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Meritocracy Reconsidered: The Politics of Civil Service Recruitment

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Meritocracy Reconsidered: The Politics of Civil Service Recruitment

by

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Professor Thad Dunning, Chair
Professor Jennifer Bussell
Professor Thomas Pepinsky
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Abstract

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A prominent literature in political science holds that the meritocratic recruitment of public servants leads to gains in bureaucratic performance. It is also believed that this institution ought to also have positive effects on social cohesion, since the meritocratic distribution of civil service jobs theoretically enables members from all groups—ethnic minority or otherwise—to win coveted employment in the public sector. Looking predominantly at Southeast Asia, and drawing on large scale surveys and archival documents, this dissertation presents an argument and evidence to the contrary. Instead, under certain conditions, the introduction of meritocratic civil service reforms perpetuates existing inequalities, as privileged groups outperform marginalized groups on entrance exams and go on to staff administrative posts at disproportionately high rates, an outcome that heightens group-based resentment and weakens national solidarity.

This dissertation develops its argument in the context of an important but understudied tension between the twinned goals of state-building and nation-building—a trade-off that comes most into focus in the Asian context. At the moment of independence, the leaders of Asian states faced the urgent task of state-building, which mostly involved recruiting a competent corps of public servants to staff the organs of their new governments. But these leaders were also tasked with nation-building to generate a sense of solidarity across their diverse populations. These twinned goals often existed—and continue to exist—in tension with one another. The most "competent" applicants for public service typically hailed from historically privileged groups who had received formal education: the forward castes in India, the Javanese in Indonesia, or the Chinese in Malaysia. A narrow focus on state-building would have led to a disproportionate representation of certain groups in the apparatus of the state, which would have surely detracted from the task of nation-building.

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Acknowledgments

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Chapter 1

Introduction

All countries face decisions over how to staff their bureaucracies. At stake is a vast array of developmental outcomes—ranging from individual citizens' ease of access to basic services to aggregate economic growth. Countries in which politicians possess the discretionary authority to appoint civil servants tend to report a lower quality of service delivery and slower economic growth, as bureaucrats will often be both incompetent and captured by short-sighted political interests.[1] Meanwhile, bureaucratic performance and economic growth are higher in countries where politicians tie their hands and empower non-partisan authorities to select public servants.[2] Theories of adverse selection are at the heart of these arguments: when politicians are given free rein in the selection of public servants, they will tend to reward political supporters independent of their underlying competence.[3]

In theory, there are many ways to craft reforms that tie politicians' hands in questions of personnel management: military conscription in many countries relies on sortition, for instance, randomly but deterministically selecting recruits from the population. Yet the preferred vehicle for the non-discretionary recruitment of civilian public servants remains the examination, commonly referred to as "meritocratic" selection.[4] It is difficult to overstate the normative hegemony of meritocratic selection as the ideal form of bureaucratic recruitment. Today, virtually every country around the world has at least nominally adopted a variant of meritocratic recruitment in principle. The legitimacy of these systems is of course occasionally undermined: for the right price, scores can be manipulated after the fact. But independent evaluations suggest that most countries around the world appear to be becoming more meritocratic (see Figure 1.1).[5] In recent years, in low- and middle-income countries, this transformation has been incentivized by international development organizations that attach conditions to lending schemes, calling for public sector employees to be recruited meritocratically. The World Bank in recent years has spent US$50 billion supporting civil service reform initiatives, an umbrella term that includes promoting the use of examinations in recruitment decisions.[6]

To most observers, this trend is a cause for celebration: civil service reform mitigates corruption and accelerates economic growth. Given the salutary effects of the meritocratic recruitment

[1] Hicken (2011) and Pepinsky, Pierskalla and Sacks (2017).

[2] Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000).

[3] Colonnelli, Prem and Teso (2020). See, also, however, Toral (2020) for an alternative account of the effects of patronage on service delivery and aggregate growth.

[4] In the pages that follow, I treat these terms—non-discretionary recruitment, examination-based selection, merito-

Figure 1.1—Civil Service Recruitment, 1789–2015



Note: Data drawn from V-DEM (V-10) for question "v2stcritrecadm" which asks country experts, "To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?" Experts ranked countries, per year, on a scale of 0-4.

of civil servants, then, the scholarly treatment of civil service reform has in general puzzled over its absence. Why, given its patently desirable consequences, do some countries fail to adopt a genuine commitment to the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants? Most explanations lay the blame at the feet of political parties, who are understandably reluctant to relinquish the discretionary authority to allocate jobs—a tool they wield to cultivate supporters. Looking at the experience of Britain, France, and the United States, Martin Shefter proposed that the extent to which patronage features in a political system is dependent on the "relative timing of democratization and bureaucratization."[7] Barbara Geddes, looking at Brazil, meanwhile, argues that initiatives to introduce civil service reform are only achieved when political parties benefit equally from the disbursement of patronage—a situation that, in its rare incidence, provides everyone with equal incentives to move towards a professionalized civil service.[8]

The framing of this debate thus supposes that the stakes of civil service reform concern outcomes such as corruption, transparency, and economic growth. The motivating observation of this dissertation, however, is that concerns over representation and solidarity are also at stake in debates over how governments ought to staff their bureaucracies. In theory, the meritocratic

cratic appointment—as functionally exchangeable.

[5]Coppedge et al. (2020).

[6]Cited in Cruz and Keefer (2015, 1943).

[7]Shefter (1993).

[8]Geddes (1994).

distribution of civil service jobs enables members of all groups and classes to win coveted employment. Particularly in countries with a history of favoritism towards certain groups, the merit-based recruitment of civil servants can therefore represent a major step towards achieving harmony and solidarity. In calling for the Unites States to adopt such a policy, for instance, Theodore Roosevelt argued that "among the many benefits of the law, not the least is the bar it puts to discrimination for or against a man because of his religious convictions."[9]

Despite the initial optimism of its advocates, the merit-based selection of public servants has come under fire in recent years for failing on the principle of fairness which it purports to advance. Critics have in particular disputed the notion that meritocratic recruitment enables a fair distribution of coveted public sector jobs.[10] Motivating these criticisms is the concern that entrenched inequalities in education and wealth across ascriptive cleavages conspire to make individuals from marginalized groups poorly positioned to win employment in public service under meritocratic recruitment procedures. In other words, the merit-based recruitment of civil servants can also theoretically lead to an unrepresentative public sector, as privileged groups outperform marginalized groups on entrance exams and go on to staff positions at disproportionately high rates.

Offering politicians discretionary authority in the selection of bureaucrats, by contrast, opens up venues for discrimination as they dole out jobs to supporters who may hail from specific ethnic or religious groups, particularly their own. "Clientelism and ethnic favoritism appear to go hand in hand in many diverse societies in the developing world," observes one recent comparative study of Lebanon and Yemen.[11] Drawing on evidence from Asia and Africa, for instance, political scientists have argued clientelistic exchange tends to benefit individuals who share ethnic or religious ties with elected officials.[12] In other words, when politicians are given latitude to select their agents as they see fit, latent biases will often inform their decisions.

But the same discretionary mechanism can theoretically work in the opposite direction, as well, as politicians can unilaterally dole out patronage to ethnic or religious groups in a manner that achieves an equitable distribution of coveted government jobs. After all, there is no inherent reason that would stop politicians—out of electoral concerns or sheer benevolence—from seeing all groups represented in the halls of government. In his famous study of mid-century city politics in New Haven, Robert Dahl explains how, in order to secure future electoral support, politicians routinely offered municipal jobs to "help members of an ethnic group [not their own] to overcome the handicaps and humiliations associated with their identity, who could increase the power, prestige, and income of an ethnic or religious out-group."[13]

These competing expectations prompt a series of important but generally overlooked questions. First, how does civil service reform affect the representation of ethnic, racial, and religious

[9] "The Present Status of Civil Service Reform," Theodore Roosevelt, *The Atlantic*. February 1895.

[10] Many of these critiques focus on meritocracy writ large, i.e., across contexts such as education and hiring. See, *inter alia*, Bell (1972); Lemann (2000); and Petersen, Saporta and Seidel (2000).

[11] Corstange (2016).

[12] Bhavnani and Lee (2018)

[13] Dahl (2005, 34). Indeed, it was against this backdrop that the movement for municipal civil service reform took hold in the United States. According to a widely-used introductory textbook for American Politics: "[a]lthough ostensibly aimed at rooting out corruption and cleaning up electoral politics, progressive reforms [which dislodged patronage] also were designed to enhance the political clout of the 'right' kind of people—educated middle- and upper-middle-class folks like the reformers themselves—at the expense of poor urban immigrants of their leaders 'of slender social distinction" Kernell et al. (2017, 501).

groups in plural societies? As the discussion above suggests, there is probably no single answer to this question. So, put differently, what are the conditions under which civil service reform leads to an unrepresentative public sector—at least as measured against the representational equilibria of prior arrangements? Second, to the extent that civil service reform does, in fact, undermine an equitable distribution of government jobs, do these policies affect broader outcomes such as social cohesion or a sense of national solidarity? A third and final line of inquiry concerns identifying the mechanisms through which bureaucratic representation affects the attitudes of the mass public.

Drawing principally on contemporary and historical evidence from North America, Western Europe, and Southeast Asia—with a particular focus on the case of Indonesia—I offer an answer to these questions by focusing on the role of group-based inequality in conditioning the effects of introducing meritocratic recruitment procedures. I present an argument that traces how the institutions governing the allocation of coveted public sector jobs can either undermine or bolster the equitable representation of ethnic and religious minorities in bureaucracies around the world—and how these representational imbalances can affect a broad sense of solidarity. When public sector jobs are distributed meritocratically, privileged groups typically outperform marginalized groups on entrance exams and go on to staff administrative posts at disproportionately high rates. Particularly in contexts with high levels of group-based inequality, this outcome weakens solidarity and threatens multi-ethnic compacts.

By contrast, when politicians have discretion over the recruitment of civil servants, a rich literature in political science has shown that they will tend towards co-ethnics—irrespective of underlying levels of privilege or marginalization. However, I argue that, when politicians expect payment in addition to fealty from job-seekers, as they often do, the coethnic allocation of appointments is intersected with a class element, as well. Under these conditions, politicians will tend to offer the job to the highest bidder, conditional on ethnicity, which in turn locks out aspirational public servants from humbler means. This arrangement generates understandable intra-ethnic grievances on the part of the masses towards their co-ethnic and co-opted elites, which inadvertently opens up a space for members of a diverse population to make common cause over their parallel resentments and forge cross-cutting commitments to develop a sense of solidarity.

Sustaining this argument involves first acknowledging that debates over the manner in which civil servants are recruited are, with perhaps surprising frequency, sites of tumultuous political conflict. The popular press in Indonesia—one of the core empirical cases to which I return throughout—has documented the incendiary events that stem from the combination of institutional and representational concerns in the bureaucracy. A January 2000 *Jakarta Post* article describes an incident in Nusa Tenggara Timor in which "hundreds of residents... ran amok on Wednesday destroying the regency office after rumors of collusion and nepotism in the recruitment of civil servants there."[14] In another incident, a conflict in Central Kalimantan that left over 100 dead was sparked by anger on the part of the local ethnic Dayak over the perceived growing dominance of ethnic Madurese in the local civil service.[15] In a final incident, a conflict in the Central Sulawesi city of Poso was widely attributed to the growing influx of Muslims into a previously Christian area, and a simmering "resentment about which side received government

[14]"Mob runs amok after test results," *The Jakarta Post.* January 13, 2000.
[15]"Corpses littering streets as fears mount," *South China Morning Post.* February 23, 2001.

jobs."[16]

These events prompt an auxiliary question: why do some people care *so much* about the manner in which government jobs are allocated—in some cases, willing to engage in outright violence? The answer to this question is twofold and sets the stage for the broader argument outlined above. First, many citizens are more interested in demanding jobs from their government than they are in demanding services from it. Across the developing world, employment in the public sector—as administrators, prison guards, teachers, and so on—is often the only apparent vehicle for upward economic mobility.[17] But, the demand for government jobs often outstrips these narrowly pecuniary explanations, as applicants to the civil service are often also chasing the status and prestige that flow from public sector employment. Importantly, the overwhelming demand for government jobs—as well as the intangible benefits motivating the desire—means that the stakes over who gets a government job are both high and indivisible, factors which in turn set the stage for serious grievances when aspirants' ambitions are thwarted.

Second, in their capacity as service-seekers, citizens have justified concerns over the downstream consequences of inadequate descriptive representation in bureaucratic institutions. For one, people want to see their identities reflected among public servants. From the perspective of the mass public, the experience of petitioning for services from outgroups can be symbolically impactful, as it highlights the uneven footing upon which different groups stand within a single political unit. But a vast literature in political science has also demonstrated that these concerns are justified in material terms, as well. When a citizen shares an identic tie with a bureaucrat, their requests are more likely to be granted.[18] If the introduction of new institutions governing the recruitment of civil servants is thought to upset the share of coethnics represented within the bureaucracy, citizens might rightly protest as they perceive a forthcoming hindrance on their ability to access public services.

In the pages that follow, I briefly introduce the argument. In doing so, I will situate the contributions of this project in several related but distinct literatures from which I draw inspiration and to which I hope to contribute. Next, I introduce the empirical context to which I take my argument—Asia since the dawn of the twentieth century—and argue that this regional and temporal focus is uniquely well-suited for both generating and testing the theory outlined above. Finally, I review the structure of the dissertation and conclude with some comments on the overall methodological approach.

1.1 The Argument in Brief: Bureaucratic Selection and Solidarity

Conventional approaches to the study of bureaucracy in political science tend to conceive of the citizen-bureaucrat interaction in instrumental terms.[19] Bureaucrats are thought to be cogs performing rigidly ordered tasks; citizens are narrowly interested in securing services. Politicians, for their part, loom over the machinery, providing oversight. This literature trains its focus on divining relationships between bureaucratic structure and developmental outcomes such as economic growth, quality of service delivery, or citizen satisfaction. These outcomes are thought

[16] "Plea for help as bloodshed racks town," *South China Morning Post.* June 12, 2000.
[17] Finan, Olken and Pande (2017*a*).
[18] Hassan (2020).
[19] Weber (1978).

of as the strategic interplay between the three actors—constituents, politicians, and bureaucrats. Since at least the 1980s, the theoretical workhorse of this approach to the study of the bureaucracy has been a two-tiered the principal-agent model, which proposes that politicians (agents) are beholden to constituents (principals) in the first tier.[20] Meanwhile, in the second tier, bureaucrats (agents) are beholden to elected officials (principals).[21] These connections form the basic contours of most models of political accountability: if citizens become dissatisfied with the performance of bureaucrats in delivering services, they may find recourse at the ballot box in voting out incumbent politicians. The threat of such action, in turn, motivates politicians to take seriously the task of monitoring bureaucrats to ensure their adequate performance.

Developmental outcomes are certainly pressing concerns. Studying how variation in the recruitment of government employees either enables or hamstrings the achievement of such goals is therefore a matter of normative interest. Yet the recent history of Asian and African states reflects the idea that leaders must negotiate these goals in the context of representational concerns. A small literature in political science and public administration surrounding the notion of "representative bureaucracy" has emerged to reflect these concerns.[22] The recent work in this vein has emphasized the role of citizens and bureaucrats' racial, ethnic, or religious identities.[23] Here, again, however, this burgeoning literature is chiefly interested in the "effect" of representation in bureaucracies on developmental outcomes.[24]

A literature specific to the United States has begun to look at how descriptive representation of minority groups translates into a form of symbolic representation that generates a sense of legitimacy on the part of citizens who encounter such institutions. Looking at educational contexts, for instance, several researchers have found correlational evidence in support of a positive relationship between increasing diversity of high school teachers and both students' and parents' perceptions of disciplinary fairness in these schools.[25] In other words, for policymakers concerned with shoring up perceptions of legitimacy of the public organizations that they are tasked with overseeing, ensuring the adequate representation of minority groups appears to be a crucial task.

This work is a useful starting point for motivating the discussion that follows, but the argument I develop departs from it in two important directions. First, this literature generally takes descriptive representation—often construed in quantitative terms—as the core independent variable.[26] But this emphasis elides important questions that emerge earlier in the chain of causality. How does institutional variation in the manner in which governments select civil servants—as when its politicians are either given discretion in recruitment (i.e. patronage) or not (i.e., meritocracy) affect descriptive representation? Focusing on this axis of institutional variation—level of discretion offered to politicians—offers a window into tracing how existing inequalities are filtered through these mechanisms in different ways to produce inequitable levels of representation

[20] See, for instance, Fearon (1999).

[21] For a review of these models, see: Gailmard (2012).

[22] Kingsley (1944).

[23] Sowa and Selden (2003).

[24] Rasul and Rogger (2015).

[25] Keiser, Haider-Markel and Darolia (2021); Roch, Elsayed and Edwards (2018)

[26] See, for instance, the citations from the previous paragraph. These measures are generally indices (Blau, Herfindahl, etc.) or a simple measure of over- or under-representation of certain groups in any given institution, benchmarked against group representation in the constituency to which they are accountable.

along different axes. In other words, descriptive representation is a mediating variable.

It is worth digressing to consider this variation—types of bureaucratic selection—in more precise terms. Throughout the pages that follow, my core interest is in tracing the consequences of varying levels of discretion afforded to politicians in the appointment of government agents—variation that I understand to be the "independent variable" of my analyses. In general, and out of convention, my analysis is preoccupied with two particular institutional forms—patronage and meritocracy—which represent ideal-type extremes along the axis of politician discretion. These institutional forms of course do not represent the universe of variation; for instance, one might also consider cases in which affirmative action or quotas are used to select civil servants.[27] My interest in these two particular institutional forms is motivated by theoretical concerns, as these two institutional forms represent extremes along a spectrum in which selection of civil servants is characterized according to the extent of discretion offered to leaders. Here, patronage is synonymous with total discretion. A meritocratic system, governed by the deterministic selection of civil servants according to impersonal examination scores, offers precisely zero discretion to leaders.

There exists even greater variation encapsulated in cases where politicians have unencumbered discretion to appoint government agents; indeed, the flexibility inherent in total discretion definitionally enables innumerable forms of bureaucratic selection. Two prominent logics commonly seen in the discretionary appointment of civil servants merit comment and distinction. First, in many cases, politicians wield the discretionary authority to appoint bureaucrats as a tool for rent-seeking, auctioning off posts to the highest bidder. In these cases, prospective bureaucrats themselves anticipate using public office to extract bribes from citizens. In general, politicians wish to share in these rents, having given the bureaucrat the job, but bureaucrats face incentives to obscure the true scale of their ill-gotten revenues in order to keep a greater share to themselves. Here, when politicians to do not trust their agents to share, they will sell posts upfront to ensure at least some compensation. Chapter 3 demonstrates that the United Kingdom is the canonical example of such a system, with aspirational office-seekers throughout the 19th century going so far as to post solicitations in the classifieds section of *The Times*. I dub this system "elitist patronage," for reasons that should be immediately clear: if government jobs are to be auctioned off, they will be disproportionately occupied by the individuals with the highest willingnesses-to-pay.

There are, of course, instances in which politicians' authority does not lead them to auction off public offices to the highest bidder. Instead, many politicians have wielded the discretionary appointment of public servants to elevate non-elites to government jobs. Consider, for instance, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia's dissenting opinion in the case *Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois* (1990), in which the justices decided whether the discretionary appointment of public servants should be outlawed, writing, "[i]t seems to me that that categorical pronouncement [on discretionary hiring] reflects a naive vision of politics and an inadequate appreciation of the systemic effects of patronage in promoting political stability and facilitating the social and political integration of previously powerless groups." It is worth unpacking the precise mechanisms here. Again, since discretionary hiring and petty corruption tend to go hand-in-hand, politicians are

[27] This narrowing of institutional forms to the exclusion of affirmative action or quotas also hews with other recent work in political science, which focuses on comparing systems characterized by either patronage or merit. See, in particular, Huber and Ting (2021).

interested in sharing in the rents collected at the frontline. When, for whatever reason, politicians trust their chosen agents to share in those rents, they face fewer incentives to demand upfront payment, thereby opening the door to the masses in a form of "non-elitist patronage." This system, however, invites certain biases concerning politicians' perceptions around which sorts of prospective agents can be trusted—oftentimes manifested along coethnic lines.

The second way in which I depart from the literature on representative bureaucracy is by focusing on dependent variables broader than the quality of service delivery—or the perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Recall again the events described in the preceding section in which aspiring bureaucrats in Indonesia turned to violence when their ambitions were dashed. The incendiary nature of these events calls attention to outcomes grander than bureaucratic performance. Indeed, one of my central arguments is that outcomes such as social cohesion and national solidarity are affected by variation in the institutions that states use to select public servants. National solidarity, at least here, refers to the case in which ethnic and religious ties are subsumed and muted beneath a more profound commitment to a national identity—similar to how Benedict Anderson defined the nation as characterized by a "deep, horizontal comradeship."[28]

The question of how a sense of national solidarity comes to pervade an otherwise and *a priori* diverse people is a question of enduring interest to political scientists. Karl Deutsch famously described a nation as "a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors." Others have argued that the extent to which such a sense of solidarity pervades a people is not fixed, but is instead affected by institutional and cultural forces.[29] One strand of research has emphasized technological and educational changes as potent forces in occasioning the arrival of national solidarity.[30] In *Peasants Into Frenchman*, Eugene Weber traces how a growing network of railways in the late nineteenth accelerated the sublimation of regional identities under the weight of a sense of French national solidarity.[31] A newer literature has shown how present-day institutional arrangements are still influential in shaping individuals' sense of national solidarity. Yang-Yang Zhou, for instance, shows how proximity to refugee camps across Africa affects individuals' depth of national identification.[32]

The theory developed in later chapters builds on this latter strand of research by tracing how variation in the manner in which governments select civil servants affects national solidarity, as mediated by representational concerns. The first prong of my argument examines the case in which public sector jobs are allocated through non-discretionary mechanisms, i.e., through competitive examinations. Under meritocratic recruitment procedures, privileged groups outperform marginalized groups on entrance exams and go on to staff administrative posts at disproportionately high rates. This happens for several reasons—generic to examinations as a selection device—many of which have been widely documented in literatures in education, economics, and sociology. In contexts with high levels of group-based inequality, access to quality education and, moreover, expensive tutoring services is likely available only to the most privileged applicants.[33]

[28] Anderson (1990, 7).

[29] See Chandra (2007) for a review of constructivist approaches to the study of identity. For an instrumentalist-Marxist account, consistent with the notion that national solidarity is fluid, see Hobsbawm (1990) and Hobsbawm (1983), in which the author argues that national solidarity is generated by the elites to stave off brewing class conflict.

[30] Gellner (1983).

[31] Weber (1976).

[32] Zhou (2018).

[33] Access to quality of childhood education has been shown to be highly variable across countries in the developed

But examinations occasionally contain biased content, reflecting knowledge held and purveyed by dominant groups in society.[34]

The disproportionate representation of privileged groups in the public sector may undermine national solidarity through two principal mechanisms. First, from the perspective of the mass public, people like to see their identities reflected in the halls of power. If the merit-based recruitment of civil servants disproportionately selects applicants from specific groups, it could spur resentment on the part of those who are relatively excluded. This expectation stands in contrast to some recent work on the so-called "contact hypothesis," which holds that the experience of interacting with members of out-groups spurs a greater sense of amity.[35] These studies are hopeful, but often examine the impact of out-group "contact" in heavily circumscribed contexts in which group competition may not be particularly salient. The experience of petitioning for government services from outgroups, meanwhile, may be more symbolically impactful as it highlights the uneven footing upon which different groups stand within a single political unit.[36] As I show with a survey experiment among Indonesian adults in Chapter 5, providing respondents with either information about the demographic composition of their local civil service or asking them to consider a vignette about an encounter with an outgroup bureaucrat leads to declines in expectations of the quality of service delivery as well as declines in national identification for some subgroups.

Second, from the perspective of applicants, the nature of failure in the merit-based recruitment of public servants is a devastating experience: to be evaluated and judged to possess insufficient "merit" is an insulting reality for applicants to face. When the bulk of successful applicants are thought to hail from certain groups, I show how this frustration is often channeled towards both the resentment of outgroups and a broader negative reflection on the nation writ large. Chapter 5 presents evidence in support of this claim: I partnered with the Indonesian civil service agency, soliciting survey responses from all 3,636,262 individuals who applied for public sector jobs during the 2018–2019 cycle, receiving responses from a total of 204,989 individuals. Survey responses were then linked to the database of examination scores, enabling a comparison of attitudes across narrowly successful and narrowly unsuccessful candidates. To capture to "effect of failure," I implement a regression discontinuity design where I focus on applicants who were within a single percentage point of an alternative disposition—a subset of respondents in which I assert that the outcome of success or failure for any given observation was as good as random. Consistent with the broader argument, I show that the simple fact of failure on the civil service examination negatively affects applicants' belief in the legitimacy of the process, some attitudes towards outgroups, and national identification.

Before continuing, it is worth preempting several possible objections to this "applicant-side" mechanism. For one, skeptics may point out that failure is simply an inescapable consequence of *all* selection mechanisms, not just meritocratic selection. Recent academic and journalistic

and developing world. This variation often coincides with existing ethnic cleavages, such that minorities often have access to weaker education; see: Chetty, Hendren and Katz (2016). This variation has been shown to have important long-term consequences. See: Chetty et al. (2011) and Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014).

[34]For the the 2018–2019 Indonesian civil servant examination, for instance, some applicants received questions about the history of the Majapahit empire—an ancient Javanese kingdom—which is content that the ethnic Javanese are presumably better positioned to answer correctly.

[35]For recent empirical examples, see: Mousa (2020) and Weiss (2021). For a review of the broader literature, see: Paluck, Green and Green (2019).

[36]Looking at Lebanon, Cammett and Şaşmaz (2022) show how the experience of petitioning for medical services from a religious outgroup doctor leads to worse measures of self-reported quality of service delivery.

perspectives, however, suggest that failure under meritocratic procedures may hold special significance in terms of generating resentment. The columnist David Brooks writes, "[t]he modern meritocracy is a resentment-generating machine" arguing that the surge in support for right-wing populist candidates across Western democracies can in part be placed at the feet of "[t]he sorting mechanism itself."[37] Michael Sandel, a political philosopher, writes of the "morally unattractive attitudes the meritocratic ethic promotes," arguing that "among the losers, [it causes] humiliation and resentment. These moral sentiments are at the heart of the populist uprising against elites...The populist complaint is about the tyranny of merit."[38] The unifying theoretical insight of these accounts is that failure under meritocratic selection is a uniquely devastating insult. Meritocratic failure is a highly individualized rebuke and losers may turn to a form of psychological self-protection: people do not like to think of themselves as failures and thus may construct entirely new perspectives on themselves, on others, and on the world more broadly in order to justify their experience.

Readers may also wonder about the at-scale consequences of failure under meritocratic selection procedures. Even if one accepts that examination failure motivates resentments that directionally undermine nation-building, skeptics may suggest that such effects operate on too small a population to be worthy of serious inquiry. But, particularly in low- and middle-income countries where public sector employment is often the only vehicle for upward economic mobility, there are typically huge numbers of applicants to government jobs. In Indonesia, for instance, 3,636,262 applicants—or nearly 2% of the entire population—applied for 180,623 vacancies in 2018.[39] More important, however, is the tendency for failed applicants to hail from an *a priori* politically activated tranche of society. Owing to educational requirements for applying to public sector jobs in the first place, prospective applicants are often both well-educated and interested in politics, which position them as opinion-makers. The frustrations of this group that stem from failure can thus have immediate impacts on broader unrest or attitudinal currents as they marshal their comparatively strong social standing to instigate others to join in their cause. To take one example, Benjamin Elman describes incidents from the Qing Dynasty in China in which municipal governments were altogether "overthrown by unreformed examination failures who turned to violence."

Note, however, that these claims are inherently comparative and can therefore only be understood in reference to the counterfactual condition in which government jobs are *not* allocated through meritocratic procedures. The second prong of my argument thus examines the use of discretion in the recruitment of civil servants. In most cases, the discretionary appointment of civil servants operates chiefly according to one of two logics described above—either non-elitist or elitist forms of patronage. In both cases, at least in contexts with high levels of diversity, the discretionary appointment of civil servants will exhibit a co-ethnic tendency. This is thought to occur for two reasons. On the one hand, politicians will in general reward those constituents that they trust will continue to support them at the ballot box. On the other hand, discretionarily appointing public servants often relies on localized informational networks that are easiest to access through ethnic linkages. When politicians offer jobs without the expectation of a bribe in return, the co-ethnic tendency predominates in a form of non-elitist patronage. But if politicians

[37]David Brooks, "How the Bobos Broke America," *The Atlantic.* August 3, 2021.

[38]Sandel (2020, 25)

[39]This is an impressive figure considering that the exam was limited to individuals with a college degree between the ages of 18-34. In other words, 46.2% of all eligible Indonesians applied for a job in the civil service in 2018.

seek to maximize available rents, they will offer jobs for sale to the highest bidder, thereby locking the masses out from employment in a form of "elitist patronage." I argue that this latter dynamic inadvertently opens up opportunities to generate a sense of national solidarity in diverse contexts. As the masses adopt intra-ethnic grievances towards their respective elites, they also make common cause over their parallel resentments to forge cross-cutting commitments and a broader sense of national solidarity.

To evaluate these claims, in Chapter 6, I turn my attention to the discretionary recruitment of indigenous civil servants on Java between 1882–1942. I construct a new yearly panel dataset on personnel, wherein the data were compiled using optical character recognition software to process over 180,000 pages from the *Regeerings-Almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indie*, a yearly periodical serving as a directory for the Dutch East Indies and which contained detailed information on the names, locations, and dates of appointment for senior members of the indigenous civil service. The final dataset includes over 22,000 yearly observations on 3,751 unique indigenous senior civil servants. The descriptive analyses demonstrate that, first, the discretionary recruitment of indigenous civil servants exhibited a strong tendency towards co-ethnic preferentialism. Second, more importantly, over the last thirty years of colonial rule, civil servants with titles implying lower aristocratic standing were increasingly closed out from employment opportunities in the colonial civil service: members of the lesser elite (i.e., those with titles such as *mas*) saw a steady decline in their representation in the senior civil service from 1900 onwards. Along with qualitative evidence on nationalist mobilization drawn from monthly political police reports, I argue that the systematic resentment among members of the lesser elite regarding their role in governance encouraged the building of cross-ethnic ties by vilifying co-opted hereditary elites and emphasizing class solidarity.

To be clear: the aforementioned logic through which elitist patronage generates cross-cutting solidarity is independent of leaders' intentions. As politicians seek to maximize on rent-seeking, in other words, they may unintentionally give rise to the conditions that enable the strengthening of cross-ethnic national solidarity. But it is worth underscoring that the discretionary recruitment of civil servants may, under different circumstances, yield alternative implications for nation-building. For one, rulers may intentionally and benevolently wield the discretionary appointment of civil servants to maintain a balance of different ethnic groups in government to engage in nation-building: before descending into kleptocratic rule, until 1972, in a bid to stem the tide of separatism in the eastern reaches of the former Zaire, Mobuto wielded his discretionary authority in public servant appointments to impose a 25% limit on the representation of any one ethnic group in the bureaucracy.[40] Belgium has continued to give considerable discretion to politicians in the recruitment of the public servants, an institutional design choice that has been influential in stemming concerns over linguistic representation and consistent with with what Arendt Lijphardt describes as the country's history of consociationalism.[41] Consistent with this possibility, looking at ministerial-level appointments, Leonardo Arriola finds that African leaders effectively use patronage to maintain political stability.[42] Chuyu Liu shows how the Chi-

[40] Phezo Dizolele (2014).

[41] See: Lijphart (1977). Cardona (2006, 2) writes of Belgium, "the civil service statute of 1937 allowed for the government to recruit outstanding individuals without following the general recruitment procedure based on the concours. In practice, this authorisation to the Government was the breach on the wall through which massive recruits out of political affiliation were done."

[42] Arriola (2009).

nese Community Party uses cross-ethnic patronage appointments in Xinjiang to stem the tide of ethnic conflict.[43] Thus, at least in these cases, the discretionary appointment of public sector employees can intentionally achieve social harmony and, perhaps, national solidarity.

Of course, the discretionary recruitment of civil servants can theoretically work in the opposite direction, as well. The history of multiethnic states is filled with examples of leaders wielding the discretionary authority to appoint government employees to the detriment of national solidarity. Yugoslavia is an illustrative example. Despite representing only 40% of the total population, ethnic Serbs had monopolized control of the bureaucracy by the interwar period, "exploiting their control of the civil service for the purposes of political patronage and ethnic favoritism."[44] The representational concerns flowing from these patronage appointments generated significant resentments, particularly on the part of the Croats and Albanians, that carried through to the bloody conflict that followed the fracturing of the Yugoslav state.[45] Taking this proposition to a global sample, one recent analysis finds that ethnic underrepresentation in government significantly increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict.[46]

The point of the foregoing discussion is to emphasize that the flexibility inherent in the discretionary recruitment of civil servants implies a wide horizon of possible outcomes vis-à-vis nation-building. The argument advanced in this dissertation is perhaps therefore better framed in terms of potentialities. As discussed earlier, under conditions of high group-based inequality, the non-discretionary recruitment of civil servants *will* undermine nation-building efforts. But under the same conditions, the discretionary recruitment of civil servants *may* or *may not* support nation-building efforts, for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Discretionary recruitment is an institution with higher variance in the nation-building outcomes it occasions.

The argument described above anticipates at least several important scope conditions, which limit the generalizability of the claims. For one, given that the struggle over national solidarity only makes sense in contexts where it faces threats from alternative identic commitments, my argument is likely only applicable in countries with diverse populations. But I am interested in cases in which group-based inequality is high, a condition which directs my attention to most of the countries of South and Southeast Asia and Africa. Absent this condition, differential rates of group representation in the civil service across salient cleavages are unlikely. I turn to these issues in greater detail in Chapter 2.

1.2 Context: State-building vs. Nation-building in Asia

Asia is an apt region for both generating and testing the theory outlined above. The abrupt end of World War II, and the rapid withdrawal of the Japanese, meant that the leaders of Asian states faced two urgent tasks. The first was the recruitment of a competent corps of public servants to staff the organs of their new governments. But it also meant the end of centuries of coercive colonial rule, in which the boundaries of the state had been externally imposed with little concern for existing ethnic and religious divisions. Newly empowered leaders—typically keen on maintaining the territorial extent of their inherited colonial states—were thus also tasked with building solidarity across diverse populations.

[43] Liu (2021).
[44] Roshwald (2002, 204).
[45] See: Petersen (2002, 208-252).
[46] Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010).

These twinned goals often existed in tension with one another. The most "competent" applicants for public service typically hailed from historically privileged groups that had received formal education—the forward castes in India, the Javanese in Indonesia, or the Chinese in Malaysia. A narrow focus on state-building would have led to (and in some cases did lead to) a disproportionate representation of certain groups in the apparatus of the state. Post-independence leaders were acutely aware of the impact this would have on the task of building solidarity, as minority groups would have seen themselves excluded from the state itself.

Meanwhile, prioritizing the importance of nation-building in the task of staffing bureaucracies would have called on politicians to wield discretionary authority to ensure the equitable distribution of government jobs so that minorities could see their identities represented in government. But the discretionary appointment of civil servants creates a situation in which bureaucrats are likely to find themselves captured in a transactional relationship, in which they owe favors to the politicians who have delivered to them a coveted job. Thus, by elevating coopted bureaucrats, such an arrangement would have just as surely detracted from the urgent need to build up capacity in Asian leaders' fledgling states.

Although particularly acute at the moment of independence, the leaders of Asian states have struck vastly different bargains in negotiating these twinned tensions over the last seventy years. Enshrined in its constitution, India, for instance, has put in place the world's most ambitious system of quotas to ensure the adequate representation of minority groups in government. Although recent work has shown few downsides in terms of state-capacity,[47] the task of building a sense of solidarity across India's diverse population remains far from fulfilled, with representational concerns often spilling over into strife and conflict.[48]

The path charted by Singapore's leaders looks vastly different, meanwhile. One of the few countries to have obtained its independence through expulsion, Singapore was shorn off the Malaysian Federation in 1965 over representational concerns. At the time, the more numerous ethnic Malays, who comprised a slight demographic majority in the federation, insisted on specific quotas in government to ensure adequate representation. In the absence of such reforms, it was thought the wealthier and better educated ethnic Chinese would capture a disproportionate share of government jobs. Lee Kuan Yew, then the leader of the opposition party, rejected this proposal as one that would undermine more pressing developmental goals and one which would weaken the comparative strength of the ethnic Chinese. These debates spawned a series of race riots between 1963–65 that left thousands dead, prompting Singaporean independence as means to stave off further bloodshed. Decades later, reflecting on the swift development of Singapore over the thirty years since its departure from the Malaysian Federation, Lee Kuan Yew emphasized that the decision to implement meritocratic recruitment procedures in the selection of civil servants was crucial: "[t]he single decisive factor that made for Singapore's development was the ability of its ministers and the high quality of the civil servants who supported them" he said in an interview in 2000.

Indonesia represents a third way—a case in which leaders have tacked back and forth between the demands of nation-building and state-building, often with disastrous consequences. In the sixty years after independence, Indonesia's leaders left the staffing of local bureaucracies at the near-total discretion of local district chiefs. This was partly in an effort to shore up the central

[47] Gulzar, Haas and Pasquale (2020).

[48] Nellis, Weaver and Rosenzweig (2016).

government's coffers, as a percentage of the extracted rents flowed upwards.[49] It was also, moreover, a policy designed to stem separatism by ensuring the governance of "like-over-like."[50] But, as we shall see, even intra-ethnic conflict can be traced to this arrangement, undermining much of its own logic. In the decades following democratization, Indonesia has decisively turned its attention to state-building, introducing reforms to recruit civil servants meritocratically. Here, again, conflict has erupted over concerns of inter-ethnic representation.

To make matters concrete, consider two illustrative events from Indonesia's recent history which demonstrate the dilemma of public sector recruitment. The first event is from late 1998, in which a group of one hundred protesters had gathered outside the district headquarters of Waikabubak—a small town on the eastern periphery of the sprawling Indonesian archipelago. The protesters had assembled as word spread that the nephew of the district chief received a coveted position in the civil service, despite records showing that he had never formally applied.[51] Clearly, patronage had been doled out and the protesters were angry at the blatant elitism in its allocation. As supporters of the chief gathered nearby, a confrontation carried into the evening and eventually spilled into an open conflict that left 18 dead.

Consider now a second event from late 2020, when once again a group of nearly a hundred protesters assembled outside the local branch of the civil service agency in Keerom—a district in the province of Papua.[52] Once again, tensions eventually boiled over and the protesters set ablaze the local branch of the civil service. Their grievance was the implementation of the incorruptible computer-based civil service examination. This system, protesters alleged, was accelerating the arrival of privileged outsiders in search of stable public sector employment. Applicants from points elsewhere viewed the competition in the historically-marginalized province of Papua as weak. By taking the civil service exam in Papua, privileged outsiders, predominantly from Java, stood a better chance of securing a toe hold in the civil service from which they could later petition for a transfer to a more desirable location.

These were of course distinct events separated by over two decades and more than two thousand kilometers. Yet I view these moments as instructive windows into broader political phenomena. Throughout, I will return to these particular episodes for illustrative purposes. To reiterate: why did the demonstrators care *so much* about the manner in which government jobs were being allocated—willing to murder in the first case and commit arson in the second? In the allocation of a scarce number of coveted government jobs, grievances are of course a *fait accompli*: there will always be losers. But what explains variation in the object of the protesters' grievances? Why were protesters directing their anger towards members of their own ethnicity in the first case, while the protesters in the second case directed their anger towards outsiders? The answer contained in the pages that follow is that it is precisely variation in the manner in which bureaucrats were being recruited—patronage in the former moment, meritocratic in the latter—that explains this striking split.

[49] Jackson (1978), Logsdon (1998).

[50] Bachtiar (1972).

[51] "Exam Rort Sparks Deadly Battle," *The West Australian.* 12 November 1998.

[52] "Tak Terima Pengumuman Hasil CPNS, Massa di Papua Mengamuk dan Serang Polsek hingga Bakar Kantor Dina," *Tribun News.* 2 October 2020.

1.3 Chapter Outline and Method

Credibly testing this theory is difficult. For one, the level of discretion offered to politicians in the recruitment of civil servants is endogenous to levels of national solidarity. Countries in which low levels of national solidarity prevail, for instance, may find it difficult to undertake civil service reform in the first place. Any straightforward attempt to estimate the effect of such institutions on national solidarity will thus be dogged by concerns of reverse causality. Second, the decision to implement meritocratic recruitment systems is typically a national decision, which makes conventional methods of statistical hypothesis testing difficult due to insufficient variation.

To accommodate these methodological difficulties, I employ a variant of process tracing, in which I attempt to test the observable implications of each link in the argument. This approach merits the caveat that the bases of evidence and research designs marshaled in evaluating the different theoretical connections of arguments are asymmetrical, blending both qualitative and quantitative evidence. For instance, the evidence evaluating the attitudinal consequences of failing meritocratic examinations, presented in Chapter 5, an important mechanism through which merit-systems undermine cohesion, relies on the direct measurement of test-takers' attitudes. Meanwhile, in Chapter 6, the evidence evaluating an analogous mechanism, the effects of being passed over for jobs under conditions of discretion, relies on circumstantial quantitative data, as well as qualitative and second-hand accounts. It is finally worth underscoring that, while I believe the available evidence to be wholly consistent with the argument, several of the theoretical connections on which the argument depends do not rise beyond the level of conjecture. In the pages that follow, I have endeavored to affix appropriate terms of uncertainty to the claims for which I believe the evidence remains mixed.

In the next chapter, I introduce my theoretical argument and articulate two core predictions. To be precise: I expect that merit-systems for the recruitment of civil servants weakens measures of horizontal solidarity in diverse settings. Meanwhile, second, and in contrast with the expectations prevailing in the existing literature, I argue that systems in which public sector jobs are allocated through "elitist" patronage offer expanded opportunities for horizontal solidarity. In this chapter, I also take care to enumerate the scope conditions on which the argument depends; in general, these conditions—plural, economically-stratified, and decentralized—direct my attention to many countries across post-colonial South and Southeast Asia, as well as those of sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to describing the theoretical framework in the next chapter, I also attempt to frame the argument in a manner that reveals an important but understudied theoretical tension between state-building and nation-building. In general, the relationship between these two concepts is thought to be positive: when governments engage in state-building by building roads or schools, it is often thought that they are also engaged in nation-building.[53] But in addition to building roads and schools, one of the most important tasks of "state-building" is the task of hiring qualified public servants to carry out the actual business of government. And in this context, efforts to recruit this competent corps of bureaucrats—as through merit-systems—can come at the cost of efforts to build a sense of national solidarity or cohesion across a diverse population. In other words, state building and nation building appear at odds with one another.

[53] See, in particular, Gellner (1983). For a more recent account leveraging recent econometric advances, see Alesina, Giuliano and Reich (2021), who argue that "higher state capacity results in more nation-building which then makes building state capacity easier still."

In the third chapter, I present a critical review of the history of institutions governing the allocation of government jobs. Many of the transformations covered in this chapter occurred in the context of Western Europe's tumultuous shift way from aristocratic modes of governance during the Industrial Revolution. Although the experience of Western Europe is distinct from that of postcolonial states, the debates explored here provide important intuitions behind the representational motivations of civil service reform. This chapter develops a distinction in the impetus for civil service reform—as either a political cudgel in the maintenance of existing power structures (e.g., 19th c. United States) or as a political concession that weakens existing power structures (e.g., 19th c. United Kingdom). While I develop this distinction in the context of Western European and North American cases for expository purposes, I argue that the path to civil service reform charted by many of the cases in Southeast Asia has been largely cudgeled—an observation that once again calls our attention to the representational consequences of mechanisms of bureaucratic selection.

The fourth chapter develops and defends an important building block for the broader theory outlined in Chapter 2. Namely, why do people care so much about who gets a government job—enough that it makes sense to connect bureaucratic recruitment to outcomes like solidarity? Drawing on a series of survey experiments conducted in Indonesia, I first present evidence that the demand for government jobs is extremely high. In the survey sample, 69.4% of respondents stated that they would choose a government job over an identical private sector one, if offered the choice. But I also show that the demand for government jobs is inelastic, thus outstripping pecuniary explanations alone. Quizzing respondents about preferences over otherwise identical private and public sector jobs, I show that a ten percent decline in the public sector wage premium is only met with a 3.4 percent decline in the share of respondents indicating they would prefer a private sector job. Instead, concerns over status can partially explain the inelasticity of demand for government jobs—a feature that, in turn, sets the stage for understanding how the thwarted ambitions on the part of would-be civil servants can affect outcomes as vast as national solidarity.

The fifth chapter focuses on the effects of the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants. The first part of the chapter looks at the so-called applicant-side mechanism, investigating how failure to secure a government job may have important effects for attitudes. The evidence used to evaluate this link of the argument derives from individual-level administrative data containing information of the demographics and exam scores for all 3.6 million applicants to the Indonesian civil service in 2018–19. The analysis combines this data with a unique survey conducted in partnership with the Indonesian civil service agency, in which we solicited participation from all 3.6 million, and which culminated in a sample of 204,989 responses from applicants for the Indonesian civil service. The results show how failure on the Indonesian civil service exam motivates significant attitudinal shifts that undermine national solidarity.

The second part of the chapter turns to the citizen-side mechanism, examining how citizens' experiences of petitioning for services under merit-systems may affect national solidarity. The evidence consulted combines administrative data and survey experiments to show how the experience of petitioning for services from outgroup bureaucrats leads to lower expectations of the quality of service delivery. Among certain well-defined sub-populations, I detect some evidence that the same experience leads to lower identification with Indonesia's national identity, although it is worth emphasizing that the results are sensitive to the specification.

In the sixth chapter, I turn my attention to an at-scale analysis of the effects of variation in

bureaucratic selection on the extent of national solidarity under conditions of high group-based inequality. To do so, I conduct a comparative historical analysis of Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. At the outset of the twentieth century, both colonies harbored prominent voices advancing visions of post-colonial national unity, an important background condition that enables credible inferences based on counterfactual potential outcomes.[54] Crucially for the purposes of this analysis, however, the distribution of jobs to the indigenous civil service in the Dutch East Indies was discretionary, while French Indochina had adopted a system of meritocratic recruitment. The evidence consulted in this chapter comes principally from two original datasets of personnel records, based on the digitization of over 600,000 pages of archival documents, which collectively offer a uniquely comprehensive portrait of patterns of representation under the two systems.

Looking at the Dutch East Indies, the discretionary appointment of civil servants led to ethnic self-rule: transfers and promotions almost never crossed salient ethnic boundaries. Importantly, moreover, mid-level recruits were systematically blocked from ascending through the ranks of the indigenous civil service. These experiences, in turn, created a shared sense of frustration as lesser elites from different ethnic groups made common cause of resenting their respective and co-opted aristocratic elite to form cross-cutting commitments. Meanwhile, the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants in French Indochina enabled the ethnic Vietnamese to outstrip the Cambodians and Laotians in the competition bureaucratic roles during the French colonial rule—an experience that frequently heightened inter-ethnic grievances. Between 1901–1940, and even in Cambodia and Laos, the share of government posts held by ethnic Vietnamese did not drop below 72.1%. Combining these findings with available qualitative evidence, variation in principles of bureaucratic selection appears to offer an answer to the puzzling emergence of Indonesia's ethnically-inclusive national identity, on the one hand, and French Indochina's fracturing on the other.

The seventh chapter take a global perspective to evaluate both the external validity of the argument developed in the Southeast Asian context, as well as to consider several extensions to the argument that make more sense to expand upon in the context of Western Europe and North America. On the first count, in chapter seven, I combine several datasets to provide an opportunity for a global analysis. Specifically, I combine a global set of time-series indicators from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, historical census data on bureaucratic representation, and contemporary outcomes on levels of national solidarity drawn from global surveys. The resulting analysis is imperfect. Yet, conditional on its shortcomings, the results of the analysis attest to the plausibility of the broader theory.

[54] See Narangoa and Cribb (2010) for a discussion of "nations-of-intent" and their uses in what the authors call "counterfactual historical geography."

Chapter 2

State-Building, Nation-Building, and a Theory of How Bureaucratic Selection Affects Both

Two of the most striking political developments of the last three centuries have been the emergence of the "state," on the one hand, and the "nation," on the other. These twinned developments have spawned a series of academic debates. What is the definition of both the state and the nation? How did these two concepts emerge—and what explains their comparative advantage in supplanting alternative forms of political organization and identity? This chapter critically reviews the scholarly literature on these questions, placing a particular emphasis on how the state and the nation are "built." In other words, I am interested in the ways in which actors—governments and rulers, chiefly—have engaged in both "state-building" and "nation-building."

But this chapter is also interested in a third question—one that is generally overlooked by scholars and, more perilously, by policymakers. Namely: what is the *relationship between* governments and rulers' efforts at state-building and nation-building? In reviewing the existing literature, I will show how the relationship between state-building and nation-building is generally thought to be positive. So, when governments engage in state-building by building infrastructural capacity through the construction of schools or roads, for instance, it is often presumed that they are also creating the conditions that lead to the adoption of a cohesive national identity. In his account of nationalism, Ernest Gellner argued that it was governments' investments in places of primary education, along with advances in transportation, that built nations.[1] Summarizing this view succinctly, Alesina and Reich write that "higher state capacity results in more nation-building which then makes building state capacity easier still."[2]

The theoretical argument developed in this chapter, by contrast, considers the possibility that some efforts at state-building may have a negative effect on nation-building. I will look in particular at one of the predominant forms of state-building: the task of identifying and recruiting individuals to act as agents of the state—i.e., bureaucratic selection. Consider that all dimensions of so-called "state-capacity," the desideratum of state-building, hinge on *individuals'* performance in executing certain roles and tasks. Building the state's coercive capacity means hiring and training

[1] Gellner (1983).
[2] Alesina, Giuliano and Reich (2021).

soldiers and police officers that will possess and wield superior might compared to adversaries. Building the state's administrative capacity means hiring competent bureaucrats, that is, people with strong analytical reasoning who understand the levers of government. Building the state's extractive capacity means recruiting tax collectors that can detect underpayment. In other words, the question of how governments go about selecting their agents is tantamount to how it goes about building its state.

In the following pages I will propose that bureaucratic selection varies according to the degree of discretion afforded politicians. On the one hand, one extreme is characterized by the situation when politicians are afforded total discretion over the selection of the state's bureaucratic agents, as in the case of various forms of patronage. On the other hand, the reverse situation in which politicians are afforded no discretion over selection characterizes the alternative end of the spectrum, often represented by an exam-based meritocracy. Importantly, a rich literature dating back to Weber has shown that states that are able to recruit its agents meritocratically—without discretion—report superior measures of both state-capacity, but also economic development and citizen satisfaction. In other words, I construe the move from a state in which agents are selected through the discretionary whims of political principals, as with patronage, to one in which they are selected meritocratically as an act of state-building in itself.

But I will also argue that this effort at state-building may, under certain conditions, undercut efforts at nation-building. Focusing on contexts with high levels of group-based inequality, which characterizes much of the postcolonial world, I will describe how the meritocratic distribution of public sector jobs weakens national solidarity and threatens multi-ethnic compacts, as privileged groups outperform marginalized groups on entrance exams and go on to staff administrative posts at disproportionately high rates. I will also propose that, in these same contexts, the discretionary recruitment of civil servants may have desirable properties for generating a sense of a horizontal national solidarity across diverse groups, which may come at the cost of overall capacity.

The remainder of this chapter addresses three tasks. First, I aim to clarify the terms state-building and nation-building. In contrast to recent internationalist interventions, I show that these terms are instead best understood as activities carried out by sovereign governments within their own territory and on their own citizens. Second, I introduce institutional variation in bureaucratic selection as one of the most important tasks of state-building. I argue that governments' efforts to move from systems of patronage-based recruitment to systems of meritocratic recruitment amount to efforts state-building. In doing so, I consider what kind of "case" bureaucratic selection constitutes in the broader array of state-building activities—and how these differences may structure its proposed relationship to nation-building. Finally, the third goal of this chapter is to articulate a theory of how variation in bureaucratic recruitment affects nation-building, focusing in particular on representational concerns.

2.1 State-Building and Nation-Building

The first task of this chapter is definitional: to what do state-building and nation-building refer? It is worth beginning this definitional exercise by emphasizing that part of the difficulty in defining these two concepts stems from some terminological ambiguity suffusing the United States' foreign policy during the 21st century. In reflecting on recent military actions, for instance, George W. Bush delivered a speech in April 2002 in which he described the recent American invasion of Afghanistan as "the ultimate nation-building mission." In pursuit of this goal of "nation-building,"

the United States poured billions of dollars into incepting institutions thought to be constitutive of a nation—an independent judiciary, a well-trained standing army, and democratically elected leaders. This view found support from leading policy think-tanks, including in a RAND Corporation Report titled, with evidently little irony or self-awareness, "A Beginner's Guide to Nation Building." The authors assert that "[t]he first-order priorities for any *nation-building* mission are public security and humanitarian assistance."[3]

And yet, this new understanding of nation-building, with its emphasis on institutions and stability, represents at most a necessary but not sufficient condition for building what most scholars conceive of as "nations," by which most understand it to be a sense of horizontal camaraderie widely shared among a people.[4] Instead, as Francis Fukuyama and others have pointed out, with its activities during the "War on Terror," the United States was actually engaged in failed attempts at state-building.[5] Far from building a nation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States was engaged in the more bloodless process of building the constitutive institutions of a state—the judiciary, legislature, executive, and civil service.

The foregoing discussion attests to the importance of terminological precision. The remainder of this section will therefore review recent scholarly definitional debates over core concepts used in this dissertation—states, nations, state-building, nation-building, state-capacity, and national solidarity. I will propose a schema for situating these concepts in relation to one another. In particular, it may be productive to distinguish between the underlying concepts (i.e., states and nations), their transitive gerunds (i.e., state-building and nation-building), and their constitutive desiderata (i.e., state-capacity and nation solidarity). I summarize the relationship between these elements below, in Table 2.1. As should by now be clear, my principal theoretical interest is in the interaction between the transitive gerunds—how certain efforts at state-building may either expand or undermine efforts at nation-building.

It is worth emphasizing at least one feature of this schema before turning to definitions. Specifically, I offer no place to the question of state-formation or nation-formation. The question of how modern states came to supplant alternative structures of political organization is beyond the scope of this project, as is the question of how nations in the first place came to be an important identic touchstone. Part of this delimiting is practical: for the context in which I am interested—Asia over the last century—states and (competing visions of) nations were already on the scene.

Table 2.1: Terms, Definitions, and Their Relationship

Concept	**Gerund**	**Desideratum**
Nation	Nation-building	National solidarity
State	State-building	State capacity

To start, scholars have proposed a wide range of definitions of the "nation." Early accounts focused on primordial explanations of the nation—emphasizing factors such as race and ethnicity

[3]Dobbins et al. (2007), emphasis added.
[4]See, in particular, Anderson (1990).
[5]Fukuyama (2004) and Fukuyama (2014).

and other ascriptive features that constituted a nation.[6] Few contemporary scholars support the primordialist position on the definition of the nation, leading Roger Brubaker to suggest that it represents a "a long-dead horse that writers on ethnicity and nationalism continue to flog."[7] A later strand of research has emphasized more contingent factors relating to geopolitical history. Karl Deutsch once referred to the nation as "a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors."[8] More recent advances have emphasized the role of political entrepreneurs in cultivating a nation—indeed, perhaps all group identities.[9] Alfred Cobban argues, for example, that "the cultural nation is more the creation than the creator of the political state."[10]

The most common definition of the nation, and the one I will adopt throughout this dissertation, comes from Benedict Anderson, who proposes the idea that nations are "imagined communities." Here, Anderson means specifically the idea that "the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship."[11] The widespread usage of print media in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century was decisive in the emergence of the nation. According to Anderson, as individuals read about the happenings of individuals in faraway places—with whom they shared a language and government—a national identity arose to justify and sustain their camaraderie.

So, for Anderson, the constitutive element of the nation was a sense of horizontal solidarity—what I term "national solidarity." This is consistent with definitions proposed by others, including Michael Hechter, who argues that "the articulation and promotion of culturally distinctive institutions is the joint good that lies at the core nation-formation."[12] It is the process of jointly articulating these institutions—the wrangling over what they ought to look like—that relies on some degree of solidarity, a sense of a shared enterprise.

This understanding of national solidarity immediately invites questions over how it can be "built." How do leaders engage in nation-building? For Anderson, the process of building the nation was incidental: newspaper editors had little intention beyond their local profit motive when they set out to sell broadsheets. But the expansion of print media was a crucial vector through which "imagined communities" were forged. This is of not to say that governments had not undertaken activities in which they knowingly cultivated the circumstances that enabled the print media to exert its impact on the nation. Two major, common interventions are worth mentioning. Particularly in post-colonial contexts, for instance, the widespread introduction of primary education to deliver common cultural and historical touchstones was a widely-used tactic. But more specifically in ethnically heterogenous polities, post-colonial governments often introduced national languages to forge commonalities across diverse populations. Muhammad Ali Jinnah insisted on Urdu as the national language of Pakistan; Sukarno introduced Bahasa Indonesia as the national language of Indonesia; and Julius Nyerere successfully adopted Kiswahili as the national language of Tanzania. The effects of these policies were profound in generating national solidarity across populations where little-to-none existed previously.

To turn next to the concept of the "state," most scholars adopt Max Weber's famous definition

[6] See Smith (2000) for a review.
[7] Brubaker (1996, 15).
[8] Deutsch (1955).
[9] Hechter (1988).
[10] Cobban (1970, 111).
[11] Anderson (1990).
[12] Hechter (2000, 23).

of the state as the "a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."[13] There is little academic debate surrounding the primacy of Weber's definition, and this dissertation has little intention of challenging it, although how to precisely articulate when a given polity has achieved "legitimacy" remains an open empirical question. Scholars of international relations have generally viewed the principle of legitimacy as arising from acceptance from other states. Others, such as Charles Tilly, have looked domestically, arguing that "[l]egitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority."[14]

Part of the answer to the question of when a given polity has achieved sufficiently "legitimacy" lies in the extent to which it has shored up its "state capacity," the constitutive element of a "state." Existing scholarly debates around state capacity have taken Weber's definition as a starting point. Michael Mann pioneered a definition of state capacity as a government's ability to penetrate society and achieve its desired policy goals.[15] While theoretically compelling, this definition of state capacity is empirically intractable, as Teorell and Lindvall point out: "if we infer our measures of state capacity from observed outcomes, we cannot use the concept of state to explain those outcomes."[16] Instead, Lindvall and Teorell argue that state capacity refers to the state's ability to project power onto its population to "get things done."[17]

A more promising line of inquiry has been to decompose the concept of state capacity by distinguishing between its constitutive elements. Charles Tilly argued that—at least in the context of Western Europe—state capacity was comprised of regulatory, extractive and coercive capacity.[18] In his study of the emergence of state-capacity in Latin America, Hillel Soifer offers a parallel disaggregation—including coercive, extractive, and administrative capacity.[19] While these distinction are clarifying, I argue that they all rest on a prior element of state capacity. That is, states' ability to project coercive, extractive, or administrative capacity is in the first place a function of having competent agents in those roles—as police, tax collectors, and bureaucrats.

My interest is in state-building, which I understand to be the actions taken by governments to build their capacity to project power—whether along coercive, extractive, or administrative dimensions. In general, as I discussed above, the question of state-building is in large part a question of personnel management. Consider, for instance, the classic Bellicist theory of state building which holds that "the state makes war and war makes the state."[20] Here, this formulation obscures its actual insight: that successful war making is in large part a function of possessing a competent corps of soldiers who are going to be more effective than their adversaries.

How, then, do governments go about building state capacity through personnel management?

[13] Weber (1946). Note, however, that some recent challenges have arisen to Weber's definition. For instance, Joel Migdal defines the state as "a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory and (2) the actual practice of its multiple parts" Migdal et al. (2001, 16).

[14] Tilly (2017).

[15] Mann (1984).

[16] Lindvall and Teorell (2016).

[17] Berwick and Christia (2018), for their part, argue that the debate remains inconclusive at least part due to the divergent objectives: "these different approaches can be divided into those that focus on state capacity as an explanatory variable and those that see it as a puzzle to be explained," the authors point out.

[18] Tilly (1975).

[19] Soifer (2015).

[20] See, for instance: Spruyt (2002) and Spruyt (2007).

The observation motivating the focus of this dissertation is that building competence in the agents of the state, and thus shoring up state capacity, involves moving away from discretionary recruitment via patronage, kinship, or patrimonialism and towards impersonal selection based on merit. Looking at Western Europe during the 18th century, Thomas Ertman observes that variation in the success of rulers attempting to engage in state-building was largely a function of their ability to steer the institutions of bureaucratic selection away from the patrimonial and towards the meritocratic. He writes,

> The statebuilding process begins when the small staff of a ruler's household is no longer capable of carrying out all of the tasks of governing. A more extensive administrative apparatus must be constructed which can no longer be supervised directly by the ruler... What results is [usually] a kind of state apparatus of patrimonial administration... In certain other circumstances, rulers successfully resist the appropriating designs of their elite staffs and retain the right to remove officials at will if such rulers then use the powers they have retained to create a formal hierarchy of positions and fill those position with candidates possessing special educational qualifications, then the groundwork will have laid for the eventual emergence of a modern, rational-legal bureaucracy.[21]

Francis Fukuyama makes similar observations. The Ottomans, as well as successive dynasties in China, were able to build their states because they recognized the principle that meritocratic recruitment of agents of the state built state capacity, which, in turn, enabled them to more effectively ward off external threats.[22] In the context of military service, selection by merit is likely to produce the most successful outcomes for war-making and, in turn, state-making. In a Darwinian sense, as Fukuyama observes, "in a field army at war, meritocracy is not a cultural norm, but a condition of survival."[23] Eric Hobsbawm draws a similar equivalence, noting that, even in the eighteenth century, the constant state of war among continental European monarchies necessitated strong state capacity, which called for competent civil servants in lieu of aristocrats: "the sheer needs of state cohesion and efficiency in an age of acute international rivalry had long obliged monarchs... to staff their state apparatus so far as possible with non-aristocratic civil servants," he writes.[24]

Further attesting to this idea—that the meritocratic recruitment of state agents builds state capacity—Figure 2.1 draws on V-DEM data from 1789-2010 to show the correlation between the extent to which a country is meritocratic in its recruitment of civil servants (0-4) and its extractive capacity. For instance, a coefficient of 0.5 would indicate that moving from "totally discretionary" recruitment to "totally non-discretionary" recruitment of civil servants would result in a two point increase on a four point scale in a state's extractive capacity. For all years since the end of the 19th century, the relationship is statistically significant and positive: the coefficients over the past fifty years routinely exceed 0.5.

How does state-building affect nation-building? The discussion thus far has centered on the idea that variation in the mechanisms of bureaucratic selection is key to understanding state-building, but it is worth bracketing that definition for a moment to consider how others have

[21] Ertman (1997, 8-9).
[22] See, in particular, Fukuyama (2011, 113-114; 184).
[23] Fukuyama (2011, 113).
[24] Hobsbawm (2010*b*, 22).

Figure 2.1—Merit-Recruitment and Extractive Capacity, 1789-2010



Note: The figure plots the beta coefficients from a bivariate regression in which I regress a measure of bureaucratic Weberianness on the state's extractive capacity, both of which are measured on a four point scale. The data comes from the V-DEM version 12 dataset. Each beta coefficient represents a single year in the dataset.

conceived of the relationship between state-building and nation-building. In one of the first treatments of this question, Juan Linz points out that "state building and nation building can be separated only conceptually but both processes have gone and are going hand in hand." In earlier sections, I have described the mechanisms by which state-building is thought to exert a positive impact on nation-building efforts. But several recent scholarly investigations have considered the possibility at the heart of this dissertation: that state-building can have unintended consequences—particularly for outcomes such as conflict.

In one recent excellent account, Emily Sellars and Francisco Garfias consider how state-building can "backfire" by looking at centralizing reforms in 19th century Mexico. The authors argue that "state building, though capacity-enhancing over the long term, can backfire by reducing the willingness of elites to back the government during a crisis. By rupturing existing power relationships between elites and the central government, efforts to centralize power can reduce the resilience of the political system to even low-level shocks by weakening the threat of repression faced by commoners."[25] In other words, the authors focus on how state-building can fail to deliver on the thing at which it aims, weakening elite intermediaries' incentives to control their populations. In another example, Peng Peng looks at how the Qing dynasty selectively used appointment to the bureaucracy—through patronage or meritocracy—to manage internal and external threats of revolt, prioritizing patronage candidates in regions where conflict

[25]Garfias and Sellars (2021).

seemed imminent.[26] That is, Chinese rulers intentionally undercut state-capacity to mitigate the probability of destabilizing conflict.

The theory developed in this chapter shares many properties with the intuition of these accounts; yet, my argument departs in several key ways. First, more in line with Peng Peng than Garfias and Sellars, I am interested in bureaucratic selection as the predominant aspect of state building. But, second, and more importantly, the theory I am developing is interested in how institutional variation in the mechanisms of bureaucratic selection affect mass politics, by generating new grievances and creating the objects towards which they are directed. Elites intervene in the theory, particularly in Chapter 6, but chiefly as objects of mass public frustration. Finally, third, my ultimate outcome of interest is nation-building and its constitutive desideratum—national solidarity. While conflict may flow from the absence of these things, they are practically and theoretically distinct.

As these recent accounts suggest, bureaucratic selection is of course only one type of state-building. Sellars and Garfias, for their part consider reforms regarding the state's extractive capacity. And, although I believe it to predominate other forms, it is worth considering that there are properties unique to bureaucratic selection that may structure its hypothesized relationship to nation-building—properties that are perhaps not present in other forms of state-building.

One of the most commonly cited aspects of state-building is infrastructural capacity: governments across the world are expected to provide basic public goods to their citizens, including the provision of roads and schools. In the classic formulation of public goods, these infrastructural offerings are both non-excludable (everyone can access them) and non-rivalrous (one's consumption of them does not impede another's). It is precisely these aspects of state-building via infrastructural capacity that have led authors to conclude that these investments have a positive effect on nation-building.[27] By providing goods and services that are both non-excludable and non-rivalrous, the intuition holds, citizens will forge a sense of national camaraderie stemming from their joint but equitable exploitation of these resources. Andreas Wimmer argues that the provision of public goods has paved the way for ethnic minorities in Botswana to report a sense of national identification, for instance.[28]

But it is worth considering these infrastructural investments from the perspective of distributive politics, as well. In this light, many of the supposedly pure public goods that spur nation-building are actually often both excludable and rivalrous: while primary education may be universal, entry into the most selective schools is often highly competitive and governed by rivalrous selection mechanisms. And rulers may choose to target specific regions in which schools are to be constructed, thus excluding potential pupils from distant locales. Some recent research, for instance, has questioned the supposedly positive relationship between the provision of roads and national identification.[29] Finite and inevitably uneven central government fiscal transfers means that some regions will have better roads than others. And in some cases, the decision of where to locate pure public goods is weighed against which communities will be least likely to agitate against its introduction in light of its negative externalities.[30]

[26] Peng (2022).

[27] Although others, such as Miguel (2004), drawing on a comparison of Kenya and Tanzania, reverse the causal relationship, arguing that greater nation-building leads to greater state-building.

[28] Wimmer (2018).

[29] De Kadt and Lieberman (2020) and Green (2019).

[30] Such as in the case of the location of the interstate highway system through major urban centers in the United

Analogous ambiguities emerge in the context of another form of state-building—i.e., governments' attempts to build coercive capacity. When governments build coercive capacity in response to an external threat by, say, raising and training an army, it is commonly thought that they are providing a non-rivalrous and non-excludable public good in the form of national defense. And this form of state-building has been shown to lead to an uptick in national identification, known as the "rally around the flag effect."[31] Here, then, state-building appears again to have a positive relationship to nation-building. Governments also build coercive capacity through the recruitment of a police force that monopolizes the legitimate use of violence to enforce the law. But consider how the disproportionate use of this coercive capacity towards certain communities—as among Black Americans—has frayed social solidarity in diverse settings.

The point here is not to side with these recent accounts and suggest that *all forms* of state-building, as through the building of infrastructural capacity, has a necessarily negative relationship with nation-building. Instead, and particularly in diverse settings, when it comes to the question of "state-building," the question of *cui bono* looms large. As discussed, a rich literature in education and sociology has shown that primary school students from historically privileged groups perform better on entrance exams to selective public schools—precisely because their parents possess the resources to pay for expensive tutoring services to give their children an edge. In other words, even if the provision of public education may often lead to gains in building a sense of national solidarity, under certain conditions it may lead to the reverse. Political scientists studying public goods provision across sub-Saharan Africa have shown that regions with better connections to those in power receive better infrastructural investments, a situation that surely detracts from a sense of shared enterprise.[32] These observations suggest that, far from generating a sense of shared enterprise, state-building through public goods provision may carry fraught implications for nation-building.

2.2 Variation in Types of Bureaucratic Selection

Before turning to the specifics of the theoretical argument, it is worth reflecting on the precise nature of variation in the core independent variable—the extent to which politicians possess discretion in the appointment of civil servants. The conceptual distinctions I wish to draw are typified in Table 2.2. As I have discussed above, I am interested in variation in the manner in which bureaucrats are recruited into government service, which I characterize chiefly according to the extent to which principals (rulers, politicians) are given discretion in these decisions. In an ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy, principals have little-to-no discretionary authority in deciding which prospective officer-seekers to select for government service. Although there are other potential mechanisms, the preferred vehicle for selecting future civil servants in non-discretionary settings is the competitive examination. There are countless examples of such systems across the developed and developing world, as outlined in the final column of Table 2.2. Consider the British model of governance through Whitehall: here, elected officials may assume control of ministries, but have no control over the selection of senior leadership in Whitehall through whom they must

States, where historically Black communities were targeted for displacement and dislocation through these constructions.

[31] Lee (1977) and Mueller (1970).

[32] Jablonski (2014).

Table 2.2: Discretion and The Selection of Civil Servants

Principal's authority	Selection mechanism	Type	Examples
Discretionary	Trust	Non-elitist patronage	USA (1829–1883) Indonesia (1999-2008) Zaire (1965-1998)
	Pay-to-play	Elitist patronage	UK (–1854) Indonesia (–1998) India (SCS, 1949–)
Non-discretionary	Examinations	Meritocracy	Indonesia (2009–) India (IAS, 1949–) USA (1883–) UK (1854–)

govern.[33] The Indian Administrative Service, an elite corps of 8,000 centralized civil servants, is another analogous example, with one of the most rigorous selection procedures in the world.

Table 2.2 also points to a distinction between two prominent logics commonly seen in the discretionary appointment of civil servants. First, in many cases, politicians have wielded the discretionary authority to appoint bureaucrats as a tool for rent-seeking, auctioning off posts to the highest bidder. At least for most Western European countries, historically, this system has been the rule rather than the exception. During the fifteenth century, the French king Francis I, went so far as to establish a government agency expressed tasked with the sale of public offices ("Bureau des Parties Casuelles").[34] When there were no vacancies to be auctioned off, they created new jobs. As I discuss further in Chapter 3, the United Kingdom is the canonical example of such a system, with aspirational office-seekers throughout the 19th century going so far as to post solicitations in the classifieds section of *The Times*.[35]

In these cases, to recoup the upfront costs associated with the purchase of their position, prospective bureaucrats anticipate using public office to extract rents from citizens. These sums are often thought to be considerable. During the *ancien régime* in France, in the early seventeenth century, some prospective office-seekers deemed the revenue potential from office-holding to be so great that they liquidated their personal estates to finance the purchase of posts.[36] One study from Indonesia conducted shortly after democratization asked bureaucrats about the size of the sums they paid for their jobs; the authors found that, on average, bureaucrats in one city paid 24.7 million IDR, approximately one years' wages at the median yearly income at the time.[37] I dub this system "elitist patronage," for reasons that should be immediately clear: if government jobs are to be auctioned off, they will be disproportionately occupied by the individuals with the highest willingnesses-to-pay—i.e., the wealthiest.

However, there is no inherent reason that offering politicians with the discretionary authority

[33]Page (see 2010, e.g.,).
[34]Swart (2012).
[35]Coolican (2018).
[36]Swart (2012, 8).
[37]Kristiansen and Ramli (2006).

to appoint government agents will lead them to auction off public offices for private gain. Instead, many politicians have wielded the discretionary appointment of public servants to cultivate electoral support at the ballot box, oftentimes in ways that have historically elevated non-elites to government jobs. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia offered a statement of this logic in his dissenting opinion in the case *Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois* (1990), in which the justices decided whether the discretionary appointment of public servants should be outlawed: "[i]t seems to me that that categorical pronouncement [on discretionary hiring] reflects a naive vision of politics and an inadequate appreciation of the systemic effects of patronage in promoting political stability and facilitating the social and political integration of previously powerless groups."

The underlying logic of this transaction is electoral: politicians exchange public office for supporters' votes. In unmediated contexts, this has a democratizing effect on the composition of the civil service, as it is often individuals with the weakest outside options for making an income that are willing to transact their vote. Indeed, drawing on historical evidence from municipal governments in the United States, in Chapter 3, I will show how elected officials in municipal governments in the largest American cities in the early twentieth century doled out public sector work to foreign-born immigrants in exchange for their support at the ballot box. Similar dynamics prevail across the developed and developing world to this day—recent work from Indonesia shows how district chiefs engage in the hiring of temporary workers in the build up to elections, as incumbents use the public purse to shore up support in advance of their campaigns.[38] In these contexts, when politicians have discretionary authority to appoint civil servants, but use this authority chiefly to cultivate supporters, rather than to enrich themselves, it tends towards what I call "non-elitist patronage."

It may be the case that countries slide from a non-elitist to an elitist form of patronage, or vice versa. The core virtue of discretion—its flexibility—is also its greatest liability, as governments' hiring tendencies can be abruptly redirected in the event of a change in power or a change in a ruler's interests. The case of Zaire under Mobuto is instructive in illustrating the ultimately indeterminate nature of offering rulers discretionary authority in the appointment of civil servants. During the first seven years of his rule, Mobuto was focused on turning the tide in separatist conflicts in the eastern provinces of Zaire. As such, he instituted policies that put a limit on 25% of the bureaucracy being comprised of a single group, and pushed for regular rotations across provinces. Of course, Mobuto's rule descended into kleptocracy—at one point, his personal net worth was thought to exceed the yearly GDP of the Zaire. Here, one source of revenue for Mobuto and his regime was the sale of public offices—thus turning into an elitist form of patronage.

This discussion builds on a large literature that has attempted to draw categorical distinctions among different modes of bureaucratic selection. One of the core rhetorical distinctions is between clientelism and patronage. Kitschelt and Wilkinson define clientelism as "the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods and services."[39] Patronage has been conceived of in larger terms, as in one literature review which argues that "patrons make appointments for a range of motives and appointees perform a variety of roles."[40] The conclusion of these authors is that clientelism is thus one "modality" of patronage—one in which patrons are narrowly interested in electoral exchange.

[38]Pierskalla and Sacks (2020).

[39]Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007, 7).

[40]Panizza, Peters and Ramos Larraburu (2019, 149).

The distinction between elite and non-elite forms of patronage comports with the idea that clientelism is just one form of patronage, as both are subsumed with the umbrella of arrangements in which principals—patrons, elected officials, and so on—have discretionary authority to select government agents. The virtue of the distinction lies in disentangling two wholly different logics by which patrons may select bureaucratic agents—for financial gain (elitist) or also for electoral gain (non-elitist). This distinction is often elided in the existing literature, in part because the exchange of government posts for financial gain does not preclude electoral gains from also following. Indeed, it seems likely that in the event that job-seekers pay for their posts, that they will offer electoral support, as well. And yet, the consequences of paying (or not) for a position has important consequences with respect to the composition of the selected agents, as I will discuss below.

One outstanding question concerns the location of affirmative action within the proposed schema.[41] In general, in the following chapters, I do not consider how selection via affirmative action may affect broader measures of national solidarity. Affirmative action policies in government hiring—such as those in India, Malaysia, and the United States—are the result of a reckoning over how other, prior forms of selection (patronage or meritocratic) have affected representational outcomes and social solidarity. Yet, these policies are often a form of non-discretionary recruitment: the system of quotas in India still relies on non-discretionary examinations to select government agents, albeit with outcomes conditional on applicants' caste.

2.3 The Argument

This dissertation builds on these insights, but from a perspective that focuses on variation in practices of government hiring. As I have argued above, when states attempt to build capacity—coercive, administrative, extractive—they are often simply attempting to elevate the competence of the human actors occupying those roles. Building coercive capacity means training soldiers and police officers. Building administrative capacity means hiring competent bureaucrats. Building extractive capacity means empowering tax collectors to devise clever strategies for detecting underpayment. In short, state-building is—in no small part—a question of human resource management.

The manner in which governments go about hiring more competent agents—thought of here as state-building—is to introduce systems for recruitment that rely on impersonal criteria rather than patrimonial ones. A large literature in economics, political science, and public administration has shown that countries that recruit bureaucrats meritocratically report superior service delivery. Meanwhile, countries that offer politicians with the unencumbered discretion to appoint civil servants often report weaker service delivery and lower state-capacity. In other words, this dissertation conceives of an important aspect of state-building as governments' transformation from one in which recruitment is done through patronage to one in which it is done through a merit system. In this section, I consider how variation in the manner in which governments hire its agents affects nation-building, focusing in particularly on the mediating role of representation.

[41] Here, I follow the convention of the U.S. in describing this system as one of "affirmative action," as opposed to the term "positive discrimination," although I consider these system to be conceptually equivalent with other such systems such as those governed by quotas.

2.3.1 Representational Consequences of Variation in Bureaucratic Selection

The theory I am advancing looks at how this move to build one's state—from patronage to merit—affects prospects for building a sense of national solidarity in a plural context. I argue that the nature of this relationship hinges on the representational consequences of variation in the mechanism of bureaucratic selection. In this section, I describe the differing representational consequences of different types of bureaucratic selection considered throughout. Systems in which politicians are offered no discretion, such as the merit system and its reliance on examinations to allocate government jobs, yield arrangements in which successful applicants to government service will reflect existing group-based inequalities in society. This happens for several reasons, particularly in contexts with high levels of group-based inequality.

The first reason relates to unequal access to childhood education. Access to quality of childhood education has been shown to be highly variable across countries in the developed and developing world. This variation often coincides with existing ethnic cleavages, as minorities often have access to weaker education.[42] This variation has been shown to have important long-term consequences.[43] This matters for the sorts of people who select into applying for positions in the civil service in the first place. The possibility of a lucrative career in public service might simply appear foreclosed to those without quality education early in life, since these individuals will perceive a slim likelihood of success against the comparative strength of applicants with elite educations. But the barriers can be even more concrete, too: many countries impose strict requirements on the minimum educational attainment for potential civil servants. In Indonesia, as I will describe in greater detail in Chapter 5, recent reforms have required that applicants for nearly every post in the civil service must possess at least a college degree.

Perhaps more troubling for unequal group representation under meritocratic recruitment is the fact that, across the globe, large industries have arisen offering test-preparation services to aspiring public servants. These services are prohibitively expensive for most applicants.[44] In addition, intensive preparation for civil service examination often involves full time study if applicants hope to be successful, which means that only individuals with sufficient savings or family support are able forego full time employment to do so. In the survey of applicants to the Indonesian civil service introduced in Chapter 5, a full 76% of respondents indicated that they had spent more than a week studying full-time—with those applicants scoring 20% higher than applicants who reported studying for only two days. And when the level of group-based inequality is high, one group is likely to access these services at higher rates, making these groups better positioned to succeed on civil service entrance exams.

Finally, the actual content of civil service exams can benefit one group over another, although it is worth underscoring that in most countries professional psychometricians attempt to mitigate this bias. One third of the points on the Indonesian civil service exam, for example, are derived from a section known as a "National Character Test," in which applicants are asked questions about general Indonesian history and culture. These questions can occasionally privilege applicants from Java, which is the center of Indonesian economic and political life. One question in

[42] Chetty, Hendren and Katz (2016).

[43] Chetty et al. (2011) and Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014).

[44] In India, for example, in-person tutoring for the CSE exam, for one year, costs roughly 80,000 Rs ($1,100 USD), which is nearly 70% of the median household income.

Figure 2.2—Exam Scores in Indonesia, 2019



2017, for example, asked applicants about the religious beliefs of the historical Majapahit empire—a fifteenth century Javanese kingdom. There are even more egregious cases. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the legislature passed the Official Language Act in 1956, which made Sinhala the national language, thus rendering Tamils "officially illiterate." As government selection examinations were to be held in Sinhala, this "all but excluded them from government jobs outside the Tamil areas. In 1956 Tamils had represented 60 per cent of professionals, 30 per cent of the Administrative Service and 40 per cent of the armed forces, but by 1970 their numbers had plummeted to 10, 5 and all of 1 per cent respectively—and this at a time ... when Tamils represented over 20 per cent of the population."[45]

Across the board, then, recruitment into the civil service via examinations will benefit those that are *a priori* privileged. The case of India is an instructive example for empirically demonstrating this principal. The Indian Administrative Service (IAS), described above, is one of the world's premier bureaucracies, representing an elite corps of approximately 6,000 meritocratically recruited officers. Competition for these positions is extremely high. Every year, nearly one million applicants compete for an average of 300 open posts. The outcomes of these examinations reflect existing inequalities in India: for instance, on the left panel of Figure 2.3, I show the percentage of IAS officers who indicate that Hindi is their mother tongue, with the figure exceeding the national average for all years. While applicants' answers to questions may be written in any scheduled language, the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) releases the question text in only English or Hindi, giving those who speak Hindi natively a distinct advantage. Meanwhile, on the right hand panel, I show the percentage of IAS officers hailing from Delhi—India's national capital. While the overall population of Delhi comprises only 1.3% of India's population, the share

[45]McCourt (2006, 144).

of IAS officers from Delhi has typically exceeded 6% for all years since 1970.

Figure 2.3—Patterns of Representation in Indian Administrative Service, 1970-2020



Note: Data from the Supremo personnel management system, downloaded from the Ashoka University open data portal. The left panel shows the percentage of IAS officers who indicate that Hindi is their mother tongue; the dotted red line indicates the national average stating the same (26%). The right panel shows the percent of IAS officers who hail from Delhi, the Indian capital. The red dotted line here indicates the share of the overall population in India that are from Delhi (1.3%).

How, then, does the discretionary recruitment of bureaucrats shape representational considerations? Recall that I distinguish between elitist and non-elitist forms of discretionary appointment, which have different representational concerns. To see why this is the case, it may be productive to consider the strategic interplay of politicians' and job-seekers' interests. Assume that politicians who possess the discretionary authority to appoint civil servants are jointly interested in both (1) reelection and (2) personal enrichment. In most cases, the former predominates the latter, but not always. These two interests are also positively related. Since the discretionary selection of bureaucrats often goes hand-in-hand with other forms of corruption—such as the outright exchange of cash for votes—politicians need access to financial resources to secure their reelection. These financial resources typically come from one of two channels. Petty corruption refers to small sums paid by citizens to (oftentimes) frontline bureaucrats in exchange for access to public services. Grand corruption involves larger sums, typically paid by institutions or wealthy individuals who wish to bend government policy to their advantage. In many low- and middle-income countries, both forms of rent-seeking prevail, while in high-income countries, petty corruption has typically been eradicated with grand corruption remaining the preferred vehicle.

Those seeking public office, for their part, are interested in both the prestige flowing from government work as well as access to financial resources—in the form of either the public sector wage premium or their share in the rents accruing from petty corruption. To finance reelection, and to secure their own personal enrichment, politicians expect some share of the rents secured by

bureaucrats in frontline petty corruption to flow upwards. But politicians cannot directly observe the scale of rents captured by frontline bureaucrats, creating an information asymmetry against which politicians have an incentive to hedge. To start, when faced with this situation, politicians may simply select bureaucrats that they "trust," a strategy that immediately suggests a co-ethnic bias in recruitment under discretionary procedures: co-ethnics tend to trust one another more, ceteris paribus, than non-co-ethnics.[46] This possibility comports with the rich literature in political science and economics which has examined patterns of distribution of government services under patronage, identifying a strong tendency towards co-ethnicity. For instance, a series of papers have shown that the regional birthplace of countries' elected leaders show stronger economic growth during their tenure.[47] But other characteristics of the discretionary appointment of civil servants drive a co-ethnic tendency, as well. For one, politicians may see appointed bureaucrats as an important voting bloc, and may wish to appoint those upon whose fealty they can depend. Logistically, moreover, identifying and evaluating prospective recipients of government jobs to be recruited discretionarily has informational requirements (i.e., knowing who is looking for a job) that must be collected quietly given the typically illicit nature of these appointments. Existing informational networks operating through co-ethnics are a simple and effective way for politicians to identify and evaluate interested job-seekers, trusting that the transaction will not be made public. Collectively, these dynamics thus suggest a tendency for the discretionary appointment of civil servants to tend towards ethnic favoritism.

Politicians may wish to further hedge against bureaucrats' potential failure to share in rents, however. To ensure their financial solvency for reelection purposes, in addition to expecting an upward flow of rents from petty corruption, politicians may demand upfront payment from job-seekers to secure a position. Edward Banfield writes, "a strong incentive exists for third parties to seek to influence [the public official's] exercise of discretion by offering a bribe... the money going not to the government but to the agent."[48] The sums paid for government jobs can often be considerable, particularly when auction dynamics prevail and the price is bid upwards by multiple contenders for the same post. Moreover, politicians have monopoly pricing power, further increasing their interest to set prices high.[49] In general, buyers of public office will be willing to pay sums roughly equivalent to the anticipated rents that will accrue to the position. Consistent with this, in describing the scale of the sale of public offices in a Chinese province in the 1990s, one scholar documents staggeringly large sums—in the area of $USD 50,000—for comparatively middling posts.[50] One recent study of an unnamed large developing country—presumed to be India—examines the sale of public office as supervisors of community health centers, finding that "at least 80 percent of hires paid a bribe" and that the average sum was 17 months worth of salary.[51] When it appears, the sale of public office immediately suggests a socioeconomic effect on the representational composition of the selected public servants, with richer constituents be-

[46] Habyarimana et al. (2007, 2009).

[47] These accounts generally leverage variation in nighttime luminosity, looking chiefly at developing economies where variation is more pronounced. See: Hodler and Raschky (2014). Other analyses have shown that, across African countries, co-ethnics with the country leader has positive effects on citizens' access to basic services including education and health. See Franck and Rainer (2012) and Kramon and Posner (2016).

[48] Quoted in Wade (1985).

[49] Wade (1985).

[50] Zhu (2008).

[51] Weaver (2021).

ing better positioned to secure government work. One scholar of corruption writes, "offices could never [have been] sold on a large scale without the existence of a rich class who was willing buy them."[52] Consistent with this, the study of community health supervisors finds that those who were hired with a bribe were not any less qualified than those who were recruited meritocratically, owing to the "correlation between wealth and quality among applicants."

It is worth emphasizing that ethnic favoritism will prevail, in general, even when politicians avail themselves of this sort of peculation. After all, peculation is a hedge against a bureaucrat capitulating on a promise to send rents upwards. In sum, politicians will either allocate government positions according to (1) ethnic favoritism or (2) ethnic favoritism *and* peculation. The second arrangement—which I dub elitist patronage—has some striking implications for representation in the bureaucracy: politicians will first and foremost offer jobs to co-ethnics. And, conditional on selecting co-ethnics, they will further select *elite* co-ethnics, over *non-elite* co-ethnics. In other words, here, there exists an intra-ethnic, class-based dynamic in the allocation of government jobs. This feature of the discretionary recruitment of civil servants—when politicians rely on petty rents but do not trust bureaucrats to share—has important and wide ranging implications for the grievances adopted by both the mass public that depends on services as well as those who desire government jobs but find themselves unable to afford the price tag.

2.3.2 Nation-building Consequences of Variation in Bureaucratic Representation

What, then, are the implications of these representational consequences for the ultimate outcome of nation-building? In the next two sections, I consider two different mechanisms from which the representational consequences of patronage and merit hiring systems might affect national-solidarity. The first mechanism concerns citizens: how do the representational consequences of patronage versus merit-systems affect the attitudes of the mass public? The second mechanism concerns applicants—i.e., would-be bureaucrats. How does failure under a patronage-system versus a merit-system affect aspirants for public sector jobs' attitudes?

Citizen-Side Mechanism: Descriptive Representation

People want to see their identities reflected in the public service, particularly in the street-level bureaucracy that constitutes what Lipsky calls everyday citizen-state encounters.[53] A recent national survey from Indonesia in December 2013, for example, found that 39.5% of respondents would be upset if a member of another religion became a teacher at a nearby school. While teachers are important and visible public servants, one might expect these numbers to be higher when surveys probe attitudes about representation in positions of more consequence, such as the headmaster or the sub-district chief. But more generally, the experience of petitioning for services from outgroups can be symbolically impactful, as it highlights the uneven footing upon which different groups stand within a single political unit.

When one group is disproportionately represented in public service—as might occur when merit is used in hiring practices—it could spur resentment on the part of relatively excluded groups. This could upend the "horizontal comradeship" that is central to the project of generating national solidarity. Recent work in sociology also bolsters this proposition. Andreas Wimmer,

[52] Swart (2017).
[53] Lipsky (1980).

for example, conducts a global regression analysis and finds that higher levels of ethno-political exclusion—i.e., monopolistic control of elected positions by a single ethnicity—negatively correlates with levels of national identification, particularly on the part of excluded groups.[54] It seems highly plausible that this finding would extend to representation in administrative public service, particularly since the number of individuals employed in such institutions is typically far greater (and thus more visible) than the number of elected officials. In other words, to the extent that a selection mechanism occasions an unequal representation of certain groups in the bureaucracy, I expect it to weaken a sense of national solidarity.

Meanwhile, recall that the discretionary recruitment of civil servants is hypothesized to have divergent impacts on the representational composition of the public sector. When politicians rely on trust alone to secure a share in the bribes being extracted by frontline bureaucrats, a co-ethnic tendency will prevail. In heterogenous administrative units—where there exists a minoritized group—this will often result in a fractious outcome that may cut against the emergence of a sense of national solidarity.[55] But in contexts in which politicians do not rely on trust to secure a share in frontline bribes, and instead rely on upfront payment from prospective bureaucrats to secure employment, a class-based tendency will emerge. Even in heterogenous administrative units, wealthy members of demographically minoritized groups can thus still secure employment. In these contexts, the selection mechanism optimizes on the class cleavage; citizens are likely to be attuned to the disproportionate representation of the well-off in coveted government jobs, a feature that may motivate vertical grievances towards elites, even intra-ethnically. When the quality of service delivery is poor—as it is liable to be when bureaucrats seek to recoup the upfront costs of purchasing the post—these vertical grievances may be doubly strong. These vertical, class-based grievances create a space for an ethnically cross-cutting identity—such as an inclusive national identity—in which citizens of diverse backgrounds define themselves in collective opposition to exploitation by the elites.

Applicant-Side Mechanism: Thwarted Ambitions

The second mechanism concerns applicants—i.e., would-be bureaucrats. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, many citizens are generally more interested in demanding jobs from their government than they are interested in demanding services from it. Across the developing world, large numbers of individuals apply for government jobs. In Indonesia, for instance, 4.4 million individuals in 2018 took the civil service exam, with only 180,000 ultimately selected. Every year in India, more than one million applicants sit for positions in the IAS with less than a few hundred ultimately selected. Nor is this situation unique to merit-systems: in post-colonial Africa, graduates of secondary and tertiary educations saw public sector employment as their only option—placing huge pressure on politicians to find work for them, in turn swelling the wage bill two- or three-fold in the decade of decolonization.[56]

The overarching hypothesis of the so-called "applicant-side mechanism" is that failed applicants might come to harbor meaningful resentments upon losing out—and that these resentments are directed towards those perceived to have been successful. When governments allocate cov-

[54] Wimmer (2018).

[55] In homogenous communities, meanwhile, this dynamic may have countervailing effects. This possibility tracks closely to recent findings from Myanmar by Jangai Jap, who finds "positive and robust associations between ethnic minorities' everyday encounters with the state and their attachment to the state" Jap (2021, 115).

[56] See: Simson (2016).

eted public sector jobs through meritocratic procedures, privileged groups outperform marginalized on entrance exams and go on to staff administrative posts at disproportionately high rates, for reasons discussed above. In turn, failed applicants—particularly those hailing from marginalized groups—form impactful resentments toward those thought to have been disproportionately successful. And, moreover, I hypothesize that failed applicants will come to reflect negatively on their national identity, given that it represents the symbolic core which undergirds the apparatus that has just denied them employment, and given that the state apparatus is apparently more interested in recruiting members of other groups.

The merit-based selection of civil servants has other properties that seem liable to provoke meaningful resentments. As discussed earlier, the cornerstone of merit-based systems is an open examination for selecting recruits. The stakes of these exams are high, particularly in developing countries where employment in the civil service affords significant prestige and income. Part of this hypothesized resentment stems from the sunk costs of futile preparation: examinations take time and resources to prepare for. But the nature of failure in a merit-based selection system is also be a unique and psychologically devastating insult: to be examined and judged to possess insufficient "merit" is an upsetting reality for many applicants to face. It seems doubly likely that failed applicants will direct generalized anger and resentment towards outgroups when the composition of successful test-takers dovetails with pre-existing cleavages.

Turning to discretionary recruitment of civil servants, consider the case of "elitist" patronage in which positions are allocated to those with the highest willingness to pay. Typically, in these cases, there is no formal tournament or competition for government posts. Brokers or politicians quietly and directly negotiate with aspirants. In some cases, these negotiations may reach the stage at which politicians and brokers solicit an initial "down payment" from several aspirants for the same vacancy. The popular press in Indonesia has historically documented cases in which aspirants publicize these "down payments" in the event that their ultimate offer is not accepted. Of course, many aspirational bureaucrats simply never get to this stage—they never "submit an application," as it were—knowing that they do not possess adequate financing to secure the position. Nonetheless, the dynamic is the same in these cases: non-elites are passed over for the elites, who have a higher willingness to pay for positions, spurring resentment towards the latter. Again, here, similar dynamics are thought to exist in the case of the "citizen-side" mechanisms: these vertical, perhaps intra-ethnic, grievances open space for a form of horizontal solidarity.

2.4 Scope Conditions

There are several crucial conditions that circumscribe the proposed theory. The first should by now be clear: I am interested in countries that report high levels of heterogeneity across ascriptive cleavages—ethnic, racial, religious, or otherwise. Indeed, in highly homogenous societies—such as those of East Asia or Scandinavia—differential rates of representation across salient ascriptive cleavages is unlikely to occur for the circular reason that such cleavages do not exist in meaningful ways. It remains possible, of course, that non-ascriptive cleavages—such as regionalism or class—may emerge as politically salient cleavages as a result of selection procedures for recruiting government employees, but this is a possibility that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Moreover

More importantly, my argument is applicable to societies where ascriptive heterogeneity is geographically segmented, rather than integrated—a distinction often elided by the existing lit-

erature in ethnic politics. Here, I refer to the distinction initially drawn by J.S. Furnivall, defining a plural society—that is, a segmented society—in the context of the Dutch East Indies, hoping his observations on the colony would

> "throw into relief the interest which attaches to Netherlands India as an example of a plural society; a society, that is, comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit.[57]

In the context of the Dutch East Indies, a segmented society existed in the sense that different groups—Chinese, Europeans, Indonesians—lived in a separate communities, with different ways of life, interacting only in the context of the marketplace.

For a graphical depiction, consider the following images, in which, say, ethnic groups are represented by variously colored circles. The largest circle represents the state in which they find themselves, and the smaller, intermediate-sized circles represent subnational units—provinces or districts, for instance. The left panel depicts a state of integration: one in which ethnic groups are uniformly—or near-uniformly—distributed across geographic subnational units. Here, we might think of settings such as the distribution of members of Other Backward Castes (OBCs) in India, which can be found alongside their more privileged peers within the same administrative units. Yet in many contexts across postcolonial Asia and Africa, the situation is better characterized by some degree of segmentation in which groups exist side-by-side but are in largely self-contained enclaves. Geographic segmentation typically occurs through a simple principle of homophily. Yet, in other contexts, as in the United States or Brazil, for instance, there is considerable segregation and sorting, achieved through government intervention and segregationist policies.

The distinction between segmented and integrated societies matters for the manner in which inequalities are reflected in public sector representation under patronage. In contexts where groups are integrated, and there is also group-based inequality, it seems likely that the prevailing expectations of ethnic favoritism would obtain as politicians seeking office identify a minimal viable coalition of constituencies according to ethnicity and, ultimately, reward them with jobs in exchange for their support. However, in contexts with geographically segmented groups, and in which constituencies are overwhelmingly comprised of a single group, politicians may find that ethnic favoritism fails and turn to alternative bases of support to forge a winning coalition. In these settings, where patronage nonetheless predominates, politicians may find that the logic of doling out jobs to members of specific ethnic constituencies no longer holds, and may instead offer those posts to those who offer the greatest value—i.e., job seekers with the best connections or access to resources.

This distinction between segmented and integrated societies anticipates a third important condition: that subnational governments both exist and are important actors. In the context of a state with, say, multiple ethnic groups, but no meaningful subnational administrative units, there is of course no possibility of a politically meaningful segmented arrangement, thus obviating the distinction. Indeed, the situation in which several geographically segmented ethnic groups find themselves vying for power in a single political unit simply reflects an integrated society at a higher unit of analysis.

Finally, I am focused on places where group-based inequality is high. Particularly in the context of meritocratic recruitment of civil servants, this condition represents the mechanism

[57] Furnivall (1939, 446).

Figure 2.4—Segmented vs. Integrated States



by which differential rates of success on examinations obtain. Conditional on examining cases with high levels of diversity, this is not a particularly restrictive condition: there are few contexts with high levels of diversity that do not also report some degree of inequality along those same ascriptive cleavages. Nonetheless, in these settings, individuals from privileged backgrounds outstrip the competition from more marginalized groups, as they typically have better access to education and are able to avail themselves of expensive private tutoring services in preparation for the civil service exam.

Taken together, these conditions may seem onerous and overly-restrictive, but they are intended for expository and clarifying purposes. In fact, despite these conditions, they characterize many countries across Africa and Asia, including the ones considered in this dissertation, but also those beyond: across religious groups in India and Nigeria; across racial groups in Brazil, the United States, and South Africa; and across ethnic groups in Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, and Tanzania.

Chapter 3

Why Reform? Meritocratic Recruitment as a Cudgel or Concession

In *The Republic*, Plato articulated an ideal type of government in which political power would be apportioned according to individuals' inherent talent—known as the myth of the three metals—with a "philosopher king" ruling. Thomas Jefferson held similar views. Writing to John Adams in 1813, he wrote, "there is a natural aristocracy among men" for which "the grounds are virtue and talents." Going further, Jefferson wondered, "may we not even say that that form of government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural *aristoi* into the offices of government?"[1] At the time, this was a radical proposition: even in the comparatively democratic United States, status and station had governed the allocation of government jobs over the first quarter century of the republic. Jefferson's proposal is now known as a meritocracy—a term coined satirically by Michael Young, a British MP, but which is now widely used without its initial snark.[2] There are few who advocate for the introduction of meritocratic selection in the apportionment of elected office—democratic elections remain the preferred vehicle—but virtually every country has, at least in principle, adopted a meritocratic system for the selection of its civil servants.[3]

There is good reason to applaud the meritocratic selection of civil servants. For one, scholars have found that countries in which civil servants are recruited according to "merit" report stronger economic performance and boast superior measures of service delivery. Under a system of examinations, after all, bureaucrats do not "owe" their position to a politician or a patron—which means they ought to face fewer incentives to engage in corruption, because they do not owe a debt to someone who might be concerned with extracting rents upwards for campaign purposes. And this means investment—both foreign and domestic—can be more confident that expropriation will not occur, enabling firms to take longer time horizons that in turn promote growth. The evidence backs this up: countries with more meritocratic recruitment of civil ser-

[1] Jefferson, Thomas. "Letter to John Adams." October 28, 1813.

[2] Young (1958).

[3] The extent to which examination scores are ultimately decisive in the allocation of government jobs varies widely, however. Golden (2003), for instance, describes how politicians in postwar Italy manipulated the civil service examination scores of applicants who supported their campaigns. And yet the fact that nearly every country has nominally adopted a system of competitive examination for the allocation of civil service jobs points to its remarkable ascendance as the singular tool for hiring bureaucrats.

vants witnessed both (1) superior economic growth during the period 1980-1990 and (2) fewer reports of corruption during the period 2017–2019 (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1—The Virtues of Meritocratic Recruitment of Civil Servants



Note: Left panel draws on V-Dem and World Bank data to show the correlation between meritocratic recruitment of civil servants and economic growth during the period 1980-1990. The right panel draws on V-Dem data to similarly capture the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants, examining the correlation with the proportion of citizens in the 2017-2019 WVS survey that reported paying a bribe for access to public services in the last year.

The second reason to applaud the introduction of meritocracy in the recruitment of civil servants concerns the end it puts to discrimination in hiring practices. A rich literature in political science has shown that when elected officials wield discretionary authority in the recruitment of bureaucrats—as under patronage systems—politicians tend to dole out positions to co-ethnics.[4] By divorcing the means of civil servant selection from both the prejudicial leanings of politicians, as well as from their short-sighted electoral interests, civil service reform promises to boost fairness in representation. Theodore Roosevelt, a prominent supporter of civil service reform in the United States, wrote in 1895, for instance, that "among the many benefits of the law, not the least is the bar it puts to discrimination for or against a man because of his religious convictions. Protestant and Catholic, Jew, Gentile, and Agnostic, are treated with an equal hand."

This raises an important question, however: if the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants is superior to its alternatives, why is it not always implemented? The conventional wisdom holds that patronage is an important mechanism by which politicians cultivate loyal supporters. And as politicians are self-interested and thus focused on their prospects for reelection, they tend not to support the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants as it would undermine their ability to dole out coveted jobs to supporters in exchange for votes. Focusing on the case of public sector reform in Latin America, for instance, Barbara Geddes argues that such initiatives are only achieved when parties benefit equally from the disbursement of patronage—a situation that

[4]Corstange (2016).

provides both with equal incentives to move towards a professionalized civil service.[5] Another account conducts a statistical analysis, similarly focusing on political parties, but examining the question in reverse, drawing on cross-national data, arguing that public sector reform fails to take hold when there are clientelistic parties in power.[6]

Yet these explanations fail when considered in light of the experience of civil service reform in the United Kingdom and the United States (see Figure 3.2). The United Kingdom began its path to civil service reform with the Northcote Trevelyan Report in 1854, cementing its roll-out with the Orders of Council in 1870. At the time, the Liberal Party and the Tories had alternated in power frequently. This alternation is surprising given both parties' ultimate commitment to the reforms introduced, standing in conflict with Barbara Geddes' argument since the Tories were significantly more reliant on patronage for shoring up support than their Liberal counterparts. Meanwhile, the United States passed federal civil service reform with the Pendleton Act in 1883. At the time, both the Democrats and Republicans relied extensively on patronage and clientelism in courting voters, thus challenging the claims of Cruz and Keefer.

Figure 3.2—Civil Service Reform, United Kingdom and United States



Note: V-Dem data plotting the extent to which the United Kingdom and United States recruited civil servants meritocratically (0-4) between 1789-2020.

In this chapter, I will argue that the indeterminacy of these explanations arises from a category mistake. Existing accounts have sought to generalize explanations of civil service reform by characterizing its achievement as a unidimensional variable: as either successful or unsuccessful. This approach forgoes important information about the nature of contestation yielding civil service

[5]Geddes (1994).
[6]Cruz and Keefer (2015).

reform, however. It is instead useful to disaggregate instances of civil service reform according to the group—or coalition of groups—agitating for the introduction of meritocratic reforms in a given political context. In many instances, successful civil service reform has represented a cudgel wielded by dominant classes, and they have adopted institutions such as exam-based recruitment believing that they stood to benefit over the comparatively marginalized. Meanwhile, civil service reform has also appeared as a concession offered to the comparatively marginalized who, whether due to frustrations with the quality of governance or their comparative underrepresentation under existing systems, have agitated for institutional change.

Drawing on historical case studies of the United Kingdom and the United States, I develop a fuller picture of these distinct pathways—what I call *cudgeled* reform and *conceded* reform. By cudgeled reform, I refer specifically to those instances when dominant groups have implemented civil service reform as a means of shoring up their representation in government. Consider the case of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants pushing for municipal civil service reform in early twentieth century United States. As I will describe in greater detail later on, the impetus for municipal civil service reform was the perceived overrepresentation of recent immigrants in local government, occasioned by the machine politics in major urban centers. Frustrated with their waning political representation, despite their continued economic supremacy, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants used the race-neutral vocabulary of good governance to usher in civil service reform from which they anticipated to benefit.

By contrast, by conceded reform, I refer to those instances in which non-dominant groups have successfully agitated for civil service reform as a means of bolstering their representation in government. Consider, for instance, the case of an ascendant urban bourgeoisie in mid-nineteenth century Britain demanding representation in the civil service, which had previously been controlled by the landed aristocracy. This pathway can be seen across nineteenth century Europe, where a moribund aristocracy was slowly displaced by a new class of bourgeoisie in the wake of the industrial revolution. Civil service reform—along with the introduction of elections and the expansion of the franchise to non-property owning men—was one of the means by which the aristocracy sought to placate an increasingly ascendant social class who found their ambitions to share in power frustrated.

The comparative historical analysis of civil service reform in the United Kingdom and the United States covers well-trodden territory. Many scholars have leveraged the historical experience of these twinned cases to understand the distinct pathways by which civil service reform can be won. Indeed, the reformers in the United States, such as Thomas Jenckes, carried out extensive personal correspondence with Sir Stafford Northcote. President Hayes dispatched Dorman Eaton to carry out a study of civil service reform in the United Kingdom to develop an understanding of how the United States might achieve similar results. At least since Martin Shefter, political scientists have similarly considered the divergent factors influencing the convergent outcomes in these two cases. For his part, Shefter argued that the sequential arrival of party politics before a professional bureaucracy in the United Kingdom, and the reverse in the United States, explain the comparative speed with which the former adopted reform.[7] Another recent account argues that "industrialization in both countries increased the size and average income of the electorate [and] made it harder for parties to discern people's votes and monitor their electoral behavior."[8] An-

[7]Shefter (1993).
[8]Stokes et al. (2013, 201).

other yet analyzes the comparative strength of business organizations in the two cases, arguing that "[i]n both cases, business interests coalesced against reliance on patronage and demanded that parties reform the state to serve economic interests by improving bureaucratic quality and regulatory oversight."[9]

The aim of this chapter is not to leverage the new distinction to offer a wholesale challenge to the foregoing explanations.[10] My goal is instead to offer a perspective on the causes of civil service reform that foregrounds the role of representational concerns—an overlooked factor that I will show to have been present in the minds of policymakers and media barons of the time. My more immediate task, however, is to build out this distinction in order to develop a vocabulary for a broader scope condition of the theory examined in later chapters: I focus on cases in which civil service reform is cudgeled rather than conceded. Recall that the organizing theory of this dissertation predicts that the introduction of civil service reform will undermine efforts at nation-building as privileged groups outstrip marginalize groups in securing government jobs, thus motivating resentment. In the case of conceded reforms, however, the dynamic is such that the comparatively marginalized have demanded the reforms—a pathway that forecloses a sense of resentment from emerging.

3.1 The United Kingdom and United States in Comparative Perspective

3.1.1 Conceded Reform in Britain

In Martin Shefter's telling, Britain's party system was established before its bureaucracy and it is this stylized sequential fact that putatively explains the extent to which patronage reined. Yet, Britain has witnessed successive systems of ordered administration since before the time of William the Conquerer in the 11th century. Before the Normans, "[t]he sheriff of each shire was appointed by the King and below the sheriff were various office holders such as the hundred-reeve and the geld (tax) collector."[11] These systems of administration had important consequences for the shape of the more modern bureaucracy in Britain that would later form, in which appointment to positions in the higher civil service was dependent on royal consent. This system had certain desirable properties from the perspective of governance, as it ensured that kings could select loyal agents. Many office seekers paid for their positions, as well, meaning that the system provided an upward flow of cash to kings and rulers who were often engaged in costly military campaigns.

Consistent with this model, one of the enduring features of the British system of administration through the late nineteenth century was the sale of public office, as long as buyers were from sufficiently elevated parentage. Tax collectors and customs agents typically purchased their posts in perpetuity, holding their office as if it were private property. The system thus incentivized excessive expropriation and limited office-holders to those with sufficient capital to purchase a post, meaning that, at least through the seventeenth century, administrators were invariably drawn

[9] Kuo (2018, 7).

[10] Indeed, the distinction between cudgeled and conceded reform is ultimately compatible with the arguments offers by Didi Kuo and Susan Stokes et al., all of whom emphasize the changing economic circumstances of the United Kingdom and the United States as decisive in motivating reform. The distinction here examines how the distribution of those economic resources across different social classes may have been influential in spurring reform.

[11] Coolican (2018, 7).

from the aristocratic class. The system continued well into the nineteenth century, during which time those looking to purchase a public office were occasionally so brazen as to post solicitations in prominent newspapers. One such advertisement in *The Times* in 1793 reads, "A Gentleman of Education and genteel family is ready to advance Two or Three Thousand Pounds, or more, to any Gentleman who has interest to procure him a Place of respectability, and an adequate income, in any of the Public Offices."[12]

Other forms of discretionary appointments prevailed, as well. Members of Parliament routinely held out public office to young men of aristocratic birth who would support their campaigns for elected office. Didi Kuo writes, for instance, "[a]n established system of "Old Corruption" in the eighteenth century allowed aristocrats to use their status as parliamentarians to deliver favors to friends and family; state offices and sinecures were often passed down within families."[13] An American envoy sent by President Hayes to describe the nature of the British spoils system as it may pertain to American reforms, remarked that during the 1820s and 1830s, "[p]atronage—that is, the right of selections for official places below heads of departments—was substantially in the hands of members of Parliament; and it was freely used for the purpose of gaining influence for themselves and making places for their favorites."[14]

This system had some notable deficiencies. As some positions were held in perpetuity, and often purchased at considerable upfront costs, holders of public office had incentives to engage in corrupt practices to capture rents from the population they were intended to serve. Relatedly, the selection mechanism was generally indiscriminate with respect to the underlying competence of the office-seeker, meaning that ineptitude in the halls of government often prevailed. One contemporaneous account reports that, "[i]t used to be by no means uncommon to have a fine, fashionably dressed young man introduced as the junior clerk. On trial he turns out fit for nothing... The public offices have been a resource for many an idle dissipated youth, with whom other occupations have been tried in vain."[15] The foregoing quote also gestures towards a third deficiency, which is that the mechanisms of recruitment into the civil services in Britain restricted entry to the aristocratic class, meaning other classes rarely saw their interests or voices represented in government service. According to one historical account, between 1880–1883, 7,991 out of a total of 13,888 surveyed government jobs were distributed to members of aristocratic families.[16]

The changing socioeconomic conditions during nineteenth century Britain had important ramifications for the tenability of the patronage system.[17] First and foremost, the industrial revolution created a multitude of new problems of governance, particularly relating to the regulation and taxation of new technologies and industries. But the industrial revolution also heralded the long death of the "old society" in which aristocratic landowners oversaw a semi-feudal model of tenancy across Britain's rural countryside. New technologies replaced the need for large numbers of laborers and staff at estates, sending them searching for work in burgeoning urban centers. This consequent rapid urbanization of Britain created other new governance problems—poverty,

[12]Cited in Coolican (2018, 25).
[13]Kuo (2018, 93).
[14]Eaton (1880, 145).
[15]Eaton (cited in 1880).
[16]Gwyn (1962).
[17]For an excellent review of the changing circumstances during the "long" nineteenth century, see Hobsbawm (2010*a*).

crime, destitution—that called for new solutions. These complex problems were often left unaddressed by the incompetent and tradition-bound bureaucrats who chiefly hailed from aloof and aristocratic backgrounds. Leading the charge, instead, were the so-called liberal Benthamites, who championed the abandonment of the patronage system and its replacement with the merit system. These reformers were interested in installing competent and technocratic administrators in government to see through their radical designs for alleviating the suffering of Britain's rapidly urbanizing population.[18] In other words, one of the key constituencies advocating for civil service reform were liberals interested in concerns over efficiency and government modernization.

Another important consequence of the changing circumstances in nineteenth century was the ascendancy of a new class of capitalist bourgeoisie. This group chafed against the aristocratic model of recruitment into the British civil service, from which they were largely locked out from sharing in representation despite their growing influence in matters of business. In describing this constituency's push for civil service reform, Dorman Eaton writes of the "independent, thoughtful portion of the people, who held it to be as unjust as it was demoralizing for members of parliament and other officers to monopolize the privilege of saying who might enter the public service."[19] In commenting on the possibility of reforming the recruitment into the British civil service, an enraged op-ed author writes in *Portsmouth Telegraph*, "it is bad enough if men are advanced without any merit save connection with the great; it may be considered an unfair advantage that the wealthy and powerful should add to their means and influence at the expense of the nation; but it becomes unbearable when this very connection is deemed by the person benefitted a ground for greater privilege than those allowed to his fellows, and aristocratic nomination is an excuse for neglected duties and a supercilious demeanor."[20]

In defending the patronage system, advocates typically turned to one of two defenses—both of which hinged on the prevailing aristocratic composition of the civil services as a virtue rather than a blemish. First, advocates charged that patronage linked elected governments and their agents in tight lockstep, such that agents were liable to carry out the government's intentions more faithfully. One op-ed published in *The Times* from March 17, 1854, writes, "[a]s long as England is governed as it is now, by men who know that they are responsible to the country for any defects in the service under their immediate control, the country can only be benefited if greater pledges are required."[21] A second line of defense held that men of aristocratic parentage were unique in their public-spiritedness and thus better positioned to faithfully execute the duties of their office on behalf of the people of Britain. An illustrative op-ed wondered aloud of the chaos that would ensue from replacing the closed-door patronage system with an open-door examination system: "[w]hat if the number of annual candidates...should turn out to be two hundred thousand, when every free-born Briton shall have an inherent right to be tested as to his capability for discharging the office of a post-office letter carrier, or filling a treasury clerkship? How shall we, then, shut the portal which has been so widely opened?"[22]

The tenor of these debates left many apathetic. One op-ed in *The Times* from April 24, 1854, written under a pseudonym, writes of the proposed reforms to recruitment in the civil service, "[i]t is assailed, on the one hand, because it would deprive the service of its aristocratic character;

[18]Lowe (2011, 32).
[19]Eaton (1880, 157).
[20]"Reforms in the Civil Service," *Portsmouth Herald.* February 11, 1854.
[21]"The Organization of The Civil Service," *The Times.* March 17, 1854.
[22]"The Civil Service 'Job,"' *The Daily News.* April 13, 1854.

on the other, because it would give an undue preference to an aristocratic education. We are told that it would deprive the Government of the necessary political patronage, and yet that that patronage is solely directed with a view to merit."[23]

The expansion of the franchise across Britain played a decisive role in changing the incentives of MPs in defending the system of discretionary appointments. As growing numbers of enfranchised voters found themselves out from under the thumb of aristocratic tenancy, and an expanding class of urban bourgeoisie sought to see its desired liberalizing reforms through to law, defenders of the system of discretionary recruitment were in an untenable electoral position. Reform-minded politicians, including those from the Conservative Party that stood to lose the most, such as Robert Peel, initially, but chiefly liberals such as William Gladstone, understood the shifting situation. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was ultimately William Gladstone who commissioned Charles Trevelyan and Stafford Northcote to undertake what would become known as the Northcote-Trevelyan report, which advocated for the use of impersonal, competitive examinations in the selection of civil servants. When it was presented in 1853, the committee recommended in 1855 for its partial adoption. For each position there would be a competitive examination, but test-takers would have to be nominated by department heads before they could sit for the exam, thus perpetuating a system of discretion temporarily. Eventually, under continued public pressure, open examinations were finally and widely established in 1870.

The introduction of competitive examinations in the selection of civil servants was ultimately a concession: from the aristocratic class that relinquished some of its authority—to an ascendant urban bourgeoisie; to liberal-minded reformers; and to increasingly powerful business-groups frustrated with incompetence in governance. On its face, the conceded nature of reform should be evident from the foregoing discussion. Yet, recent historical work has revealed the duplicitous nature of the reforms as they intended to continue to benefit members of the upper classes—a revisionist interpretation that only further confirms the concessionary position of the aristocratic classes. In other words, the true intent of examinations was never to "democratize" the civil service. In an instructive letter from William Gladstone, the liberal reformer, he admitted the predominantly aristocratic graduates of the prestigious public school Eaton would carry the day on examinations.[24] This quote is particularly important, because it reveals that the meritocratic reforms of the mid-nineteenth century were really an attempt to concede power to the growing urban bourgeoisie—whose children could afford to attend expensive public schools—but not to the lower classes, who were increasingly literate but poorly educated. One historian observes that, in introducing meritocratic recruitment for the Indian Civil Service, that it was to "be opened to gentlemen who had inherited breeding and culture, and to those of the middle class who had made themselves gentlemen by acquiring the same breeding and culture."[25] In reviewing the 514 recruits from the Indian Civil Service between 1896–1900, Lawrence Lowell, in *The Government of England*, reports that "262 had studied at Oxford and 143 at Cambridge."[26] In other words, far from democratizing the civil service, the new system of examinations—with its inclusion of irrelevant materials such as high-level mathematics—closed the door to enterprising ambitious youth.

Although these reforms satisfied those classes agitated under the patronage system—the as-

[23] "The Organization of The Civil Service," *The Times*. April 24, 1854.
[24] Hughes (1942).
[25] Chapman (1970, 39).
[26] Lowell (1909).

cendant urban bourgeoisie and the efficiency-oriented Benthamites—it also did not fully disenfranchise the aristocratic classes from representation in the civil service. It was a concession to maintain at least a toehold in power. Alfred Trevelyan, whose surname is imprinted on the famed Northcote-Trevelyan report advocating for the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants, surreptitiously anticipated that his proposed reforms would nonetheless continue to benefit the aristocratic classes. In private correspondence with Gladstone, Trevelayan wrote, "The the tendency of [the report] will, I am confident, be distinctly aristocratic, but it will be so in a good sense by securing for the public office those who are, in a true sense, worthy."[27] One op-ed author, in defending the new system of examinations, offers the revealing conciliation to his aristocratic detractors, writing that open examinations will nonetheless enable the success of the upper classes: "[t]he experience of persons engaged in education proves that the most studios young men are also generally the best conducted... A young man who habitually acts upon the principle of preferring the future to the present, gives promise of good fruit in after life."[28]

What does the British case reveal about the ways in which civil service reform is achieved? In an abstract sense, civil service reform was achieved as a concession to an ascendant social class—in this case comprised of several different constituencies. Indeed, the aristocratic class would have certainly preferred to have seen the system of discretionary recruitment maintained. Nonetheless, the aristocratic class saw the introduction of examination-based recruitment as a tolerable concession, believing they would still fare well in the competition for government jobs. Similar processes can be observed elsewhere—particularly across Western Europe, as in France and Germany. The nature of contestation for civil service reform here also has important theoretical implications for its broader consequences for nation-building. Civil service reform here appears as a democratizing institution, one that brings greater representation into the folds of government, thus likely promoting, rather than undermining, efforts at building a sense of horizontal camaraderie.

3.1.2 Cudgeled Reform in the United States

According to most historical accounts, recruitment into public service during the early days of the United States was characterized by President Washington's abiding commitment to identifying men of character and competence to staff the organs of the fledgling government. As scholars have pointed out, however, the precise mechanism of appointment was ultimately discretionary and thus recruitment tended towards those with whom Washington shared political inclinations (i.e., Federalists and a commitment to the Constitution). In the United States, as in Britain, the discretionary appointment of public servants was thus the standard practice. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, John Adams wielded this discretion with more excitement than his predecessor, famously filling the ranks of the federal bureaucracy with Federalists on the eve of Thomas Jefferson's inauguration as president in 1801 with the "midnight appointments." Despite his supposed reticence to the partisan appointment of government officials, it was then Jefferson who found himself forced to wield his discretionary authority of appointment and removal, firing dozens of appointees on the basis of their political views, lest his presidency be completely hamstrung by infighting.

The nature of appointment into the civil service in the early days of the American republic

[27] Coolican (cited in 2018, 98).
[28] "Civil Service Reform and The Letters of An Ex-Official," *The Northampton Mercury. April 8, 1854.*

was thus discretionary. Presidents turned to their peers—white, land-owning men—who also comprised the electorate of the time. And it was this fact that meant that the composition of the bureaucracy was what Van Riper describes as "semi-aristocratic."[29] However, the "mere fact of semi-aristocracy did not alone determine the traditions of the public service... The nature of the morality and conscience of many of these men of substance, as reflected in public affairs, must be considered," writes Van Riper. On the whole, then, the discretionary appointment of civil servants during the earlier years of the American republic yielded similar representational effects to those witnessed in Britain. In John Adams' view, this was a cause for celebration, as social status and merit were intertwined: "[Adams] wanted talent to be the only criterion for appointment. But he defined talent primarily in terms of a college education and he realized that education was the privilege of those who could afford it," observes one account.[30]

Predictably, the system generated significant resentment on the part of the broader public, just as similar dynamics also prevailed in Britain. Van Riper writes,

> [i]n public service, after forty years, the bureaucracy of the Founding Fathers was troubled with superannuation and with a developing concept of at least a moral property right in federal office. In a number of cases families had maintained themselves from father to son in the civil service... These developments, coupled with widespread resentment at the monopolizing of public office by representatives of the upper classes, provided a real basis for a rising crescendo of democratic complaint.[31]

It was against this backdrop that Andrew Jackson ascended to the presidency in 1829, brought about, in part, by the expansion of suffrage to non-property holding white men. Jackson took direct aim at the semi-aristocratic character of the patronage appointments in the civil service. But instead of advocating for an alternative to the patronage system—say, the merit system—Jackson subverted the spoils system to his advantage, removing public servants of upper-class backgrounds and replacing them with men of humbler origins. His defense of this arrangement was distinctly democratic: "[i]n a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another."[32] But Jackson's logic of public office was subtler that simple class warfare; instead, his view relied on a conception of the tasks of public office as inherently simple, such that any reasonably competent individual could faithfully execute the duties.[33]

The changes brought about by Jackson's democratizing subversion of patronage were large. In analyzing the social origins of cabinet-level appointments under the Adams, Jefferson, and Jackson administrations, Aronson finds a considerable drop in the share of appointments whose fathers held professional occupations and an uptick among those whose parentage was humbler. For instance, Aronson finds that only 12% of appointments under Adams had fathers who were farmers, while this figure nearly doubled to 22.4% under the Jackson presidency, despite

[29] Van Riper (1976).
[30] Aronson (1946, 3).
[31] Van Riper (1976, 33).
[32] Van Riper (1976, 37).
[33] It was for this reason that Martin Van Buren, on of Jackson's core advisors, and later president, argued that it was not important for prospective officeholders to "shine in the composition of essays on abstract and abstruse subjects," but that they instead be "practical, intelligent, and efficient men" Aronson (1946, 15).

countervailing shifts in the composition of the American economy over the twenty-five year interregnum.[34]

Not all observers were content with the notion of democratizing the civil service, as Jackson intended, however. One newspaper article from the 1829, writes, "Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were all elected 'by the people;' the first dispensed his patronage on the avowed principle of preferring the friends of his administration, and excluding his enemies. His conduct was approved, and who will impeach his integrity?—Mr. Madison followed his example, and his administration has been lauded by the whole nation."[35] As the size of the federal government grew in scale, the task of staffing government jobs anew for each administration became a time-consuming endeavor. On the day of Jackson's second inauguration, instance, a reported 30,000 office-seekers swarmed to the Washington D.C. to press their cases for public office. Daniel Webster reportedly wrote to his sister, commenting on the "monstrous crowd of people in the city," nearly all of whom had travelled from great distances, but the class origins of which were in general humble.[36]

The operation of the so-called spoils system in lower levels of governments, particularly municipalities, is legendary, with scholarly and popular accounts focusing on the role of urban political "machines." The standard history, widely recounted in popular textbooks, starts with the changing demographic composition of urban centers in late nineteenth century America. Until that time, U.S. cities were comprised of—and controlled by—a semi-aristocratic class of white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants. But as cities became comprised of larger and larger shares of foreign-born whites—from Ireland, Italy, Germany, etc—politicians quickly came to see these groups as potent political constituencies. To capture their votes, politicians used government jobs as inducements to members of these foreign-born communities in exchange for their electoral support at the ballot box. At the helm of the municipal spoils system in nineteenth century U.S. cities were the "bosses" that controlled these so-called political machines. Erie characterizes the bosses, writing, "[s]eizing control of the public till, the bosses allegedly filled their own pockets, bloated the municipal bureaucracy with party spoilsmen, and bribed venal immigrant voters...Reformers singled out the Irish Democratic bosses as the worst offenders."[37]

Here, again, just as with Jacksonian patronage, the spoils system in the municipal level of government is often thought of as a democratizing apparatus. It is worth emphasizing the two factors that allowed immigrant communities to capture government jobs at particularly high rates. For one, members of these groups were often singularly interested in economic prosperity and thus had few qualms about trading their vote for a job that would secure them a paycheck; indeed, the exceptional poverty of many recent Irish immigrants in particular is thought to have made these groups particularly susceptible to clientelistic exchange.[38] Moreover, particularly in large-cities, foreign-born whites constituted a large share of the population. Owing to the trust-boosting properties of co-ethnicity, communities of foreign-born whites were able to coordinate to exchange votes in bulk for wholesale employment—as through the widespread ethnic association groups of the era.[39]

Opponents of the use of patronage in the allocation of government jobs—at both federal and

[34] Aronson (1946, 58).
[35] *The Phenix Gazette*, November 06, 1829.
[36] Fish (1905, 110-111).
[37] Erie (1990, 271).
[38] Miller (1988).
[39] Emmons (1989, 5-7).

local levels—came principally from two camps. First, and perhaps most surprisingly, were the large number of elected officials who willingly sought to dismantle the system of discretionary appointments. The business of allocating government jobs had become the full-time role of elected officials, many of whom found the task tiresome and distracting from the business of designing and implementing policy. Indeed, it was President Chester Arthur who ultimately signed the Pendleton Act in 1883, in part as a result of his sheer frustration with the scale of the patronage operation (and despite his previous positions in which he benefited from the patronage of Roscoe Conkling).

The second camp of opponents were those who those had concerns about the representational consequences of the spoils system. Especially in local governments, these were white, native-born protestants who chafed against the growing representation of foreign-born constituencies in the halls of government. But similar dynamics can be observed at the federal level: the main champion for civil service reform among members of congress came from Thomas Allen Jenckes of Rhode Island, whom one historian describes as a "man of wealth and belonging to a family of much local consideration."[40] The legislation introduced by Jenckes in 1867 failed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 72 to 66, but was nonetheless an important forerunner to the Pendleton Act.

At the local level, it was the perceived representational strength of foreign-born whites in municipal governments that supposedly motivated those looking to introduce meritocratic mechanisms of recruitment. In a widely-used introductory textbook, the authors write, "[a]lthough ostensibly aimed at rooting out corruption and cleaning up electoral politics, progressive reforms also were designed to enhance the political clout of the 'right' kind of people—educated middle- and upper-middle-class folks like the reformers themselves—at the expense of poor urban immigrants of their leaders 'of slender social distinction."[41] One other account, argues "[reformers] believed that government should serve not the interests of the 'people,' but the 'right' people, respectable people—the middle and patrician classes—who would substitute business for political practices." In recent co-authored work with Alexander Sahn, we investigate whether the introduction of municipal-level civil service reforms had their intended effects, finding instead that it had democratizing effects in the modal American city—i.e., small and medium sized municipalities.

Yet, the modal nineteenth and twentieth century foreign-born white lived in one of the large municipalities—New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and so on. The cudgeled nature of civil service reform can be seen most clearly in these contexts, where foreign-born whites constituted a sufficiently large share of the population to wield their electoral strength towards the wholesale capture of government jobs. And yet these were also the places in which the moneyed interests of semi-aristocratic white Anglo-Saxon Protestants tended to congregate, which made quality of governance and representation in these places particularly acute.

Figure 3.3 shows the over- or under-representation of foreign-born whites in local government jobs in Cleveland, Chicago, and New York City. I look specifically at the distribution of blue collar jobs, as these were typically the purview of patronage appointments. These cities adopted civil service reforms in 1910, 1895, and 1898 respectively. The analysis normalizes the census-year observations to make trend-wise comparisons more tenable (e.g., 1920 in Cleveland

[40] Fish (1905, 211).
[41] Kernell et al. (2017).

Figure 3.3—Representation in Local Government in Three U.S. Cities, 1850-1940



Note: Representation data from the full count censuses (1850-1940), downloaded from IPUMS. Data on timing of civil service reform obtained from three surveys of American municipalities conducted in 1937, 1940, and 1943 by the U.S. Civil Service Assembly. The y-axis is a constructed variable, which is the share of blue-collar government jobs held by foreign born whites less their share of the total population in a given census decade.

and 1910 in New York City are treated as "+1" decade since reform). Two features of Figure 3.3 are worth emphasizing. In all three cities, foreign-born whites were underrepresented in government jobs, relative to their share of the population, four and five decades before civil service reform; importantly, and consistent with the discussion presented above, foreign-born whites saw their representational position steadily increase under the spoils system. Second, and also consistent with the discussion outlined above, the over-representation of foreign-born whites in government jobs, relative to their share of the broader population, peaked on or around the moment civil service reform was introduced, steadily declining thereafter.

This figure presents evidence that is of course correlational. Any straightforward inference of the effect of civil service reform on representation is likely confounded by other time- and location-specific factors. But it nonetheless constitutes suggestive and circumstantial evidence that is consistent with the broader argument I have developed in this chapter. And importantly, it finds support from existing qualitative evidence. For instance, opponents of civil service reform immediately understood how it was intended to achieve representational effects. During the floor

debate over the Pendleton Act, for instance, Senator Brown argued:

> "Under our republican system no man takes anything by hereditary right, but the way is open to the son of the humblest peasant within the brad limits of our domain... It is compatible with that system to leave the changes in the legislative department, in the executive department, and in every department except the judicial to the frequent mutations of parties and to the supposed merits of the competitors who compete for the prizes.... [civil service reform] is one step in the direction of the establishment of an aristocracy in this country, the establishment of another privileged class.[42]

In other words, one important challenge to civil service reform was its perceived representational effects. In local governments, this meant the dislodging of foreign-born whites from their positions in public office. At the federal level, the population-to-lose was organized along more diffuse class-based lines.

What does the U.S. case reveal about civil service reform, particularly in comparison to the experience of the U.K.? The first important distinction between the two cases is that in the U.S., in contrast to the experience of the U.K., the discretionary appointment to public offices was often a democratizing force rather than an elitist one. Starting with Andrew Jackson, across federal and local levels of government, politicians used patronage to bring a diversity of individuals into public service. This, in turn, set the stage for civil service reform. Here, as in the U.K., reformers in the U.S. surreptitiously veiled their language in a vocabulary of race-neutral concerns over "good governance," knowing full well that certain groups stood to benefit from recruitment via examinations. This is precisely the logic of cudgeled civil service reform. Indeed, in many large cities, following the introduction of civil service reforms, the share of foreign-born whites holding government jobs declined precipitously. Recent research shows that these trends in underrepresentation for marginalized groups in U.S. municipal governments has continued to this day.

3.2 Cudgeled Reform in Southeast Asia

For expository purposes, the foregoing discussion has centered on two cases—civil service reform in the United States and the United Kingdom. The taxonomy developed with reference to these two settings applies to the cases considered in the later empirical chapters, specifically Indonesia. Again, recall that the theory proposed in Chapter 2 revolves around the ways in which the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants creates representational imbalances in the composition of bureaucrats, which, in turn, motivates impactful forms of resentment on the part of individual citizens and would-be applicants to the civil service who failed the selection. It seems likely that these results obtain to varying extents across contexts in which reform was either cudgeled or conceded. Indeed, where reform is conceded, and where the concession is granted to previously-marginalized groups, more citizens will find their identities increasingly represented in government, thus curbing any potentially negative effects of reform with respect to nation-building. However, where reform is cudgeled and intended to further marginalize certain groups, these constituencies will become increasingly resentful of the dominant groups—thus contributing to the broader hypothesized effects of civil service reform on the prospects of nation-building.

[42] *Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, Session 2, p. 477.

How does Indonesia—the main empirical case evaluated in later chapters—fit into this schema? The modern administrative architecture of Indonesia dates back to the era of Dutch colonization. As I discuss in Chapter 5, the recruitment of public servants during the colonial era in Indonesia was a prominent concern.[43] The Dutch were mainly concerned with achieving the complacency of the subjugated population, a principle known as "peace and quiet" (*ruste en orde*). Administrative practice was central to the achievement of this goal. The Dutch thus created two parallel bureaucracies, neither of which were meritocratic in recruitment. The first branch was staffed by Europeans, and the other was staffed by the indigenous population. Although the European civil service interacted with the native civil service, the former had very little contact with the local population. The native civil service was led by heredity rulers (e.g., bupatis or rajas), who governed their respective populations. The Dutch were sensitive to principles of ethnic self-rule. Following the dissolution of the Banten Sultanate in 1811, for example, the Dutch attempted to create a new hereditary lineage of rulers, drawing on elite from neighboring Sunda. The population rebelled, according to one historical account: "there was general insistence that the bupati be, firstly, Bantenese."[44]

Over time, this arrangement became the target of early twentieth century nationalist leaders in Indonesia, particularly from members of the lesser nobility. Members of this group of lesser nobles resented the extractive demands of their co-opted hereditary rulers who had been elevated to positions of authority in the Dutch administrative civil service. Leslie Palmier writes, that "the intellectuals in the nationalist movement [members of the lesser nobility], opposed the established groups in the nobility: i.e., the European government officials and the regents (bupatis or rajas)."[45]

Yet following independence, the fledgling Indonesian state adopted administrative practices largely in line with what the Dutch had implemented. The motivation for maintaining ethnically homogenous administrative enclaves was borne out of concerns over separatism. Although the inclusive character of the nationalist movement became enshrined in Pancasila, the country's pluralistic founding ideology, many regions witnessed considerable separatist violence. Under Sukarno, national ministries were parceled out to different ethnic and religious constituencies—the civil service administration, to this day, contains an overrepresentation of ethnic Batak, for instance.

After Suharto's rise to power in 1965, policymakers became preoccupied with the difficult task of deepening mass-based attachment to this inclusive national identity. The New Order (1966–1998) was particularly active in carrying out schemes to achieve this goal. One such program (*transmigrasi*) resettled two million Javanese to outlying provinces, with the hopes of stoking interethnic contact and, in turn, a commitment to Indonesia's national identity. One other such strategy involved bringing more and more Indonesians onto the government payroll. The scale of public sector during the New Order was thus massive.[46] In 1994 there were 3,965,778 civil servants, for example.[47] Given the influence of public servants, and given the New Order's interest in maintaining social cohesion, higher-ups were careful to maintain equal rates of religious and ethnic representation in bureaucratic posts. A government report even indicated the

[43]Steinberg, Roff and Chandler (1971, 198-210).
[44]Sutherland (1973, 120).
[45]Palmier (1960, 210).
[46]**?**.
[47]Logsdon (1998).

continuation of hereditary hiring practices in Indonesia's civil service as late as 1993: "it often happened that a civil servant who had died still received wages because his duties and position were filled by his child."[48]

With the return of democratic elections in 1999, however Indonesia witnessed a period of dramatic institutional change. Among the reforms was a series of national laws ending practices of patronage in the recruitment of civil servants. Despite these good intentions, reform proved difficult to adopt in practice. Until recently, for instance, applicants to the civil service in Indonesia sat for paper based exams in large stadiums with thousands of other applicants. Complaints of manipulated scores were widespread. Instances of test "jockeying"—paying someone else to surreptitiously sit for the civil service exam on one's behalf—were often reported in the popular press. One study found that applicants often paid administrators to boost their scores.[49] Under these circumstances, examination failure was likely interpreted by applicants as uncorrelated with their underlying capabilities—a possibility that forecloses any effort to estimate the distinct sting of disappointment associated with true examination failure.

Under pressure from then-Vice President Boediono, the civil service agency (BKN) began drafting plans for the implementation of a properly meritocratic recruitment system in the decade following democratization. Starting in 2008, the BKN rolled out the computer assisted test (CAT) for its own internal recruitment of applicants. The response was generally positive, and complaints of outright corruption were reported to have mostly stopped. The system was rolled out on a national scale in 2014, with variation in regional compliance. The system was finally implemented on a totally national scale for the first time during the 2018–2019 cycle. There were significant protests from local and provincial governments, who rightly saw the implementation of the new recruitment procedures as impinging on their possibilities for rent-seeking. The Ministry of Finance, under the leadership of reform-minded Sri Mulyani, threatened to withhold fiscal transfers to noncompliant districts, with the effect of total capitulation.

The CAT is centrally-implemented and mechanistically-graded and is widely believed to have effectively rooted out foul-play in the recruitment process.[50] The newly-implemented system contained five phases:

1. **Job search:** Applicants search for job openings on the online database. The location, title, requirements, and number of vacancies for positions are listed in a searchable database.

2. **Administrative selection:** Applicants apply for a single position by submitting their documents for a review of completeness (e.g., transcript, diploma, birth certificate, etc) through an online portal. Successful applicants were invited to participate in the next phase—the "basic competency test."

3. **Basic competency test:** The basic competency test takes 90 minutes and involves three sections: (1) a general intelligence test, (2) a personality test, and (3) a nationality test. The total components add up to a maximum score of 500. A nationwide threshold was set at 255. Applicants were immediately notified of their score upon completion of the test. Applicants above the threshold were then ranked in descending fashion, with the top

[48] Logsdon (1998, 5).
[49] Kristiansen and Ramli (2006).
[50] Beschel et al. (2018).

three scoring applicants invited to continue to the fourth phase—the "specialist competency test."[51]

4. **Specialist competency test:** The specialist competency test measures applicants' preparedness for the specific tasks of the position to which they are applying. For 100% of district and provincial positions, as well as the vast majority (although not all) of positions, this test is also carried out as a computer-assisted system.[52]

5. **Score integration and selection:** After specialist competency test, the scores on the two tests are integrated—the basic test weighted at 40% and the specialist test weighted at 60%. Applicants are then ranked in descending order, with the top score selected for the vacant position.

Initially rolled out in 2008 for internal recruitment of candidates at the civil service agency, applicants continued to complain that the scoring of the exam under the CAT system was still opaque. The numbers could have been manipulated by a computer administrator after the fact, for instance. Further reforms have mitigated these concerns. During the 2018–2019 cycle, on the day of the test, applicants' families were for the first time assembled in an adjacent room while the test was live-streamed on a scoreboard with applicants' scores (and thus relative positions) updated as they answer each individual question correctly or incorrectly. This gladiatorial approach to civil servant selection appears to have been effective in totally curbing score falsification.

Although the use of examinations in the recruitment of civil servants has rooted out concerns of corruption, it has created a new class of representational concerns. The world's fourth most populous country, Indonesia harbors at least three important axes of group-based privilege which serve as the engine of uneven rates of success on examinations. The organizing axis of privilege in Indonesia is inter-island, with the historically-dominant residents of Java controlling a disproportionate stake of industry and government. A second important cleavage is a localized form of nativism: many Indonesians seek out employment in districts beyond their own, a dynamic that heightens the salience of slight differences as migrants and natives of the same island compete for scarce opportunities, often in regional capitals. A final third cleavage is religious. By law, all Indonesians must profess a religion, with 88% adhering to Islam and the remaining 12% belonging to minorities of Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus. Historically, religion has been a major source of conflict in Indonesia, with members of minority religious sects having been occasionally targeted in pogroms, and are often the object of stigma and abuse.

In general, these cleavages dovetail with economic advantages. For instance, according to the 2014 Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), district outsiders make more 61.2% more than their locally native counterparts. Similarly, Indonesians who reside on Java earn 30.8% more than their peers on outer islands. According to the same data, interestingly, Muslim Indonesians earn 2.8% less than non-Muslims, a disadvantage that is likely outweighed by Muslims' sheer demographic dominance. Nonetheless, taking these ingredients together, privileged groups—residents of Java, district outsiders, and Muslims—have generally outstripped their counterparts on civil service examinations. Looking specifically at the score on the general screening examination, on average,

[51] In the event of multiple vacancies for positions, a proportional number of applicants were invited to continue. For instance, if there were two vacancies, the top six scorers on the basic competency test would continue.

[52] Aspiring diplomats, for instance, must write an essay in a foreign language, which necessarily cannot be graded by a computerized system.

applicants from districts on Java score 27 points higher than applicants from outer-islands. Similarly, applicants who apply for positions in districts in which they do not reside score 15 points higher than local natives. Finally, Muslim applicants score 7 points higher than their non-Muslim peers.

Success on civil service examinations is largely a function of one's preparation—both in terms of early-childhood education, and specifically for the exam itself. In places with high levels of group-based inequality, such as Indonesia, privileged groups will outperform marginalized groups on exams for these reasons. Moreover, the actual content of civil service exams can benefit one group over another. One third of the points on the Indonesian civil service exam, for example, are derived from a section known as a "National Character Test," in which applicants are asked questions about general Indonesian history and culture. These questions often privilege applicants from Java. One question in 2017, for example, asked applicants about the religious beliefs of the historical Majapahit empire—a fifteenth century Javanese kingdom. As can be seen in Figure 3.4 geographical distribution of failed civil service examinations in 2019 reflects these observations, with fewer applicants failing on Java than elsewhere in eastern, more marginalized parts of the archipelago.

Figure 3.4—Geographical Distribution of Failed Civil Service Examinations, Indonesia, 2019



Note: Darker-shaded regions are those in which a greater share of the applicants failed the basic competency test during the 2018-2019 cycle. Applicants from Papua are excluded because at the time of data collection they had not resolved conflicts over the nomination of civil servants.

In sum, one consequence of this new system is that it enables applicants from privileged backgrounds to outstrip the competition and obtain coveted government jobs at disproportionately

high rates. Across the board, applicants from Indonesia's largest island (Java) as well as members of its most numerous faith (Islam) report higher scores than their counterparts.

There is some evidence that these dynamics have introduced strategic considerations in the recruitment process, as applicants from privileged groups seek out employment in places where they perceive their competition to be weaker and chances of success to be higher. The new system has thus also brought regional disparities to the fore. Consider, for instance, that 44% of applicants in 2018–2019 sought out employment in jurisdictions different from their place of residence. Tenure as a civil servant takes effect after one year. And tenured civil servants can request a transfer after three years in their initial posting. In order to obtain a toe-hold in the civil service, privileged applicants often seek out employment in poor districts where they perceive their competition to be weaker and chances of success to be higher. Acknowledging this dynamic, the head of the Indonesian civil service agency indicated that it was simply the price to be paid for human capital development:

> "...so the bright kids from Java apply to those areas where they will be competitive, like Kalimantan or Papua. And after two to three years they request a transfer and go back to Java. The question is how to keep them there longer...In Papua, the locals reject, sometimes fiercely, people from outside. But unfortunately they don't have the skills to fill the roles."

Consistent with this understanding, Figure 3.5 shows the percentage of incoming cohorts to the Indonesian civil service that were hired in the district or province in which they were born. Throughout the New Order, the percentage of incoming cohorts of civil servants that working in districts other than ones in which they were born was stable around 60%, with a similarly stable trend observed in the provincial civil services around 25%. In other words, the figures show that these percentages remained stable during the New Order, perhaps owing the government's discretionary authority to manage representational concerns and artificially engineer intergroup contact. As this authority waned under democratization, the percentage of local government jobs—in either districts or provinces—going to local outsiders steadily decreased, likely reflecting the electoral considerations of the new arrangement in which politicians wielded discretionary recruitment to entice voters.

Indonesia began rolling out the meritocratic selection of civil servants in 2008. Figure 3.5 is particularly striking in revealing the uptick in the percentage of district and provincial outsiders being hired in cohorts following the piecemeal introduction of meritocratic recruitment in the civil services in Indonesia. Looking at the share of provincial outsiders getting jobs in the provincial civil services, the figure dipped to its lowest levels in the year before meritocratic reforms (2007) at 17% of the incoming cohort. In the five years afterwards, the share of incoming cohorts comprised of outsiders spiked to 55% in 2014. Similar trends can be seen in district-level governance, with shares of outsiders comprising incoming cohorts of civil servants falling to their lowest levels in the year before civil service reforms were introduced and spiking in the aftermath.

How should we think about Indonesia's path to the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants? The descriptive statistics presented above suggest that the reforms to the manner in which civil servants are recruited have distinct representational consequences—with certain groups outperforming others (i.e., Javanese, outsiders). Importantly, these are groups that, at least in Indonesia,

Figure 3.5—Trends in Representation of Outsiders, Indonesia, 1980-2016



Note: Figures show the composition of incoming cohorts of the Indonesian civil service, according to whether or not they were hired to work in their district (left) or province (right) of birth. The observations from 2004 are excluded, as recruitment was anomalous owing to decentralization reforms. The red line demarcates 2007-2008, when certain Indonesian ministries began implementing the computer-assisted test that effectively introduced meritocratic recruitment of civil servants. The blue line in 1999 indicates democratization.

tend to be *a priori* privileged. These observations are thus consistent with an interpretation of Indonesia's path to civil service reform as a cudgeled one. The above-mentioned quote from the Indonesian civil service agency confirms this interpretation, as he suggested that marginalized groups would likely lose out in the tournament for government jobs.

Chapter 4

Explaining The Heightened Demand for Government Jobs

On an afternoon in October 2020, hundreds of protesters assembled outside the local branch of the civil service agency in Keerom—a district in the province of Papua.[1] The assembled individuals were all failed applicants to the civil service. Chief among their grievances was the implementation of an incorruptible computer-based civil service examination. This system, the protesters alleged, was accelerating the arrival of privileged outsiders in search of stable public sector employment. Applicants from points elsewhere viewed the competition in the historically-marginalized province of Papua as weak. By taking the civil service exam in Papua, privileged outsiders, predominantly from Java, stood a better chance of securing a toehold in the civil service from which they could later petition for a transfer to a more desirable location. By the end of the evening, tensions between the protesters and the local police eventually boiled over and the local branch of the civil service was set ablaze.

Although isolated, this event was not unique: the history of lower- and middle-income countries is littered with accounts of aggrieved would-be civil servants turning to extrajudicial means of redress when their ambitions are thwarted. In late 2017, for instance, a group of young men in Kano, Nigeria stormed the location in which civil servant interviews were being conducted, as they alleged that the process had intentionally excluded applicants of humble backgrounds. "I want to call on President Muhammadu Buhari to halt this glaring injustice against less-privileged Nigerians by making it open to all qualified candidates," said the leader of the protests.[2] These frustrations are not new, either: one recent historical account describes incidents from the Qing Dynasty in China in which municipal governments "were overthrown by unreformed examination failures who turned to violence."[3]

These events prompt an important but generally overlooked question: why do the individuals described in these events care *so much* about getting a government job? The lurking explanation held by most scholars is pecuniary: the intense demand for government jobs is a function of the public sector wage premium. In most lower- and middle-income countries, this explanation contends, government employees earn significantly more than their peers in the private sector, a

[1] "Tak Terima Pengumuman Hasil CPNS, Massa di Papua Mengamuk dan Serang Polsek hingga Bakar Kantor Dina," *Tribun News*. 2 October 2020.
[2] "Protest rocks NPA recruitment in Kano," *Vanguard Media Limited*. November 10, 2017.
[3] Elman (2013).

feature that undoubtedly boosts demand for government jobs.[4] But it would be surprising if this feature alone were driving the actions of the individuals in the events described above. In most countries, the public sector wage premium does not exceed 20%—a sizable sum, but probably not large enough to motivate insurrection.

In this chapter, I develop a fuller picture of the puzzlingly intense demand for government jobs across lower- and middle-income countries. In doing so, I acknowledge the existence of a substantial public sector wage premium in Indonesia. But I argue that, in addition to a wage premium, applicants to the civil service are often also chasing the status and prestige that flow from public sector employment.[5] Importantly for the argument I wish to advance in later chapters, this intangible benefit means that the stakes over who gets a government job are both high and indivisible, features that in turn set the stage for serious grievances when aspirants' ambitions are thwarted.

The evidence for this chapter draws upon administrative data, a large-scale survey of applicants to the Indonesian civil service, and a series of online survey experiments also conducted in Indonesia. In the first part of this chapter, I draw on administrative data on civil service examination scores paired with original survey responses gauging respondents' monthly wages to estimate the public sector wage premium for entry-level employees. Consistent with the existing literature, I show that, on average, compared to applicants who were narrowly rejected, applicants who were narrowly hired earn approximately 28% more each month. Yet the inference that this public sector wage premium is driving the observed demand for public sector jobs in Indonesia is dogged by a second and supplemental subnational analysis in which, looking at district-level variation, I show that the ratio of applicants to local government jobs is uncorrelated with the local-level public sector wage premium, suggesting that the wage premium may not be motivating a heightened demand for public sector work.

In the second part of this chapter, I present experimental evidence interrogating the ecological inferences drawn from the subnational analyses. Here, I challenge a crucial empirical expectation of the pecuniary theory of recruitment: that demand for public sector jobs ought to be highly elastic with respect to the public sector wage premium. To evaluate this empirical implication, I conceptualize the decision to accept public sector employment in the context of its implied tradeoff of forgone private sector employment. This approach imitates willingness to pay experiments, although in the reverse form—known as a willingness to accept experiment.[6] I am chiefly interested the rate at which willingness to accept a government job increases as the wage premium also increases. Under the strongest form of the pecuniary theory of recruitment, the relationship should be perfectly elastic, yielding a coefficient of 1. In the event, however, I find the demand for government jobs to be inelastic with respect to the wage premium, observing an elasticity coefficient of 0.37.

In the third part of the chapter, I turn my attention to evaluating the alternative explanations for the high demand for public sector jobs—focusing specifically on the role of status-seeking. Here, again, I rely on the same willingness-to-accept experiments, although my interest is now with non-pecuniary explanations. This approach compares the elasticity in the demand for government jobs across relevant conditions—status-seeking respondents or not, for instance—and

[4]Dal Bó, Finan and Rossi (2013); Finan, Olken and Pande (2017*b*); Gindling et al. (2020) and Tansel, Keskin and Ozdemir (2020).

[5]Perry and Hondeghem (2008); Thompson and Christensen (2018); Vandenabeele (2008).

[6]Green (1992).

draws inferences about the importance of these conditions based on the difference in elasticities. To investigate the importance of status considerations, prior to the willingness-to-accept experiments, I asked respondents about the importance of status in motivating individuals to seek out government jobs. In general, my approach compares the willingness-to-accept across respondents who say status was important versus those who say it was not, finding lower elasticities among the former.

This evidence sets the stage for the broader argument advanced in this dissertation. Recall that the theory predicts that applicants who are passed over for employment in the public sector will come to resent those that they believe to have been successful. The overwhelming demand for government jobs—as well as the intangible and indivisible benefits motivating the desire—means that the stakes over who gets a government job are high, which in turn sets the stage for the *depth* of grievances when aspirants' ambitions are thwarted.

4.1 The Public Sector Wage Premium

To estimate the public sector wage premium in Indonesia, I focus on the comparison between early-stage civil servants and their counterparts in the private sector. Specifically, I focus on the 2018–2019 recruitment cycle. In total, 3,636,262 individuals applied for 180,623 vacancies in the Indonesian civil service. Applicants apply to a single position and selection occurs *within* applicants for that specific job postings. Recruitment to the Indonesian civil service proceeds in two stages: (1) the general competency examination and then, conditional on having passed, (2) the specialist competency examination. There was a national minimum threshold on the general competency examination (255). The top-three scorers on the general competency exam for a job posting were invited to participate in the specialist competency exam.[7] The general competency examination is scored out of 500 points, while the specialist competency is scored out of 100 points. For the final selection, applicants' scores are integrated into a single metric between 0-100, with the general competency examination weighted at 40% and the specialist exam weighted at 60%. Applicants are then ranked in descending fashion, with the top scorers offered jobs.[8] The main estimation sample is restricted to applicants who had advanced to this final stage.

Isolating the public sector wage premium is confounded by several inferential difficulties. The most pressing issues relate to selection bias: the people who apply for government jobs are different from those that do not apply for such jobs along a host of unobserved characteristics. And it might be these unobserved characteristics that drive any observed differential between public and private sector wages. To work around this difficulty, I solicited wage data from *all* applicants who applied for civil service positions in 2018, which enables a comparison of public and private sector wages, conditional on cohort and selection into application.

A second inferential difficulty—omitted variable bias—arises at this stage, however. Conditional on applying for a job in the civil service, successful and unsuccessful applicants differ principally according to ability, a tendency that also likely drives differences in observed wages across public and private sector employees. To address this difficulty, I adopt a regression discontinuity framework and leverage the fact that employment decisions in the Indonesian civil

[7] This rule is proportional, however: if there are three jobs available in a single posting then the nine top scorers are invited to participate.

[8] This is of course also proportional. If there are multiple job postings, the same number of applicants receive offers. For instance, if there are three jobs, then the top three scorers receive offers and the fourth does not.

service are a deterministic function of an applicant's civil service exam score. Within a very narrow bandwidth around the threshold, I assert that any given applicant's disposition is as good as random. To define "narrow" I rely here on the method proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman for selecting a bandwidth, yielding a value of 2.1 percentage points around the threshold.[9]

For the main estimation, I fit the following model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{PASS}_i + f(X_i) + \epsilon_i \tag{4.1}$$

where Y_i is the monthly wage for applicant i and PASS_i is a binary variable indicating whether or not applicant i passed the exam. Meanwhile, X_i is the running variable, which is calculated at the individual level. For applicants who passed, X_i the distance between applicant i and the highest loser's score; for applicants who failed, X_i is the distance between applicant i's score and that of the lowest winner. Because securing employment as a civil servant is not perfectly predicted by the examination score, the main estimates instrument PASS_i with an indicator that takes a "1" in the event that $X_i > 0$ and a "0" otherwise. I estimate the models presented below using three specifications—first, second, and third order polynomials. My preferred specification is a first order polynomial, which I believe to be justified on a visual inspection of the data.

To collect the relevant data, I partnered with the Indonesian Civil Service Agency (BKN), which manages the recruitment process. The BKN therefore manages the database of applicants, which crucially contains information on the explanatory variable—applicants' scores on the civil service exam. The BKN database contains applicant email addresses, which were required to apply for a job. Starting in July 2020, I sent one-time survey requests to all 3,636,262 individuals who applied for civil service jobs during the 2018–2019 cycle. I obtained responses on work and income from 109,838 respondents.

Skeptics may wonder if the sample of respondents is an accurate portrait of the broader universe of applicants and, moreover, if the underlying demographic characteristics of those who narrowly passed and failed are truly comparable. In the appendix, I present several diagnostic tests to weigh these concerns. On the first count, the sample appears reassuringly similar to the broader population, although the share of respondents from Java is slightly higher among those who responded to the survey. On the second count, those that narrowly passed look statistically indistinguishable to those who failed except in terms of age, where winners are slightly older, likely owing to the tendency for employed older respondents to now be checking email when they otherwise would not have been. The difference is small in substantive terms, at any rate, with narrow winners being approximately three months older than narrow losers.

I present the point estimates for the effect of public sector employment on monthly income in Table 4.1. I include several specifications across three bandwidths, though my preferred approach is linear. Importantly for robustness, all estimates are positive and statistically significant. The benchmark estimate, presented in column (1), finds that narrowly winning public sector sector employment boosts monthly income by approximately 890,000 IDR (approx. US$61), as compared against narrow losers who went on to obtain private sector employment. The most conservative estimate is presented in column (6), which restricts the sample to observations within 1.05pp of an alternative disposition, and models the forcing variable as a quadratic. Here, I estimate the effect of public sector employment on monthly income at approximately 620,000 IDR—in this case, a

[9]Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).

22.1% increase over private sector peers. It is worth emphasizing that this is a considerable income in the Indonesian context, let alone for an entry level position for a recent college graduate.[10]

Table 4.1: Effect of Getting Civil Service Job on Monthly Income

	Outcome: Average Monthly Income (IDR, m)					
	$\hat{h}$			*h/2*		
Passed exam	0.89*	0.83*	0.80*	0.80*	0.78*	0.62*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Constant	2.61*	2.70*	2.72*	2.68*	2.71*	2.81*
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Order	1	2	3	1	2	3
Observations	6,249	6,249	6,249	3,493	3,493	3,493

Note: Coefficients from two-stage least squares regression. Robust standard errors calculated at the individual level. The outcome is a measured in millions of Indonesian rupiah (IDR).

To what extent does this public sector wage premium explain the scale of demand for government jobs in Indonesia? As discussed earlier, it may be the case that the overwhelming demand for government jobs is a function of the public sector wage premium. The evidence contained in this research offers an opportunity to ecologically examine the sensitivity of demand for government jobs according to the size of the public sector wage premium. Specifically, there is considerable regional variation in the scale of the public sector wage premium, chiefly owing to differences in the counterfactual private sector wages, since the bulk of public sector wages are set in national terms. Nonetheless, in theory, if the public sector wage premium is driving the demand for government jobs, in places where the public sector wage premium is higher—either because of depressed private sector wages or otherwise—one might expect to see a greater demand for government jobs.

[10] According to a December 2017 survey conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, for instance, 62.7% of respondents in Indonesia indicated that their monthly salaries were under 2 million IDR, considerably less than the average public sector wage estimated here of 3.5 million IDR.

Figure 4.1—Demand for Jobs is Inelastic w.r.t. Wage Premium



(a) Province (b) District

Note: Gray observations indicate non-statistically significant estimates of provincial level wage-premium. The left panel shows the provincial-level wage premia (inclusive of both district and provincial jobs); the right panel shows the district-level wage premia. Black line is the OLS line of best fit, the observations for which include both black and gray dots.

To evaluate this possibility, I construct a measure of demand for government jobs, which is the number of applicants in a province or a district divided by the number of available jobs. Greater values indicate greater demand for public sector jobs. The variation in these values is instructive: in places with a booming private sector—as in Jakarta and Surabaya—demand for government jobs is considerably lower than it is in places where government expenditures constitute a greater share of economic activity. I also compute the provincial- and district-level wage premiums, which subset the data according to the place of residence of the respondents. As this approach reduces statistical power, many estimates are not statistically significant, which I denote in Figure 4.1 with a grey point. In Figure 4.1, below, I plot these values against the provincial- and district-level public sector wage premium estimates obtained from the main analysis. Figure 4.1 includes an OLS regression line, which regresses a measure of demand for government jobs on the provincial- and district-level public sector wage premium.

The graphical presentation of the results indicate that, surprisingly, there is no appreciable relationship between citizens' desire for public sector work and the scale of the public sector wage premium, at both the provincial- and district-level of aggregation. The coefficients obtained from the regressions are instructive: I obtain coefficients of 0.22 ($p = 0.87$) and 0.17 ($p = 0.63$) for province- and district-level elasticities, respectively. This exploratory analysis calls for future research. My preferred hypothesis is that the inelasticity of demand for government jobs is attributable to the tendency for public sector employees to be held in high esteem, an intangible benefit of government employment which might draw large numbers of applicants who are comparatively uninterested in boosted wages—a possibility I interrogate in greater depth in the following pages.

4.2 The Elasticity of Demand for Government Jobs

The foregoing analyses indicate that the public sector wage premium is substantively large. Yet a subnational analysis leveraging variation in the scale of the public sector wage premium indicates that it may not be driving demand for government jobs. This subnational analysis is subject to common pitfalls associated with ecological inference, however: I am instead interested in estimating the sensitivity of *individuals'* willingness to accept a government job with respect to changes in the public sector wage premium.[11] In other words, I am interested in the wage premium elasticity, which, for the sake of brevity, I refer to as the *wage elasticity*. I understand this value be the rate at which willingness to accept a government job increases as the wage premium also increases. My preferred interpretation of wage elasticity is graphical—which is typified in Figure 4.2.[12] Here, the dotted line represents wage inelasticity, in which willingness to accept a government job is only weakly affected by changes in the public sector wage premium. The dashed line, meanwhile, represents wage elasticity, and which shows that willingness to accept is highly sensitive to changes in the public sector wage premium. Finally, the solid line indicates unitary wage elasticity, and which represents the case in which willingness to accept a government job is perfectly proportional to changes in the wage premium.

[11] Aggregate demand for government jobs is taken to be high: in my sample, 35% of respondents indicated that they had applied for a government job at some point in the last ten years.

[12] Another way to think about these different concepts is notationally. Consider, for instance:

$$\mathbf{E} = \begin{cases} |\frac{W}{D} \cdot \frac{\partial D}{\partial W}| = 0 & \text{Perfectly inelastic} \\ 0 < |\frac{W}{D} \cdot \frac{\partial D}{\partial W}| < 1 & \text{Inelastic} \\ |\frac{W}{D} \cdot \frac{\partial D}{\partial W}| > 1 & \text{Elastic} \end{cases} \tag{4.2}$$

Where "W" represents the proposed wage premium and "D" represents the aggregate willingness to accept at that rate. Here, one can calculate the wage elasticity of demand for public sector jobs for any value of 'W," as in the case of the price elasticity of demand, although it is worth emphasizing that the intuitions derived from the graphical slope-based approach are likely more appropriate in the current context: public sector wage premiums are generally fixed, or at least move very slowly.

Figure 4.2—Elasticity of Demand for Government Jobs



Consider the implications of these different ideal-types for the above discussion concerning applicants' frustrations when their ambitions are thwarted. Unitary elasticity, for instance, implies a perfect accordance between movements in the public sector wage premium and the willingness to accept a government job. In other words, an applicants' calculation is wholly pecuniary. The sting of disappointment is probably not so bad in this case: failed applicants can simply accept private sector employment at a slight discount with no loss to any intangible benefits associated with a government job. Recall, however, that the central expectation of this chapter is that the demand for government jobs is inelastic. In this case, applicants are willing to forego substantially higher private sector wages for a public sector job, meaning they will be sorely disappointed if they are passed over and forced to settle for private sector employment, likely at great financial and intrinsic cost.

To estimate the elasticity of demand for government jobs in Indonesia, I fielded a series of online survey experiments (N = 2,743). These experiments were conducted through the online platform Pollfish. Compared to the broader Indonesian population, the sample I obtained was in general younger and better educated. By virtue of having conducted the survey online, the survey sample also had greater access to online social media than the broader population. But as I am interested in the attitudes of potential applicants to the civil service, these imbalances do not substantially threaten the external validity of the experiments. For one, applicants to the Indonesian civil service must be between the ages of 18–35, a criterion that has drawn consid-

erable protest and ire from longtime contract workers who wish to convert their positions into tenured roles, but are unable to do so due to age restrictions. Second, the overwhelming majority of positions in the Indonesian civil service require at least a college degree.[13] Finally, in order to apply for a position in the Indonesian civil service, applicants must register through an online portal—a feature that necessitates internet access among applicants, and which should thus mitigate concerns over the external validity of a sample collected online.

Table 4.2: Sample and Census Comparison

Variable	Sample	Census	Difference
Religion:			
Muslim	0.836	0.873	-0.037
Christian	0.126	0.098	0.028
Other	0.038	0.030	0.008
Gender & age:			
Male	0.597	0.5	0.097
Female	0.402	0.5	-0.097
Age	30.934	28.4	2.534
Ethnicity:			
Javanese	0.465	0.402	0.063
Sunda	0.165	0.155	0.01
Minang	0.035	0.027	0.008
Education:			
College or higher	0.37	0.09	0.28
High school	0.51	0.29	0.22
Middle school	0.07	0.21	-0.14
Elementary or lower	0.04	0.38	-0.34

The core of the experiment asked respondents to select between two jobs—one public sector job and one private sector job. The prompt informed respondents that the positions were substantively identical in every regard except salary. Each respondent was thus randomly assigned to one of five categories—one category for each proposed private sector salary. The five proposed salaries varied by increments of 20%, benchmarked to a median value of the monthly GDP per capita (3,712,000 IDR, US$ 263). In order of smallest to largest, the proposed private sector salaries were 2,221,500 IDR, 2,966,800 IDR, 3,712,000 IDR, 4,457,400 IDR, and 5,202,700 IDR. Once assigned to a private sector salary and presented with its value, respondents were then offered the lowest possible salary for public sector employment (i.e., 2,221,500 IDR) and asked which position they would select. Next, the respondent was proposed the next highest possible salary for public sector employment (i.e., 2,966,800 IDR) with the randomly assigned private sector salary staying the same, after which they were asked which position they would select. This procedure was repeated until all possible public sector salaries were proposed to the respondent.

For the analysis, I focus on the wage premium by respondent as the unit of analysis. In other words, for each respondent, for each of the five scenarios, I construct a variable that measures the proposed public sector wage premium. This value is the independent variable in the resulting analysis, and which varies from -2,981,200 IDR to 2,981,200 IDR. For ease of interpretability, I present the main results using percentage values for the wage premium, which range from -80%

[13] There are exceptions for unskilled labor, such as for prison guards, which was, interestingly, the most sought-after position in the 2018–2019 recruitment cycle.

to 80% of the median salary value. The main outcome is the public sector job choice, which takes a "1" in the event that the respondent indicates a desire to select the public sector job, and a "0" otherwise.

My preferred interpretation is graphical, which I present below. Yet, for a more precise interpretation of the elasticity of demand, I also present the results in tabular form for a direct comparison of coefficients. Following convention, I estimate the elasticity of demand using logistic regression. For ease of interpretability, I also estimate the elasticity of demand modeled as a linear probability model implemented using ordinary least squares. In this final implementation, the coefficient represents the percentage point increase (or decrease) in the likelihood of individuals to accept public sector employment, given a one percentage point increase in the public sector wage premium. Values between zero and one are understood as inelastic; values in excess of one are thought to be elastic.

Figure 4.3—Elasticity of Demand for Government Jobs



(a) Linear Probability

(b) LOESS

Note: The right panel with the red line is a LOESS curve; the left panel with the blue line is OLS. The panels show the relationship between public sector wage premiums and demand for government jobs.

I present the results from the willingness-to-accept experiment in Figure 4.3. On the left panel, I present the results with a linear probability model fitted through the binned observations. On the right panel, I implement a logistic regression. Here, I emphasize three particular features of the graphical presentation of results: concerning the intercept, slope, and shape of the relationship between the wage premium and the willingness to accept a government job.

The intercept is particularly instructive, as it represents the percentage of respondents who—when faced with exactly comparable wages across private and public sector jobs—select a public sector one. One straightforward interpretation of this value is as an indication of the overall aggregate demand for public sector employment: if this value is below, say, 50%, then it would suggest that *ceteris paribus* individuals do not generally desire public sector employment more

than private sector employment, and which would undermine the broader claim of this dissertation that the competition over who gets a government job is intense. In the event, however, the willingness-to-accept experiment indicates that 69.4% of respondents would select a government job over a private sector one in the event that both paid the same amount in monthly income.

The slope is the central parameter of interest, and which I interpret as the elasticity of demand for government jobs. The left panel estimates the elasticity of demand using ordinary least squares, and thus offers a straightforward interpretation. Using this linear probability model, I estimate an elasticity coefficient of 0.37. This estimate is substantively unchanged by the inclusion of various control variables. In other words, a 10 percentage point increase in the public sector wage premium leads to a 3.7 percentage point increase in the willingness-to-accept a government job.

Finally, the shape of the relationship between the public sector wage premium and the willingness to accept a government job merits comment, as well. Although I have modeled the relationship linearly out of ease of interpretability, a simple visual inspection of the data reveals the relationship to be logarithmic. Yet, it is not symmetrically logarithmic. Notice how, on the right hand side of the figure, in which respondents encounter a positive public sector wage premium, the relationship is nearly perfectly inelastic: apparently, any wage premium is about as good as a large one. For instance, 78% of respondents accepted a government job when faced with a 20% wage premium, which only increases 4 percentage points to 82% when faced with an 80% wage premium. However, looking at the left-hand side of the panel, in which respondents face a negative public sector wage premium, the relationship is more elastic. Faced with a -20% wage premium, 50% of respondents selected a public sector job, which drops 13 percentage points to 37% when faced with a -80% wage premium. This is nonetheless indicative of a striking demand for government jobs: even at a steep discount (80%), 37% of individuals would still take a government job over a better-paid private sector offer.

4.3 Status-Seeking and its Indivisibility

The results of the willingness-to-accept experiments in the previous section demonstrate that, while pecuniary explanations of the demand for government jobs hold partial explanatory weight, there are evidently other factors at work. In this section, I show how the demand for government jobs is motivated by the perceived gains in status to be had from such employment. In Indonesia, and elsewhere across the developing world, public sector work is highly sought after as it is thought to provide employees with an elevated position in their community. As an instructive example, during the 1970s, when Suharto embarked on an ambitious initiative to erect an elementary school in every Indonesian village, public school teachers in far-flung corners of the archipelago came to be viewed as representatives of the state itself.

This status-seeking element to the demand for government jobs can help to explain why people care *so much* about getting work in the public sector. It can also explain why people turn to violence when their ambitions are thwarted. Under the pecuniary theory of demand for government jobs, failed applicants can typically find work in the private sector at a fractional discount, earning 90% of what they would have otherwise. To be sure, this is a serious penalty, and one that might motivate anger and frustration. However, the status-seeking theory of demand introduces an element of indivisibility: failed applicants who turn to find work in the private sector capture 0% of the status they were seeking, a precipitous drop likely to motivate considerably heightened

frustration that is better suited to explain the violent episodes described at the beginning of this chapter.

Figure 4.4—Perceptions of Status in Government Jobs



Note: Responses to the question: "Thinking about the reasons why people in Indonesia want to work in the civil service, how important is the following reason? Status and reputation." (*Berbicara mengenai alasan mengapa mayoritas dari masyarakat ingin bekerja di instansi pemerintah, seberapa pentingkah alasan alasan berikut?)*

To investigate the status-seeking explanation of demand for government jobs, I asked respondents a series of questions about the importance of various factors in motivating individuals to seek out civil service employment. In Figure 4.4 I present the responses to the question "Thinking about the reasons why people in Indonesia want to work in the civil service, how important is the following reason? Status and reputation." Importantly, 79.6% of respondents declared that status was a "somewhat" or "very" important reason why people seek out jobs in the Indonesian civil service. This figure increases to 83% among respondents who have applied for a civil service job in the last ten years.

Next, in Figure 4.5, I compare respondents' willingness-to-accept a government job according to a proposed public sector wage premium, across respondents who said status was important (left panel) and those who said it was unimportant (right panel). I plot the binned values, and fit both an OLS line (blue) and LOESS curve (red) through the values. As before, a comparison of the intercepts are instructive. Respondents who say that status is important, when faced with

Figure 4.5—Elasticity of Demand for Government Jobs, Among (Non) Status-Seekers



(a) Status Important

(b) Status Unimportant

Note: The red line indicates the LOESS curve, while the blue line represents a simple linear probability model. The left panel represents the binned estimates for respondents who indicate that status is an important motivation for seeking out a government job, while the right panel is subset to those respondents indicating status is not important.

equivalent salaries, select public sector employment 72% of the time. Respondents who say status is unimportant select public sector employment 60% of the time when faced with a similar situation.

To enable a more straightforward comparison of the differences in willingness-to-accept across status-seekers and non-status-seekers, I present the differences in the probability of accepting a government job across the various wage premium conditions in Figure 4.6. Here, I want to highlight several features of this analysis. Notice how, first, the willingness-to-accept a government job is higher for status seekers than non-status-seekers, across all levels of support. But the difference in the willingness-to-accept increases only by 8 percentage points across the range of proposed public sector wage premiums which yield statistically significant differences, thus suggesting the broader inference that status-seeking partially explains the inelasticity of demand for government jobs.

Figure 4.6—Differences in Demand for Government Jobs, Across (Non) Status-Seekers



Note: These estimates represent the estimated differences in the probability of willingness to accept a government job, across those who view status is important and unimportant, for all experimentally possible wage premiums. I include 95% confidence intervals.

4.3.1 Summary

This chapter has sought to uncover the sources of the puzzlingly intense demand for government jobs in Indonesia. The evidence presented in this chapter has drawn on a variety of sources—ranging from administrative data to survey responses. I establish three core stylized facts about the demand for government jobs in Indonesia. First, there is a considerable wage premium on public sector work: applicants to the civil service that were narrowly selected—as compared to those who were narrowly passed over—report monthly incomes that are approximately 22-34% higher. Second, exploiting both regional variation in the scale of the public sector wage premium and a survey experiment, I show that the demand for government jobs is in general inelastic with respect to the wage premium: most Indonesians would prefer a government job to a non-government jobs, regardless of whether it pays more or less. Third, in searching for an explanation for this inelasticity, I show that it is highest for those who indicate that the heightened status of government work is an important driver of the decision to seek out public sector employment, indicating that prospective civil servants are chasing an intangible premium.

These findings provide a partial answer to an outstanding question regarding the broader theory advanced in later chapters. Specifically, the results offer glimpses into individuals' motivations for seeking out public sector jobs—and thus why failed attempts to secure government employment can lead to serious grievances that can affect outcomes as broad as social cohesion

and national solidarity, as I will show in the following chapter.

Chapter 5

The Effect of Selection via Meritocracy in Contemporary Indonesia

In previous chapters, I argued that governments' decision to move towards the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants represents an institutional innovation that amounts to an act of state-building. The central virtue of the examination as a selection device lies in its capacity to identify competent applicants while also ensuring that the means of their selection is divorced from the short-sighted electoral interests of politicians.[1] Indeed, reflecting this observation, virtually every country around the world has at least nominally adopted the selection of government agents via examinations. In other words, the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants is generally treated as a normative absolute: a policy with few, if any, downsides.

In this chapter, I present an argument challenging this absolute normative preference for meritocratic recruitment procedures, showing how such institutions can adversely affect other desiderata, such as national solidarity. Recall that the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 2 anticipate two interlocking mechanisms through which examination-based selection may lead to weakened measures of national solidarity, thus undermining nation-building. For one, I argue that the outcomes of civil service examinations may prompt unexpected attitudinal shifts on the part of winners and losers—particularly when successful applicants disproportionately hail from specific ethnic, racial, or religious groups. Decomposing this argument, I first hypothesize that unsuccessful applicants might come to harbor impactful resentments as they grapple with the upsetting reality of their own failure. I also hypothesize that, to the extent that success results in government employment, the experience of passing the examination might result in countervailing attitudinal changes, as newly minted public servants adopt attitudes consistent with a view that success was theirs alone, rather than partially attributable to, say, systemic inequities or institutional shortcomings. Taken together, I argue that these hypothesized effects—which I dub "applicant-side" mechanisms—combine to weaken measures of national solidarity by creating a large attitudinal rift among winners and losers. Importantly for this argument, and consistent with the evidence presented in chapter 4, the demand for government jobs is overwhelming in Indonesia: 3,636,262 applicants—or 2% of the entire population—applied for 180,623 vacancies in 2018, meaning such attitudinal effects operate on a scale where it makes sense to consider

[1] Evans and Rauch (1999); Johnson (1982); Pepinsky, Pierskalla and Sacks (2017); Rauch and Evans (2000); Weber (1978).

implications for macro political outcomes.[2]

The second mechanism, which I term "citizen-side," considers how, to the extent that the meritocratic selection of civil servants leads to representational imbalances in the bureaucracy, citizens from underrepresented groups may adopt new resentments and frustrations upon seeing their identities underrepresented in the halls of government. I first consider an "egotropic" explanation: from the perspective of the individual, the experience of petitioning for services from an outgroup member can be symbolically impactful, affecting a sense of national solidarity, as it highlights the uneven footing upon which different groups stand within a single political unit. Consistent with this, recent research has also shown bureaucrats are more likely to aid citizens when they are coethnics. This chapter also considers a "sociotropic" explanation. The simple knowledge that one's group is statistically underrepresented in the halls of government—independent of one's specific experience with petitioning for services—may also motivate forms of resentment that can be impactful on individuals' political attitudes.

To test these hypotheses, I focus on the case of Indonesia, leveraging recent reforms to the manner in which civil servants are recruited there. As I will discuss later in the chapter, the impetus for the institutional reforms analyzed in this chapter originated with pressure from then-Vice President Boediono, who urged the civil service agency (BKN) to begin drafting plans for the implementation of a properly meritocratic recruitment system. Starting in 2008, the BKN rolled out the computer assisted test (CAT) for its own internal recruitment of applicants, as well as for in several other ministries and regions. The response was generally positive, and complaints of outright corruption were reported to have slowed. The system was rolled out on a national scale in 2014, with continued variation in regional compliance. The system was finally implemented on a totally national scale for the first time during the 2018–2019 cycle. There were significant protests from local and provincial governments, who rightly saw the implementation of the new recruitment procedures as impinging on their possibilities for rent-seeking. The Ministry of Finance, under the leadership of reform-minded Sri Mulyani, threatened to withhold fiscal transfers to noncompliant districts, with the effect of total capitulation.

A priori, it seems likely that these reforms would lead to the hypothesized effects in the Indonesian context. In many regards, Indonesia is an improbable nation. Its population is comprised of over 250 million individuals hailing from 700 ethnic groups, five major religions, and spread across an archipelago of 17,000 islands. Even as late as the early twentieth century, a common Indonesian identity "simply did not yet exist," according to one leading historian.[3] Overcoming this diversity to cultivate national identification has been a central preoccupation of Indonesia's leaders, as reflected in the national motto "unity in diversity" (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*). But one consequence of the new system for recruiting civil servants, as shown in Chapter 3, is that it has enabled applicants from privileged backgrounds to outstrip the competition and obtain coveted government jobs at disproportionately high rates. Across the board, applicants from Indonesia's largest island (Java) as well as members of its most numerous faith (Islam) report higher scores than their counterparts—a dynamic that may threaten Indonesia's social compact.

Before turning to the results, it is worth underscoring at the outset that the evidence in support of these two hypothesized mechanisms is mixed. In the first empirical analysis, identifying the

[2]This is an impressive figure considering that the exam was limited to individuals with a college degree between the ages of 18-34. In other words, 46.2% of all eligible Indonesians applied for a job in the civil service in 2018.
[3]Ricklefs (2008).

applicant-side effects, which relies on a regression discontinuity design comparing the attitudes of individuals who narrowly passed and failed the civil service examination, I find, consistent with the broader theoretical framework, that the simple fact of failure on the civil service exam undermines national identification, as well as heightens the belief that the process was corrupt and some measures of group-based identification. These findings are robust to alternative specifications and subsets. Meanwhile, for the second empirical analysis, to identify citizen-side effects, I rely on a series of survey experiments that randomly assign respondents to receive information about the ethnic and religious composition of their local civil service. Here, I find that such information leads citizens to anticipate worse service delivery. Randomly assigning respondents to consider a vignette about a soliciting services from a bureaucrat from an outgroup leads to declines in national identification among certain well-defined sub-populations. But on balance the evidence in support of the citizen-side mechanism is weaker, possibly owing to the superficial nature of the intervention.

5.1 Civil Service Recruitment in Contemporary Indonesia

In this section, I review the manner in which civil servants are recruited in contemporary Indonesia, which was initially introduced in Chapter 3. In the following pages, I return to the sequence of selection procedures for inferential purposes. Until recently, recall that applicants to the civil service in Indonesia sat for paper based exams in large stadiums with thousands of other applicants. Complaints of manipulated scores were widespread. One study found that applicants often paid administrators to boost their scores.[4] Under these circumstances, examination failure was likely interpreted by applicants as uncorrelated with their underlying capabilities—a possibility that forecloses any effort to estimate the distinct sting of disappointment associated with true examination failure.

However, Indonesia recently implemented a new computer assisted test (CAT). Rolled out on a national scale in 2018–2019, the CAT is centrally-implemented and mechanistically-graded and is widely believed to have effectively rooted out foul-play in the recruitment process.[5] The newly-implemented system contained five phases:

1. **Job search:** Applicants search for job openings on the online database.[6] The location, title, requirements, and number of vacancies for positions are listed in a searchable database.

2. **Administrative selection:** Applicants apply for a single position by submitting their documents for a review of completeness (e.g., transcript, diploma, birth certificate, etc) through an online portal. Successful applicants were invited to participate in the next phase—the "basic competency test."

3. **Basic competency test:** The basic competency test takes 90 minutes and involves three sections: (1) a general intelligence test, (2) a personality test, and (3) a nationality test. The total components add up to a maximum score of 500. A nationwide threshold was set at 255. Applicants were immediately notified of their score upon completion of the test. Applicants above the threshold were then ranked in descending fashion, with the top

[4]Kristiansen and Ramli (2006).
[5]Beschel et al. (2018).
[6]See here: https://sscn.bkn.go.id

three scoring applicants invited to continue to the fourth phase—the "specialist competency test."[7]

4. **Specialist competency test:** The specialist competency test measures applicants' preparedness for the specific tasks of the position to which they are applying. For 100% of district and provincial positions, as well as the vast majority (although not all) of positions, this test is also carried out as a computer-assisted system.[8]

5. **Score integration and selection:** After specialist competency test, the scores on the two tests are integrated—the basic test weighted at 40% and the specialist test weighted at 60%. Applicants are then ranked in descending order, with the top score selected for the vacant position.

Initially rolled out in 2008 for internal recruitment of candidates at the civil service agency, applicants continued to complain that the scoring of the exam under the CAT system was still opaque. The numbers could have been manipulated by a computer administrator after the fact, for instance. Further reforms have mitigated these concerns. During the 2018–2019 cycle, on the day of the test in some districts, applicants' families were for the first time assembled in an adjacent room while the test was live-streamed on a scoreboard with applicants' scores (and thus relative positions) updated as they answer each individual question correctly or incorrectly. This gladiatorial approach to civil servant selection appears to have been effective in totally curbing score falsification in the places where it was rolled out.

5.2 Meritocracy's Thwarted Ambitious: an Applicant-Side Mechanism

Before turning to the research design, it is worth reviewing the theoretical intuitions through which civil service examination outcomes may affect attitudes. The motivating observation is that the nature of failure on a high-stakes examination may be a uniquely devastating insult: to be examined and judged to possess insufficient "merit" is an upsetting reality for many applicants to face. A cross-discipline literature in education and psychology has identified the ways in which high stakes examinations heighten test-takers' anxiety and, in the event of failure, lead to feelings of shame and humiliation.[9] Leveraging a natural experiment in which hundreds of high school students were erroneously told that they failed the Minnesota Basic Standards Test, for instance, one recent study documents that over 80% of the wrongly failed students reported that they felt "depressed or embarrassed" and 4% of these students ultimately dropped out of school.[10]

It seems likely that unsuccessful test takers will search for exculpatory justifications to rationalize the observed outcomes. This possibility draws from "attribution theory," a body of research in psychology that seeks to explain how individuals understand the causes of certain human-influenced events. Particularly in the context of examination outcomes, attribution theory has

[7] In the event of multiple vacancies for positions, a proportional number of applicants were invited to continue. For instance, if there were two vacancies, the top six scorers on the basic competency test would continue.

[8] Aspiring diplomats, for instance, must write an essay in a foreign language, which necessarily cannot be graded by a computerized system.

[9] Diener and Dweck (1978); Elliott and Dweck (1988); and Kearns (2011).

[10] Cornell, Krosnick and Chang 2006

been applied to investigate how failed students' evaluations of their own performance (e.g., as a consequence of lack of effort or due to lack of inherent ability) might influence later behavior and attitudes.[11] One particularly relevant outgrowth of the attribution theory literature is a strand of research focusing on the influence of "self-serving biases" in the attribution of success and failure on assessments.[12] Research has found that individuals are more likely to take responsibility when they succeed on examinations, while they are less likely to take responsibility when they fail. It seems likely, then, that unsuccessful test takers will be more likely to search for explanations that absolve their own role in the outcome—such as underlying inequities or institutional shortcomings.

The theorized effect of examination failure extends this literature in several regards. For one, I focus on civil service examinations, as opposed to academic assessments. As the outcomes of these tests confer considerable status and employment, it might be that any frustrations stemming from failure are comparatively larger than those seen in other contexts. But particularly crucial for the present discussion is the observation that, as opposed to academic contexts, recruitment into government service invites questions of politics. Failed applicants—as they seek to attribute a cause for their shortcomings—may adopt new attitudes towards specifically political institutions thought to have played a role in their failure. For instance, the often-cited justification for introducing meritocratic examinations as the mechanism for public sector recruitment is to manage public frustration over the role of patronage and corruption in the allocation of government jobs. Yet, it may be that failure on these examinations motivates forms of frustration that lead applicants to believe the process to have been unfair anyways, thus entrenching the political attitudes that the introduction of the merit system sought to remedy.

In general, this expectation draws on several related literatures spanning political science, education, and psychology. In the political science literature, the hypothesized effect of failure maps onto an older literature in comparative politics concerning "frustrated expectations." Here, Ted Gurr famously argued that "men rebel" when their personal ambitions are systematically foreclosed.[13] In a more recent addition, Richard Nielsen traces how Islamic scholars turn to Jihadism in the event that they find their ascent through traditional scholarly communities blocked—an experience described as "thwarted ambition."[14] More immediately relevant to the context of civil service recruitment, one historian describes the climate in imperial China during the Qing dynasty in which "the search for examination success created a climate of rising expectations among low-level [elites] who dreamed of examination glory who sometimes rebelled when their hopes were dashed."[15]

To summarize, I expect that failure on the civil service examination will affect several different genres of outcomes. First, it may be that failed applicants will be more likely than successful applicants to allege corruption in the recruitment process, for instance, as they search for exculpatory explanations of their failure. Second, and particularly in contexts with high group based inequality, failing an examination may motivate outgroup resentment and ingroup preferentialism as unsuccessful test takers attribute the outcome to systemic inequalities. Finally, third, failing may prompt individuals to reflect negatively on the national identity writ large, as it represents the

[11] Dweck (2008) and Graham (1991).
[12] Miller and Ross (1975) and Sicoly and Ross (1977).
[13] Gurr (1970).
[14] Nielsen (2017).
[15] Elman (2013, 169).

symbolic core of the institution from which they have been denied employment.

Conversely, the experience of being offered—and accepting—a job in the public sector may have independent effects on successful candidates' attitudes. In other words, in addition to the hypothesized attitudinal impact of the examination itself, outlined above, I also theorize that the experience of public service may have important and countervailing impacts. For one, drawing again on attribution theory, and in particular the work of psychologists, individuals who were successful in the selection process often have an incentive believe that success was theirs alone.[16] This outlook may lead successful applicants to adopt attitudes consistent with this view. For instance, successful applicants may assert that the process was fair and free from corruption—or that systemic inequalities across group lines were not operative factors in their success.

Consistent with this, but drawing instead on system-justification theory, and particularly in the context of civil service examinations, successful applicants may feel the need to offer legitimating statements the uphold the outcome that resulted in their employment.[17] So, for instance, they may assert the fairness of the process carried out by their now-current employer. Relatedly, it may be that individuals who are employed by the state itself will be more likely to identify with the national identity, which is often understood as the symbolic core of the state itself.

5.2.1 Research Design and Data

Estimating the "effect" of success or failure on the civil service examination is dogged by inferential concerns. The first inferential issue relates to the compound nature of the intervention: in the absence of a pure control, observed attitudinal differences across winners and losers could reasonably be interpreted as either the the effect of failing or the effect of succeeding and going on to become a civil servant. To be clear, my preferred interpretation is that both mechanisms are at work. To sort out the comparative magnitude of these twinned mechanisms, I leverage different thresholds within the civil service recruitment procedure (see Figure 5.1). The first threshold involves applicants' score on the general screening examination, a test that determines whether a candidate continues to the next phase of recruitment. Importantly, the outcome of this test does not result in employment, which, I argue, enables me to attribute the attitudinal differences across winners and losers to the simple fact of failure or success. Skeptics of this approach might be concerned that some proportion of applicants who pass this screening test go on to become civil servants, thereby undermining an attempt to narrowly isolate the effect of failure. Although the scale of this bias is likely small thanks to the small share of matriculants, I also conduct an analysis restricted to those applicants who ultimately did not receive a job, thereby decoupling any so-called public service effect.

Isolating the effect of government service is more straightforward. Here, I focus on applicants who had advanced to the final stage of the recruitment process—those who had taken both the general screening examination and specialist competence examination. In addition to passing the absolute score threshold on the screening examination, applicants must also filter through the "rule of three," which stipulates that only the three top scoring candidates on the general screening examination for any given vacancy are invited to take the specialist competence examination. After this stage, recall that the two scores are integrated as a weighted average, and applicants are ranked in descending fashion within each vacancy. The proposed analysis compares

[16] Sicoly and Ross (1977).
[17] Jost (2019).

Figure 5.1—CONSORT Flow Diagram



the attitudes of applicants who were offered a position against those who were not. To bolster the interpretation that these differences are narrowly attributable to government service—rather than an additional manifestation of the hypothesized effect of failure—I conduct a test in which I compare the attitudes of those who accepted the offer against those who turned it down. Again, it is worth underscoring that this approach introduces certain biases into the estimates, as the decision to accept an offer of employment is not randomly assigned.

The second pressing inferential difficult is confounding: it might be that, for both thresholds, people who fail are systematically different than people who succeed on a host of observed and unobserved characteristics. And it might be that it is these characteristics that drive observed differences in the outcomes. To address this issue, at both thresholds, I adopt a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of losing (passing) at the different thresholds on the outcomes of interest. Specifically, I aim to capture the following two estimands for the effect of failing the general screening examination (Equation 5.1) and the effect of passing the specialist competence examination (Equation 5.2):

$$LATE_{SKD}^{FAIL} = \lim_{SKD \uparrow 255} E[Y_i(1)|SKD_i] - \lim_{SKD \downarrow 255} E[Y_i(0)|SKD_i] \tag{5.1}$$

$$LATE_{SKB}^{PASS} = \lim_{SKB \downarrow 0} E[Y_i(1)|SKB_i] - \lim_{SKB \uparrow 0} E[Y_i(0)|SKB_i] \tag{5.2}$$

The identifying assumption of this approach is that, at both thresholds, and within a narrow bandwidth, whether or not an applicant passes or fails is as good as random. Note, importantly, that the forcing variable is different in the analyses. The first forcing variable is absolute: it is an

applicant's percentage point distance to the score threshold (51%).[18] The second forcing variable is relative, as in the case of commonly-used close-election regression discontinuity designs: it is an applicant's percentage point distance to an alternative disposition.

Figure 5.2—Indonesian Civil Servant Selection Timeline, 2018-2019



To collect the relevant outcome data, working with the Indonesian civil service agency, we sent emails to all 3,636,262 applicants from the 2018–2019 cycle soliciting their participation in an online survey. We had initially planned to send the survey solicitations in March 2020, approximately twelve months after the examination scores were known to applicants, and one month after the end of a one-year probationary period for applicants selected to be civil servants (see Figure 5.2). This plan was aborted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, we sent the survey solicitations via email in July 2020, sixteen months after the general screening examination.[19] As this exceeds the typical timeframe over which follow-up survey are conducted after an informational intervention,[20] I argue that any observed effects ought to be attributable to durable attitudinal shifts rather than, say, transitory frustrations. In the end, we obtained responses from a total of 204,989 individuals, for a response rate of 5.2%. From the perspective of nonresponse bias, the main estimation sample reassuringly appears indistinguishable from the underlying population, with the exception of some age brackets and respondent location.[21] Each email contained a unique link, such that the survey responses could be linked to an individuals' civil service examination score. Finally, we did not incentivize participation in the survey.

For the dependent variables, I construct five "families" of outcomes—each of which contain two to five questions.[22] These questions are drawn from work by Seth Soderborg and Burhan Muhtadi, in which the authors develop and validate a battery of survey measures designed to

[18]The actual examination is scored out of 500 points, with the threshold being set at 255 points. Out of convention, I divide scores by five so that they are scored out of a total of 100.

[19]These emails were sent by the Indonesian Civil Service Agency.

[20]Typically, 1–8 weeks; see Haaland, Roth and Wohlfart (2022).

[21]This point merits two caveats. First, from the perspective of external validity, the differences are substantively small and likely attributable to differential rates of internet penetration for these categories. Second, from the perspective of internal validity, the experience of narrow failure or success appears uncorrelated with likelihood to respond to the survey for all demographic variables.

[22]See Table 5.1

gauge common axes of resentment in Indonesia.[23] I include the paraphrased text of these questions, as well as the range of potential responses, in Table 5.1. First, "Javan preferentialism" gauges respondents' degree of support for policies that prioritize the interest of residents of Java. Second, "regional preferentialism" gauges respondents' support for policies that prioritize regional natives. Third, "religious resentment" gauges respondents' resentment towards generalized religious out-groups. Fourth, "national identification" comes from two questions that measure the applicants' identification with an ethnically-inclusive formulation of the Indonesian national identity. Finally, fifth, "perceptions of corruption" comprises five questions measuring applicants' perceptions of corruption in the recruitment process. To simplify interpretation, I create indices such that outcomes are measured in terms of "control-group" standard deviations.[24]

[23] Soderborg and Muhtadi (2021). For most of the survey outcomes, the Indonesian language text was taken directly from Soderborg and Muhtadi (2021). For the original questions, including the family of questions gauging perceptions of corruption, the translation was done by the author and reviewed by a research assistant.

[24] These measures come from Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). Specifically, for K outcomes in a family, I compute: $\bar{y}_i = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K}(\frac{y_{i,k}-\mu_{0,k}}{\sigma_{0,k}})$ where μ_{0k} and σ_{0k} are the estimated control group mean and standard deviation for outcome k. Meanwhile, y_{1k} refers to the "treatment" group average for outcome k. For the test statistics, these indices are constructed using the values obtained in the estimation sample, i.e., respondents whose examination scores fall within a single percentage point of the threshold. Note, as well, that these individual-level values are different depending on the estimation sample.

Table 5.1: Survey Questions, Outcomes, and Families

	Question	Scale	Family
"To what extent do you agree with the following..."			
Q1	...because a big portion of the Indonesian population lives on Java, the government should primarily focus its attention there	1-4, Likert	Javan Pref.
Q2	...in recent years, the government of Indonesia has focused its attention on giving its resources to Java	1-4, Likert	Javan Pref.
Q3	...the regional government should focus its attention on the interests of original residents rather than migrants	1-4, Likert	Reg. Pref.
Q4	...too many people from outside the region hold positions in regional government	1-4, Likert	Reg. Pref.
Q5	...the government focuses too much time on the interests of city-dwellers over rural folks	1-4, Likert	Reg. Pref.
"Would you be upset if a member of another religion..."			
Q6	...built place of worship nearby	1-4, Likert	Relg. Intol.
Q7	...became mayor of your district	1-4, Likert	Relg. Intol.
Q8	...became a senior official in the national government	1-4, Likert	Relg. Intol.
Q9	How relevant is Pancasila?	1-4, Likert	Natl. ID.
Q10	Which identity is more important? National, ethnic, or both	Forced ch.	Natl. ID.
Q11	Which was more important for candidate selection? Test or connections	Forced ch.	Corruption
Q12	How transparent was recruitment process?	1-4, Likert	Corruption
"How important were the following in recruitment..."			
Q13	...candidate merit	1-4, Likert	Corruption
Q14	...connections with insiders	1-4, Likert	Corruption
Q15	...ethnicity, religion, and race (SARA)	1-4, Likert	Corruption

To recover the LATE(s) outlined in Equations 5.1 and 5.2, for the estimation, I conduct a simple difference-in-means analysis implemented using ordinary least squares (OLS). Specifically, for the two main analyses, I fit the following models:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_{SKD}^{FAIL}\mathbf{X}_{SKD,i} + \epsilon_i \tag{5.3}$$

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_{SKB}^{PASS}\mathbf{X}_{SKB,i} + \epsilon_i \tag{5.4}$$

where the unit of analysis is the individual and where Y_i is a stand-in for the indexed outcome variable of interest. The main independent variables, $\mathbf{X}_{SKD,i}$ and $\mathbf{X}_{SKB,i}$ are indicators that take the following forms:

$$\mathbf{X}_{SKD,i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } 250 \leq \text{SKD} \leq 255 \\ 0 & \text{if } 255 \leq \text{SKD} \leq 260 \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{5.5}$$

$$\mathbf{X}_{SKB,i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if -1} \leq \text{SKB} \leq 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } 0 \leq \text{SKB} \leq 1 \\ \text{NA} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{5.6}$$

Finally, the β coefficients are the parameters in which I am interested, and to which I attach a causal interpretation. It is the effect of having narrowly failed (passed) the general screening examination (specialist competence examination) on the outcomes of interest.

5.2.2 Results

To start, how do individuals who narrowly failed the general screening examination compare to those who were narrowly successful? I investigate this question by examining the five indices discussed above—support for the Indonesian national identity, Javan preferentialism, support for regional preferentialism, religious resentment, and perceptions of corruption. Recall that I leverage variation in the experience of failure on the general screening examination, starting first with an unrestricted sample in the left-hand panel of Figure 5.3. The first item looks at support for the Indonesian national identity. Recall that the core of the Indonesian national identity is a doctrine known as *Pancasila* which posits an ethnically- and religiously-inclusivist vision. Nonetheless, all Indonesians possess multiple identities, including ethnic commitments. The survey thus asks respondents two questions. First, it probes respondents' attitudes about the extent to which *Pancasila* is still "relevant" and, second, it asks respondents whether they identify as Indonesian, their ethnicity, or a little bit of both. The results consistently indicate that narrow losers are significantly less likely likely to indicate support for the Indonesian national identity. Broadly, I find that narrow losers are 0.07 SDs less likely to support Indonesia's national identity when compared against narrow winners. Specifically, and again decomposing the index for clarity, narrow losers are less likely to believe that *Pancasila* is still relevant by about 1.7 percentage points, corresponding to a 3% decrease over narrow winners.

Next, I look at questions gauging support for government preferentialism for Java—Indonesia's most populous and, by most accounts, its most privileged island. I ask respondents whether or

not they support government interventions designed to provide preferentialism to Java (1) generally and (2) in terms of access to resources. Per the pre-analysis plan, I conduct a split sample analysis that compares the attitudes of narrow losers to narrow winners on Java and off-Java. Compared to narrow winners, narrow losers from Java are significantly more likely to support government intervention on behalf of residents of Java. Specifically, implementing the baseline specification indicates that narrow lowers are 0.13 SDs more likely to be supportive of giving Java governmental "priority" and "resources" compared against narrow winners. The second row of estimates presents the results for the subset of applicants who did not reside on Java. The outer islands are generally believed to be a secondary concern for government policy compared to the attention given to Java. It might thus be the case that the experience of losing on a civil service examination could prompt further frustration towards the supposed dominance of the Javans, manifested in a decrease in support for government interventions of Javan preferentialism. Yet, surprisingly, the results presented in the third row of Figure 5.3 detect no signs that this more marginalized subset of the population is more prone to hostility towards Javan preferentialism in the event of narrowly losing, when compared against narrow winners. It might be that this null result is driven by floor effects: for instance, only 11.9% of non-Javans agree that the government should "prioritize the needs of Javans because the majority of Indonesians live there."

Figure 5.3—Failure On Screening Examination Affects Attitudes



Note: The left panel shows the effect of narrowly failing the general screening examination on the six families of attitudinal measures, as compared against the attitudes of those who narrowly passed. The right panel also estimates the effect of narrowly failing the general screening examination, compared to those who narrowly passed, albeit looking at the narrower subset of respondents who ultimately did not go on to the specialist examination.

A more general form of regional preferentialism might also be affected by the outcome of civil

service examinations. Among applicants for positions in the local and regional civil services, 44% applied for positions outside the jurisdiction in which they currently reside. Qualitative evidence indicates that many of these "outsider" applicants are often well-educated city-dwellers who are motivated by strategic considerations. It seems likely that this dynamic might heighten regionalism and regional preferentialism on the part of locals that fail the examination and believe winners to come from elsewhere. To gauge this possibility, the survey asked respondents three questions, two of which concern matters of normative preference and one of which concerns an evaluation of current government policy—but all of which concern regional preferentialism. The results are presented in the fourth row of Figure 5.3 and show that, in contrast to my expectations, narrow losers are no more supportive of regional preferentialism, compared to narrow winners.

Next, I investigate how the outcomes of civil service examinations affect attitudes towards religious outgroups. These questions differ in important respects from the previous two "families" of outcomes, as they do not gauge in-group preferentialism. Religion has historically been an important cleavage in Indonesian political life; as such, Indonesia's constitutional framework strictly outlaws preferentialism on religious grounds. Questions probing either support for such policies or perceptions of their presence, would have likely been met with nonresponse or denial. Instead, I asked respondents a series of questions designed to measure a broader form of "resentment" towards religious outgroups. These questions asked respondents if they would be "upset" if members of different religions (1) built places of worship nearby; (2) were elected to local office; or (3) were hired as a bureaucrat.

The fifth row of Figure 5.3 presents the results. In contrast with the expectations registered in the pre-analysis plan, I detect no evidence that narrow losers are any more likely to indicate hostility to religious outgroups when compared against narrow winners. This is surprising given that recent scholarly accounts have emphasized that religion has become the organizing cleavage in Indonesian politics.[25] One possible explanation concerns the comparatively slight difference in civil service examination scores across religious cleavages: recall that Muslim applicants score only 5pp higher than their non-Muslim peers, on average. In other words, it might be the case that the experience of failure on the civil service examination does not motivate heightened resentment of religious outgroups because applicants do not perceive such groups to be outpacing the competition. To test this possibility, I examine heterogeneity in the main effects, subsetting observations according to the district-level average score difference between Muslim and non-Muslim applicants. Partially bolstering this possibility, in SA Figure **??**, I show that the effect of examination failure on religious intolerance is generally higher for respondents who hail from districts in which the score difference between Muslims and non-Muslims is more pronounced.

Next, how do narrow losers perceive the recruitment process in terms of transparency and corruption, compared to narrow winners? The theory advanced in earlier sections predicts that losers in particular have an incentive to allege the recruitment process was corrupt in order to exculpate their shortcomings. To test this possibility, I quizzed applicants on a range of questions designed to measure respondents' views about the extent to which certain factors (merit, connections, ethnicity) were influential in recruitment decisions. I also asked respondents the extent to which they believed the recruitment and selection process was transparent, and asked respondents to choose between a binary option of "examination" and "connections" as the most important factor in recruitment decisions.

[25] Mietzner and Muhtadi (2018).

The results are presented in the final and sixth row of Figure 5.3 . The baseline specification shows that narrow losers, compared to narrow winners, are 0.08 SDs more likely to believe the recruitment process was corrupt. Decomposing some of the items in the index to provide a more concrete indication of the magnitude of the effects, consider that narrow losers are 2.1 percentage points more likely to say that connections were more important than examination results in hiring decisions, a 9.1% increase over narrow winners. Moreover, and particularly relevant to the hypotheses tested in this chapter compared to narrow winners, narrow losers were 1.5 percentage points more likely to say that ethnicity was a factor in hiring decisions—corresponding to a 9.2% increase. Champions of the merit system often cite its transparency as one of its chief advantages; these findings are thus particularly striking as they suggest that the experience of failing on the examination may undermine perceptions of its legitimacy.

My preferred interpretation of the results presented in Figure 5.3 is that they are attributable to the experience of failure on the general screening examination. However, in the absence of a "pure" control, observed differences around the threshold could reasonably be interpreted as either the effect of narrowly *succeeding* on the examination or the effect of narrowly *failing* the examination. To sort out this inferential difficulty, on the right hand panel of Figure 5.3, I restrict my sample solely to those applicants who ultimately did not receive a job—an approach which should thus hold constant any "aggrandizing effects" accruing from the experience of ultimate success.

The outcome indices are constructed in the same manner as the indices used in the main analysis such that the "control" group values are centered at zero. Looking at the cutpoint, and conditional on not advancing to the next stage of the recruitment process, I continue to observe attitudinal shifts between winners and losers on three out of six outcome families. Specifically, narrow losers from Java on the general screening examination are more likely to support Javan preferentialism by a margin of 0.12 SDs. Looking at national identification, I find that narrow losers, compared to narrow winners, are less likely to reflect positively on their national identity by a margin of 0.06 SDs. Finally, turning to the effect of failing the general screening examination on perceptions of corruption, I find that narrow losers, compared to narrow winners, are more likely to believe the recruitment process was corrupt, a shift of 0.05 SDs. Taken together, by ruling out a prominent alternative explanation, I argue that the durability of these results point to the causal significance of failure.

The research design also offers the ability to estimate the effect of government service on the attitudes examined in the preceding section. As discussed earlier, here I compare the attitudes of individuals who were narrowly offered a job in the civil service against those who narrowly missed out on being offered a job. In contrast to the previous analyses, these tests are therefore conducted on the smaller subset of applicants who had advanced to the final stage of the recruitment process (see, again, Figure 5.1). I present the results in Figure 5.4.

To start, again, looking at the estimates in the first row, I find that individuals who are narrowly offered civil service jobs, compared to those who narrowly missed out, are 0.13 SDs more likely to positively identify with the Indonesian national identity. Again, and similar to the interpretation of the effect of public service on perceptions of corruption, it appears that success may induce candidates to affirm their support for the Indonesian national identity in a show of support for their new employer.

On balance, the results indicate that the experience of being offered a position in the civil service makes individuals less likely to support the preferential treatment for members of ingroups,

at least as compared to individuals who were not offered government jobs. I find that, compared to applicants from Java who narrowly failed the final civil service examination, individuals from Java who passed the final civil service examination are 0.25 SDs *less* likely to support policies consistent with Javan preferentialism. Once again, I find no reverse analogous effects among non-Javans—a finding that suggests that the experiences of both success and failure may induce applicants to reflect differently on the circumstances of their ingroup, but not necessarily on the circumstances of outgroups. Consistent with these results, I also find that individuals who narrowly passed the final civil service examination are 0.27 SDs less likely to support measures of regional preferentialism, as compared against individuals who narrowly failed the final stage. Looking at the estimates in row five, I detect no evidence that the experience of being offered a position in the civil service affects individuals' likelihood to adopt religiously intolerant attitudes.

Figure 5.4—Success On Specialist Examination Has Opposite Effects



Note: The left panel shows the effect of narrowly passing the specialist screening examination on the six families of attitudinal measures, as compared against the attitudes of those who narrowly narrowly. The right panel also estimates the effect of narrowly passing the specialist screening examination, compared to those who narrowly failed, but now excluding those respondents that turned down a job in the event it was offered.

Finally, turning to the estimates in the sixth row, I show that applicants who narrowly passed the final civil service examination, when compared against those who narrowly failed, are 0.42 standard deviations less likely to indicate that the recruitment process was corrupt, bolstering the expectation that successful applicants have an incentive to say the process was free and fair to justify their own success.

Are these findings driven by the actual effect of government service, or are they attributable to an aggrandizing sensation stemming from the feeling of success on the examination itself? Recall

that earlier estimates established a psychic consequence of civil service examination failure in its own right. It might be the case, then, that the results observed in the left hand panel of Figure 5.4 reflect a reversed but nonetheless merely psychological effect at this different juncture. To adjudicate these competing possibilities, I leverage variation in successful applicants' decision to accept a job offer. If the results are being driven by the experience of public service—rather than, say, the aggrandizing effect of having passed a competitive examination—the estimates should persist when restricting the sample to those that received a job offer, and comparing the attitudes of individuals who accepted against those that did not. Once again, I restrict my analysis to individuals who were within 1 percentage point of an alternative disposition. Note, however, that this analysis is biased as it is subject to post-treatment bias: the decision to turn down a job offer is likely endogenous to the outcomes being measured.[26]

Biases notwithstanding, I present the results in the right hand panel of Figure 5.4. Importantly, the estimates are all directionally consistent with the results presented in the left hand panel. Individuals who were narrowly offered and accepted a job in the Indonesian civil service are 0.19 SDs less likely to support preferential treatment for regional insiders, as compared against Individuals who turned down a job that they were also narrowly offered. Moreover, individuals who were narrowly offered and accepted a job in the civil service are also 0.35 SDs less likely to indicate that there was corruption in the recruitment process. The results concerning perceptions of corruption are especially consistent with the expectations outlined above; having served in public service, successful applicants have an incentive to affirm the legitimacy of the institution for which they now work.

How should we think about the comparative magnitude of the effect of examination failure against the effect of being selected for public service? To facilitate a comparison, I present the coefficients from parallel sets of analyses in which I look at the raw survey measures, rather than the standardized outcomes measured in terms of standard deviations. This approach is intended to offer readers estimates that can be more easily compared. To start, the left panel of 5.5 looks at the attitudes of individuals who narrowly failed the general screening examination against those who were narrowly successful. The first item shows that, compared to individuals from Java who narrowly passed the general screening examination, those from Java who narrowly failed were 0.11 points more in support of the statement that "the government should focus its attention on Java," measured on a four-point scale—a finding that corresponds to a 4.3% increase. Quizzing respondents about the extent to which Indonesia's inclusivist national ideology, Pancasila, is still "relevant" on a four-point scale, reveals that those that narrowly failed the screening examination report a 0.05 point drop—a 1.5% decrease. Finally, respondents that narrowly failed the screening examination, compared to those that narrowly passed, are also 2.1 percentage points more likely to indicate that connections were more important than examination results in determining who received a job offer.

[26] See: Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres (2018). To demonstrate the robustness of my preferred interpretation despite these biases, however, I use propensity score matching in the appendix. The estimates are substantively similar to those presented in Figure 5.4, and are statistically significant.

Figure 5.5—Comparing the Magnitude of the Effect of Success and Failure



Note: The left panel shows the effect of narrowly failing the general screening examination on the individual, unadjusted attitudinal measures, as compared against the attitudes of those who narrowly narrowly. The right panel estimates the effect of narrowly passing the specialist screening examination, compared to those who narrowly failed, also looking at the unadjusted attitudinal survey measures.

The right panel of Figure 5.5, meanwhile, compares respondents' unadjusted answers to the same survey items across those that were narrowly selected for public service against those that were narrowly passed over. These estimates thus correspond to those analyses capturing the effect of public service reported above in Figure 5.3 and 5.4. Individuals from Java that were narrowly selected for a government job, compared to those narrowly not selected, are 0.2 points less in support of the statement that "the government should focus its attention on Java," measured on a four-point scale, corresponding to a 9% decrease. Looking at the item measuring respondents' view of the relevance of Pancasila, respondents who were narrowly selected, compared to those who were narrowly not selected, report a 0.05 increase on a 4-point scale. Finally, respondents that were narrowly selected for government jobs were 8.5 percentage points less likely to indicate that connections are more important than examination results.

In comparing the estimates in the right and left panels in Figure 5.5, it is clear that the substantive magnitude of the effect of public service is larger than the effect of examination failure by a factor of approximately two to three, depending on the outcome in question. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the theoretical interest of this paper concerns the impact of civil service examinations on broader attitudinal currents in Indonesia. Recall that the number of people who failed the Indonesian civil service examination in 2018-2019 (3,455,639) was 19.1 times as large as the number of people who passed (180,623), suggesting the need to weight these effect sizes according to their population-level frequency. Extrapolating away from the threshold, for instance, suggests that the experience of failure on the general screening examination may have nudged as many as 51,677 individuals to adopt the view that connections were more important that the test itself—more than three times greater than the 15,352 estimated to have been nudged to adopt the reverse attitude as a result of having been selected for service.[27]

5.3 Representational Imbalances: Citizen-Side Mechanisms

In the first part of this chapter, I showed how the outcomes of meritocratic selection procedures affects the attitudes of applicants. The evidence presented is an important building block in support of the broader argument, particularly as individuals applying for positions in the civil service, owing to educational thresholds, are typically of a higher status than the broader mass public and thus more liable to influence broader currents. And yet, although many citizens hold an aspirational relationship to the civil service, the modal encounter with the bureaucracy and the civil service is in a citizen's capacity as a service-seeker. The inequitable distribution of government jobs may affect the character and nature of frontline service delivery, with important consequences for outcomes such as national solidarity and social cohesion. In other words, the manner in which citizens experience the consequences of the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants may be through the unequal representation it occasions in street level bureaucracies.

[27] This outcome is a binary variable that takes a "1" if a respondent stated that connections were more important for the selection process than test results, and a "0" if they reported that test results were more important than connections. This calculation is of course subject to the assumption that the estimates obtained at the threshold generalize to the broader population of (non-narrow) winners and losers, which may of course be untenable in practice. Nonetheless, to obtain the estimates, I restrict the samples to the same 1pp bandwidth around the two thresholds, obtaining the following coefficients for the effects of failure and service, respectively: $\beta_1 = 0.021$ & $\beta_2 = -0.085$. Multiplying these effect sizes by the number of respective losers and winners around these thresholds (2,460,810 & 180,623) obtains the estimate of total attitudinal shift: $(0.021 \times 2,460,810) = 51,677$ and $(-0.085 \times 180,623) = 15,352$.

A rich literature in political science and public administration has concerned itself with the role of descriptive representation.[28] Typically concerned with elected officials, in recent years, political scientists have turned their attention to the role of descriptive representation among bureaucrats in determining frontline service delivery. One recent account, focusing on Yemen and Lebanon, shows how ethnic favoritism, at the behest of clientelistic politicians, flows through co-opted civil servants such that co-ethnics receive greater access to the state.[29] But work in public administration has shown that—independent of these clientelistic networks—descriptive representation affects the quality of service delivery.[30]

In this section, I evaluate two interlocking mechanisms by which inequities in descriptive representation might affect the mass public's political attitudes. These two mechanisms draw a distinction between what sorts of evidence citizens find compelling when forming beliefs—a distinction that I refer to as *sociotropic* and *egotropic* evaluations.[31] In the context of descriptive representation in the bureaucracy, an *egotropic* response would be for a citizen to experience attitudinal shifts as a result of individually encountering a civil servant with specific ascriptive traits in the context of petitioning for services. Meanwhile, a *sociotropic* response would stem from a citizen encountering information about the aggregate over- or under-representation of certain ascriptive traits in the civil service. Reading a newspaper article or academic paper about the percentage shares of different groups in public office, for instance.

These two mechanisms represent distinct paths through which uneven representation in the civil service might affect citizens' attitudes. It is worth emphasizing that, *a priori*, I hypothesized both mechanisms would affect citizens' attitudes in similar directions. From an *egotropic* perspective, I expect that individuals petitioning for services from civil servants hailing from an out-group will anticipate poorer services, and will also reflect negatively on out-groups and the nation more broadly. Meanwhile, from a *sociotropic* perspective, I expect that citizens who are presented with information about the over-representation of out-groups in the civil service will report similar attitudinal shifts.

It is finally worth mentioning that these experiments suffer from several shortcomings. For one, they may induce survey demand-effects, as respondents anticipate the direction in which the researcher expects the results to turn. Although I cannot rule this possibility out, recent research has estimated these survey demand-effects to be small in the context of survey experiments.[32] More troubling is the light touch of the experimental intervention, particularly in the context of the egotropic experiment: I am first and foremost interested in how actual, face-to-face interactions with bureaucrats of same and different backgrounds may differentially influence citizens' attitudes. An ideal experiment would have solicited citizen attitudes upon leaving an actual bureaucratic encounter. The survey experimental approach represents a second-best approach, and one that ought to approximate the effects that might obtain in the event of an actual encounter, albeit at a slightly diminished magnitude.

[28] Pitkin (1967).
[29] Corstange (2016).
[30] Pfaff et al. (2021) and Theobald and Haider-Markel (2009).
[31] Kinder and Kiewiet (1981).
[32] Mummolo and Peterson (2019).

5.3.1 Sociotropic Experiment

To test the sociotropic mechanism, I recruited a sample from the online polling platform Pollfish—the same platform used in the willingness-to-accept experiments presented in Chapter 3. As discussed before, the sample is, in general, representative of the Indonesian population, although it is more educated and younger than the overall population. By virtue of having been conducted online, the sample is also more active on social media than the overall population.

All respondents were asked to select from a drop-down menu the province in which they resided. The sample was then split into one of three groups: a (pure) control group presented with no information about the overall representation of different groups in the Indonesian civil service. The second group ("outsider treatment") was presented with information about the percentage of civil servants in their province who were born in a different province. For comparison, they were also shown the percentage of residents in the province who were born outside the province, as well. The third group ("religious treatment") was shown analogous information about the percentage of Muslim civil servants in their province, as well as the percentage of Muslim residents in their province. Two examples of these informational interventions can be seen below in Figure 5.6.

Figure 5.6—Example Informational Interventions–Sulawesi Utara



Note: The left panel shows the sociotropic information intervention for the outsider treatment; the right panel shows the sociotropic informational intervention for the religious intervention. The text of the figure is left in its original Indonesian. Here, "PNS" is a widely-understood acronym for civil servants. The lefthand bar thus indicates the share of civil servants in any given province—in this case, Sulawesi Utara—who are outsiders or Muslim. The righthand bar indicates the share of the general population who are outsiders or Muslim.

Respondents were then asked several batteries of questions designed to gauge several outcomes of hypothesized theoretical interest—all of which are analogous to the questions asked in

the applicant-side analysis, although with slight variation. For the indices gauging sentiment to religious outsiders, regional outsiders, and residents of Java, the questions are the same as those presented in Table 5.1. In the nationalism index, I removed Q10 and replaced it with a question gauging the extent to which respondents are "proud to be Indonesian" on a four-point likert scale. Finally, in lieu of a "corruption index," I ask a question designed to measure generic satisfaction with local government services ("In general, from 'very good' to 'very bad' how would you characterize your experience with obtaining services from your local government?"). Once again, for the first four indices, I construct measures following the method used in the construction of values for the applicant-side analysis, such that outcomes are measured in terms of "control-group" standard deviations.

Turning to the econometric specification, I model the effect of the informational treatment(s) on the likelihood of respondents to respond to these survey measures in the affirmative in the following form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \mathrm{T}_i + \lambda + \epsilon_i \tag{5.7}$$

Here, T_i is a vector of treatment indicators, which takes a "1" in the event that respondent i was assigned to either of the informational treatments and a "0" otherwise. Y_i is the outcome of interest—measured in terms of standard deviations from the control group average. As the treatments are assigned conditional on respodents' declared province of residence, λ is a provincial fixed-effect term. Finally, β is the parameter in which I am interested, and which carries a causal interpretation as the effect of the informational treatments on the attitudes of interest. I estimate β using OLS, with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.

I plot the estimated treatment effects for the two interventions on the five families of outcomes in Figure 5.7. The left panel shows the sociotropic information intervention for the outsider treatment, while the right panel shows the sociotropic informational intervention for the religious intervention. To start, looking at the left panel, randomly assigning respondents to receive information about the composition of the local civil service in terms of percentage of outsiders, I find that the treatment had no effect on changing respondents' attitudes towards regional, ethnic, or religious outsiders. Moreover, the treatment appeared to have no effect on the extent to which respondents identify with Indonesia's inclusivist national identity. However, I find that respondents assigned to receive information, compared to those in a control group, were less likely to report feeling satisfied with the quality of local services by a measure of 0.12 SDs ($p = 0.052$).

Figure 5.7—Results of Sociotropic Experiment



Note: The left panel shows the sociotropic information intervention for the outsider treatment; the right panel shows the sociotropic informational intervention for the religious intervention. I plot the estimated treatment effects with 90% confidence intervals.

Turning to the right panel, I show the estimated effect of presenting respondents with information about the religious composition of the local civil service. Once again, I find no effects of the informational treatment on the attitudinal measures gauging outgroup animosity, nor do I detect any effects of the informational treatment on the extent to which respondents identify with Indonesia's national identity. However, once again, I find that randomly assigning respondents to receive information about the religious composition of the local civil service leads to a 0.081 SD drop in their evaluation of the quality of public services ($p = 0.051$).

How should we interpret these results, in light of the broader theory being evaluated in this dissertation? On the one hand, the knowledge of representational imbalances in the civil service appears to have minimal effects on attitudes gauging attitudes towards both outgroups and national identification. Yet, prompting respondents with these same informational treatments does, in fact, appear to lead respondents to reflect more negatively on the quality of service delivery being provided. To the extent that government legitimacy hinges on citizen satisfaction with public services, it may be that these results suggest an alternative pathway through which representational imbalances in the bureaucracy may undermine broader efforts at nation-building, although it is worth cautioning that this connection is tenuous.

5.3.2 Egotropic Experiment

To evaluate the egotropic mechanism, I once again draw a sample from the online polling platform Pollfish. Respondents were asked to consider a routine scenario they might encounter in soliciting services at a government office. The scenario asked respondents to consider the likelihood in which a civil servant in a government clinic might help them with an act of bureaucratic kindness.

But the scenario contained three variables concerning the identity of the bureaucrat from whom they were asked to imagine soliciting services—including regional origin, ethnicity, and religion. Respondents were asked to imagine the following prompt:

> Imagine a situation in which you are seeking some medicine at the local government clinic in your district. You are greeted by the nurse who introduces himself as [NAME]. You have to be back to work in 30 minutes, but there are about a dozen other people waiting to see the doctor. While waiting, you begin chat with the nurse and it comes out that he is from [ORIGIN]. He jokes that both his parents were both [ETHNICITY]. After 30 minutes, you ask [NAME] if you could cut the line and see the doctor before the other patients because you have to get back to work.

In this scenario, the religion of the nurse is conveyed by the name—signalled as either Christian ("Agustus") or Muslim ("Mohammed"). The nurse's origin is varied as either from inside or outside the region. Meanwhile, the nurses religion takes one of six categories (Javanese, Sundanese, Batak, Chinese, Bugis, or Melayu). Each value was randomized in such a manner that each respondent had an equal chance of seeing any one of the attributes. Respondents were then asked whether they believed the bureaucrat would grant their request, and also whether or not they were satisfied with the quality of government services in their local district more generally. Then, respondents were asked the same series of questions as those asked in the sociotropic experiment.

The aim of the research design is to isolate the comparative impact of different identity features of bureaucrats on individuals' attitudes. To isolate these estimands of theoretical interest, I implement a conjoint analysis.[33] Specifically, I model the relationship between a bureaucrats' randomly-varied identity features and respondents' attitudes in the following form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Religion}_i + \beta_2 \text{Ethnicity}_i + \beta_3 \text{Origin}_i + \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i \tag{5.8}$$

Here, Y_i is a stand-in for the dichotomized outcomes of interest for respondent i. The parameters of principal interest—and which carry a causal interpretation—are β_1, β_2, and β_3 which are the average marginal component effects (AMCE). As these are factor variables, they are benchmarked against a "baseline" counterfactual value for each of these variables. The interpretation of the AMCE coefficients is the causal effect of these attributes while averaging over all of the other possible attribute profiles. It can further be interpreted as the percentage point effect of one such attribute—over all others—on attitudinal uptake.

Finally, as dominant groups likely experience the hypothesized encounter in much different terms than members of marginalized communities, the analysis takes a split sample approach. Specifically, I estimate the AMCEs for Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as for ethnic Javanese and non-ethnic Javanese.

To start, I look at the AMCEs for Muslims (left panel) and non-Muslims (right panel) in Figure 5.8. Looking at the six different outcomes for the three different conjoint features, there are few statistically significant coefficients—perhaps owing to the small sample size. Nonetheless, looking at the left panel, the direction of the AMCEs are consistent, with Muslim respondents in general more likely to adopt attitudes consistent with outgroup animus in the event of being presented

[33] Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014).

with a scenario in which the hypothetical bureaucrat is an outsider, along many dimensions. I observe no such results for non-Muslims; if anything, non-Muslims are less likely to report hostile attitudes following such a hypothetical encounter.

Figure 5.8—AMCE of Conjoint Features, Religious Split Sample



Note: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) obtained from Equation **??**. The left panel plots the AMCEs for Muslim respondents, while the right panel plots the coefficients for non-Muslim respondents, which includes Christians, Catholics, Buddhists, and Hindus. The different indices are dichotomized variables that take a "1" in the event that a respondent agrees with any of the statements in the family of outcomes and a "0" otherwise. Thus, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of the randomly assigned component on the percentage point increase or decrease in likelihood of agreeing with the family of outcomes.

Next, I examine the AMCEs for ethnic Javanese (left panel) and non-ethnic Javanese (right panel) in Figure 5.9. Here, in contrast with the earlier results looking at the role of bureaucrat religion, I detect no evidence that the dominant ethnic group (Javanese) are more likely to experience attitudinal shifts following hypothesized encounters with outgroups. Instead, I find that non-Javanese experience particularly meaningful attitudinal shifts following a hypothesized encounter with a non-coethnic, suggesting that minoritized groups are particularly sensitive to bureaucratic representation along an ethnic axis. Specifically, I find a statistically significant drop in generalized service satisfaction among non-Javanese who were presented with a non-coethnic bureaucrat in the hypothesized scenario ($p = 0.053$), corresponding to a 5.3% drop over a baseline scenario in which they encountered a co-ethnic.

Figure 5.9—AMCE of Conjoint Features, Ethnicity Split Sample



Note: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) obtained from Equation **??**. The left panel plots the AMCEs for self-reported ethnic Javanese respondents, while the right panel plots the coefficients for non-Javanese respondents, inclusive of all other ethnic groups in Indonesia. Again, the different indices are dichotomized variables that take a "1" in the event that a respondent agrees with any of the statements in the family of outcomes and a "0" otherwise. Thus, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of the randomly assigned component on the percentage point increase or decrease in likelihood of agreeing with the family of outcomes.

5.3.3 Summary

The evidence presented in this chapter reflects an effort to test a crucial aspect of the theoretical argument: that the decision to recruit civil servants meritocratically has important consequences for broader attitudinal currents, particularly as they relate to outcomes such as social cohesion and national solidarity. I have drawn a distinction between two distinct logics by which these results might obtain. First, I look at the experience of failing and passing the civil service examination, an experience that may shift attitudes in important ways when the composition of successful test-takers hails disproportionately from one ethnic, racial, or religious group. Given that large numbers of individuals apply for jobs in the civil service in low- and middle-income countries—and that prospective applicants are *a priori* elite owing to educational requirements for applying in the first place—these effects ought to be operating on an important tranche of society. Second, I look at the attitudes of the mass public, anticipating that the experience of petitioning for services from

The evidence is mixed, but consistent with the argument outlined in Chapter 2. Looking at

the "applicant-side" effects, I find that failure on the general screening examination leads to an uptick in support for Javan preferentialism among Javans, a decrease in support for the Indonesian national identity, and an increase in a belief that the recruitment process was corrupt—findings which suggest that the effect of failure is causally significant. I document the reverse trend among individuals who were narrowly selected for public service, looking at the outcomes of the specialist competence examination. In sum, the results suggest that the outcomes of civil service examinations—the hallmark of meritocratic recruitment—generate significant and substantively meaningful attitudinal rifts among successful and unsuccessful applicants.

Looking at the "citizen-side" effects, I find that prompting Indonesian respondents with knowledge about the demographic composition of their local civil servants affects their perceptions about the quality of service delivery. This is true both for information regarding the regional origin of civil servants, as well as their religious composition. I find effects on national solidarity that are directionally consistent with the hypotheses, but not statistically significant. Meanwhile, prompting respondents to consider a hypothetical encounter with a local civil servant of varying demographic characteristics has less well-defined effects, possibly owing to the weak nature of the treatment associated with the survey experiment. Nonetheless, for certain well-defined subpopulations, I find that respondents who consider an encounter with an outgroup bureaucrat to be less likely to identify with the Indonesian national identity, and also less satisfied with the quality of service delivery.

How should readers interpret these results, on balance? Clearly, the results are stronger for the "applicant-side" mechanisms, as compared to the "citizen-side" mechanisms. To the extent that civil service reform undermines nation-building efforts, this suggests that it may chiefly operate through the associated frustrated ambitions among the upper echelons of (in this case) Indonesian society, rather than the attitudes of the mass public. As discussed, 3,636,262 applicants—or 2% of the entire population—applied for 180,623 vacancies in 2018, a figure consistent with previous years' demand for government jobs. Yet the exam is limited to an elite tier of Indonesian society: individuals with a college degree between the ages of 18–34. In other words, 46.2% of all eligible Indonesians applied for a job in the civil service in 2018, with the overwhelming majority failing in the process. The idea that this class of individuals—frustrated, well-educated youth—hold considerable sway in the broader attitudinal currents in any given country finds support from a wide array of recent historical and sociological explorations. And as I will show in the next chapter, it is also precisely this class of individuals that were decisive in the process of nation-building in the decades building up to Indonesia's independence. That the same demographic tranche could upend efforts at nation-building in a mature Indonesia seems doubly plausible in light of the evidence that this group also forged the nation at its nascent moments.

Chapter 6

Meritocracy and Patronage in Colonial Southeast Asia

In the penultimate chapter of *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson calls readers' attention to an enduring puzzle for students of Southeast Asian history: Why did French Indochina splinter into three political units while the Dutch East Indies emerged as a single national polity? To casual observers, the geographic contiguity of French Indochina and the archipelagic properties of the Dutch East Indies makes the divergence particularly stunning. Attesting to the *a priori* plausibility of the comparison, one observer remarked in the 1930s, "[t]he region most akin to Indochina, where many of the same economic and administrative issues are encountered, is the Netherlands East Indies."[1] Equally important, there was no shortage of indigenous elites in French Indochina who had imagined an *Indochinese* nationality, nor was the Dutch East Indies at a loss for separatist movements during the years leading up to postwar independence. In other words, alternative outcomes were plausible.

One explanation concerns the duration of colonial rule. The Dutch presence on Java dates back to the early seventeenth century. Meanwhile, the French conquest of Indochina was carried out during the late nineteenth century. After three centuries of Dutch rule, pre-colonial commitments—ethnic or otherwise—may have been sublimated in ways that did not occur in the century of French colonial rule. In taking up Anderson's puzzle, this is the explanation offered by David Henley.[2] But this explanation fails when considered in light of the fact that the vast majority of territory that came to constitute the present-day borders of Indonesia—including most of Kalimantan, Papua, and Sulawesi—was only secured by the early twentieth century.

Anderson, for his part, argues that multiple factors explain the divergence, including differences in colonial education policy. But, he places a particular emphasis on the administrative structures in the Dutch East Indies. In attempting to build a bureaucratic polity, the Dutch rulers transferred bureaucrats of all ethnicities around the archipelago. Indonesia "survived," according to this account, because "colonial administrative policy did not rusticate educated Sundanese to the Sundalands, or Batak to their place of origin."[3] Instead, by offering opportunities for work in the colonial bureaucracy, the Dutch spurred intergroup contact and, inadvertently, an ethnically inclusive Indonesian national identity borne out of the bureaucratic *bonhomie* of a newly

[1] Ennis (1936, 2).
[2] Henley (1995).
[3] Anderson (1990, 132).

educated and diverse elite.

Yet, Anderson only offers an answer to one-half of the puzzle, as he does not articulate the logic by which French Indochina fractured, an oversight taken up in a recent account by Christopher Goscha. In *Going Indochinese*, Goscha builds upon Anderson's interest in the role of administrative structures in explaining the fracturing of French Indochina, placing a particular emphasis on the overrepresentation of Annamese in the colonial bureaucracy, particularly in Cambodia and Laos. An "Indochinese" nationality failed to emerge, according to this account, because the Vietnamese lorded over Cambodians and Laotians in bureaucratic roles during the French colonial rule—an experience that heightened inter-ethnic grievances. Goscha writes:

> "The problem was that an increasing number of Vietnamese located in urban centers, pushing pencils in the colonial bureaucracy...bumped up against an urban-based Cambodian and Laotion nationalist elite increasingly opposed to the growing role the Vietnamese were playing in the administration and modernization of *their* state."[4]

However, if one finds the emphasis on colonial administrative structures compelling, as I do, then Anderson and Goscha's arguments are at theoretical unease with one another. Both authors propose the same explanation—co-ethnic intermingling in the bureaucracy—to explain divergent outcomes. Yet these twinned accounts gesture towards the plausibility of the central claim of this dissertation: that variation in the manner in which governments decide to recruit its employees is an important factor in explaining social cohesion and, by extension, the process of nation-building.

The aim of this chapter is thus threefold. First, I present fresh evidence evaluating both Goscha and Anderson's theories. Specifically, I compile yearly panel datasets of the indigenous civil services in both French Indochina (1900–1941) and Dutch East Indies (1882–1942). These data were compiled using optical character recognition software to process and clean over 400,000 pages from analogous government periodicals that served as directories: the *Regeerings-Almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indie* and the *Bulletins Administratif*. In doing so, I find evidence in support of Goscha's theory of French Indochina's fracturing. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Vietnamese constituted an overwhelming majority of the nominations and transfers in the colonial bureaucracy of Annam, Tonkin and, crucially, Cambodia and Laos. However, I find little evidence in support of Anderson's argument. Looking at Java in particular, transfers and circulations were rare in the Dutch East Indies: in any given year, the average senior civil servant faced less than a 10% chance of a transfer. But more importantly, and more troublingly for Anderson's argument, when transfers did occur, they almost never crossed salient ethnic boundaries.

What, then, explains the connection between administrative practice in the Dutch East Indies and the emergence of an inclusive process of nation-building? The second goal of this chapter is to answer this question by developing and defending an alternative theory of nation-building in late colonial Indonesia—one that is consistent with the broader theoretical claims of this dissertation. I argue that through the so-called "Ethical Policy" (c. 1900–1942), colonial administrative policy reinforced a form of aristocratic patronage in the recruitment of civil servants, with the consequence being ethnic self-rule. But this arrangement generated *intra-ethnic* resentment directed towards the co-opted hereditary elite. This resentment existed on two levels. On the one hand,

[4]Goscha (2013)

thanks to the rigid aristocratic structure, members of the lesser elite were increasingly closed out from opportunities to share in power under their hereditary rulers. On the other hand, and by the same aristocratic structure, the mass public came to view the hereditary rulers as a durable symbol of collaborationist extraction and extortion. The final turn in this theory is probabilistic: these patterns of resentment made possible horizontal *inter-ethnic* identification as lesser elites from diverse groups (i.e., Javanese, Sundanese, Batak) made common cause of their parallel resentments and crafted inclusive nationalist appeals to persuade a broad coalition of aggrieved members of the mass public. I present further evidence attesting to the plausibility of this claim by drawing on qualitative contemporaneous accounts.

The third aim of this chapter is to reframe Goscha's argument by emphasizing the theoretical centrality of the institutions through which the French occasioned an overrepresentation of Annammese into the colonial bureaucracy. The French explicitly carried out a *mission civilisatrice* in which they sought to pave over ethnic differences and forge a sense of *fraternité*; chief among these interventions was the introduction of putatively race-neutral competitive examinations for the selection of civil servants. Unsurprisingly, the Cambodians and Laotians saw things differently.

6.1 Varieties of Indigenous Recruitment

6.1.1 French Indochina

The French presence in mainland Southeast Asia dates to the early 17th century with the excursions of missionaries. Official government penetration of the peninsula began in earnest in the mid-eighteenth century, when the French established a beachhead in present-day southern Vietnam—a region known as Cochinchina—through which the activities of both commercial interests and missionaries originated. These activities were often met with hostility and violence on the part of the native population. Using violence against missionaries as a pretense, Napoleon III initiated an attack on the broader region of Cochinchina in 1858.[5] After the defeat of local forces, the French initially negotiated control of three provinces of Cochinchina in 1862, before seizing the rest in 1867. Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, and through a combination of diplomacy and military might, the French successfully seized control of Cambodia (1863), Annam (1887), Tonkin (1887) and Laos (1899).

Across Indochina, the French encountered radically different systems of governance. The regions of western Indochina—Annam, Cochinchina, Tonkin—were heavily influenced by Chinese models of governance. In these regions, a highly-functioning mandarinate headed by an emperor had managed affairs since the eleventh century. Here, mandarins were selected through literary examinations to serve in roles as simultaneously a "priest, magistrate, and administrator."[6] Mandarins in these regions were revered and effectuated a highly efficient bureaucracy. Although both Cambodia and Laos boasted mandarinates, as well, these systems were less-well established: in Cambodia, mandarins were agents of a singularly powerful king that could revoke their authority at his discretion.[7]

Despite these differences, the French pursued an interest in "assimilation" across the French

[5] See *Le Moniteur Universel*, November 14, 1858 and Ennis (1936, 36).
[6] Thompson (1937, 242).
[7] Thompson (1937, 328).

Indochinese Union formed in 1887—a policy springing from its *mission civilisatrice* and which sought to deliver to the indigenous population Western institutions of governance. According to one account,

> [t]ypical French rationale evoked for intervention had been the premise of "mission civilisatrice," or to spread Western civilization to the indigenous... Throughout the French Empire stretching from the Caribbean to Africa to Indochina, there was a constant conscious effort to install a system that would "frenchify" the populations: 'to make over non-European people in the 'civilized' images of Europeans.' In theory, this policy was deemed in accordance with the character of Republican France.[8]

The consequence of French pre-occupation with its theoretical ideals was its decision to introduce identical institutions in these places. Except for Cochinchina, which was ruled directly from the metropole, the other four territories of Indochina were established as "protectorates" with analogous institutions of government. [9] One contemporaneous observer wrote, "the protectorate ideal is identical for both Cambodia and Annam, but the institutions already existing in the two countries were not comparable."

The affairs of the French Indochinese Union were officially under the purview of the Ministry of Colonies. In practice, the French Indochinese Union was headed by a governor-general, appointed from the metropole, who retained executive control over the affairs of the colony. The size of the French bureaucracy in Indochina was comparable to other similarly situated colonial possessions: in 1926, there were 5,613 Frenchmen attached to the colonial services.[10] In addition to a huge number of councils and services under the direct control of the governor-general, most of these civil servants were appointed to roles across the local administration of the four protectorates.[11] Each of the four protectorates was headed by a chief resident, each of whom was theoretically accountable to the governor of Cochinchina.

In addition to its core of foreign administrators, the French recruited large numbers from the indigenous population into the ranks of the local civil service. Many of these recruits went to a native police force, known as the *Garde Indigène*. But many more were recruited to work in functional roles—as surveyors, translators, nurses, tax collectors, and clerks. Importantly, the French co-opted the mandarins wherever they encountered them, leveraging their local knowledge towards the excise of taxes and levies, in particular.[12] But the French slowly discredited the mandarinate by elevating opportunistic low-level clerks and administrators to the nominal status of mandarins, misunderstanding the ways in which their spiritual role was bound up in their administrative authority. Samuel Popkin writes, "[b]y 1920 , the traditional mandarinate was so discredited among the population that the French—still preserving the fiction of a protectorate—abandoned

[8] Vu (2012).

[9] Thompson (1937, 395) writes "[u]ltimate responsibility can be laid at the door of French belief in the absolute value of theory. If an institution is good for France it has equal value in the colonies, or anywhere else in the world, for that matter."

[10] Ennis (1936, 70).

[11] See, in particular, Ennis (1936, 73-76).

[12] Ennis (1936, 64) describes how the French required the mandarins "submit lists of money collected from the cantons and communes. In order to retain their "revenues" and satisfy their superiors, the authorities are obliged to exact higher payments from the natives."

the traditional mandarin examinations and began to recruit civil servants with European-style education and qualifications."[13]

Central to its assimilationist policy, the French introduced a system of competitive examinations for the selection of civil servants. By the late-nineteenth century, the French had convinced King Sisowath of Cambodia to introduce a system for the hiring of senior posts that included a competitive examinations.[14] Elsewhere across the French Indochinese Union, as in Tonkin and Annam, the system of examinations was easily grafted onto existing institutions, whereby mandarins had been selected through literary examinations. Importantly, however, these examinations were conducted in French—a fact that necessitated indigenous applicants to first seek out education in French language schools, which were disproportionately located in Tonkin and Annam.

The consequence of these reforms, along with the unification of the indigenous civil services under the French Indochinese Union, was that the Annamese were particularly well-positioned to obtain positions in the local civil services. This was particularly striking in Cambodia and Laos, where a steady flow of Annamese civil servants were brought into the local administration. One historian observes that "[a]ll French policy in Cambodia was tempered by the perceived superiority of the Vietnamese... This resulted in Vietnamese, rather than Cambodians, taking the majority of the 'native' civil service positions available."[15] The urban centers in Laos were no different. Phetsarath Ratanavongsa, the first prime minister of Laos, was explicit in his frustration with the underrepresentation of Laotians in the Indochinese bureaucracy: "Phetsarath demanded ... the replacement of the Protectorate's [Lao's] Vietnamese personnel by Laotians, who made up only 54% of all civil servants in 1937."[16]

6.1.2 Dutch East Indies

Following the bankruptcy of the Dutch East Indies Company in 1803, the Dutch government finally took control of the Indonesian archipelago in 1815. In order to extract as much as possible, the Dutch were mainly concerned with achieving the complacency of the subjugated indigenous population, a principle known as *ruste en orde* (peace and quiet). Administrative practice was central to the achievement of this goal. The Dutch created two parallel bureaucracies. The first branch (*binnenlands bestuur*) was staffed by European administrators, and was the final source of authority. The number of European bureaucrats outside the colonial capital of Batavia was small; it was estimated that there were no more than 500 Europeans administering a population of nearly 40 million in 1900.[17] The second branch (*pangreh pradja*) was staffed by indigenous

[13]The date of this reform is actually unclear. Brocheux and Hémery (2011, 211) indicate that it was in in 1915 when the "French government suppressed the traditional examinations." Other instances of French degradation of the mandarinate are common. In one such instance, described by Ennis (1936, 67), "a native assistant to the mayor of Hanoi [a mandarin] was accused by a colleague of certain irregularities... A court trial was initiated, accordingly, and the crier called the names of plaintiff and defendant...The incident had no unusual significance for the French; yet the Annamites attached great importance to the affair. The prestige of the unfortunate mandarin on trial had been injured. His name had been pronounced... According to Annamite code, when speaking of all individuals, proper names cannot be used. To call by name one who bears the nomenclature of his ancestors constitutes a crime."

[14]Osborne (1969, 255).

[15]Jacobsen (2018, 79).

[16]Brocheux and Hémery (2011, 284).

[17]Day (1904).

elite, and was largely tasked with implementing decisions made by the European bureaucracy. It was hoped that this arrangement—in which colonial subjects were directly administered by non-Europeans—would blunt the harsher aspects of colonial rule and maintain peace and quiet.

In staffing the *pangreh pradja*, the Dutch drew from the *priyayi*—the upper echelon of Javanese society composed of an aristocratic elite.[18] Although the geographic extent of *priyayi* authority had historically been diffuse, the Dutch quickly imposed rigid administrative boundaries. For the European administrative service, the most important unit was the residency—a first tier administrative unit of which there were approximately twenty on Java. A Dutch "resident" governed each of these units with mostly unencumbered discretion. For the indigenous civil service, the most important administrative unit was the regency—a second tier administrative unit of which there were approximately eighty on Java. A Dutch "assistant-resident" was assigned to each of these units in a "big brother" advisory role. The most senior position in the *pangreh pradja* was a "regent," who was equivalent in rank to the assistant-resident. Most regencies were headed by a regent. The regent was typically assisted by a single assistant-regent (*patih*), who served as an advisor. Beneath the assistant-regent were the district chiefs (*wedanas*) and sub-district chiefs (*assistant wedanas*), who were tasked with the direct administration of districts and sub-districts, respectively. It was this final tier of the *pangreh pradja* that interacted with the indigenous population and truly administered the colony.

The tasks delegated to the *pangreh pradja* were vast when compared to those afforded to the indigenous civil services elsewhere in the region, such as in British Malaya or French Indochina. According to the colonial administrator J.S. Furnivall, "[i]n Java the administrative officials are not servants of the law but officers of policy or policy and, in rural areas, until quite recently there was no organized police force apart from the civil servants."[19] In addition to serving as a police force, the civil servants served as judges, as well. Most of this judicial work fell to the regents, who were also charged with managing subordinates. Naturally, most of the work involving face-to-face interactions with subjects—policing, encouraging economic development, or collecting taxes—fell to the lower rungs of the *pangreh pradja*, such as district and sub-district chiefs. Heather Sutherland describes this arrangement: "[t]he maintenance of symbolic authority and the exertion of charismatic leadership increasingly became the function of the highest officials, the regents, while the regent's assistant, the patih, and the district chiefs (wedana) handled the actual routine of government under [*binnenlands bestuur*] direction."[20]

Given the importance of administrative practice, the recruitment of civil servants in the Dutch East Indies was a prominent concern of the colonial rulers.[21] From the perspective of the Dutch rulers, recruitment was a tool for building support among local elites to solidify their control. Broadly, the Dutch were careful to maintain what they perceived to be "traditional" patterns of authority. Sutherland describes, for instance, that "as a rule, the higher positions in the native civil service (even the non-hereditary ones) went to people of high birth, as the prestige attached to the aristocracy was felt to make them more effective officials."[22] In other words, the system of recruiting civil servants to the *pangreh pradja* was best described as aristocratic.

Since 1854, the highest position in the indigenous civil service—the regent—was granted

[18] Geertz (1976).
[19] Furnivall (1948, 238).
[20] **?**, 75.
[21] Steinberg, Roff and Chandler (1971, 198-210).
[22] **?**, 110.

Figure 6.1—Administrative hierarchy in Dutch East Indies



Note: The shaded boxes represent positions held by members of the European civil service (*binnenlands bestuur*). Those boxes without shading represent positions filled by the *pangreh pradja*, and are those positions that are included in the data presented in this paper. Further positions in the *pangreh pradja* not included in this chart include the sub-district chief—known as an assistant *wedana*.

through hereditary succession. The term for these positions was lifelong. Lower positions, such as assistant regents and district chiefs were recruited through a mixed system of aristocratic patronage. This was particularly true prior to 1840, when the regents were able to unilaterally appoint district chiefs. But it remained true afterwards, as well. After 1840, the official appointment lay with the governor general, but was heavily influenced by the input of the regent. Applications for these positions—the assistant regents and district chiefs—were made by submitting a *surat asal usul* (statement of genealogy) and a *conduitestaat* (statement of work) to the relevant Dutch resident. The local regent's input was influential since he was invariably more familiar with the applicants than the governor general or the resident. This arrangement served to enable patronage as applicants sought to ingratiate themselves to the regents. Sutherland reports that "this system revolved around complex interlocking networks of patron-client relationships."[23] Assistant regents and district chiefs were typically expected to serve in their positions for two to five years, although there appears to have been significant variation in the duration.[24]

To be sure, there were exceptions to this system of aristocratic recruitment. For the most part, aristocratic recruitment only occurred for members of the general administrative civil service. Lower clerical positions were occasionally recruited through exams.[25] This is not suggest that members of the *pangreh pradja* were comparatively unqualified, either. By 1900, the Dutch had established schools for training members of the indigenous civil service (*Opleiding School Voor*

[23] **?**, 138.

[24] Sutherland (1973).

[25] "Except for what may be called the subordinate clerical positions, the native officials were not selected by means of examinations. The most important positions, held by the regents, were recruited by a hereditary succession, tempered by fitness, while the lesser officials were selected freely, a good deal of attention being paid to social influence over the other natives" Hadisumarto (1975, 134).

Inlandsche Ambtenaren, or OSVIA). And by the 1920s, nearly all regents and assistant-regents, along with many district chiefs, were graduates of OSVIA. Importantly, admission to these schools was discretionary and thus served to maintain—rather than upend—aristocratic recruitment.

The important consequence of these patterns of recruitment was localized self-rule. At the senior levels, hereditary succession ensured that districts were governed by regents of the same ethnicity. In tumultuous regencies—such as those in Banten—the Dutch occasionally tried to install regents from elsewhere, but these efforts were often met with protest and rioting.[26] At the lower levels, since aristocratic patronage was the avenue to employment in the civil service, aspiring candidates found it easiest to seek out work in areas where they had the greatest number of connections.[27]

6.2 The Representational Consequences of Patronage and Meritocracy

6.2.1 Data

French Indochina To collect data on the movements of indigenous members of the local civil services in French Indochina, I leverage scans of the *Bulletins Administratif*. Each protectorate published its own version of these bulletins, which served to deliver notices of civil servant appointments, transfers, promotions, dismissals, and leaves of absence to all corners of the colony. Much of the content of bulletins was keeping agents of the French colonial state appraised of rules, regulations, and general concerns of governance. The bulletins were published monthly, bi-monthly, or weekly—depending on the protectorate in question. With the exception of Cochichina, which only began publishing bulletins in 1927, the bulletins offer an impressively detailed window into the administrative practice of French Indochina between 1900-1941.

Importantly, each bulletin concluded with a section titled "personnel indigène" which was dedicated specifically to the movements of members of the indigenous civil service. The structure of information contained in these orders was considerably varied. In one illustrative example from the *Bulletin Administratif du Cambodge*, dated June 1, 1931, an order reads: "the secretary Nguyen-van-Tham, demoted by the aforementioned decree, is reinstated in his job, from the date of his taking up of service, as secretary of the 8th class and appointed to serve in Kratié." In other cases, the bulletins include tables listing the names and appointments of large numbers of new recruits.

To digitize these bulletins, I followed a two part process. First, I extracted the pages of the text specifically dedicated to describing the movements of the indigenous civil service. Next, for three of the protectorates' bulletins (Annam, Cambodia, Laos), I used optical character recognition software to render the text manipulable. For the bulletins from Tonkin, I relied on the French National Archives' text recognition software, and downloaded the text files directly.

[26] Following the dissolution of the Banten Sultanate in 1811, for example, the Dutch attempted to create a new hereditary lineage of rulers, drawing on elite from neighboring Sunda. The population rebelled, according to Sutherland (1973): "there was general insistence that the [regent] be, firstly, Bantenese."

[27] Marriage across districts among the elite was often actively discouraged. For instance, "[i]n the colonial period, the priyayi (bureaucratic upper class) of Tegal, claiming direct linear descent from the royal house of Mataram, actively discouraged marriage alliances with Pekalongan priyayi families, whom they claimed were descendants of an upstart collaborator who had helped the Dutch East India Company in Semarang. The impact of priyayi rivalries has been reinforced by dialect differences" Lucas (1977, 88).

Ideally, I would create an individual-level panel dataset and track the movements of indigenous civil servants across French Indochina. However, owing to extensive variation in the structure of the bulletins, this process proved impossible. Instead, I adopt the bulletin as the unit of analysis and examine the proportion of names mentioned in the document hailing from specific nationalities—Cambodian, Laos, and Vietnamese. This approach involves directly matching words in the text to a dictionary of names, which I assembled from several sources. After identifying and extracting all the names in these documents, I calculate the proportion hailing from the three nationalities.

This approach involves at least two important biases. First, it might be that the optical character recognition software is better at correctly rendering the text of certain names—and that these names are systematically more likely to come from one nationality or another. Importantly, Vietnamese names have a larger share of diacritical marks, which may be particularly hard for optical character recognition software to render if it is expecting Roman characters. Yet, recall, that the central hypothesis of this research is that the Vietnamese were disproportionately represented in the indigenous bureaucracy. In other words, this bias ought to have a null-biasing effect. Second, as this approach does not code for the action taken with respect to the names (i.e., promotion, nomination, demotion) it may be the case that a disproportionate representation of names from, say, Vietnam may, in fact, represent a purge of Vietnamese bureaucrats being demoted. A manual inspection of the documents, however, reveals that demotions are a small fraction of the total content—with the overwhelming majority of mentions coming from nominations, transfers, and promotions.

Dutch East Indies To collect data on the nominations, transfers, and promotions in the *pangreh pradja*, I turn to the *Regeerings-Almanak*—a yearly periodical serving as a directory and almanac for the Dutch East Indies. The total coverage of the documents is over 1815-1942, thus spanning nearly the entire duration of Dutch colonization, following the collapse of the Dutch East Indies Company. Starting 1881, the *Regeerings-Almanak* started printing information on members of the indigenous civil service. For the *pangreh pradja*, the almanac recorded the names of all regents and assistant-regents from 1881 onwards. Starting in 1888, it expanded its coverage to include district chiefs. It does not include information on subdistrict chiefs. For the European civil service, the *Regeerings-Almanak* also recorded the names of all residents and assistant residents.

In addition to the names of members of the indigenous civil service, the *Regeerings-Almanak* recorded important covariates. First, it included the regency (and district) in which members of the *pangreh pradja* served. This enables the measurement of transfers from year-to-year. Second, it included the date of appointment. Finally, third, the names of civil servants encode important information for distinguishing the position of an individual within the traditional hierarchy. These hereditary titles of nobility, in descending order of elevation, include: *Pangeran*, *Raden Mas*, *Raden*, and *Mas*.

The *Regeerings-Almanak* includes information on civil servants in the outer islands (e.g., those outside of Java), particularly for the later years. However, I restrict my focus to Java for at least three reasons. First, Java was the historical center of the Dutch presence in the Indonesian archipelago. Most of the outer islands only came under the control of the Dutch towards the end of the nineteenth century. Their inclusion in any analysis would introduce an unusual geographic bias. Even within Java there is important variation in the ethnic composition of the population, with the most salient division between the Javanese (70%) on the eastern two-thirds

of the island, and the Sundanese (25%) on the western third. Second, the administrative structure of the outer islands varied significantly from those on Java. In some cases, they adopted the structure of the *pangreh pradja* (such as in North Sulawesi). But the Dutch mostly demanded that local rulers swear fealty, and then let them structure their administration as they wished. In addition to introducing differences in administrative structure, third, this variation introduces difficulties to the digitization process. The records of administrators in the outer islands are inconsistent with the structure of those from Java, therefore making a generalized scraping difficult.

Turning to the digitization process, I adopted a three-step process: First, I obtained the scanned pdf documents from the Dutch National Archives in The Hague and processed the pages through open-source optical character recognition software. This process rendered the text manipulable. The output typically contained systematic errors, particularly since the scans of the *Regeerings-Almanak* were often imperfect and the typeface fonts changed from year-to-year. As well, the documents were sometimes inconsistently formatted. Therefore, second, I processed the raw text by extracting the lines of text surrounding keywords to capture relevant civil service positions, such as "regent," "patih," and "wedana." The resulting chunks of text were cleaned and geo-located. Finally, third, I created both unique regency identifiers and unique person identifiers to track transfers and promotions. Because of variation in year-to-year in the quality of the OCR output of the scans, there are still occasional typos in the spelling of regencies and names. This makes direct-matching difficult. Given the number of regencies, I manually created a dictionary of misspellings to create the geographic identifiers. Unfortunately, given the number of unique civil servants, the manual construction of a dictionary of misspellings of civil servant names would be unbearably time consuming. Instead, I create a nearest-neighbor string distance matching algorithm to assign unique person identifiers. This algorithm is conservative: anything more than a difference of two characters between two strings are interpreted as unique strings. Otherwise, nearly-identical strings are matched to the same unique personal identifier. There is good reason to think this is an accurate process, since Indonesian names among the elite are typically long, complicated, and highly distinct.

This process introduces certain possible biases into the dataset, and the resulting analysis. It is possible, for instance, that the OCR software is inaccurately rendering the text and thus not enabling my program to detect the mention of the civil service positions that I use to extract the relevant chunks of text. I have intentionally included common misspellings (e.g., detecting both "regent" and "fegent"). Nonetheless, owing to variation in the OCR software itself, rather than any underlying institutional mechanism, these missing data are likely missing completely at random.

6.2.2 Vietnamese Hegemony in French Indochina

To start, I consider the changing composition of the indigenous civil service in the four protectorates of French Indochina: Annam, Cambodia, Laos, and Tonkin. Cochinchina is excluded from this analysis as its bulletins are only available from 1927 onwards. Recall that the main expectation of this analysis, building on the qualitative work of earlier scholars, is that the Vietnamese held a disproportionate share of the roles in all protectorates—but that the Vietnamese were crucially overrepresented in Cambodia and Laos.

Figure 6.2 presents the share of names appearing in the monthly bulletins for Cambodia and Laos, binned by year. Several features of these figures are worth emphasizing. First, and consistent with the existing literature, the overwhelming share of names mentioned in both Laos

and Cambodia's bulletins are for Vietnamese bureaucrats. In Laos, in 1910, 93.7% of names mentioned in the monthly bulletins were Vietnamese. This number declined to 72.2% by 1940, with the downturn being offset by an uptick in representation for Lao names. Turning to the Cambodian panel, the trends look broadly similar. In 1902, 94.3% names mentioned in the Cambodian bulletins were Vietnamese, a figure that stayed high through 1940, at which point the share of names that were Vietnamese stood at 86.8%. Second, despite slight fluctuations, the comparative representation of Khmer, Lao, and Vietnamese are remarkably stable over time. In one sense, this supports the validity of the estimates. But it also supports the broader interpretation: despite institutional changes in the manner in which civil servants were recruited—i.e., as through schools—the hegemony of the Vietnamese was unchallenged.

Figure 6.2—Bureaucrat Names in Cambodia and Laos, 1900-1941



Note: The left panel shows the proportion of indigenous bureaucrat names in Laos between 1900-1941 that were of Khmer, Lao, or Vietnamese origin. The right panel shows the names for the same analysis for Cambodia.

Figure 6.3 presents an analogous analysis of the share of names from different nationalities appearing in the monthly administrative bulletins for Annam and Tonkin. Of course, the main theoretical interest here is in the representation of different groups in Cambodia or Laos—those protectorates that were ultimately shorn off of Indochina. Yet, it may be the case that, under the broader umbrella of the French Indochinese Union, the ethnic Khmer and Lao were circulated to points beyond their respective regions, thus offsetting any disproportionate representation of Vietnamese in Cambodia or Laos. Figure 6.3 shows that this is not the case: few-to-no Khmer or Lao names were detected in the monthly administrative bulletins for Annam and Tonkin.

These results are purely circumstantial: there are likely other factors that influenced the post-colonial fracturing of French Indochina. Yet, the evidence presented here dovetails with a widely

Figure 6.3—Bureaucrat Names in Annam and Tonkin, 1900-1941



Note: The left panel shows the proportion of indigenous bureaucrat names in Annam (present-day Vietnam) between 1900-1941 that were of Khmer, Lao, or Vietnamese origin. The right panel shows the names for the same analysis for Tonkin (also present-day Vietnam).

shared sense of grievances on the part of the Khmer and Lao who saw their respective governments being co-opted by ethnic outsiders—a dynamic that motivated the articulation and voicing of alternative bases of political identity. Borne out of the frustration of bureaucratic underrepresentation, a nationalist movement in Cambodia formed under the motto "Cambodia for Cambodians," a slogan that underscores the centrality of representational concerns in debates over post-colonial visions. Writing an editorial in *La Presse Indochine*, a Cambodian nationalist wrote, "our administrative bureaucracies, our schools, our hospitals are occupied by the Annamese... I'm not a jurist, but I find this arrangement unjust."[28] Highlighting the importance of recruitment institutions, in an editorial in the same paper three weeks later on July 21, 1934, a prominent Annamese bureaucrat in Cambodia defended the arrangement: "the candidates who are called upon to work in a French administration have indispensable talents, particularly decided by the results of an examination, such that those who pass are declared capable of performing the service for which they are engaged."

6.2.3 Ethnic Self-Rule in Dutch East Indies

First, I examine the transfer of indigenous civil servants on Java between 1882-1942. Much of the previous literature has emphasized that transfers were common, particularly among assistant-regents and district chiefs. As a benchmark, consider that, for one estimate, the author argues that"Wedana, Assistant Wedana and Patih were posted to different areas...often serving two to

[28] *La Presse Indochinoise.* July 1, 1934

five years in each place."[29] This would suggest yearly transfer rates in the range of 20–50%.[30]

Figure 6.4—Transfer probability, Java, 1881–1942



Note: Percent of members of the *pangreh pradja* who were transferred to a new district in any given year. The dashed line (10.1%) is the pooled average. Yearly averages pool across all positions within the *pangreh pradja*, including regents, assistant-regents, and district chiefs. The spike in 1928 is likely due to the massive disciplinary transfers that follow the communist uprisings in 1926–1927.

To start, how likely was it for a member of the indigenous civil service to be transferred to a new regency in any given year? Figure 6.4 graphs the percentage of indigenous civil servants who were transferred to a new regency in any given year between 1882-1942. To be clear, for each year, these numbers represent the percentage of civil servants who are serving in a regency different than the one in which they were serving the prior year. Two trends stand out. First, the overall percentage of transfers was low: the dashed line represents the pooled average of transfers over 1882–1942, which stood at 10.1%. This is considerably lower than the percentage of transfers that was predicted by early work suggesting that indigenous civil servants were transferred every two to five years (for which we would expect 20-50% transfer rates). Second, the percentage of transfers slightly increases over time, from 9% in 1883 to 18% in 1942, although this trend is inconsistent. The highest percentage of transfers occurs suddenly in 1928, when nearly 28% of indigenous civil servants were transferred to new regencies. It seems highly possible that this was a consequence of the widespread communist uprisings in the previous two years (1926–27).

[29] **?**, 92-93.

[30] A Dutch government report investigating the causes of the 1926–27 Communist uprisings placed partial blame on the extent of transfers, writing, "[t]he inability of this system to function efficiently was aggravated even more by the continual transfers which took place." See Dutch Government (1927, 33).

Figure 6.5—Transfer distance, Java, 1881–1942



Note: Distance traveled to new post from old post, among transferred indigenous civil servants. The box represents the 25–75 percentiles, with the black line representing the 50th percentile. The extent of the whiskers plot the maximum and minimum distances travelled in any given year.

Next, what happened to the indigenous civil servants who were transferred? One way to answer this question is to examine the geographic distance between posts. Figure 6.5 plots the yearly-binned box plots measuring the average distance travelled by indigenous civil servants to their new posts. For reference, consider that the distance from the western tip of Java (Cilegon) to the eastern tip (Banyuwangi) is approximately 1,200 kilometers. Figure 6.5 reveals two important insights. First, when indigenous civil servants were transferred, they typically did not travel far to their new post. Over the 59 years examined in these data, the average distance travelled when transferred was 128 kilometers. Second, the data reveal little temporal variation. This is surprising, since the early twentieth century witnessed significant transportation breakthroughs on Java (e.g., the introduction of the railroad).[31] These advances might have been expected to make long-distance travel—and thereby bureaucratic transfers—more feasible. Yet the data betray no signs that bureaucrats were being transferred longer distances. One interpretation of this finding is that other considerations—perhaps institutional—explain the tendency of civil servants to stay close to home.

Finally, another way to investigate the nature of transfers among indigenous civil servants is to map their flows. This is a particularly important test, since it directly evaluates the argument advanced by Anderson which suggested that administrative transfers led to intergroup contact across salient ethnic divisions. In Figure 6.6, I map the origin and destination of transfers among members of the indigenous civil service throughout Java. Each transfer is mapped as a line, with

[31]Ricklefs (2008).

Figure 6.6—Circulation of indigenous civil servants, Java, 1881–1942



Note: The shaded areas are broadly populated by ethnic Sundanese, while the non-shaded areas of the map are populated by ethnic Javanese. The lines correspond to bureaucratic transfers. Darker, thicker blue lines indicate a greater flow of bureaucratic transfers between two points. Current provincial borders are plotted in black. Only dyads with greater than one transfer are included.

origin-destination dyads that see greater density of transfers with darker and thicker lines. The dominant ethnic cleavage on Java is between the Sundanese and the Javanese—a diffuse border that roughly tracks with the present-day provincial border of West Java, which can be seen in Figure 6.6 around the 108th degree. The Sundanese-populated areas are also shaded in gray.

Figure 6.6 shows that there were very few transfers across this division. Among indigenous civil servants who were transferred, the pooled percentage that stayed within their previous ethnic catchment was 95.6%. Many of the transfers that did occur across this division were directed to and from Cirebon, a city in West Java with a population of approximately equal parts Javanese and Sundanese. For a more formal test of this finding, I use randomization inference. For each year, I take all the origin and destination coordinates for civil servant transfers and randomly permute the coordinate dyad, then average the number of simulated transfers that did not cross the ethnic boundary. I do this 500 times, and then examine the percentage simulated values that are greater than the observed value (95.6%). The results of this randomization inference are presented in SA Figure **??** and suggest that the tendency for transfers to *not* cross ethnic boundaries is marginally statistically significant ($p = 0.052$). I interpret these results to indicate a tendency towards ethnic self-rule.

There is at least one possible objection to these findings. Since I do not possess information on the place of birth of members of the *pangreh pradja*, I assume that the regency in which I observe the civil servant for the first time is their local origin. Strictly speaking, this assumption is likely violated in a few cases. However, it seems highly plausible—given the structure of recruitment into the indigenous civil service—that members of the *pangreh pradja* are initially hired and serve in the regencies of their birth.

6.3 Representation, Resentment, and Nation-Building in Dutch East Indies

Promotion and pedigree

Next, I examine patterns of promotion in the *pangreh pradja*. Recall that my argument expects promotions to be rare—thus fueling the frustration of lesser elites who were blocked from sharing in power. In Figure 6.7, I plot the yearly likelihood of promotion—that is, the percentage of civil servants who hold a higher post than the one they did in the previous year. The overall likelihood of promotion was low: the dotted line shows the pooled average. On average, in any given year, 1.8% of members of the indigenous civil service were promoted. Looking at the trends over time, it appears that this number increased until 1900, when the percentage of promotions hit a high point of 3.8%. Importantly, and bolstering the plausibility of my argument, the percentage of promotions declined steadily between 1929–1942.

Figure 6.7—Promotion probability, Java, 1881–1942

Note: Yearly percentage of members of the indigenous civil servants who were promoted in any given year—compared to their posting in the previous year. The horizontal dashed line indicates the overall yearly average of promotion, which is 1.8%.

I also examine the composition of the indigenous civil service in terms of nobility. The most common titles for nobility were *raden* and *mas*, with the former denoting a higher position in the traditional hierarchy. I focus specifically on the composition of assistant-regent and district chief posts, since those in the regent posts held invariably high titles (such as *raden mas* or *pangeran*). Across both positions, the trends are broadly similar: the proportion of positions held by those with *raden* titles steadily increased, while those with a *mas* title steadily decreased. I interpret

this as suggestive of an increasingly institutionalized form of aristocratic recruitment.

For assistant-regents, the proportion of posts held by individuals with a *raden* title was higher than those with a *mas* title in 1882, by a margin of approximately 20%. This is intuitively larger than the initial difference in district chief positions, since assistant-regents were the second highest position in the indigenous civil service in any regency. Over time, the proportion of assistant-regent posts held by those with a *raden* title increased, while those held by individuals with a *mas* title decreased, such that, by 1942, the difference was approximately 30%. For district chiefs, on the other hand, the proportion of positions held by those with *raden* title was statistically indistinguishable from the proportion of posts held by those with a *mas* title—at least until about 1896. Since that time, the share of positions held by those with a *raden* title has steadily increased, while the proportion held by those with a *mas* title steadily decreased, such that by 1942 the difference was approximately 22%.

Figure 6.8—Titles held by civil servants, Java, 1881–1942



Note: Yearly percentage of assistant-regents (left panel) and district chiefs (right panel) composed by different echelons of the hereditary elite. The remaining positions were mostly composed of those with extremely elevated titles (such as *raden mas* or *pangeran*. There are generally very few commoners (e.g., those without any noble title).

Again, there are at least two possible objections to these findings. First, the promotion patterns only examine those already in the indigenous civil service. It does not, unfortunately, track data on those in the position of subdistrict chief (assistant *wedana*), despite these individuals being members of the *pangreh pradja*. It might be the case, therefore, that the possibilities for promotion into roles as district chiefs was greater than the likelihood observed for higher roles. Given that the number of district chief positions is greater than the number of assistant-regent

or regent positions, this is a plausible scenario. However, it does not necessarily upend the central interpretation of the results, since the road to higher posts was evidently blocked and most members of the civil service had aspirations above the position of district chief (the positions into which subdistrict chiefs would have been promoted).

Second, it might be the case that the nature of obtaining hereditary titles changed over time. Thus, the declining proportion of the indigenous civil service with the *mas* title—as opposed to those with the *raden* title—might reflect changing norms in the ennobling of individuals, rather than a changing institutional preference for higher members of the aristocratic elite. There is no anecdotal evidence that this is occurring, however. Instead, the reverse appears to have been true. Over time, *mas* has become a basic title of respect given to any adult-aged male in Indonesia, while *raden* is almost never used.

6.3.1 Qualitative Evidence

I have argued that the above analysis attests to the resentment of the lesser elite in the Dutch East Indies—a process that opened up space for the forging of cross-cutting identic commitments. But this analysis has little to say about the way members of the mass public came went through a similar process of coming to resent the hereditary elite of their respective ethnic groups. In the main, I argue that this resentment was born out of the demands placed on the population by the hereditary elite, in the service of the Dutch— in the form of taxes, corvee labor, or the arbitrary issuance of travel permits.

A speech delivered by P. A. Achmad Djajadiningrat on November 15, 1929, a sitting regent in Banten, provides an overview of how it came to be that members of the mass public came to turn on the elites of their own ethnic groups—and how administrative practice was central to this turn:

> Although this system left much to be desired, particularly as far as the common man was concerned, it was in any case a continuation of old customs, so that chiefs and population still formed a harmonious unity…The Javanese would prefer to be skinned, and rightly so, by their own kind than be bothered by foreigners. At the time, the population could indeed accept a great deal from its chiefs. However, they inevitably discovered in whose interest they were "skinned." ... the feelings were such that abolition of the position of regents was considered. This was quite understandable [as] the deeds of the regents towards the population were too autocratic.[32]

Given that the hereditary elite were the object of their anger, the loyalty of many in the mass public was unmoored from traditional ethnic ties, and they searched for alternative touchstones to channel their frustrations. Opportunistic nationalist leaders, in particular, sought to capitalize on this space.[33] Raden Achmad, the leader of Sarekat Islam, a prominent nationalist movement, illustrates this logic: "The people have joined Sarekat Islam en masse because they seek their rights… They have sought them in vain from their legal chiefs [the Indonesian aristocracy]."

[32] Djajadiningrat delivered this lecture at a meeting of the Indisch Genootschap on November 15, 1929.

[33] Other organizations also exploited these grievances to cultivate members—trade unions were very effective in this regard, as well.

[34] Note, as well, the hereditary title ("Raden") held by Raden Achmad, indicating his status as a high-born member of the lesser elite.

The symbolic effect of the co-optation of the hereditary elite also motivated the mass public to turn on their leaders. The issue of *hormat* is an illustrative case study in this regard. In direct translation, *hormat* means "respect," but in practice it delimits a wider array of cultural practices and performances. Javanese, for instance, contains four linguistic registers and vocabularies—each of which conveys different levels of *hormat*. In day-to-day affairs, most Javanese use the lowest register. But when speaking to the Regent, on the other hand, Javanese would be expected to communicate in a higher register—although the use of the highest register would be uncomfortable, akin to excessive prostration. Similarly, the greatest act of *hormat* is the action of kneeling before one's superior and kissing his feet, in an act of symbolic submission. Historically, such an act occurred very rarely—only performed in the event of an extraordinary transgression.

However, as the Dutch sought to make colonial life both "legible" and "ethical" they codified the activities of *hormat* into a set of required practices. This created deep junctures in the practice of daily life, motivating considerable grievances on the part of all subjects, who came to view their hereditary elites as departing from well-defined cultural practices at the behest of the Dutch rulers. Excerpts from the 1929 Regent's conference reveal that the hereditary elite were well aware that these practices were influential in nudging members of the mass public to turn towards nationalist organizations. At the time, regents Koeosoemo-Oetojo, Soejono, and Djajadiiningrant discussed the sources of the decline in applicants for lower civil service positions—placing the blame on the practice of *hormat*.

[34] Cited in Kahin (1952, 69). There is also some evidence that the grievances were not strictly focused on the extractive demands of the co-opted hereditary rulers. Others have argued that the process of bureaucratic modernization wedged a cultural cleavage between the aristocratic elite and the lower classes. "The process described above tended inevitably to pull modern-educated Southeast Asian civil servants away from the life of the peasant, A new cultural joint had appeared, in some ways as wide as the earlier one but now it was between the folk and the Southeast Asian bureaucratic classes that, along with Europeans, ruled over them. The implications of that development are only now beginning to be worked out in the history of the area." See Steinberg, Roff and Chandler (1971, 203).

Chapter 7

Global Statistical Analyses: Some Indirect Tests

One of the core predictions of this dissertation is that, under certain conditions, the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants reflects and expands existing group-based inequalities in the representation of public sector employment. Extending this argument, I have also suggested that these representational imbalances may have important consequences for social cohesion and horizontal solidarity, with broader implications for the task of nation-building. Thus far, the evidence in support for this claim has derived from several contemporary and historical cases in Southeast Asia: contemporary Indonesia (Chapter 5) and a comparative historical analysis of colonial French Indochina and Dutch East Indies (Chapter 6).

The evidence in Chapter 5 drew upon micro-level attitudinal data to argue that certain features of the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants leads individuals to adopt attitudes that are broadly antagonistic to horizontal nation-building. Yet, this chapter stops short of arguing that these attitudes translate into behavioral outcomes. Chapter 6 takes up this question from the perspective of a comparative historical analysis, in which I argued that differences in the manner in which civil servants were recruited in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina help explain why the former nationally cohered while the latter fractured. Yet, this analysis is plagued by a paucity of the direct attitudinal evidence of which Chapter 5 has a surplus.

Skeptics may thus point out that this evidence exists on both the micro- and macro-levels, with a missing meso-level. Others may point out that the foregoing evidence consults data collected from one region of the world, suggesting that the analyses suffer from biases associated with a small and narrow case selection. This chapter represents an initial effort to respond to these concerns. On the first count, demonstrating that variation in the procedures of bureaucratic selection leads to representational imbalances—and that these imbalances may affect intermediate outcomes like internal conflict—is a core task of this chapter. On the second count, I will also examine the argument on a greater sample of countries.

Specifically, in this chapter, I take the theoretical predictions developed in earlier chapters to a near-global dataset using some rudimentary statistical models. The analyses rely on two sources of data. First, to capture time-series variation in the manner in which governments recruit civil servants, I rely on the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) version 10 dataset. These data derive from expert surveys in which the V-DEM team solicits information from country experts on relevant indicators of governance. The variable in which I am interested here is "v2stcritrecadm" which

asks country experts, "To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?" Experts ranked countries, per year, on a scale of 0-4. The V-DEM team then integrates expert responses into an index, with higher values indicating more meritocratic systems and lower values indicating more patronage-based systems.

The analyses below relate variation in country-year bureaucratic selection to two genres of outcomes: (1) a measure of representational inequality and (2) the incidence of internal conflict. The data for these analyses derive from two distinct sources. On the first count, I draw on the full longitudinal dataset of the World Values Survey (WVS), which spans over 100 countries over 7 waves, including more than 800,000 respondents. Each of these surveys are based on representative samples. Using a variable in which individuals indicate whether their place of employment is either a public or private institution, I calculate a measure of ascriptive representativeness, which I discuss more below. On the second count, I draw on a variable from the V-DEM dataset that captures the incidence of internal conflict in a given country-year observation.

As I will show, the results collectively point in the direction of the theory outlined in earlier chapters. First, I show that countries in which civil servants are recruited more meritocratically are also those with higher measures of bureaucratic between-group inequality. This analysis relies on a naive bivariate regression—an approach that merits several caveats, which I discuss below. Second, looking at the incidence of internal conflict in a given country-year observation, in a sample of post-colonial countries over the period 1941–2021, I find that internal conflict is more likely in countries that recruit civil servants meritocratically—and that these results persist after the inclusion of both year- and country-fixed effects.

7.1 Concepts and Measurement

The aim of the analysis that follows is to examine the relationship between the mechanisms of bureaucratic selection and the extent of inequality in representation in public institutions. To reiterate: my expectation is that the more meritocratic recruitment of civil servants occasions more unequal representation, as discussed at length in Chapter 2. Capturing the extent of unequal representation involves several non-trivial conceptual and measurement decisions, however. To start: how should analysts conceptually view bureaucratic overrepresentation of groups? Which axes of difference should be considered as salient cleavages—ethnicity, race, religion?

Donald Horowitz draws the distinction between ranked and unranked ethnic groups as a discrete one.[1] Specifically, he describes societies in which opportunities for social mobility depend on ascriptive differences as those in which ethnic groups are "ranked," as opposed to "unranked." Specifically, he writes,"[t]he distinction rests upon the coincidence or noncoincidence of social class with ethnic origins. Where the two coincide, it is possible to speak of ranked ethnic groups." Horowitz conceptualized ranked systems in a deterministic sense as those in which "mobility opportunities are restricted by group identity," such as in the case of the Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi.[2] In the context of bureaucratic representation, in other words, Horowitz views countries as falling along one side or the other of a binary variable—ranked or unranked.

Scholars have challenged Horowitz's binary conceptualization, aiming instead to introduce greater subtly into the domination and subordination of different groups across time and space.

[1]Horowitz (1985).
[2]Horowitz (1985, 21).

One of the most prominent recent efforts is the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, which is led by scholars working out of ETH Zurich and attempts to capture the extent to which different groups are empowered in the halls of government, for all countries between 1946-2021.[3] The dataset relies on expert surveys and consideres ethnic groups as politically relevant if at least one political organization "has claimed to represent their interests at the national level or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination."[4] The data classifies each ethnic group in a given country according to its extent of political empowerment—ranging from "monopoly" to "discriminated."[5]

While the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset represents an impressive effort at documenting global trends in group-based inequality, it is not well-suited for the analysis I wish to conduct for at least two reasons. First, it is chiefly interested in the extent to which groups are represented in *political offices*, rather than the bureaucracy. As discussed in earlier chapters, the modal citizen encounter with a government agent is with a bureaucrat, rather than a politician—a tendency that motivates my interest in obtaining measures of group-based inequality in the bureaucracy. Second, the EPR relies on categorical measures of ethnic domination that are ill-suited for the quantitative analyses I wish to conduct, as they do not capture the extent to which one group may come to seize representational dominance over the bureaucracy. Indeed, in cases where meritocratic recruitment prevails, it seems unlikely that any group would be characterized as "discriminated" against; yet the representational consequences of such an arrangement could nonetheless be influential. For instance, in the right panel of Figure 7.1, I present a histogram capturing the EPR dataset's count of countries, according to the percent of population discriminated against, which indicates very little variation.

[3]Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010).
[4]Vogt (2018, 118).
[5]The other categories include "dominant," "senior partner," "junior partner," "irrelevant," and "powerless."

Figure 7.1—Comparison Between BGI and EPR Measures



Note: The left panel shows the distribution of calculated measures of bureaucratic between-group inequality, based on World Values Survey data, discussed below. The right panel shows the distribution of percentages of populations that are "discriminated" against according to the Ethnic Power Relations dataset.

In this chapter, instead, I opt for a continuous measure that captures the inequality between ethnic groups, as it reflects the intensity of the inequality. There are in general standard measures for between group inequality (BGI) in the extent of income inequality between groups in a single country. Kate Baldwin and John Huber propose one such measure, which I include here:[6]

$$BGI_c = \sum_{i}^{n} \sum_{j}^{n} p_i p_j |\bar{y}_i - \bar{y}_j| \tag{7.1}$$

Here, i and j are group indices, n refers to the number of groups in country c, p refers to the proportion of the total population in country c occupied by that group, and $\bar{y}$ refers to the average income of the respective group. The measure of inequality ranges from 0 (most equal) to 1 (most unequal).

However, to my knowledge, there are no measures of between group inequality in terms of bureaucratic representation. I therefore construct a new measure of between group inequality in the bureaucratic field (BGI) that simply substitutes average group income with average share of ethnic group i or j in active employment in the civil service:

[6]Baldwin and Huber (2010).

$$BGIB_c = \sum_{i}^{n} \sum_{j}^{n} p_i p_j |b_i - b_j| \tag{7.2}$$

Where, again, n refers to the number of groups in country c, p refers to the proportion of the total population in country c occupied by that group, and b refers to the share of that group employed in the civil service.[7] Importantly, these values are constructed in a manner that benchmarks each groups' representation in public institutions against their share of the underlying population. Computationally, a society with n number of groups will yield a measure of perfect equality if each group is represented in public institutions in precise proportion to their share of the underlying population.

To construct these values, I draw on the World Values Survey (WVS), which is conducted in waves every four or five years across most countries in the world. The survey has a number of advantages over an approach using census data—e.g., as collected through IPUMS. For one, censuses have considerable variation across contexts, with inconsistent questions probing respondents' ethnicity, race, or religion. And in some cases, censuses do not ask about respondents' occupation, either, which is crucial for measuring bureaucratic between-group inequality. The WVS, meanwhile, includes a standard module asking respondents' ethnicity (which is reworded for each country) and also probes respondents' occupation. Nonetheless, the WVS suffers from incomplete coverage and a smaller sample size that introduces certain biases into the estimates.

Conditional on these shortcomings, it is my view that the WVS approach is both more tractable and yields more credible measurement of bureaucratic between-group inequality. To assist in a visualization of the values, Figure 7.2 shows the measurement for all countries included in the sample.

[7] There are at least two good reasons to use active employment in the civil service as a proxy for "bureaucratic" inequality. First, the civil service is the front line of the bureaucracy itself—group based inequality in these positions will be immediately visible. Second, particularly in the countries under examination—mostly, post-colonial developing states—employment in the civil service is a highly desirable position, raising the stakes. For one, it is typically one of the few stable jobs available. But it also provides bureaucrats with access to rent-seeking opportunities, making these positions even more coveted.

Figure 7.2—BGI-B Around The World



Note: Map shows the extent of bureaucratic between-group inequality for all countries with available data from the World Values Survey, with higher values tending towards red and lower values tending towards green. Countries for which there was no data are colored in grey.

The map in Figure 7.2 reveals some predictable trends in global bureaucratic between group inequality. The countries of Southeast Asia are consistent with earlier discussions: Indonesia and Malaysia report high levels of between group inequality in the bureaucracy, owing to the domination of the Javanese and Malays, respectively, while Thailand and Vietnam report lower measures, likely owing to their underlying homogeneity. Australia and Peru also report high levels of bureaucratic between group inequality, which appears related to the comparative exclusion of indigenous populations from representation in public service. Perhaps most striking is the case of India, which, despite persistent conflict across ascriptive cleavages, reports comparatively low levels of between-group inequality in the bureaucracy, possibly attesting to the effectiveness of its ambitious system of quotas to ensure adequate representation of marginalized groups.

The core task of this chapter is to examine the relationship between variation in the institutions through which governments recruit civil servants and the level of between-group inequality in the bureaucracy. This first involves identifying a credible measure of bureaucratic selection that varies along the dimension in which I am interested—i.e., the extent of discretion offered to politicians. The most famous effort to capture such variation in a quantitative, cross-national measure comes from the series of papers by Evans and Rauch in the late 1990s, in which they queried country experts of approximately 40 states to create a "Weberianness" scale.[8] More recently, scholars have constructed the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset, which similarly

[8]Rauch and Evans (2000) and Evans and Rauch (1999)

relies on surveys of country experts to construct quantitative measures of governance for most countries between 1789–2021.[9]The measures coming from this herculean data collection effort should be met with some skepticism, particularly for those values capturing arcane aspects of historical governance.[10]

V-DEM contains two relevant measures of bureaucracy and, in particular, the extent to which bureaucratic discretion prevails. The first variable (*v2clrspct*) captures the extent to which public officials act with discretion in the execution of their day-to-day tasks. Specifically expert respondents were asked to rate "the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination)." The second variable (*v2stcritrecadm*) measures the extent to which public officials are recruited meritocratically, asking expert respondents to state the "extent [to which] appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?" Experts rated countries on a measure from 0-4, with higher values representing those countries in which politicians had less discretion in hiring decisions and were thus more meritocratic. Although these two measures discussed are interconnected, my principal interest is in the latter, as it captures bureaucratic selection.

The ultimate outcome of interest is "national solidarity," which is a difficult thing to measure. One approach would be to leverage survey data gauging the extent to which respondents in different countries identify with their nationality. Yet, the World Values Survey only contains intermittent coverage of this measure, with other prominent crossnational survey efforts (Latinobarometer, Asiabarometer, Afrobarometer) also including questions gauging national sentiment at intermittent levels. Instead, this chapter takes a different approach by looking at the incidence of internal conflict—understood a proxy for the absence of national solidarity. This approach has certain advantages, as conflict is widely reported and can be therefore measured with more precision. Specifically, I rely on the reports

In the analyses that follow, I make several non-trivial decisions in the construction of the dataset that I use for the estimation. For one, in the analyses relating measures of bureaucratic selection to the incidence of conflict, I restrict the dataset to those observations occurring after World War Two. This is motivated by both theoretical and econometric concerns. Econometrically, the end of World War II led to a temporary upswing in both decolonization-associated conflict and also reform stemming from independence leaders' institutional designs, two trends that, jointly spurred by the end of the War but probably unrelated, would be found to be temporally correlated with one another. Theoretically, as discussed in Chapter 2, I am principally interested in the experience of Asian and African states negotiating the demands of state-building and nation-building following the post-War independence movements—an interest that also motivates me to restrict my analysis to these countries, as well.

[9]Coppedge et al. (2021).

[10]See, for instance, the discussion on Cornell, Knutsen and Teorell (2020, 2256). See also Boswell and Corbett (2021).

7.2 Bureaucratic Selection, Between-Group Inequality, and Conflict

To start, in the right panel of Figure 7.3 I show the correlation between the V-DEM measure of bureaucratic selection (MERIT) and the value of bureaucratic BGI for a given country in a given year. I also include a line of best fit, which approximates a linear mode. I estimate the model using ordinary least squares, in the following form:

$$BGI_{i,t} = \alpha + \delta \text{MERIT}_{i,t} + \epsilon_i \tag{7.3}$$

Note that, for this analysis, the data is constrained by the fact that the values for bureaucratic BGI are observed only in years and in contexts where WVS carried out a survey wave. The ethnic groups considered in each value draw from the WVS coding scheme for the "ethnicity" variable. Figure 7.3 shows that, consistent with the theoretical expectations, countries in which civil servants are recruited more meritocratically have more unequal patterns of representation in bureaucracy, at least according to the measure of bureaucratic between-group inequality being used here. The left panel shows the contemporaneous correlation between variation in bureaucratic selection and bureaucratic between-group inequality. To put the findings in more concrete terms, the results of the analysis suggest that moving from a country in which civil service jobs were allocated purely according to patronage to one where they were allocated purely according to merit would result in the measure of bureaucratic between-group inequality increasing from 0.43 to 0.74—corresponding to a 72.5% increase.

Figure 7.3—Relationship Between Merit-Selection and BGI



Note: Data from World Values Survey and V-DEM. Both figures show the relationship between variation in mechanisms of bureaucratic selection and the extent of between-group inequality in the bureaucracy. The left panel relies on contemporaneous data. The right panel uses the measure of bureaucratic selection from V-DEM from ten years prior to the observations of bureaucratic between-group inequality.

Skeptics may point out that reforms to the manner in which governments recruit employees into public institutions is a slow moving process. If such reforms take place at all, it takes many years of policymaking to put such reforms in place. Once they are legislated, moreover, observing changes in the demographic composition of the civil service could take years, as existing public servants who were recruited under previous procedures are unlikely to be removed and thus their attrition will continue naturally owing to retirements. In response, I also examine the correlation between the measure of bureaucratic selection from ten years prior to the moment in which the values for bureaucratic BGI were measured. Again, I include a line of best fit which I model in the following form:

$$BGI_{i,t+10} = \alpha + \delta \text{MERIT}_{i,t} + \epsilon_i \tag{7.4}$$

The results are presented in the left panel of Figure 7.3 and show that, again, the relationship between the meritocratic recruitment of public servants and bureaucratic BGI is positive and statistically significant. To put the findings in concrete terms, again, I find that moving from a country in which civil service jobs were allocated purely according to patronage to one where they were allocated purely according to merit would result in the measure of bureaucratic between-group inequality increasing from 0.44 to 0.72—corresponding to a 63.9% increase.

Table 7.1: The Relationship Between Bureaucratic Selection and Representation

	Between-Group Bureaucratic Inequality			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Selection (0-4)	0.078**	0.084**		
	(0.037)	(0.036)		
BGI-Income		5.132***		4.582**
		(1.801)		(1.966)
Bureaucratic Selection (0-4, 10-yr lag)			0.071*	0.083**
			(0.036)	(0.035)
Constant	0.431***	0.318***	0.442***	0.338***
	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.044)	(0.058)
Observations	92	90	100	97

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Beta coefficients from OLS regression. Conventional standard errors clustered at the country level.

For a more precise estimate of the magnitude of the correlation between these two variables, I also include the results in a tabular format. The estimates provided in columns (1) and (3) reflect the estimates obtained in the right and left panels of Figure 7.3, respectively. These estimates indicate that a one point increase in meritocratic recruitment (on a 4-point scale) is associated with anywhere between a 0.07-0.08 increase in bureaucratic BGI (on a 0-1 scale). In columns (2) and (4) I turn to models that parallel the naive regressions in columns (1) and (3) but that now include a control for a measure of income-based between-group inequality. The motivation here is to hold constant a likely confounding variable: it seems plausible that countries with a high degree of income-based between-group inequality would observe both hire bureaucratic BGI and also a higher probability of adopting civil service reform (as elite groups seek to shore up their position). The measure of income-based between-group inequality is derived from the original equation proposed by Baldwin and Huber in Equation 7.1. Nonetheless, I show that,

even after controlling for income-based BGI, the correlation between both contemporaneous and lagged measures of MERIT are positively correlated with measures of bureaucratic between group inequality.

In sum, the results suggest that the meritocratic selection of government agents is associated with greater levels of bureaucratic between-group inequality, at least as compared against those places in which recruitment is carried out through patronage. This finding is consistent with the broader theory outlined in earlier chapters. My preferred interpretation is that the meritocratic selection, which relies on the use of examinations, reflects and expands existing inequalities, as privileged groups outperform marginalized groups on the recruitment tests. Of course, the results are purely correlational and should be interpreted with appropriate levels of skepticism.

Next, I consider the relationship between the manner in which bureaucrats are recruited and the incidence of internal conflict in a given country. This analysis also merits several caveats. For one, the central theoretical expectation of this dissertation is that the introduction of meritocratic recruitment of civil servants undermines horizontal solidarity. This analysis thus rests on a leap, in which I assume that the incidence of internal conflict is reflective of the absence of horizontal solidarity. This would appear to be a fair assumption; within Indonesia, for instance, the presence of internal conflicts (i.e., in Sulawesi or Sumatra) were most severe at the moment of independence, when a sense of national solidarity was still being forged among the mass public. I also impose certain restrictions on the data. As I am interested chiefly in post-colonial settings, I restrict sample of country-year observations to those after 1941—the years in which most post-colonial countries won their independence. I also place a regional restriction on the analysis, focusing on countries in Asia and Africa.

To estimate the effect of the mechanisms of bureaucratic selection on the incidence of internal conflict, I rely on four different econometric specifications, with different combinations of time- and geographic-fixed effects. Specifically, I model the relationship in the following forms:

$$CONFLICT_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{MERIT}_{i,t} + \epsilon_i \tag{7.5}$$

$$CONFLICT_{i,t} = \beta_1 \text{MERIT}_{i,t} + \lambda_i + \epsilon_i \tag{7.6}$$

$$CONFLICT_{i,t} = \beta_1 \text{MERIT}_{i,t} + \delta_t + \epsilon_i \tag{7.7}$$

$$CONFLICT_{i,t} = \beta_1 \text{MERIT}_{i,t} + \lambda_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_i \tag{7.8}$$

To start, for all models, the outcome of interest is $CONFLICT_{i,t}$ which is a binary variable that takes a "1" in the event that there was an episode of internal conflict in country i in year t. Again, for all models the key variable of interest is $MERIT_{i,t}$ which is a measure scaled 0-4 capturing the extent to which the recruitment of civil servants is meritocratic in country i and year t. The first model (Equation 7.5) is a naive bivariate regression. Equations 7.6 and 7.7 are one-way fixed effect models that account for country- and year-specific trends in the underlying prevalence of internal conflict. Equation 7.8 is my preferred specification, which relies on a two-way fixed effects model. To attach a causal interpretation to β_1 in Equation 7.8, analysts must make the so-called "parallel trends" assumption. In other words, I assume that the trends in the incidence of conflict are comparable in countries with and without meritocratic recruitment.

Table 7.2: The Relationship Between Bureaucratic Selection and Internal Conflict

	Incidence of Conflict (0-1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bureaucratic Selection (0-4)	0.011***	0.011***	0.007**	0.007*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Constant	0.066***			
	(0.004)			
Observations	3535	3535	3535	3535
Year FE	N	Y	N	Y
Country FE	N	N	Y	Y

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.Beta coefficients from OLS regression. Conventional standard errors clustered at the country level.

Column (1) of Table 7.2 reports the results from Equation 7.5, showing a strong positive association between the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants and the incidence of internal conflict. The results suggest that a one point increase in the V-DEM measure of meritocratic recruitment (as measured on a four-point scale) is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of internal conflict. In substantive terms, the results indicate that countries with total discretion in the recruitment of civil servants report a 6.6% likelihood of internal conflict in any given year, as compared with 11.9% in countries that recruit civil servants meritocratically. The second and third columns in Table 7.2 report the one-way fixed effect models and show substantively identitcal estimates of the effect of bureaucratic selection on the incidence of internal conflict, with 1.1 and 0.7 percentage point increases in its likelihood. Finally, I find, in the fully specified two-way fixed effects model, that, moving one point closer towards meritocratic recruitment (on a 4-pt scale) leads to a 0.7 percentage point uptick in the probability of internal conflict.

Again, these results are consistent with the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter 2, although the findings rely on imperfect proxies to gauge the outcomes of interest. My interpretation of the results hinges on the earlier findings that show that countries in which civil servants are recruited more meritocratically also report higher levels of bureaucratic between-group inequality. This, in turn, through the micro-level explanations developed in chapters 4, 5, and 6, motivate forms of resentment that both undermine national solidarity and open up space for the incidence of internal conflict.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The transformation of the bureaucracy from an institution chiefly geared towards rewarding officeholders towards one focused on satisfying citizen demands constitutes a monumental reshaping of governance. Central to this transformation has been the introduction of the non-discretionary means of recruitment, mainly implemented through "meritocratic" procedures that select on competence rather than, say, connections. Today, the merit-system is normatively unchallenged as the ideal model of bureaucratic selection; at least in principle, almost every country around the world has nominally adopted such institutions. What brought about this transformation? The standard scholarly account of the arrival of meritocratic recruitment has in general trained its focus on concerns over "good governance" as the key impetus for reform. With the expansion of suffrage during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this account goes, newly-enfranchised citizens fed up with petty corruption and incompetence in government employees came to demand a higher quality of service delivery. Fearing electoral sanction, politicians thus pushed for civil service reform.

Chapter 3 challenges this standard account, drawing on qualitative and quantitative evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States, charting their different paths to the introduction of the merit system. The evidece suggests that activists in both contexts had only surreptitiously cloaked their reforms in the identity-neutral language of advancing good governance. But concerns over representation—who were to hold positions in the bureaucracy following reform—loomed large in the background of their activities. Activists championing reform often hailed from constituencies that *a priori* expected to see gains in their representation in government under examination-based recruitment. In the United States, it was chiefly native-born upper-class whites who championed reform, for instance, in a bid to stem the tide of the rising influence of foreign-born immigrants in government. This observation in turn motivates the rest of the dissertation and calls for an approach that considers the representational and thus distributional effects of different types of bureaucratic selection procedures—when politicians have discretion or possess none.

This line of inquiry has led this study in directions rarely traveled by scholars interested in the bureaucracy, looking at how different institutions for selecting government employees affects grand outcomes such as social and national solidarity. Particularly in contexts where high levels of group-based inequality prevail—a criterion that trains our attention on practically all of the postcolonial world—the meritocratic distribution of government jobs often leads to an unrepresentative public sector. Again in Chapter 3, for example, I provide *prima facie* evidence from

Indonesia in support of this claim: following the introduction of meritocratic recruitment procedures, the share of government posts held by residents of privileged regions has risen. The logic underlying this finding relies on a large existing literature in education and sociology, which has found that, compared to marginalized groups, privileged groups are better positioned to succeed on examinations of all types, including those used to select civil servants, owing to advantages in access to education and tutoring services. This situation in turn undermines a broad sense of national solidarity: the uneven representation of a country's constituent groups in the halls of government generates impactful forms of resentment on the part of both aspirational civil servants from marginalized groups who find their ambitions thwarted by more successful test-takers from privileged groups, as well as for citizens seeking services who encounter out-group bureaucrats on the other end of the exchange.

A second prong of the argument considers the counterfactual condition in which politicians are given near-total discretion in the recruitment of civil servants—an arrangement that manifests in many forms but which is typically labeled patronage. I am chiefly interested in instances where this discretion is coupled with a tendency for politicians to expect bribes in exchange for jobs, which I term "elitist" patronage. Here, government jobs tend to be allocated both *within* ethnic groups and *towards* the highest bidder. Under certain conditions, I have shown how this situation opens up space for cross-cutting commitments, as members of the mass public from diverse backgrounds find common cause in resenting their co-opted ethnic elites for both blocking their ability to share in coveted government employment and as they come to stand in as a symbol for poor government performance.

These arguments rest on two mechanisms—what I term citizen- and applicant-side mechanisms. On the first count, I hypothesized that the representational implications of these dynamics would have important implications for the mass public's sense of solidarity and attachment to their national identity, as the experience of encountering bureaucrats of different backgrounds in government offices could generate different forms of resentment. A disproportionate representation of certain ethnic groups in the civil service, for instance, might generate inter-ethnic resentment. Or the overwhelming representation of upper-class and wealthy individuals in roles as bureaucrats may generate class-based grievances. The structure of these grievances could have important consequences for either foreclosing or opening up possibilities of solidarity. Ultimately, however, the evidence in support of this conjecture is tenuous. Drawing on survey experiments, in Chapter 5, I show that providing respondents with information about the demographic composition of their local civil servants leads to declines in perceptions of the quality of service delivery and a decline in national identification, but only for certain well-defined subpopulations.

The evidence presented in this study suggests that the applicant-side mechanism is more important in generating the proposed relationship. Failure to secure a position as a bureaucrat appears to be an influential driver of mass politics by virtue of members of this subpopulation being both seriously aggrieved but also generally well-educated and thus *a priori* influential in their communities. But failure to secure a government job motivates influential forms of resentment that can *either* foreclose *or* open up possibilities for cross-ethnic solidarity, depending on the resulting composition of the successful applicants. In Chapter 5, looking at contemporary Indonesia, I surveyed the attitudes of the universe of applicants to the civil service in 2018-2019. Leveraging their scores on the civil service examination, I show that the simple fact of failure negatively affects applicants' belief in the legitimacy of the process, some attitudes towards out-groups, and national identification, thus diminishing the likelihood of cross-ethnic solidarity.

Meanwhile, the discretionary recruitment of civil servants is argued to have had different effects on the opportunities for cross-ethnic solidarity in Indonesia. At least during the time period examined in the late colonial era, the co-ethnic tendencies of discretionary recruitment were layered with a class element, as well, such that only co-ethnic elites were given jobs—thus motivating resentment on the part of the comparatively excluded masses, and thereby opening a shared experience among applicants from humbler means across ethnic lines. Consider, for instance, that nearly all of the leaders of the Indonesian inclusive nationalist movement were the sons of mid-tier bureaucratic elites, many of whom were also at one point civil servants before leaving after having found their ambitions for promotion thwarted in the face of aristocratic criteria.

It is worth dwelling on the finding that the applicant-side mechanism appears stronger than the citizen-side ones. Why should scholars care about the attitudes of would-be bureaucrats, at least as they relate to the formation of a sense of national solidarity? For one, this is often a surprisingly large constituency: at least in lower- and middle-income countries, as applicants chase the job security and prestige that come with public sector work, the demand for government jobs almost always outstrips the supply of available posts. In Indonesia in 2018-2019, for instance, the number of failed applicants outstripped the number of successful ones by a factor of twenty. But failed applicants to public sector employment are also a constituency with an unusually high degree of cultural, intellectual, and, ultimately, political power. Most countries enforce strict educational requirements to apply for government service in the first place, meaning that these also-rans tend to hail from (at least locally) well-resourced backgrounds that position them as potential opinion leaders within their communities. Indonesia requires all applicants to possess at least a bachelor's degree, for example. Taking these two ingredients together, the grievances seeded by the sting of failure on the civil service exam offers a potential spark for this group to challenge the very coherence of a national fabric that pits groups of uneven capacity against one another in the tournament for coveted employment.

This strata's importance for mass sentiment and political outcomes has both theoretical and empirical analogs. Theoretically, William Riker observed that "the dynamics of politics is in the hands of the losers. It is they who decide when and how and whether to fight on."[1] This observation has typically been applied to argue for the importance of studying would-be elected officials, on whose peaceable acceptance of defeat the functioning of democracy rests.[2] When the losers of elections reject the outcome, after all, they can galvanize public support to undermine democratic legitimacy. But in practice, compared to would-be elected officials, there are more people who both seek out and fail to obtain positions as public sector employees. Empirically, these sorts of aggrieved, unemployed, and over-educated youth have been an engine for nationalist and ideational ferment over the last two centuries.[3]

Why, though, does the experience of failure on the civil service exam, in particular, constitute a sufficiently inflammatory spark? The answer to this question involves acknowledging that the bureaucracy is not merely a vehicle for service delivery. Across low- and middle-income countries across world, many citizens are more enthusiastic about the prospect of obtaining a government job than they are in securing government services. In a broad sense, this means that we ought to understand citizens as both job-seekers in addition to service-seekers—a perspectival shift that

[1] Riker (1983).
[2] Anderson et al. (2005).
[3] See, for instance, Hobsbawm (2010*a*, 90-95).

opens up many potential productive and unanswered questions for students of the bureaucracy. Chapter 4 develops a partial answer to the question of why such demand exists in the first place by investigating why some individuals want government jobs above and beyond substantively similar and equally well-paying opportunities in the private sector. The evidence consulted indicates that, in addition to wages, many individuals are also chasing the status and prestige that flow from public sector employment in many such contexts, a finding that provides important clues to understanding the otherwise puzzling intensity of failed applicants' grievances.

8.1 State-building against Nation-building?

The observations described above offer a window into a larger theoretical conversation about the relationship between state-building and nation-building. Often, these two things are thought to go hand-in-hand; so, when governments engage in state-building, they are also thought to be engaging in activities that promote the growth of a sense of national solidarity. The expansion of primary school education is perhaps the canonical example that demonstrates this a relationship. In nineteenth century Europe, for instance, the expansion of primary education served two purposes: to both build states' capacity and generate a sense of national solidarity. On the first count, schools and teachers were often the only concrete manifestation of the state in many parts of newly-formed countries' hinterlands. On the second count, schools were an important vector through which the "nation" was mythologized, providing otherwise disparate people with a common narrative and sense of camaraderie. These educational interventions also often provided diverse people with a common language, an important mechanism through which governments generated national solidarity. At the moment of unification, for instance, it is estimated that only 2% of citizens of Italy spoke Italian as their primary language, leading one politician to comment "we have made Italy [but] now we must make Italians." The diffusion of primary schools was seen by politicians of the time as the central means to achieve this task. According to Eric Hobsbawm, "in the fifteen years following [Italian] unification, the number of primary-school children doubled" and within a generation the share of Italians for whom Italian was their primary language increase dramatically. [4]

But the foregoing discussion calls for a deeper interrogation into the distributional and representational consequences of state-building. To be sure, governments and rulers have legitimate interests in building their state capacity, particularly as it relates to maintaining order and providing public services to their citizens. These interventions are often construed as "public goods" in which their consumption is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable, meaning citizens may avail themselves freely and without impinging on others' ability to do the same. Primary school education is one such public good. Or, when governments provide security and maintain order through the provisioning of a well-equipped police, for instance, it is generally believed that everyone is made better off. Similarly, when rulers build roads to connect peripheral regions, or to provide access from the hinterlands to metropolitan centers, many analysts would characterize these interventions as Pareto improvements: interventions that, at the very least, benefit at least someone without making anyone worse off.

Most scholars of nation-building believe these public good interventions, understood here as state-building, to promote the emergence of a sense of national solidarity across diverse populations. As discussed earlier, when Italy unified under a single state in the late nineteenth century

[4] See, again, Hobsbawm (2010*a*, 90-95).

only 2% of the population spoke Italian, which many leaders saw as a hurdle to the development of an Italian national identity. The Italian state thus embarked on an ambitious state-building program by erecting primary schools across the country, through which young Italians from diverse linguistic backgrounds were schooled in Italian. Again, in theory, these interventions were public goods—at least locally—insofar as members of the nearby public could freely obtain education for their children, knowing that their enrollment would not undermine their neighbors' interest in enrolling their children. But these interventions were also believed to have salutary effects with respect to the development of the Italian national identity, generating a sense of camaraderie across a population where one had not existed prior.

While theoretically attractive, it may be the case that state-building through the provision of public goods may not always yield a salutary impact on nation-building. Some schools are better than others, for instance: the quality of teachers and facilities in wealthy areas is likely to be better than what is likely to be found in poorer areas. And when geographically concentrated economic advantages dovetail with ethnic and religious geographies, as they often do, it is likely that better schools will be places in areas where privileged groups predominate. Moreover, while these public goods may be locally non-rivalrous, their aggregate-level allocation is not. Governments and rulers are constrained by budgets, inviting decisions over where to allocate scarce resources. Roads, parks, and public services are likely to be allocated to the *a priori* wealthy areas—constituencies on whose support governments and rulers often depend more so than localities of humbler means. The point is that state-building—through, here, infrastructural capacity—has distributional consequences that, when seen through the lens of identity, underscore the oftentimes uneven access that certain communities have to putatively publicly available goods.

The impact of these distributional imbalances on nation-building is thus likely to be negative, contra the expectations of the existing literature. Undergirding this expectation is the idea that citizens are keenly attuned to the question of *cui bono*—who benefits? The tendency for groups to engage in self-comparisons is practically hard-wired: if one group or region within a state receives superior public goods than another, it will not go unremarked upon. Group-based resentments are likely to multiply when certain strata are obtaining superior access to the state, undermining efforts to build a sense of national solidarity. This insight is ultimately the engine behind the idea that civil service reform, understood as an act of state-building, may cause declines in national solidarity when there exists high levels of group-based inequality. If successful applicants disproportionately hail from privileged groups, the comparatively marginalized will be more likely to withdraw their support for the national identity itself.

This discussion calls for a broader reflection into the relationship between state-building and nation-building. Further attention ought to be given to conceptualizing state-building activities in both distributional and relational terms. There are of course many aspects involved in building the state—infrastructural, coercive, extractive capacities.[5] But when and why do these activities yield deleterious outcomes for governments' often equally pressing efforts at nation-building? And, more importantly, for which types of state-building interventions should we expect such consequences? It seems likely, for instance, that the provision of the national defense has a monotonically positive relationship with nation-building. Meanwhile, nearly every instance of building infrastructural capacity in diverse contexts invites questions over which area ought to benefit,

[5]Soifer (2015).

which is fraught with potential for resentment as competing groups vie for scarce resources.

The stakes of this line of inquiry are both high and urgent. Many of the countries for which the task of state-building is most pressing are those in which the possibilities for inter-ethnic strife are most explosive. Indeed, in these contexts, governments and rulers have attempted to wield state-building as a tool to simply pave over ethnic or confessional cleavages and forge a sense of nation solidarity, relying on the general expectation that there exists a positive relationship between state capacity and national solidarity. In Iraq, for instance, the Sunni Arab elite built a strong army as "a tool of nation building," attempting to replace "confessional and ethnic identification" through force alone.[6] Despite that this strategy would produce state capacity through a competent military in Iraq, the dominance of Sunni Muslims among the upper ranks of the political and military establishment doomed the nation-building effort from the start. Policymakers that seek to build state capacity without considering representational concerns and, more broadly, questions of nation-building, do so at their own peril.

8.2 Concluding Implications

Two outstanding questions deserve comment. The first concerns the "magnitude" of the effects examined in the preceding pages. This study has intentionally adopted a perspective that is preoccupied with the effects of causes rather than the causes of effects.[7] In other words, my interest has been in the directional effect of variation in bureaucratic selection on nation-building. I have consciously avoided attempting to answer the question "what causes nations to fall apart?" because there are many reasons that such an outcome might occur, and factors relating to bureaucratic selection are but simply one. But readers may still reasonably wonder about the absolute size of the effect of, say, introducing meritocratic civil service recruitment procedures on levels of national solidarity. The extreme interpretation of the argument I have articulated would be to assert that the introduction of meritocratic civil service recruitment causes nations to fall apart. Of course, recent history immediately suggests counterexamples to the strong version of the theory: Singapore scores the highest on V-Dem's measure of meritocratic recruitment and has also engaged in a successful nation-building project over the last sixty years since its independence.

Instead, one productive way to structure thinking on the topic is to instead consider an "ideal experiment" in which, suppose, the countries of the world were randomly assigned to adopt either a system in which politicians possess discretionary authority or in which they do not and then to measure levels of national solidarity afterwards. Although it is difficult to approximate such an experiment with any certainty, Chapter 7 attempts to leverage cross-national time-series data to conduct an observational analysis along these lines. The results suggest that countries in which civil servants are recruited meritocratically, compared to those in which politicians have more discretion over their appointment, are more likely to experience internal conflict by a margin of approximately 5 percentage points. Elsewhere, in Chapter 6, I have leveraged historical variation in the manner in which government agents were recruited in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies to analyze the at-scale national fracturing in the former and the national cohesion in the latter. The conclusions of this analysis suggest that, at least in this comparative historical study, the mechanisms of bureaucratic selection have the potential to play a pivotal causal role in at-scale national fracturing or coherence.

[6] Scholvin (2011).

[7] For a discussion of the distinction, see: Simpser, Slater and Wittenberg (2018).

It is worth underscoring, however, that the negative directional effect of civil service reform on national solidarity nonetheless represents a theoretically surprising result. Many of the architects of civil service reform argued that one of the central benefits of the legislation was the end it put to discrimination and prejudicial hiring practices—outcomes that many would have *a priori* expected to offer a boost to the sense of amity and national solidarity across groups in pluralistic countries. And yet, in the event, it appears that, under certain conditions, the introduction of the merit system undermines the achievement of national solidarity, owing to the representational imbalances that stem from selection under examination-based recruitment procedures.

The second outstanding question concerns the normative implications of the argument and evidence presented in this study. To put the question directly: if one accepts national solidarity as a normatively desirable outcome, and the evidence presented in this study is to be believed, should the meritocratic recruitment of civil servants be discouraged? Low levels of national solidarity in multi-ethnic countries has been shown to go hand-in-hand with other forms of institutionalized exclusionary behavior. In extreme cases, in diverse contexts, declines in national solidarity can lead to outright conflict as nations fall apart. These are outcomes that should surely be mitigated.

This possibility stands in striking contrast to the otherwise generally triumphalist accounts of the merit system as a normatively desirable institutional reform. The evidence supporting these arguments comes from studies that have, in general, trained their attention on outcomes relating to the overall or average quality of service delivery in a jurisdiction following civil service reform. To be sure, this study does not dispute the findings that these inquiries have yielded, which have shown that the merit system yields superior measures of service delivery. The degree to which a government ought to prioritize these salutary effects of civil service reform, as against the deleterious effects, may depend on the level of group-based inequality in a given context. Particularly in cases where group-based inequality is extremely high, as in much of Asia and Africa, this argument provides a partial explanation for the puzzling resistance of certain countries to adopting a genuine commitment to the merit-based recruitment of civil servants: policymakers in these cases might simply deem the costs of such a policy too high in terms of potential for conflict.

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Appendix

Supplementary Material to Chapter 4

Balance tests

Table 1: Balance tests and descriptive statistics, estimation sample

Variable	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}_0$	$\bar{X}_1$	$\|\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_0\|$	p
Religion:						
Muslim	0.856	8390	0.857	0.855	0.002	0.341
Christian	0.088	867	0.091	0.087	0.004	0.92
Catholic	0.037	360	0.037	0.037	0	0.579
Other	0.019	187	0.016	0.022	0.006	0.135
Gender & age:						
Male	0.391	3838	0.395	0.389	0.006	0.121
Female	0.609	5966	0.605	0.611	0.006	0.121
Age	26.815	9804	26.62	26.959	0.339	0
Level of government:						
District	0.527	5167	0.524	0.53	0.006	0.274
Province	0.108	1061	0.113	0.105	0.008	0.077
Central	0.365	3576	0.364	0.365	0.002	0.987
Ethnicity:						
Javanese	0.403	3951	0.381	0.419	0.037	0.172
Sunda	0.087	852	0.092	0.083	0.009	0.172
Melayu	0.051	504	0.053	0.05	0.002	0.805
Minang	0.055	544	0.055	0.056	0	0.151
other	0.403	3953	0.418	0.392	0.026	0.266

Note: Balance tests and descriptive statistics on demographic features of respondents in the main estimation sample ($< 2.1pp$). Difference-in-means tests implemented using OLS, with p-values calculated using robust standard errors.

Sorting tests

Figure 1—Sorting Tests, Graphical Presentation



(a) Histogram

(b) Density Sorting Test

Supplementary Material to Chapter 5

Balance Tests for Applicant-Side Analyses

Figure 2—Balance Tests, Across Both Thresholds



Note: P-Values from balance tests in which demographic variables were regressed on the treatment assignment variable—either failing the general exam, or passing the final exam. The estimation strategy here mimics the one used in the main results.

Sample Validation

Another inferential concern is a form of attrition bias. In the full sample of respondents, compared to losers, winners were more than twice as likely to complete the survey (12.0% vs. 5.1%). This is understandable, since winners are more likely to be employed than losers and thus regularly checking email. But this tendency might introduce certain biases into the baseline estimates if, for instance, the attrited losers were individuals with systematically different attitudes than those who completed the survey. However, recall that the estimation sample is the subset of respondents who narrow passed or failed the civil service exam; within this sample of respondents, attrition bias is negligible (response rates: 11.3% v 10.5%). Nonetheless, here, I consider differential attrition across the two cutpoints for a host of demographic traits.

Figure 3—Composition of Sample of Respondents and Universe of Applicants



Propensity Score Matching

Table 2: Matriculant Analysis, Propensity Score Matching

	Estimate	SE	T-Stat
Javan Preferentialism (Javans)	-0.307	0.161	-1.905
Javan Preferentialism (non-Javans)	-0.031	0.171	-0.181
Regional Preferentialism	-0.191	0.108	-1.760
Religious Resentment	-0.157	0.115	-1.360
Corruption Perceptions	-0.335	0.091	-3.680
National Identification	0.215	0.112	1.923

Balance Tests for Citizen Side Analyses

Figure 4—Balance Tests, For Both Samples