfeasance decreased. Chapter 3 studies policing in Colombia from 1844-2012, and finds that as the system became national and eventually professionalized, police malfeasance decreased. Chapter 4 undertakes a comparative study of the Mexican federal police, state police and municipal police, and finds that centralizing police and professionalizing them, even at the local level, does decrease malfeasance. The concluding chapter compares the findings from these cases, summarizes those findings, underscores the limitations of the project, and concludes with a discussion of research projects that I will undertake to move this research forward.

Conclusion

Police are at the core of a security epidemic facing Latin America and other regions. For instance, in 2006 the president of Mexico, Felipe Calderon, deployed the military against drug cartels ravaging the nation to make up for the weakness of police. This had the dire consequences of resulting in approximately 47,000 deaths due to drug related violence by 2012 (Cave, 2012). In Central America, there are 900 gangs operating with an estimated 70,000 members. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are at the epicenter of the gang crisis. This has led to a massive wave of undocumented children travelling to the United States to flee the violence. In 2004, the estimated murder rate per 100,000 people was 45.9 in Honduras, 41.2 in El Salvador, and 34.7 in Guatemala (Ribando 2010). In South America, the Venezuelan murder rate in 2010 was 67 per 100,000 (BBC, 2011).

These figures illustrate the dire situation facing Latin America. This increased criminality perpetrated by illicit groups threatens the human rights of millions of people in the region and weak policing is responsible for this growth in violence.

The police are a central, albeit sparingly, studied institution in politics. As Brewer (1988: 1) notes, police as a subject of study have “been overlooked or taken for granted, since they are commonly understood to provide the first line of defense against internal disorder.” Police, more than any other institution, embody the state itself. In Weberian terminology, it is the police who ought to apply and manage the legitimate use of force within a given territory. Failed states that cannot provide security are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, contested bitterly by warring factions, and cannot deliver public goods (Rotberg 2003, 5). Although police are central to politics and the state, we do not know enough about it, how it changes, persists or evolves over time. We also know little of how structural and institutional changes impact the overall quality of police behavior. Of course there are criminal justice studies that focus on police procedures and compare police systems, but more abstracted theories of how structure is linked to police behavior are limited. Much of the literature that does exist privileges the study of western liberal democracies, with little attention to paid towards the developing world.

Police are important for a well-functioning democracy. Governments that cannot address crime lose legitimacy and limit citizen’s ability to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the political process (Rotberg 2003, 3-4). Paul Shemella notes, police are in charge of both public and citizen security necessary for democratic governance. According to David H. Bayley (2001, 14), democratic policing is predicated on four norms:

1) protecting and serving individual citizens and private groups is their top priority; 2) they are accountable to the rule of law; 3) they protect human rights; and 4) they are transparent in their actions. Other scholars echo similar understandings. De Mesquita Neto defines democratic policing as “a form of policing in which the police are accountable to the law and the community, respect the rights and guarantee the security of all citizens in a non-discriminatory manner” (as quoted in Haberfeld & Gideon, 2008, 8). As O’Donnell has professed, “the rule of law is among the essential pillars upon which any high-quality democracy rests,” and I claim, police are at the core of the state’s ability to uphold the democratic rule of law. Furthermore, Meg Ruthenburg and Joseph Tulchin note that an individual’s ability to exercise their citizenship is “curtailed by a weak rule of law, evidenced by police misconduct and ineffective legal systems, while their political rights are hindered by imperfect institutions.”

I am interested in why some police forces are malfeasant. By learning how to control the threat of malfeasant police behavior there can be great strides in strengthening security, democracy and the quality of life of millions of people. The following chapter begins to test these arguments by taking a historical approach to Chilean policing.

CHAPTER II: “The Historical Development of the Chilean Carabineros”

Introduction

Chile faced many challenges in 1990 when the Dictator General Augusto Pinochet handed power back to civilian leaders after 17 years; there was increased inequality, rising crime, and a police force (the Carabineros de Chile) that had been involved in the systematic disappearances of Chileans. Today, Chile boasts the most trusted and professional police force in Latin America. What changes were made to achieve this despite the legacy associated with the Carabineros? I found that civilian administrations had to re-establish the professionalization of the police force that had been damaged during Pinochet’s era, while attempting to address the nefarious legacy of human rights abuses. In the process of giving Chile a historical treatment, I discovered that early in the 20th century, it had a generalized problem with malfeasance due to a decentralized system that limited professionalization. I investigated both of these periods thoroughly to construct a longitudinal case study analysis that traces jurisdictional structure, work model, and malfeasance through time.

This chapter engages in the analysis of 6 periods in Chilean policing from 1833-1891, 1891-1896, 1896-1927, 1927-1973, 1973-1990, and 1990-2014. After the analysis, the hypotheses being studied will be analyzed. Before delving into the analysis, I want to introduce a timeline that you will find useful in keeping track of the historical changes occurring to policing below

Figure 5 A Historical Timeline of Police in Chile from independence to 2012





Table 9: Summary of Findings of Chilean Police History

Chile	Development	Jurisdiction	Work Model	Militarized	Insecurity	Culture Corrupt	Regime	Malfeasance
1833-1891	Post Independence	NAT	OCC	No	High	Yes	Democracy	High
1891-1896	Pure Communal Police	LOC	OCC	No	High	Yes	Democracy	High
1896-1927	Communal Police	LOC	OCC	No	High	Yes	Democracy	High
1896-1927	Fiscal Police	LOC-NAT	SEMI	No	Low	Yes	Democracy	Medium
1896-1927	Gendermeria Police	NAT	PRO	Yes	High	Yes	Democracy	Low
1927-1973	Early Period	NAT	PRO	Yes	Low	Yes-No	Democracy	Medium-Low
1973-1989	Under Dictatorship	NAT	OCC	Yes	Medium	No	Military Dictatorship	High
1990-2013	Under Democracy	NAT	PRO	Yes	Low	No	Democracy	Low

The timetable on the previous page should provide you a clear and concise synopsis of what is to follow. The table below illustrates the types of police, their relative level of malfeasance, and the years which together highlights the shifts between independent variables and dependent variables through time.

To further guide your reading of this chapter, the table above indicates the variables being tested in study across time and through the longitudinal cases. Although a discussion of these variables will wait until the end of the chapter, I wanted to present in summary, what this chapter is about and what it is going to tell you. What follows is a historical account that traces the changes in police systems and subsequent behavior of police in each type of police institution.

Figure 6: Evolution of Policing in Chile 1833-2014



Historical Background: Policing Post Independence 1826-1833

General Bernardo O'Higgins liberates Chile from Spain in 1817. At the outset the independence movement did "little for the police of the cities, which is to say, for the police of Santiago, the only city that existed at that time" (McKenna 1875, 23). In 1822 O'Higgins formalized a group of called *Los Serenos*, comprised of 85 individuals who kept watch from sunset to sunrise in Santiago. In 1825 Ramon Freire, who had taken over after O'Higgins, noted that the Serenos were in disarray and needed to be reorganized (Miranda 1997, 61). By 1829 the police had still not been professionalized and the criminal situation in Santiago had only gotten worse. In 1830, the Interior Minister Diego Portales had created the 'Vigilantes de Policia,' made up of 90 men on foot and horseback (Historia de Carabineros Museo de Carabineros 2012, 9). The policing duties were divided between the 'Serenos' as the night watch and 'Vigilantes' as the day watch, two separate forces that switched duties at sunrise and sunset. This police force was particular to the city, not well trained, poorly paid, and largely an occupational position.

Nevertheless, there was a growing demand for their occupational services, however imperfect they were. The government spread this occupational model of police force throughout the country under the control of a centralized government. This early police force had many problems. For instance, an article in the daily *El Araucano* No. 88 titled "The Police" on 19 of May in 1832 revealed "that the police lacked the necessary resources and manpower. Without resolving the funding question the poor police service would continue to plague the city and, indeed, other cities in the country" (in Miranda 1997, 97).

On the 23 of October of 1835, the parliament passed a law that authorized the president to distribute police throughout the country, and to fund and control those cities that already had them (Becerra 1997, 98). On December 27th of 1850 the police forces of *Serenos* and *Vigilantes* were unified and formed the Brigada de Policia de Santiago with 470 personnel (Historia de Carabineros 2012, 9). In the rest of the country, funding local police would remain a problem. For instance, in Copiapo and Concepcion neighbors had to pay out of pocket to hire the necessary police (Miranda 1997, 139). In other cities like Valparaiso, the government needed to provide additional funding from the national treasury. However, the need for police increased with urbanization. During this period police forces sprang up in various cities including Cauquenes, Los Angeles, Copiapo, Vicuña, San Felipe and La Serena (Miranda 1997, 139), all under control of local intendants, who were named and controlled by the president. These police lacked two structural features that I argue are important. First, the system was only semi-centralized, as there was not a national body that had direct control over policing in the country. Instead, police development happened at the municipal level with national funds, but was still under the direction of locally appointed mayors that were accountable to the president. Hence, the system was semi-centralized, but only in terms of funding that was itself inadequate. The intendants seeking to maintain their jobs, would use the local police during elections to support the party of the president. Hence, this local control with national funding still replicates a decentralized model of policing. This precludes the development of professional police that would also reduce malfeasance.

By 1855 this system was already having a hard time moving forward in the development of police services. The lack of the necessary funding for the police and poor pay made the recruitment of quality candidates difficult. Complaints circulated amongst the public due to the abuse of police (Miranda 1997, 144). In 1872, intendant [Mayor] Benjamin Vicuña McKenna reorganized police security of Santiago as a consequence of seeing former convicts walking the streets of the capital as police officers. McKenna noted, in 1875, that “as a general sentiment, the police and their agents for our people [Chileans] are repulsive and are seen as having bad attitudes and whose actions tarnishes, annoys and angers”(1875, 3).

McKenna continues, “I know one thousand Santiaguinos who would rather give the guardians of security a kick; and for each thousand of these [...], we are sure to find ten thousand more who would give the representative of authority [police] a punch before giving them” some help (1875, 3). The hatred with the police was rooted in the fact that they abused their power and were corrupt and the source of the problem was poor welfare standards and political appointments of police. McKenna remarked, as the mayor of Santiago he would see every day people who want to work as a police officer who state that they have come to this “last recourse of misery, after having exhausted all other means of earning an honorable living (1875, 23). Indeed, the individuals in society looked at the occupation of ‘police officer’ not with honor, but thought of it as a curse or a kind of mangle (McKenna 1875, 23). The reason for this was that police pay was low and welfare was non-existent. As a result of poor welfare to attract quality candidates, recruitment was

poor, and weak local oversight produced conditions conducive to increasing both abuse and corruption.

Overall, this post-independence period of policing was rife with problems. The semi-centralized and occupationally oriented policing system was weak because it functioned as a decentralized police system with local patrimonial interests and this precluded the procurement and use of necessary funding to professional policing through benefits, welfare, and oversight, which was not provided. Had the government taken advantage of its centralized structure of the police and dedicated more funds for professionalization, it should have also seen lower malfeasance. But the government did not do that, and the evidence indicates that the police during this period was often more criminal than professional.

Table 10: Chilean Police 1833-1891

Years	1833-1891
Period Name	Post-Independence
Jurisdiction	Semi-national
Work Model	Occupational
Militarized	No
Insecurity	High
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	High

Decentralized and Occupational Police System: A Short Lived Experiment 1891-1896.

The police prior to 1891 had been used by the incumbent presidents to manipulate electoral results, indicating a high degree of political corruption that the police took part in. The president used the police positions as a spoil to be awarded to political supporters.

Anyone accepting these positions was engaged in a corrupt act, as they were awarded their positions, not based on merit, but based on political loyalty. Although the system was semi-centralized, it did not reduce malfeasance, and this is because the next step of professionalizing the police was never taken. Of course police positions would be awarded, not earned, because political leaders had not provided increased benefits, development, and oversight structure required to promote professionalization.

In 1888, the legislator Manuel José Irrarázabal y Larraín, having been impressed by law enforcement in Europe, sought to mimic the police model in Chile. His argument was that in Europe, local control had brought the police closer to the citizens and had rendered better policing. On December 22 of 1891, congress passed the “Law on Organization and Powers of Municipalities,” referred to as ‘Ley de Communas Autonomas’ (hereafter LAC). The law divided the country into 267 municipalities with the ultimate purpose of impeding presidential power to control elections vis-à-vis their police, and thought that giving the cities control over police and elections would stymie political corruption seen in the post-independence presidencies (Ley Communa Autonoma, 1891).

In practice, however, this measure suffered from serious problems because local elites used police to control elections and their outcomes. The primary goal of the LAC was to curb presidential power to intervene in local politics. LAC gave municipalities the responsibility to organize and sustain a security police. The commander or prefect of the security police would be named annually by the president of the republic as from a list proposed by the respective municipality, who were then able to reelect that same person.

But the decree did not regulate who got nominated as police commanders, how they were trained, or how they were paid.

Along with the decentralization of police services came the decentralization of the electoral process, also once controlled by the office of the president. This dual process would prove to be a toxic combination and “resulted in complete failure, whose negative effects were particularly felt in the scope of police functions. The police throughout the country were now controlled by municipalities who [...] have made these bodies a powerful instrument at the service of political interests” (Miranda 185, 1997).

Through municipal elections, police chiefs and officers would be completely overhauled when elections brought new candidates into power. Vera noted that the “constant variation of police endangered [public security].” The recruitment of police officers was also deficient. For instance, Vera (1899) notes that it was common for police institutions to “bring in the first people they see on street to apply for the police, and make them into police.” Indeed, Vera noted that in the municipal police it was common that overnight individuals were made “chiefs and officers, that before had not belonged to any police and did not have any preparation for the charge they were exercising” (Vera 1899, 14). Not only was recruitment a problem, but so too were the low welfare benefits and oversight. But the problem was that most municipalities had insufficient funds and should have received state subsidies (Prieto 1996, 5). Corruption had discredited police in many communities and the police lacked efficiency, were poorly funded, poorly trained, poorly paid, and were severely understaffed (Prieto 1996, 5)

In short, the inability of the decentralized police system to address rampant security threats “forced the government to mobilize army troops to fulfill the duties that police would not” or could not undertake (Miranda 190, 1997).

A report elaborated by a government commission was presented in the congress on February 5 of 1896 noted that a major problem plaguing all police in Chile was the lack of funds throughout the various cities in the country severely impeded the maintenance of police. Because the police were poorly funded, they were unable to fulfill arrest warrants or to help judicial authorities collect evidence. In many cases, they willfully chose to ignore those requests (Miranda 190, 1997).

By way of summarizing this period, I want to note that the decentralized model that placed control over police in the hands of local authorities resulted in higher abuse of power in general, and specifically with political corruption of police, by asking them to manipulate elections and to gain office through the spoils system. This experiment was a clear failure to the Chilean people and required immediate action. The purely decentralized and demilitarized system only lasted from 1891 to 1896, when more centralized law enforcement bodies were developed. We will now turn our attention to the period of 1896 to 1927 when three institutional frameworks of policing were used at once.

Table 11: Chile 1891-1896

Years	1891-1896
Period Name	Pure Communal Police
Jurisdiction	Local
Work Model	Occupational
Militarized	No
Insecurity	High
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	High

1896-1927 A Mixed Policing Era

There was a civil war in Chile in 1891 that produced significant challenges to security in Chile. First, the demobilized and defeated soldiers took to the countryside to become bandits, using their military knowledge to overpower and overwhelm small police forces or villages without police. Thus, Chile experienced a period where armed groups were a significant threat at the same time as having a weak policing system. Crime and banditry in the countryside, and especially in the southern regions, was on the rise. Roads that connected major cities were constantly under attack.

The state had three responses. The first was to pay for and control the police forces in major cities. These came to be called *fiscal police* because they were fiscally linked to the central government. This created a centralized and civilian police institution in major cities, while maintaining a decentralized civilian police institution in the rest of the cities. A second undertaking was a process developing a centralized and militarized law enforcement institution in the countryside and remote areas of the country. A third response was a non-response by allowing smaller municipalities to retain their own police forces as before. As a result, three competing models of policing were in place from 1896-

1927: a hybrid institution, a national civilian police institution, and various municipal police institutions. All things being equal, this provides a useful point of comparison for the three models. Organizationally, what follow are three discussions that occur in the same time and space. Thus, three parallel storylines are about to be presented. They will span from 1891-1927. First I will discuss the *communal police*, *fiscal police*, and the *gendermeria*.

The Communal Police System

The problems with this police force started early in 1891 at its birth. As Vera noted, the control over police had been given to municipal mayors and very quickly it became evident how dangerous this arrangement had become (1899, 29). The municipally based *communal police* came to be controlled by local mayors and was used inappropriately. Because of the political nature of policing at the municipal level, there was no emphasis on professionalization, and as a result police service was filled with illiterate individuals who lacked any training or experience. Another problem was the lack of funds to pay for police, and provide the necessary development, welfare and oversight regimes. Therefore, it became impossible for a vast majority of the police to provide efficient services that communities demanded. To stop this situation, in repeated opportunities, the state had to provide money to the cities (Carabineros Manual de Doctrina).

By 1899 it became clear that the communal police were failing at providing security. In an essay discussing the need to reform the nation's police system, scholar Rebastiano Vera wrote that in the urban setting of 1899 police were often "discourteous

and disrespectful with the public and from here is where hatred towards the police arises” (Vera 1899, 14). Vera continues to describe the generally poor behavior of the police and called for an end to “those horrifying scenes that happen all the time in front of us, like the drunk patrolmen on the street or in their offices, other ones abusing of their service weapons and beating or injuring defenseless people, and even befriending thieves and hiding their crimes in exchange for a small ‘tip’ [bribe] (Vera 1899, 19). Based on this description, the *communal police* in Chile at this time suffered from high levels of malfeasance.

As Vera (1899, 20) remarks, “the people hate[d] the police to death, because they [were] cruel with citizens, because they [were] arbitrary and unjust and because they [did] not know how to carry out their work on the street. In 1896 police in the capital city and other large cities became centrally funded by the government, but this did little for the smaller communal police forces that remained funded by local taxes. The result was asymmetrical: there were substantially more police in larger cities than in poorer smaller cities and rural areas. For instance, by 1900-1902, Santiago had 2,213 police officers funded and controlled by the central government—it was by far the largest police force in Chile. The second largest was the Valparaíso police with 826 police personnel (Prieto 1996, 5). Prieto (1996) estimates that in 1900 there was a total of 5,814 total police officers in the whole of Chile. This translates to an estimated 52% of all police officers in the country that were concentrated in Valparaíso and Santiago.

For instance, a municipality outside of Santiago in 1912-1913 called La Granja, had its own police department and did not get any money from the central government to fund its police. In 1912, 73 % of La Granja’s taxes went to the police force of 20 men

(Memoria 1912, 4). In 1913, police expenditures represented 66% of its annual budget (Memoria de La Granja 1914, 6). To put this into context, La Granja spent 66,828 pesos on police, while it only spent 1,000 pesos on public education and about 3,000 on public roads (Memoria de La Granja 1914, 6). Instead of providing money for those other services, the community had to spend most of its money on the police force. The worst part was that the amount they did spend on the police was insufficient to create a professional body.

La Granja could hardly afford to adequately develop police officers and provide them with adequate pay and benefits. For this reason, it was difficult to keep police in service. From 1912 to 1913 there was a total of 53 personnel changes. That is, 53 people quit being police officers from 1912-1913; on average a police officer would only last 6 months on the job (Memoria de La Granja 1914, 7).

Another important example in 1907 was the community of Tarapaca. In that region, security was a major problem in the early 1900s. In July of 1907 the province of Tarapaca had one prefect, two sub commissioners, five inspectors, 16 sub-inspectors and 254 guardians, 166 who lived in the barracks and 88 who worked in the countryside. The majority of them had no uniforms, only 44 had guns, and police training was deficient (Memoria Nortina). In 1907 the prefect (police chief) complained to the mayor that the appointment of police officers through political ‘recommendations’ did not provide competent “police personnel to provide for good service and instead led to the denigration of the institution with the added threat that those same officials, because of ignorance, fall into illegal activities” (Memoria Nortina). This reinforces that communal police were not only subject to political whims, but also to abuse of power for their own criminal benefit.

At the beginning of 1907 the newspaper, 'El Tarapaca', had an article called 'The Dangers in Tarapaca' that expressed the fear that people had in the province. The writer argued that the lack of security was aggravated by the malfeasant behavior committed by the police, the proliferation of crimes, and the arrival in the region of anarchists, all of which created a high level of uncertainty of the future for the province. In his analysis "Tarapaca is a time bomb, a territory where, if nobody does anything, can be the source of a revolution that the country would regret" (Memoria Nortina 2013).

Due to the stress of the job, poor pay and politicization of the vocation, police were often involved in abuse of power and corrupt activities. Policing in other remote areas fared much worse. Many communal police "were not able to maintain security in the countryside and military entities were created that were tasked with addressing the increasing problem of banditry at the end of the 19th century" (Tamayo 2012, 129-130). The nature of the communal police "had fragmented the power of the state throughout the country and thus damaged national security" (Tuozzo, 1999, 33). The use of the local police as a mechanism of electoral intervention, corruption of all kinds, and irregularities in the electoral process continued well into the 1920s.

The problem associated with communal police at this time prompted the government to launch an investigative inquiry into the matter by soliciting "information from intendants and governors with respect to the behavior of the municipal police. All of these functionaries unanimously agreed that since the municipal governments took over, policing had become worse" (Rios 1914, 27). The information revealed that in the "majority of the cases, these local authorities paid little attention to the police that it

deserves, which resulted in the frequent use of police officers in areas of work that were completely different from those assigned to them by law” (Rios 1914, 27).

Rios does not back down on his criticism. He argues that the communal police believed they “are real sultans and abuse their position and weapons” (Rios 1914, 28). In Rios’ analysis, there were four major reasons for police malfeasance of that era that reinforce the argument being made in this dissertation. The first is that the “constant fluctuation of police personnel endanger the service” (Rios 1914, 28). Linking the police budgets to local municipal tax bases that fluctuated from year to year resulted in booms and busts in police personnel from year to year. This promoted work instability that made being a police officer an undesirable option for many.

Second, “these employees are not chosen from the people most well prepared to undertake this difficult work” (Rios 1914, 28). It was common that “new police chiefs and officers who have never had any police experience, and who have not received any preparation except for their connection to an influential political caudillo, are suddenly made into police” (Rios 1914, 28). Because the police were under the control of local political bosses, the selection was based on loyalty rather than objective qualifications. This also implies that oversight from the top down was lacking because both commanders and troops were not trained in basic military discipline and hierarchical command that would provide at least a modicum of oversight that was just not present in communal police at this time.

A third reason is the “poor salary” (Rios 1914, 30) that was often less than what an average industrial or farm laborer could earn for a day’s work. Fourth is the “the lack of a

professional future for police: few are the individuals who would dare give their service that places their lives in danger because they have the knowledge that if they die in their post, the state will not even bother to provide a small pension to help out their family” (Rios 1914, 31). This is related to the complete lack or miniscule police welfare that protected them in the short and long term. There was little medical coverage, little in terms of pensions, and little in terms of other fringe benefits. But again, this is all linked to the fact that local governments could not afford to build these systems on their own. They scarcely had enough to give the police a meager salary.

Late in 1922, an article in the newspaper *El Mercurio* on November 22nd stipulated that “the communal police do not serve their purpose, as they were infected by the village politics; [...] enough statistics have already found that these policemen are absolutely useless to fight crime: and in practice the police have become the criminals” (El Mercurio 1922). This illustrates that police malfeasance was not an anomaly born out of colonial origins or the fact that Chile was an agrarian nation. The causal link, I argue, was that police were too expensive, and that the cost to develop a quality police force was prohibitive at the local level, but not necessarily at the national level where economies of scale could provide excellent returns on investment into the police. The newspaper 'Valparaiso Star' joined the voices criticism of the Communal Police, when it published that "in the villages and fields communal police [...] are disorganized and undisciplined, and they only have a vague appearance of police and in reality pose a danger to the public" (Valparaiso Star 1922).

The overall qualitative data in this sub-section reveals that the communal police era promoted higher malfeasance than the previous period as manifested by daily abuses, political corruption, links to criminal activity, and susceptibility to receive bribes. What this system also promoted was security gaps that gave criminals room to maneuver and escape, much like Mexico of today. Banditry was plaguing rural areas and became a serious problems for commerce amongst cities. The communal police “saw themselves unable to stop communal crimes. Meanwhile, in cases where communal police were completely overwhelmed, the local government had to call in the Armed Forces” (Navarrete 2000, 106).

The experiment of a pure decentralized police system only lasted from 1891 to 1896 — a total of 5 years. Chileans demanded professional protection. From 1896 forward, the communal police would continue to operate, but they would do so alongside a more militarized, professionalized and centralized police institution of the *gendarmerie* and a centralized and civilian institution of the fiscal police. The hope was that these other systems would bolster security. And they did. This increase in security theoretically provided municipal police with space to breathe and room to grow and develop. But the span from 1891 to 1927 revealed that in 36 years, police malfeasance amongst the communal police system was high throughout. Meanwhile, it was largely outperformed by the alternative models, which are discussed in the following two sections.

Table 12: Chilean Communal Police 1896-1927

Years	1896-1927
Period Name	Communal Police
Jurisdiction	Local
Work Model	Occupational
Militarized	No
Insecurity	High
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	High

The Fiscal Police

The *fiscal police* are called this because the central government treasury, in Spanish ‘El Fiscal’, paid the salary and budget of these police forces. In 1892, the Santiago Police Department was the only fiscal police, but that would change in 1896 when Chile’s major cities saw their police forces come under the control and funding of the central government, and hence were thereafter referred to as the *fiscal police*. As a point of reference, for all *fiscal police*, this chapter discusses the Santiago Fiscal Police from 1892-1923 as more information is available about this prominent police force than any other fiscal police, and all other locally based police forces were modeled after its organization.

The Santiago Police department in 1891, under the Communal Law system, had 900 police personnel (Miranda 1997, 185). However, the personnel number should be looked at with suspicion as there were probably never 900 police officers on the job at any given time. The reason was that there was constant and great personnel fluctuation due to the lack of interest for these jobs as well as a lack of funding (Miranda 1997, 186). The urgent need for police resulted in police being sent to the streets that had not been prepared at all for this work, and who quickly quit due to poor pay and to the fact that there was no

long term job security. Every year changes to the municipal budget would lead to the cyclical increase or decrease of police positions meaning that a good proportion of police from year to year could find themselves out of work. Few were willing to undertake this dangerous profession without having their labor conditions secure.

For instance, in January of 1892, the number of police personnel was increased by 1,500, but only for the summer months of January, February and March when crime traditionally peaks in any society. However, for the rest of the year, those 1,500 individuals would have to look for jobs elsewhere. Who wants to work for only 3 out of 12 months a year? Individuals decided that working in other industries year round was a better proposition and that being a police officer, with low pay and high risk for only 3 months, was a losing proposition. Additionally, in 1894, President Montt temporarily increased the police force by 1,500, but just for that year (Miranda 1997, 186). Again the fact that the city needed more police officers, but could not afford them would be a problem that not only Santiago would face, but also much of the country as well. This was especially true in poorer regions. By 1896, the majority of municipalities saw themselves unable to pay for public goods, including policing (Miranda 1997, 186).

In some ways, having ineffective malfeasant police was tolerable in smaller communities, but not in the larger ‘cabeceras’ that are the equivalent of capital cities of the various departments. For the good of commerce, the rule of law had to be instituted in these capital cities. Thus, the government on February 12, 1896 issued Law 344, dictating that all police in department capitols would be financed by the national treasury and controlled by the presidentially appointed governors or intendants as authorized by the

Interior Ministry. Meanwhile “all other police, under Law of Municipalities of 1891, would remain under local mayoral control” (Rios 27, 1914). They were thereafter referred to as *communal police* to denote their local linkage (Manual de Doctrina Carabineros 39-40). Prefects now depended directly from the government and could not be removed by the governors (Prieto 1996, 5).

The fiscal police were to be organized and led by the President of the republic in accordance with the Santiago Police Organization Regulation (SPOR). To be admitted as a guardian, a person was required to be between 20 and 45 years of age, had never been jailed, had high moral character and good aptitude for service, was in good health with a robust constitution, know how to read and right, and be vaccinated. Although, it does stipulate that the age and literacy requirements are not necessary if the candidate has manifested tools useful to the service. Hence, recruitment standards were fair, albeit not stringent, as police should definitely know how to read and write to do their job well.

Article 54 of the SPOR notes the punishments that can be placed on police depending on the infraction to regulations starting with verbal warning, then arrest for up to a month where the person would have to remain in the barracks when off duty, withholding salary for up to a month, and ultimately the separation and expulsion of the service. Offenses that merit expulsion include: drinking on the job, insubordination, cruelty, abandoning of positions, not following orders, and immoral behavior or debts that prohibit the proper functioning (Honorato and Urzúa 1923, 109). However, this early police force, while having some recruitment standards and oversight, still suffered some major setbacks.

Although the law mandated a requirement of 2,197 police personnel, in June of 1896 there were only 1,673, meaning that there was a deficit of 604 administrative and operational elements. There were three important reasons for this gap. First, as Honorato and Urzua (1923) note, the lack of funding meant that the full contingent of police was always in flux and in deficit. The police found that many good police officers would refuse to renew their contracts into the force, which together with the individuals kicked out for bad behavior, made it impossible to reach the due efficiency and preparation of the personnel (Honorato and Urzúa 1923, 275). This is important because it revealed that there was not a high demand to become a police officer, or else the positions would have been filled and contracts extended. The demand was missing because there was no welfare for police to attract candidates.

These problems persisted from 1896 to 1901, when there were 2,033 police personnel, with a constant rotation of 1,800 who entered and quit (Miranda 1997, 198). The problem severely affected the Santiago Metropolitan Police in the early 1920s. A problem that arose during this time was that 70% of the lower ranks had a good portion of their salary garnered by the courts (Honorato and Urzua 1923, 275). It turns out that many police agents were forced to borrow money to address a sickness and fell back on their payments, and hence the court garnered their low wages and eventually had to take up other jobs. This illustrates the importance of welfare benefits such as healthcare, pensions, and loans to not only attract candidates, but to also maintain them on the force.

Up until this point, each fiscal police force across the largest cities in the country were funded by the national treasury, but they could be organized, trained and recruited

based on principles laid out by the local governor or intendant. Thus, there were no national standards, and there was great variation. But supreme decree N. 3901 of 1904 changed that and now unified the regulations that all fiscal police had to have. The Santiago Police is the best organized, best funded and largest fiscal police force in the country. Paying keen attention to their level of malfeasance during this time would provide key insight into the general standing of the police across Chile, for which there is evidence, but it is difficult to collect. If the Santiago Police fail to provide adequate service, this would indicate that, in general, similar police services that are fiscally funded from the national treasury also similarly fail to provide adequate policing services free of malfeasance.

By the 1920s, training for a commissioned officer in the Santiago Police department was 9 months long and done at their own police school. To this end, training was improved over the previous system of appointing officers based on political favors alone. The training for these officers was extensive including self-defense, baton use, firing weapons, and legal training.

By 1923 the pay that the lowest rank received 6 pesos per day (Honorato and Urzúa 1923, 286). This is lower than someone who works as an electric street car driver who earned 8 or 9 pesos per day at the time. In this sense, police work was slightly undervalued for the service they provided. An arguably safer job of being a street car driver is paid better than that of a life risking position. These problems plagued the police system's occupational model. Thus, these jobs would only attract lower skilled labors. For this reason, institutional problems would persist not only in the Santiago police, but also elsewhere in the country.

The low salary would not be a problem if the government mitigated it by providing a social safety net that would guarantee labor and economic stability. But by the 1920's we do not see the government developing these essential programs for *fiscal police*; rather, it is the police officers who start developing their own safety nets from their paltry salaries. For instance, in 1921 the police hospital was created with 113 beds that could address 125 sick individuals at a time. This hospital was funded by the public and the Santiago Police, but not from the Chilean National Treasury (Miranda 1997, 195). That is, the hospital was built using internal funds from the police themselves without the funding support of the national administration.

Honorato and Urzúa (1923, 267) go on to note the insufficient welfare condition of officers. There was no government life insurance for police engaged in this type of work—a basic standard of any professional police force. Instead, there was an ad hoc system set up by the police themselves. If a police officer was killed, 50 cents would be taken out of the salary of each individual police officer, resulting in a lump payment of 1,350 pesos to the family of the deceased. If a high ranking officer passed away, the members of the mutual life insurance were to pay 4 payments of 40 cents, or a dollar sixty, with the sum total payment of 13,000 pesos to the family members of the deceased high ranking officer. But again, the important note to make here is that the social safety net was not created by the government, but rather created amongst the police officers themselves.

One area where the government did try to help the police was Law 1840 of February 12, 1906, which provided pensions for incapacitation or for retirement. Article 3 noted that incapacitated police officers would receive 100% of their last salary as their pension if they

served 10 years or more, and 50% if they served less than 10 years. Normal retirement took into account the last salary of the officer under the following equation (last salary * (years of service/30)). Thus, a person serving 30 years would receive 100% of their salary (1906 Recopilacion).

In terms of oversight, there was an extensive regulatory body in place to sanction officer behavior, but that would not matter because the lack of appropriate sequencing. The machine of developing non-malfeasant police requires benefits to attract candidates, training and selection to weed out weak candidates and instill internal controls and a strong oversight mechanism including strong hierarchy, internal investigations, and judicial bodies. In the end, the poor benefits and pay made the job at fiscal police undesirable. Hence, they had a constant fluctuation of troop level officers who saw no benefit to staying in the police force that pays poorly, and if they die, doesn't provide adequate life insurance to their families. Although the police in Santiago were making some headway in the right direction, their evolution would not be fast enough to maintain a well-run and professional force. As a result, both corruption and abuse were still at very high levels in the institution.

As revealed by Honorato and Urzúa (1923, 275), the police, although having rigorous selection of personnel, was not able to purge the institution from certain kinds of malfeasance. For instance in 1912, a Civic Action League was established with the support of all the Santiago press agencies to end the "gambling houses that proliferated under the protection of the police. There were allegations in the press and in parliament of police corruption, the use of torture of detainees, drinking on duty, bad treatment to citizens and many other signs of lack of professionalism" (Prieto 1996, 5).

In 1917 the newspaper La Opinion, “accused sub-prefect of police in Santiago Eugenio Rodríguez Castro of being the promoter and covering up a long list of crimes and severe administrative irregularities. That ranged from the using of criminals as police agents, extortion of gambling dens, corruption of children and acts of terrorism. It was alleged that between 1908 and 1917 he "fabricated" several dynamite attacks on churches, railways, private homes and attributed them to anarchist groups” (Prieto 1996, 4). Retired Colonel Henry Phillips launched a media campaign through La Opinion, a newspaper article entitled “Reorganization the police.” Phillips blamed the Santiago police prefect, Nicholas Yávar, of corruption, accusing him of having a former criminal as an officer (Prieto 1996, 4). President-elect Juan Luis Sanfuentes promised to make a judicial inquiry and correct the corruption of the police, but this was done unsuccessfully (Prieto 1996, 4).

These problems were generalized throughout the country. As such there was mounting pressure to further centralize the police by fusing them into one chain of command with one set of regulations. In 1924 all 23 *fiscal police* of the country were fused, creating the General Direction of Police under the Interior Ministry through Law 4052 of September 8th 1924, unifying all *fiscal police* with a civilian character (Historia de Carabineros 2012, 10).

In that year Tacna, Tarapaca, Antofagasta and Atacama were grouped into Zone 1. Zone 2 united Valparaíso, Coquimbo and Aconcagua Police. Zone 3 was made up of the Santiago Police. Zone 4 had the O’Higgins, Colchagua, Curico, Talca, Linares and Maule Police. Zone 5 had the Ñuble, Concepción, Arauco and Bio Bio. Zone 6 had Malleco, Cautín, Valdivia, Llanquihue and Chiloé. The unification allowed the establishment of

recruitment standards throughout the country. However, the unified fiscal police would only last until 1927 when they were incorporated into a militarized and centralized body called the Carabineros.

Although the fiscal police and its centralization at the national level was moving in the right direction, there was still much left to be desired in terms of police abuse and police corruption. That is, the development, welfare and oversight regimes were not strong enough to overcome problems of drunkenness on the job, abuse of weapons and corruption that the fiscal police still exhibited. Malfeasance of this level would only disappear once the police engaged in enhancing the professionalism vis-à-vis model that made training, discipline and oversight stricter. The development would come in 1927 following a professional and centralized model of policing that also started in 1896, and which is the subject of the next section.

Table 13: Chilean Police Fiscal from 1896-1927

Years	1896-1927
Period Name	Fiscal Police
Jurisdiction	Local-National
Work Model	Semi-Professional
Militarized	No
Insecurity	Low
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	Medium

The Colonial Gendermeria and the Carabineros Regiment

Major cities were covered by the *fiscal police* to some extent, but the countryside was still dominated by bandits and highwaymen who took advantage of the power vacuum established by the Municipal Law of 1891 and the weak communal police institutions. To

combat this rising insecurity, a militarized law enforcement body called the *gendermeria* was established in 1896 that focused on the southern Chilean provinces where banditry was most prevalent (Historia de Carabineros 2012, 11). Through Supreme Decree 299 of March 14 1896, Army Captain Hernan Trizano was nominated commissioner of the new ‘Colonial Gendarmerie Corps’. Initially quartered in the southern city of Temuco, the unit was formed by 1 Commissioner, 2 inspectors, 4 sub-inspectors and 50 guardians and was to provide security in the Provinces of Arauco, Malleco, Cautin, Valdivia and Llanque, where the communal police system was too weak to address banditry.

By 1897 the *gendermeria* had proven that they “were effective in their work, providing security and peace to the colonists [...] the success of this group led to the increase of this force by the National Congress” (Miranda 1997, 206). Two additional companies or sections were formed in the region for a total of three sections. Each had a commissioner, two inspectors, 4 sub-inspectors, 10 guardians first class, and 40 guardians second class. These police, it should be noted, did not provide urban policing but were specifically for rural policing and were controlled by the central government through local representatives such as governors or intendants (Miranda 1997, 206). The force of 171 police was lean, but effective in providing security.

In 1900 the Colonial Gendermeria was reorganized yet again and increased in number. Hernan Trizano would become chief of the corps, who, because of his background as an officer in the War of the Pacific and his policing exploits, started to gain mythical notoriety. Besides naming Trizano the Commissioner of all the Gendermeria, each section or commissary was also increased in size (Miranda 1997, 206).

A basic pay for soldier in the gendermeria was 40 pesos per month or 1.34 pesos per day, whereas the average agricultural worker would only earn 1.1 pesos per day (Gonzales 2009, 193). What is important to note about this force is that although pay was above a rural wage, it received little material benefits. The officers did not enjoy a uniform or other material benefits as their military counterparts did. Nevertheless, through Captain Trizano's establishment of strong professional character through training, selection and oversight, the group of men were not only effective, but were also courteous to locals and did not engage in malfeasance.

To be sure, they did engage in firefights, but they were only allowed to discharge their weapon in self-defense. This Colonial Gendarmerie would lose 15 men, but would end up killing 51 bandits and arrested many more (Miranda 1997, 206). Due to the success of these units on May 24 of 1902, President German Riesco ordered the creation of a separate force that was called the 'Gendarmerie Regiment' that was made up of mounted units from the army to combat banditry in other southern provinces of Chile not covered by the Colonial Gendermeria. To be clear, this was a different force from the Colonial Gendarmerie. Although both forces were born out of military men, only the Gendermeria Regiment remained under the control of the military. The Colonial Gendarmerie was controlled by Civilian governors or intendants under the control of the president. They were also relatively better paid than their Colonial Gendarmerie compatriots receiving 59 pesos per month or 1.96 pesos per day in 1902. As a reference point, the average agricultural worker would only earn 1.1 dollars per day at that time (Gonzales 2009, 193).

Although the both the Colonial Gendarmerie and Gendarmerie Regiment had a primary mission to repress banditry and due to their work, civilians in the region came to trust them. In short, the gendarmes were transformed from “simple bandit hunters to true police in rural communities (Tamayo 2012, 129-130). The northern region, rich in nitrates, was also experiencing frontier problems of security. As such, the ‘Regiment of Gendarmes’ reorganized itself under Lt. Colonel of the Army Roberto Daila through Supreme Decree No. 113 on the 5th of February 1906 and came to be called “Regiment of Carabineros” and moved north (Museo Historico de Carabineros de Chile, 2012). On February 23, 1907 President Montt signed Supreme Decree Number 255 that approved a Regulatory Framework for the Service of the Carabineros Regiment that provided for a strong oversight system (Museo Historico de Carabineros de Chile 2012). This centralized and militarized policing institution was not only effective because of its training and ability to share information, but also because of its structural features that promoted the quick and effective strengthening of development, welfare and oversight regulations that were severely lacking in the decentralized civilian communal police system.

In 1907 the “Colonial Gendarmerie” would fuse with the Regiment of Carabineros and thus extended their presence throughout the country. In 1909, the first commander of the body of Carabineros created the first school of Carabineros for aspiring officers to create its own officers, rather than relying on army infantry officers. The recruitment of the officers for this school had to be from retired army officers. On the 10th of September 1919, Law 3547 gave the Carabineros a legal framework, fixed the personnel positions, and provided those pensions and retirement benefits.

Because the development, welfare and oversight are important variables in my theory, I will now spend some time describing the basic aspects of the development, welfare and oversight of Carabineros in this early period. While doing so, keep in mind two things. First, this strong development, welfare and oversight foundation would only be strengthened through time as Carabineros became the only preventative police force in Chile. Meanwhile, also keep in mind that for most communal police (except the fiscal police) there were no recruitment standards, no training, low pay, no material benefits and dubious oversight. Communal police were largely illiterate, given uniforms and set to train on the job. But the Carabineros would be different. Instead, the recruitment of the officer level would be done from among the retired officers from the Army with good records, from among officers from any branch of the military, and among the conscripts from the mounted units who had completed 5 years of education.

Law 3547 Article 1 notes that the "Carabineros is a military institution. It is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of order throughout the territory of the Republic, and in particular, in the fields and public roads." Law 3547 Article 2 grants ultimate control of the Carabineros to the Ministry of the Interior, or when the President deems appropriate, to the Ministry of War. Law 3547 Article 3 states that the body of Carabineros would remain under the laws, norms and regulations of the military when it comes to discipline, training, rank ascendance and sanctioning of crimes that they may commit, and the regulations that the government would dictate to the organization and the distribution of its services. The military disciplinary structure was an effective oversight mechanism that was geared towards observing and sanctioning behavior from the top down. In terms of

recruitment, Article 4 states that the personnel of chiefs and officers would be from: 1) among the retired chiefs and officers of the Army or navy that retired with honor; 2) among the sergeants and individuals with bachelor's degrees, with no more than eight years of service and not older than 30 years of age; 3) among the officers from the military reserves; 4) among the conscripts of the armed mounted units who have completed their 5th year of education. The troops, under article 5, were to be recruited from those that have done their military service with honorable discharge, and those that had not completed their military service. Article 12 states Carabineros that have spent 20 years in public service, and 10 with the Carabineros, will have the right to retire as long as long as they are fiscally or morally unfit to continue service. Article 13 provides for full or partial retirement for injuries sustained in the line of duty.

The average salary of an industrial worker in 1918 was 4.20 pesos per day and in 1919 an agricultural worker could earn up to 2.80 per day (Gonzales 2009). In contrast, the Carabineros would pay 3.28 pesos per day for entry ranks, 3.78 per day for second corporal, and 4.27 pesos per day for first corporals. Thus, an entry job in the Carabineros at the lower ranks proved to be above an agricultural worker's daily wages, but slightly below the average industrial wage laborer. So their pay is on par and slightly above the pay of that of a blue collar laborer depending on rank. Furthermore, industrial workers did not enjoy job security and retirement pension benefits that the Carabineros did at the time. Although the wages at the lower ranks were not stellar, they added benefits of working within the institution that made this position an attractive option for individuals.

Decree Law 283 of February 1925 expanded many benefits for the officers and for the personnel of troops. To that effect, officers who were qualified but could not ascend in rank because lack of space would be given bonuses once they received their new rank to make up for the time having spent at a lower rank. The 2nd lieutenants, upon obtaining their rank, would receive money for clothes, equipment, and other necessary materials. A reward was given for changes of garrison, so that chiefs, officers, civil servants and troops who had to change their garrison because they are transferred, would receive a reward equivalent of one month of salary on the first day of the month (Miranda 197, 1997). The troops that are married or widowed with kids, and who have more than 15 years of service without incurring a bad mark on their record, would have the right to a reward for housing equivalent to 10 percent of their salary.” Decree Law 283 fixed the conditions for retirement of the officers and troops. The first to have the right to retire completely are those who provided more than 30 years of public service with at least 10 years with the Carabineros. For the troops, the right to retire was granted at 25 years of public service, 10 of which had to be with the Carabineros (Miranda 197, 1997). DL 283 would form the foundation of the strong DWO system in 1927 for the Carabineros as a police force going into the future. This, united with the improved entrance requirement of having to read and write, would result in one of the most effective, professional and uncorrupt police forces in Latin America.

What we start seeing during this period is the rise of the Carabineros as the most competent and efficient preventative policing institution in the country. It was built on a foundation of strong recruitment standards, military training, strong welfare benefits and

strict hierarchic oversight endowed by its centralized and militarized character. Because of its military character, “it developed the tactical and technical qualities to provide for public order and protect the country's borders; as a police institution it took responsibility for crime prevention and the safeguarding of the personal security of the citizenry” (Galleguillos 2004, 57-58). The Carabineros “were closer to the average civilian person than was the case with the socially segregated members of the armed forces (army, navy, and air force)” (Galleguillos 2004, 57-58). Despite the fact that the Carabineros were “conceived of as a rural police, it saw plenty of action in the cities as it confronted social protests, investigation work and organizing homeless shelters. This happened, in large part because the communal police failed to address these problems themselves. As such, the military model was looked upon as more efficient at tackling police duties and thus more responsibilities would be loaded on to them” (Tamayo 2012 p.130).

During the period of 1891-1896, Chile faced a security crisis, and to address the crisis the government experimented with several policing models from 1896-1927. The communal policing experiment failed, and the fiscal one was not that much better, but the militarized model made significant progress from 1896-1927. Remember that “one of the main motives for the militarization of the police was the fragile nature of the communal police charged with order and security over the whole past century, which translated into corruption, lack of unity, organization or efficiency throughout the country” (Prieto 1996, 4). Filling this void with a militarized police worked. The Carabineros of 1919 were not necessarily paid at high wages but adequate salary was provided with important elements of welfare benefits. Because they were originally a part of the military, they had the

corollary benefits that came along with the military as well. This included a strong pension for that time, retirement plans, insurance benefits in case of being injured on the job, opportunity to climb in rank, had access to the military warehouse, and were given free housing, all of which gave them long term security. Because the men were recruited from the military, they were already professionally trained. This training process was able to weed out weak individuals and maintain the strong ones that could withstand the pressures of the job. This would reduce turnover rates drastically. The job security and benefits, as well as the mythology surrounding these gentlemen bandit hunters made the job attractive. The selection standards and military training would impart important self-discipline in the ranks and the military hierarchy would also impose strong controls. In addition to being controlled by the hierarchy, the Carabineros would also be subject to military justice tribunals that added an additional layer of control that simply did not exist in communal police who would not be prosecuted as local clientelistic political systems controlled both the police and legal proceedings.

Table 14: Chilean Gendermeria Police 1896-1927

Years	1896-1927
Period Name	Gendermeria Police
Jurisdiction	National
Work Model	Professional
Militarized	Yes
Insecurity	Low
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	Low

Early Carabineros Era 1927-1973

President Alessandri, in a speech given in June 1922, stated that despite the increases in the Carabineros, “there were still not enough Carabineros to fulfill the daily requests received from various parts of the country, and as soon as the circumstances permitted new squadrons were formed in other provinces [so] that each province would have a police unit that would bring peace to rural areas and maintain order in small towns” (Chilean Presidential address 1922).

On March 30th of 1927, Minister of Interior Ibañez gave a speech in the 4th commissary outlining a plan to unite the police forces of Chile. On April 27 of 1927 Ibañez del Campo, signed Decree with Force of Law number 2484. This fused the services of the Policia Fiscal, the Carabineros and the Communal Police, forming their personnel and resources into one single police institution: Carabineros de Chile. This “19,000 strong national police force, Carabineros de Chile, with its high standards of smartness and discipline, came in time to be seen as the finest in Latin America” (Collier and Sater 2004, 217). However, the early history of the Carabineros was fraught with problems, not internal, but external. Society and the economy were at odds. As the country grew in terms of industrialization, workers took to the streets to unionize and demand for increased wages. This set up a series of problems for society as a whole.

But despite the political problems, the Carabineros had been able to continue their strong system of training and oversight that helped them overcome these problems. The period from 1927-1973 also saw increasing advancements in terms of welfare for Carabineros. In terms of healthcare, Carabineros had started to develop a health system in

1927 by annexing 20 beds and 2 private rooms in the Salvador hospital in Santiago for the specific use of Carabineros staff seeking to recuperate from injuries or treatment for other ailments. In 1936, funds and land were set aside to build a hospital specifically for Carabineros. The hospital was completed on April 27th of 1945 who now had access to stable and high quality healthcare (www.generales.cl).

In a parallel fashion, additional laws were passed that helped advance the social well-being of Carabineros. For instance, Supreme Decree 4540 of the 15th of November 1932 built on the 1927 foundation of welfare and advanced it by strengthening pensions and bonuses as well. As time went on different laws like Law 7260 of September 1 of 1942, and subsequently Law 7872 of September 25 1944, not only increased the salary of the Carabineros, but also their bonuses and subsidies they received. Through this period of 1927-1968 we can say that there was institutional advancement in terms of welfare benefits given to Carabineros.

By 1968, Carabineros had developed strong selection standards, strong training, and strong oversight. In 1968 DFL 2 was passed, which was an important law that not only increased the amount of Carabineros in the country but also developed the basis for a strong welfare system comprised of salaries, bonuses, and healthcare. According to Article 46 of DFL 2 of 1968, Carabineros were given raises every 5 years. The first and second increment (5 and 10 years of service) represented a 30% increase in base salary. The third and fourth increment (15 and 20 years of service) would be a 20% increase in previous salary, added onto account the 5 and 10 year increases. The fourth and fifth increases (25 and 30 years of service) would provide a 15% increase in the previous salary taking into

account previous quinquennial increases. Carabineros that provide work in hazardous situations get a 10% increase in pay, as well as an increase determined by law for having being married, having children or being single but with family duties. Carabineros injured on duty will have all of the medical expenses paid by the Carabineros. Article 56 provides access to government housing that is paid for by the Carabineros from his salary at a heavily discounted price that can vary by year to year but which is around 10% of monthly salary. Article 69 notes that officers that are found guilty of serious offenses by the military justice system will result in having their pension taken away. Article 94 provides that pensions will be calculated based on the last salary level with bonuses. For every 1 year of service, the Carabineros receive 1/30 of the amount of their last salary. For instance, if the officer received a monthly salary of 100 USD, and served for 30 years of service, the officers receive 100% or 100 USD monthly for the rest of their life. If the officer only served 15 years, they will receive 50% of their last monthly salary, or 50 USD per month, with appropriate taxes and fees taken out.

In short, the early Carabineros era was a period of some abusive practices by police to politically repress fringe parties such as communists or social nationalists. Nevertheless, this period sees the continual advancement of welfare benefits for the Carabineros and the continued strengthening of development and oversight that decreased both abuse and corruption as described to me in interviews. However, larger political forces would change this trajectory. That is the subject of the following section.

Table 15: Carabineros Early Period 1927-1973

Years	1927-1973
Period Name	Carabineros Early Period
Jurisdiction	National
Work Model	Professional
Militarized	Yes
Insecurity	Low
Culture Corrupt	Yes but Lowers by 1973
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	Low

Cold War Comes to Chile

The dramatic case of the Cuban Revolution inspired revolutionaries in Latin America to take up arms against their governments. The impact in Chile was pronounced as students and intellectuals took to the streets to demand more social equality and more socialist oriented economic policies. The state also responded by developing counterinsurgency doctrine that saw the Carabineros police grow to “become an important component in the fight against real or alleged threats to the social order” (Galleguillos 2004, 58). Specifically, the Carabineros de Chile established the “Grupo Movil, or Rapid Deployment Special Forces, which became the most visible expression of state repression against rapidly radicalizing sectors of civil society (workers, peasants, students, homeless)” (Galleguillos 2004, 58). In 1969 the Carabineros discovered two guerilla schools, one in the Maipo Valley and another one near Valdivia (Collier and Slater 2004, 324).

On top of the political and security threat to the government from leftist insurgents was the social unrest that undermined the presidency of Eduardo Frei at this time. Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democrat, attempted to implement moderate economic changes that he termed the Revolution in Liberty, which sought some minor changes in land reform.

However, “Social discontent with Frei's ‘Revolution in Liberty’ saw the Carabineros police increasingly acting in defense of private property, as numerous rural land seizures by landless peasants were accompanied by a growing number of "tomas," or empty urban plots by homeless and marginal peoples in the country's largest cities, especially Santiago. One event that still stands out, especially in that it highlights the growing alienation of police officers from the popular sectors, was the March 1969 massacre by the police of 12 squatters in the southern city of Puerto Montt” (Galleguillos 2004, 61). The deaths of these homeless squatters at the hands of the Carabineros of Puerto Montt plunged the Christian Democrats into an internal crisis (LAWR 4-28-1969 Chile).

This coincided with the rising expectation that Salvador Allende, the Marxist candidate for President running under the left leaning Union Patriotica Party, was making a strong campaign for President against Jorge Alessandri, and the Christian Democrat candidate Radomiro Tomic. In Chile’s constitution, if no candidate received a majority, Parliament would elect the president from the top two vote getters. Allende narrowly won the vote against Alessandri and took power on November 3 of 1970.

The Impact of Military Authoritarianism on Policing 1973-1988

In planning this coup against Salvador Allende, Army General Augusto Pinochet paid particular attention to the Carabineros, as he saw them as a potential threat if they remained loyal to the President. Pinochet and his fellow coup plotters reached out to the Carabineros in secret through General Arturo Yovanne. General Yovanne began to recruit other top brass Generals. He knew that top ranked General Jose Maria Sepulveda, the

Director General, and the second highest ranking sub-director, General Jorge Urrutia, were fervent constitutionalists and did not approach them (Magasich 2013). He did approach Generals Ruben Alvarez and Orestes Salinas, but were also unlikely to take command in this situation. General Yovanne approached Generals Alfonso Yañez and Martin Cadez with the offer of taking over the Carabineros after the coup, but they refused his offer. Finally, the seventh highest ranking officer that was approached, General Cesar Mendoza, at the last minute agreed to join the military coup against Salvador Allende (Magasich 2013). On the Morning of September 11th 1973 everything was in place for General Augusto Pinochet.

At 10:00 a.m. The tanks opened incessant fire on La Moneda (the presidential palace). The Carabineros immediately took defensive positions (Freire 2013). The Carabineros and other Security personnel returned fire, which repelled this initial attack (El Mercurio 2003). As Camus (1988) notes, Pinochet had some insecurities and doubts regarding the Carabineros. There was a moment when it was unclear what the Carabineros as an institution would do. In intercepted and transcribed radio communications, General Pinochet was noticeably concerned with this possibility of a Carabineros revolt. The following transcripts illustrate this concern (El Dinamo):

Pinochet: Affirmative...Patricio [Carvajal], let me ask you: Has Mendoza taken command of the Carabineros or not yet?

Carvajal: Mendoza has taken command, but I don't know if he is in the Directorate-General office.

Pinochet: Is he working or not?...Tell me another thing Patricio, is Mr. Yovanne working also?

Carvajal: Yes he is working also. He is in command of the Carabineros that are surrounding La Moneda. We are in contact with him.

Pinochet: In other words, Carabineros are behaving loyally?

Carvajal: The Carabineros that are surrounding the palace are loyal.

Pinochet: Loyal to us?

Carvajal: Some have left, but we don't know where and if they have given themselves up to Mendoza or if they just fled.

In the end, Pinochet's fears would not come true. At 10:15 news had reached the Carabineros inside defending the palace. The rest of their brothers in arms were outside and had joined the coup. The building would be bombed shortly after and they needed to leave. Shortly thereafter, the Carabineros abandoned the presidential palace. Only the Director General of the Carabineros, Sepulveda, remained close to the end, leaving only just before La Moneda was bombed by jets (El Mercurio 2003). Before he could be captured, Allende committed suicide with an AK-47 that Fidel Castro had given him, rather than being taken prisoner by Pinochet.

Following the coup the Carabineros were incorporated into the Junta. Under Decree Law 444 of 1974, the Carabineros were transferred from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Defense, now controlled by the military. But, problems would arise from the military involvement in government that would severely hamper their institutional ability to address crime. As General Lautero Contreras told me in an interview:

From September 11th of 1973, the Armed Forces wanted to be police and the Police wanted to be Military. The Armed Forces, and especially the Army started to make patrols around the country, supplanting our work. Because of this, the Carabineros was restricted in terms of funding. The logic was that the military was on the street and there was not public disorder so why do the Police need money.

These budgetary slights were evidence of how the military viewed the Carabineros with disdain.

Nevertheless many Carabineros officers were eager to illustrate their loyalty to the Junta. Consequently during Junta period, Carabineros ramped up their involvement in the anti-subversive campaign. For instance, in April 1974 the Carabineros launched large-scale anti-guerrilla maneuvers in the central Andean foothills (LAWR 4-5-1974). But their activities were not limited to the detention or arrest of suspected Marxists, their activities also included an active participation in torture, abuse and systematic repression. But the Military regime largely ignored the Carabineros in terms of funding and personnel increases, despite the efforts on some Carabineros to cooperate with the repressive campaign. As former sub-secretary of Carabineros Patricio Morales noted:


Carabineros were always the poor relative of the Junta and their budgets were continuously slashed versus the other branches. Not only that problem, but during the dictatorship roles that the Carabineros once did were now assumed by the other armed forces. For example, the control of public order, you didn't see Carabineros at night patrolling the streets, you saw military personnel.

But in 1981, the Regime would have to at least partially address the needs of the Carabineros. From 1973-1981, the citizens of Chile were afraid to openly challenge the Junta, but in 1981, under failing economic conditions, people started taking to the streets *en mass*. General Contreras discusses how this impacted the Carabineros de Chile:

In 1981, the public started to come out and test the regime and protests. And because there didn't used to be protests, the Junta did not provide for that eventuality in the Carabineros budget. It was not necessary to improve their resources, cars, [and] anti-riot technology. So in 1982-83 the Carabineros did not have buses to put detained people in. There was no tear gas. That is when some money was given to the police. But it wouldn't be until later when Democracy came back that the Police actually received the resources they needed.

The graph below illustrates the disparity that Carabineros faced. From 1973-1985, 12 years of military rule, the personnel of Carabineros was not increased at all, despite an increasing population. In 1985, after the increased protests on the streets, it reminded the Junta of the need to have adequate police numbers; it is then when we see an increase in the police force. However, we see a substantial increase of police when democracy returns in 1990-2014.

Figure 7: Estimated Carabineros Personnel through Time



Source: Personnel Laws, Tabulated by Author, represent estimates based on the allotted positions written and amending laws that establish required personnel positions. I do not include Civilian Personnel that are not ranked such as Chauffeurs or Nurses in the hospital, who are not Carabineros police themselves.

Nevertheless, the budget increase in 1983 and personnel increases in 1985 would not translate into material improvement for the average patrol officer. Carabineros Sergeant


Major Carlos Ripetti started his career in the Carabineros in 1980 and shared what it was like to be a Carabineros during the dictatorship:

I always remember the period of the Dictatorship. There were no resources for Carabineros. Carabineros without shirts or with the neck worn out. We had to make a uniform shirt last 4 years! Patrol cars were missing gas, the same people that went by on the street would donate money for gasoline of the cars. Most Carabineros went out on foot [...] with broken shoes. I went out with holes in my shoes! The salary was not enough. What I earned in a month, that wasn't even enough to buy a new pair of shoes.

Another retired Carabineros, Victor Manuel Fornes who entered the institution in 1983, talks about the logistical nightmare experienced in the Carabineros during the dictatorship:

With all the washing, cleaning, ironing, it starts to fall apart. And you had to try to buy that, and that came out of my money. What we earned back then was 25 pesos, the equivalent of buying a candy today. That is what I earned per hour. How would we do it? Either I buy my uniform or I wouldn't eat.

By 1988, the Carabineros had established a grisly history of repression. What was the toll on citizens and the institutions themselves? What did Chile lose? The table below illustrates the known deaths that occurred at the hands of the Pinochet regime as estimated by the Rettig report, who estimates that there were 2,279 political deaths during the dictatorship. This included the number of armed forces and politicians assassinated during the time for political reasons. As shown in the graph below, the majority of deaths occurred in the early years of the regime.



Source: Rettig Report

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission through the Rettig report had documented more than 3,000 cases of human rights violations with 965 disappearances during Pinochet's rule. The secret police (DINA and CNI) were responsible for 40% of the total. The Carabineros were the second most notorious violators with 23% of all violations. The army was responsible for 15 % of the deaths. The Air Force and Navy had relatively clean hands with only 29 and 11 disappearances respectively. The reality is that the Carabineros played an integral role in repression, a role that would come to haunt them until this day.

However, what is perplexing, is that during this time the Carabineros became a heavily underfunded institution, and yet they were the most involved in repression. Here, we cannot discount the variable of regime as being important. Indeed a military dictatorship will increase police malfeasance, regardless of the centralization and professionalization. Note, at the same time in Argentina, a decentralized system, also had

a military dictatorship and had the police heavily involved in malfeasant activities. In transitioning towards democracy, Chilean Carabineros are less malfeasant than their Argentina counterparts. This illustrates that, holding democracy constant, centralization and professionalization can make a substantial difference.

But not only had Chile lost individual citizens to human rights abuses, the trauma of the dictatorship also left lasting damages on the security institutions themselves, and on the Carabineros in particular. The Carabineros had been marginalized during the military's time in power. Although nominally a part of the junta, the Carabineros were not even considered the little brother of the military, but the red-headed stepchild.

Nevertheless, from my interviews, I gathered that even though the Carabineros suffered resource shortfalls, they did not engage in corrupt activities in terms of asking for bribes. Much of the distrust citizens had of the Carabineros was linked to both the abusive behavior of the police in their role as repressors, and their inability to address the rising crime at that time.

What kept the Carabineros from engaging in asking for bribes despite low pay? Despite the poor benefits and salary through this period, the Carabineros relied heavily on their discipline inculcated from training and hierarchic oversight. These two mechanisms were significant in keeping Carabineros clean in terms of corruption. In terms of abuse, the variable that overrides everything is the exceptional situation of deep political antagonism and an undemocratic military regime. The struggle on the road to democracy would be to institute civilian control, to purge the institution of human rights abusers, and to improve on the foundation of the centralized and professional system to develop a better

police force. The following section speaks to the long and arduous road towards the goal of developing a high quality police force. The cornerstone of implementing that change is rooted in improving the welfare of police, reforming training to include human rights courses for all police, extending civilian expertise in public security, and providing civilians with control over the Carabineros. Although some of these goals, like civilian oversight, are far from completely met, the following section will illustrate that advancements have been made. Nevertheless, the major lesson to take away is that the centralized and militarized structure lends itself to rapid welfare reforms and reforms to training.

Table 16 : Chilean Carabineros under Dictatorship 1973-1989

Years	1973-1989
Period Name	Carabineros Under Dictatorship
Jurisdiction	National
Work Model	Professional
Militarized	Yes
Insecurity	Medium
Culture Corrupt	Yes but Lowers by 1973
Regime	Military Dictatorship
Malfeasance	Medium

Democracy Returns: Do Carabineros Remain the Same?

In 1988, General Augusto Pinochet is forced to have a referendum on his rule in accordance with the 1980 Constitution that his junta wrote and approved. The 1988 plebiscite had only one candidate, General Pinochet. A ‘Yes’ vote indicated support for Pinochet to continue in power for another 8 years. The ‘No’ vote was for Pinochet to step down and set up civilian Presidential elections.

On October 5 of 1988, the plebiscite resulted in 54% vote of 'No' (Collier and Sater 2004, 380). Pinochet had to step down and set up civilian elections. On December 14 of 1989, the civilian leader of the Christian Democrats, Patricio Aylwin, was elected president of Chile, taking power in March of 1990 (Collier and Sater 2004, 382). The election and administration of Patricio Aylwin was a critical juncture in the development of the Carabineros de Chile. However, Pinochet would prove to be a specter that would haunt subsequent governments. Before legally transferring power to a civilian government in 1990, Pinochet made changes to the organic laws of the armed forces. It basically guaranteed high levels of autonomy of the military and the police. The Ley Organica de Carabineros gave them more autonomy. It requires a 4 out of 7 vote to change this organic law. Because of this, there is little or weak civilian control over the Carabineros.

Patricio Aylwin, as the first civilian president in decades, had a difficult task at hand of addressing crime, paramilitary groups and a depleted Carabineros who were weary of civilian leaders and who fought institutional reform attempts. When civilians took power in the 1990s, they found a very weak, depressed and judged institution. As General Lautaro Contreras notes, "It was when Aylwin came, the military disappeared from the streets and it was necessary to strengthen the police. Everything that we did not have during the military regime, Aylwin gave us. Aylwin provided us the necessary resources to grow."

President Aylwin's first order of business was to drastically increase the total amount of major improvements that were made to the police in respect to police welfare. In his first presidential address to Congress on May 21st, 1990, Aylwin highlighted the importance of the Carabineros. He stated that at that time it was "[...] necessary to

strengthen the capacity for action of the Carabineros [...] providing them with the means to efficiently fulfill their function.” The impact of these reforms was almost immediate as described by Retired Carabineros Sergeant Major Ripetti:

When Aylwin came in, he increased salary [by] 100%, he doubled our income. In the dictatorship, the department stores refused to give us credit in the past because we earned too little. Anyone else, a rural worker, right away they would give them credit because they earned more money than we did. But with the pay increase, they gave us credit.

Although during this period the Aylwin administration made substantial reforms to the welfare of the Carabineros along with making internal changes in the Carabineros, very little was done in terms of establishing external civilian control. The Frei administration continued improvements in police budgets, but it was marked by serious cases of police insubordination and failure to reform the civilian oversight.

For example the Carabineros Director General Director Rodolfo Stange had been at the head of the Carabineros since 1985. Aylwin was not empowered to remove the General or any of the generals. They were immovable. In 1995, President Eduardo Frei solicited the retirement of the General Stange due to his involvement in human rights abuses. Stange had to renounce after indicating that the power of the presidency was more powerful than the police, and as a result, the institution was suffering (Flisfich and Robledo 2012, 79). After Stepping down, Frei named the second in line of the Carabineros as the new Director General Fernando Cordero. In addition there was the problem of political representation manifested in 4 senate members that would be designated by the armed forces and Carabineros de Chile (Flisfich and Robledo 2012, 58). In addition, Frei also attempted and failed to move the Carabineros out of the Ministry of Defense and into the

Ministry of the Interior.

Although reforms to Civilian Control were not sweeping, the Frei administration introduced important reforms to the crime-fighting effectiveness, welfare, training, and image of the police in society. During Frei's government (1994 - 2000), there was a change in rhetoric from national security to citizen security as a concept that sought to incorporate closer relations between the police and society (Baeza. 2010). I interviewed Lucian Fouilloux who was sub-secretary of Carabineros under Frei from the 1994-2000 administration, and we spoke at length about the reforms made to the Carabineros. Fouilloux shared with me that "1995 was the beginning of our administration's investing in the Carabinero's vehicles, clothes, [and] infrastructure. It was so bad the state of poverty the police were in." In addition to funding and improving police welfare system and logistics, the Frei administration made important changes to professionalism. Fouilloux stated that Frei "introduced an internal framework to incorporate [an] academic aspect of human rights into all police training." In 1997 and 1998, congress approved new laws sent to them by president Frei that modernized the careers of the police through the Decreto Fuerza de Ley number 2, titled the statute of Carabineros personnel (Flisfich and Robledo 2012, 79). These changes not only made career advancement based on capacity and professionalism, but "prohibited officers involved in human rights violations from advancing along their career tracks" (Fouilloux Interview). This was an effective tool at slowly purging the institution.

As Felipe Harboe noted in my interview, "the period from 1997-2000 brought the beginning of the institutionalization of democratic civilian control in terms of citizen

security. Civilian leaders started realizing the importance of public security matters, and the government started gaining power in this arena. Indicators are created to measure effectiveness of public security processes. Civilian authority started increasing through budgetary control.” Towards the end of Frei’s administration, he gave his final speech to congress where he noted that in 1999 “the Carabineros will increase their operative force with 4,700 new functionaries, a process that will continue until, in December of 2001, [I will have added] the number of 12,000 new agents, recuperated from administrative function, for police service” (Frei Annual Address May 21st, 1999). The recuperation of police agents and officers from administrative functions was an important reform as well. During the dictatorship, the unfortunate reality was that all armed forces became heavily involved in government and became bureaucratic quagmires. Many police who were trained for law enforcement duties had been relegated to office work. This did not change in the return to democracy. Thus, Frei’s reforms reoriented police towards police duties rather than office duties. In their place, civilians were hired to take on those administrative duties, bringing Carabineros into day-to-day contact with civilian professionals. This in turn increased civilian expertise and experience in public security matters, which in the future would be important for advancing more civilian control.

The administration of Ricardo Lagos (2000-2004) would seek to build and advance on these reforms. Patricio Morales Aguirre, sub-secretary of the Carabineros under Lagos, notes that it was through the power of the purse strings that civilians started to get some degree of control in regards to the budget. Although the sub-secretary of the Carabineros

did not have any operative control, they did have more control over the budget. The Lagos administration:

Imposed the mission on the Defense Ministry to submit the police to civilian control. Specifically, Lagos was able to institutionalize more participation in designating high commanders and [the] commander in chief. But the major source of control comes from the budgeting power of President Lagos....Lagos imposed that 70% of the budget would go to non-discretionary spending such as salary, maintenance of vehicles, maintenance of buildings, etc., but 30% of the budget would be decided by the President through the sub-secretary of Carabineros.


But there was an elusive target that President Lagos would try to further civilian control—moving the Carabineros out of the Ministry of Defense and into the Interior Ministry. It was not until the recent presidential administrations of Michel Bachelet (2006-2010) and Sebastian Piñera (2010-2014) where important changes in this regard were seen. In her own words, the Bachelet administration stated, “1,500 new Carabineros entered the police force and from here on after in the years between 2007 and 2010 there would be an additional 6,000” Carabineros on the streets pursuant to law 20104 (Annual Address 2007). In addition, negotiations began in Bachelet’s administration to finally transfer the Carabineros from the Defense to the Interior Ministry. In 2005, Law 20050, a constitutional reform package, eliminated the role of ‘designated senator’ and as the seats were vacated, they returned towards selection by popular vote. This, coupled with Pinochet’s death, opened up the opportunity to make substantial reforms. After negotiations, the Carabineros de Chile was transferred to the Ministry of Interior and Public Security under Law 20502 on February 21, 2011 that reformed the Organic Law of Carabineros of March 7, 1990

(Government of Chile Website 2014). Today, the Carabineros report to the Ministry of Interior and Public Security.

Corruption and Abuse in Contemporary Chilean Carabineros

Today, Chile has the best police force in Latin America. It is known for its low levels of corruption, and low levels of abuse. The evidence in this can be found in various data sources. For instance, in Chile, only 6 percent of respondents to a Transparency International Survey in 2013 reported having paid a bribe to the police.

Figure 9: Public Opinion Project 2010 Levels of Trust in Police by Country



Police trust, although imperfect, is an important indicator or proxy for how police behave in general. First, some problems persist in Chile with respect to abuse. Since 2005 a strong student led protest movement for educational reform has pitted young adults against riot police in the streets. Yerko Ljubetic of the National Human Rights Institute of Chile notes that in these protest scenarios:

[It] is evident that there is no discrimination on the part of Carabineros with respect to people who develop peaceful use of right to manifest free speech with those that assume at the outset violent attitudes. Here we have the phenomenon, well that is international, the "hooded ones" they are a minor group but they are the ones that generate the incidents.

However, various interview subjects mentioned that police abuse is not the norm; rather, examples of police abuse are isolated incidents. Nevertheless, there are important concerns over police abuse of force in protest scenarios. According to Jose Miguel Cruz (2009), only 3.7 % of citizens reported being physically or verbally abused by the Carabineros in 2009, compared to 8.7% in Argentina, the highest in the region. Theoretically, it would be preferable for there to be no abuse at all. To reiterate, abuse is not rampant, but isolated and concentrated in dangerous cases of riots and demonstrations. Nevertheless, the concerns are valid in that the abuses of those arrested in the protest go beyond reasonable use of force as allegations of sexual abuse, physical violence in commissaries, and other abuses have been reported.

In terms of corruption, Jose Araya from Observatorio Ciudadano, a citizen oversight non-profit organization, shared with me that “we have a militarized police that does have problems, but a much more efficient control over corruption. Corruption is not systematic, it’s not a part of our culture.” As Luciano Fouilloux illustrates, “on the theme

of corruption, happily, we in Chile have a great pride [in] comparatively low levels of corruption. That is not to say that we do not have corruption, we may have little corruption.”

The facts show that although there is abuse and corruption on the Carabineros de Chile, those numbers are low relative to the rest of Latin America and other countries in the world. If my theory is correct, then we should observe strong mechanisms of development, welfare and oversight in contemporary (2012) Chile. In the following section we will discuss what the development, welfare and oversight regimes of Chile’s Carabineros look like today and how these influence police behavior with respect to abuse and corruption.

But why is malfeasance so low? According to my theory, the key should be that Carabineros have a strong development, welfare and oversight regimes enabled by a centralized and militarized structure. The following section goes to great lengths to illustrate that indeed Carabineros have strong regimes in those three areas, and this goes a long way towards explaining the levels of corruption and abuse as police malfeasance.

Development Regime of Carabineros de Chile 2012

The Carabineros de Chile has an extensive development framework that plays a central role in limiting malfeasant police behavior. The beginning of any strong development structure has to do with recruitment standards and recruitment processes. The current requirements to enter Carabineros are: be a Chilean between 18 and 25 years old,

have a high school education, be single with no kids, and be a minimum of 1.68 meters tall (women 1.60 meters) (General Opazo Correspondence 2012).

But beyond these basic entrance requirements there are additional recruitment criteria that weed out potentially problematic personnel. Felipe Harboe attributes the low levels of malfeasance to the careful selection of Carabineros. Carabineros Major Daniel Soto notes that the Carabineros that are recruited see their role as more than just a job, but more like a profession: “They are dedicated to public service. There is a certain amount of self-selection into the service. But the recruitment process is based on finding individuals that want to engage in this sort of vocational service” (Interview 2013). A recruit has to undergo stringent entrance exams that cover basic knowledge in terms of history, mathematics, and grammar (General Lautaro Contreras Interview). The Carabineros also put them through physiological, psychological, and dental health exams. The psychological exam is given to people to determine tendencies towards crime, violence, schizophrenia, or other mental health problems. The final piece of the stringent recruitment regime that sets Chilean Carabineros recruits apart has to do with the DHP, or what is called a declaration of personal history. Through that declaration candidates must list all family members, siblings, and other immediate and extended family members including their information. Afterwards, the Carabineros investigate to make sure that the recruits are not involved in drug trafficking or any other relationship with crime. Both the troop level and officer level ranks have the same requirement, but the exams are much more difficult in terms of intelligence as the exam given to them is similar to a university entrance exam (Correspondence with Carabineros General (r) Voltaire Opazo Ibañez November 2012).

Table 17 below illustrates the amount of applicants who apply and those that actually are able to enter into the Carabineros.

Table 17 Application and Acceptance Rates into Carabineros de Chile				
Year	Applied	Accepted	Denied	Percent Accepted
2005	7333	1919	5414	26
2006	8622	2062	6558	23
2007	5323	2300	3023	43
2008	8415	2490	5925	29
2009	9531	2490	7041	26
2010	8720	2404	6316	27
2011	11039	1930	9109	17
2012	15144	2794	12350	18
2013	15508	3925	12583	25

Data provided by the Office of Information, Transparency and Suggestions of the Carabineros through an e-mail correspondence with the Chief of this officer, Colonel Ramiro Larrain.

In short, the acceptance rate is very stringent; only about 1 in 4, or 26% applicants are accepted to become a part of the force from 2005-2013. But this is only the beginning as the police trainees have to now face a very difficult process of training, which in the end also forces other individuals out of the institution who lacked the mental or moral fortitude to withstand the long military training.

There are 2 types of schools where police receive training—one for commissioned officers and one for troop levels. First, there is the General Carlos Ibañez del Campo School that is for the exclusive training of future officers for the Carabineros, or the PNS. PNS stands for Superior Commissioned Personnel (Personal de Nombramiento Supremo) because their service is commissioned by the president, who must approve their ascension

in rank—hence they are named by the supreme political power in the country. The period of training at this school is for 4 years. In the third year of education they come out as 2nd lieutenant, and in the 4th year they will begin practicing in police units and work on a graduation thesis, after which they receive a Public Security Administration degree. From there, the ranks increase in the following order: 2nd Lieutenant; 1st Lieutenant; to Captain; Major; Lt. Colonel; Colonel; and General (Correspondence with Carabineros General (r) Voltaire Opazo Ibañez November 2012).

The second types of schools are PNI formation schools. PNI stands for Personal de Nombramiento Institucional, or institutionally named personnel. Referred to as *la tropa*, these are the lower ranks who engage in general policing duties such as transit, patrol, security detail duties, etc. Their career begins with the rank of Carabineros and can climb to Corporal 2nd class and Corporal 1st Class. The PNI is contracted as a Carabineros student, and after one year of training, they enter Carabineros to work in a commissary. There are various schools for the PNI in Santiago, Arica, Antofagasta, Concepcion, Ancud and Punta Arenas. The PNI can also, after 15 years of service, apply for non-commissioned officer training of 1-2 years and receive ranks of Sergeant 2nd, Sergeant 1st, Sub-officer and Sub-officer Major (Correspondence with Carabineros General (r) Voltaire Opazo Ibañez November 2012).

Carabineros officers receive very good theoretical training from well-known teachers from the Supreme Court, the public prosecutor's office and other civilian experts. An important improvement, as mentioned earlier, came from the Frei and Lagos period as the topic of human rights became an important requirement that Carabineros had to also

learn about. Today, the theme of human rights, constitutional law and civil rights is taken in all 3 years for officers and for lower ranks the troops take courses for 1 year (Major Daniel Soto, Interview). As Mario Galvez, a journalist with expertise on security matters notes, “the training of the Carabineros has not changed much through time with some slight variation. There is not much difference in the formation of a Carabineros and a military person, except in the material that they study.” Former Carabineros Corporal Victor Manuel Fornes provides an insight into the high standards and difficult training that he went through: “In 1983 I got into the Carabineros, the training was brutal...many said that the Carabineros had harsher training than the military.” The real difference is that military training is only 12-18 weeks for soldier/troops whereas in Carabineros it lasts for 9 to 12 months.

Thus, the system of recruitment and training taken together provides a strong development regime. The careful selection of officers is important for lowering malfeasance, but in order to attract qualified candidates there need to be incentives. To this end, the following section speaks to the issue of police welfare that accomplishes this task.

Welfare System of Carabineros de Chile 2012

The Carabineros have a strong welfare system that includes a low base salary but with strong pensions, healthcare, vacation, housing, child-care, education discounts, loans and mobility. The table below illustrates the current (2014) pay scale.

Table 18: Monthly Salary of Police by Rank

	LOW END	LOW END	HIGH END	HIGH END
Rank	Base Pay in Chilean Peso	Base Pay in USD	Base+ Bonuses in Chilean Peso	Base + Bonuses USD
General Director	648255	1154.54	3256275	5799.44
General Inspector	613652	1092.91	3150150	5610.44
General	584689	1041.33	3025130	5387.77
Colonel	539100	960.14	2611875	4651.76
Lt. Col.	459455	818.29	2400595	4275.47
Major	423566	754.37	2121706	3778.77
Captain	396737	706.59	1450549	2583.43
1 st Lieutenant	337456	601.01	1050856	1871.58
2 nd Lieutenant	297964	530.67	821604	1467.15
Sub-Officer Major	337456	601.01	1346865	2398.77
Sub-Officer	297964	530.67	1195290	2128.82
1 st Sergeant	260089	463.22	1078325	1920.50
2 nd Sergeant	237385	422.78	963181	1715.43
1 st Corporal	201514	358.89	718641	1279.90
2 nd Corporal	183281	326.42	591979	1054.31
Carabineros	155525	276.99	482717	859.72

Source: <http://www.carabineros.cl/transparencia/sueldo/remuneraciones.html>

* Conversion rate at 2013 was 1 USD=560 CLP

Additionally, bonuses can be earned for hazard pay and for years of service. For instance, every three years of service comes with an increase in pay, called a trienio. At 20 years of service, there is an additional bonus that is given as well, regardless if one rises in rank. In Chile, providing increases every three years to salary helps mitigate these feelings, as individuals are rewarded for good behavior even if they remain at the same rank their whole career (Transparency Response from Colonel Larrain Donoso). In addition, when Carabineros also get married and start having children, monthly salaries are increased.

Thus, for lower ranks, the base pay is 277 USD, but can rise up to 860 USD with bonuses. Entry level commissioned officers earn a base of 530 USD and at the upper end of 1467 USD with added bonuses. The monthly minimum wage in Chile is roughly 356 dollars. Carabineros earn substantially less than the minimum wage at the outset, but will see increments in salary with time.

Carabineros also receive education benefits such as free day care, pre-school and kindergarten in the major cities of Santiago, Valparaiso and Concepcion that constitute the majority of Carabineros positions in the country (transparency response from Colonel Larrain Donoso). Tuition discounts ranging from 15-50% for universities are also in place (Direccion Nacional de Personal Direccion de Educacion, Doctrina e Historia).

A correspondence with Carabineros Colonel Gonzalo Huenumil Lezana, through RSIP No 19204, revealed that after 25 years of service a Carabineros can expect to receive 619,530 pesos per month, or 1,106 USD per month during their retirement. A report by Radio Chile in 2013 stated that Carabineros' pensions were 6 times more than the national average, thus indicating how strong this welfare benefit is when we compare it to society at large.

Besides pay and pension, Carabineros also receive healthcare for any injuries received through the police service, and have subsidized healthcare for all sicknesses for them and their families (Correspondence with Carabineros General (r) Voltaire Opazo Ibañez November 2012). Their healthcare system is made up of two central hospitals, both located in the capital of Santiago: Hospital Institucional and Hospital de la Direccion de Prevision de Carabineros. They handle major surgeries or treatments for serious illnesses.

For less urgent care, 16 consultation clinics are located in the principal cities of the provinces. There are 14 regional dental centers located in the largest cities of the country. Furthermore, agreements exist with all of the public hospitals throughout the country, private care-givers, and laboratories to provide for discounted care (Transparency Response from Colonel Larrain Donoso). Carabineros also enjoy deep pharmaceutical discounts of up to 55% on generic medications, and 25% for name brand medications. Subsidies are also given for various conditions ranging from a birth of a child that costs 270 USD, to funeral expenses that costs 1,070 USD.

If an officer has less than 15 years of service, they get 2 weeks of vacation per year. As they serve more than 20 years of service, they receive close to 4 weeks of vacation per year, with pay (Transparency Request RSIP No. 18433 November 20th, 2012.) The Carabineros also ease the costs of taking vacations and have various vacation rentals available for their personnel at a deep discounted price. Carabineros can enjoy 19 vacation centers, 168 vacation cabins, 96 hotel rooms, and 22 family size apartments available throughout the country (Transparency Request RSIP No. 18433 November 20th, 2012).

Most young Carabineros of 18-22 often do not live outside of their commissaries, and actually live inside dormitories together. My visit to the 36th Commissary in La Florida in December 2012, I observed the daily life of these Young police persons. Commissaries (police stations) have on site cafeterias (called casinos in Chile), shared showers and barrack style beds, as well as communal relaxation areas to watch TV, play pool or cards. But when they do start a family or move out of the commissary, government owned housing is available (Correspondence with Carabineros General (r) Voltaire Opazo

Ibañez November 2012). The 5,815 family housing units for Carabineros are deeply discounted (Transparency Request RSIP No. 18433 November 20th, 2012).

Further, Carabineros can apply for various loans from Carabineros Mutual ranging from 1,250 USD to 12,500 USD (Mutualidad de Carabineros 2014). First, there are unattached short-term loans, meaning that the money is free to be spent with a monthly fixed interest rate of 1.05% and an annual interest rate of 13.41%, with repayment plans anywhere from 3 to 24 months (Mutualidad de Carabineros 2014). Second, there are special long term loans that can be given for medical expenses, education expenses, vehicle purchases, and home repairs/improvements where repayment plans range from 25 to 84 months at a monthly fixed interest rate of .75% and an annual interest rate of 5.95% (Mutualidad de Carabineros 2014). Finally, there are also loans available for home purchases through the Mutual of Carabineros that also place the interest rate at 5.95% to help individuals purchase their first home.

Adding to these benefits is the possibility of career advancement through upward and lateral mobility. That is, individuals can rise in rank, or they can change from a patrol officer to an investigative officer, to a technician. As Lucia Dammert, a security expert with FLACSO and a professor at the University of Chile, states, where there is “a small police force in a town in Mexico, there is no chance of advancement or a small probability. But in Chile, you enter Carabineros and you can move around. You can transfer to the countryside, or to the capital city. You can train to do new jobs. Or you can apply to rise in rank to a non-commissioned officer as well.”

Although the Carabineros do not receive a strong salary, they do have a substantial package of benefits. Strong welfare benefits attract more qualified applicants. Few other Chilean jobs exist where a high school graduate could receive these benefits. But police need to know that if they engage in malfeasance they will lose this quality of life. Lacking a credible oversight mechanism, Carabineros would not fear losing the welfare packages and can use their power to get rich rather than just living a middle-class life. Next, the section discusses the complimentary regime of institutional oversight.

Oversight Regime of Carabineros 2012

Centralized systems are a better framework to build strong systems of internal oversight. As General Lautaro Contreras states, “What is the great virtue of a national police system? The Police officer in the north will act and can be controlled in the exact same way. There is uniformity.” Centralized policing facilitates the development of strong oversight through: hierarchy, internal discipline, administrative sanctions, military penal courts, criminal courts, a comptroller, a president, and public prosecutor offices. This section discusses how the Carabineros structures its oversight mechanisms and how this controls malfeasance.

Professionalized training inculcates in the minds of the Carabineros the importance of hierarchy. The hierarchic system functions as continuous form of internal oversight at the individual and group level. At the individual level, every person in the hierarchy knows that there is a superior above them who is watching their behavior and who is interested in maintaining discipline. Individuals internalize the power of the hierarchy into their own

minds, knowing that any misstep is not only likely to be discovered, but that it will be sanctioned.

Internal hierarchic control is important, but it also functions at the group level. Lower rank officer who see a fellow officer doing something wrong will step in to stop that behavior or will likely report it lest they also get punished. As journalist Mario Galvez affirms, the “system functions so that commanders watch over their people constantly. Commanders are going to constantly be on top of their people in a way that the lower ranks do not feel free to act in whatever way they want.” A former Carabineros and practicing lawyer with expertise on Carabineros laws, norms and regulations, Jaime Jorquera, comments that “the officers can apply various administrative sanctions like demerits in the personnel file and days of arrest and or denial of pay. When a Carabineros on the street hits someone on the head, he gets taken out immediately. They are kicked out, and then there is an investigation into their actions.” Indeed, it may be unjust and extreme, but it is extremely effective and immediate—in short the strong hierarchy is a powerful mechanism to deter behavior and may be necessary for the proper functioning of a less malfeasant police force. The hierarchy is a constant force in the lives of Carabineros that shapes behavior. As Major Daniel Soto notes:

The vertical hierarchy is very important. It has a lot of disciplinary power. There is a lot of control from above. Higher ranking officers are in charge of doling out discipline and punishment to their lower ranks for acting out of order. They sanction very hard. When an officer steps out of line they get a sheet in their ‘Hoja de Vida’ folder. There is a sense of being stigmatized, because these sheets can affect career advancement.

‘Hoja de Vida’, or personnel file, is one of the strongest mechanisms of control. In it, officers can make notes as merits or demerits that follow that particular Carabineros

throughout their life. A file that is replete with demerits will be cause for separation from the institution. Thus, many Carabineros seek to keep a clean file for fear that one misstep may mean the end of their career.

Within the disciplinary regulations of the Carabineros, there are several violations that, depending on severity, require disciplinary actions. Title V of the Carabineros Disciplinary Regulation Number 11 Article 2, sub-section 1 notes the various violations related to the moral integrity of the police function that are subject to disciplinary actions. This includes accepting bribes, dressing inappropriately, or being drunk on and off duty. Sub-section 2 discusses insubordination; sub-section 3 outlines non-feasance or neglect of police duties; sub-section 4 discusses the leaking of information; sub-section 5 explains abuse of office against lower ranks or citizens; and sub-section 6 lists actions against the Carabineros as an institution, such as losing documents, using a badge to avoid identification, or getting married without permission, all of which represent a sample of some of the sanctionable offenses.

There are various sanctions that the Carabineros have, including written warnings, written reprimands, days of arrest, disponibilidad, suspension, mark on qualifications and ultimately calling for voluntary retirement or forced retirement. Written warnings and reprimand are pretty clear (Carabineros Reglamento de Disciplina 2000). But ‘days of arrest’ can range from 1-30 days wherein the Carabineros is not allowed to leave the barracks, except to conduct their patrol functions (Carabineros Reglamento de Disciplina 2000). Disponibilidad, a type of sanction, is when the Carabineros has to work in areas outside of their normal duties for 1 day to 3 months. Suspensions provide the Carabineros

with only basic pay and they are not allowed to work for up to 2 months (Carabineros Reglamento de Disciplina 2000).

‘Qualification of service’ means that the person did not receive an adequate score on their annual review and will be called upon to submit their retirement paperwork (Carabineros Reglamento de Disciplina 2000). This is less severe than forced separation. The difference is that retirement looks better for future employers. Think of the difference between honorable and dishonorable discharge. These mechanisms are the tools given to the hierarchy to maintain discipline in the ranks, and the tools are effectively used to lower and control malfeasant behavior.

But beyond the disciplinary controls, the Carabineros also have internal controls. First, there are administrative investigations conducted by each commissary guards’ office (police stations) that handle complaints and are in charge of investigating them. This is done in house at the commissary level and if evidence is found to substantiate those claims, then the cases will be taken further into the military penal courts.

Second, there is DIPORCAL or Directorate of Police Intelligence. It functions as an early warning system that provides the hierarchy with information regarding suspicious behavior or activities that they need to keep an eye on. They act independently of the hierarchic administration. A DIPORCAL office can be found in every prefecture of the Carabineros (correspondence with Carabineros General (r) Voltaire Opazo Ibañez November 2012).

Third, in the case of abuse of force, the immediate chief has the duty to confirm or strike down the allegation. When allegations are founded, the chief enacts disciplinary

measures and contacts the military tribunal (correspondence with Carabineros General (r) Voltaire Opazo Ibañez November 2012). The person is then court martialed. However, the military justice system is problematic because it is biased towards the Carabineros, especially in cases of abuse of force. Nevertheless, the presence of a military court is an important system of control.

The final, and most powerful internal control mechanism rests in the hands of the director-general. As Felipe Harboe notes, “The Director General has the discretionary power to remove anyone.” What this means is that disciplinary actions for violation of internal rules is not up to local authorities or politicians to decide, but is in the hands of its most senior officer, who can fire anybody in the institution right away. Thus, there will not be long litigation that keeps potentially offending officers in the institution while the investigations happen into their behavior.

There are also few external controls including: the power of the comptroller, the power of the president, and judicial control. Comptroller’s make sure that public funds are spent responsibly (Major Daniel Soto). For example, if Carabineros buy uniforms, then they have to use certain norms, they have to take public proposals, and they have to find the best competitor, etc.

Second, presidents have the power to remove any director general at their discretion, having to only inform congress of their decision. This power was granted to the president of Chile in 2005 through constitutional reforms (Ley N. ° 20050, del 26 de Agosto de 2005). This strengthens civilian control over the top brass of Carabineros, although removal of other generals is still under the discretion of the Director General.

Lastly, there are controls by civilian courts. In my correspondence with General Opazo, he stated that “acts of corruption are rigorously investigated by the external body of the public prosecutor’s office that function throughout the country’s provinces” (correspondence with November 2012). Carabineros engaged in corruption will be prosecuted in civilian courts and if convicted will be fired and incarcerated (correspondence with General (r) Opazo, November 2012).

Data that I received reveals that the Carabineros as an institution and their mechanism of control are functional, and do remove many Carabineros who infringe on institutional norms. The table below illustrates the amount of Carabineros that were separated from the institution, by year, since 1990.

Table 19:Carabineros Fired by Year	
Year	Number
1990	270
1991	208
1992	248
1993	288
1994	296
1995	254
1996	169
1997	230
1998	363
1999	235
2000	256
2001	226
2002	202
2003	218
2004	194
2005	303
2006	286
2007	337
2008	215
2009	285
2010	293
Total	5376
Average	256 per year

Source: Transparency Request RSIP
No. 18433 November 20th, 2012.

The average age of the person being let go was forty-two. Of the 5,346 Carabineros let go over the past twenty years, ninety-seven percent were male (transparency request RSIP No. 18433 November 20th, 2012 and Tabulated by Diego Esparza). Of those let go, seven percent were students at the troop level police academies, and 3.5 percent were aspiring cadets at the officer level. Eighty-two percent that were let go were active duty regular troop levels (sub-officer major and below), while only seven percent of those let go were from officer ranks. The dismissal of generals, although rare, is handled amongst themselves

and I was not able to find data on their removal. Most of the time, generals will retire voluntarily if faced with potential disciplinary actions (transparency request RSIP No. 18433 November 20th, 2012 by Diego Esparza).

This now begs the question: why were these people let go? Forty percent were let go for poor conduct, 3.6 percent were let go for being bad students at the academies, thirty-five percent were let go because they received poor performance reviews, twenty percent were let go because they violated ethical norms or disciplinary regulations, and 1.6 percent were let go due to administrative changes (transparency request RSIP No. 18433 November 20th, 2012 by Diego Esparza). Carabineros are frequently removed from office, meaning that there are consequences towards malfeasant behavior and that the regulations are enforced.

Below you see a table that illustrates the findings of this section. The police force in Chile has the most and the best behaved police force in Latin America exhibiting very low levels of malfeasance and high levels of citizen trust. This is the product of having a centralized and professionalized police framework.

Table 20: Carabineros under Democracy 1990-2013

Years	1990-2013
Period Name	Carabineros Under Democracy
Jurisdiction	National
Work Model	Professional
Militarized	Yes
Insecurity	Low
Culture Corrupt	Low
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	Low

Chapter Analysis

This section analyzes the hypotheses presented in the introduction. What can be seen is that the Chilean state correctly implemented a centralized police structure to sterilize the police from politicization in the early 1920s. It began to build the professionalizing foundations for police benefits, development and oversight from 1927-1973. As a result police malfeasance steadily decreased during this period while development, welfare and oversight marched on. As Pinochet took over, he not only violated the democratic form of governance necessary for police accountability, but he also actively worked to reduce the professional character of police work by decreasing the police budget and benefits. Pinochet, reverting to patrimonial forms of domination, used the police for political purposes and hence malfeasance increased. Thus, I cannot stress enough that a background scope condition of critical importance to lower police malfeasance is a functional democratic context.

Central Hypotheses

H¹: Centralization of police will decrease police malfeasance. This hypothesis is supported by the evidence. Specifically, the period of 1896-1927 that pitted three institutional models of policing showed that the centralized and professional model used by the Gendarmerie and then the Carabineros was far superior to the decentralized and demilitarized model. The purely communal police system of 1891-1896 in Chile provided very little in terms of professionalism, precisely because of obstacles that decentralization presented. Indeed it was not possible and very expensive for many poor rural communities

to have a police force at all. The evidence provided supporting this was La Granja's budget in which roughly 70% of their local taxes went to their police, and this wasn't even enough to provide an adequate salary, let alone provide adequate training, oversight, and a breadbasket of benefits.

H²: Professionalization of police will decrease police malfeasance. This hypothesis is also supported by the evidence. National control of police alone would not suffice as exhibited by the police development era of 1833-1891, and the case of Fiscal Police in 1896-1927. Centralization without professionalization will not reduce malfeasance in the same way that centralized and professionalizing institutions together will. Thus, in the case of Chile, both are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to greatly reduce malfeasance.

AH¹: Decentralization of police will decrease police malfeasance. This hypothesis was rejected given the evidence at hand. During the early period of police decentralization, and especially the law of autonomous municipalities in the 1890's, reveal the depth of the problems that decentralized systems pose to policing. From 1900-1920 it became increasingly apparent that police at the municipal level were facing serious problems with malfeasance, and the process of police centralization ensued. Hence, the decentralized system proved ineffective, and increased police malfeasance, and thus the data rejects this hypothetical argument.

AH²: Occupational models of police will decrease police malfeasance. This argument is also rejected. Occupational models that existed in Chilean municipal police fell victim to vice and patrimonial relationships. As police in larger cities, Policías Fiscales, were

centralized under national control, they were also professionalized. The Gendermeria units also were more professional in the benefits, development, and oversight structure, and hence performed better than local police. From 1890-1927, it was the occupational models of police at the municipal level that fared worse with respect to malfeasance, and it was the more professional Policías Fiscales and Gendermeria/Carabineros that had lower levels of malfeasance.

Other Arguments

CH¹: Demilitarized police systems will have lower levels of malfeasance than centralized and militarized police systems. There is no evidence to support this hypothesis, but there is evidence to disconfirm it. The pure demilitarized system implemented from 1891-1896 should be associated with lower malfeasance. In actuality, the demilitarized system is associated with poor policing. In particular, this system aided the insecurity in the country by creating security gaps that allowed bandits to dominate the countryside. The police themselves were shown to be abusive, often drunk, and were involved in criminal enterprises all the while helping local political leaders manipulate electoral outcomes. Demilitarization rather than lowering police malfeasance, greatly increased it. When a militarized model was put into place in 1896 with the rural Gendarmerie units and later the Carabineros, police behavior drastically changed and malfeasance was lower. But it was not that the police now wore military uniforms that really mattered. Militarization was what brought a professional model of work to policing, and this is the difference. In my judgment, then, militarization is either benign or beneficial to policing because it can

impart more professional institutions to the police. For this reason, having a civilian model or a militarized model does not matter as much as having a professional model of police work. Sometimes professionalization is a byproduct of importing military institutions that are beneficial for controlling deviant police behavior.

CH²: If there is a criminal environment, then police malfeasance is more likely.

To blame malfeasant police behavior on the criminal contexts does not work in the Chilean analysis. In actuality, it is the other way around. Banditry arose in Chile because the police were so weak. When the government in 1896 created and thereafter expanded the Gendarmeria, it set a centralized, and militarized police with professionalized institutions against the bandits and this did not impact police malfeasance; it thrived in the insecure context, rather than succumbing to it. To be sure, the Chile of the 1990s and 2000s does not compare to Colombia around that same time. However, the comparison is fair when we consider Chile in the 19th century and early 20th century with roving bandits in the countryside that were a threat to the state. It may be an important variable, but this analysis illustrates that a more substantial explanation of police malfeasance is linked to the structure of police and the professionalizing institutions that were copied from the military.

CH³: Police malfeasance is a socially created phenomenon, and is the result of a corrupt society. The argument here is that the reason police are corrupt is that society is corrupt. The arrow goes from society to police. However, the argument does not pan out well here. Assuming that early 1880-1930 Chilean culture is corrupt, then this would explain why the *communal police* and *fiscal police* are highly malfeasant, but not the *gendarmeria* units. Conversely, assuming the Chilean culture was not corrupt during this

time period would explain why the Gendarmeria units were not malfeasant, but would not be able to explain why the *communal and fiscal police* did exhibit malfeasance in their ranks. Furthermore, during the period of 1891-1925, known as the Parliamentary period, society and politics exhibited high levels of corruption (Vial 1987, 1037). It was in this context that the Gendarmeria and Carabineros were able to operate without themselves falling to corruption. It is not causally linked to malfeasance as a phenomenon. Rather, malfeasance is not a function of the exogenous environment in this case, but rather something that is born internally and interacts with the outside environment. Indeed police corruption existed in smaller locally administered police not because society was corrupt, but because the structural framework promoted corruption. This hypothesis does not find support here.

Controls

Other arguments presented in the literature do find currency here. There is a clear difference between police in authoritarian regimes and democratic ones. Indeed, the strongest of the three variables of centralization, professionalization, and regime type in predicting police malfeasance is regime type. Thus, I cannot refute that regime type is an important variable. My model, in its scope conditions, is only meant to cover democratic periods. Nevertheless, a finding that will become clearer, is that it does not matter what kind of professionalism or centralized police system one may have, if authoritarian leaders take over the country, all police systems fall prey to patrimonial models and will be used to suppress and abuse the human rights of citizens. A striking finding in Chile is that

although police were involved in human rights abuses, they were generally not corrupt during the regime period, at the lower ranks. Thus, centralization and professionalization do curtail corruption, but do not address the abuse of citizens. As Chile is a former Spanish colony and largely Catholic, we can control for these hypotheses in this case and reveal that despite these antecedents, Chile was capable of developing a high quality police force, thereby challenging the hypotheses that Spanish-Catholic states are doomed to have worse police than those in the English-Protestant tradition.

Conclusion

When scholars try to explain the low levels of malfeasance in the Chilean Carabineros, they often point to different variables: lack of a corrupt culture, or a low insecurity environment. What this chapter illustrates is that centralization helps remove patrimonialism and opens the door for professionalized police standards. As former sub-secretary of Carabineros Patricio Morales Aguirre notes, the connection is not unfounded:

The strict selection standards and military training limits corruption a lot. The state of Chile was interested in controlling corruption and put resources for that end through increased selection, pay, and social benefits. Salaries are not high, but benefits are great, vision, medicine, housing, and pension are better than many other public servants. The military hierarchy is also important. Lower ranks have a fierce loyalty to their higher ranks. As such, Carabineros have historically had low levels of [malfeasance].

In Chile, the process of centralization and professionalization allowed for the development of key regimes that now guide appropriate police behavior. We would therefore expect that this same mechanism would explain other cases. This dissertation now turns its attention to exploring Colombia and its structural changes as well.

CHAPTER III: “The Re-Birth National Police of Colombia”

Introduction

In 1993 only 23% of respondents in Colombia polling exhibited any trust in their police (Iberobarometro 1993). Homicide rates peaked in 1991-1993 with an average level of 70 homicides per 100,000 people. Leftist revolutionary groups roamed the countryside, pursued by conservative paramilitary groups, with citizens caught in the middle. The Cali and Medellin drug cartels were at the peak of their power. But there was a dramatic reversal. From 2000-2013, 68.5% of Colombians had come to trust the police (Gallup Colombia LTDA 2007, nota 79). By 2013 the murder rate had dipped to 33.2 per 100,000. Both the Cali and Medellin cartels had been disbanded, paramilitary groups outlawed, and leftist guerillas pushed back. This was a stunning volte-face for Colombia. Part of these stunning changes had to do with reforms to the National Police. This chapter looks intently at the case of Colombia through a historical lens. I find that the evolution of policing largely coincides with my theoretical argument about patrimonialism, centralization, and police professionalism as keys to reshaping police behavior. Similar to the previous chapter, I introduce a timeline and a table that lay out how this chapter will develop

Figure 10 Historical Timeline of Police in Colombia from Independence to 2012




Figure 11: Summary of Findings of Colombian Police History

Colombia	Period of Police Development	Jurisdiction	Work Model	Militarized	Culture Corrupt	Insecurity	Regime	Malfeasance
1846-1886	Independence	Local	Occupational	No	Yes	High	Limited Democracy	High
1886-1953	La Violencia	Local	Occupational	No	Yes	Very High	Limited Democracy	High
1953-1961	Military Dictatorship	National	Occupational	Yes	Yes	High	Military Regime	Medium
1962-1985	Frente Nacional	National	Semi-Professional	Yes	Yes	High	Pacted Democracy	Low
1985-1993	Narco Era	National	Semi-Professional	Yes	Yes	Very High	Democracy	High
1993-1997	Reform Period	National	Professional	Yes	Yes	High	Democracy	Medium
1997-2012	Professional Police Era	National	Professional	Yes	Yes	Medium	Democracy	Medium-Low

This chapter discusses seven periods of Colombian policing: 1846-1885, 1885-1953, 1953-1962, 1962-1985, 1985-1993, 1993-1997, and 1997-present. The following section starts by discussing the historical background of Colombia that frames politics and policing in the next two centuries. One thing will be made clear is that centralization and professionalization were important factors that helped reshape policing and reduce malfeasance.

Historical Background

Although policing during the Spanish colonial period was undertaken by Spanish army units, the period following independence developed the ‘sereno’ system. These were night-watchmen who were charged with lighting gas lamps, announcing the hour, and keeping watch. However, the serenos lacked the necessary traits of a true policing body. In reality, the serenos were an imperfect system to deter crime, arrest criminals, and ensure public order (Becerra 153, 2010). The region of Gran Colombia, which is made up of modern day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama, declared independence in 1810 and launched a military campaign under the guidance of Simon Bolivar and Francisco de Santander that would last until 1819, with the final battles against the Spanish forces occurring in 1822 and 1823.

The government of Gran Colombia set about building a decentralized political and policing framework based on Law 8 of 1821; it established that public security was the responsibility of the respective administrative authorities in the Departments, Provinces, and Cantons of the republic (Becerra 153, 2010). Furthermore, Law 11 of 1825 gave

governors and mayors the duty to provide for “the general tranquility of order, of security of persons and property, of executing laws or the executive power, and everything having to do with police and prosperity in their department.” According to Dayanna Becerra (153, 2010), “the multiplicity of assigned functions given to governors and mayors resulted in the existence of different bodies of police throughout the country.” Meanwhile in the capital district of Bogota, Decree 2 of 1827 authorized the president to directly name the police chief. In 1831 political infighting lead to the dissolution of the Republic of Colombia into three countries: New Grenada (present day Colombia and Panama), Venezuela, and Ecuador.

From 1832 to 1858, the country of New Granada had a centralized political system controlled by the president and his *intendentes* (mayors assigned rather than elected) in the departments. During this period, the congress of New Granada promulgated Law 8 of 1841, which created a dual policing platform, one under national control, and the other police forces under regional control. By 1848 the Conservative and Liberal parties emerged as the most influential political factions in New Granada. The Conservative party favored a strong centralized government, centralized military and security forces, a continued support of the catholic church, support of private property, and opposed the redistribution of land. In contrast, the Liberal party favored a federal form of government, a decentralized security apparatus, supported redistribution of land, and advocated for separation of church and state.

In 1853, liberal precepts were gaining ground and a federal constitution was set forth that provided more regional autonomy. This is when the Grenadine Confederation,

an extreme form of federalism, supplanted the country of Nuevo Granada, lasting until 1863. During this period, local and regional communities had more power than the central government, even allowing for provincial armies to be created, while it also restricted the federal government's ability to intervene in departmental conflicts (Mazzuca and Robinson 2009; 287). The Liberal form of government would also act to separate the church and state by nationalizing church owned lands and wealth, and barring them from their traditional role as educators (Mazzuca and Robinson 2009; 287). Such extreme policies drew concern from Conservatives, who, while in office from 1858-1862, tried to reverse these changes. The Liberals, now out of power, rose up in armed rebellion to halt the changes.

A civil war ensued from 1860-1862 between Liberals and Conservatives over these issues ending with conservative defeat in 1863. However, the Grenadine Confederation—proving volatile even for some Liberals—was dissolved and replaced with a stronger federalist constitution. This gave rise to the United States of Colombia that divided the country into 9 autonomous states, but with more powers for the central government than in the previous confederation (Delpar, 1994). Liberals dominated the presidency from 1863-1885 during this period known as the Olimpo Radical. Despite various political changes, policing was still largely under local control, and was a poorly funded, disparaged institution. For instance, Mauricio Puentes notes, Decree 819 of 1885 Article 4 prescribed that police officers at all levels had to be chosen “amongst the most respected residents of the city from landowners, businessmen, professors, scientists, and artisans” (2013, 314). However, the reality was that the people who ended up serving were generally vagrants,

beggars, drunks, and unemployed. This took away from the credibility for any project that sought to reform the police (Mauricio Puentes, 2013, 314).

Liberal dominance came not only from electoral victories, but from military victories. The police of this era were known for making “arbitrary arrests, womanizing, engaging in street fights, drinking on the job, committing sexual offenses, issuing public threats, abandoning their posts, and loss of police property” (Martinez 2001, 513). In 1885 Conservatives gained control over the federal government and built a centralized form of government under the 1886 constitution called the Republic of Colombia. This period established the ‘Hegemonia Conservadora’ when successive conservative governments began to reverse the federalist/confederalist and anti-clerical framework that Liberals had implemented during the ‘Olimpo Radical.’ In its place they built a system that centralized power, liquidated regional autonomy, restored and enhanced the power of the president, and returned expropriated property and the educational role of the church (Mazzuca and Robinson 2009; 286). However, policing remained decentralized and in the hands of local elites, resulting in continued police malfeasance. To illustrate, during this period there was a massive rural to urban migration. Rural workers, having just arrived in Bogota, were the primary recruits that became police, from day to night, for a city they didn’t even know. Many of the components of police in Bogota, besides being poor, were illiterate, lacked legal knowledge, and did not understand administrative functioning. It should be no surprise then that those enrolled were unconscious of their responsibility as a municipal police agent (Martinez 2001, 327).

Both Conservatives and Liberals used police to beat, jail, repress and murder opposition party members (Hudson 2010; 313). Furthermore, the police had a direct hand in manipulating elections. One of the “most common forms of [fraud during the] 19th century, that did not imply the use of force, had been to circulate the rumor that the draft into military police service would coincide with elections. This rumor would dissuade unenthusiastic voters from showing up at the polls” (Deas 2002, 25). Decentralization and occupational models of the police promoted this internecine conflict that would only accelerate in the coming decade.

Table 21: Colombian Police Post-Independence 1846-1886

Years	1846-1886
Period Name	Independence
Jurisdiction	Local
Work Model	Occupational
Militarized	No
Insecurity	High
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Limited Democracy
Malfeasance	Low

Patrimonialism, Local and Occupational Policing in Colombia 1886-1953

The government of president Carlos Holguin, empowered by the centralist constitution of 1886, passed Law 90 in 1888 followed by Decree 1.000 of 1891 which established the body of National Police, with a working budget and normative framework (Becerra 2011; 255). A French officer, Commissar Jean Marie Gilibert, was commissioned to head the new institution. As General Miguel Antonio Gomez (2009) remarks: Gilibert “would have to confront a first challenge: clientelism.” But along with the clientelism, Gilibert would have to fight against the stigma associated with the National Police. As an

example, by 1897 the governmental authorities noticed the poor enthusiasm found in police recruitment campaigns. This was because of the poor benefits offered to police at the time. The government officers had to venture out with a census and arbitrarily draft men to fill the empty spots in the police. This resulted in many written refusals of those who were selected. Their disinterest in serving as police had to do with the social stigma associated with serving as a police officer, and the poor pay (Martínez 2001, 325).

The individuals that did apply were “strongly armed with recommendations from influential politicians” (Gomez, 2009, 56). This, combined with the lack of ‘viable’ candidates that were drafted, resulted in the police force being filled by agents who were generally undesirable and who were far and away from the acceptable specifications that were asked for in the regulations. As a result, the “National Police was full of drunks, laggards, and even criminals,” and also became politicized (Gomez, 2009, 57).

By 1898 it was well established, not just in the PNC but in all police, that recruits and agents were motivated by party loyalty and incentivized by superiors to commit electoral fraud (Martinez 2001, 332). As Mejia (2011, 29) states, the rapid politicization predisposed police towards abuse. That, as we can expect, reduced the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of Bogota’s citizens (Mejia 2011, 29). The police were under “local patronage of political elites, [and were] well used during elections” (Deas 2002, 27). Furthermore, Deas (2002, 27) notes that during this period of decentralized and occupational models, “the local and departmental police cannot offer any guarantee of neutrality or security. To the contrary, they are the root of the problem of insecurity.” Juan Ignacio Galvez, a Colombian journalist and politician, writes in 1912 that the:

The police, instead of exercising their peculiar work of providing security, was organized to induce fear and insecurity. The abuses were spread throughout the whole institution...as a result hate and rancor grew amongst the population towards Director, right down to the least offensive of its agents. We saw police committing voter fraud by having each agent vote two or three times, and what is most wicked is that they flaunted this crime in front of their chiefs (Galvez 1912, 5-6).

On top of these issues, the ‘national police’ [NP] did not have sufficient resources to extend its coverage throughout the whole country and had only 450 men (Hudson 2010; 313). Although the vision was to create a police force that would spread throughout the country, the process was slow and did not supplant the municipal and departmental police that already existed. The table below, compiled by Cardona (2008), illustrates the slow growth of the PNC and its expansion into certain areas with few agents.

Table 22: Cardona (2008) Data on Sparse Distribution of National Police

					Departments with National Police Presence													
Year	No. Police	% Out of Capital	In Bogota	Outside of Bogota	Atlantico	Bolivar	Magdalena	Valle del Cauca	Tolima	Santander	Cauca	Cundinamarca	Huilla	Nariño	Norte de Santander	Anioquia	Boyaca	Calda
1910	750	0	750	0														
1911	897	0	897	0														
1912	1598	7	1486	112	X	X												
1913	1901	28	1368	532	X	X				X		X			X		X	X
1914	2323	40	1394	929	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X
1915	2081	46	1124	957	X	X			X	X	X	X			X		X	X
1916	1977	31	1364	612	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	
1920	2444	42	1417	1026	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X
1925	3149	40	1889	1260		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
1930	2714	30	1900	814	X			X	X	X		X	X		X		X	X
1935	2707	28	1950	757				X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	
1940	4929	30	3450	1479		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X
Source: Cardona, Christopher Michael. 2008. "Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops: Colombia's La Violencia in Comparative Perspective." UC Berkelevy Doctoral Dissertation Thesis, pg. 102																		

Note that at the same time Colombia had various municipal, departmental, rural police, and gendarmeries under the control of local politicians. Below is a presentation of some

records I obtained that provide a snapshot of how many police could be found in a common municipality in 1917-1918.

A lack of resources made it difficult to hire sufficient local police to ensure public order, as the table above illustrates. Note the police to citizen ratio; ideally, police ratios should be one per 200 according to UN standards. While in some cases cities were able to approximate that ratio, most of the above cases illustrate that some municipalities simply did not have adequate police services. For example, Girardot, a city of over 12,000 people, had no police at all. As Gutierrez noted, the police themselves lacked resources such as uniforms and weapons. The lack of police agents increased banditry throughout the country and insecurity in general. For instance, in 1916, it was reported that 200 bandidos led by Humberto Gómez attacked government authorities in Arauca, killing the police commissioner and other people, and proclaimed their own republic (Revista Credencial Historica, 2005). By the 1920s the country was suffering from insecurity, from massive corruption in its governmental institutions, and from the global great depression. The elections of 1925 were the scene of massive electoral irregularities as it “was reported that the police would distribute ballots that were already marked with candidates that were friendly to the [conservative] government” (Alvarez 2010, 96). As a result, Liberals fomented uprisings against the Conservative government. In response, the Conservatives passed Law 18 of 1928 which sent more national police troops to Antioquia, Atlántico, Bolívar, Caldas, Magdalena and Valle del Cauca because the central government feared the large number of laborers and liberals in those areas would shut down Colombia’s economy (Becerra 2011; 255).

Table 23: Sample of Distribution, Size, and Types of Police in Colombia 1917-1919

City Name	Year	Department	Population	Department Police	City Police	Gendarmeria Police	National Police	Total Police	Police Per Citizens
Puerto Wilches Santo	1917	Santander	3260	0	0	7	0	7	1:465
Domingo	1917	Antioquia	12024	3	6	0	0	9	1:1336
San Roque	1917	Antioquia	1057	0	3	0	0	3	1:352
Yolombo	1917	Antioquia	17599	5	4	0	0	9	1:1955
Etnrrios	1917	Antioquia	3529	0	2	0	0	2	1:1764
Copacabana	1917	Antioquia	6479	0	3	0	0	3	1:2159
Fredonia	1917	Antioquia	20341	5	6	0	0	11	1:1849
Girardot	1917	Cundinamarca	12697	0	0	0	0	0	0
Honda	1917	Tolima	7430	25	16	0	25	66	1:112
Ibague	1918	Tolima	26283	72	16	0	0	88	1:298
Iruango	1917	Antioquia	12518	0	3	0	0	3	1:4172
Jardin	1917	Antioquia	9440	0	4	0	0	4	1:2360
Jerico	1917	Antioquia	18848	5	8	0	0	13	1:1449
Magangue	1917	Bolivar	14076	13	3	0	0	16	1:879
Manizales	1917	Caldas	6777	0	6	13	0	19	1:356
Palmira	1918	Valle del Cauca	27032	43	0	0	0	43	1:628
Percira	1917	Risaralda	23584	12	15	0	0	27	1:873
Remedios	1917	Antioquia	1865	5	1	0	0	6	1:310
Rio Sucio	1917	Caldas	18300	14	4	0	0	18	1:1016
Roldanillio	1918	Valle del Cauca	9197	12	0	0	0	12	1:766
Salgar	1917	Antioquia	10390	0	3	0	0	3	1:3463
San Andres	1917	Antioquia	6012	0	2	0	0	2	1:3006
Santa Barbara	1917	Antioquia	12577	0	6	0	0	6	1:2096
Santa Rosa de Cabal	1917	Risaralda	19904	6	8	0	0	14	1:1421
Santa Rosa de Osos	1917	Antioquia	16290	5	5	0	0	10	1:1629
Tamesis	1917	Antioquia	13757	5	4	0	0	9	1:1528
Titiribi	1917	Antioquia	13525	5	5	0	0	10	1:1352
Tulua	1918	Valle del Cauca	15274	20	8	0	0	28	1:545
Valparaiso	1917	Antioquia	6024	0	3	0	0	3	1:2008
Yarumal	1917	Antioquia	19926	5	11	0	0	16	1:1245
Concordia	1917	Antioquia	11101	0	6	0	0	6	1:1850
Caratgo	1918	Valle del Cauca	21470	27	2	0	0	29	1:740
Carolina	1917	Antioquia	6805	0	5	0	0	5	1:1361
Caramanta	1917	Antioquia	5662	0	5	0	0	5	1:1132
Campamento	1917	Antioquia	4852	0	1	0	0	1	1:4852
Cali	1918	Valle del Cauca	27747	0	15	0	0	15	1:1849
Buga	1918	Valle del Cauca	13561	50	0	0	0	50	1:271
Bolivar	1917	Antioquia	12834	0	4	0	0	4	1:3208
Armenia	1916	Quindio	17406	3	17	0	0	20	1:870
Anserma	1917	Caldas	16040	5	3	0	0	8	1:2005
Angostura	1917	Antioquia	8363	0	3	0	0	3	1:2787
Andes	1917	Antioquia	22424	5	6	0	0	11	1:2038
Amalfi	1917	Antioquia	10750	5	4	0	0	9	1:1194
Amaga	1917	Antioquia	9447	0	3	0	0	3	1:3149
TOTAL			574477	355	229	20	25	629	1:913

Source: Gutierrez, Rufino. 1920. Monografias Tomo I y II. Biblioteca Virtual Luis Angel Arango. Imprenta Nacional. Bogota,

On December 6th of 1928, the Liberal Party led workers to strike against the United Fruit Company resulting in army troops attacking and massacring an indeterminate amount of strikers. Because of the Liberal Party challenges, the banana massacre, the poor economic performance of Colombia, and internal party splits, the Conservatives lost the election of 1930 (Hudson 2010; 313).

The election of the Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera in 1930 brought with it a deeper political role for the police. As Vasquez (2014, 265-266) remarks:

The new Liberal political leaders, aided by the police, retaliated, based on resentments due to excesses committed by the conservatives during their long prominence in power. There also exists significant documentation of complaints of abuse of authority against the departmental, municipal and national police as well as civilian leadership. These authorities committed grave abuses against the conservative populations. It is important to note that, for their part, some municipalities where there were conservative mayors or judges, the liberals presented the exact same complaints. In this manner, the power of the state at the local level was used by some and by others to harass political opposition.

The situation of politicized police had become a major problem that Congress had to address by passing law 72 of 1930 that prohibited all departmental, municipal and 'national police' from voting, along with all other armed forces (Becerra 2011, 258). This law, however, was insufficient to stop politicization. As such, the 1930s entered a period wherein police, an already unprofessional group, became an integral instrument for party politics.

Liberal governments would use police as a vehicle to not only control society, but to also diminish the power of the Conservative Party (Becerra 2011; 258). The successive Liberal Party administrations that ruled from 1930 to 1946 would appoint and incorporate Liberal Party personnel into the national police, and departmental or municipal police,

because the decentralized system made it difficult and undesirable to establish professional norms of incorporation and recruitment. At this time, the sole requirement to be accepted into the institution was to be loyal to the party. The Conservatives would do likewise. A checkered-pattern would cover all of Colombia's police. Their primary purpose was not policing, but rather to attack members of the opposite party.

During the period of Liberal rule from 1930-1946, there were collective murders of conservative partisans on electoral days at the hands of police in areas such as Capitanejo, Molagavita y Guaca, and García Rovira. Liberal police at municipal and departmental levels even went so far as to assassinate the pastor of Molagavita in rejection to Conservative ideologies (Becerra 2011; 259). Reprisals from Conservative police against Liberal candidates occurred in other regions. Thus, the decentralized and occupational police continued to be "the instrument to settle personnel vendettas" (Guzman et. al. 273; 1962). At this time, the National Police also "maintained within its ranks, officers that leaned towards the Liberal Party that were put in place during Liberal rule from 1930-1946" (Aparicio 2003; 47). The institution was not only ineffective, but also corrupt. Decentralization promoted patrimonialism and this limited the ability to implement professional standards, resulting in the heavy politicization of the police.

By 1946, controversial presidential elections were won by the Conservative politician Mariano Ospina Perez. The Liberals charged that there was electoral fraud and a new round of conflict ensued between both factions led by police. In October of 1946, Liberals launched strikes and riots in the capital. The Minister of Government, Manuel Barrera Parra, gave orders to the Director of the National Police to clear the roads. But the

police remained inactive and allowed the masses to grow. Politicization and Liberal party rule over the past decade had ensured that most of the PNC of that era were staffed by Liberals. The city quickly fell under the control of armed groups that destroyed cars, rails, and looted stores. The government did not have the loyalty of the police (Barrera 2006, 223). This illustrates the problem of having a decentralized, politicized and unprofessional system of policing.

In the coming years, tensions would continue to remain high. The police, for example, in 1947 were highly involved in not just politics, but were heavily involved in crime as well. According to James Henderson (1985, 109):

In [the department of] Santander the secretary of government Pedro Manuel Arenas searched desperately for loyal Conservatives willing to enter the departmental corps. Whenever he happened on a likely candidate he recommended him to the departmental police chief, who was then obliged to hire him. Eight months later, Colonel Blanco (departmental police chief) confronted the secretary of government with [...] documents and accused Arenas of turning the police of Santander into a ‘clan of criminals’ The man so strongly recommended turned out to be a convicted killer and cattle thief. To further substantiate his claim, Colonel Blanco produced documents revealing that others [from] the secretary’s ‘highly recommended’ recruits had committed as many as four homicides as well as a variety of other crimes

The interparty conflict and police abuse of power would reach a critical point on April 9 of 1948, when Jorge Elecier Gaitan, the popular Liberal mayor of Bogota was assassinated while leaving his office. Liberal partisans took to the streets in open revolt against the Conservative government. The ensuing violence destroyed downtown Bogota and left between 3,000 to 5,000 people dead on that day alone (Becerra 2011; 265).

Members of the PNC openly aligned themselves with the popular revolt as they took part in “looting, setting fires, and crimes of all degrees” (FBIS-FRB-48-306 on 1948-

05-07). The police were instigating the violent behavior of the masses of citizens who immediately took to the streets following Gaitan's death (Becerra 2011; 265). For instance, the fifth division of the National Police in Bogota, were under the guidance of the Liberal Party. They installed a revolutionary council in the police station with the participation of another 15 divisions—each with 300 personnel. In addition, these police provided members of the Liberal Party with weapons. In Bogota, the departmental police known as the Civil Guard of Cundinamarca had 500 members who also participated in the riots on the side of the Liberals (Aparicio 2003; 47). The police's role was undeniable; their action and inaction led to the destruction of downtown Bogota (Becerra 2011; 265).

Following the political and human disaster of the Bogotazo, the government of Ospina-Perez quickly realized the ineffective nature of the national police and ordered the Director General of the National Police and the Government to “terminate all uniformed personnel of the institution” and to raise a new police force (Aparicio 2003, 48; Becerra 2011, 266). This meant a wholesale liquidation of the police, as old agents were asked to leave their positions without anyone to replace them. What this meant is that it would take 3 years to train both officers and agents that could do the job. Congressman Roberto Piñeda (1950, xxiii) reported that although only 20% of the police force acted in inappropriate ways, the other 80% did little to regain control of the masses, standing by as the city burned. The move by Ospina Perez was costly in terms of resources and quality of officers. Up until this point, command level officers, such as Colonel and Generals, needed approximately 15 years of training experience. These officers were now out of work. Agents took at least 3 months of training and required an additional 20 to 30 months of

working on the street to learn the job of policing (Piñeda 1950, xxiii). As a consequence, the military was unduly burdened with the task of maintaining law and order in the capital while these new troops were formed.

Following the tumult of the Bogotazo, it took the Army three days to regain control over the city and assume policing functions. This military police initiated its activities in Bogota on 16th of July of 1948 and as Camacho-Leyva (29) notes, this military police provided excellent services to the citizens, imposed order in Bogota, and were applauded for their efforts because it inspired a true sense of public service.

However, the assassination of Gaitan had initiated major problem for Colombia beyond the Capital. The violence would continue elsewhere and on July 18th of 1948, a clash between civilian and departmental police took place in the city of El Carmen, Department of Bolivar, resulting in the deaths of three to seven persons. The Liberal papers blamed the Conservative police for the incident, while the Conservative *El Siglo* stated that the Liberal civilians attacked the police with stones and firearms (FBIS-FRB-48-355 on 1948-07-19).

The military that was sent to large cities to quell the Liberal insurrection were withdrawn to tackle issues like El Carmen in the countryside, where violence was escalating. According to Camacho Leyva (29), the withdrawal of the military police led to a drastic situation where partisan politics could once again interject itself in Bogota. The National Police would be ideologically staffed by conservatives. In turn, the lack of professional standards persisted. People that were selected for police service at the agent

level were foreign to police work and received no education or training before taking on their role as police (Camacho Leyva, 29).

As the military withdrew from its policing role in Bogota and other large cities, the system reverted back to the old decentralized form of policing. The result was that once again political parties at the municipal and state level fomented criminality and violence by having a police that was more focused on political harassment than on preventing crimes (Becerra 2011, 264). In the PNC, Conservative police officers had a goal of destroying the Liberal political machine (Llorente 1997, 21).

One of the new characteristic components of the national police was made up of an elite task force called ‘Los Chulavitas’, or the POPOL (Political Police). They were recruited from areas such as Boavita in the Department of Boyaca—a Conservative citadel (Guzmann, Fals and Umana 1962, 279). These police were often transferred to Liberal dominated areas of the country and used as an oppressive force by the Conservatives (Aparicio 2003, 49). These individuals were given recommendations by Conservative elites that wanted to use them as their own personal vengeance agents with the cover of police power. As such, the National Police passed from Liberal control to Conservative control, all the while maintaining sectarian political biases rather than professionalizing and being concerned with maintaining law and order (Guzmann, Fals and Umana 279, 1962).

1949 was a particularly notable year in this regard. On January 18, 1949 in Ciudad Trujillo, Department of Caldas, there were reports of “eight persons wounded and one killed in the Department of Caldas as a consequence of a clash between civilians and

Municipal Police in Pijao. The person killed was identified as a member of the Liberal Party” (FBIS-FRB-49-013). In August, in the town of Capitanejo, “several members of the departmental police force fired on assembled Liberals, killing the veteran Liberal Party leader Arronago Lozano and a woman. Five other persons were seriously wounded” (FBIS-FRB-49-169). On September 15th of 1949 local “police razed the town of La Raya, where, according to reports, more than 100 persons were killed” (FBIS-FRB-49-179). In October of 1949, Cali in the Valle del Cauca police entered the Liberal Headquarters “and assassinated in cold blood all 24 people present. [...] That year in Colombia there were 18,500 victims of the political struggle. In 1950, the number rose to 50,000” (Paredes 2011, 51). This evinces the level of police malfeasance during this period. But the violence would continue, not just in the countryside, but also in the capitol of Bogota. For example, on the 6th of September 1952, public riots were provoked by the Conservative Party. Under this cover, the ‘Chulavitas’, or conservative ‘National Police’, dressed in civilian clothing and attacked the Liberal newspapers of El Tiempo and El Espectador, the homes of Liberal Party leaders, as well as the Liberal Party headquarters.

Up until this point the police system had remained decentralized, although the PNC was slowly established in other regions. By 1950, The PNC had taken over some departments like Antioquia. According to Christopher M. Cardona (2008, 179):

This reform had a modest but notable impact on the composition and professionalism of the police corps. [...] What immediately stands out in comparing service records is that after nationalization, much fewer agents exited the service due to discipline problems. The proportion dropped from one-half to one-third. Dismissals for drunkenness were cut in half after the reform, and firings for lack of discipline also dropped.

But the country as a whole remain largely decentralized with the National Police, the 15

departmental police, a tax police, various municipal police, rural gendarmeries, and intelligence police throughout the country all under the control of Conservative or Liberal local party leaders (Guzmann et. al. 1962, 278). As such, there were severe national “problems caused by the violent political role of police organizations” (Guzmann et. al. 1962, 278). As Brigadier General Londoño noted:

The decentralized system was perverse because the municipal police and departmental police would completely change each election. If the new governor was Conservative he would name a conservative police as commander and change all of the ranks downward to conservatives. If he was Liberal he would change the chief and all of the police as well. They did not receive any training because [of a] lack of resources and there was also lacking a system of organizing the police. Here it was not organized at all. You would get elected mayor today and tomorrow your friend became chief of police...no training or anything. (Br. Gen. Fabio Arturo Londoño 4th of April 2013, ESPOL).

These various police were charged with reducing violence, and yet they only contributed to impunity. As noted by Guzman et. al. (1962, 288), the malfeasance of the police in the decentralized period engendered hatred from society towards the police, a hatred that became deeply rooted “implicating a problem that would hamper the recuperation of this institution, which would become a titanic project for the commanders that were to follow.” In Bogota, the return of local police that was under the political control of political parties increased. Malfeasance returned to such high levels that it created a national crisis that would only be solved through military intervention and centralization of the police.

Table 24: Decentralized Police and La Violencia 1886-1953

Years	1886-1953
Period Name	Decentralized Police and La Violencia
Jurisdiction	Local
Work Model	Occupational
Militarized	No
Insecurity	Very High
Culture Corrupt	High
Regime	Limited Democracy
Malfeasance	High

Military Dictatorship and the Frente Nacional: 1953-1962 and 1962-1985

Colombia had been experiencing a mounting crisis since the murder of Jorge Elecier Gaitan. Murder rates jumped from 39.33 per 100,000 in 1948 to 64.14 in 1953. La Violencia was made possible by the politicization of the police when they were more interested fighting each other than in fighting crime. Brigadier General Londoño stated in an interview that:

Departmental police and municipal police fought one another too. For instance, in Medellin, I saw a municipal policeman was attending a case. The person that was in the paddy wagon said this municipal police was beating him. A departmental police officer showed up and began questioning the municipal policeman for what he was doing. They began to argue and they eventually stabbed each other with bayonets. There were many deaths because of that inter-police fighting (Interview with Author 4th of April 2013).

The increased violence between liberals and conservatives gave rise to a political crisis that left Colombia ungovernable. Adding to this was the continued corruption and government inefficiencies that plagued Colombian society. As per Becerra (2007), the 1940s and 1950s were marred by public employees falling to the vice of looking for personal benefits at the cost of the public. This phenomenon of corruption reduced the credibility of public

institutions, increased the numbers of guerillas, and increased national disorder (Becerra, 2007).

Eventually, due to the liberal and conservative fighting, the collapse of public institutions, and the gridlock in government, general disorder throughout the country had reached a threshold. As such, factions of both the Liberal and Conservative parties, as well as the majority of society, called for military intervention. On June 13 of 1953 General Rojas Pinilla, head of the military, launched what was called the “Opinion Coup” against the Conservative presidency Laureano Gomez, because it received popular support. The Rojas Pinilla’s ‘dictatorship’ was tame compared to his Latin American counterparts. That is, of course, not to say the dictatorship was good, nor that abuses did not occur. The internal fighting amongst security forces and police in the prior period forced the military government (1953-1957) to subordinate to the National Police, departmental police, and municipal police under a unified command (Llorente 1997, 21). With article 2 and 3 of decree 1814 of 1953, General Rojas Pinilla incorporated police into the armed forces structure and brought the police under the control of the Ministry of War. There were important aspect of the takeover that had the positive benefit of centralizing and partially professionalizing the police. The social benefits given to police were upgraded to the comparative level of the national army. In 1953, the creation of the Section of Social Welfare for the Police Forces of Colombia marked a vast improvement in the benefits that municipal and departmental police officers would receive, since many did not have any social benefits. This would lead to the construction of schools for the basic and secondary education for police officers and their families.

In 1954 the command ranks and personnel of the department of Boyacá, Cauca, Córdoba, and Chocó y Huila were centralized under one rank. That same year the police rotary foundation was created to sell discounted household products and provide soft credit. Another welfare program initiated was the credit union for military housing, where police, after 15 years could ask for subsidized credit for a house or materials to build their own house. In February of 1955, the retirement pension fund of the police was created that was in charge of paying retirement pensions to officers. General Rojas Pinilla also created recreational facilities for the police allowing police to join the military club in Bogota, and assigning land in Melgar in 1957 to construct a sub-officer club close to other military clubs. In this way, during the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla, the foundation for the current welfare system was initiated.

But it would not be fully realized until 1962 when the National Police came into full force, assuming centralized administrative and operational control over the multiple, individual forces that had previously operated in the country's departmental divisions. Decree 1272 of May of 1962 stated that as of the 1st of June 1962, the nation will have under its charge the sustainment, funding, and pay of all police in all of the territories of the Republic. The national police incorporated all of the uniformed officers that provided services on behalf of departments, so long as they conformed to the physical and educational regulations for entrance into the PNC. Many did not. The departmental governments retired all other personnel that were part of the municipal or departmental police that did not fulfill the new requirements. As Brigadier General Londoño explains:

The PNC from 1950 was just a small group of police in the capital and in the periphery in Leper Colonies of Agua de Dios, Contratacion, Canyon del

Oro, and mining operations in Barrancabermeja, Istimina, and other gold mines. When the British mission had completed its training of the PNC officer, the government began to send officer-commanders to the departmental and municipal police. I was sent to Antioquia by myself in 1950; we only had 86 PNC officers throughout the nation, 1 or 2 in each department. We began the hard battle for centralization. The troops under my command were former departmental or municipal police. But it was a nationalization process that was very mediocre. [It was] very forced, because the person that named the police was not the director of police. The national police directors only named command level officers. The common agents were named by the mayor or the department, so they were not national police personnel. In 1962 that ended, and the national government assumed the pension and budget of all of the staff. So the beginning of the development happens as of that point. In 1962, that is when better professionalization of the police began (Interview 4th of April 2013).

The importance of this period is that the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla would nationalize the police and increase professionalism through better benefits, training, and vertical oversight. The case of centralization of the police following the Rojas Pinilla's coup was a necessary action that paid great dividends for the country of Colombia. First, centralizing the national police removed a violent source of power from local mayors. Second, the police incorporation standards made training more militarily oriented. Third, it introduced an extensive, albeit imperfect, oversight and sanctioning system of police through the penal military justice system. No such system had existed for the municipal and departmental police. Fourth, Rojas Pinilla focused on increasing the social benefits. All of these actions allowed the government to establish a stronger state presence, rule of law, and civilian oversight of the police in a way that had never existed before. It also professionalized, depoliticized and increased the power of police to bring security.

By 1962, political currents had also changed and both the Liberals and Conservatives united to pressure Rojas Pinilla, and later a military junta that replaced him,

to return power to a democratic form of government. The agreement between Liberals and Conservatives was to stagger control of the presidency and other government positions every presidential term for 16 years. This pacted democracy—called the Frente Nacional—was agreed upon and formed a dual-hegemony, where the Liberals and Conservatives dominated the political landscape and excluded other parties. This is also the reason why the leftists groups—including communist —formed the FARC and other guerilla groups.

In terms of policing, the ‘Frente Nacional’ precluded the need for police in elections. By 1963 the police were depoliticized, had discipline thanks in part to newly created training schools, received equal treatment in welfare allowances just like the military, had police child social welfare and retirement salary fund, and were provided with uniforms, equipment and technology. The change was dramatic as David Laughlin, Chief of the U.S. Mission for Police Reform in Colombia 1963, remarked, “There is a good administration of the personnel that contributes to the professionalization of the police officer and the rest of the personnel. Their good loans and programs of social welfare contribute notably to the stability of the personnel to confront low salaries and other difficulties of service” (Zapata 1971, 303). This stands in stark contrast to the previous system of politicized control where malfeasance ran rampant.

Inter-party rivalry, patrimonialism, and decentralized police fomented ‘La Violencia’ increasing the homicide rate to 50 per 100,000 from 1948-1961. Once the police were fully centralized and professionalized, homicide rates fell to 30 homicides per 100,000 from 1962-1984. As Ruiz (2009) states, “Thanks to the pact of the Frente

Nacional, the police was able to excel as a new institution away from violent manipulation and the traditional party alliances that had motivated past disturbances.” The National Police, as reconstructed by the regime of Rojas Pinilla, gained institutional autonomy, established a monopoly over policing functions, and strengthened its vertical oversight structure. The professionalized standards of advancing in rank and recruitment that mimicked the military were much more professionally oriented than they were in the past. At this point, the police moved away from an occupational model, to one that was closer to a professional model. Police now had more benefits, stronger recruitment standards for that time period, and a military-esque disciplinary oversight system that partially professionalized the police. Brigadier General Fabio Londoño had shared with the author that early on, the National Police provided quality, honest and effective service from 1962-1980s, but that drug trafficking eroded the professional gains made during that period. Thus, malfeasance greatly decreased during the process of centralization and professionalization during the military dictatorship and ‘Frente Nacional’, despite changes in regimes. But that professionalization would not withstand the power threats from leftist guerilla groups, right leaning paramilitary groups and narco-trafficking that increased the levels of malfeasance once again.

Table 25: Military Dictatorship and National Front 1953-1985

Years	1953-1961	1961-1985
Period Name	Military Dictatorship	National Front
Jurisdiction	National	National
Work Model	Semi-Professional	Professional
Militarized	Yes	Yes
Insecurity	Yes	Yes
Culture Corrupt	Yes	Yes
Regime	Military Dictatorship	Democracy
Malfeasance	Medium	Low

The Rise of Drug Money and Weakening of Police Institutions 1970-1990

Although the centralized structures were superior in providing quality policing, when compared to the decentralized and occupational period, the PNC still ran into some major challenges. Perhaps the first and most important one was that although the structural foundation was strong, the welfare, development and oversight structures became poorly run and underfunded in the 1970s and early 1980s. This had to do with the fact that the police, during the military dictatorship, were placed under the guidance of the Ministry of Defense, and the FARC guerillas were increasing in operational capacity.

Colombia's Ministry of Defense had traditionally been guided by an Army General. As the FARC guerillas gained in power, it was up to the minister of defense to cope with this threat to the state. As such, public security was not prioritized, and in fact de-emphasized. During this period in Latin America, protecting the state from foreign and domestic enemies was the main priority. As such, the police would receive less funding as the Army General, qua minister of defense, would favor the other branches—especially the army—over the police. In addition, the ministers of defense would use the police as an

auxiliary military force to battle the guerillas, in essence, ‘militarizing’ them. Mauricio Rubio (1997) confirms this and notes that “an excessive spending on the military was to the detriment of the police, which impacted their professionalization and forced citizens to opt for private solutions for their security problems.” This oriented the police away from their civilian role into a more military role. This meant that the military would draw individuals away from policing and place them in combat zones—meaning each police officer’s work would steadily increase. However, the benefits would not be increased to complement the increased stresses of the job.

To illustrate what this change meant, consider that the ideal standard of police to population ratio is 1 officer per every 222 persons. In 1964 there was only 1 officer per 525 inhabitants, eventually decreasing the ratio in 1974 to 1 officer for every 438 inhabitants. But not much changed in 1985 when there was only 1 officer for every 425 civilians (Aparicio 2011, 61). That means police personnel needed to be doubled in order to effectively do their job. Thus, the police were underfunded, overworked, poorly trained, and were geared towards an unnatural purpose of fighting a war and had poor benefits.

The increased power of leftist guerillas and narco-trafficking in the 1970s and 1980s further eroded the PNC, as many of these units were drawn away from public security and were co-opted to address national security problems. As evinced by both the mounting death toll of police and in society, Colombia once again grew in violence. Graph 1 illustrates the civilian death toll increases sharply from 1985-1993, and Graph 2 below illustrates the mounting deaths per year of police officers. During this time period police malfeasance increased dramatically. In the 1980s the police were supposed to provide

civilians with security. In that sense, it was a civilian dependency, but operationally it was under the control of the army. The police, therefore, had a profile that was poorly suited for police work. Brigadier General Londoño sheds light on this issue:

The nationalization of our police comprises a centralization of doctrine and decentralization of its management and its administration. If you are subordinated to the military, you can't do anything. They wanted to nationalize command through the Ministry of Defense, which impeded local decision making. Police develops in a different way; they can be centrally administered, but must address local problems with local solutions (Author Interview, 4th of April 2013).

The National Police was seen as a parallel police force to the military to fight the insurgency, not to provide public security. So when narco-trafficking arose in prominence, it particularly affected the National Police. Through the 1980s the image of the police had been deteriorating due to successive scandals and high levels of corruption from narco-trafficking that received a lot of coverage. In Medellin, for instance, the police were broken by corrupting factors. Pablo Escobar's policy of corrupting police and killing the honest ones was well known. What is not well known is that police were often the one's murdering one another to receive Escobar's payments (Gerard 2012, 197). By this point in Colombian history police professionalism was not strong enough to battle the influence of drug money. According to Sergeant (R) Juan Aparicio, the requirements in 1970-1990 were to: 1) be a Colombian citizen, 2) have 5th grade finished, and 3) have no criminal record. So standards were not high. Coupled with this is that there were little benefits for the police. For example, in terms of housing assistance, Sgt. (R) Juan Aparicio informed the author in an interview that:

The police in my day (1972-1992) had something called ‘military housing’ where they discounted your house. It was poorly managed. I would ask for a house, but they would put you on the periphery in a dangerous neighborhood. What good does that do me? I didn’t use it.

This shows that benefits and development were extremely weak. I hypothesized that if there is a shift from a weak system to a strong system of welfare, development, and oversight, than malfeasance should decrease. And that is exactly what needed to happen in order for Colombian police to improve. Important reforms would be undertaken under the administrations of Vergilio Barco (1986-1990) and Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994). But prior to these two administrations, there was little advancement in terms of police professionalization. I refer to this period as one of centralization and semi-professionalization, because some standards, albeit low, did exist for recruitment, and police did receive some training. However, while there was vertical oversight, there was no external oversight or strong internal controls that were necessary to ensure a professional force. A key explanatory factor here is that drug money increased police malfeasance. Police professionalization was not an important agenda, and had it been carried out in this period, the likelihood of police malfeasance would have decreased drastically. How do you test for this argument? The next section traces the process by which police in Colombia were professionalized, and how this contributed to overriding the malfeasance that plagued it in the Narco era.

Table 26 Narco Era 1985-1993

Years	1985-1993
Period Name	Narco Era
Jurisdiction	National
Work Model	Occupational
Militarized	Yes
Insecurity	Yes
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	High

Reforms in Welfare, Development and Oversight: 1990-1997

Between April and June of 1990, 200 police had been killed in Medellin, and in total 465 police were killed under the Escobar payment scheme (Gerard, 2012, 197). In the decade of the 1980's 690 police were killed, and in the early 1990s, 2,140 were killed. By 1993 Colombia was suffering the worst homicide rates it had ever experienced at 78 deaths per 100,000 people. The problem of police in Colombia is better described by Hugo Acero as follows:

In Latin America everyone speaks of security. We all want security. But nobody wants to invest in it. What is the status that our police have in Latin American society? They are the lowest valued public servants. I have [spoken of] this work in various auditoriums in various countries [and] I ask 'who wants to be a police officer?' Nobody raises their hand. 'Who wants to be a police officer?' Nobody wants to be a police officer. Some of them do want to be police officers but they fear people will judge them as ignorant. 'Why is that guy raising his hand? What an idiot. Why would anyone want to be a police officer?' (Author Interview Tuesday April 30, 2013).

Hugo Acero was describing the paradox in Latin America that everyone wants to have a high quality police force, but they do not provide the resources that it takes to develop it. The reforms that take place in the 1990s would substantially professionalize the police,

taking them from an institution that had not changed much in terms of police professionalization since the 1960s and 1970s into one of the most modern and professional police forces in Latin America. By the 1980s, police work was no longer geared towards public security, its funding was cut, and recruitment and training had also not changed much. Due to these problems, as well as problems with the arcane criminal justice system and constitution, the outgoing administration of President Virgilio Barco Vargas and the incoming administration President Cesar Gavaria set about to reform the constitution, the police, and public security (Gerard 2012, 289). They also worked to dismantle the Medellin Cartel accomplishing that task in 1993, and then set the foundation for the dismantling of the Cali Cartel in 1998. Note that the collapse of the Medellin and Cali cartel are outcomes, not causes, of the police and public security reforms undertaken across these two administrations.

As Rafael Pardo (Minister of Defense 1990-1994) noted, there was a lot of policy continuity from both of these administrations that allowed this to happen (Author Interview 17th of May 2013). The Vargas administration set the foundation for the Gavaria administrations to implement a series of reforms from 1990-1994. This period of reform strengthened three key areas to controlling malfeasance: welfare provision, development procedures, and internal and external controls.

Bringing about a complete reform of the police was a very difficult task. The background problem that arose was the lack of civilian trust. The police treated citizens poorly and there were many problems. Thus, Rafael Pardo, as the first civilian Minister of

Defense under the new 1991 constitution, set out to build on the previous reforms and change the high levels of malfeasance. As Rafael Pardo recounts:

Initially I asked the police to do a proposal of how to reform and the proposal was frankly a reform to leave everything the way it was. Then another reform and it was the same, another one, and finally I was not able to get the institution itself to come up with a proposal for reform. But, the credibility of the police was zero, very low in polls, one of the most corrupt institutions in the country, and corruption was everywhere (Author Interview Friday 17th of May 2013).

In 1991 Minister Pardo presented these reforms to congress with an overhaul of the National Police to congress but the project gained little traction. However, real change would begin to take place as a result of an extremely disheartening case of police abuse. In 1993, a little girl walked into a police station to visit her father who was a police officer. Her body was found raped and murdered in that same police station. It ignited deep seeded feelings of disgust and anger against the police. Initially the father was blamed for the rape of his own daughter, but later in the investigation it was revealed that it was in fact another police officer who had committed that rape. This singular event had a significant impact on reforming the police. Rafael Pardo, incensed by the murder decided to take action:

That day I went to the General Santander Officer Cadet School in Bogota. I called together all of the major officers in the city and the officers there taking courses. I gave them a speech, informing them that we were going to do a reform of the police over three months, and that there would be an external commission and an internal one made up of all of the ranks from the lowest to highest. Those commissions had to provide recommendations in three months, and in three months, I would ask congress to establish a reform of the police. So from there the process began. We had an external commission with academics, congressmen, [and] ex-police, a plural commission with political parties, [and] an internal one with agents, sub officials and officers being represented. At the end, the Presidency used these commission reports to propose a bill that would become law 62 of 1993. That project was one of the fastest in history (Interview 5/27/2013).

Three key areas that were reformed will be discussed below. First, police welfare regimes were improved by fixing salaries, upward mobility, pensions and incorporating managerial models to improve services in the area of health, disability, life insurance, housing benefits, and recreational activities. Second, police development was greatly improved by raising standards for entry into the police, allowing military service in the police, improving training length and topics, providing police with opportunities to gain university education outside of the academies, and granting university educated civilians a path to becoming part of the police. Finally, the disciplinary structure of the police was changed to incorporate stronger methods of prevention and action against corruption from internal and external entities.

Reforms to Police Welfare Regimes

An important part of this reform process was the procurement of better levels of welfare and social security for the members of the institution (Dupuy 2005, 11). In terms of police welfare, the following areas were expanded and improved: salary, pensions, healthcare, housing, vacation, life and disability insurance, and recreation. This section explores the changes made to the welfare of police during the reform process of 1990-1997.

Articles 17-54 of decree 1213 of 1990 provide for various salary bonuses including a yearly bonus equivalent to half a month's pay and a charisma bonus, equivalent to 1 month of salary. But there was a problem. Although these bonuses were meant to stimulate positive behavior, they had little effect. The reason is complicated. The old system was a pyramid that was extremely flat with three levels or steps. The first level is very thick,

but makes up 90 % of the pyramid. This is the police patrol level, which has 1 rank: agent. The second level is much smaller, constituting 8% of the pyramid. This was the old rank level of sub-officers: corporal 1, corporal 2, second sergeant, vice-first sergeant, first sergeant, and sergeant major. Finally, the top 2 % was made up of first lieutenant, second lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general, major general, and general director. So the issue with this reform is that it granted bonuses based on salary, but salaries were linked to your rank. If there was limited upward mobility, as was the case for the lowest but largest rank level (agent), then the salary bonuses did not amount to much. In this older system it was the officer class that benefited; since their rank was higher, they were paid more and they could, with regularity, expect to be raised in rank every 3 to 5 years. This was modified with decree 132 of 1995 that got rid of the middle rank of 'sub-officers' and the 'agent' level. It replaced both with an executive level rank system that allowed for greater upward regular mobility. To rise in the following rank order, individuals must be called to take exams, score very well on them, and have a good service history after having spent 5 to 7 years in that rank: patrol agent to sub-intendant (5 years), sub-intendant to intendant (5 years), intendant in chief (7 years) sub commissioner (5 years), and commissioner (5 years). This changed the flat pyramid I discussed earlier into a truly towering pyramid with ranks better distributed, leading to better salaries for police personnel. According to former defense minister Rafael Pardo:

This reform was necessary to create a career, where one person does not enter into his life as an agent and remain an agent all of his life. Because, in the end, it was an extremely class based system that was discriminatory. The poor were agents, the middle class were officers. These mechanisms allowed people to rise in ranks. So it turned into a pyramid, a true pyramid,

not just a huge base of agents with a small number of officials at the top (Author Interview May 17, 2013).

Table 27: Distribution of Police in Colombia by Rank 2012

	Rank	Personnel	Percent of Uniformed Police
Academy Students	Patrol Student	4408	3.28
First 2 Years of Officer Training	Officer Cadet	895	0.67
Last Year of Officer Training	Officer Candidate	167	0.12
Executive Level	Patrol	90000	67.04
	Sub-Intendant	16563	12.34
	Intendant	12977	9.67
	Intendant in Chief	1814	1.35
	Sub-Commissioner	927	0.69
	Commissioner	48	0.04
Officer	First Lieutenant	2000	1.49
	Lieutenant	1654	1.23
	Capitan	1011	0.75
	Major	1039	0.77
	Lieutenant Colonel	511	0.38
	Colonel	194	0.14
	Brigadier General	22	0.02
	Major General	10	0.01
	General	1	0.001
	Total Uniformed	134241	
Civilians	Total Civilian Personnel	29271	
	Total Police Personnel	163512	

Source: Data Gathered from Archival Research at Centro Estrategico de Direccionamiento Institucional Historico Virtual, April 19, 2013.

Beyond bonuses and rank-realignment, there is the issue of salary. As the tables indicate, in 1994 there had been a salary increase of 35 to 55 percent depending on rank. The table below illustrates the increases in salary of the basic patrol agent rank of police by year and by percentages.

Table 28: Changes in PNC Salaries 1992-1998

Year	Salary Of Lowest Rank of Police Presented in Pesos	Percent Increase in Salary From Previous Year
1992	73040	xxxx
1993	96250	24%
1994	149000	35%
1995	194000	24%
1996	247711	22%
1997	294462	16%
1998	347360	15%

Data source: Presentation of Colombian Senator Juan Lozano and Direction of Human Resource of the National Police.

These drastic increases had the goal to attract better candidates to police work, while providing a higher quality of life for police. The goal was to not just give police a minimum wage as before, but to provide them with a middle class salary. Police at the basic level in 2012 were paid 1,072,887 pesos (Direction of Human Resources: Salary Table 2012). That translates to 560 dollars a month in Colombia where the monthly minimum wage is 280 USD. This means that, as of 2012, police salary is double the minimum wage, not including their salary bonuses. In addition to this, police receive 30 days of paid vacation every year. Police also get a half month pay bonus every year of active service and a 1 month pay bonus for Christmas. Putting these bonuses together with the 30 days of vacation, Colombian police work 11 months out of the year but earn 13 ½ months of pay. Police work needs to have attractive perks to draw in better candidates, and this is one of the most coveted. But a stable salary alone is insufficient. It needs to be linked to a quality pension system.

In terms of pensions, the national police of Colombia historically had access to a pension that they contributed throughout their career. The basic pension plan was 50% of

their monthly salary after having completed 15 years of service for life. This was not that much money before the previous salary increases occurred. Article 104 stipulates that anyone can receive a pension if they have served at least 15 years. If an officer retires at 15 years of service, they receive 50 percent of their discounted salary with an additional 4% per year of additional service, up to a maximum of 85% of their total monthly salary as their pension if they stay for 23 years. However, if these officers retire after 30 years of service, they can receive up to 95% of their base salary, plus standard bonuses. Decree 1858 of 2012 modifies the requirements by requiring a minimum of 20 years of service rather than 15 years to receive their pensions. Under this new regiment, after 20 years of service police will receive 75% of the amount of their salary and bonuses. An additional two percent (2%) will be given for each year in excess of the 20, but in no case can exceed one hundred percent (100%) of such items. Thus an individual who provides 12 more years of service, on top of the 20, will be eligible to retire with 99% monthly payment of their final salary. Considering many police officers enter at an average age of 20, many can retire with full salary benefits at the age of 54. Additionally, police receive a 30% increase in salary when an officer gets married to subsidize his family, a 5% increase in salary for first child, a 4% increase for second child, and so forth up to four children. These improvements in salaries and pension packages brought long term stability. Pension package and increased pay were also important because now applicants were drawn into the institution. This improved the pool of applicants.

Salaries and pensions were not the only enticing benefits to becoming a police officer. In 1983 social welfare was incorporated as one of the eight divisions of the

National Police. Along with the health division, the social welfare division was poorly run by police commanders who had no experience in public administration. The health division concentrated in providing services to officers of the larger urban areas, and thus did not meet the demands of the National Police equally. Addressing this problem, Article 93 of decree 1213 of 1990 stipulated that it is the duty of the government to provide medical care to police including surgery, dental, and life time pharmaceutical care for them and their families, except the children who stop receiving benefits at 21 years of age. Law 62 of 1993 and subsequent reforms sought to reform the inefficient social welfare system that had not changed substantially since the period of Rojas Pinilla's military rule. Creating the Institution for Social Security and Welfare of the Police (INSSPONAL) as an autonomous agency increased social welfare quality. This new institution extended social benefits to 700,000 active and retired police personnel and their families.

On December 17, 1997 INSSPONAL was divided into separate directions of the police: a separate health section and a social welfare section. Professionals with degrees in public administration were recruited to operate in the new directions of health and welfare. There was a concerted effort in attracting university graduates and to train officers in management. As a result, these institutions now work well. At the time of writing, the welfare division head is Nicolás Rances Muñoz Martínez, a graduate of the University of Business Administration in Bogota. As of 2013, the police have complete healthcare coverage administered by the police that is better than the Colombia system of social security and healthcare for civilians. Thus, police have full general healthcare, maternity

care, preventative care, recuperation and rehabilitation, surgery, dentistry, hospital care, and pharmaceutical coverage

Table 29 Days to Wait for Non-Emergency Medical Services

Year	Surgery	Dental	Special Medical Care	General Visit
2007	51.8	7.3	9.8	10.9
2008	46.6	5.52	8.43	10.1
2009	23	4.4	7.62	5.43
2010	28.4	2.51	3.01	2.29
2011	6.8	2.57	4.25	3.4
2012	16.25	2.72	7.45	4.18
2013	25.56	2.76	4.88	7.59
Average Wait in Days	28.34	3.34	6.49	6.27

Source: Data Gathered from Archival Research at Centro Estrategico de Direccionamiento Institucional Historico[CEDIH] Virtual, April 19, 2013.

Last year (2012), 590,000 people used the police healthcare system in some form or another. There are three levels of healthcare offered to police dependent on healthcare needs. First off, clinics and dentistry offices, 117 in total, cover basic diagnostics and non-life threatening situations, including pharmacy, dental care, and regular check-ups. Secondly, seventeen small hospitals are spread throughout the country and handle more complex health situations such as serious injury or child-birth with ambulance services. Finally, a central hospital that is located in Bogota is available in complex cases with experts and specialists. The healthcare system counts with 32 ambulances, 628 hospital beds, 31 surgery rooms, and 16 child birth rooms (CEDIH and Direction of Health Website).

Articles 117 to 120 of decree 1213 of 1990 provides disability insurance and payment based on time as a police officer, and severity of injury. Complete disability, it should be noted, provides officers with 100% of their base salary plus discounted benefits.

Additionally police are given life insurance equivalent to 2 years of salary or, if they served more than 15 years, the equivalent to a pension. If they have died in service or are permanently disabled, the money can be transferred to the primary caregiver, usually a spouse or parents, as well as the latter receiving funds for funeral services (Decree 1213 of 1990).

Decree 353 of 1994 reformed the Military Housing Promotion Fund that aimed to provide police with homeownership by providing brokerage, credit, and financial conditions to facilitate house purchases or materials for building houses as well as greater access to quality discount housing. The monetary housing fund provided credits for people to buy a home or get a down payment on a home. In addition, this fund would provide small loans for furnishing the house. The amount of money given to one family that is affiliated with the box ranges with rank. Patrol agents get only 22 million pesos or 11,000 USD, ranks above patrolman get 27 million pesos or 14,000 USD, and officers receive 64 million pesos which is 33,000 USD to procure housing (Vivienda Fiscal PNC Website). A sum of 1,621 houses and family apartments are available for discounted rent that are owned and operated by the police. Rent is assessed as 13% of the police person's base salary. For example, a patrolman who has the lowest salary at 560 US dollars per month would have to only pay 73 US dollars in rent (Email correspondence with Lt. Col. Diana Diaz, Chief of Police Housing). Additionally, the direction of social welfare offers small loans of up to 2,000 USD with a .5% interest rate with 2 year repayment period (Bienestar Social PNC Website).

Police have access to discounted vacation centers run by the police in 15 locations throughout the country with 643 rooms, cabins or houses with a total capacity for 3,402 individuals. Additionally, there are three police clubs in Bogota that offer police rooms at a discounted rate (CEDIH Policia en Cifras V. 5). One club is for troop ranks and two are for officer level agents (CEDIH and Direccion de Bienestar Social Website). The clubs have restaurants with discounted food and alcoholic beverages, and provide a variety of amenities like spas, saunas, Olympic size swimming pools, hairstylists, manicures, pedicures, golf courses, tennis courts, soccer fields, playgrounds and regular family oriented events available for police recreation (Based on Author Visit to Bogota Officer Club and Interview with Lt. Gustavo Lopez).

Free primary and secondary education is also available for the children of police with 22 schools spread throughout the country serving 20,905 children of police or police personnel. Police and their families from any rank can go to universities at discounted prices. Note that command officers receive an accredited degree in police administration, consisting of six semesters (3 years) and 158 academic units (Email Correspondence with Lt. Col. Emilianna Vargas Academic Vice Rector). Police who seek a postgraduate education can receive scholarships from the PNC (CEDIH and Email correspondence with Lt. Col. Angel Rueda Vice rector of education and distance learning).

Referring to the police survey I conducted at postgraduate police school (ESPOL) in May of 2013, 80% also noted that a major reason they decided to join was the strong pension package they would receive. 51% noted the salary they would receive, 31% noted the discount housing and loans, and 31% noted the health insurance as important factors.

Only 25 % noted they joined because they wanted to stop crime—illustrating the importance of welfare in motivating individuals to join the police.

I asked officers ‘When do you plan on retiring’? Fifty-seven percent stated that they would retire once they have completed their 20-25 years of service so that they can receive their pension. Thirty-three percent stated they would retire when they achieved a certain rank, with most respondents having aspirations to reaching the rank of General. One officer stated that “I want to retire when I am 55 because by then I will have received the rank of General.” In addition, 14% stated that they would simply retire when the institution decided it is their time to go, and had no definitive time to retire or plan. This illustrates two things that speak to the theory. The welfare regime is an important motivator for service, especially the pension. Second, the pension package attracts qualified candidates that have professional career aspirations of rising in ranks and providing service. This is exhibited by the majority of the respondents having long term career oriented outlooks.

The government assumed and committed itself to bring about to this reformed police a new regiment of social security, which included an increase in salary, and the creation of a decentralized system responsible for health, education, recreation, housing and attention to incapacitated police that implied a new concept of the promotion and holistic development of the police personnel (Serrano 1994, 5). But welfare changes were only the beginning of this important process. Benefits attract pools of high quality candidates, but the selection and training is what makes a police officer an effective provider of public security.

Reforms to the Police Development Regime

Article 9 of Decree 1213 of 1990 changed these standards to qualify to the following: 1) be a Colombian citizen, 2) be between 18 and 30 years of age, 3) have finished the second year of high school (10th grade), 4) do not have a criminal record, 5) has never participated in politics nor be a member of a political party, 6) pass the admission exams, 7) prove that parents and immediate family did not serve prison time, and 8) that their wife and children are in good health.

As of 2013, in order to be an acceptable candidate for the basic police rank of ‘patrullero’ or agent, the candidate must be: 1) Colombian by birth, 2) complete a 12th grade education, 3) be 1.6 meters in height, 4) complete military service, 5) have no party affiliations, 6) score above 213 points on the ICFES (SAT in Colombia, universities require a score above 200), 6) be between 18 to 24 years of age if working on the street and single, or 7) be 18 to 30 years of age if working in administrative capacity with a maximum of two children (Galvan 1997).

The next step of incorporation and selection consists of: 1) passing a physical aptitude test and 2) psychological batter, 3) submitting to house visits by human resources officers, 4) undergoing thorough background analysis including criminal records of applicant and family members, and 5) having a formal interview with the director of the school that they will be trained at along with an 6) interview with the council of admission. Having raised its standards over time, the PNC now requires better education and conducts

stronger background checks. It also has a strong focus on vetting the candidates. Officer requirements are the same except the test scores must be higher.

Contrasted with the decentralized and occupational model of police systems that Brigadier General Londoño knew, this period of reformed police was a vast improvement. He shared with me that when he “entered in 1950, the first section of police that I had under my command were from the former municipal police force. This group was made up of 34 agents, of which only 5 could read. The rest of the 29 were illiterate (Author Interview with Bg. Gen. Londoño 4th of April 2013). Another significant change that was made was to the quality of police applicants by Minister of Defense Rafael Pardo with respect to military service. His goal was to promote more interaction between all levels of society and the police. At this time:

Nobody from society had a relationship with the police, except when there were criminal proceedings. There is a crime, then police show up. That is not good. There needs to be an ongoing relationship. So the first thing that I wanted to do was to make military service mandatory in the police as well. Up until then military service was mandatory for all men, but only in the three branches: navy, air force and army. What I did was to establish the police as an option for military service. In particular, military service youth from the private high schools, from high status. To provide military service in the police, to not only increase the size of the police force, but to bring in people from the outside to come to learn more about the institution and increase social relations (Interview Rafael Pardo Friday 17th of May 2013).

I conducted a survey at ESPOL in 2013 which backs the importance of this new incorporation system. Of the sample responses, 32% of officers came from blue collar households, 22% came from white collar households, and 21% of respondents came from an upper class background. In terms of obligatory military service, 2.7% came from the Air Force, 11% had done service in the Army, and 30% had done their service with the

police. Fifty-seven percent had not done their military service. You can avoid military service by paying a fee and being placed on the reserve list. But selection alone cannot mitigate corruption. The military style training and discipline, as well as time spent in training, are critical.

The reforms in the area of personnel development provided for comprehensive academic training, with an emphasis on human rights, ethical instruction, leadership and community service. A member of the National Police, according to their rank, will be fully trained in academies and comprehensive specialized training centers. The reform also meant that from here on forward higher and middle ranks would take courses in administration, human rights, ethics, citizen participation, and other themes at the best universities in the country and outside of the country (Gerard 2012, 326).

Prior to 1962, only the Escuela Santander and three regional schools existed for training. At that time the norm was 6 months of training for agents. Brigadier General Londoño told me that “there was a time when you had personnel that only had three months of training because we needed the personnel. They were the worst. They were all corrupt. Not one of them lasted. You need at least 1 year of training to make an agent” (Author Interview with Bg. Gen. (r) Londoño 4th of April 2013). Today, police agents require eighteen months of training: twelve months at an academy followed by two month training after their first year, two month training after their second year, and a final two month training course in their third year (Article 35, Decree 1213 of 1990). Article 35 also established that agents and officers receive promotions based on merit and completion of training courses that would become increasingly more difficult. As such, this law

established a clearly rigorous training regimen that focused both on the theoretical and practical aspects of police work. As of 2013, police can train in twenty-six schools that consist of nine specialty schools, fourteen training schools for agents, and three schools for the officer level, including a postgraduate school where officers can earn a master's degrees.

In addition, there has been a lot of lateral incorporation from civilians into police force. Individuals with university degrees can enter the police force provided they are thirty years of age or younger, are single or married with no kids and fulfill all of the other requirements listed above. In addition, the applicant must have a degree in the areas of business administration, educational administration, public administration, accounting, law, economics, statistics, physics, industrial engineering, psychology, psychotherapy or chemistry. These candidates will only train with at the police academy for 1 year, since they already have a comparable degree.

An additional measure taken by Defense Minister Rafael Pardo in 1993 was that "officers could take courses in universities and that they would wear their uniforms to the universities" (Author Interview with Rafael Pardo May 17th of 2013). This measure was important because it exposed police to society and it exposed society to police, reducing barriers and increasing mutual understanding while improving the mental capabilities of officers to conduct their work (Author Interview with Rafael Pardo May 17th of 2013). Police, bolstered by higher quality applicants, better training, and university education could now incorporate discourses of citizen oriented policing, strengthened with

mechanisms of planning, oversight and evaluation of outcomes and have the staff capable of conducting these activities (Gerard 2012, 326).

Hugo Acero commented that the reforms in the selection and training along with increasing police welfare were significant. Acero goes on to state that:

If there is a good selection process and a good training process, you have good police. But that selection goes through the lenses of society's view of the police. I'll put it to you this way. In the past if there is an opening of 1,000 positions in the police, 2,000 citizens would show up to try out, because people did not want to become to police. Better yet, the people that did become police showed up because they had no other recourse. They hit rock bottom. As of 2013, 1,000 positions are opened and 100,000 people show up. Some are not allowed in, and they ask me for help. This happens with friends and people who ask me for help in getting in. I mean with social welfare, there was long term security, security with the pension, security in their health, labor security, and security for their family. The security provided by the PNC is much more attractive than in many other jobs in Colombia (Hugo Acero Interview Tuesday April 30, 2013)

The table below illustrates the changes that indeed more people want to be police, yet fewer can get in.

Table 30: Applications and Acceptance into the Police Vetting Process

Year	Applied	Accepted To Vetting	Acceptance Rate to Vetting Process
2007	46425	20709	44.61%
2008	60096	21478	35.74%
2009	43476	16838	38.73%
2010	44329	14529	32.78%
2011	54191	17028	31.42%
2012	96439	30515	31.64%

Source: Data Gathered from Archival Research at Centro Estrategico de Direccinamiento Institucional Historico Virtual, April 19, 2013.

To become a police officer in Colombia is difficult. For instance in 2011, of the 54,191 people who applied, only 17,028 met the requirement to become a police officer and begin

the process of incorporation. This means that 17,028 would undergo the vetting process of psychological exams, physical exams, background checks, house visits, and interviews with panels and with the officer in charge of the police school they would be attending. In 2012, there were only 4,408 students training for the basic level patrol agent, and 895 officer cadets (CEDIH Policia en Cifras V. 5). In total, from the 2011 pool of 54,191 applicants, only 5,503 made it to the academy. This is only a ten percent acceptance rate into the police.

In terms of education, the survey that I conducted at ESPOL in 2013 attests to the increased quality of police candidates at the officer level: only 8.1% had a baccalaureate (high school) degree, 10% had a technical degree (Associates Degree), 67.6% of these students had a professional degree (Bachelor's Degree), and 13.3% had a Master's Degree. Both recruitment and training were refined. Next will be a discussion on the oversight mechanisms that further increases professionalism and lowers police malfeasance.

Reforms to Police Oversight Regimes

Reforms that took place from 1990-1997 strengthened the internal discipline and internal control mechanisms over police malfeasance (Gomez and Baracaldo, 2007, 101). As of 1994, there are four important internal controls: 1) the military penal justice system, 2) the inspector general of the police, 3) the directorate of police intelligence, and 4) the discretionary power of the Director General

Although the militarized police system instituted a strong chain of command of hierarchic vertical oversight, it alone was insufficient to stop corruption. Supplementary

controls were required. Before the 1991 constitution, the military justice covered all criminal and military infractions. As their cases would go to the military penal court, many of their charges were dismissed due to a lack of concrete evidence and the propensity for military courts to protect the ranks. While being investigated, police continued to work for up to 5 years until they finally went to trial. Thus, it was hard to fire police that were known or highly suspected to be involved in corruption or abuse.

However, the constitutional changes of 1991 and subsequent changes to the ‘fuero penal military’ changed this control system. No longer would this legal system protect officers from the civilian political system. Instead, the military penal system for police would be used primarily to render judgment on violation of institutional norms and regulations, some of which may overlap with criminal behavior. For instance, if an officer is on night watch and falls asleep on duty or discharges his weapon while on duty, that violates firearm regulations. As a result, they would go to the military penal court to stand trial. As Lt. Col. Jose Lopez, a judge for the military penal court in Medellin, put it:

The military courts are there to judge the violation that arises through one’s role as a police officer. The system is now run as an oral and accusatory similar to the anglo-saxon legal system except the judge is a lawyer that is from the National Police and understands military penal law (interview with author Friday May 10th, 2013).

Different from 1991, defendants today can hire an attorney to represent them. If they can’t afford a defender a military prosecutor is assigned to represent the charged officer. If, however, the officer violated both internal regulations and criminal law, the officer would face both a trial in the military penal court and then face criminal charges. As such, the military penal justice system does work to control officers within the ranks.

Table 31: Military Penal Justice System

Year	Absolved	Condemned	Total
2008	146	294	440
2009	91	186	277
2010	107	211	318
2011	85	121	206
2012	70	122	192
Total	499	934	1433

Source: Email Correspondence with Executive director of the Military Penal Justice System Clara Cecilia Mosquera Paz.

Table 31 illustrates all of the cases of police that come to the military penal justice system for violation of military law. In this way, the police have an important and vigilant layer of justice to control their behavior and make sure it complies with the policies that are set. This military penal court has a conviction rate of 65%, indicating that internal norms are strictly enforced and sanctioned. Depending on the severity, police will be separated from the institution and will serve prison time at a special prison for members of the armed forces. But the military penal court is not enough oversight. This is where the auxiliary layer of the inspector general comes in.

The inspector general's office is an institution charged with preventing and investigating violations of internal norms, regulations, and laws. The Procuraduria General (Attorney General) is charged with investigations of infractions committed by the Brigadier General and above. The inspector general's office handles infractions that do not constitute a violation of military penal or criminal law, but that violate norms or regulations within the institution. It also keeps a record of all activity for each officer called 'la hoja de vida.' The 'Hoja de Vida' is reviewed yearly, and various criteria of service are assessed by the

commanding officer. An officer with a troublesome record will not be allowed to take the exams to rise in rank. If an officer commits a serious offense, or three mild offenses that warrant disciplinary infraction within a five year period, they are fired. Very serious offenses are singular causes for removal. Examples of serious violations include human rights abuses, corruption, information leaking, political activity, drug possession, drunk driving, and stealing. Minor offenses include neglecting one's uniform, violating uniform norms or appearance, holding dismissive attitudes towards higher ranks, permitting malicious gossip against any public servant, being impolite, failing to report promptly, and permitting unauthorized personnel into restricted areas.


The punishments, in order of seriousness, are: 1) separation from the institution for life, 2) separation of institution for ten to twenty years, 3) one month to 179 days without pay and barred from working, 4) ten days to 180 days without pay (they still have to work), 5) minor offenses receive a written reprimand, and 6) lowest sanctions are reprimanded by requiring written reports from officers about the importance of discipline related to their particular infraction (Interview with Lt. Col. Pulido April 18, 2013).

Table 32: The Inspector General's Investigations for NPC

Year	Corruption Cases Investigated	Abuse Cases Investigated	Total Police Fired
2008	886	1553	455
2009	842	1180	441
2010	768	1162	823
2011	753	1213	767
2012	788	1098	891
Total	4037	6206	3377

The figure below illustrates how many cases of corruption and abuse come to the inspector general of police and how many police officers are subsequently fired per year.

Figure 12: Police Abuse, Corruption, and Sanctioning in Colombia



Although many officers are found guilty, it only constitutes thirty-three percent of those being investigated. The difficulty is that although there is suspicion that officers have engaged in corruption or abuse of authority, it is difficult to prove. Thus, although the inspector general's system, along with the military penal system, strengthens the internal oversight, it is still incomplete. As a result, a third measure was implemented to address this shortfall.

The third important mechanism rests on the work of the Police Intelligence Directorate, or DIPOL. This group is generally in charge of gathering intelligence in relation to actors and factors that undermine public security and the security of the country

(DIPOL Website). Through an email correspondence with Major Hector Garcia, he responded noting that DIPOL “engages in activities of counterintelligence oriented towards specialized knowledge of phenomenon that affects the institutional integrity, gathering, processing, analyzing and publicizing [of] information. In this sense, DIPOL provides the necessary information to take decision, with preventative and anticipative respects of the internal threats that harm the institutional image, such as abuse and corruption. Lieutenant Colonel Pulido also shared with me that DIPOL conducts plain clothes officer operations that investigate police corruption within the ranks. That is DIPOL agents will conduct integrity checks, trying to bribe police and seeing if they accept. But even this may not have sufficed. A fourth mechanism was instituted during the reform period of 1990-1997.

Under Law 62 of 1993, the Director General of Police was granted the discretionary powers to fire anyone without cause, and issue an internal investigation or military penal procedure. Director General of the Police Rosso Jose Serrano from 1994 to 1999 used these powers to remove twelve percent, or 8,500 police personnel, who were suspected of illegal activities. Importantly, this reform improves on the previous system where police that were suspected of corruption or other criminal activity could not be removed. Purging the police was fundamental to reestablish internal discipline (Gerard 2012, 326). Minister of Defense Rafael Pardo commented that:

The most important measure was to give authority to the director of police and minister of police to retire any officer, sub-officer or agent from the institution through discretionary power that is without any reason. Perhaps there were unjust cases, but it allowed for a purification or purge of police. It was controversial; citizens and newspaper complained: ‘you’re taking some criminal police and putting them on the street.’ I said, ‘Well it was better than keeping them in the police (Author Interview, May 21, 2013).

Thus, both the military penal system and the inspector general of the police now have the power to prosecute, investigate, and remove police officers from their ranks that are engaged in malfeasant behavior. Likewise, the inspector general keeps records of all police and their infractions, as well as prevents police malfeasance by studying indicators and flagging individuals who are at risk for engaging in this behavior. And for those that are flagged, officers can be retrained and worked with to preempt any abuse of power that may have arisen otherwise. Furthermore, if officers are suspected of corruption or abusing their authority, the inspector general can investigate these cases, and remove the offending officer if found guilty. The inspector general also can remove officers that have a combination of 3 infractions over a five year period. For these reasons the role of the inspector general as a strong control mechanism provides the National Police of Colombia with important tools in limiting malfeasance before it happens and after it happens. However, while the inspector general's office is used effectively, it cannot cover all of the suspects of malfeasant behavior. This is why the director general is also granted the discretionary power to remove any police agent or officer below the rank of colonel, allowing the institution the ability to address malfeasant behavior on three increasingly powerful, and increasingly effective levels. This of course speaks to the 'vertical' oversight of a system.

While there is a vertical system of oversight, there is also the role of horizontal oversight that includes citizens, citizen review boards, and citizen run government institutions such as prosecutor's offices, comptrollers and fiscalization investigations, as well as regular criminal courts. Although this project focuses more on internal aspects of

institutional reform, I cannot discount the importance of external reforms that should also be made to decrease malfeasance and hold police accountable.

Table 33: Reform Period of the PNC 1993-1997

Years	1993-1997
Period Name	Reform Period
Jurisdiction	National
Work Model	Professional
Militarized	Yes
Insecurity	Yes
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Democracy
Malfeasance	Medium


Centralized and Professionalized Policing Era 1997-2013

How strong is professionalism and does it change behavior? Looking at data from 1993-2013, I find that there is evidence for substantial changes. Referring to the Police Survey I conducted at ESPOL in 2013, I asked the following open response question, ‘What concerns do you have of being a police officer?’ Fifty percent of officers are concerned with being disciplined or accused of crimes and subsequently losing their job. Twenty five percent are concerned with their personal security and well-being. Twenty one percent are concerned with doing a good job. And finally, eleven percent are concerned with losing their family to either violence, or to not having spent enough time with them. Lt. Gregorio, age 28, stated that he feared “Being involved in a penal process that, independent of being innocent, one has to pay for lawyers for defense, which represents a cost that nobody in the police or their family should pay just because they are a police officer.” Lt. Esmeralda, a female of age 25, stated that she feared “being investigated by criminal courts that can end my career aspirations.” This evinces the


weight of oversight on police activities. Police are acutely aware that they are being watched and that they must be careful in how they act, lest they get investigated and removed from the institution and lose all of their benefits.

Between 1990 and 1997, the Colombian National Police had strengthened its welfare, development, and oversight. The strengthening of these regimes could not have happened as quickly and as effectively as they did had they been in a decentralized system. Institutional changes improved the police professionalism. Did these changes lower malfeasance in Colombia? The next series of graphs are meant to illustrate the changes that have occurred with respect to policing.

First, the chart below, based on Data from the Centro de Memoria Historica in Colombia, a non-profit that seeks to document information regarding violence in the country, illustrates that before the reform, police were implicated in various assassinations. However, after 1993 with the police reforms, police behavior with respect to this activity dropped off.




The CNMH in Colombia also recorded the amount of people that were killed by police in




massacres. This revelatory data reinforces the changes that have taken in police with respect to human rights abuses.

Added to this is the increased trust that Colombians now have in their police. The chart below, taken from data provided by IberoBarometro surveys, indicates that from 1991-2010, police trust has increased from close to 20% to 50%, roughly a 30 percentage point increase. This further evinces the importance of police professionalization as a causal influence in lowering police malfeasance.



Moreover, by 1993 the homicide rate in Colombia starts to drop, and continues to drop, as the chart below indicates. This drop in the homicide rate has to do with the improvements in policing, ushered in by the progressive administration of Cesar Gavaria as president, and various local mayors. Although some of this has to do with the revolutionary polices of education, community policing, and community engagement in Medellin and Bogota that spread elsewhere, part of the praise should also go to the police.

Figure 16: Colombian Homicides Per 100,000



A major difference between police behavior in the narco period versus the reform period, and after, is that the former has high malfeasance and the latter has lower malfeasance. What did not change much is that Colombia still has the same environmental threats of illegally armed groups such as the FARC and ELN that operate freely, smaller cartels and criminal bands that make cocaine and ship it to Mexico, and paramilitary groups that roam the countryside. Additionally, Colombia still remains a highly unequal and country with high levels of poverty. But today, the police are different. Political actors, such as Rafael Pardo and Hugo Acero, made concerted efforts at improving policing institutions. Thus, in the overall analysis, the theory has survived in this case and should help us understand other cases.

Table 34: Professional Police Era 1997-2012

Years	1997-2012
Period Name	Professional Police Era
Jurisdiction	National
Work Model	Professional
Militarized	Yes
Insecurity	Yes
Culture Corrupt	Yes
Regime	Yes
Malfeasance	Medium-Low

Analysis

This section analyzes the hypotheses presented in the introduction while the table below condenses the findings of the above case narratives.

Table 35: Summary of Findings

Years	Period of Police Development	Jurisdiction	Work Model	Militarized	Culture Corrupt	Insecurity	Regime	Malfeasance
1846-1886	Independence	LOC	OCC	No	Yes	High	Limited Democracy	High
1886-1953	La Violencia	LOC	OCC	No	Yes	High	Limited Democracy	High
1953-1961	Dictatorship	Semi-NAT	OCC	Yes	Yes	High	Military	Medium-Low
1961-1985	Frente Nacional	NAT	PRO	Yes	Yes	High	Pacted Democracy	Low
1985-1993	Narco Era	NAT	Occup	Yes	Yes	High	Democracy	High
1993-1997	Reform Period	NAT	PRO	Yes	Yes	High	Democracy	Medium
1997-2012	Professional Police Era	NAT	PRO	Yes	Yes	Medium	Democracy	Medium-Low

Centralization and professionalization approximate individually necessary and jointly sufficient variables for controlling police malfeasance in Colombia. Once instituted, centralized structures opened the door for advances in welfare, development, and oversight. General Rojas Pinilla correctly implemented a national police system to sterilize law

enforcement from politicization, and this allowed for professionalization. Professionalization, however, was not fully implemented because civilian leaders in the Frente Nacional increasingly withdrew resources from the police to address the nascent threats of leftist guerillas during the 1970s. When drug cartels arose in the 1980s, they were challenged by an institutionally atrophied police force hungry for resources. Taking advantage of this weakness, cartels were able to impose strong controls on the police, thereby increasing the levels of malfeasance. However, when the state launched anew its campaign to advance police professionalism, the police were able to increasingly resist the influence of cartels. And this is what explains the improbable reform of the PNC and its continued improvement as one of the most versatile, experienced, and best behaved police forces in Latin America. Each hypothesis and alternative hypothesis will now be discussed in greater specificity.

Central Hypotheses

H¹: Centralization of police will decrease police malfeasance. A major turning point of the Colombian National Police came in 1953 when the military intervention initiated the centralization and professionalization process. Although full centralization would not be achieved, the police became more professional. By 1962, local politicians no longer had patrimonial control over the police, in turn successfully depoliticizing the latter. Today, police are officially barred from voting and affiliating with a political party. In this sense, the level of police malfeasance lowered significantly. Police were by and large honest and effective at their jobs by the 1960s (Interview with Brigadier General

Londoño). The real problems with malfeasance came much later in the 1980s with the rise of narco-trafficking, the appropriation of the police for anti-insurgency activities, and the underfunding of police. This hypothesis is confirmed by the data.

H²: Professionalization of police will decrease police malfeasance. This hypothesis is confirmed. When the drug trade hit the police, and corruption started to rise during the 1980s, part of the problem was that welfare, development and oversight could not stand up to the money and threats of cartels. But in 1993, welfare, development and oversight were greatly improved. These changes helped mitigate the influence of drug trafficking, and in turn, malfeasance greatly decreased. This can be seen by the drastic changes seen in citizen trust going from 23% in 1993 to close to 50% in 2011. This data, and the previous periods of professionalization, confirms this hypothesis.

AH1: Decentralization of police will decrease police malfeasance. This hypothesis was rejected. During the decentralized and period of 1886-1953, the police force was used as a partisan tool of patrimonial party leaders. As such, the police were not concerned with security. Instead, they focused on using their power to harass and abuse citizens that were of the opposite party. In times of crisis, like the Bogotazo of 1948, the police either stood by and did nothing or actively participated in the melee. Decentralization was correlated with more, not less, police abuse of power.

AH2: Occupational Models of police will decrease police malfeasance. This hypothesis was also rejected. It was during the occupational period of police that we saw more abuses. Instead, the opposite of this hypothesis is valid. It was the transition from an occupational to a more professional model of police brought changes to the areas of

welfare, development, and oversight. Beginning in 1953 the military dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla began to build welfare divisions for the police, and incorporate the police into pre-established military welfare programs. In addition, the police were made an equivalent branch of the military. This means that police candidates now had to fulfill military requirements to enter into the police. The police were also trained in policing with military discipline. In addition, the military instituted a military penal justice system of oversight similar to the other military branches. However, the reforms were not as thorough nor as well formulated as they could have been. But the real difference is that before 1953, no municipal or departmental police had a welfare safety net, nor did they have training, entrance standards, and oversight mechanisms in place. The data refutes this hypothesis.

Other Arguments

CH¹: If a police system is militarized, then malfeasance will increase. This alternative hypothesis does not find support in the analysis. In this analysis, militarization coincided with advances in professionalization and was essential in the development of welfare, development, and oversight. The military character helped police to become professionalized and apolitical, thus rendering better police service. With the exception of the 1980s, the militarized model worked well and continues to work well. The demilitarized policing era compared to the militarized one illustrates that, at the very least, militarization does not increase malfeasance, and it might even decrease it.

CH²: If there is a threat environment, then police malfeasance will increase. Paramilitary and communist violence in the countryside of Colombia has remained constant from 1960-2012. However, police behavior has still improved despite this

context. If this was a significant variable, then the presence alone would push the police towards increasing levels of abuse of power, independent of changes to professionalization. However, as time has gone on, the police have not only reduced their malfeasant behavior towards the population in rural areas, but they have also been effective in anti-insurgency campaigns by their specialized units. Indeed the presence of the cocaine cartels were an important variable. Their presence dramatically increased police corruption. However, the variable is itself an outcome of weak policing. Their ability to rise and grow in power was the result of a weak police force that was preoccupied with fighting an insurgency rather than engaging criminal groups like the Medellin and Cali cartels. As such, weak professionalism allowed the increased power of the drug cartels, and in turn, corrupted the police. From 1990-1997 reforms to these three institutions within the police force helped decrease malfeasance, despite the continued presence and influence of various cartels. In fact, it was the reforms to the police that empowered them to effectively dismantle the Medellin and Cali cartels in 1993 through 1998. So we can say that this alternative explanation does have some explanatory power, however, once welfare, development and oversight institutions were fortified, they overrode the power of cartel influence. This shows that violent context is important, but it does not explain as much of the variation in malfeasance as professionalization and centralization.

CH³: If a society is corrupt, then police malfeasance will increase. This hypothesis argues that corrupt citizens are the source of police corruption and abuse. As a result, no changes to welfare, development and oversight systems will impact police malfeasance as long as citizens keep offering bribes to cops. However, the issue between 1886 and 1953

was not corrupt citizens, but rather corrupt politicians who were empowered by a decentralized system of policing. That system allowed politicians to use police as their personal armies to persecute political rivals. In this sense, corruption and abuse were rooted not in society, but in the elites. And the elites were ultimately empowered by the decentralized structure. It is not that the context was corrupt, or other government institutions were, but rather the political leadership was corrupt and decentralization gave them the power to taint the police.

Controls

In analyzing Colombia across time, I was able to control for several other alternative hypotheses. The period of Rojas Pinilla was a military dictatorship that advanced police reform and lowered malfeasance, while the periods of Bogotazo and La Violencia saw a country with a democratic, albeit corrupt, electoral system. In this case at least, democracy is not a necessary condition to lower malfeasance. Additionally, because Colombia was part of the Spanish colonial empire, it was also predominantly Catholic. This does not vary through time, allowing me to measure malfeasance by fully controlling these variables. Based on that, it does not appear that these variables are causal agents in explaining the variation through time, although in comparison with non-Latin American countries, they may be able to explain some of the variance of malfeasance.

Conclusion

Colombia has had many problems with policing that they have significantly addressed. In this chapter, I explained the changes through a structural and institutional

theory of police malfeasance. I argued that two major reforms were of particular importance. First, centralization depoliticized the police; this allowed increased professionalization of the police in 1953 and began the process of lowering malfeasance.

The minimal welfare, development, and oversight systems were strong enough to lower malfeasance from 1953-1985, but they were not powerful or adequate enough to provide a basic quality of life for police. When the drug trade exploded on the scene in 1985, police were ill prepared to counter cartel threats and bribes. The army, controlled by the Ministry of Defense, perennially shunned the police and left it undermanned, underfunded, and misappropriated. This resulted in rising malfeasance. This illustrates that, all things being equal, a moderate professionalization may be adequate for lowering malfeasance in a rural poor country, but places with high levels of illicit income can disrupt this equilibrium. To overcome these disruptions, police professionalization must be increased. The centralized structure allowed the police and political actors to do just that. Implementing these benefits, development and oversight institutions in this sequence was an important component to explaining the improbable resurrection of Colombia's police. What has been shown in this chapter about Colombia is true of Latin America as a whole.

Hugo Acero confirms this reality as a problem in Latin America:

I get frustrated sometimes with us Latin Americans. We all want security. In my travels to different countries I ask the audience: Do you want more security? Look, I tell everyone and nobody likes to hear this. Every country has the police force it deserves. If you have a bad police force, that is what you deserve. If I want a high quality police, then those police need to be trained. And I cannot just pay them whatever. I can't give them a minimum wage. But it's not even about salary, but about the social welfare of the police officer and his family. One needs to guarantee a quality of life for police. A police officer needs to know that their kids can go to school, that they have access to housing [and] to healthcare for their kids, and if no kids,

then benefits [for] their father and mother. There has to be a budget, and slowly and slowly with investment you can get better police. But nobody wants to invest in this. Every country has the police it deserves (Interview with Author, Hugo Acero April 30, 2013).

Colombia did invest in their police, and it was able to create, implement, and sustain professionalism. The next chapter will analyze the case of Mexico by studying three levels of policing: the municipal police, the State police, and the Federal Police. As the variables move from decentralized and occupational to more centralized and professionalized, there should be a corollary improvement in welfare, development and oversight. Simultaneously, there should also be a decrease in police malfeasance as we move from municipal (most corrupt) to federal police (least corrupt). What will be shown is that the structural constraints of decentralization condemn Mexico to chronic police malfeasance. As the following chapter unfolds, keep in mind the similarities that Mexico has to the Colombian context.

CHAPTER IV: Police Malfeasance in Mexico 1990-2014


In Mexico we have a saying
“If you fall asleep
unemployed, you can always
wake up a cop.”
—Antia Mendoza

Introduction

On September 27th of 2014, approximately forty-three students from the Ayotzinapa Teachers College vanished in the city of Iguala, in the State of Guerrero. The students had been arrested, murdered, and buried in a mass grave by municipal police officers under the orders of the Iguala Mayor Jose Luis Abarca (Wilkinson 2014a). Abarca had been using his office to protect a local drug cartel and was therefore threatened by the attention these students were placing on his administration, especially these illicit criminal links (Wilkinson 2014a). The “case shows a clear connection between politicians and drug gangs” and the “festering levels of local corruption that infect much of the country, impede development, and retard Mexico's aspirations to advance” (Wilkinson 2014b). This is how policing works in Mexico—by repressing political dissent. For this loyalty, mayors allow police to engage in extortion. Meanwhile, mayors protect criminal entities. In exchange criminal entities provide money to both police and mayors. This is an ‘Iron Triangle of Police Malfeasance’ in Mexico.

Iguala is not an isolated event. Mexican municipal police have historically been engaged in human rights abuses, but are rarely prosecuted. This gives rise to a “culture of impunity [that] fatally undermines suspects’ rights and continues to facilitate the use of

torture and ill-treatment as part of the routine practices of the police and military” (Amnesty International 2014, 27). In Mexico, “Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment play a central role in policing and public security operations by military and police forces across Mexico” (Amnesty International 2014, 21). Beyond human rights abuses, Mexican police are notoriously corrupt. Ninety percent of respondents to a survey in 2011 believed that the police are engaged in corruption (INEGI 2011). As Figure 16 below illustrates, the police in Mexico are viewed as the most corrupt institution in the country.



But not all police in Mexico are the same. The Municipal police are the least professional and most susceptible to corruption based on the research in this chapter. Meanwhile, the

more centralized and professional police at the State and Federal level are less likely to engage in malfeasance. This chapter seeks to answer two questions that spring from these facts. First, why are Mexican police so corrupt compared to Chile and Colombia? Second, what explains the variation in malfeasance between municipal, state, and federal forces? The argument in this chapter is that the decentralized structure of policing promotes patrimonial linkages between local politicians and police; this in turn facilitates corruption and abusive practices. Centralization breaks these linkages, undermining patrimonialism, and allows for professional development that in turn lowers malfeasance. Therefore, municipal police are more malfeasant, and state and federal police less malfeasant.

Although I view historical perspectives as critical to understanding policing, Mexico offers little historical variation from 1920-1997. In that period, only municipal police existed. Meaningful variation does not begin until 1997 when the Federal Preventative Police appears, and in 2004 when State Preventative Police begin to form. Thus, I provide a historical background of police development in Mexico. This chapter is slightly different from the previous two. The focus of the analysis is not primarily historical, but instead rests on the period of (2004-2014) when three models of police operate simultaneously allowing for meaningful comparisons at the municipal, state, and federal levels. In this sense, this chapter mirrors the analysis presented in Chapter II on Chile during the period of Tri-Model policing from 1897-1927 when three models of policing operated simultaneously: *municipal police*, *fiscal police*, and *Gendarmeria/Carabineros*. The finding of that analysis was that the *municipal police*

exhibited higher levels of malfeasance than the more centralized and professional models of the *Gendarmeria/Carabineros*.

The same logic of case comparison applies in this chapter. The observable implication, and the logic of comparison, is that the municipal police in Mexico, being decentralized and occupational, would be the one engaged in the most malfeasance and engender the lowest levels of trust. The federal and state police are both more centralized and professional, and hence, should be engaged in less malfeasance. The chapter also offers leverage in ruling out the alternative hypotheses that decentralized and occupational systems are associated with lower levels of malfeasance.

The value of studying Mexico from 2004-2012 is that it controls for arguments about militarization, corrupt culture, criminal environment, and regime type. From 2004-2014, municipal, state, and federal police all operated in a similar security context with the only difference being their degree of centralization and professionalization amongst the three types of police forces. To this end, this chapter will unfold as follows. First, it discusses the historical development of police under the party-authoritarian period of political domination (1920-1994). Second, it discusses the rise of democratic governance, and the continuation of the same patterns of police abuse despite democratization (1994-2014). Third, the paper compares the municipal, state, and federal police in Mexico by focusing on the welfare benefits, development, and oversight of police. Finally, the hypotheses will be discussed in relation to the findings of this chapter. However, before delving into the analysis, I want to introduce a useful timeline that will track the historical changes in policing.

Figure 18: A Timeline of the History of Police Development in Mexico




Figure 19: Summary of Types of Police in Mexico

Mexico Time Period	Type of Institution	Period	Jurisdiction	Work Model	Militarized	Insecurity	Culture Corrupt	Regime	Malfeasance
1930-1997	Purely Municipal	PRI Dictatorship	Local	OCC	No	Low	Yes	Authoritarian	High
1997-2014	Preventative Municipal Police	Tri-Model Era	LOC	OCC	No	High	Yes	Democracy	High
2004-2014	State Police	Tri-Model Era	Semi-National	Weak Professional	No	High	Yes	Democracy	Medium
1997-2014	Federal Preventative Police	Tri-Model Era	National	Weak Professional	Yes	High	Yes	Democracy	Medium-Low

Historical Background on Police Development in Mexico 1930-2014

In this section I provide a historical background of police development in Mexico from 1930-2014, which expands on the timeline presented above. It also provides information on the origins of the federal and state preventative police that help define the current policing system in Mexico. The section will begin by discussing the original position of police following the Mexican Revolution. Second, I will discuss the ‘dirty war’ period of policing. Finally, this section discusses the public security reforms in the presidential administrations of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Vicente Fox (2000-2006), Felipe Calderon (2006-2012), and Enrique Peña Nieto from (2012-2018). The table below provides a reference for comparing the different types of police as they appear in Mexico. Generally, there are two periods. The first is the pure municipal era that existed during the PRI dictatorship. The second period is the Tri-Model era of Mexican policing. This period has federal, state, and municipal preventative police forces operating at the same time. The section following this historical analysis will introduce the degree of professionalism in each of these institutions, and will illustrate that despite operating in an insecure environment with a corrupt society in a democratic era, the Federal and State police had lower levels of malfeasance than municipal police precisely because they were more centralized (national and state control) and professionalized.

Post-Revolutionary Development of Police 1920-1950

After the Mexican revolution ended in 1920, Army Generals Plutarco Elias Calles and Alvaro Obregon consolidated their political power through their National

Revolutionary Party (PNR) (1920-1929). The PNR would form the foundations of the *Institutional Revolutionary Party* (PRI), which dominated Mexican politics in the 20th century. In fact, the PRI won every presidential election and congressional majority from 1930-1994. The PRI was able to do this through cooptation and repression—the latter duty falling to the police and the military.

The police, throughout the PRI hegemony, were purely municipal. The Mexican constitution under Article 115 Part VII did not create comparable institutions at the federal or state level. Federal and state preventative police would not appear until 1997 and 2004 respectively. There were federal and ‘state highway patrols,’ but they were not tasked with traditional prevention of crime outside of highways. Hence, local police were the only game in town throughout the period of PRI rule lasting from 1920-1997.

Under the pure municipal system, police were poorly paid and received little benefits. Nevertheless, they would be rewarded by a parallel set of privileges that made up for these shortcomings. The PRI used the police to “maintain themselves in power in exchange for the police behaving like a private enterprise” (Interview with Maria Eugena Suarez de Garay, Researcher at the Institute for Democracy and Security [INSYDE]). The main police ‘industries’ were extortion, racketeering, and bribe solicitation (Lopez Portillo 2000). In exchange for this reward, police were expected to follow all regime orders to repress “social and labor protests” (Interview with Antia Mendoza, public security consultant). Thus, human rights abuses and corruption were the products of politicization of the police. Thus, the police, from their origins, were created not to provide public security, but to protect the PRI. In the early PRI era (1930-1950) police repression was

used sparingly as cooptation was the preferred mechanism of controlling opposition. As the following section discusses, the police in Mexico would become a more repressive and violent force from 1950-1980, a tradition they maintained into the present era.

The Dirty War, Drug Trafficking, and Police Malfeasance in Mexico 1950-1980

From 1950-1980, the PRI was engaged in a campaign against subversive elements in Mexico. This is referred to as the 'dirty war,' or 'low intensity war.' This period was marked by repression of movements, torture, disappearances, executions, and corruption. During this time the police played an active and violent role in suppressing public movements against the PRI or their interests. For instance, the police participated in repressing all of the following movements: the 1959 Railway Workers Strike; the 1960 Autonomous University of Guerrero Student Movement; the 1965 Doctors Movement; the 1966 Michoacán Student Movement; the 1966 Nuevo León Student Movement; the 1967 Chihuahua Student Movements; the 1968 Tabasco Student Movement; and the 1968 Tlatlelolco Massacre in Mexico City (Procuraduria General de la Republica 2006). During the 18 year period of the dirty war in Mexico, municipal police were complicit in many of the 645 reported disappearances, 99 extrajudicial executions, and more than two thousand cases of torture (Procuraduria General de la Republica 2006).

Beyond abuse, there was extensive police corruption during this period. The most prominent of the many cases of police corruption in Mexico at this time was related to the Presidential administration of Jose Lopez Portillo. Lopez Portillo had appointed his loyal childhood friend, Arturo Durazo Moreno, to the prominent position of the Chief of Police

of Mexico City for a six-year term spanning 1976-1982. Durazo Moreno became prolific for his audacious use of this office to amass a personal fortune. According to Cabildo (1984), every three months each police officer in Mexico City was obligated to collect four thousand pesos for Durazo Moreno and his staff. To get this money, the officers themselves had to extort the residents of Mexico City. Failure to do so resulted in dismissal. In addition to extortion, Durazo Moreno was also engaged in drug trafficking and amassed millions of dollars through all these activities (Gunson 2000). As soon as the Lopez Portillo administration ended, he fled the country. The FBI caught him in Costa Rica and returned him to Mexico where he was sentenced to a 16 year prison term for drug trafficking and corruption, but would only end up serving six (Gunson 2000).

The same sort of corruption was found in all municipal police throughout Mexico, where commanders maintained quotas for fines and bribes that had to be collected by lower ranks. In Mexico, this activity was so prevalent that it gained the moniker of ‘La Mordida’, or ‘The Bite.’ Citizens came to expect most police interactions to end with ‘La Mordida’, and therefore citizens did their best to avoid any unnecessary police contact. The local PRI mayors allowed this to happen because the police controlled local dissent. In addition, mayors received kickbacks from police graft. Because mayors only served three-year terms, and could not be re-elected, they had little to fear in terms of electoral repercussions for this type of behavior.

Beyond social control of opposition forces and extortion, local municipalities also engaged in protecting the drug trafficking trade (Grayson 2009, 29). Extensive cooperation emerged between the municipal police and criminal organizations. By the 1980s, México

accounted for 70% of the marijuana, 25% of the heroin, and 60% of the cocaine transported to the U.S. (Chabat, 2002; 136). As the next section discusses, the electoral reforms in the early 1990s would disrupt the equilibrium between drug cartels and the PRI party, injecting new political actors and parties into the political system throughout Mexico. Despite these changes, the corrupt and abusive municipal police would remain unchanged.

Does Democracy Matter For Police Reform? Electoral Reforms 1988-1994

As drug trafficking increased, so too did the internal pressure for electoral reforms. In 1988, the PRI splintered into a left-wing faction and a center-right faction. The leftists ran under the banner of the National Democratic Front, and would counter the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, with their own candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cardenas. Cardenas was the son of former president Lazaro Cardenas, a leftist-populist leader of Mexico. Given his family and personal credentials, Cardenas appeared poised to win the upcoming election. And indeed, on election night, exit polls had pegged him to win the presidency. However, through fraudulent mechanisms, the PRI manipulated the elections, giving Salinas de Gortari the victory. The public outcry at the fraudulent results prompted the Salinas de Gortari administration to concede to some electoral reforms in 1990. Subsequent reforms in 1993 and 1994 led to the further opening of the political system to fair competition.

Here is a critical juncture in terms of our theoretical discussion—Mexican police had been thoroughly corrupted, not by their own hand alone, but by the political actors that dominated them at the local and national level. Indeed, power was centralized in the hands

of the party led by the sitting president, who used the police to maintain PRI dominance. But local PRI actors still used their local police in a patrimonial fashion to repress and to extort citizens. However, the literature argues that a key variable that defines the level of police malfeasance is the type of regime (Tresiman 2000). Is it the authoritarian regime, or is it the structure that explains malfeasance? Up until now, we cannot parse out this difference in Mexico and one would be inclined to blame the PRI, rather than the structural problems that I note.

One way to parse this out is by considering Mexico in two instances: the PRI and Post-PRI eras. If the PRI regime was the only causal factor that facilitated police malfeasance, then once the PRI leaves power, we should see a decrease in malfeasance.

Table 36: PRI and Post-PRI Era of Policing

Variables	PRI Era	Post PRI
Militarized Police	No	No
Violent Society	Yes	Yes
Corrupt Society	Yes	Yes
Regime Type	Authoritarian	Democratic
Police System	Decentralized	Decentralized
	Occupational	Occupational
Malfeasance	High	High

The logic is that if the PRI created these relationships, then once the PRI is removed, these relationships would break down. All things being equal, we would expect local mayors from different political parties to reform their police and make them professional servants of public security. However, the simple act of democratization does nothing to change the police behavior, and the depth of the problem with local and occupational police models reveals itself. As the table above notes, despite having a democratic regime, police malfeasance remains unchanged.

As the opposition National Action Party (PAN) and the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) started to win local offices in 1994 going forward, they ended up replicating the same schema that the PRI developed during their dictatorship—patrimonial, corrupt, and oppressive policing. Antia Mendoza, a public security consultant in Mexico, confirms that after the transition, “the police continued to be used by political actors to dole out spoils—or rewards.” Carlos Flores, an expert on illicit crime in Mexico, claims, “The previous schema of political corruption does not get dislodged. The new office holders [from the PAN and PRD] maintained the autonomy of police and used it for illicit purposes.” Thus, in the post-electoral reform era in Mexico, the decentralized police system would remain, as would the patrimonial system of malfeasance.

In the democratic era, police largely continued the same behavior they had become notorious for in the authoritarian period. In the next section, the focus turns towards the administration of Ernesto Zedillo who is significant as the first president that sought extensive structural reform to the policing system. Prior to the Zedillo administration, there were little reform attempts when it came to the police system. His policies lead to the development of a Federal Preventative Police, and further centralization and professionalization attempts in subsequent administrations.

Ernesto Zedillo Administration 1994-2000

Although the electoral reforms that were passed in 1990 and 1993 ensured that the 1994 presidential elections were free and fair, the PRI candidate, Ernesto Zedillo, won the presidency. Far from continuing with the same PRI policies, the reform minded Zedillo

administration would seek to change public security in Mexico. There were two major public security reforms that he put forward. First, in 1995 Zedillo created the National System for Public Security (SNSP) with the goal of coordinated local, state, and federal police agencies. This represented the first impulse to centralize police work by establishing channels for information sharing throughout the Mexican Republic.

The second major reform under Zedillo was the creation of the Federal Preventative Police (PFP) in 1999. To be clear, there had been a Federal Judicial Police that which was a plain-clothes investigative police service charged with helping Federal prosecutors investigate crimes. There was also a Federal Highway police whose purpose was to secure the federal highways. Other than these two limited roles, however, there had been no uniformed federal police service tasked with preventing crime or providing day-to-day public security activities. The PFP is the first foray into developing a nationally based uniformed police service to provide assistance to local authorities and to pursue federal crimes (Interview with Maria Eugena Suarez de Garay). Initially, their primary role was to protect highways, arrest criminal offenders violating federal laws, and provide supporting services to local municipal police. Specifically, the Federal Preventative Police was tasked with protecting borders, government buildings and properties, ports of entry, highways, and national parks. The administration of Vicente Fox would only increase the importance of the PFP.

Vicente Fox Administration 2000-2006

Vicente Fox [PAN] was the first non-PRI presidential candidate to win in over 70 years. In terms of public security, Fox proceeded in the same direction as his predecessor. In this vein, Fox created a cabinet level office called the Secretary of Public Security specifically tasked with overseeing federal public security policy throughout Mexico. He placed the Federal Preventative Police under the direct administration of this secretariat. During his presidency, the Federal police grew to 12,000 federal police agents (Presidencia de la Republica 2012).

An additional measure that Fox undertook was the development of the Federal Investigation Agency, modeled after the FBI, to support the Prosecutor General's job of enforcing federal laws. However, the AGI would become rife with corruption and would eventually it was combined with the Federal Preventative Police. Fox's successor, Felipe Calderon, would deepen the centralization and professionalization of both federal and state police.

Felipe Calderon Administration 2006-2012

Felipe Calderon's [PAN] administration largely continued the process of centralization of his predecessors, but also had two major public security policies. First, Calderon understood that municipal police were too weak to address the rising problems of drug trafficking and that the Federal Preventative Police lacked enough personnel and resource to match the power of these cartels alone. Thus, Calderon was notorious for

militarizing public security by using the Army and Navy in counter-drug trafficking operations throughout Mexico.

But the militarization would not undermine the growth or importance of the Federal Police. At the beginning of the Calderon administration in 2006 there were only 12,000 federal police agents. By the end of his six-year term in office in 2012, there were approximately 37,000 Federal Police personnel (Presidencia de la Republica 2012).

Second, under his administration, state governors started to use federal funds to develop state level preventative police units. At the same time, Calderon proposed the creation of a national police, but the constitutional reforms required for these changes proved difficult to implement through the legislative process. Instead, Calderon proposed an alternative formulation of this 'Mando Unico Policial' based around the 32 police commands, one for each state and the capital city. As such, there was a noticeable increase in state preventative police throughout the country as governors prepared to make the required changes for the transition, but the system proved difficult to implement due to the objection of local mayors. However, a compromise was reached. The State Preventative Police would only take over municipal police duties in places where municipal police departments were not able to meet certain standards set forth by the Secretariat of Public Security. Cities, usually the larger ones that were able to meet those standards, could maintain control over their own police force. To date, this reform is still being implemented and is far from being completed.

Enrique Peña Nieto Administration 2012-2014

Recognizing the inefficiencies and incentives for police corruption at the local level, presidential and gubernatorial candidates in the 2012 elections increasingly supported the centralization of public security policy and preventative police as a way to combat the drug cartels more effectively. For instance, PAN presidential candidate Josefina Vasquez Mota proposed to develop a National Police, similar to Chile and Colombia, to address the insecurity in Mexico (Reyes 2012). Although she was defeated by the PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto, some of Mota's ideas were adopted by his administration. In fact, the Peña Nieto public security policy is largely seen as a continuation of the PAN security policies. In 2013-2014 he created Federal Gendarmerie, under the control of the Federal Police. This force was originally envisioned as a rural militarized police, whose goal was to provide public security to small municipalities without police. However, the role of the Gendarmerie has changed. It is now being oriented towards border missions and to protect industries threatened by organized crime, such as mining and agriculture. Under his administration, the policy of centralizing police at the state level had cleared major hurdles and achieved support of most state governors in Mexico. Thus, the continuing trend in Mexico is towards more centralization and professionalization of police.

Reviewing Police Development in Mexico 1930-2014

The previous section has provided important contextual information about the development of the Mexican policing system. It illustrated the degree to which the PRI

used police to suppress political dissent and protect drug trafficking. In exchange, police were allowed autonomy to use their office for personal gain. The police under the PRI dictatorship (1930-1994) were not treated as a professional labor force, but rather as an occupational type of labor, where the most important criteria for the job was party loyalty.

Under the administration of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), different parties started winning elections throughout Mexico at the state and municipal levels. However, rather than being an opening for reforming the police, the transition to democracy highlighted the difficulty of such endeavors in a decentralized policing system. Ultimately, new political actors simply replicated the same relationship between police and illicit groups that the PRI had established.

The trend linking all four presidential administrations from 1994-2014 was an attempt to centralize and professionalize police by building a federal preventative police and attempting to bring municipal police under state control. But the decentralized system remains intact with very few cases of successful reform at the local level. Daniel Sabet's book, "Police Reform in Mexico", focuses on the big city police forces in Mexico and the obstacles to police reform. The ultimate finding is that some degree of success has occurred in only a few cases.


Although Sabet is weary of centralization as an appropriate policy response, other authors like Diane E. Davis (2008, 60) argue that democratization in Mexico created "an environment of obsessive partisan competition" that, along with a decentralized policing system, "prevent[ed] the government from reforming the police." She further notes that

simply changing from an authoritarian to a democratic regime does not dislodge the logic of police malfeasance present in decentralized police systems.

The previous section contributes to these findings and notes that democratization and decentralized occupational police systems provides new platforms for illicit actors to gain access to political and police protection, thereby exacerbating the security situation. Furthermore, it illustrated the difficulty that administrations from 1994-2014 have had in addressing police malfeasance, despite various reform initiatives. Today, entrenched interests have maintained a decentralized occupational system that has resisted reform, precisely because the incentives are aligned in such a way that they perpetuate malfeasant policing practices.

Thus, despite various reform attempts at the national level, little has changed in terms of policing at the municipal level in the democratic era. As such, citizen trust in police has been historically low. As the chart below illustrates, Mexican respondents do not trust their police. The highest level of trust was found during the Zedillo administration after he implemented the SNSP, but it never went above 35% of the population.

Figure 20: Respondents with Some or a Lot of Trust in Mexican Police



However, the chart above obfuscates important variation amongst local, state, and federal preventative police. Variation amongst these three types of forces does exist, with local police faring the worst in terms of trust, and the federal police garnering the highest level of trust. What explains this variation amongst these three types of police forces? In what follows, I demonstrate that centralization and professionalization correlate with the differing levels of malfeasance. Specifically, the next section provides a nuanced comparison of municipal, state, and federal police from 2004-2014. . It will highlight that moving from decentralized and occupational models (municipal police) to more centralized and professional models (state and federal police) decrease police malfeasance. This is expected even though police at all three levels face the same security problems.

A Comparison of Police Forces in Mexico 2005-2014

Whereas the previous section discussed the historical development of police in Mexico, this section presents a comparative analysis of municipal, state, and federal police. There will be four sections: municipal police, state police, federal police, and a summary. Each section is further broken down into sub-sections focusing on: police welfare, development, and oversight. The summary section consolidates the information from municipal, state, and federal police. There are two purposes here. First, to show that municipal police best approximate occupational models, while state and federal police approximate professional models. The second purpose is to show that the municipal police are trapped in occupational modes of police because they are decentralized, while state and federal police are more professional because they are more centralized.

The Mexican Municipal Police: an Introduction

Most municipal police in Mexico are from poor cities, and are part of small departments. According to Moloeznik (2010) there are 1,100 municipalities with less than 20 police personnel, meaning that 52.4% of police in Mexico are from very small police departments. Furthermore, 530 municipalities had between 21 and 50 police, meanwhile 210 municipalities count on 51-100 police officers. Only 250 municipalities have more than 100 police (Moloeznik 2010). In Mexico, there are 400 cities that have gone 10 years without a police force (CNN Mexico). These statistics are directly correlated to the decentralized nature of the police system in Mexico.

As Pablo Monsalvo, Professor at the Iberoamerican University in Mexico City, correctly points out “the problem is that in article 115 of the constitution establishes that municipalities are the ones in charge of public security. But what if the municipalities are poor? How are they going to pay their own police” (CNN 2010). Monsalvo notes that “40 of the 2,500 municipalities produce half of the country’s wealth, the other ones are poor” (CNN 2010). But it is not simply a matter of throwing more money at these police, because the decentralized system continues to maintain local patrimonial relationships with police. Resources that exist are simply wasted by corrupt mayors. Antia Mendoza offers an example of how mayoral control results is so problematic:

Mayors provide police salaries to people who do not work. If there are 100 police positions, 30 are given to officers that do work. But there can be up to 70 positions that are ‘shadow officers,’ where people are still paid, but they do not actually do any police work.

Indeed, these shadow officers are friends and allies of the local mayor. The 30 officers themselves that do actual police work are also loyal to the mayor’s needs. The blending of the private and public role is made possible by the decentralized nature of the police. This reality illustrates how local mayors mismanage police resources. But the problem with municipal police is also a lack political motivation to create a professional police. This is the subject of the following section.

Municipal Police Welfare Benefits: Salary, Benefits, and Pensions

I conceptualize professionalism as the outgrowth of police benefits, development, and oversight structures. By advancing salary, pensions, and other benefits, police forces can

recruit better candidates. These candidates are then developed for longer periods so they receive adequate training. And finally, they should be a strong internal and external set of control mechanisms to make sure police are not engaged in malfeasance. This section begins by focusing on the key benefit: salaries.

Ambar Varela (Director of public policy evaluations for Contraloria Ciudadana) notes that the “the majority of police [in Mexico] are not given any benefits: they do not have pensions, housing” and they are poorly paid. As the OECD better life index notes, the average monthly salary in Mexico is roughly 1,100 USD (OECD 2015). In Mexico, 85 % of the municipal police officers earn less than 500 USD per month (Seventh National Survey on Insecurity, 2011). Most of the small police department, like in Candela in the state of Coahuila, can only afford to pay their police an average of 230 dollars per month (Seventh National Survey on Insecurity, 2011). Other municipalities, like in the poor state of Chiapas, have police that are paid “120 USD per month, and only work part-time” (Antia Mendoza Interview). What is not surprising, given the decentralized nature of policing in Mexico, is that even the best paid police do not reach the salary of level of an average Mexican worker, and most police earn 500 USD less than the national average. This is a major problem in developing professional police, but not the only one.

Beyond the relatively weak salary, the majority of municipal police in Mexico do not have a pension for their officers. One of the major reasons why municipalities are hesitant to provide these resources is that these cities do not have enough resources to provide one. In places that had some pension benefits for police, those benefits would be doled out at the discretion of the Municipal mayors, who used these benefits in a

patrimonial manner. In the city of Ramos Arizpe in the state of Coahuila, a new Pension Law was geared towards removing this discretion. Mario Gomez, President of the Committee for Public Security stated that the goal of the reform was “taking away the mayoral discretion in deciding who to provide pensions to. We cannot keep doing this. It is not a question of discretion, but a question of equity and we are going to incorporate ourselves into the Pension Law proposed by the governor.” In short, few municipal police get pensions.

As De La Barreda (2013) states, most “municipalities completely lack any social benefits for their police. As is the case with salaries, other police benefits are much greater in the federal police who offer life insurance, medical insurance, and retirement benefits.” The dangerous nature of police work necessitates strong insurance system for injuries or disabilities. Because municipal police lack these benefits and are poorly paid, municipal police cannot enact high recruitment standards. This is the topic of the next section.

Municipal Police Recruitment and Training

Due to the low salary and non-existent benefits, the average Mexican municipal police departments are not able to recruit selectively. Because of this, many police forces have minimal selection standards (primary or secondary education). As the table below illustrates 64% of all Municipal police in Mexico have a secondary education or less (0-9 years). Only 30 % have a high school diploma, and only 3 % have a college or advanced degree.

Table 37: Level of Police Municipal Police Education

Level of Municipal Police Education	Percent of Municipal Police
Primary	11.42
Secondary	52.67
High School	30.26
College	3.12
Graduate	0.04
Total	100

Source: INEGI. Censo Nacional de Gobiernos Municipales y Delegacionales 2013.

The reason police departments at the municipal level do not make high school a mandatory requirement is twofold: the low salary and small talent pool. First, if the minimum level of education were high school, not enough qualified candidates would apply for such a poor paying job. With a high school degree, an average citizen could earn more money than they could by becoming a police officer, doing less risky work. A clear example of why increasing the education requirement without increasing pay occurred in the 2015 case of the Municipal Police of Gomez Palacio in the state of Durango. This municipality had implemented the requirement of having completed a 12th grade education to enter the municipal police force. But Mayor Jose Miguel Campillo was forced to lower the standard to a 10th grade education because there were not enough qualified applicants (El Siglo de Torreon 2015). Secondly, there is the problem that most municipalities and municipal police recruit from within their own city. But as this chapter illustrated earlier, most municipalities in Mexico are poor. As Carlos Flores, told me “The smaller police departments have less qualified personnel to draw from” and there are not that many high school graduates in these poorer communities.”

Another symptom of municipal police systems is that they do not vet their candidates thoroughly. Most municipal police in Mexico do not conduct background checks on their officers for a lack of capacity and willingness. In addition, incoming mayors privilege loyalty over criminal records. Municipalities that do conduct a background checks do not have access to criminal information from other municipalities or states and therefore do not really know if their officers are former criminals from other jurisdictions, only that they did not commit crimes in their own jurisdiction.

The municipal system in Mexico not only makes it difficult to recruit quality police, but it also impacts the training of their recruits. Although some wealthier municipalities have training in academies lasting from 4-6 months, they represent a minority. In reality, most municipal police in Mexico can expect to receive 1-3 months of training. Antia Mendoza illustrated that:

“Municipal police in Mexico do not receive the same professional importance like a doctor or lawyer. In Mexico policing is an occupation, it does not have the rank of profession. There is a complete lack of training with most police. It is not possible to learn in 1-3 months how to use a gun, how to be an expert in public security, how to arrest, how to detain, tactics, how to deal with people.”

The municipal police in Mexico suffer from poor recruitment and poor training. This allows criminal elements to enter the police force unchecked. Furthermore, the police that do operate on the streets lack the necessary skills to provide basic security. Police abuse rests on the fact that municipal police continue to be under the influence of local politicians who use them for political and illicit ends. One way to reduce this undue influence is to remove control from the police by centralization. But even then, it is not enough, as police

may engage in malfeasance on their own accord, independent of political influence. Hence, oversight mechanisms are critical to stopping police from abusing their power. Unfortunately, at the municipal level, standard oversight mechanisms of hierarchy and internal affairs are weak or non-existent. This is the topic of the next sub-section.

Municipal Police Oversight

The first and most important system of oversight is having a strong hierarchical system. Theoretically, the commander of the police should have direct oversight over their lower ranks, through a hierarchy. However, the nature of the municipal police system places all control of police activities under control of local authorities. The literature argues that this is theoretically a good thing, providing civilian input into police activities. But in Mexico, the decentralized system makes the development of this oversight more difficult. In Mexico, local mayors are elected every three years, and cannot be re-elected. This is significant because each new municipal administration often shuffles the police commands. Commanders are demoted back to regular officers, patrol officers are made commanders, and new police chiefs are brought in from the outside. This is the best-case scenario. In municipalities of less than 50 police officers, mayors often completely change all of the police staff with few officers being carried over to the new administration. This thoroughly undermines the development of a hierarchical system. Furthermore, the arbitrary nature of promotion also undermines the meritocratic advancement typical of a professional bureaucratic system. Hierarchical ranks are not determined by seniority,

training, education, or expertise (as a modern bureaucracy requires), but by degree of loyalty to the new mayor.

More problematic is the lack of internal oversight institutions that work parallel to this weak hierarchy. Although some of the bigger city police have Commission of Honor, Justice, and Promotion that are in charge of internal affairs investigations, most do not. However, as Ernesto Lopez Portillo (Director of the Institute for Security and Democracy and NGO in Mexico) notes that where they exist they “are really chronically weak” and ineffective. He goes on to note that:

If a police is on the street and makes a mistake who is watching? Citizens? But what can they do? A citizen should be able to go to the commission of honor and justice, go to the commission of human rights, to the police itself, or go to the public ministry if they see a police officer doing something wrong. But they don’t go, because they don’t work.

Part of the reason why internal affairs and oversight remain weak is that local mayors do not benefit from their development. When mayors want to use the police for illicit purposes and to repress political and social movements, they want to hide these activities. Hence, the creation of oversight mechanisms are not in the interest of local mayors. The reality of municipal police is that they lack benefits, development, and oversight precisely because municipal authorities are not interested in professionalizing police. As such, they maintain police as occupational labor because they are easier to control for illicit purposes. Most research on Mexican police, like Sabet (2012) and Uildreks (2012) focus on a few cases of big city police like Mexico City and Tijuana, or the rare cases of successful police professionalization like in the City of Chihuahua, in the state of Chihuahua. This obfuscates and contradicts the reality that Mexico faces in terms of policing, as most police

institutions do not achieve and will not achieve police reform as long as the system remains decentralized.

The municipality of Alcozauca represents a more typical study of what afflicts Mexican municipal Police. Alcozauca is a poor city in Mexico with a population of about 18,971. The mountainous region where this municipality is located is ‘categorized as one of the most marginalized and poverty stricken areas of Mexico, where 14 of the 19 municipalities are defined as very highly marginalized and the other five are highly marginalized (INSYDE 2012, 3). This city has 33 police officers, all men. The starting salary was 375 USD per month. The police officers have an average of 5.5 years of education (INSYDE 2012, 47). There are no recruitment standards, other than loyalty to the mayor, and many of the police have difficulty reading. Ninety percent of the police have declared that they did not have any medical care from their work (INSYDE 2012, 49). There is no life insurance for these police (INSYDE 2012, 73). As a consequence of labor insecurity, and the poor conditions of work, there are high levels of job desertion (INSYDE 2012, 74). There is also substantial turnover correlated with changes in mayoral administrations. A new mayor comes to power every three years and completely changes the police force, filling police posts with loyal supporters (INSYDE 2012, 51-52). The municipal police of Alcozauca, like most police in Mexico, are occupational in nature, and are used by mayors to dole out rewards to loyal supporters, and are susceptible to malfeasance.

Municipal Police Malfeasance

The previous sections on police welfare, development, and oversight reveal that there is a great weakness in these institutions, rooted in local control over police. When I asked Antia Mendoza why we do not see municipal police reform she replied:

Local politicians use police for political ends, not for the function that police were created for: to enforce laws, to stop crime, to ensure peace and order. Here, police are used as an extension of the politicians. That is why citizens do not trust municipal police.

She goes on to explain that local elected officials seek to maintain the status quo of having a private army to suppress political dissent in their locality. Therefore, it makes little sense for them to reform the police at all. This relationship, built around the logic of the PRI hegemonic period, persists to this day not only because of the political culture or the environment of insecurity, but because it is sustained by the decentralized nature of policing. To break these patrimonial linkages, as in the cases of Colombia and Chile, the police must be centralized in terms of their administrative capacity and control. The table below summarizes the general salary, pension, healthcare, requirements, training period, and oversight of police. Municipal police in Mexico are not professional, and are largely occupational in nature (discussed later) and are more malfeasant than their State and Federal counterparts.

Table 38: Municipal Police Professionalization Indicators

Variables	Municipal
Starting Salary Average	500 USD
Pension	No
Healthcare	No
Entry Requirement	0-9 Years
Training in Months	1-3 Months
Internal Oversight	No
External Oversight	No
Administration	Local
Work Model Type	Occupational

The Mexican State Police: New, Growing, and Becoming Professionalized

The ‘State Preventative’ police is a new concept in Mexico. States have had judicial police in charge of helping state prosecutors investigate crimes and state highway patrol in charge helping stranded motorists and policing traffic offenses. However, until recently, states have not had police with traditional police roles of patrolling and crime prevention with a state level jurisdiction. During Calderon’s administration there had been a proliferation of state police forces across Mexico and an increase in their sizes and functions around this time. Sonora (2004), Nayarit (2006), and Durango (2006) had all created state police to help coordinate the war on drugs in their regions, but they were not the only ones, and all states now have state preventative police. Initially, the state police were tasked with securing buildings, property, and protecting state office-holders. However, due to the relative weakness of some municipal police, governors have been using the state police to enhance security in larger cities and in rural areas without police forces. Since 2004 the state police have increased from a few hundred to thousands of

police officers. This increase in size is correlated with increased budgets and increased policing duties. For instance, in 2011 Nayarit only had 346 state police officers, but the number has tripled and in 2014 Nayarit had 1100 state police officers (Infomex 2014, Nayarit). The state police in Veracruz has grown from a few hundred in 2006 to 9,485 state police agents in 2014 (Infomex 2014, Veracruz).

One factor explaining this growth is that municipal police have been historically weak, under the patrimonial control of local mayors, and not effective tool for State governors to implement their public security policies. The municipal police are loyal to local mayors, not to the governor's offices, and would therefore ignore state directives. Other municipalities completely lacked a police presence at all. So the growth is the result of state governor's desires to build institutions that they could use to support local municipalities and to implement their own security plans.

A second factor explaining the growth of state preventative police is that Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) sought to establish a national police force, but fell short. The first phase of the long-term national preventative police reform proposal was to unify all municipal police into a state police agency and ultimately place them under the direct control of the governor. The specific purpose was to disrupt the patrimonial relationships that had developed between municipal police, mayors, and drug traffickers. The second phase was to further unify these 32 police into one national police body. But as discussed earlier, political and constitutional difficulties made this second phase difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, the first phase is being implemented in most Mexican states as of 2012. In the small state of Aguascalientes for instance, all of the police have come under the control

of the Governor under the state police force. Other larger states like Veracruz are slowly taking over municipal police that fail to meet minimum requirements.

These two impulses have led to the growth of the state police forces across Mexico. Due to their more centralized nature, governors have been able to build more professional police forces that are superior to their municipal counterparts in terms of benefits, training, and oversight. The next sections highlight the each of these three regimes.

State Police Welfare Benefits: Salary, Benefits, and Pensions

The average pay for state police officers was 711 USD in 2011 (INEGI 2011). About 55.5% of state police officers earned 877 USD salary or above in 2011 (INEGI 2011). Since 2011, many of these salaries have been increased. The latest data that I have collected through various transparency requests from states indicates that in 2014 police earned on average 810 USD. Note that the average state police salary is 310 USD *above* the average monthly salary of their municipal police counterparts.

Another thing that many municipal police do not receive are pensions and healthcare. State preventative police do receive these benefits. Most states offer retirement after the agent turns 55-60 years old with 25-30 years of service. Meeting these requirements, the agent will receive a monthly pension equal to 100% of their last monthly salary. If only 15-20 years of service are given, then they receive only 50% of their last salary for life.

In terms of healthcare coverage, all state police cited from my transparency requests provide medical coverage to their agents and their families. Many also have life insurance

like the state of Morelos that offers 80 months of pay to the family members if the person dies outside of work, and 300 months of salary to the family members of officers who die in the line of service (Infomex Morelos). Other states offer retirement or pension for injuries on the job if person becomes disabled (Infomex Guerrero). Some states, but not all, like the state of Durango, provide access to housing of their State Police (Infomex Durango).

State Police Recruitment and Training

For most state police, the education requirement to apply varies between secondary and high school education with the latter becoming the new norm. My investigation, based on freedom of information responses, reveals that police at the state level all have to go through a basic background check and be clear of any criminal record, drug use, and have no family connections to organized crime.

Training period for state police vary from 3 to 6 months, but all state police receive training. Guerrero, Coahuila, Durango and Morelos have 3 months of training. But the rest of the responding states Training lasts 6 months (Infomex Sonora, Veracruz, Zacatecas, and Sinaloa). Training consists of militarized physical training and technical classroom education and 1-2 months of on the job training in the field.

State Police Oversight

Unlike their municipal counterparts, all of the state police that I investigated do have an internal review board. For instance, the state of Sonora has the Commission of

Honor, Justice, and Promotion (Infomex Sonora) and Guerrero has the Unit of Control and Internal Affairs (Infomex Guerrero). Citizens can submit complaints to these boards for review. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that few people actually make reports against police, and those reports lead to only a few officers being removed from the institution.

Another mechanism of control of police at the state level is the ‘Control y Confianza’ commissions. These commissions conduct regular random drug tests and polygraphs on police officers to test their loyalty to the state, whether or not they are consuming drugs, and whether they have connections to criminal groups. This has been effective in removing many officers from these institutions. For instance in 2010, 600 police officers were removed from the State police of Veracruz for failing these control tests.

Externally, the Public Ministry or Minister of the ‘Fuero Comun’ operate as external agencies in charge of investigating complaints against any state officer, whether in the bureaucracy, health department, or public security (Infomex Sinaloa). Theoretically, the other external oversight body that exists is the state commissions for human rights, who are in charge of investigating human rights violations. Although some internal and external oversight mechanisms exist, they are relatively weak. This is a critical factor in explaining why state police, although better than municipal police, do not engender more trust.

The table below provides a composite look at what State Police that were used in this study look like in terms of professionalism.

Table 39: State Police Professionalization Indicators

State	Personnel	Salary	Education Requirement	Years of Service for Pension	Health Care Coverage	Criminal Background Check	Training in Months	Internal Affairs
Guerrero	2065	812	Secondary	30	Yes	Yes	3	Yes
Sinaloa	2049	1115	Secondary	30	Yes	Yes	6	Yes
Nayarit	1099	577	High School	30	Yes	Yes	3	Yes
Sonora	338	1159	Secondary	25	Yes	Yes	6	Yes
Zacatecas	nd	923	High School	30	Yes	Yes	5	Yes
Coahuila	790	518	High School	30	Yes	Yes	6	Yes
Morelos	976	585	High School	30	Yes	Yes	4	Yes
Veracruz	12601	866	High School	38	Yes	Yes	6	Yes
Durango	211	794	Secondary	30	Yes	Yes	3	Yes
Nuevo Leon	1531	1165	Secondary	31	Yes	Yes	5	Yes
Chiapas	3329	400	Secondary	30	Yes	Yes	4	Yes
Average	2500	810	9-12 Grade	30	Yes	Yes	4.6	Yes

The table below summarizes the findings from above. This provides a general picture of what a typical state police force looks like in terms of benefits, development and oversight. Although these indicators are superior to the municipal police, they still do not approximate the threshold levels of professionalism set by the Carabineros and the National Colombian Police, especially with respect to recruitment (high school education), training (12-16 months), and oversight (internal and external) standards. In the next section, the more professional and centralized Federal Police will be discussed.

Table 40: Average State Police Indicators

Variables	State
Starting Salary Average	810 USD
Pension	Yes
Healthcare	Yes
Entry Requirement	9-12 Grade
Training in Months	3-6 Month
Internal Oversight	Weak
External Oversight	Weak
Administration	Semi-Centralized
Work Model Type	Weak Professional

Introducing the Federal Police

At the federal level, the primary police force is called the Policia Federal Preventiva. This, like the state police, is a new institution, having its origins in the 1997 Ley de Policia Federal Preventiva. In 2012, the PFP absorbed the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI), and was transferred to the National Security Commission, a new agency under the control of the Secretary of Interior (gubernacion), and changed its name to the Policia Federal. The Federal Police's jurisdiction encapsulates all the national territory, and it is tasked with

enforcing federal law (Vargas 2005). Its main mission is to prevent crimes and administrative offenses against federal law including anti-drug trafficking laws (Secretaria de Seguridad Publica Mexico, 2011). One of the PF's central goals is to participate in aid of national, state and local authorities in the investigation and prosecution of crimes, and the arrest of individuals. They can also collaborate, when requested, with local authorities. Much like the state police, the size and importance of the Federal Police has increased since 1997. For instance, in the year 2000, the police had 9,036 personnel and by 2014 it had 39,711 (Infomex Policia Federal 2014).

Federal Police Welfare: Salary, Benefits, and Pension

The entry ranks of police receive 964 USD as their monthly base salary, but with added bonuses factored in police can earn up to 1,461 USD, which is above the national average salary (Portal Transparencia 2015). The Federal Police are paid twice as much as an average municipal police officer. But beyond the higher pay, police also enjoy many benefits that most municipal police do not. After 30 years of service, police have a right to a pension of 100% of their last salary. The police also have life insurance for them and their families, disability insurance, and the ability to pay into a matched retirement fund of up to 2 pesos for every 6.5 contributed by the officer (Infomex Policia Federal 2014). The police agents also have access to medical coverage for them and their families. Another key benefit that the Federal Police have that the Municipal and State police do not have access to is low interest loans to purchase or build a home, or make home improvement

(Infomex Policia Federal 2014). These strong benefits and salary allow the Federal Police to be more selective in their recruitment as will be discussed in the next section.

Federal Police Development: Recruitment and Training

Candidates must have a minimum high school education to enter the Federal Police force, for forensic positions, a college degree is required (Infomex Policia Federal 2014). The Federal Police conduct a thorough background check on each candidate and are able to access national information regarding criminal histories, financial status, and family links to organized crime. Applicants also go through mental health exams, medical exam, and toxological exams. The police at the federal level also receive more training than the average municipal and state police officer. The period of training varies depending on the role that the police agent will play. Patrol agents receive a minimum of 6 months academy training along with 1-2 months of field training. Detectives and forensic officers receive 1 year of training. The welfare benefits, recruitment, and training allow the federal police to be more professional. But this is incomplete without a strong mechanism of oversight.

Federal Police Oversight

The Federal Police are more militarized than their municipal counterparts. This has to do with the way the institution was created. Many of the operational/patrol agents were transferred from the 3rd Military Police battalion from the Mexican Army. The training also emphasizes military discipline and due obedience to higher ranks. This allows the federal police to have a strong system of vertical oversight within the institution. Ranks are

themselves not subjectively awarded, but are based on meritocratic advancement, tenure in office, and education levels. This is possible because of the centralized nature of the police force. But vertical oversight is not enough, as other mechanism of oversight should also exist to control malfeasant practices. On this account, the Federal Police remain relatively weak compared to the Carabineros in Chile and the Colombian National Police. Remember that these institutions had strong internal affairs divisions charged with investigating crimes, with the added layers of military penal courts, and external oversight from other government institutions. This redundancy provides stronger oversight of police and is important for explaining the degree of professionalism, and hence, lower levels of police malfeasance in Chile and Colombia. However, the Mexican Federal Police lack such a strong system. While most municipal police lack an internal affairs division, the Federal Police do have such an institution. Although a relatively new institution, it has been able to investigate some officers for infractions and illegal activity, although the evidence indicates that there are few officers convicted of charges. This evinces the relative weakness of this institution. As the table below indicates below, we see that police are rarely investigated or found guilty.

Table 41 Number of Federal Police Investigated and Condemned for Crimes by Internal Affairs Division

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Number	4	3	20	11	46	42	57	53	23
Condemned	0	2	1	2	7	8	4	26	5
Source: Infomex Transparency Request Federal Police									

There is some external oversight provided by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), although they lack disciplinary power over the police themselves. Despite their superior salary, benefits, recruitment, and training, the Federal Police need stronger internal and external oversight to make them even more professional.

Table 42: Federal Police Professionalization Indicators

Measures	Federal
Starting Salary Average	964 USD
Pension	Yes
Healthcare	Yes
Entry Requirement	High School
Training in Months	6-9 Months
Internal Oversight	Weak
External Oversight	Weak
Administration	National
Work Model Type	Professional

Therefore, although the Federal Police have professional salaries, selection, and training standards, they are considered weak professional police, as they require a stronger system of internal and external oversight. In spite of this weakness in oversight, the other benefits render the Federal Police more professional than both their state and municipal counterparts, and is part of the explanation for why the Federal Police are the least corrupt of the three institutions.


Comparing Municipal Police, State Police and Federal Police

In this section, the increased levels of centralization and professionalization will be discussed in relation to the levels of police malfeasance amongst the municipal, state, and

federal police. To begin, police corruption is a common practice in Mexico, but it is most prevalent in municipal police. Corruption is such a common practice that municipal police themselves acknowledge the existence of corruption within their own institutions. For instance 83.4 % of *police officer* in the Tijuana city police recognized that there is at least some corruption within their ranks (Justiciabarometro 2015). In a survey of the Ciudad Juarez municipal police officers, 65% indicated that *there was some corruption in their institution*. In the Metropolitan Region of Guadalajara 49% of respondents recognized that there were high levels of corruption in their department (JusticiaBarometro 2009 ZMP Guadalajara). The problem of corruption is not just found in these larger municipal police, but becomes magnified at the local level.

As the table below indicates, police at the municipal level are generally viewed as the most corrupt type of police in Mexico. The state police are generally viewed as less corrupt. The Federal Police across the board, except in two states, are viewed as the least corrupt police institution in Mexico.

Figure 21: Percent Respondents Who Perceived Police Institution as Corrupt



Source: INEGI. Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública, 2011.

This data is not surprising when we compare the different levels of professionalism in each type of institution. The table below illustrates the key differences amongst the three institutions that I discussed above:

Table 43: Comparing Municipal, State, and Federal Police Indicators

Measures	Municipal	State	Federal
Starting Salary Average	500 USD	810 USD	964 USD
Pension	No	Yes	Yes
Healthcare	No	Yes	Yes
Entry Requirement	0-9 Grade	9-12 Grade	High School
Training in Months	1-3 Months	3-6 Month	6- 12 Months
Internal Oversight	No	Weak	Weak
External Oversight	No	Weak	Weak
Administration	Local	Semi	National
Work Model Type	Occupational	Weak Professional	Professional

Municipal police generally earn the lowest wages, far below the national average. Most do not enjoy any pensions or healthcare coverage. Recruitment standards are weak ranging from no education to a secondary education requirement to join a local police force. Municipal police generally receive little training of 1-3 months, but it is commonplace that many don't even know how to use their gun (Ernesto Lopez-Portillo Interview 2014). Municipal police operate with a weak hierarchy and lack internal oversight mechanisms, let alone external ones.

State police on the other hand have stronger salaries of about 810 USD. They also have stronger benefits packages generally enjoying a pension equivalent to 100% of their last salary for life, after 30 years of service. They are also given healthcare, life, and disability insurance coverage. In terms of entry requirements, state police are stronger

than municipal police as their standards range from 9th grade to high school education. Training in state police is a minimum of three months in most states, which although not ideal, is more training than most municipal police receive. Furthermore, every State police in this study had an internal affairs division that although less effective than they should be, do provide a mechanism for oversight.

The federal police end up being the most professional as they have the highest average wages amongst the three types of police. They also have strongest benefits. For this reason they can recruit at a higher level and established a minimum level of high school education to enter the police force. Their training ranges from six-months to a year depending on function. They also have an internal affairs division that is weaker than it should be. For this reason, the federal police are not fully professional when compared to Chilean or Colombia counterparts. Nevertheless, compared to the two other types of police, the Federal police are far and away the most centralized *and* professional. These differences explain the variation amongst the levels of corruption discussed above.

Human rights abuses also occur at all levels of police. However, it is the municipal police that are engaged in the daily abuse of citizens. As Ernesto Lopez Portillo discussed in an interview with me:

Abuse occurs often. When municipal police detain someone they don't get taken to the public ministry to be processed. Mexico does not have police stations or precincts as in the American context. Hence the police just drive suspects through the streets and mistreat them in their cars. Other times they take them to 'security houses' to extort money from them or their families or to get information, and all this happens because there is no accountability.

In her 2006 study on municipal police abuse in Mexico City, Claire Naval notes that police “continue to abuse their power, fail to treat individuals with due compliance to the law, and thus regularly violate civil as well as other rights. As the study confirms, resorting to abuse and ill-treatment is still a rather common behavior amongst law enforcement officers” (Naval 28, 2006). Citing data she obtained from the Federal District Police, the largest municipal police force in Mexico, reveals that 43 % of citizens that had some contact with police report also being either verbally or physically abused. These citizens reported that 88 % of their contact experiences were verbally abusive and 12 % were physically abusive which totals to an estimated 280,000 police-citizen contacts where abuse took place in a city of 8.9 million. But it is not just Mexico City, as municipal police throughout the country engage in abuse as well. In an interview with Ernesto Lopez Portillo, he noted that police use of “torture is generalized. Torture victims are usually the most vulnerable people that cannot defend themselves, without lawyers, without family.” The next section discusses these findings with respect to the hypothesis being tested.

Hypothesis Testing

The purpose of this section is to analyze the empirical findings of the previous sections with respect to the central, alternative, and control hypotheses presented in the introductory chapter. The table below provides a summary of these findings.

Table 44: Summary of Findings

Variables	Municipal	State	Federal
Administration	Local	Semi	National
Work Model	Occupational	Weak Professional	Weak Professional
Militarized Police	No	No	Semi
Corrupt Society	Yes	Yes	Yes
Criminal Environment	High	High	High
Regime Type	Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Colonial Influence	Spanish	Spanish	Spanish
Religion	Catholic	Catholic	Catholic
% Respondents That Trust The Type of Police (ENVIPE 2011)	33	40	51

Below each of these comparisons will be discussed relative to the hypothesis being tested.

H₁: National administration of police decreases malfeasance. The evidence confirms this hypothesis. As we move from decentralized to more centralized institutions, corruption decreases and trust increases. The Federal Police are the least corrupt and most trusted because they are national in scope. The decentralized municipal police are the least trusted and most malfeasant because patrimonial control continues to promote malfeasance.

H₂: Having a professional models of work decreases police malfeasance. The evidence also confirms this hypothesis. As police institutions become more professional, they are less corrupt and garner higher levels of trust. Federal Police are the most professional, and exhibit the least malfeasance. Municipal police are the least professional, and the most likely to engage in malfeasance.

Control Hypotheses

CH¹: If a police is militarized then malfeasance will increase. This hypothesis is rejected. The federal police is militarized and is trusted at higher levels and is less malfeasant than municipal civilian counterparts.

CH²: If a society is corrupt, then police malfeasance will increase. This hypothesis is rejected as changes in police malfeasance exist despite the presence of a corrupt society.

CH³: If there is a threat environment, then police malfeasance will increase. Violence in Mexico has been consistently high from 2000-2014. Even though violence is high, there is still a difference in malfeasance amongst more centralized/professionalized forces and the decentralized/occupation forces. My results remain significant in the presence of this hypothesis.

CH⁴ The transition from authoritarian PRI rule to democracy does not change police malfeasance because the structure of policing remains unchanged. I reject this hypothesis.

CH⁵ Religion and Spanish Colonialism are control variables and do not vary. I reject these hypotheses as federal and state police are able to lower malfeasance with centralization and professionalization in spite of their presence.

Conclusion

The major problem for public security in Mexico is to create police forces that actually work. As it stands, the system is dominated by municipal police who are ineffective, corrupt, and abusive. To this day, municipal police are controlled by political actors who perceive the office as a predatory mechanism by which to make money (Carlos

Flores Interview 2014). As Antia Mendoza notes “the police are one of the things that has changed the least amount in the transition to democracy.” Corruption and abuse still remain part of the normal behavior of municipal police system despite the changes in the nature of the political regime.

The realization of the perceived weakness and malfeasance of local authorities led reform attempts from 1994-2014 that sought to both centralize and professionalize municipal police in Mexico. In early October of 2010 President Felipe Calderon sent a bill to the Mexican Congress to unify all municipal police with state police forces to form a unified system of 32 police forces, one police force for each state. Calderon stated that this legislation was “one of the most important reforms in the fight for Mexican security” (Gould 2010). Calderon claimed that municipal police forces are “vulnerable, weak and do not have the faculties, infrastructure, systems, protection, mobility or stability that would guarantee security for Mexicans” (Gould 2010).

Some critics are weary of the plan to unify police as a means to address security threats. For instance, the Association of Municipal Governments of Mexico representing the largest 200 of Mexico’s 2,440 municipalities, stated that they were largely opposed to the proposal of unifying local police on a state basis (Castillo 2010). The chorus against unification was not restricted to these elected officials. In a 2010 conference, specialists in public security congregated in Jalisco, Mexico to discuss the problems facing Mexico. These specialists from Mexico, Spain, France, The United States, and Chile indicated that Mexican authorities had made a mistake in focusing on centralizing police forces (Garcia 2010). Among the attendees was Iñaki Osés Zurbano, from the Spanish Ministry of the

Interior, who argued that the fundamental problem is not one of structure, but enhancing the professionalism of those within the police force. Marcos Pablo Moloeznik Gruer, researcher at the University of Guadalajara in Mexico critiqued the federal government by rhetorically asking “what is more important, that we have a unified police or that we have a police that benefits from stability and work security?” (Garcia 2010). The erroneous assumption made by Moloeznik and Oses was that police unification or centralization had nothing to do with establishing stability and work security for police officer. The error in this argument is assuming these tasks are mutually exclusive and contradictory. The evidence in this chapter contradicts this argument and finds that municipal police are problematic precisely because the structure of the system encourages and protects police misconduct. Centralization and professionalization have worked to address police weakness, and will likely be the continuing trend in Mexican public security as future administrations seek to address the increasing violence and criminality in Mexico. The next section will compare Colombia with Chile and Mexico, and will provide new directions for future research to expand on the findings of this dissertation.

Chapter V: Conclusion

A state cannot be governed without a police.
Police and government form a binomial
relationship –Colombian Police Brigadier
General Fabio Londoño

This dissertation has addressed the following research question: why do police engage in malfeasance and how can we get them to stop? I found two interconnected answers: first, police are malfeasant because they are locally controlled; and second, policing is not treated like a profession. There are added questions that have thus far not been addressed. The purpose of this final chapter is to address these additional questions, revisit the major findings of this research, and establish a research agenda for future research. To this end, this chapter will be organized as follows. First, it will review the empirical findings of the dissertation by comparing Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Second, this chapter will discuss policy recommendations rooted in these cases. Third, it will discuss the theoretical limitations of this study and how my future research projects will seek to address these limitations.

The Case of Chilean Carabineros 1833-2014

In Chapter 2 “The Historical Development of Latin America’s Best Police Force” I presented six periods of policing in Chile: 1833-1891, 1891-1896, 1896-1927, 1927-1973, 1973-1990, and 1990-2014. I noted that the period of 1891-1896 was an important test of the alternative hypothesis that locally controlled police is better at controlling

malfeasant behavior. However, this period was defined by extensive police malfeasance and led to the rejection of the conventional argument that decentralization provided for better policing. The 'Tri-Model' period, spanning from 1896-1927, illustrated that the centralized and professional model used by the Gendarmerie/Carabineros was far superior to the decentralized and demilitarized model of municipal police.

When Chile had decentralized police, the police were subject to local patrimonial domination that corrupted the service and turned it away from its public security role. Those bonds were broken when the police were centralized, as the Carabineros de Chile in 1927, and improved police behavior. From 1927-1973, the Chilean state continued to professionalize its police by expanding benefits, development and oversight mechanisms. As a result police malfeasance steadily decreased. When the military regime of General Augusto Pinochet took over in 1973, he not only violated the democratic form of governance necessary for police accountability, but he also actively worked to reduce the professional character of police work by decreasing the police budget and benefits. Beyond this, he used the police to suppress political dissent, thereby undermining the development of the Carabineros.

The new democratic regimes in the post-Pinochet era were able to return the Carabineros, relatively quickly, to their pre Pinochet status. Democratic reforms were specifically oriented to increase the professionalization standards of the Carabineros by increasing their budgets, training, and establishing new oversight controls. Thus, in the Chilean case, I found strong confirmatory evidence that centralization of police does decrease police malfeasance.

Beyond the centralization hypothesis, there was also strong evidence for the professionalization hypothesis. The case of Chile established that centralization without professionalization will not reduce malfeasance in the same way that a centralized and professionalizing institutions will. The post-authoritarian era (1990-2014) of policing in Chile has been one of strong professional development. This chapter illustrated that the Chilean police offered strong benefits, training and selection, and internal and external oversight mechanisms that help explain why the Chilean Carabineros, are one of the most trusted and least malfeasant police forces in Latin America. However the argument could be made that Chilean conditions are unique as it does not suffer the same public security issues or corrupt cultures that infest Latin American states. Thus, the next case of Colombia was chosen as a stronger test of the hypotheses.

The Case of the National Police of Colombia 1846-2012

In Chapter 3 “The Birth and Re-Birth National Police of Colombia” I employed an analysis of Colombian policing in seven periods: 1846-1885, 1885-1953, 1953-1962, 1962-1985, 1985-1993, 1993-1997, and 1997-present. From 1846-1885, Liberal party dominated the political system and set forth a confederalist constitution that gave different departments (states) the right to have their own standing military and police. This decentralization would be challenged in 1885, when the Conservative party took over and created a unitary government. The Conservative party created the ‘National Police of Colombia,’ with the intent of centralizing all municipal police under its authority. This reform attempt did not materialize and instead, the National Police of Colombia (PNC) only had jurisdiction in

the capital city of Bogota. Alongside the PNC each department (state) and municipality had their own local police. As my theory predicted, police in local regions came to be dominated by local party elites, who used them to attack opposition party members, thereby increasing violence in Colombia.

The assassination of Jorge Elecier Gaitan in 1946 led to an insecurity spiral throughout the country. Liberals and Conservatives used their local police forces to kill and attack each other. The violence reached such high levels that in 1953, moderate Liberals and Conservatives party leaders called on the military to intervene. In 1953, General Rojas Pinilla's military dictatorship set about restoring order to society. Police malfeasance was thus lowered considerably. Police were by and large honest and effective at their jobs through the 1960s. The real problems with malfeasance came much later in 1980, with the rise of narco-trafficking. In 1993 the National Police appeared on the verge of collapse. The mounting security crises led society and politicians to mobilize and fully professionalize the police. The police were given better salaries, trained for longer periods of time, and provided with stronger oversight mechanisms. These changes helped mitigate the influence of drug trafficking and police malfeasance decreased once more.

These empirical findings confirmed that the centralization of police worked to decrease police malfeasance. The major turning point of the Colombian National Police came in 1953, when the military intervention initiated the centralization and professionalization process. The reason centralization was so critical was that it removed local patrimonial control over the police.

Although centralization removed patrimonial relations, it did not adequately address the problem of police labor as an occupation. In 1993, Colombian political leaders decided to deepen their commitment to professionalizing the police by increasing welfare, development, and oversight regimes. Following these dramatic changes, the police began to change. They were not only engaged in less malfeasance, but they also started to win back the trust that society had once held in them. Thus, the historical findings in Colombia support the professionalization hypothesis as well.

The Case of the Mexican Police System (1920-2014)

In Chapter 4, “The Tri-Model Era of Policing in Mexico” I discussed the impact of the PRI dictatorship on the Mexican police system from 1920-1997. In 1997 the Federal Preventative Police appears, and in 2004 when State Preventative Police begin to exist and expand. The focus of the empirical analysis rested on the comparison of the municipal, state, and federal police during this period (2004-2014). The chapter illustrated that it was the decentralized and occupational municipal police in Mexico that were the most engaged in malfeasance, and engender the lowest levels of trust. The state police are semi-centralized, semi-professionalized, and engendered higher levels of trust than their municipal counterparts. The federal police, being the most centralized and most professional, exhibited the lowest level of malfeasance amongst the three groups.

The evidence in Mexico confirms the hypothesis that police centralization breaks patrimonial bonds and improves their behavior. It is the municipal police that are used by

local authorities to not only protect illicit groups, but to repress political dissent. The State and Federal police are more centralized and less malfeasant.

Furthermore the professionalization hypothesis is also confirmed. The Municipal police are the least professional and hence most malfeasant. The Federal and State police are the most professional institutions, and thus they are less malfeasant. Compared to the two other types of police, the Federal police are far and away the most centralized *and* professional. These differences explain why the Federal Police are perceived as less corrupt and garner higher levels of trust from the citizenry in Mexico.

Comparing Chile and Colombia: Militarization, Insecurity, and Corrupt Cultures

I use Przeworski and Teune's (1970) most-similar *and* most different systems design to analyze the case of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. In selecting Chile and Colombia, my strategy was to employ the logic of most-different systems design. In a most-different systems design, "just one independent variable, as well as the dependent variable, co-vary, and all other plausible independent variables show different values" (Seawright and Gerring 2008). As the table below illustrates, the dependent variable should be similar, while all other relevant variables vary, except for the common variable of interest.

Table 45: Most Different Systems Comparison

Most-Different	X ¹	X ²	AH	Y
Case 1	+	+	+	-
Case 3	+	+	-	-

Both Chile and Colombia have a highly centralized police force with high professional standards, but they vary greatly with respect to other public security considerations.

Specifically, they differ in terms of militarization, violence, and a culture of corruption. Both Chile and Colombia have police modeled after their military counterparts, in that they use military ranks, uniforms, and symbols in their institutions. In fact, their military organization helps enhance the professional development of police work. As such, I expect that militarization is not a negative causal factor in the analysis, as hypothesized by the literature.

Second, the literature argues that societies with more violence tend to have more malfeasant police. Colombia's problem with criminality is partially rooted in Drug Trafficking Organization and other criminal groups. Although the Colombian government had dismantled the Medellin and Cali Cartels in the 1990s, these groups simply fragmented and reared their heads in new forms, now called *Bandas Criminales* (BACRIMS).

In contrast, Chile does not have similar criminal situation. Although there are criminal gangs in marginalized communities who engage in micro-drug trafficking, the level of organized crime pales in comparison to Colombia. Thus, Chile overall has a lower level of crime and violence than Colombia. For instance, the homicide rate in Chile is only at 3.1 per 100,000 people whereas in Colombia it is much higher at 30.8 (UNODC for Homicide Rate, UN office of Drugs and Crime). Whereas the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security rates Chile generally safe, they consider Colombia to have high levels of terrorism, crime, and political violence. Thus the problems that police face in both countries are different, and according to the literature, the level of crime should influence police malfeasance in both countries.

Third, Chile does not have a traditionally corrupt culture, but Colombia does. For instance, according to Transparency International Chile scores 73 on its Corruption Perception Index, while Colombia is much higher at 37 (the closer to 1, the more corrupt the country). Fourth, the literature discusses that the regime type might be an important causal factor explaining the levels of malfeasance. Because both Colombia and Chile have strong democracies, I view this as a control variable along with colonial legacy and religious affiliation.

Table 46: Comparing Chile and Colombia

Variables	Chile	Colombia
Militarized	Yes	Yes
Violent Environment	No	Yes
Corrupt Society	No	Yes
Democracy	Yes	Yes
Colonial Legacy	Spain	Spain
Religion	Catholic	Catholic
Centralized	Yes	Yes
Professionalized	Yes	Yes
Malfeasance	Very Low	Medium-Low

Despite the presence of these public security problems, Colombia has been able to effectively reduce its malfeasant practices through centralization and professionalization, approximating the success of the Chilean Carabineros. This comparison, together with the previous chapters provides more leverage for the argument at hand. However, there is also a valid comparison to be made between Colombia and Mexico.

Policing in Colombia and Mexico: Militarization, Insecurity, and Cultures of Corruption

According to Seawright and Gerring (2008), the most-similar method “employs a minimum of two cases. In its purest form, the chosen pair of cases is similar on all the measured independent variables except the independent variable of interest.” The logic of this comparison is exhibited in the table below, where public security variables should be similar, and the key variation is found in the difference between centralized and professionalized structures. The logic is that, controlling for alternative arguments, the variation in the structural variables should correlate with the variation in the dependent variable of police malfeasance.

Table 47 Most-Similar Systems Comparison

Most-Similar	X ¹	X ²	AH	Y
Case 1	+	+	+	-
Case 2	-	-	+	+

First, in terms of militarization, the Colombian national police employ more militarily organized police, whereas the Mexican police have more of a civilian model of policing. This allows us to rule out the hypothesis that militarized forms increase malfeasance.

Colombia and Mexico are very similar in terms of their levels of insecurity. For instance, both have the presence of drug trafficking organizations. According to a UN Human Rights Council report, “between December 2006 and November 2012, 102,696 homicides took place in Mexico, of which 70% were drug related.” Colombia’s high homicide rate is 30.8 per 100,000 people and Mexico’s is 21.5 (UNODC for Homicide Rate, UN office of Drugs and Crime). The U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic

security warns that Colombia has a high degree of terrorism, crime, and political violence. Thus the problems that police face in both countries are different, and according to the literature, the level of crime should influence police malfeasance in both countries.

Both Colombia and Mexico have corrupt cultures where paying off government officials is a normal and anticipated practice. As such Colombia scored a 37 and Mexico a 35 on the Transparency International Corruption Perception index (1 being the highest level of corruption). This helps us rule out the corrupt culture hypotheses.

Although Colombia and Mexico share the most similar characteristics in Latin America with respect to public security and policing problems, they differ greatly in terms of police structure. This structure is the only thing that is present in both cases, and helps explain why it is that both Colombia, despite having similar issues to Mexico, is able to have a less malfeasant police force. This structure is the main difference in terms of public security in Mexico and Colombia, and helps explain why Colombian police, despite operating in similar theaters of action, are trusted at higher levels and are less corrupt than Mexican police. The key difference is between the Municipal Preventative police of Mexico and Colombian national police is not only the centralized/decentralized one, but at the core it is the different levels of professionalism as measured by benefits, development and oversight structures.

Table 48: Comparing Colombia and Mexico

Variables	Colombia	Mexico
Militarized Police	Yes	No
Violent Environment	Yes	Yes
Corrupt Society	Yes	Yes
Democracy	Yes	Yes
Colonial Legacy	Spain	Spain
Religion	Catholic	Catholic
Centralized	Yes	No
Professionalized	Yes	No
Malfeasance	Medium-Low	High

Comparing the Findings of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico


Controlling for variation in public security contexts, the three countries vary only with respect to the type of police structure that they have. Mexico, having a decentralized and occupational style of police force fares the worst, whereas Colombia, which also has similar problems, does significantly better.

Table 49: Comparing Chile, Colombia, and Mexico

Variables	Chile	Colombia	Mexico
Militarized Police	+	+	—
Violent Society	—	+	+
Corrupt Society	—	+	+
Democracy	+	+	+
Centralized	+	+	—
Professionalized	+	+	—
Malfeasance	—	—	+


As can be seen in the table below police corruption varies amongst the three states, as hypothesized.

Figure 22: Comparing Chile, Colombia, and Mexico Police Corruption



Although Colombia does exhibit some corruption, it is half of what Mexico exhibits, despite similar security contexts. Chile, given the lack of corruptive external influences, faces very little problem with corruption. Beyond corruption, there is a marked difference between police in the three countries in terms of trust as exhibited by the table below. Notice how quickly Colombia's police force is able to regain community trust following the period of reform, and yet Mexican police trust remains the same. This is the difference between a centralized and decentralized police under pressure to reform: centralized systems are easier to reform.

Figure 23: Percent of Respondents with Some or a Lot of Trust in the Police



The conventional wisdom on police is that decentralized and occupational models of policing provide for more effective and trustworthy police. The research and theory presented here contradicts this conventional wisdom and instead finds that centralization and professionalization are mechanisms by which to lower malfeasance and increase public trust in their police. The practice of centralization and professionalization in Chile, Colombia and in the Federal Police in Mexico have indeed improved policing. In using a qualitative approach, this research has found confirmatory evidence for this theory. Nevertheless, these three countries still face significant problems with police that needs addressing.

The common area of weakness for Chile, Colombia, and Mexican police systems is external oversight. The new frontier of police reforms in Chile and Colombia should strengthen both the government's role in oversight as well as independent civilian review boards. In Mexico, the most pressing need is to break patrimonial bonds and professionalize its police, and in the future it will in all likelihood need to strengthen both internal and external oversight mechanisms. It is through the added layers of oversight that police professionalism will advance even further in these cases. The next section will continue this line of thought and offer other policy recommendations to improve policing in the region of Latin America.

Theoretical and Policy Implications

Scholars of policing largely support the idea of decentralizing police institutions. The argument is that decentralized police are more democratic, offer better services, and are closer to the people they serve than more centralized institutions. The findings in this dissertation differ from this line of argumentation. Part of the unwillingness to recognize centralization and professionalization as important policy options in Latin America is the historical legacy of dictatorships that saw power concentrated in the hands of a few actors. These periods were indeed problematic for the citizens as extensive abuse, torture, and disappearances were perpetrated by the police in these regimes. Thus, there is concern with centralized and professional police, as they would prove a powerful tool to repress should the wrong actors dominate the political system again.

However, this logic is not only does a disservice to Latin American societies, but it is built on dubious assumptions. A decentralized system will not provide a bulwark against authoritarian governments and their human rights abuses. The evidence in this dissertation indicates that it does not matter if the police are centralized and professional or not to authoritarian actors. Dictators will use whatever police system they have to repress, however centralized or professional it might be. Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico all used their decentralized police institutions during their respective dirty wars to repress political dissent. The Chilean Carabineros were used to repress dissent in Chile under the Pinochet dictatorship. Police, however organized, will always be used in a dictatorship to repress. But we no longer live in that era.

Furthermore, Latin America as a region has completed their transition to democracy and is engaged in a phase of democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation is a different game and poses different challenges than those encountered by newly democratic countries. Indeed, consolidation necessitates a fair assessment of all available policy responses, not just those that fit an outdated worldview. Hence, my general recommendation is to not fear centralization and professionalization, but to embrace it and manage it in a way that benefits society. To do so, police need to be protected from political influence.

One of the things that Colombia and Chile both do well is to provide the police with some autonomy in internal affairs. Operational autonomy is healthy and necessary for professionalization of police. Political actors can build administrative policies for advancing in rank, recruitment, and training standards. But it ought to be the police who

implement these policies internally, without undue influence from political actors. A Lieutenant should expect to rise in rank after a set period of time and through objective examination mechanisms, not because a political actor promotes them.

Director Generals should serve tenures that overlap presidencies. If a president is elected in 2014 to a four-year term, they must work with the police director that was promoted to power in 2012 during the previous administration. This helps limit the tendency to fire and hire police leadership based on political loyalty, rather than expertise. However, presidents should retain the right to ask for Police Chief resignation. They must then be able to choose the next director general from the top ranked police in the institution, not from outside the police, as is the custom in many Mexican municipal police departments.

Perhaps the biggest policy prescription to be drawn from this research is to treat police as professionals. Doctors, Lawyers, Architects, Engineers are all treated as professionals and are paid very well as they have to undergo extensive training. Additionally, there is strong oversight by professional associations and government bodies over these groups. Why? They have one thing in common: their work involves the welfare of human life. We want to ensure that professionals who are responsible for our welfare are well trained and that someone is making sure that these professionals have our best interests at heart. Malpractice, by any of these professions, can lead to destructive consequences for human life. Police also have our security in their hands. Thus, it is surprising that many places do not see the analogous need to make sure that police fulfill professional standards. To this end, police must be paid well, given healthcare, life

insurance, and disability insurance. They must also be trained extensively and selected from a qualified and well-educated pool of candidates in competitive and objective manner. Finally, they must be overseen by both internal and external institutions to ensure compliance with professional ethical standards.

With respect to training, there is a critical threshold discovered in Chile, Colombia and in Mexico, where policy experts noted that 1 to 6 months of training for police is not enough. One year of academic training and additional 2-3 months of field training are minimal requirements for a truly professional police force. Chile and Colombia meet this threshold, but few police in Mexico do. For Mexico to begin developing a professional police, it needs to increase training periods in the academy and outside of the academy as well.

A different policy prescription that this dissertations suggests is a stronger differentiation of roles between operational and command officers. This is similar to the military, where infantry and officer staffs are differentiated. Whereas operational agents should undergo at least 1 year of training, command officer should undergo a minimum of 3 years of training and receive an accredited degree in public security. Police commanders should not be promoted from the lower ranks. They should be like commissioned officers from the military with a separate career path. The differentiation is important to insulate command ranks to be infiltrated by organized crime, but also guarantees well trained professionals that can lead lower ranks more effectively and objectively.

Project Limitations, Gaps, and Future Research

This project provides a strong test of alternative hypotheses and controls for other arguments. The theory at hand consistently explains the variation in police malfeasance in the cases of Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Although this project provided strong leverage to test the validity of the theory, it does have a few shortcomings, which this section will briefly discuss.

The first critical problem with the research at hand is that it has limited external validity. What is critical about these findings is that if they are valid elsewhere, they could be used to help make better policy decision in developing state in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. At the other end of the spectrum, this study does not speak to the cases in advanced industrialized countries. More research is need to test these findings outside of Latin America, presenting future research opportunities.

Second, this research does not address the different ways of organizing police around the world. Neither the literature in international criminology nor in this dissertation lays out the conceptual basis by which to typologize these different forms of police organization. By conceptualizing different types of police, future research will be better able to understand how organizational patterns influence level of malfeasance around the world.

Third, the central focus of this research was not on how different authoritarian regimes used police. Although there is some implicit discussion, the study would have been strengthened by an analysis of the impact of authoritarianism on police behavior during and after the regime. The question is glaring when we look at both Chile and

Mexico, which had very different police systems, and had different types of authoritarianism. To be sure, there is a fruitful research project in addressing this puzzle.

Finally, this research does not provide a comprehensive theory of why, when, and how police reform comes about in the cases studied. Reform attempts occur in both Chile and Mexico after the end of authoritarian regimes, but with very different results. In Colombia, the impetus for reform was not a regime transition, but increased public pressure on the leadership of President Cesar Gaviria and Minister of Defense Rafael Pardo to bring about reforms to the police.

Recognizing the above limitations, my future research agenda will focus on addressing some of these problems. There are three major projects in which I plan on addressing some of the shortcomings of this project. First, I am working on a project that studies police development in the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom that tests this theory of police malfeasance in the context of advanced industrialized countries. The selection is based again on the logic of most-similar and most different systems design. Second, I am working on a typology of police models to better categorize the different types of police organizations that exist in the world, and to see which ones are most ubiquitous and which are rarer. Finally, I am working on developing a project that studies how different types of dictatorships (military, personalistic, or party-authoritarian) impact police development. Although these projects only address some of the limitations of this dissertation, they allow a continued development of the theory.

Conclusion

Much of Latin American politics has been about the struggle that states face when digging themselves out of their Spanish colonial legacies. Patrimonialism and police malfeasance are some symptoms of state weakness inherited from the Iberian Peninsula. As such, what Weber referred to as ‘administrative modernization of state’ is still an ongoing project in Latin America. What I argue is that the mechanism by which that can and has come about in Latin America is through centralization and professionalization. I found these the two steps were necessary to break patrimonialism and then establish a professional set of standards for police work. There can be no professional standards without first breaking patrimonialism because elite actors at the local level have entrenched interests in maintaining the status quo. As such, these patrimonial actors will work to stall, stop, or otherwise derail reform attempts that take control out of their hands and place it in a semi-national or national authority. Only then can professionalization take place throughout a country.

However, professionalization in a few cities is not good enough. A police system has to be able to work for small, big, rich, poor, rural and urban communities. This is what democratic governance is about: providing equal protection to all of its citizens. Without such guarantees of quality policing throughout a territory, a police system fails in its primary purpose: to protect the democratic rights of citizens. Centralization and professionalization of the police are appropriate and powerful approaches to accomplishing this democratic imperative.

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Interviews

Chile

Carabinero Interviews

Retired Carabinero Sargeant Major Francisco Ortiz, 1992-2002. 20 year veteran. Interview Date: 1/3/13.

Retired Carabinero Jimmy Walter Gatica 3 years 2008-2011. Interview Date:1/4/13.

Retired Carabinero Sargeant Major Carlos Ripetti 1985-2011, 26 year veteran. Interview Date: 12/2012.

Retired Corporal 1st Class Victor Manuel Fornes 1983-2010, 27 year veteran. Interview Date: 12/12/2012.

Retired Carabinero Jaime Jorquera. 2002-2010, 8 year veteran. Lawyer specializing on topics of Carabineors and their disciplinary rules norms and regulations. Interview Date: 12/3/2012.

Liza Zuñiga (Civilian Staff). Department of Criminal Analysis Carabineros de Chile; Political Scientist with expertise in public security. Interview Date: 11/23/2012.

Carabinero Major Daniel Soto, Lawyer in the Carabinero Department of Human Rights. Interview Date: 12/5/2012.

General Lautaro Contreras Aguilera, ex-director of Personele, ex-director of Transit and Highways and ex-director of education for the Carabineros de Chile. Interview Date: 12/18/2012.

General Voltaire Opazo Ibañez President of the Carabineros General Corp, Profesor at Escuela Superior de Carabineros. Electronic Communication Response Received 12/12/2012.

Academic Interviews

Lucia Dammert Associate Professor, Universidad de Santiago de Chile; Expert on public security issues in Latin America. Global Fellow Latin American Program at the Wilson Center. Interview Date: 10/25/2012.

Alejandra Mohor. Researcher at the University of Chile Institute for Public Policy. Interview Date: 10/17/2012

Claudio Fuentes Interview: Director of the Social Science Research Institute (ICSO) at Universidad Diego Portales in Santiago, Chile. Expertise in Human Rights and Public Security Policy. Interview Date: 12/12/2012.

Azun Candina. Professor of History and Philosophy at the University of Chile. Expertise in public security matters. Interview Date: 12/20/2012

Jorge Zalaquette, professor of Law at the University of Chile. Expert on Human Rights. Commissioner of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Chile. Interview Date: 12/23/12

Politician/Bureaucratic Elite Interviews

Luciano Fuilloux, Sub-Secretary of Carabineros Under President Frei 1994-2000. Interview Date: 11/7/2012.

Hugo Fruhling. 1992-1994 Executive Secretary of the Coordinating Council of Public Security for the Government of Chile and Special Adviser to the Ministry of Interior. Interview Date: 10/19/2012.

Marcos Robledo. Special Foreign Policy Advisor to President Michelle Bachelet 2006-2010. 1998-2005 Adviser to the Minister of Defense. Currently sub-secretary of Defense in Ministry of Defense. Interview Date: 10/26/2012.

Patricio Morales Aguire. Sub-Secretary of Carabineros in the Ministry of Defense Under President Lagos 2000-2002. A Lawyer at Perez Donozo Legal Study in Santiago. Interview Date: 11/22/2012.

Felipe Harboe. Sub-secretary of Carabineros under President Lagos 2002-2004. Former Deputy Minister of Interior under Bachelet 2006-2008. Congress Deputy from the 22 District in Santiago Centro 2009-2014. Interview Date: 12/13/2012.

Sergio Aguiló. Elected Parliamentarian, Chamber of Deputies representative from 37th district of Talca, 1990-Present. Interview 11/18/12.

Ximena Vidal. Deputy in Chamber of Deputies representing District 25. Human Rights commission in chamber of deputies. Interview date: 12/13/12.

NGO and Journalist Interviews

Jose Araya. Observatorio Ciudadano: Human Rights NGO. Expertise in Human Rights and protest policing. Interview date: 11/20/2012.

Yerko Ljubetic Principle Investigator of the National Institute for Human Rights. Ex Minister of Labor and Welfare Under President Lagos. Interview date: 10/19/2012.

Mario Galvez, Journalist at Largest paper in Chile El Mercurio, covering crime and policing issues. Interview Date: 11/8/2012.

Juan Pablo Figueroa, Investigative Journalist at Centro de Investigacion Periodistica (CIPER) covering crime and law enforcement topics. Interview Date: 11/15/2012.

Off the Record Reporter 3. Major Newspaper in Chile. Requested Anonymity due to professional relationship with Carabineros as sources could be hampered. Interview date: 11/20/2012.

Carabinero Correspondences

Carabinero Colonel Ramiro F. Larrain Donoso. Chief of the Department of Information, Complaints and Suggestions. Electronic Correspondence. Interview Date: 11/23/2012.

Carabinero Colonel Gonzalo Huenumil Lezana. Department of Public Information. RSIP No 19204. Interview Date: 4/12/12.

Colombia

National Police of Colombia Interviews

Brigadier General Fabian Arturo Londoño Cardenas, PNC. Former Police Officer and Professor at Post Graduate School of Police. 4/4/2013

Sergeant Juan Aparicio(r). PNC. Active 1971-1990, National Police of Colombia. 4/4/2013

Lieutenant Juan Aparicio, Jr. PNC. Editor of 'Revista Criminalidad' The PNC's professional journal. 2/26/2013

Lt. Col. Claudia Pulido, PNC. Chief of Observatory of Integrity, Work, Police Ethics and Human Rights. 4/18/2013

Lt. Col. Jose Lopez, PNC, Judge for Military Penal Court for Police in Medellin. 5/9/2013

Lt. Col. Yed Milton Lopez, PNC, 22 year veteran, head of community policing in Medellin 2013. 5/7/2013-5/15/2013

Col. Jose Poveda Montes, PNC, head of criminal investigation in Medellin, 2001-2003. 3/20/2013

Major Yesenia Mahecha, PNC, Chief of Research, Police postgraduate school. 3/18/2013

Lorena Mosquera, PNC Civilian, Thesis Coordinator, Police postgraduate school. 3/18/2013

Academic Interviews

Dr. Francisco Leal Buitrago, Academic, expert on political history of Colombia. Professor at National University of Colombia. 3/21/2013

Alejo Vargas, expert in civil-military relations and security studies, professor at National University of Colombia. 2/20/2013

Maria Victoria Llorente, Executive Director for Ideas Para La Paz, Public Security NGO. 3/11/2013

Juan Carlos Ruiz, expert in Public Security and Policing. Professor at Rosario University in Bogota Colombia. 3/14/2013

Journalist Interview

Jineth Bedoya, Journalist at El Tiempo news agency in Colombia. 4/12/2013

Government Officers

Rafael Pardo. Current Minister of Labor and Former Minister of Defense (1990-1994). 5/17/2013

Hugo Acero. International Police and Public Security Advisor. First advisor to peace process in the 1990s, National Security and Citizen Security in the presidency and in Bogota Secretary of Security for over 9 years. 3/18/2013

Estela Baracaldo Mendez Advisor to Project of Training and Citizen Security, Government of Bogota 1995-2003. 2/11/2013

National Police of Colombia Correspondence

Direction of Human Resources. 2012. "Tabla de Sueldos año 2012 Decreto 0842 de 25-04-2012). Document Received as Solicited by Author Via E-mail contact with direction of Human Resources in the Police.

Major Hector Garcia, Chief of Legal and Human Rights Affairs for DIPO. No. 055

Clara Cecilia Mosquera Paz, Head of the Executive Direction of Military Penal Justice. No. 757.

Major Doctor Jaime Ivan Londoño Orozco, Chief of Network Services for Direction of Health of the National Police.

Lieutenant Colonel Diana Luengas Diaz Chief of Discounted Housing for Police. No. S-2013

Lieutenant Colonel Angel Horacio Rueda Zacipa, Vicerrector of Education and Distance Learning. No. 009249.

Lieutenant Colonel Emiliana Vargas Ramirez, Vicerrector for Academic Affairs. No. 009174.

Second Lieutenant Diana Carolina Vinasco Rendon, Chief of the Educative Service Group. No. 101091.

Major Naryi Niño Marin, Chief of the Human Development. No. 145507.

Mexico

Interviews

Academics and Non-Governmental Organizations

Flores, Carlos. Researcher, Center for Research and Superior Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS). Expertise in Mexican Political-Criminal networks. Interview Date: 9/9/2014

Hoyos, Francisco. Public Relations Officer. Consejo Ciudadano. NGO geared towards improving transparency and accountability. Receive complaints and protect informants. Interview Date: 9/3/2014

Lopez Portillo, Ernesto. Director and Founder of Institute for Security and Democracy. Interview Date: 9/10/2014

Mendoza, Antia. Independent Consultant for Security and Citizen Peace. Previously worked in Chihuahua as consultant in police reform, and worked for the Secretariat of Governance for Mexican Federal Government. Interview Date: 9/23/2014

Salgado, Juan. Professor Center for Research and Teaching in Economics, Mexico City (CIDE). Interview Date: 9/23/2014

Suarez de Garay, Maria Eugenia. Lead Investigator. Institute for Security and Democracy. Interview Date: 9/10/2014

Varela, Ambar. Director of Public Policy Evaluations. Contraloria Ciudadana. Has done work on reviewing implementation of Federal Grants for Public Security in various municipal police forces in Mexico. Interview Date:9/3/2014

Transparency Information Request

Amaro López, Ana Patricia. Head of the Transparency and Information Access Unit. Infomex File: 00005414. (January 30, 2014)

Bonilla Ibarra, Raymundo Alfredo. Secretariat of Public Security Department of Judicial Affairs. Sinaloa. (January 30, 2014). Infomex File: 001751

Chaires Gonzlez, Erika. Coahuila. Public Information Access Unit. (February 17, 2014) Infomex Request File: 00060414.

Guevara Ramírez, Jorge Xavier. Director General of Administración and Head of the Public Information Unit Under the Secretary of Interior. Morelia. (October 15, 2014) Infomex Request File: 00541514

Hurtado Hernandez, Martha. The State of Durango Unit of Engagement, Transparency Access and Public Information. Durango. Infomex. (February 14, 2014). File: 00031114.

Lopez de la Vega, Rogelio Paaris. Operative Director. Nayarit. (February 28, 2014) Infomex File: 00024314

Lugo Delgado, Eldia Barbara. 2015. General Inspector. Office of General Commissioner. Federal Police. (February 28, 2014) Infomex File: 0413100084114.

Manuel-Gomez, Alonso Ulises Mendez. Director General of the State Public Security. Sonora. (August 31, 2014). Infomex Request File 00444314

Parada Cortes, Teresa. Chief of Transparency Unit. Veracruz. (February 11, 2014) Infomex file: 0042414

Rodríguez García, Oscar Agustín. Head of the Unit of Public Engagement. Zacatecas. (March 12, 2014). Infomex Request File: 00057314