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Emergent Strategic Culture:

Post-Cold War Europe Navigating Great Power Relations with the U.S., Russia, and China

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Paul Max Love III

Dissertation Committee:

Distinguished Professor Etel Solingen, Chair

Associate Professor Emeritus Caesar Sereseres

Professor Cecelia Lynch

2022

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DEDICATION

To

my parents

Penny Love and Max Love

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Description
AA	Association Agreement
API	Application Programming Interface
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AU	African Union
AUKUS	Security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAATSA	Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
CAI	Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review of Defence
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEEC	Central Eastern European Countries
CEF	Connecting Europe Facility
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CPCC	Civilian and Conduct Capabilities

Abbreviation	Description
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas
DRM	EU-China Disaster Risk Management Project
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EC	Europoean Communities/European Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Defence Fund
EDIDP	European Defence Industrial Development Programme
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ENP	European Neighourhood Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EPDB	Buhl & Rasmussen European Parliament Database
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUMC	European Union Military Committee

Abbreviation	Description
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
GRU	Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
HR	High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy; Post-Lisbon Treaty: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/European Commission Vice President
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGA	Intergovernmental Agreements
IGO	Intergovernmental Organizations
ILO	International Labour Organization
JPCOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPP	NATO Defence Planning Process
NRF	NATO Response Force

Abbreviation	Description
OCR	Optical Character Recognition
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PADR	Preparatory Action on Defense Research
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PEESA	Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act
PEESCA	Protecting Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act
PESCO	Permanent Structured Co-operation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOE	State-Owned Enterprises
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TCA	Trade and Cooperation Agreement
TEU	The Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations

Abbreviation	Description
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

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I also must thank my North Carolina State University advisor, mentor, and friend Professor Michael Struett. While earning my Master of International Studies, he offered invaluable career advice that led me to his alma mater, the University of California, Irvine. He encouraged my curiosity to explore my interests in European Union politics.

I am grateful to my loving parents. They have always been supportive of my dreams. My parents have given me the drive and self-confidence to earn my Ph.D. with enthusiasm and determination.

I have never been alone on my path to earning my Ph.D. in Political Science. It has been made possible by the nurturing concern, love, and interest of my parents, family, professors, and friends. My heartfelt thanks to them all.

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Emergent Strategic Culture:

Post-Cold War Europe Navigating Great Power Relations with the U.S., Russia, and China

by

Paul Max Love III

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Irvine, 2022

Distinguished Professor Etel Solingen, Chair

Contemporary strategic culture research views strategic cultural change as a product of subculture competition. These competitive models can overlook "latent" subcultures and have difficulty explaining how subculture dominance relates to time. I argue that strategic subcultures are dynamic conceptual spaces shaped by material and ideational factors, which overlap with ill-defined boundaries. It is impossible to describe one subculture without referencing another. This interconnectedness resembles the behavior of quantum entangled particles.

I apply quantum-theoretical approaches to open up innovative conceptual tools for strategic cultural analysis. Entangled subcultures generate an emergent macroscopic strategic culture. Once a strategic culture emerges, its irreducible macroscopic properties

affect strategic behavior. I explore my novel strategic cultural approach by considering the strategic culture of the EU in the post-Cold War period.

I assert that European strategic culture is not an amalgam of Member States' strategic cultures. Instead, it is a unique culture that transcends nations and institutions, emerging from subcultural interaction. European strategic culture as an emergent social system considers the influence of all strategic subcultures, unlike contemporary approaches that focus only on dominant subcultures arising from competition with other subcultures.

I use topic modeling of EU documents to identify latent patterns in the ideational landscape in which subcultural interaction occurs. Once generated, I coded the topics based on strategic cultural dimensions, including civilian power, normative projection, multilateralism, and transatlanticism. Using these dimensional profiles, I characterize the emergent macroscopic strategic culture.

I identify four periods marked by shocks to the international system to explore how European strategic culture emerged. These periods are the end of the Cold War, the September 11 attacks, the global financial crisis (GFC), and the rise of right-wing populism marked by Brexit and the election of American President Donald Trump. I consider how the EU's emergent strategic culture helps explain Europe's relations with other major powers, including the United States, Russia, and China.

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Strategic Culture

I argue that strategic subcultures play an essential role in strategic culture[1] in line with contemporary strategic culture studies. However, I assert that these subcultures do not have defined boundaries. They are dynamic conceptual spaces shaped by material and ideational factors that reflect what is conceivable in pursuing security objectives. Subcultures overlap each other, such that multiple subcultures can be observed within a given group or even within a given individual. Indeed, they may also be associated with specific security preferences. These strategic subcultures are thus similar to Harrison White's (1992, 337–38) conception of social structures as "social goos, shards, and rubbery gels made up by and of ourselves" that, like "frozen shards exhibit only limited orderliness." These subcultures thus exist in a soup of themselves, ever-changing. Arising from this soup is the phenomenon of strategic culture.

Contemporary strategic culture scholarship envisions strategic culture as a function of the adversarial relations between and among strategic subcultures within a competitive dynamic (Bloomfield 2012, 451–52; Libel 2020b, 355). This subcultural analysis is also known as fourth-generation strategic culture studies branching out from Alastair Johnston's (1995b) self-defined generational review of strategic culture that covered the

[1] My conception of strategic culture is similar to the notion of grand strategy that attempts to combine military and non-military aspects of "security culture" (Kilcullen 2007; Neumann and Heikka 2005; Rogers 2009). However, the distinction between "security culture" and "strategic culture" lacks much meaning (Haglund 2011). Therefore, I adopt the terminology of "strategic culture" to situate my research within the larger strategic cultural research project of the European Union while considering both military and non-military aspects of security.

first three approaches to strategic culture. Fourth-generation strategic culture views strategic cultural change as the dominance of one subculture over another, or if there is a continued strategic culture, then the continued dominance of a particular subculture (Bloomfield 2012, 456; Libel 2020b, 359). Therefore, non-dominant strategic subcultures become latent, residing on the sidelines, waiting to engage when there are opportunities to challenge the dominant strategic subculture (Bloomfield 2012, 452). Unlike previous conceptions of strategic cultural change, a systemic "traumatic shock" was not necessary (Eitelhuber 2009, 4; Gray 2009, 232).

While the strategic subcultural approach of fourth-generation scholars has improved understanding of strategic cultural change, it struggles to describe the nature of this change. These issues have not gone unnoticed. Tamir Libel (2020b) attempts to elucidate the nature of subculture interaction in a competitive space using discursive institutionalist insights. However, this approach falls short of explaining the mechanisms that bring about the dominance of a particular strategic subculture as it assumes that strategic cultures are clearly identifiable. The "victory" of one strategic subculture may not be absolute. It may draw influence from subcultures dismissed as "latent" in a competitive model. Furthermore, fourth-generation strategic culture research struggles to define when a shift in strategic culture has occurred because it does not explain how dominance is related to time. The duration of change has been an undertheorized area in strategic subcultural analysis.

Given the overlapping and ill-defined nature of strategic subcultures, I argue that it is virtually impossible to describe one without referencing another. The fundamental

interconnectedness of subcultures produces the effectively irreducible properties of strategic culture. This interconnectedness resembles, in kind, the behavior of quantum entangled particles. I, thus, consider a quantum imaginary through the logic of "homology" (Murphy 2021a) to explain the nature of strategic subcultures and their function in producing an emergent strategic culture.

Applying quantum-theoretical approaches, I attempt to open up innovative conceptual tools unconstrained by traditional reductionist ontologies (Der Derian and Wendt 2020, 409; Barad 2007; Murphy 2021c; Wendt 2015c; Zanotti 2019a). Furthermore, I combine this quantum approach with the insights of the philosophical realist tradition stemming from the work of Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar 1998). From this perspective, I attempt to explain the causal relationship between strategic culture and strategic behavior through an ontological understanding of fundamental yet unobservable "causal mechanisms" (George and Bennett 2005; Bennett 2013; Kurki 2008b; Wight 2006a). The entanglement of strategic subcultures provides a mechanism to explain the emergence of strategic culture. It helps address the issue of duration and identification of subcultures that a competitive model does not address. Once a strategic culture has emerged, it possesses properties at a macroscopic level that inform how it impacts strategic behavior. I explore my novel approach to strategic cultural analysis using the case of the European Union in the post-Cold War period.

European Union

The EU resists classification as it does not fit squarely into a state-centric world, possessing the characteristics of an intergovernmental organization and the characteristics of a Westphalian state. Nevertheless, it is a global actor in that it is an "autonomous unit" with

the "capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relations to other others in the international system" (Sjöstedt 1977, 16; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). While the EU is not a traditional state, it is effectively a peer among the other poles of power in the international system. It seeks to define itself within the liberal West[2] while countering illiberal authoritarianism from Russia and China and seeking greater autonomy from the United States, especially where their interests and ideals are out of alignment. The EU, like other powers, contributes to shaping the global security landscape. I thus argue that the EU is functionally a security actor and not just a sui generis case of post-Westphalian political institutionalization.

From the neorealist perspective, states are the only actors that matter, so the EU takes on the character of a group of 27 sovereign Member States. International institutions mirror the distribution of power in the international system through their institutional design, reflecting the interests of the most powerful states, especially in decision-making procedures (Mearsheimer 1994, 13; Rittberger, Zangl, and Kruck 2012, 17). The EU, as an international institution, would not be an independent variable to explain state behavior, and its effect, if present, is at the margin as an intervening variable (Mearsheimer 1994, 7, 13). However, the EU is not a traditional intergovernmental organization, demonstrating varying levels of integration where the member states have transferred competences associated with the state to the supranational level. Both offensive realists (Mearsheimer

[2] The West and the international liberal order are somewhat nebulous concepts with contentious definitions. In this investigation, I conceive the West as the community of nation-states that helped form and perpetuate the liberal international order. The notion of the West is often used interchangeably with the transatlantic security community. I follow this synecdochic convention, but I refer to specific political entities when a nuanced distinction is necessary. I use Richard Youngs' (2021a, 37) practical definition of the liberal international order characterized by "multilateral institutions and norms; open markets and trade liberalisation; cooperative approaches to security; and support for human rights and democratic values."

2001) and defensive realists (Grieco 1988; Waltz 2001, 2010), with their rationalist state-centric models, struggle to account for this unique form of governance.

While starting from similar rationalist assumptions as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism does emphasize international institutions. According to neoliberal institutionalists, international institutions decrease transaction costs and help overcome collective action problems, especially those that result in Pareto suboptimal Nash equilibria, through the distribution of information to reduce informational asymmetries and expose opportunistic behavior (Keohane 1982, 338; 1988, 386; Mearsheimer 1994, 17; Sterling-Folker 2013, 120). Iterative interactions between states, monitored by international organizations, increase the cost of cheating because opportunistic behavior may threaten future benefits from cooperation (Keohane 1982, 346; Mearsheimer 1994, 18). While the EU does serve the functions of an international organization, it demonstrates considerable autonomy from its Member State principals with preferences that do not necessarily fit a logic of rational utility maximization.

Within liberal scholarship that does not focus on institutional analysis (Legro and Moravcsik 1999; Moravcsik 1997), the EU's normative role helps it promote working through international organizations, increasing economic interdependence, and upholding the values of democracy in the interactive reinforcing patterns of the Kantian triangle (Russett and Oneal 2001, 35–42). Indeed, critical elements of European foreign policy have drawn on democratic peace theory (Doyle 1997). However, the EU has not taken on the form of Immanuel Kant's Pacific Federation (Oneal and Russett 1999). Instead, the EU

frustrates both liberal and institutionalist perspectives by embracing realpolitik, sometimes as if it were a state.

The constructivist perspective argues that human interactions shape and give meaning to our experienced reality (Fierke 2013, 188–89). A logic of appropriateness shapes behavior with values, norms, and social institutions (Fierke 2013, 190). International organizations may influence states by disseminating beliefs about acceptable behavior (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 712–15; Park 2007, 535–56). International institutions problematize issues by classifying social phenomena and their ability to alter and change those classifications (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 710–12). From this perspective, the EU's supranational character is better captured and demonstrates how it spreads "European values" of capitalism and liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the EU is not a federal super-state; the Member States, primarily powerful ones with considerable material resources, have considerable influence over the EU's actions. In terms of foreign relations, Member State relations with third countries can even undermine the collective aims of the Union.

The complexity of the EU's strategic behavior necessitates an approach that uses both material and ideational factors. Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil (2004) assert that both ideational and material variables can be considered using, in concert, international relations theory paradigms, including constructivism and rationalist perspectives such as realism and liberalism. This synthetic approach that they term analytical eclecticism contrasts with most international relations scholarship, which is fragmented into several fiercely guarded research paradigms (Katzenstein and Sil 2004, 3, 16–17; Sil and Katzenstein 2010, chap. 1). Strategic culture embraces the synthesis proposed by analytical

eclecticism, revealing the complex relationships between material and ideational factors for security studies.[3] Indeed, it imparts meaning to material factors that are typically considered "ahistorical" and "objective" (Johnston 1995a, 15). Strategic culture's analytical flexibility makes it well suited to capture the dynamic nature of the EU.

Colin Gray (1999, 50) describes succinctly that strategic behavior is behavior "relevant to the threat or use of force for political purposes." However, Alessia Biava (2011) asserts, in the context of the EU, that strategic behavior can extend to civilian instruments of crisis management operations run by the EU. I argue that these inconsistencies in what constitutes strategic behavior point to a problem, not of kind but degree. Military force is merely a more coercive instrument to achieve political ends than a police training initiative. I argue that strategic behavior is a function of security objectives. Therefore, strategic behavior is behavior that advances the security goals of a given security community.

A security community, explains Karl Deutsch (1957, 5), is a place where members of the community "will not fight each other physically but settle their disputes in some other way" because they become "integrated" through the development of a "sense of community" and institutions exist to ensure a durable means to effect "peaceful change" through typically "institutionalized procedures." Within a security community, threat perceptions are not formed by a power structure but by the identities of other participants in the international system (Risse-Kappen 1996, 366). The EU is a security community, given the depth of interconnectedness among its members and their institutional linkages.

---

[3] Strategic cultural analysis highlights the second image of domestic context effects on "strategic outcomes" when taking into account both material and ideational factors (Glenn 2009, 523; Johnston 1995a, 42).

I draw on a securitization approach (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993) that captures the various traditional and non-traditional security threats the EU faces and their preference to use a diverse set of instruments to address these issues.[4] Existential threats are the driving force behind securitization, both physical and identity-based (Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, 21–22). Identity-based threats concern ontological security, which Jennifer Mitzen (2006, 344) defines as "security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice." From this perspective, insecurity is that the understanding of the self is not stable, and this instability creates a damaging dissonance (Mitzen 2006, 344; Steele 2008, 51). Brent Steele (2008, 20) further explains that ontological security equally applies to polities because they, like an individual, have a self-image that has developed over time that others can threaten. I thus consider behavior strategic insofar as policymakers claim it serves the security interests of their security community. Therefore, I analyze discourse that is not limited to only strategic documents.

The EU is a security community with a self-image that engages in the active process of securitizing threats, both physical and ontological. However, this security community is not a static phenomenon but a negotiated and ever-changing entity. The evolving dynamic of the EU also informs how Europe views those who are outside of the security community. Wæver (1998) characterizes EU relations with outside actors through the lens of a center-periphery model. He argues that the EU's objective is to "keep all relevant actors oriented towards Europe," but this power "gradually fades off," moving away from the center,

[4] Security is a concept fraught with many different interpretations. See (Huysmans 1998) for a discussion of conceptualizing security. I focus on securitization from the Copenhagen school perspective. For a review of securitization conceptualizations, including the Copenhagen school, see (M. C. Williams 2003).

blurring the border of what constitutes Europe (Wæver 1998, 100). Therefore, Europe's "other" is not its peripheral neighbors of the Middle East, Russia, or the Balkans; instead, it is a continuum of Europeanness defined by the conceptual-historical distance to Europe's fragmented past. This fluidity in Europeanness helps shape the EU's security objectives over time.

Scholarship on European strategic culture or EU-level strategic culture has centered on what might be called a "convergence hypothesis" (Blockmans 2018, 1824; Chappell 2009, 2012; Christoph O. Meyer 2005; Christoph O. Meyer 2006; Jolyon Howorth 2007b; Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b). This "hypothesis" posits that the EU does not have its own unique strategic culture but rather the sum of the strategic cultures of the Member States. James Rogers (2009, 834) explains this "strategic convergence" as the "'imagined process' whereby [Member State's] strategic cultures become sufficiently coterminous in certain areas to enable shared policy outcomes at the European level."

Heiko Biehl et al. (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b) provide one of the most comprehensive studies of European strategic culture based on the notion of convergence using four cultural dimensions, drawing on 28 case studies including Turkey and the United Kingdom. They strongly defend that European strategic culture is, at best, a collection of national strategic cultures arranged in very loose "constellations" of cultural dimensions (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 391). These dimensions include "level of ambition in international security policy," "scope of action for the executive in decision-making," "foreign policy orientation," and "willingness to use military force" (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 13–16).

The first group of countries (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal) regard security policy as a "manifestation of statehood" (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 391). This constellation has a very high level of ambition in the first dimension, strong legislative rights limiting the executive, foreign policy oriented towards the EU, and a low willingness to use force (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 394). These are small states with limited resources that want to demonstrate to the international community that they can shoulder the responsibilities of being a valued member of that community by participating in international organizations and military missions (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 391). They usually avoid using force, preferring non-military crisis management and conflict prevention measures (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 391).

The second group of states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain) primarily channel their security and defense policies through alliances and international organizations because they are more concerned with influencing multinational policy to foster mutual obligation and unity (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 392). This constellation has a low to medium ambition in the first dimension, legislative rights limiting the executive, foreign policy oriented towards NATO for collective defense and the EU for other policy areas, and a high willingness to use force for defense combined with less willingness for force in crisis management (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 394). Even when their specific national interests are not at stake, they want to be dependable partners in NATO or the EU (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 392). They do, however, anticipate that their contributions will engender reciprocity from the United States and potentially enable them to influence policy

in international frameworks other than security and defense (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 392).

The third group of countries (Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) desire to protect the state and project their strength abroad, and they believe that the military is crucial to accomplishing these goals (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 393). This constellation has a high level of ambition, an executive largely unencumbered by its legislature, a foreign policy strongly directed towards the EU or NATO, and a high willingness to use military force (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 394). These countries value international order and stability; therefore, they feel obligated to assist in managing crises and conflicts and are willing to devote resources to that end (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 393). They attempt to use international institutions to assist them in achieving these aims; however, if the organizations are unhelpful, they will join willing coalitions, such as in the Iraq War (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b, 393).

This view of European strategic culture leaves unanswered the reasoning behind the convergence towards the EU by the Member States and how this convergence affects the strategic behavior of the EU (Rogers 2009, 834). Moreover, it does not sufficiently illuminate the diverse interactions among different strategic subcultures that exceed the boundaries of a given state or formal or informal transnational groupings, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). I argue that European strategic culture is an emergent social phenomenon far more complex than the convergence of Member States' national strategic cultures. It presents itself not as an amalgam of the Member States'

strategic cultures but as a distinct culture possessing unique properties. These unique properties emerge from subcultural interaction. European strategic culture transcends nationality and institutional affiliation. For example, a German member of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) may have more in common with a Swedish Commissioner than with her compatriots in other EU institutions, even the European External Action Service (EEAS), which houses the EUMC.

In contrast to the "convergence hypothesis," repeated interactions stimulate the organic development of a European strategic culture that need not align with the EU's institutional interventions. National strategic cultures in the Member States may be converging as they adopt similar ideas. However, this convergence is parallel to and complementary to the emergence of European strategic culture. This convergence perspective misses the impact of the whole of European strategic culture by narrowly focusing on only the strategic cultures of a collection of states. European strategic culture as an emergent social system illuminates the influence of all European strategic subcultures, regardless of purported dominance, on the emergent whole.

The existing literature suggests that there is a diverse ideational landscape for European strategic decision-makers and provides a most-likely case to evaluate an emergence approach to strategic culture. Moreover, European strategic culture is not limited to theoretical debate. It is a concrete policy objective for the EU. Indeed, the concept was elevated to the level of explicit strategy in the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 (European Union 2003b). It continues to be addressed among strategic decision-makers,

especially in terms of developing military capabilities independent of the United States and NATO (Macron 2017).

Method

I use unsupervised topic modeling to explore the EU's strategic culture. For the modeling, I collected texts from 1992 to 2020 produced by the EU. These texts include press releases from the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Additionally, I collected speeches made by the European Commission. Along with these documents, I included legal documents originating from the European Official Journal. For legal documents before 2004, I used a metadata database to help locate texts (Rasmussen 2014). I split the texts into four periods marked by system-level exogenous events that would likely produce significant changes to European strategic culture and produce lasting observable macroscopic patterns. These shocks include the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Global Financial Crisis, and the rise of right-wing populism stemming from the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald J. Trump.

I argue that the topics produced through topic modeling are also a form of emergence. Topics thus reveal a snapshot of the latent patterns in the ideational landscape at a given time. This snapshot helps describe the state of strategic subcultural interaction at a given time. To ensure the validity of the topics produced, I use "blended reading" that draws on "distant reading" through computer analysis and "close reading" of texts that involves careful interpretation by the researcher (Stulpe and Lemke 2016). My close reading draws on other sources of strategic culture, including geography, historical experience, and material resources (Ermarth 2009, 86; Lantis 2009, 39–41), as discourse is only part of the phenomenon.

Once I generated the topics, I coded them as to whether they exhibited specific strategic cultural dimensions relevant to European strategic culture. These dimensions include the preference for multilateralism over unilateralism (M), transatlanticism as the alignment with the United States and NATO in foreign policy (T), normative projection as the EU's pursuit to spread European values (P), and civilian power as the preference to use civilian instruments of external action (C). These dimensional profiles provide a picture of the emergent whole of European strategic culture that offers insight into the EU's strategic behavior as an international security actor.

Outline

The study proceeds with Chapter 2, which introduces an emergent approach to strategic culture, using insights from quantum theory. I follow this discussion of the theoretical framework with a methodological discussion on text analysis. The following chapters consider four different periods marked by exogenous shocks to the international system. Exogenous shocks are unnecessary to observe strategic cultural change, as minimal changes can occur whenever a strategic culture is used. However, exogenous shocks allow investigation of significant changes because they mark the introduction of ideational and structural-material uncertainty.

Chapter 3 begins after the Cold War when the 1992 Maastricht Treaty formally establishes the European Union. This treaty was a profound step toward Europe's understanding of itself as an international actor. As a result of this increased assertiveness, the EU pursued external policies that enhanced their security and helped reinforce an identity tied to the Cold War's enduring liberal democratic ideals. In this early phase of European strategic culture, the EU sought to bring other major powers closer institutionally and ideologically

in various ways. This period also marked a dramatic shift in understanding European security as part of the transatlantic framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The EU sought greater autonomy from NATO and, by extension, the United States, which provides significant support to the organization. This trend of increasing strategic autonomy outside of the transatlantic security framework continues throughout the entire post-Cold War timeline (Lindstrom 2007; Fiott 2017; Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017; Blockmans 2018; Flynn 2018; S. W. Duke 2019; S. Duke 2019b).

Chapter 4 considers the strategic behavior following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the associated Global War on Terror. This period captures the peak of "Normative Power Europe" (Manners 2006) as the EU's ontological security became increasingly tied to how it diverged from the United States' militaristic and unilateral foreign policy. With the first security strategy released in 2003 in the wake of the Iraq War, the EU sought to attract others through their perceived normative superiority and back their normative stance with proactive policies as part of a "comprehensive approach" within the "effective multilateralism" framework. The EU's inclusivity towards others, such as China and Russia, took on a more selective and assertive character.

In the following chapter, I consider the impact of the Global Financial Crisis in 2009, linked to the European sovereign debt crisis. This third period reveals the most significant "capability-expectations gap" (Hill 1993). While the EU increasingly pursued more strategic autonomy and a more assertive foreign policy towards the illiberal powers of China and Russia, the coercive power behind these goals was lacking. This period demonstrates the importance of considering discourse as only part of the strategic culture picture. The

material factors of reduced resources from the global recession took the teeth out of their foreign policy positions, yet Europe maintained its self-image as a normative superpower. Finally, the period crescendos into the disillusionment and disarray of the 2014 Ukrainian intervention by Russia, instilling doubt within and outside the EU about the potency or desirability of European normative superiority.

Chapter 6 starts with the June 2016 British referendum to leave the EU. This event was capped by the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in November of the same year. These events marked the rise of right-wing populism in the West. This schism within the West introduced political and economic uncertainty across the world. In this environment, it exited the disillusionment of the 2010s and embraced a "principled pragmatism" in its renewed security strategy in 2016. The material and the ontological threat of the United Kingdom's leaving the EU pushed the EU to develop more military capabilities. Moreover, President Trump's policies toward NATO introduced significant doubt about transatlantic security. In this context of uncertainty, the EU's engagement with illiberal powers privileged instrumentality over normative implications.

In the concluding chapter, I discuss the implications of this emergent approach for European strategic culture. The proposed theoretical framework offers opportunities to explore strategic culture with a novel set of concepts outside intuitive everyday experience. It also provides a tool to better understand the development of the European Union as a security actor as a process shaped by internal-domestic and external-global factors. My new approach offers a better understanding of the origins of European strategic culture and offers essential insights for security-oriented policymaking. Unlike structuralist

security explanations, an emergent European strategic culture approach opens up room for the agency of strategic decision-makers. Policymakers' connection to the process of strategic cultural emergence means the ability to produce change is not only possible but an ethical responsibility.

CHAPTER 2: Emergent Strategic Culture

Strategic Culture's Evolution

Strategic culture scholarship has evolved from its Cold War origins, reflecting a move towards a more rigorous and empirical study of the social phenomenon of strategic behavior. In this chapter, I explore the unique insights offered by each iteration of strategic cultural research and how they build on each other to provide a robust framework for social inquiry. In the following section, I use the "generations" convention introduced by Johnston (1995b) to see where strategic cultural analysis has been and its future trajectory in subcultural analysis.

First Generation

In the late 1970s, Jack Snyder coined the term "strategic culture" as a way to interpret Soviet military strategy (Lantis 2002, 87, 89). Snyder (1977, 8) defines strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy." Snyder situates strategic cultures in the broader theoretical framework of culture in general because they are likewise adaptive to material changes in the environment yet demonstrate continuity as the adaptations are path-dependent and evolutionary (Snyder 1977, 9; Pye 2003, 9; Mishler and Rose 2001, 36; Jackman and Miller 2004, 187). This conceptualization of strategic culture fits within the literature on culture from a sociological perspective and more specified types of culture, such as political culture concerned with "orientations towards power and authority" (Pye 2003, 7; Geertz 1973, 89).

Snyder and his contemporaries helped form the first generation of strategic cultural scholarship. This generation viewed strategic culture as a context because they understood strategic behavior and culture to mutually constitute each other (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013a, 10). For strategic behavior, I adopt the broader definition offered by first-generation scholar Colin Gray (1999, 50), which defines strategic behavior as behavior that is "relevant to the threat or use of force for political purposes." A "culturalist," Gray (2009, 226) argues, does not imply that decision-making and action are determined or primarily determined by culture.

Strategic culture can encapsulate many aspects of strategic behavior at the public, civilian leadership, and military levels (Gray 2009, 227). Gray (2009, 229) explains that it is probable that security communities use rational decision-making, but understanding the behavior of those communities requires understanding the "content of that rationality." A security community does not haphazardly choose its strategic culture based on passing trends (Gray 2009, 232). From this perspective, strategic culture evolves with the security community and cannot be altered fundamentally, except by a "traumatic shock" (Eitelhuber 2009, 4; Gray 2009, 232). Ultimately, strategic cultures "choose" their security communities and not vice versa (Gray 2009, 232).

Second Generation

In the mid-1980s, the second generation of strategic culture scholarship centered on the difference between security community elites' behavior, including speech acts, and their motives (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013a, 10; Johnston 1995b, 39). This line of thinking suggests that strategic culture may, in some instances, have a limited impact on observed behavior (Johnston 1995b, 42). It is unclear if cultural-structural constraints impact elites

as they manipulate strategic behavior nationally (Johnston 1995b, 40). If these constraints exert influence, then behavior should differ between states (Johnston 1995b, 40). This scholarship aligns with research on military doctrines regarding intra-elite interaction. However, strategic cultural analysis has a broader scope by considering ideational and material factors inside and outside the military establishment.[5]

Yitzhah Klein (1991, 5) draws attention to motives by defining strategic culture as "the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it." He attempts to identify the aims of the interested actors in the political and military arenas (Klein 1991). Klein (1991, 10) considers how congruent strategic culture is with an ideal paradigm that implements policy and strategy through operations. He describes an ideal strategic culture with three levels of strategy (1991, 10).

At the highest level, "military-political doctrine" considers the policy objective of war as determined by state leaders as well as "metastrategic" considerations, given the state of the international system, regarding the efficacy of war (Klein 1991, 10–11). The middle level of strategy may be considered "strategy proper," in that it considers how to achieve the aims determined by the "military-political doctrine" at a general level (e.g., defensive or offensive strategy) (Klein 1991, 10–11). "Operations" is the lowest level of strategy, which considers the concrete execution of a middle level (i.e., second-level) strategy (Klein 1991, 10–11).

[5] Elizabeth Kier (1995, 67; 1997) holds that military doctrine is affected by domestic politics and organizational influences within the military establishment.

Third Generation

Third-generation research in the 1990s used a falsifiable positivist approach with strategic culture as an independent variable to explain strategic behavior (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013a, 10; Gray 1999, 49; Johnston 1995b, 39). Thus, strategic culture limits decision options and shapes how decision-makers assess their choices (Johnston 1995b, 42). Johnston (1995b, 46) asserts that strategic choices can thus be predicted by understanding the ideational limits of strategic culture. Christoph Meyer (2005, 528) defines strategic culture within this perspective as

> Comprising the socially transmitted, identity derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community's pursuit of security and defence goals.

Since strategic culture is an independent variable, it implies that it is something that one can empirically observe and measure. Using indicators such as "weak" and "strong" to measure strategic culture is not helpful because it does not reveal the concept's complexity, which incorporates "contradictions and trade-offs between different norms" (Christoph O. Meyer 2005, 531). Thus, third-generation scholarship has focused on building multidimensional frameworks to measure strategic culture. For example, Fritz W. Ermarth's (2009, 85) multidimensional model of strategic culture uses four intersecting dimensions—military, political, foreign policy, and economic—that can vary within each dimension. Johnston's (1995b, 46–47) framework for strategic culture makes measurements on three dimensions: the frequency of conflict as it pertains to demonstrating the inevitability of war; the nature of conflict varying between zero-sum and variable sum; and the efficacy of the use of force to attain the goals of the state.

Extremely low scores on all dimensions indicate a "soft idealpolitik" strategic culture, and the opposite extreme high score cluster indicates "hard realpolitik" (Johnston 1995b, 47).

Fourth Generation

In contemporary scholarship on strategic culture, Alan Bloomfield (2012, 456) attempted to situate his model between Colin Gray and Alastair I. Johnston's conflicting views on strategic culture.[6] Gray viewed strategic behavior and culture as mutually constituting each other, so strategic culture operates as a context (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013a, 10). Conversely, Johnston was part of a move to use a falsifiable positivist approach where strategic culture is an independent variable that helps explain strategic behavior (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013a, 10; Gray 1999, 49; Johnston 1995b, 39). From this perspective, strategic culture limits decision options and shapes how decision-makers assess their choices (Johnston 1995b, 42). Bloomfield's (2012, 456) model conceptualizes strategic culture, through the lens of strategic subcultures, as a context that can contain contrary elements similar to Gray's approach; simultaneously, the model achieves Johnston's goal of falsifiability.

The fourth-generation analysis concentrates on the nature of strategic culture itself. Traditionally, analyses of subcultures[7] have focused on the dominant subculture with which all other subcultures interact (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013a, 12). While scholars

[6] Bloomfield's subculture ontology has spurred other studies that attempt to understand strategic culture through subculture competition (Haglund 2014; Oros 2014; Karásek 2016; Massie 2008; Miklóssy and Smith 2019b; Libel 2016).

[7] Jack Snyder (1977, 10) also considered subcultures in his work, explaining that they are a "subsection of the broader strategic community with reasonably distinct beliefs and attitudes on strategic issues, with a distinct and historically traceable analytical tradition, with characteristic institutional associations, and with more or less distinct patterns of socialization to the norms of the subculture."

frequently examine strategic culture as a single entity for a community, it frequently comprises conflicting, opposing subcultures (Bloomfield 2012, 451). From this traditional viewpoint, strategic culture evolves with the security community and cannot be fundamentally altered except by a "traumatic shock" (Eitelhuber 2009, 4; Gray 2009, 232). Bloomfield (2012, 456; Libel 2020b, 359) builds on the notion of change by explaining that a challenge to the dominant strategic subculture can come from the "external strategic environment" as an exogenous shock or endogenous factors related to a state's identity or its relationships with other states. The competition of strategic subcultures for dominance comprises the overall strategic culture that drives change (Bloomfield 2012, 451–52). Examining strategic debates among subcultures may allow for the prediction of a state's strategic culture shift in response to a specific subculture gaining dominance (Bloomfield 2012, 454). In extraordinary cases, strategic decision-makers may engage one subculture to address a specific problem but then revert to the status quo subculture after the problem has passed (Bloomfield 2012, 454).

Problematic Competition

The competition mechanism provides little insight into how strategic cultural manifestation occurs at a given point in time (Libel 2016, 140; 2020a, 356; Miklóssy and Smith 2019a, 260). The competitive dynamic draws on rationalist assumptions from economic theory, where each actor seeks to maximize their utility. This dynamic implies that strategic subcultures operate as unitary actors with clear preferences (Libel 2020a, 356). However, strategic subcultures can emanate from many different social institutions and configurations within government, the military, academia, or any group that contributes to the policy-making of security goals. Strategic subcultures likely overlap in

membership, ideology, and policy preferences, especially at a transnational level. If strategic subcultures are not truly separate, then "dominance" among co-strategic subcultures becomes less meaningful. *Who is competing against whom when it is not clear who is who?*

Tamir Libel (2020b) attempts to elucidate the competition dynamic with new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). In particular, he applies a discursive institutionalist approach (V. A. Schmidt 2008, 2010) to conceptualize cultural change. Libel (2020b) argues that security studies, including those on strategic culture, have viewed actors as independent, but a discursive understanding of the processes and interactions in which actors participate shifts the view of actors as being interdependent. This perspective acknowledges the importance of the relationships within the group of subcultures. However, it still relies on using the dominant strategic culture as the determinate factor in understanding strategic cultural change. This competitive dynamic does not capture the varying degrees of causal impact subcultural relations have on the whole strategic culture.

Fourth-generation research has also attempted to address the paradox of the structural expectations of an enduring strategic culture unchanged by time and the observed changes that do occur. Breaking strategic culture into its subcultures provides fourth-generation scholars with a pool of existing strategic subcultures built up over time by a given security community, which can displace one that took dominance in response to some exogenous shock to strategic policymakers. This strategic cultural reserve concept implies that one subculture unseats another or holds its position, which is a questionable assumption.

Moreover, the notion of a dominant strategic subculture leaves little room for the influence of other strategic subcultures besides providing an ideational reserve for the future. When strategic subcultures have indefinite boundaries in terms of ideas, membership, and preferences, the influence of non-dominant subcultures is realized in those areas in which they overlap with the dominant strategic subculture. Indeed, it is perplexing that a group would not use the entire ideational well to address an existential threat. Strategic culture should be considered a product of all strategic subcultures whose contributions to the overall strategic culture vary over time.

An Emergence Framework

Scientific and Critical Realism

While there have been attempts to improve the competition-based subculture model through discursive institutionalist tools, it does not sufficiently address the problems surrounding the nature of strategic culture and its subcultures. It is, therefore, high time to reevaluate our ontological assumptions about strategic culture. Modern philosophy of science has posed causation as an epistemological or methodological issue to avoid metaphysical debate (Kurki 2008c, 10). However, it is necessary to probe into the nature of strategic culture to reveal its causal impact.

Milja Kurki (2008c, 10–11) argues that ontological inquiry is at the root of causation within the philosophical realist perspective. Philosophical or scientific realism and its derivatives stem from the work of Roy Bhaskar (1998).[8] For scientific realists, causal mechanisms exist

[8] See (Wight 2006a)

out in the world, but they are unobservable; it is what these underlying mechanisms produce that we observe (Bennett 2013, 466). Bhaskar explains that

> The construction of an explanation for, that is, the production of the knowledge of the mechanism of the production of, some identified phenomenon will involve the building of a model, utilizing such cognitive materials, and operating under the control of something like a ***logic of analogy and metaphor***, of a mechanism, which **_if it were to exist**_and act in the postulated way would account for the phenomenon in question [emphasis mine]" (Bhaskar 1998, 13)

Thus, while the underlying nature of the world is inherently unknowable, an approximation of the actual mechanisms is the aim of scientific inquiry. Given this assumption, scientific realists apply relativism to epistemology and methodology, arguing there are many ways to learn about the world, none of which are superior to another (Kurki 2008c, 11; Kurki and Wight 2013, 25). This perspective conflicts with the orthodox Humean concept of causality that reduces causation to one dimension of "push and pull" forces, producing an ontology that is deterministic, lawlike, and objective (Kurki 2008c, 6; Mirow 2016, 26).[9] The reductionism of Humean causality focuses causal analysis on epistemological or methodological problems at the expense of interrogating the ontology of causal mechanisms. Within social science, George and Bennett (2005, 110) advocate an ontological conceptualization of causal mechanisms in line with other scientific realist analyses. They offer a helpful definition of causal mechanisms within social inquiry as

> Ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities (George and Bennett 2005, 110).

[9] David Easton (1981, 316) follows a reductionist approach to systems analysis, calling phenomena that are manifested from the system a "ghost in the machine."

Scientific realism in International Relations Theory has primarily emanated from Alexander Wendt's (1999) application of the concept to constructivism. This commitment to scientific realism has continued into his work on the quantum mind (Murphy 2021a, 47). Wendt (2015d, 244) highlights the ontological divide between collectivists and individualists. Collectivists view reality as stratified into macro-level structures and micro-level agents, while individualists view reality as reducible to the interactions of agents (Wendt 2015d, 244). However, Wendt's scientific realist approach has been criticized for only modifying positivist assumptions about the world it purports to transcend (Kurki and Wight 2013, 26). Indeed, Joseph (2010, 66) argues that Waltzian neo-realists and Wendtian constructivists share a similar reductionist view of structure that focuses on interactions between units. This form of reductionism creates a flat ontology where only individuals genuinely exist.

Breaking with this flat reductionist ontology, critical realists consider a layered ontology.[10] This is in line with Bhaskar's (2008) three domains of the real, actual, and empirical. Critical realists use both ideas and material factors; only through examining the relationship and interplay of these factors can one infer their relative importance (Kurki and Wight 2013, 26).[11] Further, ideas must come from a "material context" because the meanings we imbue on events are how those events are "materially constructed, composed, and represented" (Kurki and Wight 2013, 26). Critical realism shares a

[10] See (Kurki 2008a)

[11] Kurki (2008c, 16–17) argues that the distinction between causal and constitutive IR is illusory in that constitutive theorizing is still, in some sense, causal. This divide is not an irreconcilable philosophical conflict but a distraction in IR theoretical debates perpetuated by disciplinary "camps" (Kurki 2008c, 16–17).

commitment to mixed-methods research in IR, but it also stresses purposive choice of methods based on ontological assumptions about the phenomena under study (Joseph 2014, 6). The layered ontology of critical realism corresponds with emergentism since different layers have individual properties while interacting with all layers as a whole (Joseph 2014, 4). Joseph highlights the irony of this ontological discord by saying that International Relations theory

> Has come to be seen in terms of system versus unit or international versus domestic, ***instead of in terms of different levels***, or as [critical realism] is better able to put it, in terms of different, overlapping social strata that reflect the complexity and ontological depth of the social world [emphasis in the original]" (Joseph 2010, 65).

Critical realism views international affairs as an emergent phenomenon irreducible to a particular set of originating conditions, unlike traditional IR approaches, which break down phenomena into several levels of analysis (Joseph 2014, 4; Wight 2006b, 110). Emergence is thus the engine of change for critical realism (Zanotti 2017, 368).

Defining Emergence

At the most general level of abstraction, emergent phenomena are a function of a system's constituent parts' interactions, which exhibit properties not found in those constituent parts. Physicist P.W. Anderson famously described the relationship between the microscopic and the macroscopic as "more is different," saying that "at each level of complexity entirely new properties appear"(Anderson 1972, 393). Many different systems can exhibit this phenomenon, both natural and artificial. Emergent systems are nonlinear, demonstrating a high degree of complexity, self-organized through self-generated adaptive activity, experiencing states beyond equilibrium, and evolving towards system attractors other than equilibrium (Camazine et al. 2001, 7–8; Goldstein 1999, 55–56). Social systems

frequently exhibit self-organization, like other natural phenomena (Camazine et al. 2001, 8).

Outside the physical sciences, emergence has become a key tool in sociological network analysis, especially among scholars that have emphasized the phenomenological complexity of networks over the quantitative measures found in computational social science (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Fontdevila 2018; Ikegami 2000, 2005, 2007; Mische 2014; Tilly 1994, 2002; White 1992, 2008). Harrison White (1992, 2008) highlights how identity is an emergent network phenomenon. When the density of relationships between a subset of people reaches a certain level, the subset may consider itself to have an identity (White 2008, 52). Individuals see network relations as if they exist even when there is no active connection (White 2008, 52). Any clique member can "activate" an individual relationship with another clique member (White 2008, 52). Within international relations theory, emergence has been a helpful tool for understanding constraining structures when modeling social networks (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009, 561; Kahler 2009, 8; Maoz 2011, 6; Slaughter 2017, 38).

The philosophical tradition of emergentism includes two versions of emergence: weak and strong. Strong emergence describes phenomena entirely determined by lower-level parts of a system, so it is impossible to deduce the phenomena from those lower-level parts (Chalmers 2008, 247). Weak emergence is characterized by the unexpectedness of high-level phenomena (Chalmers 2008, 245). However, in principle, it is still possible to deduce the high-level phenomena from lower-level parts of the system (Chalmers 2008, 245). From this perspective, breaking an emergent system down to its components is likely

outside human ability. For example, suppose one fills a glass with water from a pitcher. It is ostensibly possible to move every water molecule back to the pitcher, returning it to its previous undisturbed state. However, it would be necessary to know the initial state of every fundamental particle involved in the scenario to recreate the pitcher before the pouring. This endeavor to engage in reduction would likely require intervention by something similar to Marquis de Laplace's (1902, 4) demon from his thought experiment on determinism which could know all of time with knowledge of every fundamental particle's position and momentum. Weak emergence under most circumstances manifests something that is essentially unknowable from its components. It is thus an "observer-relative property" in that it must be "interesting" to the observer in some way and have "non-obvious consequences on low-level properties" (Chalmers 2008, 251).

Chalmers (2008, 251–50) argues that weak emergence is the appropriate conception of higher-level phenomena, including social phenomena, because the inclusion of strong emergence provides too broad of a definition for emergence. Bedau (1997, 376) also advocates for weak emergence as a more useful concept than strong emergence, especially when studying complex systems found in life and the mind, especially when maintaining a physicalist ontology. If strong emergence does exist, the only potential example is consciousness (Chalmers 2008, 247). Indeed, Bedau (1997, 377) critiques strong emergence as "uncomfortably like magic." Since the most likely case of consciousness is not my focus, my use of emergence hereafter refers to weak emergence.

Emergence has a downward causal impact on a system in that lower-level parts of a system cause unexpected phenomena at a higher level (Chalmers 2008, 249; Gambini and Pullin

2016, 89, 104; Kalantari, Nazemi, and Masoumi 2020, 239; Pessa 2002, 379). This causal impact is a function of the relationship between emergence and time. Emergence is synchronic when the higher-level phenomena are present at the same time as the lower-level phenomena that generate the higher-level (Wendt 2015a, 261). This temporal relationship aligns with strong emergence, making the causal arrow between cause and effect unclear. In contrast, diachronic downward causation occurs from the evolution of interactions of parts and wholes over time (Wendt 2015a, 261). This form of emergence aligns with weak emergence in that reducibility is preserved in principle. However, it is challenged by the logic of causal exclusion.

Causal exclusion necessitates that an event cannot be over-determined if it already has a sufficient "micro-level" cause (Wendt 2015a, 261).[12] Diachronic downward causation violates this principle since it implies a separate "macro-level" cause that one could attribute to the effects at time t1 as a product of the effects of the whole's parts at an earlier time t0 (Wendt 2015a, 261). Given this condition of causal exclusion, it would appear that downward causation seems to be only applicable to synchronic emergence, which struggles with a vicious causal cycle. The difficulty of fitting emergence within a philosophical realist ontology requires reevaluating its ontological assumptions, especially regarding the role of time.

[12] See (Kim 2006a, 2006b, 1999) for a review of the extensive debate over the problems of downward causation from emergence.

A Quantum Imaginary

Quantum mechanics[13] offers a novel set of ontological assumptions that can help resolve the tensions created from a philosophical realist perspective. Critical realist Heikki Patomäki (2010, 69–70) even acknowledges that the philosophy of science cannot ignore the "empirical success" of quantum theory.[14] Murphy (2021, 65) argues that social phenomena are homologous to quantum phenomena; this relationship exceeds analogical comparison and speaks to a more fundamental shared form.[15] On a hypothetical continuum linking quantum phenomena to social phenomena, he situates himself between a total commitment to a quantum ontology and quantum theory as a helpful analogy (Murphy 2021a, 51).

One of the fundamental insights from quantum theory is the concept of superposition. For example, at the microscopic scale, an electron exists in a superposition of states in which its spin is both up and down. This superposition stops when the electron is measured, and it manifests as either spin up or spin down. This feature of the quantum world produces the

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[13] Thermodynamics predicted different outcomes for blackbody radiation than what was observed experimentally (Ball 2018, 28; Murphy 2021b, 20). This problem was sometimes called the "ultraviolet catastrophe," owing to the problematic observations at higher frequencies. To resolve this inconsistency, Max Planck suggested that oscillators could only produce or absorb radiation in a series of distinct packets, which he called "quanta" (Ball 2018, 28; Murphy 2021b, 20). This concept contrasted with the prevailing notion that radiation could only be described in terms of waves. Einstein further developed Planck's concept of quantization, proposing that light is made up of packets known as photons (Ball 2018, 29).

[14] Christopher Norris (2000) offers a defense of quantum mechanics within critical realism, but it relies on the contentious Bohmian or pilot-wave interpretation.

[15] Radek Trnka and Radmila Lorencová (2016b, 22) also argue for applying quantum-theoretical approaches to social inquiry based on the related concept of isomorphy from general systems theory. Isomorphism between two systems enables the elements and relationships of a system, such as quantum mechanics, to correspond directly with the elements and relationships of another system, such as the principles underlying sociocultural anthropology (Trnka and Lorencová 2016b, 22–23). For example, they argue that "mutual interconnectedness between individuals and groups" can be understood in terms of quantum entanglement (Trnka and Lorencová 2016a, 61).

counterintuitive phenomena of light "being" a photon particle or a wave.[16] Thus, light behaves "as if" it were a particle and "as if" it were a wave at the point of measurement (i.e., an intervention made by an observer through any apparatus, including the observer). Depending on your quantum interpretation[17], the time before a measurement is effectively outside reality and thus beyond the scope of inquiry.

If parts of a phenomenon are entangled, it is impossible to describe each part independently. A classic example from physics is the entanglement of one particle with another across a vast distance. Particle A can affect another particle B in less time than it would take to travel the distance between them at the speed of light. There would be no way for one particle to send something, like a signal, to the other particle in the time observed. The influence entangled particles have on each other violates the notion from classical physics that causation is local. However, non-local causation is not outside of everyday experience. Jaegwon Kim (1974) explains non-local causation through the story of Xantippe and Socrates. He notes that Xantippe instantly became a "widow" when Socrates died, regardless of distance (1974). The processes of her learning of his death are separate and uphold the principle of locality.

While quantum theory and IR theory may seem quite distant from each other, IR theory and political science more generally have embraced theoretical approaches from outside fields ranging from game theory (Schelling 1980) to evolutionary biology (Axelrod and

[16] See (Murphy 2021b, 20) for more information on Thomas Young's double-slit experiment demonstrating the wave-particle duality of light.

[17] See [al-khaliliWorldAccordingPhysics2020; chapter 5] for an accessible discussion of the leading quantum interpretations.

Axelrod 1984; Tang 2013). Moreover, quantum theories have offered critical insights into other social science fields (Haven and Khrennikov 2017), such as economics (Orrell 2016, 2020), game theory (A. Li and Yong 2015), anthropology (Trnka and Lorencová 2016c), and cognitive psychology (Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo 2013; Busemeyer, Wang, and Townsend 2006). Two main threads of quantum social science have entered into IR theory, stemming from Alexander Wendt's work on quantum cognition and Karen Barad's relational ontology, which has been introduced to IR theory mainly through Laura Zanotti's applications concerning ethics.

As a reimagining of scientific realism, Wendt's quantum social constructivist approach asserts that social structures have a physical reality in superposition comprised of wave functions, which is inherently unobservable (Murphy 2021a, 47–48; Wendt 2015b, 33). Thus, the macroscopic world appears to reflect only classical physics because wave functions from the microscopic world collapse or decohere (Ball 2018, 246; Wendt 2015b, 30).[18] Agents, from this perspective, are "endowed with superposed minds entangled through language, which means that they enfold socially shared wave functions within their subjectivities" (Wendt 2015e, 268).[19] Only the superpositions of potentialities are entangled, producing synchronic emergence, so entanglement is not a source of causation (Wendt 2015a, 263). Instead, downward causation within emergence comes from the collapse of the wave function through an agent's exercise of "will" in the instant of time

[18] Entanglement in avian navigation demonstrates that quantum phenomena can be observed at the macroscopic level (Hiscock et al. 2016; Murphy 2021a, 41).

[19] This quantum approach to social structures creates a non-stratified ontology where only individuals are genuinely "real," thus maintaining holism and non-locality (Wendt 2015b, 33). In this flat ontology, Wendt (2015e, 271) argues that social systems are effectively holograms in that the whole is "present in the parts, not made up of them."

created by that "will"(Wendt 2015a, 263). This quasi-synchronic downward causation relies on a process ontology, wherein processes, not substances, are fundamental. Time itself is produced, transcending the divide between synchronic and diachronic emergence of a classical Newtonian ontology (Wendt 2015a, 264).

In contrast, Karen Barad[20] follows a quantum approach consistent with the Copenhagen interpretation associated with physicist Niels Bohr (Murphy 2021a, 45). She, like Bohr, asserts that there is no inherent distinction between subject and object assumed by a measurement (Barad 2007).[21] Also in line with Bohr, Barad (2003, 815) shares her epistemological approach considering the unit of analysis as "not independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties but rather *phenomena* [emphasis in original]."[22] This position implies that "phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological inseparability of 'observer' and 'observed'; rather, *phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting 'components*' [emphasis in original]" (Barad 2003, 815). Succinctly, this describes an agential realist ontology where "relata do not preexist relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions" (Barad 2007, 140).[23] These

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[20] See Mutch (2013) for a critique of Barad's intra-agential realism. Also, see (Scott and Orlikowski 2013) in response to Mutch in defense of Barad's approach.

[21] Barad explains that "***the boundary between the 'object of observation' and the 'agencies of observation'is indeterminate in the absence of a specific physical arrangement of the apparatus*** [emphasis in original]" (Barad 2007, 114). It is the measurement by the apparatus that perpetrates what she terms a "Cartesian cut."

[22] For Erwin Schrödinger, who is also associated with the quantum Copenhagen interpretation, entanglement is epistemic and only knowledge is entangled, whereas for Bohr, entanglement is ontological, and "components" of phenomena are entangled (Barad 2007, 309).

[23] Orlikowski and Scott (2015) apply Barad's agential realism to management studies. They find that the shift in material-discursive practices from private remarks on comment cards archived at hotels to always-available public online reviews emboldens guests who have read the reviews to request specific rooms or

intra-actions "reconstitute entanglements," allowing for non-local causation (Barad 2007, 74). In other words, emergence is a product of entangled relations.

Zanotti (2017, 377) expands on the implications of an agential realist ontology, explaining that "in an entangled world, there are no externalities." She is unconvinced that responsibility for political choices can or should be diverted based on principled arguments allowing for "unintended consequences" or "collateral damage" (Zanotti 2017, 377). She questions Kantian deontological theories that use universal laws to base their ethics, which apply to all "reasonable" individuals in any context (Zanotti 2017, 363). The 1990s Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, argues Zanotti (2017, 378), demonstrate how United Nations peacekeepers permitted atrocities by blindly following established norms and rules like impartiality and bureaucratic logic. Within an entangled world that we do not control in which we are entangled, agency for change is possible, but such agency cannot over-determine outcomes (Zanotti 2017, 363; 2019b, 49). While this political agency may not deliver fundamentally transformative societal changes, it can still produce crucial political changes (Zanotti 2017, 364).

At its core, IR quantum theory shares the broad critical realist claim that one cannot observe the world's true nature as purported by structural determinism as well as material and ideational reductionism (Zanotti 2019c, 37).[24] However, Zanotti (2019b, 48) points out

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services and demand upgrades or discounts, invoking the threat of a negative assessment to secure those benefits; meanwhile, hoteliers come to view their guests as prospective reviewers (Orlikowski and Scott 2015, 702). Intra-actions entangled with different apparatuses brought into being different phenomena.

[24] Kurki (2020, 128), in her search for a new cosmology, softens the critical realist ontological position, asserting that "reality is real not because it is mind-independent 'out there' doing something, but because 'it' is, as we are 'in it' making it, also recalcitrant to our, and other species' attempts to know it." This position moves closer to the intra-agential perspective by focusing on how "doings" bring things into being. However,

that critical realism's separation of agency from reality creates a Cartesian dualist ontology. Moreover, Wendt's reimagined quantum ontology "de facto redeploys the classical Cartesian divide between res cogitans and res extensa, just reframed in a matter of degrees" because it continues to hold that language and ideas socially construct the world, which embraces the liberal assumption that humans possess free will to effect change (Zanotti 2019b, 49, 55–56).[25] Wendt necessarily adopts a panpsychist ontology since some form of minded matter is the basis of agency.[26] While Wendt's ontology requires human agency, Barad is agnostic to whether an agent is human, as the boundaries between that which is not human and human are constituted through intra-action (Barad 2007, 140; Zanotti 2019b, 56). Agential realism avoids dualism but at the same time implicates "everything" in the process of becoming. Laura Stark (2019, 333) highlights that agential realist emergence questions the notion of "causes," shifting focus on effects as explanatory of themselves. In contrast, Wendt (2015a, 264) holds that emerging social structures exert some form of downward causation. Therefore, any ontological commitment towards the quantum scientific realism of Wendt or Barad's agential realism requires a trade-off between causal power and plausible correspondence to the phenomena they attempt to describe.

The homology argument provides a solid basis for using quantum concepts in social scientific inquiry, but quantum theory is a contested theoretical approach. There are

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she holds fast to the unknowability of reality, even from our experiential relations with it, especially concerning network theory (Kurki 2020, 128).

[25] See (Waldner 2017) for a thorough critique of Wendt's notion of quantum cognition.

[26] See Porpora (2018) for a critique of the quantum mind, especially concerning panpsychism.

several mutually exclusive interpretations, ranging from the mainstream Copenhagen interpretation associated with Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg to the lesser accepted pilot-wave interpretation associated with David Bohm to the many-worlds (multiverse) interpretation that is growing in popularity in theoretical physics. This diversity of thought stretches into the quantum applications of social scientific inquiry. There is not one quantum social science approach, but a collection of approaches that disagree on fundamental ontological issues, particularly whether quantum behavior is actual, potential, or "merely" metaphorical (Der Derian and Wendt 2020, 403, 409). At this early stage of applying quantum principles to social science, it is prudent to embrace at least a minimal level of pluralism to capture all the useful insights afforded by a quantum imaginary (Der Derian and Wendt 2020, 409). Following Murphy and Zanotti, my aim is not to suggest a new metaphysics or suggest that reality is truly quantum; rather, it is to open up a new conceptual space that is unfettered by reductionist and deterministic assumptions from a classical Newtonian imaginary (Murphy 2021a, 39–40; Zanotti 2019a). I continue the push in IR theory to embrace methodological pluralism and "analytical eclecticism" to transcend inter-paradigmatic conflict (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Thus, I seek to synthesize the Wendtian and Baradian quantum worldviews.[27]

Both Barad and Wendt find emergence through quantum entanglement that precipitates "being" and thus time. They also sideline the causal issues associated with synchronic and diachronic emergence. Barad and Wendt isolate the entanglement-emergence connection as a critical point of causation. Furthermore, they recognize that agency is constrained. For

[27] See (Griffiths 2016) for an application of Wendtian and Baradian quantum perspectives through what Barad calls "diffractive methodology."

Wendt, this constraint comes from existing social structures, and for Barad, constraint comes from the uncertainty before intra-action occurs. However, Wendt's commitment to panpsychism rests on the uneasy assumption of minded matter as the basis of consciousness.[28] The lack of empirical evidence for such a position makes this approach untenable, and it quickly falls apart if contradictory evidence supports the idea that there is no minded matter. I share Wendt and Barad's notion of constrained agency, but I find Barad and Zanotti's account a more plausible account of agency. Their approach requires the less radical assumption that observation is the genesis of "being," a view shared by most physicists who follow Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation. Moreover, it highlights that people can change their world—social or otherwise—and should engage since their entanglement ties them to experienced outcomes. This conceptualization of agency has critical implications for how polities think about and attain security.

Defining Emergent Strategic Culture

In a broad sense, emergence, from a quantum IR perspective, is a product of entanglement.[29] While the empirical evidence linking entanglement to emergence is limited to extreme cases at the macroscopic level, such as the properties of superfluidity and superconductivity, the application of quantum concepts needs only to satisfy that this link

[28] H.C. White's concept of "ambage" is similar to the notion of entanglement in that it refers to the "roundaboutness" of uncertainty in a social context made manifest from the concrete ties within a social network (White 1992, 106–7). Within this realm of uncertainty and instability, individuals switch from different relational settings, allowing the individual "embody multiple identities and capacities" as they play "different roles and parts at once"(Grabher 2006, 179–80). White (2008, 27–28) offers an illustrative example of participating in online forums about football and sociology. He explains that when you log out of the forum, your identity in that forum remains, so the logout process is nondestructive. Actions taken in the forum leave a social residue from connections to others on the forum (White 2008, 28). However, this form of network analysis relies on the exercise of will, so non-human agency is not considered.

[29] Quantum entanglement is itself an example of emergence (Humphreys 2015, 763; 1997, 16; Hüttemann 2005; Silberstein and McGeever 1999, 187; Stark 2019, 335).

is possible to form an analogous working model. Strategic subcultures are part of a whole macro-strategic culture. Strategic subcultures, as addressed above, do not neatly fit into set boundaries concerning membership, ideology, and preferences. They, therefore, appear to demonstrate a level of interconnectedness that is homologous to quantum entanglement. These entanglements, as micro-level interactions, produce phenomena at a higher level of abstraction that one would call strategic culture. Strategic culture can thus be understood as an emergent phenomenon with quantum mechanical properties.

Emergent strategic culture addresses the issues troubling the competition model of fourth-generation scholarship. As mentioned before, identifying strategic subcultures has been a challenging endeavor. Not only do strategic subcultures have blurred boundaries, but the determination of what constitutes a strategic subculture also leads to demarcations ad infinitum. Is the subculture just a superset of some other set of subcultures? If strategic subcultures are entangled, their identities and associated properties, such as membership, preferences, and ideology, are of no consequence. Moreover, the highest level of abstraction is a product of observation, not an inherent aspect of the macro-level strategic culture. It only matters that strategic subcultures exist and relate to each other. From fourth-generation scholarship, it is clear that these two assumptions are reasonable.

I argue that these relations among the strategic subcultures are far more complex than competition. A shift in dominance implies that a subculture, once identified, is displaced by another subculture, also identified, for a period of time. The role of time complicates this competitive process because it is unclear how one can identify that a shift from subculture A to subculture B occurred. One might turn to what strategic behaviors were exhibited, but

this leads to a causal loop between behavior and culture. Alternatively, one could follow Tamir Libel's (2020a, 364) approach to measure the prominence of topics identified using topic modeling of relevant discourse combined with longitudinal network analysis to determine which subculture is dominant. However, the researcher must still judge that sufficiently significant change occurred within a duration of time the researcher considers not temporary but enduring.

My emergent strategic cultural approach removes the potential bias when evaluating if sufficient change in strategic culture has occurred. Emergence effectively eliminates the notion of time duration by considering time as an effect. An act of observation collapses the potentialities of strategic subculture relations. The dynamic soup of subcultures moving within the ideational landscape is isolated to a particular moment through observation. The resulting snapshot is like a photo taken of bacteria under the microscope. The circular image represents the artificial boundary established by the observer. It is the bacteria or subcultures that move to different positions over time through the boundaries of the microscope's lens. These boundaries can represent various social structures. In this study, the primary boundary imposed is the social structure of the EU as an international actor. However, unlike bacteria on a slide, the complex interactions of subcultures are virtually unobservable between snapshots. Following observation through the bounds of the EU, the strategic culture returns to a state "as if" all relations among subcultures are possible.

As I have previously stated, my reimagining strategic subcultural analysis with quantum theory does not suggest that quantum mechanics is the true nature of physical and social reality. The split between quantum and classical physics is not a novel convention. Often,

quantum mechanics is limited to the microscopic scope, while classical-reductionist physics best explains macroscopic phenomena. There is no confirmed theory that bridges quantum mechanics with classical physics. However, there are candidates, including string theory and quantum field theory, attempting to bring these concepts under one framework. While I apply quantum principles to macro-level phenomena of strategic subcultures, my analysis only treats them "as if" they are acting as fundamental microscopic particles. I depart from the quantum imaginary in considering the relationship between strategic behavior and strategic culture.

I proceed on the assumption that once a strategic culture has emerged, it possesses properties ascribable to the whole. Furthermore, I treat strategic culture as a complex system. Therefore, I shift out of the quantum realm to explain phenomena at a higher level of abstraction. Drawing on complexity theory, knowing the state of a system at a particular point in time enables the forecasting of future possibilities (Holland 2014a). Laws govern the change that an initial state can undergo (Holland 2014b). Helium gas, for example, is a complex system of helium atoms. When combined with information about the gas's initial state, such as pressure, temperature, and volume, gas laws such as Boyle's Law can anticipate how the system will change (Holland 2014a).

The shift from microscopic to macroscopic is also found in network analysis within sociology. When cultural phenomena, such as religion or literature, manifest from emergence, they take on a "thing-like" independent causal role affecting social processes as individuals' "repertoire of cultural resources and idioms to their own ends" (Ikegami 2005,

24; 2007, 217).[30] However, this causal relationship is somewhat murkier in its directionality than what I suggest here. I argue that a causal relationship between strategic culture and strategic behavior exists at a macroscopic level. I thus proceed to conceptualize the relationship between strategic culture and strategic behavior in line with a more positivist approach similar to third-generation and fourth-generation strategic cultural scholarship.

Emergent strategic culture provides a flexible analytical framework using material and ideational factors that incorporates the nexus of domestic, transnational, and global politics. These qualities make emergent strategic culture a useful tool for studying strategic behavior in contexts other than Europe. While the study demarcates a boundary encapsulating a macroscopic European strategic culture, this is similar to the imposition of institutional boundaries when looking at European strategic subcultures. Indeed, the shift between microscopic and macroscopic is a measurement choice. Therefore, the strategic cultural dimensional space is not bound by the boundary of Europe. It flows freely across other structural demarcations, such as the boundary of nation-states. For example, the dimension of transatlanticism permeates the boundary between Europe and the United States.

Method

I employ a "blended reading" approach to capture the entangled emergent European strategic culture. This methodological approach combines "distant reading" via computer

[30] See also (Ikegami 1995, 221; Mische 2014; Tilly 2002) concerning the causal impact of emergent cultural phenomena.

analysis with "close reading" of text that relies on interpretation by the researcher (Stulpe and Lemke 2016; Lemke and Stulpe 2015, 74–77). This "blended reading" follows the notable trend in social scientific inquiry to employ methodological pluralism.[31] While there are many text analysis tools, one methodology shares the quasi-irreducibility of emergence in form with stochastic interaction processes. Unsupervised topic modeling is based on machine learning cluster analysis, which reveals probabilistic patterns of words in texts (i.e., topics) that would escape the ability of human reading to observe.[32] Latent patterns within the EU's discourse provide a snapshot of the ideational landscape at a given time. While the strategic subcultures behave like goos melting into each other (White 1992, 337–38), the application of a Cartesian cut (Barad 2007) by taking a snapshot of those goos reveals an emergent strategic cultural outcome that can have a causal impact on strategic behavior.

Text Analysis

My text data sources cover the period from 1992 to 2020. I break this post-Cold War period into four sections marked by system-level exogenous shocks, including the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Global Financial Crisis, and the rise of right-wing populism in 2016. I focus on these shocks as they likely produce enduring macroscopic changes. While some change within the soup of strategic subcultures is an inherent aspect of measurement from a quantum perspective, the enduring changes from the shock can still be detected at later points in time. I, therefore, depart from other fourth-generation

[31] See (Goertz 2017) and (Seawright 2016) for discussions on multimethod research.

[32] See (Göler and Reiter 2021, 4) on the benefits of computer-assisted text analysis for strategic cultural research with large-N corpora.

strategic culture research that places a higher emphasis on endogenous change, which is conceptualized through discursive competition.

When choosing which texts to use, I considered that, to some extent, all EU institutions, informal and formal, are involved in the policy decisions taken by the Union. This interdependence between different parts of the EU has heightened over time, especially after the publicly declared policy objective of the "comprehensive approach" in the 2003 European Security Strategy. I focused my data collection on EU institutions with clear connections to EU external action for practical implementation of data mining. I chose institutions with overlapping connections within the two security frameworks: the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) or Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

With these considerations in mind, I collected data from the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union in their various configurations, and the legal corpus of the EU within the Official Journal, which is primarily authored by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Except for the legal corpus, each corpus was categorized by institution, mainly as a product of how the EU archives these texts. However, each institution reflects an overlapping subculture that may bleed into other institutional corpora analyzed as well as into other subcultural spaces outside of the corpora in the study. Therefore, the artifact of institutional boundaries does not detract fully from the ability to investigate the fuzzy nature of subculture entanglement.

For my computer-assisted text analysis, I used the open-source statistical software R (R Core Team 2021) in conjunction will a myriad of R packages that extend the program's capabilities.[33] All documents used for the text analyses are publicly available online through various websites of the EU. However, I extracted some historical Official Journal metadata before 2004 using an Application Programming Interface (API) produced by data science group Buhl and Rasmussen (Rasmussen 2014). I obtained all the Official Journal data using direct download datasets from the EU or API calls, especially for items dated 2019 and forward. When APIs were not available, I programmed automated web scraping of those documents using R. If the text data was not readily machine-readable, I used optical character recognition (OCR) in R to extract the plain text.[34]

Using R, I assigned metadata to the collected documents and prepared them for modeling by cleaning. Cleaning included stripping extraneous data automatically, such as punctuation and stop words (i.e., words that typically function to facilitate languages, such as articles and pronouns), and removing words with a high incidence that hold no theoretical purpose based on the chosen models. These words are often artifacts of the documents' formatting, are from another language, or repeated usage reveals no discernible or helpful pattern. For example, the word "European" is frequently used in the documents. However, it has little meaning as it can refer not only to substantive items but to multiple institutions and even formatting in headers and footers. Furthermore, I did not

[33] A complete list of used R packages is in the Appendix.

[34] Details on the content and metadata of collected texts are available upon request from the author.

stem the words for topic modeling as this process follows Alexandra Schofield and colleagues' (2017) guidance.

I used a spectral algorithm from the stm R package (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2019), which can generate reproducible results. This modeling is only an approximation as factors outside of discourse are not entered into the calculations, and any collected data is a subset of all available discourse (See Table 2.1 for a summary of the topic models). I thus analyzed topics through "close reading" of the source texts, related primary sources, and secondary sources on European security and foreign relations. Additionally, I used fitting metrics to determine the number of topics that cover a corpus included in the stm R package. These metrics include semantic coherence (Mimno et al. 2011), exclusivity (Bischof and Airoldi 2012), held-out likelihood (Hoffman et al. 2013), and residuals (Taddy 2012).

Table 2.1 Summary of Topic Models' Characteristics

Text Source	Period	Number of Topics	Word Count	Document Count
Commission Press Releases	1	47	76507	12991
Commission Speeches	1	34	36826	2036
EPDB Documents	1	54	171757	38690
Commission Press Releases	2	58	86740	14897
Council Press Releases	2	40	38055	3010
Official Journal	2	27	291407	76468
Commission Press Releases	3	71	84447	9036
Commission Speeches	3	44	90434	6200

Text Source	Period	Number of Topics	Word Count	Document Count
Council Press Releases	3	36	34252	3766
EEAS Press Releases	3	24	14764	1674
Official Journal	3	51	353224	83468
Commission Press Releases	4	55	29650	3132
Commission Speeches	4	41	35726	2165
Council Press Releases	4	40	15145	2380
EEAS Press Releases	4	32	23653	3086
Official Journal	4	57	275396	45032

Once each model was fitted, I labeled the topics to assist in later interpreting the meaning of those topics. I started labeling topics with words with the highest probability of belonging to a topic using data using the topic-word distribution parameter beta. I followed this conventional labeling using the FREX metric. FREX provides a weighted harmonic mean or empirical commutative distribution function of both a word's frequency and exclusivity in terms of a specific topic (Bischof and Airoldi 2012). Since this metric is a harmonic mean, it ensures that a high measurement of either frequency or exclusivity must be accompanied by a high score of the other metric (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2019, p 10-11). As a result, it can reveal words useful for understanding the topic not captured by frequency alone. Along with high FREX and high beta scoring words, I used word clouds generated from the stm package to assist in coding each of the topics by displaying a larger group of words at one time compared to the tables. The sizing of words is based on a weighted probability that a given word comes from a topic.

While some texts are not explicitly identified as security documents, I assert that the securitization of many policy elements requires a broad consideration of relevant discourse (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). To check the level of securitization, I individually coded each labeled topic within a corpus as either addressing security objectives or not. In some instances, the attention to security was explicit, using words such as "military" or "cybersecurity." However, some references to security were not as plain. For example, the word "development" within a given context, especially concerning external action, has security implications within several of the EU's strategic frameworks. The relative proportion of securitized topics can reveal the usefulness of a given corpus. The higher the proportion of security topics, the more representative the texts are of the ideational landscape for strategic decision-makers. The general trends across time within a corpus approximate the variation in the importance of security.

Dimensions

Across each period, within each corpus, I coded each topic using four dimensions of European strategic culture based on the labels I generated. These four dimensions are inspired by Christoph Meyer's (Christoph O. Meyer 2006) and Heiko Biehl et al.'s (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013b) multidimensional profiles for European strategic culture. From this coding, I calculated the relative proportion of topics within a corpus that exhibited a particular dimension.

The first dimension is Europe's preference for multilateralism over unilateralism (M). This preference may uphold the value of multilateralism and the actual execution of multilateral activities within institutional frameworks that include third countries. Another dimension is transatlanticism, referring broadly to engagement with the United States and NATO in

foreign policy over strictly European actions (T). Within this dimension is the tension of strategic autonomy in relation to NATO. However, it also includes other forms of engagement outside of military cooperation, including economic engagement. The third dimension is the projection of liberal norms (P). This dimension reflects the level of institutionalization of the promotion of human rights and democratization in third countries and accession countries. Indeed, John Ruggie (1992/ed, 561) asserts that the EU (EC) is the "undisputed anchor of economic relations and increasingly of a common political vision in the West." Finally, civilian power (C) reflects the EU's preference for civilian foreign policy instruments over military ones. I draw on Karen Smith's (2005) conception of an "ideal type" of civilian power. Civilian power is typified by "an actor which uses civilian means for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign policy-making process is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny" (K. E. Smith 2005, 6). In particular, I include the regulatory power of the EU under this dimension that is described as the "Brussels Effect" on global commerce (Bradford 2020).[35]

Each topic model creates a snapshot of the strategic cultural dimensions. In effect, it is an imposition of an artificial boundary that instantiates one strategic subculture out of many possible ones. For example, the topic model generated by the Council corpus for period 2 is a unique measurement of all four dimensions. Other observations of the Council will likely provide an overlapping dimensional profile that is ever so slightly different. Even with

[35] The Brussels Effect is the EU's unilateral market regulation power that leverages market forces to make Europe's standards global (Bradford 2020, xiii–xiv). The EU regulates a market of hundreds of millions of consumers, and when foreign firms trade with the EU, they must comply with EU standards. Since its standards are typically the most demanding internationally, the EU effectively incentivizes multinational firms to follow EU standards in all markets to avoid adjusting production for each market (Bradford 2020, xiv). Furthermore, consumers' ties to their geographic location bolster the EU's ability to regulate, as firms cannot easily use relocation to avoid regulation (Bradford 2020, xv)

blended reading, topic models only approximate a subculture, as all the variables affecting the strategic cultural dimensions cannot be fully modeled.

Each generated subculture observation from a topic model reveals a part of the macroscopic strategic culture. However, the proportion measurement that surfaces from the topic modeling is tied to a specific context. For this study, documents are primarily categorized by institution. This context-specificity of the topic models limits the comparison of proportions across corpora. For example, if the proportion of topics for a given dimension is the same between two corpora, it is unclear that this is phenomenologically the same. When a certain context can be held relatively constant, it is possible to compare proportions from different sets of topics generated by topic modeling. For example, the institutional context can be held constant by comparing proportions from the same institution at different points in time.

When the dimensional profiles of each corpus are holistically combined, a crude depiction of emergent strategic culture can be made. With this macroscopic snapshot of the resultant emergent system of strategic subcultures, I attempt to explain the strategic behavior of the EU in its relations with other global powers, including China, Russia, and the United States, in the post-Cold War period.

CHAPTER 3: Period 1 — The end of the Cold War

The EU sought to draw the United States, Russia, and China closer to Europe in terms of values and institutional interdependence through multilateral frameworks in the first period. These cooperative endeavors advance the strategic aims of the Union by providing for its security, broadly interpreted.

America

The EU has a unique relationship with the United States compared to other system powers such as China and Russia. Both the EU and, to some extent, most of the European states share similar values and norms. They comprise what Karl Deutsch (1957) calls a security community. Since WWII, NATO has defined European and American security cooperation, promoting norms and identities that foster a peaceful environment for cooperation. At both the member state and supranational institutional levels, the EU and NATO member states encourage democratic governance. Institutional-level democratic processes encourage allies to consult with members, guide members' acceptable behavior, and enable members, regardless of material endowment, to bargain and influence decision-making, legitimating Euro-Atlantic cooperation (Risse-Kappen 1996, 369–70). US Secretary of State Warren Christopher (1993a, 120), in a speech to NATO on February 26, 1993, summarized this synergistic relationship by saying that "Europe's long-term security—like America's—requires that we actively foster the spread of democracy and market economies." He further elaborates on how democracies protect minority and human rights, engage as "reliable partners" in global issues, and are less likely to go to war with each other

(Christopher 1993a, 120). The established transatlantic security community, epitomized by EU-NATO relations, aligns Europe and the United States broadly on values and norms.

The fall of the Soviet Union did not dismantle the transatlantic security community, but it did change the nature of threats to Europe. One of the first main challenges was the breakup of Yugoslavia and the resultant atrocities committed in the ensuing wars. The EU wanted to demonstrate its capability as a security player in the Balkan conflicts, as evidenced by Luxembourg's foreign minister, Jacques Poos's declaration that "this is Europe's hour, not the United States'" (McCormick 2007, 74). However, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher (1993b, 82) argued that immediate action with American partners could contain the "flames of conflict before they become an underground fire that could later erupt and become all-consuming."[36] He adds that immediate action can "demonstrate that not every crisis need become a choice between inaction and unilateral American intervention" (Christopher 1993b, 82). Indeed, the United States had little strategic interest in the Balkans compared to Europe. The EU had a lot at stake due to its proximity to the region. Instability in Southeastern Europe could lead to non-traditional security threats such as drug and human trafficking, organized crime, and unsustainable migration flows.

As the EC's special envoy for Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington helped establish and chair the Conference on Yugoslavia in September 1991 in The Hague to form a peace agreement among the factions remaining from the federation's breakup (Sharp 1999, 118). At the conference, the EC set up the Badinter Arbitration Commission, named after its chief jurist,

[36] See (Christopher 1993a, 121) for further comments from Secretary Christopher on the crisis in Bosnia.

Robert Badinter, president of the French Constitutional Court, to determine the future status of Yugoslavia. Later, in November 1991, the Badinter Commission, in their published opinion, said that "the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution" (Pellet 1992). The ruling implied that the republics that formed Yugoslavia could legally seek independence regarding the United Nations Charter and not be considered to be engaged in secessionist activity (Sharp 1999, 118). However, the Commission did not consider the request for recognition of Kosovo submitted in December 1991 (Caplan 1998, 748; Sharp 1999, 118).

At the Conference of Yugoslavia, the Carrington team set a precedent for connecting security and minority rights by envisioning greater autonomy for national or ethnic minorities in areas where those minorities constituted the majority of the population (Caplan 1998, 749; Sharp 1999, 118).[37] In December 1991, the EC, through the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism, established guidelines for the recognition of new states from Yugoslavia that included, among other items, respect for international conventions on human rights and democracy, including the Final Act of Helsinki and the guarantee of minority rights for ethnic and national groups (E. Ministers 1991). By linking the recognition of the new republics to their implementation of minority group protections, the EC hoped to assuage minority communities while reducing the likelihood of ethnic conflict in the region (Caplan 1998, 749). However, Lord Carrington's team eliminated the

[37] The Yugoslav federal constitution since 1943 reserved the status of a republic for nations (narodi) as opposed to nationalities (narodnosti)—also referred to as national minorities (Mertus 2000, 237). Narodi had principal homelands inside Yugoslavia (e.g., Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins), and the narodnosti had homelands outside Yugoslavia (e.g., Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Bulgarians, Turks, Slovaks, Czechs, and Russians) (Caplan 1998, 748; Mertus 2000, 237). The Roma and Vlachs were ignored as recognized groups in the Yugoslav Constitutions because they had no apparent homeland (Mertus 2000, 237).

requirement for the new republics to recognize Kosovo and Vojvodina's status before 1990 as autonomous provinces from the October 23, 1991 draft of the EC peace plan to gain Serbian President Slobodan Milošević's[38] acceptance of the convention (Caplan 1998, 749–50; Sharp 1999, 118). This initial peace plan formed by Lord Carrington's envisioned a more decentralized federation of the former republics, but it was rejected by the belligerent parties in 1992 (Reichard 2006, 53; Sharp 1999, 118).

Later, in a joint UN-European peace plan, the United Nations envoy Cyrus Vance and EC envoy Lord David Owen proposed creating a federal system for Bosnia with ten states largely divided by ethnicity (Shanker 1993). In May 1993, the Vance-Owen plan was defeated in a referendum by 96 percent of the approximately one million votes cast (Reichard 2006, 53; Shanker 1993). After Vance's retirement, Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg took over the UN mediator role (C. J. Williams 1994). Owen and Stoltenberg again proposed a revised joint UN-European plan, but it was rejected in December 1993 (C. J. Williams 1994). After continued failures, the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina was established by the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in 1994, transferring much of the decision-making away from the EU, NATO, and the UN (Andreatta 1997, 18).

Starting August 30, 1995, Operation Deliberate Force reflected a firm commitment from the United States (Andreatta 1997, 18; Kornprobst 2019a, 91). However, NATO first became involved in the war in April 1993 to enforce a no-fly zone in Operation Deny Flight

[38] Between March 1989 and June 1990, Milošević revoked the autonomy of the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, a status that was granted under the former Yugoslav constitution (Caplan 1998, 748; Sharp 1999, 118).

(Andreatta 1997, 24). Operation Deliberate Force, along with diplomatic efforts, helped facilitate the transition to the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995 (Kornprobst 2019a, 109). The Dayton Peace Agreement was later signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 (Kornprobst 2019a, 91). Following Dayton, the United States maintained a military presence in the form of Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations (Andreatta 1997, 18).

The Dayton agenda largely ignored Kosovo, only tangentially considered in relation to the lifting of sanctions spearheaded by the United States to ensure compliance with the peace agreement (Caplan 1998, 750).[39] Caplan (1998, 750) argues that this omission stemmed from the fact that there were other pressing issues, such as the continued influence of indicted war criminals, and the West did not want to lose the support of Milošević, who had forced the Bosnian Serbs to accept the conditions put forward at Dayton. On April 9, 1996, the EU recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but continued relations were dependent on a "constructive approach" by the FRY towards respecting "human rights, minority rights and the right to return of all refugees and displaced persons and the granting of a large degree of autonomy for Kosovo"(Commission 1996). Having had Kosovo's status pushed aside in the 1995 Dayton agreement, and the EU's recognition of the FRY without requiring Belgrade to restore Kosovar autonomy emboldened Kosovo (Sharp 1999, 118).

[39] The United States, following the Dayton Accords, established an "outer wall" of sanctions on the Yugoslavia Federation, which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro, preventing the federation from joining international institutions to ensure its compliance with the Accords with special attention given to addressing human rights in Kosovo and cooperation on the prosecution of war crimes (Abazi 2004, 20; Delevic 1998).

While the peace of Dayton was holding, tensions in Kosovo continued to increase for the remainder of the decade. Kosovar Albanians were facing the threat of ethnic cleansing and repression from Belgrade. With the memory of the Srebrenica massacre still fresh in the minds of European leaders, Europe sought to protect the ethnic Albanians from Serbian aggression (Kornprobst 2019b). However, in support of Serbia, Russia insisted that it would veto any military intervention in Kosovo in the UN Security Council (Kornprobst 2019b, 140). Peace talks began in Rambouillet on February 6, 1999, but they ultimately failed (Kornprobst 2019b, 131). The failure led Western leaders to consider NATO as another avenue for intervention. On March 24, 1999, Lavrov, as the Russian permanent representative to the UN, warned that

> Attempts to apply a different standard to international law and to disregard its basic norms and principles create a dangerous precedent that could cause acute destabilization and chaos on the regional and global level. If we do not put an end to this very dangerous trend, the virus of illegal unilateral approaches could spread not merely to other geographical regions but to spheres of international relations other than questions of peace and security (U. N. S. Council 1999).

Nevertheless, NATO began its intervention of airstrikes against Serbia without Security Council authorization in Operation Allied Force (Kornprobst 2019b, 131). In fact, Western leaders, including US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, argued that Kosovo could be a step towards developing a customary norm of humanitarian intervention that did not require Security Council authorization and that this type of illegal activity is acceptable if it is in the pursuit of an "improvement in the international legal system"(Buchanan 2010, 299).

While the media portrayed the Balkan conflicts during the 1990s as "violent, barbaric, and backward" engulfed by "ancient hatred" and "un-civilization," a revival of the Balkanization

discourse that followed World War I, the media portrayal was also mixed with a persistent narrative of "humanitarian responsibility" (Abazi and Doja 2016, 582, 586; Hansen 2006, 105, 114, 129–31).[40] This discourse transformation helped to renegotiate the fluid boundary of Europe, as described by Wæver (1998). Europeanness became a function of how "historical legacies" are instrumentally emphasized or deemphasized (Petrović 2009, 65). Specifically citing the crisis in Kosovo in its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO expanded its remit to include providing security and promoting democracy within the entirety of the "Euro-Atlantic" region (NATO 1999, pts. 2, 16). Moreover, the 1999 Strategic Concept explicitly defined Southeastern Europe as part of this region by calling for its full integration into the "wider European family" (NATO 1999, pt. 16). As Europe is not a fixed concept, Petrovic (2009, 65) argues that "joining the big European family is not the ultimate proof of the Europeanness of former socialist and Balkan countries, and correspondingly, their returning home is not final." Indeed, the future of the European periphery continues to stay in flux, thrusting even newly accepted countries into a "Eurocentric metadiscourse" in which they were conceptualized as "'almost European, but not quite European;' or, in other words, 'soon to be Europeanized Non-Europeans, who still have to learn a lot about being European'" (Velikonja 2005, 26).

[40] Rwanda's othering discourse was oriented differently in the same period. During the Cold War, Africa "mattered" to the West as an arena for superpower rivalry, but this frame of reference fell apart in the post-Cold War era (Myers, Klak, and Koehl 1996, 41). Western media portrayed the 1990s Rwanda conflict as "savage" and "primitive," such that it was "beyond reason" and "confusing," taking place somewhere distant and thus outside their concern (Myers, Klak, and Koehl 1996, 40, 43). Rwanda's war was framed in terms of tribalism instead of an ethnic conflict, which discouraged comparison with other conflicts that were more relatable to Western audiences (Myers, Klak, and Koehl 1996, 43). In the case of Southeastern Europe, there was a much more significant intervention by the West than in Rwanda.

The conflicts in former Yugoslavia provided valuable knowledge for European leaders' plans for the future security of Europe. The EU needed to find a way to keep the United States engaged in Europe because it was uncertain that Americans would continue to be so involved in European security, mainly when the threat did not directly concern the United States. Given the material disparity in military capabilities between the United States and Europe, the EU sought to find a framework of cooperation that would enable more autonomy while not undermining NATO. Initially, the EU initiated a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO in January 1994 (Jolyon Howorth 2000, 22). The ESDI was comprised solely of European forces with a European command chain while retaining the ability to borrow vital assets from NATO (Jolyon Howorth 2000, 22; 2007a, 8; Rees 2011, 64–65). An EU-led ESDI would permit the bloc to move troops into a conflict zone when the US had no desire to get involved (Jolyon Howorth 2007a, 8).

This vision of ESDI, sometimes referred to as "separable but not separate" (Jolyon Howorth 2007a, 8), was doomed before it started. The Western European Union (WEU), an intergovernmental organization that provided a bridge between the European Union and NATO, was poised to guide the ESDI within NATO. However, the WEU lacked command and planning capabilities, and the military forces provided to the WEU, known as Eurocorps, needed to be available to NATO (Rees 2011, 64–65). The WEU's weakness raised concerns about the ESDI's legitimacy and credibility (Jolyon Howorth 2007a, 44). ESDI relied on valuable American military assets, some of which the US would urgently need later for its military efforts after 9/11 (Jolyon Howorth 2007a, 44). Moreover, NATO's command structure within ESDI removed the US, which was unacceptable to the Americans (Jolyon Howorth 2007a, 44).

A solution to developing a security identity would have to take the form of a separate EU institution. From the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord ending the Bosnian War, it was clear to many in Europe that European security should be within the NATO framework (Rynning 2012, 59). This institutional process started with the unexpected 1998 Anglo-French Saint-Malo Summit, given the long history of disagreements between the French and British on the transatlantic alliance (Rynning 2012, 59). The British were concerned that the US would continue to underwrite European security to the same level as they had during the Cold War; therefore, an EU security institution appeared to be a means to preserve NATO, retaining the US's involvement in European security (Joylon Howorth 2000, 34–36). On the other hand, the French saw this endeavor as primarily a European initiative that would draw NATO in when necessary, reflecting their differing priorities regarding the transatlantic alliance with the British (Joylon Howorth 2000, 34–36). France and the United Kingdom, as Europe's two most powerful military powers, signaled that

> The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises ("Franco–British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998)" 2015).

Following Saint-Malo, the 1999 European Council in Cologne issued a decision to create the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to merge the WEU with the European Union to cooperate with NATO (McCormick 2007, 75). The ESDP reflected a compromise between the British and French that would allow the European Union to take autonomous action on security matters that would not compete with NATO. One element of the ESDP was developing a 60,000-member Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) that Europe could quickly deploy to carry out Petersburg tasks defined in the Western European Union (WEU) 1992

Declaration made near Bonn, Germany (McCormick 2007, 75; W. C. of Ministers 1992). The RRF was intended to supplement the NATO Response Force (NRF), established at the 2002 Prague Summit, and was similarly tasked with crisis response and management (Simon 2008, 171). While not replacing the RRF, the EU defense ministers established smaller "battle groups" of 1,500 troops by May 2004 that could be deployed within 15 days for a shorter period than the RRF (McCormick 2007, 76).

Russia

Armed with the victory of the liberal democratic order over Marxism-Leninism in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise, the EU sought to remake Russia and Central and Eastern Europe in the image of Western Europe. The EU seized the opportunity of the moment to bring Russia into the fold, underscoring the normative importance of liberal democratic ideals at home, bolstering the EU's identity, and attempting to remove the potential future threat of its former rival and adversary of many decades. Russia has long struggled with its Europeanness, balancing an identity that seems neither entirely European nor entirely Asian (Igumnova 2011, 255).

The notion of Russia being part of Europe has been a recurring theme throughout Russian history. Ivan III claimed to be the successor of the Caesars of Rome when he married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, so Russia was the "Third Rome" (Eitelhuber 2009, 7; Ermarth 2009, 88). Indeed, Russia regards itself as Europe's legitimate heir, following the Byzantine Empire rather than the Roman Empire and retaining a purer form of European and Christian beliefs (Eitelhuber 2009, 7; Lipman 2015, 127). Though the Soviet era was a far cry from Peter the Great's embrace of Europe, it viewed the liberal democratic ideals of

Western Europe as an insidious threat of flawed ideas that would frustrate the spread of socialism to the world (Ermarth 2009, 88; Lipman 2015, 131; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 17).

At the start of the post-Cold War period, Russia began relatively cordial relations with its European partners (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 18). However, it would be a mischaracterization to call the period trouble-free (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 11). Nevertheless, there was a dramatic thawing of relations as evidenced by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's statement at a July 1997 Brussels news conference that "Russia ought to become an EU member in the not-too-distant future" as the "entire relationship with the EU" is oriented to that goal (RFE-RL 1997).

The EU was worried that if they did not lock Russia into an institutional framework built on European values, it would cease its democratic and economic reforms, setting the country back in both respects (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 16; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 19). However, the Russians used the fear of rollback to push for concessions from the EU (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 17). In the post-Cold War period, the primary focus for the EU was on laying out a strategy for fostering peaceful political and economic integration, while Russia's primary objective was to establish a solid foothold in the emerging political structure of Europe (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 15).

The existing multilateral frameworks between the EU and Russia at the time were meager. The EU-Russian Trade and Cooperation Agreement's (TCA) narrow scope, focusing primarily on trade concerns, was insufficient to assist post-Soviet Russia's political and economic transformation (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 15). However, Europe did provide financial aid to promote democratic governance and the development of Russia's

market economy through the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program starting in 1992 (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016a, 120). Nevertheless, the EU needed to implement new foreign policy instruments to meet the challenge of helping Russia transition away from its communist past. The centerpiece of the EU-Russian relationship was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The new agreement differed from the TCA because it was more broad-based and included cooperation in political dialogue, culture, education, science, and technology (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 17). The EU expected that the PCA would be enacted by 1992, but the negotiating process lasted 19 months (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 16).

In Article 2 of the PCA (*Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establishing a Partnership Between the European Communities and Their Member States, of One Part, and the Russian Federation, of the Other Part* 1997), the EU asserts that democracy and human rights are essential elements of the agreement. The PCA directly tied the mutual obligation to uphold human rights through the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris in the Joint Declaration in Relation to Articles 2 and 107. The EU thus reserved the legal right to consider a violation of specific "European values" to warrant a breach of the agreement through Article 107 of the agreement (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 18). The agreement also established more contacts between Russia and the EU. Per Article 8, the EU troika meets with the Russian president twice a year. The Cooperation Council meets once per year at the ministerial level, according to Articles 90 and 91. In support of the Cooperation Council, the Cooperation Committee, composed of senior civil servants, meets as needed as outlined in Article 92. Also, Articles 95 through 97 explain that a joint Parliamentary Committee meets regularly, consisting of members of the European Parliament and the

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Following the PCA's entry into effect in December 1997, Russia and the EU implemented an intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary dialogue, yet they could not realize much of the agreement as Russia had not joined the WTO (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 18).

In addition to the critical PCA agreement, the EU supported Russia's entry into the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1996, affirming their support of Russia's reform efforts and simultaneously embedding Russia inside European institutions (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 18). In 1995, the European Commission issued a Communication on the EU's new strategy towards the EU (Commission 1995a). The EU also established the Northern Dimension initiative during Finland's EU presidency in 1999, whose members include the EU, Russia, Norway, and Iceland, to promote stability, economic cooperation, and sustainable development in northern Europe, including the Arctic (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 25). The 1999 Common Strategy on Russia was one of the first post-Amsterdam Treaty CFSP instruments. (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 23)

In 1994, the first Chechen war tested these institutional innovations. The conflict in Chechnya provoked indignation in Russia and the West when independent media coverage revealed dying and injured Russian soldiers and the indiscriminate use of force, which led to many civilian casualties (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 458). However, the first EU meeting on Chechnya did not happen until January 17, 1995, a month after hostilities began (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 458). Nevertheless, the military intervention did not demonstrate the "European values" that Brussels desired to instill in the new Russia. As a result, in January 1995, the EU suspended ratification of the PCA indefinitely (Forsberg and

Haukkala 2016a, 130; 2016d, 21; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 18). However, the EU did not go so far as to suspend TACIS funds, so bilateral projects were not postponed (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016a, 130).

While the EU wanted to protect against human rights violations happening in Chechnya, it deprioritized this objective by promoting democratization as the key to securing peace (Lapidus 1998, 36–37). Unlike the conflicts in Southeastern Europe, the EU emphasized its respect for the territorial sovereignty of Russia by not recognizing the breakaway region (Marshall 1995). Indeed, Europe accepted self-determination and autonomy inside a state, but territorial integrity was "sacrosanct" (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 459). This framing of the situation was especially apparent in the February 1995 European Parliament Resolution on Chechnya, condemning Russia's actions against its "national minorities"(Parliament 1995). Atrocities in Chechnya were a Russian domestic issue even if EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans Van den Broek exclaimed it was an issue over which Europe had "serious concern—verging on indignation"(Marshall 1995). When the war ended in 1996, the EU resumed negotiations on the PCA, and it later came into force in 1997 (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016a, 130; 2016d, 21; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 18). On January 31, 1997, the Presidency Conclusions underscored the EU's democratization strategy with its endorsement of the elections held in Chechnya, hoping that they would provide the "necessary democratic framework" to achieve a "comprehensive solution of the conflict" (European Union 1997).

During the Kosovo intervention, Russia observed that the United States and some EU member states could use military intervention to generate regime change at their

discretion (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 22; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 19). At the same time, Russia viewed Western support for Kosovar independence as a manifestation of the West's ambition to disrupt the post-WWII international order that emphasized sovereignty and non-interference (Allison 2017, 520; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 20). The lesson learned from Kosovo was that there were permissible cases for allowing military action to be carried out unilaterally without UN Security Council authorization (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 22). Therefore, Russia instrumentally drew on Kosovo as a precedent for military force, using the same logic as humanitarian intervention to achieve its national interests.[41] Moreover, the strength of the claim of humanitarianism was inconsequential from the Russian perspective because it felt the reasoning behind Kosovo was hollow (Shlapentokh 2001). For example, Vladimir Putin, speaking on American television, said that Russia was engaged in the Chechen conflict to protect Russian civilians (Shlapentokh 2001).

The second Chechen War began in August 1999. Again, the EU turned to a democratization strategy to address the crisis. In October 1999, Javier Solana, as the High Representative, gave a speech on the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership in Stockholm. He comments that the EU should take advantage of its new Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) to develop its partnership with Russia and that the EU "must not fail" in this challenging endeavor (Solana 1999). Solana (1999) argues that it behooves the EU to ensure Russia's successful transition to democracy and a market economy and that the EU should leverage its "mutually beneficial" trade relationship to facilitate Russia's reform process.

[41] There are several parallels between the Kosovo and Chechnya conflicts. They both involved non-democratic and repressive regimes under which ethnic minorities desired to achieve significant political autonomy or independence (Charney 2001).

Furthermore, he explains that Russian and European security is "indivisible" because the Cold War's impact continues with new threats, including nuclear proliferation, refugee migration from conflicts near Europe, and organized crime (Solana 1999).

In its 1999 Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, the EU emphasizes that the link between Russia and Europe is not just a functional outcome of democratization and market liberalization but a process of widening what constitutes "Europe" in terms of identity. The strategy calls for "a stable, democratic and prosperous Russia, firmly anchored in a united Europe free of new dividing lines" (European Union 1999). Notably, it also welcomes Russia's "return to its rightful place in the European family" founded on "shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilisation" (European Union 1999).

On December 11, 1999, the European Council issued a declaration on Chechnya, calling for the review of the 1999 EU Common Strategy on Russia, the suspension of some parts of the PCA, especially those concerning trade, and the partial redirection of TACIS funds to humanitarian assistance (E. Council 1999). In the same month, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the situation in Chechnya, condemning Russia's use of military force against civilians, especially the ultimatum the Russians gave to the besieged city of Grozny (Parliament 1999). Despite these more punitive actions, Solana reinforced the EU's strategy of rapprochement with Russia through appeals to democracy and identity. In a January 2000 article for Russian-language magazine Kommersant, Solana comments that the fall of communism and the Soviet Union has "opened the way for Russia to take its rightful place in Europe" in the "spirit of democracy, security, the respect for international norms and in

the framework of a market economy" (Solana 2000). He does acknowledge that the EU did not support Russia's actions in Chechnya but that the conflict should "not overshadow" EU-Russia relations and that the EU should work with Russia to address Chechnya "constructively and in a manner of mutual respect" (Solana 2000).

As the second war ended in 2000, the EU began a rapprochement with Russia in earnest. In June 2000, at the European Council meeting in Feira, the EU relaxed the sanctions against Russia, especially those related to TACIS, to help establish a fresh start with the newly elected President Vladimir Putin (E. Council 2000, pt. 56; Forsberg and Haukkala 2016a, 132). Indeed, Europe was ecstatic about the new Putin regime. Putin addressed the German Bundestag on September 25, 2001, in German. He said that Russia enthusiastically supports European integration, saying that "we not just support these processes, but we are looking to them with hope" (V. Putin 2001). He calls on Europe to rid themselves of the "stereotypes and cliches" formed by the divisions of the Cold War because the "Cold War is done with!" (V. Putin 2001). Echoing Solana, he proclaimed that a "modern, sound and sustainable security architecture" is necessary to build "an atmosphere of trust" within a "united Greater Europe" (V. Putin 2001). This call for unity was further undergirded by the moderation of criticism over Chechnya in the shadow of the September 11 terrorist attacks (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016a, 132). However, the EU did not draw as strong a connection as Russia between Chechnya and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in general (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016a, 132).

The EU was not dissuaded from its inclusive approach toward Russia. It continued on a "business as usual" strategy while still condemning the transgressions of certain norms and

principles, such as interfering in democratic elections (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 21). Pursuing an isolationist strategy would not allow Europe to persuade Russians to embrace European values and ideas (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 21). However, the EU's continued quasi-engagement allowed the large EU Member States willing to conduct relations with Russia to act unhindered. This lack of a unified and clear foreign policy of the EU signaled to Putin that securing agreements with powerful member states would assure Brussels would acquiesce (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 23). At its core, EU policy towards Russia in this period was largely ineffectual and, at times, counterproductive to the goal of democratic unity.

China

On the heels of the end of the Cold War, relations between Europe and China had soured because of the violent Chinese repression of demonstrators supporting democratization in Tienanmen Square in 1989. At the June 1989 Madrid European Council summit, the EC imposed an arms embargo against China in response to its "brutal repression" (European Communities 1989, 25) that continues to be a point of friction between Europe and China today. While Europe celebrated the collapse of the Soviet Union, this was, for the Chinese, the "worst-case scenario" (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 15). At the time, Beijing saw Western values as the eroding force that led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 15).

China began the 1990s with Deng Xiaoping's 24-character strategy, which promoted a restrained foreign policy as China was coping with the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The strategy called for China to

> Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership [Switzerland (2004)][42]

Beijing aimed to become a great power in the medium to long term. Deng (1994, 3:341) commented that international affairs were no longer a matter of the United States and the Soviet Union and that a dissolved Soviet Union would still produce a center of power. He envisions that China will rise in power in this geopolitical landscape to become one pole accompanied at least by the United States and Russia (Deng 1994, 3:341). He stresses his point by saying that "one way or another, China will be counted as a pole" (Deng 1994, 3:341).

In the 1990s, China gained more global influence as its economy expanded and trade relations developed. China opened up its economy and made market reforms to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and respond to the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Zheng 2005, 20). Moreover, it was becoming more disengaged from its colonial past as Hong Kong was removed from British rule in 1997 and Macau was removed from Portuguese control in 1999.

Though China was not as receptive as Russia in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the EU still pursued a similar strategy of drawing China closer institutionally and ideologically. However, the EU's engagement primarily concerned economic measures, including expanding trade and investment (Youngs 2021a, 45). While Russia was dispossessed of its socialist system of government, the EU needed to pursue a more circuitous and indirect democratization strategy in authoritarian China. The logic behind

[42] English translation (GlobalSecurity 2013)

this economic engagement was to encourage China to become more open and democratic through increased prosperity (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 16). This plan drew on assumptions from the European experience with democratization, which was closely associated with increased economic well-being. In this case, as in the case of Russia, the EU tried to advance its security interests by attempting to integrate China into the multilateral frameworks of the liberal democratic order. Moreover, the active promotion of liberal democratic values and norms helped legitimize these ideas domestically within the European integration project.

In the 1994 New Asia Strategy, the EU highlights that its interests in the region are economic. It signals Europe's desire to "integrate" fast-growing countries, including China, India, and Vietnam, into a "market-based world trading system" as they transition away from state-controlled economies, offering Europe beneficial economic opportunities and furthering its endeavor to reduce poverty in the region (Commission 1994, 14). Regarding security cooperation in the region, the strategy calls for the EU's further engagement with "regional and subregional security fora," such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Commission 1994, 25). The EU acknowledges in the strategy that the United States is the "key" security actor with a "web of bilateral security arrangements" with many states in the region and that America's security role is unmatched and unlikely to be overtaken given the conditions of the time (Commission 1994, 9). However, having close ties with the US on Asia-Pacific security has proven to be a "double-edged sword" for the EU, especially when promoting its stances on regional security issues (S. Duke and Wong 2016, 28).

Following the Maastricht Treaty, the EU became competent in common foreign policy matters, which allowed a political dialogue with China to commence in 1994 (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 15). The dialogue allowed for sanctions to be lifted, save for the arms embargo against China that the EU had imposed in light of the events at Tienanmen Square in 1989 (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 15; Youngs 2021a, 45). Other direct engagement with the EU came from annual EU-China summits starting in 1998 (Youngs 2021a, 45). In promoting the norm of multilateralism, the EU sought to persuade the Chinese government to participate in regional cooperation (Youngs 2021a, 46). In 1994, the Union became a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), of which China is also a member. Additionally, the EU began its main diplomatic endeavor toward Asia in 1996 by establishing the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Youngs 2021a, 46).

During this period, the EU struggled to define its China strategy, as evidenced by three European Commission strategy documents released within a decade in 1995, 1998, and 2001. In the 1995 European Commission Communication, the EU offered support for China's reform efforts alongside critical commentary on the country's human rights record (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 16). However, it made plain its economic motives, in agreement with the 1994 New Asia Strategy [europeancommissionNewAsiaStrategy1994], by indicating that the EU wanted to establish European business interests where the Japanese and Americans had already been successful (Commission 1995b, sec. A.2). The EU stressed the importance of human rights throughout the document, but it specifically recalled Tienanmen Square and its effect on EU policy towards China (Commission 1995b, sec. B.2).

Three years later, the 1998 Communication deemphasized human rights, and where they were mentioned, the EU took an optimistic view of the progress already made by the Chinese government (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 16). Indeed, the document never directly references the Tienanmen Square episode (Commission 1998). The Communication highlights that human rights have "improved over the last twenty years" as economic reforms have helped bring "greater freedom of choice in education, employment, housing, travel, and other areas of social activity"(Commission 1998, section B). Institutional reforms in the Chinese legal system, it claims, have introduced new citizen protections, and China has developed electoral systems at the local level of governance (Commission 1998, section B). However, the Communication only isolates the objective of creating an "open society based on the rule of law" in terms of explicit expectations for human rights reform (Commission 1998, section B). The document concludes with the EU's primary objective of supporting China's integration into the global economy through accession to the WTO and bilateral relations with the EU (Commission 1998). These foreign policy tools were a means to an end. The EU attempted to make China's WTO bid an opportunity to set conditions for social and economic reform (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 17; Youngs 2021a, 46)

At the end of the period, the European Commission's 2001 EU Strategy towards China emphasizes that China is "not always an easy partner" because China, as an authoritarian regime, makes relations with the EU's democracies "strained" over issues such as human rights (Commission 2001, 7). However, the Commission asserted that "China is both part of the problem and the solution" to global and regional issues within an economically globalizing world, so the EU must strive "towards a common understanding" with China on

these issues and promote multilateral solutions (Commission 2001, 7). The document reflects the frustration of half victories. Indeed, China's WTO accession in the same year induced reforms through various foreign policy conditions, but it did not produce the desired political liberalization that Europe desired in China (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 17). Unlike Russia, China was drawn closer to Europe through its efforts, but the relationship was not transformative in terms of values as Europe had hoped.

Analysis

The first multilateral European foreign policy tool was the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which began in 1970 (M. Smith 2013, 3; M. E. Smith 2018, 609). However, it was not until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was implemented, offering a more robust and integrated foreign policy instrument that formed one of the three pillars of governance within the Maastricht framework. The collapse of the Soviet Union thrust Europe into an unfamiliar world in which it would need to develop its actorness (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 28; Chappell and Petrov 2012; Niemann and Bretherton 2013; Rayroux 2013; Sjöstedt 1977, 16) in the international system, especially in the provision of security and defense. The challenging metamorphosis from the economically-oriented European Communities to the more politically-oriented European Union with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty was a learning process for Europe as it fumbled through the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape. However, the learning process was not without severe negative consequences, especially regarding Europe's relationship with Russia.

I analyze Europe's strategic culture to understand Europe's strategic behavior during the EU's transformation into a security actor. Through topic analysis of Commission press releases and speeches, along with legal documents collected within the EPDB database, I identify the dimensional properties of European strategic subcultures to produce a snapshot of the macroscopic emergent European strategic culture (See Table 3.1). I measure each dimension in terms of the proportion of topics in which it is present within a given corpus.

Table 3.1 Period 1 Dimension Proportions in Corpora

Text Source	Proportion of Topics with Dimension	Dimension
Commission Press Releases	0.72	Civilian Power
Commission Press Releases	0.30	Multilateralism
Commission Press Releases	0.13	Projection
Commission Press Releases	0.04	Transatlanticism
Commission Speeches	0.82	Civilian Power
Commission Speeches	0.62	Multilateralism
Commission Speeches	0.29	Projection
Commission Speeches	0.09	Transatlanticism
EPDB Documents	0.85	Civilian Power
EPDB Documents	0.26	Multilateralism
EPDB Documents	0.04	Projection
EPDB Documents	0.02	Transatlanticism

Within the Commission press releases, 0.30 of the topics concerned multilateralism. In terms of transatlanticism, the Commission press release corpus had 0.04 of its topics addressing transatlanticism. The normative projection dimension was addressed in 0.13 of the Commission press release topics. Finally, civilian power was addressed in 0.72 topics in the collection of Commission press releases. I also check if there is any deviation within an institution by measuring Commission speeches separately.

Commission speeches address multilateralism in 0.62 of the topics. Within the Commission speeches, 0.09 of the topics concerned transatlanticism. The normative projection dimension was addressed in 0.29 of the speech topics. Civilian power was addressed in 0.82 of the topics. Note that speeches have more than double the proportion of topics in all dimensions, except civilian power, compared to press releases. Also, Commission speeches have the highest proportion of topics covering multilateralism across all corpora at 0.62. Dimensional deviation within the Commission provides evidence that strategic subcultural boundaries are not confined within a given institution.

Within the EPDB database, 0.26 of the topics were about multilateralism. Only 0.02 of the topics covered transatlanticism, and 0.04 covered normative projection. These last two proportions were the lowest across all corpora in the period. The EPDB documents have the highest proportion of civilian power topics at 0.85. However, it is not surprising that civilian power is high in this corpus, mainly composed of legal documents. While Official Journal datasets are not available for this period, the EPDB database helps establish a baseline for comparison with the other legal corpora derived from the Official Journal.

Across the three corpora, a general profile of high civilian power, low normative projection, low transatlanticism, and moderate to high multilateralism emerges. This dimensional profile suggests a strategic culture of naive inclusivity. The multilateralism proportion suggests the EU wanted to establish itself as an international actor engaged in the rule-based, liberal global order. Interestingly, transatlanticism does not account for a higher proportion of topics during this period.

However, this observation may be a function of the smaller set of corpora available during this period and the fewer documents within those corpora than the other corpora used in the study. Moreover, transatlanticism stays relatively low across all periods within the Commission and legal corpora, staying below 0.15. For example, the EU does not publish online Council press releases for this period, which may have more politically ambitious statements than more bureaucratically-oriented documents of the Commission. Nevertheless, the difference in transatlanticism between speeches and press releases for the Commission in period 1 suggests that there may have been more support for transatlanticism than what is captured by the group of corpora.

A strategic culture of naive inclusivity helps to explain why the EU tried to bring the US, Russia, and China closer to Europe through shared ideals and institutional ties. Yugoslavia's disintegration tested the EU's capacity as a security actor, leading to repeated failed attempts at peace. In Bosnia and Kosovo, Europe needed to involve the United States through NATO to bring an end to the conflicts. The European Union developed the ESDI and later the ESDP to allow it to be more independent from the United States while not

alienating the US within NATO. The path of inclusivity toward the Balkans did draw in the United States, but it came at the cost of failed conflict management.

This period was also a time of unbridled optimism as the liberal democratic order had overtaken the rival framework of communism, making democratization policy seem unimpeachable. The EU was concerned that if they did not enshrine Russia's democratic and economic reforms in an institutional framework based on European ideals, Russia would abandon them. However, the EU failed to recognize that Russia's objectives were only aligned with theirs insofar as they would help establish a firm foothold in Europe's newly formed political framework. Despite the atrocities happening in Chechnya, the EU held steadfast to a democratization agenda, undermining its normative authority on human rights. In the case of Kosovo, the EU prioritized its normative agenda but lost any gains in rapprochement with Russia by violating international law in the eyes of Moscow.

The EU wanted to increase economic engagement to nudge China toward greater openness and democracy in China. This democratization strategy draws from the European experience with democracy, where increasing economic well-being helped lead to political liberalization.[43] As with Russia, the EU attempted to advance its security interests by integrating China into the global institutions of the liberal democratic order. However, China worked hard to get closer to Europe, but the relationship did not have Europe's desired effect of more political liberalization. The unintended effects of its policy of

[43] See (Boix and Stokes 2003; Lipset 1960, 1959) for arguments about the role of economic development in fostering democratization. Also, see (Przeworski, Neto, and Papaterra 1997) for one of the leading counterarguments against this connection.

economic liberalization required the EU to redefine its strategy toward China on three occasions during this period.

CHAPTER 4: Period 2 — Post-9/11

The tragic events of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, mark the beginning of the second period. This event redefined the security landscape and challenged notions of traditional security concepts from the perspective of the state. Threats against the ontological security of the major powers have gained particular salience. The 9/11 attacks precipitated the Global War on Terrorism, which struck at the heart of Western values and norms. However, the solidarity of the West was tested by the Global War on Terrorism as Europe's preferences on security began to diverge from those of the United States. This period is characterized by Europe's becoming more assertive in its foreign policy through zealous proselytization of its version of the liberal international order. While the EU introduced hard power capabilities in this period, the overarching direction of the EU's external action was to proactively foster a world that promoted Europe's brand of liberalism over that of the United States. From this position, the EU engaged with Russia, which was actively seeking to dissociate from its Europeanness, and with China, which was more actively working to define its world order based on its values.

America

Activating Article V of the NATO treaty in response to the 9/11 attacks bolstered Western solidarity. However, this solidarity began to crack under pressure placed by the United States on the international system with the American unilateral and illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 as part of the Global War on Terror. Neither American hegemonic power nor the perception of a threat by the US has driven European foreign policy cooperation (M. E. Smith 2018, 609). The EU pulled its power from its self-projected normative superiority

(Manners 2002). At the same time, the EU sought to deemphasize military power; instead, it promoted various instruments, including its economic and normative influence and civilian crisis management instruments such as the police, to address security threats (M. E. Smith 2018, 610). The EU saw military force as an ineffective tool for addressing complex security problems and that the use of such force may have worsened security by driving up opposition and insurgencies in the target state (M. E. Smith 2018, 610). These views put Europe at odds with its Western security community partner, the United States, and fueled more ambitious efforts for strategic autonomy.

The EU released the European Security Strategy (ESS) in the wake of the American invasion of Iraq. The strategy adopted in 2003 in Thessaloniki aided in defining the Union's ambition to promote a more cohesive sense of security and define shared values (Rees 2011, 33). The ESS identifies five major non-traditional threats, including terrorism, weapons proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (Biava 2011, 49; Joylon Howorth 2005, 194; European Union 2003b). In contrast to the militaristic and unilateral approach of the US, the ESS introduced an alternative international engagement format. The ESS promoted effective multilateralism (Biava, Drent, and Herd 2011, 1236; Rayroux 2013, 740; M. E. Smith 2018, 607; Youngs 2021a, 39), emphasizing the need to address the fundamental causes of security challenges within a multilateral framework, primarily the United Nations system (M. E. Smith 2018, 607). External action taken by the EU within multilateral frameworks would employ a comprehensive approach to address these fundamental causes. The EU's comprehensive approach is implemented in all phases of conflict, from prevention to post-conflict resolution, utilizing a variety of instruments, both civilian, such as development aid, and military force, in a coherent manner (Biava,

Drent, and Herd 2011, 1236; J. Schmidt 2012, 164; De Coning and Friis 2011, 245–47). The CSDP provides the institutional framework through which the comprehensive approach is implemented (Biava 2011, 45, 49; Bickerton, Irondelle, and Menon 2011, 4).

Despite American demands to enable NATO to review all the CSDP military operations, even those without NATO assets, the EU disregarded America's preference and deployed Artemis, the first autonomous CSDP mission, to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 without informing the US in advance (M. E. Smith 2018, 612–13). Acting independently of NATO, Operation Artemis helped repatriate refugees fleeing civil war (Freire 2008, 20; Rees 2011, 78–79). Operation Artemis showed that the EU could deploy 1,500 to 2,000 troops in a period of 5 to 10 days and be self-sufficient for 30 days (Menon 2009, 232). The EU could use these troops as a bridging force to facilitate sending more forces later (Menon 2009, 232). In 2004, inspired by the success of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the EU established the Headline Goal 2010 to create by 2007 EU battlegroups that the Union could deploy along with logistical support assets (Biava 2011, 50; Menon 2009, 232; EEAS 2013a, 1).

The EU Battlegroup concept has its origins in the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, resulting from the 1999 European Council meeting that called for the Union to provide 50,000 to 60,000 personnel dedicated to rapid response forces available for deployment at a high level of readiness (Lindstrom 2007, 9; EEAS 2013a, 1). In 2003 at Le Touquet, the French and the British concluded that the EU needed to improve its rapid response capability to support strategic autonomy and contributions towards the NATO Response Force, announced at the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002 (Barcikowska 2013, 1). The

2007 Lisbon Treaty introduced the mechanism of "permanent structured co-operation." Permanent structured co-operation in Article 42(6) TEU calls upon states with more capable militaries to provide EU-level rapid response forces, EU Battlegroups, per Protocol No. 10 Article 1 by 2010. This mechanism is part of the broader treaty mechanism of enhanced cooperation that allows differentiated integration into those areas that the Member States choose (European Commission and Directorate-General Communication 2017; Blockmans 2018). The treaty envisioned Battlegroup missions to encompass a broad variety of operations, including those specified in Article 43(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which expands on the tasks specified in Article 42 TEU, branded the "Petersberg Tasks" (EEAS 2013a; Lindstrom 2007, 17).[44]

Battlegroups were designed with non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism and failed states in mind, as envisaged in the ESS (Lindstrom 2007, 17; EEAS 2013a, 3). While not necessary, EU Battlegroups are ideally backed by a UN Security Council Mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Chappell 2009, 426; EEAS 2013a, 3). This authorization supports the goal of "effective multilateralism." With at least 1,500 troops, an EU Battlegroup deploys within 5 to 10 days for 30 to 120 days (EEAS 2013a, 2; Lindstrom 2007, 15). However, EU Battlegroups' capabilities limit strategic planning to approximately 6,000 km from Brussels (Lindstrom 2007, 15).

During the early 2000s, institutional development within the CSDP occurred in tandem with the six-year negotiations for the Berlin Plus agreement, formalizing EU-NATO military

[44] Petersberg tasks include: "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation" Article 43(1) TEU. Also, see the Petersberg Declaration of 1992 (W. C. of Ministers 1992).

cooperation (M. E. Smith 2018, 607). In 2003, the Berlin Plus arrangements modified EU-NATO cooperation (Cascone 2008, 145; Toje 2010, 21). As part of this framework, the EU borrows assets from the US, such as communication units and satellite images, and uses NATO's operational planning capabilities, such as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), for autonomous operations (Joylon Howorth 2005, 185; Hadden 2009, 59). Tom Hadden (2009, 61) outlines the reasoning, stating

> When the participation of the United States military forces is essential on political or logistic grounds, or when a very large military deployment is required NATO will necessarily take the lead; and level of co-ordination under the Berlin Plus arrangements is equally essential; and where the European Union is organizing a smaller military deployment, or the actual use of combined aerial and ground forces is less likely to be needed, a greater degree of European Union autonomy is likely to be appropriate.

CSDP operations Concordia (2003) and Althea (2004-), as take-over peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, provided models for the Berlin Plus agreement, in which the EU uses NATO assets to carry out EU security objectives (M. E. Smith 2018, 612). However, the EU became disinclined to use the Berlin Plus arrangement because it permitted other NATO members to refuse or delay lending of NATO assets to the EU (M. E. Smith 2018, 613).

Despite the challenges faced by the United States and the European Union during the first term of the George W. Bush administration and the widespread debates within the EU over the Iraq War, the two managed to engage in productive cooperation in their foreign relations (M. E. Smith 2018, 606). This transatlantic cooperation even took place in Iraq as part of the EUJUST-LEX CSDP rule of law mission from 2005 to 2013 (Rees 2011, 78–79). Other EU-NATO cooperative endeavors within CSDP in this period include the counter-piracy mission EUNAVFOR Somalia (2008), EUPOL Afghanistan (2007-2016), and the

NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia (2008) (M. E. Smith 2018, 612).

Russia

The EU began its most extensive enlargement endeavor during this period. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were brought into the EU in 2004 and were shortly followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. This process brought states that had been behind the "Iron Curtain" into the capitalist and liberal democratic European order. The EU framed enlargement as these countries being reunified with the West after they had been stolen away, "artificially" separated by the interlude of the Cold War in the grand European historical narrative (Rumelili 2004, 40–41; Sjursen 2002, 505; 2012, 511–12).[45] However, the integration of the states behind the "Iron Curtain" varied in depth, moving away from the European core. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) endeavored to strike a balance between the requests of Central and Eastern European Member States for engagement with neighboring countries to the east and the "enlargement fatigue" of other parts of the EU about expansion spiraling out of control (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016c, 194–95; Kuzio 2006, 91). The ENP sought to offer an alternative to full integration through enlargement by promoting broad cooperation while also allowing the Union to pursue its normative objectives through conditionality with countries not destined for Union membership (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016c, 195).

[45] Sjursen (2012, 512) highlights that the enlargement rhetoric points to reunification instead of unification, even though it is unclear when Europe was united in a similar fashion historically.

The St. Petersburg Summit in June 2003 set the goal of developing a strategic partnership as well as updating the Cooperation Council to a new intergovernmental cooperation format called the Permanent Partnership Council that had more points of contact between the EU and Russian counterparts, meeting more frequently during the year (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 27; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 18). The meetings took place at various levels, ranging from two to four times a year between the current EU troika at a given governance level (e.g., ministerial or expert-level) and their Russian counterparts (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 27). The most frequent meeting format was the monthly meetings between the troika of the Council's Political and Security Committee and the Russian ambassador within the domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 27). Additionally, it established the cooperative framework of "common spaces," including security cooperation (European Union 2003a).[46]

Russia did not object to EU enlargements in the 2000s or the extension of PCAs to new EU members, but it did take a more assertive and uncompromising stance with the EU in its future relations (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 15, 18).[47] The EU offered Russia the opportunity to be part of the ENP, but Russia did not want to be lumped together with a group of smaller states (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 26; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 20). Similarly, Russia did not want to be within the associated Eastern Partnership (EaP) framework that included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine for similar reasons

[46] The St. Petersberg, May 31, 2003, EU-Russia Summit statement states, "We agreed to reinforce our co-operation with a view to creating in the long term a common economic space, a common space of freedom, security and justice, a space of co-operation in the field of external security, as well as a space of research and education, including cultural aspects. The gradual development of these spaces should take place in the framework of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)" (European Union 2003a)

[47] See Putin's speech to the Bundestag in Chapter 3

(Khudoley and Raś 2021, 20). Russia desired a strategic partnership with the EU to reflect its status as a world power (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 26).

The admission of new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe strengthened the group of the EU Member States critical of Russia and deteriorated EU-Russia ties (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 31). The threat of the EU gained additional weight as enlargement also brought about NATO enlargement (Akchurina and Della Sala 2018, 1648) in former communist states that were part of the Soviet sphere of influence. Between the EU and Russia, the countries that make up the "common neighborhood" have become a source of contention, if not open rivalry (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 31). EU members such as Poland and the Baltic states, who had lived under Soviet influence, sought to Westernize post-Soviet republics, exacerbating the EU-Russian rivalry in the EU's eastern neighborhood (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 20). Russia viewed these activities as hostile in a "geopolitical game" fueled by EU and US interests combined with "Russophobia" (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 20). Indeed, the EU and Russia could not make a new agreement when the PCA expired in 2007 and instead fell back on the annual automatic renewal outlined in Article 106 of the agreement (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 30). Among other things, the four roadmap frameworks were only partially implemented, and the Partnership for Modernization agreement failed in 2010 (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 20).

EU leaders strongly backed democratic movements in states that were formerly republics of the Soviet Union in the Color revolutions, such as the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine (Khudoley and Raś 2021, 19). The Kremlin saw these measures by the EU as eroding its influence in its areas of "privileged interests"

(Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 28; Hopf 2017, 221–22; Khudoley and Raś 2021, 19). Further, Russian elites believed that the Color revolutions resulted from foreign interference from the West rather than upheavals by the people (Adamsky 2018, 175; Skak 2016, 325). After his 2004 re-election, Putin pushed Russia to disavow the notion of Russia and Europe sharing the same values (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 27). At the same time, Russia aimed to bolster the state's strength, even at the price of liberal "European values," and as a result, liberal groups inside the government lost influence to the siloviki, a group connected to the government's security and intelligence institutions (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 28).

Towards the end of this period, Russia intervened in Georgia in 2008. Moscow ignored its aversion to unilateralism and began its intervention even after the UN Security Council passed resolution 1808 in April 2008, earlier affirming Georgia's territorial sovereignty (Igumnova 2011, 261). What was once a regional crisis had become, for Russia, a proxy war with the West over the nature of the international order (Eitelhuber 2009, 12). Sergey Lavrov (2008), at a press conference about South Ossetia in August 2008, said that the hostile actions of Georgia against Russia are not just done "against the background of the Georgian flag, but also against the background of the flag of the European Union."

The conflict offered an opportunity for Moscow to use humanitarian intervention instrumentally, in light of the Kosovo precedent set by the West, to legitimate unilateral action that violated the sovereignty of another state. At a press conference with the president of South Ossetia, Vladimir Putin expressed that Russia felt compelled to engage in South Ossetia and Abkhazia because it had an ethical obligation to help the oppressed

ethnic minorities in Georgia achieve self-determination (V. Putin and Kokoity 2009). He refers explicitly to the Kosovo intervention several years earlier, pointing out that helping South Ossetia and Abkhazia was no different from the West's support of Kosovo (V. Putin and Kokoity 2009). He further argues that if "sovereignty" is valued over "self-determination," then Kosovo should have remained inside Serbia (V. Putin and Kokoity 2009).[48]

A clash of identity-forming narratives informs the rivalry in the "common neighborhood." Russian historical experience interwoven with Russian Orthodox Christianity serves as Russia's founding narrative, whereas the EU's narrative is universalist (Akchurina and Della Sala 2018, 1646). As Russia and the EU compete for influence in the common neighborhood, the EU narrative threatens Russia because it may resonate more in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which do not share Russia's complex history with Christianity (Akchurina and Della Sala 2018, 1646). The EU's ENP and EaP initiatives to develop ties with third countries, designed to promote democracy and market capitalism, are a natural extension of the EU's enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe (Akchurina and Della Sala 2018, 1642). The establishment of these different orbits around the EU geographically and ideologically serves to exercise the Union's aim to wield its influence to propagate a rules-based international order without regard to geopolitical realities (Akchurina and

[48] In response to Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008, at the General Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, the EU asserted that Kosovo is a "sui generis case" that did not violate the principles of "sovereignty and territorial integrity" within the UN Charter when taking account of both Kosovo's experience from the 1990s conflict and its "extended period of international administration under SCR 1244" (European Union 2008, 7).

Della Sala 2018, 1642). In effect, Europe's naiveté in pursuing its normative agenda is transformed into an existential threat from Moscow's viewpoint.

China

China's economic development took off during this period. China surpassed Japan as the world's second-largest economy (BBC 2011). It became the second-largest holder of US treasury bonds, critically linking the Chinese to US debt finance and macroeconomic stability (Yue 2008, 442). China's fast economic growth has fundamentally reshaped the supply chain for energy and raw materials globally (Yue 2008, 442). In this environment, China crafted a narrative of a "peaceful rise" that was a signal of intentions to the West. It portrayed itself as troubled with resource constraints, environmental concerns, and social upheaval that compelled the prioritization of domestic policy (Yue 2008, 440). Within this narrative, China has no ambition for global hegemony, recognizing that the US underwrites East Asian stability and aims to integrate into the global economic system, obtaining global resources peacefully through trade and investment (Yue 2008, 440). Through China's opening of its economy, its "population can serve as a growing market for the rest of the world, thus providing increased opportunities for—rather than posing a threat to—the international community" (Zheng 2005, 24).

Guiding China's process of becoming a more powerful international actor is the notion of Tianxia. From a Chinese perspective, "Tianxia" translates as "everything below the heavens," and is historically used to refer to the world in a material sense (Callahan 2008, 751). In its current form, it is a "uniquely Chinese reading of the international system that assumes dynastic authoritarianism, a hierarchical mode of international politics marked by the desire for unity and order" (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 57). It also provides a

conceptual framework for Chinese nationalism[49] in the Chinese-led world order that Zhao Tingyang[50] argues can overcome the problems facing the present Westphalian system prone to conflict (Callahan 2008, 751). Therefore, China believes it can achieve its objectives without adhering to Europe's prescription for liberal democracy based on its faith in traditional Chinese civilizational ideas and the collective philosophical insights of ancient Chinese intellectuals (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 61).

China signaled a commitment to a rules-based international order by defining its relationship with the EU based on the principle of conditionality. Thomas Christiansen (2019a, 123) argues that the Chinese established a more conditional approach in their 2003 policy paper than the EU, whose modus operandi is conditionality. China's 2003 EU Policy Paper insists on the EU's recognition of the "One China" principle regarding Taiwan so that it may not supply arms to Taiwan nor support Taiwanese membership in or admission to any international body that requires statehood (Foreign Affairs 2003). On the issue of Tibet, China required no dealings with the "Dalai clique" (Foreign Affairs 2003). For Hong Kong and Macau, the policy requires that the EU apply the "one country, two systems" in their relationship with these areas (Foreign Affairs 2003).

Many observers likened the EU-China relationship to a marriage and spoke of a honeymoon when both sides issued policy papers on the other in 2003 (Christiansen, Kirchner, and

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[49] Contemporary Chinese nationalism traces its origins to the Century of Humiliation (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 63–64). Within this nationalism is the notion of regaining *mianzi* (face) to achieve the *Zhongguo Meng* (Chinese Dream) (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 64).

[50] William Callahan (2008, 750) explains that Zhao Tingyang published an influential book, "The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution" in April 2005 that rose to popularity in China for its presentation of a uniquely Chinese approach to global problems that included the traditional idea of Tianxia, which could blend nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Wissenbach 2019a, 123; Commission 2003; Foreign Affairs 2003). In line with its neighborhood strategy, the EU used conditionality in its relations with China and other Asian states to incentivize democratic liberalization and peacebuilding through a variety of foreign policy instruments in order to foster regional stability (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019b, 124). As in the previous period, the EU sought to further its security interests by embedding China in the multilateral rules-based liberal order in the pursuit of transforming China to embrace liberal European values.

The EU prioritized this objective in its 2003 European Security Strategy, calling on Europe to form more strategic partnerships with rising powers, especially China (European Union 2003b, 14; Solana 2003). During this period, the EU worked toward replacing the 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with a new, more comprehensive EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). While the EU had disagreements with China on several issues, including human rights and the arms embargo, it proceeded with "high-level strategic and commercial dialogues" that evolved as China became more amenable to more cooperation (Youngs 2021a, 46). Additionally, in October 2003, the EU and China began cooperation in the joint development of the European satellite navigation system Galileo (Casarini 2006, 26; King 2003). China contributed € 200 million along with production and technical assistance (Casarini 2006, 26).

In February 2003, German officials in Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's government said that Beijing considered the embargo a form of "discrimination" and that China "had proven itself a responsible partner" when mediating the North Korean nuclear crisis (Welle 2003). Later, in December 2003, the European Council requested that the General Affairs and

External Relations Council "re-examine" the arms embargo against China (European Union 2004, 19). The French also joined with the Germans to promote the lifting of the embargo. In a Chinese Foreign Ministry press release with French President Jacques Chirac and Hu Jintao, Chirac called the embargo "outdated," offering France's help to end this sanction (Foreign Affairs 2005). Hu added that the arms embargo was becoming "increasingly inappropriate" as part of Sino-EU relations (Foreign Affairs 2005). However, the push to lift the embargo was not supported by all parts of the EU, as the arms embargo represented EU policy toward promoting human rights. In fact, the EU Parliament voted against lifting the arms embargo, demonstrating its moral clout in the situation because lifting the embargo was outside the EU Parliament's treaty competences (Welle 2004). Ultimately, the EU did not lift the embargo.

During France's 2008 EU presidency, French President Nicolas Sarkozy's met with the Dalai Lama. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement that Sarkozy's actions "grossly interfered in China's internal affairs, severely undermined China's core interest, gravely hurt the sentiments of the Chinese people and sabotaged the political basis of China-France and China-EU relations"(Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2008). However, his actions were in the service of the EU, which has historically been critical of China's policies towards Tibet. Indeed, in this period, the European Parliament passed resolutions that disapproved of Chinese actions in Tibet (Parliament 2006, 2009). In a demonstration of their resolve, China postponed the 11th EU–China summit in 2008 in response to Sarzkoy's meeting (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 19; 2019b, 123; M. Li 2016, 21).

Relations between China and the EU further chilled in 2008. China viewed the 2008 Olympics as the herald of the normalization of China's relations with the rest of the globe (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 65). The Chinese Communist Party ensured that the world leaders attended the opening ceremony to reinforce China's ontological security (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 65). However, Knud Jørgensen and Reuben Wong (2016, 63) argue that the West perverted the Beijing Olympics as a "form of ontological insecurity." The torchbearer for the French leg of the torch run, Jin Jing, was forced to surrender her torch after being accosted by protesters (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 65).[51] China interpreted this action as a rejection of China's great power status and a potential attempt to rein in China on the delicate issue of Tibet (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 65). When EU heads of state and government did not all attend the opening ceremony, it conveyed that China was not a significant political power (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 65).

During this period, China was also developing as an autonomous global actor untethered to the liberal order supported by many closely-tied developing countries (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 21). Chinese leaders hosted a conference with African leaders in 2006 to promote cooperation between China and the Global South and generously funded the initiative without regard to political or economic constraints (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 20). This Chinese approach challenged Europe's development strategy conditioned on promoting human rights and democratization (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 20; Michalski and Pan 2017, 119, 122–23). However, China considers Europe's role in Africa both imperialist and

[51] European human rights advocates called the Beijing Olympic Games "genocide games" (Michalski and Pan 2017, 119; Fox and Godement 2009, 42).

disruptive and seeks to build its own relationships with African countries (Fox and Godement 2009, 41). Beijing hopes to build on its relationships in Africa to deepen diplomatic connections, including garnering support in the UN on Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights (Fox and Godement 2009, 41).

In 2005 and 2006, China considered the Darfur crisis a domestic issue, refusing to vote in favor of UN resolutions denouncing Sudan's treatment of Darfur (Fox and Godement 2009, 41). In 2007, Special Envoy for Darfur Liu Guijin met with the Darfur contact group in Paris (Holslag 2011, 300). He resisted the European demands for sanctions, fearing they would be counterproductive and detrimental to Chinese economic interests in Sudan (Holslag 2011, 300). Moreover, he wanted to uphold China's stance on non-interference in the sovereignty of other states (Holslag 2011, 300). This action would ensure that China did not undermine its anti-imperialist critique of Western interference.

However, China's position on non-interference was not absolute[52]. China's important economic role in Sudan and close ties to the government in Khartoum forced it to intervene (Fox and Godement 2009, 42; Holslag 2008, 74). Beijing quietly encouraged Sudan to accept a United Nations-African Union (UN-AU) peacekeeping force in Darfur (Fox and Godement 2009, 42; Holslag 2011, 300; Michalski and Pan 2017, 119). This action was likely not a normative transformational experience within multilateral frameworks. While the EU and China have similar views on the limited use of force, this situation reveals

[52] To avoid confrontation with Western powers, Beijing opposed armed intervention in Kosovo but abstained from voting in the Security Council (Holslag 2008, 74). In the case of Somalia, China cited the "exceptionality of the situation" to justify sending peacekeeping forces without authorization from the host country (Holslag 2008, 74). Beijing used the rationale of terrorism to justify supporting unauthorized intervention in Afghanistan (Holslag 2008, 74).

China's view that the restricted use of force is a tool of power rather than a constraint informed by principles and norms in international law (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 60).

Analysis

The EU achieved the perceived status of a normative superpower in the post-9/11 period (Manners 2002, 2006). It gained this prestige by expanding its soft power (Keohane and Nye 2012) as it extended its membership to former communist states to its east using a myriad of civilian instruments. Moreover, the EU began to differentiate itself from the West as its preferences diverged from the United States' foreign policy. However, the EU's cachet was not without negative consequences.

I analyze Europe's strategic culture to understand Europe's strategic behavior during the EU's transformation into a normative superpower. Through topic analysis of several corpora of documents from this period, I identify the dimensional properties of European strategic subcultures, producing a snapshot of the emergent European strategic culture. To create this snapshot, I calculate the proportion of topics in which the dimension is present within a given corpus (See Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Period 2 Dimension Proportions in Corpora

Text Source	Proportion of Topics with Dimension	Dimension
Commission Press Releases	0.74	Civilian Power
Commission Press Releases	0.36	Multilateralism
Commission Press Releases	0.22	Projection
Commission Press Releases	0.07	Transatlanticism

Text Source	Proportion of Topics with Dimension	Dimension
Commission Speeches	0.83	Civilian Power
Commission Speeches	0.58	Multilateralism
Commission Speeches	0.25	Projection
Commission Speeches	0.14	Transatlanticism
Council Press Releases	0.78	Civilian Power
Council Press Releases	0.72	Multilateralism
Council Press Releases	0.55	Projection
Council Press Releases	0.10	Transatlanticism
Official Journal	0.74	Civilian Power
Official Journal	0.33	Multilateralism
Official Journal	0.15	Projection
Official Journal	0.04	Transatlanticism

Within the Commission press release corpus, 0.36 of the topics concerned multilateralism. The Commission press release corpus had 0.07 of its topics addressing transatlanticism. The normative projection dimension was mentioned in 0.22 of the Commission press release topics. Finally, civilian power was addressed in 0.74 of the topics in the collection of Commission press releases.

If strategic subcultures are not confined within an institution, there should be differences in the dimensional profile between different types of corpora within an institution. Indeed, there are notable changes in multilateralism and transatlanticism between the Commission

press release and Commission speeches corpora. These differences likely indicate a higher level of agency in the discourse. While press releases are negotiated baseline statements, speeches may include influences that stem from the speech-giver and the groups they represent outside of the Commission. In 0.58 of Commission speech topics, multilateralism was addressed, which is 60% higher than in the other corpus. Within the Commission speeches, 0.14 of the topics concerned transatlanticism, which is double the proportion observed in the other corpus. The normative projection dimension was considered in 0.25 of the speech topics. Finally, civilian power was addressed in 0.83 of the topics.

Also available during this period are press releases from the Council. While it may demonstrate the smoothing effect discussed above regarding press releases, the Council's greater policy autonomy and a closer connection to the Member States likely demonstrate high agency. Indeed, high proportions are observed in every dimension, except transatlanticism. Multilateralism was addressed in 0.72 of the topics within the Council press releases. The dimension of normative projection was in 0.55 of the Council press release topics. In the collection of Council press releases, civilian power was mentioned in 0.78 of the topics. While the Council press release corpus had 0.10 of its topics addressing transatlanticism, this is still consistent with the generally low proportions across the corpora in this period.

This is the first period with documents widely available from the European Official Journal. Indeed, this availability corresponds closely with the enlargement cohorts of the early 2000s. The EU's production of legal documents only increases as time progresses, providing better quality data that improves topic models generated from this period

forward. Within the European Official Journal documents, 0.33 of the topics were about multilateralism. Transatlanticism was addressed in 0.04 of the topics, and 0.15 of the topics mentioned the dimension of normative projection. Finally, 0.74 of the topics of the European Official Journal documents take into account civilian power.

Across the corpora in this period, the emergent European strategic culture had a dimensional profile with high civilian power, moderate to high normative projection, low transatlanticism, and moderate to high multilateralism. The main change from the previous period was the increase in the EU's normative projection. The EU had shifted from a strategic culture of naive inclusivity to one of selective inclusivity. In its position of prestige, the EU's increased focus on normative projection introduced indifference and hubris into its strategic behavior, damaging its relationships with the United States, Russia, and China.

Following September 11, 2001, Europe's security preferences began to diverge from those of the United States. In particular, Europe and the United States disagreed on how to address non-traditional security threats in the twenty-first century. The EU viewed military power as ineffectual at resolving complex security concerns throughout this period. The European Union published the European Security Strategy in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq that advocated promoting "effective multilateralism" that could use a "comprehensive approach" to crisis management. This approach contrasted with the American preference for military power and unilateralism. The EU experienced success in developing its capacity for crisis management with the execution of Operation Artemis as an ad hoc CSDP mission. However, the EU's attempts at permanent institutional

innovations for strategic autonomy in this period were largely ineffective. Indeed, the key innovation in strategic autonomy developed during this period, EU Battlegroups, continues not to be used even today. Europe's selectivity as part of its strategic autonomy designs further revealed Europe's capability-expectations gap (Hill 1993), underscoring its dependence on NATO and the United States.

In the previous period, the EU had widely extended the offer of membership to countries from former Yugoslavia. However, the EU became more selective in its integration as new members were added, heading eastward. Some Central and Eastern European countries were welcomed to the EU as part of a narrative of reuniting Europe from the schism created by the Cold War. Others, especially those countries that had been former Soviet republics, did not receive the same welcome. Countries under this category included Georgia and Ukraine, eager for EU membership after the Color Revolutions (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016c, 194). Assuaging concerns about enlargement by existing Member States, the ENP and EaP offered a greater connection with the EU without the promise of EU membership.

Despite offering this lighter version of integration, the draw of the EU did not deter these countries from seeking a closer relationship with Europe. Russia viewed the EU's draw through the ENP as a zero-sum game, stoking a fierce ideological rivalry between Moscow and Brussels for influence in states Russia considered within its traditional sphere of influence. The EU's selective strategic culture fostered an approach of indifference to Russia's fears that enlargement, along with the ENP and EaP, was menacing. The EU's appeal to technocratic neutrality in its application of conditionality to promote its

normative agenda fell on deaf ears in Moscow. Europe's promotion of its normative agenda fueled its cachet, but this soft power was corrosive to EU-Russian relations. The EU's uncritical normative projection thus pushed Russia away from Europe and the West more generally. The objective of preventing Russia from becoming unanchored from the liberal rules-based global order failed, as evidenced by Russia's intervention in Georgia in 2008.

The EU's strategic culture of selective inclusivity clashes heavily with China's assertiveness in this period. Europe's difference in perspective with China reflects a genuine disconnect between the norms and values of the EU and China. The EU formed an image of itself as a "postmodern political entity" fueled by its "zeal in defending human rights" (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 62). However, this insistence on upholding human rights in China by the EU is viewed by the Chinese government as a violation of domestic sovereignty, potentially perpetuating European imperialism (Jørgensen and Wong 2016, 58–59). Moreover, Beijing views this insistence as potentially "superfluous" or even a form of political manipulation (Zhang 2012, 93). The EU's policies toward China perpetuate Europe's indifference to geopolitical concerns. The EU welcomes a multipolar world, but it arrogantly assumes that such a geopolitical landscape would induce China to embrace its vision of "effective multilateralism" over a vision that prioritizes sovereignty above all other principles (Holslag 2011, 309). China's alternative vision for a global order gained significant traction in Africa during this period, complicating and delaying international action to address human rights issues in Sudan. Europe's narrow focus stemming from its strategic culture did not allow the EU to critically reflect on its values and adapt its views in light of Chinese competition, especially in exerting influence in the developing world.

CHAPTER 5: Period 3 — Post-Global Financial Crisis

While there was a severe shock to the international system from the global financial crisis (GFC), the EU did not reformulate its response to the changing global order with a new strategy for external relations and security. As in the previous chapter, the EU's actions were guided primarily through the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS).[53] In the first few lines of the ESS, the EU sets out to promote the spread of liberal democracy throughout the world by proclaiming itself the apotheosis of a liberal democratic order. Even if Europe believed it had never been "so prosperous, so secure, or so free" (European Union 2003b), the GFC put a significant strain on what the EU could realistically achieve in terms of the strategy's goals.

America

Sanger (2012, 421) identifies the Obama Doctrine as the United States having a "lighter footprint around the world, and a reliance on coalitions to deal with global problems that do not directly threaten American security" (Sanger 2012, 421). President Obama, reflecting on his foreign policy in an interview with the *Atlantic* magazine, said

> We've got to be hardheaded at the same time as we're bighearted, and pick and choose our spots, and recognize that there are going to be times where the best that we can do is to shine a spotlight on something that's terrible, but not believe that we can automatically solve it. There are going to be times where our security interests conflict with our concerns about human rights. There are going to be times where we can do something about innocent people being killed, but there are going to be times where we can't (Goldberg 2016).

[53] The ESS identifies five major non-traditional threats, including terrorism, weapons proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (Biava 2011, 49; Joylon Howorth 2005, 194; European Union 2003b). See Chapter 2 for more information on non-traditional security threats.

For Obama, retrenchment was also coupled with a "'rebalancing' away from the quagmires in the Middle East toward the continent of greatest promise in the future—Asia" (Sanger 2012, 421). Commenting on the 2012 Strategic Defense Review, Obama (2012) highlights this "pivot" to Asia, saying

> We will be strengthening our presence in the Asia Pacific, and budget reductions will not come at the expense of that critical region. We're going to continue investing in our critical partnerships and alliances, including NATO, which has demonstrated time and again—most recently in Libya—that it's a force multiplier. We will stay vigilant, especially in the Middle East.

With fewer resources due to the Great Recession, the United States needed to reassess its global engagement. The new reality did not include fully funded security and defense by the United States. While the US was not forsaking Europe, Washington expected Brussels to take on more responsibility within the transatlantic security framework. This shift of American focus was particularly evident in the Libyan intervention involving NATO.

The Obama Doctrine colored much of the American response to the democratic transitions that waved across the Middle East and North Africa in the Arab Spring. While the Libyan situation continued to deteriorate, the US did not immediately seek to intervene, to the surprise of many observers (Hallams and Schreer 2012). President Obama was insistent on having a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force (Hallams and Schreer 2012, 319–21). With the precarious situation in Benghazi and fears of a massacre, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 in March 2011 (Laity 2014, 92). The resolution empowered member states to "take all necessary measures…to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack (UNSC 2011, para. 4). According to Laity (2014, 100), the Security Council resolution legally validated the intervention, but the Arab

League's support for the Libyan intervention on March 12, 2011, gave the subsequent operations political legitimacy.

Operation Odyssey Dawn started on March 19, 2012, with airstrikes to enforce a no-fly zone led by the United States (Hallams and Schreer 2012). Following this first phase of the intervention, the United States assumed a supporting role, allowing the European allies to lead NATO's Operation Unified Protector (Hallams and Schreer 2012, 319–21). While the US did not take the lead, it remained very active within the North Atlantic Council (NAC), insisting that Europe be held accountable for showing political leadership in the intervention (Laity 2014, 96). In practical terms, the US provided essential resources, including in-flight refueling and reconnaissance (Hallams and Schreer 2012, 319–21).

The Libya campaign was viewed by members of the alliance as a possible turning point in NATO cooperation, potentially serving as a model for future cooperation (Hallams and Schreer 2012, 313). The intervention demonstrated the possibility of a fairer cost-sharing model that could handle a less engaged United States, facing financial burdens from the Great Recession and waning interest in regions outside of Asia (Hallams and Schreer 2012, 319, 324; Rees 2011, 28). Unfortunately, Operation Unified Protector suffered from America's more minor role. Operation Odyssey Dawn used critical national assets, bases, and personnel usually allocated to NATO (Laity 2014, 92–93). Despite these conducive conditions for transferring resources and forces to the NATO operation, the removal of American strike aircraft created a considerable drop in operational activity (Laity 2014, 100). In a speech in Brussels, commenting on Operation Unified Protector, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2011), in a speech in which he said that the operation has "shown

the potential of NATO, with an operation where Europeans are taking the lead with American support." He was less optimistic about the medium term, stating that

> While every alliance member voted for [the] Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't. The military capabilities simply aren't there (Gates 2011).

According to Laity (2014, 93), the vagueness about what constitutes civilian protection and how to verify its achievement contributed to a lack of clarity about the NATO mandate's end states. The Contact Group on Libya, which comprises interested states and representatives from several multilateral organizations, including the Arab League, NATO, and the European Union, met in Doha, Qatar, in April 2011. The Contact Group submitted a statement to the United Nations Security Council, stating that it was united in its decision that Qaddafi's regime must end to bring the Libyan crisis to a close (Libya 2011). Laity (2014, 94–95) argues that the Contact Group's push for regime change effectively split the UNSCR 1973 mandate that focused on civilian protection from the goal of regime change.

President Obama had assured Vladimir Putin that he was not like his predecessor, George W. Bush, in that he did not support regime change, as happened in Iraq (McFaul 2018). The Libyan intervention and the associated overthrow of Qaddafi were a Western betrayal to Putin (Allison 2017, 520; Helberg 2021, ch. 1; McFaul 2018). Putin called UN Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing intervention in Libya, analogous to "a medieval call to the Crusades," questioning the Western response to the crisis made under the auspices of international law (Barry 2011). He remarked that "almost all of Gadhafi's family has been killed, his corpse was shown on all global television channels," and "it was impossible to

watch without disgust" (Staff 2011). Putin could see that the unfettered influence of Western powers had visceral consequences.

Russia

To counter the threat from the West, Putin believed that Russia needed to fracture transatlantic and European security cooperation, preventing countries within the "common neighborhood" between Europe and Russia from joining forces against Moscow (Kroenig 2020b, 156). At the same time, Putin is working to discredit the democratic system of governance (Kroenig 2020b, 156). At the Valdai Discussion Club in September 2013, Putin framed the threat of the West as a narrative of moral decay, stating

> We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural, religious, and even sexual (V. V. Putin 2013).

Maria Lipmann (2015, 114) explains that the Putin regime has entrenched itself in a "besieged fortress" mentality, drawing on a "hodgepodge of ad hoc arguments" in a paranoid and defensive desire to protect the legitimacy and value of the Russian state and its rulers. In the face of a global monolithic West, the Kremlin has coalesced many ideologies, including "imperial, Stalinist, xenophobic and nationalist, clerical, and even fascist," to establish an anti-liberal position (Lipman 2015, 125–26; Staun 2015, 14). Russia's civilizational rivalry with Europe plays out through the EU's Eastern Neighborhood Policy (ENP) within the framework of the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

At the November 2013 Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit, the EU anticipated signing Association Agreements (AAs) with four partner countries in the EaP: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 35). The Association Agreements

entailed a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) agreement (Casier 2021, 86). The AAs called for accepting liberal democratic norms, such as respect for the rule of law and harmonizing legislation with the EU's acquis communautaire, especially concerning laws pertinent to the Single Market (Casier 2021, 86). However, Russia felt that the negotiations of the Association Agreements needed to consider Russian interests, which the parties could achieve through trilateral negotiations (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 35). The EU considered the AA talks as bilateral relations with fully independent neighboring states, so Russia should not get special recognition or consideration (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 35).

Russia's more assertive stance on involvement in the post-Soviet space was made clear by its pursuit of the Eurasian Customs Union. At the June 2012 EU-Russia summit in St. Petersburg, Putin urged that the EU consider the Eurasian Customs Union (EAEU) as the forum for treaty negotiations with Russia (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 34). The DCFTA of the AAs is incompatible with being part of the EAEU because a customs union necessitates a uniform external tariff established by an overarching body to which a state has agreed to give up its capacity to set its tariffs in separate trade deals with other entities (Delcour 2021, 397). Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov commented that "the EU's Eastern Partnership programme is designed to bind the so-called focus states tightly to itself, shutting down the possibility of co-operation with Russia" (Sergei Lavrov 2014). The legal incompatibility of the DCFTA of the AAs with the EAEU effectively created a binary choice between working with the EU or Russia (Casier 2021, 86). In their rivalry, Russia and the EU had ensnared the post-Soviet state.

Russia began frustrating the EU's Eastern Partnership plans by imposing economic sanctions on the EaP states to dissuade them from signing Association Agreements with the EU (Blank and Kim 2016, 4; Delcour 2021, 397; Youngs 2021b, 170). Armenia chose, in September 2013, during Putin's visit to Yerevan, to end its agreement with the EU and instead join Russia's emerging Eurasian Customs Union (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 35; Delcour 2021, 397; Youngs 2021b, 170). At a press conference in Chișinău, Russian Vice Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin warned that "Moldova's train en route to Europe would lose its wagons in Transnistria," the contested breakaway territory (Dempsey 2013). Rogozin added to this pressure not to proceed with the AA with his comment that "We Russia hope that you will not freeze this winter" (Dempsey 2013). This not-so-veiled threat signaled that Moscow would interfere with Moldova's natural gas supply, mainly sourced from Russia (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 35). At the same time, Russia was less aggressive towards Georgia concerning its AA because pro-Western President Mikheïl Saakashvili was not re-elected in 2013 (Delcour 2021, 397). However, Russia signed alliance agreements with the Georgian breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to pressure Tbilisi (Delcour 2021, 397).

The EU-Russian rivalry came to a head in Ukraine. Moscow incentivized Ukrainian President Yanukovych to delay signing the AA by offering preferential natural gas prices and other economic concessions totaling $17 billion (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 36). Russia paired this enticement with the threat of invasion. Russian adviser Sergey Glazyev said in September 2013 that Russia would not guarantee Ukraine's territorial integrity if Ukraine signed the AA and that they would, if called upon, safeguard Russian-supporting parts of Ukraine even if it violated Ukrainian territorial sovereignty (Forsberg and

Haukkala 2016d, 36). The EU did not take any steps to resist Russian pressure when Ukraine declined to sign the AA, except for withdrawing its call to release Ukrainian politician Yulia Tymoshenko (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 37). Ultimately, President Victor Yanukovych declared that Ukraine would reject its EU agreement (Youngs 2021b, 170). By November 2013, the Euromaidan protests started the political turmoil that would lead to a revolution that would unseat Yanukovych.

Russia considered this ouster a coup and began its intervention in Ukraine in February 2014 (Delcour 2021, 397; Youngs 2021b, 170). Within a few days, troops of so-called "little green men," who wore no insignia, gained control of the Crimean peninsula (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 37–38; Shevchenko 2014). These unmarked troops were members of Russia's special forces and military intelligence directorate (GRU) (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 37–38). While many rebel forces were Russian citizens, Moscow denied any official state involvement in the conflict, though it sent over 40,000 troops to the Ukrainian border (Euractiv 2014; Youngs 2021b, 170–71). A referendum held on March 16, 2014, resulted in the admission of Crimea into the Russian Federation (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 38). In the east of Ukraine, Russia increased military involvement in the Donbas region, with rebels expanding their control over Luhansk and Donetsk (Youngs 2021b, 171).

Russia also engaged in a global information campaign against Ukraine and the West, building on longstanding Soviet nonmilitary tactics of "aktivniye meropriyatiya" (active measures) that aim to destabilize societies (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 38; Helberg 2021, ch. 1). For example, the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, referencing disinformation generated by the Russian government, attempted to justify intervention in Ukraine by

saying it was Russia's duty "not to allow fascism to spread throughout Europe and the world at large" (Sergei Lavrov 2014; Singer and Brooking 2018, 204). The EU responded to disinformation by sanctioning Russian journalists, to which Russia retaliated with further distortion of information (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016b, 174). A statement from Russia's Foreign Ministry commented that the EU's action is "depriving millions of Europeans of the right to access different media sources" and thus "infringing on the fundamental and universally recognized right to freedom of expression and its commitments to media plurality and the freedom of information" (Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2015).

The EU moved quickly to have the Association Agreement with Ukraine signed by the newly elected government of pro-European President Petro Poroshenko (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 40). Kyiv signed the political parts of the Association Agreement on March 21, 2014, shortly after the annexation, and completed the economic component four months later (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 40). President Van Rompuy (2014), in response to the signing of the Ukrainian AA, said the agreement "shows our steadfast support for the course the people of Ukraine have courageously pursued." He calls for the agreement to

> Support and strengthen the political resolve of the leaders and citizens who want to build a democratic and inclusive Ukraine, protecting all groups and minorities, living in peace with its neighbours(Van Rompuy 2014).

The Ukrainian Rada and the European Parliament ratified the AA on September 16, 2014 (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 40). Following Russian threats of economic retaliation, the EU, Ukraine, and Russia agreed on September 12, 2014, in Brussels to postpone the provisional implementation of the DCFTA in Ukraine until the end of 2015 (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 40–41). On January 1, 2016, the EU removed tariffs and began applying

the AA provisionally (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 40). The AA went into full force when the EU member states completed their ratification process on July 11, 2017 (Welle 2017).

In September 2014, the Trilateral Contact Group, comprised of Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), signed the Minsk Protocol in the Belarusian capital to initiate a ceasefire (OSCE 2014). Germany and France dominated the European response to the crisis through their mediating roles during negotiations within the Normandy format, comprised of Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016b, 173). Despite their commitments in the agreement, Russia did not return control of Ukraine's borders to the government in Kyiv, and Kyiv stalled on implementing self-government for the two occupied territories in the Donbas (Youngs 2021b, 171). Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, and the separatist leaders signed an accord in Minsk in February 2015 for another ceasefire (OSCE 2015). The Minsk II Protocol obligated Kyiv to amend its constitution to give the breakaway areas special status, stalling any progress towards peace (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 41). The EU Member States were critical of the Franco-German dominating influence. However, their lack of action, Youngs (2021b, 190) argues, effectively "ceded power to these two governments to limit their exposure to the crisis."

As part of the EU's response to Russia, it put a new EU-Russia partnership agreement on hold, barred Russia from international gatherings, withdrew aid to Russia from European institutions, and stopped military cooperation with Russia (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 39; Youngs 2021b, 173). The EU imposed sanctions on Russian officials involved in the annexation and those close to Putin, freezing their assets (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d,

39; Youngs 2021b, 173). When an international investigation determined that a missile used to down Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 in July 2014 originated in the separatist-controlled territory, the EU issued more sanctions against critical Russian economic sectors (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 39; Youngs 2021b, 171).

Many European governments viewed Russia's annexation of Crimea in Ukraine as a "turning point" for defense integration (Shalal 2017, para. 14). For Western countries, the occupation of Crimea was a challenge to the established international order based on the notion of sovereign states, each with its geographical boundaries. According to the rules-based system (Allison 2017, 519), war is not a viable solution to conflict. The Crimean annexation was a form of "indulgent" action because Russia no longer felt obliged to the international system regulated by the West (Lipman 2015, 124). Richard Youngs (2021b, 189) argues that the EU sought an expedient containment solution that was advantageous for Russia and, to some extent, Ukraine but forsook the long-term implications of weakening the European security order. Despite its protests against Russian aggression in the common neighborhood, the EU capitulated to Russian dominance in the EU's eastern periphery and approved the annexation of Crimea through its lack of action.

China

China's diplomacy rejects the liberal, rules-based system developed by the West, creating and establishing its institutions outside existing multilateral frameworks (Youngs 2021a, 37–38). For example, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), established in 2013, invests in and acquires infrastructure along vital trade routes to enhance its economic influence across the Eurasian continent (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 141). Chinese economic influence is growing in Europe, especially in eastern Europe, Greece, and Italy, through trade

relationships and BRI infrastructure investments not tied to satisfying liberal democratic criteria (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman 2019). Without these constraints, Chinese funding increased the likelihood of corruption and unaccountability among political leaders (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 142).

China's initiative to create a group of Central and Eastern European states, including 11 EU member states, to foster economic cooperation 16 + 1 (17 + 1) was seen as an attempt by China to sow division in the EU (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 141; Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 21, 24; Christiansen 2016, 43; Fallon 2019). China uses 17 + 1 to negotiate with countries with weaker economies, receiving preferential investment and economic terms and increasing its political influence over smaller European countries (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 141). These investments in European countries were critically needed, especially in Greece amid the sovereign debt crisis (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 141).

In 2016, the Arbitrational Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled for the Philippines, which had submitted a claim against China concerning disputed territory in the South China Sea (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019b, 131). Hungary, Greece, and Croatia spearheaded efforts to ensure that the EU would not mention Beijing in a statement on the South China Sea territorial claims (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 141; Fallon 2019; Norman 2016; Youngs 2021a, 49). These member states were concerned that the EU's recognition of the decision by the tribunal set a potentially undesirable precedent for later claims in which they would be involved (Norman 2016). Moreover, they were worried that recognition would sour relations with China, on whom they depend heavily for foreign investment (Norman 2016).

High Representative Mogherini, in the official response to the tribunal's declaration, said

> The EU does not take a position on sovereignty aspects relating to claims. It expresses the need for the parties to the dispute to resolve it through peaceful means, to clarify their claims and pursue them in respect and in accordance with international law, including the work in the framework of UNCLOS (Mogherini 2016).

China's influence over a subset of EU member states diluted the EU's response. However, the EU did not fully endorse the Chinese position of the inapplicability of UNCLOS, demonstrating some respect for liberal multilateral institutions (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 23). The EU has indirectly pressured China to change its behavior in the South China Sea by working on a code of conduct with Japan and ASEAN states for the area (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019b, 125; Youngs 2021a, 49). Nevertheless, China had taken hold of Europe with little resistance from the EU during this period.

During this period, EU-China relations were limited but primarily cooperative. The original 2003 strategic partnership was expanded in 2010 to include aspects of global climate change and global economic governance (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019b, 123). In 2013, the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation promoted multilateralism in several existing areas of cooperation, such as climate change and trade, and the new area of security (EEAS 2013b; Christiansen 2016, 42–43; M. Li 2016, 18; Youngs 2021a, 46).

Security cooperation was focused mainly on non-traditional security threats. On nuclear non-proliferation, the EU and China worked together on the Iran nuclear deal (JPCOA) (Dorussen, Kirchner, and Christiansen 2018, 303). They set up the EU-China Cyber Security

Task Force in 2012 after the Fourteenth EU-China Summit (M. Li 2016, 18). Their peacekeeping forces contributed to South Sudan and Mali missions (Dorussen, Kirchner, and Christiansen 2018, 303). China also participated in the EU-led antipiracy naval mission ATALANTA, off of the Gulf of Aden (Dorussen, Kirchner, and Christiansen 2018, 299, 303; M. Li 2016, 18). In crisis management, China and the EU began cooperation on disaster relief at the Twelfth EU-China Summit in 2009 (M. Li 2016, 18). In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the EU publicly expressed appreciation of China's humanitarian support in Haiti (Dorussen, Kirchner, and Christiansen 2018, 299). In 2012, the two sides launched the EU-China Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Project (M. Li 2016, 18; Dorussen, Kirchner, and Christiansen 2018, 299). The following year, they established the EU-China Institute for Emergency Management (M. Li 2016, 18).

Analysis

The aftermath of the global financial crisis took a toll on the EU's capacity to fulfill its self-appointed role as a normative superpower. Moreover, the effects of the GFC had a deeper impact on the West as a whole, limiting the potency of the liberal global order. Europe was confronted with its vulnerability continually during this period. Transatlantic ties continued to exist but were stressed in Libya. Less impacted by the GFC, China began to leverage its financial prowess to secure influence in Europe. Nevertheless, the EU continued to maintain a delusion of its former self as a normative superpower, culminating in tacit acceptance of Russia's annexation of Crimea.

I analyze Europe's strategic culture to understand Europe's strategic behavior, which often fell short of its goals. Through topic analysis of several corpora of documents from this period, I identify the dimensional properties of European strategic subcultures, producing

a snapshot of the emergent European strategic culture. To create this snapshot, I calculate the proportion of topics in which the dimension is present within a given corpus (See Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Period 3 Dimension Proportions in Corpora

Text Source	Proportion of Topics with Dimension	Dimension
Commission Press Releases	0.83	Civilian Power
Commission Press Releases	0.27	Multilateralism
Commission Press Releases	0.18	Projection
Commission Press Releases	0.08	Transatlanticism
Commission Speeches	0.57	Civilian Power
Commission Speeches	0.32	Multilateralism
Commission Speeches	0.41	Projection
Commission Speeches	0.07	Transatlanticism
Council Press Releases	0.72	Civilian Power
Council Press Releases	0.67	Multilateralism
Council Press Releases	0.33	Projection
Council Press Releases	0.11	Transatlanticism
EEAS Press Releases	0.38	Civilian Power
EEAS Press Releases	0.88	Multilateralism
EEAS Press Releases	0.75	Projection

Text Source	Proportion of Topics with Dimension	Dimension
EEAS Press Releases	0.46	Transatlanticism
Official Journal	0.82	Civilian Power
Official Journal	0.31	Multilateralism
Official Journal	0.06	Projection
Official Journal	0.04	Transatlanticism

Slightly more than a quarter of topics (0.27) from the Commission press releases addressed multilateralism. Concerning orientation towards the United States and NATO, 0.08 of the topics addressed transatlanticism. The normative projection dimension was in 0.18 of the topics. Finally, 0.83 of the topics addressed civilian power for this corpus of Commission press releases.

Almost a third of topics (0.32) from the Commission speeches addressed multilateralism. Transatlanticism was in 0.07 of the Commission speech topics. The normative projection dimension was in 0.41 of the topics. The Commission speeches addressed civilian power in 0.57 of the topics generated. Proportion differences, especially in terms of normative projection, between the Commission speeches and press releases suggest that different strategic subcultures pervade the institutional walls of the Commission.

Council press releases addressed multilateralism in 0.67 of the topics generated from its corpus. Of the topics from the Council corpus, transatlanticism was in 0.11 of the topics. Approximately a third (0.33) of topics concern normative projection in this corpus. Lastly, 0.72 of the topics generated from the council press releases addressed civilian power.

Multilateralism was in 0.31 of the topics generated for the Official Journal corpus. Only 0.04 of the topics for the corpus addressed transatlanticism. The normative projection dimension was similarly low, with only 0.06 topics addressing the dimension. Slightly over four-fifths (0.82) of the topics concerned civilian power.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) was established during this period, offering another observation point for European strategic culture. The EEAS corpus stands out among the corpora of this period with its relatively high focus on transatlanticism. This dimension is in almost half (0.46) of the topics in the EEAS corpus. Based on the EU's purported goal of "effective multilateralism," it is not surprising that the institution responsible for coordinating external action has a corpus with the highest incidence of multilateralism. Multilateralism is present in 0.88 of the topics of this corpus. Three-quarters of topics (0.75) concern normative projection, and 0.38 of the topics address civilian power.

The emergent European strategic culture across the corpora in this period had a dimensional profile with high civilian power, moderate normative projection, low transatlanticism, and moderate to high multilateralism. The main change from the previous period was the decrease in the EU's normative projection. The EU had shifted from a strategic culture of selective inclusivity to one of quixotic inclusivity.

The failures of the Libyan intervention stemmed from both material and ideational factors. The institutional design of the mandates created legitimacy issues, while material capability gaps prevented a truly European-driven response to the crisis. However, more insidious is how European strategic culture did not sufficiently adapt to the post-GFC

period. Europe continued to exert its soft power, as evidenced by the high civilian power in its strategic cultural profile. At the same time, the low level of transatlanticism helps explain that Europe was not fully embracing the leadership role envisioned by the US within NATO. Europe had come to take NATO and the American role within the organization for granted, so Libya did not provide the future model for transatlantic burden-sharing. The lower level of normative projection helps explain the EU's lack of follow-through on promoting liberal democratic norms outside the EU's borders. Indeed, Europe and America's approval of Qaddafi's ouster had profound implications for future relations between the West and authoritarian regimes, particularly Russia.

This period's strategic cultural profile helps explain the lack of progress by the EU in the common neighborhood, despite the "continuous mushrooming of fresh instruments" (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016d, 33). The EU sought to lure EaP states closer to its ideational orbit with the various AA mechanisms. However, the EU was headstrong in courting these states through its normative suasion and civilian power. The soft power of the EU was insufficient in the face of Russian threats to the physical security of the peoples of those states through military force and economic coercion, particularly in natural gas. As in Libya, Europe deferred to the transatlantic security framework, but the United States was in the process of its own retrenchment. The objectives of the EU, especially of the Eastern Member States, could have been better served by an autonomous European response. The EU helped to establish multilateral frameworks through the Minsk Protocols, but France and Germany, through the Normandy format, prevented full European engagement in the crisis.

China's threat to a multilateral, liberal democratic order was starting to take hold during this period. The topic models do not emphasize China during this time. When reviewing the topic-word distributions of the topic models for the EEAS and the Council, "China" as a word had a low probability of belonging to any given topic. When China had a high probability in the topic-word distribution for other corpora, it co-occurred with economic or trade-related words. Indeed, Europe needed a financial boost, and Beijing was more than willing to offer assistance at a cost. Europe still had to confront Chinese human rights violations, but financial ties to Beijing hollowed the impact of any response.

CHAPTER 6: Period 4 — Post-Brexit

Britons voted to leave the European Union on June 23, 2016, exercising their right to invoke Article 50 of the TEU. Europe lamented the loss, with French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and Frank-Walter Steinmeier releasing a joint statement saying

> The decision of the British people marks a watershed moment in the history of Europe. The European Union is losing not only a member state, but a host of history, tradition and experience, with which we shared our journey throughout the past decades (Ayrault and Steinmeier 2016, 1).

While Brexit was a matter internal to the functioning of the European Union, it also marked right-wing populism's capture of the UK. The decision stemmed from more considerable pressures affecting the whole of Europe and the West more generally.

The impact of the GFC continued to widen socioeconomic inequality, while socio-cultural pressure was fomented by the ontological threat to identity perceived from increased immigration (Berman 2021). For Europe, the Western intervention in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region that facilitated the Arab Spring movements amounted to a refugee crisis in 2015. The UK embracing populist politics had far broader implications because the UK was a pillar of the liberal democratic world order and a socio-cultural bridge between Continental Europe and North America within the transatlantic security community. Norms central to the liberal democratic order, including multilateralism, institutionalized international relations, and the applicability of human rights to all peoples, are challenged by the isolationist and nativist tendencies of right-wing populism. The spread of populist ideas would also take hold across the Atlantic with the election of Donald J. Trump.

America

President Donald J. Trump's election in November 2016 helped cement the grip of right-wing populism over the Western world (Inglehart and Norris 2016; P. Norris 2019). Trump's brand of populism promoted isolationism, nationalism, protectionism, and nativism (Cha 2016). The US was pulling back from the liberal democratic world order it helped design and develop after WWII. Trump sought to reimagine American engagement with the West and the world more generally through the lens of an "America First" foreign policy (Brands 2018, ch. 5). Instead of multilateralism, America would promote bilateral relations that were transactional to the benefit of the United States (Patrick 2018, 145). Trump embraced this transactional approach with European NATO partners, whereby satisfying specific defense expenditure pledges gains them continued US military guarantees (Erlanger 2018; S. W. Duke 2019, 134). This shift in relations by Trump struck at the very core of the transatlantic security framework by injecting doubt about America's commitment to protecting Alliance members. Trump further undermined confidence in the United States of Europe by holding the EU as a "foe" among the other adversarial powers of Russia and China (News 2018). Europe could no longer rely on NATO to match its interests in the best case scenario (Shalal 2017), and in the worst case, the commitment to collective defense could be empty.

In light of the wave of right-wing populism, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) idealism was pushed aside in the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) for a self-described "principled pragmatism" that is conscious of Europe's military capabilities limits, emphasizes Europe's security, scales back liberal democratic norm promotion by focusing more narrowly on human rights, and prioritizes a transformative agenda for

multilateralism (Biscop 2016a, 1–4; S. Duke 2019a, 27). The EUGS declares that "principled pragmatism" will underlie all of the EU's foreign policy, stating

> We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. In charting the way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis of rash interventionism, the EU will engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to contingency. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead (EEAS 2016, 16).

This guiding principle redefines the nature and scope of external action. Building upon the multi-dimensionality of the CSDP's "comprehensive approach," the EU envisions an even more integrated "joined up approach" that attempts to eliminate institutional "vertical and horizontal silos" (EEAS 2015, 3). Within this new approach, the EUGS expands external action effectively to all EU instruments and policies at all levels of governance, blurring the line between the "internal and external dimension" of EU policies (EEAS 2016, 11).

The EUGS catalyzed the norm of defense cooperation executed simultaneously at the supranational and Member State levels (Biscop 2016b, 441). The strategy demonstrates the EU's aspiration to take concrete action to "step up its contribution to Europe's collective security" (EEAS 2016, 9). It calls for the Member States, within their reserved competences, to engage in deeper defense cooperation to promote "interoperability, effectiveness, efficiency and trust" and to increase the "output" of defense spending (EEAS 2016, 20). While developing exclusive European defense, the EUGS recognizes that strategic autonomy must also contribute to and not detract from NATO in the spirit of complementarity (EEAS 2016, 20).

While the EUGS provided guidelines for a renewed European foreign policy, the EU needed to take concrete steps to strengthen its indigenous security capabilities to pursue its interests if those interests diverged from those of the US. To achieve these aims set out in the EUGS, the EU turned to the full activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a form of enhanced cooperation[54], from the Lisbon Treaty. PESCO had the support of the largest European Parliament party Group, the center-right European People's Party (EPP 2015, 10), and the Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker (Juncker 2017). France and Germany shaped this new form of European security cooperation and capability development (Ayrault and Steinmeier 2016, 4; von der Leyen and le Drian 2016, 76).

Twenty-three EU Member States[55], on November 13, 2017, signed a Notification to the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR) for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) as delineated in the TEU, Articles 42 (6) and 46, as well as Protocol 10 (Communications 2017; EEAS 2017). Participating states of PESCO bound themselves to develop military capabilities and increase defense budgets (Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017, 8). They further committed themselves to activities outlined in Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 10 of TEU, including enhancing interoperability among participating states and participation in multinational forces (Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017, 29).

PESCO governance is widely spread, covering the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the Politico-Military Group, and the High

[54] See Chapter 3 Post-9/11 for more on enhanced cooperation.

[55] Malta's government has not ruled out future membership, but it is cautious given its neutrality status (Flynn 2018, 75).

Representative in their relationships with CSDP institutions, such as the EEAS and EDA (Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017, 51). The High Representative, as head of the EEAS, Vice President of the Commission, and President of the EDA, is well-positioned at the center of PESCO governance, bridging EU institutions with security competences (Blockmans 2018, 1822; Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017, 51). PESCO states agreed (States 2017, Annex II) to participate in the voluntary Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) process, based within the EDA, to monitor the execution of defense spending commitments (Fiott 2017, 1; Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017, 45; Blockmans 2018, 1787). Participating states must submit annual National Implementation Plans on how they are fulfilling the binding commitments of PESCO to the EEAS, EDA, and participating states (European Union 2017, Article 3.2). The HR then provides an annual report to the Council, in the PSC format with PESCO states only, based on contributions by the EDA, per Article 7(3)(a) of the 2017 PESCO Council Decision, and the EEAS with its associated EU Military Staff (EUMS), per Article 7(2)(a) (European Union 2017; Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017, 32, 46). The EUMC, as a Council organ, advises the PSC in the evaluation process (European Union 2017, Article 6.3).

Participating states' commitments thus depend upon the transparency of compliance by their peer participating states (Blockmans 2018, 1821). These plans are similar to the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), where states must explain their failure to meet their objectives publicly to the other involved states, as well as to their domestic audience and national parliament (Biscop 2018, 163). Relatedly, PESCO also raises the reputational cost of leaving collaborative projects because states risk the ire of their fellow collaborators if they do not follow through on their commitments (Biscop 2018, 163). PESCO's

enforcement is ultimately undergirded by the severe penalty of removal from the group, as outlined in Article 46(4) TEU and elaborated upon in Annex III Section 2.1 of the 2017 Notification (States 2017).

Annex I, Paragraph 2 of the Notification declares that "PESCO is an ambitious, binding and inclusive European legal framework for investments in the security and defence of the EU's territory and its citizens" (States 2017). In the development of the PESCO, the participating states struggled to find a balance between the ambition of PESCO and its inclusivity. Led by the French, those who favored an ambitious PESCO believed a small subset of European states would be the best design. Not held back by members unable or unwilling to engage in defense cooperation, which was the historical experience with unanimity required for CSDP, the EU could act quickly and decisively. On the other hand, Germany led the perspective of an inclusive PESCO, bolstering its legitimacy with many members and reinforcing the prerogative of states to hold back on security and defense activities that do not align with their national interests.

Rather than presenting a binary choice to the other Member States, Berlin and Paris agreed to a compromise by applying a "modular approach" to enhanced cooperation in the field of defense (Blockmans 2018, 1812). PESCO's modularity is exemplified by its hub-and-spoke design, in which the Council serves as the hub, meeting the need for inclusivity, while states lead projects[56] in spokes, allowing for unrestricted national ambition (Blockmans 2018, 1812; Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017, 53). The spokes can thus "develop a modus operandi

[56] See the following Council Decisions for more details on PESCO projects (European Union 2018a, 2018c, 2018b, 2019, 2020).

sufficiently flexible to manage diversity but also sufficiently solid to generate tangible collective gains" (Fiott, Missiroli, and Tardy 2017, 53). Nevertheless, PESCO favors inclusivity over a French desire for a higher level of ambition (Biscop 2018, 164; Blockmans 2018, 1812; S. Duke 2019a, 32; S. W. Duke 2019, 131–32; U. E. Franke 2018). While PESCO sought to "streamline" decision-making, its size contributes to "bureaucratic delay and grandfathering in internal disputes that plague other collective EU mechanisms" (Biscop 2018, 164; Mercer 2018, para. 13). French disenchantment with PESCO's inclusivity likely spawned the French-led European Intervention Initiative (EI2) that has the form of a more ambitious PESCO (Biscop 2018, 168).[57]

Annex II commits participating states to increase defense investment to 20% of defense spending and increase spending on research and technology to 2% of defense spending (States 2017). To that end, Annex II commits the participating states to support the European Defense Fund (EDF) (States 2017).[58] In the EU budget up to 2020, there were two funding windows as part of the EDF. Through the Preparatory Action on Defense Research (PADR) mechanism, the research window provided €90 million in research grants for defense technologies from 2017 to 2020 (Commission 2017). The capability window offered €500 million spread across 2019 and 2020 through the European Defense

[57] On June 25, 2018, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom signed the letter of intent to form the initiative (Armed Forces 2018). It reflects the French preference for "multi-speed" Europe, allowing those most inclined to contribute (S. W. Duke 2019, 132). Indeed, the EI2 closely matched the French vision for PESCO as a vanguard of a select group of states that would serve as the foundation for developing operational forces (Biscop 2018, 164). The goal of forming a "strategic culture," which Macron set out in his well-known speech at the Sorbonne University in September 2017, was also reinforced by the letter (Armed Forces 2018, para. 6).

[58] Simon Duke (2019, 128) criticizes PESCO and EDF associated projects as not being "major weapons" programs, save for the Eurodrone project (European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System). Brendan Flynn echoes this criticism, arguing that PESCO and EDF have focused on relatively low-hanging fruit like joint defense procurement and new capability delivery (Flynn 2018, 75).

Industrial Development Program (EDIDP) (Commission 2017). For capability development, under Regulation 2018/1092 Article 11, the EDF through the EDIDP covers 20% of the cost for projects and offers the incentive of a higher rate of 30% for projects within PESCO, for all projects that meet the criteria in Article 6(1) (Parliament and European Union 2018). In 2018, the Commission proposed €13 billion for EDF for the 2021-2027 budget (Commission 2018). In light of COVID-19, the EU allocated €8 billion to the EDF over the same period (Commission 2020).

PESCO has highlighted the tension between European strategic autonomy and complementarity with NATO. This tension was particularly pronounced at the February 2018 Munich Security Conference. American officials expressed reservations about PESCO and the EDF because they believed these instruments could weaken NATO and hinder US military manufacturers' exports to Europe (Erlanger 2018). US permanent representative to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, warned that the United States did not want PESCO to become an EU "protectionist vehicle" that "could splinter the strong security alliance that we have" (Mehta 2018). She explained that the US wants "the Europeans to have capabilities and strength," but the US wants American defense products to have "fair" competition with European ones (Mehta 2018). The schism could be seen even within the Member States at the conference. German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel warned that Europe should avoid being a "vegetarian" in a "world of carnivores" (Economist 2018). Meanwhile, the German Defense Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, emphasized the desire to "remain trans-Atlantic" while also being "more European" on defense (Erlanger 2018). NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reminded Alliance members that the EU needs

NATO and even more so after Brexit, as 80% of NATO defense spending would come from states outside the EU (NATO 2018).

Russia

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014 signaled to the EU the lengths to which Moscow would go to secure post-Soviet states from what it perceives as the insidious influence of Europe's vaunted liberal democratic values. Moreover, Putin established that the rules-based world order was a Western product that did not need to apply to Russia or its areas of privileged interest stemming from the Soviet Union. The EU scaled back its previous zealous attempts to integrate Russia into the West. Moreover, the EU has implicitly ceded its influence over several Eastern Partnership (EaP) states to Russia. However, as seen in Chapter 5, the EU has supported the pro-European government in Kyiv. That support does not extend to recapturing rebel-held areas or retaking the Crimean peninsula. The EU effectively adopted a Cold War-like containment strategy, sacrificing states such as Moldova, Armenia, and parts of Ukraine to Russia's cordon sanitaire against the West.

Meanwhile, the EU keeps Ukraine and Georgia in its orbit. However, without the prospect of EU membership, as is the case in the Western Balkans, EU engagement is graduated from the Brussels core, much like EU-China relations towards the east. Also, similar to its China strategy, the EU prioritizes economic interests over its need to uphold European values. The EU's seemingly contradictory approach to Russia is particularly evident in the oil and gas trade.

The Russian National Security Strategy to 2020 highlights Russia's foundations of using "multivector diplomacy" with its "resource potential," including its energy resources such

as natural gas, to "reinforce [Russia's] influence on the world stage" ("Russian National Security Strategy to 2020" 2009, para. 9). However, Russia's "pipeline politics" with the EU is a relationship of mutual co-dependence, albeit a dependence often shifted in favor of Moscow. Russia sells most of its oil and gas to the EU, thus impacting the Russian budget (Siddi 2020, 8). Russia cannot quickly shift those exports to other markets due to the high cost of constructing other pipelines (Siddi 2020, 8).

Despite the political quagmire of the conflict in Ukraine, European demand for Russian gas rose during this period. Indeed, due to EU-Russia-Ukraine trilateral negotiations from 2014 to 2019, there was no repeat of the gas transit crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 (Siddi 2020, 7). The political difficulties with Russia were only one factor that shaped the European gas market. Conversion from coal to gas increased in some European states due to higher carbon pricing under the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme in 2017–2019 (Siddi 2020, 9). This increased demand from high carbon pricing and the closure of German nuclear plants increased pressure on natural gas to compensate for the difference in energy production (Siddi 2020, 12). Rising domestic demand was matched with declining production in the EU, resulting from the depletion of North Sea resources and production cuts in Groningen from associated seismic activity (Energy 2020, 3; Siddi 2020, 9; Westphal 2021, 3). Additionally, the weakening of the ruble against the US dollar increased the cost competitiveness of Russian natural gas (Siddi 2020, 9).

During this period, the EU began to view its reliance on one supplier, namely Russia, as a threat to the security of the Union and not merely an economic issue. This shift to understanding energy supply and production as security was made clear in the 2015

Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. One of the overarching goals of the strategy is the diversification of gas supplies. The strategy calls for the continued work on the Southern Gas Corridor to acquire gas from Central Asian states (Commission 2015a, 4), bypassing Russia. The EU committed to building new relationships, via its foreign policy, with gas-producing and transit countries, including Algeria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, among others, within the Middle East and Africa (Commission 2015a, 6).

The other overarching aim of the strategy is to build resilience in the European gas system. Energy security is a joint effort between the Member States and stakeholders within the energy industry (Commission 2015a, 5). The strategy calls for solidarity among the Member States during crisis management while also working regionally with Energy Community parties (Commission 2015a, 5–6). It commits the EU to seek Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) backup systems when crises threaten the gas supply in Europe (Commission 2015a, 5). When the Member States are dependent on one supplier, the Commission committed to finding mechanisms for collective purchasing that would neither violate WTO rules nor EU competition rules (Commission 2015a, 6).

The strategy also envisages a more significant role for EU institutions in the gas market, where the Member States had almost complete competence previously. It calls for the EU to "reframe" the EU-Russia energy relationship "when the conditions are right" to promote mutually beneficial "fair competition, environmental protection and safety" (Commission 2015a, 7). The Commission reviews Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) earlier in negotiations involving the Member States to ensure compliance with "internal market rules

and security of supply criteria" through the revision of the Intergovernmental Agreements Decision (Commission 2015a, 7; Parliament and European Union 2012). The strategy also calls for the Commission to ensure transparency of gas supply contracts that could "impact on EU energy security" through the revision of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation (Commission 2015a, 7; Parliament and European Union 2010).

In the post-Crimean annexation period, the Nordstream 2 pipeline has been a clear challenge to Europe's energy security, frustrating many of the aims of the Energy Union. Gazprom's Nordstream 2 is an $11 billion project set to meet this increased demand (Abnett 2021; Siddi 2020, 12). The route is approximately 1000 km shorter, more modern, and more efficient than the Ukraine pipeline (Westphal 2021, 3). The Yamal Peninsula's large deposits will be transported to Germany via an offshore route parallel to the already existing Nordstream pipeline via a 55 (billion cubic meters) bcm per year capacity pipeline across the Baltic Sea (Siddi 2020, 11; Westphal 2021, 3). The Nordstream 2 pipeline route will double the route's current capacity to 110 bcm per year, making it Russia's primary export route to Europe (Abnett 2021; Westphal 2021, 3).

In October 2015, Commissioner Arias Cañete's statement to the European Parliament declared that "the task of the Commission is to ensure that full compliance with the EU acquis is respected" in the implementation of the Nordstream 2 pipeline (Commission 2015b). In January 2016, the Commission's Legal Service advised in their legal opinion that the Gas Directive (Parliament and European Union 2009) did not extend to offshore or import pipelines from third countries (de Jong and Van de Graaf 2021, 500). A month after receiving the leaked confidential legal opinion, the Commission ignored it, claiming that the

Gas Directive extended to Nordstream 2 because Member States' territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) were involved (de Jong and Van de Graaf 2021, 500; Siddi 2020, 12). In June 2017, the Commission moved forward and asked the Council of the EU to allow talks with Russia about Nordstream 2, asserting that it was necessary to set up a legal framework (Siddi 2020, 12).

In September 2017, the Council's Legal Service did not concur with the Commission's assessment that there was a lack of legal framework or conflicting regulatory regimes and found that international law, notably UNCLOS, applied to Nordstream 2 in the EEZ of a state, so the Gas Directive did not apply to import or offshore pipelines with third states (de Jong and Van de Graaf 2021, 501). The Council's Legal Service viewed the mandate for negotiations as the Commission stretching EU law into areas of international law, which infringed on the rights of Member States to determine how to satisfy their energy needs (de Jong and Van de Graaf 2021, 501). The Legal Service of the Council claimed that precedents suggest that pipelines reaching the EU from third countries use the UNCLOS, whereas the Third Energy Package (Commission 2022), which includes the Gas Directive, only applies to pipelines on land within EU territory (Siddi 2020, 12). They held that the decision on the mandate was political; hence there was no legal basis for an EU-Russia agreement concerning the project (de Jong and Van de Graaf 2021, 501; Siddi 2020, 12).

In November 2017, the Commission amended its position to assert that, following the 2009 adoption of the Third Energy Package, the guidelines for ownership unbundling and third-party access extended not just to EU territory but also to EU Member States' territorial waters, contradicting the previous practice of regulating offshore pipelines starting from

where they reached land in the EU (Siddi 2020, 12–13). The Commission proposed revising the Gas Directive to ensure that the directive would apply to new offshore pipelines in the territorial waters of the Member States (de Jong and Van de Graaf 2021, 505; Siddi 2020, 13). The amendment proposal generated confusion and hampered the operations of Nordstream 2, consequently delaying the project (Siddi 2020, 13).

The Gas Directive amendment required the support of a qualified majority[59] of Member States (Siddi 2020, 13). Germany, France, and several other smaller EU members ensured a blocking minority before 2019 under the qualified majority voting (QMV) rule (Siddi 2020, 13). In February 2019, France abruptly declared its support for changing the Gas Directive. The change may likely have been part of a strategy to gain concessions from Germany on other non-EU matters (Siddi 2020, 13). Eventually, a text was agreed upon that applied the Gas Directive to EU territorial waters but left implementation and exception approval to the member state where the pipeline first lands, which needed to be agreed upon by the Commission (Siddi 2020, 13; Westphal 2021, 2). When the (European Union and Parliament 2019) amendment went into effect in May 2019, the Commission extended its regulatory authority over the internal market to previously unregulated pipeline projects (Siddi 2020, 13). The modifications became EU law, and the Member States must implement the changes by May 2020 (Siddi 2020, 13).

[59] A qualified majority vote (QMV) must have 55% of member states voting in favor and represent at least 65% of the EU population.

China

China has taken a global leadership role as the US pulled back from multilateral institutions during the Trump years. At the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos, President Xi Jinping portrayed China as a global leader within the liberal multilateralist world order, combating climate change through the Paris Agreement and promoting free trade (Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach 2019a, 25; Goodman 2017; Kroenig 2020a, 178). China's seeming embrace of the mantle of leadership did not necessitate a commitment to world order, not of its design. H.R. McMaster (2020) of the former Trump administration commented that China seeks to build a tributary system akin to that of imperial China, in which vassal states operated in peace subject to submission to the emperor. As mentioned in Chapter 5, China began to expand its influence globally through the Belt and Road Initiative during the previous period. Beijing established the China-CEEC group (16/17 + 1) to expand the BRI's economic and political influence in Central and Eastern European countries. In July 2019, Beijing demonstrated its influence in the region. Twenty-two countries signed a UN Human Rights Council letter condemning the repression of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang (H. R. Council 2019). Of the 18 European countries that signed the letter, only three were part of the China-CEEC group: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 142).[60] European countries that received considerable Chinese investment, including Greece, Hungary, and Italy, did not sign the letter (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 142).

[60] Lithuania left the China-CEEC in 2021 (Lau 2021).

In the 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook, the EU questions China's commitment to "fair and equitable global governance," finding its engagement with multilateralism and other liberal norms has been "selective and based on a different understanding of the rules-based international order" (Commission and Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019). The EU sent a strong message of disapproval in the Outlook by calling China an "economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance" (Commission and Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019). However, days later, on March 18, 2019, High Representative Mogherini (2019) identified China as a "comprehensive strategic partner." China's economic grip on Europe constrained Europe's need to legitimize itself as a bastion of liberal democratic values within a rules-based world order. On the other hand, Europe took an ambiguous stance toward China, seeing it as both a rival and a partner.

Europe's ambiguity towards China was particularly evident in the events leading to the initial signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). The agreement aimed to open Chinese markets to European firms while also providing China with access to critical European markets (Leggeri 2020). The CAI also addressed China's commitments concerning state-owned enterprises (SOE), transparency of subsidies, and rules prohibiting the forced transfer of technology (Le Corre 2021). On December 30, 2020, after nearly seven years and 35 rounds of EU-China talks, Beijing finally agreed to commitments on international labor standards, sustainable development, and climate change (Le Corre 2021). During the 2020 EU-China Summit, Beijing took a pragmatic approach and agreed to finish the CAI talks and ease tension between the two countries (Leggeri 2020). At the 2020 World Economic Forum in Davos, the European Commission said that China agreed to

"make continued and sustained efforts" on forced labor by pursuing the ratification of the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Forced Labor Convention (C029) and Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (C105) (von der Burchard 2020). However, China did not agree to ratify the ILO's Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (Le Corre 2021).

The American presidential electoral victory of Joe Biden over incumbent Donald Trump likely guided China's flexibility in reaching an agreement. Indeed, President-elect Joe Biden has committed to bringing together the United States and its allies to use "the economic might of democracies around the world" to counter the rise of China (Biden 2020; Le Corre 2021). At the same time, Europe's confidence in the United States has been damaged by Trump's "America First" foreign policy. A change in leadership did not guarantee the restoration of the previously held trust. Europe did not want to waste the opportunity to invest in China or receive investment from Chinese firms pursuing a united front against China with the United States. Indeed, a year earlier, Trump had completed Phase 1 of the United States' trade agreement with China (Le Corre 2021). China had already made its mark through the BRI, so it chose to pursue the deal despite the objections of the United States. The EU engaged in strategic ambiguity by reaffirming its value alignment with the US in an EU-US transatlantic agenda (Commission and Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2020) shortly after the American presidential election.

Overall, the EU believes that "economic and broader strategic interests can be neatly separated," a notion repudiated by Washington (Barkin 2021). The CAI demonstrates that Europe continues to respect Chinese commitments, unlike the United States, in the face of setbacks such as repression in Hong Kong and territorial disputes over the South China Sea

(Barkin 2021). However, the traditional approach of dividing policy areas may be weakening, given Poland's reticence to expedite the CAI negotiations in consideration of Biden's reservations about the deal and France's objections about the deal's impact on human rights in China (Leggeri 2020). In an interview with the Corriere dell Sera, Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Ivan Scalfarotto said that the EU was sending a "positive signal" to China with the CAI in light of its human rights violations, including the crackdown on Hong Kong and the treatment of Uighurs, among others (Fubini 2020). Most European Parliament members also said that they were willing to put pressure on China over the issues of Hong Kong and Xinjiang (Le Corre 2021).

While the EU has chosen to pursue further engagement with China through the CAI, the EU has paired this engagement with caution towards Chinese foreign direct investment. As Article 7 of China's National Intelligence Law states, "Any organization or citizen shall support, help, and cooperate with the state intelligence work in line with the law, and keep the secrets of the national intelligence work known to the public" (Helberg 2021, ch. 1). China's public-private hybridity (Berzina et al. 2019, 16) makes Chinese business interests an extension of the CCP. In light of this threat, the EU implemented a foreign direct investment screening regulation for investments in any Member State (Parliament and European Union 2019a).

The EU has also employed another parallel offensive to China's influence by offering an alternative to the BRI (Anthony et al. 2021, 2). The main instruments are the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) (European Commission and Innovation and Networks Executive Agency 2019) and Connecting Europe and Asia strategy (Commission and Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2018). Although the initiative only focuses on pulling Asian partners closer in alignment with the EU's values and goals for a rules-based order, safeguarding those countries from predatory Chinese policies (Youngs 2021a, 49). This initiative is small compared to the BRI, which has more than 140 participating states with considerably more funding (Anthony et al. 2021, 5; Youngs 2021a, 49). BRI funding now totals more than $200 billion, and some estimates suggest it will reach $1.3 trillion by 2027 (Brandt and Taussig 2019, 141). As for European countries outside the EU, China has exerted considerable economic influence unchecked by Brussels. For example, with an existing EU accession agreement, Serbia has become a "showcase" for Chinese investment outside the regulatory strictures of the aquis (Conley et al. 2020, 5). Indeed, Serbia demonstrated its ties to China when President Aleksandar Vučić called European solidarity a "fairytale" while praising China for being the only country to help Serbia at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (CGTN 2020; Hopkins 2020; Karnitschnig 2020).

Analysis

The shortfalls Europe experienced in the previous period in its external action had eroded the luster of normative primacy of the EU. The trials of the previous period also weakened the liberal global order more generally, giving room for the rise of right-wing populism in the West. Europe was forced to look introspectively at its own identity and purpose in this uncertain environment. This time of reflection pushed forward policies and instruments that seemed inconceivable in years prior, especially the implementation of PESCO. However, the threat of anti-Western authoritarianism from Moscow and Beijing grew as the strength of the liberal West was waning. Europe found itself more isolated within the West as the UK and the United States moved towards populism. As a result, it sought to

strike a pragmatic balance between its engagement with the West and the growing authoritarian powers of China and Russia.

I analyze Europe's strategic culture to understand Europe's new balance of liberal principles with realpolitik. I identify the dimensional properties of European strategic subcultures through topic modeling of relevant corpora, producing a snapshot of the emergent European strategic culture. The snapshot is captured in the proportion of topics in which the dimensions are present within a given corpus (See Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Period 4 Dimension Proportions in Corpora

Text Source	Proportion of Topics with Dimension	Dimension
Commission Press Releases	0.60	Civilian Power
Commission Press Releases	0.42	Multilateralism
Commission Press Releases	0.18	Projection
Commission Press Releases	0.04	Transatlanticism
Commission Speeches	0.49	Civilian Power
Commission Speeches	0.49	Multilateralism
Commission Speeches	0.32	Projection
Commission Speeches	0.07	Transatlanticism
Council Press Releases	0.35	Civilian Power
Council Press Releases	0.70	Multilateralism
Council Press Releases	0.22	Projection
Council Press Releases	0.12	Transatlanticism

Text Source	Proportion of Topics with Dimension	Dimension
EEAS Press Releases	0.06	Civilian Power
EEAS Press Releases	0.75	Multilateralism
EEAS Press Releases	0.75	Projection
EEAS Press Releases	0.19	Transatlanticism
Official Journal	0.74	Civilian Power
Official Journal	0.37	Multilateralism
Official Journal	0.11	Projection
Official Journal	0.02	Transatlanticism

Commission press releases addressed multilateralism in 0.42 of the topics. Transatlanticism was mentioned in 0.04 of Commission press release topics. The normative projection dimension was addressed in 0.18 of the Commission press release topics. Finally, civilian power was mentioned in 0.60 topics of the Commission press release corpus for this period.

Within the Commission speeches corpus, 0.49 of the topics addressed multilateralism. Commission speeches mentioned transatlanticism in 0.07 of the topics. Normative projection was addressed in 0.32 of the topics. Finally, 0.49 of the topics in the Commission speeches corpus concerned civilian power. The large 75% increase in transatlanticism and 78% increase in normative projection compared to the press releases suggests there may be multiple subcultures that permeate the institutional boundary of the Commission.

Of the topics generated for the Council press releases, 0.70 of the topics addressed multilateralism. Transatlanticism was addressed in 0.12 of the topics, and normative projection was mentioned in 0.22 of the topics. Civilian power was addressed in 0.35 of the topics within the Council corpus for this period.

For this period, the Official Journal corpus addressed multilateralism in 0.37 of the topics. Only 0.02 of topics from this corpus concerned transatlanticism. Regrading normative projection, 0.11 of topics addressed this dimension. Civilian power was addressed in 0.74 of the topics within this corpus.

EEAS press releases concerned multilateralism in 0.75 of the topics. Within the EEAS corpus of this period, 0.19 of the topics addressed transatlanticism. Normative projection was addressed in 0.75 of the topics. Only 0.06 of topics concerned civilian power for this corpus.

The emergent European strategic culture across the corpora in this period had a dimensional profile with medium to high civilian power, low to moderate normative projection, low transatlanticism, and moderate to high multilateralism. Normative projection continued to drop. However, the EEAS is somewhat of an outlier in terms of normative projection because it continued to maintain the same high level across periods 3 and 4. Nevertheless, all other proportions decreased for the EEAS. Moreover, results from the EEAS must be considered in the context of its treaty competences that are tied to other institutions such as the Commission and Council. The topic models for the Commission and Council either had a decrease in normative projection or stayed the same at a low level. The continued salience of normative projection in the EEAS corpus may be a function of the EU

expression of its principles in "principled pragmatism" while being more self-regarding in other areas of external action. Indeed, civilian power that had been high in all previous periods decreased, suggesting the more inward focus of the EU during this period. Instead of being quixotic in its inclusivity in the previous period, Europe embraced a strategic culture of guarded inclusivity.

The drive towards PESCO as a binding set of commitments was animated by a more European-focused strategic culture than in years past. Despite populist influences from the United States and the United Kingdom, Europe invested in deeper defense integration outside of NATO to maintain its internal democratic legitimacy. PESCO is a far cry from Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's vision of a "European Army" (Sparrow 2015), but it reflects the ideational and material constraints that form European strategic culture. From its inception, PESCO recognized the importance of NATO to European security and defense and that it should serve to complement the Alliance. Annex I Paragraph 3 of the PESCO Notification states that "A long term vision of PESCO could be to arrive at a coherent full spectrum force package-in complementarity with NATO, which will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defence for its members" (States 2017).

Nevertheless, the binding nature of PESCO reflects a genuine desire to have concrete measures from which to build a new security architecture for Europe. Indeed, French President Macron lamented that NATO, in its current state, is suffering from "brain death" (Economist 2019). The topic models for this period point to a lower salience for transatlanticism, reflecting Europe's guardedness towards the United States. Turning inwards, the EU elevated the importance of PESCO as an instrument of legitimacy. It

prioritized inclusivity of membership at the cost of state-level ambitions even within the hub-and-spoke framework. However, establishing the French-led extra-EU institution EI2 highlights the impact of latent strategic subcultures.

The resolve of the EU to engage civilian power was particularly evident in its eventual extension of the Commission's competence over the regulation of pipelines, including Nordstream 2, at the expense of the Member States' previous remit over the policy area. Even under a QMV voting rule, the Member States could push through the Gas Directive amendment. Furthermore, the EU's 2015 Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union also reflects the EU's shift towards conceptualizing energy not merely as an economic issue but also one with consequences for the security of the EU. Both the strategy and the amendment process are consistent with the EU's preference for multilateralism, seeking to find solutions through supranational institutions and legalized relations instead of military force.

As in the last period, the EU pushed Russia away diplomatically. Europe's need for energy outweighed the associated political and moral costs in terms of the gas trade. Indeed, American sanctions against European businesses, including the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA), and the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), were seen as a cost of doing business (Westphal 2021, 1–3). The Nordstream 2 project undermined the EU's legitimacy as a normative power because the pipeline could create drastic economic consequences for Kyiv. The pipeline will likely keep Kyiv from getting $2–3 billion per year in transit fees (Abnett 2021; Blank and Kim 2016, 32; Gabuev 2021; Siddi 2020, 14). A

weakened Ukraine can allow the eventual encirclement by Russia's sphere of influence. However, these risks to the EU are insufficient to undermine its self-identity as an advocate for liberal democratic values. Russian imports of gas and oil are part of ensuring the security of the Union, reflecting the pragmatism of its principled pragmatism. At the same time, Kyiv's relegation to only being a part of the Eastern Partnership instead of putting it on track for membership demonstrates how the EU lessens the priority of its spreading its values as it moves farther away from the Brussels core.

The EU's contradictory behavior towards China is puzzling. However, it is probably one of the most robust cases of the impact of European strategic culture shaped by principled pragmatism. The EU maintains its normative leadership role in promoting human rights. However, the strength of the EU's normative projection of its values on others has become a function of its material ability to project its influence. The EU has taken proactive measures against China from its core in Brussels, such as the investment screening mechanism. Though moving to the eastern edge of the Union, many Member States are part of the BRI and the associated China-CEEC system. Outside of the Union, even in periphery states seeking EU membership, the EU has allowed Chinese influence to take root. It only offered states to its east any alternative path to the BRI, leaving other countries in Europe's periphery open to Chinese influence. Concerning Beijing, the EU's ability to project its influence is minimal, so it has primarily supported the United States' policy positions toward China. For example, the EU continues to maintain an arms embargo against China. When the EU has deviated from the US on stances toward Beijing, it has done so subtly, as in the case of the South China Sea Arbitrational Tribunal award (See Chapter 5).

The EU finds itself in the precarious position of being situated between China and the United States. Brussels cannot abandon Washington in favor of Beijing or abandon Beijing for Washington. The US dominates NATO, and the EU shares the United States' values, though perhaps to a lesser extent now. At the same time, Europe cannot ignore the deep hooks of the BRI and China's influence on regions neighboring Europe. It has thus embraced strategic ambiguity towards both the United States and China. In an Orwellian fashion, they must hold the notion of China both as a rival and as a partner in a state of doublethink. However, the EU's position is still a position of strength as it does not need or want to choose sides. Indeed, the rivalry between China and the US pales in comparison to the binary division of the Cold War. The EU has used its regulatory powers to carve out alternative policies that match its values within its core and, to a lesser extent, in its semi-periphery.

CHAPTER 7: Conclusions

Emergence of Strategic Culture

European strategic culture is a distinct culture with unique qualities rather than a compound of Member States' strategic cultures. Recurrent interactions among strategic subcultures promote the organic development of a European strategic culture that does not need to conform to the EU's institutional measures. The national strategic cultures of the Member States may be convergent as they adopt similar ideas. However, this convergence is concurrent with and complementary to the creation of European strategic culture that transcends these national borders.

Strategic subcultures lack defined boundaries, overlapping in terms of groups and people engaged and security preferences. As a result, it is nearly impossible to refer to and describe one strategic subculture without referring to another. This interconnectedness is comparable to quantum entanglement. As micro-level interactions, these entanglements generate the manifested strategic culture that possesses properties that are effectively irreducible to the constituent components. Therefore, knowledge of any part or parts of the system is insufficient to understand the macro-level strategic culture.

Competition among strategic subcultures fails to adequately describe the nature of a strategic culture. Identifying what constitutes a strategic subculture leads to an infinite number of demarcations. It is unclear if a subculture may be a superset of other subcultures. A change in dominance suggests that an identified subculture is temporarily displaced by another subculture likewise identified. Furthermore, assuming the correct

identification of subcultures, determining when a fundamental and lasting transformation happened is virtually impossible.

When considering strategic culture as emergent, an act of observation collapses the potentialities of strategic subculture relations. Following this intervention, the strategic culture returns to a condition of "as if" all subculture relations are possible. At the micro-level, time duration is irrelevant because the observed snapshot of the emergent phenomenon is not linked to an identifiable underlying process of change. Instead, the total strategic subculture mixture forms the observed snapshot, exposing the impact of all strategic subcultures on the whole through non-additive interactions. Given the nature of these interactions, cooperative subcultural interaction is precluded, such as cultural convergence.

However, I only consider strategic subcultures "as if" they behave homologously to fundamental microscopic particles. Once a macro-level strategic culture emerges, it has properties ascribable to the whole. As a result, I shift my analysis to a macroscopic scale to take advantage of the benefits of parsimony and the potential for predictive analysis. I consider the macro-level relationship between strategic culture and strategic behavior to be causal in the classical sense, similar to third and fourth-generation strategic culture scholarship. When policymakers face a security challenge, they access the strategic cultural landscape at the time, shaped both by ideational and material factors, forming a snapshot of the macro-level strategic culture. While the snapshot formed varies with each challenge, general patterns are discernible in any form of a complex system (Holland 2014c, 10–11).

For strategic culture, general trends are usually a product of exogenous shocks to the material and ideational environment (Collier and Collier 2002; Gray 2009, 236).

The previous four chapters reviewed how the EU met various challenges to its security in the wake of system-level events. These challenges forced the evolution of the EU to become an increasingly impactful security actor over the decades of the post-Cold War period. Each shock—the fall of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 attacks, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and the post-Brexit populist moment—to the international system helped to form the strategic culture guiding the behavior of the Union as it met challenges both from within the West and from global powers with anti-Western agendas.

Results of Text Analysis


In each period following a systemic exogenous shock, I collected documents from various EU institutions, such as press releases, legal texts, and speeches, to identify topics within each corpus based on probabilistic unsupervised topic modeling. Each corpus reflects a combination of a period and the archive from which it was sourced. Each topic for a corpus comprises a collection of words clustered using algorithms based on word frequencies and co-occurrences. While strategic subcultures do not respect institutional boundaries, document archives are created by institutions and often siloed from other texts. Nevertheless, each corpus reveals a strategic cultural dimensional snapshot.

Based on "close reading" (Stulpe and Lemke 2016) of some reference texts and other materials outside of the corpora, I determined if a topic exhibited qualities consistent with four different strategic cultural dimensions. These dimensions include (M) Multilateralism, (T) Transatlanticism, (P) Normative Projection, and (C) Civilian Power. From this coding, I

calculated the proportion of topics within a corpus that exhibited the strategic cultural dimension. These proportions indicate roughly the salience of each of these dimensions within a corpus. Based on this dimensional profile, the nature of a given strategic subculture related to the corpus is approximated.


Transatlanticism remained low at less than 0.20 of topics generated in all corpora, regardless of the period (See Figure 7.1). The exception was in the EEAS's corpus in period 3, where transatlanticism was addressed in almost half of all topics. However, transatlanticism was more than halved in the following period's EEAS corpus, covering only 0.19 of the topics. Except for period 3, transatlanticism proportions were consistently higher in Commission speeches than in Commission press releases. However, the difference between the two period 3 corpora was only 0.01.

Figure 7.1 Transatlanticism Across Periods



Multilateralism was relatively consistent across time within any given corpus (See Figure 7.2). However, there was a notable fluctuation in the Commission speeches, with an extensive drop in the proportion of multilateralism topics from 0.58 in period 2 to 0.32 in period 3, which later rose to 0.49 in period 4. A less severe dip occurred in the Commission's press releases in the same timeframe, dropping from 0.36 to 0.27. However, it rose to 0.42 in period 4. The Council multilateralism topics dropped from 0.72 to 0.67 from period 2 to period 3. The EEAS has the highest proportion of multilateralism topics, with 0.88 in period 3 and 0.75 in period 4.


Figure 7.2 Multilateralism Across Periods



Normative projection was relatively low in period 1 (See Figure 7.3). The highest proportion of normative projection topics in this period was 0.29 within the Commission speech corpus. While the Commission corpora did not change much between periods 1 and 2, normative projection received considerable coverage from the Council at 0.55 of generated topics. The Council topics covering normative projection dropped steadily over the subsequent two periods, reaching a low of 0.22 in period 4. There was a notable rise in the proportion of topics devoted to normative projection within the legal corpus of the EU. The EPDB dataset had only 0.04 of its topics covered by normative projection, but this increased to 0.15 in the period 2 Official Journal corpus. The highest measured proportion

of topics devoted to normative projection was in both of the EEAS corpora. It was 0.75 of the topics in both periods 3 and 4.


Figure 7.3 Normative Projection Across Periods



Civilian power was consistently high during periods 1 and 2, reaching above 0.70 of the topics in every corpus (See Figure 7.4). The Commission's speeches corpus (0.49) and the Council's press releases corpus (0.35) declined to their lowest proportions in period 4. The most precipitous drop within Commission speeches was from period 2 at 0.83 to 0.57 in period 3. For the Council corpus, a considerable drop occurred between periods 3 and 4. The proportion of topics for civilian power was more than halved, going from 0.72 to 0.35. The EEAS also had a decline in civilian power between periods 3 and 4, starting at 0.38 and

ending at 0.06. The Official Journal corpora for periods 3 and 4 continued to show high levels of civilian power. The Commission's press release corpus also did not show an extensive decline in periods 3 and 4. However, it dipped below 0.70 of the generated topics in period 4.

Figure 7.4 Civilian Power Across Periods



In the first period, securitized topics made up 0.15 of both the Commission press releases' topics and the EPDB topics (See Table 7.1). The first period Commission speeches addressed security in 0.26 of its topics. There were slight increases in securitized topics between periods 1 and 2, with the most extensive increase occurring in the Commission speeches corpus, rising to 0.33 of its topics. More than half of all topics in the Council

corpus concerned security in period 2, and this level was mainly maintained through the remaining periods, reaching a maximum of 0.58 in period 3. Both Commission corpora continued to hover around 0.25 for periods 3 and 4. These measurements confirmed that the closer the associated institutions of a corpus were to external action, the more relevant texts it produced, shaping the ideational space for strategic decision-making. For example, the EEAS corpus had the highest level of security references, indicating that subcultures around the EEAS embraced the institutional mandate of implementing the EUGS's principles.

Table 7.1 Securitization Across All Periods in All Corpora

Text Source	Period	Proportion of Security-Oriented Topics
Commission Press Releases	1	0.15
Commission Press Releases	2	0.17
Commission Press Releases	3	0.23
Commission Press Releases	4	0.27
Commission Speeches	1	0.26
Commission Speeches	2	0.33
Commission Speeches	3	0.27
Commission Speeches	4	0.27
Council Press Releases	2	0.52
Council Press Releases	3	0.58
Council Press Releases	4	0.52

Text Source	Period	Proportion of Security-Oriented Topics
EEAS Press Releases	3	0.88
EEAS Press Releases	4	0.78
EPDB Documents	1	0.15
Official Journal	2	0.11
Official Journal	3	0.16
Official Journal	4	0.18

While the proportion of topics concerning security was below 0.20 of topics for legal texts in all periods, there was a general upwards trend in the proportion of securitized topics. This trend is shared with other corpora from institutions that are historically expected to engage in security discourse, such as the Commission. These measurements of the legal texts support the use of documents not explicitly identified as strategic for understanding strategic culture and securitization of discourse more generally.

Entangled Subcultures

The strategic cultural dimensional profiles of the corpora suggest that Europe's strategic subcultures' interconnectedness resembles entanglement. Across all periods, Commission speeches have always had a higher proportion of topics devoted to multilateralism and normative projection compared to the press releases. Except for period 3, transatlanticism was higher in Commission speeches as well. While both speeches and press releases were from the Commission, the differences over time between the types of documents reflect ideational heterogeneity within the Commission. The overall trend of having higher

proportions in several dimensions for Commission speeches suggests a higher level of ambition in external action.

Speeches are the products of speech-givers and thus may reflect individuals' ambitions. Given the vetting process of speech writing, other influences associated with the speech-giver may also be reflected that are outside of the Commission. In contrast, institutions produce press releases crafted to reflect the perspective of the whole institution. Given the preference for unanimous decision-making throughout EU institutions, the ideas in the press releases likely reveal agreement based on the lowest common denominator. At least in several dimensions, such as multilateralism, there is likely to be subculture overlap with other ambitious subcultures associated with the Council and the EEAS.

The introduction of the EEAS in period 3 helped reveal the impact of attempting to form strategic subcultures from existing ones. For decades, Europeans debated between intergovernmental and community-centric governance. At the 2003 Convention on the Future of Europe, big states pushed to put EU foreign relations under intergovernmental control (Trzaskowski, Osica, and Popielawska 2012, 84, 87). At the same time, smaller states wanted to increase the power of community governance by requiring the HR to be subordinate to the Commission (Trzaskowski, Osica, and Popielawska 2012, 84, 87). After the failed Constitutional treaty, community method advocates felt that the Commission should strongly influence the EEAS and have restricted engagement with the Council Secretariat (Barton 2012, 74; Trzaskowski, Osica, and Popielawska 2012, 89). Member States and the Council sought to form an EEAS close to the Council's Secretariat but with limitations on close links with the Commission, similar to the Lisbon Treaty's CFSP

restrictions on strong links between the Commission and the Council Secretariat (Barton 2012, 73; Merket 2011, 13–14).

Ultimately, the EEAS was formed into an interstitial institution (Bátora 2013), drawing on various EU institutions, particularly the Council and the Commission. The EEAS had to integrate three distinct cultures from the Council Secretariat, the Commission, and the Member States' diplomatic services (Merket 2011, 24; Zwolski 2012, 79). The EEAS's staff's originating institutions influenced their viewpoints, so they perpetuated these mindsets throughout the organization's design (Merket 2011, 24; Zwolski 2012, 79). Commission staff that dealt with development were organized into geographical and thematic directorates, while Council personnel were divided into civilian and military crisis management domains, such as European Union Military Staff (EUMS), Civilian and Conduct Capabilities (CPCC), and Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) (Blockmans and Laatsit 2012, 154–55; Merket 2011, 24; M. Smith 2013, 9).

Comparing dimensional profiles across institutions introduces some uncertainty to what is being compared. It is possible, for example, that the normative projection dimension has slightly different meanings depending on the institution. Given this caveat, the intentional transfer of Commission and Council Secretariat staff to the EEAS may mitigate this uncertainty.

In periods 1 and 2, Commission press releases had a higher proportion of topics covering civilian power, but this switched in periods 3 and 4. The higher civilian power proportions in periods 3 and 4 in the Commission press releases are paired with relatively low proportions in the EEAS for the same dimension. The EEAS also had high proportions in

normative projection and multilateralism. Similarly, the Council press releases shifted to lower proportions of topics covering normative projection in periods 3 and 4. However, this proportion was exceptionally high for the EEAS, at 0.75 of topics in both periods. These patterns may reflect a movement of strategic subcultures into the EEAS.

Discussion: European Strategic Culture Over Time

European strategic culture emerges from the complex system of strategic subculture interactions. While understanding the full extent of these interactions is infeasible, a holistic analysis of constituent strategic cultures can help reveal general patterns to approximate the whole nature of European strategic culture at a macroscopic level. Furthermore, as a complex system, European strategic culture's resultant emergence can be further approximated by considering the constraints of the environment. In the preceding four chapters, I used the data from topic models and more interpretive text analyses of key strategic documents to describe European strategic culture after systemic-level events in the environment. From this European strategic culture, I worked to explain the strategic behavior of the EU in response to the United States, Russia, and China.

In period 1, the EU was in a primordial phase, seeking a new identity after the fall of the Soviet Union. Indeed, after decades of being divided by the "Iron Curtain," Europe sought to define its role in integrating its eastern neighbors into its orbit. This ideational and material environment of the time shaped a strategic cultural landscape of naive inclusivity that struggled to address the 1990s wars in the Balkans without turning to NATO. At the same time, the EU, with varying degrees of success, brought Russia and China closer, if mainly in terms of economic relations. European leaders built on the institutional legacy of the European Economic Community, founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, when designing

the EU. Given its historical experience as an economic union, the consistently high levels of civilian power are unsurprising. However, period 1 in all other dimensions had some of the lowest topic proportions across the four periods. The corpora during the period support the notion that the dimensions of norm projection, promoting multilateralism, and transatlanticism were not as salient during the uncertainty of the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the security aims of the Union were primarily achieved through well-defined modes of interaction, principally trade negotiations.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shifted the perspective of Europe and the United States. Liberal democracy, as manifested in the West, was under attack once again. Instead of the identifiable threat of the Soviet Union and the global spread of communism, terrorists dispersed themselves through a vast network of non-state actors, carrying out attacks on civilian targets. NATO members united under Article 5 in response to the 9/11 attacks, but a clear divide formed between Europe and the United States about addressing non-traditional security threats in the twenty-first century. In general, the corpora from this period show an upward trend from the previous period in norm projection and relatively stable multilateralism and transatlanticism, producing a strategic culture of selective inclusivity. Europe's continued reliance on the United States through NATO for its security tempered the EU's zeal to promote democracy through "effective multilateralism." The EU's institutional innovations in pursuing its "comprehensive approach" in crisis management and "effective multilateralism" had little or no application, especially in the Battlegroups. The EU's enthusiasm for converting Europe into its image through the enlargement process did not fully appreciate the Russian perspective on these actions as threatening. Furthermore, it complicated relations with China in the same period, though to

a lesser extent than in Russia. Separating value-oriented policies from economic ones fostered a "honeymoon" period briefly during this period between China and the EU.

The global financial crisis precipitated the European sovereign debt crisis, challenging the EU's very existence. The eurozone was under threat, and a Greek exit from the Union seemed likely. Across the Atlantic, the United States faced financial woes, placing a more significant burden on maintaining its vast military presence worldwide. While the EU was suffering from an existential crisis, Europe remained ambitious in terms of spreading its values, cultivating a strategic culture of quixotic inclusivity. During this period, the introduction of the EEAS demonstrated an impressive resolve to continue spreading those liberal democratic values within a rules-based multilateral world order.

With almost half of all topics in the period 3 EEAS corpus covering transatlanticism, these press releases reflect the thawing of relations between Europe and the United States after the controversy of the unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003. Indeed, the EU was able to form a NATO response to the crisis in Libya in 2011. However, the United States sent a signal that they were not leading the process, which further highlighted the capabilities deficit of Europe, even with some United States involvement that fit within the EU's mold of "effective multilateralism." Similarly, in Ukraine, the EU was still championing its ideals and attempting to bring other parts of Europe closer ideologically, but they did not back this resolve with force. Instead of the integration processes that the EU started in the Western Balkans after their conflicts, Ukraine, particularly the eastern periphery, was ceded tacitly to Russia's political influence. The continued focus on civilian power of its strategic culture helped continue the practice of separating economic policymaking from

security and normative concerns, particularly with China. The EU's engagement with China as only an economic partner allowed Chinese investment to create divisions among the Member States, especially in Eastern and Central European states. Furthermore, Chinese investment has enabled schisms between pre-accession states in the Western Balkans and the EU, thus complicating the decades-long peace process of European integration in the region.

In period 4, the Trump administration attempted to distance the United States from the liberal world order based on rules and to narrow the United States' focus on American national interests. In particular, this retrenchment extended to making threats to the American commitment to NATO despite persistent free-riding by European NATO members who are not meeting their spending pledges on defense. At the same time, while not moving away from NATO, Britain was moving away from Europe. This process challenged the internal integrity of the EU and fostered doubt across the Union about the political aims of deeper European integration. Unlike the threats in the other periods, the threat to the EU from this rise in populism struck from within the transatlantic security community. The United States' actions put into question the meaning of transatlanticism, while Britain's actions questioned what constituted Europe as an idea. The EU assumed a strategic culture of guarded inclusivity within this environment, embracing "principled pragmatism."

There was a notable increase in multilateralism in the Commission corpora. As for the EEAS corpus, there was a large drop in transatlanticism and civilian power in EEAS press releases from the previous period. The EEAS corpus's dimensional profile is consistent with

the Union's move towards greater strategic autonomy through PESCO. While covering many topics related to civilian power, it is noteworthy that a decrease happened in all corpora. Indeed, the increased activity within the PESCO framework demonstrated the EU's shift towards using military force in its external action at the expense of using its traditional civilian instruments. The EU's engagement with China and Russia reflected a disconnect between economic relations and normative or political concerns. The EU's principled pragmatism has sought to balance, recognizing realpolitik while not forsaking its values. However, this balance has been challenging to maintain and sometimes requires mental gymnastics to consider China both a partner and a rival.

The EU attempted to maintain good relations with both China and the US in its trilateral relations, often to the point of contradictory behavior, as seen with the CAI signed in late 2020. Similarly, its trilateral relations involving the United States and Russia are frustrated by Nordstream 2's persistence. The tensions between the Member States over Nordstream 2 reflect the varying reliance on Russian energy, particularly in the case of Germany, where the pipeline makes landfall. Furthermore, the eastern Member States' historical and geographical proximity to Russia exacerbated the schism over Russian energy. When the EU countered against Nordstream 2, it did so by amending EU legislation. This behavior is consistent with a high proportion of topics in the civilian power dimension, especially within the Official Journal corpus.

Looking Forward

While a strategic culture's shape changes as strategic decision-makers use it, the general trends emanating from systemic level shocks can help explain future strategic behavior. Though the corpora of the study only address documents up to the end of 2020, the

insights drawn from period 4 can help explain and inform understanding of strategic behavior in the near to medium-term future.

Trump's "America First" foreign policy and Britain's exit gave the EU a clearer image of itself because it could define itself as separate from the US and the UK, weakening the construct of the transatlantic security community and, to a lesser extent, the historical-cultural ties of the West. With the rise of right-wing populism in the West, the geopolitical landscape has drastically shifted and will likely continue to migrate towards an increasingly multipolar world. On February 13, 2019, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (2019) commented on this trend, saying that "America First" is merely part of a broader trend of other states "putting their country first." In this changing environment, he says that the EU needs a "reality check" because holding fast to principles while turning away from power may make Europe "always right, but it will seldom be relevant" (Rutte and Algemene Zaken 2019). Europe's "principled pragmatism" of the past few years indicates that the EU is headed in the right direction in its foreign policy. However, concrete action to ensure the security and influence of Europe in a world of great power competition must accompany these aspirations.

The Trump administration had an uneasy relationship with Europe. It was, therefore, unsurprising to see that European leaders anticipated a thaw in relations with the incoming Joe Biden presidency. A Biden administration was a signal that the United States would reengage with the global multilateral order from which Trump had withdrawn. Even though fully supported by the administration, this re-engagement did not necessarily mean that America could return to its former geopolitical position. While Trump is no longer in

office, the populist sentiment he leveraged to gain power did not leave with him. Isolationist populism will eventually come back into power, and it need not be in the form of a Trump reelection.

The United States has sown further doubt in Europe. During the summer of 2021, the United States unilaterally withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. This withdrawal continued the signal of American retrenchment at the expense of its European partners. In response to the withdrawal, European Commissioner Thierry Breton (2021) lamented Europe's dependence on Washington and declared that "European defence is no longer an option;" it is necessary. In September 2021, without consulting its French allies, the US sabotaged the French agreement to supply nuclear submarines to Australia. It formed the AUKUS agreement (House 2021), in which the United States and the UK agreed to provide the submarines instead. The AUKUS announcement coincided on the same day with the announcement of the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy (European Union 2021). The day before, President Ursula von der Leyen, in her State of the Union speech, had introduced new defense measures (von der Leyen 2021). These actions projected the notion that the United States did not value Europe's preferences.

Both Russia and China are actively working towards promoting their worldviews in opposition to the liberal democratic rules-based order of the West. However, they are increasingly working together towards anti-Westernism. Some of the early forms of this alignment took the form of Beijing using Moscow's disinformation hybrid warfare tactics

(Brandt and Taussig 2020). China uses its Wolf Warrior[61] diplomats for its disinformation campaigns, relying on anti-Western media outlets, predominantly Russian and Venezuelan, to confuse and deflect criticism against China (Brandt and Schafer 2020). These diplomats actively seek the attention of the Russian state-owned media outlet RT by tagging and retweeting its coverage of other Chinese officials' statements (Brandt and Schafer 2020). Beijing, like Moscow, uses its platforms to promote conspiracies to create the illusion that there is no objective truth (Brandt and Schafer 2020). Their goal is not to persuade people to agree with them but to denigrate the West to sour relations between European and North American countries (Brandt and Schafer 2020). While China and Russia pose their unique threats to the EU, their ideological move toward each other in terms of anti-Westernism presents a severe challenge to Europe in light of the fractures formed in the West by Brexit and Trump's foreign policy.

While at the 2022 Winter Olympics, Putin met with Xi to discuss the two countries' shared global and regional concerns (Rajagopalan 2022). Following these discussions, Russia and China issued a joint statement on February 4, 2022 (Office 2022), expressing their desire to collaborate to build a new world order based on their respective perspectives on human rights and democracy (Munroe, Osborn, and Pamuk 2022). In the statement, they obliquely referred to the West, saying that "certain states" have "imposed their own 'democratic standards' on other countries" and, in so doing, threaten stability and peace regionally and

[61] Zhao Lijian, a senior Foreign Ministry official, is typically credited with pioneering Wolf Warrior diplomacy through his aggressive messaging on social media (Brandt and Schafer 2020; Shepherd 2020). The term "Wolf Warrior" diplomacy comes from an eponymous nationalistic film in which a retired Chinese commando, called the Wolf Warrior, saves the day with the help of the People's Liberation Army (Economist 2020; Mitchell 2020). Wolf Warrior diplomacy stems from the CCP leadership calling for a "fighting spirit" across China, including its diplomatic actions, in reaction to the criticism of human rights issues in Xinjiang and the handling of protests in Hong Kong (Hille 2020).

globally" (Office 2022). At the same time, Beijing and Moscow committed to working together more against the West in the face of standoffs in Ukraine and Taiwan (Nichols and Pamuk 2022). Their "friendship" had "no limits," they declared, and there were "no 'forbidden' areas of cooperation" (Office 2022). The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is putting this friendship to the test. Beijing has not condemned Russia's actions in these early stages of the conflict. When Moscow rejected a UN Security Council draft resolution denouncing Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 25, 2022, China abstained from the vote, joined by India and the United Arab Emirates in abstaining (Fassihi 2022).

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine likely marks a fundamental shift in great power relations between the liberal democratic West and the authoritarian Sino-Russian axis. Indeed, two days after Russia invaded Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a defense "Zeitenwende" (a watershed moment) in which he promised €100 billion for Germany's military (Ruge and Shapiro 2022). These events may even mark the end of Europe's emergent strategic culture of guarded inclusivity. NATO, not the EU, was the ready option to lead European security in this time of crisis. The relevance of the Alliance continues to increase as EU members Finland and Sweden, both traditionally neutral countries, seek to join NATO in May 2022 in the face of an aggressive Russia. However, more data is needed to determine the full impact of Russia's actions in Ukraine.

Strategic autonomy continues to be relevant in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine as Europe is turning more toward the United States and NATO. European leaders, under the French EU presidency, issued the Versailles Declaration on March 11, 2022, reaffirming the

Union's commitment to "increase its capacity to act autonomously" and that a "stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defense" complements the transatlantic security architecture of NATO (E. Council 2022, 3). Moreover, the Declaration underscored the collective defense commitments incorporated in TEU Article 42(7) (E. Council 2022, 3), which the EU incorporated with the integration of the WEU into the EU.

In a March 2022 interview with Foreign Policy, Italian General Claudio Graziano, who serves as Chairman of the EUMC, asserted that a "defense union is really the only possible answer to this crisis"(Braw 2022). He explains that the 5,000 troop EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, launching in 2025, as outlined in the Strategic Compass (EEAS 2022, 25, 50), is an "effort to answer a security need without competing with NATO" (Braw 2022). This endeavor seeks to address strategic enabler gaps that NATO usually fills, including "strategic airlift, space communication assets, amphibious capabilities, medical assets, cyber defence capabilities and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities" (EEAS 2022, 50).

Indeed, the French version of strategic autonomy put forth by Macron (2017, 2019; 2018) includes EU rapprochement with Russia, folding Russia into the civilizational tapestry of Europe, combined with protectionist tendencies. This vision has likely "crashed and burned" for now (Szewczyk 2022). Macron's past attempts to make peace with Putin and his failure to implement the Minsk accords call into question his leadership in the EU (Herszenhorn and Barigazzi 2022). Nevertheless, Macron was reelected on April 24, 2022, in a run-off election against Marie Le Pen, holding off at the moment the rising right-wing populist sentiment headed for the Palais de l'Élysée. Furthermore, after Brexit, France is

the only permanent member of the UN Security Council and the only nuclear power in the EU, giving it tremendous diplomatic leverage (Herszenhorn and Barigazzi 2022). Despite these conditions, Macron will need to tone down his rhetoric, especially on strategic autonomy (Herszenhorn and Barigazzi 2022).

The notion of strategic autonomy and its near-synonym, the concept of strategic sovereignty (Leonard and Shapiro 2019; von Ondarza and Overhaus 2022), varies considerably across the Union, especially in terms of Europe's relationship with the United States and the openness of the Union to third countries (U. Franke and Varma 2019). Economically liberal EU Member States with strong transatlantic ties are adverse to Macron's version of "strategic autonomy," because they are concerned it is a repackaging of "dirigisme" and protectionism that offers the solution to "buy French"(Leali and Moens 2022). Alternatively, Dutch Prime Minister Rutte advocates for "open strategic autonomy" that stresses the importance of keeping the European economy open while seeking to reduce dependence on particular countries (Leali and Moens 2022), a position supported by EU Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis and the upcoming presidencies of Sweden and the Czech Republic (Moens 2022). Strategic autonomy may not look like what Macron envisioned in his first term, but the debate over the nature and leadership of European security is not over.

Europe ultimately needs to assess its defense relationship with the United States critically. While some criticize strategic autonomy as unobtainable, an "illusion" in German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer's words (2020), the notion that America is irreplaceable is damaging to the long-term security of Europe. Reducing dependence is the

key to resiliency, as the supply chain crises from the earlier global pandemic and the current Ukraine War have demonstrated. The United States' aims align with Europe's, but American actions indicate a more aggressive position on China. In terms of Russia's military threat in the common neighborhood, the United States' reluctance to engage militarily past the line marking the edge of the NATO alliance shows that there are limits to American security guarantees even on the European continent. The devastation of the current Ukraine crisis does not seem to be leading to an out-of-area deployment of NATO as in the 1990s Yugoslav wars. Indeed, the risks of intervention are much higher with the threat of the Russian nuclear arsenal and the United States' weaker geopolitical position in the 21st century.

Europe must continue to invest in developing military capabilities, especially strategic enablers that allow for the deployment of forces farther away and for more extended periods. The EU Rapid Deployment Capacity is a promising step in that direction. Nevertheless, the endeavor of making the EU an autonomous security actor will likely be generational (Ruge and Shapiro 2022). Given the time and effort needed to achieve complete autonomy in security and defense, Europe must invest now or potentially no longer set rules in a liberal world order of its making.

The evolving global order will test Europe's resolve to be more autonomous and promote its values in its current strategic cultural landscape in the near term. While the EU is not a dominant global power in many areas, it commands considerable influence economically and normatively. It should leverage these strengths to mitigate Europe's risks from both China and Russia. The EU enjoys almost unparalleled influence in its regulatory capacity in

terms of economics. Its ability to set standards for commerce, health, and numerous other areas of human life has been called the “Brussels Effect” (Bradford 2020).

For example, the EU should continue to forge a digital path separate from the United States and the techno-authoritarian visions of the world (Polyakova and Meserole 2019). The European vision of digital sovereignty (Bendiek and Schallbruch 2019) that is neither the American capitalist model of technology nor the state-controlled versions of China and Russia can ensure that Europe’s liberal democratic values, particularly regarding privacy, are part of the future digital landscape. The EU should continue its initiatives to advance this third path, such as the GAIA-X cloud computing federation of private entities and the Member States (McKay 2021), to ensure European data protection within Europe’s borders. Additionally, cybersecurity measures within the 2022 Strategic Compass [eeasStrategicCompassEU2021], 2019 Cybersecurity Act (Parliament and European Union 2019b), and the 5G Toolbox (CG 2020) are helping to forge Europe’s digital path.

In the near to medium-term, the EU needs to use its adeptness at multilateralism to counter Russia, China, and the growing Sino-Russian front. Indeed, the pressure exerted by sanctions against Russia during the 2022 Ukrainian conflict shows that Europe is leveraging that strength. Europe is showing how the rules-based world order it upholds is more than a compendium of words on pieces of paper. Europe’s lacking military capabilities make a direct confrontation with Russia, at least without NATO, not a plausible option. It can weaken Russia’s position by confronting its ally, China.

In this area, Europe can align with an interested United States. The EU should seek to support further the narrative of the liberal democratic West against authoritarianism. To

that end, Europe can push for the formation of the D-10 (Democracies-10), which would include all the G7 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, United States, EU), plus South Korea and Australia (A. Council 2020). Through their shared democracy, this group will send a clear signal of unity among the states of the West. Additionally, Europe, along with the democracies of the West, can work to provide a comparable program or programs to compete with the BRI. China's economic grip on Eastern Europe and the larger developing world builds legitimacy for its authoritarian viewpoints, which Russia essentially shares.

The most recent attempt to offer an alternative in 2021 was Global Gateway, based on the Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, establishing the Global Build Back Better program (G7 2021). Global Gateway will seek to raise €300 billion in investments between 2021 and 2027 (Commission and Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2021, 3). The EU hopes to "crowd-in" private spending by putting forward public funds similar to the earlier Juncker Plan for EU infrastructure (Commission and Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2021, 9; Pop 2021). Global Gateway seeks to demonstrate the benefits of democratic values. The investment strategy says that democratic values create "certainty and fairness for investors, sustainability for partners and long-term benefits for people around the world" (Commission and Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2021, 3). The EU will design Global Gateway projects in "close cooperation and consultation" with partner countries while also considering its own "strategic interests" (Commission and Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2021, 3). The EU wants to create a climate-neutral "viable and attractive alternative" to non-European investment, especially the BRI, with

"fair and favourable terms" that attempt to "forge links and not create dependencies" (Commission and Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2021, 1, 4).

However, this endeavor is still modest compared to the $50-100 billion per year spent with the BRI (Dollar 2020). Moreover, the EU should not be helping China's influence grow by letting countries become hostage to Chinese debt when Montenegro's plea for debt relief from the EU was unheeded in 2021 (Hopkins 2021; von der Burchard 2021). The EU must work today, embracing its newfound pragmatism, to help secure Europe, promote its values, and avoid being pushed out of relevance in the coming decades by other powers.

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APPENDIX A

The datasets generated and analyzed during the current study are available from the author on reasonable request.

Topic Labels

Period 1 Commission Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
23	0.062	aid, humanitarian, ecu, food, echo, people, refugees
29	0.043	policy, development, communication, environment, action, europe, economic
7	0.042	development, programme, regional, community, regions, local, urban
5	0.041	council, community, proposal, adopted, parliament, treaty, agreement
19	0.040	market, operation, joint, venture, company, active, services
40	0.038	assistance, cooperation, economic, support, president, political, process
37	0.036	trade, agreement, cooperation, countries, negotiations, relations, economic
2	0.035	aid, scheme, investment, regional, project, development, eligible
13	0.033	aid, decision, decided, granted, authorities, article, measures
43	0.033	programme, training, projects, support, smes, development, project
9	0.029	conference, de, europe, president, education, university, people
4	0.028	market, products, steel, operation, company, joint, markets

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
31	0.027	ecu, budget, community, total, funds, fund, financial
38	0.026	directive, eec, legislation, waste, court, decided, failure
24	0.026	aid, restructuring, steel, coal, capacity, shipbuilding, industry
14	0.023	social, employment, labour, women, people, training, workers
34	0.022	court, law, france, article, justice, treaty, opinion
8	0.020	market, single, information, internal, consumer, national, protection
11	0.018	italian, restructuring, company, capital, aid, plan, ff
26	0.018	animal, bse, food, animals, scientific, products, risk
35	0.018	transport, air, road, traffic, maritime, safety, rail
32	0.017	sweden, market, company, swedish, paper, joint, companies
42	0.016	fraud, management, financial, staff, control, customs, report
33	0.016	economic, growth, gdp, stability, programme, government, policy
36	0.016	market, merger, investigation, competition, joint, position, parties
46	0.015	health, safety, protection, information, action, public, commissioner
12	0.015	wto, trade, japan, japanese, market, industry, dispute
18	0.015	competition, agreements, rules, regulation, exemption, companies, agreement
17	0.015	research, programme, scientific, technology, technologies, projects, europe

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
30	0.015	countries, europe, eastern, central, phare, accession, candidate
15	0.014	rural, agricultural, agriculture, development, fischler, farmers, leader
20	0.014	market, markets, austria, products, competition, position, parties
28	0.014	tax, vat, taxation, customs, community, system, arrangements
44	0.014	products, industry, product, industrial, market, trade, marketing
41	0.013	telecommunications, services, mobile, operators, networks, network, communications
47	0.013	market, price, prices, production, producers, tonnes, increase
1	0.013	water, environmental, pollution, quality, environment, emissions, waste
16	0.013	financial, insurance, capital, investment, companies, market, directive
25	0.013	energy, electricity, gas, nuclear, supply, power, oil
21	0.012	information, media, television, society, internet, audiovisual, digital
39	0.011	german, germany, land, dm, ag, berlin, länder
3	0.011	fisheries, fishing, sea, fish, stocks, measures, vessels
45	0.010	euro, banks, bank, payment, currency, payments, national
6	0.010	projects, project, total, ecu, water, waste, de
10	0.010	decision, cartel, market, fines, price, competition, companies
27	0.010	public, contracts, contract, procurement, official, authorities, journal
22	0.008	service, services, public, post, competition, deutsche, postal

Period 1 Commission Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
23	0.062	echo, echo's, médecins, sudan, icrc, wfp, zaire
29	0.043	sustainable, communication, debate, challenges, policy, policies, strategy
7	0.042	spd, subprogramme, httpinforegioeceuropaeu, erdf, interreg, millan, barnier
5	0.041	convention, parliament, council, maastricht, consultation, intergovernmental, treaties
19	0.040	allianz, generali, thomsoncsf, suez, agf, alsthom, bol
40	0.038	broek, macrofinancial, patten, peace, democracy, donors, euromediterranean
37	0.036	asean, eujapan, asem, ldcs, china, euchina, asia
2	0.035	intensity, scheme, nge, gross, intensities, map, eligible
13	0.033	pta, pesetas, spanish, parafiscal, incompatible, nn, basque
43	0.033	smes, training, pilot, sme, enterprises, enterprise, tacis
9	0.029	monnet, erasmus, lingua, netdys, charlemagne, materielle, jean
4	0.028	alcan, vaw, norf, hüls, precast, rheinbraun, frantschach
31	0.027	ecu, budget, appropriations, fund, funds, allocated, structural
38	0.026	hunting, directive, failure, wild, birds, eec, transpose
24	0.026	yards, shipyards, sket, shipyard, sonderaufgaben, vereinigungsbedingte, gröditzer

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
14	0.023	gender, employability, nap, employment, labour, equality, unemployed
34	0.022	nationals, residence, reasoned, diplomas, movement, freedom, judgment
8	0.020	commerce, electronic, internal, single, scoreboard, consumer, patent
11	0.018	cmf, lit, ff, injection, mezzogiorno, italian, injections
26	0.018	ssc, tse, svc, srm, srms, pdo, pgi
35	0.018	airspace, icao, brenner, maritime, airports, rail, passengers
32	0.017	kapital, tccc, newsprint, cinven, flextronics, ica, scancem
42	0.016	antifraud, fraud, uclaf, staff, officials, transit, posts
33	0.016	deficit, gdp, inflation, growth, stability, convergence, macroeconomic
36	0.016	boeing, exxon, hutchison, shell, bp, boeing's, stena
46	0.015	communicable, smokers, racism, smoking, asylum, nonsmokers, sexual
12	0.015	fsc, dispute, japanese, korean, acea, antidumping, gatt
18	0.015	fia, block, miert, exemption, clauses, uefa, agreements
17	0.015	genome, genes, esprit, cern, proposer, briteeuram, researchers
30	0.015	slovenia, estonia, lithuania, ceecs, slovak, romania, latvia
15	0.014	suckler, cap, setaside, rural, farmers, agricultural, olive
20	0.014	totalfina, fyffes, nestlé, lyocell, vps, nappies, rewe
28	0.014	scrivener, excise, vat, taxation, tax, taxes, taxable
44	0.014	ecolabel, clothing, textiles, textile, medicinal, marketed, foodstuffs

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
41	0.013	telephony, unbundling, telecom, wrc, mobile, unisource, telecoms
47	0.013	quota, bananas, tonnes, sugar, quotas, producers, rice
1	0.013	bathing, ozone, sulphur, nitrates, pollution, pollutants, bjerregaard
16	0.013	securities, insurance, supervisory, pension, prudential, supervision, accounting
25	0.013	electricity, renewables, interconnector, energy, renewable, nuclear, gas
21	0.012	broadcast, widescreen, kirch, rtl, rightholders, dbox, egovernment
39	0.011	pomerania, saxony, westlb, bavaria, nmh, thuringia, bremen
3	0.011	cod, catches, tacs, nafo, hake, tac, whiting
45	0.010	banknotes, coins, changeover, franc, crédit, currencies, lyonnais
6	0.010	lifenature, lifeenvironment, façade, lifethird, park, athos, acropolis
10	0.010	taca, champalimaud, brewers, interbrew, cartel, taa, fines
27	0.010	microsoft, tender, procurement, contracts, contract, journal, tenders
22	0.008	poste, mail, postal, post, service, parcel, dpag

Period 1 Commission Speeches Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
17	0.070	social, employment, economic, labour, policy, people, jobs
18	0.044	agricultural, rural, agriculture, policy, farmers, development, market
29	0.043	euro, economic, monetary, currency, emu, financial, growth

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
12	0.038	parliament, council, report, committee, financial, management, proposal
14	0.037	region, cooperation, russia, economic, mediterranean, political, process
10	0.036	market, tax, single, financial, services, taxation, directive
32	0.036	treaty, europe, national, debate, community, political, rights
11	0.035	information, internet, services, society, europe, access, digital
27	0.035	enlargement, countries, candidate, council, negotiations, progress, europe
24	0.035	business, companies, europe, smes, enterprises, innovation, businesses
28	0.035	women, rights, racism, human, people, action, equality
13	0.034	food, safety, consumers, health, consumer, scientific, bse
1	0.032	development, countries, cooperation, policy, international, support, economic
30	0.031	trade, wto, countries, round, investment, rules, developing
34	0.031	countries, eastern, europe, accession, enlargement, central, economic
22	0.029	energy, market, gas, policy, electricity, climate, emissions
2	0.029	development, regions, policy, structural, local, funds, regional
33	0.028	transport, air, road, traffic, public, safety, infrastructure
16	0.028	europe, policy, security, common, world, political, foreign
31	0.028	competition, market, rules, policy, national, markets, companies
19	0.028	humanitarian, international, aid, conflict, community, human, people

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
21	0.026	trade, economic, japan, world, europe, asia, political
7	0.025	europe, people, society, world, countries, political, future
26	0.024	environmental, environment, sustainable, development, policy, industry, economic
23	0.022	trade, wto, negotiations, agriculture, countries, round, market
6	0.022	tourism, sector, industry, development, cultural, europe, audiovisual
20	0.022	education, research, europe, training, cooperation, learning, crime
5	0.020	community, economic, community's, maastricht, countries, ec, market
25	0.020	environmental, environment, local, sustainable, programme, action, cities
9	0.019	europe, uk, british, britain, single, market, national
3	0.019	health, community, public, policy, tobacco, information, people
15	0.016	consumer, consumers, market, community, protection, information, single
4	0.013	china, europe, hong, economic, kong, wto, asia
8	0.010	industry, maritime, shipping, fisheries, transport, sea, ports

Period 1 Commission Speeches FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
17	0.070	employment, unemployment, social, labour, workers, workforce, unemployed
18	0.044	cap, farmers, farming, dairy, countryside, cereals, rural

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
29	0.043	euro, emu, changeover, currencies, monetary, coins, inflation
12	0.038	fraud, court, staff, uclaf, auditors, report, parliament
14	0.037	turkey, russian, euromediterranean, russia, mediterranean, albania, turkish
10	0.036	pension, tax, taxation, vat, insurance, crossborder, pensions
32	0.036	sport, charter, treaties, parliaments, igc, nice, constitutional
11	0.035	eeurope, internet, mobile, online, digital, signatures, ecommerce
27	0.035	candidate, enlargement, enlarged, nice, acquis, prodi, chapters
24	0.035	smes, enterprise, entrepreneurs, enterprises, entrepreneurship, innovation, ict
28	0.035	racism, disabilities, discrimination, equality, women, disability, women's
13	0.034	bse, gm, bone, food, meat, gmos, labelling
1	0.032	acp, ukraine, africa, african, poverty, nuclear, chernobyl
30	0.031	seattle, wto, globalisation, doha, round, multilateral, ilo
34	0.031	poland, hungary, czech, phare, eastern, accession, applicant
22	0.029	renewables, gas, energy, electricity, renewable, kyoto, emissions
2	0.029	cohesion, regions, funds, structural, leader, fund, ireland
33	0.028	aviation, rail, airlines, airports, traffic, congestion, freight
16	0.028	nato, cfsp, transatlantic, weu, cold, yugoslavia, military

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
31	0.028	antitrust, merger, cartels, mergers, competition, anticompetitive, postal
19	0.028	angola, afghanistan, humanitarian, echo, iraqi, burundi, herzegovina
21	0.026	latin, america, japanese, japan, asia, india, asean
7	0.025	revolution, cultures, values, university, rich, religions, peoples
26	0.024	chemicals, pvc, waste, recycling, substances, pesticides, voluntary
23	0.022	distorting, nontrade, box, export, antidumping, blue, subsidies
6	0.022	tourism, audiovisual, tourist, television, film, music, cultural
20	0.022	europol, learning, crime, researchers, drugs, teaching, science
5	0.020	gatt, maastricht, community's, efta, ec, community, monnet
25	0.020	forests, liability, cities, water, forest, urban, environmental
9	0.019	britain, britain's, british, uk, conservative, uk's, sovereignty
3	0.019	tobacco, smoking, mental, health, pharmaceutical, selfmedication, diseases
15	0.016	patent, consumer, antimicrobial, vaccination, surveillance, influenza, animals
4	0.013	hong, china, kong, china's, chinese, kong's, korea
8	0.010	shipowners, fishing, shipping, ports, maritime, liner, seafarers

Period 1 EPDB Documents Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
8	0.137	regulation, commission, communities, import, council, force, standard
31	0.065	regulation, tender, commission, invitation, export, maximum, tenders
47	0.055	regulation, products, refund, refunds, export, commission, market
16	0.043	regulation, products, tariff, originating, customs, council, commission
45	0.042	regulation, aid, marketing, production, producers, market, products
46	0.042	licences, regulation, applications, quantities, import, commission, licence
1	0.041	regulation, sugar, prices, price, commission, kg, representative
30	0.039	agreement, eea, decision, protocol, council, joint, committee
29	0.038	decision, commission, council, kingdom, united, sweden, austria
52	0.037	animals, directive, decision, veterinary, meat, animal, health
26	0.028	council, committee, commission, decision, parliament, treaty, procedure
7	0.028	market, concentration, regulation, commission, parties, operation, joint
10	0.028	regulation, commission, export, oil, refund, olive, refunds
33	0.024	regulation, import, rice, commission, levy, duties, duty
19	0.023	fishing, vessels, fisheries, vessel, regulation, waters, flag
48	0.022	financial, regulation, assistance, commission, funds, programme, contribution
18	0.019	provisions, authority, measures, rules, authorities, national, application
36	0.018	directive, products, plant, medicinal, commission, plants, product

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
37	0.016	imports, industry, investigation, regulation, period, prices, market
41	0.016	regulation, cereals, import, wheat, duty, commission, tonne
20	0.015	supply, port, regulation, deadline, commission, food, shipment
6	0.014	council, economic, training, policy, social, cooperation, union
17	0.013	regulation, beef, intervention, veal, nr, meat, products
49	0.013	directive, substances, commission, waste, provisions, health, protection
51	0.012	union, acp, council, eu, security, countries, joint
50	0.011	programme, research, development, activities, projects, programmes, environmental
15	0.011	milk, content, weight, fat, butter, matter, products
53	0.011	rate, french, conversion, agricultural, rates, france, euro
3	0.011	agreement, products, quantitative, textile, limits, agreed, trade
22	0.011	aid, commission, authorities, restructuring, market, treaty, granted
25	0.010	customs, authorities, competent, document, certificate, procedure, country
43	0.009	parties, agreement, party, contracting, convention, cooperation, international
9	0.008	wine, wines, tobacco, varieties, quality, grape, distillation
23	0.008	financial, credit, assets, bank, capital, tax, insurance

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
2	0.007	commission, financial, court, expenditure, accounts, budget, mio
14	0.007	project, commission, decision, assistance, regulation, financial, expenditure
24	0.007	vehicle, directive, vehicles, test, typeapproval, requirements, motor
13	0.007	equipment, conformity, requirements, directive, body, system, safety
12	0.006	cover, intended, remarks, expenditure, appropriation, officials, communities
4	0.006	services, telecommunications, service, network, access, directive, networks
11	0.005	products, customs, materials, originating, protocol, agreement, product
32	0.004	transport, services, air, commission, market, airport, service
38	0.004	commission, court, ombudsman, proceedings, decision, complaint, office
39	0.004	steel, ecsc, coal, designed, equipment, production, tubes
42	0.004	test, method, sample, solution, water, methods, substance
35	0.004	market, products, sales, distribution, competition, parties, price
5	0.003	products, materials, manufacture, classified, purposes, weight, metal
44	0.003	gas, fuel, engine, power, air, energy, emissions
27	0.003	benefits, regulation, person, insurance, social, legislation, institution
28	0.003	market, production, price, parties, producers, commission, packaging

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
34	0.003	market, parties, products, commission, markets, product, share
21	0.002	market, television, parties, cable, tv, rights, message
40	0.001	substances, carriage, test, pressure, class, marginal, requirements
54	0.001	identification, circuit, devices, contained, housing, marking, bearing

Period 1 EPDB Documents FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
8	0.137	values, vegetables, fruit, standard, stipu, canary, islands
31	0.065	dist, invitation, interbin, tender, invitations, partial, ringen
47	0.055	starch, refunds, exported, refund, cereal, groats, eurt
16	0.043	levying, hungary, bulgaria, czech, poland, slovak, ceilings
45	0.042	setaside, arable, olives, flax, marketing, hectare, crops
46	0.042	licences, bananas, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, applications, licence, importers, quota
1	0.041	sugar, molasses, white, unginned, raw, cotton, kg
30	0.039	barbaso, efta, hafstein, westerlund, icelandic, adaptations, eea
29	0.038	ecopoints, austria, finland, kingdom, accession, sweden, eurocheque
52	0.037	veterinarian, equidae, brucellosis, enzootic, leukosis, ova, gastropods
26	0.028	partsession, alternate, appointing, votes, agenda, vote, resignation
7	0.028	skandia, tyco, fujitsu, kingfisher, valeo, cinven, ccf

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
10	0.028	olive, egg, corrective, oman, qatar, oil, poultrymeat
33	0.024	carnations, roses, morocco, israel, uniflorous, smallflowered, levy
19	0.023	scotia, fished, trawls, newfoundland, trawlers, seafoods, skagerrak
48	0.022	programming, partfinancing, esf, structural, erdf, eib, fund
18	0.019	authority, criminal, supervisory, obligations, confidentiality, undertaking, judicial
36	0.018	michiganensis, clavibacter, sepedonicus, foodproducing, viroid, fragaria, coniferales
37	0.016	psf, producersexporters, noncooperating, microdisks, rews, depb, noncooperation
41	0.016	hrw, srw, freightcost, kansascity, midamerica, adantic, mediterra
20	0.015	vestergaard, timent, locktainer, rebagged, beneficiarys, torben, cristoforo
6	0.014	crime, women, education, learning, gdp, reforms, convergence
17	0.013	categoria, kategori, artículo, membri, estadosmembros, tats, absatz
49	0.013	bap, pcp, gmos, creosote, organostannic, hazardous, biocidal
51	0.012	fiji, eumm, envoy, oau, ueeu, lannoye, unita
50	0.011	rtd, research, dissemination, technological, jrc, demonstration, technologies
15	0.011	whey, casein, caseinates, nonfat, nonlactic, butter, fat

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
53	0.011	kroner, cdr, escudos, epfr, stardust, celf, stabiporc
3	0.011	doublechecking, directorategeneral, minute, quantitative, initialled, compliments, clothing
22	0.011	bvs, sket, seleco, fintecna, mosel, verlipack, kww
25	0.010	carnet, camread, ata, typelength, departure, transit, copy
43	0.009	schcomex, schengen, visa, depositary, reportsconfirmation, nearcoastal, undisclosed
9	0.008	autogerma, rosso, aromatised, coteaux, carrots, rosato, cabernet
23	0.008	ncbs, eurosystem, counterparties, ucits, counterparty, ecb, credit
2	0.007	mio, court's, audit, edf, cmo, auditors, pmus
14	0.007	project, publicity, cohesion, instrument, leaflets, brochures, cf
24	0.007	threewheel, dippedbeam, lightsignalling, mainbeam, typeapproval, lamp, headlamps
13	0.007	typeexamination, productsmaterials, handfed, module, bandsaws, fire, accreditation
12	0.006	specifnull, hdr, chapt, subsect, specifndif, typeob, remblk
4	0.006	onp, tbr, telecom, telephony, telecommunications, voice, gsm
11	0.005	nonoriginating, invoice, exporter, exhibition, ceuta, melilla, hs
32	0.004	taca, taa, cembureau, selfhandling, eata, fefc, sabena

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
38	0.004	maladministration, söderman, ombudsman, ombudsman's, complainant's, complainant, complaint
39	0.004	usinor, mrw, pulsed, vallourec, filamentary, qsa, extrusions
42	0.004	analyte, pipette, absorbance, supernatant, crucible, inoculum, chromatogram
35	0.004	feg, tccc, scania, csds, ontrade, nathan, carlsberg
5	0.003	waxes, semiprecious, headgear, ovals, plaiting, mica, furskins
44	0.003	obd, opacimeter, diesel, mainline, particulate, emissions, ecolabel
27	0.003	pensioner, mariners, selfemployed, previdenza, maternity, maladie, oldage
28	0.003	dsd, lldpe, kapital, lyle, strapping, dboij, sewon
34	0.003	blokker, pfizer, transoflex, cégétel, ipsp, behring, identrus
21	0.002	paytv, dpag, ttcn, kirch, rtl, sanitec, bskyb
40	0.001	ibcs, receptacle, selfreactive, jerricans, pressurerelief, megcs, tankcontainer
54	0.001	bipolar, mrad, fct, bimos, pane, nonerasable, hmos

Period 2 Commission Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
22	0.050	cooperation, relations, agreement, commissioner, minister, process, political

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
46	0.040	policy, report, action, communication, progress, strategy, implementation
10	0.039	directive, court, ec, law, infringement, article, justice
44	0.038	conference, commissioner, policy, europe, meeting, future, issues
48	0.037	humanitarian, aid, people, support, food, assistance, echo
51	0.036	council, proposal, directive, parliament, regulation, rules, adopted
35	0.031	regional, development, regions, programme, policy, cohesion, programmes
13	0.029	proposed, market, products, competition, acquisition, transaction, active
8	0.026	aid, scheme, measure, competition, treaty, rules, ec
19	0.024	development, countries, africa, support, cooperation, african, aid
37	0.024	trade, wto, countries, agreement, negotiations, developing, market
2	0.021	services, market, proposed, acquisition, transaction, active, competition
50	0.020	energy, gas, electricity, supply, renewable, oil, market
52	0.020	aid, investigation, restructuring, decision, measures, company, granted
27	0.020	security, rights, justice, protection, citizens, data, visa
14	0.020	tax, vat, taxation, capital, companies, rules, treaty
55	0.019	market, financial, internal, services, directive, markets, crossborder
31	0.018	research, science, technology, scientific, programme, europe, researchers
15	0.018	information, internet, services, society, online, europe, public

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
3	0.017	social, employment, workers, labour, women, jobs, people
54	0.016	countries, czech, sweden, republic, finland, germany, poland
7	0.016	europe, prize, people, award, awards, week, campaign
33	0.016	report, study, citizens, countries, survey, people, results
21	0.015	innovation, industry, business, smes, enterprises, companies, competitiveness
6	0.015	financial, budget, fund, funds, management, control, audit
24	0.015	competition, market, merger, investigation, proposed, markets, concerns
34	0.015	health, measures, disease, influenza, avian, animal, poultry
11	0.015	euro, confidence, indicator, word, graphic, figures, processed
17	0.015	education, training, programme, projects, students, culture, learning
29	0.015	aid, investment, regional, project, rules, competition, development
41	0.015	rural, agriculture, farmers, agricultural, production, development, support
42	0.015	transport, rail, road, infrastructure, railway, freight, projects
26	0.015	director, dg, president, staff, deputy, management, appointed
20	0.014	directive, court, warning, written, waste, justice, water
28	0.014	market, mobile, operators, access, telecoms, competition, regulatory
47	0.014	services, public, service, insurance, postal, market, private
49	0.013	growth, economic, euro, gdp, rate, financial, quarter

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
5	0.013	bank, financial, banks, capital, guarantee, institutions, measures
9	0.013	fisheries, fishing, waters, stocks, measures, fish, sea
56	0.013	competition, regulation, rules, agreements, exemption, parties, block
36	0.012	emergency, assistance, protection, disaster, civil, affected, information
45	0.012	emissions, climate, change, protocol, kyoto, trading, greenhouse
1	0.012	gdp, na, deficit, programme, budgetary, government, balance
57	0.011	food, animal, feed, safety, health, products, gmos
23	0.011	air, aviation, airlines, transport, airport, passengers, agreement
32	0.011	consumer, products, consumers, tobacco, market, product, protection
25	0.010	customs, children, safety, fraud, cooperation, information, drugs
18	0.009	public, procurement, contracts, contract, china, award, authorities
39	0.009	space, nuclear, safety, galileo, satellite, programme, agreement
43	0.009	vehicles, car, road, cars, vehicle, safety, motor
53	0.009	media, tv, film, digital, audiovisual, television, music
16	0.008	maritime, sea, ships, port, shipping, safety, convention
38	0.008	environmental, waste, environment, pollution, substances, chemicals, equipment
4	0.007	products, wine, quality, information, programmes, agricultural, measures
40	0.006	project, water, projects, management, biodiversity, life, conservation

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
30	0.006	fines, cartel, companies, fine, market, information, imposed
12	0.005	de, sport, fr, microsoft, sports, diamonds, football
58	0.003	agency, travel, agencies, tourism, card, travelling, operational

Period 2 Commission Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
22	0.050	eom, asem, enp, bih, euukraine, saa, elections
46	0.040	progress, communication, strategy, recommendations, lisbon, reform, report
10	0.039	judgment, proceedings, reasoned, court, transposition, infringement, ruling
44	0.038	conference, forum, debate, discuss, representatives, discussion, challenges
48	0.037	idps, echo's, unrwa, httpeceuropaeuechoindexenhtm, icrc, echo, sudanese
51	0.036	proposal, parliament, adoption, council, welcomes, text, draft
35	0.031	hübner, erdf, interreg, nsrf, httpeceuropaeuregionalpolicyindexenhtm, danuta, cohesion
13	0.029	cargill, ineos, basell, jj, celanese, oems, huntsman
8	0.026	scheme, coal, authorises, measure, aid, shipbuilding, weekly
19	0.024	epas, euafrica, african, caribbean, mdgs, pacific, cotonou
37	0.024	gsp, antidumping, appellate, lamy, dda, wto, mandelson

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
2	0.021	gdf, electrabel, cinven, enbw, endesa's, aviva, apax
50	0.020	piebalgs, andris, energy, eurussia, renewable, hydrogen, biofuels
52	0.020	restructuring, incompatible, recover, rescue, hsy, privatisation, unlawful
27	0.020	frattini, eurodac, judicial, crime, asylum, franco, visa
14	0.020	taxable, taxed, httpeceuropaeutaxationcustomscommoninfringementsinfringementcasesindexenhtm, vat, tax, taxation, dividends
55	0.019	ucits, mccreevy, charlie, cesr, securities, mifid, sepa
31	0.018	potočnik, genomics, contestant, nanotechnologies, busquin, eureka, researchers
15	0.018	egovernment, spam, ecall, ipv, rfid, eeurope, ict
3	0.017	vladimír, egf, flexicurity, špidla, redundancies, equality, gender
54	0.016	czech, finland, sweden, hungary, malta, slovenia, estonia
7	0.016	finalists, jewish, nostra, rohe, mies, eyci, holocaust
33	0.016	eurobarometer, scoreboard, respondents, survey, europeans, study, cent
21	0.015	sunscreen, smes, verheugen, günter, patients, patent, entrepreneurship
6	0.015	audit, auditors, appropriations, budget, schreyer, multiannual, irregularities
24	0.015	aker, newscorp, divest, pernod, divestiture, carnival, moulinex

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
34	0.015	influenza, avian, culling, fmd, biosecurity, vaccinated, bluetongue
11	0.015	sentiment, bci, coins, indicator, esi, graphic, remained
17	0.015	erasmus, leonardo, eqf, europass, learners, students, teaching
29	0.015	intensity, multisectoral, everq, assisted, eligible, rdi, investbx
41	0.015	farmers, sugar, setaside, cotton, cereals, farm, fischler
42	0.015	rail, ertms, civitas, railway, freight, waterway, modes
26	0.015	epso, appointed, deputy, ddg, hors, directorgeneral, director
20	0.014	warning, written, eia, hunting, warrants, fails, spas
28	0.014	erg, bnetza, roaming, telecoms, arcep, regulator, termination
47	0.014	poste, postal, insurance, insurers, mail, service, compensation
49	0.013	quarter, quarterly, inflation, variables, forecasts, slowdown, productivity
5	0.013	lending, recapitalisation, bank, banks, westlb, eib, landesbank
9	0.013	cod, catches, cfp, tacs, hake, tac, herring
56	0.013	block, exemption, antitrust, monti, boarding, interlining, liner
36	0.012	mic, eusf, disasters, floods, disaster, gmes, fires
45	0.012	kyoto, ets, naps, emissions, greenhouse, allowances, eper
1	0.012	cp, cyclicallyadjusted, sp, deficit, na, nov, mto
57	0.011	gmos, monsanto, biosafety, mrls, herbicide, nongm, feed

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
23	0.011	airspace, ecaa, sesar, aviation, airlines, airports, airport
32	0.011	smoking, smokers, rogue, smokefree, tobacco, timeshare, kuneva
25	0.010	counterfeit, lighters, seizures, counterfeiting, fraud, toys, drug
18	0.009	tenderers, procurement, contracts, euchina, contract, tendering, chinese
39	0.009	iter, egnos, iaea, radionavigation, nuclear, space, galileo
43	0.009	repairers, tachograph, cars, vehicles, gkm, vehicle, car
53	0.009	cannes, dvbt, dvbh, bmg, drm, mankell, rtl
16	0.008	bulkcarrier, seafarers, imo, singlehull, shipgenerated, ships, maritime
38	0.008	mercury, metals, recycling, batteries, toxic, hazardous, pollutants
4	0.007	pdo, pgi, wine, wines, obesity, fruit, grubbingup
40	0.006	grasslands, lifeenvironment, bogs, biodiversity, bathing, natura, emas
30	0.006	cartel, leniency, cvk, severally, strabag, sammelrevers, bpb
12	0.005	kimberley, doping, natali, microsoft's, fifa, alrosa, kp
58	0.003	travel, agency, travelling, agencies, agency's, hotel, card

Period 2 Commission Speeches Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
19	0.073	council, parliament, proposal, report, proposals, process, community
21	0.047	market, europe, economic, growth, economy, single, jobs

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
20	0.046	development, countries, cooperation, partnership, economic, africa, regional
2	0.042	accession, enlargement, turkey, countries, process, negotiations, progress
1	0.042	europe, citizens, treaty, political, president, people, institutions
28	0.040	policy, regional, regions, cohesion, development, economic, local
33	0.038	europe, world, political, economic, policy, values, countries
16	0.034	climate, change, global, emissions, environmental, countries, international
12	0.034	trade, china, countries, wto, developing, round, world
8	0.034	financial, market, markets, crisis, funds, banks, risk
26	0.032	humanitarian, international, security, peace, support, aid, palestinian
30	0.032	maritime, policy, fisheries, marine, fishing, seas, integrated
6	0.031	social, women, employment, people, labour, society, workers
18	0.031	research, innovation, europe, knowledge, programme, technology, framework
17	0.030	economic, growth, euro, policy, stability, countries, reforms
29	0.029	energy, renewable, policy, efficiency, oil, europe, security
27	0.029	ict, information, sector, europe, services, innovation, business
10	0.027	security, rights, migration, human, countries, cooperation, terrorism
5	0.026	agricultural, support, agriculture, farmers, policy, countries, rural

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
34	0.025	policy, cap, farmers, rural, agriculture, agricultural, health
35	0.025	budget, financial, public, court, management, transparency, funds
14	0.024	companies, market, standards, corporate, tax, accounting, company
3	0.022	education, europe, languages, language, learning, training, dialogue
4	0.020	consumer, consumers, market, products, information, protection, policy
32	0.020	competition, aid, rules, policy, enforcement, merger, national
36	0.020	health, food, safety, public, animal, risk, control
13	0.019	industry, chemicals, environment, health, information, medicines, legislation
24	0.018	services, market, broadband, mobile, regulatory, competition, access
11	0.017	energy, market, russia, gas, supply, markets, electricity
7	0.017	information, media, internet, public, communication, society, online
23	0.016	transport, sea, water, road, safety, cooperation, baltic
9	0.016	reform, sector, sugar, market, production, wine, measures
15	0.011	competition, companies, market, consumers, decision, sector, cartel
25	0.011	euro, payment, sepa, payments, market, currency, countries
22	0.011	patent, property, public, defence, market, intellectual, rights
31	0.010	rural, development, policy, poland, sustainable, agriculture, environmental

Period 2 Commission Speeches FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
19	0.073	committee, parliament, council, proposal, report, proposals, implementation
21	0.047	globalisation, jobs, postal, single, economy, lisbon, businesses
20	0.046	africa, african, latin, johannesburg, euromediterranean, mediterranean, asia
2	0.042	herzegovina, turkey, turkey's, turkish, serbia, croatia, saa
1	0.042	constitution, parliaments, josé, manuel, constitutional, treaty, nice
28	0.040	cohesion, territorial, regions, jeremie, regional, cities, multilevel
33	0.038	war, democracies, continent, sovereignty, wall, wars, values
16	0.034	emission, emissions, climate, kyoto, biodiversity, carbon, copenhagen
12	0.034	mandelson, china's, chinese, china, hong, kong, wto
8	0.034	ucits, hedge, mifid, supervisory, turmoil, supervision, rating
26	0.032	palestinian, palestinians, gaza, afghan, palestine, israel's, israel
30	0.032	iuu, fishing, coastal, marine, seas, maritime, oceans
6	0.031	women, gender, equality, women's, discrimination, roma, demographic
18	0.031	erc, fp, researchers, research, science, excellence, janez
17	0.030	emu, fiscal, deficit, pact, finances, macroeconomic, monetary
29	0.029	renewable, nuclear, hydrogen, fuels, wind, energy, biofuels
27	0.029	esafety, ict, entrepreneurship, sme, egovernment, entrepreneurial,

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
		entrepreneurs
10	0.027	trafficking, asylum, enp, migration, terrorism, crime, migrants
5	0.026	tradedistorting, agricultural, farm, distorting, farmers, export, box
34	0.025	check, boel, fischer, mariann, cent, cap, crosscompliance
35	0.025	olaf, discharge, lobbying, lobbyists, fraud, errors, register
14	0.024	ifrs, csr, gaap, solvency, shareholders, corporate, auditing
3	0.022	multilingualism, languages, erasmus, intercultural, students, sport, bologna
4	0.020	consumer, gm, claims, redress, foods, consumers, gmos
32	0.020	merger, mergers, antitrust, damages, aid, icn, airlines
36	0.020	influenza, cancer, disease, obesity, pandemic, nutrition, hivaids
13	0.019	chemicals, substances, medicines, patients, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, chemical
24	0.018	erg, broadband, wireless, telecom, telecoms, mobile, spectrum
11	0.017	russia, russia's, eurussia, russian, unbundling, gas, electricity
7	0.017	audiovisual, media, television, broadcasters, rfid, privacy, spam
23	0.016	rail, freight, aviation, railway, baltic, traffic, transport
9	0.016	sugar, wine, cotton, grubbingup, quota, quotas, olive
15	0.011	microsoft, fines, cartel, repairers, cartels, microsoft's, leniency

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
25	0.011	sepa, debit, changeover, card, lithuania, cards, erm
22	0.011	patent, counterfeiting, copyright, property, patents, music, intellectual
31	0.010	und, sapard, poland, mountain, polish, zu, der

Period 2 Council Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
4	0.145	countries, republic, stabilisation, association, croatia, yugoslav, macedonia
36	0.099	countries, elections, republic, declaration, email, internet, economic
26	0.066	rights, government, humanitarian, human, situation, calls, violence
13	0.055	peace, process, support, government, agreement, afghanistan, welcomes
17	0.055	political, government, welcomes, dialogue, burmamyanmar, process, agreement
21	0.031	directive, regulation, parliament, community, agreement, rules, proposal
15	0.031	cooperation, leaders, welcomed, meeting, importance, dialogue, asem
16	0.030	international, support, security, sudan, peace, palestinian, darfur
37	0.029	rights, human, europe, belarus, georgia, osce, cooperation
1	0.027	representative, permanent, republic, ambassador, de, deputy, director
31	0.025	adopted, regulation, decision, agreement, measures, common, antidumping
19	0.024	financial, finance, commission, economic, adopted, conclusions, report

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
20	0.022	affairs, foreign, conclusions, adopted, secretary, commission, meeting
28	0.022	cooperation, development, international, economic, human, social, rights
38	0.021	african, ecowas, africa, parties, peace, development, security
10	0.021	mission, defence, security, military, development, operation, support
11	0.019	cooperation, international, security, nuclear, support, efforts, united
3	0.017	eea, agreement, association, welcomed, noted, efta, meeting
9	0.017	accession, croatia, progress, chapter, implementation, negotiations, turkey
8	0.017	transport, commission, proposal, services, regulation, directive, community
30	0.016	development, countries, support, sustainable, health, developing, action
34	0.015	environment, commission, directive, environmental, waste, development, adopted
27	0.015	agriculture, commission, fisheries, regulation, community, rural, food
12	0.015	justice, commission, decision, cooperation, adopted, framework, conclusions
40	0.015	social, health, employment, labour, commission, protection, policy
23	0.014	research, commission, policy, competitiveness, innovation, economic, community
2	0.013	deficit, gdp, programme, economic, budgetary, growth, government

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
33	0.012	energy, climate, change, development, cooperation, efficiency, renewable
7	0.012	budget, eur, million, commission, parliament, financial, payments
25	0.011	justice, decision, adopted, agreement, conclusions, law, commission
35	0.011	affairs, foreign, countries, cooperation, conclusions, adopted, commission
6	0.011	agriculture, commission, food, adopted, community, delegations, regulation
32	0.011	cooperation, russia, russian, energy, security, common, eurussia
29	0.010	education, youth, training, culture, learning, commission, cultural
22	0.010	data, torture, terrorism, swift, treasury, united, financial
24	0.010	mediterranean, euromediterranean, cooperation, partners, trade, partnership, process
5	0.009	cost, committee, research, action, proposal, main, objective
14	0.007	born, list, aka, entities, persons, common, terrorist
39	0.007	affairs, conclusions, development, foreign, commission, countries, policy
18	0.004	waters, tacs, regulation, fishing, commission, iv, species

Period 2 Council Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
4	0.145	yugoslav, macedonia, stabilisation, albania, miscarriage, montenegro, death

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
36	0.099	conform, declare, presidential, venezuela, email, election, slovak
26	0.066	sri, nepal, lanka, maoists, bhutan, ltte, nepalese
13	0.055	burundi, colombian, pakistan, somalia, afghan, igad, afghanistan
17	0.055	burmamyanmar, aung, suu, kyi, fiji, yemen, daw
21	0.031	conciliation, substances, noise, epo, directives, directive, credit
15	0.031	asem, asean, leaders, asia, euchina, kyrgyz, reaffirmed
16	0.030	gcc, darfur, sudan, gaza, sudanese, israeli, palestinian
37	0.029	belarusian, belarus, osce, georgian, georgia, transnistrian, moldovan
1	0.027	ambassador, vitae, curriculum, embassy, counsellor, director, university
31	0.025	antidumping, imports, originating, duty, definitive, imposing, steel
19	0.024	vat, supervisors, supervisory, eurogroup, efc, rates, finance
20	0.022	gucht, paet, urmas, karel, asselborn, foreign, plassnik
28	0.022	mexico, brazil, biregional, caribbean, america, american, andean
38	0.021	ecowas, sadc, au, africa, nigeria, african, eccas
10	0.021	eufor, eupol, congo, rafah, capability, eusec, tchadrca
11	0.019	transatlantic, japan, euus, eujapan, dprk, proliferation, nonproliferation
3	0.017	eea, swiss, confederation, chile, eee, euchile, contracting
9	0.017	chapter, sa, chapters, acquis, croatia's, accession, saa
8	0.017	rail, inland, freight, shipping, passengers, spectrum, railway

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
30	0.016	hivaids, mdgs, poverty, acp, millennium, johannesburg, strategies
34	0.015	waste, cop, biodiversity, recycling, cbd, emissions, mercury
27	0.015	forestry, sugar, eel, boel, meat, liberal, dairy
12	0.015	europol, interior, asylum, confiscation, vis, biometric, visas
40	0.015	patients, healthcare, gender, care, mental, labour, employment
23	0.014	patent, competitiveness, innovation, esa, smes, iter, entrepreneurship
2	0.013	cyclicallyadjusted, gdp, deficit, projected, ratio, surplus, finances
33	0.012	renewable, indiaeu, euindia, india, energy, electricity, canada
7	0.012	appropriations, payments, pdb, budget, margin, eur, payment
25	0.011	ejustice, sis, schengen, interior, sirene, eurojust, thirdcountry
35	0.011	sap, fyrom, proxima, eupm, doc, seville, thessaloniki
6	0.011	fischler, bse, byrne, farming, cereals, organic, animals
32	0.011	russian, eurussia, russia, federation, cees, space, northern
29	0.010	learning, youth, lifelong, culture, nonformal, education, digitisation
22	0.010	torture, tftp, degrading, inhuman, subpoenas, representations, swift
24	0.010	euromediterranean, euromed, mediterranean, jordan, morocco, barcelona, meda
5	0.009	cso, cost, fedi, noncost, molecular, esf, airspace
14	0.007	aka, eta, altakfir, alhijra, jarraihaikasegi, kasekin, saed

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
39	0.007	capabilities, headline, ecap, esdp, defence, capability, coherence
18	0.004	solea, pollachius, molva, merluccius, sebastes, viiic, aeglefinus

Period 2 Official Jouranl Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
8	0.162	regulation, commission, products, import, community, applicable, council
7	0.115	council, commission, decision, directive, parliament, regulation, committee
23	0.108	court, applicant, communities, decision, law, language, judgment
16	0.057	commission, programme, social, development, economic, research, support
12	0.056	authorities, authority, data, competent, national, application, means
1	0.045	commission, market, competition, parties, regulation, undertakings, undertaking
25	0.040	commission, answer, council, october, ppede, september, march
3	0.033	agreement, republic, air, community, protocol, parties, service
13	0.033	rights, council, international, security, countries, human, calls
24	0.032	financial, assets, credit, capital, accounts, euro, payment
2	0.029	aid, scheme, granted, costs, measure, decision, eligible
26	0.028	wine, quality, products, production, product, content, fresh

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
20	0.028	directive, products, substances, food, health, substance, assessment
6	0.028	animals, animal, decision, health, community, products, meat
9	0.026	kingdom, united, republic, germany, czech, poland, ireland
21	0.021	fishing, vessels, fisheries, waters, vessel, port, species
17	0.019	vehicle, system, safety, vehicles, flight, maximum, equipment
4	0.019	system, vehicle, uf, approval, manufacturer, engine, vehicles
19	0.019	appropriations, expenditure, financial, regulation, staff, payments, commitments
22	0.018	energy, transport, waste, environmental, directive, gas, electricity
11	0.018	community, regulation, industry, imports, product, producers, market
14	0.017	acp, edf, birth, africa, born, country, persons
27	0.014	services, service, directive, public, consumer, national, consumers
5	0.011	vote, committee, report, council, ppede, resolution, pse
18	0.010	hydrocarbons, petroleum, oil, gas, carbon, range, predominantly
10	0.008	equipment, safety, expired, iec, systems, cenelec, amendment
15	0.007	materials, manufacture, product, price, free, exworks, products

Period 2 Official Journal FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
8	0.162	demarty, refund, refunds, entirety, import, tariff, binding

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
7	0.115	amend, parliament, approves, nonessential, scrutiny, seatter, adopt
23	0.108	defendant, pleas, annul, appellant, intervener, jn, appellants
16	0.057	eesc, proposers, eesc's, cese, mto, cyclicallyadjusted, sigmund
12	0.056	edps, eurmed, invoice, person, exporter, residence, documents
1	0.045	epsoast, ppas, leniency, legrand, divestiture, sidel, paytv
25	0.040	nonopposition, kilroysilk, httpeceuropaeucommcompetitionmergerscases, sncm, traitx, ebeceart, etva
3	0.033	rdc, cabmintc, puolesta, bsca, nimel, vārdā, imieniu
13	0.033	eupol, sghr, eunavfor, cosac, inhuman, proxima, epss
24	0.032	eurosystem, issuer, ncb, counterparty, mfis, counterparties, receivables
2	0.029	httpeceuropaeucommunitylawstateaids, httpeuropaeuintcommsecretariatgeneralsgbstateaids, legge, ayudas, reparcelling, občini, deliberazione
26	0.028	psr, semisparkling, oίvoς, broadleaf, phytosterolsphytostanols, radicchio, prosciutto
20	0.028	registrant, premixture, pelleting, coccidiostats, registrants, cfug, notifiers
6	0.028	veterinarian, slaughterhouse, ratites, oie, biosecurity, serological, feathered
9	0.026	hexal, dohme, lundbeck, ratiopharm, lilly, filmtabletten, ingelheim

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
21	0.021	tac, briggen, myint, majgen, khin, maung, yangon
17	0.019	impactor, headlamp, torso, trackside, rvr, isofix, unisig
4	0.019	obd, dynamometer, gkwh, typeexamination, opacimeter, cers, erus
19	0.019	appropriation, outturn, nondifferentiated, appropriations, subtotal, revenue, lx
22	0.018	cpe, lng, biogeographical, mwth, ghg, iwt, tsos
11	0.018	exportersproducers, noncooperation, psf, countervailable, uniflorous, depb, largeflowered
14	0.017	taliban, abu, minneapolis, eurhl, belize, nevis, altakfir
27	0.014	injunctive, prospection, skilledcraft, digitip, επιμελητήριο, prefectural, teracom
5	0.011	rcvev, rollcall, ams, juri, envi, draftsman, rcb
18	0.010	carc, muta, xn, aliphatic, ethanediyl, hydrotreated, emollient
10	0.008	iec, lowvoltage, switchgear, controlgear, luminaires, cispr, sterilization
15	0.007	bhm, tto, crocheted, paperboard, vct, unbleached, wadding

Period 3 Commission Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
51	0.039	humanitarian, aid, people, assistance, crisis, response, commissioner
18	0.038	policy, consultation, communication, europe, public, strategy, growth

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
26	0.036	transaction, competition, merger, proposed, acquisition, mergers, notified
6	0.032	directive, legislation, infringement, ec, national, court, rules
63	0.028	president, minister, meeting, conference, barroso, summit, commissioner
12	0.024	development, commissioner, support, piebalgs, countries, cooperation, andris
53	0.023	council, proposal, parliament, regulation, rules, adopted, proposed
57	0.023	support, neighbourhood, ukraine, partnership, programme, policy, countries
13	0.022	water, waste, environment, environmental, biodiversity, management, project
68	0.020	infringement, tax, court, rules, information, vat, movement
3	0.020	euro, confidence, indicator, business, expectations, consumer, services
62	0.020	trade, agreement, negotiations, investment, economic, market, agreements
40	0.020	regional, policy, regions, development, cohesion, funds, fund
20	0.019	aid, restructuring, bank, plan, competition, banks, capital
32	0.019	education, students, culture, erasmus, training, youth, programme
42	0.018	budget, support, financial, fund, programme, assistance, funds
55	0.018	smes, investment, support, eif, finance, growth, fund

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
1	0.017	head, director, dg, office, mission, ms, appointed
2	0.017	cooperation, africa, security, development, african, partnership, international
56	0.017	energy, climate, emissions, gas, change, renewable, efficiency
66	0.017	aid, investigation, market, rules, public, airport, measures
37	0.016	social, employment, people, youth, skills, labour, education
41	0.016	aid, project, competition, energy, electricity, support, market
67	0.015	telecoms, mobile, broadband, access, operators, market, services
49	0.015	research, innovation, science, researchers, horizon, funding, scientific
31	0.015	cultural, award, prize, film, winners, heritage, awards
23	0.014	aid, scheme, competition, decision, rules, france, measure
29	0.014	report, countries, data, economic, average, europe, performance
43	0.014	court, justice, law, italy, infringement, ruling, comply
17	0.013	rights, justice, fundamental, roma, human, victims, law
69	0.013	competition, merger, investigation, proposed, concerns, transaction, acquisition
25	0.013	accession, kosovo, process, serbia, turkey, agreement, countries
28	0.013	investment, plan, projects, europe, investments, infrastructure, eib
14	0.013	women, germany, france, gender, italy, netherlands, denmark

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
22	0.013	data, security, protection, information, trafficking, crime, home
11	0.013	transport, rail, infrastructure, railway, mobility, network, freight
48	0.013	consumers, consumer, single, market, crossborder, businesses, law
60	0.012	workers, social, free, employment, movement, labour, rules
9	0.012	digital, ict, europe, data, agenda, kroes, internet
35	0.012	air, aviation, airlines, safety, airports, traffic, transport
27	0.012	egf, workers, financial, globalisation, proposed, fund, employment
54	0.012	public, services, service, procurement, rules, contracts, contract
65	0.011	market, electricity, gas, competition, antitrust, investigation, objections
44	0.011	customs, vat, fraud, commissioner, system, information, šemeta
39	0.011	visa, border, schengen, report, home, borders, citizens
7	0.010	aid, regional, guidelines, regions, eligible, investment, development
52	0.010	migration, asylum, turkey, greece, support, migrants, refugees
70	0.010	food, agricultural, agriculture, animal, farmers, rural, chain
19	0.010	space, satellite, industry, services, galileo, navigation, spectrum
4	0.009	products, market, product, safety, information, programmes, quality
24	0.009	fisheries, fishing, stocks, sea, maritime, waters, fish
33	0.009	market, markets, financial, capital, rules, investors, regulation
8	0.009	substances, health, food, chemicals, products, information, legislation

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
46	0.009	citizens, vicepresident, europe, reding, rights, commissioner, future
21	0.009	vehicles, car, cars, vehicle, road, electric, driving
58	0.008	europeans, survey, eurobarometer, citizens, tobacco, respondents, campaign
5	0.008	health, medical, healthcare, patients, care, diseases, cancer
10	0.008	competition, agreements, rules, companies, antitrust, market, authorities
50	0.008	financial, insurance, banks, banking, bank, resolution, sector
45	0.008	safety, road, nuclear, emergency, accident, accidents, standards
59	0.007	online, services, content, media, digital, internet, search
36	0.007	euro, growth, economic, forecast, expected, recovery, inflation
61	0.007	measures, russia, russian, trade, products, import, wildlife
16	0.007	tax, companies, taxation, corporate, taxes, rules, information
34	0.007	deficit, economic, fiscal, gdp, budgetary, growth, excessive
30	0.007	wto, trade, steel, china, raw, materials, panel
38	0.006	maritime, transport, port, shipping, ports, ships, safety
15	0.006	commitments, competition, concerns, offered, tv, market, antitrust
64	0.006	cartel, fines, companies, fine, commission's, damages, cartels
47	0.005	payment, fees, payments, credit, market, card, cards
71	0.000	supply, energy, combined, services, market, power, dong

Period 3 Commission Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
51	0.039	httpeceuropaeuechoindexenhtm, georgieva's, sharrock, novakova, georgievaindexenhtm, humanitarian, cyclone
18	0.038	consultation, stakeholders, communication, strategy, initiatives, policies, challenges
26	0.036	increment, kraft, quelle, cvc, arla, faurecia, behr
6	0.032	transposition, directive, transpose, reasoned, ec, directives, transposed
63	0.028	rompuy, manuel, barroso, josé, prime, herman, ashton
12	0.024	piebalgsindexenhtm, andris, piebalgs, mdgs, millennium, sanchez, aponte
53	0.023	proposal, parliament, council, draft, adoption, vote, legislative
57	0.023	ukraine's, tunisia, moldova, neighbourhood, ukraine, armenia, enp
13	0.022	bathing, nitrates, vitoriagasteiz, biodiversity, natura, habitats, landfill
68	0.020	httpeceuropaeutaxationcustomscommoninfringementsinfringementcasesindexenhtm, discriminatory, releases, uptodate, dividends, amend, inheritance
3	0.020	indicator, bci, sentiment, flash, expectations, confidence, unchanged
62	0.020	asean, fta, vietnam, gucht, korea, singapore, epa
40	0.020	interreg, erdf, cohesion, danube, corina, pompeii, euregional
20	0.019	recapitalisation, restructuring, frob, dexia, banco, ceiss, sns

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
32	0.019	etwinning, translators, erasmus, students, sport, pupils, student
42	0.018	palestinian, mfa, budget, unrwa, gaza, eur, multiannual
55	0.018	eif, cosme, innovfin, eif's, gilibert, counterguarantees, procredit
1	0.017	eom, plenipotentiary, head, election, representations, ambassador, ms
2	0.017	amisom, african, peace, africaeu, somalia, africa, euchina
56	0.017	ets, greenhouse, carbon, climate, biofuels, emissions, kyoto
66	0.017	meip, airport, nchz, investor, difficulty, doubts, rescue
37	0.016	unemployed, skills, youth, traineeships, inclusion, eures, exclusion
41	0.016	chp, eeg, coal, outweigh, mines, feedin, sovello
67	0.015	telecoms, uke, broadband, roaming, regulator, berec, cents
49	0.015	eit, ecspokesscience, kics, graphene, fieldproject, msca, contestant
31	0.015	mies, prix, rohe, natali, berlinale, roman, eurosonic
23	0.014	clubs, scheme, football, french, incompatible, postal, spanish
29	0.014	scoreboard, report, tourism, oecd, trends, performance, study
43	0.014	judgment, ruling, court, judgement, court's, ruled, warning
17	0.013	roma, charter, disabilities, arrest, lawyer, victims, fundamental
69	0.013	cemex, holcim, hdds, munksjö, divestment, readymix, cement
25	0.013	kosovo, herzegovina, bosnia, ipa, kimberley, serbia, montenegro

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
28	0.013	ginkgo, katainen, eib, roadshow, efsi, jyrki, investment
14	0.013	women, gender, female, women's, ro, boards, lv
22	0.013	firearms, terrorist, cybercrime, pnr, trafficking, terrorism, cyber
11	0.013	rail, tent, railway, ertms, tram, modes, tunnel
48	0.013	ecommerce, insolvency, consumer, professions, eccnet, crossborder, shopping
60	0.012	posting, pensions, workers, residence, employers, nationals, pension
9	0.012	coding, fiware, ict, cloud, computing, egovernment, géant
35	0.012	fabs, icao, airspace, skies, aviation, air, flights
27	0.012	egf, redundant, globalisation, redundancies, correction, corrections, lowerskilled
54	0.012	procurement, tendering, sgei, contracts, tender, bidders, service
65	0.011	objections, beh, gazprom, traction, writing, pipeline, db
44	0.011	antifraud, šemeta, fraud, olaf, algirdas, customs, undeclared
39	0.011	schengen, visa, visafree, visas, border, liberalisation, readmission
7	0.010	gber, map, intensities, eligible, eusf, guidelines, intensity
52	0.010	resettlement, relocation, amif, asylum, migration, relocations, reception
70	0.010	hens, farmers, expo, cloning, mdp, fao, animal

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
19	0.010	galileo, satellites, egnos, mhz, satellite, band, space
4	0.009	rapex, organic, wine, pgi, pdo, cheese, toys
24	0.009	tac, herring, cod, msy, tacs, catches, bluefin
33	0.009	prospectus, ccps, ucits, mifid, rating, esma, ccp
8	0.009	echa, psychoactive, substances, endocrine, biocidal, rasff, chemicals
46	0.009	eci, eudeb, mayor, couples, divorce, debates, tbc
21	0.009	typeapproval, vans, vehicles, vehicle, cars, car, ecall
58	0.008	tobacco, ipr, respondents, eurobarometer, cigarettes, europeans, attitudes
5	0.008	clinical, patient, vaccines, ebola, patients, cancer, breast
10	0.008	sweep, generic, servier, settlements, patent, pharmaceutical, lundbeck
50	0.008	insurance, resolution, banking, deposit, reinsurance, solvency, insurers
45	0.008	nuclear, accident, fatalities, accidents, iter, injuries, radiation
59	0.007	google's, avms, google, gambling, copyright, whatsapp, search
36	0.007	coins, changeover, inflation, forecast, banknotes, currency, outlook
61	0.007	russia's, cites, ilva, wildlife, russian, russia, argentina's
16	0.007	tax, avoidance, ccctb, rulings, profits, taxes, corporate
34	0.007	gdpsp, nacp, gdpcp, nanasp, deficit, nov, jan
30	0.007	antidumping, antisubsidy, isds, boeing, wto, appellate, eprocurement

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
38	0.006	imo, port, ships, shipping, ports, container, liner
15	0.006	paytv, penguin, areva, seps, ebooks, tv, tinto
64	0.006	cartel, fined, leniency, fines, cartels, bearings, immunity
47	0.005	mifs, sepa, fees, cards, payment, mastercard, rics
71	0.000	dong, combined, farm, supply, borkum, riffgrund, holding

Period 3 Commission Speeches Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
27	0.054	growth, council, economic, europe, euro, president, national
15	0.048	parliament, proposal, council, report, implementation, committee, proposals
18	0.036	digital, internet, europe, market, services, online, people
10	0.035	humanitarian, migration, crisis, people, asylum, response, countries
42	0.031	support, president, people, minister, human, political, rights
19	0.031	research, innovation, horizon, science, europe, funding, programme
5	0.031	economic, growth, euro, fiscal, crisis, reforms, financial
28	0.030	energy, gas, market, electricity, efficiency, renewable, security
36	0.030	enlargement, accession, process, turkey, progress, political, kosovo
14	0.030	development, countries, sustainable, global, africa, agenda, poverty

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
25	0.029	policy, regions, cohesion, regional, cities, funds, local
29	0.028	social, employment, europe, poverty, economic, people, policy
2	0.028	europe, world, political, people, crisis, countries, future
1	0.028	maritime, fisheries, marine, sea, blue, ocean, fishing
32	0.027	security, victims, crime, information, terrorism, cooperation, fight
38	0.026	cooperation, global, trade, international, world, relations, china
35	0.025	tax, financial, banks, banking, taxation, rules, crisis
9	0.024	civil, society, countries, policy, neighbourhood, region, partners
37	0.024	resource, economy, waste, resources, efficiency, green, circular
34	0.023	competition, market, aid, companies, markets, policy, rules
23	0.023	health, healthcare, people, diseases, patients, systems, action
8	0.023	rights, law, justice, citizens, fundamental, national, legal
20	0.023	ukraine, eastern, agreement, association, partnership, support, reforms
21	0.023	investment, capital, financial, markets, market, projects, investors
24	0.022	trade, investment, world, agreement, europe, economic, negotiations
13	0.020	skills, employment, youth, people, labour, unemployment, jobs
43	0.020	transport, rail, europe, infrastructure, aviation, road, market
33	0.019	water, biodiversity, environment, environmental, air, nature, quality
31	0.019	market, consumers, single, consumer, services, rules, online

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
4	0.017	data, protection, rules, personal, citizens, privacy, companies
22	0.017	education, people, youth, children, erasmus, support, training
41	0.016	industry, industrial, europe, innovation, competitiveness, technologies, market
39	0.015	education, europe, students, skills, universities, innovation, erasmus
44	0.015	public, business, businesses, services, sector, growth, private
16	0.014	europe, culture, people, cities, city, world, future
26	0.013	food, animal, waste, safety, health, welfare, feed
6	0.012	climate, energy, change, emissions, global, arctic, paris
17	0.012	roma, people, society, rights, integration, europe, discrimination
30	0.012	agriculture, farmers, rural, agricultural, sector, cap, food
3	0.012	women, gender, equality, women's, girls, violence, female
7	0.011	cultural, creative, culture, heritage, media, europe, tourism
40	0.010	social, workers, labour, countries, economic, mobility, employment
12	0.007	sport, people, week, physical, organisations, europe, policy
11	0.006	uk, market, british, single, services, financial, london

Period 3 Commission Speeches FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
27	0.054	greek, greece, semester, barroso, durão, eurogroup, parliaments

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
15	0.048	committee, draft, proposal, parliament's, parliament, ep, rapporteur
18	0.036	broadband, neelie, ict, kroes, spectrum, telecoms, wireless
10	0.035	humanitarian, asylum, relocation, disaster, disasters, resettlement, refugee
42	0.031	palestinian, catherine, ashtoneu, somalia, egypt, israel, libya
19	0.031	máire, horizon, fp, research, innovators, innovation, researchers
5	0.031	imbalances, deficits, debt, fiscal, deficit, adjustment, macroeconomic
28	0.030	tsos, cesec, electricity, renewables, energy, gas, grids
36	0.030	kosovo's, serbia's, kosovo, serbia, accession, montenegro, croatia
14	0.030	mdgs, addis, africa's, mdg, kiribati, pacific, tuvalu
25	0.029	cohesion, urban, regions, cities, specialisation, mayors, funds
29	0.028	ageing, social, pension, pensions, poverty, retirement, exclusion
2	0.028	war, chancellor, politics, sovereignty, founding, wars, schuman
1	0.028	iuu, iccat, discarding, bluefin, gfcm, msy, imp
32	0.027	firearms, antitrafficking, trafficking, europol, cybercrime, terrorism, cyber
38	0.026	customs, nuclear, russia, euchina, asia, russian, summit
35	0.025	ccctb, tax, evasion, taxation, vat, avoidance, banks
9	0.024	enp, neighbourhood, danube, mediterranean, southern, civil, morocco
37	0.024	landfilling, recycling, circular, plastic, resource, waste, recycled

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
34	0.023	antitrust, mergers, cartel, icn, ecn, motorola, standardessential
23	0.023	hta, alcoholrelated, noncommunicable, mhealth, herbal, smokers, antibiotics
8	0.023	eci, charter, proceedings, justice, courts, eppo, insolvency
20	0.023	ukrainian, ukraine's, moldovan, georgian, georgia's, ukraine, georgia
21	0.023	cmu, efsi, securitisation, eib, securitisations, investors, lending
24	0.022	ttip, transatlantic, singapore, tariffs, karel, trade, wto
13	0.020	apprenticeships, traineeships, unemployed, apprenticeship, skills, youth, employers
43	0.020	rail, ertms, freight, railway, aviation, tent, passengers
33	0.019	natura, biodiversity, forests, forest, water, habitats, pollution
31	0.019	sales, consumer, ecommerce, contract, consumers, shopping, traders
4	0.017	privacy, data, personal, consent, harbour, retention, revelations
22	0.017	literacy, adult, teachers, civic, school, erasmus, schools
41	0.016	industrial, bioeconomy, manufacturing, steel, defence, galileo, automotive
39	0.015	kics, eit, universities, students, marie, teaching, entrepreneurial
44	0.015	administrations, public, administration, administrative, enterprises, tape, red
16	0.014	pilsen, exhibition, award, mongolia, narrative, vitoriagasteiz, translation

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
26	0.013	gm, animal, gmos, foods, gmo, food, animals
6	0.012	kyoto, cancún, arctic, durban, warming, connie, temperature
17	0.012	holocaust, racist, roma, hate, antisemitism, jewish, lgbti
30	0.012	cap, farmers, rural, organic, farming, agrifood, agricultural
3	0.012	gender, women's, female, girls, jocelyn, women, boards
7	0.011	copyright, heritage, audiovisual, cultural, creative, creators, artists
40	0.010	posting, divergence, posted, wage, emu, devaluation, wages
12	0.007	sport, behavioural, volunteers, grassroots, volunteering, sports, football
11	0.006	british, mmo, britain, uk, britain's, uk's, australia

Period 3 Council Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
9	0.076	president, euco, spokesperson, van, world, rompuy, pr
24	0.069	decision, countries, cfsp, association, stabilisation, process, yugoslav
10	0.057	directive, parliament, regulation, agreement, services, national, reading
19	0.054	meeting, association, cooperation, ukraine, partnership, eastern, agreement
1	0.052	data, improve, statistics, content, internet, performance, change
23	0.049	economic, euro, president, growth, euco, crisis, financial
17	0.042	rights, human, international, death, world, day, freedom

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
33	0.041	measures, restrictive, iran, sanctions, persons, ban, entities
2	0.038	mission, head, security, ambassador, training, somalia, police
16	0.036	support, south, security, development, sudan, african, political
11	0.033	cooperation, development, summit, international, dialogue, security, leaders
12	0.029	financial, regulation, resolution, directive, funds, investment, capital
29	0.028	international, humanitarian, security, support, peace, terrorism, law
3	0.028	agreement, trade, negotiations, agreements, countries, commission, visa
34	0.027	budget, eur, million, billion, parliament, draft, payments
28	0.025	commission, policy, implementation, conclusions, strategy, action, welcomes
21	0.023	accession, sa, negotiations, croatia, chapter, noted, implementation
5	0.022	finance, economic, financial, tax, adopted, meeting, directive
22	0.022	deficit, gdp, economic, fiscal, excessive, measures, growth
32	0.020	migration, border, borders, external, security, cooperation, countries
35	0.019	growth, social, countries, jobs, people, economic, investment
14	0.019	affairs, foreign, secretary, adopted, representative, commission, deputy
6	0.018	transport, commission, regulation, infrastructure, safety, adopted, proposal

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
15	0.018	data, protection, regulation, justice, directive, criminal, proposal
8	0.017	affairs, foreign, support, security, international, welcomes, conclusions
4	0.016	court, justice, proceedings, criminal, judges, rights, directive
26	0.015	eea, research, innovation, market, commission, deputy, programme
36	0.015	agriculture, commission, food, fisheries, rural, development, regulation
25	0.015	social, education, employment, commission, youth, culture, labour
18	0.015	environment, commission, regulation, adopted, protocol, climate, development
20	0.014	health, products, food, medical, regulation, healthcare, draft
7	0.013	energy, gas, market, climate, commission, nuclear, efficiency
30	0.011	climate, development, global, countries, finance, change, support
31	0.010	justice, adopted, commission, conclusions, schengen, protection, interior
13	0.010	defence, security, military, development, cooperation, committee, policy
27	0.007	waters, fishing, commission, sea, fisheries, stocks, agreement

Period 3 Council Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
9	0.076	dream, grateful, aamann, preben, httpwwweuropeancouncileuropaeuthepresident, backer, presspresidentconsiliumeuropaeu

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
24	0.069	cfsp, yugoslav, macedonia, candidate, stabilisation, efta, montenegro
10	0.057	ecall, roaming, fees, mobile, plenary, trader, vehicles
19	0.054	eastern, vilnius, accreditation, ukrainian, euukraine, ukraine, azerbaijan
1	0.052	content, statistics, check, obtain, produce, read, performance
23	0.049	eurozone, monetary, euro, currency, emu, colleagues, morning
17	0.042	torture, death, penalty, punishment, defenders, inhuman, degrading
33	0.041	freeze, iranian, iran, crimea, ban, sanctions, repression
2	0.038	credentials, plenipotentiary, eucap, head, mission, eutm, commander
16	0.036	sudan, sudanese, africaeu, au, south, african, cpa
11	0.033	biregional, asem, mexico, asia, euchina, brazil, caribbean
12	0.029	deposits, efsi, securities, srf, buffer, liabilities, aifm
29	0.028	gaza, gcc, iraq, iraqi, israel, palestinian, israeli
3	0.028	colombia, peru, gsp, preferences, canada, wto, signed
34	0.027	eur, budget, conciliation, appropriations, mff, margin, payments
28	0.025	invites, notes, underlines, stresses, recalls, strategies, welcomes
21	0.023	sa, chapters, chapter, accession, acquis, noted, enlargement
5	0.022	vat, taxation, tax, finance, fraud, ecb, ssm
22	0.022	deficit, gdp, excessive, imbalances, deficits, fiscal, macroeconomic
32	0.020	firearms, migrants, smuggling, frontex, irregular, smugglers, border

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
35	0.019	precisely, unemployment, inequality, europeans, vacancies, cost, eures
14	0.019	doc, affairs, birgitta, danube, antidumping, macroregional, stubb
6	0.018	railway, rail, transport, broadband, telecommunications, aviation, transeuropean
15	0.018	pnr, offences, personal, processing, thirdcountry, applicants, insolvency
8	0.017	reiterates, libyan, yemen, syrian, urges, league, condemns
4	0.016	advocatesgeneral, judges, accused, judge, court, statute, translation
26	0.015	eea, patent, unitary, eit, research, horizon, fusion
36	0.015	cfp, farmers, agriculture, cap, rural, aquaculture, farming
25	0.015	maternity, sport, culture, spc, sports, learning, doping
18	0.015	bags, cultivation, gmos, plastic, biocidal, kyoto, organisms
20	0.014	patients, medicinal, medicines, antimicrobials, antimicrobial, diseases, healthcare
7	0.013	offshore, energy, biofuels, landuse, indirect, electricity, alien
30	0.011	mitigation, pcd, oda, unfccc, paris, brisbane, climate
31	0.010	sis, interior, succession, ceas, echr, divorce, schengen
13	0.010	eda, haiti, defence, pooling, eumc, nato, capabilities
27	0.007	cod, internat, spp, vb, cecaf, solea, clupea

Period 3 Official Journal Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
46	0.137	court, applicant, proceedings, decision, law, represented, appeal
8	0.093	regulation, commission, council, implementing, force, applicable, journal
18	0.060	decision, council, agreement, commission, eea, committee, parliament
10	0.047	agency, financial, regulation, council, decision, joint, budget
48	0.033	commission, regulation, merger, observations, procedure, concentration, competition
40	0.032	authority, commission, authorities, competent, rules, relevant, procedure
31	0.028	products, tariff, import, quantities, sugar, agricultural, duties
38	0.027	food, substance, products, substances, active, authorisation, efsa
37	0.026	social, commission, economic, committee, calls, eesc, market
25	0.025	financial, commission, budget, audit, annual, accounts, management
50	0.024	agreement, parties, party, protocol, trade, association, committee
28	0.022	directive, council, parliament, commission, national, health, legislation
16	0.021	programme, development, support, research, activities, programmes, cooperation
2	0.021	data, protection, rights, law, persons, personal, legal
43	0.020	waters, species, tac, stock, zone, fishing, quota
47	0.018	vehicle, system, vehicles, engine, maximum, pressure, speed
49	0.018	approval, vehicle, regulation, position, lamp, device, means

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
27	0.017	credit, ecb, euro, central, bank, financial, securities
41	0.017	customs, country, authorities, products, declaration, export, origin
32	0.016	services, market, service, contract, public, contracts, access
3	0.016	rights, security, human, countries, international, political, calls
34	0.016	aid, commission, tax, costs, authorities, market, measure
14	0.016	cpc, candidates, selection, professional, experience, staff, application
5	0.015	persons, entities, birth, restrictive, iran, aka, minister
21	0.015	proposal, amendment, text, resolution, vote, committee, proposed
35	0.015	republic, united, kingdom, unknown, germany, government, air
33	0.015	investigation, producers, imports, commission, regulation, product, market
11	0.014	appropriations, expenditure, financial, regulation, revenue, payments, council
12	0.014	animals, animal, health, products, disease, country, veterinary
4	0.014	aid, art, measure, reference, sis, scheme, national
39	0.012	energy, gas, emissions, waste, electricity, efficiency, power
20	0.010	wine, geographical, protected, origin, pdo, designation, quality
30	0.010	fishing, vessels, fisheries, vessel, sea, maritime, port
22	0.010	product, production, products, milk, meat, cheese, characteristics

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
51	0.009	agricultural, production, environmental, development, natural, rural, water
45	0.009	data, card, table, statistical, time, reference, reporting
7	0.009	materials, product, manufacture, price, exworks, products, content
19	0.009	risk, financial, assets, capital, insurance, credit, funds
44	0.008	air, aircraft, safety, security, aviation, flight, training
1	0.008	transport, infrastructure, road, railway, rail, train, tsi
24	0.007	cas, designed, equipment, specially, rn, chemical, control
6	0.006	commission, aid, restructuring, bank, million, capital, decision
9	0.006	vote, committee, report, council, spoke, parliament, rapporteur
13	0.006	applicable, conformity, assessment, body, product, notified, manufacturer
42	0.006	expired, iec, safety, equipment, cenelec, systems, standard
29	0.005	solution, kingdom, united, injection, mgml, tablets, germany
23	0.005	leaves, vegetables, seed, beans, liver, fruit, edible
36	0.004	free, machines, products, cpa, fibres, metal, textile
17	0.003	industry, industrial, agriculture, solar, china, production, technology
26	0.001	commission, answer, ppe, march, april, february, november
15	0.000	default, maxclimb, climb, maxtakeoff, accelerate, icaob, icaoa

Period 3 Official Journal FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
46	0.137	defendant, pleas, appellant, euipo, appellants, intervener, solicitor
8	0.093	regulation, implementing, entirety, binding, laying, enter, day
18	0.060	grippa, jiveric, atle, leikvoll, baudenbacher, ibsen, thórir
10	0.047	httpeceuropaeucompetitionmergerscases, nonopposition, httpeurlexeuropaeuenindexhtm, httpeurlexeuropaeuhomepagehtmllocaleen, eubookshop, ecainfoecaeuropaeu, ludboržs
48	0.033	compmergerregistryeceuropaeu, hdds, post's, kkr, extraeea, hutchison, karkkila
40	0.032	acts, powers, adopt, delegated, competent, supervisory, delegation
31	0.028	subperiod, outofquota, robise, farligt, dangereuses, roauk, hsen
38	0.027	jecfa, cipac, betaxylanase, betaglucanase, producttypes, cncm, faecium
37	0.026	eesc, eesc's, believes, gdp, poverty, growthfriendly, pact
25	0.025	lpis, audit, weaknesses, edf, egf, regularity, carryovers
50	0.024	arbitrators, puolesta, vārdā, nimel, vardu, imieniu, részéről
28	0.022	aifms, directive's, directive, aifs, aifm, patients, directives
16	0.021	kic, learning, researchers, eib, innovation, projects, research
2	0.021	officeholder, eio, fiducia, geol, edps, euci, sirene
43	0.020	viid, viiid, viiie, lowri, ple, sandeel, anglerfish

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
47	0.018	obd, antilock, dualfuel, whtc, transmissionconnected, aftertreatment, mgkm
49	0.018	headlamp, isofix, retractor, manikin, safetybelt, gasdischarge, passingbeam
27	0.017	vpart, eurosystem, ncb, ecbs, ssm, krona, koruna
41	0.017	administrativen, eori, bti, mrn, direktsia, cumul, excise
32	0.016	ttber, roaming, hardcore, noncompete, gambling, broadband, broadcasting
3	0.016	cosac, eusr's, eusr, salw, unoda, csdp, eutm
34	0.016	trlis, verne, eegsurcharge, síminn, finnfjord, ndla, sporveier
14	0.016	deenfr, comad, epsoast, mcq, eliminatory, cpc, unbound
5	0.015	irisl, dob, haqqani, myint, kandahar, briggen, mullah
21	0.015	rcvev, sepev, calibri, sep, split, author, proposal
35	0.015	nbn, avtn, réciproques, cabmintvc, svcs, lencouragement, wederzijdse
33	0.015	nonsampled, goi, grandchild, soninlaw, parentinlaw, sisterinlaw, depbs
11	0.014	nondifferentiated, subtotal, appropriation, ast, outturn, appropriations, revenue
12	0.014	scrapie, ratites, petfood, prebasic, sealcontainer, bov, inconversion
4	0.014	smebonuses, httpeceuropaeucompetitionelojadeisefindexcfm, authorityservice,

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
		httpeceuropaeucommunitylawstateaidsstateaidstextsenhtm, επιμελητήριο, skilledcraft, paragraphes
39	0.012	mgnm, oef, eei, dayahead, batassociated, bemp, twg
20	0.010	vinohradnícka, oblasť, chablis, savoie, rajón, vinohradnícky, chianti
30	0.010	seiners, unfsa, gillnets, ipoa, toméan, verdean, byelaw
22	0.010	pršut, curds, gibanica, prekmurska, kranjska, crackling, šunka
51	0.009	biogeographical, biodiversity, prospection, farmers, usufruct, farmer, exploration
45	0.009	voidable, celny, datetime, icef, bytes, sgbd, tlas
7	0.009	satis, cereales, mending, burling, decatising, energyreduced, unembroidered
19	0.009	recoverables, obligor, availableforsale, investee, nonproportional, crr, reinsurance
44	0.008	aerodrome, subtopic, ifr, vfr, typecertificate, pilotincommand, cargoair
1	0.008	controlcommand, gsmr, hctfr, unisig, ertmsetcs, wheelsets, conicity
24	0.007	flavis, colourant, filamentary, ferrocene, toxicol, technologyx, llna
6	0.006	sace, bsca, sernam, hgaa, neuwoges, sogeaal, sncm
9	0.006	spoke, bluecard, catchtheeye, rps, gbd, votesx, jakovčić
13	0.006	nondefaulted, eutype, lcoffunse, mdcg, mln, lcc, accreditation

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
42	0.006	rtte, motoroperated, cccccyyyy, marnix, msccirc, cdma, cenelec
29	0.005	teva, mylan, europharm, ratiopharm, hertfordshire, dohme, ramsgate
23	0.005	sapote, rusticana, radish, purslane, rubus, lovage, kumquats
36	0.004	crocheted, innrg, inncn, wadding, sanded, cermets, semidiesel
17	0.003	seraphim, chaozhou, wuxi, yingli, cccme, huashun, sinosure
26	0.001	romagnoli, kilroysilk, uen, rareşlucian, answer, ni, luca
15	0.000	maxclimb, climb, maxtakeoff, icaob, icaoa, lamax, tzero

Period 3 EEAS Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
6	0.100	attack, people, families, victims, condolences, terrorism, terrorist
18	0.093	mogherini, foreign, minister, federica, representative, hrvp, affairs
9	0.070	elections, election, process, electoral, mission, democratic, political
10	0.067	political, support, peace, government, libyan, libya, agreement
8	0.066	international, court, law, authorities, decision, russian, release
7	0.060	rights, human, dialogue, civil, society, international, freedom
23	0.060	political, process, ministers, syria, support, region, foreign
22	0.048	country, reform, reforms, government, political, bosnia, citizens
13	0.046	egypt, death, penalty, punishment, egyptian, capital, abolition
19	0.046	humanitarian, syria, parties, access, international, aid, syrian

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
15	0.039	kosovo, prime, dialogue, implementation, minister, press, albania
11	0.038	cooperation, trade, economic, development, dialogue, agreement, asean
14	0.034	international, nuclear, security, weapons, support, implementation, iran
20	0.028	migration, refugees, countries, development, turkey, support, crisis
2	0.028	ukraine, energy, council, implementation, minsk, agreements, osce
1	0.028	head, delegation, director, appointed, official, eeas, website
21	0.025	world, europe, security, development, africa, global, investment
5	0.023	defence, security, nato, strategy, cooperation, implementation, world
17	0.022	quartet, peace, palestinian, security, israel, solution, situation
3	0.020	support, efforts, iraq, security, children, tunisia, daesh
16	0.019	operation, mediterranean, people, lives, countries, council, migration
4	0.019	peace, europe, world, colombia, war, people, global
12	0.011	ministers, arab, cooperation, security, league, political, support
24	0.010	security, cooperation, peace, human, international, region, europe

Period 3 EEAS Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
6	0.100	condolences, families, attack, injured, killed, speedy, victims
18	0.093	hrvp, mogherini, federica, representativevicepresident, policyvicepresident, representative, cuba

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
9	0.070	eom, election, electoral, observation, elections, observers, presidential
10	0.067	libyan, sudan, accord, libyans, gna, libya, bernardino
8	0.066	trial, defendants, hamas, yunus, charges, court, israel's
7	0.060	torture, defenders, rights, subcommittee, human, internet, expression
23	0.060	discussion, extremely, starting, days, hours, start, remarks
22	0.048	bosnia, herzegovina, reforms, reform, sri, hahn, lanka
13	0.046	fdlr, inhumane, abolition, photography, punishment, drc, moratorium
19	0.046	issg, aleppo, cessation, hostilities, medical, humanitarian, syrians
15	0.039	vučić, aleksandar, accreditation, firstcome, rondpoint, kosovo, associationcommunity
11	0.038	aseaneu, asean, zealand, cabo, hong, argentina, trade
14	0.034	missile, ballistic, npt, dprk, jcpoa, ctbt, nuclear
20	0.028	refugees, flows, migration, refugee, valletta, turkey, fund
2	0.028	ukrainian, ukraine, crimean, georgia, cbc, minsk, smm
1	0.028	europaeu, unionan, website, serving, appointed, head, official
21	0.025	investments, investment, invest, private, huge, culture, climate
5	0.023	nato, defence, jens, warsaw, strategy, eunato, uk
17	0.022	israelis, quartet, netanyahu, palestinians, israel, palestinian, twostate
3	0.020	isildaesh, coalition, tunisia, genital, extremism, iraqi, tunisian

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
16	0.019	che, è, il, vessels, smugglers, operation, traffickers
4	0.019	santos, colombia, brandt, gilmore, nobel, prize, ets
12	0.011	league, gcc, arab, las, macao, ministers, sar
24	0.010	armenia, azerbaijan, corridor, southern, neighbourhood, nagornokarabakh, gas

Period 4 Commission Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
28	0.053	humanitarian, refugees, aid, assistance, support, crisis, people
13	0.047	investment, eib, plan, financing, bank, investments, fund
11	0.038	companies, aid, support, temporary, framework, coronavirus, outbreak
50	0.038	competition, transaction, proposed, merger, investigation, concerns, products
30	0.032	directive, court, infringements, procedure, justice, rules, law
49	0.032	development, africa, countries, african, sustainable, cooperation, international
8	0.028	budget, programme, support, fund, projects, funding, programmes
37	0.025	ukraine, report, assistance, support, reforms, reform, mfa
19	0.024	energy, climate, transition, sustainable, green, action, clean
36	0.023	trade, agreement, agreements, japan, investment, companies, exports

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
24	0.023	citizens, council, regulation, initiative, agreement, parliament, proposal
52	0.023	education, people, erasmus, training, youth, skills, students
38	0.023	cooperation, partnership, summit, joint, western, balkans, economic
7	0.023	data, digital, market, single, protection, rules, services
46	0.022	president, future, europe, juncker, parliament, council, paper
34	0.021	health, global, coronavirus, covid, response, pandemic, vaccines
10	0.021	aid, electricity, energy, support, scheme, competition, rules
35	0.020	financial, capital, markets, investment, rules, banks, market
26	0.020	innovation, research, europe, technologies, space, industrial, horizon
47	0.019	aid, coronavirus, outbreak, support, framework, companies, temporary
44	0.019	medical, protection, civil, equipment, response, mechanism, emergency
6	0.019	support, recovery, crisis, coronavirus, pandemic, covid, response
53	0.019	aid, rules, public, competition, market, bank, support
45	0.019	regions, cultural, cohesion, cities, heritage, policy, regional
48	0.018	social, employment, workers, labour, rights, women, pillar
22	0.018	security, information, systems, cybersecurity, terrorist, laundering, system
55	0.017	action, plan, strategy, communication, actions, policy, ensure
33	0.017	tax, vat, rules, taxation, companies, luxembourg, payments

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
23	0.016	online, consumer, consumers, platforms, content, authorities, disinformation
14	0.016	migration, asylum, greece, migrants, support, return, relocation
31	0.016	border, visa, schengen, travel, countries, borders, agreement
18	0.014	transport, rail, road, mobility, vehicles, safety, travel
42	0.014	aid, rules, measures, companies, granted, investigation, competition
2	0.014	competition, investigation, antitrust, rules, agreements, market, commitments
4	0.013	farmers, agricultural, agriculture, market, rural, sector, products
9	0.013	sustainable, economy, circular, biodiversity, waste, plastics, strategy
39	0.013	law, justice, rule, court, authorities, council, judicial
54	0.013	media, rights, citizens, eurobarometer, survey, respondents, report
3	0.012	water, air, quality, waste, environment, environmental, health
20	0.012	vaccine, vaccines, development, pharmaceutical, safe, global, europe
51	0.012	euro, economic, growth, forecast, countries, economy, expected
41	0.012	commission's, head, national, president, public, office, deputy
15	0.011	gas, imports, lng, products, trade, natural, market
12	0.011	food, products, chain, safety, health, supply, information
21	0.010	uk, withdrawal, united, agreement, kingdom, preparedness, ireland

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
17	0.010	report, growth, economic, debt, policy, recommendations, reforms
25	0.009	networks, services, mobile, network, broadband, digital, connectivity
16	0.009	trade, rights, human, international, countries, sanctions, customs
29	0.009	gas, steel, merger, competition, commitments, decision, commission's
43	0.009	defence, wto, subsidies, military, aircraft, body, appellate
32	0.007	damages, fines, cartel, commission's, antitrust, cartels, companies
5	0.007	air, safety, aviation, list, airlines, countries, iran
1	0.007	aid, air, airport, airports, airlines, competition, airline
27	0.007	fishing, waters, fisheries, stocks, sea, tac, proposal
40	0.006	google, search, market, devices, mobile, google's, apple

Period 4 Commission Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
28	0.053	unrwa, humanitarian, syrian, refugees, sudan, displaced, yemen
13	0.047	easi, eif, eib, eif's, efsi, procredit, godard
11	0.038	bonus, repayable, fishery, advances, aquaculture, guarantees, temporary
50	0.038	nylon, aurubis, eon, lotos, nidec, mkm, schwermetall
30	0.032	infringements, refer, transposition, reasoned, failing, ec, directive
49	0.032	mimica, neven, oda, african, sahel, africaeurope, faso
8	0.028	budget, programme, fund, investeu, programmes, funding, longterm

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
37	0.025	mfa, ukraine's, georgia, ukraine, macrofinancial, euukraine, tunisia
19	0.024	greenhouse, energy, buildings, lowcarbon, climateneutral, climate, miguel
36	0.023	japan, eujapan, singapore, trade, ceta, vietnam, japanese
24	0.023	manifestly, organisers, initiative, signatures, admissibility, formally, eci
52	0.023	vet, discovereu, learners, erasmus, vocational, students, teachers
38	0.023	balkans, summit, western, partnership, mogherini, federica, euchina
7	0.023	ai, data, privacy, digital, gdpr, personal, nonpersonal
46	0.022	reflection, debate, paper, von, der, white, leyen
34	0.021	ebola, tracing, gavi, virus, vaccination, tests, disease
10	0.021	electricity, installations, cogeneration, renewable, surcharge, reductions, sources
35	0.020	cmu, ccps, supervisory, supervision, banking, emir, npls
26	0.020	supercomputing, supercomputers, eit, horizon, innovation, space, researchers
47	0.019	outbreak, damage, suffered, temporary, shortterm, insurance, compensate
44	0.019	resceu, fires, firefighting, disasters, masks, forest, disaster
6	0.019	recovery, nextgenerationeu, pandemic, bond, crisis, instrument, greener
53	0.019	concession, cfr, nama, ports, correos, postal, marfa
45	0.019	heritage, cultural, city, creative, cities, specialisation, corina

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
48	0.018	employers, employment, pillar, marianne, globalisation, inclusion, thyssen
22	0.018	antimoney, laundering, terrorists, cybersecurity, terrorist, cyber, terrorism
55	0.017	strategy, plan, action, communication, actions, approach, stakeholders
33	0.017	engie, interchange, mastercard, vat, tax, avoidance, ikea
23	0.016	disinformation, consumer, platforms, cpc, airbnb, content, code
14	0.016	resettlement, asylum, relocation, libyan, migrants, libya, relocations
31	0.016	schengen, visa, border, guard, restriction, coast, screening
18	0.014	rail, buses, railway, shipping, freight, road, tonnage
42	0.014	exemption, recovered, occurrences, alitalia, block, hunedoara, tirrenia
2	0.014	paytv, guess, retailers, disney, retail, inquiry, antitrust
4	0.013	farmers, milk, organic, cap, rural, agricultural, fruit
9	0.013	plastics, plastic, circular, biodiversity, litter, recycled, recycling
39	0.013	judges, judicial, rule, disciplinary, supreme, hungarian, independence
54	0.013	eurobarometer, respondents, survey, audiovisual, media, films, music
3	0.012	bathing, drinking, water, agglomerations, pollution, waste, sulphur
20	0.012	curevac, biontech, bayer's, traits, mrna, pluristem, astrazeneca
51	0.012	forecast, euro, inflation, autumn, percentage, spring, deficit
41	0.012	translatores, head, representations, deputy, directorgeneral,

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
		directorsgeneral, cabinet
15	0.011	lng, liquefied, soya, beans, terminal, imports, euus
12	0.011	endocrine, disruptors, antimicrobial, amr, substances, carcinogens, chain
21	0.010	nodeal, withdrawal, azerbaijan, contingency, scenario, uk, uk's
17	0.010	semester, imbalances, countryspecific, productivity, debt, macroeconomic, reports
25	0.009	gigabit, mbps, broadband, networks, desi, telecom, speeds
16	0.009	gsp, preferences, cambodia, sri, torture, ivory, arms
29	0.009	broadcom, gazprom, modems, tennet, transgaz, canon, titanium
43	0.009	edidp, appellate, wto, defence, military, boeing, airbus
32	0.007	leniency, teva, cartel, cephalon, cartels, fines, takata
5	0.007	virgin, easa, aviation, iran, airspace, airways, jurisdictions
1	0.007	ryanair, airport, slots, niki, airports, airline, lufthansa
27	0.007	tac, cod, iuu, catches, cecaf, solea, herring
40	0.006	android, qualcomm's, google's, google, baseband, qualcomm, roaming

Period 4 Commission Speeches Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
30	0.046	development, sustainable, investment, africa, countries, global, african
29	0.044	economic, euro, growth, reforms, crisis, countries, fiscal

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
21	0.041	energy, climate, clean, europe, transition, emissions, global
16	0.040	migration, border, security, borders, information, system, schengen
32	0.040	financial, capital, markets, finance, sustainable, investment, green
39	0.038	social, people, labour, pillar, europe, workers, rights
37	0.038	digital, data, europe, market, protection, services, single
4	0.036	proposal, rules, regulation, tax, assessment, parliament, ensure
26	0.035	security, cyber, internet, threats, cybersecurity, terrorist, online
11	0.032	health, care, diseases, cancer, healthcare, prevention, patients
8	0.030	policy, regions, cities, cohesion, local, urban, regional
40	0.027	ocean, oceans, sustainable, marine, sea, blue, international
15	0.026	competition, companies, rules, markets, consumers, digital, world
41	0.025	support, budget, programme, financial, priorities, funds, report
33	0.025	economy, circular, waste, water, sustainable, plastics, plastic
27	0.025	food, waste, animal, welfare, platform, sustainable, health
28	0.025	green, europe, climate, recovery, crisis, deal, digital
6	0.024	people, sport, erasmus, education, europe, programme, future
12	0.023	europe, global, world, security, common, values, united
17	0.023	farmers, cap, rural, agriculture, agricultural, policy, food
23	0.023	trade, global, china, world, investment, market, europe

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
31	0.023	women, humanitarian, education, children, violence, girls, gender
14	0.022	uk, agreement, united, ireland, kingdom, withdrawal, future
2	0.021	education, skills, digital, people, learning, training, europe
35	0.021	refugees, migrants, migration, support, people, countries, million
20	0.020	health, amr, action, global, plan, animal, resistance
25	0.020	science, innovation, research, europe, scientific, people, future
3	0.020	cultural, heritage, culture, europe, tourism, creative, people
10	0.019	investment, defence, europe, space, projects, fund, public
19	0.018	transport, mobility, air, road, rail, infrastructure, emissions
36	0.018	law, rule, justice, court, authorities, polish, rights
34	0.017	people, europe, world, society, democracy, change, future
24	0.017	western, balkans, region, media, countries, serbia, political
13	0.016	europe, president, minister, juncker, prime, people, parliament
1	0.016	media, rights, online, disinformation, people, elections, citizens
38	0.014	disasters, protection, civil, resceu, dear, disaster, natural
18	0.013	ukraine, eastern, countries, disease, support, partnership, fever
5	0.012	consumers, products, consumer, food, information, wine, sector
7	0.012	trade, uk, agreement, brexit, customs, market, free
22	0.008	europe, people, history, world, german, day, jewish

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
9	0.006	pt, list, level, textindent, msolevelnumberpositionleft, msolevelnumberformatbullet, roman

Period 4 Commission Speeches FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
30	0.046	africa, african, development, caribbean, hunger, partner, nutrition
29	0.044	fiscal, npls, debt, emu, forecast, nonperforming, monetary
21	0.041	battery, energy, batteries, renewables, renewable, gas, electricity
16	0.040	schengen, arrivals, coast, irregular, guard, guards, asylum
32	0.040	fintech, cmu, supervisory, capital, taxonomy, investors, supervisors
39	0.038	labour, pillar, social, workers, employment, pension, semester
37	0.038	ai, gdpr, privacy, data, digital, tech, blockchain
4	0.036	taxation, tax, regulation, laundering, pesticides, assessment, glyphosate
26	0.035	cyber, deterrence, cybersecurity, attacks, terrorist, radicalisation, terrorists
11	0.032	erns, tobacco, cancer, patients, mental, alcohol, paediatric
8	0.030	cohesion, urban, regions, cities, territorial, mayors, city
40	0.027	ocean, oceans, fishing, arctic, marine, blue, fisheries
15	0.026	mergers, competition, gazprom, merger, google, android, rivals
41	0.025	budget, priorities, funds, multiannual, programme, implementation,

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
		structural
33	0.025	plastics, plastic, recycling, bioeconomy, recycled, chemicals, circular
27	0.025	welfare, food, animal, waste, feed, chain, animals
28	0.025	nextgenerationeu, recovery, pandemic, green, covid, renovation, neutrality
6	0.024	sport, erasmus, eit, universities, youth, activity, physical
12	0.023	transatlantic, multilateralism, peace, nations, populism, terrorism, values
17	0.023	cap, farmers, agricultural, rural, dairy, farming, agriculture
23	0.023	china, trade, rulesbased, india, wto, globalisation, steel
31	0.023	girls, violence, humanitarian, gender, women's, emergencies, women
14	0.022	withdrawal, kingdom, british, uk, ireland, northern, negotiation
2	0.021	vet, vocational, teachers, skills, apprenticeships, entrepreneurship, learning
35	0.021	refugees, migrants, jordan, libya, syrian, displaced, unrwa
20	0.020	amr, antimicrobials, antibiotics, antimicrobial, vaccine, drugs, vaccines
25	0.020	erc, prima, science, scientists, disciplines, eic, lamy
3	0.020	heritage, cultural, music, tourism, festivals, creative, culture
10	0.019	efsi, defence, investeu, space, eib, galileo, copernicus
19	0.018	cef, multimodality, multimodal, rail, transport, freight, modes

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
36	0.018	judges, polish, judiciary, courts, court, justice, judicial
34	0.017	liberal, privilege, democracy, proposition, born, nationalism, revolution
24	0.017	balkans, serbia, western, kosovo, albania, accession, balkan
13	0.016	estonia, juncker, maltese, prime, donald, jeanclaude, estonian
1	0.016	disinformation, racism, roma, hate, lgbtiq, charter, antisemitism
38	0.014	resceu, disasters, disaster, fires, danube, broadband, villages
18	0.013	asf, boar, hunters, ukrainian, ukraine, fever, swine
5	0.012	wine, gis, gi, consumer, ingredients, beer, consumers
7	0.012	customs, japan, mercosur, brexit, uk, nodeal, contingency
22	0.008	leo, helmut, deddie, kohl, wolfgang, germans, max
9	0.006	pt, textindent, msolevelnumberpositionleft, msolevelnumberformatbullet, marginbottom, marginleft, char

Period 4 Council Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
5	0.147	data, improve, policy, guarantee, internet, behaviour, change
3	0.068	decision, countries, albania, montenegro, measures, restrictive, macedonia
29	0.048	process, declaration, political, macedonia, montenegro, albania, countries
37	0.041	sanctions, measures, persons, restrictive, entities, freeze, regime

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
21	0.037	president, meeting, prime, conference, call, phone, video
31	0.032	energy, emissions, regulation, parliament, agreement, commission, directive
27	0.031	directive, vat, services, consumers, parliament, online, digital
38	0.028	transport, road, parliament, safety, vehicles, directive, agreement
22	0.028	trade, agreement, regulation, products, market, wto, organic
1	0.027	president, summit, leaders, future, tusk, meeting, michel
33	0.027	rights, human, international, countries, world, continue, freedom
25	0.027	conclusions, commission, action, development, implementation, welcomes, underlines
20	0.024	security, cooperation, development, peace, support, partnership, psc
2	0.024	mission, security, sahel, mali, head, support, mandate
28	0.023	programme, agreement, research, parliament, framework, regulation, innovation
18	0.022	financial, investment, markets, capital, parliament, regulation, framework
8	0.022	covid, pandemic, crisis, support, recovery, measures, response
26	0.022	budget, billion, million, support, parliament, fund, position
9	0.021	tax, sea, jurisdictions, fisheries, stocks, list, fishing
12	0.021	euro, economic, eurogroup, fiscal, growth, gdp, reforms

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
30	0.020	social, digital, economy, economic, growth, global, sustainable
11	0.020	uk, agreement, withdrawal, united, kingdom, negotiations, brexit
24	0.018	defence, security, cooperation, conclusions, pesco, cyber, projects
34	0.018	visa, border, regulation, agreement, countries, migration, cooperation
19	0.016	system, media, building, accreditation, badge, security, nationals
7	0.016	services, online, regulation, parliament, service, legal, citizens
23	0.015	syria, humanitarian, international, conference, syrian, support, conflict
17	0.015	association, agreement, ukraine, welcomed, sa, implementation, reform
4	0.015	eea, climate, agreement, change, paris, efta, global
39	0.015	commission, budget, food, regulation, financial, budgetary, agriculture
35	0.015	justice, cooperation, terrorism, terrorist, systems, law, criminal
13	0.014	data, protection, regulation, public, parliament, agreement, national
15	0.012	court, justice, appointed, office, judges, eppo, appointment
14	0.012	operation, libya, somalia, security, libyan, bosnia, political
6	0.012	public, documents, regulation, access, security, cards, citizens
16	0.012	turkey, conclusions, health, activities, dialogue, mediterranean, calls
32	0.011	parties, political, parliament, agreement, elections, regulation, decision
10	0.011	banking, banks, financial, loans, capital, npls, risk
36	0.010	rights, directive, services, enforcement, consumer, digital, protection

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
40	0.006	social, priorities, policy, commission, consensus, president, joint

Period 4 Council Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
5	0.147	behaviour, produce, statistics, guarantee, serve, improve, constantly
3	0.068	albania, cfsp, decision, macedonia, montenegro, candidate, restrictive
29	0.048	venezuelan, venezuela, hong, death, kong, penalty, peaceful
37	0.041	freeze, crimea, sanctions, sevastopol, ban, dprk, asset
21	0.037	andrej, rutte, giuseppe, phone, chapter, video, tuesday
31	0.032	ets, tyres, emissions, electricity, emission, buildings, gas
27	0.031	excise, mgm, vat, plastic, singleuse, exposure, sales
38	0.028	rail, road, transport, drivers, seafarers, vehicles, roads
22	0.028	organic, wto, mercury, tariff, epa, dispute, imports
1	0.027	discuss, tusk, invitation, presidents, letter, ahead, donald
33	0.027	defenders, torture, indigenous, discrimination, human, peoples, racial
25	0.027	stresses, underlines, recognises, notes, nature, conclusions, highlights
20	0.024	au, psc, asean, sudan, aseaneu, peace, euasean
2	0.024	rafah, mali, sahel, head, eumm, eusr, ambassador
28	0.023	horizon, programme, research, irrigation, innovation, creative, life
18	0.022	ccps, ccp, clearing, prospectus, investors, firms, investeu

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
8	0.022	covid, pandemic, virus, outbreak, coronavirus, restriction, temporary
26	0.022	billion, facility, budget, cohesion, fund, payments, million
9	0.021	baltic, noncooperative, cod, tacs, jurisdictions, catch, stocks
12	0.021	deficit, fiscal, gdp, sgp, imbalances, eurogroup, euro
30	0.020	industrial, digitalisation, skills, copernicus, transformation, economy, green
11	0.020	uk, withdrawal, kingdom, brexit, uk's, nodeal, ireland
24	0.018	pesco, cyber, defence, malicious, capability, cyberspace, threats
34	0.018	visa, esc, liaison, cash, corps, frontex, officers
19	0.016	badge, badges, lex, accreditation, typeapproval, europa, justus
7	0.016	roaming, charges, platforms, child, providers, online, eevidence
23	0.015	lebanon, syria, syrian, syrians, refugees, humanitarian, jordan
17	0.015	sa, switzerland, welcomed, association, recalled, ukraine's, corruption
4	0.015	eea, cop, paris, climate, water, pollution, adaptation
39	0.015	farmers, food, appropriations, agriculture, efsa, utps, omnibus
35	0.015	confiscation, terrorism, laundering, terrorist, radicalisation, freezing, smuggling
13	0.014	crowdfunding, whistleblowers, pension, pepps, generics, biosimilars, spc
15	0.012	advocatesgeneral, reappointed, eppo, judges, court, judge, prosecutor

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
14	0.012	med, sophia, navy, libyan, libya, eunavfor, operation
6	0.012	aarhus, cards, precursors, explosive, residence, documents, vis
16	0.012	drilling, yemen, turkey, turkey's, euturkey, diseases, mediterranean
32	0.011	iga, securitisation, foundations, ep, sts, elections, parties
10	0.011	npls, insolvency, banking, ifrs, nonperforming, banks, restructuring
36	0.010	broadcasting, marrakesh, radio, tv, audiovisual, infringements, television
40	0.006	consensus, priorities, pillar, values, social, poverty, delivering

Period 4 Official Journal Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
15	0.113	court, law, applicant, judgment, proceedings, language, parties
17	0.075	regulation, commission, council, parliament, implementing, directive, amending
14	0.067	commission, merger, regulation, concentration, notification, notified, observations
3	0.058	euipo, mark, appeal, proceedings, board, trade, applicant
37	0.039	committee, eea, agreement, text, parliament, vote, joint
7	0.035	decision, council, treaty, january, thereof, february, october
2	0.028	authority, authorities, competent, commission, national, relevant, acts
41	0.027	decision, cfsp, council, implementing, persons, restrictive, entities

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
56	0.026	social, commission, development, calls, eesc, economic, sustainable
35	0.024	financial, agency, budget, report, accounts, management, notes
57	0.024	agreement, party, united, parties, kingdom, trade, protocol
40	0.023	directive, services, service, national, contract, consumer, public
52	0.022	credit, ecb, vpart, quality, step, dollar, central
13	0.019	amendment, proposed, text, food, commission, proposal, products
48	0.019	customs, products, origin, tariff, import, countries, export
53	0.016	substance, additive, chemical, product, active, content, substances
20	0.016	vehicle, vehicles, engine, emissions, fuel, system, speed
43	0.016	replaced, data, table, column, statistical, reference, inserted
22	0.015	rights, human, calls, international, women, law, political
8	0.015	financial, fund, budget, commission, support, development, rate
32	0.014	selection, candidates, staff, board, application, experience, medical
55	0.014	republic, united, kingdom, government, germany, protection, france
34	0.013	transport, air, safety, aircraft, road, flight, aviation
6	0.012	fishing, fisheries, vessels, vessel, sea, fish, stocks
54	0.012	security, support, education, training, cooperation, activities, national
16	0.012	data, regulation, sis, personal, access, protection, art
26	0.012	product, devices, assessment, conformity, device, technical, performance

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
50	0.012	product, geographical, production, products, specification, fresh, fruit
5	0.012	person, document, address, company, identification, registration, declaration
31	0.012	appropriations, financial, regulation, council, expenditure, revenue, commitments
51	0.012	designed, vehicle, equipment, systems, approval, specially, control
24	0.011	commission, investigation, regulation, parties, review, imports, notice
45	0.011	animals, animal, health, products, official, disease, country
25	0.011	joint, programme, research, undertaking, procurement, project, financial
21	0.011	aid, commission, decision, market, measure, authorities, granted
18	0.010	wine, wines, municipality, maximum, geographical, alcoholic, minimum
4	0.010	tax, income, covid, economic, taxation, council, commission
49	0.010	birth, aka, republic, security, male, gender, ukraine
46	0.010	waste, water, environmental, directive, food, products, production
39	0.009	energy, electricity, capacity, gas, emissions, renewable, national
1	0.009	commission, market, competition, decision, solar, undertaking, parties
19	0.008	risk, credit, institutions, financial, capital, assets, exposures
30	0.008	waters, species, tac, ices, regulation, zone, apply
36	0.008	payment, financial, trading, securities, transactions, market, esma

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
9	0.007	mining, concession, usufruct, rights, tender, fee, agreement
44	0.006	cpa, products, steel, waste, gas, oil, production
29	0.006	commission, producers, imports, industry, market, investigation, regulation
28	0.006	add, liver, seeds, kidney, fruits, vegetables, submitted
12	0.006	free, trq, sugar, milk, fresh, spirit, yenkg
10	0.005	vote, committee, report, spoke, rapporteur, debate, rule
23	0.005	services, insurance, unbound, cpc, national, foreign, mt
38	0.004	solution, injection, intravenous, mgml, limited, methotrexate, kingdom
47	0.004	imo, iec, resmsc, reg, solas, standard, equipment
27	0.004	materials, manufacture, product, products, price, exworks, rn
42	0.004	plants, plant, forest, wood, timber, land, material
11	0.002	disclosure, ifrs, ifrsfull, assets, financial, ias, refer
33	0.000	credit, risk, mln, approach, irb, corporations, corporate

Period 4 Official Journal FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
15	0.113	appellants, sąd, amtsgericht, ssdeur, landgericht, verwaltungsgericht, curtea
17	0.075	twentieth, repealing, entirety, regulation, jeanclaude, journal, juncker

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
14	0.067	compmergerregistryeceuropaeu, nonopposition, httpeurlexeuropaeuhomepagehtmllocaleen, httpeceuropaeucompetitionmergerscases, bain, omers, blackstone
3	0.058	walicka, folliardmonguiral, neill, peek, hanf, aldi, halloumi
37	0.039	rcvev, maerten, sepev, monauni, ellertsdóttir, bergdís, sletnes
7	0.035	commemorative, articlex, coins, reciprocate, subrecommendation, paragraphx, nhc
2	0.028	acts, competent, adopt, authorities, powers, inform, notify
41	0.027	sanctionsconsiliumeuropaeu, da'esh, cfsp, fever, restrictive, eucap, feral
56	0.026	foragainstabstentions, lras, eesc, cor, believes, sdgs, digitalisation
35	0.024	regularity, auditors, audit, olaf, agencys, legality, discharge
57	0.024	arbitrators, arbitration, arbitrator, subcommittee, ceta, sps, kingdom's
40	0.023	eets, uctd, rightholders, injunctive, videosharing, grcm, unfairness
52	0.022	vpart, dollar, peso, krone, kuna, koruna, zloty
13	0.019	betaxylanase, dasø, atcc, acsbnøø, betaglucanase, fsmp, agrosciences
48	0.019	subperiod, plewa, paneuromediterranean, lori, trqs, customs, tariff
53	0.016	teat, iupac, usespecific, postmilking, gcmsrtl, mtt, cytotoxicity
20	0.016	subannex, nedc, gkm, obd, dualfuel, aftertreatment, nrtc
43	0.016	eaw, norbixin, tradycyjny, dcas, meads, alw, cbcountry

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
22	0.015	condemns, rakhine, isisdaesh, iccpr, cedaw, transgender, genderbased
8	0.015	ncu, eutf, eafrd, eib, mff, edf, efsi
32	0.014	mdcg, mcq, epsoad, elh, screener, epso, httpsepsoeuropaeuhelpen
55	0.014	avtn, investissements, réciproques, lencouragement, zwischen, schutz, bescherming
34	0.013	subtopic, tsis, partm, atfm, sailplane, sailplanes, typecertificate
6	0.012	msy, rfmo, comorian, shiptoship, fads, stcw, pêches
54	0.012	unoda, eusr, cybersecurity, eqf, salw, learning, youth
16	0.012	authorityservice, sirene, dpo, sis, edps, controller, schengen
26	0.012	ecolabel, device, conformity, ecodesign, manufacturers, documentation, devices
50	0.012	speck, soclnd, bauxdeprovence, baker's, huile, radicchio, queijo
5	0.012	placelocation, numberpo, tachonet, cardinality, ratingagentur, eoid, informationlng
31	0.012	nondifferentiated, outturn, appropriation, appropriations, ast, astsc, subtotal
51	0.012	ecetranswp, anchorages, isofix, technologyx, softwarex, headlamp, filamentary
24	0.011	trontdi, chaozhou, jinan, meide, junetradoc, metit, httpeceuropaeutradetradepolicyandyoucontactshearingofficer

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
45	0.011	caprine, ungulates, imsoc, serological, encephalomyelitis, ferrets, ched
25	0.011	femern, eurobioimaging, scandlines, eccsel, instructeric, embrceric, euopenscreen
21	0.011	tirrenia, altmark, oltchim, cspe, jlr, apfte, correos
18	0.010	httpeceuropaeucompetitionelojadeisefindexcfm, milliequivalents, rosé, pinot, cabernet, sauvignon, adns
4	0.010	luxopco, luxscs, aoe, amazon's, beps, pandemic, amazon
49	0.010	dob, taliban, pob, interpolun, mohammad, httpswwwinterpolintennoticesearchun, haqqani
46	0.010	bemp, prp, reuse, biodiversity, fertilisers, emas, bemps
39	0.009	tsos, epbd, lfc, bioliquids, entso, frr, fcr
1	0.009	sunowe, noncoordinated, googles, mifs, qualcomm's, trunsun, hdgts
19	0.008	pepp, brrd, mmf, mrel, riskweighted, priip, eltif
30	0.008	saithe, raja, hke, otb, jax, faroese, ple
36	0.008	csd, alphanum, debits, crel, cfds, currencycode, csds
9	0.007	usufruct, zlotys, ennnnn, snnnn, wnnnnn, mov, wawelska
44	0.006	mnh, batael, voc, fluegas, precast, bataels, motoroperated
29	0.006	jushi, goi, gff, countervailable, cpo, cnbm, hrf
28	0.006	mrls, medlars, lettuces, rusticana, spinaches, endives, cresses

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
12	0.006	yenkg, trq, drinks, skimmed, disposable, fowls, domesticus
10	0.005	bluecard, catchtheeye, notis, marias, seán, michaela, šojdrová
23	0.005	isic, legislationlegal, ipt, jsic, cpc, unbound, iiiapt
38	0.004	sandoz, mylan, kabi, willebrand, klinische, spezialpräparate, wedel
47	0.004	resmsc, solas, msccirc, itur, mepc, switchgear, uwb
27	0.004	yrs, crocheted, innrg, inncn, nonwovens, burling, breeches
42	0.004	ttbnnptnt, sfop, rnqps, prebasic, federalny, okrug, vntlas
11	0.002	ifrs, ifrsfull, noncurrent, unobservable, sharebased, availableforsale, ifrss
33	0.000	mln, nondefaulted, onx, ccairb, ccfirb, crairb, crfirb

Period 4 EEAS Press Releases Top Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
21	0.076	mogherini, representative, foreign, minister, federica, affairs, representativevicepresident
20	0.066	rights, human, freedom, international, law, civil, society
8	0.063	people, attack, condolences, victims, families, palestinian, peace
23	0.055	elections, electoral, election, process, mission, democratic, observation
25	0.055	humanitarian, conflict, parties, political, efforts, support, ceasefire
32	0.049	cooperation, agreement, trade, partnership, asia, development, global
3	0.042	dialogue, cooperation, meeting, held, issues, discussed, agreed

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
19	0.042	foreign, ministers, minister, discussed, continue, issues, council
18	0.038	balkans, region, western, kosovo, dialogue, country, serbia
24	0.036	support, sudan, iraq, government, peace, people, somalia
12	0.036	venezuela, international, political, crisis, democratic, peaceful, national
27	0.034	death, belarus, penalty, belarusian, punishment, international, authorities
2	0.033	syria, political, support, syrian, region, united, international
6	0.031	iran, nuclear, jcpoa, deal, implementation, joint, united
10	0.027	world, security, global, europe, peace, europeans, united
30	0.026	partnership, agreement, eastern, reforms, moldova, georgia, support
5	0.025	development, million, support, climate, mauritius, sustainable, economic
26	0.024	libya, migration, libyan, migrants, international, support, african
14	0.023	korea, dprk, weapons, sanctions, international, security, korean
13	0.022	security, maritime, sahel, african, mali, region, support
9	0.022	ukraine, russia, russian, head, delegation, ukrainian, nominated
31	0.022	pandemic, covid, coronavirus, health, crisis, response, countries
17	0.021	defence, security, nato, cooperation, military, structured, projects
16	0.019	people, society, country, world, civil, europe, cultural
11	0.018	afghanistan, peace, terrorism, afghan, support, international, terrorist
29	0.017	women, violence, gender, rights, children, equality, girls

Topic	gamma	Top Terms
22	0.017	myanmar, mongolia, bangladesh, rakhine, press, link, meeting
7	0.015	asean, security, cooperation, international, indonesia, cyber, regional
1	0.015	lebanon, lebanese, official, visit, support, prime, peace
28	0.012	council, turkey, foreign, les, affairs, libya, des
4	0.012	treaty, nuclear, international, support, force, continue, security
15	0.007	africa, mediterranean, di, cooperation, che, african, il

Period 4 EEAS Press Releases FREX Terms by Expected Topic Proportion

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
21	0.076	mogherini, federica, representativevicepresident, policyvicepresident, representative, borrell, hrvp
20	0.066	defenders, sentencing, expression, freedom, rights, torture, imprisoned
8	0.063	condolences, injured, israeli, attack, families, killed, speedy
23	0.055	eom, election, observation, electoral, elections, chief, observer
25	0.055	ceasefire, hostilities, yemen, deescalation, civilians, conflict, cessation
32	0.049	asia, canada, rulesbased, asian, trade, connectivity, australia
3	0.042	exchanged, cuba, consultations, cochaired, held, director, ministry
19	0.042	extremely, discussion, discuss, mentioned, ministers, issue, positions
18	0.038	vučić, aleksandar, kosovo, pristina, balkans, belgrade, thaçi
24	0.036	sudan, iraqi, sudanese, iraq, transitional, somalia, ethiopian


Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
12	0.036	icg, venezuelans, venezuelan, venezuela, kyrgyz, guaidó, uzbekistan
27	0.034	penalty, belarusian, punishment, abolition, cruel, death, belarus
2	0.033	syrians, syrian, syria, jordan, palestine, arab, unrwa
6	0.031	jcpoa, iran, deal, iranian, nuclear, atomic, iran's
10	0.027	europeans, cooperative, power, multilateralism, realise, investing, winwin
30	0.026	moldovan, moldova, georgia, maldives, armenia, azerbaijan, georgian
5	0.025	mauritius, epa, water, seychelles, afritac, angola, private
26	0.024	iom, migrants, libyan, libyans, libya, unhcr, migration
14	0.023	dprk, denuclearisation, korea, korean, verifiable, prohibition, chemical
13	0.022	mali, sahel, burkina, faso, maritime, piracy, csdp
9	0.022	ukrainian, crimean, sevastopol, azov, kerch, ukraines, volodymyr
31	0.022	coronavirus, hong, pandemic, kong, covid, disinformation, vaccines
17	0.021	jens, stoltenberg, pesco, nato, structured, defence, hybrid
16	0.019	lesotho, heritage, holocaust, diversity, cultural, basotho, maastricht
11	0.018	afghans, afghan, afghanistan, ghani, pakistan, extremism, taliban
29	0.017	girls, gender, sexual, equality, women, child, genital
22	0.017	aung, kyi, rohingya, mongolia, rakhine, myanmar, bangladesh
7	0.015	aseaneu, euasean, asean, singapore, cyberspace, cyber, viet
1	0.015	hariri, lebanese, lebanon, mozambique, official, website, lebanon's

Topic	gamma	FREX Terms
28	0.012	conseil, cyprus, pas, les, du, dans, une
4	0.012	leu, verification, ctbto, treaty, pts, cannabis, npt
15	0.007	è, questo, anche, sia, sono, dei, lavoro

APPENDIX B

Topic Clouds

Period 1 Commission Press Releases Topic Clouds



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 2



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 3



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 4



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 5



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 6



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 7



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 8



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 9



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 10



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 11



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 12



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 13



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 14



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 15



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 16



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 17



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 18




Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 19



Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 20




Commission Press Releases Period 1
Topic 21



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
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
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
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
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


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supplier
fob
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
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
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


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


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minister
taa
increase
space
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operate
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tour
maritime
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


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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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ground
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static
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numeric
path
thrust
tio
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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strong
effective
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europeans
army
summit
ministers
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
EEAS Press Releases Period 4
Topic 32




APPENDIX C

Diagnostics


Period 1 Commission Press Releases Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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
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
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
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
Period 1 Commission Speeches Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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
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
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
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
Period 1 EPDB Documents Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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Period 1 EPDB Documents Revised Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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
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
Period 2 Commission Press Releases Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 2 Commission Press Releases STM Diagnostics




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
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
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
Period 2 Commission Speeches Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Period 3 Commission Press Releases Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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
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
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
Period 3 Commission Press Releases Model Topic Quality



Period 3 Commission Speeches Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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
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
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
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
Period 3 Council Press Releases Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 3 Council Press Releases STM Diagnostics



Period 3 Council Press Releases Revised Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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
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
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
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
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
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
Period 3 Official Journal Model Topic Quality




Period 3 EEAS Press Releases Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 3 EEAS Press Releases STM Diagnostics




Period 3 EEAS Press Releases Revised Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 3 EEAS Press Releases Revised STM Diagnostics




Period 3 EEAS Press Releases Model Topic Quality




Period 4 Commission Press Releases Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 4 Commission Press Releases STM Diagnostics




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
Period 4 Commission Press Releases Revised STM Diagnostics




Period 4 Commission Press Releases Model Topic Quality




Period 4 Commission Speeches Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




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
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
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
Period 4 Commission Speeches Model Topic Quality




Period 4 Council Press Releases Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 4 Council Press Releases STM Diagnostics



Period 4 Council Press Releases Revised Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 4 Council Press Releases Revised STM Diagnostics




Period 4 Council Press Releases Model Topic Quality




Period 4 Official Journal Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 4 Official Journal STM Diagnostics




Period 4 Official Journal Revised Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 4 Official Journal Revised STM Diagnostics




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
Period 4 EEAS Press Releases Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity




Period 4 EEAS Press Releases STM Diagnostics



Period 4 EEAS Press Releases Revised Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity



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