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Democratizing Formal Politics:  
Indigenous and Social Movement Political Parties in Ecuador and Bolivia, 1978-2000

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Jennifer Noelle Collins

Committee in charge:

Professor Paul Drake, Chair  
Professor Ann Craig  
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2006

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2006

## **DEDICATION**

For my parents, John and Sheila Collins, who in innumerable ways made possible this journey.

For my husband, Juan Giménez, who met and accompanied me along the way.

And for my daughter, Fiona Maité Giménez-Collins, the beautiful gift bequeathed to us by the adventure that has been this dissertation.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AD – Acción Democrática (Democratic Action). One of two parties that alternated power in Venezuela from 1958 to 1998.

ADN – Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action). Bolivian right-wing political party founded by ex-military dictator, Hugo Banzer.

APRA – American Popular Revolutionary Alliance. Oldest Peruvian political party. Historically on the left, but in recent years has moved towards the center. Longstanding APRA leader, Alan Garcia, elected to the presidency for the second time in 2006.

CEPLAES – Centro de Planificación y Estudios Sociales (Center for Planning and Social Research). Ecuadorian NGO that carries out social scientific research. A study they carried out on indigenous voting patterns in the 1996 elections in Ecuador is referenced in Chapter 7.

CFP - Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (Concentration of Popular Forces). Ecuadorian political party. Jaime Roldós ran and won the presidency on this ticket; after his death a schism led to the formation of the populist PRE or Roldocista Party.

CMS - Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (Social Movement Coordinator). Ecuadorian umbrella organization for many of the country's non-indigenous social movements. Together with CONAIE it helped found Pachakutik.

COB - Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers' Central). Historically largest and most important labor union in Bolivia.

CODENPE – Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos de Ecuador (Development Council of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador). Ecuadorian government agency charged with coordinating development projects targeted at indigenous and minority populations in Ecuador. The work of the agency is in theory directed by and overseen by a council representing leadership from each of the country's ethnic groups. CODENPE also has some responsibility with regards to PRODEPINE.

COINCE – Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Costa Ecuatoriana (Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Ecuadorian Coast). CONAIE regional affiliate federation for the Coast.

CONAIE – Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador). Largest and most politically

powerful indigenous organization in Ecuador. Key organizational founder of Pachakutik.

CONFENIAE – Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon). CONAIE regional affiliate federation for the Amazon.

COPEI – Social Christian Party of Venezuela. One of the two parties that alternated power in Venezuela between 1958 and 1998.

CORACA – Corporación Agropecuaria Campesina (Peasant Agricultural Corporation). Bolivian government program initiated by the UDP administration aimed at supporting the peasantry through provision of equipment, credit and training.

CSUTCB – Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unified Peasant Workers' Confederation of Bolivia). Most important peasant organization in Bolivia; national in scope.

DINEIB – Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural y Bilingüe (National Directorate of Intercultural and Bilingual Education). Ecuadorian government agency that oversees the country's bilingual education programs in which indigenous children are taught in their native languages as well as in Spanish. It is part of the Ministry of Education, but indigenous organizations have direct and control and input within this particular agency.

DP - Democracia Popular (Popular Democracy). Center-right Ecuadorian political party. Osvaldo Hurtado and Jamil Mahuad both won the presidency on the DP ticket. Based largely in the Highlands.

ECUARUNARI – Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (Quichua phrase meaning, “Ecuadorian Indians Awaken”). This is the acronym for the, Confederación de los Pueblos de Nacionalidad Kichua del Ecuador (Confederation of the Peoples of Quichua Nationality of Ecuador). CONAIE Highland regional affiliate federation.

FADI – Frente Amplio de Izquierda (Broad Leftist Front). In Ecuador, coalition of leftist parties that formed at the time of the transition back to democracy and presented in elections during the 1980s. By the 1990s it had largely faded from view.

FECAB-BRUNARI – Federación de Organizaciones Campesinas de Bolívar (Federation of Peasant Organizations of Bolívar). CONAIE provincial affiliate representing indigenous organizations in the Highland province of Bolívar. Alternate spellings of the acronym include: FECAB, FECABRUNARI or FECAB-RUNARI.

FECOCI – Federación de Comunidades Campesinas e Indígenas (Federation of Campesino and Indigenous Communities). Local OSG located in the canton of Echeandia in the province of Bolivar. Members are primarily *mestizo*, but it is affiliated with FECAB-BRUNARI and thus also part of CONAIE. First organized by Milton Barragán in 1999 before his successful 2000 run for mayor of the canton of Echeandia on the Pachakutik ticket.

FEI – Federación Indígena del Ecuador (Indigenous Federation of Ecuador). Founded in 1944 by members of the Communist Party, FEI was one of first indigenous organizations in Ecuador.<sup>1</sup>

FEINE – Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos (Ecuadorian Federation of Evangelical Indians). National federation representing evangelical sectors within the Ecuadorian indigenous population. Historically it was far more conservative than the CONAIE and tended to compete with that organization for membership and political power. During the late 1990s and into the new millennium, however, there were periods of rapprochement and cooperation between the two organizations.

FENOC – Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (National Federation of Peasant Organizations). Along with FEI, an early peasant organization. FENOC was originally more class-based in its ideology.

FENOCIN – Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas, y Negras (National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organizations). National peasant and indigenous federation in Ecuador. Somewhat more class-based and less focused on ethnicity and cultural issues than CONAIE. It is the current incarnation of FENOC. It is smaller and less powerful than CONAIE and to some degree competes with CONAIE in terms of membership and mission, but has also collaborated and coordinated with CONAIE.

FEPP – Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio. Development NGO and foundation sponsored by the Ecuadorian Bishops Conference of the Roman Catholic Church. Funds projects in poor communities throughout Ecuador aimed at sustainable development and community empowerment.

FICI - Federación Indígena y Campesina de Imbabura (Indigenous and Peasant Federation of Imbabura). Provincial affiliate federation of CONAIE.

FUT - Frente Unitario de Trabajadores (Unitary Workers Front). Ecuadorian national labor union.

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<sup>1</sup> See Selverston-Scher 2001: 35.

ID – Izquierda Democrática (Democratic Left). Major Ecuadorian political party of the center-left, traditionally drawing the majority of its support from the Highlands.

ISI – Import Substitution Industrialization.

MACA – Ministry of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs. Bolivian government ministry. CSUTCB controlled this ministry under the UDP administration (1982-1985).

MAS - Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism). Bolivian social-movement political party led by Evo Morales, who won the presidency in 2006.

MICC - Movimiento Indígena y Campesino de Cotopaxi (Indigenous and Peasant Movement of Cotopaxi). Provincial affiliate federation of CONAIE representing indigenous organizations in the Highland province of Cotopaxi.

MIP – Movimiento Indio Pachakutik (Pachakutik Indian Movement). Bolivian indigenous political party founded in 2000 and led by Aymara activist and peasant leader, Felipe Quispe. It draws most support from the rural Aymara communities of the *altiplano*.

MITKA – Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari (Tupaj Katari Indian Movement). One of the first indigenous political parties founded in Bolivia along with the MRTK. MITKA was organized in the 1970s by a faction that was more staunchly indigenist in orientation and ideology than MRTK.

MNR – Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement). Bolivian political party that led the national popular revolution of 1952. After the return to democracy in the 1980s it reemerged and remains one of Bolivia's largest and most important parties.

MPD - Movimiento Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Movement). Small, leftist political party in Ecuador, closely tied to the national teacher's union.

MRTK - Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari (Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement). Bolivian political party founded in 1978. Represented the moderate wing of the indigenist movement that emerged in Bolivia during the late 1970s, known generically as Katarista. During the 1980s the MRTK splintered into several small and insignificant parties.

MRTKL - Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación (Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement). Bolivian political party active in the 1980s; off-shoot of MRTK.

MST – Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Workers Movement). Brazilian social movement that struggles for access to land and agrarian reform.

MUPP – Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional - Pachakutik (Movement of Plurinational Unity – Pachakutik). Ecuadorian social movement political party with important base in the indigenous movement. It is a central subject of this dissertation. In the text of this dissertation and in the Ecuadorian media it is often referred to simply as, “Pachakutik”.

NGO – Non-governmental organization.

NP – Nuevo País (New Country). Ecuadorian independent political organization founded in 1996 by Fredy Elhers. Initially it formed a single political movement with MUPP, but the MUPP-NP alliance disintegrated after the elections were over due to differences between Elhers and the Pachakutik Congressional bloc.

OPIP - Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza (Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza). Amazonian provincial affiliate of CONAIE.

OSG - organización de segundo grado (second tier organization). Generic term referring to local or provincial community and/or indigenous organizations, as opposed to regional or national ones.

PRD – Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution). Left-wing Mexican political party that has sought to build a base of support in part by developing close ties with social movements.

PRE – Partido Roldocista Ecuatoriano (Ecuadorian Roldocista Party). One of Ecuador’s four largest parties; it is characterized as populist and is dominated by Abdalá Bucaram, who won the presidency in 1996, but was forced out of office in response to massive popular protests after serving less than a year of his four-year term. Bastion of support for the party is in the coastal provinces.

PRI – Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party). Mexican political party that consolidated power in the wake of the Mexican Revolution and wielded hegemonic power for more than 70 years till Vicente Fox’s election in 2000.

PRODEPINE – Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Afroecuatorianas (Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project). Development project financed by the World Bank and administered in coordination and consultation with Ecuadorian indigenous organizations, including CONAIE.

PSC – Partido Social Cristiano (Social Christian Party). Major Ecuadorian political party, on the right of the political spectrum. Its bastion of support is in Guayaquil and throughout the coastal provinces.

PSE – Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano (Ecuadorian Socialist Party). Small left-wing party. One of the oldest in Ecuador having been founded in 1926.

PSP – Partido Sociedad Patriótica (Patriotic Society Party). Ecuadorian party founded by Lucio Gutiérrez in order to run for president in the 2002. Gutiérrez won the presidency, but was forced out of office in 2005.

PT - Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party). Brazilian political party that emerged out of the labor movement in the late 1970s. It's candidate, Inacio Lula da Silva won the presidency in 2002.

PUR – Partido de Unidad Republicana (Party of Republican Unity). Ecuadorian party founded in 1991 by Sixto Durán Ballén as a vehicle for his presidential candidacy. Durán Ballén won the 1992 election, but after his four-year term was over the PUR faded from view.

SIISE – Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador (Integrated System of Social Statistics on Ecuador). Ecuadorian government agency that collects data and statistics on socio-economic conditions in Ecuador. This data is made available to the public. SIISE was the source for some data referred to in this dissertation.

SINAMOS – Literally means “without masters.” Corporatist program of the Velasco Alvarado military regime in Peru (1968-1975) that sought to organize urban and rural masses along trade union lines.

TSE - Tribunal Supremo Electoral (Supreme Electoral Tribunal). Ecuadorian body that oversees and organizes elections.

UCR – Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union). The UCR together with the Peronist Party are the two dominant parties in Argentina's party system. The UCR is also one of the oldest political parties in that country.

UDP – Unión Democrática Popular (Popular Democratic Union). Coalition of left to center-left parties in Bolivia that won the elections that marked the transition back to democracy. Hernán Siles Zuazo, the UDP candidate, assumed the presidency in 1982 and formed a governing coalition with the CSUTCB and the COB, which eventually broke apart.

UNE - Unión Nacional de Educadores (National Educators Union). Ecuadorian union representing public school teachers.

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“Una transición desde las élites hacia una democracia participativa: apuntes sobre el papel emergente de los movimientos sociales en el Ecuador.” In Julie Massal and Marcelo Bonilla (eds.), *Los Movimientos Sociales en las Democracias Andinas*. Quito: FLACSO, Ecuador – IFEA (2000), pp. 55-71.

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## **ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION**

Democratizing Formal Politics: Indigenous and Social Movement Political Parties in  
Ecuador and Bolivia: 1978-2000

by

Jennifer Noelle Collins

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2006

Professor Paul Drake, Chair

During the 1980s and 1990s public faith in democratic governance was undermined throughout the Andes by a number of factors, including the persistence of elite brokering and weak, unaccountable political parties. The entrance of social movements into the electoral process presented itself as an antidote to this problem. A comparative study of the relatively successful experience of Ecuador's Pachakutik movement and that of Bolivia in the 1980s, when members of the Katarista indigenous movement ultimately failed in their attempts to launch political parties, seeks to identify

the factors that contribute to the success or failure of social-movement parties and to test the idea that such parties can transform political institutions and practices in fledgling democracies. Theoretically the dissertation draws on and makes links between the social movements and political parties literatures. Data gathering involved primarily qualitative methods, including interviews, participant observation, and archival research.

I argue that the contrasting outcomes between Ecuador and Bolivia can be traced to crucial differences in the historical evolution of each country's indigenous movements, and in particular, to the role the state played in fostering peasant organization. In so doing, I build on Douglass North's concept of path dependency and apply it to social movement organizational development. Somewhat surprisingly, I find that longer and more intensive state tutelage in Bolivia was associated later on with greater difficulty in developing viable social movement parties. In contrast, the more autonomous development of peasant and indigenous organizations in Ecuador, characterized by a historically more adversarial relationship with the state, resulted in stronger organizational structures, the growth of a pan-indigenous identity, and earlier success for a movement-based party, despite the smaller relative size of the indigenous population.

In terms of social-movement parties' potential to contribute to democratic consolidation, a close analysis of Pachakutik's performance and organization demonstrates that these parties often do develop qualitatively new models that can challenge clientelistic practices at the local level, but only once they have developed certain key internal resources: a unifying identity, an autonomous democratic organizational structure, and a track-record of addressing local needs.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

In both Ecuador and Bolivia the elections that marked the end of military rule and the return to civilian governance – 1979 for Ecuador and 1982 for Bolivia – brought about the ascension of political leaders and administrations that made genuine efforts to represent and respond to broad popular demands. The Roldós administration in Ecuador and Siles Zuazo and the UDP in Bolivia rhetorically and to a significant degree in practice attempted to respond to popular demands, make connections to and work directly with popular movements and organized sectors of civil society. These governments were by no means radical or revolutionary, but they were also not highly elitist. Nevertheless, international economic pressures and inexperience soon brought about an end to both administrations and concomitantly a marked shift towards greater elitism in formal politics and a deepening divide between political parties and the mass of poor voters.<sup>2</sup> For more than a decade after that, from the early 1980s to the mid to late 1990s economic policy shifted to neoliberalism and formal politics became largely the realm of elite actors. The parties that came to dominate the political scene were for the most part closed organizations that were largely financed by economic elites and run by individuals from the upper classes or in some cases from the professional middle classes. In short, the return to electoral politics did not appear to have produced a system that fostered effective representation of the majority poor and

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<sup>2</sup> In the case of Ecuador the death of Jaime Roldós, under what remain murky circumstances, was also a crucial precipitating factor in the shift away from government responsiveness to popular demands and to the eventual embrace of neoliberalism and a more elitist style of governing. Strong claims have been made that Roldós' death was not accidental, but that he was assassinated because he refused to capitulate to pressures from global financial actors. See Perkins 2004.

working classes, let alone, greater popular participation in politics. This pattern was not unique to Ecuador and Bolivia, but applied to differing degrees to many countries throughout the region.

However, in the latter half of the 1990s in Ecuador, and in the first couple of years of the new millennium in Bolivia, against great odds, a new type of political organization emerged in both countries. For want of a better term I refer to them as “social movement political parties,” even though in some cases, in particular that of Pachakutik in Ecuador, they were not technically registered as political parties, but as independent “political movements”. Regardless of their legal status these “political movements” would classify as parties according to most of the classical definitions within political science, given that they offer a recognizable label to voters (Epstein 1967) and present candidates at elections with the goal of placing them into public office (Sartori 1976). The “social movement” part of the appellation refers to the fact that these parties were founded directly by social movement organizations and that they retained organic ties to these organizations, in some cases with the movement organizations possessing some ability to influence decision-making within the party. The somewhat surprising emergence of these parties and their significance for democratic consolidation is the subject of this dissertation.

When the Pachakutik political movement was organized in 1996 it represented the first time in Ecuador’s history that an organization seeking to run candidates for political office, included in its highest ranks indigenous leaders and representatives from social movements. This new movement had a remarkable political debut that year winning eight congressional seats and securing a second-place finish for its

mestizo presidential candidate, Freddy Ehlers. Just four years later in 2000 Pachakutik won five of the country's twenty-two prefectures and twenty-seven mayoralties. In 2002 Pachakutik's backing and participation in the electoral coalition was credited by many observers with playing a decisive role in Lucio Gutiérrez's surprising win the race for the presidency. After a disastrous presidency and Pachakutik's break with the Gutiérrez government after less than six months in office, the movement-party experienced a decline in prestige and power for several years, although they continued to place their candidates in elected office and remained an important party in congress. So while Pachakutik's growth and trajectory has not been free from dips and setbacks, nevertheless the rapid rise of the party was remarkable and it appears to have established itself as a significant player on the Ecuadorian political scene.

In Bolivia, the ascent of the Movement Towards Socialism party (MAS) led by Evo Morales and with strong ties to peasant and indigenous movements was even more meteoric than Pachakutik's. After making dramatic gains in Bolivia's 2002 national elections,<sup>3</sup> Morales and his party continued to gain in influence and political power, culminating in Morales' astonishing and unexpected election to the presidency with more than 53 percent of the vote, a percentage unheard of in Bolivian elections. He was not only the first indigenous president of Bolivia (a majority indigenous country), but also the first social movement leader to head that country.

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<sup>3</sup> MAS and MIP, another new indigenous-movement party, won a combined 27 percent of the vote in the congressional elections and MAS candidate, Evo Morales, finished second among a field of 11 candidates for president. As a result of these elections, one third of the seats in the Bolivian bicameral congress were held "by indigenous representatives with strong links to indigenous and peasant organizations" (Van Cott 2003b: 751). An unprecedented development for this majority Indian nation.

While it is still too early to know what the future will hold for these social-movement parties, their dramatic and unexpected emergence, as well as, the fact that they have surged to the highest levels of power in the face of so many odds calls out for examination and explanation. This dissertation is concerned with the extent to which social movement involvement in electoral politics has the potential to transform political institutions and practices, offering new more participatory models of party organization and more accountable government in countries where democratic institutions have traditionally been weak and dominated by elite groups. The degree to which this potential exists has important implications for the prospects for democratic consolidation in the region and in developing countries generally. The return to democracy in the Andes has rightly been hailed as a positive development in a region long troubled by military intervention, weak political parties, and deep socio-economic inequalities. However, public faith in democratic governance has been undermined by a number of factors, including the persistence of elite brokering, weak unaccountable political parties, and corruption. Institutional weakness was apparent not only in Ecuador but throughout the Andean region during the 1990s and continued into the new millennium. In Ecuador alone, within less than a decade three presidents were forced out of office in the wake of massive popular protests calling for their removal.<sup>4</sup> The pattern was repeated in Bolivia in 2003 when massive popular protests eventually forced Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign from office and flee the

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<sup>4</sup> Abdalá Bucaram was forced out of office in February 1997, Jamil Mahuad in January 2000, and Lucio Gutiérrez, one of the leaders of the actions against Mahuad, himself was ousted in 2005. For an analysis of Mahuad's ouster and especially the role played by the indigenous movement, see Collins 2000b. For analysis and testimonials by protagonists of the actions taken against the Mahuad government that led to his ouster, see Saltos Galarza 2000.



country leaving Vice President, Carlos Mesa to assume the presidency. Just two years later in 2005 Mesa also resigned in response to unrelenting popular protests.

Throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium public opinion polls in Ecuador and Bolivia and, for that matter, throughout the Andes revealed dismally low public support for political actors, with political parties and congress generally receiving some of the lowest ratings.

Concomitantly with the erosion of public support for and trust in the major institutions of political democracy, social movements in both countries grew exponentially in strength and in their ability to mobilize large numbers of people around issues of national importance during the new democratic period. In other words, after the return to democracy in Ecuador (1979) and Bolivia (1982) social movements began asserting themselves on the national political stage, taking positions and making demands not just on issues of concern to narrow constituencies but also on broad national debates. For example, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement led massive protests against economic austerity measures in 1999 and then served as the principal interlocutor with the government in negotiations that resulted in the government freezing the price of gasoline and cooking gas for a year. Likewise, social movements in Bolivia were at the forefront of protests in 2003 against the administration's plan to privatize and export natural gas. It was this strident opposition to the government's plans and the paralyzing protests engaged in by a wide range of citizen groups and social movements that eventually forced Sánchez de Lozada to resign. In this sense, social movements in both countries emerged as some of the most important political actors on the national stage, overshadowing in some

ways the roles played by traditional political parties. Equally significant, social movements in both countries did not limit their actions to traditional social movement activities, but instead sought to harness their power in the electoral arena as well.

With traditional parties and major political institutions so disparaged in the public eye, efforts by social movements to form new types of the political parties presented a means for involving new actors in the formal political process, and appeared to offer the potential to introduce new ideas and practices into political systems that have become tainted as corrupt, elitist and ineffective.

### **Key Questions**

At the heart of this dissertation are two core questions with regard to social movement involvement in electoral politics: first of all, what helps and what hinders this involvement? Secondly, what impact do social movement parties have on the consolidation of democracy? We will elaborate on these in turn.

What helps and what hinders social movement attempts to participate in electoral politics? When are social movement-related parties successful, and why?

Social movements in general, but indigenous and peasant movements in particular, often face huge structural and organizational hurdles in seeking to form successful political parties. Scholars of social movements have tended to be pessimistic about the ability of these movements to impact, let alone transform formal politics: first, because their organizational logics tend to be different than those of political parties, and secondly because of competition among them (Doimo 1995; Mainwaring 1987). While there have been times when political parties have

succeeded in tapping into social movements' ability to mobilize, these movements often not appear to offer an entirely reliable base of support, especially for parties seeking to advance a programmatic platform at the national level (Bruhn 1997a; Bruhn 1997b).

In addition, there are institutional obstacles as almost every political system contains impediments to curb new party formation. Adding another layer of difficulty, social movements representing very poor sectors of the population face major financial limitations, which makes engaging in costly electoral campaigns difficult, if not impossible. This is clearly the case for indigenous and peasant movements which represent one of the poorest and most marginalized groups in developing countries. By the same token, poverty makes these constituencies highly vulnerable to clientelistic appeals and tactics, thus amplifying the negative impact of social movement parties' financial disadvantage.

One of the main puzzles this dissertation addresses is how Pachakutik overcame these hurdles, in particular the financial disadvantage, and succeeded in winning a significant share of votes among the rural poor in certain areas of the country. My research identified three key resources that the indigenous movement developed over the years which helped them to accomplish this: a positive indigenous identity, a strong and fundamentally democratic organizational structure with a broad leadership base, and a track record of delivering concrete material resources and programs to the grassroots.

In addition to these factors internal to the indigenous and social movements themselves, I also take into account factors and conditions in the broader political and institutional context that presented either openings or obstacles for new parties.

What is the impact of social movement-sponsored parties on democratic institutions and practices? What does this involvement portend for democratic consolidation?

This set of questions is concerned fundamentally with movement-sponsored parties' ability to generate viable alternative political models and practices as opposed to simply mirroring the practices of dominant political parties. Political parties and politicians in Ecuador and Bolivia, as in many developing countries, often resort to clientelistic tactics to win elections and retain political support. Political parties in these two countries tend to be hierarchically run and dominated by a single leader or a small cohort of leaders at the national level. Governing at both the local and national levels tends to be an exercise carried out by elites with little room for participation or input from grassroots constituents.

Social movement-based parties like Pachakutik tend to be strident in their criticism of the dominant political culture and contend that their party organizations and elected officials represent a positive alternative, one that values internal democracy within parties, citizen participation in governing, and accountability and transparency on the part of politicians. This dissertation critically assesses the degree to which the Pachakutik movement met these goals, and explains why in some instances they fell short.

## Methodology

Comparative analysis is the central approach employed in this investigation, and several levels of comparison are contained within it. Anchoring the research is an in-depth case study of Pachakutik, undoubtedly one of the most successful examples of social movement involvement in electoral politics in the region. While the majority of the dissertation focuses on this Ecuadorian movement-party the last chapter takes the findings from this central case and assesses the degree to which they help explain the more checkered trajectory of indigenous and peasant movement parties in Bolivia.

For both theoretical and practical reasons Pachakutik was an obvious choice for exploring the questions laid out above. During the 1990s and the first few years of the new millennium Pachakutik represented one of the most important social movement-sponsored political vehicles in Latin America after the Brazilian Worker's Party (PT),<sup>5</sup> both in terms of the level of voter response that it elicited and its impact at the local and national levels. With Evo Morales's dramatic presidential victory in Bolivia in 2006, the MAS party emerged as another social movement-based party in the region with tremendous electoral strength.<sup>6</sup>

According to the logic of comparative analysis (Lijphart 1971), Pachakutik can be viewed as a deviant case. First of all, as mentioned above, scholarly work on Latin American social movements has tended to be pessimistic about their ability to make the transition into formal party politics and yet clearly the Brazilian Worker's Party, Pachakutik, as well as the MAS party in Bolivia prove that this does not always hold.

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<sup>5</sup> For an early history of the PT, see Keck 1992.

<sup>6</sup> Previous to Morales' election in 2006, Pachakutik was arguably the strongest social movement party in the Andes.

But the question remains: what was it about these social movements that facilitated their success in the political arena? A study of Pachakutik can offer some answers to this question.

Pachakutik represents a deviant case in yet another way: it was a resource-poor party that competed with notable success for rural votes. Its appeal to rural voters was not uniform across the country, but instead was geographically restricted to the Highland and Amazonian regions. At least until the time of this writing, the movement did not demonstrate much ability to attract either rural or urban votes in Ecuador's populous coastal region, despite efforts to do so. Nevertheless, its appeal in rural areas with sizeable indigenous populations was significant and bears explaining in light of social scientific theory, which has traditionally discounted any role for peasants in processes of democratization. Pachakutik's ability to garner votes among poor peasants also stands in contrast to historical empirical patterns in the region, where peasant populations tended to be more easily controlled and manipulated politically than was the case with urban workers.<sup>7</sup> Thus Pachakutik's success in attracting rural votes, even if it was not monolithic, represents an interesting empirical puzzle with implications for theories of democratization, social movements and political parties. The selection of Pachakutik as the primary case for this dissertation was also facilitated by my personal familiarity with Ecuador, its history and politics, and the personal and professional contacts that resulted from four years spent living and working there before initiating graduate studies.

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<sup>7</sup> See Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion of this issue.

The methodological tools I used to study this deviant case and then to compare it to the Bolivian case were primarily qualitative, although I did some limited quantitative analysis of electoral data as well. One of my first tasks was to set a benchmark for evaluating Pachakutik's performance over the years. The aim was to assess the degree to which Pachakutik represented a qualitative departure from traditional political practices in Ecuador. Towards this end I began my research by studying Ecuador's dominant political parties so as to be able to compare and contrast them with Pachakutik's. Between December 1999 and March 2000 I conducted interviews with 23 then serving congressional deputies from five political parties: PRE, PSC, ID, DP<sup>8</sup> and Pachakutik. This set of interviews was conducted using a common set of questions so that the responses could be compared both across and within parties. While structured, the interviews were also open-ended, thus allowing the legislators latitude to talk in more depth about specific issues or to add things not contemplated in the questionnaire. The questions focused on internal party organization, structure and decision-making patterns; recruitment, candidate selection and membership; campaign strategies; the relationship between elected officials and their constituents; and the focus of their work in the legislature. The criteria used in selecting the sub-set of deputies to be interviewed and the conclusions drawn from these interviews are presented in Chapter 3.

In addition to the interviews, my analysis of Ecuador's party and party system was enriched through extensive consultation of secondary sources and archival

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<sup>8</sup> Partido Roldocista Ecuatoriano (PRE); Partido Social Cristiano (PSC); Izquierda Democrática (ID); Democracia Popular (DP).

research in the online database, Servidatos, which houses articles from Ecuador's leading newspapers and magazines. The two newspapers that I consulted and cite most frequently are: *El Comercio* and *El Diario Hoy*. Both the secondary sources as well as the press reports served to corroborate or discount findings that emerged from the interview data. I also examined each of the parties' platforms, by-laws and statutes. Finally, I had the opportunity to spend a few days in March 2000 observing campaigning by the PRE candidate for mayor of the town of Chone in the coastal province of Manabí.

Subsequent to the series of interviews with legislators, most of the rest of my field research in Ecuador focused on Pachakutik. The movement's origins and by extension the history of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement were reconstructed based on secondary sources, open-ended interviews with indigenous and social movement leaders, and newspaper accounts. Secondary sources included scholarly works as well as analyses and accounts written by movement leaders and activists themselves. I also used Servidatos to carry out extensive archival research of press coverage of the party.

Between 1999 and 2001 I interviewed thirty-three members of this political movement, including national leaders and office holders, as well as local-level activists, candidates and elected officials. In addition I conducted interviews with the President of the national indigenous confederation, CONAIE, and with two staff people from the national indigenous development organization, PRODEPINE. All of these interviews were open-ended and unstructured.



Many of the interviews with local level Pachakutik members were conducted during April and May of 2000 in the Highland Province of Bolivar during the campaign leading up to the May 2000 local elections. I spent the month leading up to the elections in Bolivar Province following the Pachakutik campaign on the ground, interviewing candidates and campaign workers, accompanying candidates on visits to local communities and small towns, attending meetings, rallies and marches, and documenting the campaign in photographs. I also interviewed the incumbent mayor of the provincial capital, who had been elected on the Pachakutik ticket but since left the party. The data I collected and the observations I made as part of this local-level case study provided far greater insight into party practices and organization than would have been possible to glean solely from interviews and press reports.

In addition to qualitative data gathering, I used socio-economic data to analyze and compare the socio-demographic characteristics of cantons where Pachakutik candidates won political office with overall regional and national averages. The results of this quantitative analysis are presented in Chapter 7, which examines the party at the local level.

My analysis of Bolivian peasant and indigenous parties was based largely on secondary sources, the majority of them by Bolivian scholars, as well as interviews and observations made during a four-month field research stint in and around La Paz, from September 2000 through January 2001. My arrival in La Paz coincided with a month-long uprising led by the country's two most important indigenous-peasant movements: the coca growers association and indigenous peasants from the *altiplano*

region around La Paz.<sup>9</sup> Living in La Paz during this period of intense social protest afforded me an opportunity to observe and gain insights into Bolivia's indigenous-peasant movements by following the extensive press coverage of the protests and the government's response to them, and later in interviews with movement activists and leaders.

### **Organization of the Dissertation**

Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework and summarizes the major hypotheses I worked from, and the findings I arrived at in the course of my research. The empirical phenomena I explore in this dissertation raise questions that are relevant to three different theoretical literatures: social movement theory, political parties and democratization. Thus, in this chapter I specify the ways in which this topic links these literatures and the specific areas of each that are relevant to this study.

Chapter 3 provides a historical review of Ecuadorian party system development and an analysis of the country's party system and the major parties that have made it up since the return to democracy in 1979. The chapter attempts to identify common political practices and norms among parties without losing sight of important differences between them. I discuss the interaction between institutional rules and voter expectations, and how these have structured political party behavior in Ecuador. One of the main things I attempt to determine is the extent to which politicians from different parties and regions relied on clientelistic-type relationships with voters to survive politically. Documenting these types of relationships is

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<sup>9</sup> Collins 2000a.

notoriously difficult, but the interviews I conducted with legislators provided some information and insights, and this was complemented by analyses and reports from Ecuadorian scholars of political parties and journalists.

The analysis of the Pachakutik movement begins in Chapter 4, with an analysis of the movement's origins and birth in 1996. I divide variables that led to the emergence of this social movement party into "permissive" and "instigating" factors, with the former being those factors comprising the "political opportunity structure," and the latter referring to the characteristics and resources internal to the social movements themselves. My analysis builds on the existing literature on party formation and argues that while similar "permissive" factors in the 1990s – high levels of political and economic crisis—led almost everywhere to direct challenges to traditional parties, whether or not these challenges came from social movements or from powerful individuals – new self-made caudillos – depended on the degree and nature of organization within civil society.

Chapter 5 analyzes the political movement's organizational structure and its internal political culture, norms and practices. I describe its organizational evolution from a loose coalition with little central structure to a somewhat more institutionalized party-like organization. The central goal of the chapter is to evaluate the extent to which Pachakutik was successful at forging a new party model. Employing the same framework used in Chapter 3, I analyze the party in terms of its leadership models, internal democracy, how political campaigns were organized and run, party financing, and the extent to which elected officials resorted to particularism and clientelism.

Chapter 6 examines the behavior and performance of Pachakutik legislators in congress from 1996 to 2002. I present a close examination of the type of legislation generated by the party, rates of defection or expulsion from the party and the nature of alliances with other parties. Pachakutik's record is compared with that of other Ecuadorian parties. In this chapter I also consider the advantages afforded, as well as, some of the problems generated for the indigenous movement by Pachakutik's presence in congress. For example, at times the goals, interests and strategies of the social movement and the political party reinforced and supported one another, but there were also moments when social movement demands and strategies threatened to undermine the political standing and maneuverability of Pachakutik elected officials, in particular members of congress.

Chapter 7 shifts the focus to the local level. Based on my fieldwork in the rural Highland province of Bolivar during the 2000 local elections, this chapter offers an explanation for how Pachakutik succeeded in winning a significant segment of the rural vote. As a crucial antecedent to Pachakutik's ability to gain the support of many poor rural voters I describe how important long-term structural changes, beginning with agrarian reform in the 1960s and 1970s, served to undermine traditional power structures in the rural areas and how the indigenous movement emerged within this context to become a powerful and concrete force at the local level. I argue that three resources developed by the indigenous movement over time were critical to Pachakutik's subsequent success in attracting rural votes: a positive indigenous identity, strong leadership and local organization, and a track record as a provider of concrete material resources and programs at the local level.

In Chapter 8 I compare the trajectory of the Pachakutik movement with the more checkered history of Bolivian indigenous-peasant-movement involvement in electoral politics. In Bolivia success for social movement-related parties came later than it did in Ecuador, and electoral efforts by Bolivian indigenous and peasant movements were more fragmented than were efforts by the Ecuadorian movements. The main empirical puzzle this chapter addresses is why the indigenous Katarista parties failed to make headway within the Bolivian electorate during the 1980s. I also offer some tentative hypotheses about what had changed by the beginning of the new millennium, which resulted in the successful incursion of two new indigenous-peasant parties – MAS and MIP – and ultimately in Evo Morales’s dramatic 2006 victory on the MAS ticket. In comparing the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases I focus on how historical differences between the two countries affected the development of indigenous-peasant movements and impacted their ability to develop the key resources necessary to make the transition into electoral politics. In addition to this focus on variables internal to the movements themselves, I also take into account the impact of differences in each of the countries’ institutional designs.

In the concluding chapter, Chapter 9, I discuss the significance of this study in light of the broader debates on democracy and democratization in the Third World. I argue that while the formal trappings of democracy, including free and fair elections, political party competition and robust institutions are critically important, they must be undergirded by social structures that make possible effective citizen participation in politics. I contend that much of the reason for the poor performance of parties and democratic institutions in the Andes and in many parts of Latin America is due in

large part to the high levels of poverty and inequitable distributions of income that tend to distort and pervert the democratic process. While by no means definitive, I suggest that social movement parties, like Pachakutik and MAS, offer some hope for correcting some of these failings, in that they are parties that come out of and retain direct ties with organized sectors of the popular classes, those who have traditionally been excluded from the realms of political and economic power in their own countries.

## Chapter 2

### Theorizing Social Movement Parties

Pachakutik-Nuevo País would like to salute, congratulate, and thank the citizens of Ecuador for making possible our positive electoral showing. This [outcome] indicates that the proposals, positions, and alternatives that our movement presented across the country have been assimilated and heard. If not for the commitment and dedicated participation [of citizens] we would have been unable to overcome a series of limitations, including a lack of financial resources, the dirty campaigns of political adversaries, and resources invested by public institutions to try and block out and denigrate our message and proposals. The electorate's presence and trust resulted in [our party] winning five prefectures, twenty-five mayoralties, as well as numerous provincial, city, and village council seats. This is a sign that this young movement is becoming a presence at the national level, and this presence means that we will definitely find a way out of this crisis.

We reaffirm our commitment to carrying out the offers we made to the electorate: to submit to social control and accountability. We believe that in doing so, our practice will serve as an example of the types of changes that are needed in political action and governance [in this country]. At the local level we have emphasized alternative development models... We also reaffirm our steadfast commitment to accompany and lead the [protest] actions and mobilizations that the people undertake in response to possible economic measures by the government.

- Miguel Lluco, National Coordinator of Pachakutik - Nuevo País, addressing reporters at a press conference immediately following the May 21, 2000 local elections<sup>10</sup>

The simultaneous declarations that, one, Pachakutik had arrived as a significant national political party; that, two, it was committed to a new type of political practice; and, finally, that it affirmed its continuing commitment to support

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<sup>10</sup> Author's tape recording of Pachakutik press conference, May 24, 2000, Quito. Translation by the author.

popular mobilizations against the government, illustrate the unique strategies, goals, and ambitions of a crop of new parties in Latin America that have either been directly sponsored by or closely associated with powerful social movement organizations. The emergence of social movement-related political parties is a phenomenon that is unique to the “third wave of democratization”.<sup>11</sup> Examples of successful social movement-based parties include the Brazilian Worker’s Party (PT), the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, and Pachakutik in Ecuador.<sup>12</sup> The Brazilian PT was founded by labor unions; the Bolivian MAS party grew out of and retains close ties to the coca growers’ federation; and Pachakutik was founded by and is closely associated with the national indigenous confederation, CONAIE, as well as other social movements. By social movement parties, I mean parties founded by and retaining organic ties to established movement organizations. This dissertation examines four related questions with regard to these parties:

This chapter will describe the theoretical approach taken in this dissertation and lay out the major theoretical arguments made in response to the above questions. The theoretical arguments made in this chapter will be further fleshed out and

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<sup>11</sup> For Huntington’s definition of the three historical “waves” of democratization, see Huntington 1991a; Huntington 1991b. The “third wave” refers to the most recent period of the spread of democracy.

Huntington identifies the start of this wave with the transitions that took place in Portugal and Spain in the mid-1970s. The “third wave” began its sweep of Latin America with Ecuador’s transition in 1979.

<sup>12</sup> Among social movement-related parties in Latin America the Brazilian Worker’s Party has received the most attention by social scientists. The first and most comprehensive book on the origins and early years of this party is Keck 1992. Since then, and in particular since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the presidency in 2002, numerous other studies have been done on different aspects of the party. See for example Abers 1998; Abers 2001; Baiocchi 2003; Doimo 1995; Nylén 2000; Samuels 2004. Other movement parties, including those in Bolivia and Ecuador, have also been the focus of recent academic interest and work. See Beck and Mijeski 2001a; Beck and Mijeski 2001b; Collins 2000b; Collins 2004; Sánchez López and Freidenberg 1998; Torres D. 1999; Van Cott 2003b; Van Cott 2003c; Van Cott 2005.



substantiated in the empirical chapters that follow. We will begin by addressing the first question on the origins of social movement parties.

### **The Unexpected Emergence of Social Movement-Based Parties**

The emergence of social movement-based parties challenges some of the widely held assumptions and conclusions in both the social movements and political parties literatures. As democratic space opened up in the region during the 1980s and 1990s social movements blossomed. They challenged elected governments, responded to social needs, worked to defend human rights, organized people at the grassroots to meet local needs, and constructed new cultural identities. Scholars writing about these burgeoning movements were optimistic about their potential to deepen civil society and perhaps even to transform the region's political culture into one that was more democratic and participatory.<sup>13</sup> However, for a variety of reasons, most scholars were pessimistic about social movements' desire, as well as their ability to play an active role in electoral politics. The social movements' emphasis on autonomy and, in many cases, their outright distrust politicians and government made the likelihood of direct movement involvement in formal politics appear remote. The premium placed on autonomy was a direct reaction to Latin America's long history of corporatism and attempts by the state to co-opt organized sectors of civil society. While many social movements rejected these old patterns, co-optation remained a

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<sup>13</sup> The literature that deals with social movements in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s is vast and rich; the following are a few of the major edited volumes that have been published on this subject: Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Eckstein 2001; Foweraker and Craig 1990; Langer and Munoz 2003.

strategy that state leaders used when they could to try divide and conquer social movements (Hellman 1994).

In some cases social movements seemed unable to transition successfully from confrontational tactics, used to press for democracy during the transition period, to strategies of negotiation and compromise, which are such a crucial part of democratic politics (Alvarez and Escobar 1992). Organizationally there appeared to be other barriers as well. Social movements are by definition loosely organized and tend to avoid hierarchical forms of organization. It was thought that this preference for looser organizational forms would handicap movements that attempted to compete in the electoral arena (Mainwaring 1987). Others were skeptical about the likelihood of social movements being able to scale up to the national level, let alone form political parties, given their distrust of large organizations (Lehmann 1990). At an even deeper level, Oxhorn (1995) suggested there was an inherent tension and contradiction between democratic civil society, with its emphasis on participation, equality, and consensus building; and political democracy, in which parties compete for power. In his study of Chile's democratic process, he found that, even though popular organizations held generally positive views of political parties, the relationship that developed between the two was competitive; political parties tended to overshadow and snuff out the potential of popular organizations. He argued that the problem did not have to do solely with infringements on popular organizations' autonomy, but instead that political parties often represented a competing source of identity capable of undercutting community identity, which was a crucial ingredient in holding popular organizations together.

Writing about the relationship between Mexico's leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and social movements, Bruhn (1997a) contended that social movements did not represent a consistently reliable base of support for the party because they were vulnerable to co-optation by the state through economic programs or handouts. Similarly with regard to the Worker's Party, Doimo (1995) observed that efforts by PT mayors to implement participatory models for city planning got bogged down in conflict between local movement organizations competing with each other over how to distribute resources. Thus, several characteristics of Latin American social movements as they developed in the 1980s and 1990s appeared to bode negatively for the ability to harness their organizational power for electoral competition and participation in formal politics.

### **Political Parties Literature**

Similarly, theoretical work on political parties and party systems offered little reason to think that social movements might spawn successful political parties. Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) observation that party systems tended to freeze after the achievement of universal franchise seemed to imply that in those cases where the franchise had been universal in earlier periods, the space for new party formation would have already been foreclosed; parties founded in those earlier periods would reassert themselves leaving no space for others to form. Lipset and Rokkan's finding about party system freezing has been explained largely by reference to numerous obstacles to entry faced by new political challengers. These barriers include electoral rules and institutions established by existing parties to discourage entry by new

players,<sup>14</sup> the challenge faced by new parties in overcoming voter loyalty to already established parties and winning voter trust, and the fact that state financing invariably goes to those parties that have already participated in elections, as such, it is unavailable to new parties.

In those few countries (Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru) where universal franchise was achieved for the first time at the moment of the transition, Lipset and Rokkan's theory implied relatively greater opportunities for the emergence of new parties. However, in addition to their above-mentioned organizational characteristics, social movements', in most cases, extremely limited access to financial resources made them unlikely political challengers. Nevertheless, despite these obstacles, social movement parties were among a host of new challengers to traditional political parties that emerged in most countries in the region.

The level of political volatility throughout Latin America in the quarter century since the return to democracy has been remarkable, especially in comparison with the stability and continuity of political party activity in industrialized democracies, where new parties and candidates without a strong party behind them are uncommon and rarely win elected office. By political volatility I am referring not only to dramatic changes in vote shares from one established party to another from election to election, but also the rise of new political parties and independent contenders who succeed in mounting powerful challenges to traditionally dominant parties. As of the time of this

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<sup>14</sup> Examples include electoral thresholds and registration requirements.

writing, of the ten major South American countries<sup>15</sup> the only ones where pre-“third wave” parties have not faced significant challenges from newcomers at the national level are Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Paraguay.<sup>16</sup> In the other six countries, pre-third wave parties were either largely displaced by new parties or faced strong competition from newcomers. And in six out of the ten largest South American countries -- Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia -- at some point between the time democracy was reinstated and 2006, an independent candidate or one representing a brand new party attained the presidency.

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<sup>15</sup> I do not include either the Guyanas or Suriname; while physically part of the South American continent, historically, culturally, and linguistically they are more a part of the Caribbean than South America.

<sup>16</sup> Even this statement, however, needs to be qualified because in Argentina the new left party Frepaso made important electoral inroads at the end of the 1990s when it formed an alliance with the long-standing Radical Civic Union (UCR). This alliance resulted in the election of de la Rúa (UCR) to the presidency and Carlos Álvarez of Frepaso as Vice President in 1999. In Colombia the new, leftist Independent Democratic Pole (PDI) surprised pundits and pollsters when its candidate, Carlos Gaviria, overtook Horacio Serpa Uribe, of the traditional Liberal Party, to win second place in the 2006 presidential race. Gaviria garnered 22 percent of the vote.

**Table 1: Change Versus Continuity in South American Parties, 1979- 2006**

<b>Newcomers Mount Successful Challenges</b>	<b>Traditional Parties Retain Political Dominance</b>	<b>Newcomers Mount Challenges Without Attaining Presidency</b>
<b>Peru</b> – Alberto Fujimori – 1990-2000	<b>Argentina</b>	<b>Colombia</b> <sup>17</sup>
<b>Venezuela</b> – Hugo Chávez – 1998-Present	<b>Chile</b>	
<b>Brazil</b> – Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – 2002- Present	<b>Paraguay</b>	
<b>Ecuador</b> – Lucio Gutiérrez – 2002 – 2005		
<b>Uruguay</b> – Tabaré Vázquez – 2004 – Present		
<b>Bolivia</b> – Evo Morales – 2006 – Present		

I argue that the emergence of social movement parties can only be understood within this broader context of extremely high levels of political volatility and flux in the region as a whole. The emergence of social movement parties was an integral part of this general trend, and therefore, in order to understand their emergence one must explain the reasons behind the generalized system volatility. My argument for the emergence of social movement parties is essentially two-fold: the first part draws on the concept of “political opportunity structure” developed in the social movements

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<sup>17</sup> While Colombia’s traditional two-party system, monopolized since independence by the Liberal and Conservative parties, remains intact at the national level up to the time of this writing, it began to unravel at the local level in the 1990s Boudon 2000. Boudon argues that even though the Conservative and Liberal parties were able to retain their control at the national level, Colombia’s party system is nevertheless in a process of “deinstitutionalization”.

literature and argues that a very favorable political opportunity structure existed for political challengers in the region generally. The second part contends that whether or not social movements emerged as one of those challengers depended on how well suited the movement's own internal resources were to the task of electoral competition.<sup>18</sup> We will begin by exploring the sources for such marked political volatility in the region.

### **Political Volatility in Latin America**

The emergence of new political parties has not traditionally been a hot topic for scholars studying political parties, precisely because they have been so rare in industrialized democracies. However, as discussed above, the “third wave of democracy” in Latin America has been characterized by surprisingly high levels of political party flux, despite the fact that most countries had previous histories of party formation under conditions of universal franchise. Why then did Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) observation about the freezing of party systems after the attainment of universal franchise not hold in Latin America? They argued that social cleavages were the main axes around which political parties formed and that when the franchise was expanded to include everyone that parties compete so as to capture all of the major cleavages. Therefore, the parties that emerged at that crucial juncture (universal franchise) essentially monopolized the electorate making it difficult, if not impossible, for other parties to form later on. Why then in Latin America did the ties between

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<sup>18</sup> This part of my argument is similar to and draws on the outline of a theory about new party formation developed by Lawrence Boudon Boudon n.d.. See below for further discussion of Boudon's work.

established parties and the electorate weaken during the third wave period? Why was it so difficult for parties to cement strong ties with the citizenry?

In his study of the European Green parties, Kitschelt (1989) considers the question of new party emergence and explores three broad categories of explanatory variables: cultural, institutional, and structural. In the case of the Green parties, he gives a nod to the importance of institutional differences between countries but places greatest emphasis on the role of cultural and value change in post-industrial societies of the type described and documented by Inglehart (1984). Kitschelt argues that fundamental changes in values and culture wrought by a new era of post-industrialism created opportunities for the emergence of parties that could give voice to and represent the interests of citizens concerned about broad collective issues such as the environment. While for Lipset and Rokkan the social cleavages that translated into political parties resulted largely from structural characteristics of a particular country's economy, for Kitschelt the Green parties were a response to a profound cultural and value shift taking place in post-industrial Europe.

In the case of Latin America, however, this cultural change argument does not fit. Poverty and lack of development meant that the majority of the population remained focused on meeting basic material needs and did not have the luxury afforded citizens of the developed world to be concerned with "post material" values.

In a concise but insightful article, Boudon outlines a theory of new political party formation. He argues that a necessary but not sufficient condition for new party emergence is some sort of systemic crisis, most likely economic or political in nature. Similarly, I argue that a systemic crisis fueled the high level of volatility in Latin



American party systems during the 1980s and 1990s, and that this volatility resulted in the emergence of a host of new parties and political actors, among them social movement parties. The emergence of these new parties was not the result primarily of cultural shifts or institutional rule changes but a reaction to the structural shock of economic crisis that affected the region as whole.

This argument bears a resemblance to Lipset and Rokkan's approach in that it emphasizes structural factors; however, the difference is that the emphasis is not on social cleavages but instead on economic instability and crisis as exogenous factors that destabilize the old systems and open the way for change. Some cases, including that of the emergence of Pachakutik in Ecuador, appear on the surface to bear a similarity to what happened in Europe, to the extent that, the entrance of certain parties represented the politicization of new constituencies that had not previously been mobilized politically. However, this cannot explain the broad trend in the region of political flux and does not apply to most of the political challenges during this period. Likewise, even in those cases where ethnic identity was being mobilized politically for the first time it is important to note that the most successful of these parties, namely Pachakutik in Ecuador and MAS in Bolivia, were not exclusively indigenous parties and avoided identifying themselves that way. Instead, both put forward broad political agendas that sought to attract votes from non-indigenous sectors.

Economic crisis and international pressure to implement neoliberal reforms were the key exogenous shocks that destabilized most of the party systems in the region, but Boudon correctly acknowledges that crisis is a necessary but not sufficient

condition. He contends that the sufficient condition for the emergence of new parties is “the commitment of the masses to political change,” and suggests that the existence of this commitment can be measured variously by electoral apathy and abstention, open disaffection with existing parties, or the willingness of voters to vote for political outsiders.<sup>19</sup> Boudon is right that crisis alone is not sufficient to bring about the emergence of new parties. Even extreme economic crisis does not always result in political destabilization or the demise of existing parties, a good example of which is the fact that the U.S. and British party systems both weathered the profound economic storm of the Great Depression. However, putting forth “public commitment to political change” as a sufficient condition is tautological. Clearly, if the public is profoundly disaffected with existing parties, some political entrepreneur will emerge to try and capitalize on this. The deeper question is why economic or other systemic crises lead in some cases but not in others to public disaffection with political elites and existing parties? Boudon does not effectively address this underlying question. I will propose an answer a little further on.

Thus new parties and political contenders in Latin America emerged in direct response to a profound discrediting of the political establishment as a whole. New party emergence was often not so much about representing new political constituencies or agendas but about kicking out the old. This was clearly different than the context in which the European Green parties emerged, competing as they did in what remained an essentially stable party system. In Latin America, by contrast, new parties were essentially filling a void created by public frustration with traditional

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<sup>19</sup> Boudon n.d.: 34.

political parties and the political class as a whole. In many cases this frustration was so great that it constituted a profound crisis of the party system itself and was characterized by a severe weakening of traditional parties and inordinately high levels of volatility from one election to the next. In the Andean region this crisis was particularly deep and long lasting. In the late 1990s and early part of the new millennium crises in several countries in the region became so severe and public protest so intense that a series of elected governments were ousted from power.<sup>20</sup>

This represents an important difference with the process of dramatic party system change that took place in Europe in the early part of the twentieth century with the birth of the mass labor parties. Unlike in the European case, the emergence of new parties and political contenders in many Latin American countries did not result in the attainment of new party system equilibrium, instead many of these systems began to experience chronic instability.

I assert that the absence of equilibrium is what Mainwaring and Scully (1995) are describing when they characterize certain Latin American party systems as “inchoate”. In an important effort to develop a way of categorizing Latin American party systems, Mainwaring and Scully divided the Latin American universe into “institutionalized” and “inchoate” systems. This breakdown differed from Sartori’s (1976) classic categorization, which focused on the number of parties and their degree

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<sup>20</sup> In April of 2005 Lucio Gutiérrez became the third president of Ecuador in a little over eight years to be ousted from office in response to popular protests. In the span of nine years, from 1996 to 2005, Ecuador had a total of seven presidents. A similar pattern whereby a succession of executives lose the public’s faith and tolerance and are run out of office occurred in Bolivia as well. In 2003 Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was ousted from office. Less than two years later, his vice president and successor as president, Carlos Mesa, resigned from the presidency after proving unable to stem a rising tide of social protests demanding nationalization of the country’s natural gas production.

of polarization. In this new categorization the crucial characteristic differentiating Latin American party systems was the degree to which a stable pattern of inter-party competition had developed and whether parties were institutionalized or not. The authors proposed the following set of four attributes to distinguish institutionalized from inchoate systems: (1) stable rules and inter-party competition, measured by electoral volatility; (2) stable roots within society; (3) the acceptance of democracy by all major political players as the only game in town; and finally, (4) party institutionalization.

While this was an interesting, appealing, and in many ways intuitive thesis, the events of the decade immediately following the book's publication challenged the validity and usefulness of this classification scheme. Some of the very systems that Mainwaring and Scully characterized as "institutionalized" and therefore stable, including most notably the longstanding Venezuelan and Uruguayan two-party systems, were transformed when the parties that had held political power for decades in each country were unseated either by new parties or independent candidates.<sup>21</sup> The ability of new contenders to displace the "institutionalized" parties in these two cases calls into question the usefulness of their distinction between "institutionalized" and "inchoate" party systems and the definition they proposed for these two categories.

While they did not hit the nail on the head, they were focused on an important issue, the deficiencies of party politics throughout much of the region. Let's take a closer look at the variables that they identified as important. The first was that of

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<sup>21</sup> In Venezuela forty years of alternation in power between the COPEI and the AD came to an end in 1998 with the election of Hugo Chávez, a former army paratrooper who formed his own party to contest the elections. In Uruguay in 2004 Tabaré Vázquez from the Frente Amplio won the presidency of that country, wresting control for the first time in 170 years from the dominant Colorado and Blanco parties.

stable inter-party competition. The fact that systems that had for years experienced stable inter-party competition and then experienced dramatic change<sup>22</sup> turns this category from an independent variable into something that itself needs to be explained. I would argue that the high level of volatility in inter-party competition throughout much of the region is better characterized as a response to a strong exogenous shock than an underlying inherent characteristic of certain systems. By the same token, the third characteristic, that of acceptance of democracy by key political and social actors, is a problematic way of categorizing party systems because it conflates the outcome – democratic stability – with the independent variable, the nature of the party system. The second and fourth factors – the degree to which parties are rooted in society and party institutionalization – are important but not decisive in guaranteeing party system stability, as evidenced by events in Venezuela and Uruguay. The fact that the majority of South American party systems, even those that had been considered the most stable, underwent such tremendous changes indicates the presence of a broader underlying factor shared by all these systems and countries.

I argue that Latin America's party systems were more vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of deep and persistent economic crisis because of the weakness of, what I call, the "systems of representation" upon which these party systems were based. By "systems of representation" I am referring to the nature of the link between voters and representatives; in other words, what motivates voters to vote for candidates and parties, and what constitutes the primary means that politicians employ to win votes. While the relationship between voter and representative or party is often

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<sup>22</sup> See Table 1.

a complex one, I suggest analyzing it in reference to two ideal types:<sup>23</sup> one based largely on programmatic identification and the other on clientelistic relationships. The ideal type of “programmatic system” refers to those political systems and societies where voters make their political choice based on some collective good that the candidate or party offers, whether that be an ideological or programmatic position, or personal characteristics that a certain candidate would bring to elected office, like trustworthiness or effectiveness. Under this category votes for parties or candidates representing specific ethnic groups, such as the francophone parties in Quebec, could also be included. In other words, a “programmatic system of representation” does not say anything about whether a system is party or candidate-centered, or what the collective good is that is being offered. The key difference is whether voters vote on the basis of some collective good or whether they cast their vote primarily in response to the receipt or the expectation of receiving a narrow particularistic good. In a programmatic system the expectation of a collective good is the most important determinant of voting. The opposite is the case in “clientelistic systems of representation.” In the latter category a significant share of voters are wooed not mainly by ideology, programs, or even which candidate they consider to have the best personal qualifications to hold office, but instead, by the offer of some narrowly targeted particularistic good, whether this be the promise of a community playing field, government employment, or simply the fact that the candidate organized an expensive campaign rally at which voters were plied with free food and liquor. In

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<sup>23</sup> Here I am referring to Max Weber’s conceptualization of “ideal types” which he used to compare and analyze different types of systems.

“clientelistic systems” people often follow the advice of a political broker who wields economic power at the local level.

The construction of this typology builds directly on concepts and insights developed by Mona Lyne (1999) in her work on the relationship in Latin America between voting and retarded economic development. Lyne argues that voters in Latin America have traditionally employed a different calculus than populations in the developed world. This different calculus created a distinct incentive structure for Latin American politicians that resulted in the undersupply of collective goods and the oversupply particularistic goods in the form of patronage, handouts, etc. In her work, Lyne draws a clear distinction between clientelism as described by scholars of Latin America since the 1960s and 1970s and discussions of “particularism” found in the work on politics in the United States and Europe. Lyne refines the definition of clientelism as the distribution by parties of excludable as opposed to non-excludable goods. Particularism, by contrast, is defined as locally targeted collective goods, such as local road construction that improves infrastructure at the local level. She claims that while particularism (as she defines it) is more a function of institutional rules, such as small congressional districts; clientelism is fueled by a collective action dilemma faced by individual voters, in which a prisoner’s dilemma-like incentive structure leads them to vote for particularistic goods. This pattern results in a failure to elect candidates and parties that have a mandate to deliver collective goods. For Lyne, clientelism is a much more insidious problem than particularism because it results in an undersupply of collective goods at all levels of government. Likewise, she asserts that clientelism cannot be remedied simply by changing the institutional

rules because the source of the problem lies not in the formal institutions but in this collective action dilemma.

Lyne does not directly address what the source of this collective action problem is or what it would take to break out of this pattern. I suggest that poverty and inequality are crucial factors supporting this type of system. The logic behind this argument is simple: under conditions of universal franchise it becomes expensive to dole out particularistic favors to all voters. As a result, under conditions of universal franchise the benefits that most voters will receive from a clientelistic system will tend to be small and marginal because there are so many voters. For a very poor voter even a small gift may be enough of an incentive to help determine their vote. But the cost of buying off middle class voters will be higher as small handouts are only of marginal value to them; they are much more likely, therefore, to cast their vote based on other considerations. In other words, middle and upper class voters can afford to vote for collective goods, and for that reason it becomes much more expensive to buy their votes. A campaign gift of a pair of shoes to a person living in poverty makes a significant difference in that person's life but not so in the case of a middle-class voter.

Not only is vote-buying cheaper among the poor, but poor voters are also much more likely to be controlled in some way or dependent upon local power brokers. As we know from many of the studies on clientelism in Latin America, the nexus between parties and voters was traditionally mediated and controlled by local political brokers (Chalmers 1977). As economies develop and diversify, and as the middle class grows in numbers; the strength of local power brokers and the control they wield over others



declines. Thus, economic development tends to weaken the foundations of the clientelistic system of representation by undermining the power of political brokers. So as voters' wealth increases so too does the cost of maintaining a clientelistic system of representation; at some point this system will become inefficient and unsustainable. Just as European voters can afford to cast their votes for "post-industrial value issues," like protecting the environment and promoting fair trade, middle and upper class voters can "afford" to vote for collective goods, efficiency, and good government more easily than poor voters. So as wealth in a society grows, assuming it is fairly evenly distributed and leads to an expansion of the middle class, the expectation is that clientelistic systems of representation will become increasingly inefficient, which in turn should eventually lead to a shift toward a more programmatic system of representation.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the combination of severe and persistent economic crises, and international pressure to privatize and reduce state spending served to emasculate the state most Latin American countries. In previous historical periods the state had served as an important source of resources used to grease the wheels of the largely clientelistic representative system and keep them turning. The crisis not only emasculated the state but also simultaneously impoverished many voters; during this period voter wealth either remained stagnant or in many cases declined precipitously. This combination of the emasculation of the state with increased impoverishment in society led to a breakdown in the traditional system of representation based on patronage and clientelism. It became much more difficult for elected politicians to extract resources from the state in order to build political

credibility and support through clientelistic means among and at the same time an impoverished citizenry was demanding more of their politicians and the state.

This scenario did not cause clientelistic patterns to disappear. Studies by Auyero (2001), Stokes (2000) and others, including my own research on political representation in Ecuador<sup>24</sup> indicate that clientelism has held its own. But neoliberalism and economic crisis did change the dynamics of the system pushing it into the private sphere and often fragmenting political power. Private interests and private money began to play an ever larger role in political mobilization through the use of clientelistic ties and the media, just as crisis and neoliberal policies whittled away at the state. In Ecuador the privatization of clientelism was particularly evident on the Coast. The parties that dominated in this region, the Social Christian Party (PSC) and the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE) were controlled by powerful economic interests, and relied on clientelistic relationships with voters.<sup>25</sup>

While economic crisis does not do away with clientelism it does mean that there are generally less goodies to give out, which in turn serves to frustrate people and weaken these systems. During times of plenty a well-greased political machine can serve to dampen public outrage at corruption, but during times of scarcity there is not as much grease and the gears get stuck. This helps explain why the public outcry and frustration over government corruption in many countries throughout the region

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<sup>24</sup> See in particular Chapter 3 of this dissertation on Ecuador's party system.

<sup>25</sup> For a discussion of urban voting and politics in Guayaquil during the early 1980s see Menéndez-Carrión 1986. In his analysis of the PSC during the 1980s, César Montúfar describes how Febres Cordero built a network within the party that linked individuals who formed part of the modern economic elite with local level *caciques* who were able to activate and control local electoral machines through traditional clientelistic relationships with voters Montúfar 2000: 56-65. In their analysis of the importance of regionalism in Ecuadorian politics Freidenberg and Alcántara also point to the importance of localized "clientelistic networks" in local-level elections Freidenberg and Alcántara Sáez 2001: 149.

became such a potent political issue in the 1990s and into the new millennium.<sup>26</sup> I think it is not so much that corruption became more rampant, but instead that public tolerance for it diminished because there are not as many goodies to go around. As a result, the political equilibrium was lost. One of the main difficulties in achieving a new equilibrium had to do with the difficulty of forging a new basis for representation under conditions of high levels of poverty and inequality.

Recent work on democratization has resurrected the importance of structural variables and further refined our understanding of the role they play in democratic endurance and consolidation. In an important article, Przeworski et al. (1996) compared the survival rate of democracies in 135 countries and found that while the emergence or transition to formal democracy is not linearly related to levels of economic development, once formal democracy is installed in a country the two strongest determinants of democratic survival are the level of economic development and the rate of economic growth. As these two factors rise so does the probability that democracy will survive. On the other hand, in those countries that do not possess a high level of development democracy is more likely to survive if economic growth is achieved and distributive pressures are controlled while, at the same time, maintaining a moderate level of inflation and reducing inequality.

I argue that one of the explanations for the empirical relationship they identify is that structural conditions characterized by high levels of income inequality, low levels of economic development, and marginalized sectors with low levels of

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<sup>26</sup> Virtually no country in the region has escaped a political crisis or scandal involving corruption. Dealing with this problem has emerged as an issue of growing concern among international organizations like Transparency International, which compiles statistics on perceived levels of corruption in countries throughout the world.

organization have negative effects on the functioning of representative institutions. High levels of inequality can distort representation in several ways. For example, under such conditions the financing of political campaigns tends to be concentrated in a few hands. The cost of this concentration is the protection of particularistic, elite interests at the expense of accountability to a larger public and the provision of broad collective goods. Clearly under these conditions there is little if any incentive for politicians to address demands for redistribution. Evidence of the perverse effects of elite financing of political campaigns abounds in Ecuador and throughout the Andean region. For example, Aspiazu, one of Ecuador's most powerful bankers, admitted in 1999 from his jail cell that he had contributed \$3.1 million dollars to Jamil Mahuad's successful 1998 presidential campaign. When the country went into a severe banking crisis, he and other prominent bankers were bailed out by the Mahuad government causing grave economic harm to the country's economy and to the majority of its citizens. The economic collapse and Mahuad's bailout of the banking sector generated such public opprobrium and protest that he was eventually ousted from office in January 2000.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to the perverse effects of influence, high levels of poverty mean that more voters are willing to sell their votes. If voters can be bought off with small material concessions and vote primarily on this basis, then they are not voting on policy grounds and often do not hold their representatives accountable for broader policy decisions beyond the specific promises made to them at the individual or local

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<sup>27</sup> For an analysis that puts the banking crisis of 1999 and the ouster of President Jamil Mahuad into historical context see North 2004. For another view of the roots of the 1999-2000 crisis see Montúfar 2001.

level. Thus, clientelistic practices used to cement the link with poor voters also dampen the pressure on individual legislators to push for structural change. Additionally, the need to compete for particularistic resources with other politicians creates incentives for politicians that often impede them from coalescing around proposals that serve to produce collective goods, such as an efficient economic model (Lyne 1999). So instead of democracy creating a “virtuous circle”, inequality and poverty create a distorted pattern that weakens democracy’s potential to provide accountability and collective goods. Ironically, these distortions that weaken the democratic process reduce the likelihood that democracy and elections will serve as effective vehicles for readdressing the structural problems of poverty and inequality.

While the European process of party system transformation that occurred in the early part of the twentieth century was quite different from what happened in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, it nevertheless serves as an interesting point of comparison. In Europe labor unrest and organization was the trigger that led to the expansion of the franchise. The expansion of the voting pool, in turn, was the exogenous shock that threw the old system of representation based on parties of notables into crisis. Under conditions of universal franchise the close-knit cadre parties that had functioned on the basis of personal relationships between members of the elite eventually became inefficient vehicles for attracting votes, especially in the face of the rise of the “mass” parties associated with labor unions. The European mass parties developed a new and effective political model that other parties were forced to

compete with and in order to do so they had to reorganize and change strategies.<sup>28</sup>

Within a couple of decades, a new political equilibrium was attained based upon a relationship between political parties and the electorate that no longer excluded large swaths of the citizenry and was more effective at representing majority and worker interests.

Will the exogenous shocks of economic crisis and neoliberal reform produce a new political equilibrium in Latin America? While it is still too early to tell, the pattern as of the time of this writing appears to be mixed. In no country in the region have programmatic politics been able to completely displace old clientelistic patterns, however, increasingly elected officials at all levels are being held to account by voters. Corruption scandals are frequent in the region and in a number of countries have provoked such high levels of public outrage that presidents and other politicians who have overstepped the bounds of their authority have been forced out of office, often through the use of mechanisms that fell on the border of, or outside the bounds of constitutionality.<sup>29</sup> In some of the larger and more developed countries, like Argentina, Chile, or even Brazil, new modes of programmatic representation appear to be gaining ground with the middle classes without completely displacing older clientelistic practices that continue to work among the poor. A new equilibrium appears to be emerging in some of these countries based on a sort of hybrid mode of political representation.

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<sup>28</sup> See Duverger 1954.

<sup>29</sup> Recent instances where presidents have been ousted from office in response to popular outrage include Collor de Mello in Brazil; Bucaram, Mahuad, and Gutiérrez in Ecuador; Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia; and Fujimori in Peru. Whether these events should be interpreted as examples of democratic vitality or institutional weakening is very much open to debate. For an interesting analysis of these popular impeachments see Pérez-Liñán 2003.

However, in the smaller and poorer central Andean nations of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru a new equilibrium was more elusive. Throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium these countries experienced an enduring pattern of political stalemate and persistent crisis. Poverty continued to grow as these countries' economies were strangled by massive foreign debt burdens and as neoliberal policies failed to produce employment and equitable economic growth. The structural conditions of high levels of income inequality and persistent poverty impeded the emergence of a new model of political representation based on more programmatic grounds just as the old clientelistic model was being severely weakened. Under these conditions, parties and politicians seeking to run on more programmatic platforms had a harder time making headway because, first of all, the task of producing collective economic improvements that could help solidify public support remained so difficult under the existing economic conditions and, secondly, an increasing pool of poor voters remained available to respond to clientelistic offers no matter how minimal these were. The possibility of constructing a social welfare state with the aim of ameliorating these structural inequalities was not a possibility given the economic constraints.<sup>30</sup> This was the Catch-22 that many poor countries found themselves in

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<sup>30</sup> The one interesting exception to this pattern in the Andes today is that of Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. President Chávez has been using the country's oil wealth to invest heavily in social welfare and employment programs for the poor. This has generated high levels of political support among the popular classes. Venezuela's oil wealth, of course, makes it a special case. Whether Chávez is building a people's democracy or unduly concentrating power in the executive and ruling with authoritarian tendencies is a topic of hot debate in academic and policy circles at the time of this writing. Some have contended that his policies are empowering and involving Venezuelan citizens in a highly democratic process (Collins 2005; Ellner 2005), while others have gone so far as to accuse him of taking the country down an authoritarian path (Corrales 2006; Krastev 2006). With regard to this study, the interesting question is the degree to which Chávez is building a clientelistic political machine versus empowering poor voters to more actively defend their citizenship rights. It is conceivable that both are occurring simultaneously.

and why it proved so difficult to arrive at a new political equilibrium that would allow for a measure of political stability. Absent a workable mode of representation, legitimacy and stability were put into jeopardy.

In her analysis of the rise of the PRD in Mexico Bruhn (1997b) identifies a challenge for new parties related to this difficulty in regaining political equilibrium. She explains that the PRD initially benefited from a political opportunity structure in which the dominant PRI had lost legitimacy with much of the population, thereby making it easier to compete for this sector's votes. However, she argues that this same situation of disillusionment with the political establishment and voter detachment from traditional political parties created hurdles for this new party as well. She argues that since new parties, like the PRD, rely heavily on "detached voters and elites," it is harder for them to consolidate their political base.<sup>31</sup> Bruhn's observation suggests an important way in which the political opportunity structure of public disillusionment with the political class as a whole presents difficulties, in addition to advantages, for new political challengers. Parties founded directly by social movements may have an advantage in this regard in that they already have a core group of supporters – the social movement base – that, presumably, would have a stronger attachment to a party birthed by their movement.

After having discussed the political opportunity structure and its broad implications for new parties and democratic stability. We will now turn to an examination of the role played by social movements and their related parties within this context.

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<sup>31</sup> See Chapter 1 in Bruhn 1997b.



## **Social Movements within the Context of Economic and Political Crisis**

Formal democracy was instituted in the central Andes under very unfavorable structural conditions that condition and constrain the quality of democracy. But structural conditions, while important, are not determinative. Democracy implies uncertainty and opens spaces for the rise of new groups and, therefore, for the possibility of change. I will argue that social movements may be able to play a role in counterbalancing these negative structural factors. In the absence of significant economic growth and redistribution the only way to begin to break the perverted pattern of democracy based on clientelistic modes of representation, which in turn serves to sustain elite economic and political dominance, is through organization. Organization in and of itself may not be enough to fully transform representative patterns and party systems, but it plays an important role as a leavening agent for change.

Ironically, just as the dire economic conditions described above sustained structural conditions that severely limited the possibility of breaking out of a clientelistic system of representation, these same conditions and the attendant political crises created greater possibilities for social movement organization.<sup>32</sup> By undermining the legitimacy of political elites, the combination of economic crisis and neoliberalism provided unique opportunities for social movements. By crippling the state's ability to build massive corporatist structures or undertake clientelistic programs capable of reaching a large mass of voters, economic crisis also greatly

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<sup>32</sup> The argument that social movements in the 1980s and 1990s emerged in response to the economic and political crises plaguing the region has been made by a number of scholars. See Alvarez and Escobar 1992 for one example of this argument.

weakened the state's ability to co-opt independent movements.<sup>33</sup> This made it easier for organizations based in civil society to maintain or achieve their independence and autonomy from the state. It is in this way that the neoliberal context of the 1980s and 1990s provided greater space for the actions of independent social movements. And indeed, social movements and organizations in both Ecuador and Bolivia took advantage of the political opportunities that resulted from this combination of economic crisis and neoliberal reform to grow, increase their political power, and eventually to launch political parties. In other words, not only did neoliberalism provide a rallying point against which these movements began to mobilize, but ironically the international pressure on Latin American governments to implement neoliberal policies actually weakened state's and traditional parties' ability to forestall the grow of these social movements by depriving the state of the resources traditionally used to cement the relationship between political elites and the citizenry. The weakness of a representative system based on clientelistic relationships under situations of economic scarcity and state downsizing is important to explaining both the tremendous growth in the power of social movement organizations during this period in Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as, the seemingly intractable political crises that plagued both countries.

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<sup>33</sup> State capacity of course varied by degrees from country to country depending on previous state strength, economic development, and the depth and breadth of the crisis in each country. In Mexico, for example, the one party state controlled by the PRI was still capable of engaging in tactics aimed specifically at co-opting popular social movements into the 1990s, in particular under the Salinas administration. For an interesting and provocative discussion of social movements and the Mexican state see: Hellman 1994. Salinas's National Solidarity Program, initiated during the 1990s, was one of the last major corporatist type programs undertaken by a Latin American state. Dresser Dresser 1994 argues that one of its main goals was to bolster support for the PRI among the poor.

## **The Emergence of Social Movement Parties**

While the exogenous factor of economic crisis was the jolt that destabilized the system, the types of political challenges that emerged in the wake of these exogenous shocks depended on the resources and level of organization possessed by potential political actors. The type of actors that possessed the resources necessary to enter the political fray varied from country to country. While most South American countries witnessed the emergence of new political challengers, the emergence of social movement parties was less common. I argue that whether or not a social movement party emerged in a particular country depended not so much on social cleavages but instead, on differences in the internal resources possessed by social movement organizations themselves. Standard theories of party system change and evolution often overlook this crucial dimension to understanding when new types of parties will emerge and how successful they will be in challenging established parties. I argue that we must take into account the relative strength of and the resources available to potential contenders who may seek to take advantage of openings in electoral competition due to structural, institutional, or cultural value changes. In party systems that are in crisis or still in flux there will be substantial room for the emergence of new contenders. However, the types of parties that emerge depend in large part on the distribution of financial and organizational resources within society.

Two contrasting examples to Ecuador and Bolivia illustrate this point. In Peru it was a political dark horse, Alberto Fujimori, who took advantage of people's frustration with ten years of guerrilla war and severe economic crisis, to win the

presidency in 1990. Fujimori had no connections to social movements and proceeded to move Peru in a highly neoliberal direction. In Venezuela economic troubles served to weaken the corporatist grip and undermine popular support for the two parties that had dominated that country since 1958. Into this void emerged a leftist populist leader, Hugo Chávez, a military man turned politician. There was at least one social movement-based party that emerged in Venezuela, Causa R, but it lost traction in the highly charged political atmosphere of conflict between the Chávez government and the right-wing opposition.<sup>34</sup> Neither Fujimori nor Chávez had strong connections with or accountability to organized sectors of civil society before coming into power, and the direction they ended up taking each of their countries in was largely a result of their own personal political orientations, the nature of the coalition they developed once in office, and the political and economic cards they were dealt.

Ecuador and Bolivia have also had their share of independent challengers attempt to win political office. In Ecuador Alvaro Noboa, one of the country's richest men, ran twice and Lucio Gutiérrez created his own party in order to run in 2003. Noboa never won the presidency despite spending millions of his own money on the campaigns. Gutiérrez was successful, but many analysts credited his success to his alliance with Pachakutik. In Peru, by contrast, two successive "outsider" presidents – Fujimori and Toledo – were elected with little, if any, active support from organized sectors of civil society. In Ecuador and Bolivia the strongest challenges to traditional parties came from parties with strong roots and connections to social movement organizations. This was not the case in Venezuela and Peru where social movements

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<sup>34</sup> For an analysis of Causa R see López-Maya 1997.

were comparatively weaker and had not succeeded in building cohesive national structures. Not surprisingly then, the main challenges to traditional political parties in those two countries came from independent candidates.

Besides the existence of a national level social movement, what are the resources that permit a social movement to make a successful leap into formal politics? This is one of the central questions addressed by this dissertation. Not only what resources or level of organization are necessary for party formation, but more importantly, what are the movement characteristics most likely to result in a party capable of electoral success? The social movement literature's insight that political organization is something that cannot be taken for granted but must be explained, is a crucial starting point for my argument. Social movement theory's concepts of "political opportunity structure" and "resource mobilization" are the main conceptual tools I use to analyze and account for the emergence of social movement parties. In the previous section I discussed the political opportunity structure that prevailed throughout the region. The following sections discuss the types of internal resources that are crucial to successful movement involvement in formal electoral politics.

Scholars of social movements have argued persuasively that, in addition to a favorable political opportunity structure, internal resources are necessary for the emergence of social movements.<sup>35</sup> This study does not focus on the rise of social movements, but instead, on how already established movements and movement organizations were able to harness their internal resources to launch competitive

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<sup>35</sup> For a comprehensive overview of social movement theory see Tarrow 1998. For a discussion of resource mobilization theory see Foweraker 1995.

political parties. In this sense, the existence of a certain level of internal movement resources is a given, the question becomes, why were some movements more successful than others in employing these resources for electoral competition. Any attempt to answer this question must identify the type of movement resources that are the most useful in the electoral arena. For example, while a loosely, horizontally organized coalition provide flexibility and inclusiveness that are advantageous for organizing a protest campaign or reframing an issue so as to attract broader support, these same resources may not be as useful in trying to organize a political party, which tends to require greater levels of institutionalization. This section then considers the applicability of movement resources to the arena of formal electoral politics and, in so doing, bridges the literatures on political parties and social movements. We will begin by briefly describing the nature of party competition in the Andes as a way of setting the stage for our discussion of the social movement resources and participation in electoral politics.

### **Andean Political Parties**

Andean political parties are difficult to fit into the categories developed in reference to industrialized democracies. While some scholars characterize the region's parties as fitting the "catch-all" model,<sup>36</sup> this categorization is problematic and does not accurately capture the nature and workings of Andean political parties. In Chapter 3 I describe in detail the workings of Ecuador's most important political parties; in the following section I will give an overview of the main points.

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<sup>36</sup> See Dix 1989. For the classic definition and analysis of "catch-all" parties see Kirchheimer 1966.

As they developed in the 1980s and 1990s Andean parties bore a resemblance to the mass party model only in that they were hierarchically organized. However, unlike the European mass parties, they did not have large, well-organized bases, but instead tended to be fairly small, elitist organizations without mass membership. Nor were these parties generally associated with strong labor unions or other mass membership organizations. Different too from the catch-all parties, access within Andean parties was often tightly controlled from the top, and they were not internally democratic. For example, very few parties in Latin America employed primaries as a means of selecting candidates for office.<sup>37</sup>

In many ways Andean parties were more akin to the earlier European cadre parties in that their leadership came from the elites and tended to be organized around a top leader.<sup>38</sup> Financing for major Andean parties tended to come from elite sectors, and often the leadership for these parties came from this same social strata. Access to private capital was crucial to financing party activities and there was little if any public control or monitoring of party finances.<sup>39</sup> Parties therefore served as the vehicles for achieving and maintaining political and economic power for elites.<sup>40</sup>

However, these parties had to compete for votes from a population that was overwhelmingly poor. In order to do this the dominant parties combined two different

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<sup>37</sup> This began to change in Ecuador in the late 1990s with a few parties beginning to experiment with internal primaries as a way of selecting candidates.

<sup>38</sup> A former member of the Social Christian Party (PSC) in Ecuador used the term “party of notables” to describe how the PSC party functioned. See Freidenberg and Alcántara Sáez 2001: 135, footnote no. 22.

<sup>39</sup> See Ardaya and Verdesoto 1998. In the late 1990s Ecuador enacted spending limits on parties, but they proved difficult to enforce.

<sup>40</sup> Ardaya and Verdesoto 1998 explains that business people finance political campaigns with the expectation of gaining access to the government and security against government intervention or action against them.

tactics: extensive use of the media, especially radio and television; and the continued use of old clientelistic strategies, such as vote-buying and the doling out of particularistic goods and favors. The reliance on the media, including paid advertisements and the use of consultants and pollsters follows a pattern similar to that that occurred in industrialized countries where the paid media has grown increasingly important in elections. In the Andes the ability to buy media time was most important in national contests and large cities. By contrast, face-to-face contact, personal reputation, and the doling out of favors remained the dominant strategies in local and provincial races in small and mid-sized towns and provinces.<sup>41</sup> A bifurcated party system developed in which modern means of political advertising became increasingly important in national races and in the major cities, but at the local and provincial levels and in less densely populated areas older tactics that relied on face-to-face contact and particularistic favors survived. Obviously, parties with strong connections to economic elites and therefore financial resources had an advantage in terms of their ability to buy media time. And even at the local level, candidates who possessed their own financial resources held an advantage in terms of being able to finance campaign activities like holding large rallies and doling out gifts to voters and communities.

However, the fact that the dominant political parties typically did not possess deep organizational roots in society and instead tended to rely on tenuous connections with poor voters, some social movements were positioned to take advantage of this weakness and in this way were able to compete with better-financed parties. A social movement's membership base is important not just in terms of the votes it represents

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<sup>41</sup> See Chapter 3.



but, even more importantly, in terms of the people power and organizational resources it can mobilize. In order to compete politically social movement parties need to be able to attract votes from the broader public. If a party is at a disadvantage in terms of access to financial resources, then it must have some other means to carry out the labor-intensive work that is involved in campaigning. If a party or candidate cannot afford to hire campaign workers and staff, then the organization or candidate must have some other source of people power to do the footwork entailed in campaigning. In a small town friends and neighbors may be enough, but in any larger setting a candidate needs campaign workers. To the extent that they can be mobilized for a campaign, social movement people power and organizational resources can be an important electoral resource. The question then is, what are the internal resources that a social movement requires in order to mobilize its base and reach voters who are not connected to the movement?

### **Internal Resources**

In the process of doing my research on Pachakutik I identified several variables that were key to explaining the party's success. I divided them up into two categories: the first relates to the movement's outward strength, which is key to its ability to attract votes among the general population. The key components of "outward strength" are the previous establishment of a national organization, the existence among the general public of name recognition for the movement and its leaders, and finally, social movements need to have demonstrated that they have a

political vision and agenda that is relevant to citizens beyond those directly involved in the movement.

The next set of four variables are components or factors that contribute to and determine a movement's internal strength: movement autonomy from the state and other political actors, a strong common identity, strong organizational links between the grassroots and the movement leadership, and a history of responding to material needs at the grassroots. I will discuss each of these in turn.

**Table 2: Movement Resources**

<b>Outward Strength / Ability to Reach Beyond Core Constituency</b>	<b>Internal Strength / Ability to Mobilize Base</b>
National organization	Autonomy
National name recognition	Identity
Reputation as an actor in political issues of national importance	Strong organizational structure linking the grassroots and the leadership
	Success in responding to material needs at the local level

### **Outward Strength**

Given the fact that most social movements in Latin America are organized to represent poor and marginalized sectors of the population, such as indigenous peoples, shantytown dwellers, and landless workers, they tend to be resource-poor and their access to financial resources extremely limited. The media is a key way for parties to reach voters, but in most cases parties with social movement roots do not have the

financial resources necessary to buy much media time. Instead of relying on the media to get its message out, parties with social movement roots need rely on an already established national movement reputation that they can use as a launching pad for the party. Therefore, we would not expect to see small localized social movements attempting to enter party politics; but once a movement is organized at the national level, has established a reputation, and become a player at that level, it is not surprising that political entrepreneurs within the movement may begin considering the possibility of building on this national reputation in order to branch out into electoral politics. For these reasons, I hypothesize that three necessary conditions for a social movement to make a successful entry into competitive party politics are that it is organized at the national level, that the organization and its leaders have achieved national name recognition, and that the movement has established itself as a significant actor in struggles and issues of broad national relevance. If an indigenous movement party is going to succeed in attracting votes from the general population, it will need to have demonstrated through its actions as a movement that it can play a leadership role on issues of concern to the population as large and not just to indigenous people. A movement organization may have established a reputation for itself at the national level but if its actions were only aimed at achieving targeted benefits for a specific community then it will have a harder time using this national reputation as a launching pad for the establishment of a political party because voters will view it as narrowly concerned with the interests of its specific constituency.

### **Internal Strength**

The following four variables are important factors that give a movement the internal cohesion it needs in order to succeed in mobilizing its base for an electoral campaign. Obviously, if the broader political opportunity structure is not conducive to the entrance of new political challengers then even a movement that possesses these internal resources in abundance may find it difficult to launch a political party.

### Autonomy

Autonomy is important for several reasons. First and foremost, if the state or political parties wield significant influence within a movement organization then it is unlikely that it will make the decision to mount a direct political challenge to the political establishment because it would not be in the interest of already established political parties to engender competition that could erode their own electoral base. In other words, because it is not in their interest to compete with new political challengers, if the state or political parties wield influence within a movement, they will seek to steer the movement away from launching a direct and independent political challenge to the status quo. Additionally, undue influence by outside actors within a movement organization often leads to internal divisions, which weaken both movements and parties.

### Identity

Collective identity is an important political resource. Therefore, the movement that has either built upon an already established identity or has succeeded in forming a new one that unites people will have an advantage in the political arena. This

dissertation is not concerned with explaining identity formation but instead, treats identity as one of several variables that is either present or not. Having said that, Chapters 7 and 8 do discuss some of the historical reasons for the emergence of strong common identities in some places and the absence of it in others.

My approach to the role of identity in social movement politics is similar to the one adopted by Tarrow (1998 ). He explains that movements both build upon and utilize pre-existing, or as some refer to them, “primordial” identities as a basis for aggregation. However, movements also shape, create, and mobilize new identities. The political mobilization of identities results from and is shaped by the actions of political entrepreneurs, whether they are parties, movements, or charismatic leaders. Thus, identity is a resource that movements seek to use and mobilize, but in the process of mobilization identity is also shaped, formed, and created by social movements, parties, or political entrepreneurs. In this sense identity and the strength that is derived when a positive identity ties people together are both a product of movement organization, as well as a cause of movement formation. Movements play a role in shaping identities, but they cannot create new identities out of thin air. As a result, they may be constrained in their efforts to build common identities by history, demographic conditions, or a host of other factors. The degree to which a particular movement-related party has a common political identity upon which to build is an empirical reality that must be evaluated, and this reality may change as a result of historical events and developments. In Tarrow’s words, “identities are not simply

woven out of whole cloth, but respond to changes in political opportunity and constraint, strategic needs, and available cultural materials.”<sup>42</sup>

### Organization

Organizational attributes are key variables in determining not only the likelihood of electoral success, but also the degree to which a movement party will develop in a way that differentiates it from traditional parties. The looser and more decentralized structure of movement-based parties not only contrasts with that of traditional parties but also challenges certain assumptions about the degree of institutionalization that is needed in order to mount effective political challenges. Social movements are by definition loosely structured and generally non-hierarchical, making them particularly flexible and effective in their ability to respond to new opportunities and frame issues in new ways (Tarrow 1998). This flexibility has generally been viewed as an asset for social movements but a hindrance to their involvement in party politics, which are believed to require greater structure and institutionalization. In their book on party systems in Latin America Mainwaring and Scully (1995) argue that institutionalized parties hold the key to democratic stability, governability, and effective representation.

The organizational structures of both the Worker’s Party and Pachakutik were decentralized and democratic in nature. The electoral success of these two parties and the degree to which one views them as contributing to democratic consolidation challenges the idea that looser, less institutionalized structures are not as effective for

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<sup>42</sup> Tarrow 1998: 120.

competing in the electoral arena or that less tightly structured parties weaken democratic institutions and representation. Although it is a study of a very different type of party, Levitsky's (2003) work on the transformation of the Peronist Party in Argentina from a labor-based to a clientelistic party bears some resemblance to my argument about the implications of party structure. Levitsky argues that part of the reason the Peronist Party under Menem was able to engineer this surprising transformation was because it was more loosely structured. According to Levitsky, the party's flexible structure allowed it to respond with more agility to the rapid economic changes resulting from neoliberalism, including the rapid decline in the power of labor, which had been the party's historic bedrock constituency.<sup>43</sup>

In a similar way, Pachakutik's loose, decentralized and flexible organization, far from being a liability, proved to be a powerful resource. For example, the decentralized nature of the party allowed for a significant degree of flexibility, autonomy, and diversity at the local level in terms of strategic alliances with other parties, which was an important factor in the party's success at this level.

In some cases, social movement structures may be compatible with party building needs, however, not all social movements have succeeded in using their organizational base to build a party. What differences in internal organizational structure separate the successful from the unsuccessful cases, and for those social movement parties that have experienced success, what is it that binds them together? I consider these two questions in Chapter 8 when I compare the experience of the Katarista parties in Bolivia with that of Pachakutik. One of the organizational

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<sup>43</sup> Siavelis 2004.

characteristics I identify as key is the existence of practices and organizational norms that foster accountability and fluid communication between the leadership and the grassroots. To refer to the ties that connect the movement leadership to the grassroots I borrow the term, “*connective structures*”, from Tarrow. He defines these as the structures that, “link leaders and followers, center and periphery, and different parts of a movement sector, permitting coordination and aggregation between movement organizations.”<sup>44</sup> I argue that strong “connective structures” between the leadership and base are essential for social movement-based parties. Because social movements tend to be resource-poor, they cannot rely as much on clientelistic relationships as the glue to connect the grassroots to the party, nor can they afford to hire campaign workers, so they must be able to mobilize a larger number of volunteers. Participatory, democratic organizational structures that facilitate communication between the grassroots and the leadership, as well as foster accountability strengthen movement organizations and give people at the grassroots a sense of ownership and involvement in the movement, which is essential if members are going to be willing to give of their own time and energy for the movement-party.

One of the key differences I discovered in comparing Bolivian and Ecuadorian movement structures, norms, and leaderships styles was the degree to which movement organizations and the parties they spawned succeeded in incorporating organizational norms and practices from the indigenous community level into their own decision-making structures. I found that when organizational practices and norms reflected community-level values and practices then the ties between the

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<sup>44</sup> Tarrow 1998: 124.



leadership and the base were stronger and more resilient, and organizations and parties were more effective. In Ecuador I found that many of the norms and practices that were part of indigenous community life had been successfully translated to higher organizational levels in the indigenous movement organizations and in Pachakutik. The fact that the party's internal organizational practices and culture reflected norms that were familiar to and viewed as legitimate by people in the movement and in grassroots communities was an important factor contributing to organizational effectiveness. By contrast, in Bolivia the leadership styles and organizational culture that characterized the regional and national peasant federations as they emerged in the 1980s did not as clearly reflect community-level norms. I argue that this disconnection in the Bolivian case played a role in the comparatively greater difficulties that Bolivian peasant and indigenous movements had in forming successful, independent political parties.

This part of my argument builds upon and lends support to work done by Cornell and Kalt (2000) on the relationship between the structure of Native American tribal governments in the United States and these tribes' success at jump-starting economic development. Cornell and Kalt assert that, "constitutional forms appear to be the make-or-break keys to development."<sup>45</sup> Their study tests the degree to which different constitutional arrangements, including provisions for a separation of powers and the presence or not of an independent judiciary, help to curtail rent-seeking and thereby create the conditions for economic development. Their argument is not limited to formal constitutional arrangements; they also emphasize the central role that

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<sup>45</sup> Cornell and Kalt 2000: 443.

“culture” plays in either undergirding or undermining formal institutions. Essentially what they argue is that a government will be more effective in the degree to which constitutional arrangements match and work in congruence with a society’s underlying values and norms about decision-making and political authority. They measure effectiveness as the ability to promote economic development. Their conceptualization of “culture” borrows directly from and builds on North (1990); they define it as being the culturally specific, informal rules of the game, including norms, codes of conduct, and values.

The likelihood of a mismatch between governing structures and underlying cultural values and practices is greater for colonized peoples, including most indigenous peoples, because of the long history of oppression and imposition from foreign cultures. Even after colonized peoples achieve self-rule, it is not uncommon for organizational and governing structures implanted by the colonizing culture to remain in place. Among the cases Cornell and Kalt study there are examples of tribal government structures that were put in place by the U.S. Federal government with little or no consultation with tribal members and that do not reflect the tribes’ cultural views about leadership, authority, and legitimacy. This sort of mismatch, they argue, has negative consequences for the ability of these communities to exert social control over their leadership and members, prevent rent-seeking, and create the right incentive structure for economically productive enterprises.

In my own study of social movement parties I found that Cornell and Kalt’s emphasis on a match between indigenous cultural practices and values, and formal governing institutions was of great importance. However, the subject of my study and

the variables I am concerned with are different than theirs. For instance, the subject of my study is not government per se but social movement and party organization.

Likewise, my dependent variable is not economic development but the ability of social movement organizations to launch successful political parties. Furthermore, the mismatch that emerged as a significant factor in my study was not a disconnection between informal norms and formal constitutional structures but a gap between organizational practices, norms, and values at the community and higher organizational levels, such as regional and national peasant organizations.

Again building on North (1990), Cornell and Kalt posit that culture, that set of informal norms and values that guide an individual's actions and set the parameters for acceptable action, is the glue that binds formal institutions and reduces the degree to which governments must resort to coercion to exact compliance from citizens. In other words, culture helps to overcome societies' collective action problems. The efficacy of particular cultural norms and values in organizing society for different tasks plays a decisive role in the "paths" taken by different societies.

On a smaller scale, social movements also face collective action problems. Scholars have devoted much energy to debating the factors that allow successful ones to overcome the problem of free riding and thereby create the conditions for effective collective action. An important vein in the literature on social movements emphasizes the importance of non-material incentives, such as ideology, identity, and the positive rewards experienced by members in the form of solidarity and the sense of being part of something larger than oneself.

Political parties generally rely to a far greater degree on selective and material incentives than do social movements to achieve their goals. For example, today it is the rule rather than the exception that the hard work of campaigning is done largely by paid staff with varying levels of involvement by volunteers. There are many more opportunities in parties than in social movements for employment and, of course, for office seeking for ambitious party members. Precisely because of the greater opportunities for access to power and resources that go along with participation in a political party, there is also a greater risk of “rent-seeking” by the party leadership and elected officials than is the case generally in a social movement. Parties use different combinations of non-material and in some cases material incentives to mobilize voters and compete. Generally, in wealthy, more economically developed countries parties rely more on their programmatic positions on different issues to attract voters. In the developing world, however, the use of material incentives, especially to attract poor voters, has been common and is exemplified by the practices of vote buying, making promises of particularistic projects for small communities, holding rallies where free liquor and food is handed out, among other tactics. In other words, a more clientelistic type of relationship with voters is one that relies to a greater extent on material incentives to attract voters. Because they are generally resource-poor, social movement parties cannot effectively compete with established parties on the basis of clientelism, at least not at the outset.<sup>46</sup> These parties must instead marshal other

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<sup>46</sup> This may change if and when a social movement party comes into power, as presumably it would then have greater access to any available state resources for patronage and clientelistic purposes. For example, the Brazilian PT was engulfed in a corruption scandal in 2005 involving accusations that the party made hefty payoffs to congressional deputies from other political parties to gain their support for the administration’s legislative agenda. See Maack 2005; Rohter and Forero 2005; Rubin 2005.

resources, namely the organizational resources of the social movements that spawned them. These organizational resources are important at a number of levels of party functioning, including mobilizing the party base for campaigning and creating incentive structures to counter outside efforts at leadership cooptation.

Organizational resources, then, are the key to success for social movement-based parties. Making a parallel argument to the one made by Cornell and Kalt (2000) with regard to economic development, I argue that a movement's resources will be more available for and effective in mobilization and electoral competition if there is congruence between the values, norms, and decision-making patterns at the grassroots level and those of higher organizational levels. Why is this important? How does it make a difference? In the first place, congruence between norms and practices at different levels should result in a higher level of identification and stronger ties between the leadership and the grassroots. The reflection of community practices and norms by leaders should create greater levels of trust in the leadership and lower the likelihood that leaders will be dismissed by the grassroots as corrupt in the absence of strong evidence of such behavior. Stronger identification with and trust in the organization and leadership should also make it easier to mobilize movement participants to work for and vote for the party. Greater levels of grassroots participation should increase the accountability of movement leaders' and elected party politicians to the grassroots.

It is not only a match between community and organizational culture and practices that is important, but also the types of practices, values, and norms that permeate social movement organizations and parties. Pachakutik had a highly

democratic and decentralized internal structure that, far from being a liability for the party, was an important, powerful resource that allowed the party to grow and make electoral inroads. The party's strong, cohesive and yet democratic, participatory internal structure was crucial in mobilizing people at the grassroots to participate in the political campaigns. In summary, three of the most important organizational capabilities for social movement are: (1) strong links and lines of communication between the grassroots and the party; (2) effective means of holding leadership accountable and preventing monopolization of leadership positions; and (3) experience and dedication to resolving internal disputes. The Ecuadorian indigenous movement developed all three of these capabilities, and I would argue that they were able to do so, in part, because of the strong connection between grassroots indigenous community values and practices and the organizational culture of the regional and national social movement organizations. I contend that this is the most important factor explaining Pachakutik's electoral success.

The finding that Pachakutik's organizational structure and culture reflects and incorporates norms and practices from indigenous communities raises an interesting point for the literature on internal party structure and the debate between neo-institutionalists and others about the degree to which constitutional engineering can impact political party behavior. Neo-institutionalists contend that formal constitutional arrangements, in particular, electoral law and the formal laws that set the rules for party competition are the most important determinants of political party behavior and party system development. To the degree that Pachakutik represented a distinct model of party organization and behavior, one that more closely reflected a

social movement model of organization than the prevailing political-party model in Ecuador, it raises questions about the predominant focus by neo-institutionalists on formal institutions and suggests that it may be important to consider the influence of other, perhaps, equally important factors affecting party development and behavior.

Having argued for the importance of congruence between cultural patterns at the local and higher institutional levels, I then consider why this congruence existed within the Ecuadorian indigenous movement but much less so within Bolivian peasant organizations. In Chapter 8 I trace this contrast back to key differences in the historical development of state and peasant relations; I compare the early years of indigenous and peasant organizing in both countries and find in this historical period the source of later organizational differences. I argue that the period of agrarian reform was the “critical juncture”<sup>47</sup> in both countries that set patterns of state-peasant relations and peasant organizational development. The conditions within which peasant organizing took place during this period and those who led the organizing efforts in both countries left a lasting imprint on the peasant and later indigenous organizations as they developed over the next fifty years. While peasant and indigenous organizations in both countries eventually moved toward autonomy and the construction of strong movements in the decades after agrarian reform, many underlying patterns of organization and decision-making persisted from this earlier period. To use North’s (1990) language, the organizational culture that was fostered in the early years proved to be “sticky” and continued to exert an important influence

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<sup>47</sup> I borrow the concept of “critical juncture” from North North 1990.

on leadership patterns, grassroots expectations, and organizational norms within peasant and indigenous organizations in the succeeding decades.

I found that the crucial factor that accounts for the difference in organizational development between the Ecuadorian and Bolivian organizations was the role played by the state in those early years of peasant organizing.<sup>48</sup> In Bolivia the revolutionary state through its party and trade union organizers was the key outside actor promoting peasant organization in the countryside. It was a massive and concerted effort by the state to transform the peasantry into a pillar of support for the revolutionary government. Peasant organizations were scaled up relatively quickly from the community level to regional and national organizations. The model foisted on peasant organizations was that of the modern trade union, as opposed to an autochthonous model developed by the communities themselves.

By contrast in Ecuador, while the state implemented agrarian reform it did not play a direct or predominant role in actually organizing peasant communities on the ground. The outside actors who were key in early peasant organizing included the Catholic Church and small leftist political parties, neither of which coordinated their activities with the state or, for that matter, with each other. As a result, the process of peasant organizing in Ecuador was much more decentralized and less coordinated.

This difference between the two cases, one characterized by strong and long-lived state intervention in peasant affairs (about two decades, from 1952 to the mid-1970s) and the other by the relatively weak presence of the state, had an impact in

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<sup>48</sup> My insights about the importance of the nature of the relationship between the state and societal groups in producing popular identity and in setting the stage for movement development were shaped in part by Foweraker and Craig 1990.



later years on peasant and indigenous organizations in terms of their autonomy, identity, and organizational cultures. The stronger and more direct role played by the state in the Bolivian case had a negative impact on the development of peasant organizations later on, resulting in certain detrimental organizational patterns that persist into the present. These patterns contributed to the longer gestation period in Bolivia before movement parties experienced success.

Whether state efforts to foment or engineer social organization is beneficial or detrimental in the long term to popular organization and democratic political culture is a question that has elicited a variety of responses in the academic literature; no clear consensus yet exists. Do state-directed efforts at mobilization and organization empower groups in civil society or do they curtail autonomous organization? Do different types of states have differing impacts on the development of civil society? Totalitarian states certainly have a negative impact, but beyond highly repressive states there is a range of other experiences and assessments about the impact of state-led mobilization of society. In her study of political culture among shantytown dwellers in Lima, Peru Stokes (1995) found that twenty years later, those who had participated in the social organizations initiated under Velasco's reformist military regime (1968-1975) were much more radical, had a much clearer sense of their own rights as citizens, and possessed a stronger working-class identity than did their neighbors who had not participated in these programs. These working class citizens had developed cultural attitudes and beliefs that were far more assertive and radical than those of their neighbors who had not participated in these programs. The implication of Stokes's argument is that the organizing efforts of the Velasco

government served to empower people and to alter, if you will, their political culture and political outlook. In a similar vein, Alvarez (1990) argues that the strongest women's movements in Latin America emerged in countries like Peru, Mexico, and Brazil where authoritarian regimes in the 1970s engaged in "top-down mobilization" of society, as opposed to the highly exclusionary regimes, like those in Argentina and Uruguay.<sup>49</sup>

My comparison of the historical patterns of peasant organization in Bolivia and Ecuador leads to a somewhat more negative assessment of the long-term impact of state-led organizing on social movement organization, at least in this particular case. What accounts for these divergent conclusions about the long-term impact of state initiatives at social mobilization is an interesting area for future research. Few scholars today would dispute the importance of a strong civil society for the success of democracy.<sup>50</sup> The thornier questions are how do strong civil societies develop, and what, if any, role can the state play in aiding the deepening of civil society? Are all state efforts to promote organization in civil society flawed from the outset? Or, do different types of states, approaches to state-led organizing, and state goals yield different results? These questions are relevant not only historically in assessing the legacies of corporatist and reformist states in Latin America but are highly relevant to recent developments in the region and to the prospects for democratic consolidation. For example, President Hugo Chávez has been using Venezuela's abundant oil

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<sup>49</sup> Some scholars of Nicaragua have argued that the popular revolutionary experience in that country strengthened civil society and laid the foundation for a less passive citizenry and greater citizen involvement in democracy. See Anderson and Dodd 2005; Booth and Richard 2006.

<sup>50</sup> The work on civil society and democracy is vast. Seminal works on the topic include Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1990; Putnam 1993.

revenues to increase social spending and promote economic growth. His administration has been collaborating with social movement organizations in order to involve Venezuelan citizens in the state's efforts at social and economic development (Collins 2005) and these massive state efforts will have lasting effects on civil society and political culture into the future. So, while I do not present a broad theory about the impact of state-led mobilizing efforts, the insights from my comparison of patterns of peasant mobilization in Ecuador and Bolivia contribute information about another case that sheds light on this question.

### Material Resources

The final characteristic that I argue is important for social movements to have developed before they attempt to form a political party is a track record of responding to and meeting concrete material needs at the grassroots. This is particularly important for social movements that represent poor and marginalized sectors of the population. Poor people are the most vulnerable to clientelistic offers from political parties because of their pressing material needs. For a new party to be able to attract votes from poor communities away from established parties the new party needs to be able to make a credible argument about how it can respond in concrete ways to local needs. Social movement organizations that have experience organizing or securing outside funding for local development projects have a track record on which to run for elected office. This resource can be important not just for mobilizing the movement's base but also for attracting votes from outside the movement. To the degree movement organizations can demonstrate a track record of delivering concrete

projects that have impacted peoples' lives at the local level previous to forming a political party, their candidates and platforms will be that much more credible both to those inside, as well as outside the movement. This last point is significant in the sense that it refocuses attention on the concrete rewards and incentives that movements use to motivate their members. As discussed earlier, many scholars of social movements have emphasized the important role of collective identity within movements, and this emphasis on culture and identity has been particularly dominant in the study of indigenous movements. While I acknowledge that the forging of collective identity is a key ingredient to movement success, as well as an important resource for social movement parties, I argue that collective identity alone is not sufficient for the long-term survival of social movement organizations representing poor and marginalized people. This is especially the case when movement organizations seek to compete in the electoral arena. In order for social movements representing the poor to successfully compete in the electoral arena they need to have demonstrated a capacity for responding to their constituents' concrete material needs. I would go further and say that the relationship between identity formation and movement achievements is one that is mutually reinforcing and interactive. The construction of a collective identity is something that happens over time and is strengthened as a movement or party wins victories and achieves concrete goals. Similarly, collective identity is often an important motivator for collective action that helps to make attaining political goals possible. But a movement and, much less, a political party will be unable to sustain collective action for long periods of time among a large number of people unless participants begin to see some concrete results

in response to their actions. For the social movement party a track record of responding to concrete needs at the local level is particularly important because, whether out of ideological conviction or simply due to a lack of resources, they do not engage to the same degree in traditional clientelistic politics, at least not at the outset. Therefore, these parties must be able to offer something else if they are to secure voter loyalty from their base and attract votes from the broader population.

### **Social Movement Parties: A New Party Model?**

Given that social movement-based parties became part of the political landscape in some countries, it is important to consider what difference their presence has made. A central objective of this study is to evaluate the real and potential impact of social movement-based parties on politics and political culture. Towards this end, I consider the question of whether or not and to what degree the Pachakutik party functioned in ways qualitatively different from those of traditional parties or whether they simply mirrored the political and organizational culture around them? My findings are consistent with conclusions arrived at in studies of the Worker's Party (Nylen 2000; Samuels 2004) that find that while the party did not fully overcome the deficiencies of traditional parties, it did develop a new, more participatory model. This speaks to the debate in the political parties literature over whether party behavior is more influenced by internal characteristics and interests or the external environment, including political institutions and electoral rules.<sup>51</sup> The example of the Pachakutik Party lends weight to the argument developed most thoroughly by

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<sup>51</sup> See Panebianco 1988 for a discussion of this question.

Panbianco (1988) that internal party structure and historical development play an important and independent role in determining party behavior.

### **Significance for Democratic Consolidation**

A crucial question with regard to social movement political parties is what they portend for democratic consolidation. In many countries in the region social movements have emerged as a potent political force. For Huntington (1968) the combination of a highly mobilized society and weak political institutions was a recipe for disaster, social upheaval, and instability. Even Tarrow (1998) discusses the possibility that we may be living in a period characterized by “social movement societies,” that is societies that are continuously mobilized for direct contestation, and that this may ultimately be problematic and detrimental. Ecuador and Bolivia in the 1990s and into the new millennium both fit Huntington’s model described above, as well as Tarrow’s “social movement society”. During this period social movement organizations mobilized and led innumerable street protests, uprisings, marches, and road blockades, several of which played a central role in bringing down elected governments. Clearly this sort of perpetual recourse to social mobilization as a way of resolving political issues has economic, political, and social costs and does not represent a long-term political equilibrium.

Given this context, the significance of the decision by some social movements to enter the formal political arena is a critical question. Will this lead to the fuller and more adequate incorporation of these groups into the formal political process thereby improving the capacity of formal political institutions to effectively channel and

respond to citizen demands? Or, on the other hand, is it simply a further manifestation of a “social movement society” run amok, of the growing power and legitimacy of political extremists, and the further weakening of democracy and democratic institutions?

My response to this question is that while social movement parties alone may not be able to safeguard democracy and democratic stability, on the whole they represent a positive development for democratic consolidation. This assertion is based in part on Rustow’s (1970) model of democratization, which envisions democratization as a four-stage process that begins with a background condition of national unity. The second phase is one of inconclusive political struggle. The inconclusive struggle leads to a third decision phase in which major political actors decide to accept the existence of diversity in unity and to institutionalize democratic procedures. The final phase and the one that I am most concerned with here is that of “habituation” to democracy. For Rustow habituation is a process in which over time democratic practices prove to be efficient in resolving differences and disputes, which leads political actors increasingly to believe that they are better off playing by the rules of the game than in subverting them when they do not get their preferred outcome.

The fact that some powerful social movements have made the leap into electoral politics is a sign of several important developments. First of all, these formally marginalized groups have gained a modicum of power relative to elites. This is important if formal democracy is going to have any substance in terms rule by the people. Secondly, these groups are creating an opportunity to test the degree to which

participation in the formal democratic process can be a means to achieve their political goals. The very acts of organizing a political party, running candidates for office, winning elections, and governing shape the attitudes of movement members and create vested interests in the democratic process. Additionally, the attitudes of elite actors and the citizenry as a whole towards previously marginalized groups, like the indigenous, also experience important shifts as indigenous people succeed in integrating themselves more fully into the political process.

There are, however, risks involved in social movement participation in electoral politics, the major ones being the absorption of movement-party leaders into corrupt systems and the failure of an alternative political model to materialize. Both of which would lead to the discrediting of social movement organizations. This risk increases as social movement parties gain more power and electoral strength. Pachakutik's track record in this regard has not been flawless; there are plenty of examples of Pachakutik congressional representatives being bought off by the government and then expelled from the party. There have also been cases of corruption and poor administration by local-level Pachakutik politicians. I discuss these cases in more detail in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Clearly once parties come into power there are a series of pressures on them that can easily result in these parties or their members engaging in corrupt practices.

While it is not yet possible to make a prediction about democratic consolidation in the Andes, and it is also not clear that social movement parties themselves will succeed in becoming stable channels for political contestation, I contend that they represent a positive development in this direction and a sign of hope



for achieving, not only political stability, but substantive democracy, by which I mean the effective representation of popular interests.

### **Conclusion**

The emergence of social movement parties came about partly in response to the imposition or attempts to impose neoliberal models on Latin American states. However, while these parties tend to be anti-neoliberal, their emergence cannot be explained simply as a popular reaction to these policies. The lines of causation about how these parties emerged, and therefore, what they represent is much more complex and tied up fundamentally with the nature of the relationship between representatives and voters. Instead of new parties simply emerging as a response to popular outrage, neoliberalism combined with economic crisis created a political opportunity structure that was highly conducive to the emergence of political challengers of all stripes. In some countries, Peru being the emblematic case, successful challengers to traditional political elites implemented far reaching neoliberal reforms. However in other places, like Ecuador, well-organized social movements were able to take advantage of this political opening and make inroads into electoral politics, advancing an anti-neoliberal agenda.

Social movement parties, while by no means pure or perfect, have been some of the most creative in developing new forms of party organization and new types of relationships between voters and elected representatives. Social movement parties tend to be much more participatory and democratic than traditional parties in Latin America. Likewise, through their incorporation of practices and norms from social

movement organizations and local level communities these parties have experimented with new ways of holding elected officials accountable to organized sectors of civil society.

After the return to democracy in the early 1980s a crisis of representation developed in Latin American party systems. These systems were treading water in an effort to find a new means of cementing the relationship between voters and elected representatives after clientelistic ties became more costly and inefficient to maintain. This crisis of representation unglued the region's party systems, which then struggled to recapture a new equilibrium. Social movement parties were at the heart of this struggle. While they did not completely escape the tension between antiquated and inefficient forms of clientelism and new bases for representation, they were at the forefront in experimenting with and implementing new models of voter-party relationships.

It is still too early to predict what the final outcome of this struggle will be, how many more years it will take for these systems to find a new equilibrium, or what role social movement parties will play in the long run. Whatever the fate of social movement parties, some of the ideas they have introduced into formal politics will certainly endure, leaving their mark on the ways Latin American political parties function and interact with voters.

## **Chapter 3**

### **The Ecuadorian Party System and its Parties**

Political parties are shaped by their own internal histories, objectives and organizational structures but also by the environment within which they have to function (Panebianco 1988). Parties' immediate environmental context is the party system itself, which, in turn, is shaped by societal and institutional factors. While the majority of this dissertation focuses on factors internal to Pachakutik and its social movement sponsoring organizations, this chapter describes the broader political context in which this movement party emerged and had to function, namely the Ecuadorian party system and the parties that made up that system. Given that one of the central objectives of this dissertation is to determine the degree to which Pachakutik deviated from standard political practice in Ecuador and succeeded in creating a new party model based on its social movement origins, it is necessary to render an account of that to which it is being compared. This task is important in order to develop a measuring stick for comparing Pachakutik to other parties, as well as for understanding the environmental constraints facing the party and evaluating the degree to which these constraints influenced its development and behavior.

In this chapter I will not only describe the party system and the dominant parties in it but also advance an explanation for why the system developed as it did during the first couple of decades after the return to democracy. Ecuador's party system has been much maligned in the academic literature as variously, inchoate, fragmented, volatile, and anti-political. During the 1980s and 1990s it was one of the

most highly fragmented party systems in the region; none of its parties could boast of a truly national reach; and ideological coherence among all parties was in short supply. Given these characteristics, some even questioned whether a party system could be said to exist in Ecuador.<sup>52</sup> Similarly scholars have tended to view Ecuadorian parties as largely dysfunctional, attaching a host of negative adjectives to them, including: disconnected from civil society, floating, populist, clientelistic, personalistic, and run by *caudillos*.

While the current trend in most studies of party systems and parties is to emphasize the role played by institutional variables, I argue that it is impossible to understand the evolution of Ecuador's party system and the behavior of individual parties within that system without reference to the structural features of poverty and inequality. Ecuador is an important case to look at in this regard, because it is impossible to attribute all or even most of the significant failings of the parties and the party system to faulty political institutions and rules. Instead the answer must be found in the country's socio-economic development and structure. I argue that high levels of income inequality and poverty tend to produce a clientelistic relationship between voters and politicians, which can have deleterious effects on party organization and discipline, as well as on lines of accountability between voters and their representatives. The dominance of clientelism combined with the persistence and strength of regional cleavages in Ecuador goes a long way to explaining the fragmentation and volatility that has characterized the Ecuadorian party system since

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<sup>52</sup> Jonathan Hartlyn, a political scientist who works on Colombia, posed this question in a brief informal conversation we had.

the early 1980s, despite, as we shall see, the adoption of formal rules and institutions that should have militated against such an outcome.

This chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the early history and development of Ecuador's party system leading up to the transition from military rule to democracy in 1979. The transitional period in the late 1970s is important for understanding Ecuador's party system for two reasons: first, because Ecuador's formal political institutions were completely redesigned in the course of the transition with an eye towards creating a modern and coherent party system. Secondly, the pacted and elite nature of the transition, in which popular sectors, social movements, and labor unions played minimal roles, helps account for the types of parties that emerged in the 1980s.

After this historical overview and a discussion of the founding moment of Ecuador's democracy, I describe the characteristics of the country's parties and party system as they developed in the 1980s and 1990s, and I entertain different explanations for the sub-optimal nature of the party system. First I consider whether the extent to which features of Ecuador's electoral laws and formal political structure can account for certain pernicious patterns in the system. I conclude that it is impossible to account for Ecuador's fragmented and volatile party system using an institutional analytical lens. After pointing to the shortcomings of institutional explanations, I turn to social and economic variables and weigh their impact. My argument seeks to demonstrate how structural conditions, including regionalism, poverty, and inequality, subverted the lofty goals of the country's constitutional designers to produce a fragmented, highly regional, and volatile party system.

After this analysis of the broad factors that shaped Ecuador's parties and the evolution of its party system, the second half of the chapter turns to an analysis of individual parties within the system. This analysis is based on a series of twenty-three semi-structured interviews that I conducted with Ecuadorian congressional representatives from five different parties, including Pachakutik, between 1999 and 2000. In this chapter I analyze the data in the interviews with legislators from the four major parties. The data from the interviews with Pachakutik deputies will be analyzed in chapters 5 and 6. In this chapter I examine and compare the dominant parties in terms of their internal organizational structure, including leadership styles and practices, internal decision-making patterns, and candidate selection. I also discuss the degree to which parties played a role in candidates' paths to elected office and the implications of the strength or weakness of this relationship for party loyalty and discipline in congress. The final section examines legislators' perceptions of what it took to win elective office and what they thought explained why voters in their province voted the way they did.

This section, then, implicitly shifts the focus of analysis away from the broad features of the party system and institutional rules to the internal dynamics of parties themselves and the relationship between candidates and politicians and those who vote for them. In adopting this focus I follow the lead of Panebianco (1988), who argues for the theoretical importance of internal party dynamics and history as an explanation for party behavior. However, I qualify this focus on internal party structure and history by arguing that broad structural characteristics are a key context within which parties must function and in this way they too have a significant impact on party

behavior and development. Here I build on work by Lyne (1999), who argues that when clientelism represents the dominant strategy for parties and politicians it has a profound distorting impact on party behavior and the development of the party system itself. Ecuador, I believe, offers a clear example of the pattern Lyne identified. The question that is introduced in this chapter and more fully explored and analyzed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 is the degree to which Pachakutik, through reliance on its unique internal history and organizational resources, succeeded in overcoming the structural constraints present in the Ecuadorian system in order to build a new party model. In other words, to what degree can a particular internal party structure (Panebianco's focus) overcome the structural constraints of poverty and inequality (implicit in Lyne's model) to produce a party model based on a non-clientelistic relationship with voters and that is capable, therefore, of advancing a political agenda that more consistently represents popular interests. Before we can get to this question, we need to understand the broader political context within which Pachakutik emerged and competed for political power.

### **Historical Overview**

The dominant feature of formal politics in Ecuador previous to the 1978 transition was exclusion – of the poor, the illiterate, the working classes, and the indigenous. In a context of highly restricted franchise political parties were the domains of the elite. The pattern of elite domination of formal politics with little effective challenge from parties representing the popular classes persisted far longer in Ecuador than in most other countries in the region and continued to shape party

behavior after the transition to democracy.<sup>53</sup> It was not until the 1990s that popular classes began to play a direct role in formal politics.

Following a typical Latin American pattern, after independence and during the early part of the twentieth century, Ecuador's political system was composed of small cadre parties that divided along conservative and liberal lines. In Ecuador the Conservative and Liberal parties broke down largely along regional lines with Liberals representing the more modern commercial and export sectors on the Coast and the Conservatives representing the Highland landowning class, whose economic base resided in the semi-feudal hacienda systems that produced food and textiles for domestic consumption.

Throughout the nineteenth century the Conservatives controlled national politics using a system of indirect elections that was easily manipulated and controlled from above. Direct elections, although still with major restrictions the franchise, were instituted after the violent Liberal Revolution of 1895. However, electoral fraud and manipulation limited the degree to which these institutional changes fostered any real political competition. One indicator of the lack of competitiveness in the system is the fact that for twenty-six years, during the Liberal-dominated period (1898-1924), not a single Conservative served in congress.<sup>54</sup>

Patterns of electoral fraud and lack of minority representation eventually led to a constitutional crisis in 1944. Out of this crisis, which led to the second presidency of

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<sup>53</sup> Conaghan also argues that Ecuador's post-1978 party system was profoundly shaped by the legacy of the oligarchic political structures that remained in place through the end of the 1970s Conaghan 1994: 257.

<sup>54</sup> See Albán Gómez 1994.



Ecuador's preeminent twentieth century *caudillo*, José María Velasco Ibarra,<sup>55</sup> came significant electoral reforms. An autonomous electoral body was established to oversee elections and prevent fraud, mechanisms to guarantee minority representation in government were introduced, and proportional representation was eventually adopted in 1947.<sup>56</sup> Despite these reforms, the period from 1944 to 1972 was one of continued political instability, marked by frequent military interventions.

More importantly, these reforms did not include any significant expansion of the franchise. Despite a series of incremental reforms expanding suffrage through the 1960s, literacy requirements remained in place, which in a country where the majority of the population was illiterate served to severely limit voting rights. As late as 1968, only 15 percent of the population voted in elections.<sup>57</sup> Thus, for the better part of the twentieth century, Ecuador remained an oligarchic democracy interrupted, not infrequently, by military interventions.

The persistence of a highly exclusionary political system and the absence of any significant political incorporation or mobilization of popular classes through the end of the 1970s represented a divergence from trends overtaking the region during the post-war period. For most Latin American nations World War II and the decades following it were characterized by social ferment and political projects aimed at the political and economic incorporation of the working classes and popular sectors, albeit through various means, ranging from populism to popular revolution. Ecuador, by

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<sup>55</sup> Velasco Ibarra served as President of Ecuador five different times between 1934 and 1972. For one of the most important historical analyses of his impact on Ecuadorian politics and of his version of populism, see Quintero López 1997.

<sup>56</sup> Albán Gómez 1994.

<sup>57</sup> Conaghan 1995: 445 citing figures taken from Wilkie 1980: 543. The same figure is cited in Mejía Acosta 1996: 133, who in turn cites McDonald and Ruhl 1989.

contrast, did not experience any such moment of popular incorporation and lagged significantly behind its neighbors in terms of working class and popular sector organization. While in most Latin American countries organized movements of workers or peasants pressed for political change and incorporation, in Ecuador popular groups remained comparatively weak and state actors made little if any effort to organize them. Liisa North (2004) observes that historically the only elite group in Ecuador to advance an incorporative project was the military. However, the military's attempts at reform were always successfully blocked by elite interests and therefore never really took off. North argues that the primary reason the military proved unable to override elite interests was because the weakness of popular organizations meant that this sector could not serve as an effective counterweight to elite resistance:

The fundamental weakness of all the military-led efforts to strengthen public institutions, undertake redistributive reforms, and sponsor a socially more benign pattern of development (through progressive-tax, industrial-promotion, agrarian, and other policies) resided in their lack of organized social and political support that might have countered the power of the country's dominant classes.<sup>58</sup>

The relative weakness of popular sector organization made it easier to restrict the franchise and participation in formal politics till so late in the twentieth century. The debility of popular sector organization resulted both from the country's economic structure, as well as, regional and ethnic divisions that served to keep the lower classes divided. In terms of economic structures, the overriding reliance on agriculture meant that the urban working class, an engine of popular organization in countries like Argentina and Chile, remained quite small. Similarly, there was no significant mining

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<sup>58</sup> North 2004: 196.

industry in Ecuador, which in countries like Bolivia and Chile had served as the loci for the foundation of strong and militant working-class movements. According to official government statistics cited by Anita Isaacs, in 1970 those employed in manufacturing represented only 12 percent of the economically active population and only 19 percent of this figure were working in the modern sector, with a full 81 percent employed as artisans.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, the use of land tenure systems based on debt-peonage, like the *huasipungo* system in the Highlands, were extremely effective at controlling and repressing the large rural population. This coupled with high levels of illiteracy served to keep peasant sectors completely disenfranchised and unable to play any role in formal politics.

Regional and ethnic divisions are another key set of factors that help to account for the feeble nature of popular organization in Ecuador during most of the twentieth century. Regionalism, a defining social cleavage in the country since the nineteenth century, was used effectively by elites to mobilize middle and lower classes and to impede unity among subordinate classes (North 2004 ). Regional divisions among the subordinate classes were and are compounded by ethnic divisions and deeply entrenched racism and racial stratification,<sup>60</sup> which historically functioned so as to make unity among Ecuador's poor and working classes quite difficult.

As a result of the political exclusion of the popular sectors and their weak challenge to elite domination, important reforms and policies that took hold in much of South America during the post-war period, including agrarian reform, corporatism,

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<sup>59</sup> Isaacs 1993: 85.

<sup>60</sup> For analyses of racism and racial constructions in Ecuador see Cervone and Rivera 1999.

and import substitution industrialization came late and, when they did, tended to be implemented in substantially diluted ways. Take, for example, agrarian reform, which was carried out by military governments in 1964 and 1973. These reforms were significant in that they succeeded in dismantling the semi-feudal debt-peonage systems that had survived throughout the Highlands and even in parts of the more economically dynamic coastal regions. However, in comparison to similar reforms in Peru or Bolivia the amount of land redistributed by the state was rather meager and the government was much more cautious in directly expropriating land from private owners. As a consequence, expropriated land represented a comparatively smaller percentage of the total land redistributed; much of the land that was distributed during these years came either from the Catholic Church or the government itself. Moreover, much of the land distributed to peasants was of poor quality. Thus, Ecuadorian agrarian reform resulted in a change in the relations of production but, compared to some other countries, it did not result in as radical a shift in ownership or land tenure patterns.

Like agrarian reform, Ecuador's version of populism was more show than substance. Velasco de Ibarra, the single most important civilian politician in Ecuador from the 1930s through the 1970s, is generally categorized as a populist, however, as Quintero López (1997) demonstrates, this label applies to his oratorical style and charisma, not to his social project or impact. Whereas the populism of a Perón in Argentina or a Vargas in Brazil involved challenges to the traditional political and economic structures and the forging of new coalitions that involved organized labor, *Velasquismo* did neither. Quintero argues that Velasco, far from challenging the

country's dominant political parties and elites, used his political capital to craft a political alliance between the Highland landed classes and the coastal elites that excluded organized labor. Velasco was useful to the traditional elites, who he helped to keep in power, because he was able to mobilize a larger group of voters in the context of a somewhat expanded franchise. Quintero cautions that:

Velasco should not be viewed as someone who *mobilized* [emphasis in the original] the masses but, instead, as one who *agglutinated* [emphasis in the original] the masses already mobilized by the land-owning class and its party. In this process the Catholic Church of 1933 acted as a focal point for the political and ideological regrouping of the most archaic sectors of the landowning oligarchy. For all of these reasons, Velasco's electoral triumph was rooted in the reaffirmation of "oligarchic domination" (in the form of *gamonalism*, *caciquismo*, and *caudillismo*<sup>61</sup>) as concrete expressions of the local and regional oligarchs. In other words, [it was rooted] in all of that with which "populism" (supposedly) broke.<sup>62</sup>

Unlike other populist leaders, Velasco vehemently opposed extending the franchise to illiterates. When this was proposed during the 1945 Constituent Assembly, he is reported to have opined, "This would be to risk the creation of a state of chaos, ignorance, and permanent uneasiness."<sup>63</sup> Needless to say, he did not create corporatist organizations among the working class or popular sectors. Also significant was the fact that he never attempted to promote import substitution industrialization, the economic hallmark of populist regimes. *Velasquismo*, then, represented a continuation of, not a break with, nineteenth century politics and economic policy. If anything, he helped prolong exclusionary politics by successfully bridging differences

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<sup>61</sup> These terms refer to different Latin American types of political power, structures, and political bossism. Often they refer to forms of social, political, and economic control wielded by strongmen at the local and regional levels.

<sup>62</sup> Quintero López 1997: 341. Translation by the author.

<sup>63</sup> Albán, Ayala Mora and Grijalva 1994: 80. Translation by the author.

between the regional elites. He accomplished this through the use of particularism, side-payments, and corruption, as opposed to forging a new class compromise based on a forward-looking economic program.

In conclusion, the Ecuadorian political system previous to 1972 was an oligarchic democracy dominated by the country's powerful economic elites from both the Coast and the Highlands.<sup>64</sup> While there were some leftist parties, the longest standing one being the Socialist Party (PSE) founded in 1926, they remained small minority parties with weak mass bases and little ability to impact government policy-making. There were some corporatist structures in place, but these represented what I would call, exclusionary corporatism, as only capitalist sectors were represented and labor excluded. For example, in the senate "functional" seats were filled not by popular election but were reserved for direct appointment by the chambers of commerce and industry. There were no seats for labor or peasant representatives. These exclusionary political structures reflected and at the same time reinforced the country's highly unequal and relatively backward economic structure, consisting of semi-feudal land tenure structures in the Highlands, an agro-export economy on the Coast and no significant industrialization.

### **Military Rule in the 1970s**

In 1972 the military seized power just as the country was poised to cash in on a major oil boom. The military viewed the discovery of oil as a unique opportunity to launch Ecuador on a path of development and modernity and did not trust civilian

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<sup>64</sup> Conaghan Conaghan 1994 makes the point that Ecuador was an oligarchic democracy for most of the twentieth century previous to the 1978 transition.

politicians with this project. Like other militaries in the region at the time, they had come to view civilian politicians as corrupt and inept and feared they would squander this unique opportunity. The military coup of 1972 brought General Rodríguez Lara to power. He was inspired by and sought to emulate the developmentalist experiment of Peru's reformist military government led by Alvarado Velasco (1968-1976). Rodríguez Lara implemented moderate ISI policies and under his leadership the state began to play a more active role in the economic arena. The growth in the size of the state sector required the expansion of the state bureaucracy and the development of a larger professional class. Growing opportunities for professional employment in the state sector led to the growth of a sizeable middle class. Likewise, under military rule a second round of agrarian reform measures were enacted and access to education was significantly expanded.

Despite these important changes, the reforms undertaken by Ecuador's military government were moderate and more limited in scope compared to the deep and thoroughgoing reforms enacted by the more radical military government in Peru.<sup>65</sup> Following previous patterns in twentieth century Ecuadorian history, Rodríguez Lara was stymied in his effort to transform Ecuador's economic structure by elite opposition, which forced him to substantially moderate his proposals for economic and social reform and ultimately led to his overthrow by another faction of the military in 1976. Rodríguez Lara lacked an organized base of popular support that could back his redistributive initiatives and, unlike Velasco in Peru, he and the Ecuadorian military were unwilling to organize such a base. Despite their modernizing and

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<sup>65</sup> For studies of the Velasco regime in Peru, see Lowenthal 1975; McClintock and Lowenthal 1983.

reformist intentions, the military leaders were apprehensive about popular organization fearing that it might escape their control.<sup>66</sup> They naively believed that promises of equitable growth would be sufficient to win widespread popular support even absent concerted efforts at mobilization.

Having ruled out the possibility of actively organizing a popular base of support and despite its lack of confidence in the country's political and economic elites, the military under Rodríguez Lara knew it had to obtain elite support if the regime was to survive. Consequently, the military actively sought to cultivate this support, while taking popular support for granted. The regime appointed prominent businessmen to sensitive economic ministries and other powerful positions in government.<sup>67</sup> Business associations and chambers were given access to the government and served as the nexus between the state and the private sector.<sup>68</sup> Likewise, certain local elected officials, such as mayors or prefects, from the country's dominant political parties were permitted to retain their posts.<sup>69</sup>

The fact that the military did not seek to organize popular sectors meant that by the time the transition to democracy took place, there was no legacy of government sponsored political party activity among these sectors to build on in the new democratic period. This, combined with the fact that organization among workers and

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<sup>66</sup> Isaacs 1993: 92.

<sup>67</sup> Isaacs 1993: 72

<sup>68</sup> Isaacs 1993: 68.

<sup>69</sup> Examples included Sixto Durán Ballén and Alvaro Pérez. In 1970 Durán Ballén was elected mayor of Quito on the PSC ticket and that same year Alvaro Pérez of the Liberal Party was elected provincial prefect of Pichincha. The military asked both to remain in their positions during the years of military rule. After the return to democracy, they continued to play prominent roles in party politics with Durán Ballén eventually winning the presidency in 1992 and Pérez winning a seat in congress. The source of information about Durán Ballén's political service during the military regime came from, Albán, Ayala Mora and Grijalva 1994. Information about Pérez's background came from the author's interview with him, Quito, December 21, 1999.



peasants was relatively weak during and previous to the 1970s, helps explain why leftist parties in Ecuador did not emerge with more vigor in the 1980s once universal franchise was implemented.

In her study of political consciousness in Lima's *barrios jóvenes*,<sup>70</sup> Stokes (1995) argues convincingly that citizen involvement during the 1970s in the government sponsored SINAMOS program<sup>71</sup> contributed to a discernable rise in class-consciousness and in the development of a different type of political culture that was less clientelistic and more assertive toward political authority. She argues that the more militant political consciousness that was sown during the state-led organizing efforts of the 1970s translated, in the 1980s after the return to democracy, into support for leftist political parties. So in Peru, even though the industrial working class was not terribly large, leftist political parties could count on voter support among the urban poor, who were largely employed in the informal sector. In contrast, in Ecuador, despite expansion of the franchise at the time of the transition, leftist political parties remained small throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Even though there was not a period of concerted efforts by the state at corporatist incorporation of workers or peasants, this is not to say that the changes wrought by the Rodríguez Lara government had no impact on the popular sectors or that these sectors remained unorganized. Significant organization did take place during the 1970s among both workers and peasants, but it was largely autonomous from the state. In 1974, for example, an important advance in union organizing was

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<sup>70</sup> This is the Peruvian term for "shanty towns".

<sup>71</sup> SINAMOS, literally "without masters," was a major program initiated during the Velasco regime that sought to organize the urban and rural masses throughout Peru.

made when several competing unions united under one national banner to form the Unitary Workers' Front (FUT). Similarly, in 1972 indigenous organizations throughout the Highlands came together to found the regional organization, ECUARUNARI, which in 1986 would be one of the two regional organizations to found the CONAIE. The implications of this autonomous development will be much more fully explored in later chapters; at this juncture two main consequences should be noted. First of all, the lack of historically strong ties with the state made it possible to attain organizational autonomy earlier on, which made the formation in the 1990s of an autonomous political party with its base in the social and labor movements easier. However, in the 1980s, the immediate consequence of the absence of state-sponsored mobilization was that no party emerged at the outset with a clear commitment to effectively representing popular sectors.<sup>72</sup> This represents a marked contrast with most of the other major countries in South America, where leftist or populist parties with strong historical ties to labor, like the Peronist Party in Argentina or APRA in Peru, emerged as major contenders in the 1980s and at some point during that decade came into power.<sup>73</sup>

While the 1960s and 1970s did not see a corporatist incorporation of Ecuadorian workers or peasants, structural reforms and socio-economic changes wrought important changes that led to the emergence of new social protagonists in the

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<sup>72</sup> Some might object to this conclusion by pointing to Jaime Roldós, who won the presidency in 1979 on the CFP ticket. While he as an individual and as president ruled in ways that addressed popular sector demands and sought to foster greater inclusion, he did not really represent his party. As a result, after he was killed in a plane crash in 1982, much of the political momentum towards responding and including worker and peasant demands was lost.

<sup>73</sup> Brazil, like Ecuador, represents an exception to this pattern. The PT was founded in the late 1970s but struggled during the 1980s and did not begin to make significant electoral inroads until the 1990s.

1980s and 1990s. Two of the most important changes were the growth of the middle class and the emergence of a more organized indigenous peasantry. As mentioned previously, the expansion of the state sector under the military governments and moderate efforts at import substitution industrialization were the main forces behind the growth of the middle class. Agrarian reform increased access to education and greater mobility among the indigenous, which resulted in the emergence of a cadre of indigenous leaders, the development of a new ethnic identity, and the scaling up of indigenous organizations from local to regional and, eventually in the 1980s, to the national level.<sup>74</sup>

By the 1980s the middle class represented an important new sector of the electorate, as did the huge masses of peasants, workers, and the poor, who previously had, for the most part, been disenfranchised. While middle class professionals played an important role in some of the parties that took center stage in Ecuador during the 1980s, peasants, workers, and the poor were not yet sufficiently well organized or united to have developed a party that included and represented their interests.

### **The Pacted Transition to Democracy**

The relative weakness of Ecuador's popular classes meant that popular protest did not play a significant role in the country's transition to democracy. While the causal weight of social protest in Third Wave democratic transitions has been questioned by scholars who have largely concluded that in most cases it did not

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<sup>74</sup> The development of the indigenous movement in the Highlands is treated in a bit more detail in Chapter 7, however, this is not the central focus of this dissertation. For studies of the origins and emergence of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, see Andolina 1999; Pallares 2002; Selverston-Scher 2001; Yashar 2005.

represent the most important explanatory variable, nevertheless, in countries like Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, it was an important part of the story.<sup>75</sup> In Ecuador, however, there was no great popular uprising against military rule, and the threat of popular protest did not figure in any significant way in the calculations of the elite actors who negotiated the transition. Isaacs (1993) describes Ecuador's transition as a military-led, three-year, consultative process involving representatives from most organized segments of civil and political society. She notes that while this process resulted in the successful striking of a pact between the outgoing military and civilian political leadership and agreements between political parties, no socio-economic pacts involving labor and business were hammered out. She attributes the absence of this third type of pact to the fact that the continued oil boom and the government's reliance on oil revenues granted it a high degree of independence and autonomy vis-à-vis the productive sector. Additionally she offers another factor, "the disproportionate strength of entrepreneurial groups as contrasted with that of popular sector organizations."<sup>76</sup>

As part of the transition process a new constitution was drafted, and in 1978 it was put to and approved by the electorate in a referendum.<sup>77</sup> To draft the new constitution the military convened commissions made up of legal scholars, political party activists, and other prominent members of civil society. Osvaldo Hurtado, leader and founder of the Popular Democracy party (DP) and who was elected vice

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<sup>75</sup> Much of the work on democratic transitions in Latin America focuses attention on the calculations of elite actors, both inside the military and in civil society. See for instance Higley and Gunther 1992; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986.

<sup>76</sup> Isaacs 1993: 121.

<sup>77</sup> When this referendum was put to the voters literacy restrictions remained in place.

president in 1979 and assumed the presidency in 1981 after Jaime Roldós's untimely death, headed up the constitutional commission charged with drafting the laws governing political party activity. Hurtado, at the time a young intellectual with studies in law, political theory, and political science, sought to design political institutions and rules that would foster the emergence of ideologically coherent and disciplined parties, as well as a moderate centrist party system.<sup>78</sup>

A moderate proportional representation system was adopted for congressional, as well as for city and provincial council elections. In congressional elections, provinces served as the districts and district magnitude ranged from two to twelve. While there was a range of district magnitude (that key determinant of proportionality), in most districts it was quite low, with the number of seats per district averaging 3.5. A system with district magnitudes of two or three is not highly proportional and, according to institutional theories, a system with district magnitudes this small should tend to produce a multi-party system with a limited number of parties.<sup>79</sup> In addition, there were several other rules designed to limit the number of parties in the system. These included a rarely enforced 5 percent electoral threshold and, previous to 1994, the barring of political alliances and the stipulation that parties had to present candidates in at least twelve of the country's twenty-one provinces. These rules were designed to foster the emergence of a moderate party system composed of a relatively small number of parties with national appeal.

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<sup>78</sup> For a firsthand account of the work of the Constitutional Drafting Commission by Hurtado see: Hurtado 1990.

<sup>79</sup> For an important argument about the relationship between district magnitude and number of parties in a party system, see Cox 1997.

In theory the rules designed by Hurtado and others should have made it difficult for small parties to survive. However they were not highly effective. Despite the requirement that parties run candidates in a majority of the provinces, the party system remained highly regionalized. Likewise, despite the fact that four or five parties emerged over time as the dominant ones in the system, every election seemed to bring new parties, independent candidates, or coalitions onto the ballot with candidates on these new tickets frequently winning elective office. Despite his and the other constitutional designers' good intentions, a relatively predictable and effective party system remained elusive during the 1980s, 1990s, and into the new millenium. As Conaghan has observed, although the electoral laws were designed to "condense and rationalize the party system, it has not been successful at eliminating the centrifugal tendencies at play in the system."<sup>80</sup>

### **Parties in the 1980s and 1990s: Continuities and Discontinuities with the Past**

The guarantee of universal franchise enshrined in the 1978 constitution and first fully implemented in the 1984 presidential elections led to a significant expansion of the electorate. Between 1978 and 1984 alone, the size of the electorate expanded by 79 percent from just under 1,500,000 in 1979 to over 2,680,000 in 1984.<sup>81</sup> This meant that parties had to appeal to a larger number of people and especially to greater numbers of the urban and rural poor than ever before. As would be expected, this expansion of the electorate, as well as, the important sociological developments that occurred during the 1970s, resulted in a party system that was different in important

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<sup>80</sup> Conaghan 1995: 447.

<sup>81</sup> Figures obtained from Ayala Mora 1989: 88-89.

ways from the pre-1972 system. That being said, Ecuadorian politics retained significant commonalities with the past. This next section will explore the ways in which party politics in the new democratic period changed, as well as stayed the same.

The most obvious change was the eclipse of the two parties that had traditionally dominated Ecuadorian politics and the emergence of other parties. The Liberal and Conservative parties, which dominated the political scene from the time of independence through the first half of the twentieth century, began to lose their hegemony in the 1950s. By the 1980s they were of marginal importance. Both parties began a process of breakup and reconfiguration in the 1960s that accelerated in the 1980s. While the Liberals had traditionally represented the interests of coastal commercial elites and the Conservatives those of the Highland land-owning aristocracy, this elite cleavage broke down and leadership factions from both parties made new alliances, sometimes across regions, reflecting new lines of ideological, regional, and socio-economic cleavage. Both parties splintered into both center-left and rightist parties, as well as into parties with dominance in different regions. The PSC, DP, and ID all have historical ties with one or both of the historically dominant Conservative and Liberal parties.

For instance, a faction of the Conservative Party joined a group of Christian Democrats in the late 1970s to form the DP, considered until the 1990s a center-left party.<sup>82</sup> A politician with close ties to the Conservative Party founded the right-wing Social Christian Party (PSC).<sup>83</sup> While the Conservative Party was associated with

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<sup>82</sup> Ecuador. Tribunal Supremo Electoral 1989b: 113.

<sup>83</sup> During the 1940s and 1950s Dr. Camilo Ponce Enríquez served in Velasco's government. Velasco was a member of the Conservative Party. Ayala Mora 1989: 59-61.

Highland landowners, the PSC ended up developing an electoral bastion in the coastal province of Guayas. In 1984 this same party made a formal alliance with the Liberal Party, which marked the beginning of the PSC's absorption of the Liberal Party.<sup>84</sup> Thus the PSC made historical alliances and incorporated elements from both the Conservative and the Liberal parties. Similarly, the Democratic Left party (ID), which in the post-transition period was strongest in the Highlands, was founded as an offshoot of another sector of the Liberal Party, which had traditionally been dominant on the Coast.<sup>85</sup> Thus, the new parties that emerged to dominate the political scene in the 1980s and 1990s (DP, PRE, ID, and PSC) had historical ties to the Conservative and Liberal parties but were fundamentally new political configurations that represented shifting elite alliances and cleavages.

The populist Ecuadorian Roldocista Party (PRE) does not acknowledge any historical links to either the Conservative or Liberal parties but, in fact, the founder of the CFP party, of which the PRE is a direct outgrowth, rose to national prominence in the 1940s as a minister in Velasco Ibarra's second administration (1944-1947).

In summary, while new parties emerged to eclipse the old Conservative and Liberal parties in the post-1978 period, it is also clear that the dominant parties in the post-1978 system all had important ties and connections to the two older parties. The fact that the country's economic elites continued to wield a great deal of power in these newer parties also points to these new parties' continuity with the past. All of the post-1978 parties incorporated professionals from the middle and upper-middle

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<sup>84</sup> Ecuador. Tribunal Supremo Electoral 1989b: 130.

<sup>85</sup> Ecuador. Tribunal Supremo Electoral 1989b: 236.



classes, but they remained largely closed to participation by those from the lower classes. Thus, while new faces appeared on the political scene, political parties continued to be influenced and, in some cases, controlled by those from the privileged upper crust of Ecuadorian society. The four most important parties –PRE, PSC, ID, and DP—, even though they each had different ideological inclinations, could all be characterized as elite-dominated parties in that most of their leadership hailed from the upper-middle and upper classes. While there are no studies of the careers of politicians previous to 1972, we can assume with a high degree of confidence that the dominant political parties and congress were in the hands of large landowners and business people, or Ecuador's, so-called, oligarchy. The important socio-economic changes wrought by agrarian reform and the modernizing efforts of the Rodríguez Lara government changed to some extent the nature and composition of Ecuador's elite sectors; new elites emerged and gained prominence, in some cases challenging the old. Thus, a more thoroughgoing study of elite configuration than is possible in this study would be required to determine the precise level of elite continuity in the political system, but what can be said is that at a fundamental level the upper class retained a tremendous amount of power in the new system, with important infiltration by upper-middle class and professional sectors as well. Labor and popular sectors remained on the fringes of formal politics.

Evidence from a study of legislative career paths and the socio-demographic characteristics of Ecuadorian legislators serving between 1979 and 1988 seems to indicate that by the 1980s the landed elite had been largely displaced in congress by

professionals with careers primarily in the service sector, especially lawyers.<sup>86</sup>

Pachano interprets this as a sign that congress was becoming more professional and that career politicians were emerging. However, what is not clear from his study is how many of these professionals came from Ecuador's elite families. In other words, it is likely that many of these new professionals came from the large landowning families. Another of his indicators, one that looks at legislators' private business activity, indicates that economic elites continued to play an important role in congress and political parties: 55.6 percent of those included in the study reported having activities in the private sector apart from their professional career. Of these, 55 percent identified themselves as business owners and another 35 percent as shareholders or partners in some private business enterprise. Only 10 percent listed themselves as employees.<sup>87</sup> This would mean that 31.6 percent of all the congressmen in his study were business owners of some kind and 19.5 percent were shareholders.

This pattern of fairly high levels of participation by economic elites in congress is further confirmed by the 1996 legislative survey carried out by a team from the Universidad de Salamanca. They asked legislators to state their social class of origin; 61 percent reported coming from an upper-middle class background and 6 percent from the upper class.<sup>88</sup> While it is difficult to use these subjective responses as objective criteria for determining social class origins, it nevertheless gives some indication of the class makeup of congress, which clearly appears to be skewed towards the minority upper class. If anything, we can probably assume that any bias

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<sup>86</sup> Pachano 1991.

<sup>87</sup> Pachano 1991: 118-121.

<sup>88</sup> Equipo de investigación sobre élites parlamentarias 1997: 14.

would push legislators to self identify as belonging to a lower rung in the social ladder than they might have expressed, because they like to think of themselves as representatives of the people. Thus, we can probably assume that the percentage with upper class or upper-middle-class origins is even higher than that indicated by the survey.

Another point of continuity with the past, mentioned earlier in this chapter, was the extreme weakness of leftist parties in the post-transition period. By contrast, in Bolivia and Peru leftist political parties experienced significant successes at the polls during the 1980s. In Bolivia the leftist UDP coalition was elected to executive office in 1982 in the first post-transition national election. Likewise, in Peru's 1978 elections for constituent assembly the five main parties on the left won an unexpected 33 percent of the vote.<sup>89</sup> In Ecuador, however, the Broad Leftist Front (FADI), the only leftist party to run a candidate for president in 1979, garnered a meager 4.74 percent of the national vote in the first round. The 1984 elections were the first presidential elections held with universal franchise in place. That year three leftist parties – FADI, MPD, and the PSE – each ran candidates separately for president in the first round. Their combined vote totals amounted to 12.42 percent, a far cry from the percentage of votes received by the left in Bolivia and Peru during those same years.<sup>90</sup> Despite universal franchise and important new realignments among traditional economic and political elites, popular support for leftist parties in Ecuador remained low, relegating the left to the margins of formal politics. Continued upper

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<sup>89</sup> Skidmore and Smith 1997: 222.

<sup>90</sup> Percentages calculated from data in Mardesic 1989: 4.2 and 4.9.

class control and the concomitant marginalizing of the majority lower classes in post-transition Ecuador are noteworthy because they indicate that political elites learned quickly how to compete in a significantly expanded electorate. This sharply contrasts with the European experience in the early part of the twentieth century when strong labor unions pressed for the expansion of the franchise and, once attained, their parties emerged as some of the most important political contenders. Electoral competition from labor parties transformed European party systems from ones dominated by elitist cadre parties into modern competitive systems dominated by mass parties.<sup>91</sup> No such radical transformation occurred in Ecuador as a result of the expansion of the franchise, at least not immediately.

Continued elite control of parties, even in a context of universal franchise, begs the question of how elite sectors succeeded in maintaining this control. I maintain that the answer is twofold. In the first place, the absence of consolidated mass organizations made it difficult for a party led by popular sectors to emerge immediately. Secondly, the cost of campaigning rose with the expansion in the absolute size of the electorate, in this way creating a further impediment to popular participation.

Gibson's (1996) analysis of conservative parties in Argentina offers a good starting point for studying Ecuadorian parties. He points to an interesting dilemma

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<sup>91</sup> Duverger Duverger 1954 directly attributed the rise of European mass parties during the first part of the twentieth century to the extension of the suffrage. He argued that the extension of the vote forced parties for the first time to compete for votes among broader sectors of the electorate. In order to succeed, new forms of organization were required. Similarly, Lipset and Rokkan Lipset and Rokkan 1967 argued that the extension of the franchise in Europe led to a decline in the salience of political cleavages along territorial and regional lines and to the emergence of class as the most salient political cleavage.

faced by conservative parties: they represent the interests of a privileged minority of the population, but in order to win elections they have to reach out to voters beyond this select group. In this sense, he makes an important distinction between the constituencies from which parties derive most of their votes and what he calls their “core constituencies”, those social sectors that define a party’s political agenda and from whence the party receives most of its resources.<sup>92</sup> This divergence between a party’s electoral base and its source of financing and programmatic direction was evident in virtually all of Ecuador’s major parties. Responding to a question that asked him to identify the specific social sectors he feels he represents, Alvaro Pérez, a legislator from the right-wing PSC, described this pattern quite clearly:

I am a businessman and I belong to this country’s private sector, I have several different business activities. Therefore, one might assume that the vast majority of my votes come from the business sector, because it is the sector to which I am indebted and many people identify me with this sector, but this is not the case. My electoral bastion is a popular one, more from the workers and those in the informal economy... If someone asks what Congressmen Pérez represents, they could respond that he represents private business, the country’s economy, the country’s oligarchy. Many people could say this, but when someone does a recount of the votes that I receive they will be able to see that my most abundant votes are in the poor neighborhoods, in the marginal sectors.<sup>93</sup>

Evidence of this differentiation between the political elites and the voters who elect them is also evident when simply comparing the social class of politicians with that of the general population in Ecuador. In a country where, according to World Bank estimates, 34 percent of the population was living below the poverty line in

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<sup>92</sup> Gibson 1996: 7-8.

<sup>93</sup> Alvaro Pérez, author interview, Quito, December 21, 1999.

1994,<sup>94</sup> 67 percent of congresspersons interviewed in 1996 identified the families they were born into as being upper-middle or upper class. This figure is significantly higher than the average that the study found for all of Ibero-America; in this case only 40 percent of legislators claimed to come from either upper-middle or upper class families.<sup>95</sup>

Gibson argues that in order to understand conservative party politics in Latin America one must study the construction of poly-class coalitions because the core constituencies of these parties tend to be so small. According to Gibson:

A conservative party is, in fact, the most polyclassist of parties. And such a party is built precisely through denial of the importance of class as a salient source of cleavage in social and political life... In contrast to parties of the Left, a conservative party must build its mass base *outside* [emphasis in the original] its core constituencies. Its appeals must thus transcend class differences and forge bonds of social solidarity on the basis of other sources of collective identification. Conservative electoral majorities are built in part by weakening class-based solidarity and replacing it with other sources of collective identity.<sup>96</sup>

Clearly, another crucial mechanism used to attract popular support by elite-dominated parties is political clientelism pure and simple. In the second half of this chapter I will identify some of the mechanisms these parties used to secure votes from the popular sectors. The next section discusses campaign and political party financing and considers the degree to which financing demands on parties and candidates served to limit competition.

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<sup>94</sup> World Bank 1995: 4.

<sup>95</sup> Equipo de investigación sobre élites parlamentarias 1997: 14.

<sup>96</sup> Gibson 1996: 17.

## Party and Campaign Financing

Political campaigns are often expensive, especially in the media age. In this next section, I will describe the overall demands on parties and candidates in terms of financing and how parties and candidates generally met these needs. This is crucial for assessing the challenges faced by social movement parties with comparatively less access to financial resources.

Previous to 1972 all party financing was private. At the time of the 1978 transition, however, constitutional designers, in an attempt to democratize access to formal politics, created two different funds for public financing of parties and campaigns. The *Fondo Partidario* was a revolving government fund that distributed money annually to all registered parties according to the following criteria: 60 percent in equal parts to every party and 40 percent distributed in proportion to the overall votes obtained by each party in the previous election. The disbursements from this fund were generally sufficient to cover the operational expenses of most parties. The *Fondo de Reposición de Gasto Electoral*, on the other hand, was distributed after the elections to parties according to the percentage of votes received.<sup>97</sup> Some parties relied completely on the disbursements from the *Fondo Partidario* to meet ongoing budget needs, while for others the government funds represented only a percentage of the party's operating expenses. The original idea behind the creation of these funds was to free parties from dependence on economic interest groups, and in terms of party maintenance and organization they did help to level the playing field. However,

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<sup>97</sup> See Ardaya and Verdesoto 1998.

disbursements were not large enough to make much of a difference in terms of campaign financing, the vast majority of which had to be raised privately. Individual candidates had to finance their own campaigns, something that was confirmed by every congressional representative I interviewed.

As the electoral market expanded, the cost of campaigns rose steadily, especially in the large provinces where access to the media became vitally important. Hard data on the costs of campaigns was hard to obtain, as there was no regulation on campaign spending until 2000. Limits were not set on private donations and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) did not keep records on what parties were spending or where the money came from. Ardaya and Verdesoto estimated that by the end of the 1990s the cost of running for provincial legislator could range from \$100,000 to \$300,000 U.S. dollars,<sup>98</sup> which is quite a remarkable sum given that annual per capita GDP in Ecuador in 2004 was only \$3,700 U.S. dollars.<sup>99</sup>

The 1998 Constitution stipulated that the TSE fix limits or caps on campaign spending and these caps were first put into place during the 2000 local elections. However, the TSE's ability to enforce the law was doubtful given the politicized nature of this body, in which the political parties wielded substantial influence. However, the new law guaranteed the public the right to know how much was being spent and this may lead to greater demands for accountability and transparency in the future. The limits fixed by the TSE were fairly modest and varied according to the district population. For the 2000 local elections of mayors, prefects, city and

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<sup>98</sup> Ardaya and Verdesoto 1998.

<sup>99</sup> United States. Central Intelligence Agency .



provincial councilors, the TSE set a total of \$2,690,000 U.S. dollars for the election of 1,151 officials. To run for mayor of Quito, for example, the cap was put at \$409,076 U.S. dollars, whereas in very small cantons, like Santa Clara in the Amazonian province of Pastaza, the spending cap was set at \$614 U.S. dollars for a mayoral candidate.<sup>100</sup> A few legislators complained to me that the spending limits were set too low and did not reflect reality. Whether these limits will be enforced and thereby curtail ever greater increases in campaign spending remains to be seen. But what is clear is that up until the end of the 1990s significant amounts of money were required to mount a successful campaign in Ecuador, especially in the more populous cities and provinces.

This was due in large measure to the fact that the mass media came to play an increasingly important role in Ecuadorian elections. It was most important for those candidates either running for national office or in one of the two largest provinces. All the media outlets, whether broadcast or print, were privately owned and there was no state funding for equal access to the media by politicians. In the smaller rural provinces, almost none of the legislators I interviewed sought access to television but most said that getting propaganda on the local radio stations was very important. Radio access was much cheaper than access to television, but there was no regulation of what stations could charge and several politicians reported that local stations routinely raised the cost of airtime during elections. Apparently many local stations were in the red during most of the year, and election time was viewed as an opportunity to recoup losses and bring in a profit.

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<sup>100</sup> Ecuador. Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Dirección de Organizaciones Políticas 2000.

Buying publicity often had a multiplier effect. PSC congressman from the Highland province of Tungurahua, Carlos Torres, explained that buying television and radio advertisements was not only important for the propaganda value of the ads themselves but was crucial to getting free access as well:

Buying radio spots is absolutely necessary for two reasons, one for the publicity of the ad itself, and secondly one has to contract with many different radio stations during their news hour, because if a candidate does not buy this time he or she will not be sought out for interviews on regular news programs. So one has to contract with the radio stations so that they give you access to interview opportunities. It works this way in all the different media venues.<sup>101</sup>

Another source of differential access and something that represented an obstacle for non-elite groups was that the media in these small provinces was often owned and controlled by locally powerful families. Personal connections to the owners of these media outlets facilitated access for a candidate, and often in these provincial settings local elites were the ones with personal connections. This was not always the case, there were some media outlets that attempted to offer more balanced coverage and access. In my fieldwork in the Highland provinces of Cotopaxi and Bolivar during the 2000 local campaign, the regional print media appeared much more democratic in its coverage than the radio stations. A regional newspaper covering the five central Highland provinces sent a reporter to cover Pachakutik's campaign in Bolivar province and ran several stories on the campaign despite the fact that Pachakutik was not taking out paid ads in its newspaper. This connection, however, appears to have been facilitated by a personal connection that one Pachakutik campaign worker had with one of the newspaper's reporters. While the print media

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<sup>101</sup> Carlos Torres, author interview, Quito, March 22, 2000.

offered somewhat greater accessibility, it was also more limited in its reach, especially in rural areas with high levels of illiteracy. In these areas radio represented people's primary link to news and events happening outside their local community and thus played a vital role in political campaigns.

Besides media access, the other major campaign expense mentioned by most, although not all legislators, was that of mobilization, in other words, travel expenses for the candidate and campaign workers. In terms of candidates' own perceptions, those from the smaller provinces overwhelmingly viewed door-to-door campaigning as still the most effective electoral strategy for their district, over and above that of access to the media.

Thus the media came to play an increasingly important role in Ecuadorian elections during the 1980s and 1990s, but its importance, especially in sparsely populated rural provinces should not be overestimated. Other factors and strategies, such as door-to-door campaigns, as well as, clientelistic connections and the delivery of particularistic goods continued to play a very important role in rural contexts and in areas of urban poverty, as well. So while the high cost of media access in a highly unequal society did serve as a constraint on parties and candidates from non-elite sectors, the disadvantage was less severe in the rural provinces, where television had not fully penetrated and door-to-door campaigning remained an important strategy. Similarly, public financing of campaigns and parties helped to level the playing field in terms of operational expenses, but the public monies were not sufficient to make much of a difference in campaigning, and more importantly, there was no guaranteed

access for candidates to broadcast media. With this background on party and campaign financing we now turn to a closer examination of individual parties.

### **Post-1978 Parties**

Scholars describe Ecuadorian parties as highly personalistic, clientelistic, regional, and weak. But beyond these generalizations little is known about these parties' internal structures and inner workings. Most analyses of Ecuadorian parties and the party system tend to discuss them as a group and pay less attention to the differences between them. In order to explore the ways in which they differ, I conducted a series of semi-structured, open-ended interviews with legislators from five different parties. The questions focused on two broad themes: (1) party organization and internal politics, including candidate selection and internal decision-making; and (2) legislators' individual strategies and means of relating to civil society, including campaign strategies and questions about which sectors they believe they represent. In analyzing the results of this survey I have borrowed things from Panebianco's (1988) conceptual framework. While I share his view that institutions do not determine party organization and that internal dynamics can have an independent impact on party behavior and evolution, I believe that especially in the case of Latin America, this view must be tempered by the realization that socio-economic structures sets limits and constraints on who can participate in politics and therefore what sorts of parties are likely to emerge. Constraints of this nature are much more determinant in the developing world than they are in Europe or North America.

All but one interview were conducted in the legislators' congressional offices in Quito between December 1999 and March 2000.<sup>102</sup> The questions were open-ended, and the length of each interview varied from forty-five minutes to two hours. I chose an open-ended format, as opposed to a structured survey, because I thought this approach would yield more substantive and richer information about how parties actually function and how politicians view their relationship with their constituencies. However, the open-ended format also meant that the interviews tended to be longer than they would have been using a straightforward survey; as a result, I had to compromise comprehensiveness in terms of the number of legislators included in the survey for depth. In total I interviewed twenty-three legislators or 19 percent of the 121 serving at that time.

Ecuador had a unicameral system and within the single chamber there were two types of legislators: national and provincial. The former were elected from a single national district and the latter from their provinces. As Table 3 shows, I prioritized interviews with provincial legislators, as they are the predominant group in congress, and my selection correlates pretty closely with the actual breakdown in congress between provincial and national legislators. Provincial legislators also were more important to my study than national ones because I have been particularly interested in the degree to which legislators run on a party platform as opposed to particularistic strategies, and one would expect that particularistic or clientelistic

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<sup>102</sup> The list of questions asked of the legislators is contained in Appendix 2. In some cases additional follow-up questions were asked.

strategies would be used more frequently by those running at the provincial level than by those elected from a national district.

**Table 3: Percentages of Provincial and National Legislators Interviewed**

Type	# in Congress	# in Survey	% in Congress	% in Survey
National	20	3	16%	13%
Provincial	101	20	84%	87%
Total	121	23	100%	100%

Table 4 gives the breakdown of provincial legislators by region in congress and in the survey. Clearly there is a selection bias in the survey towards the Highland region. The reason for this is that the focus of the dissertation is on Pachakutik, which has until now won seats only in the Highland and Amazonian regions. Part of the purpose of the survey was to create a means of comparing Pachakutik with Ecuador's dominant political parties, thus it made more sense to focus on legislators who represented the same regions where Pachakutik candidates were being elected. However, in order to be able to include the PRE in the study I had to interview some representatives from the Coast, as the PRE had only one legislator representing a province outside the Coast in the 1998-2000 period.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Marco Proaño Maya was elected to congress in 1998 from Imbabura province, a Highland province in northern Ecuador.

**Table 4: Distribution of Provincial Legislators by Region**

Region	# in Congress	# in Survey	% in Congress	% in Survey
Coast	40	3	40%	15%
Sierra	46	14	45%	70%
Amazon	15	3	15%	15%
Total	101	20	100%	100%

Table 5 lists the number of legislators from each party that were interviewed. Because of the relatively small number of interviewees and the fact that party percentages change from one election to another, I did not attempt to make my sample correlate with the actual distribution of the parties in congress at the time of my survey. Instead, I attempted to get a similar number of interviewees from each of the parties. The slight imbalance, especially with regard to the PSC, is due more to the ease or difficulty of getting interviews, as opposed to a deliberate decision on my part to focus more on one or another party.

**Table 5: Number of Survey Respondents per Party**

Party	# Surveyed
PSC	3
DP	5
PRE	5
ID	6
MUPP-NP	4

The four parties selected for purposes of the interviews and in order to compare to Pachakutik were chosen because they were the four that had emerged as the dominant parties in the system. Each of them has held the presidency once since the return to democracy and while their vote shares have varied over the years, each of these parties has been an important player in every electoral period since they began participating. Table 6 places each of these parties on a left-right ideological scale.

**Table 6: Ecuadorian Parties on Left-Right Ideological Spectrum**

<b>Left</b>		<b>Center</b>		<b>Right</b>
<b>MUPP-NP</b>	<b>ID</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>PRE</b>	<b>PSC</b>

The PRE in particular is somewhat difficult to locate ideologically, as much of what drives its agenda has to do with protecting the Bucaram family and party leaders. Founded in 1983, the PRE is the only one of the major parties to have been founded



after the return to democracy; the PSC, DP, and ID were all founded at some point previous to the 1979 transition. The PSC's ideological origins were in the Social Christian tradition and it was considered the party most closely associated with traditional elites. Young professionals, intellectuals, and university students founded the DP in the 1960s and 1970s; this party follows a Christian Democratic line. During the 1980s it was considered center-left, but by the 1990s the party had moved decidedly towards the right, and by the start of the new millennium, it was considered to be on the center-right. An official member of the Socialist International, the ID represented the left wing of Ecuador's major parties, although it was by no means on the far left. Thus, Ecuador's major parties spanned the ideological spectrum from center-left to right, with a good dose of neo-populism thrown in.

I began all my interviews by asking the representatives to give me a short biography of their life and political career, including what their profession was and how long they had been active in party politics. This provided important information about the types of people who run for office and how the parties recruit candidates. Seven of the twenty-three interviewed identified themselves as *empresarios* or businessmen,<sup>104</sup> and another three, while not identifying themselves as *empresarios*, indicated coming from families that had a history in Ecuadorian politics that pre-dated 1978.<sup>105</sup> Thus 43 percent of those I interviewed were either entrepreneurs or came from long-standing elite families. What was particularly interesting was that there were marked differences between the parties. All three of the legislators from the

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<sup>104</sup> Jaime Estrada (DP), Luis Felipe Vizcaíno (DP), Dalton Bacigalupo (ID), Bolívar Sánchez (ID), Adolfo Bucaram (PRE), Raúl Andrade (PRE), and Alvaro Pérez (PSC).

<sup>105</sup> Elizabeth Ochoa (DP), Wilfrido Lucero (ID), and Carlos Torres (PSC).

PSC, which was often referred to in Ecuador as the party of the oligarchy, fit one of these two or both categories at the same time. Of the populist PRE legislators I interviewed, two self-identified as *empresarios*. In addition, Abdalá's brother, Adolfo Bucaram, clearly hails from a family that has been involved in politics for many years and he and his family have significant business interests even if he did not use the word *empresario* to describe himself. Of the five PRE legislators interviewed, two were clearly middle class professionals. Ecuador's so-called "modern parties", the ID and the DP, had a mix of *empresarios* and middle class professionals. Indeed, the mix itself was interesting, because the four who identified themselves as *empresarios* were all relatively recent recruits to these two parties: one had never been involved in politics previously, and the other three had switched over from another party.

### Candidate Selection

How a party selects its candidates for political office can reveal much about its levels of internal democracy, institutionalization, and ideological coherence. This next section presents a detailed examination of candidate selection practices in Ecuador's four largest parties and analyzes what these practices reveal about these parties in relation to the above-mentioned criteria.

None of the Ecuadorian parties used primaries as the means to select their candidates and the decisions were usually made by a small group of party leaders. This reflected the fact that Ecuadorian parties tended to have small membership bases. The general perception among the public was that parties were controlled by small, closed groups of elites, and political analysts tended to concur with this public

perception. Pachano(1991) characterized Ecuadorian parties as “cadre parties”, far from the mass or catch-all models.

Panebianco uses party recruitment strategies to differentiate parties in terms of their levels of institutionalization. He defines two types of recruitment strategies: vertical and horizontal. Parties that tend to select their candidates from among long-time party militants and where in order to aspire to public office one must pay one's dues as a party member before being selected are said to use “vertical” recruitment strategies. These strategies, according to Panebianco, are associated with highly institutionalized parties. By contrast, a horizontal recruitment strategy is one where candidates are often recruited from outside the party structure, so instead of having to work one's way up through the party, prominent individuals can be recruited from outside the party to fill high level candidacies or positions within the party structure itself (Panebianco 1988 ).

On this variable, Ecuadorian parties manifested low levels of institutionalization, and more importantly, the trend during the 1990s was one of increasing de-institutionalization. Of the eleven DP and ID legislators I interviewed, roughly half clearly fit the pattern of vertical integration: they had been members of their party for many years and had risen up through the ranks passing through various different positions in both public administration, as well as popularly elected positions. Five of them were middle class professionals and one came from a lower class background. All had been long-standing members of the political party in which they were serving. The remaining politicians, most of them *empresarios*, were clear examples of horizontal recruitment. Some had been recruited from another party; in

two cases they had been prominent individuals in their communities and were approached by the party to run for office directly. They did not go through any period of militancy in the party before being selected as candidates to run for office. This is interesting because one of the things often cited as a defect of Ecuadorian parties is, not so much the lack of party discipline, but the high rate of disaffiliation and party switching by members of congress. Pachano found that nearly a third (32.2 percent) of those surveyed in the 1980s changed parties once they were elected to congress.<sup>106</sup> While the number of people I interviewed is not high enough to draw definitive conclusions, the interviews suggest that those from middle class professional backgrounds were more likely to rise up through party ranks and remain within the same party. This did not appear to hold as strongly for businesspersons, who were often recruited horizontally and seemed to have an easier time switching parties at their convenience.

Among those I interviewed in the PRE and the PSC there were fewer examples of horizontal recruitment. Of the five PRE legislators I interviewed only one had been recruited from outside of the party, and her election was a bit of a fluke, as she was listed very low on the party list and no one, including herself, had expected her to be elected. She was recruited by the PRE to run in the first election following Bucaram's 1997 ouster at a time when the party was extremely weak and few people wanted to run on the party ticket. She was also recruited at that time because the party needed to

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<sup>106</sup> The study covered 115 or 43.2 percent of legislators who served between 1979 and 1988 Pachano 1991: 143.

put a woman on the list to meet the legal quota of 20 percent women on party lists.<sup>107</sup>

None of the three PSC legislators I interviewed could be classified as horizontal recruits, as they all had long associations with the party.<sup>108</sup>

Summing up, my survey indicates some variation in the use of these two recruitment strategies from party to party. At least according to my sample, the Highland DP and ID parties exhibited a much more mixed pattern, whereas, the coastal PRE and PSC appeared to have a stronger tendency towards vertical integration. It is somewhat surprising that the two Highland parties manifested the highest degree of horizontal integration, since these two parties modeled themselves most explicitly on the highly institutionalized and ideological European party model. In the 1980s the social democratic ID was considered the most well organized party in Ecuador with party cells going down to the level of local neighborhoods and communities. Likewise, Hurtado, DP founder and one of the party's most important leaders and intellectuals until he left the party in 2001, was instrumental in designing the rules that structured Ecuador's post-1978 party system. He did so with the clear intent of creating highly integrated, disciplined, European-style parties. The high degree of horizontal integration manifested by these two parties by the end of the 1990s must be viewed ultimately as the failure of their attempts to build strong, programmatic organizations.

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<sup>107</sup> In 1997 the first mandatory quota for women on party lists was introduced in Ecuador. At the time parties were required to have their candidate lists for congress include at least 20 percent women. This percentage was to increase progressively in subsequent elections until reaching a mandatory 50 percent rate for all multiparty elections. International IDEA and Stockholm University 2005.

<sup>108</sup> For example, Alvaro Pérez, a legislator from Pichincha, had previously been a leader in the Liberal Party as far back as the 1960s and joined the PSC when a faction of the Liberal Party fused with the PSC. Alvaro Pérez, author interview, Quito, December 21, 1999.

DP legislators whom I interviewed explained that the policy of horizontal recruitment represented a shift from earlier party practices.<sup>109</sup> From 1979 to approximately 1988 the party's policy had been to recruit candidates only from within its activist ranks. Beginning in 1988, however, certain leaders within the party began to advocate recruiting from outside of the party. Referring to this moment, DP Congressman Juan Manuel Fuertes reflected:

Ideological parties don't have much space, because the electorate basically is not receptive to the rational message. Those that appeal more to emotions have more success. So, for example, in Democracia Popular there was a moment where we stopped and said, "let's analyze this, we prepare ourselves very well and our members are well prepared in terms of ideological orientation, doctrine, party program and technical skills, but we are not winning elections." And that is when the previous processes began to breakdown.<sup>110</sup>

At first, the DP's goal was to attract more high-level professionals into the party. The first example of this new policy was the recruitment of the well-known and respected businessman, Rodrigo Paz, to run on the party ticket for mayor of Quito in 1988. Paz won the election and oversaw a highly regarded municipal administration, thus launching the DP on a successful twelve-year run in the politically powerful Quito municipality.<sup>111</sup> During the 1990s, the party greatly expanded its efforts at outside recruitment; as the practice expanded it became more indiscriminate. Whereas initially, outside recruitment was done with an eye towards bringing people into the party who would be compatible with and reflective of its programmatic and ideological goals, by the mid-1990s and especially by 1998 the goal appeared much

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<sup>109</sup> Alexandra Vela, author interview, Quito, January 28, 2000; and Juan Manuel Fuertes, author interview, Quito, December 27, 1999.

<sup>110</sup> Juan Manuel Fuertes, author interview, Quito, December 27, 1999.

<sup>111</sup> Control of Quito passed to the ID in 2000.

more utilitarian, one of simply winning elections. In 1994, 1996, and 1998 the DP used polls to identify popular candidates who were then approached by the party to run on their ticket. The strategy reached its climax in 1998 when DP presidential candidate, Jamil Mahuad, attempted to recruit big names to the party's legislative list in the hopes of creating something of a reverse coattail effect. This strategy was especially important on the Coast where Mahuad and the DP were particularly weak and needed votes if he was to win the presidency. Polo Baquerizo, a popular television show host, and José Gallardo, a retired army general, were two of the party's most notable recruits.

While this tactic helped Mahuad garner enough critical votes on the Coast to win the presidency, it also led to a high degree of internal friction within the party. Many party militants viewed it as a short-term instrumental policy that in the long-run would weaken the party. The party did, in fact, go through a major crisis less than two years later that almost led to its collapse as a result of corruption scandals surrounding Mahuad's presidency. Mahuad's administration faced a monumental crisis in early 1999 when the banking system collapsed. The financial crisis was exploited by the PSC party, which portrayed Mahuad's actions as favoring the Highlands over the Coast. As the banking crisis turned into a regional political crisis pitting the Coast against the Highlands, most of the DP legislators who had been elected from coastal provinces in 1998 either abandoned the party outright to become independents, or began to buck party discipline and vote against the administration. There were at least four, including two national legislators, out of a delegation of thirty-three who broke with the party at this time. Commenting on this fissure to the press, party president

and national legislator, Ramiro Rivera, attempted to diminish the significance of the problem by pointing out that none of those who had abandoned the party had been part of the “old party militancy.” Instead, he claimed, they had been “imposed on the party list by Mahuad.”<sup>112</sup> This conflict and difference of opinion over strategy is a clear example of the types of conflicts that can develop when a party grows and the balance between “careerists” and “believers” shifts in favor of the former.<sup>113</sup>

A similar shift in strategy took place within the ID in the wake of their disastrous performance in the 1992 elections. The ID had swept into power with impressive electoral support in 1988 winning, not only the presidency, but also 42.3 percent of congressional seats.<sup>114</sup> However, four years in executive office had debilitated more than strengthened the party. In 1992 what everyone had believed to be a powerful political machine only succeeded in winning a little over 10 percent or eight seats in congress.<sup>115</sup> In the wake of this decline, internal party strategy came under review and changes were made. Again DP Congressman Juan Manuel Fuertes commented on some of the thinking that went on in the ID at the time:

The Democratic Left Party had been a sort of model of the modern political party. But when the Borja administration ended, this party discovered that it had been something of an inflated whale. And so they also said [like the DP Party earlier]: “We are mistaken. Parties are nothing more than electoral platforms or structures. In other words, why are we dedicating ourselves to ongoing political activity, it would be more profitable to get personalities at the local level who have

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<sup>112</sup> Jijón 1999.

<sup>113</sup> The terms “careerists” and “believers” are ones that Panebianco Panebianco 1988 uses.

<sup>114</sup> Mejía Acosta 1996: 160. In the post-transition period no president has come into office with his party holding a majority in congress. The ID’s 42.3 percent was the second largest percentage held by a single party after the CFP, which won 45 percent of legislative seats when Roldós won the presidency in 1979.

<sup>115</sup> Mejía Acosta 1996: 76.



representation, we bring them here, we put them up as candidates, end of story.”<sup>116</sup>

So the DP and the ID in essence engaged in a willful de-institutionalization of their party structures. Likewise, it is clear that this shift in strategy was carried out in response to cues from the electorate; these parties felt they were not competing as well as they should be and were searching for ways to incorporate more competitive candidates. The problem of electoral competitiveness was addressed, not by adjusting or changing the party message or platform, but by attracting more popular candidates. The evidence from my interviews suggests that the type of candidates the DP and ID sought to recruit horizontally were people of some independent means and prominence. This may help explain the ideological shift that took place in the DP, which started out in the 1980s identified as center-left but by the end of the 1990s had shifted clearly to the right.

It is important to note that the shift in party strategy preceded any change in institutional rules, so the fact that programmatic parties failed to take hold in Ecuador cannot be attributed to formal institutional rules. The rules that were put in place in 1978 were designed to promote strong, institutionalized parties with clear ideological orientations; when this outcome did not ensue, the laws were eventually changed.

The strategy of horizontal recruitment was greatly facilitated in 1995 when electoral law was changed so as to permit independents to run for political office.<sup>117</sup> This change meant that candidates could run without the sponsorship of an officially

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<sup>116</sup> Juan Manuel Fuertes, author interview, Quito, December 27, 1999.

<sup>117</sup> The congress changed the law in 1995 after the public voted overwhelmingly for this change in a 1994 referendum. The change first went into effect in the 1996 elections.

registered political party, but it also meant that parties could recruit candidates to run on their lists without these recruits being obliged to become official party members. The PSC had long been in favor of such a change. In fact, as early as 1986 during Febres Cordero's administration (PSC), the government put the question of whether independents should be allowed to run for office to the public in a popular referendum. At that time the proposal was roundly rejected.<sup>118</sup> When the change was again discussed in the early 1990s, most people assumed that, given the public's anti-party sentiment, they would vote *en masse* for independent candidates, thereby threatening the monopoly power and dominance of the traditional political parties. But despite political parties' persistent dismal rankings in public opinion polls throughout the 1990s, this did not come to pass; independents did not turn out to be very successful at winning elected office. The new law did, however, result in two important changes: (1) it facilitated and probably led to an increase in horizontal recruitment within existing parties, and (2) it allowed for the entrance of independent groups, a few of which, Pachakutik among them, succeeded in carving out an electoral space for themselves without officially becoming parties.

In conclusion, parties like the DP and the ID that had been constructed on a European party model and sought to appeal to voters, at least in part, on programmatic grounds, by the 1990s had concluded that they were not as competitive as they should be and began to recruit candidates, not solely on the basis of shared ideology or commitment to the party, but based on electoral considerations. As the earlier discussion of campaign and party financing revealed, competitive candidates are often

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<sup>118</sup>Ecuador. Tribunal Supremo Electoral 1989a: 131.

those who have access to ample resources to finance their own campaigns. This strategy was implemented in both parties during the late 1990s, but the strategy did not ultimately solve their problems. The DP experienced a massive internal crisis in the wake of Mahuad's ouster, and a couple of years later much of the party's historic leadership, including the party's founder and ideologue, Osvaldo Hurtado, left the party. The ID on the other hand, while it remained an important political party, lost ground to new political forces on the left, in particular Pachakutik.

Another important development during the 1990s was the introduction of extensive polling for purposes of candidate selection. The PSC and the DP, in particular, began in the 1990s to rely heavily on polling data to determine their candidate lists. Two of the three PSC legislators I interviewed highlighted the role polling played in their party's selection strategy. Gilberto Vaca, provincial congressman from Bolivar, explained how polling facilitates decisions within the party at the local level:

There is total openness to all party militants, friends, and sympathizers to make known that they would like to run for a certain office. With this bank of names, the party then contracts an independent polling agency to do the initial study previous to candidate selection. The majority of the designations [for various offices] are decided based upon polls, because this gives us a greater margin of security and, additionally, it makes things easier for the party directors. I am the provincial president of my party and am faced with five different people aspiring to run for the same office, it is not the provincial directorate or me who decides who the candidate will be, instead the polls decide. The one that comes out highest on the poll will be the candidate, and everyone accepts this.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Gilberto Vaca, author interview, Quito, March 16, 2000.

Based upon my interviews with PSC deputies, polling had become an almost de facto selection mechanism within the party, displacing any sort of deliberative process.<sup>120</sup> The DP also made extensive use of polling but its selection decisions appeared to be the result of a combination of criteria, including, but not limited to, polling results. The increasing use of polling in candidate selection within these two parties is interesting as it would seem to indicate a move away from a more cadre-style party to a catch-all model. While an agreement to use this technique as the main instrument for candidate selection may serve to reduce internal party frictions, it could also serve to undermine the control of the top leadership over who rises and falls within the party. Certainly there is also the risk of greater fragmentation within the party if a vertical model of candidate recruitment is completely discarded in favor of horizontal recruitment, as happened to the DP after Mahuad's fall.

The other significant thing about the use of polling is that it likely gives an edge to those parties that could afford to use it. Hiring an independent agency to conduct polls for a party throughout the country is an expensive endeavor. Like media access, polling was another advantage that money could buy a party. The increasing use of this tool on the part of parties with ample financial resources threatened to put other parties with fewer financial resources at a disadvantage. The PSC appeared from my interviews to be the party that employed polling the most. Mahuad began to expand the use of polling within the DP in 1994 and did so especially in his 1998 presidential campaign as he sought to assemble a legislative list of the most competitive candidates possible, whether they were DP members or not. Ultimately

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<sup>120</sup> Gilberto Vaca, author interview, Quito, March 16, 2000.

this contributed to the rising cost of campaigning and indirectly to the fatal temptation of receiving huge secret and illegal campaign donations, which eventually resulted in his and his party's downfall.

Candidate selection can also offer insights about party hierarchy and internal democracy. Based on my interviews with congressional representatives and party leaders, the two parties in which the central leadership retained the most control over candidate selection were the PRE followed by the ID. In the PSC and the DP candidate selection was more decentralized and there appeared to be a practice of greater input and control by local and provincial party organizations.

In the PRE, candidate selection, like all other decisions, was subject to final approval by the party's "Supreme Director", Bucaram. PRE provincial congresswoman, Mirella Adum of Manabí explained:

In hierarchical order in our party, he who gives the ultimate go-ahead to different candidacies is the party's Supreme Director, Abdalá Bucaram Ortíz. When there are problems – and there are always fights over a certain candidacy – the one who decides is Abdalá Bucaram Ortíz. His decisions are always made on the basis of the merits of loyalty that the candidate has to the party. But the provincial leadership also plays an important role. In our province this person is Dr. Luís Villacreces Colmo, who is also currently a provincial legislator. He enjoys the complete confidence of Abdalá Bucaram and is a proven man within the party; he has been in the Roldosista Party for many years. So he is the one who manages the candidacies at the provincial level and approves the choices. The one who baptizes them, of course, is Abdalá Bucaram.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Mirella Adum, author interview, Quito, January 12, 2000.

When asked if she was planning to run for reelection she responded that she would like to, but qualified that by saying, “whether I continue participating in politics depends on Abdalá Bucaram.”<sup>122</sup>

Candidate selection in the ID, on the other hand, did not hinge exclusively on a single person as in the PRE, but ultimate decision-making power was clearly centralized in the party’s national leadership body, the Central Committee. According to the ID deputies I interviewed, the “provincial directorates” in each province, these were groups of approximately thirteen party leaders, would put together a preliminary list of names for provincial and local races. In drawing up this list, these party leaders would informally poll party membership in the province and neighborhood leaders. Once this initial list was drawn up it was sent to the party’s National Executive Council for final approval. So in the ID, local leadership was subordinated to provincial leadership, which in turn was subordinated to the national leadership. There was little room for autonomous decision making at the local level. One of the consequences of this model was that personal connections with national leaders weighed heavily in terms of who had power at the provincial level. One congressman I interviewed cited this as one of the main reasons why he switched from the ID to another party. Even though he was well known in his province, he had been passed over by the party and the spot on the ID ticket had instead been given to someone with close connections to the party’s national leadership. In contrast with the PSC and the DP, ID deputies claimed that the party did not employ polling as a means to identify

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<sup>122</sup> Mirella Adum, author interview, Quito, January 12, 2000.

potential candidates. The main reason given for not using polling was that it was expensive and the party could not afford to do so.<sup>123</sup>

Of the four parties, the DP appeared to have the most decentralized candidate selection process, with different levels of party leadership being responsible for candidate selection. Cantonal leadership selected candidates for city government, provincial candidates were selected at that level, and the party's National Directive Council (CDN) chose candidates for the presidency and congress. When irresolvable disagreements emerged at the local level, the final decision was made at the next level up, either provincial or national.<sup>124</sup>

In all four parties there were high rates of overlap between party leadership and those serving in elected office, thus indicating a low level of institutionalization according to Panebianco's model. In his in-depth study of the personal profiles of Ecuador's legislative representatives during the 1980s, Pachano found that two-thirds of the legislators elected during the 1980s, with the exception of those elected from the Amazon, Galapagos, and the rural parts of the Highlands, were people who had held some leadership role in their party, from national director to member of a provincial directorate. For Pachano, this finding was evidence of the cadre nature of these parties, as opposed to a mass organizational model,<sup>125</sup> and this characterization held into the new millennium. None of these parties had formal ties to national unions or worker organizations or, for that matter, any organized social group. While during the 1990s it appeared to be less necessary to work one's way up through the party

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<sup>123</sup> Jhon Argudo, author interview, Quito, February 28, 2000.

<sup>124</sup> Jaime Estrada, author interview, Quito, December 22, 1999; and Alexandra Vela, author interview, Quito, January 28, 2000.

<sup>125</sup> Pachano 1991: 182.

hierarchy in order to be selected to run for public office, the overlap between party leadership and elected office remained high. In fact, I came across several cases where individuals recruited by the party to run for office were subsequently given leadership posts within the party. Jaime Estrada, who was recruited by the DP to run for a provincial legislative seat in Manabí, was selected to serve as that party's national vice president after winning a seat in congress. This pattern was particularly evident in the DP. For example, for the 1998-2002 period, both the party president and vice-president were members of congress. Several other legislators I interviewed were also serving as provincial presidents of their party and, as such, were in charge of candidate selection for local elections in their province.

In conclusion, this examination of candidate selection practices produced some important findings about Ecuador's largest parties at the start of the new millennium. After twenty-five years of electoral competition, they remained essentially cadre parties with limited membership bases; in some cases this model was showing signs of strain. In response to the need to expand their reach and appeal to a greater number of voters, these parties responded by increasingly engaging in horizontal candidate recruitment. While from one vantage point this could be viewed as a process of opening, on the other hand it also indicated the increasing instrumentality of party politics. For the ID and the DP, in particular, it signaled an abandonment of earlier commitments to ideological and programmatic discipline and coherence. While horizontal recruitment served to increase voter response in the short-term, it also represented a strong trend towards party de-institutionalization. Such a process should tend to produce a decline in party control over elected representatives and decreasing



levels of party discipline, because the political careers of prominent individuals recruited horizontally would not be dependent on the party, instead the party would be dependent on them.

The increasing use of polling by some parties in their candidate selection process together with the increasing importance of the media and media access represented two factors that raised the cost of campaigning and created further obstacles to non-elite sectors and candidates who sought to challenge elite parties. The exclusionary effects of increasing the costs of campaigning were heightened by the fact that individual candidates in all parties were responsible for financing their own campaigns. Parties generally played a minor, if any, role in campaign financing. There were, however, other ways in which candidates relied on parties and obtained benefits in terms of competitiveness from their party membership. These will be explored in the following section.

#### Role of the Party in Campaigns

Without exception, the legislators I interviewed had received little if any help from their parties in the way of financial or material resources for campaigning. They either had to self-finance or have access to people who could do so. Clearly in a country with a highly skewed distribution of wealth this gave undue advantage to the small segment of the population with independent means, either as financiers or as candidates themselves.

This did not mean, however, that parties or party structures played no role in campaigning or electoral success. If this had been the case then independent

candidates should have been more successful at getting elected after the law was passed allowing them to run, but this was not the case. Organized political parties remained relevant to electoral success. Interviews with legislators about their campaigns revealed several ways in which parties played a role, but the importance that the legislators attributed to parties in relation to their own success varied depending mostly on how strong their party was in their particular region. In those cases where legislators were elected in a province where their party was strong, had many local sympathizers, and a network of people at the grassroots connected to and supporting the party, legislators attributed a high degree of importance to the role the party played in their electoral success. In many of these cases legislators acknowledged that affiliation with the party was even more important than their own personal attributes. In these cases party networks of local leaders were instrumental in organizing campaign events and facilitating contact with grassroots communities. Studies focusing on politics in poor urban neighborhoods in Ecuador indicate that the foundation of this direct connection between political parties and leaders with poor grassroots communities is often based on clientelistic ties (Burgwal 1995; Lesser 1987; Menéndez-Carrión 1986).

My interviews with legislators revealed a diversity of experiences and opinions about the degree to which candidates of the same party viewed the campaign as an individual affair and attributed their success primarily to their person, versus the degree that they had worked together with other members of their party in the course of the campaign and, therefore, attributed a significant measure of their success to their association with the party. Largely as a result of a major 1998 change to

electoral law that made elections more majoritarian, the electoral outcomes in 1998 were particularly stark in terms of the regional breakdown, with parties winning very few seats outside of their electoral strongholds. The DP and the PSC were the two parties that had the broadest regional spread, with the Highland DP winning five legislative seats in coastal provinces and the coastal PSC winning three in the Highlands. The populist PRE won only one seat in the Highlands, whereas the ID did not win a single legislative seat outside of its regional bastion in the Highlands. The DP's relatively successful incursion into the Coast can be attributed in part to the fact that it had a front-running presidential candidate and, secondly, to Mahuad's deliberate efforts at horizontal recruitment.

Of the DP legislators I interviewed, four out of the five said the party was important or even fundamental to their success. This was true even for two of the candidates who ran in provinces that were not DP strongholds. Jaime Estrada, who was recruited by Mahuad's campaign team to run on the DP ticket in the coastal province of Manabí, a PRE stronghold, explained that, while he financed the bulk of his campaign through his own personal fund-raising efforts and out of his own pocket, the national party also gave him some money to cover expenses like hats, t-shirts, and propaganda, as well as a portion of the costs of radio advertisements. The DP's campaigns were coordinated at the national level and orientation was given out from the national leadership to assure a degree of uniformity among the provincial campaigns. But most important, according to Estrada, was the fact that he was running on a party ticket that had a strong presidential candidate: "A national message

and programmatic platform gives credibility to what one is proposing.”<sup>126</sup> In this case the benefit of being affiliated with a party whose presidential candidate was one of the clear front-runners, combined with a strong individual candidacy proved successful in overcoming the party’s weakness in that particular province.

DP legislator Luis Felipe Vizcaíno told a similar story. Traditionally the ID had controlled the Highland province of Carchi, and he had been a member. However, he left that party when he was denied the nomination for provincial deputy after having won the party’s internal election. At that point he abandoned the ID and ran on the DP ticket as an independent. While he attributed most of his success to his own personal following and the political machine that he had built in the province, he acknowledged that his campaign also benefited from its connection to a strong national campaign:

If I had run alone [independent of any political party] in my province, my proposals would have been very parochial, very provincial. By allying myself with someone my platform was not at a disadvantage compared to the rest of the traditional political parties. I could discuss and put forward the national proposals of my ally, who in this case was the president, and that is why I made an alliance with Jamil Mahuad.<sup>127</sup>

One important factor that differentiated the PSC’s situation from that of the DP in the 1998 elections is that the PSC did not run its own presidential candidate and chose instead to support DP candidate, Jamil Mahaud. Thus the PSC could not count on a coattail effect from a strong national candidate in provinces where it was traditionally weak. Nevertheless, it did win three seats in three Highland provinces. Unlike the DP legislators who won seats on the Coast, these three legislators placed

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<sup>126</sup> Jaime Estrada, author interview, Quito, December 22, 1999.

<sup>127</sup> Luis Felipe Vizcaíno, author interview, Quito, January 4, 2000.

greater emphasis on their strengths as individual candidates than on anything the party contributed to their own electoral victories.

The four PRE legislators I interviewed from coastal districts all attributed tremendous importance to the role that the party played in their election and especially the importance of PRE leader, Abdalá Bucaram. Bucaram's brother, Adolfo Bucaram, a national deputy at the time of my interview with him, described a highly organized and well-greased political machine that functions in the largest cities on the Coast, with neighborhood level committees and bosses tied together in a hierarchical structure up to the party's "supreme leader", Abdalá Bucaram. The PRE's only deputy from a Highland province, Marco Proaño Maya, was also the only legislator from this party who said the PRE as a party had not been important to his electoral success, because the PRE did not have the same kind of organizational structures in the Highlands.

The ID legislators I interviewed were split evenly between those who said the party was important or fundamental to their electoral success and those who viewed the party as only somewhat or marginally important. Rodrigo Borja, the ID's most important national leader and former president, was the party's presidential candidate again that year, but he garnered only 16.4 percent of the vote in the first round. Clearly legislators from this party would not see much of a reason to attribute their election to a coattail effect. Nevertheless three of the six ID legislators did attribute an important role to the party in their own electoral success. These legislators were those elected from provinces where the local party organization was strong. They talked about working together as a team with the other ID candidates in their province, of

contributing to common campaign war chests, of the organizational strength of the party in their province, and in some cases mentioned that the national party had contributed money for propaganda and mobilization expenses. In the case of the three ID legislators who said that the party played a fairly unimportant role in their election, two ran in Highland provinces where the ID was not particularly strong during the 1990s and the other ran in Bolivar, which had traditionally been an ID stronghold but where the party had been challenged in recent years by Pachakutik.

In conclusion, parties helped a candidate's electoral prospects and made a difference in terms of electoral outcomes in regions, provinces, or local areas where the party was well established and had structures in place. Outside of electoral strongholds and absent strong presidential candidates, national parties played a more marginal role in the electoral prospects of congressional candidates.

#### Caudillismo – The Role of Party Leaders

One of the characteristics commonly attributed to Ecuadorian parties is that they are run by *caudillos*; in other words, dominated and controlled hierarchically by a single leader. But, in fact, the four largest parties manifested significantly different degrees of *caudillismo*, with the PRE on the extreme end, followed by the PSC, the ID, and finally the DP, which really did not fit the category. Part of the problem is that the concept of *caudillismo* is not very well defined. This term tends to be used loosely to refer to things that should be kept analytically distinct. In some cases it appears to refer to a “charismatic party” in the Weberian sense of the term, and at other times simply to a hierarchical structure that is dominated by a single leader at the

top. The term also seems to be used in ways that imply a lack of internal democracy within the parties. By separating out these three criteria and assessing the degree to which each of them applied or did not apply to each of the parties, a more nuanced picture emerges, one that reveals some significant differences between them.

The populist PRE was the quintessential example of a charismatic party, in the ways described by both Panebianco and Weber. This party was founded in 1983 by Abdalá Bucaram and remained under his direct control. Everything within the party revolved around his person. In my interviews with PRE legislators and party activists not one of them failed to mention him. Bucaram was an admirer of Hitler and the language used internally within the party had fascist and militaristic overtones: the official title of the party leader was “supreme director” or “supreme leader”. The different organizational levels in the party were called “commandos”, including the “National Commando” and “Provincial Commandos”. The fascist culture that this terminology reflected was also evident in the party’s internal organization. More so than any of the other parties, all decisions within the PRE were ultimately subject to Bucaram’s final approval, and Bucaram was not directly accountable to anyone. Patterns of internal decision making were extremely hierarchical. In other words, there was little if any internal balance of power within the PRE itself. According to the party’s own statutes, the internal party Tribunal of Discipline and Oversight had no jurisdiction over the supreme director, the only body that has this faculty was a national convention, that was stipulated to meet once a year, however, I found no evidence of this body being convened on a regular basis. In searching newspaper archives for the 1990-2000 period only one reference was found to a PRE convention,

held in early January 1996. The article came out a few days before the convention actually took place and quoted Bucaram as saying that his vice-presidential running mate would be Marco Proaño Maya. According to PRE statutes, one of the faculties of the National Convention was to select the PRE candidates for president and vice president, but in this case the decision about Bucaram's candidacy was a foregone conclusion before the convention ever took place.<sup>128</sup> Decisions in the PRE were made by an inner circle of party leaders, many of whom were family members, and always in consultation with the supreme leader.

In February 1997 Bucaram fled to Panama after congress ousted him from the presidency in the wake of massive social protests calling for his removal. He remained in Panama thereafter in self-imposed exile in order to avoid facing criminal charges of corruption in Ecuador. Despite these charges and his own physical exile from the country, it was abundantly clear in succeeding years that he continued to run and control the PRE from afar. PRE leaders were known to travel to Panama to meet with and get orientation from the party boss. In my interview with Congressman Iván López he explained how decisions were arrived at by the party's congressional delegation: "Before any vote, we study the party's position and that of the people of Ecuador. This position is then transmitted to Panama, where our maximum leader is, and he, as any great leader will, instructs that this should go here, this should be taken out. Between our opinion and his, things are decided upon and done."<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Diario Hoy 1996b.

<sup>129</sup> Iván López, author interview, Quito, February 29, 2000.



With Abdalá Bucaram barred from running again in 1998, the PRE came to an agreement with Alvaro Noboa, one of the wealthiest men in Ecuador, that he would be their presidential candidate. Characteristically it was Bucaram who made the announcement from Panama. Again there was no mention of a party convention to make this sort of decision.<sup>130</sup> In the PRE the lines of authority are sacrosanct and, at least with regard to the top leadership, are unchallengeable, as a statement by Abdalá's brother, Adolfo Bucaram, indicates. Speaking here with regard to the PRE's relationship with its former candidate, Alvaro Noboa, he explained: "Unfortunately Alvarito [diminutive of Alvaro] made a mistake and thought that he was the leader and not Abdalá. Logically I believe that as a result of this grave mistake he will disappear politically."<sup>131</sup>

The PSC was associated with another political *caudillo* from the Coast, León Febres Cordero. However, the PSC was not as extreme as the PRE in fostering a cult of personality and one-man control. Febres Cordero's dominant leadership position in the party was evident in that throughout the 1980s and 1990s and into the new millennium he remained the party's most visible spokesperson as well as kingmaker, even as others held top leadership posts in the party. The PSC appeared to have a somewhat more collective decision-making structure than the PRE. The party's top decision-making body was a national assembly, which was convened more or less regularly at one-year intervals. The assembly was charged with electing the National Directorate, the party's executive organ, and had significant powers to set party policy,

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<sup>130</sup> El Universo 1998.

<sup>131</sup> Adolfo Bucaram, author interview, Quito, February 29, 2000.

design legislative strategy, position the party vis-à-vis the government in power, among other things. Determining the level of internal democracy within the PSC would have required more research and a closer look inside the party, neither of which was possible for this project.

The Democratic Left (ID) was yet another example of a party clearly identified with a particular *caudillo*. Rodrigo Borja founded the party in the late 1960s and remained its top leader up until the time of this writing. Nevertheless, during the 1980s and 1990s there was a bit more alternation among the party's top leadership than was evident in the PSC during the same period. For about four years after finishing his term as president in 1992, Borja retired from the party leadership and let other members take over. However, in 1998 he once again took over leadership of the party and at that time was nominated to run again for president. My interviews revealed some clear examples of the extent of Borja's control over the party to the detriment of internal democracy within the party. At the local level the party appeared to be dominated by local political bosses who had longstanding personal ties, in particular to Borja. At times when the power of these party bosses was challenged by new leadership, Borja was known to override decisions made by provincial party bodies in order to aid his closest allies and loyalists. As mentioned above, Vizcaíno claimed that he switched parties precisely for this reason, because the party's national leadership had stepped in at the behest of the provincial party bosses to deny him the

provincial nomination in favor of one of their cronies. Vizcaíno and the candidate in the top spot on ID's list won two out of the three provincial seats in that election.<sup>132</sup>

Finally, of these four parties, the DP manifested the lowest degree of *caudillismo* during the 1980s and 1990s and the highest levels of internal democracy. Until 2000 Hurtado was the DP's most prominent national leader and one of the main figures around which the party revolved. After his tenure as vice president and then president, he remained active in the party throughout the 1980s serving as the party president for several years. His last term as party president ended in 1992, after which he remained active in the party but increasingly allowed for the emergence of new leadership. One of his protégés, Jamil Mahuad, emerged as a top party leader in the 1990s. After serving as mayor of Quito (1996-1998) Mahuad won his party's endorsement to run for the presidency in 1998. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, he was instrumental in recruiting a host of independents to run on the DP ticket in 1998. Mahuad's strategies alienated many of the party activists and created serious divisions in the party that surfaced during his term as president. These internal divisions and the debacle of his presidency literally broke the party apart after he, like Bucaram before him, was ousted from office as a result of popular protests.

There are two interesting observations to be made about the DP's experience. In the first place, the fact that Mahuad and others were able to carry out the radical changes that they did within the DP, even over the objections of long-time political leaders, including Hurtado, indicates a significantly higher degree of internal democracy and contestation in the DP than in any of the other three parties. In light of

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<sup>132</sup> Luis Felipe Vizcaíno, author interview, Quito, January 4, 2000.

this, it is ironic that it was this party that essentially imploded at the end of the 1990s and the first couple of years of the new millennium. Serious divisions within the party emerged during Mahuad's presidency and were greatly exacerbated by the dramatic events of January 21<sup>st</sup>. The disintegration of this historic and, what was considered to be one of Ecuador's most "modern" parties, culminated with the disaffiliation of Hurtado and several of his closest allies. All of them had been historic DP militants and many of them, including Hurtado, had helped to found the party.

### Clientelism

I argued in Chapter 2 that clientelism remains an important means of cementing ties between politicians and many poor voters in Ecuador, and I suggested that one of the things this dissertation would explore was the degree to which Pachakutik was able to break out of this pattern. In this next section, I describe the extent to which and under what conditions clientelism represented a dominant strategy for politicians in the country's four main parties. The need to better understand the role played by clientelism in Latin American politics today is something that has been noted by Stokes (2000), who contends that more empirical work needs to be done to determine how significant it is in comparison to other models of voting behavior, and when and under what conditions clientelistic strategies are effective in determining electoral outcomes. The following section, then, hopes to contribute to our broader knowledge about the continuing role of clientelism.

Measuring clientelism is notoriously difficult. I did not attempt to construct a quantifiable measure, which in any event would be an extremely difficult, perhaps,

impossible task. Instead, I sought to gather qualitative data and to paint a more impressionistic picture. So my aim was not precision, but instead a panoramic view. While this may be wanting, I hope it is, nevertheless, helpful and broadly accurate. The sources for this panoramic view were my interviews with legislators themselves, analyses by other scholars of Ecuadorian parties, and coverage in Ecuador's national newspapers.

I began by constructing a typology based on two ideal types of parties: programmatic versus clientelistic.<sup>133</sup> In order to focus on the dichotomy between these two models I did not ask questions related specifically to socialization or retrospective voting models. Instead the questions were designed to gauge the degree of emphasis that politicians placed on the delivery of particularistic goods and services in their campaigning and congressional service versus advancing a programmatic platform. I asked questions about how they campaigned, what their main campaign promises or offers were, how they prioritized their time once in office, what they viewed as the necessary ingredients for a successful campaign in their district, and finally what they

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<sup>133</sup> I defined these two ideal types in the following way: programmatic parties can be defined as those that have clear programmatic agendas and make their primary appeals to voters based upon these agendas. Programmatic parties may represent a specific narrow issue dimension or constituency, or they may be more broad and centrist, more like what we typically think of as catch-all parties. The main point is that what they aim to deliver to voters are policies, as opposed to particularistic goods. Voters vote for these parties because they agree with the type of policy program that the party is advocating or where the party stands on certain issues within a policy-issue dimension. The voter casts his or her vote for this party with the expectation that the party will represent and pursue the programmatic policy issues that it advocates, or represent and serve the broad policy interests of the specific group it represents. The ideal-type of clientelistic party, on the other hand, is one where candidates run primarily on the basis of the delivery of particularistic goods to a large enough subset of the electorate that allows them to win office. The party is primarily a vehicle for the candidates who are seeking office. The delivery of particularistic goods is made to sectors of the electorate during the campaign and once in office politicians may pursue ways of gaining access to patronage jobs and other state resources in order to pay back or pay off political supporters. Politicians in these parties may manifest populist characteristics, especially through the use of charisma to cultivate a personal following. The primary exchange between voter and politician is one in which a vote is exchanged for the delivery of particularistic goods.

perceived as voters' perceptions of what their role as legislators should be. It is not possible based on these interviews alone to distinguish with any confidence between particularism and clientelism, according to the definition and distinction that Lyne (1999) makes between the two. These interviews offer only a first cut on the question of the persistence and current relevance of clientelism to voting behavior. Because politicians will tend to present their actions in the best light possible, they avoid describing their actions or strategies in a way that allows the researcher to discern when a selective incentive has been offered versus a truly local collective good, which is the essence of the distinction between local particularism and clientelism that Lyne so astutely draws. But this first cut does offer at least a crude measure of the existing balance between the importance of the delivery of goods and services versus programmatic affinity.

In brief, the interviews revealed that it is difficult to place the parties as units on a scale between particularistic and programmatic, because there are politicians in all the major parties who place great importance on particularistic strategies. Instead, particularistic versus more programmatic emphases appear to vary most depending on the type of district from which the candidate is elected. For example, particularistic strategies were mentioned and emphasized much more by provincial legislators elected from small rural provinces than by national deputies or those elected from the provinces with the largest urban centers – Pichincha, Guayas, and Azuay. Legislators elected from very populous districts tended, for the most part, to downplay the importance of attending to highly local needs and demands and spent more of their time and energy on national issues and legislative matters. Of the twenty-three

legislators interviewed, eleven made it clear in their responses to various questions that voters' primary expectation of them was that they resolve concrete material problems in their community; this was the main criteria, they believed, upon which their constituents decided their vote.<sup>134</sup> There were only four who emphasized the importance of ideological coherence and their party's programmatic position as a crucial part of their connection and appeal to voters. Two PRE legislators placed most emphasis on the role of their party's leader in their electoral success and voters' response to their candidacies.<sup>135</sup> Finally, two ID congressmen identified their own personal reputations as honest and capable leaders as being the key to their electoral success.<sup>136</sup> There were four interviewees who I either did not get a chance to ask this question or whose responses were difficult to categorize.<sup>137</sup>

The pressure on legislators to deliver particularistic goods to their constituencies came through very clearly in the interviews and was evident across all five parties, although with some important differences. It was also clear from the interviews that this voter expectation created a conflict in the legislator's work, as it was not compatible with the constitutional stipulations of what their responsibilities entailed. These interviews were carried out about a year and a half after the 1998 constitution went into effect. The 1998 constitution stipulated that the sole role of legislative deputies was to legislate and audit the work of other branches of

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<sup>134</sup> Vizcaíno (DP), Ochoa (DP), Vaca (PSC), Torres (PSC), Pérez (PSC), Ruíz (ID), Arévalo (MUPP-NP), Estrada (DP), Fuertes (DP), Bucaram (PRE), Grefa (MUPP-NP).

<sup>135</sup> Adum and López (PRE).

<sup>136</sup> Argudo and Sánchez (ID).

<sup>137</sup> Andrade and Proaño (PRE), Bacigalupo (ID), Talahua (MUPP-NP).

government.<sup>138</sup> The 1998 Constitution prohibits legislators from “offering, processing, receiving, or administering resources from the General State Budget.” It also prohibits members of congress from naming people to public posts or jobs.<sup>139</sup> These specific prohibitions were included in the new constitution because previous practices that had developed in congress were viewed as corrupt. In the past the Budget Committee was one of the most powerful congressional committees. When the budget was drawn up various budget line items would be negotiated and included for individual legislators to use in their provinces. The idea was that these line items would be used to finance development or public works projects in the provinces, but there was no oversight over how they were used by the congressmen who negotiated them. This meant that these were resources that the legislators had virtually complete control over and could use to advance their own standing and power or even their own personal wealth. The lack of oversight apparently led to many situations of corruption and mismanagement. Legislators themselves offered descriptions of how these discretionary budgets were used in corrupt ways. An apparently common practice was that a congressman would make a deal with a local authority to finance some local public works project, but the contract had to be given to the company or person that the legislator designated. This company in turn would give a kickback to the legislator, usually around 10 percent.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> The terms in Spanish are, *legislar* and *fiscalizar*.

<sup>139</sup> Ecuador. Gobierno Nacional 1998: 60.

<sup>140</sup> Adolfo Bucaram, author interview, Quito, February 29, 2000; Carlos Torres, author interview, Quito, March 22, 2000; Dalton Bacigalupo, author interview, Quito, February 29, 2000; and Wilfrido Lucero, author interview, Quito, January 4, 2000.



This practice of congressmen receiving discretionary funds appears also to have been facilitated and permitted by the needs of the executive. Due to the fragmented nature of the Ecuadorian party system, presidents have rarely been able to count on a stable majority in congress, as a result they have often had to look for ways to obtain a majority in congress in order to get legislation passed. One strategy was to help make these funds available to congress through the Ministry of Finance in exchange for legislative support for their initiatives.<sup>141</sup>

These various types of influence peddling and abuse of power became so common that finally some congressmen were investigated, charged, and eventually expelled from congress during the mid-1990s. The scandal over these sorts of practices contributed significantly to the public's loss of confidence in the legislature and led the Constituent Assembly to remove the congress' discretionary budget powers. While this decision was aimed at stemming corruption and laying the foundation for a more efficient legislature, one that would merit the public's trust, many of the deputies I interviewed expressed ambivalence over the new restrictions, as they removed a means for the legislator to respond to voters' demands and expectations for public works and concrete assistance at the level of the province. Several legislators stated clearly that without this possibility it was very difficult to foster a stable relationship with their constituency. Making reference to these new restrictions, Gabriel Ruíz, an ID legislator representing Tungurahua Province, offered this commentary:

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<sup>141</sup> Adolfo Bucaram, author interview, Quito, February 29, 2000.

Now congressmen can only legislate and audit. But laws do not feed or clothe people, or attend to their most urgent needs, or build infrastructure. So the people react accusing those in congress of not understanding the people... and they come and say, “these people [members of congress] are lazy, they spend all their time arguing and fighting there in that room while we are out here starving to death. Congress is worthless and inefficient.” [They say this] because they didn’t receive the paint for their church, or money to build the sidewalk, or financing for a potable water project, because legislators are now prohibited from doing these things. But they [voters] don’t understand that... So there is a complete divorce between the population and the politicians, between the institutional organization of the state and the general population.<sup>142</sup>

In response to a question about what sort of electoral strategy has the most possibility of success in her province, Congresswoman Elizabeth Ochoa, of Azuay and a long-time activist in the DP answered: “I believe that what is most important are works for the community... While laws are very important in order to be able to execute projects, in our nation, with its Latin idiosyncrasy, we are convinced by material, rather than spiritual works, which in this case would be a law.”<sup>143</sup> Jaime Estrada, also a DP congressman, but elected from the coastal province of Manabí expressed a similar viewpoint:

While it is true that we as deputies come to congress to legislate and audit, the electorate... wants the deputy to do and promote public works... I think that this is true for all deputies, not just those of the governing party; it is very common. I see them in the ministries speaking in favor of their provinces, for the provincial institutions, and I think this is legitimate and it is something that the people want – that deputies work and action is manifested in public works.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Gabriel Ruíz, author interview, Quito, February 29, 2000.

<sup>143</sup> Elizabeth Ochoa, author interview, Quito, January 12, 2000.

<sup>144</sup> Jaime Estrada, author interview, Quito, December 22, 1999.

Numerous other representatives who I interviewed expressed similar opinions and a sense of frustration at the conflicting pressures they felt, on the one hand from the voters, and on the other to meet the constitutionally stipulated demands of their office. The fact that nearly half the legislators I interviewed continued to discuss so openly the great weight they place on the delivery of goods and services to their constituencies, even at a time when many of the most direct ways of doing so were by then illegal, indicates the dominance of this particularistic imperative for the majority of congressional representatives. Given the legal stipulations surrounding the legislators' activities, one can assume that the delivery of particularistic goods to constituents was even more important and widespread than appeared from the interviews. It is likely that other legislators were more guarded in their answers, not wanting to acknowledge the importance of their particularistic strategies.

As would be expected, almost all the legislators interviewed were careful to avoid describing their electoral strategies and work in a way that could be construed as clientelistic, instead they tended to describe their actions in terms of public works projects, in other words "locally targeted collective goods," to use Lyne's distinction. However, in several cases, legislators described clearly clientelistic patterns when referring to the practices of other politicians or to voters' expectations of politicians. In the case of the Amazonian representatives, all of the three I interviewed acknowledged quite openly that they resorted, to some degree, to the distribution of selective incentives; they justified it with reference to voter expectations. At the time of my interview with him, Kaiser Arévalo was a Pachakutik legislator. He went on at length about voters' expectations in the Amazonian province of Morona Santiago:

Our population is so badly educated that when the electoral campaign comes along they treat it as if it were Christmas. They begin to ask the candidate for soccer balls, nets, trophies, uniforms for sports teams. This is the traditional way of doing politics: deceiving the people and giving them basically candy in exchange for their vote. We have tried to struggle against this tendency, we have tried to change things, but this still costs some money, but we don't spend to the same degree as the traditional parties.<sup>145</sup>

Juan Manuel Fuertes, representing Sucumbios Province for the DP Party, had a similar lament to that of Arévalo: “Unfortunately this Ecuadorian system is so clientelistic, it is tremendous, sometimes I receive petitions telling me they need so many pots of such different sizes... And one has to come through in some way... There is quite a lot of mutual cultural perversion in this regard, on the part of both the candidates and the electors.”<sup>146</sup> Valerio Grefa, one of the Amazon's most important indigenous leaders was elected to congress on the Pachakutik ticket from his native province of Napo. He campaigned on indigenous issues and demands, but he also complained that many of the voters in his province expected handouts and selective incentives from him:

The people still don't understand. It [the new law change] hasn't been socialized yet, and that is why they think that we have to do public works, to build roads. They ask for community buildings, country roads, infrastructure works and collective services. So the people still don't understand that we are only supposed to audit and legislate, and because of this they judge us. They say, “you haven't done any public work here in the province and therefore you are not worth anything. That other deputy is good because once upon a time he gave a job to my niece, or an uncle, etc.” They remember that deputy who built something for them, or gave them a computer, or a trophy, or sports uniforms. They are considered the good ones because they gave things

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<sup>145</sup> Kaiser Arévalo, author interview, Quito, February 12, 2000.

<sup>146</sup> Juan Manuel Fuertes, author interview, Quito, December 27, 1999.

and the other ones are useless because they don't give them anything.<sup>147</sup>

Clearly voter expectations in the Amazon were not focused on national party platforms or programmatic agendas. The Amazon appeared to be the region where voter expectations were most narrowly determined by these short-term and individualized incentives, but local level ethnographic studies of politics in poor urban neighborhoods in the largest cities of Quito and Guayaquil also revealed the existence and importance of clientelistic relationships between popular sectors and politicians from all of the major political parties (Burgwal 1995; Lesser 1987; Menéndez-Carrión 1986). In his study of local politics in a Quito squatter settlement, Burgwal (1995) uncovered several clientelistic networks tied into various prominent political parties, but when he interviewed the DP mayor of Quito, Rodrigo Paz, who had clearly directed the organization of one of these networks during his campaign, Paz denied that his campaign team had engaged in any sort of clientelistic behavior. Clearly the extent to which politicians relied on clientelistic networks and strategies to garner political support in Ecuador was much greater than what they were willing to reveal in interviews. Given that these strategies were discussed and emphasized by politicians from each of the five parties, gives us some confidence in concluding that the delivery of concrete goods and services, everything from outright vote buying to the provision of public works projects, remained a dominant mode of connection between elected officials and much of their constituency.

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<sup>147</sup> Valerio Grefa, author interview, Quito, March 8, 2000.

However, the survey also revealed the importance of other factors besides clientelism in the politician-voter relationship. Interestingly, there was no mention by any of the interviewees of retrospective voting. This is significant in that retrospective voting relies mostly on the idea that a voter's decision is made on the basis of his or her evaluation of a previous administration and this evaluation can have repercussions for the party and the party's candidates as a whole. The fact that retrospective voting considerations were not mentioned by any of the legislators interviewed is further evidence of the relative marginality of the party labels and the greater importance assigned to the individual candidate in Ecuadorian elections. This is not to say that retrospective voting never takes place, indeed there is evidence that it does, especially in reaction to the party that holds executive power, however, this model does not appear to function all times and in all places and is particularly weak in electoral strongholds, where a party may do very well even after a disastrous administration at the national level.

A clear example of this is the case of the populist PRE party in the 1998 congressional elections. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Abdalá Bucaram was thrown out of office in February 1997. His short passage through the presidency had been mired in corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement. And yet in spite of the PRE's disastrous experience in power, the party did surprisingly well in the 1998 elections in its Coastal electoral bastions, winning sixteen out of a total of twenty-two seats in the four predominantly rural provinces of Manabí, Los Ríos, El Oro, and

Esmeraldas.<sup>148</sup> The PRE lost a significant amount of its vote-share and seats in other provinces, but despite its national disgrace, it held its own in these four core provinces. This sort of behavior flies in the face of the normal predictions based on a traditional rational voter model. On the surface the PRE vote in these provinces in 1998 appears to have been a response to an almost hyper identification with the party and, in particular, with its leader. PRE legislators Adum and López both gave equal or greater weight to the role of the party and the charisma of its leader, in comparison to their own personal merits as candidates. Adum, a political newcomer, had not been a member of the PRE when the party approached her in 1998 and asked her if she wanted to run for congress on its list. At the time the party was having trouble filling the lower slots of its list because everyone assumed the PRE would do poorly. In my interview with her, Adum explained that she owed her electoral victory to the fact that PRE voters did not split their vote but, instead, voted down the party line. Iván López of Esmeraldas had been elected as a PRE delegate to the National Assembly in 1997 and then in 1998 Bucaram asked him personally to run for congress. He attributed his electoral success to:

The charisma of President Bucaram combined with my personal circumstances, in that I worked hard and made myself known. The people already knew who I was and went to vote for us... I can't tell you that it was I alone who swept up, it was instead the peoples' response to President Bucaram who is a charismatic man, a man who is loved in Ecuador, at least on the Coast.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> The fifth coastal province is Guayas, which is dominated by the nation's largest city, Guayaquil. Guayaquil became the electoral bastion of the PSC party during the late 1980s and 1990s.

<sup>149</sup> Iván López, author interview, Quito, February 29, 2000.

In the case of the PRE, identification with the party was mediated almost exclusively through people's identification with the party's *caudillo* leader. Carlos de la Torre (2000) argues that the type of identification promoted by the PRE is one of a personal connection between the leader and the people. Bucaram projects himself as the "savior" of the people. In my interview with her, Adum talked about peoples' connection with the party: "The people feel identified with the PRE. They believe that the party is going to solve the problems in the province... Manabí is a poor province and Abdalá is identified with the poor."<sup>150</sup> In this case people do not identify with the party because of a specific ideology or program it advances, but instead because they identify with the party's leader.

While de la Torre's work on the PRE has been important in documenting Bucaram's discursive and symbolic messages and appeals, much more work on this party remains to be done, especially documenting its grassroots structure and how it maintains such a powerful political machine. I received an initial glimpse of how the party functioned when I spent four days in the town of Chone in the coastal province of Manabí accompanying Gina de Andrade, the PRE's candidate for mayor. Andrade was married to a prominent PRE politician,<sup>151</sup> who at the time was serving as a national legislator. Chone is a very poor canton located in the heart of the rural province of Manabí. 70 percent of the population was rural and 30 percent urban. The city of Chone had very few paved streets and suffered from periodic flooding during the rainy season. The Andrade family was one of the wealthiest in the city and

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<sup>150</sup> Mirella Adum, author interview, Quito, January 12, 2000.

<sup>151</sup> Raúl Andrade, author interview, Chone, March 30, 2000.



probably in the province. They were large landowners and made their money in agriculture, including cattle raising and shrimp farming. In addition, they owned a local gas station. They used their control of important local resources and jobs to maintain themselves in political power. They built an important political network in the canton based in large part on their own private wealth. From my limited stay with the Andrade family it appeared evident that their form of local politics followed the clientelistic model of a locally powerful family with an important network of reciprocal connections and exchanges with poorer people in the province.

It is also noteworthy that the Andrade family was directly related to the Bucaram family through Gina de Andrade, whose sister was married to Abdalá's brother, Adolfo Bucaram. So the PRE model was one that relied on an extensive network of locally powerful families, who built and controlled important local networks, based on reciprocal, clientelistic relationships with subordinates. Within this network are many individuals and families who are related to one another and to the party leader through direct family ties. Whether family or not, party members are expected to be loyal to and pay deference to the party leader. Thus, in addition to the importance and appeal of Bucaram's populist message to the poor, the PRE also owes its success to a network of locally powerful clientelistic machines. What may appear as socialization in the voting patterns for the PRE is, at least in part, an artifice of clientelistic networks.

Returning to the results of the survey, there were two legislators whose responses to the questions having to do with their electoral success focused primarily on their own personal profiles and qualifications. Both of these legislators were from

the ID. One of them was a clear case of horizontal recruitment. Bolivar Sánchez ran for and won a seat to the National Constituent Assembly in 1997 on the PSC ticket. He abandoned that party over policy differences with the party leadership. The following year the ID recruited him to run for congress. What is striking about this and something which Sánchez himself pointed out, is that the PSC and the ID are ideologically very different parties: the PSC is the most right of the mainstream parties, and the ID is the furthest to the left. Since he ran for these two different posts in the same province and was elected both times, clearly it was not either the party or the party's ideological position which made the difference in his electoral victories but instead his own personal reputation. Sánchez's election cannot be attributed either to retrospective voting, socialization, or programmatic affinity. The degree to which his appeal in the province of Bolivar is based on a local clientelistic machine is impossible to determine solely from an interview. When asked, he de-emphasized the role of public works and the distribution of goods, but he did at another point explain that he had set up several community kitchens in cantons throughout the province and donated his salary from the National Assembly and the congress to these communal kitchens. Sánchez is another example of a politician from the upper class with important business interests, winning office in a very poor province.

Jhon Argudo had been a long-standing activist in the ID, but when asked about the importance of the party to his electoral success, he clearly felt that in his case the individual was more important than the party. The evidence he cited to support this position was that he received more votes in the province than did his party's presidential candidate, who came in fourth at the provincial level. When asked about

voters' expectations of legislators, he said they wanted to be able to feel proud of their representative and feel like he or she was projecting a positive image of their province. In other words, a legislator should be someone who can play a positive and admirable role at the national level. He did not mention the delivery of particularistic goods as a voter expectation, but when he talked about how it was that he had developed a reputation that allowed him to run for office, he placed emphasis on the fact that he had developed an excellent track record in the province as the director of a regional development organization. This was crucial to making him known and in demonstrating his capacity and ability. It is noteworthy that he had been working in development, which clearly addresses people's concrete material needs.

In summary, in response to questions about voter expectations and what makes a successful electoral strategy nearly 50 percent of those interviewed placed most emphasis on the need to respond in some way to local voters' concrete material needs, implying by this the delivery of particularistic goods and services. Even those whose responses appeared to emphasize voter loyalty to a specific party or leader or the image of the individual candidate, revealed in other parts of their answers that at least part of their appeal to voters was due to the fact that they had a proven track record as particularistic goods providers.

There were only four legislators interviewed who asserted that programmatic affinity with the party's platform was an essential element in obtaining voter support for their candidacy.<sup>152</sup> One was a national legislator from Pachakutik, two were elected from the Pichincha Province, which is dominated by the country's capital,

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<sup>152</sup> Alexandra Vela (DP), Wilfrido Lucero (ID), Carlos González (ID), Nina Pacari (MUPP-NP).

Quito, and the final one was a provincial deputy from Azuay Province, where Cuenca is located, Ecuador's third largest city. For DP Congresswoman Alexandra Vela voter support resulted from a combination of the DP's powerful organization in Pichincha province, which was the result of a process of socialization, as well as voters' affinity with the party's ideas and the reputation of the party's candidates and leaders. When asked what sector of the population she believed was represented by the party, she responded that the DP's electoral niche in Pichincha was the lower middle to upper middle class, essentially middle class professionals and a "much more urban than rural electorate."<sup>153</sup> She said that in Pichincha Province and in Quito, in particular, "people look for a national position, fundamentally they look for capacity and honesty [in a candidate]." She asserted that her campaign promises and those of the other DP candidates running in Pichincha focused on, "the [party's] alternative economic proposals and on the issue of peace with Peru, as well as the party's principles with regard to social policy. These were the fundamental planks of the campaign."<sup>154</sup> Clearly here the emphasis was on programmatic proposals.

Pacari, a prominent leader in the national indigenous movement, ran as an indigenous candidate advocating Pachakutik's multi-cultural platform, but she explained that when they analyzed the electoral data it became clear that the majority of her votes actually came from urban middle class sectors.

González of the ID party and elected from Azuay province was the only one to state unequivocally that, "the only valid offer [in his district] is an ideological one."<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Alexandra Vela, author interview, Quito, January 28, 2000.

<sup>154</sup> Alexandra Vela, author interview, Quito, January 28, 2000.

<sup>155</sup> Carlos González, author interview, Quito, January 4, 2000.

All four of these legislators claimed they devoted virtually all their time to national legislative matters and auditing activities. These responses were clear and indicate that there were voters in Ecuador who cast their vote not on the basis of selective incentives, but instead on their evaluations of a party's political platforms and the reputation of individual candidates, but the evidence indicates that this voting pattern was characteristic, primarily, of the urban middle class. Representatives from small, primarily rural and poor provinces tended to place greater emphasis on the importance of responding in some way to people's concrete needs. They acknowledged very clearly that candidates could not hope to be successful if the primary focus of their campaign was on national issues.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter began by describing Ecuadorian party politics previous to 1978 and the connections between the elite cadre party system that functioned through the early 1970s and the major parties that emerged after the transition to democracy. Up till the early 1970s Ecuador was an oligarchic democracy that had remained largely immune to any serious pressures from below. This was in stark contrast to most of its neighbors and other important countries in South America, many of which experienced the building of mass labor movements and some sort of populist challenge that involved mobilization of the masses. The absence of any serious threat from below in Ecuador shaped the types of parties that came to dominate the post-1978 party system.

While new parties eclipsed the historically dominant Liberal and Conservative parties in the new democratic period, the new parties still largely represented and responded to elite interests. They represented new elite configurations and alliances, and to some extent the incorporation of the middle class and professionals but did little to incorporate those from the popular sectors. So even after the attainment of universal franchise, Ecuadorian parties remained elitist. Pachano characterized them as cadre parties with few strong connections to organized civil society, except via clientelistic ties, and I concur with this description.

Despite the similarities in terms of representing different combinations of elite and middle class sectors, there was also a fairly high degree of variation among these parties in terms of their organizational structure and internal decision-making patterns. The PRE, PSC, DP, and ID exhibited varying levels of internal democracy or hierarchy, with decision making in some being more decentralized and in others, like the PRE, highly centralized. The PRE party was a family fiefdom. The DP and the ID, two parties that had attempted to create strong institutionalized party structures along the lines of European parties, by the 1990s were in the process of deinstitutionalization, as they began to engage in greater horizontal recruitment of candidates. This process of deinstitutionalization was a response to the competitive pressures in the party system itself and reflected the fact that Ecuadorian voters had notoriously low levels of party loyalty and tended to vote more for candidates who could offer them something than on the basis of their support for a particular party program.

The pressure to find candidates who could shoulder the burden of their own campaigns was another driving factor in the trend towards party deinstitutionalization. Not only were the parties themselves largely closed to popular participation due to their own internal cultures and lack of connections to organized civil society, but politics was a costly affair, requiring time and resources not readily available to most Ecuadorians. The costs of campaigning, especially in the major urban centers and the fact that these costs were shouldered largely by the candidates themselves served as another barrier for non-elite sectors of the population seeking to participate in party politics.

Finally, this chapter considered the role played by clientelism in terms of mediating the connection between parties, politicians, and voters. Clientelism remained an important component of this relationship into the new millennium, despite the adoption of constitutional changes in 1998 that sought to stem clientelism and patronage on the part of congressional deputies. The importance of the delivery of particularistic goods to voters was most evident in the smaller rural provinces, but studies of political party activity in the major cities of Quito and Guayaquil by other scholars offered evidence of its widespread use even in major urban centers. The PRE, in particular, was known to have a powerful party machine operating at the local level.

This chapter laid out the context in which Pachakutik had to operate and compete. It was one in which Pachakutik was disadvantaged as a result of its lack of resources compared to the dominant parties in the system. Likewise, this chapter painted a picture of the organizational structure and internal decision-making practices

that evolved within the dominant parties during the 1980s and 1990s. This portrait will serve as an implicit point of comparison when analyzing Pachakutik's internal structure, make-up, and practices in the following chapters. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine this party at the national and local levels and the picture that emerges is one that is substantially different from the snapshot of the dominant parties revealed in this chapter.



## Chapter 4

### The Origins and Birth of the Pachakutik Political Movement

I declare that “the democratic system we have in Ecuador” must be deepened by opening up a democratic space in which sectors representing workers, intellectuals, the press, and, in particular, the indigenous movement can express their political opinions. We believe that political parties are not the only ones called to be elected and to direct the destiny of a country. We believe in a much broader democratic system in which these sectors [workers, intellectuals, indigenous, etc.] can [also] participate.

- Luis Macas, quoted in 1990 when he held the post of president of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador<sup>156</sup>

I believe that the Movement [Nuevo País] should be a type civil society internet, a broad movement in which there are no affiliations or membership cards, or expelled members, because that is the old country. This is what many people do not understand, when I talk of a New Country and the old country, I am talking about mental structures, not left and right... I think there should be a single credential that people entering the movement must have and that is honesty. A person has to be honest, ideologically, humanly, and economically speaking.

- Freddy Ehlers, MUPP-NP presidential candidate in 1996 and 1998<sup>157</sup>

Pachakutik-Nuevo País was born in 1996 as a independent citizen movement that brought together the country’s most important social movements and included many individuals of national stature, most notably the movement’s presidential candidate, television host, Freddy Ehlers. The 1996 Pachakutik-Nuevo País political campaign was not without conflict and problems, but it was also a moment of much hope and excitement as new actors participated directly in formal politics in ways that

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<sup>156</sup> Diario Hoy 1990.

<sup>157</sup> Ehlers 1996.

explicitly sought to challenge traditional models of Ecuadorian party politics. There was a sense at the time that the Pachakutik-Nuevo País campaign represented something qualitatively new and important on the Ecuadorian political stage.<sup>158</sup>

How this broad coalition, which included the powerful indigenous movement that but a couple of years previous had called on its members to boycott elections, came together to win nearly ten percent of the national congressional seats and obtain a third place finish for their presidential candidate is a remarkable story. In this chapter I attempt, not only to tell this story, but also to develop a theoretical framework through which to better understand it's significance.

The central questions addressed in this chapter are the following. How and why did Ecuadorian social movements and, in particular, the indigenous movement decide to launch a political movement and participate directly in elections? What was the political context that facilitated this decision and the building of this coalition? It is important to distinguish between the factors that lead to the emergence of new parties and those that determine new party success and sustainability, as they are not necessarily the same. In this chapter I am most concerned with those variables that explain Pachakutik's emergence. Subsequent chapters analyze the factors that account for the movement's electoral success.

My analysis of the reasons for Pachakutik's birth builds on theoretical work on party system change and new party formation. I also draw heavily on social movement theory, combining political opportunity structure and resource mobilization theories.

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<sup>158</sup> Evidence of this sense of significance is evidenced by the fact that several books of testimonials about the campaign and Ehlers's candidacy were published within a few months of the elections. See Agencia Latinoamericana de Información (ALAI) 1996; Ortega and Ortiz 1996.

The case study analysis focuses primarily on background conditions to Pachaktutik's emergence and the foundational moment in 1995 and 1996. I will conclude by briefly comparing the Ecuadorian experience with that of social movement political participation in Brazil and Bolivia.

### **New Parties and Party System Change**

The theoretical model I develop in the theory chapter to account for new party formation emphasizes the central importance of a favorable political opportunity structure and then goes on to argue that the distribution of financial and organizational resources in civil society is key to understanding what type of electoral challengers will emerge and whether social movements will be among them. This chapter offers a close analysis of the political opportunity structure that existed in Ecuador in the mid-1990s and the conditions that created the political space for the formation of new parties. It describes developments and situations that led to widespread public frustration with the dominant parties and which in turn opened up space for new parties and political contenders.

A political opportunity structure favorable to new parties or candidates can result from a variety of changes. In his study of the emergence of the European Green parties Kitschelt (1989) considers three different types of explanations - structural, institutional, and cultural - for party system change and the emergence of new parties. He argues that the key factor that led to the opening in European party systems and the emergence of the Green parties was the profound shift in cultural values experienced

in many advanced industrialized countries in the late twentieth century (Inglehart 1984).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the post-industrial cultural shift argument does not make sense for Ecuador and other developing countries. Instead, I argue that the primary force behind the political opening in Ecuador, which social movements were able to take advantage of, was a series of political and economic crises that served to discredit the major political parties and alienate them from much of the electorate. I classify these crises as structural in nature in that their source can be traced back to a large degree to broad changes in the international economy that had deep repercussions in Ecuador's economy and those of countries throughout the region.

This part of my argument lends support to Boudon's<sup>159</sup> argument that a necessary factor for new party emergence, one that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) failed to envision, is that established political parties must enter into crisis in order for space to be opened up for new contenders. Boudon asserts that this is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the emergence of new parties.<sup>160</sup> Due to the stickiness of existing parties and constituents' party identifications new parties are only likely to emerge when existing parties enter into crisis. As Gourevitch (1986) argued, economic crisis tends to undermine the foundations of existing political alliances and throw everything up for grabs in a political system, often precipitating major political

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<sup>159</sup> Boudon n.d..

<sup>160</sup> I take issue with the notion that it is even a necessary factor; although I do think that it is one of the most likely and common factors opening the way to participation by new parties. But one exception to this is the case of the ecological parties in Europe. The established political parties in this case did not so much enter into crisis as suffer from a certain rigidity due to their internal structures that prevented them from being able to effectively represent the concerns of a new emerging ecologically minded constituency. Likewise, in the U.S. we have witnessed some important third party challenges even though the two dominant parties are not in crisis.

realignments. Thus, the combination of public disillusionment and crisis makes for a volatile environment, ripe for the emergence of new political actors.

After describing the opportunity structure that facilitated the emergence of new parties in Ecuador, the second half of this chapter focuses on the development of internal organizational resources on the part of the indigenous movement. I identify the significant characteristics of the movement, the organizational resources it had accumulated by 1996, and its relationships with other social and political actors. This is crucial to explaining how it was that indigenous and other social movements were among those that took advantage of the general political opening.

Finally, I assess the impact of changes made to Ecuadorian electoral law during the first half of the 1990s on the entrance of the indigenous movement into electoral politics. VanCott (2003a ) has argued that these changes to electoral law lowered the barriers to indigenous movement participation and, therefore, played an important role in Pachakutik's emergence and its prospects for success. While I do not disagree with this assessment, I maintain that institutional changes were not the primary impetus behind the emergence of a social movement-based party in Ecuador. Instead, I will argue that the variables of primary importance were the structural factors related to the long-term economic crisis, combined with the development of significant internal resources on the part of the indigenous movement itself. The institutional changes, while not insignificant, were of secondary importance in relation to these other factors.

## Political Opportunity Structure

Post-1978 the political environment in Ecuador became increasingly permissive in terms of the opportunities for new actors to challenge traditional political parties. Indeed, during the first two decades after 1978 the political landscape was littered with countless new parties; some of which survived, the majority of which faded into obscurity. Political volatility and the weak voter attachment to parties that this volatility is evidence of were important underlying conditions that facilitated Pachakutik's emergence in 1996.

Probably the single most important reason for the high rate of volatility in Ecuador post-1978 was the fact that this was the first period in the country's history in which there was universal franchise. Over the objections at the time of many in the political elite and existing political parties (Hurtado 1990 ), the 1978 Constitution removed the literacy requirement that in past periods and as late as 1968 had restricted the franchise to only about 15 percent of the adult population (Conaghan 1995). While there are no exact figures on the percentage of the indigenous population that was excluded from voting by the literacy requirements, it was undoubtedly extremely high. Not only were illiteracy rates disproportionately high among the indigenous population, especially previous to the 1970s,<sup>161</sup> but the dominant language spoken by

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<sup>161</sup> Ecuador. Ministerio de Economía 1960. According to figures from the 1959 census 92.35 percent of Quichua speakers were illiterate compared to 36.34 percent of Spanish speakers. Given that citizens' ethnicity was not asked in this census, language spoken is the closest measure available for determining the size and conditions of the indigenous population. The marked difference in illiteracy rates gives a clear idea of the sharp differences and inequalities faced by the indigenous population in comparison to the rest of society.

most indigenous at the time was not the nation's official language, Spanish, but Quichua, which did not have the status of an officially recognized language.

Thus, the attainment of universal franchise in Ecuador resulted in the inclusion of a whole new group of voters – indigenous people –, as well as a large influx of non-indigenous poor and uneducated voters. As might have been expected, this expansion of the electorate resulted in the appearance of a host of new parties and created a fluid and volatile party system.<sup>162</sup> But interestingly enough, despite the heavy influx of indigenous voters, the ethnic cleavage did not become, to use Laitin's (1986) term, "particized" until the 1990s. In other words, no party emerged that attempted to appeal specifically to indigenous voters previous to 1996.<sup>163</sup> Racism within established political parties was certainly an important factor. In addition, the indigenous movement did not seek to form a party during the 1980s because the movement was not yet organizationally ready. Different than labor in Europe at the turn of the century, indigenous groups in Ecuador in the 1970s had not been active protagonists in the struggle for democracy and universal franchise. Instead, Ecuador's transition to democracy was a "pacted" transition (Conaghan and Espinal 1990), and the attainment of universal franchise was probably more the reflection of contemporary international norms than a direct response to a movement from below

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<sup>162</sup> As of 1994 Ecuador's average district magnitude was 3.5, which is relatively low for a proportional representation system. And yet surprisingly, Ecuador had one of the highest numbers of effective parties, whether one determines this by votes or seats. According to Taagepera and Shuggart's Taagepera and Shuggart 1989: 82 method of measuring of the effective number of parties, in 1984 Ecuador had 10.3 electoral parties (that is according to vote shares) and 6.1 effective parties (based on seats obtained in Congress). In terms of electoral parties, that gave Ecuador the dubious distinction of being the most fragmented electoral party system in the world! Neto 1998.

<sup>163</sup> Jaime Roldós did make direct appeals to indigenous voters when he ran for president in 1979 and once elected did implement policies that earned him the support and loyalty of much of the indigenous population, in particular the implementation of the first literacy campaigns. However, his appeal was broadly to Ecuador's poor and not only to the indigenous population.

(Collins 2000c). This then is an example of how permissive factors can point to possibilities, but cannot fully predict when or what type of new party will emerge.<sup>164</sup>

Historically, the expansion of the franchise has been associated with the emergence of new parties and often with profound changes in party systems. The paradigmatic example is that of Western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when universal franchise coupled with strong labor movements produced mass parties that challenged older cadre parties, eventually forcing their transformation into more open and competitive mass parties. The result at that time was a transformation in the party systems themselves, not simply the emergence of new parties.

However, in Ecuador the flux and instability associated with the expansion of the electorate was protracted and intensified by the behavior of the political elites themselves and by extremely difficult governing conditions that resulted from prolonged economic crisis and contraction. The following section examines the impact of economic crisis and corruption on Ecuador's party system during the 1980s and 1990s.

### **Economic Crisis and the Decline in Public Trust of Political Elites**

Ecuador was not immune to the experience common to virtually every Latin American country during the 1980s and 1990s of staggering debt burdens, declining prices for exports, and pressure from international lending agencies to slash

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<sup>164</sup> My argument here builds on and adapts from Kitschelt's work on European ecological parties. In examining the explanations for the emergence of these parties he says that cultural changes explain why they emerged but not "the how, when, and with what political effect these demands articulate themselves." In order to get at these questions he looks to resource mobilization theory in the social movement literature Kitschelt 1989.



government spending. In Ecuador it was the Hurtado administration that took the first austerity measures just a couple of years after the return to democracy. As the crises continued and intensified, government legitimacy and that of political parties suffered. The political class appeared incapable of solving the country's basic economic problems and steering it on a path towards growth and prosperity.

Latin Americans refer to the 1980s as “the lost decade”. The following figures illustrate the seriousness of the economic downturn that Ecuador experienced during that time. Accounting for inflation, real urban salaries in Ecuador declined steadily during the 1980s, so that by 1985 they represented only 60.4 percent of what they had been in 1980; by 1991 they were only 30.4 percent.<sup>165</sup> Likewise, according to official figures from Ecuador's Central Bank, urban unemployment jumped from 5.4 percent in 1980 to 10.4 percent in 1985; after 1986 it went down a bit and remained in the range of 7-8 percent through 1991. Not once during the 1980s and 1990s did the urban unemployment rate return to the 1970s level of 4 to 5 percent.<sup>166</sup> Consumption per capita started to decline in 1982 and continued in this trend for the remainder of the decade.<sup>167</sup> Especially considering the contrast with the oil boom period of the 1970s, the 1980s were a rude economic awakening for Ecuadorians, as unemployment increased and salaries and consumption declined. This situation of economic scarcity and the government's inability to meet social needs, compounded by continuing corruption on the part of political elites and parties, all took a drastic toll on public support for and trust in political parties and elites during the 1980s and 1990s.

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<sup>165</sup> FLACSO - Sede Ecuador and IICA Oficina Ecuador 1994: 172.

<sup>166</sup> FLACSO - Sede Ecuador and IICA Oficina Ecuador 1994: 22.

<sup>167</sup> FLACSO - Sede Ecuador and IICA Oficina Ecuador 1994: 49.

Public opinion polls throughout the 1990s demonstrated a steady downward trend in the public's estimation of political parties and the political establishment in general. The public's view of congress and political parties dipped markedly in 1991 and continued to plummet thereafter.<sup>168</sup> Throughout the 1990s, congress and political parties consistently ranked among the worst and most corrupt of public institutions in public opinion polls. Conversely, the public held in high esteem the military and the Catholic Church. The overwhelming approval of a 1994 referendum question asking whether independents should be allowed to run for office further exemplified the Ecuadorian public's high level of frustration with political parties.<sup>169</sup>

Corruption became another Achilles heel of the political establishment. This problem became acute during the second half of the 1990s when the country was rocked by scandal after scandal. The first major series of scandals occurred in 1995 involving the Durán Ballén administration. Vice President Alberto Dahik initiated a pattern to be followed by a number of other Ecuadorian heads of state in succeeding years, when he fled the country instead of facing legal charges of corruption. President Durán Ballén did not have to flee the country, but his political persona and reputation were badly tarnished when charges of corruption involving his family members came to light. And this was just the beginning. The corruption scandals that engulfed and subsumed the Bucaram (1996-1997) and Mahuad (1998-2000) administrations were of far greater economic and political magnitude. Revelations of

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<sup>168</sup> Diario Hoy 1994

<sup>169</sup> The referendum with this question was passed in 1994. In 1995 congress enacted the legislation, and independents were allowed to run for the first time in the 1996 elections.

corruption at the highest levels in administration after administration took an extremely high toll on public trust in political elites during the 1990s.

Beyond these specific political and economic trends and developments that began in the 1980s and intensified in the 1990s, the nature of Ecuadorian parties themselves contributed to and exacerbated the tendency towards political volatility. As discussed in the previous chapter, Ecuadorian political parties were elite organizations that had failed to build strong and binding attachments to voters or high levels of voter loyalty. Writing in the mid-1990s, Conaghan (1995) described Ecuadorian voters and politicians as “floating”, meaning that neither voters nor even politicians had strong ties to political parties but instead seemed to shift from one to another with great frequency. The tenuous connections between parties and voters, and even between parties and their own elected members, combined with the highly negative views the public held of political parties to create a party system crisis.

### **What Role for Institutions?**

What role did Ecuadorian electoral law and political institutions play in the development of this problematic and disconnected party system? Furthermore, did the nature of the country’s formal political institutions facilitate the emergence of a strong social movement party there? As discussed in Chapter 3, I maintain that Ecuador’s formal political institutions are not the only key for understanding the problems inherent in the party system as a whole. Ecuador’s political institutions acted like a weak dam that was incapable of containing or completely redirecting the flow of water in the desired direction. Electoral law and political institutions had

some marginal impact but were not the driving force behind the outcomes that ensued. With regard to the second question, there were a couple of features of the country's electoral laws which did help to create the political opportunity structure that made the emergence of a social movement-based party possible. These characteristics of Ecuador's electoral institutions were facilitating factors but not the key explanatory variables. In the absence of the two central variables - the general discrediting of the traditional political elites and the indigenous movement's own internal organizational development - they would have been inconsequential.

One of the main ways Ecuador's electoral rules facilitated Pachakutik's emergence was that electoral districts were drawn so that sparsely populated provinces got disproportionate representation in congress relative to their populations. This resulted in a bias in favor of small rural provinces. Ecuador had a two-tier election system, although all delegates were elected to a single chamber. About ten percent of deputies were elected from a national slate using proportional representation rules. The rest were elected directly from their provinces, thereby giving them more of a local mandate.<sup>170</sup> The provinces served as districts and each one was automatically allocated two representatives; provinces with more than the minimum population were granted additional seats according to a formula based on the size of the population. The variation between provinces in terms of territory and population was large. To use a term coined by Pachano,<sup>171</sup> the "mandate density" was greatest in the coastal provinces and lowest in the Amazonian ones, with the Highland provinces falling

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<sup>170</sup> Today all one hundred members of congress are elected from their provinces; there are no more nationally elected seats.

<sup>171</sup> Pachano 1996: 87.

somewhere in the middle. In other words, the bias had regional dimensions as well. The bias in favor of smaller provinces was even more pronounced previous to 1998. In that year the size of congress was expanded and a larger percentage of seats were allocated to the most populous provinces, thus reducing somewhat the degree of overrepresentation previously enjoyed by the smaller provinces.

As it turned out, this structural bias benefited the indigenous movement, which had its base in the rural and sparsely populated Highland and Amazonian provinces and almost no presence on the more populous coast. Absent this structural feature of Ecuadorian electoral law, in which small rural provinces were over represented relative to their populations, Pachakutik would not have been as significant player in congress, because it's congressional delegation would have won a smaller percentage of seats. I would argue that, even absent this bias, it is likely that the indigenous movement would nevertheless have eventually decided to participate in electoral politics, but their strategies might have been different and their impact at the national level would almost certainly have been less pronounced. It is likely, for example, that more emphasis would have been placed from the outset on winning local and provincial seats and somewhat less on winning seats in congress.

The movement's base in sparsely populated rural areas was not only an advantage in terms of congressional elections. Ospina (2000 ) suggests that this geographical characteristic was one of the reasons the indigenous movement was more successful at competing in elections than the labor movement was, because they were running for office in provinces where fewer votes were needed to win seats. This played to the social movements' strength, which was based in organizational rather

than financial resources. It would have been much more difficult for Pachakutik to successfully compete in the large electoral markets, where the ability to buy significant media time is necessary in order to be competitive. As discussed in Chapter 3, campaign strategies and cultures differed tremendously between urban and rural provinces. The movement's comparative advantage in organizational strength was a viable and useful tool in rural provinces, but not sufficient in densely populated urban environments.

Finally, the fact that the organizational structure of the indigenous movement, built as it was upon a base of interconnected local communities, was territorially, as opposed to issue-based, was significant in its ability to take advantage of the country's electoral structure.<sup>172</sup> The provincial district make-up of Ecuador's electoral system would not have been of much benefit to an issue-oriented social movement, like the environmental movements in Europe that spawned the Green parties. Issue-based movements are better served by more proportional systems with large multi-member districts. Even though Ecuador's system was not highly proportional, the indigenous movement was able to compete within it, because its own territorially based structure coincided to a large degree with the electoral structure. Discussing the internal debates that took place within the CONAIE about the pros and cons of electoral participation, Sánchez López and Freidenberg write: "The arguments of those who advocated electoral participation rested on the conviction that victory was guaranteed

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<sup>172</sup> Writing about social protest and organization in Latin America in the new millennium, Adolfo Gilly makes a similar observation about the locus of organizing under neoliberalism. He writes: "The principal center of organization today is not production-based but territorial: neighborhood communities in El Alto near La Paz, *piqueteros* and communal organizations in Argentina, Councils of Good Government in Chiapas or the Landless Rural Workers' Movement in Brazil." Gilly 2005: 38.

at the local level due to the strength of their organizations in certain cantons where the majority of the population was indigenous.”<sup>173</sup>

In addition to the advantages of the territorial makeup of the indigenous movement in relation to Ecuador’s electoral system, changes made to Ecuador’s electoral laws in 1994 lowered barriers to participation by small parties thereby facilitating indigenous and social movement party formation. These changes originated with public support for several amendments contained in a 1994 referendum. The most important provisions approved by the public in this referendum were: (1) allowing independent candidates and movements to run for office, (2) removing a ban against alliances between parties, and (3) eliminating a requirement that parties field candidates in ten of the country’s twenty-one provinces and three of the most populous provinces. As a result of these changes, any candidate, whether affiliated with a political party or not, could get on the ballot in any province where they were able to obtain signatures from at least 1.5 percent of the population.<sup>174</sup> In a certain sense these changes opened the floodgates for a greater proliferation of groupings and candidates on the ballots. Previous to these rule changes individuals with political ambitions who were unaffiliated with a party either had to go through the process of registering a new party, join an existing one, or arrange to use the registration and name of a registered but defunct party. All of which were tactics that candidates had successfully employed in the past.

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<sup>173</sup> Sánchez López and Freidenberg 1998: 71.

<sup>174</sup> Van Cott 2003a: 31.

Van Cott contends that the 1994 changes to electoral law played an important role in the 1996 decision by the indigenous movement to form Pachakutik-Nuevo País. She argues that these changes significantly improved the prospects that an indigenous movement-based party would be successful in electoral competition, and that movement leaders were aware of these advantages and factored them into their decision-making. I agree with Van Cott that these changes were significant and likely played a role during 1995 and 1996 in the decision-making that led to the formation of Pachakutik. However, they should be seen as secondary or intervening variables, not the main explanatory variable. Absent the broader political opportunity structure of public disillusionment with the dominant political parties and the degree of internal organizational strength that the indigenous movement had developed by the mid-1990s, these institutional changes would have been unimportant. Within this broader context, however, they were an important factor that facilitated the formation of Pachakutik and improved its chances for success.

The elimination of the requirement that parties had to run candidates in the three most populous provinces, which meant that all parties had to run in the country's most populous province, Guayas, was an important change that no doubt made it easier for Pachakutik to field candidates at the national level. The indigenous and social movements that conformed Pachakutik had very little presence in this coastal province and it would have been difficult to register the party there. In fact,



Pachakutik did not run candidates in Guayas until 2002 when it was part of the coalition backing Lucio Gutiérrez.<sup>175</sup>

The part of the old rules that required parties to run candidates in at least ten provinces, however, would not have been an obstacle for Pachakutik. In fact, in 1996 the movement ran candidates for provincial congressional seats in eleven provinces, including the coastal province of Los Rios.<sup>176</sup> Following that election the movement steadily expanded the number of provinces in which it registered and ran candidates; by 2000 the movement was on the ballot in three coastal provinces: Los Rios, Manabí, and Esmeraldas.<sup>177</sup> That year Pachakutik won twenty-five mayoralties in eleven provinces, thus demonstrating its intention to become a national party.<sup>178</sup>

While it is true that at the outset the movement would have faced a significant barrier if the old requirement to run candidates in Guayas had been in place, it is important to note that once Pachakutik was formed it sought to extend its reach into provinces where the indigenous movement historically had little or no presence. This reflects the fact that from the outset organizers envisioned Pachakutik, not simply as the electoral arm of the indigenous movement, but as a coalition effort uniting several different social movements. Indeed, in the years after Pachakutik was founded, numerous indigenous leaders used the movement-party as a vehicle to expand the organizational reach of the movement and party into both indigenous and non-

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<sup>175</sup> Lucio Gutiérrez was one of the military officers who led the social protest actions together with the indigenous movement that resulted in the removal of Mahuad in 2000. In advance of the 2002 elections he formed a political party, Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), in order to run for president. Less than four months before the 2002 elections, Pachakutik decided to form an electoral alliance with the PSP and support Gutiérrez's candidacy.

<sup>176</sup> Ecuador. Tribunal Supremo Electoral .

<sup>177</sup> Ecuador. Tribunal Supremo Electoral .

<sup>178</sup> MUPP-NP 2000a.

indigenous areas and to solidify ties with other social movement organizations on the Coast.<sup>179</sup>

The 1994 change, which removed the ban on electoral alliances, also contributed positively to Pachakutik's prospects. As Van Cott notes,<sup>180</sup> it was very common for Pachakutik to enter into electoral alliances with other parties and this allowed them to broaden their base in provinces and regions where alone they might not have had a chance.

Finally, the institutional rule change that had the most visible impact on the indigenous movement's decision to enter the electoral fray was the one permitting independents to run for office. In this case, however, I would argue that the import of the change was not so much in that it lowered concrete institutional barriers to participation, but instead, by removing an important symbolic barrier it smoothed the way internally within the indigenous movement to accept electoral participation. If one compares the registration requirements for independent candidates with those for political parties one finds that they were not all that different. It was not much easier to register as an independent than as a party, and in at least one respect the demands on independent candidates and movements were more onerous than those for political parties. Independent candidates and movements were required to collect signatures to get on the ballot for every election. Parties, on the other hand, only had to collect signatures once; after their initial registration and assuming that they ran continuously in elections, they were guaranteed a place on the ballot and did not have to collect

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<sup>179</sup> For a discussion of some of these efforts see Chapter 7.

<sup>180</sup> Van Cott 2003a: 34.

signatures. Despite this fact, Pachakutik, along with many other candidates and coalitions, chose to register, not as a party, but as an independent movement.<sup>181</sup>

Likewise, the pre-1994 law that restricted the field of candidates to members of officially registered parties did not represent an insurmountable obstacle for unaffiliated candidates; those who wanted to run simply found ways to associate themselves with a party, whether by forming a new one or using the shell of one that was effectively defunct but still legally registered. The formation of the Republican Unity Party (PUR) is a good example of this instrumental use of parties. In 1991 after the PSC denied him their nomination for president, Sixto Durán Ballén cobbled together the PUR and registered it at the last minute. It was clear from the outset that PUR was nothing more than an electoral vehicle for Durán Ballén's candidacy, and predictably, after he completed his term as president, the party simply disappeared. This illustrates that there were numerous ways to work around the original law, the intention of which had been to foster the growth of stable, institutionalized parties.

The real significance of the change that allowed independents on the ballot was that it allowed individuals and groups to run for office without the negative baggage associated with political parties. That is what made the independent label so appealing to so many. The ability to participate in elections without having to assume the discredited classification of "party" was especially important for indigenous and social movements, which had been highly critical of traditional political parties and the

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<sup>181</sup> Pachakutik worked in Congress to have this requirement removed and bring the obligations for registered independent movements in line with those for political parties. This change was approved by the congress sometime in the first few years of the new millennium, thus eliminating the need for independents to gather signatures previous to every election.

ruling political elite. This rule change helped to tip the scales within the movement towards those who had been advocating for direct participation in elections.

Summing up, by the mid 1990s the Ecuadorian political scene was a highly permissive environment for new political contenders. This was due primarily to the fact that party loyalties had not solidified in the wake of the expansion of the franchise due to unfavorable economic conditions and the persistence of corruption and exclusionary politics on the part of political elites. Traditional practices of patronage and clientelism, that in previous periods might have helped to dampen public outrage at corruption, were more difficult to sustain during periods of scarcity. Additionally, certain electoral laws and the country's districting provided some unintended advantages to the indigenous movement. The crisis of country's volatile and fragmented party system was the central element in the political opportunity structure that facilitated Pachakutik's emergence. However, it would be a mistake to view Ecuador's electoral laws and formal political institutions as the source of this crisis. In addition to the economic crises, socio-structural factors, such as regionalism and elite monopoly of political parties, were to blame.

The two permissive factors I have emphasized – the recent attainment of universal franchise and the discrediting of the political establishment — were also present in Brazil and Peru. In the former, the labor-based PT began to build slowly in the 1980s and early 1990s and by the start of the new millennium had become a major political force. After having built up power and a reputation for efficient and participatory government at the municipal and state levels, the party standard bearer,

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was elected president in 2002.<sup>182</sup> In her analysis of the origins and early years of the PT, Keck (1992) identifies the transition to democracy as the political opportunity structure that facilitated the PT's emergence. The labor movement had been a key actor advocating the return to democracy, this role allowed it to develop a high public profile and served to strengthen the movement organizationally. When Brazil finally made the transition back to democracy, the new constitution guaranteed universal franchise for the first time in the country's history. The expansion of the right to vote to Brazilians of all social classes and race also represented an important new opportunity structure for the PT because the newly enfranchised working class voters did not have long-standing attachments to existing political parties and were therefore available as a constituency for the PT.

In Peru, by contrast, the political scene in the 1990s was dominated by the dictatorial figure of Alberto Fujimori, who surfaced from obscurity and with no organized base to win the presidency in 1990, promising to attack hyperinflation, restore order, and crush the guerilla insurgency. Notably, another political outsider with no solid party or organizational backing won Peru's 2001 presidential election, which was hailed as the beginning of the return to democracy after Fujimori's ten year reign.

Thus different types of competitors emerged in different countries to challenge established political parties. In some cases organized movements entered the political arena, but in many countries the competition came from charismatic candidates, often

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<sup>182</sup> At the time of this writing, Lula and the PT are embroiled in a major corruption scandal and the future of the party is in jeopardy.

themselves from the elite, who sought to win the public's support on the basis of populist appeals, patronage, and personal charisma. Economic and political crises in these countries had similar effects in terms of undermining public support for traditional political elites and creating a void into which new competitors would emerge. However, whether or not the new competition came from organized sectors of society or unattached, charismatic figures depended, not on the political opportunity structure, but on the level of social organization, as well as organized groups' perceptions about the advantages and disadvantages of electoral participation.

### **Movement Organizational Resources**

By the time Pachakutik-Nuevo País was founded, Ecuadorian social movements had succeeded in carving out an important and visible place for themselves at the national level. Diverse social movements had learned how to coordinate and negotiate among themselves in order to organize and lead popular protests against government attempts at privatization and structural adjustment. By the mid-1990s these movements and the indigenous movement, in particular, had emerged as significant political players in national politics; their protest actions were not easily ignored by politicians or society. Ecuadorian social movements were largely autonomous from traditional political parties. From the 1930s through the 1960s small leftist parties played an important role in peasant organizing in the Highlands, and this helped set the stage for the eventual emergence of the indigenous movement in the 1970s and 1980s. As indigenous organizations emerged and grew they increasingly sought autonomy from their early patrons, including left political

parties, labor unions, and even the Catholic Church. By the late 1980s the indigenous movement organizations retained no formal ties to any political parties. In terms of the leftist parties in Ecuador, most had relationships with and connections to labor organizations and some social movements, but the only political party that officially represented some sector of organized civil society was the Maoist MPD; it was connected to the national teachers' union. Thus, with the exception of the National Teacher's Union, formal ties between political parties and social movements and unions did not exist in Ecuador. Even personal involvement by individual members of the indigenous movement in any of the major parties was rare, and by the early 1990s it was officially sanctioned within the organization. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, the situation in Bolivia was very different; there it was common for peasant union leaders to be affiliated with one of any number of political parties.

In the next section, I will argue that the key movement resources that made possible the emergence of a social movement-led political party in Ecuador were the movement's experience in influencing national-level politics, its reputation for leadership at this level, as well as, the high levels of unity and organizational autonomy that it had succeeded in building. While in and of themselves these are not necessary and sufficient to account for all cases of social movement-led party emergence, they are the key factors that account for why a party of this type emerged in Ecuador earlier than in Bolivia, and why similar parties did not emerge with the same strength in the other Andean nations despite similar levels of frustration with traditional political parties.

### National Profile

Due to the fact that most Latin American social movements are small and local in make-up and focus, scholars writing in the 1980s and 1990s tended to be pessimistic about their potential to make a lasting impact on national politics (Mainwaring 1987). In an analysis of the relationship between municipal PT administrations and their local social movement partners, Ana Maria Doimo (1995) observed that local movement organizations had difficulty prioritizing issues among themselves and instead, tended to compete among themselves for power and resources in pursuit of particularistic gains. Doimo argues that this unforeseen problem made PT efforts to implement participatory governance at the local level more difficult than the party had anticipated. Their dispersion and particularistic focus have often hindered social movements' ability to mount concerted and programmatic challenges to the traditional political establishment.

In Ecuador, however, by the 1990s the indigenous movement had emerged as a consolidated national organization built upon a pyramidal structure of organizational layers with a base in local communities. Associations of various villages or communities belonged to provincial organizations, which, in turn, belonged to one of three regional federations representing the Coast, the Highlands, and the Amazon. These three regional federations came together in 1986 to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE).



By 1996, indigenous communities had already demonstrated their power and organizational capacity by carrying out two highly effective mobilizations that shut the country down a couple of weeks at a time and a long march to the capital by Amazonian Indians to demand legal rights to their ancestral territories. The first of these modern “uprisings” took place in 1990.<sup>183</sup> Another followed in 1994 to protest a recently passed agrarian reform law that threatened small and medium-sized peasants and farmers. As a result of the 1994 protests the government was forced to rescind the law and renegotiate a new bill with direct input from the indigenous organizations. In the late 1980s CONAIE successfully pressured Rodrigo Borja’s government to establish a national bilingual education program for indigenous primary and secondary students in an effort to assure the survival and vitality of native languages. Through social protest the movement had also forced several administrations to address specific communities’ demands with regard to land.

With the formation of the national confederation in 1986, the indigenous movement increasingly directed its demands to national political authorities and the executive branch in particular. While the demands of the first national uprising in 1990 were diffuse, combining both national and local-level demands (León 1994), by 1994 the movement was seeking to have a direct impact on national-level policy. As early as December 1990, just five months after the first national indigenous uprising, Luis Macas, then newly elected president of CONAIE, voiced the movement’s aspirations and explained CONAIE’s decision to withdraw from negotiations with the government: “We as indigenous peoples believe that we are prepared to direct our own

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<sup>183</sup> For analyses of the 1990 uprising see: Almeida Vinueza 1993; León 1994; Selverston 1993.

future; not only to govern our own communities, but Ecuador itself.”<sup>184</sup> By 1995 this sense of confidence and political entitlement was even stronger. In the succeeding several years the movement had taken bold steps and won some significant victories. In addition to the victory with the agrarian reform law in 1994, in 1992 the government granted Amazonian tribes title to nineteen territorial blocs encompassing a total of 2.75 million acres after Amazonian organizations carried out a dramatic and well-publicized march that generated public sympathy for their cause.<sup>185</sup>

Views within the indigenous movement about electoral participation had been deeply divided. In the early 1980s a number of indigenous leaders had individually run for local office on various center-left and left tickets. However, with the formation of the CONAIE in 1986 there was a definite turn inward as the movement emphasized autonomous organization building (Andolina 1999). Over the next few years this evolved into a more radical position of outright withdrawal from and boycott of the formal political system. In fact, the 1990 uprising coincided with the mid-term congressional elections; as part of the protests CONAIE instructed its members to boycott the election. That same year, in retaliation for government repression of indigenous protestors, CONAIE urged indigenous member communities not to participate in the national census.<sup>186</sup> They also boycotted the 1992 general elections. These decisions to boycott the formal political process were based on the movement’s radical critique of the Ecuadorian state. As Miguel Lluco, long-time

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<sup>184</sup> *Diario Hoy* 1990 Original text in Spanish reads: “Creemos que los pueblos indígenas estamos dispuestos a conducirnos solos frente a la historia, no solo para gobernar a las comunidades sino al Ecuador...”

<sup>185</sup> Brysk 2000; Collins 2000b: 43; Yashar 1999: 93.

<sup>186</sup> Ramón Valarezo 1990.

movement activist and Pachakutik's first national coordinator, explained: "When we advocated against participating in elections we were questioning a system that did not offer any guarantee of responding to the interests of the whole population, much less to Indian interests. So we said: 'invalidate your vote.'"<sup>187</sup>

There had, however, always been some within the movement who were anxious to participate in elections and in government. This internal cleavage between those who wanted the movement to stay clear of formal politics and those who wanted the chance to participate created tensions but was not enough to undermine the movement. By 1993 the tide had shifted within the movement and pressure mounted to allow for electoral participation. It was decided at CONAIE's third Congress that movement members would be permitted to run as candidates in local elections, as soon as the national electoral law was changed to allow for participation by independents. This law change was important for two reasons: first of all, because the indigenous movement did not want to be associated with political parties; and secondly, because of concerns that indigenous leaders might be co-opted by political parties if they began running for office on different party tickets. Maintaining movement autonomy was a central priority. The commitment to autonomy from political parties and the movement's mistrust of the political system's ability to represent indigenous peoples were evident in a proposal for constitutional reform drafted by CONAIE and presented to congress in 1994. The proposal advocated for

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<sup>187</sup> Miguel Llucio, author interview, Quito, January 3, 2000. Voting is obligatory in Ecuador and so it would not have been realistic for CONAIE to have suggested that people not to go to the polls.

the adoption of a consociational political model<sup>188</sup> in which 30 percent of congressional seats would be set aside for indigenous representatives. These representatives were not to be elected in general elections but, instead, would be selected in “internal elections within each of the indigenous groups.”<sup>189</sup> This proposal was never even reviewed by congress.<sup>190</sup> Despite the fact that their request for direct representation was not accepted, once the law was changed that allowed independents to run for office, the CONAIE decided at its May 1995 assembly to allow its members to run as independents in local elections. José Maria Cabascango, a long-time CONAIE leader and activist, in an interview at the time stated: “It is time that we indigenous think about power. We should infiltrate the powers that be at all levels in order to change things so that we don’t have to continue putting up with the politicians’ electoral maneuverings. When we have enough leaders we will found an authentically indigenous party.”<sup>191</sup>

However, a strictly indigenous party did not arise. Instead, Pachakutik was founded as a multi-racial and multi-cultural political movement, and it retained this identity. What made possible this multi-cultural alliance was the balance of power that had developed between the indigenous movement and other social sectors. By the mid-1990s an important shift had taken place in the relative power and relevance of

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<sup>188</sup> The consociational or power-sharing model of government was first identified by Arend Lijphart and has since been advocated by him and many others as an institutional model for democratic government in divided societies. For a concise description of the model see Lijphart 1991.

<sup>189</sup> The word in Spanish that I have translated as “groups” is “pueblos”. Diario Hoy 1995a.

<sup>190</sup> Other parts of the 1994 proposal, including constitutional recognition of Ecuador’s multi-ethnic and multi-cultural reality and official recognition of indigenous languages, were eventually taken up and approved by the 1998 National Constituent Assembly at Pachakutik’s urging. Pachakutik participated in the National Constituent Assembly with a delegation of seven elected representatives out of a total of seventy delegates.

<sup>191</sup> Diario Hoy 1995b

CONAIE in relation to other labor and social movements. The palpable organizational strength of the CONAIE had put it in a position of power vis-à-vis other social and labor organizations on Ecuador's left. As mentioned previously, while leftist political parties and unions, as well as the Catholic Church, had early on helped to organize indigenous peoples, during the 1970s and 1980s indigenous people sought to obtain organizational independence from these non-indigenous groups. By the 1990s the indigenous movement was well established after having fought for and established its long desired organizational autonomy. At the same time that the indigenous movement was growing and gaining strength, what had always been a relatively weak labor movement in Ecuador grew even more anemic as neoliberalism whittled away at its power base. These simultaneous developments meant that by the mid-1990s the indigenous movement had emerged as the strongest social movement in the country. By this time the indigenous organizations were in a position to set the social movement agenda and assume a leadership role. Moreover, while the focus of earlier indigenous mobilizations and actions had been primarily on indigenous issues,<sup>192</sup> in 1995 the CONAIE began joining together with public sector labor unions and other social movements to tackle a broader social agenda: opposition to privatization and neoliberalism, and a general condemnation of government corruption, which they effectively linked to privatization proposals.

In June of 1995 a National Civic Committee, *Ya Basta!*, united indigenous, labor, and social movement sectors under one umbrella to oppose president Sixto

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<sup>192</sup> Mobilizations and protest actions in the 1980s and early 1990s focused on indigenous rights and recognition as equal but different citizens within Ecuadorian society, as well as issues of specific concern to the indigenous community, such as bilingual education and land rights.

Durán Ballén's privatization plans. This unity of social sectors was spurred in part by the government's announcement that electricity rates would be raised substantially.<sup>193</sup> Severely weakened by a series of corruption scandals and difficulties in getting legislation passed due to the fact that he did not have a congressional majority, by mid-1995 Durán Ballén's administration was weak and, according to polling data, very unpopular. The joint protest actions and coordination between the indigenous movement, unions, and social movements took advantage of this political opening to launch a strident campaign against the government's plans to implement a sweeping neoliberal structural adjustment program that would have included the privatization of public enterprises. This campaign gained steam when Durán Ballén, against the advice of his own advisors, announced that he would take the question to the public in a referendum scheduled for November 1995. The social and labor movements that had begun to coalesce earlier that year now had a clear identifiable goal to defeat the president's initiative in a public vote. The campaign for the "No" vote on the referendum was extremely successful and won by a significant margin, with all eleven questions being voted down by between 55 and 62 percent.<sup>194</sup> The social movements viewed this defeat as a major victory for their anti-neoliberal agenda; even more importantly, it gave them a sense that perhaps they possessed the public support needed to compete in the electoral arena.

Immediately following the referendum in November 1995, union and non-indigenous social movement leaders involved in the campaign began strategizing

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<sup>193</sup> Diario Hoy 1995c; Diario Hoy 1995d.

<sup>194</sup> Results obtained by the author from the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) in Quito.

about running a progressive anti-neoliberal candidate in the 1996 presidential elections around whom social and union movements could unite.<sup>195</sup> Eventually a consensus developed in support of television show host and journalist, Freddy Ehlers. In the meantime, realizing that the support of the indigenous movement would be key to the success of such a broad-based electoral initiative, mestizo activists approached the CONAIE to seek their support and involvement. While the CONAIE had been planning to participate in the 1996 elections, their focus had been on gaining seats at the local level and they had not planned on supporting a candidate for the presidency, or to enter into alliances with other political parties. It wasn't until early February 1996, with the election just three months away, that CONAIE decided to join the alliance of social movements and two political parties (the ID and the Socialists) that was backing Ehlers's candidacy. As evidence of the the indigenous movement's importance, Ehlers had stipulated that he would only run if Luis Macas, the president of CONAIE, would agree to run at the top of the alliance's list of national deputies. Despite strong reservations, Macas eventually accepted the nomination and together with seven other Pachakutik-Nuevo País candidates was elected to Congress the following May. The eight seats won by MUPP-NP were just shy of 10 percent of the seats in congress.<sup>196</sup>

The other thing that is important to note about this initiative is that it was not orchestrated by political parties, but by labor and social movement activists. While

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<sup>195</sup> Several individuals were considered and approached, including former President Rodrigo Borja of the Democratic Left party (ID).

<sup>196</sup> Soon after assuming their seats in congress two Pachakutik-Nuevo País deputies abandoned the alliance and joined President Bucaram's congressional bloc. Both defectors were from Amazonian provinces.

two parties, the ID and the Socialist Party, also supported Ehlers's candidacy, these parties were by no means leading or directing the coalition. In fact, the alliance that was Pachakutik-Nuevo País was a spontaneous and completely non-institutionalized affair. This had its advantages, as well as, disadvantages. Interviews with Pachakutik candidates about that intense three-month campaign conveyed a dramatic sense of energy, enthusiasm, optimism, and solidarity permeating the whole process.<sup>197</sup> José Maria Cabascango, long-time indigenous activist and leader, described the campaign as a "*minga* for life."<sup>198</sup> But the lack of an institutional structure also led to conflict and confusion. Ehlers's candidacy was tied to a slate of candidates for local and congressional offices that was put together by the social and indigenous movements that had launched his candidacy. But the ID insisted on running its own separate list for all but the presidential ticket. This caused a good deal of friction and even some open conflict on the campaign trail, as local candidates from both lists wanted to appear with Ehlers at his campaign stops. In Imbabura Province this led to verbal and even physical battles between the two camps, which placed Ehlers in a difficult position; he was reluctant to mediate these conflicts for fear of losing the support of one or the other group.<sup>199</sup>

The fact that the social movements were able to retain the leadership position in this campaign and prevented it from being co-opted by traditional political parties is

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<sup>197</sup> This is based on the author's interviews with numerous MUPP candidates and activists between October 1999 and September 2000.

<sup>198</sup> Cabascango 1996. *Minga* is a Quichua word denoting collective action and public projects assumed by the whole community. It evokes a sense of solidarity and communal work.

<sup>199</sup> Rivadeneida 1996.



evidence of the traditionally weak links between Ecuadorian political parties and civil society.

A number of scholars have emphasized the role played by the state in explaining the emergence of the indigenous movement and its political incorporation. Sánchez López and Freidenberg contend that, “The process of rural modernization carried out by the State, the Church, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations has facilitated the incorporation of the indigenous-*campesino* sector into the Ecuadorian political system.”<sup>200</sup> While it is true that the emergence of the indigenous movement cannot be understood without discussing agrarian reform and rural development programs that the state initiated in the 1960s, the problem with their argument is that it does not look at this as a process of contestation and interaction between the indigenous and these other actors. Without focusing on the agency of the indigenous, they cannot account for the mode of incorporation that has taken place in Ecuador.

Yashar attempts to draw links between state policy and the rise of indigenous movements in various countries throughout the continent. Her argument emphasizes the frustration of indigenous and rural populations, who under neoliberalism saw their access to state resources and certain pockets of local political, material, and cultural autonomy eroded. She argues that while this trend occurred throughout Latin America, “politicized indigenous identity has found organized expression as an

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<sup>200</sup> Sánchez López and Freidenberg 1998: 65. Translation by autor.

indigenous movement only where communities have been able to draw upon existing networks.”<sup>201</sup>

While I agree in large measure with the basic thrust of her argument, I think she has overlooked a key factor that may help account for differences in the strength of these movements from country to country. The missing variable, I would argue, is the historical degree of state and party cooptation of indigenous organizations, which can continue to impact the degree of organizational autonomy of indigenous movements under neoliberalism. In Ecuador, while relationships between indigenous sectors and small leftist parties go back to the 1920s and 1930s, there was never a ruling party or national leader who sought to create a strong corporatist relationship with the indigenous population. The closest experience of this kind would have been the reformist military government of the 1970s, but the actions it took to reach out to rural populations and the programs it implemented were minor in their impact compared to state-sponsored reform programs in Peru, Mexico, or Bolivia. This lack of a historically strong corporatist relationship with the state or with government political parties is a key factor differentiating Ecuador’s indigenous movement from others in the region. It was the weakness of Ecuador’s corporatist project that made it easier later on for the indigenous movement to chart a course of organizational autonomy. The availability of international support for indigenous groups and their struggles also aided these efforts and allowed the movement to gain a degree of economic independence that would have been nearly impossible in previous historical

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<sup>201</sup> Yashar 1998: 24.

periods.<sup>202</sup> On the other hand, international aid is available to most indigenous groups in Latin America, but none of them were able to achieve the level of autonomy and national-level strength of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement so early on.

In Bolivia, indigenous leaders' affiliations with mestizo-dominated political parties contributed to constant divisions and in-fighting within *campesino*<sup>203</sup> organizations during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In contrast, within the Ecuadorian indigenous movement affiliation with any political party was frowned upon and, by 1990, expressly prohibited. The high level of autonomy attained by the Ecuadorian indigenous movement is the result of Ecuador's specific historical development and the conscious decisions made by indigenous leaders to emphasize and value autonomy beginning in the 1970s and increasing in the 1980s. This deeply entrenched autonomy within the political culture and practice of Ecuador's indigenous movement is an essential part of the explanation for the movement's ability over the years to remain united at the national level and succeed in launching an independent electoral vehicle.

Evidence of the potential pernicious effects of state and party co-optation were in evidence just a few months after the 1996 elections when the newly elected Bucaram administration attempted to divide the indigenous movement by co-opting

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<sup>202</sup> For a thorough study of international influences and support for indigenous movements in Latin America see Brysk 2000.

<sup>203</sup> Throughout this dissertation I use the Spanish term, *campesino*, and the English, "peasant," interchangeably, even though *campesino* is somewhat different and more accurate than "peasant." "Peasant" has a strong association with feudalism, and therefore is not really accurate when referring to small farmers in Latin America today. The Spanish term *campesino* is more flexible; it can be used when referring to older semi-feudal arrangements, as well as to small farmers in the post-agrarian reform period. It is also used to refer both to small holders with individual plots, as well as to members of indigenous communities that may hold some of their land in common. So it is a flexible term, all the meanings of which are not fully contained in the antiquated English, "peasant". However, there are times when one wants to use a term in English, and in this case "peasant" is preferable to "farmer" because of the extremely limited access to land, credit, and technology that characterize poor farmers in Latin America.

individuals from the Amazonian organizations. Former CONAIE vice-president, Rafael Pandam, accepted a post as Minister of Indigenous Affairs despite CONAIE's opposition, and two Pachakutik Congresspersons abandoned the alliance in which they were elected to join the PRE. By the end of 1996 this conflict had nearly torn the movement asunder. What probably saved it was the downfall of Bucaram in February 1997 and the investigation and prosecution of many members of his administration on charges of corruption, including Pandam. The indigenous and social movements that formed Pachakutik-Nuevo País the previous year played an important role in the wave of popular protests that brought down Bucaram's administration.

To recapitulate my argument, there were three internal factors that Ecuador's social and indigenous movements possessed that are essential to understanding how and why this social movement electoral challenge emerged in Ecuador. The first has to do with the leadership manifested by these movements on the national stage and in reference to issues of concern to the general population. The second factor was their organizational unity. And finally, the third relates to the movement's autonomy from political parties and the state.

An examination of the experiences in Brazil and Bolivia, two other countries where strong social movement parties emerged, confirm the importance of these three factors. In both countries strong social movements, labor in Brazil and peasants in Bolivia, had achieved a prominent national-level profile earlier than was the case with the indigenous movement in Ecuador. In both these countries social movements and social protest played an important role in the transition to democracy, something which was not the case in Ecuador, where the transition came about despite the

absence of strong popular pressure for change. While labor unions in Ecuador engaged in demonstrations in the late 1970s that helped weaken the military regime, their protests were not focused on democracy per se, but instead, on economic demands.<sup>204</sup> The indigenous movement was still in its formative stages at the time of the transition to democracy. In Brazil and Bolivia, by contrast, labor, social, and peasant movements that took to the streets in the late 1970s and early 1980s had for the most part put aside their specific demands and had united around a collective and national demand for a return to democracy.

In Brazil the Worker's Party was founded during the transition period. When the PT was organized there were many who criticized it as separatist and debilitating, because it did not join forces with the main opposition party and form a united front against the military-backed party. Despite these criticisms from others on the left, the PT held fast to its commitment to build a new party.

In Bolivia the labor and peasant movements also emerged as leaders in the popular struggle to end to military rule. The peasant movement, in particular, emerged from the transition stronger and with a high level of credibility due to the visible leadership role several of their leaders played in the transition process. Indigenous peasant leaders also formed political parties during this period. The difference in Bolivia was that these parties were much more divided and fractionalized than the efforts at social and labor movement party building in Brazil. Chapter 8 explores the reasons for the failure of the Katarista parties in Bolivia and finds that

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<sup>204</sup> My thanks to Simón Pachano for this insight.

lower levels of movement autonomy from political parties led to divisions among these parties and lack of popular support.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter examined the foundational moment of the Pachakutik-Nuevo País political organization in order to better understand when and under what conditions social movements in developing countries attempt to expand their repertoire of action by moving into the formal electoral arena. In order to get at this question, I built upon the existing literature on new party formation. Much of this literature implies that some sort of crisis that upsets the established political order is a necessary condition for the emergence of new parties. While Kitschelt's (1989) work on ecological parties in Europe demonstrates that there are exceptions to this general rule, the Ecuadorian case reveals that it remains a pretty solid finding.

Using this as a starting point, I then observed that in most Latin American countries there was a tremendous amount of economic and political upheaval during the 1980s and 1990s that shook the foundations of even seemingly solid party systems. However, the impact of these crises on new party formation varied between countries. In many cases these crises led to the ascendancy of *caudillo*-type political figures with little in the way of an organizational base behind them. In a few instances social movements have been able and willing to step into the formal electoral arena.

Given this insight I made a distinction between permissive factors that have to do with the broader political opportunity structure, and internal factors having to do with movement organization and autonomy. I argued that the level of movement

organization was important in determining what sorts of electoral challenges, whether from social movements or *caudillos*, might emerge out of the political vacuum that results from crisis or social upheaval. In order for a social movement party to emerge three things need to be in place: the social movements have to have developed a presence at the national level and have played a role in national policy debates, the organizations have to have achieved a level of unity, and finally they need to have carved out an autonomous space from political parties, and the state.

## Chapter 5

### **Pachakutik's Organizational Structure and Political Culture**

The political opportunity structure that gave birth to the Pachakutik political movement was one of profound public alienation with Ecuador's traditional political parties and political class. The social movement organizations that came together to form Pachakutik and which gave it staying power over time were explicit in their assertion that they were creating a new type of political organization. They intended to participate in the electoral process but on their own terms, employing a social movement rather than a political party model. From its inception, Pachakutik organizers defined the movement party in contrast to and as an alternative to Ecuador's political establishment, which they characterized as corrupt, elitist, and incapable of representing Ecuador's poor majority and, in particular, the marginalized indigenous population.

However, building a political party based on a new political praxis within a society, where the prevailing political culture was one of clientelism and corruption and the structural conditions of poverty and inequality had not yet been ameliorated, was easier said than done. As discussed in Chapter 3, these structural conditions helped foster and perpetuate political practices that impeded effective representation of the poor and marginalized.

Given these two competing forces – the promise of a new political practice emerging out of the social movement experience and the broad structural and cultural conditions militating against transparency and efficiency in government –, this chapter



analyzes the degree to which Pachakutik succeeded in forging a new party model versus mirroring the patterns typical of the country's traditional political establishment. In order to get at this question, this chapter focuses on Pachakutik's internal organizational structure, norms, and practices. The focus on internal organization takes its cue from Panebianco (1988), who argues that a party's internal history, organizational structure, and norms are important variables in their own right in making sense of and understanding political party behavior. The focus of this chapter also builds on ideas developed by Cornell and Kalt (2000) and discussed in detail in Chapter 2, in particular the notion that institutional legitimacy and efficiency are related to the degree to which institutions are built upon, reflect and embrace the underlying social and cultural norms of the society they are meant to govern. Cornell and Kalt's findings imply that institutional design is not something that can be looked at in isolation from the culture in which it is to function. Likewise, no matter how theoretically efficient or representative an institutional design, if it is something imposed on people, as opposed to something they design and have a stake in, it will face greater legitimacy problems.

While Cornell and Kalt focus on constitutional arrangements, this chapter focuses on the internal organizational structure of a political party. But I believe that the logic they develop with regards to government structures also applies when looking at a particular organization. Along these lines, I argue that Pachakutik's incorporation of movement and community norms and practices increased its legitimacy in the eyes of its members and those voters for whom these practices were accepted and familiar. Likewise, it gave movement and party members a stronger

stake in the organization. Finally, the fact that internal decision-making norms were negotiated and decided upon by the member organizations resulted in an organization that was more resilient in the face of internal disputes, thus lessening the tendency to splinter and fragment.

Finally, I will demonstrate that the innovation and adoption of new political practices, not only strengthened the party internally, but also served to introduce new ideas, practices, and models into the Ecuadorian body politic. While this did not result in a radical transformation of Ecuadorian politics by any stretch of the imagination, there are signs that some of the ideas and ideals embodied in Pachakutik seeped into the country's broader political discourse, thus providing new ideas and conceptions related to citizen participation, transparency, and accountability. A similar process of diffusion of ideas and practices has been observed in the case of the Brazilian PT. For example, when the PT lost municipal elections in Porto Alegre after governing that city for more than ten years, the incoming center-right government retained the innovative practice begun by the previous administration of participatory budgeting (Rubin 2005).

The framework used in Chapter 3 to analyze Ecuador's four major parties will be employed in this chapter to compare Pachakutik with these same parties. This framework examines leadership models, internal democracy, how political campaigns were organized and run, party financing, and the extent to which elected officials resorted to particularism or clientelism. The general finding in this chapter is that Pachakutik developed a structure that was significantly distinct from that of other Ecuadorian parties and that this structure bore clear imprints of its social movement

origins. So Pachakutik's organic relationship with social movements and in particular with the indigenous movement had a significant impact on the movement's structure and behavior. The impact was significant enough, I would argue, to justify the assertion that Pachakutik represented a qualitatively different political party model from that of Ecuador's traditional parties.

There are, however, also important examples that will be discussed in this chapter of how the surrounding political culture put stresses on the new organization and made the maintenance of some of the social movement norms more difficult. For example, while Pachakutik experimented with ways of avoiding the pitfalls of corruption and cooptation, the movement was not always successful at doing so and experienced a rate of defection from the ranks of its congressional delegations that was comparable to that of the other political parties. Before examining Pachakutik's organizational structure, we will first discuss the most obvious way in which this movement party differed from traditional Ecuadorian parties: in its socio-economic and ethnic composition.

### **Socio-Economic and Ethnic Profile**

As discussed in Chapter 3, Ecuadorian political parties were the domain of white and mestizo elites.<sup>205</sup> While the center-left DP and ID parties had a greater percentage of middle-class professionals than the rightist PSC and PRE, persons from

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<sup>205</sup> The one exception to this norm among Ecuadorian parties was the leftist MPD, a Maoist party, which maintained a small but consistent presence in Ecuadorian politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This party was closely tied to the national teacher's union, UNE, from whence were recruited most of their leaders and elected officials. One of their most well known and respected congressmen and ideologues was Jaime Hurtado, an Afro-Ecuadorian from the coastal province of Esmeraldas. Hurtado was gunned down in Quito on February 17, 1999. The perpetrators were never apprehended.

working-class backgrounds or ethnically marginalized populations, whether indigenous or Afro-Ecuadorians, were absent from the leadership ranks of all four parties and most of the smaller ones as well. Pachakutik's emergence on the political scene resulted in the involvement in formal electoral politics of a significant number of indigenous and working-class people for the first time in Ecuadorian history. From its inception, Pachakutik was unique in Ecuador as the only electoral organization in which indigenous people held leadership posts at all organizational levels and were selected in equal or sometimes greater numbers than mestizos and whites to run for national, provincial, and local public offices.

Historically working-class people participated in some of Ecuador's smaller leftist parties. Previous to 1978, however, indigenous participation in the formal political process was extremely rare, although there were some exceptions during the 1970s.<sup>206</sup> But the return to democracy in 1978 witnessed the beginnings of indigenous participation in electoral politics. Vastly important changes had been taking place in the indigenous world during the 1960s and 1970s that had given indigenous people greater autonomy at the local level and had allowed them to organize. Agrarian reform succeeded in dismantling Ecuador's debt-peonage system, the *huasipungo*, and freeing indigenous people from the political control of the white landowners. This led to greater mobility for Highland indigenous peoples. Efforts by the Catholic Church and the reformist military governments of the 1970s increased indigenous access to education and helped to cultivate a new indigenous leadership (Pallares 2002; Yashar

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<sup>206</sup> For example, Amazonian indigenous leader and Pachakutik congressional deputy (1998-2002), Valerio Grefa, served on his local city council from 1976 to 1978, during the period of military rule. Valerio Grefa, author interview, Quito, March 8, 2000.

2005). These developments helped create the conditions for a tremendous growth in autonomous indigenous organizing at the local and regional levels during the 1970s. With the return to democracy in 1979 and the institution of universal franchise for the first time in the country's history, indigenous leaders were in a position by the early 1980s to participate, often for the first time, in local party politics. In provinces like Imbabura in the Highlands and Napo in the Amazon, local indigenous leaders helped launch local chapters of national political parties and ran on these tickets for local and provincial office.<sup>207</sup> In many, probably most cases, those leaders who got involved in formal politics were also activists in the burgeoning indigenous movement and would later go on to organize Pachakutik. So, by the time Pachakutik was formed in 1996 a good number of indigenous leaders had had some previous experience in electoral politics, if only at the local level. For example, José María Cabascango, who later served as Pachakutik representative on the nation's Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), served from 1988-1990 as a member of the Otavalo City Council in his native Imbabura Province.<sup>208</sup> Likewise, in the largely indigenous Highland province of Chimborazo Mariano Curicama was first elected mayor of the small majority indigenous canton of Guamote in 1992 on the leftist MPD ticket.<sup>209</sup> However, after Pachakutik was organized he changed his affiliation and ran successfully for a second term on that ticket.

During the 1980s indigenous political participation occurred spontaneously and with very little, if any, coordination between indigenous leaders from different

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<sup>207</sup> For information on indigenous participation in local politics in Imbabura in the 1980s see: Pallares 1997; Pallares 2002.

<sup>208</sup> *Diario Hoy* 1996i.

<sup>209</sup> For an analysis of the experience in Guamote, see Torres D. 1999.

provinces. Instead, individual leaders in provinces and localities where the indigenous population represented a significant portion of the population sought to flex their political muscle at the local level and did so by participating within existing political parties in which they were a minority and had little say or real power. Indigenous leaders who got involved in electoral politics gravitated, by and large, to center-left parties; their participation within these parties tended to remain at the local or, at most, the provincial level. None of the center-left or leftist parties, let alone those on the right, had indigenous people in important leadership positions within their national structures. This can be attributed in part to the fact, discussed in Chapter 4, that all indigenous movement leaders had withdrawn from electoral politics by the late 1980s after CONAIE decided that its members should not participate in formal politics. But the limited experience of some indigenous leaders in traditional political parties indicates that even if CONAIE had not made this decision and indigenous leaders had continued to work within these parties, it is unlikely that significant strides in terms of full integration would have resulted. In fact, one of the things that contributed to CONAIE's decision to withdraw its members from participation in electoral politics was their experience of being marginalized within and taken advantage of by these parties. Indigenous leaders felt that mestizo organizations utilized the organizational strength of indigenous communities but were unwilling to take on their political agendas or fully integrate indigenous people into their organizations. CONAIE former President, Antonio Vargas, described this feeling: "We saw that other people – religious groups and political parties of the right or the left – had been taking advantage of the indigenous. They were the ones who gave orders and imposed their

will. They participated in elections but never shared power with the Indians.”<sup>210</sup>

Given this history of exclusion and being shunted to the margins, the fact that indigenous people were fully integrated at all levels within Pachakutik was quite significant and differentiated it from other Ecuadorian political parties.

At the same time it is important to clarify that Pachakutik was never strictly an indigenous party. While the Ecuadorian media referred to the movement party as CONAIE’s “political wing,”<sup>211</sup> Pachakutik was, from its inception, a multi-ethnic coalition. In an article written after the 2000 local elections, former CONAIE president and Pachakutik congressional deputy, Luis Macas, described the relationship between Pachakutik and CONAIE in the following terms: “While this process [the formation of Pachakutik] has a symbolic and historical identification with the Indigenous Movement, the Pachakutik movement is part of a general people’s struggle, a renovated struggle that is not afraid of participating in institutional spaces, and that is emerging as an option for those in society who want change.”<sup>212</sup> Later that same year in another article, Macas described Pachakutik’s multiethnic make-up: “Within Pachakutik there are not only Indians, there are workers, unions, professional associations of lawyers, doctors, etc., there are the non-governmental organizations that work in concrete ways within the communities, there are environmentalists, a women’s caucus made up of indigenous and non-indigenous women. We all participate.”<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> Antonio Vargas, author interview, Quito, February 4, 2000.

<sup>211</sup> In Spanish, “brazo político”.

<sup>212</sup> Macas 2000b. Translation by the author.

<sup>213</sup> Macas 2000a. Translation by the author.

Pachakutik's multi-ethnicity was reflected in its leadership, candidates, and elected authorities. For example, the organization's first national coordinator, who was re-elected to that position in 2001, was the historic Highland indigenous leader and CONAIE member, Miguel Lluco. In his position as national coordinator he worked closely with an ethnically diverse executive committee. Some of the most active members of the movement's first executive committee were four mestizos along with Luis Macas, former president of CONAIE. Of the four mestizo members, Julio César Trujillo was the only one with extensive experience in Ecuadorian party politics.<sup>214</sup> The other three, Virgilio Hernández, Víctor Hugo Jijón, and Betty Tola were all people who had come out of a non-indigenous, social-movement background. All of them were supportive of the indigenous movement but had not been directly tied to it before joining Pachakutik.<sup>215</sup>

Pachakutik's congressional delegations were also diverse; of the eight representatives who served from 1996 to 1998 five were indigenous and three mestizo. During the 1998-2002 term, four were indigenous and two mestizo. In the 2000 local elections Pachakutik won five prefectures; one of the winning candidates was indigenous and the other four were mestizos. Likewise, of the twenty-seven Pachakutik mayors who won office in 2000, eleven were indigenous.<sup>216</sup> Clearly Pachakutik endeavored to maintain a multi-ethnic profile and this set it apart from the other political parties in Ecuador.

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<sup>214</sup> Trujillo helped found the Popular Democracy party (DP) in the 1970s, but later left the party over ideological differences.

<sup>215</sup> Author's informal conversations with Virgilio Hernández and Víctor Hugo Jijón.

<sup>216</sup> The ethnicities of Pachakutik candidates who won elected office in 2000 were reported to the author by Pachakutik staff people, Quito, August 24, 2000.



Not only did its leadership differ from that of traditional parties in terms of ethnicity but also in terms of class. Quoting from its statutes, Pachakutik sought to, “create conditions of equal opportunity for the sectors that traditionally have been the most marginalized: Indians, Black people, women, children, the elderly, *campesinos*, workers, the under and unemployed.”<sup>217</sup> The full integration of indigenous people within its ranks, as well as, its identification as a peoples’ party led to stark differences with most other political parties in terms of the class background of its elected representatives. A 1997 academic survey of members of the Ecuadorian Congress revealed a sharp divergence in socio-economic origins between Pachakutik congresspersons and those from traditional parties. The survey asked legislative deputies to identify the social class into which they had been born. Whereas approximately 70 percent of those from the PSC, PRE, and DP identified themselves as coming from upper-middle class backgrounds, 62 percent of Pachakutik congresspersons said they hailed from lower-class families.<sup>218</sup>

This class difference between Pachakutik representatives and those from other parties was confirmed in the interviews I conducted with twenty-five deputies. Of the six congressmen elected on the Pachakutik ticket for the 1998-2002 term, none could be characterized as coming from the upper class or belonging to the country’s elite families, and at least two hailed from relatively poor families. Of the nineteen legislators from four other parties who I interviewed, only one from the ID identified

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<sup>217</sup> MUPP-NP 1999a.

<sup>218</sup> Equipo de investigación sobre élites parlamentarias 1997

himself as coming from a working-class background;<sup>219</sup> the rest either identified themselves as *empresarios* (businessmen) from elite families, or middle-class professionals. Compared with most other parties, Pachakutik had better representation within the ranks of its elected officials of individuals from social sectors that historically had been marginalized from formal politics, namely indigenous people and those from working-class and peasant backgrounds.

### **Membership**

Pachakutik's social movement origins were clearly reflected in its membership structure, which started out as strictly organizational, as opposed to individual. While traditional political parties in Ecuador and in most of the world have individual dues-paying members, Pachakutik's members were not individuals, but organizations. This was reflective both of the structure of its most important organizational member, CONAIE, and of the fact that it began as a coalition effort. Different from virtually all other Ecuadorian parties, Pachakutik was not founded by an individual or an ad hoc group that sought to gather a political following, but instead by pre-existing social movements and unions with national and regional structures in place. Instead of having to create a political organization from scratch, the challenge Pachakutik faced was how to unite and coordinate the efforts of various organizations into a common, sustainable political project. The idea, especially at the beginning, was not to create an autonomous institution, but instead to build on the strength of the pre-existing organizations and create a common platform upon which various movement

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<sup>219</sup> Carlos González, author interview, Quito, January 6, 2000. González was a provincial legislator representing Azuay Province.

organizations could coordinate their efforts in the electoral arena. Building upon the base of pre-existing organizations provided the movement with a ready-made network of local party organizers and organizations that could be mobilized quickly, something that was put to the test at the time of the movement's founding in 1996, just three short months before the elections.

In those areas where the indigenous population was significant, CONAIE's member organizations tended to serve as the movement party's organizational pillars. CONAIE's own structure, which consisted of a national organization built atop a pyramid of organizational layers starting at the local level, afforded important advantages for electoral organizing. At the lowest level were individual communities, for the most part rural farming communities, which tended to make decisions collectively. Some were better organized than others, but most rural communities collectively elected a president.<sup>220</sup> At the next level were the "organizaciones de segundo grado" (OSGs) or second-tier organizations, which represented a group of communities in a specific geographical area. The OSGs in turn belonged to a provincial organization, and the provincial organizations to one of three regional federations: CONFENIAE, representing the Amazon; ECUARUNARI in the highlands; and COINCE for the Coast. Finally, these three regional organizations each belonged to CONAIE. Membership in CONAIE and its local and regional

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<sup>220</sup> Patriarchal structures are still prevalent in many indigenous communities and families, which often impedes female leadership and participation in decision-making.

affiliate organizations was not individual but based on group membership to a territorially defined community.<sup>221</sup>

As Pachakutik grew in numbers and political importance, the limitations of what had been essentially a corporatist membership structure and the need for some sort of individual membership became apparent. There was a political and electoral imperative to reach out to and incorporate a broader range of people into the movement, to make space available within the organization for those who were not active in social movements. However, opening the organization up to individual membership implied a loosening of control over the movement by its founding organizations, which was also controversial. The 1999 statutes appeared to allow both institutional and individual membership, but it became clear in the floor debate at a meeting of the party's Political Council following the May 2000 elections that steps had not yet been taken to implement the mechanisms for individual member affiliation and that there was still controversy surrounding this measure.<sup>222</sup> Individual membership in the movement party was again proposed and debated at Pachakutik's 2002 Congress.

### **Organizational Structure**

While Pachakutik's social movement member organizations continued to remain its strongest and most important pillars of support, its decision-making bodies did not act as conveyor belts for decisions made by these member organizations.

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<sup>221</sup> There are some differences in the Amazon, where ethnic groups are much more clearly defined and so ethnicity plays an important role in organizational structure in addition to geographical location. But because the Amazonian nationality groups tend to have their own geographical territories ethnic groupings tend to fall along territorial lines.

<sup>222</sup> Author observation at meeting of Pachakutik Political Council, Quito, May 30, 2000.

Instead, as Pachakutik's own institutional structures became more robust and as the party grew in size and importance, a close but independent working relationship evolved, in particular between it and CONAIE. Each had its own procedures and timetables for addressing and coming to decisions, but they were made in close consultation and coordination with one another. There were two processes at work that resulted in this close but autonomous relationship between Pachakutik and its social movement sponsors. In keeping with Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" (1915), institutional interests developed within Pachakutik as the number of its elected representatives grew, the national staff and infrastructure expanded in order to meet the organization's growing challenges, and Pachakutik administrations consolidated themselves at the local level.

Pachakutik's highest decision-making body was a national organizational congress held every two years. The first was held in August 1999, three years after the movement party's founding. At this first congress a set of statutes was approved that formalized and codified an organizational structure. The 1999 statutes<sup>223</sup> specified that the majority of official delegates to party congresses were to be selected by the provincial party organizations; each province that possessed a directorate would send five delegates.<sup>224</sup> The provinces were then assigned quotas based on the percentage of votes cast in that province for Pachakutik as a percentage of the movement's overall national vote. Finally, provinces were assigned further delegates based upon the number of officials elected at the local level. For example, for every

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<sup>223</sup> MUPP-NP 1999a.

<sup>224</sup> The specific number of delegates assigned to the provinces was adjusted periodically by the party congresses. Information about the rules regarding delegates to congresses was gleaned from a 1999 copy of Pachakutik's statutes and the author's interview with Miguel Lluco, Quito, January 3, 2000.

five city council members elected, the province obtained the right to send another delegate. These delegates, selected by the organization's local and provincial bases, represented the majority of delegates to the congresses. In addition to these, each member organization was assigned a fixed number of delegates. According to the 1999 statutes, each member organization had a right to three delegates. Unlike members of the executive committee, who had the status of official delegates, Pachakutik elected authorities or members holding government posts were expected to attend congresses but were only granted voice but no vote.

For the 1999 congress, organizers had been expecting 250 delegates and were overwhelmed when 500 people showed up and had to be accommodated.<sup>225</sup> Congresses were charged with evaluating the performance of the movement's elected authorities and its staff, as well as, defining the overall political direction and goals for the coming years, including guidelines for alliance making.<sup>226</sup> The congress was also the forum where major decisions, like the strategy to be adopted at the time of presidential elections, were to be made. The first national congress to face this particular question was in 2001, and the issue proved too controversial and divisive to be decided at that time. The then CONAIE president, Antonio Vargas, was determined to make a run for the presidency, but his candidacy was very controversial and divided both CONAIE, as well as, Pachakutik along largely regional lines. The congress decided in September 2001 not to support his bid, but it was unable to make

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<sup>225</sup> Diario Hoy 1999.

<sup>226</sup> Miguel Lluco, author interview, Quito, January 3, 2000.

a final decision about who to support and passed the decision on to the National Political Council,<sup>227</sup> the movement's second most powerful body.

The council was a smaller body convened by the executive committee at more frequent intervals in order to evaluate the work of the organization and make decisions that needed to be addressed between congresses. Those convened to a meeting of the political council were the movement's national staff, elected officials, and local or regional party coordinators and organizers. For instance, immediately following the 2000 local elections, the council was convened in order to evaluate the movement's performance during those elections. In attendance were many of the newly elected local authorities, as well as, the provincial party organizers who ran the campaigns at the local level. Each province reported on what transpired in their local races, an evaluation was made of the whole experience, and recommendations were gathered for future races, as well as for how to coordinate the work of the newly elected authorities.<sup>228</sup>

Day-to-day direction of Pachakutik was in the hands of a national coordinator, who was elected every two years at the national congress. The coordinator was assisted by an executive committee charged with guiding the organization between congresses and meetings of the political council. The 1999 congress stipulated the composition of the executive committee as that of seven people elected by the congress (increased to nine in 2001), three more to be delegated by each of the member organizations (another principal organization was added in 2001 bringing this

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<sup>227</sup> Consejo Político Nacional.

<sup>228</sup> MUPP-NP 2000b. Author observation at meeting of the Pachakutik Political Council, Quito, May 30, 2000.

number to four), the national coordinator, and the head of Pachakutik's congressional bloc.<sup>229</sup> Executive committee members were unpaid, but according to my own observation two of the members worked so consistently on a daily basis that they were practically staff.

So while Pachakutik started out with a very loose, almost nonexistent, structure that allowed for more direct, if uncoordinated, control by the sponsoring social movement organizations, in a few years time this gave way to a more clearly defined, more autonomous organizational structure. The organizational structure defined on paper by the 1999 congress differed from that of other parties most notably in the space given to direct representation by the sponsoring social movements. But the full extent of the differences with other parties cannot be appreciated by comparing the written statutes. Instead the extent of the differences in terms of decentralization, participation, and a diffuse leadership structure can only be appreciated by looking at how the party functioned in practice, with special attention to the movement's unwritten norms and the power relationships that guided its actions and outcomes. As the following section will demonstrate, many of the norms that guided Pachakutik's actions had their origins in the indigenous movement experience.

### **Indigenous Norms and Pachakutik Organizational Models**

The movement's coalition origins and the cultural inheritance it received from its founding organizations, in particular the indigenous movement, led to the development of internal organizational practices that were much more participatory

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<sup>229</sup> Information on the composition of Pachakutik's Executive Committee came from two sources: Nina Pacari, author interview, Quito, March 3, 2000; and El Comercio 2001.



and democratic than those found in Ecuador's traditional political parties. This next section will identify the ways in which indigenous norms and organizational practice left their imprint on the movement party through an examination of leadership styles, relationships between the grassroots and movement leadership, and the specifics of candidate selection and internal decision-making.

### Collective Decision Making and Leadership Models

One of the clearest differences between Pachakutik and the four political parties examined in Chapter 3 was the role and importance of a central leader. Unlike the traditional parties, Pachakutik was never identified with a single leader. While there was a range among the four parties examined in Chapter 3 (PRE, PSC, ID and DP) with regard to the dominance and role of a central leader, with the PRE being the most extreme example of a party literally run, controlled, and beholden to a single all-powerful leader, each of the parties had a kingpin of sorts, a leader with whom the party was closely identified and around whom power revolved.

This was not true of Pachakutik, and this difference can be attributed in large part to its ties with social movements and their leadership patterns. The indigenous movement attributed its distinctive decision-making processes to longstanding norms and traditions in the indigenous communities. Norms evolve and change over time, something that is equally true for indigenous communities, so it is impossible to talk about indigenous norms surviving in a pure state through five hundred years of colonialism. Indigenous communities, like all other historical communities, changed

and adapted in response to their historical circumstances.<sup>230</sup> For this reason it is important to take indigenous discourse about cultural norms with a large grain of salt. Having said this, it was true that from the Highlands to the Amazon there was a long and deeply engrained tradition in indigenous communities, more so than in non-indigenous ones, of collective decision-making. In these communities consensus was the ideal pursued and majority rule a foreign concept. Participatory local governing practices survived in some form in most indigenous communities. These norms were in turn continuously emphasized, articulated, affirmed, and promoted by the leadership of indigenous regional and national organizations, so that these organizations developed practices and norms that differed significantly from, not only political parties, but many leftist non-indigenous organizations and unions as well.<sup>231</sup> While the ideal was not always fully attained in practice, it was a model that was familiar and legitimate to most indigenous and became a central part of indigenous discourse.

The closest thing in the Pachakutik experience to a leader-centered agenda came with the coalition's backing in 1996 and 1998 of Freddy Ehlers and the political organization – Nuevo País – that had formed to back his candidacy. Nuevo País was the only founding group in Pachakutik that was not a pre-existing social movement.

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<sup>230</sup> Salazar describes a fairly recent example of this sort of cultural adaptation in his study of the origin of the Amazonian Shuar Federation, which was organized in the 1960s in response to threats posed by colonization and state initiatives that sought to promote cattle ranching, in this way encroaching on what had traditionally been Shuar territory. Salazar describes the formation of the Shuar Federation, which was the first indigenous organization in Ecuador. What is interesting is that the federation was organized to defend the Shuar's land and culture, but in order to do that they changed many things about their own communities and adopted models that had not been traditional to their way of life previously. In some cases these models had been brought by missionaries and in others were modeled on the colonist settlements themselves. For instance, the very structure of the local-level communities, called *centros*, that became the building blocks of the federation, changed and according to Salazar, "replicate, in incipient form, colonists' nucleated settlements." Salazar 1981: 595.

<sup>231</sup> Andolina Andolina 1999 emphasizes the importance of indigenous ideology and organizational norms for understanding the development and actions of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement.

Although it presented itself as an alternative to traditional political parties, it was similar to mainstream parties in a couple of ways: it was organized by individuals, not organizations, in order to participate in elections, and it coalesced around a central candidate. Perhaps then it is not surprising it was the Nuevo País faction of the movement that broke off from the broader Pachakutik coalition just a few months after the 1996 elections over differences between Ehlers and the recently elected Pachakutik congressional delegation.<sup>232</sup>

My own observation of Pachakutik confirmed that leadership and decision-making authority were dispersed among a cadre of elected and non-elected national leadership. Media coverage of Pachakutik also reflected this, with numerous voices being cited by the press. The movement party's collegial leadership style mirrored that of CONAIE's, which also had no single, indispensable leader. A collegial leadership style and the absence of a dominant leader or single public figurehead suited an organization like Pachakutik in which actions and decisions had to be coordinated and decided among various organizational members.

Together with consensus and collective decision-making, another important norm in indigenous political practice was that of alternation in leadership. Occupation of a leadership post by the same person for too long a period of time was frowned upon and actively discouraged. When a leader appeared to be attempting to hold onto power, even if he or she was performing well, complaints and criticism would often begin to bubble up against this individual. Within indigenous communities value was placed, not only on effectiveness, but perhaps even more so on giving as many people

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<sup>232</sup> Diario Hoy 1996f.

as possible experience in holding leadership posts. Thus, the expectation was that people would take a turn and then open space up for others. The tradeoff of course had to do with continuity; there were times when effectiveness and experience got shortchanged when effective leaders were forced to step aside before they had accomplished everything they might have in a certain post. However, this emphasis on alternation in leadership had the positive effect of generating a constant flow of new leadership, which became incredibly important as the opportunities for indigenous people to fill different posts in the movement, in education, and finally in politics continued to expand during the 1980s and 1990s. The expanding range of opportunities in various areas for indigenous leaders during this period also meant that experience and proven leadership were not underutilized as those with experience often moved around into different positions.

The practice of regular alternation in leadership was evident in the roster of those who held the highest leadership posts in CONAIE since its formation in 1986. One of the ways CONAIE maintained unity between the Highland and Amazonian regions was through the practice of alternating the post of president between these two geographical areas. Between 1986 and 2002 CONAIE had four presidents, the first and third were from the Amazon and the second and fourth from the Highlands.<sup>233</sup> Likewise if an Amazonian was elected to the presidency, the vice presidency of the organization would be filled by a Highland leader. This particular norm played an important role in facilitating unity and avoiding splits within the organization.

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<sup>233</sup> While they were members, coastal organizations never had a high profile within CONAIE, due to the fact that indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian coastal populations were relatively small and not as well organized as those in the Highlands and Amazonian lowlands.

While Pachakutik clearly did not revolve around a single dominant leader, the indigenous norm of alternation was not as strictly adhered to as indigenous community practice and principle might have dictated. For instance, one proposal that would have required Pachakutik legislators to serve half their term and then step aside midway through their term in office so as to allow their alternate to takeover was never implemented in practice. No Pachakutik legislator gave up his or her seat to allow the alternate a chance to serve. Likewise, many of the same people who represented the core of Pachakutik's national leadership remained in their leadership posts for at least the organization's first six years. Miguel Lluco, for instance, was elected as a deputy to congress in 1996 on the Pachakutik ticket. After losing a reelection bid in 1998, he assumed the de facto position as the movement's national coordinator, a post to which he was confirmed at Pachakutik's first congress in 1999. Pachakutik's 2001 congress reelected him to this position despite the objections of some who appealed to the alternation principle. At the time, a mestizo member of Pachakutik's executive council countered that because Lluco had been doing such a good job, he should be allowed to stay on. This position eventually prevailed.<sup>234</sup> Similarly, four of the six Pachakutik legislators elected to the 1996-1998 term ran for reelection in 1998; none of them were reelected.<sup>235</sup> Clearly then, the principle of alternation, so important in grassroots indigenous communities, was losing out within Pachakutik's political practice due to the need to take advantage of leaders with political experience, not to mention these leaders' own personal ambitions.

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<sup>234</sup> El Comercio 2001.

<sup>235</sup> Pachakutik got eight people elected to congress in 1996, but there were two defections. The four who ran for reelection in 1998 and lost were: Luis Macas, Miguel Lluco, Miguel López Moreno, and Napoleón Saltos.

There was an expectation on the part of grassroots indigenous communities that the leaders they sent to serve in political or movement posts on the national level would eventually return to the community level after their term ended. This of course did not always happen, and, there was a group of nationally recognized indigenous leaders who circulated between different organizations and posts, essentially centering their lives at the national leadership level. However, there were a surprising number of leaders who did return to much more obscure lives, living and working in their rural communities or small provincial capitals after having served in a highly visible national movement or political post. Examples include Leonidas Iza, who after serving a term as a provincial congressman returned to his village in the Cotopaxi Province, or Arturo Yumbay, who after serving as CONAIE's vice president from 1997 to 1999 returned to the sleepy provincial capital of Guaranda in Bolivar Province, where the local Pachakutik chapter nominated him to run for mayor the following year.<sup>236</sup>

Indigenous organizational practices, like that of collective decision-making and leadership alternation, while not always perfectly or consistently implemented, were real enough to help preclude the emergence of a dominant single leader and to assure the regular renewal of national leadership both within CONAIE and later in Pachakutik.

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<sup>236</sup> Arturo Yumbay, author interview, Guaranda, April 12, 2000.

### Consultation with the Grassroots

Another important political principle inherited from the indigenous movement that was subsequently reinforced and articulated by Pachakutik was the idea that politics involved direct participation by the grassroots, that political decisions needed to bubble up from this base, and that major organizational decisions must always be made in consultation with the grassroots. As one commentator writing about CONAIE's proposals for electoral participation in 1995 explained: "Their [the indigenous movement's] decision to participate in electoral politics is not limited to presenting names for consideration by the voters, instead it involves a programmatic proposal that must arise from the community as the fundamental unit of their social organization."<sup>237</sup> This emphasis on the role of the grassroots in politics would eventually be incorporated into Pachakutik's bedrock principles of "control and participation." Of course collective and participatory decision making is a much different and more difficult endeavor for a national organization than for a small village, so indigenous movement organizations had to develop different mechanisms to attempt to approximate these grassroots styles of participatory decision-making. The main mechanism used by CONAIE and its member organizations was that of regular "consultation" with the grassroots. This was a time-consuming process involving ongoing communication between movement leadership and the grassroots. Generally, any major new movement initiative required months of preparatory

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<sup>237</sup> Carrión 1995.

meetings in which proposals were discussed at various organizational levels, all the way down to the local community level. The goal was to receive input from the bases and to generate organizational consensus. CONAIE employed this process in preparing its draft of a new agrarian reform law in the early 1990s. This consultative process was also used to prepare proposals for constitutional changes, in developing CONAIE's broad political program document,<sup>238</sup> and in the planning stages of various mass uprisings that the CONAIE led during the 1990s. The consultative process was facilitated by CONAIE's pyramid-like structure, in which grassroots communities were connected to the national organization through a series of intermediary organizations that went from federations of villages to provincial and regional organizations.

When the consultative process was bypassed by the leadership problems ensued and complaints would surface within the organization. One clear example of this were the internal critiques made of CONAIE president, Antonio Vargas, and his leadership leading up to and during the events of January 21, 2000 that led to the ouster of Jamil Mahuad.<sup>239</sup> While the indigenous movement characterized this event as a triumph for Ecuadorian society, attained in large measure by the leadership of the indigenous movement, internally within the movement there was a much more vigorous debate about the merits and risks of the alliance with the military and the wisdom of engaging in acts that could be characterized as anti-constitutional. Much of

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<sup>238</sup> CONAIE. Consejo de Gobierno 1994.

<sup>239</sup> On January 21, 2000 a series of social protest actions led by the indigenous movement and supported by a couple hundred rebellious officers from the Armed Forces succeeded in forcing out of office then President Jamil Mahuad. For different accounts and analyses of these events see Collins 2000b; Lucas 2000; North 2004; Saltos Galarza 2000.



the criticism was directed at the secretive and unilateral nature of Vargas's leadership in anticipation of the January protests. He was accused of making secret plans with the rebellious military officers and failing to consult with the bases, or for that matter with other leaders in the movement, on the advisability of this alliance. In the aftermath of January 21, 2001 he lost a significant amount of internal support within the movement, although he was not unseated as president, as some within the movement argued was appropriate.

This emphasis on consultation with the grassroots was carried over and incorporated into Pachakutik's practice. The consultation process, however, was not as clearly defined in Pachakutik as it was in CONAIE, where the organizational structure was better established and the constituency absolutely clear. Contained within Pachakutik was the CONAIE constituency but also other groups that had to be taken into account. As a multi-ethnic political movement attempting to appeal broadly, Pachakutik had to develop its proposals in consultation with other relevant sectors of society. So for example, in developing legislative initiatives, Pachakutik congresspersons sought to get input not only from the CONAIE indigenous bases, but from other relevant groups as well. Congresswoman Nina Pacari described the process her office undertook to develop a legislative proposal to address the problems in the country's indebted and overburdened social security agency:

We were able to form an umbrella group of all the organizations that are working on the social security issue – retirees, affiliates, and unions. In total we identified sixty-seven organizations working independently of one another with distinct objectives. Each one would come to our office to ask us for this or that, and sometimes their proposals were contradictory. So we were able to bring these sixty-seven organizations together. We organized a technical commission

and a political commission, which worked on a common agenda of twenty points. This helped us, as congressional deputies, to defend our position so that we wouldn't have to respond separately to each organization. Now a national front is being organized to fight for our proposals.<sup>240</sup>

Similarly in preparing a law that would allow for conscientious objection to military service, Pacari described a process that involved a series of workshops with youth concerned about the issue and eventually consultations with the military, so that the proposal presented would be, “a law acceptable to the military.”<sup>241</sup>

Pachakutik was also able to take advantage of the indigenous movement's organizational infrastructure to educate and carry forward the consultation process in indigenous communities about major legislative initiatives by other parties and the government. Pacari described how she and other members of Pachakutik attended assemblies and meetings of indigenous organizations to discuss and educate the indigenous grassroots about the Noboa<sup>242</sup> administration's major economic initiative, Trolé II, and its consequences for their communities. At these events they took the opportunity to present Pachakutik's alternative proposals.<sup>243</sup>

### Dialogue

Another practice the indigenous movement was largely responsible for introducing into Ecuadorian politics was that of direct dialogue between actors in civil society and government. Previous to and following the founding of Pachakutik, the

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<sup>240</sup> Nina Pacari, author interview, Quito, March 3, 2000.

<sup>241</sup> Nina Pacari, author interview, Quito, March 3, 2000.

<sup>242</sup> Gustavo Noboa served as vice president under Jamil Mahuad and took over as president, with the military's approval, after Mahuad was forced out of office in January 2000.

<sup>243</sup> Nina Pacari, author interview, Quito, March 3, 2000.

indigenous movement, primarily through CONAIE, engaged in a practice of pressuring the government by means of mass mobilizations of its members throughout the country. In most cases the protests were aimed at pressuring the executive to negotiate directly with the movement. During the 1990s the CONAIE, in some cases in conjunction with other organizations, participated in “dialogues” with almost every administration: Borja in the wake of the 1990 uprising, Durán Ballén with regard to the reforms to the Agrarian Reform Law in 1994, Mahuad after the March protests of 1999, and the Noboa administration in the wake of the February 2001 protests. While these dialogues resulted from the pressure upon the governments by the power of the protests, by virtue of their frequency during the 1990s they effectively became a para-institutional avenue of policy-making. The topics to be dealt with in these “dialogues” ranged from specific demands for government action on indigenous issues or programs, to national policies, programs, and even national laws. This corporatist practice of direct dialogue and negotiations between the government and a peak organization, such as CONAIE, had no constitutional basis. The fact that time and again the indigenous movement brought the government to the negotiating table was at once a manifestation of the movement’s tremendous organizing power and also evidence of the ineffectiveness of the constitutionally dictated channels of governmental-societal relations, namely political parties and congress. Although debatable, I would argue that even though this practice was extra-constitutional, in the grand scheme of things it served to strengthen rather than weaken democracy, because it opened up a space for input into national policy-making from civil society that had previously been limited to the wealthy and powerful. Former CONAIE president and

Pachakutik national congressman, Luis Macas, had this to say about this practice: “The practice of dialogue was instigated and imposed on our country as a result of indigenous experience and demands; we consider it one of the positive achievements of our actions.”<sup>244</sup> The fact that this practice of direct dialogue between social movement organizations and the executive branch in the wake of mass mobilizations continued even after Pachakutik’s formation indicates that the social movement actors did not yet feel fully empowered by their level of representation in the formal political institutions.

### Candidate Selection

Candidate selection mechanisms are an important indicator of a party’s level of internal democracy. Candidate selection in Pachakutik was a complex process involving different steps and layers, but ultimately one that was highly participatory and decentralized. Whether candidates were being selected for national, provincial, or local office, there was an initial pre-selection process by the relevant social movement member organizations, which was followed by negotiations aimed at creating a unified list either of Pachakutik’s member organizations or in alliance with other political parties. Because of Pachakutik’s diverse and complex structure the included autonomous organizations, the candidate selection process always involved coordinating and bringing together several different agendas. In the words of congresswoman, Pacari, Pachakutik’s diverse configuration meant that, “The movement is not directed vertically but more horizontally, in a way that respects

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<sup>244</sup> Macas 2002.

decisions made at the grassroots. For this reason, we experience a sort of double layer inside the organization: that which is decided in the Indian peoples' arena is not imposed on Pachakutik, and neither can Pachakutik impose candidates on the [indigenous] organizations.<sup>245</sup> This “double layer” was clearly visible in my observations of the movement party's organizational practice. The process was one in which Pachakutik member organizations would independently pre-select their own list of candidates that was then presented to the Pachakutik assembly. These large regional or provincial assemblies that included delegates from all the relevant member organizations would then go through a process in which a final candidate slate was drawn up. During these assemblies, the qualifications of the pre-candidates were evaluated and decisions were made collectively about what grouping of candidates constituted the strongest list. So the double layer referred to Pachakutik's member organizations and to the movement party organization itself, which was at once a combination of its member organizations and its own entity. In addition to these two internal layers described by Pacari, there was often a third level of external negotiation with other parties or movements with which Pachakutik had decided to run in alliance. This coordination task involving three separate constituencies –social movement member organizations, Pachakutik as an organization, and alliance partners – characterized the selection process at all levels, from the national to the local. Candidate selection, then, was a complex process involving numerous interlocking actors.

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<sup>245</sup> Nina Pacari, author interview, Quito, March 3, 2000.

The actual process of consultation and coordination did not follow strict procedural rules, instead norms and procedures were developed in somewhat different ways and with different sequences according to the preferences and needs of those involved at the relevant level where the selection process was taking place. For the national level offices of president and national congressional deputies, the CONAIE together with the other national social movement organizations would pre-select their candidates; a final candidate list was negotiated and decided upon at a Pachakutik congress or by the political council. For example, in anticipation of the 1998 National Constituent Assembly elections, CONAIE designated its pre-candidates during its own national congress and then combined these names with others from other social movement organizations to form a unified and diverse list.<sup>246</sup>

Following the norm in many indigenous organizations, an effort was made within Pachakutik to have the outcome of the candidate selection process be as consensual as possible, especially for the most important spots on the ticket – presidential candidates and the top slots for national congressional deputies. In those cases where deep divisions over an internal election threatened to permanently divide the political organization, instead of going forward with a majority vote, action would be taken to postpone the divisive decision in order to gain time to try and find a compromise position that would keep the organization intact. This style of dealing with and diffusing internal conflicts was successfully employed in both CONAIE, as well as, Pachakutik. For example, in 1997 CONAIE was nearly torn apart in internal elections when the Bucaram administration attempted a takeover of the organization

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<sup>246</sup> Diario Hoy 1997a.

by leaders it had co-opted. The contentious CONAIE congress was disbanded with no new governing group elected and was reconvened only after a cooling off period of a couple of months and after internal negotiations had come up with a leadership group acceptable to each of the regional member organizations.

In Pachakutik this same effort to avoid deep organizational divisions was evident in the lead up to the 2002 presidential elections. While during the 1996 and 1998 presidential elections Pachakutik had been part of the coalition backing Ehlers' candidacy, by 2001 many within the indigenous movement had begun to believe it was time for one of their own to run. Two possible candidates emerged early on, CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, from the Amazonian Province of Pastaza, and Mayor Auki Tituaña, who had been running a very successful and highly acclaimed administration in the Highland town of Cotacachi. Vargas had been the indigenous movement's most visible leader on January 21, 2000, leading the takeover of the National Congress and then assuming a position as a member of the self-appointed triumvirate that held power in Ecuador for less than twenty-four hours before the military orchestrated the presidential succession by Gustavo Noboa. Some have suggested that January 21 was the starting point of Vargas's presidential ambitions and that from that moment forward he began positioning himself within the indigenous movement for a presidential run. However, as a result of the internal criticisms made of his leadership after the events of January 2000, there was considerable resistance to his candidacy both within CONAIE, as well as within

Pachakutik.<sup>247</sup> In addition, the sense among the Pachakutik leadership was that he did not have the type of broad electoral appeal needed to run a successful or even viable campaign.<sup>248</sup> Compounding this, his national image had been tarnished by accusations of fraud in collecting signatures for a public referendum that CONAIE had attempted to call under his leadership.<sup>249</sup>

Pachakutik's second congress was held in September 2001 and was to decide, among other things, the strategy the organization would adopt with regards to the 2002 presidential elections. However, due to the sharp divisions that ran through both Pachakutik and CONAIE over these two possible candidacies, no decision was reached. Instead, the decision was postponed repeatedly as it continued to be hashed over at various CONAIE and Pachakutik meetings over the succeeding ten months. The main problem was that the Vargas and Tituaña candidacies split the indigenous movement along regional lines, with the Amazonian confederation supporting Vargas and the Highland ECUARUNARI strongly opposed and, instead, supporting Tituaña. Finally, with CONAIE's continuing refusal to support him, Vargas sought out and

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<sup>247</sup> Vargas was president of CONAIE at the time of the January 2000 action, which led to Mahuad's ouster and the installation for less than twenty-four hours of a military-indigenous junta, of which Vargas formed part. While January 21 was viewed as a historic victory by the indigenous movement, there was also a good deal of internal criticism, especially of Vargas, for his leadership in the controversial event. His critics accused him of orchestrating the events of January 21 and making the decision to ally with sympathetic sectors in the military without consulting the organization's bases. Taking steps as a leader without sufficient consultation with the grassroots flies in the face of the norms of the indigenous movement. There had also been an incident that took place under his leadership that had tainted CONAIE's anti-corruption reputation. After January 2000, CONAIE began calling for a national referendum on the legitimacy of the new administration and the national congress. In order to get the referendum on the ballot CONAIE needed to collect thousands of signatures. The collection of signatures went very slowly and CONAIE kept putting off submitting them. After they finally did, it was discovered that thousands of signatures had been forged. This, of course, tarnished the organization's reputation as a crusader against corruption.

<sup>248</sup> Informal conversations with various members of Pachakutik's executive committee during the first half of 2001.

<sup>249</sup> See *Diario Hoy* 2000a; *Diario Hoy* 2000b; *El Comercio* 2000.



won the backing of a competing indigenous evangelical organization, FEINE. Even though Vargas had taken the initiative to abandon the CONAIE, in the end both CONAIE and Pachakutik made a strategic decision not to run an indigenous candidate that could be seen as fanning the divisive fires within the indigenous movement. In the end, just four months away from the first round, Pachakutik and CONAIE joined forces with other parties and organizations on the left to back Lucio Gutiérrez's candidacy, the mestizo army colonel who, together with Vargas, participated in the triumvirate that held power for a few hours in January 2000. In the end, Gutiérrez won a plurality of 20.6 percent of the vote in the first round and went on to win the presidency in the second. By contrast, Vargas was among the weakest candidates coming out of the first round with less than 4 percent of the vote.<sup>250</sup>

While some in the Amazonian organizations resented CONAIE and Pachakutik for not backing Vargas, in the end this compromise was less damaging to organizational unity than it could have been if they had forged ahead with a Tituaña candidacy. The fact that both CONAIE and Pachakutik refused to support his candidacy while at the same time avoiding a final decision about who to support meant that when Vargas finally gave up and sought out FEINE's backing he was the one to abandon the organizations, not the other way around, and this action ended up further isolating him while failing to pull apart either CONAIE or Pachakutik.

The influence of indigenous and CONAIE practices was much in evidence in the movement's selection of its own internal leadership and also in the candidate selection processes employed at the local and provincial levels. As mentioned earlier,

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<sup>250</sup> Figures taken from Unión Europea 2002: 1.

CONAIE was constructed atop a pyramid-like structure of local, provincial, and regional organizations. Participation in each of these organizational levels all the way to the national organization was determined by delegation from below. For example, to attend a CONAIE congress an individual had to be delegated from an appropriate organization at each different level: first from the local community, then the OSG, the provincial organization, and finally by their regional organization. All national indigenous leaders attained their positions in the movement or their assignment to government posts as a result of having been vetted and having won the confidence of people at each of these different levels. José María Cabascango, a long-time leader in the movement, described how he came to be selected to serve as the Pachakutik designate to the nation's Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE): "In order to get where I am, I had to pass through various levels, first the community, then FICI,<sup>251</sup> then ECUARUNARI, afterwards CONAIE, then finally the Pachakutik Assembly, and here I am... Blanca, Ricardo,<sup>252</sup> every one of us got to where we are in the same way, and this has been an important aspect [of the movement]. Now the same method is being used to select our candidates."<sup>253</sup> This structure of links of delegation from the grassroots up to fill movement and later political positions and candidacies created strong incentives for leaders to maintain close relationships and ties to their communities. While not a fail-safe method for preventing corruption, it did prevent the commandeering of the movement organizations and later the political organization by

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<sup>251</sup> FICI, the Indigenous and Campesino Federation of Imbabura, is one of the main indigenous organizations in Cabascango's home province of Imbabura. It is an affiliate of CONAIE.

<sup>252</sup> Here Cabascango is referring to Blanca Chancosa and Ricardo Ulcuango, other well-known national indigenous leaders. At the time of my interview with him, they were serving respectively as the international relations person for CONAIE and the vice president of ECUARUNARI.

<sup>253</sup> José María Cabascango, author interview, Quito, June 1, 2000.

a leader with no real grassroots base. In other words, this structure made it virtually impossible for a neo-populist leader with no movement experience to rise up to a leadership position either in Pachakutik or CONAIE. This structure did not preclude Pachakutik deciding to support a non-movement candidate from another party, which of course it did first with Ehlers and later with Gutiérrez for the presidency, but these were candidacies that were supported in alliance, and these alliances did not alter or impact the basic internal structure of these organizations.

Practically from the outset, Pachakutik adopted a participatory style of candidate selection that relied primarily on the convening of large assemblies. None of the traditional parties described in Chapter 3 employed primaries as their means of candidate selection. Instead, the selection process in most of Ecuador's most important parties tended to be a closed, highly centralized process, often controlled and directed by the national party leadership. By contrast, in Pachakutik candidate selection was left in the hands of local groups and carried out in a manner that involved a much larger number of people. In this more decentralized process provincial and local organizations enjoyed great autonomy in organizing and running the procedures for putting together candidate slates in their jurisdiction, including those for provincial congressional deputies.

In the lead up to the 2000 local elections, provincial assemblies were held throughout the country's twenty-two provinces to select candidates for provincial council, prefect and, in some cases, for local municipal seats. As part of my research, I attended two of these assemblies, one in Cotopaxi and the other in Bolivar. Both these provinces have large indigenous populations and well-organized and firmly

entrenched indigenous organizations. I will go into some detail in describing these two assemblies, as they clearly illustrate some of the most important ways in which Pachakutik's internal organizational practices differed from those of traditional political parties. The two most important differences were the highly participatory nature of the Pachakutik selection process and the level of autonomy from the national leadership structure that the provincial branches of the party enjoyed. Autonomy meant that the provinces could set their own ground rules for the selection process and implement it with minimal interference from the national party leadership. Because the organizational practices were developed and agreed upon at the provincial level and, therefore, were in keeping with organizational practices familiar and legitimate in the eyes of those who were employing them, they functioned well. The legitimacy and familiarity of the procedures themselves helped prevent competition between groups over candidacies from devolving into permanent divisions by diffusing disagreements before they turned into long-term resentments.

Both assemblies were large and had to be held in a local theatre or auditorium in the respective provincial capitals. There were 200 people in attendance in Cotopaxi and 342 in Bolivar. It was evident at both assemblies that the CONAIE model of organizational membership had been adopted and transferred to this new political terrain. In Cotopaxi the assembly participants had been delegated from below by twenty-two organizations, most of which were local indigenous organizations, with a few provincial institutions represented as well. The larger Bolivar assembly was looser in its admissions criteria, but again the ticket for participation was organizational membership. Participants were clearly familiar with this model and

viewed it as legitimate. Salvador Quishpe, an indigenous leader from Zamora Chinchipe Province, in his capacity as one of the chairs of the Cotopaxi assembly remarked in his introductory statement to the assembly that the local indigenous communities are the “cells” of the Pachakutik organization.<sup>254</sup> In other words, it is the communities themselves that represent Pachakutik’s most fundamental organizational unit.

Both assemblies were dynamic, exciting exercises in democratic participation and decision-making. Debate was lively and oftentimes heated, rules and procedures were open to contestation and questioning, and the outcome of the deliberations was impossible to predict *ex ante*. Each assembly was organized somewhat differently with the procedural rules having been designed at the provincial level. It was clear, especially in Cotopaxi, that Pachakutik provincial leaders had taken much care to design a set of ground rules for the selection process that fostered fairness and transparency. The procedures had been developed in advance of the assembly and presented to the grassroots for debate and discussion at previous mass meetings and via OSG leaders. Thus, the ground rules were not something handed down from provincial or national leadership but instead had been had been discussed and agreed upon by all participating groups previous to the meeting. The establishment of fair and transparent ground rules was very important, as the competition between different communities over spots on the ticket was intense. One of the arrangements designed to avert conflict was to have the assembly chaired and the election process overseen

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<sup>254</sup> Author’s field notes taken at the Pachakutik provincial assembly convened in order to draw up the party’s Cotopaxi provincial ticket for the offices of prefect and provincial councilors, Latacunga, March 11, 2000.

by movement leaders from outside the province. It was presumed that a “jury” of outsiders would be more impartial and fairer as they would presumably be less personally invested in the outcome. The notables who chaired the Cotopaxi assembly were not Pachakutik functionaries, but instead well-known national indigenous leaders: Antonio Vargas, at that time CONAIE President; Salvador Quishpe, president of the Highland regional organization, ECUARUNARI; and Kurikamak Yupanki, a PRODEPINE functionary.

The Cotopaxi Assembly employed a strict protocol for nominations. Organizational delegations were the only ones with the right to make nominations, and they came to the assembly having already agreed upon who they would nominate. Each nominee was required to present a résumé prepared according to specific guidelines and outlining his or her background and qualifications. The résumé was read in its entirety to the assembly and then the nominee had to make a speech in both Spanish and Quichua about their plans should they be elected. The actual selection mechanism was fascinating in that it combined a vote by the assembly with a tallying up of points based on a common set of criteria. It was up to the jury to “grade” each nominee’s résumé based on four criteria: professional title, level of education, leadership history in the indigenous organizations, and the quality of the nominee’s presentation. In addition to this “objective” grading of each nominee’s qualifications, the assembly also voted on the candidates. Whoever won the popular vote had another twenty points added to their résumé score, which had a total possible score of eighty. Whichever candidate had the highest combined score, won the candidacy.

Despite this intricate design and the presence of the outside “jury”, conflict was not altogether avoided at the Cotopaxi Assembly. A major clash occurred when one community accused the jury of not properly computing their candidate’s score. A very heated debate ensued, but it was finally determined that the jury had indeed calculated incorrectly and the candidacy was transferred to the person from the community that had contested the original decision. What was significant about this incident is not that conflict took place, but instead that the problem was resolved through recourse to the agreed upon ground rules. The conflict generated some resentment and hard feelings, but in the end the parties in conflict accepted the outcome and Pachakutik member organizations remained united around their ticket. The complex nature of the selection process, combined with the conflict that took place, made for a marathon-length meeting of eight hours without a recess! In the end, Pachakutik candidates selected in this assembly went on to win not only several mayoralties but the prefecture as well.

The procedural rules used during the Bolivar assembly were not nearly as intricate or as strictly adhered to as they had been at the Cotopaxi meeting. There did not appear to have been as much effort invested in coming up with ground rules that would help ensure a level playing field for all involved. For one thing, unlike the Cotopaxi assembly, which was chaired by people outside the province, the Bolivar meeting was chaired by three provincial indigenous leaders: Gilberto Talahua, Pachakutik congressman for Bolivar; Fransisco Caspi, president of Bolivar’s indigenous federation, FECAB-BRUNARI; and Gonzalo Arévalo, Pachakutik provincial coordinator. Additionally, there did not appear to be the same degree of

deliberation over candidates' qualifications as there had been in Cotopaxi. Similar to Cotopaxi, there had been a flurry of organizational activity in preparation for the provincial assembly, with OSGs meeting to draw up their list of pre-candidates and prepare their delegations.<sup>255</sup> But at the assembly the candidates' speeches were short and devoid of much content and, unlike in Cotopaxi, there was little review of the qualifications of the various candidates. These differences may have been due in part to the fact that Bolivar is a much smaller province and so people were more familiar with one another, but even so, many grassroots delegates coming from small communities would not have been familiar with people from other parts of the province. While those in attendance made the nominations for mayor and municipal and provincial council seats spontaneously, the candidate for prefect had been pre-selected by the provincial leadership previous to the assembly and was presented almost as a *fait accompli*. This led some participants to complain during the assembly that the leadership was attempting to railroad it and that more deliberation was needed.

So this assembly did not appear to have quite the same degree of deliberative power as did the one in Cotopaxi, and therefore, it appeared from the outside that there was a greater possibility for division and alienation of certain sectors. However, in spite of these shortcomings, Pachakutik did equally well, if not better, in Bolivar than in Cotopaxi, and once the candidate list was put together there was impressive unity within the organized indigenous communities. Despite the somewhat lesser degree of participatory democracy at the Bolivar assembly, two things were evident: first, the provincial leadership was communal and not concentrated in a single person's hands;

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<sup>255</sup> Gilberto Talahua, author interview, Quito, March 14, 2000.



and secondly, decisions about the provincial candidacies were being made at the provincial, as opposed to the national level. It was also clear that while there were some shortcomings, the outcome of the assembly in Bolivar was by no means a foregone conclusion. The day before the assembly I interviewed congressman Talahua in Quito, who the following day was to serve as one of the three moderators at the assembly. He informed me that Pachakutik in Bolivar was going to enter into an electoral alliance with the ID party. It turns out that after negotiations between the two parties at the provincial level, Pachakutik's leadership decided against entering into this alliance. Talahua, who had been carrying out his own discussions in Quito with his colleague, Bolívar Sánchez, the ID provincial deputy for Bolivar, had been unaware of this development until he got back to the province.

It was clear in both assemblies that decisions made at the provincial level with regard to candidate lists were decided upon absolutely autonomously from the national level and that there was no question but that these decisions would be respected by the national leadership. This respect for local decision-making autonomy was something I observed consistently throughout the period I was doing my fieldwork. According to one Pachakutik leader I spoke with, the only conditions under which the national leadership would intervene in a local or provincial-level decision-making process were if they were asked to do so by the local leaders in order to try and resolve an intractable conflict, or if the candidates chosen had legal charges pending against them that would in any event invalidate their candidacy.

An example of the first situation took place in the city of Otavalo in preparation for the 2000 elections. Otavalo is the capital of Imbabura Province and an

important center of economic activity especially in the area of indigenous handicrafts. The city and province are both heavily indigenous but until 2000 had always been governed by whites or mestizos. The indigenous population in Imbabura Province is both well organized and highly stratified; Otavalo is one of the few places in the country where an indigenous bourgeoisie exists. Reflecting the class divisions within the Otavalo indigenous community itself, two strong indigenous candidates competed to run for mayor on Pachakutik's ticket: Mario Conejo represented the indigenous urban intelligentsia and Carmen Yamberla the impoverished rural sectors. According to José María Cabascango, a Pachakutik leader from Imbabura, discussions had been taking place in the province for a year about who the movement would run for mayor, but by the time of the provincial assembly to select the party's candidates for mayor and city council seats, the two candidates remained in a dead heat and there was no consensus.<sup>256</sup> Similar mechanisms to those described above for the Cotopaxi assembly were used at the one in Otavalo: a point system was created based on different criteria and an impartial "jury" was charged with "grading" the candidates. As happened in Cotopaxi, when the "jury" announced the winner, the losing side objected, challenging the jury and accusing it of bias. But in this case the conflict proved impossible to resolve at the assembly. Yamberla and her supporters appealed the provincial decision to the national level, to Pachakutik's executive committee. The executive committee voted to uphold the provincial assembly's decision.<sup>257</sup> It is significant to note that Yamberla did not respect this decision and instead went ahead

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<sup>256</sup> José María Cabascango, author interview, Quito, June 1, 2000.

<sup>257</sup> José María Cabascango, author interview, Quito, June 1, 2000.

and ran for mayor anyway as an independent and in direct competition with Pachakutik's designated candidate. This was exactly the type of situation that Pachakutik would have liked to avoid: two strong indigenous candidates competing against one another. Despite the danger of splitting the indigenous vote, Conejo won.

Another difference between Pachakutik's practices and those of the major political parties was the criteria used to evaluate potential candidates. As discussed in Chapter 3, by the 1990s many of Ecuador's most important parties had begun to incorporate polls into their candidate selection process with an eye towards choosing winning candidates. In this process of seeking out winners, criteria like name recognition and independent access to resources often assumed more importance than the candidate's track record in or loyalty to the party. To use Panebianco's (1988) terms, Ecuadorian parties began to shift from more "vertical" to "horizontal" integration as they recruited party outsiders. While by the time of my fieldwork there were still those who had risen up through the party ranks to achieve elected office, party loyalty as a criteria was increasingly giving way to a more commercial approach, as parties put people on their tickets who may have had no previous relationship with the party but who appeared to have a good chance of winning.

The criteria emphasized within Pachakutik were very different. Instead of loyalty to the party or the candidate's individual chances of success, the criteria most often employed was that of social movement involvement. While due to the newness of the organization at the time of my research it was not possible to observe patterns of horizontal versus vertical integration within the political movement per se, if the idea of vertical integration is expanded to include social movement involvement as

opposed to involvement in the party per se, then it was clear that Pachakutik was recruiting largely, though not exclusively, from its social movement bases. In the case of the fourteen congressional deputies elected in 1996 and 1998, only two were recruited from outside of social movement circles: Kaiser Arévalo representing the Amazonian province of Morona Santiago and Miguel Pérez of the Highland Province of Cotopaxi.<sup>258</sup> Significantly, both of them eventually defected from the movement.

In Pachakutik then, experience and proven commitment to indigenous and social movement organizations was highly valued and often prioritized over other criteria like name recognition or the individual's ability to independently finance their campaign. This is not to say that strategic criteria was never employed in candidate selection, but in general there was a tendency to look at these considerations in combination with the individual's relationship to the social movements. In those provinces where Pachakutik's principle organizational base was in the indigenous organizations, there was often an effort to broaden the movement's appeal by involving and recruiting for candidacies non-indigenous people. In these cases, the tendency was to look for persons who either had had a relationship with the indigenous organizations or had shown some affinity to them. In the absence of a previous relationship with the movement, the individuals were asked if they were committed to upholding Pachakutik's principles of participation and social control.

Striking a balance between choosing candidates with proven track records in the indigenous and social movements versus choosing candidates based on their

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<sup>258</sup> Information about Kaiser Arévalo's background came from the author's interview with him, Quito, February 4, 2000. Background on Miguel Pérez came from an author interview with Lourdes Tibán, Quito, March 9, 2000.

competitive attributes was not always easy. Likewise the use of large assemblies to choose candidates did not always guarantee that those selected would prove to be effective public servants or disciplined party members. There were a number of cases, especially for local or regional elections, where candidates with weak movement qualifications were chosen to run and subsequently elected, but once in office did not remain loyal to the party or were not very effective administrators. It is important to note that defectors included indigenous politicians, as well as, non-indigenous. Of the eight Pachakutik representatives elected to Congress for the 1996-1998 term two disaffiliated at the outset; both of them were indigenous. Likewise, in the 1998-2002 period, one of the two Pachakutik deputies to abandon the party was indigenous. While a participatory process should help insure the selection of candidates known to and trusted by the organization's grassroots thereby raising the likelihood that once elected these candidates would remain accountable to the base, this is by no means guaranteed. As we have seen, not all candidates selected were movement candidates and not all movement candidates were immune from corruption.

#### Organizational Control and Accountability

Clientelistic practices are positively correlated with poverty, and the indigenous movement represented a sector of the population that was largely poor and marginalized. Thus, clientelistic pressures from the grassroots of the movement on its leaders and elected officials were inevitable. In addition, for those Pachakutik politicians who hailed from lower class backgrounds, the combination of little if any experience in formal politics, perhaps lower educational levels, and economic need

were conditions that often made them more susceptible to corruption. Thus the socio-economic makeup of Pachakutik's base presented challenges that needed to be addressed by other mechanisms beyond the selection process. We will examine some of the innovative measures developed at the national level in the following section, leaving local-level experiences to Chapter 7.

Pachakutik's two main philosophical and organizational principles were participation and social control. Participation was evident in the candidate selection process described above. Social control referred to efforts to develop practices aimed at keeping elected authorities accountable to the grassroots and to Pachakutik's member organizations, as well as, promoting greater involvement and oversight by civil society in governmental administration and use of public monies. A Pachakutik promotional leaflet<sup>259</sup> described the movement's operational philosophy:

The ethic of social responsibility is the fundamental axis of MUPP-NP's political action and is pursued through the following means:

1. Accountability to the grassroots in the movement's political, organizational, and institutional actions.
2. Submission to the political control of the organization's bases.
3. Regular auditing.
4. The application of recall if and when appropriate.
5. Honesty and transparency in all areas of the movement's institutional and organizational administration and work.
6. The struggle against corruption and a commitment to the principles of *Ama Shua*, *Ama Llulla* and *Ama Quilla*.<sup>260</sup>

The emphasis on leadership accountability and submission to the grassroots and the movement's member organizations was unique for an Ecuadorian political party and was important for two reasons. First of all, one of the main planks in

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<sup>259</sup> MUPP-NP n.d..

<sup>260</sup> Translated from Quichua this means: "Do not steal, do not lie, and do not be lazy." It is a bedrock principle of Andean indigenous communities from Ecuador to Bolivia to Peru.

Pachakutik's political platform was the struggle against government corruption; for this commitment to be credible the movement party had to find ways to ensure that its own elected officials did not become embroiled in this type of behavior. Secondly, Pachakutik was attempting to forge a new political practice, one that emerged from and was responsive to the social movement experience. As we have seen, while the candidate selection process represented an innovative step in the creation of a new political practice, the record with regard to accountability and party discipline was mixed. Thus movement organizations sought ways to try and keep their elected authorities accountable and responsive to the grassroots and social movement organizations.

Upon taking office, all Pachakutik elected officials, from the national to the local levels, were expected to sign a letter of resignation that in the event they betrayed the movement's principles or became deaf to the desires of their constituents could serve to tender their resignation. The practice was established by the movement's first congressional delegation (1996-1998).<sup>261</sup> It proved to be mostly a symbolic act, not particularly effective in practice. Between 1996 and 2002 a total of four Pachakutik congressional deputies defected from the party to become independents.<sup>262</sup> These defections significantly reduced the size of the movement's delegations. In an attempt to have these renegade deputies expelled from congress

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<sup>261</sup> Albornoz Tinajero 1996.

<sup>262</sup> Party defection in Ecuador is quite common and usually responds to executive efforts to pick up legislative votes through the use of bribes to individual lawmakers. For a further discussion of legislative behavior in Ecuador see Chapter 3.

(thus making it possible for the party to replace them with their alternates) Pachakutik attempted to use these letters, but the congress did not go along.<sup>263</sup>

The defection rate of Pachakutik deputies during the first two terms since the movement's founding was 25 percent for 1996-1998 and 33 percent for 1998-2002. Clearly Pachakutik elected authorities were not immune to the temptations of money and power that came with election to political office, even despite of the participatory manner in which they had been selected to run for office. While it is impossible to make definitive inferences from such a small sample, it is worth noting that this rate of between 25 and 33 percent corresponds almost perfectly with the 32.2 percent rate Pachano found in the 1980s for congressmen changing parties once they were in congress.<sup>264</sup> So Pachakutik appeared to be no more and no less vulnerable to disaffiliation than other parties. In all four cases the disaffiliations were clearly motivated by personal interests as opposed to ideological differences with the movement. In examining this accountability breakdown, we will first look for commonalities among those who defected that differentiated them from the other Pachakutik deputies who remained faithful to the movement. In order to do this, two useful ways of categorizing members are according to ethnicity and organizational involvement. Table 7 displays this breakdown for each of the two congressional terms (1996-1998 and 1998-2002).

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<sup>263</sup> These four were José Aviles and Héctor Villamil in the 1996-1998 delegation, and Miguel Pérez and Kaiser Arévalo during the 1998-2002 term. In the second half of the 1996-1998 term, Pachakutik eventually regained the two seats they had lost early on, after Villamil and Aviles, together with 11 other congressmen, were found guilty of acts of corruption and lost their seats.

<sup>264</sup> Pachano 1991: 143.



**Table 7: Movement Involvement and Ethnicity of MUPP-NP Defectors and Loyalists in Congress, 1996-2002**

	<b>Indigenous</b>	<b>Non-indigenous</b>
<b>Previous social movement involvement</b>	1996 = 3 loyalists; 2 defectors  1998 = 3 loyalists	1996 = 3 loyalists  1998 = 1 loyalist
<b>Recruited from outside the movement</b>	1998 = 1 defector	1998 = 1 defector

All eight members of Pachakutik's first congressional delegation came directly out of social movements; five were indigenous and three mestizo. The two who abandoned the party, José Aviles and Héctor Villamil, were indigenous leaders who had each held leadership positions in the movement before being elected to congress, so the fact that they abandoned the party, which they did very soon after being elected and, in fact, before the start of the congressional session, is surprising. Villamil had served as the director of the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP), one of the most important provincial indigenous organizations in the Amazon. Aviles, on the other hand, had had a more checkered history, having at one point been kicked off of CONAIE's governing board.<sup>265</sup> Despite his repudiation by the national organization, he was still selected by the local indigenous organizations in his province to run for congress on the Pachakutik ticket.

The experience with the 1998-2002 delegation was a bit different. In this case, there were two defections: Kaiser Arévalo was a mestizo who had had little previous involvement or commitment to social movements, although he had a political

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<sup>265</sup> Diario Hoy 1996h.

background in the Socialist Party (PSE). After leaving the PSE, he was recruited by provincial indigenous organizations to run on the Pachakutik ticket.<sup>266</sup> The other deputy who ultimately defected was Miguel Pérez, an indigenous lawyer from the Highland province of Cotopaxi. Despite his ethnicity, Pérez had not had a previous trajectory of involvement and commitment to indigenous grassroots organizations. He was a professional representing a province where the vast majority of the indigenous were poor, uneducated *campesinos*. According to one leader from that province, who I spoke to, Pérez used unorthodox methods to obtain the Pachakutik nomination, implying that he had manipulated the assembly by throwing money around in order to obtain the Pachakutik nomination.<sup>267</sup>

So there is little here to indicate a clear pattern: there were both indigenous and mestizo defectors, and of all the defectors, half had social movement credentials and half did not. The one thing that does jump out from this table is the fact that the only two congressmen who were recruited from outside movement circles – one indigenous and one mestizo - both ended up defecting. While the sample size is admittedly too small to draw strong inferences, this suggests that Pachakutik representatives without social movement backgrounds were disproportionately susceptible to corruption and cooptation. While a social movement background was no guarantee of political loyalty to the party, it appeared to increase its likelihood.

The other factor that appears to be significant is that of region. Between 1996 and 2002, three of the four deputies who disaffiliated were from the Amazon; Pérez

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<sup>266</sup> Kaiser Arévalo, author interview, Quito, February 4, 2000.

<sup>267</sup> Informal conversation with Pachakutik member who asked not to be identified. It should be noted that this conversation took place well in advance of Pérez's disaffiliation from the party, so the comments were not solicited with regard to his disaffiliation.

was the only one from a Highland province. In total there were four Pachakutik congressional representatives from the Amazon during this period and three of the four eventually disaffiliated from the party, compared with only one out of ten representatives from Highland provinces.<sup>268</sup> That is a disaffiliation rate of 75 percent for those elected from the Amazon, compared with only 10 percent for those from Highland provinces! The histories, levels of development, and political cultures of the two regions are extremely different and this is reflected in these two very different disaffiliation rates. Amazonian legislators in general appeared to face greater clientelistic pressures than their counterparts in the Highlands, and Pachakutik deputies were no more immune to these pressures than politicians from other parties.

The problem of low organizational loyalty among Amazonian leaders was visible not only in the arena of electoral politics, but also in social movement politics. While there were very committed Amazonian indigenous movement leaders, there were also numerous cases where Amazonian indigenous leaders who allowed themselves to be co-opted by the state; or when organizational decisions did not go their way, turned their back on the organizational process. Rafael Pandam's story exemplifies this pattern. During the first half of the 1990s Pandam had served as vice president of CONAIE. In 1996, however, he and Valerio Grefa, another Amazonian indigenous leader, began negotiating with Bucaram for the creation of an indigenous ministry. Once Bucaram came into office, he sought to gain control of the CONAIE

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<sup>268</sup> The two MUPP-NP congressional delegations were composed as follows: 1996-1998 – Dr. Luis Macas, National Deputy; Miguel Lluco, Chimborazo; Napoleón Saltos, Pichincha; Leonidas Iza, Cotopaxi; Dr. Rosendo Rojas, Azuay; Dr. Miguel López Moreno, Azuay; José Aviles, Napo (disaffiliated); Héctor Villamil, Pastaza (disaffiliated). 1998-2002 – Dr. Nina Pacari, National Deputy; Antonio Posso, Imbabura; Gilberto Talahua, Bolivar; Valerio Grefa, Napo; Miguel Pérez, Cotopaxi (disaffiliated); Kaiser Arévalo, Morona Santiago (disaffiliated).

and enlisted Pandam's support in this effort, in exchange for which Pandam was appointed as Minister of Ethnic and Cultural Affairs. Bucaram's efforts to co-opt and gain control of CONAIE, apparently with the support and assistance of Pandam and others, provoked a leadership struggle that nearly led to a schism in the organization between the Amazonian and Highland regions.<sup>269</sup> According to one eyewitness Pandam was seen at the congress handing out money to CONAIE delegates in exchange for their votes for Bucaram's choice to head the organization. Pandam was later convicted on criminal charges for separate activities related to using illegal methods to obtain visas for migrants wanting to enter the United States.<sup>270</sup> Even Antonio Vargas, who served as CONAIE's president from 1996 to 2001, during one of the organization's most conflictive and tumultuous periods, in the end turned his back on the CONAIE and Pachakutik after they refused to endorse his bid for the presidency in 2002.

The pattern of lower party loyalty on the part of Amazonian politicians is similar in other parties as well. In a study of the frequency of party switching in Ecuador, Mejía Acosta found, among other things, that politicians from smaller provinces, in particular those that elect only one or two provincial deputies, were much more likely than their colleagues from large provinces or those elected at the national level to switch parties.<sup>271</sup> The Amazonian provinces represent most of the smallest provinces in terms of population and so Mejía Acosta's data would indicate that party switching is particularly prevalent among politicians elected from this

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<sup>269</sup> See Beck and Mijeski 2001a: 8-9.

<sup>270</sup> *Diario Hoy* 1997c.

<sup>271</sup> Mejía Acosta 1999: 17-18.

region. Mejía Acosta attributes this pattern to greater local pressures on deputies representing smaller provinces to respond to specific local demands and needs, and that these pressures led legislators to give greater priority to addressing local demands over loyalty to their party.

In addition to the size factor, there may also be stronger cultural pressure on Amazonian politicians to act in a clientelistic fashion, which in turn could lead to a greater propensity to party switching. There are two ways in which clientelistic practices and relationships between politicians and their constituents might contribute to a higher disaffiliation rate. In the first place, if politicians were expected by their constituents to dole out particularistic goods and small public works, then they will be more tempted to leave their own party if the governing party offers them resources and projects to distribute in their province. Secondly, if constituents are easily bought off by small things and have greater attachment to the individual politician than to the party or party program, then they are unlikely to care if a politician switches parties, no matter how radical the shift in ideological terms, as long as they feel the politician has been generous enough with them. Under these conditions the politician does not risk losing voter support by switching parties.

Amazonian and Highland indigenous histories and cultures are vastly different and these differences are reflected in each region's political culture. While I did not do field research in the Amazon, it became clear in my interviews with congressional deputies that political practices in the Amazonian region were much more baldly clientelistic than those in the Highlands, and this appeared to be true across parties. In interviews with congressmen from the region they talked forthrightly about how their

constituents expected to receive small gifts and public works from them. Pachakutik congressman and Amazonian indigenous leader, Valerio Grefa, described his constituents' view of the role of the legislator as a cross between a wealthy patron and Santa Claus:

The indigenous communities demand the construction of community halls and libraries, money for marching bands and musical instruments; they ask for cash and money to put on social programs and festivities for anniversaries and meetings. There are so many organizational meetings that it is impossible to attend them all. But if we say we don't have enough to attend to this or that demand, they get resentful and say, "you are getting rich and yet you don't want to spend one cent on our programs."<sup>272</sup>

Grefa described being bombarded by these sorts of requests every time he went back to his province: "It is very difficult, I get out of the car and have about ten people surrounding me asking for money, public works, handing me applications for infrastructure projects and physical works."<sup>273</sup> What is particularly interesting is that constituents' expectations of a clientelistic exchange relationship with their politician did not change after they elected one of their own; if anything these expectations may have increased. Instead the indigenous leader's new post served to put distance between him and the grassroots. In essence, election to political office, especially a fairly powerful post, such as that of congressman or mayor, served, in effect, to place that leader in a completely new role vis-à-vis the grassroots. The politician was no longer a *compañero* but a benefactor, as he was now earning a significant salary and had access to power and resources, or so it appeared. This in turn generated suspicions on the part of people at the grassroots that this person was getting rich and

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<sup>272</sup> Valerio Grefa, author interview, Quito, March 8, 2000.

<sup>273</sup> Valerio Grefa, author interview, Quito, March 8, 2000.

was unwilling to share the wealth. Here Grefa describes this experience of distancing from the bases that he experienced during his term as Pachakutik congressman representing Napo Province:

If I go to a community they don't ask me what I need or tell me how I can help them or say, "Congressmen pass this law for us," or "investigate this matter." Instead the first thing they do is put their hands on their pockets: "How much do you have and how much are you worth as a Congressman? What public works are you going to give? What things will you give us? If not, you are not worthy." This [attitude] has meant that we [members of congress] are a little disarticulated from the grassroots, that we are disconnected, even misunderstood with regard to our work... There are organizations in my province that as a movement leader I had very close ties and was very friendly with, but now in my position as congressional deputy there has been a certain amount of distancing, because I have not satisfied their requests and demands. There are times when the leaders ask us for money, and, well, we give it to them two or three times but not more than that, because there isn't enough. Once we stop giving they get resentful; it is a very difficult relationship.<sup>274</sup>

The tension described above between the represented and their representative was further exacerbated by the norm of leveling prevalent throughout indigenous Ecuador. By leveling I am referring to the disapproval of economic differentiation among members of a group, a value prevalent in many pre-industrial cultures. Societies that hold this value tend to develop mechanisms to prevent the accumulation of wealth by individuals or families and to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth among the community as a whole. Brysk describes this pattern so prevalent in the Amazon and its impact on indigenous organizations in that region:

A more deeply rooted problem in the Amazon is unauthorized "social spending." Leaders are pressured to immediately disburse seeming windfalls consonant with traditional cultural norms, and intense extended family demands are seen as more legitimate than dispersed

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<sup>274</sup> Valerio Grefa, author interview, Quito, March 8, 2000.

and sometimes artificial community units. Finally, Indian organizations are often handicapped in securing and tracking funds by a lack of literacy, accounting, and management skills.<sup>275</sup>

Among Andean indigenous cultures popular festivals are one of the leveling mechanisms. Bolivia in particular is known for its elaborate festivals, which are thrown annually in cities but also organized in small communities. They go on for days and involve the consumption of huge amounts of food and liquor. Every year a family or individual is chosen to sponsor the festival, which is both a great honor but also involves a huge expense. In this way, those families who have done well return their wealth back to the community through the throwing of what is essentially a huge communal party. One of the criticisms made of this practice is that it involves huge sums of money spent on things that do not represent long-term productive investments, and so ultimately these festivals serve to hold back economic development in poor communities.

While Highland politicians certainly faced similar, although not nearly as intense pressure from constituents for particularistic goods, there also appeared to be greater awareness within Highland indigenous organizations about the negative consequences of these patterns. In my interviews with Highland indigenous politicians and when observing some of the Pachakutik campaigns for local offices in 2000, it was clear that Pachakutik and its sponsoring organizations were making a concerted effort to change particularistic expectations at the grassroots and at the same time to put mechanisms in place to keep their elected officials accountable to the organizations and prevent them from cultivating a personal political machine based on

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<sup>275</sup> Brysk 2000: 279-280.



clientelistic relationships with their constituents. This different approach in the Highlands is captured in the following quote from Congresswoman Nina Pacari.<sup>276</sup> In response to a question about clientelistic expectations on the part of constituents she strikes a markedly different tone from the one set by Grefa:

When they [constituents] indicate that they want money for this or that, [I respond], “this is not our job *compañeros*.” What we can do is direct them to an appropriate agency that can handle this. We transfer the petition and have them attended to directly by these organizations, because this is not within our jurisdiction. And people learn. For example, at the beginning, people would often come asking us to get specific things put in the budget. But in the most recent round of budget negotiations, it was no longer, “put this line item in for me,” but instead, “monitor the process to make sure there is good distribution on this point.” This is important.<sup>277</sup>

The experience of Congressman Gilberto Talahua from Bolivar provides an example of some of the novel mechanisms that Pachakutik provincial chapters began to experiment with in an effort to try and keep their representatives accountable. Talahua, a Quichua from a small farming village in Bolivar Province, was elected to congress as a provincial deputy for the 1998-2002 term. Previous to his election he had never held political office, instead his qualifications were his leadership in Bolivar’s indigenous organizations, where he had served as president of one of the province’s largest and most important OSGs, a federation uniting forty-seven communities.<sup>278</sup> So Talahua was an example of the type of authentic movement

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<sup>276</sup> Nina Pacari had a particularly impressive background. In addition to having a long history as a prominent indigenous movement leader, she was one of the indigenous movement’s most well known intellectuals. Trained as a lawyer, she served as a CONAIE officer for several years and then was elected on the Pachakutik ticket to the National Constituent Assembly. In 1998 she became the first indigenous woman to win a seat in congress, where she served as a national deputy. Soon thereafter she was elected to the post of congressional vice-president.

<sup>277</sup> Nina Pacari, author interview, Quito, March 3, 2000.

<sup>278</sup> Gilberto Talahua, author interview, Quito, March 14, 2000.

candidate that Pachakutik was bringing into the political arena for the first time. Despite his solid movement credentials, the provincial indigenous federation, FECAB-BRUNARI, which was Pachakutik's backbone in the province, sought ways to insure that Talahua would stay true to this organizational base. Towards this end, it was FECAB-BRUNARI, not Talahua, which appointed the congressman's staff.<sup>279</sup> The organization also implemented a practice wherein Talahua's staff was rotated every six months, thus affording a greater number of people from the province the opportunity and experience of serving in the congressman's office. In an economy as poor as Ecuador's, regular salaried jobs in congress were a luxury and a privilege, even more so for people from such a small rural province as Bolivar. By removing the appointment decisions from the individual legislator, the movement helped assure, not only Talahua's continued accountability to the organization, but also his inability to use his office and the resources attached to it to build up an individual power base separate from the organization. Throughout his tenure Talahua worked closely with the FECAB-BRUNARI and, in his capacity as a congressman, he played an important role in helping to strengthen the Pachakutik organization in Bolivar Province.<sup>280</sup>

Talahua did not resist or appear to resent the restrictions on his autonomy and freedom of action imposed by the movement organization, but instead viewed them as positive mechanisms that formed part of a new style of governing that he advocated

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<sup>279</sup> Congressional deputies were given a budget sufficient to hire eight staff people at their own discretion, but in Talahua's case he turned this power of appointment over to the provincial indigenous federation. Gilberto Talahua, author interview, Quito, March 14, 2000.

<sup>280</sup> His role and that of others in the building and strengthening of Pachakutik in Bolivar province will be described in more depth in Chapter 7.

and owned as his own. In my interview with him he described the new model of authority that he and others in Pachakutik were trying to construct:

...an [elected] authority has to be part of the people and stand together with the people in good times and bad. But this is not what happens with almost all elected authorities. Once the authority is elected he is the one who knows, the one who acts and decides without considering or taking into account the social base, that entity which is the people. That is where we are very much mistaken, and it is in this regard that my proposal, our proposal [Pachakutik's], has been very different. Ultimately we believe that authorities must deliver on what they promise. At the national and provincial levels, we [Pachakutik] are proposing two fundamental principles. The first is social participation, which means that the electors and the elected have to be in communication with one another... The other fundamental principal is that of social control, which means that the people control the resources from various places. The people need to be responsible for these resources and this can be facilitated through assemblies, or popular peoples' parliaments with representatives from each one of the sectors.<sup>281</sup>

But this practice of turning over appointment power to the organization was not just something that fit with his political philosophy; it also served to enhance his credibility and reputation for transparency. In Talahua's own words: "...in this way [by having the organization be responsible for these appointments] one demonstrates very clearly that you do not owe anyone anything, that you have not made any [particularistic] campaign promises, whether to get someone a post or something else, but instead the work has been the proposal of the organization."<sup>282</sup> Not only did Talahua work closely with the organizational leadership from his province, but he also acted as a loyal member of the Pachakutik congressional bloc. In this way, Talahua's behavior resembled that of a disciplined member of a programmatic party. Not only

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<sup>281</sup> Gilberto Talahua, author interview, Quito, March 14, 2000.

<sup>282</sup> Gilberto Talahua, author interview, Quito, March 14, 2000.

this, but of all the Pachakutik deputies who served from 1998-2002, he maintained the closest ties to CONAIE.

Like Talahua, Leonidas Iza, who served as a provincial congressman from Cotopaxi from 1996-1998, also allowed his organization to exert an important degree of control over his actions while serving in congress. Like Talahua, he had been a local indigenous leader in his province and was selected by the provincial Pachakutik branch to run for congress. The Indigenous and Peasant Movement of Cotopaxi (MICC) decided previous to the 1996 elections that if any of their candidates were elected to congress their elected representatives would be allowed to select four staff people of their own choosing and MICC would appoint the other four. Lourdes Tibán was one of the young leaders selected by the provincial indigenous organization to serve as a secretary in Iza's office. She described the challenge the movement presented her with: "The indigenous organization supported me. They said, 'we are going to send Lourdes, but if she doesn't perform, we ourselves will vote to take her out.' And they gave me three months to see how I did; they challenged me."<sup>283</sup> Tibán did a fantastic job and ended up developing a close working relationship with Iza. In subsequent years, she emerged as one of the most important young indigenous leaders at the national level, eventually assuming the post of Under Secretary of Social Welfare in the Gutiérrez administration as a Pachakutik appointee.<sup>284</sup> Not only did her assignment to Iza's office facilitate MICC's continued supervision of the congressman, but it also forced him to work with and create ties with other leaders

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<sup>283</sup> Lourdes Tibán, author interview, March 9, 2000, Quito Ecuador.

<sup>284</sup> For accounts by various Pachakutik leaders who served in the Gutiérrez government of the party's six-month participation in that administration and the subsequent split between Pachakutik and Gutiérrez, see Barrera 2004.

from his province whom he might not have worked with if the choice had been his alone to make. Additionally, it gave important national political experience to a young leader with great political potential. In my interview with her, Tibán explained that this practice helped to avoid the pitfalls of opportunism that plague other parties, where those who participate actively in a candidate's campaign expect to receive jobs once the person is elected. According to Tibán, in Cotopaxi, in order to be selected by Pachakutik to fill a certain political position or post, an individual had to have at least five years experience working within the indigenous movement. According to Tibán, this "eliminates all the opportunists from the running."<sup>285</sup>

One of the most significant things about these mechanisms of organizational control was the direction of control, not top-down, but bottom-up. In other words, opposite from the case of the hierarchically structured PRE, where control and decision making emanated from the party's supreme national leader, in Pachakutik control was exerted from below by the provincial organizations upward over the politician. This was possible due to Pachakutik's practice of giving autonomy to local and provincial branches to organize themselves as they saw fit. The national organization sought to define guiding principles at its national congresses, especially in terms of guidance on ideological issues, and it did what it could to offer support in terms of training to local candidates and provincial and municipal governments, but beyond that, it let the local organizations organize themselves and only intervened when the local or provincial branches requested that they do so.

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<sup>285</sup> Lourdes Tibán, author interview, March 9, 2000, Quito Ecuador.

## **Conclusion**

Pachakutik was founded in opposition to traditional political parties. It rejected categorization as a political party and staked out its claim as an independent political movement that embodied a different model of political action, participation, and representation, one that was more responsive to popular interests. This chapter explored the degree to which this characterization rang true in terms of the movement's internal organizational structure, norms, and practices. The anchoring question around which this chapter revolved was: To what degree did Pachakutik's internal structure and practices reflect social movement influence versus mirroring those of Ecuador's major parties?

Ecuadorian social movements and indigenous cultures place great emphasis on participation, equality of opportunity, democratic and even consensual decision-making, and leadership accountability to the grassroots. Several significant and striking differences between Pachakutik's internal structure and practice and that of traditional parties were identified and linked to social movement and indigenous influence. One of the most important of these had to do with leadership. Whereas traditional parties functioned according to top-down hierarchical models and tended to be associated with a single national leader who wielded significant power, leadership within Pachakutik was collective and non-hierarchical; overall, power was much less concentrated.

The socio-economic make-up of its leadership and its candidate selection processes were two other ways in which this movement party manifested striking differences with traditional political parties. Another important contrast had to do with the extremely active and, one might say embedded role, played by some provincial indigenous organizations in supporting and holding their congressional representatives accountable. These innovative mechanisms were unique to Pachakutik and represented a radically different understanding of the role and position of elected officials compared with conceptions prevalent in the dominant political culture. Instead of concentrating autonomous and unchecked power in the hands of the elected official, the task of governing was deemed a collective endeavor, which again is reflective of organizational practices in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement.

It is hard to overemphasize how different an approach this was from the way political power was traditionally wielded in Ecuador and many other Latin American countries. Guillermo O'Donnell (1994) coined the phrase, "delegative democracy" to describe a style of governing evinced by some Latin American presidents in which virtually unchecked power is vested in the executive, who in turn justifies this power by claiming to have a popular mandate and to embody the will of the people. While O'Donnell is describing a style of presidential politics, the norms and attitudes about political authority that he describes are ones that hold for authorities at other levels of government. Ecuadorian political culture, similar to that of many other Latin American countries, tends to grant wide latitude to political authorities; citizens by contrast petition for things they want or need but do not participate in governing. Decisions are made by the politician with little if any input from the broader society.

So to constrain the powers and privileges of a congressman by appropriating his control over staffing and to insist on collective decision-making reflects a radically different conception of authority and of the relationship between that authority and citizens.

This de-linking of power from the individual politician and the various mechanisms used to hold politicians accountable were creative and effective ways of addressing the challenge Pachakutik faced of building a party with a support base among sectors of the poor and marginalized without resorting to a reliance on clientelism, and at the same time endeavoring to avoid corruption.

Not all Pachakutik elected officials adhered to the party's program and principles. Like other parties, Pachakutik had its share of legislators who broke ranks with the party, probably for corrupt reasons. Likewise, not all elected politicians had as close a working relationship with social movement organizations as did Talahua and Iza. So the record was by no means perfect, and there were cases in which the behavior of Pachakutik politicians was not much different from that of politicians in the traditional parties, but this does not negate the import of some of the significant innovations in political culture, organizational structure, and governing practices advanced by the movement and adopted by many of its members.



## Chapter 6

### Political Ideology and Behavior in Congress

We cannot stand around with our arms crossed in these spaces [formal government] when we are a small minority and cannot effect real change. When reforms are not being enacted, not even slowly, you have to look for other mechanisms to speed things up a little.

- Nina Pacari, Pachakutik deputy and Vice President of Congress, responding to a question about whether the demands and actions of the indigenous movement during the January 2000 protests represented a break with the movement's strategy of electoral participation.<sup>286</sup>

The point was never made that we [the social movements] have a bloc of deputies in congress, that even though it is a small delegation, we are not corrupt. We [Pachakutik Congressional delegation] spoke up and asserted: "We are not part of this corrupt majority." But our comrades never made this distinction. They said: "The Congress is corrupt, and they should go." So they put us in a tremendously difficult position, between a rock and a hard place. From inside [the movement] they told us to go, and then our enemies also began to insist that we go.

- Antonio Posso, Pachakutik congressional deputy, commenting on disagreements that surfaced between members of the indigenous movement and Pachakutik's congressional delegation over the movement's call to unseat all three branches of government.<sup>287</sup>

During January 2000 the indigenous and social movements' parallel strategies of protest and participation collided. The indigenous movement raised the clarion call to bring down all three branches of government, which in the view of movement members were uniformly tarnished by corruption. The ironic thing was that these movements had spawned a political party that was participating in one of the very

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<sup>286</sup> Nina Pacari, author interview, February 3, 2000, Quito, Ecuador.

<sup>287</sup> Antonio Posso, author interview, February 1, 2000, Quito, Ecuador.

institutions they were arguing should be dismissed: the congress. At the time, Pachakutik had a six representatives serving in congress, and despite the small size of the delegation one of its members, Nina Pacari, held the prestigious post of congressional vice president. However, movement leaders at the time did not distinguish between representatives from the social movement party and those from traditional parties: all were corrupt and had to go.

While this collision did not ultimately lead to a rupture between the party and the movement, it raised some interesting and important questions, two of which will be explored in this chapter. While Chapter 5 focused on internal party organization, this chapter looks at the behavior and work of the Pachakutik congressional delegation from 1996-2001. It examines the extent to which the delegation succeeded in acting collectively to advance an ideologically coherent programmatic agenda and assesses the degree to which social movement goals and aims were advanced by this participation. The degree to which the party acted programmatically in congress is relevant to the broader question addressed by this dissertation, to what extent did this social movement party differ from other parties in the Ecuadorian system?

As described in Chapter 3, the Ecuadorian party system, like its Brazilian counterpart, was notoriously fragmented and parties tended to manifest relatively low levels of party discipline. I argue in that chapter that this can be attributed in part to the prevalence of clientelism, which posits an exchange relationship between representative and voter, as opposed to a classic representative relationship in which the politician seeks to represent the interests and political outlook, in a broad sense, of his or her constituency. I argue that clientelism undermines accountability between

politicians and voters on matters of policy and ideology, leading to weak, undisciplined, and ideologically inconsistent party behavior. If this is true, then social movement-based parties, to the degree that they succeed in establishing relationships with voters that are based on something other than clientelism, should manifest greater programmatic consistency. Indeed the PT in Brazil displayed higher rates of party discipline in the Brazilian congress than did most other parties.<sup>288</sup> Clearly some degree of party discipline is necessary if a party is to have any success in advancing broad programmatic objectives. Thus, this chapter will examine the degree to which the party acted programmatically and in an ideologically consistent manner.

The second and related aim is to consider the extent to which participation in congress furthered the causes and served the interests of the indigenous and social movements that supported Pachakutik. Clearly in late 1999 and early 2000 social movement leaders were not convinced that having a Pachakutik delegation in Congress was very important. Legislators in Ecuador had a particularly difficult task. Chapter 3 described a political system and culture dominated by clientelism and *caciquismo*. Voters tended to judge elected officials more on their ability to deliver concrete goods and services than on their programmatic or ideological positions. Meeting voters' expectations was somewhat easier for local officeholders, because their job was to build infrastructure and deliver resources. But this was not the

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<sup>288</sup> This was the case, at least, while it was in the opposition.

prescribed role for legislators, a fact not well understood by voters.<sup>289</sup> Thus, it was often difficult for voters to appreciate legislators' work.

The situation was all the more challenging for legislators from a small social movement party. The degree to which such a party could successfully advance movement goals in the legislature was not at all evident. Unlike executive officeholders at the local or provincial levels, legislators have to work collaboratively within their own party and then together with other parties, especially in a fragmented party system like Ecuador's. Compromise, negotiation, and exchange are the operative norms. Gains in the legislative arena for a small party are bound to be less dramatic and more compromised. In other words, participation in congress requires a degree of capitulation to the dominant rules of the game of party politics; but the payoff, in terms of ability to influence policy, may not be commensurate if a party is in a clear minority position.

The scandal that engulfed the Brazilian Worker's Party in 2005<sup>290</sup> points to the very real risks that involvement in formal politics poses for social movements. The goal of attaining power within formal political institutions for the purposes of transforming them or changing policy can lead a party to compromise its own principles to such a degree that they actually become part of the corrupt system, in this way sacrificing their commitment and ability to advance a new political practice and

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<sup>289</sup> This disconnection was confounded by the fact that until 1998 congressmen had direct access to patronage appointments and resources to distribute in their provinces, but these privileges were withdrawn by the 1998 constitution.

<sup>290</sup> The scandal involved PT bribes and payoffs to leaders of other political parties in exchange for their support of Lula's 2002 electoral bid and for his legislative agenda once in office. The scandal brought down top PT leaders and politicians and threatened to destroy the party. For accounts and analyses of this crisis see Maack 2005; Rohter and Forero 2005; Rubin 2005.

culture. Conversely, if they remain too ideologically rigid, they risk becoming ineffective and irrelevant.

The chapter begins by describing Pachakutik's programmatic agenda and its ideological foundations. The rest of the chapter is devoted to discussing the impact that Pachakutik legislators had on the legislative process, through a close examination of the types of legislation proposed by the Pachakutik bloc, as well as, the party's involvement in oversight and other legislative work. Legislative alliances with other parties are also discussed. The two objectives throughout are to evaluate the degree to which Pachakutik acted in a programmatic way to advance a clear and consistent political agenda and, secondly, to assess the degree to which the strategy of participation in the legislative arena served to advance movement goals and objectives.

### **Political Issues and Ideology**

As discussed in Chapter 4, Pachakutik started out as a heterogeneous coalition of social movement organizations and unions that were united in their opposition to neoliberalism, privatization, and corruption. Thanks to its tremendous capacity to mobilize and put people on the streets, the indigenous movement emerged as the lynchpin. Many elements of the traditional left, which had been in disarray as a result of the weakening of organized labor and the fall of the Berlin Wall, had gravitated towards the indigenous movement. The birth of Pachakutik and the CONAIE's central role in that process was a manifestation of this shift.

While the indigenous movement, particularly in the Highlands, had historical roots in the Marxist and socialist left, its self-definition as an ethnic movement concerned with cultural issues and cultural survival as well as class and economic issues, precluded the adoption of a rigid ideological framework. Instead, as Pallares (1997) argues, the movement developed an ideology that successfully linked ethnic and cultural issues with economic concerns. In the words of Miguel Lluco, indigenous leader and national coordinator of Pachaktuk: “The greatest strength of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement has been its ability to combine [into a single analysis] the social and economic dimensions of capitalist exploitation with the historical and cultural processes that have functioned to oppress our identity.”<sup>291</sup>

The indigenous movement’s decidedly non-dogmatic ideological stance was adopted by Pachakutik and allowed it to unite a diverse array of constituencies and issues. According to Paulina Palacios, an aide to indigenous leader Luis Macas, because Pachakutik began as a broad coalition, at the outset it did not possess a clear ideological orientation. At the time, some commentators derided the new movement for its eclectic make-up, referring to it as a *fanesca* (a traditional Lenten soup made with 12 legumes).<sup>292</sup> Due to its coalitional composition and the nature of its most important organizational member – the indigenous movement –, Pachakutik had a political agenda that combined broad inclusive policy goals, such as opposition to neoliberalism, with demands of concern to specific groups, in particular, indigenous peoples. The concerns of constituencies other than indigenous people were also

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<sup>291</sup> Lluco 2000

<sup>292</sup> Paulina Palacios, author interview, March 2, 2000, Quito, Ecuador.

addressed by Pachakutik's congressional delegation, but the most important group was without question the indigenous. Thus, Pachakutik sought to advance a broad progressive agenda for the nation, while not losing sight of demands from specific groups.

Previous to the formation of Pachakutik, CONAIE had also been attempting to juggle addressing the specific demands of the indigenous community with advocacy of a broad national political platform. During the late 1980s CONAIE was dedicated almost exclusively to pressing indigenous demands, but by the mid-1990s the movement had emerged as a national political player and sought to have a say in a much broader array of issues beyond the indigenous agenda. CONAIE's "Political Project", published in 1994, laid out a broad, in some ways, revolutionary vision for the country. This statement of long-range goals rejected the Ecuadorian state in its existing form as "exclusionary, hegemonic, antidemocratic and repressive," and proposed the construction of an alternative, "new pluralist and participatory nation," based on a utopian vision of a nation free from poverty and discrimination and in which the cultural values of all Ecuador's ethnic and cultural groups would be valued and respected.<sup>293</sup> While the document had a revolutionary tone to it, the movement was practical in the ways it sought to advance its agenda, taking advantage of political openings and not rejecting opportunities for more piecemeal reform. The decision to enter the electoral arena was seen as yet another means of advancing the movement's agenda and the position of indigenous people within Ecuadorian society. On the eve of Pachakutik's founding, CONAIE leader and future congresswoman, Nina Pacari,

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<sup>293</sup> CONAIE. Consejo de Gobierno 1994: 5-7.

declared: “For the indigenous movement the decision to participate in elections is not an end in itself but a means to achieve society’s recognition of the indigenous nationalities and to advance the construction of the Plurinational State...”<sup>294</sup>

During the late 1980s and early 1990s protest proved to be a potent tool in indigenous hands. As discussed in Chapter 4, the movement won some important concessions from the state during this period, including the establishment of a bilingual education program for indigenous communities, which was run and financed through the state but with indigenous control. A march and occupation of a central park in Quito by Amazonian Indians in 1992 resulted in the demarcation and granting of land titles to large tracks of land to native Amazonian tribes. In 1994 the indigenous movement yet again employed the tactic of the uprising and forced the government to stop passage of and renegotiate a controversial agrarian law. Then in 1995, together with other social movements, they succeeded in swaying public opinion against an administration-led referendum that would have paved the way politically for privatization of most state-owned enterprises.

Given that protest tactics were working, at least to some extent, a pertinent question to ask is whether involvement in formal politics increased the movement’s ability to advance its programmatic agenda, or not? The potential advantages to direct involvement in local politics are clearer. In areas with proportionally large indigenous populations the possibility of holding executive power and thereby achieving the capacity to make substantial changes and shift power dynamics existed. However, the advantages of participation as a minority party in congress were not as evident, and

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<sup>294</sup> Diario Hoy 1996j.



there was the risk that involvement in this arena could divert energies from social movement activities.

There are several ways a minority party can use its direct representation in congress to advance a programmatic agenda. First of all, it can introduce legislation and attempt to get bills passed; they can also try to block legislation they oppose. Additionally, seats in congress offer an insider vantage point from which to monitor governmental actions and the development of new legislation. Finally, Ecuadorian legislators also have the responsibility and powers to *fiscalizar*, or oversee, monitor, and investigate other branches of government and governmental agencies with an eye towards exposing and prosecuting corruption and mismanagement. This is another area in which a minority party had the potential to play a significant role.

While Pachakutik's minority status did not permit it to set the congressional agenda, if we compare the indigenous movement's ability to introduce and shape national legislation previous to and after the creation of Pachakutik, the record indicates that direct participation in congress did increase the movement's influence on legislative outcomes, at least to a modest degree. Previous to 1996 CONAIE drafted several legislative proposals on different issues of concern to their constituency and formally presented them to congress in hopes of getting them passed. These included, among others, a new version of the Agrarian Reform Law and a series of constitutional changes dealing with indigenous peoples' status and rights.<sup>295</sup> As early as 1990, during the first indigenous uprising, CONAIE proposed the idea of convening a national constituent assembly. Not one of these three proposals was ever

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<sup>295</sup> Diario Hoy 1995a.

taken up by congress; they were simply filed away. In the case of the agrarian reform law proposal, some of the movement's concerns and proposals were eventually incorporated into a new law passed in 1994, but only after the indigenous movement had carried out a major national uprising to protest the passage of a bill that had been drawn up without their input and that responded exclusively the interests of large commercial landowners. The movement's proposals for constitutional change were not addressed until Pachakutik lobbied for them during the National Constituent Assembly of 1997-1998. In other words, lobbying congress and working through established political parties had not proven effective for CONAIE in getting its interests addressed and proposals taken seriously by the legislature. The only way the movement had of making its voice heard and influencing national policy was by carrying out massive popular protests and demanding that the executive branch negotiate directly with the movement. Some significant gains had indeed been made through protest and negotiation, but it was a costly strategy both for the movement, as well as for the nation, and it only garnered the movement influence on specific issues, as opposed to a range of policy matters.

After Pachakutik's formation, the movement continued to use social protest as a way of pressuring congress and the executive branch to address movement demands. In certain instances this proved effective in getting the legislature to address some of Pachakutik's proposals. But with or without social protest, Pachakutik's presence in congress meant that social movement voices, positions, and proposals were part of the legislative deliberations in a way they had not been before. The movement's ability to propose and shape legislation increased qualitatively with Pachakutk's founding and

the election of its deputies to congress. While a majority of the bills Pachakutik sponsored between 1996 and 2001 did not become law, there were several that did pass, and this was far more than had been the case previously. In addition, Pachakutik deputies were able to monitor bills going through the legislature. In some cases they were able to have some influence on the drafting process. This is not to say that by founding Pachakutik social movements had suddenly succeeded in becoming equal players in shaping national policy; the degree of influence they could exert was limited due to their relatively small delegations, but it did increase in relation to the pre-Pachakutik period.

For the first two terms in which Pachakutik had representatives in congress (1996-1998 and 1998-2002) its delegations were relatively small.<sup>296</sup> However the highly fragmented nature of the Ecuadorian legislature made it possible for these delegations to have an impact in spite of their size. Working in coalition with other parties, Pachakutik got some important legislation passed regarding issues in all three of its programmatic areas, and it used its congressional oversight powers to investigate and prosecute corruption. For example, Pachakutik was directly involved in drafting some important bills that eventually became law and that had a direct impact on indigenous and rural communities. Pachakutik, of course, had to negotiate with other parties in order to get these bills passed, and that meant that the final versions were the result of compromise. However, the important thing is that Pachakutik representatives were directly involved in the legislative process and, therefore, had a measure of

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<sup>296</sup> From 1996-1998 they had six representatives out of a total of eighty-two deputies, and from 1998-2002 they held six of 121 seats. At some point in 2000 or 2001 two members of the bloc defected, which reduced its number to only four.

influence on this legislation. One such bill was the Parish Councils Law,<sup>297</sup> which defined the structure, jurisdiction, and powers of a new level of local government: the rural parish councils. The establishment of this first layer of local government was significant in shifting governing power over rural villages from central government and town authorities to the rural communities themselves. It served to further strengthen a long historical process of indigenous community emancipation from mestizo and white political authority that began with the agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973.

Another important piece of legislation that Pachakutik worked on was a new body of law on water use, known as the “Water Law”.<sup>298</sup> This is an extremely important body of law that will establish the juridical structure for the distribution and use of this precious resource, including both irrigation, as well as, potable water. It is an issue of great concern and interest for small farmers, indigenous among them, as it directly impacts on their chances for survival. As of this writing, this major piece of legislation has not yet been approved by congress.

Appendix 1 contains a list all the bills sponsored by Pachakutik representatives between 1996 and May 2001.<sup>299</sup> The bills are categorized by the term in which they were presented and the type of constituency interests they addressed. I break the bills down into three categories, those that are aimed at the level of national policy; those that are targeted towards a particular sector, such as indigenous people, rural populations, or a specific locality or province; and finally, “particularistic” refers to

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<sup>297</sup> In Spanish, *Ley de Juntas Parroquiales*.

<sup>298</sup> In Spanish, *Ley de Aguas*.

<sup>299</sup> May 2001 is when I conducted my search in the congressional database for bills.

those bills that were written with a specific person or very narrow group of people in mind. Figures 1 and 2 summarize breakdown by type of bills during both periods. In Figure 1, which displays the breakdown for the first legislative period (1996-1998), one observes that Pachakutik legislators sponsored a total of twenty-three bills, 48 percent (eleven bills) of which addressed national level issues, 17 percent (four bills) of which focused on indigenous or rural issues, 13 percent (three bills) were local or provincial in nature, and 17 percent (four bills) could be classified as particularistic. During the 1998-2002 term I was unable to gather complete information beyond May 2001, but up to that point there were a total of twenty-five bills sponsored by Pachakutik legislators, of which 32 percent (eight bills) were national in nature, another 32 percent (eight bills) focused on indigenous or rural issues, 24 percent (six bills) addressed local or provincial concerns, and 12 percent (three bills) of them I was unable to classify due to limited information. In addition to bills formally introduced by May 2001, there were others in the works, including three national laws, four major pieces of legislation on indigenous issues, and at least two locally focused bills.





Figure 1: MUPP-NP Legislative Initiatives 1996-1998



**Figure 2: MUPP-NP Legislative Initiatives 1998-2001**

A comparison of the two periods suggests a shift in emphasis from the first to the next away from nationally focused legislation, which had been the main thrust during the 1996-1998 period, to a greater emphasis during the second on indigenous and rural issues. This was probably due in part to the sharp decrease in the relative size of the delegation during the 1998-2002 term. While constitutional changes expanded the size of Congress from 82 to 121, Pachakutik's delegation decreased from eight during the second half of 1996-1998, to six after the 1998 elections, and finally to just four during the latter half of the second period.<sup>300</sup> This meant that Pachakutik's share of legislative seats decreased from almost 10 percent (1997-1998),<sup>301</sup> to 5 percent (1998-2000), to just over 3 percent (2000-2002). But beyond the issue of delegation size and therefore influence, the apparent shift in legislative initiatives can also be attributed to the increasing dominance of CONAIE within the political organization and to pressure from the indigenous bases for more immediate and visible gains. None of the individual Pachakutik legislators who served during the first term (1996-1998) were re-elected. In the case of the indigenous legislators,<sup>302</sup> the interpretation offered by people in Pachakutik was that by focusing to such a large extent on national-level issues, they had not done enough to nurture their local constituencies, and that in response their indigenous bases had not come out in sufficient numbers.

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<sup>300</sup> The reduction by two after 2000 was due to the disaffiliations of Kaiser Arévalo and Miguel Pérez.

<sup>301</sup> This was after Pachakutik recovered the two seats it had lost at the beginning due to the defection of Aviles and Villamil.

<sup>302</sup> Miguel Lluco and Luis Macas were two of the most prominent indigenous leaders at the national level and it was somewhat of a surprise that they were not reelected.



Seemingly learning this lesson, three of Pachakutik's provincial representatives serving from 1998-2002, Talahua, Posso, and Grefa sponsored a greater number of bills that addressed issues and problems specific to the provinces they were elected to represent. Likewise, in my interview with Talahua it was clear that a great deal of his time and energy was devoted to attending to the needs of his province, not only in terms of legislation, but also with regard to investigation and oversight of local authorities. He also mentioned helping to put together a long-term development plan for his province and devoting time to party and organization building. So clearly the message got through after Pachakutik's first foray in congress, that provincial representatives had to devote time and energy to addressing local issues and to remaining visible in their provinces if they were going to remain viable political candidates at that level. Thus these social movement politicians were not exempt from the pressures faced by provincial politicians from other parties to address local issues, sometimes over national ones.

The bills introduced by Pachakutik, however, represent only a partial view of the movement's congressional activity during these years. The following section attempts to round out this view by discussing other aspects of the party's work in congress during these two periods.

### **1996-1998 – The Perils of Co-optation: Pachakutik and Bucaram**

The first test of Pachakutik's coherence and programmatic consistency came immediately after its formation and participation in the 1996 race. Having won nearly 20 percent of the national vote in its debut presidential run, Pachakutik's votes became

the coveted object of the two candidates to face off in the presidential run-off. According to press reports at the time, the two contending parties – PRE and PSC – went to great lengths to obtain the backing of the indigenous movement in particular. According to an editorialist from one of the major dailies, “there were few groups who were so solicited and tempted as were the indigenous peoples. The finalists [for the presidency] offered them everything from convening a constituent assembly to the presidency of congress.”<sup>303</sup> These sorts of political temptations put any political organization to the test, but all the more so an inchoate one like Pachakutik, which had so recently been formed as a loose coalition and at the time did not yet possess a structured organization with clear internal rules or lines of decision-making. The high level of pressure combined with Pachakutik’s organizational weakness could have easily destroyed the incipient organization, but the new movement/party responded in a coherent and politically consistent way, demonstrating from the outset a strong commitment to its political principles and a long-term vision.

Shortly after the first round, on May 29, 1996, MUPP-NP held a national assembly to assess the outcome of the elections and discuss strategy. At that time member organizations arrived at a consensus not to offer their support to either of the presidential candidates, neither of whom held political positions even remotely close to those of the organization. Not only was Pachakutik’s progressive platform very different from those of the right-wing PSC and the populist PRE parties, but the campaign it ran had stressed the contrast between this new movement and traditional political parties, criticizing the latter as corrupt and incapable of representing the vast

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<sup>303</sup> Albornoz Tinajero 1996.

majority of Ecuador's poor. It would have been highly inconsistent for them to jump into the fray and offer their support to one of these two parties.

But Pachakutik's ability to maintain organizational discipline was not perfect. In direct contravention of the movement party's decision, Valerio Grefa, at that time the president of the Amazonian indigenous confederation, CONFENIAE, accepted overtures from the PRE and threw his support behind populist presidential candidate, Abdalá Bucaram.<sup>304</sup> Both Pachakutik and CONAIE publicly criticized Grefa. Freddy Ehlers claimed in statements to the press that Grefa had been bought off by Bucaram.<sup>305</sup> At that point, Grefa, who had been one of the chief proponents of CONAIE's involvement in electoral politics, attempted to break the new party apart, but he was unsuccessful. Grefa eventually returned to Pachakutik and in 1998 made a successful bid for congress on the Pachakutik ticket.

But unity problems did not end there. Immediately upon taking office, Bucaram created a ministerial post on indigenous affairs and offered it to CONAIE's vice president, Amazonian indigenous leader, Rafael Pandam. The creation of a government post of this type over which the movement had no input or authority was viewed as a threat to its unity and autonomy. CONAIE strongly opposed it and forbade its leaders from accepting the post. But Pandam went ahead anyway. In December 1996 Pandam, then Minister of Ethnic Groups, apparently at that behest of Bucaram himself, showed up at CONAIE's National Congress and attempted to hijack the organization's internal election process and manipulate it so that the top

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<sup>304</sup> Diario Hoy 1996c.

<sup>305</sup> Diario Hoy 1996n.

leadership post would go to someone who could be bought off by Bucaram.

Eyewitnesses claimed that Pandam gave out money, presumably to buy votes in these internal organizational elections.<sup>306</sup> Due largely to this intervention, the meeting broke down into a fighting match as the Amazonian and Highland delegations vied for control of the organization. The congress was cut short with two sets of opposing leadership each claiming control of the organization. It appeared at the time that CONAIE had been destroyed, however, in the wake of Bucaram's ouster in February 1999 unity between the regions was restored. It is hard to know what might have been the fate of CONAIE if Bucaram had not been thrown out of office when he was.

Not only did the Bucaram administration make serious inroads in dividing CONAIE, it used similar tactics with Pachakutik. As is typical in Ecuador, Bucaram won the presidency without a working majority in the legislature. In order to put together a working majority, his party, the PRE, literally bought off legislators from different parties, including two from Pachakutik: Villamil and Aviles.<sup>307</sup> According a newspaper report at the time, "The Bucaram government, in pure *velasquista*<sup>308</sup> style, is giving out quotas to legislators in the provinces in exchange for their votes for those who are heading the lists."<sup>309</sup> In exchange for their defection Villamil and Aviles were given economic perks and seats on important legislative committees. They remained government collaborators in congress till the Bucaram administration was overthrown

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<sup>306</sup> Informal conversation with Juan Aulestia, Quito, February 6, 2000. See also *Diario Hoy* 1996g.

<sup>307</sup> *Diario Hoy* 1996m.

<sup>308</sup> This is a reference to Ecuador's long-standing populist president, José María Velasco Ibarra.

<sup>309</sup> *Diario Hoy* 1996e.

in February 1997.<sup>310</sup> Pachakutik eventually regained these two seats after Bucaram's ouster.

After these two defections, Pachakutik's delegation held together during Bucaram's tumultuous seven-month reign despite continuous, overt attempts by the administration to divide the movement, buy off its leaders, and break up the movement's base. Pachakutik initially attempted to negotiate with Bucaram, hoping to extract assurances that his administration would respect the autonomy of the indigenous movement and its organizations in exchange for conditional support for government appointments. But it quickly became apparent that this strategy was dangerous and futile. Pachakutik demanded that the administration halt its plans to create a Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, which CONAIE viewed correctly as a government attempt to co-opt the indigenous grassroots and thereby wrest power from indigenous organizations. According to press reports at the time, Pachakutik agreed to vote for the government's nominees for attorney general and comptroller in exchange for administration assurances that it would not go ahead with the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs. Part of the deal they attempted to strike with Bucaram included the appointment of hundreds of indigenous leaders to *teniencias políticas*.<sup>311</sup> The Pachakutik congressional bloc followed through on its end of the deal, voting to approve government nominees. In the end, however, bargaining with Bucaram

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<sup>310</sup> Diario Hoy 1996d; Tibanlombo 1997.

<sup>311</sup> Diario Hoy 1996l. *Tenientes políticos* were political appointees who served as the central government's representatives and administrators at the local level. Because they were not directly elected but instead appointed by the central government, local residents often resented them. This post was done away with after the Parish Councils Law was enacted.

backfired. Bucaram did not uphold his end of the bargain<sup>312</sup> and the new movement-party was roundly criticized in the press and other sectors for negotiating with and supporting the president. This incident also led to a split between Freddy Ehlers and the Pachakutik congressional bloc.<sup>313</sup>

After two months of trying to negotiate with Bucaram, Pachakutik joined the opposition; the split between Bucaram and the indigenous movement was complete.<sup>314</sup> From that point on Pachakutik became a vocal critic of the administration and its neoliberal economic policies, in particular. The party led the fight in congress against government proposals for changes to the Energy Law and put Bucaram's energy minister on trial.<sup>315</sup> Pachakutik was part of the ideologically broad coalition of parties that organized to bloc the president's economic proposals and eventually voted to remove him from office in February 1997 in response to massive social protests in which the indigenous movement played a central part.<sup>316</sup> Bucaram had greatly overestimated his ability to co-opt and control the indigenous movement. In the end, the movement, together with a wide array of social actors, brought the president down by taking to the streets. Pachakutik played an important role in congress in the president's ouster and emerged stronger for it and with more political capital.

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<sup>312</sup> Despite promises to the contrary, Bucaram went ahead and created the polemical ministry and named Pandam to head it.

<sup>313</sup> Diario Hoy 1996f.

<sup>314</sup> Diario Hoy 1996a.

<sup>315</sup> Diario Hoy 1996l.

<sup>316</sup> Diario Hoy 1997d.

### 1997-1998 – Post-Bucaram and the National Assembly

After Bucaram's ouster, Pachkutik continued to participate in the broad coalition of parties that voted to remove the president. Pachakutik supported the appointment of Fabián Alarcón as interim president.<sup>317</sup> Alarcón was not a progressive and turned out to be just as corrupt as Bucaram, so Pachakutik's support for him was not consistent with the movement's ideological principles, but it appeared to reflect a growing political savvy about how to maneuver in congress. At the beginning of the 1996-1997 congressional session Pachakutik had been effectively locked out of seats on congressional committees, due in large part to its inexperience and naiveté in congressional deal making.<sup>318</sup> But after forming part of the majority coalition that appointed Alarcón and once the two deputies who had deserted Pachakutik were removed from their positions and replaced by Pachakutik alternates, the movement was able to demand and get its proper share of committee seats. Whereas during the first year Pachakutik held a single seat on a new and fairly inconsequential committee,<sup>319</sup> after February 1997 this increased to the presidency on three separate committees.<sup>320</sup> Among these was the important Investigative Commission. Under the leadership of Pachakutik congressman, Napoleón Saltos, this committee led the way in investigating the morass of corruption charges against former government officials in

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<sup>317</sup> Diario Hoy 1997b.

<sup>318</sup> Moreno Mendoza 1996.

<sup>319</sup> Luis Macas was a member of the Comisión de Gestión Pública (Public Management). See Moreno Mendoza 1996.

<sup>320</sup> Napoleón Saltos was president of the powerful Comisión de Fiscalización (Investigation and Oversight); and Miguel Lluco served as president of the Comisión de Asuntos Indígenas (Indigenous Affairs); and Miguel López Moreno served as president of the Comisión de Salud y Saneamiento Ambiental (Health and Environment).

the Bucaram administration and congresspersons who had collaborated with the administration. As a result of this committee's work, and in particular the leadership provided by Saltos and MPD deputy, Gustavo Terán, thirteen congressmen, including the two Pachakutik defectors, were formally charged and expelled from congress.<sup>321</sup> This was a significant achievement in a country where political corruption was rampant and often carried out with impunity.

Bucaram's fall from power represented a moment of great political opening in Ecuador, as one of the country's most powerful parties was forced out of office in the wake of massive popular protests. The denouement of Bucaram's ouster did not bring about a revolutionary break with the past. The political scene remained largely dominated by the traditional political establishment. But the legitimacy of the political system had been challenged and there was a need to reestablish it under new terms. The public was demanding changes. The existence of Pachakutik put indigenous and social movements in a better position to help shape and influence institutional change and events during this fluid period. Absent such a vehicle, social movement influence would undoubtedly have been much weaker.

One of the key developments that resulted from the 1997 crisis was the decision to hold a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. This had been an indigenous movement demand for a number of years, and once it was on the table Pachakutik took an active part in congressional deliberations about the scope of the assembly's powers, its composition, and functioning. Most of their proposals, however, lost out to those of the parties on the right. For example, on the question of

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<sup>321</sup> El Comercio 1997a; Tibanlombo 1997.



how assembly delegates should be chosen, Pachakutik and its member organizations proposed that a certain percentage be elected by popular vote, with the rest being appointed by a variety of governmental and civil society institutions.<sup>322</sup> This combination of corporatist-type mechanisms with popular elections was designed to insure the participation of new social actors who had long been excluded from participation in Ecuador's formal political institutions. The Pachakutik vision for the Assembly, as voiced by Pachakutik congressman, Napoleón Saltos, was one that would, "permit social actors new channels of representation, and in which fundamental issues would be resolved through means of a grand national agreement, which would, in turn, pave the way for the re-founding of the nation."<sup>323</sup> But traditional political parties, which held the largest share of seats in congress, opposed this proposal, because it would have lessened their influence in the assembly. In the end, all the delegates were elected by popular vote, with political parties playing a central role in putting together candidate slates. Not only this, but the electoral rules were majoritarian in nature: all seventy delegates were elected from provincial districts, as opposed to a single national district, and seats were distributed to individual candidates according to a plurality rule, as opposed to proportional representation. Pachakutik opposed both of these proposals and, instead, supported a system that would have included a percentage of nationally elected seats and a voting rule that would have allowed for greater minority representation.<sup>324</sup> They lost on all counts. While Pachakutik was unhappy with this outcome, they nevertheless

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<sup>322</sup> Diario Hoy 1997f.

<sup>323</sup> Diario Hoy 1997f.

<sup>324</sup> Diario Hoy 1997e.

participated in the elections and succeeded in winning seven of the seventy assembly seats, a full 10 percent, thus guaranteeing their ability to bargain and negotiate for some of the movement's desired policies from a minority position.

Frustration over the way the assembly elections were organized, with no space allocated for direct representation from civil society, led social movements to organize an alternative assembly. The tone at this alternative assembly was strident, and its very existence was a recognition that the official assembly, which the indigenous movement had pushed and worked for so tenaciously, was not going to be a forum for radical change. There was talk at the alternative assembly that it should take over the government, and threats were made that if their proposals were not taken into account at the official assembly there would be a popular uprising.<sup>325</sup> The same social movement organizations that were members of Pachakutik also played a leadership role in this alternative assembly, and they did so as Pachakutik was preparing to take part in the official assembly. This is a good example of how Pachakutik member organizations often carried out social movement actions simultaneously and parallel to what Pachakutik was doing within the formal political arena. In the best cases these parallel tracks complimented one another, but this was not always the case.

The victory by right-wing parties in designing the selection rules meant that the assembly from the outset was stacked in their favor. Parties on the center-left and left attempted to form a bloc within the assembly, but the results in terms of advancing a progressive agenda were mixed. According to one leftist scholar, progressive forces succeeded in advancing a rights agenda, including the recognition of collective rights

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<sup>325</sup> El Comercio 1997b.

for indigenous communities, but right-wing parties took the lead on the economy and representation, instituting changes that would make it possible to privatize the state sector and making changes to electoral law that reduced minority representation.<sup>326</sup>

The Pachakutik delegation focused its energies largely on making gains on their ethnic agenda, thus reflecting the centrality of the indigenous movement at its core. The symbolic centerpiece of Pachakutik's constitutional agenda was the inclusion in the preamble of a statement recognizing the pluri-national nature of the Ecuadorian nation. They did not succeed in getting the word "pluri-national" included, but they succeeded in negotiating a compromise whereby the nation was described as "pluri-cultural and multi-ethnic." So for the first time in Ecuador's history the existence of multiple ethnic groups was officially recognized in the Constitution.

Another important achievement was the recognition of collective rights for indigenous peoples. As Julio César Trujillo, a Pachakutik assembly delegate wrote: "The program that unites indigenous collectivities is one that demands from the state the guarantees and means to preserve, promote, and develop their identity; as well as, institutions that put an end to their exclusion from decisions that concern them directly and those that affect the destiny of all Ecuadorians."<sup>327</sup> Pachakutik had wanted the Constitution to give equal status to native indigenous languages on a par with Spanish. In this case, as well, a compromise position was reached. While native languages were not recognized as official languages on equal footing with Spanish, they were

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<sup>326</sup> Ayala Mora 2003.

<sup>327</sup> Trujillo 2000: 7. Translation by the author.

acknowledged as a fundamental part of Ecuador's cultural fabric and the right of indigenous people to conduct business with the state in their native tongue was established.

Another major achievement was constitutional recognition of indigenous populations as "indigenous peoples and nationalities." This new wording was integral to a process of reorganizing indigenous representation for legal and organizational purposes along ethnic lines as opposed to juridical and territorial boundaries. The project included redesigning indigenous organizations themselves along ethnic lines. Indigenous organizations, especially those in the Highlands, had been shaped historically by legal requirements and state initiatives; the goal was to reverse this process by reconstructing and reinforcing ethnic identities that had been blurred and eroded during the five hundred year colonial history.

While a central focus, ethnic issues were not Pachakutik's sole focus in the constituent assembly. They also supported and participated in the drafting of articles designed to reduce government corruption. One of the main achievements in this area was the inclusion of a code of congressional ethics. Under the new rules legislators lost numerous patronage powers that they had possessed under the old constitution, and greater powers were granted to parties to keep their delegations in line. A newsletter from Nina Pacari's<sup>328</sup> office, described the intent of the ethic code:

...we [MUPP-NP] participated in drafting the Code of Ethics convinced that it is absolutely necessary to eradicate all the corrupt practices that have traditionally been exercised by [congressional] deputies, including party switching, vote buying, nepotism, doling out

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<sup>328</sup> Pacari served as a Pachakutik delegate to the Constituent Assembly in 1997 and then was elected to congress in 1998 as a national deputy.

posts and economic resources, deal-making, influence peddling, political bossism, etc. The Ethics Code will facilitate a qualitative improvement in the fundamental legislative tasks of law making and oversight; it will promote the proper accounting to society of legislators' actions.<sup>329</sup>

Yet another important constitutional reform backed by Pachakutik was the inclusion of a stipulation requiring congress to set campaign spending limits. Congress followed through and spending limits went into effect for the first time in 2000. By helping to level the playing field, these limits likely contributed to Pachakutik's success in the 2000 local elections.<sup>330</sup>

Despite these achievements, there were many in the indigenous and social movements who were profoundly disappointed and disillusioned with the outcome of the constituent assembly. They argued that while important strides were made in the area of indigenous rights, these gains were only partial and, even more importantly, the opportunity for a fundamental transformation the state as envisioned in CONAIE's political program document had been lost. An editorial published in an indigenous publication expresses this critical perspective: "In reality, the 1998 Constituent Assembly represented a profound defeat for the indigenous movement. In that arena the notion of governability, sustained epistemologically and politically by the powers that be..., monopolized all the available opportunities for discussion of pluri-nationality and political reform of the state."<sup>331</sup> Of course it would have been impossible for the indigenous movement to set the assembly's agenda given that

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<sup>329</sup> Consensos: Tercer Milenio n.d.: 2-3.

<sup>330</sup> In my interview with José María Cabascango he mentioned these limits as being an important factor in Pachakutik's electoral success in the 2000 local and provincial elections. José María Cabascango, author interview, Quito, June 1, 2000.

<sup>331</sup> Instituto Científico de Culturas Indígenas 2002.

weight held by parties on the right. There is a question though as to whether it was wise for the social movements to have pushed for the assembly at all, given the power of the right-wing parties to largely control the process. According to this view, the social movement members of Pachakutik may have been naïve when they pushed so ardently for the assembly.

### **1998-2002 – Pachakutik’s Second Term: Tensions Between Party and Movement**

In many ways a similar pattern to that observed in 1996, when the Pachakutik bloc began by trying to negotiate with the party in power only to reverse course and join the opposition, played itself out again in the 1998-2002 period. The 1998 delegation demonstrated more political acuity and skill at congressional wheeling and dealing than had the first, but they were also less ideologically consistent than those who preceded them. At the start of the new congressional session in 1998, the newly elected Pachakutik delegation in a surprise move formed a political pact with the governing center-right DP party and the rightist PSC. The alliance between these three ideologically incompatible parties gave President Mahuad a two-thirds congressional majority. According to press reports at the time, the goal of this alliance was to facilitate the drafting and passage of legislation required to put the provisions approved by the constituent assembly into effect. This was of great interest to the indigenous movement as there were constitutional articles that they wanted to see translated into law. So part of the justification behind this incongruous alliance was one of political expediency: participate in a majority coalition in order to expedite your specific agenda.

However, as is typical in Ecuadorian politics, the alliance did not endure; it unraveled in a couple of months. In the meantime, however, Pachakutik got some important things out of the arrangement. Because the alliance was made at the beginning of the congressional session, at the time when the makeup of committees was being decided and congressional officers were being elected, Pachakutik succeeded in getting its national deputy, indigenous congresswoman, Nina Pacari, elected to the post of second congressional vice-president. Not only that, but it got three of its six deputies onto committees, with one of them serving as president of the Committee on Indigenous Affairs.

This political maneuvering, which placed Pachakutik at odds with the other center-left and leftist parties, was highly controversial at the time, both within and outside the movement. There were many in the indigenous and social movements who were highly critical of Pacari. The criticism was two-fold, first that Pachakutik should avoid alliances with the right for ideological reasons, and secondly that Pacari and the bloc had not consulted about this move with the social movement organizations or the grassroots. Pacari justified her political deal-making and her assumption of the second vice-presidency as an important step in putting the principle of “plurinationality” into effect, in other words, having indigenous persons hold visible seats of power in government. She also argued that this would enable them to get the docket of secondary laws related to indigenous rights through congress, and

that the largest party in the opposition progressive bloc, the ID, had been unwilling to support these two demands, leading Pachakutik to abandon that bloc.<sup>332</sup>

Thus, for the moment it appeared that Pachakutik had abandoned its allegiance to the left and its broader anti-neoliberal agenda in exchange for improving its chances of getting the indigenous ethnic agenda addressed.<sup>333</sup> But this initial interpretation did not bear out. Within a few months the Pachakutik delegation rejoined the other center-left and leftist parties in opposing the right's proposals on tax reform. In response to the PSC's proposal to implement a 1 percent tax on all capital movements - a highly regressive tax - Pachakutik developed a comprehensive proposal for tax reform that included a much more progressive tax code, criminal sanctions for tax evaders, proposals for improving tax collection, and special taxes on luxury vehicles, among other things.<sup>334</sup> Their proposal did not prosper, and the PSC's one percent tax was approved at the end of 1998.

1999 opened with one of the worst financial and banking crises in Ecuador's history and the Mahuad administration responded by taking extremely anti-popular measures at the same time that he bailed out private banks at taxpayers' expense.<sup>335</sup> In response to the government's austerity measures, fuel increases, and the freezing of depositors' assets, the country erupted in massive social protests in March and July of 1999. As usual, the indigenous movement was at the forefront of these protests, and in congress the Pachakutik delegation remained in the opposition. In the months preceding the banking crisis CONAIE had been in dialogue with the Mahuad

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<sup>332</sup> Levoyer 1998.

<sup>333</sup> Ponce 1998.

<sup>334</sup> Consensos: Tercer Milenio n.d.: 3-4.

<sup>335</sup> For an excellent analysis of the roots of this crisis see North 2004.



administration, but after the measures taken by the government in March, this position was no longer tenable and CONAIE joined in and helped lead massive anti-government protests that included a diverse array of social actors including many who normally did not take part in social protests, such as taxi drivers. According to a bulletin produced by congresswoman Pacari's office, the protestors in March took up several proposals contained in Pachakutik's tax reform bill and included them in their list of demands. As a result, "the different political sectors in congress, including the government itself (except the Social Christians and the PRE), have been forced to take into account the proposals that we [Pachakutik] have been making since the end of last year, and which the social sectors demanded during the protest actions in March as the last option for a just solution to the crisis."<sup>336</sup> Important components of Pachakutik's proposed tax reform bill were ultimately included in a 1999 public finance law.

Anti-government protests in July of 1999 were massive; the indigenous movement played a central role in negotiating an end to the standoff. Whereas in the round of negotiations that brought about an end to the March protests the indigenous movement had focused its energies on pressing for a government response to indigenous demands, in June they pressed the government for changes and reforms that had significance for all Ecuadorians. In June the indigenous movement emerged as the government's key negotiating partner, and its negotiators succeeded in getting the government to roll back price increases on gasoline, cooking gas, electricity, and telephone service, and to commit to freezing these prices for a year. This victory was wildly popular and the indigenous movement was largely credited with forcing

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<sup>336</sup> Consensos: Tercer Milenio n.d.: 4.

Mahuad to back down and at the same time with bringing about a peaceful end to the crisis.

A month after the resolution of the July protests Pachakutik held its first national congress. It is significant that it was held, as it was, on the heels of the indigenous movement's success in leading national popular protests against a highly unpopular government. Given the movement's profile as a leader of this broad progressive popular coalition, it is not surprising that at this first national party congress the movement decided to clarify its ideological position. It was resolved that Pachakutik should only form alliances with parties at the center and to the left of the ideological spectrum. One of the resolutions that came out of this congress declares, "the absolute independence of the Movement of Plurinational Unity-Pachakutik and all its component parts, the congressional bloc, local authorities, social movements, and other sectors and militants, [and the implementation of] a policy of radical confrontation with the neoliberal economic model and by extension the national government."<sup>337</sup> At this congress, criticisms were leveled at the congressional bloc and Pacari, in particular, for their temporary alliance with the government and the right-wing PSC. Some delegates went so far as to call for Pacari's resignation. Most delegates considered any alliances with the right as dangerous and counterproductive, even those that appeared to be motivated by valid pragmatic goals. Motivated by these criticisms, the MUPP-NP congress sought to increase the lines of accountability and the level of coordination between the congressional bloc, the member organizations, and the party's national leadership. A protocol was approved to ensure

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<sup>337</sup> MUPP-NP 2000c.

that the congressional bloc developed its strategies in consultation with Pachakutik's national coordinator and the social movements. The national governing body also stipulated that half of Pachakutik legislative deputies' paid staff should be appointed by the national Pachakutik office.<sup>338</sup>

So at this congress party members rejected the "pragmatic" strategy of making political alliances for the purpose of advancing the ethnic agenda or increasing token representation of indigenous people in high government posts, at the expense of a strong and ideologically clear voice on broader national policy issues. Instead, the movement sought to promote greater ideological consistency and to position itself as an advocate of policies and issues, not just of concern to the indigenous population, but to all the popular sectors. Pachakutik's definition as a national popular movement on the left was in line with the direction CONAIE was also heading in at the time and was not to be sacrificed for a narrower sectoral agenda.

It is worth noting that Pachakutik's and the indigenous movement's position in Ecuador was different than the one taken by certain sectors of the Bolivian indigenous movement in the early 1990s. Whereas Pachakutik and CONAIE were ultimately unwilling to back down in their opposition to neoliberal economic policies in exchange for greater indigenous representation in government, the opposite position was taken by sectors of the Bolivian indigenous movement in the early 1990s when indigenous leader Victor Hugo Cárdenas agreed to join Sánchez de Lozada's ticket as his vice presidential running mate. Sánchez de Lozada and Cárdenas won the election,

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<sup>338</sup> MUPP-NP 2000c.

and during their four-year term the Lozada administration implemented an aggressive neoliberal program, accompanied by social policies aimed at blunting the impact of the economic adjustment on the poor. Indigenous political participation was given a boost, not just by Cárdenas's role as vice president, but by the other major political program enacted under the Lozada administration, decentralization. While Cárdenas was not simply a token, and the decentralization policy was politically empowering for indigenous peoples at the local level, the overall economic policies enacted by this administration did much to undermine the power of organized labor and ultimately hurt the poor. In a certain sense, Cárdenas's participation in this government represented a decision by some of the indigenous leadership to opt for representation and participation in exchange for their acquiescence on neoliberal reform.

Despite the effort to define and align ideological positions between the social movements and their political wing, movement-party relations were not always harmonious or on parallel tracks. Less than five months after Pachakutik's first party congress the commitment of the social movement sponsors to their party heir was thrown into doubt by the tumultuous events surrounding January 21, 2000. During the fall of 1999, CONAIE and the national social movement umbrella organization, CMS, continued to exert pressure on the government to follow through on the July agreements. But frustration continued to grow as the economic crisis worsened and the government failed to take steps to soften its impact on the population.

The cauldron of popular anger boiled over when revelations came out that Mahuad, in his bid for the presidency, had received an unreported donation of three million dollars from one of Ecuador's most powerful bankers, Fernando Aspiazu.

This was viewed by the majority of citizens as proof enough that the government was in bed with the banking sector, and that its decision to bailout this sector had not been undertaken with the public's interest at heart, but instead to protect narrow, powerful interests. Riding the tide of popular anger and frustration, towards the end of 1999 the social and indigenous movements announced a radical call for the dissolution of all three branches of government - executive, legislative and judicial.

Needless to say, this put Pachakutik's congressional bloc in a difficult position as they were part of one of the three branches of government that their social movement sponsors were demanding be disbanded. While agreeing with CONAIE's analysis of the grave crisis facing the country, several Pachakutik representatives expressed frustration that the movement had lumped them together with all other legislators into the category of "corrupt politicians".<sup>339</sup> The reticence of all but one of the Pachakutik legislators<sup>340</sup> to participate in the marches and street protests that led up to the January 21 takeover, or to officially renounce their congressional seats was viewed as opportunistic by the CONAIE leadership and many in the rank and file.

A tension between radical and reformist strategies had been longstanding within the indigenous movement, and it did not disappear with the formation of Pachakutik. The radical tendency, which surfaced from time to time, held that real change was not possible under existing political conditions, and that more

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<sup>339</sup> These comments are based on the author's interviews with three of the six Pachakutik congressional representatives serving from 1998-2002: Nina Pacari, Quito, February 3, 2000; Miguel Pérez, Quito, February 3, 2000; and Antonio Posso, Quito, February 1, 2000.

<sup>340</sup> The exception was Congressman Gilberto Talahua from Bolivar.

fundamental societal and political change was needed.<sup>341</sup> Those who held this position tended to view electoral participation instrumentally. In some ways the push and pull between these two approaches became more problematic after the formation of an electoral vehicle, and it was particularly nettlesome for Pachakutik's congressional representatives. When movement leadership became frustrated with the inability to implement change through its elected officials, it returned to movement protest strategies of pressure from without. But when the level of protest reached the point where the demands being made were for radical structural change, as they did in January 2000, then the two sets of strategies no longer appeared compatible.

Not only did Pachakutik deputies face problems within the movement, they bore the brunt of the fallout from this collision in strategies. On the one hand, CONAIE and the other social movements lumped them together with the rest of the "corrupt politicians" and demanded that they resign their posts in congress. On the other hand, in the aftermath of January 21 they faced serious challenges to their standing in the national legislature as well. In the months following the assumption of the presidency by Gustavo Noboa,<sup>342</sup> in an attempt to remove the Pachakutik delegation and a few other deputies who had participated in one way or another with what transpired on January 21, right-wing parties sought to charge them with participating in actions that violated the constitution. In the end they did not succeed, and Pachakutik's small delegation retained their seats. Likewise, during the months

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<sup>341</sup> It should be noted that the radical tendency within the movement never included those who advocated the use of violence. The Ecuadorian indigenous movement never advocated nor engaged in armed struggle.

<sup>342</sup> After Mahuad was forced out of office and the day after the dramatic takeover of congress and the National Palace by indigenous leaders and renegade military officers, Mahuad's vice president, Gustavo Noboa, assumed the presidency.

after the denouement of January 21 social movement strategy shifted away from radicalism and back toward electoral participation in anticipation of the May 2000 local elections. But this incident exemplified some of the tensions and difficulties that can emerge for social movement-based parties when protest strategies collide with those of participation in formal electoral politics.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter sought to explore two questions related to Pachakutik's participation in the Ecuadorian national legislature: to what extent did movement party representatives act in a programmatically and ideologically coherent way; and to what degree did participation in congress serve to advance the goals and interests of the movements that spawned the party. The responses to both questions are mixed and complex.

As regards ideological coherence and party discipline, Pachakutik did not fit the mold of a highly disciplined European parliamentary party, but neither could it be located on the other end of the spectrum where parties are simply vehicles for individual politician's careers and have little if any ideological coherence. The party's performance during its first several years fits somewhere in the middle. Pachakutik experienced a rate of defection from its ranks by legislators that was about average for Ecuador. The group of legislators that remained within the party, however, acted, for the most part, in concert as they attempted to advance specific group and programmatic interests. There were incidents when the bloc betrayed the movement's broad ideological precepts, the most notable one being in 1998 when they entered into

a political pact with the center and right-wing DP and PSC parties. However, this ideological inconsistency could be attributed to attempts to respond to competing agendas, rather than to a willingness to seek personal gain through corrupt practices. In other words, the deal that the Pachakutik delegation believed it was striking in 1998 when it entered into this political pact was one in which laws of interest and concern to indigenous communities would be enacted in exchange for the party facilitating control of congress to these two parties of the center and the right. It was a Faustian bargain that in the end did not last. It is also important to note that this strategy was sharply criticized internally and resulted in the organization clarifying at its first party congress its position as a party on left, and setting ground rules for alliance making with other parties that emphasized upholding this ideological position. The majority of the time Pachakutik worked with and coordinated its actions in Congress with other political parties on the left and center-left of the ideological spectrum.

Where the impact of pressures from the broader political culture on Pachakutik legislative behavior was most evident was in relation to the amount of attention devoted by provincial representatives to local issues. The first group of Pachakutik legislators (1996-1998) focused the majority of their attention on national issues and legislation, as opposed to local and provincial matters; they appeared to pay a political price for this. In response, the second cohort increased its attention to provincial matters, a shift that can be observed in the distribution of types of legislation drafted by Pachakutik legislators during the two periods.

Constitutional changes, which Pachakutik helped to enact, aimed at redirecting legislators' energies from local patronage issues to a focus on national issues in their



legislative and oversight functions. In spite of these changes, the nature of the Ecuadorian electorate and the structure of electoral districts combined to penalize legislators who neglected addressing provincial issues and concerns. This was just as true for Pachakutik legislators as it was for those from other parties. However, the type of relationships that most Pachakutik elected representatives, and in particular those from the Highland provinces, developed with the localities they were representing were distinct from those of traditional parties. In the first place, there was the accountability of many of the legislators to the provincial organizations that had sponsored them. Secondly, because Pachakutik candidates tended to come from the middle and lower classes, they did not have the access to wealth and power required to develop more traditional power bases built upon patronage and clientelism. In this sense, while there was attention to local issues, generally this did not degenerate into or serve to perpetuate patterns of clientelistic politics. The reason for this is found in the role played by the indigenous movement organizations.

The final section of this chapter discussed the tensions that arose at different points between the social movements and Pachakutik. These conflicts were not ideological in nature but stemmed from differences over strategy, and I would argue, reflected an implicit view held by some in the movement that a Pachakutik presence in congress was not particularly effective or worth defending. I would argue that this was partly a problem of perception but also reflected Pachakutik's limited influence as a small minority party in a legislature dominated by center-right and right-wing parties. The perception problem has to do with the fact that congressional politics in multi-party systems, like Ecuador's, by definition requires a great deal of negotiation

and compromise, which from a social movement perspective may give the appearance of being part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The tradeoff Pachakutik had to negotiate was one that is common for minority, ideologically-driven parties; it is a choice between maintaining an ideologically pure position, which often leads to marginalization, or engaging in brokering with other parties so as to gain some things in exchange for other concessions. The risk of the latter strategy, in particular for Pachakutik, was that it would appear to be behaving similarly to traditional political parties.

I think it can be argued that Pachakutik was fairly effective at advancing legislation related to indigenous issues, and that the party's presence in congress led to an improvement in the movement's ability to introduce and participate in the drafting of legislation compared with what had been possible relying solely on protest tactics. The passage of the Parish Councils Law is one of the best examples of a significant piece of legislation that the party played a central role in drafting, negotiating, and shepherding through the legislative process. However, the small legislative presence was not nearly as effective at blocking or impacting economic policy. At those moments, like January 2000, when the focus was on the national government and national policymaking, and when the social movements' position was so diametrically opposed to the powers controlling the executive and legislative branches, then the work of the legislative bloc in congress no longer appeared relevant or important.

This chapter has served to illuminate some of the constraints placed on social movement parties representing the poor in their efforts to effect change and impact politics in the legislative arena. As Panebianco (1988) argues, for any party a balance

needs to be struck between policy aims and organizational needs, survival and success.

How these agendas compete becomes particularly clear in the legislative arena where relevance and success requires a certain amount of compromise on ideology.

Likewise, Pachakutik legislators had to struggle with the tradeoff between supplying their local constituencies with selective incentives versus pursuing broader collective goals. In the end, the balance that Pachakutik struck during these first several years was one that remained committed to pursuing the collective goals. The reason the scales tipped in this direction was primarily due to the organic connection to the social movement organizations.

## Chapter 7

### Small Villages, Big Opportunities: Pachakutik in Local Politics

Through the vote I believe we as indigenous people and as a movement have succeeded first of all in getting others to respect our right to participate directly in politics, as opposed to being represented, as we have been throughout history, by others who have spoken, thought, said, and even written and signed for us. This, at least for us, is a change and also a challenge: to demonstrate that indigenous people are not only capable of throwing stones but also of administering a province.

- Lourdes Tibán, CONAIE leader, former government minister of Social Welfare, and former aide to the Pachakutik Prefect of Cotopaxi Province<sup>343</sup>

This chapter focuses on the factors that contributed to Pachakutik's electoral victories in the rural Highlands. The central puzzle to be addressed is, how a resource-poor, social movement-based party with limited ability and little willingness to use patronage and clientelistic political practices succeeded in attracting the votes of poor, rural voters, including a significant number of indigenous voters.

Historical patterns in Latin America, as well as, social scientific theory would lead us to presume that it would be particularly difficult for a resource-poor, social movement-based party to make inroads in poor, rural areas. Peasants have never figured as agents of democratization in the scholarly literature, instead social science theory has attributed this role alternately to the middle or the urban working classes.<sup>344</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> Author interview, Quito, January 31, 2001.

<sup>344</sup> To cite but a few examples, Lipset 1981 argued for the centrality of the middle class, whereas Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens and Stephens 1992 contend that it is the working class which is the real agent of democratization.

Peasants have tended to be portrayed as backwards and resistant to change.<sup>345</sup> This theoretical pessimism about peasant's ability to be agents of democratization reflects real world patterns. For example, journalistic analyses of the 2000 presidential election in Mexico, which brought about the dramatic end of seventy years of PRI rule, credited young urban voters with bringing about this monumental shift. Rural areas, still largely dominated by political machines were thought to be the PRI's last remaining electoral stronghold.<sup>346</sup>

In attempting to account for why rural democratization is such a juggernaut Jonathan Fox points a number of different impediments, including the continued power and presence of rural elites, limited access to information, and flawed electoral systems that often make electoral participation appear to be futile. The social control that elites have traditionally exercised in rural areas has been thorough and strong. As Fox describes: "Regional elites often control the electoral machinery, the judicial system, the economic terms of trade, the allocation of credit, and last but certainly not least, the principle means of coercion."<sup>347</sup> Thus, where elites continue dominate and control rural society these patterns of social control infringe on rural people's citizenship rights and dampen the enthusiasm for participation in elections and

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<sup>345</sup> This is certainly true within the Marxist tradition, although Maoist theory turned this on its head and gave peasants the vanguard position in revolutionary struggles. Social scientists like Moore 1966 tended to view the existence of a large peasant class as inimical to the emergence of democracy. Moore argued that one of the prerequisites of democracy was the dismantling of the peasant class, the decline of agriculture as the centerpiece of an economy and the termination of pre-capitalist forms of production in the countryside.

<sup>346</sup> Cornelius 2000. There are also numerous historical examples that attest to the difficulty of democratization in the countryside. In Chile, the oligarchy directly controlled the rural vote till the 1950s, delivering it consistently to the Conservative and other right-wing parties, thereby assuring their continued political survival even as the left was making major inroads in the urban areas. See Scully 1992; Scully 1995.

<sup>347</sup> Fox 1990: 3.

democracy: “Violence and bribery, as well as enduring patterns of clientelism and limited access to information, limit the extent to which mass-based social and economic protests translate into party identifications and issue-based voting behaviour, much to the frustration of party organizers trying to build on successful social mobilization.”<sup>348</sup>

One of the arguments I will make in this chapter is that Pachakutik’s electoral success in the rural areas of the Highlands was due primarily to the fact that throughout much of the region many of the older patterns of social control that had been constructed by local and regional elites by the mid-1990s had been significantly eroded. To, had by the 1990s. In place of the old patterns and power brokers, the indigenous movement and its organizations had emerged as a new reference point and power broker, filling to some degree the political, social and to some extent economic voids created by important changes that were initiated in the rural Highlands of Ecuador in the 1960s and 1970s.

While Pachakutik was more than just CONAIE,<sup>349</sup> nevertheless, the relationship with the indigenous confederation was a strong one. The press regularly referred Pachakutik as “the political arm” of the CONAIE, as did many in the movement itself. This strong organic connection to the indigenous movement and the fact that so many movement leaders ran on the Pachakutik ticket and organized for the party meant that Pachakutik was able to utilize the organizational resources the indigenous organizations had to offer. Equally important, it was able to assume the

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<sup>348</sup> Fox 1990: 7-8.

<sup>349</sup> The party had numerous non-indigenous members and member organizations that were not affiliated with CONAIE.

mantle of the indigenous movement and its organizations. In particular, my argument focuses on three key resources that were developed by the movement over a period of 40 years of organizing: (1) the cultivation of a strong and positive indigenous identity; (2) the development of a thick, fundamentally democratic organizational structure; and (3) the provision of programs and projects that played a visible role in local development. These resources were the basic foundation that made it possible for Pachakutik to win votes in indigenous communities. With an incipient organizational structure, few economic resources, and little access to the media, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for a new contender, like Pachakutik, to make the electoral gains it did, in 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, and beyond, without the preexisting foundation of the indigenous organizations.

This chapter is organized in the following way: the first section addresses the question of the degree to which Pachakutik succeeded in winning voter support among indigenous and other poor rural voters. Towards this end we will examine and analyze Pachakutik's performance in the 2000 local elections. The next section offers background on the important historical changes that took place in the Ecuadorian Highlands between the 1960s and the 1990s that were crucial to understanding the emergence in many areas of indigenous organizations as important power brokers at the provincial and local levels.<sup>350</sup> The final section presents findings from the local-level case study I conducted of a Pachakutik chapter in the central Highland province

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<sup>350</sup> The historical development of indigenous organizations and movements differed in significant ways between the Amazon and the Highlands. Due to time and space limitations, and also to the fact that the case study I conducted was in the Highlands, the coverage of the historical development of the movement in this chapter is limited to the Highland experience. For more comprehensive treatments of indigenous movement development in Ecuador, see Andolina 1999; Pallares 2002; Selverston-Scher 2001; Yashar 2005.

of Bolivar. This case study will be used to illustrate how the three resources mentioned above were utilized and contributed to Pachakutik's electoral success in this province. One of the most surprising things that this case study reveals is the extent to which these organizational resources were employed successfully not only to attract indigenous votes, but to reach non-indigenous voters as well.

The Pachakutik provincial organization in Bolivar was particularly successful at capitalizing on these resources so as to expand its constituency beyond the indigenous community, thereby creating the beginnings of a truly intercultural party. The willingness and ability manifested by the indigenous organization in Bolivar to engage in intercultural politics was not the case everywhere; this province offers a particularly interesting and successful example of intercultural cooperation and networking.

### **Pachakutik Electoral Demographics**

As we have seen, Pachakutik billed itself as an electoral movement that aimed to represent the poor and marginalized of Ecuador. It was a movement that sought to gain political rights and power for groups that had largely been excluded from political power, and at the same time, to block the advance of neoliberal policies within Ecuador. Pachakutik linked a broad radical economic agenda with a cultural/ethnic agenda that emphasized recognition of and respect for the plurality of the Ecuadorian population and nation. Like the indigenous movement, Pachakutik sought political recognition for Ecuador's ethnic and cultural minorities, celebrated and affirmed diversity, and promoted unity within this diversity.



Pachakutik's record in attracting the votes of the population groups it sought to represent – the poor, rural and indigenous - was mixed, although with some clear and important patterns. The most salient characteristic of Pachakutik's electoral support was the same one that characterized Ecuadorian politics in general: it was highly regional. The movement received relatively strong showings in the Highlands and the Amazon, but an insignificant response on the Coast. As discussed in Chapter 3, regionalism is one of the hallmarks of Ecuadorian politics and culture, and so in this way Pachakutik's development as a regional political movement mirrored the traditional parties, which all had regionally skewed voter support. Pachakutik's support was particularly skewed; according to the movement's own calculations, during the 1990s, on average they received only four percent of the vote in each coastal province.<sup>351</sup> This highly unbalanced support can be attributed to two main factors. The first was that the indigenous movement's base was located in the Highlands and the Amazon. Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians represent a very small sliver of the total coast population and, as a result, their organizations were much weaker and less significant than the parallel organizations in the Highlands and the Amazon. Secondly, the right-wing PSC and the populist PRE parties maintained a virtual lock on Coastal politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s, making the region largely impenetrable to other parties. On the other hand, parties from the center to the left, like the DP, the ID, MPD, etc. had dominated formal politics in the Highlands and the Amazon since the return to democracy in 1979. For reasons that will not be addressed here, mestizos in the Highlands tended to be more progressive and thus

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<sup>351</sup> MUPP-NP 1999b: 26.

open to Pachakutik's message than was the coastal population. So from its inception in 1996 to the time of this writing, Pachakutik remained a political movement with regional bases in the Highlands and Amazon.

Beyond the party's regional nature, the task of characterizing Pachakutik's voter base is not a straightforward matter because it varies to some degree whether one looks at national or local elections, and whether one is interested in absolute votes or the percentage of votes received by the movement in a specific locality. What is clear from the data and analyses by scholars and people within Pachakutik itself, is that movement's the voting base during the first five elections that it participated in (1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002) was demographically heterogeneous, including urban dwellers, members of the middle-class and mestizos, as well as, poor people, rural dwellers and indigenous peoples. So while the movement emerged, in many ways, as an advocate for marginalized sectors, including the poor in general and the indigenous in particular, it had a broader appeal beyond these groups and proved able to attract votes from urban and middle-class sectors as well. In other words, the movement during the 1990s and through at least its Third Congress, held in September 2003, was a non-sectarian, pluralistic movement and this was reflected in its patterns of voter support. Pachakutik's own bulletin, *El Churro*, acknowledged that, "MUPP's vote share has a high urban component. Approximately 64 percent of the vote comes from provincial capitals, from the popular and middle sectors."<sup>352</sup>

In their analysis of voter support in the 1996 and 1998 elections for Pachakutik candidates for president and congress, Beck and Mijeski (2001b) found a weaker than

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<sup>352</sup> MUPP-NP 1999b: 26. Translation by the author.

expected relationship between voter support for these candidates and the percentage of indigenous living in a canton or local parish. In other words, increases in the percentage of indigenous who made up the population did not result in as great an increase in votes for Pachakutik candidates as might have been expected. In fact, in terms of votes for Freddy Ehlers (Pachakutik's mestizo presidential candidate in 1996 and 1998) the effect of higher proportions of indigenous peoples on the percentage of votes for Pachakutik in a canton or parish was negligible in 1996 and non-existent in 1998. They did, however, discover a "moderate positive effect" of the percentage of indigenous in the canton variable when they looked at votes for Pachakutik's slate of congressional candidates, but again, while the effect was robust it was not as strong as might have been expected given the fact that CONAIE was one of Pachakutik's key organizational members. Also noteworthy, they found an inverse relationship between the level of poverty in a canton or parish and votes for Pachakutik. In other words, according to their analysis, higher poverty rates resulted in fewer votes for Pachakutik. The conclusions they draw from their analysis are fairly negative: "The movement performs best in the heavily indigenous Sierra region, though it has failed to mobilize and capture what it claims to be its core constituency: Ecuador's indígenas and its poor."<sup>353</sup> While their analysis is important in dispelling the idea that indigenous people represented an automatic constituency for Pachakutik, I think their conclusions are overly negative and do not recognize the significance of what was achieved in terms of the voting record or acknowledge the tremendous obstacles that a movement like Pachakutik had to overcome. This chapter gives a substantially more positive

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<sup>353</sup> Beck and Mijeski 2001b: 16.

spin to Pachakutik's electoral performance and will attempt at the same time to highlight many of the difficulties this new movement faced in making inroads into electoral politics. When one considers the obstacles faced, the record in terms of attracting indigenous support and even that of the poor does not look quite so weak.

This chapter focuses on Pachakutik's performance at the local level, and we will begin by examining at the movement's electoral performance in the 2000 local elections. In 1996, Pachakutik's debut year, local elections took place concurrently with national elections for congress and the presidency. Pachakutik ran candidates for provincial deputy and for local seats in thirteen of the nation's twenty-one provinces, in all three geographical regions. Due to changes made to the electoral calendar by the National Constituent Assembly and the disruptions in the electoral cycle precipitated by the ousters of Bucaram and Mahuad, the 2000 elections were the first in which local elections were held separately from national elections. These were also the first local elections held since 1996. By this time Pachakutik had been in existence for four years, during which time it had developed stronger, more organized bases of support throughout the country and had succeeded in getting several hundred people elected to different offices in the preceding three elections (1996, 1997 and 1998). The movement had also held its first national congress the year before and elected a national coordinator and board of directors, thus giving it more of a solid organizational base. For all these reasons, the 2000 elections represent a good vantage point from which to examine voter support for Pachakutik, because, by that time it was better established.

The other important thing to keep in mind about the 2000 elections was that they came on the heels of the popular uprising that culminated in the takeover of congress and the national government by a coalition of indigenous leaders and disaffected military officers on January 21, 2000, and which led to the overthrow of elected President Jamil Mahuad. The indigenous movement and the rebellious military officers were the chief protagonists of these events. It appeared at the time that the movement's leadership in this controversial, but nonetheless popular action, contributed in part to Pachakutik's electoral gains in the 2000 elections.

While Beck and Mijeski's (2001b) analysis reveals weakness in voter support for Pachakutik among the indigenous and the poor, the fact of the matter is that the vast majority of local governments won by Pachakutik in 2000 were in small, rural cantons, many of which had sizeable indigenous populations. In order to gain a snapshot of the types of cantons Pachakutik candidates won in 2000, I grouped together the cantons where the party won mayoral races, calculated the averages for this group of each of the three demographic variables, and then compared these averages to those for all cantons nationwide, as well as, overall regional averages. The results of this simple analysis are clear and consistent, the group of cantons where Pachakutik won races for mayor were on average, poorer, more indigenous, more rural and without a doubt smaller than the national or regional cantonal averages for these same variables. This finding is illustrated in Figures 3, 4, and 5.

Figure 3 compares MUPP-NP-controlled cantonal averages with those of the averages for the whole set of cantons throughout the nation. Figures 4 and 5 break the national results down into subsets related to the Highland and Amazonian regions


respectively. Within each chart the first set of averages, titled “All Cantons” or “All Highland Cantons” refers to the averages of the three demographic variables in question for the whole population for that figure, so in Figure 3 it refers to the averages for all cantons in Ecuador, while in Figures 4 and 5 this first bar reflects the average figures for all of the cantons in that particular region. The second grouping in each chart, titled “Cantons Won by MUPP-NP” includes all the cantons in which a MUPP-NP sponsored candidate won elected office, whether or not the elected official was or was not a member of Pachakutik. In other words, it includes those cases where MUPP-NP ran as part of a coalition, in which case the candidate may or may not have been a Pachakutik designee. Finally, the last cluster in each figure reflects the averages of those cantons where Pachakutik was the principal party on the winning ticket and where the elected official ran and governed as a participating member of Pachakutik. The demographic variables used to compare these different groupings are the following: an estimate of the percentage of the rural population which was indigenous, the percentage of people living in poverty, and the percentage of the cantonal population living in rural, as opposed to urban, areas.<sup>354</sup>

What is striking about these three charts is that in each one the averages for all three demographic variables go up consistently from the first cantonal grouping to the second and reach their peak at the third, with one minor exception in Figure 5 – Amazon, the average rural population for “Cantons Won by MUPP-NP” was slightly lower than that for “All Amazonian Cantons.” The differences are most stark in

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
<sup>354</sup> In this case urban areas are defined as any town or city with five thousand or more inhabitants. This is the definition used by SIISE, which was the source for the data.

Figure 3 precisely because this figure includes the Coast, which is decidedly more urban and has far fewer indigenous than either the Amazon or the Highlands, and it is a region where Pachakutik did not win any mayoralties in 2000. However, while lessening somewhat, the differences remain even when one restricts the view by region, as was done in Figures 4 and 5. And the differences between total regional averages and those of the averages for MUPP-NP controlled cantons in those regions is particularly strong with regards to the indigenous variable, going from 14.77 percent for all Highland cantons to 35.11 percent for those Highland cantons controlled by MUPP-NP Mayors, and in the Amazon going from an average of 22.66 percent for “All Amazonian Cantons” to an average of 32.6 percent for those controlled by MUPP-NP Mayors. The difference between the averages in terms of how rural a canton is were not terribly significant in the Amazon, where the whole region is sparsely populated with minimal urbanization. But clearly in the Highlands the “MUPP-NP controlled” canton sub-group was more rural than the average for the region.



**Figure 3: National: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of MUPP-NP Cantons Compared to National Averages of All Cantons**





**Figure 4: Highlands: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of MUPP-NP Cantons Compared with Regional Averages**




Figure 5: Amazon: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of MUPP-NP Cantons Compared to Regional Averages

With regard to the poverty measure, while the differences in each region between the overall regional average and that for “MUPP-NP controlled cantons” were not drastic, they were significant, with the latter being on average poorer than the former. The difference in the Highlands was 79.3 percent for all cantons compared to 84.3 percent for “MUPP-NP Controlled Cantons”; and in the Amazon, the average for “All Amazonian Cantons” was 67.7 percent compared to 74.8 percent for “MUPP-NP Controlled Cantons.”


Another way of looking at the results of the 2000 mayoral elections demonstrates even more convincingly the degree to which Pachakutik was based largely in indigenous communities. In order to look at this question, I divided the Highland cantons into four groups differentiated by the percentage of the rural population that is indigenous, and then looked at the percentage of cantons within each of these groups that Pachakutik won. Of the 101 Highland cantons, data on the percentage of the rural population that was indigenous was available for ninety-five.<sup>355</sup> Of these ninety-five, the vast majority, or seventy, had rural populations where 0-25 percent were indigenous; in twelve cantons the indigenous population represented 25-50 percent of the rural population; ten cantons had an indigenous population representing 50-75 percent of the rural population; and in only three cantons did indigenous people represent more than 75 percent of the rural population. Pachakutik won a disproportionate number of mayoralties in those cantons where indigenous people represented over 25 percent of the total rural population, with their highest

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<sup>355</sup> This data was taken from SIISE, Versión 2.0, 2000, based on, CODENPE, Estimación de la población indígena y negra del país, 1995.

percentage of the total being won within the 50-75 percent group. So in the 0-25 percent category of cantons MUPP-NP, whether as part of an alliance or running alone won 10 percent of the cantons or seven out of seventy; in the 25-50 percent category MUPP-NP won 42 percent of the cantons or five out of twelve; in the 50-75 percent category they won 70 percent of the cantons or seven out of ten; and finally in the 75-100 percent category they won 33 percent of the cantons or one out of three. This is represented graphically in Figure 6. Thus, while it is true that seven, or 35 percent of the twenty highland cantons where Pachakutik won either in alliance with another party or on its own, were cantons where indigenous people represented 25 percent or less of the total rural population, the fact of the matter is that seven cantons represented only 10 percent of the total number of cantons in this category.

While using aggregate data of this kind always presents certain risks, namely that of ecological fallacy, nevertheless these two different examinations of this data from the 2000 local elections gives a degree of confidence in asserting that much of Pachakutik's base was located in areas where there were sizeable indigenous communities. This of course is not the same thing as saying that all indigenous people automatically voted for Pachakutik, indeed this is clearly untrue. And it is impossible to tell from this aggregate data the percentage of the indigenous vote that Pachakutik garnered or, for that matter, the percentage of the mestizo vote that they won. The



**Figure 6: Highland Cantons Won by MUPP-NP Divided According to Percentage of Rural Population that is Indigenous**

data also indicates that Pachakutik was successful in 2000 in many of these cantons at winning sizeable portions of the non-indigenous vote. But what does seem to come through clearly from the preceding analysis is that there was something about the cantons that had significant indigenous communities that gave Pachakutik an important edge. I will argue in this chapter that this edge was indigenous organization itself. And surprisingly, one of the things this chapter reveals is that in many cases during the 2000 elections this organizational base was mobilized not solely to get out the indigenous vote, but also served as an organizational focal point for attracting mestizo votes. Significantly, what I found in my field research was that indigenous organizations often did not work in isolation from other sectors of the population and nor did they focus solely on attracting indigenous votes, instead in some of the most successful cases, these organizations spearheaded and served as the backbone for campaigns that sought to reach both indigenous and non-indigenous voters.

Before launching into the qualitative part of the chapter, a few more comments on the difference between my findings and those of Beck and Mijeski (2001b) are in order. There are several differences between their study and the analysis I just presented. The aggregate socio-economic data used is essentially the same only in addition to cantons they analyzed results by parish as well, which is the lowest level of disaggregation that the data permits and one step lower than that of the canton. Of course the methods of analysis they chose to use were substantially different than what I did: they used regression analysis, whereas I simply looked at patterns of averages and certain correlations. But the most important difference relates to the electoral data itself; they analyzed data from the 1996 and 1998 elections, while I looked at the 2000

elections. Certainly one might expect important differences in voting patterns between the first election Pachakutik participated in, when it was no more than a disparate and rapidly formed electoral coalition, and one that took place after four years of political organizing. And even more important, perhaps, is the fact that Beck and Mijeski examined voting patterns for national candidates, both presidential and national congressional deputies, whereas my analysis looked at voting patterns for Pachakutik during local elections. I would argue that these last two differences can go a long way to explaining the seemingly startling differences in the conclusions we draw about the degree to which Pachakutik was able to attract indigenous and poor voters in particular. First of all the differences between our two analyses may indicate that indigenous support for Pachakutik grew between 1998 and 2000. If this were the case, it could be explained in part due to the galvanizing role that the events of January 21, 2000 played, both among indigenous, as well as, among many mestizo people. But in particular for the indigenous January 21 was seen as a demonstration of their power and gave them a sense that achieving power was in the realm of possibility.

As regards local versus national elections, there is an argument to be made that the high levels of poverty and illiteracy in indigenous communities results in a tendency to relate more easily to local rather than national events and leaders: local elections were closer to home, more comprehensible and voters, especially from small cantons, would be more likely to know the candidate personally.<sup>356</sup> Likewise, it is

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<sup>356</sup> Sartori made a similar point when he argued that literacy is what allows voters to develop a capacity for abstraction, which, in turn, is necessary in order to develop a sense of identification with a party label as opposed to an individual. Thus, he argued that illiteracy contributed to *personalismo* in Latin American politics, which in turn was inimical to the structuring and institutionalization of parties, because voters were voting not for a party and what that party stood for, but instead for an individual:

probable that local and provincial elections would be more effective at energizing indigenous organizations at these levels for the job of campaigning, as there would be more seats to which local people might be elected. 1998 was the only cycle of the three (1996, 1998, 2000) in which only national and no local seats were being contested. This may be part of the explanation for why vote percentages for Pachakutik dropped to some degree from 1996 to 1998.

After having offered evidence that indicates that Pachakutik did attract significant support among indigenous and rural populations, we will shift to explaining how this was accomplished. Borrowing from the social movements literature, we will pay attention both to opportunity structures and to social and organizational capital. The next section offers historical background on the changes that took place in the Highlands beginning in the 1960s which laid the groundwork for the emergence of the indigenous movement and which set the stage at the local level for Pachakutik's eventual emergence on the political stage.

### **The Transformation of the Ecuadorian Highlands – 1960s-1990s**

Compared to the Coast, the Highland region of Ecuador was an economic backwater during the twentieth century. While on the Coast commercial and some industrial activity took root in the early part of the twentieth century, the rural Highlands remained choked by semi-feudal relations of production well into the 1960s. The region was dominated by large haciendas owned by a small, white, landed elite, which subjugated and utilized the labor of the largely indigenous peasantry

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“Under conditions of widespread illiteracy the structural consolidation of a party system can hardly occur.” Sartori 1994: 37-38.



through a couple different types of debt peonage systems. In the *huasipungo* and *yanapa* systems that grew to dominate the region during the first half of the twentieth century, indigenous peasants exchanged their labor, “for land use; advance wages, grains or animals; and the right to water, wood, and straw as available in the rivers, woods, and fields, respectively.”<sup>357</sup> The subjugation of the majority of the Highland indigenous peasant communities was the result of a fairly long historical process that accelerated and intensified after Ecuador’s independence from Spain. Somewhat surprisingly, the colonial period in Ecuador did not result in the total loss of autonomy by Highland indigenous people. While indigenous people had a separate, special legal status under colonial rule that denied them anything like full citizenship rights, they retained certain important rights and protections, and for many a measurable degree of autonomy. Spanish law forced obligations on its indigenous subjects, such as the *mita*, a special tax paid by Indians living on communal lands. However, it also protected these lands from encroachment. Fuentealba estimates that at the time of Ecuador’s independence from Spain, 54 percent of the Indians who paid tribute to the Spanish Crown continued to reside on communal lands. The other 46 percent, by contrast, were confined to the haciendas.<sup>358</sup> The process of the breakup and usurpation of the remaining communal lands began slowly and then accelerated during the Liberal Regime (1895-1920). Caught up in the fever of the agro-export boom, the Liberal Regime sought to free up more land for export production and to integrate indigenous peasants into the burgeoning national capitalist economy. Towards this

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<sup>357</sup> Yashar 2003: 17. For scholarly work on the debt peonaje systems that dominated the Ecuadorian Highlands up until the 1964 agrarian reform, see Guerrero 1977.

<sup>358</sup> Fuentealba 1983: 50.

end, they abolished special taxes paid by Indians and at the same time began breaking up communal lands.<sup>359</sup> Land ownership eventually became even more highly concentrated than it had been under Spanish rule. By 1954 three-quarters of land in the Highlands was controlled by large haciendas (greater than one hundred hectares).<sup>360</sup>

While some indigenous communal lands survived into the twentieth century, the extent of these lands and the number of indigenous living on them was greatly reduced. Likewise, despite a certain amount of juridical autonomy, in practical terms indigenous people living in the Highlands were subject to political control and domination by the white elites. Politically the rural areas of the Highlands were dominated and controlled by what was known as the “holy trinity,” a cooperative relationship aimed at maintaining political control over the countryside between the landed oligarchs, the Catholic Church and the central government’s local political appointees, or *tenientes políticos*.

High levels of social and educational deprivation compounded the economic and political subjugation experienced by the indigenous. According to 1950 census figures, the illiteracy rate among Quichua speakers, which would have represented the bulk of the indigenous population at the time, was 92 percent compared with 36 percent for Spanish speakers.<sup>361</sup> It is safe to assume that these figures would have changed little until the 1970s when access to education was expanded under a reformist military government. Given this extremely high illiteracy rate, the literacy

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<sup>359</sup> Iturralde 1983/1995: 20.

<sup>360</sup> Zamosc 1994: 43.

<sup>361</sup> See Figure 27 in Ecuador. Ministerio de Economía 1960.

restriction on voting, which remained in place until 1984, served as an effective means of disenfranchising indigenous people. Racial discrimination further entrenched their unequal status and severely limited their opportunities for social mobility. The disproportionately high illiteracy rate among indigenous people was indicative of an overall pattern for this population of disproportionately high levels of poverty and deprivation in the areas of health and welfare. This pattern continues up to the present. Indigenous people, along with Afro-Ecuadorians, were and remain some of the most marginalized and politically disenfranchised sectors of the Ecuadorian population.

While indigenous people continued to suffer from disproportionately higher levels of poverty, illiteracy and other social ills relative to the rest of Ecuadorian society into the twenty-first century, significant changes beginning in the 1960s and accelerating in the 1970s transformed the economic and political reality of the Highland region and offered some improvement for indigenous people in terms of greater access to education, land, mobility, and empowerment.

The agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973 were perhaps the most fundamental catalyst for change in Highland Ecuador. While they were by no means radical in their scope, especially in comparison to the agrarian reform experiences in Cuba or Peru, they did succeed in dismantling the semi-feudal debt-peonage systems that had taken root in the Highlands. They freed indigenous peasants from their semi-indentured relationship with wealthy landowners and gave them greater access to land. According to Zamosc, "In 1954, large haciendas [larger than 100 hectares] monopolized more than three-quarters of the total area, but by the mid-1980s,

agricultural land was distributed in similar proportions among large, medium, and small farms.”<sup>362</sup> While the expropriations of private land under both agrarian reforms ended up being rather modest, the agrarian reform process led many large landowners to sell off their land out of fear that it would be expropriated, and essentially to abandon the agricultural sector. Thus the agrarian reforms set in motion a process of elite flight from the rural areas of Ecuador and migration to Quito and other large and moderate sized cities and insertion into different activities. The result was that much of the rural Highlands was eventually left largely in the hands of peasant and medium-sized producers, having been abandoned by many of the wealthiest landed elites. This process happened over a period of about twenty to twenty-five years and with significant local variation depending on the intensity of the reform process and land distribution at the local level, but there is no doubt that the reform process and the changes it set in motion had a profound effect on all aspects of life for people living in the rural Highlands and in particular for indigenous people. The underlying economic structure underwent a profound transformation. The changes in the political realm were slower in coming, but I would argue that the ascendancy of Pachakutik in the rural Highlands of Ecuador was the culmination in the political realm of this profound transformation of the Highlands that began with the agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973.

In addition to witnessing the end of the oppressive land tenure systems, the period of the 1960s and 1970s saw efforts on the part of the government and the church to improve the condition of indigenous communities. Seeking to more fully

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<sup>362</sup> Qtd. in Yashar 2005: 94. For original citation see Zamosc 1994: 43.

incorporate the Indian into Ecuadorian society, the reformist military government of Rodríguez Lara greatly improved access to education for many indigenous, something that had been practically non-existent previous to the 1960s. The populist government also promised greater access to credit and other government programs to help those who had newly acquired land. However, the promise of land distribution and government aid and assistance ended up being greater than the reality of what was delivered and this fueled frustration and mistrust of the government, as well as greater levels of indigenous organizing. According to CONAIE documents, it was the paucity of agrarian reform and the fact that it was not accompanied by any technical or credit assistance that continued to strengthen Highland Indian organizing efforts, eventually resulting in the founding of the main Highland indigenous federation, ECUARUNARI, in 1972.<sup>363</sup>

In many cases with the help of the Catholic Church or leftist political parties and unions, indigenous communities throughout the Highlands undertook a tremendous burst of organizing during the 1960s and 1970s. The focus of the organizing was initially to demand greater access to land and credit. However, as Pallares cogently describes, in the process of organizing for economic rights and material demands, issues of identity and culture came to the fore and began to take on importance. What emerged during the 1970s and 1980s was an indigenous movement that had what Pallares calls a “double consciousness” that intertwined ethnic and class

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<sup>363</sup> CONAIE 1989: 128.

agendas, “underscoring the relationship between socio-economic and racial subordination.”<sup>364</sup>

So a whole group of developments impacted life in the rural Highlands during the 1960s and 1970s including agrarian reform, the government provision of education and health care services for the indigenous population for the first time, and other programs aimed at integrating indigenous people into Ecuadorian society. At the same time the Catholic Church, influenced by the Second Vatican Council, began to abandon its previous role as ideological supporter of the hacienda system and to take a much different stance with regard to indigenous people. Many of the priests in the Catholic Church and some of its most important bishops became vocal advocates for the indigenous and their rights. The Church played an important role in helping indigenous people gain greater access to land, as it gave up many of its own large landholdings in the Highlands for distribution to indigenous and other small farmers. The Church thus played a central role in aiding in the building of indigenous organization and in increasing indigenous educational levels.

All of these changes led over a period of time to the emergence and strengthening of indigenous organizations at the local, provincial and regional levels, finally culminating in the formation of the national indigenous confederation, CONAIE, in 1986. At the local level, the result of these important changes was a profound shift in power relations. In his case study of Chimborazo, one of the most heavily indigenous provinces in the country, Carrasco describes this transformation eloquently and his description bears repeating:

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<sup>364</sup> Pallares 1997: 208.

...beginning with the struggle for the land and the agrarian transformations that resulted from this period, the power structures at the local level were redefined.

In the micro-regional arenas the weight of *gamonalismo*<sup>365</sup> is increasingly weak. With the slow disappearance of the large haciendas and the large landowners' numerous intermediary agents, the traditional scheme of domination, which was located fundamentally in the villages, lost importance. The local priests generally began to change their traditional role –as supporter of the *gamonal* power—and, instead, chose to support, in a more or less decisive manner, the indigenous struggles and the organizational processes of the peasantry. The state contributed to the transformational process to some degree both through its relatively important participation in the process of land redistribution, as well as, in its decisive role in the advance of education, through which it promoted, perhaps not always intentionally, the organization of the indigenous people.

Thus, a new social actor makes its appearance on the local scene: the indigenous organizations –with their different levels of aggregation— and their presence within this context, in which the traditional agrarian structure is undergoing transformation and the regional economy is being diversified, begins to take on fundamental importance for provincial society.<sup>366</sup>

In summary, the changes wrought in the 1960s and 1970s outlined above set the stage for a dramatic, if not always complete, transformation of power relations at the local level in the rural Highlands. The agrarian reforms succeeded in undermining the political power and the control of the “holy trinity” of large landowners, the church and the central government political appointees. At the same time, slowly over a period decades the indigenous movement itself and its provincial member organizations, in particular, succeeded in building the means to fill this void and to

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<sup>365</sup> *Gamonalismo* is another term for or variant of *caciquismo*, which refers to the historical pattern that developed throughout Latin America whereby power in specific localities is controlled by a powerful individual or *cacique*, literally chief, who wields his power arbitrarily and unilaterally. This system is characterized by the use of raw power and the absence of the rule of law.

<sup>366</sup> Carrasco 1993: 44. Translation by the author.

become local power brokers and interlocutors in their own right. By the 1990s they had become important movers and shakers on the ground in rural Ecuador, having developed practices and resources that Pachakutik would then be able to harness for its political races. Likewise, indigenous organizations, especially at the provincial level had developed reputations as power brokers who had connections and were able to accomplish things. In those cases where the connection between Pachakutik and the indigenous organization was tight, this reputation was transferred to Pachakutik and its candidates.

So even before Pachakutik came onto the scene, in many parts of the Highlands a dramatic power shift had already taken place. Pachakutik, in some ways then, did not so much transform power relations at the local level, as build upon dramatic changes that had already occurred, helping to carry these changes to the final level of change at the level of electoral politics. In conclusion, one of the key things that made possible the success of this insurgent leftist party in the rural areas of Ecuador and among *campesinos*, was the fact that rural elites had by and large abandoned this area of the country by the 1990s. This is not to say that indigenous people controlled the Highland provinces or that they did not have to overcome great obstacles and face stiff competition in competing for office; this of course is simply not true. In only a few Highland provinces did indigenous people represent a majority of the population and racism against indigenous people by mestizos was something that indigenous candidates had to contend with. However, the economic and political grip of wealthy landlords that characterized traditional power structures in many rural areas in Latin America had been broken in the Ecuadorian Highlands by the 1990s.



## **Electoral Success at the Local Level –Pachakutik Organizing in Bolivar Province**

The following case study is based on fieldwork I conducted in Bolivar from March to May 2000. During these three months I accompanied the Pachakutik electoral campaign, attending campaign rallies; traveling with candidates to villages and towns to meet with voters; interviewing local Pachakutik leaders and candidates, as well as, other political authorities and residents of the province; and finally observing of the elections, which took place on May 21, 2000.

### Background on Bolivar Province

A small rural province in the center of the country, Bolivar possessed great diversity with its seven cantons and twenty-seven rural parishes<sup>367</sup> spanning an area that stretched from the foot of the spectacular snow-covered Chimborazo mountain, Ecuador's highest peak, to semi-tropical lowlands that mark the entry way to the coastal plains. However, in economic terms, Bolivar was a bit of a backwater; with no major commercial or industrial activity, the primary economic activity in the province was agriculture. According to 1990 census figures, the province had a population of barely more than 150,000 with the vast majority living in small villages or rural hamlets. Of Bolivar's seven cantons, only the sleepy provincial capital, Guaranda, with a population of fifteen thousand, exceeded the five thousand mark that the Ecuadorian government uses to designate a locality as an "urban area".<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>367</sup> The number of rural parishes listed is as of 1990 and most likely increased during the 1990s.

<sup>368</sup> Five thousand inhabitants is the minimum number that SIISE uses to designate a town an "urban" as opposed to "rural" area.

As in most of the other Highland provinces, the agrarian reforms of the 1960s and 1970s succeeded in dismantling the semi-feudal agricultural system. In particular in Bolivar, the rural areas were by the 1990s largely economically leveled, with many more small and medium-sized *campesino* producers than large landowners. A lack of industry, minimal commercial activity, and the absence of a substantial urban center, meant that Bolivar's population was minimally economically stratified, and this, I will argue, was a factor that aided in Pachakutik's organizing.

The indigenous population in Bolivar was proportionally smaller than in most of the other Highland provinces, but it was not inconsequential. There were sizeable indigenous populations in two of the provinces' seven cantons: in Guaranda indigenous people represented 55.9 percent of the rural population, and in Chillanes, 26.4.<sup>369</sup> Thus, according to statistics prepared by the government agency, CODENPE, indigenous people represented a bit more than 22 percent of the total population in Bolivar province.<sup>370</sup> According to Zamosc's calculations, Bolivar was one of the four Highland provinces where indigenous people made up the smallest percentage of the population.<sup>371</sup> So the indigenous population was definitely in the minority, but it had critical mass nevertheless.

Not only was the indigenous population in Bolivar relatively small in comparison to other Highland provinces, but also organizationally its indigenous

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<sup>369</sup> The indigenous population estimates were taken from, SIISE, Versión 2.0, 2000, based on, CODENPE, Estimación de la población indígena y negra del país, 1995.

<sup>370</sup> This estimate was calculated by the author based on data from, SIISE, Versión 2.0, 2000, based on INEC, Censo de población y vivienda de 1990; and CODENPE, Estimación de la población indígena y negra del país, 1995.

<sup>371</sup> Zamosc 1995: 25. The other three were: Carchi, Loja and Azuay.

movement was relatively new. While Bolivar's provincial indigenous organization, FECAB-BRUNARI, was founded in 1972; fully two-thirds of the local indigenous organizations in the province that had legal standing in 1990 had been registered after 1984.<sup>372</sup> According to Zamosc, of the ten Highland provinces Bolivar was the one where *campesino* organization at the local level took root latest.<sup>373</sup> By contrast, in most other Highland provinces high levels of organizing took place around the time of the agrarian reforms of 1965 and 1974 and in some cases even earlier, with some organizations having histories dating back to the 1930s.

Socio-economically and culturally Bolivar's indigenous communities were fairly homogeneous. The relatively low level of socio-economic stratification in the province applied perhaps most to the indigenous population. Most, indigenous residents of Bolivar were relatively poor *campesinos* living in rural hamlets. As a result of the literacy and bilingual education programs of the 1980s and 1990s a small nucleus of professionals had emerged from within the indigenous communities, and some of these eventually assumed leadership positions in Pachakutik. But unlike in Imbabura Province, for example, there was no self-sustaining indigenous merchant or manufacturer classes. Likewise, among Bolivar's indigenous there were no clearly differentiated ethnic or cultural groups. In Bolivar, colonialism had been particularly successful in blurring original ethnic identities and creating a more generic "indigenous" identity. One example of the degree to which this blurring had occurred is that indigenous communities in Bolivar did not have a specific ethnic name or

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<sup>372</sup> Zamosc 1995: 54.

<sup>373</sup> Zamosc 1995: 54.

names that they used to identify themselves and to distinguish themselves from indigenous people in other areas. In fact, in the late 1990s as people in the national indigenous movement began to reclaim and reassert older and more specific ethnic identities and names for specific ethnic groups there was no original indigenous name that indigenous communities in Bolivar identified with, so one of the suggestions was simply to refer to them as the “Quichua people of Bolivar.”<sup>374</sup> In other words, for indigenous people in this province older ethnic identities had been lost and residence within the province had become the delimiting factor.

A sizeable indigenous evangelical community existed in Bolivar, but this potential point of division did not materialize into a significant cleavage line within the indigenous community. Relations between indigenous evangelicals and the indigenous movement in Bolivar will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

In conclusion, the size of Bolivar’s indigenous population and the longevity of its local organizations would not have appeared make the province a likely candidate for the emergence of a strong Pachakutik chapter. However, factors that contributed to division and conflict within and among indigenous communities, as well as, impediments towards bridge building with mestizo communities were less significant in Bolivar than in many other Highland provinces with larger indigenous populations. Lower levels of socio-economic stratification in the general population and among indigenous communities, the absence of ethnic divisions within the province’s indigenous population and the fact that religious divisions did not prove particularly divisive, were the principal ones.

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<sup>374</sup> Author’s field notes from the XV ECUARUNARI Congress, Guaranda, Ecuador, April 25-28, 2000.

Thus, despite the relatively small size of the indigenous population in Bolivar, during the 1990s Pachakutik got more of its candidates elected to local and provincial seats in this province than in several other Highland provinces with relatively larger indigenous populations, longer organizational histories, or both. In Bolivar Pachakutik candidates were elected to congress in both 1998 and 2002 and Pachakutik won the race for prefect in 2000. In contrast, in Cañar and Tungurahua Pachakutik did poorly during the 1990s, despite the fact that the indigenous populations in these provinces were larger in both absolute and relative terms compared to the indigenous population in Bolivar. MUPP-NP chapters in Tungurahua and Cañar did not win any province-wide races between 1996 and 2002 and very few local seats. Clearly demographics alone are not enough to explain or understand the pattern of support for Pachakutik in the Highlands. The next section will describe in more detail how FECAB-BRUNARI and its member organizations developed the three resources – leadership and organization, identity, and a track record of responding to local needs – and how Pachakutik then harnessed them for electoral competition. It will also explore how Bolivar’s indigenous movement took advantage of the favorable characteristics of their province to reach out to other non-indigenous sectors to build a truly intercultural political movement, thus overcoming the handicap of their minority status.

#### Mobilizing Indigenous Voters - Leadership and Organization

Being on the ground in Bolivar for the 2000 campaign, there was no doubt that the provincial indigenous federation, the FECAB-BRUNARI, was the backbone of the

Pachakutik campaign. Its offices, in the center of the provincial capital, Guaranda, served as campaign headquarters and the organizing hub for all campaign activity. Interestingly enough, the construction of the FECAB-BRUNARI headquarters had been paid for in the early 1990s by the Democratic Left Party (ID) as a political favor in exchange for the indigenous community's support of ID candidates in the 1992 elections.<sup>375</sup> So it was ironic that just a few years later this political favor to the indigenous movement by a traditional political party was now being used as campaign headquarters of this new insurgent party.

The FECAB-BRUNARI was founded in 1972 by just five communities but by 1991 it had grown to include about eighty,<sup>376</sup> and this number continued to grow throughout the 1990s. Selverston-Scher attributes this dramatic growth to three things: (1) the partial success of the organization in directing resources to indigenous communities, (2) the promotion of what she refers to as "indigenous ideology" in the province as a result of the bilingual education program, and (3) the organization's role as interlocutor of development and other projects for its member communities.<sup>377</sup> These categories are similar to the three factors I identified as being the crucial social and organizing capital that the indigenous movement developed and which Pachakutik was able to build upon in its political organizing: a positive indigenous identity; organizational and leadership capital; and finally financial and development resources.

For the two months that the campaign endured the FECAB-BRUNARI and its member organizations focused their energies and devoted much of their personnel and

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<sup>375</sup> Selverston-Scher 2001: 107.

<sup>376</sup> Selverston-Scher 2001: 105.

<sup>377</sup> Selverston-Scher 2001: 105.

resources to carrying the campaign forward. During the height of the campaign volunteers would arrive almost every day at the FECAB-BRUNARI offices to be assigned tasks. Not only was their people power important for campaigning, but access to indigenous communities was easier and much more natural for Pachakutik candidates than for those from the traditional parties in the province. Many of Pachakutik's candidates were themselves indigenous movement leaders. One such candidate, Arturo Yumbay, who won the race for mayor of Guaranda in 2000, explained that in the indigenous communities Pachakutik did not carry out a traditional political campaign. Given that the communities were involved in the indigenous movement and that Pachakutik was part of this process, instead of convincing, persuading, or making known one's positions, Yumbay's task as a Pachakutik candidate was simply to make sure the communities were aware of his candidacy and understood the reasons for electoral participation.<sup>378</sup> One of the strategies employed by the Pachakutik organization in Bolivar was to have its candidates coordinate and piggyback their visits to indigenous communities on a series of previously organized FECAB-BRUNARI seminars and workshops. I traveled with Yumbay and Pachakutik's candidate for provincial prefect and it was clear that being able to take advantage of forums like these where several dozen or even a hundred community leaders were gathered together at one time was a great advantage to Pachakutik candidates in trying to get their message out to far flung rural communities. The connection between Pachakutik and its candidates, whether indigenous or mestizo, and the indigenous movement was emphasized at these

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<sup>378</sup> Arturo Yumbay, author interview, Guaranda, Ecuador, April 12, 2000.

meetings. At all the meetings I attended Pachakutik candidates were careful not to make specific particularistic offers of things or projects, although they talked about their general priorities for the province. Instead, they emphasized that their governing strategy would involve participatory planning together with the communities. At no time did I see Pachakutik candidates or their supporters handing out gifts such as hats, boots, tools, money or even t-shirts. The only piece of propaganda they handed out for free were card-sized calendars with the pictures and names of the provincial Pachakutik candidates. Pachakutik also sold rainbow colored scarves, the colors of the indigenous wipala or flag, as a fund-raising item. Martha Aroca, a mestizo Pachakutik candidate for the Guaranda City Council explained that Pachakutik candidates' inability to purchase and distribute campaign paraphernalia as many other candidates did on a regular basis did have some advantages:

...time and money are limiting factors. It is very tough, because even with regard to propaganda items we have to self-finance... But this is a kind of guarantee and we are trying to get people to see that the very fact that we don't have propaganda items to hand out shows that we are not indebted to anyone who we will have to repay with interest, like the other parties do. So this creates credibility really.<sup>379</sup>

Another campaign stop for Yumbay was a big annual festival in his community of origin. It is probably true that in the past politicians from other parties would have been invited to this and other festivals like it, but clearly Yumbay, as a native of that community, held a special place of honor.

During my time accompanying the Pachakutik candidates I did hear a couple of complaints voiced about then serving Pachakutik Provincial Congressman, Gilberto

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<sup>379</sup> Martha Aroca, author interview, Guaranda, Ecuador, April 11, 2000.



Talahua. The complaints were that he had not delivered on some promises of projects that he had made in his campaign for office. Apparently in 1998 he had made some typical political offers for public works projects, that once in congress he had been unable to deliver on. So clearly not all Pachakutik candidates were perfect in adhering faithfully to the directives to avoid making particularistic campaign promises.

In my interviews with Pachakutik organizers, I was told that some of the indigenous communities in the province had decided to bar candidates from political parties other than Pachakutik from making campaign stops in their villages during the 2000 campaign. While this practice sounds heavy-handed and somewhat undemocratic, it must be seen in the context of a long history of vote buying and was mentioned to me in that context. Essentially it was a rejection by the most well organized communities of a tradition whereby politicians from the provincial capital visit the rural areas during the campaign and hand out various gifts or make offers of small works, like a soccer field. Once elected, the politician would tend to ignore these rural communities till the time of the next election. One of the things that I heard repeatedly in my interviews with people in the rural provinces was that traditionally local politicians tended to neglect the rural areas in favor of the cantonal seats. So the idea was to reject this tradition out of hand and prevent politicians from attempting to divide the community by handing gifts out to individual families. If a candidate from one of these parties would show up they would be run out of the village by the local leadership. Only the most well organized communities, like Simiatug, a village with one of the oldest and most vibrant organizations in the province, implemented this. Simiatug's prohibition on campaigning by politicians

from other parties was part of a longer tradition of political assertiveness and autonomy. According to one long-time mestizo collaborator and advisor to the indigenous movement in Bolivar whom I interviewed, in Simiatug the indigenous organization had been running things politically for years. One aspect of this political control of their own village was that the local indigenous organization had insisted and won the right to designate its own *teniente político*, a position normally appointed by the central government or the party in power.<sup>380</sup> Apparently when Bucaram came into power he attempted to impose a *teniente político* of his choice on the community. In response, the village leadership shut down the political office and the appointee was unable to carry out his tasks. This is one clear example of the degree to which political power in certain local communities had shifted into indigenous hands by the 1990s.

The degree to which indigenous organizations and communities were successful in assuming power for themselves varied considerably from community to community, but by the mid to late 1990s there was a core of communities in which indigenous organizations had become the main power brokers. In these communities in particular Pachakutik had a distinct advantage over other political contenders, and it was that advantage that clearly made it possible for Arturo Yumbay to be the first indigenous person elected as mayor of Guaranda in 2000. To other indigenous communities that were unwilling to completely bar campaign visits by politicians from other parties, Pachakutik advised them to accept the things the candidates were

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<sup>380</sup> *Teniente político* was the central government's designate administrator for a rural hamlet. These were non-elected posts that were assigned directly by the central government and for this reason these officers were often resented by the local people they were assigned to govern.

offering, if they wanted to, but to remember that the vote was secret and, “You know who to vote for.”<sup>381</sup>

The question that arises with regard to this description of indigenous organizations as new local power brokers is, whether and to what degree these organizations fulfilled their new role in a transforming way, or whether the transfer of power to them represented the assumption by new actors of an old style of politics? I would argue that, while not perfect or complete, many Pachakutik chapters and leaders made important strides in developing new innovative types of political practice. The ability of some of these leaders to remain faithful to these changes was not due simply to a philosophical commitment on their part, but instead, to the incentive structure inherent in indigenous organizational practices and indigenous values of social leveling. As I have explained in other parts of this dissertation, indigenous organization in Ecuador is non-hierarchical, bottom-up, and has a fundamentally democratic core. To attain leadership positions in the regional or national organizations a leader must rise up through a series of organizational levels beginning with the local community. As a result, most indigenous leaders in order to remain relevant must strive to maintain close contact and connection with their local community of origin. Likewise, rotation in leadership is highly valued, so no individual leader is allowed to stay in one position for years on end. This makes it more difficult for an individual to build a political machine to entrench his or her own power. This is not to say that leaders are rotated on a constant basis or even as often

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<sup>381</sup> Author interview with Mesías Mora, lawyer and mestizo advisor to FECAB-BRUNARI and Pachakutik, Congressman for Bolivar Province (2002-2006). Interviewed in his office in Guaranda, Ecuador, May 19, 2000.

as traditionally they might be. The indigenous organizations appear to have also learned the value of experienced leadership and generally a leader who has proven capable is eventually recycled into another post or leadership position. Likewise, indigenous leaders have been reelected to certain posts for successive terms, but again, the value of continuity in leadership is always weighed against the value of making space for new leaders to assume posts of responsibility and to acquire political and organizational experience.

The networking experience that indigenous communities and organizations had developed over the years also aided in the emergence of a new alternative type of political practice within Pachakutik. By the time Pachakutik was founded FECAB-BRUNARI had already become an astute political negotiator and interlocutor with provincial politicians. As mentioned earlier, in 1992 FECAB-BRUNARI agreed to support the ID and help get out the indigenous vote for that party in exchange for a promise from the ID to build a headquarters for the organization in Guaranda; a promise upon which the ID did subsequently make good. While in a certain sense this demonstrates the FECAB-BRUNARI's ability to play the clientilistic game, the difference is that the politicians were dealing with a large group of communities represented by this federation, as opposed to negotiating with individual communities or persons. Through participation in the indigenous federation, communities and their leaders gained experience in negotiation and compromise with other communities over setting priorities and goals in common. The ability of numerous communities to negotiate, coordinate, and plan together clearly increases the likelihood that they will succeed in obtaining substantive collective goods and is, therefore, far superior to a

pattern whereby individual communities compete with one another for politicians' attention and handouts. The advantages for individuals and communities afforded by participating in this type of organization were continually reinforced in training workshops and seminars offered by the movement organizations for their members.

The other thing that distinguishes movement practice from that of traditional political machines is the fact that, while the FECAB-BRUNARI might have made a strategic alliance with the ID, they retained their organizational independence and autonomy from it and all other political parties. One of the defining features of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement was its long history of jealously guarding its autonomy from political parties and all other mestizo dominated organizations, including labor unions. So while the FECAB-BRUNARI may have entered into a strategic alliance with the ID for a single election cycle, this agreement did not allow for any penetration by the ID into the movement organizations themselves.

Thus, Pachakutik came to campaigning in a context in which their base already had a level of experience with negotiating for collective goods and where a certain degree of consciousness had been raised at the community about the negative consequences of going along with the most vulgar political practices of outright vote-buying and election time promises to individuals and communities. Finally, given the fact that as a result of the dramatic changes wrought by agrarian reform there was no longer a local economic elite with substantial economic power over the *campesino* communities, the leverage that traditional politicians held over poor rural communities had been seriously eroded. In a sense they could only offer trinkets and, given the economic crisis of the state, the package of goodies that a politician had to dole out

had grown even more meager. Within this context it is easy to understand how some Pachakutik politicians were able to largely avoid the commonplace practice of vote buying and distribution of particularistic goods to voters and still be successful.<sup>382</sup>

A major theme that was repeated in almost every interview I conducted with Pachakutik leaders in Bolivar associated with the indigenous movement was that their participation in elections was not an end in itself, but instead a means to further strengthen their organization. In fact, they would assert that the latter was the goal of electoral participation, not the reverse. In the words of Arturo Yumbay, former CONAIE vice president and then mayoral candidate:

...to participate in public administration is not the goal of the indigenous peoples, but instead, a means to strengthen each one of our organizations, our nationalities and peoples... always with our sights set on our final goal which is the construction of a pluri-national state, understood as a space where we can practice what we dream of: interculturality and perhaps the possibility of treating each other as equals...<sup>383</sup>

As we will see further on, the Pachakutik chapter in Bolivar did indeed capitalize on the opportunity of participation in local governance and elections to expand and strengthen the social movement organizations that had spawned the political party. So in other words, at least during the initial years that this dissertation

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<sup>382</sup> While these practices were largely absent from Pachautik campaigns in the Highlands, evidence from a couple of interviews I conducted with Pachakutik congresspersons from the Amazon indicated that this might not have been the case in that region. I did not do any field research in the Amazon, so I cannot offer comparative observations from the two regions, but Valerio Grefa's descriptions of his dealings with his constituents and of his experience campaigning conveyed a different picture, one in which voters expected to receive small, particularistic goodies. The Amazon is very different politically and culturally from the Highlands and indigenous organizations in the two regions have different histories and political cultures, so it is unwise to extrapolate experiences from one region to another. Valerio Grefa, author interview. Quito, March 8, 2000.

<sup>383</sup> Arturo Yumbay, author interview, Guaranda, Ecuador, April 12, 2000.

looks at, the political party did not weaken or sap the movement, if anything the social movement organizations appear to have been strengthened by political participation.

#### Mobilizing Indigenous Voters – The Role of Identity

The development of a positive indigenous identity that encompasses culturally and historically distinct ethnic groups was one of the fruits of, and at the same time, a main resource of the modern indigenous movement in Ecuador. It was achieved slowly, over a period of decades of organizing and struggle, but the results in terms of cultural change were dramatic. Whereas in the 1950s the general comportment of indigenous people in public space was one of shame, self-effacement and submissiveness; by the 1990s indigenous people, and especially the youth, had become much more assertive and proud of their ethnic identity, in many cases adopting traditional indigenous clothes as a symbol of their affirmation of their identity. The full flowering of a positive and common indigenous identity shared among lowland, highland and coastal groups began to truly take shape in the 1980s and was crystallized in the dramatic 1990 national indigenous uprising. In June of 1990 indigenous protests and civil disobedience actions paralyzed the country for a week. Demanding, among a myriad of other things, recognition and acceptance as full citizens, indigenous people blocked roads, carried out sit-ins, blocked food from getting to market, carried out marches and various other actions. The 1990 uprising is viewed as the watershed moment when indigenous people demanded their place as an integral and valued part of the Ecuadorian nation.

As Selverston-Scher argues, the bilingual education program, that was founded in the late 1980s, became an important institutional mechanism for transmitting and disseminating among the grassroots a common national indigenous ideology as developed by the national leadership, and this ideology inculcated pride in indigenous people's distinct cultural identity.<sup>384</sup>

Ethnic pride was clearly evident in Pachakutik's political campaigns with the rainbow colors of the indigenous *wipala* flag adorning the movement's propaganda and adding color to campaign events. Indigenous people with whom I spoke during the 2000 election campaign in Bolivar referred to the indigenous candidate for mayor as "one of our own," thereby signaling the significance of his election. It was also one of the reasons often given for why a person was going to vote for this candidate. This observation corresponds with the findings of a fascinating study of indigenous voting patterns carried out at the time of the 1996 elections. CEPLAES found that the most common response of indigenous people polled to the question of why they voted for whom they did was that the candidate was indigenous. This was the top answer even among those with no formal education (48 percent of these respondents), and the percentage rose substantially as educational levels rose: 71 percent of those polled who had completed high school cited this as the main factor.<sup>385</sup> This indicates that indigenous people were identifying with indigenous candidates and that they wanted to see their own people in positions of power. This was especially significant given

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<sup>384</sup> Selverston-Scher 2001, see in particular the chapter on "Identity Reconstruction" which discusses the bilingual education program.

<sup>385</sup> CEPLAES 1996: 23.



that most indigenous candidates did not have the economic resources that most other candidates brought to political campaigns.

While the indigenous movement succeeded in fostering a pan-indigenous identity, there were other cleavages within and among indigenous communities that at times threatened to divide the movement. The principal one was the religious divide. Members of CONAIE tended to be Catholic, but in Ecuador there were sizeable groups of indigenous evangelicals as well, and they had their own parallel organizational structure that often competed with CONAIE and its member organizations, although they were never as large or as well organized as CONAIE.

Within Bolivar's indigenous communities there was a sizeable evangelical sector. Despite this, religious antagonisms were not strong; FECAB-BRUNARI had forged important ties with many evangelical leaders and Pachakutik followed this pattern. Efforts to reach out to indigenous evangelicals in the province by the party organization had been so successful that the leader of the province's main evangelical indigenous organization served as MUPP-NP's provincial coordinator during the 2000 election campaign. In my interview with him, Gonzalo Arévalo explained that he had originally tried to start up a chapter of Amauta Jatari (AJ)<sup>386</sup> in the province but had not met with much success due in part to the reticence of many evangelicals to participate directly in politics. Around the same time members of Pachakutik approached him and a few other evangelicals and engaged them in discussions about their vision for the future and their goals. They offered to make spaces available on their ticket for evangelicals and so it was that they brought this evangelical

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<sup>386</sup> A political party associated with FEINE, the national federation of indigenous evangelicals.

organization into the movement.<sup>387</sup> There was another indigenous group that ran candidates on the Amauta Jatari ticket in 2000 in Bolivar, but, according to Arévalo, they were a splinter group from one community that split off from the main evangelical organization a couple of years previous. This group did not run candidates independently, but instead, joined an alliance of right-wing parties that had coalesced to oppose Yumbay's candidacy.

### Mobilizing Indigenous Voters: Material Resources

While fundamental changes occurred in indigenous consciousness and pride from the 1960s to the end of the millennium, by 2000 the majority of Indians were still extremely poor and educational levels remained low, especially in rural areas. Poor, uneducated voters are the ones least likely to vote on programmatic grounds and are also the most susceptible to vote buying and other types of political manipulation. What then was the resource-poor Pachakutik able to offer in order to garner an important share of the rural indigenous vote? I argue that there was a material component to their success. As a result of its activism, the indigenous movement helped to secure resources and programs from government and non-governmental sources at the national and international levels. To the extent that Pachakutik was closely tied to these indigenous organizations voters associated the political movement with the provision of these resources. In other words, support for Pachakutik, especially among poor rural voters, was not based solely on voter affinity with the party's political philosophy or ethnic identification with its candidates, but also on the

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<sup>387</sup> Gonzalo Arévalo, author interview, Guaranda, Ecuador, April 25, 2000.

belief that the movement's candidates would be effective suppliers of local-level resources.

Indigenous organizations gained a reputation in many local communities as power brokers or organizations that could deliver needed resources and programs because over a number of years they had experienced several major victories in pushing the state and international agencies to create and finance programs that responded to indigenous and campesino demands and had direct and far reaching impacts on these communities. Among the most important were: a national bilingual education program (DINEIB) and a development fund (PRODEPINE). In other words, the national indigenous confederation used its organizational power to press the government and even international agencies, like the World Bank, for programs that would benefit their communities in concrete ways. Equally important, the movement organizations succeeded in negotiating so that they would have a say in how these projects were run, and in so doing, insured that the programs they helped to bring into existence would not threaten their organizations but, on the contrary, strengthen them.

The bilingual education program, DINEIB, was created in 1988 by the Borja administration in response to longstanding demands and pressure from the indigenous organizations. DINEIB was not simply a program designed to include the instruction of indigenous languages in the general curriculum, but instead was structured as a parallel school system for indigenous children, in which they were taught in their native languages by indigenous teachers. Administratively DINEIB was part of the Ministry of Education, but it was autonomous from the part of the Ministry that set the

policies for the rest of the schools and was administered completely differently. Whereas in the general schooling program top appointments were made by the President and responded to the political party in power; in the case of the DINEIB, the program's national director was selected in a collaborative process involving the national indigenous organizations, and then presented for approval to the Minister of Education. In this way, the indigenous organizations retained a significant amount of control over the program.<sup>388</sup> DINEIB also had provincial directors in every province where it had functioning schools, and the same model was employed for the appointment of the provincial directors. In this case, all the indigenous organizations in the province would select pre-candidates for the position, adhering to certain criteria in terms of education and experience. The final selection would take place at a provincial assembly of representatives from each of the organizations. In this way the indigenous organizations, including those independent of CONAIE, assumed direct control over their children's educational system, removing this power from the hands of mestizo politicians and political parties.

The creation of the DINEIB was significant, not only in the sense that it insured that indigenous children would be taught in their native languages and that indigenous people and organizations would have greater control over the curriculum in their children's schools, but because it resulted in a marked expansion of professional employment for indigenous people as teachers and administrators. Previous to the founding of DINEIB, the vast majority of teachers and educational administrators were

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<sup>388</sup> The three national indigenous organizations that participated in this selection process were: CONAIE; the evangelical federation, FEINE; and FENOCIN, which in contrast to CONAIE's more identity-based agenda, espoused a more class-oriented ideology.

mestizos. With the founding of the bilingual program there was a need to hire teachers with bilingual skills, which essentially meant the hiring of a whole new contingent of indigenous teachers. In addition, previous to the creation the bilingual education program, provincial congressmen had discretion over the placement of teachers in their province, but after the DINEIB was set up, control over the hiring system for the indigenous schools was transferred to the program administrators, who in turn had been named by the indigenous organizations. Opening up the system to indigenous educators and removing hiring control from politicians went a long way to changing the distribution of power within rural communities. As Selverston explains: “The schoolteacher is often one of the most important influences in an indigenous community, and also one of the few steady jobs in the countryside.”<sup>389</sup> Thus, this new structure effectively removed a powerful tool for political patronage from the politicians and put it in the hands of the indigenous organizations, thereby undermining traditional patterns of political clientelism.<sup>390</sup> Also important is the fact that control over this program was not monopolized by a single organization but was shared by three national federations and numerous provincial organizations, that in turn were members of one or the other of the national federations. Finally, the structure of the DINIEB served to strengthen indigenous organization in general, because it was through membership in local and provincial indigenous organizations that communities participated in the governance and direction of this national program. This model of control was replicated in other

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<sup>389</sup> Selverston 1997: 181.

<sup>390</sup> The discussion of the structure and impact of DINEIB is based on Chapter 5 in Selverston-Scher 2001, as well as, an author interview with Angel Tibán, Quito, February 1, 2001.

programs that the indigenous movement succeeded in negotiating with the state and international actors.

PRODEPINE was an agency set up to administer the distribution of a \$50 million World Bank loan for local development projects in indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities. The indigenous movement had been pushing for this type of fund. When the World Bank came up with the money, the World Bank, the Ecuadorian government, and the indigenous organizations negotiated the terms for how the fund would be set up and administered. PRODEPINE's administrative structure was similar in some ways to DINEIB's, although the organizations possessed less unilateral power over the fund. In the case of PRODEPINE a sort of board of directors, composed of representatives from all the different ethnic groups in Ecuador (as opposed to the three national indigenous organizations), were responsible for naming the director in accordance with criteria drawn up by the World Bank. There was also a national committee set up to interview and screen all job applicants. This committee was responsible for selecting the top three candidates and sending these nominations to World Bank headquarters in Washington. The World Bank made the final say over which of the three finalists would be hired. So in this case, indigenous representatives, most of whom had some organizational affiliation, were mainly responsible for the hiring decisions but had to make decisions that they knew would be acceptable to the outside funding organization, in this case the World Bank.<sup>391</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> This overview of PRODEPINE's structure is based on the author's interview with Kurikamak Yupanki, Quito, January 29, 2001.

Though the indigenous organizations and in particular CONAIE, did not have direct control over this program, they exerted some influence on the organization through the indigenous professionals involved in various ways in PRODEPINE, most of whom came out of and remained organically tied to one or another of the national indigenous federations. The close connection between PRODEPINE personnel, indigenous organizations and, by extension, Pachakutik was visible during the 2000 local elections. In one of the provincial Pachakutik assemblies held to select provincial candidates for the 2000 elections a PRODEPINE staff person was brought in to serve on the jury panel that moderated the meeting and the selection process. He was a functionary of PRODEPINE but was there in his capacity as an indigenous leader in his own right from another province.<sup>392</sup>

The process of applying for PRODEPINE grants also tended to strengthen, as opposed to weaken, indigenous organization and this clearly was something that CONAIE and the other indigenous organizations were able to negotiate with the World Bank when the program was set up. For example, PRODEPINE was designed to work directly with and through local OSGs,<sup>393</sup> which are the basic organizational building blocks of the provincial, regional and national indigenous federations. OSGs are the organizational level below the provincial federations but above the village assembly and they serve as the link between local communities and the provincial federations. An example of a second-tier organization would be one that groups together fifty communities in the same canton and, which in turn, holds organizational

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<sup>392</sup> Author's field research notes.

<sup>393</sup> *Organizaciones de segundo grado*, in English this term can be translated as "second-tier organizations."

membership in the provincial indigenous federation. In order to apply for PRODEPINE funds communities had to possess a functioning OSG, as applications were only accepted from established organizations. The reason for this criterion was that PRODEPINE envisioned the organizations themselves as implementers; they were the vehicles on the ground for project implementation. Therefore, according to PRODEPINE functionary, Kurikamak Yupanki, the organizational experience and capability of the OSG was an important determinant of how feasible it would be to implement a project. For instance, some of the better-organized OSGs had their own *técnicos*,<sup>394</sup> and this was a huge boost in terms of project implementation.<sup>395</sup>

In my interview with him, Yupanki, himself an indigenous leader, emphasized that PRODEPINE was concerned about not creating divisions within and among communities and instead sought to strengthen the communities and their organizations: “The philosophy, the central principle guiding PRODEPINE is to avoid dividing the peoples, and instead to organize. This [program] was created to strengthen the indigenous and black peoples and nationalities.”<sup>396</sup> According to Yupanki, PRODEPINE was attempting to be very careful about not making funding decisions that would undermine existing organizations and was not in the business of creating new organizations, but instead, of working with and strengthening existing ones. While not an express goal of PRODEPINE, during my field research I came across plenty of evidence that incentives created for obtaining PRODEPINE funds

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<sup>394</sup> People with technical expertise and development skills.

<sup>395</sup> Kurikamak Yupanki, author interview, Quito, January 29, 2001. The vast majority of grants were made directly to OSGs, but according to Yupanki, in cases where the existing OSGs were very weak, exceptions were sometimes made with loans being made to individuals.

<sup>396</sup> Kurikamak Yupanki, author interview, Quito, January 29, 2001.



were helping to spur the growth of new local organizations in communities that had previously been largely unorganized. Many of these new organizations were in turn joining the CONAIE-affiliated federation in their province. While I was unable to obtain reliable data about the nature or extent of organizational growth of CONAIE-affiliated organizations since the start of the PRODEPINE program, the isolated pieces of evidence that I came across in the course of my fieldwork and interviews with people in the rural Highlands suggested that much, if not most, of this new growth was occurring within predominantly mestizo communities and villages. I will come back to this phenomenon further on in the chapter when I discuss how Pachakutik succeeded in broadening its appeal beyond its indigenous base to mestizos.

PRODEPINE got off the ground in 1998 and gave out grants and loans to build infrastructure and development projects in small rural villages. Projects included irrigation systems, potable water, small milk and cheese processing plants, among others. The idea was that the OSGs would help local communities strategize together and decide upon priorities for their area as a whole, and based upon this vision of local development, present proposals for the most urgent projects. Significantly, these would be projects that the communities themselves deemed necessary and vital to their own development. It was hoped that this model would help to avoid common mistakes made by outside agencies that often came into communities with lots of resources but little knowledge of local perspectives or ways of doing things; as a result, these agencies often supplied things that local people had little use for and, therefore, ended up doing little to advance local development.

The fact that the movement was seen as a catalyst for the creation of programs like DINEIB and PRODEPINE, its ability to impact their institutional design, and the thick networks that developed between movement activists and program staff, all contributed to an image of the movement and the organizations that conformed it as powerful agents that could accomplish things to address the real material and educational needs of rural communities. This in turn further strengthened indigenous pride and the ideology of ethnicity, which fed back into movement strength in an interactive dynamic.

By the time of the 2000 elections some of the PRODEPINE money had already been dispersed, projects were in the works, and many more were in the pipeline. While the program was relatively new, there was a great deal of excitement and expectation about it in the areas that I visited during the 2000 electoral campaign. Again, while PRODEPINE was an autonomous program, with its own staff, direction, rules and regulations, it was also associated in voters' minds with the indigenous movement and its organizations. Not only were many of its functionaries and staff people part of one or another of the national indigenous federations, but it was the OSGs, which were members of the provincial indigenous federations, which were the necessary conduit through which communities had to apply for these projects. So PRODEPINE, like DINIEB, represented programs that had direct and significant beneficial impacts on rural localities and communities. In the broader sense they represented spaces of authority, opportunity and dynamism in these poor rural areas. The fact that both these programs were organically tied to the indigenous organizations gave the organizations an important leadership profile in these areas. In

the poorest and least economically dynamic regions these programs and the indigenous organizations associated with them did not have much competition from other social, economic, or political actors in terms of being a reference point for development and access to resources, with the exception of international and religious development organizations.

The bilingual education system was rarely if ever mentioned in Pachakutik's 2000 campaign in Bolivar; clearly, it was a program that was by then taken for granted. And even the PRODEPINE connection was not played up as much as it perhaps could have been by Pachakutik candidates, especially the indigenous candidates. It is interesting that the candidate in Bolivar Province who emphasized PRODEPINE the most in his campaign was a mestizo running for mayor in a largely mestizo canton. I will discuss his race in greater detail in the section on reaching out to mestizo voters. So PRODEPINE was mentioned by Pachakutik candidates, but not unduly emphasized. What was more important was that Pachakutik's candidates were associated with the web of indigenous organizations, which by 2000 had become important power brokers and interlocutors for communities in their own right. The development by the indigenous organizations during the 1990s of a strong leadership role in these rural provinces and communities was crucial to Pachakutik's ability to attract significant numbers of votes in the rural Highlands, especially given the fact that most Pachakutik candidates had far fewer financial resources compared to candidates from the major parties. In Bolivar, for example, the two most important seats being contested in the 2000 elections were for prefect and mayor of the provincial capital, Guaranda. In the case of the prefecture race, the Pachakutik

candidate was running against the incumbent prefect, who was using many of the resources of his office and his personnel to bolster his campaign. In the case of the mayoral race, one of the main contenders competing against the Pachakutik candidate was the owner of an influential local radio station who possessed a fair amount of economic resources with which to finance his campaign, as well as the powerful use of his own radio station to advance his campaign.

The Pachakutik candidates were not without any resources of their own, but they certainly were more limited in this regard. The mestizo Pachakutik candidate for prefect was the head of the local union of bus drivers and owned a fleet of buses. He owned a modest home outside of the provincial capital and had previously invested his own money in at least one unsuccessful bid for congress on the DP party ticket. The candidate for mayor of Guaranda, Arturo Yumbay, was an indigenous professional who hailed from a local indigenous community but owned a home and resided in Guaranda. He had held posts as the director of bilingual education in Bolivar and subsequently as the vice president of CONAIE before running for mayor.

### **Building Bridges: Indigenous and Mestizo Alliances in Bolivar**

Simple demographics meant that despite the indigenous movement's significant resources, including ethnic consciousness and high levels of organizational and social capital, Pachakutik would have had extremely limited success if it relied only on indigenous votes and failed to attract some mestizo support. Quite simply, the localities where indigenous people represented a majority of the population were few and far between and were generally some of the poorest communities in the

country. Of all seventy-five Highland cantons only five, or 7 percent, had rural populations where indigenous people were in the majority. And only seven more had rural populations that were 25-50 percent indigenous, meaning that only 16 percent of all Highland cantons had rural populations that were more than 25 percent indigenous. While it is impossible to know exactly what percentage of the mestizo vote Pachakutik received during any given election, the organization was clearly moderately successful at attracting mestizo votes in certain areas and this was crucial to their victories in these places.

Even a moderate amount of success in attracting mestizo votes was significant because racism and prejudice against indigenous peoples throughout Ecuador remained strong into the twenty-first century. Indians were viewed as backwards, poor and ignorant, not fit to serve as governing authorities. How and why some of these attitudes began to change, thereby leading some mestizos to vote for indigenous candidates and for a party that was closely associated with the indigenous movement, can be understood by employing the same categories used above to discuss how Pachakutik attracted votes among the rural poor and the indigenous: identity, leadership and organization, and the importance of material resources. This evolutionary transformation was brought about as a result of the power and example of the indigenous movement, and it was fascinating to listen to the grassroots mestizo opinion of Pachakutik and the indigenous movement.

One of the indigenous movement's most important qualities and one which was key to facilitating the bridging ties with non-indigenous groups at all levels was its non-sectarianism. As would be expected, within the indigenous movement itself

there were a number of different philosophies and strategies; some were more Indian nationalist and sectarian, while others stressed the importance of alliances with other social sectors. There were radical and moderate strains in the movement, and this variation was evident from province to province with organizations in some provinces less willing to enter into alliances with mestizos or other parties than in others. However, by the late 1990s the actions of the indigenous movement on the national stage coupled with its own important decisions about how to employ its power had resulted in the movement advancing a broad national agenda that encompassed, without limiting itself to, indigenous issues. The indigenous movement's leadership and its willingness to fight the fight for collective goods that benefited the majority of Ecuador's population and not just its own ethnic constituency began to be recognized by many mestizos living in the Highlands. This role as national leader was coupled in some provinces by indigenous organizations, which systematically sought to reach out to and involve and organize not only indigenous, but rural mestizo communities as well. This was the case in Bolivar, and as we will see this strategy clearly worked in Pachakutik's favor.

### Identity and Cross-Ethnic Alliances

The indigenous movement in Ecuador sought to transform indigenous people's own self image and to inculcate pride in their cultures, languages and ethnic heritages. Their struggle to do so, their tenacity in demanding equal citizenship rights, their willingness to confront the state, the effectiveness of their leadership, and the demonstrated power of their organization led not only to changes in their own self-

identity but also, eventually, to gradual changes in mestizo attitudes towards them. This is not to say that racism disappeared, which it clearly did not, but there began to appear in the media, among politicians, and within the general public a new found respect for indigenous people and their high level of organization.

As described in Chapter 4, during the 1990s the indigenous movement's political focus moved increasingly in the direction of addressing issues of concern to all Ecuadorians, as opposed to narrower issues affecting only indigenous people. Because of CONAIE's organizational power, by the mid-1990s the indigenous movement had emerged as the strongest and most important social movement in the country. By the latter part of the decade the movement was increasingly viewed by an important percentage of the public at large as a force that could and would stand up to corrupt administrations in favor of the people. The indigenous movement's central role in the ouster of both Bucaram and Mahuad were viewed by large numbers of regular citizens as positive and courageous. Previous to Mahuad's dramatic ouster in January 2000, the indigenous movement had been one of the main leaders of protests against the president's plan to raise the price of gasoline, cooking gas, and electricity. Popular protests against Mahuad in March and June of 1999, in which many social actors participated along with the indigenous movement, nearly shut the country down. It was the indigenous organizations, and in particular CONAIE, that negotiated an end to the protests. What they insisted on and won in negotiations with the government was eminently popular: a repeal of the price hikes and a promise from Mahuad to freeze these prices for a year. CONAIE's willingness to put aside more particularistic demands in favor of these broad demands, even when it was clear that

much of the indigenous population was so poor that many of them did not use cooking gas and, therefore, would not directly benefit from this policy, was viewed by many as a sign of generosity, integrity, and a lack of self-interest on the part of the indigenous movement. This reputation for integrity was further reinforced for many by the central role the indigenous played in Mahuad's ouster a few months later. While there were certainly some people, especially the more educated, who were concerned about yet another break in constitutionality, for the most part the ouster of Mahuad was politically popular and once again the indigenous movement had played a central role in these events that were significant to everyone. Mesías Mora, a mestizo member of Pachakutik and long-time collaborator of the indigenous movement, was elected to congress from Bolívar Province in 2002 on the MUPP-NP ticket. In my interview with him he described how the type of demand making engaged in by the indigenous movement served to expand its appeal beyond its narrow ethnic constituency:

...the indigenous movement is gaining leadership stature through the various mobilizations, uprisings, and, above all, because the indigenous movement's demands have not been *indigenista*, they have not been of a particularistic nature, like union demands. The demands of the UNE [the national teacher's union], for example, the first point on its struggle platform is always to raise salaries. The CONAIE together with the FECAB-BRUNARI have not fallen into this trap, they have been more generous. For example, a year ago, the indigenous uprising was to demand a freeze on fuel prices – cooking gas and gasoline... Our demands are a little more generous, more open to other sectors, and this has meant that the indigenous movement at the national and provincial levels, in particular, has been gaining authority among these social sectors...<sup>397</sup>

So in this way we can say that the indigenous movement created an identity for itself that was one of national leadership and as a defender of poor people's rights

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<sup>397</sup> Mesías Mora, author interview, Guaranda, Ecuador, May 19, 2000.



against corrupt governments. In the words of Fabián Aguilar, a mestizo who ran for and won the office of prefect of Bolivar on the Pachakutik ticket:

....I believe it [the indigenous movement] is one of the most organized, and what is more, it is accepted by the people. The January 21 uprising is a practical and direct demonstration of how the people benefited as a result of the sacrifice of the indigenous comrades. As a result of this uprising we have not had any rise in fuel and gas prices since June, and this in addition to a series of other benefits that the people acquired, and we are seeing how today the people have turned in favor of the movement as regards the political process. It is as if it is a response to this benefit that was received.<sup>398</sup>

The importance of the indigenous movement's and in particular CONAIE's national profile to the 2000 local elections was evidenced by the fact that many in the national indigenous leadership hit the campaign trail to give a boost to the local Pachakutik campaigns. This seemed to be significant not only for indigenous voters, but also for mestizos as well. Antonio Vargas, then the president of CONAIE, traveled around the country attending Pachakutik rallies and campaign events. This was true for other national indigenous leaders as well; these leaders brought a certain star quality to the campaign stops.

But the national protests and uprisings against Bucaram and Mahuad facilitated Pachakutik's growth in yet another way: in many places these events served as defining moments of bridge building between indigenous movement organizations and other social actors in specific localities. In particular, the anger against the Bucaram administration was so generalized that many different social sectors participated in the spontaneous popular protests that precipitated congress's decision to remove him from office on the charge of "mental incompetence". In Bolivar, for example, all the

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<sup>398</sup> Fabián Aguilar, author interview, Guaranda, Ecuador, March 10, 2000.

mestizo Pachakutik candidates who I interviewed recounted that their ties and relationship with the indigenous movement in Bolivar got its start during those tumultuous times and events; important ties had been forged at that time. Martha Aroca, a Pachakutik candidate for Guaranda City Council, had been involved in the left and social movements for the better part of her life and most recently was a leader in the local women's movement. She described how various groups came together in Bolivar at the time of the Bucaram protests:

During the Bucaram period I was participating in the Women's Forum and we purposefully organized and coordinated our actions with the UNE and the FECAB-BRUNARI. I think it was the first time that we were able to mobilize 10,000 people in the province. We went to all the cantons, and we brought on board all the organizations of artisans, *campesinos*, in other words there was a very good level of organization. It was such a strong uprising that it succeeded in uniting the urban and rural sectors. I think it was the beginning. Then for the January 21 uprising all these groups participated again in the popular parliament. Also at this time we took over the Governor's office and there was very active participation. We sent commissions to Quito... So starting with the Bucaram protests, we have been little by little strengthening ties, and on all the issues we have been together. They [the indigenous organizations] have invited us to workshops and we have been co-participating.<sup>399</sup>

Not only did these periods of social mobilization serve to forge important ties between the indigenous movement and mestizo groups on the left, but the anger towards these administrations was so deep-seated and widespread that more mainstream groups, like transportation unions and taxi cooperatives, also got involved. The connections made between different groups translated, in some cases, into an expansion of Pachakutik's reach into the mestizo population. Such was the case of Fabián Aguilar, elected prefect of Bolivar in 2000. The bus drivers' union, which had

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<sup>399</sup> Martha Aroca, author interview, Guaranda, Ecuador, April 11, 2000.

headed, had actively participated in the 1999 and 2000 protests. In fact, the offices of the bus drivers' union in Guaranda served as the coordinating headquarters for the July 1999 protests in that city against Mahuad and the fuel hikes. A year later Pachakutik approached him about running for prefect on their ticket. He accepted and told me in my interview with him that he believes that Pachakutik sought him out as a candidate precisely because of his and his union's leadership role during those protests.

So you have the indigenous movement's identity as a leader of social protest serving as both a draw for voters and a vehicle through which ties with other organized actors were forged. All of this served to begin to erode, at least among some, the racism that permeated Ecuadorian society, as illustrated in the following quote from a mestizo who was running as a Pachakutik candidate for city council in the canton of Chimbo in Bolivar Province:

Previously there has been this type of racism in which the indigenous were marginalized by the mestizo sector. But now we mestizos have realized that there is no reason to marginalize the indigenous because they are a part of Ecuador, they are our brothers, and what is more important, they are pioneers of these great struggles at the national level where they have made the power of their organization felt. On the basis of that organization, the mestizos and the social sectors have joined in these great marches. That is why we are today forming part of Pachakutik, which is made up of indigenous people, *campesinos*, as well as poor social sectors from the towns. In sum, we are all united in Pachakutik. Now there is no racism whatsoever, nor social class that separates us, we are united in Pachakutik.<sup>400</sup>

Certainly a bit idealistic, but nevertheless it was significant that some mestizos were saying things to this effect.

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<sup>400</sup> Vinicio Vega, author interview, Chimbo, Ecuador, April 24, 2000.

### The Role of Organization and Leadership in Forging Cross-Ethnic Alliances

In addition to building ties to other social actors, the indigenous organization in Bolivar had a history of reaching out to help organize rural people in largely non-indigenous communities. According to my observations on the ground, it appeared that the indigenous movement's involvement in electoral politics through Pachakutik served to deepen and accelerate this tendency.

According to Selverston-Scher, the FECAB-BRUNARI grew tremendously in terms of affiliated communities between its founding in 1972 and the early 1990s. She argues that this growth was due to the organization's partial success in directing resources to communities, the influence of indigenous identity brought about by the existence of the bilingual education program, and the fact that the organization had become an "interlocutor for development and other projects for indigenous communities." She notes that the FECAB-BRUNARI had developed such an important reputation in these respects that several mestizo communities had approached it seeking to join the federation and that the FECAB-BRUNARI had accepted them.<sup>401</sup>

By the time of my fieldwork in Bolivar in 2000 it was evident that indigenous leaders had not only been accepting mestizo communities into their organization, but for a couple of years had been actively helping to organize unorganized mestizo rural communities throughout the province. By the time of the 2000 local elections, these recently organized communities represented the backbone of Pachakutik support in the

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<sup>401</sup> Selverston-Scher 2001: 105.

sub-tropical cantons where the indigenous population was particularly small. Pachakutik Congressman Gilberto Talahua was one of the key people who worked to spur the growth of new organizations in these cantons, where traditionally the indigenous movement had little or no presence. Several mestizos whom I interviewed in these cantons mentioned Congressman Talahua in particular as one of their main contacts and sources of support in the process of organizing an OSG in their region.<sup>402</sup> Talahua himself told me that he traveled down to these cantons on a regular basis to assist these organizing efforts.<sup>403</sup> The same organizational model used in the indigenous communities was employed when organizing these primarily mestizo rural communities. It was clear from my interviews that one of the main incentives that helped push forward this organizational drive was the promise of PRODEPINE funding for local development projects. So we will turn to the role that material resources played in expanding the reach and influence of the indigenous organizations and, in turn, the electoral success of Pachakutik.

#### Material Resources and Cross-Ethnic Alliances

The possibility of applying for PRODEPINE funds appears to have been an important organizing incentive for rural communities in some of the sub-tropical cantons of Bolivar where the indigenous movement had not traditionally had a presence. As was mentioned earlier, it was these recently founded organizations in rural communities that served as the backbone for Pachakutik organizing in the cantons outside of Guaranda, the traditional base of the indigenous movement in the

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<sup>402</sup> Author interviews with Jorge Washington Zanipatin, Chimbo, Ecuador, April 24, 2000; Vinicio Vega, Chimbo, April 24, 2000; and Milton Barragán Echeandia, Ecuador, April 30, 2000.

<sup>403</sup> Gilberto Talahua, author interview, Quito, March 14, 2000.

province. Like poor indigenous people, it would be expected that poor mestizos would tend to cast their votes not purely or even primarily on ideological grounds, but on the basis of which party or candidate appeared to offer them the greatest prospect for a concrete improvement in their daily lives. To the extent that the indigenous movement and, by association, Pachakutik had begun to represent possibilities for concrete improvement in these communities, then the political movement had a better chance of winning votes. The evidence I have to back up this conclusion is not based on hard survey data, but on a number of qualitative interviews with Pachakutik organizers and observation of the Pachakutik campaign in these cantons. Thus my argument on this point cannot be considered conclusive, but only a hypothesis that would need to be further tested through the collection of more data. Having offered that caveat, the qualitative data suggest fairly strongly that Pachakutik's success in the sub-tropical cantons of Bolivar in the 2000 elections was due in no small measure to the expansion of *campesino* organization into these cantons in the two or three years leading up to the elections, and that this organizational surge was encouraged in part by the promise of access to PRODEPINE funds for local development projects.

Of the seven cantons in Bolivar Province I visited four and conducted formal interviews in three of these: Guaranda and the two sub-tropical cantons of Echeandia and Chimbo. In both Echeandia and Chimbo MUPP-NP ran alone, not in alliance with any other party. Also in both cases, the Pachakutik candidates for mayor were mestizos, as the indigenous populations in both cantons were small to negligible. Echeandia was one of the Pachakutik success stories in 2000 with their candidate, Milton Barragán, winning the election with 44.1 percent of the vote. Jorge

Washington Zanipatin, the Pachakutik candidate in Chimbo did not fare as well, coming in third with a total of 18.5 percent of the vote.

In my interviews with both mayoral candidates and some of their running mates for city council, they discussed their efforts over the last few years to organize rural communities with the help of Congressman Talahua and the FECAB-BRUNARI, and mentioned PRODEPINE projects that had been initiated or approved for communities in their province. Even though official government estimates list Chimbo as having no indigenous population, Zanipatin informed me that there were four small indigenous communities in the canton, but they had not been well organized and were not active participants in the provincial indigenous movement. As a leftist mestizo Zanipatin began to take interest in the indigenous movement around 1994 and started to make some informal contacts. His relationship with the provincial movement solidified in 1996 when he ran for city council on the Pachakutik ticket and eventually became the political movement's cantonal coordinator. Since that time he had been struggling to gain the confidence of the four indigenous communities and to help them get better organized and more involved in the indigenous struggle. At the same time he and others began work to organize other rural communities. Just shy of a year before the 2000 local elections they founded a canton-level OSG, the Union of Indigenous and Campesino Organizations of Chimbo Canton, involving the four small indigenous communities and other mestizo farming communities. Even though this OSG was less than a year old, several of their development projects had already been approved by PRODEPINE and construction on one of them, a milk processing plant,

was about to begin. They were also expecting to receive help for the construction of a mill and financing to begin pork production in six communities.<sup>404</sup>

According to Zanipatin the Union's second congress was held specifically to decide whether or not to run a Pachakutik slate of candidates for local office in the 2000 elections. They decided in the affirmative and selected four candidates for city council in addition to Zanipatin for mayor. In other words, the *campesino* union essentially became the local Pachakutik organizational structure in that canton. Zanipatin lived in town and was employed as a professor at the local provincial university. According Vinicio Vega, one of the candidates who ran for city council, the union put together a candidate list that was 50 percent indigenous and 50 percent mestizo, because that was the make-up of the organization. Two of the candidates were union leaders, another was a rural schoolteacher, and only one was a mestizo town dweller. There are two interesting things that these selection decisions indicate about Pachakutik's strengths and weaknesses. In the first place, the fact that they put together a list was 50 percent indigenous in a canton where the indigenous population was negligible almost certainly hurt their electoral prospects. This points to the fact that Pachakutik activity and decision-making often cannot be reduced to the strict strategic logic of winning elections. As many Pachakutik leaders stated in my interviews with them, a central goal of participation in Pachakutik was to strengthen the organizational base of the indigenous and popular movements. Having these newly formed organizations in cantons like Chimbo take it upon themselves to select

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<sup>404</sup> Jorge Washington Zanipatin, author interview, Chimbo, Ecuador, April 24, 2000.



candidates and organize a political campaign must surely have been empowering, an activity in which these people had most probably never previously participated.

Secondly, the fact that three of the four Pachakutik candidates for city council were from the rural areas was typical of the political profile that Pachakutik projected at the local level: one that clearly and unapologetically sought to represent the interests of rural communities and to balance municipalities' agendas in order to address the needs of rural residents, as well as, town dwellers. The reasons why Pachakutik did not do better than a third place finish in Chimbo are probably the following: the still relatively small size of the *campesino* organization in that canton, and the mayoral candidate's lack of charisma.

Echeandia, on the other hand, was the Pachakutik success story among the mestizo cantons of Bolivar. In this case, the Pachakutik candidate for mayor was a young, handsome, charismatic candidate, who was born in the canton and had worked for twelve years previous to running for office as the local director for Plan International, an international development agency. As a result of his work with Plan, Barragán knew and in turn was known throughout the canton's rural communities. This experience had allowed him to build up a significant level of trust with these communities. This was precisely the type of mestizo candidate that Pachakutik Bolivar had turned to in the past; someone with extensive experience in rural development and who was known and trusted by the rural communities.<sup>405</sup>

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<sup>405</sup> In 1996, the year of the founding of Pachakutik, the indigenous organizations in Bolivar asked Kléver Guevara to be the Pachakutik candidate for mayor of Guaranda. Guevara was also a mestizo and had worked in the canton for many years as a representative of the Catholic development agency, FEPP. Pachakutik won that election in 1996, but within a year Pachakutik and the indigenous organizations withdrew their support for Guevara, who they claimed had not followed through on his

In 1999 Barragán and others organized a *campesino* union bringing under one organizational umbrella fifty-three rural communities in the canton. The Federation of Campesino and Indigenous Communities (FECOCI) was founded in June of 1999, right about the same time as the one in Chimbo came into being.<sup>406</sup> Even though there are no indigenous communities per se in Echeandia,<sup>407</sup> the FECOCI joined and became a member organization of FECAB-BRUNARI, ECUARUNARI, and CONAIE.

As in Chimbo, by the time of the 2000 local elections this union had developed and submitted proposals to PRODEPINE for funding and several were in the works. During a speech that Barragán gave at a campaign rally in the center of Echeandia he talked about the PRODEPINE projects and clearly associated Pachakutik and his candidacy with these developments, which was something that I did not hear at other Pachakutik campaign rallies in the province. Barragán did not use this record as a typical political boss might do, to threaten that if he or she was not elected that these promised projects would not come through, instead he talked about them as the accomplishments of the organization that they had worked to build. Nevertheless, it was clear that the existence of the PRODEPINE projects was an acknowledged part of the Pachakutik platform in this canton.

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promise to implement a political agenda in favor of the rural communities and develop an alternative type of administration. Author's field research notes and author interview with Kléver Guevara, Guaranda, Ecuador, April 25, 2000.

<sup>406</sup> Milton Barragán, author interview, Echeandia, Ecuador, April 30, 2000.

<sup>407</sup> According to Barragán there are indigenous families scattered throughout various rural communities in the canton but no majority indigenous communities. Author interview, Echeandia, Ecuador, April 30, 2000.

Again, while clearly voters were responding to the provision of some concrete material improvements, the means by which these improvements were being supplied were different than would have been the case in the typical clientelistic relationship. In the indigenous organizations and in Pachakutik itself the emphasis was on participatory planning and the development of coordinated development proposals by numerous communities in a region, as opposed to the more typical pattern of individual communities competing for attention and aid from a political boss. In my interview with Wilson Villegas, at the time a Pachakutik candidate for the Echeandia City Council and a *campesino* leader, he described these organizational differences:

...we have been preparing our governing plan [*plan de gobierno*] in the communities themselves with different leaders and organizations. There is one fundamental thing that no other movement or political party is doing and that is that the Pachakutik movement has been organizing people's parliaments in each community, and this has been received very favorably. People really like it because they are going to be the participants, the ones who legislate and monitor these works that the communities need.<sup>408</sup>

Clearly then, during the late 1990s the FECAB-BRUNARI was in an expansionary mode, and given that most indigenous communities were already organized members of the federation, combined with the fact that indigenous communities themselves only represented a bit more than 20 percent of the total provincial population, the only way to continue growing was to incorporate non-indigenous communities. From the interviews I conducted, it appeared that the previous level of organization in these communities was low and that most importantly there was not a tremendous amount of organizational capital between

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<sup>408</sup> Wilson Villegas, author interview, Echeandia, Ecuador, April 30, 2000.

communities. This scaling up through organizational membership in OSGs, then provincial federations, which in turn were connected to regional and national organizations, was something that membership in the indigenous movement uniquely offered. There had been a history in ECUARUNARI of accepting non-indigenous members, but the speed and intensity of organizational expansion and its intentional quality in Bolivar during the late 1990s appeared to be unprecedented. It is hard to say how much this expansion was spurred by a desire to increase Pachakutik's political power in the province or by other goals more specific to the social movement agenda, although the logic in favor of the former appears to be stronger, in the sense that the benefits to the party of expanding were much clearer than would have been those to the indigenous movement organizations themselves. Thus, it appears likely that in Bolivar indigenous movement involvement in politics encouraged indigenous organizations to reach out to mestizo sectors and build of ties with non-indigenous, *campesino* leaders. This type of process would naturally tend to weaken more sectarian, separatist positions in the movement. It is unclear, however, whether this inclusion of mestizo communities in the indigenous movement organizations would in the long run have the effect of diluting or diminishing the ethnic and cultural component of the movement's agenda. When I questioned Milton Barragán about the FECOCI joining these indigenous organizations, he responded by explaining, "CONAIE, ECUARUNARI... and the Pachakutik political movement do not really just belong to the indigenous, but to all social sectors throughout the country and internationally; FECAB has always been of a mind that all the cantons should have

OSGs.”<sup>409</sup> This downplaying of the import of the ethnic and cultural agenda in the indigenous organizations and within Pachakutik was interesting. The fact that a mestizo person voiced this further supports the suggestion that the indigenous movement had become a reference point for many non-indigenous people.

Due to time limitations, it was not possible for me to determine the extent to which this trend of electoral participation leading to organizational expansion into mestizo communities by provincial indigenous organizations was replicated in other provinces. This was not the only strategy used, but in Bolivar it was clearly a successful one that offered the potential for future growth. In the Highland province of Chimborazo Pachakutik’s strategy was to enter into electoral alliances with mestizo-dominated parties and thereby expand their reach among mestizo voters. This strategy was successful in terms of the election of coalition slates, but in most cases they were shallow alliances that broke up fairly quickly after the elections were over. Only infrequently did these electoral alliances translate into true governing alliances. In Cotopaxi, a Highland province with a proportionally large indigenous population, the Pachakutik movement did not appear to suffer in electoral terms even though it chose to go it alone and did not enter into electoral alliances with mestizo parties. But in Tungurahua, a neighboring province to Bolivar, the Pachakutik organization never took off and succeeded only in winning a few minor seats on the city and provincial councils, never winning a major office like that of mayor or prefect and never winning an election for congress. The main problem appeared to be the provincial indigenous organization’s unwillingness and apparent inability to draw more mestizos into the

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<sup>409</sup> Milton Barragán, author interview, Echeandia, Ecuador, April 30, 2000.

political movement or to enter into alliances with mestizo sectors. In the wake of the 2000 elections, Pachakutik and indigenous leaders stepped up efforts to build stronger organizational bases on the Coast, where the indigenous movement traditionally had a negligible presence. Pachakutik recognized that their ability to have an impact at the national level was hampered by their extremely weak presence on the Coast. So, while it was not uniform, in certain provinces, like Bolivar and Chimborazo, it was clear that electoral considerations were encouraging indigenous organizations to reach out to and build stronger ties with certain sectors of the mestizo community.

In conclusion, there were a series of historical and strategic developments within the indigenous movement that combined to raise Pachakutik's electoral appeal among some mestizos in certain areas of the Highlands. First there was the indigenous movement's national profile as leader championing the rights of poor Ecuadorians against corrupt governments. Concurrent with this emerging national profile, concerted efforts were made by indigenous movement organizations in certain provinces to reach out to and build bridges to mestizo communities, and in some cases even to expand the identity and mandate of their own organizations so as to include and incorporate mestizos. The three crucial resources that the indigenous organizations had built among Indian people – a positive self-identity, organizational capital and the provision of material resources – also served to help mobilize mestizo voters in favor of Pachakutik.

### **Pachakutik's Experience in Local Administration**

We have explored in great detail the underlying elements that positioned Pachakutik to compete effectively in the rural areas of the Highlands. Before concluding this chapter we will review briefly the actual platform that Pachakutik ran on and the governing model they were championing. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the political movement's two guiding principles were social control and participation, with the former having to do primarily with accountability on the part of politicians. Pachakutik candidates running in the 2000 elections had a strong anti-corruption message and most promised to implement a participatory style of regional and provincial planning with an eye towards meaningful and coordinated economic development. The third central plank in the Pachakutik platform in local level elections was to balance attention by the municipalities between the rural areas and the town centers. Traditionally municipal administrations in Ecuador tended to spend the vast majority of their money on public works to benefit the towns, often completely neglecting the needs of rural dwellers. Changing this equation was one of Pachakutik's central positions in races throughout the rural Highlands. In other words, Pachakutik was clearly identified with the interests of *campesinos* and rural dwellers, although certainly they made efforts to reach out to mestizo voters in the town centers as well.

At the national level and in Bolivar itself, Pachakutik had a track record to build upon in terms of its anti-corruption stance. The national indigenous movement

was seen as a champion of national popular interests against corrupt governments as a result of their leadership in the ouster of Bucaram and Mahuad. In Bolivar, Pachakutik provincial congressman, Gilberto Talahua, used his legislative oversight powers to bring corruption charges against two mayors in the province. One was removed from office by the local courts, while the other one was not convicted because the court was stacked with judges from this politician's party.<sup>410</sup>

The movement also had credibility in the area of participatory development because what they were proposing was similar to the methodology that had been developed for PRODEPINE's work. Finally, the movement's credentials as an advocate for rural peoples were impossible to deny. So Pachakutik candidates had a platform that distinguished them from traditional political parties and their political movement's association with the national indigenous movement and provincial indigenous organizations gave their proposals and positions credibility.

The question of how Pachakutik administrations fared at the local level and how successful they were at implementing their programs is a question that is beyond the scope of this dissertation and has been addressed to some extent already by others.<sup>411</sup> However, because of its importance, I will briefly review some of the obstacles and opportunities that these administrations faced.

Pachakutik did not start out with a highly specific model of local administration or infrastructure to support its candidates who won election to political office in the 1996 elections. However, a model emerged subsequent to 1996 based in

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<sup>410</sup> Author interviews with Congressman Gilberto Talahua, Quito, March 14, 2000; and Mesías Mora, Guaranda, Ecuador, May 19, 2000.

<sup>411</sup> See Cameron 2001; Grupo Democracia y Desarrollo Local 1999.



large part on the experiences of two of the most successful Pachakutik mayors, Auki Tituaña of Cotacachi canton in Imbabura Province and Mariano Curicamac of Guamote in the province of Chimborazo. Both these men came to political office after many years of involvement in the indigenous movement. In office they incorporated into their governance styles and *modus operandi* practices and principles from local indigenous experience and culture, as well as, indigenous movement organizations. NGOs working on supporting alternative development also helped to shape the experience of these Pachakutik administrations on the ground and the development of a general model of participatory local government. By the time of the 2000 elections a model for alternative municipalities had taken shape. First the canton or province would develop an overall development plan. These development plans were to be participatory processes, as opposed to something drawn up by specialists or politicians in isolation from the citizens. In Cotacachi Tituaña dedicated the first year of his administration to preparing the development plan. This process involved holding community meetings throughout the canton and having citizens actively participate in thinking through how the municipality should budget and use its resources. They had the help and input of development specialists and technicians in this process, but the fundamental idea was that the citizens should be involved and thus own the decisions that were made. This would help streamline and focus the work of the municipality or province and avoid clientelistic-type behavior on the part of the politician. The pressure on these politicians for immediate handouts was tremendous. To cite one example, in 2000 an indigenous movement leader was elected to the office of prefect of Cotopaxi Province on the Pachakutik ticket; in the first six months that he was in

office he received six thousand individual petitions from parishes<sup>412</sup> for small things like cement, school buildings, hoses, etc.<sup>413</sup> Clearly, without a good development plan and an objective assessment of needs in the province, it would have been impossible to prioritize these petitions in a fair and effective manner.

So the drafting of an integral development plan for the province or municipality was the first and most important step towards implementing a participatory administration. Clearly, the larger the region or the population being governed, the more cumbersome this type of direct democracy model would be to implement, however, it proved quite effective at the municipal level in some small, generally rural cantons, like Cotacachi and Guamote.<sup>414</sup> Its success at the provincial level and in urban areas could not be assessed, although the experience of the PT party in Brazil has demonstrated that this type of participatory model can be adapted to these settings, not without problems, but also with positive results.<sup>415</sup>

Pachakutik local elected officials faced their own set of difficulties in implementing their agenda once elected. These often included lacking a working majority on the city council, extremely limited budgets, and high levels of indebtedness, which handicapped their ability to implement public programs and works. In most cantons limited municipal budgets were consumed by fixed costs, such as salaries for government workers, building and maintenance expenses, and the like. Thus, often times elected officials would come into office with their hands tied

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<sup>412</sup> Smallest administrative unit in Ecuador. These are the rural hamlets and villages that belong to a canton.

<sup>413</sup> Angel Tibán, author interview, Quito, February 1, 2001.

<sup>414</sup> For a more in depth look at the model developed in these two cantons and how it fared, see Cameron 2001; Torres D. 1999.

<sup>415</sup> For a discussion of PT local administrations in Brazil see: Abers 1998; Delaine Rhodes 2003.

by these inherited conditions. Because of the extremely fragile tax base in these poor rural areas, increasing revenue through raising taxes was not a feasible option. The most talented of the Pachakutik mayors found that the only way out of this bind was to raise additional financing from outside sources, namely international NGOs. Interestingly enough, this proved to be easier for indigenous mayors than for mestizo politicians due to the indigenous movement's cache with international NGOs.

Of the first set of Pachakutik mayors elected in 1996, Tituaña and Curicamac proved to be the most successful. Their administrations were so forward looking, transparent, and effective that they became models within Ecuador and even received some international acclaim. According to Tituaña, Cotacachi's municipal budget more than doubled during his first term because his administration was able to raise funds from NGOs. Not only did NGO participation help financially, explained Tituaña, but the presence of these agencies, which were known to have rigorous auditing and oversight practices, helped to make credible the image of transparency that the municipality was trying to cultivate.<sup>416</sup> Tituaña, himself an indigenous leader, won reelection in 2000 garnering an astounding 80 percent of the vote in a canton where the indigenous population represented not more than 40 percent of the total population.

As John Cameron pointed out, the ability to replicate the Cotacachi and Guamote models was improbable, in large part because it is highly doubtful that the significant level of financial support that these administrations received from

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<sup>416</sup> Auki Tituaña, author interview, Cotacachi, Ecuador, April 14, 2000.

international NGOs would be available to many more municipalities.<sup>417</sup> These two elected officials were able to attract this kind of support because of their track record as indigenous leaders and the connections they had made over the years working in the indigenous organizations. Clearly not all elected officials would have this type of experience or social capital. Thus the success experienced by these two Pachakutik municipalities was due in no small measure to the attributes and experience of the individual officeholders. In subsequent years and especially in the wake of their 2000 election victories, Pachakutik worked to put in place a better institutional support network for its elected officials, that included training and help with contacts with NGOs. One part of this support network, PRODEPINE had a small fund of \$45,000 to help indigenous local elected authorities with projects for their cantons. In the 1996 elections Pachakutik won a total of five mayoralties. By contrast, in 2000 the party won twenty-seven mayoralties and five prefectures. A PRODEPINE staff person I interviewed explained that this increase in the number of elected Pachakutik officials had overloaded his agency's program, and as a result they were forced to be selective in their support and were trying to carefully target those administrations that demonstrated real evidence of implementing the alternative municipality model.<sup>418</sup>

Beyond outside financial help, the existence of organizational capital in the countryside certainly offered an important advantage for participatory planning, making the whole process easier and more manageable. But what role and how much power to give the indigenous organizations in these alternative administrations was a

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<sup>417</sup> Cameron 2001: 23

<sup>418</sup> Kurikamak Yupanki, author interview, Quito, January 29, 2001.

tricky question. For all Pachakutik elected officials, but particularly for indigenous ones, there was a fine line to be walk between being responsive to the movement constituency that helped to get them elected and avoiding the appearance of governing primarily for a single constituency. Most indigenous people elected to office granted some degree of power and involvement to indigenous movement organizations. For instance, César Umajinga, the indigenous prefect of Cotopaxi, succeeded in getting the provincial council to approve the formation of a special committee that was charged with overseeing and carrying out the development plan for the province. Serving on this committee was the prefect, two representatives from the elected provincial council, two NGO representatives, two from the local parish councils, delegates from the provincial ministries, and most interestingly, three representatives from the provincial indigenous movement organization, MICC. Provincial council members from opposition parties opposed the naming of MICC representatives to this committee, but the rationale given by the prefect for this arrangement was that he was not elected because of his own individual qualities, instead his victory was the result of the organization that backed him and it was through this organization that the NGOs now working with the prefecture had become involved.<sup>419</sup>

Pachakutik politicians faced another challenge, one typically faced by political machines: How to respond to pressures from organizations for patronage? Despite Pachakutik's alternative rhetoric and its emphasis on overcoming clientelism, the pressure on Pachakutik politicians was real. It stemmed from the lack of good jobs in the countryside and the fact that indigenous people had been for the most part locked

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<sup>419</sup> Angel Tibán, author interview, Quito, February 1, 2001.

out of most government jobs in the past. There were often severe limits on the amount of new employees an official could hire, as most municipal and provincial employees were civil servants and not political appointees. The other limitation had to do with the dearth of trained indigenous professionals to fill slots that were open. Several Pachakutik activists mentioned the need to train indigenous people in various technical fields as an important mid-term goal and priority. During his first year in office as Cotopaxi prefect, Umajinga hired only four indigenous people to minor, relatively unimportant posts. The fact that more were not hired created tensions with some local communities, as Angel Tibán, who worked closely with Umajinga, explained:

Within the indigenous population in Cotopaxi there are no architects, engineers, or planners... But our population believes that because we have gained power we can send any comrade to serve as, let's say, the head of public works. But the state statutes stipulate that this person must be an engineer. Our population does not yet understand this question of the need to train professionals, they say, 'but we have a good bricklayer over here.'... As a result, there is anger right now against the leadership over the question of why they haven't put so and so in the post they wanted. We are trying to raise consciousness that we need to train engineers, architects, doctors, etc. We need to prepare ourselves in order to be able to exercise power with all criteria.<sup>420</sup>

So Pachakutik politicians faced patronage pressures from their base, but where the organizations were strong and the elected officials were experienced and had close ties to the organizations, at least in the Highlands, this helped to mitigate and keep these pressures under control. The extent to which this was also true in the Amazon is something that I was unable to fully explore.

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<sup>420</sup> Angel Tibán, author interview, Quito, February 1, 2001.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter started out by presenting evidence that indicated that Pachakutik garnered a significant share of votes in largely indigenous and rural areas in the 2000 local elections, and that these votes were important to the election of twenty-seven Pachakutik mayors and five prefects throughout the rural Amazon and the Highlands.

Given the difficulties that have been noted in the literature about rural democratization, this chapter then set out to uncover the configuration of factors that contributed to Pachakutik's ability to attract these votes, despite the fact that most Pachakutik candidates had quite limited access to financial resources to run their campaigns. The vital role that indigenous organizations had come to play in local rural communities was highlighted as one of the key factors explaining Pachakutik's ability to garner votes in some of these areas. In particular, three resources developed over the years by the indigenous movement – positive indigenous identity, organizational and leadership capital, and the provision of material and development resources – were singled out as working together to make Pachakutik a viable political vehicle among indigenous, but also among some sectors of the mestizo population.

The chapter ended by briefly describing the Pachakutik model of local governance and discussing some of its advantages and some of the difficulties it faced. While the focus of my research and the lack, as yet, of enough historical perspective does not allow for a more definitive assessment of the Pachakutik experience in local government at this time, I offered evidence that many Pachakutik politicians attempted

to implement alternative governing models that differed in important ways from traditional clientelistic models.

Another thing that became clear in the course of my research was that Pachakutik organizing at the local level was involving rural people in local politics to greater extent than had been the case previously. In Bolivar Province, in particular, it appeared to be spurring greater organization among rural mestizo populations and the forging of important organizational ties between the indigenous and mestizo populations. As one indigenous leader from Cotopaxi Province explained:

At the community level elections were always something that had been an obligatory act we had to fulfill for the state. We have always viewed it this way. I have witnessed it ... from the vantage point of the community, you had to receive any political party, and if they gave you something you had to vote for them. That is how we lived. But once we began directly participating [in politics] things changed. In our community local residents are beginning to question [things] and to ask, "Why are things this way?" Now in the communal meetings politics is discussed: what they think of Jamil [President Mahuad] and Noboa,<sup>421</sup> how they view dollarization. These things were never discussed in the past. If our *compañeros*<sup>422</sup> had not gotten involved in politics I don't know if today these things would be topics of conversation in the communities, but now politics is part of the local discourse. I have witnessed this in every community...<sup>423</sup>

The Pachakutik experience demonstrates that social movement organization has the potential, under certain circumstances, to translate into real political power at the local level. As such, it offers a real potential for deepening the democratization process, concretely in terms of implementing new models of local administration and

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<sup>421</sup> Alvaro Noboa was presidential candidate.

<sup>422</sup> Comrades.

<sup>423</sup> Lourdes Tibán, author interview, Quito, March 9, 2000.



governance and, as this last quote indicates, by impacting and transforming political culture as opportunities for participation are expanded.

## Chapter 8

### False Starts: The Katarista Parties in Bolivia

In Bolivia, as in Ecuador, indigenous peasants organized themselves and emerged as a significant social force during the 1980s, the 1990s, and into the new millennium. As in Ecuador, *campesino*<sup>424</sup> federations in Bolivia proved capable of organizing social protests that could severely hamper economic activity throughout large swaths of the country, thus forcing the national government into direct negotiations with their leadership. An ethnic consciousness also grew within the Bolivian movement sending roots down deeply into local communities, so that by the late 1990s in many regions of the country *campesino* struggles became increasingly couched in a language of ethnic rights and cultural pride. Following a pattern similar to that which took place in Ecuador, the indigenous-*campesino* movement in Bolivia rose to a much more prominent leadership position among the country's progressive social movements after Bolivia's powerful labor movement was hobbled by the implementation of neoliberal policies and the decline of Marxism after the fall of the Soviet Union. Likewise in Bolivia, as in Ecuador, attempts were made by these movements to harness their newfound political strength through the formation of political parties that could compete for political power through the ballot box. The return to democracy in Bolivia in the early 1980s witnessed the formation of new

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<sup>424</sup> Throughout most of this chapter I use *campesino* instead of "peasant" for the reasons enumerated in Chapter 4. In Bolivia *campesino* is used more frequently than it is in Ecuador. The use of the term *indígena* (indigenous) by Bolivian indigenous peasants has been much less widespread than has been the case in Ecuador. Many Bolivian indigenous peasants tend to either identify as a member of their specific ethnic group (Aymara or Quechua), as a *campesino*, or from a certain area. This variation in usage reflects differences between the two countries in terms of identity formation. Some of the reasons for this variation will be discussed in this chapter. See also Albó 2004.

parties led by and seeking to represent the indigenous and *campesino* populations for the first time in the nation's history.

The evolution of the indigenous-*campesino* movements in both countries and their rise to prominence as important political actors during this period is strikingly similar in many ways. However, there are also some significant differences and this chapter will focus on one of these, namely the more checkered history of *campesino*-indigenous parties in Bolivia compared with Ecuador. Despite earlier attempts, indigenous and *campesino* political parties in Bolivia did not meet with any real electoral success until the late 1990s and it was only in 2002 that two of these parties, Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) and Indian Movement Pachakutik (MIP), succeeded in establishing themselves as successful challengers to Bolivia's traditional political parties. This is despite the fact that a national *campesino* federation was founded in Bolivia seven years before CONAIE came into existence in Ecuador. Likewise, Bolivian indigenous-*campesino* leaders had been actively participating in national politics in their own country more than a decade before the 1990 indigenous uprising in Ecuador signaled the coming of age of Ecuador's indigenous movement. In sum, earlier consolidation of the movement at a national level in Bolivia did not translate into earlier electoral success at the ballot box, despite the fact that several parties with roots in the national *campesino* federation were formed and ran candidates in elections during the 1980s. Indeed these first attempts by Bolivian indigenous leaders to launch political parties in the late 1970s and during the 1980s were a dismal failure. Why the Katarista parties failed is a key question that will be addressed in this chapter. A corollary question to this one that will also be addressed in this chapter is,

what were the critical changes that led to the truly remarkable electoral success by MIP and, in particular, by MAS in 2002 and then again in 2005?<sup>425</sup> Finally, why, despite the Bolivian movement's earlier consolidation at the national level did it trail the Ecuadorian indigenous movement in the formation of successful political parties?

Another notable difference between movement-based parties in both countries was that in Bolivia there was a strong tendency towards division and splintering, whereas in Ecuador, with some minor exceptions,<sup>426</sup> these efforts were unified. In Bolivia the first two indigenous parties founded in the 1970s, the Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement (MRTK) and the Tupaj Katari Indian Movement (MITKA), both splintered so badly during the 1980s that by the end of the decade there were approximately "ten tiny splinter parties with Katarista-sounding names."<sup>427</sup> By the same token, the much more successful incursion by *campesino*-indigenous parties in Bolivia at the start of the new millennium was accomplished not by a single unified party, but instead by two parties representing distinct geographical regions and led by two different leaders who were both affiliated with the national *campesino* federation, the Unified Peasant Workers Confederation of Bolivia (CSUTCB).

This chapter will consider why it took longer for successful *campesino*-indigenous political parties to emerge in Bolivia compared to Ecuador, given the

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<sup>425</sup> In 2005 MAS candidate, Evo Morales, an indigenous leader of the coca growers movement, won Bolivia's presidential elections.

<sup>426</sup> There is of course not complete unity in Ecuador either, for instance a competing national indigenous organization, FEINE, created its own political party, Amauta Jatari (AJ), at about the same time that Pachakutik was formed. However, AJ had very little electoral success. In certain local elections other indigenous parties have formed to run against Pachakutik. One of the most striking cases of this was during the 2000 local elections for mayor of Otavalo in Imbabura Province. In this case a disgruntled indigenous leader, Carmen Yamberla, formed her own party and her in ticket after she lost the nominating process within Pachakutik. In that year she lost to the Pachakutik candidate, Mario Cornejo.

<sup>427</sup> Van Cott 2003b: 765.

earlier organizational consolidation of the Bolivian *campesino* movement at the national level. It will also consider why Bolivian *campesino*-indigenous political parties have been much more prone to division than their counterparts in Ecuador. In considering the reasons for these differences we will bring to bear the hypotheses and conclusions from the study of Pachakutik in Ecuador in an effort to evaluate and test the robustness of these findings and their applicability to other cases.

Van Cott (2003b) offers an explanation for the stunning electoral success in 2002 of the MAS and MIP parties after twenty years of failure by indigenous parties to make any headway in Bolivia. She argues that, “a combination of macro-level sociopolitical changes, shifts in the political opportunity structure, and conjunctural catalysts produced this unexpected outcome.”<sup>428</sup> The most important socio-political change she cites is the “institutional consolidation” and “maturity” of the indigenous and peasant movement organizations themselves.<sup>429</sup> In terms of political opportunity structure variables, she focuses on institutional changes to electoral rules that favored regional parties, the role of decentralization in opening up political space at the local level, as well as, party system change and de-alignment of voters from traditional parties.<sup>430</sup> Finally, she points to specific conjunctures that served to debilitate the traditionally dominant parties thereby opening up electoral space for new political contenders. These factors included popular frustration with the Banzer administration

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<sup>428</sup> Van Cott 2003b: 753.

<sup>429</sup> Van Cott 2003b: 753.

<sup>430</sup> Van Cott 2003b: 754-755.

and nationalist, anti-neoliberal sentiment generated by a heavy-handed and interventionist US anti-drug policy in Bolivia.<sup>431</sup>

I agree with Van Cott's argument and the significance of the variables she identifies. My approach in this chapter will not seek to contradict her findings but instead to further develop the part having to do with the movement's organizational capital and determine why it did not exist in Bolivia earlier on. While Van Cott argues that the most important structural change facilitating the success of the two relatively new indigenous and *campesino* movement-based parties in 2002 was the "maturity" and "institutional consolidation" of the *campesino*-indigenous movement, she does not flesh out specifically what she means by this, or why it apparently took so long for the Bolivian movement to develop these characteristics. Whereas Pachakutik came into being ten years after the founding of CONAIE, in Bolivia *campesino* movement-based parties did not make any significant electoral gains until nearly twenty years after the national *campesino* federation, the CSUTCB, was founded in 1979.

I argue that the earlier failures and relatively long gestation period before the electoral success of *campesino*-indigenous parties in Bolivia were due primarily to weaknesses within the movement itself, together with specific institutional and electoral rules that put new and regionally-based parties at a disadvantage. In order to understand the former I argue that one must look to the history and evolving characteristics of the Bolivian *campesino* organizations themselves. This chapter then, seeks to expand on this key pillar in Van Cott's argument by analyzing the evolution of the Bolivian *campesino* movement and identifying the factors, especially those

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<sup>431</sup> Van Cott 2003b: 755.

internal to the organizations themselves, that undermined their strength and cohesion during the 1980s, thus making them weak platforms from which to launch political parties. This together with the limitations imposed by the country's political institutional structure and electoral rules are necessary and sufficient to account for the relatively delayed emergence in Bolivia of autonomous *campesino* parties that could compete successfully with and challenge the hegemony of traditional political parties dominated by non-indigenous urban elites.

The central argument focuses on the post-agrarian reform period and critical differences between Ecuador and Bolivia in terms of in the relationship that developed between *campesino*-indigenous populations and the state. I argue that these early differences in the nature of the *campesino*-state relationship affected later on the strength, timing, and characteristics of the movements that emerged in each country. The impact and legacy of the 1952 Bolivian Revolution will figure prominently in this discussion. One might expect that the Bolivian Revolution, which brought about agrarian reform and universal suffrage, would have paved the way for earlier and more successful indigenous participation in electoral politics compared with Ecuador where no popular revolutionary process took place. However, while a national *campesino* federation was established earlier in Bolivia, success in the electoral realm came later to the Bolivian indigenous-*campesino* movement relative to its Ecuadorian counterpart.

Even those studies that look specifically at the history and development of the Bolivian indigenous-*campesino* movement or at the Katarista movement in

particular,<sup>432</sup> do not focus much attention on why the Katarista parties garnered so little voter support in the 1980s. Because so little space has been devoted to this topic, explanations offered tend to be cursory at best or simply descriptive.<sup>433</sup> Albó (1994 and 1995) attributes the failure of these parties to a combination of, “lack of funds, weak organization, divisions and highly local characteristics.”<sup>434</sup> Calla in turn asserts that the dismal showing of the two Katarista parties in the 1985 elections, in which they came in last and second to last,<sup>435</sup> demonstrates that: “ethnic identification as the foundation for electoral action constituted a markedly marginal factor in the Bolivian political arena.”<sup>436</sup>

This chapter seeks to draw a bit more attention to this understudied chapter of indigenous movement history in Bolivia and in so doing to offer a more robust argument about why these parties failed so miserably. Adopting Douglass North’s (1990) concept of “path dependency”, I argue that patterns that got set in the post-1952 period in Bolivia in the relationship between *campesino* communities, the state, and political parties left a lasting imprint on *campesino* organizations themselves, and that this effect persisted into the new democratic period. The patterns that got set had

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<sup>432</sup> Katarista refers to a movement that sprang from within the *campesino* organizations themselves and was led by Aymara leaders seeking to reclaim their cultural heritage and promote a positive indigenous identity. The Katarista leaders were at the forefront of the movement in the 1970s to free the *campesino* organizations and federations from government control. For a history of this important movement see Hurtado 1986.

<sup>433</sup> As mentioned above, Hurtado 1986 has written the main history of the Katarista movement. Another key book on the subject, Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, traces the history of the Bolivian *campesino* movement from the beginning of the twentieth century through 1980. Studies that look at indigenous political participation in Bolivia since the return to democracy include Albó 1993; Albó 1999; Ticona Alejo 2000; Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995.

<sup>434</sup> Albó 1994 and 1995: 64.

<sup>435</sup> Their *combined* vote share of 2.8 percent put them ahead of only two other small parties Calla 1993: 71.

<sup>436</sup> Calla 1993: 72.



consequences that forestalled the emergence of independent *campesino* political parties that could rally the rural electorate to their ticket.

Using Ecuador as a comparable case, I will demonstrate how more autonomous development of indigenous organizations in that country resulted in a successful transfer to higher organizational levels, of norms, practices, and expectations consistent with the consensual and participatory characteristics of traditional community organization. In Bolivia, by contrast, greater attention to and intromission by the state early on in *campesino* organizing resulted in the creation of supra-communal *campesino* organizations that functioned on the basis of very different norms than those that existed at the local community level. In other words, the logic that infused and characterized the functioning of higher organizational levels in the Bolivian movement retained few of the positive attributes characteristic of indigenous communal-level decision-making and leadership styles, and instead, followed a more clientelistic and hierarchical model. Whereas in Ecuador, indigenous movement organizations scaled up more gradually and with much less intromission and interest by the state or political parties; in Bolivia, *campesino* organization scaled up rapidly, largely in response to incentives from the state, and based on models offered by the state and other non-indigenous social actors, resulting, again, in more hierarchical and clientelistic organizations.

Greater state intervention in Bolivia's *campesino* organizations at this early stage also set a pattern, one that that would persist into the 1980s, of greater and more direct intromission by political parties and other non-indigenous actors in *campesino*

organizations. Again, this was a pattern that had its origins during the revolutionary period and which proved difficult to alter in subsequent years.

Finally, historically the corporatist model was stronger and more penetrating in Bolivia than was the case in Ecuador. The history of corporatism and the strong ties forged between the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and peasants during the years of the national popular revolution continued to impact expectations and views at the grassroots, as many *campesinos* remained strongly identified with the MNR well into the 1980s and 1990s. For obvious reasons, this made it much more difficult for an autonomous indigenous political party to emerge and have any chance of success. While the thrust of this chapter will focus on these evolutionary differences in the Bolivian *campesino* organizations and their impact on political involvement, we will also consider the relative importance of institutional differences between the two countries and the important impact of changes to Bolivia's electoral laws that helped pave the way for successful political incursions by indigenous-*campesino* parties by the start of the new millennium.

The chapter begins by making the case for comparing the *campesino*-indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador. The next section examines the role that Bolivian electoral law and political institutions played in hindering the emergence of new parties in the 1980s and how changes made to the law in the 1990s helped to open the system up to new social actors. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to developing the argument about how the differing evolution of *campesino*-indigenous movements in both countries impacted the ability of these movements to compete in the electoral arena.

## **Bolivia and Ecuador as Comparable Cases**

In both Bolivia and Ecuador indigenous people make up a numerically important part of the population, however, in Bolivia they are in the majority, at an estimated 65 percent of the population.<sup>437</sup> In Ecuador indigenous people are in the minority, representing somewhere between 25 and 40 percent of the population. Similar to Ecuador, Bolivia's indigenous population is divided between Amazonian tribal groups, that came into contact with the West in the latter half of the twentieth century, and indigenous peasants located in the mountainous regions of the country, who were colonized by the Spanish at the time of the conquest over five hundred years ago. Culturally there are many similarities between the Amazonian groups in both countries, as well as, between the indigenous populations native to the mountainous regions. In fact, Ecuador's Highland indigenous people share a common language with a large segment of Bolivia's indigenous peasant population. The Ecuadorian dialect of Quichua, and Quechua in Bolivia, are mutually intelligible variants of the language of the Inca Empire, which dominated the region immediately previous to the arrival of the Spanish. However, while in Ecuador, Highland indigenous people share a single language, that being Quichua; in Bolivia indigenous peasants from the regions outside the Amazon are divided into two distinct cultural and language traditions: those who speak Quechua, and the Aymara Indians of the *altiplano*, or high plains.

Historically agrarian reform in both countries was, to use North's term, a "moment of discontinuous change."<sup>438</sup> In both places reform served to free indigenous

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<sup>437</sup> Van Cott 1994: 15.

<sup>438</sup> North 1990.

peasants living in the mountainous regions from various forms of service tenure that had tied them to large haciendas. The debt peonage systems had different names and varied between and within each country. In Ecuador the most common of these systems was referred to as the *huasipungo*. In Bolivia this system was called *pongueaje*. In both systems peasants worked the hacienda owner's land and performed a variety services for him and his family in exchange for water, grazing, and land use rights.

In Bolivia the hacienda system was dismantled and agrarian reform implemented within the context of a popular revolution. This dramatic process was initiated more than a decade before the military government in Ecuador undertook similar, if much more tepid, reforms in 1964. The revolutionary context in Bolivia resulted in a much more radical and extensive reform process than that which took place in Ecuador.<sup>439</sup>

Despite the revolutionary experience in Bolivia, both countries reverted to military rule for a good portion of 1960s and almost all of the 1970s. Military rule in Bolivia was longer lasting and more repressive than in Ecuador, although the military regimes in neither country rivaled the brutality of those in the Southern Cone.

Clearly then, in terms of broad historical and demographic brushstrokes there are many similarities between the two countries, and this facilitates our comparison of their respective movements. We will now review Bolivia's political institutions and

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<sup>439</sup> A second round of agrarian reform, that was somewhat more significant, took place in Ecuador between 1972 and 1975 under the reformist military regime of General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, but it still paled in comparison with the reforms in Bolivia.

rules and consider the impact they had on movement efforts to participate directly in electoral politics.

### **Political Institutions and Electoral Rules**

There were many similarities, but also some important differences, between Ecuador's and Bolivia's electoral rules and political structures. Electoral laws in both countries were reformed at various times during the two decades following the return to democracy, mostly during the 1990s. Ecuador had a unicameral legislature and Bolivia a bicameral one. In both countries the provinces served as electoral districts, however, the average district magnitudes were very different. Bolivia had less than half the number of provinces that Ecuador had<sup>440</sup> and a larger number of legislative seats,<sup>441</sup> which translated into a substantially higher average district magnitude of 14.44<sup>442</sup> than was the case with Ecuador. Due to the changes in both the size of the legislature and the number of electoral districts, Ecuador's average district magnitude varied somewhat over time, but at least through 1998 the average district magnitude hovered around 3.5.<sup>443</sup> Given its high district magnitude, Bolivia's electoral system was highly proportional and therefore theoretically more accessible to minority parties. However, there was an important aspect of Ecuador's electoral laws that

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<sup>440</sup> Bolivia has nine provinces. Ecuador had twenty-one till Orellana was created in 1998, bringing the total to twenty-two.

<sup>441</sup> The size of the Bolivian legislature has remained constant at 130 seats. In Ecuador the number has fluctuated in recent years. Throughout the 1980s and until 1998 there were roughly 82 seats, with some slight variation. In 1998 the legislature was expanded to slightly over 121. Finally, in 2002 it was reduced again to one hundred seats, all of which were elected from provincial districts. Till 2002 Ecuador used a two-tier electoral system in which 15 percent of legislative seats were elected nationally and 85 percent from provincial districts.

<sup>442</sup> Jones 1995: 12.

<sup>443</sup> This figure was calculated combining the national district, from which 12 were elected, together with the provincial districts of varying sizes.

inadvertently gave an advantage to Ecuador's indigenous, and that was the fact that sparsely populated, rural provinces, which included the provinces where the indigenous movement had its strongest bases of support, were over-represented in the legislature.<sup>444</sup> On the whole, however, because of the proportionality of the Bolivian system, it would be hard to make the case that the failure of the Katarista parties, especially compared with the success experienced by Pachakutik and the MAS later on, could be attributed to that country's institutional rules.

What we will see when we delve into the organizational strength and structure of the *campesino*-indigenous movement in Bolivia in the 1980s is that, while it had achieved a national profile and was an actor on the national political stage, this national presence was not backed up by a strong grassroots organizational base or strong identification with the national movement at the local level. The electoral rules in place previous to 1996 reinforced this weakness because there was no incentive for the national leadership to identify candidates who would be viable at the provincial or local levels. As a result, this disconnection between the national and local levels was not addressed; the parties floated their candidates without a solid voter base; and consequently, elicited very little voter response.

Another aspect of Bolivia's electoral rules that certainly played a role in the failure of the Katarista parties in the 1980s was the fact that Bolivia at the time employed an extreme version of closed list voting rules, in which voters cast a single party vote for congress and the executive. In other words the president was not

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<sup>444</sup> See Chapter 3. The degree to which small provinces were over-represented was reduced in 1998 when the size of provincial districts was adjusted and many of the largest districts received a substantial increase in the number of seats.

elected on a separate ballot. If no party received 50 percent or more of the vote, then, instead of having a presidential run-off, the president would be elected by the legislature. This system was an odd hybrid of presidential and parliamentary models, and it is easy to see how it could serve to limit the chances of minority parties to make inroads in congressional elections. In a system where the president has significant powers relative to the legislature and also in a cultural context where voters tend to cast votes based on their identification with an individual as opposed to a party, voters sympathetic to minority party candidates for congress would be faced with the decision of wasting their presidential vote or supporting their favored candidate or party for congress. In other words, in order to vote their preference for legislative deputy, they would have to forgo a strategic vote for president. Surely this would put small or regionally based parties without a strong presidential candidate at a great disadvantage. This institutional rule also helps explain why, in 1982 the MRTK decided not to run its own candidate slate, because the party had decided to support Siles Zuazo for president. The *campesino* movement's political priority at the time was to assure that the military-backed political party did not win the presidency; if they wanted to support a presidential ticket that had a real possibility of winning they had to forfeit their chance to run their own legislative slate, because of these rules. Once presidential and congressional elections were de-linked in 1997, smaller parties had the option of running their own lists for congress, while at the same time, urging their supporters to cast strategic votes for the presidential candidate of another party.

The other characteristic of Bolivia's political institutions that represented an impediment to Katarista attempts to build political parties in the 1980s was the fact

that governance at the local and regional levels had not yet been decentralized; it remained controlled and directed by the central state and the parties that controlled the state apparatus. As a result, there was no chance for new parties to start small by acquiring experience and a strong leadership base first at the local and provincial levels, before tackling national legislative elections.

In the mid-1990s a series of constitutional reforms and amendments to Bolivia's electoral rules radically changed much about the electoral system that had been disadvantageous to smaller, social movement-based parties. In 1994 the Sánchez de Lozada administration passed a major decentralization reform that opened the way, for the first time in Bolivia, for locally elected municipal government. This change alone resulted in a major increase in the number of indigenous people holding elected office.<sup>445</sup> The coca growers' movement in particular began to organize politically to win local political office in the areas where their federations were active and to build a political party with a strong base in the *campesino* federations.

Then, in 1997 important changes were made in the composition of the Bolivian Congress. Bolivia adopted a two-tier electoral system, modeled on Germany's. Elections to the lower house combined seats elected from a single nation-wide district, and another percentage elected from local, single-member districts. While electoral theory asserts that single-member districts are less representative than multi-member districts, in countries like Bolivia where power is fragmented regionally and political identities tend to be regionally based, the creation of single member districts increase

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<sup>445</sup> See Albó 1999 for a detailed analysis of the increase in indigenous participation as a result of the 1996 decentralization reforms.



the ability of regionally based movements, like the coca growers' movement, to win congressional seats. In 1998, *cocalero*<sup>446</sup> leader, Evo Morales, was elected to congress for the first time, from his local district in the Chapare.

Together with the change to a two-tier system, the closed-list rule that had been so stifling for small parties was done away with and voters could cast separate votes for president and congress. All three of these changes were very important in opening up space in the Bolivian political system for participation by new parties, including those connected with Bolivia's *campesino*-indigenous movements. But MAS's dramatic electoral victories in 2002 and 2005 were not due solely to changes in electoral rules, but more fundamentally, as Van Cott argues, to the maturation and institutionalization of the social movement behind the party. The *campesino*-indigenous movement in Bolivia did not yet possess this level of maturity and cohesion in the 1980s and the rest of the chapter will focus on examining the reasons for this.

### **Similarities and Differences Between the Bolivian and Ecuadorian Movements**

One thing that is puzzling when one compares the *campesino*-indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia in the 1980s and 1990s is that descriptions of local community values and decision-making norms are quite similar; but the parallels do not transfer as seamlessly to higher organizational levels. Whereas in Ecuador the indigenous movement was largely unified within a single organization that claimed to represent groups from every ethnic group and geographical region of the country, in Bolivia the national peasant federation never included the Amazonian indigenous

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<sup>446</sup> *Cocalero* refers to those who grow coca.

groups and was plagued throughout its existence by internal divisions and debilitating rivalries between powerful regional leaders. This pattern of division and internal rivalry was also evident when these organizations decided to compete in electoral politics.

Along these same lines, Bolivian *campesino* organizations appeared to have incorporated norms and practices from the grassroots communities into their organizational structures to a far lesser degree than did their counterparts in Ecuador. Bolivian *campesino* organizations tended to be dominated by, and revolve around individual leaders to a far greater extent than analogous organizations in Ecuador. In Ecuador it was possible to point to a whole cadre of indigenous movement leaders who rotated through various posts at different organizational levels, never remaining in one for years on end. New leaders regularly were elected to fill top leadership posts. By contrast, in Bolivia *campesino* organizations during the 1980s and 1990s tended to be associated with specific leaders, who would often remain in leadership posts for extended periods of time. In other words, the grassroots practice of leadership rotation did not appear to be as ingrained in Bolivian organizations as it was in Ecuador's movement organizations. For instance, the powerful coca growers' movement, based in the Chapare region of Bolivia throughout the 1990s, was clearly identified with the figure of Evo Morales. He served not only the head of the federation but also was the movement's elected representative to congress and its presidential candidate on the MAS ticket in 2002, as well as 2006. By contrast, neither Pachakutik nor CONAIE were associated with any single leader to this degree. In Ecuador leadership crossover between the movement organizations and the political

party was common, but in most cases when a movement leader was chosen to run for political office she was required to step down from her leadership position in the movement organization. Some indigenous organizations actually prohibited those who held leadership posts from running for elected office. The same sort of discipline was not apparent in the Bolivian organizations; it was not uncommon to see top movement leaders holding multiple posts in both political and movement arenas. This in turn, I would argue, led to a concentration of power in fewer hands. In Ecuador, by contrast, power tended to be more widely distributed and shared.

As might be expected, this leadership concentration was associated with a greater tendency in the Bolivian *campesino* movement toward a cult of personality and the identification of organizations with individual leaders. This tendency was evident at a public rally held in November 2000 to mark the founding of the Pachakutik Indian Movement (MIP), a primarily Aymara party. MIP was founded by Felipe Quispe, who at the time was serving as CSUTCB president.<sup>447</sup> While in his public statements Quispe asserted that the party aimed to be a vehicle representing all of Bolivia's indigenous peoples, regardless of ethnicity or region; the tenor and symbolism that characterized this founding rally were narrow and parochial. It was held in the tiny *altiplano* town of Peñas, a place steeped in historic symbolism for the Aymara people and the Katarista movement, as it was there that Tupaj Katari, an Aymara Indian who led a revolt against the Spanish, was executed in 1781.<sup>448</sup> Held in the heart of Aymara territory, practically all the speeches heard at the rally were made in Aymara, so

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<sup>447</sup> Quispe had a colorful history, having been a member of a guerrilla movement in Bolivia during the 1980s, for which he served several years in prison.

<sup>448</sup> Ticona Alejo 2000: 45.

whatever Quechua Indians were in attendance probably could not understand much of what was being said, as both languages are very different. There were many speakers, but it was clear that everything was leading to the moment when Felipe Quispe would emerge on the balcony to address the crowd of about eight thousand. While I was unable to understand what was being said, it was clear that the event revolved around Quispe. When he did finally appear on the balcony Aymara symbols and traditions were employed to bestow on him the mantle of the trust of the people: women adorned him with necklaces of food, meant to symbolize prosperity; they showered him with confetti and brought him gourds filled with the traditional maize beer, or *chicha*. At another point his hat and poncho were removed and a vicuna shawl was placed on his shoulders. These potent symbolic gestures were designed both to demonstrate the trust and hope these people were placing in their leader, as well as to remind him of his responsibility to them. While symbolic representations of mutual responsibility like the ones on display that day in Peñas can signal a healthy relationship between a leader and his constituents, in this case, it was accompanied by an undue emphasis on a single individual in the person of Felipe Quispe. This was in contrast to what I had observed at Pachakutik campaign rallies and political events. At none of the events I attended in Ecuador was there any evidence of a cult of personality or power residing exclusively in a single leader. In addition, no matter how important the leader, there was never the same degree of adulation as I witnessed that day in Peñas.

Another striking difference between the movements in both countries had to do with autonomy. In Ecuador indigenous organizations were extremely jealous of their autonomy from political parties, but in Bolivia *campesino* organizations from the local

to the national levels were highly permeated by traditional political parties, at least into the mid to late 1990s. In Bolivia it was common for individual *campesino* leaders to be affiliated with any of a number of parties. In Ecuador there were cases in the 1980s and 1990s of indigenous leaders running on traditional party tickets, but this did not translate into long-term militancy in these parties. Likewise, Ecuadorian movement organizations did not tolerate interference from outside groups or parties in their internal affairs.

In conclusion, our comparison of Bolivian and Ecuadorian *campesino*-indigenous movements in the 1990s reveals some interesting puzzles. While decision-making norms and practices were similar in local indigenous communities in both countries, these similarities did not transfer as neatly to the supra-communal organizational level. Bolivian indigenous organizations tended to function in a more hierarchical and top-down manner and were less consensual than their counterparts in Ecuador, although this appears to have begun to change by the late 1990s. Likewise, leadership in Bolivia's movement organizations was more highly concentrated than was the case in Ecuador. Finally, Bolivian movement organizations, at least until the mid-1990s, were much more permeable to interference by non-movement actors, including political parties, trade unions, and non-governmental organizations. These differences are crucial to understanding the relatively late emergence of successful indigenous political parties in Bolivia compared with Ecuador. In the next section, I will describe how these crucial differences resulted from different paths taken in the evolving historical relationship between the state and indigenous-*campesino* communities.

## The State and *Campesino* Organizational Development

The two most important differences that set the stage for the divergent patterns in state-*campesino* relations were the 1952 Revolution in Bolivia, which had no equivalent in Ecuador, and the fact that in Bolivia indigenous people, especially in the rural areas, made up the vast bulk of the population. In Ecuador indigenous people were a significant, but nevertheless a minority population that was easier to sideline. Agrarian reform was a defining moment in both countries for the *campesino* sector and the context in which this major transformative event took place set the stage in many ways for the way *campesino* organizations developed in subsequent years.

In 1953, a year after coming to power through a national popular revolution, the MNR carried a massive agrarian reform program. According to historical accounts of this period,<sup>449</sup> the decision to implement agrarian reform came about primarily as a result of a power struggle that was unfolding within the MNR itself between the party's left and right-wing factions. According to Malloy (1970), in an attempt to prevent the right wing of the party from co-opting and stalling the revolution, the MNR's left wing and members of the Bolivian Workers Central (COB), the national trade union that co-governed with the MNR for a number of years, went into the countryside immediately after the revolution and encouraged the peasants to rise up against hacienda owners. During this period they began a huge effort to organize the campesinos into sindicatos, or peasant unions. Rebellion among the campesino population spread quickly during this revolutionary period, and the violence and confusion that ensued in the countryside led many hacienda owners to abandon their

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<sup>449</sup> See Klein 1982; Malloy 1970.

land and retreat to the cities. Within a year, the left wing of the MNR had gained the upper hand in the party and they decided to implement agrarian reform. One of the MNR's main objectives in implementing agrarian reform was to cement its relationship with the campesino sector so as to ensure their continued support for the MNR. The strategy worked exceedingly well, and this sector became a solid pillar of MNR support in the subsequent years. This pattern of campesino support for the state continued even after the military took over in 1964 and only began to disintegrate at the end of the 1960s when the military government began to take steps that violated the implicit pact between the campesinos and the state that had first been put in place by the MNR.

Previous to the 1952 Revolution there existed little in the way of higher levels of organization among Bolivian peasants; local "free" communities certainly had their own types of internal organization, but there were few organizations that united peasants beyond the local community. For the most part, free peasant communities remained isolated from one another and those who were tied to the haciendas had little opportunity to organize or make demands to change their situation. The first attempt to address the conditions of indigenous peasants at the national level was a National Indian Congress organized by President Villarroel in 1945. According to Klein, this congress represented the first opportunity for many traditional Indian leaders to make cross-community contacts, and in this way it "paved the way for important mobilization of peasant ideology against the hacienda regime."<sup>450</sup> But previous to this

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<sup>450</sup> Klein 1982: 219.

congress, which was held seven years previous to the Revolution, there had been little in the way of supra-communal organizational links among peasants.

The left wing of the MNR and the labor union activists were acting in what was relatively virgin organizational terrain. They arrived in the rural areas bearing the promise of freedom from an oppressive service tenancy system, land, and direct access to a new revolutionary government; and for the most part they delivered. The changes that took place in the countryside after the revolution were swift and dramatic. The vehicle at the local level for taking an active part in this sea change was the *sindicato*, or local union, which was modeled on the trade unions. This model or organizational development and the norms and practices that went along with it were foreign to the peasants who were to adopt them. As such, this type of organization was not always readily adopted in all localities; the degree to which the model penetrated down to the village level varied from region to region. Ticona, Rojas, and Albó note that the process was most successful and thoroughgoing in the Cochabamba Valley, where large haciendas had predominated previous to the revolution. However, the process was much less successful in the *altiplano* regions of La Paz and Northern Potosí, where indigenous communal structures had in many cases survived. Where they had, the union model was either superimposed in a syncretistic way onto traditional structures, or it was openly resisted, which occurred to a great extent in Northern Potosí.<sup>451</sup>

So while this foreign model did not penetrate local community organizational structures uniformly, the impact of this period on higher organizational levels was

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<sup>451</sup> Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995: 36-37



much more profound and thoroughgoing, precisely because there were no autochthonous structures previously in place with which it had to compete. After the revolution and up until the late 1960s, the primary role of the *campesino* organizations at the regional and national levels, as well as the leaders who populated these organizations, was to serve as brokers or intermediaries between the local communities and the state. The MNR government and subsequent military regimes in Bolivia were probably no better than their counterparts in Ecuador at offering the kind of assistance in terms of credit, technical advice, and training that were needed to modernize production methods among *campesinos*, so as to lift them out of poverty. In spite of this, Bolivian peasants remained staunch supporters of the MNR even into the 1980s, because it was this party and the revolution that had undertaken agrarian reform. As long as the MNR and the military governments did not attempt to intrude on local community autonomy it was possible to maintain peasant support through clientelistic handouts without having to invest resources into major development efforts in the countryside.

Ticona, Rojas, and Albó characterize the relationship that developed between the peasant organizations and the government during this period as a “dependent alliance”.<sup>452</sup> *Campesino* organizations were co-opted and made dependent on the state and on the MNR through policies like the distribution of subsidized food. The MNR was intimately involved in the internal life of the peasant organizations, often manipulating things and imposing pseudo-leaders so as to assure the continued loyalty of the peasant unions to the party and the government. During the 1950s and 1960s

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<sup>452</sup> Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995: 39.

the peasant unions forfeited organizational autonomy from the state in exchange for clientelistic favors, and this had a profound effect on these organizations' and their leaders' ability to serve as independent advocates for peasants. Ticona, Rojas and Albó summarize Rivera's assessment of the MNR *campesino* unions:

During both stages [the first refers to the first moment of the revolution and agrarian reform and the second to the later MNR period], the new peasant union power cohabitated with and reproduced forms of patriarchal and liberal domination between the new bourgeoisie state and its subjects. The space in society and the power structure of these "new citizens", formally "free and equal", was pilfered away through corruption, the imposition of pseudo-leaders, and the manipulation of the peasant unions [by the state].<sup>453</sup>

For purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that there is a distinction between local community autonomy and organizational autonomy. Yashar (2003) argues that one of the crucial factors that led to the emergence of indigenous movements in Ecuador was the impact of government policies that threatened to undermine the local autonomy that indigenous communities had carved out for themselves. In the case of Bolivia there is indeed an argument to be made that indigenous and peasant communities were granted a substantial degree of local autonomy immediately following the 1953 agrarian reform. In a certain sense the pact between the peasant population and the MNR was based upon an implicit agreement: as long as the MNR left peasant communities alone and provided them and their leaders with a modest supply clientelistic handouts, then peasants would continue to support the party. Historical descriptions of the period of MNR rule paint a picture of

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<sup>453</sup> The quote is taken from Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995: 38), who in turn cite Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 113. Translation by the author.

a weak central state with little ability or desire to extend a long arm into the countryside:

Thus, the pre-1952 links broken, the *campo* slipped out from under the effective sovereignty exercised by the Bolivian state. On the one hand, there was a reversion to more primitive kinds of community organizations in which large areas and numbers reverted to atomized isolation. On the other, powerful baronies under personalized control were created, functioning as small states warring with each other and often with the nominal national state.<sup>454</sup>

The powerful baronies that Malloy describes were run and controlled by powerful indigenous *caciques* or peasant bosses, who exercised control over the *sindicatos* and centrals, or over the confederations that grouped together the local and regional *sindicatos*. Malloy's description of the range of their powers is striking:

These *sindicatos*, especially the centrals, became independent and sovereign-like units. The central took on the characteristics and performed most of the functions of a miniature state. Through the militias it mobilized force in its area... The central leaders collected taxes and imposed fines on members. With these independent sources of finance, they often bought new arms and ammunition and paid salaries of permanent staffs. Within their regions they made laws and punished transgressors.... The *sindicato* organization put itself between the individual peasant and the larger society, acting as his broker with the national state.<sup>455</sup>

During this period then, there was a scaling up of *campesino* organization through the creation of *sindicatos* at the local level, which were connected together in centrals, and these further into sub-centrals, which in turn participated in a national confederation. However, as described above, these organizations were quickly taken over by indigenous bosses and therefore cannot really be considered social movement

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<sup>454</sup> Malloy 1970: 214.

<sup>455</sup> Malloy 1970: 212-213.

organizations. Instead, according to Calderón: “This structure generated a relationship between the *campesino* movement, the state, and the MNR that was characterized by mediation, clientelism and factionalism.”<sup>456</sup> Historical descriptions of the peasant organizations during this period describe them as quite hierarchical, with power concentrated in the hands of a small number of powerful peasant bosses.

As historians of the Bolivian Revolution have concluded, while the Revolution wrought major changes in Bolivian society, the most important of which was the dismantling of the old oligarchic order, what replaced it was a reformist, corporatist state that relied on clientelistic ties with the population to retain legitimacy: “The state organized its relations with society on the basis of bureaucratic-clientelistic relations, through which positions and patronage were granted in exchange for legitimacy or political support.”<sup>457</sup> Beginning in 1968 the pattern of control and cooptation began to change. Actions by the military government that came to power in 1964 began to alienate the peasant population. Simultaneously, a new generation of indigenous leadership who embraced indigenous identity and advanced a more ethnic orientation to *campesino* issues and demands began to emerge and challenge the old generation of peasant bosses. The effort to create an indigenous peasant movement that was autonomous from the state and rejected the MNR’s homogenizing ideology in favor of a recuperation of ethnic identity and pride began in 1968 and advanced through the 1970s. It culminated in the convening of a national indigenous-peasant congress that was held in 1979 and which was the forum during which the CSUTCB was born.

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<sup>456</sup> Calderón Gutiérrez 1999: 444. Translation by the author.

<sup>457</sup> Calderón Gutiérrez 1999: 435. Translation by the author.

Significantly, this national *campesino* congress, which gave rise to the CSUTCB, was called for and organized by the powerful trade union, the COB. This is significant because it demonstrates that while the CSUTCB represented an effort to gain autonomy from the state, it was an effort that from the start was intimately tied to another very powerful force in Bolivian politics, the labor union movement. Even at this juncture, Bolivian indigenous leaders were not as protective of their organizational autonomy as were their counterparts in Ecuador.

In Ecuador, by contrast, the scaling up process of indigenous organization occurred much more gradually and autonomously from state control and intervention. Previous to the enactment of agrarian reform in 1964, a national peasant federation, the Indigenous Federation of Ecuador (FEI), had been organized and was one of the main advocates for agrarian reform. The FEI included mestizo, as well as indigenous peasants and was spearheaded by leftist political parties. While the FEI and its member unions played an important role in pushing for agrarian reform, after its enactment the organization entered into a gradual state of decline. According to Andrade and Rivera (1991), this occurred because agrarian reform resulted in greater social and economic differentiation in the countryside, which in turn debilitated the social cohesion of the *campesino* sector and its organizations. As the old style peasant unions, which had been highly influenced by the trade union model and led by small leftist parties, entered into decline, a new dynamic *campesino* social movement began to take its place. This new movement produced organizations that sought autonomy, not only from the state, but also from their previous leftist patrons. This process got its start roughly in 1968. Andrade and Rivera (1991) explain that while the old

*campesino* union organizations had been the primary vehicle for channeling *campesino* demands, meddling by political parties in the internal affairs of the organizations had led many *campesinos* to feel underrepresented in their own organizations. The *campesinos* who became active in these new organizations, of which FENOC and ECUARUNARI were two of the most important, were generally those who had not directly benefited from the meager agrarian reform of 1964. The new organizations pressed for a deepening of the reform process.<sup>458</sup> At the same time, some of these organizations, in particular ECUARUNARI, began to connect demands for land rights with an ethnic and cultural agenda.

These two histories of *campesino* organizational development hold the key, I would argue, to understanding some of the main differences between the *campesino*-indigenous movements in both countries. In Bolivia revolutionary actors with direct access to the emerging state played a central role in organizing peasant unions throughout the countryside. The revolutionary state, with the aim of securing *campesino* political support, created channels for direct access to the state by powerful peasant bosses, who in effect controlled the higher levels of *campesino* organization through the late 1960s. Thus peasant organization in Bolivia during the 1950s and 1960s was characterized by organizations that functioned in many ways like political machines: they were hierarchical and dependent on powerful peasant bosses. The relationship between the state and these organizations was based largely on clientelism.

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<sup>458</sup> Andrade and Rivera 1991: 264.

By contrast, in Ecuador during this same period the state never sought to directly organize peasant unions and it also did not make any serious attempt at forging strong clientelistic ties with the peasantry. Instead, the first outside organizers of peasant organizations were small fringe leftist political parties with little power or direct access to the state. So *campesino* organizations in Ecuador from the start could count on no powerful broker with direct access to the state to negotiate or make deals for them.

1968 marked an important juncture in the evolution of *campesino* organization in both countries. It signaled the beginning of the growth of ethnic consciousness among indigenous *campesinos* in both countries. In Bolivia the 1970s witnessed the emergence of the Katarista movement, and in Ecuador ECUARUNARI decided to focus their struggle along ethnic lines during this same time period.<sup>459</sup> It also signaled the beginning in both countries of *campesino*-led efforts to achieve autonomy from previous organizational patrons. In Ecuador ECUARUNARI began to assert its autonomy from leftist political parties, the Catholic Church and other non-indigenous institutions that had been crucial promoters of the old *campesino* federations. At nearly the same time in Bolivia, young Katarista leaders began to assert power within the *campesino* unions and to foment the move within local, regional, and national *campesino* organizations towards autonomy from the state. As a result of actions by the military government that violated the implicit pact between *campesinos* and the state and the efforts of the Katarista leadership, the peasant-military pact came undone

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<sup>459</sup> For an analysis of the development of the ethnic agenda within the Ecuadorian indigenous movement during this period see Pallares 2002. For a comparative analysis of the emergence of ethnic identity and indigenous movements in Latin America see Yashar 2005.

during the 1970s and organizational autonomy from state tutelage was achieved with the formation of the CSUTCB in 1979. However, in Bolivia the movement towards autonomy within *campesino* organizations was not as strident against political parties and other non-indigenous actors as had been the case in Ecuador. The main goal in Bolivia at the time had been independence from the state, which at the time was in the hands of the military, not the political parties. Because it was the party associated with agrarian reform, much of the *campesino* population retained a high degree of loyalty and affinity to the MNR.

One indication of the Bolivian movement's less strident position vis-à-vis political parties was the fact that Katarista leaders founded a political party before an independent national *campesino* organization had been organized. The MRTK was founded in 1978, a year before the CSUTCB came into being. While Katarista leaders appeared to have few qualms about direct participation in formal politics, in Ecuador indigenous movement organizations did not seek to advance their struggle through this means, expressing instead great distrust of the political process in their country. As discussed in previous chapters, this position of radical rejection of the formal political process reached its apogee in Ecuador in 1990 when the CONAIE prohibited its members from running for office or participating in any other way in electoral politics. The opposite was true in Bolivia. At least by the time of the transition to democracy it appeared that the struggle for autonomy on the part of the *campesino*-indigenous movement would include the formation of independent political parties.

Summing up, *campesino* organizations in Bolivia started out in a clientelistic and dependent relationship with the state, something that was never the case in



Ecuador. In Bolivia the state itself and actors connected to it were the original outside agents for *campesino* organization, whereas in Ecuador it was small fringe political parties and other non-state actors, including the Catholic Church. Thus, when the push for autonomy came in both countries indigenous-peasant organizations pursued somewhat different paths. In Ecuador they pushed for complete autonomy and organizational independence from any non-*campesino* and non-indigenous actors. For the CSUTCB in Bolivia the emphasis was on autonomy from the state that was controlled by the repressive military; there was not as much wariness about alliances with unions and political parties. Different than in Ecuador, the Bolivian state, first under the MNR and then under the Barrientos military government, sought to cultivate the support of the *campesino* population. As such, *campesino* leaders were given privileged access to the state in exchange for keeping the peasant population in line and supportive of the government in power. This situation of state reliance on peasant support, sustained through the cultivation and support of powerful indigenous political bosses resulted in a culture within *campesino* organizations themselves of clientelism, competition, hierarchy and authoritarianism. During the 1950s and 1960s peasant bosses and their organizations were enmeshed with the state and the MNR and they perpetuated in the political patterns and norms that developed during that period.

Malloy and Gamarra (1988) argue that Bolivia's economic dependency on the export of a single commodity, namely tin, severely limited the country's employment base. As a result, the state emerged as the major employer, especially for the middle class, and this pattern was intensified after the revolution. During the MNR's period of revolutionary rule patronage was the principle means by which people were

incorporated into the party. As they explain, this tendency eventually led to high degrees of factionalism within the MNR itself:

As party membership swelled relative to jobs in the expanding public sector, the party [the MNR] began to divide into clientelistic cliques formed around various party leaders. The cliques fostered personalistic leadership along with factionalism. The party began to degenerate into a congeries of strongmen heading up personal factions driven more by the dynamics of jobs and patronage than issues of ideology or representing the interests of sectors of civil society.<sup>460</sup>

The pattern of strongmen and factionalism was certainly evident within Bolivian *campesino* organizations during the 1960s. It is probable that elements of this culture of factionalism persisted into the 1970s and 1980s and may help explain the tendency of Katarista political parties in the 1980s to splinter. Certainly the pattern of political parties serving as patronage providers persisted during the 1980s and 1990s, even under the constraints of neoliberal economic policies.

### **Organizational Capacity, Institutional Change, and Electoral Performance**

Having analyzed the broad historical differences in the origins and organizational evolution of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian *campesino*-indigenous movements, we must now address the question of how these differences impacted the performance of indigenous parties in Bolivia. We will begin by briefly reviewing the history of the emergence and performance of the Katarista parties.

The first thing that is important to note is that by the time the Katarista parties first took the plunge into electoral politics, in 1985, the CSUTCB and many of its most prominent leaders had already built a national reputation for the organization and

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<sup>460</sup> Malloy and Gamarra 1988: 6-7.

for themselves. Similar to CONAIE and the Ecuadorian indigenous movement in the 1990s, Bolivia's largely indigenous *campesino* movement had been playing an active part in social movement politics at the national level before attempting to launch a political party. In fact, this involvement had been relatively longstanding, going back in some cases more than fifteen years. Throughout the 1970s indigenous leaders like Jenaro Flores, one of the founders of the MRTK and CSUTCB, had been at the forefront of the fight to end the military dictatorship. Flores and other indigenous leaders played a prominent role in Bolivia's tumultuous four-year transition to democracy. The peasant movement, while not the strongest popular sector at that time, was an active and important participant in the social upheaval and protests that eventually convinced key elements in the military to hold democratic elections and abide by the voters' decision.

The transition of the peasant sector from captive client of the state to social movement fighting for democracy was a process that took place over a period of about a decade during the 1970s and was led primarily by the Katarista leadership. As mentioned previously, the military government began to enact policies that adversely affected *campesino* interests in the late 1960s. When *campesinos* protested these actions they were on occasions violently repressed, and so began a cycle that led to the rupture of the so-called "military-peasant pact" and eventually the establishment of the autonomous peasant federation, the CSUTCB. By the late 1970s, angered over the treatment they had received at the hands of the military, the peasant population, together with many sectors of Bolivian civil society, were in open rebellion against military rule. The definitive end of the military-*campesino* pact came about with the

formation of the CSUTCB in 1979. Then in November of that same year, in reaction to the violent Nautsch coup, which aimed to derail the nascent transition to democracy, the peasant population, led by the newly formed CSUTCB, engaged in a massive popular uprising that included the blocking of major roads.<sup>461</sup> Overall, the Bolivian *campesino* movement played a much more active role in pushing for a return to democracy than did indigenous and *campesino* organizations in Ecuador during the same period. Popular protest and pressure from civil society played an important role in the Bolivian transition to democracy, whereas in Ecuador's transition it played a negligible role.

In the first few years following the formation of the CSUTCB when the Katarista leadership was in the ascendancy, the MRTK party was considered the political arm of the *campesino* federation. During the transition period the CSUTCB debated at a couple of points whether to run its own candidates for office or to throw its support behind another party. As mentioned above they decided not to run their own slate of candidates in 1982 in order to support the UDP as the best option to defeat the party backed by the military. The other reason they desisted from direct participation at this early stage was that they knew that at the grassroots there was still a high level of affinity for the MNR and its historical leadership, both of which were associated in the minds of the peasantry with agrarian reform. The Katarista leaders believed, and rightly so, that they could not yet compete with that legacy. So after much debate, the CSUTCB endorsed the candidacy of Hernán Siles Zuazo and joined

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<sup>461</sup> Hurtado 1986: 147-148; Patzi Paco 1999: 11.

the UDP coalition in the first set of elections that would mark the return to democracy. In so doing they helped to make possible the UDP's victory in 1982.<sup>462</sup>

After the UDP came to power in 1982 the CSUTCB and the COB negotiated the structuring of a co-governing coalition that would bring these two organizations directly into the UDP government. For various reasons the alliance between the UDP and these two peak organizations, representing two of the most important sectors of civil society, was unsuccessful and eventually broke asunder, but for a brief period the CSUTCB was in government.<sup>463</sup>

The UDP, which itself was a coalition of several parties, proved unable to govern successfully. Under its watch inflation spiraled out of control eventually leading to hyperinflation and social unrest. After only two years in power the country was ungovernable and President Siles Zuazo was forced to step down before his term was up. Both the CSUTCB and the COB had withdrawn from the government well before the UDP was forced out of office.

It was the elections organized after the collapse of the UDP administration in which the offshoots of the MRTK party ran their own candidate slates for the first time. The most important party that resulted from that division was the Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement (MRTKL). At the time, the MRTKL was closely associated with and tied to the CSUTCB, which had developed into an important actor on the national political stage in the wake of its involvement in the transition to democracy and its participation in the UDP coalition. With a national reputation and

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<sup>462</sup> Hernán Siles Zuazo had been a major figure in the 1952 revolution and an important MNR leader in the 1950s and 1960s.

<sup>463</sup> For an analysis of this period and, in particular, relations between the CSUTCB and the UDP government see Rivera Cusicanqui 1984: 254-256.

strong organic ties to the principle *campesino* confederation, MRTKL would have appeared to be in a good position to compete in the electoral arena. However, voter response to this party and its offshoots in 1985 and subsequent years can best be described as anemic. In 1985 the MRTKL earned the highest number of votes that it or any other Katarista party would win that year and in subsequent years, a paltry 2.77 percent of the national vote. Throughout the latter half of the 1980s and into the 1990s Katarista parties continued to do poorly and to splinter even further. Their combined electoral totals averaged “barely 2 percent of the vote between 1979 and 1993,” and individually no party ever exceeded the 2.77 percent threshold won by the MRTKL in 1985.<sup>464</sup>

The poor showing of the Katarista parties compared with the much more successful Pachakutik debut a little more than ten years later can be attributed in part to the important differences in the political context between the 1980s and the 1990s. Most importantly, Bolivians had not yet lived through the painful impact of structural adjustment and neoliberal policies. In both countries traditional political parties still had electoral pull. The parties in power would eventually be forced to implement structural adjustment policies and other neoliberal prescriptions, which combined with their own internal problems in terms of corruption, would eventually discredit most of them in the eyes of voters, thus opening up greater space for new parties, but this process was just beginning in the 1980s.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> Van Cott 2005: 82.

<sup>465</sup> In her analysis of the 2002 Bolivian elections, Van Cott 2003b suggests that shifts in party alignments was one of the reasons for the surprising electoral gains of the MAS and MIP parties. Clearly in the 1980s this opportunity had not yet arrived.

Another difference between the position of the Katarista parties in the 1980s and that of Pachakutik ten years later, was the fact that the Bolivian *campesino*-indigenous movement had not attained the same level of power as CONAIE had vis-à-vis other social movements in the country, in particular the labor movement led by the COB. The neoliberal policies that would break the back of the powerful Bolivian labor movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s had not yet been implemented, and the CSUTCB in the was still struggling for its own independent place alongside the powerful COB. It was not until the neoliberal economic policies of the 1990s had decimated the labor movement that the COB began to look to and take leadership from the *campesino*-indigenous organizations, much the same way labor did in Ecuador during this same period.

Finally, another factor that most probably played a role in the MRTKL's inability to attract pan-indigenous support was the fact that it was organized previous to the foundation of the CSUTCB by one sector of the organization, namely Aymara activists. The fact that the Katarista parties did not result from a unified decision by the CSUTCB, but instead predated the movement organization, helps to explain why it may not have resonated with all of the CSUTCB's member organizations and why support didn't filter down to the grassroots in non-Aymara areas.

All these things help explain the poor showing of the Katarista parties in the 1980s despite the existence and involvement of the CSUTCB in national issues and struggles. However, these factors do not explain why the Katarista parties did not do better in the Aymara *altiplano*, which, after all, was the Katarista stronghold. The Katarista parties did indeed have their best showing in the Aymara rural districts of La

Paz, but even there support for the Kataristas was weak relative to the dominant mestizo parties. For example, in 1985, the year the Katarista parties had their best showing, the MRTKL, led by Flores, came in sixth in Huarina and Huatajata, two *altiplano* towns in the region of La Paz around Lake Titicaca, the birthplace and spiritual homeland of the Katarista movement. Overall, in the rural areas of the province of La Paz the combined vote share of the MRTK and MRTKL parties in 1985 was just 6.6 percent.<sup>466</sup> Certainly part of the explanation for this dismal showing has to do with the significant obstacles presented by the electoral rules, but these cannot account fully for such weak voter response. I argue that we must look at the degree to which the *campesino* movement in Bolivia had developed the three kinds of resources or social capital that I argued were so important to Pachakutik's success: identity, organization and a track record in delivering material resources.

### Identity

Indigenous identity tended to be more complex and at the same time weaker in Bolivia compared to Ecuador. This weaker ethnic identification was reflected in the poor voter response to the Katarista parties, even in Aymara regions. There are structural and historical reasons for the weaker penetration of indigenous identity in Bolivia. In terms of the former, the fact that indigenous peoples make up a majority of the population meant that social mobility was not as tightly bound to race, as was the case in Ecuador. What I mean by this is that ethnically indigenous Bolivians tended to have a better chance of opting out of their classification as indigenous if they gained

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<sup>466</sup> Romero Ballivián 1993: 194.



the economic means to do so. The higher levels of social differentiation among Bolivian indigenous, as well as the somewhat greater possibilities for upward social mobility made it more difficult to forge a pan-indigenous identity uniting different ethnic groups and classes.

These problems were in evidence within the Katarista movement. While it advanced an ethnic agenda aimed at inculcating pride in indigenous identity and promoting respect for indigenous culture and peoples among the broader population, it remained fundamentally an Aymara movement and, as such, had difficulty involving and attracting the support of Quechua Indians. It was due in large measure to the efforts of the Kataristas that an ethnic agenda became part of the CSUTCB platform, but a pan-indigenous identity, such as that which developed in Ecuador, never took root as firmly in Bolivia as it did in Ecuador. Additionally, the Katarista movement was spearheaded by a new generation of indigenous leaders who had succeeded in obtaining an education and often were no longer residing permanently in the rural villages from whence they came. This led to conflicts and mistrust between the grassroots and the leadership.

Certainly a good part of the differences in the movements' abilities to foster pan-indigenous unity can be attributed to the minority versus majority status of the indigenous population in each country. The minority status of indigenous Ecuadorians made racism against all of them, regardless of nationality,<sup>467</sup> more obvious and gave them a greater incentive to band together across internal divides in order to confront

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<sup>467</sup> I am using the term "nationality" here in the way that it is used by the indigenous movement in Ecuador to refer to different indigenous ethnic groups.

the larger society. Likewise, an important factor contributing to the strength of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement was the fact that it included and was able to retain the involvement of many indigenous intellectuals. In Ecuador indigenous people who succeeded economically and were able to get an education, very quickly came up against a glass ceiling in society and politics that was nearly impossible to break through due to racism. This was somewhat less of an issue in Bolivia, where a relatively higher degree of social mobility for indigenous people was permitted. Supporting the idea that that race was less of a defining factor in Bolivia is seen in the new identities that indigenous people who have moved to the cities take on; no longer are they *indios*, they become *cholos*, which is a significant step above the indigenous people who continue to live off the land.

Finally, another factor that certainly contributed to the relatively weaker indigenous identification of Bolivian *campesinos* was the fact the Revolution had incorporated indigenous peasants into the nation-state, even if it was through a clientelistic relationship. The MNR's philosophy with regard to the indigenous question was a liberal one: the mission of the state was to forge a national "Bolivian" identity that would replace local ethnic identities. Indigenous communal identity and culture was considered backwards and antithetical to development, consequently, the goal was turn indigenous peasants into capitalist small holders. As such, the MNR encouraged identification as *campesinos* and attempted to diminish ethnic identification. This of course was another legacy that indigenous activists had to confront in Bolivia. Thus the legacy of the revolution, combined with somewhat

greater social mobility conspired to impede the development of a strong pan-indigenous identity in Bolivia.

Even in Ecuador it must be noted that the strong pan-indigenous identity, which played such an important role in the 1990s and beyond, had not fully penetrated the grassroots till the 1990s. It was the momentous 1990 indigenous uprising that signaled the maturation of this pan-indigenous identity. Ethnic consciousness and identification appeared to strengthen dramatically among Bolivian indigenous groups in the 1990s, but pan-indigenous identities still tended to be weaker than in Ecuador. Without a doubt, the maturation of a strong sense of ethnic identity among the Aymara Indians of the *altiplano* played a significant role in MIP's success in the 2002 elections. However, in the case of the MAS party, which demonstrated much broader geographical reach, ethnic identity does not appear to be as important. In the case of MAS the identity that played a more important role was their members' identification as coca growers. In other words, these people's struggle to protect their livelihood played a much more important role than ethnicity.

#### Organization and Leadership

While ethnic identity can play an important role in elections, and the weakness of ethnic identification certainly played a role in the poor showing of the Katarista parties, organization and leadership are crucial for social movements that seek to challenge traditional political parties in the electoral arena. Only a solid organization can help to offset the advantage of other political contenders with far greater financial resources. The Bolivian *campesino*-indigenous movement in the 1980s had several

organizational handicaps that prevented the Katarista parties from being able to build a strong base for their electoral bids.

First of all, the CSUTCB never succeeded in attaining the level of autonomy from political parties and unions that the CONAIE did, and this caused a series of problems. Ticona, Rojas and Albó describe how early on in the CSUTCB a radical position emphasizing autonomy from political parties, the government, and other organizations prevailed but then quickly lost ground. In their words, the indigenous movement went from its previous “mono-dependency” on the MNR in the 1950s and 1960s, to a “pluri-dependency” on a variety of non-indigenous organizations, including political parties, leftist and union organizations, as well as NGOs and international organizations.<sup>468</sup>

While at the outset the MRTK was considered the political wing of the CSUTCB, as Katarista dominance diminished within the *campesino* organization leaders with affiliations to other parties began to vie for power, which eventually led to greater penetration by these parties in the internal life of the CSUTCB. Evidence of the high degree of intromission by political parties in the internal workings of the CSUTCB during the 1980s and 1990s is abundant. Ticona, Rojas and Albó explain that in the early to mid-1980s association with political parties within the CSUTCB was not openly acknowledged and was limited to parties on the left. However, the presence and influence of political parties steadily increased, so that by the time of the 1988 Congress, “the doors of the CSUTCB opened in a much more overt way to the

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<sup>468</sup> Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995: 130.

entrance of political parties on the left and the right.”<sup>469</sup> According to these authors, the *campesino*-indigenous movement became a “partisan battleground” for parties large and small.<sup>470</sup> Outside political parties’ interest in the movement increased as the strength of the Bolivian labor movement declined. Political parties gained influence and involvement in the CSUTCB through their connections with individual leaders. *Campesino* leaders associated with particular parties competed during CSUTCB assemblies and meetings to advance the position of their party. Thus, the affiliation of CSUTCB leaders with an array of different political parties had a debilitating impact on the organization because it aggravated internal division and infighting, and led to cooptation of the organization’s agenda by outside actors. One *campesino* leader described how during a CSUTCB congress he was nominated to run for a position with the federation by seven political parties. His reflection on this experience points to problems that this kind of interference can engender: “I began to see that in practice, I was not a candidate of the Bolivian peasantry, but instead of seven or eight political parties. That is why today in practice we see that, if a leader is elected by the political parties he is never going to fight for the interests of the Bolivian peasantry.”<sup>471</sup> Clearly, members’ allegiances to a number of different political parties with no direct ties to the federation and many of which advanced political agendas quite different from that of the CSUTCB created problems for organizational unity and autonomy. This pattern of political party intromission in the internal life of the CSUTCB was consistent with the historical pattern in Bolivia that had its start with

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<sup>469</sup> Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995: 133. Translation by the author.

<sup>470</sup> Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995: 132.

<sup>471</sup> Quoted in Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995: 132-133. Translation by the author.

MNR rule in the 1950s and 1960s. By the same token, this pattern was by no means unique to the CSUTCB but was common to most civic organizations in Bolivia. For instance, party penetration of the COB was even greater than was the case in the CSUTCB. In the COB's congresses the presence and influence of political parties was so accepted that there were clearly established party blocs functioning quite openly; parties had a high degree of influence on the COB's decision-making process.<sup>472</sup> These close ties between political parties and the labor union date back to the revolutionary period and the corporatist model that developed at that time. In his analysis of the COB Calderón observes that historically, "the relationship between the workers' unions and political parties was peculiar and was characterized by a confusion of roles between the unions and the parties, with union action being dominant."<sup>473</sup> According to Paulino Guarachi, an Aymara leader and CSUTCB member, his attendance at a COB congress in 1984 convinced him that in order to succeed in the union and the *campesino* movement he had to affiliate himself with a political party. According to Guarachi, it was virtually impossible for someone without a party affiliation to accede to a position of authority within the organization.<sup>474</sup>

As Douglass North (1990) argues, institutions and norms are sticky, and patterns get set that determine subsequent sets of choices. Along these lines, I would argue that the high level of penetration by political parties into all manner of civic organizations in Bolivia, which represents part of the MNR legacy, proved difficult to

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<sup>472</sup> Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste and Albó 1995: 140.

<sup>473</sup> Calderón Gutiérrez 1999: 440. Translation by the author.

<sup>474</sup> Ticona Alejo 2000: 73.

change. Despite the best intentions and rhetoric of the Katarista leaders, who to their credit recognized the risk to the indigenous movement of not protecting its autonomy, intromission by political parties and other outside actors in the internal organizational life of the CSUTCB increased steadily throughout the 1980s and remained high into the 1990s. Interference, in particular by political parties, in the movement organizations increased internal factionalism and division, and made it more difficult for the peasant movement to assert an independent political voice. The presence of political parties within the organization also surely crippled efforts to have the CSUTCB serve as a launching pad for a new, independent political party. The question then is whether and to what degree this situation changed in the mid-to-late 1990s, and to what degree this helps explain the rise of the two *campesino*-indigenous parties: MAS and MIP.

In both Bolivia and Ecuador the 1990s were a period of rising disaffection with the traditional political establishment, which had proved incapable of lifting the majority of the population out of poverty or rooting out corruption from the political process. In Bolivia, beginning in 1985 with MNR leader Víctor Paz Estenssoro in the presidency, successive administrations restructured the Bolivian economy along neoliberal lines. While these policies initially had a positive impact by taming hyperinflation and stabilizing the economy; stabilization came at a high social cost. Unemployment rose substantially and deep cuts were made to already meager social services.<sup>475</sup> By the mid-1990s the brunt of the shift was being felt and major

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<sup>475</sup> For an anthropological account of the impact of Bolivia's neoliberal policies on the poor see Gill 2000.

economic improvements were not in the offing. Disillusionment and anger stemming from the impact of radical neoliberal restructuring eventually eroded public support for country's major parties, including the MNR. In 1997 the MNR lost the presidency to the former military dictator, General Banzer and his Nationalist Democratic Action party (ADN). Once in office, Banzer proved a loyal ally of the United States and in an effort to please Washington waged a full-blown, U.S. financed campaign to eradicate coca production.<sup>476</sup> But by this time a strong social movement of coca growers had been organized and was actively challenging and opposing these policies.

Both these sets of policies – neoliberal structural adjustment and coca eradication – eventually led to deep public frustration and anger and led to tremendous public opposition. This social discontent, in turn, opened up electoral space for new political challengers. Given how unpopular these policies were, it is likely that pressure began to build in the grassroots for *campesino* leaders to break their ties with the parties that were implementing and supporting these policies. Evidence of anger against traditional parties among *campesinos* from the *altiplano* was abundant in 2000. At rallies I attended in small *altiplano* towns in November of that year speakers repeatedly called for movement members and organizations to break their ties with and disaffiliate from the major parties. Speakers exhorted peasants to gather together all the party paraphernalia and propaganda they had in their possession and to burn it.

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<sup>476</sup> Coca eradication efforts in Bolivia were directed primarily at the Chapare region, which was the source of the coca being produced for the drug trade. The Yungas was designated as a region that could continue to produce coca for internal consumption. While coca is the primary product used to produce cocaine, in its unadulterated state it has many beneficial and benign uses. Chewing coca leaves and drinking coca tea provide a mild stimulant, act as an appetite suppressant, counteract the effects of altitude sickness, and aid in digestion. For indigenous communities in the Andes the coca leaf also has sacred and religious significance. For more information on the U.S. drug war in Bolivia see Ledebur 2004.



By 2000 it was clear that the ability of major political parties to intervene in the internal life of the *campesino* organizations had indeed weakened considerably. The coca growers' organizations probably realized the importance of autonomy from political parties much earlier on given the fact that their struggle involved them in open confrontation with official state policy, a policy which almost all the major political parties supported. Not surprisingly, it was the coca growers' organization that experienced the first successful incursion into electoral politics during the late 1990s.

In addition to the issue of autonomy, which was a limiting factor, there was the question of the degree to which *campesino* organizations had developed a healthy organizational structure that fostered accountability, transparency, and fluid communication between the grassroots and the leaders. While the Katarista leadership presented itself as an alternative to the old model of peasant bosses, there are indications that the movement did not succeed during the 1980s in creating a vibrant, democratic organizational structure. Instead, there are many indications that old leadership patterns persisted, as illustrated in one indigenous scholar's description of the relationship between the Katarista parties and their bases:

... Katarismo mutated into a political party; it entered into the Western logic and adopted electoral forms of doing politics. While its discourse advocated recovery and reassertion of cultural identity, this, in fact, concealed the negation of communal logic. That is to say, its organizational structure did not differ in the least from other parties, its leadership model was one based on personal characteristics that allowed leaders to become private owners of power and to concentrate sovereignty (the ability to make decisions) in the hands of a few who decided in the name of the people ... By alienating sovereignty from the collectivity they turned into an easily corruptible party without any social control. Even though the MRTKL's statutes provided for the

creation of a body to hold the Katarista Executive Committee accountable, which was the Katarista Parliament, to be made up of representatives from the regional organizations, *campesino* sectors, and university students; this body did not meet or function for a very long time.<sup>477</sup>

From this description it seems clear that the Katarista parties did not have effective mechanisms linking the leadership to the grassroots organizations, which are so important in maintaining accountability and fostering participation.

While it was not possible for me to fully determine within the scope of this investigation the degree to which levels of internal democracy and accountability had improved within *campesino* organizations by the late 1990s and, in particular, within the MAS and MIP parties, the limited evidence I was able to gather indicated that this had changed quite substantially, especially within the coca growers' movement and the political party associated with it, MAS. The following comments are not meant to be conclusive, but only indicative, as they are based on a spattering of interviews conducted with movement and party members in the sub-tropical town of Corioco, a few brief trips to rural communities in the *altiplano* to attend political events, as well as press reports. This limited evidence indicated that the pattern of organizational dominance by a single leader remained unchanged in Bolivia. However, there did appear to be much more consultation between the leadership and their bases and, in conjunction with this, much more active participation by the grassroots in the life of the organizations and parties than had been the case in the past. Press coverage of the coca growers' movement, as well as the CSUTCB during periods of protest actions and uprisings offered evidence of a process of constant consultation between the

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<sup>477</sup> Patzi Paco 1999: 40. Translation by the author.

leaders of these two organizations and their bases, which was more concordant with Ecuadorian movement practices. During the cycles of protest and subsequent negotiations with the state that took place during the latter half of 2000, the press reported that *cocalero* leader, Evo Morales, returned repeatedly to the Chapare region, where the movement was based, to consult with the movement leadership and bases in large assemblies. In a similar vein, at the conclusion of an intense period of social protest in September and October of that same year, CSUTCB leader, Felipe Quispe, led the organization in negotiations with the state that eventually resulted in an agreement to suspend the *campesino* uprising and road blockades. Significantly, Quispe insisted that the negotiations be held in an open manner with the presence of the press, as well as a large entourage of *campesino* leaders. In the past similar negotiations between the state and unions or social movement organizations tended to be conducted behind closed doors with the participation of a much smaller cadre of leaders. Quispe made a point of emphasizing that this was the first time this type of negotiation was being carried out in so public a manner. The idea was to insure transparency and accountability with his bases, to build a greater level of trust with them, and to make it a more participatory process. Like Morales and the coca growers, there were several times when Quispe suspended the negotiations in order to return to his base and consult with them on particular matters.

MAS members and elected officials in the town of Coroico described internal party practices for candidate selection and other activities that were very similar to the types of participatory models being practiced by Pachakutik. Also similar to the Pachakutik experience, the local and regional *campesino* organizations were fully

engaged and committed to this party. It appeared from these interviews that the problem of multiple loyalties to different parties had been overcome, at least in some areas of the country.<sup>478</sup>

In conclusion, evidence seems to indicate that during the 1990s, as Bolivian *campesino* movement organizations were forced into a more confrontational relationship with the state than had been the case in the 1950s and 1960s, their internal practices and norms also underwent change, resulting in organizations that were more internally democratic and participatory. This, together with the shift towards greater movement autonomy from political parties, surely played a role in the dramatic wins experienced by MAS and MIP in 2002 and again in 2006. However, *campesino* movement politics in Bolivia continued to be plagued by regional divisions, leadership turf wars, and the absence of a unifying identity that could serve to unite predominantly indigenous *campesinos* throughout the country. Having said that, Morales's dramatic and unprecedented victory in 2006 seems to signal at least a temporary reprieve from these problems and may, in fact, reflect the ascendancy of and mass embrace of a pan-indigenous or at least a popular identity. Bolivian social movements have crossed an impressive threshold.

### Material Resources

Despite Katarista success at wresting control of the network of *campesino* organizations from state control and intervention, by the 1980s the CSUTCB was still a relatively young organization and had had little time in which to develop a track

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<sup>478</sup> Author interviews with Santiago Gutiérrez, Juana Lourdes Pinell, and Sabino Mendoza; Coroico, Bolivia; November 10, 2000.

record as a deliverer of projects and programs that could provide concrete benefits at the local level in terms of education, employment, and material resources. Katarista leaders in the 1970s and the CSUTCB in the early 1980s had developed a strong presence at the national level but had yet to make a directly felt impact at the local level. This I would argue was another important reason for the lack of voter response in those areas that should have been the Katarista stronghold.

In the early 1980s when it was serving in the governing UDP coalition, the CSUTCB sought to implement a large-scale, long-term, development program aimed at aiding small farmers and *campesinos*. Regrettably, this program was fraught with serious and debilitating problems; if it had been otherwise, this might have served as a stronger base upon which to build support for Katarista electoral initiatives.

It was in mid-1983 that Siles Zuazo and the UDP agreed to bring the COB and the CSUTCB directly into government. As partners in the UDP coalition the CSUTCB and the COB demanded direct co-participation through control of several key ministries. In the case of the CSUTCB this meant control of the Ministry of Peasant and Agricultural Affairs (MACA) and involvement in some educational projects. Around this time the CSUTCB leadership also proposed the establishment of a rural development organization to be financed by the state and international donors but administered by the CSUTCB and its affiliates. The goal was to have the *campesino* organizations directly involved in administering rural development projects, because it was felt that in the past outside control of these projects had served to undermine the strength of the *campesino* movement by manipulating the peasant population. Rivera describes the movement's experience with outside agencies that

led to a desire for movement control over projects: “the outside projects were used during the dictatorial regimes as means of intimidating and controlling of the agrarian union movement... “discrimination” and “racist” attitudes on the part of the technical advisors were mentioned, as well as, all manner of shady deal-making and questionable use of funds.”<sup>479</sup>

In response to UDP foot dragging on the CSUTCB proposals, price freezes on agricultural goods, and the devaluation of the Bolivian currency, the *campesino* movement staged a massive week-long protest, which brought the government to the negotiating table. These negotiations resulted in the creation of the Peasant Agricultural Corporation (CORACA). CORACA’s main objective was the economic liberation of the peasantry (Equipo Multidisciplinario de Apoyo a CORACA (EMAC) 1992). The idea was to implement projects and programs that would help the peasant population move out of poverty and underdevelopment by giving them the resources to improve production levels and get better prices for their products. CORACA distributed tractors to *campesino* communities for shared use; it set up cooperative stores that offered goods and supplies at reduced prices, thereby bypassing middlemen; it supplied farmers with fertilizers and other inputs; it made small loans available for equipment purchases and start-up funds for small enterprises, such as mills located directly in rural communities, which would enable farmers to grind their own grains. The goal of the program was to avoid handouts and, instead, to promote the type of economic development that would foster *campesino* economic independence and self-sufficiency.

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<sup>479</sup> Rivera Cusicanqui 1987: 258. Translation by the author.

Unfortunately the program fell far short of attaining these ambitious goals. By all accounts CORACA failed in its goal of becoming an independent, self-sustaining, rural development agency administered by and for the peasant movement's own organizations. Likewise, the projects initiated under the program's auspices did not result in long-term qualitative improvements in the economic condition of its beneficiaries. Instead, money and resources were often wasted or used for short-term or individual gain without having a multiplying effect or long-term impact.

Rivera places most of the blame for the failure of the co-governing experience on the UDP, which she claims actually took steps to undermine the arrangement because it did not really want it to work. She explains that, "the governing coalition considered rural projects and the state's administrative apparatuses as spaces for the clientelistic assignment of quotas of power."<sup>480</sup> International donations and other resources that the government received for distribution in the rural areas were viewed by the UDP as mechanisms to "broaden the influence of the political parties in the rural areas," and, "instruments for resolving internal disputes between the governing parties through a clientelistic policy directed towards the *campesino* unions, sub-prefectures, and local councils."<sup>481</sup>

While the UDP certainly played a role in CORACA's failure, the *campesino* organizations themselves also bear a large part of the responsibility. The few analyses that exist of the experience with CORACA point to problems internal to the *campesino* organizations that contributed to this failure. It appears that the CSUTCB,

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<sup>480</sup> Rivera Cusicanqui 1987: 260. Translation by the author.

<sup>481</sup> Rivera Cusicanqui 1987: 260. Translation by the author.

as the national sponsoring organization, was not robust enough institutionally and perhaps not autonomous enough to effectively administer such a program. Ironically the level of autonomy that the CSUTCB was given in administering this program may have also contributed to its failure. A study of CORACA describes a series of problems and reasons for the program's failures most of which have to do with poor organization, a paucity of administrative skills, and a lack of proper oversight (Equipo Multidisciplinario de Apoyo a CORACA (EMAC) 1992). As the study explains, this program was initiated during a period of great political instability under the UDP administration; the country was experiencing high levels of social upheaval, conflict, and economic turmoil as hyperinflation set in. What is not mentioned in the study is that the CSUTCB was also in its infancy at the time and this surely played an important role in the failure to establish a strong and efficient structure that could effectively channel and administer the resources being distributed to the local communities and federations. Organizational weakness impedes accountability, which in turn makes it easier and more tempting for individuals in positions of power to take advantage and enrich themselves, their families, and in some cases their communities to the detriment of others.

The study indicates that CORACA's organizational structure was ill defined and hastily put together. While the study does not clearly describe the agency's national structure, it appears that the administration of the program was highly decentralized with direct responsibility for implementation and accounting residing at the provincial level and little national oversight. Thus the performance of the CORACAs varied in accordance with the level of organization that existed at the



provincial level. The experience met with moderate success in a few provinces but was quite poor in many others. It appears that the program was put together hastily in a deliberate attempt to gain control over the resources that were being sent to the Bolivian government by international agencies: “The process of organizing and getting the various CORACAs off the ground has been precipitous... They rushed to construct the CORACAs in order to be able to control the agricultural machinery and fertilizers.”<sup>482</sup> As a result of this rushed process it was up to the provincial or, in some cases, regional organizations to set up their own structure for the administration of their local CORACA. In each case there was some mix of collaboration and responsibility between the following actors at the provincial level: the provincial or sub-provincial *campesino* federations, the international NGOs that were donating money and resources, political parties, and the local communities, that were the intended beneficiaries. Unfortunately, the study of the CORACA program limited itself to describing the problems and successes experienced in each locality without engaging in a rigorous comparative analysis aimed at arriving at conclusions about the common denominators that accounted for the differences in performance between localities. In many regions the provincial or regional peasant unions and organizations were in charge of administering the program. In some cases, including Potosi and parts of Cochabamba Province, this arrangement produced positive results. In these successful cases the local peasant federation was mentioned as playing a central and positive role in administering the program. For example, the study attributes the success of one of the Cochabamba CORACAs to the fact that it was,

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<sup>482</sup> Equipo Multidisciplinario de Apoyo a CORACA (EMAC) 1992: 16. Translation by the author.

“organized in a decentralized fashion, supported by the union structure located in that zone, and that CORACA and the union organization functioned as a single unit.”<sup>483</sup>

By contrast, in one of the least successful cases, Chuquisaca, the study concluded that many of the problems in that province stemmed from the lack of clear dividing lines between the local *campesino* unions and the CORACA. Some of the problems mentioned repeatedly throughout this analysis of the CORACAs included the lack of administrative skills and training of those charged with administering the projects, lack of oversight, and top-down decision-making that allowed for little input from the project recipients in the local communities. These deficiencies led to mismanagement and misuse of funds and resources. The influx of resources in the absence of an effective administrative structure ultimately led to conflict and friction within *campesino* organizations themselves. According to Rivera:

The struggle over control of these resources heightened the internal conflicts within the CSUTCB and allowed tendencies towards clientelism, corruption, and the bureaucratization of the leadership to flourish within the heart of the organization. All of this contributed to the erosion of organizational representativeness [representatividad sindical] and the stifling of the democratic and pluralistic features that had characterized the *campesino* organization since its institutionalization in 1979.<sup>484</sup>

If we contrast this with the more successful experience of PRODEPINE in Ecuador some interesting lessons and insights emerge. Perhaps most importantly, PRODEPINE was set up in such a way that it was institutionally autonomous from the state and also from the indigenous movement organizations. Indigenous organizations had indirect input into the program, but it was not under the direct control of the social

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<sup>483</sup> Equipo Multidisciplinario de Apoyo a CORACA (EMAC) 1992: 116. Translation by the author.

<sup>484</sup> Rivera Cusicanqui 1987: 278. Translation by the author.

movement organizations or CONAIE. In light of the comparison with CORACA, the fact that the nitty-gritty of resource distribution was institutionally outside the bounds of the social movement organizations in the case of PRODEPINE appears to have been a good thing. PRODEPINE's institutional structure was designed to allow for a balance of social movement involvement and oversight from the international agency providing the majority of the resources, in this case the World Bank. While many in CONAIE chafed at this arrangement, it seems to have protected the movement organizations from being weakened by internal conflicts over managing this type of program. At the insistence of the World Bank, PRODEPINE was administered according to technical criteria and by people with technical knowledge and training. These clear rules and procedures allowed for more transparent and effective administration that was far less susceptible to accusations of favoritism or mismanagement. Often one of the main problems faced by these types of programs is the lack of technical know-how among the populations they are aiming to serve. In an interview with an indigenous PRODEPINE administrator, he explained that they had been unable to find enough indigenous people with training and expertise in technical fields and, as a result, were forced to hire mestizos to fill some of the technical positions.<sup>485</sup> If this was a problem in Ecuador at the end of the 1990s, then surely it was an even greater challenge in Bolivia in the early to mid-1980s. Indeed a major problem with CORACA appears to have been that those who were charged with administering the program often had little or no accounting or technical skills.

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<sup>485</sup> Kurikamak Yupanki, author interview, Quito, January 29, 2001.

The combination of poor organization, lack of oversight, and a paucity of technical know-how contributed to a widespread pattern of corruption, mismanagement, and poor planning that doomed most of the local CORACAs. The hundreds of tractors distributed to small farming communities did not become a tool for development or improve production quotas, because most of them were distributed to *campesinos* with plots so small that the use of tractors made little economic sense. The equipment quickly fell into disrepair, because no one had direct responsibility for their upkeep, and the technical skills and money needed to repair them were lacking. Almost all the tractors were eventually repossessed by the state in 1990. Many local CORACA projects went broke when loans were made but not repaid. Projects were decided upon without conducting social and economic feasibility studies, as a result, decisions were not based upon technically sound economic criteria. Even in those cases when CORACA programs were well administered they fell short of the goal of helping the *campesino* population attain economic independence and development. The authors of the CORACA study concluded that even in Potosi, which was one of the more successful cases, “The projects taken on by CORACA are for the most part social in nature and contribute little to the economic liberation of the peasantry. Once implemented they do not develop the capacity to generate their own resources and, as such, promote dependency by the *campesino* communities on CORACA (as if it were a charitable institution).”<sup>486</sup>

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<sup>486</sup> Equipo Multidisciplinario de Apoyo a CORACA (EMAC) 1992: 64. Translation by the author.

There were a few isolated examples of local CORACAs that functioned fairly well and made a lasting and positive impact,<sup>487</sup> however, they remained isolated, local experiences that did not contribute to the strengthening of a national movement or local identification with such a movement. The failure of CORACA meant the failure of the *campesino* movement organizations to position themselves as promoters of rural development, and this was another key factor that helped seal the fate of the Katarista parties in the 1980s.

In many ways the CSUTCB in the 1980s was a victim of its own success. Because of the fluid political context that resulted from the transition to democracy, the CSUTCB was in a position to play an important role at the national level even though it had not yet developed strong organizational roots linking local level organizations to the regional and national levels in a strong and coherent way. Not only did the CORACAs for the most part fail, but also it is not clear that any attempt was made to connect these projects and the Katarista parties. Given that CSUTCB leaders and members held conflicting allegiances to a plethora of traditional political parties combined with the fact that the whole CORACA project was so decentralized made it virtually impossible for the Katarista parties to attempt to build a base of electoral support upon this foundation.

In addition, the time frame between when the CSUTCB was organized (1979) and when the MRTKL first entered the electoral fray (1985) was relatively short, which made it difficult for a clear organizational identity to firmly take root. By

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<sup>487</sup> Among these was the CORACA in Yungas, a sub-tropical region of the province of La Paz.

contrast, in Ecuador PRODEPINE was established more than twelve years after the founding of CONAIE.

Thus, while the *campesino* movement and its leadership had been catapulted into positions of a certain amount of power at the national level, their organizational base was weak, and this was evident in the fates of both CORACA and the Katarista parties. The MAS, on the other hand, was built squarely upon the coca growers' movement, which is involved in a fight that has direct impacts on the economic livelihood of its members: their right to continue to grow coca. Thus the coca growers' federations are directly involved in defending their members' ability to make a living, and the party was built upon this foundation. MAS's success in 2002 and even more so in 2006 indicates that it has been able to appeal broadly beyond its base, but the strong base in the coca growers federations was a crucial launching pad for its later success.

## **Conclusion**

By analyzing the case of movement parties that failed to prosper, in this case the Katarista parties, this paper set out to test a set of hypotheses about the factors that facilitate and those that impede social movement-based political parties in the electoral arena. The paper addressed the impact of institutional factors but placed most emphasis on factors affecting the internal strength and cohesion of the movements that sponsor these parties. Institutional factors, including aspects of electoral law and a lack of opportunities for parties to run for office and participate in local politics because of the centralized nature of government, all were found to play an important

role in explaining the failure of the Katarista parties. However, rules and institutions alone could not account for these parties' dismal showing in areas of the country where one would have expected them to be strong. This chapter suggested that other factors having to do with the strength of the movement needed to be considered.

My analysis focused on three aspects of social movement strength: (1) the existence of a unifying identity, (2) leadership and organization, and (3) a movement's track record in providing concrete resources to its members and constituents at the local level. I explained that even though the Bolivian campesino movement had achieved a national profile by the 1980s, there were major problems and disconnections between the leadership and the grassroots that help account for the failure of parties to emerge successfully from this movement. Many of the movement's deficiencies during this period could be traced back to the corporatist and clientelistic legacy of MNR rule and the aftermath of the revolution. Ironically, greater state involvement in organizing the peasant population and providing corporatist channels during the 1950s and 1960s resulted in an organizational culture within the campesino movement that was hierarchical and prone to division. It was an organizational culture that did not provide strong links between the grassroots and the leadership. This meant that, while externally the movement appeared to be strong during the early 1980s; it was, in fact, internally weak. This weakness was manifested in the lack of voter support for the Katarista parties in the 1980s.

## Chapter 9

### Conclusion and Epilogue

This democratic cultural struggle, this cultural democratic revolution is part of the struggle of our ancestors, the extension of the struggle of Tupaj Katari. That struggle and these results are [of the same lineage as] Che Guevara. Brothers and sisters of Bolivia and Latin America we have arrived. We are going to continue until we achieve equality for our country. It is not necessary to concentrate capital in a few hands so that many die of hunger. These policies have to change, but they have to change in democracy...

Finally, in conclusion, my most fundamental respects to the indigenous-original peoples' movement of Bolivia and America, to the social movements, to the leaders who cast their lot with this movement, to the professionals and intellectuals who joined to change our history...<sup>488</sup>

- Evo Morales Ayma, Inaugural Speech, January 22, 2006

A spirit, at once old and new, is afoot in Latin America, and social movement parties are an important part of this changing tide. This is nowhere more evident than in Bolivia, where Evo Morales Ayma was elected to the presidency in January 2006. Not only the first indigenous person to win election to the highest seat in this majority indigenous land, Morales, the head of the militant coca-growers federation, is also the first social movement leader to do so. The reinvigorated and diverse left that is emerging and winning political power in Latin America has long and deep roots in struggles for social justice that, as Morales alludes to in the above quote, stretch back over centuries. But the current is also new in a couple of important respects. First of all, the struggles are taking place within the confines of the democratic process; as

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<sup>488</sup> Morales Ayma 2006.



Morales asserts, policies have to change but “in democracy.” Secondly, the impetus for change is no longer directed from above, instead social movements and autonomous civil society are playing a central role in setting the agenda and holding leaders and politicians accountable, much more so than was the case in previous historical periods. The special mention that Morales gives to social movements in the above quote testifies to their significant role. Recent events, then, lend urgency to the task of analyzing and understanding the intersection between social movements, civil society, and formal politics that is at the vortex of this sea change in Latin American politics. Social movement parties, where they exist, lie at the heart of this nexus.

In this concluding chapter I will begin by addressing the broad significance of this study to theoretical debates about democracy in the Third World. I will then briefly review some of the general findings of the study. In the final section I will comment on the significance of events that have occurred since my original research was completed and therefore are not directly addressed in the body of the dissertation. Finally, in light of these recent developments, I will identify some outstanding questions and areas for future research.

### **Democracy in the Third World – Institutions and Structure**

The formal trappings of democratic politics – free and fair elections, changes in government, competitive political parties – do not necessarily, or in and of themselves, bring into existence a healthy democracy, one in which the vast majority of citizens feel that government is responsive to their interests and in some way represents them. Formal democracy throughout much of Latin America has been

enervated and distorted internally by high levels of inequality and poverty, by the persistence of clientelism as the hinge of the politician-voter nexus, and by the endurance of cultural attitudes and practices that give inordinate power to politicians and militate against higher levels of citizen participation. Thomas Carothers (2002) argues that many emerging democracies in the Third World have gotten stuck in a “gray zone”, that while not authoritarian can neither be described as fully democratic. “Feckless pluralism,” the term he uses to characterize the political syndrome that plagues many Latin American democracies, is characterized by elitism, corruption, and citizen alienation from the political process. Changes in government produce no more than an exchange of one inefficient and corrupt elite sector for another.

While not the focus of this study, external forces have also stymied the ability of democracy to produce policies that respond to and meet the needs of its citizens as sovereignty has been eroded by the high degree of leverage that international financial institutions exert over these countries’ economies. The combination of these unfavorable internal and external conditions has resulted in high levels of citizen frustration and disaffection with the political process. This has been nowhere more apparent than in the central Andean region.

Much of the analysis within political science about what ails these democracies revolves around notions of governability. This framework attributes these failings primarily to deficient political institutions, or to the undisciplined and corrupt behavior of political elites. Analyses in this vein frequently fail to address the deeper structural characteristics of inequality and poverty and, consequently, contain an implicit bias in favor of the status quo.

A focus on social movement parties and their impact on politics presumes a different set of assumptions about the problems that ail numerous Latin American democracies and the Central Andean nations, in particular. I argue that the region's governability problems and political volatility have deep roots in these countries' exclusionary social and economic structures. Terry Lynn Karl (2003) argues that high levels of economic inequality translate into disparities in political power, which in turn create a "vicious cycle of inequality" as elites use political power to perpetuate and increase their economic power. She contends that this cycle, with its origins in the colonial system, has been self-perpetuating and that neoliberalism, far from challenging these longstanding patterns, has exacerbated them, raising levels of inequality and social exclusion. In Chapter 2 I discuss the ways in which neoliberalism destabilized old patterns of political legitimation based, in large part, on clientelism, thereby producing political instability in the region. Also in this chapter I discussed ways in which poverty and inequality distort the democratic process by privileging those who can finance expensive political campaigns and by fostering the persistence of clientelism and vote-buying as the primary nexus between poor voters and politicians, which in turn, changes the nature of and undermines accountability. Under such conditions, democratic institutions become colonized by elites who are capable of using the electoral process to sustain their economic and political dominance and resist demands from below for structural change or for greater protection from the effects of economic liberalization and globalization. The lack of responsiveness to popular sector demands that results from this skewed system of representation, in turn, engenders the type of alienation from the political process that

Carothers describes. In this view, governability problems are not primarily due to elite behavior or poorly designed institutions, although these may be contributing factors, but to the exclusionary nature of the system itself and the shallowness of representation. Consequently, they will not be fully resolved until the interests of the majority poor are more effectively represented within the formal democratic process.

Seen in this light, the emergence of social movement-based parties are a positive development, one that can contribute to a deepening of democracy through more effective representation of the interests and voices of poor and marginalized sectors within what have traditionally been exclusionary political systems. In contrast with Huntington (1968), who suggests that a highly mobilized society can be detrimental to democracy, the position taken in this dissertation is that organization of marginalized sectors is necessary if they are going to achieve adequate representation within the formal political process.

### **Review of Findings**

This dissertation has explored the extent to which social movement parties, emerging as they have within these sclerotic systems, represent vehicles that can effectively challenge and push for change within the formal democratic process. This has involved a series of different inquiries: first of all, what are the conditions necessary for the emergence of a moderately successful social movement party? (Chapters 4 and 8) Secondly, in terms of their make-up, organization, and political behavior, are these parties measurably different from traditional political parties? (Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7) How have they fared in their attempts to encourage and

exemplify transparency and accountability to voters? And finally, to the degree that they have, how have they been able to avoid relying on clientelism to cement ties with poor voters? (Chapter 7)

Different than their Ecuadorian counterparts, Bolivian peasant movements had a longer organizational history, played an important and visible role in their country's struggle against military dictatorship and in favor of democracy, thereby establishing themselves earlier as political players on the national stage. Yet when their leaders attempted to organize political parties in the late 1970s and early 1980s they failed miserably. The comparison between the failed launch of the Katarista parties in Bolivia and the successful launch of the Pachakutik Party, close to two decades later in Ecuador, reveal a number of necessary conditions for the successful emergence of social movement-based parties. First of all, if social movements are to be the founders and main protagonists of a new party, as opposed to simply supporters, then they will need to have established a national level organization and carved out political space for themselves within the national arena. This was true for both the CSUTCB in Bolivia, as well as for CONAIE in Ecuador. Presence and leadership at the national level is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.

Also important to the success of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement and, by association Pachakutik, was the development of a strong and positive pan-indigenous identity that served to unite diverse ethnicities around a common platform. Not only did this pan-indigenous identity foster affinity and identification between voters and the new party, but also the common identity uniting diverse ethnic groups served as the foundation for the creation of a national movement and party. An important part

of the explanation for the failure of the Katarista parties during the 1980s was the fact that the indigenous identity that these parties were attempting to appeal to and mobilize resonated mostly with indigenous intellectuals and had not yet penetrated the grassroots peasant populations. So a strong, positive identity is an important asset, and this is particularly the case for ethnic or racial groups that have been marginalized and discriminated against.

Within contexts of high levels of poverty and economic deprivation, however, a unifying and positive identity is not enough to compete with other parties; the allegiance of poor voters is often determined by concrete material considerations. Local political bosses' control of access to jobs or people's livelihood translates into political power. On the other hand, parties may compete for votes by doling out goodies during the campaign or promising particularistic goods to voters and specific communities. Within such a context, appeals to a positive identity and advocacy of relevant issues are not enough to win votes among the poor, instead a social movement that seeks to transition into formal politics must also have a track record of successfully providing material benefits and making concrete improvements in the lives of the people they are seeking to represent. This may be through opening up new job opportunities, helping to provide access to development projects, or other programs that have a direct impact on local peoples' lives. By the time Pachakutik was launched, the CONAIE had an impressive track record of pressuring for and obtaining concessions from the state and from international development organizations to provide for programs and initiatives designed to improve and directly impact the lives of people at the grassroots. These programs were negotiated in such a way that

they strengthened the indigenous organizations as they provided education and services for the communities. By contrast, the ambitious CORACA program launched by the CSUTCB in the early 1980s was largely a failure and, therefore, did serve as a foundation for political party organizing.

Movement autonomy from political parties, the state, and other powerful actors in civil society was also determined to be a crucial variable accounting for the contrast between the multiple failures of the Katarista parties and the success experienced by Pachakutik. Autonomy from political parties and the state was important in eliminating sources of internal conflict and competition within the movement and in removing obstacles to party formation.

In addition to a strong, unifying identity, a track record of responding to concrete material needs, and organizational autonomy, this study also found that movement structure and norms played an important role in determining the success of a social movement party and its ability to compete effectively. Social movement organizational norms and practices may or may not play a role in whether a social movement launches a political party, but they definitely have an impact on electoral success and longevity once a party is formed. Since social movement parties must of necessity rely more on their ability to mobilize people than on financial resources the nature of their internal organization and the degree of cohesiveness it engenders is vital. Social movement leaders, as was the case with a number of Katarista leaders, may decide to form political parties, but if they are not building on a strong organizational base then the party may experience some short-term success but, in all likelihood, will not have staying power. The Ecuadorian indigenous movement had

developed a particularly resilient and vibrant organizational structure that was highly democratic, non-hierarchical, and which incorporated practices that actively promoted the regular renovation of leadership, thereby assuring internal mobility within the organization and a constant supply of new leadership. Many features of the organizational structure and norms developed within the indigenous movement were successfully transposed to Pachakutik after its formation. Not only did these norms and organizational practices engender legitimacy, foster flexibility, and increase the party's ability to mobilize and campaign; but they were also crucial to the party's ability to hold its elected office holders accountable to their constituents and to the party. The fact that many of the party's candidates and elected officials were also members of social movement organizations meant that they had to answer to highly organized, well-informed, and united constituencies that considered themselves partners, as opposed to clients or subordinates.

This comparative study, then, identified a number of key elements that explain both the emergence of social movement parties, as well as their ability to compete in the electoral arena despite disadvantages in relation to other parties in terms of their access to financial resources. Having identified the factors that account for differences in terms of success, the next question addressed was the degree to which these parties represented real alternatives to traditional parties in terms of their membership and, more importantly, their political behavior. Pachakutik without a doubt was a vehicle for inclusion of sectors and peoples who had previously been largely excluded from formal politics, especially at the national level.



The party's ability to avoid clientelistic practices, maintain party discipline, act at the national level in a programmatic manner, and promote transparency was mixed but on balance positive. Not all of Pachakutik's elected officials were immune to the corrupting tendencies and pressures within Ecuador's political system; in most cases, when members violated the party's norms or positions they were expelled. While Pachakutik provincial legislators did indeed focus much of their attention to responding to needs and demands in their particular provinces, they also introduced national legislation that was consistent with the party's ideological stance and platform. Legislative alliances were a source of ongoing tension and internal debate within the party as they weighed the benefits of strategic alliances as a means to increase their influence and position in Congress with the costs that alliances with parties on the right bore in terms of violation of their own principles and the impression this left on the public. At the local level, while not all Pachakutik-run municipalities succeeded in developing transparent, effective and participatory administrations, the ones that did so, including those in Cotacachi, Guaranda, and Guamote, represented innovative experiments that served as a model for other municipalities.

In summary, while Pachakutik's track record in terms of party discipline, ideological consistency, transparency, and effectiveness in office was not perfect, it was nevertheless impressive, especially for a party that counted much of its base in poor rural communities. At several critical moments and under great pressure the party acted cohesively, remained ideologically consistent, and avoided cooptation. Examples of this cohesiveness and consistency come from both early and later years in

the party's existence. For example, just after the party's birth, Pachakutik was heavily courted by both the PSC and the PRE in an attempt to win its backing in the run-off elections. The new party made a principled decision not to endorse either candidate, as both were ideologically distant from Pachakutik. In 2003 after a frustrating six months as coalition partners in the Gutiérrez administration, the party decided to withdraw from the governing coalition and have all their ministerial appointees resign. As of the time of this writing Pachakutik remains an important party in congress and at the local level and represents a clear ideological and programmatic position within the party system. The party appears to have established itself as a significant player within the party system while simultaneously retaining strong ties with its social movement sponsors, in particular CONAIE and affiliate organizations.

Finally, while Pachakutik, as a minority party, experienced significant limits in its ability to shape policy, it nevertheless had a measurable impact on some important political outcomes. Its congressional delegations played an important role during the late 1990s in blocking privatization efforts. The party's delegation to the National Constituent Assembly won inclusion in the 1998 constitution of recognition of the country's multiethnic and cultural make-up, as well as the inclusion of certain provisions safeguarding indigenous collective rights. Pachakutik played an important role in drafting legislation that directly impacted rural communities, including the Parish Councils Law, which created a layer of government at the level of the rural hamlet, thus devolving authority from municipal urban centers to the village level. Pachakutik was not successful, however, in blocking the dollarization of the economy or the construction of a U.S. base in Manta.

In conclusion, Pachakutik's trajectory demonstrates that social movement-based parties have the potential to bring new actors into the political arena, introduce innovative political practices, and advance programmatic agendas that respond to and seek to defend non-elite interests. In all these ways social movement-based parties represent a deepening and widening of the democratic process in countries where democracy has often been more form than substance.

### **Epilogue: 2006 and Beyond**

In the years since the initial research for this dissertation was carried out momentous events involving social movement parties have taken place in the two countries that are the focus of this study, Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as in Brazil. In all three cases, parties with social movement roots succeeded in entering into national government, albeit in different ways. In 2002 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party finally won the presidency of Brazil after three previous attempts. For six months in 2003 (January to August) Pachakutik served in government as a coalition partner in Lucio Gutiérrez's cabinet. In January 2006 Bolivians elected Evo Morales to the presidency. These dramatic developments would seem to signal that social movement parties have emerged as a viable alternative party model.

The ascension of social movement parties to government provides a new and important opportunity to study the degree to which these parties provide a stable foundation for beginning to address underlying structural issues and moving policy in a direction that pays more attention to popular sector demands. It was, of course, impossible for me to include this as part of my analysis given the fact that these events

occurred several years after I had completed my field research, but I will venture some tentative comments based on these recent developments.

From the standpoint of progressive social movements themselves the PT's tenure in the executive branch has been disappointing. First of all because the economic policies enacted by da Silva's administration were much more orthodox than what he advocated while in the opposition. His adherence to a tight fiscal policy in order to maintain investor confidence required him to delay indefinitely the increased social spending that his base had been anxiously awaiting. By the same token he failed to respond to specific policy demands by different social movements that had been PT supporters. For example, Lula failed to implement any sort of agrarian reform despite that fact that this had been a longstanding demand of one of its social movement supporters, the Landless Worker's Movement (MST). Thus, the assumption of the presidency by the PT did not lead to the dramatic policy shifts that the party's rank and file and social movement supporters had been hoping for.<sup>489</sup>

The second major disappointment of Lula's presidency was the eruption of a major corruption scandal involving payments and bribes made by the PT to politicians from other parties. The accusations include payments aimed at securing the support of other parties for his run for the presidency and a program of regular under-the-table payments to individual legislators in exchange for their support of the president's legislative agenda. It should be noted that the corrupt actions the PT is accused of were aimed chiefly at increasing political power, as opposed to rent-seeking or

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<sup>489</sup> For a discussion of the challenges and opportunities facing the PT administration under Lula and expectations at the grassroots, see Rubin 2005.

personal enrichment. While Lula's administration was by no means the first to engage in these sorts of corrupt practices, the accusations were extremely damaging to a party that had built its reputation on a record of transparency and good government.

Erupting in May of 2005, the corruption scandal crippled Lula's presidency and practically destroyed the Worker's Party. It is a cautionary tale that demonstrates that social movement parties are not immune to or inoculated against corruption.<sup>490</sup>

At the time of this writing (May 2006) it is still too early to know what fate Morales's administration in Bolivia will ultimately meet, but the experience of the first four months indicates a high level of responsiveness to the social movement agenda, even in the face of intense international pressure and internal opposition from elite sectors. Morales has not backed down from his commitment to end the U.S.-backed coca eradication policies of his predecessors, and on May 1, 2006 he took the bold, and many would say audacious, step of re-nationalizing Bolivia's gas and oil production facilities. Both of these measures threaten to provoke the ire of the U.S. government but they were also non-negotiable issues for Bolivia's powerful social movements, which were responsible for ousting Morales's two immediate predecessors. Thus, Morales has taken some bold actions that are shifting state policy in new directions. These policies and his responsiveness to social movement demands have so far met with an enthusiastic popular response; public opinion polls taken in May 2006 put his approval rating at 82 percent.<sup>491</sup>

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<sup>490</sup> For reporting on the PT corruption scandal, see Maack 2005; Rohter and Forero 2005.

<sup>491</sup> La Jornada 2006.

If the goal is ultimately to address and redress inequality and exclusion then the challenge facing social movement parties is great. Social change of this nature has always been difficult to achieve; even revolutionary governments with much greater control of the reins of state power has found it difficult, because changes in the status quo inevitably threaten powerful interests. Given this, parties without strong backing by large segments of the population will find it hard, if not impossible, to enact significant change. Social movement parties are not the only ones capable of generating broad popular support, populism of course also has deep roots in the region, but social movement parties offer a more participatory and less hierarchical model for building the broad popular support that is needed to back redistributive initiatives.

This insight points to an important caveat. Social movement parties will continue to rely on traditional social movement protest tactics in order to be effective. Because of the deep inequalities in these societies social movement parties will often need the extra pressure that protest provides in order to advance certain parts of their agenda. As a result, we can expect that these parties will not replace movement organizations so much as represent a new arena and strategy for action. The parties will continue to coexist in dynamic ways with the social movements that produced them. In other words, the emergence of these parties, instead of signifying the decline of social movement activity through the incorporation of a new sector of society into party politics, instead, represents a new form of politics that is emerging in several Latin American countries that combines social movement activism and mobilization with participation in the formal electoral process. Because these parties, both in terms

of the policies they are promoting and the way they do politics, are challenging the status quo, they need to have the power of social movement pressure behind them or, at times, leading the way. Without this popular backing and pressure from the bases it is easy for a party's agenda to be sidelined or, conversely, for individual politicians representing social movement parties to succumb to corruption. Assuming the trend of simultaneous movement and party activity continues, it may represent a new model of social movement-party relations that differs from patterns in industrialized democracies, where incorporation into the party system often signals the decline of social movement activity. At least in the short-run this does not appear likely either in Ecuador or Bolivia.

One of the main conclusions of this study is that the emergence of social movement parties represents a positive step towards democratic deepening. However, it is only one step and it is still too early to say whether social movement parties combined with other developments will be enough to transform these political systems to the degree that we can talk about democratic consolidation, which I argue is ultimately tied to and dependent on addressing the deep structural issues of poverty and inequality. Simply winning seats in congress does not guarantee that workable solutions to the large and, in many ways, intractable policy issues facing many of these countries will be found and hammered out. However, if grassroots supporters of social movement parties do not see concrete changes and improvements as a result of

participation in the formal political process they may become disillusioned with the possibilities for reform.<sup>492</sup>

### **Concluding Thoughts**

Discussions of democracy and democratic consolidation in the Third World tend to fall into two distinct approaches. On the one hand, there are those who focus on political institutions and elite behavior. Studies in this camp tend to work on the assumption that a technical fix can be found for troubled democracies. Other scholars have begun arguing for the need to reincorporate the impact of broad structural variables into our analyses of the democratic process in Third World countries. But a sole focus on structural variables can lead to great pessimism. This study seeks a middle ground that allows for some optimism without ignoring the very serious structural obstacles that lie in the way of democratic deepening. It is premised on the notion that democracy is a dynamic process in which structural variables, such as wealth, income distribution and levels of poverty play an important but not a determinate role. While high levels of inequality do indeed distort the democratic process because of the ability of economic power to translate into political power, this study has found that even in some of the most unequal societies in the world social mobilization can serve as a counterweight in the electoral arena to financial resources, thereby introducing dynamism into what would otherwise be a static and inherently unjust system.

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<sup>492</sup> Rubin Rubin 2005 makes this point in reference to Lula's presidency and the PT.



The study of social movement-based political parties is an important contribution to the study of democracy in the Third World, not only because these parties represent a dynamic new force in politics, but because theoretically they represent a unique window through which to observe the interaction of two different but equally important levels at which politics takes place: the formal arena of elections and political institutions, and that of the streets, *barrios*, and *pueblos*.<sup>493</sup> The study of social movement-based parties contributes to efforts to contextualize and embed studies of political institutions, parties and party systems in specific historical and structural contexts, in an effort to improve our understanding of how social, structural, and even cultural realities interact with institutional arrangements to produce political outcomes. This examination of social movement parties highlights the importance of societal influences on party formation and organization and directs attention towards demands and interests at the level of civil society in evaluating the health and prospects for democracy.

Given the fact that social movement-based parties are such a new phenomenon, much important work remains to be done. Closer examination of social movement parties once they win elected office is one obvious area for continuing research. The dynamic and, at times, conflictive or competitive relationship between social movements and the political parties they helped to found is another area that merits more attention. Another extremely important question is whether and under what conditions the formation of political parties by social movements serves to further their policy agendas and goals. This study has suggested that in the case of the

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<sup>493</sup> Translation: neighborhoods and villages.

Ecuadorian indigenous movement, the formation of Pachakutik contributed to the advancement the movement's goals and objectives, but key to this was the fact that the movement itself continued to play a vital role. If the movement had faded from view it is not clear that the party would have accomplished what it did. But the impact that party formation has on social movement strength and cohesiveness, as well as on its ability to achieve specific goals surely varies from one experience to another and therefore merits further attention.

This study looked closely at two different experiences of social movement involvement in electoral politics from which it generated a series of hypotheses that will need to be tested by looking at other similar cases. The study of Pachakutik indicates that political parties that emerge from and retain organic ties to social movements can serve as democratic leavening in what appear to be sclerotic democracies, by challenging traditional political practices, bringing previously excluded and marginalized groups into the formal political process, and creating new mechanisms for accountability. In this sense, they appear to offer some hope that political culture and practice that has been characterized by hierarchy, exclusion, and deference to authority and power, can be transformed into one of greater participation and a sense of citizenship and rights. Ironically, the greater challenge at this point in history may be addressing the structural problems that are rooted fundamentally in the highly unequal distributions of wealth and resources. In any event, the long-term impact of social movement parties on party system behavior, political culture, and policy-making is a story that is still unfolding.

## Appendix 1

### List of Bills Presented by Pachakutik Legislative Bloc<sup>494</sup>

1996-1998

#### National

	Name of Bill	Sponsor <sup>495</sup>	Result <sup>496</sup>	Source <sup>497</sup>
1.	Ley orgánica de la defensoría del pueblo	Saltos	Law	Congressional Archives
2.	Garantía sobre el abastecimiento permanente de vacunas de insumos para el Programa Ampliado de Inmunizaciones	López Moreno	Law	Congressional Archives; copy
3.	Ley Reformatoria a la Ley de Maternidad Gratuita	López Moreno	Law	Congressional Archives; copy
4.	Ley sobre la iniciativa popular	Llucu	Presentation	Congressional Archives
5.	Ley reformatoria del Código Penal de Procedimiento Penal	Rojas	Presentation	Congressional Archives
6.	Reformas Constitucionales	Saltos	Presentation	Congressional Archives
7.	Reformatoria al Código de Trabajo	López Moreno	Presentation	Congressional Archives

<sup>494</sup> Table was compiled by the author.

<sup>495</sup> Refers to the specific MUPP-NP legislator or legislators who sponsored the bill. In many cases the bills were sponsored jointly with legislators from other parties; the co-sponsors from other parties are not listed.

<sup>496</sup> This column contains information on how far the proposal got in the legislative process. "Presentation" refers to the bill's official introduction into the congressional process. "Distribution" is the next step after presentation and means that it was distributed to the members of congress in preparation for it to be discussed in the appropriate congressional committee. "First Debate" means that it left committee and was debated by the congress as whole. "Law" means that the bill was passed and made into law. "Presidential Veto" means that after congress approved the bill, the executive vetoed it. "In progress" refers to legislative projects mentioned to the author by MUPP-NP legislators as things they were working on at the time of my interview with them but which had not yet been officially introduced into congress. Where this column is left blank it means that the author was unable to obtain information about the fate of the bill.

<sup>497</sup> This column lists the sources from which the author obtained information on the bill in question. There were essentially five different sources: 1. "Congressional Archives." With the help of the staff of the Congressional Archives the author accessed the Archives' electronic database, Proleg, to search for the bills introduced into congress by MUPP-NP legislators. Searches were done on the names of each of the MUPP-NP representatives who served between 1996 and 2002. 2. "Copy" means that the author obtained a copy of said legislation from the Congressional Archive. 3. "S & F" is shorthand for the following article: [Sánchez López, 1998 #77] 4. "Article" means that information about the bill was found in a specific journalistic article for which a footnote is provided. 5. "Interview" means that the bill was mentioned in the author's interview with one or more of the MUPP-NP legislators. The specific legislator is named.

8.	Ley Especial de Rehabilitación de los Deudores del Ecuador	López Moreno	Presentation	Congressional Archives
9.	Ley Reformatoria a la Ley de Partidos	Macas	Presentation	Congressional Archives
10.	Reformatoria a la Ley Especial de la Empresa Estatal de Petróleo	MUPP-NP Bloc		S&F

### National – Indigenous – Rural

	Name of Bill	Sponsor	Result	Source
1.	Reformatoria a la ley de desarrollo agrario	Macas	Presentation	Congressional Archives
2.	Ley de Aguas	Macas	Presentation	Congressional Archives
3.	Ley de la Corporación Financiera del Campo	Lluco	Presentation	Congressional Archives
4.	Creación de la Universidad Intercultural de las Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (UIMIE)	Macas & Iza	Presentation	Congressional Archives; Article <sup>498</sup>
5.	Ley reformativa del Seguro Social Obligatorio	López Moreno		Article <sup>499</sup> ; S&F

### Particularistic

	Name of Bill	Sponsor	Result	Source
1.	Concede Pensión Vitalicia a la Señora Tránsito Amaguaña	Saltos & Lluco	Law	Congressional Archives
2.	Ley de Creación de la Universidad Intercontinental (UNINIT)		Presidential Veto	Congressional Archives
3.	Autoriza cancelar indemnizaciones al Dr. Jorge Estupiñán Tello	Rojas	Presentation	Congressional Archives
4.	Creación del Instituto Ecuatoriano de Areas Naturales y Biodiversidad	Saltos	Presentation	Congressional Archives

<sup>498</sup> Macas 2000a.

<sup>499</sup> Diario Hoy 1996k.

**Local/ Provincial**

	<b>Name of Bill</b>	<b>Sponsor</b>	<b>Result</b>	<b>Source</b>
1.	Ley interpretativa a la ley de reactivación económica y social del Austro	López Moreno	Presentation	Congressional Archives
2.	Ley de Creación del Comité Permanente de Desarrollo Integral de la Provincial del Chimborazo	Lluco	Presentation	Congressional Archives
3.	Reformatoria a Ley de Asignación de Fondos para Obras del Sector Agropecuario de la Provincia del Chimborazo	Lluco	Presentation	Congressional Archives

**Unsure how to categorize**

	<b>Name of Bill</b>	<b>Sponsor</b>	<b>Result</b>	<b>Source</b>
1.	Ley reformativa a la ley de gratitud y reconocimiento nacional a los combatientes del Conflicto Bélico de 1995	Lluco	Presentation	Congressional Archives

**1998-2001****National**

	<b>Name of Bill</b>	<b>Sponsor</b>	<b>Result</b>	<b>Source</b>
1.	Ley Reformativa a la Ley de Partidos Políticos – Gave independent political movements the same rights as political parties to state financing	Posso	First Debate	Congressional Archives; copy
2.	Ley de Control de la Corrupción	Posso	Distribution	Congressional Archives
3.	Reforma a la Ley de Régimen del Sector Eléctrico	Talahua	Distribution	Congressional Archives; Interview with Talahua
4.	Fundamentada para el Salvataje de Petroecuador	Grefa	Distribution	Congressional Archives; Interview with Grefa
5.	Reformativa a la Ley de Presupuestos del Sector Público	Pérez	Distribution	Congressional Archives

6.	Reformatoria a la Ley de Reordenamiento en Materia Económica, en el área tributario-financiera	Pacari	Distribution	Congressional Archives
7.	Ley de creación de asignaciones de carácter específico para la atención de servicios y suministros en los planteles pre-primarios y primarios fiscales	Posso	Distribution	Congressional Archives
8.	Para la Reliquidación de los Ex – Servidores y Ex – Trabajadores Públicos del Ecuador	Posso	Distribution	Congressional Archives
9.	Reformatoria a la Ley de Educación Superior	Posso	Distribution	Congressional Archives
10.	Ley sobre la objeción de conciencia		In progress	Interview with Pacari
11.	Issues related to the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS)		In progress	Interview with Pacari

#### National – Indigenous – Rural

	Name of Bill	Sponsor	Result	Source
1.	Ley de Juntas Parroquiales – Significant legislation that devolved governing power over rural villages from municipalities to rural parish councils	Pacari	Became law in October 2000 – MUPP-NP’s draft was combined with 3 other proposals	Congressional Archives; Interview with Pacari
2.	Condonación de intereses y otros recargos adeudados al Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario, INDA, Por los Adjudicatarios de Tierras	Grefa	First Debate	Congressional Archives; Interview with Grefa
3.	Fondo Indígena – major project to create a permanent development fund for indigenous communities	Pérez, Grefa, Arévalo, Posso & Pacari	Distribution	Congressional Archives; Interviews with MUPP-NP Congresspersons

4.	Reforma a la ley de radiodifusión y televisión – related to community-owned and operated radio stations in rural areas	Pacari	Distribution	Congressional Archives; interview with Pacari
5.	Reformatoria que fija una bonificación para los educadores comunitarios	Posso	Distribution	Congressional Archives
6.	Sustitutiva a la Ley de Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuario	Arévalo	Distribution	Congressional Archives
7.	Reformatoria a la Ley de Casación – related to systems of justice in rural communities	Talahua	Distribution	Congressional Archives; Interview with Talahua
8.	Ley de Nacionalidades y Pueblos	MUPP-NP Bloc	Presentation	Article <sup>500</sup>
9.	Ley de Administración de Justicia Indígena		Presented to the public in January 2001, but not officially entered into congressional record at that time	Interview with Pacari; Article <sup>501</sup>
10.	Ley de Comunidades		In progress	Interview with Grefa
11.	Uso oficial de idiomas ancestrales		In progress	Interviews with Pacari and Talahua
12.	Salud indígena		In progress	Interview with Pacari

### Local/Provincial

	Name of Bill	Sponsor	Result	Source
1.	Ley de condonación de intereses generados por falta de pago de tarifas de agua de riego – San Vicente de Pusir, Montufar, Ambuqui, Santiaguillo, Cuambo, ubicadas en las provincias de Carchi y Imbabura	Posso	Law	Congressional Archives; Copy

<sup>500</sup> Talahua 2001.

<sup>501</sup> Talahua 2001.

2.	La Ley 46 para los cantones de Naves, Caluma, etc. in Bolivar – has to do with distribution of resources to cantons	Talahua worked on this with other deputies from Bolivar	Law	Interview with Talahua
3.	Ley de Creación del Fondo de Desarrollo de la provincia de Imbabura	Posso	Distribution	Congressional Archives
4.	Reactivación de la Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito San Francisco de Asís	Grefa	Distribution	Congressional Archives; Interview with Grefa
5.	Constitutiva de la Universidad de Otavalo, Universidad Pluricultural de la Sierra Norte	Posso	Distribution	Congressional Archives
6.	Creación de la Corporación Financiera para los Pequeños Agricultores de la Provincia de Bolivar	Talahua	In progress	Interview with Talahua

#### Unsure How to Classify

	Name of Bill	Sponsor	Result	Source
1.	Reforma a la Ley de Creación de la Corporación Ejecutiva para la reconstrucción de las zonas afectadas por el fenómeno El Niño, Corpecuador	Talahua	Distribution	Congressional Archives
2.	Reformatoria a la Ley de Régimen Municipal	Arévalo	Distribution	Congressional Archives
3.	Reformatoria a la Ley de Control Constitucional	Arévalo	Distribution	Congressional Archives



## Appendix 2

### Interview Questions for Members of Congress

#### Encuesta para Legisladores del Congreso Nacional del Ecuador 1998-2002

*Información General que espero salga en las primeras preguntas:*

1. Ha sido elegido a otro puesto anterior a diputado?
2. En el pasado se ha candidatizado o se ha militado en otro partido que no sea al que pertenece ahora?
3. Que oficio ejerció antes de entrar en la política?

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*Preguntas Biográficas:*

1. Cómo entró usted a la política? Qué hacía antes de entrar a la política? Cómo fue seleccionado por parte de su partido para ser candidato a diputado?
2. Usted es militante de su partido? Por cuántos años?

*Selección de candidatos:*

3. Cuáles fueron los factores más importantes en su selección como candidato? (Escoger uno o más, y colocar en orden de importancia):
  - a. Posibilidad de financiar su propia campaña
  - b. Una fuerte base local de poder político y habilidad de reunir votos
  - c. Un perfil nacional, es decir usted es conocido a nivel nacional
  - d. Usted es una persona con un perfil público a nivel local o provincial
  - e. Sus conexiones personales con el liderazgo nacional del partido
  - f. Experiencia previa como autoridad elegido, sea como titular de su actual puesto o como autoridad elegido a otro puesto.
  - g. Años de servicio y una trayectoria de lealtad para con su partido
  - h. Otros (favor de especificar)
4. Quiénes poseen mayor influencia en la selección de candidatos dentro de su partido? Cómo es el proceso de selección?:
  - a. Electores a través de una elección primaria
  - b. Los miembros o militantes del partido en general (existe un mecanismo de selección democrático)
  - c. Líderes locales de partido
  - d. El liderazgo nacional del partido
  - e. Autoridades elegidos
  - f. Otro actor (favor de especificar)

*Estrategía de Campaña:*

5. En la campaña electoral de 1998, cuales fueron los mecanismos más importantes para hacerse conocer con los electores? (Escoger uno o más, y colocar en orden de importancia):
  - a. Los medios de comunicación masivos, eg. televisión y/o radio
  - b. Visitas a comunidades individuales
  - c. Concentraciones masivas
  - d. A través de intermediarios – líderes políticos locales (local political brokers)
  - e. A través de intermediarios – Redes de sindicatos, movimientos sociales, u otras organizaciones cívicas.
  - f. Otros (favor de especificar)
  
6. En sus declaraciones para la prensa, en sus discursos y pronunciamientos de campaña, cuáles fueron los asuntos/temas a que mayor énfasis dió? (Escoger uno o más, y colocar en orden de importancia):
  - a. Promesas para la provisión de servicios o la entrega de obras públicas.
  - b. Promulgación de políticas nacionales que benefician a un sector específico de la población; por ejemplo, la educación bilingue para las comunidades indígenas, la creación de las comisarias de la mujer, etc. (Favor de especificar.)
  - c. Promulgación de políticas nacionales específicas que conciernen a la nación en su totalidad, como por ejemplo un tipo de política económica. (Favor de especificar).
  - d. Sus lazos con otros líderes o figuras políticas poderosas. (Favor de especificar quien).
  - e. La plataforma política de su partido.
  - f. Sus características personales (eg. honestidad, experiencia, cercanía al pueblo etc.)
  - g. Ataques contra su contrincante o un partido opositor.
  - h. Otro (favor de especificar).
  
7. En el caso de que la entrega de obras fue una promesa importante (5.a.), específica mejor que tipo de obras usted ofrecía:
  - a. Provisión de servicios dirigidos a grupos particulares o individuos, tales como empleos, acceso a instituciones burocráticas del estado, obras públicas para comunidades específicas.
  - b. Promesas de obras grandes para la provincia, como carreteras, hospitales regionales, etc.
  - c. Otros (especificar)

8. En su provincia qué tipo de estrategia electoral tiene más probabilidad de éxito?:
  - a. Uno que prima la entrega durante la campaña de recursos materiales a los electores
  - b. Uno que se basa en promesas de obras públicas
  - c. Uno que enfatiza un programa político
  
9. Cuán importante fue el papel que jugó el partido en su campaña electoral?
  - a. Muy importante
  - b. Importante
  - c. No muy importante
  - d. El partido no era nada importante para mi campaña
  
10. Si el partido jugó un papel importante, que fue la naturaleza de ese papel? (Escoger uno o más, y colocar en orden de importancia):
  - a. Proveer trabajadores para actividades de campaña
  - b. Financiar actividades de campaña
  - c. Proveer asistencia técnica para actividades de campaña
  - d. Definir la plataforma política
  - e. Servir como un importante punto de identificación
  - f. Otro (favor de especificar)
  
11. Cuáles fueron los gremios o Cámaras que apoyaron a su partido y a su candidatura? Habían algunos que endosaron formalmente a su campaña?
  
12. Cuán importante para su campaña fueron los trabajadores locales de campaña? (Es decir, las personas que colocan los afiches, organizan y realizan campañas para movilizar a los electores y reuniones con las comunidades, etc.)
  - a. Muy importante
  - b. Más o menos importante
  - c. No muy importante
  - d. No jugaron un papel importante
  
13. Cómo fueron reclutados los trabajadores de campaña?
  - a. Fueron contratados por mi organización de campaña individual y personal.
  - b. Fueron contratados por parte del partido para hacer campaña para mi y también para otros candidatos en mi partido.
  - c. Fueron voluntarios quienes son militantes del partido.
  - d. Voluntarios de las comunidades quienes fueron reclutados por organizaciones locales o individuos quienes apoyan a mi candidatura.
  - e. Empleados públicos
  - f. Otro (favor de especificar)

*Para PACHAKUTIK:*

14. Cuán importante fueron las organizaciones indígenas en su campaña?

*Para los diputados que han servido por más de un período:*

15. Ha observado usted cambios en el estilo de las campañas políticas a través de los años? Ha cambiado sustancialmente su estrategia de campaña? Afectó en algo los cambios en las reglas electorales a su estrategia de campaña?

*Financiación de Campaña y del Partido:*

16. Cómo financió su campaña?

De dónde provinieron la mayoría del financiamiento para su campaña? (Escoger uno o más, y colocar en orden de importancia):

- a. El partido
  - b. Recursos personales
- Donaciones para su campaña particular de:*
- c. Individuos
  - d. Compañías privadas
  - e. Organizaciones, incluyendo gremiales y ONGs
  - f. Otro (favor de especificar)

17. Durante su campaña, en que actividad gastó más? (Poner en orden de importancia):

- a. Anuncios en la televisión
- b. Anuncios en las emisorias de radio
- c. Sueldos para trabajadores de campaña
- d. Materiales propagandísticas (afiches, etc.)
- e. Bienes a ser entregados a simpatizantes (camisetas, gorros, comida, etc.)
- f. Organización de concentraciones y mítines
- g. Otros (especificar)

18. \*Cuáles fueron las fuentes financieras más importantes para su partido? (Escoger uno o más, y colocar en orden de importancia):

- a. Dispersiones del estado
- b. Donaciones de individuos
- c. Quotas de los militantes y miembros del partido
- d. Donaciones de compañías privadas
- e. Otro (favor de especificar).

*Representación:*

19. Aparte de una victoria electoral, que otras cosas busca usted a través de una campaña electoral? A su criterio, que papel juegan las campañas políticas en el proceso democrático? Qué es para usted una campaña política?

20. Cuáles son los intereses sectoriales o sociales hacia los cuales usted se siente responsable y que intenta representar en su posición como legislador?

Posibilidades incluyen:

- a. Intereses de una región o ciudad específica
- b. Intereses étnicos
- c. Intereses de un sector económico, es decir pequeños agricultores, mineros, empresarios, etc.
- d. Intereses de una organización o sindicato en particular, por ej. maestros, trabajadores petroleros, etc.
- e. Movimientos cívicos o sociales, como el de mujeres o el ambientalista, etc.

*Actividades como diputado y relaciones con el electorado una vez elegido:*

21. Como legislador, cuáles son las actividades a que usted y su equipo de apoyo se dedican más tiempo y dan más prioridad? (Escoger uno o más, y colocar en orden de importancia):

- a. Servicios individuales y específicos para la población de su distrito electoral, como por ejemplo, ayudando a personas con contactos con instituciones y agencias públicas, consiguiendo empleos para personas particulares, etc.
- b. Responsabilidades y actividades relacionados con su partido.
- c. Preparando o promocionando legislación sobre asuntos relacionados con su distrito electoral.
- d. Preparación o promoción de legislación sobre políticas nacionales.
- e. Proyectos de desarrollo.
- f. Otros (favor de especificar)

22. Usted ha hecho o ha ayudado a hacer obras públicas en su provincia? (Favor de detallar) Cómo concretamente se facilita esto? A través de qué mecanismos?:

- a. El ejecutivo
- b. Control del partido sobre ciertos ministerios
- c. Proyectos de leyes
- d. Fuentes exteriores al Estado; ie. internacional, etc.
- e. Otros

23. Todos los fondos para los proyectos de desarrollo local provienen del gobierno? O a veces también pueden ustedes canalizar recursos de otras fuentes, sean estas privadas o internacionales?

*Para los diputados de partidos que no son del gobierno:*

24. Si conseguir proyectos de desarrollo para su región es importante para su reelección, cómo consiguen fondos para proyectos de desarrollo en su

provincia si su partido no está en el gobierno? Esto requiere a veces no votar con su partido?

25. Cuán cerca es su relación con otras autoridades elejidos a nivel local y provincial? (ie. prefectos, alcaldes, consejeros, etc.?)
26. En un pro medio, cuánto tiempo pasa usted en su provincia?:
- Una porción de cada semana
  - Una semana al mes
  - Un mes al año
  - Sólamente durante epoca de campaña
  - Otro (favor de especificar)
27. Cuándo usted se encuentra en su distrito electoral, con que tipos de grupos se reúne? (Escoger uno o más, y colocar en orden de importancia):
- Líderes locales del partido
  - Organizaciones locales sociales, religiosos o cívicos (especificar)
  - Comunidades locales
  - Elites económicas o sectores empresariales (especificar)
  - Oficiales de los organos de gobierno local
  - Líderes sindicales (especificar)
  - Otros (favor de especificar)
28. Cuántas personas integran su equipo asesoría y trabajo aquí en el Congreso?
29. Cuáles han sido sus áreas de mayor interés en relación a legislación? Qué considera que fueron sus mayores éxitos en relación a proyectos de ley y legislación?
30. Cuáles son los comités legislativos en los cuales usted ha servido durante su carrera legislativo?

*Disciplina partidaria:*

31. Cómo caracterizaría a su partido en términos de su nivel de cohesión ideológica? (Escoger uno):
- Existe un alto nivel de consenso tanto en posiciones ideológicas como también sobre políticas públicas específicas.
  - Existe un nivel fundamental de consenso a nivel ideológico, pero referente a políticas específicas muchas veces hay discrepancias al interior del partido.
  - El partido es abierto a una amplia gama de posiciones y perspectivas ideológicas y sobre políticas particulares.
  - Consideraciones ideológicas no juegan un papel importante dentro del partido.

32. Qué describe mejor el proceso a través del cual se llega a definir estrategias legislativas y políticas dentro de su partido? (Escoger uno):
- a. Existen mecanismos para consultar a la membresía sobre asuntos de mucha importancia. (Favor de describir estos mecanismos)
  - b. Oficiales elejidos y el liderazgo del partido analizan, discuten y llegan a decisiones conjuntamente.
  - c. Un liderazgo partidario, no elejido, toma las decisiones de mayor envergadura y hacen conocer la línea a seguir a los oficiales elejidos y a los militantes.
  - d. El partido no impone mucha dirección a los legisladores individuales en relación a una estrategia legislativo a seguir, sino que cada legislador toma sus propias decisiones independientemente de los otros.
  - e. Otro (favor de especificar)
33. En un pro medio, cuan frecuentemente vota usted con su partido? (Escoge uno):
- a. Casi siempre
  - b. 75% del tiempo
  - c. 50% del tiempo
  - d. 25% del tiempo
  - e. Casi nunca
34. En los casos cuando usted no ha votado con su partido, cuál fue la razón? (Escoger uno):
- a. Debido a alianzas políticas, votar con mi partido hubiera implicado la perdida de recursos económicos, empleos o obras para mi provincia.
  - b. La legislación en cuestión hubiera sido prejudicial para la región geográfica a la cual represento. (Especificar)
  - c. Objeciones prácticas o de implementación a la legislación en cuestión.
  - d. Yo estaba en desacuerdo con la legislación desde un punto de vista ideológica.
  - e. Otro (favor de especificar)
35. Hay consecuencias para romper filas con su partido? En caso que sí, favor de especificar cuales son las consecuencias.

*Hacia el Futuro:*

36. Usted piensa candidatizarse de nuevo en 2002?
37. En caso que usted no sea re-elejido, que es lo que usted haría?

*Referente a mi Proyecto:*

38. Qué papel va a jugar usted en las próximas elecciones de mayo?

39. Quisiera acompañar el proceso de campaña de su partido en la provincia para estas próximas elecciones. Usted podría ayudarme con esto? Con contactos, etc.?
40. Tiene sugerencias de otras personas dentro de su partido a los cuales debería entrevistar? Otros diputados? Líderes de partido? Ex-diputados? Personas que saben mucho de la historia del partido, etc..



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